Subscribe to the Bombay Chartered Accountant Journal Subscribe Now!

Category: Direct Taxes

Sections 250 and 271AAA – Ex parte dismissal of appeal by CIT(A), without considering the material on record on the ground that the written submissions were not signed by the assessee, is contrary to the provisions of sub-section (6) of section 250

3. 118 taxmann.com 223 (Raj.)(Trib.) Keshavlal Devkaranbhai Patel vs. ACIT ITA No. 124 /Rajkot/2017 A.Y.: 2012-13 Date of order: 28th July, 2020

 

Sections 250 and 271AAA – Ex parte
dismissal of appeal by CIT(A), without considering the material on record on
the ground that the written submissions were not signed by the assessee, is
contrary to the provisions of sub-section (6) of section 250

 

FACTS


Aggrieved by the
order levying penalty u/s 271AAA, the assessee preferred an appeal to the
CIT(A). The assessee had filed his explanation before the A.O. and also before
the CIT(A). However, the submissions filed before the CIT(A) were not signed by
the assessee.

 

In view of this,
the CIT(A) dismissed the appeal by recording that the assessee was not
interested in pursuing the appeal.

 

Aggrieved, the
assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

 

HELD


The Tribunal found
the order of the CIT(A) to be very cryptic and not having any discussion on the
material already available on record before him. The Tribunal observed that:

(i)   there is no valid and justifiable reason
given by the appellate authority in his order while dismissing the claim of the
assessee;

(ii)  the CIT(A) has recorded in his order that the
assessee has filed written submissions in the office on 29th August,
2017 but without signature, hence the same were not considered by the CIT(A);
and

(iii) the CIT(A) dismissed the appeal for want of
prosecution even when the written submission was on record which did not bear
the signature of the assessee.

 

The Tribunal held
that the CIT(A) ought to have adjourned the matter and passed a further
direction to file fresh written submissions, duly signed. It is a basic
principle that justice should not only be done, but it must also be seen to be
done. In the absence of that, the Tribunal held, the order impugned is not in
consonance with the spirit and object of sub-section (6) of section 250.

 

The Tribunal set
aside the issue to the file of the CIT(A) with a direction to adjudicate it
afresh after giving the assessee an opportunity of being heard and to pass a
speaking order thereon keeping in mind, inter alia, the mandate of the
provisions of section 250(6) in order to render true and effective justice.

Section 50C – Provisions of section 50C are not applicable to introduction of development rights as capital contribution in an AOP of which assessee is a member

2. 119 taxmann.com 186 (Mum.)(Trib.) Network Construction Company vs. ACIT ITA No. 2279/Mum./2017 A.Y.: 2012-13 Date of order: 11th August, 2020

 

Section 50C – Provisions of section 50C are
not applicable to introduction of development rights as capital contribution in
an AOP of which assessee is a member

 

FACTS


The assessee firm
acquired development rights in respect of seven buildings of which the assessee
firm developed and sold four on its own and disclosed the profit earned as
business profit in its return of income. The development rights in respect of
the remaining three buildings were shown as investments in the balance sheet as
at 31st March, 2010.

 

As per the joint
venture agreement dated 1st July, 2010, the assessee contributed
development rights in respect of three buildings as ‘capital contribution’ in
an AOP for an agreed consideration of Rs. 5 crores. The assessee contended that
the capital gains were to be computed in accordance with the provisions of
section 45(3).

 

The A.O. treated
the introduction of the development rights as a transfer and computed capital
gains by applying the provisions of section 50C by adopting Rs. 10,10,47,000,
being stamp duty value of these rights, as the full value of consideration.

 

Aggrieved, the
assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO.

 

The assessee
preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

 

HELD


The Tribunal
observed that section 45(3) is a charging provision having two limbs joined by
the conjunction ‘AND’. The first limb is a charging provision which levies
capital gains tax on gains arising from the contribution of a capital asset in the
AOP by a member, and the second limb is an essential deeming fiction for
determining the value of consideration without which the charging provision
would fail. The Tribunal also observed that the provisions of section 50C are
also a deeming fiction which deems only the value of consideration for the
purpose of calculating capital gains in the transfer of a capital asset from
one person to another. It held that the provisions of section 50C are not
applicable in the present case and that the provisions of section 45(3) will be
applied.

 

The Tribunal
reversed the orders of the A.O. and the CIT(A) and allowed this ground of
appeal filed by the assessee.

 

Section 44AD r/w sections 44AB and 144 – Assessing Officer can resort to estimation of income under the provisions of section 44AD only after rejecting the books of accounts of the assessee, by best judgment assessment u/s 144

1. [118 taxmann.com
347] Saykul Islam vs.
ITO ITA No.
64/Ahd./2018 A.Y.: 2014-15 Date of order: 31st
July, 2020

 

Section 44AD r/w sections
44AB and 144 – Assessing Officer can resort to estimation of income under the
provisions of section 44AD only after rejecting the books of accounts of the
assessee, by best judgment assessment u/s 144

 

FACTS


The assessee is an
individual trading in hardware goods. His business turnover was in excess of
Rs. 1 crore, but he had declared profit at 0.99% of the turnover in his tax
return. The information was provided by the assessee in his return of income
reflecting maintenance of books of accounts, but not audited as required under
the provisions of section 44AB. The A.O. was of the view that as per the
provisions of section 44AD, an assessee may claim lower profits and gains than
the profits and gains specified in sub-section (1) of section 44AD provided
that the assessee keeps and maintains such books of accounts and other
documents as required under sub-section (2) of section 44AA and gets his
accounts audited and furnishes a report of such audit as required u/s 44AB. The
assessee submitted that the net profit percentage was very low in his business
and requested the officer to take the net profit percentage @3% of the
turnover.

 

The A.O. rejected
this contention and estimated the net profit at 8% of the turnover. On appeal
to the CIT(A), he reduced the estimated profit on turnover from 8% to 5%.
Aggrieved by the order of the CIT(A), the assessee filed an appeal with the
Tribunal.

 

HELD


The assessee had
produced all books of accounts, bills, vouchers and other documents; however, without
pointing out any mistake or error in the books of accounts, the A.O. made an
addition at 8%. Moreover, the books of accounts were not rejected. The Tribunal
observed that the A.O. could resort to estimation of net profits only after
rejecting the books of accounts u/s 145(3) and thereafter making best judgment
assessment u/s 144. Instead, he estimated net profits only on the basis of
suspicion that the assessee might be inflating expenses and showing a lower net
profit ratio. On the factual position of the case, the Tribunal directed the
A.O. to estimate the income at 2.5% of the turnover.

 

The appeal of the
assessee was partly allowed.

TAXATION OF RECEIPT BY RETIRING PARTNER

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION


On retirement of a
partner from a partnership firm, at times the outgoing partner may be paid an amount
which is in excess of his capital, current account and loan balances with the
firm. Such amount paid to the outgoing partner is often determined on the basis
of an informal valuation of the net assets of the firm, or of the business of
the firm.

 

Taxation of such
receipts by a partner on retirement from a partnership firm has been an issue
which has been the subject matter of disputes for several decades. As far back
as in September, 1979, the Supreme Court in the case of Malabar Fisheries
Co. vs. CIT 120 ITR 49, held that dissolution of a firm did not amount
to extinguishment of rights in partnership assets and was thus not a ‘transfer’
within the meaning of section 2(47). In 1987, the Supreme Court, in a short
decision in Addl. CIT vs. Mohanbhai Pamabhai 165 ITR 166,
affirmed the view taken by the Gujarat High Court in 1973 in the case of CIT
vs. Mohanbhai Pamabhai 91 ITR 393. In that case, the Gujarat High Court
had held that when a partner retires from a partnership and the amount of his
share in the net partnership assets after deduction of liabilities and prior
charges is determined on taking accounts on footing of notional sale of
partnership assets and given to him, what he receives is his share in the
partnership and not any consideration for transfer of his interest in
partnership to the continuing partners. Therefore, charge of capital gains tax
would not apply on such retirement.

 

The law is amended
by the Finance Act, 1987 with effect from Assessment Year 1988-89 by insertion
of section 45(4) and simultaneous deletion of section 47(ii). Section 47(ii)
earlier provided that distribution of assets on dissolution of a firm would not
be regarded as a transfer. Section 45(4) now provides as under:

 

‘The profits or
gains arising from the transfer of a capital asset by way of distribution of
capital assets on the dissolution of a firm or other association of persons or
body of individuals (not being a company or a co-operative society) or
otherwise, shall be chargeable to tax as the income of the firm, association or
body, of the previous year in which the said transfer takes place and, for the
purposes of section 48, the fair market value of the asset on the date of such
transfer shall be deemed to be the full value of the consideration received or
accruing as a result of the transfer.’

 

Section 45(4), with
its introduction, so far as the firm is concerned, provides for taxing the firm
on distribution of its assets on dissolution or otherwise. However, even
subsequent to these amendments, the taxability of the excess amounts received
by the partner on retirement from the firm, in his hands, has continued to be a
matter of dispute before the Tribunals and the High Courts. While the Pune,
Hyderabad, Mumbai and Bangalore benches have taken the view that such excess
amounts are chargeable to tax as capital gains in the hands of the partner, the
Mumbai, Chennai, Bangalore and Hyderabad benches have taken the view that such
amounts are not taxable in the hands of the retiring partner. Further, while
the Bombay, Andhra Pradesh and Madras High Courts have taken the view that such
amount is not taxable in the hands of the partner, the Delhi High Court has
taken the view that it is taxable in the hands of the partner as capital gains.

 

THE HEMLATA S. SHETTY CASE


The issue came up
before the Mumbai bench of the Tribunal in the case of Hemlata S. Shetty
vs. ACIT [ITA Nos. 1514/Mum/2010 and 6513/Mum/2011 dated 1st December, 2015].

 

In this case,
relating to A.Y. 2006-07, the assessee was a partner in a partnership firm of
D.S. Corporation where she had a 20% profit share. The partnership firm had
acquired a plot of land in September, 2005 for Rs. 6.50 crores. At that time,
the original capital contributions of the partners was Rs. 3.20 crores, the
partners being the assessee’s husband (Sudhakar M. Shetty) and another person.
The assessee became a partner in the partnership firm on 16th
September, 2005, contributing a capital of Rs. 52.50 lakhs. On 26th
September, 2005 three more partners were admitted to the partnership firm. Most
of the tenants occupying the land were vacated by paying them compensation, and
the Ministry of Tourism’s approval was received for setting up a five-star
hotel on the plot of land.

 

On 27th
March, 2006 the assessee and her husband retired from the partnership firm, at
which point of time the land was revalued at Rs. 193.91 crores and the surplus
on revaluation was credited to the partners’ capital accounts. The assessee and
her husband each received an amount of Rs. 30.88 crores on their retirement
from the partnership firm, over and above their capital account balances.

 

The A.O. noted that
the revaluation of land resulted in a notional profit of Rs. 154.40 crores for
the firm and 20% share therein of the assessee and her husband at Rs. 30.88
crores each was credited to their accounts. No tax was paid on such revalued
profits on the plea that those amounts were exempt u/s 10(2A). The A.O. held
that the excess amount received on retirement from the partnership firm was
liable to tax as short-term capital gains as there was a transfer within the
meaning of section 2(47) on retirement of the partner.

 

The Commissioner
(Appeals), on appeal, confirmed the order of the A.O.

 

Before the
Tribunal, on behalf of the assessee, reliance was placed on a decision of the
Bombay High Court in the case of Prashant S. Joshi vs. ITO 324 ITR 154,
where the Bombay High Court had quashed the reassessment proceedings initiated
to tax such excess amount received on retirement of a partner from the
partnership firm, on the ground that the amount was a capital receipt not
chargeable to tax and the reopening of the case was not maintainable.

 

It was argued on
behalf of the Department that the Tribunal had decided the issue against the
assessee in the case of the assessee’s husband, Sudhakar M. Shetty vs.
ACIT 130 ITD 197, on 9th September, 2010. In that case, the
Tribunal had referred to the observations of the Bombay High Court in the case
of CIT vs. Tribhuvandas G. Patel 115 ITR 95, where the Court had
held that there were two modes of retirement of a partner from a partnership
firm; in one case, a retiring partner, while going out, might assign his
interest by a deed; and in the other case, he might, instead of assigning his
interest, take the amount due to him from the firm and give a receipt for the
money and acknowledge that he had no more claim on his co-partners. In that
case, the Bombay High Court held that where, instead of quantifying his share
by taking accounts on the footing of a notional sale, the parties agreed to pay
a lump sum in consideration of the retiring partner assigning or relinquishing
his share or right in the partnership and its assets in favour of the
continuing partners, the transaction would amount to transfer within the
meaning of section 2(47). This view was followed by the Bombay High Court in
subsequent decisions in the cases of CIT vs. H.R. Aslot 115 ITR 255
and N.A.Mody vs. CIT 162 ITR 420, and the Delhi High Court in the
case of Bishan Lal Kanodia vs. CIT 257 ITR 449.

 

In the case of Sudhakar
Shetty (Supra), the Tribunal observed that in deciding the case of Prashant
S. Joshi (Supra), the Bombay High Court had not considered its earlier
decisions in the cases of N.A. Mody (Supra) and H.R. Aslot
(Supra) and the said decision was rendered by the Court in the context
of the validity of the notice u/s 148, and therefore the ratio of the
decision in that case did not apply to the facts of the case before it in the Sudhakar
Shetty case.

 

On behalf of the
assessee, Hemlata Shetty, it was pointed out to the Tribunal that, after the
Tribunal’s decision in Sudhakar Shetty’s case, the Department had
reopened the assessment of the firm where the assessee and her husband were
partners and assessed the notional profits as income in the hands of the firm
u/s 45(4). It was argued that the Department had realised the mistake that it
could not have assessed the partners on account of receipt on retirement u/s
45(4). It was therefore pointed out that due to subsequent developments, the
facts and circumstances had changed from those prevalent when the Tribunal had
decided the case of Sudhakar Shetty.

 

It was further
argued on behalf of the assessee that after the judgment in the Sudhakar
Shetty case on 9th September, 2010, a similar matter had
been decided by the Mumbai bench of the Tribunal in the case of R.F.
Nangrani HUF vs. DCIT [ITA No. 6124/Mum/2012] on 10th
December, 2014, where the decision in Sudhakar Shetty’s case was
also referred to. The issue in that case was similar to the issue in the case
of Hemlata Shetty. In R.F. Nangrani HUF’s case, the
Tribunal had followed the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT
vs. R. Lingamallu Rajkumar 247 ITR 801, where it had held that the
amount received on retirement by a partner was not liable to capital gains tax,
and the Tribunal in that case had also considered the decision of the Hyderabad
bench in ACIT vs. N. Prasad 153 ITD 257, which had taken a
similar view. It was argued on behalf of the assessee that when there were
conflicting decisions delivered by a bench of equal strength, the later
judgment should be followed, especially when the earlier judgment was referred
to while deciding the matter in the later judgment.

 

The Tribunal noted
that in the case of CIT vs. Riyaz A. Shaikh 221 Taxman 118, the
Bombay High Court referred to the fact that the Tribunal in that case had
followed the Bombay High Court decision in Prashant S. Joshi’s
case, while noting that Tribuvandas G. Patel’s case, which had
been followed in N.A. Mody’s case, had been reversed by the
Supreme Court. The Bombay High Court further noted in Riyaz Shaikh’s
case that Prashant Joshi’s case had also noted this fact of
reversal, and that it had followed the decision of the Supreme Court in R.
Lingamallu Rajkumar’s case 247 ITR 801.

 

The Tribunal
therefore followed the decision of the jurisdictional High Court in Riyaz
Shaikh’s case and held that the amount received by the assessee on
retirement from the partnership firm was not taxable under the head ‘Capital
Gains’.

