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Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 40(a)(ia), S. 44AE. Provisions of S. 44AE will be applicable to a person who has entered into an agreement with truck owner, by virtue of which he became owner of the trucks for the period of contract and his accounts are not aud

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63 (2010) TIOL 420 ITAT (Bang.)

B. V. Prabhu v. ITO

A.Y. : 2006-07. Dated : 29-1-2010


Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 40(a)(ia), S. 44AE. Provisions of
S. 44AE will be applicable to a person who has entered into an agreement with
truck owner, by virtue of which he became owner of the trucks for the period of
contract and his accounts are not audited. Provisions of S. 40(a)(ia) will not
be applicable in respect of transport contract business when the income is
ascertained as per S. 44AE of the Act and accounts are not audited.

Facts :

The assessee obtained a contract from Indian Oil Corporation
Ltd. (IOC) for transportation of LPG cylinders and in turn, such transportation
was being done through another contractor. The balance sheet filed alongwith the
return of income showed amount receivable from IOC and also showed the amount
payable to transport contractor. No profit and loss account was prepared. Fixed
percentage of gross receipts was considered by the assessee to be its income.
The assessee used to retain a percentage of amounts received by IOC and the
balance was paid to truck owners with whom the assessee was having agreements.
The payments were made without deduction of income-tax at source. Credit was
claimed in respect of income-tax deducted at source by IOC. Before the Assessing
Officer (AO), it was contended that the provisions of S. 44AE are applicable and
therefore the provisions of S. 40(a)(ia) do not apply. The AO held that the
transport business of the assessee was a contract with IOC and a sub-contract
with the truck owners and therefore, in view of the proviso to S. 194C(2), the
assessee was required to deduct tax at source in respect of payments made to
sub-contractors. Since no tax was deducted at source, he disallowed the
expenditure of Rs.11,26,500 u/s. 40(a)(ia).

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A)
where it contended that it merely acted on behalf of the truck owners and had
not entered into any sub-contract with the truck owners and also that it had not
debited the amount to profit and loss account and therefore the same cannot be
treated as expenditure to be disallowed u/s. 40(a)(ia). The CIT(A) noted that
the assessee had entered into a contract with IOC and had entered into agreement
with truck owners wherein he was described as transporter and truck owner was
treated as contractors. He held that the payments made to truck owners
constituted sub-contract payments and hence the provisions of S. 194C(2) were
applicable. He also held that the assessee did not own trucks and therefore the
provisions of
S. 44AE are not applicable. He confirmed the action of the AO.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal on perusal of the agreement entered into by the
assessee with IOC noted that it mentioned that the contractor (the assessee) was
owner and operator of new/old capacity trucks and had undertaken to maintain the
trucks in good working order for the period of the contract, the agreement inter
alia provided that the contractor had to pay the entire operation cost of the
trucks which include and be deemed always to include the expenses enumerated in
the agreement and the agreement also provided that the contractor shall not be
entitled to assign, subrogate, subject or part with his right under the contract
or change the ownership of the trucks. The contractor (assessee) was also
prohibited from changing constitution of its firm without obtaining prior
written consent of the Corporation.

The Tribunal also noted that in order to comply with the
clauses of the agreement entered into by the assessee with IOC, the assessee had
entered into an MOU with a truck owner wherein the truck owner agreed to act as
a manager of the transport business of the assessee. This MOU also provided that
upon the expiry of the contract the truck will be resold by the assessee to Shri
Athaulla Khan (the truck owner). The assessee under this agreement was entitled
to retain 3% of the commission.

As regards the contention on behalf of the assessee that the
assessee was registered with IOC and the truck owner was not registered with IOC
and therefore the contract was taken for the benefit of the person owning the
truck, the Tribunal observed that this may be de facto relationship. However,
one has to consider the legal agreements between the assessee and the IOC and
also considering the MOU between the assessee and the truck owner and from such
agreements, one has to draw a conclusion that de jure relationship of the
assessee with IOC was in the form of a person who has been awarded the contract.
The assessee was required to abide by the conditions mentioned in the agreement.

The Tribunal held that as per the agreement with the truck
owner, the assessee became the owner of two trucks for the period of contract.
The original truck owner became a manager for the transport business of the
assessee. In respect of contract with IOC, the assessee was owner of two trucks.
Since there was no tax audit report in respect of transport contract business,
therefore the income was to be ascertained as per S. 44AE of the Act. Once
income has been ascertained as per provisions of S. 44AE of the Act, then
provisions of S. 40(a)(ia) will not be applicable.

The Tribunal also upheld the alternative contention on behalf
of the assessee viz. that the AO should have restricted the disallowance to
Rs.5,14,725 being the amount paid by the assessee to the truck owner. From the
gross amount due to the assessee from IOC, deductions were made by IOC towards
diesel and TDS. IOC made deduction towards diesel made available for plying the
truck. The amount deducted by IOC was not paid to the truck owner, but only the
net amount received from IOC was paid to the truck owner and hence the amount on
which tax was deductible at source was the net amount of Rs.5,14,725.


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Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 10A. Hiving off of a unit which was in the form of a branch office into a subsidiary company does not cause conversion of an existing unit into a new unit so as to disentitle the claim of deduction u/s.10A.

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62 (2010) TIOL 395 ITAT (Bang.)

DCIT v. LG Soft India Pvt. Ltd.

A.Ys. : 2004-05 & 2005-06. Dated : 19-5-2010

Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 10A. Hiving off of a unit which was
in the form of a branch office into a subsidiary company does not cause
conversion of an existing unit into a new unit so as to disentitle the claim of
deduction u/s.10A.

Facts :

The assessee-company had claimed deduction u/s. 10A for both
the assessment years under appeal. The eligible undertaking which was earlier a
branch of a non-resident company/foreign company was hived off as a subsidiary
company. The Assessing Officer held that the new unit stated to be set up by the
assessee was made on reconstructing/splitting up of the existing unit and
pursuant to the provisions of S. 10A(2)(ii), the assessee is not entitled to
deduction u/s.10A. He also held that the plant and machinery in the new unit
have been installed by way of transfer. He denied the claim made by the assessee.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who
allowed the appeal.

Aggrieved the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

As rightly pointed out by the CIT(A), the asses-see’s
undertaking existed in the same place, form and substance and did carry on the
same business before and after the change in the legal character of the form of
organisation. Formerly, it was a branch establishment of a non-resident
company/foreign company, but later on it was converted into a subsidiary
company. But for the above change of the organisational status, the same unit
continued to function throughout the time. Therefore, it is quite fruitless to
argue that the organisational change has caused conversion of the existing unit
to a new unit. There is no such splitting up or reconstruction of an existing
business in the case of a branch establishment becoming a subsidiary
establishment. The assessee’s unit satisfied all the conditions stipulated in
the Act and was entitled for the benefit. Therefore, as rightly held by the
CIT(A), a mere organisational change is not a ground to hold that the assessee
has violated the conditions stated in S. 10A(2)(ii). It is a case of only change
in the name and style. It is clearly possible to state that there was no
violation of the conditions laid down in S. 10A(2)(iii) as well.

The Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue.

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Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 36(1)(vii), S. 36(2) — If brokerage is offered to tax, a sharebroker is entitled to deduction by way of bad debts u/s. 36(1)(vii) r.w. S. 36(2) in respect of the amount which could not be recovered from its clients in respect of

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61 (2010) TIOL 390 ITAT Mum.-SB

DCIT v. Shreyas S. Morakhia

A.Y. : 1998-99. Dated : 16-7-2010


Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 36(1)(vii), S. 36(2) — If brokerage
is offered to tax, a sharebroker is entitled to deduction by way of bad debts
u/s. 36(1)(vii) r.w. S. 36(2) in respect of the amount which could not be
recovered from its clients in respect of transactions effected by him on behalf
of his client, apart from brokerage earned by him.

Facts :

During the assessment years under consideration the assessee
in its return of income claimed deduction of Rs.28,24,296 on account of amount
due to the assessee by his clients on account of transactions of shares effected
by him on their behalf. It was contended that the amount has become
irrecoverable and the same has been claimed as deduction after having written it
off from the books of account. Copies of ledger accounts were filed.

The Assessing Officer (AO) disallowed the claim of the
assessee on the ground that there was no other evidence filed by the assessee
except copies of ledger account to show that any action was taken against the
concerned parties to recover the amounts due from them. He also noted that the
Bombay Stock Exchange Card held by the assessee was already sold by him and the
business in respect of which the debt in question had arisen had ceased to exist
in the year under consideration.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who
noted that the assessee had carried on business as a sub-broker and there was
hardly any difference between the business of share-broker and sub-broker. He
held that the business of the assessee had not ceased to exist on transfer of
membership card but the same continued during the year under consideration. He
also held that failure on the part of assessee to initiate recovery proceedings
could not be a ground for denying the assessee’s claim for bad debt u/s.
36(1)(vii). Accordingly, he allowed the claim of the assessee for deduction on
account of bad debt.

Aggrieved, the Department preferred an appeal to the
Tribunal. In view of the conflicting decisions on the subject, the following
question was sought to be referred by the Division Bench to the Special Bench.
The President constituted a Special Bench to consider the following question :

“Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case and in
law, the assessee, who is a share-broker, is entitled to deduction by way of bad
debts u/s.36(1)(vii) read with S. 36(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in respect
of the amount which could not be recovered from its clients in respect of
transactions effected by him on behalf of his client, apart from the commission
earned by him.”

Held :

The Special Bench having noted that in order to claim
deduction u/s.36(1)(vii), one of the conditions that is required to be satisfied
as laid down u/s.36(2)(i) is that the debt claimed to be deductible as bad or
part thereof has been taken into account in computing the income of the assessee
of the relevant previous year or of any earlier previous year, observed that the
fundamental question is whether the said condition is satisfied in case of
share-broker where only the brokerage income is credited to the P & L account
and not the value of purchase of shares made on behalf of the clients. The SB
noted that the Supreme Court has in the case of T. Veerabhadra Rao K. Koteshwar
Rao & Co. (155 ITTR 152), in the context of loan given on interest, has held
that the debt was taken into account in computing the income of the assessee
when the interest income accruing thereon was taxed in the hands of the assessee.
It noted that the Supreme Court has clearly laid down that in order to satisfy
the condition stipulated in S. 36(2)(i), it is not necessary that the entire
amount of debt has to be taken into account in computing the income of the
assessee and it will be sufficient even if part of such debt is taken into
account in computing the income of the assessee. Applying this principle to the
share-broker, it was held that the amount receivable by the assessee on account
of brokerage is thus a part of debt receivable by the share-broker from his
clients against purchase of shares and once such brokerage is credited to P & L
account of the broker and the same is taken into account in computing his
income, the condition stipulated in S. 36(2)(i) gets satisfied.

The argument that the loss was suffered owing to breach of
SEBI guidelines framed to safeguard the interest of brokers the SB held that
when a share-broker has actually suffered a loss, whether such loss is suffered
by assessee as a result of not following the guidelines or even after following
such guidelines, is not going to change the fact that assessee has suffered such
loss. If the assessee broker has not followed such guidelines in a particular
case, it is a decision taken by him as a businessman taking into consideration
all the relevant facts and circumstances including his business relations with
the concerned clients. Even if it is assumed that such loss has been incurred by
the assessee as a result of not following the rules and regulations and
guidelines issued by the SEBI, the same cannot be equated to expenditure
incurred by the assessee for any purpose which is an offence or which is
prohibited by law.

The contention of the Revenue that the sale value of shares
remaining with the assessee should be adjusted against the amount receivable
from the client so as to arrive at the actual amount of bad debt should be
raised, if permissible, before the Division Bench.

The Special Bench held that the assessee, who is a
share-broker, is entitled to deduction by way of bad debts u/s.36(1)(vii) r.w.
S. 36(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in respect of the amount which could not be
recovered from its clients in respect of transactions effected by him on behalf
of his client, apart from the commission earned by him.

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Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 251, S. 254. While the powers of CIT(A) are co-terminus with the powers of Assessing Officer, AO has no power to admit fresh claim otherwise than by way of revised return but Appellate Authorities including CIT(A) and ITAT have p

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60 (2010) TIOL 377 ITAT (Mum.)

Asian Paints Ltd. v. Addl. CIT

A.Y. : 2003-04. Dated : 23-3-2009

Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 251, S. 254. While the powers of
CIT(A) are co-terminus with the powers of Assessing Officer, AO has no power to
admit fresh claim otherwise than by way of revised return but Appellate
Authorities including CIT(A) and ITAT have power to admit such claim. The Apex
Court in the case of Goetze (India) Ltd. has itself clarified that their finding
does not impinge on the power of ITAT u/s.254 of the Act, CIT(A) has similar
power u/s.251(1)(c).

Facts :

The assessee in its return of income did not make any claim
of Rs.98.36 lakhs on account of prior period adjustments. In the course of
assessment proceedings, it pressed such claim. The Assessing Officer (AO) did
not entertain the claim.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who
relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Goetze (India) Ltd. (284 ITR
323) (SC) held that the claim for deduction can be made only in the return of
income filed and that a claim which is not made in the return of income cannot
be subsequently made. He upheld the action of the AO.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal having considered the observations of the
Supreme Court in the case of Goetze (India) Ltd. (supra) and also the powers of
the first Appellate Authority as examined by the Supreme Court in CIT v.
Nirbheram Deluram, (224 ITR 610) (SC) held as under :

(1) The Apex Court clarified in Goetze (India) Ltd.
(supra) itself that their finding does not impinge on the power of the
Income-tax Appellate Tribunal u/s.254 of the Act. We find that the CIT(A)
has also similar power u/s.251(1)(c) of the Act.

(2) The AO has no power to admit fresh claim otherwise
than revised return but Appellate Authorities including the CIT(A) and ITAT
have power to admit such claim.

The Tribunal held that without prejudice to its above finding
the claim of the assessee is in accordance with the judgment of the Apex Court
in the case of Goetze (India) Ltd. The Tribunal in the interest of natural
justice and keeping in view the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the case of
Goetze (India) Ltd. remitted the matter back to the file of the CIT(A) with a
direction to decide the issue on merit in accordance with law and after
providing reasonable opportunity of hearing to both the sides.

Compiler’s Note :

The above was one of the grounds before the Tribunal. Other
minor issues have not been covered above.

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S. 115JB — Long-term capital gain which is exempt u/s.47(iv) cannot be excluded from the book profits for the purpose of S. 115JB.

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59 (2010) 41 DTR (Hyd.) (SB) (Trib.) 449

Rain Commodities Ltd. v. DCIT

A.Y. : 2004-05. Dated : 2-7-2010

S. 115JB — Long-term capital gain which is exempt u/s.47(iv)
cannot be excluded from the book profits for the purpose of S. 115JB.

Facts :

The assessee credited an amount of Rs.149.77 crores as profit
on transfer of assets to its wholly-owned subsidiary to its profit & loss
account. It claimed the exemption u/s.47(iv) of the Act. While working out the
book profits for the purpose of S. 115JB, the assessee reduced this profit and
claimed that it cannot form part of the book profits. A Special Bench was
constituted to adjudicate the matter.

Held :

The AO has power to alter the net profits as shown in the P &
L A/c only in two cases; (1) if it is discovered that P & L A/c is not drawn up
in accordance with Part II and Part III of Schedule VI of the Companies Act, (2)
if accounting policies, accounting standards are not adopted for preparing such
accounts and methods, rates of depreciation which have been incorrectly adopted
for preparation of P & L A/c laid before the annual general meeting.

Part II & Part III of Schedule VI of the Companies Act
require the P & L A/c of a company to disclose every material feature including
credits or receipts and debits or expenses in respect of non-recurring
transactions or transactions of an exceptional nature. As held by the Bombay
High Court in the case of CIT v. Veekaylal Investment Co. (P) Ltd., 249 ITR 597,
the capital gain should be included for the purposes of computing book profits
under MAT provisions.

It is an undisputed fact that the long-term capital gain
earned by the assessee is included in the net profit determined as per P & L A/c
prepared as per Part II and Part III of Schedule VI of the Companies Act. It is
not the case of the assessee that the capital gain earned by the assessee was
not included in the net profit determined as per P & L A/c of the assessee
prepared under the Companies Act. The taxability of capital gain is relevant
only for the purpose of computation of income under the normal provisions of the
Income-tax Act, and has nothing to do with the preparation of P & L A/c in
accordance with the provisions of Part II and Part III of Schedule VI of the
Companies Act. Under these circumstances, as long as long-term capital gain is
part of profit included in the P & L A/c prepared in accordance with the
provisions contained in Parts II and III of Schedule VI of the Companies Act, it
cannot be excluded from the net profit unless so provided under Explanation to
S. 115JB for the purpose of computing book profit. In the absence of any
provision for exclusion of capital gains in the computation of book profit under
the above provision, the assessee is not entitled to the exclusion claimed. The
decision of the Calcutta Special Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Sutlej
Cotton Mills Ltd. v. ACIT, 45 ITD 22 held to be reversed by the decision of the
Bombay High Court in the case of Veekaylal Investment Co. (P) Ltd. (supra).

The Ss.(5) of S. 115JB provides that “save as otherwise
provided in this Section, all other provisions of this Act shall apply to every
assessee, being a company, mentioned in this Section”. The contention of the
assessee that since all other provisions of this Act shall also apply, it is
entitled to reduce the long-term capital gain exempted u/s.47(iv) is not
accepted. All other provisions of the Act shall apply, but subject to the
provisions otherwise provided in S. 115JB. The provision for computing book
profit by increasing or reducing the net profit as shown in the P & L A/c
prepared in accordance with the provisions of Part II and Part III of Schedule
VI of the Companies Act are specifically provided in S. 115J or S. 115JA or S.
115JB itself, as the case may be, and consequently all other provisions of the
Act providing the manner of computation of total income under normal provisions
of the Act cannot be applied while computing book profit u/s.115J or u/s.115JA
or u/s.115JB, as the case may be. The decision of ITO v. Frigsales (India) Ltd.,
4 SOT 376 (Mum.) is overruled.


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Capital gains vis-à-vis business income — Transactions in shares.

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58 (2010) 41 DTR (Mumbai) (Trib.) 426

Management Structure & Systems (P) Ltd. v. ITO

A.Y. : 2004-05. Dated : 30-4-2010

Capital gains vis-à-vis business income — Transactions in
shares.

Facts :

The assessee company is engaged in the management
consultancy, investment advisory and equity research services and also dealing
in investments. It filed return of income declaring profits of Rs.1.03 crores
earned by it on sale of shares as long-term and short-term capital gains. The AO
noted that the assessee was regularly dealing in the shares throughout the year
and held that the profit/gain earned from dealing in the shares is a business
income. Upon further appeal, the CIT(A) also confirmed the assessment order on
this issue.

Held :

The balance sheet filed by the assessee and as per the books
of account, the assessee has treated the entire investment in the shares as an
investment only and not as a stock-in-trade. Another important aspect to be
considered here is that the assessee is not a share-broker, nor is he having a
registration with any stock exchange. Moreover, some scrips are held for more
than five years and it is not the case of the AO that there were any derivative
transactions by the assessee, nor is it a case of the AO that there were
transactions without delivery. In the present case, both the authorities have
not disputed that the transactions are complete with delivery. The assessee has
not borrowed any money for investing in shares and used his own surplus funds
and these facts have not been disputed by the AO. In the case of the assessee,
in the preceding years, the assessee is consistently declaring the gain/profit
on the sale of the shares under the head ‘capital gains’ either
long-term or short-term and the same has been accepted by the AO. It is true
that the rule of res judicata is not applicable to the income-tax proceedings,
but at the same time, it is also well-settled principle that if there is no
change in the facts, then there should be consistency in the approach of the
Revenue authorities while deciding the tax liability of the assessee. Another
aspect to be considered here is that the assessee has received substantial
dividend and that is also disclosed. After considering the totality of the
facts, it was held that the transactions of sale and purchase of the shares by
the assessee cannot be treated in the line of trading in the shares, nor can it
be treated as an adventure in the nature of the trade.


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S. 194J — Various charges like VSAT charges, lease line charges, BOLT charges, Demat charges, etc. paid to stock exchange by member — Not in the nature of fees for technical services.

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57 (2010) 41 DTR (Mumbai) (Trib.) 296

DCIT v. Angel Broking Ltd.

A.Y. : 2005-06. Dated : 9-12-2009

S. 194J — Various charges like VSAT charges, lease line
charges, BOLT charges, Demat charges, etc. paid to stock exchange by member —
Not in the nature of fees for technical services.

Facts :

As a member of BSE and NSE, the assessee company had paid
various charges like VSAT charges, lease line charges, BOLT charges, Demat
charges, etc. to the stock exchange. According to the AO, the aforesaid sum paid
by the assessee to the stock exchange was a fee for technical services and,
therefore, the assessee ought to have deducted tax at source on such payment.
Since, the assessee had not deducted tax at source on such payment, the
aforesaid sum claimed as deduction was disallowed by the AO.

Held :

Following the decision of Skycell Communications Ltd. v. DCIT,
251 ITR 53 (Mad.) it was held that stock exchanges do not provide any technical
services by installing VSAT network. It is the facility provided to its members
and hence such payment cannot be said to be fees for any technical services
rendered. The AO in coming to the conclusion that the payment was for fees for
technical services has relied on the fact that the screen-based trading is a
sophisticated method of trading. This by itself will not be sufficient to hold
that technical services are rendered. The AO has held that services are not
available to the public at large but only to registered members, again this by
itself will not make the services in question as technical services. Another
reason given by the AO is the speed at which transactions were completed. This
again is not a relevant criteria for holding that the services rendered were
technical services. All the above features present in screen-based trading saves
time. This is the result of improved technology. That does not mean that stock
exchange is providing technical services. Stock exchanges are not the owner of
this technology to provide them for a fee to prospective users. They are
themselves consumers of the technology. Therefore the payment in question is not
fee for technical services.


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Companies Bill, 2008 introduced in Lok Sabha.

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New Page 1Part D :
Miscellaneous

12 Companies Bill, 2008 introduced in Lok
Sabha.

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Limited Liability Partnership Bill, 2008 passed by Rajya Sabha.

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New Page 1Part D :
Miscellaneous

11 Limited Liability Partnership Bill, 2008
passed by Rajya Sabha.

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DTAA signed between India and Tajikistan : Press Release dated 20-11-2008.

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10 DTAA signed between India and
Tajikistan : Press Release dated 20-11-2008.

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S. 271(1)(c) r.w. S. 2(24) and S. 10(10D) — Taxability of assignment of Keyman Insurance Policy based on surrender value was highly debatable as to the year of taxability and also as to the amount — Penalty not leviable u/s.271(1)(c).

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New Page 1Part A: Reported
Decisions

34 (2010) 127 ITD 116
(Delhi)

Rajan Nanda v. Dy. CIT,
Central Cir. 3,

New Delhi

A.Ys. : 2003-04, 2004-05.
Dated : 15-5-2009

 

S. 271(1)(c) r.w. S. 2(24)
and S. 10(10D) — Taxability of assignment of Keyman Insurance Policy based on
surrender value was highly debatable as to the year of taxability and also as to
the amount of taxability, so it was held that penalty is not leviable
u/s.271(1)(c).

Facts :

1. Keyman Insurance Policy
taken on the assessee by the employer company was assigned to him in the year
subsequent to the year of the policy at a much lower value.

2. However the value was
paid by the assessee in a different year and the policy was assigned to him in a
different year. The case of assessee subsequently went to the Tribunal so as to
decide the year of taxability and amount of taxable benefits.

3. The Tribunal held that
the surrender value of the policy less value paid by the assignee to the
assignor and less subsequent premium paid will be the benefits accruing to the
assessee. The decision of the Tribunal was, in a way, against the assessee.

4. The AO subsequently
initiated penalty proceedings u/s.271(1)(c) for concealment of income.

5. Also in A.Y. 2004-05 the
assessee received Rs.2.85 crore on maturity, which he claimed as exempt
u/s.10(10D) for an amount equal to 2.51 crore. The AO disallowed the exemption
and also initiated penalty proceedings for entering wrong amount and also for
concealment of income.

6. The above actions of the
AO was upheld by the learned CIT(A).

Held :

1. The assessee had
disclosed complete facts to the Department during the course of hearing and the
addition was entirely due the difference of opinion between the assessee and the
AO.

2. Since the year in which
the amount paid by the assessee to the assignor was different from the year in
which the policy was assigned to him, the issue was a matter of considerable
debate and discussion.

3. It was held that the
explanation tendered by the assessee was bona fide notwithstanding the fact that
sketchy disclosure was made in the return of income and the whole issue of
taxation of the amount was highly debatable.

4. Also for the A.Y. 2004-05
the issue of taxability of sum received on maturity of erstwhile Keyman
Insurance Policy, from the LIC was highly debatable.

5. Hence penalty
u/s.271(1)(c) was not leviable.

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S. 45 r.w. S. 28(i) — Assessee in business of real estate — Land held as investment — Agreement of sale entered in F.Y. 2002-03 — Full consideration received by F.Y. 2004-05 — Capital gains offered to tax in A.Y. 2005-06 — Taxed as business income in A.Y

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New Page 1

Part A: Reported
Decisions


33 (2010) 127 ITD 94 (Bang.)

Asha Housing Enterprises v.
DCIT

A.Y. 2003-04. Dated :
31-3-2010

 

S. 45 r.w. S. 28(i) —
Assessee was in the business of real estate — Land was held as investment —
Agreement of sale entered in F.Y. 2002-03 — Full sale consideration received by
F.Y. 2004-05 — Long-term capital gains offered to tax in A.Y. 2005-06 — AO held
it as business income for A.Y. 2003-04 — Held : Land to be treated as investment
and transfer is said to be complete in F.Y. 2004-05.

Facts :

The assessee firm was
engaged in real estate business. It had purchased land in the year 1992. On
22-6-2002, the assessee had entered into agreement of sale with A Developers for
Rs.12.25 crores. On the date of agreement, the assessee received a part payment
of Rs.5.25 crores. Thereafter, sale consideration was received in piecemeal in
the F.Ys. 2002-03, 2003-04 and 2004-05. The assessee offered to tax the income
arising out of this transaction as long-term capital gains in the A.Y. 2005-06.

The Assessing Officer
assessed the income as business income arising in A.Y. 2003-04. The AO observed
that general power of attorney (GPOA) in the favour of developers was executed
in F.Y. 2002-03 and therefore transfer had taken place in A.Y. 2003-04.

Held :

1. The execution of GPOA
cannot be construed as transfer of property.

2. The AO was not having any
conclusive evidence to show that possession of property was indeed handed over
to the developers.

3. The agreement of sale
clearly stated that the vendor shall deliver the possession of property on the
date of sale and against payment of entire sale consideration. The supplemental
agreement also had stated that the vendors at request of purchasers have
permitted by way of licence to enter upon the property to do the work of
property and that the licence granted to the purchasers was on specific
condition that the same shall not be construed as possession u/s.53A of the
Transfer of Property Act.

4. The assessee had held the
said land as investment right from the time the land was purchased. In the F.Y.
2000-01, the assessee had sold a portion of property and treated the gain out of
the same as long-term capital gain. The Department had accepted the same. The
Department cannot now treat the land as stock-in-trade. A firm involved in real
estate business can hold land as investment and/or stock-in-trade.

5. In view of the above, the
assessee had correctly offered income as long-term capital gains for A.Y.
2005-06.

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S. 68 — cannot be invoked when source of the gift is properly explained and when the donor himself appears before the AO, confirming the gift.

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New Page 1Part A: Reported
Decisions

32 (2010) 126 ITD 145 (AGRA)
(TM)

Avnish Kumar Singh v. ITO

A.Y. 2002-03. Dated :
30-4-2009

 

S. 68 — Provisions of S. 68
cannot be invoked when source of the gift is properly explained and also when
the donor himself appears before the Assessing Officer (AO), confirming the gift
made.

Facts :

1. The assessee received an
amount of Rs.2,50,000 as a gift from Mr. Rakesh Walia (donor), a resident of
Delhi. The donor was friend of the assessee’s father, and had received some help
from the assesse’s father earlier. So he had made a gift to the assessee.

2. The assessee, during
assessment, produced before the AO copy of deed of declaration of gift dated
24-1-2002 executed by the donor, his affidavit confirming the gift with his
complete address, a copy of his PAN Card and proof that he is an old income
tax-assessee, a photocopy of his ration card, a copy of accounts of the donor in
the books of Balaji Trading Corporation, Delhi (Balaji) and his Balance Sheet as
on 31-3-2001. Also the donor himself was produced before the AO and he confirmed
the gift and also gave reasons to the AO for giving the gift.

3. The AO observed that the
donor himself was a person of low financial status having monthly income of
Rs.5,000. He has no fixed assets of his own including any immovable property or
fixed deposits. He had a deposit of Rs.1,25,000 with Balaji, from which he
received Rs.2,46,000 which he forwarded to the assessee as gift. However the
reason of deposit with Balaji was not explained.

4. The Assessing Officer was
satisfied with the identity of the owner, however he was not satisfied with the
source of the income. So he invoked the provisions of S. 68 which was upheld by
the CIT(A).

Held :

1. The ITAT observed that
there could be two possibilities of the situation :

Possibility 1 :

Genuiness of the gifts
stands to be proved in the lights of all the evidences brought on record by the
assessee (in the favour of the assessee).

Possibility 2 :

Considering the
creditworthiness and capacity of the donor and closeness and natural love and
affection between the donor and the donee, the source of the gift is doubtful
(in the favour of Revenue).

2. S. 68 provides for
charging the sum credited in the books of the assessee as the income of the
assessee, if the assessee offers no explanation as to the nature and source of
the same.

3. Since the assessee has
explained the nature and sources of the credit by way of a gift, which
satisfactorily explains the genuineness of the gift, it cannot be added to the
income of the assessee as unexplained income u/s.68.

