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Penalty: Concealment: Section 271(1)(c): A. Y. 2002-03: Assessee, a limited company, made a claim for deduction of loss in the course of assessment proceedings: AO rejected the claim and imposed penalty u/s. 271(1)(c): Penalty not justified: Liberal view is required to be taken as necessarily the claim is bound to be scrutinised both on facts and law:

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CIT vs. DCM Ltd.; 262 CTR 295 (Del):

For the A. Y. 2002-03, in the course of the assessment proceedings u/s. 143(3), the assessee company made a claim that the loss of Rs. 95.55 lakh on account of loan granted to its subsidiary DCM International Ltd., which was written off, was deductible as business expenditure or in alternative as capital loss. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim and also imposed penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) for concealment of income. The Tribunal deleted the penalty.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) It is not disputed or denied that the loan in fact was granted and has been also written off. There was no concealment or furnishing of inaccurate facts. Case is completely covered by Explanation 1 to section 271(1)(c). It is not disputed that full factual matrix or the facts were before the Assessing Officer at the time of assessment when this claim was made. The fact that scrutiny assessment was pending is a relevant and important circumstance to show the bona fides of the assessee as he was aware that the claim would be examined and would not go unnoticed.

ii) Secondly, the claim was rejected in view of the legal position, which was against the assessee and not because of statement of incorrect or wrong facts. Law does not bar or prohibit an assessee for making a claim, which he believes may be accepted or is plausible. When such a claim is made during the course of regular or scrutiny assessment, liberal view is required to be taken as necessarily the claim is bound to be carefully scrutinised both on facts and in law. Full probe is natural and normal.

iii) Threat of penalty cannot become a gag and/ or haunt on assessee for making a claim which may be erroneous or wrong, when it is made during the course of the assessment proceedings. Normally penalty proceedings in such cases should not be initiated unless there are valid or good grounds to show that factual concealment has been made or inaccurate particulars on facts were provided in the computation.

iv) There is no merit in the present appeal and the same has to be dismissed.”

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Industrial undertaking: Deduction u/s. 80-I: A. Ys. 1993-94 and 1994-95: Profit must be derived from industrial undertaking: Ownership of industrial undertaking is not a condition precedent:

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Krishak Bharti Co-operative Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT: 358 ITR 168 (Del):

The assessee had an ammonia/urea plant at H. Just next to it and within its premises, the Hazira ammonia extension plant, which manufactured heavy water, had been set up and established by the Heavy Water Board, which was part of the Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India. There was an agreement between the assessee and the Government of India whereby the assessee operated and maintained the heavy water plant. The heavy water plant belonging to the Heavy Water Board and the ammonia/urea plant of the assessee were both integrated with each other. The process of manufacture of the heavy water plant was dependent on the supply of synthesis gas enriched with deuterium which was a by-product of the assessee’s ammonia/ urea plant. The assessee received service charges from the Heavy Water Board and claimed deduction u/s. 80-I in respect of it. The claim was rejected by the Assessing Officer. The Tribunal upheld the order of the Assessing Officer on the ground that the industrial undertaking manufacturing heavy water was not a part of the ammonia/urea plant of the assessee. It held that the service charges received by the assessee from the Heavy Water Board could not be treated as having been derived from an industrial undertaking of the assessee.

On appeal by the assessee, the Delhi High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) A provision in a taxing statute granting incentives for promoting growth and development should be construed liberally.

ii) A plain reading of section 80-I(1) and (2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, would indicate that the ownership by the assessee of an industrial undertaking from which assessee derives profits and gains is not a stipulated condition. The only thing that has to be seen is whether the source of the profit or gains is an industrial undertaking.

iii) The service charges received by the assessee were profits and gains derived from an industrial undertaking and were eligible for a deduction u/s. 80-I.”

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Business expenditure: TDS: Works contract: Disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) r/w. section 194C: Assessee running coaching classes for competitive exams: Agreement with franchisees: Not a works contract: Tax not deductible at source on payment to franchisees: Amount paid to franchisees not disallowable u/s. 40(a)(ia):

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CIT vs. Career Launcher India Ltd.; 358 ITR 179(Del):

The assessee was a company engaged in providing education and training for various preparatory examinations like IIM, IIT, designing, etc. These services were provided across the country through education centres run by the assessee itself or by its franchisees. For the A.Ys. 2005-06 and 2006-07, the Assessing Officer disallowed the amounts paid to the franchisees relying on section 40(a)(ia) on the ground that the assessee had not deducted tax at source which it was obliged to do u/s. 194C of the Act. The Tribunal deleted the disallowance and held that the agreement was not for making any payment to licensee for any work done for the assessee and that it was a case of sharing of fees for carrying out respective obligations under a contract. It held that neither section 194C nor section 40(a) (ia) was applicable.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The agreements with franchisees were not the simple cases of the assessee engaging certain other persons to conduct the learning centres for which they were to be paid. The agreements were much more complex and reflected a business arrangement, as opposed to a contract for carrying out a work. Both the parties, the assessee and the licensee had entered into this agreement only in their mutual interest and for mutual gains. It was a simple case of permitting the use of its trade name or reputation by the licensees for a consideration.

ii) The provisions of section 194C and section 40(a)(ia) were not applicable to the facts of the case.”

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Business expenditure: TDS: Disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) r/w. s/s. 9(1)(vii) and 195: A. Y. 2007- 08: Circular in force during relevant year not obliging to deduct tax at source: Disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) not proper: Subsequent withdrawal of Circular not relevant:

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CIT vs. Model Exims; 358 ITR 72(All):

In the A. Y. 2007-08, the Assessing Officer disallowed an amount of Rs. 57,49,489 paid to overseas entities as commission relying on section 40(a)(ia) on the ground that tax is not deducted at source u/s. 195 of the Act. The Assessing Officer rejected the contention of the assessee that the assessee was not obliged to deduct tax at source on the said payments in view of the Circular Nos. 23 of 1969, 163 of 1975 and 786 of 2000 and accordingly the said payments were not taxable in the hands of the recipients. The CIT(A) deleted the disallowance and held that the Circular No. 7 of 2009 withdrawing the above said circulars was operative only from 22nd October, 2009, and not prior to that date and had no bearing in the instant assessment year. The Tribunal confirmed the order of the CIT(A) and dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue. On appeal by the Revenue, the Allahabad High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The Circulars did not oblige the assessee to deduct tax at source. The assessment in question for the A. Y. 2007-08 would be governed by the Circular, which was operative at the relevant time. The assessee was not entitled to deduct tax at source.

ii) Circular No. 7 of 2009, dated 22-10-2009, withdrawing the earlier Circulars became operative only from that date. The Circulars in the relevant year were binding on the Department and the Assessing Officer did not have any right to ignore the Circulars and to disallow u/s. 40(a) (ia) of the Act, for non-deduction of tax at source u/s. 195.”

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Sections 194H read with section 40(a)(ia) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 – Mere distribution of the collected amount of commission does not require tax deduction if it is not shown as an expense.

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5. (2013) 55 SOT 356 (Delhi)
ITO vs. Interserve Travels (P.) Ltd.
ITA No.3526 (Delhi) of 2010
A.Y.2006-07. Dated 18-05-2012
 
Sections 194H read with section 40(a)(ia) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 – Mere distribution of the collected amount of commission does not require tax deduction if it is not shown as an expense.

Facts

The assessee was engaged in business of travel agents. It had entered into a consortium agreement with 12 other members who were travel agents for booking air tickets through platform provided by `A’. The consortium members agreed that assessee would act as a lead member and authorised it to enter into contracts with `A’ to make collections and distribute monies to each of the consortium travel agents in proportion to segment bookings effected by each travel agent. The assessee collected commission for services rendered by other members and distributed said commission amongst members on priority basis. Though the TDS certificate issued by `A’ reflected commission of Rs. 65.72 lakh, the assessee distributed an amount of Rs. 52.22 lakh amongst members for services rendered by them in booking tickets, etc. Since assessee did not deduct tax at source while making payment of commission to travel agents, the Assessing Officer disallowed the amount of Rs. 52.22 lakh u/s. 40(a)(ia).

The CIT(A) held that since the amount of Rs. 52.22 lakh was not received for any services rendered by the assessee to `A’, the amount could not be treated as income of the assessee. Further, since the assessee did not claim the said amount as expenditure in its accounts, no tax was deducted at source by the assessee. Therefore, no disallowance could be made in terms of provisions of section 40(a)(ia).

Held
On further appeal by the Revenue, the Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)’s order. The Tribunal noted as under :

1. As is evident from the terms and conditions of the consortium agreement, the payment by the assessee to other consortium members is not voluntary. The assessee is under a legal obligation in terms of the agreement to pay the amount to other consortium members in accordance with settled terms.
2. There is nothing to suggest that the assessee rendered any service to `A’. It is the settled legal position that income accrues when an enforceable debt is created in favour of an assessee. In other words, income accrues when the assessee acquires the right to receive the same. The terms of the consortium agreement do not reveal any such right in favour of assessee. Income of Rs. 52.22 lakh rightfully belonged to the other consortium members to whom the amount was distributed by the assessee.
3. Since the assessee only distributed the income in terms of the agreement and this did not amount to incurring of an expenditure nor did the assessee claim any expenditure, there was no infirmity in the findings of the CIT(A) in deleting the disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia).

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TDS: Section 194C: A. Y. 2005-06: Contract for purchase of natural gas: Transportation charges paid to seller: Transportation part of sale transaction: No works contract or contract for carriage of goods: Section 194C not attracted:

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[CIT Vs. Krishak Bharati Co-operative Ltd.; 349 ITR 68 (Guj): 253 CTR 402 (Guj):]

Assessee was engaged in the manufacture of fertilisers. It consumed natural gas which was supplied by different agencies through pipelines. The Department took the view that the agreement involved works contract for transport of the gas and the assessee was required to deduct tax at source at the appropriate rate u/s. 194C on the transportation charges. The Tribunal held that the assessee did not hire any service of carriage of goods and that, therefore, the case would not fall in clause (c) of Explanation III to section 194C of the Act.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The contract of sale of gas itself envisaged that gas would be supplied by the seller to the assessee at the receiving point of the assessee’s factory. For such purpose, the seller would be laying down its pipelines and other equipment and would maintain such paraphernalia. The seller would also have the right to use such pipelines and equipment for the purpose of distributing gas to other gas consumers. The ownership of the gas was passed on from the seller to the assessee only at the point of delivery and not before.

ii) The agreement essentially was for purchase and sale of gas. Transportation of gas was only a part of the entire sale transaction. The clear understanding of the parties that the ownership of gas would pass on to the buyer at the delivery point, showed that the transport of gas by the seller was a step towards execution of contract for sale of gas and there was no contract for carriage of goods.

iii) Thus the case was not covered u/s. 194C. The transportation charges did not depend on the consumption of quantity of gas but were a fixed monthly charges to be borne by the assessee as part of the agreement between the parties. Therefore, the application of section 194C did not arise.”

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Sections 2(24) read with sections 4 and 28(i) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 – Amount realised on sale of carbon credits is a Capital Receipt and it cannot be taxed as a Revenue Receipt.

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2. (2013) 151 TTJ 616 (Hyd.)
My Home Power Ltd. vs. Dy.CIT
ITA No.1114 (Hyd.) of 2009
A.Y.:2007-08. Dated: 02.11.2012

Sections 2(24) read with sections 4 and 28(i) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 – Amount realised on sale of carbon credits is a Capital Receipt and it cannot be taxed as a Revenue Receipt.

For the relevant assessment year, the amount realised by the assessee from sale of carbon credits was treated by the Assessing Officer and the CIT(A) as a revenue receipt and not a capital receipt.

The Tribunal, relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Maheshwari Devi Jute Mills Ltd. (1965) 57 ITR 36 (SC), held that sale of carbon credits is to be considered as a capital receipt.

The Tribunal held as under :

Carbon credit is in the nature of “an entitlement” received to improve world atmosphere and environment by reducing carbon, heat and gas emissions. It is not generated or created due to carrying on business but it is accrued due to “world concern”. It has been made available assuming character of transferable right or entitlement only due to world concern.

Further, carbon credits cannot be considered as a by-product. It is a credit given to the assessee under the Kyoto Protocol and because of international understanding. The persons having carbon credits get benefit by selling the same to a person who needs carbon credits to overcome one’s negative point carbon credit. Carbon credit is entitlement or accretion of capital and, hence, income earned on sale of these credits is capital receipt.

Thus, the amount received for carbon credits has no element of profit or gain and it cannot be subjected to tax in any manner under any head on income. It is not liable for tax for the assessment year under consideration in terms of sections 2(24), 28, 45 and 56.

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Income: Interest: Accrual: A. Y. 1992-93: Assessee-company promoted by State Government: Amount received from Government towards share capital: Interest earned on short term deposits: Agreement that interest would belong to Government: Interest not assessable in hands of assessee:

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Gujarat Power Corporation Ltd. vs. ITO; 354 ITR 201 (Guj):

The assessee was promoted by the Government of Gujarat and the Gujarat Electricity Board to augment power generating capacity in the State of Gujarat. The Gujarat Government sanctioned a sum of Rs. 5 crore towards equity share capital. It was agreed that, pending the allotment of shares whatever income was earned by way of interest by the assessee would belong to the Government of Gujarat. In the accounting year relevant to the A. Y. 1992-93, the assessee earned interest of Rs. 53.92 lakh from such short-term deposits. The assessee claimed that the interest amount belonged to the State Government and accordingly was not assessable in its hands. The Assessing Officer did not accept the contention and assessed the interest in the hands of the assessee. The Tribunal confirmed the addition.

On appeal by the assessee, the Gujarat High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) Merely because the initial agreement between the parties did not make any provision with respect to the treatment of such interest, that would not be sufficient to change the nature and basic character of such income. In the absence of specific stipulation to the contrary, such interest must be treated to be held by the assessee in trust for the Government.

ii) Further, on 17th September, 1992, the Government of Gujarat and the assessee after due deliberation, agreed that the best solution would be to transfer such income to the Government. The amounts were not assessable in the hands of the assessee.”

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Income: Accrual: S/s. 5 and 145: A. Y. 1989-90 and 1990-91: Assessee selling lottery tickets to stockists subject to return of unsold tickets before one day of draw: Income on sale of tickets accrues on the date of draw:

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CIT vs. K. & Co.: 259 CTR 398 (Del):

The assessee was engaged in the business of printing of lottery tickets and organising lotteries on behalf of, inter alia, the Government of Sikkim. The following question of law was raised by the Revenue in appeal before the Delhi High Court:

“Whether, on the facts and the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in law in holding that the tickets sent to the stockists do not become a sale on their dispatch but assumes the character of a sale on the happening of various events including the draw taking place?”

According to the Revenue, the moment the assessee dispatches the tickets to its stockists, a sale takes place. Therefore, the fact that the tickets were sent to the stockists within the accounting year would mean that the sales had been finalised during that year. It is also the contention of the revenue that it is irrelevant as to when the draw actually takes place.

The High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) After going through the agreement, the Tribunal had observed that the arrangement by which the assessee sent tickets to the stockists who in turn sold the same to their agents did not indicate that the sale took place at the point of dispatch of tickets to the stockists. We also notice that the unsold tickets are to be returned to the organising agent of the assessee at least one day before the actual date of the draw and any tickets received thereafter would not be accepted and treated as sold by the stockists.

ii) This makes it clear that those tickets which are returned by the stockists cannot be treated as having been sold. The corollary to this is that mere dispatch of tickets to the stockists would not entail a sale. It is only those dispatches of tickets which are not returnable in the manner indicated as above which would be recorded as sales.

iii) Thus, till the date of the draw or just prior to the date of the draw it cannot be ascertained as to whether the dispatched tickets were actually sold or not.

iv) We, therefore, agree with the view taken by Tribunal and, consequently, decide this question in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.”

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Charitable purpose: Educational institution: Exemption u/s. 11 r.w.s. 13: A. Ys. 1998-99 to 2002-03: CBSE denied recognition to SSSPL being a corporate entity and insisted for a society structure: Assessee society formed by SSSPL was granted recognition by CBSE: Assessee running educational institution in the set up of SSSPL: Paid rent and royalty to SSSPL: No violation of section 13: Assessee entitled to exemption u/s. 11:

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Chirec Education Society vs. Asst. DIT; 354 ITR 605 (AP):

CBSE denied recognition to SSSPL, which established a corporate run school, on the ground that the school was run by a private limited company and insisted that a properly registered society of non-proprietary character was required to be constituted. Thereafter, SSSPL formed the assessee society. It took on lease, premises belonging to SSSPL. It was granted affiliation by the CBSE. It paid rent for the building and playground that belonged to SSSPL and royalty for using its name. The Assessing Officer denied exemption u/s. 11, on the ground that SSSPL was taking out huge receipts of the assessee in the shape of rent and royalty which has the effect of violating section 13(1)(c). The Tribunal upheld the disallowance of the claim for exemption.

On appeal by the assessee, the Andhra Pradesh High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) If the assessee had taken the infrastructure and the trade name of somebody, other than SSSPL, it could not be disputed that the assessee would incur similar expenditure like the one being paid to SSSPL towards royalty as no reasonable man would transfer user rights of name and other benefits without charging adequate consideration. Merely because such facility was provided by SSSPL and royalty was being paid to it by the assessee in that behalf, the Revenue could not contend that it was impermissible.

ii) Therefore, the Revenue’s contention that this amounted to diversion of funds by the assessee to SSSPL and clause (g) of s/s. (2) of section 13 was attracted was misconceived since the payment of royalty was necessary to secure the use of trade name and infrastructure of SSSPL.

iii) Merely because the assessee was registered by SSSPL to run the school after SSSPL’s application for approval was rejected by the CBSE, it could not be said that the assessee’s payment by way of royalty to SSSPL was prohibited and consequently the assessee shall be deprived of exemption u/s. 11. The assessee was entitled to the benefit of section 11.”

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Capital gain: Exemption u/s. 54F: A. Y. 2007- 08: Sale of agricultural land and residential house on 20-06-2006: No deposit in capital gains account: Paid substantial amount and took possession of residential house on 30- 03-2008: Paid balance amount of Rs. 24 lakh on 23-04-2008: Assessee entitled to exemption u/s. 54F:

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CIT vs. Jagtar Singh Chawla: 259 CTR 388 (P&H):

On 20-06-2006, the assessee sold an agricultural land and a residential house for Rs. 2,16,00,000/- and Rs. 8,25,000/- respectively. In the A. Y. 2007- 08, the Assessing Officer disallowed the assessee’s claim for exemption of long-term capital gain of Rs. 76,85,829/- on the ground that the sale proceeds were not deposited in the specified capital gains account before the due date for filing the return u/s. 139(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The assessee claimed that on 20-06-2006 itself the assessee had written a letter to the bank to deposit the said amount in the capital gains account, but the said amount was deposited in a “flexi general account”, which is a saving as well as fixed deposit account. Assessee purchased a residential house from the sale proceeds and took possession on 30-03-008. A substantial amount was paid before 31-03-2008 and the balance amount of Rs. 24 lakh was paid on 23- 04-2008. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim on the ground that the assessee has purchased the residential house within the period prescribed for filing return of income u/s. 139 of the Act.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Punjab and Haryana High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal, and held as under:

“i) In the present case, the assesee has proved the payment of substantial amount of sale consideration for purchase of a residential property on or before 31-03-2008, i.e. within the extended period of limitation of filing of return. Only a sum of Rs. 24 lakh was paid out of total sale consideration of Rs. 2 crore on 23-04-2008, though possession was delivered to the assessee on execution of the power of attorney on 30-03- 2008.

ii) Since the assessee has acquired a residential house before the end of the next financial year in which sale has taken place, therefore, the assessee is not liable to pay any capital gains tax. Such is the view taken by the Tribunal.

iii) In view of the above, we do not find any merit in the present appeal. Hence, the same is dismissed.”

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Appeal before Tribunal: Agricultural land: Capital asset: S/s.2(14) and 253: A. Ys. 2008- 09 and 2009-10: AO did not doubt the land being used for agriculture: Tribunal did not consider the ground taken by the Revenue that the land is not agricultural land: Tribunal was right in doing so:

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CIT vs. Nirmal Bansal; 215 Taxman 693 (Del): 33 taxman. com 511 (Del):

The assessee sold different plots of land, which were claimed to be agricultural land, situated at distance of more than 8 kms. from municipal limits. In support of his contention, the assessee furnished certificate of Tehsildar and letter of District Town Planner stating that the land was situated beyond 8 kms from Municipal Committee. However, the Assessing Officer did not accept the contention of the assessee that it was not a capital asset u/s. 2(14) (iii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, taking a view that there was possibility of some other shorter distance between the plots of land and the municipal limits, being less than 8 kms. The Commissioner (Appeals) allowed assessee’s claim. The Tribunal upheld the order of Commissioner (Appeals).

In appeal by the Revenue, it contended by the Revenue that the Tribunal did not consider the question raised by the revenue that the lands in question were not agricultural lands at all. The Delhi High Court dismissed the appeal and held as under:

“i) The Tribunal noted that the Assessing Officer had made the disallowance merely on the ground that there was the possibility of a shorter distance, which would be less than 8 kms from the outer limits of the municipal corporation. The Tribunal noted that the Assessing Officer had not doubted the nature of the land being for agriculture. It was in these circumstances that the Tribunal rejected the plea of the revenue that the matter be restored to the file of the Commissioner (Appeals) for verification of the fact as to whether the lands were agricultural in nature or not.

ii) The decision in National Thermal Power Co. Ltd. vs. CIT [1998] 229 ITR 383 (SC) would be of no assistance to the revenue. In the said decision it has been clearly noted that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to examine a question of law which arose from the facts as found by the Income-tax authorities and which had a bearing on the tax liability of the assessee. The point to be noted is that the question of law which could be raised before the Tribunal would have to arise from the facts as found by the Income-tax authorities.

iii) In the present case, the Assessing Officer had not doubted the fact that the lands in question were agricultural in nature. There was no foundational fact that the lands were not agricultural in nature. As such the plea raised by the revenue before the Tribunal could not be gone into by the Tribunal as there was no foundational basis for the same. Clearly, the decision in National Thermal Power Co. Ltd. (supra) would be of no avail to the revenue in the facts of the present case.

iv) In view of the foregoing, no interference is called for with the impugned order of the Tribunal. The appeals are dismissed.”

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A Singapore resident company had a PE in India, which provided information available in public domain to subscribers. The AO held that the income was FTS under the Income-tax Act and taxable on gross basis and not on net basis as claimed by the taxpayer u

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New Page 1

Part C : Tribunal & AAR International Tax Decisions


1 2010 TII 72 ITAT-Mum.-Intl.

JCIT v. Telerate

Article 7(3), 12 of India-Singapore DTAA;

S. 9(1)(vii) of Income-tax Act

A.Y. : 1997-98. Dated : 18-2-2010

 

A Singapore resident company had a PE in India, which
provided information available in public domain to subscribers. The AO held that
the income was FTS under the Income-tax Act and taxable on gross basis and not
on net basis as claimed by the taxpayer under DTAA. The Tribunal held that the
assessee can choose between DTAA and the Income-tax Act and tax authority cannot
thrust provisions of the Income-tax Act unless they are more beneficial.

Facts :

The taxpayer was a company resident in Singapore (‘SingCo’).
SingCo had established a branch in India which was a PE in terms of Article
5(2)(b) of India-Singapore DTAA. SingCo was engaged in collecting and
disseminating information on financial, derivatives and commodities market,
which was available in public domain. The information was transmitted to
subscribers of Indian branch office on continuous basis through telephone lines
or V-Sat.

The AO held that SingCo was rendering technical services and
therefore, its income was ‘fees for technical services’ u/s.9(1)(vii) of the
Income-tax Act. The AO further held that notwithstanding provisions of Article
12(6) of DTAA, which envisages taxing FIS of PE as business profits under
Article 7(3), income should be computed in terms of S. 44D of the Income-tax Act
and consequently, income should be taxed on gross basis @ 24% in terms of S.
115A of the Income-tax Act.

Held :

The Tribunal observed that the facts were similar to those in
DCIT v. Boston Consulting Group Pte. Ltd., (2005) 94 ITD 31 (Mum.) and relying
on that decision held that :




? If the assessee chooses to be covered by provisions of DTAA, the Revenue
cannot thrust provisions of the Income-tax Act on him;



? Provisions of the Income-tax Act cannot come in to play unless they are
more beneficial;



? Article 12(4)(b) of DTAA does not cover non-technical ‘consultancy
services’.




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Fees received for assistance/services provided to Indian companies to whom loans, etc. are provided by the financial organisation from UK is business income — In absence of PE, is not chargeable to tax in India.

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Part C : Tribunal & AAR International Tax Decisions




JDIT v. M/s. Commonwealth Development Corporation

(2010) TII 102 ITAT-Mum.-Intl.

Article 7, 12(5) & 13 of India-UK DTAA

S. 2(28A) of Income-tax Act

Dated : 25-2-2010

11. Fees received for assistance/services provided
to Indian companies to whom loans, etc. are provided by the financial
organisation from UK is business income — In absence of PE, is not chargeable to
tax in India.

Upfront appraisal fee received by the UK financial
organisation constitutes ‘interest’ in terms of S. 2(28A) of the Income-tax Act
— However, such appraisal fee is not ‘interest’ in terms of India-UK DTAA.

Front-end fee recovered from the investee to whom
debt support is provided, is, ‘interest’, under the Income-tax Act as also DTAA.

Capital gain from transfer of shares in Indian
company is chargeable to tax in India.

Facts :

The assessee, a statutory corporation established
in the UK (CDC) was engaged in the business of providing loans to, and making
investment in shares of, Indian companies. The issue pertained to taxation of
the following four receipts :

(i) Director’s fees received from the Indian
companies for assistance/services rendered by CDC to Indian companies.

(ii) Appraisal fees received by CDC for
determining future profitability and worthiness for projects of Indian company
before CDC disbursed loans by way of convertible bonds, shares or debts to the
Indian Investees.

(iii) Front-end fee claimed to have been charged
for recovering cost of post-appraisal, other than cost of legal documents
which was the obligation of the investee.

(iv) CDC had sold certain shares of an Indian
company which were admittedly held as capital asset. It was the claim of CDC
that shares were held outside India and were sold outside India and hence not
taxable in India.

Held :

The ITAT held that :

  • Having regard to
    the earlier decision of the ITAT in appellant’s own case, assistance provided
    to the investee companies was not in the nature of fees for included services.
    In terms of DTAA, such income would not be taxable in India.



  • Upfront appraisal
    fee was ‘interest’ within the scope of S. 2(28A) of the Income-tax Act. In
    view of ITAT :



  • Upfront appraisal fee
    was charged before advancing loan or making investment of any kind.



  • S. 2(28A) covered
    service fee or other charges for debt incurred. Additionally, it also included
    service fee or other charges in respect of any credit facility which has not
    been utilised.



  • The first limb of
    S. 2(28A) which covered service fee/charge for debt incurred was not attracted
    in the present case as the appraisal fee was recovered even before any debt
    was incurred. However, being service fee for credit facility not utilised,
    such fee was ‘interest’.



  • Though such amount
    was ‘interest’ in term of the Income-tax Act, it was not ‘interest’ under DTAA
    as definition of interest under DTAA is restrictive and covered only income
    from debt claim.



  • Taxpayer’s
    contention that front-end fee is not related to debt investment is not
    acceptable. Front-end fee was charged by the taxpayer only if the investment
    was made in the form of debt and not for investment in the form of equity. No
    information was provided about the services for which front-end fee was
    charged. In the circumstances, the income was regarded as having direct nexus
    with the debt claim. Hence, it was ‘interest’ both in terms of the Income-tax
    Act as also DTAA.



  • Capital gain earned
    by CDC on transfer of shares of an Indian company was chargeable to tax in
    India. The ITAT rejected contention of the taxpayer that such income can be
    regarded as income arising from sale of asset outside India.



  • Share of a company
    represents bundle of rights. Though the shares are freely transferable, a
    contract between transferer and transferee regarding sale of shares is not
    complete till it is approved by the company and change of name in the register
    of a shareholder. The share in a company gives right to the shareholders to
    participate in profits as also in liquidation proceeds. Transfer of shares of
    an Indian company results in transfer of right to property/capital assets
    situated in India, irrespective of where the transfer is effected. In lieu
    thereof, charge to capital gain is attracted in terms of S. 9(1)(i) of
    Income-tax Act, which is not relieved by DTAA.

 

levitra

Compensation received by UK buyer pursuant to arbitration award, on account of failure of Indian entity to meet its export obligation — Business income — In absence of PE, not chargeable to tax in India.

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Part C : Tribunal & AAR International Tax Decisions



Goldcrest Exports v. ITO

(2010) TII 124 ITAT-Mum.-Intl.

Article 5, 7(1) of India-UK DTAA;

S. 9(1) of Income-tax Act

A.Y. : 2005-06. Dated : 7-9-2010

10. Compensation received by UK buyer pursuant to
arbitration award, on account of failure of Indian entity to meet its export
obligation — Business income — In absence of PE, not chargeable to tax in India.

Interest on arbitration award has the same
character as the underlying compensation.

The Indian payer has no obligation to deduct tax at
source.

Facts :

The taxpayer (GCE) was engaged in the business of
export/import and trading in various commodities. Through the involvement of an
Indian broker, GCE entered into contract with the UK buyer (UKCO) for supply of
certain commodities. GCE cancelled the contract. Pursuant to arbitration
proceedings initiated by UKCO, the arbitrators awarded compensation to UKCO. The
compensation was based on the difference between market price of the commodities
agreed to be supplied and the contracted price. GCE was also asked to pay
interest from the date of arbitration award till the date of payment.

GCE made provision in respect of the compensation
and the interest payable and claimed that as business expenditure.

The tax authorities denied the deduction primarily
on the ground that no tax was deducted at source in respect of the provision.

Held :

The ITAT held that :

(i) The compensation was in the nature of
business income as it was arising out of the trading contract between GCE and
UKCO. Hence, it was covered under Article 7 of the DTAA.

(ii) In absence of PE of UKCO in India, there was
no tax liability. Consequently, there was no tax withholding obligation on GCE.
Involvement of an independent agent in India does not alter the position.

(iii) Compensation payable pursuant to
arbitration award loses its original character and assumes the character of a
judgment debt. Interest payable also partakes the character of compensation.

levitra

Interest paid directly to shareholders by taxpayer’s PE is allowable as a deduction while computing taxable profits of PE in India.

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Part C : Tribunal & AAR International Tax Decisions



Besix Kier Dabhol, SA v. DDIT

ITA No. 4249/Mum./07

Article 7(3)(b), of India-Belgium DTAA

S. 36(1)(iii) of Income-tax Act

A.Y. : 2002-03. Datede : 10-11-2010

9. Interest paid directly to shareholders by
taxpayer’s PE is allowable as a deduction while computing taxable profits of PE
in India.

Currently, ITA or DTAA does not contain any
anti-abuse provisions on thin capitalisation. In absence of specific
restriction, deduction of interest on loan paid by taxpayer’s PE to its
shareholders is allowable.

Facts :

The taxpayer, a Belgian company, was constituted as
a joint venture (between Belgium and UK shareholder contributing to equity
capital in 60 : 40 ratio). It was set up for construction of a fuel jetty in
India. The operations were intended to be carried out through the taxpayer’s
project office (PE in terms of Article 5 of DTAA) situated in India. To fund the
project, taxpayer raised debt funds from its two shareholders, in the same ratio
as their equity stake in the JV i.e., 60 : 40. The loan resulted in
significantly high debt-equity ratio of 248 : 1 for the taxpayer.

The taxpayer claimed interest payments on such
borrowed funds as deductible expense in computing profits of PE.

Relying on Article 7(3)(b) of the DTAA, the Tax
Authority, disallowed the interest payments by equating the same to payments
made by a branch to its HO.

Held :

On the following grounds, the ITAT held that
interest paid directly to shareholders would be allowable as a deduction :

(i) The taxable entity is the Belgian company
(i.e., taxpayer) and not the Indian PE, even though tax liability of the
taxpayer is confined to profits attributed to its PE in India.

(ii) The profits attributable to the Indian PE
are required to be computed under normal accounting principles and in terms of
general provisions of the ITA. This accounting approach has been approved by
the Supreme Court in Hyundai Heavy Ind Ltd.2

(iii) Since the only business carried out by the
assessee is the project in India, its entire profits are taxable in India and
all expenses incurred to earn such income are deductible in computing its
taxable income.

(iv) A company and its shareholders have a
separate existence as well as identity and contracts between a company and its
shareholders are just as enforceable as contracts with any independent person.
The limitation contained under Article 7(3)(b) restricts deduction for
interest paid to HO (except for banking companies), unless it is for
reimbursement of actual expenses. In the current case, interest has been paid
to an outside party i.e., shareholders. Hence, the limitation in Article
7(3)(b) cannot apply.

(v) Thin capitalisation rules have been resorted
to by various jurisdictions in order to protect themselves against erosion in
their legitimate tax base by financing a disproportionate ratio of debts.
Belgium also has thin capitalisation rules which restrict interest deduction
if the debt-equity ratio exceeds 1 : 7. In India, the proposed DTC 2010 seeks
to provide for remedial legislative framework to counter erosion of tax base
under General Anti-Avoidance Rules (GAAR) by permitting re-characterisation of
debt into equity. Currently however, India does not have any thin
capitalisation rules and there cannot be adverse implications on that count.

(vi) Merely because a suitable limitation
provision is considered desirable and attempts are being made to legislate
anti-abuse provisions, it would not render the effort to take advantage of
exiting provision of the DTAA illegal.

 

levitra

The Delhi Tribunal in the case of Microsoft Corporation, US & its affiliates (2010 TII 141 ITAT-Del.-Intl.), recently adjudicated on the issue whether the use of or the right to use (including the granting of licence), in respect of computer program, amou

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Part C : Tribunal & AAR International Tax Decisions


 

8. Microsoft Corporation v. ADIT

ITA No 1331 to 1336 of 2008

Article 12(3) of India-US DTAA

S. 9(1)(vi) of Income-tax Act

A.Ys. : 1999-00 to 2004-05. Dated : 26-10-2010

Reliance Industries Ltd.

(2010) TII 154 ITAT-Mum.-Intl.

Article 12(3) of India-US DTAA

S. 9(1)(vi) of Income-tax Act

Dated : 29-10-2010

The Delhi Tribunal in the case of Microsoft
Corporation, US & its affiliates (2010 TII 141 ITAT-Del.-Intl.), recently
adjudicated on the issue whether the use of or the right to use (including the
granting of licence), in respect of computer program, amounts to royalty or
business profits (sale of copyrighted articles). In this case, the software
copies were sold/delivered to Indian distributors, who in turn, sold these
products to re-sellers/end users in India. Microsoft Corporation, being the
registered owner of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) in Microsoft software,
entered into an end-user licence agreement, directly with end-users. The
Tribunal, having regard to various agreements, observed that a copyrighted
article cannot be treated as a product, and the payments made are for the
licence granted in the copyright and other IPRs in the product, and will amount
to ‘royalty’ under the Income-tax Act, 1961 and the India-US tax treaty.

However, in the case of Reliance Industries Ltd, on
the issue of whether consideration paid to a US resident for licensing of
computer software would be in the nature of ‘royalty’, the Mumbai Tribunal held
that the payment was for the purchase of a copyrighted article and not the
copyright itself. Furthermore, the Mumbai Tribunal stated that it is incorrect
to hold that computer software on a media continues to be an intellectual
property right. Therefore, the payment made for the purchase of software cannot
be termed as ‘royalty’.

levitra

Sale of goods to non-AEs cannot be taken as comparable under CUP, if there are significant differences in quantity sold, geography and customer profiles.

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Part C : Tribunal & AAR International Tax Decisions


 

ACIT v. Dufon Laboratories

(2010) TII 26 ITAT-Mum.-TP

S. 92C of Income-tax Act

A.Y. : 2004-05. Dated : 26-3-2010

7. Sale of goods to non-AEs cannot be taken as
comparable under CUP, if there are significant differences in quantity sold,
geography and customer profiles.

Facts :

An Indian company (ICO) was engaged in the business
of processing and export of chemicals. ICO sold majority of its products to its
AE in the USA. A small quantity (constituting about 2.5% of overall sale) was
sold to small enterprises in Asia. The independent parties were small-time
buyers who bought in small quantities for resale to other laboratories. However,
AE in USA purchased large quantities and resold to big corporate houses. Resale
by AE was in the competitive markets of USA and Europe.

The average price charged by ICO to AE worked out
to Rs. 440 per kg. as against the average price of Rs. 617 per kg. charged to
non-AE.

Rejecting the taxpayer’s contention that the sale
price to non-AEs was not the right basis for comparable price, the tax officer
made adjustment by adopting the transfer price based on average realisation from
non-AEs.

Incidentally, the assessee had a profit margin of
about 49% even without taking into account the adjustment, whereas the AE in the
USA had incurred losses.

Held :

Considering the following factors, the ITAT held
that the transaction with AEs was on ALP :

  •   The turnover
    quantity to AEs was more than 50 times that of the non-AEs. Such difference in
    magnitude would have major bearing on the price.


  • In Ranbaxy
    Laboratories Ltd. v. ACIT1, ITAT had held that a particular entity in a
    particular country should be compared with a similar entity in the same
    country as geographical situations would, in several ways, influence transfer
    pricing.


  •   Transactions with
    high-profile clients with which AE dealt were different when compared to small
    sales to non-AEs, who were small players in South East Asian business. Also,
    AEs dealt in competitive market.


  •   The adjustment was
    not justified also on the ground that it resulted in transfer price being
    higher compared to the price recovered by AEs from the independent customers.



levitra

On facts, certain services rendered from outside India were not made available and hence, the consideration was not FIS under Article 12. Also, such offshore services could not be linked to PE in India for determining income attributable to the PE.

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  1. DIT v. Scientific Atlanta Inc.,



(2009) 33 SOT 220 (Mum.)

Articles 7, 12, India-USA DTAA

A.Y. : 1998-99. Dated : 3-7-2009

Issue :

On facts, certain services rendered from outside India were
not made available and hence, the consideration was not FIS under Article 12.
Also, such offshore services could not be linked to PE in India for
determining income attributable to the PE.

Facts :

The appellant was a tax resident of USA. It had entered
into a VSAT Agreement with an Indian company to provide Satellite Network
Communication System together with the installation and commissioning services
associated with the initial installation. During the relevant year, the
appellant earned income from various sources. It furnished item-wise detail of
the income and also the reasons for taxability or non-taxability of such
income. The appellant contended that two items of income – Project Management
& Engineering Support and Factory Acceptance Tax (‘PMES&FT’) were not taxable
because they pertained to the provision of administrative and technical
services from outside India which were provided to facilitate timely execution
of the project. Further, although such services were technical they were not
‘fees for included services’ (‘FIS’) under Article 12 of India-USA DTAA as
they did not make available any technical knowledge, experience, etc. Hence,
the income from these services would qualify as ‘business income’ and would be
governed by Article 7. The appellant stated that even though it had PE in
India for rendering installation services, income from PMES&FT was not
attributable to that PE as the services were not performed in India.

The AO did not accept contentions of the appellant. After
discussing the nature of the services in his order, the AO held that these
‘hybrid services’ were performed by the appellant to provide Satellite Network
Communication System. He further observed that when a series of technical
works/services were performed to achieve a desired result, the nature of such
works/services should be analysed in connection with the end results. He held
that, alternatively, PMES&FT consisted of development and transfer of a
technical plan or technical design. The AO concluded that in either case, the
services were in the nature of FIS subject to Article 12 of India-USA DTAA and
taxable @15%.

In appeal, the CIT(A) held that: the appellant did not make
available technology, skill, etc.; the services were inextricably and
essentially linked to the supply of equipment and should therefore take the
same character as the supply of the equipment. He also noted that since PMES&FT
services were not FIS, the income would be ‘business income’ and under Article
7, only income relatable to PE could be taxed in India. Therefore, he held
that as the services were performed outside India, income from those services
was not attributable to the PE.

Held :

To understand scope and meaning of the term ‘make
available’, the Tribunal referred to the decisions in Intertek Testing
Services India P. Ltd., In re
(2008) 307 ITR 418 (AAR) and Mahindra &
Mahindra Ltd. v. DCIT,
(2009) 30 SOT 374 (Mum.) (SB) and observed that the
AO had interpreted ‘make available’ in an erroneous manner. It held that by
rendering PMES&FT services from outside India, the appellant did not ‘make
available’ any technical knowledge, skill etc. and as such Article 12 did not
apply. Hence, the consideration cannot be treated as FIS.

Where a taxpayer has a PE in India, under Article 7(1),
business profits can be taxed in India only to the extent they are
attributable to the PE in India. As the consideration was received for
rendering services outside no part of the services rendered from outside India
could be linked to the PE in India for determining income attributable to the
PE in India.

 

levitra

Unlike sub-clause (ii), sub-clause (i) of S. 245N(a) does not specifically restrict the scope to the tax liability of a non-resident and hence, advance ruling could also be in relation to a transaction by a non-resident even if it does not involve determi

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  1. Umicore Finance, In re




(2009) 318 ITR 78 (AAR)

S. 245N(a), Income-tax Act

Dated : 7-7-2009

Issue :

Unlike sub-clause (ii), sub-clause (i) of S. 245N(a) does
not specifically restrict the scope to the tax liability of a non-resident and
hence, advance ruling could also be in relation to a transaction by a
non-resident even if it does not involve determination of tax liability of
non-resident.

Facts :

The applicant was a Luxembourg company. It had entered into
a transaction for purchase of the entire equity capital of an Indian company.
The Indian company was originally formed as a partnership and later registered
itself as a company under Part IX of the Companies Act, 1956. In terms of S.
47(xiii) of the Act, if more than 50% of the voting power in the company
continues to be held by the erstwhile partners of the partnership for a period
of not less than 5 years, no capital gain is chargeable. However, pursuant to
the transfer of shares, the erstwhile partners would not have held more than
50% of the shares for a period of not less than 5 years and therefore, the
relevant condition would be violated.

The AAR observed that, prima facie, the
determination sought by the applicant was in relation to the tax liability of
an Indian company and hence, it was doubtful whether the non-resident
applicant can seek advance ruling on this question. In response to the notice
issued by the AAR, the applicant stated that due to certain stipulations in
the Share Purchase Agreement, unless capital gains tax payable by the acquired
Indian company is determined, purchase consideration payable by the applicant
cannot be determined. Further, its obligation to provide the audited financial
statements of the acquired Indian company was also dependent on the
determination of capital gains tax liability. The applicant contended that the
ruling sought was within the definition of ‘advance ruling’ in sub-clause (i)
of S. 245N(a) of the Act.

Held :

In contrast to the language in sub-clause (ii), the
language in sub-clause (i) of S. 245N(a) of the Act is wider. Unlike
sub-clause (ii), sub-clause (i) does not have any specific requirement that
determination should relate to the tax liability of a non-resident. Due to the
stipulations in the Share Purchase Agreement, capital gains tax arising in
case of the acquired Indian company has a direct and substantial impact on the
applicant, the question raised by the applicant falls within the definition of
‘advance ruling’ in S. 245N(a) of the Act.

 

levitra

In view of Explanation 1 in S. 90, higher rate of tax applicable to foreign company cannot be said to be discriminatory.

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  1. JCIT v.
    State Bank of Mauritius Ltd.



(2009 TIOL ITAT Mum.)

S. 37, Income-tax Act;

Articles 7, 24, India-Mauritius DTAA

A.Y. : 1997-98. Dated : 16-10-2009

Issues :


(i) In view of Explanation 1 in S. 90, higher rate of
tax applicable to foreign company cannot be said to be discriminatory.


(ii) In view of absence of ‘subject to limitation under
domestic law’ provision in Article 7(3) of India-Mauritius DTAA, restrictions
under Income tax Act on allowance of travel, entertainment, etc. expenses do
not apply.

Facts :

The appellant was a Mauritius company. It had a PE in
India.

In accordance with the provisions of the Finance Act,
stipulating 55% as the rate of tax applicable to a foreign company, the AO
sought to tax the income of the appellant @ 55%. The appellant contended that
in terms of Article 24, which provides for non-discrimination, its status was
equivalent to domestic company as defined in S. 2(22A) of the Act and hence,
the rate of tax should be 40%, as applicable to a domestic company. However,
relying on the ruling of AAR in Societe Generale (1999) 236 ITR 103 (AAR), the
AO applied tax rate of 55%.

The PE had incurred certain travelling and entertainment
expenditure. While assessing the income, the AO restricted the allowance of
expenditure by applying limitation provisions of S. 37(2) of the Act. The
appellant contended that such restriction cannot be enforced as
India-Mauritius DTAA did not incorporate such restriction.

In appeal, the CIT(A) accepted the contention of the
appellant and upheld that :

(a) The rate of tax applicable to the income of the
appellant should be the same as that applicable to a domestic company and

(b) The restriction u/s.37(2) cannot be enforced.


Held :

On appeal by the department, the ITAT held as under :

(i) Applicable rate of tax :

The Finance Act 2001 inserted Explanation 1 in S. 90 with
retrospective effect from 1st April 1962. The said Explanation provides that
in case of a foreign company, the charge of tax at a rate higher than that in
case of a domestic company shall not be regarded as less favourable. In
Chohung Bank v. DDIT,
(2006) 102 ITD 45 (Mum.), the Tribunal has also
taken similar view. Following the said decision and the amended S. 90, the
rate of tax should be the higher rate applicable to a foreign company.

(ii) As regards limitation on allowance of
expenditures :


Unlike the ‘subject to the limitations of the taxation laws
of that Contracting State’ provision normally incorporated in Article 7 of
most DTAAs, Article 7(3) of India-Mauritius DTAA does not incorporate such
restriction. Therefore, restriction provided in S. 37(2) of the Act cannot be
enforced. The ITAT took note of provision of India France treaty to conclude
that restriction of income computation as per provisions of the Act needs to
be specifically agreed upon.


levitra

No expenditure/allowance can be deducted from royalty/FTS income earned by non resident pursuant to agreement entered into prior to 1st April 2003.

