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33 Exemption u/s. 10(23C)(iv) – Approval by prescribed authority – Approval granted on 01/03/2016 for A.Ys. 2006-07 to 2011-12 – Approval valid for A. Y. 2012-13 and subsequent years also

CIT(Exemption)
vs. Haryana State Pollution Control Board; 403 ITR 337 (P&H);

Date
of Order: 14th July, 2017:

A.
Y.: 2012-13:

Section
10(23C)(iv) of ITA 1961


For A. Y. 2012-13, the
assessee filed return of income claiming exemption u/s. 10(23C)(iv) of the
Income-tax Act, 1961. The Assessing Officer denied exemption on the ground that
the assessee had not obtained the necessary approval from the prescribed authority
for exemption u/s. 10(23C)(iv) of the Act.

 

The Commissioner (Appeals)
allowed the exemption on the ground that the Commissioner (Exemption)’s order
dated 01/03/2016 granting exemption u/s. 10(23C)(iv) of the Act, for the A. Ys.
2006-07 to 2011-12 was also applicable for the A. Y. 2012-13. The Tribunal
upheld the order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals).

 

On appeal by the Revenue,
the Punjab and Haryana High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held
as under:

 

“i) Circular No. 7 of 2010,
dated 27/10/2010 clarifies that as in the case of approvals under sub-clauses
(iv) and (v) of section 10(23C) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, any approval
issued on or after 01/12/2006 under sub-clause (vi) and (via) of that
sub-section would also be a one time approval which would be valid till it is
withdrawn.

 

ii) It was recorded by the
Tribunal that the capital expenditure had not been charged to the profit and
loss account. The third proviso to section 10(23C) of the Act provides for
“applies its income or accumulates it for application, wholly or exclusively to
the objects for which it is established…..” Thus, the amount was spent by the
assessee towards the object. It was further recorded by the Tribunal, after
examining the matter that the amounts spent by the assessee were clearly the
application of the income to achieve the objects of the assessee.

 

iii) The assessee had been
granted approval u/s. 10(23C)(iv) of the Act and thus, there was no question of
disallowing any amount of this nature.

 

iv) No substantial question
of law arises and the appeal stands dismissed.”

32 Educational institution – Exemption u/s. 10(23C)(vi) – School run by assessee having only up to kindergarten class – Provision of Right to Education Act applicable to school imparting education from class 1 to class 8 – Provision not applicable to assesee – Assessee cannot be denied exemption for failure to comply with that Act

CIT(Exemption)
vs. Infant Jesus Education Society; 404 ITR 85 (P&H):

Date
of order: 14th July, 2017:

A.
Y.: 2013-14:

Section
10(23C)(vi) of I. T. Act 1961


The assesee was a society
registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. The Society was running
a school since the year 2006 and the school was from class play to kindergarten
class. For the A. Y. 2013-14, the assessee applied for grant of exemption u/s.
10(23C)(vi) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Principal Chief Commissioner
rejected the application primarily on the ground that the assessee had not been
complying with the provisions of Right of Children to Free and Compulsory
Education Act, 2009.

 

The Tribunal held that the
provisions of the 2009 Act were not applicable to school being run by the
assessee and directed the Principal Chief Commissioner to grant approval for
exemption to the assessee.

 

On
appeal by the Revenue, the Punjab and Haryana High Court upheld the decision of
the Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i) The school was only up
to kindergarten class. No doubt was raised with regard to the genuineness of
the activities of the society. The provisions of the 2009 Act were applicable
to schools imparting education from class 1 to class 8 and hence the school of
the assessee was not to be governed by the 2009 Act.

 

ii) The Department failed
to show that the provisions of the 2009 Act were applicable to the assessee or
the findings recorded by the Tribunal were in any way illegal or perverse
warranting interference. No substantial question of law arose. The appeal
stands dismissed.”

31 Deduction u/s. 10A – Free trade zone – Effect of sales return – Sales return would result into reduction in profit qualifying for deduction u/s. 10A – AO has to allow corresponding reduction in total income also

CIT
vs. L.C.C. Infotech Ltd.; [2018] 94 taxmann.com 117 (Cal): Date of Order: 11th
May, 2018:

A.
Y.: 2001-02:

Sections
10A and 147 of ITA 1961


The assessee was a
corporate body engaged in computer training and software development. During
the relevant previous year the assessee made project exports to certain
parties. The assessee filed return of its income claiming exemption u/s. 10A of
the Income-tax Act, 1961 for profit from said project export. The said claim
was supported by Auditor’s certificate and was duly accepted as per intimation
issued u/s. 143(1). Based on statement made by the Auditor, that till date of
signing of Report certain amount against projects exports remained unrealised,
the Assessing Officer issued notice u/s. 148. During the course of proceeding
u/s. 147, the assessee filed supplementary Auditors report claiming profit from
software export at the reduced figure due to sales return against project
export. The Assessing Officer without accepting the claim of sales return took
the net profit at the original figure but reduced exemption u/s. 10A by the
amount in question.

 

The Commissioner (Appeals)
rejected the order of the Assessing Officer and directed for computation of net
profit by the Assessing Officer to be reconsidered. The Tribunal confirmed the
order of the Commissioner (Appeals).

 

On appeal by the Revenue,
the Calcutta High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i) The higher total income
of Rs. 2.50 crore found by the Assessing Officer was assessed on the basis of
reduced profit resulting from sales return. Sales return was the cause, as per
the assessee, the effect of which was reduction in the profit figure qualifying
for deduction under the provisions of section 10A. The exercise that resulted
in the intimation, done on the basis of material and evidence then available,
cannot be said to have been done in a manner which allowed some income of the
assessee to have escaped assessment to tax. As such there is nothing wrong with
the directions given by the said appellate authority.

 

ii) In the premises no
substantial question of law is involved in the case. The appeal and application
are accordingly dismissed.”

Section 194C – Value of by-products arising during the process of milling paddy into rice, which remained with the millers, not considered as part of the consideration for the purpose of TDS

6.  ITO (TDS) vs. Punjab State
Warehousing Corporation (Chandigarh)

Members: Sanjay Garg, JM and Annapurna Gupta, AMITA Nos.: 1309 /CHD/2016 A.Y.: 2012-13 Dated: 30th October, 2018 Counsel for Revenue / Assessee: Atul Goyal, B. M. Monga, Rohit Kaura and
Vibhor Garg / Manjit Singh


Section 194C – Value of by-products arising
during the process of milling paddy into rice, which remained with the millers,
not considered as part of the consideration for the purpose of TDS


Facts


The assessee is a procurement agency of
Punjab Government which procures paddy on behalf of Food Corporation of India
(FCI), get it milled and supply rice to FCI. The paddy was given to the millers
for milling at the rates as fixed by FCI. As per the terms of the agreement,
the millers were required to supply rice in the ratio of 67% of the paddy given
to them by the assessee in return the millers would get Rs. 15 per quintal as
milling charges. As per agreement, the by-products, if any, arising from the
process would remain with the millers and the assessee had no right in respect
thereof. The assessee deducted the tax at source u/s. 194C on the milling
charges of Rs. 15 per quintal so paid to the millers.


According to the AO, since as per the
agreement, the by-products i.e. remaining 33% part, out of the milled paddy,
was retained by the millers and the same had a marketable value, it was part of
the consideration paid by the assessee to the millers, whereon the assessee was
required to deduct tax at source u/s. 194C. Since the assessee failed to do so,
he held the assessee as assessee in default u/s. 201 (1) and 201 (1A) of the
Act.

 

The assessee appealed before the CIT(A) who
relying on the decisions of the Delhi Bench of the tribunal in the case ITO
vs. Aahar Consumer Products Pvt Ltd. (ITA No. 2910-1939-1654 &
1705/Delhi/2010)
and of the Amritsar Bench of the Tribunal in the case of D.M.
Punjab Civil Supply Corporation Ltd, (ITA No. 158/Asr/2016)
allowed the
appeal of the assessee and quashed the demand raised by the AO on account of
short deduction of tax.

 

Being aggrieved by the order of the CIT(A),
the revenue appealed before the Tribunal and made following submissions in
support of its contention that the tax at source should have been deducted
after taking into account the value of the by-products:

  • While fixing the milling
    charges by FCI, the value of by-product in the shape of broken rice, rice kani,
    rice bran and phuk and which had a reasonable market value, was duly taken into
    consideration and thereafter net milling charges of Rs. 15 was arrived at;

  • Reliance was placed on the
    correspondence / clarification from the Secretary, Food and Civil Supplies
    Department that milling charges were fixed taking into consideration the value
    of the by-product which was a part of the consideration paid by the assessee to
    the millers for paddy milling contract;

  • As per the press release
    issued by the Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food & Public Distribution, the
    Union Food Ministry had clarified that the milling charges for paddy paid by
    the Central Government to the State Agencies were fixed, on the basis of the
    rates recommended by the Tariff Commission, who had taken into account value of
    the by-products derived from the paddy, while suggesting net rate of the
    milling price payable to the rice millers;

  • As per the report of the
    Comptroller and Auditor General of India (C&AG) on Procurement and Milling
    of Paddy for Central Pool, the milling charges were fixed after adjusting for
    by-products cost recovery;

  • It also relied on the
    decisions of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Kanchanganga Sea
    Foods Ltd. vs. CIT (2004) 265 ITR 644
    , which was confirmed by the Supreme
    Court reported in (2010) 325 ITR 549.


Held


The Tribunal noted that the milling charges
were fixed by the Government and neither the assessee nor the millers had any
say on the milling charges fixed. Even the out-turn ratio was also fixed and
the miller had to return 67% of the manufactured rice, irrespective of the fact
whether the yield of rice manufactured was low or high from the paddy entrusted
to him.


Thus, the nature of the contact, according
to the Tribunal, was not purely a work contract, but it was something more than
that. Under the contract, the miller had no choice to return rice and
by-products as per the actual outcome and claim only the milling charges.


Further, it was noted that the agreement
contained specific term that ‘the by-product is the property of the miller’,
which meant that the property in the by-product passed immediately to the
miller on the very coming of it, into existence. Thus, moment the paddy was
milled, the assessee lost its ownership and control over the paddy and the
by-product, and acquired the right only on the ‘milled rice’.


Thus, as per the agreement, the by-product
never became the property of the procurement agencies. Therefore, according to
the Tribunal, it cannot be said that the said by-product had been handed over
as consideration in kind by the assessee to the millers. When one is not the
owner of the product and the property in the product had never passed on to
other person, he, under the circumstances, cannot pass the same to the others.


The property in the by-product from the very
inception remained with the miller and, hence, the Tribunal held that the same
cannot be said to be the consideration received by the miller. According to the
Tribunal, even though the consideration was fixed taking into consideration the
likely benefit that the miller will get out of milling process in the form of
by-products, such benefits cannot be said to be consideration for the
contract. 


As
regards the reliance placed by the revenue on the decision in the case of Kanchanganga
Sea Foods Ltd.
, the same was distinguished by the Tribunal and held that
the same was not applicable to the assessee’s case. In the result, the Tribunal
dismissed the appeals filed by the revenue and upheld the order of the CIT(A).

 

45. CIT vs. Airlift (India) Pvt. Ltd.; 405 ITR 487 (Bom): Date of order: 8th June, 2018 Section 260A – Appeal to High Court – Limitation – Condonation of delay – Failure by Department to remove office objections despite extension of time being granted – Absence of any particular reason for delay – Reason of administrative difficulty – Delay cannot be condoned

Notice of motion was filed by the
Department in appeal for condonation of delay on the ground that the office
objections could not be removed within the stipulated time in view of the
administrative difficulty including shortage of staff.

 

Rejecting the notice of motion, the
Bombay High Court held as under:

 

“The application for condonation
for delay was not bonafide as the applicant failed to remove the office
objections though it had secured extension of time on three occasions and the
affidavit offered no explanation as to what steps were taken by the Department
after the last extension to remove the office objections. The only reason made
out in the affidavit in support was administrative difficulty including
shortage of staff which could not be the reason for condonation of delay in the
absence of the same being particularised.”

REVENUE EXPENDITURE ON TECHNICAL KNOW-HOW AND SECTION 35 AB

Issue for Consideration

Section 35 AB introduced by the Finance Act, 1985, w.e.f  1st April 1986, provides for
deduction of an amount paid towards any lump sum consideration for acquiring
know-how for the purposes of business in six equal annual instalments
commencing from the previous year in which the deductions is first allowed. The
relevant part contained in s/s. (1) reads as ; “S. 35AB. Expenditure on
know-how. (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), where the assessee
has paid in any previous year relevant to the assessment year commencing on or
before the 1st day of April, 1998 any lump sum consideration for
acquiring any know-how for use for the purposes of his business, one-sixth of
the amount so paid shall be deducted in computing the profits and gains of the
business for that previous year, and the balance amount shall be deducted in
equal instalments for each of the five immediately succeeding previous years.”

 

The term ‘know-how’ is exhaustively defined vide an
Explanation to the section to mean any industrial information or technique
likely to assist in the manufacture or processing of goods or in the working of
mine, oil, etc.

 

Prior to the insertion of section 35AB, an expenditure of
revenue nature, incurred on know-how, was allowed as deduction u/s. 37 of the
Income tax Act. A capital expenditure on know-how was not allowable as a
deduction and its treatment was governed by the other provisions of the Income
tax Act. With insertion of section 35AB, a capital expenditure became eligible
for deduction, subject to compliance of the prescribed conditions, in the
manner specified in the section.

Section 37 provides for a deduction of any expenditure laid
out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purposes of business or
profession, in full, provided it is not in the nature of a capital expenditure
or personal expenses of the assessee and further that the expenditure is not in
the nature of the one described in section 30 to section 36 of the Act. 

 

Section 35 AB while opening a door for deduction of a capital
expenditure fuelled a new controversy, perhaps unintentionally, involving the
denial of 100% deduction to a revenue expenditure on know-how which was
hitherto allowable. It is the stand of the Revenue authorities that with the
introduction of section 35AB, the deduction for an expenditure on know-how, of
any nature, would be governed strictly by the new provision and be allowed in
six instalments and would not be allowed u/s. 37 as was the case before
insertion of the specific provision. Like any provision, a new one in
particular, section 35AB became a highly debatable provision not on one count
but on various counts. The related issues that arose, besides the issue of
identification of the relevant provision of the Act under which the deduction
for the revenue expenditure is allowable, are whether it was necessary that the
assessee acquired ownership rights over the know-how and whether the condition
for ‘lump sum’ payment meant payment in one go or even in instalments.  

 

Various High Courts had occasion to examine these issues or
some of them, leading to a fierce controversy surrounding the eligibility of a
deduction, in full u/s. 37, of an expenditure on a know-how, otherwise of a
revenue nature. The Madras, MP and the Bombay High Courts decided the issue in
favour of the Revenue by denying the deduction u/s. 37 and the Gujarat,
Karnataka and Punjab & Haryana High Courts favoured the deduction u/s. 37
for such an expenditure, incurred on know-how, in favour of the assessee. On
the issue of ‘lump sum’ payment , the Bombay High Court in two cases held that
the payment in instalments would not cease to be lump sum. The High Court also
decided that for application of section 35AB , it is not necessary to be an
owner of the know-how.

  

Anil Starch Products Ltd.’s case 

The issue arose in the case of DCIT vs. Anil Starch
Products Ltd., 57 taxmann.com 173 (Guj.)
for A.Y 1990-91, 1992-93 and
1993-94. While admitting one of the appeals, the following substantial
questions of law arose for the determination of the court; “Whether,
the Appellate Tribunal was justified in law and on facts in confirming the
order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (A) who held that the expenditure under
consideration was revenue in nature and allowable u/s 37 of the Act
disregarding the special provisions of sec.35AB?”

 

The Gujarat High Court at the outset noted that an identical
question had arisen before them in another appeal of the assessee for A.Y.
1989-90 numbered 326 of 2000 decided on 03.07.2012 , not otherwise reported,
and chose to reproduce the facts, pleadings, law and even the decision therein
to finally conclude, in the cases before them, that the provisions of section
35 AB were not applicable to the case of a revenue expenditure which was
allowable u/s. 37 of the Act. The facts and the sequence of events of the case
is therefore not available in the judgement and therefore the facts, pleadings
and the outcome of the case heavily relied upon by the court are placed and
considered here as had been done by the court.  

 

The assessee in that case, a company engaged in manufacturing
of starch and other similar products, during the year under consideration
relevant to assessment year 1989-90, paid 
the technical know-how and service fees, totalling to a sum of
Rs.23,23,880 and claimed deduction thereof in full as the revenue expenditure.
The assessee had contended that the provisions of section 35AB of the Act were
applicable only in respect of the capital expenditure and not in respect of the
revenue expenditure. The assessee further contended that the company while
acquiring such know-how, obtained no ownership right on such information and
know-how was furnished by the foreign company to the assessee under an
agreement. The assessee also contended that such technical know-how was for the
purpose of production of its existing items which are being manufactured by the
assessee company since many years.

 

The AO held that such expenditure fell within section 35AB of
the Act. The AO, did not accept the contentions of the assessee, though agreed
that such expenditure was revenue in nature and was covered within section 35AB of the Act and were to be amortised, as provided under the said
section, by spreading the benefit over a period of six years. Dissatisfied with
such a decision of the AO, the assessee carried the matter in appeal. Before
the CIT (Appeals), the assessee in addition to contending that a revenue
expenditure could not be brought under the ambit of section 35AB of the Act,
further contended that the provision of section 35AB of the Act was an enabling
provision, introduced to facilitate the deduction for a capital expenditure.

 

The CIT (A) rejected the assessee’s appeal as he was of the
opinion that section 37(1) of the Act, which covered expenditure not being in
the nature of the expenditure described in sections 30 to 36, would not apply
in the case by virtue of the provisions contained in section 35AB of the Act.
He held that since section 35AB of the Act made a specific provision to treat
the expenditure incurred for acquisition of technical know-how by way of lump
sum payment and that even if such a payment was revenue in nature, it would not
fall within sub-section (1) of section 37 of the Act.

 

On a further appeal by the assessee, the Tribunal reversed
the decisions of the revenue authorities. The Tribunal noted that as per the
agreement, all information and know-how furnished by the foreign company
remained the property of that company; the payment was made as a lump sum
consideration for use of the know-how, only, for the purpose of its running
business, for a limited period. The Tribunal noted that undisputedly, there was
no purchase of the know-how from the foreign company. The Tribunal held that
the case of the assessee was not covered u/s.35AB of the Act and that section
35AB had no application in the case and the assessee was entitled to deduction
u/s. 37(1) of the Act.

 

In the appeal to the High Court, by the Revenue, it was
contended that the Tribunal committed grave error in allowing the assessee’s
appeal; that section 35AB of the Act was widely worded and included any
expenditure incurred for acquisition of technical know-how and that  the concept of ownership was not material for
section 35AB; that once an expenditure, whether revenue or capital, was covered
u/s. 35AB of the Act then by virtue of the  language of sub-section
(1) of section 37 of the Act, the assessee could not claim any benefit thereof
u/s. 37 of the Act. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Madras High
Court in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Tamil Nadu Chemical
Products Ltd., reported in 259 ITR 582
, wherein a division bench of the
Madras High Court had held that during the period when section 35AB of the Act
remained effective, any expenditure towards acquisition of know-how,
irrespective of whether it was a capital or a revenue expenditure, was to be
treated only in accordance with section 35AB and the deduction allowable in
respect of such know-how was 1/6th of the amount paid as lump sum consideration
for acquiring know-how. The Revenue relying on the decision of the MP High
Court in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Bright Automotives and
Plastics Ltd.,
reported in 273 ITR 59 further contended that in
order to attract the rigour of section 35AB of the Act, it was not necessary
for the assessee to actually become an absolute owner of the know-how and also
that the nature of expenditure whether revenue or capital, was of no
consequence.

 

The assessee in response contended that the expenditure in
question was purely revenue in nature and the same was, therefore, not covered
u/s. 35AB of the Act; that the said provision was made to encourage acquisition
of know-how to improve the quality and efficiency of Indian manufacturing; that
the assessee had acquired the know-how for a limited period and had never
enjoyed any ownership or domain right over the know-how; that the know-how was
utilised for manufacturing of its existing items and that neither any new
manufacturing unit was established nor new item of manufacturing was
introduced. It was pointed out that even the AO agreed that the expenditure in
question was a revenue expenditure; that section 35AB of the Act had no
application to such an expenditure since the provision of section 35AB was an
enabling provision that was not introduced to limit the benefits which were
already existing. Attention was also drawn to the C.B.D.T. Circular No.421
dated 12.6.1985
wherein with respect to deduction in respect of an
expenditure on know-how, it was clarified that, the provision was inserted with
a view to providing encouragement for indigenous scientific research. Heavy
reliance was placed on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Commissioner
of Income Tax vs. Swaraj Engines Ltd., 309 ITR 443
in which the Apex Court
had an occasion to examine the decision of the Punjab & Haryana High Court
on the question of applicability of section 35AB of the Act.

 

The Gujarat High Court noted that the AO himself had accepted
that the expenditure in question was of revenue nature and that the circular
No. 421 confirmed that the provisions of section 35AB were enabling provision
and if that be so, the deduction of such expenditure could not be limited by
applying section 35AB of the Act. The Court took note of the facts in Swaraj
Engines Ltd.’s case
and also of the decision therein and observed as under;
“The Apex Court decision would suggest that for determining whether certain expenditure
would fall within section 35AB or not, it would be important to examine the
nature of the expenditure. If it is found that the same is revenue in nature,
the question of applicability of section 35AB of the Act would not arise. On
the other hand, if it is found to be capital in nature, then the question of
amortisation and spreading over, as contemplated under section 35AB of the Act
would come into play.”

 

The Court held that such provision, as was clarified by the
C.B.D.T, was made with a view to providing encouragement for indigenous
scientific research; that such statutory provision was made for making
available the benefits which were hitherto not available to the manufacturers
while incurring expenditure for acquisition of technical know-how; that to the
extent such expenditure was covered u/s. 35AB, amortised deduction spread over
six years was made available; that where such expenditure was capital in
nature, prior to introduction of section 35AB of the Act, no such deduction
could be claimed; that with introduction of section 35AB, to encourage
indigenous scientific research, such deduction was made available; that such a
provision could not be seen as a limiting provision restricting the existing
benefits of the assessee. In other words the revenue expenditure in the form of
acquisition of technical know-how, which was available as deduction u/s. 37(1)
of the Act, was never meant to be disallowed or taken away or limited by
introduction of section 35AB of the Act.

 

The Gujarat High Court also cited with approval the paragraph
from the Ninth Edition, Volume-I of Kanga & Palkhivala, while
explaining the provisions of section 35AB of the Act, : “This section
allows deduction, spread over six years, of a lump sum consideration paid for
acquiring know-how for the purposes of business even if later the assessee’s
project is abandoned or if such know-how subsequently becomes useless or if the
same is returned. The section, which is an enabling section and not a disabling
one, should be confined to that consideration which would otherwise be
disallowable as being on capital account. A payment for acquiring know-how or
the use of know-how which is on revenue account is allowable under section 37,
and does not attract the application of this section at all.”

 

The High Court concluded that the provisions of section 35AB
of the Act could apply only in case of a capital expenditure and would not
apply to a revenue expenditure even if the same was incurred for acquisition of
technical know-how and the deduction thereof could not be curtailed or limited
by applying section 35AB.A revenue expenditure remained within the ambit of
section 37(1) of the Act. The Court observed that it was unable to concur with
the view of the Madras High Court in case of Commissioner of Income Tax vs.
Tamil Nadu Chemical Products Ltd. (supra)
, which was in any case rendered
prior to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Commissioner of
Income Tax vs. Swaraj Engines Ltd. (supra).

 

Accordingly, the Gujarat High Court, in the case before it,
in appeal, in Anil Starch Ltd.’s case, dismissed the Revenue’s appeal
holding that the provisions of section 35AB did not apply to an expenditure
which otherwise was of a revenue nature. In deciding the case, the High Court
followed the ratio of the decisions in the cases of DCIT vs. Sayaji
Industries Ltd. 82 CCH 412
and the Karnataka High Court in the case of Diffusion
Engineers Ltd. vs. DCIT, 376 ITR 487.

 

Standard Batteries Ltd.’s case

Recently the issue came up for consideration, before the
Bombay High Court, in the case of Standard Batteries Ltd. vs. CIT, 255
Taxman 380 (Bom.).
The assessee, in that case, had entered into an
agreement with ‘O’, UK, in terms of which, the assessee was to receive outside
India a license to transfer and import information, know-how, advice,
materials, documents and drawings as required for the manufacture of miners’
cap lamp batteries and stationery batteries for a lump sum consideration paid
in three equal instalments, where the permission was only to use the know-how
and information without transfer of ownership. The assessee claimed deduction
in respect of the said payment u/s. 37(1). The AO however, rejected the claim
of the assessee but allowed deduction to the extent of 1/6th of the amount
spent and claimed, and the balance amount was to be deducted in equal
instalments for each of the five immediately succeeding previous years in terms
of section 35AB.

 

The Tribunal held that the assessee had acquired the
ownership rights in the technical know-how and accordingly the assessee was
entitled to deduction u/s. 35AB, and not u/s. 37(1) as was claimed by the
assessee.

 

On appeal by the assessee to the High Court, the three
aspects before the Court were about the application of section 35 AB to the
case where; (i) a revenue expenditure was incurred (ii) payment was made in
instalments and (iii) the assessee was not an owner of the rights or asset for
an effective application of section 35AB.  

 

On behalf of the assessee, it was contended that the expenditure
for receipt of technical know-how would 
not fall u/s. 35AB of the Act but would appropriately fall u/s. 37 of
the Act for the following reasons;

 

(a)  Section 35AB of the Act
required a lump sum consideration to be paid for acquiring any technical
know-how, while in the case before the Court admittedly payment was made in 3
instalments, therefore could not be regarded as a lump sum payment and as such
was therefore, outside the scope of section 35AB of the Act;

 

(b)  There was no acquisition of a technical
know-how in the facts of the case, as the applicant merely obtained a lease /
license of the rights to use such technical know-how; not having any ownership
rights over the technical know-how, the requirement of acquiring the know-how
u/s. 35AB of the Act was not satisfied and was thus, outside the mischief of
section 35AB of the Act;

 

(c)  The technical know-how
obtained by the applicant under the agreement dated 19th June, 1984
was to be used in the regular course of its business of manufacturing batteries
and therefore, would be revenue in nature; section 35AB would apply only where
the expenditure was in the nature of a capital expenditure; the expenditure for
obtaining technical know-how being of revenue nature, would fall in the
residuary section 37 of the Act.

                       

In response, it was contended on behalf of the Revenue, that
:—

 

(a)  The payment made in three equal instalments
continued to be a lump sum payment;

 

(b) Section 35AB of the Act, did not require
obtaining ownership of the technical know-how; the license to use the know-how
by itself would be covered by the words “consideration paid for acquiring
any know-how”; there was no basis for restricting the plain meaning of the
word “acquiring” in section 35AB of the Act;

 

(c) The applicant had used the technical know-how
so obtained in its business and on plain interpretation of section 35AB of the
Act, it would apply; it did not exclude revenue expenditure from its purview,
as there was no requirement in section 35AB that the same would be available
only if the expenditure was of a capital nature and not if it was revenue in
nature: that wherever the legislature wanted to restrict the benefit in respect
of the deduction claimed of expenditure dependent upon its nature, described in
sections 30 to 36 of the Act, it specifically provided so therein as was in
sections 35A and 35ABB of the Act;

 

(d) In any event, section 37 of the Act excluded
expenditure of a nature described in sections 30 to 36 from the purview of s.
37 of the Act; section 35AB fell within sections 30 to 36 and therefore, no
occasion to apply section 37 of the Act would arise;

 

Relying on the decision of the Court in the case of CIT
vs. Raymond Ltd., 209 Taxman 154 (Bom.)
, the Court held that merely because
the payments were made in instalments for using the technical know-how, it
would not cease to be a lump sum payment where the amount payable was fixed and
not variable more so when the words used in section 35AB were ‘lump sum’
payment and not a one time payment. Therefore, making of lump sum payment in 3
instalments would not make the payment any less a lump sum payment.

 

On the issue of the need to be an owner of know-how, the
assessee reiterated that the word ‘acquiring’ as used in section 35AB would
necessarily mean, acquisition of ownership rights of the technical know-how;
that a mere lease / license, would not amount to acquisition of technical
know-how as per the dictionary meaning of the word “acquisition”. The
Court however held that the dictionary meaning relied upon did not exclude the
cases of obtaining any knowledge or a skill, as was in the case before them or
technical know-how for a limited use. It held that the gaining of knowledge was
complete / acquired by transfer of know-how and the limited use of it would not
detract the same from being included in the scope and meaning of the word
acquisition; that the word “acquisition” as defined in the larger
sense even in the Oxford Dictionary referred to above, would cover the use of
technical knowledge know-how by the applicant assessee which was made available
to it; thus, the restricted meaning of the word ‘acquisition’ to mean ‘only
obtaining rights on ownership’ was not the plain meaning in English language
and obtaining of technical know-how under a license would also amount to
acquiring know-how as the words ‘on ownership basis’ were completely absent in
section 35AB(1) of the Act. The Court held that accepting the contention of the
applicant, would necessarily lead to adding the words ‘by ownership’ after the
word ‘acquiring’ in section 35AB(1) of the Act, which addition was not
permitted while interpreting a fiscal statute.

 

On the main issue of allowability u/s. 37, it was reiterated
that the technical know-how which had been obtained was used in the regular
course of its business of manufacturing batteries and it would necessarily be
in the nature of revenue expenditure, allowable u/s. 37 of the Act. Reliance
was placed upon the decisions of Gujarat High Court in DCIT vs. Anil Starch
Products Ltd. 232
Taxman 129 and DCIT vs. Sayaji Industries Ltd. 82
CCH 412 and the decision of the Karnataka High Court in Diffusion Engineers
Ltd. vs. DCIT 376 ITR 487
, to contend that the issue stood concluded in
favour of the company for the reason that while dealing with an identical
situation, the courts in the above referred three cases, have held that section
35AB of the Act would not be applicable where the expenses were of revenue
nature, and the expenditure was deductible u/s. 37(1) of the Act.

 

In contrast, the Revenue reiterated that section 37 of the
Act itself excluded expenditure of the nature described in sections 30 to 36
without any qualification as was held by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in CIT
vs. Bright Automotives & Plastics Ltd. 273 ITR 59
and the Madras High
Court in CIT vs. Tamil Nadu Chemical Products Ltd. 259 ITR 582. That the
courts in those cases had held that the expenditure incurred for acquiring technical
know-how would fall u/s. 35AB of the Act irrespective of the fact that the
expenditure was revenue in nature.

 

On due consideration of the submission of the parties , the
Bombay High Court held as under;

 

  •      The submission that the expenditure in
    question be allowed u/s. 37 could not be accepted for the reason that section
    35AB of the Act itself specifically provided that any expenditure incurred for
    acquiring know-how for the purposes of the assessee’s business be allowed under
    that section; that as detailed in the Explanation thereto the know-how to
    assist in the manufacturing or processing of goods would necessarily mean that
    any expenditure on know-how which was used for the purposes of carrying on
    business would stand covered by section 35AB of the Act.

 

  •      Section 37 of the Act itself excluded
    expenditure of the nature described in sections 30 to 36 of the Act without any
    qualification.

 

  •      On examination of sections 30 to 36 to find
    whether any of them restricted the benefit to
    only capital expenditure, it was found that section 35AB of the Act made no
    such exclusion / inclusion on the basis of the nature of expenditure i.e.
    capital or revenue. In fact, wherever the parliament sought to restrict the benefit
    on the basis of nature of expenditure falling u/s. 30 to 36 of the Act, it
    specifically so provided  viz. section
    35A which was introduced  along with
    section 35AB of the Act w.e.f. assessment year 1986-87. In fact, later sections
    35ABA and 35ABB have also provided for deduction thereunder only for a capital
    expenditure .

 

  •      Wherever the Parliament sought to restrict
    the expenditure falling within sections 30 to 36 only to a capital expenditure,
    the same was expressly provided for in the section concerned. To illustrate,
    section 35A and 35ABB of the Act have specifically restricted the benefits
    thereunder only to a capital expenditure.

 

  •      In the above view, submission on behalf of
    the assessee that section 35AB of the Act would apply only to the case of a
    capital expenditure and exclude the revenue expenditure, required adding words
    to s. 35AB which the legislature had specifically not put in; the court could
    not insert words while interpreting the fiscal legislation in the absence of
    any ambiguity in reading of section as it stood; thus, even if technical
    know-how was revenue in nature, yet it would be excluded from the provisions of
    section 37 of the Act.




The Court took note of the fact that Gujarat High Court in Anil
Starch Products Ltd.’s case (supra)
and Sayaji Industries Ltd.’s
case (supra) did not agree with the view of the M.P. High Court in Bright
Automotives & Plastics Ltd.’s
case (supra) and of the Madras
High Court in Tamil Nadu Chemical Products Ltd.’s case (supra). It also
noted that the Karnataka High Court in Diffusion Engineers Ltd.’s case
(supra)
did not agree with the view of the Madras High Court in Tamil
Nadu Chemical Products Ltd.’s
case (supra). Having taken note, it
observed that the basis of all the above referred three decisions was the
subsequent decision of the Apex Court in CIT vs. Swaraj Engines Ltd.  301 ITR 284. It further noted that the
above case before the Apex Court arose from the decision of the Punjab &
Haryana High Court in Swaraj Engines Ltd.’s case, wherein it was held
that payments made on account of the royalty would be deductible u/s. 37 and
not u/s 35AB of the Act; that the Apex Court had restored the issue to the
Punjab & Haryana High Court, by way of remand; that the Apex Court directed
that the High Court should first decide whether the expenditure incurred on
royalty would be capital or revenue in nature at the very threshold before
deciding the applicability of section 35AB or 37 of the Act.

 

The Court also observed that the Apex Court, while restoring
the issue, had clearly recorded that it had not expressed any opinion on the
matter and on the question whether the expenditure was revenue or capital in
nature and had instead, depending on the answer to that question, directed the
High Court to decide the applicability of section 35AB, and had kept all
contentions on both sides expressly open.

 

The entire issue, in the opinion of the Bombay High Court,
about whether section 35AB applied only in case of capital expenditure and not
in case of revenue expenditure had not been decided by the Apex Court in Swaraj
Engines Ltd.’s
case (supra) and was left to be decided by the Punjab
& Haryana High Court on the basis of the fresh submissions to be made by
the respective parties. It was clear to the High Court that the Apex Court in Swaraj
Engines Ltd.’s
case (supra) had not concluded the issue by holding
that section 35AB would apply only in cases where the expenditure was capital in
nature. Instead the Apex Court had expressed only a tentative view and the
issue itself was left open to be decided by the Punjab & Haryana High Court
on remand.

 

The Bombay High Court importantly held that the reliance by
the Gujarat High Court in Anil Starch Products Ltd.’s case (supra)
and Sayaji Industries Ltd.’s case (supra) and by the Karnataka
High Court in Diffusion Engineers Ltd.’s case (supra), on the
Apex Court decision in Swaraj Industries Ltd.’s case (supra), to
hold that an expenditure which was revenue in nature would not fall u/s. 35AB
and would have necessarily to fall u/s. 37 of the Act, was not warranted by the
decision of the Apex Court in Swaraj Engines Ltd.’s case (supra).
Hence, the Bombay High Court was unable to agree with the decisions of the
Gujarat High Court and the Karnataka High Court, in as much as the Apex Court
had not conclusively decided the issue and left it open for the Punjab &
Haryana High Court to adjudicate upon the said issue.

 

Observations

That the expenditure of revenue nature on acquiring know-how
is eligible for deduction u/s. 37 in full, prior to insertion of section 35AB,
was a position in law that was well settled by several decisions of the courts,
and in particular, the decisions in the cases of Ciba of India Ltd.69 ITR
692(SC), IAEC(Pumps) Ltd. 232 ITR 316(SC), Indian Oxygen Ltd. 218 ITR 337(SC)
and Alembic Works Co Ltd. 177 ITR 377(SC).
In contrast, the expenditure of
capital nature on know-how was not eligible for deduction u/s. 37, prior to
insertion of section 35AB, in as much as the section itself prohibited
deduction of an expenditure of a capital nature, though in the above referred
cases, the deduction was held to be allowable even where the expenditure
resulted in some enduring benefits.

 

This settled position in law was disturbed by the
introduction of section 35AB. With its introduction, the deduction for all
expenses on know-how, capital or revenue, was governed by the provisions of
section 35AB, was the understanding of the Revenue, a stand that was not
supported by the comments of the leading jurists published in the 9th
edition of the book titled Kanga & Palkhivala’s Law and Practice of
Income tax.
In contrast, tax payers hold that the insertion of section 35
AB had not changed the settled position for deduction in full u/s. 37 of the
Act for an expenditure of revenue nature.

 

Both the views, as noted, are supported by the conflicting
decisions of about six High Courts where some of the decisions are delivered in
favour of the taxpayers on the ground that the issue has already been settled
by the Apex Court in the case of Swaraj Engines Ltd.(supra) while
recently the Bombay High Court held to the contrary, leading to one more
controversy involving whether the Apex Court really adjudicated the issue for
good or it has left the issue open.

  

It is perhaps not difficult to decide whether the Supreme
court in the case of Swaraj Engines Ltd. (supra), at all concluded the
issue under consideration and if yes, was the conclusion arrived at in favour of
the proposition that the provisions of section 35AB applied only where the
expenditure in question was of capital nature. The Apex Court in Swaraj’s
case had noted, in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the decision, that there was a
considerable amount of confusion whether the AO in the case before him applied
section 35AB at all and whether the said contention regarding applicability of
section 35AB was at all raised. The court had further observed that the order
of the AO was not clear, principally, because the order was focussed only one
point namely, on the nature of expenditure. It further observed that depending
on the answer to the said question, the applicability of section 35AB needed to
be considered; the said question needed to be decided authoritatively by the
High Court as it was an important question of law, particularly, after
insertion of section 35AB. The Court therefore remitted the matter to the High
Court for a fresh consideration in accordance with law. It also clarified, in
para 7, on the second question, that “we do not wish to express any opinion.
It is for the High Court to decide, after construing the agreement between the
parties, whether the expenditure is revenue or capital in nature and, depending
on the answer to that question, the High Court will have to decide the
applicability of section 35AB of the Income-tax Act. On this aspect we keep all
contentions on both sides expressly open”
. Accordingly, the impugned
judgment of the High Court was set aside and the matter was remitted for fresh
consideration in accordance with law.

 

It seems that the
confusion has arisen out of the following observations of the Apex Court in Swaraj’s
case
, wherein it stated that “At the same time, it is important to note
that even for the applicability of section 35AB, the nature of expenditure is
required to be decided at the threshold because if the expenditure is found to
be revenue in nature, then section 35AB may not apply. However, if it is found
to be capital in nature, then the question of amortisation and spread over, as
contemplated by section 35AB, would certainly come into play. Therefore, in our
view, it would not be correct to say that in this case, interpretation of section
35AB was not in issue.”
These observations, made mainly to emphasise that
the decision of the High Court required to be set aside for further
examination, has been construed differently by the High Courts, some to support
the proposition that section 35AB had no application to an expenditure that was
held to be of revenue nature. In fact, in the said case, when the matter had
reached the High Court, it was dismissed by the Punjab & Haryana High Court
on an altogether different aspect of section 35AB which is not under
consideration, presently. The High Court in that case had held and observed
that effort of the revenue to bring the expenditure within the domain of
section 35AB was totally misplaced, since the pre-condition for application of
section 35AB was that the payment had to be a lump sum consideration for
acquiring any know-how and such pre-condition was not satisfied. On that basis,
the High Court had dismissed the appeal. It was this decision of the High Court
which had come up for consideration of the Apex Court . We respectfully submit
that the decision of the Apex Court in Swaraj Engines Ltd.’s case, has
not concluded that a revenue expenditure was outside the scope of section 35AB
. It has instead left this aspect of the issue open for a fresh consideration,
as has been explained by the Bombay High Court in Standard Batteries Ltd.’s
case.
 

Having noted the facts, the issue requires to be analysed on
the basis of;

 

  •     implication of the decisions favouring the
    claim for deduction u/s. 37

 

  •     an understanding of the position prevailing
    prior to insertion of section 35 AB,

 

  •     legislative intent behind introduction of
    section 35AB,

 

  •     whether section 35AB is an enabler or
    disabler,

 

  •     language of section 35AB and its scope , and

 

  •     restriction in section 37 .

 

We very respectfully submit that the decisions favouring the
claim u/s. 37, based simply on the perceived findings of the Apex Court in Swaraj
Machines Ltd.‘s
case, may not hold any force, in view of our considered
opinion that the Apex Court had, in that case, not adjudicated the issue but
had instead set aside the matter and restored the same to the Punjab &
Haryana High Court. If that is so, the decisions of the courts holding that the
deduction for expenses is governed by section 35AB alone become the only
available decisions of the High Courts leaving no controversy on the subject.
The best hope for the taxpayer is to await the decision of the Apex Court on
the subject. The issue till such time remains not concluded but the one on which
no other High Court has decided in favour of the tax payer after examining the
merits of the case.

 

The legal position, prevailing prior to insertion of section
35AB by the Finance Act, 1985, is cleared by the decisions of the Supreme Court
holding that an expenditure, on acquisition of know-how, of revenue nature is
eligible for deduction u/s. 37 of the Act, once it was incurred wholly and
exclusively for the purposes of the business and the expenditure in question
was not of a capital nature or for personal purposes. Ciba of India Ltd.69
ITR 692(SC), IAEC(Pumps ) Ltd. 232 ITR 316(SC), Indian Oxygen Ltd. 218 ITR
337(SC)
and Alembic Works Co Ltd. 177 ITR 377(SC) to name a few
wherein the deduction u/s 37 was held to be allowable for an expenditure incurred
on technical know-how acquisition even where the expenditure resulted in some
enduring benefit to the payer.

 

The CBDT circular No. 421 dated 12.6.1985, vide paragraphs
15.1 to 15.3
explains the intention behind the insertion of the new
provision in the form of section 35AB which is for providing further
encouragement for indigenous scientific research. The memorandum explaining the
provisions of the Finance Bill, 1985 and the Notes thereon have been reiterated
by the circular. They together do not throw any light about the scope of the
new provision, nor about the intention to override the existing understanding,
nor the available decisions on the subject. If that had been the intent, the
same is not expressed by the supporting documents.

 

Ideally from the tax payers angle, the provision of section
35AB should be construed to be an enabling provision that facilitates the
deduction for a capital expenditure hitherto not available before its
introduction and its scope should be restricted to that. Its insertion should
not be taken as a disabling provision leading to a disentitlement not expressly
provided for nor intended. 

Section 35AB in its language does not limit the deduction to
the case of an expenditure that is capital in its nature. It also does not
expressly provide that a revenue expenditure on acquisition of know-how will
fall for deduction only u/s. 35AB. Neither does it provide that such an
expenditure will not qualify for deduction u/s. 35AB and thereby strengthening
the claim for deduction u/s. 37. Useful reference may be made to the provisions
of section 35A and section 35ABA and section 35ABB which specifically apply
only to the cases of capital expenditures.

 

Section 37 grants deduction for any and all types of
expenditures wholly and exclusively for business purposes, other than those
described under sections 30 to 36 of the Act. The true intent and meaning of
the words ‘not being the expenditure described in s.30 to 36’ placed in
s/s. (1) was examined in various cases by the courts over a period of time. It
has been held by the High Courts, including by the full benches of courts, that
section 37 is a residuary provision and can be activated only where it is found
not to be covered by any of the provisions of section 30 to section 36. If it
is covered by any of those provisions, then the deduction cannot be granted
under the residual section 37. It will be so even where the conditions
prescribed under sections 30 to 36 remain to be satisfied. The use of the term ‘described’
as against the terms ‘covered’ or ‘of the nature covered by or
prescribed in
’ is equally intriguing.

 

If the expenditure on know-how does not satisfy the
conditions of the lump sum payment and of the acquisition, then, in that case,
provisions of section 35AB would have no application. The deduction in such
cases would possibly be governed by the provisions of section 37, subject to
the satisfaction of the conditions satisfied therein. This view however is not
free from debate in view of the discussion in the preceding paragraph.

 

Obviously, section 35 AB will have no application in cases
where the payment is not lump sum and is periodical or annual or is turnover
based, and the tax payer would be able to stake its claim u/s. 37, provided of
course that the payment is not of the capital nature. Tata Yodogawa Ltd. vs.
CIT, 335ITR 53 (Jhar.).

 

The Apex Court in the case of Drilcos (India) Pvt. Ltd.vs.
CIT, 348 ITR 382
has held that once section 35AB had come into play,
section 37 had no role to play. This decision of the court, delivered
subsequently to Swaraj Machines’ case, may play an important role in
addressing the outcome of the issue on hand. The Apex Court, in Drilcos’
case,
confirmed the decision of the Madras High Court reported in 266
ITR 12
, on an appeal by the company challenging the order of the High
Court. The High Court had held that the provisions of section 35AB encompassed
in its scope the case of a revenue expenditure, following the decision in the
case of Tamil Nadu Chemicals Products Ltd.(supra).

 

While the controversy continues for the past,
the position is now clear with effect from 1.10.1998. A ‘know-how’ is expressly
included in the definition of an intangible asset with effect from 1.10.1998
and is accordingly made eligible for depreciation. Obviously, no depreciation
would be claimed or allowed in respect of a revenue expenditure on know-how,
and with that, such an expenditure, on discontinuation of section 35AB w.e.f
1.04.1998, would be eligible for deduction u/s. 37 of the Act.

Section 2(47) – Conversion of compulsory convertible preference shares into equity shares does not amount to transfer

5.  Periar
Trading Company Private Limited vs. Income Tax Officer (Mumbai)
Members: Mahavir Singh, JM and N.K. Pradhan, AMITA No.: 1944/Mum/2018 A.Y.: 2012-13. Dated: 9th November, 2018 Counsel for Assessee / Revenue: Percy Pardiwala
and Jeet Kandar / Somnath M. Wagale


Section 2(47) – Conversion of compulsory
convertible preference shares into equity shares does not amount to transfer


Facts


During the year
under appeal, the assessee company converted 51,634 number of cumulative and
compulsory convertible preference shares (CCPS) held by it in Trent Ltd., into
equity shares. According to AO, the conversion of CCPS into equity shares was
transfer within the meaning of the definition provided in section 2(47)(i) of
the Act. Accordingly, the sum of Rs. 2.85 crore, being difference of market
value of 51,634 number of equity shares of Trent Ltd. as on date of conversion
and the cost of the acquisition of CCPS was by him as taxable as capital gains.
On appeal, the CIT(A) confirmed the order of the AO.


Held


The Tribunal noted that the CBDT vide its
Circular F. No. 12/1/84-IT(AI) dated 12.05.1964 has clarified that where one
type of share is converted into another type of share, there is no transfer of
capital asset within the meaning of section 2(47). It also relied on the Mumbai
Tribunal’s decision in the case of ITO vs. Vijay M. Merchant, [1986] 19 ITD
510.


According to it, the decision of the Supreme
Court in the case of CIT vs. Motors & General Stores (P.) Ltd [1967] 66
ITR 692
and relied on by the CIT(A) in his order, was entirely
distinguishable on facts of the present case. It further observed that, the
contrary interpretation would lead to double taxation in as much as, having
taxed the capital gain upon such conversion, at the time of computing capital
gain upon sale of such converted shares, the assessee would still be taxed
again, as the cost of acquisition would still be adopted as the issue price of
the CCPS and not the consideration adopted while levying capital gain upon such
conversion. Accordingly, it was held that conversion of CCPS into equity shares
cannot be treated as ‘transfer’ within the meaning of section 2(47) of the Act.

 

37 Section 80-IA – Appeal to Appellate Tribunal – Limitation – Order of revision and consequential order of assessment – Appeals from both orders – Tribunal considering appeal from order of assessment – Dismissal of appeal from order of revision on ground of limitation – Not valid Industrial undertaking – Special deduction u/s. 80-IA – Undertaking engaged in distribution of electricity – Computation of profits for purposes of deduction – Penalty recovered from suppliers for delay in execution of contracts, unclaimed balances of contractors, rebate from power generators and interest on fixed deposits for opening letter of credit to power grid corporation includible in profits – Miscellaneous recovery from employees, difference between written down value and book value of released assets, commission for collection of electricity duty and rental income not part of profit

Hubli
Electricity Supply Co. vs. Dy. CIT; 404 ITR 462 (Karn); Date of order : 9th
February, 2018

A.
Ys.: 2006-07 to 2008-09

The
assessee, a wholly owned company of the Government of Karnataka was engaged in
the business of distribution of electricity. The assessee was entitled to
deduction u/s. 80-IA of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter for the sake of
brevity referred to as the “Act”). In the A. Y. 2006-07, it treated
as “income from profits and gains of business” penalty for delay in execution
of work by contractors, rebate from power generators, interest from fixed
deposits, the difference between the written down value and the book value of
assets, commission for collection of electricity duty, rental income, and
miscellaneous recovery from employees. The claim was accepted by the Assessing
Officer. Thereafter the Commissioner invoked the provisions of section 263 of
the Act and set aside the scrutiny assessment, without directing a fresh
assessment. A belated appeal filed against the order of revision was dismissed
by the Tribunal on the ground of limitation. Subsequently, the consequential
assessment order u/s. 143(3) read with section 263 of the Act was passed by the
Assessing Officer disallowing the said claims. The Assessee’s appeal was
dismissed by the Commissioner. The assessee filed further appeal before the
Tribunal. In the mean time, assessment orders for the A. Ys. 2007-08 and
2008-09 were concluded on the same lines, disallowing the deduction u/s.
80-IA(4)(iv)(c) and treating the items of income claimed as “other income” and charging
them to tax. Against these matters, the appeals were filed before the Tribunal.
All these appeals were clubbed together, heard and disposed of by a common
order. The Tribunal accepted some of the claims by the assessee.

 

On appeal,
the Karnataka High Court held as under:

 

“i)  The dismissal of the appeal by the Tribunal on
the ground of limitation without going into the merits of the case was
unjustifiable when the issue was considered on merits while adjudicating the
consequential orders.

 

ii)   The penalty recovered from suppliers and
contractors for delay in execution of works contract, unclaimed balances
outstanding pertaining to security deposits of contractor written back in the
books of account, rebate from power generators, interest income (fixed deposit
for opening of letter of credit to Power Grid Corporation Ltd.) had to be taken
into account while computing the deduction u/s. 80-IA(4).

 

iii)  Miscellaneous recovery from employees, the
difference between the written down value and book value of released assets,
commission from collection of electricity duty and rental income could not be
taken into account while computing the deduction u/s. 80-IA(4).”

 

38 Section 2(22)(e) – Deemed dividend (Loans and advances to shareholder) – Where transactions between shareholder and company were in nature of current account, provisions of section 2(22)(e) would not be applicable

CIT vs. Gayatri Chakraborty; [2018] 94
taxmann.com 244 (Cal); Date of Order : 3rd 
May, 2018 A.
Y.: 2009-10

The
assessee was a director in a company, BAPL in which she held 25.24 per cent
equity shares. There were transactions between the assessee and BAPL of giving
money by the assessee to BAPL as well as by BAPL to the assessee. The Assessing
Officer from the ledger account of BAPL in books of the assessee, took note
only of the transactions whereby BAPL gave money to the assessee and was of the
view that the same was ‘loan or advance’ within the meaning of section 2(22)(e)
by a company (BAPL) to a person who held substantial interest in the company
(BAPL) and had to be brought to tax as deemed dividend to the extent the
company possessed accumulated profits.

 

The
Tribunal held that the said sum received by the assessee could not constitute
loan attracting the deeming provision contained in section 2(22)(e).

 

On appeal
by the Revenue, the Calcutta High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and
held as under:

 

“i)  Law on this point is clear in the event
transactions between a shareholder and a company in which the public were not
substantially interested and the former had substantial stake, create mutual
benefits and obligations, then the provision of treating any sum received by
the shareholder out of accumulated profits as deemed dividend would not apply.
The company in the instant case fits the description conceived in the aforesaid
provision to come within the ambit of section 2(22)(e). The controversy which
falls for determination is whether the sum received by the assessee formed part
of running current account giving rise to mutual obligations or the payment
formed one-way traffic, assuming the character of loan or advance out of
accumulated profit.

 

ii)   The Tribunal analysed the ledger account of
the company so far as the payment made to and received from the assessee was concerned
and found that a copy of the ledger of the assessee in the books of BAPL was
placed. A copy of the statement showing the balance after every transaction in
the assessee’s ledger in the books of BAPL was placed. A perusal of the
statement of balances of transactions between the assessee and BAPL shows that
BAPL owed assessee certain sum. BAPL paid the assessee certain sum and the
assessee owed BAPL certain sum. The amounts given in the bracket in the last
column of the enclosed balances in the running current account is the amount
which BAPL owed to the assessee. Mutual transactions go on in this fashion
throughout the previous year and as on the last date of the previous year the
account is squared i.e., neither the assessee owes BAPL nor BAPL owes assessee
any sum. The assessee was beneficiary of the sums given by BAPL at some point
of time during the previous year and BAPL was the beneficiary of the sums given
by the assessee at another point of time during the previous year. It was case
of mutual running or current account which created independent obligations on
the other and not merely transactions which created obligations on other side,
those on the other being merely complete or partial discharge of such
obligations and there were reciprocal demands between the parties and the
account was mutual.

 

iii)  In this factual and legal perspective, payment
of the aforesaid sums to the assessee cannot be treated as dividend out of
profit. No perversity has been pointed out on behalf of the revenue so far as
such a concurrent finding of fact is concerned by the two statutory appellate
fora. One is not inclined to disturb such finding of fact, which the Tribunal
has backed with detailed analysis. If one embarks on a fresh factual enquiry
into the accounts of the assessee or that of the company involved, such
exercise would entail reappreciation of evidence. Such enquiry is impermissible
at this stage. The Tribunal’s order, thus, stands confirmed and the question
formulated is answered accordingly, in favour of the assessee.”

Sections 50, 54F – Deemed short term capital gains, calculated u/s. 50, arising on transfer of a depreciable asset, which asset was held for more than 36 months before the date of transfer qualify for exemption u/s. 54F, subject to satisfaction of other conditions mentioned in section 54F. Assessee having utilised the net consideration by the due date as specified u/s. 139(4), is entitled to exemption u/s. 54F though he failed to deposit the net consideration in the capital gain account scheme within the time specified u/s. 139(1).

18. [2018] 99 taxmann.com 88 (Ahmedabad-Trib.) Shrawankumar G. Jain vs. ITO ITA No. 695/Ahd./2016 A.Y.: 2011-12.Dated: 3rd  October, 2018.

 

Sections 50, 54F – Deemed short term
capital gains, calculated u/s. 50, arising on transfer of a depreciable asset,
which asset was held for more than 36 months before the date of transfer
qualify for exemption u/s. 54F, subject to satisfaction of other conditions
mentioned in section 54F. 


Assessee having utilised the net
consideration by the due date as specified u/s. 139(4), is entitled to
exemption  u/s. 54F though he failed to
deposit the net consideration in the capital gain account scheme within the
time specified u/s. 139(1).


FACTS


The assessee, an individual, carrying on his
proprietorship business under the name and style of MM sold his factory shed on
which depreciation had been claimed. Accordingly, the income earned thereon was
shown as short-term capital gain u/s. 50. However, in the return of income the
assessee had claimed exemption u/s. 54F against the short-term capital gain on
the ground that same was invested in purchase of residential property.


The Assessing Officer (AO) held that the
exemption is available u/s. 54F, only on transfer of a long-term capital asset.
The impugned factory shed was subject to depreciation u/s. 32 therefore, the
gain earned on the sale of such factory shed was liable to be taxed u/s. 50
being short-term capital gain. Once, the gain was held as short-term by virtue
of the provision of section 50, same could not be subjected to exemption under
section 54F.  The Assessing Officer also
observed that the object for enacting the provision of section 50 was to avoid
the multiple benefits claimed by the assessee. He held that the assessee was
not eligible for exemption u/s. 54F.  
Besides above, he also observed that the assessee had violated the
provision of section 54F(4) as he failed to deposit the amount of net sale
consideration in the capital gain account scheme. Therefore, the assessee could
not be allowed exemption u/s. 54F.


Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the CIT(A) who upheld the order passed by the AO.


Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the Tribunal.


HELD


The Tribunal noted that It is undisputed
fact that the period of holding of factory shed, on which depreciation was
claimed and which has been sold, was exceeding 36 months. Thus, the gain
arising on sale was held as short term by virtue of the provision of section
50.


The Tribunal on a combined reading of the
sections 50 and 54F noted that all the provisions of the two sections are
mutually exclusive to each other. There is no mention under section 50
referring to the provision of section 54F and vice versa. Therefore, the Tribunal
held that the provision of one section does not exclude the provision of other
section. It held that both the provisions should be applied independently in
the instant case. The Tribunal held that the capital gain earned by the
assessee on the sale of depreciable assets being factory shed is eligible for
exemption u/s. 54F as it is long-term capital assets as per the provision of
section 2(42A).  The Tribunal observed
that it has no hesitation in deleting the addition made by the AO by
disallowing the exemption available to the assessee.


The Tribunal also held that there is no
dispute the net consideration was utilised by the assessee before filing the
income tax return within the due date as specified u/s. 139(4). Therefore, the
assessee is eligible for exemption u/s. 54F, though he failed to deposit the
net consideration in the capital gain account scheme within the time specified
u/s. 139(1). The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

 

Sections 22, 24 – Income earned by assessee, society, by letting out space on terrace for installation of mobile tower / antenna is taxable as “Income from House Property” and consequently, deduction u/s. 24(a) is allowable in respect of such income.

17. [2018] 98 taxmann.com 365 (Mumbai-Trib.) Kohinoor Industrial Premises Co-op Society
Ltd. vs. ITO
ITA No. 670/Mum/2018 A.Y.: 2013-14.              
Dated: 5th  October, 2018.


Sections 22,
24 – Income earned by assessee, society, by letting out space on terrace for
installation of mobile tower / antenna is taxable as “Income from House
Property” and consequently, deduction u/s. 24(a) is allowable in respect of
such income.


FACTS


The assessee, a co-operative society,
derived income by letting out space on terrace for installation of mobile
tower/antenna.  This income was declared
in the return of income, filed by the society, under the head `Income from
House Property’ and deduction u/s. 24(a) was claimed.


The Assessing Officer (AO) observed that the
terrace cannot be regarded as house property as it was a common amenity for
members.  He also observed that since the
conveyance was not executed, the society is not the owner of the premises.  The AO taxed the income under the head
“Income from Other Sources”.


Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO.


Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the Tribunal.



