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Educational institution: Exemption u/s. 10(23C)(vi); Rule 2CA of I. T. Rules, 1962: Assessee society running a degree college made application for approval u/s. 10(23C) (vi) for A. Y. 2009-10 onwards: Commissioner rejected application on grounds that (i) approval u/s. 10(23C)(vi) was available only to an educational institution existing solely for educational purposes while memorandum of assessee stipulated other objects as well,

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Neeraj Janhitkari Gramin Sewa Sansthan vs. CCIT; [2013] 36 taxmann.com 105 (All):

The assessee, a society, was registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. It was running a degree college in Mainpuri. It was also registered with the Income-tax Department. It made an application for approval for exemption u/s. 10(23C)(vi) for assessment year 2009-10 onwards. The Commissioner rejected the said application on the grounds that (i) the approval u/s. 10(23C)(vi) was available only to an educational institution existing solely for educational purposes while the memorandum of the assessee-society stipulated other objects as well, and (ii) the application for approval should have been filed by the educational institution while it had been made by the society.

The Allahabad High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

“i) The first and foremost question which is required to be considered is whether the application for approval u/s. 10(23C)(vi) at the instance of the assessee-society was maintainable or not. The Supreme Court in the case of American Hotel & Lodging Association Educational Institute vs. CBDT [2008] 301 ITR 86/ 170 Taxman 306 had considered the effect of insertion of clause (vi) in section 10(23C) by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1998, w.e.f. 01-04-1999 and held that the provisions of clause (vi) of section 10(23C) are analogous to provisions of section 10(22). The Punjab and Haryana High Court had the occasion to consider the effect of section 10(23C)(vi) in the case of Pinegrove International Charitable Trust vs. Union of India [2010] 327 ITR 73/ 188 Taxman 402 and while replying to a specific question whether a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 was eligible to apply for approval u/s. 10(23C)(vi) held that the application for approval u/s. 10(23C)(vi) was maintainable at the instance of a society. Similar view had been taken by the Delhi High Court in the case of Digember Jain Society for Child Welfare vs. DGIT (Exmp.) [2010] 329 ITR 459/185 Taxman 255. Therefore, the application filed by the assessee-society cannot be rejected on the ground that it is not at the instance of ‘educational institution’ as referred to u/s. 10(23C)(vi) and rule 2CA.

ii) The next question which now arises for consideration is whether the assessee’s application for approval u/s. 10(23C)(vi) can be rejected on the ground that the memorandum of association provides for various other objects apart from educational activities. In this regard, the argument of the assessee is that even though under the unamended bye-laws of the society various other aims and objects were mentioned, but according to application for approval the society is only carrying on educational activities. In the application, there is a specific assertion that the only source of income of the society is the nominal fees being charged from students and it has no other source of income. The assessee has placed strong reliance on the judgment of the Allahabad Court in the case of C.P. Vidya Niketan Inter College Shikshan Society vs. Union of India [Writ petition No. 1185 of 2011, dated 16-10-2012].

iii) Perusal of the impugned order shows that the pleading in this regard has not been taken into consideration. Further in the impugned order although there is a finding that the assesseesociety is having many objects other than educational, but there is no application of mind to the assertion made by the society that it is only pursuing the educational activity and no other. Where a society is pursuing only educational objects and no other activity, then the application by such a society for grant of approval u/s. 10(23C)(vi) cannot be rejected on the ground that its aims and objects contain several other objects apart from educational and application by such a society is perfectly maintainable.

iv) Therefore, the impugned order passed by the Commissioner was liable to be quashed. The matter required to be sent back to the Commissioner for a fresh decision in accordance with the observations made above.”

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Capital gains: Section 50C: r.w.ss. 16A and 24 of W. T. Act, 1957: Sale of immovable property for consideration of Rs. 2,06,18,227: Stamp duty value – Rs. 4,04,48,000: Value as per DVO – Rs. 2,83,19,289: Value as per Registered valuer of assessee – Rs. 2,23,41,000: AO adopted value of Rs. 2,83,19,289 as per DVO: Tribunal adopted value of Rs. 2,23,41,000 as per registered valuer without giving opportunity to DVO: Tribunal not justified in doing so:

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CIT vs. Prabhu Steel Industries Ltd.: [2013] 36 taxmann. com 393 (Bom):

The assessee admitted long-term capital gains from sale of immovable property and adopted actual sale consideration of Rs. 2,06,18,227 as basis for computation. The Assessing Officer found that as per concerned Stamp Valuation Authority, the market value of the property was Rs. 4,04,48,000. On reference, the valuation officer estimated the fair market value on the date of transfer to be Rs. 2,83,19,289. Meanwhile, the assessee submitted a report of Registered Valuer disclosing fair market value on the date of transfer to be Rs. 2,23,41,000. The Assessing Officer worked out long-term capital gain on basis of report of valuation officer and made addition. The Tribunal held that the fair market value worked out by the assessee’s registered valuer alone should have been used for computing the longterm capital gain, as it was reasonably arrived at after making allowances for various encumbrances attached to the subject property and rejected the valuation arrived at by the Valuation Officer after noting that the Valuation Officer treated stamp duty valuation as base rate, instead of actual sale instance value. Further, it held that though such report is binding on Revenue Authorities, it is not binding on the Tribunal.

The Bombay High Court allowed the appeal filed by the Revenue and held as under:

“i) It is apparent from section 16A of Wealth Tax Act that these provisions mandate that after the Assessing Officer receives report of Valuation Officer u/s. 50C, he has to act in conformity with the valuation of the capital asset worked out therein. Thus, an order of Valuation Officer determining the market value of the asset on the date of transfer u/s. 50C(2) is made appealable even for the purpose of Income-tax Act, 1961 as per scheme in section 23A of Wealthtax Act. S/s. (6) of section 23A stipulates that when the valuation of any asset is objected to in an appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) has to extend an opportunity of hearing to the Valuation Officer, who has made order u/s. 16A. It therefore, follows that when in an appeal, such exercise of valuation officer is disputed, the Appellate Authority has to extend an opportunity of hearing to the Valuation Officer.

ii) Section 24 speaks of further appeals to the Appellate Tribunal. As per section 24(5) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957; the Appellate Tribunal has to extend opportunity of hearing to the Valuation Officer, and this provision is pari materia with section 23(6) above. Therefore, when order of CIT (Appeal), is questioned in further appeal before the Tribunal, the Tribunal has to keep in mind the provisions of section 24(5) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957 and has to extend an opportunity of hearing to the Valuation Officer.

iii) As per the statutory scheme when the report/order of Valuation Officer u/s. 50C(2) is objected to by assessee, the CIT (Appeals) or Tribunal are obliged to extend an opportunity of hearing to such Valuation Officer.

iv) The Tribunal has found faults with the report/ order of District Valuation Officer. Admittedly, the said Valuation Officer had not been heard and no opportunity was extended to him. This is contrary to obligation cast upon it by the proviso of section 24(5) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957 as attracted by section 50C(2).

v) In this situation, a mandatory requirement of law has been violated in present matter. Hence, the impugned order of the Tribunal is hereby quashed and set aside and the proceedings are restored back to the file of the Tribunal for taking decision afresh, in accordance with law.”

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Business expenditure: Capital or revenue expenditure: Section 35DDA: A. Y. 2007-08: Payment to employees under voluntary retirement scheme: Compliance with Rule 2BA is for benefit u/s. 10(10C): No such compliance mandatory for deduction in the hands of employer u/s. 35DDA: Deduction allowable:

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CIT vs. State Bank of Mysore; 356 ITR 468 (Kar):

For the A. Y. 2007-08, the assessee, a public sector bank, had claimed deduction of Rs. 7,09,53,323.23 as deductible expenditure incurred to meet the claims of employees who had taken voluntary retirement. The Assessing Officer allowed the deduction as revenue expenditure. Exercising the powers u/s. 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the Commissioner held that the expenditure was in the nature of capital expenditure and disallowed the amount on the ground, inter alia, that even applying the provisions of section 35DDA the voluntary retirement scheme was not in consonance with rule 2BA of the I. T. Rules 1962. The Tribunal held that this was a case where the scheme was covered u/s. 35DDA. The condition imposed in Rule 2BA with reference to the recipient for the purpose of section 10(10C) was not attracted to the provisions of section 35DDA. Since under the provisions u/s. 35DDA the entire amount could not be allowed as deduction, but it could be spread over a period of five years, one-fifth of the expenditure could be allowed and the balance spread over the following four assessment years.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) There was no mention of any rule in section 35DDA. On the other hand, in rule 2BA there is a specific reference to section 10(10C). The language of rule 2BA made it clear that the amount received is by the employee and for the purpose of claiming the benefit u/s. 10(10C). This has nothing to do with the employer’s claim, which is a different claim u/s. 35DDA.

ii) The Tribunal rightly took the view that rule 2BA is attracted and applicable only to a circumstance, where the benefit u/s. 10(10C) is sought for and not in a situation where the provisions of section 35DDA are called in aid.”

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Section 2(22)(e) – Share application money is not “loan or advance” for the purpose of section 2(22)(e).

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4. DCIT vs. Vikas Oberoi
ITAT  Mumbai `F’ Bench
Before D. Karunakara rao (AM) and Vivek Verma (JM)
ITA Nos. 4362/M/2011  and 4 other appeals
A.Y.: 2002-03 and 2004-05 to 2007-08.     
Decided on: 20th  March, 2013.
Counsel for assessee/revenue: Murlidhar/A P Singh  

Section 2(22)(e) – Share application money is not “loan or advance” for the purpose of section 2(22)(e).


Facts
The assessee, was a partner/director/shareholder in various Oberoi Group entities. There was a search action on the assessee on 19-07-2007. In response to the notice issued u/s. 153A, the assessee filed return of income with no additional income as compared to return filed u/s. 139.

During the assessment proceedings u/s. 153A, the AO noticed that the assessee was a beneficial shareholder in both M/s Kingston Properties Pvt. Ltd (KPPL) and New Dimensions Consultants P. Ltd. (NDCPL). NDCPL had reserves and had contributed share application money into KPPL. KPPL was not the beneficial shareholder of NDCPL but the assessee was there in both the companies. NDCPL did not allot shares but the share application money was returned after the period of three years. The AO held that the assessee being a beneficial shareholder, had chosen this route to enrich his wealth by increasing net worth of KPPL, where he had beneficial interest. He rejected the book entries of both the companies by mentioning that it was a case of lifting of corporate veil. The AO assessed the sum of Rs. 1,40,03,700 as deemed dividend u/s. 2(22)(e) of the Act.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who allowed the appeal in favor of the assessee.

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held
Share application money or share application advance is distinct from ‘loan or advance’. Although share application money is one kind of advance given with the intention to obtain the allotment of shares/equity/preference shares etc, such advances are innately different form the normal loan or advances specified both in section 269SS or 2(22)(e) of the Act. Unless the mala fide is demonstrated by the AO with evidence, the book entries or resolution of the Board of the assessee become relevant and credible, which should not be dismissed without bringing any adverse material to demonstrate the contrary. It is also evident that share application money when partly returned without any allotment of shares, such refunds should not be classified as ‘loan or advance’ merely because share application advance is returned without allotment of share. In the instant case, the refund of the amount was done for commercial reasons and also in the best interest of the prospective share applicant. Further, it is self explanatory that the assessee being a ‘beneficial share holder’, derives no benefit whatsoever, when the impugned ‘share application money/advance’ is finally returned without any allotment of shares for commercial reasons. In this kind of situations, the books entries become really relevant as they show the initial intentions of the parties into the transactions. It is undisputed that the books entries suggest clearly the ‘share application’ nature of the advance and not the ‘loan or advance’. As such the revenue has merely suspected the transactions without containing any material to support the suspicion. Therefore, the share application money may be an advance but they are not advances which are referred to in section 2(22)(e) of the Act. Such advances, when returned without any allotment or part allotment of shares to the applicant/subscriber, will not take a nature of the loan merely because the same is repaid or returned or refunded in the same year or later years after keeping the money for some time with the company. So long as the original intention of payment of share application money is towards the allotment of shares of any kind, the same cannot be deemed as ‘loan or advance’ unless the mala fide intentions are exposed by the AO with evidence.

The appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed.

Cases Relied upon :
1 Ardee Finvest (P) Ltd. vs. DCIT ITA No. 218/Del/2000 (AY 1996-97)(Del)
2 Direct Information P. Ltd. ITA No. 2576/M/2011 order dated 31.1.2012 (Mum)
3 CIT vs. Sunil Chopra ITA no. 106/2011 judgment dated 27-04-2011 (Del)(HC)
4 Subhmangal Credit Capital P Ltd. ITA No.7238/ Mum/2008 dtd 19-01-2010 (Mum)
5 Rugmini Ram Gagav Spinners P. Ltd 304 ITR 417 (Mad)(HC)

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Business expenditure: Disallowance u/s. 43B(b) r/w.s. 36(va): Contribution to provident fund: Due date mentioned in section 36(va) is due date mentioned in section 43B(b): Contribution made after due date specified by Provident Fund Authority but before due date for filing return: Amount deductible:

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CIT vs. Kichha Sugar Co. Ltd.: 356 ITR 351 (Uttarakhand):

The assessee employer, had deposited the employees’ contribution towards provident fund before the due date for filing of the return but after the due date specified by the Provident Fund Authority. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim for deduction and treated the amount as income relying on the provisions of section 36(1)(va) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal, the Revenue contended that in view of section 36(1)(va) r.w.s. 2(24)(x), such payment though made to the provident fund authorities, should be treated to be income of the assessee. The Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The due date as mentioned in section 36(1) (va) is the due date as mentioned in section 43B(b), i.e. payment/contribution made to the provident fund authority any time before filing the return for the year in which the liability to pay accrued along with the evidence to establish the payment thereof.

ii) The Assessing Officer proceeded on the basis that “due date” as mentioned in section 36(1) (va) is the due date fixed by the provident fund authority, whereas in the matter of culling out the meaning of the word “due date”, as mentioned in the section, the Assessing Officer was required to take note of section 43B(b) and by not taking the note of the provisions contained therein committed a gross error, which was correctly rectified by the Commissioner (Appeals) and rightly confirmed by the Tribunal.

iii) The appeal fails and the same is dismissed.”

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S/s. 148, 150, 153, 254 – A notice u/s. 148 may be issued at any time for the purpose of making a reassessment in consequence of or to give effect to any finding or direction contained in an order. For the purpose of section 150(2), the “order which was the subject matter of appeal” is the assessment order and not the order of CIT(A). Reassessment may be completed at any time where the reassessment is made in consequence of or to give effect to any finding/direction of an order passed u/s. 254(<

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3. Sandhyaben A. Purohit vs. ITO
ITAT  Ahmedabad `C’ Bench
Before Mukul Kr. Shrawat (JM) and Anil
Chaturvedi (AM)
ITA No. 1536/Ahd/2011
A.Y.: 2004-05.   Decided on: 8th February, 2013.
Counsel for assessee / revenue: M. K. Patel /   D. K. Singh  

S/s. 148, 150, 153, 254 – A notice u/s. 148 may be issued at any time for the purpose of making a reassessment in consequence of or to give effect to any finding or direction contained in an order. For the purpose of section 150(2), the “order which was the subject matter of appeal” is the assessment order and not the order of CIT(A). reassessment may be completed at any time where the reassessment is made in consequence of or to give effect to any finding/direction of an order passed u/s. 254(1) of the Act i.e. an order of the ITAT.


Facts
The assessee sold a piece of land vide sale deed dated 21-05-2001. The consideration of sale was received before execution of the sale deed and possession was given simultaneous with the execution of the sale deed. However, the sale deed was registered on 30-07-2003. The Assessing Officer (AO) on getting information from the records of the purchaser, issued notice u/s. 148 for assessment year 2004-05. The AO collected information from the office of the Registrar and completed the assessment u/s. 144 by adopting the market value of the property sold.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who noted that the assessee had not offered capital gains on sale of property even in AY 2002-03. CIT(A) held that since the property was registered with the Registrar on 30-07-2003, transfer took place in AY 2004-05 and was correctly taxed by the AO.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal and contended that the transfer u/s. 2(47) had taken place in the financial year relevant to assessment year 2002-03 and not 2004-05. Reliance was placed on decision in Arundhati Balkrishna & Anr. vs. CIT 138 ITR 245 (Guj) for the proposition that transfer is effective from the date of execution of the document and not from the date of registration. Revenue relied on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Suraj Lamp & Industries 14 taxmann. com 103 (SC) for the proposition that transfer of an immovable property is enforceable only from the date of registration of the document.

On the possibility of making the assessment for AY 2002-03, it was submitted on behalf of the assessee that provisions of section 150 can only be attracted in respect of an order which is a subject matter of appeal and in this case order which is the subject matter of appeal is the order of cit9a0 which was dated 25-03-2011, hence the period of six years is to be computed considering the date of pronouncement of the order of CIT(A). Revenue contended that the assessment order is the subject matter of appeal which is dated 28-12-2007, hence direction can be given after considering the said date of assessment order.

Held
Considering the provisions of section 2(47)(v) and following the ratio of the decision of Bombay High Court in the case of Chaturbhuj Dwarkadas Kapadia v CIT 260 ITR 491 (Bom) the tribunal held that transfer had taken place in previous year relevant to assessment year 2002-03. It observed that since the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Suraj Lamps (supra) has been decided in a different context and the income-tax provisions were not adjudicated upon, the reliance placed by the revenue on the said precedent was misplaced.

The Tribunal noted the ratio of the decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Kalyan Ala Barot vs. M. H. Rathod 328 ITR 521 (Guj) and also the provisions of section 150 and observed that a notice u/s. 148 may be issued at any time for the purpose of making a reassessment in consequence of or to give effect to any finding or direction contained in an order. Further, in s/s. (v) of section 150, a limitation is prescribed that the clause of re-opening in s/s. (1) of section 150 shall not apply where any such reassessment relates to an assessment year in respect of which an assessment could not have been made at the time of order, which was subject matter of appeal, or as the case may be, was made by reason of any other provision of limiting the time within which any action for reassessment may be taken. The Tribunal held that assessment order is the order which is the subject matter of appeal. It also clarified that a co-joint reading with section 153(3) reveals that a reassessment may be completed at any time where the reassessment is made in consequence or to give effect to any finding / direction of an order passed u/s. 254(1) of the Act i.e. an order of the ITAT.

The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed subject to the direction mentioned above.

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Exports – Special deduction – Leasing right are ‘goods’ and transfer of such rights constitute ‘sale’ of merchandise / goods and the profits thereon are eligible for deduction u/s. 80HHC.

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Commissioner of Income-tax vs. Romesh Sharma [2013] 354 ITR 229 (SC).

 The High Court had dismissed the appeal of the revenue following its decision in Abdulgafar A. Nadiadwala (2004) 267 ITR 488 (Bom). 

On appeal, the Supreme Court noted that issue involved was whether leasing rights could be considered to be ‘goods’ and whether transfer of such rights would constitute ‘sale’. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of the revenue following its decisions in CIT vs. B. Suresh (2009) 319 ITR 149

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Chafer VI-A – Special Deduction – Duty drawbacks is not derived from industrial undertaking and thus is not eligible for deduction u/s. 80 IA.

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Commissioner of Income-tax vs. Orchev Pharma P. Ltd. [2013] 354 ITR 227 (SC)

The High Court dismissed the appeal of the revenue on the following question of law following its decision in CIT vs. India Gelatin and Chemicals Ltd. (2005) 275 ITR 284 (Guj).

“Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was right in allowing the deduction u/s. 80-IA of the Income-tax Act, 1961, by including the amount of duty drawback?”

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal of the Department in view of its decision in Liberty India vs. CIT (2009) 317 ITR 218 (SC).

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Assessment – Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition arising from the order of the High Court in view of concurrent finding of facts where the High Court had held that statements recorded during survey operation do not have any evidentiary value when the same are subsequently retracted and no addition could be made solely on the basis of such statement.

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Commissioner of Income-tax vs. S.Khader Khan Son [2013] 352 ITR 480 (SC)

A survey action was conducted u/s. 133A of the Act on 24th July, 2001, in the premises of the assessee at 90, Syed Mada Street, Shevapet Salem, and one of the partners of the firm, by name Asif Khan. In his sworn statement Asif Khan offered an additional income of Rs. 20,00,000 for the assessment year 2001-02 and Rs. 30,00,000 for the assessment year 2002-03. However, the said statement was retracted by the assessee through its letter dated 3rd August 3, 2001, stating that the partner Asif Khan, from whom a statement was recorded during the survey operation u/s. 133A, was new to the management and he could not answer the enquiries made and as such, he agreed to an ad hoc addition, which could never be achieved by the business owing to the competition and to the legislation by the Government prohibiting smoking in public places.

The assessee filed its return of income for assessment year 2001-02 on 29th October, 2001, disclosing an income of Rs. 12,640/-.

The Assessing Officer found that certain books were not produced during the course of survey action and that certain entries in the books were made subsequent to the survey action and at the time of survey action, the assessee had come forward with the admission. The Assessing Officer rejected the book, viz., “branch contractors’ agent book” produced after the survey to support the claim of manufacturing process and based on the admission made by the assessee, which according to him were directly relatable to the defects noticed during the action u/s. 133A of the Act, recomputed the assessment by his assessment order dated 30th March, 2004.

Aggrieved by the said assessment order dated 30th March, 2004 the assessee preferred an appeal before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), who, by order dated 30th November,2006, held the issue in favour of the assessee. On appeal, at the instance of the Revenue, the Appellant Tribunal holding that there was no infirmity in the order of the Commissioner, dismissed the Revenue’s appeal.

The High Court dismissed the appeal of the revenue holding that no substantial question of law arose since the Commissioner and Tribunal had followed Circular of CBDT dated 10th March, 2003 for arriving at the conclusions that the material collected and the statement obtained u/s. 133A would not automatically bind upon the assessee.

The Supreme Court dismissed the SLP in view of concurrent findings of fact.
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Business expenditure- Amount lying credited in the Modvat account at the end of the accounting year was expenditure allowable u/s. 37 read with section 43B.

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CIT vs. Shri Ram Honda Power Equipment Ltd. [2013] 352 ITR 481 (SC)

The Delhi High Court answered the following question of law in favour of the assessee and against the department in view of its decision in CIT vs. Modipon Ltd. (2002) 303 ITR 438(Del).

“Whether the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was right in holding that the amount lying credited in the Modvat account at the end of the accounting year is expenditure allowable u/s. 37 read with section 43B of the Income-tax Act, 1961?”

The appeal pertained to the assessment year 1995-96.

On further appeal by the revenue, the Supreme Court observed that the judgment of the Bombay High Court in CIT vs. Indo Nippon Chemicals Co. Ltd. (2000) 245 ITR 384 (Bom) squarely applied to this case and the said decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court in (2003) 261 ITR 275(SC). The Supreme Court held that since the assessee followed net method of valuation of closing stock, the authorities below were right in coming to the conclusion that Modvat credit is excise duty paid.

Note: The above decision was followed in Asst. CIT vs. Torrent Cables Ltd. (2013) 354 ITR 163(SC) which also pertained to the assessment year 1995-96.

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Substantial Question of Laws – Whether gains on forward currency contract is not to be excluded from the profits eligible for deduction u/s. 80HHC, is a substantial question of law.

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CIT vs. Mitsu Pvt. Ltd. [2013] 354 ITR 89 (SC)

In the appeal filed to the High Court the Revenue inter alia had raised following two questions.

1. Whether, on the facts of the case and in law, the Appellate Tribunal was justified in granting relief u/s. 80HHC of the Act to the assessee on the issue of gain on forward currency contract without appreciating the fact that the gain on exchange difference is nothing but speculation profit and not related to the business of the assessee?

2. Whether, on the facts of the case and in law, the Appellate Tribunal was justified in directing the Assessing Officer not to exclude this income from the profits eligible for deduction u/s. 80HHC without appreciating the fact that when the assessee enters into a forward contract, as in this case, the assessee stands to benefit by the fluctuations in foreign exchange irrespective of the fact whether the trade agreement exist or not?

The High Court held that no question of law arose in view of finding given by the Tribunal that the foreign exchange contract was entered into by the assessee only with a view to realise the amount due on sale of goods and was related to the business of the assessee.

On an appeal, the Supreme Court was of the opinion that the above question required consideration and decision by the High Court. The Supreme Court therefore without expressing any opinion on the merits of the aforesaid questions, remanded the matter to the High Court for examination.

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Industrial undertaking: Deduction u/s. 80-IA/80-IB: Computation: A.Ys. 1997-98 to 1999-00, 2003-04 and 2004-05: Assessee printing and publishing magazines: Four units: One unit doing job work of printing for publishing unit: Expenses attributable to publishing unit not to be allocated to printing unit for computation of the amount deductible u/s. 80-IA/80-IB:

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CIT vs. Delhi Press Patra Prakashan Ltd. (No. 1); 355 ITR 1 (Del):

The assessee was engaged in the business of printing and publishing magazines. It had four units. One unit was doing the job work of printing for the publishing unit. The assessee had maintained separate accounts in respect of which deduction u/s. 80-IA/80-IB was claimed. Relying on sections 80-IA(8), (9) and (10), the Assessing Officer held that profits of the printing unit are required to be recomputed by allocating to the printing unit the expenses relating to the cost of paper and other expenses of the publishing unit inasmuch as section 80-IA(7) requires that the profits from the eligible business must be computed as if the eligible business was the only source of income for the assessee. Accordingly, he recomputed the profits of the printing unit and the amount deductible u/s. 80-IA/80-IB. The Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) There was no material to support the view that the job work charges charged by the printing units from the publishing unit were not at market rates. In the absence of any defect or manipulation found by the Assessing Officer in the books maintained for the printing unit and in the absence of any material to indicate that the amounts charged by the printing unit from the publishing unit was not at comparable market rates, it would not be open for the Revenue to disregard the profits of the printing unit as disclosed by the assessee only on the basis that the profits were significantly higher than the profits earned by the assessee from other undertakings.

ii) The printing unit carried on job work of printing only and the expenses attributable to the publishing unit which relate to the publishing business could not be allocated to the printing unit. Only those expenses which related to the printing work carried on by the assessee in the printing unit were liable to be deducted from the job charges to arrive at the profits eligible for deduction u/s. 80-IA/80-IB, as the case may be.”

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Income: Accrual: Retention money: Sections 4 and 5: A. Y. 2003-04: Amount retained to ensure satisfactory performance of contract does not accrue: Not income of that year:

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DIT vs. Ballast Nedam International; 355 ITR 300 (Guj):

The assessee executed contracts. In terms of the contracts, the amounts at the rate of 10% on the onshore activities, and at the rate of 15% on the construction and erection activities, were withheld by the principal towards retention money. For the A. Y. 2003-04, the assessee claimed that the retention money of Rs. 14.31 crore did not accrue and accordingly cannot be assessed as income. However, the Assessing Officer held that the amount is the accrued income and made addition. The Commissioner and the Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) Unless and until a debt is created in favour of the assessee, which is due by somebody, it cannot be said that the assessee has acquired a right to receive the income or that the income has accrued to him.
ii) The amount retained had not accrued to the assessee in the accounting year relevant to the A.Y. 2003-04.”

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Depreciation: Actual cost: Subsidy: Section 43(1), Expln. 10: A.Ys. 2001-02 and 2002-03: Assessee a Government Company took over the telecommunication business from Government Department: Assets transferred at book value: Consideration in form of shares, debts and reserves: Reserve not a subsidy, grant or reimbursement for meeting cost of assets transferred: Reserves not to be reduced from fixed assets to arrive at actual cost: Reopening of the assessment for reducing the actual cost by reserve<

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BSNL vs. Dy. CIT; 355 ITR 188 (Del):

The assessee company was incorporated to provide the telecommunication services which were being provided earlier by the Department of Telecommunications of the Government of India. The assets were transferred at book value. Consideration was paid in the form of shares, debts and reserves. The Assessing Officer found that the consideration included reserves. He held that the cost of assets was being met by the reserves and therefore held that the reserve is required to be reduced from the cost of the assets in terms of Explanation 10 to section 43(1). He therefore reopened the assessments for the A.Ys. 2001-02 and 2002-03 and recomputed the depreciation by reducing the reserve from the cost of assets.

On a writ petition filed by the assessee, the Delhi High Court accepted the assessee’s claim and held as under:

“i) There was no basis for the Assessing Officer’s assumption that whereas value of share capital issued to the Government as part consideration for transfer of business to the assessee was limited only to the face value of the shares, reserves represented a subsidy, grant or reimbursement for meeting the cost of assets transferred.
ii) Free reserves and surpluses of a company could not be considered anything but part of shareholders’ funds. The book value of equity share consists of not only the paid up capital but also the reserves and surpluses of the company. The scheme of hiving off the business of telecommunication services by the Government of India to a corporate entity entailed incorporation of a wholly owned Government company (i.e., the assessee) and the transfer of the business as a going concern along with all its assets and liabilities to the company. Reserves was an integral part of the shareholders funds.
iii) The Government of India had transferred the assets to the assessee company at their book value and the book value of the Government of India’s holding on the assessee company as shareholder and a creditor aggregated the book value of the assets transferred. The configuration of the capital structure of the assessee had no impact on the value of the Government’s holding in the assessee as reserve(s) of a company are subsumed in the book value of its capital.
iv) There is no plausible reason to assume that the value of shareholders’ holding in a company is limited to the face value of the issued and paid up share capital and the reserves represent subsidy or a grant or reimbursement by the shareholders from which directly or indirectly the cost of the assets in the hands of the company are met.

v) We are thus of the view that the reasons as furnished by the Assessing Officer for reopening the assessments could not possibly give rise to any belief that income of the petitioner had escaped assessment and the proceedings initiated on the basis of such reasons are liable to be quashed.”

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Charitable institution: Exemption u/s. 10(23C) (iv): Sections 2(15) and 10(23C)(iv): A.Ys. 2006- 07 to 2011-12: Charitable purpose: Applicability of proviso to section 2(15): Assessee’s activities fall in section 2(15) as existed prior to 01-04-2009 under the category of advancement of any other object of general public utility: Activity of assessee in conducting coaching classes is integral to its activity of conducting course in accountancy: Cannot be equated with private coaching classes:

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Assessee entitled to exemption u/s. 10(23C)(iv): ICAI Vs. DGIT; 260 CTR 1 (Del):

The petitioner Institute was constituted under the Institute of Chartered Accountants Act, 1949, with the object to regulate the profession of Chartered Accountants in India and to ensure that the standards of professional knowledge and skill are met and maintained. Up to the

A.Y. 2005-06, the petitioner was granted approval for exemption u/s. 10(23C)(iv). Subsequent applications for approval were rejected on the ground that the Petitioner was holding coaching classes for preparing students for the examinations conducted by the Petitioner and was charging fees for the same.
The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the petitioner against the said denial and held as under:

“i) Assessee’s activities fall within the definition of ‘charitable purpose’ in section 2(15) as it existed prior to 01-04-2009, under the category of ‘advancement of any object of general public utility’.
ii) The activity of the assessee in conducting coaching classes is integral to its activity of conducting the course in accountancy and the same cannot be equated with private coaching classes being conducted by organisations on commercial basis for preparing students to take entrance or other examinations in various professional courses.
iii) The reasoning of the DGIT that conducting interviews for a fee for the purposes of placement of its students by the assessee amounts to carrying on of a business is not sustainable. Campus interview is only a small incidental activity carried on by the assessee Institute like Universities for the placement of their students in gainful employment. This too is an activity ancillary to the educational programme being conducted by the assessee and cannot be considered as a business.
iv) The reasoning of the DGIT that since the assessee institute charges a uniform fee from all students it cannot be said to be carrying on a charitable activity is also erroneous. It is well settled that eleemosynary is not an essential element of ‘charitable purpose’ as defined under the Act. If the object or purpose of an institution is charitable, the fact that it collects certain charges does not alter the character of the institution.
v) Expression “trade”, “commerce” and “business” as occurring in the first proviso to section 2(15) must be read in the context of the intent and purport of section 2(15) and cannot be interpreted to mean any activity which is carried on in an organised manner. Purport of the first proviso is not to exclude entities which are essentially for charitable purpose but are conducting some activities for a consideration or a fee. Thus, where the dominant object of an organisation is of charitable nature, any incidental activity for furtherance of the object would not fall within the expression “business”, “trade” or “commerce”.
vi) Impugned orders passed by the DGIT refusing to grant exemption u/s. 10(23C)(iv) are set aside and he is directed to recognise the assessee as eligible for exemption u/s. 10(23C)(iv) as an institution established for charitable purposes.”

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Business expenditure: Payment to related person: Disallowance u/s. 40A(2)(b): A.Y. 1995-96: Payment to subsidiary company: Section 40A(2)(b) not applicable:

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CIT vs. Raman Boards Ltd.: 355 ITR 305 (Kar):

The assessee, a manufacturer of insulation paper boards, entered into an agreement with its subsidiary company for manufacture of footwear soles. Under the agreement, the assessee was to pay to the subsidiary management fees of Rs. 4 lakh per month. In the A. Y. 1995-96, the assessee claimed deduction of Rs. 48 lakh so paid to the subsidiary. The Assessing Officer allowed 50% of the claim and disallowed Rs. 24 lakh u/s. 40A(2)(b). The Tribunal held that the genuineness of the agreement and the services rendered by the subsidiary company were not doubted and there being no finding that the payment made by the assessee was excessive u/s. 40A(2)(b) the Tribunal deleted the disallowance.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) To attract the provisions of section 40A(2), the assessee has to incur an expenditure by making payment to the person referred to in clause (b). The assessee was a company. The person to whom it had to make the payment in order to attract the provision was any director of the company or any relative of director.

ii) Admittedly, the payment was made to the subsidiary company and not to any director or any relative of director. Therefore, the requirement of section 40A(2)(b) was not fulfilled. The Tribunal was justified in directing the deletion of the disallowance.”

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Business expenditure: Disallowance u/s. 14A: A. Y. 2005-06 and 2006-07: Investment in subsidiaries: In respect of part of investment dividends were taxable: In respect of balance, assessee had sufficient interest free funds: No disallowance could be made u/s. 14A:

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CIT vs. Suzlon Energy Ltd: 354 ITR 630 (Guj):

The assessee had made investments in subsidiaries. The Assessing Officer made disallowance of interest expenditure and administrative expenditure u/s. 14A in respect of such investment. The Commissioner (Appeals) deleted the disallowance. The Tribunal found that in respect of part of investment, dividends were taxable and in respect of the balance the assessee had sufficient interest free funds of its own. The Tribunal confirmed the decision of the Commissioner (Appeal).

On appeal by the Revenue, the Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“The Tribunal was right in law and on facts in deleting disallowance u/s. 14A in respect of interest expenses incurred for investment in subsidiaries and administrative expenses such as staff salary of corporate office, audit fees, building rent and communication expenses.”

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Business expenditure: Disallowance u/s. 40(a) (ia) : Deduction of tax at a lesser rate due to difference of opinion: Disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) not justified:

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CIT vs. S. K. Tekriwal; 260 CTR 73 (Cal):

The assessee deducted tax @ 1% u/s. 194C(2) from the payments made to sub-contractors. The Assessing Officer held that the payments are in the nature of machinery hire charges falling under the head ‘Rent’ and the provisions of section 194-I are applicable as per which tax was deductible @ 10%. The assessing Officer, therefore, disallowed the payment proportionately by invoking the provisions of section 40(a)(ia). The Tribunal deleted the disallowance holding that no disallowance can be made by invoking the provisions of section 40(a)(ia), if there is any shortfall in deduction of tax at source due to any difference of opinion as to the taxability of any item or the nature of payment falling under various TDS provisions.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Calcutta High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“We find no substantial question of law involved in this case and therefore, we refuse to admit the appeal. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.”

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DTAA between India and Malaysia – Notification no. 7 dated 29th January, 2013

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1: DTAA between India and Malaysia – Notification no. 7 dated 29th January, 2013 –

DTAA between India and Malaysia signed on 9th May, 2012 shall enter into force on 26th December, 2012

2: Income tax (First amendment) Rules, 2013 Notification No- 8 dated 31st January, 2013–

New Rule 17CA has been inserted to enumerate the functions of an electoral trust. Form 10BC has been prescribed as an Audit Report for such electoral trusts.

3: Electoral Trusts Scheme 2013 notified under Section 10(22AAA) – Notification No- 9 dated 31st January, 2013

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Section 50C and Tolerance Band

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Issue for consideration

Section 50 C has been introduced by the Finance Act, 2002, with effect from 01-04-2003, to provide for substitution of the full value of consideration with the stamp duty valuation, in cases where such valuation happens to be more than the agreed value. As a result in computing the capital gains, on transfer of land or building or both, as per section 48, the assessee, in ascertaining the full value of consideration, is required to adopt the higher of the agreed value or the stamp duty valuation. The objective behind the introduction of section 50C is to eliminate or reduce the possibility of unaccounted element in the real estate transactions and it is on this account that the provision has been found to be constitutional by a number of high courts.

The provision contains an in-built safeguard, for authorising the assessee to seek a reference to the Valuation Officer, in a case where he is of the opinion that the stamp duty value does not represent the fair market value of the asset transferred by him. In spite of this statutory safeguard , it is usual to come across numerous cases where the assessee genuinely is aggrieved on the valuation put forth by the Valuation Officer.

It is also usual to come across instances, where the assessee is subjected to the additional taxes and interest in cases involving a marginal or insignificant difference. This difference, howsoever insignificant, arises mainly on account of the inherent element of estimation in valuation that is unavoidable. Realising this handicap in the past, while dealing with the similar provisions, the Supreme court held that a tolerance band of 15% be read in to such provisions by the authorities while applying such provisions, with the idea that no taxpayer is unjustly punished for the difference.

It is on this touchstone of avoiding unjust outcome of the literal reading of a statutory provision, one has to test the provisions of section 50C to ascertain,

whether it is possible to read therein, the existence of a tolerance band, to save the tax payers in cases of marginal differences form the noose of additional taxation. The Pune bench of the tribunal is in favour of reading such a tolerance band in the provisions of section 50C while the Kolkata bench holds a contrary view.

Rahul Constructions’ case
The issue first came up for consideration of the Pune bench of the tribunal, in the case of Rahul Constructions vs. DCIT, reported in 38 DTR at page 19, for assessment year 2004-05. In that case, the assessee firm had sold two units in the basement for the total sale consideration of Rs. 19 lakh. The stamp valuation authorities had adopted the value of Rs. 28.73 lakh for the said units. The AO invoking the provisions of section 50C, made a reference to the DVO, u/s. 50C(2), for valuation as per the law. The DVO valued the said units at Rs. 20.55 lakh. The AO adopting the said value of Rs. 20.55 lakh, substituted the full value of consideration and computed the capital gains at a higher amount than the one returned by the assesssee firm.

The explanations advanced by the firm to the AO and the DVO to the effect that the basement in rear building had no “commercial” value, the height was 8-1/2’ only, the units got waterlogged during the rainy season, they were old premises and were used by tenant/lessee and were sold on as is where is basis and the booking was in February, 2001, so valuation of 2001 be considered, were all rejected by them.

The said contentions were reiterated before the CIT(A) and in addition he was asked to apply the tolerance band due to insignificant difference between the agreed value and the DVO’s valuation. It was submitted that there was a marginal difference of Rs. 1,55,000 only, which was 8.5 per cent of the estimated sale value which was within the tolerance limit of 15 per cent for variation as was held by the Supreme Court in the case of C.B. Gautam vs. UOI, 199 ITR 530 (SC) under Chapter XX-C of the Act. The CIT(A) rejected the contentions of the firm to dismiss the appeal by observing that

the provisions of section 50C(1) of the Act were unambiguous and the AO was bound to take the rate as per the stamp valuation authorities and he was not empowered to go beyond the valuation made by the DVO. He distinguished the decision in the case of C.B. Gautam (supra) on the ground that the said decision concerned itself with the case of a purchase of property under Chapter XX-C of the Act. He upheld the action of the AO.

The firm aggrieved with such order of the CIT(A), appealed to the tribunal, inter alia, on the ground that on the facts and in law the learned CIT(A) erred in not appreciating that the difference between the sale consideration shown by the assessee and the value determined by the DVO was marginal and therefore, no addition was justified on account of the valuation determined by the DVO.

The counsel for the assessee reiterated the submissions as were made before the AO and the CIT(A). Referring to the DVO’s report he submitted that the difference between the value adopted by the DVO and the sale consideration received by the firm was less than 10 per cent and submitted that the consideration received by the firm should be considered as representing the fair market valuation and no addition was justified on account of the valuation by the DVO.

In reply the Departmental Representative submitted, that once the matter was referred to the DVO and the valuation adopted by the DVO was found to be less than the value determined by the stamp valuation authorities, the AO was bound to substitute the value determined by the DVO as the deemed sale consideration and the assessee could not challenge the same.

On due consideration of the rival submissions made by both the sides, the tribunal held that the valuation adopted by the DVO was subject to appeal and the same was not final. The value adopted by the DVO was also based on some estimate and that the difference between the sale consideration shown by the assessee at Rs. 19,00,000 and the FMV determined by the DVO at Rs. 20,55,000 was only Rs. 1,55,000 which was less than 10 per cent. It observed that the courts and the tribunals were consistently taking a liberal approach in favour of the assessee where the difference between the value adopted by the assessee and the value adopted by the DVO was less than 10 per cent.

The tribunal noted that the Pune bench of the tribunal in the case of ACIT vs. Harpreet Hotels (P) Ltd. vide ITA Nos. 1156-1160/Pn/2000 had dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue, where the CIT(A) had deleted the addition made on account of the unexplained investment in house construction on the ground that the difference between the figure shown by the assessee and the figure of the DVO was hardly 10 per cent. Similarly, the Pune bench of the tribunal in the case of ITO vs. Kaaddu Jayghosh Appasaheb, vide ITA No. 441/Pn/2004, for the asst. yr. 1992-93, following the decision in the case of Honest Group of Hotels (P) Ltd. vs. CIT 177 CTR (J&K) 232 had held that when the margin between the value as given by the assessee and the Departmental valuer was less than 10 per cent, the difference was liable to be ignored. In the result, the appeal of the assessee was allowed by the tribunal.

Heilgers’ case

The issue again came up recently, for consideration of the Kolkata tribunal, in the case of Heilgers De-velopment & Construction Co. (P) Ltd. vs. DCIT, 32 taxmann.com 147 by way of appeal by the assessee, for the assessment year 2008-09, on the ground that the ld. CIT(A) erred in confirming the addition made on account of capital gains based on the value determined by the Stamp Valuation Authority that was higher than the sale consideration declared by the assessee which was wrong and needed to be deleted.

In that case, the assessee had sold two commercial premises admeasuring 3265 sq.ft. in aggregate, for the stated aggregate consideration of Rs. 2.12 crore against the stamp duty valuation of about Rs. 2.23 crore, in aggregate. The difference was attributed by the assessee to the long gap of 7 to 9 months between the date of agreement and the date of conveyance. It was argued that considering the difference in market value when compared with the consideration received by the assessee was less than 10%. And therefore the net difference of Rs. 10,98,980 should be ignored in computing the long term capital gains. None of these submissions found favour with the AO and the CIT(A).

In the further appeal before the tribunal, the assesssee’s counsel’s first and basic contention was that the provisions of section 50C could not be invoked at all where the difference in stamp duty valuation vis-a-vis stated sales consideration was less than 15% of the stamp duty valuation; that every valuation was at best an estimate and therefore under valuation could not be presumed when there was only a marginal difference between such an estimate and the apparent consideration declared in the sale document; that the Honourable Supreme Court, in the case of C.B. Gautam vs. Union of India, 199 ITR 530, had recognised a tolerance limit for pre-emptive purchase of property under Chapter XXC, at 15% of variation, mainly for a similar reason, even though no such tolerance band was prescribed in the statute.