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S. 40(a)(ia) as amended w.e.f. 1-4-2010 is clarificatory and to be treated as retrospective w.e.f. 1-4-2005.

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Part A: Reported
Decisions

31 (2010) TIOL 765 ITAT-Ahm.

Shri Kanubhai Ramji Makwana
v. ITO

ITA No. 3983/Ahd./2008

A.Y. : 2005-06. Dated :
3-12-2010

 

Income-tax Act, 1961 — S.
40(a)(ia) — Provisions of S. 40(a)(ia) as amended by the Finance Act, 2010 w.e.f.
1-4-2010 are clarificatory in nature and therefore to be treated as
retrospective w.e.f. 1-4-2005, the date on which S. 40(a)(ia) has been inserted
by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2004.

Facts :

The assessee, a contractor,
was required to get work done through sub-contractors. While assessing the total
income of the assessee, the AO disallowed a sum of Rs.1,16,58,614 u/s.40(a)(ia)
of the Act on the ground that the amount of tax deducted at source was not
deposited before the last day of the previous year.

Aggrieved by the order of
the AO the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who observed that the AO
has disallowed the amounts based on unamended provisions of S. 40(a)(ia). The
CIT(A) observed that the provisions of S. 40(a)(ia) have been amended by the
Finance Act, 2008 w.e.f. 1-4-2005, and the amended provisions provide that tax
deducted in the last month of the previous year can be deposited before due date
specified u/s.139(1) of the Act for furnishing return of income. Accordingly, he
granted relief to the extent of payments aggregating to Rs.53,02,227 in respect
of which tax was deducted in the month of March 2004 and was paid on 19-7-2005
i.e., before the due date of filing return of income.

Aggrieved the assessee
preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where it contended that the amendment made
by the Finance Act, 2010 to provisions of
S. 40(a)(ia) w.e.f. 1-4-2010 is clarificatory in nature and since the tax
deducted has been deposited before the due date of filing return of income, no
disallowance u/s.40(a)(ia) is called for.

Held :

The Tribunal after going
through the history of the provisions of S. 40(a)(ia) observed that the
amendments brought out in S. 40(a)(ia) of the Act from time to time were
clarificatory and when an amendment is declaratory and clarificatory in nature,
the presumption against its retrospectivity is not applicable and amendments of
this kind only declare. It observed that it is no doubt true that, ordinarily, a
statute, and particularly when the same has been made applicable with effect
from a particular date should be construed prospectively and not
retrospectively. But this principle will not be applicable in a case where the
provision construed is merely explanatory, clarificatory or declaratory.

The Tribunal held that the
provisions of S. 40(a)(ia) as amended by the Finance Act, 2010 w.e.f. 1-4-2010,
which has newly been inserted by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2004, w.e.f. 1-4-2005
to S. 40 of the Act is remedial in nature, designed to eliminate unintended
consequences which may cause undue hardship to the taxpayers and which made the
provision unworkable or unjust in a specific situation, and is of clarificatory
nature and, therefore, has to be treated as retrospective with effect from 1st
April, 2005, the date on which S. 40(a)(ia) has been inserted by The Finance
(No. 2) Act, 2004.

The Tribunal allowed the
appeal filed by the assessee.

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S. 244A — Interest on excess payment of S.A. tax becomes due from the date of payment of S.A. tax.

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30 (2010) TIOL 760 ITAT-Bang.

Addl. CIT v. Vijaya Bank

ITA No. 105/Bang./2009

A.Y. : 2002-03. Dated :
30-9-2010

 


Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 244A — Interest on excess payment of self-assessment
tax becomes due from the date of payment of self-assessment tax.

 

Facts :

The assessment of total
income of the assessee, a nationalised bank, was completed u/s.143(3) of the
Act. Aggrieved by the additions made by the Assessing Officer (AO) the assessee
preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who partly allowed the appeal of the assessee.
While giving effect to the order passed by the CIT(A) the AO did not grant
interest u/s.244A on the self-assessment tax, amounting to Rs.15.50 crores, paid
by the assessee. The AO declined to pay interest on self-assessment tax on the
ground that there is no provision for allowing interest u/s.244A on the
self-assessment tax.

Aggrieved by the order of
the AO refusing to grant interest on self-assessment tax paid, the assessee
preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who allowed the appeal filed by the assessee.
The AO pursuant to the CIT(A)’s order granted interest on self-assessment tax
paid from the date of regular assessment, as against the claim of the assessee
that the interest ought to have been calculated from the date of payment of
self-assessment tax.

Aggrieved by the order of
the AO granting interest on self-assessment tax paid from the date of regular
assessment, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who held that the
assessee is entitled to interest u/s.244A on the excess payment of
self-assessment tax with effect from the date on which it was paid by the
assessee and directed the AO to grant interest u/s.244A to the assessee
accordingly. He also held that the assessee is entitled to interest on interest
u/s.244A of the Act by following the decision of the SC in the case of Sandvik
Asia v. CIT, (280 ITR 643).

Aggrieved, the Revenue
preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal having
considered the Circular No. 549, dated 31st October, 1989 and also the decision
of the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT v. Sutlej Industries Ltd., (325 ITR
331) (Del.), which decision follows the decision of the Madras High Court in the
case of Cholamandalam Investment and Finance Co. Ltd., 294 ITR 438, upheld the
decision of the CIT(A) that the assessee is entitled to interest u/s.244A on
excess payment of self-assessment tax with effect from the date of payment of
self-assessment tax. The Tribunal held that the decision of the jurisdictional
High Court in the case of CIT v. MICO, (ITA No. 419 of 2003 dated 9th July,
2008), on which reliance was placed by the Revenue, is distinguishable on facts
since in that case the Court was dealing with payment of interest u/s.244A on
excess payment of advance tax, unlike the present case where interest is being
claimed on excess payment of self-assessment tax paid u/s.140A of the Act.

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S. 201(1) and S. 201(1A) — Where deductees have paid taxes, assessee not liable to make good short deduction. Interest not chargeable for period after payment by deductees.

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Part A: Reported
Decisions


29 (2010) TIOL 751 ITAT-Del.

The Executive Engineer,
Haryana State

Agricultural Marketing Board
v. ITO

ITA No. 2011 to
2014/Del./2010

A.Ys. : 2006-07 to 2009-10.
Dated : 10-9-2010

Income-tax Act, 1961 — S.
201(1) and S. 201(1A) — In a case where deductees have paid their taxes, the
assessee cannot be held liable to make good the short deduction of tax. Interest
cannot be levied after the date on which the tax has been actually paid by the
deductees.

Facts :

The assessee, an autonomous
body controlled by the Government of Haryana, short deducted tax at source. The
Assessing Officer (AO) issued a notice of demand for the amount of tax short
deducted by the assessee. He also levied interest u/s.201(1A).

Aggrieved the assessee
preferred an appeal to CIT(A) and contended that since the deductees have paid
their tax dues, the tax cannot be recovered from the assessee. Proof with regard
to some of the deductees was sought to be filed before the CIT(A) but the
assessee could not explain why the same was not filed before the AO. The CIT(A)
did not take into consideration the said evidence filed by the assessee and
rejected the appeals filed by the assessee.

Aggrieved, the assessee
preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where it was contended that the short
deduction was due to the fact that the assessee being government-controlled body
did not have provision of engaging private consultant and the staff being not
conversant with the provisions of the Act could not deduct proper TDS, deductees
have paid the taxes due from them, interest cannot be levied for a period after
the date when the deductees have paid their taxes and in respect of delay in
depositing TDS interest be levied up to the date of tender of the cheque and not
up to the date of its encashment.

Held :

The Tribunal held this to be
a case of genuine hardship faced by the assessee and observed that if such
payment is made by the assessee, then from whom the payment can be recovered as
the deductees are stated to have already paid the taxes and have submitted their
returns.

The Tribunal restored the
matter back to the file of the AO with a direction to verify the contention of
the assessee that deductees having paid their taxes, the assessee cannot be held
liable to make good the short deduction of tax. It also held that interest
cannot be levied after the date on which the tax has actually been paid by the
deductees. The AO was directed to give reasonable opportunity to the assessee to
place the evidence on record and thereafter re-compute the liability of the
assessee u/s.201 and u/s.201(1A).

As regards interest on
belated payments, following the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT
v. Ogala Glass Works Ltd., (25 ITR 529) (SC), the Tribunal directed the AO that,
for computing interest u/s.201(1A), date of tendering of cheque be taken into
consideration and if the cheque is tendered within the due date and has also not
been dishonoured, then no interest be charged on the assessee for belated
payment on account of late encashment of cheques.

The appeal filed by the
assessee was allowed.

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S. 44AE — Assessee engaged in transport business employing own as well as the hired vehicles S. 44AE can be applied to business carried with own vehicles.

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Part A: Reported
Decisions


28 (2010) 47 DTR (Pune)
(Trib) 513

Anil Ramgopal Mali (HUF) v.
ACIT

A.Y. : 2006-07. Dated :
31-12-2009

 

S. 44AE — Even when an
assessee is engaged in the composite business employing both own as well as the
hired vehicles from others, provisions of S. 44AE can be applied with respect to
business carried on through own vehicles.

Facts :

The assessee conducted
transportation business not only with two light commercial vehicles (LCVs) owned
by the assessee but also hired vehicles owned by others. The annual gross
receipts were Rs.91,33,192. The break-up of the turnover was : (a) on account of
two LCVs owned : Rs.63,93,234 and (b) other vehicles : 27,39,958. The Assessing
Officer levied penalty u/s.271B for not getting the books of accounts audited.
The CIT(A) also confirmed the order of penalty on the ground that the assessee,
who is engaged with the composite business employing both own as well as the
hired vehicles from others, is outside the ambit of S. 44AE.

Held :

The assessees with multiple
businesses are not barred entirely from availing the benefits of the provisions
of S. 44AE. The assessee with multiple businesses, which include the business of
plying etc. with their own goods carriage, are not only entitled to the benefits
of S. 44AE but also for the exclusion of the relevant turnover from the total
turnover of all the businesses of the assessee for the purpose of computation of
monetary limits for S. 44AB of the Act in view of the existence of S. 44AE(5).


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S. 292BB — Notice by an AO not having jurisdiction over the assessee — Not a mere irregularity, but an incurable illegality, incapable of being cured by recourse to S. 292BB.

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Part A: Reported
Decisions


27 (2010) 47 DTR (Del.) (Trib.)
33

ITO v. Naseman Farms (P)
Ltd.

A.Y. : 2001-02. Dated :
14-9-2010

S. 292BB — The
jurisdictional defect of the notice having been issued by an AO not having
jurisdiction over the assessee, as such, is not a mere irregularity, but an
incurable illegality and is incapable of being cured by seeking recourse to the
provisions of S. 292BB.

Facts :

The assessee company,
registered with RoC, Delhi, was having its office at Delhi and it had filed its
tax returns for A.Y. 1998-99 to 2000-01 in Delhi. On the basis of enquiry
conducted by the Investigation Wing of the IT Department, reassessment
proceedings were initiated against the assessee for A.Y. 2001-02 by issuance of
notice u/s.148 by the AO at Agra. Then subsequently the case was transferred to
the AO at Delhi for completion of assessment, it having been found by the AO at
Agra that the return had been filed with AO at Delhi. The CIT(A) annulled the
reassessment on the ground that reassessment notice issued from Agra was without
any jurisdiction.

Held :

It is only an AO within the
meaning of S. 2(7A) of the Act, who can assess or reassess any escaped income
u/s.147 of the Act, of an assessee. It is only an AO within the meaning of S.
2(7A) of the Act, who can serve a notice u/s.148 of the Act on an assessee.
Herein, the AO at Agra not being the AO qua the assessee, he could not have
assessed or reassessed any escaped income of the assessee and he could not have
served the assessee with a notice u/s.148 of the Act.

S. 292BB seeks to deem an
action as provided under the Act, to have been done in accordance with the
provisions of the Act. But when, as in the present case, the notice itself was
not in accordance with the provisions of the Act, it was a jurisdictional
defect, which the provisions of S. 292BB of the Act cannot, by any stretch of
imagination, be canvassed to cure.

A ‘proceeding’ as envisaged
by S. 292BB has to be a legally valid proceeding which here it is not, since the
notice for reassessment is bad in law. This also goes for the ‘inquiry’
mentioned in S. 292BB. The assessee, therefore, never appeared in any
proceeding, nor co-operated in any inquiry as required u/s.292BB and so S. 292BB
does not at all come into play.

Further, in the present
case, the assessee is nowhere aggrieved of any of the three situations i.e., (1)
that the notice has not been served on him, or (2) it has not been served on him
in time, or (3) it has been served on him in an improper manner. Rather, the
grievance of the assessee is that the notice served on him was not issued by an
AO having jurisdiction over him. Now this is a jurisdictional issue which goes
to the very root of the matter.

The jurisdictional defect of
the notice having been issued by an AO not having jurisdiction over the assessee,
as such, is not a mere irregularity, but an incurable illegality and is
incapable of being cured by seeking recourse to the provisions of S. 292BB.

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Section 54F r.w.s. 54 Investment in vacant land appurtenant to and forming a part of a residential unit is eligible for exemption u/s.54F, even if no construction is done on the appurtenant land.

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52 (2009) 34 SOT 152 (Delhi)

Addl.CIT vs Narendra Mohan
Uniyal

ITA No.1624 (Delhi) of 2009 and
Cross Objection No.157 (Delhi) of 2009.

A.Y.2006-07. Dated 31.08.2009.

Section 54F r.w.s. 54 Investment
in vacant land appurtenant to and forming a part of a residential unit is
eligible for exemption u/s.54F, even if no construction is done on the
appurtenant land.

Facts:

During the relevant assessment year, the assessee sold land
and invested the capital gains in a plot of land on which a residential house
was under construction and claimed exemption u/s.54F. The assessee also claimed
exemption u/s.54F in respect of investment in another continuous plot of land
which, according to him, was land appurtenant to the building constructed on the
first plot. The Assessing Officer held that exemption u/s.54F is provided only
if investment is in respect of a residential house and not for an empty plot.
He, therefore, held that the consideration invested in the purchase of the
second plot was not entitled to exemption u/s.54F, and restricted the exemption
to the extent of amount invested in purchase of the first plot. On appeal, the
CIT(A) held that the Assessing Officer had not adduced any evidence that the
second plot was not a contiguous one and it did not constitute a land
appurtenant to the building constructed within the statutory time limit u/s.54F.
He therefore, allowed the claim of deduction u/s.54F in respect of second plot.

Held:

The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim. The Tribunal noted
as under:

a. There is no rider u/s.54F that no deduction would be
allowed in respect of investment of capital gains made on acquisition of land
appurtenant to the building or on the investment on land on which a building
is being constructed. When the land is purchased and the building constructed
thereon, it is not necessary that such construction should be on the entire
plot of land, i.e., there is no denial of exemption on investment in a piece
of land which is appurtenant to the building and on which no construction is
made.

b. In the instant case, there was no dispute in the fact
that investment of capital gains was made within the statutory period and
within the same financial year. Another plot of land which was purchased by
the assessee was adjacent to the plot already purchased during the relevant
year itself out of capital gains. Only because construction was made on the
first plot of land, the exemption claimed in respect of investment made in
Adjacent plot of land, could not be declined when all the other conditions as
stipulated u/s.54F were satisfied.

c. Both the plots formed part of one residential unit and
were contiguous and adjoining to each other. Had it been a case of land not

appurtenant to the building so constructed, then the contention of the
Assessing Officer to the effect that investment of capital gains made in the
second plot not appurtenant to the building so constructed was not eligible
for exemption, could be favourably accepted.



d. On a proper appreciation of material available on record, it was clear
that the property purchased by the assessee was a single unit and was being
used for residential purposes.

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Section 50 r.w.s. 32 and 50C 1961: Depreciation u/s. 32 can be claimed on WDV only if on the last day of the year: (1) there is at least one asset in the block, and (2) there is some value of the block.

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51 (2009) 34 SOT 64 (Mum.)

Asst.CIT vs Roger Pereira
Communications (P.) Ltd.

ITA No.2099 (Mum.) of 2008.

A.Y.2004-05. Dated August 2009.

Section 50 r.w.s. 32 and 50C
1961: Depreciation u/s. 32 can be claimed on WDV only if on the last day of the
year: (1) there is at least one asset in the block, and (2) there is some value
of the block.

Facts:

During the relevant assessment year, the assessee sold one of
its four office premises. The Assessing Officer revoked Section 50C and taxed
the difference between the agreement value and the value adopted by the stamp
duty authorities as short-term capital gains u/s. 50. The CIT (A) deleted the
addition observing that Section 50 does not have any mention of stamp duty
valuation as is mentioned in Section 50C.

Held:

The Tribunal upheld the CIT (A)’s order. The Tribunal noted
as under:

a. Section 50 is a special provision which provides for
bringing to tax by way of short-term capital gains depreciable assets which
are transferred during the previous year. This section creates a deeming
faction and it cannot be extended beyond the purpose for which it has been
enacted.

b. Further, since the block of assets continued to exist
even after the sale of the first office premises and the block had not become
negative, no capital gain arose.


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Section 32 of the Income Tax Act, 1961: Depreciation is allowable on goodwill u/s 32 (1)(ii).

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50 (2009) 33 SOT 237 (Mum.)

Kotak Forex Brokerage Ltd. vs.
Asst. CIT

ITA No.2692 (Mum.) of 2007

A.Y.2001-02. Dated August 2009.

Section 32 of the Income Tax
Act, 1961: Depreciation is allowable on goodwill u/s 32 (1)(ii).

Facts:

Pursuant to an agreement, the assessee acquired the foreign
exchange broking business of a company for which it paid a certain amount
towards broking rights and towards goodwill and claimed depreciation on the
same. The Assessing Officer allowed depreciation on the business rights (being
commercial rights), but disallowed deprecation on goodwill on the ground that
goodwill had not been included in the definition of intangible assets which
included know-how, patents, copyrights, trademarks, licenses, franchises or any
other business or commercial right. The CIT (A) confirmed the order of the
Assessing Officer.

Held:

The Tribunal, following the decision in the case of Skyline
Caterers (P.) Ltd. V. ITO [2008] 20 SOT 266 (Mum.) (SMC), allowed the assessee’s
claim. The Tribunal noted as under:

1. Goodwill paid by the assessee was towards the use of the
name ‘Kotak’ with the name of the assessee-company.

2. Goodwill was a bundle of rights which included, inter
alia, patents, trademarks, licenses, franchises, etc. Therefore, all these
rights are similar to the rights under goodwill. Applying the principles of
ejusdem generis, the meaning has to be extended to the phrase “other business
or commercial rights of similar nature”.

3. Business or commercial rights are rights obtained for
effectively carrying on business or commerce. Commerce is a wider term which
encompasses business in its fold. Therefore, any right which is obtained for
carrying on the business effectively and profitably has to fall within the
meaning of intangible asset.

4. Business or commercial rights should be of similar
nature as know-how, patents, copyrights, trademarks, licenses, franchises,
etc.— all these are assets which are not manufactured or produced overnight,
but are brought into existence by experience and reputation. They assume
importance in the commercial world as they represent a particular benefit or
advantage or reputation built over a period of time, and customers associate
themselves with such assets. Similarly, goodwill is nothing but positive
reputation built by a person / company / business-house over a period of time.
Thus, goodwill is a “business or commercial right of similar nature”.

5. Thus, goodwill is also an intangible asset of the
similar nature referred to in clause (ii) of Section 32(1) and, therefore,
deprecation is allowable on the same.


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Disallowance u/s 40A(3) to be made only when there is expenditure claimed in return of income. Mere entries in books will not change the character of transaction.

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New Page 1

49 Saral Motors & General
Finance Ltd. vs Asstt. CIT

[2009] 121 ITD 50 (Delhi
Tribunal)

A.Y. 2001-02

Date of order: May 30, 2008

Disallowance u/s 40A(3) to be
made only when there is expenditure claimed in return of income. Mere entries in
books will not change the character of transaction.

Facts:

The assessee was engaged in the business of financing second
hand motor vehicles on hire purchase basis. The assessee financed the vehicles
identified by the purchaser and entered into hire purchase agreement. The
assessee in its profit and loss account had shown purchase price of these second hand motor vehicles as Rs.
79,14,700 and on the credit side, there was a contra entry of Rs.79,14,700
showing it as sale on hire purchase. The AO found that payments in excess of Rs.
20,000 aggregating to Rs. 23,37,000 were made to 32 parties. The AO required the
assessee to explain as to why 20% of the sum of Rs. 79,14,000 should not be
disallowed. The assessee submitted that transactions were not in the nature of
expenditure. They were simply loan transactions.

The AO observed that the real test, whether a particular
transaction was in the nature of expenditure was to be decided taking into
account how the transactions were entered in the books of account and treatment
thereof. The alleged advances formed part of trading activity. The AO further
observed that in the balance sheet stock on hire under hire purchase basis was
shown, which was nothing but stock in trade. Therefore, such transactions could
not be treated as advances. On this basis, the AO made a disallowance under
section 40A(3) of the Act.


Held:

On appeal, the Hon’ble tribunal held that assessee was not a
dealer in second hand motor cars. He let out the same. Only part of the amount
was financed by the assessee. The invoices were made in the name of the
purchaser. The past behaviour of the assessee also showed that it did not intend
to deal in cars. The assessee did not earn any profit on purchase or sale of
vehicles. It earned income on hire purchase transactions. For invoking the
provisions of section 40A(3), the amount must be claimed as expenditure. When
amounts paid have not been claimed as deductible expenditure while computing
business income, provisions of section 40A(3) cannot be applied. Mere entries in
the books of account will not change the character of financial transactions.
The addition so made was thus deleted.

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Exemption u/s 10(10C) to be allowed even if the scheme is not in accordance with Rule 2BA

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48 Dy CIT vs Krishna Gopal Saha

[2009] 121 ITD 368 (Kol.) (TM)

A.Y. 2002-03

Date of Order: July 31, 2009

Exemption u/s 10(10C) to be
allowed even if the scheme is not in accordance with Rule 2BA

Facts:

The assessee is a retired employee of State Bank. During the
year under consideration, the assessee opted for voluntary retirement under a
scheme named “Early Separation Plan” (ESP) floated by the bank. He received a
compensation of Rs. 18,87,798. The employer, vide its letter, stated that
employees availing the ESP Scheme are not eligible for exemption u/s 10(10C) of
the Act as the scheme was not in conformity with Rule 2BA(i) to (v). Therefore,
no deduction under section 10(10C) was allowed in the Form 16 issued by the
employer. The assessee, however, claimed exemption under section 10(10C) in the
return of income filed. The same was processed under section 143(1) of the Act.
The assessment was reopened u/s 147 and the claim u/s 10(10C) was disallowed by
the AO.

The CIT(A) allowed the assessee’s claim. On Revenue’s appeal,
there was a difference of opinion between the members, and the matter was
referred to the “Third Member”.

Held:

The Third Member, in his order, relied on the case of SAIL
DSP VR Employees Association v UOI (262 ITR 638) (Cal.) which squarely applied
to the assessee. Their Lordship in the said judgment observed that section
10(10C) was inserted in order to make voluntary retirement attractive so as to
reduce human complements for securing economic viability of certain companies.
This object was elaborated by various departmental circulars and explanatory
statements issued from time to time. All these go to show that this was intended
to make voluntary retirement more attractive and beneficial to the employees
opting for voluntary retirement. Therefore, this has to be interpreted in a
manner beneficial to the optee for voluntary retirement, if there is any
ambiguity. A similar view was taken by the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case
of CIT vs. Nagesh Devidas Kulkarni (291 ITR 407) and the Karnataka High Court in
the case of CIT v P. Surendra Prabhu (279 ITR 402).

Following the above decisions, the amount received by the
assessee was allowed.

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The ratio of Supreme Court’s judgment in the case of Arun Kumar vs. UOI – amended Rule 3 – retrospective amendment – is valid for levy of tax on employee, but not on employer for deduction of tax at source.

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47 Canara Bank vs. ITO 8(3),
Nagpur

121 ITD 1 (Nagpur)

A.Y. 2002-03 to 2006-07

Date of Order: July 4, 2008

The ratio of Supreme Court’s
judgment in the case of Arun Kumar vs. UOI – amended Rule 3 – retrospective
amendment – is valid for levy of tax on employee, but not on employer for
deduction of tax at source.

Facts:

The assessee, a public sector company, had provided
residential accommodation to its employees in addition to salaries. The rent in
respect of such accommodation was recovered from the employees. The rent charged
to employees was as per the Service Regulations, approved by the central
government.

The assessing officer, relying on the Supreme Court’s
judgment in the case of Arun Kumar vs. Union of India [2006] (286 ITR 89),
required the assessee to deduct tax and pay the tax on the concessional
accommodation provided to its employees, from assessment year 2001-02, i.e.,
retrospectively. As per the AO, the difference in the rate specified in amended
Rule 3 and the rent charged by the assessee was a benefit in the nature of
concession and, therefore, perquisite under Section 17(2) of the Income-tax Act,
1961 (‘the Act’). The assessee ought to have deducted tax. Since the tax had not
been deducted, the assessee was in default under Section 192 read with Section
201(1A) of the Act.

Held:

On appeal to the Tribunal, the ITAT observed that a
retrospective amendment was to be given effect to, as it was there in existence
on the date from which it came into effect. The Tribunal, therefore, held that
the perquisite value is to be worked out on the basis of the amended provision
of Section 17(2) of the Act.

The Tribunal also held that a retrospective amendment could
be valid for levy of tax on the employee, but there exists no force in the
contention of the revenue that the employer would also be under responsibility
to deduct tax at source retrospectively.

Further, it observed, analysing the provisions of Sections
192(1), 192(1A) and 192(1B), Section 200 and Rule 30, that liability to deduct
tax is there on the date(s) when the salary is actually paid. If there was no
perquisite at the time when the tax was to be deducted at source, there would be
no liability to deduct tax. If a perquisite value is assumed by the
retrospective amendment after the period during which it was deducted, how can a
deduction be made on an earlier date? The retrospective amendment is for deeming
valuation of perquisites and cannot extend to deduction of tax at source
thereon.

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S. 271(1)(c) read with S. 271(1B) — The penalty was initiated for filing inaccurate particulars of income, but it was levied for concealment of income

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 Part A: Reported Decisions

 

13 (2010) 36 DTR (Agra) (Trib.) 453
ITO v. Chhail Behari
A.Y. : 2002-03 Dated : 15-10-2009

 

S. 271(1)(c) read with S. 271(1B) — The penalty was initiated
for filing inaccurate particulars of income, but it was levied for concealment
of income — If the satisfaction arrived at during the assessment proceedings was
for one reason, penalty cannot be levied for another reason — Even after
retrospective insertion of S. 271(1B), the difference between the two limbs of
S. 271(1)(c) is not erased and still remains.

Facts :

The Tribunal in appeal against the order levying penalty
u/s.271(1)(c) held that there was no proper satisfaction arrived at as required
u/s.271(1)(c) of the Act. It was held that the satisfaction was qua ‘furnishing
inaccurate particulars of income’ as recorded in the assessment order, but in
the order levying penalty u/s.271(1)(c), the same was qua ‘concealment of
particulars of income’. Hence, the penalty was
deleted.

The Revenue filed a miscellaneous application and contended
that by the Finance Act, 2008, an amendment has been made retrospectively w.e.f.
1st April, 1989 to provide that where an assessment order contains a direction
for initiation of penalty proceedings, such an order of assessment shall be
deemed to constitute satisfaction of the Assessing Officer for initiation of
penalty proceedings for concealment in respect of any amount added or disallowed
in computing the total income or loss of the assessee. Thus it can be said that
the mention by the Assessing Officer of direction for initiation of proceedings
u/s.271(1)(c) of the Act in the assessment order would cover both the actions of
the assessee i.e., ‘concealment of particulars of income’ as well as ‘furnishing
of inaccurate particulars of income.’

Held :

If the satisfaction arrived at during the assessment
proceedings was for one reason, penalty cannot be levied for another reason
relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Dilip N. Shroff
(291 ITR 519) (SC). Thus the Tribunal had not cancelled the penalty on the
ground that there was no satisfaction recorded in the assessment order. Even
after retrospective amendment, since the difference between two limbs of S.
271(1)(c) is not erased or is considered as one, the distinction between
‘concealment of particulars of income’ and ‘furnishing of inaccurate particulars
of income’ is still maintained. Hence it cannot be said that there is any
mistake apparent on record.

 

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S. 144 — CIT(A) set aside the assessment — No direction to re-do the assessment given — Assessing Officer has no jurisdiction to re-do the assessment.

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 Part A: Reported Decisions

 

12 (2010) 123 ITD 53 (Chennai)
DCIT v. Jaya Publication
A.Ys. : 1991-92 to 1993-94. Dated : 30-11-2007

S. 144 — CIT(A) set aside the assessment — No direction to
re-do the assessment given — Assessing Officer has no jurisdiction to re-do the
assessment.

The original assessment was set aside by the CIT(A).
Subsequently, the Assessing Officer issued notice u/s.142(1) of the Act. The
assessee complied with the said notice. However, not satisfied by the assessee’s
explanations, the Assessing Officer completed the assessment u/s.144 considering
the entire issues and making various additions. The assessee went in to appeal
on the ground that the assessment done by the Assessing Officer was without
jurisdiction and without any specific direction from the CIT(A).

Relying on various decisions, the Tribunal held that the
CIT(A) has set aside the assessment means that he has annulled the assessment,
since he has not given any direction to re-do the assessment. Hence, the
Assessing Officer had no jurisdiction to re-do he assessment. The only remedy
with the Department was that it has to file an appeal against the order of the
CIT(A).

 

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S. 153A — In an assessment u/s.153A of the Act addition can be made only on the basis of material found as a result of search.

