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DTAA: India-UK: Article 18(2): The assessee, an event management company, engaged the services of a non-resident agent to bring the foreign Artists to India. The assessee paid remuneration to the Artists and commission to the agent. It deducted tax on the remuneration paid to the Artists but did not deduct tax on reimbursements to Artists and the commission paid to the agents. The sum paid to agent could not be deemed to have arisen from the personal activities in a contracting State in status

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DIT vs. Wizcraft International Entertainment (P.) Ltd.; [2014] 45 taxmann.com 24 (Bom):

The assessee was an event management company. The assessee engaged the services of a non-resident agent to bring the foreign Artists to India. The assessee paid remuneration to the Artists and commission to the agent. It deducted tax on the remuneration paid to the Artists but did not deduct tax on reimbursements to the Artists and the commission paid to the agents. The Assessing Officer held that the assessee should have deducted tax on reimbursements and payments to the agent and accordingly treated the assesses as an assessee in default. CIT(A) and the Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The Artists had performed in India and for that expenses have to be incurred and reimbursement of such expenses do not constitute income derived by these Artists from their personal activities so as to be taxable under Article 18 of the Indo-UK DTAA. Thus, the reimbursement of expenses is not taxable in India.

ii) The finding of fact is that the income of the agent is not arising from the personal activities in a contracting status of entertainer or athlete. The payment in relation thereto is not in terms of Clause (2) of Article 18. It is in these circumstances that the commission income of the agent cannot be said to be taxable in India. This Clause was not applicable to him.

iii) The appeal, therefore, does not raise any substantial question of law. It is accordingly dismissed.”

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Charitable purpose: S/s. 2(15), 11 and 12: Effect of first proviso to section 2(15) inserted w.e.f. 01-04/-2009: A. Y. 2009-10: Income incidental to charitable activity would not disentitle trust to exemption: Trust for breeding and improving quality of cattle: Object charitable: Finding that income was incidental: Trust entitled to exemption:

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DIT(Exemption) vs. Sabarmati Ashram Gaushala Trust; 362 ITR 539 (Guj):

The assessee-trust was engaged in the activity of breeding milk cattle to improve the quality of cows and oxen and other related activities. For the A. Y. 2009- 10, the Assessing Officer found that the assessee had considerable income from the milk production and sale. He applied proviso to section 2(15) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and held that the trust could not be considered as one created for charitable purposes. He therefore denied exemption u/s. 11 of the Act. The Tribunal noted that the objects were admittedly charitable in nature. The surplus generated was wholly secondary. Therefore, it held that the proviso to section 2(15) of the Act, would not apply and the assessee was entitled to the exemption.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

i) M any activities of genuine charitable purposes which are not in the nature of trade, commerce or business may still generate marketable products, After settingoff of cost, for production of such marketable products from the sale consideration, the activity may leave a surplus. The law does not expect a trust to dispose of its produce at any consideration less than the market value. If there is any surplus generated at the end of the year, that by itself would not be the sole consideration for judging whether any activity is trade, commerce or business particularly if generating “surplus” is wholly incidental to the principle activities of the trust; which is otherwise for general public utility, and, therefore, of charitable nature.

ii) T he main objectives of the trust were to breed cattle and endeavour to improve the quality of cows and oxen in view of the need for good oxen as India is prominently an agricultural country. All these were objects of general public utility and would squarely fall u/s. 2(15) of the Act.

iii) Profit making was neither the aim nor object of the trust. It was not the principle activity. Merely because while carrying out the activities for the purpose of achieving the object of the trust, certain incidental surpluses were generated, that would not render the activity in the nature of trade, commerce or business. The assessee was entitled to exemption u/s. 11.”

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Capital gain: Short-term or long-term: Exemption u/s. 54EC: A. Y. 2008-09: Assessee paid 96% of consideration by October 1999: Got possession of land on 12-12-2005: Sold the land on 09-01- 2008 and invested in section 54EC Bonds: Capital gain is long-term capital gain: Assessee is entitled to exemption u/s. 54EC:

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CIT vs. K. Ramakrishnan; 363 ITR 59 (Del):

Under an agreement to purchase a land the assessee had paid 96% of the consideration by October 1999. The assessee got possession of the land on 12-12-2005. The assessee sold the land on 09-01-2008 and invested in section 54EC Bonds. The assessee claimed that the capital gain is a long term capital gain and is exempted u/s. 54EC of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Assessing Officer held that the capital gain is a short-term capital gain and accordingly disallowed the exemption u/s. 54EC of the Act. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

 On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 “i) The assessee acquired the possession of the plot on 12th December, 2005, and sold through a registered sale deed dated 9th January, 2008. This Court is of the opinion that having regard to the findings recorded by the Tribunal, the assessee had acquired the beneficial interest to the property at least 96% of the amount was paid by 3rd October, 1999.

ii) In view of the reasons the court is satisfied that the Tribunal’s impugned order does not disclose any error calling for interference. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.”

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Appeal before Tribunal: Stay: Power of Tribunal and High Court: Section 254(2A) of I. T. Act, 1961 and Article 226 of Constitution of India: A. Y. 2007-08: Power of Tribunal to grant stay limited to 365 days: In case of delay on part of Department Tribunal at liberty to conclude hearing and decide appeal: Department can make a statement that it would not take coercive steps and Tribunal can adjourn matter: Assessee can file writ petition for stay and High Court can grant stay.

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CIT vs. Maruti Suzuki (India) Ltd.; 362 ITR 215 (Guj):

In an appeal by the assessee before the Tribunal for the A. Y. 2007-08, the Tribunal granted stay of recovery by an order dated 09-12-2011 which was extended by an order dated 15-06-2012. Thereafter, by an order dated 04-10- 2013, the Tribunal extended the stay by 180 days or till the disposal of the appeal whichever occurred first. The order recorded that after 15-06-2012, the case was listed thrice for hearing on 03-07-2012, 13-08-2012 and 08-09- 2012, but adjournments were taken by the Departmental representative. The Commissioner filed a writ petition and challenged the order of the Tribunal on the ground that the Tribunal did not have power to grant stay beyond the period of 365 days. The Delhi High Court held as under:

 “i) I n view of the third proviso to section 254(2A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the Tribunal cannot extend stay of recovery of tax beyond the period of 365 days from the date of the first order of stay.

ii) T he provision will ensure that the Tribunal will try and dispose of appeals within 365 days of the grant of stay order. If the default and delay is due to lapse on the part of the Revenue, the Tribunal is at liberty to conclude the hearing and decide the appeal, if there is likelihood that the third proviso to section 254(2A) would come into operation. The third proviso to section 254(2A) does not prohibit the Revenue or Departmental Representative from making a statement that they would not take coercive steps to recover the demand. It would be appropriate and necessary for the Officers of the Revenue to examine and in appropriate cases make a statement before the Tribunal that no coercive steps would be taken to recover the demand as the delay was attributable to their fault and lapse. On such statement being made, it will be open to the Tribunal to adjourn the matter at the Request of the Revenue. Section 254(2A) does not prohibit the Revenue from not enforcing the demand, even when there is no stay of the challenged demand.

iii) T he provision does not prohibit an assessee from approaching the High Court by way of a writ petition for continuation, extention or grant of stay. The powers of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 form part and parcel of the basic structure of the Constitution and cannot be nullified. An assessee can file a writ petition in the High Court asking for stay and the High Court has power and jurisdiction to grant stay and issue directions to the Tribunal as may be required. Section 254(2A) does not prohibit the High Court from issuing appropriate directions, including granting stay of recovery. Thus, the High Court in appropriate matters can grant or extend stay even when the Tribunal has not been able to dispose of an appeal within 365 days from the date of grant of the initial stay.

 iv) If the appeal filed by the assessee has not been disposed of, it should be disposed of expeditiously and preferably within a period of two months. The demand shall remain stayed during the period in case the appeal has not yet been disposed off. However, in case the appeals were not disposed of within said period, it would be open to the assessee to file writ petition in the High Court for grant of stay of the demand. It will be also open to the Tribunal to proceed in accordance with law.”

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Capital gains vs. Business income: A. Y. 2006-07: Shares invested through Portfolio Management Scheme (PMS) resulted in capital gain and not business income:

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Radials International vs. ACIT; (Del); ITA No. 485 of 2012 dated 250-04-2014: For the A. Y. 2006-07, the assessee had offered longterm and short-term capital gains on sale of shares which had arisen through a Portfolio Management Scheme of Kotak and Reliance. The investments were shown under the head “investments” in the accounts and were made out of surplus funds. Delivery of the shares was taken. The Assessing Officer held that as the transactions by the PMS manager were frequent and the holding period was short, the gains were assessable as business profits. The Tribunal upheld the view taken by the Assessing Officer.

On appeal by the assessee, the Delhi High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The PMS Agreement in this case was a mere agreement of agency and cannot be used to infer any intention to make profit;

 ii) T he intention of an assessee must be inferred holistically, from the conduct of the assessee, the circumstances of the transactions, and not just from the seeming motive at the time of depositing the money;

iii) A long with the intention of the assessee, other crucial factors like the substantial nature of the transactions, frequency, volume etc. must be taken into account to evaluate whether the transactions are adventure in the nature of trade.

iv) T he block of transactions entered into by the portfolio manager must be tested against the principles laid down, in order to evaluate whether they are investments or adventures in the nature of trade.

v) O n facts, the sources of funds of the assessee were its own surplus funds and not borrowed funds. About 71% of the total shares have been held for a period longer than six months, and have resulted in an accrual of about 81% of the total gains to the assessee. Only 18% of the total shares are held for a period less than 90 days, resulting in the accrual of only 4% of the total profits. This shows that a large volume of the shares purchased were, as reflected from the holding period, intended towards the end of investment.

vi) T he fact that an average of 4-5 transactions were made daily, and that only eight transactions resulted in a holding period longer than one year is not relevant because the number of transactions per day, as determined by an average, cannot be an accurate reflection of the holding period/frequency of the transactions. Moreover, even if only a small number of transactions resulted in a holding for a period longer than a year, the number becomes irrelevant when it is clear that a significant volume of shares was sold/ purchased in those transactions.

vii) T his Court is thus of the opinion that the learned ITAT erred in holding the transactions to be income from business and profession. The order of the ITAT is consequently set aside and the appeal is answered in favour of the assessee.”

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Interest – Refund of excess of payment of tax paid u/s. 195(2) to the depositor – the assessee/ depositor is entitled to interest from the date of payment of such tax.

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Union of India vs. Tata Chemicals Ltd. [(Civil) Appeal vs. 6301 of 2011 dated 26-02-2014]

The respondent, a company, engaged in the manufacture of nitrogenous fertilizer had during the assessment year 1997-98, commissioned its naptha desulphurisation plant and to oversee the operation of the said plant it had sought the assistance of two technicians from M/s. Haldor Topsoe, Denmark. M/s. Haldor Topsoe had raised an invoice aggregating to $ 43,290/- as service charges for services of the technicians ($ 38,500/-) and reimbursements of expenses ($ 4,790/-).

The resident/deductor had approached the Incometax Officer u/s. 195 (2) of the Act, inter alia, requesting him determine as to what percentage of tax should be withheld from the amounts payable to the foreign company, namely, M/s. Haldor Topsoe, Denmark. The Assessing Officer/Income-tax Officer passed order u/s. 195 (2) of the Act directing the resident/deductor to deduct/withhold tax at the rate of 20% before remitting aforesaid amounts to M/s.Haldor Topsoe. Accordingly, the resident/deductor had deducted tax of Rs.1,98,878/- on the entire amount of $ 43,290/- and credited the same in favour of the Revenue.

After such deposit, the resident/deductor had preferred an appeal before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) against the aforesaid order passed by the Assessing Officer/Income-tax Officer u/s. 195 (2) of the Act. The appellate authority, while allowing the appeal so filed by the resident/deductor, had concluded that the reimbursement of expenses is not a part of the income for deduction of tax at source u/s. 195 of the Act and accordingly, directed the refund of the tax that was deducted and paid over to the revenue on the amount of $ 4,790/- representing reimbursement of expenses. After disposal of the appeal, the resident/deductor had claimed the refund of tax on $ 4,790/- (amounting to Rs. 22,005/-) with the interest thereon as provided u/s. 244A(1) of the Act.

The Assessing Officer/Income-tax Officer, while declining the claim made for interest, has observed that section 244A provides for interest only on refunds due to the assessee under the Act and not to the deductor and since the refund in the instant case is in view of the circulars viz. Circular No. 769 and 790 issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes (for short, ‘the Board’) and not under the statutory provisions of the Act, no interest would accrue on the refunds u/s. 244A of the Act. Therefore, the Assessing Officer/Income-tax Officer while granting refund of the tax paid on the aforesaid amount refused to entertain the claim for interest on the amount so refunded.

Since the Assessing Officer/Income-tax Officer had declined to grant the interest on the amount so refunded, the resident/deductor had carried the matter by way of an appeal before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). The First Appellate Authority approved the orders passed by the Assessing Officer/Income-tax Officer and declined the claim of the deductor/resident on two counts: (a) that the refund in the instant case would fall under two circulars viz. Circular No. 769 and 790 issued by the Board which specifically provide that the benefit of interest u/s. 244A of the Act on such refunds would not be available to the deductor/resident and (b) that a conjoint reading of section 156 and the Explanation appended to section 244A (1)(b) of the Act would indicate that the amount refunded to the deductor/resident cannot be equated to the refund of the amount(s) envisaged u/s. 244A(1)(b) of the Act, wherein only the interest on refund of excess payment made u/s. 156 of the Act pursuant to a notice of demand issued on account of post assessment tax is contemplated and not the interest on refund of tax deposited under self-assessment as in the instant case.

The deductor/resident, aggrieved by the aforesaid order, had carried the matter before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal (for short, ‘the Tribunal’). The Tribunal while reversing the judgment and order passed by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) has opined that the tax was paid by the deductor/resident pursuant to an order passed u/s. 195 (2) of the Act and the refund was ordered u/s. 240 of the Act. Therefore, the provisions of section 244A(1)(b) were clearly attracted and the revenue was accountable for payment of interest on the aforesaid refund amount. Accordingly, the Tribunal allowed the appeal of the deductor/resident and directed the Assessing Officer/Income-tax Officer to acknowledge the claim and allow the interest as provided u/s. 244A(1) (b) of the Act on the aforesaid amount of refund. The

Revenue being of the view that they were treated unfairly by the Tribunal had carried the matter by way of Income-tax Appeal before the High Court. The High Court refused to accept the appeal filed by the Revenue.

On further appeal by the Revenue, the Supreme Court held that the refund becomes due when tax deducted at source, advance tax paid, self-assessment tax paid and tax paid on regular assessment exceeds tax chargeable for the year as a result of an order passed in appeal or other proceedings under the Act. When refund is of any advance tax (including tax deducted/collected at source), interest is payable for the period starting from the first day of the assessment year to the date of grant of refund. No interest is, however, payable if the excess payment is less than 10% of tax determined u/s. 143(1) or on regular assessment. No interest is payable for the period for which the proceedings resulting in the refund are delayed for the reasons attributable to the assessee (wholly or partly). The rate of interest and entitlement to interest on excess tax are determined by the statutory provisions of the Act. Interest payment is a statutory obligation and non-discretionary in nature to the assessee. In tune with the aforesaid general principle, section 244A was drafted and enacted. The language employed in section 244A of the Act is clear and plain. It grants substantive right of interest and is not procedural. The principles for grant of interest are the same as under the provisions of section 244 applicable to assessments before 01-04-1989, albeit with clarity of application as contained in section 244A.

The Supreme Court further held that a “tax refund” is a refund of taxes when the tax liability is less than the tax paid. As per the old section, an assessee was entitled for payment of interest on the amount of taxes refunded pursuant to an order passed under the Act, including the order passed in an appeal. In the present fact scenario, the deductor/assessee had paid taxes pursuant to an order passed by the Assessing Officer/Income-tax Officer. In the appeal filed against the said order, the assessee had succeeded and a direction was issued by the Appellate Authority to refund the tax paid. The amount paid by the resident/deductor was retained by the Government till a direction was issued by the appellate authority to refund the same. When the said amount was refunded it should have carried interest in the matter of course. As held by the Courts while awarding interest, it is a kind of compensation of use and unauthorised retention of the money collected by the Department. When the collection is illegal, there is corresponding obligation on the revenue to refund such amount with interest in as much as they have retained and enjoyed the money deposited. Even the Department has understood the object behind insertion of section 244A, as that an assessee is entitled to payment of interest for money remaining with the Government which would be refunded. There was no reason to restrict the same to an assessee only without extending the similar benefit to a resident/deductor who had deducted tax at source and deposited the same before remitting the amount payable to a non-resident/foreign company.

According to the Supreme Court, providing for payment of interest in case of refund of amounts paid as tax or deemed tax or advance tax is a method now statutorily adopted by fiscal legislation to ensure that the aforesaid amount of tax which has been duly paid in prescribed time and provisions in that behalf form part of the recovery machinery  provided  in  a  taxing  Statute.  refund  due and payable to the assessee is debtowed and payable by   the   revenue.   The   Government,   there   being   no express statutory provision for payment of interest on the refund of excess amount/tax collected by the Revenue, cannot shrug off its apparent obligation to reimburse the deductors lawful monies with the accrued interest for the period of undue retention of such monies. the State having received the money without right, and having retained and used it, is bound to make the party good, just as an individual would be under like circumstances. The  obligation  to  refund  money  received  and  retained without right implies and carries with it the right to interest. Whenever money has been received by a party which ex aequo et bono ought to be refunded, the right to interest follows, as a matter of course.

The Supreme Court held that in the present case, it was not in doubt that the payment of tax made by resident/ depositor was in excess and the department chose to refund the excess payment of tax to the depositor. The interest is required to be paid on such refunds. The catch however was from what date interest was payable, since the present case did not fall either under clause (a) or
(b)    of section 244a of the act. the Supreme Court held that in the absence of an express provision as contained in Clause (a), it could not be said that the interest was payable from the 1st of april of the assessment year. Simultaneously, since the said payment was not made pursuant to a notice issued u/s. 156 of the Act, Explanation to Clause(b) had no application. In such cases, as the opening words of Clause(b) specifically referred to “as in any other case,” the interest was payable from the date of  payment  of  tax. the  sequel  of  the  above  discussion according to the Supreme Court was that the resident/ deductor is entitled not only the refund of tax deposited u/s. 195(2) of the Act, but has to be refunded with interest from the date of payment of such tax.

Note:     In  the  context  of  the  liability  of  the  revenue  to  pay interest u/s. 244A, reference may also be made to the judgment of the Apex Court (Larger Bench of 3 Judges) in the case of Gujarat Fluoro Chemicals [358 ITR 291] in which the Court has held that the assessee can claim only that interest which is provided under the act and no other interest can be claimed by the assessee on statutory interest for delay in payment thereof. We have analysed this judgment in our column ‘Closements’ in the november and december issues of this journal.

Treatment of expenditure incurred for development of roads/highways in BOT agreements – Circular No. 9 dated 23rd April, 2014

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CBDT has clarified that the cost of construction on development of infrastructure facility of roads/highways under BOT projects be amortised and claimed as allowable business expenditure under the Act. The amortisation is computed at the rate which ensures that the whole of the cost incurred in creation of infrastructural facility of road/highway is amortised evenly over the period of concessionaire agreement after excluding the time taken for the creation of such facility.

In the case where an assessee has claimed any deduction out of the initial cost of the development of infrastructure facility of roads/highways under BOT projects in the earlier year, the total deduction so claimed for the Assessment Years prior to the Assessment Year under consideration be deducted from the initial cost of infrastructure facility of roads/highways and the cost ‘so reduced’ be amortised equally over the remaining period of toll concessionaire agreement.Trade Circular VAT liability of developers – computation – Trade Circular 12T of 2014 dated 17-04-2014.

This Circular is applicable only to those infrastructure projects for development of road/highways on BOT basis where ownership is not vested with the assessee under the concessionaire agreement.

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Is It Fair To Ignore Prior Agreement For section 50C of Income-tax Act, 1961? [vis-a-vis section 43CA and section 56(2)(vii)(b)]

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Synopsis:

Section 43CA and Section 56 bring to tax incaome based on the concept of stamp duty value of the property transferred. The provisions contemplate the valuation as on the date of an agreement if the same is anterior to registration. There is no such saving in Section 50C, making it unfair.

This article attempts to examine whether amendments brought by Finance Act, 2013 has created anomaly, rendering section 50C of Income-tax Act, 1961 (“Act”) unfair or causing inequity.

Vide the Finance Act 2013, a new section viz. 43CA has been introduced in the Actto come into effect from 1st April, 2014. Section 43CA is similar to section 50C of the Act, (which came into effect from 1st April 2003). Section 50C provides for capital gains tax on deemed consideration as per the stamp duty valuation of capital asset at the time of its transfer. The newly introduced section 43CA creates a legal fiction, that in case of transfer of land and building by assessee, who held such asset not as a capital asset but as stock in trade. (eg. a builder), the market value decided by the Stamp authority shall be the deemed consideration received by the Transferor and income tax shall be charged on such deemed consideration notwithstanding the lesser consideration written in the deed of transfer. However, section 43CA carves out an exception to this legal fiction, where the consideration has been already fixed under an earlier Agreement for sale and when sale is completed subsequently in pursuance of such earlier Agreement for sale, the stamp duty value on the date ofprior Agreement for sale shall be taken into account and the legal fiction would operate with reference to such prior date of agreement for calculating the income tax liability under the head “profits and gains of business/profession”.

 By the Finance Act 2013, section 56 of the Act is also amended, which amendment is to come into effect from 1st April, 2014. Prior to the amendment section 56 provides that, in case of purchase of an immovable property, if consideration stated in the agreement, is less than the stamp duty value of the property, the differential amount, shall be deemed to be an income of the Purchaser, under the head “Income from other source” and accordingly, the purchaser shall be required to pay the income tax on such differential amount under the head “income from other source”. The amendment to section 56, however, provides for similar exception to the legal fiction by laying down that in cases in which the sale is completed subsequently in pursuance of an earlier agreement, the stamp duty value on the date of the earlier Agreement for sale shall be taken into consideration for income tax purpose and not the stamp duty value of property on the date of completion of transfer. In other words, the escalated market value of the property on the date of completion of transfer will not bring any additional tax liability for the purchaser.

The exceptions as aforesaid, introduced by Finance Act, 2013, to the deeming provisions are do not find a place in section 50C of Income Tax Act. The insertion of section 43CA and amendment to section 56 of the Act seem to have been brought in to provide for a remedy in several genuine situations, where under an earlier Agreement for sale the consideration is fixed and the completion of transfer is required to be postponed on account of transfer being conditional upon various statutory permissions and sanctions etc. and merely because in the meantime, the property prices have shot up, the assessee would not be required to pay additional taxes due to deeming provisions, although in fact the parties are bound by the consideration fixed under the earlier agreement and the boom in real estate market is of no help to seller for claiming higher consideration.

There seems to be no reason for not providing the similar exception in section 50C. The status of seller who is taxed u/s. 50C of the Act and the one u/s. 43CA of the Act is the same in almost all respect except that in the first case there is a transfer of capital asset and in the latter case, there is a transfer of immoveable property held as stock in trade. For the differential treatment to be valid, there has to be an intelligible differentia and reasonable nexus connected to the object of statute, which does not seem to be present in this case.

Section 50C and section 56 of Act seek to tax two sides of one transaction. The former seeks to tax the seller on a deemed to have incremental consideration on sale of capital asset and the latter seeks to tax the benefit that the purchaser is deemed to have received by paying consideration lesser than the stamp duty value. Amending only section 56 leads to an incongruous situation. The purchaser alone can rely on earlier Agreement for sale and successfully establish that the stamp duty valuation on the date of agreement is to be considered for testing the deeming fiction, however the seller in the same transaction cannot raise this contention. Further, having accepted in the assessment of purchaser a particular stamp duty valuation, it will be absurd for the department to contend in assessment of seller that a different stamp duty valuation is to be adopted.

Therefore, section 50C in its existing form is unfair and needs to be amended or read down by judicial forums.

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Reassessment: S/s. 147 and 148: A. Y. 1999-00: Note forming part of return mentioning and describing the nature of receipt under a noncompete agreement: Return accepted u/s. 143(1): Notice u/s. 148 on the basis of same material and nothing more: Not valid:

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CIT vs. Atul Kumar Swami; 362 ITR 693 (Del):

For the A. Y. 1999-00, in the note filed together with the accounts and the returns disclosed that he received a sum of Rs. 88 lakh as a one-time, non-compete fee. He concededly paid advance tax of Rs. 27,60,600/- on the same. He claimed that this is a one-time capital receipt. The return was processed u/s. 143(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Subsequently, the Assessing Officer reopened the assessment by issuing notice u/s. 148 dated 09-01- 2002 and brought the said amount of Rs. 88 lakh to tax as business income. The Tribunal held that there was no tangible material and that it was under mere circumstance that the advance tax to the tune of Rs. 27.6 lakh was paid did not amount to admission by the assessee. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s appeal and held that the reopening was not valid.

In appeal, the Revenue contended that having regard to Explanation 1 to section 147 read with section 143(1), the reopening in this case was justified. The Revenue also argued that the agreement entered into by the assessee under which the amount was paid had not been filed during the assessment stage. And this justified the reassessment proceedings.

The Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under: “

i) A valid reopening of assessment has to be based only on tangible material to justify the conclusion that there is escapement of income.

ii) The note forming part of the return filed for the A. Y. 1999-00 clearly mentioned and described the nature of the receipt under the non-compete agreement. The reasons for Notice u/s. 147 nowhere mentioned that the Revenue came up with any other fresh material warranting reopening of assessment. Therefore, mere conclusion of the proceedings u/s. 143(1) ipso facto did not permit invocation of powers for reopening the assessment.

iii) We are satisfied that the Tribunal’s reasons are justified and do not call for any interference.”

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Eligibility of deduction u/s. 801A for the unexpired period – Circular No. 10 dated 6th May, 2014 [F. No. 178/84/2012/ITA.I]

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When an enterprise or undertaking develops an infrastructure facility, industrial park or Special Economic Zone, as the also may be, and transfers it to another enterprise or undertaking for operation and maintenance in accordance with the proviso to Clause (i) or Clause (iii) of s/s. (4) of section 80-1A of the Act and if this transfer is not by way of amalgamation or demerger, the transferee shall be eligible for the deduction for the unexpired period.

Amended Form 49A and 49AA notified – Notification No. 26 dated 16th May, 2014 [S.O.2045(E)] – Income-tax (5th Amendment) Rules, 2014 – The amended form gives an option to the applicant to get his mother’s name printed on the PAN card.

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Addl. CIT vs. Vinay Vasudeo Kulkarni Income-tax Appellate Tribunal Pune Bench “A”, Pune Before Shailendra Kumar Yadav (J.M.) and R. K. Panda (A. M.) ITA No. 2363 / PN / 2012 Asst. Year 2009-10 Decided on 29-04-2014 Counsel for Revenue/Assessee: P. L. Pathade/ Kishore Phadke

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Section 145 – Income is taxable in the year when right to receive accrues.

Facts:

The assessee, an individual, was in business. His main business was that of commission agent /dealer for Daikin Air-conditioning India Pvt. Ltd. As per the practice followed – on receipt of the order for air-conditioner placed by the assessee, Daikin used to credit the commission to the account of assessee irrespective of the supply of goods and deduct tax at source. The assessee had shown such commission as “Contingent Income” under the group “Current Liabilities” in the Balance Sheet. The balance in the said account on 31-03-2009 was Rs. 32,72,500. However, the assessee was advised by Daikin to raise invoice for commission only after the installation of the air-conditioner and collection of money from the air-conditioner sold. The assessee received the payment only thereafter. The assessee, who was following the mercantile method of accounting, recognised the income in the year when invoice was raised. The AO treated the sum of Rs. 32.72 lakh as the income of the current year. On appeal, the CIT(A) allowed the appeal filed by the assessee.

Held:

 The Tribunal observed that income accrues only when there is right to receive such income. It further observed that though the Schedule VI requires income accrued but not due as part of profit, for income tax purpose ‘income accrued but not due’ is a contradiction in terms, since what was not due could not have accrued. What is not due cannot be subjected to legal action to enforce recovery and hence, income in legal sense could not be treated as accrued, so as to require its inclusion in taxable income. The Tribunal relied on the decision of the Pune Tribunal in the case of Dana India Pvt. Ltd. (ITA No. 375 / PN / 09 dt. 09.02.2011). In the case of the assessee, the Tribunal noted that the work relating to erection and installation was completed in the subsequent years. Therefore, the income also accrued in the subsequent years. Relying on the decision of the Madras high court in the case of CIT vs. Lucas Indian Services Ltd. (315 ITR 273), the Tribunal dismissed the appeal of the revenue.

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161 TTJ 283 (Del) Bharati Airtel Ltd. vs. Addl CIT ITA No. 5636/Del/2011 Assessment Years: 2007-08. Date of Order: 11.03.2014

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Section 5 – Non-refundable security deposits received by the assessee from landline subscribers and also activation fees received from them are in respect of services rendered by the assessee over the period in which the connection is in use and therefore are taxable over estimated customer churn period and not in the year of receipt.

Facts:

In the course of assessment proceedings the Assessing Officer (AO) noticed that the assessee has received Rs. 3,46,00,000 as non-refundable security deposits from land line customers. He noticed that the assessee has not regarded this amount as a revenue receipt but has amortised the same over estimated period of customer’s relationship, as derived from estimated customer churn period, in accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting Policies. For this treatment, the assessee had relied upon the exposure draft of technical guide on revenue recognition for telecommunication operators, as issued by ICAI. He also noted that the activation fees were also accounted on similar basis and direct activation cost was also deferred and amortised over the same period as activation revenue.

The AO was of the view that there is no specific recommendation in the said exposure draft with regard to non-refundable security deposit and that the activation fees cannot be treated as in parity with non-refundable security deposit since activation fees, according to him, were in the nature of joining fees for being eligible to use the services. He, charged to tax the entire amount of nonrefundable security deposits received by the assessee during the previous year. Aggrieved the assessee raised an objection before the DRP but without any success.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

Non-refundable security deposit received from landline subscribers was in respect of services rendered by the assessee over the period in which the connection would be in use, and, therefore, its being amortized over the estimated customer churn period is in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles in as much as it would indeed present a distorted picture of financial affairs when entire amount of non-refundable security deposit is treated as income relatable to the year in which it is received.

It noted that this practice has consistently been followed by the assessee and Revenue had accepted the same in other years. The Tribunal noted that the Supreme Court has in the case of CIT vs. Excel Industries Ltd. (358 ITR 295)(SC) reiterated that it would be inappropriate to allow reconsideration of an issue for a subsequent year when the same fundamental aspect permeates in the different assessment years.

The Tribunal deleted the addition made by the AO. This ground of appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

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161 TTJ 742 (Mum) Jamsetji Tata Trust vs. JDIT(Exemption) ITA No. 7006/Mum/2013 Assessment Years: 2010-11. Date of Order: 26- 03-2014

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S/s. 10, 11 to 13 – Benefit of section 10 cannot be denied by invoking the provisions of s/s. 11 to 13. Therefore, dividend income on shares and mutual funds and long term capital gains on sale of shares which are exempt u/s. 10(34), 10(35) and 10(38), respectively cannot be brought to tax by applying s/s. 11 to 13.

When short term capital gain arising from sale of shares subjected to STT is chargeable to tax at 15% then the maximum marginal rate on such income cannot exceed the maximum rate of tax provided under the Act.

Facts I :

The assessee, a charitable trust, claimed dividend income on shares and units as well as long term capital gain on sale of shares to be exempt u/s. 10(34), 10(35) and 10(38) of the Act. The Assessing Officer (AO) denied the exemption on the ground that the income was derived from property held by the trust and not by any other person. According to him, section 11 exclusively deals with the income from property held under trust and not section 10(34), 10(35) and 10(38). He held that there is a violation under s. 13 and as a result he denied the exemption u/s. 11. He denied the alternative claim that the said income is exempt u/s. 10(34), 10(35) and 10(38) on the ground that these sections do not deal with property held under trust. He observed that if the income of the trust which is not held exempt under s/s. 11, 12 and 13 is allowed to be exempt under other s/s.of section 10, it will lead to open ground for trust to exercise (sic-earn) long term securities income and dividend income and claim exemption of the same under other s/s.s of section 10 of the Act.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who upheld the action of the AO.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held I:

The exemption u/s.10 is income specific irrespective of the status/class of person whereas the exemption u/s. 11 is person specific though on the income derived from the property held under the trust. Further, the exemption u/s. 11 is subject to the application of income and modes or form of deposit and investment.

The Tribunal noted that the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs. Divine Light Mission (278 ITR 659) (Del) was dealing with a question whether agricultural income from property held under the trust can be denied exemption u/s.11 of the Act. The Court in that case held that the agricultural income shall not be included in the computation of total income of the previous year in view of section 10(1) of the Act. Therefore, this income was held not required to be considered for the purpose of section 11 of the Act. The Court noted that the Madras High Court in the case of His Holiness Silasri Kasivasi Muthukumara Swami Thambiran & Ors vs. Agrl. ITO & Ors. (113 ITR 889)(Mad) has held that agricultural income derived by charitable or religious trust is exempt u/s. 10 could not be said to be brought to tax under sections 11 to 13. It observed that a similar view has been taken in series of decisions where the question involved was allowability of exemption u/s/s. 10(22), 10(23) vs. sections 11 and 13.

The Tribunal held that exemption u/s.11 is available on the income of the public charitable/religious trust or institution which is otherwise taxable in the hands of other persons. Thus the income which is exempt u/s. 10 cannot be brought to tax by virtue of section 11 and 13 of the Act because no such pre-condition is provided either under sections 10 or 11 to 13 of the Act. Therefore, sections 11 to 13 would not operate as overriding effect to section 10 of the Act. The language of these provisions does not suggest that either section 10 is subject to the provisions of sections 11 to 13 or sections 11 to 13 has any overriding effect over section 10. Therefore, the benefit of section 10 cannot be denied by invoking the provisions of sections 11 to 13 of the Act. Once the conditions of section 10 are satisfied then no other condition can be fastened for denying the claim u/s. 10 of the Act.

The Tribunal held that dividend income on shares and mutual funds and long term capital gain on sale of shares are exempt u/s. 10(34), 10(35) and 10(38) respectively and cannot be brought to tax by applying sections11 and 13 of the Act. This ground of appeal filed by assessee was allowed.

Facts II:

The Assessing Officer (AO) while assessing the total income of the assessee, a charitable trust, denied exemption u/s. 11 of the Act and applied maximum marginal rate of tax to the entire income which included short term capital gains arising from sale of equity shares for which section 111A prescribes the rate to be 15 %. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where it was contended that the rate of tax on short term capital gain arising from sale of shares shall be the rate prescribed under the Act u/s.111A and not the maximum marginal rate.

Held :

The Tribunal noted that the rate of tax on short term capital gain arising from sale of equity shares is provided u/s. 111A as 15 %. However, relevant income which is derived from the property held under trust wholly for charitable or religious purpose is charged to tax as per provisions of section 164(2) which does not prescribe the rate of tax but mandates the maximum marginal rate as prescribed under the provisions of the Act. It observed that section 111A is a special provision for rate of tax chargeable on short term capital gain arising from sale of equity shares.

The Tribunal held that when the short-term capital gain arising from the sale of shares subjected to STT is chargeable to tax at 15 % then the maximum marginal rate on such income cannot exceed the maximum rate of tax provided under the Act. It held that the short term capital gain on sale of shares already subjected to STT, is chargeable to tax at maximum marginal rate which cannot exceed the rate provided u/s. 111A of the Act.

This ground of appeal was decided in favor of the assessee.

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[2013] 147 ITD 41 (Jaipur – Trib.) (TM) Escorts Heart Institute & Research Centre Ltd. vs. DCIT(TDS), Jaipur A.Y. 2008-09 & A.Y. 2009-10 Order dated-3th November 2013

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I. When payment is made directly by the assessee’s clients to the third party and assessee merely deducted the said amount, paid by the client, from fees charged by it to its client and the assessee did not make any payment to the third party, the question of affixing the liability u/s. 194J upon the assessee does not arise.

Facts I:

The assessee company was running a multi-specialty hospital. At the relevant time, the assessee did not have a blood bank and, therefore, patients were required to arrange blood from outside.

For various operations, the assessee company charged a package fee to the patients. Since the facility of the blood bank was not available, the patients were required to procure blood from outside and whatever expenses the patients were required to incur at blood banks, the credit for the same was given to the patients from their package fee.

If the assessee charged a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- as a package fee for performing one operation upon a patient, say ‘A’, and ‘A’ was required to take certain services of Rs. 1,000/- from the outside blood bank, then ‘A’ would directly make the payment of Rs. 1,000/- to the blood blank and assessee would later refund the same to ‘A’. In substance, the fee received by the hospital was only Rs. 99,000/- from the patient ‘A’ and Rs. 1,000/- was debited as blood processing charges by the assessee in its books of accounts.

Revenue held that the assessee had disclosed the payment made to the blood bank in its books of account and, therefore, the only inference that can be drawn is that the patients made the payment to the blood bank on behalf of the assessee and therefore assessee was required to deduct TDS u/s. 194J for the payments made to blood bank.

Aggrieved, the assessee filed appeal before Tribunal.

 It is to be noted, that it was not disputed, that all the charges received by the blood banks and were against the processing of the blood and/or conducting various tests on the blood and the blood banks were not charging anything against the cost of blood.

 Held I:

It was held, that it is settled law, that the entries in the books of account are not decisive. It is the substance of the transactions which is to be seen. In substance, it clearly emerged that the assessee had not made any payment to the blood banks and payments were made directly by the patients to blood banks, and hence the question of affixing the liability u/s. 194J upon the assessee does not arise.

II. When amount payable by assessee to retainer doctor was fixed, the retainer doctor was not allowed to take any similar assignment in any company engaged in similar business and the retainer doctor was also required to abide by general rules and regulations of the company, then it was held that there existed employer – employee relationship between assessee and the retainer doctor and the assessee was required to deduct tax u/s. 192.

Facts II:

The assessee had deducted tax from the payment made to retainer doctors u/s. 194J, treating the payment made to the doctors as professional charges. While, as per revenue, the payment made to the doctors should have been treated as salary and, accordingly, tax should have been deducted at source u/s. 192. Aggrieved, the assessee filed appeal before Tribunal.

As per retainership agreement, the following things were evident-

• The agreement initially was for fixed period and thereafter renewable, on mutually agreeable terms.

• The retainer doctor had to report to the Head of the Department.

• The retainer doctor was not allowed to act in a similar, or any capacity, for any other company engaged in a business similar to that of the company.

• Though a consolidated retainership fee of fixed amount was paid to retainer doctor, but he was required to raise a monthly bill for processing of his professional fees.

• This agreement could be terminated ‘by either party’ upon three months’ prior notice or payment of three months’ retainer fee in lieu to the other party.

• The retainer doctor must commit to work in the interests of the company and in accordance with its values and philosophy, abiding by the rules, regulations and policies, as applicable. The retainer doctor must also follow the work processes, technical standards, protocols and general instructions issued thereof, of the company, as are in force, or amended from time to time.

Held II:

On facts, it was held that the fixed monthly remuneration payable to retainer doctors is in the nature of salary liable for deduction of tax u/s. 192. It was also held that merely because a retainer doctor is required to raise a monthly bill, it cannot be accepted that he is an independent professional and the employer – employee relationship does not exist. While holding that there existed employer employee relationship between assessee and retainer doctor, the following distinctions were pointed out between facts of assessee’s case and some other cases wherein it was held that no employer-employee relation existed-

• In the case of CIT vs. Coastal Power Co. [2008] 296 ITR 433 (Delhi), consultant had agreed to indemnify the company against liabilities which it may suffer/ incur, arising out of or in connection with agreement with the consultant of the performance of services thereunder. Thus, an indemnity clause was the basis on which it was held that no employer-employee relation existed, because it is unlikely that any employee would indemnify his employer and other employees against all liabilities.

• In the case of Dr. Shanti Sarup Jain vs. First ITO [1987] 21 ITD 494 (Mum.), the doctor was not only in receipt of fixed salary of Rs. 1,000/- per month but was also entitled to 50% income from indoor patients and on visits. The doctor had also employed his own staff in his consulting room. Hence, it was held that the income received by Dr. Shanti Sarup Jain was income from profession.

• In the case of Dy. CIT vs. Ivy Health Life Sciences (P.) Ltd. [2012] 20 ITR (T) 179, the remuneration payable to the doctor was not a fixed amount but there was a fee sharing arrangement between the doctor and the hospital.

• In the case of ITO vs. Apollo Hospitals International Ltd. ITA NO. 3363/AHD/2008, it was pointed out that in the case of employee doctor, general service rules and regulations were made applicable but not in the case of consultant doctors. Judicial Member had upon certain findings concluded that there is no employer-employee relationship between assessee and retainer doctor. However the Third Member, while arriving at the conclusion that there exists employer-employee relationship, did not comment upon the following findings of the Judicial Member –

• An employee doctor is paid performance-linked bonus whereas a consultant doctor is not paid any such bonus.

• There is no retirement age for consultant retainers, whereas the same is defined for an employee as 58 years.

• The retainer doctor is required to report to the directors/ HOD of the appellant hospital. The retainer doctor is also bound by the general instructions/regulations of the company and also with the secrecy clause etc. However, these sorts of conditions would be always there in all types of employment arrangements, be it a regular, temporary or of consultancy in nature so as to ensure discipline and proper coordination in running an origination and this condition does not imply that there exists employer employee relationship.

•    The condition of the MOU with the retainer doctors, which restrict them not to work, for other hospitals, is a quite natural condition and would be there in such arrangement, especially in view of the nature of the service/expertise involved in the medical profession and this condition does not imply that there exists employer employee relationship.

•    The retainer doctors are engaged for the fixed period on temporary basis which may or may not be renewed as such. Similarly they are also not entitled for other benefits like PF contribution, retirement benefits, live benefits, HRA, LTA, terminal compensation etc., which are otherwise available to all the regular employee of the assessee.

III.    merely because the sale price is fixed as per the agreement between the parties, it cannot be said that the difference between the purchase cost and the sale price, i.e., the markup, is the commission for sale of medicines and consequently no tax is deductible u/s. 194h on the markup.

Facts iii:
The assessee had an agreement with FHWL.

the agreement had two aspects-
1.    With regard to sale of the medicines by FHWL to the assessee.
as per the agreement, FHWL had to sell the medicines at cost plus certain markup which had been fixed on the basis of turnover as under.
for turnover upto rs. 12 crore, 2% markup.
for turnover in excess of 12 crore, 1.5% markup. for turnover in excess of 15 crore, 1.25% markup.

2.    With regard to providing of the manpower by FHWL to the assessee
as per agreement fhWl would provide manpower to the assessee for smooth running of their pharmacy. however, as per the agreement, all expenses incurred by FHWL on the employees and the smooth running of pharmacy were to be reimbursed by the assessee to  FHWL  on  monthly  basis.  thus,  FHWL was  not charging anything over its actual labour cost on which the tax at source was being deducted by the assessee u/s. 194C.

Revenue  was  of  the  opinion  that  the  mark  up  paid  by the  assessee  to  FHWL on  medicines  sold  by  FHWL to assessee was commission chargeable to tax u/s. 194H.

Learned accountant  member  observed  that  FHWL was not charging anything over its actual labour cost to the assessee-company on which tax at source was being deducted u/s. 194C. The Learned Accountant Member was thus of the opinion that the mark-up on the turnover, under the given facts and circumstances, thus, represented neither business profit of FHWL nor commission allowed to it by the assessee, but a consideration toward the manpower services contracted to the assessee-company, exigible to TDS u/s. 194C.

Learned  Judicial  member  however  posed  a  question before third member that whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the provisions of section 194C on the mark up/profits, be invoked by the Tribunal where neither this is a case of department nor of the assessee.

Held iii:
Merely because the sale price is fixed as per the agreement between the parties, it cannot be said that the difference between the purchase cost and the sale price, i.e., the markup, is the commission for sale of medicines. the sale price charged by FHWL i.e., cost plus markup is the price of the medicines sold by FHWL to the assessee and there was no element of principal and agent relationship, as assumed by the ao. Therefore, the stand of the revenue that the markup is the commission cannot be accepted and consequently no tax was deductible u/s. 194h on the markup.

Similarly, the view of the learned accountant member that the markup is a consideration for providing the manpower is also based upon the presumption and contrary to the express provisions of the agreement and hence provisions of section 194C is not applicable on mark ups/ profits.

TDS: Rent: Section 194-I: Petitioner was owner of network of telecom towers: Provides passive use to telecom service providers: The amounts received by petitioner is ‘rent for use of machinery, plant or equipment’: Tax is deductible u/s. 194-I(a):

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Indus Towers Ltd. vs. CIT; [2014] 44 taxmann.com 3 (Delhi):

The petitioner provided passive infrastructure services to its customers, i.e., major telecom service providers in the country which, inter alia included, tower, shelter, diesel generator sets, batteries, air conditioners, etc. Till 2012, it sought for issue of a lower tax deduction certificate, u/s. 194-I of the Income-tax Act, 1961, on its projected receipts and such lower deduction certificates were issued treating those receipts as rent. Subsequently, the petitioner applied for issue of a lower deduction certificate on its projected receipts u/s. 194C. The Assessing Officer however issued lower deduction certificate treating receipts u/s. 194-I.

Aggrieved by that certificate, petitioner filed a writ petition before Delhi High Court, which by its order directed the petitioner to prefer a revision petition before the Commissioner who was to dispose it of expeditiously. The Commissioner by its impugned order u/s. 197 declined its request for determination of lower rate of Tax Deduction at Source (TDS).

Being aggrieved, the petitioner filed another writ petition before the Delhi High Court. The petitioner urged that there was no intention to rent or lease the premises or facilities or equipment and what was contemplated by the parties was a service.

On the other hand the revenue contended that the use of the premises, and the right to access it, amounted to renting the premises. The High Court held as under:

“i) The crucial question to be decided in instant case was whether the activity, i.e., provision of passive infrastructure by the petitioner to the mobile operator constituted renting within the extended definition under Explanation to section 194-I or whether the activity was service, pure and simple without any element of hiring or letting out of premises.

ii) The dominant intention in these transactions between the petitioner and its customers is the use of the equipment or plant or machinery. The ‘operative intention’ here, was the use of the equipment. The use of the premises was incidental; in that sense there is inseparability to the transaction. Therefore, the submission of the petitioner, that the transaction is not ‘renting’ at all, is incorrect; equally, the revenue’s contention that the transaction is one where the parties intended the renting of land (because of the right to access being given to the mobile operators) is also incorrect. The underlying object of the arrangement or agreement (in the MSA) was the use of the machinery, plant or equipment, i.e., the passive infrastructure. That it is necessary to house these equipment in some premises is entirely incidental.

 iii) In view of the above conclusions, it is held that the writ petition is entitled to succeed to the extent that the tax deductions to be made by the petitioner are to be at the rate directed in section 194-I (a) for the use of any machinery or plant or equipment at the rate indicated for that provision, i.e., 2%. The revenue’s contentions to the contrary are rejected. The writ petition is allowed.”

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ITO vs. Yash Developers ITAT Mumbai `G’ Bench Before B. R. Mittal (JM) and N. K. Billaya (AM) ITA No. 809/Mum/2011 and 3644/Mum/2012 A.Y.: 2007-08 and 2008-09. Decided on: 31st January, 2014. Counsel for revenue/assessee: B. P. K. Panda /S. C. Tiwari and Ms. Natasha Mangat.

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S/s. 80AC, 80IB(10), 139 – Amendment made to section 80IB(10) w.e.f. 01-04-2005 whereby as per Clause (d), limit has been imposed on the extent of commercial area which a project can contain, does not apply to projects approved before that date. Claim for deduction made in a return of income filed u/s. 139(4) will be decided on merits even though return of income is not filed within the time prescribed as per section 139(1) of the Act.

Facts:
The assessee, a partnership firm, engaged in the business of developing and construction filed its return of income for assessment year 2007-08 declaring total income of Rs. Nil after claiming deduction u/s. 80IB(10) of Rs. 74,684. For the assessment year 2008-09, the assessee filed return of income on 30-09-2009 by declaring total income at Rs. Nil after claiming deduction of Rs. 24,85,233 u/s. 80IB(10) of the Act.

