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Grant of administrative relief to unregistered dealers : Trade Circular No. 20T of 2009, dated 23-6-2009.

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Part B : Indirect taxes

Updates in VAT and Service Tax :

MVAT UPDATE

Mvat Circulars

  1. Grant of administrative relief to unregistered dealers :
    Trade Circular No. 20T of 2009, dated 23-6-2009.

The powers delegated to all the Additional Commissioners of
Sales Tax in Maharashtra State with respect to granting administrative relief
to unregistered dealers as per Trade Circular No. 14T of 2009 have been
modified by this Circular.

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Form ‘I’ under Central Sales Tax Act.

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Part B : Indirect taxes

Updates in VAT and Service Tax :

MVAT UPDATE

Mvat Circulars

  1. Form ‘I’ under Central Sales Tax Act.

Trade Circular No. 19T of 2009, dtd. 20-6-2009.

By this Circular the Commissioner has instructed to allow
declarations in Form ‘I’ issued by Sales Tax authorities of other States. This
will be applicable for a period of one year and the issue will be re-examined
thereafter. Form ‘I’ issued by the Commissioner, SEZ and form issued by Sales
Tax Department was valid only up to 9-9-2004 under Circular No. 8T of 2005,
dated 9-3-2005.

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Old circulars on S. 9 of the Act withdrawn — Circular No. 7 /2009, dated 22-10-2009.

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Spot Light – Part A

  1. Old circulars on S. 9 of the Act withdrawn — Circular No. 7
    /2009, dated 22-10-2009.

Erstwhile Circular No. 23, dated 23rd July 1969 on income
accruing or arising through or from business connection in India —
Non-residents — Liability to tax under clause (i) of sub-section (1), Circular
No. 163, dated 29th May 1975 on Agency engaged in activity of purchase of
goods for export and Circular No. 786, dated 7th February 2000 on Non-resident
agent operating outside the country have been withdrawn by the Board vide
aforementioned Circular.

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Income tax (Eleventh Amendment) Rules, 2009 — Notification no. 37/2009 dated 21 April 2009

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18. Income tax (Eleventh Amendment) Rules, 2009 —
Notification no. 37/2009 dated 21 April 2009


The CBDT had amended the depreciation rate and provided for
enhanced depreciation on new commercial vehicles acquired after 1st January,
2009 and before 1 April 2009. By a recent amendment, the benefit is extended.
The benefit of enhanced depreciation on commercial vehicles shall now be
available for vehicles acquired up to 30th September 2009.

 

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There are certain corrections made in ITR 2 and ITR 5 vide Notification no. 35/2009 dated 13 April 2009.

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17. There are certain corrections made in ITR 2 and ITR 5
vide Notification no. 35/2009 dated 13 April 2009.

 

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Income tax (10th Amendment) Rules, 2009 —Notification 36/2009 dated 13 April 2009

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Income tax (10th Amendment) Rules, 2009 —Notification
36/2009 dated 13 April 2009

A new clause is inserted in Form 3CD for reporting interest
inadmissible under Section 23 of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises
Development Act, 2006.

 

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Amendments in Income-tax Rules relating to TDS/TCS provisions — Notifi-cation No. 31/2009, dtd. 25th March, 2009

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15. Amendments in Income-tax Rules relating to TDS/TCS
provisions — Notification No. 31/2009, dtd. 25th March, 2009



 


The CBDT has notified Income-tax (8th Amendment Rules),
2009 in respect of TDS/TCS payments and compliance requirements with effect
from 1 April 2009. The highlights of these amendments are as under :

Rules in relation to TDS on salary payments :


Rule No.


Amendments effective 01 April 2009


30(1)

If the credit is on the date up to
which accounts of the employer/deductor are made, then TDS to be deposited
within two months from the end of the month in which amount is credited to
the account of the employee/deductee.

In any other case, within one week from the end of
the month in which tax deducted/Income-tax due.


30(2)/(3)


Quarterly deposit of TDS on 15 June, 15 September,
15 December, 15 March, if the tax officer permits in special cases with
the prior approval of the Joint Commissioner.


30(4)/(5)


E-payment of tax in Form No.17 by way of internet
banking facility or use of credit/ debit card.


31(2)


a) In case of TDS on Salary
payments : 
TDS Certificate (Form 16) to be issued within one month
from the end of the financial year i.e., 30th April following the
relevant financial year.

b) In other cases :

§
If the credit is up to the date up to which the accounts of the deductor
are made, TDS Certificate (Form 16A) to be issued within one week from
the date on which tax deposited.


§
In case of a consolidated certificate/TDS under Section 194D, within one
month from the end of the financial year (i.e., 30th April).


§
In all other cases, within one month from the end of the month in which
tax deducted.



c) In case of quarterly payments of TDS in special
cases, within 14 days from the date of payment of Income-tax.


31(4)


The tax officer to grant credit of TDS on duplicate
Form 16 /16A after obtaining an indemnity bond from the employee and get
the payment certified from the prescribed person.


31A(3)


Compliance statement to be filed (Form 24C) by 15th
July, 15th October, 15th January for first three quarters of the relevant
financial year, respectively, and 15th June following the last quarter.


31A(4)


Quarterly statement of TDS to be filed in Form
24Q/26Q/27Q by 15th June following the financial year.

The new Rules in relation to tax collected at source :


New Rule 37BB along with new forms for furnishing of information under Section 195(6) of the Act have been prescribed —Notification no. 30/2009, dated 25 March 2009.

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New Rule 37BB along with new forms for furnishing of
information under Section 195(6) of the Act have been prescribed —Notification
no. 30/2009, dated 25 March 2009.

The CBDT has issued Income-tax (Seventh Amendment) Rules,
2009 effective 1 July 2009, wherein the method of issuing a CA certificate for
the purpose of non-resident remittances has been changed. As per the modified
procedure, new forms have been introduced viz.,

G Form 15CB to be issued by a Chartered Accountant in
which detailed explanations are required for arriving at the rate of
withholding tax

G Form 15CA is required to be filled in by the payer and
submit electronically on the Income- tax website

G Thereafter a printout of such electronically submitted
Form 15CA needs to be signed and submitted by the payer prior to remitting
the payment.

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Miscellaneous — National Pension Scheme notified with effect from 1 May 2009.

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  1. Miscellaneous — National Pension Scheme notified with
    effect from 1 May 2009.

National Pension Scheme which was erstwhile applicable only
to Government employees is now made applicable to all the eligible citizens of
India (both resident and non-resident) of the age of 18 to 55 years of age,
with effect from 1 May 2009. An individual can contribute savings into this
non-withdrawable account which matures and can be annutised post 60 years of
age or as prescribed by the scheme. There is another voluntary contribution
scheme, wherein money can be withdrawn, however the same is yet to be
notified. To enrol in the scheme, an individual needs to submit a registration
Form UOS-s1 to selected agencies. NRIs should have a bank account in India to
register in this scheme. After the account is opened, the Central Record
Keeping Agency shall allot a unique Permanent Retirement Account Number (PRAN)
card. As per the scheme the minimum contribution is Rs. 500 (Rs. 6000 per
year) and a person needs to contribute at least 4 times a year. Investment
options are also available as prescribed in the scheme.

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Clarifications on the amendments/introduction of the new TDS/TCS provisions vide Notification No. 31/2009, dated 25 March 2009 — Circular No. 2/2009, dated 21 May 2009.

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  1. Clarifications on the amendments/introduction of the new
    TDS/TCS provisions vide Notification No. 31/2009, dated 25 March
    2009 — Circular No. 2/2009, dated 21 May 2009.


The CBDT vide a press release (as mentioned above) had
stalled the implementation of the new provisions relating to TDS/TCS
provisions till 1 July 1009. The CBDT has now reinstated the implementation of
these provisions with effect from 1 April 2009, by issuing this Circular and
clarifying certain ambiguities which arose due to the introduction/amendments
relating to the captioned subject. Important clarifications are under :


  •  Claim for TDS would be allowed only if amount has been
    deposited and information relating to the deductee has been provided by the
    deductor/collector and the claim matches with that of the deductee/collector.


  •  Central and State Government deductors have also been
    made responsible for payment of TDS in the bank unlike earlier when book
    adjustments/consolidated payments were allowed.


  •  Every deduction record will generate a Unique
    Transaction Number (UTN) on loading the information on NSDL and payment of
    the TDS/TCS to the Government Treasury. UTN would be emailed by the NSDL to
    the deductor, and needs to be quoted in the TDS certificate. This UTN can
    also be independently viewed by the deductee on the website of NSDL.


  •  It is mandatory for all TAN holders to furnish Form 24C
    quarterly irrespective of whether any payment liable to TDS has been made or
    not. The first quarter in respect of which Form 24C is required to be
    furnished is the quarter ending on 30th June, 2009 by 15th July.


  •  The above new system will be effective for all TDS/TCS
    on or after the 1st April, 2009. However, any TDS or TCS effected on or
    after the 1st April, 2009 but not later than 31st May, 2009 can be continued
    to be paid to the credit of the Central Government by using the old challan
    form. Post 1st June, 2009 such TDS/TCS shall be required to be paid by
    electronically by furnishing income tax challan in Form No. 17. By 15 July,
    for those TDS/TCS which have been paid in the old challan, Form No 17 needs
    to be filled up so that UTNs for these can be generated.


  •  For splitting the payment of TDS/TCS , a separate Form
    17 needs to be filled for each payment.


  •  In the said Circular, it has been clarified for the AY
    2008-09 and onwards, UTNs are going to be generated by NSDL and detailed
    procedure has been prescribed for claiming TDS on the basis of this UTNs.
    Since the returns for AY 2008-09 have already been filed, it remains to be
    seen how this would be practically implemented.


  •  Similarly new procedures have been prescribed for issue
    of TDS/TCS certificates in Form 16/16A and 27D.



Instructions for new Income Tax Return forms for Assessment
Year 2009-2010 — Circular No. 3/2009, dated 21 May 2009.

Certain clarifications have been given by the CBDT for
the
E-returns for AY
2009-10, the important ones being :






  •  It has been reiterated that no enclosures need to be
    submitted along with the paper return. The only exception being transfer
    pricing report which needs to be filed separately as per the provisions of the
    Act.


  •  With respect to E-filing(without digital signatures) and
    subsequent filing of verification form in ITR-V — hard copy of verification
    form ITR-V now can be filed within 30 days (instead of the earlier time limit
    of 15 days) from date of electronic filing. Further, the CBDT has decided to
    process all the paper returns i.e., ITR V Centrally at Bangalore.
    Hence, all the ITR V needs to be sent by the assessee at the following
    address :


“Income Tax Department — CPC, Post Box No.1, Electronic
City Post Office, Bangalore- 560100, Karnataka”

Please note that it has been specifically mentioned that
the document should be posted in A-4 size envelope without folding it since
the ITR V is bar-coded. On receipt of the ITRV, the Department will email an
acknowledgement to the taxpayer at the email id mentioned in the ITR V. There
is only one exception being ITR 7 which is Trust returns.

  •  It has been reiterated in this Circular that the credit
    for TDS/TCS and the advance tax/self assessment tax would be available mainly
    on the basis of the UTN information and CIN information feeded in the return.



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Press Release dated May, 15th 2009.

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  1. Press Release dated May, 15th 2009.

The Reserve Bank has designated 926 branches of private and
public sector banks for receiving advance Income tax in Mumbai and Navi
Mumbai. Out of these 926 branches, 862 are public sector banks and 35 are HDFC
bank branches, 10 are ICICI bank branches and 19 are AXIS bank branches.

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Press Release No. 402/92/2009 — MC (11 of 2009), dated 11.5.2009

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  1. Press Release No. 402/92/2009 — MC (11 of 2009), dated
    11.5.2009

The Central Board of Direct Taxes have decided to defer the
implementation of Notification No.31/2009, dated 25-3-2009 amending or
substituting Rules 30, 31, 31A and 31AA of the Income Tax Rules, 1962. The
amended/substituted Rules will now come into effect on 1st July 2009 instead
of 1st April 2009. Tax deductors/collectors may continue to deposit TDS/TCS
tax and file TDS/TCS returns as per the pre-amended provisions in the interim
period. This however is only for records due to the Circular issued later
which is outlined below.

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TDS on commission paid by MTNL/BSNL to owners of PCO under Section 194-H of Income-tax Act, 1961 —Instruction No. 03/2009, dated 8.5.2009 (reproduced) — [F. No. 275/15/2002-IT(B)]

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  1. TDS on commission paid by MTNL/BSNL to owners of PCO under
    Section 194-H of Income-tax Act, 1961 —Instruction No. 03/2009, dated 8.5.2009
    (reproduced) — 
    [F.
    No. 275/15/2002-IT(B)]

A number of representations have been received from BSNL/MTNL
and field formations regarding raising of/pending demands for non-deduction of
tax at source on commission payments to the franchisees/PCO owners by MTNL and
BSNL prior to 1/6/2007. The matter was discussed by the Board recently and it
has been decided that the demands raised against MTNL/BSNL on account of
non-deduction of TDS u/s. 194H on all such commission payments to franchisee/PCO
owners, etc. may not be enforced till the matter is sorted out by the Board.
However, in case MTNL/BSNL have already deducted TDS on commission payments to
the PCO owners, etc., but have not deposited it to the Govt. accounts because
of incorrect interpretations of instruction dated 15th July, 2002, they have
to be directed to deposit such sums immediately to the Govt. Account.

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Notification No. 20/2009-Service Tax, dated 7-7-2009 : w.r.t. sub-clause (n) of clause (105) of S. 65.

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Part B : Indirect taxes

Updates in VAT and Service Tax :

MVAT UPDATE

Mvat Notifications

  1. Notification No. 20/2009-Service Tax, dated 7-7-2009 :
    w.r.t. sub-clause (n) of clause (105) of S. 65.

By this Notification the services provided to any person by
a tour operator having a contract carriage permit for inter-state or
intrastate transportation of passengers, excluding tourism, conducted tours,
charter or hire service, have been made exempt from levy of service tax.

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Notification No. 21/2009-Service Tax, dated 7-7-2009 : Amendments in Notification No. 1/2002-Service Tax, dated 1-3-2002.

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Part B : Indirect taxes

Updates in VAT and Service Tax :

MVAT UPDATE

Mvat Notifications

  1. Notification No. 21/2009-Service Tax, dated 7-7-2009 :
    Amendments in Notification No. 1/2002-Service Tax, dated 1-3-2002.

By this Notification, the levy of service tax has been
extended to services provided at the installations, structures and vessels in
the entire Continental Shelf of India and Exclusive Economic Zone of India.

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Notification No. 19/2009-Service Tax, dated 7-7-2009 : w.r.t. sub-clause (zzb) and (zzp) of clause (105) of S. 65.

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Part B : Indirect taxes

Updates in VAT and Service Tax :

MVAT UPDATE

Mvat Notifications

  1. Notification No. 19/2009-Service Tax, dated 7-7-2009 :
    w.r.t. sub-clause  (zzb) and (zzp) of clause (105) of S. 65.

By this Notification services in relation to transaction of
purchase and sale of foreign currency between scheduled banks have been made
exempt. This exemption is applicable only for banks included in Second
Schedule of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934.

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Notification No. 18/2009-Service Tax, dated 7-7-2009 : w.r.t. sub-clause (zzb) and (zzp) of clause (105) of S. 65.

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Part B : Indirect taxes

Updates in VAT and Service Tax :

MVAT UPDATE

Mvat Notifications

  1. Notification No. 18/2009-Service Tax, dated 7-7-2009 :
    w.r.t. sub-clause  (zzb) and (zzp) of clause (105) of S. 65.

By this Notification the taxable service provided to an
exporter for transport of the goods by road and service provided by a
commission agent located outside India for procuring orders (Exemption is
limited to 1% of the FOB value) has been exempted from service tax subject to
conditions.

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Notification No. 17/2009-Service Tax, dated 7-7-2009 : Services received by exporters exempted.

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Part B : Indirect taxes

Updates in VAT and Service Tax :

MVAT UPDATE

Mvat Notifications

  1. Notification No. 17/2009-Service Tax, dated 7-7-2009 :
    Services received by exporters exempted.

This Notification supersedes Notification No. 41/2007-
Service Tax, dated the 6th October, 2007. By this Notification taxable
services specified in column (3) of the Table appended to this Notification
received by an exporter of goods and used for export of goods pertaining to
sub-clauses of clause (105) of S. 65 have been exempted from service tax.

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Exemption to some clubs and associations : Notification No. 16/2009-Service Tax, dated 7-7-2009 w.r.t. sub-clause (zzze) of clause (105) of S. 65.

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Part B : Indirect taxes

Updates in VAT and Service Tax :

MVAT UPDATE

Mvat Notifications

  1. Exemption to some clubs and associations : Notification No.
    16/2009-Service Tax, dated 7-7-2009 w.r.t. sub-clause (zzze) of clause (105)
    of S. 65.

By this Notification, services provided by certain clubs
and associations have been made exempt from the levy of service tax.

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Amendment to the Notification No. VAT-1505/CR-237, dated 17-10-2005 regarding mobile phones : Notification No. VAT-1509/CR-81-E/Taxation-1, dated 29-6-2009.

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Part B : Indirect taxes

Updates in VAT and Service Tax :

MVAT UPDATE

Mvat Notifications

  1. Amendment to the Notification No. VAT-1505/CR-237, dated
    17-10-2005 regarding mobile phones : Notification No.
    VAT-1509/CR-81-E/Taxation-1, dated 29-6-2009.

By this Notification the Commissioner has deleted some
items from Entry C-56 so that some products like mobile phones, digital
camera, etc. are liable at 12.50% w.e.f. 1-7-2009.

Service Tax Update

Notifications :

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Nil rate of tax for solar energy devices : Notification No. VAT-1509/CR-81-B(1)/Taxation-1, dated 29-6-2009.

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Part B : Indirect taxes

Updates in VAT and Service Tax :

MVAT UPDATE

Mvat Notifications

  1. Nil rate of tax for solar energy devices : Notification No.
    VAT-1509/CR-81-B(1)/Taxation-1, dated 29-6-2009.

By this Notification the Commissioner has notified list of
solar energy devices under Entry A-56 at NIL rate of tax w.e.f. 1-7-2009.

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Concessional rate for sales by a registered dealer to the Department of Space, Government of India of goods used in Satellite Launch System : Notification No. VAT-1509/CR-81-A/Taxation-1, dated 29-6-2009.

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Part B : Indirect taxes

Updates in VAT and Service Tax :

MVAT UPDATE

Mvat Notifications

  1. Concessional rate for sales by a registered dealer to the
    Department of Space, Government of India of goods used in Satellite Launch
    System : Notification No. VAT-1509/CR-81-A/Taxation-1, dated 29-6-2009.

By this Notification the Commissioner has added an entry to
the Schedule appended to Notification No.VAT-1505/C.R.-192/Taxation-1, dated
19-4-2007 so that specified sales by a registered dealer to the Department of
Space, Government of India of goods used in Satellite Launch System can be
made at concessional rate of tax.

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Maharashtra Tax Laws (Levy, Amendment and Validation) Act, 2009 : Notification No. VAT-1509/CR-78/Taxation-1, dated 29-6-2009.

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Part B : Indirect taxes

Updates in VAT and Service Tax :

MVAT UPDATE

Mvat Notifications

  1. Maharashtra Tax Laws (Levy, Amendment and Validation) Act,
    2009 : Notification No. VAT-1509/CR-78/Taxation-1, dated 29-6-2009.

By this Notification the Commissioner has notified
Maharashtra Tax Laws (Levy, Amendment and Validation) Act, 2009 to be
effective from 1st July 2009 wherever applicable.

By Maharashtra Tax Laws (Levy, Amendment and Validation)
Act, 2009 following Acts are amended :

(a) Amendment to Schedule I appended to the Bombay Stamp
Act, 1958;

(b) Amendment to Third Schedule appended to the Bombay
Motor Vehicles Tax Act, 1958;

(c) Amendment to Schedule I of the Maharashtra State Tax
on Professions, Trades, Callings And Employments Act, 1975;

(d) Amendment to S. 20, S. 29, S. 30, S. 63, S. 85 and
amendment to Schedules A, B, C & D of the Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act,
2002.


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Maharashtra Value Added Tax (2nd Amendment) Rules, 2009 : Notification No. VAT-1509/CR-16/Taxaion, dated 18-6-2009.

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Part B : Indirect taxes

Updates in VAT and Service Tax :

MVAT UPDATE

Mvat Notifications

  1. Maharashtra Value Added Tax (2nd Amendment) Rules, 2009 :
    Notification No. VAT-1509/CR-16/Taxaion, dated 18-6-2009.

By this Notification the Commissioner has amended Rules 17,
17A, 20, 40, 41, 45, & 53.

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Waiver of penalty in certain cases for non-filing of returns within prescribed time : Trade Circular No. 21T of 2009, dtd. 4-7-2009.

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Part B : Indirect taxes

Updates in VAT and Service Tax :

MVAT UPDATE

Mvat Circulars

  1. Waiver of penalty in certain cases for non-filing of
    returns within prescribed time : Trade Circular No. 21T of 2009,
    dtd.
    4-7-2009.

In pursuance of the announcement made by the Finance
Minister in his Budget Speech, the Commissioner has announced a scheme for
waiver of penalty as follows :

(a) if the dealers, who have not filed one or more
returns for the periods starting on or after 1st April 2005 and ending on
30th June 2009, file all such pending returns electronically along with the
due payment with interest on or before 31st July 2009, then penalty for late
filing of returns will not be levied.

(b) In a case where for the period starting on or after
1st April 2005 and ending on 30th June 2009, if penalty is imposed and
recovered, then the dealer will not be entitled for the refund of such
amount.

(c) In a case where the penalty has been already levied
for non-filing of returns but the same has not been paid by the dealer, it
will not be recovered if the dealer files all his pending returns
electronically with payment of tax and interest up to 31st July 2009.

(d) Where the penalty is already levied and the dealer
has filed an appeal against the said penalty order, then the said penalty or
part of the penalty outstanding shall not be recovered if the dealer files
all his returns up to 31st July 2009 along with payment of tax with
interest. The dealer must however, withdraw the appeal against such order
unconditionally before availing this benefit. The part payment made in
appeal shall not be refunded.

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Amendment to Rule 58 by inserting Sub-Rule (1A) : Notification No. VAT-1507/CR-53/Taxation-1, dated 1-6-2009.

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Part B : Indirect taxes

Updates in VAT and Service Tax :

MVAT UPDATE

Mvat Notifications

  1. Amendment to Rule 58 by inserting Sub-Rule (1A) :
    Notification No. VAT-1507/CR-53/Taxation-1, dated 1-6-2009.

By this Notification, the Commissioner has amen-ded Rule 58
by inserting Sub-Rule (1A) after Sub-Rule (1) with retrospective effect from
20-6-2006.

New Sub-Rule (1A) lays down the method of valuation of
goods transferred in the execution of construction contracts wherein, along
with the immovable property, the land or interest in the land, underlying the
immovable property is to be conveyed. The value of the said goods at the time
of the transfer shall be calculated after making deductions under Sub-Rule (1)
and for the cost of the land from the total agreement value. The cost of the
land shall be determined in accordance with the guidelines appended to the
Annual Statement of Rates prepared under the provisions of the Bombay Stamp
(Determination of True Market Value of Property) Rules, 1995, as applicable on
the 1st January of the year in which the agreement to sell the property is
registered. Deduction towards cost of land under this sub-rule shall not
exceed 70% of the agreement value.

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Order under Clause 12 of the Income Tax Ombudsman Guidelines, 2006

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Ombudsman Orders


In the past one year, the Ombudsman has been approached by a
few taxpayers, who have faced difficulties with the Income-tax Department. Some
excellent orders have been passed by the Ombudsman, providing much-needed relief
to harassed taxpayers. Many taxpayers are not aware of the types of relief that
the Ombudsman can provide. To encourage more taxpayers to take the benefit of
the services of the office of the Ombudsman for similar problems faced by them,
we intend to reproduce some orders passed by the Ombudsman. We reproduce one
such order below, in which the assessee received its refund pursuant to such
order. We also request readers to share their experience with other readers, by
sending in orders that may have been passed by the Ombudsman in their own or
their client’s cases, for reproduction in this column.
— Editor

Government of India

Office of the Ombudsman

Income-tax Department,

11th floor, Mittal Tower,

‘B’ Wing, Nariman Point, Mumbai-21.

Ref. No. Ombudsman/431/2007-08

Name & address of the assessee : ABC (I) Pvt. Ltd.

PAN No. : xxxxxx

A.Y. : 2006-07

Date of order : 12th March, 2008

Order under Clause 12 of the Income Tax Ombudsman Guidelines, 2006 :

1. The assessee, an advertising agency submitted on 8-2-2008
a grievance petition to the Ombudsman in which it indicated that although it had
claimed a refund of Rs.5,69,71,367 in its return of income for the A.Y. 2006-07,
it had not been granted the same so far. Enquiries made by them with the
Income-tax department revealed that the credit appearing in the department’s
records was only around Rs.1 crore.

2. Subsequently, a report furnished by the Chief Commissioner
of Income-tax, Mumbai-IV revealed that whereas the TDS claimed by the assessee
was to the tune of Rs.9.11 crores, this figure of TDS, according to the data
supplied to the Department by NSDL, was only Rs.2.37 crores. Only TDS entries of
Rs.66 lacs could be matched.

3. There appears to be some communication gap between the
assessee and the Department. The Department claims that instead of reconciling
the mismatch report and submitting only TDS Certificates in respect of entries
which did not match with the data provided by NSDL to the Department, the
assessee submitted four volumes of all its original TDS certificates. The task
of reconciliation was left to the Department. The Department has been unable to
perform this task so far to the satisfaction of the assessee. The assessee, on
the hand, claims that it has been extending full co-operation to the Department.

4. There is obviously considerable complexity involved in the
case for the reason that the assessee’s claim for refund is based on 757 TDS
Certificates, only a small proportion of which are reflected in the computerised
records of the Department.

5. To sort out these matters, a hearing was fixed on
10-3-2008 at 12.30 p.m. Shri . . . . . . . . . . . . ., C.A. and Shri
. . . . . . . . . . . . . Vice-President (Finance) attended on behalf of the
assessee and Shri . . . . . . . . . . . . ., Addl. CIT Rg. 6(3) and Shri
. . . . . . . . . . . . ., ACIT 6(3) attended on behalf of the Department.
Before me, both the Department as well as the assessee agreed as follows :

(i) The Department would ensure the settlement of the
assessee’s refund claim by 25-3-2008, as more than one and half years have
passed since the return was filed;

(ii) The assessee will extend full co-operation to the AO
in the reconciliation of mis-matched items;

(iii) The Department will be at liberty in accordance with
the law to make such verification as it deems necessary to ascertain the
correctness of the TDS claims, even after the issue of the pending refund;

(iv) Such verification however, if detailed, will not hold
up the assessee’s refund, and

(v) If directed, the assessee will comply with the
requirements of filing an Indemnity Bond and fulfilling all other formalities
in accordance with the extant procedures of the Department.

(Hardayal Singh)

Income Tax Ombudsman,

Mumbai

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Reply of BCAS Letter

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Ombudsman OrdersOmbudsman’s
reply to BCAS’s application dated 25-5-2008, seeking supply of information.

D.O.F.No.Admn/Corres/D.O.
letters/07-08

Hardayal Singh
Ombudsman
Government of
India
Office of the Ombudsman
Income Tax Department, Mumbai-400020.
  Dated : 18th
April, 2007

My Dear,

1. May I at outset wish you and your officers every success
in your endeavours during the current financial year. Even as all of you attend
to your onerous responsibilities, I am sure you will all find time to attend to
taxpayer grievances, an important area of concern for the Government. I am happy
to return to Mumbai as the Department’s Ombudsman. I am indeed looking forward
to working with you and your officers in the larger interests of the
Organisation.

2. Since the institution of Ombudsman is new, I am enclosing
herewith a copy of Income Tax Ombudsman Guidelines – 2006. It would be helpful
to me if you could have this document circulated amongst all the officers of
your charge, so that they become conversant with its provisions.

3. Very briefly, the Ombudsman will mostly focus on
administrative complaints. These have been clearly specified in Guideline 9
(Chapter IV), and include inter alia grievances relating to delays in
disposal of applications related to rectification applications, appeal effects,
waiver of interest, release of seized books of accounts and assets, issue of
refunds, failure to give credit for taxes paid, etc.

4. Under Guideline 13, the Ombudsman is ordinarily expected
to settle a taxpayer’s grievance by agreement within a month of the filing of
the complaint. Accordingly, my office would directly be writing to the officer
concerned immediately on receipt of the complaint. Ordinarily, the officer would
be expected to reply back within 15 days of the receipt of this complaint. If he
has settled the grievance by then, he should indicate as such. In that case no
further action would be necessary. Ideally, from every point of view this would
be the best result. If, however, the grievance cannot be settled, the officer
should forward his comments to me after consulting his superiors. I am sure you
would agree with me that as a general rule there should be a genuine effort to
settle as many grievances as possible on the basis of agreement.

5. Where a grievance cannot be settled by agreement, I would
mediate as required under the Guidelines. If results are still not forthcoming,
I would be passing an Award.

6. Under Guideline 8(II)(e), I am required to send a monthly
report to the Chairman, CBDT and Secretary, Department of Revenue, Ministry of
Finance, recommending appropriate action against erring officials who fail to
redress legitimate grievances. My own expectation however is that such instances
would be very rare indeed and mostly confined to very few cases where the
officials concerned are guilty of recalcitrant conduct involving deliberate
defiance.

7. Under Guideline 8(II)(g), I am required to annually
forward to you and the Board, a list of Awards made by me during the financial
year against the officials working in your charge, so that cognisance can be
taken of the same while writing their Annual Confidential Reports. Again, the
number of cases where adverse notice would need to be taken may perhaps be
limited.

8. The purpose behind my outlining some of the relevant
provisions in the preceding paragraphs is not to scare or demoralise your
officers. I would like to begin my innings on a very positive note. I am quite
sure if we all follow the spirit of Guidelines and take interest in redressing
the legitimate grievances of taxpayers in a prompt and efficient manner, there
will be no occasion to invoke any punitive provision.

9. Please rest assured that I will always be available to
your officers for any guidance or help. They are always free to approach me
after taking an appointment from my office.

With regards Yours

(Hardayal Singh)

Encl : As above†

To,

The Chief Commissioners of Income Tax — I to VII, IX to XIII, Cent-I & II,
Mumbai.

Redressal of grievances

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Ombudsman Orders

Ombudsman
Orders

Government of India

Office of the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax

3rd floor, Aayakar Bhavan,

Maharshi Karve Road, Mumbai-400020.

No. CCIT/MUM/Grie./2007-08 Date 29-8-2007

To

The Chief Commissioners of Income Tax —

I to VII, XI to XII, (C)-I & II,

Mumbai.



Sub. : Redressal of grievances — Reg.



Please find enclosed letter dated 28th August 2007 wherein
the Ombudsman, Income-tax Department had issued certain instructions in order to
reduce the grievances in these areas. Kindly ensure such instructions are
adhered to and take suitable remedial action. Progress made in this regard may
please be noted to the Ombudsman, Income-tax Department with a copy endorsed to
Chief Commissioner of Income-tax, Mumbai.

(Mala Ramakrishnan)

Chief Commissioner of Income-tax,

Mumbai.


D.O.F. No. Dir.(Hqrs.)/Ch.(DT)2007/

N. B. Singh

Member

Tel. : 23093621


Date : 18-9-2007

Smt. Mala Ramakrishnan,

Chief Commissioner of Income Tax (CCA),

Mumbai.

Dear Ramakrishnanji,

Income-tax Ombudsman, Mumbai has brought to my notice certain
irritants faced by the taxpayers. These are of recurring nature. A copy of the
relevant portion of the letter of Income-tax Ombudsman is enclosed for your
perusal.

I would request you to take action on the matters pointed out
by Ombudsman, Mumbai so that the number of grievances can be considerably
reduced.

With regards, Yours sincerely,

(N. B. Singh)



20th August, 2007


Ms. Mala Ramakrishnan,

Chief Commissioner of Income Tax,

3rd floor, Aaykar Bhavan,

M. K. Road, Mumbai-400020.

Dear

During my meetings with the tax-paying public at various
forums, the following systemic deficiencies have been brought to my notice. I am
informed that these continue to be irritants for the taxpaying public. It is
suggested that immediate action should be taken to redress the same.

(a) Refunds :


Many instances have come to light where there has been an
inordinate delay between the date of issue of the intimation and the date of
issue of refund. In one instance, the date of intimation is dated 31-7-2006, the
refund however is dated 27-7-2007.

(b) Interest u/s.244A :




(i) Interest is invariably not allowed on the delay between
the date of the assessment order/intimation and the date of issue of refund.

(ii) Sometimes the refunds are delayed on account of prior
administrative sanction sought by the Assessing Officer from the Jt. CIT/Add.
CIT/CIT/Chief CITs. No interest is allowed on such delays.


(c) Scrutiny assessments :




(i) In many cases, a standard questionnaire is sent
whenever a case is picked up for scrutiny. The details sought are either not
applicable or are available on the records of the case itself. Wherever
required, the officers should be urged to draw a specific questionnaire after
perusing the records of the relevant year and earlier assessment years.

(ii) Sufficient time is not given to taxpayers where they
have to seek information from a third party. It has been suggested that the
period of up to two weeks should normally be granted to comply with such
requirements.

(iii) In verification of cash credits, copies of returns of
income of lenders are sometimes called for. This appears to be a recent trend.
Taxpayers have complained that it impossible for them to get copies of returns
of lenders. Requirements of the law should ordinarily be treated as having
been adequately met once a taxpayer provides details of the lender’s PAN, AO,
etc.

(d) Rectification and appeal effects :


It has been brought to my notice and it is my own experience
as well that rectification applications and appeal effects are not being
attended to on time. Considerable delays are being reported to me on a daily
basis.

2. The above analysis may be brought to the notice of all the
assessing officers and their supervisory authorities – namely, Jt. CIT/Adl. CITs/administrative
CITs/Chief Commissioners for necessary action.

