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Sections 2(47) and 45 — Purchase and sale of land and flat necessary parts of business of construction. Loss arising on sale of these properties is business loss.

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32. (2012) 144 TTJ 1 (Chennai) (TM)
Vijaya Productions (P) Ltd. v. Addl. CIT
A.Y.: 2007-08. Dated: 25-11-2011

Sections 2(47) and 45 — Purchase and sale of land and flat being necessary parts of the regular business of construction carried on by the assessee, the losses arising on sale of these properties have to be considered as loss incurred in the course of carrying on its regular business.

For the relevant assessment year, the Assessing Officer disallowed the assessee’s claim for loss on sale of one flat and land as business loss.

The Assessing Officer was of the opinion that such loss was not proved to have been incurred in the course of the assessee’s business of civil construction but, on the other hand, incurred due to purchase and sale of land. Further, according to him, the purchase and sale were effected in close proximity of time and land value could not have depreciated to such a large extent in a prime location of the city. The CIT(A) allowed the assessee’s claim. The Tribunal held in favour of the assessee. The Tribunal noted as under:

(1) Both the assertions of the Assessing Officer were misplaced.

(2) The assessee was engaged in the business of promoting commercial and residential flats and was authorised by the partnership deed to carry on any line or lines of business.

(3) Even if one considers the authorisation given in the partnership deed ‘to carry on any other line or lines of business’, to be ejusdem generis with the earlier terms of ‘promoting commercial and residential flats’, sale and purchase of land would still come within the ambit of the ‘business’ of the assessee.

(4) In a business of promoting commercial and residential flats and other lines of business, it cannot be said that purchase and sale of land would be alien and not a part of the business.

(5) Further, the land was treated as stock-in-trade and this has not been disputed by the learned Department representative. When stock-intrade is sold result can only be business profit or business loss. The assessee might have been forced to sell it at a loss for a myriad of reasons. It is not for the Revenue to sit on the armchair of a businessman and to decide appropriate point of time in which a sale or purchase has to be effected in the course of his business.

(6) Neither the sale deed, nor the purchase deed had been doubted. Neither books of account have been rejected, nor the seller or purchaser were called up by the Revenue for any verification. Without doubting the purchase and sale deed, the loss could not have been disallowed.

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(2012) 27 taxmann.com 111 (Coch Trib) E.K.K. & Co. v ACIT Assessment Year: 2009-10. Dated: 16-11-2012

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Section 139, 143(2) – In a case where acknowledgment in Form ITR-V has been forwarded in a prescribed form and prescribed manner and within a prescribed time to CPC, date of filing Return of income filed electronically shall relate back to the date on which the return was electronically uploaded. Accordingly, the period mentioned in proviso to section 143(2) shall be with reference to date on which return was electronically uploaded and not with reference to date on which ITR-V was received by CPC.

Facts:
For the assessment year 2009-10, the assessee uploaded its return of income electronically without digital signature on 25-09-2009. The acknowledgment in form ITR-V was dispatched by the assessee by ordinary post on 5-10-2009 but was received by CPC on 29-11-2010. Though there was some controversy about date of dispatch of ITR-V, admittedly the same was received by CPC within the time prescribed, as was extended by CBDT from time to time.

The Assessing Officer (AO) served notice u/s. 143(2) on 26-08-2011 i.e. beyond a period of six months from the end of financial year in which return was furnished, if the date of uploading the return is to be regarded as date of furnishing the return of income. However, if the date of receipt of ITR-V by CPC is regarded as date of furnishing the return of income then the notice was served within time prescribed by section 143(2).

Held:
The Tribunal upon going through the scheme framed by CBDT noted that as per the scheme, in respect of returns filed electronically without digital signature the date of transmitting the return electronically shall be the date of furnishing of return if the form ITR-V is furnished in the prescribed manner and within the period specified. In this case the period specified was 31-12-2010 or 120 days whichever is later. Admittedly, Form ITR-V was received by CPC on 29-11-2010 which was within the prescribed time, in the prescribed manner and in the prescribed form. Hence, the date of filing of the return shall relate back to the date on which the return was electronically uploaded i.e. 25-09-2009. The assessment order passed by the AO was quashed on the ground that the notice served on the assessee u/s. 143(2) on 26-08-2011 was beyond the period of six months from the end of the financial year in which the return was furnished.

The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

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Clarifications for Notification on tax-free bonds from Rural Electrification Board — Notification No. 13/2012, dated 6-3-2012.

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In corrigendum to Notification No. 7/2012, dated 14-2-2012 it is clarified that QIBs shall have meaning as assigned to it in the SEBI (Issue and listing of Debt Securities) Regulations, 2008 and any individual investor investing above 5 lakh would be considered as a HNI.

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Exemption to certain categories of persons from filing tax returns for A.Y. 2012-13 — Notification No. 9/2012, dated 17-2-2012.

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Any salaried employee whose total income does not exceed Rs.5,00,000 and which consist of salary income and interest from savings bank account up to Rs.10,000, is exempted from filing his return of income for A.Y. 2012-13 provided:

He has given his PAN to his employer

He informs employer of his Bank interest income and tax has been appropriately deducted from such interest by the employer and paid. Has received his Form 16 wherein total income, total TDS deducted and paid are mentioned

He has no refund claim for the said year and all his tax liability is duly discharged by way of TDS

He receives his salary income from only one employer

He is not required to furnish his return of income under any other provisions of the Act.

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Deduction u/s.80-IB(10): Income from developing and building housing project: Land not owned by assessee: All other conditions satisfied: Assessee entitled to deduction u/s.80-IB(10).

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35. Deduction u/s.80-IB(10): Income from developing and building housing project: Land not owned by assessee: All other conditions satisfied: Assessee entitled to deduction u/s.80-IB(10).
[CIT v. Radhe Developers, 249 CTR 393 (Guj.)]

The assessee entered into a development agreement with the owners of the land for a housing project. The assessee claimed deduction u/s.80- IB(10) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Assessing Officer rejected the claim on the ground that the assessee was not the owner of the land. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim. The Tribunal held that for deduction u/s.80-IB(10) of the Act it is not necessary that the assessee must be the owner of the land. The Tribunal also held that even otherwise looking to the provisions of section 2(47) of the Act, r/w section 53A of the Transfer of the Property Act, by virtue of the development agreement and the agreement to sell, the assessee had, for the purpose of incometax, become the owner of the land.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 “Terms and conditions of development agreement showed that assessee had taken full responsibility for execution of the projects and the resultant profits or loss belonged to the assessee in entirety and all other conditions of section 80-IB(10) being satisfied, deduction u/s.80-IB(10) could not be disallowed to assessee on the ground that the land under development projects was not owned by the assessee and in some cases development permission was granted in the name of original land owners.”

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Charitable purpose: Sections 2(15) and 80G(5): Recognition u/s.80G(5): Objects of assessee-trust include conduct of periodical meetings on professional subjects and publishing and selling books/booklets on professional subjects: Activities are charitable in nature and cannot be construed to be in the nature of trade or commerce or business: Assessee is entitled to approval u/s.80G(5).

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34. Charitable purpose: Sections 2(15) and 80G(5): Recognition u/s.80G(5): Objects of assessee-trust include conduct of periodical meetings on professional subjects and publishing and selling books/booklets on professional subjects: Activities are charitable in nature and cannot be construed to be in the nature of trade or commerce or business: Assessee is entitled to approval u/s.80G(5).
[DI v. The Chartered Accountants Study Circle, 250 CTR 70 (Mad.)

The objects of the assessee-trust included conduct of periodical meetings on professional subjects, publishing books, booklets, etc., on professional subjects i.e., bank audit, tax audit, etc., and selling the same. The assessee filed an application in Form 10G to the Director of IT (Exemption), Chennai for grant of renewal u/s.80G of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The application was rejected on the ground that the assessee was publishing and selling books of professional interest to be used as a reference material by the general public as well as the professionals in respect of bank audit, tax audit, etc., and its activities are commercial in nature and will fall within the amended provision of section 2(15) of the Act. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s appeal.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Madras High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“Activities of the assessee-trust in publishing and selling books of professional interest which are meant to be used as reference material by the general public as well as the professionals in respect of bank audit, tax audit, etc., cannot be construed as commercial activities and, therefore, the assessee-trust was entitled to approval u/s.80G(5) of the Act.”

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Capital gain: Computation: Sections 48 and 49, and section 7 of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957: A.Y. 1992-93: Cost with reference to certain modes of acquisition: Sale of jewellery inherited from son: Fair market value of jewellery as on 1-4-1974 should be arrived at by reverse indexation, from fair market value as on 31-3-1989 on basis of which Revenue had imposed Wealth Tax upon assessee: Reverse indexation is not to be done from date of sale held in December 1991 based on sale price.

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33. Capital gain: Computation: Sections 48 and 49, and section 7 of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957: A.Y. 1992-93: Cost with reference to certain modes of acquisition: Sale of jewellery inherited from son: Fair market value of jewellery as on 1-4-1974 should be arrived at by reverse indexation, from fair market value as on 31-3-1989 on basis of which Revenue had imposed Wealth Tax upon assessee: Reverse indexation is not to be done from date of sale held in December 1991 based on sale price.
[Deceased Shantadevi Gaekwad v. Dy. CIT, (2012) 22 Taxman.com 30 (Guj.)]

 In the month of December, 1991, the assessee had sold certain jewellery which she inherited from her son. The assessee herself gave a declaration of fair market value of the selfsame jewellery as on 31-3-1989 based on the report of a registered valuer for the purpose of the Wealth-tax Act and the Assessing Officer had accepted the said valuation. Further the assessee for calculation of the capital gains arising from sale of the aforesaid jewellery worked out the fair market value of the jewellery as on 1-4-1974 by following the method of reverse indexation. She adopted the base as the fair market value of the jewellery worked out as on 31-3-1989 on the basis of valuation done by the registered valuer. The Tribunal held that fair market value of the jewellery as on 1-4-1974 should be arrived at by reverse indexation from the date of sale held in December, 1991 based on the sale price and not from the fair market value as on 31-3-1989.

On appeal by the assessee, the Gujarat High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“(i) According to provisions contained in sections 48 and 49, 1-4-1974 should be treated to be the date in the instant case on which the jewellery was deemed to have been acquired by the assessee. There is no dispute that although the jewellery was transferred in the month of December, 1991, the assessee herself gave a declaration of fair market value of the selfsame jewellery as on 31-3-1989 based on the report of a registered valuer for the purpose of the Wealth-tax Act as required under the said Act. It is admitted position that the Assessing Officer has accepted the said valuation and has not disputed the same for the purpose of the Wealth-tax Act.

(ii) There is also no dispute that both the assessee and the Revenue agreed before the Tribunal that the method of reverse indexation should be the appropriate one for the purpose of ascertaining the fair market valuation of the jewellery as on 1-4-1974.

(iii) There is substance in the contention of the assessee that the Revenue having accepted the valuation of the same jewellery given by her as on 31-3-1989 as correct valuation for the purpose of the Wealth-tax Act, there is no reason why the same valuation should not be treated to be a reliable base for the purpose of computing the capital gain under the Income-tax Act by the process of reverse indexation. There is no reason to disbelieve the valuation given by the assessee under the Wealth-tax Act as on 31-3-1989 based on the valuation assessed by a registered valuer in terms of the said statute. The Revenue having accepted the said valuation for the purpose of the Wealth-tax Act is precluded from disputing the correctness of the selfsame valuation for the purpose of assessment of capital gain, as the factor of ‘fair market value’ is decisive for the purpose of both the Wealth-tax Act and in ascertaining the cost of acquisition under the Income-tax Act.

 (iv) Therefore, there was no justification for disbelieving the valuation of the selfsame jewellery given by the assessee as on 31-3-1989 for the purpose of Wealth-tax Act.

(v) Therefore, the order passed by the Tribunal was liable to be set aside. The Assessing Officer was to be directed to recalculate the capital gain by adopting reverse indexation based on valuation of jewellery given by the assessee as on 31-3-1989 for the purpose of Wealth-tax Act.”

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Reassessment: Sections 143(2), 143(3), 147 and 148 of Income-tax Act, 1961: A.Y. 2003- 04: Assessment u/s.147 cannot be made within the time available for issuing notice u/s.143(2) and for completion of assessment u/s.143(3).

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[CIT v. ABAD Fisheries, 246 CTR 513 (Ker.)]

For the A.Y. 2003-04, the Assessing Officer accepted the returned income u/s.143(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Subsequently, even before the expiry of the period for issuing the notice u/s.143(2) for completing the assessment u/s.143(3) the Assessing Officer issued notice u/s.148 holding that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment and passed an assessment order u/s.147. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim and cancelled the assessment and held that within the time provided for regular assessment u/s.143(3) after issuing notice u/s.143(2), no reassessment u/s.147 is permissible under the Act.

On appeal by the Revenue the Kerala High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“(i) Reassessment u/s.147 cannot be completed within the time available for issuing notice u/s.143(2) and for completion of assessment u/s.143(3).

(ii) Similar view taken by the Madras and the Delhi High Courts remains unchallenged by the Department. The Departmental appeal is dismissed.”

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Order No. [F. No. 225/124/2012/ITA.II], dated 20-6-2012 — Order extending due date for filing Form 49C for F.Y. 2011-12.

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Rule 114DA of the Income-tax Rules read with Circular No. 5, dated 6-2-2012, provided that Liaison Office in India should electronically file Form 49C, within 60 days from the end of financial year. The CBDT has extended the due date of filing Form 49C for the financial year 2011-12, up to 30th September, 2012. For the financial year 2011-12, Form 49C can be filed in ‘paper mode’ instead of filing it electronically with digital signatures.

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AMENDMENTS IN DIRECT TAX PROVISIONS BY THE FINANCE ACT, 2012

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1. Background:

The Finance Minister presented the Budget
for the year 2012-13 on 16th March, 2012, and introduced the Finance
Bill, 2012, containing 154 clauses. Out of these, 113 clauses relate to
‘Direct Taxes’ and other 41 clauses relate to ‘Indirect Taxes’. There
was heated discussion on the various provisions of the Bill which
included over 30 amendments in various sections of the Income-tax Act
with retrospective effect. There was lot of protest in India and abroad
as most of these amendments would affect non-residents and will have
adverse effect on global trade. Inspite of this protest, the Government
could manage to get through the legislation with some changes. The
Finance Act, 2012, containing 119 sections relating to Direct Taxes is
now passed by both Houses of the Parliament and received the assent of
the President on 28-5-2012. Originally, the existing Income-tax Act was
to be replaced by the Direct Taxes Code (DTC) w.e.f. 1-4-2012. Since the
implementation of DTC is delayed, we will have to live with the
existing Income-tax Act for one more year. Some of the amendments made
by the Finance Act, 2012, will give some relief in the computation of
Income and Tax. However, some of the amendments, which have
retrospective and retroactive effect, will make the life of taxpayers
miserable.

 In particular, the retrospective amendments of some
of the sections of the Income-tax Act will increase the tax burden of
non-resident assessees and also increase their compliance cost. In this
respect, the tax litigation will also increase in the coming year. In
this article, the amendments made in the Incometax Act, Wealth-tax Act
and Securities Transaction Tax are discussed.

2. Rates of income tax, surcharge and education cess:

2.1
Relief in income tax: The tax slabs for individuals, HUF, AOP, BOI,
etc. have been made more beneficial. The exemption limit for these
assessees have been raised from Rs.1.80 lac to Rs.2 lac. As a result of
the revision of the exemption limit and realignment of some of the
slabs, tax liability of this category of assessees for A.Y. 2013-14 will
be less by Rs.2,000 in respect of income up to Rs.8 lac. In respect of
income above Rs.8 lac the reduction of the tax will be of Rs.22,000. For
senior citizens and very senior citizens there is no change in tax
payable on income up to Rs.8 lac. If the income is more than Rs.8 lac
the reduction in the tax liability in their cases will be of Rs.20,000.

2.2 Rates of income tax:

(i)
For individuals, HUF, AOP, BOI and Artificial Juridical person, as
stated above, the threshold limit of basic exemption has been increased
for A.Y. 2013-14. Individuals above the age of 60 years are treated as
‘Senior Citizens’ and those above the age of 80 years are treated as
‘Very Senior Citizens’. The rates of tax for A.Y. 2012-13 and A.Y.
2013-14 are as under:

(a) Rates in A.Y. 2012-13 (Accounting Year ending 31-3-2012)

(b) Rates in A.Y. 2013-14 (Accounting Year ending 31-3-2013)

No
surcharge is payable for A.Y. 2012-13 and 2013-14. However, education
cess of 3% (2+1) of the tax is payable for both the years.

 (ii)
The following table gives comparative figures of tax payable by
individuals, HUF, AOP, BOI, etc. in A.Y. 2012-13 and A.Y. 2013-14.

The above tax is to be increased by 3% of tax for education cess.

(a) Tax payable in A.Y. 2012-13 (Accounting Year ending 31-3-2012)

(b) Tax payable in A.Y. 2013-14 (Accounting Year ending 31-3-2013)

The
concessional rate of 15% plus applicable surcharge and education cess
which was provided for A.Y. 2012-13 has been continued for A.Y. 2013-14
also.

(vii) Rate of Alternate Minimum Tax (AMT)

The
rate of tax 18.5% plus education cess of 3% of tax which was payable as
AMT on income of LLP for A.Y. 2012-13 is now payable by all assessee,
other than a company, i.e., LLP, firm, individual, HUF, AOB, BOI, etc.
in A.Y. 2013-14. No surcharge is payable on AMT.

2.3 Surcharge on income tax:

(i)
As in A.Y. 2012-13, no surcharge is payable by non-corporate assessees
i.e., individuals, HUF, AOP, BOI, Firm LLP, co-operative societies, etc.
in A.Y. 2013-14. In the case of a company the rate of surcharge, if
income exceeds Rs.1 Cr, is 5% of income tax. As regards MAT u/s.115JB,
if the book profit exceeds Rs.1 Cr., rate of surcharge is 5%.

(ii) As regards TDS and TCS, no surcharge is required to be added to the rates of TDS or TCS.

(iii) In the case of dividend distribution tax u/s.115O and 115R the rate of surcharge on tax (i.e., 15%) is 5% of the tax.

(iv)
In the case of foreign companies, the rate of surcharge on income tax
is 2% of tax if the taxable income of the company exceeds Rs.1 Cr.
Similarly, the rate of surcharge on tax to be deducted u/s.195 in case
of foreign company is 2% of the tax if the income from which tax is
deductible at source exceeds Rs.1 Cr. 2.4 Education cess: As in earlier
years, education cess of 3% (including 1% higher education cess) of
income tax and surcharge (if applicable) is payable by all assesses
(Residents or non-residents). No education cess is applicable on TDS or
TCS from payments to all residents (including companies). However, if
tax is deducted from payments made to

(a) foreign companies,

(b) non-residents or

(c)
on salary payments to residents or non-residents, education cess at 3%
of the tax and surcharge (if applicable) is to be deducted.

3. Tax Deduction and Collection at Source (TDS and TCS):

3.1 Section 193: At
present, no tax is required to be deducted at source if interest
payable to a resident individual on debentures issued by a listed
company does not exceed Rs.2,500 in a year. This limit is increased to
Rs.5,000 w.e.f. 1-7-2012. This concession will now apply to debentures
issued by unlisted public companies as well as to interest payable to
resident HUF. The existing exemption in respect of interest paid on
debentures issued by listed companies which are held in Demat Account
will continue without any limit. The amendment in this section comes
into force on 1-7-2012.

 3.2 Section 194J — TDS from fees
from professional or technical services: This section is now amended
w.e.f. 1-7-2012. It will now be necessary for a company to deduct tax at
source from any remuneration, fees or commission paid or payable to a
director, if no tax is deductible u/s.192 under the head salary. The
rate for TDS is 10%. It may be noted that the manner in which the
section is amended indicates that this deduction is to be made
irrespective of the quantum of such payment in the year. As regards
professional fees, technical service fees, royalty, etc. to which this
section applies it is provided that tax is to be deducted only if
payment under each head exceeds Rs.30,000 in the financial year.
Therefore, in case of payment of fees to non-executive directors and
independent directors as ‘Director’s Fees’, the tax at 10% will be
deductible even if the total payment in the F.Y. is less than Rs.30,000
to each of them.

3.3 Section 194LA:

At present TDS from compensation on compulsory acquisition of immovable property at 10% is required to be made if compensation amount exceeds Rs.1 lac. This will now be required to be made if the compensation amount exceeds Rs.2 lac w.e.f. 1-7-2012.

3.4    Section 194LC:

This is a new section inserted in the Income-tax Act w.e.f. 1-7-2012. It provides for deduction of tax at the concessional rate of 5% plus applicable surcharge and education cess, in respect of interest paid to a non-resident, other than a foreign company. This interest should relate to monies borrowed by an Indian company from the non-resident at any time on or after 1-7-2012 and before 1-7-2015 in foreign currency from a source outside India. This borrowing should be (i) under a loan agreement or (ii) by way of issue of long- term infrastructure bonds approved by the Central Government. Further, the rate of such interest should not exceed the rate approved by the Government for this purpose.

3.5    Section 201 — Failure to deduct tax at source:

U/s.201, a person can be deemed to be an assessee in default in respect of non/short deduction of tax at source. The AO can pass order for this purpose within a period of four years from the end of the financial year in a case where no returns for tax deducted at source have been filed. Section 201 is amended with retrospective effect from 1st April, 2010, to extend the time limit for passing the order u/s.201(1) for non/short deduction of tax from 4 years to 6 years from the end of the F.Y. in which payment is made or credit is given.

3.6    Section 206C — Tax Collection at Source (TCS):

This section provides for collection of tax at source from sale of alcoholic liquor, tendu leaves, timber, forest products, scrap, etc. at the rates ranging from 1% to 5% of the sale price. The scope of this provision for TCS is extended w.e.f. 1-7-2012 as under.

    i) In respect of sale of minerals, being coal or lignite or iron ore, tax is to be collected by the seller at the rate of 1% of the sale price.

    ii) However, such tax is not to be collected if the purchase of such goods listed in section 206C(i) is made by the buyer for the purpose of manufacturing, processing or producing articles or things or for the purposes of generation of power. For this purpose the buyer of such goods has to give a declaration in Form No. 37C.

    iii) In order to reduce the quantum of cash trans-actions in bullion or jewellery sector and for curbing the flow of unaccounted money in the trading system, it is now provided that the seller of bullion or jewellery shall collect from the buyer tax at the rate of 1% of the sale consideration. For this purpose it is provided that the collection of the above tax of 1% shall be made if the sale price in cash exceeds the following amounts:

    a. For bullion, if the sale price exceeds Rs.2 lac. It may be noted that for this purpose definition of ‘Bullion’ does not include coin or any other article weighing ten grams or less.

    b. For jewellery, if the sale price exceeds Rs.5 lac.

iii) It may be noted that this tax will be collected from the buyer even if the buyer has purchased bullion or jewellery for personal use or for manufacture or processing the same for his business. Further, it appears that persons who purchase bullion or jewellery for personal use will not be able to get credit for the tax collected at source because there will be no corresponding income from sale of bul-lion or jewellery in respect of which such credit for tax can be claimed. Further, the person making such payment for purchase of bullion or jewellery in cash will have to prove the source from which such cash is paid.

    iv) There are certain consequential amendments made in section 206C on the same lines as in section 201 . According to these amendments, if the seller, who is required to collect tax under this section fails to do so, he will not be deemed to be in default if he can establish that the buyer has filed his return u/s.139 and paid tax on his income after considering the goods purchased by him. Consequential provision for reduction in the period for which interest is payable u/s.206C is also made.

3.7    No Advance tax payable by senior citizens u/s.207:

This section provides for payment of Advance Tax in instalments. It is now provided, w.e.f. 1-4- 2012, that a senior citizen who has no income from business or profession will not be required to pay any Advance Tax.

    4. Exemptions and deductions:

4.1    Charitable trust:

Section 2(15) provides that if the object of advancement of general public utility involves carrying on of any activity in the nature of trade, commerce or business, etc. and the aggregate value of the receipts from such activity exceeds Rs.25 lac, the trust will not be considered as charitable trust. New s.s (8) has been inserted in section 13 and a proviso has been added in section 10(23C), with retrospective effect from A.Y. 2009- 10, to provide that the trust or institution will not be granted exemption only for the year in which such receipts exceed Rs.25 lac. Such loss of exemption in that year will not affect the registration of the trust or institution u/s.12AA. The exemption can be claimed in subsequent years when such receipts do not exceed Rs.25 lac.

4.2    Section 10(10D) — Deduction of life insurance premium:

At present, any sum received under a life insurance policy, including bonus, but excluding amount re-ceived under Keyman Insurance policy, is exempt, provided the premium amount does not exceed 20% of the actual capital sum assured in any year during the policy period. Now, this limit is reduced to 10% in the case of an insurance policy issued on or after 1st April, 2012. Similar amendment is made u/s.80C, whereby it is provided that deduction in respect of life insurance premium, etc. in the case of insurance policies issued on or after 1st April, 2012 shall be avail-able only in respect of premium not exceeding 10% of the actual capital sum assured. It may be noted that in respect of life insurance premium paid on policies issued before 31-3-2012, the old limit of 20% of actual capital sum assured will apply.

‘Actual capital sum assured’ is also defined to mean the minimum amount assured under the policy on happening of the specified event at any time during the term of the policy, and excluding the value of any premiums agreed to be returned and benefit of bonus or otherwise over and above the sum actually assured. This is done to ensure that life insurance products are not designed to circumvent the prescribed limit by varying the capital sum as-sured from year to year. This amendment comes into force from A.Y. 2013-14 (Accounting Year end-ing on 31-3-2013).

4.3    Section 10(23FB) — Venture Capital Company (VCC) and Venture Capital Funds (VCF):

    i) This section has been amended w.e.f. A.Y. 2013-14. Simultaneously, section 115U has also been amended. Section 10(23FB) provides that a VCC or VCF registered with SEBI and deriving income from investment in a Venture Capital Undertaking (VCU) is exempt from tax. VCU is presently defined to mean such domestic company whose shares are not listed in a recognised stock exchange in India and which is engaged in any one of the nine specified businesses. VCC and VCF registered with SEBI are granted a pass-through status and the income in the hands of the investor is taxed in the like manner and to the same extent as if the investment was directly made by the investor in the VCU.

    ii) The sectoral restriction that the VCU should be engaged in only the nine specified businesses is now removed. The definition of VCU is now amended to cover any undertaking referred to in SEBI (Venture Capital Funds) Regulations, 1996. As such VCC and VCF will be exempt from tax, irrespective of the nature of business carried out by the VCU, as long as it satisfies the conditions imposed by SEBI.

    iii) At present, the income received by any VCC/ VCF from VCU, is taxed on receipt basis in the hands of the investor and hence could result in deferral of taxation till the income is distributed to the investor. It is now provided that the income accruing to VCC/ VCF will be taxable in the hands of the investor on accrual basis.

4.4    Section 10(23BBH):

This new section is inserted w.e.f. 1-4-2013 to pro-vide for exemption from tax in the case of income of the Prasar Bharati (Broadcasting Corporation of India) from A.Y. 2013-14.

4.5    Section 10(48):

This is a new provision made w.e.f. A.Y. 2012-13 (1-4-2011 to 31-3-2012). This section provides for exemption in respect of any income of a foreign company received in India, in Indian currency, on account of sale of crude oil to any person in India. This is subject to the conditions that (i) the receipt of money is under an agreement which is entered into by the Central Government or approved by it the foreign company, and the arrangement or agreement has been notified by the Central Govern-ment and (iii) the receipt of the money is the only activity carried out by the foreign company in India. This provision is introduced in view of the mecha-nism devised by the Government to make payment to certain foreign companies in Indian currency for import of crude oil (e.g., from Iran).

4.6    Section 40(a)(ia):

This section provides for disallowance of payment to a resident if tax required to be deducted there from has not been deducted by the assessee. By amendment of this section it is provided that if the assessee establishes that the resident payee (de-ductee) has paid tax on this income before furnish-ing his return of income, the expenditure shall not be disallowed under this section. This amendment is made from A.Y. 2013-14 (Accounting Year 2012-13). Consequential amendment is made in section 201 to provide, w.e.f. 1-7-2012, that the payer shall not be deemed to be in default if he can prove that the payee has furnished his return u/s.139 and paid tax on such amount. However, the payer will have to pay interest from the due date till the date of filing return by the payee. This being a beneficial provision, it should be made applicable to earlier years also. This will reduce litigation on this issue. It will be pos-sible to argue that the above beneficial amendment will have retrospective effect in view of decision of CIT v. Virgin Creations, ITA No. 302 of 2011 (Calcutta High Court) in respect of similar amendment in the section by the Finance Act, 2010.

4.7 Section 80C:

As discussed in Para 4.2 above, section 80C is amended to provide that the deduction of LIP in respect of life policy taken out on or after 1-4-2012 shall be restricted to 10% of the capital value assured.

4.8 Section 80CCG:

This is a new section inserted w.e.f. A.Y. 2013-14 (Accounting Year 1-4-2012 to 31-3-2013) and provides as under:

    i) The deduction under this section can be claimed by an Individual who is a resident, if he acquires listed equity shares in accordance with the scheme to be notified by the Government. The assessee will be allowed deduction of 50% of the amount invested subject to the limit of deduction of Rs.25,000 in the computation of income for the year of investment. It may be noted that this deduction is not allowable to an HUF.

    ii) The above deduction is subject to the following conditions:

    a) The gross total income of the assessee for the relevant assessment year should not exceed Rs.10 lac.
    b) The assessee should make the above investment in retail category specified in the scheme.

    c) The above investment should be in listed equity shares as specified under the scheme.

    d) There will be locking period of 3 years for such investment.

    iii) If the assessee fails to comply with any of the above conditions in any year, the amount of deduction allowed in earlier years will be taxable in that year.


4.9    Section 80D:

Under this section deduction up to Rs.15,000 is allowed to an assessee (individual or HUF) for premium paid on mediclaim insurance policy. For senior citizens the limit for deduction is Rs.20,000. Now it is provided that, effective from Accounting Year 2012-13, if the assessee makes payment up to Rs.5,000 in a year for preventive health check-up, deduction will be allowed within the above ceiling limit. Further, age limit for senior citizens is reduced from 65 years to 60 years. It is suggested that this deduction upto Rs.5,000 should have been allowed over and above the existing ceiling limit of Rs.15,000 or Rs.20,000. The limits of Rs.15,000/20,000 were fixed in the year 2000 and deserve to be enhanced due to increase in medical cost and consequential increase in insurance premium.

4.10    Sections 80G and 80GGA:

Deduction for donation of Rs.10000 or more under these sections will not be allowed if the same is paid in cash. This provision will apply to donations made in the Accounting Year 2012-13 onwards.

4.11    Section 80IA(4)(iv):

Under this section an industrial undertaking engaged in the business of generation and distribution of power and allied activities is entitled to tax holiday for 10 years if such undertaking begins its activities on or before 31-3-2012. This date is now extended to 31-3-2013.

4.12    Interest from bank exempt u/s.80TTA:

This is a new section which has been introduced effective from A.Y. 2013-14 (accounting year ending 31-3-2013). Under this section, in the case an individual or HUF, interest from savings bank account with a bank, co- operative bank or post office bank up to Rs.10000 will not be taxable. This provision will not apply to interest on fixed deposit with banks.

4.13    Section 115-O:

At present, dividend distributed by a company out of the dividend received from its subsidiary company, which has paid Dividend Distribution Tax, is not liable to Dividend Distribution Tax once again. For this purpose, the dividend receiving company should not be a subsidiary of any other company. By amendment of this section, effective from 1-7-2012, the condition that “the company is not a subsidiary of any other company” has now been removed. Therefore, any domestic company (whether it is a holding company or a subsidiary company) receiving dividend from its subsidiary or step down subsidiary company and declaring dividend in the same year out of such dividend amount will be allowed to reduce the amount of such dividend for determining the liability to Dividend Distribution Tax if the subsidiary or step down subsidiary company has paid Dividend Distribution Tax that is payable.

    5. Income from business or profession:

5.1    Section 32(1)(iia):

At present, an assessee engaged in the business of manufacture or production of any article or thing is entitled to additional depreciation of 20% of the cost of the new plant and machinery in the year of acquisition. From A.Y. 2013-14, this benefit is now extended to an assessee engaged in the business of generation or generation and distribution of power.

5.2    Section 35(2AB):

According to the existing provisions of section 35 (2AB) weighted deduction at 200% of expenditure on approved in-house research and development by a company engaged in the business of biotechnology or in the manufacture of specified articles is allow-able up to 31-3-2012. This benefit is now extended up to 31-3-2017.

5.3    Section 35AD:

    i) Investment-linked deduction of 100% of capital expenditure (excluding expenditure incurred for land, goodwill or financial instrument) is allowed for certain specified businesses. In the list of specified businesses, there are at present 8 types of businesses. With effect from 1-4-2012, 3 new businesses have been added to this list. These 3 businesses re-late to setting up and operating (a) inland container depot, or container freight station, (b) warehousing facility for storage of sugar and (c) bee-keeping and production of honey beeswax which commence operations on or after 1-4-2012.

    ii) Further, the above investment-linked deduction is now enhanced to 150% of the capital expenditure incurred on or after 1st April, 2012 in respect of certain specified businesses which commence operations on or after 1-4-2012. These specified businesses are setting up and operating (a) cold-chain facility warehousing facility for agricultural produce, (c) building and operating a hospital with at least 100 beds, (d) developing and building affordable housing project and (e) production of fertiliser in India.

    iii) Further, it is provided that an assessee who builds a hotel of two-star or above category as classified by the Central Government and subsequently, continuing to own the hotel, transfers the operation thereof, the assessee shall be deemed to be engaged in specified business and will be eligible to claim deduction u/s.35AD. This amendment has been made with effect from A.Y. 2011-12.

5.4    New sections 35CCC and 35CCD:

These two new sections are inserted effective from A.Y. 2013-14. They provide as under:

    i. Section 35CCC provides that when an assessee incurs any capital or revenue expenditure for agricultural extension project notified by the CBDT, he will be allowed deduction of 150% of such expenditure.

    ii. Section 35CCD provides that where a company incurs expenditure (other than expenditure on any land or building) on any skill development project notified by the CBDT, it will be allowed deduction of 150% of such expenditure.

5.5    Presumptive taxation:

Section 44AD provides for presumptive taxation in respect of non-corporate assessees carrying on specified businesses and having a total turnover of less than Rs.60 lac. Under this section 8% of the total turnover is deemed to be the income from business subject to certain conditions. It is now provided that this section will not apply to a person having income from (i) a profession, (ii) commission or brokerage or (iii) any agency business. This amendment is made effective A.Y. 2011-12. Further, the limit of Rs.60 lac for total turnover is increased to Rs.1 crore w.e.f. A.Y. 2013-14 (Accounting Year 2012-13).

5.6    Section 44AB:

The limit of turnover/gross receipts for tax audit u/s.44AB has also been increased for business to Rs.1 Cr. And for profession to Rs.25 lac w.e.f. A.Y. 2013-14 as discussed in Para 17.2 below:

    6. Capital gains:

6.1 Section 47(vii):

This section is amended w.e.f. A.Y. 2013-14. It is now provided that when a subsidiary company amalgamates with a holding company, the requirement of the issue of shares of the amalgamated company on amalgamation will not apply.

6.2 Section 49:

At present, there is no provision to treat the cost of assets of a proprietary concern, converted into a company, or a firm converted into a company as the cost of the assets in the case of the company. It is now provided, w.e.f. A.Y. 1999 -2000, that the cost of assets on conversion of a proprietary concern or a firm into a company u/s.47(xiii), or 47 (xiv), in the hands of the company shall be the same as in the hands of the converting enterprise. Similarly, when an unlisted company is converted into LLP u/s.47(xiiib), the cost assets in the case of the company shall be treated as cost in the case of the LLP.

6.3 Section 50D:

This is a new section inserted w.e.f. A.Y. 2013-14. It provides that where the consideration received or accrued for transfer of a capital asset is not ascertainable or cannot be determined, then the fair market value of the said asset shall be deemed to be the full value of the consideration on the date of transfer for computing the capital gain. This situation may arise in a case where the capital asset is transferred in exchange of another capital asset.

6.4 Section 54B:

At present, the benefit of exemption from capital gain on sale of agricultural land is available to the assessee on reinvestment of such capital gain for purchase of another new agricultural land within two years. One of the conditions is that the land should have been used by the assessee or his parent for agricultural purposes. This provision is amended, w.e.f. A.Y. 2013-14, to provide that even if such land was used by the HUF, in which the as-sessee or his parent was a member, this exemption can be claimed.

6.5 Section 54GB:

This is a new section which is inserted w.e.f. A.Y. 2013-14 to provide that if an Individual or HUF makes capital gains on sale of a residential house or plot, he can claim exemption from Capital Gains Tax if he invests the net consideration in equity shares of a new SME company. Such SME company is required to invest this amount in purchase of new plant and machinery. This exemption can be claimed subject to the following conditions.

    i) The investee company should qualify as a small or medium enterprise under the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Act, 2006. (SME).

    ii) The company should be engaged in the business of manufacture of an article or a thing.

    iii) SME company should be incorporated within the period from 1st of April of the year in which capital gain arises to the assessee and before the due date for filing the return by the assessee u/s.139(1).

    iv) The assessee should hold more than 50% of the share capital or the voting right after the subscription in the shares of a SME company.

    v) The assessee will not be able to transfer the above shares for a period of 5 years.

    vi) The company will have to utilise the amount invested by the assessee in the purchase of new plant and machinery. If the entire amount is not so invested before the due date of filing the return of income by the assessee u/s.139, then the company will have to deposit the amount in the scheme to be notified by the Central Government.

    vii) The above new plant and machinery acquired by the company cannot be sold for a period of 5 years.

    viii) The above scheme of exemption granted in respect of capital gains on sale of residential property will remain in force up to 31-3-2017.

The above conditions prescribed in the new section are very harsh. This section should have allowed the investment in existing SME company for the purpose of exemption. Further, investment in LLP, which satisfies the condition of SME enterprises, should also be permitted. The restricted time limit for acquiring new plant and machinery will create difficulties and, therefore, it should have been provided that the SME company should be allowed to make such investment in new plant and machinery within a period of 18 months from the date on which the assessee makes the investment in its equity shares. The period of 5 years for retaining the equity shares is too long and should have been reduced to 3 years. Similarly, lock-in-period for plant and machinery acquired by the SME company should be reduced from 5 years to 3 years.

6.6    Section  55A  —  Reference  to  Valuation Officer:

This section is amended w.e.f. 1-7-2012. Under this section, the AO can make a reference to the Valuation Officer with a view to ascertain the fair market value of the capital asset. At present, such reference can be made when the AO is of the view that the value disclosed by the assessee is less than the fair market value. In some cases it is held that when the assessee exercises his option to substitute fair market value of the capital asset as on 1-4-1981, for the cost of the asset, and if the AO is of the view that such market value as declared by the assessee was more, he cannot make a reference to the Valuation Officer. To overcome this position, this amendment provides that w.e.f. 1-7-2012 the AO can make such reference to the Valuation Officer. This amended provision will apply w.e.f. 1 -7-2012 but will have retroactive effect, inasmuch as, the AO can make such a reference to the Valuation Officer in respect of all pending assessments of earlier years.

6.7    Securities Transaction Tax (STT):

    i) Section 98 of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2004, providing for rates of STT has been amended w.e.f. 1-7-2012. The revised rates of STT in Cash Delivery Segment are reduced from 0.125% to 0.1%. Therefore, in the case of delivery-based transaction relating to equity shares of a company or units of equity ori-ented fund of a mutual fund entered into through a recognised Stock Exchange, the STT payable by a purchaser is reduced from 0.125% to 0.1% and a seller is reduced from 0.125% to 0.1% w.e.f. 1-7-2012.

    ii) In order to encourage unlisted companies to get them listed in recognised Stock Exchange, it is now provided that sale of unlisted equity shares by any holder of such shares, under an offer for sale to the public included in an Initial Public Offer (IPO), if subsequently such shares are listed on the recognised Stock Exchange, will be liable for pay-ment of STT at 0.2%. If such STT is paid, long-term capital gain on such sales will be exempt from tax and tax on short-term capital gain will be payable at concessional rate of 15% u/s.111A.

    7. Income from other sources:

7.1    Section 56(2)(vii):

Under this section any gift exceeding Rs.50,000 in any year received by an Individual or HUF on or after 1-10-2009 is taxable as income from other sources, subject to certain exceptions. One of the exceptions is about gift received from relatives of the individual as defined. Similar exemption is not given in respect of gifts from members of HUF. It is now provided, w.e.f. 1-10-2009, that gifts received by HUF from its members will be exempt. However, if such a gift is given by a member to such HUF, income from the property gifted will be clubbed with the income of the member u/s.64(2). In order to mitigate hardship experienced in practical life it is suggested that the following relationship should have been covered in the definition of relatives.

    i. Gifts by HUF to its members

    ii. Gifts to an Individual by any lineal descendant of a brother or sister of the Individual or his/ her spouse (i.e., gift by a nephew or niece to an uncle or aunt). Similar provision is made in section 314(214)(h) of DTC Bill, 2010.

7.2    Section 56(2)(viib):

This is a new provision inserted from the A.Y. 2013-14. It is now provided that where a closely held company issues shares to a resident, for amount received in excess of the fair market value of the shares, it will be deemed to be the income of the company under the head ‘Income from other Sources’. The fair market value for this purpose is the higher of the value arrived at on the basis of the method to be prescribed or the value as substantiated by the company to the satisfaction of the Assessing Officer. The company can substantiate the value based on the value of the tangible and intangible assets and various types of commercial rights as stated in the section.

This provision will not apply to amounts received by a venture capital undertaking from a venture capital fund or a venture capital company. Further, this provision will not apply to amount received from  non-resident, a foreign company or from a class of persons as may be notified by the Government. The provision appears to have been made with a view to ensure that excessive amount, representing revenue payment, is not received in the form of share premium and does not escape taxation.

7.3    Section 68:

This section deals with taxation of cash credits. The section is amended w.e.f. A.Y. 2013-14. This section now provides that in the case of a closely held company, if the amount credited in the name of a resident is by way of share application money, share capital, share premium or any such amount, by whatever name called, and the explanation offered for the credit is not considered to be satis-factory, such amount will be considered as income of the company. However, if the person (being a resident) in whose name the amount is credited offers explanation about the source and nature of the amount credited and such explanation is found to be satisfactory by the Assessing Officer this Section shall not apply. In the event of failure to do so, the entire amount credited will be taxed at the rate of 30% plus applicable surcharge and Education cess in the hands of the company.

This provision does not apply to amount received from a venture capital fund or a venture capital company. It will also not apply to the amount received from a non-resident or a foreign company.

7.4    Section 115BBD:

At present, this section provides that rate of tax, for dividend received by an Indian company from a foreign company in which it has share holding of 26% or more, is 15% for A.Y. 2012-13. This concession has been extended for one more year i.e., A.Y. 2013-14.

7.5 Section 115BBE:

This is a new section inserted from A.Y. 2013-14. The section provides that unexplained amounts treated as income (i) u/s.68 cash credits, (ii) u/s.69 unexplained investment, (iii) u/s.69A unexplained money, bullion, jewellery or other valuable articles, u/s.69B amount of investments, expenditure on jewellery, bullion or other valuable articles not fully disclosed in books, (v) u/s.69C — Unexplained expenditure, and (vi) u/s.69D — Amount borrowed or repaid on a Hundi in cash, will now be taxed at a flat rate of 30% plus applicable surcharge and education cess. No deduction for any expenditure or allowance will be allowed against such income.

    8. Minimum Alternate Tax (MAT) (section 115JB):

8.1 Section 115JB is amended w.e.f. 1-4-2001 (A.Y. 2001-02) to provide that in the case of the income arising from life insurance business the tax under this section will not be payable. In other words, MAT provisions will not apply from A.Y. 2001-02 onwards in respect of income from life insurance business.

8.2 (i) The section is amended w.e.f. A.Y. 2013 -14 to provide that in the case of a company, such as insurance, banking, electricity company, etc., for which the Form of Profit & Loss A/c. and Balance Sheet is prescribed in the Act governing such com-panies, the book profit shall be determined on the basis of the Form of Profit & Loss A/c. prescribed under that Act. Further, it is provided that in respect of companies to which the Companies Act applies, the book profit will be computed on the basis of the revised format of Schedule VI.

    ii) By another amendment of this section effective from A.Y. 2013-14, it is now provided that the book profit will be increased by the amount standing to the credit of revaluation reserve relating to reval-ued asset which has been discarded or disposed of, if the same is not credited to the Profit & Los A/c. This amendment is in order to cover cases in which revaluation reserve is directly transferred to general reserve on disposal of asset resulting in the gain that is not being included in the computation of book profits up to now.

    9. Alternate Minimum Tax (AMT)

9.1 Sections 115JC to 115JE for levy of AMT on ad-justed total income of LLP have now been extended to other non-corporate assessees such as individual, HUF, AOP, BOI, Firm, etc. w.e.f. A.Y. 2013-14. New section 115JEE has also been added from A.Y. 2013-14.

9.2 Provision for AMT was made last year for income of LLP w.e.f. A.Y. 2012- 13 in sections 115JC to 115JE. Now section 115JC is replaced by a new section and other sections 115JD to 115JE have been amended w.e.f. A.Y. 2013-14. A new section 115JEE is also inserted. The effect of these amendments is as under.

    i) The provisions of section 115JC will now apply to LLP and all other non-corporate assessees i.e., individual, HUF, AOP, BOI, Firm, etc. As provided in section 115JC the assessees will have to obtain audit report in the prescribed form before the due date.

    ii) In the case of an individual, HUF, AOP, BOI or Artificial Juridical person, AMT will not be payable if the adjusted total income does not exceed Rs.20 lac. (section 115JEE)

    iii) AMT is payable at 18.5% plus applicable surcharge and education cess of the adjusted total income if the amount of such tax is more than the tax payable on the total income computed under other provisions of the Income-tax Act.

    iv) Adjusted total income is defined to mean the total income computed under the Income-tax Act increased by (a) deductions claimed under Chapter VIA (section C) i.e., 80HH to 80 RRB (other than section 80P) and (b) deduction claimed u/s.10AA (SEZ income).

    v) Other provisions of sections (a) section 115JD for tax credit for AMT paid for 10 years, (b) Section 115JE applicability of other sections of the Income-tax Act and (c) Section 115JF— Definitions will continue to apply to LLP and also to other non-corporate assessees to whom sections 115JC and 115JEE for payment of AMT apply.

    10. Specified domestic transactions:

Section 40A(2) of the Income-tax Act empowers the AO to disallow payment to a related person for expenditure, if he considers that such expenditure is excessive or unreasonable, having regard to the fair market value of the goods, services or facilities for which such payment is made and claimed as a deduction in the computation of income. Similarly, sections 10AA, 80A, 80IA, 80IB, etc. provide that if there are any transactions of purchases, sales, etc. between two related persons, the AO can ap-ply the test of fair market value and make adjust-ments in the computation of income. In all these sections, the concept of ‘fair market value’ has not been specifically explained. Therefore, the Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. Glaxo Smithkline Asia (P) Ltd., 195 Taxman 35 (SC) observed that in order to reduce litigation, sections 40A(2) and 80IA(10) need to be amended to empower the AO to make adjustments to the income declared by the assessee, having regard to the market value of the transac-tions between related parties, by applying any of the generally accepted methods for determination of Arm’s- Length Price (ALP), including methods provided under Transfer Pricing Regulations. In view of the above, amendments are made in sec-tions 40A(2), 10AA, 80A and 80IA to provide that the ‘Specified domestic transactions’ will now be subject to Transfer Pricing Regulations contained in sections 92, 92BA to 92F — from A.Y. 2013-14 (Accounting Year 1-4-2012 to 31-3-2013). In brief, the effect of these provisions, from A.Y. 2013-14 (1-4-2012 to 31-3-2013) onwards will be as under.

10.1 The term ‘specified domestic transaction’ is defined in new section 92BA to mean the following transactions, other than the international transactions:

    a) Any expenditure in respect of which payment has been made or to be made to a person referred to in section 40A(2)(b). This will include remuneration, commission, rent, interest, etc. paid to a related person as well as purchases made from such person.

    b) Any transaction referred to in section 80A.

    c) Any transfer of goods or services referred to in section 80IA(8).

    d) Any business transacted between the assessee and other person as referred to in section 80IA(10).

    e) Any transaction, referred to in any other section under Chapter VI-A or section 10AA, to which provisions of sections 80IA(8) or 80IA (10) are applicable.

    f) Any other transaction as may be prescribed by Rules by the CBDT.