The Assessing Officer (AO) denied deduction u/s. 80IB(10) of the Act for assessment year 2007-08 on the ground that the assessee had constructed shops with the aggregate built up area of 3,382 sq. ft which constituted commercial area of 6.12% of the total built up area which was in excess of the limit prescribed by Clause (d) of section 80IB(10) as amended by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2004 w.e.f. 01-04-2005. Since the assessee had not fulfilled one of the conditions, the AO denied deduction u/s. 80IB(10). For assessment year 2008-09, the AO also stated that the assessee did not file the return of income within the stipulated time prescribed u/s. 139(1) of the Act. In view of the provisions of section 80AC of the Act, the AO denied the claim of Rs. 24,85,233 made u/s. 80IB(10) of the Act.

Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal to CIT(A) who allowed the appeal filed by the assessee for both the years.

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The Tribunal observed that on similar facts in the assessee’s own case for the same project, the Tribunal by its order dated 29-07-2011 relating to assessment years 2005-06 and 2006-07, the assessment years which also fall after the amendment made by insertion of Clause (d) to section 80IB(10) of the Act, applicable from 1.4.2005 has held that the assessee is eligible to claim deduction u/s. 80IB(10) of the Act in respect of the housing project. As there was no change in the facts and circumstances in the assessment years under consideration, the Tribunal applied the said decision of ITAT to these years as well. It also observed that the similar issue had also come before the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court in the case of Manan Corporation vs. ACIT (214 Taxman 373 (Guj), while considering the appeal for assessment year 2006-07 wherein it was held by their Lordship that the condition of limiting commercial establishment/ shops to 2,000 sq. feet which has come into force w.e.f. 01-04-2005 would be applicable for the project approved on or after 01-04-2005 would be applicable for the project approved on or after 01-04-2005 and where the approval of the project was prior to 31-03-2005, the amended provision would have no application for those projects. The Tribunal observed that the Gujarat High Court placed heavy reliance on the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Brahma Associates (333 ITR 289)(Bom). The Tribunal held that the issue is covered not only in the assessee’s own case for assessment years 2005-06 and 2006-07 but also by the decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Manan Corporation (supra). The Tribunal rejected the appeal filed by the revenue.

In respect of the return being filed beyond due date prescribed u/s. 139(1) of the Act, the Tribunal observed that the issue is covered in favor of the assessee by the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Trustees of Tulsidas Gopalji Charitable & Chaleshwar Temple Trust (207 ITR 368)(Bom) which has been considered by the CIT(A) while deciding the same in favour of the assessee. Following the said decision, the Tribunal held that there is no reason to interfere with the order of the CIT(A). This ground of appeal taken by the department for assessment year 2008- 09 was also rejected.

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DCIT vs. Chetan M. Kakaria ITAT Mumbai `C’ Bench Before N. K. Saini (AM) and Sanjay Garg (JM) ITA No. 4961/Mum/2011 A.Y.: 2006-07. Decided on: 3rd February, 2014. Counsel for revenue/assessee: Ravi Prakash/ Firoz Andhyarujina

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S/s. 269T, 271E – Amount given or taken from the firm by the partners cannot be treated as giving or taken of loan. Therefore, penalty u/s. 271E cannot be levied even if such amounts are given or taken in cash.

Facts:
In the course of assessment proceedings the Assessing Officer noticed that the assessee had repaid loans, aggregating to Rs. 33,26,960 (Rs. 2,00,000 + 31,26,960), in cash, to the two firms where he was a partner. Such repayment of loan in cash was also reflected in the tax audit report. The amounts borrowed from the firm were reflected in the balance sheet as unsecured loans. The AO considered these payments to be in violation of section 269T of the Act and proceedings for levy of penalty u/s. 271E of the Act. He levied penalty of Rs. 33,26,960 u/s. 71E of the Act.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who deleted the penalty levied by the AO.

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The transactions between the firm and the assessee were treated by the AO as repayment of loan in cash. It held that there is no independent legal entity opf the firm apart from the rights and liability of the partners constituting it and if any amount is given or taken from the firm by the partners that cannot be treated as giving or taking of the loan. In the instant case, the assessee being a partner gave the money to the partnership firm when it was in need of business exigencies, later on the amount was received back. If the said amount had been routed through the capital account, there could have been no disallowance by the department because a partner can deposit cash in his capital account and he also has a right to receive it in cash. The Tribunal held that the AO was not justified in levying the penalty and CIT(A) has rightly deleted it.

It noted that on a similar issue, the Madras High Court has in the case of CIT vs. V. Sivakumar (354 ITR 9) (Mad) held as under:

“that there was no separate identity for the firm and the partner is entitled to use the funds of the firm. The assessee acted bona fide and there was a reasonable cause within the meaning of section 273B. Penalty could not be imposed.

It also noted that the Rajasthan High Court has in the case of CIT vs. Lokhpat Film Exchange (Cinema) (304 ITR 172)(Raj) held as under:

“the assessee had acted bona fide and its plea that inter se transactions between the partners and the firm were not governed by the provisions of sections 269SS and 269T was a reasonable explanation. Penalty could not be imposed.”

Considering the facts of the case and also the ratio of the above stated decisions the Tribunal held that the CIT(A) was justified in deleting the penalty levied by the AO u/s. 271E of the Act.

The appeal filed by the revenue was dismissed.

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(2014) 99 DTR 162 (Agra) DCIT vs. Gupta Overseas A.Y.: 2008-09 Dated: 04-02-2014

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Rule 27 of ITAT Rules, 1963: Any ground raised by the assessee if decided against him by the CIT(A) can be pursued by the assessee in his capacity as respondent before the Tribunal even if the CIT(A) has ultimately decided the issue in favour of the assessee.

Facts:
The payments of Rs. 1,05,27,465/- under the head ‘Design and development expenses’ were disallowed by the Assessing Officer by invoking the provisions of section 40(a)(i) by taking a view that they were in the nature of fees for technical services u/s. 9(1)(vii).

Aggrieved, assessee carried the matter in appeal before the learned CIT(A). Before the CIT (A), apart from disputing the disallowance on merits, the assessee also disputed the impugned disallowance on the ground that the provisions of section 40(a) (i) can be invoked only to disallow the expenditure of the nature referred therein which is shown as ‘payable’ as on the date of Balance Sheet and is to be read pari-pasu with section 40(a)(ia). The assessee relied upon the decision of Hon’ble ITAT Special Bench, Vishakapatnam in case of Merilyn Shipping & Transport vs. ACIT [2012] 136 ITD 23. Though this decision was in the context of section 40(a)(ia), the assessee argued that the same principle should even apply in the context of section 40(a)(i) as per the non-discrimination Clause in the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA) between Indian and foreign countries in consideration.

The CIT (A) deleted the impugned disallowance by holding on merits that none of the amounts so paid by the assessee was actually taxable in India. However, the CIT (A) rejected the above alternative plea raised by the assessee on the ground that decision of the Hon’ble ITAT Special Bench, Vishakhapatnam, has been suspended as an interim measure by the Hon’ble Andhra Pradesh High court till final decision and therefore, the CIT (A) did not follow that decision.

The Revenue challenged the correctness of the CIT (A)’s order by filing an appeal. In the course of this appeal, the assessee- respondent raised the same issue by invoking Rule 27 of the Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1963.

Held:
Rule 27 of the Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1963, provides that, “the respondent, though he may not have appealed, may support the order appealed against on any of the grounds decided against him”. This provision is independent of, and quite distinct from, the statutory right to file cross objection u/s. 253(4) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, which allows the respondent, on being put to notice about the fact of an appeal having been filed against an order, to raise his grievances against the said order by filing the cross objections within stipulated time.

The important distinction between the scope of a cross objection u/s. 253(4) and an objection under Rule 27 is that while former calls into question correctness of a part of the operative order, the latter merely challenges a part of the reasoning adopted in the process of arriving at operating order, i.e. conclusion, even as it does not challenge the conclusion itself. U/s. 253(4), one can challenge the conclusions. Under Rule 27, one cannot challenge the conclusions, even though it can challenge the reasons for arriving at those conclusions, to the limited extent of the pleas which have been decided against the respondent, as it provides that the respondent “may support the order on any of the grounds decided against him”. In effect thus, under Rule 27, those grounds which have been decided against the respondent, even when the assessee does not challenge the same, can be agitated again, and to that extent, reasoning of even a favourable order can be called into question. However, cross objection u/s. 253(4) can call into question the conclusions arrived at in the impugned order, and, therefore, cross objections constitute a remedy against unfavourable portion of the order. It is thus clear that the scope and purpose of cross objections are distinct and mutually exclusive. No doubt that it is a common practice that the cross objections are routinely filed to support the orders appealed against by the other party, but a wrong practice, no matter how prevalent, can affect the correct legal position.

Therefore, while the respondent may indeed raise any of the issues, with regard to the grounds decided against the assessee even though the assessee may not be in appeal or cross objection, the respondent can do so only by way of a written intimation to that effect duly served on the other party reasonable in advance.

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2013-TIOL-119-ITAT-DEL ACIT vs. Lakhani India Ltd. ITA No. 2657/Del/2011 Assessment Year: 2006-07. Date of Order: 31- 12-2013

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Section 36(1)(iii) – In a case where assessee has substantial profits which are deposited in cash credit account and the debit balance in cash credit account is not on account of purchase of assets, interest on funds utilised from such cash credit account for acquiring capital assets cannot be disallowed under proviso to section 36(1)(iii).

Facts :
The assessee made a payment of Rs. 98.98 lakh to SIDCUL from an overdraft account. There was a debit balance in the said account on the date of making the payment. The assessee thereby incurred interest liability. The industrial plot which was allotted to the assessee was not put to use for business purposes by the assessee during the previous year relevant to the assessment year under consideration.

The Assessing Officer (AO) disallowed a sum of Rs. 10,52,537 on account of interest liability by invoking the proviso to section 36(1)(iii).

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who allowed the appeal by observing that the profit generated during the year and recoveries from the debtors, etc. are more than the investment so made in the assets.

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :
The Tribunal noted that a similar addition made by the AO in the assessee’s own case was deleted by CIT(A) for assessment year 2005-06, whose order, has been upheld by ITAT. It noted the conclusion recorded by the ITAT in the said order which was as under – “17. With the assistance of the learned representative, we have gone through the record carefully. The assessee has placed on record copy of CC account and demonstrated that the debit balance was not on account of purchase of assets. It has deposited a sum of Rs. 113.98 lakh in this account before making payment of Rs. 56 lakh. The assessee has a substantial profit which was deposited in this very account. Thus, it has substantial surplus fund which can enable it to acquire the capital assets. Learned CIT(A) has observed that the assessee has declared an income of Rs. 3.55 crore which suggest that it has excess interest free funds, than the investment made in the acquisition of the assets. Considering these aspects, we are of the view that proviso to section 36(1)(iii) is not applicable on the facts of the present case. Hence, this ground of appeal is rejected.”

Following the above mentioned order, the Tribunal dismissed this ground of appeal filed by the Revenue.

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2014-TIOL-110-ITAT-MUM Jagannath K. Bibikar vs. ITO ITA No. 2735/Mum/2012 Assessment Years: 2005-06. Date of Order: 11-12-2013

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S/s. 2(42A), 49(1) – Payment made towards
relocation of hutment dwellers is for the purpose of removing
encumbrances in title of the owners and constitutes expenditure incurred
in connection with transfer and is allowable as deduction even though
there is no specific mention about it in the development agreement.

Facts:
The
assessee was a co-owner of the land. The leasehold rights in respect of
the plot were sold to M/s. Havana Hotels Resorts Pvt. Ltd. and M/s.
Samyam Erectors Pvt. Ltd. The capital gains arising on this transaction
were offered to tax by the assessee in two years i.e., 2005-06 and
2006-07.

While computing capital gains, the assessee claimed
deduction of Rs. 5,00,000 paid towards relocation expenses. This sum of
Rs. 5,00,000 represented the assessee’s 50% share of Rs. 10,00,000. The
assessee claimed that this payment was in terms of Clause 10 of the
development agreement under which it was an obligation of the assessee
to bear any charges or encumbrances in respect of plot of land
transferred to the developer and in case any charge or encumbrance is
found the owner is liable to ward off the same. The payment was for
removal of settled hutments and therefore the assessee to discharge its
liability to remove encumbrances had incurred this expenditure. It was
also contended that the payment was made to consenting party since it
was in occupation of part of the property in question and therefore the
payment was made in connection with transfer of asset in question.

The
Assessing Officer disallowed this sum of Rs. 5,00,000 while passing an
order pursuant to direction of CIT u/s. 263 of the Act.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) who confirmed the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The
Tribunal noted that the genuineness of the payment was not disputed by
the authorities below and even the purpose of the payment was not
questioned by the AO as well as CIT(A). The disallowance was made only
on the ground that the transfer/development agreement does not speak
about such payment. It noted that as per clause 10 of the development
agreement dated 10-09-2004 it was obligatory on the part of the
owners/transferors of the land to ward off any charges and encumbrances
arising in the property.

The Tribunal did not find any merit in
the argument of the revenue that in the absence of any specific mention
in the agreement such payment is not allowable as deduction. The
Tribunal held that when the payment is undisputedly made towards
relocation of the hutment dwellers then it is certainly for the purpose
of removing the encumbrances in the title of the owners in respect of
land in question. Since the payment was made for removal of encumbrances
in respect of the property in question being relocation of the hutment
dwellers therefore, it was held to fall in the category of expenditure
incurred in connection with the transfer of property.
This ground of appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

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Section 194H – Provisions of section 194H apply when the payments are made to the agents or credited to the agent’s accounts, whichever is earlier, and not when the payment is credited to the provision account.

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5. DCIT vs. Telco Construction Equipment Co. Ltd.
ITAT  Bangalore `C’ Bench
Before P. Madhavi Devi (JM) and Jason P. Boaz (AM)
ITA No. 478/Bang/2012
Assessment Year : 2007-08.                                      
Decided on:   7th March, 2014.
Counsel for revenue/assessee: Priscilla Singsit/S. Anantha.

Section 194H – Provisions of section 194H apply when the payments are made to the agents or credited to the agent’s accounts, whichever is earlier, and not when the payment is credited to the provision account.

Facts:

The assessee-company was carrying on the business of manufacturing, purchase and sale of excavators, loaders, cranes, dumpers and spare parts etc. For the relevant assessment year, the assessee filed its return of income declaring income of Rs. 282,44,84,066/-. In the course of the assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer (AO) observed that the assessee has debited a sum of Rs. 14,84,26,424 as sales commission, out of which a sum of Rs. 6,46,11,000/- relates to the provision made towards commission. The assessee was asked to explain as to how the provision has been made and on what basis it is worked out and as to why no TDS was made from this amount. The assessee explained that the provision was made on the basis of sales made during the year from different sales offices of the company and on the basis of communication received from these offices regarding commission payable on such sales. As to why no TDS was made from this amount, it was clarified that no TDS was made from the provision but as and when the commission payments were made in the subsequent year, TDS was made and remitted to the Government account.

The AO disallowed a sum of Rs. 6,46,11,000 u/s. 40(a) (ia) since according to him the provisions of section 194H were applicable and the assessee failed to comply with the same. Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal to CIT(A) who relying on the decision of the jurisdictional High Court in the case of ACIT vs. Motor Industries Co. (249 ITR 141) held that the amount credited by the assessee is only a provision and not actual payment of commission to the party and till the amounts are credited to the respective party’s account, it cannot be said that the same have become finally quantified and hence, the provisions of section 194H are not attracted. Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:

 The amount credited by the assessee is to the provision account and not to the respective agent’s accounts. Therefore, it is clear that the assessee has not made any payment to the agents. The provisions of section 194H would apply when the payments are made to the agents or credited to the agent’s accounts, whichever is earlier, and not when the payment is credited to the provision account. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for assessee, the agents would get vested right to receive the commission only when they fulfill the obligations under the agreement for commission. We find that the CIT(A) has properly appreciated the issue before deleting the addition made by the AO. In view of the same, we do not see any reason to interfere with the finding of the CIT(A) on this issue. This ground of appeal of the revenue was dismissed.

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S/s. 143(2), 292B, 292BB – Where a revised return filed is treated as non-est since the original return was not filed within due date mentioned in section 139(1), the period of issue of notice u/s. 143(2) needs to be computed with reference to date of filing original return of income. Notice issued u/s. 143(2) beyond the period stated in the proviso to section 143(2)(ii) does not fall within the term `any mistake, defect or omission’ stated in section 292B. The provisions of section 292BB canno<

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4. Amiti Software vs. ITO
ITAT  Bangalore `A’ Bench
Before N. V. Vasudevan (JM) and Jason P. Boaz (AM)
ITA No. 540/Bang/2012
A.Y.: 2008-09.  Decided on: 7th February, 2014.
Counsel for assessee / revenue: H. N. Khincha / Bijoy Kumar Panda  

S/s. 143(2), 292B, 292BB – Where a revised return filed is treated as non-est since the original return was not filed within due date mentioned in section 139(1), the period of issue of notice u/s. 143(2) needs to be computed with reference to date of filing original return of income. Notice issued u/s. 143(2) beyond the period stated in the  proviso  to section 143(2)(ii) does not fall within the term `any mistake, defect or omission’ stated in section 292B.  The provisions of section 292BB cannot extend to a case where the question of limitation is raised on admitted factual position in a given case.


Facts:

For the assessment year 2008-09, the assessee filed the original return of income on 01- 10-2008 declaring a total loss of Rs. 16,15,127 and also claiming deduction u/s. 10A amounting to Rs. 1,54,83,511. The assessee computed tax payable under MAT u/s. 115JB. The return of income was processed on 27.8.2009 and it resulted in a demand of Rs. 2,05,710. The return filed was beyond the due date prescribed u/s. 139(1).

The assessee filed a revised return on 30.9.2009 in which business income was stated to be Rs. Nil after claiming exemption of Rs. 1,53,83,511 u/s. 10B. Since the original return was filed beyond the due date, the AO treated the revised return to be non-est. A notice dated 19-08-2010 was issued by the AO and served on the assessee. There was no dispute that this was the only notice issued and served and the assessee did not dispute having received this notice.

Since the original return was filed beyond due date mentioned in section 139(1), the AO in view of the provisions of proviso to section 10A(1A) of the Act, denied the deduction claimed u/s. 10A of the Act. He completed the assessment assessing the total income under the normal provisions of the Act and not u/s. 115JB. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) where it was contended that the assessment be annulled since the notice u/s. 143(2) was issued beyond the time limit mentioned in proviso to 143(2) (ii). The CIT(A) did not agree, since the assessee had attended the hearings and participated in the assessment proceedings. Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:

The admitted factual position is that the notice u/s. 143(2) of the Act dated 09-08-2010 was admittedly beyond the period of six months from the end of the financial year in which the return of income was filed by the assessee, as laid down in proviso to section 143(2)(ii) of the Act. It is also not in dispute that this is the only 143(2) notice issued by the AO. The order of assessment is very clear on this aspect. The law is by now well settled that issuance of a notice u/s. 143(2) of the Act within the statutory time limit is mandatory and it is not a procedural requirement which is inconsequential. Reference may be made to the decision of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of Alpine Electronics Asia Pvt. Ltd. vs. DGIT, 341 ITR 247 (Del), CIT vs. Vardhana Estates Pvt. Ltd., 287 ITR 368 and ACIT vs. Hotel Blumoon, 321 ITR 362 (SC). The contrary view expressed by the Hon’ble Madras High Court, in our view, cannot be followed as the decisions relied on by the ld. counsel for the assessee of the Hon’ble Punjab & Haryana High Court and Allahabad High Court also took the view that non issuance of notice u/s. 143(2) of the Act renders assessment order invalid. Admittedly, notice u/s. 143(2) of the Act not having been served on the assessee within the period contemplated under law, the order of assessment has to be held to be invalid and annulled.

As far as section 292B is concerned, we do not think that the notice issued by the AO u/s. 143(2) of the Act in the present case will fall within any mistake, defect or omission which is in substance and effect in conformity with or according to the intent and purpose of this Act. The requirement of giving of the notice cannot be dispensed with by taking recourse to the provisions of section 292B of the Act. As far as provisions of section 292BB is concerned, as laid down in the decisions of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Manish Prakash Gupta (supra) & Parikalpana Estate Development (P) Ltd. (supra) and Hon’ble Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Cebong India Ltd. (supra), the provisions of section 292BB cannot be applied in a case where admittedly no notice u/s. 143(2) had been issued within the time limit prescribed in law.

We may also clarify that the dispute in the present case is not with regard to issue and service of notice u/s. 143(2) of the Act, as admittedly there was only one notice u/s. 143(2) dated 19-08-2010 issued and served on the assessee before completion of the assessment proceedings.The question is as to, whether the said notice was issued and served within the time contemplated u/s. 143(2) of the Act. The provisions of section 292BB lay down the presumption in a given case. It cannot be equated to a conclusive proof. The presumption is rebuttable. The provisions of section 292BB cannot extend to a case where the question of limitation is raised on admitted factual position in a given case. We therefore hold that the provisions of section 292BB of the Act will not be applicable to the present case.

The appeal filed by the revenue was dismissed.

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Section 54EC –Term ‘month’ used in the provisions does not mean 30 days but it means ‘calendar month’ therefore investments made before the end of the calendar months eligible for deduction.

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3. Alkaben B. Patel vs. Income Tax Officer
In the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal Special
Bench, Ahmedabad
Before G.C. Gupta V. P.), Mukul Kr. Shrawat
(J. M.) and N.S. Saini (A. M.)
ITA No.1973/Ahd/2012
Asst. Year 2009-10.  Decided on 25/03/2014
Counsel for Assessee / Revenue:  U.S. Bhati / P.L. Kureel and O.P. Vaishnav

Section 54EC –Term ‘month’ used in the provisions does not mean 30 days but it means ‘calendar month’ therefore investments made before the end of the calendar months eligible for deduction.

Issue:

The issue before the Tribunal was – whether for the purpose of section 54EC the period of investment of six months should be reckoned after the date of transfer or from the end of the month in which transfer of capital asset took place? The assessee had earned Long Term Capital Gain on sale of a flat. She invested the gain earned in purchase of NHAI bonds and claimed deduction u/s. 54 EC. The sale of flat took place on 10th of June, 2008 and the bonds were purchased on 17th of December, 2008.According to the AO, the assessee was required to invest the capital gain in the specified asset within a period of six months from the date of thetransfer i.e. 10th of December 2008, and that requirement was not complied with by the assessee; hence, not eligible for the deduction u/s. 54EC of IT Act. The contention of the assessee was that since the application for the purchase ofthose bonds was tendered in the bank on 8th December, 2008,which was within the period of six months from the date of the transfer of the Long Term Capital Asset, the assesseewas eligible for the deduction u/s. 54EC.

Alternatively, the assessee’s contention was that up to the endof the month of December 2008, the said investment waseligible for the deduction. According to the AO as well as the CIT(A), the assessee was unable to establish that the impugned application for investment in NHAI bond was actually tendered on 8th of December, 2008. They were also not convinced with the alternate contention of the assessee.

Before the Tribunal, the revenue justified the orders of the lower authorities and contended that the Income-tax Act and the Income-tax Rules have used two types of phraseology in respect of the computation of period for the purpose of prescribing a limitation. The first type of wordings used is “not exceeding 6 months from the date on which application is made” or “anytime within a period of 6 months after the date of suchtransfer”. These words are used in section 54EC and section 281 B as well as in Rule 10K(2) and Rule 11AA(6). The second type of wordings used are “6 months/4months/1 month from the end of the month” in which a particular order is made/received/application is received. This wording is found in section 275 and section 154(8) aswell as in Rule 6DDA(5). It was emphasised that the wordings are unambiguous and the intention of the legislation is apparent that wherever the end of the month is to be calculated then the intention is made clear in the statute itself. Otherwise as per the language, a particular date is to be taken into account for the purpose of calculation of days/ months. It was therefore pleaded that in a situation when the intention of the legislation is clear, then there is no necessity to take the help of “General Clauses Act,1897” as suggested by the assessee. Further, it was pleaded that in section 54EC, the limitation of period for an investment has beenprescribed as “at any time within a period of 6 months from thedate of such transfer”. In ordinary sense, a ‘month’ is a period from a specified date in a month to the date numerically corresponding to the date in the following months, less one. For example, if a particular date is 10th June, 2008, one month shall be up to 9th July, 2008. Therefore, the term”month” has been used in section 54EC in an ordinary sense and the same should not exceed more than 30 days.The wordings of the section should not be replaced by any other wordings. Therefore, in the said example, one month cannot be extended up to 31st July, 2008. If that would have been the intention of the legislation, then certainly these words ought to have been prescribed in the provisions of section 54EC of the Act.

The revenue also relied on the following decisions:
 • Dhanraj Singh Choudhary vs. Nathulal Vishwakarma 16 taxmann.com249 (SC);
• Chironjilal Sharma HUF vs. UOI,(unreported decision of the Supreme Court);
• Jethmal Faujimal Soni vs. ITAT231 CTR332(Bom.);
• Kumarpal Amrutlal Doshi vs. DCIT (Appeal) (ITA No, 1523Mum/2010, order dated 09.02.2011);
• Shree Ram Engg. & Mfg Industries vs. ACIT (ITANo. 3226& 3227/Ahd/2011);
 • Hindustan Unilever Ltd. vs. Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax [191 Taxman 119 (Bom.)];
• S. Lakha Singh Bahra Charitable Trust [15Taxmann. com 97(Asr)].

Held:

The Tribunal noted the argument of the revenue thatsince the statute has prescribed the limitation of six months, the words viz.,“at any time within a period of six months” must not be replaced by the words “at any time within a period of end of six months”. However, according to the tribunal, the incentive provision is to be examined by “purposive construction of statute” or “constructive interpretation of statute” which is neither “liberal interpretation of statute” nor a ‘literal interpretation of statute’. It further added that, it is the true intention of the enactment, which is required to be considered by a court of law.

To resolve the controversy i.e., whether the intention of the legislator was to compute six calendar months or to compute 180 days,the tribunal relied on a decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Munnalal Shri Kishan Mainpuri, 167 ITR 415 where the Court while answering the dispute in respect of law of limitation held that, there is nothing in the context of section 256(2) to warrant the conclusion that the word ‘month’ in it refers to a period of 30 days. Therefore, it was held by the Apex court that reference to six months in section 256(2) is to six calendar months and not 180 days. Similarly, it was noted that in the case of Tamal Lahiri vs. Kumar P. N. Tagore, 1978 AIR 1811/1979 SCC (1) 75, the Apex court opined while interpreting section 533 of Bangalore Municipal Act, 1932 the expression six months in the said section means sixcalendar months and not 180 days.

The Tribunal also noted that in a few more sections of the Income-tax Act, the legislature had not used the terms “Month” but has used the number of days to prescribe a specific period e.g. first proviso to section 254(2A) where it is provided that the Tribunal may pass an order granting stay but for a period not exceeding 180 days.This according to the Tribunal was an important distinction made in the statute while prescribing the limitation period. Therefore, the tribunal concluded that in the absence of any definition of the word ‘month’ in the Act, the definition of General Clauses Act 1897 shall be applicable. Accordingly, the tribunal held that the investment in question qualifies for the deduction u/s. 54EC.

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Section 80-IB – Assessee engaged in development of Geographical Information System software, claimed deduction u/s. 80IB –AO and CIT(A) denied deduction u/s. 80IB holding that the assessee was not engaged in the manufacture or production of any article– Tribunal held that the software came into existence after carrying on several processes and was transferred only on completion of the said processes. When transfer of property is an ongoing process at each stage of work, then it will amount to p<

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9. [2013] 146 ITD 641 (Ahmedabad – Trib.)
Bhavin Arun Shah. v. ITO
A.Y. 2003-04
Order dated- 28th June 2013

Section 80-IB – Assessee engaged in development of Geographical Information System software, claimed deduction u/s. 80IB –AO and CIT(A) denied deduction u/s. 80IB holding that the assessee was not engaged in the manufacture or production of any article– Tribunal held that the software came into existence after carrying on several processes and was transferred only on completion of the said processes. When transfer of property is an ongoing process at each stage of work, then it will amount to provision for services. The fact that software is produced on a platform not owned by the assessee is irrelevant, when what is being transferred by the assessee is not the platform but the end product and hence assessee was held eligible for deduction u/s. 80-IB.


Facts:

The assessee was engaged in the business of development of Geographical Information System (GIS) software for municipality. And it was undisputed fact that the assessee was engaged in the business of development of customised software on job work basis. The process of development of GIS software involved collection of maps in paper form from municipality. The maps were then digitised by the assessee and also demographic features, geographical features and other infrastructure available in particular areas were incorporated. The maps so prepared were then integrated into software solution to attach further attribute, information and to provide reports and analytical options to the municipalities. The assessee had claimed deduction u/s 80-IB in respect of his business income.

The Assessing Officer had disallowed claim of deduction u/s. 80-IB on the ground that the customised software developed by the assessee was not manufacture of articles or things. The CIT (A) had upheld the order of the Assessing Officer. The Tribunal, relying on decision of Supreme Court in case of CIT vs. Oracle Software India Ltd., (2010) 320 ITR 546, had held that if a process renders a software usable for which it is otherwise not fit then the said process can be termed as manufacture. However, Tribunal was also of the opinion that if one party engages another party to create an item of property that the first party will own from the moment of its creation, then no property will have been acquired by the first party from the other and the transaction should be characterised as the provision of services. However, in case of customised software when the originally developed software is owned by the developer and not by the receiver of such software prior to its transmission then the consideration paid by the receiver is towards the software and not towards the intellectual skills employed by the software developer and in such cases the developer can be held as engaged in manufacture of a customised software and thereby be entitled to deduction u/s. 80IB. Hence Tribunal remitted the matter to the Assessing Officer to show the point of time at which the client of the assessee acquired property in the software, developed by the assessee.

The Assessing Officer, in remand proceedings, expressed the view that since basic area maps were the material on the basis of which the software was developed, and since basic area maps always belonged to the client, it was a case of provision of services. The Commissioner (Appeals) also confirmed the view of the Assessing Officer. Aggrieved, the assessee filed appeal before Tribunal again.

Held:

On demonstration of this software in court, it was noticed that what was produced by the assessee was not a mere compilation of map simplictitor but a much value added product that produced a variety of information which was big help in efficient administration of the municipal work.

The software, came into existence after carrying on several processes, and it was only on completion of these processes, the property in the product could be transferred to the client and the mere fact that one of the inputs was owned by the client itself, did not mean that the property in the product never belonged to the assessee. The transfer of property was therefore not an ongoing process at each stage of work as it is in the case of a provision of services and therefore assessee was held eligible for deduction u/s. 80-IB.

The Tribunal also held that, though the basic inputs (area maps) were given by the client, i.e. the municipality itself, but the product was much more than the compilation of the input and the fact that was being produced, was on a platform (basic inputs) not owned by the assessee, was irrelevant, inasmuch as what was being transferred by the assessee was not the platform but the end product.

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Section 5(2): Salary received by a non-resident from a foreign employer for rendering services outside India, is not taxable in India merely because said salary was credited to NRE bank account of the assessee in India.

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8. (2014) 101 DTR 79 (Agra)
Arvind Singh Chauhan vs. ITO
A.Ys.: 2008-09 & 2009-10   Dated: 14-02-2014

Section 5(2): Salary received by a non-resident from a foreign employer for rendering services outside India, is not taxable in India merely because said salary was credited to NRE bank account of the assessee in India.

Facts:

The assessee, an individual, was in employment of a Singapore Company (ESM-S) and worked on merchant vessels and tankers plying on international routes. The assessee’s stay in India in the relevant previous year, was less than 182 days, and so the residential status of the assessee is ‘non-resident’. In the income tax return filed by the assessee, the salary received from ESM-S was not offered to tax on the grounds that his salary income was accruing and arising outside India. As for the salary income being credited to the bank account in India, the assessee’s contention was that the salary income deposited in the bank account in India, directly from the bank account of the company outside India. Thus, it was outside the ambit of section 5(2). However, the Assessing Officer was of the view that the assessee’s explanation could not be accepted for several reasons. One of the reasons is that since the appointment letter was issued by a foreign employer’s agent in India, it is to be deemed that the salary income accrued in India. The Assessing Officer further took note of the fact that the salary cheques were credited to the assessee’s account with HSBC Bank in Mumbai. Hence, the salary of Rs. 13,34,884 received from ESM-S was brought to tax in the hands of the assessee.

Held:

The above issue is analysed in two parts as follows:

1. Whether issuance of an appointment letter gives the assessee the right to receive salary?

 Once it is not in dispute that the assessee qualifies to be treated as a ‘non-resident’ u/s. 6, as is the undisputed position in this case, the scope of taxable income in the hands of the assessee is restricted to section 5(2), Therefore, it is only when at least one of the two conditions u/s. 5(2) is fulfilled that the income of a non-resident can be brought to tax in India. In the present case, the services are rendered outside India as crew on merchant vessels and tankers plying on international routes. A salary is compensation for the services rendered by an employee and, therefore, situs of its accrual is the situs of services, for which salary paid, being rendered. It is wholly incorrect to assume that an employee gets the right to receive the salary just by getting the appointment letter. An employee has to render the services to get a right to receive the salary and unless these services are rendered, no such right accrues to the employee. Undoubtedly, if an assessee acquires a right to receive an income, the income is said to have accrued to him even though it may be received later on, it’s being ascertained, but this proposition will be relevant only when the assessee gets a right to receive the income, and, in the present case, the assessee gets his right to receive salary income when he renders the services and not when he simply receives the appointment letter. Thus, the receipt of an appointment letter cannot be the sole basis for deciding situs of accrual of salary.

2. Whether salary amount remitted to bank account in India attracts taxability u/s 5(2)(a)?

The law is trite that the ‘receipt’ of income, for this purpose, refers to the first occasion when the assessee gets the money in his own control – real or constructive. What is material is the receipt of income in its character as income, and not what happens subsequently once the income, in its character as such is received by the assessee or his agent; an income cannot be received twice or on multiple occasions. As the bank statement of the assessee clearly reveals these are US dollar denominated receipts from the foreign employer and credited to non-resident external account maintained by the assessee with HSBC, Mumbai. The assessee was in lawful right to receive these monies, as an employee, at the place of employment, i.e. at the location of its foreign employer, and it is a matter of convenience that the monies were thereafter transferred in India. The connotation of an income having been received and an amount having being received are qualitatively different. The salary amount is received in India in this case but the salary income is received outside India. Thus, when the salary has accrued outside India, and thereafter, by an arrangement, the salary is remitted to India and made available to the employee, it will not constitute as receipt of salary in India by the assessee so as to trigger taxability u/s. 5(2)(a).

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Section 40A(3) – In a case where liability for an expense is incurred in one year and the payment thereof is made in a subsequent year, the law applicable in the year in which the liability was incurred would be applicable and not the law applicable in the year in which the payment is made.

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7. 149 TTJ 205 (Ahm)
Tushar A. Sanghvi (HUF) vs. ITO
ITA No. 1901/Ahd/2011
Assessment Years: 2008-09.  
Date of Order: 09-02-2012

Section 40A(3) – In a case where liability for an expense is incurred in one year and the payment thereof is made in a subsequent year, the law applicable in the year in which the liability was incurred would be applicable and not the law applicable in the year in which the payment is made.

Facts :

In the course of the assessment proceedings for the assessment year 2007-08, the Assessing Officer noticed that the assessee had shown creditors’ outstanding at Rs. 1,95,17,664 as on 31-03-2007. He asked the assessee to give details of payments made to the said outstanding creditors in the subsequent years. Upon receiving the details from the assessee, the AO made enquiries with the concerned banks where the cheques issued by the assessee were presented for clearance. From the replies furnished by the bank, the AO noticed that the cheques issued in the name of the creditors M/s. Bhavi Enterprises, M/s. Patel Traders and M/s. Jayraj Traders were deposited in some other persons accounts. Cheques of amounts aggregating to Rs. 62,10,000 issued in favour of M/s. Bhavi Enterprises were deposited in accounts of another person. Cheques of amounts aggregating to Rs. 12,10,000 issued in favour of Patel Traders were deposited in accounts of other persons. The AO called upon the assessee to give details as to in which assessment year expenses have been claimed on account of the above creditors. The assessee expressed inability to furnish the reply. The AO concluded that the payments were made otherwise than by account payee cheques and accordingly Rs. 62,10,000 is required to be treated as income in the assessment year 2008-09 and Rs. 12,10,000 is required to be treated as income in the assessment year 2010-11. He reopened the assessment for the assessment year 2008-09 u/s. 147 of the Act. The assessee vide its reply informed the AO that the above mentioned parties were mediators who were entitled only to commission which is evident from the sample copy of the bill. Without prejudice, it was submitted that the purchases were made in the year 2004 and as the transactions related to the said year only 20% of the disallowance should be made of the amounts paid otherwise, than by account payee cheques or drafts as per provisions applicable in that assessment year. The AO added Rs. 62,10,000 to the total income of the assessee for assessment year 2008-09. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal found that there is no dispute about the facts. It noted that the expenses were incurred in the assessment year 2004-05 and the payment was made in the assessment year 2008- 09 by crossed cheques. It then noted the provisions of section 40A(3) as applicable in assessment year 2004-05 and also as applicable in assessment year 2008-09. It held as under: When we go through the provisions applicable in assessment year 2004-05 and assessment year 2008-09, we find that there are three major differences;

(i) The first difference is that, as per the provisions of the assessment year 2004-05, the assessee is required to make payment by way of crossed cheque/crossed bank draft whereas as per the provisions of assessment year 2008-09, the assessee is required to make payment by way of a/c. payee cheque/a/c payee bank draft;

(ii) The second difference is this, that as per the provisions applicable in assessment year 2004-05, the disallowance was to be made to the extent of 20% of payments made in contravention to the prescribed mode whereas, as per the provisions applicable in the assessment year 2008-09, such disallowance is to the extent of 100% of such payment in contravention to the prescribed mode;

(iii) The third difference is with regard to payment in a subsequent year in contravention to the prescribed mode. As per the provisions applicable in the assessment year 2004- 05, the disallowance was to be made in the relevant year in which the expenditure was incurred whereas as per the provisions of assessment year 2008-09, addition is to be made in the year in which payment in contravention to the prescribed mode was made by the assessee irrespective of the fact as to whether the expenditure was incurred in an earlier year. Now, the question to be decided by us, is as to whether if an expenditure incurred in the assessment year 2004-05 for which payment is made in the assessment year 2008-09, provision of section 40A(3) applicable in assessment year 2004-05 is required to be applied or the provisions in assessment year 2008-09 being the year of payment, are to be applied. The A O has applied the provisions of section 40A(3) as amended w.e.f. 01-04-2008, because the payments were made by the assessee in the assessment year 2008-09 and the claim of the assessee before us is this, that since the expenses were incurred in the assessment year 2004-05, such expenses are to be subjected to the provisions applicable in assessment year 2004-05.

The Tribunal noted that the decision of the Tribunal in the case of Anand Kumar Rawatram Joshi (supra) is under similar facts with small difference that in that case, the expenses were incurred in assessment year 2007-08 and the payments were made in assessment year 2008-09. It noted that in the said case the Tribunal has in para 8 held that if the liability is incurred up to 2007-08 but the payment made is in a subsequent year i.e., in the assessment year 2008-09 or any subsequent year, the provisions of section 40A(3) as applicable in that year in which the liability was incurred should be applied, as per which, if the assessee does not make payment for such a liability in a sum exceeding Rs. 20,000/- by an a/c payee cheque drawn on a bank or by an a/c payee bank draft, the allowances originally made shall be deemed having wrongly been made and the assessment order of that year in which liability was incurred should be rectified as per the provisions of section 154 and for the purpose of reckoning the limitation period of four years, it shall be reckoned from the end of the assessment year following the previous year in which the payment was so made.

The Tribunal held that the present issue is squarely covered in favour of the assessee by this Tribunal decision rendered in the case of Anand Kumar Rawatram Joshi (supra). Applying the ratio of the said decision, if the provisions of section 40A(3) as applicable in the assessment year 2004-05 are applied, no addition in the present year is justified and no disallowance can be made in the assessment year 2004-05 also because as per the provision of section 40A(3) as applicable in the assessment year 2004-05, the payments are required to be made by a crossed cheque/crossed bank draft and the assessee has made the payment by way of crossed cheque and, therefore, no disallowance is called for in the present case as per the provisions of section 40A(3) applicable for the assessment year 2004-05. The Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by the assessee.

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Section 54F – Since assessee had entered into a registered agreement within time period prescribed u/s. 54F, he was entitled to claim exemption even in respect of amounts paid at the time of booking which was more than one year prior to the date of transfer. New house vests in the assessee by registered deed and not by availing of housing loan or payment of booking amount.

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6. 62 SOT 59 (Bang)
Gopilal Laddha vs. ACIT
ITA No. 1356/Bang/2012
Assessment Years: 2009-10.          
Date of Order: 31-10-2013

Section 54F – Since assessee had entered into a registered agreement within time period prescribed u/s. 54F, he was entitled to claim exemption even in respect of amounts paid at the time of booking which was more than one year prior to the date of transfer. New house vests in the assessee by registered deed and not by availing of housing loan or payment of booking amount.

Facts:

During the previous year relevant to assessment year 2009-10, land belonging to the assessee was acquired by the Karnataka Industrial Development Board for Bangalore Metro Rail Corporation and the assessee received compensation of Rs. 84,61,701 on 21-07-2008. The assessee acquired a residential flat at Bangalore for Rs. 50,98,720 by registered sale deed dated 11-09-2008. He, accordingly, claimed exemption of Rs. 46,11,166 u/s. 54F of the Act.

In the course of assessment proceedings the Assessing Officer (AO) noticed that the said flat whose cost was considered for claiming exemption u/s. 54F of the Act was booked on 19-01-2006 and the assessee had taken a loan of Rs. 40 lakh from Syndicate Bank which was sanctioned on 24-05-2006 for investment in purchase of the said flat. Thus, the AO noticed that the amount of Rs. 44,70,852 was paid by 31-03-2007 i.e., more than one year prior to acquisition of the new asset. The AO was also of the view that since the assessee invested Rs. 40 lakh out of the Housing Loan from Syndicate Bank in the purchase of the new asset and therefore only Rs. 6,23,433 qualified for exemption. He accordingly, worked out the exemption u/s. 54F at Rs. 6,23,433 and allowed Rs. 6,23,433 instead of Rs. 46,11,166 as claimed.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), who dismissed the appeal by holding that the assessee is not eligible for exemption u/s. 54F as claimed.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:

The Tribunal noted that the AO had restricted the claim for exemption for the reason that though the flat was purchased by registered deed dated 11-09-2008, the booking was made on 09-01-2006 and a housing loan of Rs. 40 lakh was taken from Syndicate Bank on 24-05-2006 which was invested in the said property before 31-03-2007.

The Tribunal did not agree with the view of the authorities below that both these investments amounting to Rs. 44,70,852 being made more than one year prior to the date of receipt of compensation of Rs. 84,61,701 for asset, on 21-07-2008, the assessee would not be eligible for exemption u/s. 54F of the Act. The Tribunal was of the view that the amounts paid by the assessee on booking of the asset on 09- 01-2006 and the housing loan of Rs. 40 lakh availed from Syndicate Bank for investment in the purchase thereof have not vested the assessee with the ownership of the new asset. The assessee has been vested with the ownership of the new asset only by virtue of the Registered Sale Deed dated 11-09- 2008. It held that the authorities below have erred in restricting the exemption u/s. 54F of the Act to Rs. 6,23,433. It held that the assessee is entitled to exemption of Rs 46,11,166 as claimed by it.

This ground of appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

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S/s. 54B, 54F – Assessee is not entitled to claim exemption under s/s. 54B/54F in respect of investments made in the name of major married daughters. The term `assessee’ used in section 54B/54F cannot be extended to mean the major married daughters.

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5. 160 TTJ 236 (Vishaka)
Ganta Vijaya Lakshmi vs. ITO
ITA No. 253/Viz/2012
Assessment Years: 2008-09.   
Date of Order: 22-07-2013

S/s. 54B, 54F – Assessee is not entitled to claim exemption under s/s. 54B/54F in respect of investments made in the name of major married daughters. The term `assessee’ used in section 54B/54F cannot be extended to mean the major married daughters.

Facts:

During the previous year relevant to the assessment year 2008-09, the assessee transferred wet agricultural land for a consideration of Rs. 1,41,12,000. The assessee purchased an agricultural land, for a consideration of Rs. 52 lakh, in the name of her younger daughter and a residential house in the name of her eldest daughter for a consideration of Rs. 58 lakh. The long term capital gain arising on such transfer was claimed to be exempt under s/s. 54B/54F on the grounds that the investment made in the names of two daughters qualifies for exemption under s/s. 54B/54F. The assessee claimed that she has entered into “Possession purchase agreements” with her two daughters to comply with the provisions of s/s. 54B/54F. It was also contended that the daughters should be considered as her benamidars.

The Assessing Officer (AO) denied the exemption claimed by the assessee on the ground that the properties purchased were not registered in the name of the assessee. The claim of “benami” was rejected by the AO on the grounds that the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act provides exemption to the property purchased in the name of unmarried daughters only. He also refused to recognise both the “possession purchase agreements” as they were unregistered documents and did not transfer the properties. Tribunal news Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who upheld the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:

The decision of the jurisdictional High Court in the case of Late Mir Gulam Ali Khan vs. CIT 56 CTR 144 (AP) was rendered on typical facts of the case before the Court viz. that the assessee in that case entered into an agreement for purchasing a residential property and had also paid earnest money in furtherance of the same. Unfortunately, he passed away before the completion of the purchase transaction. Hence, the legal representative of the assessee completed the purchase of property. Thus, in effect, the new house property was not purchased in the name of the assessee, who sold the old property. Since the said legal representative of the assessee is liable to be assessed in respect of the capital gain on the property sold by his father, he claimed the cost of new property as deduction u/s. 54 of the Act. Thus, the facts prevailing in the case of Late Mir Gulam Ali Khan are peculiar and further, u/s. 159 of the Act, the legal representative is treated as assessee in respect of liability of the deceased person. The liberal view taken by the High Court in that case cannot be stretched in each and every case, where the property was not purchased in the name of the assessee who sold the property. It held that the assessee in the present case cannot derive support from this decision.

In respect of the other decisions relied upon, on behalf of the assessee, the Tribunal noted that in all those cases, the new property was either purchased in joint names i.e., in the names of the assessee and others, or it was purchased in the names of spouse or minor daughter. The Tribunal held that in its view the Courts have considered the investments made in the name of wife or minor daughter as an investment made by the assessee himself for the reason that there was no real intention to provide consideration for the benefit of wife/minor daughter alone.

In the instant case, undisputedly, the investments have been made in the names of the married daughters and apparently both of them are also majors. Thus, it is not a case of joint ownership along with the assessee. Both the daughters of the assessee shall have every right over the property purchased in their respective names. Thus, it cannot be said that the intention of purchasing the properties was not to give benefit to them. The assessee claims that she has entered into purchase possession agreement with her two daughters. However, we tend to agree with the view of the learned CIT(A) that the said agreement does not actually effect transfer of assets to the name of the assessee. Further, as pointed out by the AO, the said agreements have been entered only to show some compliance with the provisions of section 54B/54F of the Act.

The appeal filed by assessee was dismissed.

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Valuation of closing stock: Section 145: A. Y. 2006-07: Land purchased by assessee in dispute before civil court: Adverse impact on market value of land: Assessee reduced value of closing stock and adopted the same in the subsequent years accepted by Revenue. Addition on account of under valuation of closing stock not proper: CIT vs. Satish Estate P. Ltd; 361 ITR 451 (P&H):

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The assessee had purchased a land in respect of which one A had filed a suit against the assessee on 11-03-2006. This dispute had an adverse impact on the market value of the land. The assessee valued the land at Rs. 75 lakh below the cost price and accordingly reduced the value of the closing stock as on 31-03-2006. The Assessing Officer made an addition of Rs. 75 lakh on the ground of undervaluation of closing stock. Commissioner (Appeals) deleted the addition holding that the assessee had not changed the method of valuing the closing stock. The Tribunal found that the Revenue did not challenge the value of the opening stock of the land in the subsequent assessment year while passing the assessment order u/s. 143(3) and accepted the valuation. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue. On appeal by the Revenue, the Punjab and Haryana High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) A civil suit was filed by A in which the assessee was impleaded as a party. There was an interim order passed by the trial court which was affirmed by the Court as well. Thus, the assessee was justified in reducing the valuation of the closing stock.

ii) The assessee had reduced the closing stock and the same was taken as opening stock in A. Y. 2007-08 which was accepted by the Assessing Officer while framing the assessment u/s. 143(3). Thus no loss to Revenue had been caused.

iii) In view of the above, no substantial question of law arises. Consequently the appeal stands dismissed.”

