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(2011) 132 ITD 122 (Mum.) Amartara Plastics (P) ltd. v ACIT Assessment Year: 2005-06 Date of order: 19-01-2011

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Section 26B – Revision – Erroneous and prejudicial order-Computation of book profit u/s. 115JB – When the AO passed the assessment order; clause (i) to Expln.1 to section 115JB was not on the statute book – Order u/s. 263 cannot be passed on an issue that is debatable and hence cannot hold that the order passed by the AO is erroneous.

Facts:
The Assessee was a private limited company that had filed a return for A.Y. 2005-06 on 31st Oct, 2005 declaring Total Income as ‘Nil’. The said return was selected for scrutiny and assessment was completed u/s. 143(3) of the Act. The AO determined the Total Income of the assessee under normal provisions as ‘Nil’ and book profit u/s. 115JB as (–) Rs.26,71,922. This Loss included a provision for bad & doubtful debts of Rs.35, 95,508 allowed by the AO. Subsequently, the learned CIT exercised his revisionary powers u/s. 263 of the Act, holding the order passed by the AO as erroneous and prejudicial to revenue. He set aside the order of the AO with a direction to recompute the book profits after adding back provision for doubtful debts.

Held:
The revisionary power u/s. 263 can be exercised only if the CIT considers any order to be erroneous in so far as it is prejudicial to the interest of the revenue. The order passed by the AO allowing the provision for bad and doubtful debts was not erroneous and was in agreement with past Supreme Court judgments that provisions for bad and doubtful debts did not constitute a liability. Further, the clause (i) to explanation 1 to section 115JB was not on statute when the AO passed the order u/s. 143(3) as well as when the learned CIT exercised his power u/s. 263. Hence, the learned CIT did not have any ground to invoke his power u/s. 263 to enhance, modify, cancel or direct a fresh assessment.

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(2011) 132 ITD 98 ACIT v Rolta India Ltd (Mum) (TM) A.Y 1998-99 Date of Order: 04-06-2010

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Section 148 – Reopening of assessment is void ab intio when initiated merely on the fact that the issue was not specifically dealt with in the assessment order.

Facts:
The assessee company had developed a computer software technology internally, which was capitalised in the books of account and claimed as revenue expenditure in the return of income. The assessing officer during the assessment proceedings, had raised a specific query on allowability of expenditure on computer software. The assessee wrote a letter for the same to the AO giving justification and the relevant facts. There was no specific reference to this issue in the assessment order.

Subsequently, the AO was in receipt of the audit report from the revenue audit party, stating that he had completely overlooked the above mentioned facts and legal position in the given case. The AO then issued notice u/s. 148 based on the above finding.

The assessee then challenged the initiation of the proceedings u/s. 147/148 on the basis of reasons recorded by the AO.

Held:
Merely because the issue on which the notice was issued was not specifically dealt with in the assessment order does not give the AO jurisdiction to reopen the assessment, unless there is tangible material before him to come to the conclusion that there is escapement of income.

When no specific reference to the issue was made in the order, it is presumed that the AO had formed an opinion about the allowability of software expenses as revenue expenditure while completing the assessment u/s. 143(3).

The issue was squarely covered by the judgement of the Supreme Court in CIT v Kelvinator of India Ltd. whereby it was held that mere change of opinion by the AO cannot be taken as the “reason to believe” u/s. 147 to reopen the assessment.

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Undisclosed income: Reference to valuation officer: Ss. 69B and 142A: A. Y. 2007-08: When the books of account in respect of construction are maintained and the same are not rejected, the matter could not be referred to the DVO for assessing the value:

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[CIT Vs. Chohan Resorts; 253 CTR 106 (P&H):]

In the balance sheet filed along with the return of income for the A. Y. 2007-08, the assessee had shown investment of Rs. 5,73,000/- in the land account and Rs. 47,43,576/- in the building account. The Assessing Officer referred the case to the Departmental Valuation Officer(DVO) to determine the cost of construction. The DVO assessed the cost of the property at Rs. 1,02,54,500/-. The assessees furnished the copy of its building account as per its books of account along with the copies of the bills of items used in the building and vouchers on account of labour paid. The Assessing officer made an addition of Rs. 55,12,930/- u/s. 69B of the Act, being the difference of the cost shown in the books and the value determined by the DVO. The Tribunal deleted the addition.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Punjab and Haryana High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) In the present case, we find that the Tribunal decided the matter rightly in favour of the assessee in as much as the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the assessing authority could not have referred the matter to the DVO without the books of account being rejected.

ii) In the present case, a categorical finding is recorded by the Tribunal that the books were never rejected. In the circumstances, reliance placed on the report of the DVO was misconceived.

iii) Learned counsel for the Revenue was unable to justify that when the books of account in respect of cost of construction have been maintained by the assessee and the same were not rejected, how the matter could be referred to the DVO for assessing the value. Wherever the books of account are maintained with respect to the cost of construction, the matter can be referred to the DVO after the books of account are rejected by the Revenue on some legal or justified basis. In the absence of the same, the reference to the DVO cannot be upheld.

iv) In view of the above, we do not find any substance in the appeal. Dismissed.”

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Refunds, TDS effect etc.: Section 245 of: General problems faced by the taxpayers: Directions by Delhi High Court:

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[Court On Its Own Motion Vs. CIT; (2012) 25 taxman. com 131 (Del):]

By way of suo moto public interest writ petition, the Delhi High Court considered the general problems faced by the taxpayers specially small taxpayers/ individuals regarding issue of refunds, which are denied on the basis of wrong or bogus demand or incorrect record maintenance and the problem faced by them in getting full credit of the tax, which is deducted from their income and paid to the Revenue.

The Revenue/Income tax department, had filed counter-affidavit and acknowledged and accepted that the taxpayers are facing difficulties in receiving credit of Tax Deducted at Source (TDS for short). It is also accepted that taxpayers are facing difficulties in getting refunds on account of adjustment towards arrears.

In the counter-affidavit, steps taken by the revenue to eliminate and rectify the problems and difficulties faced by the taxpayers were mentioned. It is stated that changes in the software and the procedure have been made or are being undertaken so that the problems, glitches and difficulties are eliminated.

The High Court held/directed as under:


“1. Problems faced by taxpayers

1.1 The problems faced by the taxpayers can be broadly classified into two categories. Firstly, failure and difficulties in getting credit of TDS paid. The said amount is deducted from the income earned by the assessee, but even for several reasons not attributable to the taxpayers, they are denied credit. The second category consists of adjustment of past demands or arrears of the tax from the refund payable. The two problems have to be addressed and tackled separately.

1.2 With regard to the second category, it is noticed that the Income Tax Department has initiated process of centralised computerisation of records, centralised computerised filing and processing of returns and issue of refunds, which is to be appreciated and is laudable. The problem is not for the said reason, but because of the wrong and incorrect data uploaded in the centralised computer system. In the counter-affidavit, it is stated that the Assessing Officers were asked to carry out physical verification of the past demands and to create manual arrears D&CR for up to the financial year 2010-11 vide Board’s letter dated 28-4-2010. This was followed by several other letters written by the Board, wherein it was emphasised that the Assessing Officer must verify and correct the arrears recorded in the D&CR. This was necessary as the arrears or demands were to be uploaded in the Central Processing Unit (CPU) at Bengaluru. In the counter affidavit, it is stated that more than 46.23 lakh entries of demand aggregating to Rs. 2.33 lakh crore for the period prior to 1-4-2010, were uploaded on CPU arrear/demand portal pursuant to the information uploaded/furnished by the Assessing Officers.

2. Applicability of section 245

Section 245 envisages prior intimation to the assessee, so that he can respond before any adjustment of refund is made towards a “demand” relating to any other assessment year. Thus, the opportunity of response/reply is given and after considering the stand and plea of the assessee, an order/direction for adjustment when justified and proper is made. The section postulates and mandates a two stage action. Prior intimation, and then a subsequent action when warranted and necessary of adjustment, of the refund towards arrears.

3. Stand taken by revenue in counter-affidavit

3.1 In the counter-affidavit, the revenue had accepted that when a return is processed u/s. 143(1), the CPU itself adjusts the refund due against the existing demand i.e. there is adjustment, but without following the procedure prescribed u/s. 245, which requires prior intimation so that the assessees can respond or give their explanation. It is also stated in the said affidavit that 14.6 lakh communications have been sent by e-mail and 8.33 lakh communications have been sent through speed posts making adjustments of refunds. The total amount adjusted as per the letter dated 21-8-2012 is Rs. 4800 crore.

3.2 At this stage, it is stated that in very few cases prior intimation was sent and the procedure prescribed u/s. 245 was not followed. It is further submitted that in cases where prior intimation was given, the assessees were required to get in touch with the Assessing Officer and file response. But the Assessing Officer did not accept the reply/response on the ground that the assessee should approach CPU, Bengaluru. At the same time, CPU, Bengaluru did not accept the reply/ response on the ground that the assessee should approach the Assessing Officer. It is submitted that the procedure is contrary to statute as an order of adjustment after issue of prior intimation has to be passed by the Assessing Officer. The difference between the first and second stage is being obliterated and the section violated.

4. Directions issued to department

4.1 The department will file an affidavit in this regard explaining the true and correct position. They shall clearly indicate whether prior intimation was sent before adjustment or with the first intimation itself adjustment was made and in how many cases prior intimation was sent or was not sent before making adjustments. They shall also indicate the procedure followed, if an assessee wants to file or has filed a response/reply pursuant to the prior intimation and whether such responses are/were entertained, examined, verified and opinion of the Assessing Officers are/ were taken. It shall be stated whether any adjustment order is subsequently passed by the Assessing Officer.

4.2 Thus, interim directions were issued to the department that they shall in future follow the procedure prescribed u/s. 245 before making any adjustment of refund payable by the CPU at Bengaluru. The assessees must be given an opportunity to file response or reply and the reply will be considered and examined by the Assessing Officer before any direction for adjustment is made. The process of issue of prior intimation and service thereof on the assessee will be as per the law. The assessees will be entitled to file their response before the Assessing Officer mentioned in the prior intimation. The Assessing Officer will thereafter examine the reply and communicate his findings to the CPU, Bengaluru, who will then process the refund and adjust the demand, if any payable. CBDT can fix a time limit for communication of findings by the Assessing Officer. The final adjustment will also be communicated to the assessees.

5. Computerised adjustment of refund without following procedure prescribed u/s. 245

This brings to the problem where adjustments of refund has been made by the CPU, Bengaluru, without following the procedure prescribed u/s. 245 and adjustment has been made for non-existing or fictitious demands. Obviously, the Revenue cannot take a stand that they can make adjustments contrary to the procedure prescribed u/s. 245 based on the wrong data uploaded by the Assessing Officers as question of payment of interest also arises. However, before issuing final directions in this regard, an affidavit as directed above explaining the procedure adopted by them should be brought on record. Opportunity must be given to the Revenue, to adopt a just and fair procedure to rectify and correct their records and issue refunds with interest, without putting a harsh burden and causing inconvenience to the assessee.

6. Problem relating to failure of taxpayers to get credit of TDS
6.1 This brings to the first problem relating to the failure of the taxpayers to get credit of the TDS, which has been deducted from the income pay-able/paid to them. The said problem can be further bifurcated into two categories. The first category relates to cases where the amount is reflected in Form 26AS, but because of incorrect entries in the return or small mismatch with the return data, the taxpayers do not get credit. The second category pertains to the cases where the TDS has been deducted by the deductor, but the taxpayer has been denied and deprived credit for the failure of the deductor to correctly upload the TDS return or details. Thus, the taxpayers do not get credit of the same in spite of payment. Thus, they are forced and compelled to make double tax payment.

6.2 The magnitude of the problem can be under-stood and appreciated, as it is stated that in the financial years 2010-11 and 2011-12, as many as 43% and 39% of the returns processed in Delhi charge were found to be defective. The total demand in Delhi Zone of Rs.3000 crore (approximately) for the financial year 2010-11 was created and the same became arrears payable in the next financial years. After rectification of applications and consequent corrective orders, the figure has come down to Rs.1900 crore, which is still a substantial amount.

6.3 Most of the assessees have a grievance that in spite of writing letters to the deductors to rectify and correct the TDS details, the deductors fail and neglect to do so, as the failure does not entail any adverse consequence or action against them. The deductee being the taxpayer is out of pocket and is harassed, but the deductor does not suffer, when the deductee does not get benefit of the tax paid. The response given by the Revenue is that (i) When returns are processed u/s. 200A by TDS Assessing Officers, the deductors are informed about the errors in such returns. In case of failure to correct such errors by the deductors, no penal provision is provided under the Act. They can only be persuaded to correct such errors. (ii) While processing returns at CPU if any TDS credit claimed by the taxpayer in the return doesn’t match with the details uploaded by the deductor list of such mismatches is sent to the tax deductors total of 20119 such communications had been issued by CPU up to April 2011. A deductorwise consolidated list of such mismatches are sent from CPU to the CIT (TDS) having jurisdiction over the deductor for necessary follow-up with the deductors.

6.4 The response is unconvincing and unsatisfactory. It expresses complete helplessness on the part of the Revenue to take steps and seeks to absolve them from any responsibility.

7.    Applicability of section 272BB

Attention is drawn towards section 272BB, wherein penalty of Rs. 10,000 has been prescribed for failures on the part of the deductor. The Board will examine the said provision and whether the same can be invoked in cases where complaints are received from the taxpayers that in spite of requests, the deductors fail to rectify the defects or upload the correct TDS details. Denying benefit of TDS to a taxpayer because of fault of the deductor, which is not attributable to the deductee, is a serious matter and causes unwar-ranted harassment and inconvenience. Revenue cannot be a silent spectator and wash their hands or express helplessness. This problem is normally faced by the small taxpayers including senior citizens as they do not have Chartered Accountants and Advocates on their pay roles. The marginal amount involved compared to the efforts, costs and frustration, makes it an unviable and a futile exercise to first approach the deductor and then the Assessing Officer. Rectification and getting the corrections done and to get them uploaded is not easy. Most of the assessees will and do write letters, but without response and desired results. This aspect must be examined by the Board and appropriate steps to ameliorate and help the small taxpayers including senior citizens, should be taken and implemented.


8.    Conclusion

There can be small and insignificant mismatches, which if purely technical should be condoned or ignored. After, all tax has been paid or credited in the name of the assessee. Once the amount is correctly and rightly reflected in Form AS26, small or technical mismatch in the return should not be a ground to deny credit of the amount paid. In such cases, if the Assessing Officer feels that benefit of TDS reflected in AS26 should not be given, he should issue notice to the assessee to revise or correct the mistake and only if the necessary rectification or correction is not made, an order u/s. 143(1) should be passed and the demand should be raised. We issue an interim direction to this effect.”

Penalty: Search and seizure: Section 158BFA(2): Addition on estimate basis: Penalty u/s. 158BFA(2) not justified:

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[CIT Vs. Dr. Giriraj Agarwal Giri; 253 CTR 109 (Raj):]

In the assessment pursuant to search, an addition of Rs. 4,82,028 was made on estimate. The Assessing Officer also imposed a penalty of Rs. 2,89,217/- u/s. 258BFA(2) . CIT(A) deleted the penalty and the same was upheld by the Tribunal.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Rajasthan High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) So far as the case law referred by the learned counsel for the appellant is concerned, it is sufficient to mention that Hon’ble Apex Court in UOI Vs. Dharmendra Textile Processors; 219 CTR 617 (SC), was dealing with the provisions of Central Excise Act, 1944 and learned counsel for appellant is unable to point out that the provisions of section 11AC of Central Excise Act, 1944 and section 158BFA(2) of IT Act are pari materia.

ii) That apart, it is also relevant to mention that imposition of penalty depends on facts and circumstances of each case. In the present case, the AO imposed the penalty on so-called three items of so-called concealed income. Each item was examined, thoroughly and in detail, by CIT(A) as well as Tribunal and by a reasoned order, both came to the conclusion that additions are based on estimation only.

iii) A fact or allegation based on estimation, cannot be said to be correct only, it can be incorrect also. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, penalty was wrongly imposed by the AO.”

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Deduction u/s. 10A: A. Y. 2006-07: Deduction to be given at the stage of computing the profits and gains of business: Brought forward unabsorbed depreciation and losses of non-10A units cannot be set off against current profit of 10A unit:

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[CIT Vs. Black and Veatch Consulting Pvt. Ltd.; 348 ITR 72 (Bom):]

Dealing with the provisions of section 10A, the Tribunal held that the deduction u/s. 10A in respect of the allowable unit u/s. 10A has to be allowed, before setting off brought forward losses of a nonsection 10A unit.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) Section 10A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, is a provision which is in the nature of a deduction and not an exemption. The deduction u/s. 10A has to be given effect to, at the stage of computing the profits and gains of business. This is anterior to the application of section 72, which deals with the carry forward and set off of business losses.

ii) A distinction has been made by the Legislature while incorporating the provisions of Chapter VI-A. Section 80A(1) stipulates that in computing the total income of an assessee, there shall be allowed from his gross total income, in accordance with and subject to the provisions of the Chapter, the deductions specified in sections 80C to 80U. Section 80B(5) defines for the purposes of Chapter VIA “gross total income” to mean the total income computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act, before making any deduction under the Chapter. Therefore, the deduction u/s. 10A has to be given at the stage, when the profits and gains of business are computed in the first instance.

iii) The Tribunal was right in holding that the deduction u/s. 10A in respect of the allowable unit u/s. 10A has to be allowed before setting off brought forward losses of a non-section 10A unit.”

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Sony India Pvt. Ltd. v. ACIT ITAT ‘G’ Bench, Delhi Before C. L. Sethi (JM) and K. G. Bansal (AM) ITA Nos. 4008/Del./2010 and 4994/Del./2010 A.Ys.: 2005-06 and 2006-07 Decided on: 8-4-2011 Counsel for assessee/revenue: N. Venkat Raman & Ors./Gajanand Meena & Ors.

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Sections 35DDA, 37, Rule 2BA — Deduction u/s.35DDA for expenditure on voluntary retirement cannot be denied on the ground that the scheme is not in accordance with the guidelines prescribed u/s.10(10C) read with Rule 2BA.

Facts:
The assessee was engaged in manufacturing and trading business. During the previous year relevant to A.Y. 2005-06 the assessee, as a part of restructuring of its business, closed down the manufacturing operations of its unit at Dharuhera. A voluntary retirement scheme known as ‘Employees Voluntary Retirement Scheme — 2004’ was framed which was applicable only to the employees of the closed unit. One-fifth of the expenditure incurred on voluntary retirement was claimed as a deduction u/s.35DDA.

The Assessing Officer (AO) disallowed the claim on the ground that since the scheme was not framed in accordance with Rule 2BA, the scheme is not VRS but a substitution of retrenchment compensation payable to the employees and hence the provisions of section 35DDA are not applicable. As regards the allowability of the expenditure u/s.37 he held that deduction can be allowed u/s.37(1) only in respect of those expenses which are incurred for the purposes of business. This, according to the AO, pre-supposes that the business continues to be carried on by the assessee. Since the expenditure under consideration was incurred in the closure of business or the transfer of business, the AO held that the same is not deductible u/s.37.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who held that the expenditure under consideration was incurred in terms of VRS and was not in the nature of retrenchment compensation. However, he held that the expenditure is not allowable u/s.35DDA since the VRS of the assessee did not comply with the conditions laid down by Rule 2BA.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where it was contended that the Department has not challenged the finding of the CIT(A) that the expenditure is not in the nature of retrenchment compensation but is an expenditure on VRS and therefore such a finding has become final.

Held:

The Tribunal, for the following reasons, held the scheme of the assessee to be VRS, to which the provisions of section 35DDA are applicable:

(a) the deletion of conditionalities originally incorporated in the Bill shows that the legislative amendment was not to incorporate all the conditions of section 10(10C) in section 35DDA;

(b) the Legislature left the scheme of voluntary retirement open ended and did not place any restriction on the scheme. Thus, plain language of the provision supports the case of the assessee;

(c) it is not a case of taking guidance from a definition section;

(d) for sustaining the arguments of the learned DR, the provision contained in section 35DDA will have to be modified by incorporating a part of section 10(10C) in it. In our view, such an incorporation does not find support from any rule of construction stated before us.

The expenditure under consideration was held to be allowable u/s.35DDA.

As regards allowability u/s.37(1) of the Act, the Tribunal held that the assessee was required to prove that the closed unit was a part and parcel of the same business of the assessee. It stated that in order to give a finding, the assessee was required to prove that common control and management; interlinking of finances; common employees, no material effect of closure of the business on other businesses. Since the requisite material to give these findings was not on record the Tribunal did not give its finding on this aspect.

The appeal filed by the assessee on this ground was allowed.

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Nayan Builders & Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. ITO ITAT ‘B’ Bench, Mumbai Before R. S. Syal (AM) and Asha Vijayaraghavan (JM) ITA No. 2379/M/2009 A.Y.: 1997-98. Decided on: 18-3-2011 Counsel for assessee/revenue: Sanjiv M. Shah/Hari Govind Singh

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Section 271(1)(c) — Penalty u/s.271(1)(c) cannot be levied with respect to an addition which has been admitted by the High Court as a substantial question of law.

Facts:
The Assessing Officer (AO) levied penalty u/s.271(1) (c) in respect of additions to total income of the assessee of Rs.1,04,76,050 towards income from Spectrum Corporate Services Ltd., disallowance of brokerage of Rs.10,79,221 and disallowance of legal fees of Rs.2,00,000 which additions were upheld by the Tribunal.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who upheld the action of the AO.

Aggrieved by the order passed by the CIT(A) the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
Having noted that the additions in respect of which the penalty was levied have been held by the jurisdictional High Court as involving a substantial question of law, the Tribunal held that when the High Court admits a substantial question of law on an addition, it becomes apparent that the addition is certainly debatable. In such circumstances, penalty u/s.271(1)(c) cannot be levied. The admission of substantial question of law by the High Court lends credence to the bona fides of the assessee in claiming the deduction. Once it turns out that the claim of the assessee could have been considered for deduction as per a person properly instructed in law and is not completely debarred, the mere fact of confirmation of disallowance would not per se lead to the imposition of penalty.

The Tribunal ordered deletion of the penalty. The Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by the assessee.

Cases referred to:
(i) Rupam Mercantile v. DCIT, (2004) 91 ITD 237 (Ahd.) (TM)

(ii) Smt. Ramila Ratilal Shah v. ACIT, (1998) 60 TTJ 171 (Ahd.)

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Synergy Entrepreneur Solutions Pvt. Ltd. v. DCIT ITAT ‘J’ Bench, Mumbai Before D. K. Agarwal (JM) and Pramod Kumar (AM) ITA No. 3076/M/2010 A.Y.: 2005-2006. Decided on: 31-3-2011

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Counsel for assessee/revenue: Arvind Dalal/ Sumeet Kumar

Section 263 — Revision order, if passed for a reason not mentioned in the show-cause notice, is invalid.

Facts:
The assessee was engaged in share trading activity. The assessee had claimed set-off of trading losses against trading profits which set-off was accepted by the Assessing Officer (AO) in an order passed u/s.143(3) of the Act. The CIT issued a show-cause notice u/s.263 in which he claimed that share trading losses were speculation losses u/s.73 and the same could not be set off against trading income. The assessee, in response to show cause, clarified that the trading losses were eligible for being set off against trading profits. The CIT, without rejecting the claim of the assessee, passed an order u/s.263 on the ground that the AO had not taken the details to verify whether the profits and loss from future trading amounts to speculation profit or loss. He directed the AO to obtain complete details and conduct necessary enquiries and examine the same for the assessment year under consideration. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that the show-cause notice stated that the assessee was not eligible for set-off of losses on speculation transactions, whereas the revision has been on the ground that the AO did not make necessary verifications about the transactions. Relying on the ratio of the decision of the Tribunal in Maxpack Investments Ltd. v. ACIT, 13 SOT 67 (Del.) and the decision of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of CIT v. Jagadhri Electric Supply and Industrial Co. Ltd., 140 ITR 490 (P & H), the Tribunal held that if a ground of revision is not mentioned in the show-cause notice issued u/s.263, that ground cannot be made the basis of the order passed under the section, for the simple reason that the assessee would have had no opportunity to meet the point. The Tribunal quashed the order passed u/s.263 of the Act.

On merits, the Tribunal found the issue to be covered in favour of the assessee by the decision of the jurisdictional High Court in the case of CIT v. Lokmat Newspapers Pvt. Ltd., (322 ITR 43) (Bom.) wherein it has been held that irrespective of whether or not the profits on sale of shares arose from deliverybased trading or non-delivery-based trading, as long as the assessee is hit by Explanation to section 73, the entire profits will be deemed to be speculation profits and, accordingly, losses from non-deliverybased activity will also be eligible for set-off against profits from delivery-based transactions as well.

The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

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Housing project: Deduction u/s.80IB(10) of Income-tax Act, 1961: A.Y. 2003-04: Deduction allowable on whole of the income of the project which is approved as a ‘housing project’ by the local authority: Clause (d) inserted to section 80IB(10) w.e.f. 1-4-2005 is prospective and not retrospective.

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[CIT v. M/s. Brahma Associates (Bom.), ITA No. 1194 of 2010 dated 22-2-2011]

In this case, the following questions of law were raised before the Bombay High Court:

“(i) Whether in the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the ITAT was justified in holding that the deduction u/s. 80IB(10), as applicable prior to 1-4-2005 is admissible to a ‘Housing project’ comprising residential housing units and commercial establishments?

(ii) Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case and in law, the ITAT was justified in holding that a project having commercial area up to 10% of the project is eligible for deduction on the entire profits of the project u/s. 80IB(10) up to 1-4-2005?

(iii) Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case and in law, the ITAT was justified in holding that the projects wherein the commercial area is more than 10% of the project and the profits from the residential dwelling units in that project can be worked out separately, then subject to fulfilling other conditions, deduction on the profits relatable to the residential part of the project would be eligible for deduction u/s.80IB(10)?

(iv) Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case and in law, the ITAT was justified in holding that the limit on commercial use of built-up area as prescribed by clause (d) of section 80IB(10) has no retrospective application and it applies only w.e.f. the A.Y. 2005-06?”

The Bombay High Court answered the questions as under:

“(i) Up to 31-3-2005 (subject to fulfilling other conditions), deduction u/s.80IB(10) is allowable to housing projects approved by the local authority having residential units with commercial user to the extent permitted under the DC Rules/Regulations framed by the respective local authority.

(ii) In such a case, where the commercial user permitted by the local authority is within the limits prescribed under the DC Rules/ Regulations, the deduction u/s.80IB(10) up to 31-3-2005 would be allowable irrespective of the fact that the project is approved as ‘housing project’ or ‘residential plus commercial’.

(iii) In the absence of the provisions under the Income-tax Act, the Tribunal was not justified in holding that up to 31-3-2005 deduction u/s.80IB(10) would be allowable to the projects approved by the local authority having residential building with commercial user up to 10% of the total built-up area of the plot.

(iv) Since deductions u/s.80IB(10) is on the profits derived from the housing projects approved by the local authority as a whole, the Tribunal was not justified in restricting section 80IB(10) deduction only to a part of the project. However, in the present case, since the assessee has accepted the decision of the Tribunal in allowing section 80IB(10) deduction to a part of the project, we do not disturb the findings of the Tribunal in that behalf.

(e) Clause (d) inserted to section 80IB(10) w.e.f. 1-4-2005 is prospective and not retrospective and hence cannot be applied for the period prior to 1-4-2005.”

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The mechanism set up by Supreme Court requiring clearance of the Committee on Disputes in litigation between Ministry and Ministry of Government of India, Ministry and public sector undertakings of the Government of India and public sector undertakings between themselves and also in disputes involving the State Governments and their instrumentalities recalled.

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[Electronics Corporation of India Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 1883 of 2011 (arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 2538 of 2009) dated 17-2-2011]

By Order dated 11-9-1991, reported in 1992 Supp (2) SCC 432 (ONGC and Anr. v. CCE), the Supreme Court noted that “Public sector undertakings of Central Government and the Union of India should not fight their litigations in Court”. Consequently, the Cabinet Secretary, Government of India was “called upon to handle the matter personally”. This was followed by the order dated 11-10-1991 in 1995 Suppl. (4) SCC 541 (ONGC v. CCE) where the Supreme Court directed the Government of India “to set up a Committee consisting of representatives from the Ministry of Industry, Bureau of Public Enterprises and Ministry of Law, to monitor disputes between Ministry and Ministry of Government of India, Ministry and public sector undertakings of the Government of India and public sector undertakings between themselves, to ensure that no litigation came to a Court or to a Tribunal without the matter having been first examined by the Committee and its clearance for litigation”. Thereafter, in 2004 (6) SCC 437 (ONGC v. CCE) dated 7-1-1994, the Supreme Court directed that in the absence of clearance from the ‘Committee of Secretaries’ (CoS), any legal proceeding will not be proceeded with. This was subject to the rider that appeals and petitions filed without such clearance could be filed to save limitation. It was, however, directed that the needful should be done within one month from such filing, failing which the matter would not be proceeded with. By another order dated 20-7-2007, 2007 (7) SCC 39 (ONGC v. City & Industrial Development Corpn.) the Supreme Court extended the concept of Dispute Resolution by High-Powered Committee to amicably resolve the disputes involving the State Governments and their instrumentalities. The idea behind setting up of this Committee, initially, called a ‘High-Powered Committee’ (HPC), later on called as ‘Committee of Secretaries’ (CoS) and finally termed as ‘Committee on Disputes’ (CoD) was to ensure that resources of the State are not frittered away in inter se litigations between entities of the State, which could be best resolved by an empowered CoD. The machinery contemplated was only to ensure that no litigation came to Court without the parties having had an opportunity of conciliation before an in-house committee.

In CCE v. Bharat Petroleum Corporation, a two-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court held that the working of the COD had failed and that the time had come to revisit the law. The matter was referred to a Larger Bench for reconsideration.

The matter came up before a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court consisting of five Judges, which noted that :

Electronics Corporation of India Ltd. (‘assessee’ for short), is a Central Government Public Sector Undertaking (‘PSU’) under the control of Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India. A dispute had been raised by the Central Government (Ministry of Finance) by issuing show-cause notices to the assessee alleging that the Corporation was not entitled to avail/utilise Modvat/Cenvat credit in respect of inputs whose values stood written off. Accordingly it was proposed in the show-cause notices that the credit taken on inputs was liable to be reversed. Thus, the short point which arose for determination was whether the Central Government was right in insisting on reversal of credit taken by the assessee on inputs whose values stood written off. The Adjudicating Authority held that there was no substance in the contention of the assessee that the writeoff was made in terms of AS-2. The case of the assessee before the Commissioner of Central Excise (Adjudicating Authority) was that it was a financial requirement as prescribed in AS-2; that an inventory more than three years old had to be written off/ derated in value; that such derating in value did not mean that the inputs were unfunctionable; that the inputs were still lying in the factory and they were useful for production and therefore they were entitled to Modvat/Cenvat credit. As stated above, this argument was rejected by the Adjudicating Authority and the demand against the assessee stood confirmed. Against the order of the Adjudicating Authority, the assessee decided to challenge the same by filing an appeal before the CESTAT. Accordingly, the assessee applied before the Committee on Disputes (CoD). However, the CoD vide its decision dated 2-11-2006 refused to grant clearance, though in an identical case the CoD granted clearance to Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. (‘BHEL’). Accordingly, the assessee filed a writ petition No. 26573 of 2008 in the Andhra Pradesh High Court. The writ petition filed by the assessee stood dismissed. Against the order of the Andhra Pradesh High Court the assessee moved the Supreme Court by way of a special leave petition.