10.2 It is also provided that the Transfer Pricing provisions will not apply if the aggregate amount relating to the above transactions entered into by the assessee, in the relevant accounting year, does not exceed Rs.5 crore. It is not clear from the word-ing of the above section whether such aggregate amount is to be worked out by considering the amount of expenditure, purchases, sales, etc. under all the above sections taken together or whether the aggregate amount under each section i.e., 40A(2), 80A, 80IA, 10AA, etc. is to be separately worked out in order to determine the limit of Rs.5 crore provided in the section.

10.3    Section 40A(2):

This section provides for disallowance of revenue expenditure incurred by the assessee. The section does not apply to any revenue or capital receipt or to capital expenditure. Further, the section does not apply to any revenue expenditure which is capita-lised. Under this section, if any payment is made or to be made for any revenue expenditure to any ‘Related Person’, the AO can disallow that part of the expenditure which he considers to be excessive or unreasonable, having regard to the fair market value of the goods, services or facilities for which such payment is made and claimed as a deduction in computing the income. This section applies to the computation of ‘Income from Business or Profession’ and ‘Income from other Sources’. This section is now amended to provide that the fair market value for any payment to which the concept of specified domestic transaction applies shall be determined on the basis of arm’s-length price concept as provided in sections 92C and 92F(ii).

10.4    Section 80A:

Section 80A(6) refers to transfer of any goods or services held for the purposes of the undertaking, unit, enterprise, or eligible business to any other business carried on by the assessee. It also refers to transfer of goods or services held for the pur-poses of any other business of the assessee to the undertaking, unit, enterprise or eligible business. If the consideration for such transfer is not at the market value, then the AO can substitute the market value of the goods or services for such transfer. The expression ‘Market Value’ is defined in the Explanation to mean the price that such goods or services would fetch, if they were sold in the open market, subject to statutory or regulatory restrictions. This Explanation is now amended w.e.f. A.Y. 2013-14 to provide that the expression ‘Market Value’ in relation to specified domestic transactions shall now mean, in relation to any goods or services sold, supplied or acquired, the ‘Arm’s-length price’ as defined in section 92F(ii). It may be noted that this section applies to transfer of goods or services from one undertaking, unit or business owned by the assessee to another undertaking, unit or business owned by the same assessee.

10.5    Section 80IA:

S.s (8) and s.s (10) of this section are amended w.e.f. A.Y. 2013-14 as under.

    i) Section 80IA(8):

This provision refers to transfer of goods or services held for the purposes of the eligible business to any other business of the assessee. The section also refers to transfer of goods or services from any other business of the assessee to any eligible business. For this purpose, the expression ‘eligible business’ means business carried on by any indus-trial undertaking owned by the assessee carrying on business of infrastructure development, generation of power, telecommunication services, etc. as listed in section 80IA(4), for which 100% deduction is given u/s.80IA. Section 80IA(8) provides that transfer of goods or services between eligible business under-taking and other undertakings of the assessee shall be at market value. Now, it is provided that such transfers should be made at arm’s-length price as defined by the provisions of section 92F(ii).

    ii) Section 80IA(10):

This section provides that where it appears to the AO that, owing to the close connection between the assessee carrying on the eligible business and any other person, the course of business between them is so arranged that the profits of the eligible business for which 100% deduction is allowed u/s.80IA is shown at a figure higher than the ordinary profits in such business, the AO can recompute the profits of the eligible business for deduction u/s.80IA. The section is now amended to provide that, if the above arrangement between closely related parties involves specified domestic transactions, the AO shall compute the profit of the eligible business having regard to the arm’s-length price concept as defined in section 92F(ii).

    iii) Other sections:

It may be noted that the provisions of section 80IA(8) and 80IA(10) apply to certain other sections of the Income-tax Act also. These sections provide for deduction of income derived from various specified activities. In respect of transactions with related parties for claiming deduction from income, the above concept of arm’s-length price as applicable to specified domestic transactions will apply.

10.6 Since the concept of arm’s-length price is now extended to section 80IA(8) and 80IA(10), this concept will apply to transactions between related parties in computing income under the following sections:

    Section 10AA: Income from newly established units in SEZ.

    Section 80IAB: Income of an undertaking or enterprise engaged in the development of SEZ.

    Section 80IB: Income from certain industrial undertakings and housing projects, etc. (other than infrastructure development undertakings).

    Section 80IC: Income from certain undertakings set up in certain States such as Sikkim, Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand, North-Eastern States, etc.

    Section 80ID: Income from hotels and convention centres set up in National Capital Territory of Delhi, and Districts of Faridabad, Gurgaon, Gautam Buddhha Nagar and Ghaziabad and other specified districts having ‘World Heritage
Site’.

    Section 80IE: Income from eligible business undertakings in North-Eastern States.

10.7    Other transactions:

The CBDT has been given power to prescribe, by Rules, other domestic transactions to which the above provisions will apply.

10.8    Effect of application of arm’s-length price concept:

As stated above, the concept of arm’s-length price (ALP) is now to be applied to certain domestic trans-actions. In view of this, the assessee who enters into specified domestic transactions will have to comply with the following sections w.e.f. A.Y. 2013-14.

    i) Section 92: This section deals with computation of income from international transactions. It is now extended, w.e.f. A.Y. 2013-14, to specified domestic transactions. Therefore, the concept of ALP which was applicable to international transactions up to now will now apply to specified domestic transactions also. S.s (2A) inserted in this section now provides that any allowance for an expenditure or interest or allocation of any cost, expense or income in relation to specified domestic transactions shall be computed having regard to the ALP.

    ii) Section 92C: This section deals with computa-tion of ALP in relation to international transactions. As stated above, this concept is now extended to specified domestic transactions. The section pro-vides for six alternate methods for determination of ALP.

    iii) Section 92CA: This section provides for reference by AO to the Transfer Pricing Officer (TPO). Such reference is to be made if the aggregate value of international transactions exceed Rs.5 cr. The TPO is given wide powers. The order passed by the TPO is binding on the AO and the AO has to complete the assessment in conformity with the order of the TPO. This section has now been amended and it is now provided that such reference is to be made by the AO to the TPO even in cases where the assessee has entered into specified domestic transactions. Since section 92BA states that transactions with related parties aggregating Rs.5 Cr. or more will be considered as specified domestic transactions, all cases in which these transactions are involved will have to be referred to the TPO.

    iv) Section 92D: This section provides for maintenance and keeping of information and documents by persons entering into international transactions.  This section is made applicable to specified domestic transactions. Therefore, all assessees who enter into specified domestic transactions, as stated above, will have to maintain the information and documents specified in this section. It may be noted that these records and documents will have to be maintained w.e.f. 1-4-2012, in the manner prescribed in Rule 10D.

    v) Section 92E: This section requires that an as-sessee entering into international transactions has to obtain report from a Chartered Accountant in the prescribed form No. 3CEB before the due date for filing the return of income. This requirement is now extended to specified domestic transactions from the A.Y. 2013-14 (Accounting Year 1-4-2012 to 31-3-2013).

    vi) Section 92F: This section gives definition of certain terms. The following definitions are relevant in the context of specified domestic transactions.

    a. ‘Arm’s-length price’: This term means a price which is applied or proposed to be applied in a transaction between persons other than associated enterprises, in uncontrolled conditions.

    b. ‘Transaction’: This term includes an arrangement, understanding or action in concert, whether or not it is formal or in writing or whether or not it is intended to be enforceable by legal proceedings.

    vii) Penalty u/s.271 and 271AA: By amendment of Explanation 7 of section 271, it is now provided that penalty under that section will be leviable in respect of amount disallowed out of the above specified domestic transactions u/s.92C(4). Similarly, penalt 2% of the amount can also be levied u/s.271AA for not maintaining records u/s.92D or not reporting such transactions u/s.92E or furnishing incorrect information.

    11. Taxation of non-residents:

Some of the sections dealing with taxation of non-residents have been amended with retrospective effect. These amendments will have far reaching effect. While presenting the Budget the Finance Minister has not made any mention about these far -reaching changes affecting non-residents in his Budget Speech. However, in the Explanatory Memorandum attached to the Finance Bill, 2012, the reasons for these retrospective amendments have been explained.

The effect of these amendments with retrospective effect will be that cases of many assesses may be reopened and they may be required to pay tax, interest or penalty for last 16 years. It appears that these amendments provide for taxing gain on sale of shares in foreign countries and therefore, the time limit of 16 years for reopening the assessments will apply to such transactions. It is, therefore, necessary that a specific provision should have been made that no interest or penalty will be payable if tax levied as a result this retrospective amendment is paid by the assessee. It may be noted that when sections 28 and 80HHC were amended by the Taxation Laws (amendment) Act, 2005, with retrospective effect, CBDT issued a Circular No. 2/2005 on 17-1-2006. In this Circular the tax authorities were directed not to levy any interest or penalty if tax levied due to these retrospective amendments was paid. The Circular also provided that the tax due as a result of the retrospective amendment can be paid in five equal yearly instalments. No interest was payable on such instalments. Let us hope that the CBDT issues similar Circular in respect of the tax payable as a result of these retrospective amendments made by the Finance Act, 2012.

11.3    Section 2(14):

This section defines that term ‘Capital asset’ to mean ‘Property’ of any kind held by an assessee, whether or not connected with his business or profession. However, assets in the nature of stock-in-trade, personal effects, agricultural land, etc. are excluded from this definition. Now, Explanation has been added w.e.f. 1-4-1962 to clarify that ‘property’ shall include and shall be deemed to have always included any rights in or in relation to an Indian company, including right of management or control or any other rights. This will mean that the term, ‘Capital asset’ shall now include a tangible as well as intangible property.

11.4    Section 2(47):

This section defines the word ‘Transfer’ in relation to a capital asset. This is an inclusive definition and includes transfer of a capital asset by way of sale, exchange, relinquishment, or extinguishment of rights in the asset, compulsory acquisition of the asset, etc. Now a new Explanation is added w.e.f. 1-4-1962 to clarify that the word ‘Transfer’ shall include, and shall be deemed to have always included, disposing of, parting with an asset or any interest therein, or creating any interest in any asset, directly, indirectly, absolutely, conditionally, voluntarily or involuntarily. Such transfer may be by agreement made in India or outside India. This is irrespective of the fact that such transfer has been characterised as being effected, dependent upon or following from the transfer of shares of an Indian or foreign company. This will show that if any interest is created in the shares of an Indian or foreign company by agreement or even an action, it will be considered as a ‘transfer’ of capital asset u/s.2(47).

11.5    Section 9:

This section explains when income is deemed to ac-crue or arise in India in the case of a non-resident. The scope of this section is widened by addition of Explanation 4 and 5 below section 9(1)(i) w.e.f. 1-4-1962 as under:

    i) In section 9(1)(i) it is stated that any income shall be deemed to accrue or arise if it accrues or arises, directly or indirectly ‘Through’ or ‘From’ (a) any business connection in India, (b) any property in India (c) any asset or source of Income in India or (d) the transfer of a capital asset situated in India. Now, it is clarified in Explanation 4 that the word ‘Through’ in the above section shall mean and include (w.e.f. 1-4 -1962) — ‘by means of’, ‘in consequence of’ or ‘by reason of’. This explanation appears to have been introduced with retrospective effect to counter the decision of the Supreme Court in ‘Vodafone’ case which was against the Income-tax Department.

    ii) Similarly, Explanation 5 clarifies with retrospective effect from 1-4-1962 that an asset or capital asset being any share or interest in a foreign company shall be deemed to be situated in India if such share or interest derives, directly or indirectly, its value substantially from the assets located in India. It may be noted that the concept of holding interest in substantial value of assets located in India has not been explained or defined in this Explanation. This concept is explained in various other sections in the Income tax in different manner. This will be evident from reference to substantial interest in the following sections.

    a. Section 2(32): While defining ‘person having substantial interest in the company’ it is stated that if a person holds 20% or more of voting power it is considered as substantial interest.

    b. Section 40A(2): Under this section the provisions of transfer pricing are now made applicable in respect of domestic transactions. In the definition of related party, the concept of substantial interest in a company is to be determined by applying the test of 20% or more voting power.

    c. Section 79: For carry forward and set-off of losses of a closely held company, the concept of holding at least 50% holding of shares by shareholders who were shareholders on the last day of the year in which loss was incurred has been provided.

In view of the above, for determination of the tax liability on transfer of shares in a foreign company the concept of holding substantial interest in the value of assets located in India should have been clearly defined. Further, the section refers to share on interest in a foreign company which derives (directly or indirectly) its value substantially from the assets located in India. The word ‘value’ is also required to be defined otherwise there will be confusion as to whether the word ‘value’ refers to ‘book value’ or ‘market value’.

11.6    Section 9(1)(vi) — Royalty:

This Section provides that income by way of royalty earned by a non-resident is deemed to be income accruing or arising in India under the circumstances explained in this section. The concept of royalty for this purpose is now expanded, with retrospective effect from 1-6-1976 as under:

    i) New Explanation 4 is now added to provide that the transfer of any rights in respect of any right, property or information includes all or any right for use or right to use computer software (including granting of a licence) irrespective of the medium through which such right is transferred.

    ii) New Explanation 5 now provides that ‘Royalty’ includes consideration in respect of any right, prop-erty or information, whether or not (a) the posses-sion or control of such right, etc. is with the payer such right, etc. is used directly by the payer, or the location of such right, etc. is in India.

    iii) New Explanation 6 now provides that the expression ‘Process’ used in section 9(1)(vi), in-cludes transmission by satellite (including up-linking, amplification, conversion for down-linking of any signal), cable, optic-fiber or by any other similar technology. This is irrespective of the fact whether such process is a secret process or otherwise. It ap-pears that this provision has been made to over rule the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Aasia Satellite Telecommunication Co. Ltd. v. DIT, 332 ITR 340 (Del.).

The above amendments with retrospective effect from 1-6-1976 will create lot of practical difficulties. It is possible that the Tax Department may consider part of purchase consideration for software paid to a non-resident as royalty payment. This amendment, read with amendment of section 195, with retrospective effect from 1-4-1962, will create greater hardship to tax payers, as it will be impossible to comply with TDS provisions in respect of such payments made to non-residents in earlier years. It is also possible that the AO may invoke provisions of section 40(a)(i) and disallow such payment made to non-residential and claimed as revenue expenditure by the assessee in the earlier years.

It may, however, be noted that if any such payment is made to a non- resident in a country with which there is DTAA, the provisions in DTAA, if favourable, will apply in preference to the above provision.

11.7    Sections 90 and 90A:

Section 90 empowers the Central Government to enter into agreements with any foreign country or a specified territory for Double Taxation Relief (DTAA). Section 90A empowers the Government to enter into similar agreements with certain specified/ notified association in specified territories. Both these sections are amended as under:

    i) New s.s (2A) is inserted w.e.f. 1-4-2013 (A.Y. 2013-14) in section 90 to provide that the provisions of new sections 95 to 102 dealing with General Anti-Avoidance Rule (GAAR) will be applicable even if the provisions of DTAA are more favourable to the assessee. In other words, where GAAR is invoked, the assessee cannot seek protection of beneficial provisions of DTAA. Similar amendment is made in section 90A also.

    ii) New s.s (4) is inserted in section 90 w.e.f. 1-4-2013 (A.Y. 2013-2014) to provide that a non-resident cannot claim benefit of DTAA unless a certificate in the Form prescribed by the CBDT is obtained from the foreign country with which the Indian Govern-ment has entered into the DTAA. In this certificate such foreign country will have to certify the place of residence of the non-resident and such other particulars which the Indian Tax Department may require to decide whether the benefit claimed under a particular DTAA is available to the non-resident assessee. Similar amendment is made in section 90A.

    iii)  New Explanation 3 is inserted in section 90 w.e.f. 1-10-2009 to provide that any meaning as-signed through Notification u/s.90(3) to a term used in DTAA shall be effective from the date of coming into force of the applicable DTAA. Similar amend-ment is made in section 90A w.e.f. 1-6-2006.

11.8    Section 195:

    This section provides for deduction of tax at source (TDS) in the case of payments made to non-residents. This section is now amended with retro-spective effect from 1-4-1962. By this amendment it is provided in the new Explanation-2 that the obligation to comply with TDS provisions will apply, with retrospective effect, to all persons whether resident or non-resident. So far section 195 was understood to put the obligation for TDS on residents and non-residents who have a permanent establishment in India and who make payments to non-residents of Income taxable under the Income-tax Act. Now, w.e.f. 1-4-1962, the obligation is extended to a non-resident person who has (a) residence or place of business or business connection in India, or (b) any other presence in any manner whatsoever in India. It may be noted that the obligation for deducting tax at source (TDS) is never made under Chapter XVII of the Income-tax Act (sections 192 to 194, 194A to 194CC and 195) with retrospective effect. All these provisions for TDS, whenever introduced or amended, are from prospective dates to enable the payer to comply with the same. Even in the Finance Act, 2012, such provisions for TDS or amendments are made in sections 193, 194E, 194J, 194LA, 194LC and 195(7) only w.e.f. 1-7-2012. However, only Explanation 2 has been inserted in section 195(1) with retrospective effect from 1-4-1962. By putting such obligation to deduct tax on certain non-residents who were not covered by the section earlier will create practical difficulties for them. It may not be possible to deduct tax from payments covered by section 195 for earlier years and they may be saddled with huge Interest liabilities and other penal conse-quences under the Income-tax Act. TDS provisions in Chapter XVII puts an obligation on the payer of any amount to collect tax due by the payee and pay to the Government. This obligation is in the nature of vicarious liability. It is a well-settled principle of law that such vicarious liability cannot be saddled on a person with retrospective effect.

    ii) New s.s (7) has been inserted in section 195 w.e.f. 1-7-2012. By this amendment it is provided that the CBDT may, by Notification specify a class of persons or cases where the person responsible for paying to a non-resident, any sum, whether, chargeable to tax or not, can make an application to the AO to determine the appropriate proportion of sum chargeable to tax. On such determination tax will be deductible u/s.195(1) on that portion of the amount. Such determination by the AO may be by a general order applicable to all similar payments or may be specific order applicable to one specific transaction.

11.9    Section 163:

This section provides for liability of an ‘Agent’ of a non-resident to pay the tax or meet with obligations of a non-resident for whom he is recognised as an agent under this section. For this purpose    an employee of the non-resident, (b) a person who has any business connection with the non-resident, (c) a person from or through whom the non-resident receives any income, (d) a person who is the trustee of the non-resident or (e) a person (resident or non-resident) who has acquired by way of transfer a capital asset in India. The section provides for certain limitations on the vicarious li-ability of the agent. Section 149 provides that AO has to give notice to the person whom he wants to treat as agent of a non-resident. The time limit for giving such notice was 2 years from the end of the assessment year for which he wants to treat that person as agent u/s.163. This time limit is now extended to 4 years w.e.f. 1-7-2012. It is also pro-vided, by this amendment, that such notice can be given for any assessment year prior to A.Y. 2012-13. In other words, the AO can give such notice to any person to treat him as agent of a non-resident in respect of income assessable in the case of a non-resident for A.Y. 2008-09, after 1-7-2012 but before 31-3-2013. This amendment appears to have been made to recover tax from Vodafone by treating it as agent of the non-resident company in respect of capital gain alleged to have been made on transfer of shares of a non-resident company to another non-resident company. This tax is now proposed to be levied in respect of such transactions as a result of retrospective amendments of sections 2(14), 2(47), 9 and 195 as discussed above.

11.10  Section 119 of the Finance Act, 2012:

This section provides for validation of demands raised under the Income-tax Act in certain cases in respect of income accruing or arising, through or from a transfer of capital asset situated in India, in consequence of the transfer of shares of a foreign company or in consequence of an agreement or otherwise in a foreign country. This section also states that any notice sent or taxes levied, demanded, assessed, imposed, collected or recovered during any period prior to 1-4 -2012 shall be deemed to have been validly made. Such notice or levy of tax, etc. shall not be called in question on the ground that the tax was not chargeable. This cannot be challenged even on the ground that it is a tax on capital gains arising out of transactions which have taken place in a foreign country. This section will operate notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment, decree or order of any Court, Tribunal or any Authority. It appears that this section is inserted in the Finance Act to ensure that taxes collected in the Vodafone case or other similar cases are not required to be refunded. A question may arise about validity of such a provision for retention of taxes collected from certain assesses by the Govern-ment when any Court judgment or decree directs that such tax should be refunded to the assessee. Another question will arise whether the Government will be liable to pay interest on such amount retained under the validation provision if ultimately the Government has to refund the amount after some years of litigation.

11.11    Section 115A:

This section is amended with effect from 1-7-2012. It is provided that the rate at which Income tax shall be payable in the case of a non-resident, other than a foreign company, in respect of interest received from an Indian company engaged in specified in-frastructure activities, in respect of loan given in foreign currency under an agreement approved by the Government between 1-7-2012 to 30-6-2015, shall be taxable @ 5%. This tax shall be subject to deduction at source u/s.194LC w.e.f. 1-7-2012.

11.12    Section 115BBA:

This section is amended effective from A.Y. 2013-14 to provide that a non-resident, entertainer, such as a theatre, radio, television artist and musician, from performance in India will be taxable at 20% of gross receipts. It is also provided that in the case of a non-resident sports association, tax will be payable at 20% of gross receipts instead of 10% which is the existing rate. Consequential amendments have also been made for the purpose of TDS on these payments u/s.194E w.e.f. 1-7-2012.

11.13    Tax on long-term capital gain:

Section 112 has been amended from A.Y. 2013 -14 to provide that, in the case of a non -resident or a foreign company, capital gains tax payable on transfer of a long-term capital asset, being shares or securities which are not listed on the Stock Ex-change shall be 10%. For this purpose the long-term capital gain is to be computed without indexation or without taking advantage of foreign currency rate differences provided in section 48.

    12. Transfer pricing provisions:

In order to widen the scope of transfer pricing pro-visions and to clarify certain issues, the following sections are amended. Some of these amendments have retrospective effect.

12.1 Section 92B:

This section gives the meaning of ‘International Transaction’. This section is now amended with retrospective effect from 1-4-2002. By this amendment, it is provided that the expression ‘International Transaction’ shall include —

    i) the purchase, sale, transfer, lease or use of tangible property, including building, transportation vehicle, machinery, equipment, tools, plant, furniture, commodity and any other article or thing.

    ii) the purchase, sale, transfer, lease or use of intangible property, including transfer of owner-ship or the provision for use of rights regarding land, copyrights, patents, trademarks, licences, franchises, customer list, marketing channel, brand, commercial secret, know-how, industrial property right, exterior design or practical and new design or any business or commercial rights of similar nature.

    iii) capital financing, including any type of long-term or short-term borrowing, lending or guarantee, purchase or sale of marketable securities or any type of advance, payments or deferred payment receivable or any other debt arising during the course of business.

    iv) provision of services, including provision of mar-ket research, market development, marketing management, administration, technical service, repairs, design, consultation, agency, scientific research, legal or accounting service.

    v) a transaction of business restructuring or reorganisation, entered into by an enterprise with an associated enterprise, irrespective of the fact that it has a bearing on the profit, income, losses, or assets of such enterprise at the time of the transaction or at future date.

Further, the expression ‘Intangible Property’ has also been defined w.e.f. 1-4-2002 to include 12 items listed in the amended section. This refers to various types of intangible properties related to marketing, technology, artistic, data processing, engineering, customer, control, human capital, location, goodwill and similar items which derive their value from intellectual content rather than physical attributes.

12.2    Section 92C:

    i) This section deals with computation of arm’s-length price. In section 92C(1) six methods are provided for determination of ALP. Section 92C(2) states that the most appropriate method for this purpose shall be determined as provided in the Rules 10B and 10C framed by the CBDT. The second proviso to this section is now amended w.e.f. A.Y. 2013-14 to provide that if the variation between the ALP determined under the section and the price at which the international transaction has actually been undertaken does not exceed such percentage not exceeding 3% of the latter, as may be notified by the Government. Earlier this margin was ±5% which has now been restricted to ±3%.

    ii) Further, section 92C is amended by insertion of s.s (2A) with retrospective effect from 1-4-2002. The amendment is stated to be of a clarificatory nature. The effect of this amendment is that, in respect of first proviso to section 92C(2), as it stood before its substitution by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2009, the tolerance band of 5% is not to be taken as a standard deduction while computing ALP. However, it is also clarified that already concluded assessment proceedings should not be a reopened or rectified on the ground of retrospective amendment.

    iii) Section 92C(2) is also amended with retrospective effect from 1-10-2009. This amendment clarifies that the second proviso to section 92C(2) shall also be applicable to all proceedings which were pending as on 1-10-2009 i.e., the date on which the second proviso, as inserted by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2009, came into force.

    iv) It may be noted that, as stated above, section 92C now applies to specified domestic transactions also from A.Y. 2013-14.

12.3    Section 92CA:

    i) This section deals with reference by the AO to the Transfer Pricing Officer (TPO) in specified cases involving Transfer Pricing issues. S.s (2B) has now been inserted with retrospective effect from 1-6- 2002. It is provided by this amendment that if the assessee has not furnished the audit report u/s.92E in respect of an international transaction and such transaction comes to the notice of the TPO, during the course of proceedings before him, it will be possible for the TPO to consider this transaction as if it has been referred to him by the AO It is also provided in new sub-section (2C) that the AO shall not have power to reopen or rectify any assessment proceedings which have been completed before 1-7-2012.

    ii) As stated above, this section is now applicable to specified domestic transactions from A.Y. 2013-14. This will mean that assesses who have entered into specified domestic transaction exceeding Rs.5 Cr. in the accounting year 2012-13 onwards will have to appear before the AO as well as the TPO.

    13. Advance Pricing Agreement:

Advance Pricing Agreement (APA) mechanism is introduced by new sections 92CC and 92CD inserted in the Income-tax Act, w.e.f. 1-7-2012. This provision is similar to Clause 118 of the DTC Bill, 2010. This provision is introduced to provide certainty to the international transactions and will reduce litigation relating to transfer pricing issues. Section 92CC gives power to the CBDT to enter into an APA, with any person, determining arm’s-length price.

13.1    In brief, the provisions of section 92CC are as under:

    i) The CBDT, with the approval of the Central Government, can enter into an APA with any person (assessee) determining the arm’s-length price or specifying the manner in which such ALP is to be determined. This APA will relate to an international transaction to be entered into by that person.

    ii) The manner in which ALP is to be determined in the above APA may include any of the methods referred to in section 92C(1) or any other method, with such adjustments or variations, as the assessee and the CBDT agree upon.

    iii) Once APA is entered into by the CBDT with the assessee, the ALP for the international transaction, stated in APA, will be determined on that basis and the AO cannot invoke the provisions of sections 92C and 92CA.

    iv) APA referred to above shall be valid for such period not exceeding 5 years as specified in the APA.

    v) The above APA shall be binding on (a) the person in whose case and in respect of the transaction stated in the APA and (b) the Income tax Authorities in respect of the party to the APA for the transaction specified therein.

    vi) The above APA shall not be binding if there is change in the law or facts relating to the APA.

    vii) The CBDT, with the approval of the Govern-ment, can declare the APA as void abinitio, if it finds that the APA has been obtained by the assessee by fraud or misrepresentation of facts.

    viii) If the APA is declared as void by the CBDT, all the provisions of the Act shall apply as if such agreement was not entered into. For the purpose of taking any action against the assessee, in view of the cancellation of APA, the period from the date of the APA to the date of its cancellation will not be counted for determining the limitation period.

    ix) The CBDT will prescribe a scheme for the pro-cedure to be followed for entering into the APA.

13.2 The effect of the APA entered into by an as-sessee is explained in the new section 92CD as under:

    i) Where APA has been entered into by an assessee, the Income-tax return which pertains to a previous year covered under the above agreement and is already filed, the assessee has to file a modified return of income u/s.139 in accordance with and limited to the APA. This modified return has to be filed within 3 months from the end of the month in which APA is entered into.

    ii) Once the modified return of income is filed, the AO will have to assess, reassess or recompute the income, irrespective of the fact whether the assessment/reassessment proceedings are over or not, in accordance with the APA.

    iii) Where the assessment proceedings are completed, the reassessment proceedings are to be completed within one year from the end of the financial year in which modified return of income is filed. If the assessment proceedings are pending, the period of limitation for completion of these proceedings will be extended by 12 months.

13.3 Considering the wording of sections 92CC and 92CD and the intention of the legislation, it will be possible for any assessee, who has already entered into international transactions in the earlier years, to approach the CBDT after 1-7-2012 to enter into APA in respect of such transactions already entered into in the past. This will enable the assessee to apply to the AO that the pending assessments may be completed on the basis of APA. It appears that even if any appeals are pending for any of the earlier years, the assessee will be entitled to withdraw the appeals and approach the AO to make reassessment or recomputation of income for those years in ac-cordance with APA. For this purpose, the assessee should ensure that the APA covers all the earlier years for which disputes are pending.

13.4 Since the transfer pricing provisions have now been extended to ‘Specified Domestic Transactions’ also, it will be in the interest of the assessee and the Tax Department that the above provisions for Advance Pricing Agreement are extended to ‘Specified Domestic Transactions’ also. This will reduce litigation on the question of determination of arm’s-length pricing issues which will arise in relation to such domestic transactions.

    14. General Anti-Avoidance Rule (GAAR):

14.1 This is a new concept introduced in the Income-tax Act by the Finance Act, 2012. Very wide powers are given to the Tax Authorities by these provisions. In new Chapter X-A, sections 95 to 102 have been inserted. In para 154 of the Budget Speech, while introducing the Finance Bill, 2012, the Finance Minister has stated that “I propose to introduce a General Anti-Avoidance Rule (GAAR) in order to counter aggressive tax avoidance schemes, while ensuring that it is used only in appropriate cases, enabling review by a GAAR panel.

14.2 The reasons for introducing GAAR provisions in the Income-tax Act are explained in the Explanatory Notes attached to the Finance Bill, 2012.

14.3 There was large-scale opposition to the introduction of this provision in the form suggested in the Finance Bill, 2012, and the DTC Bill, 2010, pending consideration of the Parliament. This opposition was voiced by various trade and industry bodies in India and abroad. The Finance Minister responded to the various suggestions made by members of the Parliament and various trade and industry bodies while replying to the debate in the Parliament on 7th May 2012.

14.4 GAAR provisions:

For the reasons stated by the Finance Minister, special provisions relating to GAAR have been made in sections 95 to 102 in the Income-tax Act from A.Y. 2014-15 (Accounting Year ending 31-3-2014) and onwards. These provisions apply to all assesses (residents or non-resident) in respect of their transactions in India as well as abroad. Very wide powers are given to the tax authorities to disregard any agreement, arrangement or any claim for expenditure, deduction or relief. These provisions, broadly stated are discussed below.

14.5 Section 95:

This section provides that an arrangement entered into by an assessee may be declared to be an impermissible avoidance arrangement. The tax arising from such declaration by the tax authorities, will be determined subject to provisions of sections 96 to 102. It is also stated in this section that the provisions of sections 96 to 102 may be applied to any step, or a part of the arrangement as they are applicable to the entire arrangement.

14.6    Impermissible Avoidance Arrangement (section 96):

    i) Section 96 explains the meaning of Impermissible Avoidance Arrangement to mean an arrangement, the main purpose or one of the main purposes of which is to obtain a tax benefit and it —

    a. Creates rights or obligations which would not ordinarily be created between persons dealing at arm’s length.

    b. Results, directly or indirectly, in misuse or abuse of the provisions of the Income-tax Act.

    c. Lacks commercial substance, or is deemed to lack commercial substance u/s.97, or

    d. is entered into or carried out, by means, or in a manner, which are not ordinarily employed for bona fide purposes.

    ii) The Finance Bill, 2012, provided in the section that an arrangement whereby there is any tax benefit to the assessee shall be presumed to have been entered into or carried out for the main purpose of obtaining tax benefits, unless the assessee proved otherwise. It will be noticed that this was a very heavy burden cast on the assessee. However, this requirement has now been deleted and, as declared by the Finance Minister, the onus of proof is now on the Department who has to establish that the arrangement is to avoid tax before initiating the proceedings under these provisions.

14.7    Lack of commercial substance (section 97):

    i) Section 97 explains the concept of lack of com-mercial substance in an arrangement entered into by the assessee. It states that an arrangement shall be deemed to lack commercial substance if —

    a) The substance or effect of the arrangement, as a whole, is inconsistent with, or differs significantly from, the form of its individual steps or a part of such steps.

    b) It involves or includes

—  Round-trip financing
—  An accommodation party,
— Elements that have the effect of offsetting or canceling each other, or
— A transaction which is conducted through one or more persons and disguises the value, location, source, ownership or control of funds which is the subject matter of such transaction, or

    c) It involves the location of an asset or a transaction or the place of residence of any party which is without any substantial commercial purpose. In other words, the particular location is disclosed only to obtain tax benefit for a party.

    ii) For the above purpose, it is provided that round-trip financing includes any arrangement in which through a series of transactions —

    a) Funds are transferred among the parties to the arrangement, and
    b) Such transactions do not have any substantial commercial purpose other than obtaining tax benefit.

    iii) It is further stated that the above view will be taken by the Tax Authorities without having regard to the following.

    a) Whether or not the funds involved in the round-trip financing can be traced to any funds transferred to, or received by, any party in connection with the arrangement,

    b) The time or sequence in which the funds involved in the round trip financing are transferred or received, or

    c) The means by, manner in, or mode through which funds involved in the round-trip financing are transferred or received.

    iv) The party to such an arrangement shall be treated as ‘Accommodating Party’ whether or not such party is connected with the other parties to the arrangement, if the main purpose of, direct or indirect, participation of such party with the arrangement is to obtain, direct or indirect, tax benefit under the Income-tax Act.

v) It is clarified in the section that the following factor shall not be taken into consideration for determining whether there is commercial substance in the arrangement:

    a. The period or time for which the arrangement exists.
    b. The fact of payment of taxes, directly or indirectly, under the arrangement.
    c. The fact that an exist route, including transfer of any activity, business or operations, is provided by the arrangement.

14.8    Consequence of impermissible avoidance arrangement (section 98):

Under the newly inserted section 144BA, the Commissioner has been empowered to declare any arrangement as an impermissible avoidance arrangement. Section 98 states that if any arrangement is declared as impermissible, then the consequences, in relation to tax or the arrangement shall be determined in such manner as is deemed appropriate in the circumstances of the case. This will include denial of tax benefit or any benefit under applicable DTAA. The following is the illustrative list of conse-quences and it is provided that the same will not be limited to the list:

    i) Disregarding, combining or re-characterising any step in, or part or whole of the impermissible avoidance arrangement;

    ii) Treating, the impermissible avoidance arrangement as if it had not been entered into or carried out;

    iii) Disregarding any accommodating party or treating any accommodating party and any other party as one and the same person;

    iv) Deeming persons who are connected persons in relation to each other to be one and the same person;

    v) Re-allocating between the parties to the ar-rangement, (a) any accrual or receipt of a capital or revenue nature or (b) any expenditure, deduction, relief or rebate;

    vi) Treating (a) the place of residence of any party to the arrangement or (b) situs of an asset or of a transaction at a place other than the place or location of the transaction stated under the arrangement.

    vii) Considering or looking thorough any arrangement by disregarding any corporate structure.

    viii ) It is also clarified that for the above purpose that Tax Authorities may re-characterise (a) any equity into debt or any debt into equity, (b) any accrual or receipt of capital nature may be treated as of revenue nature or vice versa or (c) any expenditure, deduction, relief or rebate may be re-characterised.

14.9    Section 99:

This section provides for treatment of connected person and accommodating party. The section provides that for the purposes of sections 95 to 102, for determining whether a tax benefit exists —

    i)The parties who are connected person, in relation to each other, may be treated as one and the same person.

    ii) Any accommodating party may be disregarded.

    iii) Such accommodating party and any other party may be treated as one and the same person.

    iv) The arrangement may be considered or looked through by disregarding any corporate structure.

14.10 It is further provided in section 100 that the provisions of sections 95 to 102 shall apply in addition to, or in lieu of, any other basis for determination of tax liability. Section 101 gives power to the CBDT to prescribe the guidelines and lay down conditions for application of sections 95 to 102 relating to the General Anti-Avoidance Rules (GAAR). Let us hope that these guidelines will specify the type of arrangements and transactions in relation to which alone the Tax Authorities have to invoke the provision of GAAR. Further, it is necessary to specify that if the tax benefit sought to be obtained by any arrangement is say Rs.5 crore or more in a year, then only the Tax Authorities will invoke these powers.

14.11  Section 102:

This section defines words or expressions used in sections 95 to 102 as stated above.

14.12 Section 144BA:

Procedure for declaring an arrangement as impress-ible u/s.95 to u/s.102 is given in this section. This section will come into force from A.Y. 2014-15.

    i) The Assessing Officer can make a reference to the Commissioner for invoking GAAR and on re-ceipt of reference the Commissioner shall hear the taxpayer. If he is not satisfied by the submissions of taxpayer and is of the opinion that GAAR provi-sions are to be invoked, he has to refer the matter to an ‘Approving Panel’. In case the assessee does not object or reply, the Commissioner shall make determination as to whether the arrangement is an impermissible avoidance arrangement or not.

    ii) The Approving Panel has to dispose of the ref-erence within a period of six months from the end of the month in which the reference was received from the Commissioner.

    iii) The Approving Panel shall either declare an arrangement to be impermissible or declare it not to be so after examining material and getting further inquiry to be made. It can issue such directions as it thinks fit. It can also decide the year or years for which such an arrangement will be considered as impermissible. It has to give hearing to the assessee before taking any decision in the matter.

    iv) The Assessing Officer will determine conse-quences of such a positive declaration of arrangement as impermissible avoidance arrangement.

    v) The final order, in case any consequences of GAAR is determined, shall be passed by the AO only after approval by the Commissioner and, thereafter, first appeal against such order shall lie to the Ap-pellate Tribunal.

    vi) The period taken by the proceedings before the Commissioner and the Approving Panel shall be excluded from time limitation for completion of assessment.

    vii) The CBDT has to constitute an ‘Approving Panel’ consisting of not less than three members. Out of these three members, two members shall be of the rank of Commissioners of Income-tax and one member shall be an officer of the Indian Legal Service of the rank of Joint Secretary or above to the Central Government. It is not clear from these provisions whether the CBDT will appoint only one Approving Panel for the whole of the country or there will be separate Panels in each State. Considering the work load and considering the convenience of the assessees it is necessary to have one such Panel in each State.

    viii) In addition to the above, it is provided that the CBDT has to prescribe a scheme for efficient functioning of the Approving Panel and expeditious disposal of the references made to it.

    ix) Appeal against order of assessment passed under the GAAR provisions after approval by the appropriate authority is to be filed directly with the ITA Tribunal and not before the CIT(A). Section 144C relating to reference before DRT does not apply to this assessment order and, therefore, no reference can be made to DRT when GAAR provisions are invoked.

14.13 The above GAAR provisions will have far-reaching consequences for assessees engaged in the business with Indian or foreign parties. GAAR is not restricted to only business transactions. Therefore, all other assessees who are engaged in business or profession or who have no income from business or profession will be affected by these provisions. It appears that any assessee having any arrangement, agreement, or transaction with an associated person will have to take care that the same is at arm’s-length consideration. In particular, an assessee will have to consider the implications of GAAR while (a) executing a will or trust, (b) entering into partner-ship or forming LLP, (c) taking controlling interest in a company, (d) carrying out amalgamation of two or more companies, (e) effecting demerger of a company, (f) entering into a consortium or joint venture, (g) entering into foreign collaboration, or acquiring an Indian or foreign company. It may be noted that this is only an illustrative list and there may be other transactions which may attract GAAR provisions.

14.14 From the wording of the above provisions of sections 95 to 102 and 144BA it appears that the provisions of GAAR can be invoked in respect of an arrangement made prior to 1-4-2013. The CIT or the Approving Panel can hold any such arrangement entered into prior to 1-4-2013 as impermissible and direct the AO to make adjustments in the computation of income or tax in the A.Y. 2014-15 or any year thereafter. As stated in para 15.15 of the report of the Standing Committee on Finance on the DTC Bill, 2010, it would be fair to apply GAAR provisions prospectively, so that it is not made applicable to existing arrangements/transactions. It may be noted that no such provision is made in sections 95 to 102 and 144BA and, therefore, it can be presumed that the above GAAR provisions will have retroactive effect.

14.15 In section 101 it is stated that the CBDT will issue guidelines to provide for the circumstances under which GAAR should be invoked. Let us hope that these guidelines will specify that GAAR provisions will apply to all arrangements or transactions entered into after 1-4-2013 and also the type of arrangements or transactions to which GAAR will apply. It is also necessary to specify that GAAR provisions will be invoked if the tax sought to be avoided is more than Rs.5 crore, in any one year. This is also suggested by the Standing Committee on Finance in their report on the DTC Bill, 2010. As regards the procedure for invoking GAAR, section 144BA(4) provides that if the CIT agrees with the view of the AO to invoke GAAR, he should refer the matter to an Approving Panel. U/s.144BA(14) it is provided that the CBDT will appoint an Approving Panel consisting of two members of the level of Commissioners and one Law Officer. As suggested by the above Standing Committee in their report on the DTC Bill, 2010, such Panel should consist of a Chief Commissioner and two independent technical persons.

    15. Assessment, reassessment and appeals:

15.1    Section 139 — Return of income:

    i) This section is amended from A.Y. 2012-13 (Ac-counting Year ending 31-3-2012). The amendment now requires that a resident and ordinarily resident, who is otherwise not required to furnish a return of income, will be required to furnish his return of income before the due date for filing the return in the following cases:

    a) If the person has any asset located outside India. This will mean that if the person owns any immovable property outside India, any shares in a foreign company, any bank account or other assets outside India, he will have to file return even if the total income is below the taxable limit.

    b) If the person has any financial interest in any entity in a foreign country. This will mean that if the person is a beneficiary in any specific or any discretionary foreign trust, he will have to file his return of income whether he has received any benefit from the trust or not.

    c)If the person has signing authority in any account located outside India.

    ii) The above provision applies to a company, firm, individual, HUF or any non-corporate entity who is a resident and ordinarily resident. Such person will have to file return of income for the accounting year 1-4-2011 to 31-3-2012 (A.Y. 2012-13) and onwards. It may be noted that in a case where the person (whether resident or non-resident) has taxable income in India, he will have to give information about the above items in the form of return of income prescribed for A.Y. 2012-13.
    iii) At present, the due date for furnishing the return of income in the case of an assessee, being a company is required to file Transfer Pricing Re-port u/s.92E, is 30th November. It is now provided that the extended time limit up to 30th November will apply to all assessees who are required to fileTransfer Pricing Report u/s.92E. This amendment will come into force from A.Y. 2012-13.


15.2    Section 143 — Procedure for assessment:

At present, the return is required to be processed u/s.143(1) even if the case is selected for scrutiny. The section is now amended, effective from 1-7-2012, to provide that if the case is selected for scrutiny, the AO is not required to process the return of income u/s.143(1). This will mean that if the person has claimed refund in the return of income and his case is taken up for scrutiny, the refund if due, will be issued only after completion of assessment u/s.143(3).

15.3    Section 144C — Reference to DRP:

    i) This section is amended with retrospective effect from 1-10-2009. Under this section when the AO wants to make a variation in the income or loss, as a result of order passed by a Transfer Pricing Officer u/s.92CA(3), he has to pass a draft assessment order. If the assessee objects to the variation, he has to refer the matter to the Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP) u/s.144C. The DRP has power to confirm, reduce or enhance the assessment. There was a controversy as to whether this power of enhancement includes power to consider any other matter arising out of the assessment proceedings relating to the draft assessment order. To clarify this doubt, this section is now amended w.e.f. 1-10-2009 to provide that the DRP can consider any other mater relating to the draft assessment order while enhancing the variation. It may be noted that this amendment does not clarify whether the DRP can consider any other matter brought to its notice by the assessee which has the effect of reducing the income or increasing the loss.

    ii) Further, it is also clarified that the enhance-ment in time limit for computation of assessment, provided in this section 144C(13), will apply to time limit provided u/s.153 as well as u/s.153B w.e.f. 1-10-2009.

    iii) It may be noted that from A.Y. 2013-14, cases in which specified domestic transactions are there will now be referred to TPO. Therefore, the above procedure of making draft order and reference to
DRP will apply in such cases also.

15.4    Sections 147 and 149 — Reassessment of income:

These two sections dealing with income-escaping assessment and time limit for reopening assessment have been amended w.e.f. 1-7-2012. These amendments will apply to any assessment year beginning on or before 1-4-2012. The effect of these amendments is as shown in Table on the next page.


    i) At present, the time limit for reopening assessments is 6 years. In a case where assessment is made u/s.143(3) and the income-escaping assessment is not due to failure of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for assessment for that year, the time limit for reopening is 4 years. This time limit is now enhanced in specified cases.

    ii) It is now provided that if the income in relation to any asset (including financial interest in any entity) located outside India, chargeable to tax, has escaped assessment for any year, the time limit for reopening the assessment shall be 16 years. For this purpose, where a person is found to have any asset or any financial interest in any entity located outside India, shall be deemed to be a case where income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. This provision will apply to a resident or a non-resident. In the coming years, this provision will have far-reaching implications.

    iii) It is now provided that if a person has failed to furnish the Transfer Pricing Report u/s.92E in respect of any international transaction, income shall be deemed to have escaped assessment. In such a case the AO can send notice for reopening assessment within the prescribed period.

    iv) Similar amendments are made in the Wealth Tax Act also.

    v) Reading the above provisions, it appears that in a transaction similar to the case of the famous VODAFONE the assessments of a foreign company which has made taxable capital gains or other income can be reopened for 16 years instead of 6 years as in such cases some assets will be located outside India.

15.5    Sections 153 and 153B — Time limit for completion of assessments:

These sections are amended w.e.f. 1-7-2012. At present, the time limit for completion of assessment or reassessment proceedings is 21 months. In a case where reference is made to the Transfer Pricing Officer, the time limit for completion of assessment is 33 months. This time limit is extended as under:

15.6    Sections 153A and 153C — Assessment in case of search or requisition:

These sections are amended w.e.f. 1-7-2012. Sections 153A and 153C of the Act lay down the procedure for assessment/reassessment in case of search or requisition. Presently, the notice for filing of returns of income and assessment thereof has to be given for six assessment years preceding the previous year in which the search was conducted or requisi-tion made.

It is now provided that the Central Government can notify cases or class of cases where the Assessing Officer shall not be required to issue notice for initia-tion of assessment/reassessment proceedings for six preceding assessment years and proceedings may only be taken up for the assessment year relevant to the year of search or requisition.

15.7 Sections 154 and 156:

    i) These sections have been amended w.e.f. 1-7-2012. A statement of tax deduction at source is processed u/s.200A and an intimation is sent to the deductor as provided u/s.200A(1). At present, there is no provision for rectification or appeal against the said intimation.

    ii) It is now provided that any mistake apparent from the record in the intimation issued u/s.200A shall be rectifiable u/s.154. It is also provided that the intimation issued u/s.200A shall also be deemed to be a notice of demand u/s.156 and an appeal can be filed with the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) u/s.246A.

    iii) In actual practice there is considerable delay in passing order u/s.154 for rectification of mistake in any order passed by the AO It is, therefore, sug-gested that section 246A should be amended to provide that if rectification order is not passed by the AO within 6 months of filing such application the assessee will have a right to file appeal to the CIT(A). It may be noted that similar provision is made in clause 178 of the DTC Bill, 2010.

15.8    Section 245C — Settlement Commission:

Sections 245C dealing with application for settlement of cases has been amended w.e.f. 1-7-2012. At present, an application can be filed before the Settlement Commission u/s.245C by a related person who has substantial interest of more than 20% of the profits of the business at any time during the previous year. Now, it is provided that the substan-tial interest should exist on the date of search and not at any time during the previous year.

15.9    Section 245N: Authority for Advance Ruling (AAR)

This Section is amended w.e.f. 1-4-2013 (A.Y. 2013-14). By this amendment it is provided that an assessee can approach the AAR for determination or decision whether an arrangement which is proposed to be undertaken by any person (resident or non-resident) is an impermissible arrangement as provided in sections 95 to 102. This will enable the person enter-ing into an arrangement to get an Advance Ruling from AAR if he apprehends that the AO may invoke GAAR provisions during assessment proceedings. As suggested earlier, this provision should be made available to persons entering into specified domestic transactions u/s.92BA.

15.10 Section 245Q — Fees for filing application for Advance Ruling:

Fees for filing an application before the Authority for Advance Ruling is increased from Rs.2500 to Rs.10000 w.e.f. 1-7-2012. The CBDT is now given power to increase or reduce the amount of fees from time to time by prescribing the necessary rule for this purpose.