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  1. DDIT v. Pipeline Engineering GmbH (2009) 125
    TTJ 534 (Mum.)



S. 44D, S. 44DA, S. 115A, Income-tax Act;

Articles 7, 12, India-Germany DTAA

A.Y. : 2000-01 & 2001-02. Dated : 19-12-2008

Issues :


(i) No expenditure/allowance can be deducted from
royalty/FTS income earned by non resident pursuant to agreement entered into
prior to 1st April 2003.


(ii) S. 44DA does not have retrospective effect.


(iii) Authority to read down a provision vests only in a
High Court or Supreme Court.


(iv) As Article 12(5) [dealing with royalty/FTS
effectively connected with PE] excludes applicability of Article 12(1) and
(2), cap on rate of tax in Article 12(2) cannot apply.

Facts :


The appellant was a German company, and also a tax resident
of Germany. It was engaged in the business of providing engineering
consultancy services for oil and gas pipelines transmission systems. The
appellant had set up a PE in India. It entered into an agreement with an
Indian company for providing consultancy services. The agreement was entered
into before April 1, 2003
1.
Pursuant to the agreement, the appellant had earned royalty/fees for technical
services (‘FTS’) through its PE in India. The appellant had offered entire
income for tax in terms of S. 44D of the Act without claiming deduction of any
expenses. In the subsequent year, the appellant claimed that in terms of
Article 12(2) of India-Germany DTAA, tax should be chargeable @10% instead of
20% and further that the income should be computed after deduction of expenses
incurred by the PE. It also claimed that although the fees were within the
scope of Article 12, by virtue of Article 12(5), they should be treated as
business profits and subjected to Article 7. Thus, the income should be
computed after allowing expenses of the PE.

The AO concluded that the allowance of expenditure of PE
was subject to S. 44D of the Act and hence no deduction could be allowed.
Further, in terms of S. 115A, the income should be taxable @20%. The CIT(A)
upheld the Order of the AO.

Before the Tribunal, the appellant contended that :



  •  As the
    taxpayer had incurred loss in its Indian operations carried through PE, as
    per Article 7(3) of India-Germany DTAA read with S. 44D and S. 115A of the
    Act, its income cannot be taxed @20% of the gross receipts.



  •  If
    Article 7(3) is applied, actual expenses incurred for earning income should
    be allowed and hence question of invoking S. 44D cannot arise.



  •  Once the
    income is to be computed as business profits, provisions of S. 44D relating
    to royalty would not apply.



  •  The
    intention of insertion of S. 44DA was to harmonise the provisions of the Act
    and the DTAA, to bring non-resident on par with resident as regards taxation
    of royalty or FTS. S. 44DA is a clarificatory provision to be applied
    retrospectively.



  •  The
    taxpayer had choice of being assessed as per Article 12, in which case, the
    gross receipts would be taxed @10% without deduction of any expenditure.



Held :


(i) Allowance of expenses and deductions :


S. 44D as amended was applicable for computing royalty or
FTS received by the non-resident in pursuance of an agreement made before 1st
April 2003. The non-obstante clause in S. 44D(b) specifically provides that no
expenditure or allowance shall be allowed while computing income by way of
royalty or FTS. Hence, no deduction would be allowed even if the income is to
be computed under Article 7 of DTAA which requires computation of income to be
done in accordance with provisions of the Act.

(ii) Reading down the provisions of S. 44D :


The theory of reading down the provisions of the statute
can be applied only when such provision is violative of fundamental right.
Only the High Court or the Supreme Court can decide such issue and, if
necessary, apply the theory of reading down.

(iii) S. 44DA being clarificatory and having retrospective effect :


The Finance Act 2003 completely changed the scheme of
taxation of royalty or FTS. Hence, provisions of S. 44DA cannot be regarded as
clarificatory.

(iv) Non-discrimination article and its impact :


Article 24 of India-Germany DTAA is in two parts. The first
part provides that income of non-resident through a PE shall not be less
favourably taxed than that of a resident. The second part of Article 24 carves
out an exception to provide that limitation on deductibility of expenses in
computation of PE profit in accordance with provisions of the Act is not
protected by non discrimination article. As a result, Article 24(2) does not
affect operation of S. 44D of the Act.

(v) Applicable rate of tax :


As the recipient has PE in India and as income is
effectively connected with PE in India, such income is covered by provisions
of Article 12(5). In such situation, royalties or FTS received by non-resident
would be governed by Article 7 and paragraphs (1) and (2) of Article 12 are
expressly made non-applicable. The income is therefore to be treated as
business profits to be computed as per domestic law. Once paragraph (5) of
Article 12 excludes applicability of paragraphs (1) & (2), the cap in respect
of rate of tax in paragraph (2) cannot be applied. Hence, in terms of S. 115A,
the applicable rate of tax would be 20%.


Interest on fully convertible bonds till date of conversion, taxable in India as interest.

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Part C — International Tax Decisions



7 LMN India Limited


In re
[No. 769 of 2007] (AAR)

S. 2(28A), S. 90 of IT Act; Article 11 of India-USA DTAA

Dated : 10-10-2008

Issue :

Interest paid to a non-resident investor on fully and
compulsorily convertible bonds till the date of conversion is taxable in India
as interest.

Facts :

The applicant, a non-banking financial company of India, had
issued fully convertible bonds to LMCC of USA.

As per the Bond Subscription Agreement :

(a) The bonds were convertible into equity shares at the
end of five years from the date of issue.

(b) Interest was payable on the bonds on half-yearly basis,
irrespective of whether the applicant made profits or not.

(c) Until conversion, the bonds were to be treated as debt
instruments.

(d) The bonds ranked in priority to equity shares in the
event of winding-up/liquidation of the applicant-company.

(e) Upon conversion, the equity shares issued were to rank
pari passu with the existing equity shares.


The basic issue before the AAR was about tax implications and
consequential withholding tax obligation in respect of interest paid/payable to
the investor up to the date of conversion of bonds into equity shares.

Held :

Payment made to LMCC of USA up to the date of conversion of
bonds into equity shares was held to be interest in terms of definition of
‘interest’ u/s. 2(28A) of the IT Act as well as under the India-USA DTAA.

The AAR noted that under the IT Act, the term ‘interest’ is
defined in a broad manner to include interest payable in any manner in respect
of any moneys borrowed or debt incurred. Under the India-USA DTAA, it is defined
to mean income from debt claims of every kind, including income from bonds or
debentures.

Payment of interest pre-supposes borrowal of money or the
incurring of a debt. Raising of funds by means of fully convertible debenture is
a well-known commercial and business practice. Debenture creates or recognises
existence of a debt which remains to be so till it is repaid or discharged.

The convertibility of debentures does not affect its
characteristic feature of being a debt. The AAR held that conversion was the
mode of discharging the debentures and the debt would be extinguished on handing
over the fully-paid equity shares at the agreed price and at the agreed time to
the bondholder. The Supreme Court’s decisions in the case of CWT v. Spencer &
Co.,
(1973) 88 ITR 429 (SC) and Eastern Investments Ltd. v. CIT,
(1951) 20 ITR 1 (SC) were relied upon to support the proposition.

levitra

Pilot Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. ITO ITAT Mumbai `C’ Bench Before Rajendra Singh (AM) and Vivek Varma (JM) ITA No. 5307/Mum/2011 A.Y.: 2007-08. Dated: 21-11-2012. Counsel for assessee/revenue: Uttamchand Bothra / Vijay Kumar Jaiswal

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6. Pilot Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. ITO
ITAT  Mumbai `C’ Bench
Before Rajendra Singh (AM) and Vivek Varma (JM)
ITA No. 5307/Mum/2011
A.Y.: 2007-08.  Dated: 21-11-2012.
Counsel for assessee/revenue: Uttamchand Bothra / Vijay Kumar Jaiswal

S/s 44AB, 271B – In case of an assessee following project completion method, advance received which is required to be adjusted against future income cannot be considered as gross receipt of business or turnover. Bonafide belief constitutes reasonable cause for non levy of penalty.

Facts:

The assessee company was engaged in business of construction. It was following project completion method of accounting. In respect of a SRA project taken up by the assessee, it had received a booking advance of Rs. 11.25 crore from M/s Welspun Gujarat Stahi Robern Ltd. The advance was subsequently returned in 2010 since the property had several encroachments.

The assessee did not get its accounts audited as required u/s. 44AB of the Act since it was of the view that the provisions of section 44AB would apply only when sales, turnover or gross receipts exceed Rs 40 lakh. Since the assessee had only received an advance which was later refunded and the assessee was following project completion method and the sales would be accounted in the year of completion of the project.

The Assessing Officer (AO) relying on the decision of Lucknow Bench of ITAT in the case of Gopal Krishan Builders (91 ITD 124) levied penalty u/s. 271B of the Act. Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:

The Tribunal noted that the assessee was following project completion method, the advance received has been subsequently returned, the project in respect of which advance was received had not commenced even when the matter was being heard by the Tribunal. It also noted that section 44AB applies only when sales, turnover or gross receipts of business exceed Rs. 40 lakh. The amount of advance received was only from one party and also this advance was subsequently returned.

The Tribunal relying on the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Dinesh Kumar Goel (239 ITR 46) held that the advance received which is required to be adjusted against future income cannot be considered as gross receipt of business or turnover. The decision of the Lucknow Bench of Tribunal in the case of Gopal Krishan (supra) cannot be followed in view of the decision of the Delhi High Court in Dinesh Kumar Goel. Moreover, the issue being debatable, the plea of the assessee that it was of the view that books were not required to be audited u/s 44AB has to be considered as bonafide. Bonafide belief constitutes a reasonable cause.

The Tribunal set aside the order of CIT(A) and deleted the penalty levied.

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ITO vs. Bajaj Bhavan Owners Premises C.S.L. ITAT Mumbai `B’ Bench Before B. R. Mittal (JM) and Rajendra (AM) ITA Nos. 8067/M/2011 A.Y.: 2007-08. Decided on: 18th April, 2013. Counsel for revenue/assessee: Manjunath Karkihalli/M. A. Gohel

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Section 22 – Rental receipts for letting out of
terrace for erecting of antenna are chargeable to tax under the head
`Income from House Property’ subject to deductions u/s 24.


Facts:

The
assessee had received Rs. 16,39,284 as rent for letting out terrace of
the building to six parties including Bharati Airtel, Hathway, etc. The
amount of rent was claimed to be chargeable to tax under the head
`Income from House Property’ subject to deduction u/s. 24(a). The
Assessing Officer (AO) relying on the decision of the Calcutta High
Court in the case of Model Manufacturing Co. Pvt. Ltd. (175 ITR 374)
held that the amounts received by the assessee from six parties was
chargeable under the head `Income from Other Sources’ and not `Income
from House Property’ as returned. He did not allow any deduction u/s. 57
of the Act.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to
CIT(A) who following the order of ITAT for earlier years for the same
issue in assessee’s own case held that rental of terrace has to be
assessed under the head `Income from House Property’ subject to
deduction u/s. 24.

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The Tribunal noted the following observations made by the `B’ Bench of
the Tribunal while deciding the appeals for the AY 2001-02, 2002-03 and
2003- 04 (ITA/5048/Mum/2004, 1433/Mum/2007 and 1434/ Mum/2007) in
assessee ‘s own case –

“35. Ground No. 5, 6,7 and 8 are against the sustenance of addition of rental income Rs. 5,93,700 as income from other sources.

36.
The brief facts of the above issue are that it was found by the
Assessing Officer that the assessee has allowed M/s. Hutchison Max
Telecom Ltd. to erect the tower on their terrace in consideration of an
amount of Rs. 5,93,700 and claimed as income from house property subject
to deduction u/s. 24 of the Act. However, the Assessing Officer while
observing that the assessee’s society has not provided any house
property to the company and it is only the open terrace which has been
let out, treated the same as assessable under the head income from other
sources without allowing any expenditure in this regard. On appeal the
ld. CIT(A) while confirming the Assessing Officer’s action treating the
income from other sources directed the Assessing Officer to allow 20% of
the gross receipts as expenses to earn such income.

39. After
carefully hearing the submissions of the rival parties and perusing the
material available on record we find that the facts are not in dispute.
We further find that in the case of Sharda Chamber Premises vs. ITO in
ITA No. 1234/M/08 dated 01-09-2009 for Assessment Year 2003-04 in which
JM was one of the party, on the similar facts, the Tribunal after
considering the decision in ITO vs. Cuffe Parade Sainara Premises
Co-operative Society Ltd. 7225/Mum/05 dated 28th April, 2008 for
Assessment Year 2002-03 and also the decision in the case of Sohan vs.
ITO (1986) 16 ITD 272 supra has held vide para 6 and 7 of its order
dated 01-09-2009 as under:

“6. We have carefully considered the
submissions of the rival parties and perused the material available on
record. We find merit in the plea of the ld. Counsel fo the assessee
that in the case of M/s. Dalamal House Commercial Complex Premises
Co-operative Society Ltd., the Tribunal while admitting the additional
ground being a legal issue has also held that the letting out of the
terrace, erection of antenna and income derived from letting out has to
be taxed as `income from house property’ and not as `income from other
sources’. The Tribunal while deciding the issue has followed the order
of the Tribunal in the case of M/s. Cuffe Parade Sainara Premises Co-op.
Society Ltd. (supra).

7. In the absence of any distinguishing
feature brought on record by the revenue we, respectfully following the
order of the Tribunal (supra) and keeping in view the consistency while
admitting the additional ground taken by the assessee hold that the
letting out of terrace has to be assessed under the head `income from
house property’ as against `income from other sources’ assessed by the
Assessing Officer and also allow deduction provided u/s. 24 of the Act
and accordingly the additional ground taken by the assessee is allowed.”

Respectfully following the order of the Tribunal supra, we are
of the view that the letting out of terrace has to be assessed under the
head income from house property subject to deduction u/s. 24 of the Act
as against income from other sources assessed by the Assessing Officer.
We hold and order accordingly. The grounds taken by the assessee are
therefore allowed.”

Following the above mentioned observations, the Tribunal decided the issue in favor of the assessee.

The appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed.

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Bhawanji Kunverji Haria vs. ACIT ITAT Mumbai `B’ Bench Before B. R. Mittal (JM) and N. K. Billaiya (AM) ITA No. 5642/Mum/2011 A.Y.: 2008-09. Decided on: 23rd April, 2013. Counsel for assessee/revenue: G. C. Lalka/ Roopak Kumar

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Section 22 – Notional income in respect of property belonging to the assessee, but used by the firm in which the assessee is a partner, is not chargeable to tax under the head `Income from House Property’.

Facts:

The property of the assessee, located at Mahavir Market, Navi Mumbai, was utilised by the firm M/s Lakhmichand Cooverji & Co., in which assessee was a partner. The Assessing Officer (AO) charged to tax notional income in respect of this property. Accordingly, a sum of Rs. 1,68,000 was added to total income of the assessee.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:

The Tribunal noted that the issue was covered in favour of the assessee by the order of the Tribunal in the assessee’s own case for AY 2006-07 vide ITA No. 4032/Mum/2009. It noted the following observations in the said order –

“On the second issue of notional income in respect of property located at Mahalaxmi Market, Navi Mumbai. The Learned Counsel relied upon the decision of the CIT vs. Rabindranath Bhol (Ori) (1995) 211 ITR 299, in which on identical facts, the Hon’ble High Court of Orissa has held that the income from the house property owned by the assessee’s partner and used in the business carried out in the partnership firm in which the assessee is a partner would qualify for exemption u/s 22(2) (sic 22). We find that the facts of the present appeal are identical with the facts in as much as in the present appeal also the property of the assessee is being used by the firm in which the assessee is also a partner. Respectfully following the decision of the Hon’ble High Court, the addition of Rs.1,68,000 is deleted.”

Since the facts were identical the Tribunal deleted the addition made by the AO.

The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

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(2013) 84 DTR 383 (Pune) Ramsukh Properties vs. DCIT A.Y.: 2007-08 Dated: 25.7.2012

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Section 80-IB(10) – Assessee is entitled to deduction in respect of completed flats if the entire project could not be completed due to reasons beyond his control

Facts:

The assessee claimed a deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) in respect of a project consisting of six buildings and 205 flats although the completion certificate was obtained only for 173 flats within the statutory time period. The assessee contended that 85% of the project was completed within statutory time period and revenue was fully booked in accordance with the project completion method of accounting. The latecompletion was due to the fact that the assessee submitted certain modifications/rectifications for the top floors of the buildings. The said revision could not be completed as the Pune Municipal Corporation could not approve the modification as their files had been taken over by the CID for investigation under ULC Act by the Government of Maharashtra. The Assessing Officer rejected the claim of deduction on account of violation of basic condition of completing the construction within the given time period and even an alternative plea of the assessee to allow the proportionate deduction.

Held:

In case such a contingency emerges which makes the compliance with provision impossible, then the benefit bestowed on an assessee cannot be completely denied. Such liberal interpretation should be used in favour of assessee when he is incapacitated in completing project in time for the reasons beyond his control. The assessee was prevented by sufficient reasonable cause which compelled the impossibility on part of the assessee to have completion certificate in time. It is settled legal position that the law always give remedy and the law does wrong to no one. Plain reading of section 80-IB(10) suggests about only completion of construction and no adjective should be used along with the word ‘completion’. This strict interpretation should be given in normal circumstances. However, in this case, assessee was prevented by reasonable cause to complete construction in time due to intervention of CID action on account of violation of provisions of Urban Land Ceiling Act applicable to land in question. Assessee should not suffer for same. The revision of plan is vested right of assessee which cannot be taken away by strict provisions of statute. The taxing statute granting incentives for promotion of growth and development should be construed liberally and that provision for promoting economic growth has to be interpreted liberally. At the same time, restriction thereon too has to be construed strictly so as to advance the object of provision and not to frustrate the same. The provisions of taxing statute should be construed harmoniously with the object of statue to effectuate the legislative intention. In view of above facts and circumstances, it was held that assessee is entitled for benefit u/s. 80-IB(10) in respect of 173 flats completed before prescribed limit.
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(2013) 84 DTR 271 (Mum) SKOL Breweries Ltd vs. ACIT A.Y.: 2007-08 Dated: 18.1.2013

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Section 40(a)(i) – Provisions of section 40(a)(i) are not attracted to the claim of depreciation and licence fee for using computer software which falls under Explanation 4 to section 9(1)(vi)

Facts:
During the relevant assessment year, the assessee made payments to a foreign company for acquiring its trade name. The amount so paid was capitalised and depreciation was claimed in respect of it. The Assessing Officer held that the payment made by the assessee for acquisition of trademarks though capitalised by the assessee company in the books of account, the said payment attracted provisions of section 195. Since, assessee failed to deduct tax at source while making said payment, it was disallowed u/s. 40(a)(i).

Held:
There is a difference between the expenditure and other kind of deduction. The other kind of deduction which includes any loss incidental to carrying on the business, bad debts etc., which are deductible items itself not because an expenditure was laid out and consequentially any sum has gone out; on the contrary the expenditure results a certain sums payable and goes out of the business of the assessee. The sum, as contemplated u/s. 40(a)(i) is the outgoing amount and therefore, necessarily refers to the outgoing expenditure. Depreciation is a statutory deduction and after the insertion of Explanation 5 to section 32, it is obligatory on the part of the Assessing Officer to allow the deduction of depreciation on the eligible asset irrespective of any claim made by the assessee. Therefore, depreciation is a mandatory deduction on the asset which is wholly or partly owned by the assessee and used for the purpose of business or profession which means the depreciation is a deduction for an asset owned by the assessee and used for the purpose of business and not for incurring of any expenditure. The deduction u/s. 32 is not in respect of the amount paid or payable which is subjected to TDS; and therefore, the provisions of section 40(a)(i) are not attracted on such deduction.

Facts:

The assessee made payment to a group company towards software license fees. The Assessing Officer opined that the payment made by the assessee to the group company was royalty and thereby attracting the provisions of section 195 failure of which attracted the provisions of section 40(a)(i). Accordingly, the Assessing Officer disallowed the said amount.

Held:

It is clear from the Clause A of Explanation to section 40(a)(i), the meaning of the royalty for the purpose of section 40 has to be taken as given in the Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vi). It is also clear from the Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vi) that the payment for transfer of any right to use computer software does not fall within the meaning of royalty. Rather, the payment for transfer of right for use or right to use of computer software has been defined as royalty under Explanation 4. When the royalty for transfer of right to use of computer software does not fall under Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vi); but the same falls under Explanation 4 to section 9(1) (vi), then in view of the Explanation to section 40(a) (i), the said amount cannot be disallowed under the provisions of section 40(a)(i).

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(133 ITD 363)(Mum.) Vidyavihar Containers Ltd. vs. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax AYs. : 2002-03 & 2006-07 Date of Order: 21st October 2011

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Section 45(2) – Conversion of Capital Asset (Land) into Stock in Trade – conduct of the assessee showed that land was converted to stock in trade for the purpose of conducting business – hence the assessee should be rightly entitled to the benefits of section 45(2).

Section 48 – fee paid for change in the user name from industrial to commercial would constitute the cost of improvement of the asset.

Notional income – assessee cannot be charged to taxed on notional income.

Facts:

The assessee was earlier engaged in manufacturing activity. It discontinued the business and passed a special resolution at the extra ordinary general meeting of shareholders held on 12th September, 1994 authorising commencement of business of real estate and converting its land into stock in trade. It further took steps to make the property fit for development and contracted with a third party for further development in consideration of allotment of constructed area. The assessee also applied for change in the user of land from industrial to commercial user and permission for the same was granted on 4th March, 1997. The AO held that the factory land could not have been converted into stock in trade prior to the permission of the government in respect of change of user of the said land. He further held that the land thus remained to be a capital asset irrespective of the fact that special resolution was passed. Hence the assessee was denied the benefits of section 45(2) and was charged to tax u/s. 45(1).

Held:

The intention of the assessee to pass a special resolution in the meeting of shareholders to authorise the commencement of business of real estate, convert the land into stock in trade, and the further steps taken to make the property fit for further development in consideration of allotment of constructed area makes it clear that the assesseecarried on the business of real estate development. Further, the provisions of section 45(2) only pertain to computation of capital gains and business income arising on sale of asset which is converted into stock in trade prior to sale. It does not prescribe any conditions to be fulfilled. Hence, the question for permission to be sought from government for change in user of land prior to conversion does not arise. Thus the assessee was liable to be charged in terms of section 45 (2) and not section 45(1).

Facts:

The assessee has paid fees amounting to Rs. 23 crore to the collector for change of user of land from industrial to commercial. The assessee claimed the same as business expense. Alternatively, the assessee submitted that the same be treated as cost of improvement while computing capital gains u/s 45(2). The AO however held that there was no real estate development business carried on and thus declined to allow the claim of the assessee. He also disallowed the alternative claim of the assessee for deduction of the said amount in computation of capital gains u/s 48 holding that the said amount was not in the nature of cost of improvement.

Held:

The assessee had paid to the collector the amount for change in user of land before conversion of land into stock in trade. This amount paid was vital in determining fair market value of the asset. If the said amount was paid prior to conversion, the same would constitute cost of improvement. And if the said amount is paid after conversion, the same would constitute business expense. The matter was remanded back to the AO with the direction to consider and allow the claim of the assessee depending upon the fair market value of the property as on the date of conversion.

Facts:

The property of the assessee was offered as collateral security for the bank guarantee limits availed by its holding company in the AY 2002-03. Assessee did not receive any commission for the same. However, the AO noted that the assessee company had foregone commission of 2 percent for offering its property as collateral security and made addition of such notional income.

Held:

There was nothing bought on record to show that any such commission was agreed to be paid to the assessee by its holding company. Thus the addition made by the AO in the form of notional income which had never actually accrued or arisen to the assessee was not sustainable.

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(2011) 133 ITD 306 (Mum.) NRB Bearings vs. DCIT A.Y.: 2005-06. Dated : 20th September, 2011

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Section 32(1)(iia) – Allowability of Additional Depreciation Claim – enhanced capacity has to be considered unit wise and not in relation to entire business

Facts:

The assessee acquired plant & machinery in a manufacturing unit at Waluj, Ahmedabad on which additional depreciation was claimed. The claim mentioned was rejected by the AO on grounds that the enhanced capacity can only be considered with reference to the overall capacity of the company and not a single unit.

Held:

The increase in capacity is to be compared with reference to the concerned undertaking where the machinery was installed and not the whole business. This was because the additional depreciation was claimed on only one unit where the machinery was installed. This made the manufacturing unit a separate industrial undertaking for the purpose of allowability of depreciation. Also the allowability of additional depreciation nowhere requires that the capacity increase is to be compared with reference to the operational activities of all the units which have already been set up earlier by the assessee. The intention of the legislature is only to examine the increase in capacity of the undertaking where the machinery was installed and not of the entire business. The claim of the assessee was thus justified.
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Appeal to High Court: Section 260Aa: Territorial jurisdiction: Order of Tribunal passed within the jurisdiction: Appeal lies to that High Court:

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CIT vs. Shree Ganapathi Rolling Mills P. Ltd.; 356 ITR 586 (Gauhati):

Revenue preferred appeals against the orders of the Gauhati Bench of the Tribunal before the Gauhati High Court. The issue in those cases was covered in favour of the assessee by the judgment of the Gauhati High Court in CIT vs. Meghalaya Steels Ltd.; (2013) 356 ITR 235 (Gauhati). The learned Solicitor General appearing on behalf of the Revenue contended that the orders, which were impugned before the learned Tribunal, were orders passed by the Assessing Officer in the State of Meghalaya and, hence, this court does not have the territorial jurisdiction to decide the appeals.

The Gauhati High Court dismissed the appeals filed by the Revenue following its decision in the case of Meghalaya Steel Ltd. and held as under:“

i) U/s. 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, suits are to be instituted, where the defendents reside or where a cause of action, wholly or in part, arises. An appeal is nothing but an extension of a suit. Hence, a place where the cause of action, wholly or in part arises, is the legal venue for institution of an appeal under the Income-tax Act, 1961.

ii) The orders challenged in this set of appeals had been passed within the local limits of the territorial jurisdiction of the court and, hence, the court had the jurisdiction to try the appeals.”

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L o n d o n S t a r D i a m o n d C o m p a n y ( I ) P . L t d . vs. D C I T In the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal “D” Bench, Mumbai Before Vijay Pal Rao, (J. M.) and D. Karunakara Rao, (A. M.) I.T.A. No.6169/M/2012 Assessment Year: 2009-2010. Date of Order: 11.10.2013 Counsel for Assessee/Revenue: Soli Dastur and Nikhil Ranjan/Dipak Ripote

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Section 43(5) – Loss on forward exchange contracts held as incidental to export activity hence allowed as business loss.

Facts:
The assessee is engaged in the business of trading and manufacturing of rough and polished diamonds. It had entered into forward contracts with the banker to safeguard against the exchange fluctuations of export considerations/sale profits as per RBI guidelines. Total of forward contracts entered into during the was Rs. 135.99 crore and the cancellation thereof aggregated to Rs. 126.3 crore. The total exports during the year was Rs. 107.57 crore. Total outstanding receivable in foreign exchange was much higher than any of these figures. It filed its return of income declaring the total income of Rs. 35.29 lakh. The AO examined the applicability of the provisions of section 43(5) of the Act in general and clause (c) of the proviso to section 43(5) in particular and held that the foreign exchange contracts constituted speculative transactions under the said provisions and treated the loss on cancellation thereof of Rs. 4.69 crore as the speculation loss and assessed the income of the assessee at Rs. 5.04 crore. On appeal, the CIT(A) upheld the order of the AO.

Before the tribunal, the revenue relied on the orders of the AO and the CIT(A) and contended that the certain data showed that the total of Forward exchange Contracts on certain dates were more than the exports receivable and also questioned the asssessee‘s failure to demonstrate the paisa to paisa and date-wise correlation between the Forward Contracts and the Export Invoices.

Held:
The tribunal laid down the following principles:

• Considering the judgment of the Calcutta High court in the case of CIT vs. Sooraj Muill Magarmull (129 ITR 169) which was followed by the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT vs. Badridas Gauridu Pvt. Ltd. (261  ITR 256), it held that the Forward Contracts are commodities falling in the definition of speculative transactions governed u/s. 43(5);

• Forward exchange contracts when entered into with the banks for hedging the losses due to foreign exchange fluctuations on the export proceeds, are to be considered integral or incidental to the export activity of the assessee and therefore, the losses or gains constituted the business loss or gains and not the speculation activities. For the purpose it relied on the decisions of the Mumbai tribunal in the case of D. Kishorekumar and Co. (2 SOT 769), the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT vs. Badridas Gauridu (P) Ltd. (supra) and the Calcutta High Court in the case of CIT vs. Sooraj Muill Magarmull (supra).

The tribunal then noted that the loss suffered by the assessee on account of the cancellation of forward exchange contract was broadly of two types viz., loss suffered on cancellation of matured contracts (Rs. 4.15 crore) and loss suffered on cancellation of pre-matured contracts (Rs. 64 lakh). According to the tribunal, the former being related to the Forward exchange contracts which are integral or incidental to the exports of the diamonds, should be allowed as business loss in view of the binding High Court or Tribunal decisions/ judgments in the case of D. Kishore kumar and Co (supra), Badridas Gauridu Pvt. Ltd. (supra), Sooraj Muill Magarmull, (supra). In the case of loss suffered on cancellation of pre-matured contracts, the tribunal observed that the onus is on the assessee to explain satisfactorily why the assessee resorted to premature cancellation of some FCs. Further, it observed that it is not required that there must be 1:1 precise correlation between Forward exchange Contacts and the corresponding export invoice. So long as the total Contracts does not exceed the exports of the year plus outstanding export receivable, the Forward exchange Contracts can constitute hedging transaction‘. In the case of loss suffered on cancellation of pre-matured contracts, the tribunal allowed the loss of Rs. 42 lakh accepting the explanation of the assessee that the maturity date of those contracts fell during the weekend days and therefore, the assessee cancelled the contracts three days prior to the due date. As regards the other contracts cancelled prior to longer than three days it held that losses therefrom should also be allowed as business loss so long as the same are integral part of the exports. However, according to it, the assessee needs to answer as to why it went for premature termination and the onus was on the assessee as per the ratio of the Apex Court in the case of CIT vs. Josef John (67 ITR 74). Accordingly, to examine this part of the loss, the matter was remanded to the AO.

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Green Infra Ltd. vs. ITO ITAT Mumbai `G’ Bench Before D. Manmohan (VP) and N. K. Billaiya (AM) ITA No. 7762/Mum/2012 A.Y.: 2009-10. Decided on: 23rd August, 2013. Counsel for assessee/revenue: Porus Kaka/ Abha Kala Chanda.

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S/s. 56, 68. Share premium being a capital receipt cannot be charged to tax as income.

Facts:
In the course of assessment proceedings the Assessing Officer (AO) observed that an amount of Rs. 47,97,10,000 was credited under Share Premium. He observed that the assessee company was incorporated on 03-04-2008 and had collected share premium of Rs. 47,97,10,000 on allotment of shares of face value of Rs. 10 each at a premium of Rs. 490 per share. He asked the assessee interalia to justify the premium charged with specific reference to basis of valuation, furnish note on factors considered for allotting shares at a premium.

The assessee filed a detailed reply explaining that the subscribers to the Memorandum of Association have subscribed to 50,000 equity shares of Rs. 10 each amounting to Rs. 5,00,000. These shares were allotted at par and all remaining shares were allotted at a premium. The Companies Act, 1956 does not specify the price at which shares are to be issued. Also, it does not limit the premium at which shares are to be issued. Share premium is a capital receipt and has to be dealt with in accordance with section 78 of the Companies Act, 1956. The assessee also filed internal valuation report which was obtained prior to issuance of equity shares at a premium. It was also contended that the assessee company is not required to prove the genuineness, purpose or justification for charging premium on shares. As regards chargeability of share premium u/s. 56(1), it was submitted that the share premium being a capital receipt is not income in its ordinary sense.

The AO was of the belief that premium charged on allotment is not justified. He was of the opinion that these funds were introduced by the assessee through the shareholders in the guise of share premium. He held that there is no basis for the estimates made in the valuations and that the values adopted are nowhere near to the actual and achievements. He also observed that the assessee did not have any hidden assets in the form of patents, copy rights, intellectual property rights or even investments, etc belonging to the company based on which the assessee would be likely to substantially enhance its profits. He also observed that of the total receipts of Rs. 47,97,10,000 an amount of Rs. 45,36,95,212 was invested in units of IDFC Mutual Fund and balance amounts were utilised for investments in shares of subsidiary companies, bank FDRs, advances to subsidiaries, etc. He held that the assessee has entered into a sham transaction. Accordingly, he invoked the provisions of section 56(1) of the Act and taxed the share premium under the head `Income from Other Sources’.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where the capital structure of the assessee company was explained. It was explained that IDFC Private Equity Fund-II is holding 98% shares in the assessee company and almost all the Directors of the assessee company are related with IDFC group.

Held: The Tribunal noted that the transaction of issue of shares at such a premium by a zero balance sheet company could raise eye brows but considering the subscribers to the assessee company, the test for the genuineness of the transaction goes into oblivion. It observed that 10,19,000 equity shares were subscribed and allotted to IDFC PE Fund II which company is a Front Manager of IDFC Ltd., in which company Government of India is holding 18% of shares. The contributors to IDFC PE Fund-II who is subscriber to the assessee’s share capital, are LIC, Union of India, Oriental Bank of Commerce, Indian Overseas Bank and Canara Bank all of which are public sector undertakings. Therefore, to raise eye brows to a transaction where there is so much involvement of the Government directly or indirectly does not make any sense.

No doubt a non-est company or a zero balance company asking for a share premium of Rs. 490 per share defies all commercial prudence but at the same time we cannot ignore the fact that it is a prerogative of the Board of Directors of a company to decide the premium amount and it is the wisdom of the shareholders whether they want to subscribe to such a heavy premium. The Revenue authorities cannot question the charging of such huge premium without any bar from any legislated law of the land. Details of subscribers were before the Revenue authorities. The AO has also confirmed the transaction from the subscribers by issuing notice u/s 133(6) of the Act. The Board of Directors contains persons who are associated with IDFC group of companies, therefore their integrity and credibility cannot be doubted. The entire grievance of the Revenue revolves around the charging of such huge premium so much so that the revenue authorities did not even blink their eyes in invoking provisions of section 56(1) of the Act.

Having gone through the provisions of section 56(1), the Tribunal held that the emphasis in section 56(1) is on `income of every kind’, therefore, to tax any amount under this section, it must have some character of “income”. It is settled proposition of law that capital receipts, unless specifically taxed under any provisions of the Act, are excluded from income. The Supreme Court has laid down the ratio that share premium realised from the issue of shares is of capital nature and forms part of share capital of the company and therefore cannot be taxed as revenue receipt. It is also a settled proposition of law that any expenditure incurred for the expansion of capital base of a company is to be treated as a capital expenditure as has been held by the SC in the case of Punjab State Industrial Corporation vs. CIT 225 ITR 792 and in the case of Brooke Bond India Ltd. vs. CIT. Thus the expenditure and receipts directly relating to the share capital of a company are capital in nature and therefore cannot be taxed u/s. 56(1) of the Act.

In the course of hearing, the DR raised the plea that the nature of transaction should be judged from the parameters of section 68 as well. Though, the counsel of the assessee raised a strong objection to such a plea, the Tribunal in the interest of justice and fair play, drawing support from the decision of SC in Kapurchand Shrimal vs. CIT (131 ITR 451) allowed the DR to raise this issue.

Considering the arguments of the DR, the Tribunal held that the identity of the subscribers has been established beyond all reasonable doubts nor have the revenue authorities questioned the identity of the shareholders. On facts, it held that the capacity of the shareholders cannot be doubted. To counter the argument of the Revenue that charging of premium of Rs. 490 per share is beyond any logical sense and that the transaction is a sham transaction, the Tribunal looked at the application of the funds so raised. It held that the ultimate beneficiaries of the share premium may clear the clouds over the transaction being alleged to be a sham.

The Tribunal fund that the assessee company invested funds in its three subsidiary companies wherein the assessee is holding 99.88% of share capital which meant that the funds were not diverted to an outsider. This, according to the Tribunal, cleared the doubt about the application of funds and the credibility of the company in whom the funds were invested.

The Tribunal held that it could not find a single evidence which could lead to the entire transaction to be a sham. It held that the revenue authorities erred in treating the share premium as income of the assessee u/s. 56(1) of the Act. The Tribunal directed the AO to delete the addition of Rs. 47,91,00,000.

This ground of appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

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Umaben Shaileshbhai Sheth vs. DCWT ITAT Ahmedabad `D’ Bench Before A. Mohan Alankamony (AM) and Kul Bharat (JM) ITA No. 44 to 49/Ahd/2010 A.Y.: 2000-01 to 2005-06. Decided on: 4th October, 2013. Counsel for assessee/revenue: Vijay Ranjan/K. C. Mathews.

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Proviso to section 5(1)(vi) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957. If the assessee’s share in the plot of land is less than 500 sq. mts., the benefit of the proviso cannot be denied to the assessee on the ground that the area of the entire plot is more than 500 sq. mts.

Facts: The assessee had joint share in a plot of land, admeasuring 567 sq. mts., allotted by Urmi Society, along with her husband. She was a joint shareholder as well. The Assessing Officer (AO) accepted that the assessee is the owner of half portion of the land but he denied the benefit of exemption to section 5(1)(vi) in an order passed u/s 24 r.w.s. 17 r.w.s. 16(3) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957 (WT Act).

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CWT(A) who dismissed the appeal filed by the assessee on the ground that the assessee and her husband had disclosed the value of the plot of land in their taxable wealth while filing returns of net wealth for AYs 2006- 07 and 2007-08 and therefore, how can the value of the said plot be exempt in earlier years. He held that the market value of the plot of land allotted by Urmi Society is includible in taxable wealth.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held: The Tribunal noted that the CWT(A) had not given any basis as to how the proviso to section 5(1)(vi) is not applicable when there is a finding of fact by the AO that the assessee is treated owner of land less than 500 sq. mts. The only basis of denial of exemption by the CWT(A) was that the assessee had not filed the wealth-tax return for the earlier period. The Revenue had not placed reliance on any judicial pronouncement or on any provision of law to deny exemption. It further noted that as per proviso to section 5(1)(vi) of the WT Act, if plot of land is comprising an area of 500 sq. mts or less then no wealth-tax shall be payable by an assessee.

The Tribunal held that admittedly, the assessee has been treated as owner of one-half share in a plot of land admeasuring 567 sq. mts, therefore the right of the assessee is lesser than 500 sq. mts. The assessee cannot be fastened with a liability of tax which otherwise cannot be fastened under the WT Act. It held that on this piece of land, no wealth-tax is payable by the assessee in terms of proviso to section 5(1)(vi). It held that the CWT(A) erred in not granting exemption under proviso to section 5(1)(vi) of the WT Act. It directed the AO to allow exemption.

The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

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ITO vs. Pritesh D. Shah (HUF) ITAT Ahmedabad `B’ Bench Before G. C. Gupta (VP) and T. R. Meena (AM) ITA No. 175/Ahd/2013

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S/s. 40(a)(ia), 194C, 194IA – Provisions of S/s. 194C, 194IA are not applicable to amounts paid by Clearing & Forwarding Agent, on behalf of his client, receipts whereof are issued in the name of the client.

Facts:
The assessee, a clearing & forwarding agent, had charged service charges known as agency charges from its clients whose goods were exported through various ports mainly in Gujarat & Maharashtra. In respect of the amounts paid by the assessee on behalf of its clients, receipts whereof were issued by the recipients in the name of the clients, the assessee did not deduct tax at source. The assessee contended that it was merely a facilitator in the export business of its clients. The assessee received from its clients reimbursement of amounts paid on their behalf and also service charges/agency charges. It was only the agency charges which were credited as income to P&L account of the assessee.

The Assessing Officer (AO) made an addition of Rs. 1,69,11,269; Rs. 23,01,424 and Rs. 26,76,785 u/s. 40(a) (ia) r.w.s. 194C & 194I of the Act on the ground that the assessee had failed to deduct tax at source on payments made by it on behalf of its clients.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who allowed the appeal.

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that the assessee received railway freight, shipping freight, ICD charges, etc from its clients by way of reimbursement of expenses. It held that the assessee is merely a facilitator in the export business of its clients and facilitates to and fro movement of client’s goods both in land and overseas using road, rail, air and sea routes including temporary storage of the goods in custom bonded warehbouse for legal and procedural purposes, etc. The assessee received reimbursement of expenses incurred and also service charges. The Tribunal noted that the receipts were issued by various parties in the name of clients of the assessee and not in the name of the assessee and that it is only the agency charges which are credited to the P & L account of the assessee.

The Tribunal held that for applicability of provisions of section 194C and section 194I, the relationship of contractor and payee pursuant to contract between the parties is essential. In the facts of the assessee’s case, the Tribunal held that such a relationship is missing.

The Tribunal noted the finding given by CIT(A) that the clients of the assessee are reimbursing monies paid by the assessee to such agencies along with the assessee’s commission or handling charges and also that the CIT(A) has referred to number of decisions where the Hon’ble Courts have held that TDS provisions are not attracted in cases involving reimbursement of expenses held that addition on account of payments made to various parties on behalf of its clients by the assessee could not be sustained and deserves to be deleted. The Tribunal confirmed the order passed by CIT(A).

The appeal filed by the revenue was dismissed.

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Income from offshore supply of equipment not taxable in India if property in equipment passes outside India.

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New Page 33 LG Cable Ltd. v.
DDIT

(2008) 113 ITD 113 (Del.)

S. 5, S. 9, S. 90, Income-tax Act, Articles 5, 7, India-Korea
DTAA

A.Y. : 2002-2003. Dated : 8-8-2008

Issue :

Income from offshore supply of equipment not taxable in India
if property in equipment passes outside India.

Facts :


The assessee was a Korean Company (‘KorCo’). KorCo had set up
a project office in India after obtaining approval of RBI. In 2001, it was
awarded two contracts by PGCIL. One contract was for onshore execution of fibre
optic cabling system package project (‘onshore contract’). The other contract
was for offshore supply and offshore services (‘offshore contract’). KorCo
rendered the services under the onshore contract through its project office, for
which it maintained separate books of account since the project office
constituted a PE in India under Article 5 of DTAA. Income attributable to
onshore contract was offered for tax. However, income attributable to offshore
contract was not offered for tax on the ground that as property in equipment was
transferred outside India, sale transaction of offshore supply of equipment had
also taken place outside India. KorCo supported its contention with the
following facts :

(i) The bill of lading in respect of equipment sold was
issued in Korea in favour of the PGCIL (buyer) and the notified party was also
PGCIL;

(ii) The bill of entry clearly showed that the importer was
PGCIL and the goods were directly transported to the site of PGCIL and not to
that of KorCo;

(iii) As per terms of the contract, PGCIL was co-insured
under the insurance policies;

(iv) In terms of the contract, the ownership of equipment
and materials supplied from outside India was transferred to PGCIL in the
country of origin, i.e., in Korea.


The AO did not accept KorCo’s contention and held that income
from offshore contract was taxable in India. He determined 10% of the contract
value as the income chargeable to tax in India.

In appeal, CIT(A) after considering particular article of
both the contracts, held that: the two contracts were dependent on each other
and one cannot be completed without completing the other; KorCo’s responsibility
does not end merely upon delivery of equipment, but it continues till the
successful completion of the project as otherwise both contracts could be
cancelled; thus, there is interrelation and interdependence of both contracts
and it was a composite contract; it was a colourable device adopted by KorCo;
and hence, the income was taxable in India in terms of S. 9(1)(i) as well as
under Article 7 of DTAA.

Held :

The Tribunal observed and held on the various aspects as
follows :

(i) U/s.90(2) of Income-tax Act, KorCo is entitled to more
beneficial of the treatments under DTAA or under Income-tax Act. However, this
question would arise only if provisions of Income-tax Act are applicable. If
they are not, question of applicability of DTAA would not arise. As held by
the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Azadi Bachao Andolan, (2003) 263
ITR 706 (SC), no provision of DTAA can possibly fasten a tax liability where
the tax liability is not imposed by the Income-tax Act.

(ii) While considering almost identical facts and
circumstances and even where there was a single agreement for both supply and
erection of equipment, the Supreme Court [in Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy
Industries Ltd. v. DIT,
(2007) 288 ITR 408 (SC)] had held that income from
offshore supply of material/equipment did not arise in India and was not
taxable in India. It was not open to the Revenue to contend that this decision
was not applicable to the facts of the case.

(iii) Under the Sale of Goods Act, 1930, the property in
goods passes to the buyer as per the intention of the parties, which is
gathered from the facts and circumstances. The offshore contract specifically
provided that property would pass to PGCIL when KorCo loaded the goods and
handed over the documents (including bill of lading) to the nominated bank.
The payment was also received outside India. Thus, the property in goods was
transferred outside India. Merely because certain terms intended to protect a
buyer’s interest are included, it cannot be construed that the property in
goods had not passed or that it had passed conditionally.

(iv) Since delivery of goods, documents and receipts of
substantial part of sale consideration had taken place outside India, the sale
took place outside India and such income would not be taxed under Indian law.
The income from offshore contract was not taxable in India.

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Payment for outright sale of drawings and designs is not royalty either u/s.9(1)(vi) or under Article 12(3) of DTAA

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New Page 3

2 Parsons Brinckerhoff India (P) Ltd. v. ADIT

(2008) 118 TTJ 214 (Del.)

S. 9(1)(vi), S. 195, Income-tax Act; Article 12,
India-Thailand DTAA

Dated : 4-7-2008

Issue :

Payment for outright sale of drawings and designs is not
royalty either u/s.9(1)(vi) or under Article 12(3) of DTAA.