In a conjunct matter, Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (‘assessee’ for short) cleared the goods for sale at the outlets owned and operated by themselves known as company-owned and company-operated outlets. The assessee cleared the goods for sale at such outlets by determining the value of the goods cleared during the period February, 2000 to November, 2001 on the basis of the price at which such goods were sold from their warehouses to independent dealers, instead of determining it on the basis of the normal price and normal transaction value as per section 4(4) (b)(iii) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (‘1944 Act’ for short) read with Rule 7 of Central Excise Valuation (Determination of Price of Excisable Goods) Rules, 2000. In short, the price adopted by the assessee which is a PSU in terms of Administered Pricing Mechanism (‘APM’) formulated by Government of India stood rejected. The Tribunal came to the conclusion that the APM adopted by the assessee was in terms of the price fixed by the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas; that it was not possible for the assessee to adopt the price in terms of section 4(1)(a) of the 1944 Act; and that it was not possible to arrive at the transaction value in terms of the said section. Accordingly, the Tribunal allowed the appeal of the assessee. Aggrieved by the decision of the Tribunal, CCE went to the Supreme Court by way of Civil Appeal No. 1903 of 2008 in which the assessee preferred I.A. No. 4 of 2009 requesting the Court to dismiss the above Civil Appeal No. 1903 of 2008 filed by the Department on the ground that CoD had declined permission to the Department to pursue the said appeal.

The Supreme Court observed that the above two instances showed that the mechanism set up by the Supreme Court in its orders reported in (i) 1995 Suppl.(4) SCC 541 (ONGC v. CCE) dated 11-10- 1991; (ii) 2004 (6) SCC 437 (ONGC v. CCE) dated 7-1-1994; and (iii) 2007 (7) SCC 39 (ONGC v. City & Industrial Development Corpn.) dated 20-7-2007, needed reconsideration.

The Supreme Court held that whilst the principle and the object behind the aforestated orders was unexceptionable and laudatory, experience had shown that despite best efforts of the CoD, the mechanism has not achieved the results for which it was constituted and had in fact led to delays in litigation. The two examples given hereinabove indicated that on the same set of facts, clearance was given in one case and refused in the other. This has led a PSU to institute a SLP in the Supreme Court on the ground of discrimination. The mechanism had led to delay in filing of civil appeals causing loss of revenue. For example, in many cases of exemptions, the Industry Department gave exemption, while the same was denied by the Revenue Department. Similarly, with the enactment of regulatory laws in several cases there was overlapping of jurisdictions between authorities, such as SEBI and insurance regulator. Civil appeals lied to the Supreme Court. Stakes in such cases were huge. One could not possibly expect timely clearance by CoD. In such cases, grant of clearance to one and not to the other may result in generation of more and more litigation. The mechanism had outlived its utility. In the changed scenario indicated above, the Supreme Court was of the view that time had come under the above circumstances to recall the directions of this Court in its various Orders reported as (i) 1995 Supp (4) SCC 541, dated 11-10-1991, (ii) (2004) 6 SCC 437, dated 7-1-1994 and (iii) (2007) 7 SCC 39, dated 20-7-2007. In the circumstances, the said orders were recalled.

FINALITY OF PROCEEDINGS

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Issue for consideration: A lapse in a completed
assessment can be cured by the Assessing Officer by resorting to the
rectification or reassessment proceedings depending upon the nature of
the lapse. The remedy available to the Assessing Officer permits him to
proceed u/s.147 or u/s.154 for repairing the damage caused in assessing
the total income.

The existence of the information for the
belief that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment is the sine
qua non for reopening the assessment u/s.147 and discovery of an error
apparent on the record is the sine qua non for rectification u/s.154 of
the Act. These provisions are to be invoked in different circumstances,
but there can be situations where they overlap, and the AO can have
recourse to one or the other.

It is common to come across cases
where an Assessing Officer, faced with the dilemma of choosing between
the two remedies, decides to prefer one over the other and later on
drops the first and proceeds under the second. For example, an Assessing
Officer, dropping the proceedings u/s.154 initiated for curing the
lapse, later on initiates fresh proceedings u/s.147 for curing the same
lapse.

The question that arises in such circumstances is about
the validity of the second proceedings, having once exercised the option
available under the law and thereafter choosing to proceed under the
second option.

The Madras High Court has held that an option
once exercised attains finality and the Assessing Officer is barred from
availing the second remedy. However, The Kerala High Court recently has
held that there is no prohibition on an Assessing Officer proceeding
under the second remedy after dropping the first.

E.I.D. Parry
Limited’s case: The issue arose before the Madras High Court in the case
of CIT v. E.I.D. Parry Ltd., 216 ITR 489. In that case, the assessee, a
company, submitted its income-tax returns for the years 1968-69 and
1969- 70, which were, after enquiry, accepted by the AO and it was
accordingly assessed and subjected to tax. The AO reopened the
proceedings u/s.147(b) of the IT Act by issuing a notice u/s.148 and
substantially changed the assessments, resulting in a demand for tax, on
the basis of the finding that substantial income had escaped
assessment. Pending the adjudication of the appeal by the assessee, the
AO, not satisfied with the reopening u/s.147 and notwithstanding the
pendency of the appeal, took recourse to proceedings for rectification
of mistake u/s.154 of the Act, allegedly for rectification of mistake
apparent from the record.

The High Court observed that the
provisions for rectification of an error apparent from the record and
that for bringing to tax an escaped income were common features in the
tax laws, and they were to be invoked in different circumstances; that
the AO could have recourse to one or the other, but he must have
recourse to the appropriate provision having regard to the facts and
circumstances of each case; that in cases where the two appear to
overlap, the AO must choose one in preference to the other and proceed;
that the AO should not take one as the appropriate proceeding and give
it up at a later stage to have recourse to the other, since such
proceedings were quasi judicial and were intended for the same purpose.

The
Court held that in a case of overlapping remedies, constructive res
judicata and not the statutory inhibition, should make the AO desist
from using one proceeding after the other, instead of using one of the
two with due care and caution. Accordingly, the proceedings for
rectification u/s.154, initiated subsequent to reassessment proceedings
u/s.147, were held to be invalid and not sustainable in law.

India
Sea Foods’ case: The issue again came up for consideration of the
Kerala High Court recently, in ITA No. 128 of 2010 in the case of the
CIT v. India Sea Foods and was adjudged by the High Court vide its order
dated 17th January, 2011. In that case, the question raised in the
appeal filed by the Revenue was whether the AO could give up
rectification proceedings initiated u/s.154 and then proceed u/s.147 of
the Income-tax Act for the same assessment year on the ground that
income had escaped assessment.

In that case the return filed by
the assessee was processed u/s.143(1) and the deduction claimed on
export profit u/s.80HHC was allowed in terms of the claim. The AO later
noticed that excessive relief was granted while computing deduction
u/s.80HHC and, to repair the damage, he initiated the rectification
proceedings u/s.154 for withdrawal of the excess relief by issue of a
notice to the assessee u/s.154(3) of the Act. The AO did not proceed
with the rectification proceedings on receipt of the objections from the
assessee challenging the maintainability of the proceedings u/s.154,
inter alia, on the ground that there was no mistake apparent from the
record. The AO however, later on issued a notice u/s.148 proposing to
bring to tax the escaped income on account of the excess relief granted
u/s.80HHC of the Act.

In the course of the reassessment
proceedings initiated u/s.147, the assessee raised various objections,
including about the maintainability of the reopening u/s.147, by relying
on the decision of the Madras High Court in CIT v. E.I.D. Parry Ltd.
(supra). The AO overruled the objections and withdrew the excess relief
in the order of reassessment, against which the assessee filed an
appeal. The CIT (Appeals) allowed the appeal against which Revenue filed
appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal, by
upholding the finding of CIT (Appeals) based on the decision of the
Madras High Court to the effect that, after initiation of rectification
proceedings u/s.154, the AO did not have the jurisdiction to proceed to
reassess the escaped income u/s.147 of the Act. The Revenue preferred an
appeal before the Kerala High Court against the order of the Tribunal.

The
Court noted that there was no dispute that the notice u/s.148 was
issued within time and the reassessment also was completed u/s.147
within the statutory period. The question to be considered was whether
the initiation of proceedings u/s.154 and the dropping of the same
affected the validity of re-assessment u/s.147.

The Kerala High
Court expressed its inability to uphold the principle of constructive
res judicata invoked by the Madras High Court in income tax proceedings
for invalidating the subsequent proceedings initiated by the AO
successively. The Court held that the fact that the AO initiated
rectification proceedings u/s.154 did not mean that he should stick to
the same only, and proceed to issue orders as proposed; that the very
purpose of issuing a notice to the assessee was to give him an
opportunity to raise objection against the proceeding which included the
assessee’s right to question the maintainability of the rectification
proceedings. If the assessee convinced the Officer that rectification
was not permissible, the AO was absolutely free to give up the same and
see whether there was any other recourse open to him to achieve the
purpose i.e., to bring to tax the escaped income.

The Kerala High Court was unable to uphold the findings of the first Appellate Authority or the order of the Tribunal on the issue before it, as, in its view, if an assessment happened to be an under-assessment or a mistaken order, the course open to the AO was either to rectify the assessment if it was a mistake falling u/s.154 or to resort to section 147 for bringing to tax an income that had escaped assessment. The Court held that both these provisions were self-contained provisions, wherein conditions for invoking the powers, the procedure to be followed and the time limit within which orders were to be passed, were specified.

The Court allowed the appeal of the Revenue by vacating the orders of the Tribunal and that of the first Appellate Authority and restoring the order of reassessment passed by the AO.

Observations:

The Income-tax Act contains many instances wherein an aggrieved party is provided with alternative remedies, not all of which are mutually exclusive, for redressing the grievance. Depending upon the circumstances, the party has to select the most appropriate remedy. Each of the remedies, by and large, is self-contained and provides for the circumstances and the mechanism for availing the recourse thereunder. Most of them do not contain any overriding provision or a non-obstante clause, eliminating the possibility of the alternative course of action. All of them, without exception, however contain the circumstances in which the recourse under the particular provision is made available, and a failure to satisfy the terms of the provision disentitles the person from availing the benefit of the said provision.

The existence of the information for the belief that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment is the sine qua non for reopening an assessment u/s.147 and the discovery of a mistake apparent from the record is the sine qua non for a rectification u/s.154 of the Act. Usually, these provisions are to be invoked in different circumstances, but there can be situations where they overlap and the AO has the option to take recourse to one or the other. In choosing a particular remedy under the circumstances, the AO is expected to make an intelligent choice as an authority vested with the important power of assessing the total income of an assessee. The choice should be based on an application of mind and should be made after giving due weightage to the facts and circumstances of the case. The option should not be exercised in a routine manner.

In cases where recourse is open to the Assessing Officer to bring to tax escaped income, either by rectification or by way of reassessing the income that has escaped assessment, it is for the officer to choose between one of the two and proceed to pass one order. The AO cannot issue two proceedings, one u/s.154 and the other u/s.147.

The objective of the AO should be to avoid burdening an assessee with multiplicity of proceedings and to ensure that no undue harassment is caused to the assessee; first, on account of the failure to frame a proper order of assessment, followed by another failure to choose the right remedy under the law for repairing the damage caused by the first failure. It is this series of failures that has led the Courts to invoke the principle of constructive res judicata in favour of the assessee, to ensure a kind of disciplined approach, found routinely wanting, in the persons administering the provisions of the Income-tax Act.

There is a judicial acceptance of the principle that the proceedings for assessment of total income cannot be allowed to continue endlessly, and all litigation has to be brought to an end at the earliest possible time, and cannot be allowed to be pursued by resorting to the different provisions, otherwise made available, in succession of each other. Such a witch -hunt is found to be undesirable by the Courts. By resorting to the principle of constructive res judicata, the Courts have tried to bring some semblance of discipline in to the administration of the law.

Having said that, the principle of res judicata is not applicable to proceedings under the Income-tax Act. Therefore, warranting an application of constructive res judicata demands presence of such extraneous circumstances as leave the Court with no option but to invoke constructive res judicata to bring to an end the multiplicity of the proceedings caused by the non-application of mind.

Business expenditure: Capital or revenue: Section 37: Settlement charges and legal expenses for settlement of dispute is revenue expenditure allowable as business deduction:

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[CIT Vs. Airlines Hotel (P) Ltd.; 253 CTR 78 (Bom):]

Assessee was carrying on the business of conducting and managing a restautant. Under an agreement, assessee had granted a licence and permission to J to conduct and manage the restaurant business. Dispute arose between the assessee and J, which resulted in the filing of a suit before the City Civil Court, in which consent terms were arrived at and a decree was passed by consent. As per the consent decree, the assessee made payment to J which included settlement charges of Rs. 5,50,750/-. The assessee had also incurred legal expenditure of Rs. 1,65,500/- in that respect. The assessee claimed both these amounts as deduction as revenue expenditure. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim. The Tribunal allowed the claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The payment which assessee made to the conductor J included settlement charges of Rs. 5,50,750/- as recorded in the settlement of account. This payment was a payment which the assessee effected for resolving disputes and removing the hindrance which was caused in the management and conducting of the restaurant.

ii) The conductor was a bare licensee and had no interest by way of tenancy or otherwise, in respect of the premises. Consequently, the payment which was made by the assessee was one which in the true sense of the term was for removing the obstruction or hindrance in conducting and managing the restaurant and must be regarded as a matter of commercial expediency.

iii) The legal expenses in the amount of Rs. 1,65,500/- are also clearly an allowable deduction for the same reason.

iv) In this view of the matter, the view which has been taken by the Tribunal is correct.”

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TDS: Commission or brokerage: Section 194H of Income-tax Act, 1961: A.Ys. 2004-05 to 2007- 08: Agent of airline companies permitted to sell tickets at any rate between fixed minimum commercial price and published price: Difference between commercial price and published price not commission or brokerage: Not liable to TDS.

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[CIT v. Qatar Airways, 332 ITR 253 (Bom.)]

In an appeal preferred by the Revenue, the following question was raised:

“Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the difference in amount between commercial price and published price is special commission in the nature of commission or brokerage within the meaning of Explanation (i) to section 194H of the Income-tax Act, 1961?”

The Bombay High Court held as under:

“(i) The agents of the assessee-airlines were granted permission to sell the tickets at any rate between the fixed minimum commercial price and the published price. The assessee would have no information about the exact rate at which the tickets were ultimately sold by its agents. It would be impracticable and unreasonable to expect the assessee to get a feedback from its numerous agents in respect of each ticket sold.
(ii) The permission granted to the agents to sell the tickets at a lower price could neither amount to commission, nor brokerage in the hands of the agents.
(iii) Thus the tax at source was not deductible on the difference between the commercial price and the published price.”

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Recovery of tax: Stay of recovery: S. 220(6) of Income-tax Act, 1961: Factors to be considered: Existence of prima facie case warrants stay.

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[KLM Royal Dutch Airlines v. DDIT, 332 ITR 224 (Del.):

In this case, the order rejecting the application of the assessee u/s.220(6) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for stay of recovery was challenged by the assessee by filing a writ. It was pointed out that the factor that as regards the existence of the prima facie case was not considered while rejecting the application.

The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition, set aside the order of rejection and directed to pass a fresh order specifically dealing with the existence of prima facie case.

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Appeal: Question of law can be raised at any stage in income tax proceedings: Educational Institution: Exemption u/s. 10(23C) (iiiad): Seminary imparting religious education: Entitled to exemption:

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[CIT Vs. St. Mary’s Malankara Seminary; 348 ITR 69 (Ker):]

Assessee was a seminary imparting religious education. For want of registration u/s. 12A of the Incometax Act, 1961, it forfeited the claim for exemption u/s. 11 of the Act. In appeal, it raised an alternate claim before the CIT(A) who allowed the claim first, but recalled it later. The Tribunal allowed the claim on merits.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Kerala High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) A pure question of law can be raised at any stage of the proceedings under the Income-tax Act.

ii) There is nothing to indicate that section 10(23C) (iiiad) of the Act, requires the educational institutions referred to therein to impart education in any particular subject or in any manner whatsoever. The term “education” enjoys a wide connotation covering all kinds of coaching and training carried on in a systematic manner leading to personality development of an individual.

iii) In the case of a seminary, students on completion of their studies are made priests, who head churches as religious leaders practicing and propagating religion as a profession. Accordingly, religious teaching in seminary is also education and seminary is, therefore, an “educational institution” entitled for exemption u/s. 10(23C)(iiiad).

iv) The ground raised in appeal by the assessee based on section 10(23C)(iiiad) was certainly a pure question of law and on the same facts the issue was found in favour of the assessee. The assessee was rightly found to be eligible to raise the additional and alternative ground of exemption which was correctly found in its favour.”

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Appeal to the High Court: Power to condone delay in filing: Retrospective amendment does not affect completed matters: J. B. Roy Vs. Dy. CIT (All):

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[Review Petition No. 10 of 2011 in ITA No. 127 of 2006 dated 07/09/2012:]

By an order dated 11/12/2009, the appeal filed by the assessee u/s. 260A was dismissed by the Allahabad High Court, on the ground that the appeal was filed beyond the statutory period of limitation and there is no power to condone the delay. Section 260A(2A) was inserted by the Finance Act, 2010 w.e.f. 01/10/1998 (retrospectively) granting power to the High Court to condone the delay in filing the appeal. In view of the said retrospective amendment, the assessee filed review petition requesting to restore the appeal and condone the delay.

The Allahabad High Court dismissed the review petition and held as under:

“i) Though section 260A(2A) has been inserted retrospectively w.e.f. 01/10/1998 by the Finance Act, 2010, the fact remains that the cases already settled before the said amendment cannot be re-opened as per the ratio laid down in Babu Ram Vs. C. C. Jacob AIR (1999) SC 1845, where it was observed that the prospective declaration of law is a devise innovated by the Apex Court, to avoid reopening of the settled issues and to prevent multiplicity of proceedings. It is also a devise adopted to avoid uncertainty and avoidable litigation.

ii) By the very object of the prospective declaration of law, it is deemed that all actions taken contrary to the declaration prior to its date of declaration are validated. This is done in the larger public interest. In matters where decisions opposed to the said principle have been taken prior to such declaration of law, cannot be interfered with on the basis of such declaration of law.

iii) The amendment is applicable to future cases to avoid uncertainty as per the ratio laid down in M. A. Murthy Vs. State of Karnataka 264 ITR 1 (SC), where it was observed that prospective over-ruling is a part of the principles of constitutional cannon of interpretation and can be resorted to by the court, while superseding the law declared by it earlier. It is not possible to anticipate the decision of the Highest Court or an amendment and pass a correct order in anticipation as per the ratio laid down in CIT vs. Schlumberger Sea Company 264 ITR 331 (Cal). Therefore, the amendment introduced in section 260A(2A) has the effect only on pending and future cases.

iv) On the date when the appeal was dismissed on the ground of limitation, there was no discretion with the Court to condone the delay. A discretion has come to the Court by virtue of the amendment by inserting section 260A(2A). The appeal was rightly dismissed as per the then law and the subsequent amendment is not applicable as the matter has already attained finality.”

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Delegation of Legislative Power – Two broad principles are (i) that delegation of non-essential legislative function of fixation of rate of imposts is a necessity to meet the multifarious demands of a welfare state, but while delegating such a function laying down of a clear legislative policy is pre-requisite, and (ii) while delegating the power of fixation of rate of tax, there must be in existence, inter alia, some guidance, control, safeguards and checks in the concerned Act. The question o<

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[Delhi Race Club Ltd. v. UOI (2012) 347 ITR 593 (SC)]

Licence Fee – A licence fee imposed for regulatory purposes is not conditioned by the fact that there must be a quid pro quo for the services rendered, but that, such licence fee must be reasonable and not excessive. It would again not be possible to work out with arithmetical equivalence the amount of fee which could be said to be reasonable or otherwise. If there is a broad correlation between the expenditure which the State incurs and the fees charged, the fees could be sustained as reasonable.

On 19-10-1994, the Central Government in exercise of its powers u/s. 2 of the Union Territories (Laws) Act, 1950, extended the Mysore Race Courses Licensing Act, 1952 (the Act) to the Union Territory of Delhi, as it existed then, with certain amendments. Section 4 of the said Act provided for the payment of a Licence fee. Section 11 empowered the Government to make rules. In furtherance of the power conferred u/s. 11 of the Act, by a notification dated 1-3-1985, the Administration of the Union Territory of Delhi notified the Delhi Race Course Licensing Rules, 1985. Rules 4 and 5 of the 1985 Rules laid down the procedure for submission of application for grant of licence for horse racing and the validity period of such licence, respectively. Rule 6 prescribed the rate of “licence fee”, which was Rs.2000/- per day for horse racing on which the race is held on the race course and Rs.500/- per day for arranging for wagering or betting on a horse race run on any other race course within or outside the Union Territory of Delhi. On 7-3-2001, in exercise of the powers conferred u/s. 11 of the Act, the Lt. Governor of the National Capital Territory of Delhi enacted the Delhi Race Course Licensing (Amendment) Rules, 2001 and enhanced the aforesaid licence fee rates to Rs.20,000 and Rs.5,000 respectively.

On January 31, 2002, the Commissioner of Excise, Entertainment and Luxury Tax issued a demand letter to Delhi Race Club, a body corporate, the appellant, informing them that the licence fee deposited by them was short by Rs.17,80,000 for the year 2001-02 and by Rs. 18 lakh for the year 2002-03. Validity of the demand notice was questioned by the appellant by way of a writ petition in the High Court of Delhi, on the grounds that both the notifications, dated 19th October, 1984 and 7th March, 2001, were illegal in as much as : (i) delegation of powers u/s. 11 of the Act to the Lt. Governor, to fix the licence fee without any guidelines is excessive delegation of legislative power and is therefore, ultra vires, (ii) in the absence of an element of quid pro quo, the licence fee charged was not in the nature of a fee but a tax and (iii) the ten-fold increase in licence fee was highly excessive. However, based on the arguments advanced by the learned counsel, the High Court framed two key questions, viz., (i) Is the licence fee under rule 6 of the 1985 Rules a “fee” or not? And (ii) If it is a fee, is it excessive or not?

Answering both the questions against the appellant, the High Court concluded that the licence fee in question was not a compensatory fee and consequently there was no requirement of quid pro quo; the licence fee was in the nature of a regulatory fee and therefore, would not require any quid pro quo in the form of any social service and when the impost of Rs. 2,000 and Rs. 500 in the year 1984 was not regarded by the appellant as being excessive, keeping in mind the high rate of inflation between 1984 and 2001, the enhanced rates of Rs. 20,000 and Rs. 5,000 in the year 2001 could not be said to be excessive.

The appellant’s writ petition having been dismissed, they approached the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court, after considering authorities wherein the question as to the limits of permissible delegation of legislative power by a Legislature to an executive/another body was examined, held that from the conspectus of the views on the question of nature and extent of delegation of legislative functions by the Legislature, two board principles emerge, viz. (i) that delegation of nonessential legislative function of fixation of rate of imposts is a necessity to meet the multifarious demands of a welfare state, but while delegating such a function, laying down of a clear legislative policy is pre-requisite and (ii) while delegating the power of fixation of rate of tax, there must be in existence, inter alia, some guidance, control, safeguards and checks in the concerned Act. It is manifest that the question of application of the second principle will not arise unless the impost is a tax. Therefore, as along as the legislative policy is defined in clear terms, which provides guidance to the delegate, such delegation of a non-essential legislative function is permissible.

According to the Supreme Court therefore, the pivotal question to be determined was the nature of the impost in the present case.

The Supreme Court, after noting the precedents on the issue, held that the true test to determine the character of a levy, delineating “tax” from “fee” is the primary object of the levy and the essential purpose intended to be achieved. According to the Supreme Court, in the case before it, it was clear from the scheme of the Act that its sole aim was regulation, control and management of horse-racing. The Supreme Court observed that such a regulation is necessary in public interest to control the act of betting and wagering as well as to promote the sport in the Indian context. To achieve this purpose, licences are issued subject to compliance with the conditions laid down therein, which inter alia include maintenance of accounts and furnishing of periodical returns; amount of stakes which may be allotted for different kinds of horses; the measures to be taken for the training of the persons to become jockeys, to encourage Indian bred horses and Indian jockeys; the inclusion and association of such persons as the government may nominate as stewards or members in the conduct and management of the horse-racing. The violation of the condition of the licence or the Act is penalised under the Act, besides a provision for cognisance by a court not inferior to a Metropolitan Magistrate. To ensure compliance with these conditions, the 1985 Rules empower the District Officer or an Entertainment Tax Officer to conduct inspection of the race club at reasonable times. According to the Supreme Court, the nature of the impost was therefore not compulsory exaction of money to augment the revenue of the State but its true object was to regulate, control, manage and encourage the sport of horse racing as was distinctly spelled out in the Act and the 1985 Rules. For the purpose of enforcement, wide powers were conferred on various authorities to enable them to supervise, regulate and monitor the activities relating to the race course, with a view to secure proper enforcement of the provisions. Therefore, by applying the principles laid down in the aforesaid decisions, it was clear that the said levy was a “fee” and not “tax”.

The Supreme Court further held that a licence fee imposed for regulatory purposes is not conditioned by the fact that there must be a quid pro quo for the services rendered, but that, such licence fee must be reasonable and not excessive. It would again not be possible to work out with arithmetical equivalence the amount of fee which could be said to be reasonable or otherwise. If there is a broad correlation between the expenditure which the State incurs and the fees charged, the fees could be sustained as reasonable.

According to the Supreme Court, the licence fee levied in the present case, being regulatory in nature, the Government need not render some defined or specific services in return as long as the fee satisfies the limitation of being reasonable. The Supreme Court noted that the amount of licence fee charged from the appellant had not been challenged as being excessive. Thus, in the light of the above observations relating to inspection and other provisions of the Act, Supreme Court held that the licence fee charged had a broad co-relation with the object and purpose for which the Act and the 2001 Rules had been enacted.

The Supreme Court observed that the challenge to the constitutionality of section 11(2) of the Act was based on the premise that no guidance, check, control or safe-guard is specified in the Act. This principle, as distinguished above, applied only to the cases of delegation of the function of fixation of rate of tax and not a fee.

The Supreme Court in the conclusion observed that the challenge to the validity of section 11(2) of the Act was raised after almost 15 years of its coming into force. This appellant, since the commencement of the Act, had been regularly paying the licence fee and the present challenge was made only when quantum of the licence was increased by the Government on account of non-revision of the same since the commencement of the Act. Evidently, the inflation during this period was taken as the criterion for increasing the quantum of the fee. It was a reasonable increase keeping in view the fact that expenditure incurred by the Government in carrying out the regulatory activities for attaining the object of the Act would have proportionately increased. Accordingly, to the Supreme Court, an institution of the size of the race course should not have cloaked their objection to an increase in the rate of licence fee and present them as a challenge to the constitutionality of the charging section.

High Court – If the High Court finds that the Tribunal has not answered some issues which arose before it in an appeal, instead of itself answering those issues, it should remit the case back to the Tribunal.

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[Teknika Components v. CIT (2012) 346 ITR 570 (SC)]

The assessee-respondent filed a return for the assessment year 2000-01, declaring taxable income of Rs.1,72,980/- inter alia after claiming deduction u/s. 80IA of Rs.89,74,875/-. The assessment was completed accepting the return submitted by the assessee, except denying the deduction u/s. 80IA to the extent of Rs.1,72,985/- in respect of interest credited to the Profit & Loss Account. Since the assessee-firm was held eligible for deduction u/s. 80IA, the rate of gross profit at 75.8% was examined by the Assessing Officer.

The Commissioner of Income Tax, exercising his jurisdiction u/s. 263 passed an order setting aside the assessment order and directing the Assessing Officer to frame fresh assessment, after giving reasonable opportunity of being heard to the assessee, the effect of which was to disallow deduction granted u/s. 80IA.

The Tribunal cancelled this order of the Commissioner in an appeal filed by the assessee.

The High Court in the appeal preferred by the Department, came to the conclusion that the Tribunal had not answered some of the issues, which stood decided by the Commissioner of Income Tax u/s. 263. In the circumstances, the High Court set aside the order of the Tribunal.

Against the Order of the High Court, the assessee approached the Supreme Court by way of Special Leave Petition. On 5-1-2011, the Supreme Court permitted the Department to proceed with reassessment without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties. In September 2014, when the matter came up for hearing, it was pointed out to the Supreme Court that the Assessing Officer had passed a fresh order on 5-5-2011, in which he had disallowed the claim for deduction u/s. 80IA and that the assessee had preferred an appeal to the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) against the said order.

The Supreme Court was of the view that, instead of the High Court itself answering the issues which were held to be not answered by the Tribunal, it ought to have remitted the case to the Tribunal which it had not done in the present case.

The Supreme Court, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, directed the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) to decide the matter uninfluenced by the earlier order of the Commissioner of Income Tax u/s. 263. The Supreme Court set aside the order of the High Court and disposed of the appeal accordingly.

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Central Board of Direct Taxes – Representation should not be rejected without hearing and that the case should be disposed of by a reasoned order.

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[Satyam Computer Services Ltd. v. CBDT (2012) 346 ITR 566 (SC)]

The Petitioner company was a victim of unprecedented fraud perpetrated by the former chairman and previous management of the company. Serious Fraud Investigation Office (SIFO) which investigated the fraud, found that the previous management paid taxes on fictitious income to convey a false impression that the income was genuine. As per initial quantification, sales was overstated by Rs.4,915 crore (2001-02 to 2007-08), interest income of Rs.920.14 crore was shown on non-existing fixed deposits (2001-02 to September, 2008) and non-existent interest of Rs.186.91 crore was paid on fictitious fixed deposits (2001-02 to 2007-08).

In the circumstances, Petitioner Company represented to the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) stating that income declared by the earlier management in return of income had been overstated and tax credit thereon was excessively claimed, as evident from the subsequent restatement of accounts at the instance of the Company Law Board and consequent upon investigation by the SIFO. It was the case of the company before the CBDT that the Department had acted on the basis of false claims of payment of taxes made by the previous management by rectifying the assessment and raising tax demands. The case of the petitioner was that, in the circumstances, the overstated income in the specified assessment years should be reduced.

CBDT vide order dated 10-3-2011 passed u/s. 119 rejected the representation of the company for re-quantification/reassessment of income for various years for the reasons given in the order. However, no hearing was given to the petitionercompany. Aggrieved, the petitioner–company filed a writ petition in the Andhra Pradesh High Court. The High Court directed the petitioner-company to pay Rs. 350 crore and to give bank guarantee for Rs. 267 crore, pending hearing and disposal of the writ petition. The petitioner-company filed a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court was of the view that the CBDT in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, ought to have heard the petitioner-company which they had not done. The Supreme Court also found that the representations made by the petitionercompany required further details to be furnished and in the circumstances, it directed the petitionercompany to file within two weeks, a comprehensive petition/representation before the CBDT giving all requisite/details/particulars in support of the case for re-quantification/reassessment of income for the assessment years 2003-04 to 2008-09 and directed the CBDT to hear the petitioner-company and dispose of the case within a period of two weeks from the date of hearing by a reasoned order. The Supreme Court further required the chairman of the company to file an undertaking with the Registry of Supreme Court to furnish bank guarantee of the nationalised bank in a sum of Rs. 617 crore and on filing such undertaking, attachment levied by the Department would stand lifted. The Supreme Court disposed of the petition without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case and keeping all the contentions open.