15.11    Section 246A — Appealable orders before CIT(A):

The list of orders against which appeals can be filed before the CIT(A) has now been expanded. Now appeals can be filed before the CIT(A) against the following orders:

    i) The tax deductor can file appeal on after 1-7-2012 against the intimation issued u/s.200A relat-ing to short deduction of tax at source.

    ii) The assessee can file appeal against the order passed by the AO u/s.153A in search cases if such order is not passed in pursuance of the directions of the DRP. This will be effective from 1-10-2009.

    iii) The assessee can file appeal against the order of assessment or reassessment passed under new section 92CD(2) after furnishing the modified return based on the Advance Pricing Agreement as provided in the new section 92CC. This is effective from 1-7-2012.

    iv) Penalty order passed under new section 271 AAB where search has been initiated. This is effec-tive from 1-7-2012.

15.12 Section 253 — Appeals before ITA Tribunal:

    i) The following amendment is made w.e.f. 1-4-2013:

Any order passed by the AO u/s.143(3), 147, 153A or 153C in pursuance of the order passed by the CIT u/s.144BA(12) in accordance with the directions by the Approving Panel or the CIT, declaring any ar-rangement as impermissible avoidance arrangement, is appealable directly to the ITA Tribunal.

    ii) The following amendments are made with reference to DRP cases:

    a) The directions given by the DRP in the case of a foreign company or any person in whose case variation in the income arises due to order of the Transfer Pricing Officer are binding on the Assessing Officer. It is now provided that the Assessing Officer can also file an appeal before the ITA Tribunal against an order passed in pursuance of directions of the DRP in respect of objections filed on or after 1st July, 2012.

    b) The Assessing Officer or the assessee is entitled to file memorandum of cross objections on receipt of notice that an appeal has been filed by the other party.

    c) Any order passed u/s.153A or 153C in pursuance of directions of the DRP shall be directly appeal-able to the ITA Tribunal w.e.f. 1st October, 2009. Presently, such appeals are being filed with the Commissioner (Appeals).

15.13 Section 292CC — Authorisation and assessment in case of search or requisition:

This is a new section inserted w.e.f. 1-4-1976 to clarify the procedure for authorisation and assessment in certain cases of search or requisition. In the case of CIT v. Smt. Vandana Verma, 330 ITR 533 (All.) it was held that if search warrant is in the name of more than one person, then assessment cannot be made individually in the absence of any search warrant in the individual name. To overcome this judgment, it is now provided in this new section, with retrospective effect from 1-4-1976, that where a search warrant has been issued mentioning names of more than one persons, the assessment/reassessment can be made separately in the name of each of the persons mentioned in such search warrant.

    16. Penalties and prosecution:

16.1    Section 234E — Fees for delay in furnishing TDS/TCS statement:

This is a new section which has been inserted w.e.f. 1-7-2012. At present, section 272A provides for penalty of Rs.100 per day for delay in furnishing TDS/TCS statement within the time prescribed in section 200(3) or 206C(3). Newly inserted section 234E now provides for levy of fees of Rs.200 for every day of the delay in furnishing TDS/TCS state-ments. However, the total fee shall not be more than the amount of tax deductible/collectable for the quarter for which the TDS/TCS statement is delayed. The fee is to be paid before the delivery of the TDS/TCS statements. Consequently levy or penalty provided in section 272A(2)(k) is deleted. However, new section 271H has been added to levy of penalty under certain circumstances as discussed in Para 16.5 below. It may be noted that no appeal against levy of fees payable u/s.234E is provided in section 246A.

16.2 Section 271 — Penalty for concealment — Amendment w.e.f. 1-4-2013:

The transfer pricing regulations are extended to specified domestic transactions entered into by domestic related parties. If any amount is added or disallowed, based on the arm’s- length price determined by the Assessing Officer, it is now provided that such addition/disallowance shall be deemed to represent the income in respect of which particulars have been concealed or inaccurate particulars have been furnished as provided in Explanation 7 to section 271(1) and it is liable to penalty accordingly.

16.3    Section 271AA — Penalty for failure to report, etc. of International and specified domestic transactions:

    i) Amendment w.e.f. 1-7-2012

At present, there is no penalty for non-reporting of an international transaction in the report filed u/s.92E or maintaining or furnishing or incorrect information of documents.

Therefore, a levy of penalty at the rate of 2% of the value of the international transaction is provided, if the taxpayer

    a) fails to keep and maintain prescribed information and documents u/s.92D(1) or (2)
    b) fails to report any international transaction u/s.92E, or
    c) maintains or furnishes any incorrect information or documents.
    ii) Amendment w.e.f. 1-4-2013

The above provision for levy of penalty u/s.271AA will apply if there is failure to comply with the above requirements in the case of domestic transactions also from A.Y. 2013-14.

16.4    Section 271G — Penalty for failure to furnish information or documents u/s.92D — w.e.f. 1-4-2013:

At present, section 271G provides for levy of penalty at 2% of the value of transaction for failure to furnish information or documents u/s.92D which requires maintenance of certain information and documents in the prescribed proforma by the persons entering into an international transaction. This penal provision will now apply to persons entering into specified domestic transactions for such failure effective from A.Y. 2013-14.

16.5    Section 271H: Penalty for failure to furnish TDS/TCS statements:

This is a new section which has been inserted w.e.f. 1-7-2012. In addition to fees payable under the newly inserted section 234E, section 271H also provides for penalty for not furnishing quarterly TDS statements within the prescribed time limit or penalty for furnishing incorrect information such as PAN of the deductee or amount of TDS deducted, etc. in the statements to be filed u/s.200 (3) or 206C(3). A penalty ranging from Rs.10,000 to Rs.1,00,000 is leviable for these failures. No appeal against the levy of this penalty is provided u/s.246A.

It is also provided that no such penalty will be levied if the deductor delivers the statement within a year from the due date and the person has paid the tax along with fees and interest before delivering the statement.

16.6    Sections 271AAA and 271AAB — Penalty on undisclosed income found in the course of search:

    i) At present, penalty in the case of search initiated on or after 1st June, 2007 is not liviable u/s.271AAA subject to certain conditions, such as:

    a) the assessee admits the undisclosed income in a statement u/s.132(4) recorded during the search,
    b) he specifies the manner in which such income has been derived, and
    c) he pays the tax together with interest, if any, in respect of such income.

Now, section 271AAA will not apply to search initi-ated on or after 1st July, 2012.

    ii) Newly inserted section 271 AAB now provides for levy of penalty on undisclosed income of specified previous years where search has been initiated on or after 1st July, 2012 as under:

    a) If the assessee admits undisclosed income during the course of search in a statement u/s.132(4), specifies the manner in which such income has been derived, pays the tax with interest on such income and furnishes return of income declaring such income, penalty shall be 10% of undisclosed income.
    b) If undisclosed income is not so admitted during the course of search, but disclosed in the return of income filed after the search and he pays the tax with interest, penalty shall be 20% of undisclosed income.
    c) In other cases, the minimum penalty shall be 30% subject to maximum of 90% of the undisclosed income.

16.7    Prosecution provisions — Sections 276C, 276CC, 277, 277A, 278 and 280A to 280D:

The effect of these amendments w.e.f. 1-7-2012 shall be as under:

    i) Section 276C — Wilful attempt to evade tax:

At present, if the amount of tax sought to be evaded exceeds Rs.1 lac, the punishment is rigorous imprisonment for minimum of 6 months and maximum of 7 years. The limit of Rs.1 lac is now raised to Rs.25 lac.

In other cases, the rigorous imprisonment period is 3 months minimum and 3 years maximum. The period of 3 years is now reduced to 2 years.

    ii) Section 276CC — Failure to furnish Returns of Income:

In this section also amendments similar to amendments in section 276C as stated in para (i) above are made.

    iii) Section 277 — False Statement in Verification:

In this section also amendments similar to amendments in section 276C as stated in para (i) above are made.

    iv) Section 277A — Falsification of Books of Accounts or Documents:

In this section the maximum term of imprisonment has been reduced from 3 years to 2 years.

    v) Section 278 — Abetment of False Return of Income and Statements:

In this section also amendments similar to amendments in section 276C as stated in (i) above are made.

(vi)    Sections 280A to 280D:

These new sections have been inserted w.e.f. 1-7-2012 with a view to appoint Special Courts to try specified offences under the Income-tax Act. It appears that these new provisions are made to strengthen the prosecution mechanism and expe-dite the disposal of prosecution cases under the Income-tax Act. In brief these provisions deal with the following matters:

    a. Providing for constitution of Special Courts for trial of offences under the Act.

    b. Application of summons trial for offences under the Act to expedite prosecution proceedings as the procedures in summons trial are simpler and less time consuming. The provision for summons trials will apply to offences where the maximum term of Imprisonment does not exceed 2 years.

    c. Providing for appointment of public prosecutors.

17.  Other amendments:
 17.1  Senior citizens:

In various sections of the Income-tax Act the age limit for senior citizens was fixed at 65 years. This has now been reduced to 60 years w.e.f.  A.Y. 2013-14 (Accounting Year 2012-13).

  17.2  Tax audit:
Section 40AB provides that an assessee carrying on business or profession has to get the accounts audited by a Chartered Accountant if the turnover or gross receipts exceed Rs.60 lac in the case of business or exceeds Rs.15 lac in the case of profession. The limit of turnover or gross receipts for this purpose has now been increased to Rs.1 crore in the case of business or Rs.25 lac in the case of profession. Further, date for obtaining tax audit report which is 30th September has been changed to the due date of filing return of income u/s.139(1) as applicable to the assessee. The amendment increasing the limit for turnover/gross receipts will come into force from A.Y. 2013-14 (Accounting Year 2012-13).

17.3    Section 115VG — Computation of daily tonnage income for shipping companies:

This section is amended w.e.f. A.Y. 2013-14. The Tonnage Tax Scheme for shipping companies was introduced by the Finance Act, 2005. This section provides for taxation of income of a shipping company on presumptive basis. Under this scheme, the operating profit of a shipping company is determined on the basis of tonnage capacity of its ships. The rates of daily tonnage income specified in the section have not been changed since 2005. By this amendment these rates are enhanced as under:

17.4    Section 209 — Advance tax calculation:

At present, for the purpose of calculation of advance tax liability, tax deductible or collectable at source was required to be reduced even though the tax was actually not deducted. Therefore, in such cases, there was no interest liability. Now it is provided that unless such tax is actually deducted, the advance tax liability. This amendment is made w.e.f. 1-4-2012.


17.5 Section 234D — Interest on excess refund:

This section is amended w.e.f. 1-6-2003. This section was inserted by the Finance Act, 2003, w.e.f. 1-6-2003 to enable the Government to recover amount of excessive refund granted u/s.143(1). The section provides for levy of simple interest at the rate of ½% for every month or part thereof on the excess amount of refund granted u/s.143(1) if, on regular assessment, it is found to be excessive. Interest is payable for the period starting from the date of refund to the date of regular assessment.

The Delhi High Court in DIT v. Jacabs Civil Incorporated, (2011) 330 ITR 578 held that this provision will apply from the A.Y. 2004-05 and no interest is payable for the earlier assessment years. To overcome this decision, it is now provided that interest shall be payable u/s.234D on excess refund for any earlier assessment years if the proceedings in respect of such assessment are completed after 1-6-2003.

    Wealth Tax Act :

    Section 2(ea) — Definition of ‘Assets’:

At present, any residential unit allotted to officers, employees or whole-time directors is exempt from wealth tax if the gross annual salary of such person is less than Rs.5 lac. This limit of gross annul salary is increased to Rs.10 lac. This amendment is effec-tive from A.Y. 2013-14.

    Section 17 — Wealth-escaping assessment:

This section is amended w.e.f. 1-7-2012 — It is now provided in this section that if any person is found to have any asset or financial interest in any entity located outside India, it will be deemed to be a case where net wealth chargeable to tax has escaped as-sessment. In such cases the wealth tax assessment can be reopened by the AO within 16 years.

    Section 17A — Time limit for completion of assessment and reassessment:

This section is amended w.e.f. 1-7-2012. As discussed earlier, while considering the amendments in sections 153 and 153B of the Income tax, this amendment has the effect of increasing the time limit by 3 months for completion of assessment/reassessment proceedings.

    Section 45:

This section provides for exemption from wealth tax to section 25 companies, co-operative societies, social clubs, recognised political parties, mutual funds, etc. This list is now expanded to provide that the ‘Reserve Bank of India’ will not be liable to pay wealth tax w.e.f. 1-4-1957.

    To sum up:

19.1 From the above discussion, it will be evident that the amendments made in the Income-tax Act by this Budget are the most controversial. In par-ticular, the amendments affecting non -residents which have retrospective and retroactive effect will affect our relationship with many foreign countries and will affect our global trade. The Finance Minister has quoted in his Budget Speech Shakespear’s immortal words “I must be cruel only to be kind”. Reading the provisions relating to amendments in the Income-tax Act, one can say that this year he has been ‘Cruel’ with the non-resident taxpayers. Hopefully he may become ‘kind’ next year.

19.2 In his Budget speech, the Finance Minister has stated that his proposals relating the Direct Taxes will result in a net revenue loss of Rs.4,500 Cr. in the year and the proposals relating to Indirect Taxes will yield net revenue gain of Rs.45940 Cr. However, from his post-budget speeches before various trade bodies indicate that retrospective amendments in the Income-tax Act itself will yield revenue of about Rs.40000 Cr. Considering the stakes involved, it is evident that in the coming years we will witness a long-drawn tax litigation relating to interpretation of the retrospective amendments in the Income-tax Act.

19.3 Another provision which is likely to create lot of hardship to resident as well as non-resident tax-payer is about GAAR. It is true that the implementation of GAAR has been postponed to next year, there is apprehension that the Tax Department may hold arrangements made prior to 1-4-2013 as impermissible and make adjustments in the income for the year 1-4-2013 to 31-3-2014 and subsequent years. In other words, GAAR provisions may have retroactive effect. From the wording of GAAR provisions it is evident that it will now be difficult for resident as well as non-resident tax-payers to take any major decisions about the structure of any business transaction. Even the tax consultants will find it difficult to advise their clients about structuring or restructuring any business transaction. If the Government does not come out with a taxpayer-friendly Guidance Note, taking into consideration the business realities, the fear above invocation of GAAR will continue in the minds of all taxpayers and their tax consultants.

19.4 Another controversial provision which has been made this year relates to specified domestic transactions. By extending the scope of Transfer pricing provisions to these transactions, the compliance cost of the assessee will increase. At present no adequate data about domestic comparable prices is available in our country, and therefore, it will be difficult for assesses to maintain transfer pricing records and documents for this purpose. Since the provisions have been made effective from 1 -4-2012, many assesses may not be well equipped to maintain these records in this year. Since every case in which specified domestic transactions are entered into will be referred to the TPO, the entire assessment proceedings will become lengthy and time consuming. This will also increase compliance cost.

19.5 It is true that the tax burden of individuals, HUF, etc. has been reduced and some beneficial provisions have been introduced to remove some practical difficulties. But, it can be stated that these efforts are only half-hearted and there are many areas in which the taxpayers will have to face many practical difficulties.

19.6 The DTC Bill, 2010, is pending before the Par-liament. The report of the Standing Committee on Finance is also laid before the Parliament. This Bill was to be implemented from 1-4-2012. However, due to the delay in the legislative process it is stated that DTC will now be passed in the next session of the Parliament and will be made effective from 1-4-2013. In view of this, it is not clear why such controversial amendments are made this year in the last year of the life of the present Income-tax Act. By the time the taxpayers grasp the implications of these amend-ments, the new provisions of DTC will come into force from next year. When it became evident in the beginning of this year that DTC may be postponed by one year, it was felt that in this Budget some minimal amendments will be made in the Income-tax Act as and by way of parting gift to the taxpayer. But, after reading the controversial amendments in the Income-tax Act in this Budget, the taxpayers have felt that this Act has given a parting kick to the taxpayers in the last year of its existence.

Acknowledgement:

S. M. Jhaveri, Chartered Accountant has assisted the author in the preparation of this article.

Notification No. 25/2012, S.O. 1453(E) dated 2-7-2012 — Income-tax (Seventh Amendment) Rules, 2012 — Amendment in Rule 12 and substitution of forms ITR 5 and ITR 6.

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Rule 12 provided that the prescribed ITR Form SAHAJ — ITR 1 and SUGAM — ITR 4S could not be used by a resident individual or a HUF to file his return of income, if he had:

(a) assets (including financial interest in any entity) located outside India; or

(b) signing authority in any account located outside India. The Rule is amended to provide that not ordinary residents can use SAHAJ — ITR 1 and SUGAM — ITR 4S though they have assests located outside India and have signi

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Instructions to AOs to rectify/reconcile disputed arrears in demand irrespective of limitation of four years u/s.154(7) — Circular No. 4, dated 20-6-2012.

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Instructions to AOs to rectify/reconcile disputed arrears in demand irrespective of limitation of four years u/s.154(7) — Circular No. 4, dated 20-6-2012.

In certain cases, assessees have disputed the figures of arrear demands shown as outstanding against them in the records of the Assessing Officers. The Assessing Officers have expressed their inability to correct/reconcile such disputed arrear demand on the ground that the period of limitation of four years as provided u/ss.(7) of section 154 of the Act has expired. Further, in some cases, the Assessing Officers have uploaded such disputed arrear demand on the Financial Accounting System (FAS) portal of Centralised Processing Center (CPC), which has resulted in adjustment of refund arising out of processing of returns against such arrear demand which has been disputed by such assessees on the grounds that either such demand has already been paid or has been reduced/eliminated in the appeals, etc. The arrear demands, in these cases also were not corrected/reconciled for the reason that the period of limitation of four years has elapsed. The CBDT has now authorised the Assessing Officers to make appropriate corrections in the figures of such disputed arrear demands after due verification/reconciliation and after examining the same on merits, whether by way of rectification or otherwise, irrespective of the fact that the period of limitation of four years as provided u/s.154(7) of the Act has elapsed.

Notification No. 25/2012, S.O. 1453(E) dated 2-7-2012 — Income-tax (Seventh Amendment) Rules, 2012 — Amendment in Rule 12 and substitution of forms ITR 5 and ITR 6.

Rule 12 provided that the prescribed ITR Form SAHAJ — ITR 1 and SUGAM — ITR 4S could not be used by a resident individual or a HUF to file his return of income, if he had:

(a) assets (including financial interest in any entity) located outside India; or

(b) signing authority in any account located outside India.

The Rule is amended to provide that not ordinary residents can use SAHAJ — ITR 1 and SUGAM — ITR 4S though they have assests located outside India and have signing authority in any account located outside India.

Agreement for exchange of information for collection of taxes between India and Jersey — Notification No. 26/2012, dated 10-7-2012. DTAA between India and Norway notified — Notification No. 24/2012, dated 19-7-2012.

Direct Tax Press Release No. 402/92/2006-MC (15 of 2012), dated 20-7-2012.

The CBDT vide its Notification No. 9/2012, dated 17th February, 2012 has exempted salaried employees from the requirement of filing the returns for A.Y. 2012-13.

The exemption is applicable only if all the following conditions are fulfilled:

  • Employee has earned only salary income and income from savings bank account and the annual interest earned from savings bank account is less than Rs.10 thousand.
  •  The total income of the employee does not exceed Rs.5 lakh (Total income means gross total income less deductions under Chapter VIA).
  • The employee has reported his PAN to the employer.

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Section 32 — Claim for depreciation on amount paid for acquisition of the non-compete right — Whether allowable — Held, Yes.

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Issue:

Whether the CIT(A) was right in allowing depreciation on non-compete fee of Rs.4.55 crore by treating the same as intangible asset u/s.32(1)(ii). According to the AO, the fees paid for obtaining non-compete right from the vendor was not an intangible asset u/s.32(1)(ii) for the following two reasons:

(a) It is not covered under the phrase ‘any other business or rights of similar nature’ used in the provisions; and

 (b) It is not capable of and transfer like other intangible assets of know-how. Before the Tribunal, the Revenue relied on the order of the AO and placed reliance on the following decisions:

  • R. Keshvani v. ACIT, (2009) 116 ITD 133 (Mumbai);
  • Srivatsan Surveyors (P) Ltd. v. ITO, (2009) 125 TTJ 286 (Chennai);
  • CIT v. Hoogly Mills Co. Ltd., (2006) 157 Taxman 347 (SC); and
  • Bharatbhai J. Vyas v. ITO, (2006) 97 ITD 248 (Ahd.).


Held:

The Tribunal agreed with the views of the CIT(A) that the acquisition of the non-compete right by the assessee from the vendor for a period of 10 years is a right in the nature of an intangible capital asset which is capable of being transferred. According to it, it was further proved by the fact that this right had been further transferred by the assessee at the time of its amalgamation with another company. As regards the reliance placed by the Revenue on various judicial decisions, the Tribunal noted that, except one judgment of the Tribunal rendered in the case of Srivatsan Surveyors (P) Ltd., the other judgments cited by the Revenue are not regarding the allowability of depreciation on non-compete fees. As regards the Tribunal decision rendered in the case Srivatsan Surveyors (P) Ltd., the Tribunal noted that the issue was decided against the assessee on the basis that the depreciation on restrictive covenant is ‘a right in persona’ and not a ‘right in rem’ and hence, the depreciation was not allowed.

However, the Tribunal noted that in a subsequent decision of the Chennai Tribunal in the case of ITO v. Medicorp Technologies India Ltd., (2009) 30 SOT 506 on the similar issue, the case was decided in favour of the assessee. As held by the Apex Court in the case of CIT v. Vegetable Products Ltd., (1073) 88 ITR 192 (SC), the Tribunal observed that in cases where there are two views possible, the view favourable to the assessee should be followed. Accordingly, the issue was decided in favour of the assessee by following the Tribunal decision rendered in the case of ITO v. Medicorp Technologies India Ltd.

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Section 14A, Rule 8D — Exercising jurisdiction in the larger interest of justice, ITAT directed the AO to compute disallowance u/s.14A @ 2% of the exempt income instead of 4.06% as computed by the AO.

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18. JNJ Holdings P. Ltd. v. ACIT
ITAT ‘J’ Bench, Mumbai
Before B. Ramakotaiah (AM) and S. S. Godara (JM)
ITA No. 3411/M/2009
A.Y.: 2005-06. Decided on: 8-6-2012
Counsel  for  assessee/revenue:  Hiro  Rai/Rupinder Brar
       
Section 14A, Rule 8D — Exercising jurisdiction in the larger interest of justice, ITAT directed the AO to compute disallowance u/s.14A @ 2% of the exempt income instead of 4.06% as computed by the AO.

Facts:

The assessee involved in business of investments and dealing in shares, securities, filed its return declaring total income of Rs.14,60,52,720. In the said return it had shown dividend income of Rs. 76,49,289 as exempt income. In response to the show-cause notice issued by the AO as to why expenses in relation to earning of dividend income should not be disallowed, the assessee explained that it had not incurred any direct expenditure. The AO rejected this contention and computed the disallownce to be Rs.4,36,027 i.e., 4.06% of dividend income.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who directed the AO to recompute the disallowance by following Rule 8D of the Incometax Rules, 1963.

 Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where on behalf of the assessee it was contended that for the assessment year under consideration, Rule 8D is not applicable and that the Tribunal by exercising jursidiction u/s.254(1) of the Act, should determine the reasonable expenditure in peculiar circumstances of the case.

Held:

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) was not correct in directing the AO to recalculate the disallowance by following Rule 8D. Keeping in view the fair statement of the AR as well as exercising jurisdiction in the larger interest of justice, the Tribunal directed the AO to compute the disallowance @ 2% of the exempt income instead of 4.06% which the Tribunal felt should meet the ends of justice.

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Section 54G — Exemption of capital gains on transfer of assets in cases of shifting of industrial undertaking to non-urban area — Investment by assessee in land and building for its business in non-urban area — Whether is it necessary that the investment in land and building in non-urban area is for the purposes of the business of the industrial undertaking transferred — Held, No.

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17. Dy. CIT v. Enpro Finance Ltd.
ITAT ‘J’ Bench, Mumbai
Before B. Ramakotaiah (AM) and S. S. Godara (JM)
ITA No. 4428/Mum./2008
A.Y.: 2004-05. Decided on: 27-6-2012 Counsel for revenue/assessee: Rupinder Brar/Mayur Kisnadwala

Section 54G — Exemption of capital gains on transfer of assets in cases of shifting of industrial undertaking to non-urban area — Investment by assessee in land and building for its business in non-urban area — Whether is it necessary that the investment in land and building in non-urban area is for the purposes of the business of the industrial undertaking transferred — Held, No.


Facts:

The assessee-company was carrying on its business of manufacturing activity at its leased premises in Mumbai for more than 45 years. Due to severe competition and high operational overheads in Mumbai, the assessee incurred losses and the activity was commercially not feasible. During the financial year 1999-2000, it decided to shift its undertaking to a non-urban area. As the plant and machinery was very old, the assessee sold them immediately, but for surrendering the tenancy rights it took some time and after protracted negotiations with the lessor, the leased premises on which the industrial undertaking operated was finally surrendered on 1-10-2003 and compensation of Rs.4.12 crore was received. It earned capital gain of an equivalent amount as the cost of acquisition of the leased premise was nil. Out of this amount the assessee invested Rs.1.4 crore in Capital Gain Account Scheme and Rs.1.14 crore in purchase of land and building in non-urban area. The assessee claimed deduction u/s.54G of the amount of Rs.2.54 crore and offered the balance amount as taxable income.

According to AO, the assessee sold its entire plant and machinery in the financial year 1999-2000 and since there was no existence of an undertaking, having sold the entire plant & machinery, the claim u/s.54G, which provides for exemption for shifting of industrial undertaking from urban area to non-urban area is not eligible to the assessee. However, the CIT(A) on appeal allowed the claim of the assessee.

Held:

On closer reading of the provisions of section 54G the Tribunal noted that whereas u/s.54G(1)(a), the requirement is that the new machinery or plant has to be purchased for the purposes of the business of the industrial undertaking, section 54G(1)(b) merely requires that the acquisition of building or land or construction of a building should be for the purposes of its business in such non-urban area. In other words, the phrase ‘of the industrial undertaking’, which is there in clause 1(a) is conspicuously missing in clause 1(b). It further compared the provisions of section 54G with section 54D and noted that while section 54D mandates that, for the capital gains to exempt, the new land or building, have to be used only for either shifting or re-establishing or establishing an industrial undertaking (and no other purpose), the provisions of section 54G of the Act permits the use of capital gains for acquiring land or building or constructing building for the purposes of (any) business in the non-urban area. Thus, according to the Tribunal, the provisions of section 54G can be interpreted that assessee should carry on any business in non-urban area. If the amounts are utilised for acquisition of assets for the purpose of its business, this should qualify for the purpose of exemption u/s.54G as there is no requirement that the land and building should be used for the purpose of the business of industrial undertaking.

The Tribunal also did not agree with argument of the AO that the assessee’s industrial undertaking ceased to exist in 1999-2000. According to it, the assessee was in the process of shifting and even the section itself provides that shifting was ‘in course of or in consequence of’ of such industrial undertaking.

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Section 80IB(10) — If conditions prescribed u/s.80IB(10) are satisfied, claim cannot be denied merely because the assessee had not carried on construction activity itself.

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39. (2012) 23 taxmann.com 176 (Bangalore-Trib.)
Abdul Khader v. ACIT
A.Y.: 2006-07. Dated: 30-4-2012

Section 80IB(10) — If conditions prescribed u/s.80IB(10) are satisfied, claim cannot be denied merely because the assessee had not carried on construction activity itself.


Facts:

The assessee, a builder and developer, was owner of an agricultural land which was converted into stock-in-trade and put the same for development by entering into a joint development agreement. Under the joint development agreement, the assessee contributed land and incurred expenses for statutory approvals. The assessee did not carry on construction activity. The assessee was entitled to 24% share in the said project. The assessee sold 49 flats which it got as its share and claimed as deduction u/s.80IB(10).

The Assessing Officer denied the claim on the ground that the assessee had not carried on the construction activity. This was confirmed by CIT (A). The assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:

The Tribunal noted that the assessee contributed land as its contribution of capital and incurred initial expenses for development and building of housing project like sanction of plan, getting the electricity and water connection by making the payments to BWSSB and KEB, etc. It also noted that it is not the case of the Department that the project was not approved or developed and built by the assessee. The only reason for denying the deduction u/s.80IB(10) was that the assessee had not carried out construction activity himself.

The Tribunal also noted that on a joint reading of s.s (10) of section 80IB and Explanation thereto it is clear that deduction is allowable to an undertaking developing and building housing project approved, it is nowhere mentioned that, construction has to be carried out by the undertaking. Moreover, the Explanation clarified that any undertaking which has executed housing project as a works contract awarded by any person is not eligible for claiming this deduction, which clearly shows that even if any undertaking is constructing the housing project under a works contract entered by a person is not eligible for deduction. The only condition for claiming deduction u/s.80IB(10) is that the undertaking is developing and building housing projects approved by a local authority.

It observed that in such type of cases, getting the approval and plan sanction is the first and initial stage which was to be taken by the assessee and for that purose the assessee was required to make investments. So, it cannot be said that assessee did not make any investment for the project under consideration.

The Tribunal held that the deduction u/s.80IB(10) cannot be denied merely on the basis that the assssee did not construct himself. Considering the totality of the facts and the ratio of the decision of Jurisdictional High Court in the case of CIT v. Shravanee Constructions, (2012) 22 taxmann. com 250 (Kar.), the Tribunal set aside the order passed by the CIT(A) and directed the AO to allow deduction u/s.80IB(10) of the Act.

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The assessee was engaged in the business of construction of buildings

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The assessee had sold the agricultural land on which agricultural activities were carried out till the date of transfer. Thereafter order permitting non-agricultural use was obtained. The assessee claimed that it is a case of transfer of an agricultural land and therefore there was no capital gain chargeable to tax. The Assessing Officer held that the land was a capital asset and assessed the capital gain as taxable. The CIT(A) accepted the assessee’s claim and allowed the assessee’s appeal. The Tribunal held that the land sold by the assessee retained its agricultural character till the date of the order permitting non-agricultural use and that it could be treated as a capital asset only thereafter. The Tribunal held that there was no need to interfere with the finding of the CIT(A) that the sale transaction was not a transaction involving transfer of a capital asset and, therefore, no need to bring to tax the income referable to the capital gains.

On an appeal filed by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held that there was no illegality in the order of the Tribunal.

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Business expenditure: Capital or revenue expenditure: Section 37 of Income-tax Act, 1961: A.Y. 1993-94: Construction business: Amount spent for acquiring unfinished works and inventories of another company: Revenue expenditure.

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The assessee was engaged in the business of construction of buildings. The assessee entered into an agreement with AFPL to takeover by assignment and complete all the pending projects/contracts/work-inprogress remaining to be completed by the transferor company. For the A.Y. 1993-94, the assessee claimed deduction of the payment of Rs.3,20,00,000 made to AFPL as revenue expenditure. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim holding that the expenditure is capital in nature. The Tribunal upheld the disallowance.

On appeal by the assessee, the Madras High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held:

“(i) What was transferred was in the nature of stockin- trade and not the entire building division of the transferor company. There were no clauses to lead to the inference that with the transfer of the ongoing projects awaiting agreements to be signed, the transferor company had transferred its entire business.

(ii) The expenditure was deductible as revenue expenditure”

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Assessment giving effect to Tribunal order: Scope: A.Y. 1994-95: Capital gains: Sale of property and factory building: Sale consideration accepted by AO: Tribunal referring back the question of bifurcation and apportionment of sale consideration between land and building: AO enhancing sale consideration: Not justified.

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In the A.Y. 1994-95, the assessee sold a property consisting of land and factory building for a consideration of Rs.17.5 lakh. Permission for sale was granted by the Appropriate Authority u/s.269UL(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The assessee challenged the apportionment of the sale consideration between the land and building by the Assessing Officer. The Tribunal referred back the question of bifurcation and apportionment of sale consideration between land and building to the Assessing Officer. While re-examining, the Assessing Officer also enhanced the sale consideration. The Tribunal accepted the enhancement.

On appeal by the assessee, the Delhi High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“(i) The Tribunal had referred back the question of bifurcation and apportionment of the sale consideration of Rs.17.5 lakh as between the land and the factory building. To this extent, the report of the Valuation Officer was required.

(ii) The Departmental Valuation Officer and the Assessing Officer were not required or permitted by that order to go into to question and examine the total sale consideration as the assessee had applied under Chapter XX-C and the Appropriate Authority had accepted the sale consideration mentioned by the assessee. The sale consideration and the quantum thereof was never in question or doubt. This was not the aspect to be reexamined.

(iii) Thus the enhancement by the Assessing Officer of the sale consideration from 17.5 lakh to Rs.21,42,502 was not justified and as per law.

(iv) According to the report of the Depatmental Valuation Officer, the bifurcation and apportionment of the sale consideration towards the land and the factory building by the assessee had been accepted.

(v) In view of the above, the question of law is answered in favour of the assessee appellant.”

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Assessment: Validity: Sections 143(2), 143(3) and 292B of Income-tax Act, 1961: A.Y. 2002-03: Assessment in the name of non-existing amalgamating company is not valid

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For the A.Y. 2002-03, Spice Corp. Ltd. filed the return of income on 30-10-2002 declaring Nil income. Subsequently, vide order dated 11-2-2004 the said company stood amalgamated with M/s. MCorp (P) Ltd. w.e.f. 1-7-2003. The Assessing Officer selected the case for scrutiny and issued notice u/s.143(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 dated 18-10-2003 in the name of Spice Corp. Ltd. The fact that Spice Corp. Ltd., having been dissolved, as a result of its amalgamation with MCorp (P) Ltd. was duly brought to the notice of the Assessing Officer by letter dated 02-04-2004. However, the Assessing Officer passed the assessment order u/s.143(3) dated 28-3-2005 in the name of Spice Corp. Ltd. The assessee’s contention that the assessment having been framed in the name of a non-existing entity is bad in law and void ab initio was rejected by the CIT(A) and the Tribunal. The Tribunal held that the mere failure of the Assessing Officer to mention the name of the amalgamated company in the assessment order did not vitiate the assessment as a whole since the assessment was, in substance and effect, made on the amalgamated company viz., MCorp Global (P) Ltd. and not on the non-existing entity, viz. Spice Corp. Ltd. The Tribunal further held that the omission to mention the name of the amalgamated company in the assessment order was a mere procedural defect and in terms of the provisions of section 292B of the Act, such assessment was not invalid.

On appeal by the assessee, the Delhi High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held:

“(i) Assessment in the name of a company which has been amalgamated with another company and stands dissolved is null and void.

(ii) Assessment framed in the name of a non-existing entity is a jurisdictional defect and not merely a procedural irregularity of the nature which can be cured by invoking the provisions of section 292B of the Act.”

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OffShore Transaction of Transfer of Shares Between Two NRs Resulting in Change in Control of Indian Company — Withholding Tax Obligation and Other Implications

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Part-II
(Continued from last month)
Vodafone
International Holdings B.V. v. Union of India & Anr.- 341 ITR 1 (SC)


3.1 As stated in Part I of this write-up (March, 2012), the Bombay High
Court took the view that the essence of the transaction between the
parties was a change in the controlling interest in HEL, which
constituted a source of income in India. According to the High Court,
the transaction between the parties covered within its sweep, diverse
rights and entitlements for which the consideration is paid. Based on
this dissecting approach, the High Court left the issue of apportionment
of consideration open to be decided by the Revenue. The High Court also
held that VIH by the diverse agreements that it entered into has nexus
with Indian jurisdiction. Accordingly, the High Court held that the
proceedings initiated by the Revenue Authorities did not lack
jurisdiction and VIH was under an obligation to deduct TAS while making
the payment in this case.

3.2 The said view of the Bombay High
Court came up for consideration before the Apex Court at the instance of
VIH. Effectively, the Apex Court was required to consider the true
nature of the transaction between the parties, the taxability thereof
and the withholding tax obligations of VIH including the jurisdiction of
the Revenue in that respect, as well as the liability of VIH to be
treated as representative assessee u/s.163.

3.2.1 In this case,
views and the observations of the Court are given in two separate
judgments i.e., one by two Judges, namely, Shri S. H. Kapadia, CJ and
Shri Swatanter Kumar, J (Majority Judgment), and another by Shri K. S.
Radhakrishnan, J (Concurring Judgment). In both the judgments,
conclusions are the same. However, there are some differences in the
reasons given for the same conclusions, particularly in the context of
applicability of section 195. In the Concurring Judgment, certain
additional observations have also been made. On all major issues,
learned judge of the Concurring Judgment has expressly stated that he
fully concurs with the views expressed in the Majority Judgment.
However, the Majority Judgment is salient on the views expressed and
various observations made in the Concurring Judgment. This write-up is
primarily based on the Majority Judgment.

Facts relating to nature of transaction

3.3
For the purpose of deciding the issues, the Court noted the brief facts
of the case and various events which took place (referred to in paras
2.1 to 2.3.2 of Part I of this write-up).

3.3.1 After referring
to all relevant events which had taken place and various agreements and
arrangements made by the parties for the purpose of giving effect to the
transaction and the procedures followed for compliance of Indian law,
the Court observed that vide settlement agreement HTIL agreed to dispose
of its direct and indirect equity, loan and other interests and rights
in and related to HEL, to VIH. The Court then noted that these rights
and interests are enumerated in the order of Revenue dated 31-5-2010,
the details of which are given in para 35 of the Majority Judgment.

3.3.2
The Court also referred to the arrangements made between VIH and Essar
Group which, inter alia, include various terms agreed for regulating the
affairs of HEL and the relationship of shareholders of HEL including
the arrangement of put option wherein, the Essar Group can require VIH
to buy from Essar Group shareholders at their option, the shares held by
them, etc.

3.3.3 The Court then noted that on receipt of the
approval from FIBP on 7-5-2007, the board resolutions were passed by CGP
on 8-5-2007 and its downstream companies, consequent to which, various
steps were taken to give an effect to the transaction the detail of
which are appearing at para 46 of the Majority Judgment.

Tax avoidance/evasion — Settled position

3.4
After referring to the facts relating to the nature of transaction
between the parties, the Court considered the correctness of the
judgment of the Apex Court in the Azadi Bachao Andolan (263 ITR 706) as
the same was questioned by the Revenue on the ground that in that case,
the Division Bench of the Apex Court has not considered certain aspects
of the judgment in the case of McDowell & Co. Ltd. (154 ITR 148).
For this purpose, the Court noted that in that case two aspects were
dealt with viz. (i) validity of Circular issued by the CBDT concerning
Mauritius Tax Treaty and (ii) the concept of tax avoidance/evasion and
stated that in the context of this case, the Revenue has only raised
objection with regard to the second aspect i.e., tax avoidance/ evasion.

3.4.1 The Court then noted the principle laid down in the case
of Duke of Westminster in UK, popularly known as Westminster Principle,
and noted that the said principle states that “given that a document or
transaction is genuine, the Court cannot go behind it to some supposed
underlined substance”.
The Court then took note of the fact that the
said principle has been reiterated in subsequent English Court judgments
as ‘the cardinal principle’. Explaining the effect of such subsequent
judgments, the Court stated that it is the task of the Court to
ascertain the legal nature of the transaction and while doing so it has
to ‘Look at’ the entire transaction as a whole and not to adopt
dissecting approach, (‘Look at’ test). The Court then observed that in
the present case, the Revenue has adopted a dissecting approach.

3.4.2
The Court then stated that the majority judgment in McDowell’s case
held that “Tax planning may be legitimate provided it is within the
framework of law ‘. . . . . however’ colourable device cannot be a part
of tax planning and it is wrong to encourage or entertain the belief
that it is honourable to avoid the payment of tax by resorting to
dubious methods.”

3.4.3 The Court then concluded that the
judgment in the case of Azadi Bachao Andolan has been correctly decided
and held as under on this aspect (page 34, para 64):

“. . . . .
In our view, although Chinnappa Reddy, J. makes a number of observations
regarding the need to depart from the ‘Westminster’ and tax avoidance —
these are clearly only in the context of artificial and colourable
devices. Reading McDowell, in the manner indicated hereinabove, in cases
of treaty shopping and/or tax avoidance, there is no conflict between
McDowell and Azadi Bachao or between McDowell and Mathuram Agrawal.”

Tax
aspects of holding structure

3.5 In the context of holding structures,
the Court first noted that corporate bodies are treated as separate
entities. This is also recognised under the Act in the matter of
corporate taxation. The companies are viewed as economic entities with
legal independent vis-à-vis their shareholders. It is also fairly well
settled that for tax treaty purpose, a subsidiary and its parent are
also totally separate and distinct taxpayers.

3.5.1 The Court then noted that it is generally accepted that the group parent company is involved in giving principal guidance to group. The fact that a parent company exercises shareholder’s influence on its sub-sidiaries does not generally imply that subsidiaries are to be deemed residents of the State in which the parent company resides. However, if subsidiary’s executive directors are no more than puppets, then the turning point in respect of subsidiary’s residence come about. If the transaction is arranged through abuse of organisation form/legal form and without reasonable business purpose to avoid tax implications, then the Revenue may disregard the form of the arrangement or structure, recharacterise the arrangement according to its economic substance and determine tax implications accordingly on actual controlling enterprise. This should be decided on overall facts of each case.
In this context, the Court further stated as under (pages 35/36, para 67):

“…..Thus, whether a transaction is used principally as a colourable device for the distribution of earnings, profits and gains, is determined by a review of all the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction. It is in the above cases that the principle of lifting the corporate veil or the doctrine of substance over form or the concept of beneficial ownership or the concept of alter ego arises. There are many circumstances, apart from the one given above, where separate existence of different companies, that are part of the same group, will be totally or partly ignored as a device or a conduit (in the pejorative sense).”

3.5.2 The Court then noted that it is common practice in international law, which is the basis of international taxation, for foreign investors to invest in Indian companies through an interposed foreign holding or operating company, such as CI or Mauritius-based company, for both tax and business purpose. In doing so, foreign investors are able to avoid lengthy approval and registration processes required for a direct transfer of equity interest in a foreign-invested Indian company.

3.5.3 The Court then further noted that the taxation of such holding structures gives rise to issue such as double taxation, tax deferrals, tax avoidance and application of anti-avoidance rules (GAAR). The Court then stated that in the present case, it is concerned with concept of GAAR (and not with the treaty shopping) which is not new to India since India already has a judicial GAAR, like some other jurisdictions. The Court then noted that lack of clarity and absence of appropriate provisions in the statute and/or in the treaty regarding the circumstances in which the judicial GAAR would apply has generated litigation in India. The Court then took the view that when it comes to taxation of a holding structure, at the threshold, the burden is on the Revenue to establish the abuse, in the sense of tax avoidance in the creation and/or use of such structures. In this context, the Court then observed as under (pages 36/37, para 68):

“…….In the application of a judicial anti-avoidance rule, the Revenue may invoke the ‘substance over form’ principle or ‘piercing the corporate veil’ test only after it is able to establish on the basis of the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction that the impugned transaction is a sham or tax avoidant. To give an example, if a structure is used for circular trading or round, tripping or to pay bribes, then such transactions, though having a legal form, should be discarded by applying the test of fiscal nullity. Similarly, in a case where the Revenue finds that in a holding structure an entity which has no commercial/business substance has been interposed only to avoid tax, then in such cases applying the test of fiscal nullity it would be open to the Revenue to discard such inter-positioning of that entity. However, this has to be done at the threshold….’’

3.5.4 The Court then reiterated that for the above purposes, the Revenue must apply ‘Look at’ test and the Revenue cannot start with the question as to whether the impugned transaction is a tax deferment/savings device, but that it should apply the ‘Look at’ test to ascertain its true legal nature. While concluding on the issue of tax avoidance, the Court stated as under (Page 37, para 68):

“……. Applying the above tests, we are of the view that every strategic foreign direct investment coming to India as an investment destination, should be seen in a holistic manner. While doing so, the Revenue/ Courts should keep in mind the following factors: the concept of participation in investment, the duration of time during which the holding structure exists; the period of business operations in India; the generation of taxable revenues in India; the timing of the exit; the continuity of business on such exit. In short, the onus will be on the Revenue to identify the scheme and its dominant purpose. The corporate business purpose of a transaction is evidence of the fact that the impugned transaction is not undertaken as a colourable or artificial device. The stronger the evidence of a device, the stronger the corporate busi    ness purpose must exist to overcome the evidence of a device.”

Whether section 9 is a ‘Look through’ provision and covers ‘indirect transfer’ of Indian Capital Asset

3.6 The Court then dealt with the contention of Rev-enue that u/s.9(1)(i) can ‘Look through’ the transfer of shares of a foreign company holding shares in an Indian company and treat such transfer as equivalent to transfer of shares of the Indian company on the premise that section 9(1)(i) covers direct and indirect transfer of capital asset.

3.6.1 Dealing with the above issue, the Court noted that section 9(1)(i) gathers in one place various types of income and broadly there are four items of income. The income dealt with in each sub-clause is distinct and independent of the other and the requirements of bringing income within each sub-clause are separately stated. In the case under consideration, the Court is concerned with the last sub-clause of section 9(1)(i), which refers to income arising from ‘transfer of a capital assets situated in India’. This provides a fiction which comes into play only when the income is not charged to tax on the basis of receipt in India, as receipt of income in India by itself attracts tax whether the recipient is a resident or non-resident. This fiction is introduced to avoid any possible arrangement on the part of the non-resident vendor that profit accrued or arose outside India on the basis that the contract to sell is executed outside India. A legal fiction has a limited scope and when the language is unambiguous and admits no doubt, it cannot be expanded by giving purposive interpretation.

3.6.2 According to the Court, section 9(1)(i) cannot by a process of interpretation be extended to cover indirect transfers of capital assets situated in India as the Legislature has not used the words ‘indirect transfer’ in section 9(1)(i). The words directly or indirectly used in section 9(1) (i) go with the income and not with the transfer of capital assets. For this purpose, the Court also drew support from the language of the provisions of section 163(1)(c) and the proposal contained In the Direct Tax Code Bill, 2010 as well as its earlier draft version of 2009. Based on this, while taking a view that indirect transfer is not covered within the said sub-clause of section 9(1)(i), the Court finally concluded on this contention of the Revenue as under (Page 40, para 71):

“…….The question of providing ‘look through’ in the statute or in the treaty is a matter of policy. It is to be expressly provided for in the statute or in the treaty. Similarly, limitation of benefits has to be expressly provided for in the treaty. Such clauses cannot be read into the section by interpretation. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that section 9(1)(i) is not a ‘look through’ provision.”

Whether there was extinguishment of the property rights of HTIL?

3.7 The Court then dealt with the primary argument advanced on behalf of the Revenue that SPA, commercially construed, evidences a transfer of property rights of HTIL by their extinguishment. According to the Revenue, HTIL’s property rights (i.e., right of control and management over HEL and its subsidiaries) got directly extinguished under SPA and accordingly, there was a transfer of capital assets situated in India. For this purpose, the Revenue relied on various features of SPA and on various arrangements entered into between the parties. It was the contention of the Revenue that HTIL possesses de facto control over HEL and its subsidiaries and such control was the subject-matter of transfer under SPA.

3.7.1 For the purpose of dealing with the above contentions of the Revenue, the Court reiterated the position that it is concerned with the transaction of sale of share and not with the sale of assets, item wise. In this context, the Court observed as under (Page 41, para 73):

“…….. The facts of this case show sale of the entire investment made by HTIL, through a top company, viz. CGP, in the Hutchison structure. In this case we need to apply the ‘look at’ test. In the impugned judgment, the High Court has rightly observed that the arguments advanced on behalf of the Department vacillated. The reason for such vacillation was adoption of ‘dissecting approach’ by the Department in the course of its arguments……….”

3.7.2 The Court then considered the legal position that whether HTIL possesses a legal right to appoint directors on the board of HEL and as such had some ‘property right’ in HEL. In this context, the Court stated that a legal right is an enforceable right by a legal process. In a proper case of lifting of ‘corporate veil’, it would be proper to say that the parent company and the subsidiary form one entity. But barring such cases, the legal position of any company incorporated abroad is that its powers, functions, and responsibilities are governed by the law of its incorporation. A company is a separate legal person even with one shareholder. Thus even though a subsidiary may normally comply with the request of a parent company, it is not just a puppet of a parent company. There is a difference between having a power or having a persuasive position. The power of persuasion cannot be constructed as a right in legal sense. The concept of ‘de facto’ control, which existed in Hutchison structure, conveys a state of being in control without any legal right to such a state. Based on this, the Court concluded that HTIL as group holding company has no legal right to direct its downstream companies in the manner of voting, nomination of directors and management rights.