Facts :

The assessee was an Indian company. It was engaged in the
business of rendering engineering, consultancy services and was awarded a
contract by a consortium for rendering such services for a tollway project.
Inter alia,
the scope of work required preparation of design and drawings by
the assessee. The assessee entered into a contract, titled as service agreement,
with a Thailand company (‘ThaiCo’) for : supply of detailed design services,
including preparation and submission of fully dimensional general arrangement
drawings, segment casting data, etc.; calculations, drawings and reports,
rectification to design errors, etc.; site visits by ThaiCo as may be necessary;
design review for about 13 items; supply of detailed design; and production of
final design drawings. As per the contract, ThaiCo was to carry out the work
from its office in Thailand and for actual execution, its personnel may be
required to make short visits to the site. In particular, the contract
stipulated observance of confidentiality and non-disclosure of the assessee’s
trade secrets/confidential information as well as not using these either for its
own purpose or for benefit of any third person. It was further stipulated that
upon termination of the contract, ThaiCo shall surrender all the documents and
information relating to the assessee which may be in its possession. The
assessee was required to remit the contract consideration to ThaiCo in Thailand.

The assessee applied to the AO u/s.195(2) of Income-tax Act
requesting the AO to pass an order authorising remittance of the consideration
without deduction of tax. The assessee submitted that : the payment was in the
nature of business income and as ThaiCo did not have PE in India, it was not
taxable in India; the payment did not represent Fees for Technical Services (‘FTS’)
as there was no specific article dealing with FTS; and the payment could not be
construed as ‘other income’ under Article 22 of DTAA. The AO held that the
payment was for use of design/model/plan developed by ThaiCo and also that it
represented consideration for information concerning industrial, commercial or
scientific experience, and concluded that it was ‘royalty’ under Article 12 of
DTAA. In appeal, CIT(A) agreed with the conclusion of the AO.

Held :

The Tribunal observed that :



  •  Though the contract was titled as service agreement, actually it was agreement
    for supply of the package of designs and drawings that would enable the
    assessee to effectively render engineering consultancy services under its
    contract with the consortium.



  • The site visits of ThaiCo’s personnel seemed to be only to explain the
    drawings and designs to the assessee and they were similar to the visit of a
    machine supplier’s personnel to supervise the installation of machinery.



  • Decisions in Pro-Quip Corporation v. CIT, (2002) 255 ITR 354 (AAR),
    CIT v. Davy Ashmore India Ltd.,
    (1991) 190 ITR 626 (Cal.), CIT v.
    Klayman Porcelains Ltd.,
    (1998) 229 ITR 735 (AP) and CIT v. Neyveli
    Lignite Corporation Ltd.,
    (2000) 243 ITR 459 (Mad.) have brought out the
    distinction between outright sale of the property and transfer of
    right to use
    the property while retaining the ownership right. In case of
    outright sale, the consideration would be business profits and in case of
    transfer of right to use, it would be royalty.



  • There are a number of words used in Explanation 2(i) to S. 9(1)(vi)(b) and
    Article 12(3) of DTAA and all these words signify a form or a kind of
    intellectual property. The words ‘model’ or ‘design’ should be understood in
    this context. Having regard to the rules of interpretation, it would not be
    proper to hold that these two words should be understood in a different sense.
    Therefore, these two words cannot refer to drawings and designs which are sold
    outright without the seller retaining any proprietary right.



The Tribunal, accordingly, held that :



  •  an outright sale of drawings and designs cannot fall under the definition of
    ‘royalty’ in Explanation 2 to S. 9(1)(vi).



  •  As outright sale of drawings and designs is not ‘royalty’, ThaiCo is not
    chargeable to tax in India u/s.9(1)(vi).



  • Since no liability had arisen on the non-resident under the domestic law, it
    is not legally necessary or permissible to examine DTAA.



  • The payment would not be covered under Article 22 of DTAA, since the income is
    business profits which are expressly dealt with in Article 7.



  • The payment is not chargeable to tax in India.



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(i) Remuneration for processing of seismic data outside India is not taxable in India since not royalty and no PE. (ii) Fees for training for use of software pertaining to exploration/extraction of mineral oil is taxable u/s.44BB.

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New Page 3

ACIT v.
Paradigm Geophysical Pty Ltd. (2008) 117 TTJ 812 (Del.)

S. 9(1)(vii), S. 44BB, S. 90, Income-tax Act; Articles 7, 12,
13, India-Australia DTAA

A.Y. : 2003-2004. Dated : 27-6-2008

Issues :




(i) Remuneration for processing of seismic data outside
India is not taxable in India since not royalty and no PE.


(ii) Fees for training for use of software pertaining to
exploration/extraction of mineral oil is taxable u/s.44BB.



Facts :

(i) The assessee was an Australian company (‘AusCo’). AusCo
entered into contract with RIL for processing of certain seismic data. The
seismic data was to be collected by RIL. Under the contract, AusCo was to :
collect the original data tapes from RIL at Mumbai; process these tapes at only
one processing centre in Australia; return the original data tapes together with
the processed data tapes to RIL at Mumbai; provide all committed equipments and
personnel for the processing at the processing centre; ensure not to divert the
committed resources to any other jobs without prior written approval of RIL;
provide licence for the use of certain software for limited period; and complete
timely execution and delivery of data.

While furnishing its return, AusCo offered the receipts for
assessment u/s.44BB, in terms of which 10% of the receipts would be deemed to be
profits and gains of business of rendering services in connection with the
prospecting for or the extraction of mineral oil. However, during the course of
assessment proceeding, it took the position that it had no PE in India under
Article V and hence, in terms of Article VII, the receipts were not taxable in
India. While not disputing that processing was carried out in Australia, the AO
held that the basic ingredient was the situs at which the processed data was to
be utilised (which was India) and accordingly, assessed the receipts u/s.44BB.

In appeal before CIT(A), CIT(A) accepted AusCo’s contention
that AusCo did not have PE in India and hence, receipts were not to be taxed in
India.

Before the Tribunal, the Revenue contended that the software
was a copyright and hence, consideration for the use of the software was a
royalty in terms of Clause (a) of Article XII(3) (Royalties) of DTAA. Further,
in terms of Clause (d) of Article XII(3), rendering of any technical service
which is ancillary or subsidiary to the application of software was also royalty
and thus both these clauses were applicable. Therefore, the receipts cannot be
assessed as business profits under Article VII(1) of DTAA. Consequently, the
Revenue also contended that presumptive taxation u/s.44BB was not applicable if
the receipt being royalty was covered by provisions of S. 115A.

AusCo contended that it did not ‘make available’ [as
clarified in Raymond Ltd. v. DCIT, (2003) 86 ITD 791 (Mum.)] any
technical knowledge, experience, etc. to RIL. Factually, processed seismic data
provided by AusCo cannot be used by RIL in future for any project undertaken in
another area, such processed data cannot be construed to be ‘development and
transfer of a technical plan or design’ and hence, it was not ‘made available’
by AusCo to RIL. Consequently, receipt cannot be treated as royalty under
Article XII(3) and one would need to look at Article VII and not domestic law.
Once in Article VII, since there is no PE, receipt cannot be taxed in India
[relying on DCIT v. Boston Consulting Group Pte. Ltd., 93 TTJ (Mumbai)
293].

(ii) AusCo had also entered in to a separate contract for
training employees of RIL to use software which was used exclusively by oil and
gas industry worldwide for exploration/extraction of mineral oil. The training
was to be provided at RIL’s office in India as may be decided by RIL.

While furnishing its return, AusCo declared that receipts
from RIL under training contract were subject to taxation under Article XIII
(Alienation of property) of DTAA. However, during the course of assessment
proceeding, it resiled from its stand and offered the receipts for assessment
u/s.44BB, in terms of which 10% of the receipts would be deemed to be profits
and gains of business of rendering services in connection with the prospecting
for or the extraction of mineral oil. AusCo contended that its case was covered
by CBDT’s Instruction No. 1862, dated 22nd October 1990, which explains the
expressions ‘mining project’ and ‘like project’ in connection with Explanation 2
to S. 9(1)(vii).

The AO rejected AusCo’s contention and assessed the receipts
under Article XIII (Alienation of property) of DTAA.

In appeal before CIT(A), CIT(A) accepted AusCo’s contention
and directed the AO to assess the income u/s.44BB.

Held :

(i) The Tribunal observed and held that :

  • S. 44BB applies to provision of services and facilities in connection with the prospecting for or extraction of mineral oils in India and unlike Explanation 2 to S. 9(1)(vii)(b), of Income-tax Act, in S. 44BB the word ‘services’ is not qualified. It cannot be disputed that the services rendered by AusCo to RIL were consultancy or technical services in terms of Explanation 2 to S. 9(1)(vii)(b). However, since S. 44BB did not qualify the word ‘services’, consideration for any services rendered by a non-resident company in connection with prospecting or extraction of mineral oil will fall within S. 44BB.

  • The question to be examined was whether AusCo ‘made available’ any technical knowledge, experience, etc. to RIL. Factually, processed seismic data provided by AusCo cannot be used by RIL in future for any project undertaken in another area, such processed data cannot be construed to be ‘development and transfer of a technical plan or design’ and hence, it was not ‘made available’ by AusCo to RIL. Consequently, Article XII(3)(g) of DTAA would not ‘apply.

  • As per Article VII(7), if business profits include items of income for which specific provisions are made in any other Article of DTAA, then those provisions should apply to those items. However, if any of such specific provisions are not applicable to a particular item of income, such item would be subject to Article VII. AusCo’s receipts from RIL did not represent consideration for any technical services which could bring it within Article XII(3)(g). Hence, it would be business profits subject to Article VII and since AusCo did not have a PE in India, such business profits cannot be taxed in India.

(ii)    The Tribunal observed that AusCo was required to impart training to employees of RIL in various aspects pertaining to exploration/ extraction of mineral oil and that the controversy is whether S. 9(1)(vii)(b) or S. 44BB should be applied. Noting the difference between the two provisions, as brought out by Delhi Tribunal in Hotel Scopevista Ltd. v. ACIT, (ITA No. 124 to 126/Del./2006), the Tribunal held that S. 44BB would be more appropriate since AusCo was rendering services to RIL in connection with prospecting for or extraction or production of mineral oil. The Tribunal also derived support for its view from CBDT’s instruction No. 1862 dated 22nd October 1990.

Amount paid towards domain name registration, server charges for web hosting are not payment towards technical services

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New Page 2

12 M/s. Millenium Infocom Technologies Ltd.
v.
ACIT

21 SOT 152 (Del.)

S. 40(a)(i), S. 9(1)(vi)/S. 9(1)(vii), 195;

India-USA Treaty Article 26(3)

A.Y. : 2001-02. Dated : 31-1-2008

Issues :



l
Amount paid towards domain name registration, server charges for web hosting
are not payments towards technical services. There is no withholding
obligation u/s.9(1)(vii) or u/s.9(1)(vi) as it subsisted for A.Y. 01-02.


l
Even if there is default of TDS, there can be no disallowance u/s.40(a)(i) for
non-deduction of tax at source in view of provisions of non-discrimination
Article of the Treaty.


l
The assessee who has remitted funds without tax deduction by obtaining
requisite certificate of a CA and by following CBDT-laid down procedure cannot
be faulted with for not obtaining prior NOC of the AO u/s.195(2).



Facts :

The issue in appeal was disallowance u/s.40(a)(i) for alleged
failure of the assessee of not deducting tax at source in respect of amounts
remitted for registration of domain name and for server charges. The assessee
had remitted the amounts after obtaining requisite certificate of a Chartered
Accountant.

The AO was of the view that the services obtained by the
assessee in the form of domain registration and in the nature of access to
server space were technical services chargeable to tax in India u/s. 9(1)(vii)
of the Act.

Before the Tribunal, the assessee contended that the amount
paid towards server space was in the nature of lease rental and was not for
obtaining any services. The assessee himself had contended that the amount would
be equipment royalty if regard be had to amendment made to the definition of
royalty effective from A.Y. 2002-03.

The assessee also relied on provisions of non-discrimination
Article of the Treaty to contest disallowance u/s.40(a)(i). In the view of the
assessee, Article 26(3) of India-USA Treaty did not permit disallowance of
expenses in respect of payment made to US resident merely because of failure of
the payer (assessee) to deduct tax at source, since parallel payment made to
resident without deduction of tax at source would not have triggered
disallowance for the payer.

The assessee also claimed that since remittance was supported
by suitable NIL TDS certificate of CA obtained in terms of procedure laid down
in CBDT Circulars, it was not imperative for it to have obtained prior NOC
u/s.195(2).

Held :

The Tribunal accepted the contentions of the assessee and
held as under :

Relying on the decision of the Madras High Court in
Skycell Communications Ltd. v. DCIT,
(2001) (251 ITR 53) (Mad.), it was held
that payment made for hosting of website and access of server was not fees for
technical services.

Referring to Model commentaries, it was concluded that the
server on which the website is stored and through which it is accessible is a
piece of industrial equipment. Having noted that, the Tribunal referred to
amended definition of royalty u/s.9(1)(vi) (as applicable from A.Y. 2002-03) and
concluded that rent paid for hosting of website on servers was for use of
commercial and scientific equipment and was therefore royalty. The Tribunal
noted that the amended definition was applicable from the subsequent year and
hence the amount was not chargeable as royalty income for the year under
reference.

The Tribunal noted in detail self-certification procedure
laid down by various CBDT Circulars which replaced the need of obtaining
authorisation of the AO for making remittance to a non-resident. Having noted
the contents of various CBDT Circulars and after referring to the decision of
Supreme Court in the case of Transmission Corporation of AP Ltd. v CIT,
(1999) (239 ITR 587) (SC), the Tribunal concluded as under :

“Even in the cases where lower tax has been deducted or no
tax deducted, the assessee by filing an undertaking before the RBI (addressed
to the assessing officer) has made himself liable not only for payment of tax
on such remittances, but also for penalty and prosecution for the defaults
committed by him for non-deduction or lower deduction of tax at source. The
contention of the Ld DR by placing reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of Transmission Corporation of Andhra Pradesh
Limited (supra) that the assessee was under an obligation to make
application to the Assessing Officer u/s.195(2) of the Act for the
determination of income and tax to be deducted, in our view, holds no water,
as it runs contrary to the Circulars issued by the CBDT.”

 


Relying on the decision of Herbalife International India
(P) Ltd. v. ACIT,
(2006) (101 ITD 450), the Tribunal also accepted the
assessee’s contention that no disallowance can be made having regard to
non-discrimination provisions of Article 26(3) of the treaty, irrespective of
whether or not the assessee theoretically had obligation of deducting tax at
source.

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Reimbursement received by non-resident in respect of payment made on behalf of resident was not liable to tax in India.

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New Page 2



  1. DDIT v. M/s. Chubb Pacific Underwriting
    Management Services Pte. Ltd. (Mumbai) (2009 TIOL 730 ITAT Mum.)



S. 195, Income-tax Act

A.Y. : 2003-04. Dated : 15-10-2009

Issue :

Reimbursement received by non-resident in respect of
payment made on behalf of resident was not liable to tax in India.

Facts :

The assessee, a tax resident of Singapore is engaged in the
business of providing technical services and rendering of network facilities.

The parent company of the assessee was an American company
which held shares in both the assessee as well as HDFC Chubb (JVCO) in India.
The JVCO was incorporated in February 2002 and it commenced operations in
October 2002.

Pending commencement of business by JVCO, for
administrative convenience and on request of JVCO, the assessee made payments
(including certain expenses) for purchase of software licence to Apex Systems
Pte. Ltd. (Apex).

While payments were made by the assessee, JVCO complied
with tax, withholding provisions with respect to such payments. The amount was
reimbursed by HDFC Chubb to the assessee during A.Y. 2003-04.

The Assessing Officer (AO) held that the amount received by
the assessee from JVCO was income of the assessee liable to tax, in India.

The assessee contended that the amount received from JVCO
was only reimbursement of expenses that were paid on behalf of JVCO as a
matter of administrative convenience and no income had arisen on account of
such transaction. The assessee also submitted that TDS was duly deducted by
JVCO from payment to Apex and therefore Apex had already been taxed in respect
of the transaction.

The CIT(A) accepted the contention of the assessee and
deleted the addition made by AO.

Held :

Confirming the order of the CIT(A), the ITAT held :

(a) The assesee was not a party to the contract for the
supply of software licences between Apex and JVCO. It was clear that the
payments were made only on behalf of JVCO due to JVCO’s inability to pay the
same before commencement of business.

(b) The amount received by the assessee was in the nature
of reimbursement of actual payment made by the assessee on behalf of JVCO to
Apex. There was no element of profit or income involved in such payment.

(c) Adequate taxes were deducted while making payment to
the supplier Apex, evidencing the fact that the true recipient of income had
been already subjected to tax.

(d) Such receipt, which was pure reimbursement of earlier
disbursement made on behalf of JVCO, was not taxable in the hands of the
assessee under the provisions of the Act.

levitra

Lump sum consideration towards technology transfer amounts to royalty. Sale of technical documentation which is incidental to grant of right to use the know-how does not affect taxability.

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  1. M/s. International Tire Engineering

Resources LLC

(2009 TIOL 25 AAR IT)

Article 12(3)(a), India-USA DTAA

S. 115A(1), S. 195, Income-tax Act;

Part II, First Schedule, Finance Act, 2009

Dated : 28-10-2009

Issues :

  • Lump sum
    consideration towards technology transfer amounts to royalty. Sale of
    technical documentation which is incidental to grant of right to use the
    know-how does not affect taxability.


  • Consideration for designs transferred on outright basis is not taxable as
    royalty.

  • Tax rate
    applicable for withholding is the lower rate as prescribed by S. 115A, while
    the scope of chargeable amount is determined having regard to the provisions
    of the treaty.


Facts :

The applicant, an American company (‘USCO’), was engaged in
the business of supplying advanced technology for the manufacture of radial
tyres. The applicant entered into an agreement with an Indian company (‘ICO’)
for grant of perpetual irrevocable right to use know-how as also transfer
ownership in respect of certain designs. The agreement specified separate
consideration for right to use know-how and for transfer of designs. The
applicant had formulated the following questions for ruling of AAR :

(i) Whether consideration paid by ICO to USCO for
transfer of documentation was taxable under the Act ?

(ii) Whether the consideration paid by ICO to USCO for
consultancy and assistance was taxable under the Act ?

(iii) If answers to (i) and (ii) were wholly or partly
against USCO, how much consideration would be taxable and at what rate ?

The applicant claimed that the agreement involved transfer
of technical documents in the form of transfer of ‘chattel’ or a ‘plant’ which
was completed outside India. The amount was therefore not taxable in India.

The AAR noted the following to be the features applicable
to the grant of right of use of know-how :

(i) USCO had expertise and know-how for enabling ICO to
set up the plant. USCO agreed to transfer perpetual, irrevocable right to
use know-how. For this purpose, know-how was defined to include all
technical information, data, specifications, methodology, methods, material
and process specifications, etc. which would enable ICO to install, operate
and maintain its plants. It also included start-up, commissioning
assistance, training, etc.

(ii) ICO was required to pay lump sum consideration to
USCO. ICO was granted non-exclusive, irrevocable, perpetual, royalty-free
right to use know-how at its factory in India and to market the products
anywhere in the world.

(iii) The term of the agreement was for 8 years which
could be mutually extended by the parties. During the term of the agreement,
USCO had to provide updates of know-how to ICO.

(iv) Know-how so transferred could be used by ICO only in
its plants including future plants but could not be sold to third parties.

(v) The agreement clarified that ownership of know-how
continued with USCO.

(vi) For a separate consideration, USCO also agreed to
provide technical assistance by sending its personnel for rendering training
and supervision services.

The Tax Department contented that the amount was
chargeable as royalty. Alternatively, the Tax Department contended that
having regard to the activities undertaken in India in excess of 100 days,
USCO was liable to tax under service PE Article of DTAA.

Held :

In respect of taxability of know-how agreement, the AAR
held :

  • The essence
    of the transactions was to provide right of use of know-how. To say that the
    transaction is nothing more than sale of technical documents containing
    know-how is to oversimplify the issue and to ignore the plain realities. In
    reality and in substance, sale of technical documentation was not the end in
    itself but was mere incident of the grant of right to use know-how.

  • USCO also
    agreed to provide technical assistance and advice to ensure that such
    know-how is put to effective and proper use. Payment was also made
    conditional upon successful completion of certain tests. It is therefore
    incorrect to say that the consideration was for transfer of technical
    documents sold in the USA.

  • The grant
    of use of know-how is completed only after USCO provides technical
    assistance and trained the personnel of ICO about use of underlying
    technology. The crux and predominant features of the arrangement was that it
    equipped ICO with all that was necessary to effectively put know-how to use.
    Know-how which was within the exclusive use of domain was parted in favour
    of ICO by grant of non-exclusive, perpetual right and by putting in place
    the requisite measure to enable ICO to use and absorb know-how.

  • The payment
    was ‘royalty’ within the meaning of S. 9 as also in terms of Article 12 of
    the treaty as it was for making available right of use of know-how belonging
    to USCO.

  • Also, the
    transaction of sale was not completed in the USA. The agreement provided
    that the transaction was concluded only against delivery of know-how
    documents against invoices and related documents. In terms of the agreement
    between the parties, delivery was to be completed at the location of ICO and
    courier of documents by USCO outside India did not amount to completion of
    sale.

  • The
    decision of the Supreme Court in Ishikawajima Harima Heavy Industries Ltd.
    (288 ITR 408) is not relevant as the contract involving transfer of
    technology and know-how cannot be treated as the transaction completed
    outside India. In any case, there is a sufficient territorial nexus as
    technical know-how embodied in various documents is received by ICO and is
    put to use in India with the assistance and advice offered by technical
    personnel of USCO deputed to India.

In relation to outright transfer of designs, AAR held :

  • The transaction of tread and sidewall design/ patterns (TSD) involved designs prepared and approved by ICO which USCO transferred exclusively to ICO. ICO can use such designs for self use or for selling it to third party. The agreement also confirmed that the proprietary intellectual property in design was to vest exclusively in ICO. Having regard to these features, AAR accepted the contention that the transaction involved outright transfer which was not taxable in India in absence of PE of USCO.

In relation to rate of TDS, AAR held :

  • For determining tax withholding obligation of ICO, ICO can take into account favourable rate available in terms of S. 115A of the ITA. ICO therefore can deduct tax at 10% + applicable surcharge after taking into account scope of chargeable income determined having regard to the provisions of the treaty.

University of Texas (UT) is a tax resident of the USA and entitled to treaty benefit even if certain income of UT is not liable to tax in the USA on account of exemption under the provisions of US tax laws.

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  1. Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry

(2009 TIOL 30 AAR)

Articles 4, 12(4)(b), India-USA DTAA;

S. 9(1)(vii), S. 195, Income-tax Act

Dated : 30-11-2009

 

Issues :

University of Texas (UT) is a tax resident of the USA and
entitled to treaty benefit even if certain income of UT is not liable to tax
in the USA on account of exemption under the provisions of US tax laws.

Payment made by Indian entity to UT for training,
technology assessment, business development and project management as part of
commercialisation project is not ‘fees for included services’.

Facts :

FICCI, a non-profit company, registered under the Companies
Act, 1956 entered into MOU with Defense Research Development Organisation (DRDO).
Under the MOU, FICCI were to assist the DRDO laboratories in identifying
competitive global technologies from inventory of existing defense-related
inventions of DRDO so as to enable DRDO to decide upon commercialisation
policy. For this, FICCI and DRDO initiated joint programme for technology
assessment and commercialisation. While FICCI was responsible for providing
assistance to DRDO, FICCI entered into an agreement with UT for the purpose of
taking support for research in the area of market economics and other related
aspects involving commercialisation of technological innovations.

The services to be rendered by UT to FICCI were broadly
categorised under the following heads :

  • Training;

  • Technology
    Assessment;

  • Business
    Development; and

  • Program
    Management

The scope of services under each of the above four segments
included the following.

  • Training :
    Under this, UT was to conduct a workshop for DRDO officers and scientists at
    management level to provide them with broad understanding of the key
    principles involved in the technology commercialisation process. For this
    purpose, two training programmes of 5 days each were conducted in India for
    which facilities were made available by FICCI. The training materials were
    stated to be customised modules which gave broad overview of factors which
    the participant had to consider for the purposes of shortlisting the
    innovations for taking them to the second phase of the programme.


  • Technology assessment
     : Under this, UT was expected to undertake
    screening and assessment for evaluating the technologies and to shortlist
    what UT perceived to be the unique and globally competitive technologies
    which DRDO can market. This phase involved process of screening
    technologies, eliminating those which did not score well from the point of
    view of commercialisation, doing validation check for determining commercial
    potential and submitting the report of such assessment for consideration by
    the board of DRDO.

  • Business
    Development
     : The third phase of the programme was commercialisation
    process. In this phase, UT assisted in identifying about 20 global partners
    with which DRDO can enter into licensing or other engagements in respect of
    technologies identified under phase three. UT also was required to monitor
    and support negotiations between DRDO and the potential partner.


  • Programme Management
     : Under this phase, UT agreed to provide programme
    manager for administrative assistance and actual implementation.

For the above services, FICCI was required to provide lump
sum consideration to UT. In this background, the applicant sought ruling on
the following questions :

(i) Whether UT was covered by India-USA DTAA ?

(ii) Whether UT was not liable to pay tax in India on
payments received for the services ?

(iii) Whether FICCI was not required to deduct tax
u/s.195 in respect of payments to UT ?

(iv) If answers to (ii) and (iii) are in negative, which
amounts were liable to tax and at what rate ?

The Tax Department contended that the tax treaty covered
only those persons who are taxable in one of the countries and since income of
UT was exempt from tax in the USA, UT was not eligible for benefit of the
treaty. As a result, UT was liable to pay tax as payment to UT was in the
nature of fees for technical services. Alternatively, the services rendered by
UT were fees for included services as defined in Article 12 of the treaty and
hence liable for taxation in India.

Ruling :

The AAR held :

  • The fact
    that UT is required to file tax return in the USA for certain unrelated
    business income and is also having obligation of filing the tax return on an
    annual basis supports that UT would qualify as ‘resident’ of the USA as
    envisaged in the tax treaty between India and the USA. The fact that part of
    its income is exempt from tax does not take it out of the category of tax
    resident.

  • Under the
    treaty, services can be taxed only if they are in the nature of fees for
    included services (FIS). In order to be taxable as FIS under the tax treaty,
    a mere provision of technical and other services would not suffice. It,
    additionally, requires that the service provider should also make its
    technical knowledge, experience, skill, know-how, etc. known to the
    recipient of the service so as to equip him to independently perform the
    technical function in future without the help of the service provider.

  • Although
    most of the services falling within the scope of business development and
    programme management, may answer the description of technical and
    consultancy services, they do not really ‘make available’ the technical
    knowledge or know-how, except perhaps in an incidental/indirect manner.
    Therefore, it would not come within the purview of FIS.

  • In the circumstances, though the services involved certain attributes of teaching, they were only incidental to the primary objective of business promotion of technologies. The services would not constitute FIS and will also not fall in the exclusionary clause of the treaty which exempts teaching in or by educational institution.

    The AAR confirmed that FICCI did not have obligation of withholding tax as the payments were not chargeable in the hands of the recipient.

(i) only proportionate credit of tax paid in USA can be claimed in India; and (ii) credit of State income-tax cannot be claimed as it is not a ‘tax covered’.

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Part C — International Tax Decisions


13 Manpreet Singh Gambhir v.
DCIT

(2008) 119 TTJ (Del.) 615

Articles 2, 25, India-USA DTAA

A.Y. : 1999-2000. Dated : 30-9-2008

 

Issues :

Under India-USA DTAA :


(i) only proportionate credit of tax paid in USA can be
claimed in India; and


(ii) credit of State income-tax cannot be claimed as it
is not a ‘tax covered’.


 


Facts :

The assessee was a resident of India and had earned salary
income in the USA and in India. It also earned income from interest. The
assessee had paid Federal income-tax and State income-tax on his USA salary
income. He had claimed deduction u/s.80RRA in respect of his salary income from
the USA. He claimed credit in respect of Federal income-tax and State income-tax
by relying on provisions of Article 25(2)(a) of India-USA DTAA. The AO allowed
credit of taxes paid in the USA only to the extent of tax attributable in India
to the income earned in the USA.

 

In appeal before CIT(A), the assessee contended that while
allowing credit of taxes paid in the USA, not only the Federal income-tax but
also the State income-tax should be allowed. He further contended that
notwithstanding the deduction u/s.80RRA in India, as per India-USA DTAA, the
whole of the tax paid in the USA in respect of his salary income is eligible for
credit against Indian taxes payable. The CIT(A) accepted the contention that
credit should be given also for State income-tax. However, he did not accept the
other contention regarding grant of credit of whole of tax paid in the USA.

 

The Tribunal referred to the provisions of S. 90 of the
Income-tax Act, Article 25(2)(a) of India-USA DTAA and commentaries on OECD and
UN Model Conventions. It also referred to the decisions in CIT v. Dr. R. N.
Jhanji,
(1990) 185 ITR 586 (Raj.) and CIT v. M. A. Mois, (1994) 210
ITR 284 (AP) wherein in the context of relief u/s.91(1) of the Income-tax Act,
the Courts had held that where the assessee is entitled to special deduction
u/s.80RRA to the extent of 50%, his entitlement to relief would be only to the
extent of tax paid on 50% of the foreign income. The Tribunal observed that
though these decisions were in the context of S. 91, the spirit of their ratio
would also apply to claim of credit u/s.90, as there cannot be payment of taxes
outside India and claim of refund in India if there is no liability of paying
taxes in India.

 

Held :

The Tribunal held that :

(i) the assessee is entitled only to the proportionate tax
credit and not the credit for the entire tax paid in the USA on the salary
income.

(ii) in terms of Article 2 (taxes covered) of India-USA DTAA, credit can be
claimed only in respect of Federal income-tax and not State income-tax.

levitra

Where income accrues or arises u/s.5(2), S. 9(1)(i) would have no application.

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Part C — International Tax Decisions


12 Mustaq Ahmed, in re


(2008) (AAR) (Unreported)

S. 5(2), Explanation 1(b) to 9(1)(i), Income-tax Act

Dated : 19-11-2008

 

Issue :

Where income accrues or arises u/s.5(2), S. 9(1)(i) would
have no application.

 

Facts :

The applicant was a resident of Singapore. He carried on sole
proprietary business of manufacture and sale of gold jewellery in Chennai. He
was also engaged in the activity of purchasing and exporting gold ornaments. The
exports were made to Singapore company in which the applicant held substantial
shares. The purchase orders from SingCo were accepted and sales were executed in
India. Sale proceeds were also received in the assessee’s bank maintained in
India.

 

Before the AAR, the applicant contended that its activities
of purchase of gold and gold ornaments for exports was unrelated to its sole
proprietary business, since the purchase and export of gold jewellery was for
the purpose of export and since the applicant was a non-resident, the income
accruing or arising through or from these operations, which were confined to the
purchase of goods in India for the purpose of exports was not taxable in India
in terms of Explanation 1(a) and (b) to S. 9(1)(i). The applicant also contended
that ‘receipt’ follows ‘accrual’ and once there is no ‘accrual’ u/s.9, tax
liability cannot arise merely on account of ‘receipt’. The applicant also
contented that since Explanation 1(b) to S. 9(1)(i) is a beneficial provision
for promotion of exports from India, it should be construed so as to advance
that objective.

 

Before the AAR, the tax authorities contended that deeming
provisions of S. 9 had no role to play as the charge of taxation was attracted
u/s.5(2) and consequentially exemption carved out u/s.9 as the income actually
accrued in India and was received in India. The tax authorities supported their
contention with various documents which showed that exports were not to self (i.e.,
to applicant), but to foreign companies; exports were made in regular course of
business and in accordance with rules and regulations governing resident
exporters.

 

Held :

The AAR referred to S. 5(2) and S. 9(1)(i) and Explanation
thereto. It also referred to the following decisions :



  • CIT v. Ahmedbhai Umarbhai and Co., (1950) 18 ITR 472 (SC)
  • Anglo-French Textile Company Ltd. v. CIT, (1953) 23 ITR 101 (SC)
  • Bikaner Textile Merchants Syndicate Ltd. v. CIT, (1965) 58 ITR 169 (Raj.)
  • Turner Morrison & Co Ltd. v. CIT, (1953) 23 ITR 152 (SC)
  • Hira Mills Ltd. v. ITO, [1946] 14 ITR 417 (All.)
  •  CIT v. Ashokbhai Chimanbhai, (1965) 56 ITR 42 (SC)


 


The AAR observed that the expression ‘subject to the
provisions of this Act’ in S. 5(2) would mean that a non-resident’s income from
whatever source derived on account of actual or deemed receipt or actual or
deemed accrual shall be computed in accordance with other provisions of the Act.

 

After considering the modus operandi of the business
of the applicant, the AAR held that the right to receive payment had arisen in
India; once the income actually accrued or arose in India, Explanation 1(b) did
not have the effect of altogether preventing the accrual of income. Hence, the
income derived by the applicant from purchase and exports activities undertaken
by him attracted charge to tax u/s.5(2), as it represented income accrued or
received in India. The AAR held that benefit of exception of Explanation 1(b) to
S. 9(1)(i) was not available to the applicant.

levitra

Interest received by non-resident company having PE in India on refund of income-tax is effectively connected with PE and hence, should be characterised as ‘business profits’ and not ‘interest’ and taxed accordingly

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Part C — International Tax Decisions


11 BJ Services Company Middle East Ltd.
v. ACIT

(2008) 119 TTJ (Del.) 553

Articles 7, 12, India-UK DTAA

A.Y. : 2002-2003. Dated : 30-9-2008

Issue :

Interest received by non-resident company having PE in India
on refund of income-tax is effectively connected with PE and hence, should be
characterised as ‘business profits’ and not ‘interest’ and taxed accordingly.

 

Facts :

The assessee was a UK Company (‘UKCo’), which was
tax-resident of UK. UKCo had a PE in India. UKCo had received interest on the
refund of income-tax.

 

The AO held that the interest was earned by UKCo through its
PE in India and therefore, in terms of Article 12(6) of India-UK DTAA, it should
be characterised as business profits. Accordingly, tax rate applicable to
business income (i.e., 48%) and not that applicable to interest (i.e.,
15%) was applied. The CIT(A) upheld the Order of the AO.

 


Editorial note :

Article 12(6) provides that if beneficial owner of interest
carries on business through a PE and the debt-claim in respect of which the
interest is paid is effectively connected with that PE, provisions of Article 7
(business profits) apply to taxation of such interest income.

 

Before the Tribunal, UKCo’s representative relied upon AAR’s
ruling in Application No. P 17 of 1998, In re (1999) 236 ITR 637 (AAR)
wherein the AAR had ruled that : the applicant did not have a PE in India;
interest had not arisen out of any business operation in India; the debt-claim
was not connected with any activity of a PE in India; and hence, it was a case
falling under Article 12 and liable to concessional rate of tax.

 

The tax authorities’ representative submitted that since
interest had arisen through PE situated in India, Article 12(2) cannot apply.
The Department contended that the AAR ruling was also not applicable, as in the
case before AAR the non-resident applicant admittedly did not have any PE in
India.

 

Held :

The Tribunal held that : UKCo was a non-resident having PE in
India; it was carrying on business in India through a PE in India; the interest
was effectively connected with that PE in India; and therefore, in terms of
Article 12(6), the interest was chargeable under Article 7 as business profits.
The Tribunal also held that the AAR ruling relied upon by UKCo was
distinguishable on facts.

levitra

(i) Reimbursement of customs duty by an importer to a service provider is not taxable u/s.44BB. (ii) Interest received by non-resident company on refund of income-tax to be characterised as ‘interest’

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Part C — International Tax Decisions

10 Transocean Offshore Deep Water Drilling
Inc
v.
ACIT
(Delhi Trib.) (Unreported)

ITA No. 2160/Del./2006

S. 44BB, Income-tax Act; Article 11, India-USA DTAA

A.Y. : 2004-2005. Dated : 24-10-2008

Issues :




(i) Reimbursement of customs duty by an importer to a
service provider is not taxable u/s.44BB.


(ii) Interest received by non-resident company on refund
of income-tax should be characterised as ‘interest’ and taxed at the relevant
rate mentioned in Article dealing with ‘interest’.


 


Facts :



(i) The assessee was an American company (‘USACo’) which
was tax-resident of the USA. USACo was engaged in providing services in
connection with exploration and extraction of mineral oils. USACo had paid
customs duty on import of certain items which were imported by ONGC. ONGC
reimbursed the customs duty to USACo.

The AO charged tax on the income of the assessee u/s.44BB
of the Income-tax Act. Relying on the decisions in Sedco Forex
International Inc. v. CIT,
(2008) 299 ITR 238 (Uttarakhand) and USACo’s
own case in CIT v. Trans Ocean Offshore Inc, (2008) 299 ITR 248
(Uttarakhand), the AO also included the aforesaid reimbursement of customs
duty in the income of USACo.

(ii) USACo had received interest u/s.244A on income-tax
refund. The AO assessed the income as income from other sources and charged
tax @ 41%. USACo claimed that it should be taxed either @15% in terms of
Article 11 of India-USA DTAA, or @ 20% u/s.115A(1)(a)(ii) of the Income-tax
Act if provision of India-USA DTAA are considered not to apply.

 


Held :

The Tribunal held that :

(i) Payment of customs duty is primarily the obligation of
the importer, namely, ONGC; USACo discharged ONGC’s primary liability; the
payments made by ONGC to USACo were not on account of provisions of services
and facilities in connection with, or supply of plant and machinery on hire
used, or to be used, in the prospecting for, or extraction or production of,
mineral oils in India and thus, reimbursements were not in connection with the
services mentioned in S. 44BB of the Income-tax Act; and therefore, it was not
includable for determining profits and gains u/s.44BB of the Income-tax Act.

(ii) In respect of chargeability of interest on refund, the
Tribunal relied on AAR decision in Application No. P 17 of 1998, In re
(1999) 236 ITR 637 (AAR), in the context of India-UK DTAA, where AAR held that
interest derived in respect of tax lying with Revenue authorities was covered
by the definition of interest in terms of Article 12(2) and in absence of PE
in India should be entitled to benefit of reduced withholding rate of 15%.

Tribunal held that the provisions of India-USA DTAA are
identical to India-UK DTAA; since the issue involved is identical, interest on
income-tax refund should be taxed under Article 11 (interest) of India-USA
DTAA @ 15%.

 


Editorial note :

As regards the issue whether interest on the Income-tax Act
refund should be characterised as ‘interest’ or as ‘business profits’, in BJ
Services Company Middle East Ltd. v. ACIT,
(unreported) (digested above), on
similar facts, the Delhi Tribunal itself had held that such interest should be
characterised as ‘business profits’. Possibly, unlike the earlier decision, in
this case, the tax authorities do not appear to have brought out that USACo had
a PE in India and the interest on income-tax had a nexus with that PE.

levitra

S. 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Business expenditure — Payment of severance pay on closure of manufacturing business and expenditure incurred on market research — Whether allowable — Held, Yes.

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part B: unreported decisions


2 KJS India Pvt. Ltd. v.
DCIT

ITAT ‘D’ Bench, Delhi

Before G. E. Veerabhadrappa
(VP) and

Rajpal Yadav (JM)

ITA No. 2422/Del./2007 and
2168/Del./2009

Decided on : 30-7-2010

Counsel for assessee/revenue
: Salil Kapoor & Pankuj Rawat/

Kavita Bhatnagar & H. K. Lal

S. 37(1) of the Income-tax
Act, 1961 — Business expenditure — Payment of severance pay on closure of
manufacturing business and expenditure incurred on market research — Whether
allowable — Held, Yes.

Per Rajpal Yadav :

Facts :

The assessee was in the
business of manufacturing of powdered soft drink in the name and style of TANG.
During the year under appeal it closed down its manufacturing business and paid
the sum of

`93.92 lacs by way of
severance pay to its employees. Its claim to allow such payment as business
expenditure was disallowed by the AO on the following grounds :

(1) As per its Form 3CD
the Board of Directors decided to discontinue the business of production of
powdered soft drink due to non-viability of operations and accordingly, the
assessee had ceased its business operations;

(2) As per its Notes on
Accounts, the assessee had decided to sell its business and hence, its
accounts were not prepared on going-concern basis;

(3) Severance cost was
incurred for closure of the business;

(4) U/s.37 only those
expenditure which are incurred for the running of business was allowable.

Another issue before the
Tribunal was about the allowability of expenditure of

`24.52 lacs incurred on
market research. According to the AO the assessee had incurred the expenses for
developing and designing a new product. Therefore, he disallowed the said
expenditure by treating the same as capital in nature as according to him, the
expenditure had resulted in providing benefit of enduring nature to the assessee.

On appeal the CIT(A) upheld
the order of the AO.

Before the Tribunal the
Revenue supported the orders of the lower authorities and pointed out that even
the directors in their Board meeting had specifically observed that the business
of manufacturing was closed.

Held :

The Tribunal noted that the
assessee besides manufacturing, was also engaged in the business of trading. It
had not closed down the business, but it had only suspended one of the business
activities viz. that of manufacturing of powdered soft drink. It had continued
to carry on its trading business. According to the Tribunal the business cannot
be construed to mean one single activity. Further, relying on the decisions of
the Supreme Court in the cases of Ravindranathan Nair, Sasoon J. David Co. Pvt.
Ltd., Narayan Swadesh, of the Delhi High Court in the cases of DCM Ltd. and
Anita Jain, of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Assam Oil Co. Ltd. and of
the Madras High Court in the case of Simpson & Co. Ltd., it held that the
expenses incurred towards severance cost was an allowable expenditure.

The Tribunal went through
the reports of the market agency and noted that the study was to upgrade sale of
its existing product with the help of market survey. It was not for the
development and design of a new product. Accordingly, relying on the decisions
of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Ananda Bazar Patrika and of the Bombay
High Court in the case of J. K. Chemicals Ltd. it held that the expenditure was
allowable as business expenditre.

Cases referred to :

 

4.

CIT v. Assam Oil Co. Ltd., 154 ITR 647
(Cal.);

 

1.

Ravindranathan Nair
v. CIT, 247 ITR 178

 

5.

CIT v. Simpson &
Co. Ltd., (Mad.);

 

(SC);

 

6.

CIT v. Ananda Bazar
Patrika, 184 ITR 542

2.

Sasoon J. David Co.
Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT, 118 ITR

 

 

(Cal.);

 

261;

 

7.

CIT v. J. K.
Chemicals Ltd., 207 ITR 985

3.

Narayan Swadesh v.
CIT, 26 ITR 765 (SC);

 

 

(Bom.)





Sections 45(4) read with section 2(47) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 – Capital gain tax cannot be levied on firm on mere admission of partner if there was no distribution of any capital asset.

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4. (2013) 55 SOT 122 (Mumbai)
ITO vs. Fine Developers
ITA No.4630 (Mum.) of 2011
A.Y.2008-09. Dated 12-10-2012

Sections 45(4) read with section 2(47) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 – Capital gain tax cannot be levied on firm on mere admission of partner if there was no distribution of any capital asset.


Facts

During the relevant assessment year, the assesseefirm of builders and developers admitted HDIL as a new partner with 50% share. The Assessing Officer held that on the date of admission, there was a plot of land costing Rs. 28 crore held by the firm and 50% of such amount was transferred in favour of the new partner HDIL on its admission in the firm. Accordingly to the Assessing Officer the assesseefirm was, therefore, liable to capital gain tax u/s. 45(4).

The CIT(A) held that :
a. During the relevant assessment year there was only admission of HDIL as new partner in the firm.
b. There was neither retirement nor distribution of assets nor revaluation of plot of land during the assessment year under consideration.
c. Mere admission of partners did not attract provisions of section 45(4).
d. During the continuance of the partnership-firm, rights of the partners were confined to obtaining the share of the profit and no partner could have exclusive claim to any assets.

Accordingly, the addition made by the Assessing Officer was set aside.

Held
On appeal by the Revenue, the Tribunal dismissed the appeal. The Tribunal noted as under :

1. It is not a case where firm was taken over by the new partner so that provisions of section 45(4) can be invoked. As per the settled principles of law of partnership, during the continuation of the partnership, partners do not have separate right over the assets of the firm in addition to interest in share of profits. The basis of the said proposition is that value of the interest of each partner with reference to the assets of the firm cannot be isolated and carved out from the value of the partners’ interest in the totality of the partnership assets.

2. In the case under consideration, asset of the firm, i.e., plot of land, was never transferred to anybody – it always remained with the assesseefirm only. From the date of purchase of the plot till 27-05-2008, when three partners retired, it was the asset of the firm and there was no change in the ownership of the said plot. Thus, there was no extinguishment of rights, as envisaged by section 2(47), in the case of assessee-firm.

3. From the very beginning of the partnership, the plot of land in question was treated as stockin- trade by the assessee-firm. Even on 31-03- 2008 it was shown as current asset (i.e. W-I-P) in the balance sheet. The Assessing Officer has nowhere rebutted/doubted this factual position.

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Liaison office of non-resident is chargeable to FBT even if no income is earned in India

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New Page 2

9 Singapore Tourism Board, in re


(2008) 307 ITR 34 (AAR)

S. 115WA, S. 115WB, Income-tax Act

Dated : 17-10-2008

Issue :

Liaison office of non-resident is chargeable to FBT even if
no income is earned in India.

 

Facts :

The applicant was a company incorporated in Singapore with
the objective of promoting Singapore tourism (‘SingCo’). SingCo had set up
several liaison offices in India and had employees based in India, working in
these liaison offices. SingCo did not carry on any business activities through
these liaison offices; no income accrued or arose to SingCo in India; and the
expenses relating to the liaison offices were reimbursed by the Singapore office
of SingCo.

SingCo sought advance ruling on the question whether FBT
would be applicable in respect of its employees in its liaison offices in India.