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Appeal u/s. 260A – High Court ought to give its findings in detail – High Court should not set aside the order of the Tribunal in an appeal filed by the Department without hearing the assessee.

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[Rajesh Mahajan v. CIT (2012) 346 ITR 513 (SC)]

The appellant, an individual was a partner in M/s. Mahajan Exports, Panipat and M/s. Maspar, Panipat deriving business income, income from salary and income from house property. A search was conducted under section 132 (1) at his residential and business premises. Pursuant to a notice under section 158BC, the appellant filed his return for the block period declaring total undisclosed income at ‘nil’. The assessment was completed after scrutiny, determining total undisclosed income at ‘nil’. The said assessment order was set aside by the Commissioner u/s. 263 with a direction to make the assessment de novo on the following matters:

(a) cash found at the premises of the assessee at Panipat house,
(b) cash found at the Delhi house;
(c) unsecured loans, and
(d) fresh investment

The order of Commissioner u/s. 263 was set aside by the Tribunal, observing that the appellant had filed detailed explanation and supporting evidence on the basis of which the Assessing Officer had made due enquires while passing the assessment order, after obtaining necessary approval from his superior officer u/s. 158BC of the Act. The High Court set aside the order of the Tribunal in an appeal filed by the Department. On an appeal to the Supreme Court by the appellant, the Supreme Court noted that the appellant was not heard by the High Court and that the review application was also dismissed by the High Court.

The Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the High Court and remitted the case for de novo consideration observing that the High Court ought to have given its findings in detail, particularly on the question whether there was any error of law in the decision of the Tribunal and whether that error caused prejudice to the Revenue.

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DCIT v. Bharat Kunverji Kenia ITAT ‘B’ Bench, Mumbai Before D. Manmohan (VP) and Pramod Kumar (AM) ITA No. 929/Mum./2010 A.Y.: 2006-07. Decided on: 2-2-2011 Counsel for revenue/assessee: Hari Govind Singh/Pradip N. Kapasi

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Section 14 — Heads of income — Income from purchase and sale of shares — Whether taxable as capital gains or as business income — On the facts held as capital gains.

Facts:
During the year the assessee had shown short-term capital gain of Rs.40.31 lac from purchase and sale of shares. The AO noticed that the volume of purchase and sale was worth Rs.2.5 crore and the number of transactions aggregated to 276 in number. Based on the same he concluded that: the data indicated that the assessee intended to deal in shares as a trader and not as an investor. When the assessee contended that in the earlier years, under the similar circumstances, the income was taxed as capital gains and not as a business income, the AO observed that the doctrine of res judicata could be applicable to the decisions of Civil Courts and it cannot be invoked while deciding income-tax matter.

On appeal, the CIT(A) had the benefit of the order of the ITAT in the assessee’s own case for the A.Y. 2005-06 (ITA No. 6544/Mum./2008 dated 15-5-2009) wherein on identical facts, the Tribunal decided the issue in favour of the assessee. Applying the principle of consistency, the CIT(A) allowed the appeal of the assessee.

Before the Tribunal the Revenue relied on the order of the AO and further submitted that the volume, frequency and regularity of the transaction was one of the essential tests to consider the nature of transactions. Further, relying on the following two decisions, it was contended that where facts were distinguishable or fresh facts were brought on record, principles of res judicata did not come into play and the authority was free to take a different view on the matter. The decisions relied upon were as under:

  •  Sadhana Nabera v. ACIT, (ITA No. 2586/M/2009, dated 26-3-2010; and

  •  Rakesh J. Sanghvi v. DCIT, (ITA Nos. 4607/ M/2008 and 5710/M/2009, dated 31-8-2009).

Held:
According to the Tribunal, no single criteria laid down by the Courts or in the Board Circular (No. 4 of 2007, dated 15-6-2007) was decisive and they had to be considered cumulatively to bring out the real intention of the assessee before entering into such transactions. Referring to a chart prepared by the assessee, which was showing compliance with various conditions of the Board Circular, the Tribunal noted that he had complied with all the requirements mentioned in the Circular. In addition the Tribunal noted as under:

  •  The shares held were all along treated as an investment;

  •  The assessee had not borrowed funds for the purpose of making investments;

  •  Shares once sold were not purchased again;

  •  Average holding period of the shares sold by the assessee was of 181 days.

In view of the above and the Tribunal’s decision in the assessee’s own case for the earlier year, the Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue. According to the Tribunal, the case laws relied upon by the Revenue were distinguishable on the facts.

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51 DTR (Bang.) (Trib.) 173 Hewlett Packard India Sales (P) Ltd. v. CIT A.Y.: 2006-07. Dated: 16-8-2010

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Rent paid for parking slots cannot be treated as car running expenses for the purpose of levy of FBT.

Facts:
The assessee had paid Rs.1.25 crores as rent for parking slots. These slots were used for parking cars of employees of the assessee. The FBT assessment was completed without considering this rent as fringe benefit. The CIT u/s.263 set aside the assessment relying upon the CBDT Circular No. 8 of 2005, dated 29th August, 2005.

Held:
In the present case, even though the rent pertaining to the car parking slots was mentioned distinctly and separately in the lease deed, the assessee was paying the sum as part of the overall rent paid to the landlord. The essential facilities attached to a rented building have to be treated as part of the building itself and therefore the rent or licence fee paid for such facilities should be treated as forming part of rent.

Further, the head of expenditure relied on by the CIT to hold the assessee liable for FBT in respect of rent relating to car parking area is ‘running, maintenance and repair expenses of cars’. The running expenses of a motor car usually include fuel oil and other incidental expenses. It may include the driver’s wages as well. It may even include the taxes. But it is very difficult to argue that car parking expenses are in the nature of running expenses. It is not possible to treat parking slot expenses as analogous to repair and maintenance. Hence, they cannot be included within the fringe benefits.

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51 DTR (Mumbai) (Trib.) 283 DCIT v. Ushdev International Ltd. A.Y.: 2002-03. Dated: 9-10-2010

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Penalty u/s.271(1)(c) — If tax liability is determined u/s.115JB, penalty cannot be levied with reference to the additions made under normal provisions of the Act.

Facts:
The Assessing Officer had made two additions to the returned income under normal provisions of the Act which were upheld by the Tribunal. However the addition made to book profits on account of diminution in the value of investments for the purpose of computation u/s.115JB was deleted by the Tribunal. While passing the consequential order the tax payable was determined u/s.115JB since tax payable under normal provisions of the Act was nil.

The AO imposed penalty u/s.271(1)(c) in respect of disallowances made under normal provisions of the Act.

Held:
The additions which constitute the foundation for imposition of penalty u/s.271(1)(c), were made while computing income under the regular provisions of the Act. However, tax u/s.115JB was determined by making an addition on account of diminution in the value of investment, which finally stands deleted by the Tribunal. Thus the basis of assessment under the regular provisions of the Act is no more relevant because of the AO finally computed income u/s.115JB pursuant to the order passed by the Tribunal. Thus the additions which were made in the original assessment as per the regular provisions of the Act, have become academic inasmuch as they have not entered the final computation of total income made by the AO. Neither the total income has increased with such additions, nor has the loss scaled down.

The assessment under regular provisions of the Act, in which such additions were made, has been substituted with that u/s. 115JB, and in the latter case, such additions were either not made or finally deleted by the Tribunal. As such there cannot be any question of imposing or confirming the penalty u/s.271(1)(c) qua these additions.

The argument of the Revenue that penalty should be sustained since the assessee was granted credit in respect of tax paid on deemed income u/s.115JAA was not accepted as the tax credit was not available for tax paid u/s.115JB till A.Y. 2005-06.

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127 ITD 257 (Mum.) Torrential Investments (P.) Ltd. v. ITO, Ward-2(3)(3), Mumbai A.Y.: 1996-97. Dated: 11-8-2009

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Section 234C — Proviso to section 234C(1) as amended by Finance Act (No. 2), 1996 is retrospective in nature, since it was proposed to remove hardship faced by the assessee as the entire tax on capital gains had to be paid at short notice or even before the sale proceeds were received.

Facts:
The assessee had income from long-term capital gains of Rs.25,47,670 during the year which accrued to the assessee in the months of May, 1995 and July, 1995. The assessee paid advance tax instalments as per section 234C (as amended by Finance Act, 1996). However, the Assessing Officer charged interest u/s. 234C from the first instalment consequently holding that the amendment u/s. 234C is prospective.

Held:
(1) The amendment (by the Finance Act, 1996) was enacted to remove the hardship to the assessee as the entire tax had to be paid at short notice as per the original provision even before the sale proceeds were received.

(2) The amendment to proviso to section 234C is clarificatory in nature and has to be applied retrospectively.

(3) The assessee had paid taxes as a part of the instalments due after the date of sale of the asset and hence, was not in default as stipulated u/s. 234C. Thus, no interest was chargeable from it u/s. 234C.

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(2010) 127 ITD 217 (Agra.) (SB) S. K. Jain v. CIT A.Y.: 2000-01. Dated: 13-4-2010

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Section 263 — Once a particular matter has been decided and considered in the appeal, and only because a particular issue or point relating to that matter has not been considered does not render the matter as unconsidered and hence does not give power to CIT to invoke section 263.

Facts:
The assessee had explained the source of investment made of Rs.4,50,000 as cash received from his mother under a will which was found to be genuine by the AO to the extent of Rs.4,00,000 and Rs.50,000 was added. However on appeal, the CIT(A) deleted the addition and the Revenue went for further appeal.

However during the pendency of the appeal, the CIT invoked the provisions of section 263 for revision of order stating the reasons that the AO had failed to examine whether the will had been probated or not, whether bequest of cash and jewellery was as per Hindu Succession Act.

The contention of the assessee was that since the matter has already been considered in the appeal, then the order of the AO got merged with the order of the CIT(A) and the CIT has no right to invoke the provisions of section 263 as per explanation (c) to section 263(1).

Held:
Once a particular matter of appeal has been considered and decided in the appeal, only because a particular point relating to the same remains unconsidered by the CIT(A), does not render the matter as unconsidered. Therefore the order of the AO merged with that of the CIT A and the CIT loses his right to invoke the provisions of section 263 as per the explanation (c) to section 263.

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136 TTJ 263 (Mumbai) (TM) ACIT v. Dharti Estate ITA Nos. 2808 (Mum.) of 2002 and 5056 (Mum.) of 2003. A.Ys.: 1998-99 and 1999-2000 Dated: 29-10-2010

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Section 145 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Assessee following percentage completion method consistently which was accepted in earlier and subsequent years — valuation of closing WIP at historical cost was correct particularly when the categorical findings of the CIT(A) highlighting that the assessee has not deviated from the guidelines issued by the ICAI under AS-7 was not challenged by the Revenue.

The assessee, a partnership firm, was engaged in the business of construction. For the relevant assessment years, the assessee valued its closing WIP at historical cost as per its past policy. Such historical cost was the average rate realised for all the years including current year. The Assessing Officer valued the WIP at the current year’s rate of realisation and made addition to the profit. The CIT(A) held that the Assessing Officer was not justified in making the additions.

Since there was a difference of opinion between the Members of the Tribunal the matter was referred to the Third Member u/s.255(4).

The Third Member, holding in favour of the assessee, noted as under:

(1) It is not in dispute that the assessee has followed percentage completion method consistently since inception and has been declaring income/loss from year to year and the same was accepted in earlier years.

(2) Despite the AO’s stand for the A.Ys. 1998-99 and 1999-2000, with regard to correctness of the method of accounting followed by the assessee, in the year 2000-01, when the assessee declared profit of more than Rs.5 crores on completion of the project, the AO appears to have accepted the same method to accept the income declared therein, which in itself is an indication that the method of accounting followed by the assessee is an approved method of accounting.

(3) Categorical finding of the learned CIT(A) to highlight that assessee has not deviated from guidelines issued by the ICAI (under AS-7), was not challenged before the Tribunal by learned Departmental Representative by producing any evidence thereof. The learned CIT(A) has discussed the issue elaborately and met each point of dispute raised by the Assessing Officer to highlight that there is no merit in the conclusion reached by the Assessing Officer.

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(2011) TIOL 209 ITAT-Mum. ACIT v. American School of Bombay Education Trust ITA No. 136 to 138/Mum./2010 A.Ys.: 2000-01 to 2002-03. Dated: 4-2-2011

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Sections 194C, 201(1), 201(1A), 271C — Penalty u/s.271C cannot be levied if the order u/s.201(1) is barred by limitation.

Facts:
The assessee was running a school popularly known as ‘American School of Bombay’. In the course of survey u/s.133A of the Act, conducted on 24-1-2006 it was found that the assessee had failed to deduct tax at source from the salaries paid to expatriate teachers by South Asia International Educations Services (SAIESF) outside India. The Assessing Officer, upon issuing show-cause notice and considering the explanations offered by the assessee, in an order passed an order u/s.201(1) and 201(1A) held the assessee to be in default for not deducting tax at source u/s.194C. He also levied interest u/s.201(1A) and initiated penalty proceedings, after obtaining approval from the Add. CIT(TDS), by issuing notice to the assessee. Not being satisfied with the explanation offered by the assessee, the AO levied penalty u/s.271C of the Act.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who noted that the Tribunal has quashed the order passed by the DCIT(TDS) u/s.201(1) and 201(1A) on the ground that initiation of proceedings was beyond a period of six years and hence was barred by limitation. He deleted the penalty levied u/s.271C.

Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that in the case of the assessee for the A.Y. 1997-98 to 1999-2000, the Tribunal has held that — a bare perusal of section 271C(1) indicates that penalty u/s.271C can be imposed only when there is a failure on the part of the assessee to deduct or pay the whole or any part of tax and, then, the quantum of penalty is equal to the amount of tax which such person failed to deduct or pay. From here, it emerges that there must be some sum which such person failed to deduct or pay. Such amount constitutes the basis for imposition of penalty u/s.271C. In other words, the liability of the assessee u/s.201(1) is a pre-condition for imposition of penalty u/s 271C. If the very order passed u/s.201(1) creating liability has been set aside on account of limitation and there is no possibility of any fresh order being likely to be passed u/s.201(1), there remains no question of the assessee being deemed to be an assessee in default in respect of such tax. The natural corollary which, therefore, follows is that if the order u/s.201(1) ceases to be operative, it will have the effect of the assessee not being in default. Once the assessee is not in default for failure to deduct or pay tax at source, naturally, there cannot be any question of imposing penalty u/s.271C for the reason that the very basis of such penalty is the amount of tax which such person failed to deduct or pay as per law and when there is no such amount in existence, the possibility of imposing penalty will automatically be ruled out.

The Tribunal noted that the effect of the Tribunal’s order quashing the order passed u/s.201(1) and 201(1A) on account of limitation is that the assessee is not deemed to be in default in respect of any failure to deduct or pay tax at source. It held that in such circumstances the question of penalty u/s.271C cannot arise.

The appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed.

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Interest expenditure – Advances to sister concerns – Commercial expediency – S. A. Builders v. CIT needs reconsideration.

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[Addl. CIT v. Tulip Star Hotels Ltd. (SLP (CC) No.7140 of 2012 dated 30-4-2012)]

The respondent-assessee had borrowed certain funds which were utilised by the assessee to subscribe to the equity capital of the subsidiary company, namely, M/s. Tulip Star Hospitality Services Ltd. This subsidiary company used the said funds for the purpose of acquiring the Centaur Hotel, Juhu Beach, Mumbai, which is now functioning as “The Tulip Star, Mumbai”. The assessee paid interest on the borrowed money. This interest liability incurred by the assessee was claimed by it as deduction on the ground that it was business expenditure. The Assessing Officer refused to allow the expenditure.

However, the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) reversed the decision of the Assessing Officer and the opinion of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) was confirmed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal.

The Tribunal noted that the assessee was in the business of owning, running and managing hotels. For the effective control of new hotels acquired by the assessee under its management, it had invested in a wholly owned subsidiary, namely, M/s. Tulip Star Hospitality Services Ltd. On this ground, relying upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of S.A. Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT [2007] 288 ITR 1, the Tribunal held that the assessee was entitled to the deduction of interest on the borrowed funds.

On an appeal, the Delhi High Court inter alia held that the expenditure incurred under the aforesaid circumstances would be treated as expenditure incurred for business purposes and was thus allowable under section 36 of the Act.

On a further appeal, the Supreme Court was of the opinion that S.A. Builders Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, reported in 288 ITR 1, needed reconsideration. The Supreme Court therefore issued notice on the SLP.

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DEDUCTIBILITY OF ADVANCE PAYMENTS – Section 43B

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Issue for consideration
Section 43B of the Income Tax Act provides that certain deductions shall be allowed only in that previous year in which the specified sum is actually paid , irrespective of the previous year in which the liability to pay such sum was incurred according to the method of accounting regularly employed by the assessee. It basically applies to taxes, duties, cess, or fees, contributions to provident funds, superannuation funds, gratuity funds, interest on loans or borrowings from financial institutions or banks and leave encashment.

This section, which was inserted with effect from assessment year 1984-85, to the extent relevant for our discussion, reads as under:

43B. Notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this Act, a deduction otherwise allowable under this Act in respect of—

(a) any sum payable by the assessee by way of tax, duty, cess or fee, by whatever name called, under any law for the time being in force, or

(b) any sum payable by the assessee as an employer by way of contribution to any provident fund or superannuation fund or gratuity fund or any other fund for the welfare of employees, or

(c) any sum referred to in clause (ii) of sub-section (1) of section 36, or

(d) any sum payable by the assessee as interest on any loan or borrowing from any public financial institution or a State financial corporation or a State industrial investment corporation, in accordance with the terms and conditions of the agreement governing such loan or borrowing, or

(e) any sum payable by the assessee as interest on any loan or advances from a scheduled bank in accordance with the terms and conditions of the agreement governing such loan or advances, or

(f) any sum payable by the assessee as an employer in lieu of any leave at the credit of his employee,

shall be allowed (irrespective of the previous year in which the liability to pay such sum was incurred by the assessee according to the method of accounting regularly employed by him) only in computing the income referred to in section 28 of that previous year in which such sum is actually paid by him :

Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply in relation to any sum which is actually paid by the assessee on or before the due date applicable in his case for furnishing the return of income under sub-section (1) of section 139 in respect of the previous year in which the liability to pay such sum was incurred as aforesaid and the evidence of such payment is furnished by the assessee along with such return.

Explanation 2 to section 43B provides that for the purposes of clause (a), “any sum payable” means a sum for which the assessee incurred liability in the previous year, even though such sum may not have been payable within that year under the relevant law.

Therefore, in respect of the specified sums , even if the liability has been incurred, but payment has not been made, the deduction would not be allowable in the year in which the liability is incurred, but would be allowable in the year of payment.

The section begins with a non-obstante clause that has the effect of overriding the provisions of the Act . It further states that a deduction otherwise allowable in respect of the specified sums will be allowed in the year of actual payment.

A controversy has arisen in respect of a converse type of situation where the payment has been made, but liability to pay has not yet been incurred, particularly in respect of taxes which are covered by clause (a). While the Kerala High Court has taken the view that the deduction would not be allowable in the year of payment if the liability has not been incurred as per the method of accounting, the Calcutta, Punjab & Haryana and Delhi High Courts have taken a contrary view to the effect that the deduction would be allowable u/s 43B in the year of payment, even if the liability to pay tax or duty was incurred in the next year under the mercantile system of accounting followed by the assessee. A related controversy has also arisen for allowance of deduction, in the year of payment, though the liability to pay the same may not have arisen under the relevant statute governing the expenditure in the year of payment. The special bench of the ITAT favours the grant of allowance in the year of actual payment.

Kerala solvent extractions’ case
The issue arose before the Kerala High Court in the case of CIT v. Kerala Solvent Extractions, 306 ITR 54.

In this case, pertaining to assessment year 1994-95, the assessee which was following the mercantile method of accounting, made an additional payment of Rs. 23 lakhs towards sales tax payable for April 1994. This amount was claimed as a deduction for the year ended 31st March 1994. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim u/s 143(1)(a), since it was specifically stated in the accounts accompanying the return that the amount paid was towards sales tax for April 1994.

The assessee’s appeal against the disallowance was allowed by the Commissioner(Appeals), who held that the disallowance of the amount paid towards advance sales tax was a debatable point. The Tribunal confirmed the order of the Commissioner(Appeals).

Before the Kerala High Court, it was argued on behalf of the Revenue that sales tax liability payable in April 1994 was not an allowable deduction u/s 37(1) r.w.s 145. It was argued that the claim was not allowable as the assessee had not incurred expenditure, and that unless the amount paid was the liability of the assessee for the previous year, it could not be allowed, no matter whether the assessee had paid it or not. On behalf of the assessee, it was contended that the tax having been paid in the previous year, though not a liability of the year, was an allowable deduction under clause (a) of section 43B read with explanation 2.

The Kerala High Court observed that it was not in dispute that the sales tax liability of the assessee was an allowable deduction in the computation of income from business by virtue of section 29 r.w.s 37(1), that income chargeable under the head “Profits and Gains of Business or Profession” was to be computed in accordance with either cash or mercantile system of accounting regularly employed by the assessee, that the assessee was following the mercantile system of accounting and that like any other liability, sales tax liability should be claimed and allowed on mercantile basis. It was also undisputed that the sales tax liability of Rs. 23 lakh pertained to April 1994, which fell in the next financial year, and that u/s 145, the assessee was not entitled to deduction of this amount in the earlier year of payment.

According to the Kerala High Court, the issue was whether section 43B entitled the assessee to deduction of liability of the next financial year merely because the amount was paid by the assessee during the previous year relevant to the assessment year. The Kerala High Court observed that words of section 43B showed that the section dealt with deductions otherwise allowable under the provisions of the Act, and that the section only laid down the conditions for eligibility for deduction of certain al-lowances which were otherwise admissible under the Act. According to the Kerala High Court, the scheme of section 43B was to allow the deductions referred to in clauses (a) to (f) only on payment basis, even though the assessee was following the mercantile method of accounting. In other words, section 43B was an exception to section 145, inas-much as even if the claim was allowable deduction based on the system of accounting, it would still be inadmissible u/s 43B if it was not paid on or before the end of the relevant previous year, or at least before the date of filing of the return. The Kerala High Court therefore held that section 43B was only supplementary to section 145 and was only an additional condition for allowance of deductions otherwise allowable under the other provisions of the Act.

The Kerala High Court, on examination of the scheme of the sales tax, noted that under the scheme, the liability for payment of sales tax arose on the due date of filing of the monthly returns and the final return and the liability therefore arose only on due date of filing of the return. Under this scheme, if the assessee remitted any amount in the financial year towards tax payable for any month of the next financial year, this amount did not constitute tax liability of the assessee for that previous year, but would be carried as an amount of tax paid in advance for the next year, and would be adjusted towards tax liability for that year. If the assessee discontinued business, it was entitled to get refund of the tax paid in the earlier year.

According to the Kerala High Court, explanation 2 to section 43B did not justify the claim of the assessee for deduction because even under that provision, only liability incurred by the assessee during the previous year was allowable on payment basis. What the explanation contemplated was incurring of liability by the assessee in the previous year, though the amount was not payable during the previous year under the relevant law. The Kerala High Court noted that so far as sales tax was concerned, it was a tax on sale or purchase of a commodity. Since the liability arose under the statute and the payment was not towards tax due for the previous year or payable in that year, the assessee was not entitled to claim deduction u/s 29 r.w.s 37(1) and 145.

The Kerala High Court therefore held that the asses-see was not entitled to the deduction in the year of payment, and further confirmed that the payment of sales tax was prima facie disallowable, and hence upheld the disallowance u/s 143(1).

Paharpur cooling towers’ case

The issue again came up recently before the Calcutta High Court in the case of Paharpur Cooling Towers Ltd v. CIT, 244 CTR 502.

In this case, for assessment year 1996 -97, the assessee paid a sum of Rs. 3.22 crore on account of excise duty, the liability for payment of which was incurred in the previous year relevant to assessment year 1997- 98. The assessee claimed deduction in respect of the amount actually paid by it during the previous year ended 31st March 1996 in the assessment for assessment year 1996-97, u/s 43B.

The assessing officer disallowed the assessee’s claim for deduction of the excise duty paid on the ground that the liability for such excise duty was not incurred during the previous year relevant to assessment year 1996-97. The Commissioner(Appeals) allowed the appellant’s claim for deduction of excise duty. The tribunal allowed the appeal of the revenue against the order of the Commissioner(Appeals), upholding the disallowance of such advanced payment of excise duty.

The Calcutta High Court observed that the requirement of section 43B(a) was that the assessee must have actually paid the amount, as well as incurred liability in the previous year for the payment, even though such sum may not have been payable within that year under the relevant law. The court noted that the assessee had undoubtedly paid the duty in the previous year and such payment was made consequent upon the liability incurred in the very year, but in view of the fact that it followed the mercantile system of accounting, the amount was legally payable in the next year. According to the High Court, the amount therefore was clearly covered by section 43B read with explanation 2.

The High Court further noted that the position would have been different if the amount was not paid in the previous year, in which case the assessee would not have been eligible to get the benefit. The object of the legislature was to give the benefit of deduction of tax, duty, etc. only on payment of such amount, liability of which the assessee had incurred and not otherwise. Even if the tax or duty was payable in the next year in view of the system of accounting followed by the assessee, according to the Calcutta High Court, if the liability was ascertained in the previous year and the tax was also paid in that same year, there was no scope of depriving the assessee of the benefit of deduction of such amount.

The Calcutta High Court, after analysing the reasons for introduction of section 43B, stated that it was never the intention of the legislature to deprive the assessee of the benefit of deduction of tax, duty, etc, actually paid by him during the previous year, although in advance, according to the method of accounting followed by him. The Calcutta High Court observed that, if the reasoning given by the tribunal were accepted, an advance payer of tax, duty, etc payable in accordance with the method of accounting followed by him would not be entitled to get the benefit even in the next year when liability to pay would accrue in accordance with the method of accounting followed by him, because the benefit of section 43B was given on the basis of actual payment made in the previous year.

The Calcutta High Court therefore held that the advance excise duty paid was allowable as a deduction in the year of payment, though the liability to pay such duty arose in the subsequent year as per the method of accounting employed by the assessee.

A similar view was taken by the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT v. Modipon Ltd (No 2) 334 ITR 106, as well as by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of CIT v Raj and San Deeps Ltd 293 ITR 12, again in the context of excise duty paid in advance.

Observations

The dispute is two fold. In claiming deduction based on actual payment while computing the total income of the year payment, whether it is necessary that the liability to pay the specified sum has arisen (a) under the respective statute governing the expenditure and(b) under the method of accounting employed by the assessee. The Revenue’s case is that for an allowance of deduction, it is essential that three conditions are satisfied; liability under the governing statute, liability under the method of accounting and the actual payment. It is only on compliance of all the three conditions that an assessee shall be entitled to a valid claim of deduction. In contrast, the assesses are of the view that the only condition necessary for a valid deduction is the actual payment and once that is proved the claim cannot be frustrated.

The purpose behind the introduction of section 43B, and the reasons for introduction of Explanation 2 are narrated by the Explanatory Memorandum reported in 176 ITR (St) 123. It states that the objective of section 43B is to provide for a tax disincentive by denying deduction in respect of a statutory liability which is not paid in time. The first proviso to section 43B was introduced to rule out the hardship caused to certain taxpayers who had represented that since the sales tax for the last quarter cannot be paid within the previous year, the original provisions of section 43B would unnecessarily involve disallowance of the payment for the last quarter. The Memorandum further states that certain courts had interpreted the words “any sum payable” to the effect that the amount payable in a particular year should also be statutorily payable under the relevant statute in the same year. This was against the legislative intent and it was therefore being proposed, by way of a clarificatory amendment and for removal of doubts, that the words “any sum payable” be defined to mean any sum, liability for which had been incurred by the taxpayer during the previous year, irrespective of the date by which such sum was statutorily payable.

The language of the provision specifically provides for overriding or ignoring the method of accounting. Once that is done, there is no enabling provision found in the section that requires looking back to the method of accounting for ascertaining the eligibility of the deduction, otherwise. The only requirement is to ascertain the fact of the actual payment. If the payment is made , the deduction is allowed and should be allowed instead of denying the same.

The actual payment of the specified sum, under the provision, is the key consideration for allowance of the deduction. It emerges nowhere that a person should satisfy the twin conditions of the liability and of the actual payment as well, before a lawful deduction is claimed and allowed. To read the condition of the incurring of the liability in the section amounts to doing a serious violence to the provision and should be avoided. The use of the words ‘irrespective of the previous year in which the liability to pay such sum was incurred’ clearly puts to rest any doubts about the intention of the legislature, which is to allow the deduction in the year of payment, irrespective of the year in which liability was incurred.

Further, nothing is gained by denying a lawful deduction based on actual payment, as the payment is the conclusive proof of the intention of the payer. It may be that in some stray cases, the person making the payment in advance is refunded the sum paid. In such cases, the law has enough provisions to tax the refund in his hands including under the provisions of s.41(1) of the Act.

It is nobody’s case that a deduction should be allowed on payment in respect of an expenditure that is otherwise not allowable under the Act. The deduction should surely be for an expenditure that is allowable in computing the income under the provisions of the Act. In view of this position, any attempt to frustrate a deduction by relying on the opening part of the section which uses the term ‘a deduction otherwise allowable’ should be nipped in the bud. The said term simply means that the claim should be of an expenditure that is otherwise allowable under the Act and not necessarily w.r.t. the method of accounting. If the intention were to first determine the allowability on the basis of the method of accounting , it would have been provided there and then, by stating that ‘ a deduc-tion otherwise allowable on accrual’ or ‘as per the method of accounting’. On the contrary, the latter part simply advises one to ignore the method of accounting.

The next difficulty is about the need for accrual of liability under the relevant statute that provides for the expenditure and its relation to the Explanation 2. The scope of the said Explanation 2 is restricted to only those payments which are covered by clause(a) of s. 43B of the Act. This again emphasizes the fact that the scheme of the deduction is based on one and only condition and that is that of the actual payment, at least as far as the deduction under clauses(b) to(f) are concerned and if that is so, there is nothing that permits assigning of a different treat-ment for clause(a) payments. With great respect to the Calcutta High Court, it seems that the court’s observation that in order for a valid deduction, it was necessary that the liability for such payment should have been incurred under the relevant law in the same year in which the amount was paid, though it might not have become payable under the method of accounting employed by the assessee, does not seem justified. Kindly note that the said Explanation 2 itself supports the claim for the deduction in the year of payment, irrespective of the liability to pay, when it states ‘even though such sum might not have been payable within that year under that law’. If that is so, undue importance is not required to be given, for the purposes of deduction under the Income tax Act, to accrual of liability and the time thereof, under the relevant laws governing the payment of the expenditure. The Delhi High Court seems to support this position when it stated that the purpose of s. 43B is ‘subserved by the payment of the duty to the Department concerned’.

The Special Bench of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal also had occasion to consider this issue, though again in the context of excise duty, in the case of DCIT v. Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Health-care Limited, 299 ITR (AT) 1 (Chd)(SB). Some of the observations of the members of the special bench are interesting and throw considerable light on how section 43B is to be viewed in the case of advance payments, and are reproduced below:

(i)    There is no reference to any condition to establish “accrual of liability” for the claim of deduction. Only actual payment is insisted upon. The whole idea of enactment of section 43B is to change the system and replace the condition of allowability of deduction from incurring of the liability to actual payment. Having in mind the provision of section 43(2) and the purpose of section 43B, there is no question of asking the assessee to prove actual payment as well as incurring of a liability.