HELD


The Tribunal observed that the issue before
it is, what is the nature of income received by the assessee for letting out
such space to the cellular operator/mobile company for installing and operating
mobile towers/antenna? It held that the terrace of the building cannot be
considered as distinct and separate but certainly is a part of the
house property.


Therefore, letting-out space on the terrace
of the house property for installation and operation of mobile tower/antenna
certainly amounts to letting-out a part of the house property itself. It held
that the observation of the AO that the terrace cannot be considered as house
property is unacceptable.


As regards the
observation of the Commissioner (Appeals) that the rental income received by
the assessee is in the nature of compensation for providing services and
facility to cellular operators, the Tribunal observed that the revenue has
failed to bring on record any material to demonstrate that in addition to
letting-out space on the terrace for installation and operation of antenna the
assessee has provided any other service or facilities to the cellular operators.


The Tribunal
directed the AO to treat the rental income received by the assessee from
cellular operator as income from house property and allow deduction u/s. 24(a).


Appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

Section 145(3) – Books of Accounts cannot be rejected u/s. 145(3) merely because Gross profit from a particular segment was lower and assessee was not in possession of proper documentary evidences in respect of expenses where the genuineness of expenses was not doubted.

16.
(2018) 65 ITR (Trib.) 532 (Jaipur)

Dreamax
Infrastructure Developers vs. ITO ITA No. :
364/JP/2017 A.Y.:
2012-13Dated: 25th May, 2018

 

Section 145(3) – Books of Accounts cannot
be rejected u/s. 145(3) merely because Gross profit from a particular segment
was lower and assessee was not in possession of proper documentary evidences in
respect of expenses where the genuineness of expenses was not doubted.


FACTS


The appellant, a partnership firm, engaged
in the business of Infrastructure and industrial project of Construction of
Road, Industrial Township, Security Barracks etc., was awarded two different
projects. One of road work and industrial township (Chittorgarh project) and
another of a highway road project (Pune Project). Appellant had maintained
single set of books for whole of its business covering both the projects. No
work was carried in respect of Pune project and no revenue was generated,
whereas, there was contractual revenue from the Chittorgarh project.  Appellant was asked to submit separate
trading account for each project by the Assessing Officer (AO). Appellant had
not maintained separate books for each project, however books were audited and
the same were produced along with other required details. AO further pointed
out that assessee had not supported the expenditure with proper vouchers. AO
also noted that appellant had shown very less Gross Profit (GP) for the
relevant Assessment year from the work executed. Accordingly, the AO doubted
the correctness of the books of accounts of the assessee and rejected the same
by invoking the provisions of section 145(3) of the Income Tax Act and adopted
8% Net Profit rate on Contract receipts. The rejection of Books was challenged
before the Hon’ble ITAT.


HELD


When AO does
not dispute the fact that appellant maintains Books, which are also audited,
then he is not justified in segregating the activities in different category
and then observing that appellant had reported low GP in some category ,
whereas overall 7.44% GP rate was declared which was not objected by the
revenue. Further, AO had only pointed out that expenses were not supported with
proper evidences and he had not doubted the genuineness of expenditure. When
appellant had produced relevant documentary evidences, insignificant defects in
supporting evidence cannot be a reason for rejection of books of account. It
was further held that if the expenditure claimed by the appellant was not found
to be bogus/ excessive then the low profit cannot be reason for rejection of
Books. As the work was carried under a composite work contract and appellant
was working as one enterprise there was no need for production of separate
books for each activity. Further, Hon’ble ITAT followed the decision of the
Hon’ble jurisdictional High Court in case of Malani Ramjivan Jagannath vs.
ACIT 316 ITR 120
, wherein it was held that mere deviation of GP rate cannot
be a ground for rejecting books of accounts and income cannot be determined on
the basis of estimate and guesswork. Accordingly it was held that appellant’s
case did not warrant rejection of Books of Accounts u/s. 145(3).

 

Section 10(1) – Cultivation of Mushroom, although in controlled condition using trays placed above land, is an agricultural activity and income derived there from is exempt u/s. 10(1).

15.
(2018) 65 ITR (Trib.) 625 (Hyderabad – SB)

DCIT vs.
Inventaa Industries (P.) Ltd. ITA No.:
1015 to 1018(Hyd.) of 2015 C.O. No.:
53 to 56 (Hyd.) of 2015
A.Ys.:
2008-09 to 2012-13 Dated: 9th July, 2018


Section 10(1) – Cultivation of Mushroom,
although in controlled condition using trays placed above land, is an
agricultural activity and income derived there from is exempt u/s. 10(1).   


FACTS


 The assessee company was engaged in growing
Edible White Button Mushrooms and the income from the said activity was treated
as Agricultural Income claiming exemption u/s. 10(1).  Assessing Officer (AO) contended that as
Mushrooms were grown in ‘growing rooms’ under ‘controlled conditions’ in racks
placed above land and using compost manure which is not land and hence the said
activity was not an agricultural activity. CIT(A) ruled in assessee’s favor by
concluding that production of mushroom was a process of agricultural production
and income derived from such a process was agricultural income eligible for
exemption u/s. 10(1). The question before the Special Bench of the Hon’ble ITAT
(Hyderabad Bench) was, whether income from production and sale of Mushrooms can
be termed as ‘agricultural income’ under the Income Tax Act, 1961?


HELD


The Special Bench of the Hon’ble ITAT
supported the view of assessee that ‘soil’ is a part of the land, which is part
of earth. Mushrooms are grown on ‘soil’. Certain basic operations are performed
on it, which require ‘expenditure of human skill and labour’ resulting in
raising the mushrooms. When soil is placed on trays, it does not cease to be
land and when operations are carried



out on soil, it would be agricultural activity carried upon land itself.


In order to
claim exemption u/s. 10(1), use of land and performing activity on it, so as to
raise a natural product, is sufficient. If the strict interpretation is adopted
for the word ‘Land’ appearing in definition of “agricultural Income” u/s. 2(1A)
of the Act, then, when ‘soil’ attached to earth is cultivated, it would be
agricultural activity and when ‘soil’ is cultivated after detaching the same
from earth, it would not be agricultural activity. Such an interpretation is
unintended and unfair. It was concluded that ‘soil’, even when separated from
land and placed in trays, pots, containers, terraces, compound walls etc.,
continues to be a specie of land.


Further, on the question whether mushroom is
‘plant’ or a ‘fungus’ it was observed that one cannot restrict the word
‘product’ to ‘plants’, ‘fruits’, ‘vegetables’ or such botanical life only. The
only condition was that the “product” in question should be raised on
the land by performing some basic operations. Mushrooms produced by the
assessee are a product.


This product is raised on land/soil, by
performing certain basic operations. The product draws nourishment from the
soil and is naturally grown, by such operation on soil which require expenditure
of ‘human skill and labour’. The product so raised has utility for consumption,
trade and commerce and hence would qualify as an ‘agricultural product’ the
sale of which gives rise to agricultural income which is exempt u/s. 10(1) of
the Act.

Just because mushrooms are grown in
controlled conditions it does not negate the claim of the assessee that the
income arising from the sale of such mushrooms is agricultural income.
Accordingly, exemption u/s. 10(1)was allowed to the assessee.

Section 68 – No addition u/s. 68 can be made when assessee is not liable to maintain books of accounts, further bank passbook cannot be regarded as books maintained by assessee.

14.  (2018) 65 ITR (Trib.) 500 (Delhi)

Babbal
Bhatia vs. ITO ITA Nos.
5430 & 5432/DEL/2011 A.Ys.:  2010-11 to 2012-13 Dated: 8th June, 2018




Section 68 – No addition u/s. 68 can be made when assessee is not liable to
maintain books of accounts, further bank passbook cannot be regarded as books
maintained by assessee.


FACTS


Assessment was reopened u/s. 147 based on
information that Assessee had earned Rental income and had made huge cash
deposit in her bank account. In response to notice u/s. 148, she filed her
Return of Income (ROI) wherein she clearly stated that she did not maintain
books of accounts. Further, assessee had declared her income under the
presumptive taxation provisions of section44AF, however as per the contentions
of revenue, the turnover and profit shown by assessee did not entitle assessee
to be governed by section 44AF. During the assessment proceeding, she submitted
Cash Flow Statement and stated that cash deposited was received from cash sales
and withdrawals from other banks. However, the Assessing Officer (AO) rejected
the explanation and made addition of cash deposit u/s. 68.


CIT(A) upheld the order of AO and assessee
filed appeal before the Hon’ble ITAT.


HELD


The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s appeal
and held as under:


1.  If returned income did not match the
presumptive tax rates u/s. 44AF revenue authorities should have treated the ROI
as invalid. Further in such circumstances, AO cannot proceed by making addition
u/s. 68 in respect of cash deposited in Bank account knowing fully that
assessee was not maintaining books of accounts.


2.  The Hon’ble ITAT relied on the following
decisions:


(a) ITO vs. Om Prakash Sharma (ITA
2556/Del/2009)
wherein it was accepted that bank passbook does not
constitute Books of Accounts, further when no Books are maintained by assessee
addition u/s. 68 cannot be made. Reliance was placed on CIT vs. Bhaichand H.
Gandhi [141 ITR 67 (Bom.)], Sampat Automobile vs. ITO [96 TTJ(D)368], Mayawati
vs. DCIT [113 TTJ 178(Del.)], Sheraton Apparels vs. ACIT [256 I.T.R. 20 (Bom.)
].


(b) Baladin Ram v. CIT [1969] 7 ITR 427[SC]
wherein the apex court held that passbook could not be regarded as books of
account of assessee as relationship between banker and customer is that of
debtor-creditor and not of trustee-beneficiary.


(c) CIT vs. Ms. Mayawati [338 ITR 563 (Del
HC)]
wherein it was held that Bank neither act as agent of customer nor
maintains pass book under the instructions of customer (assessee). Thus, cash
credit in the Pass Book of the assessee does not attract provisions of section
68.


(d) Anandram Ratiani vs. CIT [1997] 223 ITR
544 (Gauhati)
wherein it was observed that perusal of section 68 of the
Act, shows that in relation to the expression “books”, the emphasis
is on the word “assessee” meaning thereby that such books have to be
the books of the assessee himself and not of any other person.


3.  The very sine qua non for making
addition u/s. 68 presupposes a credit of the amount in the Books of the
assessee. A credit in the Bank account of assessee cannot be construed as
credit in the books of the assessee.


4.  The Hon’ble ITAT stated that it is settled
position that statutory provision has to be given plain literal interpretation
no word howsoever meaningful it may appear can be allowed to be read into a
statutory provision in garb of giving effect to the underlying intent of
legislature. Thus, credit in bank of assessee cannot be construed as credit in
Books of assessee. Accordingly no addition u/s. 68 can be made in the given
case.

 

Section 54 r.w. section139 and 143 – There is no bar/restriction in provisions of section 139(5) that assessee cannot file a revised return after issuance of notice u/s. 143(2). The AO could not reject assessee’s claim for deduction u/s. 54 raised in revised return on ground that said return was filed after issuance of notice u/s. 143(2)

13. [2018] 195 TTJ 1068 (Mumbai – Trib.)

Mahesh H. Hinduja vs. ITO ITA No. 
176/Mum/2017 A.Y.: 
2011-12. Dated: 20th June, 2018.

 

Section 54
r.w. section139 and 143 – There is no bar/restriction in provisions of section
139(5) that assessee cannot file a revised return after issuance of notice u/s.
143(2). The AO could not reject assessee’s claim for deduction u/s. 54 raised
in revised return on ground that said return was filed after issuance of notice
u/s. 143(2)


FACTS


The assessee filed his return declaring
certain taxable income. Subsequently, the assessee filed a revised return of
income in which while offering long-term capital gain, he claimed deduction of
the said amount u/s. 54 towards investment of an amount in a new residential
house. The AO taking a view that revised return of income was filed after
issuance of notice u/s. 143(2), held that the said revised return being
invalid, assessee’s claim for deduction u/s. 54 could not be allowed. Aggrieved
by the assessment order, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A). The
CIT(A) confirmed the said disallowance.


HELD


The Tribunal held that in the original
return of income the assessee had neither declared the long-term capital gain
nor has claimed deduction u/s. 54. Therefore, the assessee filed a revised
return of income within the time prescribed u/s. 139(5) declaring net long-term
capital gain of Rs.49,96,681, though, it was claimed as deduction u/s. 54
towards investment in a new residential house.


A careful
reading of the provisions contained u/s. 139(5) would make it clear that if an
assessee discovered any omission or wrong statement in the original return of
income, he could file a revised return of income within the time limit as per
section 139(5). There was no bar/restriction in the provisions of section
139(5) that the assessee could not file a revised return of income after
issuance of notice u/s. 143(2) of the Act. The assessee could file a revised
return of income even in course of the assessment proceedings, provided, the
time limit prescribed u/s. 139(5) was available. That being the case, the
revised return of income filed by the assessee u/s. 139(5) could not be held as
invalid.


When the
assessee had made a claim of deduction u/s. 54 of the Act, it was incumbent on
the part of the Departmental Authorities to examine whether assessee was
eligible to avail the deduction claimed under the said provision. The
Departmental Authorities were not expected to deny assessee’s legitimate claim
by raising technical objection. In view of the aforesaid, the impugned order of
the CIT(A) was set aside and the issue was restored to the file of the AO for
examining and allowing assessee’s claim of deduction u/s. 54 subject to
fulfilment of conditions of section 54.

 

Section 2(24) r.w. section 12AA – Corpus specific voluntary contributions being in nature of ‘capital receipt’, are outside scope of income u/s. 2(24)(iia) and, thus, same cannot be brought to tax even in case of trust not registered u/s.12A/12AA

12. [2018] 195 TTJ 820 (Pune – Trib.)

TO(E) vs. Serum Institute of India Research
Foundation ITA No. 
621/Pune/2016
A.Y.: 
2005-06.       Dated: 29th January, 2018
.


Section 2(24) r.w. section 12AA – Corpus
specific voluntary contributions being in nature of ‘capital receipt’, are
outside scope of income u/s. 2(24)(iia) and, thus, same cannot be brought to
tax even in case of trust not registered u/s.12A/12AA


FACTS


The assessee was registered trust under the
Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950, however, it was unapproved by the CBDT as
required u/s. 35(1)(ii) of the Act. Further, it was also not registered u/s.
12A/12AA. This is the second round of the proceedings before Tribunal. During
the relevant year, the AO brought to tax the corpus donation of Rs. 3 crore on
the ground that approval u/s.35(1)(ii) had not been granted to the assessee and
the assessee had also not been registered u/s. 12A. During the first round of
the proceedings, the assessee submitted before Tribunal that even if approval
u/s. 35(1)(ii) was not granted then also the amount could not be brought to tax
since it was in nature of a gift and said aspect had not been considered by the
lower authorities. The Tribunal restored the issue to the file of the AO with a
direction to examine the contention of the assessee that the amount of Rs.3
crore received as corpus donation was in the nature of gift and, therefore, same
was not taxable.


In remand
proceedings, the AO held that “corpus donation” did not tantamount to
exempt income as laid down u/s. 2(24)(iia) of the Act. The AO referred the  provisions of section 12A/11(1)(d) and
reasoned that the voluntary contribution to the corpus of the trust were
taxable as the income of the trust but for the provisions of clause (d) of
section 11(1) of the Act. In the absence of any such specific exclusions
provided in the provisions of section 10(21), the said donation became taxable
in the hands of the assessee.


Aggrieved by
the assessment order, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A). The
CIT(A) held that section 2(24)(iia) was required to be read in the context of
introduction of the section 12 considering the simultaneous amendments to both
the provisions with effect from 01-04-1973 and that the said amount of corpus
donation was not taxable under the Act being in the nature of capital receipt.


 HELD


The Tribunal held that it was necessary to
examine the non-taxability of the corpus donations in assessee’s case despite
inapplicability of the provisions of section 12(1)/11(1)(d)/section 35/10(21).
On the face of it, the provisions of section 2(24)(iia) applied to the case of
the assessee. It had been held in various cases decided earlier that the corpus
donation received by the trust, which was not registered u/s. 12A/12AA, was not
taxable as it assumed the nature of ‘capital receipt’ the moment the donation
was given to the “Corpus of the Trust”. The provisions of sections
2(24)(iia)/12(1)/11(1)(d)/35/56(2) were relevant for deciding the current
issue. It was a settled legal proposition that in case of a registered trust,
the corpus specific voluntary contributions were outside the scope of income as
defined in section 2(24)(iia) due to their “capital nature”. But
assessee was an un-registered trust. Despite the detailed deliberations made by
revenue, the principles relating to judicial discipline assume significance and
the priority. It was also well settled that there was need for upholding the
favourable view if there existed divergent views on the issue. As mentioned
above, there were multiple decisions in favour of the assessee. Accordingly,
the corpus-specific-voluntary contributions were outside the taxations in case
of an unregistered trust u/s. 12/12A/12AAA too.


Section 40A(2) – Where AO made disallowance u/s. 40A(2)(a) without placing on record any material which could prove that payments made by assessee were excessive or unreasonable, having regard to fair market value of services for which same were made or keeping in view legitimate needs of business of assesee or benefit derived by or accruing to assessee therefrom, said disallowance could not be sustained.

11. [2018] 195 TTJ 796 (Mumbai – Trib.) Nat Steel Equipment (P.) Ltd. v. DCIT ITA Nos.: 4011 & 5070/Mum/2013 A.Y.s: 2009-10 & 2010-11        
Dated: 13th June, 2018.          


Section 40A(2) – Where AO made disallowance
u/s. 40A(2)(a) without placing on record any material which could prove that
payments made by assessee were excessive or unreasonable, having regard to fair
market value of services for which same were made or keeping in view legitimate
needs of business of assesee or benefit derived by or accruing to assessee
therefrom, said disallowance could not be sustained.   


FACTS 


The assessee
had made an aggregate payment to its related parties by way of commission/legal
and professional charges. However, the assessee had failed to place on record
any documentary evidence in support thereof. The AO was of the view that the
assessee had paid commission to its related parties at an exorbitant rate of 10
per cent of the sale value. It was further observed by the AO that not only the
payments made by the assessee to its related parties appeared to be
unreasonable, but rather 90 per cent of the total payments were found to have
been made to such related parties. After characterising the payments made by
the assessee to its related parties as unreasonable and excessive, the AO had
disallowed 30 per cent of such payments and made a consequential addition in
its hands.


Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the CIT(A). The CIT(A) confirmed the disallowance of 30 per cent of total
commission.


HELD


The Tribunal held that once the AO formed an
opinion that the expenditure incurred by the assessee in respect of the goods,
services or facilities for which the payment was made or was to be made to the
related party was found to be excessive or unreasonable, then the onus was cast
upon the assessee to rebut the same and prove the reasonableness of such
related party expenses. However, the Legislature had in all its wisdom in order
to avoid any arbitrary exercise of powers by the AO in the garb of the
aforesaid statutory provision, specifically provided that such formation of
opinion on the part of the AO had to be arrived at having regard to the fair
market value of the goods, services or facilities for which the payment was
made by the assessee.


In the case of the assessee, the CIT(A)  had upheld the ad hoc disallowance of 30 per
cent of the payments made by the assessee to its related parties, without
uttering a word as to on what basis the respective expenditure incurred by the
assessee in context of the related party services was found to be excessive or
unreasonable, having regard to either the fair market value of the services for
which the payment was made by the assessee or the legitimate needs of its
business or the benefit derived by or accruing to the assessee therefrom. The
lower authorities had carried out the disallowance u/s. 40A(2)(a) on an ad hoc
basis viz. 30 per cent of the payments made to the related parties and made a
disallowance without placing on record any material which could prove to the
hilt that the payments were excessive or unreasonable, having regard to the
fair market value of the services for which the same were made or keeping in
view the legitimate needs of the business of the assessee or the benefit
derived by or accruing to the assessee therefrom.


In the absence
of satisfaction of the basic condition for invoking of section 40A(2)(a), the
Tribunal held that the disallowance of 30 per cent of the related party
expenses i.e.Rs.38,87,705 made u/s. 40A(2)(a) could not be sustained.

2 Sections 2(47) and 54 – Condition regarding purchase of new property within one year of transfer of old property – Date of agreement to sale was considered as the date of transfer and not the date of conveyance deed.

Gautam Jhunjhunwala
vs. Income-tax Officer (Kolkata)

Members:  A. T. Varkey, (J. M.) and Dr A. L. Saini (A.
M.)

ITA No.:
1356/Kol/2017

A. Y: 
2012-13  Dated: 7th
September, 2018

Counsel for Assessee / Revenue:  P. R. Kothari / Rabin Choudhury

 


Sections 2(47) and 54 – Condition regarding
purchase of new property within one year of transfer of old property – Date of
agreement to sale  was considered as the
date of transfer and not the date of conveyance deed.

 

Facts

The assessee is an individual, who had sold
a flat vide deed of conveyance dated 26/27.12.2011. The sale deed was executed
in pursuance of an agreement to sale which was executed on 16.09.2011. The deed
of conveyance was registered while the agreement to sale was not
registered. 

 

The assessee had purchased a new residential
flat on 04.10.2010.  The AO took the date
of registration of the property sold as the date of transfer i.e. 26/27.12.2011
and since the new property was purchased on 04.10.2010, which, according to the
AO, was not within the period of one year from the date of transfer of the old
asset, he denied the benefit of section 54. 
On appeal, the CIT(A) confirmed the AO’s order.

 

Held

Relying on the Supreme Court decision in Sanjeev
Lal vs. CIT (Civil Appeal No. 5899-5900 of 2014 dated 01.07.2014))
, the
Tribunal observed that by entering into an agreement to sale, some right which
the assessee had in respect of the capital asset in question had been
extinguished, because after execution of the agreement to sale, it would not be
open to the assessee to sell the property to others in accordance with the law.

 

The vendee gets a right to get the property
transferred in his favour by filing a suit under Specific Performance Act.
Thus, according to the Tribunal, a right in respect of the capital asset (old
residential property in question) had been transferred by the assessee in
favour of the vendee/transferee on 16.09.2011. 
And since purchase of the new property was on 04.10.2010, it was held
that the purchase of the property was well within one year from the date of
transfer as per section 2(47) of the Act.

 

As regards a question as to the
admissibility or otherwise of the agreement to sell as an evidence in a suit
for specific performance, relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in the
case of S. Kaladevi vs. V. R. Somasundaram & others (Civil Appeal No.
3192 of 2010 dated 12.04.2010)
, the Tribunal noted that  the agreement to sell can be a basis for a
suit for specific performance in view of section 49 of the Registration
Act.  Thus, though the agreement to sell
was not registered, the vendee can seek decree of specific performance on the
basis of unregistered agreement to sell.

 

Return of income – Delay of 1232 days in filing return – Condonation of delay – Assessee – NRI filed an application for condonation of delay of 1232 days in filing return on ground she was not in a position to file her returns on time due to severe financial crisis in United States of America and injuries sustained by her in an accident, enclosing a medical report in support of claim – Said application was rejected by CBDT on ground that medical certificate did not support case of assessee and that assessee had professional advisor available to her and, thus, required returns ought to have been filed within stipulated period – Though there was some lapse on part of assessee, that by itself would not be a factor to turn out plea for filing of return, when explanation offered was acceptable and genuine hardship was established – Delay to be condoned

26.  Smt. Dr. Sudha Krishnaswamy vs. CCIT; [2018]
92 taxmann.com 306 (Karn):

Date of order: 27th
March, 2018

A. Ys.: 2010-11 to 2012-13

Sections 119 and 139 of I. T.
Act 1961

 

Return of income – Delay of
1232 days in filing return – Condonation of delay – Assessee – NRI filed an
application for condonation of delay of 1232 days in filing return on ground
she was not in a position to file her returns on time due to severe financial
crisis in United States of America and injuries sustained by her in an
accident, enclosing a medical report in support of claim – Said application was
rejected by CBDT on ground that medical certificate did not support case of
assessee and that assessee had professional advisor available to her and, thus,
required returns ought to have been filed within stipulated period – Though there
was some lapse on part of assessee, that by itself would not be a factor to
turn out plea for filing of return, when explanation offered was acceptable and
genuine hardship was established – Delay to be condoned

 

The assessee, a non-resident,
had filed a petition for condonation of delay u/s. 119(2)(b) of the Income-tax
Act, 1961 before Commissioner of Income Tax. She contended that she sold one
vacant site and being non-resident, purchaser of property had deducted income
tax as per provisions of section 195, which had resulted in a refund for A. Y.
2012-13. As regards A. Ys. 2010-11 and 2011-12, it was submitted that she had
no taxable income and claimed that entire refund was relating to TDS from
interest and bank deposits. Accordingly, she requested to condone delay on
ground that she was not in a position to file her returns on time due to severe
financial crisis in United States of America and injuries sustained by her in
an accident, enclosing a medical report in support of the claim and direct
Assessing Officer to accept returns for aforesaid 3 years and process return of
income on merits and issue refund orders. Said application was rejected on
ground that assessee had professional advisor available to her and required returns
ought to have been filed within a stipulated period and, accordingly, rejected
the application relating to the three assessment years in question. The
assessee filed writ petitions challenging the orders of the Commissioner.

The Karnataka High Court allowed
the writ petitions and held as under:

 

“i)  It is not the case of the assessee that she is avoiding any
scrutiny of the returns. On the other hand, it is the case of the assessee that
she is entitled for refund, being a non-resident owing to the recession at U.S.
and the accidental injuries suffered, no returns were filed within the period
prescribed. In the circumstances, it cannot be held that the
assessee-petitioner has obtained any undue advantage of the delay in filing the
income tax returns.

 

ii)   It is trite law that rendering substantial justice shall be
paramount consideration of the Courts as well as the Authorities rather than
rejecting on hyper-technicalities. It may be true that there was some lapse on
the part of assessee, that itself would not be a factor to turn out the plea
for filing of the return, when the explanation offered was acceptable and
genuine hardship was established. Sufficient cause shown by the petitioner for
condoning the delay is acceptable and the same cannot be rejected out-rightly
on technicalities.

 

iii)  Considering the overall circumstances, the delay of 1232 days in
filing the returns for the relevant assessment years in question is condoned
subject to denial of interest for the delayed period if found to be entitled
for refund.”

Recovery of tax – Provisional attachment – Certain transactions to be void – Powers of TRO – Petitioner purchased a property belonging to a deceased person through his legal representative – Same was declared void as it was under attachment proceedings for recovery of tax dues of said deceased person – Petitioner contended that he was a bona fide purchaser of property for adequate consideration and was not aware of attachment of property for recovery of tax of its owner – TRO could not declare a transaction of transfer as null and void u/s. 281 and if department wanted to have transactions of transfer nullified u/s. 281, it must go to civil court under rule 11(6) of Second Schedule to have transfer declared void u/s. 281

25.  Agasthiya Holdings (P.) Ltd. vs. CIT; [2018]
93 taxmann.com 81 (Mad):

Date of Order: 13th April,
2018

Section 281 r.w.s. 222 and
rule 11 of second schedule of I. T. Act 1961

 

Recovery of tax – Provisional
attachment – Certain transactions to be void – Powers of TRO – Petitioner
purchased a property belonging to a deceased person through his legal
representative – Same was declared void as it was under attachment proceedings
for recovery of tax dues of said deceased person – Petitioner contended that he
was a bona fide purchaser of property for adequate consideration and was
not aware of attachment of property for recovery of tax of its owner – TRO
could not declare a transaction of transfer as null and void u/s. 281 and if
department wanted to have transactions of transfer nullified u/s. 281, it must
go to civil court under rule 11(6) of Second Schedule to have transfer declared
void u/s. 281

 

The appellant/writ petitioner
company, engaged in real estate business, purchased a property through the
legal representatives of one deceased ‘PJ’. Before purchasing property the
petitioner got legal opinion from its Advocate and also by verifying the
encumbrances through encumbrance certificate which showed no encumbrance. After
a search of original assessee’s house after two years, four months and two
days, the Revenue found about the sale of the said property in favour of the
petitioner and registration on the file of the Joint Sub-Registrar, Tuticorin.
The Tax Recovery Officer, Tuticorin held that the legal representatives of the
original assessee had illegally transferred the attached property in favour of
the appellant.

 

On appeal before the
Commissioner (Appeal), the assessee contended that the Tax Recovery Officer had
acted outside his jurisdiction Madurai. The Commissioner (Appeals), noted that
on a perusal of the Assessing Officer’s and the Tax Recovery Officer’s report
and other evidence, the attachment of the said property was made on 18/12/1987
and it was duly intimated to the Sub-Registrar’s Office by the Tax Recovery
Officer on 28/09/2007 and it was served on 03/10/2007 and only after the said
information, the transfer of property had taken place and in the light of the
rule 16(1)(2) of the Second Schedule, the defaulter or his legal representative
not competent to alienate any property except with the permission of the Tax
Recovery Officer and since the Tax Recovery Officer had acted within his
jurisdiction in the light of the said rule, the representation/petition
submitted by them was to be rejected and accordingly, the same was rejected on
the ground of no merits. On appeal, the Tribunal also upheld the order of the
Commissioner (Appeals).

 

The petitioner filed appeal as
well as writ petition challenging the order. The petitioner contended that it
was for the department to move the civil court to declare the transaction in
the form of sale in their favour u/s. 281 as null and void. It further claimed
that assessee was the bona fide purchasers for value and consideration without
any notice of pre-encumbrance and therefore, the property was liable to be
released from attachment.

 

The Madras High Court allowed
the writ petition and held as under:

 

“i)  The Tax Recovery Officer, Tuticorin, had sent a communication to
the legal representatives of the original assessee by pointing out that they
had illegally transferred the attached property, which was, as per proceedings
dated 18/12/1987, attached on 06/01/1988 in favour of the appellant in writ
appeal in W.A. (MD) No. 1186 of 2017/writ petitioner and they are calling upon
to show cause as to why the illegal transaction made by them should not be
declared as null and void as per rule 16(1) of the Second Schedule.



ii)   The appellant/writ petitioner submitted a representation to the
Commissioner, Madurai, narrating the events that had happened and claimed that
they are innocent and bona fide purchasers for valid and consideration
without any notice of prior encumbrance and therefore, prayed for appropriate
direction to direct the Assessing Officer to drop any further proceedings
pertaining to the said property and raise the attachment and also enclosed the
supporting documents.

 

iii)  The Commissioner, Madurai, has taken into consideration the said
representation and noted that on a perusal of the Assessing Officer’s and the
Tax Recovery Officer’s report and other evidence, the attachment of the said
property was made on 18/12/1987 and it was duly intimated to the
Sub-Registrar’s Office by the Tax Recovery Officer on 28/09/2007 and it was
served on 03/10/2007 and only after the said information, the transfer of
property had taken place and in the light of the rule 16(1)(2) of the Second Schedule,
the defaulter or his legal representative is not competent to alienate any
property except with the permission of the Tax Recovery Officer and since the
Tax Recovery Officer has acted within his jurisdiction in the light of the said
rule, the representation/petition submitted by them is to be rejected and
accordingly, the same is rejected on the ground of no merits.

 

iv)  As already pointed out, the Tax Recovery Officer has noted that the
property has been illegally transferred by way of a registered sale deed dated
18/06/2008 and since it has been sold after service of the demand notice, it
has to be declared as null and void as per the provisions of the Income-tax
Act.

 

v)   The facts projected would also lead to the incidental question as
to whether the sale by the legal representatives of the deceased in favour of
the appellant/writ petitioner was done with a view to defraud the revenue. It
is the categorical case of the appellant/writ petitioner that before purchasing
the property, they got the legal opinion and also obtained encumbrance
certificates and any entries therein have not declared any succeeding
encumbrance including the attachment of the said property by the Income Tax
Department.

 

vi)  Now, coming to the facts of the case, the order of attachment was
made on 18/12/1987 and as per the additional affidavit of the second appellant,
dated 12/12/2011, filed in writ petition, the intimation was sent to the Joint
Sub-Registrar, Tuticorin, on 28/09/2007 and it was acknowledged by him on
03/10/2007 and notice for settling a sale proclamation u/s. 53 of the Second
Schedule of the Income-tax Act was served on the legal heirs of the original
assessee as such the sale of the property to the writ petitioner was to be held
as null and void on 09/08/2011 which was the subject matter of challenge in the
writ petition.

 

vii) In the light of the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court of India in
TRO vs. Gangadhar Vishwanath Ranade [1998] 100 Taxman 236, it is not
open to the Tax Recovery Officer to declare the said sale as null and void. The
above said decision also held that ‘the Tax Recovery Officer is required to
examine whether the possession of the third party is of a claimant in his own
right or in trust for the assessee or on account of the assessee. If he comes
to a conclusion that the transferee is in possession in his or her own right,
he will have to raise the attachment. If the department desires to have the
transaction of transfer declared void u/s. 281, the department being in the
position of a creditor, will have to file a suit for a declaration that the
transaction of transfer is void u/s. 281.’

 

viii)      In the light of the ratio laid down in the
above cited decision, it is not open to the Tax Recovery Officer to declare the
said transfer/alienation as null and void as per the provisions of the
Income-tax Act. It is also brought to the knowledge of this Court by the
appellant/writ petitioner that he also sought information under the Right to
Information Act, from the Public Information Officer – the Joint Sub-Registrar,
Tuticorin, as to the order of attachment by the Income Tax Officer in respect
of the property concerned. The said official informed that no such document is
available on file. Therefore, this Court is of the considered view that it is for
the Income Tax Department, to file a suit to hold the transaction declared as
null and void as per the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court of India
Gangadhar Vishwanath Ranade case (supra).

 

ix)  The writ petition is partly allowed and the order of the Judge in
granting liberty to the writ petitioner to move the Tax Recovery Officer under
rule 11 of the Second Schedule seeking adjudication of his claim is set aside
and the revenue is granted liberty to file a civil suit to declare the sale
transaction/sale deed in favour of the writ petitioner as null and void.”

Offences and prosecution – Principal Officer – Assessee was a Non-Executive Chairman of Board of Directors of company based in Delhi/NCR region – AO passed an order u/s. 2(35) with respect to TDS default of company treating assessee as Principal Officer of company and launched prosecution proceedings against the assessee u/s. 276B – Where there was no material to establish that assessee was in-charge of day-to-day affairs, management, and administration of his company, AO could not have named him as Principal Officer and accordingly he could not have been prosecuted u/s. 276B for TDS default committed by his company

24.  Kalanithi Maran vs.
UOI; [2018] 92 taxmann.com 308 (Mad): Date of Order:
28th March, 2018: F. Ys. 
2013-14 and 2014-15

Sections 2(35) and 276B of I.
T. Act, 1961

 

Offences and prosecution –
Principal Officer – Assessee was a Non-Executive Chairman of Board of Directors
of company based in Delhi/NCR region – AO passed an order u/s. 2(35) with
respect to TDS default of company treating assessee as Principal Officer of
company and launched prosecution proceedings against the assessee u/s. 276B –
Where there was no material to establish that assessee was in-charge of
day-to-day affairs, management, and administration of his company, AO could not
have named him as Principal Officer and accordingly he could not have been
prosecuted u/s. 276B for TDS default committed by his company

 

The assessee was a
Non-Executive Chairman of the Board of Directors of company Spice Jet Limited
based in Delhi /NCR region. The company was engaged in the business of
operation of scheduled low cost air transport services under the brand name
‘Spice Jet’. The assessee was residing and carrying on business at Chennai and
was not receiving any remuneration whatsoever from the company. The assessee
was full time Executive Chairman of Sun TV Network Ltd., which is a public
limited company, from which he drew remuneration as per the provisions of the
Companies Act. There was failure on part of Spice Jet Limited to deposit tax
deducted at source from amounts paid/payable to third parties for F.Ys. 2013-14
to 2014-15. The Assessing Officer passed an order dated 03/11/2014 u/s. 2(35)
of the Income-tax Act, 1961 with respect to TDS default of Spice Jet to the
tune of Rs. 90 crore treating the assessee as the Principal Officer of the
Company within the meaning of section 2(35). By the impugned order, while
naming the assessee as the Principal officer, the Assessing Officer also held
that the assessee was liable for prosecution u/s. 276B for the Tax Deducted at
Source default committed by the company. The assesse filed writ petition
chalanging the said order of the Assessing Officer.

 

The Madras High Court allowed
the writ petition and held as under:

 

“i)  The assessee was a Non-Executive Chairman of the Board of Directors
of the Company. Admittedly, the corporate office of the company is at Delhi. It
is not in dispute that the assessee is residing at Chennai and the impugned order
dated 03/11/2014 naming the assessee as the Principal Officer was served on the
assessee at Chennai at his residential address. It is also pertinent to note
that the show-cause notice dated 01/9/2014 was served on the assessee at his
residential address at Chennai. When the assessee had taken a stand that he is
not involved in the day-to-day affairs of the company and was also not drawing
any salary from the company, it cannot be stated that the assessee cannot file
the writ petition at the place where he received the show-cause notice as well
as the impugned order.

 

ii)   In the instant case, admittedly the assessee is challenging the
order treating him as the Principal Officer, which was received by him at
Chennai and was brought to his knowledge only at Chennai. Though the authority
is at Delhi, it is clear that part of cause of action had arisen at Chennai. As
per article 226(2) of the Constitution of India, the writ petition is
maintainable before a High Court within which the cause of action wholly or in
part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of
such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within
those territories. That apart, though the company’s registered corporate office
is at Delhi and the TAN number is at Delhi assessment, the assessee in this
writ petition has not challenged the assessment order, but, has challenged only
the impugned order naming him as the Principal Officer. In these circumstances,
this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition.

 

iii)  U/s. 2(35)(b), the Assessing Officer can serve notice only to
persons who are connected with the management or administration of the company
to treat them as Principal Officer. Section 278B clearly states that it shall
not render any such person liable to any punishment, if he proves that offence
was committed without his knowledge.

 

iv)  In the instant case, the assessee has stated that he was not
involved in the day-to-day affairs of the company and that he is only a
Non-Executive Chairman and not involved in the management and administration of
the company. Whereas, the Managing Director, himself has specifically stated
that he is the person in-charge of the day-to-day affairs of the company.

 

v)   The Assessing Officer, while passing the impugned order naming the
assessee as the Principal Officer, has not given any reason for rejecting the
contention of the Managing Director. When the Managing Director himself has
stated that he is the person who is in-charge of the day-to-day affairs of the
management and administration of the company and that the petitioner is not so,
the Assessing Officer without any reason has named the assessee as the
Principal Officer. Merely because the assessee is the Non-Executive Chairman,
it cannot be stated that he is in-charge of the day-to-day affairs, management
and administration of the company. The Assessing Officer should have given the
reasons for not accepting the case of the Managing Director as well as the
assessee in their respective reply. The conclusion of the Assessing Officer
that the assessee being a Chairman and major decisions are taken in the company
under his administration is not supported by any material evidence or any
legally sustainable reasons.

 

vi)  It is clear that the assessee was not involved in the management,
administration and the day-to-day affairs of the company, therefore, the
assessee cannot be treated as Principal Officer. In these circumstances, the
impugned order dated 03/11/2014 is liable to be set aside. Accordingly, the
same is set aside. The writ petition is allowed.”

Export oriented undertaking (Manufacture) – Exemption u/s. 10B – Assessee firm was engaged in mining and export of iron ore – It outsourced work of processing of iron ore to another company which operated plant and machinery outside custom bonded area – Assessee’s claim for exemption u/s. 10B was rejected by AO – Tribunal took a view that mere processing of iron ore in a plant and machinery located outside customs bonded area would not disentitle assessee from claiming exemption u/s. 10B where iron ore was excavated from mining area belonging to an export oriented unit – Accordingly, Tribunal allowed assessee’s claim – No substantial question of law arose

23.  Pr. CIT vs.
Lakshminarayana Mining Co.;
[2018] 93 taxmann.com 142 (Karn):

Date of Order: 6th
April, 2018

A. Ys.: 2009-10 to 2011-12

Section 10B of I. T. Act, 1961

 

Export oriented undertaking
(Manufacture) – Exemption u/s. 10B – Assessee firm was engaged in mining and
export of iron ore – It outsourced work of processing of iron ore to another
company which operated plant and machinery outside custom bonded area –
Assessee’s claim for exemption u/s. 10B was rejected by AO – Tribunal took a
view that mere processing of iron ore in a plant and machinery located outside
customs bonded area would not disentitle assessee from claiming exemption u/s.
10B where iron ore was excavated from mining area belonging to an export
oriented unit – Accordingly, Tribunal allowed assessee’s claim – No substantial
question of law arose

 

The assessee was a firm in the
business of mining and export of iron ore. It had entered into an operation and
maintenance agreement with NAPC Ltd., which operated the plants and machineries
installed in the Export Oriented Unit (hereinafter referred to as ‘EOU’) and
non-EOU both belonging to the assessee-firm. The EOU had started production on
23/09/2006 and accordingly deduction u/s. 10B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on
the profits derived from the production of iron ore from the EOU was claimed.
The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim for deduction u/s. 10B with respect
to production of iron ore said to have been outsourced by the EOU to the
non-EOU and restricted the claim to the profits derived by the EOU from its
production.

 

The Commissioner (Appeals)
confirmed the order of the Assessing Authority holding that the claim for
deduction u/s.10B was not allowable in respect of production of non-EOU. The
Tribunal held that customs bonding was not a condition precedent for granting
exemption u/s. 10B. It was thus concluded that mere processing of the iron ore
in a plant and machinery located outside customs bonded area  would 
not  disentitle  the 
assessee  from  deduction u/s.10B where the iron ore was
excavated from the mining area belonging to an export oriented unit. The
Tribunal allowed the assesee’s claim.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the
Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i)  In the instant appeal, primary contention advanced by the revenue
is to the effect that profits that have been derived by the assessee must be
pursuant to excavation and processing activity of the assessee in a customs
bonded area. It is further contended that as the ‘production’ has not been
carried out in the EOU and, contribution to the finished product by the
assessee being almost absent, deduction u/s. 10B cannot be permitted.

 

ii)   Insofar as factual aspects are concerned, the authorities have
clearly held that there has been outsourcing of processing of iron ore to
evidence which the profit and loss account and the ledger account for the
relevant year have been relied upon. The assertions to the contrary by the
revenue warrants no acceptance.

 

iii)  As regards the contention that the processing by ‘SESA plant’ which
is a plant situated outside the customs bonded area and disentitles the
assessee from claiming deduction u/s. 10B is concerned, the same can be
answered as follows:

 

(a) The processing of the iron ore in a plant belonging to the assessee
being in the nature of job work is not prohibited and forms an integral part of
the activity of the EOU;

 

(b) The mere fact that the ‘SESA Plant’ is situated outside the bonded
area is of no legal significance as the benefit of customs bonding is only for
the limited purpose of granting benefit as regards customs and excise duty. The
entitlement of deduction under the Act is to be looked into independently and
said benefit would stand or fall on the applicability of section 10B.

 

iv)  The judgement in the case of CIT vs. Caritor (India) (P.) Ltd.
[2015] 55 taxmann.com 473/230 Taxman 411/[2014] 369 ITR 463 though arises in
the context of deduction u/s. 10A which is different from deduction u/s. 10B
insofar as section 10A provides for the location of the unit in the ‘Special
Economic Zone’ such locational restriction is absent in case of section 10B,
however, the principle that benefit of customs and excise duty is independent
of the entitlement of deduction under the Act is applicable in the instant case
also. From the discussion above, it is held that no substantial question of law
arises for consideration.”

Educational institution – Exemption u/s. 10(23C)(vi) – Where assessee society was set up with object of imparting education and it had entered into franchise agreements with satellite schools and also used gains arising out of these agreements in form of franchisee fees for furtherance of educational purposes, it fulfilled requirements to qualify for exemption u/s. 10(23C)(vi)

22.  DIT (Exemption) vs. Delhi Public School
Society; 403 ITR 49 (Del); [2018] 92 taxmann.com 132 (Del): Date of Order: 3th
April, 2018

A. Y.: 2008-09

Sections 2(15), 10(23C) and 11
of I. T. Act, 1961

 

Educational institution –
Exemption u/s. 10(23C)(vi) – Where assessee society was set up with object of
imparting education and it had entered into franchise agreements with satellite
schools and also used gains arising out of these agreements in form of franchisee
fees for furtherance of educational purposes, it fulfilled requirements to
qualify for exemption u/s. 10(23C)(vi)

 

The assessee a society
registered with the Registrar of Societies, Delhi had established 11 schools
and had also permitted societies/organisations/trusts with similar objects to
open schools under the name of ‘Delhi Public School’, in and outside India. As
on date, 120 schools were functioning under that name in and outside India. The
main objective of assessee society was to establish progressive schools or
other educational institutions in Delhi or outside Delhi, open to all without
any distinction of race or creed or caste or special status with a view to
impart sound and liberal education to boys and girls during their impressionable
years. The assessee had been enjoying exemption, in respect of its income u/s.
10(22) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 since A. Y. 1977-78 till A. Y. 2007-08. In
view of the change in law, section 10(22) was substituted by section 10(23C)(vi)
with effect from 01/04/1999, the assessee applied in (Form 56D) requesting for
approval of exemption, u/s. 10(23C)(vi) on 16/04/2007 for A. Y. 2008-09
onwards. The Additional Director of Income Tax, by order dated 30/04/2008,
rejected the assessee’s application u/s. 10(23C)(vi) seeking exemption,
on the grounds that, inter alia, the franchisee fee received by it from
the satellite schools in lieu of its name, logo and motto amounts to a
‘business activity’ with a profit motive and no separate books of account were
maintained by assessee for business activity as required u/s. 11(4A). The
assessee filed writ petition challenging the order.

 

The Delhi High Court allowed
the writ petition and held as under:

 

“i)  There is a multitude of authorities that have surveyed and analysed
the exemption permitted u/s. 10(23C)(vi), which broadly conclude that if the
educational institution merely acquires a profit surplus from running its
institution, that alone would not belie its larger education purpose. For
instance, in Queen’s Educational Society vs. CIT [2015] 372 ITR 699/231
Taxman 286/55 taxmann.com 255 (SC),
the Supreme Court focused on the
requirements that were germane to qualify for exemption under the erstwhile
section 10(22) and the subsequent section 10(23C)(vi), namely that: the
activities of the educational institution should be incidental to the
attainment of its objectives and separate books of account should be maintained
by it in respect of such business; primarily to highlight that even if an
educational institution indulges in a profit making activity, that does not
necessarily subsume the larger educational/charitable purpose of the
organisation. The determining test to qualify for exemption u/s. 10(23C)(vi),
hence, lies in the final motivation on which the institution functions,
regardless of what extraneous profit it may accrue in the pursuit of the same.

 

ii)   This critical test therefore has a conspicuous qualitative value;
the objectives of the organisation are to be determined not merely by the
memorandum of objectives of the institution, but, also from the design of how
the profits are being directed and utilised and if such application of profits
uphold the ‘charitable purpose’ of the organisation (as postulated in section
2(15)) or if the objectives are marred by a profit making motive that emerges
more as a business activity rather than an educational purpose. Section
10(23C)(vi) while guiding the manner of this determination also,
provides a certain amount of discretion to the authority assessing the
compliance to these conditions for ascertaining whether the requirements of the
provision are met with. Such scrutiny is to be carried out every year,
irrespective of any preceding pattern in the assessment of the previous years.

 

iii)  As can be seen from the present income tax
appeals, the prescribed authority has examined the assessee’s application for
exemption u/s. 10(23C)(vi) in light of the recent audits of the assessee’s
accounts. Although assessee society, in the earlier years had been granted
exemption u/s. 10(23C)(vi), that itself does not cause for a res judicata
principle, as examination of the assessee’s audited accounts may be done afresh
by the prescribed authority, corresponding to the specific assessment year, as
prescribed in the second proviso to section 10(23C)(vi).

 

iv)  Despite this stipulation, the prescribed
authority will still have to apply the determinative test of assessing whether
the business is incidental to the attainment of the objectives of the entity
and whether separate books of account are being maintained in respect of such
business, even if the profits received by the assessee as such increase
exponentially, if the assessee qualifies this test, they will still be eligible
for exemption u/s. 10(23C)(vi).

 

v)   In light of the decisive test for determining eligibility for
exemption u/s. 10(23C)(vi), it is apparent that the assertion of the
DGIT that the assessee’s activities including charging a franchisee fee could
not be regarded as a charitable activity within the meaning of section 2(15),
and thus, inapplicable for exemption u/s. 10(23C)(vi), has not been
adequately substantiated, despite examination of the assessee’s audited
accounts. The DGIT asserted that the assessee is carrying out a business
activity for profit motives by entering into franchise agreements, whereby, it
has opened and is running around 120 schools, and that these charges were
received by the assessee for using the name of Delhi Public School by the
satellite schools in and outside India and no separate books of account were
maintained by the assessee for the business activity as required under section
11(4A). This is prima facie not correct, because the assessee has
maintained, accounts audited in detail for financial years 2000-2001, 2003-04,
2004-05 and 2005-06. That aspect has been found by the Tribunal for those
assessment years. Such accounts have been maintained in compliance to what is
required under the seventh proviso to section 10(23C)(vi) and section
11(4A).

 

vi)  Furthermore, the memorandum of association of assessee society, as
well as the joint venture agreements entered into by assessee society with the
satellite schools validate the motive of an educational purpose that the
assessee aims through its business activities and substantiate its contentions
in that regard. On review of the assessee’s audited accounts, it can be
observed that the surpluses accrued by assessee society are being fed back into
the maintenance and management of the assessee schools themselves. This,
reaffirms the assessee’s argument that the usage of the gains arising out of
its agreements are incidental to its educational purpose outlined by its
objective of the assessee.

 

vii) The authorities also reiterate that a mere incurrence of (surplus)
profit does not automatically presuppose a business activity that invalidates
the exemption under section 10(23C)(vi); the same has to be tested on
whether such profits are being utilised within the meaning of the larger
charitable purpose as defined in section 2(15) or not. On scrutiny, it can be
observed that the
accounts
marked the heading ‘Secretary’s Account’, detail the heads of income and
expenditure that cater to the various requirements of running and maintaining
the satellite schools. Thus, arguendo if it were held that the objected
activity were indeed commercial in nature, nevertheless, the realisation of
profit by the assessee is through an activity incidental to the dominant
educational purpose that its memorandum of association sets out, and is in turn
being channelled back into the maintenance and management of the same schools,
thus, fulfilling the objectives the assessee has set out in its memorandum of
objectives.

viii)      In view of the above analysis, it is concluded that the
assessee fulfilled the requirements u/s. 10(23C)(vi) to qualify for
exemption; assessee society is maintaining its eleven schools and the 120
satellite schools in furtherance of the education joint venture agreements with
an educational purpose that also qualifies as a ‘charitable purpose’ within the
meaning of section 2(15) and is not in contravention of section 11(4A).

 

ix)  It is felt by this court that section 10(23C)(vi) ought to
be interpreted meticulously, on a case-to-case basis. This is because, the
larger objective of an educational/charitable purpose of the institution and
its manifestation can only be subjectively adjudged; for instance, in the present
situation, the balance sheets of the assessee demonstrate how the profits are
utilised for the growth and maintenance of the very schools they are accrued
from, thus, subscribing to a charitable motive. However, the educational
institutions may take more creative steps to qualify their objectives as an
‘educational purpose’ that is more universal than the individual objectives set
out in the memoranda of objectives of such institutions. For instance, a
percentage of profits earned from a business activity indulged in by such an
educational institution may be mandated towards fructifying the implementation
the provisions of the Right to Education Act, 2009, particularly, to create a
more sensitive learning environment for children with disabilities in implementation
of the provisions in the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities,
Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995, or have a system to
analyse the ratio of inflow of money over progressive assessment years as
opposed to how much of this money is channelled back into the growth and
maintenance of such educational purpose, in order to put in place a visible
system of accountability. This is an observation, to ensure that the purpose
for which section 10(23C)(vi) was introduced, is adequately fulfilled and not
disadvantageously circumvented by vested parties.

 

x)   For the foregoing reasons, the writ petition has to succeed.
Accordingly, the assessee’s writ petition is allowed.”

Company – Recovery of tax from director – Notice to directors – Condition precedent – Furnishing of particulars to directors of steps taken to recover dues from company and failure thereof – Condition not satisfied – Order u/s. 179(1) set aside

21.  Madhavi Ketkar vs. ACIT; 403 ITR 157 (Bom);
Date of Order:  5th January,
2018

A. Ys.: 2006-07 to 2011-12

Section 179(1) of ITA 1961;
Art. 226 of Constitution of India

 

Company – Recovery of tax from
director – Notice to directors – Condition precedent – Furnishing of
particulars to directors of steps taken to recover dues from company and
failure thereof – Condition not satisfied – Order u/s. 179(1) set aside

 

The   petitioner  
was   a   director  
of   a   company.  
For A. Ys. 2006-07 to 2011-12, the
Assessing Officer of the company passed an order u/s. 179(1) of the Income-tax
Act, 1961 against the petitioner for recovery of the tax dues of the company.
The petitioner filed a writ petition in the High Court and challenged the
order. The petitioner contended that section 179(1) conferred jurisdiction on
the authority to proceed against the directors of a private limited company to
recover the tax dues from the directors only where the tax dues could not be
recovered from the company and that no effort was made by the authorities to
recover the tax dues from the defaulting company.

 

The Bombay High Court allowed
the writ petition, quashed the order passed u/s. 179(1) of the Act, and held as
under:

 

“i)  The notice issued u/s. 179(1) to the directors of a private limited
company must indicate, albeit briefly, the steps taken by the Department to
recover the tax dues from the company and failure thereof. Where the notice
does not indicate this and the directors raise objections of jurisdiction on
the above account, they must be informed of the basis of the Assessing Officer
exercising the jurisdiction and the directors response, if any, should be
considered in the order passed u/s. 179(1).

 

ii)   The Department acquired or got jurisdiction to proceed against the
directors of a private limited company, only after it had failed to recover the
dues from the company. It was a condition precedent for the Assessing Officer
to exercise jurisdiction u/s. 179(1) against the director of the company. The
jurisdictional requirement was not satisfied by a mere statement in the order
that recovery proceedings had been conducted against the defaulting company but
it had failed to recover its dues. Such a statement should be supported by
mentioning briefly the types of efforts made and the results.

 

iii)  The notice u/s. 179(1) did not indicate or give any particulars in
respect of the steps taken by the Department to recover the tax dues of the
defaulting company and failure thereof. In the letter sent in response to the
notice, questioning the jurisdiction of the Department, the petitioner had
sought details of the steps taken by the Department and had pointed out that
the defaulting company had assets of over Rs. 100 crores.

 

iv)  Admittedly, no particulars of steps taken to recover the dues from
the defaulting company were communicated to the petitioner nor indicated in the
order. At no time had the petitioner been given a chance to meet the
Department’s case that it had taken steps to recover the amount from the
defaulting company so as to meet the jurisdictional condition precedent before
passing an order u/s. 179(1).

 

v)   The order was set aside since the condition precedent was not
satisfied. However, the attachment order would be continued till the passing of
a final order by the Assessing Officer u/s. 179(1)”

                  

Co-operative society – Special deduction u/s. 80P – No deduction where banking business is carried on – No evidence of banking business – Mere inclusion of name originally and object in bye-laws of society not conclusive – Assessee entitled to special deduction u/s. 80P

20.  ELURU Co-operative House Mortgage Society
Ltd. vs. ITO; 403 ITR 172 (T&AP)

Date of Order: 13th
September, 2017

A. Ys.: 2007-08, 2008-09 and
2009-10

Section 80P of ITA 1961

 

Co-operative society – Special
deduction u/s. 80P – No deduction where banking business is carried on – No
evidence of banking business – Mere inclusion of name originally and object in
bye-laws of society not conclusive – Assessee entitled to special deduction u/s.
80P

 

The assessee was a
co-operative society, established in the year 1963. Originally, the assessee
was registered as the Eluru Co-operative House Mortgage Bank Ltd. But the
Reserve Bank of India as well as the Co-operative Department of the State
refused to accord permission to the assessee to carry on the business of
banking under that name. Therefore the word “Bank” was deleted from the name of
the assessee w.e.f. 19/02/2009. The assessee claimed that it was not a bank
within the meaning of section 80P(4) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

 

For the A.Ys. 2007-08, 2008-09
and 2009-10, the assessee filed returns of income declaring “nil” income
claiming deduction u/s. 80P(2), on the ground that it was running on the
principle of mutuality, dealing only with its own members. The Assessing
Officer rejected the claim for deduction.

 

The Tribunal upheld the
disallowance.

 

On appeal by the assessee, the
Telangana and Andhra Pradesh High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal
and held as under:

 

“i)  The entitlement of an assessee to the benefit of deduction u/s.
80P(2) does not depend upon either the name of the assessee or the objects for
which the assessee was established. The entitlement to deduction under the
provision would depend upon the actual carrying on of the business activity,
viz., banking. The fact that all co-operative banks would necessarily be
co-operative societies cannot lead to the presumption that all co-operative
societies are also co-operative banks. There are different types of co-operative
societies, many of whom may not be transacting any banking business.

 

ii)   Without reference to a single transaction that the assessee had
with any non-member, the Tribunal upheld the findings of the Assessing Officer
merely on the basis of the name of the assessee and one of the objects clauses
in the bye-laws of the assessee. Therefore, the finding of the Tribunal was
obviously perverse and such a finding could not have been recorded on the basis
of the material available on record.

 

iii)  The assessee was entitled to the special deduction u/s. 80P for the
A. Ys. 2007-08, 2008-09 and 2009-10.”

 

Business – Adventure in nature of trade – Assessee holding immovable property from 1965 – Agreement for developing property in 1994, supplementary agreement in 1997 and memorandum of understanding in 2002 – Transaction not an adventure in nature of trade – Gains from sale of flats not assessable as business income

19.  Pr. CIT vs. Rungta Properties Pvt. Ltd.; 403
ITR 234 (Cal); Date of Order: 8th May, 2017

A. Ys.: 2003-04, 2004-05 and
2006-07

Section 28 of ITA 1961

 

Business – Adventure in nature
of trade – Assessee holding immovable property from 1965 – Agreement for
developing property in 1994, supplementary agreement in 1997 and memorandum of
understanding in 2002 – Transaction not an adventure in nature of trade – Gains
from sale of flats not assessable as business income

 

The
assessee was holding immovable property since the year 1965. It entered into a
development agreement dated 28/01/1994 in relation to the property with another
company TRAL. The development agreement was followed by a supplementary
agreement dated 19/02/1997 and a memorandum of understanding dated 18/09/2002.
The arrangement between the assessee and TRAL was that a new structure was to
come up in place of the existing one at the cost of the developer and the
assessee was to get 49.29% of the developed property along with an undivided
share of the land in the same proportion, the rest going to the developer. The
Assessing Officer held that the transaction was an adventure in the nature of
trade and the income arising thereon is business income as against the claim of
the assessee that it is a capital gain.

 

The Commissioner (Appeals) and
the Tribunal reversed the decision of the Assessing Officer and allowed the
claim of the assessee.