Quoting from certain observations in “Sampat Iyen-gar’s Law of Income Tax” (Volume 3; 10th Edition) at page 4362, it was submitted that by the same logic that was employed by the Honourable Supreme Court in Gautam’s case (supra), section 50C was also subject to similar tolerance for the cases with the marginal difference. It was pleaded that the difference in valuation as per the sale deed vis-a-vis the stamp duty valuation being much less than 15% in the present case, the provisions of section 50C did not come into play at all.

The submissions of the assesssee failed to con-vince the tribunal. It noted that the submissions, howsoever attractive as they seemed at the first blush, were lacking in legally sustainable merits. The tribunal observed that ; when a provision for tolerance band was not prescribed in the statute, it could not be open to tribunal to read the same into the statutory provisions of section 50 C- no matter howsoever desirable such an interpretation was; what the provisions of section 50C clearly required was that when stated sales consideration was less than the stamp duty valuation for the purposes of transfer, the stamp duty value, subject to the safeguards built in the provision itself, should be taken as the sales consideration for the purposes of computing capital gains; casus omissus, which broadly referred to the principle that a matter which had not been provided in the statue but should have been there, could not be supplied by the tribunal as laid down in the case of Smt. Tarulata Shyam vs. CIT, 108 ITR 345(SC); the tribunal was itself a creature of the Income-tax Act and it could not, therefore, be open to it to deal with the question of correctness or otherwise of the provisions of the Act.

The tribunal also did not find any merits in the assessee’s claim of undue hardship being caused to the taxpayers and to avoid that a tolerance band be read into the provisions of the section 50C. The safeguard built in section 50C, the tribunal noted, did envisage a situation that whenever an assessee claimed that the fair market value of the property was less than the stamp duty valuation of the property and allowed for a reference to the DVO and at which point all the issues relating to valuation of the property – either on the issue of allowing a reasonable margin for market variations, or on the issue of time gap , could be taken up, before the DVO and, therefore, before subsequent appellate forums as well. This inherent flexibility, the tribunal held might rescue the assessee particularly in the case of marginal differences however, challenging the very application of section 50C was something which tribunal found to be devoid of legally sustainable merits.

Observations

The avowed legislative intention behind the introduction of section 50C is to bring to tax the unaccounted funds, used in the real estate transactions, involving land and/or building. There is no dispute about this aspect. The objective is certainly not to tax a tax payer in respect of the sterile transactions. In this background, any attempt to tax a clean transaction amounts to penalising the person for having entered in to a transaction and such attempt becomes punishing in a case where the difference is marginal.

The valuation, including the valuation by the stamp duty authorities, without doubt involves an element of estimation and can never be precise. Such a valuation, as has been repetitively held by the courts, is, at the most, a guiding factor and cannot be conclusive of the fact of the use of unaccounted funds. Interestingly, the ready reckoner rate, so famously applied by the authorities and blindly relied upon by the AOs, are nothing but the standard and generic rates annually prescribed by the stamp authorities. The prescribed rate is not even the ‘valuation’ of a specific asset. This rate is prescribed for an entire locality or an area and does not take in to consideration several factors that have a direct bearing on the price and therefore the valuation. Hardly does one come across a case where the transaction value exactly matches with the prescribed rates; it is either less or more and in most of the cases more. The values do match only in those transactions where it is so designed to match to avoid the attending issues.

It is therefore essential for the revenue to appreciate and concede that the stamp duty valuation or the DVO’s valuation is essentially an estimation that requires to be adjusted by some tolerance band. Once this wisdom, based on the ground reality, is allowed to percolate, resulting litigation or the fear or the threat thereof shall rest at least in half the cases.

One of the main reasons advanced by the Kolkata bench, for not allowing the case of the assessee, was the inability of the tribunal, as a body, to read down the provisions of the law. The bench stated in clear terms that their powers are circumscribed and the tribunal as a creature of the Income-tax Act cannot read down the provisions of the law so as to permit the application of a tolerance band. The bench expressed its helplessness and explained that such powers were vested with the courts. This also confirms that the last word on the possibility of applying the tolerance band is yet to be said.

The better course, with respect, in our considered view, for the tribunal should have been to accept that the agreed value, considering the insignificant difference, represented the fair market value.

On a careful reading of the provisions of section 50C, one gathers that a reference to the DVO is possible on the primary assumption that the stamp duty valuation exceeds the fair market value. It is also gathered that the job of the DVO is to ascertain the fair market value. The fair market value, so ascertained by the DVO, is subject to the scrutiny of the appellate authorities whose word about the correctness of the fair market value is the final word. In this background of the facts, we are of the considered view that the tribunal, in all such cases involving the marginal difference, shall accept the agreed value as the fair market value, independent of the statutory tolerance band.

Section 28 – Merely by initiating the compensation suit, the amount claimed therein cannot be treated as assessee’s income unless the other party admits the liability to pay compensation or there is a decree in favour of the assessee.

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17. ACIT v. Trident Textile Mills Limited
ITAT Chennai `A’ Bench
Before Abraham P. George (AM)  
and S. S. Godara (JM)
ITA No. 1169/Mds/2012
A.Y.: 2008-09. Dated: 17-12-2012.
Counsel for revenue/assessee: Shaji P. Jacob /M. Karunakaran

Section 28 – Merely by initiating the compensation suit, the amount claimed therein cannot be treated as assessee’s income unless the other party admits the liability to pay compensation or there is a decree in favour of the assessee.


Facts

The assessee, manufacturer and domestic seller of grey fabric, filed its return of income for the AY 2008-09 declaring a loss of Rs. 31,31,568. In the course of assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer (AO) noticed that the assessee had acquired a 1250 MW windmill, from M/s Suzlon Energy, for captive consumption. The purchase order contained compensation clause, which provided that the assessee was entitled to compensation in case of any loss of generation on account of non-availability of the machine below 95% @ 3.67/ KWH or as per the TNEB tariff during the warranty period. He also noticed that the generation of power unit did not touch the assured level of 37 lakh units. The assessee had filed a compensation case before the Jurisdictional High Court raising claim of Rs. 17,58,014 upto 15-9-2007 for shortfall in generation of power. Since the other party had not accepted the assessee’s claim for compensation and also the case was pending before the Court, the assessee had not declared the amount claimed as its income. The AO held that, since the assessee was entitled to compensation as per the agreement, he taxed the sum of Rs. 17,58,014 as the income of the assessee. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who deleted the addition made by the AO. Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held

The Tribunal noted that the capacity assured was never achieved and the assessee had initiated compensation proceedings before the Honourable High Court. The High Court had referred the case to the Sole Arbitrator, who expired during the pendency of the arbitration proceedings. The Tribunal held that it is unable to concur with the stand of the Revenue that merely by initiating the compensation suit, the amount claimed therein is liable to be assessed as assessee’s income. It also noted that the other party has not admitted any compensation or its part as payable to the assessee nor there any decree in favour of the assessee so as to realise the amount. It held that once the arbitration proceedings are pending, the outcome of the assessee’s claim involved still hangs in balance. It observed that when there is no actual receipt of any amount or accrual, the same cannot be taken as income of the assessee. It held that the amount claimed by the assessee as compensation cannot be taken to be its income. The Tribunal upheld the order of CIT(A). The appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed.

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Section 80 HHE – Deduction respect of profits from export of computer software – For the purpose of computation of deduction only the total turnover and export turnover of the eligible business is to be considered.

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2. Datamatics Technologies Ltd. vs. DCIT
ITAT Mumbai benches “D”, Mumbai
Before D. Manmohan (V.P.) and Sanjay Arora (A.M.)
ITA No. 5557 / Mum / 2011
Asst Year 2003-04.  Decided on 08-03-2013
Counsel for Assessee/revenue:  J. P. Bairagra /rupinder Brar

Section 80 HHE – Deduction respect of profits from export of computer software –  For the purpose of computation of deduction only the total turnover and export turnover of the eligible business is to be considered.


Facts
The assessee had claimed deduction of Rs. 55.99 lakh u/s. 80 HHE. The AO restricted the assessee’s claim to Rs. 8.02 lakh by taking into account the turnover of all the units of the assessee instead of the turnover of only the eligible units u/s. 80 HHE as claimed by the assessee. On appeal, the CIT(A) confirmed the AO’s order.

Before the tribunal, the revenue justified the orders of the lower authorities on the ground that if the contentions of the assessee were to be accepted, the whole premise or basis of the allocation of profits as prescribed per s/s. (3) of section 80 HHE would stand defeated inasmuch as the turnover of the assessee’s export unit would be its total turnover, rendering the apportionment as of no consequence. It also relied on the decisions of Kerala high court in the case of CIT vs. Parry Agro Industries Ltd. (257 ITR 41) and Mumbai tribunal decision in the case of Ashco Industries Ltd. vs. JCIT (ITA no. 2447 /Mum/2000 dt. 14-01-2003). The decisions in the above two decisions were rendered in the context of the provisions of section 80HHC. However, the revenue justified its reliance on the said two decisions on the ground that the two sections viz., 80 HHC and 80 HHE, are para material prescribing the same computational formula to compute profit attributable to the eligible export business.

Held
According to the tribunal, the issue to be decided was whether the ‘total turnover’ for the purpose of deduction u/s. 80 HHE would be the total turnover of only the eligible units or the total turnover of all the units.

The tribunal noted that unlike the provisions in section 10A, 10B, 80 IA, 80 IB, 80HH, etc. the deduction u/s. 80 HHE is not unit specific but is business specific, i.e. the business of export of computer software. Further, it referred to a decision of the Mumbai tribunal in the case of Tessitura Monti India Pvt. Ltd. (ITA No. 7127/Mum/2010 dt. 11- 01-2013 which decision was rendered in the context of section 10B. Relying on the said decision, the tribunal observed that the qualifying profit for the purpose of computing ‘profits and gains of business or profession’ as per Explanation (d) to the section would be the profits of the computer software business and correspondingly, it would be the export and the total turnover of the said business only that would stand to be considered for apportionment u/s. 80 HHE(3).

As regards the revenue’s contention that the formula to compute profit of the business should be given the same meaning as is given u/s. 80 HHC, the tribunal noted that the provisions of section 80 HHC also requires the adjustment of sales turnover of mineral resources from the total turnover or the adjusted total turnover, in case the assessee is also engaged in the said business. Further, referring to the various legislative amendments carried out in section 80 HHC, the tribunal observed that the same were only to neutralise the anomalies that arose in the wide variety of business situations.

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Section 40(A)(3) – Once the addition has been made by increasing the gross profit rate then there is no further scope of making separate additions.

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14. ITO vs. Nardev Kumar Gupta
ITAT Jaipur Bench ‘A’ Jaipur
Before B. R. Mittal (J. M.) and B. R. Jani (A. M.)
ITA No. 829/JP/2012
A. Y.: 2009-10.
Dated: 23-01-2013
Counsel  for  Revenue/Assessee:  Roshanta
Meena/Mahendra Gargieya

Section 40(A)(3) – Once the addition has been made by increasing the gross profit rate then there is no further scope of making separate additions.


Facts

The assesse derives income from newspaper agency. During the assessment, the AO rejected the books of accounts u/s. 145(3). While making the best judgment, the AO accepted the sales as declared by the assesse but applied the higher gross profit rate and made addition of Rs. 3.19 lakh. Besides, the addition of Rs. 21.6 lakh was also made u/s. 40A(3) on account of payments made in cash for purchase of newspaper. On appeal, the CIT(A) deleted the addition made u/s. 40A(3) and the addition of Rs. 3.19 lakh made by the AO was restricted to Rs. 1 lakh.

Before the tribunal, the revenue justified the order of the AO and placed reliance on the Gujarat high court decision in the case of CIT vs. Hynoup Food & Oil Ind. Pvt. Ltd. (290 ITR 702) and justified the disallowance made by the AO for the payments made in cash exceeding the prescribed limit u/s. 40A(3).

Held

The tribunal noted the ratio laid down in the decisions listed below, viz. that, once the addition has been made by increasing the gross profit rate then there is no further scope of making separate additions under different provisions. Based thereon, the tribunal upheld the decision of the CIT(A).
The decisions relied on by the tribunal were as under:
1. CIT vs. G. K. Contractor (19 DTR 305)(Raj);
2. CIT vs. Pravin & Co. 274 ITR 534 (Guj);
3. Choudhary Bros. (ITA No. 1177/JP/2010 dt. 31-5- 2010;
4. CIT vs. Banwari Lal Banshidhar 229 ITR 229 (All)

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S/s. 40(a)(ia), 80IB(10), – In case of an undertaking qualifying for deduction u/s. 80IB(10), amount disallowed u/s. 40(a)(ia) is allowable as deduction u/s. 80IB(10).

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34. 2013-TIOL-146-ITAT-MUM
ITO vs. Dharti Enterprises
A. Y.: 2007-08, Dated: 18- 1-2012

S/s. 40(a)(ia), 80IB(10), – In case of an undertaking qualifying for deduction u/s. 80IB(10), amount disallowed u/s. 40(a)(ia) is allowable as deduction u/s. 80IB(10).


Facts

The assessee was in the business of construction. It filed return of income declaring total income at Rs. Nil after claiming deduction u/s. 80IB(10) of the Act. In the course of assessment proceedings, the AO noticed that the profit as per P & L Account was Rs. 51,34,648 and to this, the assessee had added the amount of Rs. 13,35,990 being the amount of expenditure on which TDS was deposited later than the due date and Rs. 81,81,030 being amount of expenditure on which TDS was not deposited as per tax audit report. Thus, on a gross total income of Rs. 1,46,51,668, the assessee claimed deduction u/s. 80IB(10) of Rs. 1,46,51,668.

On being asked as to why deduction u/s. 80IB(10) should not be disallowed on Rs. 95,17,020 the assessee submitted that no disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) was called for and even if the amount is disallowed the assessee is eligible for deduction u/s. 80IB(10) on the entire amount of profit derived from the housing project as computed under the Act, which is included in the gross total income of the assessee.

The AO after considering the decision of the Apex Court in Liberty India vs. CIT 317 ITR 218 (SC) held that the assessee has wrongly claimed the deduction u/s. 80IB(10) on the amount of Rs. 95,17,020 which is not a profit of the eligible enterprise, but has to be taxed because of the violation of the provisions of section 40(a)(ia) of the Act. He disallowed the claim of deduction u/s .80IB(10) on the amount of Rs. 95,17,020.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who allowed the appeal of the assessee.

Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held

The Tribunal noted the ratio of the following decisions –

(i) S B Builders & Developers vs. ITO (ITA No. 1245/ Mum/2009)(AY 2006-07) order dated 14-5-2010;

(ii) ITO vs. Shri Ganesh Developers and Builders (ITA No. 4328/Del/2009)(AY 2006-07) order dated 11-3-2011; and

(iii) ACIT vs. Sri Lakshmi Builders and vice versa in ITA No. 244/Vizag/2008 and in ITA No. 323/Vizag/2010 (AY 2005-06) order dated 22-11-2010.

It noted that in the case of Sri Lakshmi Builders (supra) on the issue of disallowance of deduction u/s. 80IB(10) on the amount disallowed u/s. 40(a)(ia) it has been held by the Tribunal that the disallowance so made can only be treated as income derived from the impugned business activity, when the income after making the said disallowance is subjected to tax as the business profit.

Applying the ratio of the abovementioned decisions to the facts of the assessee’s case, the Tribunal held that since the AO had treated the disallowance u/s. 40(a) (ia) of Rs. 95,17,020 as income from business and it is not the case of the Revenue that the income derived by the assessee is other than the business income from developing and building housing project, the assessee is entitled to deduction u/s. 80IB(10) in respect of total profits including the profits of Rs. 95,17,020 computed as business profits of the housing project for the year under appeal. The Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A).

The appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed.

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Block assessment: Limitation: Special audit: Sections 142(2A) and 158BC: Direction for special audit without giving opportunity to assessee: Direction given to extend period of limitation: Assessment barred by limitation:

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CIT vs. Subboji Rao C. H.; 355 ITR 320 (Kar):

Pursuant to a search, block assessment proceedings were initiated by issuing a notice u/s. 158BC of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on 15-05-1998. The assessee computed the undisclosed income at Rs. 24,18,360 and the Assessing Officer computed the undisclosed income at Rs. 70,00,246. The Commissioner (Appeals) reduced the addition. He rejected the contention of the assessee that the assessment was barred by limitation since the direction for special audit u/s. 142(2A) was not valid. The Tribunal held that there was no complexity in the accounts requiring an audit u/s. 142(2A). It further held that invoking the provisions u/s. 142(2A) was bad in law and the assessment was barred by limitation.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“The assessee was not heard before the order passed u/s. 142(2A). Such a procedure was resorted to extend the period of limitation. Therefore, the assessment order was void as being barred by limitation.”

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S/s. 50C, 271(1)(c) – The mere fact that the AO had invoked section 50C(2) and adopted guideline value for computing capital gains ignoring what was disclosed by the assessee ipso facto cannot be the sole basis for imposing penalty.

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33. 2013-TIOL-39-ITAT-MAD
C Basker vs. ACIT
A. Y.: 2007-08, Dated: 12-10-2012

S/s. 50C, 271(1)(c) – The mere fact that the AO had invoked section 50C(2) and adopted guideline value for computing capital gains ignoring what was disclosed by the assessee ipso facto cannot be the sole basis for imposing penalty.


Facts

The assessee filed its return of income which return of income was subsequently revised. In the original return of income as also in the revised return of income, the assessee had computed and offered for taxation capital gains arising on sale of land. The capital gains were computed by adopting the consideration as per sale agreement to be full value of consideration. In the course of assessment proceedings, the AO noticed that the sale consideration as per agreement was Rs. 28,54,200, whereas the value of the property as per guideline value was Rs. 95,40,000. He assessed total income by computing capital gains by adopting the guideline value to be full value of consideration. He also initiated penalty proceedings. The assessee did not file any appeal against the application of guideline value by the AO. The AO levied penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) of the Act inter alia on the ground that but for information obtained by him from AIR data, correct capital gains would have escaped assessment as the assessee failed to disclose the same either in original return of income or in the revised return of income filed subsequently.

Aggrieved by the levy of penalty, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who upheld the action of the AO. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held

The Tribunal noted that it was not the case of the AO that the assessee has received consideration in excess of the amount stated in the sale deed. The mere fact that the AO had invoked section 50C(2) of the Act and adopted guideline value for computing capital gains ignoring what was disclosed by the assessee ipso facto cannot be the sole basis for the purpose of computing capital gains. The Tribunal noticed that the Mumbai Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Renu Hingorani vs. ACIT has held that penalty merely on the basis of invoking section 50C(2) of the Act cannot be sustained. It further observed that the same law has been reiterated in the case of Shri Chimanlal Manilal Patel vs. ACIT (ITA No. 508/Ahd/2010) and DCIT vs. Japfa Comfeed India Private Limited (2011-TIOL-703-ITAT-DEL). The Tribunal held that section 50C(2) is only a deeming provision which cannot be taken as to be an understatement for the purpose of imposing penalty. In order to attract imposition of penalty, the assessee must be held to have concealed particulars of income or furnished inaccurate particulars. In the instant case, there were no such allegations against the assessee. The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in confirming the penalty imposed by the AO. The Tribunal decided the appeal in favour of the assessee.

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S/s. 139(1), 139(5), 142(1), 143(2), 145 – Even in cash method of accounting, every receipt is not income but the receipt which is in the nature of income is liable to be assessed as income. Even in the case of an assessee following cash system of accounting, return of income can be revised and the amount received and offered as income can be eliminated to give effect to the decision of the High Court, rendered after the end of the financial year, holding that the said amount is not taxable.

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32. 2013-TIOL-141-ITAT-DEL
ACIT vs. Dexterity Developers A. Y. : 2008-09, Dated: 18-1-2013

S/s. 139(1), 139(5), 142(1), 143(2), 145 – Even in cash method of accounting, every receipt is not income but the receipt which is in the nature of income is liable to be assessed as income. Even in the case of an assessee following cash system of accounting, return of income can be revised and the amount received and offered as income can be eliminated to give effect to the decision of the High Court, rendered after the end of the financial year, holding that the said amount is not taxable.


Facts

The assessee firm, following cash system of accounting, had filed its return of income, declaring the total income to be Rs. 5,36,83,629. In the original return filed, the assessee had disclosed profit of Rs. 9,73,36,034 on sale of land for a total consideration of Rs. 20,55,78,119 on 11-2-2008. contention of the DR that since the The plot of land under consideration originally belonged to Ambika Mills Ltd., a company under liquidation. The Gujrat High Court constituted a committee, headed by the Official Liquidator as the Chairman, for disposal of the assets of the company in liquidation. On the basis of the report of the Official Liquidator and the open bid in the Court, the highest bid of Rs. 14.30 crore made by M/s Bheruji Estate, was accepted by the Court by order dated 23-12-2003. As the auction purchaser subsequently could not make the full payment, he requested that the freehold land be registered in the name of his nominee, Mr. Manubhai M. Patel, who would make the balance payment. However, M/s Bheruji Estate subsequently went back on this request. On 8-8-2005, the Honourable Court directed the Official Liquidator to execute sale deed in favour of Manubhai Patel, subject to the outcome of the appeal filed by M/s Bheruji Estate. On 19-10-2007, the assessee entered into an MoU with Shri Manubhai Patel for sale of freehold land, and also acted as a mediator between the two parties i.e. M/s Bheruji Estate and Shri Manubhai M. Patel. The consent terms between the disputing parties were taken on record by the Appellate Court, and the final order was passed on 23-1-2008 disposing of the appeal by M/s Bheruji Estate. In the meantime, on 29-10-2007, the Official Liquidator executed the sale deed of the freehold land in favor of Shri Manubhai M. Patel. On 11-2-2008, a registered sale deed was executed by Shri Manubhai Patel, as vendor, the assessee as confirming party and M/s Sential Infrastructures Ltd., as purchaser for a consideration of Rs. 55,67,78,119, out of which Rs. 21,60,28,119 was to be received by the assessee.

Subsequently, one of the original bidders of the auction sale of 2003, Shri Jayesbhai Patel filed an appeal against the original sale made by the Official Liquidator in favour of M/s Bheruji Estate, and on his appeal, the Gujrat High Court vide order dated 9-3-2009 held that the sale effected on 11-2-2008 should be treated to have been made by the Official Liquidator in favour of M/s Sential Infrastructure Ltd., and the intervening parties, i.e. M/s Bheruji Estate, Shri Manubhai Patel and the assessee were only entitled to their expenditure to the extent of actual investments, services rendered and cost of litigation. It was directed that the assessee was liable to return the amount of Rs. 20 crore to the Official Liquidator within one month from the date of the order, retaining only Rs. 1,60,28,119. On the basis of this High Court order dated 9-3-2009, the assessee firm filed its revised return of income showing nil income, enclosing a profit & loss account in which no sale of land was disclosed and the liability of Rs 20 crore was disclosed in its balance sheet.

The Assessing Officer held that the assessee was not entitled to revise its return on the basis of events which had occurred after the close of the previous year as it followed cash system of accounting. He held that the effect of the Court order dated 9-3-2009 could only be reflected in AY 2009-10.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who accepted the assessee’s contention and directed the AO to accept the revised return which was filed within time and was within four corners of law.

Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held

The Tribunal noted that the only dispute of the Revenue was that there was no omission or wrong statement in the original return which may be revised. The Tribunal noted that the High Court had held that the assessee was not entitled to the profit on sale of land, but was entitled only to the expenditure to the extent of actual investment and the cost of litigation. Therefore, the assessee was not entitled to the amount credited to its profit & loss account towards profit on sale of land. The Tribunal held that there was certainly an omission in the original return of income. Though the order of the High Court was subsequent to the end of the relevant previous year, it effected the transaction entered into during the previous year which was liable to be taxed in the assessment year under consideration. Since the assessment of the said year was still pending, the Tribunal held that the assessee was fully justified in revising its return in the light of the decision of the Honourable Jurisdictional High Court.

As regards the AO’s reliance on the method of accounting followed by the assessee being cash, the Tribunal held that after the order of the High Court, when the assessee is not entitled to any profit from the sale of land, the nature of the amount received from the buyer of the land cannot be considered as sale proceed or profit in the hands of the assessee, but its nature would be only an amount received in trust which the assessee is liable to refund as per the direction of the Court. Even in the cash method of accounting, every receipt is not income but the receipt which is in the nature of income is liable to be assessed as income.

As regards the contention of the DR that since the assessee had preferred an appeal against the order of the High Court, in the event of the decision being reversed in appeal, how would the Department be able to recover the tax on such income from sale of land, the Tribunal held that if any such event happens, the Revenue would be at liberty to take appropriate action in accordance with law. The Tribunal noted that as on date of its decision, the decision of the Jurisdictional High Court holds good and is binding on the parties. The assessment of the income of the assessee cannot be made, ignoring the above decision of the Honourable Jurisdictional High Court.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) was justified in directing the AO to consider the revised return. It upheld the order of the CIT(A) and dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue.

The appeal filed by the revenue was dismissed.

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Amount received on transfer of carbon credits is a capital receipt

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31. (2013) 81 DTR 173 (Hyd)
My Home Power Ltd. vs. DCIT A.Y.: 2007-08, Dated: 2-11-2012

Amount received on transfer of carbon credits is a capital receipt


Facts

The company, engaged in the business of power generation, received carbon emission reduction certificates (CERs) popularly known as ‘carbon credits’ for the project activity of switching off fossil fuel from naphtha and diesel to biomass. The part of CERs was sold and sale proceeds of Rs. 12.87 crore were treated as capital in nature and not taxable. The Assessing Officer held the same to be a revenue receipt, since the CERs are a tradable commodity and even quoted in stock exchange. The CIT(A) confirmed the order of the Assessing Officer.

Held

The carbon credit is in the nature of “an entitlement” received to improve world atmosphere and environment by reducing carbon, heat and gas emissions. The entitlement earned for carbon credits can, at best, be regarded as a capital receipt and cannot be taxed as a revenue receipt. It is not generated or created due to carrying on business, but it accrues due to “world concern”. It has been made available assuming character of transferable right or entitlement only due to world concern. The source of carbon credit is world concern and environment. Due to that, the assessee gets a privilege in the nature of transfer of carbon credits. Thus, the amount received for carbon credits has no element of profit or gain and it cannot be subjected to tax in any manner under any head of income. It is not liable for tax for the assessment year under consideration in terms of sections 2(24), 28, 45 and 56. Carbon credits are made available to the assessee on account of saving of energy consumption and not because of its business. Further, carbon credits cannot be considered as a by-product. It is a credit given to the assessee under the Kyoto Protocol and because of international understanding. Thus, the assessees who have surplus carbon credits can sell them to other assessees to have capped emission commitment under the Kyoto Protocol. Transferable carbon credit is not a result or incidence of one’s business and it is a credit for reducing emissions.

The persons having carbon credits get benefit by selling the same to a person who needs carbon credits to overcome one’s negative point carbon credit. The amount received is not received for producing and/or selling any product, by-product or for rendering any service for carrying on the business. Carbon credit is entitlement or accretion of capital and hence, income earned on sale of these credits is capital receipt. The carbon credit is not an offshoot of business but an offshoot of environmental concerns. No asset is generated in the course of business, but it is generated due to environmental concerns. It does not increase profit in any manner and does not need any expenses. It is a nature of entitlement to reduce carbon emission. However, there is no cost of acquisition or cost of production to get this entitlement. Carbon credit is not in the nature of profit or in the nature of income.

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Assessment giving effect to the order of revision: Scope: Sections 143(3) and 263: A. Y. 2006-07: Assessee carrying on two businesses; i) Mentha business and ii) Cattle feed and green vegetable business: Separate accounts maintained: Assessment set aside u/s. 263 by finding errors in cattle feed and green vegetable business: Pursuant assessment is restricted to Cattle feed and green vegetable business: Queries concerning mentha business are beyond the scope and power:

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Smt. Shobha Govil vs. Add. CIT: 354 ITR 668 (All):

The assessee was carrying on two businesses; i) Mentha business and ii) Cattle feed and green vegetable business. Separate accounts were maintained for the two businesses. The accounts of mentha business were audited. For the A. Y. 2006-07, the assessment was completed u/s. 143(3). The Commissioner found mistakes as regards the cattle feed and green vegetable business and accordingly, exercising the powers u/s. 263 set aside the assessment order and restored the matter back to the Assessing Officer. The Commissioner had not found any mistake as regards the mentha business. After remand, the Assessing Officer served a questionnaire making inquiries with regard both the businesses. The assessee resisted the questionnaire on the ground that the remand order passed by the Commissioner u/s. 263 was confined to the determination of income of the cattle feed and green vegetable business and the income from mentha business has become final as it has not been interfered with u/s. 263 of the Act. The Assessing Officer rejected the contention of the assessee.

The Allahabad High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee challenging the said stand of the Assessing Officer and held as under:

“i) The entire discussion in the order u/s. 263 was confined to the question of determination of income and expenditure of the cattle feed and green vegetable business. The discussion, paragraph after paragraph, was with regard to the cattle feed and green vegetable business, viz. its sales, sale bills, absence of addresses of the purchasers of bhusa, truck expenses and freight outward expenses, salary of the staff, all related to the cattle feed and green vegetable business.

ii) There was nothing in the order of the Commissioner suggesting that the entire assessment order was being set aside. The Assessing Officer was not justified in coming to the conclusion that he was also required to pass a fresh assessment order for the mentha business.

iii) To this extent, the order cannot be allowed to stand and was liable to be set aside.”

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High Court—Matter remanded for de novo consideration as no reasons were given for dismissal of the writ petition.

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Parvez Nazir Hussein Jafri vs. CIT (2013) 354 ITR 235 (SC)

The High Court dismissed the writ petition filed by the assessee challenging the validity of the notice dated 26th July, 2010 issued u/s. 148 for reopening the assessment for the assessment year 2006-07 holding that there was no error in issuing notice u/s. 148 and noting that the income-tax return submitted by the Petitioner was processed u/s. 143(1) on 10th March, 2007.

On appeal, the Supreme Court set aside the order of the High Court and remitted the matter back to the High Court for de novo consideration in accordance with law since the High Court had not given any reasons for not setting aside the reopening of the assessment.

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Settlement of cases: Chapter XIXA: A. Ys. 2001- 02 to 2006-07: Order passed by Settlement Commission is final: No Income Tax Authority can initiate proceedings in respect of period and income covered by such order: Settlement Commission cannot delegate its power

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CIT vs. Smt. Diksha Singh; 350 ITR 157 (All)

The Settlement Commission passed an order u/s. 245D(4), whereby the undisclosed income of the assessee was settled at Rs. 43 lakh for the assessment years under consideration. While passing the order, the Settlement Commission observed in paragraph 7 as follows:

“The Commissioner of Income-tax/Assessing Officer may take such action as appropriate in respect of the matter not placed before the Commission by the applicant, as per the provisions of section 245F(4) of the Income Tax Act, 1961”

The Assessing Officer issued notice and finally estimated the income at Rs. 75,84,900/- in addition to the agricultural income of Rs. 1,75,000 and made the additions accordingly. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal deleted the addition.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Allahabad High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) A plain reading of section 245D r.w.s. 245F makes it clear that once a matter falls within the domain of the Settlement Commission, no authority of the Income-tax Department will have jurisdiction to asses tax for the same financial year and the finding of the Settlement Commission shall be conclusive and final u/s. 245-I.

ii) A mere observation of the Settlement Commission will not empower the assessing or appellate authority to reassess on any ground, whatsoever, for the same financial year with regard to which the Settlement Commission had exercised jurisdiction and given a finding.

iii) The Legislature in its wisdom had conferred power on the Settlement Commission to reopen the proceedings in certain circumstances and to deal with the situation in the event of commission of fraud. Once power has been conferred on the Settlement Commission itself to deal with the contingency, such power cannot be delegated directly or indirectly to any authority of the Income-tax Department. The discretionary administrative power entrusted by the statute to a particular authority cannot be further delegated except as otherwise provided in the statute. In other words, when the Act prescribes a particular body or officer to exercise a power, it must be exercised by that body or officer and none else unless the Act by express words or necessary implication permits delegation, in which event, it may also be exercised by the delegate if delegation is made in accordance with the terms of the Act but not otherwise.

iv) The Settlement Commission cannot make an observation delegating its power to the assessing authority to reopen the case in certain circumstances for the same financial year, when it had been conferred wide power to deal with the situation under the statutory provisions.

v) The Tribunal has rightly decided the appeal on the sound principles of law. The appeal being devoid of merit is hereby dismissed.”

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Co-operative Society—Deduction u/s. 80P(2) (a)(iii)—Matter remanded to the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) to determine whether the activity of obtaining sugar from the sugar cane constituted manufacture?

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Morinda Co-operative Sugar Mills Ltd. vs. CIT (2013) 354 ITR 230 (SC)

The
assessee, a co-operative sugar mill, bought sugarcane grown by its
members. It undertook a particular operation whose outcome was a final
product in the form of sugar. The question before the Supreme Court was
whether the final product (sugar) would make the assessee entitled to
claim to benefit of section 80P(2)(a)(iii) in respect of marketing of
the agricultural produce grown by its members?

According to the
Supreme Court, the crucial issue was, whether at the time of marketing
of sugar, the same could be said to have retained the character of
agricultural produce (sugarcane) grown by members of the society or did
it represent an independent commercial commodity which no longer had the
character of agricultural produce? In short, the controversy was,
whether the operation undertaken by the assessee constituted
“manufacture”?

According to the assessee, the process undertaken
was not a “manufacture”. Broadly, according to the assessee, sugar
(also called “sucrose”) is synthesised by the sugarcane plant from water
and atmospheric carbon dioxide by the method of photosynthesis.
Sugarcane, according to the assessee, is produced in the agriculture
fields. In the sugar factory, after juice is extracted from the
sugarcane, it is boiled. Microscopic crystals coalesce together to form
macroscopic crystals and molasses.

This, according to the
assessee, did not constitute “manufacture”. In this connection, reliance
was placed by the assessee on the opinion given by the technical
advisor at the request of the National Federation of Co-operative Sugar
Factories Ltd.

According to the Department, the above operation/
activity constituted “manufacture”. In this connection, the Department
placed reliance on paragraph 10 of the judgment in the case of CIT vs .
Oracle Software India Limited reported in (2010) 320 ITR 546 (SC), where
it was observed as follows (page 551):

“The term ‘manufacture’
implies a change, but every change is not a manufacture, despite the
fact that every change in an article is the result of a treatment of
labour and manipulation. However, this test of manufacture needs to be
seen in the context of the above process. If an operation/process
renders a commodity or article fit for use for which it is otherwise not
fit, the operation/process falls within the meaning of the word
‘manufacture’.”

According to the Supreme Court, the above test
had to be applied and adjudicated on a case-tocase basis. It depended on
the type of product which ultimately emerged from a given operation. In
its view, this aspect had not been examined by the courts below.

For
the above reasons, the Supreme Court remitted the case back to the
Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) to re-examine the matter, directing
that (i) Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) would give an opportunity
to the assessee to put forth the opinion of an independent expert who
shall not be from the society or federation; (ii) A copy of the written
opinion shall be given to the Department; (iii) The Department would be
free to engage its own expert who, in turn, will give his opinion; (iv)
The parties be given liberty to cross-examine the experts. The
Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) would thereafter decide the case
and ascertain whether the operation undertaken by the assessee is or is
not “manufacture”. The Supreme Court disposed of the civil appeals
accordingly.

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Section 14A, Rule 8D – No disallowance can be made in respect of expenses in relation to dividend received from trading in shares. In view of the judgment of Karnataka High Court in the case of CCI Ltd vs. JCIT, the decision of the Special Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Daga Capital Management Pvt. Ltd. cannot be followed.

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16. Vivek Mehrotra v. ACIT
ITAT Mumbai `F’ Bench
Before Rajendra Singh (AM) and Amit Shukla (JM)
ITA No. 6332/Mum/2011 A.Y.: 2008-09.
Dated: 11-1-2013
Counsel for assessee/revenue: Rajiv Mehrotra/Om Prakash Meena

Section 14A, Rule 8D – No disallowance can be made in respect of expenses in relation to dividend received from trading in shares. In view of the judgment of Karnataka High Court in the case of CCI Ltd vs. JCIT, the decision of the Special Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Daga Capital Management Pvt. Ltd. cannot be followed.


Facts

The assessee received exempt income in the form of dividend from personal investments and also from shares held for trading. It also received tax free interest from relief bonds. The assessee maintained separate accounts including separate bank accounts and balance sheets for personal investments and trading activities in which expenses relating to these two activities were shown separately.

In the course of assessment proceedings, on being asked to show cause as to why expenses relating to such income should not be disallowed u/s. 14A of the Act, the assessee submitted that from the separate accounts maintained, it is clear that personal investments were made out of profit earned in the past and not from borrowings. It also contended that no expenses were incurred in respect of such investment. As regards shares held for trading it was contended that the provisions of section 14A are not applicable. The AO relying on the decision of the Special Bench in the case of Daga Capital Management Pvt. Ltd. (ITA No. 8057/Mum/2003) held that section 14A does apply even to shares held as stock-in-trade. The AO disallowed the expenses in respect of both shares held as personal investment as well as shares held for trading.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who held that, on facts, no disallowance was to be made in respect of shares held as personal investments. As regards shares held for trading he held that the provisions of section 14A are applicable and disallowance made by the AO was confirmed by him.

Aggrieved, both the assessee and the Revenue, preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held

The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had given a clear finding that the assessee maintained separate accounts including separate bank accounts and balance sheets for the two activities. He gave a finding that the personal investments were made out of own funds, investments in RBI Relief Bonds and LIC had been made in earlier years and since the assessee was having vast experience in these matters, he was personally handling these investments, there were no expenses required. Similarly, the shares which were of unlisted group companies held for the purpose of retaining control over these companies, did not require any day to day expenses. The Tribunal confirmed the action of the CIT(A) in holding that no disallowance is called for in relation to shares held as personal investments.

As regards the shares held for trading, the Tribunal noted that subsequent to the decision of the Special Bench of ITAT in the case of Daga Capital Management Pvt. Ltd. (supra), in which it has been held that section 14A would apply even to dividend income for trading in shares, the Karnataka High Court in the case of CCI vs. JCIT (250 CTR 290)(Kar) has in relation to trading shares held that the assessee had not retained shares with the intention of earning dividend income which was only incidental to shares which remained unsold by the assessee. The High Court held that no disallowance of expenses was required in relation to dividend from trading shares. The Tribunal also noted that the Mumbai Bench of the Tribunal in the case of DCIT vs. India Advantage Securities Ltd. (ITA No. 6711/Mum/2011, Assessment Year: 2008-09; order dated 14-9-2011) held that in view of the judgment of the Karnataka High Court in the case of CCI Ltd. vs. JCIT, the decision of the Special Bench in the case of Daga Capital Management Pvt. Ltd., could not be followed and no disallowance could be made of expenses in relation to dividend received from trading in shares. The Tribunal set aside the order of CIT(A) and deleted the disallowance upheld by him in relation to trading in shares.

 The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed and the appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed.

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Search and seizure: Authorisation u/s. 132(1) of I. T. Act, 1961: Validity: Reason to believe: Affidavit of Dy DIT stating that he got information that there was a “likelihood” of the documents belonging to the DS Group being found at the residence of the assessee: Would amount only to surmise or conjecture and not to solid information: Warrant of authorisation not valid and is liable to be quashed

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Madhu Gupta vs. DIT(Inv).; 350 ITR 598 (Del): 256 CTR 21 (Del) The assessee challenged the validity of the search action u/s. 132 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 by filing a writ petition.

The Delhi High Court allowed the petition and held as under:

“i) The warrant of authorisation can only be issued by competent person in consonance of information in his possession and after he has formed a reason to believe that the conditions stipulated in cls. (a), (b) and (c) of section 132(1) existed. The information must be credible information and there must be a nexus between the information and the belief. Furthermore, the information must not be in the nature of some surmise or conjecture, but it must have some tangible backing. Until and unless information is of this quality, it would be difficult to formulate a belief because the belief itself is not just an ipse dixit, but is based on reason and that is why the expression used is “reason to believe” and not simply “believes”.

ii) In the present case, the so-called information is undisclosed and what exactly that information was, is also not known. At one place in the affidavit of Dy. Director of IT, it has been mentioned that he got information that there was a “likelihood” of the documents belonging to the DS Group being found at the residence of the petitioner. That by itself would amount only to a surmise and conjecture and not to solid information and since the search on the premises of the petitioner was founded on this so-called information, the search would have to be held to be arbitrary. It may also be pointed out that when the search was conducted on 21-1-2011, no documents belonging to the DS Group were, in fact, found at the premises of the petitioner.

iii) With regard to the argument raised by the counsel for the Revenue that there was no need for the competent authority to have any reason to believe and a mere reason to suspect would be sufficient, it may be pointed out that the answer is provided by the fact that the warrant of authorisation was not in the name of DS Group but was in the name of the petitioner. In other words, the warrant of authorisation u/s. 132(1) had been issued in the name of the petitioner and, therefore, the information and the reason to believe were to be formed in connection with the petitioner and not the DS Group.

iv) None of the clauses (a), (b) or (c) mentioned in section 132(1) stood satisfied. Therefore, the warrant of authorisation was without any authority of law. Therefore, the warrant of authorisation would have to be quashed.

v) Once that is the position, the consequence would be that all proceedings pursuant to the search conducted on 21/01/2011 at the premises of the petitioner would be illegal and, therefore, the prohibitory orders would also be liable to be quashed. It is ordered accordingly. The jewellery/other articles/ documents are to be unconditionally released to the petitioner.”

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Exports—Exemption u/s. 10A—Matter remanded to the Tribunal to consider the transaction of earning of interest on foreign currency deposit in detail to determine whether there existed any nexus between interest and industrial undertaking.

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India Comnet International vs. ITO (2013) 354 ITR 673 (SC)

The assessee, a private limited company established under the Madras Export Processing Zone, a 100% export oriented unit, engaged in the business of development and export of software filed its return of income for the assessment year 2002- 03 on 31st October, 2002, admitting “nil” income after claiming exemption u/s. 10A amounting to Rs. 8,34,84,900. The assessment was completed u/s. 143(3) of the Act by adding to income, the interest on deposits amounting to Rs. 92,06,602. The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) confirmed the order of the Assessing Officer, namely that the interest income of Rs. 92,06,602 did not qualify for exemption u/s. 10A of the Act and the same had to be assessed to tax under the head “Income from other sources”. The Tribunal following the order of the jurisdictional High Court in the case of CIT vs. Menon Impex P. Ltd. (2003) 259 ITR 403 (Mad) dismissed the appeal filed by the assessee. The High Court confirmed the order of the Tribunal holding that the interest income was earned out of the export realisation and kept in the foreign currency deposit account, as permitted by the FERA under the banking regulations and that there was no direct nexus between the interest earned and the industrial undertaking since the interest was received on deposit made in banks and it was that deposit which was the source of income.

On further appeal, the Supreme Court held that the impugned judgment of the High Court was based on the judgment of the Madras High Court in the case of CIT vs. Menon Impex P. Ltd. (supra). The Supreme Court observed that in that case, the Madras High Court examined in detail the transaction in question and found that the assessee had set up a new industrial undertaking in Kandla Free Trade Zone for manufacturing light engineering goods. The goods therein were exported during the assessment year 1985-86. In the course of business, the assessee was required to open a letter of credit. On such deposit, the assessee earned interest. Under the said circumstances, the High Court held, following the judgment in the case of CIT vs. Sterling Foods reported in [1999] 237 ITR 579 (SC), that the interest received by the assessee was on deposit made by it in the banks; that such deposit was the source of income; and that, the mere fact that the deposit was made for obtaining letter of credit which letter was, in turn, used for the purpose of business undertaking did not establish a direct nexus between the interest and industrial undertaking. According to the Supreme Court, the judgment of the Madras High Court in Menon Import P. Ltd. ( supra) was based on the examination of the transaction in detail which exercise had not been undertaken in the present case.