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 Part A: Reported Decisions

 

11 2010 TIOL 177 ITAT (Mum.)
Anil Khimani v. DCIT
A.Ys. : 1999-2000 to 2004-05.
Dated : 23-2-2010

 

S. 153A — In an assessment u/s.153A of the Act addition can
be made only on the basis of material found as a result of search.

Facts :

The assessee was the proprietor of M/s. Ronak Enterprises
trading in oil and electrical contract works. In an action conducted u/s.132A of
the Act about 4 kgs of gold and cash of Rs.79,000 was seized from the assessee.
Earlier the assessee had filed returns of incomes. In response of notice issued
u/s.153A the assessee filed the same return of income, as was originally filed.
For all the assessment years, the Assessing Officer (AO) completed the
assessments u/s.143(3) read with S. 153A by making addition on account of low
withdrawal and from opening
balance in capital account. None of the additions were based on any material
found during the course of search. Aggrieved the assessee preferred an
appeal to the CIT(A).

The CIT(A) deleted the addition made on account of opening
capital account. On the issue of additions made on account of low withdrawals,
he confirmed the same.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal noted that the only addition in each of the
assessment years was on account of low withdrawals and that the addition was not
based on any material found either during the course of search or during the
course of assessment proceedings. The Tribunal made a reference to the decision
of the Delhi Bench of ITAT in the case of Anil Kumar Bhatia v. ACIT, where it
has been held that :

(i) S. 153A does not authorize the making of a de novo
assessment. While under the 1st proviso, the AO is empowered to frame
assessment for six years, under the 2nd proviso, only the assessments which
are pending on the date of initiation of search abate. The effect is that
complete assessments do not abate. There can be two assessments for the same
assessment year. Assessments which are not pending before the AO on the date
of search but are pending before an Appellate Authority will survive.

(ii) An assessment can be said to be ‘pending’ only if the
AO is statutorily required to do something further. If a S. 143(2) notice has
been issued, the assessment is pending. However, the assessment in respect of
a return processed u/s.143(1) is not ‘pending’ because the AO is not required
to do anything further about such a return.

(iii) The power given by the proviso to ‘assess’ income for
six assessment years has to be confined to the undisclosed income unearthed
during search and cannot include items which are disclosed in the original
assessment proceedings.

(iv) On facts, the returns had been processed u/s. 143(1),
the assessments were not ‘pending’ and as no material was found during the
search, the additions could not be sustained.

Following the ratio laid down by the above- mentioned
decision, the Tribunal deleted all the additions and allowed the appeals filed
by the assessee.

 

.

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S. 195, S. 234B — Once the income is subjected to TDS provision, then that amount is outside the provisions of the advance tax as per the mandate of S. 209 of the Act. Merely because there is a failure on the part of the person who made payments to the as

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 Part A: Reported Decisions

 

10 2010 TIOL 172 ITAT (Mum.)
DDIT v. Daimler Chrysler AG
A.Y. : 1997-98. Dated : 24-3-2010

 

S. 195, S. 234B — Once the income is subjected to TDS
provision, then that amount is outside the provisions of the advance tax as per
the mandate of S. 209 of the Act. Merely because there is a failure on the part
of the person who made payments to the assessee to deduct tax at source to which
provisions of S. 195(1) are attracted, no liability to pay advance tax is put on
the recipient.

Facts :

The assessee, a tax resident of Germany, filed return of
income in which royalty received from Bajaj Tempo was declared. Originally, the
as-sessee’s assessment was completed u/s.143(3) r.w. S. 147 of the Act
determining the income at Rs.6,93,14,161. The said assessment order was subject
matter of challenge before the CIT(A) and then to the ITAT. The Tribunal set
aside the matter to the file of the Assessing Officer (AO). As per the
directions of the Tribunal, the AO passed assessment order determining the total
income at Rs.3,54,28,070 and also charged interest u/s.234B of the Act.
Aggrieved by the levy of interest u/s. 234B, the assessee preferred an appeal to
the CIT(A).

The CIT(A) held that the assessee is a foreign company and
its income was subject to the provisions of TDS u/s.195 and hence the assessee
was not required to pay any advance tax u/s.208 r.w. S. 209. The CIT(A) placed
reliance on the following decisions :

(i) CIT v. Halliburton Offshore Services Inc., 271 ITR 395
(Uttaranchal)

(ii) Motorola Inc. v. DCIT, 95 ITD 269 (Del.) (SB)

(iii) SNC-Lavalin International Inc. v. DCIT, 13 DTR 449
(Del.) (Trib.)

(iv) Sedco Forex International, 75 ITD 415 (Del.)

Aggrieved the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal noted that the assessee is a non-resident and
payments made to it are subjected to TDS u/s.195(1) of the Act. Merely because
there is a failure on the part of the person who made payments to the assessee
to deduct tax at source to which the provisions of S. 195(1) are attracted, to
the extent of the income/payments which are in the mischief of TDS provision no
liability to pay advance tax is put on the recipient. Once the income is
subjected to TDS provision, then that is outside the provisions of the advance
tax as per mandate of S. 209 of the Act. The Tribunal observed that this view
has been fortified by the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of NGC
Network Asia LLC (222 CTR 86) (Bom.). The principles laid down in the case of
NGC Network Asia LLC were held to be squarely applicable to the facts of the
case.

The Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue.

 

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S. 115JAA, S. 234C and S. 244A — MAT credit which is available for set-off falls within the meaning of ‘advance tax’. If the credit of MAT u/s.115JAA has to be allowed first before working out the liability of the assessee to pay advance tax, the refund g

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 Part A: Reported Decisions

9 2010 TIOL 171 ITAT (Mum.)
DCIT v. Bharat Aluminium Co. Ltd.
A.Y. : 1998-1999. Dated : 19-2-2010

 

S. 115JAA, S. 234C and S. 244A — MAT credit which is
available for set-off falls within the meaning of ‘advance tax’. If the credit
of MAT u/s.115JAA has to be allowed first before working out the liability of
the assessee to pay advance tax, the refund granted to the assessee was held to
be not out of MAT credit available to the assessee, but out of excess amount of
advance tax paid by the assessee.

Facts :

In an order passed u/s.154/254 of the Act, the Assessing
Officer (AO) held that the assessee was entitled to tax credit u/s.115JAA of the
Act to the extent of Rs.9,61,45,549. He allowed the credit of this amount as per
provisions of S. 115JAA(1) r.w. S. 115JAA(5) of the Act. He also held that no
interest u/s.244A is to be allowed to the assessee on this amount of tax credit
of Rs.9,61,45,549 in view of the proviso to S. 115JAA(2). The AO had also
charged interest u/s.234C amounting to Rs.55.52 lakhs before giving effect to
MAT credit relief u/s.115JAA. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the
CIT(A) on both the issues.

The CIT(A) allowed the appeal of the assessee on both the
grounds.

Aggrieved by the order of the CIT(A) the Revenue preferred an
appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal noted that the Delhi High Court has in the case
of Jindal Exports Ltd. (314 ITR 137) (Del.) considered the question whether
prior to 1-4-2007, while computing the interest u/s.234B and u/s.234C, credit
for tax paid u/s.115JAA was to be considered and has held that in the year when
the assessee is eligible for tax credit u/s.115JAA, such tax credit represents
tax already paid and available as credit at the beginning of the year and
consequently the assessee cannot be charged interest on something which it had
already paid. Following the ratio of this decision, the Tribunal held that for
charging interest u/s.234C, tax credit available to the assessee u/s.115JAA has
to be reduced from the liability of the assessee for making payment of advance
tax and such interest has to be computed after setting off the tax credit
available to the assessee.

The Tribunal held that the order of the CIT(A) does not call
for any interference because as per the decision of the Delhi High Court in the
case of Jindal Exports, credit of MAT u/s.115JAA has to be allowed first before
working out the liability of the assessee to pay advance tax, therefore, the
refund granted to the assessee is not out of MAT credit available, but is out of
excess amount of advance tax paid by the assessee. There is no dispute that if
the refund is on account of excess payment of advance tax, interest u/s.244A is
allowable to the assessee as per S. 244A(1)(a) of the Act. As to whether the
refund granted is out of MAT credit or out of advance tax, the Tribunal agreed
with the CIT(A) that, following the ratio of the decision of the Delhi High
Court, effect of MAT credit u/s. 115JAA has to be first considered and the
assessee is liable to pay only the balance amount as advance tax and if the
assessee paid lesser amount of advance tax as compared to this amount of advance
tax payable by the assessee after considering MAT credit u/s.115JAA, the
assessee is liable to pay interest u/s.234B and u/s.234C and if such payment of
advance tax by the assessee is in excess than this amount of advance tax payable
by the assessee, then the refund is on account of excess payment of advance tax
which is eligible for interest u/s.244A.

The appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed by the
Tribunal.

 

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Section 244/244A, Proviso to S. 115JAA and Circular No. 763 issued by CBDT — Income-tax Act, 1961 — Assessment Year 2003-04 — Whether where after giving credit for MAT paid in earlier years, there is still tax payable and further credit is given to TDS an

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  1. 2009-TIOL-215-ITAT-MAD

Hyundai Motor India Ltd. vs. DCIT

A.Y. : 2003-2004.

Date of Order : 21.11.2008

Section 244/244A, Proviso to S. 115JAA and Circular No. 763
issued by CBDT — Income-tax Act, 1961 — Assessment Year 2003-04 — Whether
where after giving credit for MAT paid in earlier years, there is still tax
payable and further credit is given to TDS and Advance Tax, can refund, if
any, be said to have been originating from payment of Advance Tax or credit of
TDS —Held : Yes. Whether such a refund becomes entitled to interest in terms
of S. 244 and S. 244A —Held : Yes.

 

Facts :

Vide an order passed u/s. 154 of the Act, the Assessing
Officer (AO) granted credit for MAT at Rs.6,36,82,480. After having granted
credit for MAT the AO gave credit for TDS and Advance Tax and there was a net
refund due to the assessee. No interest was granted on such refund due to the
assessee.


The CIT(A) rejected the claim of the assessee on the basis
of Circular No. 763, dated 18.2.1998, which clarifies that credit allowed
against MAT will not bear any interest.


Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the
Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal upon considering the provisions of S. 115JAA
of the Act held that the only interpretation which could be given to the
Circular which has explained the proviso to S. 115JAA is that interest cannot
be allowed for intervening period. That is, if MAT is paid, for example, in AY
2001-02 and the same is credited in AY 2003-04, then for the intervening years
of 2001-02 and 2002-03 no interest is payable on such MAT credit. However, for
the year in which ultimately MAT credit is given and credit for other tax
payments is also given, then refund becomes due not because of MAT credit but
because of other tax. This legal position is absolutely clear from the fact
that payment of MAT is not refundable and it can only be used as a matter of
credit, that too, subject to the conditions laid down in S. 115JAA of the Act.


The Tribunal noted that the issue about priority of various
credits to be allowed against tax payable by an assessee was considered by the
Delhi Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Ajanta Offset
(2008-TIOL-164-ITAT-Del) and concurred with the Delhi Bench that first of all
the credit for MAT has to be given and then only credit for TDS and Advance
Tax, etc. has to be given.


The Tribunal noted that the AO had himself, in the order
passed u/s. 154, allowed the MAT credit before the credit for TDS and Advance
Tax. It stated that it is absolutely clear that refund is originating not
because of MAT credit but because of TDS and Advance Tax and, therefore, the
assessee has to be paid interest on such excess payment of TDS or Advance Tax.


The Tribunal set aside the order of CIT(A) and directed the AO to allow
interest in accordance with law.


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Article 11 of India Japan modified : Notification No. 96/2008 dated 8-10-2008.

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9 Article 11 of India Japan modified :
Notification No. 96/2008 dated 8-10-2008.


Article 11 deals with interest clause in the tax treaty. It
has been modified to alter the definition of Central Bank and financial
institution wholly owned by the Government to replace Japan Bank for
International Co-operation with International business unit of Japan Finance
Corporation.

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Notification No. 43/2010 — Service Tax, dated 30-6-2010.

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Part B : INDIRECT TAXES

SERVICE TAX UPDATE

Notifications :

87 Notification No. 43/2010 — Service Tax, dated 30-6-2010.

This Notification has amended the earlier Notification No.
13/2008, dated 1st March, 2008 so as to include services provided by port
authorities and by airport authorities alongwith services provided by goods
transport agency providing exemption of service tax as is in excess of the
amount of service tax calculated on a value equivalent to 25% of the gross
amount charged.

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S. 32(1) — exercising of option under Rule 5(1A) for higher depreciation — Claim made in return of income is sufficient — No separate procedure to exercise the option of higher depreciation is required.

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(2010) 126 ITD 215 (Chennai)

K.K.S.K. Leather Processors
(P.) Ltd. v. ITO

A.Ys. : 2003-04 & 2005-06.
Dated : 20-11-2009

 

11. S. 32(1) — exercising of
option under Rule 5(1A) for higher depreciation — Claim made in return of income
is sufficient — No separate procedure to exercise the option of higher
depreciation
is required.

Facts :

For the A.Y. 2003-04, the
return of income was filed on due date but the return of income for A.Y. 2005-06
was filed after the due date. The assessee had a windmill which was entitled to
higher rate of depreciation as per Appendix IA to Rule 5(1A).

The Assessing Officer
disallowed the claim of higher depreciation on the ground that the option of
higher depreciation was not ‘exercised’ by the assessee ‘before’ the due date of
filing return of income.

The contention of the
Revenue was that the assessee should have exercised the option by writing a
simple letter and submitting the same before the due date. Merely claiming
higher depreciation in the return along with audit report filed on due date
would not suffice.

Before the Tribunal, two
questions arose for consideration :

(i) Whether filing of
return of income along with audit report showing the claim of higher
depreciation amounts to exercising option required under second proviso to
Rule 5(1A) ?

(ii) Whether return filed
on due date would be considered as exercising option before the due date ?

Held :

(i) Explanation 5 to
Ss.(1) of S. 32 clarifies that provisions of S. 32(1) shall apply whether or
not assessee has claimed depreciation.

(ii) The above shows that
the Assessing Officer is duty-bound to allow deduction of depreciation as per
S. 32(1).

(iii) Though the proviso
stipulates that the option has to be exercised by the assessee before the due
date of filing return, the same is only to facilitate the AO in discharging
its obligation. The AO is otherwise under an obligation to allow the
depreciation.

(iv) The option to be
exercised is mentioned in the Rules and Rules cannot override the provision in
the statute. The requirement of Proviso 2 of Rule 5(1A) cannot be held of the
nature that the failure of the same would prove fatal and the very object of
provision of higher depreciation is defeated.

(v) When there is no
prescribed procedure or mode of exercising option, then the option exercised
by claiming deduction in return is sufficient.

(vi) The meaning of
‘before’, includes the return filed on the last date also. It simply means not
after the due date.

(vii) As far as A.Y.
2003-04 is concerned, the return was filed on due date claiming higher
depreciation. Hence, the required conditions of claiming on or before the due
date are fulfilled. As far as A.Y. 2005-06 is concerned, the third proviso to
Rule 5(1A) states than once the option is exercised, the same shall be final
and apply to all the subsequent years. Hence, late filing of return for A.Y.
2005-06 would have no consequence since the option was already exercised in
return filed on due date for A.Y. 2003-04.

 

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S. 40(a)(ia) — After applying a net profit rate on gross receipts, there is no further scope for making any other addition in view of S. 44AD of the Act.

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(2010) TIOL 552 ITAT (Mad.)

D. Rathinam v. DCIT

A.Y. : 2005-06. Dated :
18-6-2010

 

10. S. 40(a)(ia) — After
applying a net profit rate on gross receipts, there is no further scope for
making any other addition in view of S. 44AD of the Act.

Facts :

The assessee was engaged in
the business of construction of highways and rural roads. The assessee had
declared gross receipts of
Rs. 1.81 crores, but could not produce books of accounts for scrutiny. He
submitted before the Assessing Officer (AO) that his income may be estimated @
8% of the total contract receipts received by him. Accordingly, the AO
determined the business income at Rs. 14,48,480. The AO noticed that the
assessee had made payments to sub-contractors on which tax was not deducted at
source u/s.194C. He rejected the contention of the assessee that the provisions
were brought on the statute book w.e.f. 1-6-2007. He disallowed a sum of Rs.
52.22 lakhs u/s.40(a)(ia). Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the
CIT(A).

The CIT(A) granted relief
only to the extent of payment made for supply of labourers, but sustained the
major part of addition made by the AO.

Aggrieved the assessee
preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

The provisions of tax
deduction at source in respect of payments made by individuals to
sub-contractors were brought on the statute book w.e.f. 1-6-2007 and were not
applicable for the assessment year under consideration. Moreover, after applying
a net profit rate on gross receipts, there is no further scope for making any
other addition in view of S. 44AD of the Act. The Tribunal held the disallowance
to be not as per law.

The appeal filed by the
assessee was allowed.

 

 

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S. 40(a)(ia) — When there is no element of income and the payment is only as a reimbursement of expenses incurred by the payee, then no disallowance can be made u/s. 40(a)(ia).

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New Page 1

 (2010) TIOL 545 ITAT (Mum.)

Utility Powertech Ltd. v.
ACIT

A.Y. : 2005-06. Dated :
19-4-2010

 

9. S. 40(a)(ia) — When there
is no element of income and the payment is only as a reimbursement of expenses
incurred by the payee, then no disallowance can be made u/s. 40(a)(ia).

Facts :

The assessee-company, a
joint venture between BSES Ltd. and NTPC Ltd., was engaged in the business of
undertaking construction, erection, renovation, modernisation and other project
management activities in the power sector. The AO noted that the assessee had
made payment of Rs. 12,00,000 being office rent and Rs. 7,66,246 being office
upkeeping expenses to Reliance Energy Ltd. The assessee deducted TDS on payment
made towards office rent, but did not deduct tax from payment towards
office upkeeping. The AO disallowed Rs. 7,66,246 u/s.40(a)(ia).

Aggrieved the assessee
preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who confirmed the disallowance made by the AO.

Aggrieved, the Revenue
preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal noted that the
AO has not given a finding that the expenses for office upkeeping were revenue
receipt in the hands of Reliance Energy Ltd. and not a pure reimbursement of
expenses. The Tribunal, following the decision of the Bombay High Court in the
case of CIT v. Siemens Aktiongesellschaft, (2008 TIOL 569 HC-Mum.), held that it
is a settled proposition that when there is no element of income and the payment
is only a reimbursement of expenses incurred by the payee, then no disallowance
can be made u/s.40(a)(ia). It decided the ground in favour of the assessee and
against the Revenue.

S. 246A — An order giving effect to the order of CIT(A) is an assessment order and therefore it is amenable to the jurisdiction of the CIT(A).

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 (2010) TIOL 518 ITAT (Bang.)

Cypress Semi Conductor
Technologies India Pvt. Ltd. v. ITO

A.Ys. : 2002-03 and 2003-04

Dated : 20-5-2010

8. S. 246A — An order giving
effect to the order of CIT(A) is an assessment order and therefore it is
amenable to the jurisdiction of the CIT(A).

Facts :

While assessing the total
income of the assessee u/s.147 of the Act, the Assessing Officer (AO) disallowed
deduction u/s.10A in respect of Unit I and Unit III. Aggrieved the assessee
preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who held that Unit I is not entitled to
deduction beyond A.Y. 1998-99. As regarded deduction u/s.10A with regard to STPI
Unit III, he held that business of STPI Unit III was not set up by splitting of
any existing business and he directed the AO to allow deduction u/s.10A in
respect of STPI undertaking unit III, if other conditions are satisfied.

The AO while giving effect
to the order of the CIT(A) computed deduction u/s.10A of the Act by reducing
data link charges from export turnover of the undertaking, but he did not deduct
the same from the total turnover of the undertaking. As a result, the deduction
u/s.10A was reduced.

Aggrieved the assessee
preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who dismissed the appeal without admitting the
same.

Aggrieved, the assessee
preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal noted that the
ITAT ‘A’ Bench has in ITA No. 1122/Bang./09, Asiatic Industrial Gases Ltd., to
which the Accountant Member was a party, after referring to various decisions of
the High Courts, held that order of the AO giving effect to the direction given
by the ITAT is appealable before the CIT(A). The Tribunal allowed this ground
and remitted the matter back to the file of the CIT(A) for adjudication on
merits.

 

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S. 14A and S. 44 — S. 44 provides for application of special provisions for computation of profits and gains of insurance business in accordance with Rule 5 of Schedule 1 and, therefore, Assessing Officer cannot make disallowance by applying S. 14A.

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(2010) 130 TTJ 388 (Delhi)

Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.
v. ACIT

A.Ys. : 2000-01 and 2001-02

Dated : 27-2-2009

7. S. 14A and S. 44 — S. 44
provides for application of special provisions for computation of profits and
gains of insurance business in accordance with Rule 5 of Schedule 1 and,
therefore, Assessing Officer cannot make disallowance by applying S. 14A.

For the relevant assessment
year, the Assessing Officer held that the investments made by the assessee are
both taxable as well as tax-free. An estimated disallowance of 50% out of the
management expenses incurred and claimed in the P & L a/c was treated as
expenses incurred in connection with the tax-free investment. The CIT(A)
confirmed the disallowance. The Tribunal deleted the addition and noted as under
:

1. The income of the
assessee is to be computed u/s.44 r.w.r. 5 of Schedule I of the Income-tax
Act, 1961. S. 44 is a non obstante clause and applies notwithstanding anything
to the contrary contained within the provisions of the Act relating to
computation of income chargeable under different heads other than the income
to be computed under the head ‘Profits and gains of business or profession’.

2. In case of the
computation of profits and gains of any business of insurance, the same shall
be done in accordance with the rules prescribed in First Schedule of the Act,
meaning thereby Ss.28 to Ss.43B shall not apply. No other provision pertaining
to computation of income will become relevant.

3. In light of these
special provisions coupled with the non obstante clause, the Assessing Officer
is not permitted to travel beyond these provisions. S. 14A contemplates an
exception for deductions as allowable under the Act contained u/s.28 to
u/s.43B. S. 44 creates special application of these provisions in case of
insurance companies.

4. Therefore, the
disallowance made by the Assessing Officer which is based on the application
of S. 14A is deleted as it is not permissible to the Assessing Officer to
travel beyond S. 44 and First Schedule of the Income-tax Act.

 

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Clarifications on TDS from salary for the financial year 2008-09 : CBDT Circular no. 9/2008 dated 29-9-2008.

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8 Clarifications on TDS from salary for the
financial year 2008-09 : CBDT Circular no. 9/2008 dated 29-9-2008.


The CBDT has issued a detailed annual Circular on tax
deduction at source from salaries, which outlines estimations to be made while
computing salary income, the deductions available, the procedural aspects,
calculation of TDS on arrears of salary, etc.

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Reverse Mortgage Scheme, 2008 — Notification No. 93/2008, dated 30-9-2008.

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7 Reverse Mortgage Scheme, 2008 —
Notification No. 93/2008, dated 30-9-2008.


This scheme has been notified with effect from 1 April 2008.
The highlights of the scheme are as under :



  •  National Housing Board, scheduled bank and a registered housing company are
    defined as approved lending institutions.


  • Either a single individual or a couple of whom one of them is of sixty years
    of age or more can mortgage their residential house property located in India,
    with the approved lending institutions to obtain a loan, provided the house is
    owned and free from any encumbrance.


  • The approved lending institution would enter into a loan agreement with the
    person mortgaging his property.


  • The loan would be given either as periodic payments to be mutually decided or
    a lumpsum payment limited to 50% of the loan amount sanctioned.


  • The loan under reverse mortgage shall not be granted for more than 20 years
    from the date of the loan agreement.


  • In case of foreclosure of loan, the person or his legal heirs would be liable
    for repayment of principle amount of loan along with interest to the approved
    lending institution.


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Procedure for filing TDS returns with insufficient deductee PAN

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6 Procedure for filing TDS returns with
insufficient deductee PAN


The CBDT has made it mandatory for deductors to file TDS/TCS
statements with a threshold limit of PAN of deductees. To facilitate deductors
who face problem in filing TDS returns because of insufficiency of PAN of the
deductees and also to accommodate the deductees who have intimated their PAN,
the Department has suggested that a deductor can file a return containing
deductee details, who have provided valid PAN. It can subsequently file a
correction return with details of remaining deductees. The challan amount of TDS
needs however to be of the complete amount.

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S. 37(1) : Expenses to keep company afloat is allowable business expenditure

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14 (2007) 110 TTJ 445 (Del.)


ITO v. Mokul Finance (P.) Ltd.

ITA Nos. 4562 & 4563 (Del.) of 2005

A.Ys. 2002-03 & 2003-04. Dated : 13-7-2007

S. 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Company having not
closed its business, expenditure incurred during the period of dormancy of
business in order to keep the company afloat is allowable business expenditure.

During the relevant assessment year, the company had income
only from interest and dividend and no business activity was carried on.

The Assessing Officer disallowed the loss claimed by the
assessee, holding that since there was no business activity during the year, no
expenses could be allowed. The CIT(A), however, allowed the assessee’s claim of
loss.

The Tribunal, relying on the decisions in the following
cases, allowed the assessee’s claim :

(a) CIT v. Ganga Properties Ltd., (1993) 199 ITR 94
(Cal.)

(b) Nakodar Bus Service (P) Ltd. v. CIT, (1990) 85
CTR (P & H) 25/(1989) 179 ITR 506 (P & H)

(c) CIT v. Rampur Timbery & Turnery Co. Ltd., (1981)
21 CTR (All.) 76/(1981) 129 ITR 58 (All.)

(d) L. VE. Vairavan Chettiar v. CIT, (1969) 72 ITR
114 (Mad.)


The Tribunal noted as under :

(a) The assessee being an artificial juridical person, it
needs to incur certain expenditure to keep itself afloat and have its
continued existence. Unlike a natural person, a company can only operate
through other natural persons — whether employees or others.

(b) In the case of corporate assessees, such expenses have
to be allowed as deduction, irrespective of whether or not the assessee is
engaged in active business and even if assessee has only passive incomes.

(c) Not carrying on business activity in a particular
period cannot be equated with closure of business, as it takes an
unsustainably narrow view of the scope of cessation of a business.

(d) Unless the business is abandoned or closed and even if
business is at a dormant stage waiting for proper market conditions to
develop, the expenditure incurred in the course of such a business is to be
allowed as deduction.







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S. 143 r.w. S. 133A : Assessee can retract offer of additional income by furnishing details of income in course of assessment proceedings

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13 (2007) 17 SOT 574


Jain Trading Co. v. ITO

ITA No.5935 (Mum.) of 2002.

A.Y. 1999-2000. Dated : 30-10-2006

S. 143 read with S. 133A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — An
assessee who makes an offer of additional income during the course of an inquiry
can retract by furnishing full details of his income in the course of assessment
proceedings.

During the course of survey proceedings u/s.133A, the
assessee offered an additional income of Rs.25 lacs, but did not disclose such
income in the return of income filed. The assessee contended that since in the
assessment proceedings it had furnished complete particulars of its business
transactions and disclosed the complete details of trading results, it was not
bound by the additional income offered at the time of survey. The Assessing
Officer did not accept the explanation of the assessee and held that after
having admitted suppression of business income to the extent of 25 lacs, it was
not open to the assessee to retract from the additional income declared during
the survey proceedings. He, therefore, added Rs.25 lacs to the income of the
assessee. On appeal, the CIT(A) upheld the order of the Assessing Officer.

The Tribunal deleted the addition and noted as under :

(1) An assessee who makes an offer of additional income
during course of an enquiry by Income-tax authorities is not bound by his
offer of additional income for all time to come. At the same time, the burden
cast upon an assessee, who chooses to retract his earlier statement, is very
heavy.

(2) In the instant case, during the course of assessment
proceedings, the assessee had completely explained entire business
transactions leading up to the date of survey and had given the details of its
trading activity.

(3) The Assessing Officer had not raised even a finger of
doubt at the account statement furnished by the assessee during the course of
assessment proceedings.

(4) Therefore, the assessee had been able to discharge the
heavy burden that rested upon him while retracting from offer of additional
income at the time of survey. Even at that stage, the case of the assessee was
that the offer was made to buy peace and not because of any concealment of
income or discrepancy in accounts detected by survey party.






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S. 23 : If property held with intention to let out and efforts made to let it out, annual letting value to be calculated u/s.23(1)(c)

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12 (2007) 17 SOT 293 (Mum.)


Premsudha Exports (P.) Ltd. v. ACIT

ITA No. 6277 and 6278 (Mum.) of 2006

A.Y. 2003-04. Dated : 31-5-2007

S. 23 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — If a property is held
with an intention to let out and efforts are made to let it out, the annual
letting value will be calculated u/s.23(1)(c) as if it is a let-out property.

As per its Memorandum of Association, the assessee-company
was entitled to purchase property for letting it out and to earn rental income.
During the year, the assessee’s property remained vacant, though the assessee
made continuous efforts to let out the property. The assessee submitted that the
annual letting value (ALV) of the property should be computed as per provisions
of clause (c) of S. 23 (1), and that since the property remained vacant for the
whole year, the ALV of the property had to be taken as NIL. The Assessing
Officer did not deliberate on the submission of the assessee and computed the
ALV of the impugned property as per clause (a) of S. 23(1) and determined it at
8.5% of the cost of property. The CIT(A) upheld the order.

The Tribunal set aside the order of the lower authorities and
upheld the assessee’s claim.

The Tribunal noted as under :

(1) The sole dispute, in the instant case, was regarding
the interpretation of the words ‘property is let’ in clause (c) of S. 23(1).
For this, it is to be determined as to whether actual letting out is a must
for a property to fall within the purview of clause (c) of S. 23(1).

(2) From a reading of the provisions of sub-section (3) of
S. 23, it appears that the Legislatures in their wisdom have used the words
‘house is actually let’. This shows that the words ‘property is let’ cannot
mean actual letting out of the property, because, had it been so, there was be
no need to use the word ‘actually’ in sub-section (3) of S. 23.