 

In appeal by the Revenue, the
Calcutta High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i)  The assessee’s arrangement with the developer was not a joint
venture agreement and there was no profit or loss sharing arrangement. In the
absence of any evidence that the assessee undertook the business of property
development, the object clause in the memorandum could not be treated to be the
determining factor to conclude that this was a part of the assessee’s regular
business.

 

ii)   On the same reasoning, reference to property in the corporate name
of the assessee could not make the assessee a property development company.

 

iii)  The Tribunal as well as the Commissioner (Appeals) had concurrently
found that the transactions of sale of flats did not constitute an adventure in
the nature of trade. The finding was justified.”

TDS On Provision For Expenses Made At Year-End

Issue for Consideration

Many
of the provisions casting obligation to deduct tax at source (‘TDS’) under
Chapter XVII-B require tax  deduction at
the time of credit of the specified income or sum to the account of the payee
or at the time of payment, whichever is earlier.

 

Each
of the relevant provisions of TDS, by way of a deeming fiction, under an
Explanation, provide  that when the
income or sum is credited to any account by any name in the books of account of
the person liable to pay it, such crediting shall be deemed to be credit of
such income or sum to the account of the payee and the provisions of the
relevant section shall apply accordingly[1].

 

 

A
question often arises as to whether tax is required to be deducted at the time
of making provision, in the books of account, 
for several expenses at the end of the accounting year under the
mercantile system of accounting.  While
a  view has been taken in some cases that
tax is not required to be deducted at source where the payee is not
identifiable,  there has arisen one more  controversy even in respect of ad-hoc or
interim provisions made, in respect of liability payable to identified payees
in future. The issue that has arisen is, whether crediting the amount to the
provision account, in such cases,  be
deemed to be credit to the account of the concerned payee attracting the
liability to TDS. The incidental issue also arises as to whether the reversal
of such provision in the subsequent period has any bearing in determining
applicability of TDS. Conflicting decisions have been rendered by the Bangalore
bench of Tribunal on this subject.


[1] 
Refer to Explanations to Section 193, 
Section 194A, Section 194C, 
Section 194H,  Section 194-I,  Section 194J.


IBM
INDIA (P) LTD.’S CASE

The
issue first came up before the Bangalore bench of the Tribunal in the case of IBM
India (P) Ltd vs. ITO 154 ITD 497.

 

In this case, pertaining to assessment years 2005-06 to
2009-10, the assessee,  a wholly owned
subsidiary of a U.S. based company, was following the mercantile system of
accounting. As a part of the global group accounting policy, the assessee had
to quantify its expenses every quarter, within 3 days of the end of each
quarter. The assessee made a provision in the books of account for expenses, on
such quantification,  in respect of which
service/work had been provided/performed by the vendors in the relevant quarter  but for which the invoices had not been
furnished or in respect of which the payments had not fallen due, recognising
the liability incurred. On the basis of scientific methodology, the assessee
estimated such expenses and created a provision for such expenses every quarter
within 3 days of the end of the quarter. At the time of creation of provision,
in this manner, it was not possible for the assessee to identify parties, or if
parties were identified, to arrive at the exact sum on which TDS was to be
deducted.

 

The
expenses were debited to the profit and loss account and the provisions were
credited to a provision account, and not to the vendor accounts, as those had
not fallen due for payment. In the subsequent financial year, the provision
entries were reversed and on receipt of invoices in respect of the respective
expenses, the same were recorded as liabilities due to the respective parties,
at which point of time taxes were deducted 
at source. The provision so made was disallowed by the assessee itself
in terms of section 40(a)(i) and 40(a)(ia) while filing its return of income.

 

According
to the Assessing Officer, in respect of the provision so created by the
assessee in the books of account, tax was deductible at source and the assessee
by not deducting the tax has been in default and was liable to deposit the tax
and also for interest and penalty. In response to the show cause notice issued
u/s. 201(1) & 201(1A), the assessee submitted that invoices were not
received in respect of the underlying expenses, and therefore there was neither
accrual of expenditure nor was the payee identified, as the amount was not
credited to the account of the payee, but to a suspense account. There was no
accrual of expenditure in accordance with the mercantile system of accounting,
and therefore there was no obligation on its part to deduct tax at source. The
assessee took a stand that, though  the
relevant provisions of law in Chapter XVII-B, did provide for the situation
where  an amount was credited to a
“Suspense Account”, there should be a legal liability to pay, and the
payee should be known, and only then the obligation to deduct tax at source
arose. The Assessee also submitted that the provision entries were reversed in
the subsequent financial year(s) and necessary taxes were withheld at source at
the time of actual payment (when legal liability to pay arose and the identity
of the party was known).

 

The
Assessing Officer rejected the assessee’s arguments on the grounds that:

 

1.  The
assessee did not explain as to how the expenses had been quantified;

 

2.  When
no invoices were received, the booking of such expenses in the accounts and
claiming them as expenditure of the previous year was erroneous; and

 

3.  The
procedure followed by the assessee, of reversing the entries and recording the liability
in its books of account when invoices were received, was contrary to the
accounting policy, because once expenditure was booked in the profit and loss
account, it could not be reversed;

 

4.  There
was no clarification as to whether tax 
was deducted on the whole of the provisional entries, so as to allow the
amount that was disallowed  u/s.
40(a)(ia), in the year in which tax  was
deducted and paid ;

 

5.  The
procedure followed by the assessee might 
have led to the allowing of the expenditure one year prior to the
incurring of the actual expenses;

 

6.  The
details of the TDS made on such provisions made at the end of the year was also
provided by the assessee on sample basis, contending that the number of entries
were huge and hence could not be provided in full within a limited period;
giving rise to non-verification of deductions claimed.

 

The Assessing Officer treated the assessee
as an assessee in default for  the taxes
not deducted at source, in respect of provision for expenses made in the books
of account, and also levied consequential interest.

 

The orders passed u/s. 201(1) and 201(1A)
were upheld by the CIT (A) for the following reasons:

 

1.  Under
mercantile system of accounting, accrual of liability for any expenditure was
not dependent on receipt of invoice from the person to whom payment for
expenditure had to be made. The accounting practice followed by the assessee
was contrary to the mercantile system of accounting.

 

2.  The
claim of the assessee that it created provision in the books of account on an
estimated basis in some cases, on a historical basis in one set of cases  and by using some sort of arithmetical or
geometric progression in other cases, was not acceptable. The assessee had not
established its plea with concrete evidence. The assessee had full knowledge of
what was due to its vendors, sub-contractors, commission agents etc. Therefore,
there was no necessity to create provisions.

 

3.  The
argument regarding chargeability to tax in the hands of the payee or the time
at which the payee recognised income in respect of the payment received from
the assessee was irrelevant.

 

Before the Tribunal, the assessee
contended that:

 

1.  When
payee was not identified there could  be
no charge u/s. 4(1) and therefore there could 
be no obligation to deduct tax at source;

 

2.  The
returns of TDS to be filed under the Income Tax Rules, 1962 contemplated
furnishing of names of payees.



3.  Judicial
decisions recognise that there could be no TDS obligation in the absence of
payee.

 

4.  If there was no income chargeable to tax in
the hands of the payee, there could  be
no TDS obligation. TDS obligations arose only when there was
“Income”. TDS obligations did not arise on the basis of mere payment,
without there being income and corresponding liability of the person receiving
payment from the assessee to pay tax.

 

5.  The
Assessee relied on CBDT Circular No. 3/2010 dated 2.3.2010, issued in the
context of the provisions of section 194A of the Act dealing with TDS
obligation of banks at the time of provision of monthly interest liability
under the Core Banking Solution software, where the CBDT had clarified that TDS
was not applicable at the time of such monthly provisioning.

 

6.  Reliance
was also placed by the assessee on the Delhi High Court decision in the case of
UCO Bank vs. Union of India [2014] 369 ITR 335, where the Delhi High
Court had held that no tax was deductible on deposits kept by the Registrar
General of the High Court, since the ultimate payee was not known.

 

The Revenue argued that:

 

1.  The
assessee on its own had disallowed the expenditure in question u/s. 40(a)(i)
& 40(a)(ia). Such disallowance arose only when there existed a liability to
deduct tax at source in terms of Chapter-XVII-B of the Act. The assessee having
on its own disallowed expenditure u/s. 40(a)(i) & 40(a)(ia), could not
later on  turn around and say that there
was no obligation to deduct tax at source.

 

2.  The
assessee did not account for expenditure on accrual basis but on receipt of
invoice  which could not  be the point of time at which accrual of
expenditure could  be said to have
happened. The system of accounting followed by the assessee was not in tune
with the mercantile system of accounting.

 

3.  When
the assessee credited suspense account for payments due to various persons,
such credit itself was treated as credit to the account of the payee by a
deeming fiction in the various provisions of Income tax Act. The assessee could
not therefore say that the payee was not identified. Even in such a situation,
the assessee had to comply with the TDS provisions.

 

4.  The
method of accounting followed by the Assessee resulted in postponement of time
at which tax had to be remitted to the credit of the Government. It  could be seen from the fact that the
assessee, in some cases, was liable to charge of interest u/s. 201(1A) for
about 84 months. The question whether the Assessee was indulging in a
deliberate exercise in this regard was irrelevant. The fact that the revenue
was put to loss by reason of the system of accounting followed by the assessee
and the fact that otherwise the money should have reached the coffers of the
revenue much earlier, was sufficient to uphold the levy of interest u/s.
201(1A) of the Act.

 

5.  When
the Assessee argued that the payees were not identified, it was not open to the
assessee to also contend that there was no accrual of income in the hands of
the payee or that the payment was not chargeable to tax in the hands of the
payee in India.

 

6.  The
CBDT circular No. 3/2010 was in the context of banks crediting interest on
fixed deposits of customers. The decisions rendered by the judicial forums
based on those circulars were  not
relevant, as they were relevant only in the case of Banks and could not be
pressed into service in other cases, such as the case of the Assessee.

 

The Tribunal deleted the demand for
payment of taxes raised u/s. 201(1) as the tax that was deducted  subsequently when the actual liability was
booked, was paid. However, it upheld the applicability of the provisions of TDS
at the time of making provision and the obligation to deduct tax thereon and
accordingly,  levy of interest u/s.
201(1A) on account of delay  on the part
of the assessee in complying with the TDS provisions. On the facts of the case,
the Tribunal noted that the assessee was fully aware of the payee, but
postponed credit to its account for want of receipt of invoice. Proceeding on
the basis that payees were known to the assessee, regarding applicability of
TDS on provision, the Tribunal held as under:

 

1.  Once
the assessee had offered disallowance in respect of provision u/s. 40(a)(i) and
40(a)(ia), it was not possible to argue that there was no liability to deduct
tax at source on the same provision. The disability u/s. 40(a)(i) &
40(a)(ia), and the liability u/s. 201(1) could not be different and they arose
out of the same default;

 

2.  The
liability to deduct tax at source existed when the amount in question was
credited to a “Suspense Account” or any other account by whatever
name called, which would also include a “Provision” created in the
books of account;

 

3.  Since
the assessee had not established with concrete evidence that provision was made
on an estimated basis, it had full knowledge of amounts payable to vendors,
sub-contractors, commission agents, etc., and there was no necessity to
create a provision;

 

4.  The
statutory provisions clearly envisaged collection at source de hors the
charge u/s. 4(1).

 

5.  The
argument that TDS provisions operated on income and not on payment, in the
facts and circumstances of the  case, was
erroneous. Section 194C & 194J used the expression “sum” and not
“income”. Further, section 194H & 194-I did not use the expression
“chargeable to tax”.

 

6.  The
Tribunal further held the decision of the Bangalore bench in the case of DCIT
vs. Telco Construction Equipment Co. Ltd. ITA No. 478/Bang/2012
to be sub
silentio
, and, therefore, not binding. The Delhi High Court decision in the
case of UCO Bank (supra)  was also
distinguished on the ground that the assessee was fully aware of the payee in
the case before the Tribunal.

 

The Tribunal therefore confirmed the levy
of interest u/s. 201(1A).

 

BOSCH
LTD.’S CASE

The issue again came up before the
Bangalore bench of the Tribunal in the case of Bosch Ltd vs. ITO
TS-116-ITAT-2016.

 

This was a case relating to assessment
year 2012-13. The facts of this case were almost identical to the facts of
IBM’s case. The assessee was a company engaged in the business of manufacture
and sale of injection equipments, auto electric items, portable electric power tools, etc.

 

In respect of expenses amounting to  Rs.1,96,84,115, a provision was created by
the company in its books and the same was disallowed under the provisions of section
40(a)(i)(ia) in computation of total income filed for the assessment year
2012-13. Out of Rs.1,96,84,115, no invoices were received for an amount of
Rs.1,79,36,713 and the said  amount was
reversed in the beginning of the next accounting year. The assessee contended
that no tax was required to be deducted in respect of such amount for which no
invoices were received.

 

The contention of the assessee was not
accepted by the Assessing Officer by holding that the system of accounting
followed by the assessee was faulty and did not enable any verification. He
held that since the assessee company was following mercantile system of
accounting, tax should have been deducted on the provisions made. Accordingly,
the Assessing  Officer held that the
assessee to be an ‘assessee in default’ u/s. 201(1) of the IT Act and demanded
tax  and interest thereon.

 

The CIT (A) confirmed the action of the
Assessing Officer by holding that suo-moto disallowance under the
provisions of section 40(a)(ia) did not absolve the assessee from its
responsibility of deducting tax at source. However, the CIT (A) directed the
Assessing  Officer to exclude those
amounts in respect of which TDS had been made on the dates on which invoices
had been raised. 

 

Before the Tribunal, the assessee
submitted that, as regards the expenses for which the service provider or
vendor had not raised any invoices nor were they acknowledged by the assessee
company, it made a provision for such expenses on a scientific basis and such
provision was debited to its P&L account, in conformity with the provisions
of Accounting Standard 29- Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent
Assets (AS 29) issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India
(ICAI). Such provision, which was mandatory as per AS 29, was reversed in the
beginning of the next accounting year.

 

It was argued that:

 

a.  No
income had accrued to the payees and a mere provision was made in the books of
account at the year end. The very fact that the provision was reversed in the
beginning of the next accounting year showed that no income had accrued to the
payee and therefore, there was no liability to deduct TDS on the basis of mere
provision.



b.  The
payees as well as the exact amount payable to them were not identifiable and
therefore, there was no liability to deduct tax at source.

 

c.  The
existence/accrual of income in the hands of payee was a pre-condition to fasten
the liability of TDS in the hands of the payer;

 

d.  The
provisions of section 195 stipulated that the payer had to deduct tax at source
at an earlier point of time, either at the time of crediting to the payee’s
account or at the time of payment of income to the payee. The phrase “whichever
is earlier” would mean that both the events i.e crediting the amount to the
account of payee and payment to the assessee must necessarily occur. Therefore,
when there was no payment made the question of deducting TDS at the time of
crediting did not arise.

 

Reliance was also placed on the CBDT’s
Instruction No.1215 (F.No.385/61/78 IT(B) dated 08-11-1978.

 

On behalf of the revenue, it was argued
that on a plain reading of section 195, the liability to deduct tax at source
had arisen the moment the amount was credited in the books of account,
irrespective of fact whether the amount was paid or not. It was  further submitted that the provision of
taxing statutes should be construed strictly so that there was no place for any
inference.

 

The Tribunal took a view that the liability
to deduct tax at source arose only when there was accrual of income in the
hands of the payee. It relied upon the decision of Supreme Court in the case of
GE India Technology Centre P. Ltd. vs. CIT 327 ITR 456. According to the
Tribunal, the fact that the provisions made at the year-end were reversed in
the beginning of the next accounting year showed that there was no income
accrued. The Tribunal observed that mere entries in the books of account did
not establish the accrual of income in the hands of the payee, as held by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Shoorji Vallabhdas & Co. 46
ITR 144.

 

The Tribunal
accordingly concluded that there was no liability in the hands of the assessee
company to deduct tax at source, merely on the provisions made at the year end.

 

This order of the
Tribunal has been followed by the Bangalore bench of the Tribunal in the case
of TE Connectivity India Pvt Ltd vs. ITO (ITA 3/Bang/2015 dated 25.5.2016).

 

OBSERVATIONS

The objective  of inserting the Explanation has been stated
in Circular No. 3/2010 dated 2-3-2010. The relevant portion of this circular is
reproduced below:

 

Explanation to section 194A was introduced
with effect from 1-4-1987 by the Finance Act, 1987 to plug the loophole of
avoiding deduction of tax at source by crediting interest in the books of
account under accounting heads ‘interest payable account’ or ‘suspense account’
instead of to the depositor’s/payee’s account. (emphasis added)

 

It is gathered  from the above that, the Explanation applies
where   the interest (or any other amount
to which other provisions of TDS applies) is otherwise required to be credited
to the payee’s account and in order to avoid deduction of tax at source, it has
been credited to some other account, and not to the payee’s account.

 

A provision for an expense, by its very
nature, can not, in accountancy, be credited to any particular payee’s account;
it is rather to be credited to the Provision Account. The sum which cannot be
credited to the payee’s account as per the accounting principles cannot be
brought within the purview of Explanation so as to  deem to have been credited to the payee’s
account. The possibility to have credited a sum to the payee’s account should
first exist in order to invoke the Explanation. There is a stronger case for
non application of the  Explanation  in cases where the payee is not known in
comparision to the  cases where the payee
is known. Mere non-receipt of an invoice by the assessee cannot result in
claiming that the amount has not accrued to the service provider, particularly
when the contractual terms are also known to the assessee. The TDS provisions
in the later circumstances may be construed to have been avoided or  defeated by crediting an expenditure   to a provision account, instead of to the
payee’s account.

 

One view that the Explanation is intended
to apply only when the liability to pay that amount has become due is on
account of the language of the Explanation itself. The relevant provision of
section 194C [earlier it was present in the form of an Explanation II to s/s.
(2) but re-enacted as s/s. (2) with effect from 1-10-2009] is reproduced below:

 

Where any sum referred to in sub-section
(1) is credited to any account, whether called “Suspense account” or
by any other name, in the books of account of the
person liable to
pay such income
,
such crediting shall be deemed to be credit of such income to the account of
the payee and the provisions of this section shall apply accordingly. (emphasis
added)

 

The words used in the Explanation are
“person liable to pay such income” in contrast to the “person responsible for
paying” as used in the main provision. Therefore, as per this view, the person
should have become liable to pay the income on which tax is required to be withheld
in order to get covered by the Explanation. 
This view perhaps has a better appeal in cases of section 195 which
bases the obligation on ‘chargeability’ in the hands of the payee.
However, this view may not hold water, when one appreciates that the term
“liable to pay such income” merely qualifies the person who is required to
deduct tax, and not the point of time of deduction of tax. 

 

As far as disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) is
concerned, offering disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) cannot absolve the assessee
from his liability u/s. 201(1). Both the provisions, one for disallowance u/s.
40(a)(i) or 40(a)(ia) and the other for treatment of  the assessee as an assessee in default can
co-exist. The Second Proviso to section 40(a)(ia) envisages such a possibility whereby
the assessee can be proceeded against under the provisions of section 201,
apart from disallowing the relevant expenditure on account of his default in
complying with the TDS provisions.

 

But then, the incidental issue would be as
to whether the provision created in the books of account, for which a view is
taken that tax is not deductible on it, can be subjected  to the disallowance provisions of section
40(a)(i) or 40(a)(ia) or not. These provisions of section 40(a) apply to any sum payable
and on which tax is deductible at source under Chapter XVII-B. It is not the
case that the tax is not deductible at all from the provisions for expenses. It
is only the point of time at which tax is required to be deducted that is in
dispute. Therefore, it would be difficult to take a view that  the claim based on such provisions cannot be
disallowed u/s. 40(a)(i) or 40(a)(ia) merely because tax is not deductible at
present but in future. Otherwise, it would result into granting of deduction in
the year of making provision and making disallowance provision otiose in the
subsequent year in the absence of any claim for its deduction. However,
difficulties would certainly arise in a case where the provision is made for
liability towards unidentified payees. In such case, neither payee is known nor
his residential status is known.

 

One may however take notice of the
decision of the Mumbai Tribunal in the case of Pranik Shipping &
Services Ltd. vs. ACIT [2012] 135 ITD 233
wherein a view was taken that the
provision of section 40(a) would not apply in cases where the expenditure in
question was claimed in the return of income but was neither credited to the
account of payee nor provided for in the books.

 

If one looks at the plain reading of the
tax deduction sections, they require tax deduction at source on payment of any
income of specified nature (except in case of section 194C, which requires
payment of any sum). The chargeability to tax of such income is not a
prerequisite, except in case of section 195, which specifically requires such
sum to be chargeable to tax. Therefore, one can distinguish the provisions of
section 195 from the other tax deduction provisions, which do not specify that
such amounts have to be chargeable to tax. The reliance by the Tribunal on GE
Technology Centre’s decision (supra) in Bosch’s case,
in relation to 
section 195, may be a good law and may be debatable for provisions other
than section 195.    

 

The assessees are advised, in the interest of
mitigating litigation to deduct tax at source 
in cases where the services are rendered and the payee is known, even
while making the provisions for expenses on an estimated basis or otherwise.

1 Section 206C – Assessee defaulted in collection of tax at source for which AO took action after seven years – When no limitation is provided in the statute for initiation of action and passing the order, held that the same has to be done within a reasonable time which according to the Tribunal was four years.

Eid Mohammad Nizamuddin vs.
Income Tax Officer (Jaipur)

Members:
Vijay Pal Rao (J. M.) and
Vikram Singh Yadav (A. M.)

ITA NO.
248 and 316 /JP/2018

A. Y:
2009-10. Dated: 29th August, 2018

Counsel
for Assessee / revenue: Mahendra
Gargieya and Fazlur Rahman /  J.C.
Kulhari

 

Section 206C – Assessee defaulted in collection
of tax at source for which AO took action after seven years – When no
limitation is provided in the statute for initiation of action and passing the
order, held that the same has to be done within a reasonable time which
according to the Tribunal was four years.

 

Facts

The assessee is a partnership firm, engaged
in the business of manufacturing and trading of Bidi. During the course of
survey proceedings, it was detected that for the F.Y. 2008-09 relevant to
assessment year 2009-10, the assessee firm was liable to collect tax at source
(TCS) @ 5% on sale of tendu leaves as per provisions of section 206C(1) but it
defaulted for non-collecting of TCS. Accordingly, the Assessing Officer
proceeded to pass order u/s. 206C(6)/206C(7) on 30/03/2016 whereby the assessee
was held as “assessee in default” within the meaning of section 206C(6) read
with section 206C(7) for non-collection of tax of Rs. 98.84 lakhs, including
interest. The assessee challenged the order passed by the Assessing Officer
before the CIT(A) and also raised objection against the validity of the said
order on the ground of limitation. The CIT(A) rejected the ground of limitation
however, granted part relief to the assessee to the extent of return of income
filed by the purchaser of tendu leaves, for which they issued Form No. 27BA.
Hence, the assessee as well as the revenue, being aggrieved by the order of the
CIT(A), filed the appeal and the cross appeal. One of the grounds of appeal by
the assessee was about the validity of the order passed by the Assessing
Officer.  According to it, the order
passed by the Assessing Officer was barred by limitation. The Tribunal decided
to take the said ground first as it was the root of the matter.

 

The assessee’s contention was that the order
passed by the Assessing Officer on 30/3/2016 was barred by limitation even
though the provisions contained u/s 206C did not prescribe any time limit for
initiation of proceedings or for passing order. However, according to the
revenue, when no limitation is provided in the statute for initiation of action
and passing the order u/s. 206C, then there was no bar on the jurisdiction and
power of the Assessing Officer to pass the order.

 

Held

According to
the Tribunal, non-providing the limitation in the statute would not confer the
jurisdiction/powers to the Assessing Officer to pass order u/s. 206C at any
point of time. As otherwise, the Assessing Officer would get an unfettered
powers to take action at any point till an indefinite period which would defy
or defeat the very purpose and scheme of the statute. According to the
Tribunal, the analogy and reasoning given in the decisions of various High
Courts (listed below) in respect of the limitation for passing the order u/s.
201 was also applicable for considering the reasonable time period for passing
the order u/s. 206C. According to the Tribunal, the provisions of sections 201
and 206C have the same scheme and object, being the measures against the
avoidance of tax by the opposite parties with whom the assessee had the
transactions. Hence, applying the reasonable period of limitation as four years
within which the Assessing Officer should pass the order u/s. 206C(6)/206C(7),
the Tribunal held that the order passed by the Assessing Officer on 30/3/2016
was beyond the said reasonable period of limitation and consequently invalid,
being barred by limitation.

 

Cases relied on by the tribunal:

CIT vs. NHK Japan Broadcasting 305 ITR
137 (Delhi);

Vodafone Essar Mobile Services Ltd. vs.
Union of India & ors. (2016) 385 ITR 436 (Del);

Tata Teleservices vs. Union of India
& Anr. (2016) 385 ITR 497 (Guj);

CIT (TDS) vs. Anagram Wellington Assets
Management Co. Ltd. (2016) 389 ITR 654 (Guj);

CIT vs. U.B. Electronics Instruments Ltd.
(2015) 371 ITR 314 (AP);

CIT(TDS) & Anr. vs. Bharat Hotels
Limited (2016) 384 ITR 77 (Karn.)
.

6 Section 37(1) – In the absence of any evidence brought on record by the AO to substantiate that the payment of insurance premium of employees’ family members in terms of employment rules framed by the assessee company had no nexus with business of the assessee, it could hardly be said that the impugned expenditure was not incurred wholly and exclusively for the purposes of business, which is the real intent of section 37(1).

[2018] 96 taxmann.com 483
(Delhi)

Loesche
India (P.) Ltd. vs. ACIT

ITA No. :
295/Delhi/2016

A. Y:
2010-11    
Dated: 13th August, 2018


Section 37(1)
– In the absence of any evidence brought on record by the AO to substantiate
that the payment of insurance premium of employees’ family members in terms of
employment rules framed by the assessee company had no nexus with business of
the assessee, it could hardly be said that the impugned expenditure was not
incurred wholly and exclusively for the purposes of business, which is the real
intent of section 37(1).

           

FACTS

The assessee company engaged in business of
Design & Engineering, manufacturing and trading of vertical roller grinding
mill systems & components thereof for cement, steel, power plants and other
mineral based industries filed its return of income declaring total income of
Rs. 19,12,54,863.  In the course of
assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer (AO) noticed that amount of Rs.
15,48,654 has been claimed on account of medical insurance.  He called upon the assessee to furnish
details of relations of employees in respect of whom insurance premium has been
paid and also to show cause why it should not be disallowed on the ground that
it is gratuitious and not on commercial lines since obligation of the employee
has been met by the employer.  Upon
perusal of the list of relatives who had been insured, the AO noticed that
medical insurance premium has been paid to insure health of mother-in-law of
the Managing Director apart from his independent children and also towards
married sisters of other directors of the assessee company. He held that the
assessee had adopted an inequitable and unreasonable system by bearing the
medical insurance expenses of only the relatives of key managerial persons and
their distant family members.  Relying on
the decisions of Madras High Court in the case of CIT vs. Indian Express
Newspapers (Madurai) (P.) Ltd. [1999] 104 Taxman 578
and Calcutta High
Court in M D Jindal vs. CIT [1986] 28 Taxman 509 (Delhi), he held that
he was entitled to lift the veil of corporate entity in order to ascertain the
actual intention. He distinguished the case law of Bombay High Court in the
case of Mahindra & Mahindra on which reliance was placed by the
assessee since the instant benefit was not for achieving the purpose of
corporate social responsibility but in the instant case it was to benefit a few
selected employees.  Even otherwise,
since the employees had not offered what amounted to be perquisites in their
hands u/s. 17(2)(iv), he was of the view that these were not business expenses
qualifying for deduction u/s. 37(1).

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the Tribunal.

 

HELD

The Tribunal observed that the record
reveals that the assessee had paid the insurance premiums of the employees’
family members in terms of employment rules framed by the assessee-company
therefor.  Therefore, it can hardly be
said that the impugned expenditure were not incurred wholly and exclusively for
the purpose of business, which is the real intent of section 37(1).  The Tribunal further observed that the
authorities below have not brought any evidence on record to substantiate that
the payments so made by the assessee-company had no nexus with the business of
the assessee.  Even otherwise, it is not
necessary that all the payments/expenditure incurred by the assessee should
have a direct bearing on earning of income, but some payments are also made
under certain business expediency.  It
noted that the payments claimed to have been made for insurance premium of such
members who have attained the age of 21 years or more or who are the remote
relations of the assesse have already been offered by the assessee to tax
before the CIT(A).  It observed that the
authorities below appear to have rejected the claim of the assessee that these
payments were in the nature of perquisites to the employees as contemplated
u/s. 17(2)(iv), according to which any obligation which, but for such payment,
would have been payable by the assessee, shall be included in perquisites.
However, in view of proviso (iii) & (iv) appended to this section clearly
prohibit application of section 17(2) in certain eventualities contained in
these provisos. The Tribunal held that in view of the attending facts and
circumstances of the case and the provisions of law, noted above, there is no
justification in the findings reached by the authorities below for rejecting
the deduction of impugned expenditure claimed by the assessee. Therefore, there
is no justification to discard the impugned claim of the assessee u/s.
37(1). 

 

The Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by
the assessee.

5 Section 23 – In case of a property construction whereof is not fully in accordance with the sanctioned plan and some alteration is required to bring it under proper plan, benefit of vacancy allowance u/s. 23(1)(c) of the Act needs to be allowed in respect of the period taken for carrying out necessary alterations.

[2018] 96 taxmann.com 476
(Mumbai)

Saif Ali
Khan Pataudi vs. ACIT

ITA No.:
5811/Mum/2016

A. Y:
2012-13  
Dated: 21st August, 2018


Section 23 – In case of a property
construction whereof is not fully in accordance with the sanctioned plan and
some alteration is required to bring it under proper plan, benefit of vacancy
allowance u/s. 23(1)(c) of the Act needs to be allowed in respect of the period
taken for carrying out necessary alterations.

           

Facts

The assessee owned a residential flat in a
society. The assessee considered the annual value of this flat to be Rs.
4,00,000. The Assessing Officer (AO) while assessing the total income of the
assessee held that considering the size of the flat and its location, the
amount of rent estimated by the assessee to be its annual value was low. The AO
adopted 7% of the value of the investment in the flat to be its annual value.
Accordingly, he computed Rs. 81,08,802 to be the annual value of the flat under
consideration.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the CIT(A) where the assessee argued that the building in which the house
was situated has been constructed unauthorisedly as per letter dated 9.2.2012
of Executive Engineer, Building Proposal (WS), `H’ Ward, Municipal Corporation
of Central Mumbai. It contended that the annual value shown by the assessee be
accepted and addition made by the AO deleted. He noted that as per the
valuation report filed by the assessee, the annual value of the property has
been estimated to be Rs. 11,86,723. The CIT(A) held that the alteration
required to be done to remove the unauthorised construction was minor.
Referring to the rent of another flat in the same building, the CIT(A) computed
the annual value to be Rs. 50,40,000.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the Tribunal where on behalf of the assessee it was contended that the
assessee was not able to let out the property and hence vacancy allowance be
granted. It was also submitted that there were some inherent defects in
construction of the property. The deficiency was pointed out by the authorities
and it was necessary to remove the deficiencies in order to bring the property
in accordance with the approved plan. Since defects were subsisting there was
reasonable cause why the flat would not be let out. It was also pointed out
that subsequently substantial expenditure was incurred by the assessee in order
to bifurcate the property into 3 flats in order to rent the same. In order to
avoid litigation the assessee was agreeable to offer Rs. 11,83,723 as annual
value, as computed by the assessee’s valuer.

 

HELD

The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) has
partly rejected the assessee’s plea that the assessee was under an obligation
to remove certain unauthorised construction / defects done by the builder in
order to bring the construction under appropriate permission and sanction.  It observed that the CIT(A) has admitted that
certain defects were there but he has found the same to be minor.  No details whatsoever has been brought by the
CIT(A) in considering the defects to be dissected between major and minor.  Once when it is accepted that the construction
was not fully in accordance with the plan and some alteration was required to
bring it under proper plan, it has to be accepted that the flat was not in a
position to be let out dehors the removal of the defects.

 

The Tribunal held that there were certain
defects in the construction of the flat under the sanctioned plan, the removal
of which was necessary. Letting out a house which is not constructed as per an
approved plan cannot be forced upon an assessee.  Furthermore, subsequently the assessee has incurred
over Rs. 50 lakh for alteration of the flat which resulted in the bifurcation
of the flat into three parts. This oxygenates the assessee’s claim that the
premises required alteration in order to be properly let out.  It held that the plea made on behalf of the
assessee cannot be said to be spurious, vexatious, mere bluster or frivolous.
It held that the assessee deserves vacancy allowance u/s. 23(1)(c). 

 

Considering the ratio of the decision of the
Mumbai Bench of ITAT in the case of Premsudha Exports (P.) Ltd. vs. ACIT
[2008] 110 ITD 158 (Mum.)
, the Tribunal held that the assessee should be
granted vacancy allowance.  However,
since the assessee had in its grounds of appeal agreed to offer Rs. 11,83,723
to be the annual value of the property, the proposal of the assessee was
accepted and the order of CIT(A) was held to be modified accordingly.

 

The Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by the
assessee.

4 Section 23(1)(a) – Provisions of section 23(1)(a) cannot be applied to a property constructed by the assessee, construction whereof was completed in the month of February and property remained unsold and vacant, as it is not possible to let out property just after its completion i.e. only after one month.

[2018] 97 taxmann.com 214 (Jaipur)

Raj
Landmark (P.) Ltd. v. ITO

ITA No.:
242/Jp/2018

A. Y:
2013-14
Dated: 24th August, 2018


Section 23(1)(a) – Provisions of section
23(1)(a) cannot be applied to a property constructed by the assessee,
construction whereof was completed in the month of February and property
remained unsold and vacant, as it is not possible to let out property just
after its completion i.e. only after one month.


FACTS

The assessee, a private limited company,
engaged in the business of real estate development constructed a commercial
complex, construction whereof was completed in February 2013 and which remained
unsold and vacant for one month during the previous year 2012-13. The Assessing
Officer (AO) computed the annual value of this property to be Rs. 9 lakh for
the month of March 2013. Since the construction of the property was completed
only in February 2013, the AO determined estimated rental income only for a
period of one month. 

 

Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal to
the CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the Tribunal.


HELD

The Tribunal noted that the commercial
complex under consideration was held by the assessee as its stock-in-trade. It
noted that it was not the allegation of the AO that the assessee has
deliberately not let out the property in question under consideration. The
Tribunal, observed that without going into the controversy as to applicability
of section 23 in respect of a property held as stock-in-trade, it came to the
conclusion that it is not a case of keeping the property vacant from year after
year but the project was completed in Feb 2013. It observed that reasonably
expected rent envisaged by section 23(1)(a) itself signifies the possibility of
letting out of the property and also that there is a time lag between the
completion of construction of the property and letting out the property
thereafter. It is not practically possible to let out the property on the next
day of completion of construction or acquisition of the property. It held that
in a case when there is no possibility of any deliberate or unreasonable delay
in letting out the property then it is not expected to fetch a reasonable rent
just after completion of the project in question. Moreover, the present case
was not one of letting out a small space of the house but the entire project
was completed by assessee in the month of Feb 2013 and therefore the provisions
of section 23(1)(a) itself would not be workable in such a case for want of
immediate letting out the property just after its completion.

 

The Tribunal noted that the Legislature has
also recognised this aspect while inserting section 23(5) by Finance Act, 2017
w.e.f. 1.4.2018 allowing vacancy allowance of one year from the end of the
financial year in which certificate of completion of construction of the
property is obtained from the competent authority.

 

Though s/s. (5) is not applicable for
assessment year under consideration, however, it is not a case of allowing the
vacancy allowance in respect of the property held as stock-in-trade but it is
the fundamental issue of determination of notional annual letting value just
after completion of construction of the property held as stock-in-trade. The
Tribunal noted that without allowing a reasonable period or time gap from the
completion of construction of property held as stock-in-trade to let out the
same, the property cannot reasonably be expected to be let from year to year
and fetch fair market rent just after completion of construction.

 

The Tribunal held that in the facts and
circumstances of the case, section 23(1)(a) cannot be applied to the property
in question due to the peculiar reason that the completion certificate was
obtained only in Feb 2013 and it is not expected to let out the property just
after completion of the project and, therefore reasonable expected rent to be
fetched by the property in question is not possible immediately after the
completion without allowing a reasonable period, which is also recognised by
the Legislature.

 

The Tribunal deleted the addition made by
the AO on this account.

 

The appeal filed by the assessee were
allowed.



3 Section 271(1)(c) –Where satisfaction of AO while initiating penalty proceedings u/s. 271(1)(c) is with regard to alleged concealment of income by assessee, whereas imposition of penalty is for ‘concealment/furnishing inaccurate particulars of income’, levy of penalty is not sustainable

 
[2018] 195 TTJ (Asr)(TM) 1

HPCL Mittal Energy Ltd. vs. ACIT

ITA No.: 
554 & 555/Asr/2014

A. Ys.: 
2008-09 & 2009-10  Dated: 20th
June, 2018


Section 271(1)(c) –Where satisfaction of AO
while initiating penalty proceedings u/s. 271(1)(c) is with regard to alleged
concealment of income by assessee, whereas imposition of penalty is for
‘concealment/furnishing inaccurate particulars of income’, levy of penalty is
not sustainable

 

FACTS

During the year under consideration, the AO
made disallowance of business loss; non-declaration of interest income from
deposits with banks and non-declaration of interest income on Fixed Deposit
Receipts (FDRs) as security given to the trial court. The additions were
confirmed by the CIT(A) and the Tribunal.

 

The penalty notice u/s. 274 was issued by
stating that the assessee ‘concealed the particulars of income’ with respect to
the above three disallowance/additions. However, the penalty order was passed
holding that ‘the assessee concealed the particulars of income/furnished
inaccurate particulars of such income’.

 

On appeal to CIT(A), the penalty order was
affirmed.

 

On further
appeal to the Tribunal, the assessee contended the penalty was not sustainable,
on the ground that the Assessing Officer levelled charge of ‘concealment of
income’ and also issued penalty notices on the same charge, but found the
assessee guilty in the penalty orders on a different and vague default of ‘concealment
of the particulars of income/furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income’.

 

The Judicial
Member concurred with the submissions advanced on behalf of the assessee on
this preliminary legal ground and ordered deletion of penalty in his proposed common
order. On the other hand, Accountant Member passed order sustaining the penalty
on merits. On difference of opinion, matter was referred to the Third Member.

HELD

The Third Member held that the penalty
proceedings were separate from assessment proceedings, which got started with
the issue of notice u/s. 274 and concluded in the penalty order u/s. 271(1)(c).
Many a times, penalty initiated in the assessment order on one or more counts
by means of notice u/s. 274, was not eventually imposed by the AO on getting
satisfied with the explanation tendered by the assessee in the penalty
proceedings.

 

In any case,
confronting the assessee with the charge against him is sine qua non for
any valid penalty proceedings. It is only when the assessee was made aware of
such a charge against him that he could present his side.

 

It was evident that when the AO was
satisfied at the stage of initiation of penalty proceedings of a clear-cut
charge against the assessee in any of the three situations (say, concealment of
particulars of income), but imposed penalty by holding the assessee as guilty
of the other charge (say, furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income) or an
uncertain charge (concealment of particulars of income/furnishing of inaccurate
particulars of income), the penalty could not be sustained.

 

In the present
case, the Third Member held that the penalty was wrongly imposed and confirmed
and Judicial Member was justified in striking down all the penalty orders.

 

2 Section 11 & 13(1)(d) – It is only the income from such investment or deposit which has been made in violation of section 11(5), that is liable to be taxed; violation of section 13(1)(d) does not result in the denial of exemption u/s. 11 to the total income of the assessee.

[2018] 194 TTJ (Del) 715

ITO vs. The Times Centre for Media and
Management Studies

ITA No.: 
1389/Del/2015

A. Y.: 
2010-11    Dated: 31st
May, 2018

Section 11 & 13(1)(d) – It is only the
income from such investment or deposit which has been made in violation of
section 11(5), that is liable to be taxed; violation of section 13(1)(d) does
not result in the denial of exemption u/s. 11 to the total income of the
assessee. 

 

FACTS

The assessee was a charitable institution in
terms of section 25 of the Companies Act, 1956 and also registered u/s. 12AA(1)
of the Income-tax Act, 1961. During the year under consideration the assessee
had received a donation of 50,000 shares worth Rs.2,00,000 from Angelo Rhodes
Ltd. (United Kingdom) way back in 1996 and had received dividend income of
Rs.2,36,000.



The AO proceeded to deny the exemption u/s. 11(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961
for violation of provision of section 13(1)(d) r.w s. 11(5) of the Income-tax
Act, 1961 pertaining to mode of investment.

 

Aggrieved by the assessment order, the
assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A). The CIT(A) granted the assessee the
benefit of exemption on all income except the impugned amount of Rs.2,36,000.

 

HELD

The Tribunal held that it was well settled
that where investments or deposits had been made by a charitable trust which
were in violation of section 11(5), the benefit of exemption u/s. 11 would not
be denied on the entire income of the assessee and only the
investments/deposits made in violation of provisions of section 11(5) would
attract maximum marginal rate of tax.

 

The Tribunal followed the ratio of the
Hon’ble High Court decision in the case of CIT vs. Fr. Mullers Charitable
Institutions (2014) 102 DTR (Kal) 386
wherein while dealing with an
identical issue it was held that a reading of section 13(1)(d) made it clear
that it was only the income from such investment or deposit which had been made
in violation of section 11(5) that was liable to be taxed and that the
violation u/s. 13(1)(d) did not tantamount to denial of exemption u/s. 11 on
the total income of the assessee.

 

The Tribunal relying upon the judgement of
the Hon’ble High Court, held that in the present case the maximum marginal rate
of tax would apply only to the dividend income from shares held in
contravention of section 13(1)(d) and not to the entire income.  

1 Section 56(2)(viia) – Provisions of section 56(2)(viia) are attracted only in case of “shares of any other company”

[2018] 194 TTJ (Mumbai) 746

Vora Financial Services (P.) Ltd. vs. ACIT

ITA No.: 532/Mum/2018

A. Y.: 2014-15     Dated: 29th June, 2018


Section 56(2)(viia) – Provisions of section
56(2)(viia) are attracted only in case of “shares of any other company” and
could not be its own shares as own shares cannot become property of the
recipient company; buy-back of own shares by a company cannot attract the
provisions of section 56(2)(viia) as the same does not satisfy the tests of
“becoming property” and “shares of any other company”

 

FACTS

During the year under consideration the
assessee made an offer to existing shareholders for buy-back of 25% of its
existing share capital at a price of Rs.26 per share. One of the directors of
the company offered 12,19,075 shares under the buy-back scheme for a
consideration of Rs.3,16,95,950 on 24.05.2013. The AO noticed that the book
value of shares as on 31.03.2013 was Rs.32.80 per share, whereas the
assessee-company had bought back the shares at Rs.26 per share.

 

The AO observed
that consideration of Rs. 3,16,95,950 had been reinvested in the company in the
form of loan. Hence, the AO took the view that the entire exercise was carried
out to reduce the liability of the company by purchasing shares below the fair
market value. Accordingly, the AO assessed the difference between the book
value of shares and purchase price of shares amounting to Rs.82,89,710 lakhs as
income of the assessee company u/s. 56(2)(viia) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Aggrieved by the assessment order, the
assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A). The CIT(A) confirmed the action of
the AO.

 

HELD

The Tribunal held that a combined reading of
section 56(2)(viia) and the memorandum explaining the provision of it would
show that the section 56(2)(viia) would be attracted when “a firm or
company (not being a company in which public are substantially
interested)” receives a “property, being shares in a company (not
being a company in which public are substantially interested)”.

 

Therefore, the shares should become
“property” of recipient company and in that case, it should be shares
of any other company and could not be its own shares. Own shares could not
become the property of the recipient company.

 

Accordingly, section 56(2)(viia) would be
applicable only in cases where the receipt of shares became property in the
hands of recipient and the shares would become property of the recipient only
if they were “shares of any other company”.

 

In the instant case, the assessee had
purchased its own shares under buyback scheme and the same had been
extinguished by reducing the capital and hence the tests of “becoming
property” and also “shares of any other company” failed in this
case. Accordingly, the Tribunal took a view that the tax authorities were not
justified in invoking the section 56(2)(viia) for buyback of own shares.

In the result, the Tribunal set aside the
order passed by CIT(A) on this issue and directed the AO to delete the addition
made u/s. 56(2)(viia) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

4 Section 36(1)(vii): Bad debt- Write-off of bad debts were held to be allowable – and there is no obligation on the assessee to establish that debt had became bad.

1.     Hinduja Ventures Ltd vs.
DCIT [ Income tax Appeal no 270 of 2008, Dated: 2nd August, 2018
(Bombay High Court)]. 

 

[Hinduja
Ventures Ltd vs. DCIT; dated 24/08/2006; Mum. 
ITAT ]


After
the  close of accounting year, the
assessee had received money which it had written off as bad debts in its
accounts. Thus claim for deduction u/s.36(1)(vii) of the Act was disallowed. It
is an agreed position between the parties that after the Amendment with effect
from 1.4.1981 to section 36(1)(vii) of the Act, there is no requirement in law
that the Assessee must establish that the debt infact has become irrecoverable.

 

This as
requirement of section 36(1)(vii) of the Act to claim deduction on account of
bad debts is for the Assessee to write off the debt as irrecoverable in its
account. This is as held by the Supreme Court in TRF Ltd. vs. CIT (2010)
323 ITR 397
. 

 

In this
case, it is undisputed position that the assessee had written off bad debts in
its account for the previous year relevant to the subject assessment year and
claimed deduction u/s. 36(1)(vii) of the Act. Thus, the fact that the amounts
written off as bad debts were recovered subsequent to the end of the accounting
year would not justify the Revenue to disallow the deduction on the ground that
the debt written off was not infact bad debt. In a similar circumstance, this
Court in CIT vs. Star Chemicals (Bombay) P. Ltd. [2009] 313 ITR 126 (Bom)
placed reliance upon Circular No.551 dated 23.1.1990 issued by the CBDT to
conclude that once the Assessee has written off debts as bad debts then the
requirement of section 36(1)(vii) of the Act are satisfied. There is no
requirement  to establish that the debt
was infact bad.

 

The tax on
the amount written off as bad debts in the previous year subject to relevant
Assessment Year has been offered to tax in the year the amounts were recovered
i.e. in the subsequent Assessment Year. The assessee  appeal was 
allowed.
 

 

3 Section 264 : Revision– fresh claim of the deduction can be entertained – delay in filing the Revision Application – for reasonable cause it should have been condoned – order rejecting the revision application was set aside.


1.    Dwarikesh Sugar Industries
Ltd vs. DCIT [ Writ Petition no 1206 of 2018, Dated: 12th July, 2018
(Bombay High Court)]. 


The
assessee is engaged in manufacture of sugar. It purchases sugarcane from
farmers through various Societies established by the State Government under the
U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply & Purchase) Rules, 1954. The assessee
is required to pay commission to the above Societies from whom sugarcane is
procured. During the year, the assessee paid the Societies, the Commission
under the Sugarcane Act upto January, 2012. However, the assessee was under a
belief that the State Government would announce waiver of commission to be paid
to the Society under the Sugarcane Act for the months of February and March,
2012. In the above view, the assessee did not claim deduction on account of the
above accrued liability in its assessment for A.Y. 2012-13. However, the waiver
as expected from the State Government did not come. On the contrary, on 19th
June, 2012 the State Government called upon the assessee to pay the Commission
of Rs.4.25 crores payable to the sugarcane Societies for having acquired
sugarcane from them during February and March, 2012. In the aforesaid
circumstances, during the previous year relevant to A.Y 2013-14, the assessee
paid the commission of Rs.4.25 crores to the Societies under the Sugarcane
Act. 

 

The
assessee claimed a deduction of Rs.4.25 crores in its return for the previous
year relevant to the A.Y. 2013-14. However, the A.O, did not accept the
assessee’s claim for deduction of Rs.4.25 crores being commission paid to the
Societies under the Sugarcane Act. This on the ground that the payment relates
to the A.Y. 2012-13 and therefore could not be allowed as a deduction in the
A.Y. 2013-14. 

 

Consequent
to the above, the assessee filed an Appeal before the CIT(A). At the same time,
the assessee also filed a Revision Application u/s. 264 of the Act before Pr.
CIT alongwith an application for condonation of delay. The Pr. CIT rejected the
Assessee’s application for condonation of delay. This on the ground that the
assessee could have made this claim in a revised return for the A.Y 2012-13,
which infact it filed on 8th June, 2013. This without claiming this
deduction. Thus, the impugned order found, there is no cause for the delay and
rejected the condonation of delay application. Further, on merits also, Pr. CIT
rejected the claim. 

 

Consequent to the above,
the assessee filed an Writ Petition before the High Court. The Assessee relied
the decisions of the Delhi High Court in Rajesh Kumar Aggarwal vs.
CIT[2017] (78) taxmann.com 265
and the decision of the Kerala High Court in
Transformers & Electricals Kerala Ltd. Vs. DCIT[2016] 75 taxmann.com 298
wherein a view has been taken that the powers of revision u/s. 264 of
the Act are very wide and is not restricted to only consideration of claims
made before the A.O. Therefore, it is submitted that it would be appropriate
that, Pr. CIT passes a fresh order after hearing the parties and considering
the above decisions relied upon by the parties .

 

The
Revenue submits that restoring the Revision Application would be a futile
exercise as the Revision Application itself is not maintainable. It is pointed
out that the claim of deduction of Rs.4.25 crores being the payment made to the
Societies was not a claim made either in the original or revised return of
income before the A. O. Thus, relying upon the decision of the Apex Court in Goetze
(India) Ltd. vs. CIT, 2006 (284) ITR 323
, it is submitted that such a claim
could not be made before the CIT in Revision u/s. 264 of the Act.

 

The Hon.
Court find that the delay in filing the Revision Application u/s. 264 of the
Act is concerned, it is the assessee’s case that as payments of commission to
Societies under the Sugarcane Act was made in previous year relevant to A.Y
2013-14. This was consequent to the order dated 19th June, 2012 of
the State Government. Therefore, they took a view that, the deduction was
allowable in A.Y 2013-14. It was in the above context, that though the assessee
had filed a revised return of income, in the year 2013 for A.Y 2012-13, it did
not claim the deduction of Rs.4.25 crores being the amount paid to the
Societies. It was only after A.O, by his order dated 25th March,
2016 held that, this deduction of Rs.4.25 crores relates to A.Y 2012-13 and
therefore could not be allowed in the A.Y 2013-14 that the assessee was
compelled to file the Revision Petition so as to claim the deduction. This to
ensure that, in atleast one of the two assessment years it gets the benefit of
deduction.

 

It is to
be noted that the assessee filed its Revision Application on 22nd
April, 2016 i.e. within a month of the order of the A.O  relating to A.Y 2013-14. In the aforesaid
circumstances, the reason in filing the Revision Application is for reasonable
cause and should have been condoned by the Pr. CIT. In the above circumstances,
delay was condoned and revision application was restored to the Pr. CIT for
disposal of the application on merits. Petition was allowed.



2 Section 45 : Capital gains vis a vis Business income – sale of property held as investment – Rental income disclosed as business income – gains arising on sale of property held in investment to be treated as capital gains.

1.      
 Pr. CIT-31 vs. Shree Shreemal Builders [ Income tax Appeal no 205 of
2016, Dated: 31st July, 2018 (Bombay High Court)]. 

 

[DCIT
vs. Shree Shreemal Builders; dated 14/11/2014, Mum.  ITAT ]

The
assessee sold a building which was acquired in 1978. It offered the gain made
on the sale of the building for tax under the head “capital gains”. However,
the A.O held that as the assessee was in business of development of real estate
and the fact that rental income received from building was offered to tax as
business income in the earlier years. The profit/gain on sale of the building
was in nature of business profit/gain. Therefore, chargeable to tax under the
head profit/gain of business or purchases and not under the head “capital
gains”.

 

Being
aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal to the CIT (A). The CIT(A) on the facts
found that the assessee had been showing the building as part of its assets in
the balance sheet and it has never been shown as stock in trade till date. The
CIT(A) further held that merely because a person is engaged in business of
development of real estate he is not barred by holding any property as and by
way of investment. It was further found that interest paid on borrowed funds
was being capitalised and not claimed as an expenditure in the regular course
of business to arrive at the taxable income. So far as classifying the rental
income under the head “business income” is concerned, it held that by itself it
alone would not change the character of an investment into stock in trade. In
these circumstances the appeal of the assessee was allowed.

 

Being aggrieved the Revenue filed an appeal to the Tribunal. The
Tribunal find that the said building had been acquired in the year 1978 and
ever since that date the property has been shown as an asset/investment and not
as stock in trade. Further, it held that profit/gain on sale of the building is
classifiable under the head capital gains. Support was also drawn from the fact
that interest paid on the funds borrowed were not debited to the Profit and
Loss Account but were capitalised. So far as classifying the rental income from
the said building as business income is concerned, the ITAT helds that, by
itself, this would not change the character of the investment in the building
into a stock in trade. The appeal of the Revenue was dismissed.

 

Being aggrieved the Revenue
filed an appeal to the High Court. The Court find that the both CIT(A) and the
Tribunal on consideration of all facts has concluded that the building which
was acquired in 1978 and sold in previous year relevant to the subject
assessment year was an investment. This finding was on the basis that the
assessee had all along shown the building as its investment and not as its
stock in trade in its Balance Sheet and Profit and Loss Account. Further, the
interest paid on the amounts borrowed for acquisition of the building has been
capitalised since beginning and no amount of interest was claimed as an
expenditure in its profit and loss account. The first objection on behalf of
Revenue is that as the assessee is in the business of real estate development
all its income relating to real estate can only be taxed as business income.
This submission on behalf of the Revenue is contrary to the directions in the CBDT
circular No.4/2007 dated 15th June, 2007 wherein in paragraph 10
thereof it is stated that it is possible for a tax payer to have two portfolios
at the same time i.e. Investment portfolio (investment) and trading portfolio
(stock in trade).



Further
this Court in Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Gopal Purohit (2010) 188 Taxman
140
has also held to the same effect. The second objection on behalf
of the Revenue is that as the assessee had classified its rental income from
the said building as business income that would by itself be evidence of it
being stock in trade. In any case in such matters the totality of the facts are
to be taken into account as done by the CIT(A) and the Tribunal. Therefore the
profit/gain on sale of the investment is taxable under the head “capital
gains”. Accordingly, Revenue appeal dismissed. 

1 Section 68: Cash credits-Share application money-Permanent account numbers, bank details of share applicants and affidavits of share applicant company was furnished – share application money cannot be considered as unexplained cash credits.

1.        Pr. CIT-4 vs. Acquatic
Remedies Pvt. Ltd [ Income tax Appeal no 83 of 2016, Dated: 30th
July, 2018 (Bombay High Court)]. 

[DCIT
vs.  Acquatic Remedies Pvt. Ltd; dated
17/04/2015, Mum.  ITAT ]


A survey
was conducted on GP  by the Investigation
Wing of the Revenue. During the course of the survey, it was found that GP  was issuing bogus accommodation bills to
various concerns including the assessee and its sister companies. Consequently,
a search operation was conducted on the premises of the assessee and its sister
companies.

 

Thereafter,
assessment orders were passed u/s. 153(3) r.w.s 153A of the Act by the A.O for
A.Ys 2005-06 to 2009-10 making additions under the following heads :-

 

(a) on account
of introduction of share capital as unexplained cash credit u/s. 68 of the Act
;

 

(b) on
account of bogus purchases;

 

(c) on
account of commission paid at 2% for accommodation bills ; and

 

(d) on
account of cash discount at 5% on cash purchases.

 

The CIT(A)
for subject AYs confirmed the addition on account of unexplained cash credit
u/s. 68 of the Act relating to introduction of share capital. However, the
CIT(A) by common order partly allowed the Appeal to the extent of deleting
commission of 2% in respect of the share capital and on account of 5% discount
on purchases in respect of share capital.

 

Being
aggrieved, both the Revenue, as well as, the assessee filed appeals to the
Tribunal. The Tribunal, allowed the Appeal of the assessee on issue of cash
credit and also in respect of commission and cash discount as held by the CIT
(A) while dismissing the Revenue’s Appeal.

 

The
Revenue  in appeal before High Court  challenges the order of the Tribunal that the
identity and creditworthiness of the shareholders is not established and the
genuineness of the transaction not being established, the Tribunal ought not to
have allowed the assessee’s appeals.

 

The Hon.
High Court finds that the persons who invested in the shares of the assessee
had PAN numbers allotted to them which was made available by the assessee to
the A.O. Besides, the shareholders had also filed Affidavits before the A.O
pointing out that they had invested in the shares of the assessee out of their
own bank accounts. Copies of acknowledgement of Return of Income of the
shareholders was also filed. The assessee also requested the A.O to summon the
shareholders. These evidences have not been shown to be incorrect. Therefore,
the objection with regard to identity of the shareholders not being established
does not survive. So far as, the creditworthiness of the investors is
concerned, these Appeals are of AYs prior to AY: 2013-14. It was only with
effect from 1st April, 2013 i.e. from the Assessment Year 2013-14
that a proviso was added to section 68 of the Act which required the person
investing in shares of any Company to satisfy, if required by the A.O, the
source of the funds which enabled the investments in shares.

 

So far as
the genuineness of the investment by the shareholders is concerned, Revenue
placed reliance upon the statement of Kamlesh Jain who was an employee, as well
as, the shareholder of the assessee and that during the course of the search,
certain blank transfer forms were found in the possession of the assessee.
Besides, it is submitted that the shares were supposed to be finally
transferred to the family members of the Directors of the assessee company at a
discounted price.

 

The
Tribunal records the fact that copies of the share application form, share
allotment Register and Bank Statements showing receipt of funds were on record.
Moreover, all the shareholders had filed Affidavits declaring the fact that
they are investing in the assessee company by issuing of cheques from their
Accounts. Infact, the statement very categorically states that, he did not
intend to purchase any shares of Aqua Formulations (P) Ltd., but no such
declaration is made in respect of the investment made by him in the assessee
Company. Thus, there is no conclusive evidence in support of the above
submission in the context of the assessee. It records, that the entire basis of
the Revenue’s case is based on surmise that the assessee was taking bogus
purchase bills and cash was introduced in the form of share capital without any
evidence in support.

 

Regarding  cash discount at 5% on cash purchases  and commission paid at 2% for obtaining
accommodation bills treating the same as unexplained expenditure. The court
held that there is no unexplained expenditure nor any bogus purchases.
Accordingly, the  Appeals were dismissed.