For the above reasons, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgment and remitted the case to the Income-tax Appellant Tribunal for deciding the matter afresh after examining the transaction in question, as done by the Madras High Court in the case of Menon Import P. Ltd. (supra).

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Provisional attachment u/s. 281B: A. Y. 2008-09: Provisional attachment remains in operation only till the passing of the assessment order

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Motorola Solutions India (P) Ltd. vs. CIT; 254 CTR 569 (P&H)

In the course of the assessment proceedings for the A. Y. 2008-09, the Assessing Officer passed the provisional attachment order u/s. 281B and issued letters/ notices on 2-1-2012 to the Standard Chartered Bank and sundry debtors not to make payment to the assessee petitioner. The assessee challenged the validity of the order by filing a writ petition. In the mean while, on 8-11-2012, assessment order was passed raising a demand of Rs. 2,10,57,87,648/-. The Petitioner contended that the provisional attachment order u/s. 281B of the Act ceases to operate after passing of the assessment order on 8-11-2012. The contention of the Department was that the provisional attachment order will be in operation for a period of six months.

The Punjab and Haryana High Court accepted the contention of the Petitioner assessee and held as under:

“i) According to section 281B, during the pendency of any assessment proceeding or proceedings in pursuance to reassessment that in order to safeguard the interests of the Revenue, after recording the reasons for the same in writing and seeking the approval from the concerned authority, an order for provisional attachment can be passed. Circular No. 179 dated 30-9-1975 clearly envisages that where during the pendency of any proceeding for assessment or reassessment of any income, the raising of demand is likely to take time due to investigations and there is apprehension that the assessee may thwart the collection of that demand to be made. This supports the interpretation that it is only till actual demand is created by passing an assessment order that the provisional attachment order will remain in operation.

ii) There are sufficient provisions in the Act, like section 220(1), proviso to safeguard the interest of the Revenue in case the Assessing Officer has apprehension that the assessee by adopting extraneous method may thwart the recovery of the legitimate tax dues of the State. In view of the above, the interpretation put by the Revenue that even after passing of the assessment order, provisional attachment order shall still remain in force for six months, does not merit acceptance and is, thus, rejected.”

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Business expenditure: Disallowance u/s. 40(a) (ia): A. Y. 2008-09: Amendment of section 40(a)(ia) by Finance Act, 2010 is retrospective and is applicable for the A. Y. 2008-09 also:

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CIT vs. Naresh Kumar; 262 CTR 389 (Del):

In respect of the A. Y. 2008-09, the Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim that no disallowance u/s. 40(a) (ia) should be made in view of the amendment of section 40(a)(ia) by the Finance Act, 2010.

In appeal, the Revenue contended that the amendment is w.e.f 01-04-2010 and is not
retrospective, and accordingly, the amendment is not applicable for the A. Y. 2008-09. The Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“The Tribunal was justified in holding that the amendment made to section 40(a)(ia) by the Finance Act, 2010 should be given retrospective effect and applicable to A. Y. 2008-09 in question”

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Business expenditure: Bonus: Section 36(1) (ii): A. Ys. 2005-06 and 2006-07: Bonus paid to director as per Board resolution: Directors rendering valuable services to company: Bonus not related to shareholding: Bonus deductible:

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CIT vs. Career Launcher India Ltd.; 358 ITR 179(Del):

For the A. Ys. 2005-06 and 2006-07, the Assessing Officer disallowed the claim for deduction of the bonus paid to the directors on the ground that it would have been payable to the directors as dividend had it not been paid as bonus. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim and deleted the addition. On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) It was not disputed regarding bonus (a) that payment was supported by board resolutions, and (b) that none of the directors would have received a lesser amount of dividend than the bonus paid to them, having regard to their shareholding.

ii) Further, the directors were full-time employees of the company receiving salary. They were all graduates from IIM, Bangalore. Taking all these facts into consideration, the bonus was a reward for their work, in addition to the salary paid to them and was in no way related to their shareholding. It was deductible u/s. 36(1)(ii).”

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Assessment: Limitation: Section 158BC: Block Period ending on 14-09-2002: Exclusion of period during which assessment stayed by Court: Limitation resumes on date of vacation of stay and not from date of receipt of order by Department: Assessment barred by limitation:

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CIT vs. Drs. X-Ray and Pathology Institute Pvt. Ltd.;358 ITR 27(All)

On 14-09-2002, search was conducted at the assessee’s premises and a notice u/s. 158BC was issued on 29-04-2003. The assessee filed the return on 16-06-2003. The assessee filed writ petition and challenged the validity of search. By order dated 12-02-2004, the High Court stayed the assessment proceedings. The stay was vacated on 26-08-2009 and the copy of the order was received by the Assessing Officer on 09-11-2009. The Assessing Officer passed the assessment order on 22-06-2010. The Tribunal held that the limitation resumes on the date of vacation of the stay and accordingly the assessment was barred by limitation.

In appeal, the Revenue contended that the limitation resumes from the date of receipt of the order by the Department i.e. 09-11-2009 and accordingly the assessment was within the limitation period. The Allahabad High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The provisions of the Act for filing of the appeal from the date of service of the order would not be attracted to calculate the period of limitation to complete the assessment. This was not a case of a particular act to be performed, but the arrest of the limitation by an interim order passed by the High Court.

ii) As soon as the order was vacated, the limitation would restart and exhaust itself on the period of limitation provided under the Act. The assessment was clearly barred by limitation.”

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Reassessment – Reason to believe that income had escaped assessment – The subsequent reversal of the legal position by the judgment of the Supreme Court does not authorise the Department to reopen the assessment [beyond a period of four years in a case where original assessment is made u/s. 143(3)], which stood closed on the basis of law, as it stood at the relevant time.

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DCIT vs. Simplex Concrete Piles (India) Ltd. (2013) 358 ITR 129 (SC)

The Respondent-assessee was engaged in the business of civil construction works on contract basis and had claimed deduction u/s. 32A, 32AB, 80HH and 80HHB as under:

n the original orders of assessment for the said assessment years reliefs, inter-alia, u/s. 32A as claimed, were allowed in full for the assessment years up to 1989-90 and u/s. 32AB for the assessment year 1988-89 and 1989-90. The Respondent-assessee’s claim for relief u/s. 80HH and 80HHB was also allowed in the assessment order for assessment year 1984-85 but the claim for reliefs u/s. 80HHB for the assessment year 1985-86, 1987-88, 1988-99 and 1989-90 was not allowed in the assessments but the same were allowed in appeals by the appellate authority.

Later     on,     6     notices     all     dated     29th     July,     1994    were issued by the Petitioner u/s. 148 for reopening the assessments u/s. 147 for the assessment years 1984-85 to 1989-90, in view of the decision of the Apex Court in N.C. Budharaja and Co. (1993) 204 ITR 412, where the Supreme Court had held that an “article or “things” used in section 32A, 32AB and 80HH refers only to a movable asset and the words “manufacture or construction of an article” cannot be extended to construction of road,   building, dam or bridge, etc. and  Respondent-assessee was therefore not entitled to deduction u/s. 32A, 32AB or 80HH.

The     Respondent-assessee     filed     a    writ     petition     before the Calcutta High Court challenging all the six   notices     issued    u/s.     148.     The     single    bench    of     Judge of the Calcutta High Court (255 ITR 49) dismissed the    writ    petitions    holding    that    the    Assessing    Officer    had prima facie reason to believe that income had escaped assessment. On appeal, the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court (262 ITR 605) allowed the appeal of the Respondent-assessee. The Division Bench noted that the assessee had claimed benefit u/s. 32A/32AB and section 80HH/80HHB for the relevant assessment years. The Assessing     Officer     had     allowed     the     benefit     under     those    sections, having regard to the law as it stood then governing these provisions.  But there was divergence of opinion in the decision of the various High Courts.  Those benefits would be available only to an industrial undertaking. The assessee had claimed itself to be an industrial undertaking. But this question when came to be considered by the apex court in N.C. Budharaja and Co.’s case (supra), it held that the nature of business as were carried on by Respondent-assessee was not that of an industrial undertaking. The Division Bench held that this decision was rendered in September, 1993. Therefore, admittedly, this was the information on the basis reopening was permissible u/s. 147 but subject to  proviso thereunder. Admittedly, there was no allegation that amounts now sought to be made taxable were not disclosed and therefore it could not be said that there was any omission or failure to disclose fully and truly the materials necessary for assessment. The Petitioner had proposed to reopen the assessment only on the basis of the information derived by it from the decision in N.C. Budharaja’s case and as such the question of four years embargo would not be overcome by the Petitioner.

  On appeal to the Supreme Court by the Petitioner, the Supreme Court held that there was no error in the observation made by the Division Bench of the High Court that once limitation period of 4 years provided in section 149/149(1A) expires then the question of reopening by the Department does not arise. The Supreme Court further held that in any event, at the relevant time, when the assessment order got completed, the law as declared by the jurisdictional High Court, was that the civil construction work carried out by the Respondent-assessee would be entitled to the benefit of   section 80HH which was later reversed in the case of  CIT vs. N.C. Budharaja and Co. The subsequent reversal of the legal position by the judgement of the Supreme Court does not authorise the Department to reopen the assessment, which stood closed on the basis of the law, as it stood at the relevant time. The Supreme Court dismissed civil appeals accordingly.

Appeal to High Court – Substantial Questions of Law framed for consideration by court – The High Court’s power to frame substantial question(s) of law at the time of hearing of the appeal other than the questions on which appeal has been admitted remains u/s. 260A(4) but this power is subject, however, to two conditions, (one) the court must be satisfied that appeal involves such questions, and (two) the court has to record reasons therefor

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CIT vs. Mastek Ltd. [2013] 358 ITR 252 (SC)

The appeal filed by the Revenue u/s. 260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (the “Act”) had been admitted by the High Court and following two substantial questions of law were framed for consideration of the appeal;

“(A) Whether the Appellate Tribunal has substantially erred in law and on facts in reversing the order passed by the Assessing Officer and thereby deleting the adjustment while computation of the arm’s length price of the international transactions of software services distributed by MUK (Associated Enterprise) by making an upward adjustment of Rs. 18,62,45,100?

(B) Whether the Appellate Tribunal has substantially erred in law and on facts in reversing the order passed by the Assessing Officer and thereby deleting the adjustment by way of human resource management services of Rs. 2,92,22,683 treating the same as an international transaction?”

The grievance of the Revenue before the Supreme Court was that by necessary implication, the other questions raised in the memo of appeal before the High Court stood rejected.

The Supreme Court observed that the Revenue was under some misconception. The Supreme Court noted that proviso following the main provision of section 260A(4) of the Act states that nothing stated in s/s. (4), i.e., “The appeal shall be heard only on the question so formulated” shall be deemed to take away or abridge the power of the court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such question.

According to the Supreme Court, the High Court’s power to frame substantial question(s) of law at the time of hearing of the appeal other than the questions on which appeal has been admitted remained u/s. 260A(4). This power was subject, however, to two conditions, (one) the court must be satisfied that appeal involves such questions, and (two) the court has to record reasons therefor.

In view of the above legal position, according to the Supreme Court, there was no justifiable reason to entertain the special leave petition.

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Writ – When an alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved party it must exhaust the same before approaching the writ court—order of High Court quashing the notices issued u/s. 153C as being without jurisdiction set aside by the Supreme Court.

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CIT vs. Vijaybhai N. Chandrani [2013] 357 ITR 713 (SC)

The respondent-assessee purchased a plot of land from “Samutkarsh Co-operative Housing Society” (for short “the society”) being developed by one Savvy Infrastructure Ltd. In 2008, a search was conducted u/s. 132 of the Act, 1961, in the premises of the society and also at the office of Savvy Infrastructure Ltd. During the search certain documents were seized. Upon scrutiny, it was found that the seized documents reflected names of certain individuals including the assessee. Accordingly, for further proceedings the assessing authority had transmitted the seized documents to the jurisdictional assessing authority in whose jurisdiction the assessee was being assessed. After receipt of the said information/documents, the assessing authority has recorded a satisfaction note dated 7th October 2009, that, he has reason to believe that a case of escapement of income may exist and, therefore, the assessee’s case requires to be reassessed for the assessment years 2001-02 to 2006-07 u/s. 153C of the Act, 1961.

Accordingly, the assessing authority issued six show-cause notices u/s. 153C of the Act, 1961, to the assessee for assessment of income of the aforesaid six assessment years and directed him to furnish return of income in respect of the said assessment years in the prescribed form within 30 days of the receipt of the said notices, dated 7th October 2009.

Upon receipt of the notice, the assessee by letter dated 11th November, 2009, requested the assessing authority to furnish him with the copies of the seized documents on the basis of which the said notices were issued. The assessing authority had provided the said documents to the assessee, whereafter the assessee has approached the High Court in a writ petition questioning the six showcause notices dated 7th October, 2009.

The High Court elaborately examined the case at hand and delved into the statutory scheme for assessment in the case of search and requisition as prescribed u/s. 153A, 153B and 153C of the Act, 1961, and reached the conclusion that the documents seized by the assessing authority did not belong to the assessee and, therefore, the condition precedent for issuance of the notice u/s. 153C was not fulfilled. Accordingly, the High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and quashed the said notices issued by the assessing authority.

Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgement and order passed by the High Court, the assessing authority was before the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court observed that the jurisdictional assessing authority, upon having a reason to believe that the documents seized indicated escapement of income, had issued show-case notices u/s. 153C to the assessee for reassessment of his income during the assessment years 2001-02 to 2006-07. Thereafter, upon request of the assessee, the assessing authority had furnished him with the copies of documents seized. The assessee being dissatisfied with the said documents instead of filing his explanation/reply to the show-cause notices, had filed a writ petition before the High Court.

According to the Supreme Court, at the said stage of issuance of the notices u/s. 153C, the assessee could have addressed his grievances and explained his stand to the assessing authority by filing an appropriate reply to the said notices instead of filing the writ petition impugning the said notices. The Supreme Court remarked that it is settled law that when an alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved party, it must exhaust the same before approaching the writ court.

The Supreme Court held that in the present case, the assessee had invoked the writ jurisdiction of the High Court at the first instance without first exhausting the alternative remedies provided under the Act. According to the Supreme Court, at the said stage of proceedings, the High Court ought not have entertained the writ petition and instead should have directed the assessee to file reply to the said notices and upon receipt of a decision from the assessing authority, if for any reason it is aggrieved by the said decision, to question the same before the forum provided under the Act.

In view of the above, without expressing any opinion on the correctness or otherwise of the construction that was placed by the High Court on section 153C, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgement and order of the High Court. Further, the Supreme Court granted time to the assessee, if it so desired, to file reply/objections, if any, as contemplated in the said notices within 15 days time from the date of order. If such reply/ objections were filed within time granted by this court, the assessing authority would first consider the said reply/objections and thereafter direct the assessee to file the return for the assessment years in question. The Supreme Court clarified that while framing the assessment order, the assessing authority would not be influenced by any observations made by the High Court while disposing of the writ petition and if, for any reason, the assessment order went against the assessee, he/it would avail of and exhaust the remedies available to him/it under the Income-tax Act, 1961.

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Whether Assessee is Entitled to Interest on Delayed Payment of Interest on Refund? – Section 244A – Part I

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Article 265 of the Constitution provides that no tax shall be levied or collected except by the authority of law. The Article provides that not only levy but also the collection of a tax by the Government must be under the authority of law. In pursuance of such law, the refund claims are regulated under the provisions of Chapter XIX of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (the Act). Section 237 effectively provides for refund of excess tax paid by the assessee. This is a general provision for claim of refund. A provision is also made in section 240 which effectively provides for refund of any amount that becomes due to the assessee as a result of any order passed in appeal or other proceedings under the Act. This is a special provision dealing with refund which imposes an obligation on the Assessing Officer (AO) to refund such amount for which the assessee is not required to make any claim. All the above provisions relating to payment of interest on refund provide for payment of simple interest at the specified rate and for the period specified therein. Section 241 authorising the AO to withheld refund in certain cases has been omitted from 1st June, 2001. Section 245 provides for adjustment of the amount of refund or part thereof against any sum remaining payable under the Act after giving an intimation in writing to the assessee for the proposal of such adjustment.

The Act also provided for payment of interest on refund due to the assessee under various provisions such as section 214 (excess payment of advance tax), section 243 (interest on delayed refunds), section 244 (interest on refund where no claim is needed) etc. Section becomes due to the assessee in pursuance of an order referred to in section 240. Certain amendments were made from time to time in these provisions with which we are not concerned in this write-up and hence the same are not referred to. Only relevant broad provisions dealing with interest on refunds are noted for this purpose. These provisions relating to interest on refunds are applicable in respect of assessment year 1988-89 and earlier years (old provisions of interest).

The interest u/s. 214 was payable on the excess payment of advance tax for the period from the first day of the assessment year upto the date of regular assessment. The regular assessment is defined in section 2(40) to mean the assessment made in section 143(3) or section 144. In this context, the issue had come up before the Apex Court in the case of Modi Industries Ltd. [216 ITR 759] to decide the meaning of the expression ‘regular assessment’ as High Courts had taken different views on the same. In a detailed judgment analysing various relevant provisions providing for interest on refund, and the views expressed by various High courts in that respect, the Apex Court approved the view expressed by certain High courts such as Bombay, Allahabad, Andhra Pradesh etc. which effectively held that the expression ‘regular assessment’ in section 214 means the original assessment. In the process of deciding the above issue and the impact of the provisions of section 214 as well as section 244 dealing with interest to be granted on refund, the Court also expressed the view that there is no right to get interest on refund except as provided by the statute. The Court also stated that interpretation of section 214 or any other section of the Act should not be made on the assumption that interest has to be paid whenever an amount which has been retained by the Revenue in exercise of the statutory power becomes refundable as a result of any subsequent proceeding.

Accordingly, the interest on excess payment of advance tax u/s. 214 is not payable from the date of payment of tax but from the first day of relevant assessment year nor it is payable till the date of refund but it is payable upto the date of ‘regular assessment’. Interest u/s. 243 or section 244(1) was payable upto the date of refund but only in cases where the refund was not made within the stipulated period. Interest u/s. 244 (1A) was payable in cases where the amount paid by the assessee is found in excess of his liability as result of appeal or other proceedings under the Act and such interest was payable on the excess amount from the date of payment of such amount to the date of the grant of refund. The Court also held that for the purpose of section 244(1A), the amount of advance payment of tax and the amount of tax deducted at source (TDS) must be treated as payment of income-tax pursuant to an order of assessment on and from the date when these amounts were set off against the tax demand raised in the assessment order, in other words the date of the assessment order. The Court also dealt with the other aspects of granting interest on refund with which we are not concerned in this write-up.

From the assessment year 1989-90, the provisions for interest on refund are made in section 244AA. This section effectively provides for payment of interest on any amount of refund that becomes due to the assessee under the Act to be calculated in the manner provided therein which effectively provides for payment of interest upto the date on which the refund is granted.

All the provisions relating to interest provide for the simple interest on refund amount at the specified rate which has undergone change from time to time.

In practice, in many cases, the payment of refund gets delayed for one or the other reasons and the refunds are made to the assessee without payment of interest on such delayed payment of refunds and in such cases, the payment of such interest gets delayed and the period of such delayed payment of interest sometime runs into years. In such cases, the issue has come up in the past as to whether the assessee can claim interest on such delayed payment of interest or any compensation for unjustified delay in payment of such interest.

The issue referred to in para above has been considered by the Courts in the past with different set of facts but with a common factor of inordinate delay in payment of interest that becomes due to the assessee under the provisions of the Act. In large number of cases, the Courts had found their way to compensate the assessee for the unjustified delay in payment of interest. It seems that Courts have attempted to decide such cases bearing in mind the principle of equity and fairness. In fact, the Gauhati High Court in the case of Jwala Prasad Sikaria [175 ITR 535] has gone to the extent of clearly stating that the assessee is entitled to payment of such interest due to delay even if there is no statutory provision in this regard.

1.4.1   In this context, the judgment of the Gujarat High Court in the case of D. J. Works [195 ITR 227] is worth noting.  In this case, while giving effect to the appellate orders for the assessment years 1983-84 to 1985-86, the refunds were granted without interest to the assessee on different dates.  The assessee had filed writ petition before the Gujarat High Court for non-payment of interest and pending this petition, the interest for all the three years was paid with some difference in the amount which is not relevant for the issue under consideration. The assessee had contended before the Court that the AO illegally withheld the payment of interest and since the retention or withholding of interest was without the authority of law, the Revenue is liable to pay interest on the amounts of interest wrongfully withheld. The Revenue had contended that there is no provision in the Act for payment of interest on interest. On these facts, the Court took the view that section 214(1) itself recognises in principle the liability of the Government to pay interest on excess tax paid by the assessee. The Court noted that the legislature itself has considered it fair and reasonable to avoid interest on excess tax paid by the assessee and retained by the Government. According to the Court, the same principle should be extended to the payment of interest, which has been wrongfully withheld by the AO or the Government. It is the duty of the AO to pay interest while granting refund of excess amount paid by the assessee.  If the excess tax paid cannot be retained without payment of interest, so also the interest which is payable thereon cannot be retained without payment of interest. Though there is no specific provision for payment of interest on such interest, on general principle, the Government is liable to pay interest which had been due to the assessee u/s. 244(1) at the same rate at which the refund amount carries the interest. It seems that this judgment of the Gujarat High Court was followed by the Tribunal in the case of Narendra Doshi and this decision was affirmed by the M.P. High Court (Indore Bench). The question raised before the M.P. High Court  was `Whether Appellate Tribunal was justified in law in directing to allow interest on interest, when the law points for grant of simple interest only?’ This was answered in affirmative and in favour of the assessee. This  judgment of the M. P. High Court (dated 3rd May, 1999 in ITR No. 5 of 1996) has been affirmed by the Apex Court [254 ITR 606] stating that the said judgment of the Gujarat High Court had been followed by the same High Court in the case of Chimanlal S. Patel [210 ITR 419] and both these decisions held that “the Revenue is liable to pay interest on the amount of interest which it should have paid to the assessee but has unjustifiably failed to do so.”   Having noted these facts, the Apex Court held that “The Revenue has not challenged the correctness of the two decisions of the Gujarat High Court.  They must, therefore, be bound by the principle laid down therein.  Following that principle, the question has, as we find, been rightly answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee.”  Based on this, the appeal of the Revenue against the judgment of the M. P. High Court was dismissed.  As such, the judgments of the Gujarat High Court in this respect were impliedly approved.  

1.4.2 The issue referred to in para 1.3 also came up before the Apex Court in the case of Sandvik Asia Ltd. [280 ITR 643] in which the Court dealt with the issue in detail and in a reasoned order, decided the issue in favour of the assessee. In this case, the Court also took the view that even assuming that there is no provision in the Act for payment of compensation, the compensation for delay is required to be paid in view of the decision of this Court  viz, Narendra Doshi (supra).  The similar view also emerges from the observation of the Apex Court in the case of H.E.G Ltd. [324 ITR 331].The High Courts and the Tribunal have followed these judgments in many cases and the position on this regard was largely getting settled.

1.5    In the last year, the division bench of the Apex Court in the case of Gujarat Flouro Chemicals [252 CTR 237] doubted the correctness of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Sandvik Asia Ltd. (supra).  Accordingly, the Court recommended that the issue should be referred to a larger bench.  Recently, the Apex Court in the case of Gujarat Flouro Chemicals Ltd., has, in principle, decided the issue referred to it and considering its impact, it is thought fit to consider the same in this column.

    Sandvik Asia Ltd. vs. CIT – 280 ITR 643 (SC)

2.1       In the above case, the relevant facts were :  the assessee was entitled to certain refunds for the assessment years 1977-78, 1978-79, 1981-82 and 1982-83.  After receiving the refund, the issue for non/ short grant of interest remained for which the assessee had filed a revision petition u/s. 264 before the Commissioner of Income-tax (CIT) on 27th February, 1987 which was rejected by order dated 28th February, 1990.  Against this order, it appears that the assessee had moved the Apex Court and common order dated 30th April, 1997 was passed by the Apex Court under which the matter was remanded to the CIT for considering the claim of interest in accordance with the principle laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Modi Industries Ltd. (supra).  Under these circumstances, the interest u/s. 214/ 244 was determined by the Revenue at Rs. 40,84,906 vide order dated 27th March, 1998 which appears to have been paid. In this case, there was a delay in payment of interest for various periods ranging from 12 to 17 years.

2.1.1    As a result of the above, the assessee filed a revision petition dated 3rd July, 1998 before the CIT asking for interest on delayed payment of interest upto the date of payment thereof which was rejected against  which he assessee had filed writ petitions before the Bombay High Court on 7th June, 2001 without any success.  On these facts, the issue referred to in para 1.3 above came up for consideration before the Apex Court at the instance of the assessee.  

2.2      For dealing with the appeals of the assessee, the Court noted that substantial and important questions of law of great general public importance as well as under the Act pertaining to those four assessment years have been raised.  The Court then stated that [Page No. 646] :

    “ The main issue raised in these appeals is whether an assessee is entitled to be compensated by the Income-tax Department for the delay in paying to the assessee amounts admittedly due to it?  ”

2.3      On behalf of the assessee, it was, interalia, contended that the High Court ought to have held that the assessee is entitled to compensation by way of interest for the delay in payment of amounts lawfully due to it and which were withheld wrongly and contrary to the law for an inordinately long period. The interest u/s. 214/ 244 is also a refund as contemplated in section 240 and hence, the Revenue is liable to pay interest u/s. 244 in respect of delay in payment of such interest.  The High Court has failed to appreciate that during this period, the Department has enjoyed the benefit of the funds while the assessee was deprived of the same. It was further contended that the High Court erred in the purporting  to distinguish/explain the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Narendra Doshi (supra) based on various decisions which were neither cited in the course of hearing nor were put to the counsel appearing and as such, the assessee had no opportunity  to deal with the same. It was also contended that the High Court’s decision was erroneous as it rejected assesses claim on the sole ground that as the ‘amount due’ to the assessee was of interest, no compensation could be paid to it even when gross delay in payment was admittedly made by the Revenue contrary to the law. The case of the assessee is covered by section 240 which refers to `any amount’ which becomes due to the assessee which should include interest payable under the Act.  It was further contended that in the case of Narendra Doshi (supra), the Court had set out two issues before itself, viz., whether when Revenue had not challenged the correctness of the Gujarat High Court decisions it was bound by the principle laid down therein and whether the Gujarat High Court had rightly laid down the principle that assessee would be entitled to interest on interest. The Apex Court had decided both the issues in favour of the assessee. The Bombay High Court erred in distinguishing this decision based on various decisions which were never cited during the course of hearing and which were never put to the counsel appearing for the assessee.  

2.4     On behalf of the Revenue, it was,  interalia, contended that none of the provisions of the law contained in the Act provided for payment of interest on interest and certainly not section 244(1).  In the matter of interpretation of taxing statute, there is no scope for considerations of equity or intendment and what is expected is strict interpretation.  When the statute does not permit grant of interest, it would be inappropriate to grant interest in exercise of writ jurisdiction. Strongly relying on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Modi Industries Ltd.  (supra), it was further contended that in that case the Court clarified two factors, namely, the amount on which the interest is to be granted and the time period for which it is to be granted u/s. 214/section 244. This decision does not refer to interest on interest. Considering the overall facts and in particular, the fact that the Apex Court in its earlier order passed on 30th April 1997 directed the Revenue to decide the revision petition in accordance with the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Modi Industries Ltd. (supra), the Revenue had not wrongfully withheld the assessee’s money without any authority of law.  It was also contended that the interest payable on the refund amount u/s. 244 is a simple interest and neither compounded interest nor interest on interest is payable. It was also contended that in the case of Modi Industries Ltd. (supra), the scope of section 214 of the Act was discussed and it was held that there is no right to get interest on refund except as provided by the statute and as such, the Bombay High Court was justified in rejecting the alternative claim of the assessee on this basis.

2.5    After considering the contentions raised by both the sides, the Court noted the relevant provisions of the Act and observed as under [Page 658] :

“ We have given our anxious and thoughtful consideration to the elaborate submissions made by counsel appearing on either side. In our opinion, the High court has failed to notice that in view of the express provisions of the Act an assessee is entitled to compensation by way of interest for the delay in the payment of amounts lawfully due to the appellant which were withheld wrongly and contrary to the law by the Department for an inordinate long period of upto 17 years. “

2.6    The Court then noted the judgment of the Gujarat High Court in the case of D. J. Works (supra) referred to in para 1.4.1 above and noted the fact of the view taken therein. The Court then also noted the judgment of the M. P. High Court in the case of Narendra Doshi and the question referred to before the High Court in that case and the fact that the said judgment of the M. P. High Court is affirmed by the Apex Court. The Court also noted the relevant observations from the Apex Court referred to in para 1.4.1 in that regard. The Court then stated that in the case of Narendra Doshi (supra) the Apex Court has held as under [Page No. 660]:

“The Revenue has not challenged the correctness of the two decisions of the Gujarat High Court. They must, therefore, be bound by the principle laid down therein. Following that principle, the question has, as we find, been rightly answered (by the Madhya Pradesh High Court) in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee.

The civil appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs.”

2.7    Dealing with the contention of the Revenue that section 244 provides for a simple interest and there is no provision in the Act for payment of interest on interest, the Court stated as under [Pages 663/ 664]:

“This contention, in our opinion, has no merit. Learned counsel for the assessee cited the decision Jwala Prasad Sikaria [1989] 175 ITR 535 (Gauhati) in support of his contention wherein the Gauhati High Court held that a citizen is entitled to payment of interest due to delay even if there is no statutory provision in this regard.

………    The High Court held that where an assessment is made under the Act of 1922 after the commencement of the 1961 Act and refund is granted to the assessee, interest is payable on such refund. The High Court has further held (head-note):

“The interest would, however, be deemed to have accrued after expiry of three months from the end of the month in which refund had become payable. The rate applicable would be that applicable to grant of refund under the Act of 1961 at the relevant time.”

The above decision was cited before the Bombay High Court. The High Court very conveniently omitted to consider the decision holding that the decision in Jwala Prasad Sikaria vs. CIT [1989] 175 ITR 535 (Gauhati) was in the peculiar facts of the case.”

2.8    The Court then dealt with the contentions of the Revenue that the High Court was right in law in rejecting the assesse’s claim on the sole ground that as the ‘amount due’ was of interest, no compensation could be made even when gross delay in payment was admittedly made by the Revenue. In this respect, the Court referred to the judgment of the Madras High Court in the case of Needle Industries Pvt. Ltd. [233 ITR 370] in which the Court held that the expression “amount” in section 244(1A) of the Act would include the amount of interest levied and paid u/s. 139(8) and 215 of the Act and collected in pursuance of an order of assessment which was refunded. For this, the Madras High Court agreed with the view taken by the M. P. High Court in the case of Sardar Balwant Singh Gujaral [86 CTR 64] wherein also the Court held that liability to pay interest is on the amount of refund due and the assessee would be entitled to interest on the amount of refund due which includes interest paid u/s. 139(8) and 215 of the Act.

2.9:    The Court then further took the view that assuming there is no provision in the Act for payment of compensation, compensation for delay is required to be paid in view of the decision of this Court in the case of Narendra Doshi referred to in para 1.4.1 above. In this regard, the Court further stated as under [Page 669] :

“………This is clearly a decision of this court on the merits of the matter, albeit proceeding on the assumption that there was no provision in the Act granting interest on unpaid interest, in favour of the appellant’s contentions.

In the impugned order, the Bombay High Court has held that the Madhya Pradesh High Court was not on the point of payment of interest on interest, a view which is ex facie erroneous and clearly impossible to sustain as a plain reading of the question before the Madhya Pradesh High Court will show.”

2.10: Referring to the contentions of the Revenue that the delay in the present case was justified, the Court observed as under [Page 670] :

“ In our view, there is no question of the delay being “justifiable” as is argued and in any event if the Revenue takes an erroneous view of the law, that cannot mean that the withholding of monies is “justifiable” or “not wrongful”. There is no exception to the principle laid down for an allegedly “justifiable” withholding, and even if there was, 17 (or 12) years delay has not been and cannot in the circumstances be justified.”

2.11:    Dealing with the issue as to whether the Act provides for payment of compensation for delayed payments of amounts due to an as-sessee in a case where these amounts include interest, the Court took the view as follows [Page 671] :

“In our view, the Act recognises the principle that a person should only be taxed in accordance with law and hence where excess amounts of tax are collected from an assessee or any amounts are wrongfully withheld from an assessee without author-ity of law the Revenue must compensate the assessee.”

2.11.1: The Court also did not agree with the view of the Bombay High Court that the word “refund” must mean an amount previously paid by an assessee and does not relate to an amount payable by the Revenue by way of interest on such sums. The Court also dealt with the phrase ‘any amount becoming due to an assessee’ used in section 240 of the Act and stated that section 240 provides for refund by the Revenue on appeal etc. and accordingly deals with all subsequent stages of proceedings and therefore, this phrase is used. Referring to the judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of Good Year India Ltd., [249 ITR 527], the Court stated that in this case the Delhi High Court has held that this phrase would include interest and hence the assessee was entitled to further interest on interest wrongfully withheld. The Delhi High Court also referred to the judgment of the Gujarat High Court in the case of D. J. Works (supra) and read it as taking the same view. Similar view is also taken by the Madras High Court in the case of Needle Industries Pvt. Ltd. ( supra) as well as by the Kerala High Court in the case of Ambat Echukutty Menon [173 ITR 581]. The Court then held as under [Page 672] :

“In our opinion, the appellant is entitled to interest u/s. 244 and/ or section 244A of the Act in accordance with the terms and provisions of the said sections. The interest previously granted to it has been computed upto March 27, 1981 and March 31, 1986 (under different sections of the Act) and its present claim is for compensation for periods of delay after these dates.”

2.11.2 The Court then further stated as under [Page 673] :

“In the present appeal, the respondents have argued that the compensation claimed by the appellant is for delay by the Revenue in paying of interest, and this does fall within the meaning of refund as set out in section 237 of the Act. The relevant provision is section 240 of the Act which clearly lays down that what is relevant is whether any amount has become due to an assessee, and further the phrase any amount will also encompass interest. This view has been accepted by various High Courts such as the Delhi, Madras, Kerala High Court, etc.”

2.12 Considering the observations in the case of Modi Industries Ltd. (supra) that there is no right to receive interest except as provided by the statute on which the Bombay High Court had relied to decide the issue against the assessee, the Court stated as under [Page 672] :

“…… The decision in Modi Industries Ltd.’s case [1995] 216 ITR 759 (SC), has no bearing whatsoever on the issue in hand as the issue in that case was the correct meaning of the phrase “regular assessment” and as a consequence under which provision an assessee was entitled to interest for the period up to the date of regular assessment and thereafter. The matter of what was due to it in terms of the decision in Modi Industries Ltd.’s case [1995] 216 ITR 759 (SC) is over, concluded, no longer in dispute and was agreed/ accepted on March 27, 1998 when the second respondent gave effect to the previous order of this court dated April 30, 1997. The working of the respondents itself conclusively shows, further the interest received is admittedly in accordance with the Act. The decision in Modi Industries Ltd.’s case [1995] 216 ITR 759(SC), in our view, has no bearing whatsoever on the matter in hand. The main issue now is whether an assessee is entitled to be compensated by the Revenue for the delay in paying to the assessee’s amounts admittedly due to it?”

2.13: The Court then also dealt with the issue as to whether on general principles the assessee ought to have been compensated for the inordinate delay in receiving monies properly due to it. In this context, the Court also referred to Circular dated 2nd January, 2002 issued by the Central Excise Department on the subject of refund of deposits and noted that the Revenue has decided to view cases of the delay beyond the period of three months in the cases referred to therein adversely and decided to initiate appropriate disciplinary ac-tion against the concerned defaulting officer. The Board has also decided to implement the order passed by the Tribunal for payment of interest and the interest payable shall be paid forthwith.

2.13.1: Referring to the facts of the case of the assessee the Court observed as under [Page 676] :

“Interest on refund was granted to the appellant after a substantial lapse of time and hence it should be entitled to compensation for this period of delay. The High court has failed to appreciate that while charging interest from the assesses, the Department first adjusts the amount paid towards interest so that the principal amount of tax payable remains outstanding and they are entitled to charge interest till the entire outstanding is paid. But when it comes to granting of interest on refund of taxes, the refunds are first adjusted towards the taxes and then the balance towards interest. Hence as per the stand that the Department takes they are liable to pay interest only up to the date of refund of tax while they take the benefit of the assesses funds by delaying the payment of interest on refunds without incurring any further liability to pay interest. This stand taken by the respondents is discriminatory in nature and thereby causing great prejudice to lakhs and lakhs of assesses. A very large number of assessees are adversely affected inasmuch as the Income-tax Department can now simply refuse to pay to the assesses amounts of interest lawfully and admittedly due to them as has happened in the instant case. …………. Such actions and consequences, in our opinion, seriously affect the administration of justice and the rule of law.”

2.13.2: The Court then referred to the dictionary meaning of the word ‘compensation’. The Court then stated as under [Page 677] :

“ There cannot be any doubt that the award of interest on the refunded amount is as per the statute provisions of law as it then stood and on the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case. When a specific provision has been made under the statute, such provision has to govern the field. Therefore, the court has to take all relevant factors into consid-eration while awarding the rate of interest on the compensation.”

2.14:    Considering a manner in which the mat-ter was handled by the Department, the Court found it necessary to send the copy of the judgment to the Finance Minister for taking appropriate action against the erring officers and in this context to the Court stated as under [Page 677] :

“ This is a fit and proper case in which action should be initiated against all the officers concerned who were all in charge of this case at the appropriate and relevant point of time and because of whose inaction the appellant was made to suffer both financially and mentally, even though the amount was liable to be refunded in the year 1986 and even prior thereto. A copy of this judgment will be forwarded to the hon’ble Minister for Finance for his perusal and further appropriate action against the erring officials on whose lethargic and adamant attitude the Department has to suffer financially.”

Apart from issuing general instruction (No.2, dated 28th March 2007) for granting interest alongwith refund , it is not known wheter any serious action is taken by the Government on the above recommendation of the Court.

2.15:    Finally, the Court decided the appeals in favour of the assessee and reversed the judgment of the Bombay High Court and held as under [Page 678] :

“ The assessment years in question in the four appeals are the assessment years 1977-78, 1978-79, 1981-82 and 1982-83. Already the matter was pending for more than two decades. We, therefore, direct the respondents herein to pay the interest on Rs. 40,84,906 (rounded off to Rs. 40,84,900) simple interest at 9 % per annum from March 31, 1986 to March 27, 1998 within one month from today failing which the Department shall pay the penal interest at 15 % per annum for the above said period. “

2.16:    From the above judgment, it would appear that the Court has taken a view that the expression ‘amount’ appearing in setion 244(1A) refers not only to the tax but also to the interest and it cannot be limited to the tax paid in pursuance of the assessment order. As such, in view of the express provisions of the Act, an assessee is entitled to compensation by way of interest for delay in the payment of amounts lawfully due to the assessee which are withheld wrongfully and contrary to law. Even assuming that there is no provision for payment for compensation, compensation for delay is required to be paid as the Act itself recognizes the principle that the Revenue is liable to pay interest when excess tax was retained and the same principle should be extended to cases where interest was retained. The Court has also explained that Narendra Doshi’s case (supra) was clearly a decision on the merit though it proceeded on the assumption that there was no provision in the Act granting interest on unpaid interest.

[ To be Concluded]

Whether Assessee is Entitled to Interest on Delayed Payment of Interest on Refund? – Section 244A – Part II

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Introduction

3.1   As stated in PART 1 of this write-up, the apex court in the case of Sandvik Asia Ltd. [Sandvik] took the view that the expression ‘amount’ appearing in section 244(1A) refers not only to the tax but also to the interest and it cannot be limited to the tax paid in pursuance of the assessment order. Accordingly, the Court held that in view of the express provision of the Act, an assessee is entitled to compensation by way of interest for delay in payment of amounts lawfully due to the assessee which are withheld wrongfully and contrary to law. The Court also further took the view that even if there is no provision in the Act for payment of compensation, the compensation for delay is required to be paid as the Act itself recognises the principle that the Revenue is liable to pay interest when excess tax was retained and the same principle should be extended to the cases where interest was retained. For this, the Court also relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Narendra Doshi referred to in para 1.4.1 of PART 1 of this write-up.

3.1.1   Subsequent to the judgment of the Apex Court in Sandvik’s case, the CBDT issued Instruction No. 2 dated 28th March, 2007 which is worth noting and hence the relevant part thereof is reproduced hereunder [209 CTR (Statute) 17]:

“Sub: Section 244A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 – Refunds – Interest on – Grant of interest on refunds under section 244A simultaneously with issue of refund.

In terms of section 244A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (Act), an assessee is entitled to receive interest calculated in the manner provided in the said section on the amount of refund due under the Act. The interest is to be granted simultaneously with the refund and there should normally be no reason to grant refund without adding the entitled interest. In the case of Sandvik Asia Ltd. vs. CIT (2006) 200 CTR (SC) 505 : (2006) 280 ITR 643 (SC), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, inter alia, adversely commented upon the delay in grant of interest on refund and awarded compensation to the assessee for the said delay by the Department. While taking this view, the Supreme Court referred to the judgment of the Gujarat High Court in the case of D.J. Works vs. Dy. CIT (1992) 102 CTR (Guj) 2 : (1992) 195 ITR 227 (Guj) wherein the High Court had held that though there is no specific provision for payment of interest on interest, but if interest on the refund is wrongfully retained, interest on interest would be payable. The Court further held that even assuming that there was no provision in the Act for payment of compensation, on general principles, compensation was payable to the assessee for the delayed payment of interest. The Court also recommended that action be initiated against the officers responsible for the delay.

2. It is necessary to remind all Assessing Officers that while granting refund to the assessee, care should be taken to ensure that any interest payable u/s. 244A on the amount of refund due should be granted simultaneously with the grant of refund and there should, in no case, be any omission or delay on the grant of such interest. Failure to do so will be viewed adversely and the officer concerned will be held personally accountable, inviting appropriate action.