(ii)    It is not necessary that the assessee must prove incurring of a specific liability under any statute referred to in the different clauses of section

43B. It must be an expenditure connected and related to the assessee’s business deductible u/s 28 of the Act. It should not be a prohibited item totally unrelated to the business of the assessee. The expression “a deduction otherwise allowable” only means statutory liabilities mentioned in section 43B. The expression “a deduction otherwise allowable” reflects deduction on account of general liability fastened to the assessee’s business on account of duties, taxes, cess or fees by whatever name called, arising in the course of the carrying on of the business. The expression does not mean any specific liability which is required to be incurred.

(iii)    There is no justification to examine the previous year in which liability to pay the sum was incurred, when the mandate is “irrespective of the previous year in which liability was incurred” and the claim is to be allowed on the basis of actual payment. To do otherwise would be in violation of the words “irrespective of the previous year” in which the liability was incurred and disregard the mandate of the section.

(iv)    Section 43B brought in a change in the normal rule of deduction of expense based on the accounting method followed by an assessee. The rule of deduction u/s 43B is actual payment of the liability. When the payments are understood as actual payments, those payments even if mentioned as advance payments, need to be allowed as deduction u/s 43B.

(v)    Section 43B provides for the deduction of sums payable mentioned in clauses (a) to (f), only if actually paid ; but they shall be allowed irrespective of the previous year in which the liability to pay such sum was incurred by the assessee. The expression “irrespective of the previous year” means the deduction has to be allowed regardless of the previous year. Any reference to the time of incurring or accruing of the liability is dispensed with by the statute while concentration is made on the point of actual payment of the sum to the Treasury of the Government.

(vi)    It is highly improbable to presume that an assessee would indulge in tax avoidance by actually paying money towards duties and taxes. Any such benefit arising to an assessee is only incidental.

(vii)    The section does not lay down any rule that the liability to pay the duty must be incurred first and only thereafter the payment of such duty made, so as to claim the deduction under section 43B. The expression “otherwise allowable” refers to a declaration that payments which are available as deductions u/s 43B, are those expenses which are usually allowed by the Income-tax Act for the purpose of computing income. The expression “any sum payable” does not mean “payment outstanding”.

On a combined reading of the provisions together with the Explanatory Memorandum and of the intention and the history behind the provisions, amended form time to time, it is clear that section 43B completely overrides the method of accounting and therefore section 145, and that even advance payments of tax are allowable as deduction, in the year of actual payment, even if the liability to pay the tax did not arise during the previous year, but in a subsequent year.

The view taken by the high courts in favour of the allowance of deduction on payment is , in our respectful opinion, a better view of the matter.

Further, the view that the deduction is allowed under the Income tax Act in the year of payment , as held by the special bench of the ITAT, irrespective of its year of accrual under the relevant statute providing for liability to the expenditure, once the actual payment is made, is a far better view.

Income from house property: Deemed owner: Section 27 of Income-tax Act, 1961: Assessee giving its building on sub-licence basis without charging any lease rent or licence fee but received interest free security deposits: Sub-licencees transferred their rights in favour of others and charged rent: Sub-licensees are deemed owners u/s.27(iii) and would be liable to be assessed u/s.22: AO directed not to charge annual letting value of said building under head ‘Income from house property’ in assesse<

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[CIT v. C. J. International Hotels Ltd., 197 Taxman 230 (Del.)]

The assessee-company was running a five-star hotel. The lawn on which the hotel was constructed belonged to NDMC which had executed a licence deed in favour of the assessee granting it licence for a period of 99 years for running of the aforesaid hotel. Adjacent to the hotel, there was another building constructed on that very lawn. Admittedly, that building was not used for hotel business of the assessee, but the apartments of that building were given on sub-licence basis to different parties for carrying on business as specified in the sub-licence agreements. The sub-licences were given for a period of 9 years and 11 months, which were renewable at the request of the sub-licensees. The assessee was not charging any lease rent or licence fee from those parties, instead it had received interest-free security deposits in the year of original sub-licence, which receipts were shown by it as unsecured loans in its balance sheet. The sub-licence deeds, which were executed by the assessee with the sublicensees, permitted the sub-licensees to transfer the same to any other person on payment of transfer charges to the assessee-company. Almost all the sub-licensees had transferred their sub-licences and, thus, various other persons were occupying those premises. The said persons were paying rents to the sub-licensees, which amount had been taxed in the hands of sub-licensees under the head ‘income from house property’. The Assessing Officer, calculated the annual letting value of the said property on the basis of rent/licence fee paid by the occupiers to the sub-licensees and added same to the assessee’s income under the head ‘Income from house property’. The Tribunal accepted the submissions of the assessee that in view of the provisions of section 27(iii) it was the sub-licensee who would be ‘deemed owner’ of those premises who would be assessable and not the assessee. The Tribunal set aside the addition.

On appeal by the Revenue the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“The approach of the Tribunal in deciding the aforesaid issue was perfectly justified. There was no reason to interfere with the same. The Tribunal was justified in directing the Assessing Officer not to charge the annual letting value of the said buildings under the head ‘Income from house property’.”

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(2011) TIOL 197 ITAT-Mum. Bharat Bijlee Ltd. v. Addl. CIT ITA No. 6410/Mum./2008 A.Y.: 2005-06. Dated: 11-3-2011

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Sections 2(42C), 45, 48 and 50B — As per section 2(42C) of the Act, only a transfer as a result of sale can be construed as a slump sale transfer of an undertaking by way of ‘exchange’ will not qualify as a slump sale — When an undertaking is transferred as a going concern it is not possible to conceptualise the cost of acquisition of such a going concern as well as date of acquisition thereof — If the cost of acquisition and/or date of acquisition of the asset cannot be determined, then it cannot be brought within the purview of section 45 for levy and computation of capital gains.

Facts:
During the previous year relevant to the assessment year under consideration, the assessee, pursuant to a Court-approved scheme of arrangement u/s.391 r.w.s 394 of the Companies Act, 1956, transferred its Lift Field Operations Undertaking (‘the undertaking’), as a going concern, to Tiger Elevators Pvt. Ltd. As consideration for transfer the assessee was entitled to receive preference shares and bonds. The price for transfer was a lump sum consideration without assigning any value to any of the individual items. In the return of income filed the assessee did not return any capital gains on the ground that since the cost of undertaking is not ascertainable the machinery for computing capital gains fails. It was also pointed out that the transfer was an exchange and not a sale and therefore did not fall within the purview of the definition of slump sale u/s.2(42C) of the Act.

The Assessing Officer (AO) held the transaction of transfer of the undertaking to be a transaction of slump sale, taxable as per provisions of section 50B of the Act.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who upheld the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The Tribunal having considered the definition of ‘slump sale’ u/s.2(42C) of the Act, held that it is only a transfer as a result of sale that can be construed as a slump sale. Therefore, any transfer of an undertaking otherwise than as a result of sale will not qualify as a slump sale. On perusal of the clauses of the scheme the Tribunal noted that the scheme of arrangement did not mention monetary consideration for the transfer. The parties were ad idem that the scheme of arrangement was that the assessee was to transfer the undertaking and take bonds/preference shares as consideration. Thus, it was held to be a case of exchange and not sale and consequently the provisions of section 2(42C) were held to be not applicable. Therefore, the provisions of section 50B were also held to be not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the assessee’s case.

Since individual items of capital assets were not being transferred and aggregate of individual assets in the form of an undertaking was a capital asset which was transferred, the transfer being one of going concern, it was held that it is not possible to ascertain the profit or gain from transfer of undertaking, since cost of acquisition and the cost of improvement of the undertaking cannot be ascertained and consequently, computation provisions cannot be applied and the charge of capital gain fails.

This ground of appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

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[2014] 151 ITD 642 (Mum) ITO vs. Gope M. Rochlani AY 2008-09 Order dated – 24th May, 2013

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Explanation 5A to section 271(1)(c), read with
section 139. In absence of any limitation or restriction relating to
words ‘due date’ as given in clause (b) of Explanation 5A to section
271(1)(c), it cannot be read as ‘due date’ as provided in section 139(1)
alone, rather it can also mean date of filing of return of income u/s.
139(4). Therefore, where pursuant to search proceedings, assessee files
his return before expiry of due date u/s. 139(4) surrendering certain
additional income, he is entitled to claim benefit of clause (b) of
Explanation 5A to section 271(1)(c).

FACTS
The
assessee firm was carrying out business of housing development. A search
and seizure action u/s. 132(1) was carried out in case of assessee on
16th October 2008. In course of said proceedings, one of partners of
firm made statement u/s.132(4) declaring certain undisclosed income and
subsequently, the return was filed by the assessee declaring the amount
surrendered as income.

In the assessment order passed u/s.143(3)
read with section 153A, the assessment was completed on the same income
on which return of income was filed. The Assessing Officer also
initiated a penalty proceedings u/s. 271(1)(c).

The assessee,
before the Assessing Officer, submitted that this additional income was
offered voluntarily which was on estimate basis and the same has been
accepted in the assessment order as such, therefore, provisions of
section 271(1)(c) is not applicable. The Assessing Officer rejecting
assessee’s explanation levied penalty u/s. 271(1)(c).

In
appellate proceedings before Commissioner (Appeals), the assessee also
submitted that in view of clause (b) of Explanation 5A to section
271(1)(c) penalty could not be levied as the assessee filed return of
income on the due date which could also be inferred as return of income
filed u/s.139(4).

The Commissioner (Appeals) did not accept the
assessee’s explanation on Explanation 5A to section 271(1)(c), but
deleted the penalty on the ground that the income which was offered was
only on estimate basis, therefore, additional income offered by the
assessee could neither be held to be concealed income or furnishing of
inaccurate particulars of income.

On appeal by Revenue

HELD
There
is a saving clause in the Explanation 5A to section 271(1)(c) wherein
penalty cannot be held to be leviable u/s. 271(1)(c); according to which
if the assessee is found to be the owner of any asset/income and the
assessee claims that such assets/income represents his income for any
previous year which has ended before the date of search and the due date
for filing the return of income for such previous year has not expired
then the penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) shall not be levied.

The due
date for filing of the return of income u/s. 139(1) for assessment year
2008-09 was 30-9-2008, whereas the assessee has filed the return of
income on 31-10- 2008 i.e., after one month from the date of filing of
the return of income as provided in section 139(1). However the due date
for filing of the return of income u/s. 139(4) for the assessment year
2008-09 was 31-3-2010 and thus, the return of income filed by the
assessee in this case was u/s. 139(4).

The issue however is
whether the return of income filed u/s. 139(4) can be held to be the
‘due date’ for filing the return of income for such previous year as
mentioned in clause (b) of Explanation 5A to section 271(1)(c).

For
the purpose of the instant case, one has to see whether or not the
assessee has shown the income in the return of income filed on the ‘due
date’. Provisions of section 139(1) provides for various types of
assessees to file return of income before the due date and such due date
has been provided in the Explanation 2, which varies from year-to-year.
Whereas, provisions of section 139(4) provide for extension of period
of ‘due date’ in the circumstances mentioned therein and it enlarges the
time-limit provided in section 139(1). The operating line of
sub-section (4) of section 139 provides that ‘any person who has not
furnished the return within the time allowed’, here the time allowed
means u/s. 139(1), then in such a case, the time-limit has been
extended. Wherever the legislature has specified the ‘due date’ or has
specified the date for any compliance, the same has been categorically
specified in the Act.

In the aforesaid Explanation 5A, the
legislature has not specified the due date as provided in section 139(1)
but has merely envisaged the words ‘due date’. This ‘due date’ can be
very well-inferred as due date of the filing of return of income filed
u/s. 139, which includes section 139(4). Where the legislature has
provided the consequences of filing of the return of income u/s. 139(4),
then the same has also been specifically provided.

Once the
legislature has not specified the ‘due date’ as provided in section
139(1) in Explanation 5A, then by implication, it has to be taken as the
date extended u/s. 139(4). In view of the above, it is held that the
assessee gets the benefit /immunity under clause (b) of Explanation to
section 271(1)(c) because the assessee has filed its return of income
within the ‘due date’ and, therefore, the penalty levied by the
Assessing Officer cannot be sustained on this ground.

Thus, even
though the conclusion of the Commissioner (Appeals), is not affirmed,
yet penalty is deleted in view of the interpretation of Explanation 5A
to section 271(1)(c).

In the result, revenue’s appeal is treated as dismissed.

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Remuneration from foreign enterprise – Deduction u/s. 80-O – A. Y. 1994-95 – Assessee conducting services for benefit of foreign companies – Services rendered “from India” and “in India” – Distinction – Report of survey submitted by assessee not utilised in India though received by foreign agency in India – Mere submission of report within India does not take assessee out of purview of benefit –

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CIT vs. Peters and Prasad Association; 371 ITR 206 (T&AP):

The assessee was an agency undertaking the activity of conducting services for the benefit of foreign companies or agencies. After conducting a survey on the assigned subject, the reports were submitted to the foreign agencies. For the A. Y. 1994-95, the assessee claimed deduction u/s. 80-O in respect of the remuneration received from the foreign enterprise for such services. The Assessing Officer denied the deduction on the ground that the survey report was submitted in India and thereby section 80-O was not attracted. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim..

On appeal by the Revenue, the Telangana and Andhra Pradesh High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) It was not the case of the Revenue that the report of survey submitted by the assessee was utilised within India, though it was received by the foreign agency within India. It is only when it was established that the survey report submitted to the foreign agency was, in fact, used or given effect to, in India, that the assessee becomes ineligible for deduction.

ii) The mere fact that the submission of the report was within India, did not take away the matter from the purview of section 80-O. If that was to be accepted, the very purpose of providing the Explanation becomes redundant.

iii) Thus, the assessee was entitled to deduction u/s. 80-O.”

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[2013] 145 ITD 491(Mumbai- Trib.) Capital International Emerging Markets Fund vs. DDIT(IT) A.Y. 2007-08 Order dated- 10-07-2013

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i. Capital Loss from share swapping is allowed.

Facts:
Assessee-company, a Foreign Institutional Investor, was engaged in business of share trading.

The assessee received shares in ratio of 1 : 16 shares held by it in a company. This resulted in long term capital loss. AO disallowed the assessee’s claim of long term capital loss, on swap transaction. When the matter was referred to DRP, it was held that no sound reason was furnished by the assessee to explain as to why it entered in an exchange transaction that resulted in huge loss, that no prudent businessman would enter in to such a transaction, that swap ratio of shares transacted was not done by the competent authority i.e. a merchant banker.

Held:
Swapping of shares was approved by an agency of Govt. of India i.e. FIPB and it had approved the ratio of shares to be swapped. In these circumstances to challenge the prudence of the transaction was not proper. Even if the transaction was not approved by the Sovereign and it was carried out by the assessee in normal course of its business, the Ld AO/DRP could not question the prudence of the transaction. Genuiuness of a transaction can be definitely a subject of scrutiny by revenue authorities, but to decide the prudence of a transaction is prerogative of the assessee. A decision as to whether to do / not to do business or to carry out/not to carry out a certain transaction is to be taken by a businessman. If it is proved that a transaction had taken place, then resultant profit or loss has to be assessed as per the tax statutes. Therefore by casting doubt about the prudence of the transaction, members of the DRP had stepped in to an exclusive discretionary zone of a businessman and it is not permissible.

ii. Set off of short term capital loss subject to STT allowed against short term capital gain not subjected to STT

Facts:
Assessee has claimed set off of short-term capital loss subjected to Securities Transaction Tax(STT) against the short-term capital gains that was not subjected to STT. The AO held that as both the transactions were subject to different rates of tax, the set off of loss is not correct. He held that in order to set off the short term capital loss, there should be short term capital loss and short term capital gain on computation made u/s. 48 to 55. The assessee was entitled to have the amount of such short term capital loss set off against the short term capital gain, if any, as arrived under a similar computation made for the assessment year under consideration.

Held:
The phrase “under similar computation made” refers to computation of income, the provisions for which are contained u/ss. 45 to 55A of the Act. The matter of computation of income was a subject which came anterior to the application of rate of tax which are contained in section 110 to 115BBC. Therefore, merely because the two sets of transactions are liable for different rate of tax, it cannot be said that income from these transactions does not arise from similar computation made as computation in both the cases has to be made in similar manner under the same provisions. The Tribunal therefore, held that short term capital loss arising from STT paid transactions can be set off against short term capital gain arising from non SIT transactions.

Note: Readers may also read following decisions of Mumbai Tribunal:

• DWS India Equity Fund [IT Appeal No. 5055 (Mum.) of 2010]

• First State Investments (Hong Kong) Ltd. vs. ADIT [2009] 33 SOT 26 (Mum)

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Business Expenditure – Disallowance u/s. 40A(3) of payments in cash in excess of specified limit in an assessment made for a block period – Provisions to be applied as applicable for the assessment years in question

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M. G. Pictures (Madras) Ltd. vs. ACIT (2015) 373 ITR 39 (SC)

The appellant/assessee was engaged in production and distribution of motion pictures mainly in Tamil language. There was a search u/s. 132 of the Income-tax Act, at the business premises of the assessee during which certain book of accounts were seized. Consequent to the search, proposal was made for assessment for the block period of ten years 1.4.1986 to 31.3.1996 and thereafter, up to 13.9.1996.

The Assessing Officer disallowed the expenditure where the payments were made in cash in excess of Rs.10,000/- relying on section 40A(3) of the Act as it stood prior to 1.4.1996.The appellant filed appeal before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Madras Bench (‘the Tribunal’). The Tribunal vide order dated 28.6.2000 partly allowed the appeal and remitted the matter to the Assessing Officer for considering the claim whether the income/loss from the film Thirumurthy was to be computed for the assessment year 1996-97 in accordance with Rule 9A of the Income Tax Rules. It was also directed that in making the computation, the Assessing Officer will consider the expenditure and make the disallowance under the provisions of section 40A(3) of the Act, as was applicable for the assessment year in question.

Feeling aggrieved by the order of the Appellate Tribunal, the appellant filed appeal before the High Court. The High Court did not accept the contentions of the appellant which were based on the amended section 158B(b) in Chapter XIVB of Finance Act, 2002 and dismissed the appeal.
Questioning the validity of the aforesaid judgment of the High Court, the appellant preferred an appeal with the leave of the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court noted that in the year 1996, the provisions of section 40A(3) of the Act did not allow any expenditure if it was more than Rs.20,000/- and paid in cash. The only exception that was carved out in such cases was where the assessee could satisfactorily demonstrate to the Assessing Officer that it was not possible to make payment in cheque. Even in those cases, the expenditure was allowable up to Rs.10,000/- and all cash payments made in excess of Rs.10,000/- were to be disallowed as the expenditure. Provisions of section 40A(3) were amended with effect from 1.4.1996. With this amendment, in cases where the cash payment is made in excess of Rs.20,000/-, disallowance was limited to 20% of the expenditure.

The Supreme Court observed that since the date of the amendment fell within the aforesaid block period, the assessee wanted the benefit of this amendment for the entire block period of ten years, i.e., 1.4.1986 to 31.3.1996. According to the Supreme Court, such a plea was unacceptable on the face of it inasmuch as the amendment was substantive in nature, which was made clear in the explanatory notes of amendments as well.

The Supreme Court held that once the amendment was held to be substantive in nature, it could not be applied retrospectively. The only ground on which the assessee wanted benefit of this amendment from 1.4.1986 was that the assessment was of the block period of ten years. The Supreme Court noted that, however, on its pertinent query, learned counsel for the appellant was fair in conceding that there was no judgment or any principle which would help the appellant in supporting the aforesaid contention. According to the Supreme Court, the order of the High Court was perfectly justified.

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Capital gain: Long-term or short-term – Sections 2(42A) and 45 – Written lease for three years – Assessee continuing to pay rent and occupying premises for 10 more years – Amount received on surrender of tenancy is long-term capital gain

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CIT vs. Frick India Ltd.; 369 ITR 328 (Del):

Under a written tenancy agreement for three years the assessee occupied premises on 15-03-1973. Thereafter the assessee continued to use and occupy the premises as a tenant. Rent was paid by assessee and was accepted by the landlord. On 18-02-1987 the tenancy rights were surrendered and consideration of Rs. 6.78 crore was received from a third party. The Assessing Officer held that the amount should be treated as short-term capital gains and not as long term capital gains. The logic behind the finding of the Assessing Officer was that the tenancy after the initial period of three years by way of a written instrument, was month to month. Thus the tenancy rights were extinguished on the last day of each month and a fresh or new tenancy was created. The Tribunal held that the amount was assessable as long-term capital gain.

On appeal by the Revenue the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“The tenancy rights had been held for nearly fourteen years and consideration received on surrender had been rightly treated as long-term capital gain.”

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Refund – Self-assessment tax – Interest – Sections 140A, 244A(1)(a),(b) and 264 – A. Y. 1994-95 – Excess amount paid as tax on self-assessment – Interest payable from date of payment to date of refund of the amount

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Stock Holding Corporation of India Ltd vs. CIT; 373 ITR 282 (Bom):

For the A. Y. 1994-95, the Assessing Officer did not pay interest u/s. 244A in respect of the excess amount paid by the petitioner as self assessment tax. The petitioner’s application u/s. 264 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was rejected by the Commissioner.

The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the petitioner and held as under:

“i) The requirement to pay interest arises whenever an amount is refunded to the assessee as it is a kind of compensation for use and retention of money collected by the Revenue.

ii) Circular No. 549 dated 31/10/1989, makes it clear that if refund is out of any tax other than out of advance tax or tax deducted at source, interest shall be payable from the date of payment of tax till the date of grant of refund. The circular even remotely did not suggest that interest is not payable by the Department on self-assessment tax.

iii) The tax paid on self-assessment would fall u/s. 244A(1)(b). The provisions of section 244A(1)(b) very clearly mandate that the Revenue would pay interest on the amount refunded for the period commencing from the date payment of tax is made to the Revenue up to the date when refund is granted by the Revenue. Thus, the submission that the interest is payable not from the date of payment but from the date of demand notice u/s. 156 could not be accepted as otherwise the legislation would have so provided in section 244A(1)(b), rather than having provided from the date of payment of the tax. Therefore, the interest was payable u/s. 244A(1)(b) on the refund of excess amount paid as tax on self-assessment u/s. 140A.”

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A Press Note bearing No.402/92/2006-MC dated 17th April, 2014 has been issued by CBDT giving instructions to Assessing Officers, laying down Standard Operating Procedure (‘SOP’) for verification and correction of tax-demand. The taxpayers can get the outstanding tax demand reduced/ deleted by applying for rectification along with documentary evidence of tax/demand already paid. The SOP also makes special provisions for dealing with the tax demand upto Rs. 1,00,000/- in the case of Individuals a<

Search and seizure – Block assessment – Assessment of third person – For the purpose of section 158BD of the Act a satisfaction note is sine qua non and must be prepared by the assessing officer before he transmits the records to the other assessing officer who has jurisdiction over such other person. The satisfaction note could be prepared at either of the following stages: (a) at the time of or along with the initiation of proceedings against the searched person u/s. 158BC of the Act;

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CIT vs. Calcutta Knitwears
(2014) 362 ITR 673 (SC)

A search operation u/s. 132 of the Act was carried out in two premises of the Bhatia Group, namely, M/s. Swastik Trading Company and M/s. Kavita International Company on 05-02-2003 and certain incriminating documents pertaining to the respondent assessee firm engaged in manufacturing hosiery goods in the name and style of M/s. Calcutta Knitwears were traced in the said search.

After completion of the investigation by the investigating agency and handing over of the documents to the assessing authority, the assessing authority had completed the block assessments in the case of Bhatia Group. Since certain other documents did not pertain to the person searched u/s. 132 of the Act, the assessing authority thought it fit to transmit those documents, which according to him, pertain to the “undisclosed income” on account of investment element and profit element of the assessee firm and require to be assessed u/s. 158BC read with section 158BD of the Act to another assessing authority in whose jurisdiction the assessments could be completed. In doing so, the assessing authority had recorded his satisfaction note dated 15-07-2005.

The jurisdictional assessing authority for the respondentassessee had issued the show cause notice u/s. 158BD for the block period 01-04-1996 to 05-02-2003, dated 10- 02-2006 to the assessee inter alia directing the assessee to show cause as to why should the proceedings u/s. 158BC not be completed. After receipt of the said notice, the assessee firm had filed its return u/s. 158BD for the said block period declaring its total income as Nil and further filed its reply to the said notice challenging the validity of the said notice u/s. 158BD, dated 08-03-2006. The assessee had taken the stand that the notice issued to the assessee is (a) in violation of the provisions of section 158BD as the conditions precedent have not been complied with by the assessing officer and (b) beyond the period of limitation as provided for u/s. 158BE read with section 158BD and therefore, no action could be initiated against the assessee and accordingly, requested the assessing officer to drop the proceedings.

The assessing authority, after due consideration of the reply filed to the show cause notice, had rejected the aforesaid stand of the assessee and assessed the undisclosed income as Rs. 21,76,916/- (Rs.16,05,744/- (unexplained investment) and Rs. 5,71,172/- (profit element)) by order dated 08-02-2008. The assessing officer was of the view that section 158BE of the Act did not provide for any limitation for issuance of notice and completion of the assessment proceedings u/s.158BD of the Act and therefore a notice could be issued even after completion of the proceedings of the searched person u/s. 158BC of the Act.

Disturbed by the orders passed by the assessing officer, the assessee firm had carried the matter in appeal before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeal- II) (for short ‘the CIT(A)’. The CIT(A), while rejecting the stand of the assessee in respect of validity of notice issued u/s. 158BD, had partly allowed the appeal filed by the assessee firm and deleted the additions made by the assessing officer in its assessments, by his order dated 27-08-2008.

The Revenue had carried the matter further by filing appeal before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal (for short ‘the Tribunal’) and the assessee has filed cross objections therein. The Tribunal, after hearing the parties to the lis, had rejected the appeal of the Revenue and observed that recording of satisfaction by the assessing officer as contemplated u/s. 158BD was on a date subsequent to the framing of assessment u/s. 158BC in case of the searched person, that is, beyond the period prescribed u/s. 158BE(1)(b) and thereby the notice issued u/s. 158BD was belated and consequently the assumption of jurisdiction by the assessing authority in the impugned block assessment would be invalid.

Aggrieved by the order so passed by the Tribunal, the Revenue had carried the matter in appeal u/s. 260A of the Act before the High Court. The High Court, by its impugned judgment and order dated 20-07-2010, had rejected the Revenue’s appeal and confirmed the order passed by the Tribunal.

On appeal, the Supreme Court observed that section 158BD of the Act is a machinery provision and inserted in the statute book for the purpose of carrying out assessments of a person other than the searched person u/s. 132 or 132A of the Act. U/s. 158BD of the Act, if an officer is satisfied that there exists any undisclosed income which may belong to a other person other than the searched person u/s. 132 or 132A of the Act, after recording such satisfaction, may transmit the records/ documents/chits/papers etc., to the assessing officer having jurisdiction over such other person. After receipt of the aforesaid satisfaction and upon examination of the said other documents relating to such other person, the jurisdictional assessing officer may proceed to issue a notice for the purpose of completion of the assessments u/s. 158BD of the Act, the other provisions of XIV-B shall apply.

The opening words of section 158BD of the Act are that the assessing officer must be satisfied that “undisclosed income” belongs to any other person other than the person with respect to whom a search was made u/s.132 of the Act or a requisition of books were made u/s. 132A of the Act and thereafter, transmit the records for assessment of such other person. Therefore, according to the Supreme Court the short question that fell for its consideration and decision was at what stage of the proceedings should the satisfaction note be prepared by the assessing officer: Whether at the time of initiating proceedings u/s. 158BC for the completion of the assessments of the searched person u/s. 132 and 132A of the Act or during the course of the assessment proceedings u/s. 158BC of the Act or after completion of the proceedings u/s. 158BC of the Act.

The Supreme Court noted that the Tribunal and the High Court were of the opinion that it could only be prepared by the assessing officer during the course of the assessment proceedings u/s. 158BC of the Act and not after the completion of the said proceedings. The Courts below had relied upon the limitation period provided in section 158BE(2)(b) of the Act in respect of the assessment proceedings initiated u/s. 158BD, i.e., two years from the end of the month in which the notice under Chapter XIV-B was served on such other person in respect of search initiated or books of account or other documents or any assets are requisitioned on or after 01-01-1997.

The Supreme Court held that before initiating proceedings u/s. 158BD of the Act, the assessing officer who has initiated proceedings for completion of the assessments u/s. 158BC of the Act should be satisfied that there is an undisclosed income which has been traced out when a person was searched u/s. 132 or the books of accounts were requisitioned u/s. 132A of the Act. U/s. 158BD the existence of cogent and demonstrative material is germane to the assessing officers’ satisfaction in concluding that the seized documents belong to a person other than the searched person is necessary for initiation of action u/s. 158BD. The bare reading of the provision indicated that the satisfaction note could be prepared by the assessing officer either at the time of initiating proceedings for completion of assessment of a searched person u/s. 158BC of the Act or during the stage of the assessment proceedings. According to the Supreme  Court,  it  did not mean that after completion of the assessment, the assessing officer could not prepare the satisfaction note to the effect that there exists income belonging to any person other than the searched person in respect of whom a search was made u/s. 132 or requisition of books of accounts were made u/s. 132A of the Act. The language of the provision is clear and unambiguous. The legislature has not imposed any embargo on the assessing officer in respect of the stage of proceedings during which the satisfaction is to be reached and recorded in respect of the person other than the searched person.

Further, section 158BE(2)(b) only provides for the period of limitation for completion of block assessment u/s. 158BD in case of the person other than the searched person as two years from the end of the month in which the notice under this Chapter was served on such other person in respect of search carried on after 01-01-1997. According to the Supreme Court, the said section does neither provides for nor imposes any restrictions or conditions on the period of limitation for preparation of the satisfaction note u/s. 158BD and consequent issuance of notice to the other person.

In the result, the Supreme Court held that for the purpose of section 158BD of the Act a satisfaction note is sine qua non and must be prepared by the assessing officer before he transmits the records to the other assessing officer who has jurisdiction over such other person. The satisfaction note could be prepared at either of the following stages: (a) at the time of or along with the initiation of proceedings against the searched person u/s. 158BC of the Act; (b) along with the assessment proceedings u/s. 158BC of the Act; and (c) immediately after the assessment proceedings are completed u/s. 158BC of the Act of the searched person.

Jupiter Construction Services Ltd. vs. DCIT ITAT Ahmedabad `A’ Bench Before Pramod Kumar (AM) and S. S. Godara (JM) ITA No. 2850 and 2144/Ahd/11 Assessment Year: 1995-96 and 1996-97. Decided on: 24th April, 2015. Counsel for assessee / revenue: Tushar P. Hemani / Subhash Bains

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Section 255(4) – At the time of giving effect to the majority view, it normally is not open to the Tribunal to go beyond the exercise of giving effect to the majority views, howsoever mechanical it may seem. Even if the Third Member’s verdict is shown to be “unsustainable in law and in complete disregard to binding judicial precedents”, Division Bench has no choice but to give effect to it.

Facts:
There was a different of opinion between the members of Division Bench while deciding the appeal of the assessee relating to levy of penalty. The difference was referred to the Third Member who agreed with the Accountant Member and confirmed the levy of penalty.

At the stage of Division Bench giving effect to the order of the Third Member, the assessee claimed that the order of the Third Member could not be given effect to as it was unsustainable and in complete disregard to binding judicial precedents. The assessee claimed that the matter of whether effect could be given to such an order was required to be referred to a Special Bench.

Held:
Post the decision of the jurisdictional High Court in the case of CIT vs. Vallabhdas Vithaldas 56 taxmann.com 300 (Guj) the legal position is that the decisions of the division benches bind the single member bench, even when such a single member bench is a third member bench.