(3) If the property is held by the owner for letting out
and efforts are made to let it out, that property is covered by clause (c) and
this requirement has to be satisfied in each year that the property was being
held to let out, but remained vacant for whole or part of the year.

(4) In the instant case, the assessee-company was entitled
to purchase the property for its let out and to earn rental income. Copy of
resolution of the board of directors was also placed on record, wherefrom it
was evident that one of the directors was authorised to take necessary steps
to let out the property in question. The assessee had also fixed the monthly
rent and the security deposit of the property. Consequent to the resolution,
the assessee had approached various estate and finance consultants for letting
out the property and the request was also duly acknowledged by those
consultants. Unfortunately, during the year under appeal, the assessee could
not get a suitable tenant on account of hefty rent and security deposit. Thus,
during the whole year, the assessee made continuous efforts to let out the
property and, under these circumstances, this property could be called as to
be let out property in terms of observations made above. Since the property
had been held to be let out property, its annual letting value could only be
worked out as per clause (c) of S. 23(1) and, since the rent received or
receivable from the said property during the year was nil, the same was to be
taken as the annual value of the property in order to compute the income from
house property.



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S. 12AA r.w. S. 12A : If order u/s.12AA not passed within stipulated period, registration deemed to have been granted

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11 (2007) 17 SOT 281 (Delhi) (SB)

Bhagwad Swarup Shri Shri Devraha Baba Memorial

Shri Hari Parmarth Dham Trust v. CIT

ITA Nos. 363 (Delhi) of 2003

Dated : 31-8-2007

S. 12AA read with S. 12A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — If
order u/s.12AA is not passed within the stipulated period, then registration is
deemed to have been granted.

The CIT passed the order refusing registration u/s.12A to the
assessee-trust beyond the stipulated period of six months from the end of the
month in which application for registration was filed. The assessee appealed
before the Tribunal and contended that once the time limit fixed by S. 12AA(2)
expired without the CIT having passed any order, it must be deemed that the
registration had been granted.

The Special Bench, following the decisions in the
undermentioned cases, allowed the assessee’s appeal :

(a) Karnataka Golf Association v. DIT, (2004) 91 ITD
1 (Bang.)

(b) Sardari Lal Oberoi Memorial Charitable Trust v. ITO,
(2005) 3 SOT 229 (Delhi)

(c) People Education & Economic Development Society v.
ITO,
(2006) 100 ITD 87 (TM) (Chennai).

The Special Bench noted as under :

(1) The statutory authorities have no option, but to obey
the mandate of the law.

(2) Unless the statute provides for exceptions, the order
must be passed by statutory authorities in accordance with the time limit set
by the law. Ss.(2) of S. 12AA does not admit of any exception to the rule.

(3) Therefore, it is mandatory for the CIT to dispose of
the application for registration made u/s.12A within six months from the end
of the month in which the application was filed.

(4) While exercising such an important power available
u/s.12AA, the CIT should also pass an order within the time limit provided. It
would be incongruous to hold that conducting an enquiry into the claim for
registration is an important excise of the power, whereas passing of the order
within the time limit provided is not, and it can be done at any time.





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S. 115JA : Lease equalisation charges debited not to be added back for book profit

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10 (2007) 17 SOT 173 (Delhi)


GE Capital Transportation Financial Services Ltd. v.
ACIT

ITA No.2362 (Del.) of 2002

A.Y. 1998-99. Dated : 20-7-2007

S. 115JA of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Lease equalisation
charges debited to Profit & Loss A/c. cannot be added back while computing book
profit u/s.115JA.

In the Profit and Loss A/c. filed along with the return of
income for the A.Y. 1998-99, the assessee leasing company had deducted the
amount of lease equalisation charges from the lease rental income. In the
computation of total income, the said amount had been added back; but the same
was not added to the profit while computing book profit u/s. 115JA.

The Assessing Officer and the CIT(A) held that lease
equalisation charges debited to the Profit & Loss A/c. by the assessee leasing
company was a notional charge on the profits of the company and represented an
amount set aside out of profits/surplus to equalise the imbalance between lease
rental and depreciation charges over the period of lease. The impugned amount
was added back to the book profit under Explanation (1) to S. 115JA(2).

The Tribunal, relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in
respect of the distinction between a ‘provision’ and a ‘reserve’ in the case of
State Bank of Patiala v. CIT, (1996) 219 ITR 706/85 Taxman 416, set aside
the orders of the lower authorities.

The Tribunal noted as under :

1. The provision for lease equalisation charges was made
following the guidelines issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of
India (ICAI) on ‘Accounting of income, depreciation and other aspects for
leasing company’. The Assessing Officer held that the said guidelines issued
by ICAI on creation of lease equalisation charge were only recommendatory and
not mandatory.

2. The amount to be transferred to a reserve is debited to
Profit and Loss Appropriation A/c. and the purpose of creating the reserve is
to enable the firm to tide over a difficult financial period and not to meet
any particular contingency. The amount of lease equalisation charges, however,
was not debited by the assessee-company to its Profit and Loss Appropriation
A/c. and the purpose of the same was not to enable the assessee to tide over a
difficult financial period.

3. The amount provided for the lease equalisation charges
was not transferred by the assessee-company in its books of account to any
reserve account, but the same was adjusted against depreciation/WDV of the
relevant fixed assets given on lease.

4. The amount of lease equalisation charge, however, is
neither the portion of earnings/profits of an enterprise, nor is the same
appropriated for a general or specific purpose. The same is a charge against
the profit to arrive at true and correct profits of the leasing business,
which by no means can be treated as part of undistributed profits or capital
of the business.

5. If the nature and character of lease equalisation
charge, as is evident from the purpose for which the same was provided as well
as the accounting treatment given thereto in the books of account, was
considered in the light of the meaning of the expression ‘reserve’ as defined
in the context of terms commonly used in financial statements as well as by
the Apex Court in the judicial pronouncement, it was to be held that the
provision made for lease equalisation charges could not be regarded as an
amount transferred to reserves as envisaged in Explanation (b) to S. 115JA
(2).

6. Therefore, the adjustment made by the Assessing Officer
by adding the amount of lease equalisation charges while computing the book
profit u/s.115JA was not permissible, since the said amount was not covered
within any of the clauses of Explanation below S. 115JA(2) including clause
(b).



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S. 36(1)(iii) r.w. S. 43(1) : Interest on capital borrowed for acquiring machinery, deductible u/s.36(1)(iii), whether put to use or not

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9 (2007) 17 SOT 90 (Del.)


Simbhaoli Sugar Mills Ltd. v. ACIT

ITA Nos. 2856 and 2857 (Delhi) of 2005

A.Ys. 2000-01 and 2001-02

Dated : 11-5-2007

S. 36(1)(iii) read with S. 43(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961
— Interest on capital borrowed for acquiring machinery required to be used for
its business is eligible for deduction u/s.36(1)(iii), irrespective of fact
whether machinery was put to use or not in accounting year.

The AO and the CIT(A) held that since machinery acquired by
the assessee was not put to use in the year under consideration, the assessee in
view of Explanation 8 to S. 43(1), was not entitled to claim deduction
u/s.36(1)(iii) in respect of interest paid
on the capital borrowed for acquiring the machinery.

The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim. The Tribunal noted
as under :

(1) In view of a catena of decisions of the Supreme Court
and various High Courts on the question of allowability of interest
u/s.36(1)(iii), it is clear that the expenditure incurred on interest on
capital borrowed for acquiring the machinery required to be used for the
business of the assessee is eligible for deduction u/s.36(1)(iii),
irrespective of the fact whether the machinery was put to use or not in the
accounting year relevant to assessment year under consideration.

The Tribunal referred to the following cases :

(a) CIT v. Associated Fibre & Rubber Industries (P.)
Ltd.,
(1999) 236 ITR 471/102 Taxman 700 (SC)

(b) CIT v. Modi Industries, (1993) 200 ITR 341/68
Taxman 114 (Delhi)

(c) CIT v. Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Ltd., (2000) 242
ITR 129/109 Taxman 363 (Delhi)

(d) CIT v. Orissa Cement Ltd., (2003) 260 ITR 626
(Delhi)

(e) CIT v. J. K. Synthetics Ltd., (1988) 169 ITR
267/22 Taxman 260 (All.)

(f) ITO v. Malwa Vanaspati & Chemical Co. Ltd.,
(1997) 226 ITR 253/92 Taxman 262 (M.P.)

(g) CIT v. Bhillai Iron Foundry (P.) Ltd., (1998)
234 ITR 661 (M.P.)



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S. 33AC : Profit from business means profit generated during course of business of operation of ships and not only from operation of ships

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8 (2007) 17 SOT 54 (Mum.)


Mercator Lines Ltd. v. Dy. CIT

ITA Nos. 8045 to 8047 (Mum.) of 2003

and 53 (Mum.) of 2004

A.Ys. 1997-1998, 1999-2000 and 2001-02. Dated : 25-6-2007

S. 33AC of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Profit from business
means any profit generated during course of business of operation of ships and
is not confined only to income from operations of ships — Sale of
scrap is an income derived from business of shipping operation and was eligible
for deduction u/s.33AC.

The Assessing Officer and the CIT(A) disallowed the
assessee’s claim for deduction u/s.33AC in respect of income from sale of scrap
and income from interest on FDRs.

The Tribunal allowed the claim of the assessee and noted as
under :

(1) ‘Profit derived from business’ used in S. 33AC means
any profit generated during the course of business of operation of ships and
does not confine only to operation of ships.

(2) Income from sale of scrap is certainly an income
generated during the course of business of operation of ships — it is an
income derived from the business of shipping operation and is eligible for
deduction u/s.33AC.

(3) In respect of interest earned on FDRs, since nothing
had been placed on record by the assessee regarding whether it was received
during the course of business of operation of ships, the matter was restored
to the file of the Assessing Officer to re-adjudicate the issue. However, if
the FDRs were purchased to obtain the credit limit or on account of business
exigencies, the interest generated thereon would certainly be business income
and was eligible for deduction u/s.33AC. In case surplus funds were put in
FDRs and interest was generated thereon, that interest income would not
qualify to be business income of the assessee and also would not be eligible
for deduction u/s.33AC.





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S. 12A, S. 12AA : CIT cannot refuse registration to trust on extraneous considerations, when no fault with objects, genuineness of activities

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7 (2007) 109 TTJ (Asr.) 850


Dream Land Educational Trust. v. CIT

ITA No. 481 (Asr.) 2005

Dated : 5-4-2007

S. 12A and S. 12AA of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — CIT, having
found no fault with objects of the trust and genuineness of its activities, was
not justified in refusing registration u/s.12A on extraneous considerations.

The CIT rejected the assessee’s application for registration
u/s.12A, on the following grounds :

(a) Dissolution deed of the firm of which property was
settled on trust was not registered.

(b) No transfer deed was executed regarding property
transferred to trust.

(c) The takeover action was unilateral.

(d) No objection certificate was not obtained from bankers.

(e) On dissolution of firm, it was left to the trustees to
decide the fate of net assets.


The Tribunal held that the CIT was not justified in refusing
registration u/s.12A. The Tribunal noted as under :

(1) U/s.12AA, the CIT was only required to satisfy himself
with regard to the objects and genuineness of the activities of the trust.

(2) The CIT has not, anywhere in the impugned order,
doubted either the genuineness of the activities of the trust or its objects.
It has not been stated that any object of the trust is not that of charity or
that the income of the trust has been used for the purpose of the trustee or
their families and has not been utilised for charity.

(3) In the absence of any dissatisfaction of the CIT with
regard to either the objects or the genuineness of the activities of the
trust, registration has been refused to the trust in violation of the
provision of S. 12AA. The reasons recorded for such rejection of registration
are entirely extraneous to the requirement of the said Section.


The Tribunal relied on the decisions in the following cases :

(1) Sanjeevamma Hanumanthe Gowda Charitable Trust v.
Director of IT (Exemption),
(2006) 203 CTR (Kar.) 533; (2006) 285 ITR 327
(Kar.)

(2) St. Don Bosco Educational Society v. CIT, (2004)
84 TTJ (Lucknow) 805; (2004) 90 ITD 477 (Lucknow)

(3) Smt. Mansukhi Devi Bihani Jan Hitkari Trust v. CIT,
(2004) 83 TTJ (Jd) 763; (2005) 94 ITD 1 (Jd)

(4) People Education & Economic Development Society (Peeds)
v. ITO,
(2006) 104 TTJ (Chennai) (TM) 467; (2006) 100 ITD 87 (Chennai)
(TM)

(5) Acharya Sewa Niyas Uttaranchal v. CIT, (2006)
105 TTJ (Del.) 761






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S. 154 r.w. S. 43B: Relief entitled can not be denied merely because omitted by mistake

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New Page 1

6 (2007) 109 TTJ (Jp.) 794


Lustre Tiles Ltd. v. Addl. CIT

ITA No. 489 (Jp.) 2003

A.Y. 1995-96. Dated : 28-7-2006

S. 154 read with S. 43B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — If on
the basis of material on record, the assessee is entitled to a relief which has
remained to be allowed, then it would constitute mistake apparent from record
and, consequently, such relief cannot be denied merely because the assessee, by
oversight, had omitted to make the claim.

The assessee’s application for rectification u/s.154 for
allowing claim u/s.43B was rejected by the Assessing Officer and the CIT(A), on
the ground that no such claim was made in the return of income, nor in
subsequent proceedings.

The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim and observed as
under :

(1) In a Note in Schedule 1 to the balance sheet, it has
been clearly mentioned in the balance sheet that Rs.53 lacs being interest on
the term loan has been converted into equity shares of equal value.

(2) CBDT Circular No. 669, dated 25th October 1993,
allowing entertainment of rectification application in such matters, is
binding on the Department.

(3) ‘Record’ for purposes of S. 154 would include all
documents available at the time of passing of order subjected to rectification
proceedings and the claim was clearly reflected in the Note appended to
Schedule 1 of the balance sheet.

(4) The Supreme Court in the case of Anchor Pressings P.
Ltd. v. CIT,
(1986) 58 CTR 126 held that the jurisdiction u/s.154 to
rectify a mistake is very wide and relief could be allowed in the
rectification proceedings if all factual materials necessary for allowing the
relief were available on record and such relief could not be denied merely
because the assessee had omitted to claim the same.


The Tribunal relied on the following further decisions :

(1) CIT v. K. N. Oil Industries, (1982) 30 CTR (MP)
137; (1983) 142 ITR 13 (MP)

(2) West Bengal Warehousing Corpn. v. CIT, (1986) 54
CTR (Cal.) 21; (1986) 157 ITR 149 (Cal.)

(3) CIT v. Smt. Aruna Luthra, (2001) 170 CTR (P&H) (FB)
73; (2001) 252 ITR 76 (P&H) (FB)






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S. 37(1) : (a) One-time charges paid by assessee company to NSDL for converting shares into demat form, allowed as revenue expenditure (b) Expenditure on installation of traffic signal for benefit of employees is allowable business expenditure (c) Deduc

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New Page 1

5 (2007) 109 TTJ (Bang.) 631


Infosys Technologies Ltd. v.
Jt. CIT

ITA No. 1022 (Bang.) 2003

A.Y. 1998-99. Dated : 7-4-2006




(a) S. 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Payment
made by assessee company as one-time charges to National Security Depository
Ltd. (NSDL) for converting shares of company from physical into dematerialised
form is allowable as revenue expenditure.


(b) S. 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Assessee
installed traffic signals at a circle in the vicinity of its office premises
to help its employees out of traffic jams, so that they may reach the office
in time, and handing over the same to traffic police, expenditure was
allowable being wholly and exclusively for assessee’s business.


(c) S. 80G read with S. 10A & S. 14A of the
Income-tax Act, 1961 — Deduction u/s.80G is allowable even if it is made out
of exempted income; S. 14A does not apply to S. 80G.



(a) Relying on the decisions in the cases of CIT v.
Tirrihannah Co. Ltd.,
(1992) 195 ITR 393 (Cal.) and Karjan Cooperative
Cotton Sales Ginning & Pressing Society v. CIT,
(1992) 106 CTR (Guj.)
47/(1993) 199 ITR 17 (Guj.), the Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim of
Rs.44.43 lacs paid to NSDL as one-time charges for converting the company’s
shares from physical to dematerialised form. The Tribunal, inter alia,
observed that :

(1) The dematerialisation has helped significantly in
reducing the administrative costs. Even if certain expenses result into some
benefit to the shareholders, the expenditure incurred in respect of or in
connection with the shareholders, is allowable as revenue expenditure.

(2) The expenditure can even be considered in the nature of
compliance with listing requirements. The CBDT by its Circular Letter
F.No.10/67/65-IT(A-1), dated 26th August 1965 opined that expenses incurred by
company on getting its shares listed in stock exchange should be considered as
laid out wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business and therefore
admissible as business expenditure u/s.37(1).

(3) The guidelines of SEBI mandate that the shares to be
traded in stock exchange can only be in dematerialised form. Thus, the charges
paid to NSDL, having not brought into existence any capital asset and being
for the purpose of efficient functioning of the business, are to be held as
business revenue expenses and allowable as such.


(b) The Tribunal allowed the expenditure of Rs.7.38 lacs
incurred by the assessee for installation of traffic signals as business
expenditure. The Tribunal relied on the decisions in the following cases :

(1) Atherton v. British Insulated & Helsby Cables Ltd.,
(1925) 10 Tax Case 155

(2) 191 (HL), Eastern Investment Ltd. v. CIT, (1951)
20 ITR 1 (SC); SCR 594

(3) CIT v. Chandulal Keshavlal & Co., (1960) 38 ITR
601 (SC)

(4) Mysore Kirloskar Ltd. v. CIT, (1987) 61 CTR (Kar.)
265; (1987) 166 ITR 836 (Kar.)

(5) CIT v. Royal Calcutta Turf Club, (1961) 41 ITR
414 (SC)

(6) CIT v. Madras Refineries Ltd., (2004) 266 ITR
170 (Mad.)


The Tribunal noted as under :

(1) As a result of getting repeatedly involved in traffic
jams and other hazards, the workers are a distressed lot. The incurrence of
expenditure was prompted solely with a view to benefit its employees. The
expenditure was incurred in the character as a trader and was prompted by
commercial expediency.

(2) What is to be seen is not whether it was compulsory for
the assessee to make the payment or not, but the correct test is that of
commercial expediency.

(3) As long as the payment which is made is for the
purposes of the business, and not disallowable specifically under the Act, the
same would be allowable as a deduction. If there is incidental benefit to a
party other than the assessee, it could not be relevant to decide whether the
expenditure is allowable or not.

(4) Since the expenditure was incurred to secure the
benefit to its employees, which in turn has also achieved its social objects,
it can still be considered as “wholly and exclusively for the purpose of
business” and, hence, allowable u/s.37(1).


(c) The donation of Rs.15.00 lacs made by the assessee was
paid out of ‘K’ unit, the profit of which was exempt u/s.10A. The Assessing
Officer and the CIT(A) disallowed deduction u/s.80G, holding that since the
expenditure is made out of exempt income, the issue is covered u/s.14A. the
Tribunal allowed the deduction and noted as under :

(1) The donation cannot be considered as ‘expenditure
incurred’ for the purpose of earning income, which is exempt under the Act.

(2) S. 10A is an exemption Section, whereas S. 80G is a
deduction Section and, therefore, there would be no double deduction of the
same item even if a benefit under both the Sections has been claimed. There
has been no double deduction in respect of the same item of expenditure.

(3) There is no stipulation in S. 80G that the donation has
to be made out of taxable income only for qualifying as a deduction.

(4) The provisions of S. 14A would not be applicable to a
deduction u/s.80G, as S. 14A is limited in its operation to chapter IV only,
where-as deduction u/s.80G falls under chapter VI-A and donation made does not
constitute expenditure. S. 14A applies to expenditure only.

(5) S. 80G would be available even when the said donations are made out of capital or gifts received or exempted income or income of earlier years.

S. 199 : Credit for TDS to be given pro rata in assessment year in which corresponding income assessable

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New Page 1

4 (2007) 109 TTJ (Chd.) (TM) 445


Pradeep Kumar Dhir v. ACIT

ITA No. 798 (Chd.) 2006

A.Y. 2003-04. Dated : 27-4-2007

S. 199 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Credit for TDS is to be
given to the assessee in the assessment year in which the corresponding income
is assessable. If only a portion of income is found assessable in the relevant
assessment year, credit has to be allowed only on that portion on pro-rata basis
and the credit for the balance TDS is to be allowed only in future when the
remaining income is assessable.

The assessee was following cash system of accounting. The
Assessing Officer and the CIT(A) held that the credit for TDS was allowable only
with respect to the income which was assessable for this year and not the entire
amount of TDS claimed by the assessee as per the TDS certificates.

The Third Member, relying on the decisions in the following
cases, also confirmed the order of the lower authorities :

(a) Smt.Varsha G. Salunke v. Dy. CIT, (2006) 101 TTJ
(Mum.) (TM) 703

(b) Tej Ram v. ITO, (2005) 92 TTJ (Chd.) 1185/(2005)
93 ITD (Chd.)


The Third Member noted as under :

(1) Important conditions for getting benefit of TDS as per
S. 199 are :

(a) The assessee should produce the certificate for the
amount of TDS.

(b) The assessee should show that income subjected to TDS
is disclosed in the return of the assessment year as ‘assessable’.

Both the abovementioned conditions are to be satisfied.

(2) Therefore, the assessee will not be entitled to have
benefit or credit for the amount, though mentioned in the certificate for the
assessment year, if income relatable to the amount is not shown and is not
assessable in that assessment year. If instead of entire income referable to
amount of tax deducted, only a portion of income is found assessable, the
benefit has to be allowed only on the portion shown. If balance income on
account of system of accounting followed by the assessee or for some other
reason is found to be assessable in future, then the credit for the balance
TDS can be allowed only in future when income is assessable.

(3) The CBDT Circular No. 5 of 2001, dated 2nd March 2001
also supports the view that where tax is deducted from the amount which is
liable to be assessed and spread over more than one financial year, credit
shall be allowed for TDS on pro-rata basis and in the same proportion
in which such income is offered for taxation in different assessment years.



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S. 115JB r.w. S. 2(1A) — Agricultural income does not form part of book profit for purposes of S. 115JB.

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New Page 1

  1. (2009) 32 SOT 497 (Cochin)


Harrisons Malayalam Ltd. v.
ACIT

A.Y. : 2005-06. Dated : 12-5-2009



(a) S. 115JB r.w. S. 2(1A) — Agricultural income does
not form part of book profit for purposes of S. 115JB.


(b) S. 50B r.w. S. 2(42C) — Profit on sale of
agricultural land was agricultural income in nature; hence, it would not be
covered by provisions of S. 50B.



During the relevant assessment year, the assessee sold its
rubber estate situated in a rural area and outside the purview of any
municipal limit, along with standing trees and other equipment as a going
concern. While computing its book profit for the purpose of S. 115JB, the
Assessing Officer had added the profit arising to the assessee on the sale of
the said rubber estate as forming part of the book profit. The CIT(A) upheld
the order of the Assessing Officer. The CIT(A) also enhanced the assessment by
holding that the surplus arising to the assessee on sale of its rubber estate
was taxable as capital gain u/s.50B, as the rubber estate owned by the
assessee was sold as a going concern, which showed that the sale was a slump
sale of an undertaking in its entirety.

The Tribunal held in favour of the assessee on both
matters.

In the matter of S. 115JB :

(1) Since the rubber estate was in a rural area and it
was outside the purview of any municipal limit and following the judgment of
the Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. All India Tea & Trading Co. Ltd.,
(1996) 219 ITR 544/85 Taxman 391 and of the Kerala High Court in the case of
CIT v. Alanickal Co. Ltd., (1986) 158 ITR 630/28 Taxman 504, it would
have to be held that the profit arising to the assessee on transfer of the
said rubber estate amounted to agricultural income as provided u/s.2(1A).

(2) It is a settled law that the profits arising on
transfer of agricultural land partake the character of agriculture income
and agricultural income is not to be included in the total income as
provided in S. 10(1). S. 115JB provides that any income listed u/s.10, other
than listed in clause (38), shall be reduced from the book profit, meaning
that agricultural income shall not form part of book profit for the purpose
of S. 115JB.

In the matter of S. 50B :

(1) The assessee-company was engaged in different types
of businesses.

(2) In its agricultural division, the assessee was having
a number of estates growing tea, rubber, cocoa, cardamom, etc. In the case
of rubber itself, the assessee was having about 12 different estates. During
the relevant previous year, the assessee had sold one of its rubber estates.
The estate had been sold on the basis of a detailed agreement executed
between the vendor and the vendee. The total consideration stipulated for
the transfer of the estate had been split over different assets, both
movable and immovable, enumerated in different Schedules and Annexures.

(3) The items sold did not include liabilities. The sale
agreement did not include investments and deposits. All the investments,
deposits, receivables, stock and such other current assets in the form of
financial and other assets remained with the assessee-company along with the
liabilities. Only those assets which were enumerated in the Schedules and
Annexures were sold to the vendee. Therefore, the instant case was one of
split sale and not a case of slump sale.

(4) The assets sold by the assessee had been listed out
in different Schedules and Annexures. The consideration had been
specifically assigned to the sale of immovable property by way of rubber
estate. Separate consideration had been assigned to the sale of movable
properties, including vehicles and other properties. Therefore, it was not a
case of slump sale for a lump sum amount of consideration.

(5) The profit arising on sale of agricultural land was
agricultural income in nature and, therefore, the surplus did not come
within the meaning of capital assets and by the nature of the income, it
would not come under the provisions of S. 50B. Therefore, the CIT(A) had
erred in directing the Assessing Officer to levy long-term capital gains
u/s.50B on the surplus arising to the assessee on sale of its estate.


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S. 37(1) — Premium on Keyman Insurance Policy is allowable business expenditure

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New Page 1

21 (2008) 118 TTJ 263


Sunita Finlease Ltd. v. Dy. CIT

ITA No. 203 (Nagpur) of 2007

A.Y. : 2004-05. Dated : 15-2-2008

S. 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — In view of CBDT
Circular No. 762, dated 18th February 1998, premium on Keyman Insurance Policy
is allowable business expenditure.

 

The premium paid by the assessee-company on a Keyman
Insurance Policy was disallowed by the Assessing Officer to the extent of 30%,
on the grounds that the sum assured and the premium paid were excessive
vis-à-vis
the worth of the company. The disallowance was confirmed by the
CIT(A).

 

The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim on the basis of
Circular No. 762, dated 18-2-1998 [(1998) 145 CTR (St.) 5]. The Tribunal noted
as under :

(1) The policy known as ‘Keyman Insurance Policy’ provides
for an insurance policy taken by a business organisation on the life of some
important persons in the organisation, generally called as Keyman in the
insurance nomenclature.

(2) In Circular No. 762, dated 18th February 1998,
clarifying with regard to the treatment of the premium paid of Keyman
Insurance Policy whether it should be allowed as a capital expenditure or a
revenue expenditure, the Board has clarified that the premium paid on the
Keyman Insurance Policy be allowed as business expenditure.

 


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S. 263 — In revision proceedings CIT cannot travel beyond reasons for revision given by him in show-cause notice.

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New Page 1

  1. (2009) 32 SOT 428 (Mum.)


Geometric Software Solution Co. Ltd. v. ACIT

A.Y. : 2003-04. Dated : 10-7-2009

S. 263 — In revision proceedings CIT cannot travel beyond
reasons for revision given by him in show-cause notice.

For the relevant assessment year, the assessee’s claim for
deduction u/s.10A was allowed in the assessment u/s.143(3). The CIT noticed
that the assessee had incurred certain expenses in foreign currency in the
relevant assessment year, which were mainly in the nature of travel expenses
and sales and marketing expenses which were to be excluded while working out
the deduction u/s.10A and not doing so had resulted in excess allowance of
deduction. The CIT, accordingly, issued show-cause notice to the assessee as
to why the assessment order passed by the Assessing Officer should not be set
aside. Thereafter, the CIT, having considered the assessee’s reply, set aside
the assessment order stating another ground also that some of the sale
proceeds were yet to be received by the assessee in India at the relevant
time.

The Tribunal held as under :

(1) The CIT had revised the assessment order passed
u/s.143(3) by issuing show-cause notice only with regard to not reducing the
expenditure incurred in foreign currency from the total export turnover
while computing the deduction u/s.10A, but in the revision order the
assessment was set aside on another ground also that some of the sale
proceeds were yet to be received by the assessee.

(2) The revision u/s.263 is not like the reopening of the
assessment where once the assessment is reopened entire assessment is open
before the Assessing Officer to be reconsidered in accordance with law.

(3) In the revision proceedings the CIT cannot travel
beyond the reasons given by him for revision in the show-cause notice.
Therefore, the revision on the ground that part of the sale proceeds were
yet to be received by the assessee was not tenable.

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S. 50B r.w. S. 2(19AA) and S. 2(42C) — Basic condition to be satisfied to qualify as slump sale is that there should be a transfer of undertaking i.e., either business as a whole is transferred or any part of undertaking or unit or division of undertaking

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36. (2009) 32 SOT 183 (Mum.)


Duchem Laboratories Ltd. v. ACIT

A.Y. : 2000-01. Dated : 12-6-2009

S. 50B r.w. S. 2(19AA) and S. 2(42C) — Basic condition to
be satisfied to qualify as slump sale is that there should be a transfer of
undertaking
i.e., either business as a whole is transferred or
any part of undertaking or unit or division of undertaking is transferred.


During the year, the assessee sold its business of hospital
products pursuant to a business transfer agreement. The Assessing Officer held
that such sale was a transfer of assets and liabilities relating to
identifiable parts of a business and was not a transfer of business as a
whole, for attracting the provision of S. 50B. The CIT(A) upheld the Assessing
Officer’s order.