3. These instructions may be brought to the notice of all officers working in your region for strict compliance. The Range Officers should be directed to carry out periodic test checks of cases within their jurisdiction to ensure that provisions of section 244A are scrupulously implemented. ………………”

3.1.2    After the above judgment of the Apex Court, the High Courts as well as the Tribunal have followed/ explained the same in various cases such as Motor General Finance Ltd. [320 ITR 881 (Del)], Gujarat Fourochemicals Ltd. [300 ITR 328 (Guj)], State Bank of Travancore [292 ITR (AT) 56 – Cochin), Delhi Tourism Transportation Corp. [(2012) 35 CCH 046 – Del Trib], Deutsche Bank AG [ITA Nos. 3789, 3790 & 4282/Mum/2010], etc. In these cases, the judgment of the apex court in Sandvik’s case is understood as laying down the prin-ciple that the assessee is also entitled to interest on unpaid interest receivable by him on the refund due to him. When the correct interest is paid by the Revenue along with the refund, this issue was not considered as relevant. It may also be noted that the Ahmedabad Bench (TM) of the Tribunal in the case of Nirma Chemical Works Ltd. [125 TTJ 487] did not follow Sandvik’s case on the ground that it was a case prior to the assess-ment year 1989-90 (i.e., it was not rendered in the context of the provisions of section 244A) and also on the basis that it was a case where the interest has been granted in a writ as compensation and not as interest on interest under the Act. According to the Tribunal, section 244A(1)(a) grants interest only on that amount of refund which is out of the tax paid by the assessee by way of advance tax/TDS/TCS and not on the amount of interest due to the assessee but withheld by the Revenue. Section 244A(1)(b) provides for interest on refund in any other case in which case the interest has to be calculated from the ‘date of payment of the tax or penalty’. The Tribunal also stated that the Apex Court also considered certain deci-sions laying down a ratio that “the amount of refund” includes refund of tax as well as interest. According to the Tribunal, even in such a case the assessee will not be entitled to interest as unlike section 244 which grants interest on any amount of refund, section 244A provides for grant of interest on the amount of refund out of any tax/penalty paid by the assessee or collected from him and in any case, otherwise it requires the date of payment by the assessee. Even if the inter-est due to an assessee is considered to be a ‘refund of any amount’ u/s. 240 or under the opening part of section 244A(1) as held by the courts in certain cases, ‘it would not entitle an assessee to further interest on that amount of interest either under Clause (a) of section 244A(1) as it was not a refund out of any tax paid by him or collected from him; nor under Clause (b) of section 244A(1) as the interest is to start from the date of payment of tax or penalty and in the case of refund of interest, there cannot be the date of payment by an assessee’. Further, according to the Tribunal, the Supreme Court made it clear in para 40 of the judgment that there cannot be any doubt that the amount of interest on the refunded amount is as per the provisions of law as it then stood and on the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. When a specific provision has been made under the statute, such provision has to govern the field. The Tribunal then further stated that the AO is the statutory author-ity. The Tribunal, as an appellant authority, is likewise a statutory authority. It is not a court of equity. Therefore, it has to act as per the provisions of the Act and if a benefit or a relief is not available to an assessee under the Act, it cannot be granted on the grounds of equity or the general provisions of law as can be granted by the courts in their writ jurisdiction. Referring to the full Bench Judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of Carona Sahu Co. Ltd. [146 ITR 452], the Tribunal held that though interest is compensatory in character, yet there is no right to receive interest other than by right created under a statute. According to the Tribunal, section 244A apparently reveals that there is a liability to pay interest on delayed payment of refund amount but the section does not provide for payment of any interest on interest, even though there is a delay in payment of such interest. Finally, the Tri-bunal held that looking to the language of section 244A, the assessee was not entitled to any interest on interest as it was not a case of the refund of amount out of any tax paid by or collected from the assessee nor it has a date of payment by the assessee from which it can run. It may also be noted that the phrase ‘date of payment of tax or penalty’ is also defined in the Explanation to section 244A(1) to mean that ‘the date on and from which the amount of tax or penalty specified in the notice of demand issued under section 156 is paid in excess of such demand’. However, it is worth not-ing that even u/s. 244(1A), the interest was required to be calculated from the date of excess payment and still the Apex Court in Sandvik’s case took the view that assessee is entitled to interest on unpaid amount of interest as mentioned in para 3.1 above. Under the circumstances, to what extent the distinction drawn by the Tribunal in the context of section 244A(1)(b) should hold good could be a matter of debate. It may also be noted that in this case the Tribunal did not have the benefit considering the judgment of the apex court in the case of H.E.G Ltd. and its effect referred to in para 3.1.3 to 3.1.3.3 as the same was delivered subsequently. As such, the view taken by the Tribunal in this case may not be necessarily regarded as correct.

3.1.3    The judgment of the apex court in the case of HEG Ltd. [324 ITR 331] is also worth noting. In this case, the Court was dealing with batch of appeals. At the outset, the Court stated that if a question is not properly framed then, at times, confusion arises resulting in wrong answers and the present batch of appeals is an illustration thereof. For this purpose, the Court noted the facts of the case of one of the appeals [SLP(SC) No. 18045/2009] for the assessment year 1993-94 and stated that the question framed by the Revenue with regard to the entitlement of the assessee to claim interest on interest u/s. 244A is erroneous. As such, the Court clarified that this is not a case where the assessee is claiming com-pound interest or interest on interest as is sought to be made out by the Revenue. The Court then dealt with a question as to what is the meaning of the words “refund of any amount becomes due to the assessee” in section 244A? In this context, the Court rejected the argument of the Revenue that the words “any amount” will not include the interest which accrued to the assessee for delay in refunding the amount and held as under [Page No. 333]:

“………….We see no merit in this argument. The interest component will partake of the character of the “amount due” under section 244A. It becomes as integral part of Rs. 45,73,528 which is not paid for 57 months after the said amount became due and payable. As can be seen from the facts narrated above, this is the case of short payment by the Department and it is in this way that the assessee claims interest u/s. 244A of the Income-tax Act. Therefore, on both the aforestated grounds, we are of the view that the assessee was entitled to interest for 57 months on Rs. 45,73,528. The principal amount of Rs. 45,73,528 has been paid on 31st December, 1997 but net of interest which, as stated above, partook of the character of “amount due” u/s. 244A.”

3.1.3.1 From the available facts in the above judgment, it seems that the total tax paid had two components, viz., TDS (Rs. 45,73,528) and tax paid after the original assessment (Rs. 1,71,00,320). It seems that the assessee was entitled to refund of Rs. 2,16,73,848 consisting of the above two components from which, it appears that refund of Rs. 45,73,528 (TDS component) was delayed by 57 months and the assessee had claimed statutory interest u/s. 244A for this delayed refund of Rs. 45,73,528 for a period from 1st April, 1993 to 31st December, 1997. Therefore, it appears that the amount of Rs. 45,73,528 represents the principal amount and does not seem to include any interest. As such, there is no clarity on the facts in the context of the above view expressed by the apex court.

3.1.3.2 It may be noted that in the above case, in the Head Notes of the ITR, references are given to various appeal numbers and it is also mentioned that such appeals are arising out of the judgment of the MP High Court in the case of CIT vs. H.E.G. Ltd. reported in 310 ITR 341 and of the Madras High Court in the case of Cholamandalam Investment and Finance Co. Ltd. reported in 294 ITR 438. There seem to be some confusion in this regard. The facts dealt with in the text of the judgment of the apex court are, it is stated, for the assessment year 1993-94 [seems to be in the case of H.E.G. Ltd.] and it appears that this assessment year was not covered in the judgment of the MP High Court reported in 310 ITR 341 in which the High Court has held that grant of interest on interest is permis-sible and this position does not change u/s. 244A. The judgment of the MP High Court for the assessment year 1993-94 could not be verified as the same was not available. Accordingly, in view of lack of clarity on the factual position, it seems difficult to take a view that the judgment of the MP High Court reported in 310 ITR 341 has been affirmed by the apex court as mentioned in the Head Notes of the ITR. This position gets further clarified by the fact that the apex court has also stated that the question does not relate to interest on interest. Notwithstanding this position, this judgment of the apex court supports the view that the words ‘amount due’ appearing in section 244A include interest and the interest component will partake of the character of the ‘amount due’ under section 244A. Similar view was also taken in Sandvik’s case in the context of section 244(1A) as mentioned in para 2.16 of PART 1 of this write-up.

3.1.3.3 The effect of the judgment of the apex court in H.E.G. Ltd. (supra) has been explained by the Delhi High Court in a recent judgment dated 6th September, 2013 in the case of India Trade Promotion Organisation [ITA Nos. 167 & 168 of 2012]. This judgment has been delivered in the context of claim of interest u/s. 244A on account of delayed payment of interest after granting the refund of the principal amount. The High Court explained that if the refund does not include interest due and payable on the amount refunded, the Revenue would be liable to pay interest on the shortfall. This does not amount to payment of interest on interest. The Court has also explained this with example. According to the Court, the claim of such interest is on account of the shortfall in payment of the amount due and payable (including interest) and not a claim of interest on interest.

Gujarat Flourochemicals Ltd. vs. CIT – 300 ITR 328 (Guj)

4.1 The issue with regard to the entitlement of interest on interest also came up before the Gujarat High Court in the above case after Sandvik’s case. In this case, the brief facts were: The assessee had made certain payment to a foreign company (non-resident) and in that context on making an application for non-deduction of tax, the Assessing Officer (AO) had directed the assessee to deduct tax @ 30% on the basis which the assessee had deducted certain amount of tax and paid to the Government (it seems – somewhere in June 1987). Subsequently, the assessee realised that tax deducted and paid was excess on account of non-application of the principle of grossing up to its case at the relevant time and accordingly, claimed refund for such excess payment of tax which was granted (Rs. 10,26,868) by the AO vide order dated 30th November, 1990. Subsequently, the assessee claimed interest on such refund for a period from 1st July, 1987 to 30th November, 1990. There is some confusion in facts on terminal date i.e., 30-11-1990 or 13-11-1990. However, this is not relevant. The claim of the assessee was rejected by the CIT, CCIT as well as the CBDT. On these facts, the issue of grant of interest on such refund of excess tax paid came up before the Gujarat High Court in a writ petition filed by the assessee.

4.1.1 For the purpose of deciding the issue, the Court noted that the question as to whether the assessee is entitled to compensation by way of interest for delay in payment of amount lawfully due to the assessee which are withheld wrongly and contrary to law stands concluded by the apex court in Sandvik’s case. The Court also noted the subsequent instruction (referred to in para 3.1.1) issued by the CBDT in this regard. Based on this, the Court took the view that the assessee is entitled to interest as claimed and directed the Revenue to pay interest at the rate of 9% from 1st July, 1987 to 30th November, 1990. The Court also further directed to pay running interest at the rate of 9% on the amount of interest which may be granted to the assessee in pursuance of the judgment of the High Court.

4.1.2    It may be noted that in the above case, the Gujarat High court took the view that the assessee is entitled to interest on the amount refunded to the assessee as well as interest on such interest on general principles effectively relying on the judgment of the Apex Court in Sandvik’s case.

CIT vs. Gujarat Flourochemicals – 348 ITR 319 [SC – Division Bench]

5.1    It seems that the above judgment of the Gujarat High Court came up for consideration before the Division Bench of the apex court at the instance of the Revenue. The facts are not given in the case before the apex court. The Court also stated that this controversy arises in number of cases pending before the apex court. While dealing with this case, the Court noted that the short point which arises in the present case is: “What is the character of Tax Deductible at Source (TDS)/ Advance Tax under the Income-tax Act, 1961.” The Court further stated that the question which arises in this case is, whether interest is payable by the Revenue to the assessee if the aggregate of installments of Advance Tax/TDS paid exceeds the as-sessed tax? The Court also mentioned that this controversy arises in a number of cases pending before the Apex Court. Interestingly, it seems that, this question does not refer to liability of the Revenue to pay interest on interest but only refers to the liability of the Revenue to pay interest on excess payment of tax (i.e. Advance Tax/ TDS). However, it is also worth noting that the High Court had directed the Revenue to pay running interest on the amount of interest as mentioned in para 4.1.1.

5.1.1    In the above case, the assessee had relied on the judgment of the apex court in Sandvik’s case. Referring to this, the Court stated that the main issue which arose for determination in Sandvik’s case was whether the assessee was entitled to be compensated by the Rev-enue for delay in paying to it the amounts admittedly due. The Court also doubted the correctness of the judgment in Sandvik’s case. In this context, the Court stated as under:

“The argument in Sandvik Asia [supra] on behalf of the assessee was that it was entitled to compensation by way of interest for the delay in payment of the amounts lawfully due to it which were wrongly withheld for a long period of seventeen years. Vide Paragraph (23) of Sandvik Asia [supra], the Division Bench held that, in view of the express provisions of the Act, the assessee was entitled to compensation by way of interest for the delay in payment of the amounts lawfully due to the assessee, which were withheld wrongly by the Revenue. With due respect, section 214 of the Act does not provide for payment of compensation by the Revenue to the assessee in whose favour a refund order has been passed. Moreover, in Sandvik Asia [supra], interest was ordered on the basis of equity. It was also ordered to be paid on the basis of Article 265 of the Constitution. We have serious doubts about the correctness of the judgment in Sandvik Asia [supra]. In our view, the judgment of this Court in the case of Modi Industries Limited vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, 1995 (6) S.C.C. 396 correctly holds that Advance Tax or TDS loses its identity as soon as it is adjusted against the liability created by the Assessment Order and becomes tax paid pursuant to the Assessment Order. If Advance Tax or TDS loses its identity and becomes tax paid on the passing of the Assessment Order, then, is the assessee not entitled to interest under the relevant provisions of the Act?…”

5.1.2 The Court then referred to the relevant provisions of the Act [viz. sections 195, 195A, 214, 243, 244 etc.] and took the view that Sandvik’s case has not been correctly decided and referred the above issue arising in the above case as well as in other appeals to the Hon’ble Chief Justice for decision by a Larger Bench.

Gujarat Flourochemicals – 358 ITR 291 (SC – Larger Bench)

6.1    Based on the view of the Division Bench of the apex court referred to in para 5.1.2, the question of law involved in many cases [which, it seems, included the judgment of the Gujarat High Court in Gujarat Flouro-chemicals Ltd. (supra)] was referred to the Larger Bench (consisting of 3 judges) for consideration and authoritative pronouncement. In the context of the issue to be decided, the Court noted as under:

‘The question which arises in this case is, whether interest is payable by the Revenue to the assessee if the aggregate of installments of Advance Tax or TDS paid exceeds the assessed tax?’

6.2:    Referring to the judgment in Sandvik’s case, the Court stated as under:

“We would first throw light on the reasoning and the decision of this Court on the core issue in Sandvik case (supra). The only issue formulated by this Court for its consideration and decision was whether an assessee is entitled to be compensated by the Income-tax Department for the delay in paying interest on the refunded amount admittedly due to the assessee. This Court in the facts of the said case had noticed that there was delay of various periods, ranging from 12 to 17 years, in such payment by the Revenue. This Court had further referred to the several decisions which were brought to its notice and also referred to the relevant provisions of the Act which provide for refunds to be made by the Revenue when a superior forum directs refund of certain amounts to an assessee while disposing of an appeal, revision etc.

Since there was an inordinate delay on the part of the Revenue in refunding the amount due to the assessee this Court had thought it fit that the assessee should be properly and adequately compensated and therefore in paragraph 51 of the judgment, the Court while compensating the assessee had directed the Revenue to pay a compensation by way of interest for two periods, namely; for the Assessment Years 1977-78, 1978- 79, 1981-82, 1982-83 in a sum of Rs.40,84,906/- and interest @ 9% from 31.03.1986 to 27.03.1998 and in default, to pay the penal interest @ 15% per annum for the aforesaid period.”

6.2.1    The Court then stated that the said judgment has been misquoted and misinterpreted to say that in that case the Court had taken a view that the Revenue is obliged to pay interest on interest in the event of its failure to refund the interest payable within the statutory period.

6.2.2    Finally, explaining the effect of Sandvik’s case, the Court stated as under:

“As we have already noticed, in Sandvik case (supra) this Court was considering the issue whether an assessee who is made to wait for refund of interest for decades be compensated for the great prejudice caused to it due to the delay in its payment after the lapse of statutory period. In the facts of that case, this Court had come to the conclusion that there was an inordinate delay on the part of the Revenue in re-funding certain amount which included the statutory interest and therefore, directed the Revenue to pay compensation for the same not an interest on interest.”

6.3 After explaining the effect of the judgment of Sandvik’s case as above, to decide the question of law referred to it, the Court held as under and referred back all the matters before a Division Bench to consider each case independently and take appropriate decision one way or the other:

“Further it is brought to our notice that the Legislature by the Act No. 4 of 1988 (w.e.f. 01.04.1989) has inserted section 244A to the Act which provides for interest on refunds under various contingencies. We clarify that it is only that interest provided for under the statute which may be claimed by an assessee from the Revenue and no other interest on such statutory interest.”

6.4      From the above decision of the Court, one may get an impression that the Court seems to have taken a view that Sandvik’s case was decided under pre-1989 provisions and from assessment year 1989-90, the interest on refund is payable u/s. 244A. As no reasonings are available in this judgment for the view taken by the Court, there is no clarity on this aspect. However, it would appear that the Larger Bench of the Court has not overruled the judgment in Sandvik’s case.  The Larger Bench of the Court also does not seem to have approved the view expressed by the Division Bench (referred to in para 5.1.2) that Sandvik’s case has not been correctly decided.  Instead, the Court has explained the view taken in Sandvik’s case and the effect thereof that in that case the Court had directed the Revenue to pay compensation for inordinate delay in refunding certain amount due to the assessee which included statutory interest and in that case, the Court had not decided that the Revenue is liable to pay interest on interest.    

Conclusion
7.1       From the judgment of three judge Bench of the Apex Court (Larger Bench) in the above case, it becomes clear that the assessee can claim only that interest which is provided under the Act and no other interest can be claimed by the assessee on statutory interest for delay in payment thereof. The similar approach was adopted by the three judge Bench of the Apex Court in the case of Panchanatham Chettiar [99 ITR 579]. As such, the assessee is not entitled to claim interest on interest unless there is a provision in the Act for the same.  

7.1.1     It is unfortunate that Larger Bench of the Apex Court has taken such a strict technical view of the issue which, in many cases, may involve the issue of equity and justice. In fact, with     this     judgment,    some    Revenue    Officials    may be tempted to delay payment of interest as that does not create any liability to pay further interest on the amount of interest wrongly withheld. This may happen in cases involving large amount of interest in this era of    unjustified    pressure    for    meeting    unrealistic revenue collection targets. This possibility was noted by the Apex Court in Sandvik’s case referred to in para 2.13.1 of Part 1 of this write-up wherein the Court has also opined that such actions and consequences seriously affect     the    administration    of     justice    and     the    rule of law.  It appears that this was also one of the factors considered by the Court to decide the issue in favour of the assessee in Sandvik’s case. Similar approach is found in the judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of India Trade Promotion Organisation referred to in para 3.1.3.3.  Otherwise also, this position may be open to abuse and that is not in the long term interest of fair administration of tax laws.  Somehow, the Larger Bench of the Court in the above case has not appreciated this ground reality.  To be fair to the assessee, appropriate provision should be made in the Act itself to compensate the assessee in cases of delay in payment of interest due to the assessee. We only hope that the Revenue Officials will strictly follow the directions contained in the Instruction No. 2 dated 28th March, 2007 (referred to in para 3.1.1) issued by the CBDT after the judgment of the apex court in Sandvik’s case.

7.2     From the above judgment, it seems to us that the Larger Bench in the above case has not decided that the assessee will not be entitled to claim compensation from the Revenue even if there is inordinate delay in payment of amount due to the assessee which may include statutory interest.  As mentioned in para 6.4, in the above case, the Court has not held that Sandvik’s case was wrongly decided. As such, as held in Sandvik’s case, in case of delay in payment of     ‘amount    due’     to     the    assessee     it    may    be possible for the assessee to claim compensation on such amount even if such amount includes statutory interest. Such a claim of the assessee should not be regarded as claim of interest on interest. It also appears that the claim for such compensation may be considered by the Courts and, as held by the Tribunal (TM) in the case of Nirma Chemicals (referred to in para 3.1.2), such a claim may not be entertained by the Tribunal or the lower authorities.

7.3    In the above context, it is worth noting that as mentioned in para 3.1.3.2, the Apex Court in the case of H.E.G. Ltd has held that the words ‘amount due’ appearing in section 244A include interest and the interest com-ponent will partake of the character of the ‘amount due’ u/s. 244A. It seems that this position is not disturbed by the judgment of the Larger Bench in the above case as this has not been considered in the above case. This was also not the issue before the Larger Bench in the above case. It is also worth noting that the judgment of the apex court in H.E.G Ltd was also delivered by a three judge Bench of the apex court. With this position, the claim of interest u/s. 244A on the interest component of the ‘amount due’ may be regarded as claim of interest on shortfall in payment of ‘amount due’ and not as claim of interest on interest. As such, such a claim may be regarded as the claim under the provisions of the Act. This needs consideration even after the judgment of the Larger Bench in the above case. In this context, the judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of India Trade Promotion Organisation ( supra) is worth noting. At the same time, in this context, the view expressed by the Tribunal (TM) in the case of Nirma Chemicals (supra) may also be borne in mind.

7.4    In the cases of D. J. Works [195 ITR 227] and Chimanbhai S. Patel [210 ITR 419], the Gujarat High Court had taken a view that the assessee is entitled to interest on interest. As mentioned in para 1.4.1 of Part 1 of this write- up, the judgment of the Gujarat High Court was followed by the M. P. High Court in the case of Narendra Doshi and the judgment of the M. P. High Court in the case of Narendra Doshi has been affirmed by the apex court [254 ITR 606]. This is also relied on in Sandvik’s case to take a view that even if there is no provision in the Act for payment of compensation, the compensation for delay is required to be paid. In Sandvik’s case, as mentioned in para 2.9 of Part 1 of this write-up, a view was also taken that the decision of the apex court in Narendra Doshi’s case is on the merits of the matter, though it proceeded on the assumption that there was no provision in the Act grating interest on unpaid interest. Even this judgment in the case of Narendra Doshi was delivered by a three judge Bench of the Apex Court. It is worth noting that this judgment has also not been considered by the Larger Bench in the above case. The implication of this factual position may need consideration and we will have to wait and watch for the position which may ultimately emerge from this situation.

7.4.1 When the Division Bench of the apex court finally decides the issue on merit in the case of Gujarat Flourochemicals [or in any other case from the set of appeals forming part of the judgment of the Larger Bench in the above case], some light may be thrown on the above. Let us hope for the development/ clarity in this regard at that stage.

WRIT PETITION MAINTAINABILITY

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SYNOPSIS

When an alternative remedy is
available under the Act, writ petition is not maintainable. However, in
various decisions the Hon’ble Supreme Court and High Courts have held
that if a issued is patently illegal or without jurisdiction,
notwithstanding the alternative remedy, writ is maintainable. In this
article, the author analyses of the recent SC ruling in the case of
Vijaybhai N. Chandrani which in his view is inconsistent with this
position and therefore requires reconsideration.

Brief Factual Background of the case before the Hon’ble Supreme Court:

Recently,
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Vijaybhai N. Chandrani
[Civil Appeal No. 5888 to 5903 of 2013 dated 18.7.2013] has held that
writ petition before the Hon’ble High Court is not maintainable when
alternate remedy is available under the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘the
Act’). The brief background of the case is given hereunder:

In
the case of Vijaybhai (supra), the assessee purchased a plot of land
from Samutkarsh Co-operative Housing Society being developed by Savvy
Infrastructure Ltd. In 2008, a search was conducted u/s. 132 of the Act
in the premises of the Society and Savvy Infrastructure Ltd. During the
search, Assessing Officer (‘AO’) seized certain documents u/s. 132A of
the Act. One of the documents was loose sheet of paper containing list
of members under the heading “Samutkarsh Members Details”. One of the
names was that of the assessee and certain details were mentioned
against each name in different columns. On the basis of these documents
the AO issued notices u/s. 153C to the assessee to furnish his returns
of income for assessment years 2001-2002 to 2006-2007. Upon receipt of
the said notice, the assessee requested the AO to provide copies of the
seized material. The AO supplied copies of three loose sheets of paper
which, according to the assessee, did not belong to him. Under these
circumstances, the assessee moved a writ petition before the Hon’ble
Gujarat High Court challenging the aforesaid notices.

The
Hon’ble Gujarat High Court quashed the notices by holding that as the
said documents undoubtedly  did not belong to the assessee the condition
precedent for issuance of notice was not fulfilled and therefore the
action taken u/s. 153C of the Act stood vitiated. Though the Hon’ble
Supreme Court did not express any opinion on the correctness or
otherwise of the construction that was placed by the High Court on
Section 153C of the Act, it held that as alternate remedy was available
to the assessee, the High Court ought not to have entertained the writ
petition and instead should have directed the assessee to file reply to
the said notices. Upon receipt of a decision from the AO, if for any
reason assessee was aggrieved by the said decision, the same could be
questioned before the forum provided under the Act. Accordingly, the
order of the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court was reversed.

Supreme
Court decisions on maintainability of writ petition – against
action/notice without jurisdiction – when alternative remedy is
available

It is a settled position that, generally, when
alternative remedy is available under the Act, writ petition is not
maintainable. However, in various decisions the Hon’ble Supreme Court
and High Courts have held that if the notice issued is patently illegal
or without jurisdiction, notwithstanding the alternative remedy, writ is
maintainable. Some key decisions laying down the said ratio are quoted
hereunder:

• Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. v. ITO [1961] 41 ITR 191 (SC)

“Mr.
Sastri mentioned more than once the fact that the company would have
sufficient opportunity to raise this question, viz., whether the
Income-tax Officer had reason to believe that under-assessment had
resulted from non-disclosure of material facts, before the Income-tax
Officer himself in the assessment proceedings and, if unsuccessful
there, before the Appellate Officer or the Appellate Tribunal or in the
High Court under section 66(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act. The
existence of such alternative remedy is not however always a sufficient
reason for refusing a party quick relief by a writ or order prohibiting
an authority acting without jurisdiction from continuing such action.”
(Emphasis supplied).

• Foramer vs. CIT [2001] 247 ITR 436 (All) affirmed by Supreme Court in [2003] 264 ITR 566 (SC)

“As
regards alternative remedy, we are of the opinion since the notice
under section 148 is without jurisdiction, the petitioner should not be
relegated to his alternative remedy vide Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. v.
ITO [1961] 41 ITR 191 (SC)…. .”

• UOI & Anr vs. Kunisetty Satyanarayana [2007] 001 CLR 0067 (SC)

“No
doubt, in some very rare and exceptional cases the High Court can quash
a charge-sheet or show-cause notice if it is found to be wholly without
jurisdiction or for some other reason if it is wholly illegal.”

From
the above decisions, it is very clear that as a matter of practice writ
petition is not maintainable if alternative remedy is available under
the Act. However, in exceptional cases when the notices issued are
patently illegal or without jurisdiction, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has
held that writ petition is maintainable.

Notice u/s. 153C in the case of Vijaybhai (supra) – without jurisdiction – liable to be quashed

In
the case of Vijaybhai (supra), the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court drew
distinction between the provisions of section 153C and section 158BD.
Whereas section 158BD seeks to tax any “undisclosed income” which “belongs”
to a person other than the person in whose case search has been carried
out, section 153C seeks to tax such other person only where “money, bullion, jewellery or other valuable article or thing or books of account or documents seized” “belongs” to him. The Hon’ble High Court held “….it is an admitted position as emerging from the record of the case, that the documents
in question, namely the three loose papers recovered during the search
proceedings do not belong to the petitioner. ….it is nobody’s case that
the said documents belong to the petitioner. It is not even the case of
Revenue that the said three documents are in the handwriting of the
petitioner. In the circumstances, when the condition precedent for
issuance of notice is not fulfilled any action taken under s. 153C of
the Act stands vitiated.”
In the instant case, since it was an
admitted fact that the documents seized did not belong to the assessee,
the High Court held the notices issued u/s. 153C to be without
jurisdiction. In light of the above, having regard to the judgments
noted earlier, it is respectfully submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme
Court should have upheld the judgment of the Gujarat High Court.

An
alternate remedy against an order passed pursuant to a notice cannot be
considered as an alternate remedy available against the notice which is
patently without jurisdiction

The Hon’ble Supreme Court did
not affirm the decision of Hon’ble Gujarat High Court supposedly on the
ground that the assessee had alternate remedies under the Act against
the notices issued. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held:

“…… at the
said stage of issuance of the notices under Section 153C, the assessee
could have addressed his grievances and explained his stand to the
Assessing Authority by filing an appropriate reply to the said notices
instead of filing the Writ Petition impugning the said notices. ….

In the present case, the assessee has invoked the Writ jurisdiction of the High Court at the first instance without first exhausting the alternate remedies provided under the Act. In our considered opinion, at the said stage of proceedings, the High Court ought not have entertained the Writ Petition and instead should have directed the assessee to file reply to the said notices and upon receipt of a decision from the

Assessing Authority, if for any reason it is aggrieved by the said decision, to question the same before the forum provided under the Act. ….

Further, we grant time to the assessee, if it so desires, to file reply/objections, if any, as contemplated in the said notices within 15 days’ time from today. If such reply/objections is/are filed within time granted by this Court, the Assessing Authority shall first consider the said reply/objections and thereafter direct the assessee to file the return for the assessment years in question. We make it clear that while framing the assessment order, the Assessing Authority will not be influenced by any observations made by the High Court while disposing of the Writ Petition. If, for any reason, the assessment order goes against the assessee, he/it shall avail and exhaust the remedies available to him/it under the Act, 1961. ….”

It is respectfully submitted that if the underlined portion of the judgment was not forming part of it, the said judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court would have been on the lines of its earlier judgment in the case of GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd vs. ITO  [2003] 259 ITR 19 (SC) wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a writ challenging notice u/s. 148 had directed the assessee/AO as under:

Thus, in the absence of the underlined part in the aforesaid judgment, as has happened in several writs challenging notices u/s. 148, the assessee would be able to approach the High Court after the AO’s order dealing with or rejecting the objections of the assessee against issue of notices u/s. 153C. As evident from the underlined part of the judgment quoted above, it is respectfully submitted that it appears that the Hon’ble Supreme Court:

a)  was either under an impression that there is a remedy under the Act against issue of notice u/s. 153C; or

b)     has    failed    to    appreciate    the    difference    between    an alternate remedy available against an order passed pursuant to a notice in contradistinction with an alternate remedy available against the issuance of the notice itself.

Conclusion:
In the light of the above, it is most humbly and respectfully submitted that the aforesaid judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court requires reconsideration as:

(i)   the notice issued u/s. 153C was clearly without jurisdiction.

(ii)   there is no alternate remedy available under the Act against the issuance of notice u/s. 153C.

(iii)   in any case, as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in number of cases notwithstanding the availability of an alternate remedy, a writ is clearly maintainable against an action/notice which is issued patently without jurisdiction.

Activities Relating to Purchase of Goods from India by a Liaison Office

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Synopsis
Under Section 9, income of a non-resident (NR) from a “business connection” in India would be deemed to accrue or arise in India. However, if the activities of NR are confined to purchase of goods in India for the purpose of export the deeming fiction does not apply.

The scope of the phrase “operations which are confined to the purchase of goods in India” has been a subject matter of controversy, with the Tax Department generally adopting a fairly narrow interpretation. In this feature the authors analyse the various judicial pronouncements in this regard.

Issue for consideration

An income of a foreign company or part thereof, attributable to its operations in India, is taxable in India provided such operations or activities are construed to be a ‘business connection’ within the meaning of the term as defined in Explanation 2 to section 9(1) of the Income-tax Act. Such an income is deemed to accrue or arise in India where it is found to be through or from any business connection in India, whether directly or indirectly. The said Explanation 2 provides that a business connection shall inter alia include any business activity, carried out through a person who habitually exercises an authority to conclude contracts in India on behalf of the non-resident, unless his activity is limited to the purchase of goods or merchandise for the non-resident.

Explanation 1(b) provides that income shall not be deemed to accrue or arise in India, where operations are confined to purchase of goods in India for the purpose of export.

An issue has arisen in cases where an Indian liaison office of a foreign company purchases goods from India for its head office and carries out several activities incidental thereto. The courts have been asked, under the circumstances, to define the true meaning of the term ‘confined to purchase of goods in India’ and explain whether the activities that are carried out for effecting purchase of goods in India could be considered as an independent activity or as an integral part of the purchase of goods in India. In case of the latter, the activity shall not attract Indian taxation and in case of the earlier, it may expose the income attributable to such activity to taxation in India. Recently, the Karnataka High Court has held that such activities constitute purchase of goods in India, while the Authority for Advance Ruling has held the same to be not forming part of purchase.

Columbia Sportswear Co.’s case

The issue arose before the Authority for Advance Rulings In Re Columbia Sportswear Co, 12 taxmann. com 349. The company in this case was incorporated under the laws of the USA, a multinational wholesaler and retailer of outdoors apparel with global operations. It conducted research and development to develop marketable products outside India. In the year 1995, the company established a liaison office in Chennai for undertaking liaison activities, in connection with purchase of goods in India, which activities had subsequently been expanded to Bangladesh and Egypt. Besides coordinating purchase of goods from India, the Indian liaison office also assisted the company in purchase of goods from Egypt and Bangladesh and engaged in quality monitoring and production monitoring of goods purchased from these countries. The goods procured from Egypt and Bangladesh were directly sold to the company in the United States from those countries. In the year 2000, a support office was opened by the Indian liaison office in Bangalore with the approval of the Reserve Bank of India.

The company claimed that;

• its products were produced by independent suppliers worldwide including India.

• the Indian liaison office was involved in activities relating to purchase functions for the company and incidentally was engaged in vendor identification, review of costing data, vendor recommendation, quality control and uploading of material prices into the internal product data management system of the company besides monitoring vendors for compliance with its policies, procedures and standards related to quality, delivery, pricing and labour practices.

• the Indian liaison office did not have any revenue streams; it did not source products to be sold locally in India.

• it did not sell any goods in India and therefore no income arose from its Indian operations.

• no income could be deemed to have accrued or arose in India within the meaning of section 9(1) of the Act.

• its case was covered by Explanation 1(b) of s.9(1) (i) and could not be construed as a case of business connection.

• it did not undertake any activity of trading, commercial or industrial in nature in India.

• the expenditure of the liaison office was entirely met by remittances made by the company.

On these facts, the company approached the Authority seeking a ruling on the question whether, given the nature of the activities carried on by the liaison office, any income accrues or arises in India as per section 5(2)(b) of the Act? Whether the applicant can be said to have a business connection in India as per the provisions of section 9(1)(i) of Act read with Explanation 2? Whether various activities carried out by the India LO, as listed in the Statement of relevant facts (Annexure-III), are covered under the phrase, ‘through or from operations which are confined to the purchase of goods in India for the purpose of export’ as stated in part (b) of Explanation 1 to section 9(1)(i) of the Act?

The Authority in paragraph 8 of the decision noted the following facts surrounding the activities of the LO;

“The liaison office of the applicant in India is engaged in vendor identification, review of costing data, vendor recommendation, quality control and uploading of material prices into the internal product data management system of the applicant. The liaison office monitors vendors for compliance with its policies, procedures and standards related to quality, delivery, pricing and labour practices. The liaison office is engaged in quality monitoring and production monitoring for goods purchased from Egypt and Bangladesh. It coordinates, ascertains, monitors and verifies with the vendors to develop the material in line with the quality and aesthetic requirements of the product as provided by the applicant’s product design team. It undertakes laboratory testing of fabrics/garments in India in addition to inspecting the quality of the products. It reviews production and quality assurance including the monitoring of the labour practices compliance and periodic performance reviews. It conveys the orders placed by the applicant on to the suppliers and interacts with the suppliers in relation to capacity utilisation, quality assurance, on-time delivery performance and so on. The role of the quality control team in the liaison office includes executing pre-sourcing factory evaluations to determine the vendor’s ability to manufacture the product to the expectations of the applicant. The quality control team also gives quality training to the newly selected vendors and is responsible for communicating the quality processes of the applicant and expectations to suppliers. The team also ensures that standard methods, tools, machinery and layouts are used. The liaison office also summarises seasonal vendor quality performance for the consideration of the applicant. The liaison office also ensures compliance with the quality process including seeking to ensure that the targeted defect percentage is maintained. It also ensures that the requirements of environmental laws and labour laws of the country are obeyed by the suppliers.”

The Authority concluded that the applicant could not take benefit of Explanation 1(b) to section 9(1) (i) as, in its opinion, the activities carried out by the assessee were not confined to purchase of goods in India. The following findings and observations of the Authority are pertinent;

•    The liaison office had about 35 employees divided into 5 teams dealing with material management, merchandising, production management, quality control and administration support, constituting teams from finance, human resources and information systems.

•    Activities carried on by the liaison office related to ensuring the choosing of quality material, occasionally testing them for quality, conveying of requisite design, picking out of competitive sellers, the ensuring of quality, the ensuring of adherence to the policy of the applicant in the matter of procurement and employment, in the matter of compliance with environmental and other local regulations by the manufacturers – suppliers and in ensuring that the payments made by the applicant reach the suppliers.

•    In the matter of manufacturing of products as per design, quality and in implementing policy, the liaison office was actually doing the work of the applicant, which actually was in the business of designing, manufacturing and selling branded products, brands over which it had exclusive right.

•    The activities of the liaison office were not confined to India. It also facilitated the doing of business by the applicant with entities in Egypt and Bangladesh.

•    A person in the business of designing, manufactur-ing and selling could not be taken to earn a profit only by a sale of goods. The goods as designed and styled by the applicant could not be sold without it being got manufactured and procured in the manner designed and contemplated by the applicant.

•    It would be unrealistic to take the view that all the activities other than the actual sale of the goods are not an integral part of the business of the applicant and have no role in the profit being made by the applicant by the sale of its branded products. It was difficult to accept the argument that what was done in India by the liaison office of the applicant was only to expend money and all its income accrued outside India by the sale of the products.

•    All activities other than the actual sale could not be divorced from the business of manufacture and sale especially in a case like that of the applicant, where the sale was of a branded product, designed and got made by the applicant under supervision, under a brand owned by the applicant. Therefore, the argument on behalf of the applicant that all the activities carried on in India were confined to the purchase of goods in India, could not be accepted.

•    ‘Confined’ meant, ‘limited, restricted’. ‘Purchase’ meant ‘get by payment, buy’.

The Authority observed that what section 9(1)(i), Explanation 1(b) deemed in the case of a non-resident, was that no income arose in India to a person through or from operations which were confined to the purchase of goods in India for the purpose of export but, in the case before it, the activities of the liaison office of the applicant in India were not confined to the purchase of goods in India for the purpose of export. It further observed that the applicant, in fact, transacted in India its business of designing, quality controlling, getting manufactured consistent with its policy and the laws, the branded products it sold elsewhere and that those activities could not be understood as activities confined to purchase of goods in India for export from India.

Income resulting from manufacture, purchase and sale, in the opinion of the Authority, could not be compartmentalised and confined to one arising out of a sale only, and that the whole process of procurement and sale had to be completed to generate income. Getting manufactured and purchasing formed integral parts of the process of generating income and the liaison office acted as the arm of the applicant regarding that part of the activity, and its functions were not confined to purchase or mere purchase.

Another aspect that influenced the Authority’s decision was the fact that the activities of the liaison office of the applicant in India, was not confined to India but extended to Egypt and Bangladesh. Since the activities of the applicant in India included its business in Egypt and Bangladesh, it could not be stated that the operations of the applicant in India were confined to the purchase of goods in India for the purpose of export.

The Authority therefore took the view that the activities of the liaison office gave rise to taxable income in India, not being exempt under explanation 1(b) to section 9(1)(i).

Nike Inc.’s case

The issue recently came up for consideration before the Karnataka High Court in the case of CIT vs. Nike Inc., 34 taxmann.com 170. The company in this case was engaged in the business of sports apparel with its main office in the USA and had globally located associated enterprises or subsidiaries. From its office in the USA, the company arranged for all its subsidiaries the supply of various brands of sports apparel for sale to various customers. It did not carry on any manufacture by itself. It engaged various manufacturers all over the world on a job-to-job basis and made arrangements with its subsidiaries for purchase of the manufactured goods directly and payment for the same to the respective manufacturers.

With a view to procure various apparel from manufacturers from various parts of the world, the company opened a liaison office in India and;

•    employed persons in various categories.

•    the rate or price for each apparel was negotiated by the liaison office with the manufacturer.

•    the quality of each apparel was also indicated and the samples so developed were forwarded to the US office.

•    the liaison office proposed and gave its opinion about the reasonability of the price, etc. and the US office decided about the price, quality, quantity, to whom to be shipped and billed.

•    the local manufacturer in India was conveyed of the decision by the office in the USA and once it was accepted, the local manufacturer carried on his activity.

•    the liaison office kept a close watch on the progress, quality, etc. at the manufacturing workshop and also kept a watch on the time schedule to be followed and rendered such assistance as may be required in the dispatch of the goods, including the actual buyer and the place for export.

For all these activities in India, the liaison office was receiving funds through banking channels from the USA.

For the relevant assessment years, the company filed returns of income declaring nil income. It contended that its activities were to carry on activities that were ancillary and auxiliary to the activities of its head office and other group companies and to act as a communication channel between the head office and parties in India. It claimed that in terms of Explanation 1(b) to section 9(1)(i), no income shall be deemed to accrue or arise in India to a non-resident from operations which were confined to the purchase of goods in India for the purposes of export. In terms of Circular No. 20, dated 7-7-1964, a non-resident would not be liable to tax in India on any income attributable to operations confined to purchase of goods in India for export, even though the non-resident had an office or an agency in India for the purpose, or the goods were subjected to any manufacturing process before being exported from India. Therefore, no income shall be deemed to accrue or arise in India to it, as its operations were restricted to purchase of goods in India for the purpose of export, even though it had a liaison office to facilitate sourcing of products from Indian suppliers.

The Assessing Officer held that the activities of the company were actually beyond its activities required as a liaison office and a part of the entire business was done in India through the liaison office and therefore, the income had accrued or arisen or deemed to have accrued or arisen to the company in India in view of clause (b) of s/s. (2) of section 5. He, therefore, held that the income of the company was chargeable to tax to the extent of income, which was attributable to the activities done in India or accruing or arising in India on its behalf by its liaison office. He further held that 5% of the export value could reasonably be considered as income attributable to India operations, i.e., income accruing or arising in India to the company.

On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) held that it was an admitted fact that the company was not involved in the purchase of goods in India for the purpose of export, which would have involved transfer of title of goods purchased from the seller to the purchaser and as no purchase took place in the name of the liaison office, it was not entitled to the exemption enumerated in section 9(1). He, therefore, upheld the order of the Assessing Officer.

On second appeal, the tribunal held that the case before it was a case of purchase of the goods for the purpose of export by the assessee. It observed that in the absence of there being any prima facie contract between the assessee and the local manufacturer, the status of the liaison office was that of buyer’s agent, more so when the local manufacturer knew it only as the agent of the buyer i.e., the company had placed the orders on it with a view to buy the goods in the course of export and, as directed, export it to various affiliates of the company. It held that the Explanation 1(b) to section 9(1)(i) clearly applied to the company and hence, no income was derived by the company in India through its operations of the liaison office in India. It accordingly, set aside the orders of the lower authorities and granted relief to the company.

On appeal to the High Court by Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the tribunal and held that the activities of the assesssee were confined to purchase of goods in India and could not be construed to represent any business connection nor could it be said that it resulted in any deemed accrual or arising of any income in India.

In the context of the income accruing or arising from ‘business connection’, the court observed that till 2004, the word ‘business connection’ had not been defined. However, by the Finance Act, 2003, Explanation 2 was inserted in section 9(1)(i), which, though it came into effect from o1-04-2004, was clarificatory in nature. It further took note of the deletion of the Proviso to Explanation 1(b) to section 9(1)(i) by the Finance Act, 1964, with effect from 01-04 -1964, which deletion had the effect of exempting a non-resident from tax in India on any income attributable to operations confined to purchase of goods in India for export, even though the non-resident had an office or agency in India for the purpose, or even though the goods were subjected by him to any manufacturing process before being exported from India.

In the instant case, the court noted that the as-sessee was not carrying on any business in India though it had established a liaison office in India whose object was to identify the manufacturers, give them the technical know-how and see that they manufactured goods according to its specifications, which would be sold to its affiliates. It further noted that the person who purchased the goods paid the money to the manufacturer and in the said income the assessee had no right; the said income could not be said to be an income arising or accruing in India vis-à-vis the assessee; the evidence on record showed that the assessee paid the entire expenses of the liaison office.

According to the court, the payment by the non-resident buyer of some consideration to the assessee outside India, as per the contract between the as-sessee and the buyer entered outside India, was an irrelevant factor in deciding the accrual of income in India and in any case, even if any income arose or accrued to the assessee, it was outside India.