3. When supervisory officers take up cases for
review/inspection, they may specifically keep an eye for the defects indicated
above. If they notice lapses, they should specifically comment upon the same.

4. You will appreciate that the instructions issued by you as
well as your colleagues may help in reducing grievances in these areas. I shall
therefore be grateful if a copy of the same is endorsed to me.

Yours

(Hardayal Singh)

Income Tax Ombudsman,

Mumbai.

Copy to :

The Chairman,

C.B.D.T., North Block,

New Delhi-110001.


Government of India

Office of the Ombudsman

Income Tax Department

11th floor, Mittal Tower, ‘B’ Wing,

Nariman Point, Mumbai-21.

Tel. : 22829930

Ref. No. : Ombudsman/352/2007-08

Name & Address of the assessee : Mrs. Xxxx

PA No. :

A.Y. : 1994-95

Date of hearing : 04-02-2008

Date of order : 7th February, 2008

Award under clause 13 of the Income Tax Ombudsman  Guidelines, 2006

The complainant’s grievance dated 5-12-2007relates to her failure to obtain credit for advance-tax of Rs.40,000 for the A.Y. 1994-95. In her letter to the Ombudsman, she has pointed out that the cheque in question of Indian Overseas Bank, Nariman Point Branch, Mumbai was cleared on 30-3-1994. Her accountant however did not show this payment while filing her return for the relevant assessment year. It is only in April, 2001 that she discovered that al-though she had made the payment of Rs.40,OOO,she had not claimed the same in her return of income and hence had failed to receive the credit for the same. In her complaint, the assessee has produced all the necessary proof for this payment including a certificate from India Overseas Bank. A copy of the challan for the payment made has also been  enclosed.

2. On obtaining the report from the ITO dated 2-1-2008, received in this office on 23-1-2008, this case was fixed for hearing on 4-2-2008. 5hri ….. , Addl. CIT.Rg.20(1) and 5hri ….. , ITO. 20(1)(1), Mumbai were present on behalf of the Department. Mrs……….. the assessee herself was also present for the hearing.

3. The fact of this case falls within a very narrow compass and have .been narrated above. From the Department’s point of view, it has been pointed out by the Assessing Officer in his report dated 2-1-2008 that the assessee’s application for rectification dated 4-7-2002 was initially rejected by the Department on the ground that the claim had been made beyond four years from the passing of the assessment order dated 29-1-1997. The assessee applied for condonation of delay to CIT-20, who rejected her claim vide his letter dated 11-3-2004. The assessee then petitioned the CCIT- XI, Mumbai. Her application did not find favour with him also and her request was rejected on 3-6-2004. The assessee then petitioned the Board on 18-6-2004 which again ruled that there was no mistake apparent from the record. The assessee reapplied to the Board on 13-2-2006 under the Right to Information Act. In reply, the Board asked her to file a revised return and move an application for the condonation of delay in filing her return, u/s.119 of the Act.

4. The assessee complied with this direction. No action was however taken between 7-3-2006 and 11-4-2007 i.e., for more than a year. After waiting for so much time, the C.LT. quoted  Board’s instruction No.13/2006, issued in December, 2006, and pointed out to the assessee that no fresh application for claim . of refund was to be entertained six years beyond the end of the assessment year for which the application was made. Under this instruction, according to the CIT, the limitation set in on 31-3-2001.

5. The assessee is aggrieved against the aforesaid direction. According to her, she has complied with Board’s directions and her revised return deserves to be considered as it was filed much before the instruction No. 13/2006 dated 2-12-2006 was issued.

6. I have applied my mind to the facts of this case. First of all, it is not equitable that one year should have been allowed to lapse before giving effect to the Board’s directions for reconsidering the assessee’s revised return. Understandably, filing of a revised return, on the directions of the Board, was never meant to be an idle formality.

The Board’s subsequent instructions cannot be construed to deprive the assessee of her vested right to have her revised return considered for the purpose of obtaining the credit for the advance-tax payment of Rs.40,000.

7. Secondly and much more importantly, I find that the instruction itself clearly says that no fresh application for claim of refund will be entertained beyond six years from the end of the relevant assessment year. This instruction can only apply to new cases, where a claim is filed after the issue of this instruction. In the assessee’s case, her claim precedes the Board’s instruction by more than four years. The assessee’s claim for payment of advance tax under her revised return was in pursuance of the directions of the Board and has therefore necessarily to be considered. The assessee’s claim for giving credit/ refund should therefore be re-examined in accordance with law.

8. The assessee will indicate within 15 days of the receipt of this order as to whether she accepts this award in full and final settlement of her claim. On her acceptance, the Assessing Officer will thereafter re-examine the assessee’s case in accordance with the Board’s instructions on the subject and if any refund results, the same will be issued to the asses-see within one month of the date of receipt of this award. The Assessing Officer’s report clearly indicates that the regular assessment in this case was completed on 29-1-1997 u/s.143(3). Issues other than the credit for Rs.40,000 towards advance-tax thus appear to have been fully examined.

9. There will be no order as to compensation. The assessee will not also be entitled to claim interest on any delayed refund, that might result from this award.

(Hardayal Singh)
Income Tax Ombudsman,
Mumbai.

Procedure for representation before BIFR and AAIFR : Circular No. 5/2009, dated 2-7-2009.

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 Part A : Direct taxes


  1. Procedure for representation before BIFR and AAIFR :
    Circular No. 5/2009, dated 2-7-2009.

For granting income-tax reliefs/concessions to be given to
sick companies for their rehabilitation under the Sick Industrial Companies (SICA)
Act, 1985 the CBDT has issued a Circular superseding all earlier ones issued on
this account — prescribing method to be followed before the Board for Industrial
and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) and the Appellate Authority for Industrial
and Financial Reconstruction (AAIFR).

  • The Director General Income Tax
    (Administration), [DGIT (Admn.)] has been nominated as a nodal agency for co-ordinating
    between BIFR, AAIFR and CBDT.

  • Every scheme where financial
    assistance is sought u/s.19(2) of SICA, the consent would be granted by the
    DGIT (Admn.) by considering each case on merits. Where the tax relief has been
    quantified, the DGIT (Admn.) would communicate the consent/denial after
    getting it approved from the CBDT. In case of incomplete information, after
    calling for requisite information, the file would be put up to the CBDT and
    the decision be conveyed to BIFR.

  • Since all the above relief
    decisions are vetted by the CBDT, they would be binding on all Assessing
    Officers and relief would be granted to the assessees accordingly.

  • In case BIFR/AAIFR takes a
    different view from CBDT, the DGIT (Admn.) would be responsible for filing an
    appeal before AAIFR/Delhi High Court as the case may be. Where the case is
    filed by sick companies, the CCIT (Admn.) would be responsible to represent
    the Department before the Appellate Authority.

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India Luxembourg Social Security Agreement signed : Press Release dated 30-9-2009.

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11. India Luxembourg Social Security Agreement signed : Press
Release dated 30-9-2009.

 

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S. 10B — Gain on account of foreign exchange rate fluctuation qua export proceeds credited/deposited in EEFC account of assessee in foreign exchange is export realisation which constitutes profits derived from export business eligible for exemption u/s.10

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59.    (2009) 121 TTJ 751 (Ahd.) (TM)


ITO v. Banyan Chemicals Ltd.

A.Y. 2001-02. Dated 29-12-2008

S. 10B — Gain on account of foreign exchange rate
fluctuation qua export proceeds credited/deposited in EEFC account of
assessee in foreign exchange is export realisation which constitutes profits
derived from export business eligible for exemption u/s.10B.

The assessee-company was a 100% EOU. For the relevant
assessment year, the Assessing Officer excluded the amount of net foreign
exchange gain which it received on account of gain on foreign exchange on
conversion of receipts from export sales. The learned CIT(A), by following the
decisions in the cases of K. Uttamlal Exports Ltd. v. Dy. CIT, (2003)
133 Taxman 196 (Mumbai) (Mag.) and Mohindra Impex v. Asstt. CIT, (2002)
121 Taxman 326 (Del.) (Mag.), allowed the claim of exemption u/s. 10B of the
Act. Since there was a difference of opinion between the Members, the matter
was referred to the Third Member u/s.255(4).

The Third Member held in favour of the assessee partly. The
Tribunal noted as under :

(1) The receipt of the sale consideration was in US
dollars. It was credited/deposited in the EEFC account of the assessee to be
retained in US dollars as per guidelines for operating this account. In this
account, the receipts may be kept in foreign currency instead of converting
it to Indian rupees.

(2) The gain on account of exchange fluctuation is part
of the receipt of foreign currency of export sales made by an assessee. It
is a part of the receipt of sale proceeds converted into Indian rupees.
There is no exception in S. 10B like that in Expln.(baa) to S. 80HHC.

(3) The gain accounted for by the assessee is the excess
rupee value of US dollars on the date of realisation of sale proceeds
credited. Therefore, the exchange gain on the date of deposit in the EEFC
account has to be treated as sales realised in US dollars on that date. The
exchange gain is thus sales realisation of the billed amount in US dollar
and would be an income derived from the export of goods and articles.

 


However, in respect of gains arising at the time of
withdrawal of amount from the EEFC account by way of difference in exchange
rates between the date of deposit into the account and the date of withdrawal
from the EEFC account, the Third Member noted adversely as under :

(1) Such gain would not be part of sales as once the sale
consideration is deposited in EEFC account, the exchange gain accrued
thereafter would not be a part of the turnover and, consequently, not a
profit arising from the export of goods.

The Third Member relied on the decisions in the following
cases :

(a) Smt. Sujata Grover v. Asst. CIT, (2002) 74
(Mumbai) TTJ (Del.) 347

(b) Renaissance Jewellery (P) Ltd. v. ITO, (2006)
104 TTJ (Mumbai) 382/(2006) 101 ITD 380 (Mumbai)

(c) Shah Originals v. Asst. CIT, (2007) 112 TTJ
(Mumbai) 754

(d) Priyanka Gems v. Asst. CIT, (2005) 94 TTJ (Ahd.)
557



 

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S. 140C, S. 244A(2) — Where power of attorney has not been attached to the return of income filed by a non-resident Company, which has been processed u/s.143(1)(a) and also assessment made u/s.143(3) without power of attorney, grant of interest u/s.244A(2

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58.    2009 TIOL 483 ITAT (Del.)


China Trust Commercial Bank v. ADIT

(International Taxation)

A.Y. : 1998-99. Dated : 15-5-2009

S. 140C, S. 244A(2) — Where power of attorney has not been
attached to the return of income filed by a non-resident Company, which has
been processed u/s.143(1)(a) and also assessment made u/s.143(3) without power
of attorney, grant of interest u/s.244A(2) cannot be denied on the ground that
the delay is attributable to the assessee.

Facts :

The assessee, M/s. China Trust Commercial Bank incorporated
in Taiwan was engaged in the business of international banking services. The
assessee filed its return of income for A.Y. 1998-99 on 28-11-1998 declaring
taxable income of Rs.71,94,840. The return was processed u/s.143(1)(a) on
31-3-1999 and the assessment order u/s.143(3) was passed on 29-12-2000
accepting the income declared in the return of income. The Assessing Officer
issued a refund as claimed in the return of income, however, he did not grant
interest u/s.244A of the Act. The assessee filed an application u/s.154 of the
Act requesting the AO to rectify the mistake by granting interest u/s.244A.
The application u/s.154 of the Act was rejected on the ground that the
assessee had not filed valid power of attorney in due time, which was filed
only after the lapse of a long delay and, therefore, delay in issuing refund
was attributable to the assessee. He, therefore, denied granting interest
u/s.244A of the Act.

The CIT(A) held that the issue of declining interest
u/s.244A(2) to the assessee is well beyond the scope of proceedings u/s.154
being an issue on which two views are always possible. He upheld the order of
the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the
Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal noted that the power of attorney was filed on
30-9-2002. Non-grant of interest was because the power of attorney was not
filed alongwith the return. The refund became due on processing the return
u/s.143(1)(a) on 31-3-1999. The Tribunal noted the provisions of S. 140C of
the Act which mandate that in case of a non-resident company, the return of
income is to be signed and verified by a person who holds a valid power of
attorney and the power of attorney be attached to the return. The Tribunal
also noted that the return was processed without the power of attorney, the
assessment u/s. 143(3) was also made without the power of attorney. In the
circumstances, the Tribunal held that the refund due on such processing or on
making the assessment cannot be withheld because of the absence of such power
of attorney. The Tribunal held that if without the power of attorney the
return could be processed and assessment could be made, the refund could also
be prepared and made to the assessee. The Tribunal held that from a bare
reading of the Section it is evident that the delay is to be seen with
reference to the proceedings resulting in refund and the delay is attributable
in such proceedings, to the assessee. The proceedings which result in refund
are the processing of the return or making an assessment u/s.143(3) and since
these proceedings were completed long back even without the power of attorney,
the delay in filing the power of attorney was not the cause for delay in the
proceedings resulting in refund.

However, the Tribunal noted that the provisions of S.
244A(2) provide that where the question arises as to which period is to be
excluded, it shall be decided by the Chief Commissioner or the Commissioner
whose decision thereon shall be final. Since the AO had not referred the
matter for the decision of the Chief Commissioner or the Commissioner the
Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) and the AO and remitted the matter
back to the file of the AO to decide the issue of excluding the period for
granting interest to be decided by the Chief Commissioner or the Commissioner,
as the case may be, and follow his decision on that.

 

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S. 54 — Where assessee paid advance to a builder for purchase of a house, but due to inability to arrange funds, could not purchase the property and got the advance back, the conditions of purchase/construction within time specified in S. 54 are not satis

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57.    2009 TIOL 512 ITAT (Bang.)


Mrs. Shakuntala Devi v. DDIT (International
Taxation)

A.Y. : 2005-06. Dated : 23-6-2009

S. 54 — Where assessee paid advance to a builder for
purchase of a house, but due to inability to arrange funds, could not purchase
the property and got the advance back, the conditions of purchase/construction
within time specified in S. 54 are not satisfied. In such a case, exemption
can be denied only on expiry of time period of 3 years from date of transfer
of original asset.

Facts :

During the previous year relevant to assessment year
2005-06 the assessee sold two flats — one at Prithvi Apartments and another at
Embassy Diamante, Bangalore. Long-term capital gain arising on sale of these
two flats was worked out at Rs.46,51,537. The assessee advanced a sum of
Rs.98,69,970 to the builder towards the purchase of the flat at Embassy
Habitat. Accordingly, it claimed the sum of Rs.46,51,537 to be deductible
u/s.54 of the Act. In an order passed u/s.143(3) r.w.s. 147 of the Act, the
Assessing Officer stated that the assessee failed to furnish either the
registered sale deed or the purchase agreements to substantiate her claim both
for sale of two properties and also for purchase of the flat at Embassy
Habitat. He also noted that the statement of affairs as on 31-3-2006 did not
reflect the flat at Embassy Habitat as her asset. He held that the since the
title of the property was not transferred to the assessee the provisions of S.
54 were violated and accordingly, he denied the exemption claimed by the
assessee u/s.54 of the Act.

The CIT(A) confirmed the order of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the
Tribunal. On behalf of the assessee it was submitted that the assessee had
entered into an agreement for purchase of a house and had paid an advance, but
subsequent to the payment of advance the assessee could not raise the
necessary funds for purchase of the flat and therefore, the agreement entered
into by the assessee was terminated and cancelled and the assessee received
back the advance paid by her. It was also contended that it is premature to
decide upon denial of exemption. It was submitted that unutilised amount is to
be brought to tax in the assessment year relevant to the previous year in
which the period of three years from the time of transfer of original asset
ends. For this proposition reliance was placed on provisions of S. 54(2) of
the Act which provides for depositing the amount of gain into a Capital Gain
Account and utilisation therefrom within the prescribed time period. Upon
failure to utilise the amount deposited in Capital Gain Account for purchase
or construction within the prescribed time period, the unutilised amount is
charged to tax in the previous year relevant to the assessment year in which
the period of three years from the time of transfer of original asset (that
resulted in the capital gains arising in the first place) ends.

Held :

Since the transaction entered into by the assessee did not
culminate into purchase of residential house either one year before or two
years after the date of transfer nor a residential house was constructed
within a period of three years after the date of transfer, the CIT(A) was
justified in denying the claim of exemption u/s.54 of the Act.

As regards the alternative contention raised the Tribunal
restored the issue to AO with a direction to decide the same as per facts and
law, after providing due opportunity of hearing to the assessee.

 

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S. 28, S. 45 — Gain arising on transfer of land held by the assessee as its capital asset in lieu of 50% of the constructed areas to be constructed by the developer at his own cost without any construction activity to be carried on by the assessee is char

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56.    2009 TIOL 477 ITAT (Mum.)


ACIT v. Shree Dhootapapeshwar Ltd.

A.Ys. : 2001-02 and 2002-03.

Dated : 30-3-2009

S. 28, S. 45 — Gain arising on transfer of land held by the
assessee as its capital asset in lieu of 50% of the constructed areas to be
constructed by the developer at his own cost without any construction activity
to be carried on by the assessee is chargeable to tax as capital gains.

Facts :

The assessee company was engaged in the business of
manufacturing and trading in ayurvedic medicines. It was owner of land
acquired by it in 1936 on which it had constructed a factory for manufacturing
ayurvedic products. The land was held by it as a fixed asset and was
consistently shown as fixed asset in its accounts. The assessee had not
converted this land into its stock-in-trade. The development agreement entered
into by the assessee recorded that the assessee did not have the requisite
expertise and know-how to undertake the development of the said land. As per
the agreement, the assessee was to part with the land and in lieu thereof was
entitled to receive 50% of the constructed area without carrying out any task
of development. The assessee was not required to meet any of the expenses
towards construction of the buildings.

The AO noted that — (i) the agreement described the
assessee as the owner and the developer as the licensee; and (ii) under the
agreement the assessee was given absolute rights to sell all the residential
as well as commercial property developed and handed over by the developers at
whatever rate as per the prevalent market conditions. Considering these, the
AO charged the profit arising on transfer of land under the head ‘Income from
Business’.

The CIT(A) allowed the assessee’s appeal.

Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal noted that CIT(A) has observed that (a) the
constructed area was to be shared amongst the parties; (b) the parties were
free to deal with their respective areas in the manner they thought fit; (c)
this was not a case where the parties by virtue of the agreement have decided
to share the profit from the project; (d) the assessee was to receive 50% of
the constructed area, irrespective of the cost of development incurred by the
developer.

On facts and having noted the observations of the CIT(A),
the Tribunal held that the agreement could not be regarded as a joint venture
and the constructed area received by the assessee was consideration for
transfer of land. The Tribunal agreed with the conclusion of the CIT(A) and
noted that the conclusion of the CIT(A) is supported by the following judicial
decisions :

(a) CIT v. Smt. Radha Bai, (272 ITR 265) (Del.)

(b) CIT v. B. K. Bhaumik, (245 ITR 614) (Del.)

(c) CIT v. Mohakampur Ice and Cold Storage, (281
ITR 354) (All.)

The appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed.

 


levitra

S. 28, S. 45 and S. 56 — Amount of liquidated damages received by the assessee from the vendor of the property under an agreement for purchase of property constitutes a capital receipt not chargeable to tax.

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55.    2009 TIOL 511 ITAT (Bang.)


Mrs. Yogesh Aurora v. ITO

A.Y. : 2005-06. Dated : 9-4-2009

S. 28, S. 45 and S. 56 — Amount of liquidated
damages received by the assessee from the vendor of the property under an
agreement for purchase of property constitutes a capital receipt not
chargeable to tax.

Facts :

The assessee was working as a consultant with a
pharmaceutical company. She had entered into an agreement for purchase of
property for Rs.17,95,175 and paid an advance of Rs.10 lakhs. The agreement
for purchase inter alia provided that if the vendor fails to register a
sale deed within the period mentioned in the agreement in favour of the
assessee or her nominee he shall be liable to pay liquidated damages of Rs.5
lakhs. The vendor did not execute the sale deed. The assessee obtained legal
opinion and was advised that the only legal recourse available to her was to
accept liquidated damages. The assessee contended that the amount of
liquidated damages received by her constituted capital receipt not exigible to
tax.

The Assessing Officer (AO) charged this sum to
tax.

The CIT(A) was of the view that the property
sought to be purchased was huge considering the fact that the assessee was a
professional. He, therefore, held that the transaction was an adventure in the
nature of trade. However, since on the date of receipt of the amount the
adventure in the nature of trade had not come into full-fledged existence, he
held that the amount be charged to tax under the head ‘Income from Other
Sources’.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to
the Tribunal where it was contended that the compensation was received on
foregoing a right to acquire a capital asset and therefore, it is a capital
receipt. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of
Kettlewell Bullen and Co. Ltd. v. CIT, (53 ITR 261) and also in the
case of Oberoi Hotels Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT, (236 ITR 903).

Held :

The Tribunal noted that the Gujarat High Court in
the case of CIT v. Hiralal Manilal Mody, (131 ITR 421) and Calcutta
High Court in the case of CIT v. Ashoka Marketing Ltd., (164 ITR 664)
had considered similar issue. Following the ratio of the decisions of these
two Courts the Tribunal held the amount of liquidated damages to be capital
receipt. It also observed that because no cost can be attached to the right,
therefore, following the ratio of the decision of the Apex Court in the case
of CIT v. B. C. Srinivasa Shetty, (128 ITR 294) the amount cannot be
taxed as capital gain.

The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

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S. 142A r/w S. 143 — Reference to valuation cell u/s.142A can be made during the course of assessment and reassessment, and not for the purpose of initiating reassessment — Where Assessing Officer had not rejected books of accounts by pointing out any def

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54.    (2009) 118 ITD 382 (Luck.)


ITO v. Vijeta Educational Society

A.Ys. : 1998-99 to 2001-02 and 2003-04 to 2004-05

Dated : 28-9-2007

S. 142A r/w S. 143 — Reference to valuation cell u/s.142A
can be made during the course of assessment and reassessment, and not for the
purpose of initiating reassessment — Where Assessing Officer had not rejected
books of accounts by pointing out any defect, reference to DVO for valuation
of cost of construction of building incurred by the assessee was not valid,
and hence, the DVO’s report could not be utilised for framing
assessment/reassessment even though the same was obtained u/s.142A.

The assessee society was granted registration u/s. 12A. In
the course of assessment, the AO referred the valuation of building
constructed by the assessee to valuation cell. However the AO completed the
assessment without considering the report as the DVO’s report was not received
in time. Subsequently, the AO received the report from the DVO, wherein it was
shown that the assessee had made additional investment of Rs.46.87 lacs in the
building. On the basis of the said report, the AO initiated reassessment
proceedings, treating the differential amount as income from undisclosed
sources.

The CIT(A) held that even if the said addition was to be
added to the assessee’s income, the same would be exempt u/s.11, and deleted
the addition.

On second appeal by the department, it was held :

1. If the assessee has maintained proper books of
accounts and all details are mentioned in such books, which are duly
supported by vouchers, no defects are pointed out and the books are not
rejected, then the figures mentioned therein will have to be followed. The
valuation report has to be taken into consideration only when the books of
accounts are not reliable, in the opinion of the ITO.

2. Further, there cannot be any reference u/s.142A when
there is no process of assessment which is initiated after filing of return
of income, or issuance of notice u/s.142(1).

3. The process of reassessment can be initiated only
after issuance of notice u/s.148(1) after duly fulfilling the formalities
mentioned therein. It is clear that invoking S. 142A is a process after
re-opening of the assessment. The use of the word ‘require’ in S. 142A is
not superfluous but signifies a definite meaning, whereby some preliminary
formation of mind by the Assessing Officer is necessary which requires him
to make a reference to the DVO u/s.142A.

4. The provisions of S. 142A cannot be read in isolation
to S. 145. If books of accounts are found to be correct & complete in all
cases, no defect being pointed out therein, then addition made on account of
difference in cost of construction on the basis of DVO’s report is not
correct. Use of such a report obtained u/s.142A is not mandatory, but
discretionary.

Hence, the order of the CIT(A) was to be upheld, though on
different grounds.

 

levitra

Assessee was a mutual concern in the strict sense as all the members were travel agents in India, and convention receipts, membership and subscription fees and interest therefrom were exempt being in the nature of mutual receipts — Hence, having regard to

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53.    (2009) 118 ITD 285 (Mum.)


Travel Agents Association of India v. ACIT

A.Ys. : 1997-98, 1998-99, 2001-02

Dated : 10-2-2008

Assessee was a mutual concern in the strict sense as all
the members were travel agents in India, and convention receipts, membership
and subscription fees and interest therefrom were exempt being in the nature
of mutual receipts — Hence, having regard to the fact that once said receipts
were taken out of computation of excess of income over expenditure, such
receipts could not decide the character of activities carried out by the
assessee and in such circumstances, when assessee was held to be a mutual
concern, S. 115JA was not applicable to it.

The assessee was a company incorporated u/s.25 of the
Companies Act, to promote interests of travel agents in India. Distribution of
income or property was prohibited by the Memorandum of Association & Articles
of Association. The assessee contended that it conformed with the requirements
of a mutual association and hence income was exempt from taxation on the
grounds of mutuality. The assessing authority held that even if the assessee
was a company registered u/s.25, it was liable for assessment u/s.115JA. The
CIT(A) held that as the Profit & Loss A/c had been prepared in accordance with
Schedule VI, book profit was liable to be taxed u/s.115JA.

On appeal to the Tribunal it was held :

1. S. 115JA deals with companies earning normal business
profits. The assessee was earning ‘income’ and not profits. The expression
‘income’ was a little different from ‘profits’, and hence S. 25 of the
Companies Act provides that such company has to prepare ‘Income &
Expenditure Account’, instead of ‘Profit & Loss A/c’. Companies carrying on
activities of charitable purposes or mutual interest are registered u/s.25.

2. Where the mutual association like the assessee does
not carry on any business and almost entire income is derived from mutual
activities, it is exempt from tax. Only when such a company indulges in
activity of earning profits and distributing the same, it comes out of the
tax exemption.

3. It is possible that a mutual association may earn
income from services/facilities provided to non-members. If such activity is
the major activity, then the question of taxability would arise in a
substantial way, and the rule of mutuality would be questioned.

4. In the instant case, the assessee was a professional
association and there was no case of non-members being involved in the
affairs of the company. Therefore, the activities carried on by the assessee
company were meant only for the member travel agents and were mutual in
character. It was held that the assessee was a mutual concern, it did not
declare dividends, nor distribute its income. Therefore, it did not come
under the MAT regime.

Hence, the computation of income made for the relevant
assessment years u/s.115JA was to be set aside.

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Articles 5 & 7 of India-Korea DTAA —arrangement between the parties did not give rise to emergence of AOP — Income from offshore supply is not taxable in India — In calculating threshold for Supervisory PE, duration of each project to be considered separa

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Part C — Tribunal & International Tax Decisions



  1. Hyosung Corporation

Authority for Advance Ruling

224 CTR 329 (AAR)

Dated : 17-6-2009

Facts :

The applicant, a company incorporated in Korea, is engaged
in the business of setting up of power stations. The applicant successfully
bid for the contract awarded by Power Grid Corporation of India Ltd. (PGCIL)
for execution of works related to 800KV/400KV Tehri Pooling Station Package
associated with Koteshwar Transmission System (Project).

According to the terms and conditions of the bid and with
PGCIL’s approval, the applicant assigned a part of the contract related to
onshore supply/ services to Larsen & Toubro (L&T). The overall responsibility
for successful performance of the project continued to be on the applicant.
The applicant gave guarantee to PGCIL for successful completion of the project
and in turn, the applicant obtained a counter-guarantee from L&T for the part
assigned to L&T.

PGCIL entered into 3 separate contracts in the following
manner :


  • Contract no. 1
     : Offshore supply contract with the applicant for design,
    engineering, manufacture, testing at manufacturer’s works, Free-On-Board
    (FOB) dispatch, shipment, marine transportation and insurance and CIF supply
    of all offshore equipment and materials, including mandatory spares from
    countries outside India and testing and training to be conducted outside
    India.




  • Contract no. 2
     : Onshore supply contract with L&T for supply of certain
    equipment and materials in India.




  • Contract no. 3
     : Onshore service contract with L&T for inland
    transportation, insurance, storage, erection including associated civil
    works, testing and commissioning of all equipment and materials, including
    offshore equipments.



On the aspect of taxation of offshore supply, the applicant
argued that the title to the equipment and material was passed outside India
and the payment for offshore supply was also received in foreign currency
outside India. Therefore, no income accrued or arose to the applicant in India
in respect of the offshore supply contract.

The tax authorities argued that as the applicant had to
bear the overall responsibility of commissioning the project, the transfer of
property in goods and sale can be regarded completed in India. Accordingly,
part of the profits from supply of equipment was taxable in India.

In the background aforesaid, the following issues were
raised before the AAR :

  • Whether
    the applicant, along with L&T, can be said to constitute an AOP and,
    accordingly, be assessed as an AOP in relation to all the 3 components of
    the contract of the project.



  • Whether
    the consideration for offshore supply of equipment, materials, etc., is
    taxable in India under the provisions of the domestic law and the applicable
    Treaty between India-Korea (Treaty).




Ruling of AAR :

On the point of AOP emergence :

Based on the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) entered into
between the parties, the Tax Department contended that the arrangement between
the applicant and L&T constituted an AOP. For this, the Tax Department relied
on the recitals of the MOU which stated that the parties desired to co-operate
with each other for the purpose of submitting a single bid for the project and
in the event of the bid being accepted, the parties would be jointly and
severally responsible for execution of the contract. The Tax Department also
referred to other clauses dealing with joint and several responsibility,
possibility of applicant paying liquidated damages for the fault of L&T, etc.

The AAR held that on the facts of the case, the
relationship did not give rise to AOP. The AAR noted that separate contracts
were entered into by PGCIL with the applicant and L&T. The assignment of
onshore supply/services by the applicant was as permitted in the bid and there
was a separate contract directly between L&T with PGCIL. L&T had worked as an
independent contractor and was entitled to separately raise and realise the
bills for the work L&T carried out for PGCIL. The individual identity of each
party, in doing the part of the work entrusted to it was preserved despite the
co-ordination between them and the overall responsibility of the applicant.

The AAR concluded that :

(a) Mere collaborative effort and the overall
responsibility assumed by the applicant for the successful performance of
the project was not sufficient to constitute an AOP.

(b) The requirement for the applicant to provide
performance guarantees for all the 3 contracts was not in furtherance of a
joint venture or a common design to produce income, but it was a special
stipulation insisted by PGCIL in the overall interest of the project. The
requisite cohesion, unity of action and the common objective of sharing the
revenue or profit were lacking and hence there was no PE.

The facts in the case of Geoconsult (304 ITR 283), wherein
the parties had entered into an arrangement as a ’consortium’ which was held
by the AAR to meet the requisites of an AOP, was held distinguishable from the
facts in the present case.

Royalty income, where payment is subject to fulfilment of certain conditions, accrues only on fulfilment of conditions specified

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Part C —
International Tax Decisions




17 Guardian Industries Corporation v. ADIT
(2008) (Unreported)

S. 5, IT Act

A.Y. : 2002-2003. Dated : 31-3-2008

Issue :

Point of time for accrual of royalty income where payment is
subject to fulfilment of certain conditions.

Facts :

The assessee was an American company (‘USCo’). USCo had
entered into a technical licence agreement with an Indian company (‘IndCo’). In
terms of the agreement, IndCo was required to pay certain royalty to USCo for a
period of 8 years.

IndCo had obtained loans for its project from IDBI. Under the
loan agreement, IDBI had stipulated a condition that IndCo shall not pay royalty
to USCo till such time payments of instalments of principal, interest and any
other monies to IDBI were outstanding. USCo had also agreed to the said
condition.

IndCo defaulted in making payments to IDBI. Hence, it could
not pay any royalty to USCo between the periods 1st March 1993 to 31st March
1999. Thereafter, vide its letter dated 26th November 1999, IDBI allowed payment
of royalty for the period 1st April 1999 to 28th February 2001. Subsequently,
vide its letter dated 26th April 2001, IDBI gave its approval for payment of
past royalty (i.e., up to 31st March 1999). This was subject to two
conditions, namely, IndCo had adequate cash flows and it had no overdues to any
financial institutions or bank at the time of payment of each installment The
past royalty was permitted to be paid in 6 half-yearly installments during the
period 1st October 2001 to 1st April 2004.

On the basis that the royalty income had accrued at the time
when IDBI issued its letter of approval, the AO brought to tax the entire
royalty in the relevant previous year. In appeal, the CIT(A) confirmed the order
of the AO.

The Tribunal observed that notwithstanding that an assessee
was following mercantile or cash system of accounting, such income cannot be
brought to tax if the assessee does not have the right to receive such income
due to non-fulfilment of certain terms and conditions. The Tribunal referred to
AS-9 issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India, which mentions
that revenue is to be recognised only at the time when it would be reasonable to
expect the ultimate collection; and, revenue recognition needs to be postponed
if there is uncertainty as to ultimate collection. The Tribunal observed that
the right to receive income from IndCo arose to USCo as per IDBI’s letter of
26th April 2001 and therefore, applying the ratio of E D Sassoon & Company
Ltd. v. CIT,
(1954) 26 ITR 27 (SC), it held that only that portion of income
for which IndCo had complied with the terms and conditions of the said letter
can be said to have accrued.

Accordingly, only the instalments actually remitted during
the year upon fulfilment of attached conditions were held to be chargeable to
tax.

Held :

Notwithstanding the mercantile system of accounting followed
by USCo, the royalty income accrued in its favour only when both conditions
stipulated by IDBI were complied.

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(i) Outright sale of documentation pertaining to plant supplied does not constitute royalty, either u/s.9(1)(vi) or under Article 12. 572 (ii) Mere shareholding by foreign supplier of plant in purchaser Indian company does not result in business connect

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Part C —
International Tax Decisions



16 ADIT (IT) v. Zimmer AG

(2008) 22 SOT 297 (Kol.)

S. 9(1)(i), (vi), IT Act; Article 12,

India-Germany DTAA

A.Y. : 2001-2002. Dated : 19-12-2007

Issue :



(i) Outright sale of documentation pertaining to the
plant supplied does not constitute royalty, either u/s.9(1)(vi) or under
Article12.