10 Section 69C – Unexplained expenditure (Work-in-progress)

CIT vs. B. G. Shirke Construction
Technology (P.) Ltd.; [2018] 96 taxmann.com 608 (Bom):
Date of the order: 8th August, 2018

A. Y. 2009-10


Search was conducted at
assessee-civil contractor’s premises on 18/12/2008 – Value of work-in-progress
as done by its site engineer on 30/11/2008 was done only on provisional basis –
Addition was sought to be made u/s. 69C on ground that figures indicated in
valuation report of site engineers were higher than work-in-progress recorded
in books – However, no verification was ever done by search party – Return
filed for relevant year showing closing work-in-progress as per books had been
accepted by Assessing Officer – There was no occasion to apply section 69C
since there was finding of fact that there was no excess work-in-progress than
that declared by respondent-assessee, and valuation done of work-in-progress as
on 31/11/2008 was only on provisional basis – Addition rightly deleted

The
respondent-assessee was a company engaged in the business of civil
construction. There was search and seizure operation conducted in the
respondent’s premises. During the course of search, valuation report of the
site engineers of the projects regarding Work in Progress (WIP) as on 30/11/2008
were found. It was noticed the figures indicated in the valuation report of the
site engineers were higher than the work-in-progress recorded in the books of
the respondent as on 30/11/2008. As per the provisional profit and loss
account, this difference was Rs. 9.30 crores. Thus, the respondent had agreed
to addition of Rs. 10 crores being made. However, at the end of subject
assessment year in its return of income the respondent had not offered the
additional income of Rs. 10 crores. Nevertheless, the Assessing Officer
proceeded to add Rs. 10 Crores being the additional income on account of excess
work-in-progress, which was financed out of unexplained source of income.
Resultantly, the Assessing Officer made an addition of Rs. 10 crores u/s. 69C of
the Act.

 

The
Commissioner (Appeals) deleted the addition of Rs. 10 crores holding that the
Assessing Officer did not controvert statement of the appellant that he had
correctly taken value of work-in-progress. Further, it held the Assessing
Officer had not brought on record any evidence to show that the appellant had
not recorded sales, purchase, other expenses properly in its books of account.
The Tribunal recorded the fact that the Assessing Officer had not disputed the
valuation of closing work-in-progress as on 31/03/2009. This figure had been
arrived on actual verification. There was also no disallowance of any
expenditure or suppression of income detected by the revenue. In the aforesaid
facts, the Tribunal held that in the absence of any material being brought on
record to show that the valuation done as on 31/03/2009 was incorrect, no
occasion to apply section 69C could arise. The Tribunal upheld the decision of
the Commissioner (Appeals).

 

On appeal
by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and
held as under:

 

“i)    Both the Commissioner (Appeals) as well as
the Tribunal have rendered a finding that work-in-progress as indicated in its
return of income for the year ending 31/03/2009 correctly reflects the closing
work-in-progress determined on physical verification. On facts both the
Commissioner (Appeals) as well as the Tribunal have rendered a finding that the
value of work-in-progress as done by its site engineers in November, 2008 was
only on provisional basis. No verification was ever done by the search party.
The return filed on 31/03/2009 showing its closing work-in-progress has been
accepted by the Assessing Officer. In the aforesaid facts, unless it is first
established by the revenue that there is unexplained expenditure, no occasion
to apply section 69C can arise.

 

ii)    The revenue has not challenged the
concurrent findings of the Commissioner (Appeals) as well as of the Tribunal
that the work-in-progress as disclosed during the time of search was on
provisional basis and it was taken into consideration while determining the
work-in-progress as on 31/03/2009. The proposed question that the Tribunal held
that there is a difference in the book value and the physical value of the
work-in-progress is factually not correct. The revenue was not able to
substantiate the above presumption in the question as framed.

 

iii)    In view of the above, the question as
proposed does not give rise to any substantial question of law.”

9 Section 43(5) – Speculative loss – Difference between speculation and hedging – Loss in hedging transaction – Deductible

ACIT vs. Surya International (P) Ltd.; 406
ITR 274 (All): Date of order: 6th September, 2017

A.
Y. 2009-10


The assessee was engaged in the business of production, refining and
sale of edible oil and its by-products. For the A. Y. 2009-10, the assessee
claimed that the market related to purchase of raw materials, for improvement
and manufacture of refined oil was highly volatile and it had entered into
contracts for purchase of raw materials, mainly crude oil, which was the raw
material for refined oil on “high seas sale” basis and many times, looking to
the market trend, the assessee had to cancel such contracts for sale of raw
materials (crude oil). In the relevant year, it had resulted in a loss of Rs,
1,07,88,693/- which the assessee claimed as the business loss. The Assessing
Officer disallowed the claim holding it to be speculative loss.

 

The
Tribunal allowed the claim in respect of 32 transactions.

 

On appeal
by the Revenue, the Allahabad High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal
and held as under:

 

“i)    Section 43(5) of the Income-tax Act, 1961,
provides that speculative transaction means a transaction in which a contract
for the purchase or sale of any commodity including stocks and shares, is
periodically and ultimately settled otherwise than by the actual delivery or
transfer of the commodity or scrips.

 

ii)    Clause (a), however, provides that a
transaction of this nature will not be deemed to be a speculative transaction
if the contract in respect of raw material or merchandise had been entered into
by a person in the course of his manufacturing or merchanting business to guard
against loss through future price fluctuations in respect of his contracts for
actual delivery of goods manufactured by him. Such contracts entered into by a
merchant or manufacturer to safeguard against loss through future price
fluctuation are in a commercial world known as hedging contracts. This clause
contemplates contracts entered into by two classes of persons namely (a) a
person who manufactures goods from raw materials, and (b) a merchant who
carries on merchanting business. Whereas in the case of a manufacturer it is
the contract entered into by him in respect of raw materials used in the course
of his manufacturing business to guard against loss through future price fluctuations
in respect of his contracts for actual delivery of goods manufactured by him,
that are taken out of the ambit of speculative transactions, the contracts
taken out of the scope of such transactions in the case of merchants are those
which he enters into in respect of his merchandise with a view to safeguard
loss through future price fluctuation in respect of contracts for actual
delivery of merchandise sold by him.

 

iii)    It is significant to note that section 43
nowhere provides that such hedging contracts must necessarily be purchasing
contracts. It will depend upon the facts of each case whether a particular
transaction by way of forward sale, which is mutually settled otherwise than by
actual delivery of the said goods has been entered into with a view to
safeguard against loss through price fluctuation in respect of the contract for
actual delivery of the goods manufactured.

 

iv)   The Tribunal was correct in allowing the
claim of the assessee in respect of 32 transactions.”

BOOK-PROFIT FOR PAYMENTS TO PARTNERS – SECTION 40(B)

The column “Controversies” was started
in January, 1980, with Vilas K. Shah and Rajan R. Vora as the initial
contributors. Harish N Motiwalla took over from 1985-86 to 1993-94. Pradip
Kapasi contributed from May, 1992, and has not stopped rolling out controversy
after controversy till today. That is 27 years of monthly contributions. Gautam
S Nayak joined as co-author in April, 1996 and is now an experienced
‘controversialist’ for 23 years. Their unbeaten partnership is perhaps the
longest under BCAJ! The authors have been bringing out a new controversy every
month, month after month. So far, they would have brought out a record 275
controversies. Bhadresh Doshi joined them in June, 2018.

This is not a digesting feature, but an
ANALYTICAL FEATURE. The process starts with identifying a suitable controversy
where there are two conflicting views on a legal issue which are not settled by
the Supreme Court. Currently forum based or subject based issues are covered.
Pradip Kapasi says: “The authors, in the initial years used to ‘conclude’ the
issue, under consideration, in the end which practice for long has been
substituted with the authors offering their comments in the form of
‘observations’ leaving the debate open for readers.”  

In the era of law driven by judgements,
the authors bring observations, record decisions, and also alternative
contentions that help resolve or reconcile controversies. In answer to the
question – what keeps them going – Pradipbhai said: “At an early age, the
feature taught that no view, even of the high court, is final and that there is
always another view which at times can be a better view.” Gautambhai answered
thus: “Writing this column is time consuming, but exhilarating, as one has to
consider all aspects of the issue thoroughly, while giving the observations.
After writing on an issue, one becomes completely aware of all the nuances of
the issue, as well as case laws on the subject, which definitely helps in one’s
practice, when one comes across similar issues.”

 

Book-Profit for payments to
partners –

Section 40(b)

 

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION


Section 40(b)
limits the deduction, in the hands of a firm, in respect of expenditure on
specified kinds of payments to partners. Clause(1) of section 40(b) prohibits
the deduction for payment of remuneration to a partner who is not a working
partner. Clause(2) provides that a deduction for payment of remuneration to a
working partner is allowed in accordance with the terms of the partnership
deed. Clause (5) has the effect of limiting the deduction for remuneration to
working partners, to the specified percentage of the “book-profit” of the firm.

 

“Remuneration”
includes any payment of salary, bonus, commission or remuneration by whatever
name called. The term “book-profit” is defined exhaustively by
Explanation 3 to section 40(b) which reads as under “Explanation 3-For the
purpose of this clause, ”book-profit” means the net profit, as shown in the
profit and loss account for the relevant previous year, computed in the manner
laid down in Chapter IV-D as increased by the aggregate amount of the
remuneration paid or payable to all the partners of the firm if such amount has
been deduced while computing the net profit”

 

‘Book-Profit’, as
per Explanation 3, means the net profit as per the profit and loss account of
the relevant year, computed in the manner laid down in Chapter IV-D. The
requirement to take net profit as shown in profit and loss account is quite
simple, but the requirement to compute the same in the manner laid down in
Chapter IV-D has been the subject matter of debate.

It is usual to
come across cases wherein the profit and loss account is credited with receipts
such as interest, rent, dividend, capital gains and such other income, which
may or may not have any relationship to the business of the firm. It is in such
cases that an issue arises while computing the Book-Profit of the firm, wherein
the firm is required to ascertain as to whether the interest and such other receipts
credited to profit and loss account are required to be excluded from the net
profit or not to arrive at the figure of the book-profit.

 

Conflicting
decisions of the high court are available on the subject of determination of
the book-profit for the purpose of section 40(b) of the Act. While the Calcutta
high court has favoured the acceptance of the net profit as per the profit and
loss account as representing the book-profit, the Rajasthan high court has
recently ordered for exclusion of such receipts from the net profit. 

 

MD SERAJUDDIN
& Bros.’ CASE


The issue arose
before the Calcutta High Court in the case of 
Md. Serajuddin & Bros. vs. CIT, 24 taxmann.com 46 (Cal.). In
that case, the assessee, a partnership firm, filed its return of income for the
relevant assessment years 1995-96 to 1998-99 by claiming deduction for
remuneration paid to partners which was calculated on the basis of the net
profit of the firm as per the profit & loss account of the year, which inter
alia
included the credits for consultancy fees, interest on bank deposits,
profit on disposal of assets and interest on advance tax, which had been shown
as income under the head ‘other sources’. The returned income was accepted by
the Assessing Officer on issue of the intimation u/s. 143(1)(a). Subsequently,
the AO held that the income by way of consultancy fees, interest on bank
deposit, profit on disposal of assets and interest on advance tax, which had
been shown as income under the head ‘other sources’, could not be considered as
part of the book profit for the purpose of computation of allowable partners’
remuneration. He recomputed the deduction for remuneration by reworking the
book profit and disallowed the excess remuneration by applying the provisions
of section 40(b) of the Act. The Commissioner (Appeals) rejected the appeal of
the assessee. On further appeal, the Tribunal, without giving any reasonable
opportunity to the assessee, dismissed the appeal.

 

The High Court
admitted the appeals of the assessee firm on the following substantial question
of law on the issue under consideration, besides a few other aspects of the
issue not germane for the discussion :-

“Whether and
in any event, on a proper construction of the provisions of Section 40(b)(v)
and explanation 3 thereto, book profit comprises the entire net profit as shown
in the profit and loss account or only profit and gains of business assessed
under Chapter IV-D?”

 

On behalf of
the assessee firm, it was highlighted that for the purpose of Explanation 3 to
section 40(b)(v), the appellant had taken into consideration its net profit as
shown in the profit and loss account, which included consultancy fees, interest
on bank and company deposits, profit on disposal of cars used in the business
and interest on refund of advance tax paid and other items of incomes, which
were shown in the return under heading ‘income from other sources’. In support
of its action, it was submitted that;

  •     the said Explanation 3 of section 40(b)(v)
    provides for taking the net profit as shown in the profit and loss account and
    not the profit computed under the head ‘profit and gains of business or
    profession’;
  •     unlike Explanation (baa) to section 80HHC
    and section 33AB, both of which mentioned profit as computed under the head
    ‘profit and gains of business or profession’, Explanation 3 to Section 40(b)(v)
    did not refer to any head of income and instead mentioned ‘net profit as shown
    in the profit and loss account’;
  •     had the intention been to restrict the
    deduction only to the profit computed under the head ‘profits and gains of
    business or profession’, the expression used in Explanation (baa) to section
    80HHC and section 33AB would have also found place in Explanation 3 to section
    40(b).
  •     that none of the sections 30 to 43D, of part
    IV –D, provided for exclusion of any item of income because it did not fall
    under the head of ‘profits and gains of business or profession’.
  •     the reasons for making the computation
    provisions of Chapter IV-D applicable for computing the book profit was only to
    ensure that all deductions had been allowed, as otherwise an assessee might
    compute the book profit at a higher figure and thereby claim a higher amount by
    way of remuneration for the purpose of deduction.
  •     the quantum of deduction in computing income
    under the head ‘profits and gains of business or profession’ ought be computed
    with reference to the income falling under all the heads of income, including
    the head ‘income from other sources’.
  •     the decision of the Supreme Court in case of
    Apollo Tyres Ltd. vs. CIT, 255 ITR 273 confirmed that the decision as to
    which item of income should be taken into account for computing the quantum of
    deduction, depended upon the language of the statutory provision allowing the
    deduction.

The Revenue, in
response, contended that the assessee himself had offered the receipts in
question under the head ‘income from other sources’; that from a plain reading
of section 40(b)(v) r.w. Explanation 3 thereto, it was manifestly clear that
the term ‘book profit’ meant only that net profit which was computed in the
manner laid down in Chapter IV-D of the Act, which chapter dealt only with the
profit and gains of business or profession, and did not include profits
chargeable under Chapter IV-F under the head ‘income from other sources’; that
in a taxing statue, the words of the statue were to be interpreted strictly;
that section 40(b)(v), Explanation 3 made it abundantly clear that the net
profit had to be computed in the manner laid down in Chapter IV-D and such
profit did not include profit referred to in Chapter IV-F of the Act.

 

The Calcutta
High Court, on due consideration of the rival contentions, held that chapter
IV-D nowhere provided that the method of accounting for the purpose of
ascertaining net profit should consider the income from business alone and not
from other sources; section 29 provided for the manner of computing the income
from profits and gains of business or profession which had to be done as
provided u/s. 30 to 43D; by virtue of section 5 of the said Act, the total
income of any previous year, included all income from whatever source derived;
for the purpose of section 40(b)(v) read with Explanation there could not be
separate method of accounting for ascertaining net profit and/or book-profit;
the said section nowhere provided that the net profit as shown in the profit
and loss account should be the profit computed under the head profits and gains
of business or profession, only.

 

The Calcutta
High Court, citing the following paragraphs from the decision of the Supreme
court in the case of Apollo Tyres Ltd.(supra) , observed that the said
decision provided for an appropriate guidance on the point as to what should be
done in order to ascertain the net profit in case of the nature before the
court.

 

“Sub-section
(1A) of section 115J does not empower the Assessing Officer to embark upon a
fresh inquiry in regard to the entries made in the books of account of the
company. The said sub-section, as a matter of fact, mandates the company to
maintain its account in accordance with the requirements of the Companies Act
which mandate, according to us, is bodily lifted from the Companies Act into
the Income-tax Act for the limited purpose of making the said account so
maintained as a basis for computing the company’s income for levy of
income-tax. Beyond that, we do not think that the said sub-section empowers the
authority under the Income-tax Act to probe into the accounts accepted by the
authorities under the Companies Act. If the statute mandates that income
prepared in accordance with the Companies Act shall be deemed income for the
purpose of section 115J of the Act, then it should be that income which is
acceptable to the authorities under the Companies Act. There cannot be two
incomes one for the purpose of the Companies Act and another for the purpose of
income-tax both maintained under the same Act. If the Legislature intended the
Assessing Officer to reassess the company’s income, then it would have stated
in section 115J that “income of the company as accepted by the Assessing
Officer”. In the absence of the same and on the language of section 115J,
it will have to held that view taken by the Tribunal is correct and the High
Court has erred in reversing the said view of the Tribunal.”

 

“The fact that it is shown under a
different head of income would not deprive the company of its benefit under
section 32AB so long as it is held that the investment in the units of the UTI
by the assessee-company is in the course of its “eligible business”.
Therefore, in our opinion, the dividend income earned by the assessee-company
from its investment in the UTI should be included in computing the profits of
eligible business under section 32AB of
the Act.”

 

Relying heavily
on the findings of the apex court, the Calcutta High Court held that once the
income from other sources was included in the profit and loss account, to
ascertain the net profit qua book-profit for computation of the
remuneration of the partners, the same could not be discarded for the purposes
of computing the deductible amount of remuneration to partners. The appeal of
the assessee firm was thus allowed and the orders of the lower authorities were
set aside.

 

ALLEN CAREER INSTITUTE’S CASE 


Recently, the
issue again arose before the Rajasthan High Court in the case of CIT vs.
Allen Career Institute. 94 taxmann.com 157
. In this case, the Rajasthan
High Court, admitting the Revenue’s appeals, framed the following substantial
questions of law:

 

“Whether
in the facts and circumstances of the case the ITAT is justified in considering
the interest as part of the book profit in contravention of Section 40(b) i.e
as per Section 40(b) the book profit has to be computed in the manner laid down
in Chapter-IV D?”

“Whether
the Tribunal was legally justified in deleting the disallowance of
Rs.2,30,00,796/- made on account of remuneration to partners by taking the
interest earned on FDRs as part of book profit and business income under
Section 28 specifically when it was “Income from other sources” and
contrary to Section 40(b), Explanation 3 and Section 40(b) (v) (2)?”

 

On behalf of
the Revenue it was contended that Chapter IV-D, consisting of section 28 to 44,
provided for computation of the income under the head profits and gains of
business or profession; that the investment in the FDRs was not made as a
business necessity, without which the business of the assessee could not be
run, and, in fact, the FDRs were made out of the surplus funds available with
the assessee, and the income from bank FDRs could not be said to be business
income and was to be treated as income from other sources.

 

On behalf of
the assessee, it was contended that the interest income from the FDRs, credited
to the profit & loss account, should not be excluded from the net profit
for the purposes of determining the quantum of deduction in respect of the
payment of remuneration to the partners while applying the provisions of
section 40(b). Reliance was placed on the decisions in the case of CIT vs.
J.J. Industries, 358 ITR 531 (Guj.)
and Md. Serajuddin & Bros. vs.
CIT, (supra)
and Apollo Tyres Ltd. vs. CIT(supra). In addition, the
decision in the case of CIT vs. Hycron India Ltd. 308 ITR 251 (Raj.),
was relied upon to contend that the expression “profits and gains” as
used in section 2(24), had a wider expression, and was not confined to
“profits and gains of business or profession”. Further, the language
of section 10B, again, provides for exemption, with respect to any
“profits and gains” derived by the assessee, and was not confined to
“profits and gains of business and profession” as provided u/s. IV-D.
That ‘profit’ was an elastic and ambiguous word, often properly used in more
than one sense; its meaning in a written instrument was governed by the
intention of the parties appearing therein, but any accurate definition thereof
must always include, the element of gain. The meaning of word “gain”
has been given as acquisition, and has no other meaning. Gain was something
obtained or acquired, and was not limited to pecuniary gain. The word
“profit”, as ordinarily used, means the gain made upon any business
or investment. “Profits” is capable of numerous constructions, and
for any given use, its meaning must be derived from the context. In addition,
it was contended that had the intention been to limit the scope of the term
‘profit’ to the income determined under the head profits and gains of business
or profession, then it would have been so done as was done in the case of
section 115J of the Act.

 

The Rajasthan
High Court rejected the contentions of the assesse made in support of inclusion
of the income from interest and other sources for the purposes of computing the
quantum of the deduction in respect of the remuneration paid to partners,
holding that the interest and other income taxable under the head ‘income from
other sources’ was not to form part of the book profits for the purposes of section
40(b) of the Act, and was therefore required to be excluded from the net profit
as per the profit & loss account.

 

OBSERVATIONS


Section 14
requires the total income to be classified into five different heads of income
for the purpose of charge of income tax. Subject to such classification, the
total income of an assessee remains unchanged. The charge of the tax is on the
total income of the firm, and is not changed on account of its classification
into different heads of income.

 

There are
several provisions in the Income Tax Act, for grant of relief or otherwise,
where the legislature has used such language that expressly refers to the
income computed under the head ‘profits and gains from business and
profession’. For example, the benefit of deduction u/s. 10B is not restricted
to the income computed under the head ‘profits and gains from business and
profession’ but is allowed in respect of the ‘profits and gains’. Again,
section 115JB deals with the profit and loss account of an assessee in its entirety,
and covers the profit of the company as shown by the profit and loss account,
without restricting the same to the income of business. Explanation 3 also
employs a similar terminology while defining the term “book-profit” to mean the
net profit as shown in the profit and loss account for the relevant previous
year. In contrast, the provisions of section 33AB and section 80 HHC restrict
the relief to profits computed under the head ‘profits and gains of business or
profession’.

The use of the
words “computed in the manner laid down in Chapter IV-D” in Explanation
3 that follows the words ‘net profit, as per profit & loss account for
the relevant previous year
’ may not presently change the amount of net
profit for the following reasons;

 

  •     Unlike adjustments to book-profit required
    to be made u/s. 115JB for MAT, no specific guidelines are provided in section
    40(b) for adjusting the net profit. Reference may also be made to provisions of
    section 33AB and section 80HHC, which expressly provide for restricting the
    relief to profits computed under the head ‘profits and gains of business or
    profession’ .
  •     Chapter IV-D by itself cannot be considered
    to provide any help in the matter of computation of book profit. Any attempt to
    compute the book profit by applying all and sundry provisions of Chapter IV-D
    would lead to a “book-profit” that would be devoid of any reality and may
    result in allowing remuneration in excess of even the net profit of the firm.
  •     Explanation 3 requires the net profit to be
    increased by the amount of remuneration paid to partners of the firm. This
    specific requirement is an example of an adjustment expressly provided by the
    legislature to the net profit for quantification of the remuneration payable.
  •     Needless to say that any attempt to exclude
    certain receipts from net profit will have to be followed by the exclusion of
    the expenditure incurred for earning such income. Such an exercise may be
    extremely difficult and if attempted, may reflect inaccurate results.

 

None of the provisions for allowing deduction u/s.
30 to 43D of Chapter IV-D contains a provision that restricts the deduction
thereunder to the profits computed under the head ‘profits and gains of
business or profession’. There cannot be a separate method of accounting for
ascertaining net profit/book-profit and therefore, any income, if credited to
profit and loss account, should be eligible to be classified as book profit.



Ordinarily
unless otherwise provided, an income, even though computed under the different
heads of income, would not cease to be the income of the business more so where
the objective of the assessee such as a firm or company is to carry on business
for the entity.

 

The issue under
consideration has also been addressed by the Gujarat High Court in the case of CIT
vs. J.J.Industries, (supra),
wherein the court allowed the deduction of
remuneration to partners calculated on net profit that included receipts of
interest and a few other items taxed under the head ‘ income from other
sources’.

 

The term
“profits and gains” used in section 2(24), clause(i) is wide enough to include
all the receipts of an assessee firm, and its scope need not be restricted to
the ‘profits and gains of business or profession’. Profit is an ambivalent and
multi-faceted term which connotes different meanings at different times and in
different contexts. The Supreme Court, in the case of Apollo Tyres Ltd.
(supra)
, clarified that the true meaning of the ‘profit’ should be gathered
with reference to the intention of the legislature in enacting the particular
provision. Any attempt to ascribe a general and all purpose meaning to the term
“profit” should be avoided and only such a meaning that fits into the context
should be supplied. The Rajasthan high court in fact, in the case of Hycron
India Ltd (supra)
, in a different context, has held that the term ‘profits
and gains’ need not necessarily be confined to ‘profits and gains of business
or profession’.

 

Attention is
invited to the decisions of the Jaipur bench of the tribunal in the case of S.P.
Equipment & Services 36 SOT 325, and Allen Career Institution 37 DTR 379

and the Madras High Court in the case of Sri Venkateshwara Photo Studio,
33 taxmann.com 360 and the Rajkot Bench in the case of Sheth
Brothers, 99 TTJ189 and the Mumbai Bench in the case of Suresh A. Shroff &
Co., 27 taxmann.com 291,
all of which have held that, for the purpose of
computing the deduction for payment of remuneration to partners in the hands of
the firm, the items of income credited to the profit & loss account should
not be excluded, even where such items have otherwise been taxed under the head
‘income from other sources’.

 

The better view
therefore is the one propounded by the Calcutta & the Gujarat High Courts
that takes into consideration the larger meaning of the ‘profits & gains’
which fits into the context of section 40(b) and takes into consideration the
method of accounting employed by the firm for determining the net profit of the
firm.

 

The case for
inclusion of interest and such other receipts in the book profit is stronger in
cases where such receipts have been taxed under the head ‘profits and gains of
business or profession’. In such cases, there should not be any opposition from
the AO, who has otherwise accepted the character of such receipts as a business
income and assessed and brought to tax such receipts under the head ‘profits
and gains from business and profession’.

 

There is no
leakage or very little leakage of revenue in the whole exercise, in as much as
what is allowed in the hands of the firm is taxed in the hands of the partners.
Further what is disallowed in the hands of the firm is to be excluded from the
income of the partners.
All of this is made clear by the express provisions of section28(v) of the Act.

Taxability of interest of NPAs in case of NBFCs

The column “Closements” commenced in
May, 1981, with Rajan Vora as the initial contributor who carried it till
1990-91. From August, 1988, Kishor Karia became a co-contributor to
“Closements”, and he continues to contribute 31 years later. R P Chitale had
joined in from 1990-91 to 2007-08. Atul Jasani joined the panel of contributors
from July 2008 and continues till date.

This
column covers a Supreme Court decision and provides an in-depth analysis and
implications.

 

Taxability of interest of NPAs in case of NBFCs


Introduction


1.1     In case of an assessee following Mercantile
System of Accounting [i.e. accrual basis of accounting], the taxability of
interest on ‘sticky loans’ or ‘doubtful advances’, not recognised as revenue in
the books of account , has been a matter of debate and litigation under the
Income-tax Act [ the Act] for a long time under different circumstances/
scenario.

 

1.2     In case of Banks, Non-Banking Financial
companies [NBFCs] etc., which are also engaged in the business of lending
money, the accounting treatment of Non-Performing Assets [NPAs] and interest
thereon is governed by the norms set by the Reserve Bank of India [RBI- RBI
norms]. Under such norms, such entities are required to make provisions for
NPAs and are also mandated to not to recognise the interest on such NPAs as
revenue in the accounts.

 

1.3     Subject to specific provisions in the Act,
the provision for such NPAs is not deductible in computing income under the
head “Profits and gains of business or profession’ [Business Income] in case of
such entities as held by the Apex Court in the case of Southern Technology
Ltd [(2010)- 320 ITR 577]
– Southern Technology’s case. However, the
taxability of interest on such NPAs not recognised as revenue in the accounts
as per the RBI norms in case of NBFCs [which are not covered by section 43D]
has been a matter of debate and litigation as the same are not protected by the
provisions of section  43D of the Act
[applicable to Banks, Public Financial Institutions, Housing Finance Public
Companies etc] which effectively provides that such interest is taxable either
in the year of recognition in the accounts or in the year of actual receipt,
whichever is earlier. Co-operative Banks [ except in specified cases] are also
now covered within the scope of Sec 43D from assessment year 2018-19. The
Revenue, usually takes the view that such interest is taxable under the
Mercantile System of Accounting [Mercantile System] as income having accrued in
the relevant year on time basis, notwithstanding the fact that the principal
amount of loan itself is doubtful of recovery [i.e. NPA] and the NBFCs are
mandatorily required not to recognise such interest as revenue in the accounts
under the RBI norms. The Delhi High Court in the case of Vasisth Chay Vyapar
Ltd
has taken a favourable view on this issue and similar view is also
taken in other cases by the High Courts [Mahila Seva Sahakari Bank Ltd
(2007) 395 ITR 324(Guj), Brahmaputra Capital & financial Services Ltd
(2011) 335 ITR 182 (Del)
, etc]. However, the Revenue is contesting this
view.

 

1.4     The issue referred to in para 1.3 above had
come-up before the Apex Court in the context of Delhi High Court judgment
referred to in para 1.3 above and other appeals filed by the Revenue involving
the similar issue and the issue is now decided by the Apex Court and therefore,
it is thought fit to consider the same in this column.

 

CIT
vs. Vasisth Chay Vyapar Ltd [(2011) 330 ITR 440 (Del)]


2.1     Before the Delhi High Court, various
appeals pertaining to different assessment years of the same assessee had
come-up involving common issue. In the above case, the assessee company was
NBFC and accordingly, was governed by the Directions of the RBI and was
required to follow the RBI norms.

 

2.2     In the above case, the brief facts were:
the assessee had advanced Inter Corporate Deposit (ICD) to Shaw Wallace Company
(SWC) and on account of default of the payment of interest by SWC, under the
RBI norms, the ICD had become NPA and was accordingly, treated as such by the
assessee. The interest income on the ICD was recognised on accrual basis and
offered to tax for the assessment years 1995-96, 1996-97. For the subsequent
years, the interest income on ICD was not recognised under the RBI norms and
the same was also not offered to tax. Factually, the interest on the ICD was
also not received until the assessment year 2006-07. The SWC was passing
through adverse financial crisis and winding up petitions were also pending
against the SWC in the court. As such, the recovery of the amount of ICD itself
was uncertain and substantially doubtful.

 

2.2.1   On the above facts, the Assessing Officer
(AO) took the view that the interest on ICD had accrued to the assessee under
the Mercantile System and accordingly, added to the income of the assessee. The
first Appellant Authority also affirmed the order of the AO. For this, the
Revenue held the view that: the provisions of the RBI Act, 1934 (RBI Act) read
with the NBFCs Prudential Norms. (Reserve Bank) Directions, 1998 (RBI norms)
can not override the provisions of the Act under which the amount of interest
was taxable as accrued under the Mercantile System and is accordingly, taxable
u/s. 5 of the Act; and as such, the interest in question is taxable in
respective years. When the matter came-up before the Tribunal, the view was
taken that the provisions of
section 45Q of the RBI Act overrides the provisions of the Income-tax Act and
the action of the assessee not recognising income from ICD, following RBI
norms, was correct and in accordance with the law.  Accordingly, the Tribunal held that in terms of
section  145 of the
Act, no addition could be made in respect of such unrealised interest on the
ICD which was admittedly NPA.



2.3     Under the above mentioned circumstances,
the issue came-up before the Delhi High Court at the instance of the Revenue
viz. ‘whether the Tribunal erred in law and on the merits by deleting the
addition of income made as interest earned on the loan advanced to SWC by
considering the interest as doubtful and unrealisable.

 

2.3.1   On behalf of the Revenue, the views held by
the Revenue [referred to in para 2.2.1] was reiterated. It was also contended
that the liability under the Act is governed by the provisions of the Act and
merely because for accounting purposes, the assessee had to follow  the RBI norms, it would not mean that the
assessee was not liable to show the interest income which had accrued to the
assessee under the Mercantile System and was exigible to tax under the Act. For
this, the reliance was placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in Southern
Technology’s case (supra)
which, according to the Revenue, supports this
position.

 

2.3.2   On the other hand, on
behalf of the assessee, it was, inter-alia, contended that: as per the
provisions of
section 45Q of the RBI Act
[which has non-obstante clause], interest income on such NPA is required to be
recognised as per the RBI norms and as held by the Apex Court in TRO vs
Custodian, Special Court Act. 1992 [(2007) 293 ITR 369
] where an Act makes
provision with non-obstante clause that would override the provisions of all
other Acts; the chargeable Business Income has to be determined as per the
method of accounting consistently followed by the assessee; as per the relevant
provisions of Companies Act, as well as
section 145 of the Act, it was incumbent upon the assessee to confirm to the
mandatory accounting method and follow those standards; the system of
accounting consistently followed by the assessee was in conformity with those
accounting standards which, inter-alia, provided not to recognise
interest on such NPA, in view of the uncertainty of ultimate collection due to
tight and precarious financial position of the borrower [i.e. SWC]. For this,
specific reference was also made to the Accounting Standard 9 [AS 9] issued by
the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India [ICAI]. Relying on certain
judgments of different High Courts [such as Elgi Finance Ltd [(2017) 293 ITR
357(Mad)
etc], it was also further contended that the courts have held that
even under the Mercantile System, it is illusionary to take credit for interest
where the principal itself is doubtful of recovery. It is further contended
that the courts have also recognised the theory of ‘real income’ and held that
notwithstanding that the assessee may be following Mercantile System, the
assessee could only be taxed on ’real income’ and not on any
hypothetical/illusionary income. For this, reference was made to the judgments
of the Apex Court in the cases of UCO Bank [(1999) 237 ITR 889], Shoorji
Vallabhdas & Co [(1962) 46 ITR 144]
and Godhra Electricity Co Ltd
[(1997) 225 ITR 746]
. It was also pointed out that relying on this ‘real
income’ theory, the Delhi High Court has also held that interest on sticky
loans, where recovery of the principal was doubtful, could not be said to have
accrued even under the Mercantile System and accordingly, such notional
interest could not be taxed as income of the assessee. For this, reference was
made to the two judgments of the Delhi High Court viz. Goyal M. G, Gases (P)
Ltd [(2008) 303 ITR 159]
and Eicher Ltd [(2010) 320 ITR 410]



2.4     After noting the facts of the case and
contentions raised on behalf of both the sides, the Court proceeded to decide
the issue. For this purpose, the Court first referred to the provisions of
section 45Q of the RBI Act [under the caption ‘Chapter III- B to override other
laws’] which effectively provides that the provisions of Chapter III-B shall
have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any
other law for the time being in force or any instrument having effect by virtue
of any such law. The Court then also noted as under (pg 448):

 

“It is not
in dispute that on the application of the aforesaid provisions of the RBI and
the directions, the ICD advanced to M/s. Shaw Wallace by the assessee herein
had become NPA. It is also not in dispute that the assessee–company being NBFC
is bound by the aforesaid provisions. Therefore, under the aforesaid provisions,
it was mandatory on the part of the assessee not to recognize the interest on
the ICD as income having regard to the recognized accounting principles. The
accounting principles which the assessee is indubitably bound to follow are
AS-9……”

 

2.4.1   The Court also noted the provisions of AS 9
contained in para 9 dealing with effect of uncertainty on revenue recognition.

 

2.4.2   The Court then noted that in the above
scenario, it has to examine the strength in the submission made on behalf of
the Revenue that whether it can still be held that the income in the form of
interest though not received had still accrued to the assessee under the
provisions of the Act and was therefore exigible to tax.

 

2.4.3   In the above background, the Court decided
to first consider the issue of taxability in the context of the Act and for
that purpose to examine whether, under the given circumstances, interest on ICD
has accrued to the assessee. In this context, after referring to the factual
position with regard to the ICD [referred to in para 2.2 above], the Court,
concluded as under (pg 449):

 

“…These
circumstances, led to an uncertainty in so far as recovery of interest was
concerned, as a result of the aforesaid precarious financial position of Shaw
Wallace. What to talk of interest, even the principal amount itself had become
doubtful to recover. In this scenario it was legitimate move to infer that
interest income thereupon has not “accrued”. We are in agreement with the
submission of Mr. Vohra on this count, supported by various decisions of
different High Courts including this court which has already been referred to
above.”

 

2.4.4   Having considered the position with regard
to accrual of interest under the Act as above, the Court further explained the
effect of RBI norms as under (pg 449):

 

 ” In the instant case, the assessee-company
being NBFC is governed by the provisions of the RBI Act. In such a case,
interest income cannot be said to have accrued to the assessee having regard to
the provisions of section 45Q of the RBI Act and Prudential Norms issued by the
RBI in exercise of its statutory powers. As per these norms, the ICD had become
NPA and on such NPA where the interest was not received and possibility of
recovery was almost nil, it could not be treated to have been accrued in favour
of the assessee.”

 

2.4.5 The
Court then noted the argument raised on behalf of the Revenue that the case of
the assessee was to be dealt with for the purpose of taxability under the
provisions of the Act and not under the RBI Act, which was concerned with the
accounting method that the assessee was supposed to follow and in that respect,
the reliance placed by the Revenue on the judgment of the Apex Court in Southern
Technology’s case (supra).
In this context, the Court noted that, no doubt,
in the first blush, that judgment gives an indication that the Apex Court has
held that the RBI Act does not override the provisions of the Act. However, on
a closure examination in the context in which the issue had arisen before the
Apex Court and certain observations of the Apex Court in that case, shows that
this proposition advanced on behalf of the Revenue may not be entirely correct.
In that case, primarily the Apex Court was dealing with the issue of
deductibility of provisions for NPA as bad debt u/s. 37 (1)(vii) of the Act and
many of the observations of the Apex Court should be read in that context.
However, in that case itself, the Apex Court has made a distinction with regard
to ‘income recognition’ and held that income had to be recognized in terms of
RBI norms, even though the same deviated from Mercantile System and/or section
145 of the Act. In this context, the Court, inter-alia, noted the following
observations of the Apex Court in that case (pgs 451/452):   

 

“At the
outset, we may state that the in essence RBI Directions 1998 are
prudential/provisioning norms issued by the RBI under Chapter III-B of the RBI
Act, 1934. These norms deal essentially with income recognition. They force the
NBFCs to disclose the amount of NPA in their financial accounts. They force the
NBFCs to reflect ‘true and correct’ profits. By virtue of section 45Q, an
overriding effect is given to the Directions 1998 vis-à-vis ‘income
recognition’ principles in the Companies Act, 1956. These Directions constitute
a code by itself. However, these Directions 1998 and the Income-tax Act operate
in different areas. These Directions 1998 have nothing to do with computation
of taxable income. These Directions cannot overrule the ‘permissible
deductions’ or ‘their exclusion’ under the Income-tax Act. The inconsistency
between these Directions and Companies Act is only in the matter of income
recognition and presentation of financial statements. The accounting policies
adopted by an NBFC cannot determine the taxable income. It is well settled that
the accounting policies followed by a company can be changed unless the
Assessing Officer comes to the conclusion that such change would result in
understatement of profits. However, here is the case where the Assessing
Officer has to follow the RBI Directions 1998 in view of section 45Q of the RBI
Act. Hence, as far as income recognition is concerned, section 145 of the
Income-tax Act has no role to play in the present dispute. “

 

2.4.6   After referring to the above referred
observations of the Apex Court in Southern Technology’s case (supra) and
deciding the issue in favour of the assessee, the Court further stated as under
(pg 452):

 

“We have also noticed the other line of cases wherein the Supreme Court
itself has held that when there is a provision in other enactment which
contains a non obstante clause, that would override the provisions of the
Income-tax Act. TRO v. Custodian, Special Court Act, 1992 [2007] 293 ITR 369
(SC) is one such case apart from other cases of different High Courts. When the
judgment of the Supreme Court in Southern Technology  [2010] 320 ITR 577 is read in manner we have
read, it becomes easy to reconcile the ratio of Southern Technology  with TRO v. Custodian, Special Court Act,
[1992] [2007] 293 ITR 369 (SC). Thus viewed from any angle, the decision of the
Tribunal appears to be correct in law. The question of law is thus decided
against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee.  As a result, all these appeals are
dismissed.”

 

CIT vs. Vasistha Chay Vyapar Ltd – [(2019) 410 ITR
244 (SC)]


3.1      At the instance of the Revenue, the above
judgment of the Delhi High Court came up for consideration before the Apex
Court [being Civil Appeal No 5811 of 2012]. Many other appeals [such as appeal
in the Mahila Seva Sahakari Bank Ltd [(2017) 395 ITR 324 (Guj), Brahmaputra
Capital & Financial Services Ltd (2011)335 ITR 182 (Del)
, etc]
involving similar issue filed by the Revenue were also simultaneously  dealt with by the Apex Court while deciding
this common issue.

 

3.2      Having considered the judgments under
appeal, the Apex Court, agreed with the same and held as under (pg 246):

 

” Having
gone through the impugned judgment in the aforesaid appeals, we are of the view
that the consideration of the question has been given a full and meaningful reasoning
and we agree with the same.

 As a result, all the aforesaid appeals are
dismissed. . . .”

 

Conclusion.


4.1       In view of the above judgment of the
Apex Court, affirming the judgment of Delhi High Court referred to in para 2
above and other similar judgments involving the same issue, the position is now
settled that interest on NPAs not recognised in the accounts following the RBI
norms cannot be taxed on the ground that the assessee is following Mercantile
System of accounting. The judgment also clearly supports the view that under
such circumstances, interest of NPAs cannot be said to have accrued and
accordingly, can not taxed by invoking the provisions of section 5 of the Act.

 

4.1.1    Apart from this, the judgment of Delhi High
Court referred to in para 2 above having been affirmed and in that judgment,
relying on the observations of the Apex Court in Southern Technology’s case
[referred to in para 2.4.5 read with the observations referred to para 2.4.6],
the Delhi High Court has, effectively, expressed the view that the provisions
of section 45Q of the RBI Act and the RBI norms override the provisions of the
Act in this respect, and therefore also, such interest on NPA is not taxable
under the Act. In this context, the subsequent judgment of the Punjab &
Haryana High Court in the case of Ludhiana Central Co-op Bank Ltd [(2009)410
ITR 72]
is also useful in which the High Court, after considering these
judgments, has clearly taken a view that section  45Q of the RBI Act has overriding effect and therefore,
such interest cannot be held to have accrued under the Act.

 

4.1.2 In
cases not governed by the RBI norms also, the observations in the Delhi High
Court judgment [referred to in para 2.4.3 above] should be useful  in cases of interest on ‘sticky loans’ not
recognised in accounts, if the principle amount of loan itself is genuinely
doubtful of recovery, particularly due to precarious financial condition of the
borrower.

 

Effect of ICDS


4.2     From the Asst. Year. 2017-18, Business
income and ‘Income from Other Sources’ [Other Income] is required to be
computed in accordance with the provisions made in Income Computation and
Disclosure Standards [ICDS] notified u/s. 145 (2) of the Act. ICDS IV [Revenue
Recognition] also deals with recognition of interest as revenue in para 8. In
this context, answer to question no 13, given in Circular No 10/2017, dtd
23/3/2017 issued  by the CBDT is worth
noting and the same is reproduced hereunder: 

 

Question 13:
The condition of reasonable certainty of ultimate collection is not laid down
for taxation of interest, royalty and dividend. Whether the taxpayer is obliged
to account for such income even when the collection thereof is uncertain?

 

Answer: As
a principle, interest accrues on time basis and royalty accrues on the basis of
contractual terms. Subsequent non recovery in either cases can be claimed as
deduction in view of amendment to Section 36 (1) (vii). Further, the provision
of the Act (e.g. Section 43D) shall prevail over the provisions of ICDS.

 

4.2.1  The validity of some of the provisions of
different ICDS was challenged before the Delhi High Court in the case of Chamber
of Tax Consultants vs. UOI [(2018) 400 ITR 178
– CTC’s case]. Many of these
provisions of ICDS were held to be ultra vires the Act by the High
Court. Most of these invalidated provisions have been re-validated with
retrospective effect by various amendments made by the Finance Act, 2018 with
which we are not concerned in this write-up.

 

4.2.2 One
of the items under challenge before the Delhi Court in CTC’s case (supra)
was para 8.1 of the ICDS IV [Revenue Recognition] which provides that interest
shall accrue on time basis to be determined in the specified manner. The main
contention against this provisions was that in case of NBFCs also the interest
would become taxable on this accrual basis, even though such interest is not
recoverable [i.e. because of NPA status of the loan]. The deduction, if any, in
respect of the same can be claimed only u/s. 36(1)(vii) in respect of such
interest [which become the debt] as bad debt in the year in which the amount of
such debt or part thereof becomes irrecoverable without recording the same in
the books
of account.

 

4.2.3 In
the above context, the counter affidavit filed by the Revenue was as follows
(pgs 211/212):

 

“The
petitioners completely ignore the fact that this very provision of the ICDS
have been given approval by the highest legislative body, i.e., Parliament by
making an amendment to section 36(1)(vii) of the Act with effect from April 1,
2016 by Finance Act, 2015. The petitioners for furthering their point have
erroneously mentioned that the second proviso to section 36(1)(vii) casts an
additional burden on the assessee to prove that the debt is established to have
become due. In fact, a provision which is for the benefit of the assessees is
being projected to be a provision which is against the interests of
the assessee.

 

The ICDS
does not in any way wish to alter the well laid down principles of real income
by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, but is actually ensuring that there is a trace
available of the income which is foregone on this concept. Therefore, if there
is an interest income which is not likely to be realized is written off by the
assessee in the very same year immediately on its recognition (and even without
passing through its books), then it would be first recognised as revenue and
then allowed as a deduction under section 36(1)(vii) of the Act, including in
the case of NBFCs. However, in this process, the tax Department would have
information about the income which is so written off and keep a track of the
said sum then realised. Therefore, there is no enlargement of scope of income
or any deviation from the principles laid down by the hon’ble Supreme Court.”

 

4.2.4 In
view of the above, the Delhi High Court in CTC’s case (supra), while
rejecting the contention raised on behalf of the Petitioner, concluded as under
on this issue (pg 212) :

 

“Since
there is no challenge to section 36(1)(vii), para 8(1) of ICDS IV cannot be
held to be ultra vires the Act. This is to create a mechanism of tracking
unrecognized interest amounts for future taxability, if so accrued. In fact the
practice of moving debts which the bank or NBFC considers irrecoverable to a
suspense account is a practice which makes the organizations lose track of the
same. The justification by the respondent clearly demonstrates that this is a
matter of a larger policy and has the backing of Parliament with the enactment
of section 36(1)(vii). The reasoning given by the respondent stands to logic.
It has not been demonstrated by the petitioner that para 8(1) of ICDS IV is
contrary to any judgment of the Supreme Court, or any other court.”

 

4.2.5   Since the Delhi High Court in CTC’s case (supra)  accepted the justification of the Revenue,
more so due to amendment made in the provisions of section 36(1)(vii), the High
Court took the view that para 8.1 of ICDS IV cannot be held to be ultra vires
the Act and it has not been demonstrated by the Petitioners that para 8.1 of
ICDS IV is contrary to any judgment of the Apex Court, or any other court. In
view of this, there is no amendment in the Act in this respect and accordingly,
interest income should continue to be governed by this provision of the ICDS.

 

4.2.6 In view of the judgment of
the Apex Court [referred to in para 3 above] affirming the judgment of the
Delhi High Court [referred to in para 2 above], it is worth exploring to raise
a contention that the said para 8.1 of ICDS is now contrary to the judgment of
the Apex Court. Apart from this, such interest on NPAs cannot be regarded as
accrued as held by the Apex Court and therefore, such interest cannot be
treated as accrued on time basis as contemplated in the ICDS and cannot be
taxed. Additionally, such interest, arguably, can not be taxed also on the
ground that the provisions of RBI Act[ read with RBI norms]overrides the
provisions of the Act as mentioned in para 4.1.1 above.  Also due to the fact that the counter affidavit
of the Revenue before the Delhi High Court in CTC’s case (supra)
[referred to in para 4.2.3 above] specifically states that ICDS does not in any
way wish to alter the well laid down principles of real income by the Apex
Court, but is actually ensuring that there is a trace available of the income,
which is foregone in this concept, arguably, applying the real income theory,
such interest income should also not be considered as taxable.  This contention should also be available to
the cases referred to in para 4.1.2 above.It may also be noted that, in cases
where interest income is assessable as Other Income, there is no specific
provision to claim deduction of income assessed under ICDS on time basis when
it becomes irrecoverable and this fact has not been considered by the Delhi
High Court in CTC’s case (supra) while dealing with the issue relating
to the said para 8.1 of ICDS IV.
 

Section 92C: Transfer pricing – Notional interest on Redemption of preference shares money paid to Associated enterprises- transfer pricing adjustments by re-characterising was held to be not legal Corporate guarantee commission – No comparison can be made between guarantees issued by commercial banks as against a corporate guarantee issued by a holding company for benefit of its AE

18. 
CIT-6 vs. Aegis Limited [Income tax Appeal no 1248 of 2016 , Dated: 28th
January, 2019 (Bombay High Court)]. 

[Aegis Limited vs. ACIT-5(1); dated
27/07/2015; ITA. No 1213/Mum/2014, AY: 2009-10; Bench : K, Mum.  ITAT ]

 

Section 92C: Transfer pricing – Notional
interest on Redemption of preference shares 
money paid to Associated enterprises- transfer pricing adjustments by
re-characterising was held to be not legal

 

Corporate guarantee commission – No
comparison can be made between guarantees issued by commercial banks as against
a corporate guarantee issued by a holding company for benefit of its AE

 

The assessee subscribed to redeemable
preference shares of its AE and also redeemed some of these shares at par. The
assessee’s case had been that subscription of preference shares does not impact
profit & loss account or taxable income or any corresponding expense
resulting into deduction in the hands of the assessee. Redemption of preference
shares at par represents an uncontrolled price for shares, based on a
comparison with such uncontrolled transaction price and, therefore, such
redemption of preference share should be considered at arms length from Indian
transfer pricing prospective.

 

During the course of transfer pricing
proceedings, the TPO observed that the preference shares are equivalent to
interest free loan and in an uncontrolled third party scenario, interest would
be charged on such an amount, as these are not in the nature of business
advances. After making reference to FINMMDA guidelines and conducting enquires
from CRISIL u/s. 133(6), he assumed the credit ratings of the AE to be BBB(-)
and on the basis of bond rate information obtained from CRISIL, he determined
the rate of interest at 15.41% and computed the adjustment of Rs. 59,90,19,794/.
The DRP agreed that the TPO’s re-characterisations approach into loan and
charging of interest thereon is correct. However, they did not agree with the
TPO’s approach of imputing the interest using credit rating and Indian bond
yield. They instead directed the Assessing Officer to charge interest rate as
charged by the assessee which was at 13.78% and thereby also directed to add
markup of 1.65%, for risks. They directed the adjustment to made
accordingly. 

 

Being aggrieved
with the DRP order, the assessee filed an appeal to the ITAT. The Tribunal find
that the TPO /Assessing Officer cannot disregarded any apparent transaction and
substitute it, without any material of exception circumstance highlighting that
assessee has tried to conceal the real transaction or some sham transaction has
been unearthed. The TPO cannot question the commercial expediency of the
transaction entered into by the assessee unless there are evidence and
circumstances to doubt. Here it is a case of investment in shares and it cannot
be given different colour so as to expand the scope of transfer pricing
adjustments by re-characterising it as interest free loan. Now, whether in a
third party scenario, if an independent enterprise subscribes to a share, can
it be characterise as loan. If not, then this transaction also cannot be
inferred as loan. The Co-ordinate Benches of the Tribunal have been
consistently holding that subscription of shares cannot be characterises as
loan and therefore no interest should be imputed by treating it as a loan.
Accordingly, the adjustment of interest made by the A.O was deleted.

 

Being aggrieved
with the ITAT order, the revenue filed an appeal to the High Court. The Court
observed  that, we are broadly in
agreement with the view of the Tribunal. The facts on record would suggest that
the assessee had entered into a transaction of purchase and sale of shares of
an AE. Nothing is brought on record by the Revenue to suggest that the transaction
was sham.

 

In absence of any
material on record, the TPO could not have treated such transaction as a loan
and charged interest thereon on notional basis. Accordingly this ground was
dismissed. Next Ground is adjustment made by TPO in connection with the
corporate guarantee given by the assessee in favour of its AE.

 

The Tribunal
restricted subject addition to 1% guarantee commission relying upon other
decisions of the Tribunal along similar lines. The TPO had, however, added 5%
by way of commission. Being aggrieved with
the ITAT order, the revenue filed an appeal to the High Court. The Court relied
on the judgment of this Court in the case of Commissioner of Income-tax,
Mumbai v. Everest Kento Cylinders Ltd. [2015] 58 taxmann.com 254
wherein it
has been held  that there is a
substantial difference between a bank guarantee and a corporate guarantee.

 

The ITAT
observed  that, the Tribunal applied a
lower percentage of commission in the present case considering that, what the
assessee had provided was a corporate guarantee and not a bank guarantee. The
Revenue appeal was dismissed.
 

 

Section 37(1) : Business expenditure–Capital or revenue-Non-compete fee –Allowable as revenue expenditure

17. 
Pr CIT-3 vs. Six Sigma Gases India Pvt. Ltd [ ITA no 1259 of 2016 Dated:
28th January, 2019 (Bombay High Court)]. 

[Six Sigma Gases India Pvt. Ltd vs..
ACIT-3(3); dated 09/09/2015 ; AY: 
2006-07  ITA. No 3441/Mum/2012,
Bench : E ; Mum.  ITAT ]

 

Section 37(1) : Business
expenditure–Capital or revenue-Non-compete fee –Allowable as revenue
expenditure

 

The assessee is a Private Limited
Company. During the year the assessee had entered into a non-compete agreement
with the original promoter of the Company under which in lieu of payment of
Rs.2.06 crore (rounded off), the promoter would not engage himself in the same
business for a period of five years. Incidentally, the business of the company
was of manufacture of oxygen gases.




The A.O did not
allow the entire expenditure as claimed by the assessee but treated it as
differed revenue expenditure to be spanned over five years period. By the
impugned order, the CIT(A) confirmed the action of the AO.

 

Being aggrieved
with the CIT (A) order, the assessee filed an appeal to the Tribunal. The
Tribunal by the impugned judgment held in favour of the assessee relying upon
and referring to the decision of this Court in the case of The CIT-1,
Mumbai vs. Everest Advertising Pvt. Ltd., Mumbai dated 14th December, 2012
rendered in Income Tax Appeal No. 6539 of 2010
wherein the Hon’ble
High Court has held that “…..the object of making payment was to derive an
advantage by eliminating the competition over a period of three years and the
said period cannot be considered as sufficiently long period so as to ward off
competition from Mr. Kapadia for a long time in future or forever so as to hold
that benefit of enduring nature is received from such payment. The Tribunal has
recorded a finding that exit of Mr. Kapadia would have immediate impact on the
business of the assessee-company and in order to protect the business interest
the assessee had paid the said amount to ward off the competition…..”

 

The Revenue
argued that, under the agreement, the assessee would avoid competition from the
erstwhile promoter for a period of five years. The assessee thus acquired an
enduring benefit. The expenditure should have been treated as a capital
expenditure.

 

The assessee submitted that, the
assessee did not receive any enduring benefit out of the agreement. Under the
non-compete agreement, the asssessee had received a immediate benefit by
avoiding the possible competition from the original promoters of the Company.

 

Being aggrieved with the ITAT order,
the revenue filed an appeal to the High Court. The Court find that the Madras
High Court in the case of Asianet Communications Ltd. vs. CIT, Chennai
reported in 257 Taxman 473
also treated the expenditure as revenue in
nature in a case where the non compete agreement was for a period of five yers
holding that the same did not result into any enduring benefit to the assessee.
Similar view was expressed by the same Court in the case of Carborandum
Universal Ltd. vs. Joint Commissioner of Income-tax, Special Range-I, Chennai,
reported in [2012] 26 taxmann.com 268.
It can thus be seen that, looking to
the nature of non-compete agreement, as also the duration thereof, the Courts
have recognised such expenditure as Revenue expenditure. In the present case,
the assessee had subject agreement with the promoter of the Company to avoid
immediate competition. The business of the assessee company continue. No new
business was acquired. The benefit therefore was held by the Tribunal
instantaneous.

 

Accordingly appeal of revenue was
dismissed.

Section 263 : Commissioner- Revision – Book profit – only power vested upon the Revenue authorities is the power of examining whether the books of accounts are certified by the authorities under the Companies Act – Revision was not valid. [Section 115JB]

It
started in January, 1971 as “High Court News”. Dinesh Vyas, Advocate, started
it and it contained unreported decisions of Bombay High Court only. Between
January, 1976 and April, 1984, it was contributed by V H Patil, Advocate as “In
the Courts”. The baton was passed to Keshav B Bhujle in May, 1984 and he
carries it even today – and that’s 35 years of month on month contribution.
Ajay Singh joined in 2016-17 by penning Part B – Unreported Decisions.

16. 
The Pr. CIT-1 vs. Family Investment Pvt. Ltd [ Income tax Appeal no:
1669 of 2016 Dated:
28th January, 2019 (Bombay High
Court)]. 

[Family Investment Pvt. Ltd vs. The Pr.
CIT-9; dated 02/12/2015 ; ITA. No 1945/Mum/2015, AY:2010-11;      Bench 
F      Mum.  ITAT]

 

Section 263 : Commissioner- Revision – Book
profit – only power vested upon the Revenue authorities is the power of
examining whether the books of accounts are certified by the authorities under
the Companies Act – Revision was not valid. [Section 115JB]

 

The assessee-company is engaged in the
business of dealing in shares and securities under the Portfolio Management
Scheme. While framing the assessment order u/s. 143(3) of the Act, the A.O
observed that 15% of Book Profit is less than the tax payable on the income assessed
under the normal provision of the Act, provisions of section 115JB of the Act
will not apply. Hence, for the purpose of taxation, total income shall be taken
as per the normal provisions of the Act. This order did not find favour with
the Principal CIT who vide notice u/s. 263 of the Act dated 22nd
September, 2014 sought to set aside the assessment order holding it to be
erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue.

 

Being aggrieved
with the Pr.CIT order, the assessee filed an appeal to the Tribunal. The
Tribunal held that it can be seen that the only power vested upon the Revenue
authorities is the power of examining whether the books of accounts are
certified by the authorities under the Companies Act. It is not the case of the
Pr. CIT that the books of account have not been properly certified by the
authorities under the Companies Act, therefore the observations of the Pr. CIT
is not acceptable. The second contention of the Principal CIT is that the AO
has not examined this issue during the course of the assessment proceedings.

 

The Court observed  that vide letter dated 7th
December, 2012, the assessee has furnished (a) ledger account of donation u/s.
80G alongwith donation receipts (b) copy of acknowledgement of return of income
and balance sheet and profit and loss account of Shantilal Shanghvi Foundation
alongwith all its schedule. Thus, it can be seen that in response to a specific
query, the assessee has filed all the related details alongwith supporting
evidences. Therefore, it cannot be said that the AO has not examined this issue
during the course of assessment proceedings. The AO has thoroughly examined the
claim, therefore ITAT set aside the order of the Principal CIT.