Noting the provisions contained in Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(i) concerning the business connection and that the saving for the activities was limited to the purchase of goods or merchandise, the court observed that no income should be deemed to ac-crue or arise in India. The court observed that once the entire operations were confined to the purchase of goods in India for the purpose of export, the income derived therefrom should not be deemed to accrue or arise in India u/s. 9. It also observed that the activities of the assessee in assisting the Indian manufacturer to manufacture the goods according to its specification was to see that the said goods manufactured had an international market, and could therefore be exported. The Court concluded that the assessee was not earning any income in India, and, if at all it was earning an income outside India under a contract which was entered into outside India, no part of its income could be taxed in India either u/s. 5 or section 9.

In arriving at the conclusion in favour of the assessee, the court was guided by the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Anglo-French Textile Co. Ltd. vs. CIT ,23 ITR 101 (SC) (para 15) and CIT vs. R.D. Agarwal & Co. 56 ITR 20 (SC).

Observations

Clause (b) of Explanation 1 to section 9(1)(i) clarifies that no income shall be deemed to accrue or arise in India, in the case of a non-resident, through or from operations which are confined to the purchase of goods in India for the purpose of export. It clearly conveys that a non-resident can carry an activity in India and such activity may signify a business connection so however the income through or from such activity, if confined to purchase, shall not be deemed to accrue or arise in India.

An activity that travels beyond purchase of goods in India shall expose the income, pertaining to such an activity, to taxation in India under the deeming fiction contained in section 9(1)(i) of the Act. Such an activity may be carried out by a non-resident himself or through his agent or a liaison office.

It therefore is essential, for an exemption from tax, that the activity is confined to purchase of goods for export. The term ‘confined’ to is not defined in the Act and, as has been seen, has been the subject matter of intense conflict. One view of the matter is that the term ‘purchase’ signifies placing of an order for purchase of such goods that are exported. The other view is that the term connotes carrying out all such activities that lead to placing an order of purchase of goods for export, i.e., all activities that precede the placement of an order are ‘purchase’. In the narrowest possible view of the term ’purchase’, the activity is restricted to placing the purchase order, while taking a broader view, even the activities leading to placing an order for purchase of goods shall be included in ‘purchase’ of goods.

The term ‘confined’, in the context, is defined to mean “restrict within certain limits of scope” by the Oxford Dictionary. An activity or activities whose scope is restricted to purchase of goods can be said to be confined under the meaning supplied by the Oxford Dictionary. A plain reading explains that the dictionary does not narrow down or limit a ‘purchase’ to the activity of placing the order of purchase. Isolating activities leading to purchase from its scope is not even implied.

The important thing is to ascertain that can an order for purchase be placed without necessarily undertaking the activities that lead to such an order, such as; identifying the product and its quality, short-listing a vendor, giving product specifications, negotiating the price and fixing it, defining the logistics and specifying the delivery schedule? If the answer, in the context of clause(b) is no, then carrying on the pre- purchase activities shall not result in any deemed accrual of income.

The dictionary meaning of the term ‘purchase’ is to acquire on payment or for a consideration. It needs to be appreciated that an acquisition is not limited to placing an order of purchase but involves the series of acts carried out to successfully acquire a thing and includes the act of payment effected, post purchase, for an acquisition. It is significant to note that the word ‘purchase’ is preceded by the word ’to’, collectively reading ‘to purchase’ and so read, it sets any doubts to rest about the true un-derstanding of the law. To purchase without doubt, shall rope in all activities that enables the placement of a purchase order leading in turn to purchase or acquisition of goods.

The Authority in Columbia Sportswear Co.’s case has refused to appreciate that the activities considered by it to be constituting a business nonetheless were part of an activity of purchase without which it was not possible to purchase goods, and in that view of the mater, such activities were confined to purchase of goods alone and that they were not to be isolated from the purchase of goods as was being represented by the revenue authority.

In contrast, the Karnataka High Court in Nike Inc.’s case took a pragmatic view by holding that the pre-purchase activities were activities that were part of purchase of goods and carrying on such activities did not amount to travelling beyond the scope of the exemption contained in clause (b).

One needs to appreciate that the Reserve Bank of India while permitting a foreign company to set up a liaison office in India ensures that the operations of such an office are restricted in its scope and does not include carrying on of the business in which case, the company shall be required to set up a branch in India. In fact, carrying on of the pre- purchase activities by a liaison office is within the scope of the permission of the Reserve Bank of India.

Another aspect that requires appreciation is that pre-purchase activities and purchase represent an expenditure and not an income and therefore, even on this account, it is difficult to hold that these activities by themselves can lead to any income or even a deemed income. A right must have emerged to enable the assessee to demand and receive an income before it can be taxed in the hands of the assessee. No such right can be said to have emerged for carrying out pre-purchase activities. The Supreme court in the case of Anglo-French Textiles Co. Ltd., 23 ITR 101(SC) held that no profit could be said to have arisen on mere purchase of goods in India. For some incoherent reason this aspect was not appreciated by the Authority. Secondly, for the purpose of bringing even a deemed income to taxation, it is essential that the income pertaining to such an activity is defined and it is only then that a deemed income could be brought to taxation, as was held by the Supreme Court in the case of Anglo-French Textiles Co. Ltd., 25 ITR 27(SC). The principle so laid down by the apex court has a legislative acceptance in the form of clause (a) of Explanation 1 to section 9(1)(i) of the Act. In the said case, the court held that distribution of profits over different business operations or activities ought only to be made for sufficient and cogent reasons. The principle was reiterated in the case of R.D. Agarwala & Co. 56 ITR 20 and was expressly relied upon by the Karnataka High Court in Nike Inc.’s case and was ignored in Columbia Sportswear co’s case by the Authority.

The following observations and findings of the court in Nike Inc.’s case are helpful in appreciating the intent of the lawmakers; “If we keep the object with which the proviso to clause (b) of Explanation 1 to s/s. (1)(i) of section 9 of the Act was deleted, the object is to encourage exports thereby the Country can earn foreign exchange. The activities of the assessee in assisting the Indian manufacturer to manufacture the goods according to their specification is to see that the said goods manufactured has an international market, therefore, it could be exported. In the process, the assessee is not earning any income in India. If at all he is earning income outside India under a contract which is entered outside India, no part of their income could be taxed in India either u/s. 5 or section 9 of the Act.”

The Authority seems to have been largely influenced by the fact that the Indian office of the foreign company undertook activities of similar nature in Egypt and Bangladesh which in its opinion was outside the scope of exemption granted under clause(b) of Explanation 1 of section 9(1)(i) of the Act. This is clear from the following observations and findings; ‘There is another aspect. The activities of the liaison office of the applicant in India, is not confined to India. It also takes up the identical activities as in India, in Egypt and Bangladesh. The applicant has only pleaded that the goods procured from Egypt and Bangladesh are not imported into India and are sold only to the applicant in the US. Whether products of the applicant are sold in Egypt and Bangladesh is not clear. Whatever it be, since the activities of the applicant in India takes in, its busi-ness in Egypt and Bangladesh, it cannot be stated that the operations of the applicant in India are confined to the purchase of goods in India for the purpose of export.”

The very same Authority in IKEA Trading (Hong Kong) Ltd., 176 Taxman 344 held that re-purchase activities were a part of the purchase of goods and did not take away the benefit of clause (b) of the said Explanation. It however chose not to follow the ratio of the said decision by observing that it was delivered on the facts of that case. In that case, on a finding that the applicant therein, a foreign com-pany having a liaison office in India was engaged only in purchase operations in India for export, it was held that no income was generated by such an activity in India to be taxed in India either from the standpoint of section 5(2) or section 9(1)(i) read with Explanation 1(b) of the Income-tax Act. The AAR in Columbia Sportswear co.’s case confirmed that it was true that the activities undertaken by the applicant therein included some of the activities undertaken by the applicant before it.

The Authority, with respect, was unduly swayed by the proposition that all activities other than the actual sale cannot be divorced from the business of manufacture and sale especially in a case where the sale is of a branded product, designed and got made by the applicant under supervision, under a brand owned by the applicant. What the Authority failed to appreciate is that while what was stated by it was otherwise true but was rendered irrelevant, in the context, by virtue of clause (b) of Explanation 1 to section 9(1)(i) of the Act, which clause specifically excluded an activity of purchase from being labeled as business connection. In that view of the matter, the conclusion of the authority based on the decisions delivered without the benefit of analysing the said clause(b) cannot, with respect, be said to be laying down a good law. It was incorrect to have rejected the contention of the applicant that the decision of the Supreme Court in Anglo-French Textile Co. Ltd’s case (supra) did not govern the situation, anymore, in view of the addition of Expla-nation 1(b) to section 9(1)(i) of the Income-tax Act, taking out activities of purchase while deeming the accrual of income.

The Authority, instead of appreciating the change in law, went on to hold that the activity of purchase cannot be totally divorced from the activity of sale leading to income and this principle, in its opinion, is not affected by the Explanation which only seeks to exclude income from activities limited to purchase of goods in India for the purpose of export. The principle that a purchase of raw material, getting goods manufactured and selling the product form an integral activity remains unshaken in the opinion of the Authority and hence a deemed income arose in the hands of the applicant even on purchase of goods for export form India.

The decisions in the cases of CIT vs. N.K. Jain, 206 ITR 692 (Del.) and Mustaq Ahmed, In 307 ITR 401 (AAR) were also relied on by the applicant in Columbia Sportswear co.’s case to argue that the effect of the Explanation as understood therein supported the position adopted by the applicant. These decisions in our opinion are relevant to the issue being considered here in as much as the issue in those cases was about what constituted a business conncection in cases where the Indian arm of the non-resident was carrying out activities that preceded placing an order for purchasing goods. The Authority, however, chose to ignore these decisions on the ground that can be best explained by reproducing the words of the Authority; “There was no argument based on the decision of the Supreme Court before the High Court. There was no reference to that decision and there was no consideration of an argument that a purchase could not be totally divorced from a sale in such cases. There is no ra-tio emerging that by virtue of the addition of the Explanation, the principle set down by the Supreme Court in Anglo-French Textile Co. Ltd.’s case (supra) is no more relevant or binding.”

The Authority rather relied upon the decision In Mustaq Ahmed’s case (supra), to hold that the Authority, in that case, after noting the decision of the Supreme Court in Anglo-French Textiles’ case and the history of the Explanation to section 9(1) (i)    of the Act, confirmed after a detailed discussion on the question, that the ratio of the decision in that case remained unaffected by the addition of clause (b) to Explanation 1 in the present Act and the principle enunciated in the decision applied with equal vigour, irrespective of Explanation 1(b). Yet another decision relied upon by the applicant In Angel Garment Ltd., In 287 ITR 341, concerning the purchase of goods by a liaison office was held by the Authority to be delivered on the facts of that case and was not applied.

It is true that the activity of purchase contributes to eventual profit and therefore it may not be correct to say that such an activity does not contribute to any income. But what is needed to be appreciated is that the income attributable to such activity of purchase has been specifically excluded from the purview of taxation by the legislature on insertion of clause(b). It is this fact which appears to have been missed by the Authority when it relied on the decision in the Anglo-French Textiles’ case that was rendered on a law that did not have any such exclusion. The whole process of procurement and sale has to be completed to generate income and surely purchasing goods forms an integral part of the process of generating income, but the income, if any, pertaining to such an activity requires to be excluded by the law contained in clause(b) of Explanation 1 to section 9(1).

It is our considered view that the conflict on the issue discussed is not only avoidable but should be avoided by the Revenue by taking a pragmatic stand to include the activities leading to placing an order for purchase of goods in purchase of goods for export. In our opinion, the term purchase of goods is wide enough and should be so construed, in the present days, to include even manufacturing of goods for export out of India, more so when such goods are used for captive consumption by a non-resident.

The discussion here is valid in the context of the provisions of the Income tax Act. The taxation of the assessees governed by a Double Tax Avoidance Agreement will be determined largely by the provisions of such agreement.

Interest-free loans advanced to overseas wholly-owned subsidiaries cannot be regarded as quasi equity capital.

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Tribunal News

Part C — Tribunal & AAR International Tax Decisions

Geeta Jani
Dhishat B. Mehta
Chartered Accountants

20 Perot Systems vs DCIT

2010-TIOL-51-ITAT-DEL

Section 92,

Dated: 30.10.2009

 

Issues:

  • Interest-free loans advanced to overseas
    wholly-owned subsidiaries cannot be regarded as quasi equity capital.


  • Notional arm’s length interest on a loan to
    an AE can be taxed having regard to applicable transfer pricing provisions
    .

Facts:

  • The assessee, a company
    incorporated in India, is engaged in the business of developing and designing
    technology for business solutions and also providing business consultancy
    services.

  • The assessee advanced
    interest-free foreign currency loans to its two wholly-owned subsidiaries (WOS)
    situated in Bermuda and Hungary. The funds were used by the WOS for making
    long-term investments in step down operating subsidiaries.

  • During the course of the
    assessment proceedings, the tax authorities held that the loan was an
    international transaction and grant of interest-free loan was inconsistent
    with the arm’s length principles of section 92 of the Income Tax Act.

  • The assessee resisted the
    notional assessment by contending that:

(a) The overseas entities were 100% subsidiaries. The
assessee had neither any intention nor had earned any interest, and that it
was commercially expedient to extend such interest-free loans to WOS.

(b) Interest-free loans were in the form of quasi equity as
the subsidiaries had very small capital base. Further, unavailability of easy
borrowing means to the newly set up WOS was one of the main reasons for the
funding.

(c) Requisite approval of the RBI was obtained by the
assessee for such remittance. The Income Tax Act and the OECD Guidelines
support the contention that the effect of government control/intervention
should be considered while determining ALP

(d) Reliance was placed on Para 1.37 of 1995 OECD
Guidelines to support proposition that it is legitimate to consider the
economic substance of a transaction. The thin capitalisation rules of Hungary
were also referred to support the view that debt in excess of three times the
equity of the subsidiary is to be treated as equity.

(e) Relying on the Supreme Court’s Judgments in CTV. KRMTT
Thiagaraja Chetty & Co. 24 ITR 525 and Morvi Industries Ltd v CIT 82ITR835 it
was contended that the term income includes real income and not fictitious
income, and notional income assessment was not justified.

 

Held:


 


The ITAT upheld the contentions of the tax department and
held:

(a) The agreements between the parties indicate that the
assistance to the WOS was in the nature of loans and not in the nature of
capital.

(b) The concept of real income cannot be applied in respect
of international transactions covered by transfer pricing provisions.

(c) Reliance by the assessee on OECD guidelines and thin
capitalisation norms of the source country was not apt as they dealt with the
issue from the perspective of the borrower and the recipient country, and not
from the perspective of the lender. In any case, the thin capitalisation norms
of Hungary only regulated admissibility of interest expenditure in the hands
of the payer.

(d) Interest-free loans granted in Bermuda (situated in a
tax haven) would result in higher income in the hands of the AE and the
taxpayer’s income in India would reduce by the corresponding amount. This
would result in reduction of the overall tax incidence of the group, resulting
in a case of violation of the TP norms where profits are shifted to lower tax
regimes to bring down the aggregate tax incidence of multinational groups.

(e) The approval of the Reserve bank of India does not
validate or approve the true character of the transaction from a TP
perspective. RBI regulations could not be applied for the purpose of TP under
the Income Tax Act.

(f) Based on the above, the ITAT upheld the order of the
CIT(A) and held that the transaction to provide interest-free loans was an
international transaction subject to the TP guidelines, and income thereof,
arising from such transaction, should be determined under the provisions of
Income Tax Act.

 



levitra

Payments received from the supply of software products cannot be considered as ‘royalties’, taxable under the provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961 or under India-Japan tax treaty.

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19 Dassault Systems K. K

2010-TIOL-02-ARA-IT

Articles 5, 7 and 12, India-Japan DTAA; Section 9(1)(vi),
Dated: 29.01.2010

 

Issues:

  • Payments received from the supply of software
    products cannot be considered as ‘royalties’, taxable under the provisions of
    the Income-tax Act, 1961 or under India-Japan tax treaty.

  • In absence of a Permanent Establishment (PE)
    of non-resident in India, business income from distribution of software
    through independent distributors cannot be taxed in India.



 

Facts:

  • The applicant, a company
    incorporated in Japan, was engaged in the business of providing ‘Products
    Lifecycle Management’ (PLM) software solutions, applications and services. The
    applicant was marketing software products through a distribution channel
    comprising of Value Added Resellers (VAR).

  • The VAR were independent
    third party resellers engaged in the business of selling software to
    end-users. The applicant entered into a General VAR Agreement (GVA) with the
    VAR, authorising them to act as resellers of the products on a non exclusive
    basis. As per the business model, software solutions were sold to VAR for a
    consideration based on the standard list price, after deducting the agreed
    discount. The VAR, in turn, sold the products to end-users at a price
    independently negotiated between them and the end-users. Upon receipt of the
    order from end user, the VAR placed a back-to-back order on the applicant. The
    end-users entered into End User License Agreement with the applicant (with the
    VAR being a party) containing the terms of software license. The applicant
    thereupon provided a license key via e-mail so that the customer could
    download the product, hosted on a server located outside India through the web
    link. After download of the product, the end-user activated the software on
    the customer’s designated machine, using the license key.

  • The issue before the AAR
    was whether the payments received by the applicant on sale of the software
    products were taxable as business profits under Article 7 of the tax treaty or
    ‘royalty’ as defined in article 12 of the tax treaty.

  • The applicant contended
    that:


(a) What was transferred to the end-user was copyrighted
software. The copyright of the software continued to be with the applicant and
was neither made available to the VAR or end-users.

(b) Limited right to use the copyrighted products is not
equivalent to use of copyright for commercial exploitation — and consideration
for use of copyright for commercial exploitation alone could constitute
royalty.

(c) Each VAR was a distinct legal and independent entity
who acted as a non- exclusive distributor on a principal-to-principal basis.
Such entity did not constitute agency PE.

  • The tax authority claimed
    that the payments by the VAR were royalty payments by contending that:


(a) The payments made by the end-users were for transfer of
rights in respect of the copyright of the software, i.e., for use of the
computer programme.

(b) The Copyright Act makes a distinction between the
copyright of a literary work like a book and a computer programme. The right
to sell, in relation to a computer programme, is specifically treated as the
use of copyright under the Copyright Act.

(c) The concept of “copyrighted article” is apt for a book
or music CD, but is inapt for software where one or more rights in copyright
need to be necessarily transferred to make the same workable

(d) The End User License Agreement (EULA) makes it clear
that software use is licensed for a fee.

(e) In any case, consideration can be treated as royalty as
it is for the right to use the process.

(f) The VAR constituted agency PE as they were
substantially controlled and directed by the applicant.

 

Held:


 


The AAR accepted the contentions of the applicant and held
that there was no payment of royalty as:

(a) Computer software enjoys protection under the Copyright
Act. The term copyright needs to be understood as per the Copyright Act.

(b) Assignment of a right of the owner of a copyright is
essential to trigger royalty taxation. A non-exclusive and non-transferable
license for enabling the use of the copyrighted product is not equivalent of
the authority to enjoy the rights of the copyright owner.

(c) Parting of the IPR, inherent and attached to the
software product, in favour of the licensee is a mandatory requirement of the
Income Tax Act and the tax treaty to trigger royalty taxation.

(d) The right to copy, reproduce or store given to the
end-user is incidental to providing use of the copyrighted product. The
end-user has to use the license within the limitation of non-exclusive
self-user license. Section 52(aa) of the Copyright Act does specifically
permit the lawful possessor of the copy of computer programme to use the same
for self use, take back-up for archival purposes or protect against loss,
destruction, etc. This also supports the view that the license to the end-user
offered a limited right of use of the copyrighted product and was not meant
for commercial exploitation.

(e) The payments for the software could not be construed as
royalty, as the use of the programmes contained in the software could be
construed as the use of the process or acquisition of any rights in relation
thereto.

Capital gains arising on transfer of Indian assets by way of amalgamation of overseas companies with an Indian company, is exempt from tax in the hands of the overseas amalgamating companies under section 47(vi), read with section 2(1B) of the Act.

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18 Star Television Entertainment Limited

(AAR) (2010–TIOL-01-ARA-IT)

Sections 47(vi), 47(vii), 2(1B)

Dated: 21.01.2010

 

Issues:


  • Capital gains arising on transfer of Indian
    assets by way of amalgamation of overseas companies with an Indian company, is
    exempt from tax in the hands of the overseas amalgamating companies under
    section 47(vi), read with section 2(1B) of the Act.


  • Shareholders of overseas amalgamating companies
    are entitled to exemption under section 47(vii), read with section 2(1B) of
    the Act.


  • Taxpayers are entitled to plan affairs so as to
    avail of the benefit of tax exemptions and are not precluded from minimising
    their tax burden. Only a sham or a nominal transaction or a transaction which
    is a contrived device, solely for tax avoidance, can be ignored.



 

Facts:

  • The applicants — three
    group entities of the Star Group — were foreign companies registered in UAE/BVI.
    These companies (herein Amalgamating Companies) owned Indian telecasting
    channel rights, as also certain overseas assets. The Amalgamating Companies
    disposed of their non-Indian assets and proposed a scheme of amalgamation with
    another group company in India (viz. SIPL). SIPL is held by two Mauritius
    companies.

  • The main reason for the
    amalgamation was stated to be to obtain operational synergies, enhanced
    flexibility and to create a strong base for future growth of the entities.
    Upon amalgamation, SIPL was to issue shares to the shareholders of the
    Amalgamating Companies, based on a fair swap ratio determined by the valuer.

  • The scheme of amalgamation
    was filed with the Bombay High Court for approval, as required under the
    provisions of sections 391 and 394 of the Companies Act, 1956. The application
    to the AAR was filed at the time when the amalgamation petition was pending
    before the High Court for approval.

  • The issue before AAR was
    whether the scheme of amalgamation would result in any capital gains tax
    liability in the hands of the Amalgamating Companies or their shareholders.

  • The applicant’s
    contentions before the AAR were:



(a) The conditions stipulated for exemption under sections
47(vi) and (vii), read with section 2(1B) were fulfilled and, hence, capital
gains were exempt from tax.

(b)
The scheme of amalgamation
had specifically provided that all liabilities including arrears of tax dues
of the Amalgamating Companies would vest in and would be ultimately recovered
from the assets of the amalgamated Indian company. As a result, the interests
of the tax department were not likely to be prejudiced.



 

  • The tax
    department contended that the application was to be rejected as:


(a) The object of the scheme of amalgamation was to avoid
capital gains tax arising on the transfer of business by the Amalgamating
Companies.

(b) Had the parties directly transferred the shares of the
amalgamating companies to the amalgamated company, capital gains arising on
such transfer would have attracted tax in India.

(c) The scheme of amalgamation should be kept on hold until
the high court has accorded its sanction, as the tax department would then be
able to present its case before the court on the adverse financial
repercussions of merger.

(d) There was no business or commercial purpose for the
proposed amalgamation. The object of the scheme was primarily to avoid payment
of taxes and it was a plan to artificially inflate profits and reduce
liability of the amalgamating companies.

 

Held

The AAR accepted the applicant’s contentions and held:

(a) Capital gains arising due to the proposed amalgamation
would be exempt from tax in the hands of the Amalgamating Companies as well as
their shareholders, as the conditions prescribed under section 47 (vi)/(vii)
of the Income Tax Act would be fulfilled.

(b) The contention of the tax department that acceptance of
the application should be kept in abeyance until the high court has accorded
its approval, cannot be accepted as it would lead to the AAR, a statutory
authority, refusing to exercise jurisdiction vested in it by law. The Ruling
was sought and was also provided on the basis that the scheme will have
approval of the Court. The ruling would take effect only after the court’s
approval. The AAR can provide its ruling on the proposed transaction in the
interest of providing a firm idea of tax implications in India.



(c) The scheme is not
likely to jeopardize the interests of the tax department as all tax dues of
the amalgamating companies vest in and can be recovered from SIPL.

(d) The application cannot be rejected on the ground that
it is a pure and simple design to avoid capital gains tax. Relying on the Apex
Court’s decision in the case of Azadi Bachao Andolan and the Gujarat High
Court’s decision in the case of Sakarlal Balabhai , the AAR held that it was
possible for a taxpayer to enter into a transaction in such a manner that
legitimate tax exemptions are availed of and the tax liability is reduced. The
AAR also observed that:



Consolidated return filed after due date in S. 139(1), held valid as in substance, a relevant provision complied with

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21 Nicholas Applegate South East Asia Fund
Ltd.
v.
ADIT

(2009 TIOL 74 ITAT Mum-TM]

S. 139, 292B, Income-tax Act

A.Y. : 2001-02. Dated : 9-1-2009

Issue :

On facts, consolidated return filed after the date prescribed
in S. 139(1), held valid as in substance and in effect the relevant provision
was complied with.

 

Facts :

The assessee was a company incorporated in Mauritius under
the Protected Cells Companies Act. It had four Cells. For A.Y. 2001-02, it filed
separate returns of income of four Cells. These returns were filed on 30th
October 2001, i.e., within the time prescribed u/s.139(1) of Income-tax
Act. The assessee subsequently realised that being a single entity (company), it
was required to file consolidated return at entity level i.e., for all
four Cells. Accordingly, on 29th October 2002 it filed a consolidated return for
all four Cells.

 

The assessee had derived income from dividend (which was
claimed exempt u/s.10(33) of the Income-tax Act) and short-term capital loss,
which the AO had found in order. However, the AO issued show-cause notice to the
assessee to explain why consolidated return filed on 29th October 2002 should
not be considered as original return and four separate returns filed on 30th
October 2001 should not be considered invalid.

 

The assessee explained that it filed separate returns for
four Cells as it was of the view that the Cells had separate legal existence.
Further, the original returns of four Cells did not suffer from any defect
mentioned in S. 139(9) of the Income-tax Act and hence the subsequent
consolidated return filed on 29th October 2002 was only a revised return. The
AO, however, held that the earlier returns were invalid and only the subsequent
return was valid. Therefore, he did not allow carry forward of loss. The CIT(A)
upheld the order of the AO.

 

On account of differences in the views of Tribunal members,
the case was referred to the Third Member. The assessee put forth the following
propositions :

(i) Provisions of S. 139(1), S. 139(3) and S. 139(4) must
be harmoniously construed.

(ii) S. 139 is a machinery provision as against a fiscal
provision, and must be interpreted in a liberal and equitable manner.

(iii) The original returns filed by the Cells have only
been consolidated in the subsequent returns dated October 29, 2002 and as
observed by this Tribunal, there is no mala fide intention on the part
of the appellant in doing so.

(iv) Benefit u/s.139(5) cannot be denied on technical
grounds.

(v) The information contained in the revised return dated
October 29, 2002 is congruent to the information provided in the four separate
returns filed by the Cells and there is no variance whatsoever, hence there is
no loss of revenue. Further, information contained in the belated return
cannot be held as invalid so as to be overlooked by the Assessing Officer.

(vi) It is provided u/s.292B of the Income-tax Act that no
return of income furnished or made shall be invalid or shall be deemed to be
invalid merely by reason of any mistake, defect or omission in such return of
income, if such return of income is in substance and effect in conformity with
or according to the intent and purpose of this Act.

(vii) The ‘purpose’ of the Income-tax Act, as is evident
from S. 292B of the Income-tax Act, is to achieve/determine the correct total
income and when correct total income was given in four returns filed
simultaneously and later in the return consolidating figures were given, the
original four returns filed were valid.

 


The tax authorities contended that there was difference,
though minor, between the earlier four returns and the subsequent consolidated
return. Further, u/s.139(3) of the Income-tax Act, only a valid return can be
revised.

 

Held :

The Tribunal referred to the decisions in CIT v. Kulu
Valley Transport Co. P. Ltd.,
(1970) 77 ITR 518 (SC) and State Bank of
Patiala v. S. K. Sharma,
(1996) 3 SCC 364 and held that as all the relevant
and correct information was given in prescribed time, the four Cells filing four
separate returns had complied in substance and in effect with the intent and
purpose of the Income-tax Act and that the subsequent consolidated return was
not revised return but mere consolidation of the four earlier returns.

 

Compilers note :

The issue whether a Protected Cell Company should file a
consolidated return or different returns for each cell was neither raised before
the Tribunal, nor was it examined by the Tribunal.

levitra

Concept of economic employer — Reimbursement under Secondment Agreement to legal employer on actual cost basis represented salary paid to secondee — No tax was required to be deducted at source.

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20 IDS Software Solutions (India) Pvt Ltd
v. ITO

(2009 TIOL 82 ITAT Bang.)

S. 195, S. 9(1)(vii), Income-tax Act; Article 12(4),

India-USA DTAA

A.Y. : 2006-07. Dated : 21-1-2009

Issue :

Concept of economic employer and that reimbursement under
Secondment Agreement to legal employer on actual cost basis represented salary
paid to secondee, wherein no tax was required to be deducted at source.

 

Facts :

The assessee was wholly-owned subsidiary of an American
company. The assessee was engaged in software development business. To assist it
in its business, the assessee executed Secondment Agreement with its parent
company (which was an American company) for providing services of certain
personnel (‘secondee’). The secondee was to report to, and be responsible to,
the assessee and was to act in accordance with assessee’s instructions and
directions. Though the American company remained the legal employer of the
secondee as per the agreement, the secondee was appointed as per the articles of
association of the assessee and was to act in accordance with reasonable
requests, instructions and directions of the assessee. The assessee was obliged
to reimburse to the American company the entire remuneration (including bonus
and other incidental costs) of the secondee on actual cost basis without any
mark-up. The assessee was also obliged to indemnify the American company for all
claims that may arise as a consequence of any act or omission committed by the
secondee. The American company hired a qualified person and seconded him as
managing director to the assessee.

 

The assessee applied u/s.195 to the AO for reimbursement of
remuneration to the American company without deduction of tax, on the ground
that for all practical purposes, the secondee was assessee’s employee and salary
received by him from the American company was offered to tax in India in his
individual capacity. The AO held that payment by the assessee to the American
company cannot be considered as mere reimbursement exempt from tax and further
that in absence of employer-employee relationship, the proposed remuneration
cannot be considered as salary. Accordingly, remuneration would be considered as
Fees for Technical Services (‘FTS’) in terms of Explanation 2 to S. 9(1)(vii) of
the Income-tax Act. The assessee’s contention that no technical services were
made available was rejected by the AO who directed it to deduct tax @10%. The
CIT(A) upheld the order of the AO.

 

Before the Tribunal, the assessee contended that for all
practical purposes, the secondee was an employee of the assessee and
employer-employee relationship existed between the assessee and the secondee.
Accordingly, payment made by the assessee to the American company was only
reimbursement of ‘salary’ cost. The assessee relied on the decisions in CIT
v. Lady Navajbai R. J. Tata,
(1947) 15 ITR 8 (Bom.), K. R. Kothanda-raman
v. CIT,
(1966) 62 ITR 348 (Mad.), Lakshmi-narayan Ram Gopal and Son Ltd.
v. Government of Hyderabad,
(1954) 25 ITR 449 (SC), Anderson v. James
Sutherland,
(1941) SC 203 (Scottish Court of Sessions) and Ram Prashad v.
CIT,
(1972) 86 ITR 122 (SC) and also certain extracts from Professor Klaus
Vogel’s Commentary to support its contention of employer-employee relationship.

 

On facts of the assessee’s case, the Tribunal observed that
the assessee was ‘economic employer’ of the secondee. The secondee was rendering
services to the assessee under the control and supervision of the assessee, the
salary costs were borne by the asseesse by way of cross charge, the asseesee
could have terminated the services of the secondee as per articles and the
assessee could regulate the powers and duties of the secondee.

 

The Tribunal then considered the issue whether the amount
paid to the American company could be considered as FTS. The Tribunal held that
certain terms in Secondment Agreement, like indemnification and duties of the
secondee being mentioned clearly indicated that the secondee was an employee and
— usually not found in an agreement for rendering technical services. These
facts went against the tax authorities’ contention that the payment was FTS.

 

Held :

Payment by the assessee to the American company under
Secondment Agreement was not FTS, but represented reimbursement of salary paid
by the American company to the secondee. The agreement represented an
independent contract of service in respect of employment of the secondee even
though the agreement was per se between the assessee and the American
company. Since tax was deducted at source from salary and was remitted to the
tax authorities in India, the assessee was not liable to deduct tax from the
amount reimbursed to the American company.

 

levitra

Although services under Secondment Agreement constituted provisions of services of technical personnel, as the essence of transaction was for mutual business development and not to derive income for service, no FTS can be said to have accrued to foreign

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19 Cholamandalam MS General Insurance Co.
Ltd.
In re


(2009 TIOL 02 ARA IT)

S. 9(1)(vii), Income-tax Act; Article 13.4,

India-Korea DTAA

Dated : 29-1-2009

 

Issue :

Although services under Secondment Agreement constituted
provisions of services of technical personnel, as the essence or substance of
transaction was for mutual business development and not to derive income for
service and the parties never contemplated payment of FTS, no income in the
nature of FTS can be said to have been accrued to the foreign employer.

 

Facts :

The applicant is an Indian company, which is engaged in
non-life insurance business. It is interested in developing business
relationship with Indian affiliates of Korean and Japanese companies. For this
purpose, it requires persons who are well-versed with insurance business,
respective language, etc.

 

To this end, the applicant executed Secondment Agreement with
a Korean company for deputation of Korean company’s employee (‘secondee’) for a
period of two years. The terms of the arrangement for secondment were for mutual
interests. As far as the applicant was concerned, it would benefit from the
services of seconded employees, whereas from the perspective of Korean provider
company, the arrangement would not only promote its business in India but also
that wherever possible, the reinsurance business would be placed with the Korean
company.

 

In terms of the agreement, the applicant was to reimburse
Korean company for only a part of the salary and other benefits and no payment
was to be made by the applicant to the secondee. The Korean company continued to
remain legal employer of the secondee and pay salary to him. It also deducted
tax from his salary and the tax was deposited with the tax authorities.

 

The services to be performed by the secondee were defined to
mean : (a) introduce applicant to potential business contacts; (b) assist
applicant to develop insurance products for Indian market; (c) furnish applicant
with necessary expertise to establish and develop business; and (d) to provide
applicant with inputs on design of reinsurance programmes.

 

Secondment Agreement provided for consideration by way of
reimbursement of the secondee’s salary and benefits, which was not to exceed
those applicable to the applicant’s employees of the same or equivalent grade.
AAR noted that the secondee had no right or authority to conclude any contract
on behalf of the applicant and that the Korean company was not in the business
of supply of manpower.

 

The tax authorities had initially contended that the secondee
could be regarded as the Korean company’s agent and consequently, it had an
agency PE in India. However, this contention was not pursued. Factually, it was
noticed that reimbursement by the applicant constituted about 55% of salary,
house rent, etc. paid by the Korean company to the secondee.

 

The AAR referred to definition of Fees for Technical Services
(‘FTS’) in Explanation 2 to S. 9(1)(vii) and Article 13.4 of India-Korea DTAA
and observed that the definitions were substantially similar.

 

In this background, the issues before the AAR were :

(i) Whether amount payable by the applicant to the Korean
company was in the nature of income requiring deduction of tax at source under
Income-tax Act ?

(ii) If answer to (i) is in affirmative, what should be the
rate of tax to be deducted at source ?

(iii) Whether the Korean company could be considered to
have PE in India requiring attribution of income to that PE ?

 


The AAR admitted that it is debatable whether the term
‘including provision of services of technical or other personnel’ is independent
of, or integral part of, the term ‘managerial, technical or consultancy
services’. Applying the ratio of decisions in Intertek Testing Services India P
Ltd. In re (2008) 307 ITR 418 (AAR) and G V K Industries Ltd. v.
Income-tax Officer,
(1997) 228 ITR 564 (AP), it held that the secondee’s
services were technical in nature involving specialised knowledge and expertise
in insurance business. Accordingly, the Korean company did provide services of
technical personnel.

 

The AAR then considered the question whether amount paid by
the applicant could be construed as ‘consideration’ for the provision of
services of technical personnel. It observed that the agreement represented a
mutually beneficial arrangement and its essence or substance was not to derive
income by way of fee for service, but only partial reimbursement of the cost.
Thus, no income in the nature of FTS was generated. Viewed in this light, the
parties never contemplated payment of FTS, either under Income-tax Act or under
DTAA.

 

The AAR examined the ratio of the decisions in CIT v.
Dunlop Rubber Co Ltd.,
(1983) 142 ITR 493 (Cal.) and CIT v. Industrial
Engineering Projects (P) Ltd.,
(1993) 202 ITR 1014 (Del.) wherein nature of
receipt of reimbursement of expenses were considered and the respective Courts
had, on facts, held that reimbursement of expenses did not constitute income.

 

The tax authorities had relied on AAR’s rulings in A T & S
India P Ltd., In re (2006) 287 ITR 421 (AAR) and Danfoss Industries P
Ltd., In re (2004) 268 ITR 1 (AAR), wherein similar payment for
deputation of technical personnel under secondment agreement and for rendering
services to group companies was considered as FTS. The AAR distinguished these
rulings on facts and particularly because in the present case the details
furnished showed that it was only partial reimbursement of cost incurred by the
Korean company.

Purpose of DTAA may be relevant also in cases involving discrimination. (ii) India-Germany DTAA, Indian subsidiary of German parent company listed on German Stock Exchange considered ‘company in which public are substantially interested’.

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18 Daimler Chrysler India (P) Ltd. v.
DCIT

(2009) 120 TTJ 803 (Pune)

S. 2(18), S. 79, S. 90(1)(a), Income-tax Act; Article 24(4),
India-Germany DTAA

A.Y. : 1999-2000. Dated : 21-1-2009

Issues :



(i) Purpose of tax treaty may be relevant not only in
case of double taxation and prevention of fiscal evasion, but also in cases
involving discrimination.


(ii) Due to ‘ownership non-discrimination’ protection
under Article 24(4) of India-Germany DTAA, Indian subsidiary of German parent
company listed on German Stock Exchange would be considered a ‘company in
which public are substantially interested’.


 


Facts :

The assessee is an Indian company (‘I Co’) in which Daimler
Benz AG (‘DBAG’), a German company held 81.33% equity share capital. DBAG was
listed on stock exchange in Germany.

 

During the relevant year, DBAG and Chrysler Corporation USA,
an American company decided to merge their respective businesses. Hence, a new
company, namely, Daimler Chrysler AG (‘DCAG’) was incorporated in Germany. DBAG
and Chrysler Corporation became wholly-owned subsidiaries of DCAG. Thereafter,
DBAG merged into DCAG. Thus, all the assets and liabilities of DBAG were
transferred to DCAG. Inter alia, these included DBAG’s shareholding in I
Co.

In terms of S. 2(18) of the Income-tax Act, I Co was not a
‘company in which public are substantially interested’.

S. 79 of Income-tax Act disentitles carry forward of losses
of a company in case shares having not less than 51% of the voting power are
transferred.

I Co had suffered loss in its business for several years and
had substantial carried-forward losses. Since DBAG’s shareholding in I Co was
transferred to DCAG, and since DBAG was not listed on stock exchange in India,
the AO proposed to apply provisions of S. 79 to I Co. In respect of the
immediately succeeding year, S. 79 was amended with a view to exempt all cases
similar to that of I Co from the rigours of S. 79. I Co contended that the
amendment was clarificatory and having retrospective effect and requested the AO
to hold that S. 79 was not attracted. The AO however did not accept the
contention and held that I Co was not entitled to carry forward and set off the
accumulated losses. The CIT(A) confirmed the decision of the AO.

Before the Tribunal, I Co also put forth the additional
ground for invoking of ‘ownership non-discrimination’ under Article 24(4) of
India-Germany DTAA.

The tax authorities contended that there was no question of
treaty override or treaty applicability since there was no double taxation of
any income. The Tribunal referred to S. 90(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act and noted
that Clause (a) of S. 90 was substituted with effect from 1st April 2004, to
grant relief even in respect of income only in one jurisdiction and the relief
could be with a view to ‘promote mutual economic relations, trade and
investment’.

The next issue before the Tribunal was whether a resident
assessee could qualify to access protection under DTAA. The Tribunal referred to
Article 24 of India-Germany DTAA and observed that excepting the case of
invoking of PE non-discrimination, it is not necessary that the assessee seeking
treaty protection in one country must belong to or be resident of or be national
of the other country.

To seek protection under Article 24(4) in India, it is
necessary that taxation or any requirement connected therewith in India should
not be other or more burdensome (for a company which is wholly or partly owned
or controlled by a German resident) than the taxation and connected requirements
to which similar Indian enterprises may be subjected. This requires examination
of a ‘similar Indian company’ and ‘taxation or any requirement connected
therewith’ applicable to such similar Indian company. The Tribunal noted that
the basis of differentiation was the stock exchange on which the shares of DBAG
were listed, since if they were listed on a stock exchange in India, S. 79 would
not be attracted. Further, considering that S. 21 of the Securities (Contract)
Regulation Act, 1956 and draft listing agreement indicate that listing agreement
is possible only with ‘a company duly formed and registered under the Indian
Companies Act’, it would not be possible for the German parent company to list
its shares on a stock exchange in India. The Tribunal thereafter observed that
while there were no judicial precedents in India, there were several judgments
by foreign judicial bodies. While such precedents cannot have binding values,
they do deserve due and careful consideration. The Tribunal did refer to these
decisions.

 

Held :



(i) Provisions of tax treaty may be relevant even when
income is not taxed in the hands of assessee. Substitution of Clause (a) of S.
90(1) reflects the ground realities and rightly indicates that in today’s
world, the role of treaties is not only confined to avoiding double taxation
or to give relief in respect of doubly taxed income. Tax treaties are seen as
instruments of fostering economic relations, trade and investment. Treaty
override, even before amendment in 2004, covered all the provisions of the tax
treaties, including the provisions relating to non-discrimination.

(ii) It is not necessary that the assessee seeking treaty
protection in one country must belong to or be resident of or be national of
the other country, and a resident assessee would qualify for protection under
DTAA. As per Article 24(4) of the treaty, it is not necessary that the
taxpayer, in whose cases non-discrimination is invoked, should be a resident
of the other contracting state. Since the capital of the taxpayer is
substantially owned by a resident of Germany, the coverage criteria under the
enterprise non-discrimination clause of the treaty is satisfied.

(iii) Having regard to the provisions of Article 24(4), the
disability [u/s.79 read with S. 2(18)], of carry forward and set off of
accumulated losses on account of change in shareholding pattern, cannot be
extended to Indian subsidiaries of German parent companies so long as German
parent companies are listed on a German stock exchange recognised under their
domestic laws. To this extent, the rigours of the domestic law relating to
carry forward of losses must stand relaxed due to treaty overriding domestic
tax.

 


Fees received by non-resident for performing services in India through a PE are taxable in accordance with Article 7 of DTAA. If Article 7 applies, S. 9(1)(vii), S. 44D and S. 115A would not apply.

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New Page 1Part C : Tribunal & AAR
International Tax Decisions


12 Rio Tinto Technical Services v.
DCIT [Unreported]
[ITA No. 3399/Del./2002, 5372/Del./2003& 4742/Del./2004]
Article 7, India-Australia DTAA; S. 5, S. 9(1)(vii), S. 44D, S. 115A, Dated :
19-3-2010

Counsels : Salil Kapoor & Ors. (for taxpayer)
Y. S. Kakkar & Other (for Revenue)

 


Fees received by
non-resident for performing services in India through a PE are taxable in
accordance with Article 7 of DTAA. If Article 7 applies, S. 9(1)(vii), S. 44D
and S. 115A would not apply.