3.7.3 Dealing with the power of a parent company on account of its shareholding in subsidiary, the Court concluded as under (Page 43, para 74):

“…..The fact that the parent company exercises shareholder’s influence on its subsidiaries cannot obliterate the decision-making power or authority of its (subsidiary’s) directors. They cannot be reduced to be puppets. The decisive criteria is whether the parent company’s management has such steering interference with the subsidiary’s core activities that subsidiary can no longer be regarded to perform those activities on the authority of its own executive directors.”

3.7.4 The Court then dealt with the need for executing an SPA and stated that exit is an important right of an investor in every strategic investment. Thus, a need for an SPA arose to re-adjust the outstanding loans between companies; to provide for standstill arrangements in the interregnum between date of SPA and completion of the transaction, to provide for seamless transfer and to provide for fundamental terms of price, indemnities, warranties, etc. SPA was entered into, inter alia, for smooth transaction of business of divestment by HTIL.

3.7.5 Dealing with the issue with regard to arrangements entered into with Essar Group, partner in HEL, as well as with other Indian companies holding 15% interest in HEL (minority investors), the Court stated that the minority investor has what is called a ‘participative’ right, which is subset of ‘protective rights’. These participative rights in certain instances restrict the powers of the shareholders with majority voting interest to control the operations or assets of the investee. Even minority investors are entitled to exit. This ‘exit right’ comes under ‘protective rights’. Considering the Hutchi-son structure in its entirety, the Court found that the participative and protective rights existed in Hutchison structure under various arrangements. Even without execution of SPA, such rights existed in the above arrangements and therefore, it would not be correct to say that such rights flowed from SPA. The Court also stated that it is important to note that ‘transition’ is a vide concept. It is impossible for the acquirer to visualise all events that may take place between the date of SPA and completion of acquisition. For all such things, an SPA may become necessary, but that does not mean that all the rights and entitlements flow from SPA.

3.7.6 After considering various agreements, arrangements and features of SPA, on the issue of extinguishment of property rights of HTIL, the Court concluded as under (Page 48, para 77):

“For the above reasons, we hold that under the HTIL structure, as it existed in 1994, HTIL occupied only a persuasive position/influence over the downstream companies qua manner of voting, nomination of directors and management rights. That, the minority shareholders/investors had participative and protective rights (including RoFR/TARs, call and put options which provided for exit) which flowed from the CGP share. That, the entire investment was sold to VIH through the investment vehicle (CGP). Consequently, there was no extinguishment of rights as alleged by the Revenue.”

Whether Hutchison structure is sham or tax-avoidant?

3.8 The Court also considered the issue as to whether the structure of Hutchison Group is a sham/device/tax-avoidant and whether it was pre-ordained to avoid the tax in question.

3.8.1 Dealing with the above issue, the Court stated that there is a conceptual difference between ‘pre-ordained transaction’ which is created for tax avoidance purposes and a transaction which evidences ‘investment to par-ticipate’ in India. Having mentioned this conceptual difference, the Court explained the concept of ‘investment to participate’ and stated that in order to find out whether a given transaction evidences a pre-ordained transaction in the sense indicated above or investment to participate, one has to take into account various factors enumerated earlier and again re-iterated them, such as duration of time during for which the holding structure existed, the period of business operations in India, generation of taxable revenue in India during the period of business operations in India, etc. referred to the para 3.5.4 above. Explaining the effect of these tests on the case on hand, the Court held as under (Pages 42, para 73):

“……Applying these tests to the facts of the present case, we find that the Hutchison structure has been in place since 1994. It operated during the period 1994 to 11-2-2007. It has paid income-tax ranging from Rs.3 crore to Rs.250 crore per annum during the period 2002-03 to 2006-07. Even after 11-2-2007, taxes are being paid by VIH ranging from Rs.394 crore to Rs.962 crore per annum during the period 2007-08 to 2010-11 (these figures are apart from indirect taxes which also run in crores). Moreover, SPA indicates ‘continuity’ of the telecom business on the exit of its predecessor, namely, HTIL. Thus, it cannot be said that the structure was created or used as a sham or tax-avoidant…..”

3.8.2 While taking the above view, the Court further observed as under (Page 42, para 73):

“……. In a case like the present one, where the structure has existed for a considerable length of time generating taxable revenues right from 1994 and where the Court is satisfied that the transaction satisfies all the parameters of ‘participation in investment’ then in such a case the Court need not go into the questions such as de facto control v. legal control, legal rights v. practical rights, etc.’’

The effect of introduction of CGP before entering into transaction

3.9 The main contention of the Revenue was that CGP was inserted at a late stage in the transaction in order to bring in a tax-free entity (or to create a transaction to avoid tax) and thereby, avoid tax on capital gains. Originally in this transaction, the transfer of shares of Array was contemplated. According to the Revenue, the Mauritius route was not available to HTIL in this transaction to get the benefit to avoid liability of tax.

3.9.1 Dealing with the above contention of the Revenue, the Court first noted that when a business gets big enough, it does two things. First, it reconfigures itself into corporate group by dividing itself multitude of commonly owned subsidiaries. Second, it causes various entities in the said group to guarantee each other’s debts. A typical large business corporation consists of sub-incorporates. Such division is legal and recognised by various laws including laws of taxation. If large firms are not divided into subsidiaries, creditors would have to monitor the enterprise in its entirety. Subsidiaries also promote the benefits of specialisation, permit creditors to lend against only specified division of the firm, reduce the amount of information that creditor needs together, etc. These are efficiencies inbuilt in a holding structure. As a group member, subsidiaries work together in many ways and they are financially inter-linked. The Court then further observed as under (Page 49, para 79):

“….. Such grouping is based on the principle of internal correlation. Courts have evolved doctrines like piercing the corporate veil, substance over form, etc. enabling taxation of underlying assets in cases of fraud, sham, tax avoidant, etc. However, genuine strategic tax planning is not ruled out.”

3.9.2 CGP was incorporated in 1998 in CI and it was in Hutchison structure since then. CGP was an investment vehicle. The transfer of Array had the advantage of transferring control over the entire shareholding held by downstream Mauritius companies, other than 3GSPL (GSPL). On the other hand, the advantage of acquisition of CGP share was to enable VIH to also indirectly acquire the rights and obligations of GSPL (the option to acquire further 15% interest in HEL). This was the reason for VIH to go by CGP route. Dealing with the argument with regard to non-availability of Mauritius route for getting the tax benefit, the Court stated that HTIL could have influenced its Mauritius subsidiaries (indirect) to sell the shares of Indian companies in which case no liability to pay tax on capital gain would have arisen. Thereafter, nothing prevented Mauritius companies from declaring dividend to ultimately remit money to HTIL and there is no tax on dividend in Mauritius in such cases. Thus, the Mauritius route was also available, but it was not opted because that route would not have given the control over GSPL. The Court then took the view that it was open to the parties to opt for any one of the two routes available to them. Accordingly, taking a holistic view, the Court held that it cannot be said that the intervened entity (CGP) had no business or commercial purpose.

Situs of CGP share

3.10 It was contended by the Revenue that under the Companies Law of CI, an exempted company was not entitled to conduct business in CI and therefore, CGP, being exempted company, cannot conduct business in CI and hence, the situs of CGP share existed where the ‘underlying assets are situated’, that is to say, India. While dealing with this contention, the Court stated that the Court does not wish to pronounce authoritatively on the Companies Law of CI. However, under the Indian Companies Act, 1956, the situs of the shares would be where the company is incorporated and where its shares can be transferred. In the present case, it has been asserted by VIH that the transfer of CGP share was recorded in CI and this has neither been rebutted in the order of the Department, nor traversed in the pleadings filed by the Revenue, nor controverted before the Court. Accordingly, the Court took the view that the situs of CGP share cannot be taken at the place where underlying assets stood situated and hence, the same is not in India.

Did VIH acquire 67% controlling interest in HEL?

3.11 It was the contention of the Revenue that VIH acquired 67% controlling interest (including option to acquire 15% interest in HEL held by AS/AG/IDFC through various companies). For this, the Revenue relied on various agreements, arrangements and features of SPA.

3.11.1 Dealing with the above contention of the Revenue, the Court noted that primary argument of the Revenue is based on the equation of ‘equity interest’ with the word ‘control’. On the basis of the shareholding test, HTIL can be said to have 52% control over HEL. By the same test, it can be equally said that the balance 15% stake in HEL remained with AS/AG/IDFC, who had through their respective group companies invested in HEL. This 15% stake comes under the options held by GSPL. Pending exercise, options are not management rights. At the highest, options can be treated as potential shares and they cannot provide right to vote or management or control. HTIL/VIH cannot be said to have a control over 15% stakes in HEL. It is for this reason that even FIBP gave its approval to the transaction by saying that VIH was acquiring or has acquired shareholding of 51.96% in HEL.

3.11.2 Dealing with the case of the arrangement with Indian JV partner Essar Group, the Court stated that it was entered into in order to regulate the affairs of HEL and to regulate the relationship of shareholders of HEL and continue the practice of appointment of directors on agreed basis. The articles of association of HEL did not grant any specific person or entity a right to appoint directors. Under the Company Law, the management control vests in the Board of Directors and not with the shareholders. Therefore, neither from SPA, nor from the terms sheets one can say that VIH had acquired 67% controlling interest in HEL.

3.11.3 Dealing with the contention of the Revenue that why VIH should pay consideration to HTIL based on 67% of the enterprise value of HEL, the Court stated that it is important to know that valuation cannot be the basis of taxation. The basis of taxation is profits or income or receipt. In this case, the Court is not concerned with the tax on income/profit arising from business operations but with the tax on transfer of rights (capital asset) and gains arisen therefrom. In the present case, VIH paid US $ 11.08 bn for 67% of the enterprise value of HEL and its downstream companies having operational licences. When the entire business or investment is sold, for valuation purposes, one may take into account the economic interest or realities. In this case, enterprise value is made-up of two parts, namely, the value of HEL, the value of CGP and companies between CGP and HEL. The Revenue cannot invoke section 9 of the Act on the value of underlying assets or consequence of acquiring a share of CGP. The price paid as a percentage of enterprise value ought to be 67% not because that was available in praesenti to VIH, but on account of the fact that competing Indian bidders would have had de facto access to the entire 67%, as they were not subject to limitation of FDI cap and therefore, they would have immediately encashed the call options.

Approach of the High Court and true nature of transaction

3.12 Dealing with the dissecting approach adopted by the High Court, the Court stated as under (Page 56, para 88):

“We have to view the subject-matter of the transaction, in this case, from a commercial and realistic perspective. The present case concerns an offshore transaction involving a structured investment. This case concerns ‘a share sale’ and not an asset sale. It concerns sale of an entire investment. A ‘sale’ may take various forms. Accordingly, tax consequences will vary. The tax consequences of a share sale would be different from the tax consequences of an asset sale. A slump sale would involve tax consequences which could be different from the tax consequences of sale of assets on itemised basis.”

3.12.1 Further, dealing with the question of transfer of controlling interest dealt with by the High Court, the Court state as under (Page 56, para 88):

“…….Ownership of shares may, in certain situations, result in the assumption of an interest which has the character of a controlling interest in the management of the company. A controlling interest is an incident of ownership of shares in a company, something which flows out of the holding of shares. A controlling interest is, therefore, not an identifiable or distinct capital asset independent of the holding of shares. The control of a company resides in the voting power of its shareholders and shares represent an interest of a shareholder which is made up of various rights contained in the contract embedded in the articles of association. The right of a shareholder may assume the character of a controlling interest where the extent of the shareholding enables the shareholder to control the management. Shares, and the rights which emanate from them, flow together and cannot be dissected…..”

3.12.2 The Court further stated that if owners’ structure is looked at by acquiring one share of CGP, VIH acquired control over various companies which gave it 52% shareholding control over HEL and indirect control over GSPL which gave VIH control over the options to acquire further 15% interest in HEL. These options continued to be held by GSPL and there is no transfer of them. The options have remained un-encashed with GSPL and therefore, even if options are treated as capital asset as held by the High Court, section 9 (1)(i) was not applicable as there was no transfer of such options. The Court also stated that the High Court wrongly viewed the transaction as acquisition of 67% of the equity capital of HEL. 67% of economic value is not equivalent to 67% of equity capital. If the High Court was right, then entire investment would have breached the FDI norms (which had imposed a sectorial cap of 74%) as in this case, Essar group held 22% of its stake through Mauritius Companies.

3.12.3 The Court also stated that as a general rule, in case of transaction involving transfer of shares lock, stock and barrel, such a transaction cannot be broken up in to separate individual components, assets or rights such as right to vote, right to participate in company meetings, management’s rights, controlling rights, control premium, brand licences and so on as shares constitute a bundle of rights. According to the Court, the High Court failed to examine the nature of various items such as non-compete agreement, control premium, call and put options, etc. The Court then took the view that the High Court ought to have examined entire transaction holistically. The transaction should be looked at as an entire package. Where the parties have agreed for a lump sum consideration without placing separate value for each of the items which go to make up the entire ‘investment in participation’, merely because certain values are included in the correspondence with FIPB which had raised the query, would not mean that the parties had agreed for the price payable for such individual items. The transaction remained a contract of outright sale of the entire investment for a lump sum consideration.

3.12.4 Finally, the Court did not agree with the dissecting approach adopted by the High Court and treated the transaction as sale of one share of CGP outside India and accordingly, it does not involve any gain arising on transfer of capital asset situated in India. Hence, capital gain in question is not chargeable to tax u/s.9(1)(i) of the Act and as such, question of deduction of TAS does not arise. Accordingly, the ultimate view of the High Court that the proceedings initiated by the Revenue Authorities did not lack jurisdiction and VIH was under an obligation to deduct TAS while making the payment in this case did not find favour with the Apex Court.
(to be concluded in the third part)

Note: Subsequent Developments
In the Finance Bill, 2012, certain amendments are proposed with retrospective effect from 1-4-1962 to effectively overturn the final position emerging from the above judgment. With these proposals, the stand of the Revenue Authorities with regard to the taxability of such gain, withholding tax obligation of the NR Payer and the jurisdiction of the Revenue Authorities in that respect is sought to be retrospectively confirmed by the legislative amendments.

We understand that on 20th March, 2012, the Apex Court has dismissed the review petition filed by the Government in Vodafone’s case.

(2011) 131 ITD 263 DCIT v. Jindal Equipment Leasing & Consultancy Services Ltd. A.Y.: 2003-04. Dated: 25-2-2011

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Section 48 — The full value of consideration as contemplated in section 48 of the Act does not have any reference to the market value, but only to the consideration referred to in the sale deeds or other supporting evidences as the sale price of the assets which have been transferred.

Facts:
The assessee-company sold shares held in Nalwa Sponge Iron Ltd. (NSIL) to three persons at Rs.12 per share. The book value of shares was estimated to be Rs.254.40 at the time of sale. The AO took the view that the sale of shares was a device to pass on undue monetary benefit to the persons, who according to the AO were related persons. Based on that the AO recomputed capital gain by adopting the fair market value of the shares which was Rs.254.50. He thus made additions of Rs.6,06,27,500 as undisclosed sale consideration. On appeal to the CIT(A) by the assessee, it was held that the AO can’t alter the computation of capital gain without any evidence.

The Department filed appeal against the order of the CIT(A).

Held:

Section 48 contemplates ascertainment of ‘full value of consideration received or accruing as a result of the transfer of capital asset’. The word received means actually received and word accruing means the debt created in favour of the assessee as a result of transfer. In any case, both the terms are used as actual and not estimated amounts. The erstwhile provision does not contain words ‘fair market value’, thus addition made to sale consideration by the AO is not in accordance with the section 48 of the Act.

As regards the objection raised by the AO regarding related party, there was no evidence to prove that transferees were related to the directors of the company. However in any case transferees could not be said to be related to the company as company does not have any corporeal existence.

Hence it was held that the transactions were conducted with independent parties.

Also it is commonly accepted law that the onus to prove otherwise than the fact lies on the person who alleges. In the instant case even though the transaction had taken place at values far less than the arm’s-length price, in absence of any evidence purporting receipt of more consideration than stated, computation of capital gain made by the assessee cannot be altered by the AO.

In order to show that the transaction was colourable device intended to evade tax, the Revenue must prove understatement of consideration. They should have basic material and evidence in its hand. In the instant case, the AO relied upon hypothetical sale price without any evidence, which does not prove that there is more consideration passed than what is disclosed.

Held that as there was no evidence on record that transferees were related to directors of the assessee-company and that the assessee had received amount more than stated consideration, computation of capital gain can be made only on the basis of consideration actually received.

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(2012) TIOL 44 ITAT-Mum. Mithalal N. Sisodia HUF v. ITO A.Y.: 2005-06. Dated: 5-8-2011

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Section 271(1)(c) — Penalty cannot be levied in respect of amount surrendered by the assessee unless the AO proves that bogus LTCG was being declared to claim benefit of either exemption or lower rate of tax.

Facts:
The assessee HUF in its return of income declared long-term capital gains on sale of shares. The assessee claimed that it had purchased a flat and therefore LTCG was exempt u/s.54F of the Act. The LTCG arose on sale of 6000 shares of a company known as Poonam Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (P). The shares had been purchased by the assessee on 8-4-2003 for a sum of Rs.14,320 through V. K. Singhania, a stock-broker in Calcutta. The purchase price was claimed to have been paid in cash. The shares were sold in 3 tranches in August, Sept and Nov 2004 for a total consideration of Rs.17,87,450. The shares were claimed to have been sold through Shyamlala Sultania, stock-broker in Calcutta. The delivery of shares was received and given via Demat account of the assessee. In the course of assessment proceedings, the AO with a view to verify the transactions of purchase and sale of shares wrote a letter to P which was returned unserved with a remark ‘Not Known’. The broker through whom the shares were claimed to have been sold stated that the assessee was not his client and during the previous year he had not done any transactions in shares of P. The Calcutta Stock Exchange confirmed that M/s. V. K. Singhania had not done any transaction in scrip P in the physical form in the online trading system of Calcutta Stock Exchange.

The AO, in the course of assessment proceedings, examined the assessee u/s.131 and recorded statement of the Karta of the assessee. In the statement it was stated that the shares were purchased and sold on the advice of one Mr. R who was resident of Mumbai. Upon being confronted with the materials collected by the AO, he stated that he had purchased and sold shares and had nothing more to say. He then sought adjournment and before the next date of hearing filed a letter surrendering the amount of exemption claimed on the ground that due to his age he cannot go to Calcutta to verify the details, he has not concealed any income nor filed wrong particulars, but with a view to buy peace and avoid litigation the surrender was being made by revising return of income (though time for filing revised return u/s.139(5) had expired) and taxes were paid. The AO made a reference to investigation conducted by Investigation Wing of the Department and pointed modus operandi followed by various persons claiming LTCG. The AO held that the assessee had brought into his accounts unaccounted money and paid less tax by claiming the sum brought in the books as LTCG.

Subsequently, the AO levied penalty on the ground that the assessee had concealed particulars of income and only when investigation was carried out the assessee surrendered the amount and offered the sale proceeds of shares as Income from Other Sources.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who confirmed the order of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The Tribunal noted the sequence of events and observed that the assessee had shown the shares in its balance sheet as on 31-3-2004 and the same was accepted by the Revenue. It also noted that the shares were transferred to the Demat account of the assessee. Sale consideration was received by banking channels. The Tribunal observed that the enquiry by the AO from the Calcutta Stock Exchange that the transaction was not done through the Exchange cannot be taken as basis to conclude that the transactions of sale of shares was not genuine. It observed that denial of Shyamlal Sultania, through whom shares were sold is a circumstance going against the assessee. The Tribunal held that from the sequence of events it cannot be said with certainity that the claim made by the assessee was bogus. It noted that the surrender was made to buy peace and avoid litigation. It was because of his inability to go to Calcutta, due to old age, to collect necessary evidence that the surrender was made. The AO had not brought on record any independent material to show that the assessee was part of any investigation referred to in the assessment order. The Tribunal held that imposition of penalty would depend on facts and circumstances of the case. On the present facts, the Tribunal held that the explanation offered by the assessee was bona fide. The Tribunal directed that the penalty imposed be deleted.

The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

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(2012) TIOL 25 ITAT-Bang.-SB Nandi Steels Ltd. v. ACIT A.Y.: 2003-04. Dated: 9-12-2011

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Section 72 — Capital gains arising on sale of land and building used for business purposes cannot be set off against brought forward business loss.

Facts:
The assessee-company was engaged in the business of manufacture/production of iron and steel. In the proceedings u/s.143(3) r.w.s. 148 the Assessing Officer (AO), relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Killick Nixon & Co. v. CIT, (66 ITR 714) (SC), held that the brought forward business loss and unabsorbed depreciation cannot be set off against income from capital gains arising on sale of land and building used for the purposes of the business. He noted that the SC has in the said case held that only income which is earned by carrying on business is entitled to be set off. Accordingly, he denied the set-off of gains arising on sale of land and building which were computed under the head ‘Capital Gains’ against brought forward business loss.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who confirmed the order of the AO. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Before the Division Bench, the assessee relied upon the decision of the Bangalore Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Steelcon Industries (P) Ltd. v. ITO, ITA No. 571 (Bang.) 1989, A.Y. 1985-86, order dated 27-12- 2004) wherein the issue was decided in favour of the assessee by following the decisions of the SC in the cases of CIT v. Cocanada Radhaswami Bank, (55 ITR 17) (SC) and CIT v. Chugandas & Co., (55 ITR 17) (SC). The Division Bench noticed that there is another judgment of the SC in the case of CIT v. Express Newspapers Ltd., (53 ITR 250) wherein the SC held that capital gains are connected with the capital assets of the business and therefore, it cannot make them the profit of the business and cannot be set off against the brought forward business loss. This decision of the SC was not considered by the Tribunal in the case of Steelcon Industries (P) Ltd (supra) and therefore, the Division Bench felt that the decision in the case of Steelcon Industries (P) Ltd. (supra) requires reconsideration by a Special Bench. The President constituted a Special Bench for disposal of the following two grounds of the appeal filed by the assessee —

“(1) That the learned CIT(A) erred in law and on facts that the appellant is not entitled to set off carry forward business loss of Rs.39,99,652 against the long-term capital gain arising on sale of land used for the purpose of business.

(2) That the authorities below ought to have appreciated that there is no cessation of business and the appellant is entitled to set off the carry forward business loss.”

Held:
Section 72 permits carry forward of business loss to subsequent assessment years and allows it to be set off against profits & gains, if any, of any business or profession carried on by the assessee and assessable for the relevant assessment year. The term ‘profits and gains of business or profession’ means income earned out of business carried on by the assessee and not any income which is in some way connected to the business carried on by the assessee.

SB did not agree with the contention of the assessee that the assets sold by the assessee were business assets. It held that these were un-disputedly capital assets and capital receipts are not taxable, nor are the capital payments deductible from the income of the assessee. The capital is to be used for the purpose of carrying on the business of the assessee and it shall remain in the business of the assessee till it is either converted into stock-in-trade or is disposed of. The income earned by the assessee by carrying on the business by use of stock-in-trade only is the business income of the assessee.

SB held that the decision of the SC in Express Newspapers Ltd. (supra) is squarely applicable to the facts of the present case and that the Coordinate Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Steelcon Industries Pvt. Ltd. (supra) has wrongly placed reliance upon the decision of the Apex Court in the cases of United Commercial Bank Ltd. and M/s. Cocanada Radhaswami Bank Ltd. It held that the gains arising on sale of land and building were not eligible for set-off against the brought forward business loss u/s.72.

These grounds of appeal filed by the assessee were decided against the assessee.

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(2011) 142 TTJ 358 (Hyd.) Four Soft Ltd. v. Dy. CIT A.Y.: 2006-07. Dated: 9-9-2011

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Section 92B and 92C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Corporate guarantee provided by the assessee company does not fall within the definition of international transaction and, therefore, no TP adjustment is required in respect of corporate guarantee transaction undertaken by the assesseecompany.

Facts:
The assessee-company had provided corporate guarantee to ICICI Bank UK on behalf of its subsidiary. The TPO held that guarantee is an obligation and if the principal debtor falls to honour the obligation, the guarantor is liable for the same and, hence, the TPO determined a commission @ 3.75% as the ALP under the CUP method on the basis of the commission charged by the ICICI Bank as benchmark.

Held:
The Tribunal held that no TP adjustment is required in respect of corporate guarantee transaction done by the assessee-company. The Tribunal noted as under:

(1) The TP legislation provides for computation of income from international transaction as per section 92B.

(2) The corporate guarantee provided by the assessee-company does not fall within the definition of international transaction.

(3) The TP legislation does not stipulate any guidelines in respect of guarantee transactions.

(4) In the absence of any charging provision, the lower authorities are not correct in bringing aforesaid transaction in the TP study. The corporate guarantee is very much incidental to the business of the assessee and hence, the same cannot be compared to a bank guarantee transaction of the bank or financial institution.

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(2011) 142 TTJ 252 (Visakha) Dredging Corporation of India Ltd. v. ACIT A.Ys.: 2006-07 to 2008-09. Dated: 25-7-2011

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Section 234D r.w.s. 2(40) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Reassessment made u/s.147 after completion of assessment u/s.143(3) cannot be termed as regular assessment and, consequently, interest u/s.234D is not chargeable in such reassessment.

Facts:
The assessee was given refund while processing the return u/s.143(1) and further refund was given after assessment u/s.143(3). In reassessment proceedings u/s.147, the refund amount got reduced and, therefore, the excess refund given earlier became collectible from the assessee. The Assessing Officer levied interest u/s.234D on such excess refund amount. The learned CIT(A) held that the interest u/s.234D is not chargeable in the hands of the company in reassessment proceedings.

Held:
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)’s order. The Tribunal noted as under:

(1) On a plain reading of section 234D, it is noticed that the interest u/s.234D is leviable only if the refund granted to the assessee u/s.143(1) of the Act becomes collectible in the order passed under regular assessment.

(2) As per section 2(40) read with Explanation to section 234D, ‘regular assessment’ is defined to mean assessment order passed u/s.143(3) or u/s.144 or where the assessment has been made for the first time u/s.147 or u/s.153A. Thus, reassessment proceedings u/s.147 after completion of the assessment u/s.143(3) is excluded from the purview of ‘regular assessment’.

(3) Such exhaustive definition of ‘regular assessment’ when considered in the light of the fact that in the appellant-company’s case the assessment u/s.147 has been made not for the first time, but after the completion of an assessment u/s.143(3), the same cannot be termed as regular assessment and, consequently, the provisions of section 234D cannot apply in the appellantcompany’s case.

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(2011) 142 TTJ 86 (Pune) Drilbits International (P.) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT A.Y.: 2006-07. Dated: 23-8-2011

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(a) Section 32(1)(iii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Unit acquired at slump price — Amount allocated towards trademark, brand name, logo, etc. and technical know-how by approved valuer is capital expenditure eligible for depreciation claim.

(b) Section 92C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 read with Rules 10B(1)(a), 10B(1)(c) and 10B(1)(e) of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 — Transfer pricing — Most appropriate method for computing arm’s-length price — Rates charged to the third parties in the domestic market cannot be compared with the rates charged to AE in the export market — There are various factors which affect the pricing of the product in the domestic market vis-à-vis the export market — Hence the CPM method is not appropriate method for determining the ALP — CUP or TNMM was the most appropriate method for determining ALP.

Facts:
(a) Depreciation u/s.32(1)(iii)

The assessee acquired the unit of G on slump-sales basis consisting of all its assets which included intellectual property rights such as designs, drawings, manufacturing processes and technical know-how for a consideration of Rs.17.01 crore. The registered valuer valued the knowhow acquired at Rs.2.41 crore and royalty payable for use of brand name, trademark, logo, etc. at Rs.2.67 crore. The Assessing Officer disallowed depreciation on the same on the basis that as per agreement, the assessee has not purchased any know-how from G and the assessee is entitled to use trademark, logo and brand name of G free of cost for a period of three years.

Held:
The Tribunal, relying on the decisions in the following cases, allowed the assessee’s claim:

(a) Amway India Enterprises v. Dy. CIT, (2008) 114 TTJ 476 (Del.) (SB)/(2008) 4 DTR (Del.) (SB) (Trib.) 1/(2008) 111 ITD 112 (Del.) (SB)

(b) Hindustan Coca Cola Beverages (P.) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT, (2010) 43 DTR (Del.) 416

The Tribunal noted as under:

(1) It is an undisputed fact that the assessee has paid the agreed consideration of Rs. 17.01 crore as a lump-sum amount to purchase the unit in its entirety i.e., the unit consisting of items like trademark, logo and brand name, designs, drawings, manufacturing processes and technical know-how.

(2) Simply because, in the agreement to purchase, it is mentioned that the use of all items like trademark, logo and brand name is allowed to the assessee for three years by G free of cost, it does not mean that there is no value for these items. The agreement between the seller and the purchaser does not put restriction on the right of the purchaser to record the asset at its fair value in its books.

(3) The apportionment of the lump-sum amount amongst the various assets and rights has to be made and which has been done in the present case as per the valuer’s report. The approved valuer has valued the know-how acquired at Rs.2.41 crore and royalty payable for use of brand name, trademark and logo at Rs.2.67 crore.

(4) The Special Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Amway India (supra) has held that if the software is useable/used for more than two years, it is a capital expenditure and if it is for less than two years, it is revenue expenditure. Thus, following the ratio laid down therein, since the assessee had purchased the use of brand name, trademark, logo for three years and similarly, the intellectual property right such as design, drawings, manufacturing processes and technical know-how in respect of the products manufactured by the unit was acquired, the expenditure incurred in this regard as valued by the approved valuer is capital expenditure on which the claim of depreciation was allowable.

Facts:
(b) Computation of ALP

During the year, the assessee-company sold goods to its associate enterprises (AEs). Initially, while filing the return of income, the assessee had adopted the comparable uncontrolled price method (CUP) for determining the arm’s-length price (ALP) in respect of exports transactions undertaken with the AE. Thereafter, in the proceedings before the learned TPO, the assessee contended that even as per transactional net margin method (TNMM), the transactions of export of goods are at ALP. The revised Form No. 3CEB was filed and details of the company selected as comparable were furnished. The learned TPO did not agree with the submissions of the assessee and held that the CUP method and TNMM are not applicable for determining the ALP. The learned TPO has considered the gross margin earned by the assessee in the export segment visà- vis gross margin earned in the domestic segment. Accordingly, he has held that the gross margin in the domestic segment is much higher than the margin earned in the export segment and, hence, he made an addition of Rs.58.54 lakh.

Held:
The Tribunal held that the TPO was not justified in adopting CPM and in comparing the gross margin in export segment vis-à-vis gross margin in domestic segment of the assessee without appreciating that the CUP or TNMM was the most proper method for determining the ALP. The TPO was directed to accept the claim of the assessee regarding the ALP based on TNMM which method has been accepted in the succeeding year.

The Tribunal noted as under:

(1) Rates charged to the third parties in the domestic market cannot be compared with the rates charged to AE in the export market. There are various factors which affect the pricing of the product in the domestic market vis-à-vis the export market and, therefore, the price cannot be compared. The assessee has to bear substantial marketing cost in the domestic segment, there is no bad debt risk in respect of the sales made to the AE and no product liability risk. Besides, it is also a material aspect that the assessee has to bear product liability risks like retention money, bank guarantee, warranty, etc. in the domestic segment, but such risks are not to be borne in the export segment. Due to these factors, the assessee has to charge higher rates in the domestic segment and, therefore, comparison of the rates of the products in the domestic segment and the export segment is not justified.

(2) For the A.Y. 2007-08, the assessee has adopted TNMM for determining the ALP and the TPO has accepted the same. There is substance in the alternative submissions of the authorised representative that TNMM can also be accepted during the year for determining the ALP.

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(A) ITAT: Jurisdiction: Power and scope: Decision on a matter not arising in appeal: AO not disputing genuineness of transaction: Not questioned genuineness before CIT(A) or Tribunal: Tribunal treating transaction sham is erroneous. (B) Non-competition fee received by assessee prior to 1-4-2003 is capital receipt and not taxable.

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The relevant assessment year is A.Y. 1997-98. The assessee was one of the promoters and a director of Gaghra Sugar Ltd. which had a factory for manufacture of sugar. The assessee was also the director of Ganges Sugar Mills (P) Ltd. which had applied for and received licence to set up new sugar factory in the same region. In such circumstances Gaghra Sugar Ltd. negotiated with the assessee and entered into an agreement with the assessee preventing the assessee from competing with the sugar business of the company directly or indirectly for a period of five years for a consideration or Rs.25 lakh. In the assessment proceedings the assessee claimed the said amount received for ‘non-competition’ as capital receipt not liable for tax. The Assessing Officer however taxed the said amount under the head ‘Other Sources’. The CIT(A) accepted the assesses contention and allowed the appeal. In the appeal filed by the Revenue, the Tribunal held that the claim of the assessee of ‘non-competition’ fee was not genuine and allowed the appeal of the Assessing Officer.

In the appeal filed by the assessee the Calcutta High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“(i) The Assessing Officer having assessed the noncompetition fee as revenue receipt without disputing the genuineness of the transaction and not questioned the genuineness even in the appeal either before the CIT(A) or before the Tribunal, order passed by the Tribunal treating the receipt of non-competition fees as a sham transaction is erroneous.

(ii) Non-competition fees received by the assessee prior to 1-4-2003 has to be treated as capital receipt and it is not taxable.”

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(2012) 65 DTR (Mum.) (Trib.) 104 Ramesh R. Shah v. ACIT A.Y.: 2005-06. Dated: 29-07-2011

Revised return u/s.139(5) — When original return made u/s.139(1) declaring positive income, claim for carry forward of long-term capital loss made in revised return u/s.139(5) is allowable.

Facts:

The assessee had filed original return of income u/s.139(1) declaring total income of Rs.94.09 lakhs. Subsequently, the assessee filed a revised return claiming long-term capital loss of Rs.1.82 crore and the said loss was claimed to be carried forward u/s.74. The AO denied carry forward of such loss on the ground that as per section 80, loss not determined in return u/s.139(3) cannot be allowed to be carried forward and set off u/s.74. The learned CIT also confirmed the order of the AO observing that carry forward of loss returned for the first time in revised return of income is not eligible for carry forward to the next assessment year as per provisions of section 80.

Held:

In the present case, the assessee filed the original return u/s.139(1) in which the positive income is determined and subsequently even revised return filed declared positive income as the assessee could not set off the long-term capital loss on the sale of shares. He claimed the same to be carried forward.

As per the provisions of section 139(5) in both the situations where the assessee has filed the return of positive income as well as return of loss at the first instance as per the time-limit prescribed and subsequently, files the revised return then the revised return is treated as valid return. Hence once the assessee declares positive income in original return filed u/s.139(1), but subsequently finds some mistake or wrong statement and files revised return declaring loss, then he cannot be deprived of the benefit of carry forward of such loss.

TDS: Payment to sub-contractors: Section 194C: Union of truck operators procuring contracts for its members: No sub-contracts: Tax not deductible at source.

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[CIT v. Truck Operators Union, 339 ITR 532 (P&H)]
The assessee was a truck operators’ union. It procured contracts for its members. The Assessing Officer made an addition of Rs.6,30,32,453 by way of disallowance u/s.40(a)(ia) holding that such payment to the members required deduction of tax u/s.194C of the Act which was not done. The Tribunal deleted the addition and held as under:

“The assessee-union had been formed by truck operators in order to obtain bigger contracts through it. It was of course entitled to booking charges received, which constituted its main income and the main function of the assessee was to arrange contracts from different agencies for its member operators which were factually and collectively formed by such members. The freight received from the parties concerned belonged to the member truck operators by whose trucks the contracts were performed and as such, the same was disbursed to none else but them. The assessee-union did not give any sub-contract to its members as alleged by the Assessing Officer.”

On appeal by the Revenue, the Punjab and Haryana High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“When the union was acting only in the representative capacity and there was no separate contract between the union and its members for performance of the work as required for applicability of section 194C(2) of the Act, section 40(a)(ia) of the Act was not applicable.”

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TDS: Sections 194C and 194I of Income-tax Act, 1961: A.Y. 2007-08: Assessee engaged in transportation of building materials: Payment to contractors for hiring dumpers: Not rent for machinery or equipment but payment for works contract: Section 194C applicable and not Section 194I.

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[CIT v. Shree Mahalaxmi Transport Co., 339 ITR 484 (Guj.)]

The assessee was engaged in the transportation of building materials, etc. In the A.Y. 2007-08, the assessee paid Rs.1,18,29,647 as rent for hiring dumpers and deducted tax at source at the rate of 1.12%. as applicable u/s.194C of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Assessing Officer held that the payment was governed by section 194-I and accordingly passed order u/s.201(1) holding the assessee to be in default and levied interest u/s.201(1A) of the Act. The Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal held that the assessee was not in default and that the levy of interest was not justified.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“(i) The assessee had given contracts to the parties for the transportation of goods and had not taken machinery and equipment on rent. The Commissioner (Appeal) was justified in holding that the transactions being in the nature of contracts for shifting of goods from one place to another wood be covered as works contracts, thereby attracting the provisions of section 194C of the Act. Since the assessee had given sub-contracts for transportation of goods and not for the renting out of machinery or equipment, such payments could not be termed as rent paid for the use of machinery and the provisions of section 194-I of the Act would not be applicable.

(ii) The Tribunal was, therefore, justified in upholding the order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals).”

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Chanchal Kumar Sircar v. ITO ITAT ‘A’ Bench, Kolkata Before Mahavir Singh (JM) and C. D. Rao (AM) ITA No. 1147/Kol./2011 A.Y.: 2005-06. Decided on: 21-2-2012 Counsel for assessee/revenue : S. Bandyopadhyay/S. K. Roy

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Section 54EC — Exemption from capital gains tax —
Whether assessee entitled to claim exemption under the provision when
the investment in the eligible bonds is made within six months of the
date of receipt of consideration as against the prescribed condition of
the date of transfer — Held, Yes.

Facts:

During the year under appeal
the assessee sold three flats and the entire floor of a building
constructed by him by sales agreements dated 2-7-2004 and 1-7-2004,
respectively. The entire consideration aggregating to Rs.131.77 lacs was
received in instalments between 1-7-2004 and 27-6-2005. Each of the
instalment received by the assessee was deposited by him in full with
NABARD almost immediately and in any case within six months’ period from
the dates of the respective receipts. The assessee claimed exemption
u/s.54EC of the Act on Capital Gains. The AO completed the assessment
u/s.143(3) of the Act accepting the returned income. The CIT, in
exercise of his powers u/s.263 of the Act, held that the investments of
sale consideration amounts should be within six months’ from the date of
the sale and not from the date of receipt of consideration as claimed
by the assessee. In that view, he not only set aside the assessment, but
also gave directions for not considering the deposits made beyond the
period of six months from 2-7-2004 for the purpose of section 54EC.

In
consequence to revision order passed u/s.263 of the Act by the CIT,
assessment was framed u/s. 254/263/143(3) of the Act by the AO on
24-12-2010, and disallowed exemption u/s.54EC of the Act. Aggrieved, the
assessee preferred appeal before the CIT(A) and the CIT(A) also
confirmed the action of the AO.

Held:
According to the Tribunal, if the
period is reckoned from the date of agreement and receipt of part
payment at the first instance, then it would lead to an impossible
situation by asking the assessee to invest money in specified asset
before actual receipt of the same. In taking this view the Tribunal was
supported by the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case
of S. Gopal Reddy v. CIT, (181 ITR 378), where in a similar situation of
delayed receipt of compensation amount on acquisition of property, the
Court observed that if the investment in specified asset was made within
a period of six months from the date of receipt of compensation, as
against the date of acquisition of the property denoting transfer
thereof, the same should be considered to be sufficient compliance for
the purpose of claiming exemption u/s.54E of the Act. The Tribunal noted
that similar view was also taken by the Allahabad High Court in the
case of CIT v. Janardhan Dass, (late through legal heir Shyam Sunder)
(299 ITR 210) and by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of
Darapaneni Chenna Krishnayya (HUF) v. CIT, (291 ITR 98). In view of the
above consistent principle adopted by the High Courts in respect to
interpretation of a beneficial provision and the fact that the assessee
invested in specified bonds i.e., NABARD bonds, within one month of the
receipt of sale consideration, the Tribunal held that the assessee is
eligible for exemption u/s.54EC of the Act.

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Shri 1008 Parshwanath Digamber Jain Mandir Trust v. DIT ITAT ‘I’ Bench, Mumbai Before P. M. Jagtap (AM) and N. V. Vasudevan (JM) ITA No. 5544/M/2009 Decided on: 8-2-2012 Counsel for assessee/revenue: Ajay Ghosalia/ Sanjiv Dutt

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Section 12AA — Registration of charitable trust — Trust constituted with the object clause consisting of charitable as well as religious — Whether entitled for registration — Held, Yes.

Facts:
The assessee trust had applied for registration u/s.12AA of the Act. Its objects, as per its trust deed, were charitable as well as religious. According to the DIT, since the objects were admixture of religious as well as non-religious, relying on the decision of the Jammu & Kashmir High Court in the case of Ghulam Mohidin Trust v. CIT, (248 ITR 587) and the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Kerala v. M. P. Shanti Verma Jain, (231 ITR 787), the registration u/s.12AA was denied. Before the Tribunal, the Revenue justified the order of the DIT on the ground that at the time of grant of registration u/s.12AA, it was necessary that he was satisfied that the objects are charitable and as per section 2(15), which defines the term ‘charitable purpose’, religious purpose is not part of charitable purpose.

Held:

According to the Tribunal, the trust, whose objects are religious as well as charitable, would be entitled for grant of registration and also to claim exemption u/s.11. For the purpose, reliance was placed on the decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of ACIT v. Bibijiwala, (AA) Trust (100 ITR 516). It further observed that when the assessee seek exemption u/s.11, the same would be allowed subject to provision of section 13(1)(a) and (b) of the Act. According to it, the decisions relied on by the Revenue were on different facts, hence, not applicable to the case of the assessee.

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Interest on refund: Section 244A of Incometax Act, 1961: A.Y. 1998-99: Period for interest: Period of delay caused by assessee: Assessee’s belated claim for deduction allowed by CIT(A): No delay caused by assessee: Interest payable from beginning of relevant A.Y.

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[CIT v. South Indian Bank Ltd., 340 ITR 574 (Ker.)]

For the A.Y. 1998-99, the assessee’s belated claim for bad debts was rejected by the Assessing Officer for failure to establish the claim. The claim was allowed by the CIT(A). The Assessing Officer denied interest on refund u/s.244A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on the ground that the delay was attributable to an additional claim of deduction which was allowed by the CIT(A). The Tribunal held that the assessee was entitled to interest from 1-4-1999.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Kerala High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“The Assessing Officer had not established that the assessee had caused any delay in issuing the refund order. There was no decision by the Commissioner or Chief Commissioner on this issue. The assessee was eligible to get interest from 1-4-1999, till the date of refund.”

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Penalty – Concealment of Income – There is no time limit prescribed for payment of tax with interest for the grant of immunity under clause (2) of Explanation 5 to section 271(1)(c).

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[Asst. CIT v. Gebilal Kanhaialal HUF (2012) 348 ITR 561 (SC)]

Search and seizure operation were carried out during the period 29-7-1987 to 1-8-1987 at the residential/business premises of the assessee HUF, represented by the Karta, Shri Kalyanmal Karva. Assets worth Rs.48,32,000 besides incriminating documents were seized. On 1-8-1987, the Karta while surrendering the amount made a statement u/s. 132(4). The return of income for the assessment year 1987-88 which was required to be filed u/s.139(1) on or before 31-7-1987 was not filed. Pursuant to notices issued u/s.142(1)(ii) in December 1988, the assessee on 16-2-1990 furnished required information including statement of all assets and liabilities whether included in the accounts or not. In the said statement, the said Karta reiterated his earlier statement of concealment. The Department denied the immunity under clause (2) of Explanation 5 to section 271(1) (c) mainly for the reason that the assessee had failed to file his return of income on or before 31-7-1987 and had failed to pay the tax thereon.

The Supreme Court observed that Explanation 5 is a deeming provision. It provides that where, in the course of search u/s. 132, that assessee is found to be the owner of unaccounted assets and the assessee claims that such assets have been acquired by him by utilising, wholly or partly, his income for any previous year which has ended before the date of search or which is to end on or after the date of search, then, in such a situation, notwithstanding that such income is declared by him in any return of income furnished on or after the date of search, he shall be deemed to have concealed the particulars of his income for the purposes of imposition of penalty u/s. 271(1)(c). The only exception to such a deeming provision or to such a presumption of concealment is given in sub-clause (1) and (2) of Explanation 5. Three conditions have got to be satisfied by the assessee for claiming immunity from payment of penalty under clause (2) of Explanation 5 of section 271(1)(c). The first condition was that the assessee must make a statement u/s. 132(4) in the course of search, stating that the unaccounted assets and incriminating documents found from his possession during the search have been acquired out of his income, which has not been disclosed in the return of income to be furnished before expiry of time specified in section 139(1). Such statement was made by the karta during the search which concluded on 1st August, 1987. It was not in dispute that condition No.1 was fulfilled. The second conditions for availing of the immunity from penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) was that the assessee should specify, in his statement u/s. 132(4), the manner in which such income stood derived. Admittedly, the second condition, in the present case also stood satisfied. According to the Department, the assessee was not entitled to immunity under clause (2) as he did not satisfy the third condition for availing of the benefit of waiver of penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) as the assessee failed to file his return of income on 31st July, 1987, and pay tax thereon particularly when the assessee conceded on 1st August, 1987 that there was concealment of income.

The Supreme Court held that the third condition under clause (2) was that the assessee had to pay the tax together with interest, if any, in respect of such undisclosed income. However, no time limit for payment of such tax stood prescribed under clause (2). The only requirement stipulated in the third condition was for the assessee to “pay tax together with interest”. In the present case, according to the Supreme Court, the third condition also stood fulfilled. The assessee had paid tax with interest up to the date of payment.

The Supreme Court held that the assessee was entitled to immunity under clause (2) of Explanation 5 to section 271(1)(c).

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Time limit for issuing of notice : Sections 148 and 149 of Income-tax Act, 1961: A.Y. 1998-99: Assessment order u/s.143(3) passed on 28-2- 2001: Notice u/s.148 issued on 30-3-2009: Not valid: Section 149 amended by Finance Act, 2001, w.e.f. 1-6-2001 reducing the time limit from 10 years to 6 years is applicable.

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[C. B. Richards Ellis Mauritius Ltd. v. ADIT, 21 Taxman. com 535 (Del.)]

For the A.Y. 1998-99 the assessment was completed u/s.143(3) on 28-2-2001. Subsequently, on 30-3-2009, a notice u/s.148 was issued for reopening the assessment. The assessee’s objections were rejected by the Assessing Officer. The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under: “

(i) The issue in dispute gained importance because the time limit for issuance of notice u/s.148 as stipulated and stated in section 149 underwent substitution by the Finance Act, 2001 with effect from 1-6-2001. By the Finance Act, 2001, the period was restricted to six years from the end of the relevant assessment year. Before the said substitution, till 31-5-2001 reassessment proceedings could be initiated for up to 10 years from the end of the relevant assessment year.

(ii) It is an accepted and admitted position that the re-assessment notice dated 30-3-2009 would be barred and beyond time, in case, the period stipulated in substituted section 149 with effect from 1-6-2001 is applied.

However, the contention of the Revenue is that the substituted section is not applicable and section 149 before its substitution by the Finance Act, 2001 would apply. It is stated that the return in question was filed on 20-11-1998 and the law/limitation period prescribed/applicable on the first day of the assessment year determines and decides the time period for issue of notice u/s.147/148. The question raised is whether the amendment substitution of the period with effect from 1-6-2001 in section 149, is procedural or substantive.

(iii) Law of limitation is a procedural law and the provision or the limitation period stipulated on the date when the suit is filed applies. Law of limitation, therefore, being procedural law has to be applied to the proceedings on the date of institution/ filing. No person can have a vested right in the procedure. Therefore, the procedural law on the date when it was enforced is applied.

(iv) Law of limitation does not create any right in favour of a person or define or create any cause of action, but simply prescribes that the remedy can be exercised or availed of by or within the period stated and not thereafter. Subsequently, the right continues to exist but cannot be enforced. The liability to tax under the Act is created by the charging section read with the computation provisions. The assessment proceedings crystallise the said liability so that it can be enforced and the tax if short-paid or unpaid can be collected. If this difference between liability to tax and the procedure prescribed under the Act for computation of the liability (i.e., the procedure of assessment), is kept in mind, there would be no difficulty in understanding and appreciating the fallacy and the error in the primary argument raised by the Revenue.