Before the AAR, the tax authorities referred to AAR’s ruling
in Population Council Inc., In re (2006) 286 ITR 243 (AAR) and submitted
that while in that ruling, the applicant was a non-profit-making organisation,
in the present case, the applicant is a profit earning company though it is not
earning any income in India because RBI does not permit liaison offices of
foreign companies to do so. It further submitted that the applicant has incurred
expenses which would be subject to FBT and the earlier ruling should apply to
the applicant’s case.

Held :

The AAR referred to the observations in the earlier ruling
and ruled that :

(i) as per the scheme of Chapter XII-H and S. 115WA, FBT
liability is in addition to income-tax and is subject to separate provisions
with regard to return, assessment, payment of tax, etc.

(ii) FBT is a levy on certain types of expenditure rather
than tax on income. Taxability of income is not a prerequisite for liability
to FBT. S. 115WA(2) makes it clear that even when there is no liability to pay
income-tax, FBT liability may still be attracted.

(iii) a foreign entity not earning any income in India, but
having employees based in India, is liable to FBT if it pays fringe benefits
to those employees.


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(I) AO/TPO should establish that the taxpayer had manipulated prices to shift profits. (ii) After taxpayer discharges onus by conducting proper analysis, before determining ALP, AO/TPO should prove that one of four conditions in S. 92C(3) is satisfied. (

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New Page 2

Part C — International Tax Decisions


8 Philips Software Centre (P) Ltd. v.
ACIT (2008) 26 SOT 226 (Bang.)

A.Y. : 2003-2004

S. 92C, S. 92CA, Income-tax Act

Dated : 26-9-2008

 

Issues :




(i) AO/TPO should establish that the taxpayer had
manipulated prices to shift profits.


(ii) After the taxpayer discharges onus by conducting
proper analysis, before determining ALP, AO/TPO should prove that one of the
four conditions in S. 92C(3) is satisfied.


(iii) Data used for comparability and analysis should
relate to the relevant financial year and should also be available as on the
specified date (
i.e., the due date of filing tax return).



(iv)
Margin of comparable companies
cannot be taken as a benchmark without a proper FAR analysis to eliminate
differences.


 


Facts :

IndCo was engaged in providing software development services
to its associated enterprises. The Company claimed tax holiday under the
Income-tax Act, 1961 relating to the A.Y. 2003-04. While preparing its transfer
pricing documentation under Indian transfer pricing Rules for the relevant tax
year (2002-03), the Taxpayer selected the Cost Plus Method (‘CPM’) as the most
appropriate method for determining the arm’s-length price and also undertook a
benchmarking analysis using Transaction Net Margin Method (‘TNMM’). Based on the
analysis, the Taxpayer conducted a search on the electronic database available
in public domain and used various qualitative and quantitative filters. Data
till October 2003 (i.e., available up to the date of filing return of
income) was used for comparable analysis. The Taxpayer had made adjustment on
account of depreciation for difference in the depreciation policy adopted by the
him vis-à-vis comparable companies.

 

The TPO rejected the transfer pricing analysis undertaken by
IndCo on several grounds and determined the arm’s-length margin at higher
amount. On the basis of the TPO’s order, the Assessing Officer (‘AO’) made
adjustment to the total income of the Taxpayer.

 

Before ITAT, the assessee claimed that the adjustment was not
warranted as :

(a) The AO/TPO did not establish that the Taxpayer had
manipulated prices to shift profits outside India.

(b) The AO/TPO did not satisfy and communicate to the
Taxpayer the relevant clause u/s.92C(3) of the Act which alone empowers the AO
to disregard the analysis conducted by the Taxpayer.

(c) The AO/TPO conducted the analysis using the data that
did not exist by the specified date of filing the return of income and thus
contravened statutory requirement of using contemporaneous method.

(d) The AO/TPO did not grant suitable adjustments to
account for differences in functions performed, assets employed and risks
assumed between the Taxpayer and the comparable companies to arrive at the
ALP.

(e) The TPO had not granted the benefit of ±5% of tolerance
adjustment as provided under the Act.


Held :

The ITAT accepted most of the contentions of the appellant
and held that :

(i) The intention of the transfer pricing provisions is to
curtail avoidance of taxes by shifting profits outside India. The AO/TPO is
duty bound to demonstrate that the Taxpayer has manipulated its prices to
shift profits outside India, before a transfer pricing adjustment can be made.
The Taxpayer had also highlighted that the average rate of tax was much lower
in India than the tax rate applicable to the associated enterprise (‘AE’) in
the Netherlands. Accordingly, there was no motive on the part of the taxpayer
to shift profits out of India.

(ii) The AO/TPO did not establish, either before initiating
the transfer pricing proceedings or even at the time of concluding the
proceedings that the taxpayer had manipulated prices to shift profits. Since
the Taxpayer was availing tax holiday benefit, it would be devoid of logic to
argue that the Taxpayer had manipulated prices and shifted profits to an
overseas jurisdiction for the purpose of avoiding tax in India.

(iii) At no stage of the assessment proceedings the AO/TPO
established that the transfer pricing analysis of the Taxpayer could have been
rejected in terms of provisions of S. 92C(3) of the Act. The Taxpayer had
discharged its onus by conducting proper analysis. The AO/TPO cannot reject
such analysis unless they find deficiency or insufficiency in the
documentation of the Taxpayer.

(iv) As per the transfer pricing rules, for the purpose of
conducting the comparability analysis, subject to certain exceptions, the data
to be used for the comparability analysis need to relate to the relevant
financial year in which the international transaction has been entered into
and should exist latest by the specified date (i.e., the due date of
filing tax return). The ITAT held that both the conditions are cumulative in
nature. If any one of the conditions is not satisfied, the relevant comparable
cannot to be included in the analysis.

(v) The ITAT held that for the purpose of the analysis, the
comparables should not have transactions with its associated enterprises. Any
company having even a single rupee of related-party transaction cannot be
considered for benchmarking purpose.

(vi) The ITAT held that the margin of the comparable
companies cannot be directly taken as a benchmark without doing a proper FAR
analysis to eliminate differences on account of functions performed, risk
assumed and assets employed. By relying on the earlier Tribunal decisions in
case of Mentor Graphics (Noida) Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT, [(2007) 109 ITD 101]
and E-gain Communication (P) Ltd. v ITO, [(2008) 23 SOT 385], the ITAT
emphasised that adjustment needs to be made to the margins of the comparables
to eliminate differences on account of functions, assets and risks.



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Salary: Perquisite/Profit in lieu of salary: S/s 15 and 17: Keyman Insurance policy for employee/directors: Assignment of policy to employee/director receiving surrender value: Difference between actual premia paid and surrender value not assessable as salary:

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[Maturity value of policy not assessable: CIT Vs. Rajan Nanda; 349 ITR 8 (Del):]

The employer company took keyman insurance policies on the lives of two employees/directors in different years. After paying premia for a certain period, they were assigned to the two employees/directors receiving the surrender value from them. For the remaining period of the policies, the insurance premia were paid by the assignees. The Assessing Officer held that the difference between the premia paid by the employer and the surrender value paid by the employee is the benefit to be taxed in the hands of the employees. The Tribunal deleted the addition and held that merely by assignment in a particular year when the policy was still continuing, no taxable event had taken place and, therefore, no tax could be charged. It also held that the amount in question could not be taxed as perquisite so as to fall within the scope of section 17(3).

On appeal by the Revenue, Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) Explanation to section 10(10D) gives the meaning to “keyman insurance policy” and only that sum received under this policy would be treated as income. Sub-clause (ii) of clause (3) of section 17 taxes “any sum received in a keyman insurance policy”. The word “received” assumes significance. The Legislature in its wisdom thought to tax only that payment, which is received by the employee assessee under the keyman insurance policy. The purport of sub-clause (ii) is all together different. Such an amount due or received by the assessee has to be : (a) before joining any employment; or (b) after cessation of its employment. No such contingency occurred when the keyman insurance policy was assigned by the company in favour of the director assessee. The tax event did not occur, as no such amount was received at the time of assignment of the policy by the company as employer to the director assessee, as employee. The amounts were not taxable in the hands of the directors.

ii) There is no prohibition on the assignment or conversion of keyman insurance under the Act. Once there is an assignment, it leads to conversion and the character of the policy changes. The Insurance Company had itself clarified that on assignment, it does not remain a keyman policy and gets converted into an ordinary policy. Hence, the policy in question was not a keyman insurance policy and when it matured, the advantage drawn therefrom was not taxable.”

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Salary: Perquisite: S/s 17(2)(iii) and 17(2)(iv) of I. T. Act, 1961 and Rule 3 of I. T. Rules, 1962: Expenditure on repairs of residential accommodation occupied by employee:

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[Not a perquisite: Scott R. Bayman Vs. CIT; 253 CTR 233 (Del): ]

The assessee was an employee (President and CEO) of a company M/s. GE. In the relevant year, the employer had spent an amount of Rs. 50 lakhs towards repair and renovation of the residential accommodation occupied by the assessee. The Assessing Officer treated this amount as perquisite and added in the salary income of the assessee. The Tribunal confirmed the addition.

On appeal by the assessee, the Delhi High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) Express provisions of Rule 3 which elaborates various contingencies in relation to perquisite of rent free accommodation rules out the intention of the Parliament to treat expenses in relation to improvement, repairs or renovation as falling within the meaning of “perquisite”.

ii) Argument on behalf of the Revenue that the repairs and renovation expenses constituted an obligation of the employee, which was borne by his employer is meritless. Lease deed nowhere spells out any obligation on the employee to carry out repairs and renovations. Section 17(2) (iv) cannot be made applicable.

iii If the Assessing Officer had returned a finding that the premises were to be valued at market value (of the rental), in case it is increased as a result of the renovations, the only prescribed mode was to apply the method indicated by Rule 3(a)(iii).

iv) In view of the above, the appeal has to succeed. The impugned order of the Tribunal is hereby set aside. The cost of repairs and renovation shall be deleted from the taxable income of the assessee.”

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Revision: Section 264: A. Y. 2007-08: Claim for exemption in return but by mistake not shown in computation: Intimation u/s. 143(1) denying exemption: Rejection of application for revision: Not justified:

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[Sanchit Software and Solutions P. Ltd. Vs. CIT; 349 ITR 404 (Bom):]

For the A. Y. 2007-08, in the return of income, the assessee made a claim for exemption u/ss. 10(34) and 10(38) in respect of the dividend and long-term capital gains. However, by mistake, included the dividend of the long term capital gain in the total income in the computation. Intimation u/s. 143(1) of the Act denied the exemption. The assessee filed an application for rectification u/s. 154. The assessee also filed revision petition u/s. 264 of the Act which was rejected by the Commissioner.

The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

“i) The entire object of administration of tax is to secure revenue for the development of the country and not to charge the assessee more tax than that which is due and payable by the assessee. On April 11, 1955, the CBDT issued a circular directing the Assessing Officer not to take advantage of the assessee’s ignorance or mistake.

ii) The Commissioner committed a fundamental error in proceeding on the basis that no deduction on account of dividend income and income from capital gains u/s. 10 of the Act was claimed. Therefore, there was an error on the face of the order and the order was not sustainable.

iii) The Assessing Officer was directed to treat the application dated 08/02/2010, as a fresh application at the earliest preferably within six weeks of the order.”

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Export profit: Deduction u/s. 80HHC: Retrospective amendment to section 80HHC(3) by Taxation Laws(Second Amendment) Act, 2005 to get over decision of Tribunal is not valid: Amendment prospective:

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[Vijaya Silk House (Bangalore) Ltd. Vs. UOI; 349 ITR 566 (Bom):]

Dealing with the validity of the retrospective amendment to section 80HHC(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 the Bombay High Court held as under:

“i) The amendment made by the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 2005, in order to overcome the decision of the Tribunal by insertion of the third and fourth provisos to section 80HHC(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, is violative for its retrospective operation and for depriving the benefit earlier granted to a class of assessees whose assessments were still pending, although such benefit will be available to assessees whose assessments have already been concluded. In this type of substantive amendment, retrospective operation can be given only if it is for the benefit of assessees and not in a case where it affects even a small section of assessees.

ii) Accordingly, the amendment could be given effect from the date of the amendment and not in respect of earlier assessment years in case of assessees whose export turnover is above Rs. 10 crore. In other words, the retrospective amendment should not be detrimental to any of the assessees.”

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Capital gains: Section 50C: A. Y. 2003-04: Stamp duty value higher than sale consideration: Reference to DVO: Report of DVO binding on AO:

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[CIT Vs. Dr. Indira Swaroop Bhatnagar; 349 ITR 210 (All):]

In the previous year relevant to the A. Y. 2003-04, the assessee sold an immovable property for a consideration of Rs. 51,75,000/-. The Assessing Officer applied section 50C and substituted the stamp duty value of Rs. 1,38,00,000/- for the consideration. Assessee’s registered valuer valued the property at Rs. 48,37.500/. Assessing Officer rejected the said value and referred the matter to the DVO for determining the market value. The DVO determined the market value of the property at Rs. 58,50,000/- The Assessing Officer rejected the DVO’s report and adopted the stamp duty valuation. The Tribunal held that the valuation by the DVO had to be adopted.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Allahabad High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) Section 50C of the Act provided that where the assessee claims that the value adopted or assessed for stamp duty purposes exceeds the fair market value of the property as on the date of transfer, the Assessing Officer may refer the valuation of the relevant asset to a Valuation Officer in accordance with section 55A. Generally, when the Assessing Officer has obtained the report of the DVO it is binding on him.

ii) The valuation of the DVO had to be adopted.”

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Capital gain: Exemption u/ss. 54 and 54EC: A. Y. 2007-08: Long term capital gain: investment in residential property and bonds: Inclusion of husband’s name as joint owner: Assessee entitled to exemption of entire investment:

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[DI(Int Tax) Vs Mrs. Jennifer Bhide; 349 ITR 80 (Kar):]

In A. Y. 2007-08, the assessee sold her residential property and from the sale proceeds, purchased residential property and bonds. The property and the bonds were purchased in the joint names of herself and her husband. The assessing Officer allowed 50% of the claim for deduction. The Tribunal allowed the full claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) It was nobody’s case that the assessee’s husband had contributed any portion of the consideration for acquisition of the property or the bonds. The source for acquisition of the property and the bonds was the sale consideration.

ii) Once the sale consideration was utilised for the purpose mentioned u/s. 54 and 54EC, the assessee was entitled to the benefit of those provisions. As the entire consideration had flowed from the assessee and no consideration had flowed from her husband, merely because either in the sale deed or in the bond her husband’s name was also mentioned, in law he would not have any right. Therefore, the assessee could not be denied the benefit of deduction.”

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Penalty – Concealment of income – Suit for recovery by bank settled at Rs.42,45,477 as against Rs.52,07,873 outstanding in the assessee’s books of account – Not a case to which section 271(1)(c) would apply.

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Northland Development and Hotel Corpn. V. CIT (2012) 349 ITR 363 (SC)

The assessee took loan from Citi Bank N.A. to buy a hotel (capital asset). Default was committed in repayment of loan. Suit was filed for recovery, which was settled by signing consent decree on 30th April, 1982. The consent decree recited that the borrowers acknowledged their liability to the plaintiff-bank in the sum of Rs.42,45,477, being the outstanding amount in the loan account of the bank as on 30th April, 1982. However, in the books of account of the assessee, the outstanding amount repayable to the bank was Rs.52,07,873 as on 30th April, 1982. Consequently, the Department came to the conclusion that there was a waiver by the bank to the extent of approximately rupees ten lakhs. This amount was sought to be taxed by the Department. The Department also initiated proceedings u/s. 271(1)(c) of the Incometax Act, 1961, against the assessee. The Supreme Court observed that, in the books of account of the assessee, the outstanding amount, as on 30th April, 1982, was Rs.52,07,873, including interest. However, the decree in favour of the bank was for Rs.42,45,477, because that was the amount indicated as the outstanding amount due and payable by the assessee to the bank in its books of account.

According to the Supreme Court it appeared that the bank had not calculated the interest over the years possibly for the reason that, in its accounts, this amount was classified as “NPA”. The Supreme Court held that in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, was not applicable.

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Exemption u/s. 10A: A. Ys. 2002-03 and 2003-04: Current losses as well as brought forward losses of the non-EPZ unit cannot be deducted or reduced from the profits of the EPZ unit for computing the deduction u/s. 10A:

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CIT vs. Tei Technologies (P) Ltd.; 259 CTR 186 (Del):

In the relevant years, the assessee claimed exemption u/s. 10A, 1961 by computing the exempt amount without setting off the loss of non eligible units. The Assessing Officer computed the amount after setting off the loss from the non -eligible units against the profit of the eligible units. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) Even after the amendment by the Finance Act, 2000, section 10A has been retained in Chapter III of the Act, notwithstanding the change in the language of s/s. (1) thereof. Secondly, though s/s. (1) provides for a deduction of the eligible profits, it further states that the deduction “shall be allowed from the total income of the assesee”.

ii) Determination of total income is the last point before the tax is charged, and once the total income is determined or quantified, there is absolutely no scope for making any further deduction. If this is the true legal position, it is not possible to understand s/s. (1) of section 10A as providing for a “deduction” of the profits of the eligible unit “from the total income of the assessee”. The definition of the expression “total income” given in section 2(45) cannot be imported into the interpretation of s/s. (1) having regard to the context in which it is used and the scheme of the Act relating to the charge of tax.

iii) The form of the return of income prescribed by the Rules gives a further indication that section 10A provides for an exemption and not merely a deduction. Steps given in the return form ITR-6 are also an indication that the relief u/s. 10A has to be given before the adjustment of the losses of the current year and the brought forward losses from the past years.

iv) Incomes which are enumerated in Chapter III have traditionally been considered as incomes which are exempt from tax rather than as deduction in the computation of total income. The fact that a particular class of income is only partially exempt from taxation does not necessarily mean that it is only a deduction. Admittedly, there is ambiguity and lack of clarity or precision in the language employed in section 10A(1) which says that deduction shall be made from the total income, when the Act contains no provision to allow any deduction from the total income.

v) Thus, it is not impermissible to rely on the heading or title of Chapter III and interpret the section as providing for an exemption rather than a deduction even after the amendment by Finance Act, 2000 w.e.f. 01-04-2001.

vi) S/s. (4) of section 80A cannot defeat such construction. Sole object of s/s. (4), is to ensure that double benefit does not enure to an assessee in respect of the same income, once u/s. 10A or 10B or under any of the provisions of Chapter VI-A and again under any other provisions of the Act. This s/s. does not militate against the view that section 10A or section 10B is an exemption provision.

vii) Contents of Circular No. 5 of 2010 dated 03-06- 2010, accord with the aforesaid view. Therefore, the current losses as well as brought forward losses of the non-EPZ unit cannot be deducted or reduced from the profits of EPZ unit for computing the deduction u/s. 10A.”

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Charitable trust: Certificate u/s. 80G(5): Amendment by Finance Act (No.2) of 2009 and Circular Nos. 5 and 7 of 2010 issued by CBDT: Certificate once granted operates in perpetuity: Withdrawal, if any, should be as per the procedure:

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CIT vs. Bhhola Bhandari Charitable Trust: 259 CTR 279 (P&H):

The assessee, a charitable trust was granted certificate u/s. 80G(5), which was valid upto the F.Y. 2010-11 ending 31-03-2011. The assessee filed an application for renewal on 25-04-2011 which was withdrawn on 30-05-2011 in view of the amendment by Finance Act (No. 2) of 2009 and Circular Nos. 5 of 2010 and 7 of 2010 wherein it was stated that the Certificate granted u/s. 80G(5) which is existing on 01-10-2010 would continue till perpetuity unless it is withdrawn as per law. However, CIT passed order dated 05-12-2011 withdrawing the certificate. The Tribunal set aside the said order.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Punjab and Haryana High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) We find that the order of the Tribunal setting aside the order of CIT is based on sound reasoning. The assessee had valid exemption on 01-10-201, when the provisions of section 80G of the Act were amended so as to dispense with the periodic renewal of the exemptions. Such statutory provisions were clarified by Circular No. 5 of 2010 and Circular No. 7 of 2010 issued by the CBDT. Once the statute has given perpetuity to the exemptions granted u/s. 80G(5) of the Act, the same could not be withdrawn without issuing show cause notice in terms of the statutory provisions in the manner prescribed by law.

ii) In view of the said fact, we do not find that any substantial question of law arises for consideration.”

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Charitable trust: S/s. 11(1)(d) and 80G(5): A. Y. 2005-06 to 2007-08: Certificate u/s. 80G(5); Refusal to continue on the ground that the conditions u/s. 11(1)(d) not satisfied: Refusal not proper: Department directed to pay Rs. 1,00,000/- to the trust:

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DIT (Exemption) vs. Sri Ramakrishna Seva Ashram: 258 CTR 201 (Kar):

The assessee, a charitable trust, was registered u/s. 12A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in May 1991 and was allowed exemption u/s. 11 of the Act since then. A certificate u/s. 80G(5) of the Act was also issued to the assessee trust. The assessee’s application dated 02-02-2009 for continuation of certificate u/s. 80G was rejected on the ground that the donations to the rural project fund are not corpus donations, as such, the same are not credited to corpus account. No details of the donors is furnished in spite of the specific directions. Such donations have not been considered for computation of 85% application u/s. 11(1) of the Act for the A. Ys. 2005-06 to 2007-08. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s appeal and directed the DIT(Exemption) to grant continuation of the 80G certificate.

On appeal by the Revenue, the following question was raised before the Karnataka High Court:

“If the assessee receives contributions for charitable purposes and does not show them in the statement of account as the ‘corpus fund’, but, shows the said amount under a different specific head, does it cease to be a corpus fund to be eligible for the benefit u/s. 11(1)(d) of the Act.?”

The High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal, dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue and held as under:

“i) The word ‘corpus’ is used in the context of IT Act. This can be understood in the context of a capital opposed to expenditure. It is a capital of an assessee; a capital of an estate, capital of a trust; a capital of an institution. Therefore, if any voluntary contribution is made with a specific direction, then it shall be treated as the capital of the trust for carrying on its charitable or religious activities. Then such an income falls u/s. 11(1)(d) and is not liable to tax. Therefore, it is not necessary that a voluntary contribution should be made with a specific direction to treat it as corpus.

ii) If the intention of the donor is to give that money to a trust which they will keep in trust account in deposit and the income from the same is utilized for carrying on a particular activity, it satisfies the definition part of the corpus. The assessee would be entitled to the benefit of exemption from payment of tax levied. From whatever angle it may be seen, the deposited amount cannot be said to be income in the hands of the recipient trust.

iii) Similarly, the assessee after receiving the amount keeps the amount in deposit and only utilises the income from the deposit to carry out the charitable activities, then also the said amount would be a contribution to the corpus of the trust and the nomenclature in which the amount is kept in deposit is of no relevance as long as the contribution received are kept in deposit as capital and only the income from the said capital which is to be utilised for carrying on charitable and religious activities of the institute/corpus of the trust, for which section 11(1)(d) is attracted and the said income is not liable to tax under the Act. In so far as the argument that the person who made these contributions do not specifically direct that they shall form part of the corpus of the trust is concerned, it has no substance. In view of the language employed in section 11(1)(d), the requirement is that the voluntary contributions have to be made with a specific direction. The law does not require that the said direction should be in writing. In the absence of the direction in writing, the only way that one can find out whether there was a specific direction and to find out how the money so paid is utilised. If the money so received by way of voluntary conrtributions, if it is meant to be used for the leprosy patients and is credited to a particular account and from the income from the said capital, the said activity is carried on, the requirement of section 11(1)(d) is complied with.

iv) In the instant case from records it is seen that those people who have paid by way of donation that includes the cheque with a letter with a specific direction, which is in compliance with section 11(1)(d). But, in case the contributions are made without cheque, i.e., by cash, and oral direction has been issued to the trust to utilise the said fund for the purpose of treating the leprosy patients and if such amounts are credited to the account meant for it, even then the requirement of section 11(1)(d) is complied with.

v) The attitude of the IT authorities is surprising who are over-technical in denying the benefit to the deserving institutions which are rendering laudable services to the rural masses. By not granting tax exemption, which they deserve, the authorities have hampered the said social activities of the trust and they are made to waste their precious time, energy and money in fighting this litigation. Unfortunately, the persons who took a decision to file an appeal before this court are wasting the precious time of the trust which could have been used in the social service. Public money and the time of this court is also wasted. This attitude on the part of the Department cannot be countenanced. Therefore, it is appropriate to impose cost incurred by the assessee for fighting litigation so that the Department would be more careful in taking decision to file appeal in such frivolous cases by ignoring the policy of the Government, viz., National Litigation Policy, 2011.

vi) Hence, the appeal is dismissed with cost of Rs. 1,00,000/-, to be deposited by the Department within one month from today in favour of the rural project fund of the assessee trust.”

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Business income or house property income: S/s. 22 and 28: A. Y. 2003-04: Assessee owner of property: Hotel run in property by company of which assessee was director: No lease of property: Share of profits received by assessee: Assessable as business income:

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CIT vs. Francis Wacziarg; 353 ITR 187 (Del):

Assessee was the owner of the property. Hotels were run in the property by a company in which assessee was director. There was no lease agreement. The assessee was entitled to a certain share in the gross operating profit calculated in terms of the agreement. The asessee disclosed the income as business income and claimed deduction of expenditure and depreciation. The Assessing Officer assessed the income as income from house property and disallowed the claim for deduction of expenditure and depreciation. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The Commissioner (Appeals) had given a detailed factual finding why income earned by the assessee from the three properties was taxable under the head “Income from business or profession” and not under the head “Income from house property”. This finding had been upheld by the Tribunal. The findings were not perverse and were based on documents and material placed on record. This income was assessable as business income.

ii) Once it was held that the income from the three properties was taxable under the head “Income from business or profession” depreciation had to be allowed under the provisions of section 32. Similarly, disallowance of 80% from the expenses deleted by the Commissioner (Appeals)/Tribunal had been explained and supported by cogent reasoning. The depreciation and the expenditure were deductible.”

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Business expenditure: S/s. 2(24)(x), 36(1)(va) and 43B: A. Y. 2001-02: Employees’ contribution towards ESI: Deposited before due date for filing return though after due date prescribed under ESI Act, 1948: Deduction to be allowed: No distinction to be made between employer’s contribution and employees’ contribution: Amendment of section 43B by Finance Act, 2003 deleting second proviso is retrospective:

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CIT vs. Nipso Polyfabriks Ltd; 258 CTR 216 (HP):

For the A. Y. 2001-02, the assessee’s claim for deduction of employees’ contribution to ESI was disallowed by the Assessing Officer on the ground that the same was deposited after the due date prescribed under the ESI Act though it was deposited before the due date for filing the return of income. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the following question was raised:

“Whether the Tribunal was correct in holding that amounts received by the assessee from employees for crediting to their accounts in provident fund and ESI but not so credited on or before the due dates specified under the respective statutes, were allowable deductions u/s. 36(1) (va) of the IT Act?”

The Himachal Pradesh High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) By the Finance Act, 1987 section 2(24)(x) was inserted and the sums collected by the assessee from his employees as contribution to provident funds and ESI were to be treated as income. By the same Act, section 36(1)(va) was introduced. Resultantly, the contribution of the employees collected by the employer was treated as his income. At the same time, the same was allowed as deductible expense if deposited within a particular time. Section 43B was also amended in the year 1987 itself and the two provisos were inserted. As per the amendment, there was no differentiation between the employer’s or employees’ contributions. Both had to be deposited by the due date as defined in the Explanation below cl. (va) of s/s. (1) of section 36. By the Finance Act of 2003, which came into effect from 1st April, 2004, the second proviso to section 43B which specifically made reference to section 36(1)(va) was deleted. The amendment was curative in nature and hence would apply with retrospective effect from 1st April, 1988.

ii) The second proviso to section 43B(b) specifically referred to the due date u/s. 36(1)(va) and as such, it cannot be urged that the provisions of section 43B and section 36(1)(va) should not be read together. It is clear that the law was enacted to ensure that the payment of the contributions towards the provident funds, the ESI funds or other such welfare schemes must be made before furnishing the return of income u/s. 139(1).

iii) Though the amount was not deposited by the due date under the Welfare Acts, it was definitely deposited before furnishing the returns. That is no reason to deny him the benefit of section 43B, which starts with a non obstante clause and which clearly lays down that the assessee can take benefit of deduction of such contributions, if the same are paid before furnishing the return. There is no reason to make any distinction between the employees’ contribution or the employer’s contribution.”

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Bad debts: Section 36(1)(vii): A. Y. 2007-08: Assessee taking all assets and liabilities of two web portals from its holding company as going concerns: Debt due to holding company: Assessee is entitled to write off: Bad debt allowable:

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CIT vs. Times Business Solutions Ltd. 354 ITR 25 (del):

Consequent
upon a scheme of demerger, the assessee company had acquired all the
assets and liabilities of two web based portals that were hitherto being
operated by the assessee’s holding company. The portals were acquired
as going concerns. In the A. Y. 2007-08, the Assessing Officer rejected
the claim for deduction of bad debt of Rs. 3,63,31,432/- on the ground
that these debts related to the years 2003 to 2006 when the web portals
were run and operated by the holding company and that the assessee could
not have written off the bad debts as such contravened section
36(1)(vii). The CIT(A) and the Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i)
When the original owner would have been entitled to write off the bad
debts, the successor who acquires the assets and liabilities from the
previous owner would also be entitled to treat the bad debts in the same
manner in which the original owner was entitled under law.

ii)
The assesee had acquired all the assets and liabilities of two web based
portals from its holding company. The assessee, for the A. Y. 2007-08,
had written off the bad debts acquired from the holding company.
Therefore, the asessee was entitled to write off the irrecoverable bad
debts related to the years 2003 to 2006 when the web portals were run by
the holding company.

iii) The appeal is dismissed.”

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Search and seizure: Block assessment: S/s. 69A, 80-IB(10) and 158BB: Block Period 1-4- 1995 to 21-2-2002: Assessee in construction business eligible for deduction u/s. 80-IB(10): Disclosure of construction income: Assessee is entitled to deduction u/s. 80-IB(10):

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CIT vs. Sheth Developers (P) Ltd.; 254 CTR 127 (Bom):

The assessee carried on business as a builder and was entitled to deduction u/s. 80-IB(10). In the course of the search action u/s. 132 of the Act, on 21/02/2002, the assessee had made a declaration of undisclosed income of Rs. 7 crore. In the block return, the assessee offered undisclosed income of Rs. 3.5 crore. The assessee claimed that at the time of making the statement, the director of the assessee was unaware of the deduction u/s. 80-IB of the Act. The Assessing Officer did not allow the claim for deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) of the Act and computed the undisclosed income at Rs. 7.68 crore. CIT(A) and the Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) Consequent to the amendment by the Finance Act, 2002 with retrospective effect from 1-7-1995, the total income or loss has to be computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Consequently, w.e.f. 1-7-1995, the total income/ loss for the block period has to be computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the same would include Chapter VI-A. Section 80-IB is a part of Chapter VI-A. In view of the above, while computing the undisclosed income for the block period, the respondent assessee is entitled to claim deduction from its income u/s. 80-IB.

ii) It is not the case of the Revenue that the money found in possession of the assessee could not be explained and/or its source could not be explained to the satisfaction of the Assessing Officer. In the present case, undisclosed income found in the form of cash was explained as having been acquired while carrying on business as builder and this explanation was accepted by the Assessing officer by having assessed the undisclosed income for the block period as income from profits and gains of business or profession.

iii) In the present case, no question of application of sections 68, 69, 69A, 69B and 69C arises as the same has not been invoked by the Department. It is an admitted position between the parties as reflected even in the order of the Assessing Officer that undisclosed income was in fact received by the assessee in the course of carrying out its business activities as a builder. In view of the above, the order of the Tribunal cannot be faulted.”

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Reassessment: S/s. 115AD, 147 and 148: A. Y. 2006-07: Validity to be determined with reference to reasons recorded for belief: Assessment u/s. 143(1) determining Nil income: Notice u/s. 148 on the ground that that section 115AD may be applicable: Not valid:

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Indivest Pte Ltd. vs. Addl. DIT; 350 ITR 120 (Bom):

The assessee company was owned by the Government of Singapore. For the A. Y. 2006-07, in the return of income, the assessee had claimed that the profits earned from the transactions in Indian securities are not liable to tax in India in view of Article 7 of the India-Singapore tax treaty. Accordingly, the assessee had returned Nil income. The assessment was completed u/s. 143(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 determining Nil income. Subsequently, the Assessing Officer issued notice u/s. 148 dated 16-3-2011 on the ground that the possibility of escapement of income taxable as STCG under the Act may not be ruled out.

The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

“i) The Assessing Officer has power to reopen an assessment, provided there is “tangible material” to come to the conclusion that there is escapement of income from assessment. Reason must have a live link with the formation of the belief. The validity of the notice reopening the assessment u/s. 148 of the Act, has to be determined on the basis of the reasons which are disclosed to the assessee. Those reasons constitute the foundation of the action initiated by the Assessing Officer of reopening the assessment. Those reasons cannot be supplemented or improved upon subsequently.

ii) Reading the reasons of the Assessing Officer, it was evident that there was absolutely no tangible material on the basis of which the assessment for the A. Y. 2006-07 could have been reopened. Upon the return of income being filed by the assessee both in electronic form and subsequently in the conventional mode, the assessee received an intimation u/s. 143(1).

iii) While disposing of the objections of the assessee, the Assessing Officer had purported to state that the assessee had filed only sketchy details in its return filed in the electronic form. The relevant provisions expressly make it clear that no document or report can be filed with the return of income in the electronic form.

iv) The notice was not valid and was liable to be quashed.”

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Industrial undertaking: Deduction u/s. 80-IC: A. Y. 2004-05: Interest received for delay in payment for goods: Is income derived from industrial undertaking: Eligible for deduction u/s. 80-IC:

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CIT Vs. Universal Pipes (P) Ltd.; 254 CTR 311 (Gau):

The assessee was engaged in the manufacture and sale of PVC pipes. The assessee was entitled to deduction u/s. 80-IC. In the relevant year, the assessee had received an amount of Rs. 3,13,19,602/- by way of interest from the irrigation department, as per the order of the High Court, for the delay involved in the payment in connection with delivery of goods. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim for deduction u/s. 80-IC in respect of this amount. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Gauhati High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“Interest received from the Irrigation Department as per the order of the Court for the delay involved in the payment in connection with delivery of goods to Irrigation Department constituted income derived from the industrial undertaking of the assessee and is eligible for deduction u/s. 80-IC.”

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Income from undisclosed sources: Reference to DVO: S/s. 69 and 142A: A. Y. 1989-90: Rejection of books of account is prerequisite for valid reference to DVO for valuation u/s. 142A: Report of DVO pursuant to invalid reference could not be a basis for addition u/s. 69:

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Goodeluck Automobiles (P) Ltd. vs. ACIT; 254 CTR 1 (Guj):

In the previous year relevant to the A. Y. 1989-90, the assessee had constructed a building and had declared the cost of construction to be Rs. 13,23,321/-. The Assessing Officer made a reference to the DVO for valuation who computed the cost of construction at Rs. 19,13,100/-. The Assessing Officer made the addition of the difference of Rs. 5,89,779/- as undisclosed income u/s. 69 of the Income-tax Act, 1969. The reference to the DVO and the addition was upheld by the Tribunal.

On appeal by the assessee, the Gujarat High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) Expression used by the Legislature in the heading of section 142A as well as in the opening part of the said section is “estimate”. Question of estimate arises only when the books of account of the assessee are not reliable. For the purpose of resorting to the provisions of section 142A, the Assessing Officer is first required to record a satisfaction that the assessee has made investments which are not recorded in the books of account. As a necessary corollary, he would then reject the books of account as not reflecting the correct position and then proceed to make the assessment on the basis of the estimation. Thus, it is apparent that the question of estimating the value of any investment would arise only when the books of account are not reliable. Accordingly, the Assessing Officer is first required to reject the books of account before making a reference to the Valuation Officer.

ii) Report of the Valuation Officer cannot form the foundation for rejection of the books of account. In the instant case, the Assessing Officer has categorically recorded a finding to the effect that the assessee’s accounts are duly audited and complete details are available. He made reference to the valuation Officer merely to seek expert advice regarding the cost of construction. There is nothing in the assessment order to suggest that the Assessing Officer had any doubt regarding the cost of construction or that he was not satisfied regarding the correctness or completeness of the books of account.

iii) Prior to making the reference to the valuation Officer, the Assessing Officer has not ascertained what was the defect in the cost of construction disclosed by the assessee in its return. Except for the difference between the estimated cost determined by the Valuation Officer and the actual cost shown by the assessee, the Assessing Officer has not brought any material on record to establish that the assessee has made any unaccounted investment in the construction of the building in question and that the books of account do not reflect the correct cost of construction.

iv) Hence, the reference made to the Valuation Officer not being in consonance with the provisions of law was invalid. Accordingly, the report made by the valuation Officer pursuant to such invalid reference could not have been made the basis of the addition u/s. 69.

v) In view of the above discussion, the Tribunal was not justified in holding that the reference made by the Assessing Officer to the Valuation Officer for estimating the cost of construction was not invalid. The Tribunal was also not justified in holding that the addition made by the Assessing officer u/s. 69 of the Act was correct.”

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Income: Accrual of: Section 5: A. Y. 2004-05: Amount (Rs. 3,037 crore) for transfer of indefeasible right of connectivity for 20 years: Assessee correctly spread the entire fee of Rs. 3,037 crore over a period of 20 years and accordingly paid tax: Entire amount was not assessable during the relevant year:

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CIT vs. Reliance Communication Infrastructure Ltd.; 254 CTR 251 (Bom):

In the previous year relevant to the A. Y. 2004-05, the assessee had received an amount of Rs. 3,037 crore as fees for grant of Indefeasible Right of Connectivity for a period of 20 years. The assessee spread the amount over a period of 20 years and accordingly paid the tax. The Assessing Officer allowed the claim. Exercising the powers u/s. 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the Commissioner held that the entire amount was income accrued to the assessee in the relevant year i.e. A. Y. 2004-05 itself. The Tribunal upheld the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The Tribunal has on examination of the agreement dated 30-4-2003 entered into between RI Ltd and the assessee concluded that RI Ltd in terms of the agreement had only a right to use the network during the tenure of 20 years agreement. Further, the agreement was liable to be terminated at the sole discretion of RI Ltd. and consequently, the amount received as advance for 20 years lease period would have to be returned on such termination for the balance unutilised period.

ii) Further, the Tribunal held that the agreement dated 30-4-2003 was only in the nature/form of a lease agreement. On application of AS-19 formulated by the ICAI, a lease income arising from operating lease should be recognised in the statement of profit and loss in a straight line method over the term of the lease. Therefore, the assessee had in terms of AS-19 correctly spread the entire fee of Rs. 3,037 crore over the period of 20 years and to pay tax thereon over the entire period.”

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Expenditure: Capital or revenue: Section 37: A. Y. 1997-98: Amounts paid by assessee to clubs for obtaining membership is revenue expenditure:

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CIT vs. Infosys Technologies Ltd. (No. 3); 349 ITR 598 (Kar):

In the relevant year, the Assessing Officer disallowed the claim of the assessee for deduction of the amount paid to the clubs for obtaining membership holding the same as capital expenditure. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held that the amount paid to the clubs for obtaining membership is revenue expenditure.

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Charitable trust: Registration: S/s 12A and 12AA: Statute does not prohibit or enjoin the CIT from registering trust solely based on its objects, without any activity, in the case of a newly registered trust:

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DI vs. Foundation of Opthalmic and Optometry Research Education Centre; 254 CTR 133 (Del):

The assessee society had applied for registration u/s. 12AA on 10-7-2008. The Director of IT(Exemption) refused to grant registration on the ground that no charitable activity had in fact taken place since the society was a newly established one. The Tribunal allowed the assesse’s appeal.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) Facially, the provisions of section 12AA would suggest that there are no restrictions of the kind which the Revenue is reading into this case. In other words, the statute does not prohibit or enjoin the CIT from registering trust solely based on its objects, without any activity, in the case of a newly registered trust. The statute does not prescribe a waiting period, for a trust to qualify itself for registration.

ii) Tribunal was right in holding that while examining the application u/s. 12AA(1)(b) r.w.s. 12A, the concerned CIT/Director is not required to examine the question whether the trust has actually commenced and has, in fact, carried on charitable activities.

iii) The appeal is accordingly dismissed.”

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Reassessment: S/s. 143(1), 143(3), 147 and 148: A. Y. 2002-03: No distinction to be made while interpreting the words “reason to believe” vis-à-vis section 143(1) and 143(3): In the absence of “fresh material” assessment cannot be reopened: Change of opinion is not a valid basis for reopening assessment:

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CIT vs. Oriented Craft Ltd.(Del); ITA No. 555 of 2012 dated 12/12/2012:

For the A. Y. 2002-03, the assessee filed the return of income claiming deduction of Rs. 13.35 crore u/s. 80HHC of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The returned income was accepted by an order u/s. 143(1) of the Act. Subsequently, the Assessing officer issued notice u/s. 148 of the Act and reopened the assessment on the ground that the sale proceeds of the quota was wrongly considered as export turnover and that it was business profits and 90% thereof had to be reduced for computing deduction u/s. 80HHC. The assessee challenged the reopening on the ground that there was no “fresh material” as contemplated by the Supreme Court in the case of CIT Vs. Kelvinator of India Ltd; 320 ITR 561 (SC). The Tribunal accepted the assessee’s contention and held that the Assessing Officer had no jurisdiction to reopen the assessment made u/s. 143(1) of the Act.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:
“i) Section 147 permits an assessment to be reopened if there is “reason to believe”. It makes no distinction between an order u/s. 143(3) or an intimation u/s. 143(1) of the Act. Accordingly, it is not permissible to adopt different standards while interpreting the words “reason to believe” vis-à-vis section 143(1) and 143(3). The Department’s argument that the same rigorous standards which are applicable in the interpretation of the expression when it is applied to the reopening of a section 143(3) assessment cannot apply to a section 143(1) intimation is not acceptable because it would place an assessee whose return is processed u/s. 143(1) in a more vulnerable position than an assessee in whose case there is a full-fledged scrutiny assessment u/s. 143(3).

ii) Whether the return is put to scrutiny or accepted without demur is not a matter which is within the control of assessee. An interpretation which makes distinction between the meaning and content of the expression “reason to believe” between a case where a section 143(3) assessment is made and one where an intimation u/s. 143(1) is made may lead to unintended mischief, be discriminatory and lead to absurd results.

iii) In CIT vs. Kelvinator India Ltd; 320 ITR 561(SC) it was held that the term “reason to believe” means that there is “tangible material” and not merely a “change of opinion” and this principle will apply even to section 143(1) intimation.

iv) On facts, the Assessing Officer reached the belief that there was escapement of income on going through the return of income filed by the assessee. This is nothing but a review of the earlier proceedings and an abuse of power by the Assessing Officer. There is no whisper in the reasons recorded of any tangible material which came to the possession of the Assessing Officer subsequent to the issue of the intimation. It reflects an arbitrary exercise of power conferred u/s. 147.

v) Appeal of the Revenue is accordingly dismissed.”

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Appeal to High Court – High Court should not overrule the findings of the Tribunal and Commissioner (Appeals) on the factual aspects and in case of doubt should remit the matter for deciding the matter afresh after giving reasonable opportunity to the assessee.

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M.K. Shanmugam vs. CIT [2012] 349 ITR 384 (SC)

The assessee was engaged in the business of jewellery and money-lending. He was the proprietor of M/s. Sri Velmurugan Financiers, M/s. Sri Raja Jewellery, M/s. Sri Raja Silks and M/s. M.K.S. Finance. He was also the managing director of M/s. Shanmugaraja Chit Funds Pvt. Ltd. and partner in M/s. Sri Raja Chit Funds, M/s. Sri Velmurugan Chit Funds, Coimbatore and M/s. United Fabrics, Tiruppur. A search was conducted in the business premises of the assessee on 31st January, 2001, u/s. 132 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, hereinafter referred to as “the Act”, by the Investigation Unit II, Coimbatore. During the course of the search, various incriminating documents were seized, which indicated that the assessee did not disclose the correct income earned by him in the returns filed by him before conducting such a search. Before the date of the search, the assessee filed returns of income only up to the assessment year 1998-99. Therefore, a notice u/s. 158BC of the Act was issued to the assessee on 28th February, 2001. The search was concluded on 13th March, 2001. On 18th September, 2002, block return in Form 2B was filed by the assessee for the period from 1st April, 1990 to 13th March, 2001, declaring a loss of Rs. 16,47,844. In response to the notices and the letters issued, the assessee made written as well as oral submissions in respect of his income and investments during the said block period. The documents seized from his business premises and the documents produced by him were scrutinised and after hearing the assessee, the Assessing Officer completed the assessment. The Assessing Officer made additions of (i) Rs. 42 lakh on account on-money received from sale of Raja Street properties; (ii) Rs. 60,72,900 being bogus outstanding deposit in jewellery; (iii) Rs. 3,83,000 being bogus outstanding fixed deposits in Sri Velmurugan Finances; (iv) Rs. 26,63,130 in respect of unexplained payments made to various parties, and (v) Rs. 2,00,000/- being sale proceeds of A.P. Lodge.

As against the assessment order, the assessee filed an appeal before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) II, Coimbatore, who by order dated 25th March, 2004, allowed the appeal in part. Aggrieved by the said order of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), the Revenue filed an appeal before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and the assessee filed cross-objection in respect of the disallowed portion. The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, by its common order dated 23rd November, 2006, dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue and partly allowed the cross objection filed by the assessee. Challenging the same, the Revenue filed appeal before the High Court.

The High Court allowing the appeal held that
(i) the Assessing Officer had not committed any error in making the addition of Rs. 42 lakh, while completing the block assessment,
(ii) out of Rs. 60,92,900/- a sum of Rs. 21,21,400/- was assessable as undisclosed income,

(iii) the addition of Rs. 13,83,000 was justified and
(iv) the amount of Rs. 26,63,130/- was rightly treated as undisclosed income [349 ITR 369 (Mad)].