 

This decision of
the Tribunal in Hemlata Shetty’s case has been approved by the
Bombay High Court in Principal CIT vs. Hemlata S. Shetty 262 Taxman 324.
R.F. Nangrani HUF’s Tribunal decision has also been approved by the
Bombay High Court in Principal CIT vs. R.F. Nangrani HUF 93 taxmann.com
302. A similar view has also been taken by the Andhra Pradesh High
Court in the case of CIT vs. P.H. Patel 171 ITR 128, though this
related to A.Y. 1973-74, a period prior to the deletion of clause (ii) of
section 47. Further, in the case of CIT vs. Legal Representative of N.
Paliniappa Goundar (Decd.) 143 ITR 343, the Madras High Court also
accepted the Gujarat High Court’s view in the case of Mohanbhai Pamabhai
(Supra) and disagreed with the view of the Bombay High Court in the
case of Tribhuvandas G. Patel (Supra), holding that excess amount
received by a partner on retirement was not taxable.

 

A similar view has
also been taken by the Mumbai bench of the Tribunal in the case of James
P. D’Silva vs. DCIT 175 ITD 533, following the Bombay High Court
decisions in Prashant S. Joshi and Riyaz A. Shaikh’s
cases and by the Bangalore bench in the case of Prabhuraj B. Appa, 6 SOT
419 and by the Chennai bench in the case of P. Sivakumar (HUF),
63 SOT 91.

 

SAVITRI KADUR’S CASE


The issue again
came up before the Bangalore bench of the Tribunal recently in the case of Savitri
Kadur vs. DCIT 177 ITD 259.

 

In this case, the
assessee and another person had formed a partnership with effect from 1st
April, 2004. Yet another person was admitted as a partner with effect from 1st
April, 2007, and simultaneously the assessee retired from the firm with effect
from that date. The assessee had a capital balance of Rs. 1.64 crores as on 1st
April, 2006 and her share in the profit for the year of Rs. 46 lakhs was
credited to her account. The land and building held by the firm was revalued
and her share of Rs. 62.51 lakhs in the surplus on revaluation was credited to
her account. Interest on capital of Rs. 18.12 lakhs was also credited to her
account which, after deducting drawings, showed a balance of Rs. 2.78 crores as
on the date of her retirement. The assessee was paid a sum of Rs. 3.40 crores
on her retirement. The assessee had invested an amount of Rs. 50 lakhs in
capital gains bonds.

 

The difference of
Rs. 62 lakhs between Rs. 3.40 crores and Rs. 2.78 crores was taxed as capital
gains by the A.O. in her hands. According to the A.O., such amount was nothing
but a payment for her giving up her right in the existing goodwill of the firm,
that there was a transfer u/s 2(47) on her retirement, which was therefore
liable to capital gains tax.

 

The Commissioner
(Appeals) upheld the order of the A.O., placing reliance on the decision of the
Bombay High Court in the case of CIT vs. A.N. Naik Associates 265 ITR 346,
where the High Court had held that there was a charge to capital gains tax u/s
45(4) when the assets of the partnership were distributed even on retirement of
a partner, and the scope of section 45(4) was not restricted to the case of
dissolution of the firm alone.

 

On appeal, the
Tribunal observed that it was necessary to appreciate how the act of the
formation, introduction, retirement and dissolution of partnership was used by
assessees as a device to evade tax on capital gains; first by converting an
asset held individually into an asset of the firm and later on retiring from
the firm; and likewise by conversion of capital assets of the firm into assets
of the partners by effecting dissolution or retirement. In that direction, the
Tribunal analysed the background and tax implications behind conversion of
individual assets into assets of partnership, distribution of assets on
dissolution, reconstitution of the firm with the firm continuing whereby a
partner retired and the retiring partner was allotted a capital asset of the
firm for relinquishing all his rights and interests in the partnership firm as
partner, and continuation of the firm after reconstitution whereby a partner
retired and the retiring partner was paid a consideration for relinquishing all
his rights and interests in the partnership firm as partner in any of the
following manner:


(a) on the basis of
amount lying in his / her capital account, or

(b) on the basis of
amount lying in his / her capital account plus amount over and above the sum
lying in his / her capital account, or

(c) a lump sum consideration with no reference to
the amount lying in his / her capital account.

 

The Tribunal
thereafter held that the case of the appellant, on the basis of the facts
before it, was a situation falling under (b) above, meaning that the assessee
on her retirement from the firm was paid on the basis of the amount lying in
her capital account plus an amount over and above the sum lying in her capital
account.

 

The Tribunal
observed that:


(i) there was no
dispute that there could not be any incidence of tax in situation (a) above on
account of the Supreme Court decision in the case of Additional CIT vs.
Mohanbhai Pamabhai (Supra);

(ii) so far as
situations (b) and (c) were concerned, they had been the subject matter of
consideration in several cases, and there had been conflict of opinion between
courts on whether there would be incidence of tax or not;

(iii) the fact that
there was revaluation of assets of the firm with a resultant enhancement of the
capital accounts of the partners was not relevant.

 

The Tribunal
further observed that:

(1) the share or
interest of a partner in the partnership and its assets would be property and,
therefore, a capital asset within the meaning of the aforesaid definition. To
this extent, there could be no doubt;

(2) the question
was whether it could be said that there was a transfer of capital asset by the
retiring partner in favour of the firm and its continuing partners so as to
attract a charge u/s 45;

(3) the share or
interest of a partner in the partnership and its assets would be property and,
therefore, a capital asset within the meaning of the aforesaid definition. The
next question was whether it could be said that there was a transfer of capital
asset by the retiring partner in favour of the firm and its continuing partners
so as to attract a charge u/s 45;

(4) the question
whether there would be incidence of tax on capital gains on retirement of a
partner from the partnership firm would depend upon the mode in which
retirement was effected. Therefore, taxability in such a situation would depend
on several factors like the intention, as was evidenced by the various clauses
of the instrument evincing retirement or dissolution, the manner in which the
accounts had been settled and whether the same included any amount in excess of
the share of the partner on the revaluation of assets and other relevant
factors which would throw light on the entire scheme of retirement /
reconstitution;

(5) for the
purposes of computation, what was to be seen was the credit in the capital
account of the partner alone.

 

The Tribunal,
referring to the observations of the Bombay High Court in the case of Tribhuvandas
G. Patel (Supra), held that the terms of the deed of retirement had to
be seen as to whether they constituted a release of any assets of the firm in
favour of the continuing partners; where on retirement an account was taken and
the partner was paid the amount standing to the credit of his capital account,
there would be no transfer and no tax was exigible; however, where the partner
was paid a lump sum consideration for transferring or releasing his interest in
the partnership’s assets to the continuing partners, there would be a transfer,
liable to tax. The Tribunal noted that the Supreme Court, in appeal in that
case, had held that there was no incidence of tax on capital gains on the
transaction only because of the provisions of section 47(ii), which exempted
the distribution of capital assets on dissolution, even though the facts in the
case in appeal before the Supreme Court were concerning the case of a retiring
partner giving up his rights over the properties of the firm.

 

The Tribunal
referred to the cases of the Pune bench in the case of Shevantibhai C.
Mehta 4 SOT 94 and the Mumbai bench of the Tribunal in the case of Sudhakar
M. Shetty (Supra) and held that the facts in the case before it were
almost identical to the facts in the case of Sudhakar M. Shetty.

 

It distinguished
the other cases cited before it on behalf of the assessee on the grounds that
some of those cases related to a period prior to the amendment of the law made
effective from A.Y. 1988-89, or were cases where the issue involved was whether
the reassessment proceedings were valid, or were cases involving the
partnership firm and not the partner, or were cases where the retiring partner
was paid a share in the goodwill of the firm. In short, the Tribunal held that
those cases were not applicable to the facts of the assessee’s case.

 

The Tribunal
finally upheld the action of the A.O. in taxing the excess paid to the retiring
partner over and above the sum standing to the credit of her capital account as
capital gains. However, it modified the computation of the capital gains by
treating the amount lying to the credit of the partner’s account, including the
amount credited towards goodwill in the partner’s capital account, as a cost
and allowing the deduction thereof. It also held the gains to be long-term
capital gains and allowed exemption u/s 54EC to the extent of investment in
capital gains bonds.

 

A similar view has
been taken by the other benches of the Tribunal in the cases of Shevantibhai
C. Mehta (Supra), Sudhakar M. Shetty (Supra) and Smt. Girija
Reddy vs. ITO 52 SOT 113 (Hyd)(URO). The Delhi High Court also, in a
case relating to A.Y. 1975-76 (before the amendment), Bishan Lal Kanodia
vs. CIT 257 ITR 449, followed the decision of the Bombay High Court in Tribhuvandas
G. Patel (Supra) to hold that the receipt on retirement was liable to
capital gains tax.

 

OBSERVATIONS


To understand the
root of the controversy, one would have to go back to the decision of the
Gujarat High Court in the case of CIT vs. Mohanbhai Pamabhai 91 ITR 393,
which was affirmed by the Supreme Court, 165 ITR 166, holding
that there was no transfer of capital assets by a partner on his retirement. In
that case, on retirement, the assessee received a certain amount in respect of
his share in the partnership which was worked out by taking the proportionate
value of a share in the partnership assets, after deduction of liabilities and
prior charges, including an amount representing his proportionate share in the
value of the goodwill. It was this proportionate share in the goodwill which
was sought to be taxed as capital gains by the authorities.

 

In that case, the
Gujarat High Court held that:

(i) what the
retiring partner was entitled to get was not merely a share in the partnership
assets, he has also to bear his share of the debts and liabilities, and it was
only his share in the net partnership assets, after satisfying the debts and
liabilities, that he was entitled to get on retirement;

(ii) Since it was only in the surplus that the
retiring partner was entitled to claim a share, it was not possible to predicate
that a particular amount was received by the retiring partner in respect of his
share in a particular partnership asset, or that a particular amount
represented a consideration received by the retiring partner for extinguishment
of his interest in a particular partnership asset;

(iii) when the
assessee retired from the firm, there was no transfer of interest of the
assessee in the goodwill or any other asset of the firm;

(iv) no
consideration received or accrued as a result of such transfer of such interest
even if there was a transfer; and

(v) no part of the amount received by the assessee
was assessable to capital gains tax u/s 45.

 

The Gujarat High
Court relied on its earlier decision in the case of CIT vs. R.M. Amin 82
ITR 194, for the proposition that where transfer consisted in
extinguishment of a right in a capital asset, unless there was an element of
consideration for such extinguishment, the transfer would not be liable to
capital gains tax.

 

It may be noted
that in Mohanbhai Pamabhai, the document pursuant to which
retirement was effected stated that the amount had been decided as payable to
the retiring partners in lieu of all their rights, interest and share in
the partnership firm, and each of them voluntarily gave up their right, title
and interest in the partnership firm. The goodwill had not been recorded or
credited to the capital accounts of the partners, and therefore it was a (b)
type of situation classified by the Bangalore Tribunal. The Bangalore bench of
the Tribunal therefore does not seem to have been justified in stating that
only cases where only balance standing to credit of the capital account is paid
to the retiring partner [situation (a) cases] are not transfers as was held by
the Supreme Court in Mohanbhai Pamabhai. In other words, the
facts of the Mohanbhai Pamabhai case classified with situation
(b) and the Tribunal overlooked this fact; had it done so by appreciating that
the facts in the case before the Supreme Court were akin to situation (b), the
decision could have been different.

 

The Supreme Court
approved the Gujarat High Court decision on the footing that there was no
transfer within the meaning of section 2(47) on retirement of a partner from a
partnership firm. By implication, the Supreme Court held that such cases of
retirement, where a partner was paid a sum over and above the balance due as
per the books of accounts, was not chargeable to capital gains tax.
Interestingly, in deciding the case the Supreme Court, while holding that the
receipts in question were not taxable, did not distinguish between different
modes of retirement, as some of the Tribunals and High Courts have sought to
do, for taxing some and exempting others.

 

The Tribhuvandas
G. Patel case (Supra) was one where the retiring partner was paid his
share in the goodwill of the firm and was also paid his share of appreciation
in the assets of the firm. Here, relying on the Commentary of Lindley on
Partnership, the Bombay High Court observed as under:

 

‘Further, under
section 32, which occurs in Chapter V, retirement of a partner may take any
form as may be agreed upon between the partners and can occur in three
situations contemplated by clauses (a), (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) of
section 32. It may be that upon retirement of a partner his share in the net
partnership assets after deduction of liabilities and prior charges may be
determined on taking accounts on the footing of notional sale of partnership
assets and be paid to him, but the determination and payment of his share may
not invariably be done in that manner and it is quite conceivable that, without
taking accounts on the footing of notional sale, by mutual agreement, a
retiring partner may receive an agreed lump sum for going out as and by way of
consideration for transferring or releasing or assigning or relinquishing his
interest in the partnership assets to the continuing partners and if the
retirement takes this form and the deed in that behalf is executed, it will be
difficult to say that there would be no element of “transfer”
involved in the transaction. In our view, it will depend upon the manner in
which the retirement takes place. What usually happens when a partner retires
from a firm has been clearly stated in the following statement of law, which
occurs in Lindley on Partnership, 13th edition, at page 474:

 

“24.
Assignment of share, etc., by retiring partner.—When a partner retires or dies,
and he or his executors are paid what is due in respect of his share, it is
customary for him or them formally to assign and release his interest in the
partnership, and for the continuing or surviving partners to take upon
themselves the payment of the outstanding debts of the firm, and to indemnify
their late partner or his estate from all such debts, and it is useful for the
partnership agreement specifically so to provide.”

 

At page 475,
under the sub-heading “stamp on assignment by outgoing partner”, the
following statement of law occurs:

 

“An
assignment by a partner of his share and interest in the firm to his
co-partners, in consideration of the payment by them of what is due to him from
the firm, is regarded as a sale of property within the meaning of the Stamp
Acts; and consequently the deed of assignment, or the agreement for the
assignment, requires an ad valorem stamp. But if
the retiring partner, instead of assigning his interest, takes the amount due
to him from the firm, gives a receipt for the money, and acknowledges that he
has no more claims on his co-partners, they will practically obtain all they
want; but such a transaction, even if carried out by deed, could hardly be held
to amount to a sale; and no ad valorem stamp, it is apprehended, would
be payable.”

 

A couple of
things emerge clearly from the aforesaid passages. In the first place, a
retiring partner while going out and while receiving what is due to him in
respect of his share, may assign his interest by a deed or he may, instead of
assigning his interest, take the amount due to him from the firm and give a
receipt for the money and acknowledge that he has no more claim on his
co-partners. The former type of transactions will be regarded as sale or
release or assignment of his interest by a deed attracting stamp duty, while
the latter type of transaction would not. In other words, it is clear, the
retirement of a partner can take either of two forms, and apart from the
question of stamp duty, with which we are not concerned, the question whether
the transaction would amount to an assignment or release of his interest in
favour of the continuing partners or not would depend upon what particular mode
of retirement is employed and as indicated earlier, if instead of quantifying
his share by taking accounts on the footing of notional sale, parties agree to
pay a lump sum in consideration of the retiring partner assigning or
relinquishing his share or right in the partnership and its assets in favour of
the continuing partners, the transaction would amount to a transfer within the
meaning of section 2(47) of the Income-tax Act.’

 

Based on the
language of the Deed of Retirement, the Bombay High Court took the view that
since there was an assignment by the outgoing partner of his share in the
assets of the firm in favour of the continuing partners, there was a transfer
and the gains made on such transfer were exigible to tax.