(ii)
Mere shareholding by a foreign
supplier of plant in the purchaser Indian company does not result in business
connection.



Facts :

The assessee was a German company engaged in manufacture of
plant and machineries. It had entered into three separate agreements — Equipment
Supply Agreement, Engineering and Know-how Supply Agreement and Technical
Assistance Agreement — with an Indian company, which proposed to set up a plant
for manufacture of certain petrochemicals products. Under the Engineering and
Know-how Supply Agreement, the German company had undertaken to supply a fully
integrated plant. Under Engineering and Know-how Supply Agreement, the German
company agreed to sell engineering information, drawings and designs to Indian
company on outright basis. The transfer of ownership and title in the
documentation took place in Germany. The payment was also made by remittance to
Germany. Thereafter, the Indian company imported these in physical form into
India. These were required for installation and commissioning of the plant.

The Indian company’s contention was that: the import of the
documentation was similar to the import of plant; it was purchase on outright
basis of a capital asset on which depreciation was permissible and not a case of
mere right to use of engineering information and know-how; the technical
documentation formed integral part of the plant since in its absence, the Indian
company could not have set up, operated or maintained the plant; and as such the
consideration payable under the Engineering and Know-how Supply Agreement did
not constitute royalty and therefore it was not taxable either u/s. 9(1)(vi) of
the Income-tax Act or under Article 12 of the India-Germany DTAA.

The Department’s representative contended that under the
Engineering and Know-how Supply Agreement, the Indian company paid lump sum
consideration for transfer of technical know-how, design and secret process and
therefore, the payment was taxable in India (which was the country of source of
income) as royalty, not only u/s.9(1)(vi) of the Income-tax Act, but also under
Article 12(3) of the India-Germany DTAA. He also referred to the secrecy clause
in the said agreement which prohibited the Indian company from disclosing the
confidential information to any person and submitted that this made it apparent
that the German company had not sold these on outright basis, but allowed mere
use and hence, the payment was royalty u/s.9(1)(vi) of the Income-tax Act as
well as under Article 12(3) of the India-Germany DTAA. He, then, referred to the
order of the AO and argued that the German company was one of the promoters of
Indian company and therefore, there was a business connection between the German
company and the Indian company and hence, the income should be taxable
u/s.9(1)(i) itself. He also referred to the decisions in N. V. Philips’
Gloeilempenfabrieken v. CIT,
(1988) 172 ITR 541(Cal.) and N. V. Philips
v. CIT,
(1988) 172 ITR 521 (Cal.) to substantiate that even lump sum
payments were taxable in India as royalty.

The Tribunal referred to various relevant clauses of the
Engineering and Know-how Supply Agreement and found that : ownership, title and
risk in documentation was transferred in Germany; consideration was also paid
outside India; documentation was imported into India; the engineering supplied
by the German company was limited to designs of plant supplied by it; and supply
of engineering, drawings and designs was incidental to sale of plant which was
tailor-made to suit specific requirements of the Indian company. Considering
these factors, the Tribunal observed that supply of engineering, drawings and
designs was integral part of supply of plant and it could not be viewed in
isolation and therefore, the payment was not for acquiring mere right to use,
which would constitute royalty. The Tribunal found that even under Article 12(3)
of the India-Germany DTAA, it could not be considered as royalty. It then
referred to the decision in Scientific Engineering House P. Ltd. (1986) 157 ITR
86 (SC) wherein the Supreme Court had held that lump sum payment made to acquire
technical know-how to facilitate operations and process amounted to acquisition
of capital asset and technical drawings, designs, charts, processing data and
other literature fell within the definitions of ‘plant’. In light of that it
agreed with the German company’s contention that what was acquired was ‘plant’,
it was acquired outside India and therefore, the payment could not be taxed as
royalty in India. The Tribunal, thereafter, referred to and discussed the
following decisions and observed that these decisions squarely supported the
contention that the consideration received by the German company under the
Engineering and Know-how Supply Agreement was not in the nature of royalty,
either u/s.9(1)(vi) of Income-tax Act or under Article12 of India-Germany DTAA.

(a) DCIT v. Finolex Pipes Ltd., (2007) 106 TTJ 741 (Pune)

(b) Skoda Export Co. Ltd. v. DCIT, (2003) 81 TTJ 633
(Visakha.)

(c) ACIT v. King Taudevin & Gregson Ltd., (2002) 80
ITD 281 (Bang.)

(d) CIT v. Klayman Porcelains Ltd., (1998) 229 ITR
735 (AP)

(e) CIT v. Neyveli Lignite Corporation Ltd., (2000)
243 ITR 459 (Mad.)

(f) CIT v. Davy Ashmore India Ltd., (1991) 190 ITR
626 (Cal.)


Held :



(i) Where both the plant as well as the engineering documentation were delivered outside India, payments for them were made outside India, supply of plant alongwith documentation represented a composite supply and hence, the payment for documentation cannot be considered separately as royalty, either u/s.9(1)(vi) of the Income-tax Act or under Article 12 of the India-Germany DTAA.

(ii) Merely because the German company is one of the shareholders of Indian company, payments made by the Indian company to the German company for supply of plant cannot be brought to tax as income in India on the ground of existence of business connection of German Company in India.

(i) S. 44BB : Actual reimbursements cannot be considered as income for the purpose of S. 44BB. 571 (ii) Article 12(2) of DTAA : Interest on Income-tax refund is subject to Article 12(2) of DTAA and not under Article 12(5).

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Part C —
International Tax Decisions



15 ACIT v. Pride Foramer France Sas (2008) 116
TTJ 369 (Del.)

S. 44BB, IT Act; Article 12,

India-France DTAA

A.Y. : 2002-2003. Dated : 22-2-2008

Issue :



(i) Actual reimbursements cannot be considered as income
for the purpose of S. 44BB.



(ii)
Interest on income-tax refund is
subject to Article 12(2) of DTAA and not under Article 12(5).



Facts :

(i) The assessee was a French company operating in India in
oil drilling operations and related services under several contracts with ONGC.
Under one of the contracts, the assessee had charter-hired its drilling rig and
received gross fee for drilling operations and had offered the income for
taxation in accordance with S. 44BB of Income-tax Act. While working out the
receipts, the assessee had not taken into computation gross sum of Rs.34.73
lakhs, which was received by it from ONGC by way of reimbursements. Relying on
the Delhi Tribunal’s decision in Sedco Forex International Drilling Inc v.
Deputy CIT,
(2000) 67 TTJ 670 (Del.), the assessee claimed that
reimbursements of actual cost of supply should not be included for the purpose
of computing receipts in terms of S. 44BB of Income-tax Act. The AO observed
that the reimbursements were part of contractual receipts and hence were
includible while computing profit u/s.44BB of Income-tax Act.

The assessee’s contention was that the reimbursements were
wholly unrelated to the project. For instance, these pertained to loss of
equipment, use of satellite communication and supply of dry fruits. After
considering that the AO had found that there was no element of profit in
reimbursements, CIT(A) found that supply of material was obligation of ONGC and
assessee had merely provided these services to ONGC. Relying on the Delhi
Tribunal’s decision in Sedco forex International Inc (supra),
CIT(A) held that the reimbursed expenses were not taxable u/s.44BB.

The Tribunal noted that S. 44BB is a code in itself, which
excludes application of normal business income computation provisions and to
assess any income u/s.44BB, the activity should be the one described in S.
44BB(2). The reimbursements made by ONGC had nothing to do with activity of
prospecting for, or extraction, or production of, mineral oils. Also, the
reimbursements were based on actual expenditure and there was no element of
profit. Hence, reimbursements were rightly held to be excludible by CIT(A).

(ii) The assessee had received interest on income-tax refund.
The assessee claimed that such interest should be taxed at the rate applicable
in terms of Article 12(2) of India-France DTAA (which restricts the tax rate to
15%). According to AO, the interest should be considered in terms of Article
12(5) (which applies in case the recipient of interest carries on business
through a PE) read with Article 7 of DTAA, since interest had accrued to the
assessee through its PE in India. The assessee’s contention was that the
interest received by it was not in respect of debt which was effectively
connected with PE, which is one of the conditions under Article 12(5) and
therefore, Article 12(5) could not be applied. The AO, however, considered
interest as chargeable to tax under Article 12(5) at the rate of tax applicable
to a foreign company. In appeal, the CIT(A) upheld the order of the AO.

The Tribunal noted that similar issue was considered in
Application No P 17 of 1998, In re (1999) 236 ITR 637 (AAR) wherein the
AAR had held that such case was covered under Article 12(2) of DTAA. The
Tribunal observed that although the order of AAR would not have a binding force,
it would have persuasive value. Further, the tax authorities did not bring any
contrary decision to the effect that the interest should be considered under
Article 12(5) of DTAA to the notice of the Tribunal. The Tribunal also noted
that in the assessee’s own case in earlier year, the Tribunal had observed that
the assessee was not in the business of obtaining income-tax refunds and earning
interest thereon and therefore, the interest was neither derived from, nor
attributable to the business activity of the assessee. Considering both the
abovementioned reasons, the Tribunal held that the interest cannot be taxed
under Article 12(5) of DTAA.

Held :



(i) If reimbursements were based on actual expenditure, had
no element of profit and had no relation to activity described in S. 44BB(2),
provisions of S. 44BB cannot be applied.

(ii) Interest received on delayed issue of income-tax
refunds would be chargeable to tax under Article 12(2) of DTAA and not under
Article 12(5) even though the assessee had PE in India, since the interest was
neither derived from, nor attributable to the business activity of the
assessee.


levitra

S. 9(1)(ii) : Salary relatable to visits outside India in respect of expatriate deputed to India held taxable.

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New Page 1Part C —
International Tax Decisions



14 ACIT v.
Unger Booke David (2008)

(Unreported)

S. 9(1)(ii), IT Act

A.Y. : 2001-2002. Dated : 15-2-2008

Issue :

Taxability u/s.9(1)(ii) of salary relatable to visits outside
India in respect of expatriate deputed to India being R but NOR.

Facts :

The assessee was deputed to India as South East Asia Bureau
Chief of The Economist, UK for collection of news and views. He was having his
permanent base in India, controlling the operations from India and staying in
India with his family. During relevant year, the assessee visited Pakistan for 7
days, Sri Lanka for 14 days and the UK for 38 days, aggregating to a stay of 59
days outside India. Since his residential status during the relevant year was
resident but not ordinarily resident, he claimed that the remuneration received
for 59 days did not relate to services rendered to India and hence, it was not
taxable in India.

To examine the claim, the AO asked the assessee to furnish
copy of appointment/deputation letter, which the assessee did not furnish. Since
the assessee was responsible for South East Asian countries and the salary was
received because of his assignment in India, the AO held that the visits outside
India were incidental to the assignment in India and hence the salary for 59
days outside India was also taxable in India.

In appeal before CIT(A), the assessee furnished several
documents including the deputation letter and news stories/articles collected
from Pakistan, Sri Lanka, discussion with London editors on SEA Region
activities. After reviewing the documents, the CIT(A) held that the assessee’s
visits to Pakistan and Sri Lanka were for work done in those countries and hence
the remuneration relatable to stay in those countries was not taxable in India.
In respect of the assessee’s stay of 38 days in the UK at a stretch, the CIT(A)
held that entire period of 38 days cannot be considered as towards briefing
London editors about developments in SEA Region. The CIT(A) concluded that
period of 18 days could be considered for briefing and hence, remuneration
relatable to that period was not taxable in India but remuneration of balance
days was held taxable in India.

The Tribunal found that: the assessee was appointed as South
East Asia Bureau Chief for collection of news, views and information on various
aspects pertaining to that region; he was staying in India with his family; he
had no establishment in Pakistan and Sri Lanka; there was no material on record
to indicate that the terms of his appointment varied when he visited those
countries; and during visits to countries outside India he had not shifted his
family to those countries. The Tribunal observed that the assignment terms
contained provision for gathering news from neighbouring countries and
therefore, short visits to Pakistan and Sri Lanka for collection of news and to
London Head Quarters to brief the editors were also in connection with the
employment in India. The Tribunal, then, observed that the issue in question was
squarely covered by the decision in CIT v. Halliburton Offshore Services Inc,
(2004) 271 ITR 395 (Uttaranchal), wherein the Court had observed that S.
9(1)(ii) read with the Explanation provides for an artificial place of accrual
for income taxable under the head ‘Salaries’ and in such case, the place of
receipt or accrual of salary is immaterial. The Tribunal also referred to the
decision in the case of Hiromi Hirose in ITA No. 4506/Del./2003 for A.Y. 2003-04
and observed that the facts in that case were identical to those of the
assessee’s case.

Held :

Following the precedent in case of Hiromi Hirose, the
Tribunal held that the CIT(A) was not justified in treating that the salary
relatable to Pakistan, Sri Lanka and UK was for performance of duties outside
India and held that such salary was taxable in India.


Editorial Note : The abovementioned decision of the Delhi
Tribunal appears to be taking a position different than that taken by the Delhi
Tribunal in its two decisions in DCIT v. Mr. Erick Moroux C/o. Air France and
Others,
(BCAJ July 2008 Page 455) and DCIT v. Vivek Paul, [82 TTJ
(Del.) 699], wherein it had held that Salary income of an expatriate who partly
rendered services in India and partly outside India would not be chargeable to
tax in India in respect of proportionate period for which services are performed
outside India.


levitra

S. 195 would not apply to payments made to a resident holding power of attorney from non-residents.

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Chartered
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Part C : Tribunal & AAR International Tax Decisions

3. Rakesh Chauhan v. DDIT

(2010) 128 TTJ (Chd.) 116

S. 195, Income-tax Act

A.Y. : 2005-06. Dated : 27-11-2009

S. 195 would not apply to payments made to a
resident holding power of attorney from non-residents.

Facts :

Five individuals based in the UK owned land in
India as co-owners. The non-resident co-owners had issued a power of attorney in
respect of the land in favour of one PS who was a resident in terms of the
Income-tax Act. PS was vested with the rights to sell the land as well as
receive the payment. The appellant purchased the land and paid the consideration
to PS.

In his order, the AO noted that the appellant had
not furnished any explanation for non-deduction of tax from payment made to PS,
who acted as representative of non-residents. The AO also noted that the
appellant had not applied u/s.195(2) of the Income-tax Act and hence, relying on
the Supreme Court’s decision in Transmission Corporation of AP Ltd. v. CIT,
(1999) 239 ITR 587 (SC), he concluded that the appellant had made payment to
non-resident without deducting tax, which he was required to deduct u/s.195 of
the Income-tax Act. As the appellant had not so deducted the tax, he was an
assessee in default u/s.201 and u/s.201(1A) of the Income-tax Act. The AO, thus,
raised demand of tax and interest on the appellant. In appeal, the CIT(A)
concluded that as the sale deeds were executed by PS on behalf of non-residents,
and as PS was acting on behalf of non-residents, he received the money on their
behalf. Hence, the
payment was to be considered as payment to non-residents.

The Tribunal observed that though the payment was
made for purchase of land which belonged to non-residents, rights therein were
assigned unequivocally to PS. PS was not merely acting as an agent of the
non-residents to receive money, but as a person who had the right to alienate
the land by the virtue of rights vested in him by the power of attorneys signed
by the co-owners. The payment was not made to PS as a representative nominated
by non-residents. The Tribunal noted the decision of the Bombay High Court in
Narsee Nagsee & Co. v. CIT, (1959) 35 ITR 134 (Bom.) to the effect that if the
non-resident nominates a particular agent to whom
payment is to be made and pursuant to that direction, a taxpayer makes payment
to that nominee-agent, S. 195 would apply. However, the facts in case of the
appellant were materially different as the rights in the land were assigned to
PS and thus, PS was not merely acting as agent of non-residents to receive money
by virtue of rights vested in him by co-owners. The Tribunal further observed
that in Tecumesh Products (I) Ltd. v. DCIT, (2007) 13 SOT 489 (Hyd.), it was
held that when a payment is made to resident even on behalf of non-residents, S.
195 does not apply.

Held :

The Tribunal held that S. 195 would not apply when
the appellant made the payment to the power of attorney holder, but it would
apply when payment is made to non-residents. Hence, it will come into play only
when PS makes the payment to the actual owners of the land.

levitra

If India-specific accounts are furnished to the tax authorities, normative attribution of profits cannot be made.

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Part C : Tribunal & AAR International Tax Decisions

4. BBC Worldwide Ltd. v. DDIT, New
Delhi

(2010) TIOL 59 ITAT (Del.)

S. 92, Circular No. 742, Article 5 of India UK DTAA

A.Y. : 2000-01. Dated : 15-1-2010

If the commission paid to dependant agenfor
rendering agency services in India is on an arm’s-length basis, no further
attribution of profits is required in the hands of the assessee.

If India-specific accounts are furnished to the tax
authorities, normative attribution of profits cannot be made.



Facts :




The assessee, a British company, was operating
as an international consumer media company in the areas of television,
publishing, programme licensing, etc. The assessee had appointed BBC
Worldwide (India) Pvt. Ltd. (ICO), its indirect subsidiary, as its
authorised agent in India under the Airtime Sales Agreement (ASA) to market
and procure orders for the sale of airtime on its news channel.

ICO was paid marketing commission at 15% of the
advertisement revenue received by the assessee from Indian customers.

The assessee claimed that it did not attract
tax liability in India in the absence of permanent establishment (PE) in
India and in any case there was no tax attribution possible as its agent was
remunerated at fair price.

The Assessing Officer rejected the contention
of the assessee and estimated 20% of the advertisement revenue as income
attributable to Dependant Agent PE of the taxpayer in India.

The CIT(A) upheld the order of the Assessing
Officer, but reduced the estimated attributable profits to 10%, based on the
CBDT Circular 742, dated 2nd May 19961.

Before the ITAT, the assessee contended
that :

(a) It did not have a business connection or PE
in India.

(b) In any case ICO was remunerated on fair
transfer price. In support of this, reliance was placed on own transfer
pricing order of the ICO for the subsequent year. Reliance was also placed
by the assessee on the decisions in the case of Set Satellite Singapore Pte
Limited (2008 TIOL 414 HC Mum.) and Galileo International Inc, (2007 TIOL
447 ITAT DEL) to support that payment of commission exhausted charge of
taxation in respect of dependant agent PE.

(c) The assessee also placed reliance on the
CBDT Circular No. 23 of 1969, which states that if the commission paid fully
represents the value of profit attributable to the services, it would prima
facie extinguish the assessment of the foreign principal.

(d) The assessee also contended that since
audited accounts were filed indicating the allocation of revenue and
expenses of the Indian activity, the CBDT’s Circular No. 742, which was
relied on by the Department, was not applicable.



ITAT held :






(a) The ITAT proceeded on the basis that the
issue of PE or absence of business connection was not challenged before it.
Having admitted that, the ITAT confirmed that upon payment of arm’s-length
remuneration, the agent would extinguish the charge arising on account of
presence of dependant agent. For this purpose it relied on the following :

Set Satellite Singapore Pte Limited (2008
TIOL 414 HC Mum.);

Galileo International Inc, (2007 TIOL 447 ITAT
DEL); and

Circular No. 23 of 1969




(b) The CBDT Circular permitting normative taxation @ 10% of
receipts net of commission is not applicable to the facts of the case as the
applicant made available India-specific accounts to the tax officer which
revealed that the taxpayer had incurred loss in the Indian segment.

levitra

On facts, where technical knowledge, etc. was ‘made available’, fees paid held taxable in terms of Article 13(4)(c) of India-UK DTAA.

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Part C : Tribunal & AAR International Tax Decisions


 

1. TVS Motor Co. Ltd. v. ITO

(2010) 35 SOT 230 (Chennai)

Articles 7, 13, India-UK DTAA

A.Ys. : 2001-02 and 2002-03

Dated : 18-9-2009

On facts, where technical knowledge, etc. was ‘made
available’, fees paid held taxable in terms of Article 13(4)(c) of India-UK DTAA.

Facts :

The appellant is an Indian company manufacturing
motorcycles. The appellant engaged a UK company (UK Co) for two projects.

Under first project, UK Co was to :



à
fully document and make available future design solutions to the appellant;

à encourage
active participation of engineers of the appellant and share relevant
information with them; and

à provide
specific training to engineers of the appellant in test techniques and
procedures.


Under the second project, UK Co was to carry out
appraisal of motorcycles manufactured by the appellant. UK Co had extensive
experience of product development, including use of experimental and analytical
techniques, to improve the dynamic behavior (ride, handling, vibration, etc.) of
vehicle system.

The appellant filed returns of income for UK Co as
a representative assessee and claimed that the fees for technical services
received by UK Co were exempt particularly in terms of provisions of India- UK
treaty. The AO rejected the claim and concluded that the income was taxable in
India. On appeal, the CIT(A) confirmed the AO’s order.

Before the Tribunal, the appellant contended that :



à UK Co did not
provide any technical know-how, plan or design;

à UK Co was in
business of testing vehicles and it did not have PE in India;

à the appellant
had sent the prototype machines to UK Co in UK;

à UK Co merely
carried out the tests and no technical knowledge, experience, skill,
know-how or processes were ‘made available’ (in terms of Article 13(4)(c) of
India-UK DTAA) by UK Co to the appellant;

à no ‘development
and transfer of a technical plan or design’ had occurred;

à the payments
were towards business income covered by Article 7 and not royalties or fees
for included services in terms of Article 13; and

à
in terms of Article 7, business profits cannot be taxed in India, if UK Co
does not have PE in India as the entire services were rendered only in UK.


The tax authorities contended that from perusal of
the contract between the appellant and UK Co, particularly ‘Objectives’ and
‘Project Scope and Technical Content’, UK Co had ‘made available’ technical
knowledge, experience, skill, know-how or processes to the appellant and hence,
the payments were covered by Article 13(4)(c) of India-UK DTAA.

As regards the first project, the Tribunal referred
to ‘Objectives’ and ‘Project Scope and Technical Content’ and observed that UK
Co was to provide training in test techniques and procedures to the appellant’s
staff. UK Co was also to undertake data collection, measurement of dynamic
properties of machineries and to fully document and make available the model to
enable the appellant to investigate future design solutions.

As regards the second project, the Tribunal
observed that UK Co was merely to provide an independent pre-launch evaluation
of the motorcycle.

Held :

On facts, the Tribunal held that in respect of the
first project where UK Co ‘made available’ technical knowledge, experience,
skill, know-how and processes, the payments were fees for technical services
within the meaning of Article 13(4)(c) and were taxable accordingly. As regards
the second project where UK Co merely provided pre-launch independent evaluation
of the motorcycle, no technical knowledge, experience, skill, know-how or
processes was ‘made available’ and hence, it was not taxable.


levitra

Payments made to American company for supply of personnel are not ‘fees for included services’ under Article 12(4)(b) of India-USA DTAA.

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Chartered
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Part C : Tribunal & AAR International Tax Decisions


2. ACIT v. IIC Systems (P) Ltd.

(2010) 127 TTJ 435 (Hyderabad)

S. 9(1)(vii), S. 90, S. 195 & S. 201(1)

Income-tax Act; Article 12(4),

India-USA DTAA

A.Ys. : 2005-06 and 2006-07. Dated : 9-10-2009

Payments made to American company for supply of
personnel are not ‘fees for included services’ under Article 12(4)(b) of
India-USA DTAA.

Facts :

The appellant is an Indian company. It is
subsidiary of an American company. The appellant entered into a contract with
another Indian company (which was an affiliate of IBM) in Bangalore for
providing software personnel by the appellant for global (including the USA)
projects of IBM. The appellant, in turn, entered into contract with another US
company by name ACSC. In terms of the contract between the appellant and ACSC,
ACSC was to supply software personnel in the USA for projects of IBM (which were
awarded to the appellant) in the USA. Thus, whenever IBM Bangalore required
personnel for a project in the USA, it instructed the appellant. The appellant,
in turn, would instruct ACSC and procure the personnel from ACSC and would
deploy them for IBM projects in the USA. ACSC raised invoice on the appellant on
monthly basis and the appellant, in turn, raised its invoice on IBM. The
appellant remitted the payments to ACSC in US $, but had not deducted tax at
source on the same.

The AO was of the view that (i) the payments made
by the appellant to ACSC were for supply of software professionals for executing
on site work in the USA in connection with the appellant’s contract with IBM
Bangalore; (ii) they were ‘fees for technical services’ and chargeable in terms
of S. 9(1)(vii)(b) of the Income-tax Act; and (iii) as the appellant had not
deducted the tax on such payments, the appellant should be treated as an
‘assessee in default’. While admitting that the recipient (namely, ACSC) is
entitled to be taxed either under the Income-tax Act or the India-USA DTAA,
whichever is beneficial, the AO did not accept the appellant’s contention that
the payment made by it was not covered under Article 12(4)(a) or (b) of the
India-USA DTAA. Finally, the AO concluded that the payments made by the
appellant to ACSC were covered u/s.9(1)(vii)(b) of the Income-tax Act as well as
under Article 12(4)(b) of the India-USA DTAA and accordingly, the appellant was
required to deduct u/s.195 of the Income-tax Act. As the appellant had not so
deducted the tax, he was an assessee in default u/s.201 and u/s.201(1A) of the
Income-tax Act. The AO, thus, raised demand of tax on the appellant.

In appeal, the CIT(A) annulled the order of the AO
and deleted the demand.

The Tribunal observed that the questions were:
firstly, whether the payments were towards ‘fees for technical services’ or
merely for supply of personnel; secondly, whether the payments could be
considered ‘fees for included services’; and thirdly, whether the payments would
be ‘business profits’ in the hands of ACSC. Also, under the India-USA DTAA,
non-technical consultancy services cannot be treated as ‘fees for included
services’.

The Tribunal noted that what was ordered was
certain amount of manpower at a specified unit price per hour and no detail as
to the work to be done was stipulated by the appellant, which showed that the
payments were made only for supply of manpower. It observed that the India-USA
DTAA also clarified that provision of technical input by the person providing
the services does not per se mean that technical knowledge or skill is ‘made
available’. Similarly, use of the product embodying the technology also does not
per se mean that the technology is ‘made available’. Even if there is a transfer
of developed work, software, etc. it is not ACSC, but the appellant who
transfers the same. Also, neither the appellant nor ACSC appear to be engaged in
computer programming and the developed work never belonged to the appellant or
ACSC.

Held :

Since no technology, skill, experience, technical
plan, design, etc. was made available either by the appellant or by ACSC,
provisions of Article 12(4)(b) could not be invoked.

Even if payments were to constitute ‘fees for
technical services’ u/s.9(1)(vii), in view of S. 90(2) the appellant has option
to be governed by the provisions of the DTAA.


levitra

Proportionate cost of technical personnel working at HO for PE in India does not trigger disallowance in terms of S. 44C of the Act.

 4 DCIT v. M/s. Stock Engineer & Contractors BV

(2009 TIOL 30 ITAT Mum.)

S. 40(a)(i), S. 44C. Article 5(2)(i) of India-Malaysia Double Tax Avoidance Agreement, Article 5(2)(j) and 5(2)(k) of India-UK Double Tax Avoidance  A.Y. : 2000-01. Dated : 5-12-2008

Issues :

India-Malaysia Treaty

  •     Manning services provided by a Malaysian company are not taxable in India.

  •     Proportionate cost of technical personnel working at HO for PE in India does not trigger disallowance in terms of S. 44C of the Act.

India-UK Treaty

1. There is no tax implication for supervisory activity in India if the duration of such activity is less than the threshold of Supervisory PE — though the duration of such activity exceeded Service PE threshold of the treaty.

Issue 1 :

Manning services provided by a Malaysian company are not taxable in India :

Facts :

The assessee, a tax resident of Netherlands, is engaged in design and construction of oil and gas products, oil refining, chemicals and petro-chemicals. The assessee was awarded a contract in India by Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (‘IOCL’) for engineering, procurement and construction of the Sulphur Block for the Haldia Refinery Project on turnkey basis. For the purpose of executing the contract, the assessee set up a project office in Mumbai and a site office in Haldia.

The assessee awarded a sub-contract in favour of its subsidiary company, namely, Stock Comprimo (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd. (hereinafter called as ‘Malaysian company’). Under the agreement the Malaysian company was required to supply personnel to the assessee company for the purpose of execution of its project at Haldia.

The assessee did not deduct tax at source in respect of the payment to Malaysian company. Relying on AAR ruling in the case of Tekniskil (1996) 222 ITR 551, it was argued that the Malaysian company supplied the personnel; that, personnel supplied by the Malaysian company to the assessee were working under the direction, supervision and control of the assessee and, therefore, it could not be said that services were rendered by the Malaysian company in India.

The Assessing Officer (AO), however, held that :

(a) Malaysian company deputed its own technical personnel;

     
(b) the deputed personnel continued to be Malaysian company’s employees;

     
(c) through the employees, Malaysian company rendered project supervisory services in India;

     

(d) Since duration of such services exceeded 6 months threshold of Construction PE, Malaysian company was liable to tax in India. Since the assessee failed to deduct tax at source with regard to payment made, the same was disallowable in computation of PE income in terms of S. 40(a)(i) of the Act. The CIT(A) accepted the assessee’s contention that :

     

(a) Malaysian company merely rendered services of supplying the personnel;

     
(b) since India-Malaysia treaty does not have FTS article, such amount is not taxable in India in absence of PE or presence of Malaysian company in India.

Held :

1. The ITAT noted that the following features of the service agreement between Malaysian company and the assessee supported that the role of Malaysian company was limited to supply of personnel and the Malaysian company did not have responsibility of performing supervisory activities in India.

(a) Malaysian company was engaged in the business of supplying skilled and unskilled personnel. In order to execute the contract, the assessee sought personnel from Malaysian company.

(b) Malaysian entity had no role to play after the personnel were supplied. It was not involved in carrying out supervision over the personnel supplied.

     
(c) The assessee was responsible for imparting/conducting training to the personnel and to equip them to carry out the desired work.

     
(d) Personnel performed and worked under the directions and control of the assessee.

Manning services provided by a Malaysian company are not taxable in India.

 4 DCIT v. M/s. Stock Engineer & Contractors BV

(2009 TIOL 30 ITAT Mum.)

S. 40(a)(i), S. 44C. Article 5(2)(i) of India-Malaysia Double Tax Avoidance Agreement, Article 5(2)(j) and 5(2)(k) of India-UK Double Tax Avoidance  A.Y. : 2000-01. Dated : 5-12-2008

Issues :

India-Malaysia Treaty

    Manning services provided by a Malaysian company are not taxable in India.

    Proportionate cost of technical personnel working at HO for PE in India does not trigger disallowance in terms of S. 44C of the Act.

India-UK Treaty

1. There is no tax implication for supervisory activity in India if the duration of such activity is less than the threshold of Supervisory PE — though the duration of such activity exceeded Service PE threshold of the treaty.

Issue 1 :

Manning services provided by a Malaysian company are not taxable in India :

Facts :

The assessee, a tax resident of Netherlands, is engaged in design and construction of oil and gas products, oil refining, chemicals and petro-chemicals. The assessee was awarded a contract in India by Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (‘IOCL’) for engineering, procurement and construction of the Sulphur Block for the Haldia Refinery Project on turnkey basis. For the purpose of executing the contract, the assessee set up a project office in Mumbai and a site office in Haldia.

The assessee awarded a sub-contract in favour of its subsidiary company, namely, Stock Comprimo (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd. (hereinafter called as ‘Malaysian company’). Under the agreement the Malaysian company was required to supply personnel to the assessee company for the purpose of execution of its project at Haldia.

The assessee did not deduct tax at source in respect of the payment to Malaysian company. Relying on AAR ruling in the case of Tekniskil (1996) 222 ITR 551, it was argued that the Malaysian company supplied the personnel; that, personnel supplied by the Malaysian company to the assessee were working under the direction, supervision and control of the assessee and, therefore, it could not be said that services were rendered by the Malaysian company in India.

The Assessing Officer (AO), however, held that :

(a) Malaysian company deputed its own technical personnel;

     
(b) the deputed personnel continued to be Malaysian company’s employees;

     
(c) through the employees, Malaysian company rendered project supervisory services in India;

     

(d) Since duration of such services exceeded 6 months threshold of Construction PE, Malaysian company was liable to tax in India. Since the assessee failed to deduct tax at source with regard to payment made, the same was disallowable in computation of PE income in terms of S. 40(a)(i) of the Act. The CIT(A) accepted the assessee’s contention that :

     

(a) Malaysian company merely rendered services of supplying the personnel;

     
(b) since India-Malaysia treaty does not have FTS article, such amount is not taxable in India in absence of PE or presence of Malaysian company in India.

Held :

1. The ITAT noted that the following features of the service agreement between Malaysian company and the assessee supported that the role of Malaysian company was limited to supply of personnel and the Malaysian company did not have responsibility of performing supervisory activities in India.

(a) Malaysian company was engaged in the business of supplying skilled and unskilled person-nel. In order to execute the contract, the assessee sought personnel from Malaysian company.

(b) Malaysian entity had no role to play after the personnel were supplied. It was not involved in carrying out supervision over the personnel supplied.

     
(c) The assessee was responsible for imparting/conducting training to the personnel and to equip them to carry out the desired work.

     
(d) Personnel performed and worked under the directions and control of the assessee.

Services rendered outside India by R but NOR are not taxable in India if the taxpayer can substantiate that presence outside India does not relate to his employment in India.

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3 ACIT v. Shri Ellis ‘D’ Rozario (2009 TIOL 138 ITAT Del.) Section/Article : S. 5

A.Y. : 2001-02. Dated : 5-12-2008

Issue :

Services rendered outside India by R but NOR are not taxable in India if the taxpayer can substantiate that presence outside India does not relate to his employment in India.

Facts :

The assessee, an Australian National, was Resident but Not Ordinarily Resident (R but NOR). The assessee was employed by a UAE Company and was posted to India as a regional manager of the Indian sub-continent. The UAE company was in the process of establishing a liaison office for collection of information from India. For the year under reference, the assessee was in India for 224 days, while he was outside India for 51 days. The assessee claimed that proportionate salary for 51 days pertaining to the period for which he was outside India was not taxable in India, as (i) his residential status was that of R but NOR; and (ii) the visits outside India were on assignments totally unrelated to Indian assignment.