On appeal to the Supreme Court by the assessee, the Apex Court, after going through the judgment of the High Court, observed that the High Court had overruled the decisions of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) on factual aspects also. By way of illustration, the Supreme Court pointed out that the High Court had stated that cash flow statements submitted by the assessee were not supported by the documents. According to the Supreme Court, in such a case, the High Court should have remitted the case to the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) giving opportunity to the assessee to produce relevant documents. The Supreme Court, for the aforestated reasons, set aside the judgement of the High Court and remitted the case to the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), to decide the matter uninfluenced by the judgment of the High Court.

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Business Expenditure – Disallowance under section 40A(9) – The Supreme Court refrained from going into the scope and applicability of section 40A(9) when the proper foundation of facts had not been laid.

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Sandur Manganese And Iron Ores Ltd. vs. CIT [2012] 349 ITR 386 (SC)

The assessee, a limited company engaged in the business of extraction of manganese and iron ore had claimed in the return of income filed for the assessment years 1985-86, 1986-87, 1989-90, 1990-91 and 1992-93, deductions for the payments made to Sandur Residential School and Sandur Educational Society.

In the orders of assessments passed for the assessment years 1985-86, 1986-87, 1989-90, 1990-91 and 1992-93, the Assessing Officer disallowed the deductions claimed for the payments made to Sandur Residential School and Sandur Educational Society by applying the provisions of section 40A(9) of the Act r.w.s. 40A(10) of the Act.

The assessee after exhausting the remedy of the first appeal before the Appellate Commissioner, filed the second appeal before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal allowed the deductions claimed, on the ground that the expenses had been incurred fully and exclusively for the purpose of business and welfare of the employees’ children. Therefore, the deduction was allowable for the assessment year 1983-84 in view of the non-obstante clause of section 40A(10) of the Act and for the assessment years 1985-86 till 1992-93 in view of section 37(1) of the Act. The Tribunal placed reliance on the decision in the case of Mysore Kirloskar Ltd. vs. CIT [1987] 166 ITR 836 (Karn).

The Tribunal inter alia referred the following question of law to the High Court for its consideration and opinion.

“Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was right in allowing the payments made by the assessee to Sandur Residential School and Sandur Educational Society as business expenditure for the assessment years 1985-86, 1986-87, 1989-90, 1990-91 and 1992-93?” The High Court held that a reading of the Budget speech of the Finance Minister would indicate that under the provisions of section 40A(9) of the Act, no deduction is permissible on the contribution made by the corporate bodies to the so-called welfare funds, except the contributions made to such funds which are established under the statute or an approved provident fund, superannuation fund or gratuity fund.

The High Court did not accept the view expressed by the Kerala High Court in P. Balakrishnan, CIT v. Travancore Cochin Chemicals Ltd. (2000) 243 ITR 284 (Ker) and by the Bombay High Court in CIT v. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (2001) 252 ITR 431 (Bom) in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Larsen and Toubro Institute of Technology v. All India Council for Technical Education, AIR 1995 (SC) 1585. The High Court answered the question in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.

On an appeal to the Supreme Court, on the issue of the allowability of the sum spent as welfare expenses towards providing education to its employees’ children, the Supreme Court observed that section 40A(9) was inserted as a measure for combating tax avoidance. The application of section 40A(9) would come into play only after the assessee has established the basic facts. According to the Supreme Court, the facts were not clear inasmuch as the assessee had made payments to other educational institutions and also not only to the school or the society promoted by the assessee. According to the Supreme Court, from each assessment year, the Tribunal would have to record a separate finding as to whether the claim for deduction was being made for payments to the school promoted by the assessee or to some other educational institutions/ schools and thereafter apply section 40A(9). The Supreme Court accordingly restored the matter to Tribunal, for de novo consideration for each of the assessment years and directing it to give a clear bifurcation between payments made by the assessee to Sandur Residential School and Sandur Education Society and payments made to schools other than the above two institutions. The Supreme Court however, refrained from going into the scope and applicability of section 40A(9) in the absence of proper facts.

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THE FINANCE ACT, 2013

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1 Introduction

1.1 Shri P. Chidambaram, the Union Finance Minister, presented the last effective Budget of the present term of the UPA II Government for the year 2013-14 on 28th February, 2013. The Finance Bill, 2013, introduced by him with his budget, contained 125 clauses, out of which only 53 clauses relate to ‘Direct Taxes’ and 72 clauses relate to ‘Indirect Taxes’. This year, there was no serious debate in the Parliament on the Finance Bill. The Finance Minister introduced 11 new clauses, which were more or less of clarificatory nature on 30th April, 2013, and the Bill was passed by the Lok Sabha on the same day without any debate. Similarly, the Rajya Sabha passed the Finance Bill without any debate on 2nd May, 2013. The Bill has received the assent of the President on 10th May, 2013.

1.2 While concluding his Budget Speech, the Finance Minister has, in Para 188, made some predictions as under:

“Any economist will tell us what India can become. We are the tenth-largest economy in the World. We can become the eighth, or perhaps the seventh largest by 2017. By 2015, we could become a $5 trillion economy, and among the [top] five in the world. What we will become depends on us and on the choices that we make. Swami Vivekananda, whose 150th birth anniversary we celebrate this year, told the people: “All the strength and succour you want is within yourself. Therefore, make your own future.”

1.3 In Para 185 of the Budget Speech, it is stated that the effect of changes in Direct Tax Laws this year will bring additional revenue of Rs. 13,300 crore. So far as Indirect Taxes are concerned, the additional revenue will be Rs 4,700 crore.

1.4 In this Article, the amendments made in the Income-tax Act, the Wealth Tax Act and Securities Transaction Tax (STT) are discussed. A new tax viz. “Commodities Transaction Tax” (CTT) is now levied u/s. 105 to 124 of the Finance Act, 2013. This is on the same lines as the STT. The important features of this new tax are also discussed in this Article.

2 Rates of income tax, surcharge and education cess:
2.1 Surcharge on Super-Rich:

There are no changes in the tax slabs, rates of income tax, or rates of Education Cess. In Para 126 of the Budget Speech, the Finance Minister has stated that “Fiscal consolidation cannot be effected only by cutting expenditure. Wherever possible, revenues must also be augmented. When I need to raise resources, who can I go to except those who are relatively well placed in society? There are 42,800 persons — let me repeat, only 42,800 persons — who admitted to a taxable income exceeding Rs. 1 crore per year. I propose to impose a surcharge of 10 percent on persons whose taxable income exceeds Rs. 1 crore per year. This will apply to individuals, HUFs, firms and entities with similar tax status.” In Para 127, he has stated that in the cases of domestic companies, the existing surcharge is 5% if the taxable income exceeds Rs. 1 crore. This will now be 10% if the taxable income exceeds Rs. 10 crore. Similarly, in the case of a foreign company the existing surcharge of 2% will increase to 5% — if the income exceeds Rs. 10 crore. In Para 128, the Finance Minister has stated that the existing surcharge of 5% will increase to 10% in case of tax on dividend distribution. Further, in Para 129 of his speech, he has stated that this additional surcharge will be in force only for one year i.e. financial year 2013-14 (A.Y. 2014-15).

2.2 Rebate from Tax:

In order to give a small relief to Resident Individual Tax Payers, a new Section 87A is inserted in the Income-tax Act (IT Act) w.e.f. A.Y. 2014-15. Under this section, a resident individual whose total income does not exceed Rs. 5 lakh, will be entitled to receive a rebate of Rs. 2,000/- or the income tax payable (whichever is less) from the income tax payable by him. It may be noted that this rebate cannot be claimed by an HUF.

2.3 Rates of Income-tax and Surcharge:

(i) For Resident Individuals, HUF, AOP, BOI and Artificial Juridical Person, as stated above, there are no changes in the tax slabs, rates of Income tax or rates of Education Cess. The only change is about levy of 10% surcharge on tax if the income exceeds Rs. 1 crore. The rates of tax for A.Y. 2013-14 and A.Y. 2014-15 (Accounting years ending on 31-03-2013 and 31-03-2014) are the same as stated below):

Notes:

•    In A.Y. 2014-15 Surcharge @ 10% of the tax will be payable if income of the assessee exceeds Rs. 1 crore.
•    An Individual having gross total income below Rs 5 lakh will get rebate upto Rs. 2,000/- from tax in A.Y. 2014-15 u/s. 87A.
•    Education Cess of 3% (2%+1%) of the tax is payable for both the years.

(ii)    The following table gives figures of tax payable by Resident Individual, HUF, AOP, BOI etc. in A.Y. 2013-14 and A.Y. 2014-15.

(a)    Tax payable in A.Y. 2013-14 (Accounting year ending on 31-03-2013)


Note: The above tax is to be increased by 3% of tax for Education Cess.

(b)    Tax payable in A.Y. 2014-15(Accounting year ending on 31-03-2014)
Notes:

•    In the first two items (Rs. 3 lakh and Rs. 5 lakh) in the case of an Individual having income below Rs. 5 lakh, the tax payable will be reduced by Rebate of Rs. 2,000/- u/s. 87A.
•    The last item (Rs. 125 lakh) includes surcharge of 10%.
•    The above tax is to be increased by 3% of tax for Education Cess.

(iii)    Other Assessees (excluding companies)

The rates of taxes (including rate of Education Cess) for the other assesses (excluding companies) for A.Y. 2013-14 and A.Y. 2014-15 are the same. No surcharge on tax was payable by Co-operative Societies, Firms, LLP or Local Authority in A.Y. 2013-14. However, in A.Y. 2014-15, if the income of the above entities exceed Rs. 1 crore, Surcharge @ 10% of tax will be payable.

(iv)    For Companies:

The rates of Income tax for Companies for A.Y. 2013-14 and A.Y. 2014-15 are the same. For domestic companies, surcharge of 5% of tax is payable in A.Y. 2013-14 if the total income exceeds Rs. 1 crore. In A.Y. 2014-15, the rate of surcharge will be 5% if the total income exceeds Rs. 1 crore but does not exceed Rs. 10 crore. If the total income exceeds Rs. 10 crore, the rate of surcharge will be 10% of the tax payable on the entire income.

In the case of a foreign company there is no change in the rates of income tax in A.Y. 2013- 14 and A.Y. 2014-15. As regards surcharge, the rate is 2% of the tax if the total income exceeds Rs. 1 crore in A.Y. 2013-14. In A.Y. 2014-15, the rate of surcharge will be 2% if the total income exceeds Rs. 1 crore but does not exceed Rs. 10 crore. If the total income exceed Rs 10 crore the rate of surcharge will be 5% of the tax payable on the entire income.

In both the above cases, Education Cess @ 3% of tax is payable in A.Y. 2013-14 and A.Y. 2014-15.

(v)    Rate of Tax u/s. 115JB (MAT)

The rate of tax (i.e. 18.5%) will be payable on the book profits of a company computed u/s. 115JB (MAT) in A.Y. 2013-14 and A.Y. 2014-15. The surcharge will be payable on this tax as stated in (iv) above. Education Cess @ 3% of the tax plus applicable surcharge will be payable as at present.

(vi)    Rate of Tax u/s. 115JC (AMT)

The rate of tax (i.e. 18.5%) will be payable on the adjusted total income of non-corporate assesses u/s. 115JC (AMT) in A.Y. 2013 -14 and A.Y. 2014-15. The surcharge and Education Cess will be payable on this tax as stated in (iii) above.

(vii)    Dividend Distribution Tax
:

Dividend Distribution Tax or Income Distribution Tax payable u/s. 115O, 115QA, 115R or 115TA shall be pay-able as provided in these section. The surcharge at 10% of tax will be payable in respect of the above tax for A.Y. 2014-15. The Education Cess @ 3% of the tax shall also be payable on the above tax. It may be noted that surcharge @ 10% of tax will be payable irrespective of the amount distributed under these sections.

(viii)    Rate of Tax on Dividends from Specified Foreign Companies:

The concessional rate of 15% plus applicable surcharge and Education Cess which was applicable for A.Y. 2013-14 u/s. 115BBD has been extended for one more year i.e. for A.Y. 2014-15.

2.4 Education Cess:

As in the earlier years, Education Cess of 3% (including 1% Higher Education Cess) of the income tax and applicable surcharge is payable by all resident assessees and non-resident assessees. No Education Cess or surcharge is applicable on TDS and TCS from payments to all resident corporate and non-corporate assesses. However, if tax is deducted from

(a)    payments to foreign companies, (b) payments to non-residents or (c) salary to residents or non-residents, Education Cess at 3% of the tax and applicable surcharge is to be deducted.

3.    Tax deduction and collection at source (TDS and TCS)

3.1 In the case of a resident assessee or a domestic company, where tax is required to be deducted or collected at source, no surcharge or Education Cess of the applicable rate of tax is to be considered. However, in the case of a non -resident or a foreign company while deducting or collecting tax at source, under the provisions of the Income-tax Act during the period commencing from 01-04-2013, the applicable rate of tax is to be increased by the applicable rate of surcharge and Education Cess. As stated earlier, in the case of non-residents (other than foreign companies), if the total income exceeds Rs. 1 crore, the rate of surcharge is 10% of the tax. In the case of a foreign company, if the total income is more than Rs. 1 crore but less than Rs. 10 crore, the rate of surcharge is 2% of the tax. If the income is more than Rs. 10 crore, this rate is 5% of the tax on total income. In all cases, the rate of Education Cess is 3% of the tax (including applicable surcharge).

3.2 TDS on transfer of immovable property:

(i)    Section 194-1A – This new section is inserted in the Income-tax Act w.e.f. 01-06-2013. It provides that any person (transferee) who purchases any immovable property (whether residential or commercial) for a consideration, shall now deduct tax at source at the rate of 1% of the amount paid to a resident seller (transferor) if the said consideration exceeds Rs. 50 lakh. For this purpose, the term “Immovable Property”, is defined to mean any land (other than Agricultural Land) or any building or part of a building. It may be noted that the section will apply in both cases i.e. when the purchaser is purchasing the property as a capital asset or as stock-in-trade.

(ii)    This section will apply to all assessees, whether resident or non-resident, who purchase any immovable property in India from a resident. In other words, the obligation for deduction of tax is on every purchaser of immovable property, whether he is required to get his books of accounts audited u/s. 44AB or not. It will not be necessary for the purchaser to obtain Tax Deduction Account Number (TAN) u/s. 203A.

However, the purchaser will have to file TDS Return and deposit TDS amount with the Government as provided in Section 200. The seller of the property must provide his PAN to the purchaser. If this is not done, tax on the sale consideration will have to be deducted at 20% as provided in section 206AA. It may be noted that the option of obtaining certificate from the A.O. u/s. 197 prescribing NIL rate or lower rate of TDS is not available in the above case.

(iii)    If the purchase of the immovable property is from a non-resident, the tax will be deductible by the purchaser at the applicable rate u/s. 195 as at present. This new section will not apply to such a purchase. Similarly, this new section will not apply to payment of compensation on acquisition of immovable property to which the provisions of TDS u/s. 194LA are applicable.

(iv)    It may be noted that a similar provision for TDS was proposed to be introduced by the insertion of section 194LAA in the Income-tax Act by the Finance Bill, 2012. Under this provision, it was proposed that the purchaser of an immovable property for a consideration exceeding Rs. 50 lakh in the specified area and Rs. 20 lakh in other areas shall deduct tax at source @ 1% of the consideration. For this purpose, the consideration was to be considered as specified in the Sale Deed or stamp duty valuation u/s. 50C whichever was higher. The registering authority was directed not to register the document unless the evidence for payment of TDS amount was produced before him. There was a lot of protest against the introduction of such a provision last year. Therefore, this provision was dropped before passing the Finance Act, 2012. A similar provision is again introduced this year and in the absence of any serious debate the same has been now brought into force from 01-06-2013.

(v)    This new provision is likely to raise some issues as under:

(a) The definition of immovable property only covers land (other than agricultural land) or building or part of the building. This will mean that any right in a building such as tenancy right, leasehold right etc. will not be subject to this TDS provision. [Refer: Atul G Puranik vs. ITO 132 ITD 499 (Mum)]

(b)    If a person has booked a flat in a building under construction, either the flat is booked before 01-06-
2013 or after that date, and makes payment for the same, a question will arise whether he is required to deduct tax at source under this section. It is possible to take the view that by the agreement with the builder the purchaser gets a right to get the flat when constructed. Therefore, when the instalment payments are made to the builder there is no transfer of immovable property. [Refer: ITO vs. Yasin Moosa Godil 147 TTJ 94 (Ahd)] The transfer of flat will take place only when possession is given.

Therefore, the obligation to deduct tax will arise under this section only when the last instalment is paid against possession of the flat. However, TDS @ 1% will have to be deducted on the entire consideration for the flat at that time.

(c)    Since there is no specific mention in this section that if the amount of stamp duty valuation u/s. 50C is more than the actual consideration, the stamp duty valuation will be considered as consideration for TDS purposes, it can be concluded that tax is to be deducted from the actual consideration payable as per the sale deed. As stated earlier, in the Finance Bill, 2012 the proposed section 194LAA specifically provided for considering stamp duty valuation if that was more than the consideration stated in the Sale Deed. There is no such provision in this new section 194-1A.

(d)    Section 199 of the Income-tax Act provides that credit for TDS amount will be given against the income in respect of which such tax is deducted. In a transaction of sale of immovable property, the seller will be showing income from such sale under the head “Capital Gains” or “Income from Business or Profession”. It may so happen that an individual selling his immovable property may claim exemption u/s. 54 or 54F due to reinvestment in another property or u/s. 54EC by reinvestment in Bonds. In all such cases, credit for TDS under this new section will be available even if the income computed under the head “Capital Gains” is NIL.

(e)    If the property is purchased by two or more persons as co-owners, the tax will be deductible by each co-owner in respect of his/her share of the consideration paid if the total consideration for the property exceeds Rs. 50 lakh. This section also applies in respect of purchase of property from a relative.

(f)    It may be noted that there is no provision for disallowance of purchase price of the property u/s. 40(a)(ia) in the case of a purchaser who has purchased the property as stock-in-trade.

3.3    tds from interest income of FII or qfi:

Section 194LD: This is a new Section inserted in the Income-tax Act w.e.f. 01-06-2013. This Section provides that any person paying interest to a Foreign Institutional Investor (FII) or a Qualified Foreign Investor (QFI) in respect of the following investment shall deduct tax at source at the rate of 5% plus applicable surcharge and Education Cess.

(a)    Interest on a Government Security

(b)    Interest on a rupee denominated bond of an Indian Company, provided that the rate of interest does not exceed the rate notified by the Central Government.

It may be noted that consequential amendments have been made in Sections 115A, 115AD, 195 and 196D. However, no consequential amendment is made in Section 206AA and, therefore, in the case of any FII or QFI, if PAN is not furnished tax will be deductible @ 20% plus applicable surcharge and Education Cess.

3.4 Section 206AA: This section is amended w.e.f. 01-06-2013. By this amendment, it is now clarified that in respect of interest paid to a non-resident or a foreign company on long term infrastructure bonds issued by an Indian Company in foreign currency as provided in section 194LC, the provisions of section 206AA will not apply from 01-06 -2013. Therefore, if such foreigner lender does not furnish PAN, the tax will be deducted at 5% plus applicable surcharge and Education Cess u/s. 194LC and not at the rate of 20% as provided in section 206AA.

It is surprising that similar concession is not given u/s. 206AA to tax deductible u/s. 194LD as discussed in Para 3.3 above.

3.5    Section 206C – Tax collection at source (TCS)

This section was amended last year w.e.f. 01-07-2012 by inserting s/s. (1D) in section 206C providing for TCS @ 1% of the sale consideration for bullion purchased by a buyer if the consideration exceeded Rs. 2 lakh and was paid in cash by the buyer. It was provided that for this purpose, the term “Bullion” shall not include any coin or any other article weighing 10 grams or less. This provision is now amended by the Finance Act, 2013, and it is provided that w.e.f. 01-06-2013, the exemption given from TCS provision to a coin or other article of bullion weighing 10 grams or less shall not be available. Therefore, tax will have to be collected @ 1% if the buyer of bullion (including any coin or other article) pays amount exceeding Rs. 2 lakh in cash.

4.    Exemptions and Deductions:

4.1    Agricultural Land Section 2(1A) and 2(14):

These two sections of the Income tax Act have been amended w.e.f. A.Y. 2014-15.

(i)    Section 2(14) defines the term “Capital Asset”.
As per the provisions of the section before the amendment, agricultural land situated within the jurisdiction of a Municipality, Cantonment Board etc. having population of more than 10,000 was considered as a Capital Asset. Similarly, agricultural land situated within the distance (not exceeding 8 kms) from the local limits of a Municipality, Cantonment Board etc. as notified was also considered as Capital Asset.

(ii)    Section 2(14) has now been amended to provide that the agricultural land situated in any area within the following distance, measured aerially, from the local limits of any Municipality, Cantonment etc. shall be considered as a Capital Asset.

(a)    Within 2 kms having population of more than 10,000 but less than 1 lakh;
(b)    Within 6 kms having population of more than 1 lac but less than 10 lakh;
(c)    Within 8 kms having population of more than 10    lakh.

In other words, agricultural land situated outside the above territory will not be considered as Capital Asset u/s. 2(14).

(iii)    The population for the above purpose is defined to mean population according to the last preceding census of which the relevant figures have been published before the first day of the Financial Year. The distance for the above purpose is to be measured “aerially”. This provision appears to have been made to settle the controversy about the method of measurement. In the case of CIT vs. Satinder Pal Singh 188 Taxman 54 (P&H) it was held that the distance should be measured by approach road and not by a straight line distance on a horizontal plane.

(iv)    Section 2(1A) has similarly been amended w.e.f. A.Y. 2014-15.

Income derived from any building and situated in the immediate vicinity of the agricultural land is presently exempt as agricultural income, subject to certain conditions u/s. 2(1A). By amendment of this section, it is now provided that income from such building falling within the area specified in (ii) above will not qualify for exemption as agricultural income.

4.2    Keyman Insurance Policy – Section 10(10D)

(i)    Section 10(10D) grants exemption to any sum received under a life insurance policy, subject to certain conditions. Amount received on maturity of Keyman Insurance Policy is not exempt u/s. 10(10D). There was a controversy whether the Keyman Insurance Policy assigned to the beneficiary continues to be a Keyman Insurance Policy. Delhi High Court held in the case of CIT vs. Rajan Nanda 349 ITR 8 that the Keyman Insurance Policy becomes an ordinary policy on the life of the beneficiary on assignment and therefore the amount received under this policy will be exempt if other conditions of section 10(10D) are complied with. To overcome this decision, Explanation 1 to the section is now amended w.e.f. A.Y. 2014-15 to provide that the Keyman Insurance Policy which has been assigned to the beneficiary during its term, with or without consideration, will be considered to be a Keyman Insurance Policy u/s. 10(10D) and exemption under that section will not be available in respect of the amount received on maturity. It may be noted that for A.Y. 2013-14 and earlier years the exemption can be claimed on the basis of Delhi High Court decision in the case of CIT vs. Rajan Nanda 349 ITR 8.

(ii)    One of the conditions for granting exemption provided in section 10(10D)(d) is that the annual premium payable in respect to a life insurance policy should not exceed 10% of capital sum insured. This percentage of the premium is increased to 15% in the case of insurance policy issued on or after 01-04-2013 on the life of (a) a person with disability stated in section 80U or (b) a person who is suffering from a disease or ailment specified u/s. 80DDB. Consequential amendment is made in section 80C also.


4.3    Securitisation Trusts: New Sections 10(23DA), 10(35A), 115TA to 115TC

(i)    New Scheme for taxation of Income of Securitisation Trust (Trust) has been introduced from A.Y. 2014-15. For this purpose, new sections 10(23D), 10(35A), 115TA, 115TB and 115TC have been added. The terms “Securitisation Trust”, “Securities”, “Securitised Debt Instrument”, “Instruments” “Investor” and “Special Purpose Vehicle” are defined in section 115TC. These terms have the same meaning as given to them in SEBI (Public Offer and

Listing of Securitised Debt Instruments) Regulations, 2008 or the Guidelines on the securitisation of standard assets issued by RBI.

(ii)    Under the new scheme the provisions can be summarised as under:

(a)    Any income of the Trust from the activity of securitisation will be exempt from tax u/s. 10(23DA);

(b)    Income received by the Investor holding any securitised debt instrument or securities issued by the Trust will be exempt in the hands of the Investor u/s. 10(35A);

(c)    Trust will be liable to pay at the following rates on the income distributed to the investor u/s. 115TA.

•    In the case of Individual or HUF – 25% Income tax plus applicable surcharge and Education Cess;

•    In the case of others – 30% Income tax plus applicable surcharge and Education Cess;

•    In the case of a person who is not liable to pay tax on such income – No tax is payable by the Trust.

The provisions for payment of the above tax on income distributed to Investors are contained in section 115TA to 115TC. These provisions are similar to tax payable on distribution of dividend by a company and tax payable on distribution of income by a Mutual Fund.

(iii)    Section 115TA also provides for filing of Statement of income distributed and tax paid thereon, charging of interest for the delayed payment of tax and treating a person responsible for compliance with these provisions as an assessee in default for the non-compliance with provisions of sections 115TA to 115TC.

(iv)    If one compares the existing provisions with the above new scheme, it will noticed that under the above scheme the total tax liability of the trust and Investors, put together, will be more.

4.4    Investor Protection Fund:    New Section 10(23ED)

This is a new section inserted w.e.f. A.Y. 2014-15. This section grants exemption to any income, by way of contribution received from a Depository by an Investor Protection Fund (Fund) set up in accordance with the regulations notified by the Central Government. It may be noted that Depositories (NSDL or CDSL) are required to set up Investor Protection Fund as provided in SEBI (Depositories and Participants) Regulations, 1996. The above exemption is now provided to the Fund in respect of contribution by the Depository. It is also provides that if the Fund shares any amount with the Depository in any year, out of such exempt income, the amount so shared will be taxable in its hands. This section is on the same lines as section 10(23EA) which grants exemption to amount contributed by a recognised Stock Exchange to its approved Investor Protection Fund.

4.5    Venture Capital Fund: Section 10(23FB):

This section provides for exemption to any income of Venture Capital Company (VCC) and Venture Capital Fund (VCF) from investment in Venture Capital Undertaking (VCU). Essentially, this section treats VCC and VCF as pass-through entities. U/s. 10(23FB), the income of VCC and VCF is exempt but is taxable directly in the hands of investors in these entities u/s. 115U. The SEBI (VCF) Regulations, 1996, have been replaced by the SEBI (Alternative Investment Funds) Regulations, 2012 w.e.f. 12-05-2012. By amendment of Section 10(23FB), w.e.f. A.Y. 2013-14, the existing explanation has been substituted to provide as under:

(i)    The pass-through status can be enjoyed by VCC and VCF that has been granted registration as category I Alternative Investment Fund;

(ii)    VCC and VCF registered and governed by old VCF Regulations will continue to enjoy the pass through status;

(iii)    VCC/VCF will have to comply with the conditions stated in the Explanation. Shares of the VCC and Units of the VCF should not be listed on any recognised stock exchange. 2/3rd of the investible funds should be invested in unlisted equity shares or equity linked instruments of a VCU. Further, the VCC should not invest any funds in a VCU in which its directors and substantial shareholders (10% or more holding) hold more than 15% of paid-up equity share capital of the VCU. Similar conditions are provided for VCF also.

4.6    Section 10(48):

Under this section, any income received in India in Indian currency by a foreign company on account of sale of crude oil to any person in India is exempt from tax, subject to certain conditions. The scope of this exemption is now expanded w.e.f. A.Y. 2014-15 and it is now provided that this exemption can be claimed by a foreign company in respect of income from sale to any person in India of crude oil, any other goods or rendering of services as may be notified by the Central Government.

4.7    New Section 10(49):

This new Section is inserted in the Income -tax Act to provide for exemption from tax to any income of the National Financial Holding Company Ltd., a company set up by the Central Government on 07-06-2012. This exemption is granted for A.Y. 2013-14 and for subsequent years.

4.8    Recognised Provident Fund:

One of the conditions in Schedule IV – Proviso to Rule 3 of Part A is that a Provident Fund will be considered as recognised under the Income tax Act only if the establishment for which the Provident Fund is set up is also exempted u/s. 17 of the P.F. Act. The date for obtaining such exemption under the P.F. Act which expired on 31-03-2013 under Rule 3 has now been extended by amendment of Rule 3 to 31-03-2014.

4.9    Rajiv    Gandhi    Equity    Savings    Scheme (RGESS):    Section 80CCG:

At present, a resident individual, who is a first time retail investor, investing in listed equity shares under RGESS Scheme, is allowed a one time deduction of 50% of the eligible investment upto Rs. 50,000/- in the A.Y. 2013-14. Thus, the maximum deduction allowable under this section is Rs. 25,000/- if the gross total income of such individual does not exceed Rs. 10 lakh.

Now this section is amended w.e.f. A.Y. 2014-15 to provide as under:

(i)    Limit of gross total income of the individual is increased from Rs. 10 lakh to Rs 12 lakh.

(ii)    The scope of investment in eligible investment is extended to include listed units of an equity fund specified in RGESS. This includes investment in eligible shares, ETFs and Mutual Fund Units which has such eligible shares as the underlying assets.

(iii)    The deduction upto Rs. 25,000/- (50% of investment upto Rs. 50,000/-) will now be available for each of the 3 consecutive assessment years beginning with the year in which such investment was first made.

(iv)    There is a lock-in period of 3 years for such investment.

(v)    If the prescribed conditions of RGESS are violated, the deduction originally granted will be deemed to be the income of the year in which such violation takes place.

4.10 Contribution to Health Scheme: Section 80D:

At present deduction u/s. 80D can be claimed in respect of premium on Mediclaim Policy upto Rs. 15,000/- (Rs. 20,000/- for Senior Citizens) by an individual or an HUF. Such deduction is also allowable for any contribution made to the Central Government Health Scheme or for preventive health check-up subject to the above limit. By amendment of this section the above benefit is now extended w.e.f. A.Y. 2014 -15 to contribution to such other Health Schemes as may be notified by the Central Government.

4.11  Additional Deduction for Interest on Housing Loans: Section 80EE:

This is a new section inserted in the Income tax Act w.e.f. A.Y. 2014-15. Under this section, one time deduction upto Rs. 1,00,000/- will be allowed to an individual for interest paid on Housing Loan taken for acquiring a residential house. This deduction will be over and above the deduction allowed for interest paid for the housing loan u/s. 24(b) of the Income-tax Act. This deduction can be claimed subject to following conditions.

(i)    Housing Loan should be taken from a Bank, Financial Institution or a Housing Finance Company as defined in Section 80EE (5);

(ii)    Housing Loan should have been sanctioned between 01-04-2013 to 31-03-2014;

(iii)    Housing Loan sanctioned should not exceed Rs. 25 lakh;

(iv)    The value of the residential house should not exceed Rs. 40 lakh;

(v)    The individual claiming this deduction should not own any residential house on the date of sanction of the housing loan;

(vi)    If the interest payable on the above loan, in A.Y. 2014-15, is less than Rs. 1,00,000/-, the assessee can claim deduction for the balance amount paid in A.Y. 2015-16. In other words, deduction allowable for interest on the housing loan in the A.Y. 2014-15 and 2015-16 cannot exceed Rs. 1,00,000/-.

It may be noted that this deduction cannot be claimed by an HUF. Further, there is no condition that the residential house should be self occupied. The assessee can let out the residential house. It also appears that if a residential house is purchased by two or more co-owners, each co-owner can claim the deduction for interest under this section against his share of income from the joint property.

4.12 Donation u/s. 80G:

This section is amended w.e.f. A.Y. 2014-15. At present, donation to National Children’s Fund is eligible for deduction u/s. 80G at the rate of 50% of the amount of the donation. This section is now amended to provide that 100% of the donation to National Children’s Fund made on or after 01-04-2013 will be eligible for deduction u/s. 80G.

4.13 Donation to Political Parties: Sections 80GGB and 80GGC.

These two sections provide for deduction from gross total income of 100% of the amount donated by any company, individual, HUF, firm, LLP or other specified persons to recognised Political Parties or Electoral Trusts. Now, it is provided, by amendment of these sections, that no such deduction will be allowed if such donation is made in cash on or after 01-04-2013. It may be noted that in sections 80G and 80GGA donation to approved trusts can be made in cash upto Rs. 10,000/-. So far as Political Donations are concerned, it is now provided that no cash donations will be eligible for deduction under the above sections.

4.14 Power Sector undertakings: Deduction u/s. 80IA.

This section provides for deduction of income of certain undertakings. This includes undertaking which commences its business of generation and/or distribution, transmission or distribution of power, or substantial renovation and modernisation of the existing transmission or distribution lines on or before 31-03-2013. By amendment of this section, the above time limit for commencement of business by such an undertaking is extended upto 31-03-2014.

4.15 Additional deduction for wages paid to New Workmen: Section 80JJAA:

Under the existing section, deduction is allowed to an Indian Company of an additional amount equal to 30% of the wages paid to new regular workmen employed by the Company in an industrial undertaking engaged in the manufacture or production of an article or thing, subject to certain conditions specified in this section.

This section is amended w.e.f. A.Y. 2014-15 to provide as under:

(i)    Now the above deduction can be claimed by an Indian company only if it is deriving income from the manufacture of goods in a factory. For this purpose, the word “Factory” shall have the same meaning as in section 2(m) of the Factories Act, 1948;

(ii)    The new regular workmen should be employed by the company in such factory;

(iii)    This deduction can be claimed by the company in the year in which appointment is made and for two subsequent assessment years;

(iv)    Such deduction is not allowable to the company in case the factory is hived off, transferred from another existing entity or acquired as a result of an amalgamation.

5.    Income from Business or Profession:

5.1 Investment Allowance: New Section 32AC: This is a new section inserted in the Income tax Act w.e.f. A.Y. 2014- 15. The section provides for a one time deduction (Investment Allowance) to a company. This deduction can be claimed if the following conditions are complied with:

(i)    This deduction can be claimed by a company engaged in the business of manufacture or production of any article or thing.

(ii)    Such a company should acquire and install specified new asset between 1-4-2013 to 31-3-2015 for an aggregate cost exceeding Rs. 100 crore. If the specified new asset is acquired before 1-4-2013, this deduction cannot be claimed.

(iii)    The above deduction is allowable at the rate of 15% of the actual cost of the specified new asset acquired and installed during the accounting year 2013-14 (A.Y. 2014-15) if the actual cost of such asset exceeds Rs. 100 crore. If such actual cost is less than Rs. 100 crore no deduction will be allowed in A.Y. 2014-15.

(iv)The company can claim deduction of 15% of the actual cost of such new asset acquired and installed during accounting year 2014-15 (A.Y. 2015-16) if the aggregate cost of the new asset during the period 1-4-2013 to 31-3-2015 exceeds Rs. 100 crore.

  In other words, deduction of 15% can be claimed as under:

v)   The deduction allowed under this section will be over and above the normal depreciation and additional depreciation (20%) allowable u/s. 32(1)(ii) and (iia) on the above specified new assets.

(vi)   This being a special incentive for encouraging industrial companies which invest more than Rs. 100 crore in specified new assets, the amount of deduction allowed is not to be deducted from W.D.V. of the block of assets.

(vii)   Further, this deduction is not for depreciation and, therefore, for the purpose of carry forward of losses, it will form part of business loss and not “unabsorbed depreciation”.

(viii)   Since no provision for this deduction of 15% (investment allowance) is required to be made in the books of the company, deduction for this amount cannot be claimed for computation of Book Profits u/s. 115 JB.

(ix)   For the purpose of this section, specified new asset means new plant and machinery. This will not include (a) ship or aircraft, (b) second hand plant and machinery (whether imported or not), (c) plant and machinery installed in office premises or residential premises (including guest house), (d) office appliances, (including computers or computer software), (e) vehicles, and (f) plant and machinery in respect of which 100% deduction by way of depreciation or otherwise is allowed in any previous year.  It may be noted that intangible assets are not excluded from the definition of specified new asset.  Therefore, any intangible asset attached to a plant and machinery can be considered as a specified new asset.

(x)    It may be noted that this deduction will not be allowable to companies engaged in the business of hotel, hospital, road, bridge and other construction businesses.

(xi)  There is a lock-in period of 5 years for the above specified new assets.  If such asset is sold or transferred within 5 years of the date of installation, then the amount allowed as deduction in the earlier years will be taxable as profit or gain from business in the year of such sale or transfer.  This will be in addition to the taxability of capital gains (if any) arising on such sale or transfer of such assets.

(xii)  The above provision of lock-in period as stated in (xi) above, will not apply if the transfer of such asset is as a result of an amalgamation or a demerger.  However, the Amalgamated Company or the Resulting Company will have to ensure that such new asset is not sold or transferred by it within 5 years from the date of installation by the Amalgamating Company or the Demerged Company.

5.2 Deduction of Bad/Doubtful Debts to Indian Banks: Section 36(1)(vii) and 36(1)(viia) – (i) Under the existing provisions of section 36(1)(viia), banks and financial institutions, depending upon their categories, are entitled to claim deduction for provision for bad and doubtful debts made for Urban and Rural Branches at specified rates. Similarly, a bank/financial institution is also entitled to claim deduction for bad debts actually written off u/s. 36(1)(vii) to the extent it is in excess of the credit balance in Provision for Bad and Doubtful Debts A/c made u/s. 36(1)(viia).  Some doubts had arisen about the interpretation of the provisions of these two sections.  In the case of Catholic Syrian Bank Ltd v/s CIT 343 ITR 270 the Supreme Court held that banks are entitled to full benefit of write off  bad debts, written off u/s. 36(1)(vii) in addition to the deduction for the provision for bad and doubtful debts made u/s. 36(1)(viia). It is also held that, in the case of rural advances, there will be no double deduction for provision made u/s. 36(1)(viia). The proviso to section 36(1)(vii) limits its application to the bank which has made such provision u/s.6(1)(viia). The provision of section 36(1)(vii) and 36(1)(viia) and 36(2)(V) should be construed together.  Thus, they form a complete scheme for deduction and prescribe the extent to which deduction is available to banks.

(II)    For removal of doubts, section 36(1)(vii) has been amended from A.Y. 2014-15 by adding an Explanation that for the purpose of proviso to this section, the account referred to therein shall be only one account in respect of provision for doubtful debts u/s. 36(1)(viia). In other words, no distinction will be made for provision for urban and rural advances made u/s. 36(1)(viia). Therefore, in such cases, the amount of deduction in respect of bad debts u/s. 36(1)(vii) shall be limited to the amount by which the same exceeds the credit balance of the provision made u/s. 36(1)(viia).

5.3 Commodities Transaction Tax (CTT):
Section 36(1) has been amended from A.Y. 2014-15 and it is now provided in section 36(1)(xvi) that the amount equal to CTT paid by the assessee in respect of the taxable commodities transactions entered by it in the course of its business will be allowed as its business expenditure.

5.4 Disallowance of certain payments by State Government Undertakings: Section 40(a)(iib) -This new clause has been added in section 40(a) from A.Y. 2014-15. Disputes had arisen in income tax assessments of some State Government Undertakings (SGU) as to whether any amount paid by SGU to the State Government by way of Royalty, Licence Fees, Service Fee, Privilege Fee, Service charges or any similar Fee/charge is deductible as business expenditure. It is now provided by this amendment that any such fee or charge which is levied exclusively on the SGU or is directly or indirectly appropriated from the SGU by the State Government will not be allowed as business expenditure to SGU. For this purpose, Explanation to the section defines SGU. (It includes a company in which the State Government has more than 50% of equity).

5.5  Commodity Derivative Transactions:
Section 43(5) – This section defines a “Speculative Transaction”. At present, it excludes from this definition certain transactions, including eligible transactions in respect of derivative transactions carried out in a recognised Stock Exchange. In view of introduction of MCX as a recognised association for commodities transactions, this section is now amended from A.Y. 2014-15 to provide that eligible transactions in Commodity Derivatives entered into through a recognised association will not be considered as speculative transactions.

5.6 Full value of consideration of Immovable Property held as Stock-in-Trade: New section 43CA

–    (i) This new section is inserted from A.Y. 2014-15. Therefore, it will apply to real estate transactions entered into on or after 1st April, 2013. U/s. 50C, in the case of transfer of an immovable property (land, building or both) which is held by the seller as a capital asset, if the consideration is less than the market value adopted (assessed or assessable) for the purpose of payment of stamp duty, such stamp duty valuation is considered as the full value of the consideration u/s. 50C. Thus, the capital gain in the hands of the seller is computed on that basis as provided u/s. 50C. This provision was not applicable to immovable property held by the seller as stock-in-trade.

(ii)    By introduction of this new section 43CA, it is now provided that the above concept of section 50C of adopting stamp duty valuation as full value of consideration will apply for computation of business income in the hands of seller who holds such property as stock-in-trade. The provisions of section 50C are made applicable w.e.f. 01-04-2013, to the extent applicable, to such transactions. This new provision will apply to Builders, Developers and Dealers engaged in real estate transactions. The provision will apply according to the method of accounting followed by the assessee. It may be noted that this new provision will not apply when the assessee makes a slump sale of the business as a going concern.

(iii)    It is also provided in this Section that if there is a time gap between the date of the agreement of sale and the date of registration. The full value of the consideration will be determined with reference to the stamp duty valuation assessable on the date of the agreement of sale provided that full or part of the consideration stated in the agreement was paid, otherwise than in cash.

(iv)    It may be noted that the definition of immovable property for the purpose of this section or section 50C does not include any right in the immovable property such as leasehold or tenancy right etc. If the assessee has booked a flat in a property under construction, the right to get possession of the flat is not covered under the section. However, when the property is constructed and the possession of the flat is taken, the section will apply with reference to the Agreement for sale when executed.

(v)    It may be noted that section 56(2)(vii)(b) has been amended as discussed in Para 6 below. Effect of this amendment is that w.e.f. 01-04-2013, in the case of a purchaser of an immovable property, if the difference between the stamp duty valuation and the actual consideration paid as per the agreement of sale is more than Rs. 50,000/-, such difference will be considered as “income from other sources” in the hands of such purchaser. However, this provision will not apply if the purchase is from a relative as defined in Explanation to section 56(2)(vii). From this provision, it will be noticed the difference between the stamp duty valuation and actual consideration will be taxable in the hands of the seller as well as the purchaser if such difference exceeds Rs. 50,000/-.

6.    Income from other sources
: Section 56(2)(vii)(b) – (i) This section is amended from A.Y. 2014-15. This section provides for levy of tax on certain gifts received from non-relatives. This amendment comes into force in respect of transactions relating to purchase of immovable property i.e. land, building or both made on or after 01-04-2013. Prior to 31-03-2013, if an immovable property was received by an Individual or HUF from a non-relative, without consideration, the market value (based on the stamp duty valuation) on the date of the gift, if it exceeds Rs. 50,000/-, was treated as income from other sources in the hands of the assessee. There is no change in this provision. However, it is now provided, w.e.f. 01-04-2013, that if the purchase of an immovable property by an Individual or HUF is made for consideration which is less than the stamp duty valuation assessed or assessable by the stamp duty authorities, the difference will be taxable as income in the hands of the purchaser. This provision will apply only if such difference is more than Rs. 50,000/-.

(ii)    It is now also provided by this amendment that if there is a time gap between the date of the agreement for purchase of the property and date of registration of the agreement, the stamp duty valuation assessable on the date of the agreement will be considered for this purpose. This concession will apply only if the full or part of the consideration stated in the agreement is paid by the purchaser by any mode other than cash before the date of registration.

(iii)    For this purpose, the term “Immovable Property” is defined to mean “Land, Building or Both”. This will mean that any right in the immovable property will not be covered by this provision. Therefore, any tenancy right, leasehold right or similar right will not be considered as Immovable Property. If a flat in a building under construction is booked by the individual or HUF, the right to get possession of the flat will not be considered as purchase of immovable property under this section. Therefore, the consideration paid for this right as per the agreement will not be covered by this section.

(iv)    If the stamp duty valuation is disputed, the provisions of section 50C for reference to Valuation
Officer will apply.

(v)    It may be noted that if the difference between the stamp duty valuation and actual consideration exceeds Rs. 50,000/- tax will be payable on such notional amount by the seller as well as the purchaser under the following sections:

(a)    In the case of the seller who is holding the immovable property as stock-in-trade as business income under new section 43CA – w.e.f. 01-04-2013.

(b)    In the case of the seller who is holding the property as a capital asset, as capital gain u/s. 50C.

(c)    In the case of Individual or HUF purchaser, under amended section 56(2)(vii)(b) – w.e.f. 01-04-2013 as income from other sources.

(vi)    It may be noted that in the hands of the individual or HUF, if such property is held as “Capital Asset”, then such an assessee will be entitled to claim that the stamp duty valuation of the property adopted for taxation u/s. 56(2)(vii)(b) should be deemed to be the cost of acquisition of such property. To this extent there will be some deferred benefit to such individual or HUF. This benefit is provided u/s. 49(4). This benefit will not be available to a person who purchases an immovable property and treats it as stock-in-trade of his business.

(vii)    It may be noted that amendment similar to what has been made, as stated above, in section 56(2)(vii)(b) was made in section 50(2)(vii)(b) by the Finance (no.2) Act, 2009, w.e.f. 01-10-2009. When it was pointed out to the Government that such a provision is unjust as both the seller and the purchaser of the immovable property will have to pay tax on this same notional addition, it was realised by the Government and in the Finance Act, 2010, this provision for levying tax on the purchaser was deleted with retrospective effect from 01-10-2009. This year the same amendment is made to tax the purchaser w.e.f. 01-04-2013, which has the effect of levying tax on the seller as well as the purchaser on the same notional addition. No reasons are given in the Explanatory Statement issued with the Finance Bill, 2013, for reintroducing this provision.