Facts :

The taxpayer was
PE in India of an Australian Company (‘AusCo’). AusCo had entered in to contract
with an Indian Company for evaluation of coal deposit and feasibility study for
transportation of extracted coal. The taxpayer received approval of RBI for
establishing a project office in India. After completion of that project, AusCo
entered into another contract with another Indian company for evaluation of iron
ore deposit and feasibility study for transportation of iron ore. The taxpayer
received approval of RBI for establishing project office for this contract.

The PE received
consideration for performing the services under the contracts. The AO held that
the consideration was in nature of fees for technical services. The AO
considered it to be subject to S. 9(1)(vii) and accordingly, he taxed it @20% of
the gross receipts of the PE. In appeal, the CIT(A) upheld the order of the AO.

The Tribunal
perused the agreement between AusCo and Indian Company and noted that the
services to be provided were not simple technical and consultancy services, but
specific activities required to be done on site. Hence, AusCo had established a
PE in India.

Held :

When taxing a
non-resident, it should be first ascertained whether income is taxable u/s.5 or
9. If it is so taxable, and if the taxpayer qualifies to access DTAA, the option
would be with the taxpayer whether to prefer to be governed by provisions of
DTAA or the Income-tax Act.

Income of the PE
was taxable u/s.5(2) and AusCo had opted to be taxed as per India-Australia DTAA.
Income of the PE was ‘Business Profits’. Hence, Article 7 would apply. Article
7(2) provides that the PE should be treated as a distinct and independent
enterprise, and Article 7(3) provides that deductions in accordance with the
Income-tax Act shall be allowed. Since Articles 7 applies, S. 9(1)(vii), S. 44D,
S. 115A would not apply.

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Execution of a contract for transportation and installation work for mineral oil exploration platforms—Whether receipts for services outside India, taxable in India u/s 44BB. Presumptive income can be taxed only if it is otherwise taxable under Income-tax

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New Page 1Part C : Tribunal & AAR
International Tax Decisions


11 DCIT v. J Ray McDermott Eastern
Hemisphere Ltd.
(2010) TII 41 ITAT (Mum.-INTL)
S. 44BB

 

Execution of a contract for transportation and
installation work for mineral oil exploration platforms—Whether receipts for
services outside India, taxable in India u/s 44BB. Presumptive income can be
taxed only if it is otherwise taxable under Income-tax Act.

Facts :

The taxpayer was a company incorporated in, and tax
resident of, Mauritius (‘MCo’). MCo was engaged in the business of designing,
fabrication, construction and installation of platforms, docks, pipelines,
jackets and other similar services which are used in the exploration and
production of mineral oil. MCo undertook and executed a contract for
transportation and installation work for certain well platforms to be used in
mineral oil exploration. While furnishing its tax return, MCo did not offer for
tax receipts pertaining to activities carried on outside India.

S. 44BB provides for presumptive taxation @10% of
the gross receipts in respect of the services that are used in prospecting,
extraction or production of mineral oil. The AO concluded that u/s.44BB, income
is computed on presumptive basis, w.r.t. all receipts and therefore the
distinction between activities carried on in India and those carried on outside
India is not relevant. He accordingly applied presumptive rate to entire gross
receipts of the contract for determining taxable income.

The CIT(A), accepted contentions of the taxpayer.

Before the Tribunal, MCo contended that the income
pertaining to installation and transportation activities carried on outside
India is not taxable under the Income-tax Act. Alternatively, the income
pertaining to such activities or work carried on outside India cannot be
attributable to a PE in India.

Held :

The Tribunal referred to the following decisions
wherein it was held that before computing income on presumptive basis, it should
be ensured that such income falls within the scope of charging provisions :

  • Saipem SPA v. DCIT,
    (2004) 88 ITD 213 (Delhi)

  • McDermott ETPM Inc v.
    DCIT, (2005) 92 ITD 385 (Mum.)

The Tribunal held
that only the income which is reasonably attributable to operations carried on
in India is taxable in India. Therefore, income computed on presumptive basis
can be taxed in India only if such income is otherwise chargeable to tax under
general provisions of the Income-tax Act.

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Mauritius company executing 3 contracts in India. Whether the duration of each contract should be considered separately or should be aggregated —DTAA applied test of PE to each construction site separately—The 3 contracts were not inextricably interconnec

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New Page 1Part C : Tribunal & AAR
International Tax Decisions

10 ADIT v. Valentine Maritime Mauritius Ltd. (2010)
TIOL 195 (ITAT-Mum.)
Article 5(2)(i), India-Mauritius DTAA
A.Y. : 2001-02. Dated : 5-4-2010

 

Mauritius company executing 3 contracts in India.
Whether the duration of each contract should be considered separately or should
be aggregated —DTAA applied test of PE to each construction site separately—The
3 contracts were not inextricably interconnected and interdependent—Hence, the
duration of 3 sites cannot be aggregated—Since none of the contracts exceeded
the threshold period, there was no PE.

Facts :

The taxpayer was a company incorporated in
Mauritius (‘MCo’). The Mauritius tax authority had issued tax residency
certificate to MCo, which qualified MCo to access India-Mauritius DTAA (‘the
DTAA’). MCo was engaged in the business of marine and general engineering and
construction. During the relevant assessment year, the taxpayer executed the
following three different contracts in India :

Contract Activity Duration
1. Replacement of main
deck with temporary deck
100 days
2. Charter of barge for
accommodation
137 days
3. Charter of barge for
power project together with technical personnel
225
days

In respect of contract 2, the taxpayer had applied
for lower withholding of tax order u/s.197. The AO considered the hire charges
as income u/s.44B. Accordingly, the taxpayer accepted the liability @7.5% on
gross basis.

Subsequently, the taxpayer contended that in terms
of Article 5(2)(i) of the DTAA, a building site or a construction or assembly
project or supervisory activities in connection therewith, would constitute a PE
(Construction PE), only if it continues for a period of 9 months. Since income
from the contracts was ‘business profits’ of MCo, under Article 7 of the DTAA,
such income could be taxed in India only if MCo had a PE in India. As none of
the 3 contracts continued for more than 9 months, no Construction PE of MCo was
constituted in India. Accordingly, the profits from the execution of the 3
contracts were not taxable in India.

The AO concluded that to determine existence of a
Construction PE, time spent on all contracts should be aggregated. As aggregate
time spent on the 3 contracts was more than 9 months, MCo had a PE in India and
its income from all the contracts was taxable in India.

The CIT(A), however, held that to determine the
existence of a Construction PE, the time spent on each contract should be
separately considered.

The main issue before the Tribunal was, whether MCo
had a Construction PE in India.

The Tribunal considered the relevant provisions of
the DTAA, OECD Commentary and various case laws.

Held :

As regards ‘fixed place PE’ :

To constitute a fixed place PE, there must be a
fixed place through which business of the enterprise is carried on. The business
of MCo is that of giving barge on hire and business activity is not carried on
at the barge hired out. Since the business is not carried on at a fixed place,
the barge cannot be held to be a PE of MCo.

As regards relationship between ‘fixed place PE’
and ‘Construction PE’ :

In terms of the specific treaty provision, PE,
inter alia, includes a building or construction project if such project
continues for a period of more than 9 months. Thus, the ‘duration test’ for a
Construction PE limits the general principle of permanence under the fixed place
PE rule.Hence, even if a PE is constituted under the fixed place PE rule, if the
activity is that specified in Article 5(2)(i), the PE would not be constituted
if the specified activity does not cross the prescribed time threshold.

As regards ‘duration test’ for a ‘Construction PE’
:

For the following reason, activity of each
site/project should be considered separately and all the activities in a country
are not to be aggregated :

 

  • Reference to
    Construction PE is in singular and the DTAA does not specifically provide for
    aggregating number of days spent on all sites/projects. Also, activities of
    MCo at different locations are not so inextricably interconnected that they
    should be viewed as a coherent whole.

  • Large number of India’s
    DTAAs specifically provide for aggregation of sites/projects for computing
    threshold time period under ‘duration test’.

  • If DTAA does not
    specifically mention aggregation principle, the same cannot be inferred or
    applied.

  •     
    Both OECD and UN Model Commentaries provide for application of ‘duration
    test’ to each site/project.

    •     
      OECD Commentary recognises possible abuse of duration test by
      splitting of one contract into several parts. However, the onus is on the tax
      authorities to establish artificial splitting of contract.
    •     
      OECD Commentary recognises that even if a building site is based on
      several contracts, it should be regarded as a single unit if commercially and
      geographically it forms a coherent whole.

        
    The test of geographical coherence and commercial coherence are only
    vague tests. They cannot be applied universally or conclusively due to various
    ambiguities. They are also unworkable in practical situation.

     

    The true
    test is, (in addition to geographical proximity and commercial nexus,)
    interconnection and interrelationship.

     

    The Tribunal did not
    find that the 3 contracts were inextricably interconnected, interdependent or a
    coherent whole in conjunction with each other. Hence, it held that as the
    duration of the 3 contracts executed by MCo cannot be aggregated for
    determining the existence of a PE, no PE of MCo in India was constituted.

(2012) 54 SOT 44 (Hyd.) J.V.Krishna Rao vs. Dy. CIT ITA Nos.1866 & 1867 (Hyd.) of 2011 A.Y.2008-09. Dated 15-06-2012

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Sections 54F – Exemption is available even if borrowed funds are used for investment.

Facts

For the relevant assessment year, the assessee’s claim for exemption u/s. 54F was denied by the Assessing Officer on the ground that the assessee’s deposit in the `Capital Gains Accounts Scheme’ included borrowed funds. The CIT(A) upheld the disallowance.

Held

The Tribunal, relying on the decisions in the following cases, allowed the exemption u/s. 54F :

a. Muneer Khan V. ITO (2010) 41 SOT 504 (Hyd.)

b. Sita Jain V. Asst. CIT (IT Appeal Nos.4754, 4755 and 5036 (Delhi) of 2010, dated 20-5-2011

c. Bombay Housing Corpn. vs. Asst. CIT (2002) 81 ITD 545 (Mum.) d. Mrs.Prema P.Shah vs. ITO (2006) 100 ITD 60 (Mum.)

The Tribunal noted as under :

The capital gains earned by the assessee can be utilised for other purposes and as long as the assessee fulfils the condition of investment of the equivalent amount in the asset qualifying for relief u/s.54F by securing the money spent out of the capital gains from other sources available to him, either by borrowing or otherwise, he is eligible for relief u/s. 54F in respect of the entire amount of capital gains realised.

In this case, even though part of those capital gains were utilised for other purposes, the assessee made deposits of the amounts equivalent to the capital gains in Capital Gains Account Scheme, by borrowing the amount equivalent to such utilised funds. Therefore, he is entitled to relief u/s. 54F as ultimately the assessee deposited the requisite amount in the Capital Gains Account Scheme within the time stipulated by the statute.

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Checklist received from CIT (TDS), Mumbai listing basic details to be submitted alongwith the application u/s. 197 for lower deduction/ Nil deduction of tax at source.

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(a) Projected Profit and Loss Account for Financial Year 2013-14

(b) Annual Report for AY 2011-12, 2012-13 and 2013-14 (if not finalised, submit unaudited results)

(c) Tax Audit Report for AY 2011-12, 2012-13 and 2013- 14 (if finalised)

(d) Wherever there is delay in payment of TDS as per Tax Audit Report, attach proof of payment of interest.

(e) List of parties included in the projected receipts with their TAN and expected amount.

(f) If there is fall in net profit for Financial Year 13-14 as compared to earlier three years then reasons for fall in net profit.

(g) Copies of Provisional TDS statement of FY 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13.

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Clarification regarding conditions relevant to identify development centres engaged in contract R & D services with insignificant risk – Circular 3/2013 dated 26th March, 2013

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Development centre in India may be treated as a contract R & D service provider with insignificant risk if the following conditions are cumulatively complied with:

(a) Foreign principal performs most of the economically significant functions involved in research or product development cycle whereas Indian development centre would largely by involved in economically insignificant functions;

(b) The principal provides funds. capital and other economically significant assets including intangibles for research or product development and Indian development centre would not use any other economically significant assets including intangibles in research or product development;

(c) Indian development centre works under direct supervision of foreign principal who not only has capability to control or supervise, but also actually controls or supervises research or product development through its strategic decisions to perform core functions as well as monitor activities on regular basis;

(d) Indian development centre does not assume or has no economically significant realised risks. If a contract shows the principal to be controlling the risk but conduct shows that Indian development centre is doing so, then the contractual terms are not the final determinant of actual activities. In the case of foreign principal being located in a country/territory widely perceived as a low or no tax jurisdiction, it will be presumed that the foreign principal is not controlling the risk. However, the Indian development centre may rebut this presumption to the satisfaction of the revenue authorities; and

(e) Indian development centre has no ownership right (legal or economic) on outcome of research which vests with foreign principal, and that it shall be evident from conduct of the parties.

Further, it has been clarified that all the above conditions should be actually proved by conduct of parties and not mere contractual terms.

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Clarification regarding selection of profit split method as most appropriate method – Circular 2/2013 dated 26th March, 2013

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The circular lists the factors to be borne in mind while selecting Profit Split method as most appropriate method, while determining the arms length price for transfer pricing purpose.

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(2012) 150 TTJ 159 (Mumbai) BSEL Infrastructure Realty Ltd. vs. Asst. CIT ITA No.6559 (Mum.) of 2011 A.Y.2007-08 Dated 13-04-2012

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Section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act 1961 – Penalty cannot be levied when additions were made while computing the total income under normal provisions of the Income-tax Act but finally the assessee’s income was determined on the basis of book profit u/s. 115JB.

Facts

For the relevant assessment year, the Assessing Officer made disallowances/additions to the assessee’s income as per normal provisions of the Income Tax Act. Finally, however, income was determined and tax was computed u/s. 115JB. The Assessing Officer, thereafter, levied penalty on all the disallowances/additions. The CIT(A) deleted the penalty on certain additions, while confirming the same on other additions.

Held

The Tribunal, relying on the decisions in the following cases, deleted the penalty:
a. CIT vs. Nalwa Sons Investments Ltd.(2010) 235 CTR (DEL.) 209/(2010) 45 DTR (Del.) 345/(2010) 327 ITR 543 (Del.)
b. Ruchi Strips & Alloys Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT ITA Nos.6940 & 6941 (Mum.) 2008 The Tribunal noted as under:

1. If book profits are deemed to be the total income of the assessee in terms of section 115JB and is more than income under the normal provisions of the Act, then by legal fiction such a book profit will be deemed to be the total income of the assessee.

2. Therefore, if tax has been imposed and collected on the deemed income u/s. 115JB in the assessment, then the tax under the normal provisions/computation is not leviable or charged.

3. Therefore, if any addition or disallowance has been made in the normal provisions/computation of the Income Tax Act and finally assessment has not been completed or tax has not been levied on such normal computation, then such additions/disallowances cannot be a subject matter of penalty because no tax has been levied on such additions/disallowances.

4. When income tax is paid on the book profits by a legal fiction, such a legal fiction has to be taken to its logical conclusion and it cannot be held that for the purpose of penalty, normal computation would be considered even though tax has not been levied under the normal provision/ computation. Therefore, penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) cannot be imposed because there was no tax sought to be evaded.

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Supervisory PE threshold as prescribed in India-Germany treaty needs to be reckoned w.r.t each separate project.

 2 JDIT v. M/s. Krupp Uhde Gmbh
(2009 TIOL 78 ITAT Mum.)
Article 5(2)(i) of India-German Double Tax Avoidance Agreement (treaty)
A.Y. : 1998-99. Dated : 7-1-2009

Issue :

  •     Supervisory PE threshold as prescribed in India-Germany treaty needs to be reckoned w.r.t each separate project.

  •     In absence of emergence of PE, onshore technical services are liable to tax @ 10% of gross fee.

Facts :

The assessee, a German company (herein GermanCo), was engaged in the business of providing technical know-how/licence, basic engineering services, and supervisory services in connection with construction or installation of specified machineries/assembly projects. The assessee rendered services to various Indian companies. A large part of the services was rendered on offshore basis. In connection with on-shore supervisory activities involving various projects, personnel of the GermanCo were present in India in aggregate for more than 6 months duration — though, presence in respect of each project was of less than 6 months. The GermanCo offered the amount for taxation as fees for technical services chargeable @ 10% on gross basis in terms of Article 12 (2) of India-Germany DTAA.

The Assessing Officer (AO) rejected the contention of the assessee and held that the GermanCo had PE in India. In view of the AO, for determining whether or not Supervisory PE emerged, duration of all the projects in a particular year had to be aggregated. In view of the AO, since the German Co had PE in India, the benefit of concessional rate of 10% provided in the treaty was not available and the amount had to be assessed under domestic law @ 30% by applying provisions of S. 115A of the Act.

On further appeal, the CIT(A) accepted GermanCo’s contention that offshore services are not chargeable to tax in India. The Department did not object to this aspect in further appeal before the Tribunal. The controversy before the Tribunal was therefore confined to taxation of onshore services.

As regards on-shore supervisory activities, the CIT

(A) accepted the assessee’s contention and held that : (i) threshold of 6 months provided in the treaty is required to be applied to each project separately;

(ii) since none of the project sites involved presence of more than 6 months, no PE emerged for GermanCo; (iii) in absence of PE, the fees for Supervisory activities was chargeable @ 10% in terms of Article 12 of DTAA.

Against the above finding, the Department filed further appeal to the Tribunal, primarily objecting that the CIT(A) erred in applying 6 months threshold to each project separately.

Held :

The ITAT held :

    (a) The Tribunal referred to Construction and related PE provisions of India-Germany DTAA. It also referred to similar provisions of India’s treaties with China, USA, Canada and Italy. It concluded that unlike similar treaty provisions of India with China, USA, Canada and Italy, there is nothing in the language of India-Germany treaty to indicate that different sites on which work is carried on by the assessee can be considered together in determining whether or not the Construction/Supervisory PE has emerged for the German Co.

(b) Reference was made to commentary of Klaus Vogel and the book ‘Principles of International Taxation’ to conclude that each project site duration needs to be considered separately, particularly when different contracts have no effective interconnection with each other.

     
(c) The Tax Department contended that overall project duration needs to be considered for determining length of supervisory project of GermanCo. The Tribunal rejected the contention of the Revenue that the date of commencement or the duration of the project should be considered for determining trigger of supervision PE for the assessee. According to the Tribunal, such reckoning would lead to absurd results since there could be instances where contracts for construction of building, supply of plant and machinery, installation, commissiong in respect of a project may be awarded to independent parties and each party may have involvement of differing duration.

     
(d) After considering the language of the treaty, the Tribunal held that the intervening period caused on account of factors such as seasonal shortage of material, labour difficulties, time needed for material to dry, etc cannot be excluded.

    (e) One of the contentions of the taxpayer was that since income-tax is linked to a given assessment year, the threshold of construction PE needs to be considered for each year separately. The assessee claimed that Supervisory PE was not triggered if work during a given tax year involved period of less than 6 months though the overall project duration exceeded 6 months. The Tribunal rejected the contention and held that the prescribed period of 6 months has to be computed, irrespective of the tax years involved. For instance, where an activity starts in January and ends in July, total period is 6 months – though period falling in each of the two financial years is less than 6 months.

In absence of emergence of PE, onshore technical services are liable to tax @ 10% of gross fee.

 2 JDIT v. M/s. Krupp Uhde Gmbh
(2009 TIOL 78 ITAT Mum.)
Article 5(2)(i) of India-German Double Tax Avoidance Agreement (treaty)
A.Y. : 1998-99. Dated : 7-1-2009

Issue :

  •     Supervisory PE threshold as prescribed in India-Germany treaty needs to be reckoned w.r.t each separate project.

  •     In absence of emergence of PE, onshore technical services are liable to tax @ 10% of gross fee.

Facts :

The assessee, a German company (herein GermanCo), was engaged in the business of providing technical know-how/licence, basic engineering services, and supervisory services in connection with construction or installation of specified machineries/assembly projects. The assessee rendered services to various Indian companies. A large part of the services was rendered on offshore basis. In connection with on-shore supervisory activities involving various projects, personnel of the GermanCo were present in India in aggregate for more than 6 months duration — though, presence in respect of each project was of less than 6 months. The GermanCo offered the amount for taxation as fees for technical services chargeable @ 10% on gross basis in terms of Article 12 (2) of India-Germany DTAA.

The Assessing Officer (AO) rejected the contention of the assessee and held that the GermanCo had PE in India. In view of the AO, for determining whether or not Supervisory PE emerged, duration of all the projects in a particular year had to be aggregated. In view of the AO, since the German Co had PE in India, the benefit of concessional rate of 10% provided in the treaty was not available and the amount had to be assessed under domestic law @ 30% by applying provisions of S. 115A of the Act.

On further appeal, the CIT(A) accepted GermanCo’s contention that offshore services are not chargeable to tax in India. The Department did not object to this aspect in further appeal before the Tribunal. The controversy before the Tribunal was therefore confined to taxation of onshore services.

As regards on-shore supervisory activities, the CIT

(A) accepted the assessee’s contention and held that : (i) threshold of 6 months provided in the treaty is required to be applied to each project separately;

(ii) since none of the project sites involved presence of more than 6 months, no PE emerged for GermanCo; (iii) in absence of PE, the fees for Supervisory activities was chargeable @ 10% in terms of Article 12 of DTAA.

Against the above finding, the Department filed further appeal to the Tribunal, primarily objecting that the CIT(A) erred in applying 6 months threshold to each project separately.

Held :

The ITAT held :

    (a) The Tribunal referred to Construction and related PE provisions of India-Germany DTAA. It also referred to similar provisions of India’s treaties with China, USA, Canada and Italy. It concluded that unlike similar treaty provisions of India with China, USA, Canada and Italy, there is nothing in the language of India-Germany treaty to indicate that different sites on which work is carried on by the assessee can be considered together in determining whether or not the Construction/Supervisory PE has emerged for the German Co.

(b) Reference was made to commentary of Klaus Vogel and the book ‘Principles of International Taxation’ to conclude that each project site duration needs to be considered separately, particularly when different contracts have no effective interconnection with each other.

     
(c) The Tax Department contended that overall project duration needs to be considered for determining length of supervisory project of GermanCo. The Tribunal rejected the contention of the Revenue that the date of commencement or the duration of the project should be considered for determining trigger of supervision PE for the assessee. According to the Tribunal, such reckoning would lead to absurd results since there could be instances where contracts for construction of building, supply of plant and machinery, installation, commissiong in respect of a project may be awarded to independent parties and each party may have involvement of differing duration.

     
(d) After considering the language of the treaty, the Tribunal held that the intervening period caused on account of factors such as seasonal shortage of material, labour difficulties, time needed for material to dry, etc cannot be excluded.

    (e) One of the contentions of the taxpayer was that since income-tax is linked to a given assessment year, the threshold of construction PE needs to be considered for each year separately. The assessee claimed that Supervisory PE was not triggered if work during a given tax year involved period of less than 6 months though the overall project duration exceeded 6 months. The Tribunal rejected the contention and held that the prescribed period of 6 months has to be computed, irrespective of the tax years involved. For instance, where an activity starts in January and ends in July, total period is 6 months – though period falling in each of the two financial years is less than 6 months.

Services to Subsidiary in India by deputing personnel of affiliated companies constitute Service PE.

 1 Lucent Technologies International Inc v. DCIT

(2009 TIOL 161 ITAT Del)/(28 SOT 98) Section/Article : Article 5 India — USA Double Tax Avoidance Agreement A.Ys. : 1997-98 to 2000-01. Dated : 19-12-2008

Issue :

  •     Services to Subsidiary in India by deputing personnel of affiliated companies constitute Service PE.

  •     Payment towards licence for use of copyrighted software provided as part of equipment supply is not royalty.


Facts :

The assessee, US Company (USCO), is a leading supplier of hardware and software used for GSM cellular radio telephone system. The USCO supplied telecommunication hardware and software to its customers in India. USCO had an Indian subsidiary (herein WOS) which undertook the work of installation and providing after-sales services to the customers of USCO in India.

USCO had entered into a contract with one Indian telecom company by name Escotel Mobile Communications Ltd. (herein Escotel). In terms of the agreement between USCO and Escotel, USCO was to supply hardware and software to Escotel while the services of installation were to be provided by WOS. In terms of the contract with Escotel, USCO had the responsibility of designing, manufacturing, supplying and delivering all hardware and software. The contract also required USCO to undertake installation, testing, commissioning and achieve final acceptance of the system by the customer. A part of responsibility of the inspection, installation and supervising the testing and commissioning was that of the Indian WOS. To some extent there was an overlap of responsibilities of USCO vis-à-vis that of WOS. As part of the supply contract, the assessee also provided licence for use of computer software which was required for the purposes of functioning of GSM network.

For enabling the WOS to discharge its obligation, USCO made available to WOS personnel who were the employees of the affiliates of USCO. Such employees were under the control of USCO and the WOS was required to pay remuneration to USCO. USCO claimed that it incurred no tax liability in India as the hardware was supplied from outside India. The assessee also claimed that payment received for the licence agreement for use of computer software was business income and was not royalty chargeable in terms of Article 12 of DTAA. Reliance for this was placed on the decision of Special Bench in case of Motorola Inc v. DCIT, (96 TTJ 1) (Delhi SB). The AO claimed that the USCO attracted tax liability in India on the ground that, in the circumstances of the case, USCO had PE in India. The AO claimed that (i) USCO had PE in the form of WOS being its dependent agent; (ii) that premises of WOS were available at the disposal of the employees who were deputed by USCO; (iii) that negotiation and conclusion of the contract happened in India. In respect of software supply, the Department claimed that software licence fees was chargeable as royalty income.

Held :

The ITAT accepted the department’s contention and held that USCO had PE in India on account of the following features :

    (1) Having regard to the terms of the contract with the customer, not only Indian WOS but also USCO was responsible for turnkey functioning of the project of the GSM network. The ITAT noticed that the agreements with customer in India made USCO and WOS responsible for the turnkey completion of the GSM project individually and severally. The responsibility to Escotel was such that USCO had to complete installation should WOS fail in any manner. Conversely, WOS had responsibility of arranging for hardware and software should USCO fail in its responsibility. Having noted this, the ITAT concluded that the arrangement was ‘in short a consortium or partnership’ between USCO and WOS.

(2) The ITAT noted that the terms of agreement between Escotel and USCO and WOS also required of WOS to provide warranty in respect of the hardware supply made by USCO. This, according to the Tribunal, supported that the WOS was acting on behalf of USCO.

     
(3) The ITAT noted that USCO made available the personnel (though employees of the affiliates of USCO) to WOS for the purpose of enabling the WOS to discharge the responsibility of installation, commissioning, etc. of the GSM equipments. Such personnel were made available for remuneration. The ITAT concluded that in terms of the treaty, the service PE was triggered when the USCO provided services to its affiliate WOS even for a day. Since USCO provided services to ICO with the help of personnel who were under USCO’s control, the ITAT concluded that the USCO had service PE in terms of Article 5(2)(l)(ii) of the treaty.

     
(4) On the aspect of taxation of consideration received for software licence agreement, the ITAT noted that the facts of the case of USCO were at par with the facts which operated in the case of Motorola (supra). Relying on the Special Bench decision, the ITAT accepted the assessee’s contention that the licence fee was business income and was not royalty.

Compilers’ remarks :

The ITAT was not concerned with nor has dealt with the aspect of determination of income which is attributable to USCO’s activities in India to the extent the ITAT concluded that USCO had PE in India.

Payment towards licence for use of copyrighted software provided as part of equipment supply is not royalty.

 1 Lucent Technologies International Inc v. DCIT

(2009 TIOL 161 ITAT Del)/(28 SOT 98) Section/Article : Article 5 India — USA Double Tax Avoidance Agreement A.Ys. : 1997-98 to 2000-01. Dated : 19-12-2008

Issue :

  •     Services to Subsidiary in India by deputing personnel of affiliated companies constitute Service PE.

  •     Payment towards licence for use of copyrighted software provided as part of equipment supply is not royalty.

Facts :

The assessee, US Company (USCO), is a leading supplier of hardware and software used for GSM cellular radio telephone system. The USCO supplied telecommunication hardware and software to its customers in India. USCO had an Indian subsidiary (herein WOS) which undertook the work of installation and providing after-sales services to the customers of USCO in India.

USCO had entered into a contract with one Indian telecom company by name Escotel Mobile Communications Ltd. (herein Escotel). In terms of the agreement between USCO and Escotel, USCO was to supply hardware and software to Escotel while the services of installation were to be provided by WOS. In terms of the contract with Escotel, USCO had the responsibility of designing, manufacturing, supplying and delivering all hardware and software. The contract also required USCO to undertake installation, testing, commissioning and achieve final acceptance of the system by the customer. A part of responsibility of the inspection, installation and supervising the testing and commissioning was that of the Indian WOS. To some extent there was an overlap of responsibilities of USCO vis-à-vis that of WOS. As part of the supply contract, the assessee also provided licence for use of computer software which was required for the purposes of functioning of GSM network.

For enabling the WOS to discharge its obligation, USCO made available to WOS personnel who were the employees of the affiliates of USCO. Such employees were under the control of USCO and the WOS was required to pay remuneration to USCO. USCO claimed that it incurred no tax liability in India as the hardware was supplied from outside India. The assessee also claimed that payment received for the licence agreement for use of computer software was business income and was not royalty chargeable in terms of Article 12 of DTAA. Reliance for this was placed on the decision of Special Bench in case of Motorola Inc v. DCIT, (96 TTJ 1) (Delhi SB). The AO claimed that the USCO attracted tax liability in India on the ground that, in the circumstances of the case, USCO had PE in India. The AO claimed that (i) USCO had PE in the form of WOS being its dependent agent; (ii) that premises of WOS were available at the disposal of the employees who were deputed by USCO; (iii) that negotiation and conclusion of the contract happened in India. In respect of software supply, the Department claimed that software licence fees was chargeable as royalty income.

Held :

The ITAT accepted the department’s contention and held that USCO had PE in India on account of the following features :

    (1) Having regard to the terms of the contract with the customer, not only Indian WOS but also USCO was responsible for turnkey functioning of the project of the GSM network. The ITAT noticed that the agreements with customer in India made USCO and WOS responsible for the turnkey completion of the GSM project individually and severally. The responsibility to Escotel was such that USCO had to complete installation should WOS fail in any manner. Conversely, WOS had responsibility of arranging for hardware and software should USCO fail in its responsibility. Having noted this, the ITAT concluded that the arrangement was ‘in short a consortium or partnership’ between USCO and WOS.

(2) The ITAT noted that the terms of agreement between Escotel and USCO and WOS also required of WOS to provide warranty in respect of the hardware supply made by USCO. This, according to the Tribunal, supported that the WOS was acting on behalf of USCO.

     
(3) The ITAT noted that USCO made available the personnel (though employees of the affiliates of USCO) to WOS for the purpose of enabling the WOS to discharge the responsibility of installation, commissioning, etc. of the GSM equipments. Such personnel were made available for remuneration. The ITAT concluded that in terms of the treaty, the service PE was triggered when the USCO provided services to its affiliate WOS even for a day. Since USCO provided services to ICO with the help of personnel who were under USCO’s control, the ITAT concluded that the USCO had service PE in terms of Article 5(2)(l)(ii) of the treaty.

     
(4) On the aspect of taxation of consideration received for software licence agreement, the ITAT noted that the facts of the case of USCO were at par with the facts which operated in the case of Motorola (supra). Relying on the Special Bench decision, the ITAT accepted the assessee’s contention that the licence fee was business income and was not royalty.

Compilers’ remarks :

The ITAT was not concerned with nor has dealt with the aspect of determination of income which is attributable to USCO’s activities in India to the extent the ITAT concluded that USCO had PE in India.

S. 9 and Article 5 & 7, India-Italy DTAA : Supply of machinery and raw material to WOS, no PE

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New Page 2

DCIT v. Perfetti SPA

(2008) 113 TTJ 701 (Del.)

A.Y. : 1997-98. Dated : 31-10-2007

3. S. 9, Income-tax Act; Articles 5 & 7, India-Italy DTAA.


Issues :

(i) Whether business connection and income taxable in
India ?

(ii) Whether PE having taxable income in India ?


Facts :

The assessee company was a resident of Italy. It had a
wholly-owned subsidiary company in India. Managing Director of the WOS was
appointed by the assessee company, which also paid part of his salary outside
India. The assessee company had supplied machinery and raw materials to its WOS
and had not filed return of its income in India, on the ground that in terms of
India-Italy DTAA, its income was not taxable in India.

The AO issued notice u/s.163(1)(a) of the Act to the WOS
asking the assessee company to file return. After considering the
representations of the assessee company, the AO observed that the assessee
company had business connection in India and its income was deemed to have
accrued and arisen in India, since :

(i) It had supplied machinery on a continuous basis over a
long period;

(ii) By virtue of payment of salaries of Managing Director
and other expatriates, the assessee company had total control over management
and affairs of the WOS;

(iii) Orders for machinery were placed from India without
any written contract or negotiations, which showed business connection between
the assessee company and the WOS;

(iv) The machinery was overinvoiced; and

(v) The supply was made on CIF basis and hence the assessee
company was required to supply the goods in India.

Before CIT(A), the assessee company had contended that it did
not carry out any business activity in India as : the order for supply of
machinery and raw material was placed at Italy; the goods were also shipped at
airport in Italy; it did not retain any right in the disposal of goods; and it
sent technicians, food technologists and process specialists for developing
products and processes best suited for Indian environment and these personnel
were not connected with installation or running of machinery. The Customs
authorities had not raised any objection regarding the valuation of the goods,
which supported the assessee company’s contention that the supply was made on
principal-to-principal basis.

As regards control over management and affairs of the WOS,
the assessee company had submitted that the WOS acts as an independent legal
entity and takes its own decisions in day-to-day financial matters and that the
AO had not confronted it with the material brought on record. The CIT(A)
concluded that the contract was executed at Italy.

The Tribunal observed that having regard to the facts brought
on record, it appeared that findings of the AO were merely based upon
presumptions. He had not brought any evidence on record, either that the
employees of the assessee company installed machinery for the WOS, or that the
assessee company had used its dominant position to over-invoice the machinery.
The findings of the CIT(A) were also not disputed. Based on facts and
circumstances, since the contract was executed in Italy and the sale was made on
principal-to-principal basis at arm’s length, it was covered by CBDT’s Circular
No. 23, dated July 23, 1969. Mere existence of business relation does not give
any right to the AO to assess any income in India. The AO had also not brought
any evidence to prove the assessee company’s PE in India or as to what business
was conducted by it during the assessment year in question or what profit or
income was earned by it on supply of machinery and raw material. Thus, the
findings of the AO were presumptuous. The AO had not discharged the onus upon
him. The Tribunal further observed that under Article 5 of India-Italy DTAA, the
term PE includes several kinds of places. However, the AO had not proved
existence of any such place vis-à-vis the assessee company. Also, Article
5(6) of India-Italy DTAA clarifies that mere control of one enterprise over the
other does not constitute a PE. The AO merely presumed 20% as the profit on the
supplies, but did not bring any evidence to prove it.

Held :


(i) S. 9(1) of the Act was not attracted as the assessee
company had merely supplied machinery and raw material on
principal-to-principal basis on arm’s length price to the WOS.

(ii) In the absence of the PE of the assessee company in India, Articles 5
and 7 of India-Italy DTAA were not attracted and hence, no part of its income
taxable in India.

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ITO vs. Roche Goplani ITAT “G” Bench, Mumbai Before Rajendra Singh (A. M.) and Amit Shukla (J. M.) ITA No. 7737 / Mum / 2011 Asst. Year : 2008-09. Decided on 24-05-2013 Counsel for Assessee / Revenue: D. K. Sinha / Dr. P. Daniel

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Explanation 5 to section 271(1)(c) – undisclosed income declared in return filed u/s. 139(4) and assessed as such entitled to immunity from penalty.

Facts:

In the order passed u/s 143(3) r.w. section 153A, the AO accepted the income of Rs. 1.31 crore retuned by the assessee. Thereafter, he initiated the penalty proceedings u/s. 271(1)(c) for the reasons that the assessee declared the additional income as a result of the search operation carried out by the department and secondly, the return of income was filed after the due date of filing of return. The assessee explained that the income was offered voluntarily which was on estimate basis and the same had been accepted in the assessment order as such. Therefore, the provisions of section 271(1) (c) was not applicable. However, the AO rejected the explanation offered and imposed a penalty of Rs. 42.41 lakh. Before the CIT(A) the assessee submitted that in view of clause (b) of Explanation 5A to section 271(1)(c), penalty cannot be levied as the assessee filed the return of income on the due date which can also be inferred as return of income filed u/s. 139(4). The CIT(A) however, didn’t accept the assessee’s explanation on Explanation 5A but deleted the penalty on the ground that the income which was offered was only on estimate basis, therefore, the additional income offered to tax can neither be held as concealed income or furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income.

Before the tribunal, the revenue submitted that it was not a case of estimate made by the AO in the regular assessment proceedings but it is a case of search and seizure, wherein the assessee has himself declared additional income in the statement recorded u/s. 132(4). Even if such surrender was based on estimate, then also it represents undisclosed income. Thus, the penalty cannot be deleted on the ground that it was based on the estimated income. Further it was submitted that as per the language of the Explanation 5A to section 271(1)(c), if any undisclosed income is found which is not shown in the return of income either prior to the date of search or before the due date of filing of return, penalty was levieable.

Held:

According to the tribunal, Explanation 5A to section 271(1)(c) provides that if during the course of search, the assessee is found to be the owner of any asset or income which has not been shown in the return of income which has been furnished before the date of search and the “due date” for filing the return of income has expired, the assessee is deemed to have concealed the particulars of his income or furnish inaccurate particulars of income and liable for penalty u/s. 271(1)(c). In other words, if the income is offered in the return which is filed by the “due date”, no penalty can be imposed.

The tribunal then examined whether the “due date” in Explanation 5A encompasses a belated return filed u/s. 139(4). It observed that the “due date” can be very well inferred as due date of filing of return of income u/s. 139(4) because wherever the legislature has provided the consequences of filing of the return of income u/s. 139(4), then the same has also been specifically provided. E.g., section 139(3) which denies the benefit of carry forward of losses u/s. 72 to 74A if the return of income is not filed within the time limit provided u/s. 139(1). In the absence of such a restriction, the limitation of time of “due date” cannot be strictly reckoned with section 139(1). Even a belated return filed u/s. 139(4) will be entitled to the benefit of immunity from penalty. For the said proposition the tribunal also relied on the decisions of the Gauhati high court in the case of Rajesh Kumar Jalan (286 ITR 276), the Punjab & Haryana high court in the cases of Jagriti Aggarwal (339 ITR 610) & of CIT vs. Jagtar Singh Chawla. In view of the above, the tribunal held that the assessee gets immunity under clause (b) of Explanation 5A to section 271(1) (c) because the assessee has filed return of income within due date.

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Recovery of tax pending stay application – A draconian directive

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New Year Shock

The Central Board of Excise and Customs (CBEC) has, in supersession of seven previous circulars on the same subject, issued Circular No. 967/01/2013 CX dated 1-1-2013 (the new Circular), directing the departmental officers to initiate recovery action in cases where 30 days have expired after the filing of appeal by an assessee before an appellate authority. This action by CBEC is highly unprecedented and totally unjust and unfair inasmuch as it would not only result in penal consequences for reasons beyond the control of an assessee, but also render the statutory right of appeal nugatory.

While the taxpayer fraternity fully recognises that the Government is empowered under the relevant statutory provisions to collect and recover legitimate taxes due from assessees, at the same time, the taxpayer fraternity does feel that as a good tax administration practice, it is essential that, in regard to tax demands which are pending in appeal before various appellate authorities, the legitimate rights of assessees under the relevant statutory provisions are also recognised, before initiation of coercive action for recovery of tax dues.

Impact

The new Circular which seeks to instruct departmental officers to initiate recovery action, if no stay is granted by the concerned appellate authorities within 30 days of filing of an appeal, is likely to result in severe hardships to taxpayers. Coercive actions for recovery of tax like attachment of bank accounts, assets and properties, etc. of assessees pending disposal of stay applications would adversely impact businesses in a significant way and also cause unprecedented hardships. It is also likely to result in filing of writ petitions before the High Courts across the country in large numbers. In fact, the Honourable Andhra Pradesh High Court has granted interim stay against the operation of the new Circular in a writ petition.

 Reasons for High Level of Tax Litigation

Before issuing such a drastic and draconian circular, the Government needs to appreciate and take cognizance of the fact that, the principal reason for extensive tax litigation is high pitched adjudications which do not fully appreciate the correct legal position in a matter. A perusal of records available with the Government would clearly reveal that, in a high number of tax litigations, the matters are finally decided against the revenue and in favour of tax payers. Statistics (Refer Table) given by the Union Minister of State for Finance, Mr. S.S. Palanimanickam in a written reply to a question in the Lok Sabha on 5-9-2012, regarding the outcome of revenue cases supports the above view.

Table – Revenue Department’s Success Rate (%)

Year

Supreme

Court

High
Court

CESTAT

2008-09

9.81

29.6

10

2009-10

7.85

35.1

18.2

2010-11

5.5

27.1

17.2

2011-12

10.64

29.85

19.7

The Minister also mentioned that, even though approx. Rs. 86,000 crore were held up in court cases, it should not create an impression that the Government would get much monies upon finalisation of litigation. It may get only about 10% to 15% of the said amount. In the light of the above stated position, in a scenario where tax demands are unrealistic and sustained in a very small number of cases by the appellate authorities, it is totally unfair, unjust and unwarranted on the part of the Government to pressurise tax payers for no fault on their part.

Unjust and Unfair Circular

The new Circular is unjust and unfair to the taxpayer due to the following reasons, in particular:
a) Initiation of coercive actions to recover the tax dues in regard to which appeal and stay application are pending disposal before the concerned appellate authorities, is not in consonance with the settled principles of natural justice, laid down by the Supreme Court of India from time to time.

b) It also needs to be appreciated that, in a large number of cases, stay applications are not disposed off due to inactions at the end of the concerned appellate authority and for no fault of the assessee.

c) The new Circular refers to a very old Supreme Court ruling in Krishna Sales (P) Ltd (1994) 73 ELT 519 (SC) wherein it was observed as under: “As is well known, mere filing of an Appeal does not operate as a stay or suspension of order appealed against”.

However, the significant observations made by the the Honourable Supreme Court of India in a subsequent ruling in Commissioner of Cus & CE vs. Kumar Cotton Mills Pvt. Ltd. (2005) 180 ELT 434 (SC), have been totally ignored. The relevant observations are reproduced below for ready reference :

Para 6

“The s/s. which was introduced in terrorem cannot be construed as punishing the assessees for matters which may be completely beyond their control. For example, many of the Tribunals are not constituted and it is not possible for such Tribunals to dispose of matters. Occasionally by reason of other admin-istrative exigencies for which the assessee cannot be held liable, the stay applications are not disposed within the time specified. ….

The aforesaid observations need to be appropriately recognised and appreciated by the Government.

d)    There are a large number of judicial decisions including those of various High Courts, to the effect that, no recovery actions should be taken until the disposal of the stay application by the appellate authorities. In this regard, useful reference can be made to the following rulings:

i)    In Legrand (India) vs. UOI (2007) 216 ELT 678 (BOM HC DB), the Asst. Commissioner enforced the bank guarantee even before the expiry of the statutory period of filing appeal, despite a directive of High Court (in another case) not to take coercive action for recovery in such cases. It was held that this was a civil contempt of Court.

ii)    Quoting CBEC Circular, in Shree Cement Ltd vs. UOI (2002) 126 STC 324 (Raj HC DB), it was held that no coercive action for recovery should be taken when stay application is pending.

iii)    A view similar to the view expressed in the above case was expressed in Delhi Acrylic Mfg C6 vs. CC (2002) 144 ELT 24 (DEL HC DB).

It is most inappropriate for the CBEC to issue a circular in disregard to the binding court judgments and showing no respect for judicial precedence on the subject.