The CIT(A) accepted the claim of the assessee.

Before the Tribunal, the Department claimed that the visits outside India were in connection with assessee’s employment in India and hence the entirety of salary was chargeable to tax in India. The Tax Department also claimed that as per the assessee’s own admission, he had undertaken debriefing of his Indian activities during one of his visits abroad.

The assessee relied on the following decisions to claim that having regard to his status of R but NOR, salary pertaining to the period of stay outside India is not chargeable to tax in India :

  • W/A Kielmann (ITR No. 4/1979) dated 9-8-1984 (Delhi HC)



  • J Callo and Others (ITA No. 5921-5929/Del/86) dated 2-8-1989 (Delhi)


The assessee also relied on the decision of the Delhi Tribunal in the case of Eric Marou (ITA No. 1174/ Del./2005), dated 15-2-2008 to support the proposition that no inference can be drawn as to ‘while being outside India the employee rendered services in respect of their operations in India’ and that the period of employment outside India should not be considered as services rendered in India.

Held :

The Tribunal observed :

    (1) The decisions relied on by the assessee involved cases where the employment contract specifically required of the assessee to work outside India for a particular period of time. As against that, in the case of the assessee, the employment contract required the assessee to be based in India and undertake overseas travel in connection with his employment in India. According to the Tribunal, as compared to other cases, the period for which the assessee was liable to work outside India was not specified in the agreement.

(2) The facts on record showed that while being outside India, the assessee held debriefing meeting about his Indian activities. Thus, even while being outside India, certain activities relating to the Indian activities were undertaken. The Tribunal held that such part of the salary was taxable as the income can be regarded as arising in India.

    (3) The Tribunal set aside the matter with a direction that to the extent the assessee can substantiate with evidence, that while being outside India the assessee did not do any activity in relation to India-specific employment, the amount of such salary would be excluded from the scope of total income.

S. 48 — When interest-bearing borrowed funds are utilised for making an application for allotment of shares and the number of shares allotted is less than the number of shares applied for, the entire interest (including interest on funds borrowed for shar

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New Page 1Part B : UNREPORTED DECISIONS

(Full texts of the following Tribunal decisions are
available at the Society’s office on written request. For members desiring that
the Society mails a copy to them, Rs.30 per decision will be charged for
photocopying and postage.)



10 Smt. Neera Jain v. ACIT
ITAT ‘B’ Bench, Mumbai
Before R. S. Syal (AM) and R. S. Padvekar (JM)
ITA No. 1861/Mum./2009

A.Y. : 2005-06. Decided on : 22-2-2010

Counsel for assessee/revenue : Dharmesh Shah/S. S. Rana and
Peeyush Jain

S. 48 — When interest-bearing borrowed funds are utilised for
making an application for allotment of shares and the number of shares allotted
is less than the number of shares applied for, the entire interest (including
interest on funds borrowed for shares applied for but not allotted) is to be
treated as cost of acquisition of shares allotted.

Per R. S. Padvekar :

Facts :

The assessee applied for 1,26,000 shares of Punjab National
Bank. For this purpose she borrowed Rs.4 crores @ 15% p.a. for 15 days and paid
interest of Rs.2,63,015. She was allotted 4,635 shares. The entire amount of
interest of Rs.2,63,015 was capitalised as cost of shares allotted. Similarly,
the assessee applied for 8,76,000 shares of NTPC Ltd. For this purpose she
borrowed Rs.4.88 crores @ 17% p.a. for 17 days and paid interest of Rs.3,87,317.
She was allotted 73,403 shares. The entire amount of interest of Rs.3,87,317 was
capitalised as cost of shares allotted.

The assessee sold the shares allotted. While computing
capital gains on sale of shares allotted the entire amount of interest
capitalised was regarded as cost of acquisition and claimed as deduction.

The Assessing Officer (AO) disallowed the entire interest of
Rs.6,50,330 (Rs.2,63,015 + Rs.3,87,317).

The CIT(A) allowed the claim of deduction for interest to the
extent of borrowed amount utilised for the purpose of payments of shares
allotted by Punjab National Bank and NTPC. The assessee preferred an appeal to
the Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal noted that there was no dispute that the entire
loan was borrowed for the purpose of acquiring the shares of Punjab National
Bank and NTPC and also that immediately after allotment of shares, money
refunded by both the companies was refunded to the financiers. The Tribunal held
that the fact that applied shares were not allotted in full will not deprive the
assessee from claiming the entire interest paid as part of the cost of
acquisition of the shares allotted, as money borrowed has direct nexus with
acquisition of shares. The Tribunal directed the AO to treat the interest paid
by the assessee to both the financiers as part of cost of acquisition of shares
and allow the same as a deduction.

This appeal of the assessee was allowed.


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Section 14A and its Applicability to Cases of Stock-in-trade

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1. Issue for Consideration

One of the major controversies, revolving around disallowance u/s. 14A, that has remained unresolved, is about the possibility of disallowance of an expenditure in the hands of a dealer in shares and securities, who holds such shares and securities as stock-in-trade. With the passage of time and examination of the issue by the courts, the issue has become more and more controversial.

Section 14A provides that no deduction shall be allowed in respect of an expenditure, incurred by the assessee, in relation to an income which does not form part of the total income.

A dealer in shares and securities is a person who ordinarily receives income from transfer of shares i.e., taxable under the head ‘Profits and gains of business or profession’. In addition, he receives income from dividend i.e., exempt from taxation as it does not form part of the total income under the Act. The expenditure incurred by such a person for carrying on the business of dealing in shares and securities, like any other business, is of varied nature that comprises of interest on borrowed funds to administration expenses and also depreciation.

The questions that arise for consideration in the case of a dealer in shares are – Whether any part of his expenditure could be said to have been incurred in relation to earning an exempt income? Can such an expenditure be treated as incurred in relation to earning the dividend income that is not taxable? Can a part of the expenditure at least be considered as related to earning an exempt income and therefore be disallowed? Can one apply the provision of Rule 8D for giving effect to the legislative intent expressed in section 14A? Can one contend that no expenditure is incurred at all for the purposes of earning dividend?

The Special Bench of the ITAT in the case of Daga Capital & Investment, 117ITD129 (SB)(Mum.) had held that the provisions of section 14A applied to the case of a person who was a dealer in shares. The ratio of the said decision to the extent relevant here is recently approved by a decision of the Delhi High Court, reported recently. The said decision of the court is in conflict with the decisions of the Karnataka and the Kerala High Courts. The appellate tribunals in the meanwhile have taken conflicting stands on the subject, throwing the issue wide open.

2. Maxopp Investment’s Decisions

The issue came for consideration in the case of Maxopp Investment Ltd. vs. CIT before the Delhi High Court reported in 347 ITR 272. The assessment years under consideration were A.Y. 1998-99 to A.Y. 2005-06. In the said case,the assessee company was engaged in the business of dealing in shares and securities. It held part of the shares as trading assets for the purpose of acquiring and retaining control over its group companies and the profit from sale of such shares, held as trading assets, was offered to tax as the business income. An amount of Rs. 1.61 crore was claimed as business expenditure u/s. 36(1)(iii), being interest paid on the funds borrowed from investment in shares held as trading assets. The company had a profit on sale of shares of Rs. 1,49,285/- and had received a dividend of Rs. 49,90,860/-.

The A.O. held that the interest claimed by the company was disallowable u/s. 14A. However, he restricted the disallowance to the amount of dividend. The CIT(A) and the ITAT following the Special Bench’s decision in the Daga Capital’s case (supra) upheld the action of the A.O.

In an appeal by the assesseee company to the High Court, on behalf of the company, an emphasis was laid on the expressions “incurred” and “in relation to” for contending that the word “incurred” must be taken literally in the sense that the expenditure must have actually taken place and that the expenditure must also have taken place in relation to income which did not form part of the total income. It was contended that the expression “in relation to” implied that there must be a direct and proximate connection with the subject matter and only that actual expenditure which was made directly and for the object of earning exempt income, i.e., the dividend income could be disallowed u/s. 14A. It was submitted that if the dominant and main objective of spending was not the earning of ‘exempt’ income, then the expenditure could not be disallowed u/s. 14A, provided it was otherwise allowable u/s. 15 to 59 of the said Act. It was also emphasised that the expenditure must be actual and could not be computed on the basis of some formula as stipulated under Rule 8D read with s/s. (2) & (3) of section 14A.

The Delhi High Court did not agree with the submissions of the assessee company that a narrow meaning ought to be ascribed to the expression “in relation to” appearing in section 14A as the context did not suggest that a narrow meaning ought to be given to the said expression. The court observed that the provision was inserted by virtue of the Finance Act, 2001 with retrospective effect from 1-4-1962 confirming the intention of the Parliament that it should appear in the statute book, from its inception that expenditure incurred in connection with income which did not form part of total income ought not to be allowed as a deduction; the factum of making the said provision retrospective made it clear that the Parliament wanted that it should be understood by all that from the very beginning, such expenditure was not allowable as a deduction; the Supreme Court in CIT vs. Walfort Share and Stock Brokers P Ltd: 326 ITR 1 (SC), held that the basic principle of taxation was to tax the net income, i.e., gross income minus the expenditure and on the same analogy the exemption was also in respect of net income; in other words, where the gross income would not form part of total income, it’s associated or related expenditure would also not be permitted to be debited against other taxable income.

The court noted that accepting the submission made on behalf of the assessees, then s/s. (1) would have to be read as follows:-“For the purposes of computing the total income under this Chapter, no deduction shall be allowed in respect of expenditure incurred by the assessee with the main object of earning income which does not form part of the total income under this Act.” It observed that such rereading was certainly not the purport of the said provision; the expression “in relation to”did not have any embedded object and simply meant “in connection with” or “pertaining to”; if the expenditure in question had a relation or connection with or pertained to the exempt income, it could not be allowed as a deduction even if it otherwise qualified under the other provisions of the said Act; in Walfort (supra), the Supreme Court made it very clear that the permissible deductions enumerated in sections 15 to 59 were now to be allowed only with reference to income which was brought under one of the heads of income and was chargeable to tax and that if an income like dividend income was not part of the total income, the expenditure/deduction related to such income, though of the nature specified in sections 15 to 59, could not be allowed against other income which was includible in the total income for the purpose of chargeability to tax.

In deciding that the provisions of section 14A applied in the case of receipt of dividend by a dealer in shares, against the asseessee, the Delhi High Court took note of the law prevailing before insertion of section 14A in the Act with retrospective effect, as was explained by the Supreme Court in the cases of CIT vs. Maharashtra Sugar Mills Ltd: 82 ITR 452 (SC) and Rajasthan State Warehousing Corporation vs. CIT: 242 ITR 450 (SC). The court also took note of the Memorandum explaining the provisions of section 14A and also extensively relied upon the decision of the Supreme court, delivered after introduction of section 14A, in the case of Walfort (supra) where the apex court stated that the insertion of section 14A with retrospective effect, reflected the serious attempt on the part of Parliament not to allow deduction in respect of any expenditure incurred by the assessee in relation to income, which did not form part of the total income against the taxable income. The High Court observed that the apex court in that case, clearly held that in the case of an income like dividend income which did not form part of the total income, any expenditure/deduction relatable to such (exempt or non-taxable) income, even if it was of the nature specified in sections 15 to 59 of the said Act, could not be allowed against any other income which was includible in the total income.

3.    CCI Ltd’s Case

The issue recently came up for consideration of the Karnataka High Court in the case of CCI Ltd vs. JCIT reported in 250 CTR 291. In that case, the assessee company, a dealer in shares & securities, had acquired 93% of shares of Kurl-on Ltd., by availing an interest free loan with the help of a broker who had been paid an amount of Rs.28,00,000/- as brokerage. The assessee company had received a dividend of Rs.46,67,190/- which dividend was exempt from taxation. The assessee company had claimed the brokerage of Rs.28,00,000/- as deduction in computing the business income from dealing in shares & securities. The A.O. in assessing the total income of Assessment year 2007-08 treated the said brokerage expenditure as directly attributable to earning the dividend income and disallowed the same besides disallowing a part of the other business expenditure. The CIT (Appeals) confirmed the said order of the A.O. and the tribunal upheld the action of the A.O in part by directing him to prorate the said expenses over the dividend and the business income.

In an appeal to the Karnataka High Court, the assessee company raised the following question of law:“Whether the provisions of section 14A of the Act are applicable to the expenses incurred by the assessee in the course of its business merely because the assessee is also having dividend income when there was no material brought to show that the assessee had incurred expenditure for earning dividend income which is exempted from taxation?”

The assessee company contended before the High Court that the assessee had incurred an expenditure for purchasing shares and a part of such shares so purchased were sold and the income derived therefrom was offered to tax as business income and the remaining unsold shares yielded dividend; that the assessee had not incurred any expenditure to earn the said dividend income and therefore, no expenditure could be attributed to the said dividend income and the said expenditure could not be disallowed and the assessee was entitled to the benefit of deduction of the entire expenditure incurred in respect of purchase of shares.

On behalf of the Revenue,it was pointed out to the court that when shares retained by the assessee had yielded dividend, when the dividend income was exempted from payment of income tax, the expenditure incurred in acquiring that dividend also should be excluded from amount of expenditure that qualified for allowance and in that view of the matter, the orders passed by the authorities were legal and valid.

The High Court observed that when no expenditure was incurred by the assessee in earning the dividend income, no notional expenditure could be deducted from the said income; that it was not the case of the assessee retaining any shares so as to have the benefit of dividend; 63% of the shares, which were purchased, were sold and the income derived therefrom was offered to tax as business income; the remaining 37% of the shares were retained and had remained unsold with the assessee which unsold shares had yielded dividend, for which, the assessee had not incurred any expenditure at all. It further noted that though the dividend income was exempted from payment of tax, if any expenditure was incurred in earning the said income, the said expenditure also could not be deducted but in the case, when the assessee had not retained shares with the intention of earning dividend income and the dividend income was incidental to his business of sale of shares, which remained unsold by the assessee, it could not be said that the expenditure incurred in acquiring the shares had to be apportioned to the extent of dividend income and that should be disallowed from deductions.

The High Court held that the approach of the authorities, in disallowing a part of the expenditure, was not in conformity with the statutory provisions contained in section 14A of the Act. The orders were held to be not sustainable in law and were set aside.

4.    Observations

Section 14A(1) stipulates that for the purposes of computing the total income under Chapter IV, no deduction shall be allowed in respect of an expenditure “incurred” by the assessee “in relation to” an income which does not form part of the total income under the Income tax Act.

The position in law in respect of the expenditure incurred for earning an income, a part of which was exempt from taxation, prior to the introduction of section 14A, was governed by the ratio of the decisions in the cases of CIT vs. Maharashtra Sugar Mills Ltd: 82 ITR 452 (SC) and Rajasthan State Warehousing Corporation vs. CIT: 242 ITR 450 (SC). It was held therein that no part of expenditure could be disallowed where the expenditure was incurred in earning an income a part of which was taxable and the balance was exempted from taxation.

The object behind the insertion of section 14A is stated in the Memorandum explaining the provisions of the Finance Bill, 2001 :-“Certain incomes are not includible while computing the total income as these are exempt under various provisions of the Act. There have been cases where deductions have been claimed in respect of such exempt income. This in effect means that the tax incentive given by way of exemptions to certain categories of income is being used to reduce also the tax payable on the nonexempt income by debiting the expenses incurred to earn the exempt income against taxable income. This is against the basic principles of taxation whereby only the net income, i.e., gross income minus the expenditure is taxed. On the same analogy, the exemption is also in respect of the net income. Expenses incurred can be allowed only to the extent they are relatable to the earning of taxable income. It is proposed to insert a new section 14A so as to clarify the intention of the Legislature since the inception of the Income Tax Act, 1961 that no deduction shall be made in respect of any expenditure incurred by the assessee in relation to income which does not form part of the total income under the Income-tax Act.The proposed amendment will take effect retrospectively from 1st April, 1962 and will accordingly; apply in relation to the assessment year 1962-63 and subsequent assessment years.”

The law of section 14A has been sought to be explained by the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Walfort Share and Stock Brokers P Ltd: 326 ITR 1 (SC),as under:-“Further, section 14 specifies five heads of income which are chargeable to tax. In order to be chargeable, an income has to be brought under one of the five heads. Sections 15 to 59 lay down the rules for computing income for the purpose of chargeability to tax under those heads. Sections 15 to 59 quantify the total income chargeable to tax. The permissible deductions enumerated in sections 15 to 59 are now to be allowed only with reference to income which is brought under one of the above heads and is chargeable to tax. If an income like dividend income is not a part of the total income, the expenditure/ deduction though of the nature specified in sections 15 to 59 but related to the income not forming part of the total income could not be allowed against other income includible in the total income for the purpose of chargeability to tax. The theory of apportionment of expenditure between taxable and non-taxable has, in principle, been now widened u/s. 14 A.”

The issue veers down to examining whether any disallowance is possible in cases where the income that is exempted from taxation is incidental to the main objective of expenditure and that the expenditure has no direct or proximate connection to the income that has been exempted from taxation. The issue is best exemplified with the case of a dealer in shares who incurs expenditure primarily for earning a taxable income from dealing in shares and received an exempt income from dividend as an incidence of his business of dealing in shares.

It is the assessee’s case that only such expenditure that can be disallowed that has been incurred directly in earning an exempt income and that an expenditure which has the distant effect of earning such an income cannot be disallowed where the income that was taxed has a proximate connection to such an expenditure. The revenue on the other hand is of the view that the language of section 14A does not provide for an exclusion, from operation of section 14A, of an expenditure which incidentally results in earning an exempt income; the provision for prorating of an expenditure under Rule 8D rather confirms that at least a part of the expenditure shall stand disallowed in all the cases; the relationship of some part of the expenditure, for earning an exempt income cannot be altogether denied.

The Income Tax Act, 1961 is replete with expressions like ‘in relation to’ and ‘relating to’, for example, sections 28, 35 and 36. While it is true that the terms carry a meaning which is wider than the one provided by the term wholly and exclusively incurred or for the purposes of, it nonetheless cannot be so wide as to include an expenditure with a remote or a distant connection to an exempt income.

Obviously for a dealer in shares, the dominant or the immediate objective is making profit on sale of shares. Earning dividend income cannot be the domi-nant objective and the dividend at the most may represent an incidental objective, unless it is held that earning dividend is also a dominant objective and there is a proximate link with such objective, the expenditure in question cannot be considered as having been incurred in relation to .

In our considered view the A.O., for a valid disallowance, should establish two important things. One that the expenditure incurred has a proximate link with the income that is exempt from taxation and the second that the purchase of shares was made with the main or dominant objective of earning an exempt income. Unless both of these facts are established by the A.O., no expenditure or part thereof should be disallowed u/s. 14A in computing the total income of a person who is a dealer in shares in respect of shares held as stock in trade.

The Kerala High Court in CIT vs. Leena Ramachandran, 339 ITR 296 held that no disallowance of interest claimed u/s. 36(1)(iii) should be made, u/s. 14A, in case of a dealer in shares who purchased shares out of the borrowed funds and held the same as stock-in-trade.

The issue has been sharply brought in focus by the decisions of the tribunal, delivered after considering the decisions of the Kerala High Court in Leena Ramachandran’s case (supra) and of the Karnataka High Court in the case of CCI Ltd. (supra) in the following cases;

In American Express Bank Ltd. ITA No. 5904 & 6022 /Mum/2000 dated 8-8- 2012, it was held that a prorated disallowance of an expenditure must be made u/s. 14A in the case of an assesseee engaged in the business of dealing in shares earning dividend income which is exempted from taxation in his hands. The tribunal distinguished the decision in Leena Ramachandran’s case (supra) by stating that the said decision rather supported the case of disallowance and the observations of the court in relation to shares held as stock-in-trade were to be treated as an obiter dicta and not the ratio decidendi which was to disallow the interest and that was upheld by the court.

In GanjamTrading Co. Pvt. Ltd. ITA No. 3724/ Mum/2005 dated 20-7-2012, the decision of the Special Bench in Daga Capital (supra) was distinguished to hold that the provisions of section 14A did not apply to the case of dealer in receipt of dividend income that was incidental to the dominant income from dealing in shares that was taxable by relying on the decision of the Karnataka High Court in CCI Ltd.’ s case (supra).

Similarly in India Advantage Securities Ltd. ITA No. 6711/Mum/2011 dated 20-7-2012, it was held that the provisions of section 14A did not apply to the case of dealer in receipt of dividend income that was incidental to the dominant income from dealing in shares that was taxable by relying on the decision of the Karnataka High Court in CCI Ltd.’ s case(supra). In this case, the decision of the tribunal in the case of American Express Bank Ltd(supra) was considered and was not followed.

Likewise, in Prakash K. Shah Securities Pvt. Ltd. ITA No. 3339/Mum/2012, the tribunal held that the provisions of section 14A did not apply to the case of dealer in receipt of dividend income that was incidental to the dominant income from dealing in shares that was taxable by relying on the decision of the Karnataka High Court in CCI Ltd.’ s case(supra).

The issue that was thought to be settled by the special bench decision has been sharply brought back in focus by the conflicting decisions discussed above. The correctness of the decision of the special bench decision was always under a scanner as was clear from the dissenting decision of Shri K.C. Singhal, the Accountant Member, in the context of the income from shares held as stock-in-trade. Even the part that held that Rule 8D was retrospective in its operation has not been accepted by the High Court in the case of Godrej & Boyce Ltd. vs. CIT, 328 ITR 081(Bom), which found the said rule to be prospective in its effect.

The Karnataka High Court in CCI’s case (supra) has relied on the intention of the dealer behind incurring the expenditure and proceeded to hold that no disallowance shall take place where the intention was clearly to earn business income by incurring an expenditure. It favoured ignoring the incidental income behind such an expenditure. This approach of the court charts out a new course by examining the proximity of the expenditure to the income and while doing so, takes into consideration the intention of the legislature stated in the memorandum to nullify the effect of the Supreme court decisions in the cases of Rajasthan Warehousing Co. and Maharashtra Sugar Millls (supra). Such an approach is desirable and is equitable and has the salutary effect of reducing the frivolous litigation in cases where the expenditure incidentally produces some exempt income. Accepting this approach also helps the revenue in avoiding an undesired expenditure on litigation in which the outcome is more likely to favour an assessee. Even the language of section 14A does seem to favour the assesssee.

The meaning of the term ‘in relation to’ can be gathered by referring to the ratio of the decision of the 11 judges bench of the Supreme court in the case of H.H.M. Madhavao Jivajirao Scindia ,Bahadur of Gwalior vs. Union of India, 1971, 1 SCC 85 wherein the court while interpreting the meaning of the term ‘relating to’ by a majority decision held that the term meant a dominant and immediate connection. A reference may also be made to Law Lexicon which states the term ‘in relation to’ requires elimination of the remote connection and indicates nearness or proximity.

The case of the revenue seems to largely hang on rule 8D that provides for the proration of an expenditure. This part of rule 8D cannot override the provisions of section 14A which does not mandate such proration at least in cases where the expenditure is not found to be incurred in relation to an exempt income. It is an accepted position in law that a rule cannot expand the scope of a legislative provision. It is true that s/s. (2) provides for determination of expenditure in accordance with Rule 8D. However, the said Rule while providing the methodology for calculation cannot extend the meaning of the term, ‘in relation to’ by including such expenditure that cannot be construed as having been incurred in relation to an exempt income.

There is one more angle to the issue that is provided by the language of clause (ii) of sub-Rule (2) of Rule 8D when it provides for a calculation with reference to the ‘value of investment’. This language again supports the case that no disallowance is envisaged in respect of shares held as stock in trade.

In cases where the dealer holds the shares as an investor for the purposes of earning dividend income, the disallowance u/s. 14A shall hold water.

Provisions of S. 115JB (MAT) are not applicable to foreign companies that do not have physical presence in India, in the form of an office, branch or a permanent establishment (PE).

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New Page 1Part C : Tribunal & AAR International Tax Decisions

22 The Timken Company &

Praxair Pacific Limited

2010 TII 25 & 26 ARA-Intl.

S. 115JB of the Act, Article 5 of India-USA DTAA and

Article 13 of India-Mauritius Treaty

Dated : 23-7-2010

 

Provisions of S. 115JB (MAT) are not applicable to foreign
companies that do not have physical presence in India, in the form of an office,
branch or a permanent establishment (PE).

Facts :

  • As part of its global
    restructuring exercise, Timken, a US company (USCO) proposed to transfer
    shares of in an Indian listed company. The proposed transfer was to be through
    stock exchange, and hence, was expected to qualify for exemption from capital
    gains tax in terms of S. 10(38) of the Act.

  • The issue raised
    before AAR was whether in absence of any presence in India, USCO was liable to
    pay tax under MAT provisions on capital gains arising from transfer of shares.



Ruling of AAR :

On the following grounds, AAR held that MAT provisions did
not apply to foreign companies that had no business presence in India :

  • A foreign company
    that has not established a place of business in India is not required to
    prepare its financial statements in accordance with S. 591 r.w. S. 594 of the
    Companies Act.

  • The context of the
    MAT regime, the Finance Minister’s speech and the administrative circulars
    indicate that the MAT is not designed to be applicable to a foreign company
    which does not have presence in India.

  • The earlier AAR
    ruling holding that MAT is applicable to foreign companies was in the context
    of an entity that was doing business in India and had a PE in India. Such
    foreign company had obligation to comply with the provisions of the Companies
    Act and maintain books of accounts in India and therefore, was liable to MAT.



Note : This ratio was also applied when a foreign transferor
company earned capital gains, which was exempt from tax in terms of the
India-Mauritius Treaty. (Praxair Pacific Limited)

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Partnership firms, though assessed as fiscally transparent entities1 in the country of residence, are eligible to claim treaty benefits under the India-UK DTAA.

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New Page 1


Part C : Tribunal & AAR International Tax Decisions

21 Linklaters LLP v. ITO

2010 TII 80 ITAT Mum.-Intl.

Article 5 & 7, India-UK DTAA

 

  • Partnership firms,
    though assessed as fiscally transparent entities1 in the country of residence,
    are eligible to claim treaty benefits under the India-UK DTAA.

  • A Service PE is a
    deemed PE and, therefore, does not need to satisfy requirement of Basic PE
    rule. The presence of personnel in excess of the specified time-threshold,
    triggers service PE in India.

  • By providing for
    coverage ‘profits indirectly attributable to permanent establishment’ Article
    7 of India-UK DTAA incorporates Force of Attraction (FOA) rule. Profits
    relating to services rendered outside India in respect of Indian projects are
    also taxable in India.



Facts :

  • The taxpayer, was a
    UK-based limited liability partnership, engaged in law practice. It did not
    have a branch or any other similar form of presence in India, but rendered
    legal services to certain clients whose operations extended to India. These
    services were rendered partly from the UK and at times, by partners and staff
    visiting India. During the financial year under consideration, the taxpayer’s
    partners/staff were present in India for more than 90 days.

  • The taxpayer
    disclosed ‘nil’ taxable income in Indian tax return by claiming treaty benefit
    and by contending that it has no PE presence (including service PE) in India.

  • Without prejudice,
    the taxpayer also claimed that as per DTAA, profits of PE were to be computed
    having regard to the market conditions in India. Arm’s-length income of PE is
    based on fiction of independence and is required to be calculated having
    regard to the rates that would have been charged by Indian
    lawyers/professionals for similar services.

  • The Tax Department
    rejected the taxpayer’s arguments and concluded that the taxpayer had a
    service PE in India. Entire income in relation to Indian projects (including
    services rendered from the UK office) was taxed on the ground that no details
    about overseas work was furnished.

  • On appeal, the CIT(A)
    agreed with the AO on the applicability of service PE Rule, but restricted
    taxation only to the extent of services rendered in India.



Held :

Treaty eligibility to the overseas firm assessed as flow
through entity in home country :

The ITAT raised the issue about eligibility of the UK firm to
claim treaty benefit. The issue was raised on account of ‘reverse hybrid
situation’ and ‘asymmetrical taxation’ scenario arising from the UK firm being
taxed in India at an entity level, whereas in the UK, the assessment is as a
pass through/transparent entity in the name of the members of the firm. The ITAT
rejected primary contention of the taxpayer challenging right of the tribunal to
consider the issue for the first time. The ITAT was convinced that the legal
issue could be examined by it after providing reasonable opportunity of hearing
to the parties if the tribunal finding did not enlarge the quantum of income as
assessed by the lower authorities.

Having proceeded to answer the issue, the ITAT held :

  • The UK legal firm is
    a person under the treaty definition of the term.

  • The difference in
    taxation system applicable to the partnership firm in the source jurisdiction
    [(India) and residence country (UK)] results in economic double taxation
    though not juridical double taxation. The philosophy of DTAA which supports
    merits of avoiding juridical double taxation should equally be applicable to a
    situation of economic double taxation.

  • The decision of
    Canadian Court in the case of TD securities (USA) LLC v. Her Majesty the
    Queen, (2010 TCC 186) supports that the treaty benefit can be given even in a
    situation involving asymmetrical taxation. In this case, single-member LLC of
    the USA was given the benefit of USA-Canada treaty despite the fact that in
    Canada, assessment was in the names of LLC whereas in the USA, due to the
    option exercised, the assessment was in the name of the member of the LLC. The
    decision also supports that the treaties need to be interpreted on a
    contextual basis rather than based on strict principles of interpretation as
    applicable to tax laws. The treaty interpretation is not subjected to literal
    interpretation in isolation with the objects and the purpose for which the
    treaty provisions are made.

  • The treaty benefit is
    available to a person who is a treaty resident of the other country. In terms
    of the treaty, an entity is resident of the UK if it attracts tax liability in
    the UK on account of criteria such as domicile, residence, place of
    management. Though the modalities or mechanism of taxation may vary, facts of
    taxation need to be decided in an objective and uniform manner.

  •     In a situation where the entire income of a partnership firm is taxed in its own hands or in the hands of a partner, the definition of residence should be regarded as fulfilled. The Canadian decision in TD Security’s case supports that the term ‘liable to taxation’ needs to be interpreted in a pragmatic manner so as to extend the treaty benefits to fiscally transparent entities. The test of fiscal domicile relevant for treaty residence purpose is fulfilled so long as the country of residence has right to tax income of the firm, irrespective of whether such right is actually exercised by the resident state or not.


  •     As a result, the taxability of entire income in the country of residence is more relevant rather than the mode of taxability i.e., whether the tax is levied in the hands of the firm or in the hands of the partners. The treaty benefit therefore cannot be denied to the firm so long as entire income of the firm is taxed in the residence country, not in its own right but in the hands of the partners.


  •     Incongruent result arising on account of asymmetrical result needs to be avoided and the benefit of the treaties is to be given so long as income of the enterprise is subjected to taxation in the other jurisdiction either directly or indirectly.


  •     The OECD report dealing with applicability of DTAA to partnership has indicated that in case of asymmetrical taxation, benefit should be available to the partners and not to the partnership firm. The ITAT consciously took the decision of adopting a view different from that by the OECD report which suggested grant of treaty benefit to the members of the firm. Reference was made by the ITAT to the reservation of India on the OECD commentary to conclude that the Government had rejected the stand of the OECD.


Other issues :

  •     The firm had a fictional service PE in view of presence of its partners/personnel in excess of the specified threshold.


  •     Actual revenues earned by taxpayer needs to be considered in respect of third-party dealings. It is not correct to apply hypothetical rates of earnings based on what could be the earnings of other Indian legal firms.


  •     The UK treaty provides for taxation of profits in the state to the extent they are directly or ‘indirectly attributable’ to that PE. The inclusion of profits indirectly attributable to the PE incorporates a force of attraction principle in the UK treaty.


  •     This permits taxability of overseas income in respect of services rendered for an Indian project if it is similar or relatable to the services rendered by the PE.


Income from hiring of equipments under global usage Bareboat Charter Agreements (BCA) arises at the place where the equipment is delivered. Subsequent use by lessee as per his discretion is not relevant for determination of place of accrual.

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New Page 1Part C : Tribunal & AAR International Tax Decisions

20 Seabird Exploration FZ LLC

AAR No. 829 of 2009

S. 9(1)(vi) & S. 44BB, Income-tax Act

Dated : 25-6-2010

 

Income from hiring of equipments under global usage Bareboat
Charter Agreements (BCA) arises at the place where the equipment is delivered.
Subsequent use by lessee as per his discretion is not relevant for determination
of place of accrual.

Facts :

The taxpayer, UAE Company (UAECO) provides geophysical
services to the oil and gas industry in India. For this purpose, the taxpayer
entered into agreements for hiring the vessels (equipment) pursuant to BCA on
global-usage basis. Under the agreements, the lessor (owner) provided the
vessels to the taxpayer on hire without providing any crew or other services.
The terms of the agreement had the following features :

  • Agreements for hiring
    of vessels were entered into outside India;

  • In terms of the
    agreement, hire charges were payable outside India;

  • Delivery and
    redelivery of vessels was to take place outside India;

  • The taxpayer was
    obliged to pay period-linked hire charges irrespective of usage of vessel
    i.e., even during idle period fixed hire charges were payable;

  • Vessels were under
    complete control and dominion of the hirer;

  • It was the discretion
    of the hirers to use equipment in or outside India;

  • The owner had limited
    responsibility of maintenance of equipments and consequential right of
    inspecting the vessels during the term of the agreement.


The charges paid pursuant to the agreement were not covered
by royalty definition u/s.9(1)(vi) of the Act in view of provisions of S. 44BB
of the Act. The taxpayer contended that the hire charges were not taxable in
India as it represented income earned by non-resident owners outside India.

The Tax Department sought to assess the amount on gross basis
u/s.44BB of the Act by contending that the income accrued/arose in India due to
use of vessels in India.

Held :

The AAR accepted contentions of the taxpayer and held :

  • The income can be
    taxed in the hands of the non-resident owner only if income accrues or arises
    in India or is deemed to be accruing or arising in India, given the fact that
    the hire charges were payable outside India.