 

Being aggrieved with the ITAT order,
the Revenue filed an appeal to the High Court. The Court observed that on
perusal of the documents on record with the assistance of the learned counsel
for the parties would show that the Tribunal proceeded to allow the appeal
principally on two grounds.

 

Apart from these observations of the
Tribunal, independently the court observed that during the year under
consideration the assessee had committed to a total donation of Rs.12.75 crore,
out of which Rs.10.25 crore was actually donated during the period relevant to
the assessment year in question. Out of the remaining Rs. 2.50 crore, Rs. 2
crore was donated in the next year, but even before the date of closing of the
account of the present year and remaining Rs.50 lakh was donated shortly after
that. In view of such facts, we do not see any reasons to interfere.




The court also took the note of the
fact that the decision of the Supreme Court in case of Apollo Tyres is referred
to larger bench. In the result, appeal is dismissed.

 

Section 194C and 194-I – TDS – Works contract/rent – Assessee refining crude oil and selling petroleum products – Agreement with another company for transportation of goods – Agreement stipulating proper maintenance of trucks – Not conclusive – Payment covered by section 194C and not section 194-I

58. CIT(TDS) vs. Indian Oil Corporation
Ltd.; 410 ITR 106 (Uttarakhand)
Date of order: 6th March, 2018

 

Section 194C and 194-I – TDS – Works
contract/rent – Assessee refining crude oil and selling petroleum products –
Agreement with another company for transportation of goods – Agreement
stipulating proper maintenance of trucks – Not conclusive – Payment covered by
section 194C and not section 194-I

 

The assessee-company was engaged in refining
crude oil and storing, distributing and selling the petroleum products and for
this purpose required tank trucks for road transportation of bulk petroleum
products from its various storage points to customers or other storage points.
For this purpose, it entered in to an agreement with another company which was
operating trucks. The assesse deducted tax at source u/s. 194C of the Act in
respect of payments to the said company.

 

The Commissioner (Appeals) held that the tax
was deductible u/s. 194C and not u/s. 194-I. The Tribunal upheld this. On
appeal by the Revenue, the Uttarakhand High Court upheld the decision of the
Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i)   Modern transportation contracts are fairly
complex having regard to various requirements, which fall to be fulfilled by
the contracting parties. Conditions like maintaining the tank trucks in sound
mechanical condition and having all the fittings up to the standards laid down
by the company from time to time would not make it a contract for use.

ii)   The tenor of the contract showed that the
parties to the contract understood the agreement as one where the carrier would
be paid transport charges and that too for the shortest route travelled by it
in the course of transporting the goods of the assessee from one point to
another. It unambiguously ruled out payment of idle charges. It also made it
clear that there was no entitlement in the carrier to any payment dehors the
actual transporting of the goods.

iii)   The carrier under the contract was
undoubtedly obliged to maintain the requisite number of trucks of a particular
type subject to various restrictions and conditions, but it was under the
obligation to operate the trucks for the purpose of transporting the goods
belonging to the assesse. Therefore, use of the words “exclusive right to use
the truck” found in clause 1 and also in clause 6(e) would not by itself be
decisive of the matter. Even after the amendment to the Explanation u/s. 194-I,
the case would not fall within its scope as it was a case of a contract for
transport of goods and, therefore, a contract of work within the meaning of
section 194C and not one which fell within the Explanation to section 194-I,
namely use of plant by the assessee.”

 

Sections 9, 147 and 148 of ITA 1961 and Article 11 of DTAA between India and Mauritius – Reassessment – Income – Deemed to accrue or arise in India (Interest) – Where Assessing Officer, during assessment had accepted claim of assessee that it was entitled to benefit of India Mauritius DTAA, assessment could not have been reopened on ground that assessee did not carry out bona fide banking activities in Mauritius

57. HSBC Bank (Mauritius) Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT;
[2019] 101 taxmann.com 206 (Bom)
Date of order: 14th January, 2019 A. Y. 2011-12

 

Sections 9, 147 and 148 of ITA 1961 and
Article 11 of DTAA between India and Mauritius – Reassessment – Income – Deemed
to accrue or arise in India (Interest) – Where Assessing Officer, during
assessment had accepted claim of assessee that it was entitled to benefit of
India Mauritius DTAA, assessment could not have been reopened on ground that
assessee did not carry out bona fide banking activities in Mauritius

 

The assessee was a Banking Company
registered under the laws of Mauritius. For the A. Y. 2011-12, the assessee
filed its return of income declaring nil income. In the return, the assessee
had shown interest income of Rs. 238.01 crores and claimed the same to be
exempt from tax in India. This amount comprised of income on securities of Rs.
94.57 crore and interest income on External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) of Rs.
143.43 crore. According to the assessee, such income was not taxable in India
by virtue of DTAA between India and Mauritius. The Assessing Officer on
scrutiny, passed order u/s. 143(3) in which he added a sum of Rs.94.57 crore to
the total income of the assessee by rejecting the assessee’s claim of such
income on securities not being taxable in India. He however did not disturb the
assessee’s claim of interest income on ECB being not taxable. After four years,
the Assessing Officer issued notice to reopen assessment in case of assessee on
ground that banking activities carried out by assessee locally in Mauritius
were for namesake and assessee had failed to make true and full disclosure
regarding its beneficial ownership status. The assessee on being supplied
reasons for reopening assessment raised objections to the notice of reopening
of assessment. The Assessing Officer, however, rejected said objections.

 

The assessee filed writ petition and
challenged the validity of reopening. The Bombay High Court allowed the writ
petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

“i)   The perusal of the reasons recorded by the
Assessing Officer would show that the only ground on which the notice of
reopening of assessment is issued was the assessee’s claim of exemption of
interest income which in turn was based on DTAA between India and Mauritius.
According to the Assessing Officer, the assessee had attempted to misuse the
DTAA since according to him, the assessee did not carry out banking business in
the said country.

ii)    In this context, it is noted that the entire
claim had come up for consideration before the Assessing Officer during the
original scrutiny assessment. During such assessment, the Assessing Officer had
noted the assessee’s claim of exemption of interest on ECB made in the return
filed. In written query dated 21/10/2013, the Assessing Officer had asked the
assessee to explain several issues and called for documents.

iii)   It was after detailed examination that the
Assessing Officer passed the order of assessment on 28/01/2016 in which he
disallowed the assessee’s claim of exempt interest of Rs. 94.57 crore which
related to interest on securities. He, however, did not tamper with the
assessee’s claim of exempt interest of Rs. 143.43 crore which was interest on ECB.
Thus, the entire issue was minutely examined by the Assessing Officer during
the original scrutiny assessment. To the extent, the Assessing Officer was not
satisfied with the assessee’s claim of exempt interest, the same was
disallowed. However, in the context of assessee’s claim of exempt interest of
Rs. 143.43 crore, by virtue of DTAA between India and Mauritius, the Assessing
Officer accepted the same.

iv)   This very issue now the Assessing Officer
wants to re-examine during the process of reassessment. For multiple reasons,
same would be wholly impermissible. Firstly, as noted, the entire issue is a
scrutinised issue. This would be based on mere change of opinion and would be
impressible as held by series of judgments of the various Courts.

v)   Quite apart, the impugned notice has been
issued beyond the period of four years from the end of relevant assessment
year. There is nothing in the reasons recorded to suggest that there was any
failure on the part of the assessee to disclose truly and fully all material
facts which led to the income chargeable to tax escaping assessment. In fact,
the perusal of the reasons would show that the Assessing Officer was merely
proceeding on the material already on record. Even on this ground, the impugned
notice should be set aside.

vi)   In the result, the impugned notice is set
aside. Petition is allowed and disposed of accordingly.”

Section 144, 147 and 148 – Reassessment – Service of notice u/s. 148 – Notice sent to old address – Assessee’s returns for earlier years already on file and reflecting new address – Issue of notice at old address mechanically – Notice and order of reassessment and consequential attachment of bank accounts – Liable to be quashed

56. Veena Devi Karnani vs. ITO; 410 ITR 23
(Del)
Date of order: 14th September,
2018 A. Y. 2010-11

 

Section 144, 147 and 148 – Reassessment –
Service of notice u/s. 148 – Notice sent to old address – Assessee’s returns
for earlier years already on file and reflecting new address – Issue of notice
at old address mechanically – Notice and order of reassessment and
consequential attachment of bank accounts – Liable to be quashed

 

In the F. Y. 2010-11, the assessee shifted
her residence and filed returns of income under the same permanent account
number and e-mail ID. The returns disclosed the changed address. For the A. Y.
2010-11, the Assessing Officer sent a series of notices u/s. 148 of the Act for
reopening the assessment to the assessee’s old address. As there was no
response, the reassessment was completed on best judgment basis and an ex-parte
order was passed u/s. 144 read with 147. Upon issuance of an attachment order
to satisfy the demand raised in the reassessment order, the assessee filed a
writ petition contending that the reassessment proceedings were a nullity
because the notice was never served upon her and that the Assessing Officer did
not comply with the provisions of Rule 127 of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 which
stipulated examining the permanent account number database or the subsequent
years returns to ascertain the correct address of the assessee.

 

The Delhi High Court allowed the writ
petition and held as under:

 

“i)    Rule 127(2) states that the addresses to
which a notice or summons or requisition or order or any other communication
may be delivered or transmitted shall be either available in the permanent
account number database of the assesse or the address available in the
income-tax return to which the communication relates or the address available
in the last income-tax return filed by the assesse. All these options have to
be resorted to by the concerned authority, in this case the Assessing Officer.

ii)    When the Assessing Officer issued the
reassessment notice on December 13, 2013, he was under a duty to access the
available permanent account number database of the addressee or the address
available in the income-tax return to which the communication related or the
address available in the last return filed by the addressee. The return for the
A. Ys. 2011-12 and 2012-13 had already been filed on 22/02/2012 and 13/12/2012
respectively, reflecting the changed address but with the same permanent
account number and before the same Assessing Officer.



iii)    The Assessing Officer had omitted to access
the changed permanent account number database and had mechanically sent notices
to the old address of the assessee. The subsequent notices u/s. 142(1) were
also sent to the old address and the reassessment proceedings were completed on
best judgment basis. The Assessing Officer had mechanically proceeded on the
information supplied to him by the bank without following the correct procedure
in law and had failed to ensure that the reassessment notice was issued
properly and served at the correct address in the manner known to law.

iv)   The reassessment notice issued u/s. 148, the
subsequent order u/s. 144 r.w.s. 147 and the consequential action of attachment
of the assessee’s bank accounts were quashed.”

Section 5 – Income – Accrual of income – Telecommunication service provider – Payments received on prepaid cards – Liability to be discharged at future date – To the extent of unutilised talk time payment did not accrue as income in year of sale – Unutilised amount is revenue receipt when talk time is actually used or in case of cards that lapsed on date when cards lapsed

55. CIT vs. Shyam Telelink Ltd.; 410 ITR 31
(Del)
Date of order: 15th November,
2018 A. Ys. 2003-04, 20004-05 and 2009-10

 

Section 5 – Income – Accrual of income –
Telecommunication service provider – Payments received on prepaid cards –
Liability to be discharged at future date – To the extent of unutilised talk
time payment did not accrue as income in year of sale – Unutilised amount is
revenue receipt when talk time is actually used or in case of cards that lapsed
on date when cards lapsed

 

The assessee provides basic
telecommunication services and had both prepaid and post paid subscribers. The
prepaid subscribers were billed on the basis of actual talk time. According to
the Department, in respect of the prepaid cards, the assessee was to account
for and include the entire amount paid on the date of purchase of the prepaid
cards by the subscribers and the date of purchase of the prepaid card was the
date when the income accrued to the assessee.

 

However, the assesse recognised the revenue
on prepaid cards on the basis of the actual usage and carried forward the
unutilised amount outstanding on the prepaid cards, if any, at the end of the
financial year to the next year. The unutilised amount was treated as advance
in the balance sheet and recognised as revenue in the subsequent year, when the
talk time was actually used or was exhausted when the cards lapsed on expiry of
stipulated time.

 

The Tribunal held that the amount received
on the sale of prepaid cards to the extent of unutilised talk time did not
accrue as income in the year of sale. On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High
Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i)   The payments made on account of the prepaid
cards by the subscribers was an advance subject to the assesse providing basic
telecommunication services as promised, failing which the unutilised amount was
required to be refunded to the prepaid subscribers. The apportionment of the
prepaid amount was contingent upon the assessee performing its obligation and
rendering services to the prepaid customers as per the terms. If the assesse
failed to perform the services as promised, it was under an obligation to
refund the advance payment received under the ordinary law of contract or
special enactments, such as Consumer Protection Act, 1986.

ii)    The Tribunal was right in
holding that the amount received on the sale of prepaid cards to the extent of
unutilised talk time did not accrue as income in the year of sale. In the case
of prepaid cards that lapsed, the unutilised amount had to be treated as income
or receipt of the assessee on the date when the cards had lapsed. The Assessing
Officer was to compute the assessees income accordingly while he gave effect to
the order of the Tribunal.”

Section 80P(1), (2)(a)(i) – Co-operative society – Co-operative bank – Deduction u/s. 80P(1), (2)(a)(i) – Income from sale of goods for public distribution system of State Government – Ancillary activity of credit society – Entitled to deduction

54. Kodumudi Growers Co-operative Bank Ltd.
vs. ITO; 410 ITR 218 (Mad)
Date of order: 31st October, 2018 A. Y. 2005-06: Ss. 80P(1), (2)(a)(i) of ITA 1961:

 

Section
80P(1), (2)(a)(i)
Co-operative
society – Co-operative bank – Deduction u/s. 80P(1), (2)(a)(i) – Income from
sale of goods for public distribution system of State Government – Ancillary
activity of credit society – Entitled to deduction

 

The assessee-society was in the business of
banking and provided credit facilities to its members. For the A. Y. 2005-06 it
filed Nil return. The Assessing Officer computed the assessee’s income at Rs.
22,16,211/- of which a sum of Rs. 2,55,118/- represented income on account of sale
of goods for the public distribution system of the Government of Tamil Nadu.
The Assessing Officer was of the view that such activity was not related to the
assessee’s banking activity and held that the income that arise therefrom was
not allowable as deduction u/s. 80P(2)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961
(hereinafter for the sake of brevity referred to as the “Act”) but
included such income for consideration in the overall deduction allowable u/s.
80P(2)(c)(ii) which amounted to Rs. 50,000/-.

 

The Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal
upheld the decision of the Assessing Officer.

 

The Madras High Court allowed the appeal
filed by the assessee and held as under:

“i)   The activity undertaken by the assesse was
not one which it was not authorized to do. The assessee was entitled to
distribute the items under the public distribution system. The bye-laws
themselves provided for such an activity as an ancillary activity by the
assesse. Furthermore, the assesse was bound by the directives issued by the
Government as well as the Registrar of Co-operative Societies. The fair price
shops were opened based on the directions opened by the Government as
communicated by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies and the District
Collector. Therefore, the activity done by the assesse could not be truncated
from the activity as a credit society and the authorities below had committed
an error in denying the special deduction.

ii)    The assessee was entitled to the benefit of
deduction u/s. 80P(1) r.w.s. 80P(2)(a)(i).

iii)   The tax appeal is allowed. The orders passed
by the authorities below are set aside and the substantial question of law is
answered in favour of the assessee. The Assessing Officer is directed to extend
the benefit of deduction u/s. 80P(1) r.w.s. 80P(2)(a)(i) to the
appellant/assessee.”

Business income or long-term capital gain – Income from shares and securities held for period beyond 12 months – Investments whether made from borrowed funds or own funds of assessee – No distinction made in circular issued by CBDT – Department bound by circular – Profit is long term capital gain

53. Principal CIT vs. Hardik Bharat Patel;
410 ITR 202 (Bom):
Date of order: 19th November,
2018 A. Y. 2008-09

 

Business income or long-term capital gain –
Income from shares and securities held for period beyond 12 months –
Investments whether made from borrowed funds or own funds of assessee – No
distinction made in circular issued by CBDT – Department bound by circular –
Profit is long term capital gain

 

For the A. Y. 2008-09, the Tribunal directed
the Assessing Officer to treat the profit of the assessee that arose out of the
frequent and voluminous transactions initiated with borrowed funds in shares as
“long term capital gains” instead of as business income following its order for
the earlier assessment year. The Department filed appeal before the High Court
and contended that the amount invested in shares by the assessee was out of
borrowed funds and therefore, the profit was to be treated as business income
and not as long-term capital gains. The Bombay High Court upheld the decision
of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i)   According to Circular No. 6 of 2016 dated
February 29, 2016, issued by the CBDT, with regard to the taxability of surplus
on sale of shares and securities, whether as capital gains or business income
in the case of long term holding of shares and securities beyond 12 months, the
assessee has an option to treat the income from sale of listed shares and
securities as income arising under the head “Long-term capital gains”. However,
the stand once taken by the assessee would not be subject to change and
consistently the income on the sale of securities which are held as investment
would continue to be taxed as long-term capital gains or business income as
opted by the assessee. The circular makes no distinction whether the
investments made in shares were out of borrowed funds or out of its own funds.

ii)    The Department was bound by Circular No. 6
of 2016 dated February 29, 2016 issued by the CBDT and the distinction which
had been sought to be made by the Department could not override the circular
which made no distinction whether the investments made in shares were out of
borrowed funds or out of the assessee’s own funds. No substantial question of
law. Hence not entertained.”

Section 37 (1) and 41 (1) – A. Business expenditure – Allowability of (Illegal payment) – Where assessee had purchased oil from Iraq and payments were made by an agent, there being no evidence to suggest that assessee had made any illegal commission payment to Oil Market Organisation of Iraqi Government as alleged in Volckar Committee Report, Tribunal’s order allowing payment for purchase of oil was to be upheld

52. CIT-LTU vs. Reliance Industries Ltd.;
[2019] 102 taxmann.com 142 (Bom)
Date of order: 15th January, 2019

 

Section 37 (1) and 41 (1) – A.  Business expenditure – Allowability of
(Illegal payment) – Where assessee had purchased oil from Iraq and payments
were made by an agent, there being no evidence to suggest that assessee had
made any illegal commission payment to Oil Market Organisation of Iraqi
Government as alleged in Volckar Committee Report, Tribunal’s order allowing
payment for purchase of oil was to be upheld




The assessee claimed deduction towards the
payment for purchase of oil. The Assessing Officer’s case was that assessee had
paid illegal commission for purchase of such oil to State Oil Marketing
Organisation and therefore, such expenditure was not allowable.

 

The Commissioner (Appeals), while reversing
the disallowance made by the Assessing Officer, observed that there was no
evidence that the assessee had paid any such illegal commission. He noted that
except for the Volcker Committee Report, there was no other evidence for making
such addition. He noted that even in the said report, there was no finding that
the assessee had made illegal payment and it appeared that the payments were
made by an agent and there was no evidence to suggest that the assessee had
made any illegal commission payment to Iraq Government. The Tribunal confirmed
the view of Commissioner (Appeals).

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High
Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

“The entire issue is based on appreciation
of materials on record and is a factual issue. No question of law arises.”

 

B. Deemed income u/s. 41(1) – Remission or
cessation of trading liability (Claim for deduction) – Where on account of
attack on World Trade Centre, financial market, collapsed and market value of
bonds issued by assessee was brought down below their face value and, hence,
assessee purchased its own bonds and extinguished them, profit gained in
buy-back process could not be taxable u/s. 41(1) as assessee had not claimed
deduction of trading liability in any earlier year

 

The assessee had issued foreign currency
bonds in the years 1996 and 1997. On account of the attack on World Trade
Centre at USA on 11/09/2001, financial market collapsed and the investors of
debentures and bonds started selling them which in turn brought down the market
price of such bonds and debentures which were traded in the market at a value
less than the face value. The assessee purchased such bonds and extinguished
them. In the process of buy back, the assessee gained a sum of Rs. 38.80 crore.
The Assessing Officer treated such amount assessable to tax in terms of section
41(1).


The Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal,
however, deleted the same. The Tribunal in its detail discussion came to the
conclusion that the liability arising out of the issuance of bonds was not a
trading liability and therefore, section 41(1) would have no applicability.


On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High
Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i)         There
is no error in the view taken by the Tribunal. Sub-section (1) of section 41 provides
that where an allowance or deduction has been made in the assessment for any
year in respect of loss, expenditure or trading liability incurred by the
assessee and subsequently, during any previous year, such liability ceases, the
same would be treated as the assessee’s income chargeable to tax as income for
previous year under which subject extinguishment took place. The foremost
requirement for applicability of sub-section (1) of section 41, therefore, is
that the assessee has claimed any allowance or deduction which has been granted
in any year in respect of any loss, expenditure or trading liability. In the
present case, the revenue has not established these basic facts. In other
words, it is not even the case of the revenue that in the process of issuing
the bonds, the assessee had claimed deduction of any trading liability in any
year. Any extinguishment of such liability would not give rise to applicability
of sub-section (1) to section 41.

ii)          For
applicability of section 41(1), it is a sine qua non that there should
be an allowance or deduction claimed by the assessee in any assessment year in
respect of loss, expenditure or trading liability incurred by the assessee.
Then, subsequently, during any previous year, if the creditor remits or waives
any such liability, then the assessee is liable to pay tax under section 41.
This question, therefore, does not require any consideration.”

8 Sections 179(1), 220, 222, 281 and Schedule II, rr 2, 16 – Recovery of tax – Attachment and sale of property – Private alienation to be void in certain cases – Condition precedent for declaring transfer void – Issuance of notice to defaulter – Failure by Department to bring on record service of notice under Rule 2 –Charge registered by Sub-Registrar six and a half years after sale deed registered in favour of purchaser – Order declaring transfer null and void and notice for auction of property set aside

Rekhadevi
Omprakash Dhariwal vs. TRO; 406 ITR 368 (Guj): Date of order: 2nd
July, 2018

A.
Y. 1998-99


The
petitioner acquired the property in question under a sale deed dated 11/12/2008
for consideration through the power of attorney of the original owner VCT. The
transaction was carried out after due diligence like public advertisement and
title clear certificate. The property had been attached on 28/09/2006, towards
the outstanding tax dues of VCT, the original owner but the petitioner had no
knowledge of such attachment and came to know about the attachment subsequently
on 29/09/2011. Thereafter the petitioner made efforts to find out the details
with regard to such attachment, but ultimately, an order dated 26/05/2015 was
passed by the Tax Recovery Officer under rule 16 of Schedule II to the Act
declaring the sale to the petitioner null and void. The petitioner communicated
with the Department on various occasions with a request to withdraw the order
declaring the sale null and void. On the basis of the order dated 26/05/2015,
which was affixed on the property along with information that the charge of the
Department had been registered on 08/12/2017, on 19/12/2017, a notice of
auction was issued to satisfy the outstanding demand of the original owner VCT.

 

The
petitioner filed writ petition challenging the said action by the Department.
The petitioner submitted that the order declaring the sale null and void after
a delay of six and half years and not within a reasonable period was arbitrary
and illegal and without jurisdiction and that therefore, the subsequent
communication for auction of the property was also illegal. Criminal
proceedings u/s. 276B of the Act were initiated against a company for
non-payment of tax deducted at source. Notice was issued to the petitioner who
was the non-executive chairman of the company treating him as the principal
officer of the company and an order was also passed.

 

The
Department contended that the property in question originally belonged to VCT,
that the order u/s. 144/147 for the A. Y. 1998-99 was passed on 23/03/2006,
that the demand was certified by the Assessing Officer on 22/08/2006 and the
tax recovery certificate was issued on 06/09/2006, and that on account of
default by the assessee VCT, the original owner of the immovable property, it
was attached by the Tax Recovery Officer on 28/09/2006 and copies were sent to
the Sub-Registrar. The notice of demand, the certificate, the order of
attachment of the property as well the panchnama by which the property was attached
were produced. The Sub-Registrar submitted that the order of attachment was
received on 26/06/2015 and subsequent thereto the charge was registered.

 

The
Gujarat High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

 

“i)    The petitioner being a bonafide purchaser
for consideration after due diligence could not be made to suffer on account of
the tax dues that ran in the name of the original owner. The sale deed was for
a consideration and the index copy was also issued in connection with the
transaction. The public notice for executing the sale deed was issued in
vernacular newspaper on 26/10/2007 and thereafter, a search was carried out.
The search report dated 01/10/2008 was also on record along with the title
clearance certificate of the advocate. It was evident from the documents that
the property in question was free from all encumbrances having clear title and
was available for transaction.

 

ii)    The documents produced along with the additional affidavit being
order u/s. 179(1), the certificate u/s. 222, the order of attachment and
panchnama drawn were all against the defaulting assesee VCT, and the petitioner
was not in the picture. The proviso to section 281 provided that such transfer
or charge might not be declared void if such a transfer or charge was made for
adequate consideration and without notice of pendency or completion of such
proceeding or without the notice of any tax liability or other sum payable by
the assessee.

According to the procedure for recovery of tax, Rule 16 of Schedule II to the
Act provides for issuance of notice for recovery of arrears by the Tax Recovery
Officer upon the defaulter requiring the defaulter to pay the amount specified
in the certificate within fifteen days from the date of the service of the
notice and intimating that in default, steps would be taken to realise the
amount.

 

iii)    Rule 16 of Schedule II to the Act provides
for private alienation to be considered void in certain cases and requires
service of notice on the defaulter under Rule 2. In the affidavit as well as in
the additional affidavit the Department had not brought on record service of
notice under Rule 2 of Schedule II.

 

iv)   Moreover, it was evident from the affidavit
filed on behalf of the Sub-Registrar that for the first time the order of
attachment was given effect to by him only on 26/06/2015, when the charge was
registered which was six and a half years after the sale deed was registered in
favour of the petitioner.

 

v)    The order of the Tax Recovery Officer
declaring the transfer null and void and the subsequent communication for
auction of the property were to be set aside.”

Section 194H – TDS – Commission – Definition – Manufacture and sale of woolen articles – Trade discounts allowed to agents who procured orders and sold goods on behalf of assessee – Not commission – Consistent trade practice followed by assessee – Concurrent finding by appellate authorities – No liability to deduct tax at source

40. CIT vs. OCM India Ltd.; 408 ITR 369
(P&H):
Date of order: 9th May, 2018 A. Y. 2008-09

 

Section 194H – TDS – Commission –
Definition – Manufacture and sale of woolen articles – Trade discounts allowed
to agents who procured orders and sold goods on behalf of assessee – Not
commission – Consistent trade practice followed by assessee – Concurrent
finding by appellate authorities – No liability to deduct tax at source

 

The assessee
manufactured and sold woolen articles. During inspection of the office records
of the assesee it was found that the assessee debited an amount of Rs.
4,57,52,494, to the account of trade turnover discounts which had been netted
out from the gross turnover and did not appear as an item of expense in the
profit and loss account. The assessee submitted before the Assessing Officer
that the commission or brokerage arose on account of agency transactions which
did not attract deduction of tax at source for the services rendered by the
third party. The Assessing officer held that the amount being turnover discount
was directly or indirectly for the services rendered according to the inclusive
definition of the Explanation to section 194H of the Act and that the assessee
was liable to deduct the tax at source. A demand of Rs. 47,12,507 on account of
TDS and a further amount of Rs. 6,59,751 on account of interest charged u/s.
201(1A) was raised.

 

The Commissioner
(Appeals) held that the assessee had been debiting commission which amounted to
Rs. 1.84 crore to its commission agents appointed territory-wise who acted and procured
orders or effected sales of the assessee’s products for and on its behalf and
got commission which varied from place to place and quality of the product to
product and therefore, the Assessing officer was not justified in invoking the
provisions of section 194H read with its Explanation to the trade discount
allowed by the assessee to its buyers, customers and direct trade dealers
without involvement of any intermediator or commission agents. Accordingly, he
held that the assessee was not liable under the provisions of section 194H read
with its Explanation and deleted the demand of Rs. 53,72,258. The findings were
affirmed by the Tribunal which held that there was no material on record before
the Assessing officer that such discount offer was a commission within the
meaning of section 194H.

 

On appeal by the
Revenue, the Punjab and Haryana High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal
and held as under:

 

“i)    On a plain reading of section 194H, it is
clear that tax at source is to be deducted by a person responsible for paying
any income by way of “commission or brokerage”. The expression “commission or
brokerage” referred to in this section derives its meaning from the explanation
appended thereto. According to it, “commission or brokerage” includes any
payment received or receivable directly or indirectly by a person acting on
behalf of another person (a) for services rendered (not being professional
services), or (b) for any services in the course of buying or selling of goods,
or (c) in relation to any transaction relating to any asset, valuable article
or thing, not being securities. In order to examine whether Explanation (i) to
section 194H of the Act is attracted, necessarily, it is to be seen whether the
assessee has made any payment and, in case it is so, whether it is for services
rendered by the payee to the assessee.


ii)    Since concurrent findings had been recorded
by the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal that the assessee had been
debiting trade discount allowed to its commission agents who were acting and
procuring orders or effecting sales of its products for and on its behalf, the
Assessing Officer was not justified to have invoked the provisions of the
Explanation to section 194H. The Department had not been able to show any error
or illegality therein.”

30 Depreciation – Condition precedent – User of plant and machinery – Machinery utilised for trial runs – Depreciation allowable

Princ. CIT vs. Larsen and Toubro Ltd.; 403 ITR 248 (Bom); Date of Order: 06th November, 2017:
A. Y.: 1997-98:
Section 32 of ITA 1961

For the A. Y. 1997-98, the
assessee claimed depreciation in respect of machinery installed and put to use
in the production of cement. A trial run was conducted for one day and the
quantity produced was small. The assessee was unable to establish that after
the trial run, commercial production of clinker was initiated within a
reasonable time. According to the Assessing Officer, trial runs continued till
October, 1997 before a reasonable quantity of cement was produced. According to
the Assessing Officer, use of machinery for trial production was not for the
purpose of business and, therefore, depreciation could not be allowed. The
Assessing Officer therefore disallowed the claim for depreciation on the ground
that the plant was only used for trial runs.

 

The Commissioner (Appeals)
confirmed the disallowance finding that there was a long gap between the first
trial run, subsequent trial runs and commercial production and that the user of
the assets during the year should be actual, effective and real user in the
commercial sense. The Tribunal held that once the plant commenced operations
and a reasonable quantity of product was produced, the business was set up even
if the product was substandard and not marketable. It directed the Assessing
Officer to verify the period of use and restrict depreciation to 50% if the
Assessing Officer found that the machinery was used for less than 180 days
during the year under consideration.

 

In appeal by the Revenue,
the Calcutta High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i) Once a plant commences
operation, even if the product is substandard and not marketable, the business
can be said to have been set up. Mere breakdown of machinery or technical snags
that may have developed after the trial run which had interrupted the
continuation of further production for a period of time cannot be held to be a
ground to deprive the assessee of the benefit of depreciation.

ii) The assessee was
entitled to depreciation.

 

iii) The appeal is not
entertained. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.”

Sections 194L, 194J and 260A – TDS – Acquisition of capital asset – Compensation payment (Encroached land) – Section 194L – Where land belonging to State was encroached upon, and such encroachment was removed by assessee, and encroaching squatters/hutment dwellers were rehabilitated, there was no question of land being acquired by assessee and, therefore, provisions of section 194L would not be applicable

19. CIT(TDS) vs. Mumbai
Metropolitan Regional Development Authority; [2018] 97 taxmann.com 461 (Bom):

Date of the order: 6th
September, 2018

A. Ys. 2008-09 and 2009-10

 

Sections 194L, 194J and 260A – TDS – Acquisition of capital asset
– Compensation payment (Encroached land) – Section 194L – Where land belonging
to State was encroached upon, and such encroachment was removed by assessee,
and encroaching squatters/hutment dwellers were rehabilitated, there was no
question of land being acquired by assessee and, therefore, provisions of
section 194L would not be applicable

 

TDS – Fees for professional or technical services (Maintenance
services) – Section 194J – Where assessee made payments in respect of
maintenance contracts which related to minor repairs, replacement of some spare
parts, greasing of machinery etc., since, these services did not required any
technical expertise, same could not be categorised as ‘technical services’ as
contemplated u/s. 194J

 

For the purpose of implementing
scheme of Government relating to road widening near railway track, assessee
evacuated illegal/unauthorised persons who were squatters/hutment dwellers –
Since, possession of these persons was unauthorised and illegal and they were
not owners of land on which they had squatted/built their illegal hutments the
Assessing Officer was of the firm opinion that there had been acquisition of
immovable property, for which the affected persons were compensated as per the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Since, the assessee had not deducted Tax at Source
as per the provisions of section 194L/194LA of the Act, the Assessing Officer
treated the assessee as an assessee in default and computed the payment of tax
u/s. 201(1) and that for interest u/s. 201(1A). Additionally, for A. Ys.
2008-09 and 2009-10 the Assessing Officer noticed that the assessee had made
payment towards Annual Maintenance Contracts (AMCs) for Air Conditioners and
Lifts on which TDS was deducted u/s. 194C when, according to the Assessing
Officer, the same ought to have been deducted u/s. 194J. Since, the assessee
had deducted TDS u/s. 194C, the Assessing Officer proceeded by levying the
liability u/s. 201(1) and also held the assessee liable to pay interest u/s.
201(1A). In relation to section 194L/194LA,
the Commissioner (Appeals) accepted that there was no payment of compensation
for acquisition of any land or immovable property, and therefore, the said
sections had no application to the facts of the present case. Accordingly, he
deleted the demand raised by the Assessing Officer u/s. 201(1) and 201(1A).
Similarly, the Commissioner (Appeals) observed that the Annual Maintenance
Contracts were contracts for periodical inspection and routine maintenance work
along with supply of several parts. He was, therefore, of the view that such
services did not constitute technical services, and therefore, section 194J had
no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case. In these
circumstances, the Commissioner (Appeals) held that the assessee had correctly
deducted the TDS u/s. 194C and was not required to deduct TDS as per the
provisions of section 194J thereof. He, therefore, deleted the demand of
tax/interest u/s. 201(1) and section 201(1A). The Tribunal upheld the order of
the Commissioner (Appeals) and dismissed the appeals filed by the revenue.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the
Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i)    Section194LA inter alia deals with payment
of compensation on acquisition of certain immovable property. Section 194LA was
brought into force with effect from 01/10/2004. Section 194L, deals with
payment of compensation on acquisition of a capital asset and was omitted with
effect from 01/06/2016. Basically, what both these provisions provide is that
any person responsible for paying to a resident any sum in the nature of
compensation or enhanced compensation or consideration or enhanced
consideration on account of compulsory acquisition, under any law for the time
being in force of any capital asset, at the time of payment of such sum in cash
or by issue of a cheque or draft or by any other mode, whichever is earlier, is
liable to deduct an amount equal to 10 per cent of such sum as TDS on the
income comprised therein. The provisos to said sections are not really relevant
or germane for our purpose. What can be seen from the aforesaid provisions is
that TDS is to be deducted when compensation is paid on account of compulsory
acquisition under any law for the time being in force. In the facts of the
present case, as correctly recorded by the Tribunal, for the purpose of
implementing the scheme of the Government relating to road widening near the
railway track, the assessee evacuated the illegal/unauthorised persons who were
squatters/hutment dwellers.

ii)    The
fact of the matter was that the possession of these persons was unauthorised
and illegal and they were not the owners of the land on which they had
squatted/built their illegal hutments. In fact, they were trespassers. This
being the case, there was no question of the land being acquired by the
assessee. In fact the Tribunal, came to the conclusion that the land always
belonged to the State; it was encroached upon, which encroachment was removed
by the assessee; and the encroaching squatters/hutment dwellers were rehabilitated.
This being the case, section 194L or section 194LA had absolutely no
application to the facts and circumstances of the present case. The revenue has
totally misunderstood the law when it assumes that the squatters/hutment
dwellers are deemed owners of the land on which they squat or encroach upon.
The squatters/hutment dwellers have absolutely no title in the land on which
they squat or build their illegal and unauthorised hutments. This being the
case, there is no question of there being any compulsory acquisition from them
under any law either under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 or any other
enactments which permit compulsory acquisition of land. This being the case,
section 194L or section 194LA has absolutely no application to the facts and
circumstances of the present case.

iii)    In this regard the Tribunal correctly held that the assessee had
made payments only in respect of maintenance contracts which relate to minor
repairs, replacement of some spare parts, greasing of machinery etc. These
services do not require any technical expertise, and therefore, could not be
categorized as ‘technical services’ as contemplated u/s. 194J. Section 194J,
deals with fees for professional or technical services. In contrast, section
194C deals with payments to contractors. In the facts and circumstances of the
present case, the assessee had correctly deducted TDS under the provisions of
section 194C and not as per the provisions of section 194J thereof. This being
the case, even the additional question of law (for the A. Ys. 2008-09 and
2009-10 does not give rise to any substantial question of law which would
require to admit the present appeals.

iv)   They
are all, accordingly, dismissed.”

29 Cash credits – Burden of proof – Change of law – Assessee discharging onus by filing confirmation letters, affidavits, full addresses and PAN of creditors – Amendment requiring assessee to explain source of source – Not to be given retrospective effect – Cash credit not to be taxed

Princ.
CIT vs. Veedhata Tower P. Ltd.; 403 ITR 415 (Bom): Date of Order: 17th
April, 2018:

A.
Y.: 2010-11:

Section
68 of I. T. Act, 1961


The assessee obtained a
loan from LFPL. For the A. Y. 2010-11, the Assessing Officer held that the
assessee was unable to establish the genuineness of the loan transactions
received in the name of LFPL nor prove the credit worthiness or the real source
of the funds and made an addition of the loan of Rs. 1.65 crore as unexplained
cash credit u/s. 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

 

The Tribunal held that the
assesse had discharged the onus placed upon it u/s. 68 of the Act by filing
confirmation letters, affidavits, the full addresses and PAN of creditors, that
therefore, the Department had all the details available with it to proceed
against the persons whose source of funds were alleged to be not genuine and
deleted the addition made by the Assessing Officer.

 

On appeal by the Revenue,
the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i)  The proviso to section 68 of the Act was
introduced by the Finance Act, 2012 w.e.f 01/04/2013 and therefore, it would be
effective only from the A. Y. 2013-14 onwards and not for earlier assessment
years.

 

ii)  The Tribunal found that the assessee had discharged
the onus which was cast upon it in terms of the pre-amended section 68 of the
Act by filing the necessary confirmation letters of the creditors, their
affidavits, their full addresses and their PANs. The finding of fact was not
shown to be perverse.

 

iii) Since there was no obligation to explain the
source of the source prior to 01/04/2013, i.e. A. Y. 2013-14, no substantial
question of law arose from the order of the Tribunal.”

28 Bad debts (Computation of) – U/s.36(1)(viia) read with rule 6ABA aggregate average advance made by rural branches of scheduled bank would be computed by taking amount of advances made by each rural branch as outstanding at end of last day of each month comprised in previous year which had to be aggregated separately

Principal CIT vs. Uttarbanga Kshetriya Gramin Bank.; [2018] 94 taxmann.com 90 (Cal):
Date of Order:  07th May, 2018:
A. Y.: 2009-10:
Section 36(1)(viia) of ITA 1961 r.w.r. 6ABA of ITRules 1962

The assessee was a regional
rural bank and its main business was banking activity. The assessee claimed
deduction u/s. 36(1)(viia)(a) from its total income. The case of the assessee
was that it had 71 rural branches. 10 per cent of aggregate monthly average
advance u/s. 36(1)(viia) read with Rule 6ABA, 1962 Rules came to Rs. 22.25
crore. The Assessing Officer, however calculated the sum at Rs. 81.88 lakh on
the basis of aggregate of monthly average advances of Rs. 8.18 crore being the
sum total of advances made during the financial year relevant to A. Y. 2009-10.

 

The Appellate Authority
confirmed the action of the ITO. The Tribunal allowed assessee’s appeal holding
that as per Rule 6ABA of 1962 Rules, for the purpose of section 36(1)(viia),
the aggregate average advance made by the rural branches of scheduled bank
would be computed by taking amount of advances made by each rural branch as outstanding
at the end of the last day of each month comprised in the previous year which
had to be aggregated separately.

 

The Tribunal thus directed
the Assessing Officer to compute 10 per cent of the aggregate monthly average
advances made by the rural branch of such Bank by taking the amount of advances
by each rural branch of such Bank by taking the amount of advances by each
rural branch as outstanding at the end of the last day of each month comprised
in the previous year and aggregate the same separately as given under Rule
6ABA.

 

On appeal by the Revenue,
the Calcutta High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

“The amended direction made
by the Tribunal is in terms of Rule 6ABA. The ITO had made the computation of
aggregate monthly advances taking loans and advances made during only the
previous year relevant to assessment year 2009-10 as confirmed by CIT (A). The
Tribunal amended such direction, correctly applying the rule.”

 


27 Assessment – Jurisdiction of AO – AO not having jurisdiction – Effect of transfer of case u/s. 127 – Waiver by assessee and assessee taking part in assessment proceedings – Waiver will not confer jurisdiction on AO – Order passed by AO not valid

CIT vs. Lalitkumar Bardia; 404 ITR 63 (Bom):
Date of Order: 11th July, 2017:

F.
Ys.: 1989-90 to 1999-2000:

Sections
124, 127 and 158BC of I. T. Act, 1961



Search and seizure – Block
assessment – Notice – Jurisdiction of AO – Objection to jurisdiction u/s.
124(3) – Limitation – Limitation not applicable to return filed u/s. 158BC

 

Search was carried out u/s.
132 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in the case of assessee in February 1999. At
that time, the assessee was being assessed at Rajnandgaon (MP). On  06/07/1999, the Commissioner, Raipur, in
exercise of powers u/s. 127 of the Act, transferred the assessee’s assessment
proceedings (case) from ITO Rajnandgaon to the Dy. Commissioner, Nagpur. The
assessee challenged the order dated 06/07/1999 before Madhya Pradesh High
Court. On 17/09/1999, the Madhya Pradesh High Court quashed the order dated
06/07/1999 and directed the Commissioner to hear the assessee and pass a reasoned
order in support of the transfer of the case. On 22/09/1999, the Dy.
Commissioner Nagpur issued a show cause notice u/s. 158BC of the Act calling
upon the assessee to file his return of income. In response to the notice, on
05/05/2000, the assessee filed his return of income declaring undisclosed
income at Rs. “Nil”. In the mean time, the Commissioner passed a fresh order
u/s. 127 dated 18/01/2000 maintaining the order dated 06/07/1999. On
12/08/2000, the Dy. Commissioner, Nagpur issued notices u/ss. 142(1) and 143(2)
of the Act. The assessee participated in the proceedings and consequent thereto
an order of assessment dated 28/02/2001 was passed u/s. 143(3) r.w.s. 158BC of
the Act by the Dy. Commissioner , Nagpur.

 

The Commissioner (Appeals)
partly allowed the appeal filed by the assessee. Before the Tribunal, the
assessee raised an additional ground that the assessment order dated 28/02/2001
passed by the Dy. Commissioner, Nagpur, was without jurisdiction. Holding that
on 22/09/1999 when the notice u/s. 158BC of the Act was issued, the Dy.
Commissioner, Nagpur did not have jurisdiction, the Tribunal allowed the
assessee’s appeal.

 

On appeal by the Revenue,
the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i) The issue of notice
u/s. 158BC of the Act, consequent to search is mandatory, as it is the very
foundation for jurisdiction. Therefore, the notice u/s. 158BC of the Act has
necessarily to be issued by a person who is the Assessing Officer and not by
any officer of the Income-tax Department.

 

ii) A
waiver would mean a case where a party decides not to exercise its right to a
particular privilege, available under the law. However, non-exercise of the
right or privilege will not bestow jurisdiction on a person who inherently
lacks jurisdiction. Therefore, the principle of waiver cannot be invoked so as
to confer jurisdiction on an officer who is acting under the Act when he does
not have jurisdiction. The Act itself prohibits an officer of income-tax from
exercising jurisdiction u/s. 158BC, unless he is an Assessing Officer. This
limit in the power of the Income-tax Officer in exercise of jurisdiction is
independent of the conduct of any party. Waiver can only be of irregular
exercise of jurisdiction and not of lack of jurisdiction.

 

iii) Transfer of
proceedings u/s. 127 of the Act cannot be retrospective so as to confer
jurisdiction on a person who does not have it. Section 127 of the Act does not
empower the authorities under the Act to confer jurisdiction on a person who does
not have jurisdiction with retrospective effect. Section 127 does not validate
notices or orders issued without jurisdiction, even if they are transferred to
a new officer by an order u/s. 127.

 

iv) The amendment by the
Finance Act, 2016 w.e.f. 01/06/2016 brings cases within the ambit of section
124(3) of the Act when notice is issued consequent to search u/s. 153A or
section 153C of the Act prohibiting an assessee from raising the issue of
jurisdiction. It does not include notices issued u/s. 158BC. Hence the time bar
u/s. 124(3) to question the jurisdiction of the Income-tax Officer would not
apply to the cases where return has been filed consequent to notice u/s. 158BC.

 

v) It was an undisputed
position that the return of income was filed declaring undisclosed income at
“nil” on 05/05/2000 in response to the notice dated 22/09/1999 issued u/s.
158BC of the Act and not consequent to notice u/s. 142(1)(i) of the Act which
was issued on 12/08/2000. The bar of section 124(3) of the Act, would not
prohibit the assessee from calling in question the jurisdiction of the Dy.
Commissioner, Nagpur in passing the assessment order beyond the period provided
therein.

 

vi) On 22/09/1999, when the
notice u/s. 158BC was issued by the Dy. Commissioner, Nagpur, he was not the
Assessing Officer of the assessee. The notice and the consequent assessment
were not valid.”

17. The Pr. CIT-6 vs. I-Ven Interactive Ltd [ Income tax Appeal no 94 of 2016, Dated: 27th June, 2018 (Bombay High Court)]. [ACIT-10(1) vs. I-Ven Interactive Ltd; dated 19/01/2015 ; ITA. No 1712/Mum/2011, AY: 2006-07 Mum. ITAT ] Section 143(2) : Assessment–Notice–Notice served on the old address- Assessment was held to be void [Section 292BB]

The assessee had filed its return
of income for A.Y 2006-07 giving its new address therein. However, the A.O
served the notice within the stipulated time u/s. 143(2) of the Act not on the
address in the return but upon the address in the PAN record. The above notice
sent by the Revenue within the prescribed time was not received by the assessee
as it ceased to be the address of the assessee. Thereafter, admittedly beyond
the time prescribed u/s. 143(2) of the Act, the notice was served upon the assessee.

 

During the Assessment proceedings,
the assessee did raise objections as to the jurisdiction to assess the
department u/s. 143(3) of the Act. However, the A.O did not accept it and
passed an order u/s. 143(3) of the Act.

 

The justification of the Revenue is
that, they served the notice dated 5th October, 2007 at the address
available in its PAN records. Therefore, the notice u/s. 143(2) of the Act sent
on the earlier address was correct. Besides, the assessee participated in the
assessment proceedings and their action is protected by section 292BB of the
Act.

Being aggrieved with the order of
the A.O, the assessee filed the Appeal before the CIT(A). The CIT(A) find that
the impugned statutory notices issued without jurisdiction. The notice u/s.
143(2) was not served to the assessee and therefore, the proceedings u/s.
143(2) were bad in law. In view of the assessee raising such objections during
assessment proceedings, the provisions of section 292BB were not applicable and
section 292BB could not have given validity to the illegality / irregularity of
the notices.

 

The CIT(A) held that the A.O
completed assessment u/s. 143(3) of the Act without assuming valid jurisdiction
u/s. 143(2) of the Act. In the facts and circumstances, the assessment framed
u/s. 143(3) of the Act was invalid.

Being aggrieved with the order of
the CIT(A), the Revenue filed the Appeal before the ITAT. ITAT upheld the CIT(A) order.

 

Being aggrieved with the order of
the ITAT, the Revenue filed the Appeal before the High Court. The Court
observed  that besides the return of
income indicating the new address, the appellant had by earlier letter dated 6th
December, 2005 intimated the change of its address to the A.O and also
requested a issue of fresh PAN. Besides, the A.O had infact served at the new
address, the assessment order u/s. 143(3) of the Act on 30th
November, 2006 in respect of AY: 2004-05. This was much prior to the statutory
notice issued on 5th October, 2007 and 25th July, 2008 at
the address of the assessee as recorded in the PAN. The Assessee had taken up
the objection with regard to non service of notice during the assessment
proceedings. Thus, as rightly held by the impugned order of the Tribunal that,
in view of the proviso to section 292(BB) of the Act, the notice not being
served within time, cannot be deemed to be valid. Therefore, no fault can be
found with the impugned order of the Tribunal. Accordingly, revenue Appeal
was  dismissed.

16. The Pr. CIT-9 vs. Agilisys IT Services India P. Ltd [ Income tax Appeal no 1361 of 2015, Dated: 12thJune, 2018 (Bombay High Court)]. [ITO V Agilisys IT Services India P. Ltd; dated 29/04/2015 ; ITA. No 2226/Mum/2011, AY 2003-04 Bench: K , Mum. ITAT ] Section 143(3) r.w.s 263 : Once the CIT(A) by its order had accepted the fact that the assessment order had gone beyond a scope of directions of the CIT u/s. 263 of the Act – there was no occasion for him to touch upon the merits of the issue

Assessee a 100% EOU is engaged in
the business of software development and export of software. In its return of
income, Assessee had claimed benefit of exemption u/s. 10B of the Act in
respect of its 100% EOU. The assessment was completed on 29th March,
2006 u/s.  143 (3) of the Act.

 

The CIT passed an revision order
u/s.  263 of the Act, holding that the
assessment order was erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of Revenue. This
to the extent exemption was allowed u/s. 10B of the Act in respect of non
receipt of foreign exchange within six months of exports and on the issue of
International Transactions in respect of Transfer Pricing of International
Transactions with Associated Enterprises (AE), not being referred to the
Transfer Pricing Officer (TPO) in terms of section 92CA of the Act. In the
light of the above, the CIT directed the A.O to finalise the assessment denovo,
on the above issues.

 

Consequent to the above order of
the CIT, the A.O proceeded to pass a fresh order. However, in the fresh order,
the A.O not only dealt with issue of exemption u/s. 10B of the Act in relation
to delay in realisation of foreign exchange and referred the matter to the TPO
but also dealt with the issue of reallocation of R & D Expenses for
claiming deduction u/s.  10B of the Act.

 

Being aggrieved by the order of
A.O, the Assessee carried the matter in appeal to the CIT(A). The CIT(A) by an
order, accepted the contention of the assessee that, the A.O had gone beyond
the issue which were directed to be considered denovo by the CIT in its
order u/s.263 of the Act. Therefore, to that extent, the order was without
jurisdiction. Notwithstanding the above finding, the CIT(A) proceeded further
to decide the issue, inter alia, with regard to R & D expenses on
merits, held that assessee is entitled to set off R & D expenses with the
profits of STIP units as the R & D expenses have a direct nexus with the
export business of the STIP unit.

 

Being aggrieved with the order of
the CIT(A), both the Revenue as well as assessee filed the Appeal to the
Tribunal. The Revenue in its appeal before the Tribunal, did not challenge the
finding of the CIT(A) that the order of the assessing officer dated 24th
December, 2009, was beyond the directions contained in the order dated 27th
September, 2007 passed by the CIT u/s. 263 of the Act and, therefore, without
jurisdiction. Nor did it urge this issue at the hearing before the Tribunal.
The Revenue’s only challenge was on the issue of allowing the set off of R
& D Expenses incurred in a non STIP Unit with STIP unit of the Respondent .

 

The Appellant’s basic contention
was that once the CIT(A) had by its order dated 12th January, 2011
had accepted the fact that the Assessment Order dated 24th December,
2009 had gone beyond a scope of directions of the CIT u/s. 263 of the Act,
there was no occasion for him to touch upon the merits of the issue. This as it
was beyond the scope of the directions of the CIT i.e. to the extent of set off
of R & D Expenses. The ITAT upheld the contention of the assessee.

 

Being aggrieved with the order of
the ITAT, the Revenue filed the Appeal before the High Court. The Court
observed that the Revenue has not challenged the finding of the CIT(A) that the
A.O has gone beyond the scope of directions given by the CIT(A) in its order
u/s. 263 of the Act. The issue now being urged by the Revenue in appeal. As
this was not an issue urged by them before the Tribunal, this question does not
arise from the order of the Tribunal.

 

Further the question as urged, is
beyond the issue raised before the Tribunal and cannot be urged before this
Court as held by this Court in CIT vs. Tata Chemicals 256 ITR 395. In
any case, it may be pointed out that the earlier Assessment Order dated 29th
March, 2006 has not been cancelled by the order of CIT u/s. 263 of the Act, for
passing a fresh Assessment Order. Once it is not disputed by the Revenue before
the Tribunal that, the order of the A.O on set off of R & D Expenses was
beyond the scope of the directions given by the CIT in exercise of its power
u/s. 263 of the Act, the occasion to examine the correctness of the same, would
not arise. Accordingly, the  Appeal
was  dismissed.

54. Dimension Data Asia Pacific PTE Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT; [2018] 96 taxmann.com 182 (Bom): Date of order: 6th July, 2018: A. Y.: 2011-12 Section 144C r.w.s. 143(3) – Transfer pricing – Reference to DRP (Draft assessment order) – Where in case of foreign assessee, Assessing Officer passed final assessment order u/s. 144C(13), read with section 143(3) without passing a draft assessment order u/s. 144C(1), said order being violative of provisions of section 144C(1), deserved to be set aside

The assessee was a foreign company
entitled to the procedure provided u/s. 144C. For relevant year assessee filed
its return declaring nil income. The Assessing Officer passed assessment order
u/s. 143(3) r.w.s. 144C(13) making certain addition to assessee’s income. The
assessee filed writ petition raising a contention that it was entitled to a
draft assessment order being passed u/s. 144C(1) before the final assessment
order as passed in this case u/s. 143(3) r.w.s. 144C(13) since the impugned
order ignored the mandate of section 144C same deserved be set aside.

 

The Bombay High Court allowed the
writ petition and held as under:

 

“i)  It
is an undisputed position that the assessee is a foreign company and an
eligible assessee as defined in section 144C(15)(b)(ii) of the Act. A foreign
company is entitled to being assessed in accordance with section 144C of the
Act. It is the section 144C, which provides a separate scheme for the manner in
which the Assessing Officer would pass assessment orders under the Act and a
separate procedure to challenge a draft order i.e. before an assessment order
which is subject to appeal under the Act is passed.

 

ii) The
entire object is to ensure that the disputes of Foreign Companies are resolved
expeditiously and final assessment orders are not passed without a re-look to
the proposed order (draft order), if so desired by the Foreign Company. In
essence, it obliges the Assessing Officer to first pass a draft of the proposed
assessment order indicating the proposed variation in the income returned. This
draft Assessment Order is to be passed u/s. 144C(1) of the Act, which entitles
an eligible assessee such as a Foreign Company to approach the DRP with its
objection to the draft assessment order. This is so provided, so that an
eligible assessee can have his grievance addressed before the final assessment
order is passed. In case, an assessee does not object to the draft assessment
order, then a final assessment order is passed in terms of the draft assessment
order by the Assessing Officer. It is only on passing of the final assessment
order that the assessee, if aggrieved by it, would be able to approach the
appellate authorities under the Act. These special rights are made available
u/s. 144C to an eligible assessee such as the assessee. Therefore, it cannot be
ignored by passing a final order u/s. 144(13) of the Act without preceding it
with a draft assessment order as required therein.

 

iii) The contention of the revenue that the requirement of passing a
draft assessment order u/s. 144C of the Act would only extend to the orders
passed in the first round of proceedings or in respect of an order passed by
the Assessing Officer in remand proceedings by the Tribunal which has entirely
set aside the original assessment order. This distinction which is sought to be
drawn by the revenue is not borne out by section 144C of the Act. In fact, even
in partial remand proceedings from the Tribunal, the Assessing Officer is
obliged to pass a draft assessment order u/s. 144C(1) of the Act. The Assessing
Officer, is obliged to, in terms of section 144C to pass a draft assessment
order in all cases where he proposes to assess the Foreign Company under the
Act by making a variation in the returned income.

 

iv) In
this case, the impugned order has been passed in terms of section 143(3) read
with section 144C read with section 254 of the Act and it certainly makes a
variation to the returned income filed by the assessee. This even if, one
proceeds on the basis that the returned income stands varied by the order of
the Tribunal in the first round, to the extent the petitioner accepts it.
Therefore, the Assessing Officer correctly invokes section 144C of the Act in
the impugned order. Once having invoked section 144C, the Assessing Officer is
obliged to comply with it in full and not partly. This impugned order was
passed consequent to the order of the Tribunal restoring some of the issues before
it to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication.

 

v) This
‘fresh adjudication’ itself would imply that it would be an order which would
decide the lis between the parties, may not be entire lis, but
the dispute which has been restored to the Assessing Officer. The impugned
order is not an order merely giving an effect to the order of the Tribunal, but
it is an assessment order which has invoked section 143(3) of the Act and also
section 144C of the Act. This invocation of section 144C of the Act has taken
place as the Assessing Officer is of the view that it applies, then the
requirement of section 144C(1) of the Act has to be complied with before he can
pass the impugned order invoking section 144C(13) of the Act.

 

vi) In
fact, section 144C(13) of the Act can only be invoked in cases where the
assessee has approached the DRP in terms of s/s. 144C(2)(b) of the Act and the
DRP gives direction in terms of section 144C(5) of the Act. In this case, the
assessment order has invoked section 144C(13) of the Act without having passed
the necessary draft assessment order u/s. 144C(1) of the Act, which alone would
make a direction u/s. 144C(5) of the Act by the DRP possible. Thus, the
impugned order is completely without jurisdiction.

 

vii) Moreover, so far as a foreign company is concerned, the
Parliament has provided a special procedure for its assessment and appeal in
cases where the Assessing Officer does not accept the returned income. In this
case, in the working out of the order of the Tribunal results in the returned
income being varied, then the procedure of passing a draft assessment order
u/s. 144C(1) of the Act is mandatory and has to be complied with, which has not
been done.

 

viii)  In the above view, the impugned order has
been passed without complying with the mandatory requirements of section 144C
of the Act which is applicable to a foreign company such as the assessee.
Therefore, the impugned order is quashed and set aside.”

53. CIT vs. Shark Roadways Pvt. Ltd.; 405 ITR 78 (All): Date of order: 1st May, 2017: A. Y.: 2008-09 Sections 40(a)(ia) and 194C – TDS – Payments to contractors – Payment of hire charges – No contract between assessee and parties of hired vehicles on freight basis for transportation on behalf of principal – Transporters not contractors or sub-contractors – No liability to deduct tax at source

For the A. Y. 2008-09, the
Assessing Officer made additions to the assessee’s income on the ground that
the assessee was a transporter and not trader, and therefore, provisions of
section 194C of the Act were applicable to the hire charges paid by it to the
parties whom the lorries or trucks were hired.