Suggestions

The following is suggested so as to ensure that undue hardship is not caused to tax payers:

a)    CBEC Circular No. 967/01/2013 – CX dated 1-1-2013 needs to be immediately withdrawn/appropriately modified to provide that no recovery actions are initiated until the disposal of the stay applications by the appellate authorities.

b)    Suitable instructions need to be issued that recovery action be restricted to cases where stay applications are disposed off and stipulated conditions are not complied with.
c)    Vacancies existing in Tribunals/Courts should be filled up at the earliest.
d)    All stay applications pending before appellate authorities be disposed off, in terms of existing provisions under the relevant law, on a war footing by appointing fast track Tribunals/Courts.
e)    Alternatively, in all cases where appeals are filed, stay be granted and appeal itself be taken up for disposal.

Reforming Tax Administration – Some Recommendations

In order to promote and encourage good tax administration practices, from a long term perspective, the following measures are recommended:

a)    Establish accountability in tax administration whereby statutory provisions are enacted in tax laws specifically providing for actions against departmental officers passing inappropriate orders.
b)    Install quality reviews/audits of tax administration processes including adjudication process in particular.
c)    Expand the scope of Advance Ruling Mechanism to minimise litigation.
d)    Evolve new speedy dispute redressal mechanisms.
e)    Award costs to the assessees so as to cover litigation expenses.
f)    Increase the existing rate of interest on refunds of pre-deposit pending appeals as well as other refunds so as to be on par with prevailing commercial rate of interest.
g)    Introduce incentive schemes for team of departmental officers, in cases where, demands are sustained at higher judicial levels.

Conclusion

It is projected that by 2030, India is likely to become a World Economic Power. Hence, the entire world is looking at us. As per the taxation policy announced by the Government, it is expected that substantive tax reforms (viz. DTC & GST) are likely to be introduced in the near future. However, the Government needs to expressly recognise and take cognizance of the fact that, from a taxpayer perspective, the need of the hour is reforming tax administration. Employing unfair, unjust and coercive tax administration methods, would only encourage dishonest practices and non-compliances, rather than boosting tax revenues. Government needs to recognise that employing coercive tax administration methods is not the right policy to boost tax revenues. Instead, in order to boost tax revenues, priority focus of the government should be on evolving good tax administration practices.

Centralised Processing of Statements of Tax Deducted at Source Scheme, 2013 – Notification No. 03 /2013 dated 15th January 2013

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CBDT has made the subject scheme to set out the procedures for filing correction statement, rectifications, appeals, etc in connection with TDS statements filed online.

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Clarifications regarding deduction for software related expenses – Circular 1/2013 dated 17-1-13

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Exemption would be available u/s. 10A, 10AA and 10B (as applicable) vis-à-vis software business in following scenario:

• Software developed abroad at a client’s place amounting to ‘deemed export’, so long as there exists a direct and intimate nexus or connection of development of software done abroad with the eligible units set up in India pursuant to a contract between the client and the eligible unit.

• Profits earned from deployment of technical manpower at the client’s place abroad specifically for software development work pursuant to a contract between the client and the eligible unit provided such deputation of manpower is for the development of such software and all the prescribed conditions are fulfilled.

• In case of each Statement of Works which is a part of a Master Service Agreement.

 • Research and Development activities pertaining to software development would be covered under the definition of ‘Computer Software’.

• In case of a slump sale, the tax holiday can be availed of for the unexpired period at the rates as applicable for the remaining years, subject to fulfilment of prescribed conditions.

• Separate books of account need not be maintained for each eligible unit. However, the assessee should be able to produce the required details called for by the AO.

• When an eligible SEZ unit relocates physically to another SEZ in accordance with the prescribed rules, tax holiday would be available for the unexpired period at the rates applicable to such years.

• Exemption would be available to a freshly set up unit, as long as it is set-up after obtaining necessary approvals from the competent authorities; has not been formed by splitting or reconstruction of an existing business; and fulfils all other conditions prescribed in the relevant provisions of law.

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DCIT vs. Kaushik Shah Shares & Securities Pvt. Ltd. ITAT Mumbai `A’ Bench Before B. Ramakotaiah (AM) and Vivek Varma (JM) ITA No. 2163/Mum/2013 A.Y.: 2008-09. Decided on: 10th July, 2013.

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Counsel for revenue / assessee: Surinder Jit Singh/ Jinesh Doshi Section 88E, 115JB—It is the gross tax payable under normal provisions without deducting rebate u/s. 88E is to be compared with tax payable u/s. 115JB. From the higher of the two, rebate u/s. 88E is to be allowed. Rebate u/s. 88E is allowable even from tax payable on book profits u/s. 115JB.

Facts:
The Assessing Officer noticed that the assessee had made tax payment under normal provisions by comparing its tax liability (before claiming rebate u/s. 88E) on total income with income u/s. 115JB. The assessee submitted that tax rebate is a step which comes after determining income-tax payable on total income computed as per applicable provisions. It supported its view by income tax return ITR 6 prescribed by CBDT wherein gross tax liability before claim of rebate u/s 88E is first to be compared with tax credit under MAT and then from the higher of the MAT liability and tax liability under normal provisions of the Act, tax rebate u/s. 88E is to be reduced to arrive at a final tax payable by the assessee. The contention of the assessee was rejected by the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) where it was contended that rebate u/s. 88E was also to be allowed while working out tax liability u/s. 115JB for the purpose of determining tax liability u/s. 115JB. Reliance was placed on decision of Bangalore Bench of ITAT in the case of Horizon Capital Ltd and also on the decision of Mumbai Bench of ITAT in the case of Naman Securities Finance Pvt. Ltd. The CIT(A) allowed the appeal of the assessee on this ground.

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that the issue is covered by the decision of the Karnataka High Court in the case of CIT vs. Horizon Capital Ltd. (ITA No. 434 of 2010 dated 24.10.2011) and by the following decisions of coordinate Bench –

1 Ambit Securities Broking P. Ltd. vs. ACIT (ITA No. 7856/M/2011, AY 2008-09, order dated 6.6.2013);
2 DCIT vs. Arcadia Share & Stock Brokers Pvt. Ltd. (ITA No. 1515/M/2012, AY 2008-09, order dated 20.3.2013);
3 SVS Securities Pvt. Ltd. (ITA No. 6149/M/2011, AY 2008-09, order dated 8.8.2012).
Since the CIT(A) had followed the decision of the co-ordinate Bench in the case of Horizon Capital Ltd which was confirmed by the Karnataka High Court and also the decision of the co-ordinate Bench in the case of Naman Securities Finance Pvt. Ltd. which in turn has been followed by other co-ordinate Benches, the Tribunal did not see any merit in the grounds raised by the revenue.
The appeal filed by the revenue was dismissed.

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AAR: Section 245R : Application for ruling: No requirement of recording reasons at stage of admission: Commissioner or his representative need not be heard at that stage: Hearing Commissioner or his representative before pronouncing advance ruling only if Authority considers necessary:

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DIT vs. AAR; 352 ITR 185 (AP):

The second Respondent sought an advance Ruling on the question whether the capital gains arising from the sale of shares of a French incorporated entity by the applicant, a French incorporated entity, was liable to tax in France or in India. Notice was given by letter to the CBDT. The Department objected that since proceedings had already been taken in terms of section 195 to 201 in the applicant’s case, the application was hit by the bar in proviso to section 245R(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. However, before the objections were received by the Authority for Advance Ruling, the Authority passed an order admitting the application.

In a writ petition filed by the Department, the following question was considered by the Andhra Pradesh High Court:

“Whether while allowing the application filed u/s. 245Q(1) it was essential for the Authority for Advance Rulings to consider the issue of admissibility as a preliminary issue, with regard to the threshold bar u/s. 245R(2), by recording reasons in writing and whether the Department was entitled to a hearing before allowing the application for pronouncing its advance ruling?”

The High Court dismissed the petition and held as under:

“i) S/s. (1) of section 245R, which contemplates forwarding of a copy of such application to the Commissioner, if necessary, calling upon him to furnish the relevant records, does not contemplate the filing of objections or response to the application so made. S/s (2) authorises the Authority, after examining the application and the records called for, by order, either allow or reject the application, but a rider is added by way of proviso that the Authority shall not allow application, inter alia, where the question raised in the application is already pending before any income-tax authority or Appellate Tribunal. The second proviso provides that no application shall be rejected unless an opportunity has been given to the applicant of being heard. If the application is rejected, reasons for such rejection shall be given as per the third proviso to section 245R.

ii) Nowhere does section 245R state that the Commissioner from whom records were called for is to be called upon to make his objections to the admission of application and record reasons when it allowed the application for an advance ruling.

iii) While exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, if the High Court is of the opinion that there is no other convenient or efficacious remedy open to the petitioner, it will proceed to investigate the case on its merits and if the Court finds that there is an infringement of the petitioner’s legal rights, it will grant relief, otherwise relief should be rejected.

iv) The entire exercise to be undertaken by the Authority for allowing the application is only to verify the records called for whether an advance ruling on the question specified in the application was required to be made or not. There is a clear dichotomy between the threshold stage of allowing the application for advance ruling and pronouncing of advance ruling. If the Authority admits the application for pronouncing an advance ruling recording of reasons at that stage is not at all required nor is hearing contemplated to the Commissioner or his authorised representative. Only on such admission before pronouncing its advance ruling hearing of the Commissioner or his authorised representative is provided if the Authority considers necessary to hear but not at the threshold stage of admitting the application.

v) The Director of Income-tax and the Additional Commissioner failed to substantiate the infringement of legal right conferred on them under the statute while allowing the application for advance ruling. The writ petitions were devoid of merit and were accordingly dismissed.”

iii) Therefore, the sum forfeited by the assessee to the Council was allowable u/s. 37(1).”

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136 ITD 315 (Mum.) Arrow Coated Products Ltd. vs. ACIT A.Y 2006-07 Dated : 14th March, 2012

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Section 36(1)(vii)—Deduction of bad debts available when debited to P&L Account—In order to claim deduction on account of bad debts, it is not necessary that individual debtor’s account has to be closed by crediting said account—a mere reduction in loans and advances/debtors account to extent of provision for bad and doubtful debt is sufficient

Facts:
The assessee had made provision for bad and doubtful debts in books of accounts in AY 2004-05 of Rs. 70 lakh. The provision was debited to Profit and Loss Account and also correspondingly reduced from gross total sundry debtors in the balance sheet. The individual ledger of debtor account was not written off by the amount of doubtful debts. In the return of income the assessee had not claimed deduction of provision of doubtful debts for AY 2004-05. In AY 2005-06 & 2006-07, the assessee wrote off the provision of doubtful debts of Rs. 20,36,000 (being part of Rs. 70 lakh) from the individual account of debtors thereby closing debtors account. The AO held that as the amount of doubtful debts was not transferred to P&L Account, the claim cannot be allowed. The CIT(A) upheld the order of the AO.

Held:

After insertion of Explanation to section 36(1)(vii), the taxpayer is now required to debit Profit and Loss Account and also simultaneously reduce debtors account to the extent of corresponding amount. It is not necessary that individual debtors account be closed in order to claim deduction of bad debts. In the present case the assessee had not claimed deduction on account of bad debts in AY 2004-05. It is not required for the assessee to actually close the individual account of each debtor.

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Industrial Undertaking – Deduction u/s. 80IA – Texturing and twisting of polyester yarn amounts to manufacture.

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CIT vs. Yashasvi Yarn Ltd. (2013) 350 ITR 208 (SC).

A short question that arose for determination before the Supreme Court was whether texturing and twisting of polyester yarn amounts to “manufacture” for the purpose of computation of deduction u/s. 80IA.

The High Court had dismissed the appeals of the Revenue following its decision in CIT vs. Emptee Poly-Yarn Pvt. Ltd. (2008) 305 ITR 309 (Bom).

The Supreme Court dismissed the civil appeals of the Revenue holding that the question had been squarely answered by it in CIT vs. Emptee Poly-Yarn P. Ltd. (2010) 320 ITR 665 (SC).

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Exports – Profits on telecasting rights of a T.V. Serial are entitled to the benefit of section 80HHC

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CIT vs. Faquir Chand (HUF) (2013) 350 ITR 207 (SC)

The question that arose before the Supreme Court was whether the profit on telecasting rights of a T.V. serial are entitled to the benefit of section 80HHC.

The High Court had dismissed the appeal of the Revenue in view of its judgment in Abdul Gafar A. Nadialwala v. ACIT (2004) 267 ITR 488 (Bom).

The Supreme Court dismissed the civil appeal of the Revenue holding that the issued was squarely covered in favour of the assessee by its decision in CIT vs. B. Suresh (2009) 313 ITR 149(SC).

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(2012) 135 ITD 233 (Mumbai) Pranik Shipping & Services Limited vs. ACIT (Mumbai ITAT) ITA No.5962 /Mum/2009 18th January, 2012

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Section 36(1)(iii)- Interest free loans given to sister concerns—if assessee held interest free funds and also interest bearing funds, presumption would be that investments were made from interest free funds available with assessee.

Section 40(a)(ia) and section 194A—Business expenditure—assessee claimed deduction of interest expenditure for which no accounting entry was passed in books of account— the event for deduction of tax at source arises when the amount of interest is credited to the account of the payee or when it is paid, whichever is earlier—Since the said interest was neither credited in the books of account nor paid in the year, section 194A cannot be attracted—Once there is no liability to deduct tax at source u/s. 194A, the provisions of section 40(a)(ia) cannot be attracted.

Facts I:
The assessee had given interest-free funds to its sister concerns. The AO observed that no interest was charged on such advances to sister concerns whereas substantial interest was paid on borrowed funds. In absence of any nexus between the interest-free funds advanced and interest-free funds available with the assessee, the AO made disallowance by applying 15% rate of interest. The CIT(A) also upheld the AO’s action.

Held I:
The Tribunal observed that the interest-free funds available at the disposal of the assessee were far in excess of the interest-free loans advanced to the sister concerns. Relying on the decision of Hon’ble jurisdictional High Court in the case of CIT vs. Reliance Utility and Power Limited [(2009) 313 ITR 340 (Bom.)], the Tribunal held that if the assessee has interest-free funds as well as interest-bearing funds at its disposal, it shall be presumed that investments were made from interest-free funds available with the assessee. The addition was deleted.

Facts II:
Assessee claimed deduction of interest expenditure in the computation of total income for which no accounting entry was passed in the books of account. The AO held that assessee followed cash system of accounting in respect of accounting of interest expenditure and as assessee had not made any payment of interest, the same was not deductible. The Ld CIT(A) held that the assessee had not deducted TDS on interest payable and hence u/s. 40(a)(ia) the deduction was not allowed.

Held II:
The Ld. AO was not justified in applying hybrid system of accounting i.e., applying cash system for accounting of interest expenditure and mercantile system for accounting for all other items. As per section 145, income under the head ‘Profits and gains of business or profession’ is to be computed in accordance with either cash or mercantile system of accounting regularly employed by the assessee. The assessee was regularly following mercantile system of accounting.

In the mercantile system of accounting, deduction is allowed on accrual of liability and it is not material whether the amount is paid or not or whether or not it is recorded in the books of account. Assessee’s similar claim of deduction of such interest expenditure was allowed in earlier assessment years also.

As per sections 40(a)(ia) and 194A, the event for deduction of tax at source arises when the amount of interest is credited to the account of the payee or when it is paid, whichever is earlier. The assessee did not credit such interest in the books of account under any account and further such interest had not been paid during the year. The deduction had been claimed on the basis of mercantile system of accounting straightway in the computation of income, without routing it through books of account, which had been held by us to be allowable. Hence, the mandate of section 194A cannot be attracted. As there is no liability to deduct tax at source u/s. 194A, the provisions of section 40(a)(ia) cannot be attracted.

This loophole was probably not contemplated by the Legislature while enacting the relevant provisions, which has been exploited by the assessee as a measure of tax planning.

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(2011) 135 ITD 398 (Pune) Patni Computer Systems Ltd vs. DCIT A.Y 2002-03 & 2003-04. Dated : 30th June, 2011

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Section 92B—Transfer Pricing—Extension of credit to the Associated Enterprises (‘AEs’) beyond the stipulated credit period vis-a-vis others cannot be construed as an “international transaction” for the purposes of section 92B(1) so as to require adjustment for ascertaining the ALP.

Section 92B—Transfer pricing—Adjustment for cost of consultancy fees paid for undertaking study for the purpose of restructuring the assessee’s organisational structure—Apportionment of impugned cost is permissible only in a situation where there exists a “mutual agreement or arrangement” between two or more AEs for apportionment of cost.

Section 10A—Establishment of three new units at three different locations, with investments in fixed assets is not mere expansion and would be eligible for deduction u/s 10A.

Facts I:
Assessee had international transactions with AEs and on this count, the AEs had some outstandings due to the assessee. Such outstandings were overdue and no interest was charged by the assessee on such amounts. The TPO has considered non-charging of interest as an ‘international transaction’ requiring adjustment to determine the ALP on the basis that the normal period of credit allowed to the AEs was 90 days, and to the other similarly placed customers the credit period allowed was 30 to 45 days. The fundamental question raised by the assessee was as to whether extending the credit limit can be considered as “international transaction” under section 92B(1) of the Act.

Held I:
Relying on the judgement of the Mumbai Bench Tribunal in case of Nimbus Communications Ltd. vs. Asst. CIT. ITA No. 6597/Mum/2009, it was held that a continuing debit balance is not an international transaction per se, but is a result of international transaction. The commercial transaction, as a result of which the debit balance has come into existence, and the terms and conditions, including terms of payment, has to be examined for the purpose of arm’s length price.

Facts II:
The assessee had undertaken a study for the purpose of restructuring the organisational structure. According to the TPO, changes proposed in the study would also give benefits to the AEs and thus an arm’s length allocation of cost of consultancy expenses paid for study was required to be made. According to the Revenue, it was imperative for the assessee to have recovered such costs from the AEs and since the assessee had not done so, certain expenditure was allocated by the TPO on this score.

Held II:
Apportionment of impugned cost is permissible only in a situation where there exists a “mutual agreement or arrangement” between two or more AEs for apportionment of cost. There existed no such agreement or arrangement in the given case. The study reports may bring certain intangible benefits in the form of enhanced productivity to the businesses of the AEs, however, this would not ipso facto justify the apportionment of the cost incurred, where the use of such studies by the AEs is not obligated in terms of any mutual agreement or arrangement between the assessee and the AEs, but the use is only discretionary on the part of the foreign AEs.

Moreover, there would not be any justification for apportioning the expenditure unless it is shown that the expenses incurred on such activities was disproportionate and the benefit which accrued to the AEs in the form of increased business productivity was not merely incidental, but was tangible and concrete. There was no material to show that any tangible and concrete benefit has accrued to the AEs as a result of the expenditure incurred by the assessee in obtaining consultancy.

Facts III:
The AO noted that the assessee has treated three new units as separate independent units for the purpose of deduction u/s. 10A of the Act. The AO further noted that approval from STPI reflected the new units as expansion of existing units. On the basis of this the AO concluded that the profitability of the aforesaid three units was liable to be combined with that of the corresponding old units and thus the eligible period for deduction u/s. 10A of the Act with respect to the said three units would be reckoned from the first year of the eligibility of the corresponding old units. The CIT(A), however, held that the assessee fulfilled all the conditions prescribed u/s. 10A(2) of the Act. All the three units had their own plant and machinery having substantial investment and substantial turnover and were located in different premises.

Held III:

For claim of deduction u/s. 10A of the Act, examination as to whether the three units are independent units and whether they fulfil the conditions prescribed u/s. 10A(2) of the Act is important. There is no prohibition that an expansion in the same line of business achieved by setting up a new independent unit would lead to denial of deduction u/s. 10A of the Act. The assessee would not be disentitled to deduction u/s. 10A merely due to the fact that the requisite permissions from STPI refer them as expansions of the existing units.

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Business Expenditure – Interest on borrowed capital by an assessee carrying on manufacture of ferro-alloys and setting up a sugar plant – where there is unity of control and management in respect of both the plants and where there is intermingling of funds and dovetailing of business the interest could not be disallowed on the ground that the assessee had not commenced its business.

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CIT vs. Monnet Industries Ltd. (2012) 350 ITR 304 (SC)

In 1991, the assessee had set up a ferro-alloys manufacturing plant in Raipur, which was engaged in both the manufacture of ferro-alloys, as also, trading of ferro alloys.

In the years 1994-95 and 1995-96, the assessee set up a sugar manufacturing plant at Muzaffanagar in the state of UP. The sugar plant had an installed capacity 2500 RD. The assessee’s trial in respect of sugar plant commenced on 20-03-1996. The assesee spent a sum of Rs. 5,66,79,270/- as pre-operative expenses in respect of the sugar plant which inter alia included financial charges of Rs.3,50,83,472/-.

In its return of income for the assessment year 1996-97, the assessee declared loss of Rs.7,23,18,949/- in which the assessee, inter alia, had claimed the aforesaid sum of Rs. 5,66,79,270/- as revenue expenditure.

The Assessing Officer disallowed the expenditure for the reason that the sugar plant constituted new source of income as it was not the same business in which the assessee was engaged.

The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) came to the conclusion that the expenditure in issue was in the nature of revenue expenditure since the sugar plant project was in the same business fold.

The Tribunal allowed deduction of only that expenditure which was incurred towards finance charges, being a sum of Rs. 3,50,83,472/- incurred for setting up of sugar plant as revenue expenditure u/s. 36(1)(iii). In respect of the balance amount in the sum of Rs. 2,15,95,798/-, the Tribunal restored the matter back to the Assessing Officer to ascertain whether the expenditure was of capital or revenue nature.

On an appeal to the High Court by the Revenue, the High Court observed that the Tribunal had given the finding that there was unity of control and management in respect of the ferro alloys plant as well as the sugar plant and there was also intermingling of funds and dovetailing of business. The High Court held that in the circumstance, it could not be said that the assessee had not commenced its business and hence, interest would have to be capitalised. The High Court confirmed the order of the Tribunal.

The Supreme Court dismissed the civil appeal filed by the Revenue in view of the concurrent finding recorded by court below.

Note: W.e.f. 01.04.2004, the Finance Act, 2003 inserted proviso to section 36(i)(iii) which effectively, prohibits the deduction under this section in respect of interest on capital borrowed for acquisition of an asset for extension of existing business for the period up to the date on which such asset is first put to use.

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S. 195, S. 245N, S. 245R, and Articles 5, 7, 12 of India-USA DTAA : TDS on hardware and software contracts

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Airports Authority of India, In re (AAR)
[Unreported]

Dated : 28-2-2008

2. S. 195, S. 245N, S. 245R, Income-tax Act; Articles 5, 7,
12, India-USA DTAA.

Issue :

Obligation to deduct tax and rate for deduction of tax on
Hardware Contract and Software Contract.

Facts :

The applicant was a PSU operating airports in India. It had
entered into two separate contracts, named Hardware Repair Support Contract
(‘Hardware Contract’) and Software Maintenance Support Contract (‘Software
Contract’), with an American company. In respect of contracts having
substantially similar terms and conditions, the applicant had sought ruling of
AAR earlier (see 273 ITR 437). The possible reasons for seeking a fresh ruling
were that technically the transaction is a separate transaction and that in case
of the American company, the tax authorities had taken a different view in the
course of its assessment proceedings.

The Hardware Contract provided that : the applicant shall
send the hardware to the American company outside India; the American company
shall repair the hardware outside India; and the applicant shall take delivery
of hardware duly repaired by the American company outside India.

In the context of the Hardware Contract, the issues raised
for determination were :

(a) Whether the payment received by the American company
was liable to tax in its hands in India, and

(b) If the payment was taxable in the hands of the American
company, what should be the rate at which tax should be deducted by the
applicant ?

In the context of the Software Contract, the issues raised
for determination were :

(a) Whether deputation of engineers by the American company
to India for installation and testing of required software constituted its PE;

(b) Whether the payment received by the American company
was liable to tax in its hands in India; and

(c) If the payment was taxable in the hands of the American
company, what should be the rate at which tax should be deducted by the
applicant ?

In its earlier ruling, the AAR had held that the American
company did not have a PE in India (which was also conceded by the counsel for
the Revenue). In respect of Hardware Contract, the payment received by it was
not income from furnishing services as defined in Article 12 of India-USA DTAA,
but it was business profits within the meaning of Article 7(7) of India-USA DTAA
and since it did not have a PE in India, it was not taxable in India. In respect
of the Software Contract, the applicant had contended that the defects in the
software would also be attended to outside India and that the visit of the
American company’s engineer is only for a short period and incidental. Hence,
amount paid for repair of software should also represent business income and
should not be chargeable to tax in India. Even if the payment was treated as
‘fees for included services’, as per MOU appended to India-USA DTAA, the visit
would not be covered within the meaning of ‘included services’. Even if the
amount is so treated, in view of limited number of visits, it may be apportioned
between ‘fees for included services’ and ‘business income’. The Revenue had
contended that the payment was ‘fees for included services’ under Article
12(4)(a), as well as ‘royalty’ under Article 12(3(a), of India-USA DTAA, since
the applicant’s agreements of 2003 are only supplementary to the original
agreements of 1993. The AAR had then proceeded to consider Article 7 and Article
12, and had concluded that insofar as software and documentation were concerned,
the applicant had acquired a right to use the same subject to certain
conditions, and as regards repair of software, payment received by the American
company would be ‘fees for included services’ under Article 12(4)(a) and would
be outside the purview of Article 7(7). Accordingly, in view of Article 12(2)
the payment would be taxable in India.

In case of the present ruling, the Revenue contended that for
earlier ruling, the AAR was not apprised of the facts relating to PE and that
its counsel had wrongly conceded and further that subsequent investigation in
the course of assessment proceedings revealed the existence of PE. To satisfy
itself about prima facie sustainability of the Revenue’s contention, the
AAR examined the assessment orders relating to the American company. It observed
that there was no definite finding supported by reasons on the existence of PE.
The fact that the American company admitted having an installation PE had no
bearing on the aspect whether a PE was set up in the context of the Hardware
Contract and the Software Contract. The AAR expressed the probability that since
the entire activity of hardware repair took place outside India and as the
hardware was sent outside India and its delivery after repair was also taken
outside India by the applicant, there was very little part which the liaison
office could have played. Further, from the sporadic visits of a few days by the
American company’s personnel, it was difficult to draw the inference of
existence of PE.

As regards the Revenue’s contention about the American
company having a dependent agent PE, the AAR observed that there was nothing in
the agreement which indicated that the agent was assigned any role or
responsibility under the Hardware Contract. The AAR did not get any satisfactory
reply from the counsel of the Revenue on the request to clarify whether any
activity related to the contract was undertaken by the so-called PE. The AAR
declined to reconsider its earlier ruling on the ground that the Revenue’s
counsel had wrongly conceded or that the applicant had not made proper
disclosure on the issue of PE.

The AAR then considered the Revenue’s contention about the maintainability of the application and the AAR’s jurisdiction in view of the embargo in proviso (i) to S. 245R(2), on the ground that the question raised in the application was already pending before the Income-tax authority. The AAR observed that the question of tax deduction cannot be said to be pending before the Income-tax authority and hence, the application was not hit by the embargo. It further observed that the issue relating to tax deduction at source was ‘in relation to’ the tax liability of the American company and therefore, it was within the purview of the definition of ‘advance ruling’ in S. 245N(a) and (b).

The counsel for the applicant stated that it was desirous of getting answer to the second question regarding its obligation to deduct tax at source and once that was answered, it was not desirous of getting answer to the first question. Hence, the AAR treated the first question as withdrawn by the applicant. Similarly, in respect of the Software Contract, only the question regarding the rate of tax deduction survived as other questions were not pressed.

Held:
(i) As regards the Hardware Contract, the applicant was not legally required to deduct tax on payments made by it to the American company.
(ii) As regards the Software Contract, the tax was required to be deducted @ 10%.

(2012) 54 SOT 263 (Bangalore) ITO vs. Mahaveer Calyx ITA Nos.153 & 998 (Bang.) of 2011 A.Ys.2007-08 & 2008-09. Dated 31-08-2012

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Section 80-IB of the Income-tax Act 1961 – Deduction available even if sold area exceeds approved area and assessee has not paid fees to regularise the same.

Facts

For the relevant assessment year, the Assessing Officer disallowed the assessee’s claim for deduction u/s. 80-IB since the built-up area sold by the assessee was in excess of the sanctioned area. The Assessing Officer, therefore, held that the project constructed by the assessee was not an approved housing project. Before the CIT(A), the assessee contended that though it had not made payment of the compounding fee for regularisation of the excess area constructed, it could not be said that the housing project was not approved. The CIT(A) held that the assessee was entitled for deduction u/s. 80IB(10).

Held

The Tribunal, relying on the decisions in the following cases, held that the CIT(A)’s order in favour of the assessee was in accordance with law: a. Petron Engg. Construction (P.) Ltd. V CBDT (1989) 175 ITR 523/(1988) 41 Taxman 294 (SC) b. Pandian Chemicals Ltd. V CIT (2003) 262 ITR 278/129 Taxman 539 c. CIT V N.C. Budharaja & Co. (1993) 204 ITR 412/10 Taxman 312 d. IPCA Laboratories Ltd. V Dy. CIT (2004) 266 ITR 521/135 Taxman 594 The Tribunal noted as under : It was clear that the assessee has fulfilled the conditions mentioned in section 80-IB(10). The assessee has obtained approval of the concerned local authorities for construction of a housing project. The fact that the compounding fee for regularisation of the excess area constructed by the assessee has not yet been paid would not mean that the housing project constructed by the assessee is unlawful. Thus, there was no violation of the provisions of section 80-IB.

The incentive provisions must be interpreted in a manner which advances the object and intention of Legislature. The fact that the assessee has obtained approval for the housing project cannot be lost sight of. As for the excess area constructed, it is for the local authority to look into the violations, if any, in the construction of the housing project. That, however, does not authorise the Assessing Officer to hold that the assessee has not got approval for the housing project or that the conditions laid down in section 80-IB(10) violated.

Therefore,the assessee was entitled to deduction u/s. 80-IB(10).

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Insertion of Rule 40BA and Form No. 29C — Notification No. 60/2011 [F. No. 133/70/2011- SO(TPL), dated 1-12-2011.

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CBDT has made following amendments vide Incometax (Ninth Amendment)

Rules, 2011 with effect from 1st December, 2011 Rule 40BA inserted to provide for special provisions for payment of tax by Limited Liability Partnership (LLP)

LLP shall furnish the report of an accountant as required by section 115JC for the purpose of computation of adjusted total income and minimum alternate tax in Form No. 29C.

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Narad Investments & Trading Pvt. Ltd. v. Dy. CIT ITAT ‘H’ Bench, Mumbai Before B. R. Mittal (JM) and Rajendra Singh (AM) ITA Nos. 3360/Mum./2010 A.Y.: 1996-97. Decided on: 19-10-2011 Counsel for assessee/revenue: Jayesh Dadia/ V. V. Shastri

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Section 220(2) — Interest payable by assessee — Manner of computing default period — Original assessment set aside and fresh assessment made by the AO — Whether period of levy of interest is to be reckoned from the date of default as per the original assessment order or as per the fresh assessment order — Held that interest payable is to be computed from the date of fresh assessment order.

Issue: When original assessment has been set aside by the Tribunal and fresh assessment has been made by the AO, the period of levy of interest u/s.220(2) should be reckoned from the date of default as per the original assessment order or as per the fresh assessment order.

In the case of the assessee the original assessment was confirmed by the CIT(A) but on further appeal, the Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) and the issue was restored back to the AO. In the fresh assessment, the AO repeated the addition raising the same demand but interest u/s.220(2) was levied from the date of demand notice issued as per the original assessment order. The assessee disputed the AO’s action relying on the Board Circular No. 334, dated 3-4-1982, and contended that as the original assessment had been set aside by the Tribunal, the interest u/s.220(2) could be charged only from the date when the demand become due as per the fresh assessment order and not from the date of original assessment order.

Held:
In terms of the Board Circular (supra), in case the assessment is set aside by the CIT(A) and setting aside become final, interest u/s.220(2) has to be charged only after expiry of 35 days from the date of service of demand notice pursuant to the fresh assessment order. In the case of the assessee, since the original order of assessment was confirmed by the CIT(A) but on further appeal, the Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) and the issue restored to the AO, it was held that in terms of the Circular, the interest u/s.220(2) had to be charged only from the date of the fresh assessment order.

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Haware Constructions Pvt. Ltd. v. ITO ITAT ‘H’ Bench, Mumbai Before N. V. Vasudevan (JM) and R. K. Panda (AM) ITA Nos. 5601/Mum./2009, 6861/Mum./2010 & 1547/Mum./2011 A.Ys.: 2005-06, 2006-07 & 2007-08 Decided on: 5-8-2011 Counsel for assessee/revenue: J. P. Bairagra/ Goli Sriniwas Rao

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Section 80IB(10) — Deduction in case of housing project — (1) Whether an assessee builder can follow project completion method of accounting — Held, Yes; (2) Whether the AO justified in refusing to grant deduction on the ground that the commercial area exceeded the permissible limit and/or the area of the flat exceeded the permissible limit after considering balcony and terrace — Held that the limit as applicable as on the date when the project was approved should be applied and not as on the date of completion of the project and based thereon, the assessee had not exceeded the permissible limit as laid down in the Act;

Section 2(22)(e) — Deemed dividend — Loans and advances to related concern — Held that taxable in the hands of the shareholder and not in the hands of the assessee borrower.

Facts:
(1) A.Y. 2005-06:

The assessee was engaged in the business of construction and builder. On account of revision in AS-9, it changed its method of accounting in respect of projects which commenced after 1st April, 2003 from percentage completion method and started recognising revenue from the projects on completion of the projects, when the risk of ownership was transferred to the customer. However, the AO termed the change to project completion method as invalid. On appeal, the CIT(A) agreed with the AO and rejected the project completion method of accounting applied by the assessee to the new projects.

(2) A.Y. 2006-07:

The assessee was denied the benefit of deduction u/s.80IB(10) for the following reasons:

(a) The commercial area in the housing project exceeded 5% of the total project area;

(b) Some of the purchasers of flats had also purchased adjacent flats, the sum total of these two flats exceeded 1000 sq.ft.;

(c) Majority of the flats sold exceeded the area of 1000 sq.ft. after including balcony and terrace.

(3) A.Y. 2007-08:

The assessee had taken unsecured loan of Rs.8.02 crore during the year from HEB Pvt. Ltd., which had got free reserves of Rs.50.96 crore. According to the AO the provisions of section 2(22)(e) were attracted since one of the shareholders of the assesseecompany was holding more than 20% equity capital in HEB Pvt. Ltd. and the assessee-company.

Held:
(1) A.Y. 2005-06:

Relying on the various decisions (listed below), the Tribunal held that the project completion method was an accepted and recognised method of accounting. It also noted that the same was also accepted by the AO in the preceding as well as in the subsequent assessment year. According to it, an assessee can follow any recognised method of accounting and the condition was that the same method should be followed consistently. Since the assessee in the instant case was regularly following the project completion method and has offered the income in the year of completion of project, the Tribunal did not find any reason to reject the same. Accordingly, the assessee’s appeal was allowed.

(2) A.Y. 2006-07:

(a) Relying on the decision of the Special Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Brahma Associates reported in 122 TTJ 443 and the Co-ordinate Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Shri Girdharilal K. Lulla vide ITA No. 4207/Mum./2009 order dated 30-5-2011, the Tribunal found merit in the submissions of the assessee that when the approval was obtained prior to 31-3-2005, the condition of shopping area not exceeding 5% of built-up area or 2000 sq.ft. whichever is less, as introduced by the subsequent amendment are not applicable in respect of projects approved and commenced before 1-4-2005. Accordingly, the appeal filed by the assessee was allowed on this ground.

(b) As regards the second objection of the revenue that the assessee had sold two or more than two flats to one party, the combined area of which was more than 1000 sq.ft., the Tribunal accepted the submission of the assessee that the area of two flats should not be combined even though the two flats were sold to one person because:

  • the built-up area of each flat as approved by CIDCO was less than 1000 sq.ft.;
  • the assessee has sold each flat under separate agreement;
  • the assessee has not sold two flats by combining them together as one flat to one party;
  • there is no evidence with the Department that the assessee had sold the flat after combining the two flats together;
  • It is also not the case of the Revenue that each flat in the housing project undertaken by the assessee could not have been used as an independent or as a self-contained residential unit not exceeding 1000 sq.ft. of built-up area and that there would be a complete habitable residential unit only if two or more flats were joined with each other which would ultimately exceed 1,000 sq.ft. of built up area;
  • the condition that not more than one residential unit in the housing project was allotted to any person not being an individual, has been inserted by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2009 w.e.f. 1-4-2010.

(c) The Tribunal agreed with the assessee that the definition of ‘built-up area’ as given in s.s 14(a) of section 80IB, whereby the balcony/terrace area was also considered as part of built-up area, was inserted by the Finance Act, 2004 w.e.f. 1-4-2005 and, therefore, the same was applicable only in respect of the projects approved after 1-4-2005. In the given case of the assessee, as the project was approved prior to 1-4-2005, the appeal filed by the assessee was allowed on this ground.

(3) A.Y. 2007-08:

The Tribunal noted that the assessee was not a registered shareholder in HEB Pvt. Ltd. Therefore, relying on the decision of the Special Bench of the Tribunal in the case of ACIT v. Bhaumik Colour P. Ltd., [313 ITR (AT) 146] where it was held that deemed dividend can be assessed only in the hands of the person who is a shareholder of the lender company and not in the hands of a person other than a shareholder and not in the hands of the borrowing concern in which such shareholder is member or partner having substantial interest, the appeal filed by the assessee was allowed and directed the AO to delet the addition.

Cases relied on (A.Y. 2005-06):
1. Awadesh Builders v. ITO, 37 SOT 122 (Mumbai);
2. Prestige Estate Projects (P) Ltd. v. DCIT, 129 TTJ (Bang) 680;
3. CIT v. Bilahari Investment (P) Ltd., 299 ITR 1 (SC);
4. H. M. Constructions v. CIT, 90 TTJ (Bang.) 510.

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ITO v. Damodar Bhuvan CHS Ltd. ITAT ‘D’ Bench, Mumbai Before N. V. Vasudevan (JM) and T. R. Sood (AM) ITA No. 1610/Mum./2010 A.Y.: 2005-06. Decided on: 16-9-2011 Counsel for revenue/assessee : M. R. Kubal/ B. V. Jhaveri

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Section 2(24) — Income — Taxability of receipt of transfer fees and non-occupancy charges from its members by the housing society — Amount received in excess of the limits prescribed under the law — Held that the sum received is exempt from tax on the principle of mutuality.

Facts:
The assessee was a co-operative housing society. During the year under appeal, its claim to treat the receipt of the sum of Rs.15 lac towards transfer charges (described as contribution to heavy repair fund) and Rs.1.31 lac towards non-occupancy charges as exempt was negatived by the AO. On appeal, the CIT(A) held that these receipts are exempt under the principle of mutuality.

Held:
As regards the receipt of Rs.15 lacs towards transfer charges, relying on the Bombay High Court decision in the case of the Sind Co-operative Housing Society v. Income-tax Officer, (317 ITR 47), which was also followed in the cases of Suprabhat Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. v. ITO, (ITA No. 1972 of 2009 dated 1-10-2009) as well as Shyam Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. v. CIT, (ITA Nos. 92, 93 and 206 of 2008, dated 17-7-2009), the Tribunal held that the principle of mutuality applies to the receipt of transfer fees. Similarly, in respect of the receipt of Rs.1.31 lac towards non-occupancy charges, the Tribunal relied on the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Mittal Court Premises Co-op Society v. ITO, (320 ITR 414) and held that the principle of mutuality equally applies to such receipt. It further held that the restriction on the quantum of receipt by an association from its members prescribed by any other law regulating the relationship between members and its association will not be relevant while taxing the receipts under the Act. Thus, according to it, the principle of mutuality will not cease to exist in respect of receipts from members by an association beyond the quantum restricted by any law regulating the relationship between members and its association.

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Yahya E. Dhariwala v. DCIT ITAT ‘G’ Bench, Mumbai Before J. Sudhakar Reddy (AM) and V. Durga Rao (JM) ITA No. 5501/Mum./2009 A.Y.: 2005-06. Decided on: 25-11-2011 Counsel for assessee/revenue: K. Gopal/ A. K. Nayak

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Section 54EC — Six months period, referred to in section 54EC, should be reckoned from the end of the month in which the transfer takes place.

Facts:
During the previous year relevant to the assessment year under consideration the assessee sold shares of two private limited companies. The assessee chose to invest the entire sale consideration in the bonds specified u/s.54EC of the Act. Of Rs.1,97,50,000 invested by the assessee in REC bonds, a sum of Rs.45,00,000 was invested on 30th August, 2005. The AO in an order passed u/s.147 r.w.s. 143(3) of the Act denied the claim for deduction of Rs.45,00,000 on the ground that the shares have been transferred on 24th February, 2005, whereas the investment was made on 30th August, 2005 which is beyond the period of six months from the date of sale. The assessee submitted that the sale of shares took place on 28th February, 2005, based on documents filed with the Registrar of Companies.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who upheld the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to ITAT.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that the subject-matter of transfer is shares of a private limited company. In case of shares of private limited company, the process of transfer of shares can be said to be completed only when the board of directors approves the transfer. The Annual Return filed before the ROC disclosed that the date of registration of transfer was 28th February, 2005. Board resolution approving the transfer of shares was passed on 25th February, 2005. Just because the stamping was done on 24th February, 2005 of blank forms, it cannot be concluded that there is transfer on 24th February, 2005. The Tribunal concluded that the date of transfer is 28th February, 2005. Hence, the investment made on 30th August, 2005 was within a period of six months as contemplated under the Act.

The Tribunal then held that even if the date of transfer is to be taken as 24th February, 2005, the wording used in the section is ‘at any time within a period of six months after the date of such transfer’. The Tribunal noted that the Madras High Court in the case of Kadri Mills Ltd. and the Calcutta High Court in the case of Brijlal Lohia and Mahabir Prasad Khema have held that since the term ‘month’ is not defined in the Income-tax Act, 1961, the expression used under the General Clauses Act, 1897 should be applied. Having noted the definition of the term ‘month’ as defined under The General Clauses Act, 1897 and also that the Act in certain sections has stated the period in number of days the Tribunal held that from the language in section 54EC the period of six months should be reckoned from the end of the month in which the transfer takes place. As the investment was made on 30th August, 2005, the Tribunal held that the assessee has invested a part of the capital gain within a period of six months after the date of transfer of the long-term capital asset in question in specified assets.

The Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by the assessee.

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S. 115C, S. 115D, S. 115E : Interest on NRO deposit with banking company is investment income : TDS at 20%.

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New Page 2V. Ravi Narayanan,
In re (AAR)

(Unreported)

A.Y. : 2008-09. Dated : 3-3-2008

1. S. 115C, S. 115D, S. 115E, Income-tax Act.

Issues :


(i) Whether deposit in NRO account made with convertible
foreign exchange is ‘foreign exchange asset’ ?

(ii) Whether interest earned on such deposit is ‘investment
income’ qualifying for benefit u/s. 115E of the Act ?

(iii) What should be the rate of TDS on such interest ?


Facts :

The applicant had left India during the relevant previous
year and was a non-resident during that year. He proposed to open a Non-Resident
Ordinary (‘NRO’) account with a bank in India. The intended source of deposits
in the NRO account was remittances from outside India. He contended that the
interest earned on such deposits would be ‘investment income’ u/s.115C of the
Act and accordingly, applicable rate of tax should be 20% u/s.115E of the Act.
He was informed that since banks in India do not treat this as ‘investment
income’, tax would be deducted @ 30%.