  • The income can be
    deemed to accrue or arise in India if it was income earned through or from any
    asset or source of income in India. The source of income for owner of the
    equipment lies in delivering and transferring control of the vessel to the
    hirer outside India and not its subsequent utilisation which may or may not be
    in India.

  • The expression
    ‘source of income’ is not a legal concept, but needs to be understood the way
    a practical man would regard it to be a real source of income. It is required
    to be understood in a broad and practical sense and not in a technical manner.

  • Reliance was placed
    on the following extract of Privy Council decision in the case of Commissioner
    of Inland Revenue v. Hang Seng Bank Ltd. [1991 (1) AC 306]

    “. . . . . , if the profit was earned by the exploitation of property assets
    as by letting property, lending money or dealing in commodities or securities
    by buying and reselling at a profit, the profit will have arisen in or derived
    from the place where the property was let, the money was lent or the contracts
    of purchase and sale were effected.”

  • Having regard to the
    above, it was concluded that in case of hire of moveable property, the source
    of income is the place where property is let out and delivered and subsequent
    utilisation of such equipment as per the discretion of the hirer does not
    impact the determination of source.

  • Consequentially,
    income from hire charges does not accrue or arise in India if the asset is
    delivered outside India. It can be charged to tax only if the delivery of the
    asset is in India either at the time of entering into original agreement or at
    the time of renewal of the agreement.



levitra

S. 92CA — Difference on tangible bearing on costs, price or profit to be given due weightage while comparing controlled & uncontrolled transactions

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New Page 1

22 Egain Communications Pvt. Ltd. v.
ITO Pune

(2008) TIOL 282 Pune

Transfer Pricing Provision — S. 92CA

A.Y. : 2004-05. Dated : 10-6-2008

 

Issue :

While comparing the controlled and uncontrolled transactions
under the Transactional Net Margin Method (TNMM), the differences having
tangible bearing on costs, price or profit are to be given due weightage to make
suitable adjustments.

 

Facts :

The assessee, an Indian company (ICO) was engaged in the
business of software development and was a registered STPI eligible for 100% tax
break u/s.10A of the Act. The entirety of turnover of ICO was in favour of its
parent in the USA (USCO). The USCO had assured complete buyback from ICO. USCO
had privity with the ultimate customers and was responsible for all risks
including the risk of credit, marketing risk, recovery risk, inventory risk,
warranty risk, foreign exchange risk and post-sales risk, etc.

 

The revenue model of ICO was based on cost plus basis. ICO
recovered mark-up of 5% of all the costs including depreciation which was
provided in the books of ICO based on the US system.

 

The TPO made addition on the ground that comparable PBIT was
about 16%. For the purpose of determining comparable mark-up, TPO took into
account 20 comparable cases which included two high margin cases where the
profit was 67% and 54%, respectively, as against average of 16%.

 

There was no dispute on application of TNMM being the most
appropriate method with reference to profit level indicator of PBIT.

 

Before the ITAT, the assessee claimed adjustment to the
comparable margin determined by the TPO on account of the following factors :

(1) Adjustment was made to rework PBIT of ICO by adopting
depreciation as per Schedule XIV rates. This was as against accelerated rates
at which depreciation was provided by ICO based on US system. The adjustment
lowered depreciation charge and improved profitability of ICO.

(2) Adjustment was made to exclude non operating income
like interest income in respect of the comparables adopted by TPO. This was
suggested as ICO did not have any other income.

(3) Adjustment was made to exclude margin of an entity
which was engaged in trading activity — the same being activity unrelated to
the activity of the assessee.

(4) Downturn economic adjustment on account of low risk
profile of ICO as it was a captive unit of USCO which was responsible for all
business risks.

It was also indicated that the parent suffered losses and the
fact that ICO was otherwise eligible for 100% deduction also supported that
there was no motive for transfer pricing evasion. It was also argued by the
assessee that no adjustment was warranted so long as the price charged by the
assessee was within the range of margin of the comparables.

Held :

The ITAT accepted the assessee’s claims for adjustments on
account of the factors narrated above.

The ITAT accepted that in application of TNMM, (i) the
differences likely to affect the price, cost charged or paid or the profit in
the open market are to be taken into consideration to make reasonable and
accurate adjustments to eliminate the differences having material impact; (ii)
if the differences are not capable of being evaluated, the comparables may need
to be ignored.

The ITAT confirmed that Rule 10B as also OECD Guidelines
specifically required suitable adjustments for differences on account of FAR and
other relevant factors. The ITAT also relied on decision of Delhi Tribunal in
the case of Mentor Graphics (Noida) Pvt. Ltd. v. DCIT, (109 ITD 101) to
support that determination of arm’s-length price, functional profile, assets and
assumed risk of controlled and uncontrolled transactions (FAR analysis) need to
be appropriately screened and adjusted for the purpose of making them
comparable.

The ITAT relied on US IRS manual on transfer pricing
provisions which supported adjustments to be made to uncontrolled transactions
to make them comparable.

The ITAT also noted that from out of 20 comparables
considered by the TPO, there were two comparables with high profitability of 54%
and 68% as against the average of 16% and that such extreme cases needed special
consideration. For this ITAT relied on OECD Guidelines :

Para 1.47 of OECD guidelines is to the following effect :

“1.47 Where application of one or more methods produces a
range of figures, a substantial deviation among points in that range may
indicate that the data used in establishing some of the points may not be as
reliable as the data used to establish the other points in the range or that
the deviation may result from features of the comparable data that require
adjustments. In such cases, further analysis of those points may be necessary
to evaluate their suitability for inclusion in any arm’s-length range.”

 


Having observed the above, the ITAT permitted adjustments as
requested for, since the adjusted profit margin of the assessee was comparable
with uncontrolled margin with tolerance of 5%.

 

levitra

S. 9(1)(vi) —Payment of USCO towards bandwidth for availing standard services not chargeable as equipment royalty.

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21 Dell International Services India Pvt.
Ltd. Bangalore

(2008) TIOL 09 ARA IT

S. 9(1)(vi) of the Act

Article 12 of India-US DTAA

Dated : 18-7-2008

 

Issue :

Payment to USCO towards telecom bandwidth in the form of
private leased line telecom circuits is for availing standard services which is
not chargeable as equipment royalty. Such services are not fees for included
services.

 

In terms of S. 9(1)(vi)(b), source of income is not outside
India only because customers are located outside India.

 

Facts :

The applicant, Dell India, an Indian Company (ICO) was
engaged in the business of providing call centre, data processing and
information technology support services to its group companies. For providing
the services, ICO entered into agreement with US Company by name BT America (BTA)
for two-way transmission of voice and data through telecom bandwidth. For this
purpose, ICO was provided private leased line circuit for full country coverage
in the USA and in India. ICO established privity with BTA though the rates of
services were fixed pursuant to Master Services Agreement signed by ICO’s parent
with BTA for all the group concerns. BTA raised invoices for monthly recurring
charges on ICO. The invoice also described the amount as rent for dedicated
private telecom leased circuits.

 

BTA had its own network up to certain point while it tied up
with other service providers such as VSNL and Bharati for the balance part of
the connectivity. It was however a common ground that ICO had privity only with
BTA, while BTA was responsible for arrangements with VSNL/Bharati, etc. The
following chart depicts the flow of the arrangement.

 

The applicant sought ruling on TDS implications in respect of
remittance made on account of recurring charges to BTA.

 

The AAR noted the following to be the features of arrangement
entered into between ICO and BTA :



  •  Agreement described that BTA provided dedicated, point-to-point, international
    links directly connecting two customers sites via digital circuits for
    transmission of voice & data.



  • The services provided by BTA was an end-to-end offering between the specific
    site in country A and the specific site in country B.



  • BTA has huge network of optical fibres cables laid under sea, other equipments
    and infrastructure which were controlled and operated by BTA for the purpose
    of rendering such services. Additionally, BTA had tied up with other service
    providers for taking care of the segment in which BTA did not have its own
    network.



  • BT provided similar services to others also. Incidentally, similar services
    were provided by other service providers also. The services were standard
    services akin to telephone connection.



  • The agreement made it clear that the arrangement was for provisioning of
    services. BTA was responsible for maintenance of service levels. The agreement
    was clear that the ownership, right and responsibility of operating and
    maintaining assets and infrastructure was that of BTA. The agreement made it
    clear that ICO had no control, possession or right of operating the
    infrastructure, while BTA had control, possession, dominion over the assets of
    its network.



  • For establishing connectivity, certain instruments were placed at the location
    of ICO. While the agreement contemplated recovery of one-time installation
    charges, actually the same were waived.



 


The applicant contended that the remittance did not attract
tax implications either in terms of domestic Act provisions or in terms of
India-USA treaty.

 

As against that, the Department’s contention was
that the remittance was towards rental of equipment, hence subject to
withholding taxes in India as royalty income both in terms of provisions of S.
9(1)(vi) and in terms of provisions of India-USA treaty.

 

Held :

AAR held that the contract was for rendition of services
which was admittedly not in the nature of fees for included services and was
therefore not liable to tax in India in terms of India-USA treaty. The AAR held
that the amount was not in the nature of royalty for use or right to use the
equipment. For this purpose, the AAR concluded :



  • The use or the right to use equipment covers only those arrangements where
    there is some positive act of utilisation, application or employment of
    equipment for the desired purpose by the payer. Merely because
    facility/service is provided to the customer from sophisticated equipment
    installed and operated by the service provider does not result in grant of
    right of use of equipment to the service recipient.



  • To determine whether the arrangement involves right of user, the question to be asked is whether the payer is required to do positive act in relation to the equipment such that he operates and controls the equipment in order to enjoy the facility. The right of adapting the equipment for the use by the payer is essential to characterise the transaction as that of equipment rental. The fact that the service availer exercises no possessory rights in relation to the network and merely enjoys facilities/services rendered from the infrastructure, supports that the transaction is that of service and not that  of rent.
  • The fact that BTAmaintains the entire infrastructure for offering services to various other cus-tomers also indicates that use of equipment is by BTA. The AAR likened and compared the arrangement with the use of bridge, road or telephone connection.
  •  The AAR referred to following extract from Professor Klaus Vogel’s commentary to make distinction between service and rent of equipment.


“……the use of a satellite is a service, not rental; this would not be the case only in the event that the entire direction and control over the satellite such as piloting, steering were transferred to the user” (at page 802)”.

The use of expression rentals or the fact that certain part of the instruments were installed at the premises of the assessee were held to be of no relevance.

The AAR also held that the amount was not royalty as consideration for use of secret process. In view of AAR, the treaty triggered royalty taxation only in the event when consideration was for use of secret process and the fact that services were of standard nature and provided by multiple other service providers supported that the arrangement was not for use of secret process.

The AAR did not accept the applicant’s contention that the amount remitted was protected from taxation in India on account of exception of S. 9(1)(vi)(b). In view of AAR, the assessee had its business principally carried out in India and the fact that the export was made to the US counterpart did not lead to conclusion that the source of income was situated outside India. In view of AAR, source is the starting point or the origin from where something springs or comes into existence and the fact that the customers were located outside India did not make the source of income to be outside India.

S. 2(31) — AOP is assesable person even when formed without object of deriving income

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20 Geoconsult Zt GmbH (2008)

TIOL 11 AAR IT

Explanation to S. 2(31) of the Act

Article 5 and 12 of India-Austria DTAA

Dated : 31-7-2008

 

Issue :

Joining together with common purpose gives rise to emergence
of AOP, which is assessable as such, even when the members share gross
consideration.

 

Explanation to S. 2(31)(v) makes AOP an assessable person
even when formed without the object of deriving income.

 

Facts :

The applicant GZT, a company incorporated in Austria (Ausco),
was specialised in providing consultancy services.

 

Ausco entered into joint venture with other two Indian
companies by name Rites and Secon.

 

Under MOU signed in April, 06, Ausco, Rites and Secon agreed
to collaborate together in a joint venture for providing consultancy services to
Himachal Pradesh Road and Infrastructure Development Corporation Ltd. (HPRIDC).
The joint venture executed service agreement with HPRIDC in August 2006, wherein
the JV was service provider / consultant to HPRIDC being the client. The
services were to be rendered by the JV to HPRIDC for HPRIDC’s project of
development of seven tunnels in Shimla. JV was responsible only for consultancy
services and to carry out implementation of said services. The service contract
was a fixed price contract. Ausco was the lead member. In terms of the
agreement, each of the joint venture members was jointly and severally liable to
HPRIDC for performance of the contract.

 

As a sequel to the service contract signed with HPRIDC,
formal joint venture agreement was executed between three parties viz.
Ausco, Rites & and Secon in September 2006. The AAR took note of the following
features of the joint venture agreement :

(1) The preamble read that the three parties had agreed to
‘collaborate’ for performing all works associated with the consultancy
services to be rendered to HPRIDC.

(2) Each of the members had joint and several liability to
the client, though Ausco was a leading member and one of the employees of
Ausco present in India was designated to be the team leader.

(3) Certain of the tasks were entrusted to each of the
members. The agreement however clarified that while each member had primary
responsibility in respect of task allotted to it, the other parties were bound
to render assistance to the other members.

(4) Each of the members had unrestricted access to the work
carried out by the other members in connection with the project.

(5) In the event of default/insolvency of one of the
members, other members were irrevocably appointed to step in and perform the
work of the defaulting member in view of joint and several liability of the
parties. Also, in the event of default by one, the work was assigned to the
others.

(6) The total consideration received from the client was
distributed at gross level with Ausco receiving approximately 50% of the
amount, while the other parties received 20% and 30% of the amount. The amount
was directly paid to the respective party pursuant to common bill on the
client being raised by HPRIDC. The agreement also clarified that each party
was responsible for meeting its own cost and expenses and was responsible for
maintenance of accounts concerning its own affairs.

 


The applicant Ausco primarily sought ruling of the AAR on tax
implications of the amount which fell to Ausco’s share. It was the claim of
Ausco that consultancy services which Auso was liable to render viz. the
services of carrying out geological and technical investigation, undertaking
field survey, collecting seismological data, surveying topographical conditions,
etc. were primarily rendered from outside India. And, in absence of PE or long
duration presence in India in connection with the project, the amount was not
chargeable as business income. The applicant however conceded that the amount
was fees for technical services chargeable as such at 10% on gross basis
u/s.9(1)(vii) of the Act read with Article 12 of India-Austria treaty.

 

During the course of hearing, the department representative
contended that the joint venture of Ausco with Rites and Secon constituted an
AOP, particularly in terms of Explanation to S. 2(31) of the Act.

 

It was agreed by the parties that the issue of presence or
absence of emergence of AOP was crucial to determine the tax implications of
Ausco and the questions raised before the AAR would be influenced by conclusion
on this basic issue.

 

Before the AAR, the applicant relied on the AAR’s ruling in
the case of Van Oord ACZBV, 248 ITR 399 (AAR). It was claimed by the applicant
that there was no emergence of AOP as :



  • Each of the members was responsible for identified task allocated and that
    consortium or joint venture was only for convenience of execution.



  • The agreement was clear that the task of each individual member was identified
    and the cooperation amongst them was only for co-ordination and satisfactory
    completion of the project.



  • The joint venture was clear that each of the parties to the contract merely
    shared gross revenue and there was no sharing of profit/loss.



  • All in all, each individual member was executing a standalone and independent
    portion of the overall contract and was receiving revenue for the work done by
    the member and each member alone was responsible for meeting its part of the
    cost.


S. 195 — Commission paid to foreign selling agents does not trigger tax with-holdings obligation on payer

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19 DCIT, Hyderabad v.
Hyderabad Industries Ltd.

(2008) TIOL 309 Hyd.

S. 195 of the Act.

A.Ys. : 1996-97 to 2000-01. Dated : 30-5-2008

 

Issue :

Commission paid to foreign selling agents does not trigger
tax withholding obligation on the payer.

 

Facts :

The assessee, Indian manufacturer of engineering goods,
exported goods to various foreign countries through its sales agents based in
the foreign countries. The assessee remitted commission to foreign agents
without deducting tax at source.

 

As a sequel to survey operations, the Department held that
the assessee was liable to deduct tax at source in respect of commission
payment. The Department raised huge demand u/s.201(1) and u/s.201(1A) on the
ground that :



  • The assessee ought to have made application u/s.195(2) before taking the view
    on non-applicability of TDS;



  •  The amount was taxable in the hands of the recipient as payment was received
    by the agents in India.


 


Incidentally, the decision has considered only domestic law
provision. It is not clear whether any of the recipients had benefit of a
treaty.

 

Before the Tribunal, the DR also sought to justify taxation,
on the ground that remittance was in the nature of royalty for commercial
information given by the agent or was in the nature of technical services
rendered by the agent who provided assistance in obtaining LC established or
getting advance payment from customers, etc.

 

Held :

The Tribunal held that :



  • Since the contract between the assessee and the overseas agent did not specify
    any mode of payment, the remittance made by the assessee by way of cheque or
    draft cannot be regarded as payment made in India to the agent of non-resident
    in India.



  • The services rendered by the commission agent were commercial services in
    respect of sales effected. The commercial information provided or after-sales
    services provided to the customers of the assessee were part of the composite
    arrangement which the assessee had with the agent.



  • The information provided by the commission agent was simple market information
    and over which the agent had no exclusive domain. Payment for information can
    be termed as royalty only when it is consideration for information concerning
    industrial, commercial or scientific experience over which the granter has an
    exclusive right. The Tribunal observed :

“The commercial information which the agent in our case is
expected to provide to the assessee is not such over which the agent has an
exclusive domain. It is merely a market information which any Tom, Dick and
Harry can go into the market and obtain it. The definition given in the DTAA
is also in consonance with the definition discussed above. It states that
royalty means payment of any kind received as a consideration for information
concerning industrial, commercial or scientific experience. It simply means
that a person who has an exclusive right over a particular information and
over which no one else in the world is a privy to it, can assign a right to
use such information to the other.”


  • The Tribunal also held that the services of commission agent were not
    technical in nature.



  • In absence of tax liability of the recipient, the remittance made without
    deduction of tax at source was held to be justified.

“. . . ., the Circulars of the Board apply with full force
to the facts of the present case and since the payments made to the
non-residents are not income chargeable to tax in India, the assessee was not
liable to deduct at source u/s.195 of the Act”.


 

levitra

S. 9(1)(i) — Liaison office of USCO acting as buyer’s agent for exports by independent manufacturers to associates of USCO, covered by exclusion

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New Page 118 Nike Inc. India Liaison Office
v.
ACIT

(2008) TIOL 255 Bang.

S. 9(1)(i) of the Act

India-USA Treaty

A.Ys. : 1999-2000 to 2002-03. Dated : 28-5-2008


Issue :

Liaison office of a US Company, which is acting as
buyer’s agent in respect of exports made by independent manufacturers to the
associates of USCO is covered by exclusion provided in terms of Explanation to
S. 9(1)(b) of the Act.

.

Facts :

Nike Inc., (USCO) is a company incorporated in USA.
It is a world-known name and brand in sports apparels. It has its main office in
the USA with AEs, subsidiaries (associates) in various parts of the world. The
associates distribute goods in various countries.

From its office in the USA, the USCO arranges
sourcing of goods for all its subsidiaries and associates (being sports
apparels, accessories) from independent manufacturers spread across the globe.
The associates establish direct privity with independent manufacturers. The USCO
acts as procurement and liaisoning agent and provides diverse services to the
associates enabling them to procure the goods. The associates pay
commission/fees to the assessee company for providing assistance in procurement
and purchase of goods from the independent manufactures.

In respect of procurements from India, USCO set up
a liaison office in India with approval of RBI. The approval was obtained for
acting as a communication channel between the manufacturers in India, the H.O.
and the associates. The activities of the Indian liaison office involved the
following functions :

1. Liaisoning with manufacturers. For this
purpose, the liaison office employed merchandisers, product analysts, quality
engineers, fabric controllers, etc.

2. Giving opinion on reasonableness of rates to
be negotiated with independent manufacturers.

3. Getting the samples of products approved by
the H.O. or the associate and ensuring that the final product matched with the
approved sample.

4. Providing training to personnel of the
manufacturers, undertake evaluation of the factory, etc.

5. Supervising the production schedule and
activities of the manufacturer.

6. Undertaking fabric testing, garment testing
and generally to do quality assurance activities.

7. Keeping tab on delivery schedule and shipments
for ensuring timely delivery to the concerned purchaser.



In a nutshell, as a buying agent of its associates,
the USCO assisted by liasoning with the manufacturers, assisting in selection of
goods, supervising production, scheduling, quality control and managing
transportation and logistics of shipment, etc.

The USCO, as a buying agent for the associates, had
entered into agreement with the manufacturers on behalf of the associates. The
agreement with the manufacturers defined their obligations, including the
obligation to purchase equipments required specifically for production of
apparels on which the brand ‘Nike’ was put.

It was a common ground that there was direct
privity between the manufacturers and the associates. USCO earned commission
from associates for performing buying agency services.

The goods which were procured from India
constituted less than a fraction of one percent i.e., about 0.22% of the
overall goods procured the world over, in respect of which USCO earned
commission income from the associates.

The Tax Department held that the liaison office in
India had transgressed the scope of RBI-permitted functions and had indulged in
income earning activity. The Department assessed 5% of the global income as
attributable to the operations of liaison office in India. The Tax Department
rejected contention of USCO that the operations carried out by the liaison
office in India were preparatory and auxiliary and were confined to export of
goods from India and hence no part of income was taxable having regard to
provisions of Explanation to S. 9(1)(b).

To support its contention that the operations of
the assessee were not limited to that of facilitating export and were involved
functions, the Tax Department relied on statements of the employees and the job
profile of the employees employed by the liaison office. The Department
contended that as per the statements of the employees, the employees indulged in
the activities of designing, providing suggestions on manufacturing, verifying
the receipt of raw materials, commercial negotiations of pricing with the
manufacturers, etc. These activities, according to the Department, were part of
core income-earning activity. The Department also contended that exclusion from
taxation in respect of purchase of goods by a non-resident for the purpose of
export would not apply to the buying agent and was limited only to the person
who actually purchased the goods.

Held :

The Tribunal noted that the role of USCO and its
liaison office in India was restricted to provide assistance to the associates
in the matter of procuring goods from India and that USCO/Liaison office had not
acted as an agent of manufacturers and had not received any remuneration or
commission from the manufacturers. The only source of income for the USCO was
buying agent’s commission that it received from its associates.

Income from house property: Section 23(2) of Income-tax Act, 1961: Allowance for self-occupation u/s.23(2) is available for HUF also.

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[CIT v. Hariprasad Bhojnagarwala, 342 ITR 69 (Guj.) (FB)]

The following question was considered by the Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court: “Whether the Appellate Tribunal is right in law and on facts in holding that the benefit of section 23(2) is available to a Hindu Undivided Family?”

The High Court held as under: “

(i) The benefit of relief in respect of self-occupied property u/s.23(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is available only to the owner who can reside in his own residence. That means, the benefit of relief is available only to an individual assessee and not to an imaginary assessable entity.

(ii) A Hindu Undivided Family is nothing but a group of individuals related to each other by blood or in a certain manner. A Hindu Undivided Family is a family of a group of natural persons. The family can reside in the house, which belongs to the Hindu Undivided Family. A family cannot consist of artificial persons.

 (iii) There is nothing in the words used in section 23(2), which excludes its application to a Hindu Undivided Family.

(iv) The question is answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.”

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Capital gains: Exemption u/s.54F of Incometax Act, 1961: A.Y. 2007-08: Purchase of residential house in joint names of assessee and his wife: Wife had not contributed: Assessee entitled to exemption u/s.54F to the full extent.

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[CIT v. Ravindra Kumar Arora, 342 ITR 38 (Del.)]

The assessee sold a land being a long-term capital asset and invested the sale proceeds in a residential house which was purchased in the joint name of the assessee and his wife. His wife had not made any contribution. The assessee’s claim for deduction u/s.54F of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was rejected by the Assessing Officer on the ground that the house had been purchased in the joint names of the assessee and his wife. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under: “

(i) Section 54F of the Income-tax Act, 1961, is a beneficial provision which should be interpreted liberally in favour of the exemption/deduction to the taxpayer and deduction should not be denied on a hyper-technical ground.

(ii) The condition stipulated in section 54F stood fulfilled. It would be treated as the property purchased by the assessee in his name and merely because he had included the name of his wife and the property purchased in the joint names would not make any difference. The assessee was entitled to exemption u/s.54F.”

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Recovery of tax: Stay of recovery during pendency of appeal: Section 220(6) of Income-tax Act, 1961: If prima facie the case is in favour of the assessee, stay should be granted for the full demand.

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The assessee filed appeal against the order u/s.201 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 before the CIT(A). The assessee also filed an application for stay of the demand before the CIT(A). The CIT(A) observed that there is ‘enough strength in the plea of the assessee for stay of demand’. However, he directed to pay 30% of the demand.

The Allahabad High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under: “

(i) If on a cursory glance it appears that the demand raised has no leg to stand, it would be undesirable to require the assessee to pay full or substantive part of the demand. From the perusal of the materials brought on record, we are of the view that the Commissioner having himself expressed opinion on the order that there is enough strength in the plea of the assessee for stay of the demand, there was no occasion to direct for deposit of 30%.

(ii) In view of the above, we provide that during the pendency of the appeal the demand against the petitioner shall be kept in abeyance. However, the petitioner shall furnish adequate security in respect of the said 30% of the demand.”

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Recovery of tax: Attachment: Stay of recovery: Sections 220(1), 220(6) and 281B of Income-tax Act, 1961: Provisional attachment u/s.281B on 7-10-2011: Assessment order passed on 9-3-2012: Demand directed to be paid within 7 days instead of 30 days: Not proper: Application for stay of demand till disposal of appeal by CIT(A) rejected: Not just: High Court directed stay of recovery till disposal of appeal by CIT(A).

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[Firoz Tin Factory v. ACIT (Bom.), W.P. (L) No. 765 of 2012 dated 26-3-2012]

By an attachment order dated 7-10-2011, passed u/s.281B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 mutual funds of value Rs.36.54 crore were attached. The assessment order for the A.Y. 2010-11 was passed on 13-3-2012 raising a demand of Rs.36,56,61,776. Demand was directed to be paid within 7 days instead of 30 days as provided u/s.220(1) of the Act. The petitioner assessee filed an appeal before the CIT(A) and made an application u/s.220(6) of the Act dated 12-3-2012 for stay of demand till disposal of appeal by the CIT(A), which was rejected.

The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

 “(i) The provisions of section 220(1) stipulate that the amount of demand shall be paid within 30 days of the service of the notice. The proviso stipulates that where the Assessing Officer has any reason to believe that it would be detrimental to the interest of Revenue if the full period of 30 days is allowed, he may direct, with the previous approval of the Joint Commissioner, that the demand shall be paid within a period less than 30 days. The power to reduce the period under the proviso cannot be exercised casually and without due application of mind. The question as to whether it would be detrimental to the interest of the Revenue to allow the full period of 30 days has to be addressed. The reasons as well as the approval which has been granted by the Joint Commissioner must be made available to the assessee where a copy of the reasons is sought from the Assessing Officer.

(ii) In the present case, a provisional attachment has already been made on 7-10-2011 u/s.281B. The attachment was to the extent of Rs.36.54 crore. That being the position, evidently there would have been no basis for forming a reason to believe that if the period of 30 days was to be observed u/s.220(1), that would be detrimental to the Revenue. Merely because the end of the financial year is approaching that cannot constitute a detriment to the Revenue. The detriment to the Revenue must be akin to a situation where the demand of the Revenue is liable to be defeated by an abuse of process by the assessee. This is of course illustrative, for what is detrimental to the Revenue has to be determined on the facts of each case and an exhaustive catalogue of circumstances cannot be laid down. Consequently, we find that there is absolutely no justification for the Assessing Officer for making an order of demand directing the assessee to deposit the entire demand by 16-3-2012. The action is highhanded and contrary to law.

(iii) The Revenue is adequately protected by the attachment u/s.281B. No coercive steps shall be taken for recovery of the demand, pending the appeal.”

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Recovery of tax: Stay of recovery during pendency of appeal: Section 220(6) of Incometax Act, 1961: AO and Appellate Authorities are not mere tax gatherers: They have to be fair to the assessee.

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[Nishit M. Desai v. CIT (Bom.), W.P. No. 653 of 2012; dated 15-3-2012]

The assessee is a professional. For the A.Y. 2009- 10, the Assessing Officer passed assessment order u/s.143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 determining the total income at Rs.22.43 crore as against the returned income of Rs.19.41 crore and raised a demand of Rs.1.18 crore. A refund of Rs.78 lakh was due to the assessee for the A.Y. 2010-11. The assessee filed appeal before the CIT(A) and also filed an application for stay of recovery till the disposal of appeal. The CIT(A) directed that the refund of Rs.78 lakh be adjusted and the balance of Rs.41 lakh be paid. He held that considering ‘the financial status and affairs’ of the assessee, the payment of the balance demand would not cause financial hardship.

The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

“(i) The power which vested in the Assessing Officer u/s.220(6) and on the CIT(A) to grant a stay of demand is a judicial power. It is necessary for both the Assessing Officer as well the Appellate Authorities to have due regard to the fact that their function is not merely to act as tax gatherers, but equally as quasi-judicial authorities, they owe a duty of fairness to the assessee. This seems to be lost [Nishit M. Desai v. CIT (Bom.), W.P. No. 653 of 2012; dated 15-3-2012] The assessee is a professional. For the A.Y. 2009- 10, the Assessing Officer passed assessment order u/s.143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 determining the total income at Rs.22.43 crore as against the returned income of Rs.19.41 crore and raised a demand of Rs.1.18 crore. A refund of Rs.78 lakh was due to the assessee for the A.Y. 2010-11. The assessee filed appeal before the CIT(A) and also filed an application for stay of recovery till the disposal of appeal. The CIT(A) directed that the refund of Rs.78 lakh be adjusted and the balance of Rs.41 lakh be paid. He held that considering ‘the financial status and affairs’ of the assessee, the payment of the balance demand would not cause financial hardship. The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under: “(i) The power which vested in the Assessing Officer u/s.220(6) and on the CIT(A) to grant a stay of demand is a judicial power. It is necessary for both the Assessing Officer as well the Appellate Authorities to have due regard to the fact that their function is not merely to act as tax gatherers, but equally as quasi-judicial authorities, they owe a duty of fairness to the assessee. This seems to be lost sight of in the manner in which the authority has acted in the present case.

 (ii) The parameters for the exercise of jurisdiction to grant stay of demand has been set out in several judgments of this Court, including in KEC International v. B. R. Balakrishnan, 251 ITR 158.

(iii) The assessee’s submissions on merits require consideration. The CIT(A) ought to have devoted a more careful consideration to the issue as to whether a stay of demand was warranted. As out of total demand of Rs.1.18 crore, Rs.78 lakh has been adjusted, the balance has to be stayed.”

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Housing project: deduction u/s.80IB(10) of Income-tax Act 1961: A.Ys. 2004-05 and 2005- 06: Multiple housing projects in one acre plot is permissible.

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[CIT v. Vandana Properties (Bom.), ITA Nos. 3633 of 2009 and 4361 of 2010 dated 28-3-2012]

The assessee-firm was engaged in the business of construction and development of housing projects. On a plot of land admeasuring 2.36 acres in Mumbai the assessee had constructed buildings A, B, C and D over a period of years, in respect of which no deduction u/s.80IB(10) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was claimed. In the year 2001, the assessee became entitled to construct an additional building ‘E’ on the said plot of land. IOD was approved by the Municipal Corporation on 11-10-2002 and the commencement certificate was issued on 10-03-2003. For the A.Ys. 2004-05 and 2005-06, the assessee’s claim for deduction u/s.80IB(10) was rejected by the Assessing Officer. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue the following issues were considered by the Bombay High Court:

(i) What is a housing project u/s.80IB(10)?

 (ii) Whether, if the approval for construction of ‘E’ building was granted by local authority subject to the conditions set out in the first approval granted on 12-5-1993 for construction of A and B buildings, construction of ‘E’ building is an extension of the earlier housing project for which approval was granted prior to 1-10-1998 and, therefore, benefit of section 80IB(10) cannot be granted?

(iii) Whether the housing project must be on a vacant plot of land which has minimum area of one acre and if there are multiple buildings and the proportionate for each building is less than one acre, deduction u/s.80IB(10) can be denied?

The Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“(i) As the expression ‘housing project’ is not defined, it must have the common parlance meaning and means constructing a building or group of buildings consisting of several residential units. The approval granted to a building plan constitutes approval granted to a housing project. Construction of even one building with several residential units of the size not exceeding 1000 sq.ft. would constitute a ‘housing project’ u/s.80IB(10).

(ii) ‘E’ building is an independent housing project and not an extension of the housing project already existing on the plot, because when the earlier plans were approved, ‘E’ building was not even contemplated and came into existence much later. The fact that the approval was granted on the same terms as that granted to the other buildings does not make it an ‘extension’.

(iii) Section 80IB(10)(b) specifies the size of the plot of land but not the size of the housing project. While the plot must have a minimum area of one acre, it need not be a vacant plot. The object of section 80IB(10) is to boost the stock of houses. There can be multiple housing projects on a plot of land having minimum area of one acre.”

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Disallowance: Section 14A of Income-tax Act, 1961: A.Y. 2007-08: Section 14A does not apply to shares held as stock in trade.

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[CCI Ltd. v. JCIT (Kar.), ITA No. 359 of 2011 dated 28-2-2012]

 The assessee was in the business as a dealer in shares and securities. In the relevant year, the assessee had earned dividend income of Rs.46,67,190. The assessee had incurred an expenditure of Rs.28 lakh as broking charges for availing interest-free loan of Rs.14 crore for converting partly-paid shares into fully-paid shares. The Assessing Officer estimated the expenditure incurred on earning the dividend income at Rs.27,24,330 u/r. 8D and disallowed the same u/s.14A of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer was not right in attributing the entire broking commission as relatable to earning of dividend income only. The broking expenditure has to be considered as business expenditure, as well. The Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to bifurcate all the expenditure proportionately and allow the expenditure in accordance with law.