 

In the context of
taxation, the Bombay High Court observed:

 

‘It may be
stated that the Gujarat decision in Mohanbhai
Pamabhai’s case [1973] 91 ITR 393 is the only
decision directly on the point at issue before us but the question is whether
the position of a retiring partner could be equated with that of a partner upon
the general dissolution for capital gains tax purposes? The equating of the two
done by the Supreme Court in Addanki
Narayanappa’s case, AIR 1966 SC 1300, was not
for capital gains tax purposes but for considering the question whether the
instrument executed on such occasion between the partners inter se required registration and could be admitted in evidence
for want of registration. For capital gains tax purposes the question assumes
significance in view of the fact that under section 47(ii) any distribution of
assets upon dissolution of a firm has been expressly excepted from the purview
of section 45 while the case of a retirement of a partner from a firm is not so
excepted and hence the question arises whether the retirement of a partner
stands on the same footing as that upon a dissolution of the firm. In our view,
a clear distinction exists between the two concepts, inasmuch as the
consequences flowing from each are entirely different. In the case of
retirement of a partner from the firm it is only that partner who goes out of
the firm and the remaining partners continue to carry on the business of the
partnership as a firm, while in the latter case the firm as such no more exists
and the dissolution is between all the partners of the firm. In the Indian
Partnership Act the two concepts are separately dealt with.’

 

This distinction between the dissolution and the retirement, made by
the High Court for taxing the receipt was overruled by the Supreme Court by
holding that the two are the same for the purposes of section 47(ii) of the
Act.

 

It was therefore
that the Bombay High Court first held that there was a transfer and later that
the receipt of consideration on transfer was not exempt from tax u/s 47(ii) of
the Act. The Supreme Court, however, overruled the Bombay High Court decision,
holding that retirement was also covered by dissolution referred to in section
47(ii), and that such retirement would therefore not be chargeable to capital
gains. It may also be noted that the Bombay High Court’s decision was rendered
prior to the Supreme Court decision in the case of Mohanbhai Pamabhai
(Supra).

 

Surprisingly, the
Delhi High Court, while deciding the case of Bishanlal Kanodia (Supra),
relied upon the decision of the Bombay High Court in Tribuhuvandas G.
Patel (Supra), overlooking the implications of the decisions of the
Supreme Court in the cases of Mohanbhai Pamabhai and Tribhuvandas
G. Patel wherein the ratio of the decision of the Bombay High
Court was rendered inapplicable. The Delhi High Court sought to distinguish
between dissolution and retirement, even though the Supreme Court had held that
the term ‘dissolution’ for the purpose of section 47(ii) included retirement up
to A.Y. 1987-88; the case before the Delhi High Court concerned itself with
A.Y. 1975-76.

 

Further, though the
decision of the Madras High Court in the case of the Legal Representatives of
N. Paliniappa Goundar (Supra) was relied upon by the assessee in the
case of Savitri Kadur (Supra), it was not considered by the
Bangalore bench of the Tribunal. The Madras High Court in that case, for A.Y.
1962-63, considering the provisions of section 12B of the 1922 Act, had dealt
with the decisions of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Mohanbhai
Pamabhai and of the Bombay High Court in the case of Tribhuvandas
G. Patel, which had not yet been decided by the Supreme Court. While
disagreeing with the view of the Bombay High Court, the Madras High Court
observed as under:

 

With respect, we
cannot see why a retirement of a partner from a firm should be treated as
having different kinds of attributes according to the mode of settlement of the
retiring partner’s accounts in the partnership. In our view, whether the
retiring partner receives a lump sum consideration or whether the amount is
paid to him after a general taking of accounts and after ascertainment of his
share in the net assets of the partnership as on the date of retirement, the
result, in terms of the legal character of the payment as well as the
consequences thereof, is precisely the same. For, as observed by the Gujarat
High Court in Mohanbhai‘s case when a partner retires from the firm and receives an amount
in respect of his share in the partnership, what he receives is his own share
in the partnership, and it is that which is worked out and realised. Whatever
he receives cannot be regarded as representing some kind of consideration
received by him as a result of transfer of assignment or extinguishment or
relinquishment of his share in favour of the other partners.

 

We hold that
even in a case where some kind of a lump sum is received by the retiring
partner, it must be regarded as referable only to the share of the retiring
partner. This being so, no relinquishment at all is involved. What he receives
is what he has already put in by way of his share capital or by way of his
exertions as a partner. In a true sense, therefore, whether it is a dissolution
or a retirement, and whether in the latter case the retirement is on the basis
of a general taking of accounts or on the basis of an ad hoc payment to the retiring partner, what the partner obtains
is nothing more and nothing less than his own share in the partnership. A
transaction of this kind is more fittingly described as a mutual release or a
mutual relinquishment. In the very case dealt by the Bombay High Court, the
particular amount paid by the remaining partners in favour of the retiring
partner was only a payment in consideration of which there was a mutual
release, a release by the retiring partner in favour of the remaining partners
and a release by the remaining partners in favour of the retiring partner. The
idea of mutual release is appropriate to a partnership, because a retired
partner will have no hold over the future profits of the firm and the partners
who remain in the partnership release the retired partner from all future
obligations towards the liabilities of the firm.

 

We, therefore,
unqualifiedly accept the decision of the Gujarat High Court as based on a
correct view of the law and the legal relations which result on the retirement
of a partner from the partnership. With respect, we do not subscribe to the distinction
sought to be drawn by the learned Judges of the Bombay High Court between an ad hoc payment to a retiring partner and a payment to him after
ascertaining his net share in the partnership.

 

The Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of CIT vs. L. Raghu
Kumar 141 ITR 674, also had an occasion to consider this issue for the
A.Y. 1971-72. In this case, the retiring partner received an amount in excess
of the balance lying to the credit of his capital account and his share of
profits. The Andhra Pradesh High Court considered the decisions of the Bombay
High Court in the case of Tribhuvandas G. Patel (Supra) and CIT
vs. H.R. Aslot 115 ITR 255, where the Bombay High Court had held that
whether there was a transfer or not would depend upon the terms of the retirement
deed – whether there is an assignment by the outgoing partner in favour of the
continuing partners, or whether the retiring partner merely receives an amount
for which he acknowledges receipt.

 

The Andhra Pradesh
High Court observed as under:

 

‘It is no doubt
true as submitted by the learned counsel for the revenue that the Bombay High
Court did not accept the principle in the Mohanbhai case, that there is no distinction between a case of a retirement
of the partner and dissolution of the partnership firm and that there can never
be a transfer of a capital asset in the case of a retirement of a partner as
there is no relinquishment of a capital asset or extinguishment of rights
therein. With great respect, we are unable to agree with the view of the Bombay
High Court. The rights of a partner are governed by the provisions of the
Partnership Act. Otherwise by a mere description, the nature of the transaction
can be altered. Further, the Gujarat High Court in Mohanbhai’s case (Supra) followed the
decision of the Supreme Court in Narayanappa
(Supra) which laid down the proposition of law
unequivocally.’

 

This decision of
the Andhra Pradesh High Court has been affirmed by the Supreme Court in CIT
vs. R. Lingmallu Raghukumar 247 ITR 801. Therefore, effectively, the
Supreme Court has approved of the approach taken by the Andhra Pradesh High
Court, to the effect that there can never be a transfer of a capital asset in
the case of retirement of a partner as there is no relinquishment of a capital
asset or extinguishment of rights therein, and that the nature of the
transaction cannot be altered by a mere description, but is governed by the
provisions of the Partnership Act. It is only logical that a transfer cannot
arise merely because a retiring partner is paid an amount in excess of his
capital, or because the retirement deed wording is different.

 

This fact of law
laid down by the Supreme Court and the overruling of the law laid down by the
Bombay High Court, has been recognised by the Bombay High Court in its later
decision in the case of Prashant S. Joshi (Supra), clearly and
succinctly, where the Bombay High Court observed:

 

‘The Gujarat
High Court held that there is, in such a situation, no transfer of interest in
the assets of the partnership within the meaning of section 2(47). When a
partner retires from a partnership, what the partner receives is his share in
the partnership which is worked out by taking accounts and this does not amount
to a consideration for the transfer of his interest to the continuing partners.
The rationale for this is explained as follows in the judgment of the Gujarat
High Court (in the Mohanbhai Pamabhai case):

 

“…What
the retiring partner is entitled to get is not merely a share in the
partnership assets; he has also to bear his share of the debts and liabilities
and it is only his share in the net partnership assets after satisfying the
debts and liabilities that he is entitled to get on retirement. The debts and
liabilities have to be deducted from the value of the partnership assets and it
is only in the surplus that the retiring partner is entitled to claim a share.
It is, therefore, not possible to predicate that a particular amount is
received by the retiring partner in respect of his share in a particular
partnership asset or that a particular amount represents consideration received
by the retiring partner for extinguishment of his interest in a particular
asset.”

 

14. The appeal
against the judgment of the Gujarat High Court was dismissed by a Bench of
three learned Judges of the Supreme Court in Addl.
CIT vs. Mohanbhai Pamabhai [1987] 165 ITR 166.
The Supreme Court relied upon its judgment in Sunil
Siddharthbhai vs. CIT [1985] 156 ITR 509. The
Supreme Court reiterated the same principle by relying upon the judgment in Addanki Narayanappa vs. Bhaskara Krishnappa AIR 1966 SC 1300. The Supreme Court held that what is envisaged on the retirement of
a partner is merely his right to realise his interest and to receive its value.
What is realised is the interest which the partner enjoys in the assets during
the subsistence of the partnership by virtue of his status as a partner and in
terms of the partnership agreement. Consequently, what the partner gets upon
dissolution or upon retirement is the realisation of a pre-existing right or
interest.

 

The Supreme
Court held that there was nothing strange in the law that a right or interest
should exist in praesenti but its realisation or
exercise should be postponed. The Supreme Court inter alia cited with
approval the judgment of the Gujarat High Court in Mohanbhai Pamabhai’s
case (Supra) and held that there is no transfer upon the retirement of a
partner upon the distribution of his share in the net assets of the firm. In CIT
vs. R. Lingmallu Raghukumar [2001] 247 ITR 801, the Supreme Court held,
while affirming the principle laid down in Mohanbhai Pamabhai
that when a partner retires from a partnership and the amount of his share in
the net partnership assets after deduction of liabilities and prior charges is
determined on taking accounts, there is no element of transfer of interest in
the partnership assets by the retired partner to the continuing partners.

 

15. At this
stage, it may be noted that in CIT vs.
Tribhuvandas G. Patel [1978] 115 ITR 95 (Bom.),
which was decided by a Division Bench of this Court, under a deed of
partnership, the assessee retired from the partnership firm and was inter alia paid an amount of Rs. 4,77,941 as his share in the
remaining assets of the firm. The Division Bench of this Court had held that
the transaction would have to be regarded as amounting to a transfer within the
meaning of section 2(47) inasmuch as the assessee had assigned, released and
relinquished his share in the partnership and its assets in favour of the
continuing partners. This part of the judgment was reversed in appeal by the
Supreme Court in Tribhuvandas G. Patel vs. CIT [1999] 236 ITR 515.

 

Following the
judgment of the Supreme Court in Sunil
Siddharthbhai’s case (Supra), the Supreme Court
held that even when a partner retires and some amount is paid to him towards
his share in the assets, it should be treated as falling under clause (ii) of
section 47. Therefore, the question was answered in favour of the assessee and
against the revenue. Section 47(ii) which held the field at the material time
provided that nothing contained in section 45 was applicable to certain
transactions specified therein and one of the transactions specified in clause
(ii) was distribution of the capital assets on a dissolution of a firm. Section
47(ii) was subsequently omitted by the Finance Act of 1987 with effect from 1st
April, 1988. Simultaneously, sub-section (4) of section 45 came to be inserted
by the same Finance Act. Sub-section (4) of section 45 provides that profits or
gains arising from the transfer of a capital asset by way of distribution of
capital assets on the dissolution of a firm or other association of persons or
body of individuals (not being a company or a co-operative society) or
otherwise, shall be chargeable to tax as the income of the firm, association or
body, of the previous year in which the said transfer takes place.

 

The fair market
value of the assets on the date of such transfer shall be deemed to be the full
value of the consideration received or accruing as a result of the transfer for
the purpose of section 48. Ex facie sub-section
(4) of section 45 deals with a situation where there is a transfer of a capital
asset by way of a distribution of capital assets on the dissolution of a firm
or otherwise. Evidently, on the admitted position before the Court, there is no
transfer of a capital asset by way of a distribution of the capital assets on a
dissolution of the firm or otherwise in the facts of this case. What is to be
noted is that even in a situation where sub-section (4) of section 45 applies,
profits or gains arising from the transfer are chargeable to tax as income of
the firm.’

 

The Bombay High
Court in Prashant Joshi’s case (Supra) also considered the fact
that section 45(4) was brought in simultaneously with the deletion of section
47(ii), providing for taxation in the hands of the firm, in a situation of
transfer of a capital asset on distribution of capital assets on the
dissolution of a firm or otherwise. Clearly, therefore, the intention was to
tax only the firm and that too only in a situation where there was a
distribution of capital assets of a firm on dissolution or otherwise, which
situation would include retirement of a partner as held by the Bombay High
Court in the case of CIT vs. A.N. Naik Associates 265 ITR 346.
This understanding of the law has clearly been brought out by the Bombay High
Court in Hemlata Shetty’s case (Supra), where the Bombay High
Court has observed that amount received by a partner on his retirement from the
partnership firm is not subject to tax in the retiring partners’ hands in view
of section 45(4), and the liability, if any, for tax is on the partnership
firm.

 

Had the intention
been to also tax a partner on his retirement on the excess amount received over
and above his capital balance in the books of the firm, an amendment would have
been made to cover such a situation involving the receipt of capital asset by a
partner on distribution by the firm simultaneously with the deletion of section
47(ii).

 

The Bombay High
Court’s decision in the case of Riyaz A. Shaikh (Supra) is a
decision rendered in the context of A.Y. 2002-03, i.e., post-amendment. It was
not a case of a writ petition filed against any reassessment but was an appeal
from the decision of the Tribunal. The Court in that case has considered all
the relevant decisions – the Bombay High Court’s decisions in the cases of Prashant
S. Joshi, N.A. Mody and Tribhuvandas G. Patel, besides
the Supreme Court decisions in the cases of Tribhuvandas G. Patel
and R. Lingamallu Rajkumar – while arriving at the view that the
amounts received on retirement by a partner are not liable to capital gains
tax.

 

Similarly, Hemlata
Shetty’s case pertained to the post-amendment period and the Court
therein has considered the earlier decisions of the Bombay High Court in the Prashant
S. Joshi and Riyaz A. Sheikh cases and has also
considered the impact of section 45(4). It is indeed baffling that the Bombay
High Court decision delivered on 5th March, 2019 and the earlier
decision of the Tribunal in the same case have not been considered by the
Bangalore bench of the Tribunal in Savitri Kadur’s case, decided
on 3rd May, 2019, which chose to follow the decision of Sudhakar
M. Shetty (Supra), where the matter was still pending before the Bombay
High Court, rather than a decision of the Bombay High Court in his wife’s case
on identical facts (retirement from the same partnership firm) for the
immediately preceding assessment year, where the matter had already been
decided on 5th March, 2019. We are sure that the decision of the
Tribunal could have been different if the development had been in its
knowledge.

 

One may note that
the Legislature, realising that the receipt in question was not taxable under
the present regime of the Income-tax Act, 1961, had introduced a specific
provision for taxing such receipt in the hands of the partner under the
proposed Direct Tax Code which has yet to see the light of the day.

 

The better view of
the matter therefore is that retirement of a partner from a partnership firm is
not subject to capital gains tax, irrespective of the mode of retirement of the
partner, as rightly held by the Bombay High Court in various decisions, and the
Mumbai bench of the Tribunal in the cases of Hemlata Shetty and James
P. D’Silva (Supra). It is rather unfortunate that this issue has been
continuing to torture assessees for the last so many decades, even after
several Supreme Court judgments. One hopes that this matter will finally be
laid to rest either through a clarification by the CBDT or by a decision of the
Supreme Court.