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Recovery of tax: Power of TRO u/s. 281: Petitioner had purchased a property from one ‘M’ on 17-05-1995: TRO having found that ‘M’ inspite of several demand notices issued during years 1989 to 1994 had not paid income tax dues passed an order u/s. 281 declaring above sale transaction as void: TRO had no power u/s. 281 to declare sale transaction as void:

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Karsanbhai Gandabhai Patel vs. TRO; [2014] 43 taxmann. com 415 (Guj):

The petitioner purchased a property from one ‘M’ on 17-05-1995. ‘M’ had defaulted in making payment of income tax dues for various assessment years. The Assessing Officer issued several demand notices on ‘M’ during the years 1989 to 1994 for recovery of the unpaid taxes. However, ‘M’ had not paid such taxes. Thereupon the Tax Recovery Officer (TRO) attached the above property by issuing an order dated 22-05-1995. Thereafter, he passed an order dated 08- 11-1995 u/s. 281 declaring the above sale transaction as void. He passed the order without any notice to the petitioner. Later on 03-02-2004, he wrote to ‘M’ indicating that the department would proceed with the auction sale of the property under attachment to recover the dues of ‘M’. The Gujarat High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the petitioner and held as under:

“i) Section 281 provides certain transfers to be void. S/s. (1) thereof provides that where, during the pendency of any proceedings under the Act or after the completion thereof, but before the service of notice under rule 2 of the Second Schedule, any assessee creates a charge on, or parts with the possession (by way of sale, mortgage, gift, exchange or any other mode of transfer) of, any of his assets in favour of any other person, such charge or transfer shall be void as against any claim in respect of any tax or any other sum payable by the assessee as a result of completion of the said proceedings or otherwise. Proviso to s/s. (1), however, provides that such charge or transfer shall not be void if made for adequate consideration and without notice of pendency of such proceedings or without notice of such tax or other sum payable by the assessee or with the permission of the Assessing Officer.

ii) It can thus be seen that, even if the transaction creating a charge or parting of possession has been entered into by the assessee during the pendency of any proceedings under the Act or after completion thereof, the eventuality of such charge or transfer being declared void can be avoided provided one of the two conditions contained in the proviso is satisfied. Under such circumstances, the transferee can demonstrate that the transaction had taken place with the previous permission of the Assessing Officer or that the same was entered into for adequate consideration and without notice of pendency of such proceedings or without notice of such tax or other sum payable by the assessee.

iii) This element of the transaction being with adequate consideration and without notice would equally apply to the assessee as well as the transferee. In a given case, it may even be open for the assessee to establish that the transaction was for adequate consideration without notice. In a given case, even if the assessee had notice of the pendency or the outstanding tax or sum payable, the transferee can still take shelter of the transactions having been entered into by him for adequate consideration and without notice.

 iv) It is, therefore, that the Courts have read into this provision the requirement of hearing the transferee also. Quite apart from this, Courts have taken a view that s/s. (1) of section 281 only provides for the eventuality of the transaction hit by the said provision as being void. It does not create any machinery for the revenue authorities to entertain dispute and declare the transaction to be void for which purpose, only a civil suit would lie.

v) The Bombay High Court in the case of Gangadhar Vishwanath Ranade (No. 2) vs. T.R.O. [1989] 177 ITR 176 held that u/s. 281, the TRO has no power to declare a transfer as void. This decision of the Bombay High Court was carried in appeal before the Supreme Court. The Apex Court in TRO vs. Gangadhar Vishwanath Ranade [1998] 234 ITR 188/100 Taxman 236 confirmed the view of the Bombay High Court.

vi) The issue involved in the instant case is squarely covered by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Gangadhar Vishwanath Ranade (supra). Therefore, the order passed by the Tax Recovery Officer u/s. 281 was liable to be set aside.”

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Recovery of tax: Liability of directors: Section 179: A. Y. 1998-99: Debts Recovery Tribunal directing recovery of bank’s dues by sale of properties of company: Balance due to bank supplied by directors from their personal resources: Directors agreeing to forgo their loans to company in order to have its name struck of register of companies: Facts establishing that non-recovery of tax due from company not attributable to gross neglect, misfeasance or breach of duty on part of directors: Recover<

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(2014) 43 taxmann.com 288 (Guj):

The petitioners were directors of a private company. On 24-06-2002, the Assessing Officer issued notices to the directors u/s. 179(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, for recovery of the tax dues of the company of Rs. 7,53,649/- in respect of the A. Y. 1998-99. Being not satisfied by the reply given by the directors, the Assessing Officer passed order u/s. 179 for recovery of the tax dues from the directors. The Commissioner dismissed the revision petition made u/s. 264 of the Act.

The Gujarat High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the directors and held as under:

“i) The company had run into losses. The company had substantial dues towards the bank from which it had taken loan. Certain properties were also mortgaged to the bank. To realise its dues, the bank filed a petition before the Debt Recovery Tribunal where the parties agreed to settle the total dues for Rs. 25 lakh. The properties of the company were valued at Rs. 18 lakh. The balances was supplied by the directors from their personal resources. Additionally, in order to strike the name of the company off the register of companies, the directors agreed to forgo their loans to the company which were in excess of Rs. 16 lakh.

ii) When such facts were established, the Assessing Officer ought to have held that the petitioners had succeeded in establishing that non-recovery of the tax dues of the company could not be attributed to gross neglect, misfeasance or breach of duty on the part of the directors in relation to the affairs of the company.

iii) The assets of the company may not have been mortgaged to the bank. Nevertheless, the Debts Recovery Tribunal held the bank entitled to recover the suit dues by sale of hypothecated machinery and movables and by sale of immovable property. This would not bring the action of the petitioners within the expression of gross neglect, misfeasance or breach of duty on their part.

iv) The contention of the counsel of the Revenue that the petitioners should have offered the properties for recovery of the Department was not tenable. The orders passed by the Income Tax Officer and the Commissioner were to be quashed.”

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Reassessment: Change of opinion: S/s. 147 and 148: A. Y. 2005-06: AO completed original assessment u/s. 143(3) on 24-12-2007: Subsequently issued notice u/s. 148 on basis of investigation report dated 13-03-2006 received from investigation wing: Reasons to believe did not state that investigation report was not with Assessing Officer when he completed original assessment: Attempt to reopen assessment was result of a change of opinion: Reopening not valid

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Rasalika Trading & Investment Co. (P.) Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT; [2014] 43 taxmann.com 371 (Delhi):

The assessee, an investment and security business company, had raised additional capital and offered shares at a premium of Rs. 90 per share during the previous year relevant to the A. Y. 2005-06. The Assessing Officer completed the assessment of the assessee for the A. Y. 2005-06 u/s. 143(3) on 24-12-2007. Subsequently the Assessing Officer issued notice u/s. 148 on the basis of the investigation report dated 13- 03-2006 received from the DIT (Investigation), New Delhi. The said report indicated that the assessee was amongst the beneficiaries of bogus accommodation entries. The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

“i) It is evident from the aforesaid that the reassessment proceedings were initiated by the impugned notice which expressly and plainly states that ‘reasons to believe’ are based upon the materials contained in the investigation report of 13-03-2006. The notice itself does not spell out that the report was not on the record when the original assessment was completed on 24-12-2007, nor did the revenue even suggest so in the counter affidavit filed in the proceedings. It is only in a subsequently filed additional affidavit that the position is sought to be clarified. Clearly, the High Court refrains from making such an enquiry at a time when the Assessing Officer has, in the first instance, failed to spell out clearly in section 148 notice itself that such report was not on record. In other words ‘the reasons to believe’ do not state even in one sentence that the investigation report was not with the Assessing Officer when he completed the assessment.

ii) The material on record in fact suggests otherwise. The nature of the queries put to assessee and the replies and confirmation furnished to the Assessing Officer in the course of the regular assessment clarify that what excited the suspicion was indeed gone into by the Assessing Officer himself while framing the assessment u/s. 143(3).

iii) Such being the case the Court has no doubt that the impugned notice, in the circumstances of the case, is based upon stale information which was available at the time of the original assessment and in fact appears to have been used by the Assessing Officer at the relevant time, i.e., during the completion of proceedings u/s. 143(3).

iv) Therefore, the attempt to reopen the proceedings u/ss 147 and 148 is really the result of a change of opinion. Consequently, the impugned notice and all proceedings further thereto are beyond the authority of law and were liable to be quashed.”

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2014-TIOL-150-ITAT-MUM Sudhir Menon HUF vs. ACIT ITA No. 4887/Mum/2012 Assessment Year: 2010-11. Date of Order: 12-03-2014

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Section 56(2)(vii)(c) – Provisions of section 56(2) (vii)(c) do not apply to a bonus issue. The provisions are not attracted in case of an issue of shares by a company to its existing shareholders on a proportionate basis.

Facts:
As on 01-04-2009, the assessee held 15,000 shares in Dorf Ketal Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. which represented 4.98% of the share capital (3,01,316 shares). The assessee was offered 3,13,624 additional shares, on a proportionate basis, at the face value of Rs. 100 per share. The assessee subscribed to and was allotted 1,94,000 shares on 28-01-2010. The other shareholders were allotted shares, on the same terms, not only the shares similarly offered to them on a proportionate basis, but also those not subscribed by the other shareholders as 1,19,624 (3,13,624 minus 1,94,000) shares by the assessee. The shares were received by the assessee on 10-02-2010. The book value of the shares so allotted/ received was Rs. 1,538 as on 31-03-2009.

Since the book value of the shares so received by the assessee was more than the face value thereof, the Assessing Officer held that the shares were received by the assessee for an inadequate consideration. He treated the difference between the fair market value of the shares and their face value as being chargeable to tax u/s. 56(2)(vii)(c) read with applicable rules.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who upheld the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The provision, firstly, would not apply to bonus share Issue of bonus shares is by definition, a capitalisation of its profits by the issuing-company. There is neither any increase nor decrease in the wealth of the shareholder (or of the issuing company) on account of a bonus issue, and his percentage holding therein remains constant. What in effect transpires is that a share gets split (in the same proportion for all the shareholders), as for example by a factor of two in case of a 1:1 bonus issue. There is no receipt of any property by the shareholder, and what stands received by him is the split shares out of his own holding. It would be akin to somebody exchanging a one thousand rupee note for two five hundred or ten hundred rupee notes. There is, accordingly, no question of any gift of or accretion to property; the shareholder getting only the value of his existing shares, which stands reduced to the same extent. The same has the effect of reducing the value per share, increasing its mobility and, thus, liquidity, in the sense that the shares become more accessible for transactions and, thus, trading, i.e., considered from the holders’ point of view.

The premise on which we found the issue of bonus shares as not applicable would, to the extent pari materia, apply in equal measure to the issue of additional shares, i.e., where and to the extent it is proportional to the existing shareholding.

Therefore, as long as there is no disproportionate allotment, i.e., shares are allotted pro-rata to the shareholders, based on their existing holdings, there is no scope for any property being received by them on the said allotment of shares; there being only an apportionment of the value of their existing holding over a large number of shares. There is, accordingly, no question of section 56(2)(vii)(c), though per se applicable to the transaction, i.e., of this genre, getting attracted in such a case.

A higher than proportionate or a non-uniform allotment though would, and on the same premise, attract the rigour of the provision. This is only understandable in as much as the same would only be to the extent of the disproportionate allotment and, further, by suitably factoring in the decline in the value of the existing holding. We emphasise equally on a uniform allotment as well. This is as a disproportionate allotment could also result on a proportionate offer, where on a selective basis, i.e., with some shareholders abstaining from exercising their rights (wholly or in part) and, accordingly, transfer of value/property. Take, for example, a case of a shareholding distributed equally over two shareholder groups, i.e., at 50% for each. A 1 : 1 rights issue, abstained by one group would result in the other having a 2/3rd holding. A higher proportion of `rights’ shares (as 2:1, 3:1, etc.) would, it is easy to see, yield a more skewed holding in favour of the resulting dominant group. We observe no absurdity or unintended consequences as flowing from the per se application of the provision of section 56(2)(vii) (c) to right shares, which by factoring in the value of the existing holding operates equitably. It would be noted that the section, as construed, would apply uniformly for all capital assets, i.e., drawing no exception for any particular class or category of the specified assets, as the `right’ shares.

The Tribunal held that no addition u/s. 56(2)(vii)(c) would arise in the facts of the present case.

The appeal filed by assessee was allowed.

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Recovery of tax: PPF account is immune from attachment and sale for recovery of Income-tax dues: Dineshchandra Bhailalbhai Gandhi vs. TRO:

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[2014] 42 taxmann.com 300 (Guj)

The petitioner is an individual assessee. The Tax Recovery Officer issued a notice dated 25-02-2005 u/s. 226(3) attached the assessee’s PPF account and also recovered an amount of Rs. 9,05,000/- from the said account.

The Gujarat High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee challenging the recovery of the said amount from the PPF account and held as under:

“i) Rule 10 of the Second Schedule to the Income- Tax Act, 1961 provides that All such property as is by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, exempt from attachment and sale in execution of a decree of a civil court shall be exempt from attachment and sale under this Schedule. Proviso to section 60(1) of Code of Civil Procedure contains list of properties which shall not be liable to attachment or sale which inter alia covers in Clause (ka) “(ka) all deposits and other sums in or derived from any fund to which the Public Provident Fund Act, 1968 (23 of 1968), for the time being applies, in so far as they are declared by the said Act as not to be liable to attachment.”

ii) Therefore, any amount lying in the PPF account of a subscriber is immune from attachment and sale for recovery of the Income-tax dues. As long as an amount remains invested in a PPF account of an individual, the same would be immune from attachment from recovery of the tax dues. The situation may change as and when such amount is withdrawn and paid over to the subscriber.

iii) CBDT circular dated 07-11-1990 clarifying that “Section 9 of the Public Provident Fund applies only to attachment under a decree/order of a Court of Law and not to attachment by the Income-tax Authorities is contrary to the above statutory provisions.”

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Reassessment: S/s. 147, 148 and 149: A. Y. 2003-04: Extended time limit of 6 years u/s. 149(1)(b) requires data for prima facie computation of income escaping assessment at more than Rs. 1,00,000/-:

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BBC World News Ltd. vs. ADIT; (2014) 42 taxman. com 456 (Del):

For the A. Y. 2003-04, the assessment was completed by an assessment order u/s. 143(3) dated 24-03-2006. Subsequently, the assessment was reopened by a notice u/s. 148 dated 30-03-2010. The reasons for reopening are stated to be:

“The assessment order in the case was passed on 24-03-2006 wherein the Assessing Officer has held that the assessee has an agency PE in India in the form of BBC Worldwide (India) Private Limited (BWIPL). And attributed a loss of Rs. 69,42,475 to Indian activities. While perusing the records of the case, it is noticed that during the assessment proceedings the actual expenditure incurred on the activities related to the Indian operations were not submitted by the assessee. In the orders for A.Ys. 2004-05 to 2006-07, in the case of the assessee, it has been held that the global loss, if any, is not on account of activities of the assessee in India and such loss cannot be attributed to the PE of the assessee in India. It is therefore held that the statements furnished by the assessee showing loss from Indian activities do not represent the correct position and the same has been found not reliable.

The office believes that in the absence of such crucial information assessment of the income of the assessee for the A.Y. 2003-04 could not be completed properly….”

The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and quashed the notice issued u/s. 148, inter alia for the reasons as under:

“i) There is a third reason why we think that the petitioner must succeed. Reasons to believe must have nexus and live link with the formation of opinion by the Assessing Officer that taxable income had escaped assessment. We have noted the reasons to believe mentioned above. As per mandate of section 149(1)(b), income escaping assessment should be or likely to exceed Rs. 1 lakh. This required prima facie computation of income escaping assessment. This in turn required examination of data or figures relating to “Indian operations”.

ii) If we accept the stand of the Revenue, then the said data and details were not available in the records for the assessment year 2003-04. It is not the contention of the Revenue that figures for the assessment year in question for the “Indian operation” were available in the records for subsequent or other years and were examined. Figures and data for every assessment will alter and change. This being the position and stand of the Revenue, the Assessing Officer could not have formed any prima facie or tentative opinion that income had escaped assessment as the petitioner had positive income from “Indian operations”, if we take into account “actual expenditure” incurred relating to Indian operations.

iii) In the absence of the said details, the averment made in the reasons to believe will be only a guess work or surmise and not cogent or reliable material to form a prima facie view. We understand that the Assessing Officers may be handicapped in such cases but there are sufficient provisions in the Act to get hold of the said data before proceedings are initiated or reasons are recorded. There is nothing to indicate and show the data and figures of the year in question were ascertained or gathered from records for other assessment years or otherwise.

iv) In view of the aforesaid, we allow the present writ petition and quash the reassessment proceedings initiated by issue of notice u/s. 148 dated 30th March, 2010 relating to assessment year 2003-04.

v) Copy of this order will be sent to the Chairman of Central Board for Direct Taxes for appropriate and necessary action to ensure proper record maintenance and issuance of suitable directions.”

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Industrial undertaking: Deduction u/s. 80-IB: A. Y. 2001-02: Production of article: Bottling of gas into cylinders amounts to production: Assessee entitled to deduction u/s. 80-IB:

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Puttur Petro Products P. Ltd. vs. ACIT; 361 ITR 290 (Karn):

The assessee had claimed deduction u/s. 80-IB contending that bottling of LPG gas in the cylinders amounts to production/manufacturing activity. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim. The Tribunal upheld the disallowance.

On appeal by the assessee, the High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The process of bottling of gas into gas cylinders, which requires a very specialised process and independent plant and machinery, amounts to production of “gas cylinders” containing gas for the purpose of claiming deduction u/s. 80-IB.
ii) In the circumstances, the question framed by us is answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.”

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Exemption: Share of profit of partner from firm: Section 10 (2A): A. Y. 2010-11: Partners are entitled to claim exemption u/s. 10(2A) on the share of profit received from the firm even if it includes that income also which was exempted in the hands of the firm under various provisions of section 10.

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Vidya Investment & Trading Co. (P.) Ltd. vs. UOI; [2014] 43 taxmann.com 1 (Karn)

The assessee, a private ltd. company, was a partner in a partnership firm. In the assessment order u/s. 143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, for the A. Y. 2010-11, the Assessing Officer granted exemption to the assessee u/s. 10(2A) of the Act, in respect of its share of profits from the partnership firm except to the extent of the income which was exempt in the hands of the firm under other provisions of section 10.

The assessee filed a writ petition and challenged the Explanation to section 10(2A) on the ground that it was discriminatory and in violation of Articles 14 and 265 of the Constitution. Further, a declaration was sought by the assessee that it was entitled to claim exemption u/s. 10(2A) in respect of its total share of profit received as partner of the firm which would include the income exempted from tax in the hands of the firm.

The Karnataka High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

“i) Although the dividends income and income derived from mutual funds were not includible in the taxable income of the firm yet they were nevertheless part of its profits;

ii) The expression total income of a firm in the Explanation to section 10(2A) would not mean taxable income of the firm but gross total income of a firm which included exempted income as well;

iii) The Assessing Officer had lost sight of this aspect and had held that ‘total income’ for the purpose of Explanation to section 10(2A), as defined in section 2(45), would mean the total amount of income as referred to in section 5, computed in the manner laid down in the Act; Therefore, the Assessing Officer was not right in holding that the income which was excluded from the total income of the firm u/s. 10, would have to be taxed in the hands of the partners on the reasoning that only income which was taxed in the hands of the firm would be exempted from tax in the hands of the partner;

iv) The Explanation to section 10(2A) would not call for any striking down in the hands of this Court. The Explanation could not be given a literal interpretation, so as to defeat the object of the amendment made to the Act. The object of the amendment was to make it clear that the distribution of profits and gains of a firm in the hands of the individual partners shall not be considered to be income of the partners and therefore, not includible while computing the total income of the partner under the Act;

v) Thus, the assessee was entitled to claim exemption u/s. 10(2A), on the share of profit of the firm, inclusive of the income, which is exempted under s/s. (34), (35) and (38) of section 10, as the total income referred to in section 10(2A), includes exempted income of the partnership firm.”

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Charitable purpose: Exemption u/s. 11: A. Y. 2008-09: Accumulation of income: Notice u/s. 11(2)(a) to be furnished in Form 10: Information furnished in form of letter with full detail as required in Form 10: Sufficient compliance: Assessee entitled to exemption u/s. 11:

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CIT vs. Moti Ram Gopi Chand Charitable Trust; 360 ITR 598 (All):

The assessee, a charitable Trust was registered u/s. 12A. For the A. Y. 2008-09, the Assessing Officer disallowed the claim for exemption u/s. 11 of the Act in respect of the accumulated income inter alia on the ground that the notice u/s. 11(2)(a) was not in the specified Form 10 as prescribed by Rule 17. The Tribunal found that the information with full details as required in Form 10 was furnished by the assessee by a letter. The Tribunal held that the assessee had made an investment in the next year amounting to Rs. 1,25,17,086/- and thus the purpose of the provisions of the Act had been achieved. The Tribunal accordingly allowed the claim of the assessee.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Allahabad High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) We do not find any error of law in the order of the Tribunal. When a request by way of a letter, which complies with the requirement and furnishes all the information required in Form 10 was made available on record and there was sufficient proof before the Assessing Officer that the amount was not only kept apart but was also spent in the next year, the adherence to the form and not substance was not valid exercise of power by the Assessing Officer.

ii) The questions of law are decided in favour of the assessee and against the Department.”

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Capital gain: Cost of acquisition: Market value as on 01-04-1981: Section 55A: Reference to DVO only when value of capital asset shown by assessee less than its FMV:

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CIT vs. Daulal Mohta (HUF); 360 ITR 680 (Bom):

In the relevant year, the assessee had sold a property called Laxmi Niwas which was owned by it since prior to 01-04-1981. For computing the capital gain, the assessee got the value of the property as on 01-04-1981 determined at Rs. 2,13,31,000/- from a Government approved valuer. The Assessing Officer referred the case to the DVO u/s. 55A who determined the value at Rs. 1,35,40,000/-. The Assessing Officer adopted the value determined by the DVO and computed the capital gain. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim and held that the cost of acquisition should be taken at Rs. 2,13,31,000/- as determined by the Government approved valuer.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) Reference to the DVO can only be made in cases where the value of the capital asset shown by the assessee is less than its fair market value as on 01-04-1981. Where the value of the capital asset shown by the assessee on the basis of the approved valuer’s report was more than its fair market value, reference u/s. 55A of the Income-tax Act, was not valid.

ii) The Tribunal was right in law in reversing the decision of the Commissioner (Appeals) on valuation of the property at Rs. 1,35,40,000/- made by the DVO as against the valuation done by the Government approved valuer at Rs. 2,13,31,000/-.”

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Business expenditure: Section 37: A. Y. 2006- 07: Tribunal noticing assessee’s books of account as well as sales tax records of seller and finding purchase genuine transaction: No rejection of books of account: Deletion of addition on account of purchase transactions justified:

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CIT vs. Sunrise Tooling System P. Ltd.; 361 ITR 206 (Del):

For the A. Y. 2006-07, the assessee had claimed deduction of Rs. 43,34,496/- towards the purchases from S. On the basis of the statement of a director of the assessee in the course of survey that the amount represented a non-existent or bogus transaction, the Assessing Officer disallowed the claim for deduction and made the addition. The Tribunal took note of the statement of the director and the retraction of that statement on 21st February, 2008. The Tribunal noticed that the statement was recorded in the course of survey u/s. 133A and did not have any evidentiary value. The Tribunal also took note of the fact that no copy of the statement was given to the assessee to enable it to cross-examine the director and accordingly deleted the addition.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The Tribunal could not be faulted in its approach in rendering the findings of fact. Although the Revenue endeavoured to submit that the Tribunal fell into error in overlooking and discounting the statement of the director on the ground that it was retracted, the discussion in the order of the Tribunal would show that the Tribunal took note of the materials before the Assessing Officer and the Commissioner (Appeals), which included the assessee’s books of account as well as the sales tax records of S. This established firmly and conclusively that the claim of the assessee that it had purchased goods from S were borne out.

ii) The Tribunal also noted that the Income-tax Authorities had not even rejected the books of the assessee even while finding the claim bogus.

iii) The impugned order of the Tribunal does not disclose any error, warranting framing of substantial questions of law.”

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Assessment: S/s. 143 and 144: A. Y. 2002-03: Assessment order passed without serving notice on the assesee is not valid: Burden of Revenue to prove service of notice: No evidence of service by Revenue: Assessment not valid:

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CIT vs. Gita Rani Ghosh; 361 ITR 17 (Gau):

For the A. Y. 2002-03, the Assessing Officer passed best judgment assessment order u/s. 144 claiming that the assessee did not respond to the notices issued u/s. 143(2) and 142(1) of the Act. The assessee challenged the validity of the assessment order on the ground that no such notices were served on the assessee in respect of the assessment proceedings of the assessee for the relevant year. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s appeal and held that the assessment order was illegal and void ab initio as no notice u/s. 143(2) or section 142(1) was served on the assessee. The Tribunal accordingly cancelled the assessment order.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Gauhati High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) It is settled law that to establish service of a notice upon the assessee, the initial onus is on the Revenue and unless and until this onus is discharged, the service of a notice simply, on the basis of presumption and assumption, cannot be accepted, so as to justify an ex parte best judgment assessment u/s. 144 of the Act.

ii) When the assessee had denied the receipt of the notices u/s. 142(1) and section 143(2) for the A. Y. 2002-03, it was for the Revenue to prove, by bring ing materials on record including witnesses, if any, that the notices sent to the assessee were for the A. Y. 2002-03. This was, however, not done.

iii) It was not the case that after the Assessing Officer had come to know of having issued notices in the wrong name, he had corrected the same by issuing a second set of notices. Similarly, the fact of service of notice had also not been mentioned in the order-sheet, meaning thereby that there was no evidence with the Revenue to establish its case that it was the second set of notices which were served upon the assessee as per acknowledgment.

iv) The Tribunal is correct in cancelling the best judgment assessment passed u/s. 144.”

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Appeal to CIT(A): Condition precedent to pay admitted tax before filing appeal: Section 249(4)(a): A. Y. 1996-97: Amount belonging to assessee available with Revenue far in excess of admitted tax: Requirement of section 249(4)(a) met: Appeal should be admitted:

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CIT vs. Pramod Kumar Dang; 361 ITR 137 (Del):

The Commissioner (Appeals) dismissed the appeal filed by the asessee relying on the provisions of section 249(4)(a) on the ground that the assessee appellant has failed to pay admitted tax. The Tribunal found that Rs. 4.6 lakh seized from the assessee was lying with the Department. The Tribunal held that the amount of Rs. 4.6 lakh should be treated against the payment of due tax on the returned income and directed the Commissioner (Appeals) to decide the appeal on merits.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The rationale behind section 249(4) is that where an assessee has filed a return, the tax which is admittedly payable by the assessee should be paid prior to the hearing of any appeal filed by the assessee. The rationale is very logical for the reason that no assessee can be heard in an appeal where the tax which is admittedly payable by the assessee is outstanding. It is to enforce payment of tax on the admitted income.

ii) When an assessee files the return of income then at least the tax which is payable on the returned income should be paid by the assessee. But where the assessee either has paid the tax on the returned income or sought adjustment admittedly lying with the Revenue towards the tax payable on the returned income, the assesee cannot be denied a hearing.

iii) The amount of Rs. 4.6 lakh belonging to the assessee which was admittedly available with the Department was far in excess of the amount of tax payable in terms of the returned income and even in excess of the demand of Rs. 2,15,926 created u/s. 143(1)(a). The assessee could not have been denied a hearing merely on the ground of non-payment of tax due on the returned income. Therefore, the requirements of section 249(4)(a) of the Act, were duly complied with.”

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Reassessment: S/s. 147 and 148: A. Ys. 199-00 to 2002-03: Reasons for reopening recorded after issuing notice u/s. 148: Notice u/s. 148 and reassessment proceedings are invalid:

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CIT vs. Baldwin Boys High School; [2014] 45 taxmann. com 33 (Karn):

The assessee trust, was running educational institution. For the relevant assessment years, the assessee had declared income ‘Nil’, claiming exemption u/s. 10(23C) (vi) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Assessments were completed allowing the claim. Subsequently, the assessments were reopened by issuing notices u/s. 148 of the Act dated 30-01-2004, on the ground that the assessee was not registered u/s. 12A nor had requisite approval u/s. 10(23C)(vi) of the Act. The Tribunal set aside reassessment proceedings taking a view that notices u/s. 148 to reopen assessment was issued without recording reasons as contemplated by s/s. (2) of section 148 which vitiated the whole proceedings.

On appeal by the Revenue, the following question was raised:

 “Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the notice issued by the Assessing Officer u/s. 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 without recording reasons as contemplated by s/s. (2) of section 148 of the Act would vitiate the whole proceedings? In other words, whether the reasons as contemplated by s/s.(2) of section 148 of the Act, in the present cases, were recorded after issuance of notice u/s. 148 of the Act and, therefore, the whole proceedings are bad in law?”

The Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 “i) F rom bare perusal of section 148, it is clear that the Assessing Officer is obliged to record reasons before issuing notice u/s. 148. It is true that in one of the files, there was a draft of reasons purportedly prepared by the Assessing Officer on 20-01-2004. It was not signed by the Assessing Officer. The reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer were typed, as is clear from the printout of the original reasons, on 04-02-2004. The typed date was struck off with pen and the date 30-01- 2004 was written by hand with the same pen. Though the original date (typed) was struck off with pen still the typed date is visible/could be read or is clearly seen, and it was typed as 04-02-2004.

 ii) Before the Tribunal, a controversy was raised that the printout of the reasons was computer generated and it was printed with the date of printing automatically by the Computer. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the typed date or the date of printout was 04-02-2004 and that it was changed to 30-01-2004 as the date of reasons recorded under s/s. (2) of section 148.

iii) Thus, the record was set right by showing that the date of the notice and the date on which the reasons were recorded was same. Why and how the date 04- 02-2004 is appearing on the original reasons recorded under s/s. (2) of section 148 is not explained by the Assessing Officer.

iv) On perusal of the original records, it is clear that the reasons were prepared on 04-02-2004 whereas the notice was sent on 30-01-2004. It is also pertinent to note that the contents of draft reasons and the original reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer do not tally.

v) Thus, from perusal of the order passed by the Tribunal and so also the other materials placed on record, it is clear that it is a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal holding that notice was issued even before the reasons were recorded. In such circumstances, there was no reason to interfere with the finding of facts recorded by the Tribunal.”

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DTAA: India-Singapore: Royalty: Section 9(1) (vi)(c): PE: Assessee, resident of Singapore made payment to GCC in Singapore for acquiring rights of telecasting cricket matches from Singapore: Had no connection with the marketing activities carried out through alleged PE in India: Payments could not be deemed as royalty in view of Article 12(7) of India Singapore DTAA:

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DIT vs. Set Satellite (Singapore) Pvt. Ltd.; [2014] 45 taxmann.com 100 (Bom):

The assessee is a Singapore based company engaged in the business of acquiring rights in television programmes, motion pictures and sports events and exhibiting the same on its television channels from Singapore. The assessee is a tax resident of Singapore. The assessee entered into an agreement on 25th January, 2002 with Global Cricket Corporation Private Limited (GCC), also a tax resident of Singapore. Under that agreement, GCC granted rights to the assessee throughout the licence territory. The licence territory, inter alia, included India. The assessee paid consideration to GCC for acquisition of such rights. The Assessing Officer made an addition of the amount so paid to GCC by way of disallowance on the ground that the tax was not deducted at source on such payment. The Tribunal deleted the addition. On appeal by the Revenue, the following questions were raised: “

i) Whether the payment to GCC (a Singaporean Company)for acquisition of telecasting rights were in the nature of ‘royalty’ covered by Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vi)(c)?

ii) Even if payments would be deemed as royalty, whether they would not be chargeable to tax as per Article 12(7) of India-Singapore DTAA ?

The Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The appellate authorities had already held that payment was made only for broadcasting operations carried out from Singapore, which had no connection with the marketing activities carried out through alleged Permanent Establishment (‘PE’) of assessee in India.

 ii) Thus, there was no economic link between the payments. The payer was not a resident of India and the liability to pay royalty had not been incurred in connection with and was not borne out by the PE of the payer in India.

iii) The absence of economic link was thus the foundation on which the Tribunal’s conclusions were based. Thus, the Appeal was to be dismissed as no substantial question of law was involved.

 iv) Once it does not raise any substantial question of law, then, the Appeal deserves to be dismissed. It is also dismissed because the view taken by the Tribunal in the given facts and circumstances cannot be said to be perverse or based on no material.”

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TDS on Premium Paid for Grant of Lease

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Synopsis U/s. 194-I of the Income Tax Act, 1961, an assessee is required to deduct tax at source from payment of rent made to a resident. In some lease transactions, particularly when land is taken on a lease for a long period of time, a one-time premium is paid for the grant of lease. In addition to the premium, an annual lease rent of a nominal amount may be charged. The issue is whether the payer needs to deduct tax at source from the one-time premium paid.

The issue has been the subject matter of adjudication in various cases and judgment largely depends on the facts of the case. In this article, the authors have analysed various judicial pronouncements in this regard and have made several observations that will help the reader understand the issue in its entirety.

Issue for Consideration

Section 194-I of the Income-tax Act, 1961 requires deduction of tax at source from payment of any income by way of rent to a resident. For this purpose, ‘rent’ has been defined to mean any payment, by whatever name called, under any lease, sub-lease, tenancy or any other agreement or arrangement for the use of (either separately or together) any, land, or building (including factory building), or land appurtenant to a building (including factory building), ……………….. whether or not any one or all of the above are owned by the payee.

Very often, when land is taken on lease for a long period of time, say for 30 years, 50 years or 99 years, a premium is paid for such grant of lease, particularly when the lease is being taken from a Government Authority, such as an Industrial Development Corporation or a Regional Development Authority. In addition to the premium, annual rent may also be charged, which at times may be a nominal amount. The payment of such a premium has been the subject matter of several controversies, under the tax laws, surrounding the liability of the payer to deduct tax at source u/s. 194-I and his eligibility to claim deduction for such payment in computing his total income.

One of the issues is whether such a premium is really in the nature of rent for the purposes of section 194-I, and whether tax is deductible at source from such premium, or whether such premium is in the nature of a capital expenditure for the grant of lease of the land and no tax is deductible from such payment. While the Chennai bench of the Tribunal has taken the view that tax is required to be deducted at source u/s. 194-I from the payment of lease premium, the Delhi and Mumbai benches of the Tribunal have taken a contrary view that payment for such premium is a capital expenditure and no tax is required to be deducted at source thereon.

Foxconn India’s case

The issue first arose before the Chennai bench of the tribunal in the case of Foxconn India Developer (P) Ltd. vs. ITO 53 SOT 213.

In this case, the assessee was engaged in the business of developing a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) and had taken on lease, a plot of land of 151.85 acre for a period of 99 years from SIPCOT Ltd., a Tamil Nadu State Government Corporation engaged in industrial development, which was the nodal agency for development of land for SEZ at Sriperumbudur. The assessee paid an amount of Rs. 28.41 crore as upfront charges for the lease. The annual lease rent was Rs. 1 per year for 98 years and Rs. 2 in the 99th year, such rent also being paid in advance. The upfront fee was non-refundable and consisted of Rs. 27.09 crore towards non-refundable upfront charges and Rs. 1.32 crore for payment towards provision of water and pipeline up to the boundary limit.

The Assessing Officer (TDS) took the view that such payment came within the definition of rent as per the explanation to section 194-I, and that the assessee had failed to deduct tax at source thereon. He therefore treated the assessee as in default for non-deduction of TDS and raised a demand for the amount of TDS and interest thereon.

The Commissioner (Appeals) was of the view that the upfront fee was nothing but advance rent, since the annual rent was very small. According to the Commissioner (Appeals), such upfront payment obviated the problem of SIPCOT in collecting the rent annually. He therefore held that the assessing officer was justified in applying section 194-I and holding that the assessee had failed to deduct TDS. However, since the lessor had included upfront and water connections charges received by it as its income and paid tax thereon, he held that the TDS could not be recovered from the assessee following the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Hindustan Coca-Cola Beverages 293 ITR 226, but that interest could be levied u/s. 201(1A) up to the date of payment of final installment of advance tax by SIPCOT Ltd.

Before the Tribunal, it was argued that the upfront fee was a capital outgo, and that by such payment, the assessee derived the right of possession of the land for 99 years; that the right was an asset, giving rise to an enduring benefit; that the assessee had reflected this right acquired by such payment as an asset in its balance sheet; that no tax was deductible on a capital outgo. SIPCOT Ltd. had treated the entire amount received by it as a revenue receipt and part of its business income from the area development activity, and had accordingly treated the transaction as a deemed sale of land. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Patna High Court in the case of Traders and Miners Ltd. vs. CIT 27 ITR 341, for the proposition that lease of land was a transfer of a capital asset.

The Tribunal agreed with the assessee’s contention that it had received a benefit of enduring nature, that the outgo was on capital account and that it had acquired an asset by making such payment. It noted that the assessee had derived an interest in the property since leasehold interest was a valuable right.

However, according to the Tribunal, the question was not as to whether the outgo was capital or revenue, but as to whether the upfront fee fell within the definition of ‘rent’ under the Explanation to section 194-I. According to the Tribunal, section 194-I did not differentiate between a capital outgo and a revenue outgo. It rejected the assessee’s argument that the payment was made before the date of signing of the lease agreement, as not being relevant. According to the Tribunal, it was an accepted position that the payments were for the lease of the land, that the lease was already in contemplation and that the payment would not have been made unless the lease was at least orally agreed to between the parties. Therefore, according to the Tribunal, the payment, by whatever name called, was made under a lease agreement.

According to the Tribunal, the definition of rent would definitely include payments of any type under any agreement or arrangement for the use of land. For the purposes of section 194-I, the Tribunal was of the opinion that the normal meaning of the term rent could not be used, but that the specific definition of rent had to be applied, which, in the opinion of the Tribunal, would squarely cover the payment made by the assessee to SIPCOT Ltd.

The Tribunal therefore upheld the order of the Commissioner (Appeals), holding that tax was deductible at source. Having held that the tax was deductible at source, the Tribunal however proceeded to hold that such tax could not be recovered from the assessee as the relevant taxes had already been paid by SIPCOT Ltd., and that only interest u/s. 201(1A) could be recovered from the assessee.

Navi Mumbai SEZ’s case

 The issue again came up before the Mumbai bench of the Tribunal in the case of ITO vs. Navi Mumbai SEZ (P) Ltd., 147 ITD 261.
in this case, the assessee was a special purpose  vehicle constituted by the maharashtra Government Corporation, City and industrial development Corporation of maharashtra ltd. (CidCo) and dronagiri infrastructure Private Limited for developing and operating an SEZ at  navi  mumbai.  CidCo  was  the  town  development authority for navi mumbai, and had acquired privately owned lands in that area for development work. CidCo was also appointed as the nodal agency for setting up the SeZ at navi mumbai.

a development agreement, followed by the lease deed, was entered into between CidCo and the assessee, whereunder the assessee agreed for payment of lease premium, in respect of land acquired by CidCo and allotted to the assessee, from time to time. accordingly, the  assessee  paid  lease  premium  of  rs.  50  crore  in assessment year 2006-07, rs. 946.06 crore in assessment year 2007-08, Rs. 1,033.61 crore in assessment year 2008-09,  and  rs.  146.82  crore  in  assessment  year 2009-10.

By virtue of the lease, the assessee had acquired lease- hold rights in the land for the purpose of developing, designing, planning, financing, marketing, developing necessary infrastructure, providing necessary services, operating and maintaining infrastructure, and administering and managing the SEZ to be known as the navi mumbai SEZ. the assessee had also acquired the rights to determine, levy, collect, retain, and utilise user charges, fees for provision of services and/or tariffs under the lease deed. the lease deed and development agreement assigned to the assessee the right to develop, construct and dispose of residential and commercial spaces. the assessee was also entitled to grant a sub-lease in respect of portions of the lease land, in accordance with applicable laws and as per the lease deed. the assessee was granted the power to assign its rights, title or interest or create a security interest in respect of its right, either fully or in part thereof, in favour of lenders, including the grant of step in rights in the event of default under the financing arrangements for the purposes of obtaining finance for the SEZ. under the development agreement, the assessee acquired sole rights for marketing of the SEZ and the industrial/commercial projects to potential tenants.

The assessing officer took the view that the lease premium was ‘rent’ within the meaning of the said term u/s. 194-i and that the assessee ought to have deducted tax at source from such payment. according to the assessing Officer, almost any and every payment in relation to property under lease transactions was to be treated as rent for the purposes of section 194-i and hence lease premium partook of the character of rent. according to the ao, the various restrictive clauses in the lease agreement negated the assessee’s contention that it had acquired rights in the land and not merely rights to use the land. the ao therefore held that the assessee was in default for non-deduction of tax at source on such payment.

The  Commissioner  (appeals)  noted  that  the  assessee had been allotted land for a period of 60 years on the payment of lease premium and that the lease deed and the development agreement assigned to the assessee leasehold rights, which included a bundle of rights. he held that the payment of lease premium by the assessee was for acquiring the lease and it could not be equated with rent. The Commissioner (Appeals) noted that the definition of the term ‘rent’ specifically used the term ‘for the use of,’ and that the usage was of the utmost importance in any transaction for it to be treated as rent. according to the Commissioner (appeals), a transaction of lease might have stipulations which make it a transaction identical   to the transactions between a landlord and a tenant and that was why various terms like sub-lease, tenancy, etc. had been used in the section. however, in many cases, a lease transaction might not necessarily be similar or identical to a transaction between a landlord and tenant, and instead might indicate a sale transaction, in the sense that certain more valuable rights in the property were transferred.

The Commissioner (appeals) also drew a distinction be- tween a case where the tenant or lessee used the proper- ty for his own purposes or employed it for his own benefit, in which case the consideration would be in the nature  of rent, as against a situation where the property was exploited in a manner that its identity did not remain the same and thereafter it was sold, by the lessee, for a profit, which was the situation in the assessee’s case and hence could not be termed as a transaction between a landlord and a tenant. according to the Commissioner (appeals), the latter was a case where the lessee acquired a capital right to develop the land and exploit it. the Commissioner (appeals) therefore held that the assessee had acquired rights in land and had not paid for the use of the land, and that therefore the provisions of section 194-i were not attracted.

On further appeal by the revenue, the tribunal noted that the word ‘rent’ as defined u/s. 194-I had a wider meaning than that in common parlance. the tribunal also noted that the assessee however had paid the lease premium to acquire the leasehold land and that there was no provi- sion for refund of the lease premium paid by the assessee. it took note of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of A. R. Krishnamurthy vs. CIT 176 itr 417, wherein the apex Court held that a lease of land was a transfer  of interest in the land, that involved a transfer of title in favour of the lessee, though the lessor had the right of reversion after the period of lease terminated. it also took note of the decision of the delhi high Court in the case  of Bharat Steel Tubes Ltd. vs. CIT 252 itr 622, wherein the court held that amount paid for acquiring leasehold rights was premium, which was capital in nature, and that periodical payments made for the continuous enjoyment of the benefits under the lease amounted to rent, which was revenue in nature.

The tribunal also noted the decision of the jurisdictional Bombay high Court in the case of CIT vs. Khimline Pumps Ltd. 258 itr 459, wherein it was held that the payment made for acquiring leasehold rights from a lessee was capital in nature, and could not be treated as an advance rent. according to the tribunal, in the assessee’s case, there was a transfer of substantive interest of the lessor in the leasehold land in favour of the assessee and that the lease premium was a capital expenditure to acquire a capital asset and not for the use of the land.

The  tribunal  observed  that  in  the  case  of  foxconn  in- dia developers (supra) the Chennai bench of the tribu- nal had observed that the payment was made under the lease agreement, and had held that the payment was for use of land and not for acquisition of leasehold land. the tribunal in navi mumbai SeZ’s case therefore, was of the view that the decision of the Chennai bench in foxconn’s case was not applicable to the case before it. the tribu- nal preferred to follow the decision of the delhi tribunal in ITO vs. Indian Newspapers Society 144 itd 668, wherein it was held that the payment of the lease premium was not liable to deduction of tax at source. it also took note of the ratio of the decision of the special bench of the tribunal at mumbai in the case of Jt. CIT vs. Mukund Ltd. 13 Sot 558, where the special bench had held that premium paid for acquiring leasehold rights in land was a capital expenditure.

The mumbai bench of the tribunal therefore held that the premium paid by the assessee did not attract the provisions of section 194-i, and that no tax was required to be deducted at source on such lease premium.

A similar view had been taken earlier by the mumbai bench of the tribunal in the case of ITO vs. Wadhwa & Associates Realtors (P) Ltd. 146 itd 694, in the context of lease of land from mumbai metropolitan regional development authority.

Observations
An immovable property comprises of a bundle of rights, each of them can be separately conveyed for varied consideration to different people. for example, right to own, right to use, right to mine, right to let, right to manage and control, etc. under the general law, sale consideration is received for conveyance of absolute rights in a property while a premium is received for transfer of the partial in- terest of the owner of the property and rent is received for grant of the right to use the property for a period. each of these transfers operate in different fields and the payments there under have different implications.the receipt of the rent is in the revenue field and of the premium is in the capital field. The payment of the rent is revenue expenditure and of the premium is a capital outlay. there may be cases where it may be difficult to draw a precise line between the premium and the rent. there may also be the cases that the parties for convenient reasons chose to use such nomenclatures that do not reveal the true nature of the transactions. the distinction between premium and rent and the norms for identifying each of them is noted by the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Panbari Tea Co. Ltd. 57 itr 422 in the following words:

“The real test of a salami or premium is whether the amount paid, in a lump sum or in instalments, is the consideration paid by the tenant for being let into possession. When the interest of the lessor is parted with for a price, the price paid is premium or salami. But the periodical payments made for the continuous enjoyment of the benefits under the lease are in the nature of rent. The former is a capital receipt, and the latter are revenue receipts. There may be circumstances where the parties may camouflage the real nature of the transaction by using clever phraseology.

This section (section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act), therefore brings out the distinction between the price paid for transfer of right to enjoy the property and the rent to be paid periodically to the lessor. When the interest of the lessor is parted with for a price, the price paid is premium or salami. But the periodical payments made for the continuous enjoyment of the benefits under the lease is in the nature of rent. The former is a capital income and the latter a revenue receipt.

In some cases, the so-called premium is in fact advance rent and in others, rent is deferred  price. It is not the form, but the substance of the transaction that matters. The nomenclature used may not be decisive conclusion, but it helps the court, having regard to the other circumstances, to ascertain the intention of the parties.”

It is therefore appropriate to hold that the issue that whether a payment is a premium or a rent is largely a question of fact. the facts will decide as to what has been paid is a premium or a rent, no matter what nomenclature the parties have chosen to use; the facts will decide the character of the payment, no matter it has been paid in one go or in installments. the facts that are relevant for deciding the character are whether the payer’s interest  in the property are transferred or whether the payment is for the limited purpose of use of the property for a period. Where the payment is for use of the property, the same would be on revenue account even where paid in one go for a period exceeding one year. in contrast where the payment is for acquiring a part of the interest of the owner, the same will be on capital account even where paid in installments.

Usually in the long lease, the transaction involves a transfer of interest of the owner in part and of the right to use the property as well as the separate payment being made for each of them. in such circumstances, it is fair for the parties and also for the authorities to respect the contents of the lease deed unless they do not reveal the facts but camouflage them.

An yardstick that can be safely used, in a case where the contents of the lease deed do not clearly reveal the true nature of the transaction and of the payment, is to look for the value of the property in the open market and if the premium matches such value, with a difference attributable to the limited title, it can be said that the payment was made for transfer of interest in the property.