A larger bench decision binds the bench of a lesser strength because of the plurality in the decision making process and because of the collective application of mind. What three minds do together, even when the result is not unanimous, is treated as intellectually superior to what two minds do together, and, by the same logic, what two minds do together is considered to be intellectually superior to what a single mind does alone. Let us not forget that the dissenting judicial views on the division benches as also the views of the third member are from the same level in the judicial hierarchy and, therefore, the views of the third member cannot have any edge over views of the other members. Of course, when division benches itself also have conflicting views on the issues on which members of the division benches differ or when majority view is not possible as a result of a single member bench, such as in a situation in which one of the dissenting members has not stated his views on an aspect which is crucial and on which the other member has expressed his views, it is possible to constitute third member benches of more than one members. That precisely could be the reason as to why even while nominating the Third Member u/s. 255(4), the Hon’ble President of this Tribunal has the power of referring the case “for hearing on such point or points (of difference) by one or more of the other members of the Appellate Tribunal”. Viewed from this perspective, and as held by Hon’ble Jurisdictional high Court, the Third Member is bound by the decisions rendered by the benches of greater strength. That is the legal position so far as at least the jurisdiction of the Gujarat High Court is concerned post Vallabhdas Vithaldas (supra) decision, but, even as we hold so, we are alive to the fact that the Hon’ble Delhi High Court had, in the case of P. C. Puri vs. CIT 151 ITR 584 (Del), expressed a contrary view on this issue which held the field till we had the benefit of guidance from the Hon’ble jurisidictional High Court. The approach adopted by the learned Third member was quite in consonance with the legal position so prevailing at that point of time.

At the time of giving effect to the majority view, it cannot normally be open ot the Tribunal to go beyond the exercise of giving effect to the majority views, howsoever mechanical it may seem. In the case of dissenting situations on the division bench, the process of judicial adjudication is complete when the third member, nominated by the Hon’ble President, resolves the impasse by expressing his views and thus enabling a majority view on the point or points of difference. What then remains for the division bench is simply identifying the majority view and dispose of the appeal on the basis of the majority views. In the course of this exercise, it is, in our humble understanding, not open to the division bench to revisit the adjudication process and start examining the legal issues.

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Heranba Industries Ltd. vs. DCIT ITAT Mumbai `H’ Bench Before R. C. Sharma (AM) and Sanjay Garg (JM) ITA No. 2292 /Mum/2013 Assessment Year: 2009-10. Decided on: 8th April, 2015. Counsel for assessee / revenue: Rashmikant C. Modi / Jeetendra Kumar

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Section 271(1)(c) – If surrender is on the condition of no penalty and assessment is based only on surrender and not on evidence, penalty cannot be levied. The fact that surrender of income was made after issuance of a questionnaire does not mean that it was not voluntary.

Facts:
The assessee company was engaged in manufacture of pesticides, herbicides and formulations. It filed its return of income for assessment year 2009-10 returning therein a total income of Rs.1.49 crore. In the course of assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer (AO) noticed that during the previous year under consideration, the assessee had received share application money of Rs. 89.50 lakh. He asked the assessee to furnish details with supporting evidences. In response, the assessee expressed its inability to provide the necessary details and stated that in order to buy peace, it agreed to offer the share application money of Rs. 89.50 lakh as its income.

The AO added Rs. 89.50 lakh to the assessee’s income u/s. 69A and also levied penalty u/s. 271(1)(c).

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to Tribunal.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that the assessee, at the very first instance, surrendered share application money with a request not to initiate any penalty proceedings. Except for the surrender, there was neither any detection nor any information in the possession of the department. There was no malafide intention on the part of the assessee and the AO had not brought any evidence on record to prove that there was concealment. No additional material was discovered to prove that there was concealment. The AO did not point out or refer to any evidence to show that the amount of share capital received by the assessee was bogus. It was not even the case of the revenue that material was found at the assessee’s premises to indicate that share application money received was an arranged affair to accommodate assessee’s unaccounted money.

The Tribunal noted that the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Suresh Chandra Mittal 251 ITR 9 (SC) has observed that where assessee has surrendered the income after persistence queries by the AO and where revised return has been regularised by the Revenue, explanation of the assessee that he has declared additional income to buy peace of mind and to come out of vexed litigation could be treated as bonafide, accordingly levy of penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) was held to be not justified.

The Tribunal held that in the absence of any material on record to suggest that share application money was bogus or untrue, the fact that the surrender was after issue of notice u/s. 143(2) could not lead to the inference that it was not voluntary.

The amount was included in the total income only on the basis of the surrender by the assessee. It held that in these circumstances it cannot be held that there was any concealment. When no concealment was ever detected by the AO, no penalty was imposable. Furnishing of inaccurate particulars was simply a mistake and not a deliberate attempt to evade tax. The Tribunal did not find any merit in the levy of penalty u/s. 271(1)(c).

The appeal filed by the assessee was dismissed.

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DCIT vs. Aanjaneya Life Care Ltd. Income Tax Appellate Tribunal “A” Bench, Mumbai Before D. Manmohan (V. P.) and Sanjay Arora (A. M.) ITA Nos. 6440&6441/Mum/2013 Assessment Years: 2010-11 & 2011-12. Decided on 25.03.2015 Counsel for Revenue / Assessee: Asghar Zain / Harshavardhana Datar

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Section 221(1) – Penalty for delay in payment of self-assessment tax deleted on account of financial crunch faced by the assessee.

Facts:
Due to financial crunch the assessee was not able to pay the self-assessment tax within the stipulated period. However, according to the AO, the assessee could not prove its contention with cogent and relevant material. Further, he observed that substantial funds were diverted to related concerns. He therefore levied penalty u/s. 221(1) of the Act. On appeal, the CIT(A) allowed the appeal of the assessee and deleted the penalty imposed.

Held:
According to the Tribunal, the Revenue was unable to show that the assessee had sufficient cash/bank balance so as to meet the tax demand. Secondly, it also could not show if any funds were diverted for non-business purposes at the relevant point of time so as to say that an artificial financial scarcity was created by the assessee. In view of the same the tribunal accepted the contention of the assessee and upheld the order of the CIT(A).

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[2015] 152 ITD 533 (Jaipur) Asst. DIT (International taxation) vs. Sumit Gupta. A.Y. 2006-07 Order dated- 28th August 2014.

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Section 9, read with section 195 and Article 7 of DTAA between India and USA

Income cannot be said to have deemed to accrue or arise in India when the assessee pays commission to non-resident for the services rendered outside India and the non-resident does not have a permanent establishment in India. Consequently, section 195 is not attracted and so the assessee is not liable to deduct TDS from the said payment.

FACTS
The assessee exported granite to USA and paid commission on export sales made to a US company but it did not deduct tax u/s. 195.

The Assessing Officer held that the sales commission was the income of the payee which accrued or arose in India on the ground that such remittances were covered under the expression fee for technical services’ as defined u/s. 9(1)(vii)(b). He thus held that the assessee was liable deduct tax u/s. 195 and he was in default u/s. 201(1) for tax and interest.

On Appeal, CIT (Appeals) held that commission does not fall under managerial, technical or consultation services and therefore, no income could be deemed to have accrued or arisen to the non-resident so as to attract provisions of withholding tax u/s. 195.

On Appeal-

HELD THAT
The order of CIT(A) was to be upheld as the non-resident recipients of commission rendered services outside India and claimed it as business income and had no permanent establishment in India. Thus, provisions of section 9 and section 195 were not attracted.

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Business expenditure – Disallowance u/s. 14A – A. Y. 2007-08 – Disallowance u/s. 14A is not automatic upon claim to exemption – AO’s satisfaction that voluntary disallowance made by assessee unreasonable and unsatisfactory is necessary – In the absence of such satisfaction the disallowance cannot be justified

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CIT vs. I. P. Support Services India (P) Ltd.; 378 ITR 240 (Del):

In the A. Y. 2009-10, the assessee had earned dividend income which was exempt. The Assessing Officer asked the assessee to furnish an explanation why the expenses relevant to the earning of dividend should not be disallowed u/s. 14A. The assessee submitted that as no expenses had been incurred for earning dividend income, this was not a case for making any disallowance. The assessing Officer held that the invocation of section 14A is automatic and comes into operation, without any exception. He disallowed an amount of Rs. 33,35,986/- u/s. 14A read with rule 8D and added the amount to the total income. The Commissioner (Appeals) found that no interest expenditure was incurred and that the investments were done by using administrative machinery of PMS, who did not charge any fees. He deleted the addition. The Tribunal affirmed the order of the Commissioner (Appeals).

In appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The Assessing Officer had indeed proceeded on the erroneous premise that the invocation of section 14A is automatic and comes into operation as soon as the dividend income is claimed as exempt. The recording of satisfaction as to why the voluntary disallowance made by the assessee was unreasonable or unsatisfactory, is a mandatory requirement of the law.

ii) N o substantial question of law arises. The appeal is dismissed.”

Housing project: Deduction u/s. 80-IB(10): A. Y. 2007-08: Amendment w.e.f. 01/04/2005 requiring certificate of completion of project within four years of approval: Not applicable to projects approved prior to that date: Assessee entitled to deduction:

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CIT vs. CHD Developers Ltd.; 362 ITR 177 (Del):

The assessee, a real estate developer obtained approval for a housing project on 16-03-2005 from the Development Authority. It completed the project in 2008 and by a letter dated 05-11-2008 applied to the Competent Authority for the issue of the completion certificate. The assessee’s claim for deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) was denied inter alia, on the ground that the completion certificate was not obtained within the period of four years as prescribed by the Finance Act, 2004 w.e.f. 01-04-2005. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim for deduction accepting the assessee’s claim that, since the approval was granted to the assessee 16-03-2005 i.e., prior to 01-04-2005, the assessee was not expected to fulfill the conditions which were not on the statute when such approval was granted to the assessee.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The approval for the project was given by the Development Authority on 16-03-2005. Clearly, the approval related to the period prior to the amendment, which insisted on the issuance of the completion certificate by the end of the four year period, was brought into force. The application of such stringent conditions, which are left to an independent body such as the local authority who is to issue the completion certificate, would have led to not only hardship but absurdity.

ii) As a consequence, the Tribunal was not, therefore, in error of law while holding in favour of the assessee.”

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Constitutional validity – Amendment made in section 80-IB(9) by adding an Explanation was not clarificatory, declaratory, curative or made “small repair” in the Act – On the contrary, it takes away the accrued and vested right of the Petitioner which had matured after the judgments of ITAT. Therefore, the Explanation added by the Finance (No.2) Act 2009 was a substantive law – Explanation added to section 80-IB(9) by the Finance (No.2) Act, of 2009 is clearly unconstitutional, violative of Arti<

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Niko Resources Ltd. vs. UOI: [2015] 55 taxmann.com 455 (Guj):

The
Petitioner is a foreign company based in Canada and has set up a
project office in India with the permission of Reserve Bank of India.
The Petitioner has been claiming benefit of deduction of 100% of the
profits and gains from the production of mineral oil and natural gas
u/s. 80-IB(9) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, as it stood prior to the
amendment by the Finance (No.2) Act 2009. In these proceedings, the
constitutional validity of the amendment to sub-section (9) of section
80-IB and Explanation added to it under the Act by the Finance (No.2)
Act, 2009, has been challenged.

The disputed question was as to
whether the benefits of tax holiday of seven years was available on each
undertaking which has now been taken away by the amendment made in
section 80-IB(9) by adding on Explanation that provides that all blocks
licensed under a single contract shall be treated as a single
undertaking.

The Gujarat High Court held as under:

“i)
Arbitrarily, the 100% tax deduction benefit could not be withdrawn by
the Finance Minister or the legislature by amending section 80-IB(9) of
the Act retrospectively from an anterior date.

ii) The amendment
in such cases where already tax benefit had accrued and vested in the
assessee could not be taken away by giving retrospective amendment to
section 80-IB(9) which is nothing but a substantive provision inserted
by amendment and it can only operate prospectively and not
retrospectively.

iii) Explanation added to section 80-IB(9) by
Finance (No.2) Act, of 2009 is clearly unconstitutional, violative of
Article 14 of the Constitution of India and is liable to be struck
down.”

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Sunder Deep Education Society vs. ACIT In the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal Delhi Bench ‘ G’ New Delhi Before Rajpal Yadav (J. M.) and T. S. Kapoor (A. M.) ITA No. 2428/Del/2011 Assessment Year: 2007-08. Decided on 6th December, 2013 Counsel for Assessee / Revenue: Rakesh Gupta / N. Srivastava

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Sections 11, 12 and 68 – Failure to present donors on being summoned – Donations cannot be taxed as income under section 68.

Facts
The assessee is registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and u/s. 12AA of the Income tax Act, 1961. It also enjoys exemption u/s. 80G. The assessee runs educational institutions conducting various professional courses. In respect of the voluntary contribution aggregating to Rs. 1.97 crore received during the year, the assessee was not able to produce the donors when summoned by the AO who, as claimed by the assessee, had made the said donations. Therefore, the AO held that the same were anonymous and unexplained cash credit and added the said amount as the assessee’s total income as per section 115BBC and section 68.

Before the CIT(A) the assessee submitted the name and address of the persons who had made donations alongwith other particulars prescribed by the Act. The CIT(A) agreed that the donations could not be treated as ‘anonymous’. However, according to him, since the assessee could not prove the donations amount of Rs. 1.97 crore the same was treated as unaccounted income by him and brought to tax u/s. 11(4) read with section 68/69/69C. Before the tribunal, the revenue did not challenge the CIT(A)’s finding that the donations were not anonymous but contended that as held by the CIT(A), the same were taxable u/s. 68 and 69 as income from other sources and the benefit of section 11 and 12 would not be available to the assessee.

Held
The tribunal referred to the decision of the Delhi tribunal in the case of Shri Vivekanand Education & Welfare Society (ITA No. 2592 / Del / 2012) which was based on the decision of the Delhi high court in the case of DIT(Exem) vs. Keshav Social & Charitable Trust (278 ITR 152) where the Court observed that the fact that complete list of donors was not filed or that the donors were not produced, does not necessariiy lead to the inference that the assesse was trying to introduce un-accounted money by way of donation receipts. The Court further observed that as the assesse had disclosed the donation as income, the provisions of section 68 cannot be applied. Applying the ratio, the tribunal held that the said receipts of Rs. 1.97 crore would be governed by the provisions of sections 11 and 12 of the Act and if 85% thereof is applied towards the objects of the trust, then the income assessable would be nil.

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IDBI Capital Market Services Ltd. vs. DCIT ITAT “I” Bench, Mumbai Before N.K. Billaiya, (A. M.) & Amit Shukla (J. M.) I.T.A. No. 618/Mum/2012 Assessment Year: 2008-09. Decided on 18.02.2015 Counsel for Assessee/Revenue: N.C. Jain/Kishan Vyas

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Section 37(1) – Loss arising from valuation of interest rate swap contracts as at the end of the year is allowable as deduction.

Facts:
The assessee is engaged in the business of investment, share broking and dealing in Government securities and it is a member of Bombay Stock Exchange as well as National Stock Exchange. While scrutinising the return of income the AO noticed that as on 31st March 2008 the assessee had valued the outstanding interest swap contracts and the loss of Rs.18.3 crore determined was debited to P&L Account. According to the AO, the assessee had recognised only the loss and not the profit. Further, he observed that the assessee was not consistent and definite in making entries in the account books in respect of losses and gains and accordingly denied the claim of deduction. On appeal, the CIT(A) relied upon the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Bharat Ruia in ITA No.1539 of 2010 and treated the loss as speculation loss and confirmed the disallowance.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that it was an undisputed fact that the assessee had made the valuation of interest rate swap contracts as at the end of the year and had incurred losses on such valuation. Further, it also noted that the assessee had made the entries following Accounting Standard AS- 11 of the ICAI. The Tribunal further found the observations of the AO that the assessee had never accounted for the gains on such transactions as totally misplaced and against the facts of the case. Relying on the decision of the Tribunal Special Bench Mumbai in the case of Bank of Bahrain & Kuwait, ITA No.4404 & 1883/Mum/2004 and of the Supreme Court in the case of Woodward Governor India Pvt. Ltd. [2009] 179 Taxman 326 (SC), the Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) and directed the AO to delete the addition of Rs.18.3 crore.

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Income Computation & Disclosure Standards – Some Issues

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The 10 Income Computation and Disclosure Standards (ICDS) which have been notified on 31st March 2015 u/s. 145(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 have significant implications on the computation of income for assessment years beginning from assessment year 2016-17.

Under the notification, these standards come into force from 1st April 2016, i.e. assessment year 2016-17, apply to all assessees following mercantile system of accounting, and are to be followed for the purposes of computation of income chargeable to income tax under the head “Profits and gains of business or profession” or “Income from other sources”. The notification also supercedes notification dated 25th January 1996 [which notified 2 Accounting Standards u/s 145(2) – Disclosure of Accounting Policies, and Disclosure of Prior Period and Extraordinary Items and Changes in Accounting Policies], except as regards such things done or omitted to be done before such supersession.

Background
Section 145, which deals with method of accounting, was substituted by the Finance Act, 1995, with effect from assessment year 1997-98. Sub-section (2) to this section, after this amendment, provided that the Central Government may notify in the Official Gazette from time to time accounting standards (“AS”) to be followed by any class of assessees or in respect of any class of income.

The provisions of sub-section (1) were made subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), whereby the income chargeable under the head “Profits and gains of business or profession” or “Income from other sources” was to be computed in accordance with either cash or mercantile system of accounting regularly employed by the assessee, subject to the provisions of subsection (2).

Sub-section (3) provided that where the assessing officer was not satisfied about the correctness or completeness of the accounts of the assessee, or where the method of accounting provided in sub-section (1) or AS notified under sub-section (2) had not been regularly followed by the assessee, the assessing officer could make an assessment in the manner provided in section 144 (i.e. a best judgement assessment).

In 1996, AS notified by ICAI were not mandatory for companies, but were mandatory for auditors auditing general purpose financial statements. On 29th January 1996, two AS (“IT-AS”) were notified by the CBDT, Disclosure of Accounting Policies, and Disclosure of Prior Period and Extraordinary Items and Changes in Accounting Policies.

In July 2002, the Government constituted a Committee for formulation of AS for notification u/s 145(2). In November 2003, this Committee recommended the notification of the AS issued by ICAI without any modification, since it would be impractical for a taxpayer to maintain two sets of books of account. It also recommended appropriate legislative amendments to the Act for preventing any revenue leakage due to the AS being notified by ICAI. These recommendations were not implemented.

With the imminent introduction of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in India in the form of Ind- AS, in December 2010, the Government constituted a Committee of Departmental Officers and professionals to suggest AS for notification u/s. 145(2). The terms of the Committee were as under:

i) to study the harmonisation of AS issued by the ICAI with the direct tax laws in India, and suggest AS which need to be adopted u/s. 145(2) of the Act along with the relevant modifications;

ii) to suggest method for determination of tax base (book profit) for the purpose of Minimum Alternate Tax (MAT) in case of companies migrating to IFRS (IND AS) in the initial year of adoption and thereafter; and

iii) to suggest appropriate amendments to the Act in view of transition to IFRS (IND AS) regime. This Committee submitted an interim report in August 2011. The recommendations of the Committee in such interim report were as under:

1. Separate AS should be notified u/s. 145(2), since the AS to be notified would have to be in harmony with the Act. The notified AS should provide specific rules, which would enable computation of income with certainty and clarity, and would also need elimination of alternatives, to the extent possible.

2. Since it would be burdensome for taxpayers to maintain 2 sets of books of account, the AS to be notified should apply only to computation of income, and books of account should not have to be maintained on the basis of such AS.

3. T o distinguish such AS from other AS, these AS should be called Tax Accounting Standards (“TAS ”).

4. S ince TAS were based on mercantile system of accounting, they should not apply to taxpayers following cash system of accounting.

5. S ince TAS are meant to be in harmony with the Act, in case of conflict, the provisions of the Act should prevail over TAS .

6. S ince the starting point for computation of taxable income was the profit as per the financial accounts, which are prepared on the basis of AS whose provisions may be different from TAS , a reconciliation between the income as per the financial statements and the income computed as per TAS should be presented.

In October 2011, drafts of 2 TAS – Construction Contracts and Government Grants – were released for public comment. In May 2012, drafts of another 6 TAS were released for public comment.

The Committee gave its final report in August 2012. It focused only on formulation of TAS harmonised with the provisions of the Act, since the position regarding the transition to Ind-AS was fluid and uncertain, and therefore even the impact of Ind-AS on book profits relevant for the purposes of MAT could not be ascertained.

It recommended that of the 31 AS issued by ICAI, 7 AS did not need to be examined, since they did not relate to computation of income. Of the remaining 24 AS, 10 related to disclosure requirements, were not yet mandatory or were not required for computation of income. The Committee therefore provided drafts of 14 TAS . The Committee also recommended that TAS in respect of certain other areas be considered for notification – Share based payment, Revenue recognition by real estate developers, Service concession arrangements (example, Build Operate Transfer agreements), and Exploration for and evaluation of mineral resources.

In January 2015, the CBDT released the draft of 12 TAS (renamed as ICDS) for public comment. These did not include 2 TAS recommended by the Committee – Contingencies and Events Occurring After the Balance Sheet Date and Net Profit or Loss for the Period, Prior Period Items and changes in Accounting Policies.

Section 145 was amended by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2014 with effect from 1st April 2015 (assessment year 2015-16), by substituting the term “income computation and disclosure standards” for the term “accounting standards” in sub-section (2). Similarly, sub-section (3) was amended to substitute the “not regular following of accounting standards” with “non-computation of income in accordance with the notified ICDS”.

Finally, in March 2015, the CBDT notified 10 ICDS as under:

ICDS I – Accounting Policies
ICDS II – Valuation of Inventories
ICDS III – Construction Contracts
ICDS IV – Revenue Recognition
ICDS V – Tangible Fixed Assets
ICDS VI – Effects of Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates
ICDS VII – Government Grants
ICDS VIII – Securities
ICDS IX – Borrowing Costs
ICDS X – Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets

The draft ICDS prepared by the Committee but not notified were those relating to Leases and Intangible Fixed Assets.

Applicability & Issues
The notified ICDS apply with effect from assessment year 2016-17, while section 145(2) was amended with effect from assessment year 2015-16. Therefore, for assessment year 2015-16, IT-AS would not apply, since the section provides for ICDS to be followed. Further, since ICDS were not notified till March 2015, ICDS were also not required to be followed for that year. Effectively, for assessment year 2015-16, neither IT-AS nor ICDS would apply. ICDS would apply only with effect from assessment year 2016-17.

ICDS would apply to all taxpayers following mercantile system of accounting, irrespective of the level of income. It would not apply to taxpayers following cash system of accounting. It would not apply only to taxpayers carrying on business, but even to other taxpayers, who may have income under the head “Income from Other Sources”. Effectively, since almost every taxpayer would have at least bank interest, which is taxable under the head “Income from Other Sources”, it would apply to most taxpayers. Further, most taxpayers choose to offer income for tax on an accrual basis, to facilitate matching of tax deducted at source (TDS) from their income with their claim for TDS credit as per their return of income.

Would it apply to taxpayers who do not maintain books of accounts? The provisions would certainly apply to all taxpayers who offer their income to tax under these 2 heads of income on a mercantile basis. Can a taxpayer choose to offer his income to tax on a cash basis, where books of account are not maintained, or is it to be presumed that his income has to be taxed on a mercantile or accrual basis in the absence of books of accounts?

In N. R. Sirker vs. CIT 111 ITR 281, the Gauhati High Court considered the issue and held as under:

“It can safely be assumed that ordinarily people keep accounts in cash system, that is to say, when certain sum is received, it is entered in his account and in the case of firms, etc., where regular method of accounting is adopted, sometimes accounts are kept in mercantile system. In the instant case it was not the case of the department that the assessee’s accounts were kept in mercantile system. On the other hand, the assessment orders showed that no proper accounts were kept. That being so it would not be justified to presume that the assessee kept his accounts in the mercantile system. Income-tax is normally paid on money actually received as income after deducting the allowable deductions. In the case of an assessee maintaining accounts in mercantile system, there was some variation, inasmuch as moneys receivable and payable were also shown as received and paid in the books. In order to apply this method, the proved or admitted position must be that the assessee keeps his accounts in mercantile system.”

Similarly, in Dr. N. K. Brahmachari vs. CIT 186 ITR 507, the Calcutta High Court held that unless and until it was found that the assessee maintained his accounts on accrual basis, income accrued but not received could not be taxed.

In CIT vs. Vimla D. Sonwane 212 ITR 489, the Bombay High Court considered a case where the assesse did not maintain regular books of accounts and did not follow mercantile system of accounting. The Bombay High Court held in that case:

“Option regarding adoption of system of accounting is with the assessee and not with the Income-tax Department. The assessee is indeed free even to follow different methods of accounting for income from different sources in an appropriate case. The department cannot compel the assessee to adopt the mercantile system of accounting. As a matter of fact, it was not adopted.”

In Whitworth Park Coal Co. Ltd. vs. IRC [1960] 40 ITR 517, the House of Lords laid down that where no method of accounting had been regularly employed, a non-trader cannot be assessed, (in the Indian context, u/s. 56 under the head ‘Income from other sources’) in respect of money which he has not received. The House of Lords observed:

“…The word ‘income’ appears to me to be the crucial word, and it is not easy to say what it means. The word is not defined in the Act and I do not think that it can be defined. There are two different currents of authority. It appears to me to be quite settled that in computing a trader’s income account must be taken of trading debts which have not yet been received by the trader. The price of goods sold or services rendered is included in the year’s profit and loss account although that price has not yet been paid. One reason may be that the price has already been earned and that it would give a false picture to put the cost of producing the goods or rendering the services into his accounts as an outgoing but to put nothing against that until the price has been paid. Good accounting practice may require some exceptions, I do not know, but the general principle has long been recognised. And if in the end the price is not paid it can be written off in a subsequent year as a bad debt.

But the position of an ordinary individual who has no trade or profession is quite different. He does not make up a profit and loss account. Sums paid to him are his income, perhaps subject to some deductions, and it would be a great hardship to require him to pay tax on sums owing to him but of which he cannot yet obtain payment. Moreover, for him there is nothing corresponding to a trader writing off bad debts in a subsequent year, except perhaps the right to get back tax which he has paid in error.” (p. 533)

“The case has often arisen of a trader being required to pay tax on something which he has not yet received and may never receive, but we were informed that there is no reported case where a non-trader has had to do this whereas there are at least three cases to the opposite effect—Lambe v. IRC [1934] 2 ITR 494, Dewar v. IRC 1935 5 Tax LR 536 and Grey v. Tiley [1932] 16 Tax Cas. 414, and I would also refer to what was said by Lord Wrenbury in St. Lucia Usines & Estates Co. Ltd. v. St. Lucia ( Colonial Treasurer) [1924] AC 508 (PC). I certainly think that it would be wrong to hold now for the first time that a non-trader to whom money is owing but who has not yet received it must bring it into his income-tax return and pay tax on it. And for this purpose I think that the company must be treated as a non-trader, because the Butterley’s case [1957] AC 32 makes it clear that these payments are not trading receipts.” (p. 533)

Therefore, for income falling under the head “Income from other sources”, it is clear that in the absence of books of accounts, and where the assessee has not exercised any option, the income would be taxable on a cash basis.

It is well settled that the method of accounting is vis-a-vis each source of income, since computation of income is first to be done for each source of income, and then aggregated under each head of income. An assessee can choose to follow one method of accounting for some sources of income, and another method of accounting for other sources of income. In J. K. Bankers vs. CIT 94 ITR

107    (All), the assessee was following mercantile system of accounting in respect of interest on loans in respect of its moneylending business, and offered lease rent earned by it to tax on a cash basis under the head “Income from Other Sources”. The Allahabad High Court held that an assessee could choose to follow a different method of accounting in respect of its moneylending business and in respect of lease rent. Similarly, in CIT vs. Smt. Vimla D. Sonwane 212 ITR 489, the Bombay High Court held that “The assessee is indeed free even to follow different methods of accounting for income from different sources in an appropriate case”.

Where an assessee follows cash method of accounting for certain sources of income and mercantile system of accounting for others, ICDS would apply only to those sources of income, where mercantile system of accounting is followed and would not apply to those sources of income, where cash method of accounting is followed. For instance, an assessee may have a manufacturing business, and a separate commission agency business. He may be following mercantile system of accounting for his manufacturing business, and a cash method of accounting for his commission agency business. ICDS would then apply only to the manufacturing business, and not to the commission agency business.

Can a taxpayer opt to change his method of accounting from mercantile to cash basis, in order to prevent the applicability of ICDS? Under paragraph 5 of ICDS I, an accounting policy shall not be changed without reasonable cause. Under AS 5, such a change was permissible only if the adoption of a different accounting policy was required by statute or for compliance with an accounting standard or if it was considered that the change would result in a more appropriate presentation of the financial statements of the enterprise. Would a change in law amount to reasonable cause? If such a change is made from assessment year 2016-17, the year from which ICDS comes into effect, an assessee would need to demonstrate that such change was actuated by other commercial considerations, and not merely to bypass the provisions of ICDS.

Do ICDS apply to a taxpayer who is offering his income to tax under a presumptive tax scheme, such as section 44AD? Under the presumptive tax scheme, books of account are not relevant, since the income is computed on the basis of the presumptive tax rate laid down under the Act. It therefore does not involve computation of income on the basis of the method of accounting, or on the basis of adjustments to the accounts. Therefore, though there is no specific exclusion under the notification for taxpayers following under presumptive tax schemes from the purview of ICDS, logically, ICDS should not apply to such taxpayers. However, where the presumptive tax scheme involves computation of tax on the basis of gross receipts, turnover, etc., it is possible that the tax authorities may take a view that the ICDS on revenue recognition would apply to compute the gross receipts or turnover in such cases.

Would ICDS apply to non-residents? The provisions of ICDS apply to all taxpayers, irrespective of the concept of residence. However, where a non-resident taxpayer falls under a presumptive tax scheme, such as section 115A, on the same logic as that of presumptive tax schemes applicable to residents, the provisions of ICDS should not apply. Further, where a non-resident claims the benefit of a double taxation avoidance agreement (DTAA), by virtue of section 90(2), the provisions of the DTAA would prevail over the provisions of the Income-tax Act, including section 145(2) and ICDS notified thereunder. In other cases of incomes of non-residents, which do not fall under presumptive tax schemes or DTAA, the provisions of ICDS would apply.

It has been stated in each ICDS that the ICDS would not apply for the purpose of maintenance of books of accounts. While theoretically this may be the position, the question arises as to whether it is practicable or even possible to compute the income under ICDS without maintaining a parallel set of books of account, given the substantial differences between AS being followed in the books of accounts and ICDS. Most taxpayers would end up at least preparing a parallel profit and loss account and balance sheet, to ensure that ICDS and its consequences have been properly taken care of while making the adjustments.

Further, the Committee had recommended that a tax auditor is required to certify that the computation of taxable income is made in accordance with the provisions of ICDS. Before certification, a tax auditor would invariably require such parallel profit and loss account and balance sheet to be prepared, to ensure that all adjustments required on account of ICDS have been considered. This will result in substantial work for most businesses, and may even result in the requirement of parallel MIS, one for the purposes of regular accounts, and the other for the purposes of ICDS. One wonders whether the Committee really wanted to avoid the requirement of maintenance of 2 sets of books of account, as stated by it, or has taken into account the practical difficulties, given the complex and myriad adjustments it has suggested through ICDS.