The Tribunal held in favour of the assessee. The Tribunal
noted as under :

(1) The purchase price agreed between the parties was a
comprehensive purchase price for the sale of business. There was no
apportionment of purchase price to the different assets and liabilities
being taken over.

(2) A perusal of the business transfer agreement and the
schedules attached thereto confirmed that the intention of the parties was
to sell the entire business as a whole and no particular consideration was
attributed to any particular asset or liability transferred.

(3) The steps taken by the assessee clearly reflected
that the line of business sold by the assessee was an identifiable line of
business being carried on by the assessee from year to year and all the
transactions, rights and liabilities in connection with the said line of
business were transferred by the assessee to the purchaser.

(4) The transfer of business was as an ongoing concern
and the amount received for the transfer of inventory, contract, licence
agreements, accounts receivables including vendor lists, etc., relating to
the business would fall within the definition of ‘slump sale’ and was to be
considered for computation of capital gains in line with the provisions of
S. 50B.




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S. 115JA r.w. S. 14A — Provisions of Ss.(2) and Ss.(3) of S. 14A cannot be imported into clause (f) of Explanation to S. 115JA while computing adjusted book profit.

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New Page 1

  1. (2009) 32 SOT 101 (Delhi)


Goetze (India) Ltd. v. CIT

A.Y. : 2000-01. Dated : 20-5-2009

S. 115JA r.w. S. 14A — Provisions of Ss.(2) and Ss.(3) of
S. 14A cannot be imported into clause (f) of Explanation to S. 115JA while
computing adjusted book profit.

For the relevant assessments year, the CIT, acting u/s.263,
estimated certain expenditure for earning dividend income and added said
amount to book profit of assessee for purpose of computing adjusted book
profits u/s.115JA.

The Tribunal set aside the CIT’s order. The Tribunal noted
as under :

(1) Under the provision contained in S. 14A, no deduction
is to be allowed in respect of expenditure incurred by the assessee in
relation to income which does not form part of the total income under this
Act.

(2) Under clause (f) of the Explanation to S. 115JA, the
amount of expenditure relatable to any income to which any of the provisions
of Chapter III apply has to be added to the book profit.

(3) Since the issue of expenditure related to divided
income, which is a matter falling under Chapter III, it was clear on perusal
of these two provisions that they are similar in nature. Clause (f) uses the
words ‘expenditure relatable to any
income’ while S. 14A uses the words ‘expenditure incurred by the assessee in
relation to income’. These words have the same meaning.

(4) Further, S. 14A contains two more sub-sections,
Ss.(2) and Ss.(3), which do not find a place in clause (f).

(5) Therefore, insofar as computation of adjusted book
profit is concerned, provisions of Ss.(2) and Ss.(3) of S. 14A cannot be
imported into clause (f) of the Explanation to S. 115JA.

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S. 254 — A Division Bench decision which is directly contrary to a Larger Bench decision cannot be said to have any binding force.

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New Page 1

  1. (2009) 32 SOT 132 (Mum.)


ACIT v. MSS India (P.) Ltd.

A.Y. : 2003-04. Dated : 29-5-2009

S. 254 — A Division Bench decision which is directly
contrary to a Larger Bench decision cannot be said to have any binding force.

For the relevant assessment year, the Transfer Pricing
Officer made certain additions to the total income of the assessee. The CIT(A)
deleted the additions. Before the Tribunal, the Revenue relied upon the
decision of Five-Member Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Aztec Software
& Technology Services Ltd. v. Asstt. CIT,
(2007) 107 ITD 141 (Bang.) (SB).
The assessee, however, relied upon the decision of a Division Bench in the
case of Philips Software Centre (P.) Ltd. v. Asstt. CIT, (2008) 26 SOT
226 (Bang.) submitting that the Bangalore Bench had duly considered the impact
of Aztec decision (supra) by the Five-Member Bench of the Tribunal.

The Tribunal held as under :

(1) The view of the Division Bench of the Bangalore
Tribunal was diametrically opposite to the decision of an earlier
Five-Member Special Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Aztec Software &
Technology Services Ltd. (supra).

(2) It is only elementary that a judicial forum’s
approach to disregard a binding precedent from a superior judicial forum,
including by Larger Benches of the same judicial institution, is contrary to
the first principle of the theory of judicial precedence.

(3) A Division Bench cannot even disregard decision of
another Division Bench of equal strength leave aside a Larger Bench.

(4) When the law mandates that a Division Bench cannot
disregard another Division Bench and there is a Division Bench decision
which is directly contrary to a Larger Bench decision, the order so
disregarding the Larger Bench cannot be said to have any binding force.

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S. 37(1) — For the expenditure to be allowable u/s.37(1), it may be incurred ‘voluntarily’ and without any ‘necessity’ and if it is incurred for promoting business and to earn profits, assessee can claim deduction u/s.37(1), even though there was no compe

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New Page 1

  1. (2009) 32 SOT 9 (Pune)


Dy. CIT v. Kolhapur Zilla Sahakari Dudh
Utpadak Sangh Ltd.

A.Ys. : 1993-94, 1995-96 to 1999-2000 and 2001-02 Dated :
28-3-2008

S. 37(1) — For the expenditure to be allowable u/s.37(1),
it may be incurred ‘voluntarily’ and without any ‘necessity’ and if it is
incurred for promoting business and to earn profits, assessee can claim
deduction u/s.37(1), even though there was no compelling necessity to incur
such expenditure.

For the relevant assessment years, the Assessing Officer
disallowed animal husbandry expenditure incurred by the assessee on the
following grounds :

(a) Assessee did not own any cattle.

(b) It did not procure milk directly from cattle owners.

(c) It collected milk from primary societies which, in
turn, collected milk from the cattle owners.

(d) Providing services for animal husbandry was not a
business activity of the assessee.

(e) The animal husbandry expenditure benefited the cattle
owners and not the business of the assessee, particularly because the
assessee-society was not buying milk directly from the cattle owners.

The CIT(A) deleted the disallowance made by the Assessing
Officer on the ground that the expenditure incurred by the assessee resulted
in increasing the quality and productivity of milk which the assessee was
purchasing as part of its business.

The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)’s order. The Tribunal noted
as under :

(1) Although one might argue that the assessee could have
carried on its business without incurring the above expenditure and that it
was not ‘necessary’ for the assessee to incur that expenditure in order to
carry on its business of purchase and sale of milk, such an argument was not
relevant for deciding the question whether an expenditure was allowable
u/s.37(1).

(2) The expression ‘wholly and exclusively’ used in S.
37(1) does not mean ‘necessarily’.

(3) An expenditure may be incurred ‘voluntarily’ and
without any ‘necessity’ and if it is incurred for promoting the business and
to earn profits, the assessee can claim deduction u/s.37(1) even though
there was no compelling necessity to incur such expenditure. The fact that
somebody other than the assessee is also benefited by the expenditure should
not come in the way of an expenditure being allowed by way of deduction
u/s.37(1).

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S. 271(1)(c) — AO must have definite evidence to refuse assessee’s claim or explanation — Mere non-acceptance of explanation cannot indicate concealment of income.

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New Page 1

  1. (2009) 31 SOT 474 (Mum.)

Twin Star Jupiter Co-operative Hsg.

Society Ltd. v. ITO

A.Ys. : 1998-99, 1999-2000 and 2000-01

Dated : 15-4-2009

S. 271(1)(c) — AO must have definite evidence to refuse
assessee’s claim or explanation — Mere non-acceptance of explanation cannot
indicate concealment of income.

For the relevant assessment year, the Assessing Officer
made certain additions to the total income of assessee and, thereafter, levied
penalty u/s. 271(1)(c). The CIT(A) deleted the penalty partly.

The Tribunal deleted the entire penalty. The Tribunal noted
as follows :

(1) The proceedings u/s.271(1)(c) can be initiated only
if the Assessing Officer or the first appellate authority is satisfied, in
the course of any proceeding under the Act, as per clause (c) that any
person has concealed the particulars of his income or has furnished
inaccurate particulars of such income.

(2) There cannot be a straitjacket formula for detection
of these defaults of concealments or of furnishing inaccurate particulars of
income and indeed concealment of particulars of income and furnishing of
inaccurate particulars of income may at times overlap.

(3) The Assessing Officer cannot invoke provisions of S.
271(1)(c) on the basis of routine and general presumptions. Whether it be a
case of only concealment or of only inaccuracy or both, the particulars of
income so vitiated would be specific and definite and be known in the
assessment proceedings by the Assessing Officer who, on being satisfied
about each concealment or inaccuracy of particulars of income, would be in a
position to initiate the penalty proceedings on one or both of the grounds
of defaults as may have been specifically and directly detected.

(4) Part A of the Explanation 1 to S. 271(1)(c) states
that “if the assessee fails to offer an explanation or offers an explanation
which is found by the AO or the CIT(A) or the CIT to be false”. This
Explanation can, therefore, be applied only where the assessee has either
not offered any explanation or where he has offered any explanation, the
same is found to be false by the AO, etc. Mere non-acceptance of explanation
offered by the assessee cannot form a basis for the satisfaction of the AO
to the effect that the assessee has concealed particulars of his income. The
AO must have some definite evidence to refuse the assessee’s claim or
explanation.

(5) When the assessee is able to offer a reasonable
explanation based on some evidence, the AO cannot invoke Part B of the
Explanation 1 unless he has given a finding based on some contradictory
evidence to disapprove that explanation offered by the assessee which the
assessee is not able to substantiate and fails to prove that such
explanation is bona fide and that all the facts relating to the same
and material to the computation of his total income have been disclosed by
him.

(6) In this case, the assessee had disclosed all relevant
material for the purpose of computation of total income. It was also found
that the assessee had furnished an explanation in this regard, which was not
found false by the Assessing Officer. When the assessee had filed all the
particulars of income, the correct assessment and calculation of total
income had to be done by the Assessing Officer. If in such process the
Assessing Officer found different total income to be assessed than the
income offered by the assessee, in such case it was not automatically a case
where penalty u/s.271(1)(c) was leviable.

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If assessee offers income or furnishes accurate particulars of income before the AO takes up the issue and comes across information, then there was no concealment of income or furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income.

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New Page 1

  1. (2009) 31 SOT 97 (Delhi) (TM)


Addl. CIT v. Prem Chand Garg

A.Ys. : 2003-04 and 2004-05

Dated : 11-5-2009

S. 271(1)(c) r.w. S. 68 :



(a) If assessee offers income or furnishes accurate
particulars of income before the AO takes up the issue and comes across
information, then there was no concealment of income or furnishing of
inaccurate particulars of income.


(b) Mere omission of surrendered amount from the
return of income is neither concealment of income nor furnishing of
inaccurate particulars of income unless and until there is some evidence to
show or some circumstances are found from which it can be gathered that
omission was attributable to an intention or a desire on part of assessee to
hide or conceal income so as to avoid imposition of tax thereon.



During the previous years relevant to the assessment years
in question, the assessee had received two gifts. Consequent upon the search,
a notice u/s.153A was issued to the assessee. In response to the said notice,
the assessee replied that the original returns filed be taken as returns under
the aforesaid provision. Thereafter, the assessee offered/surrendered the
amount of gifts within four days of the receipt of the notice u/s.153A for
taxation by way of a letter. The Assessing Officer held that the assessee had
furnished inaccurate particulars of income and concealed the particulars of
income in both the years and he levied penalty u/s.271(1)(c). The CIT(A)
deleted the penalty on the following grounds :



  •  No evidence was found in the course of search
    indicating that these gifts were not genuine.


  •  The only question asked by the Assessing Officer in the
    course of assessment proceedings was whether the assessee had taken or given
    any loan or gift in the period under consideration and to give details
    thereof.


  •  The assessee furnished the details of the gifts from
    NRIs, furnished copies of gift deeds and also mentioned that the gifts were
    surrendered for taxation to buy peace and to avoid dispute in the matter;
    that the surrender was made subject to the condition that penalty
    proceedings would not be initiated.


  •  The course of events narrated above showed that the AO
    did not have any information to hold that the gifts were not genuine or that
    they formed part of the total income of the assessee.


Since there was a difference of opinion between the
Members, the matter was referred to the Third Member u/s.255(4).

The Third Member upheld the order of the CIT(A) deleting
the penalty. The Third Member noted as under :

(1) It was true that the letter of surrender did not
obliterate the original return and suppression of income therein, but when
the surrender was made before detection or without any material on record
suggesting that income was withheld, it would be a case of voluntary offer
and, in that case, there would not be concealment of income by the assessee.

(2) The surrender of the amount after receipt of the
questionnaire could not lead to an inference that it was not voluntary in
absence of any material on record suggesting it to be bogus or untrue.

(3) The question, whether there is concealment of income
or whether inaccurate particulars thereof have been furnished, is
essentially a question of fact. To find out or to decide the same, all the
attending circumstances have to be taken into account. The question is at
what point of time this material fact is to be found out. Generally, it is
with reference to the return of income and at that time it is to be seen
whether there was concealment of income or furnishing of inaccurate
particulars thereof in the return of income chargeable to tax. By the time
the Assessing Officer takes up the issue and comes across the information in
his possession, if the assessee makes up the deficiency and offers the
income or furnishes accurate particulars thereof, he cannot be held guilty
of concealment of income or furnishing of inaccurate particular of his
income. Any action rectified relates back to the original act and to the
date and time of filing the return. When the Assessing Officer started
scrutiny of the return and initiated assessment proceedings there was
nothing concealed and the inaccuracy, if any, disappeared. Therefore, the
assessee could not be held guilty of concealment.

(4) The correct and accurate disclosure may be made by
filing the revised return or by furnishing the particulars of such income
before the detection by the Assessing Officer. The mere fact that the
assessee had not revised his returns or that the offer was made by letter to
avoid harassment to the assessee and the donors who were non-resident
persons, it could not convert an offer to tax as concealment of income.
Therefore, the assessee had not furnished inaccurate particulars of the
income in the returns before detection by the Revenue.

(5) Apart from the surrender, there was nothing more on
record to hold the assessee guilty of offering the said amount on detection
of the concealment. Even in the assessment order there was nothing of that
sort. On a perusal of the questionnaire, it was evident that it was general
in nature, without specifying the name of the donors or any other such
details. On the basis of the questionnaire, it could not be presumed that
the AO had information to call for specific information. There was neither
any detection nor any information in the possession of the Revenue nor in
the manner of its communication to the assessee, which might lead to a
detection of concealment.

(6) On the face of the evidence in the shape of
confirmation letters, bank accounts, passports, etc., in the hands of the
assessee, it might be valid gift that would have convinced a reasonably
minded person, specially a person exercising a judicial function. The
accepted position of law is that merely because an assessee had agreed to
the assessment, it cannot bring in automatic levy of penalty.

(7) Therefore, the CIT(A) was right in deleting the
penalty and his order was to be affirmed.

 

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S. 2(22)(e) — Deemed dividend can be assessed only in the hands of a person who is a registered shareholder of lender company.

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  1. (2009) 31 SOT 76 (Delhi)


Dy. CIT v. National Travel Services

A.Ys. : 2003-04 and 2004-05

Dated : 31-3-2009

S. 2(22)(e) — Deemed dividend can be assessed only in the
hands of a person who is a registered shareholder of lender company.

For the relevant assessment year, the Assessing Officer
invoked the provisions of S. 2(22)(e) in respect of a loan taken by the
assessee-firm from a company in which the assessee-firm was a shareholder
through its partners. The AO treated the loan of Rs.21.95 lacs given by the
company to the assessee-firm as deemed dividend. The CIT(A) held that since
the assessee-firm was not a registered shareholder, the loan could not be
treated as deemed dividend in the hands of the assessee-firm.

The Tribunal, relying on the Special Bench decision of the
Mumbai Tribunal in the case of ACIT v. Bhaumik Colour (P.) Ltd., (2009)
27 SOT 270 upheld the CIT(A)’s order. The Tribunal noted as under :

(1) The assessee-firm on whose behalf the partners had
become the shareholders in the company which had given the loan to it could
not be said to be a registered shareholder for the purpose of S. 2(22)(e).

(2) Since the assessee-firm was not a registered
shareholder of the company, the condition necessary to invoke S. 2(22)(e)
was not satisfied.

(3) The deemed dividend can be assessed only in the hands
of a person who is a registered shareholder of the lender company and not in
the hands of a person other than a registered shareholder.

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S. 50 r.w. S. 54EC — Since depreciation was never claimed by assessee on the building sold, S. 50 was not applicable.

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New Page 1



29. (2009) 31 SOT 38 (Mum.)


Dr. (Mrs.) Sudha S. Trivedi v. ITO

A.Y. : 2002-03. Dated : 20-2-2009

S. 50 r.w. S. 54EC — Since depreciation was never claimed
by assessee on the building sold, S. 50 was not applicable.

For the relevant assessment year, the assessee claimed
exemption u/s.54EC in respect of capital gains arising to her from sale of her
business premises on which she had not claimed any depreciation in the past.
The Assessing Officer held that even if no depreciation was allowed to the
assessee in the earlier years, the mandate of Explanation 5 to S. 32(1) would
be attracted since the building sold by the assessee was falling within the
‘block of asset’ and the resultant capital gain would be covered u/s.50 being
taxable as short-term capital gain. The Assessing Officer, therefore, denied
the exemption u/s.54EC and computed the short-term capital gain. The CIT(A)
upheld the order of the Assessee Officer.

The Tribunal, relying on the decision in the case of CIT
v. Ace Builders (P.) Ltd.,
(2006) 281 ITR 210/ (2005) 144 Taxman 855, held
that the assessee was eligible for exemption u/s.54EC. The Tribunal noted as
under :

2. In order to be covered within the provisions of S. 50,
the following two conditions should be simultaneously fulfilled :

à the capital asset transferred should be an asset
forming part of the ‘block of assets’; and

à the capital asset is such in respect of which
depreciation has been allowed under this Act.

3. Explanation 5 to S. 32(1) was inserted by the Finance
Act 2001 w.e.f. 1-4-2002. It is, therefore, clear that from the A.Y. 2002-03
the deduction in respect of depreciation shall be granted automatically,
notwithstanding the fact that the assessee has not claimed this deduction.

4. Therefore, from the A.Y. 2002-03, Explanation 5 to S.
32(1) would apply only if the assessee has not claimed depreciation. If,
however, the asset has been sold in the previous year, relevant to the A.Y.
2003-03 and there is no other asset in that block, then there cannot be any
question of allowing depreciation on the asset sold and, as such, the
application of Explanation 5 would be ruled out.

5. Since the assessee had not claimed depreciation on the
building in any of the earlier years, the denial of exemption u/s.54EC on the
ground that Explanation 5 to S. 32(1) would apply was out of place. Further,
since the second condition of S. 50, being ‘in respect of which depreciation
has been allowed under this Act’, was wanting in the instant case, the
provisions of S. 50 treating the capital gains arising from the transfer of
such capital asset as short-term capital gain would not be applicable.



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S. 28(i) read with S. 56 of the Income-tax Act — Whether the amount received by licensed bookmaker from hedge bets placed with another bookmaker was integral part of his business activity as a bookmaker and was not liable to be taxed u/s.115BB — Held, Yes

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23 (2008) 114 ITD 638 (Pune)


ACIT v. Raghunath B. Taware

A.Ys. : 1991-92, 1992-93, 1994-95

Dated : 31-5-2007

S. 28(i) read with S. 56 of the Income-tax Act — Assessee was
a licensed bookmaker who ran a business of booking races — Besides, he also used
to bet on horse races to minimise his probable losses —Whether the amount so
received by the assessee from hedge bets placed with another bookmaker had close
nexus or link with total amount received or paid for bets accepted by him on a
particular horse, and hence, same was integral part of his business activity as
a bookmaker and was not liable to be taxed u/s.115BB — Held, Yes.

 

Facts :

The assessee was a licensed bookmaker operating at the Pune
race course, under the terms and conditions for a bookmaker’s licence formulated
by Royal Western India Turf Club (RWITC). The assessee used to accept bets for
‘win’ or ‘place’ from the punters on the horse races as per the guidelines
formulated by RWITC. To minimise losses, a bookmaker, under the club rules, is
permitted to make a hedge bet with another bookmaker, subject to the condition
that total amount of such hedge bet laid over by one bookmaker should not exceed
the total amount of the bets accepted by him on a particular horse, at the time
of such lay-over. In case, the amount of laid-over bet exceeds the total amount
of bets accepted, then the last laid-over bet will be treated as independent
bet. Winnings from such hedge bets was called ‘Tote Winnings’.

 

During the relevant assessment years, the assessee had earned
income from tote winnings. The AO was of the view that such income was taxable
under the head ‘Income from Other Sources’ u/s.56(2)(ib), and not as business
income.

 

On appeal, the CIT(A) held that hedge betting was a part of
the business transactions in respect of business of bookmaking, inasmuch as
hedging was permitted, and such tote winnings was to be brought to tax as
business income.

 

On Revenue’s appeal, the Tribunal held as under :

1. The bookmaker is allowed to make hedge bet with another
bookmaker to the extent of total amount of bets collected by him on horsewise
basis and not with reference to aggregate total amount of bets collected by him
on all the horses. Thus, hedge betting by one bookmaker with another in respect
of the bets already accepted by him on a particular horse is an integral part of
the activity of a bookmaker accepting bets on horse races from others. The
position of the assessee-bookmaker is distinct and different from that of a
punter, and he cannot be deemed to have stepped in the shoes of the punter while
making a hedge bet.

2. Taking reference to CBDT Circular No. 461, dated 9-7-1986,
the Tribunal observed that where there is an integral relation of any payment as
to the very source of activity, the same should be treated as a part of the same
primary transaction or activity, and cannot be viewed independently so as to
divorce the same from its source. Thus, as is in the case of gross winnings from
lotteries and certain percentage deducted therefrom by the Government or lottery
agencies conducting the lottery, hedge betting by a bookmaker will also be
considered to be an integral part of the same activity.

3. The receipts from hedge betting cannot be considered in
isolation from the receipts and payments made by the assessee as a bookmaker on
bets accepted by him, so as to permit the revenue authority to tax the same
independently, at the rates specified u/s.115BB. Therefore, the same were
chargeable to tax as business income, and not income from other sources.

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S. 43B — Business disallowance — Certain deductions to be made only on actual payment — A service provider acts as an agent of the Government and is not entitled to claim deduction on account of service tax — S. 43B not applicable to service tax

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New Page 1

22 114 ITD 573 (Mad.)


ACIT v. Real Image Media Technologies (P.) Ltd.

A.Y. : 2002-03. Dated : 31-12-2007

 

S. 43B of Income-tax Act — Business disallowance — Certain
deductions to be made only on actual payment — A service provider acts as an
agent of the Government and is not entitled to claim deduction on account of
service tax. — For applicability of S. 43B, claim should be first preferred by
assessee, and the same should be disallowed for reason of failure to make
payment — in the instant case, assessee had not even preferred a claim towards
service tax — Whether on this account alone, addition u/s.43B could not have
been made, and CIT(A) had correctly deleted addition so made — Held, Yes.

 

Facts :

The assessee company was engaged in the business of running a
recording and dubbing studio, production of advertisement films, software
development, etc. During the assessment proceedings, the AO noticed that service
tax was not being routed through the Profit & Loss Account, and the assessee had
shown a liability towards service tax of Rs. 5,72,374 as on 31-3-2002 in its
balance sheet. The AO made additions to the assessee’s income contending that
the service tax had been collected, but had not been paid to the Government.

 

In its appeal before the CIT, the assessee made two-fold
submission, stating that for the applicability of S. 43B, claim should be
preferred by the assessee, and disallowance could be made only on account of
failure to make actual payment, and secondly with reference to Rule 6 of Service
Tax Rules, service tax is required to be paid only on the value of taxable
service received in a month or quarter and not on the gross amount charged or
billed. The CIT(A) having found force in the assessee’s submissions deleted the
addition.

 

On Revenue’s appeal before the Tribunal, it was held as under
:

1. S. 43B starts with the non-obstante clause and specifies
that the deduction ‘otherwise allowable’ under the Act shall not be allowed
unless it is actually paid. The rigour of S. 43B might be applicable to excise
or sales tax, but the same could not be applicable in the case of service tax
due to two reasons :

(i) The assessee merely acts as an agent of the
Government in collection of service tax, and is not entitled to claim
deduction on account of service tax.

(ii) S. 43B(c) uses the expression ‘any sum payable’. For
making any disallowance, it has to be established that such sum is payable.
A reading of Rule 6 of the Service Tax Rules states that the liability to
pay such service tax arises on receipt of payments towards the value of
taxable service. If there is no liability to make the payment to the
Government, because of non-receipt of payments from the receiver of
services, then it cannot be said that such service tax had become payable in
terms of S. 43B(a).

2. S. 145A includes sales tax, excise duty, etc. in the
turnover of purchases and sales of goods, but it does not apply to services
and hence service tax cannot be included in the turnover.

3. In the given case, the assessee had not preferred a
claim for the amount of service tax. Further, there was no liability on the
assessee to make payments to the credit of Central Government because of
non-receipt of payments from the receiver of services. Therefore, the rigour
of S. 43B is not attracted and the CIT(A) was right in deleting the additions
made on account of disallowance u/s.43B.

 

Case referred to :

(i) Srikaollu Subbarao & Co. v. Union of India,
(1988) 173 ITR 708 (AP)

 


Case distinguished :



(i) Chowranghee Sales Bureau Ltd. v. CIT, (1977) 110
ITR 385 (Cal.)

 

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S. 45 — Conversion of shares into stock-in-trade valid u/s.45(2) even if assessee not carrying on the business of shares and securities before such conversion

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20 (2008) 23 SOT 512 (Mum.)


ACIT v. Jehangir T. Nagree

ITA No. 7503 (Mum.) of 2004 and

3927 (Mum.) of 2005

A.Y. : 2001-02. Dated : 10-4-2008

S. 45 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Conversion of shares into
stock-in-trade would be valid u/s.45(2) even if the assessee was not carrying on
the business of shares and securities before such conversion.

 

On 1-4-2000 the assessee, a manufacturer and seller of
furniture, having short-term capital loss in earlier years, converted his
investment in shares brought forward from A.Y. 2000-01 into stock-in-trade.

 

Besides trading in shares and securities which were
converted, the assessee had made further purchases of shares and securities and
during the accounting year he had engaged himself in speculation of shares of
very high volume. The assessee incurred loss in share transaction activity and
also in speculation of shares and claimed deduction of the same as business
loss. The Assessing Officer rejected the assessee’s claim, holding that the
provision of S. 45(2) contained the words ‘of business carried by him’ and since
as on date of conversion the assessee had no business of share transaction, the
said conversion was not valid. The Assessing Officer, accordingly, held that by
this arrangement, the assessee had gained immensely by setting off income in
various other heads against the business loss, which benefit would not have been
available had this loss been treated as a short-term capital loss and disallowed
the assessee’s claim.

 

The CIT(A) held that the conversion made by the assessee was
valid and not a device, especially in view of the fact that the assessee had
done large volume of transactions during the year in speculation account and had
also made fresh purchases of shares for share business.

 

The Tribunal held that the assessee was entitled to benefit
u/s.45(2). The Tribunal noted as under :

(1) Having seen the volume of transactions undertaken by
the assessee in the impugned assessment year, it was very difficult to hold
that the assessee still held the investment in shares and securities. It was
the sweet will of the assessee to decide as to when he intended to convert his
investment in stock-in-trade.

(2) In S. 45(2), the words ‘business carried on by him’ do
not mean that before conversion of investment or capital assets into
stock-in-trade the assessee must carry on business of share transaction or
such a business must be in existence.

(3) The restrictive meaning as suggested by the Revenue
should not be given to the words ‘business carried on by him’ in the light of
the use of the words in other Sections like S. 28(i).

(4) The assessee could undertake multiple business
activities under his proprietary concern. Besides the manufacturing and sale
of furniture, the assessee could also deal in trading in shares in the name of
same proprietary concern keeping the stock-in-trade of shares separate.

(5) Thus, conversion of investment in shares and securities
into stock-in-trade would be valid u/s.45(2) even if business of trading of
shares is not carried on by the assessee before such conversion.

 


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S. 80IB — Production of masala varieties, is manufacture of goods

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13 ACIT v. Empire Spices & Foods Mumbai Ltd.


ITAT ‘G’ Bench, Mumbai

Before Sunil Kumar Yadav (JM) and

Rajendra Singh (AM)

ITA No. 4477/M/06

A.Y. : 2003-04. Decided on : 18-9-2008

Counsel for revenue/assessee : D. Songate/

B. V. Jhaveri

S. 80IB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘the Act’) — Whether
business of the assessee, which is producing masala of different varieties, is
manufacture of goods or is only processing of goods — Held, it is manufacture of
goods.