An additional issue is whether the distinction between the two terms is to be ignored while interpreting section 194-i, given the specific definition contained in the Explanation to that section. On the first glance, one may be tempted to hold, like what was done by the Chennai bench in foxconn’s case, that any payment made under a lease, is subjected to the provisions of tax deduction at source as such payment should be termed as ‘rent’ within its extended meaning u/s. 194-I. We are afraid that the view  of the bench requires reconsideration in as much as the term ‘rent’, even u/s. 194-I, covers a payment only where it is for the use of the properties listed therein. The definition of rent in section 194-i uses the term “for the use of” clearly indicating that it is intended to cover the subsequent periodical payments, which are meant for continuous subsequent usage of the property, and not initial capital payment, meant for acquisition of the right to use the property. had section 194-i intended to also cover payments made for acquisition of the right to use property, it would have used the term “for acquisition of the right to use, or for the use of”.

The Chennai bench of the tribunal took the view that it did not matter as to whether the payment of premium was capital in nature or revenue in nature. it proceeded on the footing that the definition of ‘rent’ in section 194-I was broad enough to cover even capital payments. however, given the use of the term “for use of” in the definition, it is clear that what is covered by the definition is only a revenue expenditure, and not a capital expenditure. the distinction, as observed by the Supreme Court in Panbari tea’s case (supra), between rent (revenue) and premium (capital) also does not seem to have been taken into account by the Chennai bench of the tribunal.

In fact, if one takes the Chennai bench’s decision to its logical conclusion, even payment for outright purchase of land or building will be covered by section 194-i, as purchase of land or building includes acquisition of the right to use the land or building. this would be an absurdity, more particularly as there is a separate provision u/s. 194-ia for deduction of tax at source from payments for acquisition of immovable property.

As rightly analysed by the Special Bench of the tribunal in mukund’s case (supra), if the premium is non-refundable and there is a provision for termination of the lease prior to the end of the lease term, without refund of any part of the lease premium for the unexpired lease term, the payment of premium cannot be regarded as a payment of advance rent. unless the agreement shows that the amount of premium was paid as advance rent for all future years and that a lump sum payment of future years’ rent was paid to avail of some concession in rent, the premium paid is to be regarded as a price for obtaining the leasehold rights. in that case, the tribunal also relied upon the Supreme Court decision in the case of Durga Das Khanna vs. CIT 72 ITR 796, where the Supreme Court took a similar view in relation to a lease agreement for a cinema hall.

The delhi high Court, in the case of Krishak Bharati Co- Operative Ltd. vs. DCIT 350 ITR 24, has pointed out that payment of lease premium is a precondition for securing possession. Where the tenure of the lease is quite substantial and the lease virtually creates ownership rights in favour of the assessee, who is at liberty to construct upon the plot, and exclusive possession has been handed over to the assessee at the time of creation of the lease, the lease premium could not be regarded as advance rent to be amortised over the period of the lease.

In the case of R. K. Palshikar HUF vs. CIT 172 ITR 311 (SC), where the lease was for a long period, namely 99 years, the assessee had parted with an asset of an enduring nature, namely, the rights to possession and enjoyment to the properties leased for a period of 99 years subject to certain conditions on which the respective leases could be terminated, and a premium had been charged by the assessee in all the leases, the Supreme Court held that the grant of the leases amounted to transfer of the capital assets.

In Krishak Bharati’s case (supra), the delhi high Court observed that all the cases where the lease premium was held to be in the nature of advance rent were fact dependent. in the case of DCIT vs. Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. 329 ITR 479 (Guj), the lease premium was held to be deductible as the annual lease rent was a token amount of rs. 40. in CIT vs. Gemini Arts (P) Ltd. 254 itr 201 (mad), the rent was a nominal amount and there was no provision for increase in rent during the period of lease.

As observed by lord Greene m.r. in henriksen vs. Grafton Hotel Ltd. 24 TC 453:

“A payment of this character appears to me to fall into the same class as the payment of a premium of a lease, which is admittedly not deductible. in the case of such a premium, it is nothing to the point to say that the parties, if they had chosen, might have suppressed the premium and made a corresponding increase in the rent. no doubt they might have done so, but they did not do so in fact.” importantly, the Supreme Court in the case of durga das Khanna (supra) held that the onus is on the revenue to demonstrate that the advance rent has been camouflaged as premium and that the premium has been inflated. According to the Supreme Court, where an arm of the government is a party to the lease agreement, the burden on the Assessing Officer to prove such camouflage would be very heavy and onerous.

Therefore, in a situation where an assessee obtains substantial domain over the immovable property by payment of the lease premium, particularly where the lease premium is paid to a Government authority, the premium would be regarded as a payment for acquisition of the property for the lease period, and not as a payment for the user of the property. therefore, the provisions of section 194-I should not be attracted to such payment of lease premium. the ratio of the decisions of the mumbai and delhi benches of the tribunal, to the effect that no tax is deductible at source in respect of such premium, therefore seems to be the better view of the matter.

The Aayakar Seva Kendra, situated at Ground Floor, Aayakar Bhavan, Mumbai will accept the Dak/Tapal of the charges of Commissioner of Income Tax-I to Commissioner of Income Tax -13 from assesses/their representatives between 10.30 a.m. to 4.00 p.m. (Lunch Time 1.30 to 2.00 p.m.). Copy of the order available at www.bcasonline.org

A Press Note bearing No.402/92/2006-MC dated 17th April, 2014 has been issued by CBDT giving instructions to Assessing Officers, laying down Standard Operating Procedure (‘SOP’) for verification and correction of tax-demand. The taxpayers can get the outstanding tax demand reduced/ deleted by applying for rectification along with documentary evidence of tax/demand already paid. The SOP also makes special provisions for dealing with the tax demand upto Rs. 1,00,000/- in the case of Individuals a<

Intervention application opposing amalgamation – Direct Tax Circular No. 279-Misc.-M-171- 2013-ITJ dated 11th April 2014 –

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CBDT has directed the Commissioners to send comments/ objections of the Income tax department to the scheme of amalgamation, if the same is found to be prejudicial to the interest of the revenue. The comments/objections be sent to Regional Director, MCA for incorporating them in its response to the Court.

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New tax returns forms notified – Notification no- 24/2014 [S.O. 997(E) dated 1 April, 2014 – Income tax (Fourth amendment) Rules, 2014

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New forms SAHAJ (ITR-1), ITR-2, SUGAM (ITR-4S) and ITR-V” have been notified. Further Rule 12 has been amended with effect from 1st April, 2014 and provides as under :

a) Every partnership firm is required to file its return of income for A.Y. 2014-15 and in subsequent years electronically.

b) Every political party (if its income exceeds the maximum amount not chargeable to tax) is required to file its return of income for A.Y. 2014-15 and in subsequent years electronically.

c) Every Charitable officer by filing form 10. It is now provided that Form 10 is required to be filed electronically.

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Certificate of Lower deduction or non-deduction of tax at source under section 197 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 – matter regarding. – INSTRUCTION NO 1/2014, Dated: 15th January, 2014 (reproduced)

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All the Chief Commissioners & Directors General of Income Tax, As per the Citizens Charter the time line prescribed for a decision on application for no deduction of tax or deduction of tax at lower rate is one month. Instances have been brought to the notice of the Board, about considerable delay in issuing the lower/ non deduction certificate u/s. 197 by the jurisdictional Assessing Officers.

2. I am directed to say that the commitment to tax payers as per the Citizens Charter must be scrupulously adhered to by the Assessing Officers and all applications for lower or no deduction of tax at source filed u/s. 197 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 must be disposed of within the stipulated time frame as above.

3. This may be brought to the notice of all officers in the field for compliance. 4. Hindi version will follow. F.No.275/03/2014-IT(B)

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No TDS to be deducted on Service tax component – Circular no. 1/2014 dated 13th January 2014

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CBDT has clarified that where as per the terms of contract, service tax is indicated to be charged separately to a resident, TDS would not be deductible on such component of service tax for all items covered under Chapter XVII-B of the Act.

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Clarification on conflicting views of Courts on the issue of disallowability under Section 40(a)(ia) of the Act – CIRCULAR NO.10/ DV/2013 [F.NO.279/MISC./M-61/2012-ITJ(VOL. II)], dated 16-12-2013

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There are conflicting judgments of the High Courts, on the issue of applicability of provisions of section 40(a)(ia) of the Act. Various High Courts have taken divergent views on whether the section applies to amounts payable at the end of the year or also to the payments made during the year. CBDT has issued a circular clarifying the provision of section 40(a) (ia) of the Act would cover not only the amounts which are payable as on 31st March of a previous year but also amounts which are payable at any time during the year. For the purpose of section 40(a) (ia) of the Act, the term “payable” would include “amounts which are paid during the previous year”.

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New forms 49A and 49AA prescribed for allotment of PAN – Income –tax (19th Amendment) Rules, 2013 dated 23rd December 2013

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For Individuals who are citizens of India, HUF, company, firms (including LLPs), AOPs and BOIs formed and registered in India – Form no 49A has been prescribed and Form 49AA is prescribed for others. Specific requirements have been spelled out for each category in these Rules for documents to be considered as proof of identity, address and date of birth/incorporation.

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CBDT issues Instructions to Assessing Officers advising them to follow the Circular issues on section 10A, 10AA and 10B – Instruction No. 17/2013 (F.NO.178/84/2012-ITA.I) dated 19-11-2013 (reproduced)

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A clarificatory Circular No. 01/2013, dated 17-01-2013 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Circular’) was issued by CBDT to address various contentious issues leading to tax disputes in cases of entities engaged in export of computer software which are availing tax-benefits u/s. 10A, 10AA and 10B of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

2. Instances have been reported where the Assessing Officers are not following the clarifications so issued and are taking a divergent view even in cases where the clarifications are directly applicable.

3. The undersigned is directed to convey that the field authorities are advised to follow the contents of Circular in letter and spirit. It is also advised that further appeals should not be filed in cases where orders were passed prior to issue of Circular but the issues giving rise to the disputes have been clarified by the Circular.

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ITO vs. Haresh Chand Agarwal (HUF) ITAT Agra Bench Before A. Mohan Alankamony (AM) and Kul Bharat (JM) ITA No. 282/Agra/2013 A.Y.: 2004-05. Decided on: 20th December, 2013. Counsel for revenue/assessee: K. K. Mishra/ Deependra Mohan.

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S/s. 50C, 147 – Failure to apply provisions of section 50C does not lead to escapement of income. Section 50C is not final determination to prove that it is a case of escapement of income.

Facts:
While assessing the total income of the assessee the Assessing Officer (AO) lost sight of the provisions of section 50C of the Act and computed long term capital gains, arising on transfer of property, by adopting agreement value of Rs. 6 lakh to be the sale consideration. The stamp duty value of this property was Rs. 25,89,000.

Subsequently, the AO recorded reasons and reopened the assessment on the ground that income has escaped assessment. In reassessment proceedings, the AO rejected the contentions of the assessee that the property was rented and since the assessee was in need of funds he had to sell the property to its tenants. The AO adopted the stamp duty value to be full value of consideration. He also did not accept cost of construction declared by the assessee at Rs. 6,42,558 for computation of capital gains.

Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal to CIT(A) where it challenged the reopening and also the additions on merits. The CIT(A) held that reopening was bad in law since it was based on change of opinion as the AO did not have any tangible material in his possession except the sale deed which has already been produced before the AO at the stage of original assessment proceedings.

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal. Held: The Tribunal after considering the ratio of the various decisions of the Apex Court and the High Courts held that it is clear that AO is not justified in reopening the assessment on mere change of opinion. It is admitted fact that there is no material available with the AO to form his opinion that income has escaped assessment. All material evidences were available at the stage of original assessment proceedings and the AO merely following the provisions of section 50C, as was not considered in the original assessment proceedings, reopened the assessment. The assessee has disclosed all the facts which were known all along to the Revenue. Section 50C is not final determination to prove that it is a case of escapement of income. The report of approved valuer may give estimated figure on the basis of facts of each case. Therefore, on mere applicability of section 50C would not disclose any escapement of income in the facts and circumstances of the case. The AO at the original assessment stage considered all the documents and material produced before him and has accepted the cost of property as was declared by the assessee. Therefore, on mere change of opinion, the AO was not justified in reopening the assessment. The CIT(A) on proper appreciation of facts and law correctly quashed the reassessment proceedings.

The appeal filed by the revenue was dismissed.

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Business expenditure: Disallowance u/s. 14A: Where assessee did not earn any exempt income in the relevant year the provisions of section 14A are not applicable and disallowance u/s. 14A could not be made:

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CIT vs. M/s. Shivam Motors (P) Ltd.(All); ITA No. 88 of 2014 dated 05-05-2014: A. Y. 2008-09):

Held:
In the absence of dividend (i.e., exempt income) the provisions of section 14A of the Act is not applicable and accordingly, there can be no disallowance u/s. 14A of the Act.

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Search and seizure – Block assessment – Assessment of third person – For the purpose of section 158BD of the Act a satisfaction note is sine qua non and must be prepared by the assessing officer before he transmits the records to the other assessing officer who has jurisdiction over such other person. The satisfaction note could be prepared at either of the following stages: (a) at the time of or along with the initiation of proceedings against the searched person u/s. 158BC of the Act;

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CIT vs. Calcutta Knitwears
(2014) 362 ITR 673 (SC)

A search operation u/s. 132 of the Act was carried out in two premises of the Bhatia Group, namely, M/s. Swastik Trading Company and M/s. Kavita International Company on 05-02-2003 and certain incriminating documents pertaining to the respondent assessee firm engaged in manufacturing hosiery goods in the name and style of M/s. Calcutta Knitwears were traced in the said search.

After completion of the investigation by the investigating agency and handing over of the documents to the assessing authority, the assessing authority had completed the block assessments in the case of Bhatia Group. Since certain other documents did not pertain to the person searched u/s. 132 of the Act, the assessing authority thought it fit to transmit those documents, which according to him, pertain to the “undisclosed income” on account of investment element and profit element of the assessee firm and require to be assessed u/s. 158BC read with section 158BD of the Act to another assessing authority in whose jurisdiction the assessments could be completed. In doing so, the assessing authority had recorded his satisfaction note dated 15-07-2005.

The jurisdictional assessing authority for the respondentassessee had issued the show cause notice u/s. 158BD for the block period 01-04-1996 to 05-02-2003, dated 10- 02-2006 to the assessee inter alia directing the assessee to show cause as to why should the proceedings u/s. 158BC not be completed. After receipt of the said notice, the assessee firm had filed its return u/s. 158BD for the said block period declaring its total income as Nil and further filed its reply to the said notice challenging the validity of the said notice u/s. 158BD, dated 08-03-2006. The assessee had taken the stand that the notice issued to the assessee is (a) in violation of the provisions of section 158BD as the conditions precedent have not been complied with by the assessing officer and (b) beyond the period of limitation as provided for u/s. 158BE read with section 158BD and therefore, no action could be initiated against the assessee and accordingly, requested the assessing officer to drop the proceedings.

The assessing authority, after due consideration of the reply filed to the show cause notice, had rejected the aforesaid stand of the assessee and assessed the undisclosed income as Rs. 21,76,916/- (Rs.16,05,744/- (unexplained investment) and Rs. 5,71,172/- (profit element)) by order dated 08-02-2008. The assessing officer was of the view that section 158BE of the Act did not provide for any limitation for issuance of notice and completion of the assessment proceedings u/s.158BD of the Act and therefore a notice could be issued even after completion of the proceedings of the searched person u/s. 158BC of the Act.

Disturbed by the orders passed by the assessing officer, the assessee firm had carried the matter in appeal before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeal- II) (for short ‘the CIT(A)’. The CIT(A), while rejecting the stand of the assessee in respect of validity of notice issued u/s. 158BD, had partly allowed the appeal filed by the assessee firm and deleted the additions made by the assessing officer in its assessments, by his order dated 27-08-2008.

The Revenue had carried the matter further by filing appeal before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal (for short ‘the Tribunal’) and the assessee has filed cross objections therein. The Tribunal, after hearing the parties to the lis, had rejected the appeal of the Revenue and observed that recording of satisfaction by the assessing officer as contemplated u/s. 158BD was on a date subsequent to the framing of assessment u/s. 158BC in case of the searched person, that is, beyond the period prescribed u/s. 158BE(1)(b) and thereby the notice issued u/s. 158BD was belated and consequently the assumption of jurisdiction by the assessing authority in the impugned block assessment would be invalid.

Aggrieved by the order so passed by the Tribunal, the Revenue had carried the matter in appeal u/s. 260A of the Act before the High Court. The High Court, by its impugned judgment and order dated 20-07-2010, had rejected the Revenue’s appeal and confirmed the order passed by the Tribunal.

On appeal, the Supreme Court observed that section 158BD of the Act is a machinery provision and inserted in the statute book for the purpose of carrying out assessments of a person other than the searched person u/s. 132 or 132A of the Act. U/s. 158BD of the Act, if an officer is satisfied that there exists any undisclosed income which may belong to a other person other than the searched person u/s. 132 or 132A of the Act, after recording such satisfaction, may transmit the records/ documents/chits/papers etc., to the assessing officer having jurisdiction over such other person. After receipt of the aforesaid satisfaction and upon examination of the said other documents relating to such other person, the jurisdictional assessing officer may proceed to issue a notice for the purpose of completion of the assessments u/s. 158BD of the Act, the other provisions of XIV-B shall apply.

The opening words of section 158BD of the Act are that the assessing officer must be satisfied that “undisclosed income” belongs to any other person other than the person with respect to whom a search was made u/s.132 of the Act or a requisition of books were made u/s. 132A of the Act and thereafter, transmit the records for assessment of such other person. Therefore, according to the Supreme Court the short question that fell for its consideration and decision was at what stage of the proceedings should the satisfaction note be prepared by the assessing officer: Whether at the time of initiating proceedings u/s. 158BC for the completion of the assessments of the searched person u/s. 132 and 132A of the Act or during the course of the assessment proceedings u/s. 158BC of the Act or after completion of the proceedings u/s. 158BC of the Act.

The Supreme Court noted that the Tribunal and the High Court were of the opinion that it could only be prepared by the assessing officer during the course of the assessment proceedings u/s. 158BC of the Act and not after the completion of the said proceedings. The Courts below had relied upon the limitation period provided in section 158BE(2)(b) of the Act in respect of the assessment proceedings initiated u/s. 158BD, i.e., two years from the end of the month in which the notice under Chapter XIV-B was served on such other person in respect of search initiated or books of account or other documents or any assets are requisitioned on or after 01-01-1997.

The Supreme Court held that before initiating proceedings u/s. 158BD of the Act, the assessing officer who has initiated proceedings for completion of the assessments u/s. 158BC of the Act should be satisfied that there is an undisclosed income which has been traced out when a person was searched u/s. 132 or the books of accounts were requisitioned u/s. 132A of the Act. U/s. 158BD the existence of cogent and demonstrative material is germane to the assessing officers’ satisfaction in concluding that the seized documents belong to a person other than the searched person is necessary for initiation of action u/s. 158BD. The bare reading of the provision indicated that the satisfaction note could be prepared by the assessing officer either at the time of initiating proceedings for completion of assessment of a searched person u/s. 158BC of the Act or during the stage of the assessment proceedings. According to the Supreme  Court,  it  did not mean that after completion of the assessment, the assessing officer could not prepare the satisfaction note to the effect that there exists income belonging to any person other than the searched person in respect of whom a search was made u/s. 132 or requisition of books of accounts were made u/s. 132A of the Act. The language of the provision is clear and unambiguous. The legislature has not imposed any embargo on the assessing officer in respect of the stage of proceedings during which the satisfaction is to be reached and recorded in respect of the person other than the searched person.

Further, section 158BE(2)(b) only provides for the period of limitation for completion of block assessment u/s. 158BD in case of the person other than the searched person as two years from the end of the month in which the notice under this Chapter was served on such other person in respect of search carried on after 01-01-1997. According to the Supreme Court, the said section does neither provides for nor imposes any restrictions or conditions on the period of limitation for preparation of the satisfaction note u/s. 158BD and consequent issuance of notice to the other person.

In the result, the Supreme Court held that for the purpose of section 158BD of the Act a satisfaction note is sine qua non and must be prepared by the assessing officer before he transmits the records to the other assessing officer who has jurisdiction over such other person. The satisfaction note could be prepared at either of the following stages: (a) at the time of or along with the initiation of proceedings against the searched person u/s. 158BC of the Act; (b) along with the assessment proceedings u/s. 158BC of the Act; and (c) immediately after the assessment proceedings are completed u/s. 158BC of the Act of the searched person.

‘Additional Depreciation’ where assets used for less than 180 days

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Issue for Consideration
An assessee, in addition to the claim of the depreciation, is entitled to a claim of depreciation u/s. 32(1)(iia) (‘additional depreciation’), on purchase of new plant and machinery and installation thereof, at the rate of 20% of the actual cost of such plant and machinery that is used by the assessee in his business of manufacture or production of articles or things.

Under the second proviso to section 32(1), the depreciation allowed to an assessee is reduced to 50% of the depreciation otherwise allowable, in cases where the asset is put to use for less than 180 days in a year.

Depreciation remaining to be absorbed is carried forward to the following year and is allowed to be set off against the income of such year in accordance with the provisions of section 32(2) of the Income-tax Act.

An interesting issue has arisen, in the context of the above provisions, specifically for additional depreciation, in cases where the new plant and machinery is used for less than 180 days. The issue is about whether, in the circumstances narrated above, an assessee has the right to set off the balance 50% of additional depreciation in the year subsequent to the year of purchase and installation of new plant and machinery. While the Delhi, Mumbai and Cochin benches of tribunal have held that the balance additional depreciation can be set-off in the subsequent year, the Chennai bench of tribunal has taken a contrary view, leading us to take notice of this controversy.

Cosmo Films Ltd .’s case
The issue first came up for consideration in the case of DCIT vs. Cosmo Films Ltd., 13 ITR(T) 340 (Delhi), involving the disallowance of arrears of additional depreciation of Rs. 3,34,78,825 and negating an alternate claim for deduction of additional depreciation for assessment year 2004-05.

The assessee company had purchased new plant and machinery during the financial year 2002-03 which were eligible for additional depreciation. They were put to use in that year for less than 182 days. The company had claimed additional depreciation at 50% of the total additional depreciation for assessment year 20003-04 and the balance 50% for the assessment year 2004-05. The claim of the company was disallowed by the AO for assessment year 2004-05 and his action was confirmed by the Commissioner(Appeals).

In the appeal to the Tribunal, the assessee reiterated that, as per the provisions of section 32(1)(iia), the assessee was entitled for a further sum of depreciation equal to 15% of the actual cost of new plant and machinery acquired during the year and installed; that the assessee had been granted a statutory right by provisions of section 32(1) (iia) to claim a further sum equal to 15% of the actual cost in the year of acquisition; that it had claimed additional depreciation during the year which pertained to the additions to the fixed assets during the preceding previous year; the said additions were made during the second half of the financial year 2002-03 relevant to Assessment Year 2003-04 and the additional depreciation was claimed only for 50% of the eligible additional depreciation otherwise available on all the additions made after 30th September, 2002 on account of the second proviso to section 32(1) (ii). Hence, the same was being claimed during the assessment year 2004-05 as it was the balance of the additional depreciation.

The company further explained that the expression “shall be allowed” made it clear that the assessee was entitled to claim an overall deduction equivalent to 15 % of the actual cost of the said additions to the plant and machinery. It contended that the second proviso to section 32(1)(ii) restricted the allowance to 50% in cases where the assets were used for less than 180 days based on the period of usage and such a restriction could not have abrogated the statutory right provided to the assessee by section 32 (1)(iia). It claimed that nowhere in the Act it was prohibited that remaining balance of additional depreciation on the assets added after 30th September, should not be allowed and the second proviso to section 32(1)(ii) could not overlook the one time allowance, which was a statutory right earned in the year of acquisition; had there been intention to restrict the one time allowance to 50%, then it could have been provided in the proviso to clause (iia), as provided in respect of the second hand machines and those used in office, etc. or in respect of office appliances or road transport vehicles.

It was pointed out that the scope of the additional depreciation u/s. 32(1)(iia) introduced by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2002 w.e.f. 01-04-2003 was explained by Circular No. 8 of 2002 dated 27-08-2002 reported in 258 ITR (St.) 13 as being ‘a deduction of a further sum’ as depreciation. Therefore what was proposed to be allowed was depreciation simplicitor though it was called as additional depreciation. Therefore, any balance of the amount of additional sum of depreciation was to be considered to be available for being carried forward and set off in terms of s/s. (2) of section 32 of the Act which provided that where, in the assessment of the assessee, full effect could not be given to any allowance u/s/s. (1) of section 32 in any previous year, then the allowance should be added to the amount of allowance for depreciation for the following previous year and deemed to be part of that allowance, or if there was no such allowance for that previous year, then it would be deemed to be the allowance for that previous year, and so on for the succeeding previous year.

The company, relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bajaj Tempo Ltd. vs. CIT 196 ITR 188, claimed that a provision for promoting economic growth had to be interpreted liberally and that additional depreciation, being an incentive provision, had to be construed so as to advance the objective of the provision and not to frustrate it. The additional depreciation as provided in Clause (iia) of s/s. (1) of section 32 was a one time benefit whereas the normal depreciation was a year to year feature.;If the benefit was restricted only to 50% then it would be against the basic intention to provide incentive for encouraging industrialisation, which would be unfair, unequitable and unjust. There was no restriction provided in law which restricted the carry forward of the additional sum of depreciation which was a one time affair available to assessee on the new machinery and plant. It was also pleaded that what was expressly granted as an incentive could not be denied through a pejorative interpretation of second proviso to section 32(1)(ii), when such provision by itself did not bar consideration of the balance u/s. 32(2) of the Income-tax Act. Alternatively, it was pleaded that the provisions of section 32(1)(iia) did not stipulate any condition of put to use. Therefore, full deduction was allowable in the year of purchase itself and had to be allowed in full in the assessment year 2003-04, itself.

In reply, the Revenue submitted that the full additional depreciation could be allowed as per section 32(1) (iia) only when the assets were put to use for more than 180 days in the year of acquisition; that the additional depreciation on the assets which were put to use by the assessee for less than 180 days was restricted to 50% of the amount by the second proviso to section 32(1)(ii); that there could not be any carried forward additional depreciation to be allowed in subsequent year; and that compliance of the condition to put to use, in the year of claim, was necessary for allowing any type of depreciation.
On hearing both the sides the tribunal observed and held as under;

•    Additional depreciation was introduced for promoting investment in industrial sector.

•    The intention was clarified by the Finance Minister, the Memorandum explaining the provisions and the Circular explaining the amendments.

•    The provision contained in section 32(1)(iia) wherever desired had placed restriction on the allowance of additional depreciation.

•    The said provision did not contain any restriction on allowance of the unabsorbed additional depreciation in the subsequent year.

•    The intention was not to deny the benefit to the assesses who had acquired or installed new machinery or plant. The second proviso to section 32(1)(ii) restricted the allowance only to 50% where the assets had been acquired and put to use for a period less than 180 days in the year of acquisition which restriction was only on the basis of period of use. There was no restriction that balance of one time incentive in the form of additional sum of depreciation should not be available in the subsequent year.

•    Section 32(2) provided for a carry forward and set off of unabsorbed depreciation. The additional benefit in the form of additional allowance u/s. 32 (1)(iia) was a one time benefit to encourage industrialisation and in view of the decision in the case of Bajaj Tempo Ltd. (supra), the provisions related to it had to be constructed reasonably, liberally and purposively to make the provision meaningful while granting the additional allowance.

•    The assessee deserved to get the benefit in full when there was no restriction in the statute to deny the benefit of balance of 50% when the new plant and machinery were acquired and used for less than 180 days.

•    One time benefit extended to assessee had been earned in the year of acquisition of new plant and machinery. It has been calculated at 15% but restricted to 50% only on account of period of usage of these plant and machinery in the year of acquisition.

•    The expression “shall be allowed” confirmed that the assessee had earned the benefit as soon as he had purchased the new plant and machinery in full but was restricted to 50% in that particular year on account of period of usage. Such restriction could not divest the statutory right.

•    The extra depreciation allowable u/s. 32(1)(iia) was an extra incentive which had been earned and calculated in the year of acquisition but restricted for that year to 50% on account of usage. The incentive so earned must be made available in the subsequent year.

BRAKES INDIA LTD.’S CASE

The issue had again come up for consideration before the Chennai Tribunal in the case of Brakes India Ltd. DCIT(LTU), 144 ITD 0403.

In this case, the assessee company contested the disallowance of additional depreciation of Rs. 4,91,39,749 by the AO and confirmed by the Commissioner (Appeals), which was the balance of its claim carried forward from the preceding assessment year. The company had claimed additional depreciation for machinery newly added by it during the preceding assessment year 2006-

7.    Since the machinery were used for a period less than 180 days in the preceding assessment year, the assessee had to restrict its claim to 50% of the normal rate of additional depreciation allowed under the Act. However, for the subsequent assessment year 2007-08, the company claimed carry forward of the balance 50% of the additional depreciation. The AO was of the opinion that additional depreciation could be allowed only for new assets added during the year and since the claim of the assessee related to additions to assets made in the preceding assessment year, it could not be allowed. In other words, as per Assessing Officer, residual additional depreciation from earlier year could not be allowed for carry forward to a subsequent year. The Commissioner (Appeals) confirmed the action of the AO following the decision of the tribunal for the preceding assessment year in the company’s own case, wherein the Tribunal had confirmed the disallowance of such a claim.

In appeal before the Tribunal, the company supported its claim on several grounds on the lines of the contentions raised by it before the tribunal for assessment year 2006-07 (copy of unreported decision not available) besides contending that section 32(1 )(iia) was amended with effect from 01-04-2006. and under the amended provision, the only condition for the claim was installation of the asset on which additional depreciation was claimed and that such additional depreciation was statutorily allowable, once assets were installed.

The Tribunal noted and held as under;

•    The first requirement for being eligible for a claim of additional depreciation was that the claim should be for a new machinery or plant. A machinery was new only when it was first put to use. Once it was used, it was no longer a new machinery.

•    Admittedly, the machinery, on which carry forward additional depreciation had been claimed, was already used in the preceding assessment year, though for a period of less than 180 days.

•    Therefore, for the impugned assessment year, it was no more a new machinery or plant. Once it was not a new machinery or plant, allowance u/s. 32(1 ) (iia) could not be allowed to it.

•    Additional depreciation itself was only for a new machinery or plant. Carry forward of any deficit of additional depreciation which, as per the assessee, arose on account of use for a period of less than 180 days in the preceding year, if allowed, would not be an allowance for a new machinery or plant.

•    A look at the second proviso to section 32(1)(iia) clearly showed that it restricted a claim of depreciation to 50% of the amount otherwise allowable, when assets were put to use for a period of less than 180 days, irrespective of whether such claim was for normal depreciation or additional depreciation.

•    The intention of the Legislature was to give such additional depreciation for the year in which assets were put to use and not for any succeeding year.

•    There was nothing in the statute which allowed carry forward of such depreciation. There could not be any presumption that unless it was specifically denied, carry forward had to be allowed. What could be carried forward and set off had been specifically mentioned in the Act.

•    The Tribunal in the assessee’s own case in I.T.A. No. 1069/Mds/2010 dated 6th January, 2012, at para 15, held as under:-

“15. We have considered the rival submissions. A perusal of the provisions of section 32 as applicable for the relevant assessment year clearly shows that additional depreciation is allowable on the plant and machinery only for the year in which the capacity expansion has taken place, which has resulted in the substantial increase in the installed capacity. In the assessee’s case, this took place in the assessment year 2005-06 and the assessee has also claimed the additional depreciation during that year and the same has also been allowed. Each assessment year is separate and independent assessment year. The provisions of section 32 of the Act do not provide for carry forward of the residual additional depreciation, if any. In the circumstances, the finding of the learned CIT(A) on this issue is on a right footing and does not call for any interference. Consequently, ground No.1 of the assessee’s appeal stands dismissed.”

The tribunal upheld the orders of the AO and the Commissioner (Appeals) and held that the Commissioner (Appeals) was justified in following the view taken by co-ordinate Bench of the Tribunal for the preceding assessment year.

OBSERVATIONS

Section 32(1)(iia) was inserted by Finance (No. 2) Act, 2002 with effect from 01-04-2003. The Finance Minister, in his budget speech, stated that the provision for additional depreciation was introduced to provide incentives for fresh investment in industrial sector and that the clause was intended to give impetus to new investment in setting up a new industrial unit or for cases where the installed capacity of existing units is expanded by at least 25%. The section provided, initially, for additional depreciation at the rate of fifteen percent in respect of the new plant and machinery acquired and installed after 31st March, 2002. These provisions were substituted by the Finance (No. 2) Act of 2004 w.e.f. 01-04-2005 and in its present addition provides for additional depreciation at the rate of twenty percent in respect of the new plant and machinery acquired and installed after 31st March, 2005 by an assessee engaged in the business of manufacture or production of any article or thing. The benefit of additional depreciation is not allowed in respect of the second hand assets, assets installed in office or residence or guest-house, ship, aircraft, vehicles, etc.

The view that an assessee is entitled to claim the deduction for the balance additional depreciation in the succeeding year has been upheld by the Cochin Tribunal in the case of Apollo Tyres Ltd., 45 taxmann.com 337, the Mumbai Tribunal in the case of MITC Rolling Mills (P) Ltd., ITA No. 2789/M/2012 dated 13.05.2013 and again by the Delhi Tribunal in the case of SIL Investments, 54 SOT 54. The Chennai bench of the Tribunal however held that the claim for additional depreciation was not allowable every year but only in the year of the installation of the new asset, CRI Pumps, 58 SOT 154. It is therefore clear that but for the lone decision of the Chennai bench in Brakes India Ltd’s case, the overwhelming view is in favour of the allowance of the balance depreciation in the subsequent years.

The original provision for grant of additional depreciation, operating during the period 01-04-2003 to 31-03-2005, contained a very specific provision in the form of first Proviso, to allow a deduction in a previous year in which the new industrial undertaking began to manufacture or produce any article or thing. A specific reference was therefore made to the previous year in which the deduction was allowed. Significantly, under the new provision, no such restriction based on the year is retained, and this again confirms that the new provision effective from A.Y 2006-07, has no limitation concerning the year or years of claim.

The controversy boils down to insignificance when the Revenue realises that the assessee in no case, over a period of life of the asset, can claim a deduction on account of the depreciation as well as the additional depreciation higher than the actual cost of the asset. It perhaps needs to appreciate that there is no loss of revenue at all over a period of time, confirming the fact that the attempts of the Revenue are misdirected when it is contesting the claim of the assessee for the allowance of the balance additional depreciation.

It is true that Clause (iia) of section 32(1) does not contain any restriction or prohibition for claiming the balance additional depreciation in the subsequent year. At the same time, it is also true that the said clause does not expressly provide for such a claim. There neither is an enabling provision nor a disabling provision. In the circumstances a view favourable to the assessee is preferable, more so when the proviso to the said Clause lists several exclusions, and none of them limit the right of an assessee to claim additional deprecation in full nor deny the right of carry forward of the balance amount.

The provision admittedly has been directed towards encouraging industrialisation by allowing additional benefit for acquisition and installation of new plant and machinery. The incentive is aimed to boost new investments in preferred direction. A construction which frustrates the basic purpose of the provision should be avoided in preference of a pragmatic view.

The Finance Minister in his budget speech and the Finance Bill in the Memorandum and the CBDT in its Circular have amplified that the grant of additional depreciation is for incentivising the promotion of capital goods industry. In the circumstances, it is in the fitness of the scheme that the Revenue Department rises to supplement the intentions of the legislature, instead of frustrating the same. It is a settled position in law that an incentive provision should be liberally construed in favour of grant of the deduction. (see Bajaj Tempo Ltd., 196 ITR 188 (SC)). Even otherwise, an interpretation favourable to the assessee should be adopted in cases where two views are possible, Vegetable Products Ltd. 88 ITR 192 (SC), and for the case under consideration, surely two views are possible, as is confirmed by the conflicting decisions of the tribunal on the subject.

In our opinion, the issue under consideration has moved in a narrow compass and in the process, the larger controversy has remained to be addressed, which is, whether there ever was a need to restrict the claim of additional deprecation to 50%, of the eligible amount under the second proviso, in cases where the new asset in question was used for less than 180 days. Had this aspect been addressed by the concerned parties, the understanding of the issue on hand would have been more clear.

Our understanding of the larger issue is as under:

•    The claim for regular depreciation is made possible vide clauses (i) and (ii) of s/s. (1) of section 32 of the Act.
•    The quantum of regular depreciation, so allowed, has been circumscribed to 50% of the deprecation, otherwise allowable, by virtue of the second proviso to the said provision contained in clauses (i) and (ii) of s/s. (1) of section 32 of the Act.

•    The claim for additional depreciation is allowed under a separate Clause namely, Clause (iia) of section 32(1) of the Act, which Clause is otherwise independent of clauses (i) and (ii) above, though it does refer to clause (iia), and therefore, the claim for additional depreciation is independent of the said restrictive second proviso that has application only to the regular depreciation claim made under the said Clauses (i) and (ii).

•    The limitation contained in the said second proviso to Clauses (i) and (ii) should have no application to clause (iia) while claiming additional depreciation.

•    Clause(iia) operates in an altogether different field than that of Clauses (i) and (ii).

•    The claim for additional deprecation therefore shall be allowed in full in the first year itself, irrespective of the number of days of use and should be set off against the income of the year and importantly, to the extent not so set-off, should be carried forward to the subsequent year for being set off against the income for the succeeding year as per the provisions of s/s. (2) of section 32 of the Act.

In our respectful opinion, the additional depreciation is investment based, while the regular depreciation is period based and both are unrelated to each other. For a valid claim of additional depreciation, it is sufficient to establish that new assets are acquired and installed, and once that is proved, the claim has not to be restricted on account of use of such asset for a period of less than 180 days. The additional depreciation, in full, should be allowed, where possible, in the first year itself, and the balance, where remaining to be absorbed, should be carried forward to the succeeding year and should be allowed to be set off against the income of that year.

Interest expenditure: Section 57(iii): Money borrowed for investing in shares in company owning immovable property: Dividend not received: Interest not disallowable on ground that investment was not made for purpose of earning dividend:

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Sri Saytasai Properties and Investment P. Ltd. vs. CIT; 361 ITR 641 (Cal):

The assessee borrowed money for investment in shares of a company P owning an immovable property the value of which was much higher than the book value. The assessee had not received dividend. The assessee’s claim for deduction of interest on borrowed funds u/s. 57(iii) of the Income-tax Act, was disallowed by the Assessing Officer on the ground that the investment could not be said to have been made for earning dividend. The Tribunal upheld the disallowance.

On appeal by the assessee, the Calcutta High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) Even though the language of section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, is a little wider than that of section 57(iii), that cannot make any difference in the true interpretation of section 57(iii). The language of section 57(iii) is clear and unambiguous and it has to be construed according to its plain natural meaning and merely because a slightly wider phraseology is employed in another section which may take in something more, it does not mean that section 57(iii) should be given a narrow and constricted meaning not warranted by the language of the section and, in fact, contrary to such language.

ii) There was no reason why a proper expenditure should have been disallowed only because the investment was not made for the purpose of earning dividend. There is no finding that the investment was made otherwise than for the purpose of making an income. The Tribunal and the Assessing Officer were wrong in disallowing the expenditure.”

levitra

Housing project: Deduction u/s. 80-IB(10): A. Y. 2007-08: Amendment w.e.f. 01/04/2005 requiring certificate of completion of project within four years of approval: Not applicable to projects approved prior to that date: Assessee entitled to deduction:

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CIT vs. CHD Developers Ltd.; 362 ITR 177 (Del):

The assessee, a real estate developer obtained approval for a housing project on 16-03-2005 from the Development Authority. It completed the project in 2008 and by a letter dated 05-11-2008 applied to the Competent Authority for the issue of the completion certificate. The assessee’s claim for deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) was denied inter alia, on the ground that the completion certificate was not obtained within the period of four years as prescribed by the Finance Act, 2004 w.e.f. 01-04-2005. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim for deduction accepting the assessee’s claim that, since the approval was granted to the assessee 16-03-2005 i.e., prior to 01-04-2005, the assessee was not expected to fulfill the conditions which were not on the statute when such approval was granted to the assessee.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The approval for the project was given by the Development Authority on 16-03-2005. Clearly, the approval related to the period prior to the amendment, which insisted on the issuance of the completion certificate by the end of the four year period, was brought into force. The application of such stringent conditions, which are left to an independent body such as the local authority who is to issue the completion certificate, would have led to not only hardship but absurdity.

ii) As a consequence, the Tribunal was not, therefore, in error of law while holding in favour of the assessee.”

levitra

CBDT Circular: Binding on Revenue: S/s. 119 and 143(2): A. Y. 2004-05: Circular prescribing time limit of three months from date of filing of return for issuing notice u/s. 143(2): Return filed on 29-10-2004: Notice u/s. 143(2) issued on 14-07-2005: Not valid

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Amal Kumar Ghosh vs. ACIT; 361 ITR 458 (Cal):

For the A. Y. 2004-05, the assessee had filed return of income on 29-10-2004. The Assessing Officer issued the notice u/s. 143(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on 14-07-2005. The assessee claimed that the notice u/s. 143(2) was not valid since it has been issued beyond the period of three months of date of filing of the return as prescribed by the CBDT Circulars Nos. 9 and 10. The Tribunal rejected the assessee’s contention and dismissed the appeal filed by the assessee. The Tribunal accepted the contention of the Revenue that the Assessing Officer was competent to issue notice u/s. 143(2) after the expiry of period of three months from the date of filing of the return.

In the appeal by the asessee before the High Court, the Revenue contended that such a notice u/s. 143(2) could have been issued within 12 months from the date of filing of the return and, therefore, the notice was well within time. The Calcutta High Court allowed the assessee’s appeal, reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) Even assuming that the intention of the CBDT was to restrict the time for selection of the cases for scrutiny to a period of three months, it could not be said that the selection in the case of the assessee was made within the period. The return was filed on 29-10-2004, and the case was selected for scrutiny on 06-07-2005. By any process of reasoning, it was not open to the Tribunal to come to the finding that the Department acted within the four corners of Circular No.s 9 and 10 issued by the CBDT. The Circulars were evidently violated. The Circulars were binding upon the Department u/s. 119.

 ii) Even assuming that the circulars were not meant for the purpose of permitting unscrupulous assessees from evading tax, it could not be said that the Department, which is the State, can be permitted to selectively apply the standards set by itself for its own conduct. When the Department has set down a standard for itself, the Department is bound by that standard and cannot act with discrimination. If it does that, the act of the Department is bound to be struck down under Article 14 of the Constitution. In the facts of the case, it was not necessary to decide whether the intention of the CBDT was to restrict the period of issuance of the notice from the date of filing of the return laid down u/s. 143(2).

 iii) Thus, the notice u/s. 143(2) was not in legal exercise of jurisdiction.”

levitra

Charitable trust: Exemption u/s. 11 : A. Y. 2009-10: Where assessee-trust, failing to use 85 % of income from property, wrote letter conveying department for option available under Clause (2) of Explanation to section 11(1) to allow it to spend surplus amount to next year, no disallowance was to be made merely on ground that declaration was not made in a prescribed manner:

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CIT vs. Industrial Extension Bureau; [2014] 43 taxmann. com 392 (Guj)

The assessee, a registered public charitable trust, being unable to utilise income from property to extent of 85 % wrote a letter conveying department to exercise option available under Clause (2) of Explanation to section 11(1) for allowing accumulation of income. The Assessing Officer added to the income of assessee on ground that for claiming exemption the assessee had to give declaration in the prescribed form which was not done by the assessee. While exercising option a mistake was committed by the assessee, as the amount was wrongly mentioned to a lower figure, but later on the same was rectified. On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) allowed only that part which was declared by the assessee in original letter before due date and disallowed remaining revised amount by observing that the revision option was not exercised within due date. On cross appeals, the Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim and deleted entire amount on ground that the mistake was bona fide and the requirement of exercising option within prescribed time was only directory in nature.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) U/s. 11, a charitable trust unable to utilise its income derived from property held under trust wholly for charitable or religious purposes to the extent of 85 % would have an option either in terms of clause (2) of Explanation to s/s. (1) thereof, or as provided u/s/s. (2). When such an option is covered u/s/s. (2) i.e., the income is sought to be accumulated or set apart for the period prescribed, that the requirement of making a declaration in the prescribed manner arises. In case of an option under Clause (2) of Explanation to s/s. (1), there is no such requirement of making declaration but the requirement is exercising of such option in writing before the expiry of the time allowed u/s/s. (1) of section 139 for furnishing the return of income.

 ii) In the present case, the assessee did exercise such option as is apparent from the letter dated 22-09-2009. In such letter, the assessee conveyed to the department that the assessee gave a notice of option exercised by the trust to allow to spend surplus amount of Rs. 59,17,600 that may remain at the end of the previous year ended on 31-03-2009, during the immediately following the previous year, i.e., 2009-10. In the caption, the assessee referred to as the subject-notice of option exercised as required under Clause (2) of Explanation to section 11(1). These things are thus abundantly clear – firstly, that such option was exercised before last date of filing the return, which was 30-09-2009 and secondly, that such option was exercised in terms of clause (2) of Explanation to section 11(1). That was clearly not an option u/s/s. (2) of section 11. The caption of the said communication dated 22-09–00- as well as the contents of the letter make this clear. If that be so, the assessee cannot be precluded from pursuing such option on the ground as was done by the Assessing Officer that no declaration in the prescribed form was made. As we have noticed that such declaration was required only if the assessee’s option was to be covered by the provision of section 11(2).

 iii) It is true that in such option exercised on 22/09/2009, the assessee indicated a smaller figure of Rs. 57,17,600 and it was only later that the same was corrected to Rs. 1,05,67,047. However, the Tribunal has taken note of facts on record namely that the option in fact was exercised within the time permitted under the statute. It was a bona fide error to indicate a wrong figure. The intention to avail carry over of the un-spend income to the next year was clear.

iv) The requirement of exercising an option within the time permitted under Clause (2) of Explanation to section 11(1) is directory and not mandatory. Substantial compliance thereof would therefore be sufficient.

v) Even otherwise, without going to the extent of holding such time limit as directory and not mandatory, in the facts of the present case, the Tribunal committed no error in granting the benefit to the assessee for the entire amount since it was a mere oversight or bona fide error in not indicating the correct and full amount for the option under clause (2) of Explanation to section 11(1).”

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Business expenditure: Disallowance: TDS: Commission/trade discount: S/s. 40(a)(ia) and 194H: A. Y. 2005-06: Assessee in business of manufacture and trade of pharmaceutical products: Incentive to dealers, distributors, stockists under different schemes: Not commission: Section 194H not applicable: Disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) not proper:

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CIT vs. Intervet India Pvt. Ltd. (Bom); ITA No. 1616 of 2011 dated 01/04/2014:

The assessee was engaged in the business of manufacture and trading of pharmaceutical products. The assessee gave incentives to its distributors/dealers/ stockists under different schemes. In the relevant year, i.e. A. Y. 2005-06, the incentive so given of Rs. 70,67,089/- was disallowed by the Assessing Officer u/s. 40(a)(ia) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, treating the same as commission, on the ground that the assessee has not deducted tax at source u/s. 194H of the Act. CIT(A) and the Tribunal deleted the addition holding that the payment was not commission and the provisions of sections 194H and 40(a)(ia) were not applicable.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The assessee had undertaken sales promotion scheme viz., product discount scheme and product campaign under which the assessee had offered an incentive on case to case basis to its stockists/ dealers/agents. An amount of Rs. 70,67,089/- was claimed as deduction towards expenditure incurred under the said sales promotional scheme. The relationship between the assessee and the distributors/ stockists was that of principle to principle and in fact the distributors were the customers of the assessee to whom the sales were effected either directly or through the consignment agent. As the distributors/ stockists were the persons to whom the product was sold, no services were offered to the assessee and what was offered to the distributor was a discount under the product distribution scheme or product campaign scheme to buy the assessee’s products.

ii) The distributors/stockists were not acting on behalf of the assessee and that most of the credit was by way of goods on meeting the sales target, and hence, it could not be said to be a commission payment within the meaning of Explanation (i) to section 194H of the Act. The contention of the Revenue in regard to the application of Explanation (i) below section 194H being applicable to all categories of sales expenditure cannot be accepted. Such reading of Explanation (i) below section 194H would amount to reading the said provision in abstract. The application of the provision is required to be considered to the relevant facts of every case.

iii) We are satisfied that in the facts of the present case that as regards sales promotional expenditure in question, the provisions of Explanation (i) below section 194H of the Act are rightly held to be not applicable as the benefit which is availed by the dealers/ stockists of the assessee is appropriately held to be not a payment of any commission in the concurrent findings as recorded by the CIT(A) and the Tribunal.

iv) We do not find that the appeal gives rise to any substantial question of law. It is accordingly dismissed.”