The assessee filed appeal before the Karnataka High Court and raised the following question of law:

“Whether the provisions of section 14A are applicable to the expenses incurred by the assessee in the course of its business merely because the assessee is also having dividend income when there was no material brought to show that the assessee had incurred expenditure for earning dividend income?”

The Karnataka High Court decided the question in favour of the assessee and held as under:

“(i) When no expenditure is incurred by the assessee in earning the dividend income, no notional expenditure could be deducted from the said income. It is not the case of the assessee retaining any shares so as to have the benefit of dividend. 63% of the shares, which were purchased, are sold and the income derived therefrom is offered to tax as business income. The remaining 37% of the shares are retained. It is those unsold shares have yielded dividend, for which, the assessee has not incurred any expenditure at all.

(ii) Though the dividend income is exempt from payment of tax, if any expenditure is incurred in earning the said income, the said expenditure also cannot be deducted. But in this case, when the assessee has not retained shares with the intention of earning dividend income and the dividend income is incidental to his business of sale of shares, which remained unsold by the assessee, it cannot be said that the expenditure incurred in acquiring the shares has to be apportioned to the extent of dividend income and that should be disallowed from deductions.

(iii) In that view of the matter, the approach of the authorities is not in conformity with the statutory provisions contained under the Act. Therefore, the impugned orders are not sustainable and require to be set aside.”

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Capital asset v. Stock-in-trade: Section 50C of Income-tax Act, 1961: A.Y. 2006-07: Section 50C does not apply to land & building held as stock-in-trade.

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[CIT v. M/s. Kan Construction and Colonizers (P) Ltd. (All.), ITA No. 1 of 2012 dated 9-4-2012.]

In the A.Y. 2006-07, the assessee had sold a plot of land which was held by it as stock-in-trade. The Assessing Officer held that the land was a capital asset and computed the capital gain by applying the provisions of section 50C of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal accepted the assessee’s claim that the land was a stock-in-trade and that the provisions of section 50C are not applicable.

The Allahabad High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue and held as under: “

(i) For applicability of section 50C, one of the essential requirements is that an asset should be a ‘capital asset’. Whether sale of land is sale of capital asset or stock-in-trade is essentially a question of fact. The assessee is a builder and the investment in purchase and sale of plots was ancillary and incidental to its business. The assessee had treated the land as stock-in-trade in the balance sheet.

(ii) The Tribunal has rightly held that the provisions of section 50C are not applicable with respect to the sale of land which was not a capital asset.”

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Offshore supply of equipment is not liable to tax in India though it is a part of composite contract involving onshore service component.

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New Page 1

Part C — Tribunal & International Tax Decisions







  1. M/s. Xelo Pty Limited v. DDIT



ITAT Mumbai

Before Shri R. S. Syal (AM) and

Shri D. K. Agarwal (JM)

ITA Nos. 4107 & 4108/Mum./2002

A.Ys. : 1995-96 & 1997-98. Dated : 22-6-2009

Counsel for assessee/revenue : Percy Pardiwala/ Abhijit
Patankar

Facts :

The assessee, an Australian resident, executed 3 contracts
with 3 different Indian enterprises through its PE in India. Two of the
contracts involved only onshore supply and services. The third contract
entered into with Metro Railways, Calcutta involved offshore supply of
equipment; onshore services involving supervision, installation, testing,
commissioning of integrated fibre communication system between Dumdum and
Tollygunj sections of Metro Railways, Calcutta (hereinafter the contract).
Consideration in the contract was split into three parts :

  • Imported
    supplies on FOB basis (offshore supply)



  • Imported
    services (offshore services)



  • Indigenous services (onshore services)



There was no dispute on taxation of onshore services and
income in respect thereof was offered to tax in respect of the contract. The
assessee claimed that income from offshore supply was not taxable in India
since title to the goods passed outside India.

The AO rejected the contention and brought to tax the
entire amount of the contract consideration including the offshore supply on
the grounds that :

(a) the supply of equipment was part of single composite
contract involving onshore services; and

(b) the assessee had PE in India.

On the assessee’s appeal, CIT(A) accepted the submissions
of the assessee and held that the income from offshore supply was not taxable
in India.

Before ITAT, the Tax Department raised the following
contentions :

  • The
    contract was a single contract. There was no scope for bifurcation of
    consideration towards onshore services and offshore supply of the equipment.



  • The
    receipt towards the supply of equipment was liable to be considered as
    appropriation towards consideration for single contract which involved
    supply of the equipment with responsibility of supervision of installation
    work in India.



  • As the
    assessee had PE in India, having regard to force of attraction provisions of
    Article 7(1)(b) of the DTAA between India and Australia, taxable income
    attributable to PE would also include income from offshore supply.




Held :

The ITAT held :

Though the contract is single contract; separate
identifiable consideration has been mentioned towards supply and rendition of
services. There is no dispute that the receipt was towards ‘offshore supply’.
No income accrued to the assessee in India from the offshore supply of
equipment where the title to the equipment passed outside India.

The substance of the matter rather than its form is crucial
for the determination of the tax liability. If the intention of the parties to
the contract is clearly flowing from the terms of the contract, then it is not
permissible to negate those terms to infer to the contrary.

Reliance was placed on the Supreme Court decision in the
case of Ishikawajima Harima Heavy Industries Ltd. v. DIT, (288 ITR 408)
to support that in respect of a composite contract involving onshore and
offshore components, consideration for offshore supply and offshore services
cannot be brought to tax in India in terms of domestic law provisions. In
terms of S. 9(1)(i) of the Income-tax Act, no income accrued or arose in India
as the title to goods passed to the buyers outside India on payment of price
abroad. Also, no operations were carried out in India and therefore there was
no scope for taxation of such income.

Where the income is not taxable in terms of the domestic
law, DTAA cannot be invoked to create any tax liability. The object of DTAA is
not to create any fresh tax liability if it does not exist as per domestic
law. DTAA can only restrict tax liability if it exists.

The contentions of the Tax Department that if the assessee
has PE in India all income accrued to the assessee can be brought to tax in
terms of DTAA is liable to be rejected.


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S. 12AA — Registration of Charitable Trust — Whether rejection of registration on grounds of (a) genuineness of appellant; and (ii) alleged violation of S. 13(1)(b) sustainable — Held, No.

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New Page 1Part B : UNREPORTED DECISIONS

(Full texts of the following Tribunal decisions are
available at the Society’s office on written request. For members desiring that
the Society mails a copy to them, Rs.30 per decision will be charged for
photocopying and postage.)




12 JITO Administrative Training Foundation v. DIT
(Exemption)

ITAT ‘J’ Bench, Mumbai
Before Pramod Kumar (AM) and P. Madhavi Devi (JM)
ITA No. 4126/Mum./2009
Decided on : 18-3-2010

Counsel for assessee/revenue : A. H. Dalal/L. K. Agarwal

S. 12AA — Registration of Charitable Trust — Whether
rejection of registration on grounds of (a) genuineness of appellant; and (ii)
alleged violation of S. 13(1)(b) sustainable — Held, No.

The assessee was a company registered u/s.25 of the Companies
Act, 1956. It was set up for the purpose of rendering certain services in the
field of inter alia, education. Its application for registration made u/s.12A of
the Act was rejected. The reasons for the rejection given amongst others, were
as under :

  • The genuineness of the
    appellant was not proved; and


  • Alleged violation of S.
    13(1)(b) of the Act.


The DIT relied on the decisions in the cases of Zenith Tin
Works Charitable Trust 103ITR119 (Mum) and Yogiraj Charitable Trust
[103ITR777(SC)].

Held :

The Tribunal relying on the decision in the case of Agarwal
Mitra Mandal Trust 106ITD531(Mum)held that the rejection of registration by the
DIT was not sustainable. According to it, at the time of considering the
application for registration, the DIT is only required to examine whether the
activities of the applicant were bona fide or not. The compliance with the
provisions of S. 13(1)(b) were not relevant at the time of considering the
application for registration.

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S. 148 — Reassessment completed by an AO on the basis of a notice u/s 148 issued by another AO who had no jurisdiction over the assessee is not valid.

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New Page 1Part B : UNREPORTED DECISIONS

(Full texts of the following Tribunal decisions are
available at the Society’s office on written request. For members desiring that
the Society mails a copy to them, Rs.30 per decision will be charged for
photocopying and postage.)



11 Dr. (Mrs.) K. B. Kumar v. ITO
ITAT ‘D’ Bench, Delhi
Before D. R. Singh (JM) and R. C. Sharma (AM)
ITA No. 4436/Del./2009


A.Y. : 2001-02. Decided on : 20-1-2010

Counsel for assessee/revenue : Ved Jain & Rano Jain/B. K.
Gupta

S. 148 — Reassessment completed by an AO on the basis of a
notice u/s 148 issued by another AO who had no jurisdiction over the assessee is
not valid.

Per D. R. Singh :

Facts :

The ITO Ward 21(3), Ghaziabad, based on information received
by him from Additional Commissioner, Range 1, Ghaziabad, regarding receipt of
Rs.5 lakhs on 19-2-2000 from Sanjay Mohan Agarwal recorded reasons of income
escaping assessment on 25-3-2008 and issued notice u/s.148 on 27-3-2008. In
response thereto, the assessee submitted to ITO, Ghaziabad that she has filed
her return of income with ITO, Range-48, New Delhi on 3-9-2001 and hence his
notice was without jurisdiction. Subsequently, the assessee, at request of ITO,
Ghaziabad, vide her letter dated 6-12-2008, submitted a copy of income-tax
return for A.Y. 2007-08 along with acknowledgment of receipt of AO, Ward, 34(2),
New Delhi.

The ITO, Ghaziabad transferred the case to the office of AO,
Ward 34(2), New Delhi who issued a notice dated 16-12-2008 to the assessee u/s.
143(2) of the Act. In response thereto, the assessee submitted her reply
mentioning that the proceedings had become time-barred and were illegal and the
proceedings need to be filed. The assessee received a letter dated 2-12-2008
from the AO, New Delhi assessing the income at Rs.9,6,380 by adding the gifted
amount of Rs.5,00,000.

The CIT(A) confirmed the order passed by the AO.

The assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal following decisions in the cases of ITO v.
Krishan Kumar Gupta, (2008) 16 DTR 1 (Del.) (Trib.) 1; Ranjeet Singh v. ACIT,
(2009) 120 TTJ 517 (Del.) and CIT v. Smt. Anjali Dua, (2008) 174 Taxman 72
(Del.) held that the notice u/s.148 issued by ITO, Ghaziabad was without
jurisdiction and consequently the reassessment framed by the AO, Delhi is
invalid. The Tribunal quashed the order passed by the AO, Delhi.

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DP World Pvt. Ltd. vs. DCIT ITAT Mumbai Bench ‘D’ Mumbai Before D. Manmohan (V. P.) and N.K. Billaiya (A. M.) ITA No.3627/Mum/2012 A.Y.: 2008-09. Dated: 12-10-2012 Counsel for Assessee/Revenue: Rajan Vora & Nikhil Tiwari/Rupnder Brari

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10. DP World Pvt. Ltd. vs. DCIT
ITAT Mumbai Bench ‘D’ Mumbai
Before D. Manmohan (V. P.) and N.K. Billaiya (A. M.)
ITA No.3627/Mum/2012
A.Y.: 2008-09. Dated: 12-10-2012
Counsel for Assessee/Revenue:  Rajan Vora &
Nikhil Tiwari/Rupnder Brari

Ss. 28(iv)/56(2) – Gift of residential flats through transfer of shares by foreign company to Indian company – Whether taxable – Held no.

Facts:

The assessee had received by way of a gift, three residential flats in Hill Park from its sister concern viz., BISNCL, a UK based company. BISNCL was holding shares of Hill Park Ltd. which entitled it for use and occupation of the said three flats and the gift was effected by transfer of the said shares. Both, the assessee and BISNCL, were 100% subsidiary of a U.K. based entity which in its turn was 100% subsidy of a Dubai based entity. This transaction, in the eyes of the AO, was a colourable device who taxed the value adopted for WT purpose as income from other sources. However, the same, in the eyes of the CIT[A], was nothing but a benefit derived by the donee out of its business relations with the donor company and therefore, he taxed the same as profit and gains of business & profession.

The issue before the tribunal was whether such transaction can be termed as a ‘Gift ‘or Income in the hands of the Donee.

Held:

According to the tribunal, such a transfer may trigger capital gains ramifications in India, since the shares of an Indian company were situated in India and when the transferor is a non-resident, the deeming provisions of section 9(i)(i) of the I.T. Act, 1961 came into play. However, referring to section 47(iii), the tribunal noted that the transfer of a capital asset, amongst others, under a gift is not treated as transfers for the purposes of section 45 of the Act. Referring to the provisions of section 5 and section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act (‘TPA’), the tribunal noted that there was no requirement in the TPA that a ‘gift’ can be made only between two natural persons out of natural love and affection which means that as long as a donor company is permitted by its Articles of Association to make a ‘gift’, it can do so. In case where donor is a foreign company, the tribunal noted that the relevant corporate/commercial law of the jurisdiction where the donor is based needs to be considered. Referring to the Certificate and Attestation by the Notary Public of the City of London, England, wherein the authority has inter alia certified and attested that the Deed of Gift was binding on BISNCL in accordance with the relevant provisions of English law, the tribunal concluded that BISNCL was legally authorised to give gift of shares.

Therefore, it held that the gift of shares of an Indian Company by a foreign company without consideration has to be treated as gift within the meaning of section 47(iii) of the Act.

As regards the order of the CIT(A) applying the provisions of section 28(iv), it observed that simply because both the donor and the donee happened to belong to the same group cannot ipso facto establish that they have any business dealings to attract the provisions of section 28(iv). Therefore, it was held that in the absence of any specific provision taxing a Gift as a deemed business income, provisions of section 28[iv] cannot be applied

As regards the applicability of the provisions of section 56 relied upon by the AO, the tribunal noted that a plain reading of the provisions show that not every receipt is taxable under the head ‘Income from other sources‘ but only those which can be shown as ‘Income‘ can be brought to tax under this head, if it does not fall directly under other heads of income specified in section 14 of the Act. According to it, the issue involved under the present appeal got covered under the clause (viia) of section 56(2). However, the said clause was introduced with effect from 1st day of June, 2010, hence, not applicable to the case of the assessee.

Accordingly, it was held that the transaction involved in the present appeal was nothing but a Gift and thus it was a capital receipt not taxable under the provisions of the Act.

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Kewal Silk Mills v. ACIT ITAT Mumbai `A’ Bench Before I. P. Bansal (JM) and Rajendra (AM) ITA No. 4335/Mum/2012 A.Y.: 2009-10. Dated: 12-10-2012. Counsel for assessee/revenue: Rajan Vora & Hemen Chandriya/Surinder Vit Singh

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9. Kewal Silk Mills v. ACIT
ITAT  Mumbai `A’ Bench
Before I. P. Bansal (JM) and Rajendra (AM)
ITA No. 4335/Mum/2012
A.Y.: 2009-10.    Dated: 12-10-2012.
Counsel for assessee/revenue: Rajan Vora & Hemen Chandriya/Surinder Vit Singh

S/s 2(14), 45, 55(2) – Right to use a portion of the shed, in which the looms and machinery taken on license basis are situated, by way of permissible use on license basis as incidental to using the said looms and machinery is covered by the term “any kind of property” and is therefore a capital asset. Amount received on surrender of such right is chargeable to tax under the head Income from Capital Gains and not Income from Other Sources. Amount received by Licensees who are deemed to be tenants u/s. 15A of the Bombay Rent, Hotel & Lodging and House Rates Control Act, 1947, by virtue of amendment in 1973, on surrender of such license/tenancy is chargeable to tax under the head Income from Capital Gains.

Facts:

The assessee, a partnership firm, through its partners entered into an agreement dated 13.6.1972 with Modern Textile Rayon and Silk Mills Pvt. Ltd. (Modern) whereby it took on license basis, for a period of one year, loom and machinery described in first schedule of the said agreement on a monthly compensation of Rs. 3,250 per month. Modern was the tenant of the shed belonging to Mr. Paresh S. Shah. This agreement referred to the assessee as licensee. The assessee was entitled to use a portion of the shed in which the looms were situated by way of permissible use on license basis only as incidental to using the said looms and machinery. The agreement provided that the assessee shall never be construed as sublessee in any form of the said portion of the said shed. The assessee was also provided with access to the said portion of the said shed through portion of the shed retained by the licensors or otherwise. Thus, as per the agreement the assessee had incidental right of premises through which the looms were to be used. The said right of the assessee was recognised from the date of the agreement till the date of its surrender.

The assessee regarded this right as sub-tenancy and in the return of income filed the amounts received on surrender thereof were offered for taxation under the head Income from Capital Gains after claiming exemption u/s. 54EC of the Act.

The Assessing Officer after going through various clauses of the agreement dated 13.6.1972 came to the conclusion that the assessee was not a sub-tenant of the land which had been sold by the owner thereof but only had an incidental right to use the shed and that the amounts received are not assessable as capital gains. He also examined the purchasers of the said land who mentioned that only Modern and M/s Saurdeep Chemicals Pvt. Ltd were tenants of the land purchased by them. However, actual possession and occupation was held by the assessee and payments have been made to the assessee in order to get peaceful and vacant possession of the property. The AO observed that the payment received was in the nature of nuisance value and assessee did not have any capital right since the possession of portion of the shed was incidental to the license granted to it for use of machinery. The amount received was assessed to tax under the head Income from Other Sources.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who upheld the action of the AO. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:

The Tribunal noted that the incidental right to use the premises was provided by the agreement dated 13.6.1972 itself and also that the assessee was referred to as the licensee in the said agreement. By an amendment in 1973, which is subsequent to the date of the agreement entered into by the assessee, certain licensees have been deemed to be tenants u/s. 15A of the Bombay Rent, Hotel & Lodging and House Rates Control Act, 1947 and were to be considered as tenants. Therefore, in any case the assessee had acquired the status of tenant of the landlord. As per provisions of section 55(2) tenancy right has been considered to be a capital asset. Moreover, the definition of capital asset as per section 2(14) of the Act is wide enough to cover “property of any kind” and the type of right acquired by the assessee in the property used by it cannot in any manner be said to be less than “any kind of property” held by the assessee.

The Tribunal also observed from some of the rent receipts filed by the assessee before the Tribunal that the amount being paid by the assessee was considered to be rent by the other parties and thus parties in principle had accepted that the assessee was the tenant from whom the rent was being received by the other party. The further correspondence between the assessee and its licensor, the purchaser of the land and the assessee are also describing the right of the assessee as tenancy right only and the deed executed between purchaser of the premises and the assessee is also described as deed of surrender of tenancy. Thus, the assessee was enjoying a right over the property in the nature of being tenant of the same for the last so many years and that right of the assessee cannot be considered as evaluated much less than the right of tenancy right.

The assessee, in fact, was enjoying the possession of the impugned property and for peaceful vacation thereof it had received the impugned amount which was described by both the parties as the amount paid for surrender of tenancy rights. The assessee had acquired the said right long back and licensor to the assessee also had recognised the said right of the assessee. The right of the assessee was undisputed and nature thereof was “property of any kind” which was held by the assessee and was to be termed as capital asset within the meaning of section 2(14) of the Act. Tenancy right has also been recognised as capital asset within the meaning of section 55(2)(a) of the Act.

The tribunal held that the amount received by the assessee is assessable as capital gains and not as income from other sources. The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

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Chandrakant K. Shah v. ITO ITAT Mumbai `C’ Bench Before Dinesh Kumar Agarwal (JM) and B. Ramakotaiah (AM) ITA No. 4913/Mum/2011 A.Y.: 1993-94. Dated: 17-10-2012. Counsel for assessee/revenue: Aasifa Khan/ Rajarshi Dwivedy

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8. Chandrakant K. Shah v. ITo
ITAT  Mumbai `C’ Bench
Before Dinesh Kumar Agarwal (JM) and B.
Ramakotaiah (AM)
ITA No. 4913/Mum/2011
A.Y.: 1993-94. Dated: 17-10-2012.
Counsel for assessee/revenue: Aasifa Khan/ Rajarshi Dwivedy

Section 234B – At the time of passing an order giving effect to order of ITAT, interest u/s. 234B is to be computed on tax on total income finally determined under regular assessment as reduced by the amount of TDS and self assessment tax. Interest u/s. 234B cannot be levied on amount of interest chargeable u/s. 234A and 234C.

Facts:

The assessee filed its return of income declaring income of Rs. 1,51,351. The Assessing Officer (AO) vide order passed u/s. 143(3) of the Act assessed the total income of the assessee to be Rs. 15,93,220. After giving effect to the order of ITAT, the total income was determined at Rs. 14,41,074 as per order dated 28.11.2006 giving effect to the order of ITAT. The AO while charging interest u/s. 234B calculated interest @ 2% per month for 19 months on Rs. 8,44,797 (i.e. Rs 5,63,906 amount of tax worked out after giving credit of TDS and self assessment tax (+) Rs. 1,09,440 amount of interest charged u/s. 234A (+) Rs. 1,70,230 amount of interest u/s. 234B up to 15.5.1994 and Rs 1221 amount of interest charged u/s. 234C). According to the assessee, the interest u/s. 234B was chargeable only on Rs 5,63,906 which is amount of tax worked out after giving credit of TDS and self assessment tax. Thus, according to the assessee interest u/s. 234B worked out to Rs. 2,14,284 as against Rs. 8,44,797 charged by the AO. The assessee filed an application u/s. 154 of the Act objecting that interest charged u/s. 234B is not correctly computed.

The AO rejected the claim of the assessee vide order dated 15.4.2010. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who held that the AO had rightly rejected the appellant’s request for rectification of amount of interest charged u/s. 234B of the Act.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:

The Tribunal noted that the there is no dispute that the interest u/s. 234B is leviable. The dispute was on the amount on which interest u/s. 234B is leviable. Having noted the provisions of section 234B of the Act, the Tribunal held that in the facts of the assessee’s case, interest u/s. 234B for the relevant period is chargeable @ 2% per month for 19 months on the amount of Rs. 5,63,906 worked out after giving credit of TDS and self assessment tax.

The Tribunal directed the AO to verify the amount of interest calculated by the assessee as mentioned hereinabove and if he finds that the same is in order, reduce the levy of interest u/s. 234B accordingly. The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

Compiler’s Note: Though not mentioned in the order, it appears that 15.5.1994 was the date of filing of return by the assessee.

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Shri Rumi K. Pali v. Dy CIT ITAT Mumbai `D’ Bench Before D. Manmohan (VP) and N. K. Billaiya (AM) ITA No. 7314/Mum/2011 A.Y.: 2008-09. Dated on: 17-10-2012. Counsel for assessee/revenue: Reepal Tralshawala/A B Koli

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7. Shri Rumi K. Pali v. Dy CIT
ITAT  Mumbai `D’ Bench
Before D. Manmohan (VP) and N. K. Billaiya (AM)
ITA No. 7314/Mum/2011
A.Y.: 2008-09.     Dated on: 17-10-2012.
Counsel for assessee/revenue: Reepal Tralshawala/A B Koli

S/s 10(11) – ITAT can consider a new deduction which, inadvertently, was not claimed in the return filed by the assessee. Assessee is entitled to claim interest on PPF to be exempt even though the same was not claimed in the incometax return.

Facts:

The assessee in the return of income filed, which return of income was revised on two occasions, as well as in the two revised returns filed by him offered for taxation under the head Income from Other Sources, Rs 3,81,565 being interest on PPF. The Assessing Officer (AO) completed the scrutiny assessment by accepting the returned income.

In an appeal to CIT(A), the assessee contended that he should be allowed exemption in respect of interest on PPF deposit u/s. 10(11) of the Act. The CIT(A), relying on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Goetze India Ltd. (284 ITR 323) held that no fresh claim can be made by the assessee. He dismissed the appeal filed by the assessee.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where on behalf of the assessee, it was contended that a statutory claim can be made at any stage; mistake which has crept in the income-tax return was inadvertent; and the assessee cannot be put in a position so as to be taxed on something which he is not legally bound to. Reliance was also placed on the decision of Bombay High Court in the case of CIT v Pruthvi Brokers & Shareholders Pvt. Ltd. (ITA No. 3908 of 2010).

Held:

 The Tribunal noted that the assessee failed to claim interest on PPF deposits as exempt from tax even in the revised returns and the impugned amount of interest is exempt from tax u/s. 10(11) of the Act. It noted that the Supreme Court, in the case of National Thermal Power Company Ltd. v CIT 229 ITR 383 (SC), has observed that even if a claim is not made before the AO, it can be made before the Appellate authority. It also noted that the decision of the Bombay High Court on which assessee has placed reliance, having considered the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of Goetze India Ltd. (supra) and also National Thermal Power Company Ltd. v CIT (supra), held as under:

“The jurisdiction of the appellate authorities to entertain such a claim has not been negated by the Supreme Court in this judgment. In fact, the Supreme Court made it clear that the issue in the case was limited to the power of the assessing authority and that the judgement does not impinge on the power of the Tribunal u/s. 254.”

Following the above mentioned decision of the Bombay High Court, the Tribunal directed the AO to allow exemption of interest on PPF deposit at Rs. 3,81,565. The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

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Income: Mutuality: A. Y. 2005-06: TDR premium paid by members to housing co-operative society for utilising extra FSI is exempt in the hands of society on the principle of mutuality:

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CIT vs. Jai Hind Co-operative Housing Society Ltd.; 259 CTR 501 (Bom):

The assessee is a co-operative housing society formed of plot owners, who had obtained a lease of land from the Maharashtra Housing Board. The society in turn entered into sub-lease agreements with its members. The society passed a resolution by which it resolved that if any member desires to avail of the benefit of TDR for carrying out construction on his/her plot, the member should apply for a no objection certificate which would be granted on the payment of a premium calculated at Rs. 250 per sq. ft. In the previous year relevant to the A. Y. 2005-06, the assessee society received a premium of Rs. 18.75 lakh from four members of the society. The Assessing Officer rejected the claim of the assessee society that the premium amount is governed by the principle of mutuality and accordingly is not chargeable to tax and added the said amount of Rs. 18.75 lakh to the total income. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim and deleted the addition.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The principle of mutuality would clearly apply to a situation as to the present. The TDR premium is a payment made by a member to the society of which he is a member, as a consideration for being permitted to make an additional utilization of FSI on the plot allotted by the co-operative housing society.

ii) The society which looks after the infrastructure, requires the payment of the premium in order to defray the additional burden that may be cast as a result of the utilisation of the FSI. The point however is that there is a complete mutuality between the co-operative housing society and its members. The principles of mutuality would apply. Hence no substantial question of law arises.”

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A Netherlands resident company received payments for grant of licence for off-the-shelf software to an Indian customer. No right in the copyright was transferred. The AAR held that payments were not royalty or FTS under DTAA and since the company did not

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New Page 5

Part C : Tribunal & AAR International Tax Decisions


2 GeoQuest Systems B.V., In re

AAR No. 774 of 2008 (AAR)

Article 7, 12 of India-Netherlands DTAA;

S. 9(1)(vi) (vii) of Income-tax Act

Dated : 6-8-2010

A Netherlands resident company received payments for grant of
licence for off-the-shelf software to an Indian customer. No right in the
copyright was transferred. The AAR held that payments were not royalty or FTS
under DTAA and since the company did not have PE in India, payments were not
taxable in India.

Facts :

The applicant was a company incorporated in the Netherlands
(‘DutchCo’). It was engaged in the business of supplying special-purpose
computer software for use in exploration and production of mineral oils. The
software was not prepared to suit the special requirements of any particular
customer and hence DutchCo described it as off-the-shelf. Under an agreement
DutchCo granted an exclusive non-transferable licence for the software to an
Indian company. DutchCo was to retain all IPRs in the software as well as in
modifications and updates. DutchCo was to supply the software package to the
customer outside India and the customer was to pay the consideration also
outside India. On termination of the agreement the customer was to discontinue
the use of the software and return the same. The agreement also contained
certain other restrictions on use of the software by the customer.

The issue before the AAR was, whether the income from supply
of the software would be taxable as royalty under the Income-tax Act or DTAA ?

Drawing distinction between transfer of copyright in a
product and transfer of a copyrighted product, DutchCo contended before the AAR
that the transfer was of a copyrighted product and hence, the consideration
should not be taxed as royalty.

The tax authority initially contended that the payment was
royalty but later on contended that as per the AAR ruling in Airports Authority
of India, In re (323 ITR 211) (AAR), it was FTS.

Held :

The AAR observed that the core question was whether the
payment conferred any rights in the copyright or right to use the copyright. The
AAR relied on its earlier rulings in Factset Research Systems Inc., In re (317
ITR 169) (AAR) and Dassault Systems K K, In re (322 ITR 125) (AAR) wherein it
was held that what was transferred to the end-user was copyrighted software but
not copyright therein and mere transfer of computer software de-hors any
copyright does not amount to royalty.

The AAR distinguished its earlier ruling in Airports
Authority of India, In re (323 ITR 211) (AAR) and observed that in that case,
apart from the licence of the software, the contract also envisaged imparting of
technical knowledge and hence, that ruling was not applicable to this case.

The AAR relied on the OECD commentary and held that Article
12.4 of DTAA contemplates conferring of right of use of copyright. As transfer
of such right was not evident from the agreement, the payments were not in the
nature of royalty or FTS under DTAA. As DutchCo did not have a PE in India, the
payments were not taxable in India.

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DCIT vs. Kemper Holding Pvt. Ltd. ITAT Mumbai `A’ Bench Before Sanjay Arora (AM) and Sanjay Garg (JM) ITA Nos. 6426/M/2011 A.Y.: 2008-09. Decided on: 26th April, 2013. Counsel for revenue/assessee: Surinder Jit Singh/Pradeep Sagar

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Section 2(47) – Conversion of warrants into shares is neither an extinguishment nor relinquishment of any rights in the assets.

Facts:

During the financial year 2006-07 the assessee was allotted 7,00,000 warrants of Rs. 100 each. 10% of the cost of the warrant was paid on allotment and the balance 90% was to be paid at the time when the warrants were to be converted into shares. During the financial year 2007-08, the assessee paid the balance 90% and the said warrants were converted into shares. The market price of each share on the date of conversion was Rs. 231.35.

The Assessing Officer (AO) held that the assessee while exercising his option for conversion of warrants into equity shares had extinguished his rights in warrants and simultaneously gained rights in equity shares. He held that the shares were purchased at the price of Rs. 100 when their market value was Rs. 231.35. Therefore, he held that the assessee had gained a benefit of Rs. 131.35 per warrant. Thus Rs. 9,45,00,000 was charged to tax as long term capital gain in the hands of the assessee.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who deleted the addition of Rs. 9,45,00,000 on the ground that there was no transfer at all and the AO had taken market value of the shares to be the full value of consideration. He even rejected the alternative contention of the AO that the said benefit is taxable u/s. 28(iv) of the Act. Aggrieved the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

The conversion of warrant into shares by paying the remaining 90% amount was neither any extinguishment nor relinquishment of any rights in the assets. It observed that the assessee had purchased the warrants by paying 10% of the pre-determined price of the shares. There was an option for the assessee to get the said warrants converted into shares by paying 90% of the amount within the stipulated period, the nonpayment of which would have resulted in forfeiture of money. So the money paid for warrants was just an advance payment for the purchase of shares and the assessee exercised its rights within the stipulated time and got the shares allotted by paying the remaining 90% amount at the predetermined value of the shares. It can be said to be an investment in shares. The capital gain would have arisen if the assessee would have sold the said shares in the market at a higher price. The shares have been retained by the assessee and the gain or fall in the market value of the said shares does not itself constitute any transfer under the Act. The purchase of shares at a specified rate, which were booked by paying 10% amount in advance neither amounts to any transfer of shares or warrant by the assessee nor does it invite any tax liability under the Act. The Tribunal also held that the AO has wrongly and illegally interpreted proviso (iv) to section 48 of the Act. The Tribunal confirmed the order passed by CIT(A).

The Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the revenue.

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Sections 14A read with section 2(22A) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 – Interest in relation to investment in shares of foreign companies not to be disallowed u/s. 14A.

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6. (2013) 153 TTJ 181 (Mumbai)
ITO vs. Strides Arcolab Ltd.
ITA No.6487 (Mum.) of 2004
A.Y.2001-02. Dated 03-08-2012
 
Sections 14A read with section 2(22A) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 – Interest in relation to investment in shares of foreign companies not to be disallowed u/s. 14A.

Facts
For the relevant assessment year, the Assessing Officer made disallowance u/s. 14A in respect of interest on investment in shares on which assessee had earned dividend income which was claimed as exempt/s.10(33). The CIT(A), inter alia, held that only the dividend income received from a domestic company is exempt u/s. 10(33) [this was the section during A.Y.2001-02 – now it is section 10(34)]. Therefore, interest in respect of assessee’s investment in shares of foreign companies was not liable to be considered u/s. 14A.

Held

The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)’s order in respect of the above matter. The Tribunal noted as under :

1. Section 10(33), at the material time, exempted, inter alia, dividend referred to in section 115-O from the purview of taxation. Section 115-O talks of a `domestic company’.

2. On perusal of the definition of `domestic company’ u/s. 2(22A), it transpires that it is only Indian company or any other company, which has, in respect of its income is liable to tax under this Act, made prescribed arrangement for the declaration and payment of dividend. Obviously, this definition does not extend to foreign companies.

3. Therefore, the disallowance u/s. 14A is conceivable only in respect of investment made in the shares of domestic companies and not foreign companies.

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Bhawanji Kunverji Haria vs. DCIT Income-tax Appellate Tribunal Mumbai Bench “F”, Mumbai Before Vijay Pal Rao (J. M.) and N. K. Billaiya (A. M.) ITA No. 4032/Mum/2009 A Y. 2006-07. Decided on 25.05.2012 Counsel for Assessee/Revenue: G. C. Lalka/M. Rajan

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Sections 22 and 23—(i) Where on account of interior work being carried out during the year the property could only be leased out from the next financial year, no notional rent could be added as the income of the assessee in the current year; (ii) Income from house property which is used in the business carried out in the partnership firm in which the assessee was a partner eligible for exemption u/s. 22.