 

The Commissioner (Appeals) called
upon the assessee to produce copies of challans and after verifying them found
that section 194C was not attracted. He found that for the fulfillment of its
transportation commitment to its principals, the assessee, besides using its
own trucks and lorries was also hiring trucks and lorries from other owners or
directly from the drivers available in the market through brokers on a random
basis as and when required on freight basis. He further found that the payments
of hire charges were made directly by the assessee to those transporters without
there being any written or oral contract, vis-à-vis its principal. He held that
the payment of lorry hire charges to individual transporters was part of the
direct costs attributable to the receipts of the assessee, computable u/s. 28
and that in the absence of any evidence, it could not be said that the
individual truck owners or drivers of transporters were contractors or
sub-contractors of the assessee. Consequently, he held that the payments made
to such transporters hired by the assessee were not in the nature of payments
to contractors or sub-contractors within the meaning of section 194C. The
Tribunal affirmed the findings of the Commissioner (Appeals) and held that the
provisions of section 194C did not apply.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the
Allahabad High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i)  The
learned counsel for the appellant (Department) could not show that the
Assessing Officer while taking the view against the assessee by reference to
section 194C recorded his findings based on any evidence whatsoever and we find
that it was only on assumption.

 

ii)  It
is for this reason the findings of the Assessing Officer have been reversed by
the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal. These are concurrent findings of
fact and when vouchers otherwise were verifiable, we find no reason to take an
otherwise view in the matter.

 

iii)  The question is answered against the appellant, i.e., the Revenue.
The appeal lacks merit.”

52. Banco Products (India) Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT; 405 ITR 318 (Guj): Date of order: 26th March, 2018: A. Y.: 2008-09 Section 35(2AB) – Scientific research expenditure – Weight deduction – Condition precedent for weighted deduction u/s. 35(2AB) – Date of approval not relevant – Application for approval in December 2006 and approval granted in October 2008 – Assessee entitled to weighted deduction in A. Y. 2008-09

The assessee claimed weighted
deduction u/s. 35(2AB) of the Act on the expenditure incurred for setting up
research and development facility. This was supported by the approval granted
by the concerned authority with respect to such facility. The Assessing Officer
was of the opinion that such deduction could not be granted for the period
prior to the effective date
of approval.

 

The Commissioner (Appeals) upheld
the decision of the Assessing Officer. The Tribunal took the view that the
facts were somewhat contradictory. It was not clear when the application for
approval was made and when actually approval was granted. The Tribunal
therefore, remanded the proceedings for fresh consideration by the Assessing
Officer.

 

On appeal by the assessee, the
Gujarat High Court held as under:

 

“i) Section 35(2AB) of the Act is
aimed at promoting development of in-house research and development facility
which necessarily would require substantial expenditure which immediately may
not yield desired results or be correlated to generation of additional revenue.
By very nature of things, research and development is a hit and miss exercise.
Much of the efforts, capital as well as human investment may go waste if the
research is not successful. The Legislature therefore, having granted special
deduction for such expenditure, it should be seen in the light of the purpose
for which it has been recognised. Research and development facility can be set
up only after incurring substantial expenditure. The application for approval
of such facility can be made only after setting up of such facility. Once an
application is filed by the assessee to the prescribed authority, the assessee
would have no control over when such application is processed and decided. Even
if therefore, the application is complete in all respects and the assessee is
otherwise eligible for grant of such approval, approval may take some time to
come by.  

 

ii)    The
claim for deduction cannot be defeated on the ground that such approval was
granted in the year subsequent to the financial year in which the expenditure
was incurred. In order to avail of the deduction u/s. 35(2AB) what is relevant
is not the date of recognition or the cut off date mentioned in the certificate
of the prescribed authority or even the date of approval, but the existence of
recognition.

 

iii)   The Assessing Officer was not right in restricting the deduction
to expenditure incurred prior to April 1, 2008. He had to recomputed such
deduction and give its effect to the assessee for the relevant assessment year.

 

iv)   In
the result, the appeal is allowed. The question is answered in favour of the
assessee. Decision of the Assessing Officer to restrict the assessee’s claim
for deduction on the expenditure which was incurred prior to April 1, 2008 is
set aside. The Assessing Officer shall recomputed such deduction and give its
effect to the assesee for the relevant assessment year.”

51. Ashokbhai Jagubhai Kheni vs. Dy. CIT (Appeals); 405 ITR 179 (Guj); Date of order: 12th March, 2018: A. Ys.: 2011-12, 2013-14 and 2014-15 Section 220(6) and CBDT Circulars – Recovery of tax – Stay of recovery pending appeal – Circular by CBDT that 15% of disputed demand to be deposited for stay – Permits decrease or even increase in percentage of disputed tax demand to be deposited – Requirement reduced to 7.5% on further condition of security for remaining 7.5% to satisfaction of Assessing Authority

For A. Ys. 2011-12, 2013-14 and
2014-15, the Assessing Officer raised a total demand of Rs. 30 crore. The
Assessee filed appeals before the Commissioner (Appeals) and requested for stay
of the demand pending appeals u/s. 220(6) of the Act. The Assessing Officer
required the assessee to deposit 15% of the disputed tax demand, upon which,
the recovery of the remaining amount would be stayed. The assessee approached
the Principal Commissioner, who refused to grant any further relief to the
assessee.

 

The Gujarat High Court allowed the
writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

 

“i)  The
issue of granting stay of pending appeals is governed principally by two
circulars issued by the CBDT. The first circular was issued on 02/02/1993 being
Instruction No. 1914.

 

The circular contained guidelines
for staying the demand pending appeal, stating that the demand would be stayed
if there are valid reasons for doing so and mere filing of appeal against the
order of assessment would not be sufficient reason to stay the recovery of
demand. The instructions issued under office memorandum dated 29/02/2016 are
not in supersession of Instruction of Instruction No. 1914 but are in partial
modification thereof. This circular thus lays down 15% of the disputed demand to
be deposited for stay, by way of a general condition.

 

The circular does not prohibit or
envisage that there can be no deviation from this standard formula. In other
words, it is inbuilt in the circular itself that the percentage of the disputed
tax to be deposited could be either decreased or even increased for an assessee
to enjoy stay pending appeal. The circular provides the guidelines to enable
Assessing Officers and Commissioners to exercise such discretionary powers more
uniformly.

 

ii)   The
total tax demand was quite high. Even 15% of the disputed tax dues would run
into several crores of rupees. Considering such facts and circumstances, the
requirement of depositing the disputed tax dues was to be reduced to 7.5% in
order to enable the assessee to enjoy stay of pending appeals before the
Commissioner. This would however be on a further condition that he should offer
immovable security for the remaining 7.5% to the satisfaction of the assessing
authority.

 

iii)  The order passed by the Principal Commissioner was to be modified
accordingly. Both these conditions should be satisfied by April 30, 2018.”

50. Principal CIT vs. Geetaben Chandulal Prajapati; [2018] 96 taxmann.com 100 (Guj) : Date of order: 10th July, 2018: A. Y.: 2006-07 Section 271(1)(c) and 275(1A) – Penalty – Concealment of income – Where penalty proceeding initiated against assessee were dropped after considering reply submitted by assessee, Assessing Officer was not justified in initiating fresh penalty proceedings on same set of facts

The assessee did not file the
return of income for the year under consideration, though she received a total
sum of Rs. 62 lakh out of the sale consideration for sale of the land and
thereafter she filed the return of income only after notice u/s. 148 of the Act
and offered the aforesaid amount to tax. The income was assessed at Rs. 62
lakh. However, the Assessing Officer also initiated the penalty proceedings to
which the assessee filed the reply. The Assessing Officer dropped the penalty
proceedings considering the reply submitted by the assessee. Against the
assessment order the assessee filed appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals).
The said appeal came to be dismissed by the Commissioner (Appeals). Thereafter,
the Assessing Officer issued the fresh notice to the assessee for imposing the
penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) and passed the order imposing the penalty u/s.
271(1)(c).

 

On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals)
cancelled the penalty levied u/s. 271(1)(c). The Tribunal confirmed the order
of the Commissioner (Appeals).

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the
Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i) 
It can be said that fresh penalty proceedings are permissible only with
a view to give effect to the order of the higher Forum revising the assessment
and a fresh penalty order can be passed and/or penalty can be imposed,
enhancing, reducing or canceling the penalty or dropping the proceedings for
the imposition of the penalty on the basis of the assessment as revised by
giving effect to such order of the Commissioner (Appeals) …. etc.

 

ii) 
Therefore, in a case where the assessment was not required to be revised
pursuant to the order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) or the Appellate
Tribunal or the High Court or the Supreme Court, as the case may be, the power
u/s. 275(1A) cannot be exercised and the fresh penalty proceedings cannot be
initiated once earlier the penalty proceedings were dropped after considering
the reply submitted by the assessee, as there is no revised assessment which is
required to be giving effect to. Therefore, it is to be noted that the
Commissioner (Appeals) as well as the Tribunal are justified in deleting the
penalty imposed u/s. 271(1)(c) faced with a situation that earlier the penalty
proceedings were dropped after considering the reply submitted by the assessee
and that thereafter the assessment was not required to be revised giving effect
to the order passed by the learned Commissioner (Appeals) as the Commissioner
(Appeals) simply confirmed the assessment order determining the income at Rs.
62 lakh. In the facts and circumstances of the case narrated herein above, the
order passed by the Tribunal deleting the penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) is to be
confirmed.

 

iii)  No substantial question of law arises and
hence, present Tax Appeal deserves to be dismissed.”

49. Kalanithi Maran vs. Union of India; 405 ITR 356 (Mad): Date of order: 28th March, 2018 Sections 2(35)(b) and 276B – Offences and prosecution – TDS – Failure to pay tax deducted at source to Revenue – Company – Principal officer – Non-executive chairman not involved in day-to-day affairs of company – Managing director admitting liability and entering into negotiations with Revenue – Prosecution of non-executive chairman – Not valid

Criminal proceedings u/s. 276B of
the Act were initiated against a company for non-payment of tax deducted at
source. Notice was issued to the petitioner who was the non-executive chairman
of the company treating him as the principal officer of the company and an
order was also passed.

 

The non-executive chairman filed a
writ petition and challenged the said action against him. The Madras High Court
allowed the writ petition and held as under:

 

“i)  U/s.
2(35)(b) of the Act, the Assessing Officer can serve notice only to persons who
are connected with the management or administration of the company to treat
them as principal officer. Section 278B states that it shall not render any
such person liable to any punishment, if he proves that offence was committed
without his knowledge.

 

ii)  The
assessee had stated that he was not involved in the day-to-day affairs of the
company and that he was only a non-executive chairman and not involved in the
management and administration of the company. The managing director himself had
specifically stated that he was the person in charge of the day-to-day affairs
of the company.

 

iii)  The second respondent, while passing the order naming the assessee
as the principal officer had not given any reason for rejecting the contention
of the managing director. The second respondent without any reason had named
the assessee as the principal officer. Merely because the assessee was the
non-executive chairman, it could not be stated that he was in charge of the
day-to-day affairs, management and administration of the company.

 

The second respondent should have
given the reasons for not accepting the case of the managing director as well
as the petitioner in their respective reply. The conclusion of the second
respondent that the assessee being a chairman and major decisions were taken in
the company under his administration was not supported by any material evidence
or any legally sustainable reasons. The second respondent had not produced any
material to establish that the petitioner was responsible for the day-to-day
affairs of the company.

 

iv) In
the absence of any material, the second respondent should not have come to the
conclusion that the assessee was the principal officer. The order which held
the assessee as the principal officer of the company and therefore, liable to
be prosecuted for the alleged default of the company u/s. 276B was not valid.”

48. CIT vs. Bhatia General Hospital; 405 ITR 24 (Bom): Date of order: 26th February, 2018: A. Y.: 2007-08 Sections 11, 32(1)(iii) and 37 – Charitable purpose – Hospital – Equipment – Equipment which had outlived its useful life – Depreciation – Government rules prohibiting sale as scrap – Additional depreciation allowable – Computation of income – On commercial principles

The assessee was a charitable
trust, running a hospital. For the A. Y. 2007-08, the Assessing Officer
disallowed the assessee’s claim to additional depreciation on the hospital
equipment, which had completed their usefulness of 10 years. It was submitted
by the assessee that the claim was only for the purpose of writing off the
value of the assets. However, the Assessing Officer held that in a case where the
assets had outlived their useful life, they should have been sold as scrap and
in the absence of such evidence, disallowed the claim of additional
depreciation.

 

The Commissioner (Appeals) held
that the income of the trust was required to be computed on commercial
principles and allowed the assessee’s claim to additional depreciation. The
Tribunal recorded that the additional depreciation had been claimed by the
assessee in respect of hospital equipment which had outlived its life and that
according to the Government rules the assessee was prohibited from selling such
hospital equipment as scrap and upheld the order of the Commissioner (Appeals)
and reiterated the fact that the income of the trust had to be computed on
commercial principles.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the
Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i)  According
to the provisions of section 32(1)(iii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, where a
plant and machinery was discarded or destroyed in the previous year, the amount
of money received on sale as such or as scrap or any insurance amount received
to the extent it fell short of the written down value was allowed as
depreciation, provided the same was written off in the books of account.

 

ii)   The
assessee could not sell the hospital equipment as scrap nor it could use the
hospital equipment. Therefore, the written down value of the hospital
equipment, was to be allowed as depreciation, as the asset had been written off
from its books of account. Thus, the nomenclature, as additional depreciation
rather than depreciation, was the only objection of the Department and the
nomenclature could not decide a claim.

 

iii)  It was also allowable as business u/s. 37 as it was an expenditure
incurred wholly and exclusively for carrying out its activity as hospital.(on
commercial principles).”

47. Jayantilal Investments vs. ACIT; [2018] 96 taxmann.com 38 (Bom): Date of order: 4th July, 2018 A. Y.: 1988-89 Section 36(1)(iii) – Business expenditure – Interest on borrowed capital – Where assessee, engaged in construction business, purchased plot of land out of borrowed funds for implementation of a project, since plot of land was purchased in course of business of assessee, same formed part of its stock-in-trade, and, therefore, interest paid on borrowings for purchase of said land was to be allowed as revenue expenditure

The assessee partnership firm was
engaged in construction activity. The assessee had taken a loan to purchase
open plot of land for its project named, ‘LS’. The assessee had claimed an
amount paid as interest on said loan as revenue expenditure. The Assessing
Officer held that purchase of plot of land was capital in nature. Hence,
interest must also be capitalised. Thus, he disallowed the deduction on amount
being interest paid on loan for acquisition of land.

 

On appeal, the Commissioner
(Appeals) found that interest paid on borrowings for purchase of land was
allowed as revenue expenditure in the earlier assessment years and it was only
in the subject assessment year that the Assessing Officer for the first time
treated the same as work-in-progress and capitalised the same. He held that the
interest paid on the loan taken for the purpose of its stock-in-trade, i.e.,
plot of land for the ‘LS’ project had to be allowed as expenditure to determine
its income. Consequently, he deleted the disallowance made by the Assessing
Officer. The Tribunal held that crucial question to be decided was whether the
assessee could be said to have commenced work on project ‘LS’ during the
previous year relevant to subject assessment year. On facts it held that the
assessee had not shown any work had commenced on LS project plot of land during
the previous year relevant to the subject assessment year. Thus, the Tribunal
concluded that the Assessing Officer was justified in coming to conclusion that
interest expenditure in respect to ‘LS’ project (plot of land) could not be
allowed as revenue expenditure.

 

On appeal by the assessee, the
Bombay High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i)  In
view of section 36(1)(iii) as existing prior to amendment with effect from
1-4-2004 all interest paid in respect of capital borrowed for the purpose of
business or profession has to be allowed as deduction while computing income
under head ‘income from business’. Prior to amendment made on 1-4-2004, there
was no distinction based on whether the borrowing is for purchase of capital
asset or otherwise, interest was allowable as deduction in determining the
taxable income. It was only after introduction of proviso to section 36(1)(iii)
with effect from 1-4-2004 that the purpose of borrowing, i.e., acquisition of
assets then interest paid would be capitalised. In this case, concern is with
the A. Y. 1988-89, i.e., prior to amendment by addition of proviso to section
36(1)(iii). Therefore, the interest paid on the borrowings to purchase the plot
of land for LS project is allowable as a deduction u/s. 36(1)(iii) as it was
incurred for the purposes of its business.

 

ii)   The
revenue’s submission is that the deduction u/s. 36(1)(iii) will not be
available as no income has been earned in respect of LS project. This cannot be
appreciated. It is an undisputed position that the appellant-assessee has filed
return of income declaring income under the head income from business. The
assessee has various projects executing construction projects and, therefore,
interest expenditure is to be allowed as deduction to arrive at profits and
gains of business or profession of builders carried out by the assessee. It is
not a case where the only project of the assessee was the LS project.
Admittedly, in this case the business of the assessee as developer had already
commenced and income offered to tax.

 

iii)  In the above view, substantial question of law is answered in
negative, i.e., in favour of the appellant-assessee and against the
respondent-revenue.”

Section 45: Capital gains –Business income- Investment in shares- A company can have two portfolio – investor and a trader at the same time- Investment was held to be assessable as short term capital gains. [Section 28i)]

10. The Pr. CIT-12 vs. Business Match Services (I)
Pvt. Ltd [ Income tax Appeal no 699 of 2016  Dated: 27th November, 2018 (Bombay High Court)].

 

 [Business Match Services (I) Pvt. Ltd vs.
DCIT; dated 19/08/2015 ; ITA. No 7267/M/2010, AY: 2007-08 and 2008-09, Bench B,
Mum. ITAT ]

 

Section
45: Capital gains –Business income- Investment in shares- A company can have
two portfolio – investor and a trader at the same time- Investment was held to
be assessable as short term capital gains. [Section 28i)]


The assessee company is engaged in the business of providing
consultancy services in the field of private placement of shares to foreign
institutional investors, financial institutions.


During the two years under consideration, the assessee also dealt in
purchase and sale of shares. It declared a portion of profits arising on sale
of shares as Short term Capital Gain (STCG) and the remaining portion was offered
as its business income, i.e. the assessee has maintained separate portfolios
for investment and trading assets. In both the years under consideration, the
AO did not agree with the claim of STCG declared by the assessee and
accordingly assessed the same as business income. 


The CIT(A) confirmed the view of the A.O, upon which, the issue
reached the Tribunal at the hands of the Assessee.


Being aggrieved with the order of the CIT(A), the assessee filed the
Appeal before ITAT. The Tribunal find that the AO has considered all the shares
together to take the view that the assessee has indulged in trading in shares.
However, the fact remains that the assessee itself has offered gains arising on
shares held as trading stock as its business income. The assessee has claimed
the gains arising on sale of Adani Enterprises Limited only as Short Term
Capital Gain with the claim that it has held the same as its investment. It is
now well settled proposition that a person is entitled to maintain two separate
portfolios, one for its investment and another one for its trading assets. For
this proposition, it relied on to the Circular No.4/2007 dated 15/06/2007
issued by the CBDT and also the decision rendered by Hon’ble High Court
in the case of Gopal Purohit (2010) (228 CTR 582)
. In the instant case,
the A.O has not disproved the claim of the assessee that it has maintained two
different portfolios as discussed above. Even though the Ld. CIT(A) has
observed that the question whether transactions were in the nature of trade or
otherwise is largely dependent upon the facts of each case, yet we are of the
view that the Ld CIT(A) has not properly appreciated the facts prevailing in
the instant case. The Tribunal held that the intention of the assessee at the
time of purchase of shares of Adani Enterprises Limited was to hold it as its
investments. The A.O has not brought any material on record to show the
contrary, which means that the AO has arrived at the adverse conclusion only on
surmises. Accordingly, the gains arising on its sale should be assessed as
Short term capital gains only. Accordingly, the gains arising on sale of shares
of Adani Enterprises Limited under the head “Income from Capital gains.” In the
earlier year also, Assessee had claimed capital gain out of its sale of shares.
Same was accepted by the A.O.


Being aggrieved with the order of the ITAT, the Revenue filed the
Appeal before High Court. The Court observed that the dispute pertains only to
one scrip namely the shares of M/s. Adani Enterprise Ltd., Assessee had
purchased the shares in installments and after holding them for some time, sold
them also in installments. Thus, there were no instances of repetitive purchase
and sale of shares. From the balance sheet, it could be gathered that the
Assessee had used its own funds or interest free funds, borrowed from the
Directors of the Company in order to purchase the shares. The Assessee had
taken physical delivery of the shares and in the books of account, treated the
same as an investment. Inter alia, on said grounds, Tribunal had ruled in
favour of the Assessee. Whether the purchase and sale of shares is in the
nature of investment or business venture, would depend on facts and
circumstances of each case. There are judicially laid down guidelines and parameters
to judge whether in a case, the sale of shares would give rise to business
income or capital gain. In the present case, the Tribunal has applied the
correct parameters to the facts, emerging from the record. The revenue appeal
was dismissed.

 

TAXABILITY OF LOAN WAIVER POST SC DECISION IN CASE OF MAHINDRA & MAHINDRA

Introduction 

The decision
of the Supreme Court (SC) in the case of Commissioner vs. Mahindra &
Mahindra Ltd
.1
(Mahindra’s case) is a landmark ruling in the context of tax treatment
of loan waiver benefit obtained by a tax payer. The SC held that such waiver is
neither taxable as business perquisite u/s. 28(iv)2  of the Income-tax Act 1961 (ITA), nor taxable
as remission of trading liability u/s. 41(1)3 of the ITA.

 

The SC delivered the judgement after hearing a
batch of connected appeals with the lead case being that of Mahindra. In most
cases before the SC, the loan was utilised by the assessee for acquiring capital
assets (including in Mahindra’s case). But, there were also cases where the
loan was utilised by the assessee for working capital purposes. The SC has
delivered the judgment by analysing the fact pattern of Mahindra’s case as the
lead case.

 

To understand
the controversy in greater detail, it is worthwhile to revisit the history of
judicial development on this aspect.

 

OLD ENGLISH RULING ON NON – TAXABILITY OF REMISSION OF LIABILITY

 

As far back
as 1932, the House of Lords in the British Mexican Petroleum Company Limited
vs. The Commissioners of Inland Revenue
4 (British case) dealt
with a case where the tax payer used to purchase raw material from a supplier
who was also the promoter of the company. At a later date, there was remission
or waiver of indebtedness (including indebtedness which arose due to supplies
effected during the year of remission). The release from liability was not
regarded as a ‘trading receipt’. The Court held “how on earth the
forgiveness in that year of a past indebtedness can add to those profits, I
cannot understand”.

_________________________________________

1   [2018]
404 ITR 1

2   Section
28(iv) of the ITA provides for taxation under the head ‘Profits and gains from
Business or Profession’ of value of any benefit or perquisite whether
convertible into money or not arising from business or profession

3   Section
41(1) of the ITA provides for business taxation of any loss, expenditure or
trading liability which is claimed in past years in the year of remission or
cessation of such loss, expenditure or trading liability.

4   (16
Tax Cases 570) (HL)

 

 

BRITISH CASE FOLLOWED BY INDIAN JUDICIARY

In the case
of Mohsin Rehman Penkar vs. CIT5 before the Bombay High Court
(HC), there was waiver of loan (including waiver of interest expense
component).Following the ratio of the British case, the Bombay HC held “it
is impossible to see how a mere remission which leads to the discharge of the
liability of the debtor can ever become income for the purposes of taxation”
.

 

The ratio of these decisions was followed in the
following illustrative cases dealing with (a) waiver of a trading liability,
e.g. payable towards trading goods, or interest expense, allowed as deduction
from income, (b) waiver of a loan used for working capital purposes, and (c)
waiver of loan used for fixed capital.

 

Illustratively,
the following cases dealt with waiver of trading liability:

  •    Agarchand Chunnilal vs.
    CIT [1948] 16 ITR 430 (Nagpur HC) (A.Y. 1943-44)
  •   C.I.T. vs. Kerala Estate
    Moorlad Chalapuram [1986] 161 ITR 155(SC)(A.Y. 1964-65)

 

Further,
the  following cases dealt with waiver of
loan used for trading purposes:

  •   CIT vs. Phool Chand Jiwan
    Ram [1995] 131 ITR 37 (Delhi)(A.Y. 1957-58)

 

Further, the
following cases dealt with waiver of loan used for fixed capital purposes:

  •    Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd
    vs. CIT [2003] 261 ITR 501(Bom HC) (A.Y. 1976-77);
  •    Iskraemeco Regent Ltd vs.
    CIT [2010] 331 ITR 317(Mad HC (A.Y. 2001-02).

5     [1948] 16 ITR
183

 

 

 

STATUTORY INTERVENTION TO OVERCOME THE RATIO OF BRITISH CASE RESTRICTED TO REMISSION OF TRADING LIABILITY

To overcome
the ratio of British case, a new s/s. (2A) was added in section 10 of the
Indian Income-tax Act 1922 (erstwhile ITA), whereby waiver of trading liability
was expressly made liable to tax by treating the waiver or remission as profits
and gains of business chargeable to tax as such.

 

Section 41(1)
of ITA is successor to section 10(2A) of the erstwhile ITA. Section 41(1)
fictionally treats any amount or benefit received by way of remission or
cessation in respect of loss, expenditure or trading liability allowed in any
past year as profits and gains of business or profession. The fiction is
attracted regardless of discontinuance of business in respect of which the
allowance or deduction was originally made.

 

The question
whether section 41(1) is wide enough to overrule decisions like Phool Chand (supra)
dealing with non-taxability of loan used for working capital became the subject
matter of debate which is discussed a little later in
this article.

 

JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS FAVOURING NON TAXABILITY OF WAIVER OF FIXED CAPITAL LOAN

The judicial
development in context of non-taxability of waiver of loan utilised for fixed
capital like plant and machinery has been quite consistent. The Courts
consistently held that such waiver is neither taxable u/s. 28(iv) of the ITA as
a business perquisite nor taxable u/s. 41(1) of the ITA. Refer, the following
illustrative cases:

  •    Mahindra & Mahindra
    Ltd vs. CIT (supra);
  •   Narayan Chattiar Industries
    vs. ITO [2007] 277 ITR 426(Mad HC);
  •    CIT vs. Chetan Chemicals Pvt
    Ltd [2004] 267 ITR 770(Guj HC) (A.Y. 1982-83);
  •    Iskraemeco Regent Ltd vs. CIT
    (supra);

 

An aberration
to this trend was the Madras HC ruling in the case of CIT vs. Ramaniyam
Homes
6  which after
considering the earlier rulings including its own decision in the case of
Iskraemeco Regent (supra) held that waiver of loan has ‘monetary value’
and is, therefore, taxable u/s. 28(iv) of the ITA.

_________________________________

6     [2016] 384 ITR 530 (A.Y. 2006-07)

 

 

JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS FAVOURING NON TAXABILITY OF WAIVER OF WORKING CAPITAL LOAN

The Bangalore
Income-tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) in the case of Comfund Financial
Services (I) Ltd vs. DCIT
7  held
that section 41(1) of the ITA does not capture remission of a loan liability
used for working capital purposes.

 

In that case,
Deutsche Bank (DB) was one of the promoters of the tax payer company. It also
acted as banker to the tax payer company. DB had extended huge overdraft
facilities to the tax payer company. During the year under reference (A.Y.
1983-84), the outstanding on account of principal amount was Rs. 44.70 crore
and the outstanding on account of interest was Rs. 2.60 crore.

 

On account of huge losses suffered by the tax
payer company, DB decided to write off the above outstanding. In the assessment
of the tax payer, there was no dispute as regards taxability of write-back of
interest amount of Rs. 2.60 crore which was offered to tax u/s. 41(1) of the
ITA. The write-back of principal amount of Rs. 44.70 crore was not offered by
the tax payer to tax on the ground that section 41(1) of the ITA did not apply
to such write-back. However, the Tax Department’s contention was that the
overdraft facility was used to buy securities on trading account, and the cost
of security was allowed as deduction.

 

The ITAT did
not accept the contentions of the Tax Department and held that neither section
41(1) nor section 28(iv) of the ITA was applicable to the facts of the case.
The ITAT, drawing distinction between trading transactions of the tax payer
comprising of purchase of securities and the loan transactions with DB, held that
the remission of loan does not constitute revenue income in the hands of the
tax payer.

 

JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS FAVOURING TAXABILITY OF WAIVER OF WORKING CAPITAL LOAN

However, the
tide turned against the tax payer with the Bombay HC ruling in the case of Solid
Containers Ltd vs. DCIT
8 which held that waiver of working
capital loan is taxable as income. The Bombay HC distinguished its earlier
ruling in the case of Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. (supra) where waiver
of loan used for acquiring capital assets was held to be non-taxable u/s. 41(1)
or section 28(iv) of the ITA. The Bombay HC ruling was followed by the Delhi HC
in the case of Rollatainers Ltd. vs. CIT9  and Logitronics (P.) Ltd. vs. CIT10  where the Delhi HC distinguished between
waiver of loan used for acquiring fixed assets and loan used for working
capital purposes. The Delhi HC held that waiver of loan used for acquiring
fixed assets is not taxable, whereas waiver of loan used for working capital
purposes is taxable as income. While in the case of Solid Containers and
Rollatainers (supras), the taxability was confirmed u/s. 28(iv) of the
ITA, in the case of Logitronics (supra) it is not clear whether the
taxability was confirmed u/s. 41(1) or section 28(iv) of the ITA. None of the
decisions considered the amount to be a chargeable receipt w.r.t section 28(i)
of the ITA, and, with respect, correctly so.

 

__________________________________

7   [1998]
67 ITD 304 (A.Y. 1983-84)

8   [2009]
308 ITR 417

 

 

While
sustaining taxability, the Bombay and Delhi HCs relied on SC decisions in the
cases of CIT vs. T.V. Sundaram Iyengar & Sons Ltd.11 and CIT
vs. Karamchand Thapar
12 for their conclusion on taxability of
waiver of working capital loan. Hence, it is necessary to understand the
purport of these SC rulings.

 

The SC in
Sundaram’s case (supra) held that if the amount is received as trading
transactions, even though it is not taxable in the year of receipt as being of
capital character, the amount changes its character when the amount becomes the
tax payer’s own money because of limitation or by any other statutory or
contractual right. 

 

In the case
of Karamchand (supra), the tax payer was acting as a delcredre agent of
collieries and also as an agent for purchase of coal. Excess collections from
the customers for payment of railways remained unclaimed with the tax payer and
the Tax authority sought to tax the same as revenue income. In this case, the
SC upheld taxability on the reasoning that the initial receipt from the
customers was on trading account as a part of trading transaction. Excess
remaining with the tax payer was a normal feature of the regular business of
the tax payer. The SC held that “we do not see the case as a case of
transaction on capital account; it is a simple case where trading receipts were
more than expenditure”.

___________________________

9 [2011] 339 ITR 54

10 [2011] 333 ITR 386

11 [1996] 222 ITR 344

12[1996] 222 ITR 112

 

 

Having regard
to the context before the SC in the above rulings, with utmost respect, the
authors believe that reliance on these SC cases was not apt. These SC cases are
distinguishable from loan waiver case inasmuch as the SC in Sundaram’s case (supra)
and tax payer’s case was dealing with a receipt which always represented a
trading transaction, at point of receipt. The ratio, with respect, could not
have been extended to waiver of a loan receipt which was never, to begin with,
a trading receipt forming part of the regular trade transaction.

 

BUNCH OF APPEALS BEFORE SC IN MAHINDRA’S CASE INVOLVES BOTH WAIVER OF FIXED CAPITAL AND WORKING CAPITAL LOANS

The Tax
Department appealed to the SC against HC rulings holding that waiver of loan
used for acquiring fixed assets is on capital account and not taxable. The tax
payer in Rollatainer’s case (supra) appealed against the Delhi HC ruling
to the extent it held that waiver of loan used for working capital purposes is
taxable as revenue income13. The tax payer in Ramaniyam Homes (supra)
also appealed to the SC against the Madras HC ruling holding that remission of
loan is taxable as ‘monetary benefit’ u/s. 28(iv) of the ITA. The SC heard all
the appeals together in Mahindra’s case and disposed them under a common judgement.

 

AS A LEAD CASE, SC DECIDED MAHINDRA’S CASE, INVOLVING WAIVER OF FIXED CAPITAL LOAN, IN FAVOUR OF THE TAX PAYER

The SC explicitly dismissed the Tax Department’s
appeal in Mahindra’s case making it clear that waiver of loan used for
acquiring capital assets is neither taxable u/s. 28(iv) of the ITA nor taxable
u/s. 41(1) of the ITA. The SC held that the scope of section 28(iv) of the ITA
is restricted to non-monetary benefits received during the course of business,
whereas waiver of loan is akin to receipt of money.

 

Further, since the loan when borrowed
was not allowed as deduction, waiver thereof is not taxable as remission of
trading liability u/s. 41(1) of the ITA.

_________________________

13    Civil Appeal No. 1214 of 2012

 

 
SC ‘disposed’ off
other appeals involving both fixed capital and working capital loan cases

While
concluding and dealing with other appeals including tax payer’s appeal in
Rollatainer’s case (supra), the SC observed as follows:

 

“17. To
sum up, we are not inclined to interfere with the judgment and order passed by
the High Court in view of the following reasons:

 

(a) Section
28(iv) of the IT Act does not apply on the present case since the receipts of
Rs 57,74,064/- are in the nature of cash or money.

(b) Section
41(1) of the IT Act does not apply since waiver of loan does not amount to
cessation of trading liability. It is a matter of record that the respondent
has not claimed any deduction under section 36 (1) (iii) of the IT Act qua the
payment of interest in any previous year.

 

18. In
view of above discussion, we are of the considered view that these appeals are
devoid of merits and deserve to be dismissed. Accordingly, the appeals are
dismissed. All the other connected appeals are disposed off accordingly,
leaving parties to bear their own cost.”

 

Unfortunately,
the SC did not expressly comment on the aspect of distinction between loan used
for acquiring fixed assets and a loan used for working capital purposes.

 

SC RULING ARGUABLY SETTLES WAIVER OF WORKING CAPITAL LOAN CONTROVERSY

In the view
of the authors, the reasoning adopted by the SC at para 17 of the judgment for
upholding non-taxability was that: (a) section 28(iv) of the ITA does not apply
to a benefit in the nature of cash; and (b) section 41(1) of the ITA does not
apply since waiver of loan is not cessation of trading liability for which
respondent has claimed deduction. These reasonings are as applicable to a loan
for working capital as to a term loan. In fact, the basis on which some of the
decisions turned against the tax payer stands demolished by the SC conclusion
that section 28(iv) of the ITA is inapplicable to a case of loan receipt which
was received in the form of cash or money.

 

Further, it is also arguable that the SC used the
term ‘disposed’ while dealing with other connected appeals as distinguished
from ‘dismissed’ or ‘allowed’ since it was concerned with both the Tax
Department’s and the tax payer’s appeals.

 

Hence, the
authors believe that the ratio of the SC ruling in Mahindra’s case is equally
applicable to waiver of working capital loan.

 

WHETHER WAIVER OF LOAN CAN BE TAXED U/S. 56(2)(x) OF THE ITA?

In Mahindra’s
case, while dealing with non-applicability of section 28(iv) of the ITA to
waiver of loan, the SC observed, “Hence, waiver of loan by the creditor results
in the debtor having extra cash in his hand.
It is receipt in the hands
of the debtor/assessee.” This observation raises concern whether a waiver of
loan granted by lender can be taxed as ‘Income from other sources’ u/s. 56(2)(x)
of the ITA.

 

Section
56(2)(x)14  of the ITA is an
‘anti-abuse’ provision. Section 56(2)(x) of the ITA provides that where any
person receives, in any previous year any sum of money, without
consideration
, the aggregate value of which exceeds fifty thousand rupees,
the whole of the aggregate value of such sum shall be regarded as income
chargeable to tax. The provision has certain exceptions (like gifts from
relatives) which are not relevant for the purposes of current discussion.

 

The authors
believe that the context and language of section 56(2)(x) of the ITA would not
permit such interpretation. Firstly, in context, on a strict construction
basis, the section could apply only in a case where there is physical instead
of a hypothetical receipt, and the chargeability is examined at the stage of
receipt. Secondly, when the amount was received, it was not without
consideration. Thirdly, more often than not, the creditor will grant waiver in
lieu of some condition to be fulfilled by the borrower. For example, the banker
may grant waiver of a part of the amount, provided the balance part is agreed
to be paid within a given time frame. In any such scenario, the waiver is
backed up by consideration and cannot be said to be a grant ‘without
consideration’. Fourthly, in case of a distressed or insolvent company, it
would be a case of inability to recover rather than an intent to place cash in
the hands of the company. All in all, the context of a provision should be
limited to cases which tap the abuse for which the provision is introduced, and
is, arguably, very unlikely to extend to a case of waiver of loan.

______________________________

14    As also its predecessor provisions of s.
56(2)(v) / (vi) / (vii) / (viia) of the ITA

 

 

MINIMUM ALTERNATE TAX (MAT) LIABILITY IS GOVERNED BY BOOK TREATMENT

The entire
discussion in the earlier part of this article is in the  context of computation under normal
provisions of the ITA. In contrast, section 115JB levies a MAT on ‘book profit’
of the company. The ‘book profit’ is largely governed by accounting treatment
adopted for recognition of gains and losses in Profit & Loss account
(P&L) as per applicable accounting standards. It is well settled by a
series of SC rulings starting with Apollo Tyres Ltd. vs. CIT15  that MAT requires strict construction and the
Tax Authority is not permitted to tinker with net profit shown in P&L
beyond what is expressly permitted by MAT provision itself.

 

Incidentally, the Expert Advisory Committee (EAC)
of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India has opined that waiver of
loan should be credited to P&L16. Hence, if gain on account of
waiver of loan is credited to P&L, an issue arises whether such gain is
liable to MAT. This is a controversial issue which is not resolved by Mahindra’s
case since Mahindra’s case was concerned with normal tax treatment.

______________________________________

15  [2002]
255 ITR 273

16  Refer
EAC Opinion dated 24th December 1998

 

 

Mahindra’s
case is helpful to the extent it holds that the benefit of waiver of loan is
not in the nature of ‘income’. The debate which arises is whether a benefit
which does not fall within the scope of charging provisions of sections 4 and 5
of the ITA can be taxed under MAT merely because it is credited to P&L.
This is a highly debatable issue on which there is sharp difference of opinion
within the judiciary, but this part of the controversy is best discussed as an
independent subject.

 

CONCLUSION

Since the
introduction of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, the waiver or re-calibration of
banking loans has been a matter of regular recurrence. The sacrifice made by
financial institutions plays a vital role in the rehabilitation of ailing
enterprises. The stamp of non-taxability on such waiver amount is perceived by
the tax payers as a substantial relief. The SC judgement is consistent with the
understanding that, but for a fictional provision in law, an income can only
accrue provided it originates from a source of income; the grace from a lender
is not reckoned to be a source from which income is expected to accrue to a man
in business. While the authors believe that the judgement is authentic enough
to urge for non-taxability of waiver of working capital loans, a clarification
to that effect from tax administration will go a long way in controlling
litigation in the years to follow. 
 

BOOK PROFIT – WHETHER ADJUSTMENT REQUIRED FOR SHARE OF LOSS FROM PARTNERSHIP FIRM?

 Issue for consideration


U/s. 115JB
of the Income Tax Act, 1961, a company is required to computateits book profits
and pay the Minimum Alternate Tax at 18.5% of such book profits. Explanation 1
to section 115JB provides that the term “book profit” means the ‘profit’ as
shown in the statement of profit and loss for the relevant previous year
prepared under s/s. (2), as increased or reduced by certain items specified
therein. One of the items of reduction contained in clause (ii) is –

 

(ii) – the
amount of income to which any of the provisions of section 10 (other than the
provisions contained in clause (38) thereof) or section 11 or section 12 apply,
if any such amount is credited to the statement of profit and loss.

 

There is
also a corresponding item of addition contained in clause (f) of the
explanation, which reads as under –

 

(f) the
amount or amounts of expenditure relatable to any income to which section 10
(other than the provisions contained in clause (38) thereof) or section 11 or
section 12 apply;

 

Section
10(2A) provides for an exemption in the case of a partner of a firm which is
separately assessed as such. The exemption is as under:

 

in the
case of a person being a partner of firm which is separately assessed as such,
his share in the total income of the firm.

 

Explanation:
For the purposes of this clause, the share of a partner in the total income of
a firm separately assessed as such shall, notwithstanding anything contained in
any other law, be an amount which bears to the total income of the firm the
same proportion as the amount of share in the profits of the firm in accordance
with the partnership deed bears to such profits;

 

Therefore,
where a company is a partner in a partnership firm, which is taxed separately
as a partnership firm, and the company is entitled to a share of profits of the
partnership firm, such share of profit that the company is entitled to, is not
only exempt u/s. 10(2A) from income tax, but is also to be excluded from the
book profit, by reducing such share of profit credited to the statement of
profit and loss under Explanation 1(ii) of section 115JB and in so computing
any expenditure, incurred for earning such share of profit, is required to be
added back while computing the book profit.

 

The issue
has arisen before the Income tax Appellate Tribunal as to whether, in a case
where the share of the company in the income of the firm is a ‘loss’ which has
been debited to the statement of profit and loss of the company, whether such
loss is required to be added to the book profit of the company , in the same
manner as the share of profit is reduced from the profit as per the statement
of profit and loss. While the Chennai bench of the Tribunal has taken a view
that such share of loss from the partnership firm is to be added back while computing
the book profit, the Mumbai and Kolkata benches have taken the view that such
share of loss is not required to be added back while computing the book profit.

 

Metro Exporters Ltd’s case


The issue
first came up before the Mumbai bench of the tribunal in the case of DCIT
vs. Metro Exporters Ltd 10
SOT 647.

 

In this
case, relating to assessment year 1997-98, the provision then applicable was
section 115JA, which was almost identical to section 115JB in respect of the
issue under consideration. It provided for a reduction from the net profit as
shown in the profit and loss account for the relevant previous year of the
amount of income to which any of the provisions of Chapter III applied, if any
such amount was credited to the profit and loss account.

 

The assessee had debited its share of loss of Rs. 46.94 lakh from a
partnership firm to its profit and loss account. In the initial assessment, the
assessee’s computation of book profits, wherein it had not added back such
share of loss to the book profits, was accepted by the AO. However,
subsequently, reassessment proceedings were initiated u/s. 148 on the ground
that the income chargeable to tax was under assessed by way of omission to
increase the book profit by the share of loss in the partnership firm amounting
to Rs. 46.94 lakh debited to profit and loss account while computing the book
profit as per provisions of section
115 JA. Such share of loss was added to book profits by the AO in the
reassessment proceedings.

 

In first
appeal, the Commissioner(Appeals) deleted the addition made in the reassessment
proceedings, holding the reassessment proceedings as not being in accordance
with law, besides holding that the addition of Rs. 46.94 lakh of share of loss
from partnership firm could not be made to the book profits.

 

Before the
Tribunal, the Department contested both aspects – the decision against validity
of the reassessment proceedings, as well as the merits of the addition made to
book profits. Before the Tribunal, it was argued on behalf of the Department
that sub-clause (f) of the Explanation to section 115 JA, provided that for the
purposes of the section, the profit meant the net profit as shown in the profit
and loss account for the relevant previous year prepared under s/s. (2) as
increased by the amount or amounts of expenditure relatable to any income to
which any of the provisions of Chapter III applied and that the sub-clause
applied in the case of the assessee. It was further argued that the word
‘income’ included ‘loss’ also, and therefore sub-clause (ii) to Explanation to
section 115JA applied to the assessee.

 

On behalf
of the assessee, it was submitted that the addition was wrongly made as Chapter
XII-B was a special provision relating to certain companies, and therefore had
to be strictly construed. It was submitted that the proposition that the word
‘income’ included ‘loss’ was not applicable to assessment framed under Chapter
XII-B of the Act. Further, it was argued that the ‘loss’ was not an
‘expenditure’, and therefore did not fall within the purview of sub-clause (f)
to Explanation to section 115 JA. It was further submitted that sub-clause (ii)
to the Explanation to section 115 JA applied only “if any such amount is
credited to the profit and loss account”. In the case of the assessee, the
share of loss from the partnership firm was not credited to the profit and loss
account, but was debited to the profit and loss account, and therefore
sub-clause (ii) also did not apply to the case of the assessee.

 

The
Tribunal noted that the assessee had debited its share of loss from the
partnership firm to its profit and loss account. It observed that the
provisions of Chapter XII-B were special provisions relating to assessment of
certain companies, whereby the income of certain companies chargeable to tax
for the relevant previous year was deemed to be an amount equal to 30% of such
book profit. Being special provisions applicable to certain companies,
according to the Tribunal, they had to be strictly applied. The income of the
assessee had to be computed in accordance with book profit of the assessee, and
the working of the book profit had to be made as per the provisions of Chapter
XII-B.

 

The
Tribunal held that the proposition that the word “income” included “loss” was
not applicable while computing the profit in accordance with the provisions of
Chapter XII-B. The Tribunal further found that the provisions of sub-clause (f)
of the Explanation to section 115 JA applied to the amounts of “expenditure”
relatable to any income to which any of the provisions of Chapter III applied.
According to the Tribunal, the share of loss from a partnership firm was not
synonymous with the word “expenditure” used in that sub-clause.

 

The
Tribunal further noted that sub-clause (ii) of the Explanation to section 115
JA applied to income to which chapter III applied, if such amount was credited
to the profit and loss account of the assessee. In the case before it, the
tribunal noted that the share of the assessee from the partnership firm was
loss, and was therefore debited to the profit and loss account of the assessee,
and could not have been credited to the profit and loss account of the
assessee. Since it was not a case of share of profit from a firm credited to
the profit and loss account of the assessee, the tribunal held that no addition
for the purpose of computation of the book profit under section 115 JA could be
made with regard to share of loss of the assessee from a partnership firm.

The ratio
of this decision of the Mumbai bench of the Tribunal has been appllied by the
Kolkata bench of the Tribunal in the case of CD Equifinance Pvt Ltd vs.
DCIT, ITA No 577/Kol/2016 dated 9.2.2018
in the context of section 115JB
for Assessment Year 2012-13.

 

Fixit (P) Ltd’s case


The issue
again came up before the Chennai bench of the Tribunal in the case of DCIT
vs. Fixit (P) Ltd 95 taxmann.com 188.

 

In this
case,the assessee was a partner in two partnership firms, and its share of loss
from the two firms was Rs. 2,11,346 and Rs. 68,564, respectively. Such share of
loss was debited to the profit &loss account of the assessee, but was not
added back by the assessee to the net profit while computing book profit u/s.
115JB.

 

The
Assessing Officer was of the opinion that share income from a firm being exempt
under Chapter III, even if such share was a loss, it had to be added back for
computing the profit u/s. 115 JB. He therefore added the share of loss of the
two firms to the profits as per the profit & loss account and computed the
book profit for the purpose of levying tax u/s. 115 JB accordingly.

 

The
Commissioner (Appeals) decided the first appeal in favour of the assessee, on
the ground that the Explanation to section 115 JB spelt out the additions that
could be made to the profits shown in the audited profit & loss account.
Share of loss from a partnership firm could not be considered as an expenditure
relatable to exempt income, and therefore though such share of loss was debited
to the profit &loss account, such share of loss could not be added back
while computing the book profit u/s. 115 JB.

 

Before the
Tribunal, on behalf of the Department, it was argued that clause (ii) of the
Explanation to section
115JB clearly mandated deduction of any income to which any of the provisions
of section 10 applied, if such amount was credited to the profit & loss
account. It was argued that loss incurred by a firm was carried forward in the
hands of such firm. When share of profits from firms were to be reduced, loss,
being a negative income, had to be added back to profits shown in the profit
&loss account. That would be equivalent to an addition.

 

The
Tribunal analysed the provisions of section115 JB, in particular the
Explanation to that section. It also analysed the provisions of section 10
(2A). According to the Tribunal, what was excluded from the total income by
section 10 (2A) was the share of the partner in the total income of the firm.
Since share of loss in the firm was not an expenditure relatable to any exempt
income, in the opinion of the Tribunal, clause (f) of the explanation did not
apply.

 

However,
according to the Tribunal, it was clause (ii) of the Explanation which was
applicable. That was on account of the fact that in the opinion of the
Tribunal, share of loss was nothing but share of negative income. Clause (ii)
of the Explanation mandated reduction of income to which section 10 applied, if
such income was credited in the profit & loss account. According to the
Tribunal, when share of income from a firm was exempt and required to be
excluded u/s. 10 (2A), necessarily the share of loss was also to be excluded.
In the view of the Tribunal, what the assessing officer had done was that by
adding the loss from the two firms to the profits, he was effectively reducing
the negative profit, since loss was nothing but negative profit.

 

The
Tribunal therefore upheld the addition made by the assessing officer of share
of loss from the partnership firms to the book profit of the assessee.

 

Observations


The
controversy surrounds adjudicating upon two important facets; whether a ‘loss’
could be termed as an ‘expenditure’ and be added back to the book profit and
whether the right to reduce an ‘income’ from the book profit would oblige a
company to add back its losses. In effect, both the Mumbai and the Chennai
benches of the Tribunal have accepted the position that the provisions of
clause (f) to section 115 JB, providing for add back of the expenditure, do not
apply to the share of loss from a partnership firm, since such loss is not an expenditure
in relation to exempt income. Therefore, there is no dispute on the first
aspect of the controversy.

 

The
dispute is only as to whether clause (ii) of the Explanation to section 115JB
applies so as to require the company to exclude the loss in computing the book
profit or add back the loss, otherwise debited to the profit & loss
account, to the book profit. That Explanation applies to “amount of income
to which any of the provisions of section 10 apply”. The issue therefore
revolves around whether the proposition that “income” includes loss would apply
in this case i.

The
provisions of Chapter XII-B are special provisions that carry a fiction for
taxing an artificially computed income termed as book profit which is far
detached from the income or the real income on which tax is payable under the
original scheme of taxation of the Act. Computing the book profit is a
convoluted exercise that is removed from the concept of income and seeks to tax
an income that can in no sense be termed as an income. In the circumstances, it
is a futile exercise to apply the understanding otherwise derived in
interpreting the main provisions of the Act that deal with the income or the
real income.In the context of the income taxation, which seeks to tax the real
income of a person, It is true that the term ‘income’ includes ‘loss’ but it is
equally true to restrict the application of such an understanding to such an
income and not extend it to artificial income or fictional income. The Supreme
Court in J.H. Gotla’s case, 156 ITR 323 laid down the law while
explaining the ordinary concept of income to hold that it includes loss, as
well. Application of this analogy to an artificially conceived income should be
avoided at all costs.

 

There are
however two more arguments in favour of the proposition that such share of loss
is not to be added back in computing the book profits. The first is that the
share of loss is not credited to the profit and loss account, as required by
clause (ii), but is debited to the profit and loss account. Besides clause (ii)
falls under the items to be deducted while computing book profits, and not
under the additions to be made while computing book profits.

 

Secondly,
one may draw support from the decision of the Mumbai bench of the Tribunal in
the case of Raptakos Brett & Co Ltd 69 SOT 383 in the context
of exemption of capital losses on sale of listed shares u/s. 10(38). In that
case, while holding that only gains arising from the transfer of a long term
listed equity share was exempt, and not loss, the Tribunal interpreted the term
“income arising from the transfer of a long term capital asset”. It drew a
distinction between a situation where an entire source of income was exempt,
and a situation where only certain types of income from a source were exempt.
According to the Tribunal, if the entire source is exempt or is considered as
not to be included while computing the total income, then, in such a case, the
profit or loss resulting from such a source does not enter into the computation
at all. However, if a part of the source is exempt by virtue of particular
provision of the Act for providing benefit to the assessee, it cannot be held
that the entire source will not enter into the computation of total income.
According to the Tribunal, the concept of income including loss applies only
when the entire source is exempt, and not in the cases, where only one
particular stream of income falling within a source is falling within the
exemption provisions.

 

In the
case of a partner of a partnership firm, the partnership firm is the source of
income. Remuneration and interest from the partnership firm are taxable, with
only share of profit from the partnership firm being exempt from tax.
Therefore, only one stream of income from the source is exempt. That being the
case, following the rationale of Raptakos Brett’s decision, “income”
would not include loss, and share of profit would not include share of loss.
Therefore, the share of loss from a partnership firm, though may be covered by
section 10(2A), is not an income for the purposes of clause(ii) of section
115JB , and is further not credited to the profit and loss account. That being
the case, it is not required to be added back while computing book profits.

 

The better
view seems to be that no adjustment to the net profit is required to be made in
respect of the amount of share in loss debited to the statement of profit &
loss  of the company while computing book
profit u/s. 115JB.
 

 

 

APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 14A – RELEVANCE OF ‘DOMINANT PURPOSE’ OF ACQUISITION OF SHARES/ SECURITIES – PART – I

INTRODUCTION


1.1     The Finance Act, 2001 introduced the
provisions of section 14A in Chapter IV of the Income Tax Act,1961[the Act]
with retrospective effect from 1/4/1962 to provide restriction on deduction,
while computing the Total Income under the Act, of any expenditure incurred in
relation to
income which does not form part of the Total Income [such
income is hereinafter referred to as Exempt Income]. Effectively, the section
provides for disallowance of expenditure incurred in relation to Exempt Income.

 

1.1.1   For the purpose of determining the quantum of
disallowance u/s. 14A, the Finance Act, 2006 introduced section 14A (2)/(3)
with effect from 1/4/2007. Section 14A (2) provides that the Assessing Officer
[AO] shall determine the amount of expenditure incurred in relation to Exempt
Income in accordance with the prescribed method, if the AO, having regards to
the accounts of the assessee, is not satisfied with the correctness of the
claim of the assessee in respect of such expenditure. section 14A (3) further
provides that the provisions of section 14A (2) shall also apply in cases where
the assessee has claimed that no such expenditure is incurred [i.e. such
expenditure is NIL]. The method of determining such expenditure is prescribed
under Rule 8D which was introduced with effect from 24/3/2008 and the same was
subsequently amended with effect from 2/6/2016

 

1.2     In the context of the provisions of section
14A, large number of issues have come-up for debate such as: applicability of
section 14A in cases where the shares [having potential of yielding Exempt
Income] are acquired /retained not for the purpose of earning dividend income
but for acquiring/retaining controlling interest; such shares are for trading
purpose and held as ‘stock-in trade’ where the dividend is incidentally earned;
whether section 14A can apply to cases where no Exempt Income [dividend] is
earned during the relevant previous year; etc. The issues have also come-up
with regard to quantification of amount of disallowance u/s. 14A under
different circumstances; whether the amount of disallowance should be limited
to the amount of Exempt Income earned during the year and also, whether for
this purpose, the application of Rule 8D is mandatory in all cases irrespective
of the fact that the assessee himself has determined the proper amount of such
disallowance while furnishing the Return of Income or has made a claim that no
such expenditure is incurred; etc. Large scale litigation is continued on
number of such issues in the context of the implications of section 14A.

 

1.3     Recently, the Apex Court, in MaxOpp
Investments Ltd and other cases, had an occasion to consider the major/main
issue of applicability of the provisions of section 14A under the circumstances
where the shares were purchased of a company for the purpose of gaining control
over the said company or were purchased as ‘stock-in-trade’. Since this
judgment settles this major issue and in the process,deals with some other
issues in the context of these provisions, it is thought fit to consider the
same in this column.

 

MAXOPP INVESTMENTS LTD Vs. CIT (2018) 402 ITR
640 (SC)

 

Background


2.1 In the above
case, various appeals [preferred by the assessees as well as the Revenue] had
come-up before the Apex Court involving the implications of section 14A.
Initially, the Court noted that, in these appeals, the question has arisen
under varied circumstances where the shares/stocks were purchased of a company
for the purpose of gaining control over the said company or as
‘stock-in-trade’. However, incidentally income was also generated in the form
of dividends as well which was exempt. On this basis, the Assessees contend
that the dominant intention for purchasing the share was not to earn dividends
income but control of the business in the company in whose shares investment
was made or for the purpose of trading in the shares as a business activity and
the shares are held as stock-in-trade. In this backdrop, the issue is as to
whether the expenditure incurred can be treated as expenditure ‘in relation to
income’ i.e. dividend income which does not form part of the total income. To
put it differently, is the dominant or main object would be a relevant
consideration in determining as to whether expenditure incurred is ‘in relation
to’ the dividend income. In most of the appeals, including in Civil Appeal Nos.
104-109 of 2015 [MaxOpp Investment Ltd], aforesaid is the scenario. Though, in
some other cases, there may be little difference in fact situation. However,
all these cases pertain to dividend income, where the investment was made in
order to retain controlling interest in a company or in group of companies or
the dominant purpose was to have it as stock-in-trade.

 

2.2   In the above context, the Court noted that
the Delhi High Court in MaxOpp Investments Ltd had taken a view that the
provisions of section 14A would apply regardless of the purpose behind making
the investment and consequently, proportionate disallowance of the expenditure
incurred by the assessee will be justified if the expenditure is incurred in
relation to Exempt Income. In this case, after deciding this major common
issues, the Delhi High Court also separately decided some other appeals on
their individual facts with which we are not concerned in this write-up. On the
other hand, the Court noted that the Punjab & Haryana High Court in State
Bank of Patiala has taken a view which runs contrary to the view taken by the
Delhi High Court.

 

2.3   For the purpose of deciding above referred
major issue, the Court preferred to deal with the findings given by the Delhi
High Court in the case of MaxOpp Investment ltd vs. CIT (2012) -347 ITR 272
[MaxOpp Investment Ltd’s case]
and by the Punjab & Haryana High Court
in the case of  Principal CIT vs.
State Bank of Patiala (2017) – 391 ITR 218 [State Bank of Patiala’s case]

in the context of facts of these cases.

 

MAXOPP INVESTMENT LTD’S CASE


3.1   In the background given in para 2 above, the
Court decided to briefly note the facts in the above case of Delhi High Court
(arising from Civil Nos104-109 of 2015) for better understanding of the issues
involved and relevant findings given by the High Court in that case.

 

3.2   In the above case, the Appellant company
[MaxOpp Investment Ltd- one of the appellants in set of appeals before Apex
Court] was engaged, inter alia, in the business of finance, investments
and dealing in shares and securities. The Appellant holds shares/securities in
two portfolios, viz. (a) as investment on capital account and (b) as trading
assets for the purpose of acquiring and retaining control over investee group
companies, particularly Max India Ltd., a widely held quoted public limited
company. Any profit/loss arising on sale of shares/securities held as
‘investment’ is returned as income under the head ‘capital gains’, whereas
profit/loss arising on sale of shares/securities held as ‘trading assets’ (i.e.
held, inter alia, with the intention of acquiring, exercising and
retaining control over investee group companies) has been regularly offered and
assessed to tax as business income under the head ‘profits and gains of
business or profession’ [Business Income].