An interesting issue arises in this context. Can an assessee maintain 2 separate books of accounts – one under the Companies Act or other applicable law on a mercantile system, and a parallel set of books of accounts for income tax purposes on a cash basis? If one looks at the provisions of section 145(1), it provides that income chargeable under these 2 heads of income shall be computed in accordance with either cash or mercantile system of accounting regularly employed by the assessee. What is the meaning of the term “regularly employed”? Normally, the system of accounting adopted by the assesse in his books for his dealings with the outside world would be adopted for the purposes of computing the profit or loss for tax purposes also. The accounts are those maintained in the regular course of business. It may therefore be difficult for an assessee to maintain separate books of account with different system of accounting only for income tax purposes.

It may be noted that even after the introduction of ICDS, the computation still has to be in accordance with the method of accounting regularly employed by the assessee. Compliance with ICDS is an additional requirement. Therefore, the computation in accordance with the method of accounting is merely modified by the requirements of ICDS, and not substituted entirely.

Since ICDS is not applicable for the purposes of maintenance of books of account, one wonders as to what is the purpose and ambit of ICDS I on Accounting Policies. Since the purpose of ICDS is not to lay down accounting policies which are to be followed in the maintenance of the books of account, ICDS I should be regarded as merely a disclosure standard and not a computation standard. There are however certain provisions in ICDS I which relate to computation.

For example, the provision that accounting policies adopted shall be such was to represent a true and fair view of the state of affairs and income of the business, profession or vocation, and that for this purpose, the treatment and presentation of transaction and events shall be governed by their substance and not merely by their legal form, and marked to market loss or an expected loss shall not be recognised, unless the recognition of such loss is in accordance with the provisions of any other ICDS, really relates to what accounting policies an assessee should follow in its books of account. This is inconsistent with the preamble to this ICDS, that it is not applicable for the purpose of maintenance of books of account. This is also ultra vires the powers available under the provisions of section 145(2), which provide for computation in accordance with notified ICDS, and no longer contain the power to notify accounting standards.

This anomaly possibly arose on account of the fact that the provisions of section 145(2) were modified only after the Committee provided the draft of the relevant ICDS. Possibly, such provisions of ICDS I may not be valid.

Each ICDS states that in the case of conflicts between the provisions of the Income-tax Act and the ICDS, the provisions of the Act would prevail to that extent. Such a provision is ostensibly to harmonise the provisions of the ICDS with the provisions of the Act. One wonders as to why the Committee did not take into account the various provisions of the Act while framing ICDS. While such a provision is helpful, it would lead to substantial litigation in cases where there is no express provision in the Act, but where courts have interpreted the provisions of the Act in a manner which is inconsistent with the provisions of the ICDS.

There have been 3 specific amendments made to the Income-tax Act by the Finance Act 2015, to ensure that the provisions of the Act are in line with the provisions of ICDS. These 3 provisions are as under:

1.    The definition of “income” u/s. 2(24) has been amended by insertion of clause (xviii) to include assistance in the form of a subsidy or grant or cash incentive or duty drawback or favour or concession or reimbursement (by whatever name called) by the Central Government or a State Government or any authority or body or agency in cash or kind to the assessee, other than the subsidy or grant or reimbursement, which is taken into account for determination of the actual cost of the asset in accordance with the provisions of explanation 10 to clause (1) of section 43. This is to align it with the provisions of ICDS VII on Government Grants.

2.    The provisions of the proviso to section 36(1)(iii) have been modified to delete the words “for extension of existing business or profession”, after the words “in respect of capital borrowed for acquisition of an asset”, to bring the section in line with ICDS IX on Borrowing Costs, whereby interest in respect of borrowings for all assets acquired, from the date of borrowing till the date of first put to use of the asset, is to be capitalised.

3.    A second proviso has been inserted to section 36(1) (vii), to provide that where a debt has been taken into account in computing the income of an assessee for any year on the basis of ICDS without recording such debt in the books of accounts, then such debt would be deemed to have been written off in the year in which it becomes irrecoverable. This is to facilitate the claim for deduction of bad debts, where the debt has been recognised as income in accordance with ICDS, but has not been recognised in the books of accounts in accordance with AS.

Obviously, with the amendment of the Income-tax Act as well, the provisions of the ICDS in this regard read along with the amended Act, which may be contrary to earlier judicial rulings, would now apply.

There could be earlier judicial rulings which are based on the relevant provisions of the accounting standards, and where the court therefore interpreted the law on the basis of such accounting standards. These judicial rulings would now have to be considered as being subject to the requirements of ICDS, as the method of accounting is now subject to modification by the provisions of ICDS.

The third and last category of judicial rulings would be those where the courts have laid down certain basic principles while interpreting the tax law, in particular, the relevant provisions of the tax law. In such cases, such judicial rulings would override the provisions of ICDS, since such rulings have interpreted the provisions of the Act, which would prevail over ICDS.

For instance, various judicial rulings have propounded the real income theory. The Delhi High Court, in the case of CIT vs. Vashisht Chay Vyapar 330 ITR 440 has held, based on the real income theory, that interest accrued on non-performing assets of non-banking financial companies cannot be taxed until such time as such interest is actually received. Would the contrary provisions of ICDS IV on revenue recognition change the position? It would appear that the ruling will still continue to hold good even after the introduction of ICDS.

In case any of the provisions of ICDS is contrary to the Income Tax Rules, which one would prevail? The provisions of ICDS are silent in this regard. Given the fact that rules are a form of delegated legislation, while ICDS is in the form of a notification, which then becomes a part of the legislation, it would appear that the provisions of ICDS should prevail in such cases.

Since ICDS is not applicable for the purpose of maintenance of books of account, it is clear that the provisions of ICDS would not apply to the computation of “book profits” for the purposes of minimum alternate tax under section 115JB.

In fact, most of the ICDS provisions would increase the gap between the taxable income and the book profits, instead of narrowing down the gap. In this context, one wonders whether a recent Telangana & Andhra Pradesh High Court decision would be of assistance. In the case of Nagarjuna Fertilizers & Chemicals Limited 373 ITR 252, the High Court held that where an item of income was taxed in an earlier year but was recorded in the books of account of the current year, on the principle that the same income could not be taxed twice, such income had to be excluded from the book profits of the current year.

Can one use the provisions of AS for interpreting ICDS, where the provisions of both are identical? If one compares the ICDS with the corresponding AS, one notices that the bold portion of the AS has been picked up and modified, and issued as ICDS. Where the provisions of the AS and ICDS are identical, one should therefore be able to take resort to the explanatory paragraphs forming part of the AS, though they do not form part of the ICDS, in order to interpret the ICDS.

Impact & Conclusion

One thing is certain – the provisions of ICDS will create far greater litigation, then what one is now witnessing. That would defeat the very purpose of ICDS of bringing in tax certainty and reduction of litigation. Does reduction of litigation mean introduction of complicated provisions which are unfair to taxpayers? Is there at least one provision in the ICDS which decides a disputed issue in favour of taxpayers?

Does the CBDT believe that what is accepted worldwide as income (profit determined in accordance with IFRS), is not the real income when it comes to taxation? Are the Indian tax authorities an exception to the rest of the world? ICDS does not increase taxes – it merely results in advancement of taxability of income to an earlier year, and postponement of allowability of expenditure to a later year. Is the need for advancement of tax revenues so pressing, that taxpayer convenience and compliance costs are brushed aside?

Looking at the requirements of ICDS, one cannot but help wonder as to whether ICDS has been merely brought in to overcome the impact of adverse judicial rulings, and not really with a view to facilitate transition to IndAS. What ought to have been done by amendments to the law is being sought to be implemented through ICDS.

Assessees would now have to cope with not only frequent changes to the law, but also with frequent changes to ICDS, given the unfinished agenda of 4 draft ICDS yet to be notified, and the further 4 recommended for notification by the Committee. One understands that the Committee is in the process of drafting further ICDS for notification.

One also understands that the CBDT is likely to issue FAQs to clarify various aspects of ICDS. One only hopes that such FAQs will not create further confusion, but would help clear the confusion created by the ICDS.

One wonders as to how such ICDS fits in with the Prime Minister’s promise to improve the ease of doing business. The additional compliance costs in order to comply with ICDS would far outweigh the advantages gained by the tax department by recovering taxes at an earlier stage. Would business be keen to expand or would persons be willing to set up new businesses, given the significant compliance costs? The country would certainly take a significant hit in the “Ease of Doing Business Survey” once ICDS is implemented.

Tax auditors will now be in an extremely difficult situation, if the recommendation relating to requirement of certification of computation of income in accordance with ICDS is implemented. So far, they merely had to certify the true and fair view of the accounts, and the correctness of the information provided in Form 3CD. They did not have to certify the correctness of the claims for various deductions. If an auditor would now have to certify the correctness of the computation of income, this would give rise to various issues as to how such certification could be carried out, particularly in cases where the issue was debatable.

Instead of taxpayers, tax auditors may bear the brunt of the income tax department’s actions in respect of claims for deduction or exemption made which, in the view of the income tax department, is not allowable. Would assessees be willing to remunerate tax auditors for such additional high risks which they would bear in certifying the computation of income? If such a requirement of certification of the computation of income were introduced, it is possible that many chartered accountants may no longer be willing to carry out tax audits.

The biggest beneficiaries of ICDS may be tax lawyers and chartered accountants, who will have to handle the resultant additional litigation. The biggest losers will be the taxpayers, due to additional compliance and litigation costs, and the country, due to loss of productive manhours, and the loss of potential growth in business.

S. 80IB : DEPB receipt eligible for relief

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Part B — Unreported Decisions




19 Flora Exports v. ACIT


ITAT ‘E’ Bench, New Delhi

Before P. M. Jagtap (AM) and

George Mathan (JM)

ITA Nos. 4522 /Del./2004

A.Y. : 2001-02. Decided on : 31-1-2008

Counsel on assessee/revenue : Ved Jain/

Amit M. Govli

S. 80IB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Profits and gains from
industrial undertaking — Profits of the undertaking included DEPB — Whether DEPB
receipt eligible for relief — Held, Yes.

Per George Mathan :

Facts :

The issue in dispute in this appeal was against the action of
the CIT(A) in confirming the order of the Assessing Officer to the extent that
the amount of DEPB received by the assessee who was a supporting manufacturer,
was held to be not forming part of the business profits derived from the
manufacturing activity for the purpose of computing deduction u/s.80IB of the
Act.

The Revenue supported the orders of the lower authorities by
relying on the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Ritesh Industries
Ltd. where it was held that duty draw back was not income derived from an
industrial undertaking and not entitled to special deduction u/s.80I of the Act.

Held :

The Tribunal referred to the Supreme Court decision in the
case of Baby Marine Exports, where it was held that the premium paid by the
export house or the trading house to a supporting manufacturer on FOB was an
integral part of the turnover of the supporting manufacturer and was includible
in the profits of the business and was eligible for deduction u/s.80HHC.
Further, it noted that the Delhi Tribunal in the case of Maharashtra Seamless
Ltd., applying the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of
Baby Marine Exports had taken a view that once such receipts were taken as part
of the turnover and formed part of the eligible profits, then the assessee would
be entitled to the deduction u/s.80IB on such DEPB receipts also. Accordingly,
the assessee’s appeal was allowed.

Cases referred to :



(1) Baby Marine Exports 290 ITR 323 (SC)

(2) Maharashtra Seamless Ltd. (ITA No. 1107/Del./2003 dated
30-11-2006 and MA No. 250/Del./2007 dated 20-12-2007)


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S. 37(1), S. 28, S. 36(1)(vii) : Access fee for usage of software is not capital expenditure; Claims for bad debts and alternatively, as business loss, of dues receivable against sales value of shares of clients allowed.

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Part B — Unreported Decisions


(Full texts of the following Tribunal decisions are available
at the Society’s office on written request. For members desiring that the
Society mails a copy to them, Rs.30 per decision will be charged for
photocopying and postage.)


18 Angel Capital & Debt Market Ltd. v. ACIT


ITAT ‘I’ Bench, Mumbai

Before R. K. Gupta (JM) and

Abraham P. George (AM)

ITA No. 7075 /Mum./2005

A.Y. : 2002-03. Decided on : 12-5-2008

Counsel for assessee/revenue : Rajiv Khandelwal/

Bharat Bhushan

(1) S. 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Capital or
revenue expenditure — Payment of access fee for the usage of software —
Whether allowable as revenue expenditure — Held, Yes.


(2) S. 28 and S. 36(1)(vii) of the Income-tax Act,
1961 — Assessee, a sharebroker — Dues against the sales value of shares of the
clients sold written off and claimed as bad debts and alternatively, as
business loss — Whether the claim of the assessee allowable — Held, Yes.



Per Abraham P. George :

Facts :

The assessee was a sharebroker and had effectively taken two
grounds in appeal before the Tribunal, the facts whereof were as under :

(1) During the year the assessee had paid the sum of
Rs.11.62 lacs as charges for client access licence of a software viz.,
Derivatives front-office software product for NSE. The amount paid was claimed
as business expenditure. However, the Assessing Officer as well as the CIT(A)
rejected the claim of the assessee and treated the same as capital
expenditure.

(2) The non-recoverable dues of Rs.10.25 lacs from its
clients, which were written off by the assessee in its books of accounts were
claimed as bad debts u/s.36(1)(vii). According to the AO, out of the total sum
receivable from the clients, that part which was not brokerage i.e.,
the value of the shares, was not covered u/s.36(2). Hence, the assessee’s
claim was rejected. The alternative claim of the assessee to allow the claim
u/s.28, by treating the same as business loss was not considered by the AO.

Before the Tribunal the actions of the lower authorities were
justified by the Revenue on the ground that the payment was made for acquisition
of system software and not application software.

Held :

(1) The Tribunal noted that the amount paid by the assessee
was for access to certain software used by sharebrokers for accessing NSE and
controlling its trading functions. By this, according to the Tribunal, the
assessee did not get any enduring benefit. This was so because the assessee was
required to pay the amount periodically in order to have its continuous access.
It was also noted by the Tribunal that the ownership to the software was not
transferred to the assessee. According to the Tribunal, though the software did
help the assessee to be competitive in its line of business and for the
efficient conduct of its day-to-day business, that alone would not be sufficient
to hold the payment as capital expenditure. Further, relying on the test laid
down by the Special Bench in the case of Amway India Enterprises, the Tribunal
allowed the appeal of the assessee.

(2) Relying on the decision of the Special Bench Tribunal in
the case of Oman International Bank SAOG, the Tribunal held that the assessee
having written off the non-recoverable dues, had satisfied the stipulation as
per S. 36(1)(vii). According to it, based on the decision of the Mumbai Tribunal
in the case of B. D. Shroff, the assessee was entitled to succeed even under the
alternative ground viz., by way of trading loss u/s.28.

Cases referred to :




(1) Amway India Enterprises & Others v. Dy. CIT, 21
SOT 1 (Del) (SB);

(2) Dy. CIT v. Oman International Bank, SAOG 100 ITD
257 (SB);

(3) CIT v. B. D. Shroff, (ITA No. 4475 / Mum. /
2000)



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CBDT Circular No. 14, dated 11-4-1955 — In the case of an assessee following mercantile system of accounting interest expenditure which has accrued during the previous year is allowable as deduction even if it was not debited to P&L Account and also not c

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  1. 2009 TIOL 664 ITAT (Del.)


ACIT v. Technofab Engg. Ltd.

ITA No. 4698/Del./2005 & 2666/Del./2006

A.Ys. : 2002-03 and 2003-04

Dated : 30-7-2009

CBDT Circular No. 14, dated 11-4-1955 — In the case of an
assessee following mercantile system of accounting interest expenditure which
has accrued during the previous year is allowable as deduction even if it was
not debited to P&L Account and also not claimed in the return of income but
was claimed by filing a letter, before the assessment, making the claim.

Facts :

The assessee was following mercantile system of accounting,
which was accepted by the Assessing Officer. The assessee had not debited some
interest in its books of accounts and consequently the same was not even
claimed as deduction while computing the total income. The assessee did not
revise its return of income but filed a letter, before completion of
assessment, making a claim that deduction for interest accrued during the
previous year be allowed in accordance with the method of accounting regularly
followed by it. The AO did not accept the claim made by the assessee.

The CIT(A) directed the AO to allow liability of interest
although the same was not debited to the books of account and the said claim
was not made by filing a revised return.

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

The CBDT has issued circulars, which are binding on the
Department, to the effect that the assessee should be properly guided in
relation to the claims. The CBDT has emphasized upon the AOs to assess the
correct income to tax. If the assessee is following a particular method of
accounting and he has omitted to claim the deduction or exemption, to which he
is otherwise entitled, the Board has emphasized that the AO should guide the
assessee so that the correct income is assessed as per the provisions of the
Act. In Circular No. 14 dated 11-4-1955 CBDT has emphasized that the
Department should not take advantage of the assessee’s ignorance to collect
more tax out of him than the liability due from him. This Circular is very
much binding on the Department. In the light of the said Circular and also in
view of the findings of the CIT(A) that the claim made by the assessee was a
perfectly legal claim supported by the method of accounting which the AO has
accepted from year to year, the Tribunal upheld the order of CIT(A).

The appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed.

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S. 80IA(4), Explanation to S. 80IA(13), S. 255(3) and S. 255(4) — There is a material difference in the circumstances where a reference is made to a Special bench u/s.255(3) and a Third Member or Larger Bench u/s.255(4) — A Third Member/Larger Bench is co

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  1. 2009 TIOL 692 ITAT Mum-LB


B. T. Patil & Sons v. ACIT

ITA Nos. 1408 & 1409/Pn/2003

A.Ys. : 2000-01 and 2001-02

Dated : 26-10-2009

S. 80IA(4), Explanation to S. 80IA(13), S. 255(3) and S.
255(4) — There is a material difference in the circumstances where a reference
is made to a Special bench u/s.255(3) and a Third Member or Larger Bench
u/s.255(4) — A Third Member/Larger Bench is constituted only when there are
differing orders — A Bench constituted u/s.255(4) has to apply the law as
amended with retrospective effect even though such law was not available at
the time of passing of the separate orders by the dissenting Members — S.
80IA(4) (even prior to amendment) applies to a ‘developer’ and not to a
‘contractor’ —Deduction u/s.80IA(4) is allowable only to a person directly
engaged in developing, maintaining and operating the facility — There should
be a complete development of the facility and not just a part of it.

Facts :

The assessee was a civil contractor engaged in construction
of various projects of Governments and local authorities. It claimed deduction
u/s.80IA on the ground that it had undertaken ‘infrastructure projects’. The
Assessing Officer (AO) did not allow the deduction on the ground that the
assessee did not do any business in infrastructure facility but had merely
constructed the properties belonging to the Government/statutory bodies for a
fixed consideration. He also held that the other conditions of S. 80IA(4) were
not satisfied.

The CIT(A) confirmed the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the
Tribunal. The JM upheld the claim on the ground that the assessee is a
developer. The AM dissented after taking note of Explanation to S. 80IA then
proposed to be inserted by Finance Bill, 2007 w.e.f. 1-4-2000, rejected the
claim. The President, acting as Third Member, noted that as the AM had decided
on the basis of a point not raised by the parties during the hearing, a
solitary TM decision on the issue may create complications and so the issue
was referred to a Larger Bench.

Before the Larger Bench, apart from the issue under
consideration, two more questions arose (i) whether the reference was made
u/s.255(4) or u/s.255(3) since scope and limitations in both the situations
are different; and (ii) whether the Bench constituted u/s.255(4) has to apply
the law as amended with retrospective effect even though such law was not
available at the time of passing of the separate orders by the dissenting
Members.

Held :

(i) There is a material difference in the circumstances
where a reference is made to a Special Bench u/s.255(3) and a Third Member or
a Larger Bench u/s.255(4). Ss.(4) is a special provision dealing only with a
particular situation in which the members who earlier heard the case differ on
a point or points, as against the language of the relevant part of Ss.(3)
which refers to constituting a Special Bench consisting of three or more
members couched in a general manner. Special Bench u/s.255(3) is always
constituted in the absence of differing opinion expressed by the Members in
that particular case through their separate orders.

(ii) In the present case, the Members had passed differing
orders. Consequently, the reference was u/s.255(4). A Third Member/Larger
Bench is constituted only when there are differing orders.

(iii) Proceedings u/s.255(4) are confined to the point or
points on which Members of the Division Bench differ. One or more of the other
Members appointed under Ss.(4) are supposed to confine himself/themselves only
to the facts of the case before the Bench. Since the Bench has to confine
itself to the facts of the case, interveners are normally not allowed.

(iv) The rule that interveners are not allowed in
proceedings u/s.255(4) is subject to the exception where pure and substantial
question of law is involved in proceedings u/s.255(4). Interveners are allowed
provided their arguments are confined to the substantial legal question posed
before the Bench u/s.255(4).

(v) Proceedings qua the point of difference continue before
the Bench constituted u/s.255(4) and are deemed to continue till passing of
order under this sub-section. A bench constituted u/s.255(4) has to apply the
law as amended with retrospective effect even though such law was not
available at the time of passing of the separate orders by the dissenting
members. The order of the TM/Bench is final and conclusive on the point in
difference and the failure to apply the applicable law will render the order
of the TM/Bench absurd and erroneous.

(vi) On merits, S. 80IA(4) [even prior to insertion of
Explanation below S. 80IA(13)] applies to a ‘developer’ and not to a
‘contractor’. ‘Developer’ is a person who conceives the project which he may
execute himself or assign some parts of it to others. On the contrary
Contractor is the one who is assigned a particular job to be accomplished on
behalf of the developer. His duty is to translate such design into reality.
There may, in certain circumstances, be overlapping in the work of developer
and contractor, but the line of demarcation between the two is thick and
unbreachable. The role of a developer is much larger than that of contractor.
In certain circumstances a developer may also do the work of a contractor but
a mere contractor per se can never be called as a developer. The assessee in
this case was held to be a contractor. Moreover, it did not even own the
facility.

S. 45, S. 47, Explanation (iii) to S. 48 — In respect of a capital asset received as a gift, indexed cost of acquisition needs to be computed by applying cost inflation index of the year in which the previous owner had first held the asset.

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  1. 2009 TIOL 698 ITAT Mum.-SB


DCIT v. Manjula J. Shah

ITA No. 7315/Mum./2007

Date of Order : 16-10-2009

S. 45, S. 47, Explanation (iii) to S. 48 — In respect of a
capital asset received as a gift, indexed cost of acquisition needs to be
computed by applying cost inflation index of the year in which the previous
owner had first held the asset.

Facts :

The assessee transferred a capital asset which was received
by her as a gift on 1-2-2003. The previous owner had acquired the capital
asset on 29-1-2003. While computing long term capital gain, the assessee
computed indexed cost of acquisition by applying cost inflation index of the
year in which the previous owner first held the asset. The AO was of the view
that the provisions of Explanation (iii) to S. 48 which define the term
‘indexed cost of acquisition’ are very clear and as per those provisions the
assessee is entitled to indexation from the year in which the asset was first
held by the assessee and not by the previous owner.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) which
was allowed.

Aggrieved by the order of CIT(A), Revenue preferred an
appeal to the Tribunal. Since there were divergent decisions of Division
Benches on this issue, a Special Bench was constituted to consider the issue.

Held :

A literal reading of Explanation (iii) to S. 48 suggests
that one has to go by the year in which the asset was held by the assessee.
The scheme of the Act as reflected in the definition of ‘short term capital
asset’ in Explanation 1(b) to S. 2(42A) provides that the period for which the
asset was held by the previous owner also has to be taken into account. Also,
the cost of acquisition of the previous owner is regarded as cost of
acquisition of the assessee. It is not logical that the cost of acquisition
and the period of holding is determined with reference to the previous owner
and the indexation factor is determined with reference to the date of
acquisition by the assessee. Therefore, literal interpretation of Explanation
(iii) to S. 48 is inconsistent with the scheme of the Act. Also, literal
interpretation will lead to absurdity and unjust results and will defeat the
purpose of the concept of ‘indexed cost of acquisition’. In accordance with
the principles of purposive interpretation of statutes, Explanation (iii) to
S. 48 has to be read to mean that the indexed cost of acquisition has to be
computed by taking into account the period for which the asset was held by the
previous owner.

The appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed.

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S. 115JB — For purpose of computing book profits u/s.115JB, although provisions made by an assessee are not allowable as deduction, yet certain provisions which are capable of estimation with a reasonable certainty without quantification are allowable, as

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  1. (2009) 30 SOT 495 (Mum.)


Dresser Valve India (P.) Ltd. v. ACIT

ITA No. 6464 (Mum.) of 2007

A.Y. : 2003-04. Dated : 24-4-2009

S. 115JB — For purpose of computing book profits u/s.115JB,
although provisions made by an assessee are not allowable as deduction, yet
certain provisions which are capable of estimation with a reasonable certainty
without quantification are allowable, as they are ascertainable.

For the relevant assessment year, the assessee-company
added back the amount of provision for gratuity while computing its total
income but did not do the same while computing book profits in terms of S.
115JB. The Assessing Officer, having found that the assessee had failed to
follow AS-15 and the actuarial method referred to therein with regard to
gratuity for determining actual liability, added back the provision for
gratuity to the book profits u/s.115JB. On appeal, the CIT(A) upheld the
action of the Assessing Officer.

The Tribunal, following the decisions in Dy. CIT v. Oman
International Bank SAOG,
(2006) 100 ITD 285 Delhi (SB) and Bharat Earth
Movers v. CIT,
(2000) 245 ITR 428/112 Taxman 61 (SC), set aside the order
of the CIT(A). The Tribunal noted as under :

(a) The provisions of S. 115JB are a code by themselves
and determination of the book profits has to be done only as per the
provisions of S. 115JB, which unambiguously provide for exclusion of
provision of ascertained liabilities for the purpose of ‘book profits’.

(b) Although the provisions are not allowable as
deduction, yet certain provisions which are capable of estimation with a
reasonable certainty without quantification are allowable, as they are
ascertainable. On finding that the actual quantification is not a legal
necessity in matters of ascertainment of the gratuity, the provision of
gratuity in the assessee’s case was capable of being estimated with a
reasonable certainty and, therefore, it was not a contingent or
unascertained liability. It was an ascertained liability and the same was
outside the scope of the provisions of clause (c) of Explanation 1 to S.
115JB, warranting no addition to the ‘book profits’.

(c) The Supreme Court has held in the case of Bharat
Earth Movers (supra) as under :

“Business liability arising in the accounting year — the
deduction should be allowed although the liability may have to be quantified
and discharged at a future date. What should be certain is the incurring of
the liability. It should also be capable of being estimated with reasonable
certainty without actual quantification. Till these requirements are
satisfied, the liability is not a contingent one. The liability is in
presenti though it will be discharged at a future date. It does not make any
difference if the date on which the liability has to be discharged it is not
certain.”

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 54, dated 26-5-2010 — Remittance towards partici-pation in lottery, money circulation schemes, other fictitious offers of cheap funds, etc.

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Part C : RBI/FEMA

60 A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 54, dated  26-5-2010 —
Remittance towards partici-pation in lottery, money circulation schemes, other
fictitious offers of cheap funds, etc.

This Circular reiterates that remittance from India in any
form towards participation in lottery schemes existing under different names,
like money circulation scheme or remittances for the purpose of securing prize
money/awards, etc. is prohibited under FEMA.

It also clarifies that any person resident in India
collecting and effecting/remitting such payments directly/indirectly outside
India will be liable for prosecution for contravention of FEMA as well as
regulations relating to Know Your Customer (KYC) norms/Anti Money Laundering
(AML) standards.

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Direct Tax Instruction No. 4, dated 25-5-2010 — F.No. 275/23/2007-IT(B) — Certificate of lower deduction for non-deduction of tax at source u/s.197 of the Income-tax Act — matter reg

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59 Direct Tax Instruction No. 4, dated 25-5-2010 — F.No.
275/23/2007-IT(B) — Certificate of lower deduction for non-deduction of tax at
source u/s.197 of the Income-tax Act — matter reg.

1. I am directed to bring to your notice on the subject of
issue of certificates u/s.197 that by Instruction No. 8/2006, dated 13-10-2006,
it was laid down that certificates for lower deduction or nil deduction of tax
at source u/s.197 are not to be issued indiscriminately and for issue of each
certificate, prior administrative approval of the concerned Range Head shall be
obtained by the AO. Subsequently, Instruction No. 7/2009, dated 23-12-2009 read
with letter F.No.275/23/2007-IT(B) dated 8-2-2010 has laid down monetary limits
for prior administrative approval of the CIT-TDS or DIT-Intl. Taxation, as the
case may be. Such certificates are normally being issued at present manually
rather than through the ITD system.

2. To maintain centralised data of issue of such certificates
and facilitate better processing of the TDS returns filed by the deductors and
in continuation to the above instructions, I am directed to communicate that
henceforth w.e.f. . . . . . . . the certificates u/s.197 shall be generated and
issued by the AO mandatorily through ITD system only.

3. In case due to certain reasons, it is not possible to
generate the certificate through the system on the date of its issue, the AO
shall upload the necessary data on the system within 7 days of the date of issue
(manually) of the certificate.

4. The manner of issue of certificate u/s.197 through the
system, uploading of data in situation covered in para 3 above and the prior
administrative approval by the Range Head and by the CIT-TDS/DIT-Intl. Taxation
is given in the enclosed Annexure for guidance of all concerned.

5. The content of the above Instruction may be brought to the
notice of all officers working in your charge for strict compliance.

Hindi version will follow.

Sd/-
Tajbir Singh
Under Secretary (Budget)

Annexure—Note for issue of certificate u/s.197 mandatorily
through the system – uploaded on website viz.
www.bcasonline.org


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DTAA between India and Botswana notified : Notification No. 70/2008, dated 18-6-2008

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44 DTAA between India and Botswana notified : Notification
No. 70/2008, dated 18-6-2008

This DTAA had been signed on 8 December, 2006 but was pending
notification in the official gazette. It has now been notified and made
effective from 1-4-2009.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 40 dated, 10-12-2008 — Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 — Foreign travel — Mode of payment in Rupees.

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Part C : RBI/FEMA


Given below are the highlights of certain RBI Circulars.


23 A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 40 dated,
10-12-2008 — Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 — Foreign travel — Mode of
payment in Rupees.

Presently, payment for purchase of foreign exchange for
travel abroad can be made in cash if the amount does not exceed Rs.50,000. Where
the amount exceeds Rs.50,000, payment can be made by a crossed cheque/Banker’s
cheque only.

 

This Circular provides that apart from the above modes,
payment for purchase of foreign exchange can be made by the purchaser through
his own debit card/credit card/prepaid card.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 39, dated 8-12-2008 — Buyback/Prepayment of Foreign Currency Convertible Bonds (FCCBs)

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Part C : RBI/FEMA


Given below are the highlights of certain RBI Circulars.


22 A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 39, dated
8-12-2008 — Buyback/Prepayment of Foreign Currency Convertible Bonds (FCCBs)

Guidelines applicable to ECB also apply to FCCB and
accordingly banks are permitted to allow prepayment of ECB up to USD 500 million
without prior approval of the Reserve Bank, subject to compliance with the
stipulated minimum average maturity period as applicable to the loan. Further,
existing ECB can be refinanced by raising a fresh ECB, subject to the conditions
that the fresh ECB is raised at a lower all-in-cost and the outstanding maturity
of the original ECB is maintained. The existing provisions for prepayment and
refinancing will continue, as hitherto.