Facts:

The assessee owned two commercial properties. In his return of income filed, he had not offered income from house property. According to him, the possession of one of the properties was received in December 2005. He took three months to complete the furniture work and the property was let out from April 2006. The other property was used by the partnership firm in which he was the partner. As regards the first property, the AO held that as the property was in possession of the assessee, the provisions of section 23(1) were attracted and the annual value of the property was deemed to be the income of the assessee. As regards the second property, he held that the individual and partnership firm are two different entities, hence, the exemption claimed in respect of the same u/s. 22 was not available. On appeal, the CIT (A) confirmed the order of the AO.

Held:

In respect of the first property, the tribunal noted that the facts regarding the date of its possession and the time the assessee took to furnish the premises were not in dispute and that immediately thereafter, the premises was let out in April 2006. Therefore, it accepted the assessee’s submission and held that no notional rent could be added as the income of the assessee qua the said property.

As regards the second property which was let out to a partnership firm where the assessee was a partner, the tribunal relying on the decision of the Orissa High Court in the case of Commissioner of Income-tax v. Rabindranath Bhol (211 ITR 299) held that the income from the house property which is used in the business carried out in the partnership firm in which the assessee was a partner would qualify for the exemption provided u/s. 22.

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Khar Gymkhana vs. DIT(E) In the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal Mumbai Bench ‘A’, Mumbai Before B. Ramakotaiah, (A. M.) and Vivek Varma, (J. M.) I.T.A. No.: 373/Mum/2012 Asst. Year: 2009-10. Decided on 10-07-2013 Counsel for Assessee/Revenue: A. H. Dalal/ Surinder Jit Singh

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Section 12AA—Order cancelling Registration of the trust for carrying on activities in the nature of trade, commerce or business revoked. Registration restored.

Facts:

The assessee trust was granted registration under section 12A(a) since the year 1984. During the course of the assessment proceedings, the AO noticed that the assessee had earned income by the sale of liquor at Rs. 1.45 crore, canteen compensation at Rs. 20.67 lakh, Card and daily games, at Rs. 0.82 lakh, guest fees at Rs. 31.50 lakh and income from banquet. According to the AO these receipts were clearly in the nature of business income and were in excess of the monetary limit as laid down in the provisions of section 2(15) r.w. proviso which has come into effect from A.Y. 2009-10. Therefore, he concluded that such entity cannot be considered as for charitable purpose. Since the assessee is not for charitable purpose then the trust itself becomes non-genuine as it loses its public charitable status and accordingly the provision of section 12AA(3) of the Act gets attracted. Thus in view of the facts and circumstances the AO held that the assessee trust has become non-genuine and the registration as allowed to it in earlier years u/s. 12AA was cancelled/ withdrawn w.e.f A.Y. 2009-10.

Before the tribunal, the assessee contended that the rigours of section 12AA get attracted “if the activities of the trust or institution are not genuine or are not being carried out in accordance with the objects of the trust, as the case may be.” According to the assessee just because the legislature has inserted section 2(15), registration, as allowed by the Income-tax Department cannot get cancelled, without the change of objects and character of the trust. He further placed reliance on the earlier decisions of the tribunal in ITAs no. 4315 & 4316/ Mum/2010 in assessee’s own case.

On the other hand, the revenue justified the order of the DIT and submitted that with the insertion of section 2(15), the character of the charitable trust has got very limited scope. It becomes ineligible for registration, if the trust gets into the field of trade or profit making.

Held:

The tribunal noted that the case of the department was that the assessee had crossed the twin conditions, as mentioned in section 12AA(3), viz., ”that the activities of such trust or institution are not genuine or are not being carried out in accordance with the objects of the trust or institution”. However, it noted that in the instant case, the department had nowhere mentioned that “social intercourse among members” was not one of the objects of the trust, when it was originally formed on 04-10-1934. Further, it also noted that in the tribunal orders in the assessee’s own case which were relied on by the assessee, the aspect of section 2(15) had also been taken and adjudicated upon. Thus, noting that none of the revenue authorities have made any observation/comments on the objects recited as early as 04-10-1934 of the assessee trust, the twin conditions existing in section 12AA(3) and for ignoring the existing orders of the coordinate Bench in the case of the assessee and following the principles of judicial propriety, as well as the facts coming out of the documents placed before it, the tribunal held that the revenue has erred in cancelling the registration u/s. 12AA(3).

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Knight Frank (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Addl. CIT ITAT Mumbai `A’ Bench Before B. Ramakotaiah (AM) and Vivek Verma (JM) ITA No. 2021/Mum/2011 A.Y.: 2007-08. Decided on: 10th July, 2013. Counsel for assessee/revenue: M. M. Golvala/ Kalik Singh.

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Sections 43B, 145A. Provisions of section 145A do not apply to service tax. Accordingly, service tax is not includible in cost of components.

Facts:

The assessee had not considered service tax for computing cost of components. In the course of assessment proceedings the Assessing Officer (AO) asked the assessee to explain why the same should not be included in view of the provisions of section 145A. Rejecting the submissions made by the assessee, the AO enhanced the trading profit by Rs. 69,20,599 and added the same to the total income returned by the assessee.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who sustained the order of the AO on the point of inclusion of service tax by invoking the provisions of section 145A.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where it placed reliance on the decision of Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs. Noble & Hewitt (I) Pvt. Ltd. (305 ITR 324)(Del) and Chennai ITAT decision in the case of ACIT vs. Real Image Media Technologies Pvt. Ltd. (306 ITR 106)(AT-Chennai).

Held:

The Tribunal held that since the assessee is a service provider company patently the provisions of section 145A cannot be made applicable because the provision was specifically introduced for the purposes of manufacturing segment of the business. It noted that section 145A(a)(ii) mentions “…by the assessee being goods to the place of location & conditions as on the date of valuation are required to be included.” It also noted that the issue is now covered by the decisions relied upon by the assessee. Following the said decisions, the Tribunal set aside the order of CIT(A) and directed the AO to delete the addition.

This ground of appeal was decided in favour of the assessee.

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DCIT v. Hemal Raju Shete ITAT Mumbai `H’ Bench Before P. M. Jagtap (AM) and Dr. S. T. M. Pavalan (JM) ITA No. 2198/Mum/2010 A.Y.: 2006-07. Decided on: 10th July, 2013. Counsel for revenue/assessee: P. K. Shukla/J. D. Mistry & M. A. Gohel.

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Section 45, 48. What is to be taxed is the gain received or accrued. Accordingly, deferred consideration under the share sale agreement cannot be taxed. Maximum cap provided in the agreement cannot be equalled either with sale value nor with full value of consideration since the said maximum cap is neither received nor accrued for the purposes of calculating capital gains.

Facts:

The assessee filed its return of income for AY 2006-07 declaring total income of Rs. 11,68,470. The assessee had shown long term capital gain of Rs. 42,38,674 on sale of 75,000 shares of Unisol Infrastructures Ltd and had claimed exemption u/s. 54EC by investing the sale proceeds in bonds of SIDBI. In the course of assessment proceedings, on examining the agreement dated 25.1.2006 pertaining to transfer of shares the Assessing Officer (AO) noticed that the said agreement grants absolute right to the assessee as well as other transferors to receive the specified amount in a deferred manner with nomenclature of `initial’ and `deferred’ consideration being employed. The AO reworked the share of the assessee in the alleged total consideration `accrued’ to the transferors by clubbing the initial consideration and deferred consideration and thereby assessed the capital gain at Rs. 4,91,94,923. He therefore made an addition of Rs. 4,48,54,923 to the total income returned by the assessee.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who allowed the appeal filed by the assessee since according to him the deferred gain could not be taxed as the gain was not received nor accrued to the assessee.

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where on behalf of the assessee it was pointed out to the tribunal that clause 3 of the agreement dealing with consideration provided that Rs. 20 crore is the maximum limit. This clause served as a cap to the effect that the aggregate of initial and deferred consideration shall not exceed the cap of Rs. 20 crore. The manner of computation of deferred consideration was explained to demonstrate that the assessee may or may not get the deferred consideration. It was pointed out that since there was no certainty of receiving the amount and also that the quantum to be received was not known, taxing the maximum cap provided is not tenable.

Held:

On perusal of the agreement the tribunal found that the amount of Rs. 20 crore was the maximum amount which could be received by the assessee’s group. This amount comprised initial consideration and deferred consideration. There was no guarantee for receipt of this maximum amount by the assessee’s group. In view of these facts, the tribunal agreed that what is to be taxed is the gain received or accrued and not the notional/hypothetical income. It held that the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. George Henderson & Co. Ltd. and that of ITAT in Mrs. Alpana Piramal, relied upon by DR have no application as the ratio in the said cases is applicable when the dispute relates to adopting the full value of consideration visà- vis the sale consideration which is not the case in the present appeal. Maximum cap mentioned in the agreement cannot be equated either with sale value consideration (sic sale consideration) or with full value of consideration since the said maximum cap is neither received nor accrued for the purposes of claiming capital gains. The Tribunal upheld the order passed by CIT(A).

The appeal filed by the revenue was dismissed.

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Transfer pricing: S/s 92B and 92C: A. Y. 2004- 05: International transaction: Meaning of: Assessee a wholly owned subsidiary of Mauritius company which, in turn, was a wholly owned subsidiary of a US company: Assessee booked orders in India for equipments manufactured by US company and earned commission: Also rendered services against warranty given by US company: Apart from that, assessee entered into independent contracts with Indian customers for installation, commissioning and maintenance

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CIT vs. Stratex Net Works (India) (P.) Ltd; 215 Taxman 533 (Del): 33 taxman.com 168 (Del):

The assessee was a wholly owned subsidiary of a Mauritius company which, in turn, was a wholly owned subsidiary of a company of USA. US company was an associated enterprise of the assessee. All the equipments for microwave links were manufactured by the said associated enterprise (AE). The orders in India for installation of these equipments were booked by the assessee, for which it received commission from its AE. Services against warranty given by AE were also rendered by assessee. Apart from that, the assessee also undertook installation of the said equipment and was also undertaking annual maintenance to its Indian customers vide a separate contact. To compute profit level indicator (PLI) in respect of international transactions, the Transfer Pricing Officer had adopted the Transactional Net Margin Method (TNMM) as the most appropriate method u/s. 92C(1)(e). While computing the PLI, the Transfer Pricing Officer (TPO) took into account not only the operating revenue and operating costs of the international transactions involving warranty services and commission income, but also took into account the operating revenue and operating costs of the installation/commissioning and maintenance services which were domestic transactions and made TP adjustment to assessee’s income. The Commissioner (Appeals) deleted said addition. The Tribunal concurred with the order of the Commissioner (Appeals).

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) It is evident that the Transfer Pricing Officer, himself, did not consider installation/commissioning and maintenance to be international transactions inasmuch as no adjustment was made by him in respect thereof. The adjustments made to the extent of Rs. 1,19,41,893/- were only with regard to the value of international transactions relating to commission on sales and warranty support service.

ii) On going through the order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) as also the impugned order passed by the Tribunal, it was clear that both these authorities have returned a finding of fact that the installation/commissioning and maintenance services were not part of the international transactions. In fact, the Tribunal held that the installation/commissioning and maintenance agreements were independent agreements unconnected with the transactions of warranty support services and the transaction which generated the commission income.

iii) The Tribunal noted that the equipment had been supplied to 40 customers by the/assessee’s associated enterprise. However, only three of them had availed of the installation services from the assessee. The Tribunal also noted that a corroborative circumstance for construing the transactions of installation/commissioning and maintenance as domestic transactions was that, in the order of the TPO itself, no adjustment was made in respect of these transactions. The Tribunal further held that since the profit level indicator shown by the assessee on the international transactions of waranty service and commission income was 18.98%, there was no need for any adjustment in the arm’s length prices of these transactions inasmuch as the profit level indicator of the comparables were determined by the Transfer Pricing Officer at 16.34%, which was lower.

iv) It is in this backdrop that the Tribunal felt that there was no reason to examine the issue on the argument of the assessee that the Transfer Pricing Officer had not applied the proper comparables while working out the profit level indicator of comparables.

v) From the foregoing discussion, it is evident that the transactions pertaining to the installation/ commissioning and maintenance services were not international transactions as contemplated u/s. 92B(1). They were also not deemed international transactions u/s. 92B(2) of the said Act because none of the conditions stipulated therein of a prior agreement/existing between the customers of the assessee and the associated enterprise had been established as a fact. Moreover, there is no finding that the terms of the transaction of installation/commissioning as well as maintenance had been determined in substance between the customers and the assessee by the associated enterprise.

vi) In the absence of such findings, it cannot be deemed that the transaction of installation/commissioning as well as provision of maintenance services by the assessee to its domestic customers in India were international transactions falling within section 92B(2).

vii) As such, no substantial question of law arises for the consideration of this court.”

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Revision: Rectification: S/s. 154,155(14) and 263: A. Y. 1999-00: Assessee not claiming refund for non-availability of TDS certificates: Certificates produced later and rectification order allowing credit: Revision of rectification order by Commissioner u/s. 263: Provision permitting rectification not in force at time of rectification but in force at time of revision by Commissioner: Order of rectification not erroneous and could not have been revised:

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CIT vs. Digital Global Soft Ltd.; 354 ITR 489 (Kar):

For the A. Y. 1999-00, while filing the return of income, the assessee did not have TDS certificates in respect of Rs. 19,44,692/- and accordingly, could not claim credit of the said amount in the return of income. After receiving the intimation u/s. 143(1), the assesee received the TDS certificates in respect of the said amount. Thereafter, the assessee filed the said TDS certificates and claimed credit of the said amount by rectification u/s. 154 of the Act. The Assessing Officer allowed the claim by passing order u/s. 154. The Commissioner exercising his power u/s. 263 of the Act withdrew the said credit of Rs. 19,44,672/- given by the Assessing Officer u/s. 154. The Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by the assessee and set aside the order of the Commissioner passed u/s. 263.

On appeal by the Revenue, the following question was raised:

“Whether the order passed by the assessing authority giving credit to the amount paid by way of tax deducted at source and consequently directing refund when the assessee has not claimed the said amount in the return filed under the purported exercise of power u/s. 154 of the Act is valid?”

The Karnataka High Court dismissed the appeal and held as under:

“i) As the provisions of section 155(14) were not in the statute book on the day the Assessing Officer passed the order u/s. 154, the order passed on 12th June, 2001, could not be strictly in accordance with law. It was erroneous. The amendment came into effect only from 1st June, 2002.

ii) But on the day the Commissioner exercised his power and passed order on 31st July, 2002, the amendment was in the statute book. Therefore, on 31st July, 2002, when revisional jurisdiction was exercised, the Commissioner could not have held that the order passed by the assessing authority was erroneous, as on that day the amended law provided for such rectification.

iii) Even if it was erroneous, unless the erroneous order was prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue, the Commissioner could not have exercised the power. The amount that was ordered to be refunded to the assessee was not an amount lawfully due to the Revenue at all, but an amount which the Revenue legitimately should have refunded if only the claim had been made in the return enclosing the certificates u/s. 203.

iv) Because the assesee was handicapped by such certificates not being forwarded to it and consequently not being able to make the claim, such a claim was not made. The moment it got possession of those certificates within two years from the end of the assessment year it had put forth the claim. The amount was not a lawful amount due to the Government. It was an amount which should have been refunded to the assessee.

v) In that view of the matter we do not see any merit in this appeal. The substantial question of law framed is answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. The appeal is dismissed.”

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Presumptive income: Section 44AD r.w.s. 69: Assessee, a construction company: Books of account maintained by assessee were duly audited and there was no question of disbelieving them in absence of any cogent evidence: Benefit u/s. 44AD could be granted to assessee:

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CIT vs. Dolphin Builders P. Ltd.; 35 taxman.com 3 (MP):

The assessee, a construction company constructed 24 flats in two buildings and entered into agreement with ‘G’, according to which flats were sold through ‘G’ on an agreed commission. A raid was conducted in the premises of ‘G’ in which a note book was found, where in the column for cost of flats some figures were mentioned in respect of assessee’s apartments. The Assessing Officer taking view that the figures indicated the sale price of flats of assessee’s apartments, recomputed the income u/s. 44AD by calculating sale proceeds as per the seized document. Commissioner (Appeals) held that since gross receipts including those not accounted for exceeded Rs. 40 lakh, section 44AD was not applicable. On cross appeals before the Tribunal, the appeal of the assessee was allowed that no addition was required.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Madhya Pradesh High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) On perusing the orders of the Assessing Officer, Income-Tax Commissioner, the ITAT it is agreed that the arguments advanced on behalf of assessee that no prima facie evidence of passing any money from ‘G’ to assessee was proved and for the papers seized from any other place i.e. ‘G’ assessee cannot be held liable, so, the tribunal has committed no error.

ii) On perusing the material in the matter it is found that there was no evidence in the matter that the excess amount, if any, was collected by ‘G’ or even if it was collected then it was passed on to the assessee. There was no search, survey or seizure of the premises of the assessee. Apart from this, the department had not examined any purchaser or flat owner to verify the correctness of the aforesaid noting that some higher amount was paid by the said purchaser to ‘G’ or the fact that actual price was much higher to the price which was recorded in the account books.

iii) The Tribunal has also found that if any amount was collected in excess to the agreed price then ‘G’ could have been liable for that and not the assessee. It is found that reasoning of the Tribunal to be reasonable. Though there may be some doubt about the price of the flats but until and unless it could have been proved by some evidence, aforesaid doubt cannot take place of proof. Until and unless such noting is corroborated by some material evidence, the Assessing Officer erred in making addition in the income.

iv) So far as the applicability of section 44AD is concerned, when the assessee had maintained accounts books, vouchers and other documents as required u/s/s. (2) of section 44AA and got them audited and furnished it along with audit report then such benefit should have been extended to the assessee. In the present case audited accounts books were maintained and there was no question of disbelieving them in absence of any cogent evidence.

v) The order passed by the Tribunal is based on proper appreciation of facts and there is no error in the order. In view of the aforesaid discussion, no merit and substance is found in the appeal and is, accordingly dismissed.”

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Penalty: Concealment: Section 271(1)(c): 1999- 00: Inadvertent mistake in claiming exemption: No concealment: Penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) not justified:

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CIT vs. Bennett Coleman & Co. Ltd.; 259 CTR 383 (Bom):

In the A. Y. 1999-00, the assessee had claimed exemption of interest on tax free bonds of Rs. 5,60,11,644/-. In the course of the assessment proceedings, the assessee was asked to give details of interest on tax free bonds. While preparing the said details, it was noticed that 6% Government of India Capital Index Bonds purchased during the year were inadvertently categorised as tax free bonds and therefore interest of Rs. 75,00,000 was wrongly claimed as exempt. The assesee offered the said amount to tax. The Assessing Officer levied penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act 1961 on the said amount. The Tribunal found that by inadvertent mistake interest at the rate of 6% on the Government of India Capital Index Bonds was shown as tax-free bonds. The Tribunal concluded that there was no desire on the part of the assessee to hide or conceal the income so as to avoid payment of tax on interest from the bonds. Accordingly, the Tribunal deleted the penalty.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The decision of the Tribunal is based on finding of fact that there was an inadvertent mistake on the part of the assessee in including the interest received of 6% on the Government of India Capital Index Bonds as interest received on tax free bonds. It is not contended by the Revenue that above finding of fact by the Tribunal is perverse.

ii) In these circumstances, we see no reason to entertain the proposed question. Appeal is dismissed.”

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TDS effect, Refunds, etc.: S/s. 139, 143(1), 154, 245, 200 and 244A: General problems faced by the taxpayers: Directions by Delhi High Court: Court On Its Own Motion vs. CIT and AIFTP vs. UOI; 352 ITR 273 (Del): 214 Taxman 335 (Del):

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258 CTR 113(Del): 31 taxman.com 31(Del)

A letter dated 30-04-2012, written by a Chartered Accountant was treated as a public interest litigation and marked to the Court. Subsequently, the All India Federation of Tax Practitioners fied another writ petition on identical or similar lines. The attention of the Court was drawn towards the numerous difficulties faced by income-tax assesses, consequent upon computerisation and central processing of income-tax returns. The difficulties arose due to faulty processing of returns and uploading of details of tax deducted at source by deductors resulting in creation of huge demands because of mismatch between the tax deducted at source claimed in the return and that reflected in the online computer records, i.e., in Form No. 26AS. Moreover, the Central Processing Unit set up in Bangalore, while issuing refunds in the later years adjusted demands for earlier years which may not have been communicated to the assessee. The Petitioners prayed for suitable directions to the Income Tax Department. By an interim order dated 31-08-2012 certain directions were issued by the Delhi High Court which has been summarised in the November 2012 Issue of the BCA Journal (In the High Courts). Further directions have been now given in this order. Briefly, the directions are as under:

1. Uploading of wrong or fictitious demand and delayed disposal of rectification applications

1.1 Each assessee has a right and can demand from the respondents that correct and true data relating to the past demands should be uploaded. CBDT should and must endeavour and direct the Assessing Officers to upload the correct data. Filing of applications u/s. 154 i.e. application for rectification and correction by the assessee would entail substantial expenses on the part of the assessee who would be required to engage a counsel or advocate or make repeated visits to the Income-tax office for the said purpose. This would defeat themain purpose behind computerisation i.e., to reduce involvement of human element.

1.2 As per Citizen Charter of Income tax Department, refund along with interest in case of electronically filed returns should be made within six months. In case of manually filed returns, refund should be made within nine months. The time commences from the end of month in which the return/application is received. Similarly, the Citizen Charter states that a decision on the rectification application u/s. 154 will be made within a period of two months. The Board has, however, issued instructions that rectification application u/s. 154 should be disposed of within 4/6 months. There is a general grievance that the Assessing Officers do not adhere to the said time limits and the assessees are invariably called upon to file duplicate applications or new applications in case they want disposal. It is stated that there are no dak or receipt counters or register for receipt of applications u/s. 154. Thus, there is no record/register with the Assessing Officer with details and particulars of application made u/s. 154, the date on which it was made, date of disposal and its fate. Therefore, the respondents are to examine the necessity for proper dak/receipt counters for receipt of applications u/s. 154 by hand or by post. It would be desirable that each application received should be entered in a diary/register and given a serial number with acknowledgement to the applicant indicating the diary number. It was also suggested that details of applications u/s. 154 should be uploaded on the website as this would entail transparency. The website should indicate the date on which the application was received and date of disposal of the application by the Assessing Officer concerned.

1.3 Uploading of the details of the said registers should be made online preferably within a period of six months. This would be in accordance with the mandate of the Citizen Charter of the Department which states that the respondents believe in equity and transparency.

2. Regarding adjustment of refund contrary to the mandate of section 245

2.1 Section 245 requires that an opportunity ofresponse/reply should be given and after considering the stand and plea of the assessee, justified and valid order or direction for adjustment of refund can be made. The section postulates two stage action; prior intimation and then subsequent action when warranted and necessary for adjustment of the refund towards arrears.

2.2 CPC, Bengaluru stated that after handing over of old demands to the CPC and commencement of processing of returns by CPC, the procedure u/s. 245 was being followed by CPC before making adjustment of the refunds and assessees were being given full details with regard to the demands which were being adjusted. The intimation u/s. 143(1) issued from CPC incorporated the full details of the existing demands that were adjusted against the refunds. Further, when the processing of a return at CPC resulted in demand, the communication u/s. 245 was incorporated into the intimation itself. As far as the demands uploaded by the Assessing Officers to CPC portal were concerned, CPC had already issued a communication to the taxpayers through e-mail (wherever e-mail address is available) and by speed post informing him the existence of the demand in the books of the Assessing Officer and that such demand was liable for adjustment against refund u/s. 245.

2.3 The respondents accept that when a return of income is processed u/s. 143(1) at Central Processing Unit at Bengaluru, the computer itself adjusts the refund due against the existing demand, i.e., there is adjustment but without following the two stage procedure prescribed in section 245.

2.4 In the order dated 31-08-2012, the respondents were directed to follow the procedure prescribed u/s. 245 before making any adjustment of refund payable by the CPC at Bengaluru. The assessees must be given an opportunity to file response or reply and the reply must be considered and examined by the Assessing Officer before any direction for adjustment is made. The process of issue of prior intimation and service thereof on the assessee would be as per the law. The assessees would be entitled to file their response before the Assessing Officer mentioned in the prior intimation. The Assessing Officer wouldthereafter examine the reply and communicate his findings to the CPC, Bengaluru, who would then process the refund and adjust the demand, if any payable. The final adjustment will also be communicated to the assessee.

2.5 The said interim order is confirmed. It is noticed that the respondents have taken remedial steps to ensure compliance of section 245 as they now give an option to the assessee to approach the Assessing Officer.

3. Regarding past adjustments

3.1 The problem relating to ‘past adjustment’ before passing of the interim order on 31-08-2012, still persists and has to be addressed.

3.2 Inspite of the opportunity given to the Revenue to take steps, prescribe, adopt a just procedure, to correct the records, etc., nothing has been done and they have not taken any decision or steps. In these circumstances, direction is issued, which will be applicable only to cases where returns have been processed by the CPC Bengaluru and refunds have been fully or partly adjusted against the past arrears while passing or communicating the order u/s. 143(1) without following the procedure u/s. 245. In such cases, it is directed that :

A. All such cases will be transferred to the Assessing Officer;

B. The Assessing Officers will issue notice to the assessee which will be served as per the procedure prescribed;

C. The assessees will be entitled to file response/ reply to the notice seeking adjustment of refund;

D.    After considering the reply, if any, the Assessing Officers will pass an order u/s. 245 permitting or allowing the refund;

E.    The Board will fix time limit and schedule for completing the said process.

4.    Regarding interest on refund u/s. 244A

4.1  An assessee can certainly be denied interest if delay is attributable to him in terms of s/s. (2) to section 244. However, when the delay is not attributable to the assessee but is due to the fault of the Revenue, then interest should be paid under the said section.

4.2 False or wrong uploading of past arrears and failure to follow the mandate before adjustment u/s. 245, cannot be attributed and treated as a fault of the assessee. These are lapses on the part of the Assessing Officer i.e. the Revenue.

4.3 Interest cannot be denied to the assessees when the twin conditions are satisfied and in favour of the assessee.

5.    Regarding uncommunicated intimations under section 143(1)

5.1 The grievance of the petitioner is with regard to the uncommunicated intimations u/s. 143(1) which remained on paper/file or the computer of the Assessing Officer. This is a serious challenge and a matter of grave concern. The law requires that intimation u/s. 143(1) should be communicated to the assessee, if there is an adjustment made in the return resulting either in demand or reduction in refund. The uncommunicated orders/ intimations cannot be enforced and are not valid.

5.2 The onus to show that the order was communicated and was served on the assessee is on the Revenue and not upon the assessee. If an order u/s. 143(1) is not communicated or served on the assessee, the return as declared/ filed is treated as deemed intimation and an order u/s. 143(1) . Therefore, if an assessee does not receive or is not communicated an order u/s. 143(1), he will never know that some adjustments on account of rejection of TDS or tax paid has been made. While deciding applications u/s. 154, or passing an order u/s. 245, the Assessing Officers are required to know and follow the said principle. Of course, while deciding application u/s. 154 or 245 or otherwise, if the Assessing Officer comes to the conclusion and records a finding that TDS or tax credit had been fraudulently claimed, he will be entitled to take action as per law and deny the fraudulent claim of TDS etc. The Assessing Officer, therefore, has to make a distinction between fraudulent claims and claims which have been rejected on ground of technicalities, but there is no communication to the assessee of the order/intimation u/s. 143(1). In the latter cases, the Assessing Officer cannot turn around and enforce the demand created by uncommunicated order/intimation u/s. 143(1).

6.    Regarding credit of tax deducted at source (TDS)

6.1 The said problem can be divided into two categories; cases where the deductors fail to upload the correct and true particulars of the TDS, which has been deducted and paid as a result of which the assessee does not get credit of the tax paid, and the second set of cases where there is a mismatch between the details uploaded by the deductor and the details furnished by the assessee in the income tax return. The details of TDS credited /uploaded in the case of each assessee are available in form 26AS.

6.2 This being a PIL, no specific direction is being issued but the Board must re-examine the said aspect and if they feel that unnecessary burden or harassment will be caused to the assessees, suitable remedial steps should be taken.

6.3 Also, there can be mismatch because of deductor and the assessee following different methods of accounting. Further, the assessee may treat the income on which tax has been deducted as income for two or more different years. The respondents must take remedial steps and ensure that in such cases TDS is not rejected on the ground that the amounts do not tally. Of course, while issuing corrective steps, the respondents can ensure that fraudulent or double claims for TDS are not made. As it is a technical matter no specific direction is issued, but the respondents should take remedial steps in this regard.

7.    Regarding unverified TDS under different headings

7.1 The respondents will fix a time limit within which they shall verify and correct all unmatched challans. This will necessarily require communication with the deductor and steps to rectify. The time limit fixed should take into account the due date of filing of the return and processing of the return by the Assessing Officer. An assessee as a deductee should not suffer because of the fault made by deductor or inability of the Revenue to ask the deductor to rectify and correct. Once payment has been received by the Revenue, credit should be given to the assessee.

8.    Regarding failure of deductor to file correct TDS statements in time

8.1 It is directed that when an assessee approaches the Assessing Officer with requisite details and particulars, the said Assessing Officer should verify whether or not the deductor has made payment of the TDS and if the payment has been made, credit of the same should be given to the assessee. These details or the TDS certificate should be starting point for the Assessing Officer to ascertain and verify the true and correct position. The Assessing Officer will be at liberty to get in touch with the TDS circle, in case he requires clarification or confirmation. He is also at liberty to get in touch with deductors by issuing a notice and compelling them to upload the correct particulars/details. The said exercise must be and should be undertaken by the Revenue i.e., the Assessing Officer as an assessee who suffers in such cases is not due to his fault and can justifiably feel deceived and defrauded.

8.2 The stand of the Revenue that they can only write a letter to the deductor to persuade him to correct the uploaded entries or to upload the details cannot be accepted. Power and authority of the Assessing Officer cannot match and are not a substitute to the beseeching or imploring of an assessee to the deductor. Section 234E will also require similar verification by the Assessing Officer. In such cases, if required, order u/s. 154 may also be passed.

2012-TIOL-703-ITAT-KOL Sri Raajkumar Jain v ACIT A. Y.: 2004-05. Dated: 07-09-2012

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20. 2012-TIOL-703-ITAT-KoL
Sri Raajkumar Jain v  ACIT
A. Y.: 2004-05. Dated: 07-09-2012

S/s 263, 271(1)(c) – An order sheet entry dropping the penalty which was never communicated to the assessee can be construed as an order to take up action u/s. 263. What the CIT himself cannot do, he cannot get it done through the assessing authority by exercising revisional powers.

Facts:

There was a search and seizure operation in the case of Sri Gopal Lal Badruka and M/s Ahura Holdings on 26.7.2006, a copy of an agreement for sale deed dated 26.8.2003 was found, according to which the assessee had entered into an agreement for purchase of plot admeasuring 1529 sq. yards @ 11570 per sq. yard from M/s Ahura Holdings. The total sale consideration worked out to Rs. 1,79,65,750. In the registered sale deed the sale consideration was mentioned as Rs. 56,20,000 which worked out @ Rs 4000 per sq. yard. During the assessment proceedings in the case of M/s Ahura Holdings, Sri Gopal Lal Badruka had confirmed that he had received entire consideration of Rs. 1,65,08,750 from the assessee for 1405 sq. yards @ 11750 per sq. yard. As the difference of Rs. 1,08,88,750 between amount admitted to have been received by Sri Gopal Lal Badruka and the amount mentioned in the registered sale deed, represents the assessee’s unaccounted purchase consideration of plot from M/s Ahura Holdings for the AY 2004-05, the AO issued notice u/s. 148. In response thereto, the assessee filed revised return admitting additional income of Rs. 1,08,88,750. The assessment was completed u/s. 143(3) r.w.s. 147 on 28.4.2010. The AO initiated penalty proceedings for concealment of income u/s. 271(1)(c) of the Act.

The AO after considering the submissions made by the assessee dropped the penalty proceedings u/s 271(1)(c) by order sheet noting as follows:

“The assessee filed a detailed explanation in response to the notice u/s. 271(1)(c) of the Act read with section 274. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and in the light of the explanation filed, the penalty proceedings initiated u/s. 271(1)(c) of the Act are dropped.”

The CIT invoking his jurisdiction u/s. 263 of the Act held that the dropping of penalty proceedings u/s. 271(1)(c) is erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the revenue. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:

Even an order sheet entry as to be considered as an order in view of the judgment in the case of H H Rajdadi Smt. Badan Kanwar Medical Trust v CIT (214 ITR 130)(Raj). On merits, the Tribunal noted that the additional income was offered in revised return only on evidence found in search and on the basis of the statement of acceptance of the transaction by Sri Gopal Lal Badruka of M/s Ahura Holdings. The Tribunal noted that the reply given by the assessee was considered by the AO and his conclusion is based on the explanation offered by the assessee and he has taken one possible view. If the CIT is not agreeable with that proposal he cannot say that the order of the AO is erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the revenue. Levy of penalty is a quasi criminal proceeding. The AO must have enough material to prove that there is concealment of income or furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income. He cannot presume that there is concealment or furnishing of inaccurate particulars. The Gujarat High Court has in the case of CIT v Parmanand M. Patel (278 ITR 3) held that the CIT is not empowered to record satisfaction by invoking section 271(1)(c) of the Act and if he is not entitled to do so, on his own, he cannot do it by directing the assessing authority. The Court observed that in other words, what the CIT himself cannot do, he cannot get it done through the assessing authority by exercising revisional powers. Considering these observations, the Tribunal vacated the direction of the CIT to AO to levy penalty u/s 271(1)(c) of the Act.