Per Rajendra Singh :

Facts :

The assessee, engaged in business of masala, claimed for the
relevant assessment year, deduction u/s.80IB of the Act by treating the business
as industrial undertaking for manufacture and sale of masala. The Assessing
Officer (AO) noted that the assessee was only purchasing raw material in the
form of different spices which were grinded and mixed and filled in pouches and
then sold. The AO placed reliance on the judgments of the Supreme Court
(sic-Calcutta High Court) in the case of Apeejay Plantation and also in the case
of Indian Hotels and on the judgment of Madras High Court in the case of Sacs
Eagles Chicory and held that the activity of the assessee amounts to processing
and not manufacture and accordingly he disallowed the claim of deduction
u/s.80IB. Before the CIT(A) it was contended by the assessee that it was
manufacturing various types of masala, such as chivda masala, pickle masala,
etc. which involved different formulas and process; the raw material i.e., raw
spices underwent changes and the final product was masala which was sold in the
market as a distinct and different commercial product; each type of masala was
different in taste and uses; the manufacturing process involved various
activities such as cleaning of various raw spices, roasting, frying, polishing,
mixing, boiling, pulping, grinding, etc. which are done with the help of
machinery. Reliance was placed by the assessee on the judgment of the Supreme
Court in the case of Aspinwall & Co. Reference was also made to the decision of
the Mumbai Tribunal in the cases of Pankaj Jain and Comet Foods & Metals Ltd.
The CIT(A) being satisfied with the explanation, held that the end product in
this case was completely different from the raw material and therefore the
activity carried on by the assessee was manufacture and not processing. He also
observed that the Department had allowed the
claim of manufacture in earlier years. Accordingly, he allowed the claim for
deduction u/s.80IB treating the business as manufacture of masala. Aggrieved,
the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

It is settled legal position that producing articles whether
by any labour or by machine will amount to manufacture if the final product is
different from the input and is known as a commercially different product in the
business parlance. The assessee is producing different variety of masala, such
as chiwda masala, pickle masala, etc. which are commercially known products in
the market and these products are different from the different spices used in
the process. In case of the assessee, different raw spices which are inputs are
combined in different proportions and undergo different processes to produce the
final product which is masala and which is different from the input raw
material. The assessee is producing different types of masala using different
formula with the help of input spices and these products are commercially known
products, such as garam masala, mutton masala, pav bhaji masala and have
different uses. The Tribunal noted that the judgment of the Supreme Court in
Aspinwall & Co. supports the case of the assessee and that the decision of the
Tribunal in the case of Tirupathi Microtech Pvt. Ltd. is in favour of the
assessee. The judgments relied upon by the AO viz. Appejay Plantation, Indian
Hotels and Sacs Eagles Chicory were found to be distinguishable. Accordingly,
the Tribunal held that the assessee is a manufacturing concern entitled to
deduction u/s.80IB.

Cases referred to :



1. Indian Hotels Co. Ltd. & Ors. v. Income Tax Officer &
Ors., (245 ITR 538) (SC)

2. Aspinwall and Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax,
(251 ITR 323) (SC)

3. Apeejay Plantation (206 ITR 367) (Cal.)

4. Commissioner of Income-tax v. Sacs Eagles Chicory, (241
ITR 319) (Mad.)

5. Comet Foods & Metals Ltd. v. ITO, (95 TTJ 440) (Mum.)

6. Pankaj Jain v. ITO, (97 TTJ 28) (Asr.)

7. ACIT v. Tirupathi Microtech Pvt. Ltd., (111 TTJ 149) (Jodh.)

8. ACIT v. Panachayil Industries, (7 SOT 96) (Coch.)




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S. 80IB(10) — Deduction of profits of of housing project — Date of completion relevant — Not the date of completion certificate but the date of completion mentioned in the certificate.

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Part B :
UNREPORTED DECISIONS

(Full texts of the following Tribunal decisions are available at
the Society’s office on written request. For members desiring that the Society
mails a copy to them, Rs.30 per decision will be charged for photocopying and
postage.)

12 D. K. Construction v. ITO

ITAT Indore Bench, Indore

Before Joginder Singh (JM)
and

R. C. Sharma (AM)

ITA No. 243/Ind./2010

A.Y. : 2006-07. Decided on :
6-12-2010

Counsel for assessee/revenue
:

M. K. Sharma/P. K. Mitra

 

S. 80IB(10) of the
Income-tax Act, 1961 — Deduction in respect of profits and gains arising from
development of housing project — Date of completion of the housing project —
Relevant date is not the date of issuance of the completion certificate by the
local authority but the date of completion as mentioned in the certificate.

Per R. C. Sharma :

Facts :

The assessee was engaged in
the business of civil construction, building and developing housing project. It
claimed deduction of Rs.36.63 lacs u/s. 80IB(10) of the Act. According to the
AO, the housing project was not completed prior to the prescribed date of
31-3-2008. The contention of the assessee was that it had completed the project
before the prescribed date and the local authority was duly informed of the fact
vide its letter dated 21-3-2008. According to the assessee, merely because the
completion certificate was not issued by the local authority, over which the
assessee had no control, the same could not be made a basis for denial of claim.
However, according to the AO, the availability of the completion certificate
before the date prescribed was a must for the allowance of deduction
u/s.80IB(10). Therefore, he rejected the assessee’s claim for deduction. On
appeal, the CIT(A) confirmed the disallowance.

Held :

According to the Tribunal,
what is crucial is not the date of issue of letter by the local authority, but
the date mentioned in the letter certifying completion of the project.
Therefore, it rejected the contention of the Revenue to the effect that the date
of completion shall be taken as the date on which the certificate is physically
issued by the local authority.

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Section 50C – Transfer of tenancy right – Held such transaction not covered under the provisions of section 50C.

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Tribunal News

Part B — Unreported Decisions

(Full texts of the following Tribunal decisions are available
at the Society’s office on written request. For members desiring that the
Society mails a copy to them, Rs.30 per decision will be charged for
photocopying and postage.)



23 Kishori Sharad Gaitonde vs. ITO

ITAT Mumbai Bench ‘SMC’, Mumbai

Before A. L. Gehlot (A. M.)

ITA No. 1561 / M / 09

A.Y. 2005-06. Decided on 27.11.2009

Counsel for Assessee / Revenue: L. K. Doshi / S. K. Madhukar

Section 50C – Transfer of tenancy right – Held such
transaction not covered under the provisions of section 50C.


Facts:

During the year, the assessee had sold a tenancy right for Rs.
30 lakhs. In her return of income, the assessee had computed the long term
capital gain based on the said consideration. However, the AO observed that for
the purpose of stamp duty, the Sub-Registrar had adopted the market value of Rs.
33.11 lakhs. Therefore, applying the provisions of section 50C, he computed the
capital gain based on the market value of Rs. 33.11 lakhs.

One of the issues raised before the tribunal was whether the
provisions of section 50C were applicable to a tenancy right.

Held:

The tribunal noted that by virtue of section 50C, a legal
fiction had been created for assuming the value adopted or assessed by any
authority of the State Government as the full value of sale consideration
received in respect of transfer of land or building. Relying on the decisions of
the Supreme Court in the case of Amar Chand Shroff and in the case of Mother
India Refrigeration Industries Pvt. Ltd., the tribunal observed that the legal
fiction cannot be extended beyond the purpose for which it was enacted.
Accordingly, it noted that as per the plain reading of the provisions of section
50C, it applies only to those items of capital assets which are either land or
building or both. Since in the case of the assessee, the capital assets
transferred was tenancy right, it held that the provisions of section 50C were
not applicable.

Cases referred to:



1. CIT vs. Amar Chand Shroff 48 ITR 59 (S.C.);

2. CIT vs. Mother India Refrigeration Industries Pvt. Ltd.
155 ITR 711 (S.C.)


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S. 271(1)(c) — Whether penalty can be levied in case where rental income is assessed under head ‘Income from House Property’ as against ‘Income from Business’ — Held, No.

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New Page 1

Part B — Unreported Decisions

(Full texts of the following Tribunal decisions are available
at the Society’s office on written request. For members desiring that the
Society mails a copy to them, Rs.30 per decision will be charged for
photocopying and postage.)





27 ACIT 8(3) v. Vazir Glass
Works Ltd.


ITAT ‘F’ Bench, Mumbai

Before S. V. Mehrotra (AM) and

V. D. Rao (JM)

ITA No. 332/Mum./2007

A.Y. : 2001-02. Decided on : 24-11-2008

Counsel for revenue/assessee : J. V. D. Langstein/ B. V.
Jhaveri

S. 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Whether penalty
can be levied in a case where rental income is assessed under the head ‘Income
from House Property’ as against ‘Income from Business’ as returned by the
assessee – Held, No.

 



Per S. V. Mehrotra :

Facts :


The assessee-company was engaged in the business of glass
vials and bottles. One of the issues before the Tribunal was whether the AO was
justified in levying a penalty u/s.271(1)(c) in respect of the assessment of
rental income under the head ‘Income from House Property’ as against the
assessee’s claim of it being chargeable under the head ‘Income from Business’.

Held :

The Tribunal found that out of the gross receipt of Rs.23.14
lacs, the sum of Rs.11.14 lacs received by the assessee was by way of
reimbursement of expenses incurred towards electricity and telephone. And the
balance sum of Rs.12 lacs was credited by the assessee to miscellaneous receipts
account and shown accordingly in the Profit and Loss Account. According to the
Tribunal this was a case of honest difference of opinion between the assessee
and the Department on whether rental income was assessable as ‘Income from House
Property’ or as ‘Business Income’. The Tribunal also observed that it was not
the case of the AO that the expenses incurred were not genuine. Thus, the
explanation of the assessee that the income was assessable as income from
business was found bona fide one. Therefore, the Tribunal held that this
case cannot be said to be a case of furnishing inaccurate particulars of income.
According to the Tribunal the assessee had not concealed any facts from the
Department and, therefore, no penalty can be levied u/s. 271(1)(c).

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S. 145 — Method of accounting — Assessee has more sources of income under head ‘Business income’ — Whether assessee can follow different method of accounting for each source — Held, Yes.

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New Page 1

Part B — Unreported Decisions

(Full texts of the following Tribunal decisions are available
at the Society’s office on written request. For members desiring that the
Society mails a copy to them, Rs.30 per decision will be charged for
photocopying and postage.)





26 ACIT v. Mehul J. Somaiya


ITAT ‘B’ Bench, Mumbai

Before N. V. Vasudevan (JM) and

Karunakara Rao (AM)

ITA No. 7118/Mum./2006

A.Y. : 2002-03. Decided on : 10-12-2008

Counsel for revenue/assessee : G. Gurusamy/

C. N. Vaze

S. 145 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Method of accounting —
Assessee having more than one source of income under the head ‘Business income’
— Whether the assessee has the option to follow different method of accounting
in respect of each of the different sources of income under the head — Held,
Yes.

 

Per N. V. Vasudevan :

Facts :

During the year the assessee had returned income under the
head salary, business and income from other sources. In respect of income under
the head business, he had three different sources of income viz., (i)
Remuneration from partnership firm where he was a partner; (ii) income from
proprietary concern; and (iii) consultancy fee. In respect of the first two
sources of business income, the assessee was following mercantile system of
accounting, while in case of the latter, the assessee claimed that it was
following cash method of accounting. Accordingly, from the consultancy fee of
Rs.7.87 lacs receivable, he offered to tax the sum of Rs.41,344 i.e., the
sum equal to the tax deducted at source by the client and for which the TDS
certificate was received by him, for tax.

 

According to the AO, the assessee was not allowed to adopt
different methods of accounting for different sources of income falling under
the same head. Therefore, he brought to tax the entire consultancy fee of
Rs.7.87 lacs. On appeal, the CIT(A) allowed the appeal of the assessee.

 

Held :

The Tribunal noted that the object of the amendment of S. 145
made by the Finance Act, 1995 was only to do away with the mixed system of
accounting, by which certain transactions relating to a particular source
were recorded following one system and the other transactions following the
other system of accounting. According to the Tribunal, if there were more than
one sources of income falling under the same head of income, and the assessee
follows either cash or mercantile system of accounting for different sources
income, it cannot be said that the hybrid system of accounting for different
sources of income is being followed. According to it, so long as for a
particular source either cash or mercantile system was followed, there can be no
objection. Thus, as noted by the CIT(A), since the assessee was consistently
following the cash system of accounting for his consultancy income, it accepted
the submission of the assessee and dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue.

 

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Sale of depreciable assets — Sale of two units — Consideration for both units based on individual value of land, building, plant and machinery –– Whether sale of two units covered by S. 50 and not by S. 50B — Held, Yes.

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New Page 1

Part B — Unreported Decisions

(Full texts of the following Tribunal decisions are available
at the Society’s office on written request. For members desiring that the
Society mails a copy to them, Rs.30 per decision will be charged for
photocopying and postage.)


25 Accelerated Freeze Drying Co. Ltd.
v. DCIT


ITAT Cochin

Before N. Barathvaja Sankar (AM) and

N. Vijayakumaran (JM)

ITA No. 611/Coch/08

A.Y. : 2002-03. Decided on : 5-12-2008

Counsel for assessee/revenue : R. Sreenivasan/

V. M. Thyagarajan

S. 50 and S. 50B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Sale of
depreciable assets or slump sales — Sale of two manufacturing units along with
immovables and movables — Consideration for both the units was based on the
individual value of each of the lands, buildings and plant and machinery ––
Whether the sale of these two units was covered by S. 50 and not by S. 50B —
Held, Yes.

 

Per N. Vijayakumaran :

Facts :

The assessee is engaged in the business of processing frozen
foods. During the relevant assessment year, the assessee sold two of its units
for valuable considerations. Both the units were sold to two different buyers
and the consideration for both the units was arrived at based on the separate
valuations done for land, building and each of the items of plant and machinery.
The assessee regarded these transactions as sale of depreciable assets as per
provisions of S. 50 of the Act. The Assessing Officer by way of reassessment
u/s.148, brought these amounts to tax as slump sale within the meaning of S. 50B
of the Act. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who upheld
the action of the AO. Aggrieved by the order of the CIT(A), the assessee
preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

 

Held :

The Tribunal observed that there is ample evidence which
shows that there is bifurcation of sale profits, splitting up of the value
between movable and immovable assets and the assets are depreciable assets. The
Tribunal held that this is a case where S. 50 is squarely applicable. It is not
the aggregate value taken as the net worth for the purpose of application of
slump sale provision as u/s.50B. The Tribunal found the decision of the Cochin
Tribunal in the case of International Creative Foods P. Ltd. to be squarely
applicable to the facts of the case. Accordingly, the Tribunal set aside the
order of the authorities below and following the decision of the Cochin Tribunal
in the case of International Creative Foods P. Ltd. allowed the claim of the
assessee.

 

Cases referred to :


ACIT v. International Creative Foods P. Ltd., ITA Nos.
227/Coch./2006 and 447/Coch./2007, dated 10-9-2008.

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Miscellaneous

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Part D : Miscellaneous


5 The Employees’ Provident Fund
Organisation has launched a facility for online verification of status of the
claim under the EPF. The facility can be availed at http://epfindia.nic.in/indiaepf%5Cloginnew.aspx
the user needs to select his State, the EPF office, Establishment Code,
Extension code, if any and then enter the employee number to ascertain the claim
status.

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The Cost Inflation Index has been notified for the financial year 2008-09 as 582 — Notification No. 86/2008 [f. no. 142/8/2008-tpl], dated 13-8-2008.

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4 The Cost Inflation Index has been notified
for the financial year 2008-09 as 582 — Notification No. 86/2008 [f. no.
142/8/2008-tpl], dated 13-8-2008.

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Income earned in foreign countries to be included in the total income of the Resident in India — Notification No. 90/2008 and 91/2008, dated 28-8-2008.

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3 Income earned in foreign countries to be
included in the total income of the Resident in India — Notification No. 90/2008
and 91/2008, dated 28-8-2008.


The CBDT has notified that when the income earned by a
Resident Indian outside India, is taxed outside India as per the provisions of
Double Taxation Avoidance Agreements, such foreign income needs to be included
in the total income of the Resident in their return of income in India. Also,
relief would be granted as per the elimination of double taxation avoidance
provisions provided in the respective Agreements applicable to the assessee.
This provision equally applies to Indian associations as specified in S. 90A of
the Act also.

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S. 14A — Disallowance of expenditure incurred to earn exempt income — Where no nexus between expenditure & income, expenditure not disallowed.

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12 Indo German International Pvt. Ltd. v. DCIT


ITAT ‘C’ Bench, New Delhi

Before I. P. Bansal (JM) and Deepak R. Shah (AM)

ITA Nos. 4971/Del./2007

A.Y. : 2004-05. Decided on : 9-5-2008

Counsel for assessee/revenue : Ramo Jain/

M. P. Singh

S. 14A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Disallowance of
expenditure incurred to earn exempt income — Where no nexus is established
between the expenditure and the income earned, can the expenditure be disallowed
— Held, No.

Per Deepak R. Shah :

Facts :

The assessee was engaged in the business of export and import
of iron, steel and allied products and as commission agent. During the year it
earned dividend income of Rs.78.05 lacs which was claimed as exempt u/s.10(33).
According to the AO, the provisions of S. 14A were applicable and as the
assessee had not furnished any evidence to establish that no expenses had been
incurred in earning the dividend income, it was held that 5% of dividend income
was incurred for earning dividend income.

The CIT(A) on appeal held that the AO had rightly applied the
provisions of S. 14A, as incurring of expenditure had to be inferred from the
accounts. According to it, if no expenses were debited against the exempt
income, the AO was justified in estimating the same.

Before the Tribunal, the Revenue relied on the Mumbai Bench
Tribunal decision in the case of Citicorp Finance (India) Ltd. and contended
that the orders of the lower authorities be upheld.

Held :

According to the Tribunal, the pre-requisite for disallowance
u/s.14A is that the expenditure should have been incurred in relation to exempt
income. In the given case, the assessee had all along claimed that it had not
incurred any expenditure. It further noted that the AO had not been able to
correlate any expenditure, which could be said to have been incurred for earning
exempt income. According to it, the decision in the case of Citicorp Finance
(India) Ltd. relied on by the Revenue was based on the provisions in Ss.(2) and
(3) which were inserted by the Finance Act, 2006 w.e.f. 1-4-2007. According to
it, the insertion of the said provisions was not retrospective in nature. Hence,
the ratio as laid down in the said Tribunal decision cannot be applied to the
case of the assessee. Further, relying on the decision of the Delhi Tribunal in
the case of Wimco Seedling Ltd., the Tribunal allowed the appeal of the assessee.

Cases referred to :



1. ACIT v. Citicorp Finance (India) Ltd., 12 SOT 248 (Mum.)

2. Wimco Seedling Ltd. v. DCIT, 107 TTJ 267 (Del)


Note :

Attention of the readers is drawn to the insertion of Ss.(2)
and (3) to S. 14A by the Finance Act, 2006 w.e.f. 1-4-2007 and the Rule 8D which
prescribes the method in which expenditure incurred to earn exempt income could
be determined.

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Form Saral II notified for assessees having income from salary, income from house property (except those having brought forward loss or more than one property) and income from other sources (except those having income from lottery winnings or race horses)

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Part A : Direct Taxes

36 Form Saral II notified for assessees having income from
salary, income from house property (except those having brought forward loss or
more than one property) and income from other sources (except those having
income from lottery winnings or race horses) — Notification No. 34/2010, dated
19-5-2010.

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S. 79 and S. 115JB — In computing book profit u/s.115JB, lower of brought forward loss or unabsorbed depreciation to be reduced, irrespective of whether allowable u/s.79

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10 (2008) 117 TTJ 891 (Ahd.)

Fascel Ltd. v. ITO

ITA No. 1195 (Ahd.) of 2007

A.Y. : 2003-04. Dated : 17-8-2007

S. 79 and S. 115JB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — In arriving
at the book profit u/s.115JB, the lower of the amount of brought forward loss or
unabsorbed depreciation as appearing in the books of account of the assessee has
to be reduced, irrespective of the fact whether the same is allowable u/s.79 or
not.

 


While computing the book profit u/s.115JB for A.Y. 2003-04,
the Assessing Officer held that since there was a substantial change in
shareholding in A.Y. 2000-01, the provisions of S. 79 were attracted. Therefore,
the brought forward loss/depreciation up to A.Y. 2000-01 is not to be carried
forward for computing the business income as well as for the purposes of S.
115JB. The Assessing Officer also held that there is no direct case law on the
subject, but logic demands that prohibition u/s.79 shall apply both to normal
computation u/s.28 to u/s.43C as well as u/s.115JB. The CIT(A) upheld the
Assessing Officer’s order.


 

The Tribunal held in favour of the assessee. The Tribunal
noted as under :

(a) Clause (iii) of the Explanation to S. 115JB(2)
specifically provides that the amount of loss brought forward or unabsorbed
depreciation as per the books of account is to be reduced from the book profit
and it is lower of the two amounts that is to be reduced. It is the amount
which is as per the books of accounts that is to be reduced and not as per the
income-tax records which has been computed under the provisions of the Act.


(b) The admissibility of loss as per other provisions of
the Act has nothing to do with the computation of book profit and that is made
clear by the provisions of clause (iii) of the Explanation. If it is appearing
in the books of accounts and not set off in the subsequent year’s profit, the
effect is to be given in the impugned year of profit while computing the book
profit of the assessee.




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S. 67A — Share of loss of company in AOP could be set-off against other income.

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9 (2008) 117 TTJ 721 (Mum.) (TM)

Mahindra Holdings & Finance Ltd. v. ITO

ITA Nos. 5319 & 6074 (Mum.) of 2004

A.Ys. : 2000-01 and 2001-02. Dated : 23-6-2008

S. 67A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Share of loss of company
in an AOP could be set off against other income of the company.

For the relevant year, the assessee-company, which was a
member of an AOP, set off its share of loss from the AOP against its other
income. The claim of the assessee was rejected by the Assessing Officer on the
following grounds :



  • that S. 67A is not applicable in the assessee’s case.

  •  the provisions of S. 67A can only be applied in those cases where a member of
    an AOP or a BOI is not a company or a co-operative society or a society
    registered under the Societies Registration Act.



  • since the assessee is a company, its total income cannot be computed as per
    provisions of S. 67A and as such, the loss booked by the assessee cannot be
    allowed to be set off against the other income of the assessee.


The CIT(A) also disallowed the assessee’s claim.

Since there was a difference of opinion between the members,
the matter was referred to the Third Member u/s.255(4).

The Third Member, relying on the decision in the case of
CIT v. Salem District Urban Bank Ltd.,
(1940) 8 ITR 269 (Mad.), held in
favour of the assessee. The Third Member noted as under :

(a) The purpose of S. 67A is to compute the share of
income/loss in the AOP/BOI. If all the provisions are read together, the
entities specified in the parenthesis in S. 67A would qualify the AOP/BOI and
not the member of such AOP/BOI.


(b) Reference to S. 2(17) indicates that the expression
‘AOP’ includes a company or a cooperative society or a society mentioned in
parenthesis in S. 67A.


(c) The purpose of S. 67A is to determine the share of
income/loss in the profits/losses of the AOP since share is to be included in
the income of the member of AOP for rate purpose as per the provisions of S.
86. However, in the case of a company, cooperative society or society, the
income is not apportioned amongst the members constituting these entities.
Such entities may have income, but may not declare dividend and thus nothing
would be includible in the income of the members of such entities. On the
other hand, these entities may not have income, still they may declare
dividend out of their accumulated profits. Therefore, despite there being no
income in the hands of such entities, the dividend declared by them would be
assessable as income in the hands of members. Therefore, considering the
different schemes of taxation in respect of income received by members from
such entities, the Legislature has excluded these entities from the ambit of
the expression ‘AOP/BOI’.


(d) Had the Legislature not excluded the entities specified
in the parenthesis, it would have resulted in double taxation — once as per
share determined u/s.67A read with S. 86, and again when dividend income is
distributed by such entities to its members.


(e) If the contention of the Revenue is accepted, then it
will lead to absurd result not intended by the Legislature and also will be
detrimental to the interest of the Revenue itself. If it is held that the
words in the parenthesis qualify the word ‘member’ and not the AOP/BOI, then
the company or a cooperative society or a society or other entities in the
parenthesis would not be liable to pay any tax in respect of their share of
income in the AOP/BOI as per the provisions of S. 86, even though such share
of income is includible in the total income. In such cases, the companies or
societies by themselves may not carry on any business and may form various
AOPs/BOIs and may get away by paying lesser rate of tax on such AOP/BOI, since
AOP/BOI (having members whose shares are determinate or known) would be
chargeable to normal rate of tax applicable to individuals. The interpretation
put forth by the Revenue would give birth to legal device for evading the tax
by the entities specified in the parenthesis. Such absurd result could never
have been intended by the Legislature.


(f) It is a well-settled rule of interpretation that
provisions of a statute should be interpreted in a manner which augments the
object behind the legislation and not in a manner which frustrates the object.




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S. 10BA — DEPB/DDB credit part of profits of business for S. 10BA(4) and will not enter into total or export turnover for calculating profits derived from business.

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8 (2008) 117 TTJ 672 (Jd.)


ITO v. Bothra International

ITA Nos. 607 & 608 (Jd.) of 2007

A.Ys. : 2004-05 and 2005-06. Dated : 27-6-2008

S. 10BA of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Amount of credit on
account of DEPB/Duty Drawback (DDB) has to be included as profits of the
business of the undertaking for the purpose of S. 10BA(4) and the said amount of
credit of DEPB or DDB will not enter into the total turnover or export turnover
of the undertaking for the purpose of calculating profits derived from the
business of the undertaking of the assessee within the meaning of Ss.(4).

 

For the relevant assessment year, the Assessing Officer
rejected the assessee’s claim for deduction of DEPB and DDB u/s.10BA. The
CIT(A), however, allowed the claim for deduction.

 

The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)’s order and allowed the
deduction u/s.10BA. In arriving at this decision the Tribunal relied upon the
decisions in the case of B. Desraj v. CIT, (2008) 7 DTR (SC) 54 and
Kerala State Co-op. Marketing Federation Ltd. & Ors. v. CIT,
(1998) 147 CTR
(SC) 29/231 ITR 814 (SC).

 

The Tribunal noted as under :

(a) By the use of expression ‘subject to’ in Ss.(1) of S.
10BA, it is clear that the provision contained U/ss.(4) shall override the
provisions of Ss.(1) of S. 10BA.

(b) Once the assessing authority has found the assessee
eligible for deduction u/s.10BA(1), then the only scope available to the
assessing authority was to find out the quantum of the deduction as per
prescription of Ss.(4) of S. 10BA and no other method or manner could be used,
as the answer is available from the scheme contained in the special provision
of S. 10BA itself, where allowability of deduction was by mandate subjected to
such provisions contained therein.

(c) When the profits are derived from manufacture and
export of eligible articles, the solitary business activity of the
undertaking, then the incentive such as DEPB/DDB irrespective of its real
character or source has to be taken into account and has to be included as
profits of the business of the undertaking, in particular when the expression
used in Ss.(4) of S. 10BA is the ‘profits of the business of undertaking’.

(d) The Legislature in its wisdom did not use the
expression ‘profit’ in singular, but used it as ‘profits’ in plural. Thus,
there can be profits not only by exporting the eligible articles or things,
but also can be those profits which are related to export of such articles or
things, which in the present case are DEPB and DDB determined with relation to
export sales effected by these assessees.


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S. 234D has no retrospective effect — Applicable only from A.Y. 2004-05.

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7 ITO v. Ekta Promoters (P) Ltd.

ITA Nos. 2551 to 2553 (Del.) of 2006

A.Ys. : 1998-99 to 2000-01. Dated : 11-7-2008

S. 234D of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 234D, inserted
w.e.f. 1-6-2003, being substantive in nature has no retrospective effect — It is
applicable only from A.Y. 2004-05 and cannot be charged for earlier assessment
years even though assessments are pending as on 1-6-2003.

 

A Special Bench was constituted to answer the following
question :

“Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case,
interest u/s.234D should be charged from A.Y. 2004-05 or with reference to
regular assessment framed after 1-6-2003, irrespective of the assessment years
involved or irrespective of the date when refund was granted ?”

 


The Special Bench, relying on the decisions in the following
cases, held that the provisions of S. 234D are substantive and they cannot be
retrospective :

(a) J. K. Synthetics Ltd. v. CTO, (1994) 119 CTR
(SC) 222

(b) Padmasundara Rao (Decd.) & Ors. v. State of Tamil
Nadu & Ors.,
(2002) 176 CTR (SC) 104; (2002) 255 ITR 147 (SC)

(c) Reliance Jute & Industries Ltd. v. CIT, (1979)
13 CTR (SC) 186; (1979) 120 ITR 921 (SC)


The Special Bench noted as under :

(a) The argument that Legislature has brought this
provision just to fill the lacuna in the law and, therefore, these provisions
should be construed retrospective cannot be accepted, more particularly when
these provisions have been inserted on the statute w.e.f. 1-6-2003 and not
with retrospective effect.

(b) The Legislature has specifically mentioned the date of
applicability i.e., 1-6-2003 and the Legislature was not incompetent to
make retrospective provision, if it was so intended.

(c) In a fiscal legislation, if a provision is brought for
imposing any liability, the normal presumption will be that it has no
retrospective operation and it is a cardinal principle of tax law that law to
be applied is the law which is in force in the assessment year, unless
otherwise provided expressly or by necessary implication.

(d) The provisions regarding levy and collection of
interest even if construed as forming part of the machinery provisions are
substantive law for the simple reason that in the absence of contract or
usage, interest can be levied under law and it cannot be recovered by way of
damages for wrongful detention of amount.

(e) Thus, the contention of the Revenue that the provision
of S. 234D being under Chapter XVII under the head ‘Collection and recovery’
should be construed to be a procedural or machinery section and, therefore,
should be applied retrospectively has to be rejected.

(f) If the provisions of S. 234D are substantive, then the
same cannot be held to be retrospective, unless specifically provided in the
statute itself.

(g) While applying Heydon’s Rule, (mischief rule of
purposive construction) a word of caution is necessary that text of statute is
not to be sacrificed and the Court cannot rewrite the statute on the
assumption that whatever furthers the purpose of the Act must have been
sanctioned and, therefore, the Court cannot add to the means enacted by the
Legislature for achieving the object of the Act. Moreover, the application of
Heydon’s Rule itself does not confirm retrospective operation of a provision
brought under that rule. This is irrespective of the fact that for application
of that rule it is a condition precedent to find out that there existed a
mischief. Mere fact that earlier there was no provision to charge interest on
the refund issued on processing of return cannot by itself be described as
‘mischief’ or ‘defect’.



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S. 120, S. 124(3) and S. 148 — Reassessment initiated by AO not having jurisdiction, completed by AO having jurisdiction — Reassessment invalid.