 

 

 

The beauty of doing nothing is that you can do it
perfectly. Only when you do something is it almost impossible to do it without
mistakes. Therefore people who are contributing nothing to society, except
their constant criticisms, can feel both intellectually and morally superior.

— 
Thomas Sowell

Section 28: Share of profits paid to co-developer based on oral understanding not disallowable as the recipient had offered it to tax and there was no revenue loss and the transaction was tax-neutral

14. HP Associates vs. ITO (Mumbai) Vikas Awasthy (J.M.) and G. Manjunatha (A.M.) ITA No. 5929/Mum/2018 A.Y.: 2011-12 Date of order: 12th June, 2020 Counsel for Assessee / Revenue: Haridas Bhatt / R. Kavitha

 

Section 28:
Share of profits paid to co-developer based on oral understanding not
disallowable as the recipient had offered it to tax and there was no revenue
loss and the transaction was tax-neutral

 

FACTS

The A.O.
disallowed a sum of Rs. 61,800 being share of profit transferred by the
assessee to Lakshmi Construction Co. The disallowance was made on the ground
that there was no formal written agreement to share profit in an equal ratio.

 

Aggrieved,
the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the
A.O.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the
Tribunal where it was contended that the assessee had jointly developed a
project with Lakshmi Construction Co. for which there was a joint development
agreement. Though there was no formal written agreement between the co-developers
for sharing profits in equal ratio, there was, however, an oral understanding
between the parties that the profits will be shared in equal ratio. The
transfer of share of profits by the assessee has not resulted in any loss of
revenue as the recipient has offered the same to tax and paid taxes thereon.

 

HELD

The Tribunal observed that the contention on
behalf of the assessee that there was no revenue loss has been substantiated by
placing on record the income-tax return of M/s Lakshmi Construction Co. It also
noted that both the firms are assessed at the same marginal rate of tax.
Therefore, the transaction is tax-neutral and no loss is caused to the
Government exchequer. The Tribunal deleted the addition of Rs. 61,800 made by
the A.O. and confirmed by the CIT(A).

Section 35(1)(ii): Deduction claimed by an assessee in respect of donation given by acting upon a valid registration / approval granted to an institution cannot be disallowed if at a later point of time such registration is cancelled with retrospective effect

13. Span Realtors vs. ITO (Mumbai) G. Manjunatha (A.M.) and Ravish Sood (J.M.) ITA No. 6399/Mum/2019 A.Y.: 2014-15 Date of order: 9th June, 2020 Counsel for Assessee / Revenue: Rashmikant Modi and Ketki Rajeshirke
/ V. Vinod Kumar

 

Section
35(1)(ii): Deduction claimed by an assessee in respect of donation given by
acting upon a valid registration / approval granted to an institution cannot be
disallowed if at a later point of time such registration is cancelled with
retrospective effect

 

FACTS

The assessee
firm, engaged in the business of real estate, had made a donation of Rs. 1
crore to a Kolkata-based institution, viz. ‘School of Human Genetics and
Population Health’ (SHG&PH) and claimed deduction of Rs. 1.75 crores u/s
35(1)(ii) @ 175% on Rs. 1 crore. The A.O. called upon the assessee to
substantiate the claim of such deduction. The assessee submitted all the
evidences which were required to substantiate the claim of deduction.

 

However, the A.O. was not persuaded to subscribe
to the genuineness of the aforesaid claim of deduction by the assessee. He
observed that a survey operation conducted u/s 133A of the Act on 27th
January, 2015 in the case of SHG&PH had revealed that the said research
institution had indulged in providing accommodation entries of bogus donations
to the donors through a network of brokers. The A.O. gathered that the
secretary had admitted in her statement that was recorded in the course of
survey proceedings u/s 131(1) of the Act that the said institution,  in lieu of commission, was
providing accommodation entries of bogus donations through a network of market
brokers. Besides, the accountant of SHG&PH, in the course of survey
proceedings, was found to be in possession of a number of messages from brokers
regarding bogus donations and bogus billings. He also observed that as per the
information shared by DDIT (Inv.), Kolkata, the said institution had filed a
petition before the Settlement Commission, Kolkata Bench, wherein it had
admitted that in consideration of service charge they had indulged in providing
accommodation entries of bogus donations.

 

Moreover, the
Ministry of Finance vide a Notification dated 15th September,
2016, had withdrawn its earlier Notification dated 28th January,
2010. Hence, the A.O. disallowed the claim of deduction of Rs. 1.75 crores.

 

Aggrieved,
the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the
A.O.

 

Still
aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

 

HELD

The Tribunal observed that as on the date of
giving of donation, SHG&PH was having a valid approval granted under the
Act. Having regard to the language of the Explanation to section 35(1)(ii), the
Tribunal was of the view that it can safely be gathered that a subsequent
withdrawal of such approval cannot form a reason to deny the deduction claimed
by the donor. By way of analogy, the Tribunal observed that the Supreme Court in
the case of CIT vs. Chotatingrai Tea [(2003) 126 Taxman 399 (SC)]
while dealing with section 35CCA of the Act, had concluded that a retrospective
withdrawal of an approval granted by a prescribed authority would not
invalidate the assessee’s claim of deduction. The Tribunal also observed that
on a similar footing the Bombay High Court has in the case of National
Leather Cloth Mfg. Co. vs. Indian Council of Agricultural Research [(2000) 100
Taxman 511 (Bom.)] observed that such retrospective cancellation of
registration will have no effect upon the deduction claimed by the donor since
such donation was given acting upon the registration when it was valid and
operative.

 

The Tribunal
held that if the assessee acting upon a valid registration / approval granted
to an institution had donated the amount for which deduction is claimed, such
deduction cannot be disallowed if at a later point of time such registration is
cancelled with retrospective effect. It also observed that the co-ordinate
Mumbai bench of the Tribunal in Pooja Hardware Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT [ITA
No. 3712/Mum/2016 dated 28th October, 2019] has, after
relying on the earlier orders of the co-ordinate benches of the Tribunal on the
issue pertaining to the allowability of deduction u/s 35(1)(ii) of the Act in
respect of a donation given to SHG&PH by the assessee, vacated the
disallowance of the assessee’s claim for deduction u/s 35(1)(ii) of the Act.
The Tribunal observed that the issue is squarely covered by the orders of the
co-ordinate benches of the Tribunal, and therefore it has no justifiable reason
to take a different view. Following the same, the Tribunal set aside the order
of the CIT(A) and vacated the disallowance of the assessee’s claim for
deduction u/s 35(1)(ii) of Rs. 1.75 crores.

 

Section 254: Non-consideration of decision of jurisdictional High Court, though not cited before the Tribunal at the time of hearing of appeal, constitutes a mistake apparent on record

12. Tata Power Company vs. ACIT (Mumbai) Shamim Yahya (A.M.) and Saktijit Dey (J.M.) M.A. No. 596/Mum/2019 arising out of ITA No. 3036/Mum/2009 A.Y.: 2003-04 Date of order: 22nd May, 2020 Counsel for Assessee / Revenue: Nitesh Joshi / Micheal Jerald

 

Section 254:
Non-consideration of decision of jurisdictional High Court, though not cited
before the Tribunal at the time of hearing of appeal, constitutes a mistake
apparent on record

 

FACTS

In ground No.
3 of ITA No. 3036/Mum/2009, the Revenue challenged the decision of the CIT(A)
in deleting the surplus on buyback on Euro Notes issued by the assessee
earlier. It was the claim of the assessee that since Euro Notes were issued by
the assessee for capital expenditure, the income derived as a surplus on
buyback of Euro Notes would be capital receipt and hence not taxable. Although,
the A.O. treated it as the income of the assessee, the CIT(A), relying upon the
decision of the Tribunal in the assessee’s own case for the assessment year
2000-01, allowed the assessee’s claim and deleted the addition.

 

Before the
Tribunal, the assessee, apart from relying upon the decision of the Tribunal in
its own case, also relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in CIT
vs. Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. [(2018) 302 CTR 201 (SC)] to contend
that foreign exchange fluctuation gain on buyback of Euro Notes cannot be
treated as income chargeable to tax as Euro Notes were raised for incurring
capital expenditure. The Tribunal restored the issue to the A.O. for fresh
adjudication after applying the ratio laid down in Mahindra &
Mahindra Ltd. (Supra).

 

In the course
of hearing of the Miscellaneous Application, it was submitted that after taking
note of the decisions of the Supreme Court in Mahindra & Mahindra
Ltd. (Supra) and in CIT vs. T.V. Sundaram Iyengar & Sons
[(1996) 222 ITR 344 (SC)], the Jurisdictional High Court has reiterated
the view expressed by the Supreme Court in Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd.
(Supra) and consequently the issue stands settled in favour of the
assessee. Therefore, there is no need for restoring the issue to the A.O.

 

HELD

The Tribunal
observed that the Jurisdictional High Court in Reliance Industries Ltd.
(ITA No. 993 of 2016, dated 15th January, 2019), after
taking note of the decisions of the Supreme Court in Mahindra &
Mahindra Ltd. (Supra) and T.V. Sundaram Iyengar & Sons
(Supra) has upheld the decision of the Tribunal in holding that the
gain derived from buyback of foreign currency bonds issued by the assessee
cannot be treated as revenue receipt.

 

The Tribunal
held that though it may be a fact that the aforesaid decision was not cited
before the Tribunal at the time of hearing of appeal, however, as held by the
Supreme Court in Saurashtra Kutch Stock Exchange Ltd. [(2008) 305 ITR 227
(SC)], non-consideration of a decision of the Supreme Court or the
Jurisdictional High Court, even rendered post disposal of appeal, would
constitute a mistake apparent on the face of record. It held that since the
aforesaid decision of the Hon’ble Jurisdictional High Court will have a crucial
bearing on the disputed issue, non-consideration of the said decision certainly
constitutes a mistake apparent on the face of record as envisaged u/s 254(2) of
the Act.

 

The Tribunal
recalled the order dated 21st May, 2019 passed in ITA No.
3036/Mum/2009 and restored the appeal to its original position.

Sections 2(47), 28(i), 45 – Gains arising on transfer of development rights held as a business asset are chargeable to tax as ‘business income’ – Only that part of the consideration which accrued, as per terms of the agreement, would be taxable in the year of receipt

22. [117 taxmann.com 637 (Del.)(Trib.)] ITO vs. Abdul Kayum Ahmed Mohd. Tamboli ITA No. 1408/Del/2011 A.Y.: 2006-07 Date of order: 6th July, 2020

 

Sections 2(47), 28(i), 45 – Gains arising
on transfer of development rights held as a business asset are chargeable to
tax as ‘business income’ – Only that part of the consideration which accrued,
as per terms of the agreement, would be taxable in the year of receipt

 

FACTS

The assessment of the assessee was re-opened because the consideration
received for transfer of development rights was not offered for taxation. Since
the assessee had handed over possession of the land and also transferred the
development rights, the A.O. in the course of reassessment proceedings taxed
the amount received by the assessee on transfer of development rights as
business income. The assessee submitted that under the contract with the
developer, he was to perform work on the basis of receipt of funds from the
developer. Accordingly, the assessee had offered only a part of the receipts as
income to the extent that receipts had accrued. The balance, according to him,
were conditional receipts. The developer, in response to a notice sent u/s
133(6), confirmed the position as stated by the assessee.

 

But the A.O. opined that the said accounting treatment was not in
consonance with the mercantile system of accounting followed by the assessee. Besides, since the transfer had been
completed, the consideration would be taxable in the year of receipt as
business income.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) and contended
that the balance amount be considered as capital receipts. The CIT(A)
adjudicated in the assessee’s favour and held that only the part of the amount
accrued as per the agreement would be taxable in the year of receipt. He
estimated an amount of 10% of the gross receipts to be taxable in the year of
receipt. The provisions pertaining to capital gains were also held to be
inapplicable as the development rights were business assets.

 

Aggrieved, the Revenue filed an appeal to the Tribunal.

 

HELD

It was evident from
the terms of the joint venture agreement that only part income accrued to the assessee on execution of the project agreement. The balance consideration was a
conditional receipt and was to accrue only in the event of the assessee
performing certain obligations under the agreement. Since the development
rights constituted the business assets of the assessee, the provisions of
capital gains would not be applicable. The order of the CIT(A) taxing 10% of
the gross receipts was justified. The Tribunal upheld the decision of the
CIT(A) and held that only part of the receipts as estimated accrued to the
assessee were taxable.

 

Sections 28, 36(1)(iii) – In a case where since the date of incorporation the assessee has carried on substantial business activities such as raising loans, purchase of land, which was reflected as stock-in-trade in the books of accounts, and entering into development agreement, the assessee can be said to have not only set up but also commenced the business. Consequently, interest on loan taken from bank for purchase of land which was held as stock-in-trade is allowable as a deduction

21. [117 taxmann.com 419 (Del.)(Trib.)] Jindal Realty (P) Ltd. vs. ACIT ITA No. 1408/Del/2011 A.Y.: 2006-07 Date of order: 22nd June, 2020

 

Sections 28, 36(1)(iii) – In a case where
since the date of incorporation the assessee has carried on substantial
business activities such as raising loans, purchase of land, which was
reflected as stock-in-trade in the books of accounts, and entering into
development agreement, the assessee can be said to have not only set up but
also commenced the business. Consequently, interest on loan taken from bank for
purchase of land which was held as stock-in-trade is allowable as a deduction

 

FACTS

During the previous
year relevant to the assessment year under consideration, the assessee, engaged
in real estate business, borrowed monies from banks and utilised the same to
purchase land for township projects and also for giving as advance to other
associate parties for purchase of land by them. The interest on such monies
borrowed was claimed by the assessee as deduction u/s 36(1)(iii), and the
return of income was filed for the previous year declaring a loss.

 

The A.O. disallowed
the claim of deduction of interest on the ground that the assessee had not
commenced any business activity and held the same to be pre-operative in
nature.

 

Aggrieved, the
assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the A.O.

 

Still aggrieved,
the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

 

HELD

The Tribunal held
that since the date of incorporation, the assessee carried on substantial
business activities such as raising loans, purchase of land which was reflected
as stock-in-trade in the books of accounts and entering into development
agreements. The Tribunal relied on the decision of the Delhi High Court in the
case of CIT vs. Arcane Developers (P) Ltd. 368 ITR 627 (Del.)
wherein it is held that in case of real estate business, the setting up of
business was complete when the first steps were taken by the
respondent-assessee to look around and negotiate with parties.

 

Thus, the assessee
had not only set up the business but also commenced the business in the
previous year and therefore was eligible to claim deduction of interest
expenditure u/s 36(1)(iii).

 

The appeal filed by
the assessee was allowed.

 

Section 50B read with sections 2(19), 2(42C) and 50 – Windmills of an assessee, engaged in the business of aqua culture, export of frozen shrimp, sale of hatchery seed and wind-power generation, along with all the assets and liabilities, constitute an ‘undertaking’ for the purpose of slump sale

20. [117
taxmann.com 440 (Vish.)(Trib.)] ACIT vs. Devi Sea
Foods Ltd. ITA No.
497/Vish./2019 A.Y.: 2013-2014 Date of order: 19th
June, 2020

 

Section 50B read
with sections 2(19), 2(42C) and 50 – Windmills of an assessee, engaged in the
business of aqua culture, export of frozen shrimp, sale of hatchery seed and
wind-power generation, along with all the assets and liabilities, constitute an
‘undertaking’ for the purpose of slump sale

 

FACTS

The assessee sold
three windmills, declared the gains arising on such sale as a slump sale and
computed the long-term capital gains as per section 50B. The assessee had not
furnished separate financial statements for the windmill business activity;
however, it was claiming deduction u/s 80-IA on the income from the windmill as
a separate business which was allowed by the A.O. from A.Y. 2009-10 onwards.
But at the time of the sale, the A.O. denied the applicability of the
provisions related to slump sale by stating that the windmills did not
constitute an ‘undertaking’ and charged the income as short-term capital gains.