II. REPORTED:

1. Business Expenditure: Disallowance: Ss. 40(a)(ia), 40A(3) and 194C(2): A. Ys. 2005-06 and 2009-10: ONGC acquiring lands from farmers and others: Land losers forming society for enabling to survive by way of alternate means of plying vehicles on rent to the ONGC: Society receiving amounts from ONGC and distributing to farmers/members: Payments not expended by society and would not come within the meaning of expenditure either u/s. 40(a)(ia) or section 40A(3): No disallowance can be made: ITO vs. Ankleshwar Taluka ONGC and Land Loser Travellers Co-operative Society; A. Y. 2005-06; 362 ITR 87 (Guj): CIT vs. Ankleshwar Taluka ONGC and Land Loser Travellers Co-operative Society; A. Y. 2009-10; 362 ITR 92 (Guj):

ONGC acquired lands in a particular area from farmers and other persons. Land losers formed the assessee society to enable them to earn a source of livelihood by means of plying vehicles on rent to ONGC. The assessee society received the amounts from ONGC on behalf of the members and distributed the same amongst the members. ONGC deducted the tax at source on such payment to the assessee society.

A. Y. 2005-06:

 In the A. Y. 2005-06, the assessee society received Rs. 2,57,62,253 and distributed the same to the members. The Assessing Officer was of the view that the society was a sub-contractor and that it ought to have deducted tax at source on payments made to each of the farmers u/s. 194C(2) and disallowed the whole of the amount of Rs. 2,57,62,253/- u/s. 40(a)(ia) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. He made a further addition of Rs. 51,47,250/- being 20% of the said amount by way of disallowance u/s. 40A(3) on the ground that the said amount was paid to the members in cash. The Commissioner (Appeals) deleted the addition. He held that there was no element of works contract in terms of the provisions of section 194C in the activities performed by the society and, accordingly, set aside the disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia). He also held that there was no case for disallowance u/s. 40A(3) as no expenditure was incurred by the society in distributing the rentals to the members. The Tribunal concurred with the findings of the Commissioner (Appeals) and dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue.

In appeal before the High Court, the Revenue raised the question of disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) but did not raise the question of disallowance u/s. 40A(3) of the Act. The Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) In the light of the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Tribunal upon appreciation of evidence on record, the reasoning adopted by the Tribunal was just and reasonable.

 ii) Thus, it was not possible to state that there was any infirmity in the order of the Tribunal so as to give rise to any question of law, much less, a substantial question of law so as to warrant interference.” A. Y. 2009-10: In this year, the assessee society had received an amount of Rs. 3.79 crore from ONGC and the same was distributed by the assessee society to its members. The Assessing Officer made an addition of 20% of the said amount by way of disallowance u/s. 40A(3) of the Act, on the ground that the assessee had paid these amounts to its members in cash. The Tribunal deleted the addition.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“The view of the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal that the payments were not expended by the assessee and that, therefore, would not come within the meaning of expenditure (be it based on section 40(a)(ia) or section 40A(3) of the Act) was to be confirmed.”

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Income from property held for charitable or religious purposes – A charitable and religious trust which does not benefit any specific religious community would not be covered by section 13(1)(b) of the Act and would be eligible to claim exemption u/s. 11 of the Act.

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The respondent, a registered Public Trust under the M. P. Public Trusts Act, 1951, filed an application for registration before the Commissioner of Income Tax (for short, “the Commissioner”) as envisaged u/s. 12A read with section 12AA of the Act for availing the exemption u/s. 11 of the Act. The Commissioner, after affording an opportunity of hearing to the applicant, came to the conclusion that the respondent was a charitable trust but since the object and purpose of the trust was confined only to a particular religious community the same would attract the provisions of section 13(1)(b) of the Act and therefore, declined the prayer made for registration of the trust by his order dated 14-09-2007.

Aggrieved by the order so passed, the respondent carried the matter by way of an appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal after going through the objects of the respondent-trust came to the conclusion that the respondent was a public religious trust as the objects of the trust were wholly religious in nature and thus, the provisions of section 13(1)(b) which are otherwise applicable, in the case of the charitable trust would not be applicable and therefore, held that the respondent-trust was entitled to claim registration u/se. 12A and 12AA and accordingly, allowed the appeal and set aside the order passed by the Commissioner and further directed the Commissioner of Income-tax to grant registration u/s. 12A read with section 12AA of the Act to all the applicant-trust.

Aggrieved by the aforesaid decision passed by the Tribunal, the Revenue approached the High Court u/s. 260-A of the Act. The court primarily, was of the view that the decision of the Tribunal was rendered purely on the factual matrix of the case and therefore, it would be improper to disturb the finding of fact so arrived by the Tribunal. Secondly, the court observed that the provisions of section 13(1)(b) would not be applicable to the respondent-trust as the trust was not created or established for the benefit of any particular religious community or caste. Consequently, the court has dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue by judgment and order dated 22-06-2009.

Disturbed by the aforesaid ruling, the Revenue approached the Supreme Court.

According to the Supreme Court, the determination of the nature of trust as wholly religious or wholly charitable or both charitable and religious under the Act was not a question of fact. It was a question which required examination of legal effects of the proven facts and documents, that is, the legal implication of the objects of the respondent-trust as contained in the trust deed. It is only the objects of a trust as declared in the trust deed which would govern its right of exemption u/s. 11 or 12. It is the analysis of these objects in the backdrop of fiscal jurisprudence which would illuminate the purpose behind the creation or establishment of the trust for either religious or charitable or both religious and charitable purpose. The Supreme Court therefore held that the High Court had erred in refusing to interfere with the observations of the Tribunal in respect of the character of the trust.

Having said so, the Supreme Court proceeded to examine the question, whether the Courts below were justified in coming to the conclusion that the respondent-trust was a public religious trust and therefore, outside the purview of section 13(1) (b) and eligible for exemption u/s. 11 of the Act.

The Supreme Court noted that the Tribunal had analysed the objects of the trust in the light of the holy scriptures and the Quran and recorded its satisfaction as follows: “16… The objects of the assessee-trust reproduced above clearly refer to the religion and are supported by reference made to different pages of Holy Quran. The learned Counsel for the assessee referred to the true copies of several pages of Holy Quran written by two of the authors referred to above in which giving of food in days of hunger or orphan is considered as highly religious ceremony. Reference is also made that who will give to the people or poor then Allah will give them in return and, i.e., who will give loan then Allah will give double to them. Likewise, for helping the needy people for religious activities and to carry out religious activities or spend for good, spending wealth in the way of Allah, bestowing mercy, teaching were considered to be highly religious activities. On going through several true pages of Holy Quran written by the authors referred to above, we are satisfied that the learned Counsel for the assessee was justified in contending that all the objects of the assesee-trust are solely religious in nature because each of them refers to religious occasions, religious education or to religious activities. The learned Counsel for the assessee also explained that the words ‘Shariat-e- Mohammadiyah’ means the path shown by prophet Mohammed. Therefore, the objects of Shariat-e- Mohammadiyah are identical with those of ‘Dawate- Hadiyah’. For Dawoodi Bohras, true path shown by the prophet is the one indicated and shown by their living guide Dai-al-Mutlaq of the time who is the living and visible guide for Dawoodi Bohras. It is an undisputed fact that for the people believing in Islam, writings in Quran are words of Allah for them. The directions given in the Holy Quran are considered by the people of Islamic faith as orders from Allah and the people of Islamic faith obey such orders as holy and religious. The learned Counsel for the assessee has been able to demonstrate that all the objects of the assessee-trust, as noted above, came out from the writings in Quran and as such these are the orders for them while observing Islamic faith.”

The Supreme Court observed that unquestionably, objects (c) and (f) which provide for the activities completely religious in nature and restricted to the specific community of the respondent-trust are objects with religious purpose only. However, in respect to the other objects, in our view the fact that the said objects trace their source to the Holy Quran and resolve to abide by the path of godliness shown by Allah would not be sufficient to conclude that the entire purpose and activities of the trust would be purely religious in colour. The objects reflects the intent of the trust as observance of the tenets of Islam, but do not restrict the activities of the trust to religious obligations only and for the benefit of the members of the community. The Privy Council in Re The Tribune, 7 ITR 415 has held that in judging whether a certain purpose is of public benefit or not, the Courts must in general apply the standards of customary law and common opinion amongst the community to which the parties interested belong to. Therefore, it is pertinent to analyse whether the customary law would restrict the charitable disposition of the intended activities in the objects.
The provision of food to the public on religious days of the community as per object (a) and (b), the establishment of Madrasa and organisations for dissemination  of  religious  education  under object
(d) and rendering assistance to the needy and poor for religious activities under object (e) would reflect the essence of charity. The objects (a) and
(b)    provide for arrangement for nyaz and majlis (lunch and dinner) on the religious occasion  of  the birth anniversary and Urs Mubarak of Awliya-e- Quiram (SA) and the Saints of the Dawoodji Bohra community and for arrangement of lunch and din- ner on religious occasions and auspicious days of the Dawoodi Bohra community, respectively. Nyaz refers to the food a person makes and offers to others on any particular occasion on the occasion of the death of a saint and Majhlis implies a place  of gathering or meeting. The activity of providing for food on certain specific occasions and other religious and auspicious events of the Dawoodi Bohra community do not restrict the benefit  to  the members of the community. Neither the religious tenets nor the objects as expressed limit  the service of food on the said occasions only to the members of the specific community. Thus, the activity of Nyaz performed by the respondent-trust does not delineate a separate class but  extends the benefit of free service  of  food  to  the  public at large irrespective of their religious, caste or sect and thereby qualifies as a charitable purpose which would entail general public utility.

Further, the establishment of the Madrasa or institutions to impart religious education to the masses would qualify as a charitable purpose qualifying under the head of education under the provisions of  section  2(15)  of  the  Act.  The  institutions  established  to  spread  religious  awareness  by  means of  education  though  established  to  promote  and further religious thought could not be restricted to religious  purposes.  The  House  of  Lords  in  Barralet vs.  IR,  54  TC  446,  has  observed  that  “the  study and  dissemination  of  ethical  principles  and  the cultivation  of  rational  religious  sentiment”  would fall  in  the  category  of  educational  purposes.  The Madrasa  as  a  Mohommedan  institution  of  teaching  does  not  confine  instruction  to  only  dissipation  of  religious  teachings  but  also  contributes  to the  holistic  education  of  an  individual.  Therefore, it  cannot  be  said  the  object  (d)  would  embody a  restrictive  purpose  of  religious  activities  only. Similarly, assistance by the respondent-trust to the needy  and  poor  for  religious  activities  would  not divest  the  trust  of  its  altruistic  character.

Therefore, the objects of  the  trust,  according to the Supreme Court, exhibited dual tenor of religious and charitable purposes and activities. Section 11 of the Act shelters such trust with composite objects to claim  exemption  from  tax  as a religious and charitable trust subject to pro- visions of section 13. The activities of the trust under such object would therefore be entitled to exemption accordingly.

According to the Supreme Court, the second issue which arose for its consideration and decision was, whether the respondent-trust was a charitable and religious trust only for the purposes of a particular community and therefore, not eligible for exemption u/s. 11 of the Act in view of provisions of section 13(1)(b) of the Act.

The Supreme Court held that in the present case, the objects of the respondent-trust  were  based  on religious tenets under the Quran according to the religious faith of Islam. As already  noticed,  the perusal of the objects and purposes of the respondent-trust clearly demonstrated that the activities of the trust though both charitable and religious were not exclusively meant for a particular religious community. The objects, as explained in the preceding paragraphs, did not channel the benefits to any community if not the Dawoodi Bohra Community and thus, would not fall under the provisions of section 13(1)(b) of the Act.

In that view of the matter, the Supreme Court  held that the respondent-trust was a charitable and religious trust which did not benefit any specific religious community and therefore, it  could  not  be held that section 13(1)(b) of the Act would be attracted to the respondent-trust and thereby, it would be eligible to claim  exemption  u/s.  11  of  the Act.

Year of Taxability of Interest on Refund of Tax

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Synopsis

Section 244A of the Income Tax Act,
entitles an assessee to receive interest on amount of refund of tax due
to him. For an assessee, following the mercantile system of accounting,
the issue arises on the year of accrual of such interest and taxability
thereon.

 The issue being whether such interest is accrued in each year
and hence to be taxed by spreading it over the number of years for which
it is granted or should it be taxed in the year in which it is granted.
This issue had been a subject matter of adjudication before various
courts. Here, the author has analysed various judicial pronouncements in
this regard.

Issue for Consideration:

An assessee is entitled to
receive simple interest, on the amount of refund of tax that becomes due
to him, at the specified rate, for the period commencing from the date
of payment of tax to the date on which the refund is granted, as per the
provisions of section 244A of the Income-tax Act.

Such interest is
usually chargeable to tax under the head “Income From Other Sources” and
is computed in accordance with the method of accounting regularly
employed by the assessee. This interest is taxed in the year of receipt,
in case of an assessee following the cash system of accounting, and in
case of an assessee following the mercantile system of accounting, is
taxed in the year of the accrual of such interest.

The period for which
such interest is granted usually exceeds 12 months. The quantum of
interest also varies in many cases on passing of orders from time to
time, subsequent to the intimation or the first order, ranging from
assessment orders to appellate orders. Again, in many cases, the
assessees are forced to pay taxes towards demands raised in pursuance of
orders that finally do not stand the scrutiny of the appellate
authorities. In all these cases, barring a few cases, the assessee
receives interest only on the final settlement of the disputes
concerning computation of the total income by the highest appellate
authority.

The issue that arises, for consideration, in all such cases
of receipt of interest, is about the year or years of taxation of such
interest, for the period exceeding 12 months, in the hands of the
assessees following the mercantile system of accounting. The issue in a
nutshell is about ascertaining the year of accrual of such interest.
Does such interest, under the mercantile system, accrue from year to
year from the date of payment of tax till the date of the receipt of
such interest or does it accrue only when the refund is ordered by an
authority and interest thereon is granted to the assessee? In the first
case, the interest so received is taxable in more than 1 year, on the
understanding that the interest accrues on a daily basis and is taxable
in more than 1 assessment year while in the later case, it is taxed only
in the year of the passing of an order grating interest.

 The courts
have been asked to adjudicate as to whether such interest accrued form
year to year and is therefore to be taxed by spreading it over the
number of years for which it is granted or should it be taxed in the
year in which it is granted. Recently, the Andhra Pradesh High Court has
held that such interest accrued from year to year and for taxation, it
should be spread over the number of years for which interest is granted
dissenting from the decisions of the Kerala, Orissa and Allahabad High
Court.

Smt. K. Devayani Amma’s case

The issue of years of accrual of
interest on refund, granted u/s. 244, was examined by the Kerala High
Court in the case of Smt. K. Devayani Amma vs. DCIT, 328 ITR 10. In that
case, the Court was asked, by the assessee, to decide whether the
Tribunal was justified in holding that interest received by the assessee
on refund was assessable in the assessment year in which such interest
was granted. In that case, the Assessing Officer granted an amount of
interest of Rs. 2,87,537, u/s. 244, on refund of tax computed in
pursuance of the order passed to give effect to an appellate order for
A.Y. 1983-84, that was decided in favour of the assessee. The order of
refund was passed in the previous year relevant to A.Y. 1994-95 and the
refund together with interest was also received in the said year. The
Assessing Officer taxed the entire interest of Rs. 2,87,537 in the A.Y.
1994-95, by treating such interest as the income of A.Y. 1994-95, on the
ground that interest had accrued during that year.

The assessee
however, contested the liability for tax on the entire interest in one
assessment year on the ground that the interest in question accrued from
year to year, from the date of payment of excess tax till the date of
refund. The contention of the assessee was upheld by the CIT(A), but the
Tribunal agreed with the Assessing Officer by holding that the said
interest accrued in A.Y. 1994-95, only, following the decisions in the
case of CIT vs. Sri Popsingh Rice Mill, 212 ITR 385 (Orissa) and J.K.
Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. vs. Addl. CIT, 104 ITR 695 (All.). The
assessee, in the appeal before the High Court, contended that interest
income was assessable on a year to year basis, spread over the period
commencing from the year in which the tax was paid and ending with the
year in which it was refunded together with interest thereon, by relying
on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Rama Bai vs. CIT,
181 ITR 400.

In reply, the standing counsel for the Income-tax
Department submitted that the interest income accrued only on passing of
the order for granting refund. He also submitted that the decision in
Rama Bai’s case (supra) was delivered in respect of an interest received
under the Land Acquisition Act and was not relevant for determining the
year of taxation of interest received under the Income-tax Act. He also
pointed out that the decision in the case of Sri Popsingh Rice Mill
(supra), delivered by the Orissa High Court, had followed the subsequent
decision of the Supreme Court in preference to its decision in Rama
Bai’s case to hold that the interest was taxable in the year of grant
thereon.

The Kerala High Court noted that the decision in Rama Bai’s
case(supra) concerned itself with taxation of interest under the Land
Acquisition Act and was not binding for deciding an issue of taxation of
interest, granted under the Income-tax Act and that the issue therefore
was required to be considered in light of the statutory provisionsof
the Income-tax Act. The court also observed that the law declared by the
Supreme Court was neutralised by the amendments in section 145A(b) and
section 56(viii) by the Finance (no.2) Act, 2009 concerning the year of
taxation of interest received on compensation or enhanced compensation
for compulsory acquisition .

The Kerala High Court found that the
assessee’s eligibility for interest arose only when the effect was given
to the appellate order and till such time the assessee was not entitled
to any refund at all; that the right to interest on refund arose only
when the refund was ordered in favour of the assessee. Accordingly, in
view of the Court, interest accrued only when the assessee was found to
be eligible for refund of the excess tax, based on the revision of the
assessment order. The Court took notice of the fact that not only the
interest was granted during A.Y. 1994-95, but was also paid during the
said assessment year. The assessee’s appeal was dismissed and the order
of the Tribunal was confirmed by the Court by holding that interest on
refund of tax accrued in the year of passing the order granting refund .

M. Jaffersaheb (Decd.)’s case
The  issue  once  again  arose  recently,   before  the Andhra  Pradesh  High  Court,  in  the  case  of  Shri  M. Jaffer  Saheb  (Decd.)  vs.  CIT,  43  taxmann.com,123. The facts in this case were that for the assessment year 1982-1983, an assessment was completed with substantial additions resulting into a huge demand for  payment  of  taxes.  The  assessee  paid  the  de- manded  tax  and  thereafter  availed  the  appellate remedies and in that process the appellate tribunal finally passed an order granting substantial relief to the assessee on 16-06-1989. The AO gave effect to the  order  of  the  Tribunal  by  an  order  dated  18-09- 1989, refunding the excess amount paid along with interest of Rs. 79,950/- for the period 30-10-1985 to 31-08-1989  which  was  received  thereafter.  The  AO brought  to  the  tax  the  amount  of  interest  in  the assessment year 1990-1991, ignoring the claim of the assessee  to  spread  over  the  said  amount  for  the assessment  years  starting  with  assessment  orders 1985-1986 to 1988-1989. The Appellate Commissioner allowed the claim of the assessee and directed that the  interest,  other  than  the  part  pertaining  to  the assessment year 1990-91, be taxed in the preceding previous years. The Tribunal, on further appeal by the Revenue, reversed the order of the Appellate Commissioner and restored the assessment order passed by the A.O.

At the instance of the assessee, the following two questions of law for the assessment year 1990-1991 were referred to the Andhra Pradesh High Court :

1)    “Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, is the Appellate Tribunal correct in law in holding that interest U/S.244(1A) of the Income-tax Act on the refund due accrues on the date when the Appellate Tribunal passed order and did not accrue on any day anterior to the date of the Tribunal order?”

2)    “Whether on the facts and in the circumstances  of the case, the Appellate Tribunal is correct in law;  in refusing to accept the contention of the applicant that interest on the refund accrued from the previous year relevant to the assessment year 1982-1983 and interest is chargeable to tax in the respective years for which interest is paid?”

The   assessee  submitted  before  the  High  Court that  he  was  entitled  to  the  refund  from  the  date of  payment  of  the  tax  till  the  date  of  granting  of the  refund  and  that  such  interest  accrued  on  day to  day  basis  on  the  excess  amount  paid.  He  submitted  that  the  entitlement  of  the  interest  was  a right conferred by the statute that did not depend on  the  order  for  the  refund  being  made  which was  only  consequential  and  in  law  was  required to  be  made  more  in  the  nature  of  complying  with the  procedural  requirement,  but  his  right  to  claim interest was a statutory right conferred by the Act and  in  that  view  of  the  matter,  it  was  but  fair  to spread the interest amount in the respective years in issue. He relied on the judgment of the Calcutta High Court in the case of   CIT vs. Hindustan Motors Ltd.,   202  ITR   839     for  the  proposition  that  “Accrual  of  interest  takes  place  normally  on  day  to  day basis. Where there is no due date fixed for payment of  interest,  interest  accrues  on  the  last  day  of  the previous  year.  Accrual  of  interest  does  not  depend upon making up of the accounts.” He also relied on the  judgment  of  the  Kerala  High Court  in  the  case of  Peter  John  vs.  CIT,  157  ITR   711  (Ker)(FB)  for  the proposition  that  “Interest  is  separate  from  refund. Interest whether statutory or contractual represents profit  the  creditor  might  have  made  if  he  had  used that money or loss he suffered because he had not that use. It is something in addition to the refund (capital amount) though it arises out of it.” He also relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court  in the case of Ramabai vs. CIT, 181 ITR 401 (SC).

On  the  other  hand,  the  Income-tax  Department submitted  that  the  right  to  claim  interest  by  the assessee was dependent on an orders being passed u/s. 240 and section 244 of the Income-tax Act and in that view of the matter, the right to claim interest  accrued  to  the  assessee  only  on  the  date  of consequential  order  passed  pursuant  to  the  order of the Appellate Authority and as such, the interest income was assessable in the assessment year 1990- 1991.  Reliance was placed on the judgments of the Orissa, Kerala and Allahabad High Courts in the cases of Commissioner of Income-Tax vs. Sri Popsingh Rice Mill,  212 ITR 385 (Orissa), Smt. K. Devayani Amma vs. Deputy Commissioner of Income-Tax and Another 328 ITR 10 (Ker),)and J.K. Spinning and Weaving Mills Co., vs. Additional Commissioner of Income-Tax, Kanpur104 ITR 695  (Allahabad).

The  Andhra  Pradesh  High  Court  examined  the provisions  of  sections  237,  240,  244  and  244A  for ascertaining the statutory position relating to grant of refund and interest thereon. A close scrutiny of the sections 237 and 240, revealed to the Court  that the statutory right was conferred on the assessee to get refund of the excess tax paid and such refund was made available to the asssessee even without his  having  to  make  any  claim  in  that  behalf   in  as much  as  section  244A  of  the  Act  entitled  the  assessee  to  get  interest  on  the  refund  amount  and such  interest  was  payable  from  the  date  of  payment  of  tax  or  payment  of  penalty  from  the  date till  refund was granted.

It  was  clear  to  the  High  Court,  from  the  statutory provisions as applicable to the relevant assessment years, that there was no requirement of the assessee for making a claim either for refund or for interest. As a matter of fact, the Court noticed that sections 243 and 244, were made inapplicable in respect of any assessment for the assessment year commenc- ing on the first day of April, 1989 or any subsequent assessment years.

On a detailed analysis of the decisions of the various Courts in the cases of   Rama Bai vs. CIT, 181 ITR 401 (SC),  CIT  vs.  Sankari  Manickyamma  105  ITR  172  (AP).

Mrs. Khorshed Shapoor Chinai vs. ACED 90 ITR 47 (AP), CIT vs. Govindarajulu Chetty (T.N.K.) 165 ITR 231 (SC),T.N.K.  Govindarajulu  Chetty  vs.  CIT  87  ITR  22  (Mad.), CIT vs.Dr. Sham Lal Narula, 84 ITR 625 (P&H), and CIT, Mysore vs. V.Sampangiramaiah, 69 ITR 159 (Kar), the court  significantly  noted  that   the  principle  which could be culled out was that once the income had legally  accrued  to  the  assessee,  i.e.,  the  assessee had  acquired  a  right  to  receive  the  same,  though its valuation might   be postponed to a future date, the determination or quantification of the amount did  not  postpone  the  accrual.  In  other  words,  if the right had legally accrued to the assessee, then the right should be deemed to have accrued in the relevant  year,  even  though  the  dispute  as  to  the right  was  settled  in  the  later  year,  by  the  one  or the  other  of  the  authorities in the  hierarchy.

The Andhra Pradesh High Court expressly dissented with the decision of the Kerala High Court in the case of Smt. K. Devayani Amma (supra) by observing that;

•    though the Kerala High Court, in the said judge- ment, referred the case of Rama Bai (supra), there was no discussion about the principles that were approved in the judgment of the Supreme Court;

•    though the provisions of sections 240 and 244(1A) of the Act were referred to, the Kerala High Court held that interest on refund arose only on passing an order in favour of the assessee;

•    the eligibility of interest u/s. 244(1A) of the Act arose on an order of revision of assessment passed pursuant to the appellate order which led to grant of refund of excess tax paid by the assessee;

•    the reading of sections 237, 240 and 244(1A) cast a duty on the AO to charge that much of tax which the assessee was liable to pay and mandated the refund of the excess amount along with interest;

•    the hierarchy of appeals provided were only to ensure that the tax authorities adhere to strict rules of taxation and the statutory provisions. Even the final order that might be passed by the higher authority in the hierarchy of authorities provided under statue was also an order of assessment only for the simple reason that the final order passed was nothing but a correction of the original assessment order, which was erroneous.

•    the opinion expressed by the Kerala High Court that interest u/s. 244(1A) of the Act accrued to the assessee only, when it was granted to the assessee along with the refund order issued u/s. 240 of the Act was not correct, especially,   in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court as quoted in the judgment of the Madras High Court in T. N. K. Govindarajulu Chetty’s case (supra).

•    The court was unable to accept the judgment of Kerala High Court reported in K. Devayani Amma’s case (supra) on the issue.

The  judgment  of  the  Allahabad  High  Court  in  J.K. Spinning  and  Weaving  Mills  Co.  (supra)  was  found to  be  distinguishable  and  not  applicable  in  view of  the  variance  in  the  statutory  scheme  contained in  the  provisions  contained  in  Indian  Income-tax Act,  1922,  with  the  statutory  scheme  under  the Income-tax Act, 1961 and the Allahabad High Court had  taken  into  consideration  that  interest became payable to the assessee only when the assessments for  the  years  in  dispute  were  made  which  were  in fact  made  in  1956,  though  the  assessments  were 1951-1952 and  1952-1953.

The Andhra Pradesh High Court was  unable to agree with  the  reasoning  of  the  judgment  of  the  Orissa High Court in Sri Popsingh Rice Mill case (supra), as the  question  considered  by  the  Orissa  High  Court was in relation to section 244 of the Act and not in relation  to  section  244A  of  the  Act  and  the  Orissa High  Court  had  failed  to  notice  the  judgments  of the  Supreme  Court  and  instead  relied  on  three judgments  which  were  not  dealing  with  interest. Likewise, the other two judgments referred to in the said   judgment also were found to be not relevant for  the  purpose of  deciding the  issue.

The court accordingly answered the questions referred to it in favour of the assessee and against the revenue by holding that the interest on refund accrued from year to year and was not to be taxed in the year of the order granting refund.

Observations
An assessee, following the mercantile system of accounting, is taxed on his income, including interest income, in the year in which the income accrues or arises. An income, in ordinary circumstances, is said to have been accrued on vesting of a legal right to receive such income irrespective of whether it is received or not. Such accrual, based on a right to receive, is independent of the order of any Court  or an authority passed for confirming such right to receive, for the reason that such right to receive arises to a person on the basis of the terms of the agreement or the statutory provisions of any law.

It is an accepted position in law that interest accrues from day to day, in case of a person maintaining books of account and accrues on yearly basis   in case of a person not maintaining the books of account. In both the cases, the interest income is spread over number of years and is taxed on year to year basis.

The Supreme Court in E.D. Sassoon Company Ltd. vs. CIT, 26 ITR 51, observed that the computation of the profits,  whenever  it  may  take  place,  cannot  possi- bly be allowed to suspend its   accrual. The accrual happens  irrespective  of  the   quantification  of  the profits, and is not always linked to computation. For attracting the charge of taxation, what has however got to be determined is whether the income, profits or  gains  accrued  to  the  assessee;  before  it  can  be said  to  have  accrued  to  him,  it  is  necessary  that he must have acquired a right to receive the same or  that  a  right  to  the  income,  profits  or  gains  has become vested in him though its valuation may be postponed or its material station depends on some contingency.

The Supreme Court in Rama Bai (supra)’s case was concerned  with  the  taxability  of  interest  received on account of enhanced compensation, where the assessee’s lands were acquired and not being satis- fied  with  the  compensation  awarded  by  the  Land Acquisition  Officer,  the  assessee  appealed  to  the higher  Courts  and  finally  received  enhanced  com- pensation  along  with  interest  payable  u/s.  28  and 34  of  the  Land  Acquisition  Act.  The  said  amounts were  received  in  the  year  1967  and  were  sought to be assessed in the year 1968-1969. The assessee claimed  that  interest  was  allocable  and  assessable in  different  assessment  years  as  it  accrued  from year  to  year  and  only  that  portion  of  the  interest relating  to  the  period  April,  1967  to  March,  1968 was assessable for the assessment year 1968-1969. The Tribunal referred the following question to the Supreme  Court:  “Whether,  on  the  facts  and  in  the circumstances  of  the  case,  the  interest  received  by the  assesses  as  per  the  City  Civil  Court’s  award  for the period commencing from the date of possession till  31st  March,  1968,  was  entirely  assessable  for  the assessment  year  1968-1969?”  The  Supreme  Court answered  the  question  in  favour  of  assessee  and against the revenue by following its earlier judgment in  the  case  of  CIT  vs.  Govindarajulu  Chetty  (T.N.K.) 165  ITR  231  (SC)  wherein  in  a  short  judgment,  the Apex Court approved the judgment of the Madras High  Court  in  the  case  of  T.  N.  K.  Govindarajulu Chetty  vs.  CIT,  87  ITR  22  (Mad.).  The  Madras  High Court held that;   “11. In this case the liability to pay interest would arise when the compensation amount due  to  the  assessee  had  not  been  paid,  in  each  of the relevant years. Therefore, the accrual of interest has to be spread over the years between the date of acquisition  till  it  was  actually  paid.  We  are  not  in  a position to accept the contention of the revenue that …………… basis for assessing the income. When a statute brings to charge certain income, its intention is to enforce the charge at the earliest point of time.”

The  Supreme  Court  has  pointed  out  in  Laxmipat Singhania  vs.  CIT,72  ITR  291,  that:  “Again,  it  is  not open  to  the  Income-tax  Officer,  if  income  has  accrued to the assessee, and is liable to be included in the  total  income  of  a  particular  year,  to  ignore  the accrual and thereafter to tax it as income of another year on the basis of receipt.” Similar view was taken by the Panjab & Haryana High Court in the case of CIT  vs.  Dr.  Sham  Lal  Narula,  84  ITR  625   and  by  the Karnataka High Court in the case of CIT, Mysore vs. V.  Sampangiramaiah,  69  ITR  159   where  under  the question  which  was  considered  was  “Whether,  on the  facts  and  in  the  circumstance  of  the  case,  the Appellate  Tribunal  was  right  in  law  in  holding  that the  entire  interest  amount  of  Rs.  87,265/-  was  not assessable  in  the  assessment  year  1962-63  and  that only  the  proportionate  interest  referable  to  the  assessment  year  1962-63  was  assessable  in  that  year?” The  Karnataka  High  Court  answered  the  question in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee and against the  revenue.

The  right  to  receive  interest  u/s.  244A  is  entirely based  on  the  right  to  refund  u/s.  240  of  the  Act. Unless an assessee is entitled to a refund of taxes, no  right  to  receive  an  interest  arises  in  his  favour. The  key  consideration  therefore  is  the  right  to a  refund  of  excess  taxes  paid.  Whether  such  a right  to  refund  arises  on  passing  of  an  order  by an  Income-tax  Authority,  for  granting  a  refund,  or that such a right arises with payment of taxes and is  independent  of  the  order  of  the  authority.  The fact that interest u/s. 244A, whenever granted and paid,  is  paid  for  the  period  commencing  with  the date  of  payment  of  tax,  apparently  conveys  that such a right is associated with the payment of excess taxes and only its (interest) payment is deferred to the  year  of  grant  by  an  authority.  This  prima  facie understanding is, further confirmed by the amendments  in  section  145A(2)(B)  and  section  56(2)(Viii) of  the  Act  by  the  Finance  (NO.2)  Act,  2009,  that expressly  provide  that  interest  on  compensation shall  be  taxed  in  the  year  of  receipt  only.  In  other words,  in  the  absence  of  any  provision  for  taxing the  interest income  in  the  year  of  receipt, interest will be taxed in the year of accrual and when such interest pertains to a period exceeding 12 months, its  accrual  happens  on  year  to  year  basis  in  more than 1  assessment year.

On a conspectus reading of the scheme of refund, contained  in  Chapter  XIX  u/s.  237  to  245,  it  is gathered  that  the  right  to  refund  of  excess  taxes paid  is  independent  of  any  requirement  to  claim such  refund.  While  it  is  true  that  an  assessee  is entitled  to  a  refund  of  the  excess  taxes  paid,  only on  satisfaction  of  the  A.O  that  the  taxes  paid  by him  exceeds  the  amount  of  tax  payable  by  him,  it none  the  less  is  independent  of  any  order  section 237  does  not  require  an  Assessing  Officer  to  pass an  order  of  refund,  it  rather  requires  an  Assessing Officer to refund the excess taxes. Likewise, section 244A entitles an assessee to simple interest on the amount of  refund that becomes due to  him.

An assessee is entitled to receive interest u/s. 244A(1) where refund of any amount becomes due to him. The  language  of  section  244A  (1)  may  convey  that unless  an  assessee  becomes  entitled  to  a  refund, he is not entitled to interest and as a consequence of  such  an  understanding,   entitlement  to  interest is  postponed  to  the  time  when  a  refund  becomes due  to  him;  no  interest  therefore  accrues  to  him till  such  time  an  order  of  refund  is  passed.  Such an understanding, we feel, is not supported by the scheme of the Act and in particular by the scheme of  the  refund  and   the  grant  of  interest  thereon. Under  the  scheme,  the  moment  an  excess  tax  is paid,  the  refund  thereof  becomes  due  to  him  and the  entitlement  to  interest  runs  with  the  right  to receive  refund  which  right  arises  with  payment  of taxes, irrespective of an order of refund. This understanding is fortified with the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Jaffersaheb’s case, in as much as the issue therein concerned  taxation of interest received u/s. 244A   in assessment year 1990-91 and the  Court  while  deciding  the  issue  of  the  year  of taxation, examined the implications of the provisions of section 244A w.r.t to the scheme of refund and applied  the  ratio  of  the  decision  of  the  Supreme Court  in  Rama  Bai’s  case.  In  our  considered  view, no  material  difference  exists  between  the  interest that  was  granted  u/s.  244  r.w.s  240  and  the  one now being granted u/s. 244A   r.w.s 240   of the Act as  regards  the  time  of  entitlement.  In  conclusion, it  is  safe  to  hold  that  the  right  to  refund  and  the right to interest thereon are statutory rights which rights arise  on payment of  excess taxes.

The case for the taxation of interest, received under the Income-tax Act, on the year to year basis, by yearly spread over, is greater as compared to the interest received under the Land Acquisition Act for the reason under the scheme of taxation, an amount of refund becomes due, the moment an assessee pays excess tax which is neither dependent on the claim for refund nor on the order of the authorities. Accordingly the decisions of the courts, holding that the interest under the Land Acquisition Act is taxable on the year to year basis, shall apply with greater force, to the cases of receipt of interest, under the Income-tax Act.

Having so concluded that interest is taxable on year to year basis, an assessee is placed in an unenviable position in a case where an Assessing Officer makes substantial additions to the returned income and demands additional tax instead of granting refund. The issue that is required to be considered is about the liability to pay tax on interest that could be said to have accrued, even though the eligibility to refund and consequent interest thereon depends on the outcome of the appeal filed to contest the aforesaid additions to the returned income. While the assessee may not be asked to make the payment of regular taxes but may be required to pay taxes on the accrued interest, which is included in the assessed income, in the hope that he will suc- ceed in the appeal and will be entitled to refund and interest thereon. Nothing  could  be  more  confusing  than  this  in  as much  as,  it  leads  to  an  inference  that  interest  on refund  accrues,  even  before  the  finality  of  refund itself. This confusion is aptly conveyed by Palkhivala’s words  when  he  states  that  ‘one  of  the  delights  of income tax law is occasional incongruities’.  The Bombay  High  Court  noticing  the  confusion  in  the  case of CIT vs. Abbasbhoy, 195 ITR 28, arising on account of the contrasting decisions of the Supreme Court in  the  case  of  Govindarajulu  Chetty  (supra)  and the earlier decision in the case of CIT vs. Hindustan Housing  ,  161  ITR  524,   with  the  hope  that  the  Su- preme Court will resolve the controversy observed that  “the incongruity does not end here. Despite the conclusion  that  interest  in  such  cases  accrues  from year to year, it is doubtful whether it will be possible to hold the assessee responsible for not disclosing interest income in the past on accrual basis.” Kanga & Palkhivala in the 4th edition of their book titled The Law  and  Practice  of  Income  tax  have  commented on  the  assessee’s  obligation  to  return  income,  on account of accrued interest, where the refund is in dispute  in  the  following  words  ,”the  assessee  can always  take  a  stand  that  the  amount  of  compensation  including  enhanced  compensation  or  damages having  been  determined  subsequently,  he  could  not possibly  anticipate  accrual  of  interest”.  Kindly  also see,   pg.  1085  of  volume  1  of  the  10th  edition  of Sampath Iyengar’s Law  of  Income Tax.

This unenviable situation may however be remitted by resorting to rectification proceedings u/s. 154 for amending the order where such interest on disputed refund is taxed on accrual basis. Please see Garden Silk  Mills  Ltd., 221 ITR 861(Guj.)

Sunder Deep Education Society vs. ACIT In the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal Delhi Bench ‘ G’ New Delhi Before Rajpal Yadav (J. M.) and T. S. Kapoor (A. M.) ITA No. 2428/Del/2011 Assessment Year: 2007-08. Decided on 6th December, 2013 Counsel for Assessee / Revenue: Rakesh Gupta / N. Srivastava

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Sections 11, 12 and 68 – Failure to present donors on being summoned – Donations cannot be taxed as income under section 68.

Facts
The assessee is registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and u/s. 12AA of the Income tax Act, 1961. It also enjoys exemption u/s. 80G. The assessee runs educational institutions conducting various professional courses. In respect of the voluntary contribution aggregating to Rs. 1.97 crore received during the year, the assessee was not able to produce the donors when summoned by the AO who, as claimed by the assessee, had made the said donations. Therefore, the AO held that the same were anonymous and unexplained cash credit and added the said amount as the assessee’s total income as per section 115BBC and section 68.

Before the CIT(A) the assessee submitted the name and address of the persons who had made donations alongwith other particulars prescribed by the Act. The CIT(A) agreed that the donations could not be treated as ‘anonymous’. However, according to him, since the assessee could not prove the donations amount of Rs. 1.97 crore the same was treated as unaccounted income by him and brought to tax u/s. 11(4) read with section 68/69/69C. Before the tribunal, the revenue did not challenge the CIT(A)’s finding that the donations were not anonymous but contended that as held by the CIT(A), the same were taxable u/s. 68 and 69 as income from other sources and the benefit of section 11 and 12 would not be available to the assessee.

Held
The tribunal referred to the decision of the Delhi tribunal in the case of Shri Vivekanand Education & Welfare Society (ITA No. 2592 / Del / 2012) which was based on the decision of the Delhi high court in the case of DIT(Exem) vs. Keshav Social & Charitable Trust (278 ITR 152) where the Court observed that the fact that complete list of donors was not filed or that the donors were not produced, does not necessariiy lead to the inference that the assesse was trying to introduce un-accounted money by way of donation receipts. The Court further observed that as the assesse had disclosed the donation as income, the provisions of section 68 cannot be applied. Applying the ratio, the tribunal held that the said receipts of Rs. 1.97 crore would be governed by the provisions of sections 11 and 12 of the Act and if 85% thereof is applied towards the objects of the trust, then the income assessable would be nil.

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S/s. 43(6), 50 – The term `acquired’ used in section 50 is not synonymous with acquisition of title to the property. Use of asset is not a condition for availing the benefits of section 50. In a case where amounts are paid and registration had been complete, though possession was not received, it can be said that the assessee has acquired the property for the purpose of section 50.

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6. ITO vs. D. Chetan Kumar & Co.
ITAT  Mumbai `D’ Bench
Before Rajendra (AM) and Dr. S. T. M. Pavalan (JM)
ITA No. 6886/Mum/2011
Assessment Year : 2008-09.                                      
Decided on:  5th March, 2014.
Counsel for revenue/assessee: Sanjeev Jain/Hiro Rai.

S/s. 43(6), 50 – The term `acquired’ used in section 50 is not synonymous with acquisition of title to the property. Use of asset is not a condition for availing the benefits of section 50. In a case where amounts are paid and registration had been complete, though possession was not received, it can be said that the assessee has acquired the property for the purpose of section 50.

Facts:

The assessee had, vide agreement dated 05-04-2007, sold business premises, whose stamp duty value was Rs. 48,47,850, for a consideration of Rs. 39,00,000. Depreciation was claimed on the premises sold and they constituted part of block of asset. The assessee had purchased two new galas vide agreements dated 28-03-2008 for Rs. 27,28,462 and Rs. 12,71,538. The building in which the galas were situated were under construction and possession of these galas was not with the assessee as on 31-03-2008.

The Assessing Officer held that since the possession of new galas purchased were not with the assessee as on 31–03-2008, they could not be said to be forming part of block of assets for financial year 2007-08 and therefore when the sale consideration of the property sold is reduced from the block of assets, the block would cease to exist and the sale consideration in excess of the opening written down value would be taxed u/s. 50. Since the stamp duty value was not disputed by the assessee, the AO adopted stamp duty value to be the sale consideration. He charged Rs. 47,69,046 as short term capital gains.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who held that a reading of Clause (c) of section 43(6) would reveal that the written down value had to be adjusted by actual cost of any asset falling within the block acquired during the year. The assessee had purchased two galas and the entire amount of Rs. 40 lakh had been paid, registration had been completed, therefore, the assessee had acquired the assets as per section 43(6)(c). The term used in section 50 was “acquired during he previous year”. Referring to the decision of the jurisdictional Tribunal in the case of Orient Cartons Ltd. (60 ITD 87), he held that the use of the asset was not a condition precedent for making an adjustment in block of asset. There was no explicit requirement in the statutory provision to the effect that the new asset should also be used in a business carried on by the assessee and that if there was no business carried on by him, the deduction could not be given. He also held that the word “acquired” in section 50 was of a very amorphous word and the acquisition of the property in that section was not synonymous with acquisition of title to the property. Accordingly, he held that the assessee had acquired the premises within the meaning of section 50 of the Act and therefore was entitled for adjustment of cost of the property with that of WDV of the block of assets for the purposes of capital gains. He allowed the appeal filed by the assessee. Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:

The Tribunal noted that a similar view had been taken in the case of Lalbhai Kalidas & Co. Ltd. (ITA No. 5832/Mum/2011, AY 2007-08 dated 08-11-2013). Following the said decision, the Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A) on this ground. This ground of appeal of the revenue was dismissed.

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Business expenditure: Section 37: A. Y. 2006- 07: Expenditure on foreign education of employee (son of director) is deductible if there is business nexus:

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Kostub Investment Ltd. vs. CIT (Del); ITA No. 10 of 2014 dated 25-02-2014:

In the relevant year, the assessee company had claimed the deduction of an expenditure of Rs. 23,16,942/- being expenditure on higher education of an employee, who happens to be the son of directors, for undertaking an MBA course in the UK. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim for deduction and the Tribunal upheld the disallowance.

The Delhi High Court allowed the appeal filed by the assessee, reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) Whilst there may be some grain of truth that there might be a tendency in business concerns to claim deductions u/s. 37, and foist personal expenditure, such a tendency itself cannot result in an unspoken bias against claims for funding higher education abroad of the employees of the concern. As to whether the assessee would have similarly assisted another employee unrelated to its management is not a question which this court has to consider. But that it has chosen to fund the higher education of one of its director’s son in a field intimately connected with its business is a crucial factor that the Court cannot ignore.

ii) It would be unwise for the Court to require all assesses and business concerns to frame a policy with respect to how educational funding of its employees generally and a class thereof, i.e., children of its management or directors would be done. Nor would it be wise to universalise or rationalise that in the absence of such a policy, funding of employees of one class – unrelated to management – would qualify for deduction u/s. 37(1). We do not see such a intent in the statute which prescribes that only expenditure strictly for business can be considered for deduction. Necessarily, the decision to deduct is to be case dependent.

iii) In view of the above discussion, having regard to the circumstances of the case, this Court is of the opinion that the expenditure claimed by the assessee to fund the higher education of its employee to the tune of Rs. 23,16,942/- had an intimate and direct connection with its business, i.e., dealing in security and investments. It was, therefore, appropriately deductible u/s. 37(1).

iv) The Assessing Officer is thus directed to grant the deduction claimed.”

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Offences and Prosecution – Section 276CC applies to situations where an assessee has failed to file a return of income as required u/s. 139 of the Act or in response to notice issued to the assessee u/s. 142 or section 148 of the Act.

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Sasi Enterprises vs. ACIT (2014) 361 ITR 163(SC)

M/s.
Sasi Enterprises was formed as a partnership firm by a deed dated 6th
February, 1989, with N. Sasikala and T. V. Dinakaram as its partners,
which was later reconstituted with effect from 4th May, 1990, with J.
Jayalalitha and N. Sasikala as partners. The firm did the business
through two units, namely, M/s. Fax Universal and M/s. J. S. Plan
Printers, which, inter alia, included the business in running all kinds
of motor cars, dealing in vehicles and goods, etc.

The
Partnership deed dated 4th May, 1990, stated that the partners, are
responsible and empowered to operate bank accounts, have full and equal
rights in the management of the firm in its business activities, deploy
funds for the business of the firm, appoint staff, watchman, etc., and
to represent the firm before Income-tax, sales tax and other
authorities.

M/s. Sasi Enterprises, the firm, did not file any returns for the assessment years 1991-92 and 1992-93.

J.
Jayalalitha and N. Sasikala filed their individual returns for the
assessment years 1991-92 and 1992- 93, though belatedly on 20th
November, 1994, and 23rd February, 1994, respectively. In those returns
it was mentioned that the accounts of the firm had not been finalised
and no returns of the firm had been filed. J. Jayalalitha and N.
Sasikala did not file returns for the assessment year 1993-94.

In
the complaint E.O.C.C. No. 202 of 1997 filed before the Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate Egmore, M/s. Sasi Enterprises was shown as the
first accused (A-1) and J. Jayalalitha and N. Sasikala were shown as
(A-2) and (A-3), respectively, who were stated to be responsible for the
day-to-day business of the firm during the assessment years in question
and were individually, jointly and severally made responsible and
liable for all the activities of the firm.

The Assistant
Commissioner of Income-tax in his complaint stated that the firm through
its partners ought to have filed its returns u/s. 139(1) of the Act for
the assessment year 1991-92 on or before 31st August, 1991, and for the
assessment year 1992-93 on or before 31st August, 1992, and A-2, in her
individual capacity, also should have filed her return for the year
1993-94 u/s. 139(1) on or before 31st August, 1993, and A-3 also ought
to have filed her return for the assessment year 1993-94 on or before
31st August, 1993, as per section 139(1) of the Act. The accused
persons, it was pointed out, did not bother to file the returns even
before the end of the respective assessment years, nor had they filed
any return at the outer statutory limit prescribed u/s. 139(4) of the
Act, i.e., at the end of March of the assessment year. It was also
pointed out the a survey was conducted in respect of the firm u/s. 133A
on 24th August, 1992, and following that a notice u/s. 148 was served on
the partnership firm on 15th February, 1994, to file the return of
Income-tax for the years in question. Though notice was served on 16th
February, 1994, no return was filed within the time granted in the
notice. Neither the return was filed, nor were particulars of the income
furnished. For the assessment year 1991-92, it was stated that
pre-assessment notice was served on 18th December, 1995, notice u/s.
142(1)(ii) giving opportunities was also issued on 20th July, 1995. The
Department made the best judgment assessment for the assessment year
1991-92 u/s. 144 on a total income of Rs. 5,84,860 on 8th February,
1996, and tax was determined as Rs. 3,02,434 and demand notice for Rs.
9,95,388 was issued as tax and interest payable on 8th February, 1996.