7.    Buy-back of shares and Dividend Distribution Tax: Sections 10 (34A), 115-O, 115 QA to 115QC and 115R:

7.1 (i) At present, when a company buys back its shares from shareholders u/s. 77A of the Companies Act the shareholder is liable to pay tax u/s. 46A on the difference between the amount received from the company and the cost of acquisition of shares as provided u/s. 48 under the head “Capital Gains”. This provision will continue to apply in the case of shares which are listed if such buy back is not through a Recognised Stock Exchange.

(ii)    A new section 115QA is inserted w.e.f. 01-06-2013 which provides as under.

(a)    This section applies to buy back of shares which are not listed by a domestic company (whether public or private) u/s. 77A of the Companies Act on or after 01-06-2013.

(b)    The consideration paid by the company to its shareholders for such buy-back of shares will now be liable to additional tax in the hands of the company at the rate of 20% plus 10% surcharge on tax (i.e. 2%) and 3% Education Cess on the tax (i.e. 0.66%) (Aggregate 22.66%). This tax is to be paid on the amount of such consideration after deduction of the amount received on the issue of such shares.

(c)    The shareholder receiving this consideration on buy back of shares will not be liable to pay capital gains tax u/s. 46A as provided in the new section 10(34A) introduced w.e.f. A.Y. 2014-15.

(d)    The above tax is to be deposited with the Government within 14 days of the payment of the consideration by the company to the shareholders.

(e)    No credit for such tax can be claimed by the shareholder or the company against any tax liability.

(f)    The above provision is on the same lines as Dividend Distribution Tax payable u/s. 115-0.

(iii)    New section 115QB is also inserted to provide that interest at the rate of 1% p.m. for each month or part of the month shall be payable for the delay in payment of tax as required u/s. 115QA. Further, under new section 115QC provision is made for considering the company as assessee in default if it does not comply with the provisions of section 115QA. These provisions are similar to existing sections 115P and 115Q.

(iv)    In section 115QA, it is stated that from the consideration paid by the company for buy-back of shares, the amount received on issue of shares should be deducted and the tax @ 20% is to be paid on this net amount. The question for consideration is as to how the amount received on issue of shares will be worked out in the following cases:

(a)    When shares are issued at a Premium.

(b)    When shares are issued as Bonus shares.

(c)    When shares are issued on conversion of debentures.

(d)    When shares are issued to employees at concessional rate under ESOP scheme.

(e)    When shares are issued at a discount or there is reduction in face value of shares to write off losses under a High Court Order.

(f)    When shares are issued on amalgamation or on demerger.

In all the above cases, it will not be possible to determine the exact amount received on the issue of a particular share which the shareholder has offered for buy-back. This practical difficulty will have to be resolved by the tax authorities by a issuing a clarification.

(v)    In the above scheme of taxation of the net consideration paid on buy-back of shares, it will be noticed that the tax is payable by the company. However, at present, the shareholder holding shares as a Capital Asset, is pays tax on such buy-back on the surplus, after the following deductions, under the head capital gains, at applicable rate.

(a)    Actual cost of shares or Indexed cost (if long term asset) is deductible from the consideration.

(b)    Set off of other capital loss or brought forward loss can be claimed against such capital gain.

(c)    Benefit of deduction u/s. 54EC or 54F is available if the consideration is invested in Bonds or purchase of a residential house.

Taking into consideration the above, it will be noticed that incidence of tax under the new section 115QA will be higher as compared to the present provisions. In the case of a person holding such shares as stock-in-trade he will not get benefit of deduction of actual cost or set off of business losses or set off of carried forward losses.

7.2 Section 115-0:
This section deals with Dividend Distribution Tax (DDT) payable by a Domestic company on dividend distributed by it. Section 115-0 (1A) has now been amended w.e.f. 01- 06-2013 to provide that no DDT will be payable on the amount relatable to dividend received from a foreign subsidiary company on which tax is paid by the domestic company at 15% u/s 115 BBD.

7.3 Section 115R:
(i) This section deals with the payment of additional tax by a Mutual Fund (other than an equity oriented mutual fund) on the income distributed to the unit holders. This section is amended w.e.f. 01-06-2013. Hitherto such additional tax payable in respect of income distribution to Individual or HUF unit holders (excluding Money Market Fund or liquid fund) was 12.5%. Now from 1-6-2013 such tax will be payable by Mutual Fund at the rate of 25%. This will mean that the amount to be distributed to such unit holders will be reduced.

(ii)    There is also an amendment in the section from 1-6-2013 to the effect that the rate of tax payable in the case of income distribution by an Infrastructure Debt Fund Scheme to a Non-Resident (including foreign company) unit holder shall be 5% only.

(iii)    Surcharge at the rate of 10% of tax and Education Cess at the rate of 3% of tax will also be payable on the above tax.

8.    Tax Residency Certificate for Non-Residents(TRC):  Sections 90 and 90A

(i)These two sections empower the Central Government to enter into Agreements with any foreign country, Specified Territory or certain specified/Notified Associations in Specified Territories for avoidance of double taxation (DTAA). The Finance Act, 2012, had amended section 90 by insertion of sub- section (2A) w.e.f. 01-04-2013 to provide that the provisions of new sections 95 to 102 dealing with General Anti Avoidance Rule (GAAR) will be applicable even if the provisions of DTAA are more favourable to the assessee. In other words, where GAAR is invoked the assessee cannot seek protection of beneficial provision of DTAA. Similar amendment was also made in section 90A.

(ii)    These two sections have now been amended to provide that section 90(2A) as well as 90A(2A) will now apply w.e.f. A.Y. 2016-17 because applicability of the provisions of sections 95 to 102 dealing with GAAR has now been postponed to A.Y. 2016-17.

(iii)    (a) In section 90(4) as well as 90A(4), last year an amendment was made to provide that a Non Resident cannot claim benefit of DTAA unless Tax Residency Certificate in the form prescribed is obtained from the foreign country/specified territory with which India has entered into DTAA. In this certificate, such Foreign Country/Territory was required to certify the place of residence and such other particulars which the Indian Tax Department may require to decide where the benefit claimed under a particular DTAA is available to the Non Resident assessee.

(b)    Some doubts were expressed about the effect of the amendment on the evidential value of TRC. Subsequently, the CBDT issued a press release clarifying the issue as under. “The Tax Residency Certificate produced by resident of contracting state will be accepted as evidence that he is a resident of that contracting state and the Income tax Authorities in India will not go behind the TRC and question his residential status.”

(c)    To give effect to the above assurance section 90(4) as well as 90A(4) have been amended and the requirements about the Tax Residency Certificate containing the prescribed particulars about the assessee being resident of the contracting foreign country/specified territory has now been removed with retrospective effect i.e. A.Y. 2013-14. After removal of the above requirements s/s. (5) has been added in section 90 as well as 90A to provide that the Non-Resident which has obtained TRC from the foreign country/specified territory shall provide such other documents and information as may be prescribed. This amendment is made w.e.f. A.Y. 2013-14.

9.    Taxation of Non-Residents: Sections 115A and 115AD

9.1 Section 115A: This section deals with tax on Dividends, Royalty and Technical Service Fees in the case of a Non-Resident. This section is amended w.e.f. A.Y. 2014-15 as under :

(i)    It is now provided that the tax on interest referred to in section 194LD from Rupee Denominated Bonds of Indian Company as discussed in para 3.3 above will be payable @ 5% plus applicable surcharge and the Education Cess.

(ii)    Under the existing section 115A(i)(b), the rate of tax on Royalty and Fees for Technical services is 10%. With effect from 1-4-2013 (A.Y. 2014-15) that rate is increased to 25% plus applicable surcharge and the Education Cess.

9.2 Section 115AD : This section deals with taxation of Foreign Institutional Investors. By an amendment of this section, w.e.f. A.Y. 2014-15, it is now provided that the tax on interest referred to in section 194LD from Rupee Denominated Bonds of an Indian company, as discussed in para 3.3 above, will be payable @ 5% plus applicable surcharge and the Education Cess.

10.    General Anti-Avoidance Rule (GAAR)

10.1 This was a new concept introduced in the Income tax Act by the Finance Act, 2012. Very wide powers were given to the tax authorities by these provisions. In new Chapter X–A, sections 95 to 102 were inserted. In para 154 of the Budget Speech, while introducing the Finance Bill, 2012, the Finance Minister had stated that “I propose to introduce a General Anti-Avoidance Rule (GAAR) in order to counter aggressive tax avoidance schemes, while ensuring that it is used only in appropriate cases, enabling review by a GAAR panel.”

10.2 The reasons for introducing GAAR provisions in the Income tax Act were explained in the Explanatory Notes attached to the Finance Bill, 2012 as under:

“The question of substance over form has consistently arisen in the implementation of taxation laws. In the Indian context, judicial decisions have varied. While some courts in certain circumstances had held that legal form of transactions can be dispensed with and the real substance of the transaction can be considered while applying the taxation laws, others have held that the form is to be given sanctity. The existence of anti-avoidance principles are based on various judicial pronouncements. There are some specific anti-avoidance provisions but general anti-avoidance has been dealt only through judicial decisions in specific cases.

In an environment of moderate rate of tax, it is necessary that the correct tax base be subject to tax in the face of aggressive tax planning and use of opaque law tax jurisdictions for residence as well as for sourcing capital. Most countries have codified the “substance over form” doctrine in the form of General Anti Avoidance Rule (GAAR).

In the above background and keeping in view of the aggressive tax planning with the use of sophisticated structures, there is a need for statutory provisions so as to codify the doctrine of “substance over form” where the real intention of the parties and effect of transaction and purpose of an arrangement is taken into account for determining the tax consequences, irrespective of the legal structure that has been superimposed to camouflage the real intent and purpose. Internationally several countries have introduced, and are administering statutory General Anti Avoidance Provisions. It is, therefore, important that Indian taxation law also incorporates a statutory General Anti Avoidance Provisions to deal with aggressive tax planning. The basic criticism of statutory GAAR which is raised worldwide is that it provides a wide discretion and authority to the tax administration which at times is prone to be misused. This vital aspect, therefore, needs to be kept in mind while formulating any GAAR regime.”

10.3 There was large scale opposition to the introduction of this provision in the form suggested in the Finance Bill, 2012, and the DTC Bill, 2010, pending consideration of the Parliament. This opposition was voiced by various Trade and Industry bodies in India and abroad. The Finance Minister responded to the various suggestions made by members of the Parliament and various Trade and Industry bodies while replying to the debate in the Parliament on 7th May 2012, in the following words.

“Certain provisions relating to a General Anti-Avoidance Rules (GAAR) have also been proposed in the Finance Bill, 2012. After examining the recommendations of the Standing Committee on GAAR provisions in the DTC Bill, 2010, I propose to amend the GAAR provisions as follows:

(i)    Remove the onus of proof entirely from the tax payer to the Revenue Department before any action can be initiated under GAAR.

(ii)    Introduce an independent member in the GAAR approving panel to ensure objectivity and transparency. One member of the panel now would be an officer of the level of Joint Secretary or above from the Ministry of Law.

(iii)    Provide that any tax payer (resident or non-resident) can approach the Authority for Advances Ruling (AAR) for a ruling as to whether an arrangement to be undertaken by the assessee is permissible or not under the GAAR provisions.

To provide greater clarity and certainty in the matters relating to GAAR, a Committee has been constituted under the Chairmanship of the Director General of Income Tax (International Taxation) to give recommendations for formulating the rules and guidelines for implementation of the GAAR provisions and to suggest safeguards so that these provisions are not applied indiscriminately. The Committee has already held several rounds of discussion with various stakeholders including the Foreign Institutional Investors. The Committee will submit its recommendations by 31st May, 2012.

To provide more time to both tax payers and the tax administration to address all related issues. I propose to defer the applicability of the GAAR provisions by one year. The GAAR provisions will now apply to Income of Financial Year 2013-14 and subsequent years.”

10.4 For the reasons stated above, special provisions relating to GAAR were made in sections 95 to 102 in the Income tax Act from A.Y. 2014-15 (Accounting Year ending 31-3- 2014) and onwards. These provisions applied to all assesses (Residents or Non-Residents) in respect of their transactions in India as well as abroad. Wide powers were given to the tax authorities to disregard any agreement, arrangement or any claim for expenditure, deduction or relief.

10.5 The GAAR provisions contained in sections 95 to 102 (chapter X-A) and in section 144-BA which were introduced by the Finance Act, 2012, w.e.f. A.Y. 2014-15 have now been withdrawn and replaced by another set of provisions in new chapter X-A (sections 95 to 102) and new section 144-BA by the Finance Act, 2013, w.e.f. A.Y. 2016-17 (Accounting year 01-04-2015 to 31-03-2016).

10.6 In para 150 of the Budget Speech while introducing the Finance Bill, 2013, the Finance Minister has stated as under:

“150. Hon’ble Members are aware that the Finance Act, 2012 introduced the General Anti Avoidance Rules, for short, GAAR. A number of representations were received against the new provisions. An expert committee was constituted to consult stakeholders and finalise the GAAR guidelines. After careful consideration of the report, Government announced certain decisions on 14-01-2013 which were widely welcomed. I propose to incorporate those decisions in the Income tax Act. The modified provisions preserve the basic thrust and purpose of GAAR. Impermissible tax avoidance arrangements will be subjected to tax after a determination is made through a well laid out procedure involving an assessing officer and an Approving Panel headed by the Judge. I propose to bring the modified provisions into effect from 01-04-2016.”

10.7 In the Explanatory Statement presented with the Finance Bill, 2013, the reasons for introducing the new provisions are explained as under:

“The General Anti Avoidance Rule (GAAR) was introduced in the Income tax Act by the Finance Act, 2012. The substantive provisions relating to GAAR are contained in Chapter X-A (consisting of section 95 to 102) of the Income tax Act. The procedural provisions relating to mechanism for invocation of GAAR and passing of the assessment order in consequence thereof are contained to section 144 BA. The provisions of Chapter X-A as well as section 144 BA would have come into force with effect from 1st April, 2014.

A number of representations were received against the provisions relating to GAAR. An Expert Committee was constituted by the Government with broad terms of reference including consultation with stakeholders and finalizing the GAAR guidelines and a road map for implementation. The Expert Committee’s recommendations included suggestions for legislative amendments, formulation of rules and prescribing guidelines for implementations of GAAR. The major recommendations of the Expert Committee have been accepted by the Government, with some modifications. Some of the recommendations accepted by the Government require amendment in the provisions of Chapter X-A and section 144 BA.”

GaarProvisions

10.8 In view of the above discussion, the existing sections 95 to 102 and 144BA have been now deleted. New set of Sections 95 to 102 and 144BA have been inserted in the Income tax Act w.e.f. F.Y.: 2015-16 (A.Y. 2016-17). These new provisions are discussed below broadly.

10.9 Section 95 :
This section provides that an arrangement entered into by an assessee may be declared to be an impermissible avoidance arrangement. The tax arising from such declaration by the tax authorities, will be determined subject to provisions of sections 96 to 102. It is also stated in this section that the provisions of sections 96 to 102 may be applied to any step or a part of the arrangement as they are applicable to the entire arrangement.

10.10 Impermissible Avoidance Arrangement (Section 96) :

(i)    Section 96 explains the meaning of Impermissible Avoidance Arrangement to mean an arrangement, the main purpose of which is to obtain a tax benefit and it –

(a)    Creates rights or obligations which would not ordinarily be created between persons dealing at arm’s length.

(b)    Results, directly or indirectly, in misuse or abuse of the provisions of the Income-tax Act.

(c)    Lacks commercial substance, or is deemed to lack commercial substance u/s. 97, in whole or in part, or

(d)    is entered into or carried out, by means, or in a manner, which are not ordinarily employed for bonafide purposes.

(ii)    An arrangement whereby there is any tax benefit to the assessee shall be presumed to have been entered into or carried out for the main purpose of obtaining tax benefits, unless the assessee proved otherwise. It will be noticed that this was a very heavy burden cast on the assessee. The Finance Minister has, however, declared on 07-05-2012 that the onus of proof will be on the department who has to establish that the arrangement is to avoid tax before initiating the proceedings under these provisions.

10.11 Lack of Commercial Substance (Section 97) :

(i)    Section 97 explains the concept of Lack of Commercial Substance in an arrangement entered into by the assessee. It states that an arrangement shall be deemed to lack commercial substance if:

(a)    The substance or effect of the arrangement, as a whole, is inconsistent with, or differs significantly from, the form of its individual steps or a part of such steps; or

(b)    It involves or includes:

–    Round Trip Financing
–    An accommodating party.
–    Elements that have the effect of offsetting Or cancelling each other; or
–    A transaction which is conducted through one or more persons and disguises the value, location, source, ownership or control of funds which is the subject matter of such transaction.

(ii)    It involves the location of an asset or a transaction or the place of residence of any party which is without any substantial commercial purpose. In other words, the particular location is disclosed only to obtain tax benefit for a party, or

(iii)    It does not have a significant effect upon the business risks or net cash flows of any party to the arrangement apart from any effect attributable to the tax benefit that would be obtained.

(iv)    For the above purpose, it is provided that round trip financing includes any arrangement in which through a series of transactions –

(a)    Funds are transferred among the parties to the arrangement, and,

(b)    Such transactions do not have any substantial commercial purpose other than obtaining tax benefit.

(iii)    It is further stated that the above view will be taken by the tax authorities without having regard to the following:

(a)    Whether or not the funds involved in the round trip financing can be traced to any funds transferred to, or received by, any party in connection with the arrangement.

(b)    The time or sequence in which the funds involved in the round trip financing are transferred or received, or

(c)    The means by, manner in, or mode through which funds involved in the round trip financing are transferred or received.

(iv)    The party to such an arrangement shall be treated as “Accommodating Party” whether or not such party is connected with the other parties to the arrangement, if the main purpose of, direct or indirect tax benefit under the Income tax Act.

(v)    It is clarified in the section that the following factors may be relevant but shall not be sufficient for determining whether the arrangement lacks commercial substance.

(a)    The period or the time for which the arrangement exists

(b)The fact of payment of taxes, directly or indirectly, under the arrangement.

(c)    The fact that an exit route, including transfer of any activity, business or operations, is provided by the arrangement.

10.12 Consequence of Impermissible Avoidance Arrangement (Section 98) :

Under the newly inserted section 144BA, the Commissioner has been empowered to declare any arrangement as an impermissible avoidance arrangement. Section 98 states that if an arrangement is declared as impermissible, then the consequences, in relation to tax or the arrangement shall be determined in such manner as is deemed appropriate in the circumstances of the case. This will include denial of tax benefit or any benefit under applicable DTAA. The following is the illustrative list of consequences and it is provided that the same will not be limited to the list.

(i)    Disregarding, combining or re-characterising any step in, or part or whole of the impermissible avoidance arrangement;

(ii)    Treating, the impermissible avoidance arrangement as if it had not been entered into or carried out;

(iii)    Disregarding any accommodating party or treating any accommodating party and any other party as one and the same person;

(iv)    Deeming persons who are connected persons in relation to each other to be one and the same person;

(v)    Re-allocating between the parties to the arrangement, (a) any accrual or receipt of a capital or revenue nature or (b) any expenditure, deduction, relief or rebate;

(vi)    Treating (a) the place of residence of any party to the arrangement or (b) situs of an asset or of a transaction at a place other than the place or location of the transaction stated under the arrangement.

(vii)    Considering or looking through any arrangement by disregarding any corporate structure.

(viii)    It is also clarified that for the above purpose that tax authorities may re-characterise (a) any equity into debt or any debt into equity, (b) any accrual or receipt of Capital nature may be treated as of revenue nature or vice versa or (c) any expenditure, deduction, relief or rebate may be recharacterised.

10.13 Section 99 : This section provides for treatment of connected persons and accommodating party.

The section provides that for the purposes of sections 95 to 102, for determining whether a tax benefit exists –

(i)    The parties who are connected persons, in relation to each other, may be treated as one and same person.

(ii)    Any accommodating party may be disregarded.

(iii)    Such accommodating party and any other party may be treated as one and same person.

(iv)    The arrangement may be considered or looked through by disregarding any corporate structure.

10.14 It is further provided in section 100 that the provisions of sections 95 to 102 shall apply in addition to, or in lieu of, any other basis for determination of tax liability. Section 101 gives power to CBDT to prescribe the guidelines and lay down conditions for application of sections 95 to 102 relating to General Anti-Avoidance Rules (GAAR). Let us hope that these guidelines will specify the type of arrangements and transactions in relation to which alone the tax authorities have to invoke the provision of GAAR. Further, it is necessary to specify that if the tax benefit sought to be obtained by any arrangement is, say Rs. 5 crore or more in a year, then only the tax authorities will invoke these powers.

10.15 Section 102 : This section defines words or expressions used in sections 95 to 102 as stated above. Some of these definitions are as under:

(i)    “Arrangement” means any step in, a part or whole of any transaction, operations, scheme, agreement or understanding, whether enforceable or not, and includes the alienation of any property in such transaction, operation, scheme, agreement or understanding.

(ii)    “Connected Person”, in relation to a person who is an Individual, Company, HUF, Firm, LLP, AOP or BOI is defined in more or less the same manner as the term “Related Person” is defined in section 40A(2). It may be noted that, for this purpose, the definition of the word “Relative” is wider in as much as the definition of “Relative” given in Explanation to section 56(2)(vi) is adopted, whereas in section 40A(2) the narrower definition of “Relative” given in section 2(41) is adopted.

(iii)    “Fund” includes (a) any cash, (b) cash equivalents and (c) any right or obligation to receive or pay in cash or cash equivalent.

(iv)    “Party” means any person, including Permanent Establishment which participates or takes part in an arrangement.

(v)    “Relative” has the same meaning as given in section 56(2)(vi) – Explanation. It may be noted that this definition is very wide as compared to the definition given in section 2 (41) which is adopted for the purpose of explaining related person in section 40 A (2).

(vi)    The definition of a person having substantial interest in the company and other non-corporate bodies is the same as given in section 40A (2).

(vii)    “Tax Benefit” includes (a) a reduction, avoidance or deferral of tax or other amount payable under the Income tax Act, (b) an increase in a refund of tax or other amount under the Act, (c) a reduction, avoidance or deferral of tax or other amount that would be payable under the Act, as a result of tax treaty, (d) an increase in a refund of tax or other amounts under the Act as a result of tax treaty, (e) a reduction in total income or (f) increase in loss in the relevant accounting year or any other accounting year.

(viii)    “Tax Treaty” means Agreements entered into by the Government with any foreign country, territory or Association u/s. 90 or 90A.

10.16 Section 144 BA : Procedure for declaring an arrangement as impressible u/s. 95 to 102 is given in this section. This section will come into force from A.Y. 2016-17.

(i)    The Assessing Officer can, at any stage of assessment or reassessment, make a reference to the Commissioner for invoking GAAR. On receipt of reference the Commissioner has to hear the tax payer. If he is not satisfied by the submissions of the taxpayer and is of the opinion that GAAR provisions are to be invoked, he has to refer the matter to an “Approving Panel”. In case the assessee does not object or reply, the Commissioner can issue such directions as he deems fit in respect of declaration as to whether the arrangement is an impermissible avoidance arrangement or not.

(ii)    The Approving Panel has to dispose of the reference within a period of six months from the end of the month in which the reference was received from the Commissioner.

(iii)    The Approving Panel can either declare an arrangement to be impermissible or declare it not to be so after examining material and getting further inquiry to be made. It can issue such directions as it thinks fit. It can also decide the year or years for which such an arrangement will considered as impermissible. It has to give hearing to the assessee before taking any decision in the matter.

(iv)    The Assessing Officer (AO) can determine consequences of such a positive declaration of arrangement as impermissible avoidance arrangement.

(v)    The final order, in case any consequences of GAAR are determined, shall be passed by the AO only after approval by Commissioner and, thereafter, first appeal against such order shall lie to the Appellate Tribunal.

(vi)    The period taken by the proceedings before Commissioner and the Approving Panel shall be excluded from time limitation for completion of assessment.

(vii)    The Central Government has to constitute one or more Approving Panels. Each Panel shall consist of 3 members, including a chairperson. The constitution of the Panel shall be as under.

(a)    Chairperson – He shall be a sitting or retired judge of a High Court.

(b)    Members – One member shall be IRS of the rank of CCIT or above.

–    One member shall be an academic or scholar having special knowledge of matters such as direct taxes, business accounts and international trade practices.

The term of the Panel shall ordinarily be for one year and may be extended from time to time upto 3 years. The Panel shall have power similar to those vested in AAR u/s. 245U. CBDT has to provide office infrastructure, manpower and other facilities to the Approving Panel’s members. The remuneration payable to Panel members shall be decided by the Central Government.

(viii)    In addition to the above, it is provided that the CBDT has to prescribe a scheme for efficient functioning of the Approving Panel and expeditious disposal of the references made to it.

(ix)    Appeal against order of assessment passed under the GAAR provisions, after approval by the appropriate authority, is to be filed directly with the ITA Tribunal and not before CIT(A). Section 144C relating to reference before DRT does not apply to such assessment order and, therefore, no reference can be made to DRT when GAAR provisions are invoked.

10.17 The above GAAR provisions will have far reaching consequences for assessees engaged in the business with Indian or Foreign parties. GAAR is not restricted to only business transactions. Therefore, all assessees who are engaged in business or profession or who have no income from business or profession will be affected by these provisions. It appears that any assessee having any arrangement, agreement, or transaction with a connected person will have to take care that the same is at Arm’s Length Consideration. In particular, an assessee will have to consider the implications of GAAR while (a) executing a WILL or Trust, (b) entering into a partnership or forming an LLP, (c) taking controlling interest in a company, (f) entering into amalgamation of two or more companies, (c) effecting demerger of a company, (f) entering into a consortium or joint venture, (g) entering into foreign collaboration, or (h) acquiring an Indian or Foreign company. It may be noted that this is only an illustrative list and there may be other transactions which may attract GAAR provisions.

10.18 From the wording of the above provisions of sections 95 to 102 and 144BA it appears that the provisions of GAAR can be invoked even in respect of an arrangement made prior to 01-04-2015. The CIT or the Approving Panel can hold any such arrangement entered into prior to 01-04-2015 as impermissible and direct the AO to make adjustments in the computation of income or tax in the assessment year 2016-17 or any year thereafter. As stated in para 15.15 of the report of the Standing Committee on Finance on the DTC Bill, 2010 it would be fair to apply GAAR provisions prospectively so that it is not made applicable to existing arrangements/transactions. Even in the Press Note issued by the Central Government on 14-01-2013 it was stated that transactions entered into prior to 30-08-2010 will not made subject to GAAR provisions. This has not been provided in the above sections and, therefore, the above GAAR provisions will have a retrospective effect.

10.19 In section 101, it is stated that CBDT will issue guidelines to provide for the circumstances under which GAAR should be invoked. Let us hope that these guidelines will specify that GAAR provisions will apply to all arrangements or transactions entered into after 01-04-2015 and also the type of arrangements or transactions to which GAAR will apply. It is also necessary to specify that GAAR provisions will be invoked only if the tax sought to be avoided is more than Rs. 5 crore, in any one year. This is also suggested by the Standing Committee on Finance in their report on the DTC Bill, 2010. Even in the Press Note dated 14-01-2013, the Government had stated that there will be monetary threshold of Rs. 3 crore of tax benefit in a year for invocation of GAAR.

10.20 It may be noted that the above revised set of provisions for invoking of GAAR which will come into force on 01-04-2015 do not contain provisions relating to following decisions of the Government announced in the Government Press Note dated 14-1-2013.

(i)    GAAR will not apply to an FII which does not avail treaty benefit.

(ii)    GAAR will not apply to Non-Resident Investors in FII.

(iii)    Where GAAR and SAAR are both in force, only one of them will apply subject to prescribed guidelines.

(iv)    GAAR will be restricted to only “PART” of the arrangement which is impermissible and not to the whole arrangement.

Let us hope that these issues will be considered when CBDT issues the Guidelines for invocation of GAAR.

11.    Assessments, Reassessments and Appeals:

11.1 Section 132B : This section, which deals with application of seized or requisioned assets, is amended w.e.f. 01 -06-2013. This section provides that the “existing liability” under the Income tax Act, Wealth tax Act, etc. and the amount of liability determined on completion of assessment under 153A and the assessment of the year relevant to the previous year in which search is initiated or requisition is made, or the amount of liability determined on completion of assessment for the block period (including any penalty levied or interest payable in connection with such assessment) may be recovered out of assets seized u/s. 132 or requisitioned u/s. 132A if such person is in default or is deemed to be in default. It was debatable as to whether the assets seized or requisitioned could be adjusted against advance tax payable. With effect from 01-06-2013, an Explanation 2 is inserted to this section to provide that the “existing liability” does not include advance tax payable in accordance with the provisions of the Income-tax Act.

11.2 Section 139(9) :
This section explains when the return of income filed by the assessee u/s. 139 will be considered as defective. If these defects are not removed within the prescribed time, the A.O. will consider that the assessee has not filed the return. This section is now amended w.e.f. 01- 06- 2013. As per section 140A of the Act tax payable on the basis of return of income i.e. self assessment tax, along with interest payable, if any, is required to be paid by the assessee before furnishing the return of income. With effect from 1st June, 2013, non-payment of self assessment tax together with interest, if any, payable in accordance with the provisions of section 140A, before furnishing the return of income, shall make the return of income a defective return. This defect will have to be rectified on receipt of defect notice u/s. 139(9) within the prescribed time.

11.3 Section 142(2A) :
This section empowers the CIT to order a Special Tax Audit of Accounts of the assessee in specified circumstances. At present, order for such audit can be passed having regard to the nature and complexity of the accounts of the assessee and taking into consideration the interest of the revenue. The scope of this section is now expanded w.e.f. 01-06-2013. By amendment of this section such order for Special Audit can be passed by the CIT having regard to –

(i)    Volume of the accounts,

(ii)    Doubts about the correctness of the accounts,

(iii)    Multiplicity of transactions in the accounts and

(iv)    Specialised nature of business activity of the assessee.

This new provision will cover a large number of assessees and although the accounts of large companies are audited by Statutory Auditors as well as Tax Auditors, they can be subjected to this Special Audit.

It may be noted that the CIT has to fix fees of the Chartered Accountant for such special audit on the basis of guidelines contained in Rule 14B and the same is payable by the Central Government.

11.4 Section 153 : This section deals with the time limit for the completion of Assessments and Reassessments. Some issues were arising in computation of this time limit. To resolve these issues the following amendments are made in this section with effect from different dates as stated below.

(i)    If income of the assessee was first assessable in A.Y. 2009-10 or any subsequent year, and the matter is referred to the Transfer Pricing Officer (TPO) u/s. 92 CA, the time limit for completion of assessment will be 3 years from the end of the assessment year instead of 2 years. This amendment is effective from 01-07-2012.

(ii)    In the case of reassessment where notice u/s. 148 is issued on or after 1-4-2010 and the case is referred to TPO u/s. 92CA, the time limit for completion of reassessment will be two years instead of 1 year. This is effective from 01-07-2012.

(iii)    Where order of ITA Tribunal is received by CIT or where CIT has passed order u/s. 263 or 264 on or after 01-04-2010, and while passing the fresh assessment order, a reference is made to TPO u/s. 92CA, the time limit for completion of the fresh assessment will be two years instead of 1 year. This is effective from 01-07-2012.

(iv)    Explanation 1(iii) to this section is amended from 01-06-2013. At present, in computing time limit for completion of assessment in a case in which AO has issued direction for special Audit u/s. 142(2A), the period from the date on which such direction is issued to the date on which the assessee is required to furnish report of the special Audit is to be excluded. It is now provided that, if the above direction is challenged in any court, the period upto the date on which such order is set aside by the court will also be excluded.

(v)    Explanation 1(viii) to this section is amended w.e.f. 01-06-2013. It is now provided that while computing the time limit for completion of assessment the time taken for obtaining information from a foreign country/territory of foreign specified Association u/s. 90 or 90A will be excluded. This will be subject to a maximum of one year.

(vi)    A new clause (ix) is added to Explanation 1 to the above section, effective from 01-04-2016. This relates to GAAR provisions as discussed in para 10 above. It is provided in this clause that the period from the date on which reference for declaration of an arrangement to be an impermissible avoidance arrangement is received by CIT u/s. 144BA and the date when direction from the CIT or the Approving Panel is received by the A.O. will be excluded for computing the period for completion of the assessment.

11.5 Section 153B : This section provides for time limit for completion of assessment in cases of Search and Seizure u/s. 153A. The section is amended from 01-07-2012, 01-04-2013 and from 01-04-2016 as stated in para 11.4 above. These amendments for computation of time limit for completion of the assessment or the reassessment are on the same lines as amendments in section 153 discussed in para 11.4 above.

11.6 Section 153D : This section provides for prior approval for assessment in cases of search or Requisition. This section is amended w.e.f. 01-04-2016. It is now provided that in cases of assessments or reassessments in respect of any of the years mentioned in section 153(1)(b) or the assessment year referred to in section 153B(1)(b), where the Assessing Officer has made a reference to the Commissioner to declare an arrangement as an impermissible avoidance arrangement and to determine the consequence of such an arrangement within the meaning of Chapter X- A, dealing with GAAR, the Assessing Officer shall pass the order of assessment or reassessment with the prior approval of the Commissioner. In such cases, the prior approval of the Joint Commissioner shall not be required.

11.7 Sections 167C and 179 : These sections deal with recovery of taxes due from partners of an LLP in liquidation and directors of a private limited company in liquidation respectively. These sections are amended w.e.f. 01-06-2013. Section 167C allows recovery from the partners of any tax due from an LLP in certain cases. Similarly, section 179 allows recovery from the directors of any tax due from a private company in certain cases. In certain decisions [e.g. Dinesh T. Tailor vs. TRO 326 ITR 85 (Bom.)] it has been held that the “Tax due” will not comprehend within its ambit a penalty or interest. Now, an Explanation is added to both these sections to provide that the expression “Tax due” shall include penalty, interest or any other sum payable under the Act. It would, therefore, be possible for tax authorities to recover not only the tax but also the penalty and the interest dues of an LLP or private company from its partners or directors respectively.

11.8 Sections 245N and 245R :(i) Section 245N(a) defines “Advance Ruling”. In view of the amendments relating to GAAR as discussed in para 10 above, section 245N(a)(iv) has been amended w.e.f. 01-04-2015 (A.Y.: 2016-17). It provides that a Non-Resident can obtain Advance Ruling under XIX-B in respect of determination or decision by Authority for Advance Ruling (AAR) whether an arrangement, which is proposed to be undertaken by a Resident or Non-Resident, is an impermissible avoidance arrangement as referred to in GAAR provisions. Consequential amendment is made in section 245N(b) also.

(ii)    Section 245R is also amended effective 01-04-2015 to provide that AAR will not allow an application where it finds that the transaction is designed prime facie as arrangement which is impermissible avoidance arrangement.

11.9 Section 246A:
This section provides for appeal to CIT(A). Clauses (1)(a)(b)(ba) and (c) of section 246A have been amended w.e.f. 01-04-2016 to provide that an assessment or reassessment order passed u/s. 143(3), 147 or 153A with the approval of CIT u/s. 144BA(12) or any order passed u/s. 154 or 155 in relation to such an order shall not be appealable before CIT(A). In all such cases, direct appeal before ITA Tribunal can be filed.

11.10 Section 252: This section deals with the constitution and appointment of the ITA Tribunal Members. This section is amended w.e.f. 01-06-2013. After this amendment, it is provided that the Central Government shall appoint a President of ITA Tribunal out of the following persons.

(i)    A sitting or retired High Court Judge who has completed 7 years or more of service as such High
Court Judge.

(ii)    Senior Vice President or one of the Vice Presidents of ITA Tribunal.

11.11 Section 253:
This section provides for the list of orders against which appeal can be filed before the ITA Tribunal. Effective from A.Y. 2016 -17, it is now provided that such appeal can be filed directly before the ITA Tribunal against an assessment order passed u/s. 143(3) in regular case, in reassessment proceedings u/s. 147 or in search proceedings u/s. 153A with the approval of CIT u/s. 144BA. Even orders passed u/s. 154 or 155 to rectify mistakes in such proceedings u/s. 144BA will be subject to such appeals before ITA Tribunal u/s. 253.

11.12 Section 271FA: This section provides for levy of penalty for failure to furnish “Annual Information Return” (AIR). This section is amended effective from 01-04-2013 (A.Y. 2014-15). As per the existing provisions, in case of failure in furnishing AIR a penalty of Rs. 100 is leviable for each of day of default after the prescribed date. i.e. 31st August. If the Income tax authority issues notice requiring any person, who has failed to furnish an AIR to submit such return and such person does not furnish such return within the time provided in the notice then the enhanced penalty of Rs. 500 per day is now leviable for the period of such default after the expiry of time provided to furnish the return in the notice issued by AO.

12.    Wealth tax act :

12.1 Section 2(ea): Explanation 1(b) defines “Urban land”. The existing definition is modified w.e.f. A.Y. 2014-15 in such a manner that Urban Land within the area as stated in the amended section 2(1A) of the Income tax Act (as discussed in para 4.1 above) will be included in the definition of Urban Land.

The Finance Minister has stated in his speech while replying to Budget discussion that no wealth tax will be levied on Agricultural Land as at present.

12.2 Sections 14A, 14B and 46 : These sections are amended w.e.f. 01-06-2013. So far provision for electronic filing of returns are applicable to returns filed under the Income tax Act.p Now, sections 14A, 14B & 46 of WT Act are inserted to facilitate electronic filing of annexure – less return of net wealth. Under these provisions, rules will be made for the following:

(i)    The class of person who shall be required to furnish the return electronically.

(ii)    The form and manner in which returns can be filed electronically.

(iii)    The computer resource or the electronic record to which the return may be transmitted electronically.

(iv)    The exemption from furnishing the documents, statements, reports, etc. along with the return filed in an electronic form.

13.    Commodities transaction tax (ctt)

(i)    The Finance Act, 2013 has introduced a new tax called Commodities Transaction Tax (CTT) to be levied on Taxable Commodities Transactions entered into in a recognised association. A transaction of sale of commodity derivatives in respect of commodities, other than agricultural commodities, traded in recognised associations is considered as Taxable Commodities Transaction.

(ii)    CTT is leviable on sale of Commodities Derivatives at the rate of 0.01 per cent and the same is payable by the seller.

(iii)    Section 36 of the Income-tax Act is amended to provide that CTT paid in the course of business shall be allowable as deduction if the income arising from such taxable commodities transactions is included in the income computed under the head “Profits and gains of business of profession”.

(iv)    This tax is to be levied from the date on which Chapter VII of the Finance Act, 2013 relating to CTT comes in to force by way of notification by the Central Government.

(v)    Sections 105 to 124 (Chapter VII) of the Finance Act, 2013, make detailed provisions for the levy of CTT, collection, filing of returns, assessments, appeals, rectifications, penalties etc. on the same lines as chapter VII of the Finance (No.2) Act, 2004 relating to STT.

14.    Securities Transactions Tax (stt)

With effect from 1st June, 2013, the rates of STT have been revised as under:

15.    General Observations:

15.1 This year’s budget being the last effective budget of the present Government can be considered as a soft budget. The provisions relating to GAAR which were to come into force from the current year have been postponed by two years. The provisions relating to the constitution of the Approving Panel and resolution of GAAR disputes have been strengthened. However, unless the mindset of the persons administering these provisions is changed, the tax payers will have to face hardships and they will face unending litigation. For implementing such complex provisions, the tax authorities have to implement these provisions by taking into consideration the ground realities of business and industry in our country. In implementing such provisions the tax authorities should not only consider the letter of the law but should consider the spirit behind this legislation. For this purpose, the CBDT will have to consider the business realities while framing the tax payer friendly guidelines for implementing these provisions.

15.2 As stated above, the Finance Minister has addressed the issue relating to GAAR to some extent. However, the provisions relating to taxation of Non-Residents introduced last year with retrospective effect have not been addressed. These provisions have affected our relationship with many foreign countries. This will affect our global trade in the long term. Disputes have arisen in some cases of large Multinationals and the Government is trying to resolve these disputes by enactment of separate legislation. When the Government has recognised that these disputes have arisen due to these retrospective amendments, it should have amended these provisions and given them only prospective effect.

15.3 One disturbing feature relates to the amendments made this year relating to TDS from consideration paid or payable on purchase of an Immovable Property under new section 194-IA. This will put tax payers and those who are not liable to pay tax into many practical difficulties of collecting 1% tax at source, depositing the same with the Government and filing return of TDS. There will be some issues relating to the date on which such tax is to be deducted when a flat is booked prior to 01-06-2013 or after that date in a building under construction and payments are made in instalments.

15.4 Amendment made in section 56(2)(vii)(b) levying tax on the notional amount of difference between stamp duty valuation of an immovable property sold and the actual consideration paid by an Individual or HUF (Purchaser). This will mean levying tax on the same notional amount in the hands of the seller as well as purchaser. It may be noted that such tax is not payable if the purchaser is a firm, LLP, company or persons other than individual or HUF. Similar tax was levied in 2009 but was withdrawn in 2010 with retrospective effect. It is unfortunate that the Government has again levied this type of tax which is payable by individual/HUF purchaser and seller of the property on the same notional amount. This is a very harsh and unjust provision in the Income-tax Act.

15.5 Provision made last year, effective from 01-04-2012 relating to “Specified Domestic Transactions” has increased the compliance cost of assessees. Transfer Pricing provisions have been made applicable to some domestic transactions. Although one year has passed since these provisions have come into force, there is no clarity about the type of transactions to which these provision will apply. No adequate data about comparable prices is available. In particular, there is no clarity as to how the assessing officers will compare the managerial remuneration paid to connected persons while making disallowance u/s. 40A(2). CBDT has not framed any separate Rule prescribing the information or documents required to be maintained by the assessee to whom this provision is applicable. No separate Form of Audit Report to be obtained u/s. 92E by the assessee to whom these provisions apply has been prescribed. We are informed that the provisions of Rule 10D and 10E and Form 3CEB of Audit Report prescribed for International Transactions can be used. If we refer to these Rules and the Form it will be noticed that there is no mention about Specified Domestic Transactions in these Rules or Form. It is not clear as to how specific requirements of these Domestic Transactions are to be reported in the Audit Report.

15.6 It may be noted that the present Finance Minister mooted the idea of replacing the present Income-tax Act and the Wealth Tax Act by Direct Taxes Code (DTC) in 2006-07. The DTC Bill, 2009 was circulated on 12.08.2009 for public debate. After considering the suggestions from various quarters, the DTC Bill, 2010, was introduced in the Lok Sabha and was to come into force w.e.f. 01.04.2012. The Bill was referred to the Standing Committee of the Finance. Since its report was delayed, DTC could not be passed in 2011 and hence its implementation was delayed. In Para 154 of the Budget Speech the Finance Minister has stated that DTC is work-in-progress. He has also stated that the report of the Standing Committee is received. The same is being examined and the revised Bill will be introduced in the budget session of the Parliament. This has not happened and it appears that this important legislation may not be passed during the present term of the UPA II Government.

15.7 Another legislation viz. Goods and Service Tax (GST) in the field of Indirect Taxes, was announced by the Finance Minister in 2007-08. He has referred to this in Para 186 of the Budget Speech this year. Due to differences in the views of various States, the required legislation has not been introduced in the Parliament. The Prime Minister has admitted that GST, which is to replace Excise Duty, Customs Duty, Service Tax and VAT laws in our Country may be enacted in 2014 after the elections by the new Government which may come to power.

15.8 Another major reform measure in the field of Corporate legislation relates to replacement of the Companies Act, 1956 by the Companies Bill, 2011. This Bill has been passed by the Lok Sabha in December, 2012. It is pending in the Rajya Sabha. The impression given to us was that this Bill will be passed in this year’s Budget Session and will come into force soon. This Bill is pending before the Rajya Sabha and this important legislation is also delayed.

15.9 The above three legislations are being discussed for the last more than five years but our Parliament is not able to legislate the same. We are assured that these new legislations will simplify our tax and Corporate Legislation and make the life of all stakeholders hassle free. Let us hope the Parliament in its wisdom legislates these provisions before the end of the current Financial Year.

(Acknowledgement: S.M. Jhaveri, Chartered Accountant and Dalpat H Shah, Chartered Accountant have assisted the Author in the preparation of this Article)

Dilip Sambhaji Shirodkar vs. ITO ITAT “D” Bench, Mumbai Before P.M.Jagtap (A.M.) and Dr S.T.M. Pavalan (J. M.) ITA No.8899/Mum/2010 Assessment Year: 2006-07. Decided on 12.06.2013 Counsel for Assessee/Revenue: Jitnedra Jain & Sachin Romani / Rajarshi Dwivedy

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Section 69 – Acquisition of a flat in lieu of the surrender of a tenancy right – Existence of difference in value between consideration for tenancy right acquired and the value of the new flat received in lieu thereof not sufficient ground for making addition.

Facts:
The assessee was an individual engaged in the occupation of goldsmith. In his return of income he had declared a total income at Rs. 0.80 lakh. The AO, in assessment made u/s.143(3) found that during the year under consideration the assessee had purchased a property worth Rs. 50.35 lakh. The AO treated this impugned investment as unexplained and made an addition of Rs.50.35 lakh u/s.69. On appeal, the CIT(A) confirmed the action of the AO.

Before the tribunal, the assessee submitted that he had acquired tenancy right as per Agreement dated 09-04-2001 for a sum of Rs. 4 lakh. Thereafter, pursuant to the agreement dated 07-10-2005, the assessee was allotted a flat in another building in lieu of surrender of his tenancy right. The value of the flat allotted in lieu of surrender of tenancy right was Rs. 50.35 lakh as per the valuation done by the Stamp Duty Authorities, while registering the agreement. He further submitted that the consideration on the surrender of the tenancy rights, equal to the value of the new flat, stood fully invested in a residential flat, the Long Term Capital Gain arising on the said transaction was not chargeable to tax u/s.54F. The contention of the revenue was that the assessee had not been able to prove that he had received the flat by virtue of the surrender of tenancy rights.