The AAR considered the provisions of S. 115C, S. 115D and S.
115E of the Act, which are contained in Chapter XIIA of the Act. The AAR
observed that the applicant is a citizen of India, who is a non-resident. Hence,
he would qualify to claim benefit u/s.115E of the Act. Thereafter, the AAR
considered the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 and the Banking Regulation
Act, 1949 in order to test whether NRO deposit would constitute ‘specified
asset’ being deposits with Indian company. The AAR concluded that an Indian bank
governed by the Banking Regulation Act is also a company which is not a private
company as defined in the Companies Act, 1956 and therefore, a deposit made with
it would be a ‘specified asset’ within the meaning of S. 115C(f)(iii) of the
Act.

The representative of the Revenue had contended before the
AAR that :

(a) though NRO deposit is acquired with convertible foreign
exchange, its maturity proceeds are not repatriable;

(b) hence such a deposit does not constitute a ‘foreign
exchange asset’ u/s.115C of the Act;

(c) as such, interest earned on it does not qualify as
‘investment income’ u/s.115C of the Act; and

(d) since it is not ‘investment income’, tax should be
deducted @ 30%.

The AAR observed that the question is whether repatriability
of the deposit was a requirement and found that it was not a requirement under
Chapter XIIA of the Act.

Held :


(i) Deposit made in NRO account with a banking company,
which is not a private company, by remitting convertible foreign exchange,
would be ‘foreign exchange asset’ u/s.115C(b) of the Act.

(ii) Interest earned on deposit in NRO account mentioned in
(i) above would be ‘investment income’ u/s.115C(c) of the Act and would be
subject to tax @ 20% u/s.115E.

(iii) Deposit with a banking company is a ‘specified asset’
u/s.115C(f) of the Act.

(iv) Banks paying interest on the deposit in NRO account
mentioned in (i) above are required to deduct tax @ 20%.


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Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 28, S. 37 — Exchange fluctuation loss in respect of unmatured forward contracts on the last date of the accounting period on the basis of rate of foreign exchange prevailing on that date is allowable as a deduction.

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New Page 2

(Full texts of the following Tribunal decisions are available
at the Society’s office on written request. For members desiring that the
Society mails a copy to them, Rs.30 per decision will be charged for
photocopying and postage.)


Part B : UNREPORTED DECISIONS


17 DCIT v. Bank of Bahrain &
Kuwait

ITAT ‘C’ Bench, Mumbai (SB)

Before D. Manmohan (VP),

S. V. Mehrotra (AM) and D. K.
Agarwal (JM)

ITA Nos. 4404 & 1883/Mum./2004

A.Ys. : 1999-2000 & 1998-99

Decided on : 13-8-2010

Counsel for revenue/assessee :
Ajit Kumar
Sinha/F. V. Irani

Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 28, S.
37 — Exchange fluctuation loss in respect of unmatured forward contracts on the
last date of the accounting period on the basis of rate of foreign exchange
prevailing on that date is allowable as a deduction.

Per S. V. Mehrotra :

Facts :

The assessee was a non-resident
company carrying on banking business in India. It entered into forward contracts
with its clients to buy or sell foreign exchange at an agreed price on a future
date. On the date of maturity, the execution of the contract resulted in profits
or losses to the assessee. There was no dispute as regards losses arising on
execution of the contracts within the same year. However, in cases where the
date of maturity of the contract fell beyond the end of the accounting period,
the assessee evaluated the unmatured forward contract on the last day of the
accounting period on the basis of rate of foreign exchange prevailing on that
date and booked the profit or loss accordingly. The Assessing Officer (AO) taxed
the profit so booked but did not allow the assessee’s claim of loss, by relying
on the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Indian Overseas Bank
(183 ITR 200), on the ground that the loss is incurred on the date of maturity
of the contract and there cannot be any loss prior to such date. In other words,
he held such loss to be notional.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred
an appeal to the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) who allowed the assessee’s
appeal.

Aggrieved the Revenue preferred
an appeal to the Tribunal.

The assessee supported its claim
by relying on the decision of the Mumbai Tribunal in the case of Deutsche Bank
A.G., 86 ITD 431 (Mum.). The Tribunal noted that in the case of Deutsche Bank
(supra) the decision of the Madras High Court was distinguished on the ground
that the Court was concerned with the issue as to whether notional or
anticipated loss could be allowed as deduction or not, while the Tribunal was
concerned with the valuation of stock-in-trade. The Bench referred the matter,
since the assessee, as a banker, only entered into contract to sell/buy the
foreign currency at a future date, but did not buy or sell such contracts from
or in the market. It observed that the assessee was not holding these contracts
as stock-in-trade and, therefore, the decision in the case of Deutsche Bank was
not applicable.

The Bench framed the following
question of law for reference :

“Whether on facts and
circumstances of the case, can it be said that where a forward contract is
entered into by the assessee to sell the foreign currency at an agreed price at
a future date falling beyond the last date of accounting period, the loss is
incurred to the assessee on account of evaluation of the contract on the last
date of the accounting period i.e., before the date of maturity of the forward
contract.”

Held :

The Special Bench of the
Tribunal decided this ground in favour of the assessee and held :

(1) Deduction is allowable
under the Act in respect of those liabilities which crystalise during the
previous year. Therefore, the concept of crystalisation of liability under
the Income-tax Act assumes significance vis-à-vis commercial principles in
vogue. As per the commercial principles of policy of prudence, all
anticipated liabilities have to be accounted, but as per Income-tax Act,
only that liability will be allowed which has actually accrued. Due
weightage must be given to commercial principles in deciding such issues.

(2) Anticipated liabilities
which are contingent in nature are not allowable, but if an anticipated
liability is coupled with present obligation and only quantification can
vary depending upon the terms of the contract, then a liability is said to
have crystalised on the balance sheet date.

(3) A contingent liability
depends purely on the happening or not happening of an event, whereas if an
event has already taken place, which, in the present case, is of entering
into the contract and undertaking of obligation to meet the liability, and
only consequential effect of the same is to be determined, then, it cannot
be said that it is in the nature of contingent liability.

    4. The issues relating to accrual of income cannot be decided on the same footing and considerations on which the issues relating to loss/expense is to be decided. In case of loss/expense, it is the concept of reasonable certainty to meet an existing obligation which comes into play which in legal terminology is said to be ‘crystalisation of liability’. When outflow of economic resources in settlement of present obligation can be anticipated with reasonable accuracy, then it is to be recognised as a crystallised liability. This is in consonance with the principle of prudence as considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Woodward Governor of India Pvt. Ltd.

    5. The Revenue’s contention that liability can arise only when contract matures is completely divorced of principles of commercial accounting and, therefore, cannot be accepted. Both legal obligation and commercial principles have to be taken into consideration for deciding such issues.

    6. The anticipated losses on account of existing obligation on 31st March, determinable with reasonable accuracy, being in the nature of expenditure/accrued liability, have to be taken into account while preparing financial statements.

    7. The elements of financial statement can be broadly divided into the following five groups, viz. assets, liabilities, equity, income/gains and expenses/loss. These items are recognised in a financial statement if both the following criteria are met :

    a) future economic benefit will be there from the said events,

    b) the event can be measured in monetary terms.

In the present case, the AO himself has observed in the assessment order that at the time of entering into the contract, the assessee has recorded the income/loss on the basis of difference between the contracted rate and spot rate. Thus, to say that the contract was incapable of being recognised in the books of account, is not correct. The assessee recorded only the net effect of the transaction and not the entire transaction. Whether the deduction is allowable or not, therefore, cannot be guided by this factor.

    8. The AO cannot reject the method of accounting followed by the assessee merely on the ground that a better method of accounting could be the alternate one. However, in the present case, though observations have been made by the AO to this effect, but actual disallowance has been made by treating the impugned amount as contingent liability.

    9. Accounting Standard 11 issued by ICAI is mandatory and mandates that in a situation like in the present case, since the transaction is not settled in the same accounting period, the effect of exchange difference has to be recorded on 31st March.

    10. The foreign exchange currency held by the assessee bank is its stock-in-trade. On facts, this contract was incidental to the assessee’s holding of the foreign currency as current assets. Therefore, in substance, it cannot be said that the forward contract had no trappings of stock-in-trade.

    11. Profits are considered only when actual debt is created in favour of the assessee, but in case of anticipated losses, if an existing binding obligation, though dischargeable at a future date, is determinable with reasonable certainty, then the same is allowable.

    12. The principle that the liability in paraesenti is an allowable deduction but a liability in futuro, which for the time being is only contingent is not allowable has to be applied keeping in view the principles of prudence and applicable Accounting Standards.

13. When  profits  are  being  taxed  by  the Department in respect of such unmatured foreign exchange contracts, then there was no reason to disallow the loss as claimed by the assessee in respect of the same contracts on the same footing.

S. 40(a)(ia) read with S. 194C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Tax deductible for the year deducted belatedly on the last day of the accounting year and paid before the due date for filing of return — Whether AO justified in disallowing the expenditure u/s.

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New Page 2

(Full texts of the following Tribunal decisions are available
at the Society’s office on written request. For members desiring that the
Society mails a copy to them, Rs.30 per decision will be charged for
photocopying and postage.)


Part B : UNREPORTED DECISIONS

16 Bapusaheb Nanasaheb Dhumal v.
ACIT

ITAT ‘B’ Bench, Mumbai

Before P. M. Jagtap (AM) and

Vijay Pal Rao (JM)

ITA No. 6628/Mum./2009

A.Y. : 2005-06. Decided on :
25-6-2010

Counsel for assessee/revenue :
Anil J. Sathe/

S. S. Rana

S. 40(a)(ia) read with S. 194C
of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Tax deductible for the year deducted belatedly on
the last day of the accounting year and paid before the due date for filing of
return — Whether AO justified in disallowing the expenditure u/s.40(a)(ia) —
Held, No.

Per Vijay Pal Rao :

Facts :

During the year, the assessee
had paid various sums to contractors but the tax was deducted only on 31-3-2005.
According to the AO, as per the provisions of S. 194C, the assessee was required
to deduct and pay the tax regularly in each month when the contractors were
paid. Since the assessee had deducted full amount of the tax only on 31-3-2005,
he restricted the allowance of deduction only in respect of payments made during
the month of March and disallowed the deduction in respect of the payments which
were credited and made during the period other than the month of March 2005. On
appeal the CIT(A) upheld the order of the AO.

Before the Tribunal the Revenue
submitted that the assessee had failed to deduct and pay tax as required
u/s.194C. According to it, S. 40(a)(ia) grants relaxation of time period in
depositing the TDS only in a case when the tax was deductible and deducted in
the last month of the previous year — where the time for deposit of tax is
allowed till the due date of filing of the return u/s.139(1). In cases where the
tax is deductible prior to the month of March, then the same has to be deducted
before the end of the last month of the previous year and paid by the due date
as given in S. 194C. According to it, since the assessee had failed to deduct
and pay tax as required u/s.194C and other provisions of Chapter XVII of the
Act, the AO was justified in disallowing the expenditure claimed. It also relied
on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Madurai Mills and Co. Ltd.
(89 ITR 445).

Held :

According to the Tribunal the
controversy revolves around the applicability of the provisions of S. 194C while
disallowing the expenditure u/s. 40(a)(ia). According to it, the provisions of
S. 194C are relevant only for the purposes of ascertaining the deductibility of
the tax from the payments made. Once it is determined that the nature of payment
falls under the provisions of Chapter XVII, the disallowance for non-compliance
with TDS provisions would be governed by the provisions of S. 40(a)(ia).
According to it, the proviso to S. 40(a)(ia) makes it further clear that even in
the case when the tax has been deductible as per the provisions of Chapter XVII,
but deducted in the subsequent year or deducted during the last month of
previous year, but paid after the due date u/s.139(1) or deducted during the
other months of the previous year, but paid after the end of the said previous
year, then the said sum would be allowed as deduction in the previous year in
which the tax is paid. According to it, if the conditions of deduction and
payment prescribed under Chapter XVII are applicable for disallowance of
deduction, then the provisions of S. 40(a)(ia) would be rendered as meaningless.
It further added that as per S. 40(a)(ia) when the tax is deducted, even
belatedly, and deposited belatedly, then deduction is not denied and is
allowable in the previous year in which the tax was deposited. According to it,
the provisions of Chapter XVII were relevant only for ascertaining the
deductibility of the tax at source and not for the actual deduction and payment
for attracting the provisions of S. 40(a)(ia).

Therefore, since the assessee
had deducted the tax in the last month of the previous year and deposited the
same before the due date of filing of the return, it allowed the claim of the
deduction of the assessee. It further observed that the case relied on by the
Revenue is not relevant.

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S. 147 — AO cannot assess other income noticed in proceedings

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26 ITO v. Smt. Darshan Kaur

w/o S. Adesh Singh

ITAT Amritsar Bench, Amritsar (SMC)

Before Sh. Joginder Pall (AM)

ITA No. 282/ASR/2007

A.Y. : 2001-02. Decided on : 16-11-2007

Counsel for revenue/assessee : M. S. Minhas/

P. N. Arora

S. 147 — Reassessment — When no addition is made on the
ground for which reassessment was initiated, can the AO assess any other income
which comes to his notice in the course of such proceedings — Held, No.

Facts :

The assessee filed return of income for A.Y. 2001-02,
declaring total income of Rs.32,180, which was processed u/s.143(1)(a) of the
Act. Subsequently, based on tax evasion petition, the Assessing Officer
initiated proceedings u/s.147 allegedly on the ground that the assessee had
purchased ½ share of land with one room, on 15-11-2000, for a consideration of
Rs.1,19,250 from undisclosed income. Thus, reassessment proceedings were
initiated to bring to tax unexplained investment in property. In response to
notice u/s.147, the assessee filed return of income declaring total income to be
the same as that shown in his original return. Along with this return of income,
he filed copy of capital account indicating opening capital of Rs.4,56,298. The
assessee had shown withdrawals of Rs.1,25,000 from the said opening capital as
being invested in purchase of property. The assessee explained the source of
opening capital to be accumulated savings of the past. The Assessing Officer
observed that income earned in the past must have been utilised for purchase of
property from which rental income is being shown in the returns. Thus, the
Assessing Officer allowed credit of Rs.1,00,000 of past savings and made an
addition of Rs.3,56,298 on account of opening capital shown in the return. No
addition on account of unexplained investment in purchase of property for which
proceedings were initiated u/s.147 was made. The CIT(A) quashed the order passed
by the Assessing Officer on the ground that no addition in respect of ground for
which proceedings u/s.147 were initiated has been made by the Assessing Officer.
Aggrieved by the order of CIT(A), the Revenue preferred an appeal to the
Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue on the
ground that since the Assessing Officer has not made any addition, in respect of
which proceedings were initiated, he was not competent to bring to tax the
opening capital during the course of completing the reassessment. The Tribunal
observed as under :

(a) No doubt, the amended provisions of S. 147 empower the
AO to assess or reassess the income chargeable to tax, which has escaped
assessment and also any other income chargeable to tax, which has escaped
assessment which comes to his notice subsequently during the proceedings
u/s.147. However, the question of bringing to tax any other income chargeable
to tax, which comes to his notice subsequently during the course of
reassessment proceedings would arise only if the ground for which proceedings
u/s.147 were initiated was found valid.

(b) Since in this case, the AO has not made any addition in
respect of ground for which proceedings were initiated, he was not competent
to bring to tax the opening capital during the course of completing the
reassessment. The AO was competent to initiate separate proceedings u/s.147 to
bring to tax the unexplained capital by dropping the proceedings already
initiated, provided such action was within the time allowed.

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S. 80JJA — Subsidy received from State Government qualifies for deduction.

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25 Arvind Gupta v. ITO


ITAT ‘B’ Bench, Jaipur

Before I. C. Sudhir (JM) and

B. P. Jain (AM)

ITA No. 799/JP/07

A.Y. : 2003-04. Decided on : 31-3-2008

Counsel for assessee/revenue : Mahendra Gargieya & Sharvan
Gupta/D. P. Gupta

S. 80JJA of the Income-tax Act, 1961 –– Whether subsidy
amount received from the State Government qualifies for deduction u/s.80JJA —
Held, Yes.

Facts :

During the previous year relevant to A.Y. 2003-04, the
assessee was granted subsidy aggregating to Rs.26.16 lacs by the Government of
Rajasthan. The assessee’s claim for deduction u/s.80JJA of the Act, included the
said amount of subsidy. The AO was of the view that the subsidy is not derived
from the specified business and therefore he disallowed the claim of deduction
u/s.80JJA. The CIT(A) upheld the action of the AO.

Held :

The Tribunal noted that the certificate of the Additional
Director of Agriculture made it evident that subsidy was not given to the
manufacturer, but it was a subsidy to the cultivators. As per the procedure laid
down by the Government, the assessee had to receive a part of the sale price
from the Government. Thus, the subsidy was only a part of the selling price and
hence was a trading receipts. The Tribunal agreed with the contentions of the
assessee that the subsidy granted was nothing but a part of the sale price of
the product, which was realised. The Tribunal further observed that u/s.80JJA,
the subjected profit is not confined merely to the undertaking, but profit and
gains should be derived from any business of an undertaking, thus giving it a
wider meaning.


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S. 32(1) read with S. 43(6) — WDV of block brought forward from preceeding year to be reduced by WDV of assets discarded.

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24 Yamaha Motors India Pvt. Ltd. v. ACIT


ITAT ‘G’ Bench, Delhi

Before C. L. Sethi (JM) and

Deepak R. Shah (AM)

ITA No. 1986 (Del.) 2005

A.Y. : 2000-01. Decided on : 23-5-2008

Counsel for assessee/revenue : Ved Jain/

Surkesh K. Jain

S. 32(1) read with S. 43(6) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 —
Depreciation — Block of assets — certain assets forming part of block of assets
were discarded — Whether WDV of the block brought forward from the immediately
preceding previous year needs to be reduced by the WDV of the assets which have
been discarded — Held, the scrap value of the assets discarded needs to be
reduced from the WDV of the block of assets brought forward.

Facts :

The assessee had capitalised certain assets at Rs.4,71,51,016
on 1-11-1996. WDV of these assets as on 31.3.1999 was Rs.2,32,07,141. These
assets were discarded and written off by the assessee in the books of accounts
during the previous year relevant to A.Y. 2001-02. The discarded assets were not
disposed of or sold during the relevant financial year. The assessee while
computing the WDV of the block of assets qualifying for depreciation did not
reduce the WDV of the block brought forward from immediately preceding previous
year by the WDV of the assets discarded. The AO disallowed a sum of Rs.58,01,785 being depreciation on assets written off in the books of accounts,
on the ground that these assets have not been used for the purpose of the
business of the assessee. The CIT(A) confirmed the action of the AO. The
assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal noted that the scheme of depreciation effective
from 1-4-1988 has done away with the assetwise depreciation by substituting the
same by the scheme of block of assets by putting all the assets entitled to the
same rate of depreciation in one block of assets. The WDV of the block can now
be adjusted only in the manner provided in Ss.(6) of S. 43 of the Act. The
action of the AO in reducing the WDV of a block of assets by WDV of individual
assets by working out the same on the basis of asset-wise depreciation was held
by the Tribunal to be not in accordance with the provisions of S. 43(6)(c) of
the Act. The Tribunal held that what needs to be reduced from WDV of a block of
assets in the present case is only the scrap value of assets which have been
discarded during the year under consideration.


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S. 14 — Income from redemption of deep discount bonds taxed as capital gains

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23 C. S. Gosalia v. ITO


ITAT ‘A’ Bench, Mumbai

Before N. V. Vasudevan (JM) and

V. K. Gupta (AM)

ITA No. 1373/Mum./2006

A.Y. 2002-03. Decided on : 30-7-2008

Counsel for revenue/assessee : Ajay C. Gosalia/

S. Srivastava

S. 14 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Heads of income — Deep
discount bonds held as investment — Taxability of gains earned on redemption
thereof — Held that income arising therefrom is taxable as capital gains and not
as income from other sources.

Per V. K. Gupta :

Facts :

The assessee had purchased 64 deep discount bonds between
February 1999 and April 1999 through Bombay Stock Exchange for a total cost of
Rs.4.9 lacs. The same were held by the assessee as investment and he had not
offered to tax any income thereon in the year of holding. The said bonds were
redeemed by IDBI on 31-3-2002, resulting into gain of Rs.2.78 lacs. The said
gain was offered to tax by the assessee as long-term capital gain.

According to the AO, the income was liable to be taxed as
‘Income from other sources’ as per the Board Circular dated 15-2-2002. The
asssessee’s contention that the Circular relied on by the AO was applicable to
bonds issued after 15-2-2002 and his case was covered by the earlier Circular
dated 12-3-1996 was rejected. On appeal, the CIT(A) confirmed the action of the
AO.

Held :

The Tribunal agreed with the assessee and held that the
subsequent Circular issued by the Board was not retrospective in nature and the
case of the assessee was covered by the earlier Circular of the Board viz.,
the Circular dated 12-3-1996. It also took note of the fact that the
assessee was holding the bonds as investment. Accordingly, the assessee’s appeal
was allowed.


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S. 115JA — Capital gains credited directly to capital reserve in balance sheet not to be considered in book profit.

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22 ACIT v. Vijay Furniture Mfg. Co. Pvt. Ltd.


ITAT ‘F’ Bench, Mumbai

Before Sushma Chawla (JM) and

Abraham P. George (AM)

ITA No. 7104/Mum./2005

A. Y. 2000-01. Decided on : 9-7-2008

Counsel for revenue/assessee : B. K. Singh/

Jayesh Dadia

S. 115JA of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Capital gain earned
during the year was directly credited to capital reserve in balance sheet —
Whether AO justified in adding such gain to the book profit — Held, No.

Per Sushma Chawla :

Facts :

During the year under consideration the assessee had earned
capital gain of Rs.8.81 crore. In the accounts the said capital gain was
credited directly to the capital reserve in the balance sheet. The as-sessee had
claimed the capital gain as exempt u/s. 54E of the Act.

As per the accounts of the assessee, there was a book loss.
However as per the Assessing Officer, the capital gain was required to be
credited to the profit and loss account. Thus, according to him, there was a
book profit u/s.115JA. Applying the ratio of the Bombay High Court decision in
the case of Veekaylal Investment Co. Ltd., he assessed the income at Rs.2.66
crore, after adjusting the book loss disclosed in the Profit and Loss Account
against the capital gains.

The CIT(A), relying on the Apex Court decision in the case of
Appollo Tyres Ltd. and of the Mumbai High Court decision in the case of Kinetic
Motor Co. Ltd., held that the Assessing Officer had no power to recast the
profit disclosed in the audited accounts. Accordingly, the appeal filed by the
assessee was allowed.

Held :

The Tribunal relying on the decisions of the Apex Court in
the case of Appollo Tyres Ltd. and of the Mumbai High Court in the case of
Akshay Textile Trading & Agencies Pvt. Ltd. agreed with the CIT(A) and held that
the AO has no power to recast the profit once the same was certified by the
statutory auditors, and only those adjustments which are permitted by
Explanation to Ss.(2) of S. 115JA of the Act, can be made.

Cases referred to :



1. Appollo Tyres Ltd. v. CIT, 255 ITR 273 (SC)

2. CIT v. Akshay Textile Trading & Agencies Pvt. Ltd.,
203 Taxation 303 (Bom.)

3. Kinetic Motor Co. Ltd. v. DCIT, 262 ITR 330
(Mum.)

4. CIT v. Veekaylal Investment Co. Ltd., 249 ITR 330
(Bom.)


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S. 272A(2)(e) — Delay in return due to non-availability of accounts condoned.

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21 ADIT (E) v. Shri Vardhaman Sthanakvasi Jain
Sangh


ITAT ‘G’ Bench, Mumbai

Before R. K. Gupta (JM) and R. K. Panda (AM)

ITA Nos. 961 to 965/Mum./2006

A.Y. 1998-99 to 2002-03. Decided on : 16-5-2008

Counsel for revenue/assessee : Malathi Sridharan/ K. Shivaram
and Paras Savla

S. 272A(2)(e) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Penalty for delay
in furnishing of return — Delay was on account of non-availability of the
accounts — Whether cause of the delay was reasonable to condone the delay —
Held, Yes.

Per Bench :

Facts :

In respect of the years under appeal there was delay in
filing of returns of income which ranged between 553 days to 1,649 days. The
delay according to the assessee, was due to non-availability of accounts which
were taken by the accountant of the assessee and which could be obtained by the
assessee after long persuasion, in the year 2003-04. This resulted into delay in
finalisation of accounts and in auditing thereof. However, according to the
Assessing Officer, there was no reasonable cause for the failure to file the
return within the stipulated time and relying on the Bombay High Court decision
in the case of Malad Jain Yuvak Mandal Medical Relief, levied a penalty
u/s.272A(2)(e) of the Act, which aggregated to Rs.6.44 lacs computed @ Rs.100
for each day of default. On appeal, the CIT(A) relied on the decisions listed at
S. Nos. 2 to 4 below and deleted the penalty.

Being aggrieved, the Revenue went in appeal before the
Tribunal and relied on the order of the Assessing Officer, and the Bombay High
Court decision relied on by the Assessing Officer.

Held :

The Tribunal agreed with the CIT(A). Further, according to
the Tribunal, the returns filed by the assessee were non-est returns.
Therefore, relying on the Tribunal decision in the case of Rupam Cut Piece
Centre, it held that no penalty can be imposed.

Cases referred to :



1. Rupam Cut Piece Centre, 42 TTJ 533

2. CIT v. Sulekha Works Pvt. Ltd., 156 ITR 190
(Cal.)

3. CIT v. Vishnu Brass Parts Works Taxation, 48(1)
Guj.

4. CIT v. Maheshprasad Gupta, 178 ITR 468 (MP)

5. DIT (Exemption) v. Malad Jain Yuvak Mandal Medical
Relief,
250 ITR 488 (Mum.)



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Consideration paid by Indian Company to American Company under assignment agreement was not capital gains but business profits – Since American Company did not have PE in India, consideration not chargeable to tax in India. Payer not required to withhold

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New Page 1Part C : Tribunal & AAR
International Tax Decisions

9 Laird Technologies India Pvt. Ltd.
(2010) 323ITR598(AAR)
Article 7, India-USA DTAA; S. 195
Dated : 18-2-2010

Consideration paid by Indian Company to American
Company under assignment agreement was not capital gains but business profits –
Since American Company did not have PE in India, consideration not chargeable to
tax in India. Payer not required to withhold tax u/s.195.

Facts :

The applicant Indian Company (‘IndCo’) was a group
company of a UK company (‘UK Co’). USCo was another group company of UK Co.
IndCo was engaged in the business of design and manufacture of antenna and
battery packs for mobile phones. USCo was a globally known designer and
manufacturer of antenna, etc. USCo had entered into a global Product Purchase
Agreement (‘PPA’) with Nokia for supply of products in respect of Nokia’s
requirements. Inter alia, PPA stipulated that “neither party shall assign any of
its rights or obligations under this agreement without prior written consent of
the other party”. USCo and IndCo entered into an Assignment Agreement under
which, USCo assigned all its beneficial rights, title, interest, obligations and
duties under PPA in favour of IndCo for a period of 5 years for certain lump sum
consideration.

IndCo applied to AAR for its ruling on the
following issues :

  • Whether amount received
    by USCo as assignment fee from IndCo was taxable under the Income-tax Act or
    under India-USA DTAA ?

  • Whether IndCo was
    required to withhold tax even if the assignment fee was not taxable in the
    hands of USCo ?

Held :

The AAR ruled as follows :

As regards taxability as capital gains :

An inference could not be
drawn that Nokia had consented to ratify the Assignment Agreement, nor was it
known whether Nokia was apprised of all the terms of Assignment Agreement.
Further, mere fact of Nokia accepting goods from IndCo would not lead to the
inference that assignment had approval of Nokia. Therefore, there was no valid
assignment in the eyes of law.

In the absence of any
valid assignment, the contention of IndCo that there was legal transfer of
capital asset and that consideration should be deemed to be capital gain cannot
be accepted. However, the fact remained that IndCo paid certain amount to USCo
which was received by USCo in its bank account. Thus, irrespective of the
validity of the Assignment Agreement, amount received by USCo can be examined
for ascertaining tax implications for USCo. Amount received on assignment was
business profits of USCo.

As regards constitution of PE :

There was nothing on
record that USCo had any role to play in regular manufacturing and business
activities of IndCo. IndCo did not constitute USCo’s PE in India. As per facts
on record, fixed place of PE of USCo is ruled out. USCo was not in picture after
IndCo started manufacture and supply of goods. The tax authorities did not
elaborate in what manner IndCo was dependent on USCo and hence, that contention
is not sustainable.

In absence of agency or
fixed rule PE, business income is not taxable in India.

As regards taxability and withholding tax :

As USCo had not derived
any income chargeable in India, IndCo was not required to withhold tax u/s.195
of the Income-tax Act.

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ITO vs. M/s. Kirtilal Kalidas Diamond Exports (Mumbai) (Unreported). [ITA No 1868/Mum/2005].

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Part C — International Tax Decisions

  1. ITO vs. M/s. Kirtilal Kalidas Diamond Exports
    (Mumbai) (Unreported). [ITA No 1868/Mum/2005].

A.Y. : 2001-2002

Sections
40(a)(i), 195, I T Act; India-UK DTAA

Dtd. : 30th
September 2008

 


Issue


Commission paid to non-resident agent for purchase of raw materials is not
taxable in India, either under I T Act or under India-UK DTAA.

Facts

The
assessee was engaged in the business of export of cut and polished diamonds.
For its business, it was importing rough diamonds. During the relevant year,
it imported rough diamonds through a non-resident agent and paid commission to
that agent. While making payment of commission to the non-resident agent, the
assessee did not deduct any tax at source.


Before the AO, the assessee contended that: the non-resident had rendered the
services outside India; the assessee had paid commission outside India; the
non-resident did not have any establishment in India; and hence, the income of
the non-resident was not chargeable to tax in India.

The
AO held that the assessee was required to deduct tax at source under Section
195 of the Act and since it failed to deduct such tax, provisions of Section
40(a)(i) of the Act were attracted. Accordingly, the AO disallowed the
commission while computing the income of the assessee.

On
appeal the CIT(A) deleted the disallowance.

Held

The
Tribunal observed that the Department had not countered the facts, namely :

(i)
the services were rendered outside India;


(ii) the assessee had paid commission outside India;


(iii) the non-resident did not have any establishment in India. On these
facts, it held that no income accrued to the non-resident in India.

Even under India-UK
DTAA, business profits, cannot be charged to tax in India in absence of
permanent establishment in India.

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Worley Parsons Services Pty. Ltd. 312 ITR 317 (AAR)

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Part C — International Tax Decisions

  1. Worley Parsons Services Pty. Ltd. 312 ITR 317 (AAR)


Article 5 (3) and Article 12 of
India-Australia DTAA


Dtd. : 23rd April, 2009

 

Issue

  •  In the facts of the applicant’s case, for the
    purpose of determining threshold under the service PE, presence in respect of
    all the contracts is to be taken into account.
  •   The services involving preparation of technical plan amounts to royalties
    within the meaning of Article XII of India-Australia treaty.
  •   The services involving review of the designs prepared by the third party,
    assisting in the bid process, making suggestion on optimisation of resources,
    etc., do not meet the test of ‘make available’, etc., and is therefore not
    royalty within the meaning of Article XII of India Australia treaty.


Facts

Worley Parson, a company registered in Australia,
(AUSCO) is engaged in the business of providing professional services
including engineering, procurement and project management services to various
players engaged in the business of energy and resource industry.

AUSCO entered into six separate service contracts
with ONGC. The contracts were entered into in respect of two offshore projects
of ONGC. One of the six contracts (contract no.5) involved the work of
preparing design, provide lay out and cost optimisation scheme along with the
process designs for the new process platform of ONGC. The consideration paid
pursuant to contract no.5 was admitted to be the payment in the nature of
royalty as it involved consideration for development and transfer of technical
plan.

In respect of the balance 5 contracts, the
applicant provided the following services :

1. Reviewing the design and engineering
documents prepared by the third party consultants engaged directly by ONGC.

2. Reviewing technical and commercial bid
document floated by ONGC for the purpose of inviting tender from the
interested parties.

3. Reviewing the proposals of optimisation and
cost savings presented by ONGC.

4. Reviewing the existing facilities and making
recommendations.

5. Assisting ONGC in procurement phase of one
of the offshore projects.

Services in respect of these contracts were
rendered partly in India and partly in Australia. The aggregate presence of
employees pursuant to various contracts (other than contract no. 5) exceeded
period of 90 days in 12-month period reckoned for two financial years.

Before the AAR, the applicant claimed that :



  •   The services rendered under the various contracts except contract no. 5
    cannot be regarded as royalties as defined in the treaty.


  • For the purpose of determining the service PE trigger threshold, each
    contract should be viewed separately;


  •   There was no service PE trigger except under contract 6 since in each of the
    contracts seen individually the time spent by the employees of the applicant
    did not exceed the threshold of 90 days in 12-month period provided in the
    treaty.


  •   Relying on SC decision in the case of Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy
    Industries Ltd. vs. DIT,
    (288 ITR 408), it was submitted that offshore
    services cannot be taxed in India even in respect of contract no. 5.



The Department contended that the entire amount was taxable as royalty and
hence no distinction is required for onshore & offshore services. Further all
the contracts should be seen together in order to ascertain whether service PE
has emerged or not.

Held :

The AAR held :



  •   Consideration for contract no. 5 was taxable as royalty income. For the
    purpose of determining number of days of presence for service PE, the
    presence of employees pursuant to contract no.5 is to be excluded in view of
    specific provisions of Article V(3)(c) of the treaty.


  •   Services rendered pursuant to other contracts were not royalty within the
    meaning of Article XII of the treaty. The services rendered pursuant to the
    contracts had a technical content and recommendation for use by ONGC.
    However, the services and the input did not result in the recipient of
    service getting equipped with the knowledge and expertise of the applicant.
    The services were project specific and ONGC could not make use of such
    services for unrelated project to the exclusion of the applicant. The
    services therefore did not make available technology to ONGC so as to be
    regarded as royalty within the meaning of Article XII(3)(g) of the treaty.


  • The AAR also rejected the contention of the Department that the services of
    reviewing designs of third party and suggesting recommendations thereon
    resulted in development of technical plan or design for transfer by the
    applicant. The AAR observed that the payment was not royalty as the
    applicant did not evolve and transfer plan or design to ONGC.


Mahindra and Mahindra Limited (M&M) vs. DCIT [ITA Nos. 2606, 2607, 2613 and 2614/Mum/2000] (Mumbai SB).

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Part C — International Tax Decisions


  1. Mahindra and Mahindra Limited (M&M) vs.
    DCIT [ITA Nos. 2606, 2607, 2613 and 2614/Mum/2000] (Mumbai SB).


A.Y. : 1998-99


Section 9(1)(vii), 191, 195,
200, 201 of the Income- tax Act and Article 13 of India-UK DTAA


Dtd. : 9th April, 2009


Issue


(1) Proceedings under Section
201 are akin to assessment/reassessment and time limit available for
initiating and completing assessment/reassessment proceedings are as equally
applicable to it.


(2) In terms of Section 195, a
payer is required to withhold taxes only where the payment includes a sum
chargeable to tax in India.


(3) No order treating a person
as an assessee in default can be passed if the Department has not taken any
action against the recipient to treat the income as taxable.


Facts

M&M had come out with 2 Euro issues in November
1993 and July 1996. In this connection, M&M had availed services of Lead
Managers (LM) of UK. M&M was obliged to pay management, underwriting and
selling commission to LM. In addition, certain expenses of LM were also
reimbursed by M&M. LM had retained their commission from out of proceeds of
the issue. No taxes were withheld in respect of payments retained by LM.

The Department had initiated action against the
payer (M&M) for failure to withhold taxes and treated M &M to be assessee in
default.

The primary contention of M&M was that there was
no obligation to withhold tax as the payment was not towards technical
services but was for subscription of capital. In any case, the fees were
retained by the service provider and there was no separate remittance so as to
attract obligation of TDS.

By way of an additional ground, M&M raised the
aspect of applicability of time limit to S.201 proceedings; it also challenged
the validity of proceedings by contending that :


.
Section 201 (1)/ 201 (1A) proceedings apply only where taxes are withheld
but have not been remitted to the Government. The proceedings had no
application where the payer had not withheld taxes.

.
The payer cannot be treated as an assessee in default unless the Department
has assessed or initiated action for assessment of income in the hands of
the recipient.

.
As no time limit has been prescribed for initiating action, the proceedings
need to be exercised within a reasonable time. As judicial precedents have
held that 4 years is a reasonable time for initiating and completion of the
proceedings under Section 201(1)/(1A), the same needs to be adhered to. In
the present case, since this limitation period was crossed, no action can be
taken against the payer for not withholding taxes.

As
against the above, the Department contended :


Services offered by LM were in the nature of FTS and hence taxable in India.
Retention of amount by LM in effect amounted to making of payment.


M&M did not file any application to the Department for determination of the
amount to be withheld on its payments to LM. In absence of lower/nil tax
deduction certificate, taxes were necessarily required to be withheld by
M&M.


Section 201(1)/201(1A) proceedings apply to both the categories of
defaulters, i.e., one who has withheld taxes but not remitted it to
the Government and also to those who have not withheld taxes from the
payment.


Assessment of recipient is not a pre-condition for enforcing a withholding
tax liability on the payer. The withholding tax provisions are separate and
operate independent of the assessment proceedings of the recipients. For
this, the Tax Department relied on provisions of Sections like 115A , 115AC,
115BBA, 115G, etc. to support the proposition that under certain situations,
the recipients have no obligation of filing the return if there is suitable
tax withholding.


Where no provision for limitation is present in a statute, the Courts cannot
artificially introduce a limitation.


Held


The Special Bench admitted the additional ground on the question of limitation
which was raised for the first time before it. It held that the issue involved
a question of law and needed no fresh investigation of facts.

Canora Resources Ltd. In re 313 ITR 2 (AAR) Section 45(3), 10(2A), 92, 184, 245R of the Income-tax Act and Article 24 of India-Canada DTAA.

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Part C — International Tax Decisions

  1. Canora Resources Ltd. In re 313 ITR 2 (AAR)
    Section 45(3), 10(2A), 92, 184, 245R of the Income-tax Act and Article 24 of
    India-Canada DTAA.

Dtd. : 23rd
April, 2009

Issue

^ A foreign
partnership can be assessed as a partnership firm under the Indian Income-tax
Law.

^ Provisions
of Transfer Pricing Regulations override provisions of Section 45(3) of the
Act. Capital gains in respect of contribution of asset to a partnership firm,
if in the nature of international transaction, attracts tax liability w.r.t.
fair market value.

^
Nationality non-discrimination provision cannot be invoked for claiming non
applicability of transfer pricing provisions which are based on residential
status of the parties.

Facts

Applicant, a
company registered in Canada, is engaged in the business of exploration and
production of petroleum and natural gas. In India, applicant held
participating interest (PI) in three oil blocks. Amongst others, it held 60%
PI in Amguri development block (Amguri block). The Amguri block had good
commercial prospects and had known commercial discovery while the other two
blocks were at nascent stage.

The
applicant proposed to restructure its business in India with a view to
attracting investments in Amguri block and with a view to holding Amguri block
in a separate entity. It proposed to transfer its PI in Amguri block to a
partnership firm (Firm) to be formed in Canada. The Firm was proposed between
the Applicant and its wholly-owned Canadian subsidiary as partners.



Before the
AAR, the applicant raised the following contention.

a) The
Canadian firm should be assessed to tax as a ‘firm’. The applicant furnished
copy of the partnership Act of Alberta, Canada to show that the provisions
of that Partnership Act were almost at par with the provisions of the Indian
Partnership Act. It was explained that the Act of Alberta recognised the
principle of agency between partners; the liability of partners was joint
and several; properties of the firm belonged to the partners collectively;
the firm had no separate legal personality of its own, etc.

b) It is
enough that the mechanism of sharing is described or defined on a certain
basis; it is not necessary to express or set out the fractional or other
shares, so as to enable the entity to be assessed as firm in compliance with
Section 184 of the Act.

c) The
capital gains income, if any, arising from transfer of PI to the proposed
firm should be computed as per provisions of Section 45(3) of the Act by
adopting contribution value. In view of the special provisions of charging
Section of Section 45(3), the transfer pricing provisions cannot be applied.

As against
that, the Tax Department contended :

a) The
application deserved to be rejected having regard to the provisions of
Section 245R(2) of the Act as the transaction was for avoidance of
Income-tax. The proposed restructuring was merely a ruse for avoidance of
tax and the applicant had failed to substantiate how its object of
attracting investments was sub-served. The proposal was prone to tax
avoidance since the proposed restructuring would facilitate the applicant to
exit from Amguri block by transferring its stake in the firm without payment
of tax in India.

b) A
partnership firm can be assessed as a firm under the Act only if it is a
partnership firm as understood under the Indian Law. The proposed
partnership firm would have characteristic of a company or a corporation and
should be taxed in India as a foreign company. For this purpose, the Tax
Department sought to place reliance on features like managing partner of the
firm having power akin to that of a managing director, likely feature of
payment of dividend, etc.

c) The
proposed partnership deed was so worded that it failed to specify the
individual shares of the partners in the instrument of partnership and hence
also the firm cannot be assessed as a partnership firm under the Act in view
of provisions of Section 184 of the Act.

d) The
transaction between the applicant and the firm is in the nature of
international transaction between two associated persons. Therefore, the
transfer pricing regulations would require that the capital gains income is
computed with reference to the arm’s-length price.


The AAR Held



(1) In the case of Azadi Bachao Andolan (263 ITR 706),
the Supreme Court has approved the principle that a taxpayer is entitled to
resort to a legal method available to him to plan his tax liability. The AAR
noted that it may reject the application, provided it relates to a
transaction which is designed prima facie for avoidance of tax. The
expression ‘prima facie’ can be understood as ‘at first sight’; ‘on
first appearance’; ‘on the face of it’; etc. The future possibility of the
applicant’s exit from Amguri block by transferring PI to someone cannot by
itself be a ground to conclude that the arrangement was, on the face of it
to avoid tax.

S. 37(1) — Capital or revenue expenditure — Whether the amount paid for handsets and for talk-time charges were capital in nature — Held, No.

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New Page 1

Part B :
Unreported
Decisions

(Full texts of the following Tribunal decisions are available at
the Society’s office on written request. For members desiring that the Society
mails a copy to them, Rs.30 per decision will be charged for photocopying and
postage.)

 

 


8 Radial Marketing Pvt. Ltd. v. ITO
ITAT ‘SMC’ Bench, Mumbai
Before R. K. Gupta (JM)
ITA No. 3868/Mum./2008

A.Y. : 2003-04. Decided on : 19-5-2009
Counsel for assessee/revenue : G. P. Mehta/K. K. Mahajan

S. 37(1) — Capital or revenue expenditure — Whether the
amount paid for handsets and for talk-time charges were capital in nature —
Held, No.

Facts :

During the year under appeal the assessee had claimed a sum
of Rs.24,500 paid for handsets and Rs.14,000 paid for talk-time charges as
revenue expenditure. However, the AO treated the same as capital expenditure and
allowed the depreciation.

Held :

The Tribunal referred to the CBDT Circular issued with
reference to the payments made under ‘Own Your Telephone’ scheme of MTNL. It
noted that as per the Circular the amount paid for the purchase of handsets was
allowable as revenue expenditure. In view thereof, it allowed the claim of the
assessee. As regards the amount paid for talk-time — it agreed with the assessee
that it cannot be treated as capital in nature as the same was not for any
capital assets.

Reference :

CBDT Circular No. 204/70/75-IT (All), dated 10-5-1976.

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