For
the assessment year 1992-93, the best judgment assessment u/s. 144 was
made on 9th February, 1996, on the firm on a total income of Rs.
14,87,930 and tax determined at Rs. 8,08,153, a demand notice was issued
towards the tax and interest payable.

So far as A-2 was
concerned, the due date for filing of return of income as per section
139(1) of the Act for the assessment year 1993-94 was 31st August, 1993.
Notice u/s. 142(1)(i) was issued to A-2 calling for return of income on
18th January, 1994. The said notice was served on her on 19th January,
1994. Reminders were issued on 10th February, 1994, 22nd August, 1994
and 23rd August, 1995. No return was filed as required u/s. 139(4)
before 31st March, 1995. The Department on 31st July, 1995, issued
notice u/s. 142(1)(ii) calling for particulars of income and other
details for completion of assessment. Neither the return of income was
filed nor were the particulars of income furnished. Best judgment
assessment u/s. 144 was made on 9th February, 1996 on a total income of
Rs. 1,04,49,153 and tax determined at Rs. 46,68,676 and demand of Rs.
96,98,801, inclusive of interest at Rs. 55,53,882 was raised after
adjusting pre-paid tax of Rs. 5,23,759. The Department then issued
show-cause notice for prosecution u/s. 276CC on 14th June, 1996. Later,
sanction for prosecution was accorded by the Commissioner of Income-tax
on 3rd October, 1996.

A-3 also failed to filed return of income
as per section 139(1) for the assessment year 1993-94 before the due
date, i.e., 31st August, 1993. Notice u/s. 142(1)(i) was issued to A-3
calling for filing of return of income on 8th November, 1995. Further,
notice was also issued u/s. 142(1)(ii) on 21st July, 1995, calling for
particulars of income and other details for completion of assessment.
Neither the return of income was filed nor the particulars of income
were furnished. Best judgment assessment u/s. 144 was made on 8th
February, 1996, on a total income of Rs. 70,28,110 and tax determined at
Rs. 26,86,445. The total tax payable, inclusive of interest due was Rs.
71,19,527. After giving effect to the appellate order, the total income
was revised by Rs. 19,25,000, resulting in tax demand of Rs. 20,23,279,
inclusive of interest levied. Later, a show-cause notice for
prosecution u/s. 276CC was issued to A-3 on 7th August,1996. A-3 filed
replies on 24th November, 1996, and 24th March, 1997. The Commissioner
of Income-tax accorded sanction for prosecution on 4th August, 1997.

The
final tax liability, so far as the firm was concerned, was determined
as Rs. 32,63,482 on giving effect to the order of the Income-tax
Appellate Tribunal (B-Bench), Chennai dated 1st September, 2006 and
after giving credit of prepaid tax for the assessment year 1991-92. For
the assessment year 1992-93 for the firm, final tax liability was
determined at Rs.52,47,594 on giving effect to the order of the
Income-tax Appellate Tribunal (B-Bench), Chennai dated 1st September,
2006, and after giving credit of pre-paid tax. So far as A-2 was
concerned for the assessment year 1993-94 final tax liability was
determined at Rs. 12,54,395 giving effect to the order of the Income-tax
Appellate Tribunal (B-Bench), Chennai dated 11th October, 2008, after
giving credit to pre-paid tax. So far as A-3 was concerned, for the
assessment year 1993-94, the final tax liability was determined as Rs.
9,81,870 after giving effect to the order of the Income-tax Appellate
Tribunal (B-Bench), Chennai dated 14th September, 2004, and after giving
credit to pre-paid tax.

For not filing of returns and due to
non-compliance with the various statutory provisions, prosecution was
initiated u/s. 276CC of the Act against all the accused persons and the
complaints were filed on 21st August, 1997, before the Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate which the High Court by its order dated 2nd
December, 2006 had permitted to go on by dismissing the revision
petitions filed by the firm and the two partners against the dismissal
of their discharge petitions by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate.

On appeal, the Supreme Court held that section
276CC applies to situations where an assessee has
failed to file a return of income as required u/s.
139 of the Act or in response to notice issued to
the assessee u/s. 142 or section 148 of the Act.
The proviso to section 276CC gives some relief to
genuine assessees. The proviso to section 276CC
gives further time till the end of the assessment
year to furnish return to avoid prosecution. In
other words, even though the due date would be
31st August of the assessment year as per section
139(1) of the Act, as assessee gets further seven
months time to complete and file the return and
such a return though belated, may not attract
prosecution of the assessee. Similarly, the proviso
in Clause (ii)(b) to section 276CC also provides
that if the tax payable determined by regular assessment
as reduced by advance tax paid and tax deducted at source does not exceed Rs. 3,000,
such an assessee shall not be prosecuted for
not furnishing the return u/s. 139(1) of the Act.
Resultantly, the proviso u/s. 276CC takes care of
genuine assessees who either file the returns belatedly
but within the end of the assessment year
or those who have paid substantial amounts of
their tax dues by pre-paid taxes, from the rigour
of the prosecution u/s. 276CC of the Act.
Section 276CC, takes in s/s. (1) of the section 139,
section 142(1)(i) and section 148. But the proviso
to section 276CC takes in only s/s. (1) of section
139 of the Act and the provisions of section 142(1)
(i) or section 148 are conspicuously absent. Consequently,
the benefit of the proviso is available
only to voluntary filing of return as required u/s.
139(1) of the Act. In other words, the proviso
would not apply after detection of the failure to
file the return and after a notice u/s. 142(1)(i) or
section 148 of the Act is issued calling for filing
of the return of income. The proviso, therefore,
envisages the filing of even belated return before
the detection or discovery of the failure and issuance
of notice u/s. 142 or section 148 of the Act.
The Supreme Court referred to s/s. (4) of section
139 wherein the Legislature has used an expression
“whichever is earlier”, and observed that
both section 139(1) and s/s. (1) of section 142 are
referred to in s/s. (4) to section 139, which specify
time limit, therefore, the expression “whichever is
earlier” has to be read within the time if allowed
under s/s. (1) of section 139 or within the time allowed
under notice issued under s/s. (1) of section
142, whichever is earlier. The Supreme Court held
that so far as the present case was concerned, it
was noticed that the assessee had not filed the
return either within the time allowed under s/s. (1)
of section 139 or within the time allowed under
notice issued under s/s. (1) of section 142.
The Supreme Court noted that on failure to file
the returns by the appellants, the Income-tax Department
made a best judgment assessment u/s.
144 of the Act and later show-cause notices were
issued for initiating prosecution u/s. 276CC of the
Act. The Supreme Court held that the proviso to
section 276CC nowhere states that the offence
u/s. 276CC has not been committed by the categories
of assesses who fall within the scope of
that proviso but it is stated that such a person
shall not be proceeded against. In other words,
it only provided that under specific circumstances
mentioned in the proviso, prosecution may not be
initiated. An assessee who comes within Clause
(2)(b) of the proviso, no doubt he has also committed
the offence u/s. 276CC but is exempted
from prosecution since the tax falls below Rs.
3,000. Such an assessee may file belated return
before the detection and avail of the benefit of
the proviso. The proviso cannot control the main
section, it only confers some benefit to certain
categories of assesses. In short, the offence u/s.
276CC is attracted on failure to comply with the
provisions of section 139(1) or failure to respond
to the notice issued u/s. 142 or section 148 of the
Act within the time limit specified therein.
Applying the above principles to the facts of
the case in hand, the Supreme Court held that
the contention of the learned senior counsel for
the appellant that there has not been any willful
failure to file their return could not be accepted
and on facts, offence u/s. 276CC of the Act had
been made in all these appeals and the rejection
of the application for the discharge called for no
interference by it.
The Supreme Court also found no basis in the
contention of the learned senior counsel for the
appellant that pendency of the appellate proceeding
was a relevant factor for not initiating prosecution
proceedings u/s. 276CC of the Act. According
to the Supreme Court, section 276CC contemplates
that an offence is committed on the non-filing of
the return and it is totally unrelated to the pendency
of assessment proceedings except for the
second part of the offence for determination of
the sentence of the offence, the Department may
resort to best judgment assessment or otherwise
to past years to determine the extent of the
breach. If it was the intention of the Legislature
to hold up the prosecution proceedings till the
assessment proceedings are completed by way of
appeal or otherwise the same would have been
provided in section 276CC itself.
The Supreme Court was also of the view that the
declaration or statement made in the individual
returns by partners that the accounts of the firm
were not finalised, hence no return had been
filed by the firm, would not absolve the firm in
filing the statutory return u/s. 139(1) of the Act. The firm was independently required to file the
return and merely because there had been a best
judgment assessment u/s. 144 would not nullify
the liability of the firm to file the return as per
section 139(1) of the Act.
The Supreme Court further held that, section
278E deals with the presumption as to culpable
mental state, which was inserted by the Taxation
Laws (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions)
Act, 1986. The question is on whom the burden
lies, either on the prosecution or the assessee,
u/s. 278E to prove whether the assessee has or
not committed willful default in filing the returns.
The court in a prosecution of offence, like section
276CC has to presume the existence of mens rea
and it is for the accused to prove the contrary
and that too beyond reasonable doubt. Resultantly,
the appellants have to prove the circumstances
which prevented them from filing the returns as
per section 139(1) or in response to notice u/s.
142 and 148 of the Act.

Taxability of Long Outstanding Liability Not Written Back

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Synopsis

Section 41(1) applies when an assessee gets a remission or benefit in respect of trading liability cessation thereof,or by a unilateral act by the assessee by way of writing back of such liability in his accounts.

The question that arises is if any benefit has been obtained in respect trading liability by remission or cessation, when a creditor’s balance has remained unpaid for a long period of time, though it has not been written back to the profit and loss account, particularly if the recovery of such amount is barred by the law of limitation.

Issue for Consideration

Section 41(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 provides that where an allowance or deduction has been made in the assessment for any year in respect of loss, expenditure or trading liability incurred by the assessee and subsequently during any previous year, the assessee has obtained, whether in cash or in any other manner whatsoever, any amount in respect of such loss or expenditure or some benefit in respect of such trading liability by way of remission or cessation thereof, the amount obtained by such person or the value of benefit accruing to him shall be deemed to be profits and gains of business or profession and accordingly chargeable to Incometax as the income of that previous year.

The provisions of this section, therefore, come into play only when the assessee has “obtained any amount in respect of such loss or expenditure or some benefit in respect of such trading liability by way of remission or cessation of such liability”.

Explanation 1 to this section, inserted with effect from Assessment Year 1997-98, further provides that the expression “loss or expenditure or some benefit in respect of any such trading liability by way of remission or cessation thereof” shall include the remission or cessation of any liability by a unilateral act by the assessee by way of writing off such liability in his accounts.

The question has arisen before the courts as to whether any benefit has been obtained in respect of trading liability by way of remission or cessation when a creditor’s balance has remained unpaid and outstanding for a long period of time, though it has not been written back to the profit and loss account, particularly if the recovery of such amount is barred by the law of limitation.

The Delhi High Court has taken two different views of the matter, one in the case of sundry creditors, and the other in the case of unpaid dues of employees. In one case, it has held that the amount is not taxable u/s. 41(1), while in the other, it is held that such outstanding amount of liability is taxable.

Shri Vardhman Overseas’ Case
The issue first came up before the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs. Shri Vardhman Overseas Ltd. 343 ITR 408.

In this case, relating to the Assessment Year 2002- 03, the assessee was a company engaged in the manufacture of rice from paddy. It also sold rice after purchasing it from the local market. The Assessing Officer, while verifying the sales and sundry debtors, decided to verify the sundry creditors shown in the books of account. He asked the assessee to submit confirmation letters from the sundry creditors. The assessee did not submit the confirmation letters, on the ground that it was not aware of the present whereabouts of the creditors after a lapse of 4 years, and whatever addresses were available had been given by the suppliers at the time that the purchases were made from them. The assessing officer added the amount of sundry creditors to the assessee’s income.

On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) held that the assessee’s conduct clearly showed that the liability shown in the sundry creditors account in its books did not exist. He, therefore, held that the liabilities had ceased to exist, and therefore, the addition made by the assessing officer was held to be justified, but confirmed as taxable u/s. 41(1).

The Tribunal held that since the amounts payable to the sundry creditors were not credited to the profit and loss account for the year but continued to be shown as outstanding as at the end of the year, the tribunal held that the provisions of section 41(1) were not attracted, in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT v Sugauli Sugar Works (P) Ltd. 236 ITR 518. According to the Tribunal, this decision of the Supreme Court applied with greater force since, in that decision, the assessee had credited the profit and loss account with the amount standing to the credit of the sundry creditors, whereas in the case before the Tribunal, the amounts payable to the sundry creditors were not credited to the profit and loss account for the year and were still shown as outstanding as at the end of the year. The Tribunal, therefore, deleted the addition made by the assessing officer.

Before the Delhi High Court, on behalf of the revenue, attention was drawn to the fact that the assessee itself had admitted that the amount was outstanding for more than 4 years, and therefore, the assessee had obtained a benefit in the course of its business, which was assessable u/s. 41(1). It was argued that it would make no difference that the liabilities were not written back to the profit and loss account for the year under consideration, because what was to be seen was whether the assessee had obtained a benefit in a practical sense. It was claimed that since the amounts remained unpaid for 4 years, there was a reasonable inference that the assessee was no longer liable to pay those parties. According to the revenue, the benefit arose on account of the fact that the debts were more than 3 years old, and were, therefore, not recoverable from the assessee in view of the law of limitation.

It was argued that Explanation 1 to section 41(1) was not relied upon by the revenue, but the writing back of the accounts of the sundry creditors in the profit and loss account was only one of the many unilateral acts which could be done by the assessee, and even in the absence of such a write back, there could be remission or cessation of the trading liability which resulted in a benefit to the assessee.

The Delhi High Court agreed that the Explanation 1 was not applicable, but observed that it must be established that the assessee had obtained some benefit in respect of the trading liability which had earlier been allowed as a deduction. It noted that there was no dispute that the amounts due to the sundry creditors have been allowed in the earlier assessment years as purchases in computing the business income of the assessee. The question was whether by not paying them for a period of 4 years and above, the assessee had obtained some benefit in respect of the trading liability allowed in earlier years. It observed that the revenue’s argument that, non-payment or non-discharge of liability resulted in some benefit in respect of such trading liability in a practical sense or common sense overlooked the words “by way of remission or cessation thereof”. It observed that it was not enough that the assessee should derive some benefit in respect of such trading liability, but it was also essential that such benefit should arise by way of remission or cessation of the liability.

Analysing the meaning of the terms “remission” and “cessation”, the Delhi High Court noted the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bombay Dyeing and Manufacturing Company Ltd. vs. State of Bombay AIR 1958 SC 328, where the Supreme Court held that when a debt becomes time-barred, it does not become extinguished, but only unenforceable in a court of law. The Supreme Court had also held that modes in which an obligation under contract becomes discharged were well-defined, and the bar of limitation was not one of them. This was the view also taken by the Supreme Court in the case of Sugauli Sugar Works (supra), which was a case where the credits were outstanding for almost 20 years and were written back by credit to the profit and loss account. The Delhi High Court noted that in the Sugauli Sugar Works case, a contention was advanced before the Supreme Court on behalf of the revenue that since the liability remained unpaid for more than 20 years, there was practically a cessation of the debt, which resulted in a benefit to the assessee, which should be brought to tax u/s. 41(1). This argument was not accepted by the Supreme Court in that case.

The Delhi High Court, therefore, held that, as there was no write back of the accounts of the sundry creditors to the profit and loss account, the amount of outstanding liabilities was not taxable u/s. 41(1).
This decision was followed by the Delhi High Court on the same date in the case of CIT vs. Hotline Electronics Ltd. 205 Taxman 245, taking an identical view.
Chipsoft Technology’s Case
The issue again came up before the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs. Chipsoft Technology (P) Ltd. 210 Taxman 173 (Del)(Mag). In this case, relating to assessment year 2006-07, the assessee had outstanding liabilities on account of employee dues, some of which pertained to salary for the Assessment Year 2005-06, and the balance related to earlier years, extending to as far back as Assessment Year 2000-01.
The Assessing Officer called for confirmations from the employees. The assessee was able to furnish confirmations from only 3 employees out of 170 employees whose dues were outstanding. The Assessing Officer held that there was a cessation of the assessee’s liabilities and that he had obtained benefit in respect of these amounts, and he, therefore, added these amounts to the assessee’s income u/s. 41(1).
The Commissioner (Appeals) allowed the assessee’s appeal, holding that the liability was outstanding in the books of account, and that it did not, therefore, amount to cessation of liability. The Tribunal upheld the Commissioner(Appeals) order.
Before the Delhi High Court, on behalf of the Revenue, it was argued that the amount due to 170 employees remained unchanged and static for about 6 or 7 years and no payment was made during the intervening period. It was pointed out that the assessee did not claim that the employees were actively pursuing their claims and had taken any steps to recover their dues. No correspondence with the employees was filed to substantiate its argument that the amount was still outstanding, and even in the assessment proceedings it was unable to furnish full particulars about its employees. It was, therefore, argued that the liability had ceased. It is further argued that even if it was assumed that at some point the liability existed, the lapse of time and the resultant defence available to the assessee under the Limitation Act justified inclusion of these amounts as the income of the assessee on the ground of cessation of liability. It was claimed that the tribunal had not appreciated that the benefit had accrued to the assessee by virtue of the wage liability becoming time-barred.
The Delhi High Court noted the decisions cited on behalf of the revenue in the case of Kesoram Industries and Cotton Mills Ltd vs. CIT 196 ITR 845 (Cal), and in the case of CIT vs. Agarpara Co. Ltd. 158 ITR 78, where the Calcutta High Court had held, in the context of bonus payable to workmen which had remained outstanding for several years, that once bonus had been offered by the employer, but remained undrawn, it cannot be said that the liability subsisted even after the expiry of the time prescribed by the statute, particularly when there was no dispute pending regarding the payment of bonus. The Calcutta High Court had observed that under these circumstances, it may be inferred that  unclaimed or unpaid bonus was in excess of the requirement of the assessee, and therefore, to that extent, the liability had ceased.
The Delhi High Court observed that the view that the liability did not cease as long as it is reflected in the books and that mere lapse of the time given to the creditor or the workmen to recover the amount due did not efface the liability though it barred the remedy, was an abstract and theoretical one and did not ground itself in reality. According to the Delhi High Court, interpretation of laws, particularly fiscal and commercial legislation, was increasingly based on pragmatic realities, which meant that even though the law permitted the debtor to take all defences and successfully avoid liability, for abstract dualistic purposes, he would be shown as a debtor. According to the Delhi High Court, it would be illogical to say that the debtor or an employer holding
onto unpaid dues should be given the benefit of his showing the amount as a liability, even though he would be entitled in law to say that the claim for its recovery was time-barred, and continue to enjoy the amount.
The Delhi High Court also observed that Explanation 1 to section 41(1) used the term “shall include” and not the term “means”, which meant that there could be other means of deriving benefits by way of cessation or remission of liability. According to the Delhi High Court, even omission to pay over a period of time and the resultant benefit derived by the employer/assessee would qualify as a cessation of liability, though by operation of law. The Delhi High Court rejected the assessee’s argument that no period of limitation was provided for under the Industrial Disputes Act, by referring to the Supreme Court decision in the case of Nedungadi Bank Ltd. vs. K. P. Madhavankutty AIR 2000 SC 839, when the Supreme Court held that even though no period of limitation had been prescribed under that Act, a stale dispute where the employee approached the forum under the said Act after an inordinate delay could not be entertained, or adjudicated.
The Delhi High Court, therefore, held that there was a benefit derived by the employer by cessation or remission of liability and that the amount of outstanding workmen dues was taxable u/s. 41(1).
Observations
Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides that every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence. Section 18(1) of that Act provides that where, before the expiration of the prescribed period for a suit or application in respect of any property or right, an acknowledgment of liability in respect of such property or right has been made in writing signed by the party against whom such property or right is claimed, or by any person through whom he derives his title or liability, a fresh period
of limitation shall be computed from the time when the acknowledgment was so signed.
Therefore, the law of limitation merely bars filing of a suit for recovery of debts beyond the period of limitation. It does not bar payment of such amounts, where the debtor is willing to pay the liability.
As rightly observed by the Delhi High Court in Vardhaman Overseas’ case, as well as by other Courts, including the Supreme Court, the mere fact that recovery of a liability has been barred by limitation does not mean that the liability has ceased to exist. The assessee may still have the intention of paying off the liability, as and when demanded. Under such circumstances, taxing such liability would not be justified. Further, if such liability is subsequently paid off, the assessee would not be able to claim a deduction in the year of payment. Therefore, taxation of such outstanding amount, which is not written back, does not seem to be justified.
The Delhi High Court, in Chipsoft’s case, did not consider various other decisions of its own High Court, where the High Court had observed that disclosure of a liability in its Balance Sheet has the effect of extending the period of limitation, since it amounts to an acknowledgement of debt by the company for the purposes of section 18 of the Limitation Act. Further, it’s attention was also not drawn to its own earlier decisions in the case of Vardhaman Overseas and Hotline Electronics, where it had held that such amounts, suits for recovery of which may be barred by limitation, did not result in a benefit due to cessation or remission of liability.
Given the express observations of the Supreme Court in Bombay Dyeing’s and Sugauli Sugar Works’ cases, to the effect that a remission of a liability can only be granted by a creditor, and a cessation of the liability can only occur either by reason of operation of law, or by the debtor unequivocally declaring his intention not to honour his liability
when payment is demanded by the creditor, or by a contract between the parties or by discharge of the debt, the Delhi High Court does not seem justified in preferring to follow decisions of another High Court in preference to the decisions of the Supreme Court.
In Chipsoft’s case, the Delhi High Court relied to a great extent on the decisions of the Calcutta High Court in Agarpara’s and Kesoram’s cases. If one looks at the logic behind Agarpara’s case, it proceeds on the footing that the unpaid provision for bonus was an excess provision than that required under the law, and that it was, therefore, no longer
payable. Kesoram’s case dealt with unpaid wages, which were written back to the Profit & Loss Account. Following Agarpara’s case, the Calcutta High Court in Kesoram’s case held that considering the facts that the employer himself came to the conclusion that the unpaid amount of wages would not be claimed by the concerned employees, that it proceeded to forfeit such amount and wrote it back to the credit of the Profit & Loss Account, the reasonable inference that would follow from these facts and circumstances and the conduct of the assessee was that the amount which was provided for was not necessary and was an excess provision.
These facts were not present in Chipsoft’s case, as neither the employer had credited the amounts to the Profit & Loss Account nor were there any actions of the assessee to indicate that such amounts were no longer payable. In Chipsoft’s case, it was not proved by the revenue that such provision was an excess provision. Therefore, the application of the ratio of Agarpara’s and Kesoram’s cases to Chipsoft’s case does not seem to have been justified.
The decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Kohinoor Mills Ltd. vs. CIT 49 ITR 578, which was also a case dealing with unpaid wages, though these were written back to the Profit & Loss Account, was not brought to the attention of the Delhi High Court. The Bombay High Court, in that case, held:
“Where wages are payable but they are unclaimed and their recovery is barred by limitation, the position in law is that the debt subsists, notwithstanding that its recovery is barred by limitation. There is in such a case no ‘cessation of trading liability’ within the meaning of section 10(2A) and the amount of such wages cannot be added to the income.”
This view had been also confirmed by the Bombay High Court in the case of J. K. Chemicals Ltd. vs. CIT 62 ITR 34.
It also needs to be kept in mind that Explanation 1 to section 41(1) was inserted to expressly cover amounts written back by credit to the Profit & Loss Account. If the intention was to cover all liabilities outstanding beyond the period of limitation or beyond a particular period of time, whether written back or not, the explanation would have read differently. It would have provided for the specific year in which such debt, barred by limitation, is deemed to be income.
The view taken by the Delhi High Court in Vardhaman Overseas’ case, that such long outstanding amounts continuing as liabilities in the accounts, cannot be taxed u/s. 41(1), therefore, seems to be the better view of the matter.

DCIT vs. Swarna Tollway Pvt. Ltd. In the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal Hyderabad Bench ‘A’, Hyderabad Before Chandra Poojari, (A. M.) and Asha Vijayaraghavan, (J. M.) ITA No. 1184 to 1189/Hyd/2013 Asst. Years : 2005-06 to 2010-11. Decided on 16.01.2014 Counsel for Revenue/Assessee: P. Soma Sekhar Reddy/I. Rama Rao

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Facts:
The assessee was awarded the contract by the NHAI for widening, rehabilitation and maintenance of the existing two-lane highway into a four-lane on BOT basis. The entire cost of construction of Rs. 714.61 crore was borne by the assessee. The assessee claimed depreciation for the years under appeal. The AO held that no ownership, leasehold or tenancy rights were ever vested with the assessee for the assets in question, i.e., roads, in respect of which it had claimed depreciation and, therefore, disallowed the depreciation claimed on the highways.

On appeal by the assessee, the CIT(A) observed that though the NHAI remained the legal owner of the site with full powers to hold, dispose of and deal with the site consistent with the provisions of the agreement, the assessee had been granted not merely possession but also right to enjoyment of the site and NHAI was obliged to defend this right and the assessee has the power to exclude others. In view thereof and relying on certain decisions he held that the assessee was entitled for depreciation. Against this, the Revenue went in appeal before the tribunal.

Held:
The tribunal referred to the decision of the Apex court in the case of Mysore Minerals Ltd. vs. CIT (239 ITR 775) wherein the meaning of word “owner” was explained. In the said case, the Court had allowed the assessee’s claim for depreciation where the title deeds were not executed and possession was given. Further, the tribunal referred to the case of CIT v. Podar Cement (P.) Ltd. (226 ITR 625) (S.C.) where the Court considered the meaning of the word “owner” in section 22 and held that the owner is a person, who is entitled to receive income from the property in his own right. Further, relying on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of R.B. Jodha Mal Kuthiala vs. CIT (82 ITR 570), the Allahabad High Court in the case of CIT vs. Noida Toll Bridge Co. Ltd. (213 Taxman 333) and of the Hyderabad tribunal in the case of M/s. PVR Industries Ltd. (ITA No. 1171, 1175/Hyd/07 and 1176, 1196/Hyd/08 dated 08-06- 2011), dismissed the appeal filed by the revenue.

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[2013] 145 ITD 491(Mumbai- Trib.) Capital International Emerging Markets Fund vs. DDIT(IT) A.Y. 2007-08 Order dated- 10-07-2013

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i. Capital Loss from share swapping is allowed.

Facts:
Assessee-company, a Foreign Institutional Investor, was engaged in business of share trading.

The assessee received shares in ratio of 1 : 16 shares held by it in a company. This resulted in long term capital loss. AO disallowed the assessee’s claim of long term capital loss, on swap transaction. When the matter was referred to DRP, it was held that no sound reason was furnished by the assessee to explain as to why it entered in an exchange transaction that resulted in huge loss, that no prudent businessman would enter in to such a transaction, that swap ratio of shares transacted was not done by the competent authority i.e. a merchant banker.

Held:
Swapping of shares was approved by an agency of Govt. of India i.e. FIPB and it had approved the ratio of shares to be swapped. In these circumstances to challenge the prudence of the transaction was not proper. Even if the transaction was not approved by the Sovereign and it was carried out by the assessee in normal course of its business, the Ld AO/DRP could not question the prudence of the transaction. Genuiuness of a transaction can be definitely a subject of scrutiny by revenue authorities, but to decide the prudence of a transaction is prerogative of the assessee. A decision as to whether to do / not to do business or to carry out/not to carry out a certain transaction is to be taken by a businessman. If it is proved that a transaction had taken place, then resultant profit or loss has to be assessed as per the tax statutes. Therefore by casting doubt about the prudence of the transaction, members of the DRP had stepped in to an exclusive discretionary zone of a businessman and it is not permissible.

ii. Set off of short term capital loss subject to STT allowed against short term capital gain not subjected to STT

Facts:
Assessee has claimed set off of short-term capital loss subjected to Securities Transaction Tax(STT) against the short-term capital gains that was not subjected to STT. The AO held that as both the transactions were subject to different rates of tax, the set off of loss is not correct. He held that in order to set off the short term capital loss, there should be short term capital loss and short term capital gain on computation made u/s. 48 to 55. The assessee was entitled to have the amount of such short term capital loss set off against the short term capital gain, if any, as arrived under a similar computation made for the assessment year under consideration.

Held:
The phrase “under similar computation made” refers to computation of income, the provisions for which are contained u/ss. 45 to 55A of the Act. The matter of computation of income was a subject which came anterior to the application of rate of tax which are contained in section 110 to 115BBC. Therefore, merely because the two sets of transactions are liable for different rate of tax, it cannot be said that income from these transactions does not arise from similar computation made as computation in both the cases has to be made in similar manner under the same provisions. The Tribunal therefore, held that short term capital loss arising from STT paid transactions can be set off against short term capital gain arising from non SIT transactions.

Note: Readers may also read following decisions of Mumbai Tribunal:

• DWS India Equity Fund [IT Appeal No. 5055 (Mum.) of 2010]

• First State Investments (Hong Kong) Ltd. vs. ADIT [2009] 33 SOT 26 (Mum)

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[2013] 145 ITD 111 (Hyderabad – Trib.) SKS Micro Finance Ltd. vs. DCIT A.Y. 2006-07 & 2008-09 Order dated- 21-06-2013

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Section 32 – Assessee acquired entire business of ‘S’ – Depreciation claimed by assessee on acquisition of rights of clients of ‘S’ contending that consideration paid towards transfer of clients was an intangible asset eligible for depreciation – AO and CIT(A) disallowed the claim holding that the right acquired was not an intangible asset – Tribunal held that by acquiring the customer base the assessee has acquired business and commercial rights of similar nature and hence eligible for depreciation.

Facts:
The assessee was engaged in the business of Micro Financial Lending Services through small joint liability groups and direct micro loans. The assessee entered into memorandum of understanding (MOU) with ‘S’, another company which was also engaged in the business of micro finance and acquired the entire business of ‘S’. This also included the acquisition of rights over more than 1.10 lakhs existing clients of ‘S’. The assessee claimed depreciation on the amount contending that the consideration paid to ‘S’ towards transfer of clients was for an intangible asset eligible for depreciation. It was contended that the customers were a source of assured economic benefits over the next 5 years and in that process, the assessee capitalised the cost in the books and amortised the cost over a period of 5 years.

The AO disallowed depreciation holding that the intangible asset claimed to have been acquired by the assessee does not come under any of the identified assets appearing in the depreciation schedule (intangible asset) i.e. know-how, patents, copy rights, trade marks, licenses, franchises or any other business or commercial rights of similar nature. The AO held that as the assessee had acquired part of the already existing business of ‘S’, the said asset had not been created during the course of business of the assessee and hence cannot be considered to be a business or commercial rights of similar nature.

The CIT (A) held that the customer base acquired by the assessee cannot be considered a licence or business or commercial right of similar nature as it does not relate to any intellectual property whereas section 32(1)(ii) contemplate depreciation in respect of those licenses or rights which relate to intellectual property.CIT(A) relied on decision of the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in case of CIT vs. Techno Shares & Stocks Ltd. [2009] 184 Taxman 103.

Held:
The customer base acquired by the assessee has provided an impetus to the business of the assessee as the customers acquired are with proven track record since they have already been trained, motivated, credit checked and risk filtered. They are source of assured economic benefit to the assessee and certainly are tools of the trade which facilitates the assessee to carry on the business smoothly and effectively. Therefore, by acquiring the customer base the assessee has acquired business and commercial rights of similar nature.

The Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of Areva T & D India Ltd. ([2012] 345 ITR 421) while interpreting the term “business or commercial rights of similar nature” has held that the fact that after the specified intangible assets the words “business or commercial rights of similar nature” have been additionally used, clearly demonstrates that the Legislature did not intend to provide for depreciation only in respect of specified intangible assets but also to other categories of intangible assets. In the circumstances, the nature of “business or commercial rights” cannot be restricted to only know-how, patents, trade marks, copyrights, licences or franchisees. All these fall in the genus of intangible assets that form part of the tool of trade of an assessee facilitating smooth carrying on of the business.

The CIT(A) while coming to his conclusion had relied upon the decision of the Bombay High Court in case of CIT vs. Techno Shares & Stock Ltd. wherein the High Court while considering the issue of transfer of membership card of Bombay Stock Exchange has held that it does not Constitute an intangible asset. However, this decision of the High Court has been reversed by the Supreme Court in the case of Techno Shares and Stocks Ltd. vs. CIT [2010] 327 ITR 323. The SC has held that intangible assets owned by the assessee and used for the business purpose which enables the assessee to access the market and has an economic and money value is a “licence” or “akin to a licence” which is one of the items falling in section 32(1) (ii) of the Act.

Based on all the above decisions, it was held that the specified intangible assets acquired under slump sale agreement were in the nature of “business or commercial rights of similar nature” specified in section 32(1)(ii) of the Act and were accordingly eligible for depreciation under that section.

Readers may also read Mumbai Tribunal decision in case of India Capital Markets (P.) Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT [2013] 29 taxmann.com 304/56 SOT 32 (Mum.)

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2013-TIOL-802-ITAT-AHD Kulgam Holdings Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT ITA No. 1259/Ahd/2006 Assessment Years: 2002-03. Date of Order: 21.06.2013

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S/s. 28, 45 – For the purpose of deciding whether the Deep Discount Bond is a short term capital asset or a long term capital asset the holding period has to commence from the date of allotment of the DDB and not from the date of its listing on the National Stock Exchange.

Income does not accrue on a day to day or year to year basis on Optionally Fully Convertible Premium Notes where the terms of the issue provide that the holder of OFCPN could only in the last quarter of the 5th year decide to convert or not to convert the OFCPN into equity shares and in the event of his deciding not to convert the OFCPN into equity shares becomes entitled to Face value being a sum greater than issue price.

Facts I:

On 18-03-2002, the assessee sold 330 Deep Discount Bonds (DDBs) Series A of Nirma Ltd. of Rs. 330 lakh for a consideration of Rs. 4,02,92,630. The DDBs were allotted to the assessee vide letter of allotment dated 28-07-2000. The debenture trust deed was dated 27-04-2001 and certificate of holding to the assessee was issued on 10-05-2001. These DDBs were made available for dematerialisation on 24-09- 2001 and were listed in NSE on 20-09-2001.

The surplus arising on sale of DDBs was returned by the assessee as long term capital gain and benefit of section 54EC was claimed.

The Assessing Officer held that for deciding whether the DDBs are long term capital asset or short term capital asset the holding period should commence from the date of listing of the DDBs on NSE and not from the date of allotment as was the case of the assessee. He, accordingly, considered the gain to be short term capital gain and denied the benefit of section 54EC of the Act.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who upheld the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held I :
The Tribunal observed that in the case of Karsanbhai K. Patel (HUF) (ITA No. 1042/Ahd/2006 dated 09-10- 2009; assessment year 2002-03) the Tribunal was considering an identical issue on identical facts. In the said case, the Tribunal held that the period of holding has to be counted from the date of allotment. Following the ratio of the said decision, the Tribunal held that the holding period be counted from the date of allotment. If the holding period was counted from the date of allotment, in the present case, the gain arising on transfer of DDBs would be long term capital gain and the assessee would be entitled to claim benefit of section 54EC. The Tribunal decided the issue in favor of the assessee.

Fact II:

The assessee held Optionally Fully Convertible Preference Notes (OFCPN) of Nirma Industries Ltd. which were acquired by the assessee on 25- 03-2002 i.e. after the date of issue of CBDT Circular No. 2 dated 15-02-2002. The assessee was following mercantile system of accounting.

The OFCPN were of the face value of Rs. 33,750 and were issued for Rs. 25,000. The Tenure was five years from the date of allotment. The terms of the issue provided that the investor had an option to put the OFCPN in the last quarter of 5th year. The investor also had an option to convert each of the OFCPN at the end of 5th year from the date of allotment into 2,500 equity shares of Rs. 10 each at par but no interest would be payable till maturity. If the assessee opts for conversion, it would get 2,500 equity shares of Rs. 10 each at par in lieu of one OFCPN of issue price of Rs. 25,000 and the assessee will not get any monetary gain in the form of interest or otherwise and only if the assessee does not exercise this option then the assessee will get Rs. 33,750 after the expiry of the period of 5 years from the date of allotment.

In view of the terms of the issue, the assessee was of the view that no interest accrued on day to day basis or on year to year basis. However, the Assessing Officer (AO) made an addition of Rs. 47,812 to the total income of the assessee on account of notional accrued interest on OFCPN.

This issue was raised as an additional ground and was admitted. The Tribunal observed that since this issue was not raised before the lower authorities normally it would be restored to the file of the CIT(A) or the AO but since a legal issue had to be decided as to whether as per the terms of the OFCPN of Nirma Industries Ltd., it can be said that any income is accruing on year to year basis or not and since the terms of the issue were before the Tribunal and also before the authorities below the Tribunal decided to decide the issue rather than restore it back to the file of the lower authorities.

Held II:

The Tribunal noted that, as per the terms of issue, in the initial 4 years, the assessee is not eligible to decide as to whether he is going to exercise the option of convertibility or not and such option is to be exercised only in the last quarter of the 5th year and the assessee will get shares at the end of the period of 5 years and no interest as such is payable till maturity even if the assessee does not opt for conversion. If the assessee does not opt for conversion into equity shares he will get Rs. 33,750 for each OFCPN after the expiry of period of 5 years from the date of allotment. The debentures are transferable during the period of 5 years and company is also eligible to purchase debentures at discount, at par or at premium in the open market or otherwise. Hence, in the earlier period also, if the assessee is not opting for conversion in the equity shares, the assessee can sell the debentures in the open market or to the issuer company and it is quite natural that in the open market, such debentures will command such price which will include offer price plus proportionate accretion on account of difference in the issue price and the face value which can be considered as interest although no such nomenclature is given for accretion in the issue details.

The Tribunal held that the issue details suggest that no income is guaranteed to the assessee even after 5 years period from the date of allotment if the assessee opts for conversion and the assessee will get the income being difference between the face value and the issue price only if such option of conversion is not exercised by the assessee which he can exercise only in the last quarter of 5th year. There was an argument forwarded by the learned DR that before the last quarter of the 5th year, the assessee has an option to sell these OFCPNs because these OFCPNs are transferable and in that situation, the assessee will get at least issue price plus proportionate accretion till date of transfer over and above the issue price. This may be correct but in our considered opinion, even in the light of these facts, it cannot be said that any income is accruing to the assessee on day to day or year to year basis. The OFCPN may be held by the assessee as investment or trading item. If the assessee is holding OFCPN as a trading item and till the same is sold by the assessee, it has to be considered by the assessee as closing stock which has to be valued at the cost or market price whichever is lower and in that situation, even if the market price is more than the cost price i.e. issue price, then also this income is not taxed till the sale takes place. Although, if the market price goes down below the cost price i.e. issue price then in that situation, the assessee can claim loss to that extent by valuing the closing stock of OFCPN at market price but in case the market price is more than the cost price, no income is accruing to the assessee till the same is sold.

In another situation, where the assessee is holding these OFCPNs as investment then also, the income if any in respect of such capital asset is taxable only as capital gain and that too after the capital asset in question is transferred by the assessee. Till the actual transfer takes place, neither any income is taxable in the hands of the assessee even if the market value of the asset has gone up nor any loss is allowable to the assessee even if market value of the asset has gone down. It is not the case of the AO that the assessee has sold or transferred these OFCPNs in the present year. In the absence of this, it cannot be said that any income has accrued to the assessee even if it is accepted that the market value of these OFCPNs till the last date of the present year is more than cost price i.e. issue price which can be issue price plus proportionate accretion and the difference between the face value and issue price.

We have already discussed that the nature of OFCPN is not that of a fixed deposit and it is also not of the nature of DDB because of convertibility option and uncertainty about receipt of any extra amount over and above the issue price. Even on conversion, shares are to be allotted at par and not at premium i.e. face value.
Considering all these facts, we hold that in the facts of the present case, it cannot be said that any income has accrued to the assessee on account of these OFCPNs of Nirma Industries Ltd. because no sale has taken place and there is no guaranteed income to the assessee even after 5 years in case the assessee opts for conversion into shares at par.

The Tribunal allowed this ground of appeal of the assessee.

2013-TIOL-885-ITAT-MUM Citicorp Finance (India) Ltd. vs. Addl. CIT ITA No. 8532/Mum/2011 Assessment Years: 2007-08. Date of Order: 13-09-2013

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Form 26AS – Department is required to give credit for TDS once valid TDS certificate had been produced or even where deductor has not issued TDS certificates on the basis of evidence produced by the assessee regarding deduction of tax at source and on the basis of indemnity bond.

Facts:
For assessment year 2007-08 the assessee claimed total credit for TDS of Rs. 21,51,63,912 – claim of Rs 16,52,09,344 was made in the original return and further claim of Rs 1,42,71,296 was made in revised return filed on 13-04-2009 and a claim of Rs. 3,56,83,272 was made vide letter, dated 28-12-2010, filed in the assessment proceedings. The Assessing Officer (AO) granted credit of TDS only to the tune of Rs. 11,89,60,393. The AO did not grant credit claimed because of discrepancy with respect to credit shown in Form No. 26AS.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who directed the assessee to furnish all TDS certificates in original before the AO and directed the AO to verify the claim of credit of TDS and to allow TDS as per original challans available on record or as per details of such TDS available on computer system of the department.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where it was contended that credit of TDS has to be given on the basis of TDS certificates and in case TDS certificates are not available, on the basis of details and evidence furnished by the assessee regarding deduction of tax at source. Reliance was placed on the decision of Bombay High Court in the case of Yashpal Sawhney vs. ACIT (293 ITR 593). Reference was also made to the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Court on its own Motion vs. CIT (352 ITR 273).

Held:
The Tribunal noted that the credit of TDS has been denied to the assessee on the ground that the claim for TDS was not reflected in computer generated Form No. 26AS. It observed that the difficulty faced by the tax payer in the matter of credit of TDS had been considered by the Hon’ble High Court of Bombay in the case of Yashpal Sawhney vs. DCIT (supra) in which it has been held that even if the deductor had not issued TDS certificate, the claim of the assessee has to be considered on the basis of evidence produced for deduction of tax at source as the revenue was empowered to recover the tax from the person responsible if he had not deducted tax at source or after deducting failed to deposit with Central Government. The Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in case of Court on its Own Motion v. CIT (supra) have also directed the department to ensure that credit is given to the assessee, where deductor had failed to upload the correct details in Form 26AS on the basis of evidence produced before the department. Therefore, the department is required to give credit for TDS once valid TDS certificate had been produced or even where the deductor had not issued TDS certificates on the basis of evidence produced by the assessee regarding deduction of tax at source and on the basis of indemnity bond.

The Tribunal modified the order passed by the CIT(A) on this issue and directed the AO to proceed in the manner discussed above to give credit of tax deducted at source to the assessee.

This ground of appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

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2013-TIOL-959-ITAT-DEL ITO vs. Tirupati Cylinders Ltd. ITA No. 5084/Del/2012 Assessment Years: 2004-05. Date of Order: 28.06.2013

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S/s. 148, 151, 292B – U/s. 151 approval for issue of notice u/s. 148 has to be granted only by the Joint Commissioner or the Additional Commissioner. If the approval is not granted by the Joint Commissioner or the Additional Commissioner but is instead granted/taken from the Commissioner of Income-tax then notice for reassessment issued u/s. 148 would not be valid and assessment done pursuant to such notice would be liable to be quashed.

Facts:
For the assessment year 2004-05, the assessee filed a return declaring income of 31-08-2004. The return was processed u/s. 143(1) of the Act. Subsequently a notice was issued u/s. 148 of the Act. In response to this notice, the assessee filed a letter asking the Assessing Officer (AO) to treat the return filed u/s. 139 to be a return in response to the said notice. In an order passed u/s. 143(3) r.w.s. 147 of the Act, the AO made an addition of Rs. 10 lakh u/s. 68. In the order passed u/s. 143(3) r.w.s. 147 the AO mentioned that no notice u/s. 143(2) of the Act was served to the assessee within the statutory time limit during the original assessment proceedings. In the reassessment proceedings, the AO had mentioned that as a matter of precaution permission of CIT was obtained.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who held that the reassessment to be null and void, since it was not in accordance with the provisions of the Act.

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that the Delhi High Court has in the case of CIT vs. SPL’s Siddhartha Ltd. (345 ITR 223)(Del) held that u/s. 151 of the Act it was only the Joint Commissioner or the Additional Commissioner who could grant the approval of the issue of notice u/s. 148 of the Act. The court has further held that if the approval was not granted by the Joint Commissioner or the Additional Commissioner and instead taken from Commissioner of Income-tax, then the same was not an irregularity curable u/s. 292B of the Act and consequently notice issued u/s. 148 was not valid.

Following this decision of the Delhi High Court, the Tribunal decided the issue in favor of the assessee and held that the reopening of assessment was not in accordance with law and was liable to be quashed.

The appeal filed by revenue was dismissed.

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Recovery of tax: Reduction of period for payment: Section 220(1) proviso: A. Y. 2010-11: Budget deficit of Income Tax Department is not a ground for reduction of period:

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Amul Research and Development Association vs. ITO; 359 ITR 549 (Guj):

The assessee is a charitable trust which enjoyed exemption u/s. 11 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. For the A. Y. 2010-11 exemption u/s. 11 was denied by an order u/s. 143(3) of the Act and a demand of Rs. 1,41,07,755/- was raised. A period of seven days was granted instead of statutory period of 30 days from the date of service of the notice as prescribed u/s. 220 of the Act. Assessee preferred an appeal and also filed stay application before Commissioner(Appeals). In the mean time, the Assessing Officer recovered a sum of Rs. 1,39,70,275/- from the bank account of the assessee on 28th March, 2013.

The Gujarat High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee, set aside the demand notice dated 13/03/2013, with a formal direction to the Revenue to refund the amount of Rs. 1,39,70,275/- by way of a cheque to be issued in favour of the assessee within two weeks and held as under:

“i) S/s. (1) of section 220 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, any amount otherwise than by way of advance tax, specified as payable in a notice of demand to be issued u/s. 156 of the Act, needs to be paid within 30 days of the service of the notice. However, the proviso to section 220(1) of the Act gives discretionary powers to the Assessing officer to reduce such period.

ii) Two conditions are required to be fulfilled before the Assessing officer resorts to this exception of the statutory period of 30 days. Firstly, he must have a reason to believe that the grant of the full period of 30 days would be detrimental to the interest of the Revenue and, secondly, prior permission of the Joint Commissioner requires to be obtained. The words “reason to believe” must have the same flavor as one finds in the case of exercise of powers by a reasonable man acting in good faith, with objectivity and neutrality based on material on record or exhibited in the order itself. The prior permission of the superior officer is to ensure that the powers are not exercised arbitrarily and there is a safeguard of a higher officer applying his mind independently to the issue in question when such belief is communicated by the Assessing Officer.

iii) If the demand is not likely to be defeated by any “abuse of process by the assessee”, belief cannot be sustained on the ground that availing of the full period would be detrimental to the interest of the Revenue.

iv) The reason given for reduction of the period for payment of taxes was that in the assessee’s place of assessment there was a budget deficit in the Income-tax Department. It was the budget deficit which was the very basis for making such a formation of belief. Another reason given was that the assessee had a rich cash flow and if the period of 30 days was reduced, the budget deficit would be met and the target set by the Department would be achieved.

v) The reasoning was contrary to the very object of introducing the proviso for giving discretion to the Assessing Officer. It clearly and unequivocally indicated that the Assessing Officer had completely misread the provision and his belief was neither of a reasonable man nor at all based on a rational connection with the conclusion of reduction of the period on account of it being detrimental to the Revenue.

vi) While issuing notice to the bank u/s. 226(3) of the Act for making payment, a notice has also to be given to the assessee which in this case was on the very day when the notice was issued to the bank. No opportunity had been given to the assessee for meeting such a notice issued to the bank. The sizeable amount of Rs. 1.39 crore had been withdrawn and deposited in the account of the Revenue on the very same day. Notice was an illusory and empty formality. This arbitrary exercise of withdrawal of amount from bank also required interference.

vii) Moreover, when the very action of the Assessing Officer was held to be contrary to the provisions of the law, the assessee’s not resorting to note (3) of the demand notice u/s. 156 of the Act or its having resorted to an alternative remedy was not bar to the court exercising the writ jurisdiction.”