 

3.2.1 Consistent
with the aforesaid treatment regularly followed, the Appellant filed return of
income for the previous year relevant to the Assessment Year 2002-03, declaring
income of Rs. 78,90,430/-. No part of the interest expenditure of Rs.
1,16,21,168/- debited to the profit and loss account, to the extent relatable
to investment in shares of Max India Limited, yielding tax free dividend
income, was considered disallowable u/s. 14A of the Act on the ground that
shares in the said company were acquired for the purposes of retaining
controlling interest and not with the motive of earning dividend. According to
the Appellant, the dominant purpose/intention of investment in shares of Max
India Ltd. was acquiring/retaining controlling interest therein and not earning
dividend and, therefore, dividend of Rs. 49,90,860/- earned on shares of Max
India Ltd. during the relevant previous year was only incidental to the holding
of such shares. The AO, while passing the assessment order dated August 27th,
2004 u/s 143(3), worked out disallowance u/s. 14A at Rs. 67,74,175/- by
apportioning the interest expenditure of Rs. 1,16,21,168/- in the ratio of
investment in shares of Max India Ltd. (on which dividend was received) to the
total amount of unsecured loan. The AO, however, restricted disallowance under
that section to Rs. 49,90,860/-, being the amount of dividend received and
claimed exempt.

 

3.2.2   In appeal, the Commissioner of Income Tax
(Appeals) [CIT (A)] vide order dated January 12th, 2005 upheld the
order of the AO. The Appellant herein carried the matter in further appeal to
the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi (ITAT). In view of the conflicting
decisions of various Benches by the ITAT with respect to the interpretation of
section 14A of the Act, a Special Bench was constituted in the matter of ITO
vs. Daga Capital Management (Private) Ltd. 312 ITR (AT) 1 [Daga Capital’s case]
.
The appeal of the Appellant was also tagged and heard by the aforesaid Special
Bench.

 

3.2.3 The Special
Bench of the ITAT in Daga Capital’s case, dismissing the appeal of the
Appellant, inter alia, held that investment in shares representing
controlling interest did not amount to carrying on of business and, therefore,
interest expenditure incurred for acquiring shares in group companies was hit
by the provisions of section14A of the Act. The Special Bench further held that
holding of shares with the intention of acquiring/retaining controlling
interest would normally be on capital account, i.e. as investment and not as
‘trading assets’. For that reason too, the Special Bench held that there
existed dominant connection between interest paid on loan utilized for
acquiring the aforesaid shares and earning of dividend income. Consequently,
the provisions of section 14A of the Act were held to be attracted on the facts
of the case.

 

3.2.4 On the
interpretation of the expression ‘in relation to’, the majority opinion of the
Special Bench was that the requirement of there being direct and proximate
connection between the expenditure incurred and Exempt Income earned could not
be read into the provision. According to the majority view, ‘what is relevant
is to work out the expenditure in relation to the Exempt Income and not to
examine whether the expenditure incurred by the Assessee has resulted into
Exempt Income or taxable income’. As per the minority view, however, the
existence of dominant and immediate connection between the expenditure incurred
and dividend income was a condition precedent for invoking the provisions of
section 14A of the Act. It was accordingly held, as per the minority, that mere
receipt of dividend income, incidental to the holding of shares, in the case of
a dealer in shares, would not be sufficient for invoking provisions of section
14A of the Act.

 

3.2.5 Against the
aforesaid order of the Special Bench, the Appellant preferred appeal u/s. 260A
of the Act to the High Court. The High Court of Delhi has, vide impugned
judgment dated November 18th, 2011, held that the expression ‘in
relation to’ appearing in section 14A was synonymous with ‘in connection with’
or ‘pertaining to’, and, that the provisions of that section apply regardless
of the intention/motive behind making the investment. As a consequence,
proportionate disallowance of the expenditure incurred by the Assessee is
maintained.

 

3.2.6   While coming to the above conclusion, the
High Court also took into the account the law prevailing prior to insertion of
section 14A (Prior Law) and the object of insertion of section 14A. The Prior
Law was that when an assessee has a composite and indivisible business which
has elements of both taxable and non-taxable income, the entire business
expenditure was deductible and in such a case the principle of apportionment of
such expenditure relating to non-taxable income did not apply. However, where
the business was divisible, such principle of apportionment was applicable and
the expenditure apportioned to the Exempt Income was not eligible for deduction
[ref CIT vs. Indian Bank Ltd (1965)56 ITR 77 (SC), CIT vs. Maharashtra Sugar
Mills Ltd (1971)82 ITR 452(SC) and Rajasthan State Warehousing Cooperation vs.
CIT (2000) 242 ITR 452 (SC)
]

 

3.3    The Apex Court considered the above
judgment and, inter alia, noted the following observations and findings
of the High Court:

 

a.  The object behind the insertion of section 14A
in the said Act is apparent from the Memorandum explaining the provisions of
the Finance Bill, 2001 which is to the following effect:

 

‘Certain incomes
are not includable while computing the total income as these are exempt under
various provisions of the Act. There have been cases where deductions have been
claimed in respect of such Exempt Income. This in effect means that the tax
incentive given by way of exemptions to certain categories of income is being
used to reduce also the tax payable on the non-exempt income by debiting the
expenses incurred to earn the Exempt Income against taxable income. This is
against the basic principles of taxation whereby only the net income, i.e.,
gross income minus the expenditure is taxed. On the same analogy, the exemption
is also in respect of the net income. Expenses incurred can be allowed only to
the extent they are relatable to the earning of taxable income.

 

It is proposed to
insert a new Section 14A so as to clarify the intention of the Legislature
since the inception of the Income-tax Act, 1961,that no deduction shall be made
in respect of any expenditure incurred by the Assessee in relation to income
which does not form part of the total income under the Income-tax Act.

 

The proposed
amendment will take effect retrospectively from April 1, 1962 and will
accordingly, apply in relation to the assessment year 1962-63 and subsequent
assessment years.’

 

b. As observed by the Apex Court in the case of CIT
vs. Walfort Share and Stock Brokers P. Ltd. (2010) 326 ITR 1 (SC) [Walfort’s
case]
, the insertion of section 14A with retrospective effect reflects the
serious attempt on the part of Parliament not to allow deduction in respect of
any expenditure incurred by the assessee in relation Exempt Income against the
taxable income. The Apex Court in Walfort’s case further observed as under:

 

“…In other words,
Section 14A clarifies that expenses incurred can be allowed only to the extent
that they are relatable to the earning of taxable income. In many cases the
nature of expenses incurred by the Assessee may be relatable partly to the
exempt income and partly to the taxable income. In the absence of Section 14A,
the expenditure incurred in respect of exempt income was being claimed against
taxable income. The mandate of Section 14A is clear. It desires to curb the
practice to claim deduction of expenses incurred in relation to exempt income
against taxable income and at the same time avail of the tax incentive by way
of an exemption of exempt income without making any apportionment of expenses
incurred in relation to exempt income….

 

…Expenses allowed
can only be in respect of earning taxable income. This is the purport of
Section 14A. In Section 14A, the first phrase is “for the purposes of
computing the total income under this Chapter” which makes it clear that
various heads of income as prescribed in the Chapter IV would fall within
Section 14A. The next phrase is, “in relation to income which does not
form part of total income under the Act”. It means that if an income does
not form part of total income, then the related expenditure is outside the
ambit of the applicability of Section 14….”

 

The Apex Court in
Walfort’s case also clearly held that in the case of an income like dividend
income which does not form part of the total income, any expenditure/deduction
relatable to such (exempt or non-taxable) income, even if it is of the nature
specified in sections 15 to 59 of the Act, cannot be allowed against any other
income which is includable in the Total Income. The exact words used by the
Apex Court in that case are as under:

 

“Further, Section
14 specifies five heads of income which are chargeable to tax. In order to be
chargeable, an income has to be brought under one of the five heads. Sections
15 to 59 lay down the Rules for computing income for the purpose of
chargeability to tax under those heads. Sections 15 to 59 quantify the total
income chargeable to tax. The permissible deductions enumerated in Sections 15 to
59 are now to be allowed only with reference to income which is brought under
one of the above heads and is chargeable to tax. If an income like dividend
income is not a part of the total income, the expenditure/deduction though of
the nature specified in Sections 15 to 59 but related to the income not forming
part of the total income could not be allowed against other income includable
in the total income for the purpose of chargeability to tax. The theory of
apportionment of expenditure between taxable and non-taxable has, in principle,
been now widened Under Section 14A.”

 

c.  Likewise, explaining the meaning of
‘expenditure incurred’, the High Court agreed that this expression would mean
incurring of actual expenditure and not to some imagined expenditure. At the
same time, observed the High Court, the ‘actual’ expenditure that is in
contemplation u/s. 14A (1) is the ‘actual’ expenditure in relation to or in
connection with or pertaining to Exempt Income. The corollary to this is that
if no expenditure is incurred in relation to the Exempt Income, no disallowance
can be made u/s. 14A.

 

STATE BANK OF PATIALA’S CASE.


4.1    In the above case, the Punjab and Haryana
High Court has taken a view which runs contrary to the aforesaid view taken by
the Delhi High Court. The Punjab and Haryana High Court followed the judgment
of the High Court of Karnataka in CCI Ltd. vs. Joint Commissioner of Income
Tax, (2012) 206 Taxman 563 [CCI Ltd’s case]
. The Revenue has filed appeals
challenging the correctness of the said decision.

 

4.2     The Apex Court noted the brief facts of
this case and further noted that this case arose in the context where Exempt
Income  was earned by the Bank from
securities held by it as its stock in trade. The Assessee filed its return
declaring an income of about Rs. 670 crores which was selected for scrutiny.
The return for the assessment year 2008-09 showed dividend income exempt u/s.
10(34) and (35) and net interest income exempt u/s. 10(15)(iv) (h). The total
Exempt Income claimed in the return of income was, Rs. 12,20 crore. The
Assessee while claiming the exemption contended that the investment in shares,
bonds, etc. constituted its stock-in-trade; that the investment had not been
made for earning tax free income; that the tax free income was only incidental
to the Assessee’s main business of sale and purchase of securities and,
therefore, no expenditure had been incurred for earning such Exempt Income; the
expenditure would have remained the same even if no dividend or interest income
had been earned by the Assessee from the said securities and that no
expenditure on proportionate basis could be allocated against Exempt Income.
The Assessee also contended that in any event it had acquired the securities
from its own funds and, therefore, section 14A was not applicable. The AO
restricted the disallowance to the amount of Rs. 12.20 crore which was claimed
as Exempt Income as against the expenditure of Rs. 40.72 crore allocated
towards Exempt Income by applying the formula contained in Rule 8D holding that
section 14A would be applicable. The CIT(A) issued notice of enhancement u/s.
251 of the Act and held that in view of section 14A, the Assessee was not to be
allowed any deduction in respect of expenditure incurred in relation to Exempt
Income. Therefore, he disallowed the entire expenditure of Rs. 40.72 crore
instead of restricting the disallowance to the amount which was claimed as
Exempt Income as done by the AO. The ITAT set aside the order of the AO as well
as CIT (A). It referred to a CBDT Circular No. 18/2015 dated 02.11.2015 which
states that income arising from such investment of a banking concern is
attributable to the business of banking which falls under the head
“Profits and gains of business and profession”. The circular states
that shares and stock held by the bank are ‘stock-in-trade’ and not
‘investment’. Referring to certain judgments and the earlier orders of the
Tribunal, it was held that if shares are held as stock-in-trade and not as
investment even the disallowance under Rule 8D would be nil as Rule 8D(2)(i)
would be confined to direct expenses for earning the tax Exempt Income. In this
factual backdrop, in appeal filed by the Revenue, the High Court noted that
following substantial question of law arose for consideration:

 

“Whether in the
facts and circumstances of the case, the Hon’ble ITAT is right in law in
deleting the addition made on account of disallowance Under Section 14A of the
Income Tax Act, 1961?”


4.3     The Apex Court then considered the above
judgment and, inter-alia, noted the following observations and findings
of the High Court:

 

(a) In its analysis, the High Court accepted the
contention of the counsel for the Assessee that the Assessee is engaged in the
purchase and sale of shares as a trader with the object of earning profit and
not with a view to earn interest or dividend. The Assessee does not have an
investment portfolio. The securities constitute the Assessee’s stock-in-trade.
The Department, in fact, rightly accepted, as a matter of fact, that the
dividend and interest earned was from the securities that constituted the
Assessee’s stock-in-trade. The same is, in any event, established. The Assessee
carried on the business of sale and purchase of securities. It was supported by
Circular No. 18, dated November 2th, 2015, issued by the CBDT, which
reads as under:

 

“Subject: Interest
from Non-SLR securities of Banks – Reg.

 

It has been brought
to the notice of the Board that in the case of Banks, field officers are taking
a view that, “expenses relatable to investment in non-SLR securities need
to be disallowed Under Section 57(i) of the Act as interest on non-SLR
securities is income from other sources.

 

2. Clause (id) of
Sub-section (1) of Section 56 of the Act provides that income by way of
interest on securities shall be chargeable to income-tax under the head
“Income from Other Sources”, if, the income is not chargeable to
income-tax under the head “Profits and Gains of Business and
Profession”.

 

3. The matter has
been examined in light of the judicial decisions on this issue. In the case of CIT
vs. Nawanshahar Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. [2007] 160 TAXMAN 48 (SC)
,
the Apex Court held that the investments made by a banking concern are part of
the business of banking. Therefore, the income arising from such investments is
attributable to the business of banking falling under the head “Profits
and Gains of Business and Profession”.

 

3.2 Even though the
abovementioned decision was in the context of co-operative societies/Banks
claiming deduction u/s. 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Act, the principle is equally
applicable to all banks/commercial banks, to which Banking Regulation Act, 1949
applies.

 

4. In the light of
the Supreme Court’s decision in the matter, the issue is well settled.
Accordingly, the Board has decided that no appeals may henceforth be filed on
this ground by the officers of the Department and appeals already filed, if
any, on this ground before Courts/Tribunals may be withdrawn/not pressed upon.
This may be brought to the notice of all concerned.”


(b) The High Court pointed out that the Circular
carves out a distinction between stock-in-trade and investment and provides
that if the motive behind purchase and sale of shares is to earn profit then
the same would be treated as trading profit and if the object is to derive
income by way of dividend then the profit would be said to have accrued from
the investment. If the Assessee is found to have treated the shares and
securities as stock-in-trade, the income arising therefrom would be business
income. A loss would be a business loss. Thus, an Assessee may have two
portfolios, namely, investment portfolio and a trading portfolio. In the case
of the former, the securities are to be treated as capital assets and in the
latter as trading assets.


(c) Further, as a banking institution, the Assessee
was also statutorily required to place a part of its funds in approved
securities, as held in CIT vs. Nawanshahar Central Co-operative Bank Ltd.
MANU/SC/2707/2005 : (2007) 289 ITR 6 (SC) [Nawan shahar’s case]
. Since, the
shares, bonds, debentures purchased by the Assessee constituted its
stock-in-trade, the provisions of section 14A were not applicable. Here, the
High Court noted distinction between stock-in-trade and investment and stated
that the object of earning profit from trading in securities is different from
the object of earning income, such as, dividend and interest arising therefrom.
The object of trading in securities does not constitute the activity of
investment where the object is to earn dividend or interest.


(d) The High Court then discussed in detail the
judgment of the Apex Court in Walfort’s case (supra) which related to
dividend stripping. After explaining the objective behind section 14A, the Apex
Court, in the facts of that case, had held that a payback does not constitute
an ‘expenditure incurred’ in terms of section 14A as it does not impact the
profit and loss account. This expenditure, in fact, is a payout.


(e) According to the High Court, what is to be
disallowed is the expenditure incurred to “earn” Exempt Income. The
words ‘in relation to’ in section 14A must be construed accordingly. Applying
that principle to the facts at hand, the High Court concluded as under:

 

“Now, the dividend
and interest are income. The question then is whether the Assessee can be said
to have incurred any expenditure at all or any part of the said expenditure in
respect of the exempt income viz. dividend and interest that arose out of the
securities that constituted the Assessee’s stock-in-trade. The answer must be in
the negative. The purpose of the purchase of the said securities was not to
earn income arising therefrom, namely, dividend and interest, but to earn
profits from trading in i.e. purchasing and selling the same. It is axiomatic,
therefore, that the entire expenditure including administrative costs was
incurred for the purchase and sale of the stock-in-trade and, therefore,
towards earning the business income from the trading activity of purchasing and
selling the securities. Irrespective of whether the securities yielded any
income arising therefrom, such as, dividend or interest, no expenditure was
incurred in relation to the same.”

 

4.4     The Court also noted that the Punjab and
Haryana High Court in the above case referred and concurred with the judgment
of Karnataka High Court in CCI Ltd’s case and considered the same. Apart from
this, the Court also felt it useful to refer and consider the judgment of
Calcutta High Court in the case of G.K. K. Capital Markets (P) Ltd [ (2017)
373 ITR 196 ] [G.K.K. Capital’s case]
which had also agreed with the view
of the Karnataka High Court in CCI Ltd’s case. In this context, the Court also
mentioned that the earlier judgment of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Danuka
& Sons vs. CIT [(2011) 339 ITR 319} [Danuka & Sons’ case]
was cited
by the Revenue in G.K.K. Capital’s case but that judgment was distinguished on
the ground that, in that case, there was no dispute that part of the income of
the assessee from its business was from dividend and the assessee was unable to
produce any material before the authorities below showing the source from which
the relevant shares were acquired.

 

[ to be
concluded]


Note: The judgment of the Apex Court in the
case of Rajasthan State Warehousing Corporation referred to in para 3.2.6
above dealing with the Prior Law was analysed in this column in the April, 2000
issue of this journal.  

Section 147 : Reassessment – Beyond period of 4 years –Findings in case of another assessee – No failure to disclose material facts – Reassessment was held to be not valid. [Sections 80IB(10) ,148]

12.  Pr.CIT
vs. Vaman Estate [ Income tax Appeal no 678 of 2016,
Dated: 27th November, 2018 (Bombay
High Court)].
 

 

[ACIT-21(2) vs. Vaman Estate; dated 15/07/2015 ;
ITA. No 5584/Mum/2012, AY: 2004-05 , Bench: F, Mum.  ITAT ]

 

Section
147 : Reassessment – Beyond period of 4 years –Findings in case of another
assessee – No failure to disclose material facts – Reassessment was held to be
not valid. [Sections 80IB(10) ,148]

 

The assessee filed on 31.10.2004 declaring total income at Rs. Nil.
In the return of income filed by the assessee for the said assessment year, the
principal claim was of deduction u/s. 80IB(10) of the Act arising out of income
from development of a housing project. In the assessment carried out by the
A.O, he disallowed a part of the claim after detailed scrutiny. Such assessment
was reopened by the A.O by issuance of notice, which was done beyond the period
of four years from the end of relevant assessment year. In order to issue such
notice, the A.O had recorded the detailed reasons. The gist of his reason was
that a similar claim was lodged by one 
Abode Builders for the same housing project. In the course of
examination of such claim of the said assessee, the A.O had detected certain
defects. The A.O had rejected the claim inter alia on the ground that
the development and construction of housing project had commenced prior to
01.10.1998 (which was the crucial date for claiming the benefits u/s. 80IB(10)
of the Act). The A.O of the present assessee, therefore, found that the
assessee was not entitled to the deduction since one of the essential
requirements of the provision was breached. He noted that these facts were not
disclosed by the assessee and not brought to the notice of the A.O during the
assessment. Therefore, there was failure on the part of the assessee to
disclose truly and fully all material facts necessary for assessment.


The CIT(A) observed that during the scrutiny assessment, there was
no failure on the part of the assessee to disclose truly and fully all material
facts. Even on merits, he was of the opinion that there was no evidence to
suggest that the development and construction of the housing project commenced
prior to 01.10.1998. On such grounds, the assessee’s appeal was allowed.

 

The Revenue carried the matter in further appeal before the
Tribunal. The Tribunal held that in absence of any failure on the part of the
assessee to disclose true facts, the reopening of assessment beyond the period
of four years was not permissible. It is undisputed that in the original
assessment, the A.O had examined the assessee’s claim of deduction u/s.
80IB(10) of the Act at some length. To the extent he was dissatisfied, the
claim was disallowed. Such assessment was sought to be reopened only on the
ground that in case of Abode Builders where similar claim was raised in
connection with the same housing project, the A. O had detected certain
breaches which disqualified the assessee from claiming deduction. Essentially,
according to the A.O, the development and construction of the housing project
had commenced prior to 01.10.1998. The CIT(A) in a detailed consideration of
all the relevant aspects of the matter came to the conclusion that there was no
material to suggest that the development and construction of the housing
project had commenced prior to 01.10.1998.


Being aggrieved with the order of the ITAT, the Revenue filed the
Appeal before High Court. The Court find that the assessee had made full
disclosure of all relevant facts during the original scrutiny assessment. As
noticed by the CIT(A), all necessary facts were before the A.O while deciding
the original assessment. During such assessment, the assessee’s claim of
deduction was also minutely examined by the A.O. Reopening of assessment beyond
the period of four years was, therefore, correctly disallowed by the CIT(A) and
the Tribunal. As noted, the only source available with the A.O to contend that
relevant material was not brought on record by the assessee was assessment in
case of Abode Builders. Here also, there is one vital defect in the logic
adopted by the A.O. We do not find any where any material to suggest that the
development and construction of the housing project commenced before
01.10.1998. Even in the reasons recorded, the A.O has not linked any material
in order to make this observation. He has mainly relied on the findings of the
A.O of Abode Builders. This conclusion was reversed by the CIT(A) noting that
in fact all along there was evidence suggesting that the commencement of
construction of the housing project was some time in the year 2002. It was
pointed out that the assessment order in case of M/s. Abode Builders was set
aside by the CIT(A) and the same was confirmed by the Tribunal. There was no
failure on the part of the assessee to disclose truly and fully all relevant
facts as correctly held by the CIT(A) and the Tribunal pursuant to the detailed
discussion. Therefore, no question of law arises. The appeal was dismissed
accordingly.
 

 

Section 222 and Rule 68B of Second Schedule – Recovery of tax – Where TRO had issued on assessee a notice dated 18/11/2004 for auction of its attached property and SC vide order dated 16/01/2001 had dismissed SLP of assessee filed against assessment order, period of three years enacted in Rule 68B(1) of Second Schedule to the Act would begin to run from 01/04/2001 and notice dated 18/11/2004 was, therefore, barred by limitation

27. Rambilas Gulabdas (HUF) vs. TRO;
[2018] 98 taxmann.com 309 (Bom);
Date of order: 27th
September, 2018


Section 222 and Rule 68B of Second Schedule
  Recovery of tax – Where TRO had issued
on assessee a notice dated 18/11/2004 for auction of its attached property and
SC vide order dated 16/01/2001 had dismissed SLP of assessee filed against
assessment order, period of three years enacted in Rule 68B(1) of Second
Schedule to the Act would begin to run from 01/04/2001 and notice dated
18/11/2004 was, therefore, barred by limitation


The Tax Recovery officer
had issued on the assessee a notice dated 18/11/2004 for auction of its
attached property. The assessee filed a writ petition praying to quash the
above notice. It submitted that the notice was barred by limitation because of
rule 68B of Second Schedule of the Act. The assessee had challenged the
relevant assessment order upto Supreme Court and the Supreme Court vide order
dated 16/01/2001 had dismissed the SLP of the assessee.


The Bombay High Court allowed
the writ petition and held as under:


“i)    Perusal of memo of writ petition does not show any effort made by
revenue after 16/01/2001 till 18/11/2004 for auction of attached property. The
only effort appears to be on 18/11/2004. It, therefore, is not a case of resale
but first or initial sale or auction only.


ii)    Perusal of the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court rendered
in the case of S.V. Gopala Rao v. CIT [2005] 144 Taxman 395/[2004] 270 ITR 433
shows that the CBDT does not have power to issue Notification to amend a
provision enacted by Parliament. Notification dated 01/03/1996 enhancing period
of limitation of three years stipulated in rule 68B(1) to four years is,
therefore, found to be bad. This judgment of Andhra Pradesh High Court was challenged
by department before the Apex Court. The Apex Court has endorsed the findings
of Andhra Pradesh High Court. With the result, it follows that period of
limitation of three years enacted by Parliament in rule 68B(1) could not have
been altered by the CBDT. The period, therefore, was always three years.


iii)    Here the SLP of assessee is also dismissed on 16/01/2001 by the
Apex Court. The period of limitation, therefore, begins to run from 01/04/2001.
The period of three years expired on 31/03/2004 and period of four years
expired on 31-03-2005.


iv)   The steps are initiated by the department in present matter on
18/11/2004, i.e., after expiry of period of three years but before expiry of
period of four years. The judgment of Apex Court endorses reasoning of Andhra
Pradesh High Court on lack of authority in CBDT to increase the period from
three years to four years. The incompetent authority, therefore, cannot
prejudice legal rights of the assessee flowing from statutory provisions or
eclipse the same in any manner. Notice dated 18/11/2004 is, therefore, beyond
period of three years and, therefore, hit by rule 68B(1).


v)    In view of the aforesaid, the notice dated 18/11/2004 is
unsustainable and deserved to be quashed. Consequently, in view of mandate of
rule 68B(4), attachment of property which formed subject matter of notice dated
18/11/2004 is also set aside.”

Sections 147 and 148 – Reassessment – Validity of notice – No action taken on notice u/s. 148 dated 23/03/2015 for A. Y. 2008-09 – Another notice u/s. 148 issued on 18/01/2016 for A. Y. 2008-09 by new AO – Notice not mentioned that it was in continuation of earlier notice – Notice barred by limitation – No reasons given – Notices and consequent reassessment not valid

26. Mastech Technologies P. Ltd. vs. Dy.
CIT; 407 ITR 242 (Del):
Date of order: 13th July,
2017

A. Y. 2008-09


Sections 147 and 148 – Reassessment –
Validity of notice – No action taken on notice u/s. 148 dated 23/03/2015 for A.
Y. 2008-09 – Another notice u/s. 148 issued on 18/01/2016 for A. Y. 2008-09 by
new AO – Notice not mentioned that it was in continuation of earlier notice –
Notice barred by limitation – No reasons given – Notices and consequent
reassessment not valid


The assessee filed writ
petition and challenged the validity of two notices dated 23/03/2015 and
18/01/2016 issued u/s. 148 of the Act by the Assessing Officer for the A. Y.
2008-09. During the pendency of the writ petition, the Assessing officer passed
the reassessment order making additions but did not give effect to the order in
terms of the interim order passed by the High Court.


The Delhi High Court
allowed the writ petition and held as under:


“i)    The Revenue did not pursue the notice dated 23/03/2015 issued to
the assessee u/s. 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The notice dated 18/01/2016
did not state anywhere that it was in continuation of the earlier notice dated
23/03/2015. There was no noting even on the file made by the Assessing Officer
that while issuing the notice he was proposing to continue the proceedings that
already commenced with the notice dated 23/03/2015. The entire proceedings u/s.
148 stood vitiated since even according to the Assessing Officer, he initiated
proceedings on 18/01/2016 on which date such initiation was clearly time
barred.


ii)    Secondly, the fresh initiation did not have
the approval of the Additional Commissioner, as required by law. The Assessing
Officer had followed a very strange procedure. The reasons that he furnished
the assessee by the letter dated 23/02/2016 contained only one sentence. For
some reasons, the Assessing officer did not provide the assessee the reasons
recorded in annexure A to the pro forma which contained the approval of the
Additional Commissioner dated 19/03/2015. Also, clearly, these were not the
reasons for reopening of the assessment on 18/01/2016. There was no
satisfactory explanation as to why the notice dated 23/03/2015 was not carried
to its logical end. The mere fact that the Assessing Officer who issued that
notice was replaced by another Assessing Officer could hardly be the
justification for not proceeding in the matter. On the other hand, the
Assessing Officer did not seek to proceed u/s. 129 of the Act but to proceed de
novo u/s. 148 of the Act.


iii)   This was a serious error which could not be accepted to be a mere
irregularity. As regards the non-communication of the reasons as contained in
annexure A to the pro forma on which the approval dated 19/03/2015 was granted
by the Additional Commissioner, there was again no satisfactory explanation.
The fact remained that what was communicated to the assessee on 23/02/2016 was
only one line without any supporting material.


iv)   Consequently, there were numerous legal infirmities which led to
the inevitable invalidation of all the proceedings that took place pursuant to
the notice issued to the assessee first on 23/03/2015 and then again on
18/01/2016 – both u/s. 148 and all consequential proceedings including the
assessment order dated 30/03/2016 was to be set aside.”

Section 80-IB(10) – Housing project – Deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) – TDS – Amendment w.e.f. 01/04/2010 barring deduction where units in same project sold to related persons – Prospective in nature – Flats sold to husband and wife exceeding prescribed area in 2008 – Assessee entitled to deduction

25. CIT vs. Elegant Estates; 407 ITR 425
(Mad): Date of order: 19th June, 2018

A. Ys. 2010-11 to 2012-13


Section 80-IB(10) – Housing project –
Deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) – TDS – Amendment w.e.f. 01/04/2010 barring deduction
where units in same project sold to related persons – Prospective in nature –
Flats sold to husband and wife exceeding prescribed area in 2008 – Assessee
entitled to deduction


The assessee was in the
business of real estate development. For the A. Ys. 2011-12 and 2012-13 the
assessee claimed deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) of the Act. The Assessing Officer
disallowed the claim on the grounds that two adjacent flats were sold to
husband and wife, that the total super built-up area was 3225 sq. ft. and that
the sale of the flats was recognised on 31/03/2010, during the previous year
2009-10, relevant to the A. Y. 2010-11. He was of the view that the provisions
of section 80-IB(10) were not attracted, since two flats had been sold to
related persons thereby contravening clause (f) of section 80-IB(10).


The Commissioner (Appeals)
allowed the appeals and held, inter alia, that the flats in question
were sold on 14/04/2008 and 16/07/2008 respectively and that the amendment of
section 80-IB which was prospective w.e.f. 01/04/2010 had no application. The
Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the Department.


On appeal by the Revenue,
the Madras High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:


“The Appellate Commissioner
and the Tribunal based on their concurrent factual finding that the actual sale
of the flats in question took place on 14/01/2008 and 16/07/2008 respectively
before the amendment of section 80-IB(10) had rightly held that the amendment
was prospective w.e.f. 01/04/2010 and that the assessee was entitled to
deduction. No question of law arose.”

Section 10B – Export oriented undertaking (Date of commencement of production) – Deduction u/s. 10B – Where in order to determine admissibility of assessee’s claim u/s. 10B, date of commencement of manufacture or production could be ascertained from relevant documents such as certificate of registration by competent authority, mere wrong mentioning of said date in Form No. 56G filed in support of claim of deduction, could not be a ground to reopen assessment

24. MBI Kits International vs. ITO;
[2018] 98 taxmann.com 473 (Mad):

Date of order: 4th October,
2018 A. Y. 2010-11


Section 10B – Export oriented undertaking
(Date of commencement of production) – Deduction u/s. 10B – Where in order to
determine admissibility of assessee’s claim u/s. 10B, date of commencement of
manufacture or production could be ascertained from relevant documents such as
certificate of registration by competent authority, mere wrong mentioning of
said date in Form No. 56G filed in support of claim of deduction, could not be
a ground to reopen assessment


The assessee firm was
formed with an object to carry on the business of manufacturing and testing
chemicals. The Madras Export Processing Zone issued a letter of permission
dated 28/03/2000. The Government of India, Ministry of Commerce by letter dated
29/03/2000, granted permission to the petitioner to carry on its business of
manufacturing of test kits used for checking iodized salt. The assessee filed
its return of income for A. Y. 2010-11, claiming deduction u/s. 10B of the Act.
An order of assessment u/s. 143(3) was passed on accepting the claim of
deduction u/s. 10B. Subsequently, the Assessing Officer noticed that in Column
No. 7 to Form No. 56G, filed in support of claim of deduction u/s. 10B, date of
Commencement of manufacture or products was mentioned as 28/03/2000. According
to the Assessing Officer if the date of commencement of manufacture or
production referred to in the Column No. 7 in Form No. 56G as 28/03/2000 was
taken as true, the deduction claimed was at the eleventh year and not at the
tenth year which was not permissible. Thus, Assessing Officer took a view that
on account of assessee’s failure to disclose all material facts truly and fully
at time of assessment, deduction u/s. 10B was wrongly allowed. He thus relying
upon proviso to section 147, initiated reassessment proceedings.


The assessee raised an
objection to initiation of reassessment proceedings by contending that actual
date of commencement of manufacturing was only on 25-5-2000 and, thus,
deduction was claimed in tenth year itself. The Assessing Officer rejected the
assessee’s objection.

On a writ petition
challenging the validity of the notice the Madras High Court allowed the writ
petition and held as under:


“i) The assessee is engaged in manufacturing of test chemicals. They
got approval from the Development Commissioner, Export Processing Zone on
29/03/2000. It is claimed by the assessee that they commenced the manufacturing
activities only on 25/05/2000 and not on 28/03/2000, as has been wrongly stated
in Form 56G, an Auditor’s Report filed for claiming deduction u/s. 10B of the
Act.


ii)  Admittedly, the assessee has furnished the details in Columns 7
and 8 of Form 56G. According to the revenue, if the date of commencement of manufacture
or production referred to in the Column No.7 in Form No.56G as 28/03/2000 is
taken as true, the deduction claimed was at the eleventh year and not at the
tenth year. The assessee seeks to explain that the entry made in Column No.7 of
Form 56G was by mistake and on the other hand, the actual date of commencement
of manufacture was only on 25/05/2000. At the same time, Column No.8, which
deals with number of consecutive year for which the deduction claimed, relevant
year was rightly stated as tenth year. Therefore, the question that arises for
consideration, under the above stated circumstances, is as to whether these
contradictory statement made by the assessee can be brought under the purview
of non-disclosure of fully and truly all material facts necessary for his
assessment, to attract the extended period of limitation.


iii) No doubt, Column Nos.7 and 8 contradict each
other with regard to the commencement of manufacture. However, when one of such
column has specifically referred the number of consecutive year as the tenth
year to claim section 10B deduction and when the Assessing Officer has also
considered and allowed such deduction, it has to be construed that such
deduction was granted by the Assessing Officer by forming his opinion based on the
conjoined consideration of materials already placed. In other words, it cannot
be stated that the assessee has availed the benefit u/s. 10B by giving false
details. If the date of manufacture as referred to in Form 56G is taken as the
right date, the Assessing Officer ought not to have allowed the deduction.
Likewise, if the number of consecutive year referred to in Form 56G as tenth
year is taken as the true statement, the Assessing Officer was right in
allowing the deduction. Therefore, it is evident that by furnishing the wrong
date of manufacture as 28/03/2000, the assessee has not either deceived or
suppressed any material fact before the Assessing Officer to claim deduction
u/s. 10B. If the exact date of manufacturing/production could be ascertained or
gathered from the conjoined consideration of other material documents, such as
relevant certificates of registration by the competent authority, mere wrong
mentioning of the date in Column 7 could not be construed as non-disclosure of
true and material facts, especially when column 8 of statement supported the
claim. One can understand and appreciate the stand of the revenue for reopening
the assessment, if the assessee, by giving a false information regarding the
date of commencement of manufacture as 28/03/2000 alone, had obtained deduction
u/s. 10B. Thus, it is seen that the Assessing Officer, who has originally
chosen to allow the deduction based on the materials filed already, has now
changed his opinion and has chosen to reopen the assessment, which cannot be
done after a period of four years.


iv) Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned
proceedings of the respondent in reopening the assessment for the A. Y. 2010-11
are set aside.”

Sections 253 and 260 – A Appeal to High Court – Power of High Court to review – High Court has power to review its decision Appeal to Appellate Tribunal – Decision of Commissioner (Appeals) based on report on remand by AO – Tribunal not considering report – Decision of Tribunal erroneous – Decision of High Court upholding order of Tribunal – High Court can recall its order – Matter remanded to Tribunal

22. B. Jayalakshmi
vs. ACIT; 407 ITR 212 (Mad) :
Date of order: 30th July,
2018:
A. Ys. 1995-96 to 1997-98


Sections 253 and 260 – A Appeal to High Court
– Power of High Court to review – High Court has power to review its decision

Appeal to Appellate Tribunal – Decision of
Commissioner (Appeals) based on report on remand by AO – Tribunal not
considering report – Decision of Tribunal erroneous – Decision of High Court
upholding order of Tribunal – High Court can recall its order – Matter remanded
to Tribunal


A search u/s. 132 of the
Act was conducted in the residential premises of the assesee. In consequent
reassessment proceedings the Assessing Officer added an amount as unaccounted
income of the assessee holding the same represented undisclosed income of her
husband, which had been brought in the name of the assessee in the guise of
agricultural income.


Before the Commissioner
(Appeals), apart from furnishing other details, the assessee produced a copy of
the decree passed by the civil court granting a decree of permanent injunction
in her favour, when an attempt was made to evict her from the leased property.
Since fresh evidence in the form of court orders and other details were placed
before the Commissioner (Appeals), a report was called for from the Assessing
Officer on the stand taken by the assessee in the appeal proceedings.
Accordingly, the Assessing Officer submitted a report, dated 25/11/2002. The
report was wholly in favour of the assessee. Thus taking note of the report of
the Assessing officer, as well as the report of the Inspector of Income-tax,
the Commissioner (Appeals) held that the action of the Assessing Officer
treating the sum of Rs. 4,08,841/- as “non-agricultural income” was incorrect.
In appeal by the Revenue, the Tribunal upheld the assessment order and the
addition and reversed the decision of the Commissioner (Appeals).


The Madras High Court
dismissed the appeals of the assessee by order dated 30/09/2013. The assessee
preferred a review petition. The High Court allowed the writ petition and held
as under:


“i)    In VIP Industries Ltd. vs. CCE (2003) 5SCC
507, it was held that all provisions, which bestow the High Court with
appellate power, were framed in such a way that it would include the power of
review and in these circumstances, sub-section (7) of section 260A of the
Income-tax Act, 1961 cannot be construed in a narrow and restricted manner. In
the case of M. M. Thomas, the Supreme Court held that the High Court, as a
court of record, has a duty to itself to keep all its records correctly in
accordance with law and if any apparent error is noticed by the High Court in
respect of any orders passed that the High Court has not only the power but
also a duty to correct it.


ii)    The Tribunal repeated verbatim the order passed by the Assessing
officer dated 29/03/2001, and ignored the remand report dated 25/11/2002 and
the findings rendered by the Commissioner (Appeals) based on such remand
report. Thus, if such is the situation, the appeal itself would have been
incompetent. Hence, this question, which touches upon the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal, has not been considered by the Tribunal, we are inclined to review
the judgment and remand the matter to the Tribunal for fresh consideration.


iii)    In the result, the review petitions are allowed and the judgment
dated 30/09/2013 is reviewed and recalled and the appeals stand disposed of, by
remanding the matter to the Tribunal to decide the question of its jurisdiction
to entertain the appeals by the Revenue against the orders of the Commissioner
(Appeals). In the event, the Tribunal decides the question in favour of the
Revenue, it shall reconsider the other issues after opportunity to the Revenue
and assessee.”

 

Sections 68, 69A and 254(1) – Appeal to Appellate Tribunal – Jurisdiction and power – Cannot go beyond question in dispute – Subject matter of appeal in regard to addition made u/s. 68 – Tribunal holding addition u/s. 68 unjustifiable – Tribunal cannot travel beyond issue raised in appeal and make addition u/s. 69A – Order vitiated

21. Smt. Sarika Jain vs. CIT; 407 ITR
254 (All);
Date of order: 18th July,
2017
A. Y. 2001-02


Sections 68, 69A and 254(1) – Appeal to
Appellate Tribunal – Jurisdiction and power – Cannot go beyond question in
dispute – Subject matter of appeal in regard to addition made u/s. 68 –
Tribunal holding addition u/s. 68 unjustifiable – Tribunal cannot travel beyond
issue raised in appeal and make addition u/s. 69A – Order vitiated


In the A. Y. 2001-02, the
assessee had inducted capital in the firm in which she was a partner. During
reassessment proceedings u/s. 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, (hereinafter for
the sake of brevity referred to as the “Act”), the assessee explained
the source of the amounts received as gifts through banking channels and also
produced the gift deeds. The statements of the two donors were also recorded
u/s. 131. However, the Assessing Officer held that the gifts were not genuine
and added the amounts u/s. 68 of the Act as undisclosed income.


The Commissioner (Appeals)
affirmed the order and recorded findings that the documentation in respect of
the gifts was complete and that the assessee had established the identity of
the donors and their creditworthiness to make the gifts, but did not
acknowledge the gifts as genuine. The Tribunal held that the additions made by
the Assessing Officer u/s. 68 and sustained by the Commissioner (Appeals) could
not be sustained. Thereafter the Tribunal added the said amount as the income
of the assessee u/s. 69A.


On appeal by the assessee,
the Allahabad High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as
under:


“i)    The use of the word “thereon” in section 254(1) of the Income-tax
Act, 1961 is important and it reflects that the Tribunal has to confine itself
to the questions which arise or are subject matter in the appeal and it cannot
travel beyond that. The power to pass such order as the Tribunal thinks fit can
be exercised only in relation to the matter that arises in the appeal and it is
not open to the Tribunal to adjudicate any other question or issue, which is
not in dispute and which is not the subject matter of the dispute in appeal.


ii)    The Tribunal travelled beyond the scope of the appeal in making
the addition of the amounts of the gifts as income u/s. 69A. The subject matter
of the dispute all through before the Tribunal in the appeal was only with
respect to the addition, made u/s. 68, of the amounts received by the assessee
and not whether such addition could have been made u/s. 69A.


iii)    The Tribunal had recorded a categorical finding that it was clear
that under the provisions of section 68, the addition made by the Assessing
Officer and sustained by the Commissioner (Appeals) could not be sustained
meaning thereby that the Tribunal was of the opinion that the Assessing Officer
and the Commissioner (Appeals) had committed an error in adding the amounts
u/s. 68 to the income of the assessee.


iv)   When the amounts could not have been added u/s. 68, the Tribunal was
not competent to make the addition u/s. 69A. Therefore, the order of the
Tribunal was vitiated in law. Matter remanded to the Tribunal.”

10. ACIT vs. Sameer Sudhakar Dighe Members : Mahavir Singh, JM and G. Manjunatha, AM ITA No. 1327/Mum/2016 Assessment Year: 2011-12. Decided on: 13th April, 2018. Counsel for revenue / assessee: V. Rajguru / None Section 56(2)(vii), CBDT circular no. 477 [F. No. 199/86-IT(A-1)], dated 22.1.1986 – Award received by a non-professional sportsman will not be chargeable to tax in his hands.

Section 56(2)(vii), CBDT circular no. 477
[F. No. 199/86-IT(A-1)], dated 22.1.1986 – Award received by a non-professional
sportsman will not be chargeable to tax in his hands.

FACTS

The assessee, retired from international cricket in the year
2002, was appointed as a cricket coach by BCCI to train the players at national
level.  During the year under consideration,
a benefit match was arranged by BCCI for assessee. The assessee received net
proceeds of Rs. 50.44 lakh, which he treated as capital receipt. In the course
of assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer (AO) asked the assessee to
explain why the amount under consideration should be treated as a capital
receipt.  The assessee explained that the
benefit match is a game played for retired sportsmen to appreciate personal
talent and skill in sports and accordingly funds collected on behalf of benefit
match is a capital receipt.  He placed
reliance on CBDT circular no. 477 [F. No. 199/86-IT(A-1)], dated
22.1.1986.  The AO, treated the amount
received from benefit match as a revenue receipt and taxed it u/s. 56(2)(vii)
of the Act.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who
considering the submissions made by the assessee and also the Board Circular
No. 477 (supra) decided the appeal in favour of the assessee.

 

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

 

HELD

The assessee is a full time employee of Air India.  The benefit match was conducted by BCCI,
which is a regulatory body for cricket in India to appreciate the personal
talent and skill in this sport because the assessee is a retired sportsman and
the proceeds arising out of this benefit match are in the nature of award.  The Tribunal relying on the decision of the
Bangalore Bench of Tribunal in the case of G. R. Viswanath vs. ITO [(1989)
29 ITD 142 (Bang.
)] held that there is no direct nexus between the payment
and assessee’s profession and these receipts being capital in nature cannot be
brought to tax. 

 

The Tribunal also noted that the Delhi Bench of the Tribunal
has in the case of Abhinav Bindra vs. DCIT [(2013) 28 ITR (Trib.) 376 (Delhi)]
has considered the identical issue and also the provisions of section 56(2)(v)
and has held that if a sportsman who is not a professional sportsman has been
given awards/rewards/prizes then a liberal construction of Circular No. 447 is
required and amount of awards/rewards/prizes are held to be capital in nature.

 

The Tribunal held that the amount represents the gratitude
from the fans and followers by attending the benefit match conducted in honour
of the assessee who is a retired cricketer of international repute.  This type of receipts are specifically
exempted by CBDT Circular No. 477 which states that the amount paid to amateur
sportsman who is not a professional will not be liable to tax in his hands as
it would not be in the nature of income. 
The assessee was an amateur cricketer and his profession is employment
with Air India from where he is getting salary. 
He played the game of cricket for India as his passion and the receipts
of the net proceeds from the benefit match was only in the nature of
appreciation of his personal achievements and talent and thus, cannot be
brought to tax by invoking the provisions of section 56(2)(vii)(a) of the
Act.  These proceeds from the benefit
match received by the assessee are in appreciation of his past achievements in
International Cricket arena and such type of receipt cannot be taxed.  The Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A).

 

The appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed

9. DCIT vs. Saleem Mohd. Nazir Sheikh Members : Shamim Yahya, AM and Ram Lal Negi, JM ITA No. 5576/Mum/2015 Assessment Year: 2009-10. Decided on: 13th April, 2018. Counsel for revenue / assessee: Pooja Swarup / None

Section 271AAA
– If the search party does not put any question to the assessee about the
source of income, any adverse inference for the levy of penalty u/s. 271AAA
cannot be drawn.

FACTS

The assessee, in the course of search and seizure action on
Hitcons & Pranay group of cases, voluntarily declared amounts aggregating
to Rs. 70,03,525 as his undisclosed income. 
In the return of income filed, he declared total income of Rs.
90,65,390.  The Assessing Officer (AO)
passed order u/s. 143(3) assessing the total income of the assessee to be Rs.
1,11,28,815.  Penalty proceedings under
section 271AAA were initiated for disclosure of Rs. 70,03,525.

 

The AO levied penalty under section 271AAA on the ground that
though the assessee had admitted undisclosed income of Rs. 70,03,525 in his
statement recorded u/s. 132(4) of the Act, he failed to specify as well as
substantiate the manner in which undisclosed income was derived.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who
relying upon the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in the case of CIT vs.
Radha Kishan Goel [2005] 278 ITR 454 (Allahabad
) and the decision of the
Gujarat High Court in the case of CIT vs. Mahendra C. Shah [2008] 299 ITR
305 (Guj.
) as also the decision of the Nagpur Bench of the Tribunal in the
case of Concrete Developers v. ACIT [2013] 34 taxmann.com 62 (Nagpur-Trib.) allowed
the appeal filed by the assessee.

 

Aggrieved, revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where it,
interalia, contended that the decision of Nagpur Bench of Tribunal,
relied upon by the CIT(A), has not been accepted by the Revenue and appeal has
been filed and admitted against the said decision of Nagpur Bench of Tribunal.

 

HELD

The Tribunal observed that the assessee has made a disclosure
of undisclosed income in the course of search and has shown such undisclosed
income in the return of income and has paid taxes thereon and the AO has
accepted the income returned and the source of the same.  However, the AO has levied penalty u/s.
271AAA of the Act.  The Tribunal observed
that CIT(A) relying on the ratio laid down in the decision of the Allahabad
High Court and the Gujarat High Court has elaborately considered the issue and
has passed an order deleting the levy of penalty.  It observed that the ratio emanating out of
these two High Court decisions is that if the search party doesn’t put any
question to the assessee about the source of income, any adverse inference for
levy of penalty u/s. 271AAA cannot be drawn. The Tribunal also noticed that the
revenue has in the grounds mentioned about a decision of Nagpur Bench of the
Tribunal in favor of the assessee which has not been accepted by the revenue
but the department is in appeal before the High Court.  The Tribunal observed that since no contrary
decision was pointed out by the Revenue, the Tribunal upheld the order passed
by CIT(A).

 

The appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed.

7 Section 263 – Revision – Validity – Merger of assessee-company with another entity – Assessee-company non-existant on date of issue of notice and order u/s. 263 – Notice and order void ab initio

Principal
CIT vs. Kaizen Products (P) Ltd.; 406 ITR 311 (Del): Date of order: 25th
July, 2017

A.
Y. 2009-10


There was
merger of the assessee with an entity V by an order of the Court dated
08/10/2010 and the merged entity was named A. For the A. Y. 2009-10, the
assessee filed the return of income on 19/09/2009. The Assessing Officer issued
a notice dated 09/04/2013 u/s. 148 of the Act and passed assessment order u/s.
147 on 23/07/2014 accepting the return filed by the assessee. The Principal
Commissioner issued a notice dated 23/03/2016 u/s. 263 and consequent thereto,
passed an order on 31/03/2016.

 

The
asessee contended before the Tribunal that the order u/s. 263 had been passed
against an entity which did not exist in the eye of law and therefore, the
proceedings were vitiated. The Department’s contention was that during the
proceedings u/s. 147, the assessee did not raise any objection on that ground
and therefore, it should not be permitted to raise the objection before the
Tribunal. The Tribunal held that the notice and order were both in the name of
a non-existent entity and therefore, void ab initio.

 

On appeal
by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and
held as under:

 

“The
assessee had ceased to exist as a result of the order of the Court approving
its merger with another company and the issuance of the notice u/s. 263 and the
consequent order were in respect of a non-existent entity and void ab initio.”

6 Section 263 – Revision – Powers of Commissioner u/s. 263 – Commissioner (Appeal) passed order in appeal – Assessment order merges in appellate order – Commissioner has no jurisdiction to set aside such order – Order passed by AO and Commissioner (Appeals) after due consideration – Commissioner cannot set aside such order

Principal
CIT vs. H. Nagraj; 406 ITR 242 (Karn): Date of order: 29th May, 2018

A.
Y. 2008-09 and 2009-10

 

The
assessee firm was in the business of purchasing agricultural lands, converting
them for non-agricultural purposes and selling them. In the relevant years, the
assessee had claimed expenditure for developing lands. The assessee had
furnished names and addresses of parties to whom the amounts had been paid
along with permanent account numbers, bills and vouchers. Considering the
details furnished in support of the development expenses, the Assessing Officer
made addition of Rs. 2,38,16,700/- and Rs. 4,25,72,383/- for the A. Ys. 2008-09
and 2009-10 respectively. The Commissioner (Appeals) confirmed the additions to
the extent of Rs. 12,50,000/- for A. Y. 2008-09 and allowed the appeal in
respect of the balance. As regards A. Y. 2009-10, an addition of Rs. 2 crores
was confirmed and balance of Rs. 1,92,72,383/- was deleted.

 

By
exercising his powers of revision u/s. 263 of the Act, the Commissioner
proceeded to hold that the properties purchased by the assessee and the
subsequent sale made in favour of B did not tally in respect of both the
assessment orders and therefore, directed reconsideration of the entire
material. The Commissioner further found that the development expenses
consisting of labour charges and work-in-progress had to be added for the A. Y.
2008-09. Similarly, in respect of payment towards commission, the Commissioner
found that the cheque payments and the tax deducted at source made for claiming
expenditure had to be verified. The Tribunal set aside the order of the
Commissioner. 

 

On appeal
by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal
and held as under:

 

“i)    The revisional authority cannot, by acting
u/s. 263, interfere and upset the order passed by the Appellate Commissioner.

 

ii)    When the development expense as considered
by the Assessing Officer were the subject matter of appeal and the Commissioner
(Appeals) had found that for both the assessment years, the expenses incurred
had to be accepted disallowing the claim of Rs. 50 lakhs for the A. Y. 2008-09
and Rs. 2 crores for the A. Y. 2009-10, the question of the Commissioner
(Administration) exercising revisional jurisdiction u/s. 263 to once again
examine the very same issue so as to disallow the labour charges and
work-in-progress did not arise, as the order of assessment made by the
Assessing Officer merged with the order of the Appellate Commissioner.

 

iii)    When the Assessing Officer scrutinised the
returns for the A. Ys. 2008-09 and 2009-10, he considered the purchase of lands
from villagers and thereafter sale of the same to B. He had dealt with the same
in the assessment order and had proceeded to arrive at a conclusion that for
the A. Y. 2008-09, there was unexplained income of Rs. 1,25,66,700/- and for
the A. Y. 2009-10, there was unexplained income in a sum of Rs. 1,92,72,383. He
had thus proceeded to treat these two items as undisclosed profit for the
respective years.

 

iv)   The order passed by the Assessing Officer
merged with that of the Appellate Commissioner for both the assessment years.
Therefore, there was no scope for the Commissioner to exercise jurisdiction
u/s. 263 to reexamine the purchase made by the assessee in respect of the lands
in question. Similar was the factual matrix involved in respect of commission
expenses claimed by the assessee for the two assessment years. The assessee had
submitted full details regarding payment of commission. After considering the
material, the Assessing Officer chose not to make any addition on the item
pertaining to commission.

 

v)    The Tribunal was right in holding that the
Commissioner was not justified in exercising the revisional powers u/s. 263 to
upset the order passed by the Assessing Officer which stood merged with the
order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals).”

5 Sections 10AA and 144C – Draft assessment order – Section 144C – Power of AO – Additions not proposed in draft assessment order cannot be made by AO in final order – AO making disallowance of deduction u/s. 10AA in final order not proposed in draft order – Breach of provisions of section 144C – Not permissible

Pr. CIT vs. WOCO Motherson Advanced
Rubber Technologies Ltd.; 406 ITR 375 (Guj):
Date of order: 20th February, 2017

A. Y. 2011-12


The
assessee was a joint venture company of a company in Germany and another in
India. For the A. Y. 2011-12, in the draft assessment order issued by the
Assessing Officer u/s. 143(3) read with section 144C of the Act, the Assessing
Officer proposed only an arm’s length price adjustment of Rs. 1,48,43,000/- and
did not propose any disallowance in the draft assessment order. The draft
assessment order was carried before the Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP) but the
assessee did not succeed. Thereafter, while passing the final assessment order
the Assessing Officer not only made addition of the arm’s length price
adjustment of Rs. 1,48,43,000/-, but also disallowed 50% of the deduction
allowed u/s. 10AA on the ground that it was claimed in excess by the assessee.

 

The
Tribunal held that the disallowance made u/s. 10AA was in breach of section
144C and set aside the disallowance.

 

On appeal
by the Revenue, the Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and
held as under:

 

“i)    Considering the entire scheme of section
144C, in conformity with the principals of natural justice, the assessee is
required to be given an opportunity to submit objections with respect to the
variations proposed in the income or loss returned. Therefore, while passing
the final assessment order, the Assessing Officer cannot go beyond what is
proposed in the draft assessment order.

 

ii)    When the Assessing Officer forwarded a draft
of the proposed assessment order to the assessee, he had not proposed to make a
disallowance of Rs. 7,64,15,421/- u/s. 10AA of the Act. The Tribunal was right
in deleting the disallowance made by the Assessing Officer in respect of the
claim made by the assessee u/s. 10AA on the ground that the disallowance was in
breach of section 144C in as much as it was not proposed by the Assessing
officer in the draft assessment order.”

4 Section 32 – Depreciation – Rate of depreciation – Computer – Printer part of computer – entitled to depreciation at 60%

CIT vs. Cactus Imaging India Pvt. Ltd.;
406 ITR 406 (Mad); Date of order: 16th April, 2018

A. Ys. 2003-04 and 2004-05


For A. Ys.
2003-04 and 2004-05, the assessee had claimed depreciation at the rate of 60%
on its computers. The computers included printers. The Assessing Officer held
that the printers were not normal printers, but high value printers used for
printing banners and advertisement materials of large sizes and could not be
treated as a peripheral to a computer and the printer purchased by the assessee
could not perform any other function as performed by a normal computer.
Accordingly, the claim for depreciation at 60% was denied.

 

Before the
Commissioner (Appeals), a video demonstration was conducted and upon going
through the technical manual of the printers, he found that the printer could
not be used without the computer and concluded that it was a part of the
computer system. Accordingly, the appeals filed by the assessee were allowed.
These orders were affirmed by the Tribunal.

 

On appeal
by the Revenue, the Madras High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and
held as under:

 

“i)    Item III(5) of the old Appendix I to the
Income-tax Rules, 1962 stated “computers including computer software” and the
notes under the Appendix defined “computer software” in clause 7 to mean any
computer programme recorded in disc, tape, perforated media or other
information storage device. In the notes contained in the Appendix, the term
“computer” has not been defined.

 

ii)    A printer cannot be used without a computer
and should be treated as part of the computer and an accessory to the computer.

 

iii)    Since in respect of the very same machinery,
depreciation at the rate claimed had been permitted for the earlier years and
affirmed by the Division Bench, depreciation at the rate of 60% was allowable
on the printers.”

3 Section 32 – Depreciation – Additional depreciation – Condition precedent – Manufacture of article – Assessee need not be principally engaged in manufacture – Assessee entitled to additional depreciation on plant and machinery used in manufacture of ready mix concrete

Cherian Varkey Construction Co. (P) Ltd.
vs. UOI; 406 ITR 262 (Ker): Date of order:
19th December, 2017

A.
Y. 2006-07


For the A.
Y. 2006-07, the assessee procured three vehicles, specifically for the
transport of ready mix concrete for use in the construction site, from its own
manufacturing unit. The procurement of the vehicles was in the relevant year.
The assessee claimed additional depreciation u/s. 32(1)(iia) of the Act to the
extent of 20% of the actual cost of such vehicles which, according to the
assessee qualified as plant and machinery used in manufacture. The claim was allowed
by the Assessing Officer, but later disallowed in reassessment u/s. 147/148 of
the Act.

The
Tribunal held that there was no manufacture involved in the making of ready mix
concrete and upheld the disallowance.

 

On appeal
by the assessee, the Kerala High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal
and held as under:

 

“i)    It cannot be held on a reading of section
32(1)(iia) of the Act, that the additional depreciation permissible to the
extent of 20% of the actual cost of plant and machinery, would be permissible
only in the case of an assessee engaged principally in the business of
manufacturing or production. This would be doing violence to the provision
since then it would amount to introducing the word “principally” to read “ an
assessee engaged in the business principally of manufacture and production of
any article or thing; then a claim u/s. 32(1)(iia) would be permissible to the
extent allowed as depreciation.