 

Aggrieved, the
assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who held that each windmill is a
unit of the undertaking and is covered by the definition of slump sale. He also
noted that though the assessee had shown windmills as part of the block of
assets, depreciation claim could not be a factor to deny benefit of slump sale.
He directed the A.O. to compute long-term capital gains u/s 50B.

 

Aggrieved, the
Revenue filed an appeal to the Tribunal.

 

HELD

The Tribunal observed that the windmills were part of the assessee’s
business, for which the assessee was claiming deduction since A.Y. 2009-10. The
A.O. had not made any adverse remarks in respect of deduction claimed u/s
80-IA. Though separate books of accounts had not been maintained, the assessee
had demonstrated separate ledger account belonging to the windmill operation,
and income from such activity was independently ascertainable. Further, there
is no requirement in the Act that all assets sold under slump sale should be
together. The Tribunal held that the real test for considering any sale of an asset
as non-slump sale would be any independent asset or liability not forming part
of the business operations. It held that the windmills satisfied all conditions
for being considered as an ‘undertaking’ and the provisions of slump sale would
be applicable.

 

Reopening – Capital gains arising on conversion of the land into stock-in-trade – Closing stock has to be valued at cost or market price whichever is lower – No reason to believe income had escaped assessment – Reopening bad in law: Sections 45(2) and 147 of the Act

9. M/s. J.S. & M.F. Builders vs. A.K. Chauhan and others [Writ Petition
No. 788 of 2001 A.Ys.: 1992-93, 1993-94, 1994-95 and 1995-96 Date of order: 12th
June, 2020 (Bombay High Court)

 

Reopening – Capital gains arising on conversion of the land into
stock-in-trade – Closing stock has to be valued at cost or market price
whichever is lower – No reason to believe income had escaped assessment –
Reopening bad in law: Sections 45(2) and 147 of the Act

 

The petitioner had challenged the legality and validity of the four
impugned notices, all dated 25th February, 2000 issued u/s 148 of
the Act, proposing to re-assess the income of the petitioner for the A.Ys.
1992-93, 1993-94, 1994-95 and 1995-96 on the ground that income chargeable to
tax for the said assessment years had escaped assessment.

 

The case of the petitioner is that it is a partnership firm constituted by
a deed of partnership dated 21st October, 1977. The object of the
firm is to carry out business as builders and developers.

 

An agreement was entered into on 8th November, 1977 between one
Mr. Krishnadas Kalyanji Dasani and the petitioner whereby and whereunder Mr.
Dasani agreed to sell, and the petitioner agreed to purchase, a property
situated at Borivali admeasuring approximately 6,173.20 square metres. The
property consisted of seven structures and two garages. The property was
mortgaged and all the tenements were let out. The aggregate consideration for
the purchase was Rs. 3,00,000 and a further expenditure of Rs. 44,087 was
incurred by way of stamp duty and registration charges. The said property was
purchased subject to all encumbrances. The purchased property was reflected in
the balance sheets of the petitioner drawn up thereafter as a fixed asset. For
almost a decade after purchase, the petitioner entered into various agreements
with the tenants to get the property vacated. In the process, they incurred a
further cost of Rs. 9,92,427.

 

In the balance sheet as on 30th September, 1987 the Borivali
property was shown as a fixed asset the value of which was disclosed at Rs.
13,36,514; a detailed break-up of it was furnished. With effect from 1st
October, 1987, the petitioner converted a portion of the property into
stock-in-trade and continued to retain that part of the property which still
remained tenanted as a fixed asset. The market value of the entire Borivali
property as on 1st October, 1987 was arrived at Rs. 69,38,000 out of
which the value of the property that was converted into stock-in-trade was
determined at Rs. 66,29,365.

 

The petitioner thereafter demolished the vacant structures and commenced
construction of a multi-storied building. In the balance sheet as on 31st
March, 1989, the petitioner reflected the tenanted property as a fixed asset at
a cost of Rs. 2,86,740 and the stock-in-trade at a value of Rs. 66,29,365.. A
revaluation reserve of Rs. 55,58,759 was also credited. In the Note
accompanying the computation of income it was clearly mentioned that the
conversion of a part of the Borivali property was made into stock-in-trade and
the liability to tax u/s 45(2) of the Act would arise as and when the flats
were sold. During the previous year relevant to the A.Y. 1992-93, the
petitioner had entered into 14 agreements for sale of 14 flats, the total area
of which admeasured 10,960 square feet (sq. ft.).

 

For the A.Y. 1992-93 the petitioner declared income chargeable under the
head ‘profits and gains of business or profession’ at Rs. 9,37,385 and the
income chargeable under the head ‘capital gains’ at Rs. 8,10,993. The ‘capital
gains’ was arrived at by determining the difference between the market value of
the land converted into stock-in-trade as on 1st October, 1987 and
the cost incurred by the petitioner which came to a figure of Rs. 55,87,591.
Having regard to the total built-up area of 37,411 sq. ft., the ‘capital gains’
per sq. ft. was computed at Rs. 149.36 on a pro-rata basis. Accordingly,
having regard to the area of 10,960 sq. ft. sold, the ‘capital gains’ was
determined at Rs. 16,36,986. Along with the return of income, a computation of
income as well as an audit report in terms of section 44AB of the Act were also
filed. The A.O. completed the assessment u/s 143(3) of the Act assessing the
petitioner at the income of Rs. 17,85,560.

 

For the A.Y. 1993-94, as in the previous A.Y., income was computed both
under the head ‘profits and gains of business or profession’ as well as under
the head ‘capital gains’ for 12 flats sold during the relevant previous year.
The return was accompanied by the tax audit report as well as the profit and
loss account and balance sheet. The A.O. completed the assessment u/s 143(3)
assessing the petitioner at an income of Rs. 17,30,230. It is stated that in
the assessment order the A.O. specifically noted that income from ‘long-term
capital gains’ was declared in terms of section 45(2) of the Act.

 

The petitioner’s return of income for the A.Y. 1994-95 was processed u/s
143(1)(a) of the Act and an intimation was issued on 30th March,
1995.

 

For the A.Y. 1995-96, the petitioner filed its return declaring income
under both heads, i.e., ‘income from business’ and ‘capital gains’. The income
of the petitioner was computed in a similar manner as in the earlier years with
similar disclosures in the tax audit report, profit and loss account and
balance sheet furnished along with the return. In the course of the assessment
proceedings, the petitioner furnished details of flats sold as well as the
manner of computing profit in terms of section 45(2). The assessment for the
A.Y. 1995-96 was completed u/s 143(3) of the Act determining the taxable income
at Rs. 1,32,930.

 

According to the petitioner, it received on 8th March, 2000  four notices, all dated 25th
February, 2000, issued u/s 148 of the Act for the four assessment years, i.e.,
1992-93 to 1995-96.

 

The reasons recorded for each of the assessment
years were identical save and except the assessment details and figures. The
A.O. broadly gave four reasons to justify initiation of re-assessment
proceedings. Firstly, the petitioner was not justified in assuming that the
market value of the stock adopted as on 1st October, 1987 would
continue to remain static in the subsequent years. In other words, the closing
stock of the land should have been valued at the market price as on the date of
closing of accounts for the year concerned. This resulted in undervaluation of
closing stock and consequent reduction of profit.

 

Secondly, even though the petitioner might have entered into agreements and
sold certain flats, the ownership of the land continued to remain with the
petitioner. The whole of the land under the ownership of the petitioner
constituted its stock-in-trade and it should have been valued at the market
price as on the date of closing of accounts for the year concerned. Thus, the
assessee had suppressed the market price of the closing stock, thereby reducing
the profit.

 

Thirdly, for the purpose of computing the ‘capital gains’ in terms of
section 45(2) of the Act, the petitioner was not justified in taking the cost
of the entire land; rather, the petitioner ought to have taken only a fraction
of the original cost of Rs. 3,00,000. Thus, there was inflation of cost.
Lastly, in terms of section 45(2), the ‘capital gains’ arising on conversion of
the land into stock-in trade ought to have been assessed only in the year in
which the land was sold or otherwise transferred. As the land was not conveyed
to the co-operative society, the petitioner was not justified in offering to
tax the ‘capital gains’ in terms of section 45(2) of the Act on the basis of
the flats sold during each of the previous years relevant to the four A.Y.s
under consideration.

 

The Court admitted the writ petition for final hearing.

 

The petitioner submitted that it had fully complied with the requirement of
section 45(2) of the Act and the capital gains arising on the conversion of the
land into stock-in-trade was offered and rightly assessed to tax in the years
in which the flats were sold on the footing that on the sale of the flat there
was also a proportionate sale of the land. This methodology adopted by the
petitioner is in accordance with law. It was also submitted that it is not
correct to think that any profit arises out of the valuation of the closing
stock. In this connection, reliance was placed on a decision of the Supreme
Court in Chainrup Sampatram vs. CIT, 24 ITR 481.

 

The Petitioner also referred to a decision of this Court in CIT vs.
Piroja C. Patel, 242 ITR 582 to contend that the expenditure incurred
for having the land vacated would certainly amount to cost of improvement which
is an allowable expenditure.

 

The case of the Revenue was that the A.O. after recording the sequence of
events from acquiring the property vide the deed of conveyance dated 23rd
April, 1980 noted that the assessee had converted part of the property
into stock-in-trade on 1st October, 1987 with a view to construct
flats. On the date of conversion into stock-in-trade, the value thereof was
determined at Rs. 66,29,365. Up to A.Y.1991-92 there was no construction. After
the building was constructed, the constructed flats were sold to various
customers. On the sale of flats, the assessee reduced the proportionate market
value of the land as on 31st March, 1989, in the same ratio as the
area of the flat sold bore to the total constructed area. However, the assessee
valued the closing stock at market price prevailing as on 1st
October, 1987. According to the A.O., the closing stock should have been valued
at the market price on the close of each accounting year. This resulted in
undervaluation of closing stock and consequent reduction of profit.

 

Secondly, land as an asset is separate and distinct from the building. The
building was shown as a work in progress in the profit and loss account
prepared by the assessee and filed with the return. Even after construction of
the building and sale of flats, the stock, i.e., the land was still under the
ownership of the assessee. Ownership of land was not transferred. As the land
continued under the ownership of the assessee, its value could not be reduced
on the plea that a flat was sold. The whole of the land under ownership of the
assessee constituted its stock-in-trade and it should have been valued at the
market price as on the date of closing of the accounts for the year under
consideration. Therefore, the A.O. alleged that the assessee had suppressed the
market price of the closing stock, thus reducing the profit.

 

The third ground given was regarding computation of ‘capital gains’
furnished with the return of income. The A.O. noted that the total capital
gains as on 1st October, 1987 was arrived at by deducting the cost
of the land as on 1st October, 1987, i.e., Rs. 10,41,774, from the
fair market value of the land, i.e., Rs. 66,29,365, which came to Rs.
55,87,591. According to the A.O., the assessee made deduction of the cost
incurred for the entire land whereas only a fraction of the said land was
converted into stock-in-trade where construction was done.

 

The A.O. worked out that the cost of the converted piece of land was only
Rs. 13,260. He arrived at this figure by deducting Rs. 2,86,740, which was the
value of the tenanted property from the cost of the property, i.e., Rs.
3,00,000. Thus, he alleged that there was inflation of cost by Rs. 10,28,514
(Rs. 10,41,774 – Rs.13,260).

 

The last ground given by the A.O. was regarding offering of long-term
capital gain by the assessee. He noted that for the purpose of computation of
long-term capital gain, the assessee estimated the fair market value of the
land converted to stock as on 1st October, 1987 at Rs. 66,29,365
which was reduced by the cost incurred as on 1st October, 1987,
i.e., Rs. 10,74,774. However, the A.O. also noted that the method of
computation of cost was not clear in view of the fact that the whole of the
land with tenanted structures was purchased for Rs. 3,00,000. The A.O. further
noted the methodology adopted by the assessee for computation of long-term
capital gain. According to him, the assessee had worked out the difference
between the fair market value of the land converted to stock and the cost and
thereafter divided it by the total permissible built-up area. The quotient was
identified by the assessee as capital gains per sq. ft. The assessee thereafter
multiplied the built-up area of individual flats sold with such quotient and
claimed it to be the ‘capital gains’ for the year under consideration. By
adopting such a computation, the assessee was claiming sale of land in
different years in the same ratio as the area of flat sold bore to the total
permissible FSI area. But this calculation was not accepted by the A.O.
primarily on the ground that land as a stock was different from the flats.
Selling of flats did not amount to selling of proportionate quantity of land.

 

The Court held that u/s 45(2) of the Act, ‘capital gains’ for land should
be considered in the year when land was sold or otherwise transferred by the
assessee. Though flats were sold, ownership of the land continued to remain
with the assessee. ‘Capital gains’ would be chargeable to tax only in the year
when the land was sold or transferred to the co-operative society formed by the
flat purchasers and not in the year when individual flats were sold.

 

The Court accepted the contention of the petitioner that the A.O. proceeded
on the erroneous presumption that stock-in-trade had to be valued at the
present market value. In Chainrup Sampatram (Supra), the Supreme
Court had held that it would be wrong to assume that the valuation of the
closing stock at market rate has for its object the bringing into charge any
appreciation in the value of such stock. The true purpose of crediting the
value of unsold stock is to balance the cost of those goods entered on the
other side of the account so that the cancelling out of the entries relating to
the same stock from both sides of the account would leave only the transactions
on which there had been actual sales in the course of the year showing the
profit or loss actually realised on the year’s trading. While anticipated loss
is taken into account, anticipated profit in the shape of appreciated value of
the closing stock is not brought into the account as no prudent trader would
care to show increased profit before its actual realisation. This is the theory
underlying the rule that the closing stock has to be valued at cost or market
price whichever is lower and it is now generally accepted as an established
rule of commercial practice and accountancy. In such circumstances, taking the
view that profits for income tax purposes are to be computed in conformity with
the ordinary principles of commercial accounting unless such principles have
been superseded or modified by legislative enactments, the Supreme Court held
that it would be a misconception to think that any profit arises out of
valuation of the closing stock.

 

With regard to the third ground, i.e., computation of ‘capital gains’, the
Court held that the cost incurred included not only the sale price of the land,
i.e., Rs. 3,00,000, but also the expenditure incurred by way of stamp duty and
registration charges amounting to Rs. 44,087. That apart, the assessee had
incurred a further sum of Rs. 9,92,427 in getting the entire property vacated.
The contention of the A.O. that there was inflation of cost is not correct.
Thus, for computing the income under the head ‘capital gains’, the full value
of consideration received as a result of transfer of the capital asset shall be
deducted by the expenditure incurred in connection with such transfer, cost of
acquisition of the asset and the cost incurred in improvement of the asset. The
expression ‘the full value of the consideration’ would mean the fair market
value of the asset on the date of such conversion. The meaning of the
expressions ‘cost of improvement’ and ‘cost of acquisition’ are explained in
sections 55(1) and 55(2) of the Act, respectively.

 

The expression ‘capital asset’ occurring in sub-section (1) of section 45
is defined in sub-section (14) of section 2. ‘Capital asset’ means property of
any kind held by an assessee whether or not connected with his business or
profession as well as any securities held by a foreign institutional investor,
but does not include any stock-in-trade, consumable stores or raw materials,
personal effects, etc.