(v) It is a settled position that liability to tax as a levy is normally determined as per statute as it exists on the first day of the assessment year, but this is not the issue or question in the present case. The issue or question in the present case relates to assessment, i.e., initiation of re-assessment proceedings and whether the time/limitation for initiation of the re-assessment proceedings specified by the Finance Act, 2001 is applicable. The Court is not determining/deciding the liability to tax but has to adjudicate and decide whether the re-assessment notice is beyond the time period stipulated. This is a matter/issue of procedure, i.e., the time period in which the assessment or re-assessment proceedings can be initiated. Thus, the time period/limitation period prescribed on the date of issue of notice will apply.

(vi) In view of the aforesaid reasoning, writ petition is allowed and the re-assessment notice dated 30-3-2009 and the order passed by the Assessing Officer and Assistant Commissioner dismissing the objections of the assessee are quashed.”

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Speculation business: Speculation loss: Section 73, r/w section 28(i)-: A.Ys. 1996-97 and 1998-99: Assessee-company in business of dealing in shares and also earning interest income by granting loans and advances: Incurred loss in purchase and sale of shares: Claimed set-off of above loss against interest income: AO denied set-off relying on Explanation to section 73: Tribunal held that principal business of assessee was granting of loans and advances: Allowed set-off: Tribunal is right.

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[CIT v. Narayan Properties Ltd., 21 Taxman.com 547 (All.)]

The assessee-company was in the business of purchase and sale of shares and was also earning interest income by granting loans and advances. During the previous years relevant to the A.Ys. 1996-97 and 1998-99, the assessee incurred loss in the purchase and sale of shares and earned interest income from loans and advances. It claimed set-off of the above loss against the interest income. The Assessing Officer assessed the interest income as business income. He further treated the business of purchase and sale of shares as speculation business as per Explanation to section 73 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. He, therefore, considered the aforesaid loss as speculation loss and held that it would only be set off against the speculation profit in the subsequent years. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

 On appeal by the Revenue the Allahabad High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under: “

(i) Section 73(1) provides that any loss, computed in respect of speculation business carried on by the assessee, shall not be set off except against profits and gains, if any of another speculation business. Section 73(1) uses the words ‘business carried on’. The Explanation to section 73 also uses the phrase ‘where any part of the business of the company . . . . . consists in the purchase and sale of shares of other companies’. Section 28(1) provides for charging of income-tax on profits and gains of any business or profession which was carried on by the assessee at any time during the previous year. Section 28(1) r/w section 73(1) which also uses the words ‘business carried on’ clearly indicate that what is chargeable to the income-tax is the business actually carried on and profits and gains of the said business.

The Explanation to section 73 contains an exclusionary clause, according to which the following companies are excluded from the operation of the deeming clause

(i) a company whose gross total income consists mainly of income which is chargeable under the heads ‘Interest on securities’, ‘Income from house property’, ‘Capital gains’ and ‘Income from other sources’, or (ii) a company the principal business of which is the business of banking or granting of loans and advances’.

(ii) The question to be considered is as to whether a company, which fulfils the conditions as mentioned in the exclusionary categories, can be denied the benefit, if the income consists mainly of income as used in first category and the principal business of which as used in the second category from the activities and business which are not the part of the memorandum of association of the company. Section 28(1), section 73(1) and the Explanation to section 73 indicate that the income which is chargeable is the income in the relevant year arising from business or profession carried on by the company. The words ‘carried on’ mean actual carrying of the activity. The words ‘carried on has to be read in context of what actually was done by the company in the relevant year, rather than what was main object in the memorandum of association of the company. Thus, the submission of the Revenue that since in the memorandum of association the activity or business, which is shown to have been carried on by the assessee, is not included, it is not entitled to be considered in exclusionary clause, has to be rejected.

(iii) For qualifying the exclusionary categories as mentioned in the Explanation to section 73, the condition to be fulfilled is that gross total income consists mainly of income which is chargeable under the heads

 (a) ‘Interest on securities’,

(b) ‘Income from house property’,

(c) ‘Capital gains’ and

(d) ‘Income from other sources’.

The said provision uses the words ‘mainly of income’. The words ‘mainly of income’ and similarly in the second category the words ‘principal business of which’ mean substantially or primarily.

(iv) In the instant case, the total gross income of the assessee, which has been shown in the assessment order, is interest income. The assessment order does not refer to any other income. Hence, the condition that income consists ‘mainly of income’ is completely fulfilled. One of the heads of the income for exclusionary category is income from other sources.

 (v) The second category consists of the phrase ‘a company the principal business of which is granting of loans and advances’. The income, which has been treated to be gross income, is income from interest of the assessee from granting loans and advances. Thus, the assessee was covered by exclusionary clause of Explanation to section 73.

(vi) Therefore, the assessee was clearly covered by the exclusionary clause of Explanation to section 73 and the Tribunal rightly set off of the aforesaid loss against the income of the assessee from loans and advances.”

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Settlement of case: Abatement: Sections 245C, 245D and 245HA : A.Ys. 1989-90 to 1993-94: Effect and scope of section 245HA: Where there was no fault of the applicant and he himself is not responsible for delay in getting decision on the settlement application, the application shall not abate.

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[Md. Sanaul Haque & Ors. v. UOI, 250 CTR 218 (Jharkhand)]

Dealing with the effect and scope of section 245HA of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the Jharkhand High Court followed the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Star Television News Ltd. v. UOI, 317 ITR 66 (Bom.) and held as under: “In a case where there was no fault of the applicant and he himself is not responsible for delay in getting decision on the settlement application, in that situation, the application shall not abate. The Settlement Commission has to decide the application following the principles laid down in Star Television News Ltd.”

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Penalty: Delay in filing declaration in Form No. 15H: Section 272A(2)(f): A.Ys. 1991-93, 1992-93 and 1994-95: No obligation to file declaration prior to 1-6-1992: Penalty not imposable for that period: Further the penalty to be restricted to the tax amount as per subsequent clarificatory amendment to proviso.

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[CIT v. Krishna Cold Storage, 250 CTR 134 (Guj.)]

For the A.Ys. 1991-92, 1992-93 and 1994-95 penalty u/s.272A(2)(f) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was imposed for delay in filing declaration in Form 15H. The Tribunal held that no penalty was imposable for the period prior to 1-6-1992 because there was no statutory obligation to file the prescribed form u/s.197A. The Tribunal also held that the penalty should be restricted to the amount of tax deductible by giving retrospective effect to the proviso which is clarificatory.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under: “

(i) Failure to file the declaration in Form No. 15H prior to 1-6-1992 not being a default u/s. 272A(2) (f), no penalty could be levied for delay up to 1-6-1992.

(ii) In view of proviso, which is remedial in nature and consequently retrospective in operation, penalty could not exceed the tax deductible.”

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PAN: TDS: Section 206AA, r.w.s. 139A: Constitutional validity; Article 14 of the Constitution of India, 1950: Requirement to furnish PAN: Section 206AA is unconstitutional and has to be read down from statute and made inapplicable to persons whose income is less than taxable limit: Therefore, banking and financial institution shall not invariably insist upon PAN from small investors as well as persons who intend to open an account in bank or financial institution.

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[Smt. A. Kowsalya Bai v. UOI, 22 Taxman.com 157 (Kar.)]

Considering the constitutional validity of section 206AA of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the Karnataka High Court held as under: “

(i) The very intent of section 206AA is to make it conditional for every person who wish to have a transaction in the bank or financial institution including small investors/depositors, invariably to have a PAN. This runs contrary to what has been contemplated u/s.139A which was introduced by the Legislature in its wisdom. What is not in dispute is, persons whose income is below the taxable limit need not have a PAN and also they need not furnish income tax declaration/ returns. Of course, under the Finance Act, it is made clear that a person whose income is less than the taxable limit is not taxable.

(ii) Such of the small investors who come forward to invest their savings from earnings as security for their future, by virtue of the present section 206AA necessarily have to give their PAN. The poor and illiterate/uneducated persons are finding it difficult rather to approach the various Government departments, particularly the Income-tax Department to get their PAN.

(iii) It is, therefore, held that it may not be necessary for such persons whose income is below the taxable limit to obtain PAN. Such investments/ savings from their earnings or by way of agriculture or any other source, in banking and financial institutions would also further the financial position from the point of the country’s economy.

(iv) But imposing condition to invariably go for a PAN on such small depositors would cause hindrance and discourage such small investors to come forward to invest their money for secured returns and as security for their future.

(v) The difficulty expressed by the petitioners and similarly placed persons is, imposing condition to invariably go for PAN as per section 206AA would run contrary to section 139A. It is also their grievance that filing of Form 15G to seek exemption from deduction of income tax at source, also is not accepted by the 3rd and 4th respondents and acted upon unless the PAN is produced.

(vi) Section 139A which is introduced way back in April 1991 is in vogue and this provision stands the scrutiny of Article 14 of the Constitution for reasonableness. But, section 206AA which is contrary to section 139A appears to be discriminatory as if it is overriding section 139A introduced earlier.

Though the intention of the Legislature is to bring the maximum persons under the net of income tax, when necessarily it provides for exemption up to taxable limit, it may not insist such persons whose income is below the taxable limit to compulsorily go for PAN. If any mischief of avoiding of tax or any other act of concealing the income is detected, that could be taken care of by penal provisions.

vii) In that view of the matter, in view of the specific provision of section 139A, section 206AA is made inapplicable to persons and read down from the statute for those whose income is less than the taxable limit as per the Finance Act, 1991. However, it is made clear that section 206AA would of course be made applicable to persons whose income is above the taxable limit.

(viii) The banking and financial institutions shall not invariably insist upon PAN from such small investors like the petitioners as well as from persons who intend to open an account in the bank or financial institution.”

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Income: Deemed to accrue or arise in India: Sections 5, 6 and 9 : A.Y. 2001-02: Assessee was an employee of an American company and non-resident from year 1991 to 1999: On termination of employment in 1999, he received certain amount from previous employer as retirement benefit/severance/ vacation engagement: Assessee not ordinary resident in relevant assessment year: Amount received by assessee had not accrued/ deemed to be accrued/paid in India in terms of section 6 and section 9(1)(ii): Amou<

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[CIT v. Anant Jain, 207 Taxman 117 (Del.), 21 Taxman. com 19 (Del.)]

The assessee was an employee of an American company from 1991 till November, 1999 and during this period he was a non-resident Indian. The employment was terminated in the year 1999. In the relevant year, i.e., A.Y. 2001-02 the assessee was ‘not ordinarily resident’. In the relevant year the assessee received certain amount as leave encashment according to the number of years of service, which was subsequently described as severance and vacation encashment paid by the erstwhile employer of the assessee in the USA for services rendered outside India.

The assessee claimed that this amount was not taxable in India under provisions of section 5(1)(c) read with section 9(1)(ii). The Assessing Officer held that the said amount was received by the assessee as his profit in lieu of salary which was payable by the employer under the employer-employee relationship and, therefore, was taxable u/s.17(3)(ii). The CIT(A) held that the receipt of the impugned amount was on account of the past services rendered by the assessee to his previous foreign employer outside India at a time when he was a non-resident and this could not be deemed to have accrued or arisen in India and would not come under the purview of section 9(1)(ii).

The Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A). On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under: “

(i) It is clear from the factual findings recorded by both the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal, that the payment in question was received towards retirement benefit/severance/vacation encashment from the erstwhile employer on termination of employment in November, 1999. The erstwhile employer was based in the USA and services were rendered to the erstwhile employer in the USA.

(ii) In view of the aforesaid factual position, elucidated and accepted by both, the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal, the said amount cannot be taxed in India, as the status of the assessee during the year in question was that of ‘not ordinary resident’. The said income did not accrue or arise in India.

(iii) The Tribunal has rightly held that in terms of section 6 and section 9(1)(ii), the amount/income had not accrued/deemed to be accrued/ paid in India.”

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Depreciation: Intangible assets: Section 32(1) (ii): A.Ys. 2002-03 and 2005-06: Know-how, business contracts, business information, etc., described as goodwill are intangible assets eligible for depreciation u/s.32(1)(ii) as ‘business or commercial rights of similar nature’ specified in section 32(1)(ii).

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[Areva T&D India Ltd. v. Dy. CIT, 250 CTR 151 (Del.)]

The assessee had acquired know-how, business contracts, business information, etc., as part of the slump sale described as goodwill. The assessee’s claim for depreciation u/s.32(1)(ii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on such intangible assets was disallowed for the A.Ys. 2002-03 and 2005-06, for the reason that the same were described as goodwill. The Tribunal upheld the disallowance.

On appeal by the assessee, the Delhi High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under: “Intangible assets viz., business claims, business information, business records, contracts, employees and know-how acquired by the assessee under slump sale of running business are in the nature of ‘business or commercial rights of similar nature’ specified in section 32(1)(ii) and therefore, the same are eligible for depreciation.”

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Capital gains: Sections 2(47) and 48: A.Y. 2002-03: Redemption of preference shares amounts to transfer u/s.2(47): Computation: Redeemable preference shares are not bonds or debentures: At time of redemption of preference shares, assessee would be entitled to benefit of indexation u/s.48.

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[CIT v. Enam Securities (P.) Ltd., 345 ITR 64 (Bom.); 208 Taxman 54 (Bom.); 21 Taxman.com 267 (Bom.)]

In the A.Y. 2001-02, the assessee redeemed three lakh preference shares (held for 10 years) at par and claimed long-term capital loss after availing benefit of indexation and claimed the set-off of the same against the long-term capital gain on sale of other shares. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim on the grounds that —

(i) both the assessee and the company in which the assessee held the preference shares, were managed by the same group of persons;

(ii) that there was no transfer; and that the assessee was not entitled to indexation on the redemption of non-cumulative redeemable preference shares. The CIT(A) allowed the claim of the assessee. The Tribunal affirmed the view of the CIT(A).

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under: “

(i) There is a finding of fact that the transaction was not questioned by the Revenue for over ten years: that both the assessee and the company of which the assessee held redeemable preference shares were juridical entities and the mere fact that both were under common management would not necessarily indicate that the transaction was not genuine. There is no reason for this Court to differ with the finding of the Tribunal.

(ii) The judgment of the Supreme Court in Anarkali Sarabhai v. CIT, (1997) 224 ITR 422/90 Taxman 502 concludes the issue that a redemption of preference shares by a company squarely comes within the ambit of section 2(47), since it amounts to a transfer.

(iii) The second proviso to section 48 provides for indexation where long-term capital gain arises from the transfer of a long-term capital asset. The third proviso, however, stipulates that nothing contained in the second proviso shall apply to long-term capital gain arising from the transfer of a long-term capital asset being bonds or debentures other than capital indexed bonds issued by the Government.

The Assessing Officer was of the view that the principal characteristic of a bond is a fixed holding period and a fixed rate of return. According to him, the four per cent non-cumulative redeemable preference shares which the assessee redeemed also had a fixed holding period and a fixed rate of return and on this basis denied the benefit of cost indexation to the assessee. The entire basis on which the Assessing Officer denied the benefit of cost indexation was flawed and was justifiably set right in the order of the Tribunal.

(iv) There is a clear distinction between bonds and share capital, because a bond does not represent ownership of equity capital. Bonds are in essence interest-bearing instruments which represent a loan. This distinction has been accepted by the Supreme Court in R. D. Goyal v. Reliance Industries Ltd., (2002) 40 SCL 503.

(v) Section 48 denies the benefit of indexation to bonds and debentures other than capital indexed bonds issued by the Government. The four percent non-cumulative redeemable preference shares were not bonds or debentures within the meaning of that expression in section 48. In these circumstances, the Tribunal was correct in its decision to that effect.”

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Capital gain: Sections 48 and 55(2): A.Y. 1999- 00: Transfer of self acquired trademark and design: No cost of acquisition: Capital gain not chargeable to tax.

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[CIT v. M/s. Fernhill Laboratories and Industrial Establishment (Bom.); ITA No. 5615 of 2010, dated 12-6-2012]

In the previous year relevant to the A.Y. 1999-00, the assessee transferred self acquired trademark and designs for the considerations of Rs.15 crore and Rs.20 lakh, respectively. The assessee claimed that the capital gain on such transfer is not chargeable to tax in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. B. C. Srinivasa Setty, 128 ITR 249 (SC). The Assessing Officer rejected the assessee’s claim and held that the capital gain is chargeable to tax. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal accepted the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under: “

(i) Prior to the amendment made to section 55(2) by the Finance Act, 2001 effective from 1-4-2002 by adding the words ‘trademark or brand name associated with the business’ self-generated assets such as trademark did not have any cost of acquisition. Therefore, for the period under consideration the computation u/s.48 fails resulting in such transfer of trademarks not being chargeable to capital gains tax.

 (ii) Consequent to amendment made to section 55(2) w.e.f. 1-4-2002 by which the words trademark or brand name associated with the business was introduced into it, the computation provision becomes workable and the consideration for the sale of trademark would be subject to capital gains tax.

(iii) In fact, when the amendment was made to section 55 by the Finance Act, 2001 the CBDT had issued Circular bearing No. 14-2001 explaining the provisions of the Finance Act, 2001. From the said Circular it would be clear that the amendment bringing self-generated intangible assets such as trademarks to capital gains tax only w.e.f. A.Y. 2002-03 onwards. In this case we are concerned with the A.Y. 1999-00 and therefore, the amendment would not have any effect. Consequently, the sale of self-generated trademarks during the A.Y. 1999-00 are not chargeable to capital gains tax.

(iv) So far as the sale of self-generated designs (i.e., not acquired) the same is also not chargeable to capital gains tax not only for the reasons applicable to trademarks, but for the fact that even till this date, no amendment has been made to section 55(2) of the said Act, defining cost of acquisition of design as in the case of trademark, goodwill, etc.”

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Capital gain: Indexed cost: Sections 2(42A), 48 and 49 : A.Y. 2005-06: Acquisition of asset by inheritance: Indexation to be made w.r.t. the holding of asset by previous owner.

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[CIT v. Ms. Janhavi S. Desai (Bom.); ITA No. 126 of 2011 with CO(L) No. 2 of 2012, dated 5-7-2012]

In or about the year 1942, the assessee’s father acquired the immovable property from his father. The assessee’s father expired on 21-8-1988, leaving behind a will bequeathing the property to his wife (assessee’s mother) and the assessee in equal shares. The assessee’s mother expired on 21-2-2000 and her 50% share was inherited by the assessee. In the previous year corresponding to the A.Y. 2005-06, the assessee sold the property for a consideration of Rs.9.5 crore and declared a long-term capital gain of Rs.38,44,247. While computing the capital gain the assessee considered the date of acquisition of the property to be prior to 1-4-1981 and took the cost of acquisition and indexed the same w.r.t. 1-4-1981. The AO held that for the purpose of indexation, the actual date of acquisition by the assessee must be taken. Accordingly, he indexed the cost in respect of 50% w.r.t. 21-8-1988 (date of death of father) and the balance 50% w.r.t. 21-2-2000 (date of death of mother). The CIT(A) allowed the assessee’s appeal and held that the indexation should be w.r.t. 1-4- 1981. The Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A) w.r.t. 50% of the property acquired from the father. In respect of the balance 50% acquired from mother, the Tribunal held that the indexation should be w.r.t. 21-8-1988 when the mother acquired the property from the father. The Tribunal held that for the purpose of indexation, the period of holding of the asset by the previous owner should be taken into account.

The Revenue filed appeal in respect of the 50% decided in favour of the assessee and the assessee filed cross-objection in respect of the balance 50%. The Bombay High Court dismissed the appeal and allowed the cross-objection and held as: “

(i) The Explanation to section 49(1) defines the expression ‘previous owner of the property’ to be the last previous owner thereof, who acquired it by a mode of acquisition ‘other than that referred to in clauses (i) to (iv) of s.s (1)’. The last previous owner of the property, who acquired the property by a mode of acquisition other than those referred to in clauses (i) to (iv), was the assessee’s grand-father. The assessee’s father admittedly acquired the property in 1942 from his father.

 (ii) As far as the 50% portion of the property acquired by the assessee from his father is concerned, the cost of acquisition must be determined to be the cost at which the assessee’s grandfather, in any event the assessee’s father acquired the property and not the date on which the assessee acquired it. The Tribunal does not hold otherwise either.

(iii) The Tribunal however held that in respect of 50% of the property inherited by the assessee from her mother, the period of holding would start from 21-8-1988, as she became owner of her 50% share in the property only from that date. This requires consideration. The last previous owner of the assessee’s mother’s 50% share was her husband’s father and at the highest her husband. Thus the assessee must be deemed to have held this 50% share in the property also from 1-4-1981.

(iv) In the circumstances, the questions are answered in favour of the assessee. The period of holding shall be from 1-4-1981 in respect of the entire property.”

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Dy. Commissioner v. MTZ Polyfilms Ltd. ITAT ‘B’ Bench, Mumbai Before N. V. Vasudevan (JM) and Pramod Kumar (AM) ITA No. 5015/Mum./2009 A.Y.: 2004-05. Decided on: 30-12-2011 Counsel for revenue/assessee: P. C. Mourya/ Jitendra Jain

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Section 36(1)(iii), section 37(1) and section 43B — Interest paid on unpaid purchase consideration — It was held that such interest is governed by the provisions of section 37(1) and not by section 36(1) (iii) — Further held that the provisions of section 43B are not applicable to such interest.

Facts:
The assessee was engaged in the business of manufacturing of polyester films. It had its manufacturing facilities at GIDC, Gujarat. It was allotted plot of land by GIDC. As per the terms of allotment the assessee was required to pay the purchase consideration of the land in instalments with interest. For the year under consideration the assessee had paid the sum of Rs.99.97 lakh as interest to GIDC and the same was claimed as business expenditure. According to the AO the expenditure was of capital in nature. On appeal the CIT(A) allowed the appeal and held that the expenditure was of revenue in nature.

Before the Tribunal the Revenue supported the order of the AO and further contended that since the interest to GIDC was unpaid, it is not allowable u/s.43B.

Held:
The Tribunal, as per the order of the CIT(A), noted that the fact that the production by the assessee had commenced in October, 1988 was not controverted. Accordingly, it held that the interest paid during the year cannot be considered as capital expenditure. Further, it referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bombay Steam Navigation Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT, (1953) (56 ITR 52), where the interest paid on purchase consideration of the assets by the amalgamated company was held as allowable as business expenditure u/s. 10(2)(xv) of the 1922 Act (equivalent to section 37(1) of the 1961 Act) According to the Apex Court, the expression ‘capital’ used in section 10(2)(iii) of the 1922 Act (equivalent to section 36(1)(iii) of the 1961 Act), in the context in which it occurred, meant money and not any other asset. The Apex Court further observed that an agreement to pay the balance consideration due by the purchaser did not in truth give rise to a loan. On that basis the Apex Court held that the interest paid was not allowable as deduction u/s.10(2)(iii) of the 1922 Act, but as business expenditure u/s.10(2) (xv) of the 1922 Act. Applying the above ratio, the Tribunal held that the interest paid to GIDC by the assessee was allowable u/s.37(1). It further agreed with the assessee that the provisions of section 43B would also not apply to the facts of the present case, since unpaid sale consideration cannot be said to be monies borrowed.

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Sections 28, 145 — Project completion method — In the case of an assessee following project completion method, receipts by way of sale of TDR, which TDR has direct nexus with the project undertaken, can be brought to tax only in the year in which the project is completed.

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16. Pushpa Construction Co. v. ITO ITAT ‘C’ Bench, Mumbai
Before J. Sudhakar Reddy (AM) and R. S. Padvekar (JM)
ITA No. 193/Mum./2010

A.Y.: 2006-07. Decided on: 25-4-2012 Counsel for assessee/revenue: Vipul B. Joshi/ A. C. Tejpal

Sections 28, 145 — Project completion method — In the case of an assessee following project completion method, receipts by way of sale of TDR, which TDR has direct nexus with the project undertaken, can be brought to tax only in the year in which the project is completed.


Facts:

The assessee, a partnership firm, engaged in construction activity especially the Slum Rehabilitation Programme (SRA Scheme) launched by the Government of Maharashtra, had undertaken two projects of slum rehabilitation, during the financial year 2005-06, which were not completed as on 31-3-2006. The assessee was following project completion method of accounting.

During the financial year 2005-06, the assessee sold TDR allotted to it by BMC, which TDR was directly linked to the projects undertaken by the assessee, for a consideration of Rs.2,67,29,626. Since the projects were not complete as on 31-3-2006, this amount was reflected in the balance sheet as on 31- 3-2006 as advance. The Assessing Officer (AO) rejected the contentions of the assessee and brought to tax the entire amount as income of the assessee for A.Y. 2006-07. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal where it was also submitted that the entire sale proceeds of TDR totalling to Rs.6,90,26,192 were reflected in the P & L Account for A.Y. 2008-09 and surplus income of Rs.2,78,59,939 was offered. The CIT(A) confirmed the order of the AO. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:

The Tribunal noted that admittedly the two slum rehabilitation projects were not completed in A.Y. 2006-07 and also that the TDR in quesetion had direct nexus with the two projects undertaken by the assessee. It found that the contention of the assessee is supported by the decision of the jurisdictional High Court in the case of CIT Central I, Mumbai v. Chembur Trade Corporation, (ITA No. 3179 of 2009) order dated 14-9-2011 and also the decision of Mumbai Bench of ITAT in the case of ACIT v. Skylark Building, 48 SOT 306 (Mum.) and also that the assessee has offered the amounts in A.Y. 2008- 09 when the projects were completed.

The Tribunal accepted the contention of the assessee and restored the matter back to the file of the AO with a direction to verify whether the assessee has offered sale consideration of TDR in question in A.Y. 2008-09. If it has so offered, then the same should not be taxed in A.Y. 2006- 07.

The Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by the assessee.

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(2012) 49 SOT 387 (Delhi) Harnam Singh Harbans Kaur Charitable Trust v. DIT (Exemption) Dated: 16-12-2011

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Section 80G of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — After omission of proviso to clause (vi) of section 80G(5), existing approval expiring on or after 1-10- 2009 would be deemed to have been extended in perpetuity unless specifically withdrawn.

The assessee-charitable trust’s recognition for exemption u/s.80G expired on 31-3-2011. The assessee made an application in Form No. 10G seeking exemption for the period after 31-3-2011. The Director of Income-tax (Exemption) rejected this application for renewal of exemption and also held that assessee was earning huge money/fees in the name of medical treatment which was nothing but income from commercial activity carried out under the name of medical relief and, accordingly, invoked section 2(15) for withdrawing exemption.

The Tribunal held in favour of the assessee. The Tribunal noted as under:

(1) Proviso to clause (vi) of section 80G(5) has been omitted by the Finance Act, 2009 with effect from 1-10-2009. This proviso imposing the limitation of five years was omitted by the Finance Act, 2009 with effect from 1-10-2009 to provide that the approval once granted shall continue to be valid in perpetuity.

(2) The impact and scope of the omission of proviso to clause (vi) of s.s (5) of section 80G has been explained by the Board in its Circular No. 5, dated 3-6-2010 clarifying that the existing approval expiring on or after 1-10-2009 will be deemed to have been extended in perpetuity unless specifically withdrawn.

(3) Therefore, in the instant case, the filing of an application for renewal of exemption after the expiry of the same on 31-3-2011 by the assessee was not required. Once the exemption granted stands extended in perpetuity by operation of law, merely moving an application by the assessee would not divest it of the assessee’s right to treat the exemption to have been extended in perpetuity, which right had accrued to the assessee in view of the aforesaid Circular and the amendment made in the Act.

(4) Proviso to section 2(15) inserted w.e.f. 1-4-2009, provides that the advancement of any other object of general public utility shall not be a charitable purpose if it involves carrying on of any activity in the nature of trade, commerce or business, or any activity of rendering any service in relation to any trade, commerce or business, for a cess or fee or any other consideration, irrespective of the nature of use or application or retention of the income from such activity.

(5) It is clear that this proviso is applicable in respect of charitable institutions engaged in the activity of advancement of any other object of general public utility i.e., the 4th limb of section 2(15). The first three limbs i.e., relief of the poor, education and medical relief are outside the purview of the aforesaid proviso inserted to section 2(15). It has been admitted by the Director of Income-tax (Exemption) himself that the assessee-society has been registered u/s.12A as charitable trust and is running dispensary and health centre, which makes it clear that the charitable purpose for which the assessee-society is established includes medical relief and it is not a case of advancement of any other object of general public utility. Therefore, applying the provisions of proviso to section 2(15) to the instant case by the Director of Income-tax (Exemption) is also totally misplaced and for that reason, the assessee cannot be said to be not eligible for exemption u/s.80G.

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Section 54 — Exemption from capital gains tax provided the amount is invested in purchase or construction of a flat within the prescribed time period — Held that (1) booking of the flat with the builder is to be treated as construction of flat; (2) the extended period u/s.139(4) has to be considered for the purposes of utilisation of the capital gain amount.

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15. Kishore H. Galaiya v. ITO ITAT ‘A’ Bench, Mumbai Before B. R. Mittal (JM) and Rajendra Singh (AM) ITA No. 7326/Mum./2010 A.Y.: 2006-07 Decided on: 13-6-2012 Counsel for assessee/revenue: Bhavesh Doshi/K. R. Vasudevan

Section 54 — Exemption from capital gains tax provided the amount is invested in purchase or construction of a flat within the prescribed time period — Held that (1) booking of the flat with the builder is to be treated as construction of flat;     the extended period u/s.139(4) has to be considered for the purposes of utilisation of the capital gain amount.


Facts:

  • The assessee along with his wife was joint and equal owner of the property being a residential flat at Mumbai which had been purchased by them in April 2002 for a consideration of Rs.21 lac. The flat was sold by them on 7-3-2006 for a consideration of Rs.45 lac in which the share of the assessee was Rs.22 lac. The assessee computed the long term capital gain from sale of the flat after deducting the indexed cost of acquisition at Rs.9.98 lac. The assessee purchased another flat jointly along with his wife for a total consideration of Rs.35 lac. The assessee had made total payment of Rs.14.62 lac till 16-2-2009. The assessee, therefore, claimed that he was entitled to claim exemption u/s.54 of the Act as the capital gain had been invested in the new residential flat. The claim for exemption was denied by the AO because the assessee: Failed to deposit the balance amount in the account in any of the specified bank as required u/s.54 and utilise the same in accordance with the scheme framed by the Government; and
  • Could not produce evidence regarding taking possession of the new flat. On appeal, the CIT(A) confirmed the disallowance made by the AO. Before the Tribunal, the Revenue strongly supported the orders of the authorities below.

Held:

The Tribunal noted that the assessee had booked the new flat with the builder and as per agreement, the assessee was to make payment in instalments and the builder was to hand over the possession of the flat after construction. Based on the clarification of the CBDT vide its Circular No. 472, dated 16-12-1993 read with Circular No. 471 dated, 15-10-1986 and the decision of the Mumbai Bench of the Tribunal in the case of ACIT v. Smt. Sunder Kaur Sujan Singh Gadh, (3 SOT 206), the Tribunal noted that the case of the assessee was to be considered as construction of new residential house and not purchase of a flat. Thus, the Tribunal held that in case the assessee had invested the capital gains in construction of a new residential house within a period of three years, this should be treated as sufficient compliance of the provisions of section 54. According to it, it was not necessary that the possession of the flat should also be taken within the period of three years. For the purpose, it relied on the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT v. Mrs. Hilla J. B. Wadia, (216 ITR 376). As regards the default pointed out by the authorities below regarding non-deposit of unutilised amount of capital gain in the Capital Gain Account Scheme, the Tribunal noted the submission of the assessee that it was only due to ignorance of law and intention of the assessee was always to utilise the amount for construction of flat and the assessee had kept the amount in the savings bank account which was utilised towards the construction of flat. According to the Tribunal, this was only a technical default and on this ground alone the claim of exemption cannot be denied, particularly when the amount had been actually utilised for the construction of residential house and not for any other purpose. The view was supported by the decision of the Jodhpur Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Jagan Nath Singh Lodha v. ITO, (85 TTJ 173). The Tribunal also agreed with the assessee’s contention that the due date of filing of return of income u/s.139(1) has to be construed with respect to the due date of section 139(4) as the s.s (4) provides for the extended period for filing return as an exception to the section 139(1) and considering this, there was no default as the entire amount of capital gain had been invested within the due date u/s.139(4). For the purpose, reliance was placed on the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Ms. Jagrity Aggarwal (339 ITR 610).

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(1) Section 54F — Exemption of long-term capital gains where sales consideration is invested in purchase of a house — Whether purchase of house jointly with spouse is eligible — Held, Yes. (2) Section 94(7) — Purchase of units and sale thereof at loss after earning dividend — If date of tender of cheque for purchase of shares was considered as the date of purchase, then the sale was not within three months of purchase — Whether the provisions of section 94(7) attracted — Held, No.

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14. Vasudeo Pandurang Ginde v. ITO ITAT ‘F’ Bench, Mumbai
Before Vijay Pal Rao (JM) and N. K. Billaiya (AM)
ITA No. 4285/Mum./2009
A.Y.: 2004-05. Decided on: 6-6-2012
Counsel for assessee/revenue: C. N. Vaze/ Rajan

Section 54F — Exemption of long-term capital gains where sales consideration is invested in purchase of a house — Whether purchase of house jointly with spouse is eligible — Held, Yes.

Section 94(7) — Purchase of units and sale thereof at loss after earning dividend — If date of tender of cheque for purchase of shares was considered as the date of purchase, then the sale was not within three months of purchase
— Whether the provisions of section 94(7) attracted — Held, No.


Facts:

(1) The assessee had made long-term capital gain on sale of shares. The sales proceeds were invested in purchase of row house and exemption u/s.54F was claimed. One of the grounds on which the exemption was denied by the AO was that the house purchased by the assessee was in the joint name of his wife.

(2) The assessee had purchased units of mutual funds of Rs.3 crore on 26-12-2003. On the very same date, the assessee received a dividend of Rs.1.16 crore. On 29-3-2004, the assessee redeemed the units for Rs.1.7 crore and thereby booked a shortterm capital loss of Rs.1.3 crore. The AO found that the cheque of Rs.3 crore for the purchase of units was actually realised on 30-12-2003 and therefore, according to him, the period of holding before the redemption of the said units on 29-3-2004 was only 88 days i.e., less than 3 months. Therefore, according to him, the transaction was hit by the provisions of section 94(7) of the Act. The AO was also of the view that the entire transaction of sale and purchase of mutual fund units was nothing but a colourable device for setting off of the capital gains arising on sale of shares. Accordingly, the set off of short term capital loss claimed by the assessee was denied. On appeal the CIT(A) confirmed the denial of exemption u/s.54F. While on the issue regarding applicability of section 94(7) he noted that the provisions of section 94(7) lays down three cumulative conditions, the non-fulfilment of any one of the conditions would result into non applicability of section 94(7). Thus, if the date of the purchase as claimed by the AO was 30-12-2003, then it cannot be said that the units were purchased within three months prior to the record date because the record date was 26-12-2003 when the dividend was declared. Thus, one of the conditions essential for application of section 94(7) is not fulfilled. Secondly, the CIT(A) noted that the mutual fund had accepted 26-12-2003 as the date on which the units were allotted to the assessee. Based on the said date, the second conditions viz. that the units are sold within a period of three months was also not fulfilled. Accordingly, it was held that the provisions of section 94(7) were not applicable. As regards the point raised by the AO that the entire transaction was a colourable device, the CIT(A) relying on the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT v. Walfort Share & Stock Brokers Pvt. Ltd., Appeal No. 18 of 2006 held that as the conditions of section 94(7) have not been fulfilled, no disallowance was permissible.

Held:

(1) The Tribunal noted that the total consideration for the house had been met by the assessee. According to it the assessee had added the name of his wife only for the sake of convenience. It also drew support from the provisions of section 45 of the Transfer of Property Act which provides that the share in the property will depend on the amount contributed towards the purchase consideration. Further, relying on the decisions listed below, the Tribunal held that since the total consideration for the house had been paid by the assessee, the exemption cannot be denied on this ground.

  • The decisions relied on are as under:  ITO v. Arvind T. Thakkar in ITA No. 7338/Mum./2005 vide order dated 29-4-2011;
  •  Ravinder Kumar Arora v. ACIT in ITA No. 4998/ Del./2010 vide order dated 11-3-2011; and
  •  DIT v. Mrs. Jennifer Bhide, (2011) 15 Taxmann 82 (Kar.). (2) As regards section 94(7) The Tribunal noted that the whole issue revolved around the date of purchase of units. The Tribunal agreed with the findings of the CIT(A) and the appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed.
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(2012) 49 SOT 312 (Delhi) Dhoomketu Builders & Developers (P.) Ltd. v. Addl. CIT A.Y.: 2006-07. Dated: 30-11-2011

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Section 28(i) r.w.s. 56 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Participation in tender for sale of land demonstrates that business of real estate development is set up during the year.

For the relevant assessment year, the assessee, which was a 100% subsidiary of DLF Ltd., filed its return of income declaring a loss. The assessee company borrowed Rs.186 crore from DLF Ltd. and the paid the same amount as earnest money deposit for a tender for sale of land. This deposit was received back along with interest of Rs.0.62 crore and the assessee, in turn, returned the amount to DLF Ltd. and paid interest of Rs.1.79 crore, resulting in a net loss of Rs.1.17 crore. The Assessing Officer disallowed the loss on the ground that the assessee had not commenced any business activity and, therefore, it was not entitled for interest expenses as claimed by it. Similarly, the interest income received by the assessee deserved to be assessed as an ‘income from other sources’ and not as a business income.

The CIT(A) allowed the adjustment of interest received against the interest paid and determined the net loss of Rs.1.17 crore under ‘Income from Other Sources’, but did not allow carry forward of this loss.

The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim. The Tribunal noted as under:

(1) Participation in the tender was starting of one activity which enabled the assessee to acquire the land for development. The actual development of the land is immaterial for construing that business of the assessee has been set up.

(2) The investment of Rs.186 crore was not as a deposit out of surplus funds; rather it was earnest money paid by the assessee for the purchase of land. Thus, the assessee had demonstrated that its business was set up during the accounting period relevant for this assessment year.

(3) Therefore, income of the assessee had to be assessed under the head ‘business income’ and consequently loss computed by the first appellate authority at Rs.1.17 crore deserved to be permitted for carry forward.

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(2012) TIOL 64 ITAT-Bang. Shakuntala Devi v. DCIT A.Y.: 2007-08. Dated: 20-12-2011

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Section 22, section 23(1)(a), section 23(1)(c) — Annual value of property which could not be let out throughout the previous year needs to be taken as ‘nil’ in accordance with the provisions of section 23(1)(c).

Facts:
The assessee, a non-resident Indian, owned eight properties in India. During the relevant previous year, four properties were let out, whose annual value was offered for taxation under the head ‘Income from House Property’. Annual value of one property was claimed to be ‘nil’ on the ground that it be regarded as self-occupied property. For the other 3 properties in Mumbai annual value was regarded as ‘nil’ under the provisions of section 23(1)(c) of the Act. Before the AO it was submitted that of these 3 properties — one was old and was not in a habitable condition. The second property was let out in the earlier year and also in the subsequent year. It was contended that despite the best efforts, the assessee could not find a tenant for this property. As for third property it was purchased during the year and was let out in subsequent year. The AO held that since the assessee had not shown any proof regarding the efforts made to let out these three properties, it was quite inconvincible that there can be any hardship faced in letting out since these properties were located in prime localities like Bandra and Andheri (East) in Mumbai. He considered 70% of the rent received in subsequent year for each of the two properties to be their annual value. Accordingly, he added Rs.6,95,555 to the total income of the assessee.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who held that the annual value of these properties needs to be computed u/s.23(1)(a) of the Act.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that the Lucknow ‘B’ Bench has, in the case of Smt. Indu Chandra v. DCIT, (ITA No. 96 (Lkw)/2011, dated 29-4-2011, for A.Y. 2004- 05), following the decision of the Mumbai Bench in the case of Premsudha Exports (P) Ltd. v. ACIT, [110 ITD 158 (Mum.)] decided the issue in favour of the assessee. The Tribunal also noted that the facts involved in the present case are similar to the facts before the Lucknow Bench in the case of Smt. Indu Chandra. Accordingly, following the decision of the Lucknow Bench, the Tribunal deleted the addition made by the AO and sustained by the CIT(A).

The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

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Sections 40(a)(ia), 194H — Commission retained by credit card companies out of amounts paid to merchant establishment is not liable for deduction of tax at source u/s.194H.

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13. DCIT v. Vah Magna Retail (P) Ltd.
ITAT ‘B’ Bench, Hyderabad
Before D. Karunakararao (AM) and Saktijit Dey (JM)
ITA No. 905/Hyd./2011
A.Y.: 2007-08. Decided on: 10-4-2012
Counsel for revenue/assessee: Dr. B. V. Prasad Reddy/None

Sections 40(a)(ia), 194H — Commission retained by credit card companies out of amounts paid to merchant establishment is not liable for deduction of tax at source u/s.194H.


Facts:

The assessee-company, engaged in business of direct retail trading in consumer goods, had claimed a deduction of Rs.16,34,000 on account of commission paid to credit card companies, which amount was disallowed by the AO u/s.40(a)(ia) on the ground that assessee failed to deduct tax at source u/s.194H of the Act. Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) where it contended that the assesee only receives payment from bank/credit card companeis after deduction of commission thereon, and thus, this is only in the nature of a post facto accounting and does not involve any payment or credit to the account of the banks or any other account before making such payment by the assessee. The CIT(A) accepted the claim of the assessee for deduction of Rs.16,34,000 and observed as follows: “9.8 On going through the nature of transactions, I find considerable merit in the contention of the appellant that commission paid to the credit card companies cannot be considered as falling within the purview of section 194H. Even though the definition of the term ‘commission or brokerage’ used in the said section is an inclusive definition, it is clear that the liability to make TDS under the said section arises only when a person acts on behalf of another person. In the case of commission retained by the credit card companies however, it cannot be said that the bank acts on behalf of the merchant establishment or that even the merchant establishment conducts the transaction for the bank. The sale made on the basis of a credit card is clearly a transaction of the merchants establishment only and the credit card company only facilitates the electronic payment, for a certain charge. The commission retained by the credit card company is therefore in the nature of normal bank charges and not in the nature of commission/brokerage for acting on behalf of the merchant establishment. Accordingly, concluding that there was no requirement for making TDS on the ‘Commission retained by the credit card companies, the disallowance of Rs.16,34,000 is deleted . . . . .” Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:

 The Tribunal found no infirmity in the reasoning given by the CIT(A). It upheld the order passed by the CIT(A). The Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue.

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(2012) TIOL 63 ITAT-Mum. Savita N. Mandhana v. ACIT A.Y.: 2006-07. Dated: 7-10-2011

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Section 28(va), section 55(2)(a) — Consideration received by a shareholder of a company, for transfer of shares of the company, under a share transfer agreement which includes non-compete covenant and the assessee is not actively engaged in business, is chargeable to tax as capital gains.

Facts:
The assessee along with other shareholders of Mandhana Boremann Industries Pvt. Ltd., who were all family members of the assessee, transferred their shares to Paxar BV, a Dutch Company. The shares were acquired by Paxar BV for a consideration of Rs.570 per shares which worked out to Rs.45.60 crore for the shares held by Mandhana family. All the shareholders in Mandhana family entered into an agreement with Paxar BV for the purpose of this transfer of shares, and one of the clauses in the agreement also provided that the transferor shall not carry on, or be interested in, any business which competes with the business of Mandhana Boremann. The AO held that a part of the sale consideration of Rs.570 is attributable to the non-compete covenant and is liable to be taxed in the hands of the assessee u/s.28(va). The AO computed the value of shares, by break-up method, at Rs.365. Accordingly, the balance amount of Rs.205 per share was treated as towards non-compete fee and brought to tax u/s.28(va) in the hands of the assessee.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who upheld the action of the AO in principle, but held that only Rs.41 per share can be attributed to non-compete fees. He also held that the decision of a Co-ordinate Bench in the case of Homi Aspi Balsara v. ACIT, (2009 TIOL 789 ITAT-Mum.) does not help the assessee as there is specific mention of non-compete obligations in the share sale agreement, and therefore, part of the sale consideration of shares is attributable to the non-compete obligations.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal and contended that no part of consideration can be attributed to non-compete fees.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that the even in the case of Homi Aspi Balsara there was a specific non-compete obligation and yet the Co-ordinate Bench had taken a view that no part of sale consideration of shares could be attributed to be taxed in the hands of the assessee as business income u/s.28(va).

Following the ratio of the decision of the Mumbai Tribunal in Homi Balsara the amounts held to be attributable to non-compete obligations are taxable as capital gains and not as business income. To this extent it reversed the order of the CIT(A). It observed that since the entire consideration was already offered for taxation as capital gains, the bifurcation between consideration attributable to sale of shares and for non-compete obligations is rendered academic and infructuous. It also noted that since it was uncontroverted position that the assessee was not actively engaged in the business it was not necessary to examine the matter any further. The Tribunal upheld the stand of the assessee in treating the entire consideration received on sale of shares as taxable under the head ‘capital gains’.

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Section 14A — Disallowance u/s.14A applies to partner’s share of profits in a firm — ‘Depreciation’ is not an expenditure but an allowance, hence the same cannot be disallowed u/s.14A.

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12. Vishnu Anant Mahajan v. ACIT
ITAT Special Bench, Ahmedabad
Before G. E. Veerabhadrappa (President),
G. C. Gupta (VP) and K. G. Bhansal (AM)
ITA No. 3002/Ahd./2009
A.Y.: 2006-07. Decided on: 25-5-2012
Counsel for assessee/revenue: Sunil H. Talati/S. K. Gupta with Kartarsingh

Section 14A — Disallowance u/s.14A applies to partner’s share of profits in a firm — ‘Depreciation’ is not an expenditure but an allowance, hence the same cannot be disallowed u/s.14A.


Facts:

The assessee, a partner in the firm, derived income by way of remuneration and interest from the firm in addition to the share of profits in the firm which was exempt u/s.10(2A). Apart from the income from the firm, the assessee also had income under the head house property, capital gains, interest income and dividend income. The assessee had suo motu disallowed 1/10th of depreciation allowance of motor car. The Assessing Officer (AO) disallowed expenditure u/s.14A. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who held that since the share of profits from the firm is exempt u/s.10(2A), expenditure was required to be disallowed u/s.14A. Since the assessee derived 76% of professional income as share from firm and balance 24% by way of remuneration and interest income, the CIT(A) allocated the expenses to income not includible in total income u/s.10(2A). Thus, business income by way of remuneration and interest from firm was taxed in the hands of the assessee u/s.28(v) after allowing 24% of the expenditure. 76% of the expenditure was disallowed. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

 Held:

A firm is not a separate entity under the general law, whereas under the Income-tax Act, it is a separate entity distinct from its partners. Remuneration and interest on capital of partners is allowed as a deduction to the firm and the same are taxable in the hands of the partners u/s.28(v), whereas the profits of the firm, after deducting remuneration to partners and interest on capital of partners, are taxed in the hands of the firm. The partners do not pay tax on the share of profits from the firm since the same are exempt u/s.10(2A). Section 10(2A) provides that the share of partner shall not be included in his total income, hence it is not possible to hold that share of profit is not excluded from the total income of the partner because the firm has already been taxed thereon. Since share of profits are excluded from the total income of the partner, section 14A would apply and any expenditure incurred to earn the share of profits needs to be disallowed. In the case of Hoshang D. Nanavati v. ACIT, (ITA No. 3567/Mum./2007 for A.Y. 2003-04, order dated 18-3- 2011), while considering the question as to whether depreciation is an expenditure or not, it has been held that section 14A deals only with the expenditure and not any statutory allowance admissible to the assessee. A statutory allowance u/s.32 is not an expenditure. Being in agreement with the decision of the DB in the case of Hoshang Nanavati (supra), the SB held that depreciation cannot be disallowed u/s.14A.

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(2012) TIOL 65 ITAT-Mum. Tanna Agro Impex Pvt. Ltd. v. Addl. CIT A.Y.: 2007-08. Dated: 29-7-2011

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Section 40(a)(ia), section 194H — Hedging transactions of commodities, if in the nature of derivatives transactions, do not attract the provisions of section 194H.

Facts:
The assessee was engaged in export, import and wholesale trade of agro products. Since the assessee had not deducted tax at source from payments of Rs. 4,61,769 made towards brokerage on commodities hedging transactions, the AO disallowed the same u/s.40(a)(ia).

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who confirmed the order of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that the payment towards commission or brokerage in respect of transactions in ‘securities’ is not covered by the scope of tax deduction at source requirements and as per Explanation (iii) to section 194H the meaning assigned to the expression ‘securities’ is the same as assigned to it in clause (h) of section 2 of Securities Contracts (Regulations) Act, 1956 which covers transactions of derivatives. It held that hedging transactions of commodities, if in the nature of derivatives transactions, will be outside the ambit of transactions on which TDS requirements come into play. Since this aspect of the matter was not clear from the material on record, the Tribunal remitted the matter to the file of the AO for fresh adjudication in the light of the abovementioned observations. The Tribunal also clarified that except in the abovementioned situation, commission paid on transactions of sales and purchases of commodities through commodities exchange are clearly covered by the scope of section 194H.