 

ii)    Considering the high degree of precision and
stringent quality control observed in the selection and processing of
ingredients as also the specific entry in the Central Excise Tariff First
Schedule, heading 3824 50 10 which deals with “Concrete ready to use known as
“Ready mix concrete”, though the ready mix concrete did not have a shelf-life,
the final mixture of stone, sand, cement and water in a semi-fluid state,
transported to the construction site to be poured into the structure and
allowed to set and harden into concrete was a thing or article manufactured.

 

iii)    The assessee, though engaged principally in
the business of construction, was entitled to additional depreciation u/s.
32(1)(iia) for the plant and machinery used in the manufacturing activity being
the production of ready mix concrete.”

2 Section 68 – Cash credit (Shares, allotment of) – Where assessee allotted shares to a company in settlement of pre-existing liability of assessee to said company, since no cash was involved in transaction of said allotment of shares, conversion of these liabilities into share capital and share premium could not be treated as unexplained cash credits u/s. 68

V. R. Global Energy (P) Ltd. vs. ITO;
[2018] 96 taxmann.com 647 (Mad): Date of order:
6th August, 2018 A. Y. 2012-13


The
assessee-company allotted 1,19,000 shares with face value of Rs. 10 at a
premium of Rs. 5400 to one VR and the allotment of shares by the assessee to VR
was in settlement of the pre-existing liability of the assessee to said VR. The
Assessing Officer added the share premium and the share capital for the fresh
allotment of shares and treated the same as unexplained cash credits u/s. 68 of
the Act, while holding that the method of valuation was not acceptable and that
the share premium of Rs. 5400 was unreasonable.

 

In appeal,
the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal upheld the decision of the
Assessing Officer.

 

On appeal
by the assessee, the Madras High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal
and held as under:

 

“i)    The cash credits towards share capital were
admittedly only by way of book adjustment and not actual receipts which could
not be substantiated as receipts towards share subscription money.

 

ii)    The appeal is, thus, allowed and the
judgment and order of the Tribunal is set aside, for the reasons discussed
above. Additions u/s. 68 are also set aside.”

1. Section 2(28A) and 40 (a)(i) – Business expenditure – TDS – Disallowance u/s. 40(a)(i)

Principal CIT vs. West Bengal Housing
Infrastructure Development Corpn. Ltd.; [2018] 96 taxmann.com 610 (Cal):
Date of order: 9th August, 2018

A. Y. 2005-06

Interest
(Compensation for belated allotment of plot) – As per agreement, under Housing
Scheme, for failure to make plots available to allottees within stipulated
time, assessee housing/infrastructure development corporation paid
damage/compensation on amount allottees paid at rate equivalent to SBI interest
rate of FDs – Payments so made would not make payment on interest as defined
u/s. 2(28A) since there was neither any borrowing of money nor was there
incurring of debt on part of assessee – Tax not deductible – No disallowance
u/s. 40(a)(i)

 

The
assessee, was engaged in development of land, housing and infrastructural
facilities. A sum of Rs. 9.71 crore was found debited in the profit and loss
account of the assessee. This sum was claimed as deduction in computing the
income of the assessee under the head ‘income from business‘. The nature
of this expenditure was explained by the assessee before the Assessing Officer
as ‘compensation for delay, delivery of plots‘. The explanation given
was that as per the offer of allotment of plot of land developed by the
assessee, the assessee was under an obligation to hand over physical possession
of the plot to the allottees on payment of the entire cost of the land. If
possession of handing over of the plot was delayed for more than six months
from the scheduled date of possession, the assessee had to pay interest on
installments already paid by the allottee during such extended period at the
prevailing fixed term deposit rates for similar period offered by the State
Bank of India. According to the assessee, the actual nature of payment was in
the nature of damages for delayed allotment of a plot and thus, the assessee
had no TDS obligation. The Assessing Officer viewed the payment to be in the
nature of payment of interest and held that by reason thereof, the assessee
should have deducted tax at source u/s. 194A of the Income tax Act, 1961
(hereinafter for the sake of brevity referred to as the “Act”) at the
time of payment or credit. The Assessing Officer further held that since the
assessee failed to deduct tax at source on the amount, the claim of the
assessee for deduction of the said sum cannot be allowed by reason of section
40(a)(ia).

 

The
Tribunal held that the amount in question cannot be characterised as interest
within the meaning of section 194A and hence, there was no obligation on the
part of the assessee to deduct tax at source and allowed the assessee’s claim.

 

On appeal
by the Revenue, the Calcutta High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and
held as under:

 

“i)    From the definition of interest as occurring
in section 2(28A), it appears that the term ‘interest’ has been made entirely
relatable to money borrowed or debt incurred and various gradations of rights
and obligations arising from either of the two. The parenthesis in the section
is in the nature of a qualification of the borrowing of money/incurring of debt
and what it includes.

 

ii)    In CIT vs. H.P. Housing Board [2012] 18
taxmann.com 129/205 Taxman 1/340 ITR 388 (HP)
the High Court held that the
money was paid on account of damages suffered by the allottee for delay in
completion of the flats.


iii)    Reference may be made to the Apex
Court in Central India Spg. & Wvg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd. vs. Municipal
Committee, Wardha AIR 1958 SC 341
. Besides agreeing with the reasons given
by the Himachal Pradesh High Court for holding that payment for delayed
allotment of flats cannot be brought u/s. 2(28A) the said decision is of a
co-ordinate Bench.

 

iv)   The payment made by the assessee to the
allottee was in terms of the agreement entered between them where the liability
of the assessee would arise only if it failed to make the plots available
within the stipulated time. Hence, the payment made under the relevant clause
was purely contractual and as rightly held by the Tribunal, in the nature of
compensation or damages for the loss caused to the allottee in the interregnum
for being unable to utilise or possess the flat: The Flavour of compensation
becomes evident from the words used in the particular clause. The expression
‘interest’ used in the relevant clause of the Housing Scheme may be seen merely
as a quantification of the liability of the assessee in terms of the percentage
of interest payable by the State Bank of India. Since there is neither any
borrowing of money nor incurring of debt on the part of the assessee, in the
present factual scenario, interest as defined u/s. 2(28A) can have no application
to such payments. Consequently, there was no obligation on the part of the
assessee to deduct tax at source and consequently no disallowance could have
been made u/s. 40(a)(ia).

 

v)    In view of the above, the decision of the
Tribunal is to be confirmed.”

Scope of The Definition of The Term ‘Interest’ – Section 2(28a)

Issue for Consideration

The term ‘interest’ has been defined in section 2(28A) of the Income
tax Act as under:

 

“interest” means interest payable in
any manner in respect of any moneys borrowed or debt incurred (including a
deposit, claim or other similar right or obligation) and includes any service
fee or other charge in respect of the moneys borrowed or debt incurred or in
respect of any credit facility which has not been utilised.

 

The term has been exhaustively defined and in its scope it includes the
service fee or other charges in respect of the borrowings, debts and even
unutilized credit facilities. It not only includes interest, as understood
generally, which is payable on any kind of borrowing or debt, but also includes
payment on a deposit, claim or other similar right or obligation. This
extensive definition of ‘interest’ has been a subject matter of controversy,
more particularly from the point of view of the applicability of section 194A
to various types of payments for deduction of tax at source.

 

By applying the extensive definition, the Madras High Court considered
the payment of guaranteed return at a particular percentage to the investors,
under an investment scheme, to be an ‘interest’, though not captioned as
interest otherwise by the parties. On the other hand, the Calcutta High Court
took a view that the payment of an amount due to delay in delivering the plots,
though termed as interest in the letter of allotment, did not fall within the
ambit of the definition of ‘interest’. Though the facts of the cases before the
Madras High Court and the Calcutta High Court were materially different, the
issue arising therefrom was similar i.e. when does a payment made in respect of
a particular ‘obligation’ constitute interest. 

  

Viswapriya Financial Services & Securities Ltd.’s case:

The issue regarding the interpretation of the definition of the term
‘interest’ first came up, before the Madras High Court, in the case of Viswapriya
Financial Services & Securities Ltd. vs. CIT 258 ITR 496.

 

In this case, the assessee had floated an innovative scheme of
investment which enabled individual investors to entrust their funds for
management to the assessee, with a guarantee from the assessee that it would so
manage the funds as to ensure a minimum return of 1.5 percent per month to the
investor. The salient features of the scheme operated by the assessee were as
follows:

 

    The offer memorandum was issued inviting the
investors to contribute and to entrust their money to the assessee for what had
been referred to as fund management. The offer memorandum formed the contract
between the investors and the assessee for the management on the investors’
behalf of the funds provided by the investors under the memorandum for
deployment in any investment.

 

    The investor, under that memorandum, was to
pay the amount to the assessee by cheques or drafts drawn in the name of
“Viswapriya Funds Management Account-Bank Guaranteed Investments”.
The investors’ money were not made part of the funds of the assessee-company’s
accounts but were kept in a separate account.

   A firm of chartered accountants had
been appointed to function as fiduciary and custodian of the scheme and the
accounts of that fund were also separately audited.

 

    The investments made in the course of the
management were fully secured and were backed by bank guarantees. However, the
money entrusted under the scheme was to be managed by the assessee, and the
investor was not required to be informed as to the specific investments made
from the fund and the particular investment in which the investor’s amount was
utilised.

 

    The investors were assured a guaranteed
return of 1.5 percent per month of the amount invested.

 

   The assessee was entitled to a management
fee of 6 percent per annum from all the funds invested on behalf of the
investors, but with a condition to forgo a part of that management fee if the
returns on the investment were insufficient to ensure the stipulated distribution
at the rate of 1.5 percent per month to the investors.

 

    If the return from the investments was in
excess of the amount of management fee and the minimum guaranteed return for
the investor, the assessee would become entitled to a performance incentive of
10 percent of such excess.

 

    The investor had been promised the return of
his investment at the end of the agreed period of three years.

 

    The investment made by the investor was
transferable. It was possible to be assigned or pledged with prior intimation
to the assessee. In the event of the death of the investor, the amount was to
be transferred to his nominee, if any, and in the absence of nomination, to his
legal heirs.

 

In the backdrop of these facts, for the assessment years 1993-94 and
1994-95, the assessing officer had passed an order u/s. 201(1) holding that the
assessee was liable to deduct tax at source u/s. 194A on the payments made to
the investors. The Tribunal upheld the order of the assessing officer and held
that the money received by the assessee from the investors created an
‘obligation’ and that the return on that investment at the guaranteed minimum
payment of 1.5 percent per month was covered by the definition of ‘interest’ as
provided in section 2(28A).

 

Before the High Court, on behalf of the assessee, it was submitted that
the income received by the assessee from the investments made by it did not
attract the liability for deduction of tax at source. Therefore, when the
amounts were distributed among the investors, no tax was deducted at source, as
the returns of the investments made from the fund were received by the
fiduciary and the custodian. It was also submitted that the scheme did not
bring about a relationship of debtor and creditor or borrower and lender and,
therefore, the definition of ‘interest’ in section 2(28A) did not apply to the
facts of the scheme.

 

The High Court held that the definition of interest, after referring to
the interest payable in any manner in respect of any money borrowed or debt
incurred, included the  deposits, claims
and ‘other similar right or obligation’ and observed that the statutory
definition included amounts which might not otherwise be regarded as interest
for the purpose of the statute. Even amounts payable in transactions where
money had not been borrowed and debt had not been incurred were brought within
the scope of the definition, as in the case of a service fee paid in respect of
a credit facility which had not been utilised. Even in cases where there was no
relationship of debtor and creditor or borrower and lender, if payment was made
in any manner in respect of any money received as deposits or on money claims
or rights or obligations incurred in relation to money, such payment was, by
the statutory definition, regarded as interest.

 

The scheme operated by the assessee imposed an obligation on the
assessee to repay the investor at the end of the period of 36 months, and also
to ensure a monthly payment of 1.5 percent to the investor during that period.
This obligation to repay, in the opinion of the High Court, was an obligation
akin to a claim or a deposit, to which reference was made in the definition of
interest. The payment made by the assessee being a payment made in respect of
an obligation incurred under the terms of the offer memorandum, was regarded as
interest falling within the scope of section 2(28A). The fact that the assessee
did not choose to characterise such payment as interest was not considered as
relevant by the High Court.

 

West
Bengal Housing Infrastructure Development Corpn. Ltd.’s case

The issue of the interpretation of the definition of the term
‘interest’, in the contest of section 194A, again came up before the Calcutta
High Court in the case of Pr. CIT vs. West Bengal Housing Infrastructure
Development Corpn. Ltd. 96 taxmann.com 610.

 

The assessee was a
company engaged in the business of development of land, housing and
infrastructural facilities in New Town Projects, Kolkata. For assessment year
2005-06, it claimed a deduction of expenditure amounting to
` 9,71,17,977 which was in the nature of compensation for delay in
delivery of plots. As per the offer for allotment of plot of land developed by
the assessee, the assessee was under an obligation to hand over physical
possession of the plot to the allottees on payment of the entire cost of the
land and registration of sale deed.

 

If possession of
the plot was delayed for more than six months from the scheduled date of
possession, the assessee had to pay interest on installments already paid by
the allottee during such extended period, at the prevailing fixed term deposit
rates, for similar period offered by the State Bank of India. According to the
assessee, although the relevant clause of the allotment letter used the
expression “interest”, the actual nature of payment was in the nature
of damages for delayed allotment of a plot and not in the nature of interest.

 

Rejecting the explanation of the assessee, the assessing officer viewed
the payment to be in the nature of interest, and disallowed the expenditure
claimed by the assessee u/s. 40(a)(ia), on account of the failure of the
assessee to deduct tax at source u/s.194A. The CIT (A) confirmed the order of
the assessing officer. Upon further appeal, the Tribunal held that the amount
in question could not be characterised as interest within the meaning of
section 194A, and hence there was no obligation on the part of the assessee to
deduct tax at source. Accordingly, it deleted the disallowance made by the
assessing officer and confirmed by the CIT(A).

 

Before the High Court, on behalf of the revenue, it was argued that the
amount in question was covered by the definition of interest as provided in
section 2(28A). Reliance was placed on the decision of the Madras High Court in
the case of Viswapriya Financial Services & Securities Ltd. (supra). Reliance
was also placed on the decision in the case of CIT vs. Dr. Sham Lal Narula
50 ITR 513 (Punj),
for the proposition that the amount paid in lieu of
delayed payment of compensation to which a person was entitled on the
acquisition of his land was in the nature of interest1.

 

On behalf of the
assessee, it was argued that the amount payable by the assessee on account of
delay in delivering the plots was not interest within the meaning of section
2(28A), since the contract, in the instant case, was for sale of land by the
assessee to the allottee; the assessee did not borrow any money or incur any
debt; and no money was due by the assessee to the allottee. There was no
debtor-creditor relationship between the parties. The ‘right’ must be to a sum
of money and the ‘obligation’ must also be in respect of a sum of money. The
right of an allottee to obtain possession of land and the obligation of the
assessee to deliver possession therefore did not fall within the purview of the
definition. Reliance was also placed on the decision of the Himachal Pradesh
High Court in the case of CIT vs. H.P. Housing Board 340 ITR 388
wherein, on an almost identical set of facts, it was held that the amount paid
by the assessee (H.P. Housing Board, in that case) was not payment of interest,
but payment of damages to compensate the allottee for the delay in the
construction of his house and the harassment caused to him.

 

Additionally, the assessee also contended that taxing statutes must be
strictly construed and any doubt must be construed against the taxing
authorities and in favour of the taxpayer.

 

As far as the definition of ‘interest’ was concerned, the High Court
held that the term ‘interest’ had been made entirely relatable to money
borrowed or debt incurred, and various gradations of rights and obligations
arising from either of the two. The parenthesis in the section was in the
nature of a qualification of the borrowing of money/incurring of debt and what
it included.

 

On the facts of the case, the High Court held that the payment made by
the assessee to the allottee was in terms of the agreement entered between
them, where the liability of the assessee would arise only if it failed to make
the plots available within the stipulated time. Hence, the payment made under
the relevant clause of the letter of allotment was purely contractual and in
the nature of compensation or damages for the loss caused to the allottee in
the interregnum for being unable to utilise or possess the flat. It had the
flavour of compensation and the expression ‘interest’ used in the concerned
clause might be seen merely as a quantification of the liability of the
assessee in terms of the percentage of interest payable by the State Bank of
India. Since there was neither any borrowing of money nor incurring of debt on
the part of the assessee, it was held that the interest as defined u/s. 2(28A)
had no application to such payments.

 

__________________________________________________

1   Though the
revenue relied upon this decision and claimed that such amount paid in lieu of
delayed payment of compensation was regarded as interest, the High Court in
that case refrained itself from dealing with the question as to whether the
said amount was “interest” or “compensation”. The High Court in that case had
considered the essence of the transaction more than the nomenclature and dealt
with the issue as to whether the said amount was a “capital receipt” or
“revenue receipt”.

 

 

While holding so, the High Court preferred to rely upon the decision of
the Himachal Pradesh High Court in the case of H.P. Housing Board (supra) over
the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Viswapriya Financial
Services & Securities Ltd (supra).
 

 

Observations

From the features of the scheme operated in Viswapriya’s case as
presented before the High Court, it appears that the scheme was similar to the
portfolio management scheme. In the case of portfolio management scheme, the
fund manager invests the funds of the investors and the gains generated by it
accrue to the investors. The fund manager receives the management fees for
managing the portfolio.

 

In Viswapriya’s case, the assessee had guaranteed a minimum
return with the condition that its management fees would get reduced to the extent
it failed to provide the guaranteed return. Therefore, as per the facts as
presented before the High Court, the only consequence of inability to provide
the guaranteed return was forgoing of the management fee to the extent of
shortfall and nothing more. Had it been the obligation of the assessee to
compensate the shortfall out of its own capital, then perhaps the view taken by
the High Court would have been justified.

 

In a similar case of chit funds, where the funds belong to the
contributors, various High Courts have taken a view that the bid discount and
dividend to contributors does not amount to interest. The logic is that bid
amount which is distributed among all the subscribers/members is not in respect
of any money borrowed by the chit fund company or any debt incurred by it.

 

Reference may be made to the following decisions in this regard:

 

CIT vs. Sahib Chits (Delhi) Pvt Ltd 328 ITR 342
(Del)

CIT vs. Avenue Super Chits (P) Ltd 375 ITR 76
(Kar)

CIT vs. Panchajanya Chits (P) Ltd 232 Taxman 592
(Kar)

 

The similar logic should have applied equally in Viswapriya’s
case. It appears that these cases have not been cited before the Madras High
Court nor the distinction between the interest, a definite liability, and the
return of gain to the one on whose behalf it was earned has been appropriately
highlighted.

 

A careful analysis of the definition of ‘interest’ as provided in
section 2(28A) reveals that, in order that a particular payment is regarded as
‘interest’ the following conditions should be satisfied –

 

1.  The payment should be
interest, service fee or other charge.

 

2.  It should be in respect of any
money borrowed or debt incurred including a deposit, claim or other similar
right or obligation and credit facility which has not been utilised.

 

3.  It is payable in any manner.

 

Not all payments can be considered as ‘interest’, unless the payment
can be termed as the interest, service fee or other charge. The legislature in
its wisdom has used the words “interest” and not just “any amount”.
Therefore, an amount paid, which is not an interest in form and in substance,
cannot be brought into the definition of the term to deem it as interest. The
very fact that the definition, in its second limb, has specifically included
‘any service fee or other charge’ within its scope suggests that the ‘interest’
in its extended meaning includes service fee and other charge and nothing else.
If the first limb was capable of including any type of payment within its
scope, which is in respect of money borrowed or debt incurred, then the second
limb would become otiose. Such an interpretation is against the basic rule of
harmonious construction, whereby an interpretation which reduces one of the
provisions to a dead letter should be avoided. In short, unless the payment can
be classified as an ‘interest’ in its ordinary meaning of the term, it would
not be termed as ‘interest’ u/s. 2(28A) unless of course, the payment
represents the service fee or charge of the specified kind. 

 

In the case of Viswapriya Financial Services & Securities Ltd.,
the amount paid by the assessee under the investment scheme floated by it can
also not be characteriSed as interest as per its general meaning. Interest is
something which is paid from one’s own income or capital. In the kind of
investment scheme operated by the assessee, the money was received from the
investors and retained by it in its fiduciary capacity. The assessee did not
become the owner of that money. The accumulated money was invested by the assessee
on behalf of the investors and the return earned by investing such money had
been distributed back to the investors who were entitled to it.

 

The Madras High Court was also swayed by the fact that the assessee had
guaranteed a certain percentage of return on investment made by the investors.
However, there may be several such arrangements under which the minimum return
has been guaranteed. For instance, a builder may assure a guaranteed repurchase
price to the investors. A life insurance policy may also have a minimum sum
assured on maturity to the policyholder. The differential amount in such cases
cannot be considered as an ‘interest’ merely because there is an obligation to
pay the amount with a pre-determined rate of return.

 

In the context of the certificates of deposit and the commercial paper
which are issued at a discount, the CBDT vide its Circular No. 647 dated
22-3-1993 has clarified that the difference between the issue price and the
face value is to be treated as ‘discount allowed’ and not as ‘interest paid’
and, therefore, the provisions of section 194A are not applicable to it. Thus,
the payment, even though in respect of the borrowing, has not been treated as
interest, as it is understood to be the discount and not the interest.

 

Guidance can be obtained from the decision of the High Court of Punjab
in the case of CIT vs. Sham Lal Nerula 50 ITR 5132 for
understanding the general meaning of interest as quoted below:

 

Interest” in general terms is the return or compensation
for the use or retention by one person of a sum of money belonging to or owed
to another. In its narrow sense, “interest” is understood to mean the
amount which one has contracted to pay for use of borrowed money.
“Interest” in this sense may be placed broadly in three categories.
The first kind is interest fixed by the parties to the bargain or contract,
that is, “interest'” ex pacto or ex contractu. The second kind of
“interest” is conventional interest, determined by the accepted
usage, prevalent in a trade or a mercantile community. This is also called ex
mora. In the third category may be placed the legal interest allowed by law or
where the court is empowered by the statute to grant interest generally or at a
fixed rate, that is, ex lege.

_______________________________________________

2     This decision is pertaining to the assessment
years prior to 1-6-1976 the date from which the definition of the term
‘interest’ was inserted in the Act.

 

The High Court of Punjab relied upon the decision of the House of Lords
in Westminster Bank Ltd. vs. Riches [1947] A.C. 390 / 28 Tax Cas. 159.
It was a case where a decree was passed against the Westminster Bank for £
36,255 as representing a debt due to Riches. In the exercise of its statutory
powers, the court also awarded a further sum of £ 10,028 as representing
interest due on the debt from the date when the cause of action arose. The
issue before the House of Lords was whether the additional sum of £ 10,028 was
taxable, being in the nature of income. The appellant contended that the
additional sum of £ 10,028, though awarded under a power to add interest to the
amount of the debt, and though called interest in the judgment, was not really
interest attracting income tax, but was damages.

 

In this context, Lord Wright observed:

 

“The appellant’s contention is in any case
artificial and is, in my opinion, erroneous, because the essence of interest is
that it is a payment which becomes due because the creditor has not had his
money at the due date. It may be regarded either as representing the profit he
might have made if he had had the use of the money, or conversely the loss he
suffered because he had not that use. The general idea is that he is entitled to
compensation for the deprivation. From that point of view it would seem
immaterial whether the money was due to him under a contract express or
implied, or a statute, or whether the money was due for any other reason in
law. In either case the money was due to him and was not paid or, in other
words, was with-held from him by the debtor after the time when payment should
have been made, in breach of his legal rights, and interest was a compensation,
whether the compensation was liquidated under an agreement or statute, as for
instance under section 57 of the Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, or was
unliquidated and claimable under the Act as in the present case. The essential
quality of the claim for compensation is the same, and the compensation is
properly described as interest.”

Though interest has been interpreted as including the damages or
compensation for deprivation in the aforesaid decision, it may not be true in
every case, in view of the subsequent insertion of the specific definition in
the Act. As per the definition, the interest should be one which is payable in
respect of –

   any moneys borrowed

   debt incurred

    deposit

    claim

   other similar right or obligation

   Credit facility, utilised or not.

 

Something which is not payable in respect of any of the above, cannot
be regarded as interest for the purpose of the Act, though can be regarded or
called as interest otherwise as per the principles laid down in the aforesaid
decisions.

 

The first item in the above list is borrowing of money, which is simple
to understand, and there cannot be any debate with regard to it. The second
item refers to the ‘debt incurred’ and the term ‘debt’, though not defined
further in this section, has been defined in section 94B as follows:

 

“debt” means any loan, financial instrument,
finance lease, financial derivative, or any arrangement that gives rise to
interest, discounts or other finance charges that are deductible in the
computation of income chargeable under the head “Profits and gains of
business or profession”.

 

The term ‘deposit’ is defined in section 269T as follows:

 

“loan or deposit” means any loan or
deposit of money which is repayable after notice or repayable after a period
and, in the case of a person other than a company, includes loan or deposit of
any nature.

 

Though both the above definitions have limited applicability to the
relevant Sections, it will have a persuasive value in order to understand their
meaning in the context of the definition of the term ‘interest’.

 

It can be seen that the common feature of all of the above items is
that there should be an involvement of money. As far as the borrowing is
concerned, the reference to ‘any moneys’ makes it clear that it cannot include
borrowing of non-monetary assets, for instance, borrowing of securities under
Securities Lending and Borrowing Scheme. As far as incurring of debt is
concerned, it can be a monetary debt or even a non-monetary debt. However, in
the context of this definition and considering the other preceding and
succeeding terms, it should be read in the narrow sense by applying the
principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Bharti
Cellular Ltd. 330 ITR 239
. In this case, the words “technical
services” have been interpreted in the narrower sense by applying the rule
of Noscitur a sociis, because the words “technical services”
in section 9(1)(vii) read with Explanation 2 comes in between the words
“managerial and consultancy services”. Therefore, incurring of a debt
not having monetary involvement should not be considered for the purpose of
interpreting the definition of the term ‘interest’.

 

Apart from borrowing of money and incurring of debt, the definition
also includes “deposit, claim or other similar right or obligation” in
parenthesis. As involvement of money is regarded as essential criteria, the
right must be to a sum of money and the obligation must also be in respect of a
sum of money. The Madras High Court has interpreted the term ‘obligation’ as
including the obligation to repay the money received. However, the definition
refers to a ‘similar’ right or obligation. Therefore, any and every obligation
in respect of money does not get covered unless it is similar to the borrowing
of money or incurring of debt. For instance, preference share capital cannot be
considered as a ‘similar obligation’. 

 

Reference can also be made to CBDT’s Instruction O.P. No.
275/9/80-IT(B) dt. 25-1-1981 which dealt with the issue of applicability of
s/s. 94A to the hire purchase instalment paid by a hirer to the owner under a
hire purchase contract. The relevant portion of the circular is reproduced
below:

 

4. It has to be considered whether the payment of any instalment or
instalments under a hire purchase agreement can be said to be by way of
interest in respect of any moneys borrowed or debt incurred. In this context,
it has to be borne in mind that a hire purchase agreement is a composite
transaction made up of two elements bailment and sale. In such an agreement,
the hirer may not be bound to purchase the thing hired. It is a contract
whereby the owner delivers goods to another person upon terms on which the
hirer is to hire them at a fixed periodical rental. The hirer has also the
option purchasing the goods by paying the total amount of the agreed hire at
any time or of returning before the total amount is paid. What is involved in
the present reference is the real nature of the fixed periodical rental payable
under a hire purchase agreement.

 

5. It may be pointed out that part of the amount
of the hire purchase price is towards the hire and part towards the payment of
price. The agreed amount payable by the hirer in periodical instalments cannot
be characterised as interest payable in any manner within the meaning of
section 2(28A) of the Income-tax Act. It is in the nature of a fixed periodical
rental under which the hire purchase takes place.

 

6. It is true that the definition of the hire
purchase price in section 2(d) of the Hire Purchase Act, 1972, also refers to
any sum payable by the hirer under the hire purchase agreement by way of
deposit or other initial payment or credit or amounts to be credited to him
under such agreement on account of any such deposit or payment. But such
deposit or payment is not in respect of any money borrowed or debt incurred
within the meaning of section 2(28A) of the Income-tax Act.

 

7. In view of the above, it would appear that the
provisions of section 194A will not be attracted in the case of payment of
periodical instalments under a hire purchase agreement
.

 

Thus, deposit not in the nature of
money borrowed or debt incurred has been considered to be not relevant for the
purpose of interpreting the definition of the term ‘interest’. It strengthens
the view that “deposit, claim or other similar right or obligation” in
parenthesis should also have the element of borrowing of money or incurring of
debt. Similarly, in the case of bill discounting and factoring, where the bill
or debt is assigned to the bank/financial entity, various High Courts have
taken the view that the discount or factoring charges in such cases does not
amount to interest, given that such transactions amount to assignment of the
bill or debt, and discounting or factoring charges paid were not in respect of
any debt incurred or money borrowed. Reference may be made to the following
cases:



CIT vs. MKJ Enterprises Ltd 228 Taxman 61
(Cal)(Mag)

Principal CIT vs. M Sons Gems N Jewellery (P.)
Ltd 69 taxmann.com 373 (Del)

CIT vs. Cargill Global Trading (P) Ltd 335 ITR 94
(Del) – affirmed by the Supreme Court in 21 taxmann.com 496

 

Attention is also invited to the decision of the Allahabad High Court
in the case of CIT vs. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. 211 Taxman 369. The
High Court was dealing with the applicability of section 194A on delayed
payment of compensation for accident under the Motor Vehicle  Act.
The relevant observations of the Court are
reproduced here:

37. The necessary ingredients of such interest are
that it should be in respect of any money borrowed or debt incurred. The award
under the Motor Vehicle Act is neither the money borrowed by the insurance
company nor the debt incurred upon the insurance company. As far as the word
“claim” is concerned, it should also be regarding a deposit or other
similar right or obligation. The definition of Section 2(28A) of the Income Tax
Act again repeats the words “monies borrowed or debt incurred” which
clearly shows the intention of the legislature is that if the assessee has
received any interest in respect of monies borrowed or debt incurred including
a deposit, claim or other similar right or obligation, or any service fee or
other charge in respect of monies borrowed or debt incurred has been received
then certainly it shall come within the definition of interest.

 

38. The word “claim” used in the
definition may relate to claims under contractual liability but certainly do
not cover the claims under the statutory liability. The claim under the Motor
Vehicle Act regarding compensation for death or injury is a statutory
liability.

 

In the case of West Bengal Housing Infrastructure Development Corpn.
Ltd. 96 taxmann.com 610
, the Calcutta High Court was dealing with
altogether different facts as compared to Viswapriya’s case. The High
Court rightly held that the rights and obligation referred in the definition
should be arising either from borrowing of money or incurring of debt.
Therefore, the interest payable on account of failure to deliver a particular
asset on the scheduled date as per the agreed terms does not fall within the
definition of the term ‘interest’ under the Act. Though such compensatory
payment could have been regarded as interest as per the principles laid down in
the case of CIT vs. Sham Lal Nerula and Westminster Bank Ltd. vs. Riches,
the statutory definition does not recognise it as interest in the absence of
any borrowing of money, incurring of (monetary) debt or other such similar
arrangements having monetary involvement in respect of which the payment has
been made. Perhaps for similar reasons, the interest payable under the Real
Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 on account of the failure of the
promoter as envisaged in Section 18 of that Act may also not be regarded as
interest for the purpose of the Act.

 

This
analysis is restricted to the interpretation of the term ‘interest’ mainly from
the point of view of applicability of section 194A.

 

Business expenditure – Disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) – Payments liable to TDS – Effect of insertion of second proviso to section 40(a)(ia) – Declaratory and curative and applicable retrospectively w.e.f. 01/04/2005 – Payee offering to tax sum received in its return – Disallowance not attracted

42.  Principal CIT
vs. Shivpal Singh Chaudhary; 409 ITR 87 (P&H)
Date of order: 5th July, 2018 A. Y. 2012-13 Sections 37, 40(a)(ia) and 201(1) of ITA 1961

 

Business expenditure – Disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) –
Payments liable to TDS – Effect of insertion of second proviso to section
40(a)(ia) – Declaratory and curative and applicable retrospectively w.e.f.
01/04/2005 – Payee offering to tax sum received in its return – Disallowance
not attracted

 

For the A. Y. 2012-13, the Assessing Officer had made certain
disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) of the Act being amount paid to a construction
company for job work on the ground that tax was not deducted at source. The
assessee had filed confirmation from the payee that the payment made by the
assesse to it had been shown in its return.

 

The Commissioner appeals held that the second proviso to section
40(a)(ia) is clarificatory and retrospective and deleted the addition. The
Tribunal upheld the decision of the Commissioner (Appeals).

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Punjab and Haryana High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i)   The second proviso to section
40(a)(ia) of the Act was inserted by the Finance Act, 2012 w.e.f. 01/04/2013.
According to the proviso, a fiction has been introduced where an assessee who
had failed to deduct tax in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XVII-B,
but is not deemed to be an assessee in default in terms of the first proviso to
sub-section (1) of section 201 it shall be deemed to have deducted and paid the
tax on such sum on the date of furnishing of return of income by the resident
payee referred to in the proviso.

 

ii)   From the first proviso to
section 201(1) and the second proviso to section 40(a)(ia) it is discernible
that according to both the provisos, where the payee has filed the return
disclosing the payment received or receivable, and has also paid the tax on
such income, the assessee would not be treated to be a person in default and a
presumption would arise in his favour.

iii)  The rationale behind the
insertion of the second proviso to section 40(a)(ia) was declaratory and
curative and thus, applicable retrospectively w.e.f. 01/04.2005. However, under
the first proviso to section 201(1) inserted w.e.f. 01/07/2012, an exception
had been carved out which showed the intention of the Legislature not to treat
the assessee as a person in default subject to fulfilment of the conditions as
stipulated thereunder. No different view could be taken regarding the
introduction of the second proviso to section 40(a)(ia), which was intended to
benefit the assessee, w.e.f. 01/04/2013 by creating a legal fiction in the
assessee’s favour and not to treat him in default of deducting tax at source
under certain contingencies and that it should be presumed that the assessee
had deducted and paid tax on such sum on the date of furnishing of the return
by the resident payee.

iv)  In view of the above,
substantial question of law stands answered against the Revenue and in favour
of the assessee.”

17. [2018] 193 TTJ (Mumbai) 214 Asia Investments (P.) Ltd. vs. ACIT ITA NO. : 7539/MUM/2013 & 4779/Mum/2014 A. Y.: 2003-04 Dated: 23rd February, 2018

Section 271(1)(c) read with section 275
  Where once addition on which penalty
has been levied is set aside to Assessing Officer for fresh consideration, it
is as good as there is no addition for levy of penalty u/s. 271(1)(c)

FACTS

The assessee company filed return of income and the
assessment was completed u/s. 143(3) making certain additions. The assessee
carried the matter in appeal before the CIT(A) wherein the partial relief was
allowed by the CIT(A). The assessee filed appeal before Tribunal for the
additions sustained by the CIT(A). The Tribunal set aside the issue to the file
of the AO with a direction to examine the entire facts of the case.

 

The AO had initiated penalty proceedings u/s. 271(1)(c) and
after considering the submissions of the assesse, he passed order levying penalty
u/s. 271(1)(c).

 

Aggrieved by the penalty order, the assessee preferred an
appeal before the Ld. CIT(A) wherein the penalty was confirmed by the CIT(A).

 

HELD

The Tribunal stated that once the addition on which penalty
had been levied was set aside to the AO for fresh consideration, it was as good
as there was no addition for levy of penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) of the Act.

 

In present case, the AO had finalised penalty proceedings
before the Tribunal had set aside the issue of additions in the quantum appeal
to the file of the AO. The case was covered under the provisions of sub section
(1A) to section 275 of the Act where it is categorically stated that in a case
where the relevant assessment or the order is the subject matter of an appeal
before the appellate authorities or High Court and an order imposing or
enhancing or reducing or cancelling penalty or dropping the proceedings for the
imposition of penalty is passed before the order of the appellate authority is
received by the Commissioner then the order imposing or enhancing or reducing
or cancelling penalty or dropping the proceedings for the imposition of penalty
may be passed on the basis of assessment as revised by giving effect to such
order of the appellate authorities.

 

Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the issue to the file of
the AO directing him to reconsider the issue as per the provisions of section
275(1A) of the Act.

16. [2018] 193 TTJ (Mumbai)(UO) 36 ACIT vs. Zee Media Corporation Ltd ITA NO. : 2166/MUM/2016 A. Y. : 2011-12 Dated: 16th April, 2018

Section 4 read with section 133(6) – In the
absence of any material on record to show that the assessee has received amount
more than the income which had been declared by it in the P&L a/c, addition
cannot be made solely based on AIR information, especially when the assessee
requested the AO to examine the parties by issuing notice u/s. 133(6) but AO
failed to make any enquiry.  

FACTS

The AO in the course of the assessment proceedings, on
perusal of the AIR data found that there was a discrepancy in income to the
extent of Rs.14,13,908 in Form 26AS and the books of account.

 

The assessee submitted that the transactions in respect of
the discrepancy did not happen and were not related to the assessee. The
assesse also filed before the AO a rectification application under section- 154
requesting for withdrawal of corresponding TDS credit.

 

It was submitted before the AO that these transactions did
not appear in the books of account of the assessee and the bank account also
did not reflect any receipts from these parties. The assessee requested the AO
to verify the books of account and also to examine the parties by issuing the
notices under section 133(6).

 

However, the AO treated the said amount as income of the
assessee for the reason that assessee claimed TDS on such transactions but
denied owning up of the said transactions.

 

Aggrieved by the assessment order, the assessee filed appeal
before CIT(A) but the addition was sustained by the CIT(A).

     

HELD

The Tribunal stated that in the absence of any material
brought by the revenue authorities that the assessee had received amount more
than the professional fees which had been declared by him in the P&L
account and when the professional income declared by the assessee far exceeded
the professional fees shown in the AIR information, the additions solely based
on the AIR information were not sustainable.

 

The AO also failed to make any enquiries with the parties as
requested by the assesse when the assessee had denied any transactions with
them. When the assessee had denied any transactions with the parties, the onus
was on the AO to verify the transactions with the parties and to establish that
the assesse indeed entered into any transactions with the said parties and had
received income from them. No such enquiries or effort was made by the AO.

 

The addition was made solely based on the AIR information
without bringing any cogent evidence on record to suggest that the assessee
received income from the said parties.

 

In the result, the Tribunal reversed the order of the CIT(A)
and directed the AO to delete the addition made on account of alleged
difference in income.

15. [2018] 194 TTJ (Mumbai) 122 All India Federation of Tax Practitioners vs. ITO ITA NO. : 7134/MUM/2017 A. Y.: 2013-14 Dated: 04th May, 2018

Section 249(1) read with rule 45 – Assessee
having filed the appeal in paper form, CIT(A) ought not to have dismissed the
same solely on the ground that the assessee has not filed the appeal
electronically as per the mandate of rule 45.

FACTS

The assessee was a trust and had filed its return of income
for A.Y.2013-14. Thereafter, assessment for the said year was completed by
order u/s. 143(3) on 17-2-2016.

 

Aggrieved by the order of the AO, the assessee preferred
appeal before CIT(A). The assessee filed appeal before CIT(A) in paper form as
prescribed under the provisions of IT Act, 1961 within the prescribed period of
limitation.

 

But the same was dismissed by CIT(A) by holding that the
assessee had not filed appeal through electronic form, which was mandatory as
per IT Rules, 1962. The CIT(A) passed the order without allowing hearing to
assessee merely on the basis of alleged default of not having appeal filed
electronically .

     

HELD

The Tribunal observed that the assessee had already filed the
appeal in paper form, however, only the e-filing of appeal had not been done by
the assessee which was only a technical consideration.

 

The Tribunal followed the ratio of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
decision in the case of State of Punjab vs. Shyamalal Murari & Ors. AIR
1976 SC 1177
wherein it was held that courts should not go strictly by the
rulebook to deny justice to the deserving litigant as it would lead to
miscarriage of justice and no party should ordinarily be denied the opportunity
of participating in the process of justice dispensation.      

 

The Tribunal relying upon the judgement of Hon’ble Supreme
Court, held that the alleged compliances defaults were of a technical nature
and the same could not be a reason to deny an opportunity of appeal and
opportunity of justice in the deserving case.

 

In the result, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A) order and
allowed the appeal. The Tribunal directed the assessee to file the appeal
electronically within 10 days from the date of receipt of ITAT order and
further directed the CIT(A) to consider the appeal filed by the assessee on
merits by passing a speaking order.

15. CIT(Exemption) vs. Indian Institute of Banking and Finance. [ITA No. 1368 of 2015 Dated: 28th March, 2018 (Bombay High Court)]. [ Affirmed ACIT vs. Indian Institute of Banking and Finance, dated 11/02/2015 ; Mum. ITAT ] Section 11 : Educational Institution – purpose of development of banking personnel for/in the banking industry – by holding courses and also disbursing knowledge by lectures, discussions, books, correspondence with public bodies and individuals or otherwise etc – Trust entitle to exemption.[Section 2(15)]

[ Affirmed ACIT vs. Indian
Institute of Banking and Finance, dated 11/02/2015 ; Mum. ITAT ]

 

Section 11 : Educational
Institution – purpose of development of banking personnel for/in the banking
industry – by holding courses and also disbursing knowledge by lectures,
discussions, books, correspondence with public bodies and individuals or
otherwise etc – Trust entitle to exemption.[Section 2(15)]


The assessee is a Company
registered u/s. 26 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913 as a non-profit making
Company. The principal objects of the assessee as per the Memorandum of
Association is to inter-alia conduct educational activities in respect
of the banking and finance subjects by holding courses and also disbursing
knowledge by lectures, discussions, books, correspondence with public bodies
and individuals or otherwise etc. It is an undisputed position that, assessee
is registered u/s. 12A of the Act.

 

During the course of assessment
proceedings, the assessee sought benefit of exemption u/s. 11 of the Act. The
A.O denied the same on the ground that the claim for exemption u/s. 10(22) of
the Act for the A.Y 1996-97 to 1998-99 which had been granted by the Tribunal was
pending in Appeal filed by the Revenue in High Court, as well as, application
u/s. 10(23C)(vi) of the Act was pending before the CIT. It was on the aforesaid
basis that the A.O held that the benefit u/s. 11 cannot be granted to the
petitioners. This without dealing with the petitioner’s primary contention that
they are entitled to exemption as they satisfy the definition of charitable
purpose as they are an educational institution.

 

On further Appeal, the Tribunal
allowed the assessee’s appeal. The Tribunal after examining the object clause
as given in the Memorandum of Association gave a finding that the assessee has
been created for the purpose of development of banking personnel for/in the
banking industry. The assessee company imparts education to the candidates who
are connected with the banking industry. It has library facility, organises
lectures, seminars and undertake examinations for promoting bank officers. In
the aforesaid context, the Tribunal concluded on facts which were before the
Revenue Authorities that it exists for advancement of learning in the field of
banking. Besides, on facts it found the fee structure of the institute for
these courses was not on the higher side. Further, the assessee company
reliance upon the decision of this Court in Director of Income-tax
(Exemption), Mumbai vs. Samudra Institute of Maritime Studies Trust, reported
in [2014] 49 taxmann.com 510 (Bombay)
to inter-alia hold that the
activity which is carried out by the assessee company is educational in nature.
This is for the reason that it imparts education to the members of the banking
industry and prepares them to discharge their duties as bankers more
efficiently.

 

Further, with regard to the
objection of the A.O that as the benefit of the assessee company is restricted
only to the persons working in the banking industry, it is not available to the
public at large was negatived by placing reliance upon the decision of the Apex
Court in Ahmedabad Rana Caste Association vs. Commissioner of Income-Tax,
reported in 82 ITR 704
. In the above case, it has been held that the object
beneficial to a section of the public is an object of general public utility
and to serve a charitable purpose it is not necessary that the object should be
to benefit the whole of mankind or all persons in a country or State. In the
above view, it was, held that the petitioners were an institute for a
charitable purpose as defined in section 2(15) of the Act.

 

Being aggrieved, Revenue filed
appeal before the High Court. The Revenue contented  that the activity carried out by the assessee
is in the nature of running Coaching Classes or Center and therefore the
benefit of section 11 of the Act cannot be extended to the assessee company.

 

The Court observed that there is no
such objection taken before the authorities by the Revenue. Besides, nothing
has been shown to us why it should be considered as a coaching class. Further,
the Court found that the impugned order of the Tribunal has only applied the
decision of this Court in Samudra Institute of Maritime Studies Trust (supra)
to conclude that the activities which are run by the institute is an
educational activity and not in the nature of running a Coaching Center or a
Class. The grant or refusal to grant exemption u/s.  10(22) and/or (23C) of the Act cannot govern
the application of section 11 of the Act. In the above view, the Appeal was
dismissed.
 

14. CIT vs. Shankardas B. Pahajani [ITA No. 1432 of 2007 Dated : 24th April, 2018 (Bombay High Court)]. [Affirmed DCIT vs. Shankardas B. Pahajani [dated 13/09/2004 ; AY 1994-95 , Mum. ITAT] Section 147 : Reassessment – Audit objection- Reopening on basis of same set of facts available at time of original assessment – change of opinion – reassessment was held to be invalid

[Affirmed DCIT vs.
Shankardas B. Pahajani [dated 13/09/2004 ; AY 1994-95 , Mum. ITAT]

 

Section 147 : Reassessment
– Audit objection- Reopening on basis of same set of facts available at time of
original assessment – change of opinion – reassessment was held to be invalid

 

During the
course of assessment, detailed letters were filed by the assessee giving
complete details of the transactions relating to the purchase and sale of flats
in a building known as ‘Tanhee Heights’ resulting in capital gains. Thus, the
same was subject of consideration leading to assessment order u/s. 143(3) of
the Act. On 15th May, 1998 a notice u/s. 148 of the Act was issued by the A.O seeking to reopen the assessment for
AY: 1994-95. The assessee objected to the re-opening of Assessment but the same
was not accepted. This resulted in assessment order passed u/s. 143(3) r/w section 147 of the Act and made addition.

 

On appeal, the CIT (A), allowed the
assessee’s appeal, holding that re-opening notice dated 15th May,
1998 is without jurisdiction.

 

Being aggrieved, Revenue preferred
appeal before ITAT. The Tribunal held that the exercise of re-opening the
assessment is without jurisdiction. This on the ground that, the entire issue
of capital gains on which the reopening notice was issued was the subject
matter of consideration during the regular assessment proceedings u/s. 143(3)
of the Act. This is evident from the letters of the assessee disclosing all
facts during the regular assessment proceedings. Therefore, it held it to be a
case of change of opinion on the part of the A.O and therefore, absence of any
reason to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment.

 

The Tribunal concluded that there
was absence of application of mind by the A.O and the reopening notice was
issued on borrowed satisfaction i.e. on the basis of audit objection. Therefore
re-opening notice to be without jurisdiction. 

 

The Revenue contended that the
reopening notice dated 15th May, 1998 has been issued on account of
a recent decision of the Bombay High Court in Commissioner of Income-Tax vs.
Smt. Beena K. Jain, [1996] 217 ITR 363 (rendered on 23rd November,
1993)
. Thus, it is submitted that the reopening notice is valid in law and
the appeal deserves to be admitted.

 

The High Court held that, the
assessee had furnished all information in respect of the issue of capital gains
by letters during assessment proceedings. Therefore, the A.O had applied his
mind to the facts and the law while passing the order of regular assessment.
The decision in the case of Beena K. Jain (supra) being relied
upon in support of the re-opening notice was available at the time when the regular
assessment order dated 12th September, 1996 u/s 143 of the Act was
passed. The reasons recorded in support of the impugned notice was merely on
the basis of borrowed satisfaction of the audit party. This also makes the
impugned notice bad. For the aforesaid reasons, the appeal was dismissed.

13. Jaison S. Panakkal vs. Pr. CIT. [ W.P no. 1122 of 2018, Dated : 26th April, 2018 (Bombay High Court)]. Section 179(1): Liability of director – Private company – show cause notice issued u/s. 179(1) did not indicate or give any particulars in respect of steps taken by department to recover tax dues from defaulting private company – Order set aside.

Section 179(1): Liability
of director – Private company – show cause notice issued u/s. 179(1) did not indicate or give any particulars in respect of steps taken
by department to recover tax dues from defaulting private company – Order set
aside.


The Assessing Officer vide order
dated 15/2/2018 passed u/s. 179(1) of the Act, held that the Petitioner was
liable to pay the tax dues of Rs.38.34 crores of M/s. Damasy Retail Jewellery
Pvt. Ltd. The Petitioner was a former Director of M/s. Damasy Retail Jewellery
Pvt. Ltd., having been a director during the period 29th December,
2007 to 11th November, 2009.

 

It was the case of the assessee
that the impugned order was not preceded by service of any show cause notice
upon him. Consequently, Petitioner had no opportunity to put forth his case
before passing of the impugned order.



The Revenue contended that the show
cause notice dated 26th July, 2017 was attempted to be served by
Registered Post. However, same was received back with the postal remark “not
known
”.

 

The Petitioner contended that the
show cause notice dated 26th July, 2017 does not make any mentioning
of the Revenue’s attempt to recover the tax dues of M/s. Damasy Retail
Jewellery Pvt. Ltd. from it and the result thereof. In this circumstances, it is
submitted that the impugned proceedings, are completely, without jurisdiction.

 

The Hon’ble Court relied on the
decision in case of  Madhavi Kerkar
vs. Asst CIT (Writ Petition No.567 of 2016) dt 5th January, 2018
and
Mehul Jadavji Shah vs. Deputy CIT (Writ Petition No. 291 of 2018) dt : 5th
April, 2018
, wherein the High Court held that the jurisdiction to commence
proceedings against the Director of a delinquent company for a recovery of the
tax dues of the delinquent company, would require the notice to the Directors/
former Directors, itself, indicating what steps had been taken to recover the
dues from the delinquent company and the failure thereof. The show cause notice
should indicate to have satisfied the condition precedent for commencing
proceedings u/s. 179(1) of the Act.

 

As
the condition precedent for commencing proceedings u/s. 179(1) of the Act were
not satisfied the impugned order dated 15th February, 2018 was
quashed and set aside.

44 Sections 9(1)vii), Expln 2 and 194J – TDS – Fees for technical services – Transmission of electricity – Payment made only for facility to use and maintenance of transmission lines – Not technical services – Mere involvement of technology does not bring something within ambit of technical services – Provisions of section 194J not applicable

The assessee was a licensee for
distribution and sale of electricity under the provisions of the Electricity
Act, 2003, by the Uttar Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission. The assessee
purchased power from Uttar Pradesh Power Corporation. For the A. Y. 2008-09,
the assessee made payments in terms of tariff issued by the Commission which
was bifurcated in two parts: (a) power supply tariff and (b) power transmission
tariff. The transmission charges were paid to the Uttar Pradesh Power
Transmission Company Ltd. (UPPTCL) and power supply charges were payable to the
Corporation. The Assessing Officer observed that payment made to the company
was not a payment of purchase or supply of power but payment of technical
charges for rendering “technical service” on monthly basis and consequently
held that the assessee was liable to deduct tax at source on charges paid for
transmission to the company and since it failed to do so, the amount of Rs.
1,65,32,88,040 was to be disallowed u/s. 40(a)(ia) of the Act.

 

The Commissioner (Appeals) and the
Tribunal accepted the assessee’s claim and cancelled the disallowance.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the
Allahabad High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i)  Since
electricity was a commodity which could not be carried from one place to
another like other commodities, it had to flow through metal conductors which
were called “transmission lines” and therefore, transmission lines constituted
a facility for travelling of electricity from the point of generation to the
point of distribution. This flow of electricity in a conductor could not be
said to be any specialized, exclusive individual service rendered by the
company to the assessee because the grid was common and transmission lines were
used in general by respective distributor licensees. Only for the purpose of
facility to use and maintenance of transmission lines, charges were paid and
there was no “technical service”, as such, rendered by the company to the
assessee.

 

ii)   Mere
involvement of technology would not bring something within the ambit of
“technical services” as defined in Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vii) because
under the Act, the term “technical services” was defined in a different manner,
i.e., along with terms “managerial and consultancy services”. “Managerial and
consultancy services” by themselves did not include any technology but still
would be covered by the definition of “fees for technical services” in the Act.
Therefore, the term “technical services” was not dependent solely on whether or
not use of technology was involved.

 

iii)  Moreover, the term “technical” had to be read applying the principle
of noscitur a sociis in the term “managerial and consultancy”. That
takes away normal and common meaning of “technical services” as was known in
common parlance and makes it totally different. Therefore, in transmission of
electricity, there was no human touch or effort and if the term “technical was
read applying the principle of noscitur a sociis with the term
“managerial or consultancy”, the provisions of section 194J were not
applicable.

 

iv)  The
questions formulated are answered against the Revenue and in favour of the
assessee.”

43 Sections 10(38), 45 and 271(1)(c) – Penalty – Concealment of income – Capital gain – Exemption – Assessee claiming exemption u/s. 10(38) with a note that it reserved its right to carry forward loss – Bona fide belief of assessee that loss not required to be considered u/s. 10(38) – Penalty rightly cancelled by Tribunal

DIT
(International Taxation) vs. Nomura India Investment Fund Mother Fund.; 404 ITR
636 (Bom); Date of order : 15th June, 2017 A. Y.: 2008-09

 

The
assessee earned long-term capital gain as well as long-term capital loss on
purchase and sale of shares. For the A. Y. 2008-09, while computing the total
income, it did not set off the long-term capital loss of Rs. 80.64 crores
against the long-term capital gain of Rs. 697.70 crores, which was exempted
u/s. 10(38) of the Act and in its return had put a note reserving the right to
carry forward the long-term capital loss. The Assessing Officer rejected the
claim of the assessee to carry forward the long-term capital loss and held that
it was not admissible and also levied penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) for concealment of income.

 

The
Tribunal cancelled the penalty.

 

On appeal
by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and
held as under:

 

“i)  The provisions of section 271(1)(c) could only
be invoked upon satisfaction of the conditions laid down therein. The assessee
had claimed exemption u/s. 10(38) with a note that it reserved its right to
carry forward the loss of Rs. 80.64 crores, under the bona fide belief
that u/s. 10(38) the loss was not required to be considered. It could not be
stated that the act of the assessee in giving the note was with some ulterior
intention or concealment of income or giving inaccurate particulars.

 

ii)   Therefore, the penalty was rightly cancelled
by the Tribunal. No question of law arose.”

42 Section 4 – Income – revenue or capital receipt – Where Government gave grant-in-aid to a company wholly-owned by Government, facing acute cash crunch, to keep company floating, even though large part of funds were applied by company for salary and provident funds, grant received was capital receipt

Pr.
CIT vs. State Fisheries Development Corporation Ltd.; [2018] 94 taxmann.com 466
(Cal); Date of order : 14th May, 2018A. Y.: 2006-07:

 

The
assessee was a company wholly-owned by the State Government. The assessee was
engaged in business of pisciculture. The assessee received an amount as
grants-in-aid. Out of that, certain sum was received for payment of salary to
its employees, certain sum for payment of Provident Fund dues and certain sum
for the purpose of flood relief. The assessee claimed deduction of said sum
from its income on plea that same constituted capital receipt. The Assessing
Officer found that the fund was applied for items which were revenue in nature.
He recorded that such receipts were consistently treated in the past by the
assessee as revenue receipt. Thus, same could not be allowed for deduction as
capital receipt.

 

The
Tribunal did not solely rely on the nature of application of the funds received
through grant-in-aid. The Tribunal examined the character of the assessee as a
Government company as well as the character of grantor, being the State
Government itself, the financial status of the assessee and certain other
factors. The Tribunal accepted the assessee’s claim that grant-in-aid towards
provident fund dues constituted capital receipts.

 

On appeal
by the Revenue, the Calcutta High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and
held as under:

 

“i)  The fundamental principle for distinguishing
capital receipt from revenue receipt in relation to Government grant has been
laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Sahney Steel & Press Works
Ltd. vs. CIT [1997] 94 Taxman 368/228 ITR 253
. That was a case involving
government subsidy in the form of certain time bound incentives and facilities.
These incentives and facilities included refund of sales tax on raw materials,
machineries and finished goods. The Supreme Court found that the incentives and
facilities under a subsidy scheme to enable the assessee to acquire new plant
or machinery for expansion of manufacturing capacity or set up new industrial
undertaking could constitute capital receipt. In that case, however, the scheme
contemplated for refund of sales tax on purchase of machinery and raw
materials, subsidy or power consumption and certain other exemptions on
utilities consumed. The Supreme Court rejected the plea of the assessee for
treating such facilities and incentives as capital receipt on the reasoning
that such subsidy could only be treated as assistance given for the purpose of
carrying on the business of the assessee.

 

ii)   So far as assessee’s case in this appeal is
concerned, Rs. 3.60 crores was received as grant-in-aid in the relevant
previous year towards salary and provident fund dues. On surface test, receipt
under these heads no doubt has the attributes of revenue receipt. But there are
two factors which distinguish the character of the grant-in-aid which the
assessee wants to be treated as capital receipt. Said sum was not on account of
any general subsidy scheme. Secondly, the sum was given by the State to a
wholly-owned company which was facing acute cash crunch. Financial status of
the company appears from the submission of the assessee’s representative
recorded in the order of the first Appellate Authority and there is no denial
of this fact in any of the materials placed.

 

iii)  In the case of the assessee, though it is not
a grant from a parent company to a subsidiary company, the grant is from the
State Government, which was in effect, hundred per cent shareholder of the
assessee. Rs. 3.60 crores was meant for payment of staff salaries and provident
fund dues. As already observed, these item heads may bear the label of revenue
receipt on the surface, it is apparent that the actual intention of the State
was to keep the company, facing acute cash crunch, floating and protecting
employment in a public sector organization. There is no separate business
consideration on record between the grantor, that is the State Government and
the recipient thereof being the assessee. The principle of law as laid down in
the case of Siemens Public Communication Network (P.) Ltd. vs. CIT [2017] 77
taxmann.com 22/244 Taxman 188/390 ITR 1 (SC)
is that voluntary payments
made by the parent company to its loss making Indian subsidiary can also be
understood to be payments made in order to protect the capital investment of
the assessee-company. Though the grant-in-aid in this case was received from
public funds, the State Government being 100 per cent shareholder, its position
would be similar to that of, or at par with a parent company making voluntary
payments to its loss making undertaking. No other specific business
consideration on the part of the State has been demonstrated in this appeal.
The assistance extended appears to be measures to keep the assessee-company
floating, the assessee being, for all practical purposes an extended arm of the
State. Though large part of the funds were applied for salary and provident
fund dues, the object of extension of assistance, to ensure survival of the
company.

 

iv)  As regards the funds extended for flood
relief, the same cannot constitute revenue receipt. Flood relief does not
constitute part of business of the assessee.

 

v)  Accordingly, the question is answered in
favour of the assessee and confirm the finding of the Tribunal.”