 

Again, the word ‘transfer’ occurring in sub-section (1) of section 45 has
been defined in section 2(47) of the Act. As per this definition, ‘transfer’ in
relation to a capital asset includes sale, exchange or relinquishment of the
asset or the extinguishment of any rights therein, or compulsory acquisition of
the asset, or in case of conversion of the asset by the owner into
stock-in-trade of the business carried on by him, such conversion or any
transaction involving the allowing of possession of any immovable property to
be taken or retained in part performance of a contract, or any transaction
whether by way of becoming a member of or acquiring shares in a co-operative
society, etc. which has the effect of transferring or enabling the enjoyment of
any immovable property.

 

In the case of Miss Piroja C. Patel (Supra), the court held
that on eviction of the hutment dwellers from the land in question, the value
of the land increases and therefore the expenditure incurred for having the
land vacated would certainly amount to cost of improvement.

 

Thus, the cost incurred on stamp duty, etc., together with the cost
incurred in carrying out eviction of the hutment dwellers would certainly add
to the value of the asset and thus amount to cost of improvement which is an
allowable deduction from the full value of consideration received as a result of
the transfer of the capital asset for computing the income under the head
‘capital gains’.

 

Insofar as the fourth ground is concerned, the A.O. has taken the view that
long-term capital gains arising out of sale or transfer of land would be
assessed to tax only in the year in which the land is sold or otherwise
transferred by the assessee. Opining that land as a stock is a different item
of asset than a flat, the A.O. held that ownership of land continued to remain
with the assessee notwithstanding the sale of flats. Therefore, he was of the view
that ‘capital gains’ would be chargeable to tax only in the year when the land
is sold or otherwise transferred to the co-operative society formed by owners
of the flats and not in the year when individual flats are sold.

 

According to the A.O., the assessee had erred in
offering to tax ‘capital gains’ in the year when the individual flats were
sold, whereas such ‘capital gains’ could be assessed to tax only when the land
was transferred to the co-operative society formed by the flat purchasers. If
the assessee had offered to tax as ‘capital gains’ in the assessment years
under consideration that which should have been offered to tax in the
subsequent years, it is beyond comprehension as to how a belief can be formed
that income chargeable to tax for the assessment year under consideration had
escaped assessment. That apart, the flat purchasers by purchasing the flats had
certainly acquired a right or interest in the proportionate share of the land
but its realisation is deferred till the formation of the
co-operative society by the owners of the flats and eventual transfer of the
entire property to the co-operative society.

 

The Court also referred to various other decisions, namely, Prashant
S. Joshi [324 ITR 154 (Bom)], Additional CIT vs. Mohanbhai Pamabhai, 165 ITR
166 (SC), Sunil Siddharthbhai vs. CIT, 156 ITR 509 (SC) and
Addanki Narayanappa vs. Bhaskara Krishnappa, AIR 1966 SC 1300, wherein
the Court held that what is envisaged on the retirement of a partner is merely
his right to realise his interest and to receive its value. What is realised is
the interest which the partner enjoys in the assets during the subsistence of
the partnership by virtue of his status as a partner and in terms of the
partnership agreement. Therefore, what the partner gets upon dissolution of the
partnership or upon retirement from the partnership is the realisation of a
pre-existing right or interest. The Court held that there was nothing strange
in the law that a right or interest should exist in praesenti but
its realisation or exercise should be postponed. Applying the above principle,
the Court held that upon purchase of the flat, the purchaser certainly acquires
a right or interest in the proportionate share of the land but its realisation
is deferred till formation of the co-operative society by the flat owners and
transfer of the entire property to the co-operative society.

 

Thus, on an overall consideration of the entire matter, the Court held
that there was no basis or justification for the A.O. to form a belief that any
income of the assessee chargeable to tax for the A.Y.s under consideration had
escaped assessment within the meaning of section 147 of the Act. The reasons
rendered could not have led to formation of any belief that income had escaped
assessment within the meaning of the aforesaid provision.

 

Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the impugned
notices issued u/s 148 of the Act dated 25th February, 2000 were set
aside and quashed.

 

 

 

Settlement of cases – Chapter XIX-A of ITA, 1961 – Powers of Settlement Commission – Application for settlement of case – Settlement Commission cannot consider merits of case at that stage; A.Ys. 2015-16 to 2018-19

51. Hitachi Power Europe GMBH vs. IT Settlement Commission [2020] 423 ITR
472 (Mad.) Date of order: 17th February, 2020 A.Ys.: 2015-16 to
2018-19

 

Settlement of cases – Chapter XIX-A of ITA, 1961 – Powers of Settlement
Commission – Application for settlement of case – Settlement Commission cannot
consider merits of case at that stage; A.Ys. 2015-16 to 2018-19

 

In June, 2010, the National Thermal Power Corporation had invited bids
under international competitive bidding for the supply and installation of
eleven 660-megawatt steam generators at five locations in India. A bid was
successfully submitted by B, a company incorporated in India and engaged in
providing turnkey solutions for coal-based thermal power plants. B
sub-contracted a portion of the scope of work under three contracts to its
joint venture company, which in turn sub-contracted a portion thereof to the
assessee. One of the contentions raised by the assessee on the merits was that
the scope of work under each of the contracts was separate and distinct in all
respects including the delineation of the work itself, the modes of execution
of the contract and the payments therefor.

 

For this reason, the assessee took the stand that the income from offshore
supplies would not be liable to tax in India. For the A.Ys. 2015-16 to 2018-19
the assessee filed returns of income offering to tax the income from onshore
supply and services only. While assessment proceedings were pending, the
assessee applied for settlement of the case. The Settlement Commission held
that the contract was composite and indivisible and hence the applicant, i. e.,
the assessee, had failed to make a full and true disclosure of income.

 

On a writ petition against the order, the Madras High Court held as under:

 

‘i) The scheme of Chapter XIX-A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is to provide a
holistic resolution of issues that arise from an assessment in the case of an assessee that has approached the
Commission. The question of full and true disclosure and the discharge of tax
liability at all stages prior to final hearing should be seen only in the
context of the issues offered for settlement and the remittances of additional
tax thereupon. Issues decided by the Commission and the liability arising
therefrom will be payable only at the stage of such determination, which is the
stage of final hearing u/s 245D(4) of the Act.

 

ii) The assessee had just applied for settlement of the case. The Commission,
however, in considering the “validity” or otherwise of the application,
proceeded to delve into the merits of the matter even at that stage. The order
of the Settlement Commission was beyond the scope of section 245D(2C) having
been passed on the merits of the issue raised and set aside the same. This writ
petition is allowed.’

 

 

Glimpses Of Supreme Court Ruilings

14. Yum! Restaurants (Marketing) Private Limited vs.
Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi

Date of order: 24th April, 2020

 

Doctrine of mutuality – Applicability of – The
receipt of money from an outside entity without affording it the right to have
a share in the surplus does not only subjugate the first test of common
identity, but also contravenes the other two conditions for the existence of
mutuality, i.e., impossibility of profits and obedience to the mandate – There
is a fine line of distinction between absence of obligation and presence of
overriding discretion – An arrangement wherein one member is subjected to the
absolute discretion of another, in such a manner that the entire liability may
fall upon one whereas benefits are reaped by all, is antithetical to the mutual
character in the eyes of law – The raison d’être behind the refund of
surplus to the contributors or mandatory utilisation of the same in the
subsequent assessment year is to reduce their burden of contribution in the
next year proportionate to the surplus remaining from the previous year –
Non-fulfilment of this condition is antithetical to the test of mutuality

 

The
appellant company Yum! Restaurants (Marketing) Private Limited (‘YRMPL’ or
‘assessee company’ or ‘assessee’) was incorporated by Yum! Restaurants (India)
Pvt. Ltd. (‘YRIPL’), formerly known as Tricon Restaurants India Pvt. Ltd., as
its fully-owned subsidiary for undertaking the activities relating to
advertising, marketing and promotion (‘AMP activities’) for and on behalf of
YRIPL and its franchisees after having obtained approval from the Secretariat
for Industrial Assistance (‘SIA’) for the purpose of economisation of the cost
of advertising and promotion of the franchisees as per their needs. The
approval was granted subject to certain conditions as regards the functioning
of the assessee whereby it was obligated to operate on a non-profit basis on
the principles of mutuality.

 

In
furtherance of the approval, the assessee entered into a tripartite operating
agreement (the ‘tripartite agreement’) with YRIPL and its franchisees, wherein
the assessee company received fixed contributions to the extent of 5% of gross
sales for the proper conduct of the AMP activities for the mutual benefit of
the parent company and the franchisees.

 

For the
assessment year 2001-02, the assessee filed its return stating the income to be
Nil under the pretext of the mutual character of the company. The same was not accepted by the A.O.
who observed that the assessee company along with the franchisees was to
contribute a fixed percentage of its revenue to YRMPL. However, as per the
tripartite agreement submitted by YRMPL, YRIPL had the sole absolute discretion
to pay to YRMPL any amount as it may deem appropriate and that YRIPL had no
obligation to pay any amount if it chooses not to do so. YRIPL was under no
legal obligation to pay any amount of contribution as per its own version
reflected from the tripartite agreement. The A.O. determined the total income
at Rs. 44,44,002, being the excess of income over expenditure for A.Y. 2001-02.

 

The
imposition of liability by the A.O. was upheld by the CIT(A) on the ground of taint
of commerciality in the activities undertaken by the assessee company.

 

The
liability was further confirmed by the Tribunal, wherein the essential
ingredients of the doctrine of mutuality were found to be missing. The Tribunal
inter alia found that apart from others, contributions were also
received from M/s Pepsi Foods Ltd. and YRIPL. Pepsi Foods Ltd. was neither a
franchisee nor a beneficiary. Similarly, some contribution was also received
from YRIPL who was not under any obligation to pay. Thus, the essential
requirement, that the contributors to the common fund are either to participate
in the surplus or they are beneficiaries of the contribution, was missing.
Through the common AMP activities no benefit accrued to Pepsi Foods Ltd. or
YRIPL. Accordingly, the principles of mutuality could not be applied.

 

The
consistent line of opinion recorded by the aforementioned three forums was
further approved in appeal by the High Court.

 

According
to the Supreme Court, the following questions of law arose in the present case:

(i)
Whether the assessee company would qualify as a mutual concern in the eyes of
law, thereby exempting subject transactions from tax liability?

(ii)
Whether the excess of income over expenditure in the hands of the assessee
company is not taxable?

 

The
assessee had contended before the Supreme Court that the sole objective of the
assessee company was to carry on the earmarked activities on a no-profit basis
and to operate strictly for the benefit of the contributors to the mutual
concern. It was further contended that the assessee company levied no charge on
the franchisees for carrying out the operations. While assailing the
observations made in the impugned judgment, holding that Pepsi Foods Ltd. and
YRIPL were not beneficiaries of the concern, the assessee company had urged
that YRIPL was the parent company of the assessee and earned a fixed percentage
from the franchisees by way of royalty. Therefore, it benefited directly from
enhanced sales as increased sales would translate into increased royalties. A
similar argument had been advanced as regards Pepsi Foods Ltd. It was stated
that under a marketing agreement the franchisees were bound to serve Pepsi
drinks at their outlets and, thus, an increase in the sales at KFC and Pizza
Hut outlets as a result of AMP activities would lead to a corresponding
increase in the sales of Pepsi. It was pointed out that Pepsi was also
advertised by the franchisees in their advertising and promotional material,
along with Pizza Hut and KFC.

 

As
regards the doctrine of mutuality, it was urged by the assessee company that
the doctrine merely requires an identity between the contributors and
beneficiaries and it does not contemplate that each member should contribute to
the common fund or that the benefits must be derived by the beneficiaries in
the same manner or to the same extent. Reliance had been placed by the
appellant upon reported decisions to draw a parallel between the functioning of
the assessee company and clubs to support the presence of mutuality.

 

The
Revenue / respondent had countered the submissions made by the assessee company
by submitting that the moment a non-member joins the common pool of funds created
for the benefit of the contributors, the taint of commerciality begins and
mutuality ceases to exist in the eyes of law. It had been submitted that the
assessee company operated in contravention of the SIA approval as contributions
were received from Pepsi, despite it not being a member of the brand fund. It
was urged that once the basic purpose of benefiting the actual contributors was
lost, mutuality stands wiped out.

 

The
Supreme Court held that it was undisputed that Pepsi Foods Ltd. was a contributor
to the common pool of funds. However, it did not enjoy any right of
participation in the surplus or any right to receive back the surplus which was
a mandatory ingredient to sustain the principle of mutuality.

 

The
assessee company was realising money both from the members as well as
non-members in the course of the same activity carried on by it. The Supreme
Court noted that in Royal Western India Turf Club Ltd., AIR 1954 SC 85
it has categorically held such operations to be antithetical to mutuality.
Besides, the dictum in Bankipur Club (1997) 5 SCC 394 was apposite.

 

According
to the Supreme Court, the contention of the assessee company that Pepsi Foods
Ltd., in fact, did benefit from the mutual operations by virtue of its
exclusive contracts with the franchisees was tenuous, as the very basis of
mutuality was missing. Even if any remote or indirect benefit is being reaped
by Pepsi Foods Ltd., the same could not be said to be in lieu of
it being a member of the purported mutual concern and, therefore, could not be
used to fill the missing links in the chain of mutuality. The surplus of a
mutual operation was meant to be utilised by the members of the mutual concern
as members enjoy a proximate connection with the mutual operation. Non-members,
including Pepsi Foods Ltd., stood on a different footing and had no proximate
connection with the affairs of the mutual concern. The exclusive contract
between the franchisees and Pepsi Foods Ltd. stood on an independent footing
and YRIPL as well as the assessee company were not responsible for
implementation of the contract. As a result, the first limb of the
three-pronged test stood severed.

 

The
Supreme Court held that the receipt of money from an outside entity without
affording it the right to have a share in the surplus did not only subjugate
the first test of common identity, but also contravened the other two
conditions for the existence of mutuality, i.e., impossibility of profits and
obedience to the mandate. The mandate of the assessee company was laid down in
the SIA approval wherein the twin conditions of mutuality and non-profiteering
were envisioned as the sine qua non for the functioning of the assessee
company. The contributions made by Pepsi Foods Ltd. tainted the operations of
the assessee company with commerciality and concomitantly contravened the
prerequisites of mutuality and non-profiteering.

 

The
Court further held that YRIPL and the franchisees stand on two substantially
different footings. For, the franchisees are obligated to contribute a fixed
percentage for the conduct of AMP activities, whereas YRIPL is under no such
obligation in utter violation of the terms of the SIA approval. Moreover, even
upon request for the grant of funds by the assessee company, YRIPL is not bound
to accede to the request and enjoys a ‘sole and absolute’ discretion to decide
against such request. An arrangement wherein one member is subjected to the
absolute discretion of another, in such a manner that the entire liability may
fall upon one whereas benefits are reaped by all, is the antithesis to the
mutual character in the eyes of law.

 

According
to the Supreme Court, the contention advanced by the appellant that it is not
mandatory for every member of the mutual concern to contribute to the common
pool failed to advance the case of the appellant. The Court held that there is
a fine line of distinction between absence of obligation and presence of
overriding discretion. In the present case, YRIPL enjoyed the latter to the
detriment of the franchisees of the purported undertaking, both in matters of
contribution and of management. In a mutual concern, it is no doubt true that
an obligation to pay may or may not be there, but in the same breath it is
equally true that an overriding discretion of one member over others cannot be
sustained in order to preserve the real essence of mutuality wherein members
contribute for the mutual benefit of all and not of one at the cost of others.