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Cash credits: Section 68: A. Y. 1989-90: Meaning of “any sum”: No explanation regarding particular amount: Addition of sum in excess of such particular amount is not permissible u/s. 68:

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D. C. Rastogi vs. CIT; 359 ITR 513 (Del):

For the A. Y. 1989-90 the assessee could not satisfactorily explain cash entry to the tune of Rs. 15,17,060/-. The Assessing Officer was of the opinion that even the profits returned were not truly disclosed as were other sources of income. He, therefore, proceeded to reject the accounts and complete the assessment on an estimate basis. Accordingly, the Assessing Officer made an addition of Rs. 25 lakh over and above the specific amount of Rs. 15,17,060/-. The Commissioner (Appeals) reduced the estimation to Rs. 17 lakh. This was upheld by the Tribunal.

The Delhi High Court allowed the assessee’s appeal and held as under:

“i) In the case of section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, there cannot be any estimate even if for the rest of the accounts, such an exercise is validly undertaken. This is for the simple reason that the expression “any sum” refers to any specific amount and nothing more.

ii) U/s. 68 any amount other than one found credited in the account books of the assessee could not be estimated and charged to tax.”

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Capital gain: Business profits vs. Capital gains: S/s. 45, r.w.s. 28(i): A. Y. 2006-07: Conversion of stock-in-trade (shares) into investment in 2002 and 2004: Sale of such shares in relevant year: Profit is capital gain and not business income:

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Yatish Trading Co. (P.) Ltd. vs. CIT; 359 ITR 320 (Bom):

218 Taxman 316 (Bom): The assessee was engaged in the business of investments and also dealing in shares and securities. In the A. Y. 2006-07, the assessee declared income under the heads ‘profits and gains of profession’ and also under the head ‘capital gains’. The Assessing Officer noted that a part of the capital gains declared was in respect of transfer of shares/securities which were held by the assessee originally as stock-intrade as a dealer in shares/securities which were converted into investment by the assessee on 1st April, 2002 and 1st October, 2004. He held that the short term and long term gains arising out of the sale of shares which were held originally as stock in trade and converted into investments was to be treated as business income. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim. The Tribunal held that it is not in dispute that the conversion of its stock in trade into investment was accepted by the Department in A. Ys. 2003-04 and 2005-06. It is also not in dispute that the shares which were sold and gains from such sales were offered under the head capital gains from the date of conversion from stock in trade into investments and prior thereto as business profits. Further in its books of account the assessee showed the shares on which tax is levied under the head capital gain as investments. Further the fact that the assessee was trading in the shares would not estop the assessee from dealing in shares as investment and offer the gain for tax under the head capital gains. Thus, it is open to the trader to hold shares as stock in trade as well as investments.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) Once the finding of fact is recorded that the shares sold were held by assessee as investments, the gains arising out of the sale of investment were to be assessed under the head capital gains and not under the head business profits.

ii) In view of the above, we see no question of law arises for our consideration. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.”

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Capital gain: Exemption u/s. 54F: A. Y. 2009- 10: Construction of new house commenced before the sale of ‘original asset’: Denial of exemption u/s. 54F not proper:

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CIT vs. Bharti Mishra; [2014] 41 taxmann.com 50 (Delhi):

The assessee, an individual, had sold shares and thereafter the sale proceeds of Rs. 54,86,965/- were invested in construction of house property. Exemption was claimed u/s. 54F of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Assessing Officer rejected the claim on the ground that the construction of the house had commenced before the date of sale of shares. The Tribunal allowed the claim of the assessee.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) Section 54F(1) if read carefully states that the assessee being an individual or Hindu Undivided Family, who had earned capital gains from transfer of any long-term capital asset not being a residential house could claim benefit under the said section provided, any one of the following three conditions were satisfied; (i) the assessee had within a period of one year before the sale, purchased a residential house; (ii) within two years after the date of transfer of the original capital asset, purchased a residential house and (iii) within a period of three years after the date of sale of the original asset, constructed a residential house.

ii) For the satisfaction of the third condition, it is not stipulated or indicated in the section that the construction must begin after the date of sale of the original/old asset. There is no condition or reason for ambiguity and confusion which requires moderation or reading the words of the said s/s. in a different manner.

iii) Section 54F is a beneficial provision and is applicable to an assessee when the old capital asset is replaced by a new capital asset in form of a residential house. Once an assessee falls within the ambit of a beneficial provision, then the said provision should be liberally interpreted.

iv) In view of the aforesaid position, we do not find any merit in the present appeal and the same is dismissed.”

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Business expenditure: TDS: Disallowance: Royalty: Section 9(1) Expl. (2), 194J and 40(a)(ia): A. Y. 2009-10: Consideration for perpetual transfer for 99 yrs of copyrights in film is not “royalty”:

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Mrs. K. Bhagyalakshmi vs. Dy. CIT; 2013] 40 taxmann. com 350 (Mad):

The assessee is a person carrying on business in the purchase and sale of Telugu films. For the A. Y. 2009-10, the Assessing Officer, made a disallowance of Rs.7,16,15,000/- for non-deduction of TDS u/s. 194J of the Income-tax Act,1961 by invoking section 40(a) (ia) of the Act on the ground that the purchase of film rights fell under the term “Royalty” and that the agreement entered into between the assessee with respect to purchase of film rights was termed as an assignment agreement and the assignee of the satellite rights and the person who transferred such rights was the assignor and such rights were given for a period of 99 years. Therefore, the Assessing Officer held that it is not a sale but a mere grant of satellite right in the movie produced by the assignor and the payments made for transfer of such rights fall within the meaning of “Royalty”. The CIT(A) allowed the assessee’s appeal and held that the payments made by the assessee could not be termed as ‘Royalty’ as they are not covered by Explanation 2 to Clause (vi) of section 9(1) of the Act and the payment were covered by section 28 of the Act as trading expenses and there was no scope for invoking section 40(a)(ia) of the Act and therefore the CIT(A) held that the payments for acquiring of the film rights were not exigible for deduction of Tax at Source u/s. 194J of the Act as they did not qualify as ‘Royalty’. The Tribunal reversed the decision of the CIT(A) and upheld the disallowance.

On appeal by the assessee, the Madras High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) We have seen the various conditions contained in the sample transfer deed and there is a transfer of copy right in favour of the assessee. Though the agreement speaks of perpetual transfer for a period of 99 years, in terms of section 26 of the Copy Right Act, 1957, in the case of cinematographic film, copy right shall subsist until 60 years from the beginning of the calendar year next following the year in which the film is published. Therefore, the agreement in the case on hand, is beyond the period of 60 years, for which the copy right would be valid, the document could only be treated as one of sale.

ii) We have no hesitation to hold that the findings of the First Appellate Authority was perfectly justified in holding that the transfer in favour of the assessee as sale and therefore, excluded from the definition of “Royalty” as defined under clause (v) to Explanation (2) of section 9(1) of the Act.

iii) In the result, the order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal shall stand set aside and the Tax Case(Appeal) is allowed.”

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Business expenditure: Capital or revenue: A. Ys. 1994-95 to 2004-05: Media cost paid for the import of a master copy of Oracle Software used for duplication and licensing is an expenditure of a revenue nature and as such is an allowable deduction:

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Oracle India (P.) Ltd. vs. CIT; [2013] 39 taxmann.com 150 (Delhi):

The Appellant company is a subsidiary of Oracle Corporation USA. The Appellant company entered into a licence agreement with its parent/holding company under which the Appellant was granted non-exclusive non-assignable right and authority to duplicate on appropriate carrier media software products or other products and sub-licence the same to third parties in India. The holding company retained the ownership of the copyright. For the relevant years the Assessing Officer disallowed the claim for deduction of the royalty paid to the holding company treating the same as capital expenditure. The Tribunal upheld the disallowance.

The Delhi Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal, allowed the assessee’s appeal and held that the expenditure was of revenue nature and as such an allowable deduction.

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Assessee in default: TDS: S/s. 194B and 201: A. Ys. 2001-02 and 2002-03: Non-deduction of TDS from lottery winnings in kind: Assessee not in default: Not liable u/s. 201:

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CIT vs. Hindustan Lever Ltd.; 264 CTR 93 (Kar):

The assessee company was engaged in manufacture and sale of certain consumer products. Under its sales promotion scheme the purchasers were entitled to prizes as indicated on the coupons inserted in the packs/containers of their products. The prizes were Santro car, Maruti car, gold chains, gold coins, gold tablas, silver coins, emblems etc. The total amount of prizes distributed valued at Rs. 6,51,238/- for A. Y. 2001-02 and Rs. 54,73,643 for A. Y. 2002- 03. The Assessing Officer held that what has been paid by the assessee as prize in kind is a lottery on which tax was deductible u/s. 194B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and treated the assessee as an assessee in default on the ground that the assessee neither deducted the tax nor ensured payment thereof before the winnings were released. Accordingly, the Assessing Officer raised a demand of Rs. 3,78, 550/- for the A. Y. 2001-02 and Rs. 17,73,902/- for A. Y. 2002-03 u/ss. 201(1) and 201(1A). The Tribunal cancelled the demand and held that there was no obligation on the assessee to deduct tax at source in respect of prizes paid in kind and in absence of any such obligation no proceedings u/s. 201 could be taken against the assessee.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) From the plain reading of the proviso to section 194B, it is clear that it does not provide for deduction of tax at source where the winnings are wholly in kind and it simply puts a responsibility to ensure payment of tax, where winnings are wholly in kind. In the present case, admittedly the winnings were wholly in kind.

ii) The combined reading of sections 194B and 201 would show that if any such person fails to “deduct” the whole or any part of the tax or after deducting, fails to pay the tax as required by or under this Act, without prejudice to any other consequences, which he may incur, be deemed to be an assessee in default in respect of the tax. In other words, the provisions contained in these sections do not cast any duty/responsibility to deduct the tax at source where the winnings are wholly in kind. If the winnings are wholly in kind, as a matter of fact, there cannot be any deduction of tax at source.

iii) The proceedings against the person u/s. 201, such as the assessee in the present case, who fails to ensure payment of tax, as contemplated by proviso to section 194B, before releasing the winnings, are not maintainable or the proceedings against such person are without jurisdiction.”

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Assessee in default: TDS: S/s. 192, 201(1) and 201(1A) : A. Y. 1992-93: Short deduction on account of bona fide belief: Assessee not in default: Not liable u/s. 201(1) and 201(1A):

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CIT vs. ITC Ltd.; 263 CTR 241 (All):

Assessee believed that conveyance allowance is exempt and accordingly computed TDS u/s. 192 excluding conveyance allowance. The Assessing Officer treated the assessee as assessee in default and raised demand u/s. 201(1) and also levied interest u/s. 201(1A). The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s appeal and cancelled the demand.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Allahabad High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“Assessee was under bona fide belief that the conveyance allowance was exempt u/s. 10(14) and tax was not deductible at source and therefore assessee could not be treated as assessee in default for charging interest u/s. 201(1A) of the Act.”

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Export – Deduction u/s. 80HHC – DEPB credit – Matter remanded to the Assessing Officer in accordance with the law laid down in Topman Exports.

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The assessee was a manufacturer-exporter. For the assessment year 2003-04, the assessee filed return of income on 28th November, 2003, showing a total income of Rs. 1,79,80,000. The assessee also claimed deduction u/s. 80HHC of the Act. The claim of the assessee for such deduction included consideration of Rs. 1,54,67,000 upon transfer of the DEPB credit. The Assessing Officer was of the opinion that 90 % of such sum had to be excluded for the purpose of deduction u/s. 80HHC of the Act. He framed the assessment accordingly.

The assessee approached the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), who confirmed the decision of the Assessing Officer, holding that the entire amount received by the assessee towards consideration on transfer of the DEPB credits would be covered u/s. 28(iiid) of the Act. Ninety per cent of the such amount, therefore, had to be excluded for the purpose of working out of the deduction u/s. 80HHC of the Act. The Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) observed that the treatment to the DEPB amount should be the same as that of duty draw back. In other words, the entire amount of the DEPB credit would be covered under section 28(iiid) of the Act. The Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) was of the opinion that the cost of acquiring the DEPB credit to the assessee was nil.

The assessee carried the issue in appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal in the detailed judgment considered various aspects including the interpretation of various clauses of section 28, and in particular, clause (iiid) of section 28 and its co-relation to section 80HHC of the Act. The Tribunal was of the opinion that the face value of the DEPB would be the cost of its acquisition by the assessee. If the assessee sold such DEPB credit at a price higher than the face value, the difference would be the profit of the assessee which would be covered u/s. 28(iiid) of the Act. It is only this element which to the extent of 90 per cent be excluded for the purpose of working out section 80HHC deduction. The Tribunal also referred to Explanation (baa) to section 80HHC, by virtue of which, 90 % of the income referred to in section 28(iiid) of the Act is to be excluded from the total turnover of the assessee for the purpose of working out section 80HHC deduction.

The Revenue carried the matter to the High Court, which on combined reading of the Government of India policy providing for the DEPB benefits, the decision of the Bombay High Court in Kalpataru Colours and Chemicals (2010) 328 ITR 451 (Bom.) and the apex court, in Liberty India vs. CIT (2009) 317 ITR 218 (SC) concluded that the face value of the DEPB credit cannot be taken to be its cost of acquision in the hands of the assessee-exporter.

According to the High Court, the Tribunal committed an error in coming to the conclusion that on transfer of the DEPB credit by an assessee only the amount in excess of the face value therefore would form part of profit as envisaged in clause (iiid) of section 28.

Before the Supreme Court, the learned Additional Solicitor General for the Revenue, fairly submited that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Topman Exports vs. CIT [2012] 342 ITR 49 (SC), the civil appeal deserved to be allowed and the matter should be sent back to the Assessing Officer.

The Supreme Court for the reasons given in Topman Exports (supra) set aside the judgement and order of the Gujarat High Court and directed the Assessing Officer to compute the deduction u/s. 80HHC of the Income-tax Act, 1961, in the light of the observations made by it in Topman Exports.

Note: A similar decision was delivered by the Supreme Court in the case of Global Agra Products vs. ITO (2014) 360 ITR 117 (SC)

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MAT – A Conundrum unsolved..

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Synopsis

Minimum Alternate Tax (‘MAT’) was introduced as an alternative mode of tax with an intent to maintain minimum quantum of tax to be paid by the assessee – company which made profits but offered little or negligible income to tax by virtue of various deductions. While the methodology for computing MAT appears simple , the same has been under the subject matter of controversy due to interpretation of terms contained in section 115JB.

In the following article, the authors have analysed the treatment of a provision for the purposes of MAT and brought out the various dimensions of the issue.

1. Introduction

The era of MAT began as an ‘alternative mode’ of tax. With the efflux of time, the MAT regime has actually left us with no ‘alternative’ but to ‘tax’. Its objective is well known; although the text and content is vexed which often keeps the tax doyens perplexed. This complex provision has thrown out innumerable issues from its Pandora box. In this article, we have attempted to address one such issue through a case study.

2. Case Study

X Limited is an Indian company which acquired 1,00,000 equity shares of Y Limited for a consideration of Rs. 60 crore. In Year 1, X Limited created a “Provision for investment loss” amounting to Rs. 16 crore [by debiting the profit and loss account]. Cost of investment in the balance sheet was reduced to the extent of the provision (ie, Rs. 16 crore). The net loss as per the profit and loss account was Rs. 17 crore.

While computing the book profit under the provisions of section 115JB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (“the Act”), the Provision for investment loss (i.e. Rs 16 crore) was “added back” to net the loss as per the profit and loss account. The book loss (u/s. 115JB) for Year 1 was accordingly computed at Rs. 1 crore. The loss computed under the regular provisions of the Act was Rs. 50 lakh. The loss computed under regular provisions being lower than the book loss, the return of income for Year 1 was filed with the loss of Rs. 50 lakh.

Subsequently, in Year 2, X Limited sold the 100,000 equity shares in Y Limited for Rs. 68 crore. The sale resulted in a gain of Rs. 8 crore. X Limited recognised this gain as “Profit on sale of investment” in the Profit and loss account along with reversal of Provision for investment loss (pertaining to shares sold during the year) amounting to Rs. 16 crore. Cumulatively, profit on sale of investment recognised in financial statements added up to Rs. 24 crore [ie, 8 crore + 16 crore]. The company paid tax under the provisions of MAT (section 115JB) amounting to Rs. 2 crore [after reducing Rs. 16 crore from the net profit].

In this background, the write-up discusses the appropriateness of the MAT computation carried out by X Limited.

3. Case Analysis

MAT – General principles

Minimum Alternate Tax (“MAT”) computed u/s. 115JB is an alternative regime of taxation. The section provides for an alternate, nay an additional mechanism, of ‘computing the tax liability’ of an assessee apart from the normal computation. A comparison is made between tax payable under the normal provisions of the Act and the tax payable on “book profit”. The higher of the tax payable from out of the two computations would have to be discharged by the assessee company.

S/s. (1) to section 115JB requires a tax (at 18.5%) on book-profit to be compared with income-tax payable on the total income as computed under the Act. Section 115JB is an alternative tax mechanism. This is evident from the section heading which reads – “Special provision for payment of tax by certain companies”. It is thus a special provision for payment of tax. The intent of section 115JB is to maintain the minimum quantum of tax (at 18.5% on book profit) that an assessee-company should be liable to pay. If the tax u/s. 115JB is higher, the “book-profit” is deemed to constitute the total income of the Company.

‘Book Profit’ is defined in Explanation 1 to section 115JB. It is defined to mean the net profit as shown in the profit and loss account prepared as per s/s. (2) to section 115JB as reduced or increased by certain sums specified in the section. S/s. (2) requires the profit and loss account to be prepared in accordance with Parts II & III of Schedule VI of the Companies Act, 1956. In arriving at the net profit, therefore, the principles outlined in Parts II & III of schedule VI of the Companies Act, 1956, shall be followed [Apollo Tyres Ltd (2002) 255 ITR 273(SC) and CIT vs. HCL Comnet Systems & Services Ltd. (2008) 305 ITR 409 (SC)].

Explanation 1 outlines a process of additions and deletions of certain sums to the ‘net profit’ disclosed in the Profit and loss account. Judicial precedents indicate that these adjustments are exhaustive. No other adjustments apart from those outlined in the explanation can be made to the ‘net profit’ to arrive at the “book profit”.

Characteristics of book-profit

S/s. (1) to section 115JB envisages a comparison of taxes. If the tax on book profit is higher than the tax payable under the normal provisions of the Act, then, (i) such book-profit would be deemed to be the total income and (ii) the tax payable shall be the tax on book profit (at 18.5%). A two-fold deeming fiction is envisaged. The total income under the normal provisions is replaced with book profit and the tax payable under the normal provisions paves way for ‘tax on book-profit’. Thus, s/s. (1) visualises a 3 step-approach:

(i) The book profit should be an outcome of the computation envisaged in Explanation 1 wherein, net profit as per the profit and loss account is adjusted by the adjustments specified therein;

(ii) Tax on such book profit should exceed the tax on income under the normal provisions; and

(iii) On satisfaction of the twin characteristics above, the book profit is deemed as the total income and the tax on book profit shall be the tax payable by the assessee.

Step ‘(iii)’ is a natural consequence of steps ‘(i)’ & ‘(ii)’. S/s. (1) of section 115JB is operative only when steps (i) and (ii) result in step (iii). In other words, in the absence of book profit or if tax on income under the normal provisions exceeds or is equal to the tax on the book profit, the deeming fiction in step (iii) is not to be invoked. If step (i) and (ii) do not culminate in step (iii), the computation in step (i) [book profit computation] becomes relevant only for step (ii) [comparison] and not step (iii). This is because, the computation of total income under normal provisions is sustained and the occasion of its replacement by book profit does not occur/ arise.

In case the computation [of book profit] under step (i) results in a negative number (or book loss, step (ii) becomes inapplicable or irrelevant. The comparison envisaged in step (ii) is between ‘tax on total income’ and ‘18.5% on book profit’. A negative book profit will invariably result in tax on total income under the normal provisions not being lower than tax on book profits. This can be explained by looking at the twin possibilities below:

Case 1 – Positive total income and book loss

In the above case, tax on total income under the normal provisions (being a positive number) exceeds the “tax payable” on the negative book profit (or book loss) and consequently results in tax on total income under the normal provisions being higher than 18.5% of book profit. Accordingly, section 115JB(1) is not satisfied.

Case 2 – Nil total income and book loss

Particulars

Amount (Rs)

 

 

Total income under the normal provisions

Nil

 

 

Tax on total income (@ 30%) – (A)

0

 

 

Book loss

(20)

 

 

18.5% on book loss – (B)

(3)

 

 

Tax payable by the
assessee (Higher of A and B)

0

 

 

In the above case, tax on total income (being nil) exceeds the negative tax on the book profit (or book loss) and consequently results in tax on total income being higher than 18.5% of book profit. Accordingly, section 115JB(1) is not satisfied.
In both the situations, “tax” on total income un-der the normal provisions would exceed 18.5% on book loss (or negative book profit). It is a trite to state that ‘total income ’ could either be ‘positive’ or ‘nil’.There cannot be negative total income. Consequently, there cannot be a ‘tax in negative’. For section 115JB to operate, ‘18.5% of book profit’ should be higher than such tax. Even if ‘18.5% on book loss’ is taken to be ‘nil’ in both the aforesaid examples, tax on total income under the normal provisions would not be lower which is the primary condition for section 115JB to be invoked.

Creation of provision for investment loss

In the given case study, X Limited created ‘Provi-sion for investment loss’ which was added back (or adjusted) while computing the book profit u/s. 115JB. The company had filed its return of income in Year 1 with loss (computed under normal provisions of the Act) amounting to Rs. 50 lakh. This loss was lower than the book loss (u/s. 115JB) for Year 1 which was Rs. 1 crore.

Being a book loss, there was no occasion to compute ‘tax on book profit’. Comparison of taxes u/s/s. (1) was not possible. The total income and tax payable could not be deemed as ‘book profit’ and ‘tax on book profit’ respectively for Year 1. Accordingly, operation of section 115JB was not triggered. For Year 1, the ‘Provision for investment loss’ was added back (or adjusted) while computing the “book profit” u/s. 115JB. The net result of the computation was a loss.

The appropriateness of this treatment (i.e, adding back of the provision) can be examined by traversing through the various adjustments housed in Explanation 1. These adjustments can be bisected into ‘upward adjustments’ and ‘downward adjustments’ which increase and decrease the net profit respectively. The opening portion of the Explanation 1 reads – “For the purposes of this section, “book profit” means the net profit as shown in the profit and loss account for the relevant previous year prepared u/s/s. (2), as increased by…”.

The phrase used is ‘net profit’. The expression ‘net profit’ and ‘net loss’ are not synonymous and can-not be used interchangeably. One could argue that the Explanation 1 visualises only a ‘net profit’ and not a ‘net loss’. In other words, the adjustments contemplated under Explanation 1 are not operative where the net result of operation is a loss. This is because the threshold condition to ignite section 115JB, viz. ‘net profit’, is not satisfied.

Further, the opening portion of the Explanation 1 deals with ‘increase’ of ‘net profit’ by certain adjustments. The second portion which deals with downward adjustments deals with reduction of the net profit by certain adjustments. The phrase used therein is “reduced by”. Thus, the law envisages an ‘increase’ and ‘decrease’ of net profits. The legislature has not employed the phrase “adjusted by”. The phrases used in the Explanation 1 have specific connotations. They cannot be understood in any modified manner. This aspect is important because an adjustment which ‘increases’ a ‘net profit’ would arithmetically ‘decrease’ if the start point were to be a ‘net loss’. This opposite numerical consequence indicates that the adjustments in the first portion have to necessarily result in an increase in the base figure and the ones in the latter portion should cause a reduction. Accordingly, the law visualises only ‘net profit’ to be the start point or base figure [and not ‘net loss’].

In the present case study, the net loss as per Profit and loss account in the Year 1 was Rs. 17 crore. Existence of net loss thus excludes X Limited from the clutches of section 115JB. Accordingly, it could be argued that there was no need to carry out any computation u/s. 115JB.

Alternative view

If one were to adopt the aforesaid position [that MAT is operative only on ‘net profit’], then all loss making companies would be excluded from the gamut of MAT computation. Such interpretation, although may be literally correct, would defy the objective of MAT computation. This could encourage the practice of ‘skewing of profits’ or ‘window dressing’ of financial statements.

Having accepted that loss making companies are also subject to MAT provisions (like in the present case), one needs to understand whether the book profit computation carried out by X Limited for Year 1 is in accordance with Explanation 1.

Two adjustments which could be relevant in the present context are clause (c) and (i) of the first part of the Explanation 1. These clauses read as under:

(c)    the amount or amounts set aside to provisions made for meeting liabilities, other than ascertained liabilities

……

(i)    the amount or amounts set aside as provision for diminution in the value of any asset

As per clause (c) of Explanation 1, any provision for liability other than ‘ascertained liability’ is to be added to the net profit in order to arrive at the book profit for the purpose of section 115JB. A liability may be capable of being estimated with reasonable certainty though the actual quantification may not be possible. Even though estimation is involved, it would amount to a provision for ascertained liability. The intention of the legislature in inserting clause (c) is to possibly prohibit provision for contingent liability helping in reduction of the book profit. A provision for loss on investment should not be regarded as provision for meeting unascertained liability.

Prior to insertion of clause (i), there was no express provision which dealt with provision for diminution in the value of asset. It amply clarified by the Apex Court in the case of CIT vs. HCL Comnet Systems & Services Ltd. (2008) 305 ITR 409 (SC) that clause
(c)    does not deal with diminution in value of as-sets. The Court observed (although the decision was in the context of provision for doubtful debts) that a provision for doubtful debts is to cover up the probable diminution in value of asset (debtors) and is not provision for a liability. Thus, provision for diminution in value of assets cannot be equated with provision for liabilities. Consequently, clause (c) in Explanation 1 cannot be applied in cases where a diminution in value of investments is contemplated.

Subsequently, clause (i) in second part under Explanation 1 was inserted by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2009, with retrospective effect from 01-04-2001. Acknowledging that clause (c) was not suitable to rope in provision for loss in the value of assets, clause (i) was inserted to achieve this objective. Clause (i) statutorily affirms the Apex Court decision that provision for diminution in value of assets is different from provision for liabilities.

Clause (i) employs the expression “provision for diminution in the value of any asset”. Both clause (c) and

(i)    use the term ‘provision’. This is possibly because a provision need not necessarily be for a liability and it could also be for diminution in the value of assets or for loss of an asset. This is discernible from the definitions/ description given in the ICAI literature and Company Law provisions. The word “provision” has not been defined in the Act. The Guidance Note on “Terms Used in Financial Statements” issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India defines the term ‘provision’ as under:

“an amount written off or retained by way of providing for depreciation or diminution in value of assets or retained by way of providing for any known liability, the amount of which can-not be determined with substantial accuracy.”

Paragraph 7(1) of Part III of old Schedule VI to the Companies Act, 1956
defines the term ‘provision’ as under:

“the expression ‘provision’ shall, subject to sub-clause (2) of this clause, mean any amount written off or retained by way of providing for depreciation, renewals or diminution in value of assets or retained by way of providing for any known liability of which the amount cannot be determined with substantial accuracy.”

From the above, one can discern that a provision need not necessarily be for a liability. It can also be provision for depreciation or diminution in value of assets. The Mumbai Tribunal in the case of ITO vs. TCFC Finance Limited (ITA No.1299/Mum/2009) held that provision for diminution in the value of investment has to be added for computing book profit, regardless of the fact whether or not any balance value of the asset remains. The Tribunal also defined the meaning of the term “diminution” in the following manner:

“In common parlance the word “diminution” indicates the state of reduction. The Shorter Oxford Dictionary gives the meaning of the word “diminution” as “the action of making or becoming less; reduction “. Accordingly, any provision made for diminution in the value of any asset, is to be added for computing book profit under the provisions of section 115JB”

In the present case-study, the provision was created against loss due to decrease in the realisable value of investment (i.e, shares in Y Limited). It signifies preparedness for a dip in the value of the asset (Y Limited shares). The provision for investment loss after the amendment to the statute would be covered within the precincts of clause (i).

Reversal of provision for investment loss in Year 2

In the present case study, X Limited sold 100,000 equity shares in Y Limited in Year 2 for a gain of Rs. 8 crore. The company reversed the provision for investment loss amounting to Rs. 16 crore. Conse-quently, Rs. 16 crore was included in net profits while computing the MAT liability. After reducing Rs. 16 crore from the net profit, the company discharged its tax liability under MAT.

There is no dispute around inclusion of Rs. 8 crore in the book profit [being gain from the sale of shares]. The question is whether while computing book prof-its under MAT, reversal of “Provision for investment loss” was to be ‘retained’ or ‘reduced’ from the net profits in ascertaining tax on book profit.

As already detailed, Explanation 1 outlines the computation of book profit involving certain additions and deletions (or adjustments) to the ‘net profit’. The start point of such computation is ‘Net Profit as shown in the Profit & Loss Account’. The adjustments contemplated in the definition include ones which increase such net profit (‘Upward Adjustments’) and items which reduce the net profit (‘Downward Adjustments’). One such ‘Downward Adjustment’ is amount withdrawn from any Reserve or Provision, if any such amount is credited to the Profit & Loss Account and had been instrumental in increasing the book profit for any earlier year. Clause (i) of the second part of Explanation 1 which houses this adjustment, reads as under:

(i)    the amount withdrawn from any reserve or provision (excluding a reserve created before the 1st day of April, 1997 otherwise than by way of a debit to the profit and loss account), if any such amount is credited to the profit and loss account:


Provided that where this section is applicable to an assessee in any previous year, the amount withdrawn from reserves created or provisions made in a previous year relevant to the assessment year commencing on or after the 1st day of April, 1997 shall not be reduced from the book profit unless the book profit of such year has been increased by those reserves or provisions (out of which the said amount was withdrawn) under this Explanation or Explanation below the second proviso to section 115JA, as the case may be;

Clause (i) read with the proviso appended to it mandates reduction of net profits by the amount withdrawn from any reserves/provisions if – (a) it is credited to the profit and loss account and (b) the book profit u/s. 115JA / 115JB for year in which such provision was created had been increased by the amount of such provision. In other words, reduction as per Clause (i) is permissible only on satisfaction of twin conditions. Firstly, the amount withdrawn is credited to profit and loss account and secondly at the time of ‘creation’ of reserve, the ‘Book Profit’ had been increased by the amount of the said with-drawal. This was the mandate of the Apex Court in the case of Indo Rama Synthetics (I) Limited vs. CIT (2011) 330 ITR 363 (SC). The ruling advocates a strict reading of the downward adjustment for withdrawal from reserve. The Supreme Court held that if the reserves created are not referable to the profit and loss account and the amount had not gone to increase the book value at the time of creation of the reserve; the question of deducting the amount (transferred from such reserve) from the net profit does not arise at all. The Apex Court held that the objective of clauses (i) to (vii) is to find out the true and real working result of the assessee company.

In the present case, X Limited had credited the re-versal of provision for investment loss to its profit and loss account in Year 2. The reversal of the pro-vision to the profit and loss account satisfies the first condition referred to above. On this, there is no dispute. The doubt is regarding the compliance of the second condition. X Limited has excluded such reversal while computing the MAT liability. To enable such exclusion, the said reversal (of provi-sion) should have ‘decreased’ the book losses in the year of its creation (i.e, Year 1). A reduction of book loss has the same effect as increase in book profit. Accordingly, the second condition is satisfied. The question is whether the said treatment is tenable? Can increase in book profits (in the year of creation) to the extent of provision created by itself, satisfy the stipulated condition? Does such increase necessarily have to culminate in tax being payable under the MAT regime? Should an increase in book profit (on creation of provision) necessarily be accompanied with a tax liability u/s. 115JB?

The answer to this issue has both ‘for’ as well as ‘against’ view points. The analysis would not be complete, unless both the possible views are captured. The following paragraphs discuss these viewpoints:

View I – Increase in book profits should result in payment of tax under MAT

As per this view -point, the increase in book profit should result in tax liability under the MAT provisions. If such increase does not culminate in tax being payable u/s. 115JB, then the reversal of such provision should not be reduced while computing the book profit.

In this regard, it may be relevant to peruse circular no.550 issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes explaining amendments to Income-tax Act vide Finance Act, 1989. The relevant portion of the same is as under:

“Amendment of the provisions relating to levy of minimum tax on ‘book profits’ of certain companies

24.4 Further, under the existing provisions certain adjustments are made to the net profit as shown in the profit and loss account. One such adjustment stipulates that the net profit is to be reduced by the amount withdrawn from reserves or provisions, if any, such amount is credited to the profit and loss account. Some companies have taken advantage of this provision by reducing their net profit by the amount withdrawn from the reserve created or provision made in the same year itself, though the reserve when created had not gone to increase the book profits. Such adjustments lead to unintended lowering of profits and consequently the quantum of tax payable gets reduced. By amending section 115J with a view to counteract such a tax avoidance device, it has been provided that the “book prof-its” will be allowed to be reduced by the amount withdrawn from reserves or provisions only in two situations, namely :—

(i)    if the reserves have been created or provisions have been made in a previous year relevant to the assessment year commencing before 1st April, 1988; or

(ii)    if the reserves have been created or provisions have been made in a previous year relevant to the assessment year commencing on or after 1st April, 1988 and have gone to increase the book profits in any year when the provisions of section 115J of the Income-tax Act were applicable.” (emphasis supplied)

The Circular clarifies that clause (i) is an anti-abuse provision. It was introduced to prohibit unintended lowering of profits and consequent reduction of tax payable. The intent was to induce parity in tax treatment in the year of creation and withdrawal of reserves. The objective is to plug-in tax leakage. The emphasis is on the payment of correct quantum of tax. The amendment seeks to impact the tax liability under MAT and not the mere arithmetic adjustment of book profit. In this background, it may be pertinent to observe the closing portion of the above quoted circular. It is clarified that the amount withdrawn from reserves or provisions is deductible in MAT computation only if (a) the reserves have been created or provisions have been made for the year on or after 1st April, 1988 and (b) have gone to increase the book profits in any year when the provisions of section 115J of the Income-tax Act were applicable. Twin conditions are visualised by the circular. The first relates to year of creation being on or after 01-04-1998 and the second mandates that the book profits should have been increased in the year in which section 115J is applicable. The latter condition thus requires not only enhancement of book profit but such increment has to occur in the year in which section 115J is applicable. MAT is “applicable” when the final discharge of tax happens under the regime of section 115J. The phrase “is applicable” has to be read in such context. Otherwise, it would have no meaning, as section 115J being a part of the statute would in any way be “applicable” to any company. The circular issued in the context of section 115J should also be applicable to section 115JB purposes, as in substance, the provisions are the same (More on ‘applicability’ of section 115JB later).

The latter condition of book profit enhancement accordingly has to occur in the year in which section 115JB is applicable. Section 115JB is an alternate tax regime. It is applicable only when the tax on book profits exceeds the tax on total income. If the tax on book profits does not ‘exceed’ tax on total income, section 115JB is not applicable.

To conclude, amount withdrawn from reserves or provisions is deductible in MAT computation only if (a) provisions have been made for the year on or after 01-04-1988; (b) such amount has gone to increase the book profit in the year in which taxes were payable under MAT regime (or section 115JB).

This view is supported by the Hyderabad tribunal in Vista Pharmaceuticals Ltd vs. DCIT (2012) 6 TaxCorp (A.T.) 27449 (Hyd). The issue before the tribunal was with regard to direction of the CIT to consider the interest waived to be included in the computation of book profit under section 115JB. The facts of the case were that the assessee computed its book profit u/s. 115JB at ‘nil’ after reducing the amount of interest waived by bank on the ground that it is the amount withdrawn from provision for interest to financial institutions debited to Profit and Loss account in earlier year now credited. The tribunal held as under:

“In the case of the present assessee, the amount withdrawn from reserve or provision i.e., waiver of interest cannot be considered as part of book profit since it was never allowed in the computation of book profit of the company in any of the earlier years since the company never had any book profit being sick industrial undertaking…….

It is also an admitted fact that in the earlier years there is no computation of book profit ex con-sequentia, there was no assessment with regard to computation of book profit u/s. 115JB of the Act. It was held in the case of Narayanan Chettiar Industries vs. ITO (277 ITR 426) that in respect of remission of liability no addition can be made un-less an allowance or deduction is allowed to the assessee in the previous year. Further in the case of Rayala Corporation Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT, 33 DTR 249, wherein it was held that returns for earlier years have been found defective by the Assessing Officer and declared to be nonest, as the assessee had failed to rectify the defect in spite of notice issued u/s. 139(9) of the Act, deduction of interest claimed in such returns cannot be deemed to have been allowed and, therefore, interest waived by bank cannot be charged u/s. 41(1) of the Act.

6.    Taking the clue from the above judgments, similarly, unless the provision created by the assessee towards interest liability is allowed as a deduction while computing the book profit u/s. 115JB, when the assessee writes back the same to the Profit and Loss A/c, then it should be considered for determining the book profit. It is nobody’s case that interest liability has been allowed as deduction in earlier years. In other words, an allowance or deduction has been made in earlier years in respect of interest liability while computing the book profit and writing back the same could be added to the book profit. A reading of clause (i) to Explanation 1 to section 115JB(2) gives the above meaning.” (emphasis supplied)

The Hyderabad Tribunal ruled that unless the provision increased the “book profit” in an earlier year, the write back of such provision should continue to be considered for determining the “book profit”. The Tribunal departed from the literal reading of clause (i) and the proviso therein. The clause (and the proviso) stipulates the increase in book profit in the year of creation of provision/reserve. The “increase” is not an exercise in vacuum but one which results in attraction and enhancement of book profit tax. The Tribunal opted to place reliance on the rationale in circular no.550.

In the present case, while computing book profit u/s. 115JB for Year 1, X Limited had decreased the net loss by the provision of Rs. 16 crore made for diminution in the value of investment. In Year 2, the company reversed Rs. 16 crore out of the above referred provision for investment loss.

The provision for investment loss was “added back” while computing book profit (in Year 1). However, there was no net profit as per Profit and loss account in that year. As already explained, in the absence of net profit, it could be argued that section 115JB is not applicable. Tax was also not discharged in that year u/s. 115JB. In effect, there is no addition of provision for diminution in value of investment allowance. Applying the principles of the circular and the Hyderabad Tribunal, X Limited has not suffered tax under MAT on creation of provision for investment loss. Consequently, reversal of such provision would continue to be included in book profits computation. Once section 115JB is not applicable in the year of creation of reserve, reversal of such provision cannot be excluded from book profit computation.

Further, the provision for diminution in value of investments did not result in any additional tax liability under the MAT computation. On the contrary, such provision has decreased/reduced income while computing the total income under the normal provisions of the Act. It is an ‘erosion of capital’ which resulted in a loss. Such loss was claimed as a charge against income chargeable to tax. Subsequently, these investments were sold at a price over and above the original cost of investments/ shares. To clarify:

X Limited purchased shares at Rs. 6,000.  A provision for diminution was created to the extent of Rs. 1,600.  This reduced the value of shares to  Rs. 4,400. On sale of shares at Rs. 6,800, X Limited made a capital gain of Rs. 2,400 [i.e, 6,800-4,400].  This gain of Rs. 2,400 consists of Rs. 800 (being its gain over and above the original cost of the asset) and Rs. 1,600 (being proceeds over and above the revised/ reduced cost of the asset). By creating a provision for Rs. 1,600, X Limited acknowledged and recognised that the value of investment had been eroded or vanished to such extent. Any   consideration exceeding the reduced value but not exceeding the actual cost would amount to ‘recoupment of loss’. It is a refurbishment of losses which were claimed as a charge against the profits in the earlier years.  Such refurbishment (of losses) would amount to income (in the year of reversal of provision).

Accordingly, one possible view is that reversal of provision for diminution in value of investment cannot be excluded under Clause (i) of the second part of Explanation 1 while computing book profits.

View II – Increase in book profits need not result in payment of tax under MAT

Literal interpretation
Clause (i) is permissible only on satisfaction of twin conditions – (i) amount withdrawn is credited to profit and loss account and (ii) at the time of ‘creation’ of reserve, the ‘Book Profit’ was increased by the amount of the said withdrawal. The mandate of the law is clear and unambiguous. Modern judicial approach to interpretation of statutes is often driven by literal rule. Laws and regulations are the intentions of legislators captured in words. Every statute must be read according to the natural construction of its words. The words of a statute are to be understood in their natural and ordinary grammatical sense. The aspect of allowance or deduction discussed by the Hyderabad Tribunal is deviation from the literal reading of the law. Nothing prevented the legislature to lay down law to this effect.  

View-I could result in absurd results Even otherwise, View I appears to revolve around whether the adjustment of provision for investment loss in the year of creation results in a positive book profits.  It could never be the intent of the law to discriminate between companies which have only a nominal value of book profits (post set-off of provision for investment loss) with those companies where the net loss is not completely wiped off by the provision for investment loss in the computation. This can be understood through the below explained illustration:

Particulars

Company A

Company B

 

 

 

Net loss as per Profit and loss

(10,000)

(10,000)

account for Year 1

 

 

 

 

 

Add: Provision for investment

10,100

9,900

loss

 

 

 

 

 

Book
profit/ (Loss)

100

(100)

If the aforesaid provision was reversed in Year 2, Company B would not be able to claim reduction in that year (if View I were to be followed). On the contrary, Company A which has a nominal book profit of Rs. 100 may be allowed reduction of pro-vision reversal in Year 2 (although one could argue that only proportionate reduction will be allowed). Such interpretation would result in unintended consequence.

View I results in tax on capital

In the present case study, consideration received on sale of shares (by X Limited) was over and above the historical or original cost of such shares. The differential between such sale consideration and original cost is a gain and has to be necessarily offered to tax. There is no dispute on this aspect. One could argue that consideration to the extent of reversal of provision is ‘capital’ in nature. This is because, such consideration (i.e, to the extent of reversal of provision) refills the vacuum created by provision. Levying a tax on such consideration would amount to a ‘tax on capital’. In essence, it would culminate in higher effective rate of tax on capital gains. The philosophy of MAT taxation was to provide for an alternate tax regime and not double taxation. A denial of reduction from book profit would compel the taxpayer to pay taxes on income which he never earned.

Section 115JB – wider applicability

Circular no. 550 clarified that the amount withdrawn from reserves or provisions is deductible in MAT computation only if (a) the reserves have been created or provisions have been made for the year on or after 1st April, 1988 and (b) have gone to increase the book profits in any year when the provisions of section 115J of the Income-tax Act were applicable. The latter condition thus requires not only enhancement of book profits but such increment has to occur in the year in which section 115J is applicable.

S/s. (1) to section 115JB deals with the ‘applicability’ of the provision. It is applicable to every “company”. If 18.5% of book profit of such company exceeds tax on its total income then, such amount (i.e, 18.5%) would be the tax payable and book profit would be the total income. Thus, section 115JB is applicable to every company but the liability to pay tax is only in case of certain companies. The ‘certain companies’ are those which are liable to tax under MAT. This is supported by the section heading which reads – “Special provision for payment of tax by certain companies”. Section 115JB deals thus deals with payment of tax ‘by certain companies’. In other words, section 115JB is ap-plicable to all companies but renders only ‘certain companies’[whose tax under MAT exceeds normal tax computation] as liable to tax u/s. 115JB.

Applying this proposition in the present case, section 115JB was applicable to X Limited in Year 1 [although there was a book loss]. The provision for investment loss was “added back” while computing book profits for that year. The adjustment resulted in a reduction of loss. A “reduction of loss” is effectively the same as “increase in profits”. Accordingly, reversal of such provision in Year 2 should be excluded from while computing book profits for the year.

One may, in this connection, refer to the decision of the Kolkata Tribunal in the case of Stone India Limited vs. Department of Income-tax [ITA Nos. 1254/ Kol/2010]. The Tribunal in this case had an occasion to deal with treatment of “Provision for diminution in value of investment” for the purposes of book profits u/s. 115JB. In this case, the assessee debited its Profit and Loss A/c for the year ended 31.03.2001 with certain provision for diminution in the value of investment. In computation of book profit u/s. 115JB of the Act the said provision for diminution in the value of investment was not added back to the book profit. Subsequently, out of the said provision, the assessee wrote back certain amount in the accounts for the year ended 31-03-2006. The question was whether the reversal of provision for diminution in the value of investment was deductible in computation of book profit for AY 2006-07. The Court observed –

“It is also observed that clause (i) of Explanation to section 115JB of the Act says that the amount withdrawn from any reserves or provisions created on or after 01- 04-1997, which are credited to the profit and loss account, shall not be reduced from the book profits, unless the books profits were increased by the amount transferred to such reserves or provisions in the year of creation of such reserves (out of which the said amount was withdrawn). In this case, provision for diminution in the value of investment Rs. 7,05,73,000/ – was created in the financial year 2000-01 relevant to assessment year 2001-02 but book loss of the said year was not appreciated by the said amount in the computation filed u/s. 115JB along with the return. As there is a loss of Rs. 30,008/- prior to providing of prior year adjustment and diminution in the value of investment, no addition has been made u/s. 115JB by the assessee in the assessment year 2001-02 on account of diminution in the value of investment….. and the

exceptional item on account of diminution in the value of investment has not been adjusted while computing the book profit u/s. 115JB. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the observation of the Ld. CIT(A)was not justified in directing the assessee…” (emphasis supplied)

In the aforesaid case, provision for investment loss was not added back to the net loss while computing the book profits. The same had been reversed in subsequent year. In the year of provision, there was a net loss. The assessee did not carry out any adjustment. The Tribunal therefore ruled that reversal cannot be reduced from the book profits. The basis or rationale for such decision is that the book profits were not adjusted or appreciated by the provision created.

The Tribunal appears to have laid emphasis on the ‘adjustment or appreciation’ of book profits. The conclusion of the tribunal was driven by the non-adjustment of book profits in the initial year. Applying the ratio of the Tribunal ruling, it appears that if an adjustment of “book profit” had been made in the year of creation of the reserve, it would suffice to exclude the reversal of provisions while computing book profit for a subsequent year.

4.    To conclude

X Limited had a net loss as per Profit and loss ac-count for Year 1. A view could be taken that MAT computation is not applicable in the year of loss and no adjustment contemplated u/s. 115JB is required. A better view would be that MAT provisions are applicable even in the year of loss and accordingly, adjustment of adding back provision for diminution in the value of investment in the Year 1 was appropriate.

As regards, exclusion of reversal of provision from book profit computation in Year 2, there are two views possible. View II appears to be appropriate and therefore reversal of provision should be excluded while computing book profits for Year 2.

5.    Fall out of view-ii

In the present case, there was a provision created for diminution in investment amounting to Rs. 16 crore in Year 1. Such provision reduced the profits (or increased the losses) for the year. Subsequently, in Year 2, such provision was reversed and credited to Profit and loss account. Such credit ‘enhanced’ the profits for the year. While computing book profit for MAT purposes, X Limited reduced such reversal of provision. Thereby ‘enhancement of profit’ was nullified. By this, MAT liability was reduced.

Due to the provision entry in Year 1, the brought forward loss of Year 2 was increased. This enhanced loss translated into an ‘(increased) deduction’ from book profits while computing MAT liability for Year 2.

This is due to a ‘downward’ adjustment as per clause
(iii)    of Explanation 1 to section 115JB which reads –
“the amount of loss brought forward or unabsorbed depreciation, whichever is less as per books of ac-count.” In this adjustment, the amount of brought forward losses (or business loss) is compared with unabsorbed depreciation loss; lower of the two is reduced in the book profits computation. The brought forward losses are to be adopted from the books of account. Consequently, an expense/ charge in the earlier years enhances the brought forward losses of the current year.