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(2011) 130 ITD 137/9, Chennai Bench D ACIT v. Harshad Doshi A.Y.: 2006-07. Dated: 23-4-2011

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Section 2(22)(e) — Advance which carries with an obligation of repayment is covered u/s.2(22) (e). Trade advance/advance given for effecting commercial transaction did not fall under the ambit of section 2(22)(e). Amount advanced by company to its directors under board resolution, for specific business purpose would not fall under the mischief of section 2(22)(e) of the Act.

Facts:
The assessee was managing director in DHL Ltd. The company was engaged in the business of development of property. The company advanced funds to purchase plot of lands in the name of the assessee on understanding that land is to be given to DHL for development. The AO on scrutiny of books of DHL Ltd., discovered that there is advance of Rs.3.59 crore and rental advance of Rs.19.89 lakh issued to the assessee. The AO applied provisions of deemed dividend u/s.2(22)(e) on these advances. In order to support its contention the AO also relied on the capital gain shown by the assessee in his books.

Appeal was filed by the assessee to the CIT(A). The assessee contended that advance of Rs.3.59 crore was taken to acquire land which was to be developed by DHL. The main intention behind bifurcating ownership of land and development rights was to reduce the cost of stamp duty so that they remain competitive in this fierce market. The CIT(A) deleted the above addition except sum of Rs.39.62 lakh accepting the fact that transaction was motivated by business consideration and commercial expediency.

The CIT(A) also deleted the addition of lease advance of Rs.19.89 lakh accepting holding it to be advance given for lease of building to be used as office by DHL Ltd.

Aggrieved by the order of the CIT(A), the AO filed appeal before the ITAT.

Held:
Trade advance and monies given for business expediency could not be taxed as dividend. In order to bring any advance within the four corners of section 2(22)(e), advance should carry an obligation of repayment.

Advance given by the company to managing director to purchase the land in its name and then transfer the development rights to the company was a business arrangement made with a view to avoid payment of stamp duty twice, first on land and then on proposed construction of flats.

The assessee was well within the law to adopt such practice which would reduce the cost incidence to the ultimate customer. The AO’s contention that bifurcation was done with an intention to circumvent provisions of the Tamil Nadu Stamp Act could not be accepted being for an unlawful purpose.

Also, the project executed by DHL Ltd. does not appear in the capital gain computation of lands as disclosed by the assessee. So there was no direct nexus as alleged by the AO.

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Business expenditure: TDS: Disallowance: Non-resident: Sections 9 and 40(a)(i): A.Y. 2007-08: Income deemed to accrue or arise in India: Business connection not established: Mere entry in books of account of Indian payer does not mean that non-resident received payment in India: No income accrued in India: Tax need not be deducted at source: Expenditure not disallowable.

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32. Business expenditure: TDS: Disallowance: Non-resident: Sections 9 and 40(a)(i): A.Y. 2007-08: Income deemed to accrue or arise in India: Business connection not established: Mere entry in books of account of Indian payer does not mean that non-resident received payment in India: No income accrued in India: Tax need not be deducted at source: Expenditure not disallowable.

[CIT v. EON Technology P. Ltd., 343 ITR 366 (Del.)]

The assessee-company was engaged in the business of development and export of software. In the A.Y. 2007-08, the assessee paid commission to its parent company in the U.K. on the sales and amounts realised on export contracts procured by it for the assessee and the same was claimed as deduction. The Assessing Officer held that the U.K. company had a business connection in India and that commission income had accrued and arisen in India when credit entries were made in the books of the assessee in favour of the U.K. company and the income towards commission was received in India. He held that the assessee was liable to deduct tax at source and as there was failure to do so, disallowed the expenditure u/s.40(a)(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Commissioner (A) held that the ‘business connection’ was not established and allowed the assessee’s claim. The Tribunal upheld the decision of the Commissioner (A).

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“(i) The Assessing Officer did not elaborate or had not discussed on what basis he had come to the conclusion that ‘business connection’ as envisaged u/s.9(1)(i) existed. The assessee had submitted that the U.K. company was a non-resident company and did not have any permanent establishment in India. The U.K. company was not rendering any service or performing any activity in India itself. These facts were not and could not be disputed.

(ii) The stand of the Revenue was contrary to the two Circulars issued by the CBDT in which it was clearly held that when a non-resident agent operates outside the country, no part of his income arises in India, and since payment was remitted directly abroad, merely because an entry in the books of account was made, it did not mean that the non-resident had received any payment in India.

(iii) The Assessing Officer did not make out a case of business connection as stipulated in section 9(1)(i) of the Act. He had not made any foundation or basis for holding that there was business connection and, therefore, section 9(1)(i) of the Act was applicable.

 (iv) The Appellate Authorities, on the basis of material on record, had rightly held that ‘business connection’ was not established.”

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Interest on refund: Section 244A of Incometax Act, 1961: A.Y. 2002-03: Interest u/s.244A is to be calculated from the date of payment of tax till the date of refund and not from the 1st of April of the assessment year or from date of regular assessment.

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[CIT v. Vijaya Bank, 246 CTR 548 (Kar.)]

For the A.Y. 2002-03, the Assessing Officer granted interest u/s.244A of the Act from the date of regular assessment. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal held that interest should be calculated from the date on which the self-assessment tax was paid by the assessee.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“Where the assessee is entitled to refund of self-assessment tax, interest u/s.244A is to be calculated from the date of payment of tax till the date of refund and not from the 1st of April of the assessment year or from the date of regular assessment.”

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Business expenditure: Capital or revenue: A.Y. 2003-04: Assessee tenant in premises contributed to reconstruction cost of premises with understanding that it will continue as tenant at the same rent: Expenditure is revenue expenditure.

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31. Business expenditure: Capital or revenue: A.Y. 2003-04: Assessee tenant in premises contributed to reconstruction cost of premises with understanding that it will continue as tenant at the same rent: Expenditure is revenue expenditure.
[CIT v. Talathi and Panthaky Associated P. Ltd., 343 ITR 309 (Bom.)]

The assessee was a tenant of 5000 sq.ft. in a building which was declared as unsafe. The assessee contributed Rs.1.5 crore for reconstruction of the building with the understanding that it will continue as a tenant at Rs.11,300 per month. In the A.Y. 2003-04, the assessee claimed the deduction of the said expenditure of Rs.1.5 crore. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim holding that it is capital expenditure. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“(i) The assessee had not incurred any expenditure of capital nature. The expenditure did not result in the acquisition of a capital asset by the assessee. The assessee continued as before to be a tenant in respect of the premises.

(ii) By contributing an amount of Rs.1.5 crore towards the construction or, as the case may be, renovation of the existing structure, the assessee obtained a commercial advantage of securing tenancy of an equivalent area of premises at the same rent as before. Since there was no acquisition of a capital asset and the occupation of the assessee continued in the character of a tenancy, the expenditure could not be regarded as being of a capital nature.

(iii) The cost of repair/reconstruction of the tenanted premises was of a revenue nature and was allowable as and by way of deduction.”

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Export profit: Deduction u/s.10BA of Incometax Act, 1961: A.Y. 2005-06: DEPB is a profit derived from export business for the purpose of deduction u/s.10BA.

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[CIT v. Arts & Crafts Exports, 246 CTR 463 (Bom.)]

The Tribunal held that DEPB is a profit derived from export business for the purposes of deduction u/s.10BA of the Income-tax Act, 1961. In appeal by the Revenue, the following question was raised:

“Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal erred in law in holding DEPB as a profit derived from export business for the purpose of deduction u/s.10BA ignoring the ratio of decision in the case of Liberty India v. CIT, (2009) 225 CTR (SC) 233; (2009) 28 DTR (SC) 73; (2009) 317 ITR 218 (SC) having binding force on facts and circumstances of the case?”

The Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“The Counsel for the Revenue fairly states that though the question has been raised by relying upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Liberty India v. CIT, the said decision has no relevance to the facts of the present case. In this view of the matter, the question raised by the Revenue cannot be entertained.”

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Appellate Tribunal: Adjournment: Section 255, Rule 32 of Income-tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963: Where a case is adjourned by Tribunal by giving a last opportunity to counsel for assessee, same can be adjourned again on the next date, if sufficient or reasonable cause exists on that day.

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30. Appellate Tribunal: Adjournment: Section 255, Rule 32 of Income-tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963: Where a case is adjourned by Tribunal by giving a last opportunity to counsel for assessee, same can be adjourned again on the next date, if sufficient or reasonable cause exists on that day.

[Mehru Electrical and Engg. (P) Ltd. v. CIT, (2012) 22 Taxman.com 45 (Raj.)]

The assessee’s appeal before the Tribunal was fixed for hearing on 11-1-2010 and at the request of the counsel for the assessee, hearing of the case was adjourned to 9-2-2010 giving him a last opportunity. However, the counsel for the assessee moved an application before the Tribunal for adjournment of the case in advance on 8-2-2010 on the ground that he was going to Mumbai for some urgent work. On 9-2-2010 the Tribunal rejected the application for adjournment. It further heard the counsel for the Revenue ex parte and allowed the appeal of the Revenue. On appeal to High Court, the assessee contended, inter alia, that

(i) from the order of the Tribunal it was clear that adjournment application was rejected only on the ground that a last opportunity was granted to counsel for the assessee to argue the appeal, and

(ii) even if a last opportunity was granted on last date, it did not mean that on sufficient ground the case could not be adjourned again. The Rajasthan High Court allowed the assessee’s appeal and held as under: “(i) From the proceedings of the Tribunal dated 11-1-2010, it is clear that last opportunity was given and the case was adjourned for 9-2- 2010. Application for adjournment was filed on 8-2-2010, which was put up for consideration before the Tribunal on 9-2-2010. From the application, it appears that counsel for the assessee had to go to Mumbai due to some urgent work. No one was present on behalf of the assessee. The Tribunal, in absence of counsel for the assessee, rejected the adjournment application. (ii) Ordinarily it is not incumbent on the part of the Tribunal to adjourn the case again when a last opportunity had already been granted to the counsel for the assessee. However, there may be number of circumstances where adjournment becomes necessary in the interest of justice. If counsel for the assessee had to go for some urgent work to Mumbai and an application for adjournment was moved in advance, then in the interest of justice a short adjournment should have been granted. If number of opportunities had already been afforded to the counsel for the assessee, then adjournment could have been granted on payment of cost.

(iii) The Tribunal has not assigned any reason as to whether reason mentioned in the application for adjournment constituted sufficient cause for adjournment or not. Even if a last opportunity is granted and case is fixed for hearing and sufficient cause is shown on the date fixed for hearing, then the case can be adjourned and it should be adjourned in the interest of justice. In these circumstances, the Tribunal committed an illegality in rejecting the application for adjournment and in deciding the appeal ex parte.

(iv) Therefore, the ex parte order passed by the Tribunal deserved to be set aside. The case was to be remitted back to the Tribunal for decision afresh on merits.”

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Appeal to High Court: Power and scope: Section 260A: Jurisdiction to reassess: Question can be raised for the first time before the High Court.

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29. Appeal to High Court: Power and scope: Section 260A: Jurisdiction to reassess: Question can be raised for the first time before the High Court.
[Mukti Properties P. Ltd. v. CIT, 344 ITR 177 (Cal.)]

The assessee had not raised the issue as regards the jurisdiction to reassess before the Assessing Officer, Commissioner (A) or the Tribunal. For the first time the assessee raised the issue before the High Court in appeal u/s.260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

The Calcutta High Court admitted the question and held as under:

“A pure question of law which goes to the very root of the jurisdiction and further initiation of the proceedings can be raised at any stage, even at the stage of appeal to the Supreme Court.”

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Deemed income: Remission or cessation of trading liability: Section 41(1) of Incometax Act, 1961: A.Y. 1995-96: Explanation 1 to section 41(1) is prospective and not retrospective: Applies w.e.f. A.Y. 1997-98: Not applicable to A.Y. 1995-96: For A.Y. 1995-96 mere writing back of amounts in relation to unclaimed salaries, wages and bonus and unclaimed suppliers’ and customers’ balances could not amount to cessation of liability: Amounts (uncashed cheques, dividend paid to shareholders, provision<

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[CIT v. Mohan Meakin Ltd., 18 Taxman.com 47 (Del.)]

In the A.Y. 1995-96, the assessee had written back certain amount representing (a) unclaimed salaries, wages and bonus; (b) credit balances unclaimed by the suppliers; (c) credit balances unclaimed by the customers; (d) uncashed cheques; (e) excess dividend; and (f) excess provision made for doubtful debts in its books of account. The Assessing Officer added these amounts as deemed income relying on the provisions of section 41(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal deleted the additions.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the deletion and held as under:

“(i) Salaries, wages and bonus

The contention of the assessee was that there was no cessation or remission of the liability and, therefore, by merely writing back the credit balances in the books of account, which is an unilateral action of the assessee, the liability cannot be said to have ceased.

The concerned assessment year was 1995-96. Explanation 1 to section 41(1) was added by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1996 with effect from 1-4-1997. The Explanation provides that the unilateral act of the assessee by way of writing off such liability in its accounts would be considered as remission or cessation of the liability. In Circular No. 762, dated 18-2-1998, which is reported in (1998) 230 ITR (St.) 12, the CBDT has explained the reason behind insertion of the above Explanation. In paragraph 28.3 of the Circular it has further been stated that the amendment will take effect from 1-4-1997 and will, accordingly, apply in relation to A.Y. 1997-98 and subsequent years. The Explanation, therefore, does not have any retrospective effect. It does not, therefore, apply to the A.Y. 1995-96. For this reason, the mere writing back of the loan in relation to unclaimed salaries, wages and bonus cannot amount to cessation of the liability.

(ii) Suppliers’ credit balances and customers’ credit balances

So far as the suppliers’ credit balances and the customers’ credit balances are concerned, the same reasoning is applicable for the year under consideration. Accordingly, those two additions made by the Assessing Officer are also not in accordance with law.

(iii) Uncashed cheques

In the case of the uncashed cheques, the finding of the Tribunal is that there was no claim for deduction in any of the earlier years and, therefore, the amount cannot be added u/s.41(1). It is not in dispute, as it cannot be, that the amount of uncashed cheques was not allowed as deduction in any of the earlier assessment years. As per the assessee this represents the cheques received and remaining on hand on the last day of the accounting period. The Tribunal has accepted this stand. The Assessing Officer and the Commissioner (Appeals) have not stated why the stand of the assessee was not acceptable. The Revenue has also not stated and averred that in the assessment order now passed, this aspect was not considered and examined. In these circumstances, section 41(1) can hardly have any application. Accordingly, the decision of the Tribunal deleting the addition is to be upheld.

(iv) Excess dividend

Dividend paid by a company to its shareholders is not an allowable deduction under the Income-tax Act as it represents an appropriation of the profits after they have been earned. If the dividend is not allowable as a deduction, the excess written back cannot also be assessed as income u/s.41(1).

(v) Excess provision for doubtful debts

The finding of the Commissioner (Appeals) is that the provision was never allowed as a deduction in the earlier years. Since the finding that the provision was not allowed in the earlier year as a deduction is not under challenge, the amount cannot be added u/s.41(1) when it is written back in the accounts. The decision of the Tribunal is to be upheld.”

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Business expenditure — Banks — The provisions of clause (viia) of section 36(1) relating to the deduction on account of the provision for bad and doubtful debt(s) are distinct and independent of the provisions of section 36(1) (vii) relating to allowance of the bad debts — The scheduled commercial banks would continue to get the full benefit of the writeoff of the irrecoverable debt(s) u/s.36(1)(vii) in addition to the benefit of deduction for the provision made for bad and doubtful debt(s) u/s<

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[Catholic Syrian Bank Ltd. v. CIT, (2012) 343 ITR 270 (SC)]

The
assessee, a scheduled bank, filed its return of income for the A.Y.
2002-03 on October 24, 2002, declaring total income of Rs.61,15,610. The
return was processed u/s.143(1), and eligible refund was issued in
favour of the assessee. However, the Assessing Officer issued notice
u/s.143(2) to the assessee, after which the assessment was completed.
Inter alia, the Assessing Officer, while dealing, u/s.143(3), with the
claim of the assessee for bad debts of Rs.12,65,95,770, noticed that the
argument put forward on behalf of the assessee, that the deduction
allowable u/s.36(1) (vii) is independent of deduction u/s.36(1)(viia),
could not be accepted. Consequently, he observed that the assessee
having a provision of Rs.15,01,29,990 for bad and doubtful debts
u/s.36(1)(viia), could not claim the amount of Rs.12,65,95,770 as
deduction on account of bad debts because the bad debts did not exceed
the credit balance in the provision for bad and doubtful debts account
and also the requirements of clause (v) of s.s (2) of section 36 were
not satisfied. Therefore, the assessee’s claim for deduction of bad
debts written off from the account books was disallowed. This amount was
added back to the taxable income of the assessee, for which a demand
notice and challan was accordingly issued. This order of the Assessing
Officer dated January 24, 2005, was challenged in appeal by the assessee
on various grounds.

The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals)
vide his order dated April 7, 2006, partly allowed the appeal,
particularly in relation to the claim of the appellantbank for bad
debts. Relying upon the judgment of a Division Bench of the Kerala High
Court in the case of South Indian Bank Ltd. v. CIT, (2003) 262 ITR 579
(Ker.), the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) held that the claim of
the appellant was fully supported by the said decision and since the
entire bad debts written off by the bank u/s.36(1)(vii) were pertaining
to urban branches only and not to the provision made for rural brances
u/s.36(1)(viia), it was entitled to the deduction of the full claimed
amount of Rs.12,65,95,770. Consequently, he directed deletion of the
said amount.

Being aggrieved from the order of the Commissioner
of Income-tax (Appeals), the Revenue as well as the assessee filed
appeal before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin. Vide its order
dated April 16, 2007, while relying upon the judgment of the
jurisdictional High Court in the case of South Indian Bank Ltd. (supra),
the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal dismissed the appeal of the Revenue
on this issue and also granted certain other benefits to the assessee in
relation to other items.

However, the Department of Income-tax,
being dissatisfied with the order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal
in the A.Y. 2002-03, filed an appeal before the High Court u/s.260A of
the Act.

The Division Bench of the High Court of Kerala at
Ernakulam hearing the batch of appeals against the order of the Income
Tax Appellate Tribunal expressed the view that the judgment of that
Court in the case of South Indian Bank (supra) was not a correct
exposition of law. While dissenting therefrom, the Bench directed the
matter to be placed before a Full Bench of the High Court.

Vide
its judgment dated December 16, 2009, the Full Bench not only answered
the question of law but even decided the case on the merits. While
setting aside the view taken by the Division Bench in South Indian Bank
(supra) and also the concurrent view taken by the Commissioner of
Income-tax (Appeals) and the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, the Full
Bench of the High Court held as under (page 181 of 326 ITR):

“What
is clear from the above is that provision for bad and doubtful debts
normally is not an allowable deduction and what is allowable under the
main clause is bad debt actually written off. However, so far as banks
to which clause (viia) applies are concerned, they are entitled to claim
deduction of provision u/ss.(viia), but at the same time when bad debts
written off is also claimed deduction under clause (vii), the same will
be allowed as a deduction only to the extent it is in excess of the
provision created and allowed as a deduction under clause (viia). It is
worthwhile to note that deduction u/s.36(1)(vii) is subject to s.s (2)
of section 36 which in clause (v) specifically states that any bad debt
written off should be claimed as a deduction only after debiting it to
the provision created for bad and doubtful debts. What is clear from the
above provisions is that though the respondent-banks are entitled to
claim deduction of provision for bad and doubtful debts in terms of
clause (viia), such banks are entitled to deduction of bad debt actually
written off only to the extent it is in excess of the provision created
and allowed as deduction under clause (viia). Further, in order to
qualify for deduction of bad debt written off the requirement of section
36(2)(v) is that such amount should be debited to the provision created
under clause (viia) of section 36(1). Therefore, we are of the view
that the distinction drawn by the Division Bench in the South Indian
Bank’s case between the bad debts written off in respect of advances
made by rural branches and bad debts pertaining to advances made by
other branches does not exist and is not visualised under the proviso to
section 36(1)(vii). We, therefore, hold that the said decision of this
Court does not lay down the correct interpretation of the provisions of
the Act. Admittedly, all the respondent-assessees have claimed and have
been allowed deduction of provision in terms of clause (viia) of the
Act. Therefore, when they claim deduction of bad debt written off in the
previous year by virtue of the proviso to section 36(1)(vii), they are
entitled to claim deduction of such bad debt only to the extent it
exceeds the provision created and allowed as deduction under clause
(viia) of the Act.

In the normal course we should answer the
question referred to us by the Division Bench and send back the appeals
to the Division Bench to decide the appeals consistent with the Full
Bench Decision. However, since this is the only issue that arises in the
appeals, we feel it would be only an empty formality to send back the
matter to the Division Bench for disposal of appeals consistent with our
judgment. In order to avoid unnecessary posting of appeals before the
Division Bench, we allow the appeals by setting aside the orders of the
Tribunal and by restoring the assessments confirmed in first appeals.”

Dissatisfied
from the judgment of the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court, the
assessee filed the appeals before the Supreme Court purely on question
of law.

The Supreme Court held that the income of an assessee
carrying on a business or profession has to be assessed in accordance
with the scheme contained in Part D of Chapter IV dealing with heads of
income. Section 28 of the Act deals with the chargeability of income to
tax under the head ‘Profits and gains of business or profession’. All
‘other deductions’ available to an assessee under this head of income
are dealt with u/s.36 of the Act which opens with the words ‘the
deduction provided for in the following clauses shall be allowed in
respect of matters dealt with therein, in computing the income referred
to in section 28’. In other words, for the purposes of computing the
income chargeable to tax, beside specific deductions, ‘other deductions’
postulated in different clauses of section 36 are to be allowed by the
Assessing Officer, in accordance with law.

Section 36(1)(vii) and 36(1)(viia) provide for such deductions, which are to be permitted, in accordance with the language of these provisions. A bare reading of these provisions shows that sections 36(1) and 36(1)(viia) are separate items of deduction. These are independent provisions and, therefore, cannot be intermingled or read into each other. It is a settled canon of interpretation of fiscal statutes that they need to be construed strictly and on their plain reading.

The provision of section 36(1)(vii) would come into play in the grant of deductions, subject to the limitation contained in section 36(2) of the Act. Any bad debt or part thereof, which is written off as irrecoverable in the accounts of the assessee for the previous year is the deduction which the assessee would be entitled to get, provided he satisfies the requirements of section 36(2) of the Act. Allowing of deduction of bad debts is controlled by the provisions of section 36(2). The argument advanced on behalf of the Revenue is that it would amount to allowing a double deduction if the provisions of section 36(1)(vii) and 36(1)(viia) are permitted to operate independently. There is no doubt that a statute is normally not construed to provide for a double benefit unless it is specifically so stipulated or is clear from the scheme of the Act. As far as the question of double benefit is concerned, the Legislature in its wisdom introduced section 36(2)(v) by the Finance Act, 1985, with effect from April 1, 1985. Section 36(2)(v) concerns itself as a check for claim of any double deduction and has to be read in conjunction with section 36(1)(viia) of the Act. It requires the assessee to debit the amount of such debt or part thereof in the previous year to the provision made for that purpose.

The Supreme Court, referring to the Circular Nos. 258, dated 14-6-1979, 421, dated 12-6-1988, 464, dated 18-7-1986 and the objects and reasons for the Finance Act, 1986, held that clear legislative intent of the relevant provisions and unambiguous language of the Circulars with reference to the amendments to section 36 of the Act demonstrate that the deduction on account of provision for bad and doubtful debts u/s.36(1)(viia) is distinct and independent of the provisions of section 36(1)(vii) relating to allowance of the bad debts. The legislative intent was to encourage rural advances and the making of provisions for bad debts in relation to such rural branches. Another material aspect of the functioning of such banks is that their rural branches were practically treated as a distinct business, though ultimately these advances would form part of the books of accounts of the principal or head office branch. According to the Supreme Court the Circulars in question show a trend of encouraging rural business and for providing greater deductions. The purpose of granting such deductions would stand frustrated if these deductions are implicitly neutralised against other independent deductions specifically provided under the provisions of the Act.

The Supreme Court further held that the language of section 36(1)(vii) of the Act is unambiguous and does not admit of two interpretations. It applies to all banks, commercial or rural, scheduled or unscheduled. It gives a benefit to the assessee to claim a deduction on any bad debt or part thereof, which is written off as irrecoverable in the amounts of the assessee for the previous year. This benefit is subject only to section 36(2) of the Act. It is obligatory upon the assessee to prove to the Assessing Officer that the case satisfies the ingredients of section 36(1)(vii) on the one hand and that it satisfies the requirements stated in section 36(2) of the Act on the other. The proviso to section 36(1)(vii) does not, in absolute terms, control the application of this provision as it comes into operation only when the case of the assessee is one which falls squarely u/s.36(1)(viia) of the Act. The Supreme Court noticed that the Explanation to section 36(1)(vii), introduced by the Finance Act, 2001, had to be examined in conjunction with the principal section. The Explanation specifically excluded any provision for bad and doubtful debts made in the account of the assessee from the ambit and scope of ‘any bad debt, or part thereof, written off as irrecoverable in the accounts of the assessee’. Thus, the concept of making a provision for bad and doubtful debts would fall outside the scope of section 36(1)(vii) simpliciter. The proviso, would have to be read with the provisions of section 36(1)(viia) of the Act. Once the bad debt is actually written off as irrecoverable and the requirements of section 36(2) satisfied, then, it would not be permissible to deny such deduction on the apprehension of double deduction under the provisions of section 36(1)(viia) and the proviso to section 36(1)(vii). According to the Supreme Court this did not appear to be the intention of the framers of law. The scheduled and non-scheduled commercial banks would continue to get the full benefit of write-off of the irrecoverable debts u/s.36(1)(vii) in addition to the benefit of deduction of bad and doubtful debts u/s.36(1)(viia). Mere provision for bad and doubtful debts may not be allowable, but in the case of a rural advance, the same, in terms of section 36(1)(viia)(a), may be allowable without insisting on an actual write-off.

The Supreme Court observed that as per the proviso to clause (vii), the deduction on account of the actual write-off of bad debts would be limited to the excess of the amount written off over the amount of the provision which had already been allowed under clause (viia). According to the Supreme Court the proviso by and large protects the interests of the Revenue. In case of rural advances which are covered by clause (viia), there would be no double deduction. The proviso, in its terms, limits its application to the case of a bank to which clause (viia)applies. Indisputably, clause (viia)(a) applies only to rural advances.

The Supreme Court further observed that as far as foreign banks are concerned, u/s.36(1)(viia)(b) and as far as public finance institutions or State financial corporations or State industrial investment corporations are concerned, u/s.36(1)(viia)(c), they do not have rural branches. The Supreme Court therefore inferred that the proviso is self-indicative that its application is to bad debts arising out of rural advances.

In a concurring judgment, the Chief Justice held that u/s.36(1)(vii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the taxpayer carrying on business is entitled to a deduction, in the computation of taxable profits, of the amount of any debt which is established to have become a bad debt during the previous year, subject to certain conditions. However, a mere provision for bad and doubtful debt(s) is not allowed as a deduction in the computation of taxable profits. In order to promote rural banking and in order to assist the scheduled commercial banks in making adequate provisions from their current profits to provide for risks in relation to their rural advances, the Finance Act inserted clause (viia) in relation to their rural advances, the Finance Act inserted clause (viia) in s.s (1) of section 36 to provide for a deduction, in the computation of taxable profits of all scheduled commercial banks, in respect of provisions made by them for bad and doubtful debt(s) relating to advances made by their rural branches. The deduction is limited to a specified percentage of the aggregate average advances made by the rural branches computed in the manner prescribed by the Income-tax Rules, 1962. Thus, the provisions of clause (viia) of section 36(1) relating to the deduction on account of the provision for bad and doubtful debt(s) is distinct and independent of the provisions of section 36(1)(vii) relating to allowance of the bad debts. In other wards, the scheduled commercial banks would continue to get the full benefit of the write-off of the irrecoverable debt(s) u/s.36(1)(vii) in addition to the benefit of deduction for the provision made for bad and doubtful debt(s) u/s.36(1)(viia). A reading of the Circulars issued by Central Board of Direct Taxes indicates that normally a deduction for bad debt(s) can be allowed only if the debt is written off in the books as bad debt(s). No deduction is allowable in respect of a mere provision for bad and doubtful debt(s). But in the case of rural advances, a deduction would be allowed even in respect of a mere provision without insisting on an actual write-off. However, this may result in double allowance in the sense that in respect of the same rural advance the bank may get allowance on the basis of clause (viia) and also on the basis of accrual write-off under clause (vii). This situation is taken care of by the proviso to clause (vii) which limits the allowance on the basis of the actual write-off to the excess, if any, of the write-off over the amount standing to the credit of the account created under clause (viia).

Note: The Court incidentally considered whether, when findings recorded in the other assessment year are accepted by the Revenue, it should be permitted to question the correctness of the same in the subsequent years. The relevant portion of the judgment is extracted below:

The applicant has contended that as the similar claims had been decided in favour of the banks for the A.Ys. 1991-92 to 1993-94 by the Special Bench of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, which had not been challenged by the Department, as such, the issue had attained finality and could not be disturbed in the subsequent years.

The above contention of the appellant-banks does not impress us at all. Merely because the orders of the Special Bench of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal were not assailed in appeal by the Department itself, this would not take away the right of the Revenue to question the correctness of the orders of assessment, particularly when a question of law is involved. There is no doubt that the earlier orders of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) had merged into the judgment of the Special Bench of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and attained finality for that relevant year. Equally, it is true that though the Full Bench judgment of that very Court in the case of South Indian Bank (supra), it did not notice any of the contentions before and principles stated by the Special Bench of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal in its impugned judgment. As already noticed, the questions raised in the present appeal go to the very root of the matter and are questions of law in relation to interpretation of sections 36(1)(vii) and 36(1)(viia) read with section 36(2) of the Act. Thus, without any hesitation, we reject the contention of the appellant-banks that the findings recorded in the earlier A.Ys. 1991-92 to 1993-94 would be binding on the Department for subsequent years as well.

Capital or revenue expenditure: Section 37 of Income-tax Act, 1961: A.Y. 1998-99: Airport authority: Expenditure towards removal of encroachments in and around technical area of airport for safety and security: Is revenue expenditure.

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[Airport Authority of India v. CIT, 340 ITR 407 (Del.) (FB)]

The assessee is the Airport Authority managing the airports in India. The assessee incurred expenditure towards removal of encroachments in and around technical area of the airport for safety and security. The assessee’s claim for deduction of the expenditure was disallowed by the Assessing Officer and the disallowance was confirmed by the Tribunal.

On appeal by the assessee, the Delhi High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“The land belonged to the assessee. In the scheme formulated by the Government for removal of encroachers and their rehabilitation amount was not for acquisition of new assets. The payment was made to facilitate its smooth functioning of the business in a profitable manner and, therefore, such an expenditure was revenue in nature.”

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Deduction u/s.80IB Manufacture: Production of perfumed hair oil by using coconut oil and mineral oil is manufacture: Assessee entitled to deduction u/s.80IB.

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The assessee was engaged in the business of production of perfumed hair oil using coconut oil and mineral oil as per the requirement of M/s. Hindustan Lever Ltd. The assessee’s claim for deduction u/s.80IB was rejected by the Assessing Officer holding that the activity did not amount to manufacture for the purposes of section 80IB. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“(i) The finding of fact recorded by the ITAT is that the production of the perfumed hair oil as per the requirement of Hindustan Lever Ltd. constituted manufacture of a product distinct from the inputs used and on the said manufactured product the Central Excise Duty has been paid. The Apex Court in the case of CCE v. Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd., reported in (2006) 12 SCC 453 has held that addition of perfume to coconut oil to produce perfumed oil constitutes a manufacturing process.

(ii) Moreover, in the present case it is not in dispute that the deduction u/s.80IB of the Act has been allowed to the assessee in the first year of manufacture and that order has attained finality.

(iii) In these circumstances, the decision of the ITAT in holding that the assessee is engaged in manufacturing activity and hence entitled to avail deduction u/s.80IB cannot be faulted.”

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Capital gain: Computation: Section 2(42A) and section 48 Indexed cost: A.Y. 2001-02: Acquisition of capital asset by gift, will, etc.: Indexed cost to be determined w.r.t. the holding of the asset by the previous owner.

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The settler of the assessee-trust had acquired the property before 1-4-1981 and he settled it on trust on 5-1-1996. The assessee-trust sold the property and computed the indexed cost of acquisition on the basis that it ‘held’ the property from the time the settler had held it. The Assessing Officer accepted that the settler’s cost of acquisition had to be treated as the assessee’s cost of acquisition but held that the settler’s period of holding could not be treated as the assessee’s period of holding. The Tribunal upheld the decision of the Assessing Officer.

On appeal by the assessee, the Delhi High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal, followed the judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT v. Manjula J. Shah, 16 Taxman.com 42 (Bom.) and held as under:

“(i) The Department’s contention that in a case where section 49 applies the holding of the predecessor has to be accounted for the purpose of computing the cost of acquisition, cost of improvement and indexed cost of improvement but not for the indexed cost of acquisition will result in absurdities. It leads to a disconnect and contradiction between ‘indexed cost of acquisition’ and ‘indexed cost of improvement’.

(ii) This cannot be the intention behind the enactment of section 49 and Explanation to section 48. There is no reason why the Legislature would want to deny or deprive an assessee the benefit of the previous holding for computing ‘indexed cost of acquisition’ while allowing the said benefit for computing ‘indexed cost of improvement’.

(iii) The benefit of indexed cost of inflation is given to ensure that the taxpayer pays capital gains tax on the ‘real’ or actual ‘gain’ and not on the increase in the capital value of the property due to inflation.

(iv) The expression ‘held by the assessee’ used in Explanation (iii) to section 48 has to be understood in the context and harmoniously with other sections and as the cost of acquisition stipulated in section 49 means the cost for which the previous owner had acquired the property, the term ‘held by the assessee’ should be interpreted to include the period during which the property was held by the previous owner.”

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Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement — While India is not a party to the Vienna Convention, it contains many principles of customary international law, and the principle of interpretation of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, provides a broad guide-line as to what could be an appropriate manner of interpreting a treaty in Indian context also.

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In a petition filed before the Supreme Court by an organisation called Citizen India based upon media and scholarly reports alleged that various individuals, mostly citizens, but may also include non-citizens, and other entities with presence in India, have generated and secreted away large sums of monies, through their activities in India or relating to India, in various foreign banks, especially in tax havens and jurisdiction that have strong secrecy laws with respect to the contents of bank accounts and the identities of individuals holding such accounts and that the Government of India and its agencies have been very lax in terms of keeping an eye on the various unlawful activities generating unaccounted monies; the consequent tax evasion and such laxity extends to efforts to curtail the flow of such funds out and into, India and seeking the Court’s intervention to order proper investigations and monitor continuously, the action of the Union of India, and any and all governmental departments and agencies in these matters.

In deciding the matter, the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement with Germany and the Vienna Connection and it made certain observations with respect to the same.

The Supreme Court noted the relevant portions of Article 26 of the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement with Germany, which reads as follows:

“1. The competent authorities of the Contracting States shall exchange such information as is necessary for carrying out the provisions of this Agreement. Any information received by a Contracting State shall be treated as secret in the same manner as information obtained under the domestic laws of that State and shall be disclosed only to persons or authorities (including courts and administrative bodies) involved in the assessment or collection of, the enforcement or prosecution in respect of or the determination of appeals in relation to, the taxes covered by this Agreement. Such persons or authorities shall use the information only for such purposes. They may disclose the information in public court proceedings or in judicial decisions.

2. In no case shall the provisions of paragraph 1 be construed so as to impose on Contracting State the obligation:

(a) to carry out administrative measures at variance with the laws and administrative practice of that or of the other Contracting State;

(b) to supply information which is not obtainable under the laws or in the normal course of the administration of that or of the other Contracting State;

(c) to supply information which would disclose any trade, business, industrial, commercial or professional secret or trade process or information, the disclosure of which would be contrary to public policy (order public).”

The Supreme Court observed that the above clause in the relevant agreement with Germany would indicate that there is no absolute bar or secrecy. Instead the agreement specifically provides that the information may be disclosed in public court proceedings which the instant proceedings are. The proceedings before it, relate both to the issue of tax collection with respect to unaccounted monies deposited into foreign bank accounts, as well as with issues relating to the manner in which such monies were generated, which may include activities that are criminal in nature also. Comity of nations cannot be predicated upon clauses of secrecy that could hinder constitutional proceedings such as these, or criminal proceedings.

The Supreme Court noted that the claim of the Union of India is that the phrase ‘public court proceedings’, in the last sentence in Article 26(1) of the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement only relates to proceedings relating to tax matters. The Union of India claims that such an understanding comports with how it is understood internationally. In this regard, the Union of India cited a few treatises. According to the Supreme Court, however, the Union of India did not provide any evidence that Germany specifically requested it to not reveal the details with respect to accounts in the Liechtenstein even in the context of proceedings before it.

The Supreme Court held that in Article 31, ‘General Rule of Interpretation’, of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, 1969, provides that a “treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.” While India is not a party to the Vienna Convention, it contains many principles of customary international law, and the principle of interpretation of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, provides a broad guideline as to what could be an appropriate manner of interpreting a treaty in Indian context also.

The Supreme Court said that in Union of India v. Azadi Bachao Andolan, (2003) 263 ITR 706; (2004) 10 SCC 1, it approvingly had noted Frank Bennion’s observations that a treaty is really an indirect enactment instead of a substantive legislation, and that drafting of treaties is notoriously sloppy, whereby inconveniences obtain. In this regard this Court further noted that the dictum of Lord Widgery C.J. that the words “are to be given their general meaning, general to lawyer and layman alike . . . . The meaning of the diplomat rather than the lawyer.” The broad principle of interpretation, with respect to treaties, and the provisions therein, would be that the ordinary meanings of words be given effect to, unless the context requires or otherwise. However, the fact that such treaties are drafted by diplomats, and not lawyers, leading to sloppiness in drafting also implies that care has to be taken to not render any word, phrase, or sentence redundant, especially where rendering of such word, phrase or sentence redundant would lead to a manifestly absurd situation, particularly from a constitutional perspective. The Government cannot bind India in a manner that derogates from constitutional provisions, values and imperatives.

The last sentence of the Article 26(1) of the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement with Germany, “They may disclose this information in public court proceedings or in judicial decisions,” is revelatory in this regard. It stands out as an additional aspect or provision, and an exception, to the proceeding portion of the said Article. It is located after the specification that information shared between the Contracting Parties may be revealed only to “persons or authorities (including courts and administrative bodies) involved in the assessment or collection of, the enforcement or prosecution in respect of, or the determination of appeals in relation to taxes covered by this Agreement.” Consequently, it has to be understood that the phrase ‘public court proceedings’ specified in the last sentence in Article 26(1) of the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement with Germany refers to court proceedings other than those in connection with tax assessment, enforcement, prosecution, etc., with respect to tax matters. If it were otherwise, as argued by the Union of India, then there would have been no need to have that last sentence in Article 26(1) of the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement at all. The last sentence would become redundant if the interpretation pressed by the Union of India is accepted. Thus, notwithstanding the alleged convention of interpreting the last sentence only as referring to proceedings in tax matters, the rubric of common law jurisprudence, and fealty to its principles, leads us inexorably to the conclusion that the language in this specific treaty, and under these circumstances cannot be interpreted in the manner sought by the Union of India.

The Supreme Court while agreeing that the language could have been tighter, and may be deemed to be sloppy, to use Frank Bennion’s characterisation, negotiation of such treaties are conducted and secured at very high levels of Government, with awareness of general principles of interpretation used in various jurisdictions. It is fairly well known, at least in common law jurisdictions, that legal instruments and statutes are interpreted in a manner whereby redundancy of expressions and phrases is sought to be avoided.

The Supreme Court inter alia constituted Special Investigation Team to take over the matter of investigation of the individuals whose names had been disclosed by Germany as having accounts in Liechtenstein; and expeditiously conduct the same.

Nath Holding & Investment Pvt. Ltd. v. DCIT ITAT ‘B’ Bench, Mumbai Before D. Manmohan (VP) and Pramod Kumar (AM) ITA No. 5328/Mum./2006 A.Y.: 1996-97. Decided on: 25-10-2011 Counsel for assessee/revenue: N. R. Agarwal/P. K. B. Menon

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Section 271(1)(c) — Penalty for concealment of income — During quantum proceedings assessee failed to explain certain discrepancies in respect of its claim for loss in share trading business — AO disallowed the loss and imposed penalty — Held that in the absence of the finding that the claim for loss was bogus or false, penalty cannot be imposed.

Facts:
The impugned penalty was levied in respect of disallowance of loss in share trading business. The loss was disallowed on the ground of discrepancy in the distinctive number of shares purchased and sold and which could not be explained at the relevant point of time. It was only for the lack of explanation for discrepancy that quantum addition was finally confirmed.

Before the Tribunal the assessee furnished reconciliation in order to explain the discrepancy and it also filed an affidavit setting out the reasons as to why the same could not be explained earlier.

Held:
According to the Tribunal, once the assessee had given a reasonable explanation which was not found to be false, imposition of penalty in respect of the same cannot be justified. Further, it observed that the mere fact that the assessee could not explain its claim in the quantum proceedings and in the absence of any independent finding in the penalty order to the effect that claim for loss made by the assessee was bogus or false, it held that the penalty cannot be imposed.

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OffShore Transfer of Shares Between Two NRs Resulting in Change in Control OF Indian Company — Withholding Tax Obligation and Other Implications

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Part-I

Introduction
1.1 With the liberalisation and the history of strong economic growth in the last few years and with the prospects of reasonably sound economic growth, India has become one of the major attractive destinations for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) for carrying on business by Multinational Companies (MNC). 1.2 Large amount of FDI has flown to India through Mauritius for various commercial purposes including the tax advantage under Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement entered into by India with Mauritius (Mauritius Tax Treaty).

1.2.1 Under the Mauritius Tax Treaty, one major advantage is with regard to non-taxability of capital gain arising on alienation of shares of the Indian companies. Under the Mauritius Tax Treaty, the right to tax such a gain is only with Mauritius (with some exception with which we are not concerned in this writeup) and as such, the same cannot be taxed in India. For this purpose, Mauritian Company is required to establish that it is tax resident of Mauritius and which can generally be established by producing Tax Residency Certificate (TRC) issued by the Tax Department of Mauritius. Such TRC issued by the Mauritius tax officer is generally regarded as sufficient evidence for that purpose by virtue of the CBDT Circular No. 789, dated 13-4-2000. This legal position is also confirmed by the judgment of the Apex Court in Azadi Bachao Andolan (263 ITR 507). There is a historical background to this position, with which also we are not concerned in this write-up.

1.3 For the purpose of withholding tax from the taxable income received by a Non-Resident (NR), section 195(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (the Act) provides that any person responsible for paying (Payer) to NR (Payee) any sum chargeable under the Act is liable to deduct tax (TDS) as provided therein. There are some exceptions to this, with which we are not concerned in this write-up. Effectively, under these provisions, the Payer is liable to deduct tax at source (TAS) in such cases and pay the amount so deducted to the Government. Procedural provisions are also made for compliance of these provisions and consequences are also provided for default in compliance of these provisions, with which also we are, effectively, not concerned in this write-up.

1.4 Multinational Groups (MNG) generally operate through various companies in different jurisdictions where such operating companies are directly or indirectly controlled through downstream subsidiaries set up by the main holding company of the MNG. Such holding and subsidiary structures are common in commercial world for various business needs. One of the objectives of putting-up overseas holding and downstream subsidiary structure for FDI is also to provide for easy exit at a later stage when it is decided to withdraw from a business carried on in India through Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) created in India. At the time of exit, in such cases, generally shares of overseas company are transferred to the buyer who, in the process, acquires control and management of Indian SPV. Such overseas transaction, many times, takes place between two NR entities.

1.5 In case of a transaction of the nature referred to in 1.4 above, of late, the Revenue Department has taken a stand that on account of transfer of shares of such overseas holding company, there is indirect transfer of underlying assets of the Indian company as the control and management of the Indian company gets indirectly transferred in such cases. Therefore, the capital gain arising in such offshore transaction between two NRs is liable to tax in India by virtue of provisions of section 9(1)(i) which, inter alia, provides that all income accruing or arising, whether directly or indirectly through the transfer of capital asset situate in India shall be deemed to accrue or arise in India. According to the Revenue, indirect transfer of capital asset situated in India is covered within the scope of this provision.

1.5.1 In view of the above stand of the Revenue, further stand is taken by the Revenue that the Payer NR entity is also required to deduct TAS u/s.195(1) while making payment to the transferor of the share, which is also another NR entity. If such obligation of TDS is not discharged, then the Payer is regarded as ‘assessee in default’ u/s.201 and he would be liable to pay the amount of such tax with interest and will also be subject to other consequences such as penalty, etc. The Payer could also be considered as representative assessee of the Payee u/s.163.

1.6 The issues referred to in paras 1.5 and 1.5.1 are under debate currently in many cases and different views were being taken. The issue became more vital in view of the judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of Vodafone International Holdings B. V. (VIH) reported in 329 ITR Page 126.

1.6.1 Recently, the issues referred to in para 1.6 above, came up for consideration before the Apex Court in the case of VIH and this hotly debated issue got finally decided. Relevant principles of law have been decided/re-iterated in this case and therefore, the judgment becomes more relevant.

1.7 Now, since the Revenue has filed a review petition before the Apex Court for recalling the judgment in Vodafone‘s case, it would also be useful to consider the judgment of the High Court in little greater detail. Various contentions were raised by both the parties before the High Court, as well as Supreme Court. Both the judgments are very long. For the sake of brevity and space constraints, only some of the main contentions are referred to in this write-up. For the same reasons, even the facts of the case are very broadly given in brief. For the sake of convenience, the percentages of shareholding referred to herein at different places are rounded off.

Vodafone International Holdings B.V. v. UOI — 329 ITR 126 (Bom.)

Facts in brief
2.1 In 1992, Hutchison group of Hong Kong (HK) acquired interest in Mobile Telecommunication Industry in India, through a joint venture Company in India (JV Co.), Hutchison Makes Telecom Ltd., [subsequently renamed Hutchison Essar Ltd. (HEL)] through its overseas group of companies. In 1998, CGP Investment Holdings Ltd., (CGP) was incorporated in Cayman Islands (CI) of which the sole shareholder was Hutchison Telecommunication Ltd., HK (HTL). The CGP had set up two Wholly-Owned Subsidiaries (WOS) in Mauritius viz. Array Holdings Ltd. (Array) and Hutchison Telecommunication Services India Holdings Ltd., (HTI-MS).

Array, through its various downstream subsidiaries in Mauritius held 42% shareholdings interest in HEL. Further, 10% shareholding interest in HEL was held by CGP through certain overseas JV companies. HTL-MS had set up WOS in India, namely, 3 Global Services Pvt. Ltd. (3GSPL). The shareholding of HTL in CGP got transferred to another group com-pany [HTI (BVI Holding Ltd.) HTIHL (BVI)], a company incorporated in British Virgin Island (BVI). The HTIHL (BVI) was indirectly WOS of Hutchi-son Telecommunication International Ltd. (HTIL), a company incorporated in CI. HTIL was listed on stock exchange of New York and Hong Kong. As part of group restructuring and consolidation, the structure was further evolved with certain arrangements/ agreements and finally in 2006, the Hutchison group held 52% shareholding in HEL through structural arrangement of holding and subsidiary companies and it had also options to acquire through 3GSPL, a further 15% shareholding interest in HEL from certain Indian companies, subject to relaxation of FDI norms as the Essar group, JV partner, was already hold-ing 22% shareholding through Mauritius companies. Effectively, CGP through its downstream overseas subsidiaries held 42.43% (42%) interest in HEL and it had indirect interest of 9.62% (10%) in the equity of HEL through its pro rata shareholding (indirect) in some Indian companies which had direct/indirect equity interest in HEL. These Indian companies [viz., Telecom Investment India Pvt. Ltd. (TII) and Omega Telecom Holding P. Ltd. (Omega)] belong to (with majority shareholding) its Indian Partners (viz. Mr. Asim Ghosh, Mr. & Mrs. Analgit Singh and IDFC). The structure created was very complex and various commercial arrangements were made between group companies and others for that purpose. The detailed chart of the structure is appearing in the judgment of the High Court at pages 134/135.