Held:

The tribunal agreed with the assessee that the agreement dated 07-10-2005 clearly indicated that the new flat was acquired by the assessee in lieu of surrender of his tenancy right in the old building. The perusal of the agreement dated 09-04-2001, also indicated that the old tenants transferred the tenancy rights in respect of the said property to the assessee for a consideration of Rs. 4 lakh. Secondly, as regards the reasoning of the CIT(A) that the acquisition value of Rs. 4 lakh had not been paid by the assessee, the tribunal found merit in the contention of the assessee that the same had been by way of constructive payment made by the builder on behalf of the assessee, which according to it was not a new practice of the developer in business of construction industry. Thirdly, regarding the finding of the lower authorities as to the difference in values between the consideration for relinquishment of rights by the old tenant (Rs.4 lakh) and the market value of the new flat (more than Rs.50 lakh), the tribunal opined that it was beyond the purview of the lower authorities to suspect a transaction solely on the ground of adequacy/inadequacy of consideration in the absence of any other corroborating evidence and thereby making any adverse inferences. Further, the value as adopted by AO was based on the valuation determined by the stamp duty authorities while registering the agreement dated 07-10-2005. Therefore, it held that mere suspicion without evidence on record could not be the basis for making an addition to income u/s. 69 and hence, the addition made was deleted.

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MITC Rolling Mills P. Ltd. vs ACIT ITAT “B” Banch, Mumbai Before D. Manmohan, (V.P.) and Rajendra, (A. M.) ITA No.2789/Mum/2012 Assessment Year: 2009-10. Decided on 13.05.2013 Counsel for Assessee/Revenue: T. M. Gosher / Mohit Jain

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Section 32(1)(iia) – Additional depreciation on Plant and Machinery – Where the plant and machineries were put into use for less than 180 days in the year of installation and hence, disentitled the assessee to the 50% of the additional amount of depreciation, the assessee was entitled to the balance 50% of the additional depreciation in the subsequent year.
Facts:
The assessee was engaged in the business of manufacture and sale of iron and steel. Assessee installed certain new plant and machinery after September, 2007. For the previous year relevant to A. Y. 2008-09 the plant and machinery having been put to operation for less than 180 days the assessee claimed only 50% of the additional depreciation and the balance 50% was claimed in the previous year relevant to A. Y. 2009-10, which is the year under appeal. The AO as well as the CIT(A) were of the opinion that the assessee was not entitled to claim balance 50% deprecation in the subsequent year u/s. 32(1)(iia) of the Act. The case of the assessee was that it is a onetime incentive allowed to the assessee under the Act where the object was to encourage establishment of industries and hence, balance 50% was allowable in the year under consideration.

Held:
The tribunal placed reliance upon the following decisions of the Delhi tribunal:

i. DCIT vs. Cosmo Films Ltd. 139 ITD 628

ii. ACIT vs. Sil Investment Ltd. 54 SOT 54

The tribunal noted that as per the Delhi tribunal, there was no restriction on allowing balance of one time incentive in the subsequent year if the provisions are constructed reasonably, liberally and in a purposive manner. According to it, the additional benefit was intended to give impetus to industrialisation and in that direction the assessee was entitled to get the benefit in full when there was no restriction in the statute to deny the benefit of balance 50% when the new plant and machinery was acquired and put to use for less than 180 days in the immediately preceding year. Accordingly, it was held that the assessee was entitled to depreciation in the subsequent year if the entire depreciation was not allowed in the first year of installation.

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Apollo Tyres vs. DCIT ITAT Cochin Bench Before N. R. S. Ganesan (JM) and B. R. Baskaran (AM) ITA No. 31/Coch/2010 A.Y.: 2006-07. Decided on: 29th May, 2013. Counsel for assessee/revenue: Percy J. Pardiwala, T. P. Ostwal and Indra Anand, Madhur Agarwal/M. Anil Kumar

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Section 40(a)(ia) – Section 40(a)(ia) does not envisage a situation where there was short deduction/lesser deduction as in case of section 201(1A) and therefore in case of short/lesser deduction of tax, the entire expenditure whose genuineness was not doubted by the AO cannot be disallowed.

Facts:

The assessee made payments on which tax deductible at source was deducted at a rate lower than the rate at which tax ought to have been deducted. The short deduction was due to surcharge not being considered in some cases and in some cases rate applicable to sub-contractors was applied instead of applying the rate for payment to contractors. The AO disallowed a sum of Rs. 68,68,556 u/s. 40(a)(ia) of the Act.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The Tribunal after having considered the provisions of section 40(a)(ia) and section 201(1A) of the Act held as follows :

In section 201(1A) the legislature intended to levy interest even in case of short deduction of tax. In other words, if any part of the tax which was required to be deducted was found to be not deducted then interest u/s. 201(1A) can be levied in respect of that part of the amount which was not deducted whereas the language of section 40(a)(ia) does not say that even for short deduction disallowance has to be made proportionately. Therefore, the legislature has clearly envisaged in section 201(1A) for levy of interest on the amount on which tax was not deducted whereas the legislature has omitted to do so in section 40(a)(ia) of the Act. In other words, provisions of section 40(a)(ia) do not enable the AO to disallow any proportionate amount for short deduction or lesser deduction.

The Mumbai Bench found that short deduction of TDS, if any, could have been considered as liability under the Income-tax Act as due from the assessee. Therefore, the disallowance of the entire expenditure, whose genuineness was not doubted by the AO is not justified. A similar view was also taken by the Kolkatta Bench of the Tribunal in the case of CIT vs. S. K. Tekriwal. In this case, on appeal by the revenue, the Calcutta High Court confirmed the order of the Kolkatta Bench of the Tribunal (ITA No. 183 of 2012, GA No. 2069 of 2012 judgment dated 3.12.2012).

Section 40(a)(ia) does not envisage a situation where there was short deduction/lesser deduction as in case of section 201(1A) of the Act. Therefore, in case of short/lesser deduction of tax, the entire expenditure whose genuineness was not doubted by the AO cannot be disallowed.

This ground of appeal was decided in favour of the assessee.

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S. 55A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Valuation report of Departmental Valuation Officer — To determine fair market value as on 1st April, 1981 whether reference to DVO can be made — Held, No.

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New Page 1

part B: unreported decisions


1 ITO v. Surendra V. Shah

ITAT ‘E’ Bench, Mumbai

Before D. Manmohan (VP) and

Pramod Kumar (AM)

ITA No. 5667/Mum./2008

Decided on : 23-7-2010

Counsel for revenue/assessee
:

Naveen Gupta/Dr. Rashmi J.
Zaveri

Per Pramod Kumar :

Facts :

S. 55A of the Income-tax
Act, 1961 — Valuation report of Departmental Valuation Officer — To determine
fair market value as on 1st April, 1981 whether reference to DVO can be made —
Held, No.

The issue before the
Tribunal was whether the AO can resort to Departmental Valuation Officer’s (DVO)
report for ascertaining fair market value of an asset as on 1st April, 1981 and
for the purpose of computing cost of acquisition u/s.55(2)(b)(i).

Held :

According to the Tribunal a
reference to DVO can only be made u/s.55A. Further relying on the decision of
the Mumbai Bench of Tribunal in the case of Daulai Mohta (HUF) which decision
was subsequently approved by the Bombay High Court, the Tribunal upheld the
order of the CIT(A) to the effect that the reference to the DVO was invalid.

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Business expenditure: TDS: Disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia): A. Y. 2009-10: Tax deducted at source on salaries of employees paid by another party on behalf of assessee: Assessee not required to deduct tax on reimbursement to that party: Disallowance u/s. 40(a) (ia) cannot be made:

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CIT vs. Victor Shipping Services (P) Ltd.; 357 ITR 642
(All):

In the A. Y. 2009-10, M paid salary to the employees of the assessee on behalf of the assessee and also deducted tax at source as per law. The assessee reimbursed the amount to M. The Assessing Officer disallowed the payment made to M relying on the provisions of section 40(a)(ia), on the ground that no tax was deducted at source on such payment to M. The CIT(A) allowed the assessee’s appeal and held that since M had deducted tax at source on salaries paid by it on behalf of the assessee, the assessee was not required to deduct tax at source on reimbursement made by it to M, and when the expenses incurred by the assessee were totally paid and did not remain payable as at the end of the accounting period, the provisions of section 40(a) (ia) of the Act were not applicable. The Tribunal affirmed the decision of the CIT(A).

On appeal by the Revenue, the Allahabad High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) Tax was deducted at source from the salaries of the employees paid by M, and the circumstances in which such salaries were paid by M for the assessee were sufficiently explained. For disallowing expenses from business and profession on the ground that tax has not been deducted at source, the amount should be payable and not which has been paid by the end of the year.

ii) The Tribunal had not committed any error in recording on facts, and no question of law arose for consideration in appeal.”

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The scope of ‘services’ in the context of Section 44BB is not restricted and they need not be only those which are other than ‘technical services’ under Section 9(1)(vii).

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New Page 2

17 Geofizyka Torun Sp Zo O, In
re [2009] 32 DTR (AAR) 139

Sections 9(1)(vii), 44BB, 44DA,
I T Act

7th December, 2009

Issue

The scope of ‘services’ in the context of Section 44BB is not
restricted and they need not be only those which are other than ‘technical
services’ under Section 9(1)(vii).

Facts

The applicant was a tax resident of Poland (“PolCo”). It was
in the business of providing geophysical services to the international oil and
gas industry. It conducted seismic surveys and provided onshore seismic data
acquisition and other associated services such as processing and interpretation
of such data to global and oil companies. Seismic surveys are used to identify
hydrocarbons, increase exploration success, maximise production, better target
the oil and gas reserves and to reduce the overall exploratory drilling risks.
The short question before AAR was whether income derived by PolCo in India was
covered under section 44BB of the Act.

Before the AAR, the tax authorities contested the
applicability of Section 44BB on the ground that the services contemplated in
Section 44BB were other than those coming within the purview of Explanation 2 to
Section 9(1)(vii) of the Act, whereas the services provided by PolCo were
covered under the said provision. Further, ‘fees for technical services’ under
Section 9(1)(vii) should be computed under Section 44DA where the service
provider has a PE in India. It was also contended that PolCo itself was not
undertaking any mining or like project (which was being undertaken by someone
else), and that Section 44BB would come into play only if the services were out
of the purview of Section 9(1)(vii).

The AAR observed that it was an undisputed and undeniable
fact that PolCo was engaged in business in India. The AAR then referred to
Sections 44BB, 44DA and 115A and proceeded to consider the meaning of the
expression ‘in connection with’.

Held

Having regard to the meaning of the expression ‘in connection
with’, it is clear that the services provided by PolCo were in connection with
the prospecting for or extraction of mineral oils and there was real, intimate
and proximate nexus between the services performed by PolCo in India and
prospecting for or extraction of mineral oils.

The expression ‘services’ should be understood in its plain
and ordinary sense and in the absence of any limitation or exclusion in the
statute. There was no reason to assign narrow and restricted meaning and confine
it to ‘services other than technical, consultancy or managerial services’.
Section 44BB and Section 44DA being competing provisions, and Section 44BB being
a more specific provision, it should prevail.

 

End notes:

1. In its decision, the Supreme Court did not
examine this issue. It reversed Gujarat High Court’s decision merely because of
retrospective amendment to section 10(15)(iv)(c) whereby usance interest was
exempted but, only in case of an undertaking engaged in the business of ship
breaking. Hence, it is doubtful whether the Supreme Court could be said to have
reversed the ratio of Gujarat High Court’s decision.

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S. 45 read with S. 10(38) — Profit from delivery-based transactions in shares treated as capital gains and not as business income.

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60.    (2009) 29 SOT 117 (Mum.)


Gopal Purohit v. Jt. CIT

A.Y. : 2005-06. Dated : 10-2-2009

S. 45 read with S. 10(38) — Profit from delivery-based
transactions in shares treated as capital gains and not as business income.

During the relevant assessment year, the assessee entered
into transactions of sale and purchase of shares in two forms i.e.,
delivery-based transactions and non-delivery-based transactions. Non-delivery
based transactions had been treated by the assessee as business activity and
income earned by assessee from delivery-based transactions was treated as
capital gain. The assessee’s claim for exemption of long-term capital gain
u/s.10(38) was rejected by the Assessing Officer on the following grounds :



  • the frequency of the transactions carried on by the assessee was very high
    with large volumes of shares.



  • the assessee had borrowed funds which were utilised for carrying out share
    transactions.



  •  transactions where no delivery was taken had been squared up on the same day
    the profit/ loss resulting therefrom was shown as business income.



  •  in respect of delivery-based transactions, as per the statement of capital
    gains filed by the assessee, the period of holding was few days only.


The Assessing Officer, therefore, held that the entire
profit was to be assessed as income from business and profession.

Before the CIT(A) the assessee contended that in earlier
five assessment years on identical facts, the assessment had been completed
u/s.143(3) by accepting the assessee’s claim. Hence, on the basis of the
principle of consistency and in absence of any fresh material, the same
treatment should be given by the Revenue for this year also. The CIT(A) upheld
the Assessing Officer’s order.

The Tribunal, relying on the decision in the case of
Sarnath Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. Asst. CIT,
(2009) 120 TTJ 216 (Luck.),
held in favour of the assessee. The Tribunal noted as under :

1. The assessee had claimed himself both as a dealer as
well as an investor and offered income for taxation accordingly and he claimed
that such income had been accepted by the Revenue authorities in earlier
years. Hence, it becomes important to analyse the facts of earlier years. On
considering the facts of the earlier years, the following conclusions
emerged :

(i) The facts of the year under consideration with regard
to nature of income(s) earned by the assessee and the transactions were same
in all those years, except transactions in F & O segment in some of the
years, wherein this kind of activity was started by the stock exchange.

(ii) Interest on borrowed capital had been allowed as
business expenditure against the profit on jobbing activities shown by the
assessee as business profit.

(iii) The assessee had shown shares purchased on delivery
basis as investments at the end of the year and no stock-in-trade existed on
that date and the assessee had earned both long-term and short-term capital
gains which meant that the assessee had also held shares for the period of
more than 12 months.

Thus, the nature of activities, modus operandi of
the assessee, manner of keeping records and presentation of shares as
investments at the year end were the same in all the years and hence,
apparently, there appeared no reason as to why the claim made by the assessee
should not be accepted.

2. The Revenue authorities had taken a different view in
the year under consideration by holding that the principle of res judicata
was not applicable to the assessment proceedings. There could not be any
dispute on this aspect, but there is also another judicial thought that there
should be uniformity in treatment and consistency under the same facts and
circumstances and it was already found that facts and circumstances were
identical, even though a different stand had been taken by the Revenue
authorities.

3. On the facts and circumstances of the instant case, on
the basis of principle of consistency alone, the action of the Revenue
authorities was liable to be quashed.

4. On the basis of merits also, in view of the ratio of the
decision of Sarnath Infrastructure (P.) Ltd.’s case (supra), it was
held that the delivery-based transaction should be treated as of the nature of
investment transactions and profit therefrom should be treated as capital
gains.

5. The Revenue authorities had also held that borrowed
funds were utilised for making such investment. In earlier years, interest on
such loans had been allowed as business expenditure against profit on share
trading transaction shown as business income. In the year under consideration
also no nexus between the interest-bearing funds and investments had been
established and, hence, for this reason also, there was no merit in treating
the capital gains as business profit.


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ITO vs. Zinger Investments (P) Ltd. ITAT Hyderabad `A’ Bench Before Chandra Poojari (AM) and Saktijit Dey (JM) ITA No. 275/Hyd/2013 A.Y.: 2007-08. Decided on: 21st August, 2013. Counsel for revenue/assessee: M. H. Naik/ Inturi Rama Rao.

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Sections 2(42C), 50B—Transfer of undertaking, with all its assets and liabilities under a scheme of amalgamation, where no monetary consideration is involved, cannot be considered to be a slump sale within the meaning of section 2(42C).

Facts:
The assessee filed return of income declaring nil income. In the course of assessment proceedings u/s. 147 of the Act, the Assessing Officer (AO) noticed that under the scheme of amalgamation approved by the Andhra Pradesh High Court u/s. 391 and 394 of the Companies Act the manufacturing division of the assessee company was transferred to M/s. Novopan Industries Ltd. with all its assets and liabilities as per the terms of scheme of amalgamation approved by the High Court. The assessee in return for the transfer of assets and liabilities received the investments of Rs. 25,24,05,000 besides the allotment of 38 equity shares of Rs. 10 each to the shareholders of the assessee company for every 100 equity shares held in the assessee company. The net worth of the assessee company as on 31-3-2006 was Rs. 681.22 lakh.

The AO held the transfer of manufacturing division to M/s. Novopan Industries Ltd to be a `slump sale’ within section 50B attracting liability of capital gains. He computed long-term capital gain by adopting full value of consideration to be Rs. 31,52,12,500 being aggregate of Rs. 6,28,07,500 (being shares issued to shareholders) and Rs. 25,24,05,000. He considered Rs. 6,81,22,000 to be the cost of acquisition. Accordingly, he determined long-term capital gain to be Rs. 24,70,90,500. He rejected the contention of the assessee that there was no monetary consideration and therefore the transfer under consideration was not a slump sale.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who allowed the assessee’s appeal.

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held: The Tribunal, having noted the facts, observed that there is no monetary consideration received by the assessee company for transfer of manufacturing division. To qualify as a slump sale u/s. 2(42C), two conditions have to be satisfied viz., (1) there must be transfer of one or more undertaking as a result of sale and (2) the sale should be for a lumpsum consideration without values being assigned to the individual assets and liabilities. The Tribunal noted the ratio of the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Motors & General Stores Pvt. Ltd. 66 ITR 692 (SC) and also CIT vs. R. R. Ramakrishna Pillai 66 ITR 725 (SC) wherein it was held that where a person carrying on business transfers assets to a company in consideration of allotment of shares, it would be a case of exchange, but not sale.

The Tribunal held that since there is no monetary consideration involved in transferring the manufacturing division with all its assets and liabilities to M/s. Novapan Industries Ltd. under scheme of amalgamation approved by the Andhra Pradesh High Court, it cannot be considered to be a slump sale within the meaning ascribed u/s. 2(42C) of the Act so as to attract the liability of capital gains u/s. 50B of the Act. The Tribunal did not find any reason to interfere with the finding of CIT(A).

The appeal filed by the revenue was dismissed.

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ITO vs. Gope M. Rochlani ITAT Mumbai `G’ Bench Before Rajendra Singh (AM) and Amit Shukla (JM) ITA No. 7737/Mum/2011 A.Y.: 2008-09. Decided on: 24th May, 2013. Counsel for revenue/assessee: D. K. Sinha/ Dr. P. Daniel.

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Explanation 5A to section 271(1)(c). The expression “due date” in Explanation 5A encompasses a belated return filed u/s. 139(4). Even a belated return filed u/s. 139(4) will be entitled to the benefit of immunity from penalty.

Facts: The assessee, a partner of the firm M/s. Madhav Constructions, in its return of income for assessment year 2008-09, filed u/s. 139(4), returned a total income of Rs. 1,31,19,140. The returned income included a sum of Rs. 1,25,00,000 declared by it in the statement recorded u/s. 132(4) of the Act in the course of search action on Madhav Group. In an order passed u/s. 143(3) r.w.s. 153A, the income returned by the assessee was accepted by the Assessing Officer (AO). Thereafter, the AO initiated proceedings u/s. 271(1)(c) on the ground that the income was offered only as a consequence of search and the return of income in which it was declared was filed after due date u/s. 139(1). He held that the assessee’s case was covered by Explanation 5A to section 271(1)(c). He rejected the assessee’s contention that the sum of Rs. 1,25,00,000 declared was offered voluntarily on an estimated basis and the same was accepted in the assessment order and hence the provisions of section 271(1)(c) are not applicable.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who allowed the appeal filed by the assessee on the ground that income was offered on an estimated basis and therefore the additional income so offered and accepted could not be held to be concealed income nor could it amount to furnishing of inaccurate particulars.

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
In Explanation 5A, the legislature has not specified the due date as provided in section 139(1) but has merely envisaged the words “due date”. This “due date” can be very well inferred as due date of filing of return of income filed u/s. 139 which includes section 139(4). Where the legislature has provided the consequences of filing of return of income u/s. 139(4), then the same has also been specifically provided for eg., section 139(3). Thus, the meaning of the words “due date” sans any limitation or restriction as given in clause (b) of Explanation 5A cannot be read as “due date as provided in section 139(1)”. The words “due date” can also mean date of filing of the return of income u/s. 139(4).

The Tribunal also noted that in the context of sections 54F and 54(2), in the case of CIT vs. Rajesh Kumar Jalan (286 ITR 276)(Gau); CIT vs. Jagriti Aggarwal (339 ITR 610)(P & H) and CIT vs. Jagtar Singh Chawla (ITA No. 71 of 2012, order dated 20th March, 2013), it has been held that provisions of section 139(4) are actually an extension of due date of section 139(1) and therefore due date for filing return of income can also be reckoned with the date mentioned in section 139(4).

The Tribunal held that the assessee gets the benefit/ immunity under clause (b) of Explanation to section 271(1)(c), because the assessee has filed its return of income within “due date” and therefore, the penalty levied by the AO cannot be sustained on this ground. It held that it is not affirming the findings and conclusions of CIT (A). However, the penalty levied was deleted in view of the interpretation of Explanation 5A to section 271(1)(c).

The appeal filed by the revenue was dismissed.

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Om Stock & Commodities Pvt. Ltd. vs. DCIT ITAT Mumbai `C’ Bench Before Sanjay Arora (AM) and Vijay Pal Rao (JM) ITA No. 441/Mum/2011 A.Y.: 2008-09. Decided on: 10th July, 2013. Counsel for assessee/revenue: Prakash Jhunjhunwala/T. Roumuan Paite

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Sections 44AB, 271B—Value of transactions of online trading in commodities through MCX without taking delivery do not constitute turnover for computing the limits u/s. 44AB of the Act. There is no element of turnover where there is no physical delivery of commodities given or taken.

Facts:
The assessee company, a member of Multi Commodity Exchange of India (MCX) was engaged in online business of trading in commodities. The transactions carried on by the assessee were speculative in nature. The bills issued by the Exchange on a daily basis represented mark to market bills and not actual sales/purchase turnover. The transactions were without taking delivery. The entire transaction was squared off at the end of the day or was carried forward to the subsequent day. The net amount, as per contract notes, was either debited or credited to the account of the assessee.

The Assessing Officer (AO), considering the value of the transactions carried out by the assessee on MCX to be the sales figure, invoked section 271B for violation of section 44AB. He held that the turnover of the assessee was more than Rs. 40 lakh, being the limit prescribed u/s. 44AB for getting the accounts audited and obtaining and furnishing the report as required by the Act.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who upheld the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where it placed reliance on the following decisions:

Banwari Sitaram Pasari HUF vs. ACIT (29 Taxmann 137) (Pune ITAT)

Growmore Exports Ltd. vs. ACIT (72 TTJ 691) (Mum ITAT)

CIT vs. Growmore Exports Ltd. (Appeal No. 18 to 20 of 2001) (Mum HC).

Held:
The Tribunal noted that the Pune Bench of ITAT has in the case of Banwari Sitaram Pasari (supra), following the decision of Mumbai Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Growmore Exports Ltd. (supra) held that the transaction of buying and selling of commodities where no physical delivery is taken or given is a speculative activity and there is no element of turnover in such transactions.

The Tribunal also noted that the view taken by the Tribunal in the case of Growmore Exports Ltd. has been confirmed by the Bombay High Court vide decision dated 19-12-2007 and speaking order has been passed in the connected case of CIT vs. Harsh Estate Pvt. Ltd. where the Court has observed as under:

“In other words the finding by the Commissioner (Appeals) that the purchase was coupled with delivery has been reversed by the order of ITAT. Nothing has been brought to our attention from the record that the said finding of reversal is perverse warranting this court to take a view different from the view of the Tribunal. We, therefore, proceed on the footing that though there was transaction of shares it was not coupled with delivery. Once there was no delivery, the sale price of the shares could not have been considered as the turnover but only the difference between the price at which the shares were purchased and consequently sold by the broker…

Considering the findings on merits namely that there was no delivery and consequently the sales prices of the shares could not have been considered, it is not necessary to go into the other aspects. In the light of the above, we find no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed.”

The Tribunal considering the above mentioned decisions held that the value of sale transaction of commodity through MCX without delivery cannot be considered as turnover for the purpose of section 44AB. It deleted the penalty levied u/s. 271B.

The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

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Section 271(1)(c) r.w.s. 115JB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Penalty for concealment of income — Assessing returning income based on book profit — Pursuant to search action additional income declared — Total income as per normal provisions of the Act less

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22 Ruchi Strips & Alloys Ltd. v. DCIT


ITAT ‘D’ Bench, Mumbai

Before N. V. Vasudevan (JM) and

T. R. Sood (AM)

ITA No. 6940 & 6941/Mum/2008

A.Ys. : 2003-2004 & 2005-2006

Decided on : 21-1-2011

Counsel for assessee/revenue :

Bhupendra Shah/Jitendra Yadav

 

Section 271(1)(c) r.w.s. 115JB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 —
Penalty for concealment of income — Assessing returning income based on book
profit — Pursuant to search action additional income declared — Total income as
per normal provisions of the Act less than the book profit — Whether the penalty
can be imposed — Held, No.

Per N. V. Vasudevan :

Facts:

The assessee was a company. During the years under appeal it
offered to tax its income computed u/s.115JB as its taxable income under the
normal provisions of the law was nil (on account of setting off of brought
forward losses). There was action u/s.132 of the Act and based on certain
incriminating documents found, the assessee offered to tax an additional income
of Rs.12 lakh and Rs.2.84 crores in the two years. However, on account of the
un-adjusted carried forward losses, its income under the normal provisions of
the Act still remained nil and the same amount of income, which was returned
earlier u/s.115JB, was assessed u/s.153A. The issue before the Tribunal was
whether the AO was justified in levying of penalty for concealment of
particulars of income by the assessee.

Held:

According to the Tribunal, the addition, in respect of which
the penalty was imposed, was made while computing total income under the normal
provisions of law. While ultimately, the total income of the assessee was
determined on the basis of book profit u/s.115JB of the Act. Therefore, relying
on the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT v. Nalwa
Investment Ltd.
, [(2010) 322 ITR 233] the Tribunal cancelled the penalty
imposed by the AO.

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Income-tax Act, 1961 — Section 271(1)(c). Penalty u/s.271(1)(c) is not leviable on addition arising u/s.50C.

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21 Renu Hingorani v. ACIT


ITAT ‘D’ Bench, Mumbai

Before R. S. Syal (AM) and

Vijay Pal Rao (JM)

ITA No. 2210/Mum./2010

A.Y. : 2006-2007. Decided on : 22-12-2010

Counsel for assessee/revenue : Vipul Joshi/

Jitendra Yadav

 

Income-tax Act, 1961 — Section 271(1)(c). Penalty
u/s.271(1)(c) is not leviable on addition arising u/s.50C.

Per Vijay Pal Rao :

Facts:

The assessee inter alia sold a residential flat for
a consideration of Rs.63,00,000, whereas the value of this flat as per the Stamp
Valuation Authorities was Rs.72,00,824. Thus, there was a difference of
Rs.9,00,824. The assessee in her return of income computed capital gains with
reference to sale consideration as per sale agreement. In the course of the
assessment proceedings, upon being asked to show cause why the difference should
not be added back to the total income, the assessee agreed to the same.
Accordingly, the said sum of Rs.9,00,824 was added to the total income of the
assessee by applying the provisions of section 50C of the Act. The AO initiated
penalty proceedings u/s.271(1)(c) and vide order dated 20-3-2009 levied the
penalty of Rs.1,98,181 (being 100% of tax sought to be evaded).

Aggrieved by the levy of penalty, the assessee
preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO.

Aggrieved by the order of the CIT(A), the assessee
preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal having noted that — (i) the AO had not
questioned the actual consideration received by the assessee, but the addition
was purely on the basis of deeming provisions of section 50C of the Act; (ii)
the AO had not given any finding that the actual sale consideration was more
than the sale consideration admitted and mentioned in the sale agreement; and
(iii) the assessee had furnished all the relevant facts, documents/material
including the sale agreement, the genuineness and validity whereof was not
doubted by the AO, observed that the assessee’s agreement to an addition on the
basis of valuation by the Stamp Valuation Authority would not be a conclusive
proof that the sale consideration as per agreement was incorrect and wrong. It
held that the addition because of the deeming provisions does not ipso facto
attract penalty u/s.271(1)(c). In view of the decision of the Apex Court in the
case of CIT v. Reliance Petroproducts Pvt. Ltd., (322 ITR 158) (SC), the
penalty levied was held to be not sustainable.

The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

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Section 271B r.w. s. 44AB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Penalty for non-furnishing of Tax Audit Report — Assessee who was property developer, was following project completion method of accounting — During the year the project was not completed — Whether A

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20 Siroya Developers v. DCIT

ITAT ‘I’ Bench, Mumbai

Before S. V. Mehrotra (AM) and

Asha Vijayaraghavan (JM)

ITA No. 600/Mum./2010

A.Y. : 2005-2006. Decided on : 12-1-2011

Counsel for assessee/revenue : B. V. Jhaveri/

S. K. Singh

Section 271B r.w. s. 44AB of the Income-tax Act,
1961 — Penalty for non-furnishing of Tax Audit Report — Assessee who was
property developer, was following project completion method of accounting —
During the year the project was not completed — Whether AO justified in holding
that since the advance received against the flats sold exceeded the prescribed
limit of Rs.40 lakh, the assessee was liable to get the accounts audited
u/s.44AB — Held, No.

Per Asha Vijayaraghavan :

Facts:

The issue before the Tribunal was whether on the
basis of the facts, the assessee was liable to get its accounts audited u/s.44AB
of the Act. The assessee, a property developer, was following project completion
method of accounting. As per its accounts, the work in progress as at the
beginning of the year was Rs.4.35 crores and as at the end of the year was
Rs.10.07 crores. During the year it had received advances against the sale of
flats of Rs.4.03 crores. Referring to the Board Circular (No. 387, dated 6-7-1984), the
authorities below contended that the legislative intent would be defeated if the
provisions were applied only in the year when the project was completed.
According to the Revenue, if the project takes the period as long as 10 years,
then as contended by the assessee, the audit report would be filed in the said
tenth year when it would not be possible for the AO to look into the details of
10 years. Secondly, during the year under appeal, the value of the work in
progress as well as the receipt of advances from the customers had exceeded the
prescribed limit of Rs.40 lakh.

Held:

According to the Tribunal, when the assessee was
following the project completion method of accounting, the advances received
against booking of flats could not be treated as sale proceeds/turnover/gross
receipts. For the purpose it relied on the Pune Tribunal decision in the case of
ACIT v. B. K. Jhala & Associates and the views of the Institute of Chartered
Accountants of India. Accordingly, the appeal filed by the assessee against the
order for levy of penalty u/s.271B was allowed.

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Income-tax Act, 1957, section 50 — Provisions of section 50 are not attracted in a case where on the asset transferred depreciation was neither claimed nor allowed.

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19 Divine Construction Co. v. ACIT


ITAT ‘D’ Bench, Mumbai

Before R. S. Syal (AM) and

Vijay Pal Rao (JM)

ITA No. 5396/Mum./2009

A.Y. : 2006-2007. Decided on : 20-12-2010

Counsel for assessee/revenue : Dr. P. Daniel & S.
M. Makhija/Jitendra Yadav

Income-tax Act, 1957, section 50 — Provisions of
section 50 are not attracted in a case where on the asset transferred
depreciation was neither claimed nor allowed.

Per R. S. Syal :

Facts :

The assessee transferred office premises and
returned the gain arising therefrom as long-term capital gain. Upon being called
by the Assessing Officer (AO) to explain why the provisions of section 50 are
not applicable, the assessee submitted that though the property was included in
the block of assets but since no depreciation was ever claimed or allowed
thereon, the provisions of section 50 are not applicable. The AO held that in
view of the provisions of section 50 read with Explanation 5 of section 32, the
contention of the assessee is not acceptable. He computed the short-term capital gain and charged the same to tax.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the
CIT(A) who upheld the action of the AO.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the
Tribunal.

Held:

Section 50 gets activated only on satisfaction of
twin conditions mentioned therein viz. (i) the capital asset should be an asset
forming part of block of asset; and (ii) depreciation should have been allowed
on it under this Act or under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. The Tribunal
noted that the property was reflected in the Schedule of Fixed Assets at its
original purchase price. Since depreciation was never claimed, nor allowed on
this property, the Tribunal overturned the order passed by the AO and held that
the long-term capital gain declared by the assessee be accepted as such, since
no infirmity was pointed out by the AO in the calculation shown by the assessee.

The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

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Income-tax Act, 1961, section 244A — Interest u/s.244A(1)(b) is allowable and should be granted on refund of tax paid in pursuance of an order u/s.201 of the Act.

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18 Reliance Infrastructure Ltd. v. DDIT


ITAT ‘D’ Bench, Mumbai

Before J. Sudhakar Reddy (AM) and

V. Durga Rao (JM)

ITA No. 7509/Mum./2010

A.Y. : 1999-2000. Decided on : 28-1-2011

Counsel for assessee/revenue :

Jitendra Sanghavi/Dr. S. Senthil Kumar

 

Income-tax Act, 1961, section 244A — Interest
u/s.244A(1)(b) is allowable and should be granted on refund of tax paid in
pursuance of an order u/s.201 of the Act.

Per J. Sudhakar Reddy:

Facts:

The assessee hired M/s. Jardine Flemming as lead
managers for the GDR issue and paid commission to them as well as to their
associates without deducting tax at source u/s.195. The Assessing Officer (AO)
in an order passed u/s.201, after issuing the requisite notice and considering
the submissions made by the assessee, held that the assessee was liable to
deduct tax at source and accordingly directed the assessee to pay USD 26,76,750.
Aggrieved by the order of the AO the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A)
who partly allowed the appeal. On further appeal to the Tribunal, the Tribunal
set aside the matter to the file of the AO. Consequently, the AO passed the
impugned order dated 7-3-2008 and determined a refund but did not grant interest
u/s.244A.

The CIT(A) rejected the claim by holding that the
assessee could not show that TDS was voluntarily deposited by it or under
protest u/s.195(2) and hence was not eligible for interest u/s.244A.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the
Tribunal.

Held:

The Tribunal held that the assessee is entitled to
interest u/s.244A. It was of the opinion that the issue stands covered in favour
of the assessee by the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of ITO v. Delhi
Development Authority, (252 ITR 772) (SC) and also by the following orders of
the Tribunal, on which reliance was placed on behalf of the assessee :


(1) Tata Chemicals v. DCIT, 16 SOT 481
(Mum.)

(2) ADIT (IT) v. Reliance Infocomm Ltd.,
(ITA No. 6100 to 6110/M/2008)

(3) ADIT (IT) v. Reliance Infocomm Ltd.,
(ITA No. 5581/M/2008 and 5585/M/2008)

(4) DDIT (IT) v. Star Cruises (India) Travel
Services Pvt. Ltd.
, (ITA Nos. 6498 & 6500/M/06, C.O.os. 10 &
12/Mum./2009.)


The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

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Section 48 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Cost of acquisition for computation of Capital gains — Whether the payments of charges towards firefighting, generator and processing fees to a builder would be part of cost of acquisition — Held, Yes.

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17 Praveen Gupta v. ACIT


ITAT ‘F’ Bench, New Delhi

Before G. E. Veerabhadrappa (VP) and

I. P. Bansal (JM)

ITA No. 2558/Del./2010

A.Y. : 2007-2008. Decided
on : 13-8-2010

Counsel for assessee/revenue
: Ved Jain, Rano Jain & Venkatesh Chourasia/Banita Devi Naorem


    (1) Section 48 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Cost of acquisition for computation of Capital gains — Whether the payments of charges towards firefighting, generator and processing fees to a builder would be part of cost of acquisition — Held, Yes.

    (2) Explanation (iii) to Section 48 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Indexed cost of acquisition — Whether the year of acquisition should be the year when the assessee entered into an agreement to purchase or the year when the conveyance deed was executed — Held that it is the year when the assessee entered into an agreement to purchase the flat.

Per I. P. Bansal:

Facts:

The assessee had sold a
flat and the following issues had arisen with reference to capital gains tax :

    1. Whether the following payments made by the assessee to the builder with reference to the flat could form part of its cost of acquisition/improvement:

  •      For firefighting charges Rs.0.35 lakh;
  •      For generator charges Rs.0.47 lakh; and
  •      For processing fees and other charges Rs.0.80 lakh.

   

    2. Year from which the indexed cost of acquisition was to be computed. According to the assessee, the year should be 1995-1996 when he entered into an agreement with the builder. While as per the Revenue, the same should be the year when the conveyance deed was executed i.e., 2001-2002.

Held:

According to the Tribunal the different charges
paid by the assessee were in respect of the flat purchased and the same were
made to the builder who sold the flat to the assessee. Without making these
payments, the assessee could not have obtained the conveyance in his favour.
Therefore, it held that the AO was in error in taking the cost of acquisition as
the only the amount stated in the conveyance deed. Thus, it held that all these
charges would form part of cost of acquisition of the flat sold.

As regards the year of acquisition, according to
the Tribunal, the assessee by entering into an agreement to purchase a flat had
identified a particular property which he was intending to buy from the builder
and the builder was also bound to provide the applicant with that property.
Referring to the provisions of S. 2(14) defining the term ‘capital asset’, it
observed that it was not necessary that to constitute a capital asset, the
assessee must be the owner for computing the capital gain. According to it, the
assessee had acquired a right to get a particular flat from the builder and that
right itself was a capital asset of the assessee. Therefore, it held that the
benefit of indexation had to be granted to the assessee from the date he entered
into an agreement to purchase the flat.

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s. 10(38), 70(3), 74 — Non-exempt long-term capital loss cannot be set-off against exempt long-term capital gains.

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29 G. K. Ramamurthy vs JCIT

ITAT Mumbai `G’ Bench

Before N. V. Vasudevan (JM) and
A. L. Gehlot (AM)

ITA No. 1367/Mum/2009

A.Y.: 2005-06. Decided on: 9.2.2010

Counsel for assessee / revenue: K. Shivram & Paras Savla / K.
R. Das

s. 10(38), 70(3), 74 — Non-exempt long-term capital loss
cannot be set-off against exempt long-term capital gains.

Per A. L. Gehlot:

Facts:

The assessee had made a long-term capital gain of Rs.
33,01,57,200 on sale of certain shares between the period 1.10.2004 and
31.3.2005, in respect of which, security transaction tax (STT) was paid by him
and the same was exempted u/s 10(38) of the Act. The assessee was also having a
long-term capital loss in respect of redemption of units and other loss
pertaining to the period prior to 1.10.2004, amounting to Rs. 9,23,55,945. The
assessee claimed carry forward of long-term capital losses of Rs. 9,23,55,945 to
subsequent years.

The Assessing Officer (AO) held that there was a loss and
also a gain under the same head of income, i.e., Long Term Capital Gain, and
consequently the loss of Rs. 9,23,55,945 had to be set-off against exempt income
of Rs. 33,01,57,200.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who
confirmed the order of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:



(i) It is clear from the scheme of the Act that incomes
which do not form a part of the total income as laid down in Chapter III of
the Act, do not enter the computation of total income at all.

(ii) The case of the revenue that long-term capital gain is
income notwithstanding the fact that it is exempt u/s 10(38) of the Act, is
based on a reasoning which is fallacious.

(iii) Since income which is exempt from tax does not enter
the computation of total income at all, the question of aggregating them under
Chapter VI at all does not arise. Therefore, the question of set-off of the
same u/s 70(3) of the Act also does not arise for consideration. Therefore,
the right of carry forward u/s 74(1) of the Act, in respect of the long-term
capital loss suffered by the assessee, remains unaffected by the provisions of
s. 70(3) of the Act.

(iv) Section 10(38) has been inserted with a particular
object: to grant exemption to such income, as tax has already been levied on
some different footings. If we accept the contention of the revenue to adjust
long-term capital loss against exempt income (long-term capital gain), it will
be contrary to the law and contrary to the intention, object and purpose of
the legislature in introducing clause (38) to s. 10 of the Act. Further,
acceptance of the revenue’s view on the issue, gives rise to an absurd outcome
of interpretation. If the facts are reversed, then, long-term capital loss
from taxable assets will have to be adjusted against the long-term capital
gains exempt u/s 10(38) of the Act.


The Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by the assessee.

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Gift Tax – Deemed Gift – Whether there is deemed gift of bonus shares (retained by the Donee) by the Donor in the year of revocation of gift of shares with proviso that gift shall not include bonus shares? – Matter remanded.

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Satya Nand Munjal vs. CGT (2013) 350 ITR 640(SC)

On 20th February, 1982, the assessee, being the absolute owner of 6000 fully paid up equity shares of the face value of Rs. 25 each of M/s. Hero Cycles (P) Ltd., executed a deed of revocable transfer in favour of M/s. Yogesh Chandran and Brothers Associates (the transferee). Under the deed the assessee could, on completion of 74 months from the date of transfer but before the expiry of 82 months from the said date, exercise the power of revoking the gift. In other words, the assessee left a window of eight months within which the gift could be revoked.

The deed of revocable transfer specifically stated that the gift shall not include any bonus shares or right shares received and/or accruing or coming to the transferee from M/s. Hero Cycles (P) Ltd. (the company) by virtue of ownership or by virtue of the shares gifted by the assessee and standing in the name of the transferee. Effectively therefore, only a gift of 6,000 equity shares was made by the assessee to the transferee.

On 29th September, 1982, the company issued bonus shares and since the transferee was a holder of the gifted equity shares, 4,000 bonus shares of the said company were allotted to the transferee by the company. Similarly, on 31st May, 1986, another 10,000 bonus shares were allotted to the transferee by the company. 

Thereafter, during the window of eight months, the assessee revoked the gift on 15th June, 1988, with the result that the 6,000 shares gifted to the transferee came back to the assessee. However, the 14,000 bonus shares allotted to the transfree while it was the holder of the equity shares of the company continued with the transferee.

Assessment proceedings for the assessment year 1982-83

For the assessment year 1982-83, the Gift-tax Officer passed an assessment order on 17th February 1987, in respect of the assessee. He held that the revocable transaction entered into by the assessee was only for the purpose of reducing the tax liability. As such, it could not be accepted as a valid gift. For arriving at this conclusion, the Assessing Officer relied upon McDowell and Co. Ltd. vs. CTO [1985] 154 ITR 148 (SC). Accordingly, the Assessing Officer, while holding the gift to be void, made the assessment on a protective basis.

Feeling aggrieved by the assessment order, the assessee preferred an appeal before the Commissioner of Gift Tax (Appeals), but found no success. The Commissioner of Gift-tax (Appeals) however, held that since the gift was void, a protective assessment could not be made.

The assessee then preferred a further appeal to the Tribunal and by its order dated 23rd August 1991, allowing the appeal; the Tribunal held that the revocable gift to be valid. It was noted the concept of a revocable transfer by way of gift was recognised by section 6(2) of the Gift-tax Act, 1958 (“the Act”). The value of the gift in such a case was to to calculated in terms of rule 11 of the Gift-tax Rules 1958.

Feeling aggrieved by the decision of the Tribunal, the Revenue took up the matter in appeal before the Punjab and Haryana High Court. By its judgement and order in CGT vs. Satya Nand Munjal [2002] 256 ITR 516 (P&H) the High Court dismissed the appeal and held:

“It is a legitimate attempt on the part of the assessee to save money by following a legal method. If on account of a lacuna in the law or otherwise the assessee is able to avoid payment of tax within the letter of law, it cannot be said that the action is void because it is intended to save payment of tax. So long as the law exists in its present form, the taxpayer is entitled to take its advantage. We find no ground to accept the contention that merely because the gift was made with the purpose of saving on payment of wealth tax, it needs to be ignored.”

Assessment proceedings for the assessment year 1989-90

On 30th January, 1996, the Gift-tax Officer issued a notice to the assessee u/s. 16(1) of the Act to the effect that for the assessment year 1989-90 the gift made by the assessee was chargeable to gift-tax and that it had escaped assessment year. The assessee responded to the notice by simply stating that there is no gift that had escaped assessment.

On 24th March, 1998, the Assessing Officer passed a reassessment order for the assessment year 1989-90. While doing so, he framed two issues for consideration: firstly, whether the transferee becomes the owner of the bonus shares particularly because the shares have been received by it as a result of a revocable transfer; secondly, whether the bonus shares received by the transferee could be described as a benefit by the transferee from the transferred shares.

The Assessing Officer held that the transferee does not become the owner of the gifted shares until the transfer is an irrevocable transfer. Proceedings on this basis, it was held that the 14,000 bonus shares allotted to the transferee were a part and parcel of the gifted shares and the assessee only took back 6,000 shares from the transferee pursuant to the revocable gift. Consequently, it was held that the assessee had surrendered his right to get back 14,000 bonus shares which were treated as a gift by the assessee to the transferee in view of the provisions of section 4(1)(c) of the Act. The assessee was taxed accordingly.

Feeling aggrieved by the reassessment order, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Commissioner of Gift-tax (Appeals). By his order dated 8th September, 1998, the Commissioner held that since there was no regular transfer of the bonus shares, the transferee could not claim any ownership of the shares. The Commissioner also referred to McDowell and Co. Ltd. and held that the assessee had carefully planned his affairs in such a manner as to deprive the Revenue of a substantial amount of gift-tax. The reassessment order was accordingly upheld.