To sum-up, if View-II were to be adopted, X Lim-ited would avail dual benefit by – (i) reducing the book profits by amount of reversal in provision for diminution in value of investment and (ii) availing accelerated losses (depreciation or business loss whichever is less).

Penalty – Concealment of Income-Voluntary disclosures do not release the assessee from the mischief of penal proceedings.

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Mak Data P. Ltd., vs. CIT (2013) 358 ITR 593 (SC)

Penalty – Concealment of Income – The Assessing Officer during the assessment proceedings, is not required to record his satisfaction for initiation of penalty proceeding in a particular manner.

The appellant-assessee filed his return of income for the assessement year 2004-05 on 27th October, 2004, declaring an income of Rs. 16,17,040 along with tax audit report. The case was selected for scrutiny and notices were issued u/s. 143(2) and 142(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

During the course of the assessment proceedings, it was noticed by the Assessing Officer that certain documents comprising share application forms, bank statements, memorandum of association of companies, affidavits, copies of income-tax returns and assessment orders and blank share transfer deeds duly signed had been impounded. These documents had been found in the course of survey proceedings u/s. 133A conducted on 16th December, 2003, in the case of M/s. Marketing Services (a sister concern of the assessee). The Assessing Officer then proceeded to seek information from the assessee and issued a show-cause notice dated 26th October, 2006. By the showcause notice, the Assessing Officer sought specific information regarding the documents pertaining to share applications found in the course of survey, particularly, blank transfer deeds signed by persons, who has applied for the shares. Reply to the show-cause notice was filed on 22nd November, 2006, in which the assessee made an offer to surrender a sum of Rs. 40.74 lakh with a view to avoid litigation and buy peace and to make an amicable settlement of the dispute. Following were the words used by the assessee :

“The offer of surrender is by way of voluntary disclosure and without admitting any concealment whatsoever or any intention to conceal, and subject to non-initiation of penalty proceedings and prosecution”

The Assessing Officer after verifying the details and calculation of the share application money accepted by the company completed the assessment on 29th December, 2006 and a sum of Rs. 40,74,000 was brought to tax, as “income from other sources” and the total income was assessed at Rs. 57,56,700.

The Department initiated penalty proceedings for concealment of income and not furnishing true particulars of its income u/s. 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act. During the course of the hearing, the assessee contended that penalty proceedings are not maintainable on the ground that the Assessing Officer has not recorded his satisfaction to the effect that there has been concealment of income/furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income by the assessee and that the surrender of income was a conditional surrender before any investigation in the matter. The Assessing Officer did not accept those contentions and imposed a penalty of Rs. 14,61,547 u/s. 271(1)(c) of the Act. The assessee challenged that the order before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), which was dismissed.

The assessee filed as appeal before the Income-tax Appellant Tribunal, Delhi. The Tribunal recorded the following findings:

“The assessee’s letter dated November 22, 2006, clearly mentions that the offer of the surrender is without admitting any concealment whatsoever or any intention to conceal.”

The Tribunal took the view that the amount of Rs. 40,74,000 was surrendered to settle the dispute with the Department and since the assessee, for one reason or the other, agreed or surrendered certain amounts for assessment, the imposition of penalty solely on the basis of the assessee’s surrender could not be sustained. The Tribunal, therefore, allowed the appeal and set aside the penalty order.

The Revenue took up the matter in appeal before the High Court. The High Court accepted the plea of the Revenue that there was absolutely no explanation by the assessee for the concealed income of Rs. 40,74,000. The High Court took the view that in the absence of any explanation in respect of the surrendered income, the first part of clause (A) of Explanation 1 was attracted.

On appeal to the Supreme Court by the assessee, the Supreme Court fully concurred with the view of the High Court that the Tribunal has not properly understood or appreciated the scope of Explanation 1 to section 271(1)(c) of the Act.

According to the Supreme Court, the Assessing Officer should not be carried away by the plea of the assessee like “voluntary disclosure”, “buy peace”, “avoid litigation”, “amicable settlement”, etc., to explain away its conduct. The question is whether the assessee has offered any explanation for concealment of particulars of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars of income. The Explanation to section 271(1) raises a presumption of concealment, when a difference is noticed by the Assessing Officer, between reported and assessed income. The burden is then on the assessee to show otherwise, by cogent and reliable evidence., that income was not concealed or inaccurate particulars were not furnished. When the initial onus placed by the explanation, has been discharged by him, the onus shifts on the Revenue to show that the amount in question constituted the income and not otherwise.

The assessee has only stated that he had surrendered the additional sum of Rs. 40,74,000 with a view to avoid litigation, buy peace and to channelise the energy and resources towards productive work and to make amicable settlement with the Income-tax Department. The statute does not recognise those types of defences under Explanation 1 to section 271(1)(c) of the Act. It is a trite law that the voluntary disclosures do not release the appellant assessee from the mischief of penal proceedings. The law does not provide that when an assessee makes a voluntary disclosure of his concealed income, he had to be absolved from penalty.

The Supreme Court was of the view that the surrender of income in this case was not voluntary in the sense that the offer of surrender was made in view of detection made by the Assessing Officer in a survey conducted 0n the sister concern of the assessee. In that situation, it could not be said that the surrender of income was voluntary. The Assessing Officer during the course of assessment proceedings has noticed that certain documents comprising share application, forms, bank statements, memorandum of association of companies, affidavits, copies of income-tax returns and assessment orders and blank share transfer deeds duly signed, had been impounded in the course of survey proceedings u/s. 133A conducted on 16th December, 2003, in the case of a sister concern of the assessee. The survey was conducted more than 10 months before the assessee filed its return of income. Had it been the intention of the assessee to make full and true disclosure of its income, it would have filed return declaring an income inclusive of the amount which was surrendered later during the course of the assessment proceedings. Consequently, it was clear that the assessee had no intention to declare its true income. It is the statutory duty of the assessee to record all its transactions in the books of account, to explain the source of payments made by it and to declare its true income in the return of income filed by it from year to year. In the opinion of the Supreme Court, the Assessing Officer, had recorded a categorical finding that he was satisfied that the assessee had concealed true particulars of income and was liable for penalty proceedings u/s. 271 read with section 274 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

According to the Supreme Court, the Assessing Officer has to satisfy whether the penalty proceedings be initiated or not during the course of the assessment proceedings and the Assessing Officer is not required to record his satisfaction in a particular manner or reduce it into writing.

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Ghatkopar Jolly Gymkhana vs. Director of Income tax (E) In the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal “G” Bench, Mumbai Before D. Karunakara Rao, (A. M.) and Sanjay Garg (J. M) ITA No.882/Mum/2012 Assessment year:2009 -10. Decided on 23/10/2013 Counsel for Assessee / Revenue : A. H. Dalal / Santosh Kumar

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Section 2(15), 12A and 12AA – Charitable trust carrying on the activities which are in the nature of trade, commerce or business receipts therefrom exceeding the limit prescribed under second proviso to section 2(15) – Action of the AO in cancellation of registration by treating the trust as non-genuine not justifiable.

Facts
The assessee is a club registered u/s. 12A as a charitable trust. The DIT(E) noticed that the assessee was carrying on activities in the nature of trade, commerce or business and its gross receipts there from during the year were in excess of Rs.10 lacs, the limit then prescribed under second proviso to section 2(15). According to him since the activities of the assessee did not fall within the definition of charitable purpose as defined u/s. 2(15), the assessee trust became non-genuine and as such the provisions of section 12AA(3) got attracted. He accordingly cancelled the registration w.e.f assessment year 2009-10 and declared the assessee as non-charitable trust. Before the tribunal the revenue justified the order of the DIT(E).

Held
According to the tribunal, before the insertion of the second proviso from 01-04-2009, the definition of charitable purpose when read with first proviso was very restrictive. However, by the insertion of the second proviso the rigour of the first proviso has been diluted and is not applicable if the trust carries on business activities and the gross receipts therefrom is Rs. 10 lakh or less. Thus, according to the tribunal, from 01-04-2009 the carrying out of the activities of trade, commerce or business by a charitable trust is not barred so as to exclude its activities from the definition of charitable purposes. However, a limitation has been imposed to the effect that the gross receipts from such activities should not be more than Rs.10 lacs. The tribunal further noted that the use of the term “previous year” in the second proviso is also more relevant. It means the benefits will not be available to the assessee for the assessment year in which the gross receipts exceed the limit of Rs. 10 lakh. It does not mean that such benefits will not be available to the trust in the years during which its receipts does not exceed Rs. 10 lakh. According to the tribunal, in cases where the receipts from the activities in the nature of trade, commerce or business exceed the limit of Rs. 10 lakh, the registration of the trust as the charitable institution does not get affected, rather, it is the eligibility of the said trust to get tax exemption/benefits which gets affected that too for the relevant year during which the gross receipts of the trust crosses the limit of Rs. 10 lakh. For the said proposition, the tribunal also relied on the decision of the Jaipur bench of the Tribunal in the case of Rajasthan Housing Board vs. CIT (2012) 21 Taxmann.com77.

Accordingly, the tribunal held that the action of the CIT(A) in relying upon the second proviso to section 2(15) for cancelling the registration of the trust was not correct or justified. The only effect will be that the Assessee will not be entitled for exemption or tax benefits which otherwise would have been available to it being registered as charitable institution, for the relevant year during which its income has crossed the limit of Rs. 10 lakh. Subject to the same, the tribunal ordered the restoration of the registration granted to the trust.

(Editorial Note: By the Finance Act, 2011 the limit prescribed under second proviso to section 2(15) has been revised to Rs. 25 lakh w.e.f. 01.04.2012)

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Interpretation of Provisions of section 10(2A) in cases where income of the firm is exempt -Circular No. 8 dated 31st March 2014 [F.No. 173/99/2013-ITA]

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CBDT has clarified that ‘total income’ of the firm for s/s. (2A) of section 10 of the Act, includes income which is exempt or deductible under various provisions of the Act. The income of a firm is to be taxed in the hands of the firm only and the same can under no circumstances be taxed in the hands of its partners. Accordingly, the entire profit credited to the partners’ accounts in the firm would be exempt from tax in the hands of such partners, even if the income chargeable to tax becomes NIL in the hands of the firm on account of any exemption or deduction as per the provisions of the Act.

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Appeal before Tribunal: Rectification of mistake: Section 254(2): A. Y. 1996-97: Application for rectification: Period of limitation commences from the date of receipt of the order and not the date of the order:

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Peterplast Synthetics P. Ltd. vs. ACIT; 364 ITR 16 (Guj):

The assessee had received the order of the Tribunal dated 20-02-2007 on 19-11-2008. The assessee made an application for rectification u/s. 254(2) of the Incometax Act, 1961 on 09-05-2012. The Tribunal dismissed the application on the ground that the same is barred by limitation u/s. 254(2) as the application has been made beyond the period of four years from the date of the order.

The Gujarat High Court allowed a writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

“i) Section 254(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, is in two parts. Under the first part, the Tribunal may, at any time, within four years from the date of the order, rectify any mistake apparent from the record and amend any order passed by it under s/s. (1).

ii) Under the second part, the reference is to the amendment of the order when the mistake is brought to its notice by the assessee or the Assessing Officer. The statute has conferred the right in favour of the assessee or even the Revenue to prefer a rectification application within a period of four years and, therefore, even if a rectification application/ miscellaneous application is submitted on the last day of completion of four years from the date of receipt of the order, which is sought to be rectified, it is required to be decided on merits and in such a situation the assessee is not required to give any explanation for the period between the actual date of receipt of the order, which is sought to be rectified and the date on which the miscellaneous application is submitted.

iii) The order of the Tribunal sought to be rectified was received by the assessee on 19-11-2007. The assessee preferred the application on 09-05-2012. The application was not barred by limitation.”

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ITO vs. Theekathir Press ITAT Chennai `B’ Bench Before Dr. O. K. Narayanan (VP) and V. Durga Rao (JM) ITA No. 2076/Mds/2012 A.Y.: 2009-10. Decided on: 18th September, 2013. Counsel for revenue/assessee: Guru Bhashyam/J. Prabhakar

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Section 40(a)(ia)– Since there is a judicial controversy on whether section 40(a)(ia) applies to amounts that have already been “paid” or it is confined to amounts “payable” at the end of the year, the rule of judicial precedence demands that the view favorable to the assessee must be adopted.

Facts:
The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim of certain expenditure u/s. 40(a)(ia) on the ground that the tax has not been deducted at source. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) who allowed the appeal by stating that the amounts `payable’ only attract disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) and the amounts already paid would not attract the provisions of section 40(a) (ia).

Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where it relied on three decisions of Calcutta High Court and Gujarat High Court which have held that the law stated by the Special Bench in Merilyn Shipping & Transports vs. Addl CIT is not acceptable.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that the judgment of the Allahabad High Court is in favour of the assessee but the orders of the Calcutta High Court and the Gujarat High Court are against the assessee. It held that in such circumstances, the rule of judicial precedence demands that the view favourable to the assessee must be adopted, as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Vegetable Products Ltd. 88 ITR 192 (SC). In view of the fundamental rule declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the Tribunal following the judgment of the Allahabad High Court, which is in favor of the assessee, held that the disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) applies only to those amounts which are `payable’ and not to those amounts which are `paid’.

The appeal filed by the revenue was dismissed.

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Deduction u/s.80IB of Income-tax Act, 1961: A.Y. 1999-00: Condition of employing ten or more workers: ‘Worker’ means person employed by assessee directly or by or through any agency including a contractor.

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[CIT v. M/s. Jyoti Plastic Works Pvt. Ltd. (Bom.), ITA No. 5045 of 2010, dated 15-11-2011]

The assessee was engaged in the manufacture of goods by using job workers. Its total number of permanent employees was less than ten. If the job workers are taken into account, the number was more than ten. The assessee’s claim for deduction u/s.80IB was rejected on the ground that the total number of workers (permanent) was less than ten and the condition in section 80IB(2)(iv) was not satisfied. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim. The following question was raised in the appeal filed by the Revenue:

“Whether the Tribunal was justified in holding that the workers supplied by the contractor are also to be treated as workers employed by the assessee for the purposes of section 80IB(2)(iv) of the Income-tax Act, 1961?”

The Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“(i) Section 80IB(2)(iv)(iii) provides that an industrial undertaking must ‘employ’ ten or more workers in a manufacturing process carried on with the aid of power. The expression ‘worker’ which is not defined in the Act means any person employed by the assessee directly or by or through any agency (including a contractor).

(ii) What is relevant is the employment of ten or more workers and not the mode and the manner of employment. The fact that the employer-employee relationship between the workers employed by the assessee differs cannot be a ground to deny deduction u/s.80IB.”

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Deduction u/s.80HHE in case of MAT assessment is to be worked out on the basis of adjusted book profit u/s.115JA and not on the basis of profit computed under regular provisions of the law applicable to the computation of profits and gains of business or profession.

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[CIT, Chennai v. Bhari Incomation Tech. Sys P. Ltd., {SLP (Civil) No.33750/2009 dated 20-10-2011}]

The assessee filed its return of income for A.Y. 2000- 01. The assessee claimed deduction u/s.80HHE to the extent of Rs.1,56,33,719 against net profit as per profit and loss account amounting to Rs.3,07,84,105 to arrive at the book profit of Rs.1,51,50,386 u/s.115JA of the Income-tax Act, 1961. This claim for deduction made by the assessee was rejected by the AO.

According to the AO, since in the present case in normal computation no net profit was left after brought-forward losses of the earlier years got adjusted against the current year’s profit, the assessee was not entitled to deduction u/s.80HHE to the extent of Rs.1,56,33,719 for computing book profit u/s.115JA. In Appeal, the CIT(A) upheld the order of the AO. The assessee went in appeal, against the order of the CIT(A), before the Tribunal which, following the judgment of the Special Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax, Range 8(3) v. Syncome Formulations (1) Limited, [(2007) 106 ITD 193], took the view that the MAT scheme which includes section 115JA did not take away the benefits given u/s.80HHE. The said judgment of the Special Bench was with regard to computation of deduction u/s.80HHC which, like section 80HHE, fell under Chapter VI-A of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

The High Court upheld the judgment of the Tribunal. On further appeal, the Supreme Court observed that in the said judgment of Special Bench, which Kishor Karia Chartered Accountant Atul Jasani Advocate Glimpses of supreme court rulings squarely applied to the facts of the present case, the Tribunal had held that the deduction u/s.80HHC (section 80HHE also fell in Chapter VI-A) had to be worked out not on the basis of regular income tax profits, but it had to be worked out on the basis of the adjusted book profits in a case where section 115JA was applicable. In the said judgment the dichotomy between the regular income tax profits and adjusted book profits u/s.115JA was clearly brought out. The Tribunal in the said judgment had rightly held that in section 115JA relief had to be computed u/s.80HHC(3)/3(A).

According to the Tribunal, once law itself declared that the adjusted book profit was amendable for further deductions on specified grounds, in a case where section 80HHC (80HHE in the present case) was operational, it became clear that computation for the deduction under those sections needed to be worked out on the basis of the adjusted book profit. The Supreme Court noted that in the present case it was concerned with section 80HHE which was referred to in the Explanation to section 115JA, Clause (ix).

According to the Supreme Court, the judgment of the Special Bench of the Tribunal in Syncome Formulations (supra) squarely applied to the present case. Following the view taken by the Special Bench in Syncome Formulations (supra), the Tribunal in the present case had come to the conclusion that deduction claimed by the assessee u/s.80 HHE had to be worked out on the basis of adjusted book profit u/s.115JA and not on the basis of the profits computed under regular provisions of law applicable to computation of profits and gains of business. According to the Supreme Court there was no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment. The Supreme Court agreed with the view taken by the Special Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Syncome Formulations (supra). The Supreme Court dismissed the special leave filed by the Department. Note: In the above context, reference may also be made to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Ajanta Pharma Ltd., which has been analysed by us in the column ‘Closements’ in November, 2010 issue of the Journal.

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Taxability of Income from ‘sale of computer software’ as ‘royalty’

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Issue for consideration

Section 4 and section 5 r.w.s. 9(1)(vi) of the Act provide for taxability of income from royalty in India. Section 9(1)(vi) of the Act by a deeming fiction provides for the taxation of income from royalty in India. Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vi) of the Act defines the word ‘royalty’, which is wide enough to cover both industrial royalties as well as copyright royalties, both being forms of intellectual property. Computer software is regarded as an ‘industrial royalty’ and/or a ‘copyright royalty’. Industrial properties include patents, inventions, process, trademarks, industrial designs, geographic indicators of source, etc. and are generally granted for an article or for the process of making such article. Whereas on the other hand, copyright property include literary and artistic works, plays, films, musical works, knowledge, experience, skill, etc. and are generally granted for ideas, principles, skills, etc.

Just as tangible goods are sold, leased or rented in order to earn monetary gain, on similar lines, the Intellectual Property laws enable authors of the intellectual properties to exploit their work for monetary gain. The modes of exploitation of intellectual property for monetary gains are different for each type of Intellectual Property, which has been covered in various sub-clauses of the definition of ‘royalty’ under Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vi) and subjected to tax as per the scheme of the Act.

On similar lines, monetary gains arising from exploitation of computer program, an intellectual property, which subsists in computer software is sought to be taxed as royalty under the Act. Explanation 3 to section 9(1)(vi) defines computer software as computer program recorded on any disc, tape, perforated media or other information storage device and includes any such program or any customised electronic data. The Supreme Court in the case of Tata Consultancy Services v. State of AP, 271 ITR 401 held that shelf software were ‘goods’ for the purpose of Sales tax and that there was no distinction between the branded and unbranded software. Without prejudice to the applicability of the aforesaid conclusions as drawn by the Apex Court in context of indirect tax laws, to the provisions of the Act, at least one may refer to the aforesaid decision for a proper understanding as to what software is and what is the nature and character of software, which is also advised by the Apex Court in the decision. The controversy, sought to be discussed here, revolves around the issue whether the income from a sale of the computer software is a ‘royalty’, or is a ‘sale’.

The Revenue holds such sales to be royalty on the ground that during the course of sale of computer software, computer program embedded in it is also licensed and/ or parted with the enduser of the software, and as against the claim of the taxpayers who treat the transaction as one of sale of computer software and not of the computer program embedded in it. The Authority for Advance Rulings (‘AAR’) recently in its ruling in the case of Millennium IT Software Ltd., in re, 62 DTR 1 had an occasion to deal with the aforesaid issue under consideration, wherein the AAR while deciding against the taxpayer’s contention, held that the income from the transaction be regarded as a royalty, liable to tax in India. In deciding the issue in this case the AAR gave findings that were contrary to its own findings on the subject given in the earlier decisions in the cases of Dassault Systems K. K., in re, 322 ITR 125 and FactSet Research Systems Inc, in re, 317 ITR 169.

Millennium IT Software’s case

Millennium IT Software Ltd. (‘Millennium’), a Sri Lankan company, had entered into a software licence and maintenance agreement (‘SLMA’) with Indian Commodity and Exchange Ltd. (‘ICEL’), an Indian company, on 27 March 2009. Under the agreement, Millennium had allowed ICEL to use the software product ‘licensed program’, owned by it. As per the SLMA, an ‘implementation fee’ of Rs.4 crores was agreed to be paid by ICEL to Millennium for licence to use the ‘licensed program’ for 4 years and its installation, with a clause to extend the licence period at the discretion of ICEL. The other relevant terms of SLMA are provided as under:

— Millennium had granted ICEL a ‘right to use’ the licensed program for its business operation;

— Rights granted under the SLMA were nonexclusive, non-transferable, non-assignable, indivisible;

— Millennium had granted rights to make copies of the licensed program to be installed on equipments only at designated sites of ICEL and each copy of licensed program was to carry copyright, trademark and other notice relating to proprietary rights of Millennium;

 — ICEL had no right to sell, distribute or disclose the licensed program or associated documents to any third party;

 — No intellectual property right or licence was granted to ICEL.

Use of source code and reverse engineering of the licensed program was strictly prohibited; Based on the aforesaid clauses in SLMA, Millennium submitted before the AAR that the implementation fee was not chargeable to tax under the provisions of the Act or under the DTAA with Sri Lanka relying on some of the earlier favourable legal decisions on the subject. The Income-tax Department objected to the said contention of Millennium and submitted before the AAR, that consideration towards implementation fee should be termed as industrial intellectual property that was covered under the vires of the definition of ‘royalty’ under Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vi).

The AAR however, to begin with, chose to classify computer software as a copyright intellectual royalty as against the Revenue’s contention that it was an industrial intellectual property. The AAR observed that ICEL under SLMA was granted a ‘licence to use’ the computer program which was owned and developed by Millennium and that the consideration paid as ‘implementation fee’ was to enable ICEL to have a ‘right to use’ the licensed program. Further, the AAR held that as per SLMA, Millennium had not only conveyed the ‘right to use’ the software to ICEL but along with the said right had also enabled ICEL to ‘use’ copyright embedded in the program though limited in nature. The AAR in addition to above, held that the second proviso to section 9(1)(vi) of the Act was substantive in nature and if the conditions of second proviso to section 9(1)(vi) were not satisfied, then the intention of the Legislature was to tax even the income from sale of a computer software as a royalty under the Act.

Distinguishing its earlier decision on the facts in the case of Dassault Systems K. K. (supra), the AAR concluded that the consideration received for ‘right to use’ the software is embedded with right or interest in computer program and therefore, would be termed as royalty under the provisions of the Act as well as Article 12.3 of the DTAA with Sri Lanka and made the following observations as regard to DTAA with Sri Lanka:

“The DTAA involved herein is the one between India and Sri Lanka. The definition of royalty contained in this treaty in Article 12.3 shows that it is a payment of any kind received as consideration for the ‘use of or the right to any copyright’. This is seen to differ from some of the later treaties like the one with USA wherein royalty is payment of any kind received as consideration for the ‘use of, or the right to use, any copyright’. The definition in the India-Sri Lanka DTAA is wider than the one found in the IT Act. For, it takes in even the consideration received for permitting another to use a copyright. Even a right to use need not be conferred.

…. It is not necessary even to grant the right to use the copyright if one were to look at it literally, though the grant of a right to use could be said to be included in the grant of a right in the copyright.”

The AAR concluded that the consideration received by Millennium from ICEL be termed as a royalty under the DTAA and u/s.9(1)(vi) of the Income-tax Act.

Dassault Systems’ case

Dassault Systems K. K., (‘Dassault’), a Japanese Company, is engaged in the business of providing ‘Product Lifecycle Management’ software solutions, applications and services. Dassault marketed the aforesaid licensed products mostly through a distribution channel comprising of Value Added Resellers (‘VAR’). VARs are independent third-party resellers who are in the business of selling software products to end-users. As per the business model, Dassault entered into General Value Added Resellers Agreement (‘GVA’) with VARs and sold the software product to VARs for a consideration based on the standard list less discount. The VARs in turn sold the products to end-users at a price independently determined by VARs. The end-users then entered into End User Licence Agreement (‘EULA’) with Dassault and VARs for the product supplied.

Based on the abovementioned facts, Dassault had sought for a ruling from the AAR as to whether the consideration received by Dassault from VARs, from sale of software products would be termed as a business income or a royalty under the Act and/or DTAA between India and Japan. Further, the AAR was explained the modus operandi of the transactions undertaken between Dassault, VARs and the end-users. Dassault submitted before AAR that the end-users including VARs in the sale of software products were only transferred copyrighted software containing computer program but not the copyright therein. It was further contended that consideration was paid for ‘use of copyrighted product and not for use of copyright in computer program’. The end-users/VARs did not avail any of the rights referred to in section 14 of the Copyright Act, 1957 (‘the 1957 Act’). The Income-tax Department objected to the contention of Dassault and submitted that consideration received by Dassault from VARs was on account of rights conferred u/s.14(b) of the 1957 Act and therefore, would be termed as a royalty under the Act.

The AAR to begin with, considered the ordinary meaning of ‘copyright’, reference was made to various definition provisions, modes of transfer of copy-right under the 1957 Act and to the earlier decision of the AAR in the case of FactSet Research Systems Inc., 317 ITR 169. It referred to various clauses of GVA and EULA agreements and the provision of section 14 of the 1957 Act and observed that passing of a ‘right to use’ and facilitating the use of a product for which the owner had a copyright was not the same thing as transferring or assigning rights in relation to the copyright. Further, it observed that “use of a copyrighted product does not entail enjoyment of rights referred in section 14 of the 1957 Act” for computer program and therefore no copyright was transferred and/or parted in the course of said transaction. Merely authorising or enabling a customer to have the benefit of data or instructions therein without any further right to deal with them independently did not entail transfer of rights in relation to copyright or conferment of the right of using the copyright. After negating the objections of the Revenue and in light of the aforesaid observations and references to some of earlier favourable legal decisions on the subject, the AAR held that considering the facts of the case no rights in relation to copyright had been transferred, nor any right of using the copyright as such had been conferred on VARs/end-users in the course of transactions.

In deciding the application, the AAR referred to the provisions of Article 12.3 of the DTAA with Japan which read as under:

“The term ‘royalties’ as used in this article means payments of any kind received as a consideration for the use of, or the right to use, any copyright of literary, artistic or scientific work including cinematograph films and films or tapes for radio or television broadcasting, any patent, trademark, design or model, plan, secret formula or process, or for the use of, or the right to use, industrial, commercial or scientific equipment or for information concerning industrial, commercial or scientific experience.”

On due consideration of the said Article 12 of the DTAA and the provisions of section 9(1)(vi) of the Act, the AAR concluded that the income from the transaction under consideration was not a royalty.

Observations

The Income-tax Act, 1961 defines royalty in relation to computer program under Explanation 2(v) to section 9(1)(vi) as ‘transfer of all or any rights (including granting of license) in respect of any copyright ………..A question which requires consideration is therefore, whether the expression ‘transfer of all or any rights’ under the said Explanation can be read to implicitly cover ‘use’ or ‘right to use’.

Observations here are restricted to the provisions of the Act and no references are sought to the text of respective DTAAs, for following reasons:

  •     The definition of royalty and the text of the provisions on royalty under the respective DTAAs are different;

  •     Once the nature of income being discussed here fails to be termed as a ‘royalty’ under the provisions of the Act, then one may not be required even to refer to the provisions of the respective DTAAs, considering the fact that recourse to DTAA is envisaged only for any reliefs and benefits, not conferred by the Act.

The issue under consideration is otherwise a multi- faceted issue and has several dimensions which are sought to be addressed through a few questions and answers thereon.

Does the expression ‘transfer of all or any rights’ under Explanation 2(v) to section 9(1)(vi) include ‘use or right to use’?

A construction of definition of royalty under the Act explains that different actions qua the type of intellectual properties are covered and subjected to tax according to the scheme of the Act, which is tabulated below:
 

The Legislature in its wisdom has distinguished between the royalty for industry intellectual properties and copyright intellectual properties. It appears that the distinction is in sync with the available means through which each type of intellectual property is exploited for earning a monetary gain. To take an illustration, a technical design which belongs to industrial intellectual property type can be exploited for earning monetary gain in any of the ways as mentioned in Explanation 2(i), (ii) and (iii) of section 9(1)(vi) of the Act, but the same test may fail for films, artistic work, etc., a part of copyright intellectual property type, and vice versa.

When different provisions are made depending upon the type of intellectual property, then the part relevant thereto only should be applied while determining whether or not that part shall fall under the definition of royalty. Such a construction is in accordance with the Latin legal maxim ‘Expresso unius est exclusive alterius’. The general meaning of the maxim is that the express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another. As a fallout of the said construction, it is possible to hold that rights as prescribed in Explanation 2(i) to (iva) of section 9(1)(vi), as in the nature of right to share information and the use or right to use thereof cannot be covered by the expression ‘transfer of all or any right (including granting of licence)’ under Explanation 2(v) of the Act. In other words, the Legislature did not seek to consider ‘use or right to use’ of computer program embedded in computer software as royalty under the Act.


What is meant by the expression ‘transfer of all or any rights (including granting of licence’ and which rights are sought to be covered?

Though the Act defines the word ‘royalty’, but the expressions viz., ‘all or any’, ‘or’ are uncertain as regard to their scope. Similarly, the terms patents, copyrights, process, invention, skill, etc., remain undefined. In such circumstances, one is required to scrutinise the legislative history to ascertain the principal intention of the Legislature. The above-referred terms are defined in their respective governing special Acts on the subject viz., Copyrights Act, 1957 (‘the 1957 Act’); Patents Act, 1970; Trade Marks Act, 1999, etc.

Section 14 of the 1957 Act defines a copyright in the computer program as a list of rights granted to the author of computer program. The Act also provides for the modes for transfer of the said list of rights in computer program viz. assignment and licence of rights. References to other types of intellectual properties provide for similar provisions under the respective Acts. The intention of the Legislature can therefore be considered as referring to the rights as listed in section 14 of the 1957 Act. The aforesaid construction is also supported by the decision of the Special Bench of the Delhi Tribunal in the case of Motorola Inc v. DCIT, 95 ITD 269.
 

Whether the rights referred in section 14 of the Copyrights Act, 1957 are transferred in sale of computer software to end-users?

To answer this pertinent question, one requires to appreciate the nature of the transaction which generally takes place in a sale of computer software to end-users. A sale of computer software to end-users either takes place directly from the author of the computer program to end-users or through the channel of distributors. In either case, the computer program embedded in the computer software may or may not be parted and/or licensed with the computer software. Generally, in such sale transactions, what is sought to be parted with the end-users is the copy of copyrighted program embedded in the computer software and not the copyrighted computer program.

Therefore, it requires to be seen whether in a standard End-user License Agreement (‘EULA’) of computer software between the author and end-users, any of the rights mentioned in section 14 r.w.s. 52 of the 1957 Act are made available to the end-users. A table summarising the rights u/s.14 for computer program, as available to each party, generally, to exercise after the transaction of sale of computer software is reproduced below:

Whereas the author of the computer program, as observed in the Table, has all the rights, the end-user does not have any rights under Section 14. Further, the distributors have rights to sell or give on commercial rental a copy of computer program or give limited right to reproduce and store the said computer programs. In other words, the end-users cannot exercise any rights in respect of copyrights in computer program and therefore, any consider-ation paid to the authors/ distributors by the end-user towards sale of computer software may not qualify for being termed as a ‘royalty’ under the Act. In contrast, under the agreement between the author and distributor, since the right to sell or give on commercial rental is conferred on the distributors, any consideration received by the author from a distributor in such a scenario may qualify to be termed as a ‘royalty’ under the Act.

Whether ‘computer program’ is copyright and/or industrial intellectual property?

Though it may sound ironical, but all the contrary judgments on the subject confirm to the proposition that ‘computer program’ is a literary work and qualifies to be termed as a copyright intellectual property. However, the difference of opinion stems in considering the computer program as industrial intellectual property, not being limited to patents but also as process, invention and secret formula. Since, ‘invention’, and ‘patents’ are not defined under the Act it shall be necessary to rely on the respective special Acts governing the law on the subject. Section 3(k) of the Patents Act, 1970 (‘the 1970 Act’) which defines ‘invention’ specifically excludes computer program from being regarded as invention. Section 2(m) of the 1970 Act defines ‘patent’ as an invention, thereby indirectly excluding computer program from its purview. Further, since the end-users do not have any access to the computer program embedded in computer software, they cannot be said to have rights in relation to a process. Lastly, to classify computer program as a secret formula shall be too far-fetched, considering the fact that a secret formula is placed as genus of ‘technical know-how’ under the provisions of the Act.

As a result, computer program embedded in computer software may only be termed as a copyright intellectual property under Explanation 2(v) to section 9(1)(vi).

Without prejudice to aforesaid discussions, recently the Delhi High Court in a judgement delivered in the case of CIT v. Dynamic Vertical Software India (P)    Ltd., 332 ITR 222, has based on the facts and circumstances of the case where the assessee, a dealer of Microsoft, had been purchasing the on the subject software from Microsoft and selling it further in Indian market held that the payment made by the assessee to Microsoft could not be termed as a ‘royalty’. Therefore, it can be said that computer software is not a copyright intellectual property.

Lastly, if the rights to use intellectual property are capable of and are allowed to be transferred in sale of computer software to end-users, then every second person would have been capable of developing softwares like Microsoft, Oracle, etc. The general understanding of the word ‘royalty’ in the context of copyright refer to a consideration received by the author from the publisher, who published his work and not as a consideration received by the publisher from the end-user on sale of copy of work.

Based on the aforesaid discussions and observations made in the decision in the case of Dassault Systems (supra), it appears that the ratio of the recent decision of the AAR in the case of Millennium IT Systems (supra) may require reconsideration.

Adding to the bandwagon of major judgments, the AAR has recently in the case of Upaid Systems Limited, In re, 885 of 2010, dated 12th October 2011, based on the facts and circumstances of the case, held that the consideration paid by Satyam to Upaid for perpetual licence of right to use computer software shall be taxable as ‘royalty’ under section 9(1)(vi) of the Act.

1    Facts in the case of Dassault Systems K. K. (supra) were different then generally prevailing in the industry or found in the case of Gracemac Corporation v. ADIT, (supra)
2    For limited purpose as provided in section 52 of the Copyright Act, 1957
3    Facts in the case of Dassault Systems K. K. (supra) were different then generally prevailing in the industry or found in the case of Gracemac Corporation v. ADIT, (supra)
4    Motorola Inc v. DCIT, (95 ITD 269) (Del.) (SB)
5    Gracemac Corporation vs ADIT (47 DTR 65) (Del)
6    Sonata Information Technology Ltd vs ACIT (103 ITD 324) (Bang.)
7    Frontline Soft Ltd vs DCIT (12 DTR 131) (Hyd)

Section 148 — Reassessment proceedings — Assessee’s appeal allowed by the CIT(A) on merits — In the appellate proceedings whether the assessee can challenge the validity of the reassessment proceedings — Held, Yes.

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Dy. CIT v. Duratex Export
ITAT ‘D’ Bench, Mumbai
Before Pramod Kumar (AM) and Asha Vijayaraghavan (JM)
ITA Nos. 3088 & 3089/Mum./2010 (C.O. Nos. 19 & 20/Mum./2011) A.Ys.: 2001-02 & 2002-03 Decided on: 15-6-2011 Counsel for revenue/assessee: R. K. Gupta/ K. Shivaram

Section 148 — Reassessment proceedings — Assessee’s appeal allowed by the CIT(A) on merits — In the appellate proceedings whether the assessee can challenge the validity of the reassessment proceedings — Held, Yes.


Facts:

The assessee firm was engaged in the business of manufacturing and trading in fabrics. Pursuant to the scrutiny assessment proceedings, the assessment for the A.Y. 2001-02 was finalised on 19-12-2003. In its return the assessee had claimed deduction u/s.80HHC amounting to Rs.3.18 crores which was computed after considering the sum of Rs.24.03 lac received on account of sale of DEPB licence. The assessment for A.Y. 2002-03 was made u/s.143(1). By the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 2005, the receipt on account of the sale of DEPB licence was excluded from the definition of the term ‘total turnover’. The amendment made was retrospective from April 1, 1998. In view thereof, the AO reopened the assessment u/s.147 and issued the notice dated 28-3-2008 u/s.148. The assessee challenged validity of the action of the AO.

On appeal, the CIT(A) treated the grievance against reopening of assessment as not pressed but gave relief to the assess on merits in respect of additions made on account of the sale of DEPB licence by following the Special Bench decision of the Mumbai Tribunal in the case of Topman Exports [318 ITR (AT) 87]. Before the Tribunal, the Revenue relied on the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Kalpataru Colours & Chemicals (328 ITR 451) whereunder the Special Bench decision of the Mumbai Tribunal in the case of Topman Exports was reversed. As regards the validity of reopening of assessment, it was contended that since the assessee did not object to reopening of assessment before the CIT(A), it was not open to do so now.

Held:

According to the Tribunal, the mere fact that the assessee was not allowed to, or did not, press the grievance against the reopening of assessment before the CIT(A), particularly in a situation in which the resultant addition on merits could not have been sustained because of binding judicial precedent then holding at the relevant point of time, the assessee cannot be deprived of his rights to adjudicate the reopening of assessment at a later stage. Accordingly, it proceeded to decide the validity of the reassessment proceedings. Relying on the Mumbai Tribunal decision in the case of Dharmik Exim Pvt. Ltd. v. ACIT, (ITA No. 232/ Mum./2009), the Tribunal observed that it was a settled legal position that when the assessment is reopened beyond four years from the end of the relevant previous year and unless it cannot be established that the assessee had failed to disclose all the material facts necessary for the purpose of assessment, such reassessment proceedings cannot be upheld under the law. In the case of the assessee, the assessment for the A.Y. 2001-02 was made u/s.143(3) on 19-12-2003 while the notice u/s.148 was issued after 4 years on 28-3-2008. Therefore, the Tribunal upheld the grievance raised by the assessee in its cross-objection and allowed the same.

According to it, the fact that the assessment for A.Y. 2002-03 was framed u/s.143(1) would not have any impact on the validity of reassessment proceedings. As per the decision of the Mumbai Tribunal in the case of Pirojsha Godrej Foundation v. ADIT, [133 TTJ (Mumbai) 194] where it was held that irrespective of whether the assessment was finalised u/s.143(1) or section 143(3), the requirements of section 147 have to be fulfilled, the Tribunal allowed the cross-objection of the assessee challenging the reassessment proceedings and the appeals filed by the Revenue was dismissed as infructuous.

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Section 271B r.w.s 44AB — Penalty for failure to get accounts audited — Assessee following project completion method of accounting — Whether advances received from the customers could be considered as part of turnover — Held, No.

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Siroya Developers v. DCIT
ITAT ‘I’ Bench, Mumbai
Before S. V. Mehrotra (AM) and Asha Vijayaraghavan (JM)
ITA No. 600/Mum./2010
A.Y.: 2005-06. Decided on: 12-1-2011 Counsels for assessee/revenue: B. V. Jhaveri/ S. K. Singh

Section 271B r.w.s 44AB — Penalty for failure to get accounts audited — Assessee following project completion method of accounting — Whether advances received from the customers could be considered as part of turnover — Held, No.


Facts:

The assessee, a property developer, was following project completion method. During the year the opening work in progress was Rs.4.35 crore and the closing work in progress was Rs.10.07 crore. Besides the assessee had also received advances against sale of flats of Rs.4.03 crore. According to the AO, the assessee was required to obtain and file report u/s.44AB by 31-10-2005. For failure to do so, he levied a penalty u/s.271B. On appeal the CIT(A) confirmed the AO’s order.

Held:

According to the Tribunal, when the assessee was following the project completion method of accounting, the advances received against booking of flats cannot be treated as sale proceeds or a turnover or as part of gross receipt because the same was not received by the assessee unconditionally. For the purpose it relied on views expressed by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India and on the Pune Tribunal decision in the case of ACIT v. B. K. Jhala & Associates, (69 ITD 141). Accordingly, the penalty levied was deleted and the appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

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Section 14A — Rule 8D can be invoked only after AO records his satisfaction on how the assessee’s calculation is incorrect. Onus is on the AO to show that expenditure has been incurred for earning taxfree income. Disallowance u/s.14A cannot be made on the basis of presumptions.

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DCIT v. Jindal Photo Limited ITAT ‘D’ Bench, Delhi
Before G. E. Veerabhadrappa (VP) and A. D. Jain (JM)
ITA Nos. 814/Del./2011
A.Y.: 2008-09. Decided on: 23-9-2011 Counsel for revenue/assessee: R. S. Negi/ Rupesh Saini

Section 14A — Rule 8D can be invoked only after AO records his satisfaction on how the assessee’s calculation is incorrect. Onus is on the AO to show that expenditure has been incurred for earning tax-free income. Disallowance u/s.14A cannot be made on the basis of presumptions.


Facts:

The AO disallowed a sum of Rs.31.01,542 u/s.14A of the Act by invoking Rule 8D. However, he did not record satisfaction as to how the assessee’s calculation was not correct. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A). The CIT(A) upheld the applicability of Rule 8D but he reduced the amount of disallowance to Rs.19,43,022 by reducing the amount of disallowance on account of interest but as regards disallowance of administrative expenses he upheld the action of the AO. He also upheld the applicability of Rule 8D. Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal and the assessee filed cross-objections.

Held:

The Tribunal noted that the assessee has suo motu made a disallowance u/s.14A. The Tribunal also noted that the AO has invoked Rule 8D without recording satisfaction as to how the assessee’s calculation is incorrect. Upon considering the ratio of various decisions of the Tribunal and the decision of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of CIT v. Hero Cycles, (323 ITR 518), the Tribunal held that for invoking Rule 8D the AO must record satisfaction as to how the claim of the assessee is incorrect. If that is not done, provisions of Rule 8D cannot be invoked. An ad hoc disallowance cannot be made under Rule 8D. The onus is on the AO to establish that expenditure has been incurred for earning exempt income. Disallowance u/s.14A cannot be made on the basis of presumption that the assessee must have incurred expenditure to earn tax-free income.

Since the AO had not recorded satisfaction regarding the assessee’s calculation being incorrect and since such satisfaction is a pre-requisite for invoking Rule 8D, the CIT(A) erred in partially approving the action of the AO. The Tribunal dismissed this ground of the appeal filed by the Department. Cases referred:

1. CIT v. Hero Cycles, (323 ITR 518) (P&H)

2. ACIT v. Eicher Ltd., (101 TTJ 369) (Del.)

3. Maruti Udyog v. DCIT, (92 ITD 119) (Del.)

4. Wimco Seedlings Ltd. v. DCIT, (107 ITD 267) (Del.) (TM)

5. Punjab National Bank v. DCIT, (103 TTJ 908) (Del.)

6. Vidyut Investment Ltd. (10 SOT 284) (Del.) 7. D. J. Mehta v. ITO, (290 ITR 238) (Mum.) (AT)

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Capital gains v. Business Income: Section 28(va) of Income-tax Act, 1961: A.Y. 2006- 07: Consideration received on transfer of rights of trade mark, brands and copy rights: Business given up distinct from business continued: Consideration not arising out of business: Not business income, but is longterm capital gain.

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[CIT v. Mediworld Publications Pvt. Ltd., 337 ITR 178 (Del.), 244 CTR 387 (Del.)]

The assessee was engaged in the business of healthcare, print media and electronic media communications. The assessee entered into a specified assets transfer agreement with one CMP for sale of all its rights, title and interest in specified assets of its healthcare journals and communications business. In consideration of the transfer the assessee had received Rs.3.80 crores. In the return of income the receipt was shown as the long-term capital gain. The Assessing Officer taxed it as business income u/s.28(va) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal accepted the assessee’s claim that it is long-term capital gain.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under: “

(i) By the agreement, the assessee had transferred the rights of trade marks, brands, copyrights, etc., in the journals and publications. The clinical trials business which the assessee continued to carry on was distinct and separate from the business of healthcare journals and communications. As far as the healthcare journals and communication business is concerned, it had been given up in entirety in favour of the transferee.

(ii) Thus section 28(va) was not applicable to any sum received on account of transfer of right to carry on any business which was chargeable under the head ‘Capital gains’. In the specified asset transfer agreement, ‘business’ was to mean the business of publishing, distributing and selling the periodicals and products as carried on by the seller (assessee).

(iii) There was a transfer of exclusive assets and on the transfer it was the transferee which had become the sole and undisputed owner of these assets which were the business assets of the assessee.

(iv) We find no merit in this appeal and dismiss the same.”

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Business expenditure: Interest on borrowed capital: Section 36(1)(iii) of Income-tax Act, 1961: Assessee invested borrowed funds in the shares of subsidiary company to have control over that company: Interest on borrowed funds allowable as deduction u/s.36(1)(iii).

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[CIT v. Phil Corporation Ltd., 244 CTR 226 (Bom.)]

The assessee had invested the borrowed funds in the shares of the subsidiary company. The assessee’s claim for deduction of interest u/s.36(1)(iii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was rejected by the Assessing Officer. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under: “

(i) The Tribunal found that the assessee had invested the amount in question in subsidiary company for the acquisition of its shares i.e., to have a control over majority shares but not to earn dividend or interest. Before the Tribunal, it was not disputed that such an investment is an integral part of the business.

(ii) We find that the reasoning of the Tribunal that the overdraft was not operated only for investing in shares of subsidiary company to have control over that company and, therefore, the element of interest paid on the overdraft was not susceptible of bifurcation and, therefore, the respondent no. 1 is entitled to the deduction u/s.36(1)(iii) of the Income-tax Act is correct and deserves to be accepted.

(iii) In the result we hold that Tribunal was right
in deleting the addition.”

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Business expenditure: Deduction u/s.35AB of Income-tax Act, 1961: A.Ys. 1993-94 to 1995-96: Agreement for supply of technical knowhow: Assessee obliged to pay income-tax under the agreement: Assessee entitled to deduction of income tax paid u/s.35AB.

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[Tata Yodogawa v. CIT, 243 CTR 263 (Jharkhand)]

The assessee entered into a collaboration agreement with ESW for acquiring know-how for use in the business. Under the agreement, the assessee was required to pay a fixed sum and also the tax payable on such sum. Jharkhand High Court considered the following question of law: “Whether deduction u/s.35AB was permissible only in respect of the remittances made by the assessee to ESW or it was permissible in respect of the income-tax paid by the assessee on the said remittances in terms of the collaboration agreement? To be more specific the question is whether the phrase ‘lump sum consideration’ used in section 35AB(1) would include the taxes paid by the assessee under the agreement for acquisition of know-how?” The High Court held as under:

“(i) Deduction u/s.35AB is permissible in respect of any lump sum consideration for acquiring any know-how for use for the purpose of assessee’s business. The word ‘consideration’ include the entire obligation of the assessee, without which the assessee would not be able to acquire the know-how.

(ii) On the facts of the case the obligation of the assessee under the agreement with ESW extended not merely to remitting the amount of two million DM to ESW, but also extended to payment of taxes which would include the income-tax as well as the R&D cess. It seems quite obvious that if the assessee had not paid the tax or the R&D cess, and had merely made payment of two million DM to ESW, the latter would not be obliged to part with the knowhow in view of the terms of the collaboration agreement. Therefore, payment of these taxes are as integral a part of the ‘consideration’ as the payment of two million DM.

(iii) There is no logical reason for not treating the income-tax paid by the assessee in terms of the collaboration agreement as part of the ‘consideration’ for acquisition of the knowhow. The word ‘lump sum’ as used before the word ‘consideration’ in section 35AB only excludes periodical or turnover based payments like royalty, etc., and any one-time payment for the know-how would fall within the expression ‘lump sum’ if it is fixed and specified in the agreement, although it may be payable in installments.”

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