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New Page 2

6 (2008) 117 TTJ 42 (Lucknow)


M. I. Builders (P.) Ltd. v. ITO

ITA No. 111 (Lucknow) of 2006

A.Y.  : 1997-98. Dated : 7-9-2007

S. 120, S. 124(3) and S. 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 —
Reassessment proceedings initiated by AO not having jurisdiction — Reassessment
completed in continuation of such initiation by AO having jurisdiction —
Reassessment was invalid.

For the relevant assessment year, notice u/s.148(1) was
issued by an Assessing Officer having no jurisdiction over the assessee. On
protest by the assessee within one month of such notice, the case was
transferred to the Assessing Officer having jurisdiction over the assessee and
this Assessing Officer finally passed the reassessment order. The assessee
contended before the CIT(A), inter alia, that the notice u/s.148(1) was
devoid of proper jurisdiction and, therefore, void ab initio.

The CIT(A), however, upheld the reassessment order.

The Tribunal, relying on the decisions in the following
cases, held that the reassessment was invalid :

(a) Lt. Col. Paramjit Singh v. CIT, (1996) 135 CTR
(P&H) 8; (1996) 220 ITR 446 (P&H)

(b) Naginimara Veneer & Saw Mills (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT,
(1996) 136 CTR (Gau.) 134; (1996) 219 ITR 527 (Gau.)

(c) Anant Mills Ltd. (In Liquidation) v. CIT, (1993)
109 CTR (Guj.) 231; (1994) 206 ITR 582 (Guj.)

(d) P. A. Ahammed v. Chief CIT, (2006) 200 CTR
(Ker.) 378; (2006) 282 ITR 334 (Ker.)

(e) CIT v. Metal Goods Manufacturing Co. (P) Ltd.,
(1992) 197 ITR 230 (All)

(f) K. V. Kader Haji (Decd.) through LR v. CIT,
(2004) 189 CTR (Ker.) 313; (2004) 268 ITR 465 (Ker.)

(g) ITO v. Ashoke Glass Works, (1980) 125 ITR 491
(Cal.)

The Tribunal noted that the issuance of notice u/s. 148(1) by
the first Assessing Officer was without jurisdiction and, therefore, invalid.
The assessment framed on that basis by the jurisdictional Assessing Officer was
also invalid and, therefore, cancelled.

The Revenue’s stand for protection u/s.124 was also not
allowed by the Tribunal. It noted as follows :

(a) Invoking of S. 124(2) would arise if there was any
chance of validation of proceedings by virtue of S. 124(3) which is not
available to the Assessing Officer in the present case, either under clause
(a) or under clause (b) of S. 124(3).

(b) Protection of the proceedings and assessment thereafter
on account of failure of the assessee to object within the time allowed
u/s.124(3) is available to specific proceedings and not to every proceeding.
Erroneous assumption of jurisdiction cannot, in general, be validated. Such
validation is specific in S. 124(3).

 

(2008) 117 TTJ 289 (Delhi) (SB)


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S. 40A(3) — Cash payment exceeding prescribed limits — S. 40A(3) read with Rule 6DD — Purchases in cash towards supplies of carcass in business of processing and export of meat and meat products — Allowable under clause (l) of Rule 6DD — Also as per claus

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New Page 2

  1. (


  1. (2009) 120 itd 89 (Delhi)


Dy. CIT v.
Hind Industries Ltd.

A.Y. : 2003-04. Dated : 26-9-2008

 

S. 40A(3) — Cash payment exceeding prescribed limits — S.
40A(3) read with Rule 6DD — Purchases in cash towards supplies of carcass in
business of processing and export of meat and meat products — Allowable under
clause (l) of Rule 6DD — Also as per clause (f) of Rule 6DD and, therefore, no
disallowance could be made u/s.40A(3).

The assessee-company was engaged in the business of
processing and export of meat and meat products. The assessee had made all the
purchases in cash and had regularly withdrawn huge cash from bank and
ostensibly made payments for supplies of carcass. The Assessing Officer was of
the view that the payments made in cash would be hit by provisions of S.
40A(3). On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) opined that since the payments
had been made to agents in respect of purchases of carcass, there was no room
to interpret clause (f) of Rule 6DD in favour of the assessee. However, so far
as the assessee’s claim for exclusion under clause (l) of Rule 6DD was
concerned, the Commissioner (Appeals) held that payments in cash to agents for
purchases of products of animal husbandry could not be disallowed u/s.40A(3).

 

On the Revenue’s appeal, the ITAT held that :

(1) The AO had disallowed the claim of the assessee in
view of the decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of CIT v.
Pehlaj Raj Daryanmal,
(1991) 190 ITR 242. The decision by the Allahabad
High Court was rendered in 1991 whereas clause (l) was inserted by the IT
Amendment Rules in the year 1995. Therefore, the ratio of the decision of
the Allahabad High Court would not be applicable to the facts of the instant
case.

(2) The contention of the department, that there was no
agent, did not sound good because the AO himself had disallowed the payments
for the reason that they were not made directly to producers/cultivators but
through intermediaries or agents.

(3) Though the Commissioner (Appeals) had rejected the
claim under clause (f), yet, in view of Rule 27 of the Income-tax (Appellate
Tribunal) Rules, 1963, the claim of the assessee was allowable as per clause
(f) of Rule 6DD.

Accordingly, the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) was to
be confirmed.


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S. 32 — Whether road is eligible for depreciation in category of ‘building’ at rate applicable to buildings — Held, Yes.

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New Page 2

  1. (2009) 120 ITD 20 (Chennai)


Tamil Nadu Road Development Co. Ltd. v. ACIT/ITO

A.Ys. : 2003-04 and 2004-05

Dated : 24-10-2008

S. 32 — Whether road is eligible for depreciation in
category of ‘building’ at rate applicable to buildings — Held, Yes.

The assessee-company was incorporated for construction,
development and maintenance of roads at various places in Tamil Nadu as per
the agreement entered into with the Government of Tamil Nadu. Its claim for
depreciation on roads at the rate of 25% (as plant and machinery), was
rejected by the Assessing Officer as road did not figure in the depreciation
schedule. He further observed that roads were not buildings, entitled to
depreciation. On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the Assessing
Officer’s view.

On second appeal by the assessee, the Tribunal held that :

(1) Merely because some optical fibre lines or connection
lines had been laid, the road could not get converted into a plant.

(2) The assessee-company was entitled to collect fixed
amount of toll per vehicle for which it could have created any kind of
barrier for collection of such toll. If the assessee had chosen to install
automated toll plaza, then mere construction of one toll plaza would not
change the nature of the asset which remained the road.

(3) After the A.Y. 1988-89, all the appendices,
prescribing the table of rates of depreciation had the note that building
would include road. Therefore, the assessee would become entitled to
depreciation on the road in the category of ‘building’.

 


In these circumstances, the order of the Commissioner
(Appeals) was set aside and the Assessing Officer was directed to allow
depreciation on the road at the rate applicable to the buildings.


levitra

Collection of tax at source u/s.206C — Collection of octroi under Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 was neither for parking lot nor at toll plaza nor for mining or quarrying nor it was for purpose of business, and, therefore, collection of

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New Page 2

  1. (2009) 120 ITD 7 (Nag.)


Akola Municipal Corporation v. ITO

A.Ys. : 2005-06 to 2007-08

Dated : 21-5-2008

 

Collection of tax at source u/s.206C — Collection of octroi
under Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 was neither for
parking lot nor at toll plaza nor for mining or quarrying nor it was for
purpose of business, and, therefore, collection of octroi by agent appointed
by assessee would not fall in S. 206C(1C).

 

The assessee-corporation had appointed an agent for
collection of octroi, as levied by the assessee under the Bombay Provincial
Municipal Corporation Act, 1949. The assessing authority held that the
assessee was to collect tax at source on the octroi which was in the nature of
‘Toll Plaza’ within meaning of S. 206C(1C). On appeal, the Commissioner
(Appeals) confirmed the order of the assessing authority.

 

On second appeal by the assessee :

(1) On a close reading of the legislation like the Bombay
Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949, the Constitution, the Tolls Act,
1851 and the Supreme Court and the High Courts’ decisions and various
dictionary meanings, it could be said that ‘toll’ is a different thing than
‘octroi’. Octroi is normally a tax levied on entry of goods into local
areas, whereas ‘toll’ is a tax levied as compensation for the purpose of
temporary use of land or allowing passage of vehicles through the land.

(2) In the instant case, the contract of the
assessee-corporation with the agent for collecting octroi, was different
from clause (e) of the said section dealing with ‘toll’.

 


Accordingly, the orders of the Commissioner (Appeals) as
well as the Assessing Officer were to be vacated and the appeal of the
assessee was to be allowed.


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Deductions u/s.80-IB — Conditions stipulated U/ss.(2) of S. 80-IB are to be fulfilled only if eligible assessee is an industrial undertaking within meaning of Ss.(3) to Ss.(5) of said section — Where assessee was engaged in business of carrying out scient

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New Page 2

  1. (2009) 119 itd 427 (Mum.)


Enem Nostrum Remedies (P.) Ltd. v. ACIT

A.Ys. : 2003-04 and 2004-05

Dated : 28-8-2008

Deductions u/s.80-IB — Conditions stipulated U/ss.(2) of S.
80-IB are to be fulfilled only if eligible assessee is an industrial
undertaking within meaning of Ss.(3) to Ss.(5) of said section — Where
assessee was engaged in business of carrying out scientific research and
development and was not an industrial undertaking and had been approved by
Government of India, for claiming benefit of deduction u/s.80-IB(8A),
conditions of Ss.(2) of S. 80-IB were not required to be fulfilled by it.

 

The assessee-company had been approved as an R&D company by
the department of scientific and industrial research. It claimed deduction
u/s.80-IB(8A). The Assessing Officer denied the deduction u/s.80-IB(8A) by
observing that :

(1) The assessee had not claimed deduction u/s.80-IB(8A)
in the initial year,

(2) Subsequent claim made by it in the relevant
assessment years could only lead to the surmise that its business was formed
by splitting up, or the reconstruction of a business already in existence;

(3) The certificate by the Chartered Accountant in Form
10CCB was not produced.

 


On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) held that the
assessee did not fulfill the conditions of S. 80-IB(2)(iii) as it was not
manufacturing or producing any article or thing, and, accordingly, upheld the
view of the Assessing Officer on a different count.

On second appeal by the assessee, the Tribunal held that :

(1) The four conditions stipulated U/ss.(2) of S. 80-IB
are to be fulfilled only if the eligible assessee is an industrial
undertaking within the meaning of S. (3) to S. (5) of said Section, as the
case may be.

(2) If the assessee is not an ‘industrial undertaking’
but is otherwise eligible for deduction under any of other sub-sections of
S. 80-IB, then there is no requirement for importing the conditions
stipulated in Ss.(2) of S. 80-IB which are applicable to industrial
undertakings.

(3) Since in the instant case, the assessee was engaged
in the business of carrying out scientific research and development and had
been approved by the Government of India, for claiming the benefit of
deduction u/s.80-IB(8A), the conditions of Ss.(2) of S. 80-IB were not
required to be fulfilled by it.

Based on the above observations, the Tribunal directed the
Assessing Officer to allow deduction as claimed by the assessee.


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S. 194J of the Act are applicable to payments made for availing bandwidth services and port charges — Held, No.

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New Page 26
2009 TIOL 130 ITAT Mum.


Pacific Internet (India) Pvt. Ltd.
ITA Nos. 1607 to 1609 (Mum.) of 2006
A.Ys. : 2003-04 to 2005-06. Dated : 23-12-2008



Whether payments made to MTNL/VSNL for availing
bandwidth services and port charges are technical services — Held, No. Whether
provisions of


S. 194J of the Act are applicable to payments
made for availing bandwidth services and port charges

— Held, No.

Facts :

The assessee-company was engaged in the business
of providing internet access services to corporate clients and consumers. In
the course of survey action u/s.133A of the Act against the assessee, on
29-10-2004, it was found that the assessee had made huge payments to avail
services of MTNL and VSNL for using bandwidth and network operating. The
Assessing Officer was of the opinion that in respect of payments made to MTNL/VSNL
for availing bandwidth services and port charges, the assessee should have
deducted tax at source as required u/s.194J of the Act. The Assessing Officer,
therefore, treated the assessee as in default within the meaning of S. 201(1)
and passed the order, raising the demand against the assessee for failure to
deduct tax in respect of payments made to MTNL/VSNL and also levied interest
as per the provisions of S.


201(1A) of the Act. Aggrieved, the assessee
preferred an appeal to CIT(A), challenging the order passed by the Assessing
Officer treating the assessee in default within the meaning of S. 201(1), but
did not find favour.

On an appeal by the assessee to the Tribunal,

Held :

The bandwidth services and other infrastructure
availed by the assessee for providing Internet access to its customers are
standard facilities. The Tribunal was of the view that the case of the
assessee is covered by the decision of Delhi High Court in the case of Estel
Communications (P.) Ltd. and accordingly held that payment made by the
assessee company to MTNL/VSNL and other concerns for availing the service of
bandwidth network infrastructure cannot be said to be technical services
within the meaning of S. 194J of the Act read with Explanation 2 to clause
(vii) of S. 9(1) of the Act. The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed and
the orders passed by the Assessing Officer u/s.201(1) and u/s.201(1A) of the
Act were cancelled.

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S. 23 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Annual Value — In respect of a let-out property whether association maintenance charges are deductible while computing annual letting value of the property u/s.23 of the Act — Held, Yes.

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New Page 25 2009 TIOL 126 ITAT Bang.


Sheriff Constructions v. ACIT
ITA No. 975/Bang./2008
A.Y. : 2005-2006. Dated : 23-12-2008

 




S. 23 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Annual
Value
— In
respect of a let-out property whether association maintenance charges are
deductible while computing annual letting value of the property u/s.23 of
the Act — Held, Yes.

Facts :

The assessee-firm was owner of a property by
the name ‘The Summit’ from which rent of Rs.18,39,027 was declared and in
doing so, the assessee deducted association maintenance charges of
Rs.1,77,000. The AO disallowed the claim by holding that this is not an
allowable expenditure u/s.24 of the Act.

The CIT(A) upheld the order of the AO.

In an appeal before the Tribunal, the assessee
contended that since the association maintenance charges have to be paid by
the owner of the property, it depresses the annual letting value of the
property and thus the amount of rent which the property may be reasonably
expected to let from year to year would be an amount against which the
maintenance charges have to be reckoned with. Therefore, the association
maintenance charges were claimed u/s.23(1)(b) of the Act while computing the
annual letting value of the property.

Held :

The issue under consideration is squarely
covered in favour of the assessee in view of the decision of the Delhi Bench
of the Tribunal in the case of Neelam Cable Manufacturing Co. and the
decisions of Mumbai Bench of Tribunal in the case of Sharmila Tagore and
also in the case of Bombay Oil Industries Ltd. The Tribunal observed that no
order or judgment taking a contrary view was brought to its notice by the
Department. Accordingly, the AO was directed to deduct association
maintenance charges paid by the assessee to the Summit Apartment Owners’
Association while computing the annual letting value of the property u/s.23
of the Act.

Cases referred to :

  1. Neelam Cable Manufacturing Co. v. ACIT, (1997) 63 ITD 1 (Del.)

  2. Sharmila Tagore v.
    JCIT,
    (2005) 93 TTJ 483 (Mum.)

  3. Bombay Oil Industries,
    ITA No. 550/Mum./ 2000 dated 15-11-2000.

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S. 10B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Second proviso to S. 10B(1) and Ss.(4) of S. 10B — When the assessee had domestic sales of more than 25% of total sales value during A.Y. 2001-02, is the asses-see still entitled to partial deduction proportionately on

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New Page 24 2009 TIOL 124 ITAT Mad.-TM


Tube Investments of India Ltd. v. ACIT
ITA No. 12/Mds./2006
A.Y. : 2001-2002. Dated : 5-1-2009

S. 10B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Second
proviso to S. 10B(1) and Ss.(4) of S. 10B — When the assessee had domestic
sales of more than 25% of total sales value during A.Y. 2001-02, is the
asses-see still entitled to partial deduction proportionately on export
turnover in view of S. 10B(4) — Held, Yes. Whether excise duty needs to be
included in domestic turnover while computing the value of domestic sales to
find out the domestic sales as a percentage of total turnover — Held, Yes.

Facts :

The assessee had in its return of income claimed
a sum of Rs.2,88,84,327 as exempt u/s.10B of the Act in respect of income of
100% EOU. In the course of assessment proceedings, the AO noted that the
details of sales were as under :

Domestic Sales     Rs. 901.40 lakhs

Export Sales         Rs. 2,227.34 lakhs

Total Sales           Rs. 3,128.74 lakhs

The AO held that since the domestic sales were
28.8%, the assessee was not entitled to deduction u/s.10B of the Act. The
domestic sales as mentioned above were taken to be inclusive of excise duty.

On an appeal by the assessee, the CIT(A)
confirmed the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to
the Tribunal where it contended that the amount of domestic sales to be
considered should be exclusive of excise duty. Also, since during the
assessment year under consideration, second proviso to as well as Ss.(4) were
both on the Statute Book, therefore, it is entitled to claim deduction
u/s.10B, if not at 100%, on proportionate basis in terms of Ss.(4) of S. 10B.

As regards inclusion of excise duty in computing
the value of domestic sales, the Tribunal held that in view of the ratio of
the decision of SC in the case of Chowranghee Sales Bureau P. Ltd., excise
duty and sales tax are part of trading turnover and therefore, excise duty
needs to be included in domestic sales to find out the value of domestic
sales.

The Accountant Member held that since during the
assessment year, both, the second proviso as well as Ss.(4) were on the
statute book, an assessee whose domestic sales were less than 25% would be
covered by the second proviso and would be entitled to 100% deduction and if
the domestic sales exceeded this limit of 25%, then Ss.(4) would apply and the
assessee would be entitled to deduction on a proportionate basis. In the
present case, since the domestic sales exceeded 25% of the total sales, the AO
was directed to allow deduction on a proportionate basis u/s.10B(4).

The Judicial Member disagreed with the Accountant
Member on the issue of grant of proportionate deduction and held that during
the period relevant to the A.Y. 2001-02, if an assessee had domestic sale of
more than 25%, then the assessee would not be entitled to exemption u/s.10B of
the Act.

Upon a difference of opinion amongst the Members,
the TM was asked to consider the question as to whether when the assessee had
domestic sales of more than 25% of the total sale value during the A.Y.
2001-02, he is still entitled to partial deduction on export turnover in view
of provisions of 10B(4) ?

On a reference the Third Member

Held :

The eligibility criteria are laid down in Ss.(1).
The second proviso is an additional incentive which has been granted to the
assessee to provide economic flexibility and to allow it to dispose of the
export-rejects and by-products, etc. The second proviso no way governs the
eligibility criteria. No interdict is laid down in the statute to withdraw the
total benefit of S. 10B in the eventuality of domestic sales being in excess
of 25% limit. There is no ambiguity in the language of the statute. The
interpretation that benefit of S. 10B is not available in the eventuality of
domestic sales exceeding the percentage mentioned in the second proviso would
render the provisions of Ss.(4) otiose. On the panoply of the second proviso
deduction cannot be denied. Accordingly, he held that the assessee was
entitled to claim deduction proportionately on export turnover in view of the
provisions of S.10B(4).



The view of the Accountant Member became the
majority view. The ground raised by the assessee stood allowed.

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S. 10(10D) read with S. 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Keyman Insurance Policy premium paid by firm in respect of policy on lives of partners is an allowable deduction.

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New Page 23 (2009) 27 SOT 476 (Mum.)


 ITO v. Modi Motors
 ITA No. 6900 (Mum.) of 2006

A.Y. : 2003-04. Dated : 12-12-2008
 

 
S. 10(10D) read with S. 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961
— Keyman Insurance Policy premium paid by firm in respect of policy on
lives of partners is an allowable deduction.

For the relevant assessment year, the assessee’s
claim for deduction of premium paid by it on the Keyman Insurance Policy in
respect of the lives of two working partners u/s.37(1) was disallowed by the
Assessing Officer on the grounds that :

  1. Keyman Insurance Policy
    premium was allowable only in case an assessee who was an employer, paid the
    amount in respect of the life of an employee.

  2. the partnership firm could
    not be termed as ‘Another person’ within the meaning of S. 10(10D), as a
    firm is not independent and distinct from its partners.

The CIT(A) held that the Assessing Officer was
not justified in presuming that there was no distinction between the partners
and the firm, and the conditions of S. 37 were also satisfied because that
expenditure had been incurred for the purpose of business and, accordingly, he
deleted the disallowance made by the Assessing Officer.

The Tribunal allowed the claim of the assessee.
The Tribunal noted as under :


  1. In view of
    the various judicial opinions and also the legislative change in the Act, it
    was to be held that under the Income-tax Act, a partnership firm is an
    entity separate from its partners and if there exists any specific provision
    in the Income Tax law modifying the partnership law, then such specific
    provision shall be applied.




  2. The
    wordings of Explanation to S. 10(10D) are also relevant, wherein it has been
    mentioned that “Keyman Insurance Policy life insurance taken by the person
    on the life of another person who is or was the employee of a
    first-mentioned person or is or was connected in any manner whatsoever with
    the business of the first-mentioned person”. Hence, the Legislature has also
    envisaged various kinds of relationships (in addition to employer-employee
    relationship) which may exist between the person paying the premium and the
    person on whose life such

     





Keyman Insurance Policy is taken.


  1. The CBDT
    vide its Circular No. 762, dated 182-1998 has explained the provisions of S.
    10(10D) wherefrom it is abundantly clear that in order to allow the premium
    paid on Keyman Insurance Policy as business expenditure, there can exist
    relationships other than that of an employer and employee.




  2. The amount
    received on maturity or surrender of Keyman Insurance Policy is taxable
    under the head ‘Income from salary’ u/s.17(3)(ii) or ‘Income from profits
    and gains of business or profession’ u/s.28(1)(vii) or ‘Income from other
    sources u/s.56(2)(iv)’. Hence, if the Legislature would have intended that
    such premium was allowable as deduction only in cases where employer and
    employee relationship existed, then the amount received on
    maturity/surrender would have been made taxable only under the head `Income
    from salary’.





  3. In view of
    the above, Keyman Insurance Premium paid by the firm on the life of its
    partners is allowable as business expenditure.



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Tax avoidance — For application of Ss.(7) of S. 94, all the three conditions mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (c) thereof must be cumulatively satisfied; conditions of three months before and after record date for purchase and sale respectively of units

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New Page 22 (2008) 304 ITR (AT) 36 (Delhi)


ITO v. Shambhu Mercantile Ltd. ITA No. 2056/Del./2006
A.Y. : 2004-2005. Dated : 29-2-2008

S. 94(7) and CBDT Circular No. 14 of 2001

Tax avoidance — For application of Ss.(7) of
S. 94, all the three conditions mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (c) thereof
must be cumulatively satisfied; conditions of three months before and after
record date for purchase and sale respectively of units not having been
satisfied cumulatively in all the transactions, loss incurred in those
transactions could not be disallowed by invoking Ss.(7) of S. 94.

The assessee had purchased units of three mutual
funds on the record date for declaration of dividend. These units were sold
after a period of three months from the said record date at a loss of
Rs.1,88,47,816.

The Assessing Officer held that S. 94(7) can be
invoked even if any one of the conditions is fulfilled. Since the units were
purchased on the record date, he held the case to be one of dividend stripping
and disallowed the loss invoking the provisions of S. 94(7), even though they
were sold after three months from the record date. The CIT(A) accepted the
claim of the assessee that all three conditions of S. 94(7) are to be
cumulatively satisfied. On Revenue’s appeal, the ITAT held that :

  1. The question that arises for consideration is as to whether clauses (a), (b)
    and (c) of S. 94(7) need to be satisfied cumulatively or not. One may take a
    look at the language used in other portions of the IT Act, 1961, where such
    requirement for satisfying one of the many conditions or all conditions
    cumulatively is laid down.

  2. The case where only one condition is needed to be satisfied as laid down in
    the proviso to S. 139(1) relating to one by six scheme, may be taken for
    instance. The language of such provision uses the expression ‘or’ at the end
    of each condition.

  3. The Legislature, when it desired that all conditions are to be satisfied
    cumulatively, has used the word ‘and’ in the relevant provision. For
    example, one may take the language used in provisions of S. 80-O, where the
    conditions of receipt of income in convertible foreign exchange and such
    income should be for services rendered outside India are cumulatively
    required to be satisfied.

  4. A
    plain reading of the provision of S. 94(7) shows that it has neither used
    the expression ‘or’ nor the expression ‘and’. The Revenue wants to say that
    each of the conditions laid down in S. 94(7) is independent and if an
    assessee satisfies any one of the conditions, then he should be held to be
    covered within the mischief of the law. But the use of words, ‘such person’,
    ‘such unit’, ‘such date’, ‘such securities or units’ in clauses (b) and (c)
    of S. 94(7) also indicates that the three clauses have to be read
    together—Such an interpretation also finds support from CBDT Circular No. 14
    of 2001.

On these reasonings, the ITAT upheld the claim of
the assessee that all the conditions laid down in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of
Ss.(7) of S. 94 have to be satisfied before the said provisions can be applied
in a given case.

levitra

Assessee engaged in loading and unloading iron and steel at railway siding using a mobile crane cannot be said to be carrying on civil construction work within the meaning of S. 44AD and, therefore, she is not liable to penalty u/s.271B for failure to get

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New Page 21 (2008) 304 ITR (AT) 246 (Patna)


Nirmal Jain (Smt.) v. ITO
ITA No. 273/Pat./2005
A.Y. : 2000-01. Dated : 8-2-2007

S. 44AB, S. 44AD, S. 271B, S. 273B

Assessee engaged in loading and unloading iron
and steel at railway siding using a mobile crane cannot be said to be carrying
on civil construction work within the meaning of S. 44AD and, therefore, she is
not liable to penalty u/s.271B for failure to get accounts audited u/s.44AB,
even though she has shown income below 8% of the gross receipts.

The assessee was engaged in loading and unloading
iron and steel at railway siding using a mobile crane. She declared net profit
at a rate lower than 8% of the gross receipts. The Assessing Officer held that
she should have got her accounts audited as required under clause (c) of S. 44AB
and accordingly imposed penalty u/s.271B. The said order of penalty was upheld
by the CIT(A). On second appeal, the ITAT held that :

1. Use of mobile crane for loading and unloading iron and steel cannot be said to be civil construction work. Once the provisions of S. 44AD are enacted for computing profits and gains of business of civil construction, then any other work which is not in the nature of civil construction cannot be brought within the mischief of this Section.

2. ‘Works contract’ cannot be construed to mean any contract relating to work. Therefore, the assessee was under a bona fide belief that her case does not fall u/s.44AD and that she was not required to get her accounts audited, even though she has shown income below 8% of the gross receipts.

3. Her gross receipts being less than Rs. 40 lacs, there was no compulsion to get the accounts audited u/s.44AB.

4. The principle of ejusdem generis has to be invoked when particular words pertaining to a class or category or genre are followed by general words, and the general words are construed as limited to words of the same kind as those specified. This principle would apply when : (i) the statute contains an enumeration of specified words; (ii) the subject of enumeration constitutes a class or category; (iii) that class or category is not entrusted by enumeration; (iv) each term follows enumeration; and (v) there is no indication of a different legislative intent.

5. There is no legislative intent to infer that works contract can mean any works contract other than civil construction. The heading of S. 44AD clearly says “Special provision for computing profits and gains of business of civil construction, etc.” Ss.(1) of S. 44AD provides that a sum equal to 8% of the gross receipts paid or payable to the assessee can be assessed as income from civil construction or supply of labour for civil construction. Therefore, intention of the Legislature is clear that S. 44AD has been enacted for the purpose of computing profits and gains of business of civil construction and nothing else.

Cases referred to :

    CIT v. Shree Warna Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana, (2002) 253 ITR 226 (Bom.), and

    CIT v. Mohd. Ishaque Gulam, (1998) 232 ITR 869 (MP)

Payment of tax by employer on behalf of employee is a non-monetary perquisite — Tax on such tax is exempt u/s.10(10CC)

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3) (2007) 109 ITD 141 (Delhi) (SB)


RBF Rig Corpn. LIC (RBFRC) v. ACIT

A.Y. 2004-05. Dated : 30-11-2007

 

Payment of tax by employer on behalf of employee is a
non-monetary perquisite and hence tax on such tax is not liable to be again
included in the total income of the employee by virtue of clause 10CC of S. 10.

 

For A.Y. 2004-05, the returns of income of non-resident
foreign national employees employed in India were filed by the employer as their
statutory agents. These employees were paid salary ‘net of taxes’ and the taxes
were borne by the employer company. Accordingly, the taxes borne by the employer
were added to the income of the employees and tax was calculated on the
grossed-up salary. However, the Assessing Officer held that the tax borne by the
employer was also a monetary perquisite and hence further tax on such tax should
also be added to the salary by multiple-stage grossing up process. The assessee
appealed to CIT(A), but without success.

 

In the following two cases, the Delhi Bench of the Tribunal
held that tax on tax borne by the employer was a monetary perquisite and hence
not exempt u/s.10(10CC) :

(1) B.J. Services Co. Middle East Ltd. v. ACIT, (IT
Appeal No. 4033 to 4053 of 2005)

(2) Western Geo International Ltd. v. ACIT, (2007)
16 SOT 459

 


In the circumstances, a Special Bench was constituted at the
request of the assessee and recommended by the Regular Bench to consider the
operation of S. 10(10CC) and to review the above decisions.

 

The Special Bench observed that :

(1) The Finance Act 2002 has inserted Clause 10CC in S. 10
to exempt tax on non-monetary perquisites paid by the employer on behalf of
the employees.