 

This Circular has liberalised, subject to other terms and
conditions, the procedure for premature buyback of FCCB, both under the
automatic route as well as the approval route, as under :

A. Automatic Route :

The designated AD Category-I banks may allow Indian companies
to prematurely buyback FCCB, subject to compliance with the terms and conditions
set out hereunder :

 


(i) The buyback value of the FCCB shall be at a minimum
discount of 15% on the book value;

(ii) The funds used for the buyback shall be out of
existing foreign currency funds held either in India (including funds held in
EEFC account) or abroad and/or out of fresh ECB raised in conformity with the
current ECB norms; and

(iii) Where the fresh ECB is co-terminus with the
outstanding maturity of the original FCCB and is for less than three years,
the all-in-cost ceiling should not exceed 6 months Libor plus 200 bps, as
applicable to short-term borrowings. In other cases, the all-in-cost for the
relevant maturity of the ECB shall apply.

 


B. Approval Route :

The Reserve Bank will consider proposals from Indian
companies for buyback of FCCB under the approval route, subject to compliance
with the following conditions :



(i) The buyback value of the FCCB shall be at a minimum
discount of 25% on the book value;

(ii) The funds used for the buyback shall be out of
internal accruals, and this has to be evidenced by Statutory Auditor’s and
designated AD Category-I bank’s certificate; and

(iii) The total amount of buyback shall not exceed USD 50
million of the redemption value, per company.

 


Applications complying with the above conditions may be
submitted, together with the supporting documents, through the designated bank
to the Central Office of RBI for necessary approval.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 38, dated 4-12-2008 — Deferred Payment Protocols dated April 30, 1981 and December 23, 1985 between Govt. of India and erstwhile USSR.

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Part C : RBI/FEMA


Given below are the highlights of certain RBI Circulars.

21 A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 38, dated
4-12-2008 — Deferred Payment Protocols dated April 30, 1981 and December 23,
1985 between Govt. of India and erstwhile USSR.

The rupee value of the special currency basket has been fixed
with effect from November 10, 2008 at Rs.62.5050 as against the earlier value of
Rs.65.4398.

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Dealers are now required to file MVAT returns online — Notification No. VAT/AMD-1007/IB/Adm-6, dated 20-12-2008.

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New Page 1Part B : Indirect taxes

MVAT

20 Dealers are now required to file MVAT
returns online — Notification No. VAT/AMD-1007/IB/Adm-6, dated 20-12-2008.

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Filing of claim for refund of service tax paid under Notification No. 41/2007 — Circular No. 106/9/2008-ST, dated 11-12-2008.

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New Page 1Part B : Indirect taxes

Service tax

19 Filing of claim for refund of service tax
paid under Notification No. 41/2007 — Circular No. 106/9/2008-ST, dated
11-12-2008.

Certain clarifications have been provided by the Board as
regards the refund claims of exporters, important ones being :



  • The invoices/challans/bills issued by supplier of taxable service containing
    requisite details (name, address and registration No. of service provider, Sr.
    No. and date of invoice, name and address of service receiver, description,
    classification and value of taxable service and the service tax payable
    thereon), are reasonable evidence that the services on which refund is being
    sought are taxable service used by the exporter. Random checks are suggested
    for actual payment of service tax and where the amounts involved are
    substantial, post-refund audit has been suggested.


  • Clear instructions have been passed on to the field force to dispose of the
    pending refund claims expeditiously and adhere to the timeline of 30 days
    refund from the date of application of refund to the extent feasible.


  • Simplified procedure for refund under sanction of refund/rebate of unutilised
    CENVAT credit has been made applicable to refund claims under this
    Notification. This would mean an interim refund of 80% of taxes paid for
    complete applications by specified exporters within 15 days of filing of the
    application.


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Amendments to Notification exempting services availed by exporters — Notification No. 33/2008-Service Tax, dated 7-12-2008.

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New Page 1Part B : Indirect taxes

Service tax

18 Amendments to Notification exempting
services availed by exporters — Notification No. 33/2008-Service Tax, dated
7-12-2008.

This Notification makes the following amendments :



  • Exemption is granted to exporters who use certain specified services for
    export of goods subject to certain conditions. Condition of exporting the
    goods without availing duty drawbacks of service tax paid has been removed by
    the Notification.


  • Refund amount on services availed from clearing and forwarding agents outside
    India, was restricted to actual amount of service tax paid or service tax
    calculated on 2% of FOB value of export goods, whichever is less. This has
    been changed to 10% instead of 2%


  • Additional category of services rendered by clearing and forwarding agents is
    included in the list of exempt services, subject to the fulfilment of
    conditions prescribed.


  • Consequential amendments are made in the Form for the claim.


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India-Tajikistan DTAA signed on 20th November 2008. It would be effective post date of being published in the official gazette — Press Release dated 20-11-2008.

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17 India-Tajikistan DTAA signed on 20th
November 2008. It would be effective post date of being published in the
official gazette — Press Release dated 20-11-2008.


 

The
Income-tax Department has uploaded list of assessees whose income-tax refund has
been returned due to address being wrong or non-available.

Data is available from A.Y.
2003-04 till A.Y. 2007-08. The link for this is

http://www.incometaxindia.gov.in/CCIT/refundsearch.asp

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Clarification on date of filing return of income — Press Release No. BSC/SS/GN- 338, dated 22-12-2008.

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16 Clarification on date of filing return of
income — Press Release No. BSC/SS/GN- 338, dated 22-12-2008.


There have been many instances that returns have been
electronically filed on 30 September, however, the acknowledgement number
generated electronically mentions the date of filing as 1 October. The CBDT has
issued a Press Release to clarify that in all such cases, the date of filing the
return would be considered as 30 September, being filed within due date as
prescribed and would be eligible to all the benefits thereof and consequently no
penal consequences would be attracted and interest u/s.234 would also be averted
to this effect.

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Income-tax (Eleventh Amendment) Rules, 2008 — Notification No. 107/2008, dated 11-12-2008.

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15 Income-tax (Eleventh Amendment) Rules,
2008 —
Notification No. 107/2008, dated 11-12-2008.

In the last budget, S. 35(1)(iia) had been newly introduced
to provide weighted deduction of one and one-fourth times for expenses for
outsourcing research and development to an eligible approved scientific research
company. This deduction is only available to the company outsourcing such R&D
activities and not to the company who actually undertakes these activities. A
new Rule 5F and Form No. 3CF-III have been inserted, which prescribe the
authority, guidelines, form, manner and conditions for approval u/s.35(1)(iia)
of the Act.

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Definition of ‘Charitable purpose’ u/s.2(15) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Circular No. 11/2008, dated 19-12-2008.

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14 Definition of ‘Charitable purpose’
u/s.2(15) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Circular No. 11/2008, dated 19-12-2008.


S. 2(15) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘Act’) defines
‘charitable purpose’ to include the following :



(i) Relief of the poor

(ii) Education

(iii) Medical relief, and

(iv) The advancement of any other object of general public
utility.

 



An entity with a charitable object of the above nature was
eligible for exemption from tax u/s.11 or alternatively u/s.10(23C) of the Act.
However, it was seen that a number of entities who were engaged in commercial
activities were also claiming exemption on the ground that such activities were
for the advancement of objects of general public utility in terms of the fourth
limb of the definition of ‘charitable purpose’. Therefore, S. 2(15) was amended
vide the Finance Act, 2008 by adding a proviso which states that the
‘advancement of any other object of general public utility shall not be a
charitable purpose if it involves the carrying on of :

(a) any activity in the nature of trade, commerce or
business; or

(b) any activity of rendering any service in relation to
any trade, commerce or business;

for a cess or fee or any other consideration, irrespective of
the nature of use or application, or retention of the income from such
activity’.

 

2. The following implications arise from this amendment :

2.1 The newly inserted proviso to S. 2(15) will not apply in
respect of the first three limbs of S. 2(15), i.e., relief of the poor,
education or medical relief. Consequently, where the purpose of a trust or
institution is relief of the poor, education or medical relief, it will
constitute ‘charitable purpose’ even if it incidentally involves the carrying on
of commercial activities.

 

2.2. ‘Relief of the poor’ encompasses a wide range of objects
for the welfare of the economically and socially disadvantaged or needy. It
will, therefore, include within its ambit purposes such as relief to destitute,
orphans or the handicapped, disadvantaged women or children, small and marginal
farmers, indigent artisans or senior citizens in need of aid. Entities who have
these objects will continue to be eligible for exemption even if they
incidentally carry on a commercial activity, subject, however, to the conditions
stipulated u/s.11(4A) or the seventh proviso to S. 10(23C), which are that



(i) the business should be incidental to the attainment of
the objectives of the entity,

and

(ii) separate books of account should be maintained in
respect of such business.

 


Similarly, entities whose object is ‘education’ or ‘medical
relief’ would also continue to be eligible for exemption as charitable
institutions even if they incidentally carry on a commercial activity, subject
to the conditions mentioned above.

 

3. The newly inserted proviso to S. 2(15) will apply only to
entities whose purpose is ‘advancement of any other object of general public
utility’ i.e., the fourth limb of the definition of ‘charitable purpose’
contained in S. 2(15). Hence, such entities will not be eligible for exemption
u/s.11 or u/s.10(23C) of the Act if they carry on commercial activities. Whether
such an entity is carrying on an activity in the nature of trade, commerce or
business is a question of fact which will be decided based on the nature, scope,
extent and frequency of the activity.

 

3.1 There are industry and trade associations who claim
exemption from tax u/s.11 on the ground that their objects are for charitable
purpose, as these are covered under ‘any other object of general public
utility’. Under the principle of mutuality, if trading takes place between
persons who are associated together and contribute to a common fund for the
financing of some venture or object and in this respect have no dealings or
relations with any outside body, then any surplus returned to the persons
forming such association is not chargeable to tax. In such cases, there must be
complete identity between the contributors and the participants.

 

Therefore, where industry or trade associations claim both to
be charitable institutions as well as mutual organisations and their activities
are restricted to contributions from and participation of only their members,
these would not fall under the purview of the proviso to S. 2(15), owing to the
principle of mutuality. However, if such organisations have dealings with
non-members, their claim to be charitable organisations would now be governed by
the additional conditions stipulated in the proviso to S. 2(15).

 

3.2 In the final analysis, however, whether the assessee has
for its object ‘the advancement of any other object of general public utility’
is a question of fact. If such assessee is engaged in any activity in the nature
of trade, commerce or business or renders any service in relation to trade,
commerce or business, it would not be entitled to claim that its object is
charitable purpose. In such a case, the object of ‘general public utility’ will
be only a mask or a device to hide the true purpose which is trade, commerce or
business or the rendering of any service in relation to trade, commerce or
business. Each case would, therefore, be decided on its own facts and no
generalisation is possible. Assessees, who claim that their object is
‘charitable purpose’ within the meaning of S. 2(15), would be well advised to
eschew any activity which is in the nature of trade, commerce or business or the
rendering of any service in relation to any trade, commerce or business.

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Issuing of Tax Clearance Certificates:

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43 i. Issuing of Tax Clearance Certificates:

Trade Circular No.1T of 2010, Dated 05/01/2010

By this Circular procedure for applying and obtaining Tax
Clearance Certificates under the MVAT Act, CST Act, Profession Tax Act, etc. has
been standardized and explained.

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Revised Forms ITR-2, ITR-3, ITR-4, ITR-5, ITR-6, ITR-7 and ITR-V, are notified — Notification No. 33/2010/ F.No.142/12/2010-SO(TPL), dated 11-5-2010.

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58
Revised Forms ITR-2, ITR-3, ITR-4, ITR-5, ITR-6, ITR-7 and ITR-V, are notified —
Notification No. 33/2010/ F.No.142/12/2010-SO(TPL), dated 11-5-2010.

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Explanatory Notes to Finance (no. 2) Act, 2009—Circular No. 5, dated 3-6-2010.

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57 Explanatory Notes to Finance (no. 2) Act, 2009—Circular
No. 5, dated 3-6-2010.

Circular No. 5, dated 3rd June 2010 is issued containing
Explanatory Notes to the Provisions of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2009.


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Revised Discussion Paper on DTC—

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56 Revised Discussion Paper on DTC—

The draft Direct Taxes Code (DTC) along with a Discussion
Paper was released in August, 2009 for public comments.

After considering the inputs given by various organisations
and individuals, major issues have been identified and Revised Discussion Paper
on DTC is released. This Revised Discussion Paper is available on finmin.nic.in
and incometaxindia.gov.in.


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Industrial Park Scheme, 2008 amended — Notification No. 37, dated 21-5-2010.

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Industrial Park Scheme, 2008 is amended to extend the last
date of commencement of the industrial park to claim deduction under clause
(iii) of Ss.(4) of S. 80-IA from 31st of March 2009 to 31st March, 2011.



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Income-tax (5th Amendment) Rules, 2010 — Notification No. 38, dated 21-5-2010.

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The date by which an industrial undertaking, claiming
deduction u/s.80IA(4)(iii) develops, develops and operates or maintains and
operates an industrial park has been extended from 31st March 2009 to 31st
March, 2011.


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Gratuity Exemption Limit Enhanced—Notification No. 43, dated 11-6-2010.

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The exemption limit under S. 10(10)(iii) is increased to ten
lakh rupees in relation to gratuity received by employees who retire or become
incapacitated prior to such retirement or die on or after the 24th day of May,
2010 or whose employment is terminated on or after the said date.


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Income-tax (6th Amendment) Rules, 2010 — Notification No. 41/2010, dated 31-5-2010.

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Rules 30, 31, 31A, 31AA, 37CA and 37D have been substituted,
which provide for time and mode of payment of TDS/TCS to the Government account,
issue of certificate of TDS/TCS and filing of quarterly statements thereof. The
said rules shall apply in respect of tax deducted/collected on or after 1st
April, 2010. The major amendments include :


  • Revised forms of TDS
    certificates to include the receipt number of TDS return filed by the tax
    deductor, which along with the PAN of the deductee and the TAN of the deductor
    would form the unique identification, based on which credit for TDS would be
    available.

  • Even the Government
    authorities are now required to furnish a monthly return electronically in new
    Form 24G.

  • The due date of filing
    the TDS return for the last quarter of the financial year has been pre-poned
    from 15th June to 15th May and the due dates for furnishing the TDS
    certificates have also been modified to 15th May for Form 16 to be furnished
    annually and fifteen days from the date of submitting TDS certificates for
    other non-salary TDS certificates to be issued quarterly.



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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 50, dated 3-6-2008 — Export of goods and services — Realisation of export proceeds — Liberalisation.

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Part C : RBI/FEMA


Given below are the highlights of certain RBI Circulars.

 

54 A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 50, dated
3-6-2008 — Export of goods and services — Realisation of export proceeds —
Liberalisation.

 

This Circular has enhanced the present period of realisation
and repatriation to India of the amount representing the full value of goods or
software exported from the present period of six months to twelve months from
the date of export. There has been no change in the period of realisation in
case of exports by an SEZ unit or exports to overseas warehouses.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 48, dated 3-6-2008 — Overseas Investments — Liberalisation/Rationalisation.

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Part C : RBI/FEMA


Given below are the highlights of certain RBI Circulars.

 

53 A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 48, dated
3-6-2008 — Overseas Investments — Liberalisation/Rationalisation.

This Circular has further liberalised the provisions of
Notification No. FEMA 120/RB-2004, dated July 7, 2004 in the following cases :

1. Overseas Investment in Energy and Natural Resources
Sectors — Indian companies can invest in excess of 400 % of their net worth as
on the date of the last audited balance sheet, after obtaining prior approval
of RBI, in the energy and natural resources sectors such as oil, gas, coal and
mineral oil.

2. Investment in Overseas Unincorporated Entities in Oil
Sector :

(a) ONGC Videsh Limited and Oil India Limited are
permitted to invest in overseas unincorporated entities in oil sector (for
exploration and drilling for oil and natural gas, etc.) without any limits.

(b) Subject to certain conditions, Indian companies can
invest up to 400% of their net worth as on the date of the last audited
balance sheet in overseas unincorporated entities in the oil sector.
Investments in excess of 400% of their net worth require prior approval of
RBI.

 



In case of capitalisation of exports — the time limit for
obtaining prior approval of RBI has been aligned with the time limit provided
for in the Foreign Trade Policy. Thus, prior approval of RBI for capitalisation
of export proceeds will be required only where the exports remain outstanding
beyond the period of realisation prescribed by the Foreign Trade Policy.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 46, dated 2-6-2008 — External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) by Services Sector — Liberalisation.

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Part C : RBI/FEMA


Given below are the highlights of certain RBI Circulars.

 

52 A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 46, dated
2-6-2008 — External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) by Services Sector —
Liberalisation.

This Circular permits borrowers in service sector viz.
hotels, hospitals and software companies to avail ECB up to US $ 100 million,
per financial year, under the approval route for the purpose of import of
capital goods. This is in addition to the existing facility for availing trade
credit up to US $ 20 million per import transaction, for a period of less than 3
years.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 44, dated 30-5-2008 — Reporting under FDI Scheme — Revised procedure.

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Part C : RBI/FEMA


Given below are the highlights of certain RBI Circulars.

 

51 A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 44, dated
30-5-2008 — Reporting under FDI Scheme — Revised procedure.

This Circular has made the following changes in respect of
reporting the details of the issue of shares/convertible debentures :

1. Form FC-GPR has been revised.

2. A standard format for reporting receipt of monetary
consideration for issue of shares/convertible debentures has been prescribed.
Upon receipt of this report, the concerned Regional office of RBI will allot a
Unique Identification Number.

3. A format for KYC report on the non-resident investor
from the overseas bank remitting the amount has been prescribed. This report
has to be submitted along with the report of receipt of money.

4. The annual report of all investments will now have to be
submitted before July 31 every year instead of June 30.


 

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 43, dated 29-5-2008 — External Commercial Borrowings Policy — Liberalisation.

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Part C : RBI/FEMA


Given below are the highlights of certain RBI Circulars.

 


50 A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 43, dated
29-5-2008 — External Commercial Borrowings Policy — Liberalisation.

Presently, borrowers proposing to avail ECB up to US $ 20
million for Rupee expenditure for permissible end-uses require prior approval of
the Reserve Bank under the approval route.

 

This Circular has relaxed the above limit of US $ 20 million
for Rupee expenditure under the approval route as under :

(i) Borrowers in infrastructure sector can avail ECB up to
US $ 100 million.

(ii) Other borrowers can avail ECB up to US $ 50 million.

 


The all-in-cost ceilings in respect of ECB have been revised,
with immediate effect, as under :

Maturity
period

All-in-cost ceiling over 6-month LIBOR for the respective
currency of credit or applicable benchmark

  Existing
Revised
Three years
and up to five years
150 basis
points
200 basis
points
More than five
years
250 basis
points
350 basis
points

 

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 42, dated 28-5-2008 — Trade credits for imports into India — Review of all-in-cost ceiling.

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Part C : RBI/FEMA


Given below are the highlights of certain RBI Circulars.

 

49 A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 42, dated
28-5-2008 — Trade credits for imports into India — Review of all-in-cost
ceiling.

This Circular has revised the all-in-cost ceiling in respect
of Trade Credits, with immediate effect, as under :

Maturity
period

All-in-cost ceiling over 6-month LIBOR for the respective
currency of credit or applicable benchmark

  Existing
Revised
Up to one year
50 basis
points
75 basis
points
More than one
year up to three years 
125 basis
points
125 basis
points

 

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Processing of returns of A.Y. 2007-08 — Steps to clear the backlog — Instruction No. 6/2008, dated 18-6-2008 issued by CBDT.

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48 Processing of returns of A.Y. 2007-08 —
Steps to clear the backlog — Instruction No. 6/2008, dated 18-6-2008 issued by
CBDT.

Kindly refer to above. The issue of processing of pending
returns has been discussed by the Board and following decisions have been taken
in order to clear the backlog :

(i) It has been decided that all CCsIT (CCA) should
redeploy officers and staff to clear the backlog in high pendency charges
keeping in view the overall work load including pendency of scrutiny cases.
Concerned CCsIT may take recourse to outsourcing of data entry as per standing
instructions of the Board/Directorate of Systems on the subject. For this
purpose, necessary funds would be placed at the disposal of the CCIT (CCA) for
outsourcing of data entry. CCsIT (CCA) should send proposals to the
Directorate of Income-tax (Systems) for outsourcing of data entry.


(ii) It has also been decided that in order to clear the
backlog of I-T returns for A.Y. 2007-08 in networked stations, 2D based AST
Software would continue to be used for processing the returns in ITR 1, 2, 3,
4. For non-networked stations, TMS Software would continue to be used.


(iii) Non-networked stations using TMS Software would be
provided CDs with OLTAS data as was done previously by the RCC so that the
Assessing Officers could verify tax payments.


(iv) In all I-T returns for A.Y. 2007-08 where the
aggregate TDS claim does not exceed Rs.5 lakh and where the refund computed
does not exceed Rs.25,000, the TDS claim of tax payer should be accepted at
the time of processing of returns. In all remaining returns, the AO shall
verify the TDS claim from the deductor or assessee as the case may be, before
processing the return. In all cases selected for scrutiny, all TDS claims
should be verified. In all cases where PAN was earlier found to be duplicate
or bogus and in cases where TDS certificates were called for processing
returns for the A.Y. 2006-07 but were not produced, the credit for TDS shall
be given after full verification.


(v) The rules in AST Software for matching OLTAS data with
the claim for credit made in the return are being modified to take care of the
common data deficiencies.


(vi) It has also been decided to launch a time bound TDS
drive to make those deductors who have not filed their TDS returns for F.Y.
2006-07 do so. The CsIT in charge of TDS functions are requested to follow up
cases where TDS returns were filed but PAN of some deductors were not reported
in TDS returns even though the TDS deducted from such deductees exceeded Rs.l
lakh. Information relating to such deductors/deductees will be provided by DIT
(Systems). This drive is to be an intensive two month campaign which is to be
monitored weekly by the Board and has to be completed by 31-8-2008. This drive
should be followed up by a concerted effort in improving TDS compliance.
Proforma of sending compliance report after TDS verification shall be sent
separately by DIT (Systems), New Delhi.




 



 

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Procedure for selection of cases for ‘scrutiny’ for non-corporate assessees

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47 Procedure for selection of cases for
‘scrutiny’ for non-corporate assessees



In supersession of earlier instructions on the above subject,
the Board hereby lays down the following procedure for selection of
returns/cases of non-corporate assessees for scrutiny during the current
financial year i.e., 2007-08.

 

2. The following categories of cases shall be compulsorily
scrutinised :


(i) All assessments pertaining to search and seizure
cases.


(ii) All assessments pertaining to surveys conducted
u/s.133A of the Income-tax Act.


(iii)
1All returns where deduction
claimed under Chapter VIA of the Income-tax Act is Rs.25 lakhs or above in
stations other than the cities on computer network.


(iv) 1All returns, including those of non-residents,
where refund claimed is Rs.5 lakhs or above in stations other than the
cities on computer network.


(v) (a) All cases in which the CIT (Appeals) or ITAT
has confirmed an addition/disallowance of Rs.5 lakhs or above or if the
assessee has conceded an addition in any preceding assessment year and
identical issue is arising in the current year. But if the issue involves
a substantial question of law, the cases may be picked up for scrutiny,
irrespective of the quantum of tax involved. However, if the addition has
been deleted by a superior appellate authority and the Department has
accepted that decision, the case need not be taken up for scrutiny.

(b) All cases in which an appeal is pending before the
CIT (Appeals) against an addition/disallowance of Rs.5 lakhs or above, or
the Department has filed an appeal before the ITAT against the order of
the CIT (Appeals) deleting such an addition/disallowance and an identical
issue is arising in the current year. However, as in (i) above, the
quantum ceiling may not be taken into account if a substantial question of
law is involved.


(vi) All returns filed by statutory bodies, marketing
committees and other authorities assessable to income-tax.


(vii) All cases of banks and non-banking financial
institutions with deposits of Rs.5 crores and above.


(viii) Cases of universities, educational institutions,
hospitals, nursing homes and other institutions for rehabilitation of
patients (other than those which are substantially financed by the
Government), the aggregate annual receipts (including donations credited to
the corpus/ any other fund) of which exceed Rs.10 crores in Delhi, Mumbai,
Chennai, Kolkata, Pune, Hyderabad, Bangalore and Ahmedabad and Rs.5 crores
in other places [Ref. S. 10(23c) & Rule 2BC].


(ix) All cases where exemption is claimed u/s.11 of the
Income-tax Act and the gross receipts (including donations credited to the
corpus/ any other fund) exceed Rs.5 crores in Delhi, Mumbai, Chennai,
Kolkata, Pune, Hyderabad, Bangalore and Ahmedabad and Rs.1 crore in other
places.


(x) (a) All cases where total value of International
Transactions (as defined u/s.92B of the Income-tax Act) exceeds Rs.15
crores).

(b) In all other cases where the Transfer Pricing Audit
carried out in the earlier year had led to an adjustment/addition to the
total income.


(xi) All cases of stockbrokers and commodity brokers as
well as their sub-brokers where brokerage received is disclosed at Rs.1
crore or above.


(xii) All cases of stockbrokers and commodity brokers as
well as their sub-brokers where there are claims of bad debts of Rs.5 lakhs
or more.


(xiii) All cases of professionals with gross receipts of
Rs.20 lakhs or more if total income declared is less than 20% of gross
professional receipts.


(xiv) All cases of deductions u/s.10A, u/s.10AA,
u/s.10BA, u/s.10B of the Income-tax Act exceeding Rs.25 lakhs.


(xv) All cases of contractors (excluding transporters)
whose gross contractual receipts exceed Rs.1 crore if total income declared
from contract work is less than 5% of gross contractual receipts.


(xvi) All cases of builders following project completion
method.


(xvii) All cases in which fresh capital introduced during
the year exceeds Rs.50 lakhs in Delhi, Mumbai, Chennai, Kolkata, Pune,
Hyderabad, Bangalore and Ahmedabad and Rs.10 lakhs in other cities.


(xviii) ¹All cases in which new unsecured loan introduced
during the year exceeds Rs.25 lakhs.


(xix) All cases in which deduction u/s.80IA(4), u/s.80IB,
u/s.80IC, u/s.80JJA, u/s.80JJAA, u/s.80LA, u/s.10(21), u/s.10(22B), u/s.
10(23A), u/s.10(23B), u/s.10(23C), u/s.10 (23D), u/s.10(23EA), u/s.10(23FB),
u/s.10(23G), u/s.10(37), u/s.10A, u/s.10AA, u/s.10B, or u/s.10BA of the
Income-tax Act is claimed for the first time.


(xx) *All cases in which loss from house property is more
than Rs.2,50,000.


(xxi) *All cases in which investment in property is more
than five times the gross receipts (i.e., purchase of property (008
from AIR)/[Gross total income (746) + Agricultural income (762) + Income
claimed exempt (125)>5]


(xxii) *All cases in which sum of short-term capital
gains u/s.111A and long-term capital gain is more than Rs.25 lakh.


(xxiii) *All cases in which sale of property has been
shown as per AIR return, but no capital gains have been declared in the
return of Income.


(xxiv) *All cases in which commission paid is more than
Rs.10 lakhs.


(xxv) *All cases having business of real estate with
gross turnover exceeding Rs.5 crores.


(xxvi) *All cases having business of hotels/tour
operations with gross turnover exceeding Rs.5 crores if net profit shown is
less than 0.05%


(xxvii) *All cases in which total depreciation claimed at
the rates of 80% and 100% is more than Rs.25 lakhs.


(xxviii) All cases in which net agricultural income is
more than Rs.10 lakhs.

Cabinet agreed to amend the DTAA between India and Syria : Press release dated 1-6-2008.

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46 Cabinet agreed to amend the DTAA between
India and Syria : Press release dated 1-6-2008.


 

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Prevention of Money-laundering (Maintenance of Records of the Nature and Value of Transactions, the Procedure and Manner of Maintaining and Time for Furnishing Information and Verification and Maintenance of Records of the Identity of the Clients of the B

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New Page 2

Part C : RBI/FEMA

Given below are the
highlights of certain RBI Circulars.

33. Prevention of
Money-laundering (Maintenance of Records of the Nature and Value of
Transactions, the Procedure and Manner of Maintaining and Time for Furnishing
Information and Verification and Maintenance of Records of the Identity of the
Clients of the Banking Companies, Financial Institutions and Intermediaries)
Second Amendment Rules, 2010 — Obligation of Authorised Persons.

The Government of India has
vide Notification No. 10/2010-E.S./F.No.6/8/2009-E.S., dated June 16, 2010,
amended the Prevention of Money-laundering (Maintenance of Records of the Nature
and Value of Transactions, the Procedure and Manner of Maintaining and Time for
Furnishing Information and Verification and Maintenance of Records of the
Identity of the Clients of the Banking Companies, Financial Institutions and
Intermediaries) Rules, 2005. A copy of the Notification is attached to this
Circular.

The highlights of the
amendments are :


(a) in Rule 2 in
sub-rule (1), after clause (g),
the following Explanation shall be inserted, namely :




Explanation :
Transaction involving financing of the activities relating to terrorism includes
transaction involving funds suspected to be linked or related to, or to be used
for terrorism, terrorist act or by a terrorist, terrorist organisation or those
who finance or are attempting to financing of terrorism.


(b) in Rule 9, for
sub-rule (1A), the following sub- rule shall be substituted, namely :


(1A) Every banking company,
financial institution and intermediary, as the case may be, shall determine
whether a client is acting on behalf of a beneficial owner, identify the
beneficial owner and take all reasonable steps to verify his identity.


(c) in Rule 9, for
sub-rule (1B), the following sub-rule shall be substituted, namely :


(1B) Every banking company,
financial institution and intermediary, as the case may be, shall exercise
ongoing due diligence with respect to the business relationship with every
client and closely examine the transactions in order to ensure that they are
consistent with their knowledge of the client, his business and risk profile and
where necessary, the source of funds.


(d) in Rule 9, for
sub-rule (1C), the following sub- rule shall be substituted, namely :


(1C) No banking company,
financial institution and intermediary, as the case may be, shall allow the
opening of or keep any anonymous account or account in fictitious names or
account on behalf of other persons whose identity has not been disclosed or
cannot be verified.


(e) in Rule 9, after
sub-rule (1C), the following sub- rule shall be inserted, namely :


(1D) When there is a
suspicion of money laundering or financing of activities relating to terrorism
or where there are doubts about the adequacy or vera-city of previously obtained
customer identification data, every banking company, financial institution and
intermediary shall review the due diligence measures including verifying again
the identity of the client and obtaining information on the purpose and intended
nature of the business relationship, as the case
may be.


(f) in Rule 10, after
sub-rule (3), the following Explanation shall be inserted, namely :


“Explanation : For the
purpose of this rule :


(i) the expression
‘records of the identity of clients’ shall include records of the
identification data, account files and business correspondence.

(ii) the expression
‘cessation of the transactions’ means termination of an account or business
relationship.



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Know Your Customer (KYC) Norms/Anti-Money Laundering (AML), Standards/Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT)/Obligation of Authorised Persons under Prevention of Money Laundering Act, (PMLA), 2002, as amended by Prevention of Money Laundering (Amendme

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New Page 2

Part C : RBI/FEMA

Given below are the
highlights of certain RBI Circulars.

32. Know Your Customer (KYC)
Norms/Anti-Money Laundering (AML), Standards/Combating the Financing of
Terrorism (CFT)/Obligation of Authorised Persons under Prevention of Money
Laundering Act, (PMLA), 2002, as amended by Prevention of Money Laundering
(Amendment) Act, 2009 — Cross-Border Inward Remittance under Money Transfer
Service Scheme.