 

The
Court observed that the settled legal position is that in order to qualify as a
mutual concern, the contributors to the common fund either acquire a right to
participate in the surplus or an entitlement to get back the remaining
proportion of their respective contributions. Contrary to the above stated
legal position, as per clause 8.4 the franchisees did not enjoy any
‘entitlement’ or ‘right’ on the surplus remaining after the operations were
carried out for a given assessment year. As per the aforesaid clause the
assessee company may refund the surplus subject to the approval of its Board of
Directors. It implied that the franchisees / contributors could not claim a
refund of their remaining amount as a matter of right. According to the Supreme
Court, the raison d’être behind the refund of surplus to the
contributors or mandatory utilisation of the same in the subsequent assessment
year is to reduce their burden of contribution in the next year proportionate
to the surplus remaining from the previous year. Thus, the fulfilment of this
condition is essential. In the present case, even if any surplus is remaining
in a given assessment year, it would not reduce the liability of the
franchisees in the following year as their liability to the extent of 5% was
fixed and non-negotiable, irrespective of whether any funds were surplus in the
previous year. The only entity that could derive any benefit from the surplus
funds was YRIPL, i.e., the parent company. This was antithetical to the test of
mutuality.

 

It was
observed that the dispensation predicated in the tripartite agreement may
result in a situation where YRIPL would not contribute even a single paisa to
the common pool and yet be able to derive profits in the form of royalties out
of the purported mutual operations, created from the fixed 5% contribution made
by the franchisees. This would be nothing short of derivation of gains /
profits out of inputs supplied by others. According to the Supreme Court, the
doctrine of mutuality, in principle, entails that there should not be any
profit-earning motive, either directly or indirectly. One of the tests of
mutuality requires that the purported mutual operations must be marked by an
impossibility of profits and this crucial test was also not fulfilled in the
present case.

 

The
Supreme Court further observed that the exemption granted to a mutual concern
is premised on the assumption that the concern is being run for the mutual
benefit of the contributors and the contributions made by the members ought to
be directed accordingly. Contrary to this fundamental tenet, the tripartite
agreement relieves the assessee company from any specific obligation of
spending the amounts received by way of contributions for the benefit of the contributors.
It explicates that the assessee company does not hold such amount under any
implied trust for the franchisees.

 

According
to the Supreme Court, the assessee company had acted in contravention of the
terms of approval.

 

The
appellant had urged before the Supreme Court that no fixed percentage of
contribution could be imputed upon YRIPL as it did not operate any restaurant
directly and, thus, the actual volume of sales could not be determined.
According to the Court this argument was not tenable as YRIPL received a fixed
percentage of royalty from the franchisees on the sales. If the franchisees
could be obligated with a fixed percentage of contribution, 5% in the present
case, there was no reason as to why the same obligation ought not to apply to
YRIPL.

 

The
Court further noted that the text of the tripartite agreement pointed towards
the true intent of the formation of the assessee company as a step-down subsidiary.
It was established to manage the retail restaurant business, the advertising,
media and promotion at the regional and national level of KFC, Pizza Hut and
other brands currently owned or to be acquired in future. In its true form, it
was not contemplated as a non-business concern because operations integral to
the functioning of a business were entrusted to it.

 

The
Supreme Court held that the doctrine of mutuality bestows a special status to
qualify for exemption from tax liability. The appellant having failed to fulfil
the stipulations and to prove the existence of mutuality, the question of
extending exemption from tax liability to the appellant, that, too at the cost
of the public exchequer, did not arise.

 

The
assessee company had relied upon reported decisions before the Supreme Court to
establish a parallel between the operations carried out by it and clubs.
According to the Supreme Court, all the members of the club not only have a
common identity in the concern but also stand on an equal footing in terms of
their rights and liabilities towards the club or the mutual undertaking. Such
clubs are a means of social intercourse and are not formed for the facilitation
of any commercial activity. On the contrary, the purported mutual concern in
the present case undertook a commercial venture wherein contributions were
accepted both from the members as well as from non-members. Moreover, one
member was vested with a myriad set of powers to control the functioning and
interests of other members (franchisees), even to their detriment. Such
assimilation could not be termed as a case of ordinary social intercourse
devoid of commerciality.

 

The
Supreme Court was of the view that once it had conclusively determined that the
assessee company had not operated as a mutual concern, there was no question of
extending exemption from tax liability.

 

To
support an alternative claim for exemption, the assessee company took a plea in
the written submissions that it was acting under a trust for the contributors
and was under an overriding obligation to spend the amounts received for
advertising, marketing and promotional activities. It urged that once the
incoming amount is earmarked for an obligation, it does not become ‘income’ in
the hands of the assessee as no occasion for the application of such income
arises.

 

The
Supreme Court left the question of diversion by overriding title open as the
same was neither framed nor agitated in the appeal memo before the High Court
or before it (except a brief mention in the written submissions), coupled with
the fact that neither the Tribunal nor the High Court had dealt with that plea
and that the rectification application raising that ground was pending before
the Tribunal.

 

15. Basir Ahmed
Sisodiya vs. The Income Tax Officer Date of order: 24th
April, 2020

 

Cash credits – The
appellant / assessee, despite being given sufficient opportunity, failed to
prove the correctness and genuineness of his claim in respect of purchase of
marble from unregistered dealers to the extent of Rs. 2,26,000 and resultantly,
the said transactions were assumed as bogus entries (standing to the credit of
named dealers who were non-existent creditors of the assessee) – The appellant
/ assessee, however, in penalty proceedings had offered explanation and caused
to produce affidavits and record statements of the unregistered dealers
concerned and establish their credentials and that explanation having been
accepted by the CIT(A) who concluded that the materials on record would clearly
suggest that the unregistered dealers concerned had sold marble slabs on credit
to the appellant / assessee, as claimed – That being the indisputable position,
the Supreme Court deleted the addition of amount of Rs. 2,26,000

 

The appellant / assessee was served with a notice u/s
143(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (the ‘1961 Act’) by the A.O. for the A.Y.
1998-99, pursuant to which an assessment order was passed on 30th
November, 2000. The A.O., while relying on the balance sheet and the books of
accounts, inter alia took note of the credits amounting to Rs. 2,26,000.
He treated that amount as ‘cash credits’ u/s 68 of the 1961 Act and added the
same in the declared income of the assessee (the ‘second addition’). According
to the A.O., the credits of Rs. 2,26,000 shown in the names of 15 persons were
not correct and any correct proof / evidence had not been produced by the
assessee with respect to the income of the creditors and source of income. He
also made other additions to the returned income.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal before the
Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), Jodhpur. The appeal was partly allowed vide
order dated 9th January, 2003. However, as regards the trading
account and credits in question, the CIT(A) upheld the assessment order.

 

The
assessee then preferred a further appeal to the ITAT. Having noted the issues
and objections raised by the Department and the assessee, the ITAT partly
allowed the appeal vide order dated 4th November, 2004.
However, the order relating to the second addition regarding the credits of Rs.
2,26,000 came to be upheld.

 

The
assessee then filed an appeal before the High Court u/s 260A of the 1961 Act.
The appeal was admitted on 27th April, 2006 on the following
substantial question of law:

 

‘Whether
claim to purchase of goods by the assessee could be dealt with u/s 68 of the
Income-tax Act as a cash credit, by placing burden upon the assessee to explain
that the purchase price does not represent his income from the disclosed
sources?’

 

The High
Court dismissed the appeal vide impugned judgment and order dated 21st
August, 2008 as being devoid of merits. The High Court opined that the amount
shown to be standing to the credit of the persons which had been added to the
income of the assessee, was clearly a bogus entry in the sense that it was only
purportedly shown to be the amount standing to the credit of the fifteen
persons, purportedly on account of the assessee having purchased goods on
credit from them, while since no goods were purchased, the amount did represent
income of the assessee from undisclosed sources which the assessee had only
brought on record (books of accounts), by showing to be the amount belonging to
the purported sellers and as the liability of the assessee. That being the
position, the contention about impermissibility of making addition under this
head, in view of addition of Rs. 10,000 having been made in trading account,
rejecting the books of accounts for the purpose of assessing the gross profit,
could not be accepted. The gross profit shown in the books had not been
accepted on the ground that the assessee had not maintained day-to-day stock
registers, nor had he produced or maintained other necessary vouchers, but
then, if those books of accounts did disclose certain other assets which were
wrongly shown to be liabilities, and for acquisition of which the assessee did
not show the source, it could not be said that the A.O. was not entitled to use
the books of accounts for this purpose.

 

The
assessee in the civil appeal before the Supreme Court reiterated the argument
that the A.O., having made the addition u/s 144 of the 1961 Act being ‘best
judgment assessment’, had invoked powers under sub-section (3) of section 145.
For, assessment u/s 144 is done only if the books are rejected. In that case,
the same books could not be relied upon to impose subsequent additions as had
been done in this case u/s 68.

 

The
assessee filed an I.A. No. 57442/2011 before the Supreme Court for permission
to bring on record subsequent events. By this application, the assessee placed
on record an order passed by the CIT(A) dated 13th January, 2011
which considered the challenge to the order passed by the Income-Tax Officer
(ITO) u/s 271(1)(c) dated 17th November, 2006 qua the
assessee for the self-same assessment year 1998-99. The ITO had passed the said
order as a consequence of the conclusion reached in the assessment order which
had by then become final up to the stage of ITAT vide order dated 27th
April, 2006 – to the effect that the stated purchases by the assessee
from unregistered dealers were bogus entries effected by him. As a result,
penalty proceedings u/s 271 were initiated by the ITO. That order was set aside
by the appellate authority [CIT(A)] in the appeal preferred by the assessee, vide
order dated 13th January, 2011 with a finding that the assessee
had not made any concealment of income or furnished inaccurate particulars of
income for the assessment year concerned. As a consequence of this decision of
the appellate authority, even the criminal proceedings initiated against the
assessee were dropped / terminated and the assessee stood acquitted of the
charges u/s 276(C)(D)(1)(2) of the 1961 Act vide judgment and order
dated 6th June, 2011 passed by the Court of Additional Chief City
Magistrate (Economic Offence), Jodhpur City in proceedings No. 262/2005.

 

The
Supreme Court noted that during the course of appellate proceedings, the
appellant filed an application under Rule 46A vide letter dated 16th
October, 2008 and the same was sent to the ITO, Ward-1, Makrana vide
this office letter dated 28th January, 2009 and 1st
December, 2010 to submit remand report after examination of additional
evidences. Along with the application under Rules 46A, the appellant filed
affidavits from 13 creditors, the Sales Tax Order for the Financial Year
1997-98 showing purchases from unregistered dealers to the tune of Rs.
2,28,900, cash vouchers duly signed on revenue stamp for receipt of payment by
the unregistered dealers and copy of ration card / Voter ID Card to show the
identity of the unregistered dealers. The A.O. recorded statements of 12
unregistered dealers out of 13. In the report dated 22nd December,
2010, he mentioned that statements of the above 12 persons were recorded on 15th
/ 16th December, 2010 and in respect of identify the unregistered
dealers filed photo copies of their voter identity cards and all of them had
admitted that they had sold marble on credit basis to Basir Ahmed Sisodiya, the
appellant, during F.Y. 1997-98 and received payments after two or three years.
However, he observed that none of them had produced any evidence in support of
their statement since all were petty, unregistered dealers of marble and doing
small business and therefore no books of accounts were maintained. Some of them
had stated that they were maintaining small dairies at the relevant period of
time but they could not preserve the old dairies. Some of them had stated that
they had put their signature on the vouchers on the date of the transactions.

 

The
Supreme Court further noted that the CIT(A) had observed that in respect of the
addition of Rs. 2,26,000 there had been no denial of purchase of marble slabs
worth Rs. 4,78,900 and sale of goods worth Rs. 3,57,463 and disclosure of
closing stock of Rs. 2,92,490 in the trading account for the year ended on 31st
March, 1998. Without purchases of marble, there could not have been sale and
disclosure of closing stock in the trading account which suggested that the
appellant must have purchased marble slabs from unregistered dealers. The
CIT(A) had found that the explanation given by the appellant in respect of
purchases from unregistered dealers and their genuineness were substantiated by
filing of affidavits and producing these before the A.O. in the course of
remand report, and the A.O. did not find anything objectionable in respect of
the identity of the unregistered dealers and claims made for the sale of marble
slabs to the appellant in the F.Y. relevant to A.Y. 1998-99.

 

The
Supreme Court observed that considering the findings and conclusions recorded
by the A.O. and which were commended to the appellate authority as well as the
High Court, it must follow that the assessee despite being given sufficient
opportunity, failed to prove the correctness and genuineness of his claim in
respect of purchase of marble from unregistered dealers to the extent of Rs.
2,26,000. As a result, the said transactions were assumed as bogus entries
(standing to the credit of named dealers who were non-existent creditors of the
assessee).

 

According
to the Supreme Court, the assessee, however, in penalty proceedings had offered
explanation and caused to produce affidavits and record statements of the
unregistered dealers concerned and establish their credentials and that
explanation having been accepted by the CIT(A) who concluded that the materials
on record would clearly suggest that the unregistered dealers concerned had
sold marble slabs on credit to the assessee, as claimed.

 

The
Supreme Court was therefore of the view that the factual basis on which the
A.O. formed his opinion in the assessment order dated 30th November,
2000 (for A.Y. 1998-99) in regard to the addition of Rs. 2,26,000, stood
dispelled by the affidavits and statements of the unregistered dealers
concerned in penalty proceedings. That evidence fully supported the claim of
the assessee. The appellate authority vide order dated 13th
January, 2011, had not only accepted the explanation offered but also recorded
a clear finding of fact that there was no concealment of income or furnishing
of any inaccurate particulars of income by the appellant / assessee for the
A.Y. 1998-99. That now being the indisputable position, it must necessarily
follow that the addition of the amount of Rs. 2,26,000 could not be justified,
much less maintained.

 

The
Supreme Court, therefore, allowed the appeal.

 

16. Union of India (UOI) and Ors. vs. U.A.E.
Exchange Centre Date of order: 24th
April, 2020

 

India-UAE DTAA – Merely
having a fixed place of business through which the business of the assessee is
being wholly or partly carried on is not conclusive unless the assessee has a
PE situated in India, so as to attract Article 7 dealing with business profits
to become taxable in India, to the extent attributable to the PE of the
assessee in India – As per Article 5, which deals with and defines the
‘Permanent Establishment (PE)’, a fixed place of business through which the
business of an enterprise is wholly or partly carried on is to be regarded as a
PE and would include the specified places referred to in Clause 2 of Article 5,
but Article 5(3) of the DTAA which starts with a non obstante clause and
also contains a deeming provision predicates that notwithstanding the preceding
provisions of the Article concerned, which would mean clauses 1 and 2 of
Article 5, it would still not be a PE if any of the clauses in Article 5(3) are
applicable – No income as specified in section 2(24) of the 1961 Act was earned
by the liaison office of the respondent in India because the liaison office was
not a PE in terms of Article 5 of DTAA as it was only carrying on activity of a
preparatory or auxiliary character

 

The
respondent, a limited company incorporated in the United Arab Emirates (UAE)
was engaged in offering, among other things, remittance services for
transferring amounts from UAE to various places in India. It had applied for
permission u/s 29(1)(a) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (‘the 1973
Act’), pursuant to which approval was granted by the Reserve Bank of India (the
RBI) vide letter dated 24th September, 1996.

 

The
respondent set up its first liaison office in Cochin, Kerala in January, 1997
and thereafter in Chennai, New Delhi, Mumbai and Jalandhar. The activities carried on by the respondent
from the said liaison offices were stated to be in conformity with the terms
and conditions prescribed by the RBI in its letter dated 24th
September, 1996. The entire expenses of the liaison offices in India were met
exclusively out of funds received from the UAE through normal banking channels.
Its liaison offices undertook no activity of trading, commercial or industrial,
as the case may be. The respondent had no immovable property in India otherwise
than by way of lease for operating the liaison offices. No fee / commission was
charged or received in India by any of the liaison offices for services
rendered in India. It was claimed that no income accrued or arose or was deemed
to have accrued or arisen, directly or indirectly, through or from any source
in India from liaison offices within the meaning of section 5 or section 9 of
the Income-tax Act, 1961 (the 1961 Act). According to the respondent, the
remittance services were offered by it to non-resident Indians (NRIs) in the
UAE. The contract pursuant to which the funds were handed over by the NRI to
the respondent in the UAE was entered into between the respondent and the NRI
remitter in the UAE. The funds were collected from the remitter by charging a
one-time fee of Dirhams 15. After collecting the funds from the NRI remitter,
the respondent made an electronic remittance of the funds on behalf of its
customer in one of two ways:

    

(i)  By telegraphic transfer through bank
channels; or

(ii) On
the request of the NRI remitter, the respondent sent an instrument / cheque
through its liaison offices to the beneficiaries designated by the NRI
remitter.