The assessee then took up the matter with the Tribunal which held in its order dated 23rd May, 2000, that in view of the assessment to gift-tax made in respect of the assessee for the assessment year 1982-83, the notice issued u/s. 16(1) of the Act was merely a change of opinion and, as such the reassessment proceedings could not have been taken up. On the merits of the case, it was noted that neither the dividend income on the bonus shares nor their value had been taxed in the hands of the assessee. Consequently, the assessee was liable to succeed on the merits of the case also. The gift-tax reassessment was accordingly quashed by the Tribunal. The Revenue then came up in appeal before the High Court with the following substantial question of law:

“Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal was right in quashing the gift tax assessment in the assessee’s case?”

In the impugned order, the High Court held that the assessee was liable to gift-tax on the value of the bonus shares which were a gift made by the assessee to the transferee. It was held that the bonus shares were income from the original shares by relying upon Escorts Farms (Ramgarh) Ltd. vs. CIT [1996] 222 ITR 509 (SC). Accordingly, the order of the Tribunal was set aside and the reassessment order upheld.

On appeal to the Supreme Court by the assessee, the Supreme Court observed that the fundamental question before the High Court was whether there was in fact a gift of 14,000 bonus shares made by the assessee to the transferee. According to the Supreme Court the answer to this question lay in the interpretation of section 4(1)(c) of the Act, but a perusal of the impugned judgment and order facially indicated that there had been no consideration of the provisions of section 4(1) (c) of the Act.

The submission of the learned counsel for the assessee is that on an interpretation of section 4(1)(c) of the Act, it could not be said by any stretch of imagination, that the assessee had made a gift of 14,000 bonus shares to the transferee in the previous year relevant to the assessment year 1989-90.

The Supreme Court however, was not inclined to decide this issue finally since it did not have the view of the High Court on the interpretation of section 4(1)(c) of the Act. Nor did it have the view of the High Court on the applicability or otherwise of the principle laid down in McDowell and Co. Ltd.

As far as the applicability of Escorts Farms is concerned, the Supreme Court observed that the question that arose for consideration in that case was the determination of the cost of acquisition of the original shares when bonus shares are subsequently issued. That is the second part of section 4(1)(c) of the Act and that question would arise (if at all) only after finding is given by the High Court on the first part of section 4(1)(c) of the Act.

Under the circumstances, the Supreme Court remanded the matter for de novo consideration by the High Court keeping in mind the provisions of section 4(1)(c) of the Act as well as the orders passed in the case of the assessee for the assessment year 1982-83.

Depreciation – Assessee is entitled to depreciation in respect of vehicles financed by it but registered in the name of third parties and is eligible to claim it at a higher rate where such vehicles are used in the business of running on hire.

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I.C.D.S. Ltd. vs. CIT & Anr. (2013) 350 ITR 527 (SC)

The assessee a public limited company, classified by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) as a non-banking finance company was engaged in the business of hire purchase, leasing and real estate, etc. The vehicles, on which depreciation was claimed, were stated to have been purchased by the assessee against direct payment to the manufactures. The assessee as a part of its business, leased out their vehicles to its customers and therefore, had no physical affiliation with the vehicles. In fact, lesse were registered as the owners of the vehicles, in the certificate of registration issued under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as “the MV Act”).

In its return of income for the relevant assessment years, the assessee claimed, among other heads, depreciation in relation to certain assets, (additions made to the trucks) which, as explained above, had been financed by the assessee but registered in the name of third parties. The assessee also claimed depreciation at the higher rate on the ground that the vehicles were used in the business of running on hire.

The Assessing Officer disallowed claims, both of depreciation and higher rate, on the ground that the assessee’s use of these vehicles was only by way of leasing out to other and not as actual user of the vehicles in the business of running them on hire. It had merely financed the purchase of these assets and was neither the owner nor used of these assets. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred appeals to the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). In so far as the question of depreciation at normal rate was concerned, the Commissioner (Appeals) agreed with the assessee. However, the assessee’s claim for depreciation at higher rate did not find favour with the Commissioner.

Being aggrieved, both the assessee and the Revenue carried the matter further in appeal before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal (for short “the Tribunal”). The Tribunal agreed with the assessee on both the counts.

Being aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Bombay High Court u/s. 260A of the Act. The High Court framed the following substantial questions of law for its adjudication :

“Whether the appellant (assessee) is the owner of the vehicles which are leased out by it to its customers and whether the appellant (assessee) is entitled to the higher rate of depreciation on the said vehicles, on the ground that they were hired out to the appellant’s customers.”

Answering both the questions in favour of the Revenue, the High Court held that in view of the fact that the vehicles were not registered in the name of the assessee, and that the assessee had only financed the transaction, it could not be held to be the owner of the vehicles, and thus, was not entitled do claim depreciation in respect of these vehicles.

On an appeal to the Supreme Court by the assessee, it was held that the provision on depreciation in the Act reads that the asset must be “owned, wholly or partly, by the assessee and used for the purposes of the business”. Therefore, it imposes a twin requirement of “ownership” and “usage for business” for a successful claim u/s. 32 of the Act.

Before the Supreme Court, the Revenue attacked both legs of this portion of the section by contending: (i) that the assessee is not the owner of the vehicles in question, and (ii) that the assessee did not use these trucks in the course of its business. It was argued that depreciation can be claimed by an assessee only in a case where the assessee is both the owner and user of the asset.

The Supreme Court dealt with the second contention before considering the first. The Revenue argued before the Supreme Court that since the lessees were actually using the vehicles, they were the ones entitled to claim depreciation and not the assessee. The Supreme Court was not persuaded to agree with the argument. According to the Supreme Court, the section requires that the assessee must use the asset for the “purposes of business”. It does not mandate usage of the asset by the assessee itself. As long as the asset is utilised for the purpose of business of the assessee, the requirement of section 32 will stand satisfied notwithstanding non-usage of the asset itself by the assessee. The Supreme Court held that in the present case, the assessee was a leasing company which leased out trucks that it purchased. Therefore, on a combined reading of section 2(13) and section 2(24) of the Act, the income derived from leasing of the trucks would be business income or income derived in the course of business, and has been so assessed. Hence, it fulfilled the aforesaid second requirement of section 32 of the Act, viz., that the asset must be used in the course of business. The assessee did use the vehicles in the courses of its leasing business. In the opinion of the Supreme Court, the fact that the trucks themselves were not used the assessee was irrelevant for the purpose of the section.

Dealing with the first requirement, i.e., the issue of ownership, the Supreme Court held that no depreciation allowance is granted in respect of any capital expenditure which the assessee may be obliged to incur on the property of other. Therefore, the entire case hangs on the question of ownership. If the assessee is the owner of the vehicles, then he will be entitled to the claim on depreciation, otherwise, not.

The Supreme Court noted that definitions of ‘owner’, ‘ownership’ and ‘own’ given in Black’s Law Dictionary (Sixth Edition) and observed that these definitions essentially made ownership a function of legal right or title against the rest of the world. However, as seen therein, it is “nomen generalissimum, and its meaning is to be gathered from the connection in which it is used, and from the subject-matter to which it is applied.”

According to the Supreme Court scrutiny of the material facts at hand raised a presumption of ownership in favour of the assessee. The vehicle, along with its keys, was delivered to the assessee upon which, the lease agreement was entered into by the assessee with the customer.

The Supreme Court noted that the Revenue’s objection to the claim of the assessee was founded on the lease agreement. It argued that at the end of the lease period, the ownership of the vehicle is transferred to the lessee at a nominal value not exceeding 1 per cent of the original cost of the vehicle, making the assessee in effect a financier. However, the Supreme Court was not persuaded to agree with the Revenue. According to the Supreme Court as long as the assessee had a right to retain the legal title of the vehicle against the rest of the world, it would be the owner of the vehicle in the eyes of law. A scrutiny of the sale agreement could not be the basis of raising question against the ownership of the vehicle. The clues qua ownership lie in the lease agreement itself, which clearly pointed in favour of the assessee.

The Supreme Court observed that the only hindrance to the claim of the assessee, which was also the lynchpin of the case of the Revenue, was section 2(30) of the Motor Vehicles Act, which defines ownership as follows:

‘Owner’ means a person in whose name a motor vehicle stands registered, and where such person is a minor, the guardian of such minor, and in relation to a motor vehicle which is the subject or hire-purchase agreement, or a agreement of lease or an agreement of a hypothecation, the person in possession of the vehicle under that agreement.”

The Supreme Court noted that the general open-ing words of the aforesaid section 2(30) say that the owner of a motor vehicle is the one in whose name it is registered, which, in the present case, is the lessee. The subsequent specific statement on leasing agreements states that in respect of a vehicle given on lease, the lessee who is in possession shall be the owner. The Revenue before the Supreme Court thus, argued that in case of ownership of vehicles, the test of ownership is the registration and certification. Since the certificates were in the name of the lessee, they would be the legal owners of the vehicles and the ones entitled to claim deprecation. Therefore, the general and specific statements on ownership construe ownership in favour of the lessee, and, hence, were in favour of the Revenue.

According to the Supreme Court, there was no merit in the Revenue’s arguments for more than one reason:

(i)    Section 2(30) is a deeming provision that creates a legal fiction of ownership in favour of lessee only for the purpose of the Motor Vehicles Act. It defines ownership for the subsequent provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, not for the purpose of law in general. It serves more as a guide to what terms in the Motor Vehicles Act mean. Therefore, if the Motor Vehicles Act at any point uses the term owner in any section, it means the one in whose name the vehicle is registered and in the case of a lease agreement, the lessee. That is all. It is not a statement of law on ownership in general. Perhaps, the repository of a general statement law on ownership may be the Sale of Goods Act;

ii)    Section 2(30) of the Motor Vehicles Act must be read in consonance with s/s. (4) and (5) of section 51 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The Motor Vehicles Act in terms of s/s. (4) and (5) of section 51 mandates that during the period of lease, the vehicle be registered, in the certificate of registration, in the name of the lessee and, on conclusion of the lease period, the vehicle be registered in the name of the lessor as owner. The section leaves no choice to the lessor but to allow the vehicle to be registered in the name of the lessee. Thus, no inference can be drawn from the registration certificate as to ownership of the legal title of the vehicle; and

(iii)    If the lessee was in fact the owner, he would have claimed depreciation on the vehicles, which, as specifically recorded in the order of the Appellate Tribunal, was not done. It would be a strange situation to have no claim of depreciation in case of particular depreciable asset due to a vacuum of ownership. The entire lease rent received by the assessee is assessed as business income in its hands and the entire lease rent paid by the lessee has been treated as deductible revenue expenditure in the hands of the leassee. This reaffirms the posision that the assessee is in fact that owner of the vehicle, in so far as section 32 of the Act is concerned.

Therefore, in the facts of the present case, the Supreme Court held that the lessor, i.e., the assessee was the owner of the vehicles. As the owner, it used the assets in the course of its business, satisfying both requirements of section 32 of the Act, and, hence, was entitled to claim depreciation in respect of additions made to the trucks, which were leased out.

With regard to the claim of the assessee for a higher rate of depreciation, the Supreme Court held that the import of the same term “purposes of business”, used in the second proviso to section 32(1) of the Act gained significance. According to the Supreme Court the interpretation of these words would not be any different from that which it ascribed to them earlier, u/s. 32(1) of the Act. Therefore, the assessee fulfilled even the requirements for a claim of a higher rate of depreciation, and hence, was entitled to the same.

In this regard, the Supreme Court inter alia endorsed the following observations of the Tribunal, which clinched the issue in favour of the assessee.

“15. The Central Board of Direct Taxes, vide Circular No.652, dated 14th June, 1993, has clarified that the higher rate of 40 per cent in case of lorries, etc., plying on hire shall not apply if the vehicle is used in a non-hiring business of the assessee. This circular cannot be read out of its context to deny higher appreciation in case of leased vehicles when the actual use in hiring business.

Perhaps, the author meant that when the actual use of the vehicle is in hire business, it is entitled for depreciation at a higher rate.”

Search and seizure – Block Assessment – Undisclosed Income – If the search is conducted after the expiry of the due date of filing return, payment of advance tax or deduction of tax at source is irrelevant in construing the intention of the assessee to disclose income – The ‘disclosure of income’ is disclosure of total income in a valid return u/s. 139.

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CIT vs. A. R. Enterprises, (2013) 350 ITR 489 (SC)

The assessee firm came into existence on 25th June 1992. On 23rd February, 1996, a search operation u/s. 132 of the Act was carried out at the premises of another concern, viz., M/s. A.R. Mercantile P. Ltd. During the course of the search, certain books and documents pertaining to the assessee, i.e., M/s. A.R. Enterprises, were seized. On scrutiny, the Assessing Officer found that though the assessee had taxable income for the assessment year 1995-96, no return of income had been filed (due to be filed on or before 31st October, 1995) till the date of the search. Based on the material seized by virtue of the aforesaid search, the Assessing Officer was satisfied that the assessee had not disclosed its income pertaining to the assessment year 1995-96. Accordingly (without recording any reasons for his satisfaction), he initiated action u/s. 158BD of the Act requiring the assessee to file its return of income. The assessee, after filing return for the block period (ten years preceding the previous years), which covered the assessment years 1993-94 to 1995- 96, pointed out that it had already filed returns for the assessment years 1993-94 and 1994-95. It objected to action initiated under Chapter XTV-B of the Act on the ground that in relation to the assessment year 1995-96, advance tax had already been paid in three installments and, therefore, income for that period could not be deemed to be undisclosed.

Rejecting the plea of the assessee, the Assessing Officer formed the opinion that the assessee had failed to file the return as on the date of search, and the seized documents did show income, which had not been or would not have been declared. Accordingly, he proceeded to compute the total undisclosed income for the block period 1993-94 to 1995-96 (up to the date of search), treating the income returned by the assessee for the period 1995-96 as nil, as stipulated in section 158BB(1)(c) of the Act.

Against the said order, the assessee preferred an appeal before the Tribunal. Accepting the stand of the assessee, the Tribunal allowed the appeal, and held that having paid the advance tax, the assessee had disclosed his income for the relevant assessment year.

Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal before the High Court of Madras u/s. 260A of the Act, questioning the validity of the order of the Tribunal.

Before the High Court, the stand of the Revenue was that since the return for the assessment year 1995-96 had not filed by the due date, by filing the return after the search, the assessee could not escape the consequences as stipulated in Chapter XIV-B of the Act. It was contended that payment of advance tax by itself did not establish the intention to disclose the income.

The Revenue’s plea did not find favour with the High Court. It observed that payment of advance tax itself necessarily implies disclosure of the income on which the advance is paid.

The short question for consideration before the Supreme Court was therefore whether payment of advance tax by an assessee would by itself tantamount to disclosure of income for the relevant assessment year and whether such income can be treated as undisclosed income for the purpose of application of Chapter XIV-B of the Act?

The Supreme Court held that “undisclosed income” is defined by section 158B as that income “which has not been or would not have been disclosed for the purposes of this Act”. The Legislature has chosen to define “undisclosed income” in terms of income not disclosed, without providing any definition of “disclosure” of income in the first place. The Supreme Court was of the view that the only way of disclosing income, on the part of an assessee, is through filing of a return, as stipulated in the Act, and, therefore, an “undisclosed income” signifies income not stated in the return filed. According to the Supreme Court, it seemed that the Legislature had clearly carved out two scenarios for income to be deemed as undisclosed : (i) where the income has clearly not been disclosed, and (ii) where the income would not have been disclosed. If a situation is covered by any one of the two, income would be undisclosed in the eyes of the Act and, hence, subject to the machinery provisions of Chapter XIV-B. The second category viz, where income would not have been disclosed, contemplates the likelihood of disclosure, it is a presumption of the intention of the assessee since in concluding that as assessee would or would not have disclosed income, one is ipso facto making a statement with respect to whether or not the assessee possessed the intention to do the same. To gauge this, however, reliance must be placed on the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case.

One such fact, as claimed by the the assessee, is the payment of advance tax. However, in the opinion of the Supreme Court, the degree of its material significance depended on the time at which the search is conducted in relation to the due date for filing return. Depending on which side of the due date the search was conducted, material significance of payment of advance taxes vacillated in construing the intention of the assessee. If the search was conducted after the expiry of the due date for filing return, payment of advance tax was irrelevant in construing the intention of the assessee to disclose income. Such a situation would find place which the first category carved out by section 158B of the Act, i.e. where income has clearly not been disclosed. The existence of an intention to disclose did not arise since, as held earlier, the opportunity of disclosure had lapsed, i.e., through filing or return of income by the due date. If, on the other hand, search was conducted prior to the due date for filing return, the opportunity to disclose income or, in other words, to file return and disclose income still existed. In which case, payment of advance tax may be a material fact for deciding whether an assessee intended to disclose. An assessee is entitled to make the legitimate claim that even though the search or the documents recovered, show an income earned by him, he has paid advance tax for the relevant assessment year and has an opportunity to declare the total income, in the return of income, which he would file by the due date. Hence, the fulcrum of such a decision is the due date for filing of return of income visà- vis date of search. Payment of advance tax may be a relevant factor in construing the intention to disclose income or filing return as long as the assessee continues to have an opportunity to file return and disclose his income and not past the due date of filing return. Therefore, there can be no generic rule as to the significance of payment of advance tax in construing the intention of disclosure of income. The same depends on the facts of the case, and hinges on the positioning of the search operations qua the due date for filing returns.

Thus, according to the Supreme Court, the question that whether payment of advance by an assessee per se is tantamount to disclosure of total income, for the relevant assessment year, at the very outset had to be answered in the negative. On further scrutiny, according to the Supreme Court there was yet another reason to opine so. Payment of advance tax and filing of return are functions of completely different notions of income i.e. estimated income and total income respectively. The payment of advance tax is based on an estimation of the total income that is chargeable to tax and not on the total income itself. According to section 209(1)(a), the assessee shall first estimate his “current income” and thereafter pay income tax calculated on this estimated income on the rates in force in the relevant financial year. This income is an estimation that is made by the assessee and may not be the exact income, which may ultimately be declared u/s. 139 and assessed u/s. 143. The payment of advance tax does not absolve an assessee from obligation to file return disclosing total income u/s. 139. Hence, the ‘disclosure of income’ is the disclosure of the total income in a valid return u/ s. 139, subject to assessment and chargeable to tax under the provisions of the Act.

The Supreme Court noted that in the instant case, after the search was conducted on 23rd February 1996, it was found that for the assessment year 1995-96, the assessee had not filed its return of income by the due date. It was only when the block proceedings were initiated by the Assessing Officer, that the assessee filed its return for the said assessment year on 11th July, 1996 u/s. 158BC showing its total income at Rs. 7,02,768. The Supreme Court held that since the assessee had not filed its return of income by the due date, the Assessing Officer was correct in assuming that the assessee would not have disclosed its total income.

Note 1: During the course of hearing, the counsel for the assessee relying upon the decision in Asst. CIT vs. Hotel Blue Moon (2010) 321 ITR 362 (SC) for the first time contended that the Revenue did not have jurisdiction to invoke Chapter XIV-B against the assessee as the Assessing Officer had not recorded his satisfaction that any undisclosed income belonged to the assessee or that the assessee did not have the intention to disclose their income before initiating proceeding u/s. 158BD. The Supreme Court however was unable to appreciate the submission since the same was never urged before the High Court and the Tribunal and refrained from making any observations on it.

Note 2: In CIT vs. Nachammai [C.A. No.2580 of 2010], a companion appeal, the issue was whether tax deduction at source amounts to disclosure of income. The Supreme Court held that since the tax to be deducted at source is also computed on the estimated income of an assessee for the relevant financial year, such deduction cannot result in the disclosure of total income.

Deemed Registration and Time Limit for Disposal of Application for Registration of Charitable Trusts u/s.12AA

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Issue for Consideration
Every charitable or religious trust, seeking exemption of its income under the provisions of sections 11 and 12 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, is required to be registered with the Commissioner of Income Tax u/s. 12AA. The procedure for such registration is laid down in section 12AA. S/s. (2) of section 12AA provides that every order, granting or refusing registration by the Commissioner, shall be passed before the expiry of 6 months from the end of the month in which the application u/s. 12A, made by the trust, was received by him.

Since the section does not specifically mention the consequences of non-disposal of the application by the Commissioner within the specified time limit, a controversy has arisen as to what would be the consequences in such a situation. One view is that the trust shall not be made to suffer for the inaction of the Commissioner and the registration shall be deemed to have been granted. The other view is that the trust shall not be granted the exemption from tax, since the same is not registered. One more view is that the time limit prescribed in section 12AA is not mandatory and the Commissioner can and should proceed with the application and take appropriate decision even after the expiry of the time limit and such decision shall have retrospective effect. While the Allahabad High Court has taken the view that in the event of such failure to pass an order, within the specified time by the Commissioner, registration shall be deemed to have been granted u/s. 12AA, as the time limit provided in the section is mandatory and no decision on the application can be taken on expiry of the time limit thereafter, a contrary view has been taken by the Madras and Orissa High Courts to the effect that such a time limit is not mandatory, and that non-disposal of the application shall not result in the deemed registration of the trust and till such time as registration is granted, the trust shall be treated as not registered and non-registration of the trust shall result in denial of the exemption from tax so however the Commissioner shall pass the appropriate orders on the application of the assessee at the earliest though after the expiry of the prescribed time. In short, according to the latest view, the registration cannot be deemed to have been granted and the Commissioner is empowered to deal with and should deal with the application even after the expiry of the time specified in section 12AA.

Society for the Promotion of Education Adventure Sport’s case:

The issue came up before the Allahabad High Court in the case of Society for the Promotion of Education Adventure Sport & Conservation of Environment vs. CIT 216 CTR (All) 167.

The assessee was a society running a school, whose income was entitled to exemption u/s. 10(22). On omission of section 10(22), it applied for registration u/s. 12A. No decision however was taken by the Commissioner on its application within the time limit of 6 months fixed by section 12AA (2), and in fact, no decision was taken, even after a lapse of almost 5 years. On account of such delay, large tax demands were raised on the assessee. The assessee filed a writ petition in the Allahabad High Court challenging the tax demands.

On behalf of the assessee, it was contended that the registration
should be deemed to have been granted after the expiry of the period
prescribed u/s. 12AA(2), if no decision had been taken on the
application for registration. Reliance was placed on various decisions
of the Allahabad High Court, which had held that where an application
for extension of time was moved, but was not decided, it would be deemed
to have been allowed; that given the fact that the CIT was required to
give an opportunity to the applicant before refusing registration and
that reasons for refusal were required to be given by the CIT in his
order, the absence of any such opportunity and the order of the CIT
should be taken to mean that he had not found any reason for refusing
registration;, that the legislative intent wasevident by the fact that the order of the CIT granting registration, was not appealable by the Income Tax Department and that the laches and lapses on the part of the Income tax Department could not be to its own advantage by treating the application for registration as rejected.

On behalf of the Department, reliance was placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Chet Ram Vashisht vs. Municipal Corporation AIR 1981 SC 653, where the Court examined the effect of the failure on the part of the Delhi Municipal Corporation to decide an application for sanction to a layout plan within the period specified in section 313(3) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957.

The Allahabad High Court observed that what had to be examined was the consequence of such a long delay on the part of the Income tax authorities in not deciding the assesssee’s application for registration. It noted that admittedly after the statutory limitation, the CIT would become functus officio, and he could not, on expiry of the time limit, thereafter pass any order either allowing or rejecting the registration. Obviously, the application could not be allowed to be treated as perpetually undecided. Therefore, the key question, in the opinion of the court, was whether upon lapse of the six-month period without any decision, the application for registration should be treated as rejected or it should be treated as allowed.

The Allahabad High Court distinguished the Supreme Court decision cited on behalf of the revenue, in Chet Ram Vashist’s case (supra), by pointing out that the said decision dealt with a different statute and that one of the important aspects considered by the Supreme Court for taking view in that case that the sanction of the layout was mandatory and could not be deemed to have been granted on expiry of the time limit, was the purpose and objective behind of the provision requiring sanction of the layout plans. The High Court noted that under the relevant provision of the said statute, there was involved an element of public interest, namely, to prevent unplanned and haphazard development or construction to the detriment of the public and any sanction or deemed sanction of a layout plan entailing constructions being carried out, would create an irreversible situation. The Allahabad High Court noted that in the case before it, there was no such element of public interest in the case before it under the provisions of section 12A; that taking a view that non-consideration of the registration application within the time limit would result in deemed registration might, at the worst, cause loss of some revenue or income tax, payable by that individual trust.

The Allahabad High Court compared the act of non-disposal of an application with a situation where the assessing authority failed to make assessment or reassessment within the prescribed limitation, which also led occasionally to loss of revenue from that individual assessee. It observed that taking the contrary view and holding that not taking of a decision within the time limit was of no consequence would leave the assessee totally at the mercy of the tax authorities, as the assessee had not been provided any remedy under the Act against non-decision by the Commissioner on an application by the assessee.

The Allahabad High Court observed that taking the view of deemed registration did not create any irreversible situation, because the CIT had the power to cancel registration u/s. 12AA(3) if he was satisfied that the objects of such trust were not genuine or the activities were not being carried out in accordance with its objects and the only drawback might be that such cancellation would operate only prospectively. The deemed registration, in the court’s view, furthered the object and purpose of the statutory provision.

Considering the pros and cons of the two views, the Allahabad High Court held that the non-consideration of the application for registration within the time fixed by section 12AA(2) led to the deemed grant of registration as there was no good reason to make the assessee suffer merely because the Income Tax Department was not able to keep its officers under check and control and take timely decisions in such simple matters such as consideration of applications for registration, even within the long six-month period provided by section 12AA(2).

The Allahabad High Court therefore directed the Commissioner to treat the assessee as an institution approved and registered u/s. 12AA, to recompute its income by applying the provisions of section 11, and to issue a formal certificate of approval forthwith.

Sheela Christian Charitable Trust’s case:
The issue later also came up before the Madras High Court in the case of CIT vs. Sheela Christian Charitable Trust 354 ITR 478 (Mad).

In this case, the trust created in August 2003, made a delayed application for registration u/s. 12AA in August 2005 without a specific request for condonation of delay being filed. It had not filed the accounts since its inception along with the application. Since details of activities and copy of accounts were not filed with the Commissioner, he merely lodged the application and did not process the same. A second application was made in April 2007, seeking retrospective registration from April 2005. This application was rejected by the Commissioner. On appeal, the Tribunal set aside the order of the Commissioner and remitted the matter back to the Commissioner to decide the matter afresh, after giving opportunity to the assessee.

The Commissioner, as directed by the tribunal, gave an opportunity to the assessee and considered the matter afresh. This time the Commissioner granted the registration to the trust but with prospective effect. He rejected the assessee’s request to grant registration with effect from April 2005, holding that there was no just and reasonable cause for delay in filing the application.

On appeal to the Tribunal, the Tribunal held that so far as condonation of delay was concerned, a pragmatic approach should be adopted and substantial cause of justice should not be denied merely on pedantic reasons. The Tribunal noted that the order granting or refusing registration should have been passed before the expiry of 6 months from the end of the month in which the application was received, and since the Commissioner kept the application pending beyond the permitted time, and it was neither accepted nor rejected within the period of 6 months, the registration should be assumed to have been granted. Reliance was placed by the Tribunal on the decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Society for Promo-tion of Education Adventure Sport and Conservation of Environment (supra). It therefore held that the original application of August 2005 was to be treated as accepted, and registration u/s. 12AA should be deemed to have been granted to the trust.

On behalf of the Department, on appeal against the said order of the tribunal, it was argued before the Madras High Court that the Tribunal ought to have held that the trust could not agitate the inaction of the Commissioner on its earlier application in a subsequent application filed by it for registration u/s. 12AA. It was further contended that the tribunal erred in holding that there was a deemed registration by relying on the decisions of the Orissa High Court in the case of Srikhetra, A. C. Bhakti-Vedanta Swami Charitable Trust vs. Asst. CIT (2006) 2 OLR 75 and of the Madras High Court in the case of Anjuman-E-Khyrkhah-E-Aam 354 ITR 474, for the proposition that there was no concept of deemed registration u/s. 12AA(2).

The Madras High Court analysed the provisions of section 12AA(2) and the decision of the Orissa High Court referred to above. It agreed with the Orissa High Court that the time frame laid down u/s. 12AA(2) was only directory and not mandatory and that the Commissioner could pass an order even after the expiry of the statutory time limit. It observed that section 12AA(1)(b)(i) and (ii) made it clear that there was a statutory mandate imposed on the Commissioner to pass an order in writing either registering the trust or refusing to register the trust. It noted that the Madras high court in Anjuman’s case (supra), where the Commissioner had passed an order on the last day of the time limit neither accepting nor rejecting the application but lodging the complaint instead, had rejected the concept of deemed registration and remitted the matter back to the Commissioner to afford an opportunity of hearing to the trust and to decide the matter afresh.

In view of the above, and noting that the counsel for the trust also fairly submitted to the Court that there was no question of “deemed registration” and that the matter be remitted back to the Commissioner for consideration of the matter afresh, the Madras High Court held that non-consideration of the registration application, within the prescribed time, did not amount to “deemed registration” of the trust. The Madras High Court therefore set aside the matter and remitted it back to the Commissioner for consideration of the application afresh, to pass orders after affording sufficient opportunity to the trust.

This decision of the Madras High Court was also followed by it in a subsequent decision in the case of CIT vs. Karimangalam Onriya Pengal Semipu Amaipu Ltd 354 ITR 483, where also a similar concession was given by the counsel for the trust and there also, the Madras High Court remitted the matter back to the Commissioner for consideration afresh.

Observations

The decisions of the Madras High Court seem to have been significantly influenced by the decision of the Orissa High Court in Bhakti-Vedanta Swami Charitable Trust’s case. In that case, the delayed application was made in August 2004, but was claimed to have been misplaced by the tax authorities and was made significantly without a request for condonation of delay. The Orissa High Court observed in that case, as under:

“In our view, the period of 6 months as provided in s/s. (2) of section 12AA is not mandatory. Though the word “shall” has been used, but it is well known that to ascertain whether a provision is mandatory or not, the expression “shall” is not always decisive. It is also well known that whether a statutory provision is mandatory or directory has to be ascertained not only from the wording of the statute, but also from the nature and design of the statute and the purpose which it seeks to achieve. Herein the time-frame under s/s. (2) of section 12AA of the Act has been so provided to exclude any delay or lethargic approach in the matter of dealing with such appli-cation. Since the consequence for non-compliance with the said timeframe has not been spelt out in the statute, this Court cannot hold that the said time limit is mandatory in nature, nor the period of six months has been couched in negative words. Most of the time, negative words indicate a mandatory intent. This Court is also of the opinion that when public duty is to be performed by the public authorities, the time limit which is granted by the statute is normally not mandatory but is directory in the absence of any clear statutory intent to the contrary. See Montréal Street Railway Company vs. Normandin AIR 1917 PC 142. Here, there is no such express statutory intent, nor does it follow from necessary implication.”

In this case, the Orissa High Court directed the authorities to complete the statutory exercise of deciding on the application within a period of six months from the date of the court order, and that if the registration was granted, it would relate back to the date of application. The court also levied costs on the officer for his careless attitude taken and the misleading stand taken before the court by the Department.

The Orissa High Court proceeded on the basis that the task being performed by the Commissioner was a public duty, and therefore took the view that it did that no time limit could be laid down in such a situation. On the other hand, the Allahabad High Court rightly distinguished the process of registration for a trust and noted that in such process, there was merely a tax liability of an individual trust involved, and no public element or public interest involved.

If one would take the decision of the Orissa High Court to its logical conclusion, it would mean that in every case where the time limit was exceeded, the trust would have to approach the High Courts for extending the time limits, since the Commissioner would take the stand that he cannot pass an order once the time limit has expired under the law. This would create untold difficulty for such trusts, for no fault of theirs.

The Orissa High Court decision also ignores the fact that the statute has expressly laid down a time limit for disposal of the application for registration — whereas the High Court’s view seems to be that such a time limit cannot be laid down, but is merely a guidance. As against this, the Allahabad High Court has rightly tried to sub- serve the purpose of laying down the time limit by the legislature, which is to avoid undue delays in processing of applications, which was the norm earlier.

A note may also be taken of the following observations in the decision of the Special Bench of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal in the case of Bhagwad Swarup Shri Shri Devraha Baba Memorial Shri Hari Parmarth Dham Trust vs. Commissioner of Income Tax 111 ITD 175, while upholding the concept of deemed registration on failure to pass an order within the specified period:

“If the application for registration is to abate because the CIT did not pass an order thereon and the assessee is asked to file another application again that would be putting, the assessee to the grind all over again for no fault of his. That consequence should be avoided. If the application is to be treated as pending, then again the CIT would be getting an extended period of limitation which the section does not allow. Further, it would be uncertain as to how long the period can be extended. The assessee cannot be kept waiting to the end of time. If it is held that the application must be deemed to have been refused, obviously the assessee must be in a position to file an appeal against the refusal to the Tribunal but it will not be able to do so in the absence of a written order containing the reasons for refusal; the appeal remedy would be rendered illusory. That consequence cannot be countenanced. Therefore by a process of exclusion, the conclusion is that the CIT must be deemed to have allowed the registration if he has not passed any order within the time prescribed. That way, the rights of the Department are also protected in the sense that it would be open to the CIT to cancel the deemed registration by invoking s/s. (3) to section 12AA, if it is otherwise permitted and the procedure prescribed therefor is followed. The assessee, if aggrieved by the cancellation of registration, has a right to appeal to the Tribunal u/s. 253(1)(c)…..

It would be incongruous to hold that while the condition that the trust or charitable institution must be registered with the CIT is mandatory or absolute, the provision that the CIT shall pass an order thereon within six months from the end of

the month in which the application was filed is merely directory, leaving it to the convenience of the CIT to pass the order at any time he likes disregarding the time-limit prescribed. That would introduce an element of uncertainty and con-fusion in the administration of the Act and may even compel trusts or institutions claiming exemption u/s. 11 to invoke Art. 226 of the Constitution. Such consequences have to be avoided. The assessments of the trust or charitable institution may in the meantime be completed rejecting the claim for exemption on the ground that it is not registered, even though the trust/charitable institution is found by the AO to satisfy the other conditions such as application of income, investment of the funds and so on. In other words, by not passing the order within the time-limit, the claim of the trust/charitable institution can be frustrated, albeit unintentionally. There is no good ground shown, nor does any appear to exist in the scheme of the Act, to hold that the time-limit within which the CIT has to pass an order on the application for registration of the trust or institution is merely directory. It is not merely a question of prejudice being caused to the assessee, but it is something which goes to the very root of good administration and obedience to the law. It could not have been the intention of the law that the CIT could pass the order granting or refusing registration at any time. Any provision has to be so interpreted as to advance the cause and suppress the mischief.”

The one thing that is clear is that an assessee cannot be altogether denied the benefit of tax exemption on account of the laches of the Commissioner in dealing with the assessee’s application in time; he also cannot refuse to pass an order on the application on the ground that the law prevents him in doing so after the statutorily prescribed time. In short he cannot take benefit of his lapses by inflicting punishment on the assessee. Even under the view of the Orissa and Madras High Courts, not so favourable to the assessees, the need for the Commissioner to dispose the application remaining undisposed, is not dispensed with. The courts have clearly hauled up the authorities for their inaction by awarding the costs and have directed the authorities to dispose the application within the extended time after affording opportunity to the assessee. Importantly, the courts have held that the decision of the authorities when taken shall have retrospective effect, thereby ensuring that no undue harm is caused to the assessee for no fault of his. What perhaps remains to be ensured is that the tax demand, if any, in the intervening period is not pursued and enforced and the assessee is saved the trouble of moving the courts to make the Commissioner act on his application.

The purposive interpretation adopted by the Allahabad High Court, that registration should be deemed to have been granted, however, seems to be the far better and practical view of the matter, fulfilling both the requirements of the provision and its intention. The view is strengthened by the presence of the Proviso to section 12AA(1) which provides for giving an opportunity of hearing to the assesseee, by the Commissioner, before rejecting his application for registration which in turn clearly conveys that the denial of registration on account of non disposal of application is altogether ruled out. This view has the effect of satisfying the law abiding assessee who has made the application in time and is otherwise equitous in as much as the law provides for no condonation of delay in application of the assessee.

(2011) 133 ITD 77 (Mum) RBS equities India Ltd. vs. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax Assessment Year : 2004-05 Date of order: 26-08-2011

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Section 271(1)(c) Explanation 7 – AO charged penalty for – Concealment in computation of Arm’s Length Price (ALP). The assessee – RBS equities India Ltd. had computed ALP as per Transactional Net Margin Method (TNMM) which resulted in reduced tax liability of Rs.2,13,25,474 and AO was of the view that the same should have been calculated as per Comparable Uncontrolled Price Method(CUP).

Facts

AO exercised option u/s. 92CA(1) to calculate ALP with reference to the transaction between the assessee and ABN Amro Asia (Mauritius) Ltd (Associated Enterprise). The assessee had provided stock broking services in respect of clearing house trade to Associated Enterprise (AE) and had earned brokerage at the rate of 0.24%. The assessee had provided the same service to FIIs @ 0.408% & to FIs @ 0.22%. The AO contended that AE being FII should have charged @ 0.408%. The AO levied penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) under Explanation 7 to section 271(1)(c). The AO rejected TNMM on the ground that CUP method could be applied to facts of case and accordingly rejected the method without any specific reasons for inapplicability of said method and on the ground that direct method was preferable.

Held:

ALP (Arms Length Price) was computed by assessee in accordance with section 92C in good faith and due diligence as per rule 10C. AO’s view is that ALP could be computed correctly by CUP method only and hence, it cannot be the proper ground to invoke provisions of section 271(1)(c). As the assessee was of the view that TNMM was the appropriate method to determine ALP and the same was derived by assessee in accordance with the provisions of section 92C and as per Rule 10C, deeming fiction under 271(1)(c) cannot be invoked.

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(2011) 132 ITD 604(Mum.) Momaya Investments (P) Ltd. vs. ITO AY : 1996-97 Date of order : 22-06-2011

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Section 73 – Not applicable if the principal business of the company is banking or granting of Loans and Advances – The business of Banking need not be necessarily mentioned in the Memorandum of Association of the company – But the actual nature of the business is to be looked at.

Facts:

The assessee company was mainly engaged in the business of providing loans and advances that formed about 68% of the income. The original assessment dated 30th September, 1998 was passed assessing the total income at Rs. 8,58,522/- This was eventually followed by a revision order passed which stated that the assessee dealt in shares and hence Explanation to section 73 was attracted since the main income did not consist of “Interest on securities, income from House Property, Capital Gains or Income from Other sources.” The assessee had appealed to the tribunal which remanded the matter back to CIT to re-examine certain aspects. The matter was then remanded back to the AO. In the fresh assessment, the assessee submitted that it was mainly engaged in the business of providing loans and advances and rediscounting bill. And therefore, Explanation to section 73 was not applicable. The AO however, objected to assessee’s contention that it was in business of granting loans and advances on the basis that main object of the memorandum of association was only to acquire, hold or deal in stocks and shares. Further, he also held that the activity of bill rediscounting cannot be called as granting of loans and advances.

Held:

What is important is not the object stated in the memorandum of association, but it is also important to look at the actual activity of the assessee. Therefore, merely because the business of granting loans was not mentioned in the memorandum, would not mean that actual nature of business cannot be looked at. It was even concluded that the activity of bill rediscounting has to be treated as only granting of loans. This was because the word “discount”, in regard to financial transactions, represents interest.

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(2012) 80 DTR 23 (Mum) Genesys International Corporation Ltd. vs. ACIT A.Ys.: 2008-09 & 2009-10 Dated: 31-10-2012

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Facts:

While computing tax liability u/s. 115JB, the assessee deducted income of its Mumbai unit which was a SEZ unit and eligible for tax benefit u/s. 10A. The Assessing Officer disputed the claim of the assessee on the ground that the Finance Act, 2007 amended section 115JB w.e.f. A.Y. 2008-09 for bringing the amount of income to which provisions of section 10A or 10B apply within the purview of MAT.

Held:

By SEZ Act, 2005 w.e.f. 10th February 2006, a new section 10AA has been inserted which provides exemption to the units located in SEZ. Section 2 of SEZ Act, defines SEZ as under:

“(za) Special Economic Zone means each Special Economic Zone notified under the proviso to s/s. (4) of section 3 and s/s. (1) of section 4 (including free trade and warehousing zone) and includes an existing Special Economic Zone.”

It is evident from the relevant provisions that an existing SEZ unit will also be governed by SEZ Act, 2005. Therefore, the benefits which are to be provided to the newly established unit in SEZ as per section 10AA will also be available to the existing units in SEZ. Moreover, section 4(1) of SEZ Act provides that an existing SEZ unit shall be deemed to have been notified and established in accordance with provisions of SEZ Act and the provisions of SEZ Act shall apply to such existing SEZ units. It is also observed that by the SEZ Act, s/s. (6) to section 115JB was also inserted providing that provisions of section 115JB shall not apply to the income accrued C. N. Vaze, Shailesh Kamdar, Jagdish T. Punjabi, Bhadresh Doshi Chartered Accountants Tribunal news or arisen on or after 1st April, 2005 from any business carried on, or services rendered, by an entrepreneur or a developer, in a unit or SEZ, as the case may be. Hence, income of units located in SEZ will not be included while computing book profit for the purpose of MAT as per section 115JB(6). In view of above, irrespective of the fact that amendment has been made in clause (f) of Explanation 1 to section 115JB(2) to apply the provisions of MAT in respect of units which are entitled to deduction u/s. 10A or section 10B, the units which are in SEZ will continue to get benefits from the applicability of provisions of MAT in view of s/s. (6). Section 115JB(6) does not refer section 10A or section 10AA but it only refers that provisions of section 115JB will not apply to the income accrued or arisen on or after 1st April, 2005 from any business carried on in a unit located in SEZ. Hence, the unit in SEZ will be covered by s/s. (6) to section 115JB irrespective of the fact that those units were claiming deduction u/s. 10A.

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Waiver of interest: Section 220(2A): Provision to be construed liberally: Application for stay of recovery proceedings cannot be construed as non-cooperation: Partial relief granted:

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Arun Sunny vs. CCIT ; 350 ITR 147 (Ker):

For the A. Y. 2006-07, the Chief Commissioner rejected the assessee’s application for waiver of interest u/s. 220(2A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on the ground that the assessee blocked recovery by obtaining stay against attachment notices and the assessee had not cooperated in recovery proceedings and payment of interest would not cause any genuine hardship to the assessee.

On a writ petition challenging the rejection order, the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court directed the Assessing Officer to reduce 25% of interest and held as under:

“i) Section 220(2A) is an incentive to defaulter assessee to co-operate with the Department and to remit the tax voluntarily at the earliest and, therefore, compliance should be rewarded by taking a liberal view and approach. What is indicated by the provision is that relief to be granted u/s. 220(2A) should be proportionate to the extent of satisfaction of the conditions stated therein. In other words, if the conditions are partially satisfied, the assessee should be given partial relief, i.e. partial waiver which should be in proportion to the extent of satisfaction of the conditions.

ii) The right to move for stay against recovery during pendency of an appeal is a statutory right, exercise of which cannot be said to be an indication of assessee’s lack of co-operation. Lack of co-operation happens when the assessee makes recovery difficult for the Revenue by transferring or siphoning off his assets leading to protracted enquiry and continuation of recovery proceedings by the Department.

 iii) The assessee voluntarily remitted the entire amount of tax before the Department started chasing the assessee with steps for recovery such as attachment of movables and immovables, sale thereof in public auction etc. In fact, the entire arrears were paid within six months from the date of payment based on the assessment. During the pendency of the stay, the assessee was not required to remit the tax which was contested in appeal. Therefore, all the three conditions were to some extent satisfied and the refusal of the Chief Commissioner to grant reduction in interest was not justified. Partial relief had to be granted, taking into account the amount of tax paid by the assessee on the interest earned on term deposits, the retention of which delayed payment of tax that led to levy of default interest.”

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Section 253 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Direct stay application filed before Tribunal is maintainable and it is not a requirement of law that assessee should necessarily approach Commissioner before approaching Tribunal for grant of stay.

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(2012) 49 SOT 333 (Pune)
Honeywell Automation India Ltd. v. Dy. CIT
A.Y.: 2006-07. Dated: 24-2-2011

Section 253 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Direct stay application filed before Tribunal is maintainable and it is not a requirement of law that assessee should necessarily approach Commissioner before approaching Tribunal for grant of stay.

The assessee filed separate application for stay of demand before the Deputy Commissioner, before Additional Commissioner and finally before the Commissioner. None of these officials disposed of the assessee’s applications for stay of demand. The assessee-company thereupon filed application before the Tribunal for stay against the demand of arrears by the Revenue. The Revenue raised an objection that Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain directly stay application (DSA) without waiting for decision of the lower authorities.

The Tribunal dismissed the objections raised by the Revenue. The Tribunal noted as under:

(1) The Act has conferred certain powers on the Income Tax authorities for discharging and 158 (2012) 44-A BCAJ 9 10 one such power relates to matters of stay of the demand. The assessee filed the stay application before the Assessing Officer, but the Assessing Officer did not take any action, be it a case of rejection or otherwise. The same is the fate of application lying with the Additional Commissioner. The Commissioner merely passed on the responsibility to his deputies instead of either staying the demand or rejecting the request for stay of the same or otherwise.

(2) While there is inaction on part of the Revenue on the applications for stay, the assessee is busy in making application for stay of demand from time to time fearing ultimate coercive action by the AO and its likely adverse effects on the business operations of the assessee.

(3) Regarding the DSA by the assessee before the Tribunal, the decisions of the Tribunal are in favour of the assessee for the proposition that it is not necessary that the assessee should necessarily approach the Commissioner of Income-tax before approaching the Tribunal for grant of stay.

(4) Therefore, DSA filed before the Tribunal is maintainable and it is not the requirement of law that the assessee should necessarily approach the Commissioner before approaching the Tribunal for grant of stay.

(5) It does not make any difference whether the assessee filed any application before the Revenue and not awaited their decisions before filing application before the Tribunal or directly approached the Tribunal without even filing the applications before the Revenue authorities when there exists threat of coercive action by the Assessing Officer.

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