This Circular advices
Authorised Persons (AP) and their sub-agents (for whom they are responsible
under MTSS) to not only take into account the risks arising from the
deficiencies in the AML/CFT regime of certain jurisdictions, as identified in
the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Statement, issued from time to time,
while dealing with the individuals or businesses from these jurisdictions but in
addition also consider using publicly available information for identifying
countries, which do not or insufficiently apply the FATF Recommendations.

AP are further advised to
examine the background and purpose of transactions with persons (including legal
persons and other financial institutions) from jurisdictions included in FATF
Statements and countries that do not or insufficiently apply the FATF
Recommendations and where the transactions have no apparent economic or visible
lawful purpose, written findings together with all the documents should be
retained and made available to the Reserve Bank/other relevant authorities, on
request.

A.P. (DIR Series) Circular
No. 24,

dated 13-12-2010

A.P. (FL/RL Series) Circular
No. 5,

dated 13-12-2010

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 17, dated 16-11-2010 — Processing and settlement of export-related receipts facilitated by Online Payment Gateways.

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Part c : rbi fema


Given below are the highlights of certain RBI Circulars.

25. A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 17, dated 16-11-2010 —
Processing and settlement of export-related receipts facilitated by Online
Payment Gateways.

This Circular allows banks, subject to certain conditions, to
offer the facility of repatriation of export-related remittances by entering
into standing arrangements with Online Payment Gateway Services Providers
(OPGSP). Some of the important conditions are :


1. Banks offering this facility must carry out the due
diligence of the OPGSP.

2. This facility will only be available for export of
goods and services of value not exceeding US $ 500.

3. Banks providing such facilities must open a NOSTRO
collection account for receipt of the export-related payments facilitated
through such arrangements.

4. A separate NOSTRO collection account must be
maintained for each OPGSP or the bank must be able to delineate the
transactions in the NOSTRO account of each OPGSP.

5. Only the following debits will be permitted to the
NOSTRO collection account opened under this arrangement :

(a) Repatriation of funds representing export proceeds to
India for credit to the exporters’ account;

 

(b) Payment of fee/commission to the OPGSP as per the
predetermined rates/frequency/arrangement; and

 

(c) Charge back to the importer where the exporter has
failed in discharging his obligations under the sale contract.

 

6. Balances in the NOSTRO collection account must be
repatriated and credited to the respective exporter’s account with a bank in
India within seven days from the date of credit to the NOSTRO collection
account.

7. Banks shall satisfy themselves as to the bona fides of
the transactions.


8. OPGSP who are already providing such services as per the
specific holding-on approvals issued by the Reserve Bank shall open a liaison
office in India within three months from the date of this Circular. All new
OPGSP must open a liaison office with the approval of the Reserve Bank before
operationalising the arrangement.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 16, dated 16-11-2010 — Reporting Mechanism — Data of Authorised Deler Category-I Branches.

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Part c : rbi fema


Given below are the highlights of certain RBI Circulars.

24. A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 16, dated 16-11-2010 —
Reporting Mechanism — Data of Authorised Deler Category-I Branches.

Presently, banks are required to inform RBI, via email, any
changes in the categorisation of their branches dealing in foreign exchange.
This Circular states that the path to the web directory has been changed from
www.rbi.org.in to http://dbie.rbi.org.in. The full details of the path and
options are given in Annex-II to this Circular.

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Extension of Advance Ruling Schemes to certain categories of Residents — Notification No. 27/2009-ST, dated 2-8-2009.

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Part B : Indirect Taxes

 

Updates in VAT and Service Tax :

Service Tax UPDATE

Notifications

  1. Extension of Advance Ruling Schemes to certain categories
    of Residents — Notification No. 27/2009-ST, dated 2-8-2009.

The Advance Ruling Schemes shall be applicable to a public
sector company.

Public sector company shall have the same meaning assigned
to it in Section 2(36A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

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Effective date for new services — Notification No. 26/2009-ST, dated 19-8-2009.

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Part B : Indirect Taxes

Updates in VAT and Service Tax :

Service Tax UPDATE

Notifications

  1. Effective date for new services — Notification No.
    26/2009-ST, dated 19-8-2009.

The effective date for new services introduced vide the
Finance Act, 2009 shall be 1st September, 2009.

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S. 28, S. 41 — Waiver of amount of loan taken for acquiring capital asset is not taxable under the Act.

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  1. 2009 TIOL 707 ITAT Mum.


Cipla Investments Ltd. v. ITO

ITA No. 1996/Mum./2008

A.Y. : 2003-04. Dated : 28-8-2009

S. 28, S. 41 — Waiver of amount of loan taken for acquiring
capital asset is not taxable under the Act.

Facts :

The assessee had in 1998 received a sum of Rs.82,91,076
from its holding company towards share application money which was
subsequently transferred to unsecured loans. The amount was utilised for
investment in shares of other concerns. The shares so purchased with borrowed
funds were held as capital assets and income arising on transfer of shares was
offered for tax under the head ‘Income from Capital Gains’. In view of the
losses incurred by the assessee, the holding company had written off the
amount as unrecoverable whereas the assessee company had not written back the
said amount as cessation of liability. The AO taxed the sum of Rs.82,91,076
u/s.41(1) of the Act.

On appeal by the assessee CIT(A), the CIT(A) held that the
provisions of S. 41(1) are not attracted but he held that the assessee’s
business activity comprised investment in shares and securities and
advancement of loan to various parties on interest. He also held that the
amount was obtained in the course of business and by virtue of waiver of the
amount by the holding company the assessee had gained in the course of the
business and therefore the sum waived was held to be taxable u/s.28 of the
Act.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the
Tribunal.

Held :

(i) The CIT(A) was correct in holding that the provisions
of S. 41(1) do not apply.

(ii) In view of the assessee’s contention that it has not
done any trading activity nor shown any income as business income on
investments made the findings of the CIT(A) that the amount was received in
the course of its business are against his findings given while considering
the addition u/s.41(1).

(iii) The assessee’s business activity may comprise
investment in shares and securities, but as far as computation of income is
concerned the profit and loss in those transactions are said to be under the
head ‘Capital Gains’ but not ‘Business Income’, hence, the gain earned by the
assessee in the course of business in investment and advance of loans is in
the capital field but cannot be on the revenue field.

(iv) Remission of a debt by the holding company which was
not claimed and allowed as a deduction in any manner in any earlier previous
year could not be brought to tax either u/s. 41(1) or u/s.28(iv). There is no
benefit or perquisite arising to the assessee in this regard.

(v) The decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of
Solid Containers Ltd. v. Dy. CIT,
(308 ITR 417) does not apply to the
facts of the case. The facts of the present case are similar to the decision
of the Bombay High Court in the case of Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. v. CIT,
(261 ITR 501). The loans availed for acquiring the capital assets i.e.,
shares, when waived cannot be treated as assessable income by invoking the
provisions of S. 28.

(vi) Since the original receipt was undoubtedly capital in
nature its waiver does not have the quality of changing the same into a
revenue receipt.

(vii) On facts, the provisions of S. 28 do not apply and
the amount is not taxable.


 


The assessee’s appeal was allowed.


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S. 14A r.w. S. 143(3) and S. 147 — Proviso to S. 14A inserted by Finance Act, 2002 w.e.f. 11-5-2001 does not confer any jurisdiction on Assessing Officer to make reassessment u/s.147 for any assessment year beginning on or before 1-4-2001.

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  1. (2009) 30 SOT 461 (Mum.)


Jt. CIT v. Bombay Dyeing Mfg. Co. Ltd.

ITA Nos. 1632 and 2208 (Mum.) of 2006

A.Y. : 1998-99. Dated : 16-4-2009.

S. 14A r.w. S. 143(3) and S. 147 — Proviso to S. 14A
inserted by Finance Act, 2002 w.e.f. 11-5-2001 does not confer any
jurisdiction on Assessing Officer to make reassessment u/s.147 for any
assessment year beginning on or before 1-4-2001.

For the relevant A.Y. 1998-99, the Assessing Officer issued
notice u/s.148 on 21-4-2004, with a view to reopen the concluded assessment
and disallowed certain expenses, which the assessee had claimed as deduction,
on account of exempted income u/s.14A. On appeal, the CIT(A) upheld the order
of the Assessing Officer.

The Tribunal held that the disallowance made was contrary
to the proviso to S. 14A, as the same was not permissible under reassessment
proceedings u/s.147 in respect of the assessment year beginning on or before
1-4-2001.

The Tribunal noted as under :

1. A bare perusal of the proviso to S. 14A clearly
demonstrates the legislative intent in placing absolute embargo on the
jurisdiction of the Assessing Officer to re-assess the case u/s.147. Having
regard to the express legislative intent, as enshrined by the Parliament,
vide the Finance Act 2002, w.e.f. 11-5-2001, the Assessing Officer ceases to
have any jurisdiction to re-assess any case u/s.147. In such a statutorily
explicit and undisputed position, the question of reopening of the case or
initiation of the re-assessment proceedings u/s.147 r.w. S. 148, is
inconceivable and incomprehensible. Thus, in the absence of existence of
statutory jurisdiction, in terms of proviso to S. 14A with the Assessing
Officer, to make reassessment u/s.47 the very discussion on the validity or
otherwise of assumption of such jurisdiction, by way of issuance of the said
notice u/s.148, is irrelevant and an exercise in futility.

2. The CBDT issued Circular No. 11 of 2001, dated
23-7-2001, and placed restrictions on reopening of completed assessments, on
account of provisions of S. 14A. The said circular clearly demonstrates the
legislative intent in interpreting the newly inserted proviso to S. 14A.

3. The Circulars issued by the CBDT are binding on the
Assessing Officer, even where the same are not in consonance with the
meaning of the provisions, if they are benevolent and issued to mitigate the
hardship of the assessee. It is pertinent to add that the Assessing Officer
had ignored the said Circular of the Board and judicial mandate of the Apex
Court as contained in the various decisions and initiated reassessment
proceedings, in the instant case, despite there being express exclusion of
such jurisdiction of the Assessing Officer by the proviso to S. 14A.

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S. 234B r.w. S. 195 and S. 209 — No interest can be levied where advance tax is not paid in respect of income on which tax is not deducted at source by payers who were obliged to deduct the same.

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  1. (2009) 30 SOT 248 (Delhi)


Turner Broadcasting System Asia Pacific, Inc., America
v.
Asst. DIT

ITA Nos. 724, 728 and 733 (Delhi) of 2008

A.Ys. : 2001-02 & 2004-05

Dated : 13-3-2009

S. 234B r.w. S. 195 and S. 209 — No interest can be levied
where advance tax is not paid in respect of income on which tax is not
deducted at source by payers who were obliged to deduct the same.

During the relevant assessment years, various parties
advertising their products paid consideration to the Indian agent of the
assessee, who, in turn, remitted such amounts to the assessee. Neither the
advertiser nor the agent deducted tax at source before payment or repatriation
of money, respectively, as provided u/s.195. The AO levied interest upon the
assessee u/s.234B for non-payment of advance tax. The CIT(A) upheld the levy
of interest.

The Tribunal, applying the decisions in the following
cases, deleted the interest levied u/s.234B :

(a) CIT v. Madras Fertilizers Ltd., (1984) 49 ITR
703 (Mad.)

(b) CIT v. Ranoli Investment (P) Ltd., (1999) 235
ITR 433 (Guj.)

(c) CIT v. Sedco Forex International Drilling Co.
Ltd.,
(2003) 264 ITR 320/(2004) 134 Taxman 109 (Uttaranchal)

The Tribunal noted as under :

1. Since the assessee was a non-resident person, the
amounts paid to their agent in India by the Indian advertisers were liable
for tax deduction u/s.195. The tax had not been so deducted and,
consequently, not paid to the credit of the Government.

2. As provided in S. 209, while computing the amount of
advance tax, the tax deductible at source was to be reduced from the total
tax liability.

3. In the assessee’s case the advance tax payable was Nil
after considering the amount of tax deductible at source u/s.195. It was not
the assessee’s fault, if no tax was deducted by the payers.

4. Since no advance tax was payable as per calculations
in terms of S. 209 and S. 195, there would be no liability to pay interest
u/s.234B. The charge of interest will follow only if there is a default of
non-payment of advance tax. In the absence of default, interest cannot be
charged.



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S. 41(1) — Limitation of time is not a determining factor in matters relating to remission or cessation of liabilities.

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  1. (2009) 30 SOT 31 (Mum.)


DSA Engineers (Bombay) v. ITO

ITA No. 5354 (Mum.) of 2007

A.Y. : 2003-04. Dated : 12-3-2009

S. 41(1) — Limitation of time is not a determining factor
in matters relating to remission or cessation of liabilities.

For the relevant assessment year, in respect of certain
creditors appearing in the Balance Sheet of the assessee, the AO found that
there was neither a pending litigation in existence nor any correspondence
from the parties demanding for clearing the liabilities and held that the
assessee had not proved that it was yet to make the payment of the said
outstanding balances to the creditors, that it had the intention to make the
said payment, and that the liability had not ceased. He, accordingly, invoked
the provisions of S. 41(1) and deemed the liabilities of the creditors as the
profits and gains of business or profession and treated them as the income of
the year. The CIT(A) upheld the order of the AO.

The Tribunal set aside the orders of the lower authorities.
The Tribunal noted as under :

2. From the rival positions of both parties as well as
the provisions of S. 41(1) and the legal propositions of various judicial
fora, the following issues have emerged :



  •  the
    issue of limitation of period of three years



  •  the
    issue of discharge of onus when the assessee had not unilaterally written
    them off



  •  the
    issue of unilateral write-off for the assessments of the post-amendment
    period, i.e., after 1-4-1997.


3. Regarding the issue of limitation of three years, it
was noticed that there is no such limitation provided in S. 41(1) or in its
Explanation 1. In the case of Dy. CIT v. Himalaya Refrigeration & Air
Conditioning Co. (P.) Ltd.,
(2003) 91 TTJ (Delhi) 296, the Tribunal held
that in the absence of any evidence of cessation of liabilities, mere fact
that the liabilities were outstanding for more than three years and were
time barred, was not sufficient ground for addition u/s.41(1). The
limitation of time is not a determining factor in the matters relating to
remission or cessation of liabilities.

4. Regarding the issue of discharging of onus, it was
held that when the assessee continues to reflect or record the liabilities
as still payable to the creditors and decides not to write them off
unilaterally, the Assessing Officer has higher levels of responsibility and,
hence, he has to establish with evidence that the said book entries are
wrong or not bona fide and, thus, the Assessing Officer is under the
obligation to discharge the onus in this regard. The onus is on the revenue
to prove that the liabilities have ceased finally and there is no
possibility of their revival.

5. Regarding the issue of unilateral write off for the
assessments of the post amendment period, i.e. 1-4-1997, it was
noticed that Explanation 1 was brought into statute by the Finance (No. 2)
Act, 1996 with effect from 1-4-1997. Mere unilateral transfer entry in the
accounts does not confer any benefit to the assessee and, therefore, the
revenue cannot invoke S. 41(1). The assessee’s case, being one where the
alleged liabilities were not unilaterally written off, the requirements of
the Explanation were not met and, therefore, it could not be considered as
the case of obtaining of the benefit during the year under consideration.


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(a) S. 68 — Since no new amount credited in accounts of creditors during year, addition could not be made u/s.68. (b) S. 41(1) — Brought forward balances of creditors could not be added to assessee’s income.

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19 (2008) 24 SOT 393 (Delhi)

Shri Vardhman Overseas Ltd. v. ACIT

ITA No. 440 (Delhi) of 2006

A.Y. : 2002-03. Dated : 11-7-2008



(a) S. 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Since no new
amount had been credited in accounts of creditors during year under
consideration, addition could not be made u/s.68.


(b) S. 41(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Brought
forward balances of creditors could not be added to assessee’s income, as
question of genuineness could be examined only in the year in which they were
credited to the account.


 



During the relevant assessment year, the Assessing Officer
asked the assessee-company to prove the genuineness of certain sundry creditors.
The assessee could not file confirmations from the said creditors except one.
The Assessing Officer, thus, treated the credit balances appearing in the
assessee’s books of account as unexplained credits u/s.68. On appeal, the CIT(A)
confirmed the additions u/s.41(1).


 


The Tribunal deleted the additions made u/s.68 and u/s.41(1).
The Tribunal followed the decisions in the cases of :

(a) CIT v. Sugauli Sugar Works (P.) Ltd., (1999) 236
ITR 518; 102 Taxman 713 (SC)

(b) Chief CIT v. Kesaria Tea Co. Ltd., (2002) 254
ITR 434/122 Taxman 91 (SC)

 



The Tribunal noted as under :


(a) No new amount had been credited by the assessee in
their accounts during the year under consideration. Therefore, applicability
of S. 68 was ruled out and addition could not be made under this Section.

(b) The balances were brought forward balances. If the same
were added on account of their non-genuineness, then also those amounts could
not be added to the income of the assessee for the year under consideration,
as the question of genuineness thereof could be examined only in the year in
which they were credited to the account.

(c) The amount could also not be considered to be the
income of the assessee on the ground of expiry of limitation, as according to
well-settled law explained by the Supreme Court in the case of CIT v.
Sugauli Sugar Works (P.) Ltd.,
(1999) 236 ITR 518; 102 Taxman 713 in the
absence of creditor, it is not possible for the Department to come to the
conclusion that the debt is barred and has become un-enforceable as there may
be some circumstances which may enable the creditor to come with a proceeding
for enforcement of the debt even after expiry of the normal period of
limitation, as provided in the Limitation Act, 1963.



(d) It had not been shown by the CIT(A) that the assessee
had acquired any benefit from these liabilities which were still outstanding
in the balance sheet of the assessee and it had also not been shown that these
liabilities had ceased finally without the possibility of revival. Thus, the
onus had wrongly been shifted by the Revenue on the assessee. The assessee had
shown these liabilities outstanding in its balance sheet. Therefore, there was
no occasion to treat the said amounts as taxable u/s.41(1) and if the
Department intended to assess the same by applying the provisions of S. 41(1),
then the onus was on the Revenue to show that the liabilities which were
appearing in the balance sheet had ceased finally and there was no possibility
of their revival.

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S. 48 r.w. S. 45 and S. 55 — Right to construct additional floors acquired without incurring any cost and had no inherent quality of being available on expenditure of money — Such right is outside scope of S. 45.

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18 (2008) 24 SOT 366 (Mum.)

Maheshwar Prakash-2 CHS Ltd. v. ITO

ITA No. 34 (Mum.) of 2008

A.Y. : 2003-04. Dated : 15-5-2008

S. 48, read with S. 45 and S. 55 of the Income-tax Act, 1961
— Right to construct additional floors under Development Control Regulations,
1991, acquired by assessee without incurring any cost and, moreover, such right
had no inherent quality of being available on expenditure of money — Such right
is outside the scope of S. 45.

 


The assessee, a co-operative housing society established in
the year 1962, owned a building in Santacruz, Mumbai. This building had been
constructed after utilising the entire FSI available to it and, therefore, no
right was available for any further construction on this plot of land. However,
the Bombay Municipal Corporation (BMC) relaxed the development regulations in
the year 1991 and on that account additional Transferable Development Right
(TDR) of FSI was allowed under the newly enacted Development Control
Regulations, 1991 (DCR). Thus, the assessee became entitled to construct
additional space of 15,000 sq.ft. In view of the availability of such right, the
assessee entered into an agreement with two developers on 25-11-2002 for
construction of additional floors on the existing structure of the society’s
building and development of the said property against a consideration of Rs.42
lacs. Under this agreement, TDR was to be arranged by the developers at their
own cost. For the relevant A.Y. 2003-04, the assessee did not admit of any
capital gain tax liability on the aforesaid amount of Rs.42 lacs. The Assessing
Officer held that as per the amended provisions of S. 55(2) applicable to the
year under consideration, the cost of acquisition was to be taken as NIL and,
since the assessee had surrendered its right to the developers against the
consideration, the income had accrued to it in the year under consideration. The
Assessing Officer, therefore, assessed the entire sum of Rs.42 lacs in the hands
of the assessee as long-term capital gain, holding that the right to construct
was embedded in the land which was held by the assessee for more than three
years.

 

The CIT(A) upheld the order of the Assessing Officer and also
held that the instant issue was akin to the issue of bonus shares, which are
issued only to the persons who own the original shares. He also held that the
decision of the Supreme Court in the case of B. C. Shrinivasa Shetty (1981) 128
ITR 294/5 Taxman, relied on by the assessee was not applicable in the instant
case.

 

The Tribunal set aside the orders of the lower authorities
and held that the sum of Rs.42 lacs received by the assessee was not chargeable
to tax u/s.45. Relying on the decision of the Mumbai Bench of the Tribunal in
the case of Jethalal D. Mehta v. Dy. CIT, (2005) 2 SOT 422, the Tribunal
noted as under :

(a) Clause (aa) and Clause (ab) of S. 55(2) deal with the
case of shares or securities and, therefore, the same are not relevant for
disposal of the instant appeal.

(b) The perusal of S. 55(2)(a) reveals that the cost of
acquisition is to be taken at NIL in those cases where the capital asset
transferred is either goodwill of business or a trademark or a brand name
associated with business or a right to manufacture, produce or process any
article or thing or right to carry on any business, tenancy rights, stage
carrier permits or loom hours. In the instant case, the assessee was not
carrying on any business and the right to construct additional floors was not
covered by any of the assets mentioned in the aforesaid Ss.(2) of S. 55.
Therefore, the amended provisions of S. 55(2) did not apply to the instant
case and the lower authorities were not justified in taking the cost of
acquisition of the capital asset being a right to construct the additional
floors at NIL.

(c) Further, the contention of the Revenue that right to
construct the additional floors was embedded in the land and, therefore, the
instant case was akin to the issue of bonus shares and, consequently, it could
not be said that there was no cost of acquisition in respect of such right,
was not acceptable for two reasons, firstly, because it was not the case of AO
or the CIT(A) that the cost of acquisition was taken by them as NIL as per the
amended provisions; secondly, because the theory of spreading over the cost of
original shares over the original shares and bonus shares was based on the
fact that bonus shares were issued to the detriment of the original shares. In
the instant case, the right to construct attached to the land on the date of
purchase of land had already been exhausted by construction of flats prior to
1991 as per the FSI available according to law as was in force. Therefore,
there was no further right to construct any flat on that land. It was because
of DCR, 1991 that additional right had accrued to the assessee, which was
distinct and separate from the original right. Therefore, it could not be said
that such right was embedded in the land. Even assuming, for the sake of
argument, that such right was embedded in the land, there was no detriment to
the cost of land by granting such right on the assessee-society. On the
contrary, price of the land had increased because of the additional right made
available to the assessee-society.

d) Ignoring the events involving the surrendered row house and on examination of the facts regarding the flat in Abhijit building, the assessee’s investment of capital gain in the purchase of block of shares of company, which, in turn, got him entitled to a flat in the Abhijit building, was within the period of three years. After all, the purchases of block of shares of company’S’ and procuring the entitlement to a flat were composite transactions which were interlinked. Therefore, the investment in block of shares of the company’S’ was the investment of capital gain in the flat.

e) On the issue of how the assessee’s case was a case of construction, the assessee’s reliance on Circular Nos. 471 and 672 was relevant. The combined reading of Circular Nos. 471 and 672 shows that investment as in the assessee’s case was to be treated as a case of construction for the purpose of 5. 54F. The assessee’s investment of Rs.30.50 lacs in the construction of the house in Abhijit building fell within three years of the first sale of the shares.

f) Therefore, the investment of the long-term capital gain in the flat in Abhijit building was a case of construction and applicable time limitation was three years and not two years as held in the impugned order by the CIT(A).

S. 54F — Investment in flat in building under construction was a case of ‘construction’ and time limit of 3 years (and not 2 years) applicable

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17 (2008) 24 SOT 312 (Mum.)


Mukesh G. Desai HUF v. ITO

ITA No. 2077 (Mum.) of 2007

A.Y. : 1996-97. Dated : 24-6-2008

S. 54F of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — On facts, investment of
long-term capital gain in a flat in a building under construction was a case of
‘construction’ and time limit of three years (and not two years) was applicable
— Exemption u/s.54F was available.

 

The assessee invested a sum of Rs.30.50 lacs with a builder
for purchase of a row house. Subsequently, the assessee having come to know that
there was a drive by District Authorities for demolition of row houses,
cancelled the aforesaid agreement dated 26-8-1996 and received back whole amount
from the builder. Subsequently, the assessee entered into an agreement with a
company ‘S’, which was engaged in construction of a building known as Abhijit,
and paid a sum of Rs.30.50 lacs to ‘S’ for purchasing ‘block of shares’ of
company ‘S’ and got them transferred to his name. On this basis, the assessee
became entitled to allotment of a flat in the under-construction building,
Abhijit. The said building was constructed and the assessee got occupancy
certificate from the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (MCGM). The
assessee’s claim for exemption u/s.54F was denied by the Assessing Officer, on
the ground that the investment in the row house was an investment for purchase
of a ‘new asset’ as per Ss.(1) of the S. 54F and that cancellation of the above
transaction amounted to transfer of new asset during the lock-in period of 3
years, violating the condition of Ss.(3) of S. 54F. He, therefore, ignored the
investment in flat in Abhijit building and, thus, denied the exemption u/s.54F.

 

The CIT(A) held that the assessee’s case is the case of
purchase of new asset and not the construction of new asset and, accordingly,
the applicable time limit is of two years and not three years, hence the
exemption is not available. Further, the CIT(A) also observed that the assessee
has not utilised long-term capital gains for the purchase or construction of new
asset before filing the return of income u/s.139 and also failed to deposit the
same as per the scheme specified in Ss.(4) of S. 54F and, therefore, the
exemption should be denied on this ground also.

 

The Tribunal held that the assessee was entitled to exemption
u/s.54F. The Tribunal relied on the decisions in the following cases :

(a) CIT v. T. N. Aravinda Reddy, (1979) 120 ITR 46/
2 Taxman 541

(b) Jagan Nath Singh Lodha v. ITO, (2004) 85 TTJ 173
(Jodh.)(Para 6)

(c) Asst. CIT v. Smt. Sunder Kaur Sujan Singh Gadh,
(2005) 3 SOT 206 (Mum.)(Para 6)

(d) Mrs. Seetha Subramanian v. Asst. CIT, (1996) 56
TTJ 417 (Mad.)

The Tribunal noted as under :

(a) The sequence of events in the instant case revealed
that the assessee’s intention to invest the capital gains in the residential
house to avail of the exemption u/s.54 was beyond any doubt. The Assessing
Officer had not established that the agreement with the first builder and the
agreement for cancellation were bogus. Therefore, the cancellation of the
agreement by the assessee would fall within the ambit of the doctrine of
caveat emptor (i.e., buyers beware) and surrender of row house was
legally justified. The assessee was not expected to proceed to buy a defective
residential house (new asset), which was prone to demolition by the Municipal
Authorities, in order to qualify for exemption for exemption u/s.54F.
Therefore, the decision of the lower authorities in treating the row house as
a new asset was misplaced.

(b) Ss.(3) of S. 54F stipulates that the ‘new asset’
purchased or constructed must not be transferred within the lock-in period of
3 years from the date of such purchase or construction of ‘new asset’. The
Assessing Officer denied the claim of exemption u/s.54F for the reason of
violation of the said condition, considering the row house as a ‘new asset’.
The assessee did not actually purchase a ‘new asset’ and, therefore, the
refund received by the assessee from ‘D’ in respect of the surrender of the
row house was not relatable to any transfer of the new asset. Resultantly, the
violation of the said condition in Ss.(3) of S. 54F did not arise.

(c) Ss.(4) of S. 54F provides for depositing the unutilised
capital gains in the bank as per the prescribed Capital Gain Scheme and manner
of taxing such gains if not utilised before the due date for furnishing the
return of income u/s.139. Since the assessee had already parted with the
capital gain before the due date for filing the return in connection with the
‘row house’ acquisition, there was no way in which the assessee would have
complied with the condition of depositing it in the bank as per Ss.(4) of S.
54F. There was no violation of the condition of Ss.(4) of S. 54F by the
assessee.

(d) Ignoring the events involving the surrendered row house
and on examination of the facts regarding the flat in Abhijit building, the
assessee’s investment of capital gain in the purchase of block of shares of
company ‘S’, which, in turn, got him entitled to a flat in the Abhijit
building, was within the period of three years. After all, the purchases of
block of shares of company ‘S’ and procuring the entitlement to a flat were
composite transactions which were interlinked. Therefore, the investment in
block of shares of the company ‘S’ was the investment of capital gain in the
flat.

S. 45 r.w. S. 28(i) — Where stock-in-trade is converted into investment and later sold on profit, formula favourable to assessee to be accepted

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16 (2008) 24 SOT 288 (Mum.)

ACIT v. Bright Star Investment (P.) Ltd.

ITA Nos. 6374 & 9543 (Mum.) of 2004

A.Ys. : 2000-01 and 2001-02. Dated : 2-7-2008

S. 45 r.w. S. 28(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — In absence
of specific provision in S. 45(2) to deal with a situation where stock-in-trade
is converted into investment and later on investment is sold for profit, formula
which is favourable to an assessee should be accepted.

 


The assessee had converted some shares from stock-in-trade to
investment as on 1-4-1998 at its book value. Thereafter, the assessee sold some
of the shares out of the above shares and offered profit earned as long-term
capital gain. The Assessing Officer opined that in view of the provisions laid
down u/s.45(2), the income of the assessee would be computed separately as
business income till the date of conversion of the shares from the stock to
investment and, thereafter, as long-term capital gain. The AO, therefore, took
the highest market rate of the said shares on the date of conversion and
computed the business income, being the difference in the value at which the
said shares were converted into investment and the market value of the said
shares on the date of conversion, i.e., 1-4-1998 and, further computed
the long-term capital gain at Rs.457.62 lacs being the difference between the
market value and the actual sale value of the shares.

The CIT(A) held that the action of the Assessing Officer to
segregate the long-term capital gain as shown by the assessee in the return of
income into business income and capital gain was totally arbitrary and
unjustified.

The Tribunal held in favour of the assessee. The Tribunal
relied on the decisions in the following cases :

(a) Sir Kikabhai Premchand v. CIT, (1953) 24 ITR 506
(SC)

(b) CIT v. Dhanuka & Sons, (1980) 124 ITR 24; (1979)
1 Taxman 417 (Cal.)

The Tribunal noted as under :


(a) The provisions of S. 45(2) deal with the issue of
capital gain where the investment is converted into stock-in-trade.


(b) While incorporating Ss.(2) to S. 45, the Legislature
has not visualised the situation in other way round, where the stock-in-trade
is to be converted into investment and later on the investment is sold on
profit. In the absence of a specific provision to deal with this type of
situation, a rational formula should be worked out to determine the profits
and gains on transfer of the asset.


(c) In the absence of a specific provision to deal with the
present situation, two formulas can be evolved to work out the profits and
gains on transfer of the assets.


(d) One formula which had been adopted by the Assessing
Officer, i.e., difference between the book value of the shares and the
market value of the shares on the date of conversion should be taken as a
business income and the difference between the sale price of the shares, and
the market value of the shares on the date of conversion, be taken as a
capital gain.


(e) The other formula which was adopted by the assessee,
i.e., the difference between the sale price
of the shares and the cost of acquisition of shares, which was the book value
on the date of conversion with indexation from the date of conversion, should
be computed as a capital gain.


(f) In the absence of a specific provision, out of these
two formulae, the formula which was favourable to the assessee should be
accepted.



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