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Scientific research expenditure: Section 35(2AB): Explanation to section 35(2AB)(1) does not require that expenses included in said Explanation are essentially to be incurred inside an approved in-house research facility: Assessee-company incurred various expenses on clinical trials for developing its pharmaceutical products outside approved laboratory facility: Assessee entitled to weighted deduction in respect of said expenses:

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CIT vs. Cadila Healthcare Ltd;(2013) 31 taxman.com 300(Guj)

The assessee carried out scientific research in its facility approved by the prescribed authority. It incurred various expenditure including on clinical trials for developing its pharmaceutical products. These clinical trials were conducted outside the approved laboratory facility. The assesee’s claim for weighted deduction u/s. 35(2AB) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was rejected by the Assessing Officer on the ground that such expenditure not having been incurred in the approved facility could not form part of the deduction provided u/s. 35(2AB). The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim and held that merely because an expenditure was not incurred in the in-house facility, it could not be discarded for the weighted deduction u/s. 35(2AB)

On appeal by the Revenue, the Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) Section 35(2AB) provides for deduction to a company engaged in business of bio-technology or in the business of manufacture or production of any article or thing notified by the Board towards expenditure of scientific research development facility approved by the prescribed authority. The Explanation to section 35(2AB) (1) provides that for the purpose of said clause, i.e. clause (1) of section 35(2AB), expenditure on scientific research in relation to drugs and pharmaceuticals shall include expenditure incurred on clinical drug trial, obtaining approval from any regulatory authority under the Central State or Provincial Act and filing an application for a patent under the Patents Act, 1970.

ii) The whole idea appears to be to give encouragement to scientific research. By the very nature of things, clinical trials may not always be possible to be conducted in closed laboratory or in similar in-house facility provided by the assessee and approved by the prescribed authority. Before a pharmaceutical drug could be put in the market, the regulatory authorities would insist on strict tests and research on all possible aspects, such as possible reactions, effect of the drug and so on.

iii) Extensive clinical trials, therefore, would be an intrinsic part of development of any such new pharmaceutical drug. It cannot be imagined that such clinical trial can be carried out only in the laboratory of the pharmaceutical company. If one gives such restricted meaning to the term expenditure incurred on in house research and development facility, one would on one hand be completely diluting the deduction envisaged u/s.s. (2AB) of section 35 and on the other, making the Explanation quite meaningless.

iv) As noticed earlier that for the purpose of the said clause in relation to drug and pharmaceutical, the expenditure on scientific research has to include the expenditure incurred on clinical trials in obtaining approvals from any regulatory authority or in filing an application for grant of patent. The activities of obtaining approval of the authority and filing of an application for patent necessarily shall have to be outside the in-house research facility. Thus the restricted meaning suggested by the revenue would completely make the Explanation quite meaningless. For the scientific research in relation to drugs and pharmaceuticals made for its own peculiar requirements, the Legislature appears to have added such an Explanation.

v) Therefore, the Tribunal committed no error. Merely because the prescribed authority segregated the expenditure into two parts, namely, those incurred within the in-house facility and those were incurred outside, by itself would not be sufficient to deny the benefit to the assessee u/s. 35(2AB). It is not as if that the said authority was addressing the issue for deduction u/s. 35(2AB) in relation to the question on hand. The certificate issued was only for the purpose of listing the total expenditure under the Rules. Therefore, no question of law arises.” Therefore, no question of law arises.”

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Provisional attachment: Section 281B: Provisional attachment of bank accounts aggregating to over Rs. 33 lakh: Assessment raising demand of Rs. 9,62,378/-: Attachment should be restricted to the demand:

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Nirmal Singh vs. UOI; 352 ITR 396 (P&H):

The bank accounts of the assessee aggregating to over Rs. 33 lakh were provisionally attached u/s. 281B. The assessee challenged the attachment by filing writ petition. In the mean while the assessment was completed raising a demand of Rs. 9,62,378/-. The assessee contended that the provisional attachment could be operative only up to the assessment and once assessment had been framed, the Revenue was entitled to attach the account to the extent of the demand raised and not all the bank accounts of the assessee.

The Punjab and Haryana High Court allowed the petition and held as under:

“i) The bank accounts of an assessee are provisionally attached to secure the interest of the Revenue pending assessment proceedings to meet the eventuality of demand of tax to be raised against such assessee. Once the assessment had been completed, the Revenue would be justified to attach the account to the extent of the demand raised against the assessee and not the entire amount standing to the credit of the assessee.

ii) The action of the Revenue in extending the period of attachment in respect of all the bank accounts of the assessee and in respect of over Rs. 33 lakh in these circumstances was wholly unjustified and illegal.”

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2012-TIOL-771-ITAT-KOL DCIT v Rajeev Goyal A.Y.: 2007-08. Dated: 01-06-2012

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19. 2012-TIOL-771-ITAT-KoL
DCIT v  Rajeev Goyal
A.Y.: 2007-08. Dated: 01-06-2012

S/s 2(31), 54EC, 64(1A) – In a case where the income of minor child is clubbed with the income of the assessee u/s. 64(1A), the assessee is eligible for separate deduction u/s 54EC of the Act on investment in specified bonds on account of minor’s income being long term capital gains. Prior to insertion of proviso to section 54EC, for the purpose of section 54EC, the investment is limited to Rs 50 lakh in respect of a person and not in respect of an assessee. Minor child being a separate person, investment in the name of minor child, whose income is to be clubbed in the hands of the assessee, is eligible for separate limit of investment prior to insertion of proviso to section 54EC.

Facts:

During the previous year, the assessee and his two minor children sold shares which resulted in long term capital gains. The assessee invested Rs 50 lakh in bonds qualifying for deduction u/s 54EC of the Act. He also invested Rs. 49.50 lakh and Rs. 39.50 lakh in the names of two minor children. In the return of income filed, the assessee included total income of two minor children after claiming separate deduction for investment made in bonds, qualifying for deduction u/s. 54EC, in the names of the respective minor children. Thus, total deduction claimed u/s. 54EC was Rs. 139 lakh.

The Assessing Officer, relying upon Notification No. 380/2006 dated 22.12.2006, restricted the deduction u/s. 54EC to Rs 50 lakh.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who allowed the appeal of the assessee. Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:

Section 54EC provides that capital gain is not to be charged to tax if net consideration is invested in certain bonds. Therefore, investments made in certain bonds shall be outside the scope of capital gain for the purpose of computation of total income itself. It is not a deduction under Chapter VI-A which comes into picture only after computing the total income and the deductions are being allowed from gross total income as per section 80A(1).

There is a difference between the word `assessee’ and the word `person’. The notification on which the AO relied upon has not put any embargo on investments by an assessee but the embargo is on allotment of the bonds to a `person’ and such embargo is on the allotting authority. The bonds have been allotted to the three persons as per the notification itself and the assessee is entitled to the benefits as per provisions of section 54EC under which restriction has been put only for investments from 1.4.2007.

The Tribunal noted that the ratio of the decision of Mumbai Tribunal in the case of JCIT v Govind Rohira alias Srichand Rohra 95 ITD 77 (Mum) and also other decisions of the High Courts is that even if the income of the minor is clubbed with the income of the other individual, all the deductions are to be allowed while computation of income of the minor /spouse and only the net taxable income is to be clubbed u/s. 64.

The Tribunal allowed the claim of the assessee and directed the AO to re-compute the long term capital gains accordingly.

The appeal filed by the revenue was dismissed.

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(2011) 132 ITD 296 (Del) Mrs. Maninder Sidhu vs. ACIT A.Y.: 2004-05. Dated: 09-04-2010

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18. (2011) 132 ITD 296 (Del)
Mrs. Maninder Sidhu vs. ACIT
A.Y.: 2004-05. Dated: 09-04-2010

Section 271(1)(c) – Set off long term capital loss against short term capital gain wrongly claimed by assessee – Withdrew the claim during course of assessment- Revenue did not prove or show falsity of facts as disclosed by assessee in computation of income – In fact revenue accepted computation of capital loss and gain – Assessee under bonafide belief that set off is allowed – in absence of any proof of falsity of facts in computation of income as submitted by assessee, penalty not to be leviedwrong claim is to be distinguished from false claim.

Facts:

The assessee had incurred long-term capital loss and short term capital gain. The loss was adjusted against the gain. However, after issue of notice u/s. 143(2), the claim of the adjustment was withdrawn in the course of hearing. Assessee explained that the adjustment was a mistake made while preparing the return. However, the AO initiated penalty proceedings u/s. 271(1)(c) of the Act as according to the him if there was no mala fide intention in making the claim, the assessee could have withdrawn the claim before the receipt of the notice. However, the claim was withdrawn only when notice was issued to the assessee.

Held:

The claim of assessee was a bona fide mistake. All facts regarding computation of the loss and the gain were furnished along with the return of income. Thus, it is neither a case of concealment of income nor furnishing inaccurate particulars of income.

Falsity of facts made by the assessee in computation of long-term capital loss or short-term capital gain was not proved by the revenue. On the contrary, computation of the loss and the profit had been accepted by the revenue.

Setting off of the loss against the gain was an inadvertent mistake by the assessee which should be taken as bona fide mistake. In absence of proof of falsity in the details regarding computation of income, it was held that the assessee cannot be charged with the penalty. In such matters, one has to distinguish between a wrong claim and a false claim. There was no falsity in the assessee’s case. Penalty ought not to have been levied on assessee in respect of inadvertent but wrong claim.

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(2012) 77 DTR 235 (Jodhpur) Amit Jain vs. DCIT A.Y.: 2007-08. Dated: 17-09-2012

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17. (2012) 77 DTR 235 (Jodhpur)
Amit Jain vs. DCIT
A.Y.: 2007-08. Dated: 17-09-2012

Section 56(2)(vi) – Gift by father to son directly out of borrowings from HUF does not necessarily mean gift by HUF to the son and hence no tax leviable on such gift.

Facts:

The assessee received a gift of Rs. 5 lakh from his father to enable the assessee to purchase a new flat. The father had received a loan of Rs. 5 lakh in bank account of his proprietary concern from his HUF and on the same day he made gift of Rs. 5 lakh from that bank account. According to the Assessing Officer, the HUF had made payment to the assessee rotating the money through the father. Hence, the Assessing Officer treated the gift of Rs. 5 lakh as gift from HUF of father to the assessee. Since HUF is not covered under the definition of “relative” as given in the Explanation to section 56(2)(vi), the Assessing Officer treated the amount of Rs. 5 lakh received as gift as income from other sources. The learned CIT(A) upheld the stand of the Assessing Officer stating that the so-called loan transaction between HUF to individual has to be ignored and real transaction was in the nature of gift from HUF to the assessee.

Held:

In the given case, the assessee received a gift of Rs. 5 lakh from his father who was assessed to income-tax. The father of the assessee being a donor asserted in the declaration of the gift that he had given an absolute and irrevocable gift out of natural love and affection of Rs. 5 Iakh to his son i.e., the assessee. Also the father was having opening balance in his capital account at Rs. 20.24 lakhs and closing balance of Rs. 20.53 lakhs. Therefore, it is clear that the donor was having the capacity to give the gift which was given to his son under love and affection, there was also an occasion for which gift was received and this contention of the assessee that the gift was received for purchase of a flat at Mumbai, has not been rebutted at any stage. The amount which was paid by way of an account payee cheque by HUF to father had been shown under head “loan and advance” by HUF. Also the gift made by father to son was by way of an account payee cheque.

Therefore, the transaction was a genuine transaction. In the instant case, nothing was brought on record to substantiate that the loan received by the father of the assessee from his HUF was bogus or non-genuine or it was taken with an intention of non-payment. In the present case, the donor was identifiable, his creditworthiness was not doubted and occasion for giving the gift was also there. The donor being the father of the assessee, was a close relative and therefore it was a genuine gift received by the assessee from his father and the same is not chargeable to tax as ‘income from other sources’ u/s. 56(2)(vi).

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(2012) 77 DTR 89 (Mum) Chemosyn Ltd. vs. Asst. CIT A.Y.: 2007-08. Dated: 07-09-2012

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16. (2012) 77 DTR 89 (Mum) Chemosyn Ltd. vs. Asst. CIT A.Y.: 2007-08. Dated: 07-09-2012

Section 37 (1) Business Expenditure Allowability – Premium paid by company on purchase of own shares from warring group of shareholders as per order of Company Law Board is revenue expenditure and allowable as business expenditure.

Facts:

The assessee, a pharmaceutical company had two groups holding shares of a company i.e. one owning 66% and other 34%. Owing to differences between two groups which were headed by two brothers. The disputes between them reached the Company Law Board which directed assessee to buy 34% shareholding. The assessee purchased 34% shareholding and paid Rs. 6.81 crores as premium on purchase and cancellation of own shares. As per Assessing Officer, the said expenditure was incurred as a part of family dispute settlement and the same could not be attributed to the business of the company. The Assessing Officer disallowed the expenditure stating that even otherwise, the same was a capital expenditure since incurred for acquisition of a capital asset. The action of the Assessing Officer in disallowance was upheld by the learned CIT(A) stating that the purchase of shares was a result of mutual settlement amongst family members and hence was of personal nature.

Held:

In the given case, the warring group of shareholders were creating problems in the smooth functioning of the business. The total sales of the assessee which were in the range of Rs. 20 to 25 crore p.a. during the pre-dispute period had come down in the range of Rs. 10 to 14 crore during litigation period. After the settlement period there was substantial increase in sales. Similarly, negative profits during the period of disputes became positive after the settlement. Very few new products were launched by the assessee company during the period of disputes, while many new products were launched during the post-settlement period giving boost to assessee’s business.

Documentary evidence showed that demand notices were issued by the Debt Recovery Tribunal to the assessee for recovery of debts during the period of disputes, whereas a fresh loan was sanctioned by bank to the assessee for the purpose of working capital as well as for the purpose of acquiring new assets after the settlement. All these facts are sufficient to show that the dispute among the shareholders had affected the day-to-day business of the assessee and that the settlement of the said dispute certainly helped the assessee to run its business smoothly and effectively. Therefore, expenditure incurred by the assessee company on payment of premium for purchase of its own shares from warring group of shareholders and cancellation thereof is revenue expenditure and is allowable as business expenditure.

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TDS: F. Y. 2012-13: Certificate u/s. 197: Cannot be denied on the ground that the assessee had violated the provisions of TDS and proceedings u/ss. 276B and 271C were pending:

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[Serco BPO (P) Ltd. Vs. ACIT ; 253CTR 410 (P&H):]

On 03/04/2012, the assessee filed an application u/s. 197 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for issuance of a Nil tax deduction certificate for the F.Y. 2012-13. The application was rejected on the ground that proceedings u/ss. 276B and 271C of the Act were pending.

The Punjab and Haryana High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

“i) Issue of certificate u/s. 197(1) of the Act is mandatory on fulfillment of conditions enumerated under the rules.

ii) Rejection of application of assessee on the ground that the assessee had violated the provisions of TDS and proceedings u/ss. 276B and 271C were pending was not sustainable. None of these grounds validly form part of reasons for rejecting an application filed by an assessee u/s. 197(1) r/w. r. 28AA.

iii) The Assessing Officer is directed to redecide the application within a period of two weeks.”

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Writ – Non-entertainment of petitions under writ jurisdiction by the High Court when an efficacious alternative remedy is available is a rule of self-imposed limitation. It is essentially a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law.

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The assessee, a Sikkim based non-Sikkimese filed his first return of income for the assessment year 1997-98. Upon assessment, it was discovered that the he had a net profit of Rs. 5,73,832/- during the assessment year 1996-97 relevant to the previous year 1995-96. Since no return was filed for the assessment year 1996-97 despite capitalising the aforesaid profit, proceedings u/s. 147 of the Act were initiated against him for the said assessment year. Accordingly, on 26th May, 1998, the notice was issued u/s. 148 of the Act. Further, the Revenue found out that as on 31st March, 1996, the assessee had brought forward closing capital of Rs. 1,73,90,397/- including that aforesaid net profit during the assessment year 1996-97. The same remained unexplained as the return of income for the assessment year 1995-96 was also not furnished by the assessee. Hence, another notice u/s. 148 was issued to the assessee for the assessment for the assessment year 1995-96, dated 30th March, 2000. The assessee did not comply with the aforesaid notices u/s. 148 of the Act and thus, a letter dated 19th January, 2001, came to be issued to the assessee as a reminder to file his returns to income for the assessment years clearly mentioning that failure to do so would lead to an ex parte assessment u/s. 144 of the Act. Thereafter, upon filing of written submissions by the assessee, notice u/s. 142(1) of the Act dated 25th June, 2001, was issued for the assessment year 1995-96 along with final show cause fixing compliance for hearing dated 9th July, 2001. The assessee sought an adjournment which was not granted and the assessments were completed ex parte u/s. 144 of the Act raising a tax demand of Rs. 2,45,87,625/- and Rs. 6,32,972/- for the assessment year 1995-96 and 1996-97, respectively by order dated 9th July, 2001 and 28th March, 2001, respectively. Further, penalty proceedings u/s. 271(1)(c) of the Act were also initiated for both assessment years.

The assessee approached the writ court challenging the aforesaid notices issued u/s. 148, dated 26th May, 1998 and 30th March, 2000 and the subsequent assessment orders dated 9th July, 2001 and 28th March, 2001. The issue raised before the writ court was whether the income of the non-Sikkimese residing in Sikkim was taxable u/s. of the Act. The said question was referred to a Committee for its consideration and the writ petition was disposed of as withdrawn with the direction to maintain status quo in the matter till the declaration of final decision by the Committee, by order dated July 21, 2005. In the meanwhile, section 10(26AAA) of the Act was inserted by section 4 of the Finance Act, 2008, whereby certain income accruing or arising to a Sikkimese individual was exempted from tax. Thereafter the Central Board of Direct Taxes (for short “the Board”) issued Instruction No.8, dated 26th July, 2008 in respect of tax liability of the income accruing or arising to a non- Sikkimese individual residing in Sikkim. In the light of the aforesaid amendment and instruction, the writ court by order dated 15th July, 2009, reiterated.

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Section 17 incentive bonus received by LIC Development Officer to be treated as salary and no expenses deductible.

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The appellant, T.K. Ginarajan, Development Officer in the LIC, claimed deduction of 40 % of the incentive bonus paid to him in the return of income-tax for the various years prior to 1st April, 1989, on the ground that he had incurred expenditure to the extent of 40 % of the incentive bonus for canvassing business.

The claim for exclusion of 40 % of the incentive bonus towards the expenditure was declined by the Income-tax Officer. The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) dismissed the appeal. However, the Incometax Appellate Tribunal held in favour of the assessee. But the High Court was in favour of the Revenue.

The Supreme Court noted that LIC of India had requested the Central Board of Direct Taxes (hereinafter referred to as “the CBDT”) for a clarification on deduction explaining that the Development Officer had actually incurred some expenditure in the performance of their duty, to the tune of at least 40 % of the incentive bonus paid to them. However, the CBDT affirmed that the incentive bonus paid by the LIC to the Development Officers formed part of their income towards salary. To quote :
“ Such portion of the incentive bonus which is actually spent by the Development Officer for duties of office can still be exempted from tax if the LIC makes the payment against the expenses incurred by the Development Officer by way of reimbursement of expenses. In that case, such reimbursement will not form a part of the salary of the Development Officer and only the incentive bonus will appear in their salary certificate. LIC has not certified that a part of the incentive bonus is against the expenses incurred by the Development Officers by way of reimbursement of expenses. If such a part is certified and that part of the salary and that part of the incentive bonus which is not certified will appear in the salary certificate. Hence, no deduction is contemplated from the incentive bonus, which finds a place in the salary certificates…”

The Supreme Court further noted that, however, with effect from 1st April, 1989, the LIC itself issued a clarification to the effect that the Development Officers would be entitled to claim reimbursement to the extent of 30 % of the incentive bonus granted to them.

The Supreme Court observed that thus, the dispute was confined only to the period prior to 1st April, 1989, and, thereafter, the Development Officers were entitled to the reimbursement of actual expenses incurred by them, to the extent of 30 %. In other words, after 1st April, 1989, only that part of the incentive bonus after reimbursing the expenses to the extent of 30 % would appear in the salary certificate. What is the fate of the incentive bonus to the Development Officers in LIC prior to 1st April, 1989, for the purpose of income tax was therefore the question to be considered in this case.

The Supreme Court held that compartmentalisation of income under various heads and computation of the taxable portion strictly in accordance with the formula of deductions, rebates and allowances are to be done only as per the scheme provided under the Act. The appellant being a salaried person, the incentive bonus received by him prior to 1st April, 1989, had to be treated as salary and he was entitled only for the permissible deductions u/s. 16 of the Act. The expenses incurred in the performance of duty as Development Officer for generating the business so as to make him eligible for the incentive bonus was not a permissible deduction and, hence, the same was eligible to tax. According to the Supreme Court, there was no merit in the appeal of the Appellant. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

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Acquisition of New Asset by Assessee for Capital Gains Exemption

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Issue for Consideration

Sections 54, 54B,54EC, 54F, 54GA and 54GB of the Income Tax Act, 1961 provide for exemption of capital gains on an acquisition by an assessee, of a specified asset (purchase, construction, etc.) within the specified time period, subject to fulfilment of various other conditions. Section 54 exempts along term capital gains arising on transfer of a residential house and section 54F grants exemption to long term capital gains arising on transfer of any other capital asset. Section 54B provides for exemption for long term capital gains on transfer of a land used by for agricultural purposes. Similar provisions are contained in other sections for grant of exemption for capital gains on reinvestment by the assessee within the specified period, in specified assets.

All these sections require acquisition by the assessee. Section 54 reads – “the assessee has within a period of ………………purchased, or has ………..constructed a residential house”. The other sections use similar language. In view of the stipulation in the above mentioned provisions, that require the acquisition by an assessee, aquestion has arisen before the courts as to whether the acquisition (purchase, construction, etc.) by the assessee necessarily means that the new asset must be acquired in the name of the assesseeor that it would be sufficient where the funds belonging to the assessee are used for acquiring the specified asset to enable an assessee to claim the exemption from tax.

The courts do not find any difficulty in upholding the claim of the assessee for exemption in cases where the acquisition of the new asset is in the joint names of the assessee and another person, as in the courts opinion such acquisition in joint names would not hamper the claim for exemption, so long as the funds for acquisition of the new house have come from the assessee. The conflict of the judicial view however, has been in respect of acquisition of a new asset in the name of a family member, without the name of the assessee being included, though with the funds from the assessee. While the Madras, Andhra Pradesh and Delhi High Courts have taken the view that even in such a case, the assessee is entitled to the benefit of the exemption, the Punjab & Haryana, Bombay and Delhi High Courts have taken a contrary view.

Prakash’s case
The issue came up before the Nagpur bench of the Bombay High Court in the case of Prakash vs. ITO 312 ITR 40 in the context of section 54F. In that case,the assessee, an elderly person, sold certain plots of land, and acquired a plot of land in the name of his adopted son and constructed a residential building thereon by submitting plans for construction in the name of his son. He did not file his return of income voluntarily, but did so after receipt of a notice u/s. 139(2) from the Assessing Officer. The assessee besides claiming that the plots sold were agricultural land, which was not a capital asset, and that there was therefore no capital gains, also claimed an exemption u/s. 54F in respect of the purchase of a plot of land and the construction of the residential building thereon. It was claimed that the investment in the new asset was made in the son’s name, in view of the advanced age of the assessee.

The Assessing Officer rejected both the contentions of the assessee and subjected the capital gains to tax. He denied the claim for exemption on the ground that the reinvestment was in the son’s name. The Commissioner (Appeals) held that the transfer was of the agricultural land which was not a capital asset, and accordingly no taxable capital gains arose. The Tribunal held that the asset transferred was a capital asset and subject to eligibility of the assessee for an exemption u/s. 54F, a taxable capital gains arose. It however, remanded the matter back to the Commissioner (Appeals) to examine the assessee’s claim for exemption u/s. 54F.

On remand, the Commissioner (Appeals) held that section 54F contemplates only investment in a residentialproperty by the assessee; it was enough if the sale proceeds were invested in the construction of aresidential house. It was further held by the Commissioner (Appeals) that it was not necessary that the newly constructed house should be in the name of the assessee, and that an adopted son had the samerights as a natural son. The Commissioner (Appeals) allowed the appeal of the assessee granting relief u/s. 54F. The Tribunal quashed the order of the Commissioner (Appeals), denting the benefit of the exemption.

On appeal by the assessee, the Bombay High Court examined the provisions of section 54F and the definition of the term “assessee” contained in section 2(7). It noted that as per the scheme of section 54F, the assessee, who is the owner of the original asset, needs to, purchase or construct a residential house within the specified period. It noted that the concepts of “assessee”, “own”, “owner”, “ownership”, “co-owner”, “owner of house property”, and “ownership of property” contained in various sections were very much interlinked and connected for granting the benefits under the Income Tax Act. Referring to the Supreme Court decisions in the cases of Podar Cement (P) Ltd. 226 ITR 625 and Mysore Minerals Ltd 239 ITR 775, it expressed the view that an assessee must have valid title legally conveyed to him after complying with the requirements of law or should at least be entitled to receive income from the property in his own right and have control and domain over the property for legal purposes, while basically excluding a third person of any right over the said property. It was of the view that the object being to give a benefit to the assessee, it meant that the assessee must comply with the conditions strictly in all respects.

The Bombay High Court expressed the view that right from the sale of the original asset till the purchase and/ or construction of the new asset, the ownership and domain over the new asset was a must. According to the High Court, the new property must be owned by the assessee, or he should have legal title over the same. Though others might use and occupy the property along with the assessee, the ownership of the residential house should be of the assessee.

The Bombay High Court noted that by constructing the house in the name of his son, the assessee effectively transferred the new property to his son, who became the owner thereof, in spite of the prohibition on transfer of the new house for a period of 3 years from the date of transfer of the original asset. The High Court noted that the assessee had no domain and/or right on the property, which disentitled him to the claim for exemption, since there was non-compliance of the conditions as per the scheme of section 54F.

The Bombay High Court noted the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court cited before it in the case of Late Mir Gulam Ali Khan 228 ITR 165, where the court had taken the view that the term “assessee” must be given a wide and liberal interpretation, and that where the legal heirs had completed the purchase of the new house after the death of the assessee, the assessee was entitled to the benefit of the exemption. The Bombay High Court however expressed its disinclination to accept the liberal view given to the word “assessee” in Late Mir Gulam Ali Khan’s case, stating that the facts before it were different, since in the case before them, it was the son (who was not the assessee) who had purchased and constructed the new property. It also noted that the assessee had admitted that the son was the beneficial owner of the property.

The Bombay High Court therefore held that the as-sessee was not entitled to the benefit of exemption u/s. 54F.

A similar view has been taken in the context of sec-tion 54B by the Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Jai Narayan vs. ITO 306 ITR 335 , where the new land was purchased in the names of the son and the grandson of the assessee, by the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Kalya v CIT 251 CTR 174, where the new land was purchased in the names of the son and the daughter-in-law, and in the context of section 54F, by the Delhi High Court, in the case of Vipin Malik (HUF) vs. CIT 330 ITR 309, where the new house was purchased in the names of the karta and his mother.

Kamal Wahal’s case

The issue came up recently before the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs. Kamal Wahal 351 ITR 4.

In this case, the assessee, a retired employee, sold his share in an inherited property, and invested a part of the sale proceeds in purchase of a residential house in the name of his wife. He claimed exemption u/s. 54F for the investment in the residential house.

The assessing officer denied the benefit of the exemption, on the ground that the investment should have been made in the assessee’s name, and not in the name of his wife. The Commissioner(Appeals) allowed the assessee’s appeal, following the decisions of the Madras High Court in the case of CIT vs. V Natarajan 287 ITR 271 and of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Mir Gulam Ali Khan vs. CIT 165 ITR 228.The tribunal dismissed the appeal of the revenue, following the judgments of the Madras and Andhra Pradesh High Courts, and also of the Karnataka High Court in the case of DIT vs. Jennifer Bhide 349 ITR 80, where the property was purchased in the joint names of the assessee and her spouse. While noting the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Prakash(supra), the tribunal took the view that where a statutory provision was capable of more than one view, the view favouring the taxpayer should be preferred.

The Delhi High Court approved the decision of the tribunal, noting that besides the decisions referred to by the tribunal, the Delhi High Court itself in the case of CIT vs. Ravinder Kumar Arora 342 ITR 38 had also taken a similar view in the context of section 54F involving purchase of a new property in the joint names of the assessee and his spouse. The Delhi High Court also noted the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of CIT vs. Gurnam Singh 327 ITR 278, where a similar view had been taken in the context of section 54B involving purchase of the new land in the joint names of the assessee and his bachelor son.

According to the Delhi High Court, the predominant judicial view was that, for the purposes of section 54F, the new residential house need not be purchased by the assessee in his own name nor was it necessary that it should be purchased exclusively in his name. It noted that in the case before it, the property was not purchased in the name of a stranger, somebody unconnected with the assessee, but in the name of his wife, and that there was no dispute that the entire investment had come out of sale proceeds and that there was no contribution from the assessee’s wife.

Having regard to the rule of purposive construction and the object of section 54F, the Delhi High Court held that the assessee was entitled to the benefit of exemption u/s. 54F.

Observations

The Andhra Pradesh High Court, in Mir Gulam Ali’s case reiterated the acknowledged position in law, while deciding in favour of the assessee’s claim for exemption, that the exemption provisions should be liberally construed. None of the sections, under scanner, expressly require purchase or construction in the name of the assessee himself and a concerted effort is requfcired by the courts to read that requirement in the law so as to deny the benefit of exemption to the assessee. It is this highly debatable position, perhaps,that has led the courts to favour the assesses including the courts, which originally had taken a stand against the claim for exemption, but had later on, in other cases favoured the claim for exemption from tax. Further, the intention behind sections 54 and 54F and other provisions similarly placed is to encourage reinvestment in residential houses, which purpose is achieved by permitting reinvestment in the name of a close relative.

It is quite common to purchase properties in joint names of husband and wife, or jointly with close relatives and importantly there is no prohibition in law against it. In such an event, if the funds flow from the assessee, it is clear that the assessee cannot be denied the benefit of the exemption. Given this, should it make a difference if the assessee does not include his own name because of the circumstances of his old age or for convenience of simpler succession?

It may be noted that almost all the decisions favouring the assessee have been cases where the property has been purchased in the name of the spouse of the as-sessee and where funds have flown from the assessee. In all such cases, in any case, clubbing provisions would operate and the property would be regarded for both income tax and wealth tax purposes as the property of the assessee. The natural corollary is that the benefit of the exemption should also be given in such cases.

On the other hand, the decisions which have gone against the assessee have been cases where the prop-erty was purchased in the name of a son, daughter-in-law or grandson. In the case of a major son or grandson, clubbing provisions do not apply, and hence perhaps the adverse view was taken by the courts, though not highlighted in so many words .

The decisions involving section 54B which have gone against the assesseehave also been partly decided on account of the fact that section 54B requires use of the new land for agricultural purposes by the assessee unlike section 54F that merely requires acquisition of a residential house, and does not require the assessee to reside therein.

Mir Gulam Ali Khan’s case again was a case where the assessee initiated the process of purchase of the property, but passed away before he could complete the purchase, and the purchase was then completed by his legal heirs. Therefore, the subsequent purchase by the legal heirs was part of the same chain of events of sale of the old property and purchase of the new property initiated by the assessee himself.

Of course, one would need to take into account the provisions of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 in such a case. That Act excludes transac-tions entered into in the name of a wife or unmarried daughter. The Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Bill, 2011, seeks to exclude transactions in the name of spouse, brother or sister or any lineal ascendant or descendant. The law, therefore, seems to recognise that properties of a person can be purchased in the names of certain close relatives. Given this legal background, can the intention be to deny the benefit of an exemption, the conditions of which are otherwise fulfilled, on the mere ground that the property is pur-chased in the name of one such close relative?

In view of the fact that the issue involves interpretation of tax exemption provisions and that the said provisions do not in any case require that the investment has necessarily to be made in the name of the assessee, leading to a possibility of a debate, the better view seems to be that purchase of a property in the name of a spouse or close relative should qualify for the benefit of the exemption u/s. 54, 54B or 54F, as long as the funds belonging to the assessee are used and the assessee retains domain over the property. However, given the fact that while planning one’s affairs one should not plan in a manner so as to attract unnecessary litigation, it is advisable to purchase the property in the joint names of the assessee and such close relative, rather than in the name of the close relative alone.

Speculative business: Section 43(5) proviso (d): A. Y. 2006-07: Proviso (d) to section 43(5) inserted w.e.f. 01-04-2006: Transactions in derivatives on recognised stock exchange not deemed speculative: Rule prescribing conditions for notification framed on 01-07-2005: Notification in January 2006: Notification has retrospective effect: Loss in derivative transactions during July 2005 and September 2005 is not deemed speculative:

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CIT vs. NASA Finelease P. Ltd.; 358 ITR 305:

The assessee was engaged in the business of dealing in securities and investments. The assessee had claimed a loss of Rs. 1,90,29,988 in derivative transactions during the period July, 2005 and September, 2005 and claimed that it is not deemed speculative in view of exclusion in proviso to clause (d) to section 43(5) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and Notification dated 25th January, 2006 notifying the National Stock Exchange and Bombay Stock Exchange for that purpose. The Assessing Officer held that the loss was speculative loss u/s. 73, and since the derivative transactions were during the period July, 2005 to September, 2005, they were violative of proviso (d) to section 43(5) and the benefit of Notification dated 25th January, 2006 is not applicable for those transactions. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s appeal and held that the assessee was entitled to the benefit u/s. 43(5) proviso (d) read with the said Notification dated 25th January, 2006.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) Notification No. 2 of 2006, dated 25-01-2006, issued by CBDT does not specify any particular date and simply notifies the National Stock Exchange and Bombay Stock Exchange under proviso (d) to section 43(5) of the Act. Issue of notification obviously had to take some time as it involved processing and examination of applications etc. This was a matter relating to procedure and the delay in issue of notification or even framing of the Rules was due to administrative constraints.

ii) The delay occasioned, as procedure and formalities have to be complied with, should not disentitle or deprive an assessee, specially, when the transactions were carried through a notified stock exchange. The notification was procedural and necessary adjunct to the section enforced w.e.f. 01-04-2006.

iii) The rule and notification issued in the present case effectuate the statutory and the legislative mandate. There was no reason to interfere with the findings of the Tribunal.”

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