2.2 Vodafone International Holdings B. V., Netherlands (VIH) is a company controlled by Vodafone group, UK (Vodafone) . The said VIH acquired the entire shareholding of CGP from HTIHL (BVI) vide transaction dated 11 -2-2007, as a result of which the Vodafone group indirectly acquired the interest of Hutchison group in HEL which that group held through structural arrangement of holding and subsidiary companies (referred to in para 2.1) either through Mauritius-based companies having Tax Residency Certificates (TRCs), or through other entities in which the interest of Hutchison group was held by Mauritius companies. On these facts, the Revenue took a stand that it was a case of acquisition of 67% controlling interest in HEL by VIH from HTIL and since HEL is a company resident in India, such controlling interest is an asset situated in India. Therefore, the capital gain arising from this transaction is taxable in India on the basis that though CGP is not a tax resident in India, it indirectly also holds underlying Indian assets of HEL. The transaction results into indirect transfer of capital assets situated in India. As such, VIH was also under obligation to deduct TAS u/s. 195 from the payment made for acquiring 67% interest of Hutchison group. This was disputed by VIH saying that it agreed to acquire share of CGP and as a consequence, it has direct/indirect control of 52% shareholding of HEL with call options to further acquire 15% shareholding.

2.3 Prior to the above arrangement of transfer of direct and indirect interest of Hutchison group to Vodafone group, certain events took place such as: in December 2006, HTIL had issued a statement stating that is has been approached by various potential-interested parties regarding possible sale of its equity interest in HEL; in December 2006, Vodafone group had made non-binding offer to HTIL for its direct and indirect shareholding in HEL; in February 2007, the offer was revised with binding offer on behalf of VIH for ‘HTIL’s shareholdings in HEL together with inter-related company loans; in February 2007, Bharti Infotel Pvt. Ltd. had also given a letter stating it has no objection to the proposed transaction (as Vodafone had some shareholding in the said company). Ultimately, final binding offer was made by Vodafone group on February 10, 2007 of US $ 11.076 billion.

2.3.1 On 11th February, 2007, Share Purchase Agreement (SPA) was entered into with HTIL [and not with HIHL (BVI) which was holding share of CGP] under which HTIL agreed to procure and transfer to VIH the entire issued share capital of CGP by HTIHL (BVI), free from all encumbrances together with all rights attaching or accruing, and together with as-signment of its loan interests. This was followed by announcement of Vodafone group on February 12, 2007 stating that it had agreed to acquire a controlling interest in HEL via its subsidiary VIH. On February 28, 2007 Vodafone group, on behalf of VIH, addressed a letter to Essar group for purchase of Essar’s entire shareholding in HEL under ‘Tag along rights’ of Essar group under its joint venture with Hutchison group in HEL and so on.

2.3.2 On 28th February, 2007, VIH filed an application with the Foreign Investment Promotion Board (FIPB) of the Union Ministry of Finance in which, effectively, it was requested to take note and grant approval under Press Note 1 to the indirect acquisition of 51.96% stake in HEL through an overseas acquisition of the entire shareholding of CGP from HTIHL (BVI). HTIL in its filing before US SEC had, inter alia, stated that a combined holding of the HTIL group was 61.88%, which is sought to be transferred. Therefore, on a query being raised by FIPB in regard to the difference in percentage of shareholding mentioned in the application and in the filing with US SEC, it was clarified that the variation is because of the difference in the US GAAP and Indian GAAP declarations that the com-bined holding for US GAAP purpose was 61.88% and for the Indian GAAP purpose it is 51.96% and the Indian GAAP number reflects accurately a true equity ownership and control position. Based on this clarification, FIPB granted a requisite approval. On 15th March, 2007, a settlement was also arrived at between HTIL and set of companies belonging to the Essar group on certain payments on the basis of which the Essar group indicated its support to the proposed transaction between Hutchison group and Vodafone group. For the purposes of running the business of JV with Essar Group, a term sheet agreement between VIH and Essar Group of companies was entered into for regulating various affairs of the HEL and the relationship of shareholders of the HEL. In this term sheet, it was, inter alia, stated that VIH had agreed to acquire the entire indirect shareholding of HTIL in HEL, including all rights, contractual or otherwise, to acquire directly or indirectly shares in HEL owned by others, which shares shall, for the purposes of the term sheet, be considered to be part of holding acquired by VIH.

2.3.3 In respect of the above transac-tion, a show- cause notice u/s.163 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (the Act) was issued by the Revenue to HEL in August 2007 asking it to explain why it should not be treated as a representative assessee of VIH. A notice was issued u/s.201(1) and 201(1A) of the Act to VIH in September 2007 asking it to show cause as to why it should not be treated as an ‘assessee in default’ for failure to withhold tax. This action of the Revenue was challenged by VIH before the Bombay High Court in a writ petition in which the jurisdiction of the Revenue over the petitioner for issuing such a notice was challenged. The petition was dismissed by the Bombay High Court (311 ITR 46) declining to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 in a challenge to the show-cause notice. Against this, a Special Leave Petition (SLP) was filed by the petitioner before the Supreme Court which was also dismissed with a direction to Revenue to determine the jurisdictional challenge raised by the petitioner and the right of the petitioner to challenge the decision of the Revenue (if, determined against the petitioner) on this issue was reserved keeping all the questions of law open (179 Taxman 129).

2.3.4 Subsequent to the above events, another show-cause notice u/s.201 was issued by the Revenue in October 2009 on the basis of which, after considering the assessee’s reply, the order was passed u/s.201 upholding jurisdiction of the Revenue on 31st May, 2010. On the same date, a show-cause notice was also issued u/s.163 to VIH as to why it should not be treated as an agent/representative assessee of HTIL. These were challenged by the assessee before the Bombay High Court by a writ petition.

Basic contentions from both the sides

2.4 Before the High Court, on behalf of the petitioner, it was pointed out that the CGP through its downstream subsidiaries, directly or indirectly controlled equity interest in HEL. The transfer of share of CGP has resulted in the petitioner acquiring control over the CGP and its downstream subsidiaries including ultimately HEL and its downstream operating companies. On the passing of downstream companies, commercial arrangements common to such transaction were put in place. The transaction represents a transfer of a capital asset (i.e., share of CGP) situated outside India and hence, any gain arising on such transfer is not taxable in India. Accordingly, there was no obligation on the part of the petitioner to deduct tax u/s.195. It was also pointed out that if the shares held by the Mauritian companies were sold in India, the capital gain, if any arising on such transaction would not be taxable in India in view of the Mauritius Tax Treaty. Section 195 is inapplicable to foreign entity which has no presence in India, not even a branch office, as such entity cannot be subjected to obligation to deduct tax in respect of offshore transaction. It is the recipient who is the potential assessee as he has received the sum chargeable, if any. This by itself, does not create nexus with the Payer who has neither taxable income nor any presence in India. In support of this stand, various submissions were made.

2.5 On behalf of the Revenue, primarily it was pointed out that SPA and other documents establish that the subject-matter of the transaction between HTIL and VIH was a transfer of 67% interest (direct as well as indirect) in HEL. The CGP share is only one of the means to achieve this object. The transaction constitutes a transfer of composite rights of HTIL in HEL as result of the divestment of HTIL’s rights which paved way for VIH to step in the shoes of HTIL. The transaction in question has a sufficient territorial nexus to India and is chargeable to tax under the Act. This is evident from various arrangements made to give an effect to the understanding between the parties including the fact that SPA was entered in to with HTIL and not HTIHL (BVI). The consideration paid was a package for composite rights and not for a mere transfer of a CGP share. It was also pointed out that there is a distinction between proceedings for deduction of tax and regular assessment proceedings. The jurisdiction issue should be legitimately confined to obligation of VIH u/s.195 to withhold tax. Nonetheless, the Revenue made various submissions before the Court with regard to chargeability to tax arising out of the transaction.

2.5.1 The view of the Revenue that the real nature of transaction is with regard to transfer of 67% interest of HTIL in HEL to VIH and not only transfer of one CGP share was based on the premise that on interpretation of SPA and other agreements/documents, it is clear that the form of the transaction is reflected therein. Several valuable rights which are property rights and capital assets of HTIL stand relinquished in favour of VIH under these agreements. These rights are property and constitute capital assets which are situated in India. But for these agreements, the HTIL would not have been able to effectively transfer to VIH, its controlling inter-est in JV Co., HEL, to the extent of 67%. The HTIL’s interest in HEL arose by way of indirect equity shareholding upon agreements; finance agreements, shareholdings agreements, call options agreements, etc. aggregate of which confers a controlling interest of 67% in HEL. All these varied interests did not emerge only from one share of CGP and could not have been conveyed by the transfer of only one equity share of CGP. The parties themselves have treated the transaction as acquisition of one share of CGP, as well as other assets in the form of various rights, and entitlements, which are situated in India.

Settled principles acknowledged

2.6 For the purpose of considering the submissions made by both the parties and the principles on which they have relied, the Court referred to various judicial precedents and the principles emerging therefrom and acknowledged various settled principles in that regard such as: in interpretation of fiscal legislation, the Court is guided by the language and the words used; a legal relationship which arises out of the business transaction cannot be ignored in search of substance over form or in pursuit of the underlying economic interest; the tax planning is legitimate so long as the assessee does not resort to colourable device or a sham transaction with a view to evade taxes; incorporated corporation has a distinct juristic personality and its business is not the business of its shareholders; during the subsistence of corporation, its shareholders have no interest in its assets; a share represents an interest of a shareholder which is made up of various rights; shares, and rights which emanate from them, flow together and cannot be dissected; a controlling interest is an incident of the ownership of the shares in a company and the same is not an identifiable or distinct capital asset independent of the holding of shares; control and management is one facet of the holding of shares; the jurisdiction of a State to tax NRs is based on the existence of nexus connecting the person sought to be taxed with the State which seeks to tax; in certain instances, a need for apportioning income arises where the source rule applies and the income can be taxed in more than one jurisdiction, etc.

2.6.1 Evaluating the contentions of the petitioner with regard to obligation to withhold tax, the Court dealt with the provisions of section 195(1) as well as the relevant precedents and then, the Court formulated the principles governing the interpretation of section 195 which, inter alia, include the position that the Parliament has not restricted the obligations to deduct TAS on a resident and the Court will not imply a restriction not imposed by the legislation.

Analyses of facts and tax implications

2.7 The Court, then, proceeded to analyse the fact of the case on hand to determine the issues raised on the basis of settled principles referred to hereinbefore. For this purpose, the Court noted that essentially the case of VIH is that the transaction was only in respect of the purchase of one share of CGP and that being a capital asset situated outside India, no taxable income arises in India. On the other hand, the case of the Revenue is that the subject-matter of the transaction on a true construction of SPA and other transaction documents is a composite transaction involving transfer of various rights in HEL by HTIL to VIH, which resulted into deemed accrual of Income for HTIL from a source of income in India or through transfer of capital assets situated in India.

2.7.1 To decide the issue, the Court first considered as to how both the parties have construed the transaction. The Court noted that it is revealed from both the interim and final reports of HTIL that the transaction represented discontinuation of its operations in India upon which, it had generated a profit of HK $ 70,502 million. From the proceeds of the transaction, the HTIL also declared special dividend to its shareholders. Accordingly, from HTIL’s perspective, it had carried on in India Mobile Telecommunications Operations, which were to be discontinued as a result of the transaction.

On the other hand, VIH also perceived the transaction as acquisition of 67% interest in Indian JV Co., for an agreed consideration. This is evident from various announcements made by VIH, as well as the arrangements entered into between the parties. The equity value of HTIHL (BVI)’s 100% stake in CGP was computed on the basis of the enterprise value of HEL at US $ 18,250 million and by computing 67% of equity value on that basis. The entire value that was ascribed to its stake in CGP was computed only on the basis of enterprise value of HEL.

The Court then noted that it is in the above background, various documents should be considered and analysed and the effect thereof should be determined.

2.7.2 After considering various clauses of the SPA and the relationship of shareholders of the Company, the Court observed as under (Page 207):

“The diverse clauses of the SPA are indicative of the fact that parties were conscious of the composite nature of the transaction and created reciprocal rights and obligations that included, but were not confined to the transfer of the CGP share. The commercial understating of the parties was that the transaction related to the transfer of a controlling interest in HEL from HTIL to VIH BV. The transfer of control was not relatable merely to the transfer of the CGP share.

Inextricably woven with the transfer of control were other rights and entitlements which HTIL and/or its subsidiaries had assumed in pursuance of contractual arrangements with its Indian partners and the benefit of which would now stand transferred to VIH BV. By and as a result of the SPA, HTIL was relinquishing its interest in the telecommunications business in India and VIH BV was acquiring the interest which was held earlier by HTIL.”

2.7.3 The Court also further noted various other agreements/arrangements made between the parties such as: the term sheet agreement with Essar group to regulate the affairs of HEL and relationship of the shareholders of both the groups, put option agreement with Essar group of companies, a tax deed of covenant for indemnifying various companies in respect of taxation and transfer pricing liabilities, the brand licence agreement, the loan assignment agreements, the arrangement with the existing Indian partners of HTIL (viz. Asim Ghosh, Analjeet Singh and IDFC), etc.

2.7.4 The Court then observed that the facts which have been disclosed before the Court support the contention of the Revenue that the transaction between HTIL and VIH took into consideration various rights, interests and entitlements which, inter alia, include: direct and indirect interest of 52% equity shares of HEL; indirect interest of 15% in HEL through call options held by Indian partners of Hutchison group; right to carry on business through telecom license in India; non-compete in India; management rights of HEL under SPAs; right to use Hutchison brand for a specified period, etc. (the complete details of rights, etc. are appearing on pages 211/212 of the judgment).

2.7.5 The Court then also referred to the FIPB process in the transaction, wherein various queries were raised and clarifications were given by VIH. Referring to one of the clarifications of VIH dated 19th March, 2007, the Court noted that VIH had stated that it had agreed to acquire from HTIL for US $ 11.08 billion interest in HEL, which included 52% equity shareholding (direct/indirect). This price included a control premium, use and rights to use the Hutch brand in India, a non-compete agreement, loan obligations and entitlement to acquire further 15% indirect interest in HEL, subject to the FDI rules, etc. These elements together equated to about 67% of the equity capital.

2.7.6 The above facts clearly establish that it will be simplistic to assume that the entire transaction between HTIL and VIH was only related to transfer of one share of CGP. The commercial and business understanding between the parties postulated what was being transferred was controlling interest in HEL from HTIL to VIH. In its due diligence report, Earnst & Young have also stated that the target structure now also includes CGP which was originally not within the target group. The due diligence report emphasises that the object and intent of the parties was to achieve the transfer of control over HEL and transfer of solitary share of CGP was put in place at the behest of HTIL, subsequently as a mode of effectuating the goal.

2.7.7 The Court further observed that the true nature of the transaction as it emerges from the transactional documents is that the transfer of solitary share of CGP reflected only a part of the arrangement put into place by the parties in achieving to object of transferring control of HEL to VIH. T h e Court, then, held as under (pages 213/214):

“The price paid by VIH BV to HTIL of US $ 11.01 billion factored in, as part of the consideration, diverse rights and entitlements that were being transferred to VIH BV. Many of these entitlements were not relatable to the transfer of the CGP share. Indeed, if the transfer of the solitary share of CGP could have effectuated the purpose it was not necessary for the parties to enter into a complex structure of business documentation. The transactional documents are not merely incidental or consequential to the transfer of the CGP share, but recognised independently the rights and entitlements of HTIL in relation to the Indian business which were being transferred to VIH BV.”

2.7.8 According to the Court, intrinsic to the transaction was a transfer of other rights and entitlements. These rights and entitlements constitute in themselves capital assets within the meaning of section 2(14) of the Act.

2.7.9 After concluding that the transaction should be dissected in to various rights and entitlements for which the consideration is paid, the Court, dealing with the issue of apportionment of consideration to such rights and entitlements to determine the taxability thereof, further held as under (page 215):

“The manner in which the consideration should be apportioned is not something which can be determined at this stage. Apportionment lies within the jurisdiction of the Assessing Officer during the course of the assessment proceedings. Undoubtedly, it would be for the Assessing Officer to apportion the income which has resulted to HTIL between that which has accrued or arisen or what is deemed to have accrued or arisen as a result of a nexus within the Indian taxing jurisdiction and that which lies outside. Such an enquiry would lie outside the realm of the present proceedings ……..”

2.8 The Court then considered the issue with regard to jurisdiction of the Revenue to initiate pro-ceedings u/s.195 in the case of VIH. In this context, after referring to the provisions of section 195(1) and the relevant judicial precedents, the Court concluded as under (page 221):

“Chargeability and enforceability are distinct legal conceptions. A mere difficulty in compliance or in enforcement is not a ground to avoid observance. In the present case, the transaction in question has significant nexus with India. The essence of the transaction was a change in the controlling interest in HEL which constituted a source of income in India. The transaction between the parties covered within its sweep, diverse rights and entitlements. The petitioner by the diverse agreements that it entered into has nexus with India jurisdiction. In these circumstances, the proceedings which have been initiated by the income-tax authorities cannot be held to lack jurisdiction.”

2.8.1 The Court finally stated that the issue of juris-diction has been correctly decided by the Revenue for the reasons already noted above and the VIH was under an obligation to deduct TAS while making payment to HTIL.

2.8.2 This judgment of the High Court is now reversed by the Apex Court (of course, subject to outcome of the review petition filed by the Revenue) which we will consider in the next part of this write-up.
(To be continued)

Ghanshyam Mudgal v. ITO ITAT ‘A’ Bench, Jaipur Before R. K. Gupta (JM) and N. L. Kalra (AM) ITA No. 896/JP/2010 A.Y.: 2007-08. Decided on: 9-9-2011 Counsel for assessee/revenue: Mahendra Gargieya/D. K. Meena

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Section 14 — Heads of income — Compensation received on acquisition of land under the Land Acquisition Act — Additional amount received was linked to the period when the Notification was issued till the date of actual possession — Whether AO justified in treating the sum so received as interest income — Held it was part of the compensation amount receivable and taxable as capital gains.

Section 2(1A) — Agricultural income — Compensation received on account of demolition of borewell and godown on agricultural land — Held that the amount received is agricultural income.

Facts:

During the year under appeal, the assessee’s land was acquired by the government agency under the Land Acquisition Act. Amongst other amounts, he received a sum of Rs.4.64 lakh with reference to the land acquired. As per the provisions of section 23(1A) of the Land Acquisition Act, the said amount was calculated @ 12% p.a. on market value of the land acquired for the period commencing on from the date notified for acquisition of land to the date of taking its possession. In addition, the assessee had also received Rs.8.54 lakh as compensation on account of demolition of borewell and godown used by him in his agricultural activities. According to the assessee, the sum of Rs.4.64 lakh received was part of the land compensation though it was computed on the basis of the period between the date of notification to the date of possession. As regards the sum of Rs.8.54 lakh received, it was contended that the same should be treated as receipt on account of transfer of agricultural land, income wherefrom is exempt from tax. However, the AO treated the sum of Rs.4.64 lakh as interest income. As regards the sum of Rs.8.54 lakh received, the AO assessed it as capital gains and after indexation the gain was determined at Rs.2.86 lakh. On appeal the CIT(A) agreed with the AO and upheld his order.

Held:
As regards the receipt of Rs.4.64 lakh, the Tribunal, relying on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of CIT v. Ghanshyam, (HUF) (224 CTR 522) agreed with the assessee that the amount received should be treated as enhanced compensation receivable on acquisition of the land by the government agency. Accordingly, it was held that the said receipt of Rs.4.64 lakh would be considered as part of capital gains and taxed accordingly.

As regards the sum of Rs.8.54 lakh received, the Tribunal observed that borewell is a form of irrigation and related to agricultural income. Hence, the compensation received on borewell is to be considered as compensation for agricultural land. Similarly, it was held that the compensation received against godown which was used for storage of agricultural produce, would also be considered as compensation for agricultural land.

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Baba Promoters & Developers v. ITO ITAT ‘B’ Bench, Pune Before I. C. Sudhir (JM) and G. S. Pannu (AM) ITA Nos. 629/PN/2009; 625/PN/2009 and 159/PN/2010 A.Ys.: 2004-05, 2006-07 and 2005-06 Decided on: 29-2-2012 Counsel for assessee/revenue: Sunil Ganoo/ Satindersingh Navrath and Ann Kapthuama

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Section 80IB(10) — While computing the area of plot, the area of a plot acquired subsequently for providing approach road also needs to be included in the measurement of total plot area. Areas of open land/garden/store/gym room meant for common use are not to be included for calculating built-up area of the residential unit. Merger of flats, after purchase, by the owners thereof to make it into a larger flat for their own convenience cannot be a cause for denial of deduction u/s.80IB(10).

Facts:
The assessee-firm started construction of a residential project at Aundh, Pune. As per the original lay-out plan approved by Pune Municipal Corporation (PMC), the total area of the plot was shown to be 3995.34 sq.mts. i.e., marginally less than the prescribed area of 1 acre. The assessee submitted that in addition to the above-stated area of land, an additional land measuring 5 ‘Are’ was also acquired by the assessee for the approach road to the said project vide a separate agreement made with the same landlords from whom the above-stated area of 3995.34 sq.mts. of land was purchased. On including this area, the size of the plot exceeded 1 acre. The assessee submitted that if this area would not have been acquired, the PMC would not have sanctioned the plan and issued commencement certificate. The AO visited the site and being satisfied allowed the deduction.

The CIT found this order to be erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the revenue on the ground that: (1) the area of the plot is less than 1 acre; (2) as per sale agreement of row house, the saleable area mentioned is more than 1500 sq. feet; (3) in A.Y. 2005-06 the AO has in order passed u/s.143(3) denied deduction u/s.80IB(10); and (4) flats have been merged together and the modification is not as per approved plans.

Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal questioning the validity of revisional order passed u/s.263 of the Act.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that in the case of Haware Engineers and Builders (P) Ltd. v. ACIT, (11 Taxmann.com 286) (Mum.) deduction claimed u/s.80IB(10) was denied by the A.O. on the ground that the additional plot acquired subsequently, by allotment, was a distinct plot which cannot be included in computation of the area of the plot. The Mumbai Bench of Tribunal held that in case an assessee finds that he is not eligible for deduction u/s.80IB(10), because size of the plot on which project is built is less than minimum necessary size, and he makes good that deficiency, and ensures that all the necessary pre-conditions are satisfied and approvals obtained, the assessee is eligible for deduction u/s.80IB(10). It was further held that the fact that he satisfied the conditions later, does not adversely affect its claim for deduction. What is material is that at the point of time when matter comes up for examination of the claim, the necessary pre-conditions for being eligible to claim are satisfied. The Tribunal held that the facts in the present case are similar as the assessee has acquired the additional land of 5 ‘Are’ subsequently after the acquisition of the main plot of land from the same seller. It held that it is a well-established proposition of law that for transfer of a plot within the meaning of the Act, the requirement is handing over of the possession and payment of consideration. Thus, registration of document of the transaction is not the foremost requirement to establish the transfer for the purpose of the Act. The Tribunal also noted that the Pune Bench of the Tribunal has in the case of Bunty Builders v. ITO held that housing project constitutes development plan, roads and grant of other facilities, therefore, those areas should exist within the prescribed limits and area to be considered as part and parcel of the project. In the present case, after addition of 5 Are of land purchased by the assessee vide agreement dated 20th March, 2004, for the purpose of approach road, to the area given in the lay-out plan, it fulfils the prescribed area for eligibility of claiming deduction u/s.80IB(10) of the Act.

As regards the second ground about row house having area exceeding 1500 sq.ft., the Tribunal noted that sale area included area of open land/garden and if that is excluded, then area of the row house is less than 1500 sq.ft.

As regards the merger of flats and thereby exceeding the prescribed limit of 1500 sq.ft. being taken as a basis for denial of deduction in A.Y. 2005- 06, the Tribunal held that there is no substance since it is undisputed fact that each flat was within the prescribed limit of 1500 sq.ft. area and if after purchasing of 2 flats the owner(s) of flats merges it into a larger flat, the claimed deduction cannot be denied to the assessee.

The Tribunal held that the grounds on which the assessment order has been treated as erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue are debatable and hence revisional powers cannot be invoked.

The Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by the assessee.

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DCIT v. Tejinder Singh ITAT ‘B’ Bench, Kolkata Before Pramod Kumar (AM) and Mahavir Singh (JM) ITA No. 1459/Kol./2011 A.Y.: 2008-09. Decided on : 29-2-2012 Counsel for revenue/assessee: A. P. Roy/ L. K. Kanoongo

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Section 50C — Transfer of leasehold rights in a building does not attract provisions of section 50C.

Facts:
The assessee along with one Amardeep Singh had vide registered lease deeds dated 19th November, 1992 acquired from Shree Khubchand Sethia Charitable Trust (Owner), leasehold rights for 99 years, in a house property at Kolkata.

By a tripartite registered deed dated 20th July, 2007 entered into between the owner, the assessee and Amardeep Singh (lessees) and three entities viz. Sugam Builders Pvt. Ltd., Neelanchal Sales and Suppliers Pvt. Ltd. and Pleasant Niryat Pvt. Ltd. (purchasers), the purchasers purchased this property. Under this deed dated 20th July, 2007 the owner transferred its ownership and reversionary rights in the said property for a consideration of Rs.1,00,00,000; the lessees for a consideration of Rs.3,19,00,000 gave up all their rights and interests in the said premises. Thus, purchasers paid total consideration of Rs.4,19,00,000 — Rs.1,00,00,000 to the owner and Rs.1,59,50,000 to the assessee and Rs.1,59,50,000 to Amardeep Singh — co-lessee. As against the consideration of Rs.4,19,00,000 the stamp duty valuation of the property was Rs.5,59,57,375.

The Assessing Officer (AO) computed the capital gains by adopting the stamp duty valuation to be the full value of consideration and notionally divided the said amount amongst the owner and the lessees in the ratio of actual consideration received by them. Accordingly, as against actual consideration of Rs.1,59,50,000 the AO computed capital gain by adopting Rs.2,12,47,375 to be the full value of consideration. He considered the lease rents paid over a period of time, duly indexed, to be the indexed cost of acquisition and on this basis arrived at LTCG of Rs.1,84,17,692. Since the assessee had invested Rs.1,96,03,685 and not the entire consideration adopted by the AO for computing capital gains, the AO granted proportionate exemption u/s.54F and charged balance Rs.14,46,692 to tax as LTCG.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who relying upon various Tribunal decisions held that provisions of section 50C do not apply to transfer of leasehold rights.

Aggrieved the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal and the assessee filed cross-objection on the ground that the CIT(A) has not adjudicated the alternative ground of the assessee viz. for the purposes of section 54F, full value of consideration does not mean value determined u/s.50C.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that the assessee was a lessee of the property which was sold by the owner of the property, yet the AO had treated the assessee as a seller apparently because the assessee was a party to the sale deed. The Tribunal held that in case of purchase of tenanted property the buyer pays the owner for ownership rights and if he wants to have possession of the property and remove the fetters of tenancy rights he would pay the tenants for surrendering their tenancy rights. Merely because the amount is paid at the time of purchase of the property, the character of receipt will not change.

The provisions of section 50C are not applicable where only tenancy rights are transferred or surrendered. On facts, the assessee had the rights of the lessee and not ownership rights. The assessee had granted, conveyed, transferred and assigned leasehold right, title and interest.

The Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue.

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(2011) 130 ITD 287/9 taxmann.com 69 (Mum.) Ashok Kumar Damani v. Addl. CIT A.Y.: 2005-06. Dated: 3-12-2010

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Allowability of penalty paid to stock exchange for violation of bye-laws of the stock exchange — The payment made to the stock exchange on account of short payment of margin money is only a compensatory payment under the rules of the stock exchange and not for infraction of law. Hence the same is allowable as revenue expenditure.

Facts:

The assessee had made short payment of margin money to the stock exchange. The penalty is levied by the stock exchange for the same which was paid by the assessee during the period under consideration. The AO disallowed the same on belief that the said expenditure is not an allowable expenditure being in the nature of penalty.

Before the Tribunal, the assessee relied on the decision of the Tribunal in ACIT v. Ramesh M. Damani, [ITA No. 5143 (Mum.) of 2006].

Held:
Following the judgment of the Mumbai Bench of the Tribunal in the case of ACIT v. Ramesh M. Damani, (supra), it is held that the payment had been made to stock exchange on account of short payment of margin money. This is only a compensatory payment under the rules of the stock exchange which is allowable as revenue expenditure as the same is not for infraction of law.

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(2011) 130 ITD 255 (Jp.) Dy. CIT v. Abdul Latif A.Y.: 2005-06. Dated: 30-4-2010

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Section 145 — Method of accounting — Rejection of accounts — Addition cannot be made simply on the basis of closing stock without considering the opening stock.

Facts:
The assessee was engaged in the business of manufacture of papers. He had shown purchases of packing material and colour and chemicals as on 31- 3-2005. Also, he had shown closing stock of colour and chemicals as on 31-3-2005, but no amount of packing material was shown in the closing stock. On being asked by the AO as to why the purchases of packing material purchased on the last day of the accounting period were not shown in the closing stock, it was submitted:

(1) that the packing material shown as purchased on last day was actually purchased in earlier months, which due to some computer error were posted on 31-3-2005; (2) that such packing material was consumed during the process; and

(3) that entire packing material remains after the end of year becomes obsolete and, therefore, it was not shown in the closing stock.

The Assessing Officer having noticed that there could be a possibility that some purchases made in the previous year could have been booked during the year, held that the book results were not acceptable. He, therefore, rejected the books of account of the assessee and made a certain addition to his income.

The assessee on the appeal before the CIT(A) had submitted that the packing material is used by him within a period of 7 to 15 days and the same is recognised as expenditure. Further, it was submitted that such practice is followed consistently.

Before the CIT(A), the assessee relied upon the decision of the ITAT, Chandigarh Bench in the case of ACIT v. Ram Sahai Wool Combers (P.) Ltd., (2002) 120 Taxman 84 (Mag.) in which it was held that the addition on account of closing stock cannot be made in case the assessee is consistently showing the purchases as expense.

Relying on the decision of the ITAT in the above case, the learned CIT(A) held that in respect of packing material, there was consistent practice of showing the entire purchase of packing material as consumed. Once this consistent practice was accepted, merely not including the stock of packing material in the closing stock could not be a reason for invoking section 145(3) or making the addition.

On second appeal by the Revenue —

Held:

In case the Assessing Officer felt that such purchases were entered on the last day of the accounting period, then he could have made an investigation to enquire about the genuineness of the purchases. However, he had not taken any step to verify as to whether such purchases were genuine or not. It was not the case of the Revenue that the purchases were not genuine. Moreover, in case the AO wanted to change the method of valuation of closing stock, then he was also required to consider opening stock on the same basis as he had taken for the closing stock. The assessee was following a consistent method of valuing the closing stock by including the packing material as consumed at the time of purchase.

Hence, the Assessing Officer had rejected the books of account on an improper ground. Further, the addition cannot be made simply on the basis of closing stock without considering the opening stock.

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DTAA between India and Georgia notified — Notification 4/2012, dated 6-1-2012.

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DTTA between India and Georgia shall be given effect from 1st April, 2012
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Central Processing of Returns Scheme, 2011 and related amendments/clarifications in relevant sections of the Act — Notification No. 2/2012 and Notification No. 3/2012, dated 4-1-2012.

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The CBDT has notified the aforementioned scheme which lays down the procedure for E-filing of the returns of income either digitally signed or not, filing of ITR V in the latter case, receipt and acknowledgement of such returns, procedure for filing revised return of income, cases wherein the returns would be considered invalid or defective and the remedy thereof, processing of the returns filed and rectification procedure for the same, adjustment of refund against the arrears of demand outstanding as per the records of the CPC, service of notice or communication, appellate proceedings, etc.
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Guidelines for Notification of affordable housing project u/s.35AD — Notification No. 1/2012, dated 2-1-2012.

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The Board vide the Income-tax (First Amendment) Rules, 2012 has Rule 11-0A prescribing guidelines for approval of affordable housing projects u/s.35AD. This includes Form No. 3CN in which the application needs to be made to Member (IT), Central Board of Direct Taxes, the manner in which the form would be approved and the objections/defects if any would be treated, the circumstances under which the application would be rejected, etc. It also lays down the conditions for eligibility of such projects. Conditions are as under:

  • The project shall have prior sanction of the competent authority empowered under the Scheme of Affordable Housing in Partnership framed by the Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation, Government of India.

  • Date of commencement of the project should be on or after 1st April 2011 and date of completion should be within five years from the end of financial year in which the above authorities have sanctioned it.

  • The plot of land should not be less than one acre.

  • Of the total allocable rentable area of the project, affordable housing units for Economically Weaker Section (EWS), Lower Income Group (LIG) and Middle Income Group (MIG) should be as prescribed in the Rule.

Separate books need to be maintained for the project. Also the various terms like date of commencement, housing unit, etc. have been defined in the said rules.

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SRL Ranbaxy Ltd. v. Addl. CIT ITAT ‘G’ Bench, Delhi Before A. D. Jain (JM) and Shamim Yahya (AM) ITA Nos. 434/Del./2011 A.Y.: 2006-07. Decided on: 16-12-2011 Counsel for assessee/revenue: Ajay Vohra & Rohit Garg/Gajanand Meena

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Section 194H — Existence of principal-agency relationship is a sine qua non for invoking section 194H. Amount of discount retained by the collection centres is not ‘commission’ paid by the assessee to the collection centres and consequently section 194H does not apply to such amounts. Since assessee has not paid any amounts to the collection centres, provisions of section 194H could, not have been met.

Facts:
The assessee entered into non-exclusive agreements with domestic and international collection centres comprising of hospitals, nursing homes, clinics and other laboratories/entrepreneurs also. In accordance with the said agreements, the collection centres collected samples from patients/ customers seeking various laboratory testing services. The collection centres had their own premises, infrastructure, staff and necessary licences/ approvals. The collection centres acted as authorised collector for collecting samples and availed of the professional services of the assessee with respect to testing of samples and issue of necessary reports. The assessee charged a discounted price to the collection centres. The price to be charged by the collection centres to its patients/customers was fixed by them and not by the assessee. The assessee raised an invoice on the collection centre which was paid by the collection centre after deduction of TDS u/s.194J. The payment made by the collection centres to the assessee was not dependent on the collection centres receiving the payment from its patients/customers. The amount of discount given to collection centres was not claimed by the assessee as expenditure, but the amount charged to collection centres was shown as its income. The collection centres had flexibility and freedom to choose the laboratory to which samples should be sent for testing, unless the patient/ customer mandated that it be sent to the assessee.

While assessing the total income of the assessee u/s.143(3), the Assessing Officer (AO) held that a sum of Rs.16,80,66,667 being discount offered by the assessee to collection centres was liable for deduction of TDS u/s.194H/194C and since tax was not deducted at source, he disallowed this sum u/s.40(a)(ia).

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who restricted the disallowance from Rs.16,80,66,627 to Rs.11,78,24,030 but affirmed the disallowance, in principle, holding that the relationship between the assessee and the collection centres was that of principal and agent attracting the provisions of section 194H of the Act.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:

The element of agency is necessarily to be there in cases of all the services or transactions contemplated by section 194H. Where the dealing between the parties is not on a principal to agent basis, section 194H does not get attracted. The Tribunal held that the relationship between the assessee and the collection centres was not on a ‘principal & agent’ basis because (a) the centres issued their own bill to the customer/patient, collected the fees and issued the receipt; (b) the rates charged by the centres from its customers were not decided by the assessee; (c) there was no privity of contract between the assessee and the patients; (d) the amounts were not collected by the centres on behalf of the assessee; (e) the set-ups of the collection centres was entirely different from that of the assessee; (f) the collection centres were not under an obligation to forward the samples for testing only to the assessee, but could forward them to other laboratories as well unless mandated by the patients/customers; (g) the expenditure of the collection centres did not show any interlacing with that of the assessee and also the staff of the two was distinct and separate; (h) the collection centres had no authority to bind the assessee in any form.

Further, the disallowance u/s.40(a)(ia) r.w.s. 194H can be made only in respect of expenditure in the nature of commission paid/credited to the account of the recipient, or to any other account. In the present case, the assessee received the amount of the invoice raised, net of discount, from the collection centres. The Tribunal held that this discount, indisputably, cannot, in any manner, be said to be expenditure incurred by the assessee and so, section 40(a)(ia) of the Act is not attracted.

The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed by the Tribunal.

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DCIT v. Tide Water Oil Co. (India) Ltd. ITAT ‘A’ Bench, Kolkata Before Mahavir Singh (JM) and C. D. Rao (AM) ITA No. 2051/Kol./2010 A.Y.: 2003-04. Decided on: 20-1-2012 Counsel for revenue/assessee: D. R. Sindhal/A. K. Tulsiyan

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Section 80IB, Form No. 10CCB — By filing Form No. 10CCB in the course of reassessment proceedings (which form was not filed with the return of income, nor was it filed in the course of assessment proceedings) the assessee is not making any fresh claim for deduction u/s.80IB but merely furnishing the documents to substantiate its claim made during the course of assessment and even reassessment proceedings.

Facts:
For A.Y. 2003-04, the assessee filed its return of income by due date mentioned in section 139(3) of the Act. In the return of income filed the assessee claimed deduction u/s.80IB. The Assessing Officer (AO) assessed the total income u/s.143(3) to be Rs.7,31,51,920 as against returned income of Rs.5,16,02,964 by restricting deduction u/s.80IB on allocation of corporate expenses proportionately over all units. Subsequently, the AO noticed that the assessee had not filed audit report in Form No. 10CCB, hence is not eligible for deduction u/s.80IB and due to that the income has escaped assessment. The AO initiated proceedings u/s.147 r.w.s. 148 of the Act.

In the course of reassessment proceedings the assessee filed Form No. 10CCB and claimed that nonfiling of Form No. 10CCB is only a technical default and since original Form No. 10CCB was filed along with return of income u/s.148, technical default is removed and deduction u/s.80IB should be allowed. The AO noticed that the due date of filing return of income u/s.139(3) was 30-11-2003 and the assessment u/s.143(3) was completed on 31-3-2006, but the audit report filed along with return u/s.148 was dated 23-2-2007 and also balance sheet of Silvasa Unit, in respect of which deduction u/s.80IB was claimed, was audited on 23-2-2007, whereas the P & L Account of Silvasa unit was audited on 16-10- 2003. He held that there was severe non-compliance on the part of the assessee. He, accordingly, denied claim for deduction u/s.80IB. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A).

The CIT(A) confirmed the jurisdiction, but he allowed the claim of the assessee u/s.80IB by holidng that submission of audit report in Form No. 10CCB is directory in nature and it is not mandatory and that submission of audit report even during reassessment proceedings is sufficient compliance u/s.80IB of the Act. The assessee did not challenge the decision of the CIT(A) confirming jurisdiction. Therefore, the assumption of jurisdiction became final.

Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that the AO while framing assessment u/s.143(3) of the Act, originally, accepted the claim of deduction u/s.80IB of the Act despite the fact that there was no audit report in Form No. 10CCB i.e., that means that the AO was also under bona fide belief that the assessee is entitled to deduction u/s.80IB of the Act and he allowed the same. It was subsequently that he noticed that the assessee had not filed the audit report along with return of income, nor had it filed the same during the course of assessment proceedings. He, accordingly, recorded reasons and re-opened the assessment.

The Tribunal held that the assessee is not making any fresh claim for deduction u/s.80IB of the Act, but merely furnishing the documents to substantiate its claim made during the course of assessment and even reassessment proceedings. The Tribunal held that there is no infirmity in allowing the claim of deduction even though the assessee has filed audit report in Form No. 10CCB during the course of reassessment proceedings. It upheld the order of the CIT(A).

The Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue.

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Rachna S. Talreja v. DCIT ITAT ‘D’ Bench, Mumbai Before J. Sudhakar Reddy (AM) and V. Durga Rao (JM) ITA No. 2139/Mum./2010 A.Y.: 2006-07. Decided on: 28-12-2011 Counsel for assessee/revenue : G. P. Mehta/ C. G. K. Nair

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Section 143 — Assessment — Assessee during the course of assessment proceedings filed revised computation of income and claimed additional deduction — Whether AO justified in refusing to consider the revised income and insisting that only by filing revised return u/s.139(5) the additional deduction can be claimed — Held, No.

Facts:
The assessee had filed her return of income on 31-10-2006 declaring income of Rs.11.05 lakh. Subsequently, during the course of assessment proceedings, the assessee filed revised computation of income by claiming deduction on account of interest of Rs.2.1 lakh paid to a bank. The AO did not consider the revised computation of income filed by the assessee on the ground that there was no provision in the Act to file a revised computation of income. According to him, the assessee should file revised return of income as per section 139(5). On appeal, the CIT(A), relying on the Supreme Court decision in the case of Goetz India Ltd. (284 ITR 323) upheld the AO’s order.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that a similar issue had arisen before the Mumbai Tribunal in the case of Pradeep Kumar Harlalkar v. ACIT, (47 SOT 204) wherein the Tribunal following the decision in the case of Goetz India Ltd. observed that ‘power of the Appellate Authority to entertain claim in question was still there . . . . .’. In view thereof the Tribunal admitted the claim made by the assessee and restored the matter to the file of the AO with a direction to consider the revised computation of income filed by the assessee and decide the issue afresh.

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Baba Amarnath Educational Society v. CIT ACE Educational & Charitable Society v. CIT ITAT ‘B’ Bench, Chandigarh Before Sushma Chowla (JM) and Mehar Singh (AM) ITA Nos. 825 & 826/Chd./2011 Decided on: 29-12-2011 Counsel for assessees/revenue : P. N. Arora/ Jaishree Sharma

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Section 12A read with section 2(15) — Registration of charitable institution — Assessees engaged in educational activities — One of the objects permitted assessee to export computer and other similar activities — The said object was never acted upon by the assessee — Whether the CIT justified in rejecting registration application of the trust — Held, No.

Facts:
In the present two appeals, since the facts of the cases as well as the grounds of appeal were identical, the Tribunal decided to dispose of the same by a consolidated order.

The assessee-trusts were established primarily to promote education. The assessees’ application for registration u/s.12A was rejected by the CIT on the ground that their one of the object clauses provided for promotion of export of computers hardware/ software, telecommunication, internet, e-commerce and allied services. For the purpose the CIT relied on the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Yogi Raj Charities Trust v. CIT, (103 ITR 777) and of East India Industries (Madras) Pvt. Ltd. (65 ITR 611).

Held:
From the detailed list of activities carried out by the two assessees, the Tribunal noted that they have carried out activities pertaining to achieving their charitable objects viz., imparting education. The object clause, which was objected to by the CIT and the ground on which the registration was rejected was never acted upon and it remained on paper. According to it, single inoperative object cannot eclipse the whole range of other charitable objects and actual conduct of charitable activities. According to it, it was not the letter or language of one single object clause which is conclusive, but it was the activity of the appellants, which was more relevant. Further, it observed that the first proviso to section 2(15) was not applicable to the first three objects enumerated in the definition. The said proviso only restricts the scope of the expression ‘ advancement of any other object of general public utility’. The proposition was also supported by the Board Circular No. 11/2008, dated 19-12-2008 which inter alia states “where the purpose of a trust or institution is relief of the poor, education or medical relief, it will constitute charitable purpose, even if it incidentally involves the carrying on of commercial activities”.

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Hansraj Mathuradas v. ITO ITAT ‘H’ Bench, Mumbai Before R. V. Easwar (President) and P. M. Jagtap (AM) ITA No. 2397/Mum./2010 A.Y.: 2006-07. Decided on: 16-9-2011 Counsel for assessee/revenue : Mehul Shah/ A. G. Nayak

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Section 37(1) — Business expenditure — Whether the expenditure, which are subjected to FBT, can part thereof be disallowed on the ground that the same are not for the purpose of the business — Held, No.

Facts:
The assessee is a partnership firm engaged in the business of providing services as insurance surveyor and loss assessor. In one of the grounds before the Tribunal, the assesse had challenged disallowance made by the AO and confirmed by the CIT (Appeals), conveyance and telephone expenses of Rs.4,818 and Rs.17,224 out of Rs. 24,088 and Rs.86,120, respectively. In the absence of any record maintained by the assessee in the form of log book or call register to establish that the said expenses were wholly and exclusively for the purpose of its business, the same were disallowed by the AO to the extent of 20%.

Held:
The Tribunal referred to the CBDT Circular No. 8/2005, dated 29-8-2005 and opined that once fringe benefit tax is levied on expenses incurred, it follows that the same are treated as fringe benefits provided by the assessee as employer to its employees and the same have to be appropriately allowed as expenses incurred wholly and exclusively incurred by the assessee for the purpose of its business.

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Dy. Director of Income tax vs. G. K. R. Charities Income tax Appellate Tribunal “G” Bench, Mumbai. Before G. E. Veerabhadrappa (President) and Amit Shukla (J. M.) ITA No. 8210/Mum /2010 Asst. Year 2007-08. Decided on 10.08.2012. Counsels for Revenue/Assessee: Pavan Ved/A. H. Dalal

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Section 11 – Charitable institution – (1) Claim for depreciation on fixed assets is treated as application of income; (2) Receipt of loan in violation of the Bombay Public Trust Act does not invite denial of exemption u/s. 11; (3) Repayment of loan originally taken for the objects of the trust will amount to an application of income.

Facts:
The assessee is a charitable trust registered with the Charity Commissioner as well as u/s 12A of the Act. In the assessment order passed for the year under appeal, the AO held as under:

1. In respect of depreciation of Rs. 19.48 lakh claimed: Since cost of fixed assets had already been allowed as application of income in the earlier years, relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Escorts Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Union of India (199 ITR 43), the claim for depreciation was denied;

2. Re: Treatment of repayment of loan of Rs. 2.92 crore as the application of income: Since the loan when it was raised was not declared/treated as income in the year of receipt, relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Escorts Ltd. & Anr. (supra), the assessee’s claim would result into double deduction, hence not permissible;

3. The above loan was taken without the Charity Commissioner’s permission, thus in violation of the provisions of section 36A(3) of the Bombay Public Trust Act. Therefore, relying on the Bombay high court decision in the case of CIT vs. Prithvi Trust (124 ITR 488), he forfeited the exemption granted u/s. 11.

Being aggrieved by the order of the CIT(A), who held in favour of the assessee, the revenue filed appeal before the tribunal. Before the tribunal, the revenue justified the order passed by the AO and further relied on the decision of the Cochin bench of tribunal in the case of DDIT Vs. Adi Shankara Trust (ITA no. 96/Coch/2009 dated 16-06-2011) and on the Cochin tribunal decision in the case of Lissie Medical Institution (2010 TIOL 644). According to it, the later decision was also affirmed by the Kerala high court. Further, it was contended that the decision of the Bombay high court in CIT vs. Institute of Banking Personnel Selection (264 ITR 110) relates prior to insertion of section 14A of the Act without considering the judgment of Escorts Ltd.

Held:
As regards the denial of exemption u/s. 11 on the ground that loan taken by the assessee in earlier years from managing trustee was in violation of the Bombay Public Trust Act, the tribunal held that under the Act, once the CIT grants registration u/s. 12AA, looking to the objects of the trust, the same cannot be withdrawn until and unless there was a violation of provisions of section 13 or the registration is cancelled u/s. 12AA(3). The tribunal further observed that once the loan taken was duly shown in the Accounts, there was no requirement under the Act that the provisions of other Acts have to be complied with. According to it, the Bombay high court decision in the case of Prithvi Trust was on a different ground, hence, not applicable to the case of the assessee. According to it, the decision of the Supreme court in the case of ACIT vs. Surat City Gymkhana (300 ITR 214) and Mumbai tribunal decision in the case of ITO (Exemption) vs. Bombay Stock Exchange (ITA No. 5551/Mum/2009 dt. 22. 08. 2006) also support the case of the assessee.

As regards the allowability of depreciation – the tribunal preferred to follow the decision of the Bombay high court in the case of Institute of Banking Personnel Selection. It further noted that on the similar issue, the Punjab & Haryana high court in the case CIT vs. Market Committee, Pipli (330 ITR 16) after considering the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Escorts Ltd., held in favour of the assessee. Also, taking note of the Mumbai tribunal decision in the case of ITO vs. Parmeshwaridevi Gordhandas Garodia (ITA No. 4108/ Mum/2010 dated 10-08-2011), the tribunal held that allowing of depreciation is application of income and it does not amount to double deduction. Hence, the order of the CIT (A) was upheld on this ground also.