(2) The above clause overrides S. 200 of the Companies Act,
1956, which prohibits payment of tax-free salary by a Company.

(3) Combined reading of S. 10(10CC) along with other
consequential amendments by the Finance Act, 2002 like insertion of S.
192(1A), S. 40(a)(v), amendment of S. 195A, etc. suggests that the employer
has an option to pay the taxes on behalf of the employee. Once this option is
exercised by the employer, it is nothing but discharge of an obligation by the
employer, which but for such payment by the employer would have been payable
by the employee. Thus it is a perquisite fully covered by sub-clause (iv) of
clause (2) of S. 17.

(4) A payment by the employer to a third party on behalf of
the employee cannot be considered as a monetary payment to the employee. It
may be a monetary gain or monetary benefit or monetary allowance for the
employee, but it is definitely not a monetary payment to the employee.

(5) S. 10(10CC) excludes from its operation tax on direct
monetary payments to the employees. Tax paid to the Government is a payment to
a third party and hence cannot be excluded from the operation of S. 10(10CC).

 


Thus, taxes paid by employer on behalf of employees is a
non-monetary perquisite within the meaning of S. 17(2)(iv) and hence tax on such
tax is exempt u/s.10(10CC). Such taxes can be added in the salary of the
employees for the purpose of grossing up, but the tax on such tax can not be
again added for multiple-stage grossing up.

 

Case relied upon :

 CIT v. Mafatlal Gangabhai & Co. (P) Ltd., (1966) 219 ITR 644 (SC)

levitra

S. 43B : (a) Advance payment of excise duty allowable without incurring of prior liability. (b) Modvat credit available does not amount to payment, hence not allowable.

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2) (2007) 110 TTJ 183 (Chd.) (SB)


Dy. CIT v.
Glaxo Smithkline Consumer Healthcare Ltd.

ITA No. 343 (Chd.) 2005

A.Y.2001-02. Dated : 20-7-2007

S. 43B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 –




(a) Deduction for tax, duty, etc. is allowable u/s.
43B on payment basis before incurring the liability to pay such amounts;
excess amount of excise duty reflected in the account-current is, therefore,
nothing but actual payment of excise duty, even though mentioned as advance
payments. Hence, it is allowable deduction u/s.43B.


(b) Modvat credit available to assessee, as on the
last day of the previous year does not amount to payment of excise duty and,
hence, not allowable u/s.43B.


 


Allowability u/s.43B on payment :

The assessee’s claim before the Assessing Officer was that
the balance of Central Excise Duty lying in the PLA and RG-23 registers should
be allowed as a deduction u/s.43B. The CIT(A) allowed the claim, relying on the
decisions in the following cases :

(a) Raj & Sandeep Ltd. v. Asst. CIT, (ITA No.
1853/Chd./1992 dated 18-2-1993)

(b) Modipon Ltd. v. IAC, (1995) 52 TTJ (Del.) 477

(c) Honda Siel Power Products Ltd. v. Dy. CIT,
(2000) 69 TTJ 97 (Del.)/(2001) 77 ITD 123 (Del.)

 


The Regular Division Bench at Chandigarh found that divergent
views have been expressed by the co-ordinate Benches of the Tribunal on this
issue and there is no judgment of any superior Court so as to settle the
divergent views. The Special Bench was constituted to decide the following
issue :

“Whether deduction for tax, duty, etc. is allowed on
payment basis without incurring of prior liability to pay such amount u/s.43B
of the Act ?”

 


The Special Bench held that deduction for tax, duty, etc. is
allowable u/s.43B on payment basis before incurring the liability to pay such
amounts; excess amount of excise duty reflected in the account-current is,
therefore, nothing but actual payment of excise duty even though mentioned as
advance payments. Hence, it is allowable as deduction u/s.43B. The Special Bench
relied on the decisions in the following cases :

(a) Indian Communication Network (P) Ltd. v. IAC,
(1994) 48 TTJ (Del.) (SB) 604; (1994) 49 ITD 56 (Del.) (SB)

(b) Lakhanpal National Ltd. v. ITO, (1986) 54 CTR
(Guj.) 241; (1986) 162 ITR 240 (Guj.)

(c) Berger Paints India Ltd. v. CIT, (2004) 187 CTR
(SC) 193; (2004) 266 ITR 99 (SC)

 


The Special Bench noted as under :

(a) S. 43B provides for the deduction of sums payable
mentioned in clauses (a) to (f), only if actually paid, but it shall be
allowed irrespective of the previous year in which the liability to pay such
sum was incurred by the assessee. The intention of the legislature is apparent
in the language used in S. 43B that the deduction in respect of tax or duty,
which was actually paid by the assessee has to be allowed as deduction without
looking into the year of incurring the liability. The expression ‘irrespective
of the previous year’ dispenses with the concept of previous year in the
matter of the sums covered by S. 43B.

(b) Any reference to the time of incurring or accruing of
the liability is dispensed with by the statute, while concentration is made on
the point of actual payment of the sum to the treasury of the Government.

(c) The payments made to the credit of the accounts-current
are nothing but substantial/actual payments of central excise duty. The
assessee has no option to pay or not to pay such deposits in that running
account to meet the liability of central excise duty arising from time to
time. The payments of advance deposits in the account-current are necessitated
by the mandate of law and not by the option of the assessee. The advance
payments of central excise duty, therefore, satisfy the character of exaction
made by the sovereign under authority of law.

(d) S. 43B has brought in a change in the normal rule of
deduction of expense based on the accounting method followed by an assessee.
The normal principles and practices are done away. Accordingly, there is no
force in the argument of the Revenue that the deduction can be granted only if
the liability is incurred during the previous year even when the payment was
made by the assessee.

(e) The nature of the account-current brings home the point
that the advance payments of excise duties are actual payments of duties.
Therefore, when the payments are understood as actual payments, those
payments, even if mentioned as advance payments, need to be allowed as
deduction u/s.43B.

 


Modvat credit not allowable u/s.43B :

The other issue considered by the Special Bench was whether
Modvat credit available to the assessee as on the last day of the previous year
amounts to payment of central excise duty u/s.43B.

 

The Special Bench held that Modvat credit available to the
assessee on the last day of the year does not amount to payment of excise duty
and, hence, it is not allowable u/s.43B.

 

The Special Bench noted as under :

(a) There is a distinction between unexpired Modvat credit
available in the hands of the assessee as well as the set-off of the credit
balance against actual liability. The time lag between the two points cannot
be ignored. On actual set-off of the unexpired Modvat credit against the
liability towards the payment of duty may be as good as tax paid, but the
unexpired Modvat credit before the point of such set-off cannot be treated as
tax paid.

    b) In the case of unexpired Modvat credit, there is no question of set-off on the last day of the previous year and, therefore, there is no occasion to treat the unexpired credit as equivalent to tax paid. In fact, the unexpired Modvat credit available to an assessee is in the nature of a future entitlement which cannot be considered as equivalent to advance payment of duty.

    c) In a case of advance payment of central excise duty, there is a defacto payment of duty by cash in the Government treasury. The payment is made towards the central excise account which has been already held as actual payment of excise duty itself. However, in the scheme of Modvat, there is no such payment of excise duty. The credit is available to an assessee under the scheme of Modvat in order to minimise the escalation effect of payment of excise duty by successive manufacturers. Therefore, the excise duty paid at the earlier point is set off against the central excise liability at the next point. Till the set-off is availed at the next point, the duty available for set-off by the assessee is nothing but part of the cost of the materials purchased by him. That is not a payment per se made towards excise duty, but it was in fact a payment made towards the purchase cost.

    d) The balance of Modvat credit becomes equivalent to the payment only at the point of time the assessee exercises his option to set off the credit balance against the central excise liability and not before.

S. 147 : In proceedings /s.147, AO cannot probe if any other income had escaped assessment.

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New Page 2

1 ) (2007) 110 TTJ 118 (Jp)


Silver Mines
v. ITO

ITA No. 426 (Jp) 2005

A.Y. 2000-01. Dated : 21-5-2007

S. 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 – When proceedings u/s.147
are initiated, Assessing Officer cannot probe if any other income had escaped
assessment.

 

In the course of reassessment proceedings, the Assessing
Officer made various additions to the assessee’s income. The CIT(A) held that
when proceedings u/s.147 of the Act are initiated, the proceedings are open only
qua items of underassessment. Further, finality of assessment proceedings on
other issues remains undisturbed. He noted that no assessment was framed
u/s.143(3), nor notice u/s. 143(2) was issued within the time allowed and,
therefore, other issues which are not covered by escaped income cannot be
disturbed. Accordingly, he deleted such additions. He relied on the decisions in
the cases of Vipin Khanna v. CIT, (2002) 175 CTR (P & H) 335 and CIT
v. Sun Engineering Works (P.) Ltd.,
(1992) 107 CTR (SC) 209.

 

The Tribunal, also relying on the decisions in the above
cases, upheld the CIT(A)’s order. The Tribunal noted as under :

(a) No notice u/s.143(2) had been served on the assessee
within the stipulated time, indicating that the Assessing Officer had not
found it necessary to require the assessee to produce any evidence in support
of the return. Therefore, the return filed by the assessee had become final.

(b) Therefore, when proceedings u/s.147 are initiated, the
proceedings are open only qua items of underassessment and the finality of
assessment proceedings on other issues remains undisturbed. The amendments
made in S. 143 and S. 147 w.e.f. 1st April 1989 do not in any manner negate
this proposition of law.

(c) The Assessing Officer is not permitted to make fishing
inquiries to probe if any other income had escaped assessment or not, and such
inquiries can only be permitted if, in the first instance, some material comes
to his notice to suggest that some other item of income may have escaped
assessment or had been underassessed.



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I S. 2(47), 54EC- Transfer of shares is completed only on final delivery of shares and upon all covenants of the share purchase agreement becoming finally irrevocable and not on the date of execution of the share purchase agreement.

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46 2009-TIOL- 789-ITAT- MUM

Mrs. Hami Aspi Balsara vs ACIT

ITA No. 6402/Mum/2008

Assessment Year: 2005-06.
Date of Order: 22.5.2009

I S. 2(47), 54EC- Transfer of
shares is completed only on final delivery of shares and upon all covenants of
the share purchase agreement becoming finally irrevocable and not on the date of
execution of the share purchase agreement.


II Ss. 28(va), 55(2)(a)- Section
28(va) would be attracted where the assessee was carrying on business and not
where the assessee only had right to carry on business in the form of capital
asset— Where capital asset is in the nature of right to carry on business, then
the consideration for non-compete will come within the ambit of capital gains
tax.

Fact I:

The assessee, on 27.1.2005, entered into an agreement for the
sale of shares held by the assessee and other persons in three companies viz.
Balsara Home Products Ltd., Balsara Hygiene Products Ltd. and Besta Cosmetics
Ltd. (i.e. target companies) to Dabur India Ltd. (the buyer). A sum of Rs
10,65,06,753 was received by the assessee on 28.1.2005. As per the terms of the
share purchase agreement, the transfer of shares was effective from 1.4.2005.
The assessee regarded 1.4.2005 to be the date of transfer, and investments
qualifying for exemption u/s 54EC were made within a period of six months from
1.4.2005.

The Assessing Officer (AO) held that since various covenants
in the share purchase agreement resulted in substantial extinguishment of the
rights of the assessee in the target company, and also since the sale
consideration was not refundable to the assessee, the transfer of shares had
taken place on 27.1.2005, it being the date of the share purchase agreement. He
taxed capital gains in the assessment year 2005-06. He also held that the
investment had not been made within six months from the date of transfer and,
therefore, denied exemption u/s 54EC.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who
confirmed the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.


Fact II:

The sale consideration for shares of companies having
Intellectual Property Rights, was in excess of the book value of the shares.
Since the share purchase agreement had a non-compete covenant and no specific
consideration was assigned to it, the AO considered the difference between the
sale consideration for the transfer of shares and the book value of the shares —
which was approximately 80% of the sale consideration — to be the consideration
for non-compete, and charged it to tax u/s 28(va).

The CIT(A) confirmed the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held I:



(i) `Sale’, as contemplated u/s 2(47)(i), and
extinguishment of rights, as contemplated u/s 2(47)(ii), are not mutually
interchangeable. If a particular transaction is a transaction of sale, then,
unless the sale is complete, no transfer can be said to have taken place;
because there will always be extinguishment of rights in the case of a sale —
and if a single right out of the entire bundle of the property in a capital
asset is extinguished, then, the transfer would be complete. This will lead to
an absurd situation.

(ii) A case of sale and that of extinguishment of rights
are mutually exclusive. It could not be said that there was extinguishment of
rights on 27.1.2005 because extinguishment of rights implies that the right
cannot be revived. However, till the time the right is revocable, it could not
be said that there was extinguishment of rights. At best it can be said to be
a case of suspension of rights till all the requirements for completing the
sale were over. It was only on execution of the second amendment to the share
purchase agreement on 1.4.2005 that the Escrow Agreement and the power of
attorney became incapable of being revoked, modified or altered unilaterally
by the sellers. Therefore, prior to this date, the sellers had the right to
revoke the share purchase agreement.

(iii) Clause (c) of Section 372A of the Companies Act, 1956
mandates that a company cannot acquire by way of subscription, purchase or
otherwise the securities of any other corporate body, unless previously
authorized by a special resolution passed in a general meeting. This special
resolution was passed by Dabur India Ltd. on 28.3.2005. Therefore, in any
case, prior to this date, it cannot be said that the shares of the assessee
were acquired by Dabur India Ltd.

(iv) The definition of the term `sale’ as per the Sale of
Goods Act assumes importance since this term is not defined in the Income-tax
Act. On a reading of S. 4 of the Sale of Goods Act, it becomes evident that an
agreement to sell becomes complete when the conditions contemplated in the
agreement are fulfilled.

(v) S. 65 of the Indian Contract and Specific Relief Act
makes it very clear that if, for any reason, the terms of a contract cannot be
fulfilled, then the assessee is bound to restore the benefits she had
received, including the consideration to the purchaser.

(vi) The decision of the Amritsar Bench of ITAT, in the
case of Maxtelcon Ventures Ltd. (301 ITR (AT) 90), was rendered with reference
to K N Narayanan (145 ITR 373)(Ker) without considering the subsequent
decision of the same High Court in the case of 203 ITR 663.

In view of specific provision in Indo-Swiss treaty, income from shipping business does not qualify for benefit under DTAA and hence, such income would be taxable in terms of provisions of Income-tax Act.

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  1. Gearbulk AG (AAR)

(2009 TIOL 24 ARA IT)

AAR No. 803 of 2009

Article 7, 22, India-Switzerland Treaty

Dated : 30-9-2009

 

Issue :

In view of specific provision in Indo-Swiss treaty, income
from shipping business does not qualify for benefit under DTAA and hence, such
income would be taxable in terms of provisions of Income-tax Act.

Facts :


The applicant is a non-resident shipping Company
incorporated under the laws of Switzerland. The applicant enters into medium
and long term shipping contracts for the transportation of cargo worldwide.

During the financial years 2007-08 and 2008-09, the
applicant entered into a shipping contract with non resident charter for
transportation of cargo from Indian ports to overseas ports. The customers
were procured with the help of assistance of independent agents in UK. In
India, independent agent was appointed for shipping agency, clearing &
forwarding services and for acting as port agent. Admittedly, the applicant
had no physical presence or dependent agent anywhere including in India.

There was no dispute that the applicant trigged tax
liability in India in terms of provisions of S. 172 of the Act but, claimed
exemption by relying on treaty provisions.

Treaty between India and Switzerland as signed in the year
1994 is peculiarly worded. Article 7(1) of the treaty specifically excludes
profits from the operation of ships in international traffic. Article 8 of the
treaty is restricted in its application to the operation of aircraft in
international traffic. The treaty was amended in the year 2001 and ‘other
income’ article was added. In terms of ‘other income’ article, income not
dealt with in the foregoing articles was made taxable only in the Country of
Residence (COR) unless right or property in respect of which income paid is
effectively connected with PE in source country.

The applicant’s contention was that the profits from the
operation of ships in international traffic which stands excluded by Article 7
of the DTAA, is covered by ‘other income’ Article of the treaty; and in
absence of PE in India, the income cannot be taxed in India after amendment of
treaty in the year 2001.

Held :

The AAR held :

The Treaty provisions show that shipping business income
earned by a non-resident is not intended to be covered by Indo–Swiss treaty.
The language and scheme of the provisions of the treaty as also a comparative
study of Treaties of India & Switzerland with others lead to the inevitable
conclusion that shipping income derived from international operations is
sought to be kept outside the purview of the Treaty.

Article 7 of the treaty is explicit and specifically
excludes profits from shipping activity. While specific provision is made for
air transportation business, no such provision was made in the treaty for
shipping business.

The residuary Article 22, concerning ‘other incomes’ was
introduced in 2001. Till then, there was no dispute that the profits derived
from the operation of ships in international traffic was left untouched by the
Treaty because of the specific exclusion in Article 7. The obvious implication
of the exclusion is that such income is subjected to domestic tax law
provisions.

If such legal position was intended to be changed by the
amendments made to the treaty in 2001, specific reference to that effect was
required by amendment to Article 7 and/or in ‘other income’ Article. The AAR
observed :

‘Nor is there explicit language in Article 22 to bring it
within the coverage of the Article. When a particular species of income
excluded from the ambit of the Treaty is sought to be brought within the
scope of the Treaty for the first time, we would expect clear and specific
language to express the intendment rather than leaving it to be taken care
of by Article 22 by implication’.

Shipping profits is specie of business income. As a result
profits of shipping business can be considered to have been dealt with by
Article 7. In any case, when an article concerning business profits
specifically refers to profits from the operation of ships in international
traffic, it can be said that the shipping profits have been dealt with in a
manner as provided by Article 7 of DTAA and the exclusion clause clearly
depicts the intention of the authors of the treaty not to treat the shipping
profits at par with the business profits. As a result, for the purpose of
Article 22, Article 22 cannot apply as the profits arising from the operation
of ships cannot be treated as an item not dealt with in the preceding articles
of the treaty.

The AAR noted the commentary on UNMC and Prof. Klaus Vogel,
which was brought to the notice of the AAR by the applicant, on the rationale
of the provision of reserving the right of taxation to the country of
residence in respect of aircraft and shipping operations. The AAR however
contended that in the absence of clear words in the Indo Swiss Treaty, the
shipping profits could not be placed at par with international air transport.


levitra

S. 263 — Assessing Officer adopted one of the permissible view — Such order cannot be said to be erroneous.

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Part A: Reported Decisions


(2010) 126 ITD 141 (Bang.)

Siemens Public Communication Networks Ltd. v. CIT

A.Y. : 2003-04. Dated : 16-1-2009

20. Provision of warranty created on accrual basis
is an allowable expenditure.

S. 263 — Assessing Officer adopted one of the
permissible view — Such order cannot be said to be erroneous.

Notional income cannot be considered for deduction
u/s.10B as the assessee is the same.

Facts:

The assessee created provision for warranty on
accrual basis on the last day of each quarter. The actual warranty-related
expenses were adjusted against the provision. The assessee claimed the provision
for warranty as expenditure in its computation of income. The Assessing Officer
allowed the assessee’s claim. The CIT invoked S. 263 and disallowed the
provision for warranty.

The main contention of the assessee was that
provision for warranty was made on the basis of past experience. It placed
reliance on the decision of Wipro-GE Medical Systems Ltd. v. DCIT, (81 TTJ 455)
(Bang.).

Held:

Following the decision of CIT v. Wipro GE Medical
Systems, (supra), the provision for warranty was held to be an allowable
expenditure.

The Tribunal further held that the Assessing
Officer had adopted one of the permissible views. An order is not erroneous or
prejudicial to the interest of Revenue, unless the view taken by the AO is
unsustainable in law.

Facts:

The assessee company had two units — SCS & TCM. SCS
unit’s income was exempt u/s.10B. The company maintains a common bank account
where the amounts received by both the units are deposited. As such no separate
balance sheets for both the units were prepared. The amounts received were
identified by the invoices in the name of respective units and necessary entries
passed in accounts maintained in SAP. Hence it was natural that the funds earned
by S. 10B unit were also utilised by non-10B unit. Based on the fund
utilisation, a monthly cross-charge interest at a suitable rate of interest was
made. Hence, the surplus funds which were available from the EOU have been used
by the other unit. The assessee booked a notional interest income in the account
of EOU unit and claimed expenditure u/s.10B for the said interest income.

Held:

The interest income booked by the assessee is only
a cross entry. As such the assessee has not earned any interest income. The
assessee is the same. There is no relationship of borrower or lender. Such
interest derived on notional basis cannot be considered for the purpose of
deduction u/s.10B.

Note : Though the judgment as regards second issue is
against the assessee, it discusses an important aspect of notional income which
cannot be taxed as the assessee remains the same.


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Deeming fiction in S. 50C in respect of the words ‘full value of consideration’ applicable only to S. 48 — Meaning of full value of consideration in Explanation to S. 54F(1) not governed by S. 50C — For S. 54F, sale deed value is the full value of conside

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Part A: Reported Decisions



(2010) 45 DTR (JP) (Trib) 41

Gyan Chand Batra v. ITO

A.Y. : 2006-07. Dated : 13-8-2010

 

19. Deeming fiction in S. 50C in respect of the
words ‘full value of consideration’ applicable only to S. 48 — Meaning of full
value of consideration in Explanation to S. 54F(1) not governed by S. 50C — For
S. 54F, sale deed value is the full value of consideration.

Facts :

The assessee had sold a plot of land for sale
consideration of Rs.10.81 lac and declared a long-term capital gain of Rs.5,558.
The AO invoked provisions of S. 50C and the full consideration was taken as
Rs.19,24,987 and reworked capital gain accordingly.

The assessee has purchased a flat within a period
of two years from the date of transfer of the plot. The assessee has made total
investment of Rs.21,14,986, out of which Rs.16.74 lac was paid before the date
of filing of return for concerned assessment year. Therefore, before the learned
CIT(A), the assessee contended that the assessee may be allowed relief u/s.54F
by considering the full value of the consideration as shown by the assessee in
the sale deed as compared to the full value of consideration adopted by the AO
in view of S. 50C of the Act. The learned CIT(A) rejected the claim of the
assessee by observing that the assessee had not claimed S. 54F deduction at the
time of filing of return of income or during the course of assessment
proceedings. Further, the learned CIT(A) held that the availability of deduction
u/s.54F is subject to fulfilment of various conditions and those conditions were
not fulfilled by the assessee.

Held :

The deeming fiction as provided in S. 50C in
respect of the words, ‘full value of consideration’ is to be applied only for S.
48 of the Income-tax Act. The words ‘full value of consideration’ as mentioned
in other provisions of the Act are not governed by the meaning as provided in S.
50C. For the meaning of full value of consideration as mentioned in different
provisions of the Act except in S. 48, one will have to consider the full value
of consideration as specified in the sale deed.

For claiming exemption u/s.54F, net consideration
received upon transfer of original asset is compared with the cost of the new
asset. In Explanation to S. 54F(1), it is mentioned that net consideration means
the full value of consideration received or accruing as a result of the transfer
of the capital asset as reduced by any expenditure incurred wholly and
exclusively in connection with such transfer. The meaning of full value of
consideration in Explanation to S. 54F(1) will not be governed by meaning of
words ‘full value of consideration’ as mentioned in S. 50C. In the instant case,
the cost of new asset is not less than the net consideration as per sale deed,
thus the whole of the capital gains will not be charged even if the capital
gains have been computed by adopting the value adopted by the stamp registration
authority.

The decision of Goetze (India) Ltd. v. CIT, (2006)
204 CTR (SC) 182 restricts the power of the AO to entertain the claim for
deduction otherwise than by revised return and did not impinge on the power of
the Tribunal u/s.254 of the Act. In the instant case, the assessee has claimed
the deduction u/s.54F before the learned CIT(A) and the learned CIT(A) has
entertained such claim. Therefore, the issue of claim can be considered.

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Security deposit received from the licensee with a view to secure due performance of its obligations under the leave-and-licence agreement is in the nature of loan and is in the capital field — Forfeiture of such security deposit upon premature terminatio

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Part A: Reported Decisions



(2010) 44 DTR (Mumbai) (Trib.) 124

ACIT v. Das & Co.

A.Y. : 2003-04. Dated : 27-8-2009

 

18. Security deposit received from the licensee
with a view to secure due performance of its obligations under the
leave-and-licence agreement is in the nature of loan and is in the capital field
— Forfeiture of such security deposit upon premature termination of lease does
not partake the character of income as a capital receipt cannot be said to have
converted itself into a trading receipt on signing of the termination agreement.

Facts :

The assessee was into the business of warehousing,
property leasing, trading in chemical and textile auxiliaries. The assessee
entered into a leave-and-licence agreement with Concord Motors Ltd., a
subsidiary of Tata Motors Ltd. for a period of two terms of three years each. A
lock-in period of five years and six months was provided in the agreement. The
lease rent was treated as business income. During the assessment year under
consideration, the agreement was terminated prematurely by the licensee when 16
months were still remaining out of the lock-in period. On termination of the
lease, the assessee forfeited the interest-free security deposit received by it
from the licensee which was for an amount of Rs.1.50 crore under a separate
security deposit agreement and Rs.5 lakh under a leave-and-licence agreement.
Further, the assessee had received an amount of Rs.24,37,500 as damages for
premature termination from the licensee. This amount was paid on account of
hardship and inconvenience suffered by the assessee as damages. The assessee
treated entire receipt as capital receipt. The AO treated it as revenue receipts
and as taxable income. Upon further appeal, the CIT(A) upheld the order of the
AO.

Held :

A perusal of the terms of agreements clearly shows
that the security deposit is a capital receipt. The deposit is not in the nature
of advance for goods or services, nor could it be qualified as in relation to
the rental component. It is in the nature of loan and is in the capital field.
On a perusal of the termination agreement, it is clear that the forfeiture of
security deposit in question is not in lieu of rental payments and the assessee
is not in default. The forfeiture of security deposit does not partake the
character of income, because a capital receipt cannot be said to have converted
itself into a trading receipt on signing the agreement.

In a decision of Morely (Inspector of Taxes) v.
Tattersall, (1939) 7 ITR 316 (CA), it is clearly laid down that the quality and
nature of receipt for income-tax purpose are fixed once and for all when it is
received and that it does not change its character subsequently. This decision
has been followed in the case of K.M.S. Lakshmanier & Sons v. CIT, (1953) 23 ITR
202 (SC) and it has been observed that one of the conditions is that it is to be
adjusted against a claim arising out of a possible default of a depositor,
cannot alter the character of the transaction or the fact that the purpose for
which the deposit is made is to provide a security for the due performance of a
collateral contract, cannot invest the deposit with a different character. It
remains a loan of which the repayment in full is conditioned by the due
fulfilment of obligations under the collateral contract.

In a subsequent decision of CIT v. T.V. Sundaram
Iyengar & Sons Ltd., (1996) 222 ITR 344 (SC), the above decision of Morely
(Inspector of Taxes) v. Tattersall was considered and held that if an amount is
received in the course of trading transaction, even though it is not taxable in
the year of receipt as being of revenue character, the amount changes its
character when the amount becomes the assessee’s own money because of limitation
or by any other statutory or contractual right. In the case on hand, the
original receipt was in the nature of a loan and never had a revenue character
as it was not at any time a trading receipt as in the case of T.V. Sundaram
Iyengar & Sons.

Further, in the case of Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. v.
CIT, (2003) 261 ITR 501 (Bom.), it is held that subsequent waiver of principal
amount of loan was not assessable u/s.28(iv) of the Act.

Therefore, the forfeiture of security deposit
amounting to Rs.1.55 crore is not taxable. However, the payment of lump sum
consideration of Rs.24.37 lac is in lieu of the rents and is in the revenue
field unlike the remission of a loan liability. Therefore the same was rightly
taxed as such.

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S. 80IB(10) — Merely because some flats are larger than 1500 sq. feet, the assessee will not lose the benefit in its entirety — Only with reference to the flats which have area more than the prescribed area the assessee will lose the benefit — While compu

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Part A: Reported Decisions



(2010) TIOL 619 ITAT-Bang.

SJR Builders v. ACIT

ITA No. 1192/Bang./2008

A.Y. : 2005-06. Dated : 21-8-2009

 

17. S. 80IB(10) — Merely because some flats are
larger than 1500 sq. feet, the assessee will not lose the benefit in its
entirety — Only with reference to the flats which have area more than the
prescribed area the assessee will lose the benefit — While computing the
built-up area of 1500 sq. feet for the purpose of deduction u/s.80IB(10), the
mezzanine floor and common areas are to be excluded.

Facts :

The assessee firm was engaged in the construction
and real estate business. In the return of income filed, the assessee claimed
deduction u/s.80IB(10) in respect of the projects developed and built by it. The
Assessing Officer (AO) in a survey action found that some of the flats in the
project undertaken by the assessee, in respect of which deduction u/s.80IB(10)
was claimed were more than 1500 sq. feet. He held that the assessee was not
entitled to the benefit of S. 80IB(10).

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to
CIT(A) who confirmed the disallowance made by the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the
Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal held that the assessee is entitled to
deduction u/s.80IB(10) to the extent of flats the built-up area of which is not
more than 1500 sq. feet. In respect of penthouses, the built-up area of which
was more than 1500 sq. feet, the Tribunal held that they may be excluded for
exemption. The Tribunal held that in the light of the decision of the Special
Bench in the case of Brahma Associates, merely because some flats are larger
than 1500 sq. feet the assessee will not lose the benefit in its entirety. It
held that the assessee will lose the benefit only with reference to the flats
which have area more than the prescribed area. It also held that while
considering the built-up area of 1500 sq. feet for the purpose of exemption
u/s.80IB(10), the mezzanine floor and common areas are to be excluded. It
directed the AO accordingly.

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