As regards the claim for treating repayment of loan as the application of income, the tribunal agreed with the order of the CIT (A) and relying on the CBDT Circular No. 100 dated 24-01-1973 and the decision of the Gujarat high court in the case CIT vs. Shri Plot Swetamber Murti Pujak Jain Mandal (211 ITR 293)and of the Rajasthan high court in the case of Maharana of Mewar Charitable Foundation (164 ITR 439), held that such repayment of loan originally taken to fulfill one of the objects of the trust will amount to an application of income for charitable and religious purposes.

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(2012) 75 DTR (Chennai)(Trib) 113 Smt. V.A. Tharabai vs. DCIT A.Y.: 2007-08 Dated: 12-1-2012

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54F – Inability to construct the residential house within three years due to restraint order by competent Court will not disentitle the assessee from the exemption.

Facts:
The assessee sold her capital asset resulting in long-term capital gains which was claimed as exempt as the the assessee was proposing to construct a residential house property out of the sale consideration. The exemption was claimed u/s. 54F. The assessee sold the property on 8th June, 2006 and immediately thereafter, on 5th July, 2006, purchased a landed property to construct a house. The purchase price paid for the land was more than the long-term capital gains arisen in the hands of the assessee on sale of her capital asset. But the assessee could not construct the residential house in the land purchased by her as proposed, due to injunction granted to the owners by the Civil Court. The expiry of the threeyear period from the date of sale of the property was on 8th June, 2009. The matter went upto the Hon’ble Supreme Court, which was dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and all proceedings were dismissed on 13th September 2011.

Held:
The facts demonstrate that the assessee had arranged the transaction in such a bona fide manner so as to claim the exemption available u/s. 54F. It is after the purchase of the property that hell broke loose against the assessee in the form of civil litigation. The litigation started on 25th February, 2008 and ended only on 19th September, 2011. By that time, the available period of three years to construct the house was already over, on 8th June, 2009. It is an accepted principle of jurisprudence that law never dictates a person to perform a duty that is impossible to perform. In the present case, it was impossible for the assessee to construct the residential house within the stipulated period of three years.

A dominant factor to be seen in the present case is that the entire consideration received by the assessee on sale of her old property has been utilised for the purchase of the new property. The conduct of the assessee unequivocally demonstrates that the assessee was in fact proceeding to construct a residential house, based on which the assessee had claimed exemption u/s. 54F. It is true that the assessee could not construct the house. In the special facts and circumstances of the present case, therefore, it is necessary to hold that the amount utilised by the assessee to purchase the land was in fact utilised for acquiring/constructing a residential house.

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Aplicability of Explanation to Section 73

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Section 73 of the Income-tax Act prohibits set-off of losses of speculation business except against profits and gains of another speculation business. The Explanation to section 73 extends the meaning of speculation business for the purposes of such set-off, by deeming any part of the business of a company which consists in the purchase and sale of shares of other companies to be a speculation business.

There are however two exceptions to this deeming fiction — one is for a company whose gross total income consists mainly of income which is chargeable under the heads ‘Interest on Securities’, ‘Income from House Property’, ‘Capital Gains’ and ‘Income from Other Sources’ and the second is for a company the principal business of which is the business of banking or the granting of loans and advances.

The Explanation to section 73 reads as under:

“Where any part of the business of a company (other than a company whose gross total income consists mainly of income which is chargeable under the heads ‘Interest on Securities’, ‘Income from House Property’, ‘Capital Gains’ and ‘Income from Other Sources’, or a company the principal business of which is the business of banking or the granting of loans and advances) consists in the purchase and sale of shares of other companies, such company shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to be carried on a speculation business to the extent to which the business consists of the purchase and sale of such shares.”

Two issues have arisen before the Courts, in the context of the first fiction, above, as to how the composition of the gross total income is to be looked at for the purpose of considering the applicability of this Explanation. One issue has been as to how negative income (loss) has to be considered — whether in absolute terms ignoring the negative sign, or to be taken as lower than a positive figure, for determining the majority composition of the gross total income. The second issue has arisen as to whether, for considering the applicability of this Explanation, the deemed speculation business loss is to be set off first against the other business profits, and only the net business income after such set-off is to be considered as ‘included’ in the gross total income and that it is such net business income, so included, that is to be compared with the income from the other heads of income to determine the composition of the gross total income. Naturally, the income under the other heads of income shall gain a higher share in composition of the gross total income where the business income is first set off against the losses of the deemed speculation business.

Considering the second issue, the Calcutta High Court has taken the view that for considering the applicability of the Explanation, the share trading loss is not to be set off against other business profits by adopting the ratio of its earlier decisions in the context of the first issue, the Bombay High Court has held that only the net business income after setting off the share trading loss against other business profits is to be considered as included in the gross total income.

Park View Properties’ case
The issue first came up before the Calcutta High Court in the case of CIT v. Park View Properties P. Ltd., 261 ITR 473.

In this case, the assessee-company had incurred a loss of Rs.8,98,799 in share trading, and had other business profits of Rs.12,32,469, the net business profits being Rs.3,33,670. The assessee had income from other sources and dividend income (which was taxable at that point of time) of Rs.5,73,701. The gross total income, determined after set-off of the share trading loss, was therefore Rs.9,07,371.

The Assessing Officer denied the benefit of the exception to the Explanation to section 73, denying set-off of share dealing loss on the ground that such losses were to be deemed as the loss of a speculation business, on application of the said Explanation. The Commissioner (Appeals) allowed the appeal of the assessee, holding that the main source of income of the assessee consisted of income from interest on securities and income from house property. The Tribunal upheld the order of the Commissioner (Appeals), allowing set-off of the share trading business loss without treating the same as a speculation loss.

The Calcutta High Court noted that the Tribunal had allowed the benefit of the exception to the Explanation to section 73 by setting off the share trading loss against the profits of other business for the purposes of determining whether the said Explanation was applicable or not. The Court did not approve the approach of the Tribunal. According to the Calcutta High Court, in order to ascertain whether an assessee would be covered by the Explanation to section 73, it had to be first examined whether the assessee came within the exception provided to the Explanation. This, according to the Court, was to be done by taking into consideration only the business profits, excluding the share trading loss, as could be gathered from the expression ‘gross total income consists mainly of income chargeable under the heads . . . . .’ used in the Explanation that was clear and unambiguous, and reflected the intention of the Legislature.

The Calcutta High Court noted that while computing the gross total income, loss was also to be taken into account, since loss was treated as a negative profit. The Calcutta High Court noted that in the case of Eastern Aviation and Industries Ltd. v. CIT, 208 ITR 1023, the Calcutta High Court had held that the explanation to section 73 could be applied before the principle of deduction was applied, namely, after computing the gross total income.

Applying this principle, the Court observed that if the loss in the share dealing account of Rs.8,98,799 was treated as a negative profit, then definitely the income from other sources and dividend income of Rs.5,73,701 was lower. Therefore, according to the Calcutta High Court, the main income consisted of the business of share trading, which was the main object of the assessee. The Calcutta High Court expressed the view that the business income computed after setting of the loss in share trading of Rs.3,33,670 did not represent the business income, since it was arrived at after applying the benefit of the explanation to section 73, namely, setting off the speculative income.

The Calcutta High Court therefore held that the case did not fall within the exception in the explanation to section 73, and the loss incurred on share trading was to be treated as speculation loss and could not be set off against other income.

Darshan Securities’ case
The issue again recently came up before the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT v. Darshan Securities Pvt. Ltd., (ITA No. 2886 of 2009, dated 2-2-2012 — available on www. itatonline.org).

In this case, the assessee had an income from service charges of Rs.2,25,04,588, and share trading loss of Rs.2,23,32,127, besides a taxable dividend income of Rs.4,79,325. The assessee claimed that in computing the gross total income for the purposes of the Explanation to section 73, the share trading loss had to be first adjusted against the income from service charges.

The Assessing Officer disallowed the set-off of the share trading loss, holding it to be a speculation loss. The Commissioner (Appeals) accepted the assessee’s claim that the case of the company was covered by the first exception to the said Explanation to section 73, as did the Tribunal.

On behalf of the Revenue, it was argued before the Bombay High Court that in computing the gross total income for the purposes of the Explanation to section 73, income under the heads of profits and gains of business or profession must be ignored. Alternatively, it was urged that where the income from business included a loss in trading of shares, such loss should not be allowed to be set off against income from any other source under the head of profits and gains of business or profession.

The Bombay High Court analysed the provisions of section 73 and the Explanation thereto. It noted that the Explanation to section 73 was a deeming fiction applying only to a company and extending only for the purposes of that section. It noted that the bracketed portion of the Explanation carved out an exception.

The Bombay High Court noted that ordinarily income which arose from one source, which fell under the head of profits and gains of business or profession could be set off against the loss, which arose from another source under the same head. Section 73(1) however set up a bar to setting off a loss which arose in respect of a speculation business against the profits and gains of any other business. Consequently, such speculation loss could be set off only against the profits and gains of another speculation business.

According to the Bombay High Court, the explanation provided a deeming fiction of when a company is deemed to be carrying on a speculation business. If the Department’s submissions were accepted, it would lead to an incongruous situation, where in determining as to whether a company was carrying on a speculation business within the meaning of the explanation, section 73(1) would be applied in the first instance. According to the Bombay High Court, this would not be permissible as a matter of statutory interpretation, as the explanation was designed to define a situation where the company was deemed to carry on speculation business. It is only thereafter that section 73(1) can apply. Applying the provisions of section 73(1) to determine whether a company was carrying on speculation business would reverse the order of application, which was impermissible and not contemplated by Parliament.

The Bombay High Court observed that in order to determine whether the exception carved out by the Explanation applied, the Legislature had first mandated a computation of the gross total income. Further, the words ‘consists mainly’ were indicative of the fact that the Legislature had in its contemplation that the gross total income consisted predominantly of income from the 4 heads referred to therein. Obviously, according to the Bombay High Court, in computing the gross total income, the normal provisions of the Act must be applied, and it was only thereafter that it had to be determined as to whether the gross total income so computed consisted mainly of income which was chargeable under the heads referred to in the Explanation.

The Bombay High Court followed the ratio of its earlier decisions in the cases of CIT v. Hero Textiles and Trading Ltd. , (ITA No. 296 of 2001 dated 29-1-2008) and CIT v. Maansi Trading Pvt. Ltd., (ITA No. 47 for 2001 dated 29-1-2008). It also noted that it had dismissed Notice of Motion No. 1921 of 2007 in ITA (Lodging) No. 852 of 2007 for condonation of delay against the Tribunal Special Bench decision in the case of Concord Commercial Pvt. Ltd., which decision had been followed by the Tribunal in this case.

The Bombay High Court therefore held that since the net business income of Rs.1,72,461 was less than the dividend income of Rs.4,79,325, the assessee was covered by the exception carved out in the Explanation to section 73, and would not be deemed to be carrying on a speculation business for the purposes of section 73(1).


Observations

The Calcutta High Court seems to have placed reliance on its decision in the case of Eastern Aviation and Industries Ltd. (supra) in arriving at its conclusion. In particular, it followed the view taken in that case that negative profits are also income and are to be considered in the absolute sense (ignoring the positive or negative signs) for the purpose of the exception carved out in explanation to section 73(1). The Calcutta High Court, however, failed to appreciate that Eastern Aviation’s case dealt with a situation where there was a negative speculation income and negative share trading income, but no other profits from any other business. The question of set-off of share trading loss against any other business profit, therefore, did not arise for consideration in that case. In that case, the gross total income itself also was a negative figure. The reliance placed on the ratio of that decision, therefore, seems to have been misplaced.

Even assuming that the ratio of Eastern Aviation’s case that even negative incomes should be considered in the absolute sense were correct, what needs to be considered is the net position of the income under each head of income, and not the net position of each source of income. In Darshan Securities’ case, the net position of the income under the head business or profession was a positive figure, which was lower than the income under the head ‘Income from Other Sources’. Therefore, even applying Eastern Aviation’s case, the ratio of Darshan Securities’ case seems justified.

As rightly observed by the Bombay High Court, one cannot start with a presumption that the explanation applies and that the loss is a loss from speculation business for determining whether the explanation applies. One would therefore have to compute the gross total income without applying the explanation for finding out the applicability of the explanation. In doing so, one would have to apply the normal provisions for computation of gross total income ignoring the explanation to section 73, i.e., by setting off the share trading loss against other business profits, which would normally have been the position in the absence of the explanation. It is only then if it is determined that the explanation applies, as the case falls outside the exception to the explanation, that the prohibition on set-off of the loss would apply.

The view taken by the Bombay High Court that the share trading loss is to be set off against other business income for determining whether explanation to section 73 applies, is therefore the better view of the matter.

War Against Offshore Tax Evasion — Will Tax Information Exchange Agreements Work?

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In the recent crackdown against errant taxpayers, the Income-tax Department has initiated action against many Indians who had stashed their wealth in the HSBC bank in Geneva. This is similar to the action it had taken earlier against the Indian account holders in LGT Bank in Lichtenstein. Similarly, proceedings are also expected to be initiated against many tax evaders on the basis of more than 10,000 pieces of information reportedly received from the different countries. This news may be comforting to the majority of taxpayers who honestly pay their taxes and believe that the Government ought to severely punish tax evaders.

This development gives hope that such trickle would turn into a flow of information to bring back Indian black money stashed abroad after the Indian Government has entered into Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs) with the tax havens. India has so far signed TIEAs with Bermuda, Bahamas, Isle of Man, British Virgin Island, Cayman Island, Liberia, and Jersey and more TIEAs are under negotiation. India is also seeking to amend its 75 existing Double Taxation Agreements with the countries to provide for effective exchange of tax information.

However, sceptics feel that Tax Information Exchange Agreements are unlikely to make any meaningful contribution in fight against tax evasion, more particularly against offshore tax evasion. Their scepticism is because of several reasons. However, before discussing their views it may be necessary to go through a bit of background to understand the issues involved in TIEAs.

Background

The global financial crisis triggered TIEA drive. One of the fallout of the global financial crisis was that of growing realisation among the governments on the menace of tax evasion, particularly offshore tax evasion, which has resulted in massive revenue loss hitting developing countries harder, which need more funds for their development and poverty eradication. Various agencies and organisations have estimated the magnitude of the problem. For example, a non-profit organisation, ‘Global Financial Integrity’ in its report published in January 2009, has estimated that the developing countries lost between $ 858 billion to $ 1.06 trillion in illicit financial outflows in 2006. ‘Oxfam’, another non-profit organisation in a study carried out in March 2009 found that at least $ 6.2 trillion wealth of the developing countries is held offshore, depriving them annual tax receipts between $ 64-124 billion. Therefore, considering the sheer size of the revenue loss, the governments are looking to collect tax from the funds deposited in the offshore accounts, on which tax was not paid.

Role of a tax haven

Critical role played by tax havens in offshore tax evasion is well known, which often ignore and many a time aid tax evasion taking place in their jurisdiction. Tax evaders find tax havens attractive because many tax havens have developed ‘liberal’ systems, such as simple registration of a company with bearer shares, minimum capitalisation, nominal reporting requirements, provide ease of funds transfer and offer possibility of keeping ownership anonymous. Such rules make tax evasion easier. More importantly, tax havens are attractive to tax evaders because of lack of transparency and little exchange of information apart from the fact that it levies nominal tax or no tax on them. On the other hand, for a tax haven, on-going financial activity in its jurisdiction is beneficial for its survival and prosperity. It is win-win situation for both: the tax haven and the tax evaders.

OECD response
Tax administrations cannot function beyond their country’s jurisdiction, although globalisation of economy and growing international business require tax administrations to operate internationally. Tax administrations find it difficult to detect tax evasion involving tax haven because of the lack of adequate information on such transactions. Therefore, ‘Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development’ (OECD) decided to tackle two critical elements — which make a jurisdiction a tax haven — lack of transparency and lack of or little exchange of information. The OECD, strongly supported by the G20 Nations, has aggressively promoted international co-operation in tax matters through exchange of information by promoting TIEAs with tax havens.

The OECD started its campaign in 1998 with the publication of the report ‘Harmful Tax Competition: Emerging Global Issue’ emphasising the need for effective exchange of information. Subsequently, the OECD developed a model ‘Tax Information Exchange Agreement’ which is largely followed by all nations. The OECD also devised a compliance standard for the tax havens to ensure that each of them sign and effectively implement TIEAs. This compliance standard required each tax haven to sign TIEAs with minimum 12 nations other than tax havens. As standards for monitoring their compliance, the OECD also calls for willingness on part of the tax haven to continue to sign agreements even after reaching threshold and insists on effective implementation of the TIEAs.

The ‘Global Forum’ created by the OECD member countries has devised a system to monitor jurisdiction’s standards on transparency and exchange of tax information by carrying out phase-wise peer reviews by other jurisdictions. Peer review assesses jurisdiction’s legal and regulatory framework on criteria of 10 key elements in 1st Phase of review and in Phase 2 review, examines effective implementation of exchange of tax information after a jurisdiction removes deficiencies identified in its legal and regulatory framework. The peer reviews assess the availability of ownership, accounting and bank information and authorities’ power to access as well as capacity to deliver information along with rights and safeguards and provisions of confidentiality.

So far various countries world over have signed more than 700 TIEAs. The tax havens have signed these agreements to come out of the OECD’s ‘grey list’ to avoid possible sanctions imposed on them if they fail to comply with the stipulated standard of signing minimum 12 TIEAs with the countries other than tax havens.

TIEA

TIEAs provide for exchange of requested information even in the cases in which the conduct of the taxpayer does not constitute crime in the jurisdiction of the requested country (Tax haven). The country is also required to provide requested information which is not in its possession by gathering it. Most importantly, the TIEAs provide for obtaining information from the banks and the financial institutions regarding ownership of companies, partnerships, trusts including ownership information of the persons in the ownership chain and also information on the settlers, trustees, and beneficiaries. This is one of the most important provisions of the agreement, which make it possible, at least theoretically, to unravel ultimate beneficiaries of the tax haven bank accounts. It is too well known that beneficiaries of the tax haven bank accounts are often shielded by a deliberately created complex ownership structure consisting of a maze of entities. It is also important to note that TIEA does not place any restrictions on information exchange caused by the bank secrecy or domestic tax interest requirements.

Why TIEAs cannot be effective

Despite having the well-designed provisions in the TIEA and seriousness of the OECD and governments in dealing with tax evasion, many professionals believe that the TIEAs will not work. There are various reasons for this negative sentiment.

Firstly, there is a conflict of interests among tax haven and non-tax haven countries. Secrecy jurisdictions are hardly interested in sharing information about their customers.

In many jurisdictions, ownership and beneficial ownership information is protected by domestic law.

From the OECD’s Progress Report Tax Transparency of 2011, it becomes clear that making legal and structural changes in secrecy jurisdictions is going to be a time-consuming affair. So far, out of total 81 peer reviews launched, Global Forum has adopted 59 reports. Out of the 59 reviews completed, 42 are Phase 1 reviews and 17 are combined reviews (reviews of both the Phases conducted simultaneously). Nine Jurisdictions will move to Phase 2 after they fix the deficiencies pointed out in the peer reviews. Thus, jurisdictions have to do considerable work to enable them to exchange tax information effectively. Moreover, one of the conclusions of the Report is that the information exchange is too slow.

Secondly, there is no automatic exchange of information. The TIEA requires that for getting information on a taxpayer, the applicant country has to provide specific information of the taxpayer such as (a) the identity of the taxpayer under examination or investigation; (b) the period for which information is requested; (c) the nature of the information requested and the tax purpose for which the information is sought; (d) grounds for believing that the requested information is present in the requested country or is in the possession of a person within the jurisdiction of the requested country; (e) to the extent known, the name and address of any person believed to be in possession of the requested information; (f) a statement that the request is in conformity with the law and administrative practices of the applicant country, that if the requested information was within the jurisdiction of the applicant country, then the applicant country would be able to obtain the information under the laws of the applicant country or in the normal course of administrative practice and that it is in conformity with this agreement; (g) a statement that the applicant country has pursued all means available in its own territory to obtain the information, except which would give rise to dispro-portionate difficulties. Thus, very high amount of information is required to be furnished for making a request meaning that the tax administration should already have substantial evidence against the taxpayer rather than gathering evidence against a taxpayer to make a case of tax evasion. Very often, furnishing such information before the completion of investigation is like putting a cart before the horse.

Thirdly, a taxpayer can move his deposits from the bank account of one tax haven to another before developing of an enquiry making tax administration’s efforts futile. Lastly, experiences of some of the countries indicate little usefulness of TIEAs as they have sparingly used it for the information exchange.

It may be recalled here that the information on the basis of which the Income-tax Department has recently initiated action was not received under the TIEA. The information on Indian account holders in LGT bank Lichtenstein was provided by Germany, which in turn had bought it from the disgruntled employee of the Bank, whereas France reportedly passed on the information on the account holders of the HSBC Bank, Geneva.

Responses by other countries

Probably considering the limitations of the TIEA, some of the countries have adopted multi-pronged strategy to counter offshore tax evasion. On the one hand, US, Germany and Australia had offered Voluntary Income Disclosure Scheme and on the other, some of them have enacted specific legislations to deal with it.

The US has strengthened domestic legislation by enacting specific laws to counter offshore tax evasion by creating additional sources of information gathering.

The US introduced ‘Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act’ (HIRE) providing tax incentives for hiring and retaining unemployed workers also imposes 30% withholding on payment made to foreign financial institution, unless such institution agrees to adhere to certain reporting requirements with respect to US account holders. It has also enacted legislation — FATCA (the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act) which is to be implemented from 2013 requiring non-US banks to report the accounts of US clients to the US Internal Revenue Service. There is also a proposal in the US for enacting additional law, ‘Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act’ strengthening FATCA and plugging specific offshore tax evasion schemes. Similarly, UK’s new law introduced in 2010 provides for higher penalty at 200% on offshore tax evasion.

In addition, many countries have stepped up their counter offensive by allocating more work force to investigate the cases of offshore tax evasion. It is reported that the IRS of the US had placed more than 1400 agents on a project to investigate the merchants who were directly depositing credit card sales in their offshore accounts.

Conclusion

The real challenge to willingness to exchange of information comes from the difference in the tax laws and law on confidentiality along with conflicting interests among countries. Therefore, there is a need to take additional measures along with the TIEAs. However, the measures for information gathering which may work for the countries such as the US, Germany or the UK because of their political and economic clout may not work for India. India will have to supplement its measures — legislative as well as administrative — for information gathering in its battle against tax evasion leveraging at the international level its position of a giant emerging market.

On a positive note, the biggest contribution of the TIEAs is providing legal instrument in an environment against tax evasion. With the result, tax evaders are now increasingly realising that there will be no safer havens in near future for their tax evaded funds, which is the fundamental requirement in a fight against tax evasion.

Guidelines for setting up an Infrastructure Debt Fund u/s.10(47) — Notification No. 16/2012, dated 30-4-2012.

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A new Rule 2F has been inserted vide Income-tax (Fifth Amendment) Rules, 2012 prescribing guidelines and conditions for setting up an infrastructure debt fund for the purpose of claiming exemption u/s.10(47) of the Act. These conditions inter alia provide as under:

A new Rule 2F has been inserted vide Income-tax (Fifth Amendment) Rules, 2012 prescribing guidelines and conditions for setting up an infrastructure debt fund for the purpose of claiming exemption u/s.10(47) of the Act. These conditions inter alia provide as under:
(a) The fund shall be set up as a NBFC as per the Guidelines issued by RBI.
(b) The fund shall invest in Public Private infrastructure projects as prescribed.
(c) The fund shall issue Rupee denominated Bonds as well as Foreign Currency Bonds in accordance with guidelines issued by RBI and regulations under FEMA.
(d) Restrictions are imposed on investment by the fund as well as lock-in period for the investor.

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Section 54EC — Exemption from payment of capital gains tax provided the amount is invested within six months from the date of transfer — Whether the investment made within six months from the date of the receipt of consideration is eligible — On the facts held yes.

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Mahesh Nemichandra v. ITO
ITAT ‘A’ Bench, Pune
Before Shailendra Kumar Yadav (JM) and
G. S. Pannu (AM)
iTa Nos. 594 to 597/PN/10
A.Y.: 2006-07. Decided on: 29-3-2012
Counsel for assessee/revenue : S. U. Pathak/Ann Kapthuama

Section 54EC — exemption from payment of capital gains tax provided the amount is invested within six months from the date of transfer — Whether the investment made within six months from the date of the receipt of consideration is eligible — on the facts held yes.


Facts:

The assessee jointly owned with three others land at Pune. The
assessee entered into a joint venture development agreement with a
builder on 12-7- 2005, in which the consideration was fixed at Rs.2.50
crore. This document was registered later by way of confirmation deed
dated 23-1-2007. Thereafter, a correction deed was entered into on
2-7-2007 in which the sale consideration was increased to Rs.4.90 crore.
Out of the total sale consideration at Rs.4.90 crore, the assessee’s
share was 1/4th i.e., Rs.1.22 crore. On these facts, the Assessing
Officer inferred that the date of joint venture agreement, i.e.,
12-7-2005 was the date of transfer for the capital asset. Further the
claim for relief u/s.54EC on account of investments of Rs.12.5 lac and
Rs.37.5 lac made on 3-8-2007 and 27-10-2007 was denied. The assessee
objected to taxation of the capital gain in A.Y. 2006-07, and contended
that it should be considered in the A.Y. 2007-08 since the joint venture
agreement was registered on 23-1-2007 and only after which it was acted
upon and implemented. On appeal the CIT(A) confirmed the order of the
AO. Before the Tribunal the Revenue supported the orders of the
authorities below by pointing out that the Bombay High Court in the case
of Chaturbhuj Dwarkadas Kapadia v. CIT, (260 ITR 491) (Bom.) has noted
that after insertion of clauses (v) and (vi) in section 2(47) of the
Act, the expression ‘transfer’ includes any transaction which allowed
possession to be taken/retained in part performance of a contract of the
nature referred to in section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act,
1882. Therefore, it contended that in the case of the assessee, as he
had granted possession with an irrevocable permission for development of
the land in favour of the builder, the date of development agreement
was the date of transfer for the purpose of ascertaining the year of
taxability of capital gains.

Held:

The Tribunal noted that under the
agreement dated 12-7-2005 the builder was given the possession of the
property for development. This according to it, fulfils the requirements
of section 2(47)(v) as understood and explained by the Mumbai High
Court in the case of Chaturbhuj Dwarkadas Kapadia. Accordingly, it held
that the ‘transfer’ in terms of section 2(47)(v), had taken place during
A.Y. 2006-07. As regards the issue relating to granting of exemption
u/s.54EC of the Act in respect of the investment Rs.12.5 lakh and
Rs.37.5 lakh made on 3-8-2007 and 27-10-2007, respectively, in eligible
bonds, the Tribunal noted that the assessee had received the aforestated
consideration on subsequent dates, namely, 12-2-2007, 14-5-2007,
19-6-2007 and 3-7-2007. The Tribunal referred to the CBDT Circular No.
791 issued in the context of the provisions of sections 54EA, 54EB and
54EC. Under the said provisions the assessee is similarly granted
exemption from capital gains tax arising from the conversion of capital
assets into stock-in-trade provided the assessee makes investment in the
specified bonds within six months of the date of conversion.

The CBDT
in consultation with the Ministry of Law decided that the period of six
months for making investment in specified assets for the purpose of
sections 54EA, 54EB and 54EC of the Act should be taken from the date
such stockin- trade is sold or otherwise transferred in terms of section
45(2) of the Act, though the taxability of capital gain was on the
basis of ‘transfer’ as understood in section 45(2) of the Act. According
to the Tribunal, the interpretation placed by the CBDT in the
above-referred Circular to the condition of making investment within six
months from the date of transfer in section 54EC would support the
claim of the assessee for exemption from capital gain with respect to
the impugned sum of Rs.50 lakh invested in specified assets on 3-8- 2007
and 27-10-2007.

Accordingly, the contention of the assessee on this
ground was accepted and exemption u/s.54EC as claimed by the assessee
was granted.

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Sections 37, 40(a)(ii) — Taxes levied in foreign countries whether on profit or gain or otherwise are deductible u/s.37 — Payment of such taxes does not amount to application of income.

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Mastek Ltd. v. DCIT
ITAT ‘A’ Bench, Ahmedabad
Before D. K. Tyagi (JM) and
a. Mohan alankamony (aM)
iTa Nos. 1821/ahd./2005, 2274/ahd./2006 and
2042/ahd./2007
A.Ys.: 2003-04 to 2004-05
Decided on: 11-5-2012
Counsel for assessee/revenue:
S. N. Soparkar/Kartar Singh

Sections 37, 40(a)(ii) — Taxes levied in foreign countries whether on profit or gain or otherwise are deductible u/s.37 — Payment of such taxes does not amount to application of income.


Facts:

The assessee had, in its accounts, debited Rs.42,57,297 on account of taxes paid in Belgium and claimed this amount as a deduction u/s.37 on the ground that all taxes and rates were allowable irrespective of the place where they are levied i.e., whether in India or elsewhere. The exception to this being Indian income-tax which is not allowable by virtue of provisions of section 40(a)(ii). The Assessing Officer (AO) held that the term ‘tax’ u/s.40(a)(ii) is not limited to tax levied under the Indian Incometax Act, but is wide enough to include all taxes which are levied on profits of a business. He disallowed the entire amount of Rs.42,57,297 charged to P & L Account. Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who held that the amount is allowable u/s.37 of the Act. He allowed this ground of the appeal. Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:

Taxes levied in foreign countries whether on profits or gains or otherwise are deductible u/s.37(1). Such taxes are not hit by section 40(a)(ii). It is also not application of income. The Tribunal noted that in the case of South East Asia Shipping Co. (ITA No. 123 of 1976) the Mumbai Bench of ITAT has held that tax levied by different countries is not a tax on profits but a necessary condition precedent to the earning of profits. In this case reference application of the Revenue was rejected by the Tribunal which has been upheld by the Bombay High Court in ITA No. 123 of 1976. The Tribunal also noted that in the case of Tata Sons Ltd. (ITA No. 89 of 1989) the Department’s reference applications u/s.256(1) and 256(2) were rejected and the issue has reached finality. The Tribunal upheld the order passed by the CIT(A) on this ground. The Tribunal decided this ground in favour of the assessee.

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Section 54F — Exemption u/s.54F can be claimed in respect of deemed long-term capital gain u/s.54F(3) arising on transfer of new house if net consideration thereof is again invested in purchase of a residential house within a period of two years.

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(2012) 21 taxmann.com 385 (Chennai)
aCiT v. Sultana Nazir
A.Y.: 2007-08. Dated: 23-3-2012

Section 54F — exemption u/s.54F can be claimed in respect of deemed long-term capital gain u/s.54F(3) arising on transfer of new house if net consideration thereof is again invested in purchase of a residential house within a period of two years.


Facts:

On 5-5-2005 the assessee sold land held by him as long-term capital asset, for a consideration of Rs.81 lakh. On 1-10-2005, the assessee invested Rs.75 lakh in purchase of new house property at Alwarpet. In A.Y. 2006-07, the assessee claimed Rs.73,94,157 to be exempt u/s.54F of the Act, which was allowed. On 13-11-2006, the assessee sold the house purchased at Alwarpet for a consideration of Rs.50 lakh and purchased another residential house at Spur Tank Road on 15-11-2006 for Rs.70,80,620. The Assessing Officer (AO) while assessing the total income for A.Y. 2007-08 held that the long-term capital gain of Rs.73,94,157 claimed to be exempt u/s.54F in A.Y. 2006-07 was to be withdrawn in A.Y. 2007-08. According to the AO, the assessee suffered a capital loss of Rs.25 lakh on sale of house property situated at Alwarpet and therefore, allowing set-off of such loss, he brought to tax the balance amount of Rs.48,94,157. Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who allowed the appeal. Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:

The Tribunal after considering the provisions of section 54F(3) of the Act held that the AO was justified in treating Rs.73,94,157 as long-term capital

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Section 54 — Exemption u/s.54 can be claimed when under a development agreement an assessee exchanges his old flat for a new flat. Such acquisition amounts to construction of new flat and therefore time period of 3 years is available for such acquisition.

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(2012) 21 taxmann.com 316 (Mumbai)
Jatinder Kumar Madan v. ITO
A.Y.: 2006-07. Dated: 25-4-2012

Section 54 —  exemption u/s.54 can be claimed when under a development agreement an assessee exchanges his old flat for a new flat. Such acquisition amounts to construction of new flat and therefore time period of 3 years is available for such acquisition.


Facts:

Vide development agreement dated 8-7-2005 the assessee surrendered his flat of carpet area 866 sq.ft. to the builder and in lieu thereof was allotted new flat of carpet area 1040 sq.ft. and also given cash compensation of Rs.11,25,800. The cash compensation was invested by the assessee in REC bonds and was claimed to be exempt u/s.54EC. Since the assessee had acquired new flat in lieu of the old flat, capital gain arising on account of the transfer of the old flat was claimed to be exempt u/s.54 of the Act. The assessee submitted that the capital gain computed at Rs.55,91,866 was less than the value of the new flat and, therefore, the same was exempt u/s.54 of the Act.

The AO held that the assessee had neither purchased, nor constructed the new flat and therefore was not eligible to claim exemption u/s.54. He denied the claim u/s.54. He computed sale consideration of old flat to be Rs.86,96,760 comprising Rs.75,64,960 being market value of the new flat and Rs.11,25,800 being cash compensation. After deducting indexed cost of acquisition from the sale consideration, he computed the long-term capital gains to be Rs.55,91,866.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who confirmed the disallowance u/s.54. Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:

The Tribunal held that acquisition of a new flat under a development agreement in exchange of the old flat amounts to construction of new flat. This view was also taken in the case of ITO v. Abbas Ali Shiras, (5 SOT 422). The Tribunal held that the provisions of section 54 are applicable and the assessee is entitled to exemption if the new flat had been constructed within a period of 3 years from the date of transfer. Since cash compensation was part of consideration for the transfer of old flat and the assessee had invested money in REC bonds, the exemption u/s.54EC will be available. Since the longterm capital gain computed by the AO including cash compensation as part of sale consideration was much below the cost of new flat and therefore, the cash component was also held to be exempt u/s.54. The Tribunal noted that to substantiate the completion of new flat within 3 years the assessee had filed a copy of letter dated 30-5-2007 of the builder in which it was mentioned that the builder had applied for occupation certificate and possession was given on 14-6-2007. This letter was not available with lower authorities. The exact date of taking possession of the flat was also not clear. The Tribunal directed the AO to verify these facts.

The Tribunal held that the assessee is entitled to exemption u/s.54, subject to verification of the date of taking possession by the assessee. The Tribunal decided this ground of appeal in favour of the assessee.

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Section 26 — Income of co-owners of house property — Cannot be assessed as income of an association of persons (AOP) in spite of the fact that a return was filed in the legal status of AOP.

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30. (2011) 131 ITD 377 (Mum.) Sujeer Properties (AOP) v. ITO A.Y.: 2002-03. Dated: 28-1-2011

Section 26 — Income of co-owners of house property — Cannot be assessed as income of an association of persons (AOP) in spite of the fact that a return was filed in the legal status of AOP.


Facts:

A particular house property was co-owned by five persons. A return of income was filed by the association of persons (AOP) of these five persons declaring NIL income and claiming that income is to be assessed in the hands of the respective coowners of the building as share of each co-owners is predetermined. The assessment of AOP was subsequently reopened since the AO observed that the assessee had not paid any municipal taxes but had claimed the same in computation of house property. Before the ITAT, the assessee argued that in view of clear provisions of section 26, there was no question of first ascertaining the property income in the hands of the AOP and then ascertaining the share in the hands of each co-owner. He further argued that the entire exercise of filing of return of AOP was an entirely infructuous exercise and had no income tax implications at all. The DR argued that since the assessee had not taken up this plea of nontaxability while filing the original return, the same cannot be taken up before the Tribunal.

Held:

(1) Since the plea of non-taxability of income is a purely legal ground which does not require any further investigation of facts, there is no bar on dealing with the said plea.

(2) Further, there is a merit in the argument that the very act of filing return of income by the AOP as far as co-ownership of house property is concerned has no income tax implications. This is because the income from house property is to be taxed as per sections 22 to 26. There is no support for the proposition that annual value of the property is to be determined in the course of the AOP itself. So far as the income from house property is concerned, the Act does not envisage that annual value of the co-owned property, upon being determined in the assessment of the AOP, is to be divided amongst the co-owners in predetermined ratio.

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(2011) 130 ITD 219 (Cochin) (TM) Dy. CIT, Circle 2(1), Range-2, Ernakulam v. Akay Flavours & Aromatics (P.) Ltd. A.Y.: 2004-05. Dated: 20-9-2010

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Section 10B, r.w.s. 32 and section 72 — For hundred percent export-oriented unit eligible for deduction u/s.10B, set-off of unabsorbed depreciation and business loss brought forward from relevant assessment year in which deduction was so claimed for the first time up to A.Y. 2000-01, will be allowed against business income or under any other head of income including ‘income from other sources’, for all assessment years up to assessment year in which deduction was last claimed (i.e., during the tax holiday period).

Facts:
The assessee is a hundred percent export-oriented unit and is eligible for deduction u/s.10B of the Income-tax Act. The first relevant assessment year for which deduction u/s.10B claimed was A.Y. 1996- 97 and therefore the last assessment year for which the deduction will be available to assessee will be A.Y. 2005-06. During the assessment of return of income for A.Y. 2004-05, the AO noticed that the assessee had claimed set-off brought forward unabsorbed depreciation up to A.Y. 2000-01 against income computed under the head ‘Income from other sources’. The AO disallowed the claim of deduction under grounds of provision of section 10B(6) and while computing the income of the assessee during the assessment, the AO, first set off the brought forward business loss and unabsorbed depreciation against the income from the export unit and balance income was considered for deduction u/s.10B. Thus the AO neutralised the claim of deduction u/s.10B by setting off the brought forward loss and unabsorbed depreciation first and disallowed the assessee’s claim of set-off against income under the head ‘Income from other sources’.

The assessee, against said order of the AO, preferred an appeal to the CIT(A). The CIT(A) reversed the order of the assessing officer and upheld the claim of the assessee. The CIT(A) opined that reading of provision u/s.10B(6)(ii) clearly states that set-off of unabsorbed depreciation and business loss brought forward up to A.Y. 2000-01 will not be allowed to be carried forward beyond the tax holiday period. In the instant case, the last year of claim of deduction u/s.10B was A.Y. 2005-06, whereas the assessment year for which appeal was referred is A.Y. 2004-05, therefore the view of AO could not be upheld and the assessee’s claim was allowed.

Aggrieved the Revenue appealed before the ITAT.

Held:
(1) On simple reading of section 32 with section 72, it is apparent that unabsorbed depreciation can be set off against business income or under any head of income including ‘Income from other sources’. There is no provision in law which prohibits set-off of unabsorbed depreciation from income computed under head ‘Income from other sources’.

(2) The benefit given u/s.10B is deduction and not an exemption and is evident from the wordings of the said provision which states that only 90% of the business profits are allowed as deduction. Thus the balance 10% has to be treated only as business income. The perusal of section 10B(1) clearly reveals that deduction under the section from profits and gains derived by undertaking from the export has to be made first while computing income under the head ‘Income from business’ and not at a later stage of computation of the gross total income of the assessee.

(3) Provision of section 10B(6)(ii) states that no loss insofar as it relates to the business of the undertaking including unabsorbed depreciation, so far it relates to any relevant assessment year up to A.Y. 2000-01 shall be carried forward for set-off while computing income for any assessment year subsequent to the last relevant assessment year in which deduction under this section is claimed i.e., after the tax holiday period. Therefore, setoff of such brought forward business loss or unabsorbed depreciation can be made in accordance with provisions of section 32, section 71 and section 72 while computing the total income of the assessee for assessment year within the tax holiday period.

(4) Thus, set-off of brought forward business loss and unabsorbed depreciation up to A.Y. 2000-01 cannot be disallowed for A.Y. 2004- 05, where the last year of claim for deduction u/s.10B was A.Y. 2005-06 as the assessment year in consideration falls within the tax holiday period. Thus Revenue’s appeal stood dismissed and the view taken by the CIT(A) was upheld.

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Section 12A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Registration under charitable institutions — Trust formed for propagating the knowledge of Vedas cannot be said to be benefiting only a particular community — Registration cannot be denied on this ground.

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29. 2011) 131 ITD 370 (Cochin) Kasyapa Veda Research Foundation v. CIT A.Y.: 2008-09. Dated: 28-4-2011

Section 12A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Registration under charitable institutions — Trust formed for propagating the knowledge of Vedas cannot be said to be benefiting only a particular community — Registration cannot be denied on this ground.


Facts:

The assessee-trust filed an application u/s.12A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 seeking registration as a charitable trust. It was formed for preaching and propagating the knowledge of Vedas. The Commissioner of Income-tax was of the opinion that the trust was not benefiting the public at large and was confined to only the Hindu community. He thus cancelled registration u/s.12A of the Income-tax Act. He further passed an order declaring the trust as religious trust.

Held:

There is a very thin line of difference so as to identify whether the nature of activity is a charitable one or a religious one. The assessee-trust was formed to propagate and spread the knowledge of Vedas and Vedanta amongst the public so that they can change their living habits and take the necessary steps for the betterment of humanity. This would not only help the common public to improve their current status but also would enhance their ability to think about the humanity as a whole. The overall appeal of Vedas and its contents are universal and a representation of religious scriptures. The whole purpose of imparting education in Vedas is to promote the behavioural patterns of the people. Also as mentioned in the Trust deed, the other activities are pure charitable in nature. Thus, the assessee-trust was thus allowed a status of charitable trust.

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Section 11 of the Income-tax Act — Accumulation @ 15% should be calculated on the gross income and before deducting other expenses.

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28. (2011) 131 ITD 335 (Luck.) Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti v. DCIT A.Y.: 2006-07. Dated: 7-6-2010

Section 11 of the Income-tax Act — Accumulation 15% should be calculated on the gross income and before deducting other expenses.


Facts:

The assessee-trust has earned total receipts of Rs. 1.32 crore as per their books of accounts. As per the provisions of section 11 of the Act, it accumulated 15% of the receipts and claimed as an exemption. However, the AO computed exemption @ 15% after deducting administrative expenses.

Held:

According to section 11(a) of the Act, income derived from the property held by the trust and applied for religious or charitable purposes will be exempt. Where any income is accumulated, exemption to the extent of fifteen percentage of the said income will be available. The assessee-trust calculated the exemption on the basis of gross income received from the property. As per the AO and the CIT(A) the exemption should be calculated after deducting the expenses incurred for charitable purposes. Relying on the decision of CIT v. Programme for Community Organisation, (248 ITR 1) (SC) it was held that the exemption of 15% must be taken on the gross income and not on net income as determined for income tax purposes.

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Section 22 r.w.s 28(1) — Principle of res judicata though not applicable to income tax proceedings, principle of consistency applicable and in absence of any change of circumstances or non-consideration of material facts or statutory provisions, Department cannot change the stand taken in earlier years.

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27. (2011) 131 ITD 171 (Luck.)ACIT v. Harbilas Cold Storage and Food ProductsA.Y.: 2006-07. Dated: 12-11-2010

Section 22 r.w.s 28(1) — Principle of  res judicata though not applicable to income tax proceedings, principle of consistency is applicable and in absence of any change of circumstances or non-consideration of material facts or statutory provisions, Department cannot change the stand taken in earlier years.


Facts:

(1) The assessee was engaged in carrying on business of running cold storage till 1989. Thereafter, the assessee made some alterations and additions in cold storage building and rented out certain portions for use as warehouse and office.

(2) The rent income was offered by the assessee as income under the head income from house property and the same was accepted by the Department in all earlier assessment years. Further, there was no change in facts in the year under consideration as compared to earlier years.

(3) However for the assessment year under consideration, the AO treated the income as profits and gains from business and profession on the ground that the assessee was not just letting property, but also providing various facilities.

(4) On appeal filed by the assessee, the CIT(A) held that the income is chargeable under the head income from house property only, thus allowing the appeal filed by the assessee.

 (5) Against the order of the CIT(A), the Department filed appeal before the Tribunal.

Held:

 (1) Though principle of res judicata is not applicable in tax proceedings, the principle of consistency is applicable as held by the Supreme Court in the case of Radhasoami Satsang (100 CTR 267) and the Jurisdictional High Court in case of Goel Builders (supra).

(2) Where an issue is decided either in one manner or other and the same has not been challenged by either of the parties, it would not be appropriate to change the position in subsequent years.

(3) The Department has got the right to depart from its earlier practice only on change of circumstances or non-consideration of material facts or statutory provisions.

(4) In the present case, no new facts have been brought on record by the AO so as to justify departure from the earlier stand taken by the Department.

(5) Thus, appeal of the Revenue was dismissed.

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Reassessment: Sections 143(3), 147 and 148: A.Y. 2004-05: Original assessment u/s.143(3): Notice u/s.148 beyond 4 years: No allegation in the reasons of failure on the part of the assessee to state fully and truly all material facts necessary for assessment: Reopening not valid.

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38. Reassessment: Sections 143(3), 147 and 148: A.Y. 2004-05: Original assessment u/s.143(3): Notice u/s.148 beyond 4 years: No allegation in the reasons of failure on the part of the assessee to state fully and truly all material facts necessary for assessment: Reopening not valid.
[Shriram Foundry Ltd. v. Dy. CIT, 250 CTR 116 (Bom.)]

For the A.Y. 2004-05, the original assessment was made u/s.143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Subsequently, on 10-2-2011 i.e., beyond the period of 4 years, the Assessing Officer issued notice u/s.148 for reopening the assessment. The reasons recorded for reopening are as under: “You have claimed a melting loss in excess of 7.24%, which is higher than what is found in the similar line of business. So the melting loss earlier allowed is excess.” Objections filed by the assessee were rejected. Thereafter the assessee filed a writ petition challenging the reopening.

The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

 “(i) The original assessment was completed u/s.143(3). The assessment is sought to be reopened beyond a period of 4 years from the end of the relevant assessment year. The jurisdictional condition is that in such case, before an assessment can be validly reopened, there must be a failure on the part of the assessee to state fully and truly all the material facts necessary for the assessment.

 (ii) There is no such allegation in the reasons which have been disclosed to the assessee. The Assessing Officer has purported to reopen the assessment only recording that according to him the melting loss of 7.24% which was claimed by the assessee is higher than what is found in a similar line of business. This ex facie would amount merely to a change of opinion.

 (iii) The reopening of the assessment u/s.148 is not valid. The consequential assessment order dated 30-12-2011 would have to be quashed and set aside.”

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Presumptive income: Section 44AE: A.Y. 2001- 02: Transporters: Section 44AE stipulates tax on presumptive income, which may be more or less than actual income: Assessee is not required to maintain any account books: No addition could be made as income from other sources on ground that assessee was not able to explain discrepancies in account books.

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37. Presumptive income: Section 44AE: A.Y. 2001- 02: Transporters: Section 44AE stipulates tax on presumptive income, which may be more or less than actual income: Assessee is not required to maintain any account books: No addition could be made as income from other sources on ground that assessee was not able to explain discrepancies in account books.
[CIT v. Nitin Soni, (2012) 21 Taxman.com 447 (All.)]

The assessee, a proprietor of transport business possessed eight trucks. In the income-tax return for the A.Y. 2001-02, he disclosed income u/s.44AE. The Assessing Officer made additions to the income of the assessee on ground that the assessee did not have sufficient withdrawals to explain as to how he had been meeting daily expenses. He held that the assessee must have got income from other sources. The Tribunal deleted the addition holding that it could not be treated as income from other sources.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Allahabad High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

(i) Section 44AE inserted by the Finance Act, 1994 provides special provision for computing profits and gains of business of plying, hiring or leasing goods carriages. It opens with an non obstante clause by giving an overriding effect over sections 28 to 43C, in the case of an assessee who owns not more than ten goods carriages. Income of such assessee chargeable to the tax under the head ‘Profits and gains of business or profession’ shall be deemed to be the aggregate of the profits and gains, from all the goods carriages owned by him in the previous year, computed in accordance with the provisions of s.s (2).

(ii) The very purpose and idea of enactment of provision like section 44AE is to provide hassle-free proceedings. Such provisions are made just to complete the assessment without further probing provided the conditions laid down in such enactments are fulfilled. The presumptive income, which may be less or more, is taxable. Such an assessee is not required to maintain any account books. This being so, even if, its actual income in a given case, is more than income calculated as per s.s (2) of section 44AE, cannot be taxed. (iii) Thus, it follows the query of the Assessing Officer as to how the assessee met his daily expenses, there being no withdrawal and conclusion of additional income was uncalled for. (iv) The addition made by the Assessing Officer due to increase in the capital cannot be taxed u/s.56 as income from other sources as the accretion, if any, in the capital is relatable to profit from transport business of the assessee. A reading of the assessment order would show that the addition was made on account of excess generation of income of the assessee from the goods carriages business, u/s.56.”

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