 

In
compliance with section 139 of the ITA, 1961, the respondent had been filing
its returns of income from the A.Y. 1998-99 and until 2003-04, showing Nil
income, as according to the respondent no income had accrued or was deemed to
have accrued to it in India, both under the 1961 Act as well as the agreement
entered into between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government
of the UAE, which is known as the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (‘DTAA’).
This agreement (DTAA) had been entered into between the two sovereign countries
in exercise of powers u/s 90 of the 1961 Act for the purpose of avoidance of
double taxation and prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes and
income on capital. The DTAA had been notified vide notification No. GSR
No. 710(E) dated 18th November, 1993. The returns were filed on a
regular basis by the respondent and were accepted by the Department without any
demur.

 

However,
as some doubt was entertained, the respondent filed an application u/s 245Q(1)
before the Authority for Advance Rulings (Income Tax), New Delhi, which was
numbered as AAR No. 608/2003 and sought ruling of the Authority on the
following question:

 

‘Whether
any income is accrued / deemed to be accrued in India from the activities
carried out by the Company in India?’

 

The
Authority vide its ruling dated 26th May, 2004 answered the
question in the affirmative, saying, ‘Income shall be deemed to accrue in India
from the activity carried out by the liaison offices of the applicant in
India.’ In so holding, the Authority opined that in view of the deeming
provision in sections 2(24), 4 and 5 read with section 9 of the 1961 Act, the
respondent-assessee would be liable to pay tax under the 1961 Act as it had
carried on business in India through a ‘permanent establishment’ (PE) situated
in India and the profits of the enterprise needed to be taxed in India, but
only that proportion that was attributable to the liaison offices in India (the
PE).

 

The
Authority held that the applicant had liaison offices in India which attended
to the complaints of the clients in cases where remittances were sent directly
to banks in India from the UAE. In addition, in cases where the applicant had
to remit the amounts to the beneficiaries in India as per the directions of the
NRIs, the liaison offices downloaded the information from the internet, printed
cheques / drafts in the name of the beneficiaries in India and sent them
through couriers to various places in India. Without the latter activity, the
transaction of remittance of the amounts in terms of the contract with the NRIs
would not be complete. The commission which the applicant received for
remitting the amount covered not only the business activities carried on in the
UAE but also the activity of remittance of the amount to the beneficiary in
India by cheques / drafts through courier which was being attended to by the
liaison offices.

 

There
was, therefore, a real relation between the business carried on by the
applicant for which it received commission in the UAE and the activities of the
liaison offices (downloading of information, printing and preparation of
cheques / drafts and sending the same to the beneficiaries in India), which
contributed directly or indirectly to the earning of income by the applicant by
way of commission. There was also continuity between the business of the
applicant in the UAE and the activities carried on by the liaison offices in
India. Therefore, it followed that income had deemed to have accrued / arisen
to the applicant in the UAE from ‘business connection’ in India.

 

The
Authority further held that insofar as the amount was remitted telegraphically
by transferring directly from the UAE through bank channels to various places
in India and in such remittances the liaison offices had no role to play except
attending to the complaints, if any, in India regarding the remittances in
cases of fraud etc., it could be said to be auxiliary in character. However,
downloading the data, preparing cheques for remitting the amount and
dispatching the same through courier by the liaison offices was an important
part of the main work itself because without remitting the amount to the
beneficiaries as desired by the NRIs, performance of the contract would not be
complete. It was a significant part of the main work of the UAE establishment.
It, therefore, followed that the liaison offices of the applicant in India for
the purposes of this mode of remittance were a ‘permanent establishment’ within
the meaning of the expression in the DTAA.

 

Following
the impugned ruling of the Authority, dated 26th May, 2004, the
Department issued four notices of even date, i.e., 19th July, 2004
u/s 148 of the 1961 Act addressed to the respondent and pertaining to A.Y.s
2000-01, 2001-02, 2002-03 and 2003-04, respectively. The respondent approached
the Delhi High Court by way of Writ Petition No. 14869/2004, inter alia
for quashing of the ruling of the Authority dated 26th May, 2004,
quashing of the stated notices and for a direction to the appellants not to tax
the respondent in India because no income had accrued to it or was deemed to
have accrued to it in India from the activities of its liaison offices in
India.

 

The High
Court was of the opinion that the Authority proceeded on a wrong premise by
first examining the efficacy of section 5(2)(b) and section 9(1)(i) of the 1961
Act instead of applying the provisions in Articles 5 and 7 of the DTAA for
ascertaining the respondent’s liability to tax. Further, the nature of
activities carried on by the respondent-assessee in the liaison offices being
only of a preparatory and auxiliary character, were clearly excluded by virtue
of the deeming provision. The High Court distinguished the decisions relied
upon by the Authority in Anglo-French Textile Co. Ltd., by
agents, M/s. Best & Company Ltd., Madras vs. Commissioner of Income
Tax, Madras AIR 1953 SC 105 and R.D. Aggarwal & Company
(Supra). The ratio in these decisions, according to the High
Court, was that the non-resident entity could be taxed only if there was a
business connection between the business carried on by a non-resident which
yields profits or gains and some activity in the taxable territory which
contributes directly or indirectly to the earning of those profits or gains.

 

The High
Court then concluded that the activity carried on by the liaison offices of the
respondent in India did not in any manner contribute directly or indirectly to the
earning of profits or gains by the respondent in the UAE and every aspect of
the transaction was concluded in the UAE, whereas the activity performed by the
liaison offices in India was only supportive of the transaction carried on in
the UAE. The High Court also took note of Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(i) and
observed that the same reinforces the fact that in order to have a business
connection in respect of a business activity carried on by a non-resident
through a person situated in India, it should involve more than what is
supportive or subsidiary to the main function referred to in clauses (a) to
(c). The High Court eventually quashed the impugned ruling of the Authority and
also the notices issued by the Department u/s 148 of the 1961 Act, since the
notices were based on the ruling which was being set aside. The High Court,
however, gave liberty to the appellants to proceed against the respondent on
any other ground as may be permissible in law.

 

Feeling
aggrieved, the Department filed a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme
Court.

 

According
to the Supreme Court, the core issue that was required to be answered in the
appeal was whether the stated activities of the respondent-assessee would
qualify the expression ‘of preparatory or auxiliary character’?

 

The
Supreme Court observed that having regard to the nature of the activities
carried on by the respondent-assessee, as held by the Authority, it would
appear that the respondent was engaged in ‘business’ and had ‘business
connections’ for which, by virtue of the deeming provision and the sweep of
sections 2(24), 4 and 5 read with section 9 of the 1961 Act, including the
exposition in Anglo-French Textile Co. Ltd. (Supra) and R.D.
Aggarwal & Company (Supra), it would be a case of income deemed to
accrue or arise in India to the respondent. However, in the present case, the
matter in issue would have to be answered on the basis of the stipulations in
the DTAA notified in exercise of the powers conferred u/s 90 of the 1961 Act.

 

Keeping
in view the finding recorded by the High Court, the Supreme Court proceeded on
the basis that the respondent-assessee had a fixed place of business through
which its business was being wholly or partly carried on. That, however, would
not be conclusive until a further finding is recorded that the respondent had a
PE situated in India so as to attract Article 7 dealing with business profits
to become taxable in India, to the extent attributable to the PE of the
respondent in India. For that, one has to revert back to Article 5 which deals
with and defines the ‘Permanent Establishment (PE)’. A fixed place of business
through which the business of an enterprise is wholly or partly carried on is
regarded as a PE. The term ‘Permanent Establishment (PE)’ would include the specified
places referred to in clause 2 of Article 5. According to the Supreme Court, it
was not in dispute that the place from where the activities were carried on by
the respondent in India was a liaison office and would, therefore, be covered
by the term PE in Article 5(2). However, Article 5(3) of the DTAA opens with a non
obstante clause and also contains a deeming provision. It predicates that
notwithstanding the preceding provisions of the Article concerned, which would
mean clauses 1 and 2 of Article 5, it would still not be a PE if any of the
clauses in Article 5(3) are applicable. For that, the functional test regarding
the activity in question would be essential. The High Court had opined that the
respondent was carrying on stated activities in the fixed place of business in
India of a preparatory or auxiliary character.

 

The
Supreme Court, after noting the meaning of the expression ‘business’ in section
2(13) of the 1961 Act, discerning the meaning of the expressions ‘business
connection’ and ‘business activity’ from section 9(1) of the 1961 Act and the
dictionary meaning of the expressions ‘preparatory’ and ‘auxiliary’, concluded
that since the stated activities of the liaison offices of the respondent in
India were of preparatory or auxiliary character, the same would fall within
the excepted category under Article 5(3)(e) of the DTAA. As a result, it could
not be regarded as a PE within the sweep of Article 7 of the DTAA.

 

According
to the Supreme Court, while answering the question as to whether the activity
in question could be termed as other than that ‘of preparatory or auxiliary
character’, it was to be noted that the RBI had given limited permission to the
respondent u/s 29(1)(a) of the 1973 Act on 24th September, 1996.
From paragraph 2 of the stated permission it was evident that the RBI had
agreed for establishing a liaison office of the respondent at Cochin, initially
for a period of three years, to enable the respondent to (i) respond quickly
and economically to inquiries from correspondent banks with regard to suspected
fraudulent drafts; (ii) undertake reconciliation of bank accounts held in
India; (iii) act as a communication centre receiving computer (via modem)
advices of mail transfer T.T. stop payments messages, payment details, etc.,
originating from the respondent’s several branches in the UAE and transmitting
to its Indian correspondent banks; (iv) printing Indian Rupee drafts with a
facsimile signature from the Head Office and counter signature by the
authorised signatory of the office at Cochin; and (v) following up with the
Indian correspondent banks. These were the limited activities which the
respondent had been permitted to carry on within India. This permission did not
allow the respondent-assessee to enter into a contract with anyone in India but
only to provide service of delivery of cheques / drafts drawn on the banks in
India.

 

The
permitted activities were required to be carried out by the respondent subject
to conditions specified in Clause 3 of the permission, which included not to
render any consultancy or any other service, directly or indirectly, with or
without any consideration and further that the liaison office in India shall
not borrow or lend any money from or to any person in India without prior
permission of the RBI. The conditions made it amply clear that the office in
India would not undertake any other activity of trading, commercial or
industrial, nor shall it enter into any business contracts in its own name
without prior permission of the RBI. The liaison office of the respondent in
India could not even charge commission / fee or receive any remuneration or
income in respect of the activities undertaken by it in India. From the onerous
stipulations specified by the RBI, it could be safely concluded, as opined by
the High Court, that the activities in question of the liaison office(s) of the
respondent in India were circumscribed by the permission given by the RBI and
were in the nature of preparatory or auxiliary character. That finding reached
by the High Court was unexceptionable.

 

The
Supreme Court concluded that the respondent was not carrying on any business
activity in India as such, but only dispensing with the remittances by
downloading information from the main server of the respondent in the UAE and
printing cheques / drafts drawn on the banks in India as per the instructions
given by the NRI remitters in the UAE. The transaction(s) had been completed
with the remitters in the UAE, and no charges towards fee / commission could be
collected by the liaison office in India in that regard. To put it differently,
no income as specified in section 2(24) of the 1961 Act was earned by the
liaison office in India and more so because the liaison office was not a PE in
terms of Article 5 of the DTAA (as it was only carrying on activity of a
preparatory or auxiliary character).

 

The
concomitant was that no tax could be levied or collected from the liaison
office of the respondent in India in respect of the primary business activities
consummated by the respondent in the UAE. The activities carried on by the
liaison office in India as permitted by the RBI clearly demonstrated that the
respondent must steer away from engaging in any primary business activity and
in establishing any business connection as such. It could carry on activities
of preparatory or auxiliary nature only. In that case, the deeming provisions
in sections 5 and 9 of the 1961 Act could have no bearing whatsoever.

 

The Supreme
Court dismissed the appeal with no order as to costs.

 



Settlement of cases – Sections 245C(1) and 245D(4) of ITA, 1961 – Powers and duties of Settlement Commission – Application for settlement – Duty of Commission either to reject or proceed with application filed by assessee – Settlement Commission relegating assessee to A.O. – Not proper; A.Ys. 2008-09 to 2014-15

50. Samdariya Builders Pvt. Ltd. vs. IT Settlement Commission [2020] 423
ITR 203 (MP) Date of order: 7th May, 2019 A.Ys.: 2008-09 to 2014-15

 

Settlement of cases – Sections 245C(1) and 245D(4) of ITA, 1961 – Powers
and duties of Settlement Commission – Application for settlement – Duty of Commission
either to reject or proceed with application filed by assessee – Settlement
Commission relegating assessee to A.O. – Not proper; A.Ys. 2008-09 to 2014-15

 

The assessee was a part of a group of companies. Search and survey
operations under sections 132 and 133A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 were
conducted in the residential and business premises of the group, including
those of the assessee and some brokers. No incriminating material was found
against the assessee during the operations, but nine loose sheets of paper,
purportedly relating to the assessee, were seized from a broker. In compliance
with notices issued u/s 153A for the A.Ys. 2008-09 to 2013-14 and section
142(1) for the A.Y. 2014-15, the assessee filed returns of income. During the
assessment proceedings, the assessee filed an application u/s 245C(1) before
the Settlement Commission for settlement and the application was admitted u/s
245D(1) and was proceeded with by the Settlement Commission u/s 245D(2C).
Thereafter, the Principal Commissioner filed a report under Rule 9 of the
Income-tax Rules, 1962. The Settlement Commissioner, by his order u/s 245D(4)
relegated the assessee to the A.O. Hence, the A.O. issued a notice to the
assessee to comply with the earlier notice issued u/s 142(1).

 

The assessee filed a writ petition and challenged the order. The Madhya
Pradesh High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

 

‘i) The Settlement Commission’s power of settlement has to be exercised in
accordance with the provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Though the
Commission has sufficient powers in assessing the income of the assessee, it
cannot make any order with a term of settlement which would be in conflict with
the mandatory provisions of the Act, such as in the quantum and payment of tax
and the interest. The object of the Legislature in introducing section 245C of
the Income-tax Act, 1961 is to see that protracted proceedings before the
authorities or in courts are avoided by resorting to settlement of cases.

 

ii) The Settlement Commission could have either rejected the application or
allowed it to be proceeded with further. If the Settlement Commission was of
the opinion that the matter required further inquiry, it could have directed
the Principal Commissioner or the Commissioner to inquire and submit the report
to the Commission to take a decision. The Commission could not get around the
application for settlement. When a duty was cast on the Commission, it is
expected that the Commission would perform the duty in the manner laid down in
the Act, especially when no further remedy is provided in the Act against the
order of the Settlement Commission. The order of the Settlement Commission
relegating the assessee to the A.O. was to be set aside.’

Offences and prosecution – Sections 271(1)(c), 276C(2), 278B(3) of ITA, 1961 and Section 391 of Cr.P.C., 1973 – Wilful default in payment of penalty for concealment of income – Conviction of managing director and executive director of assessee by judicial magistrate – Appeal – Evidence – Documents to prove there was no wilful default left out to be marked due to inefficiency and inadvertence – Interest of justice – Appellate court has power to allow documents to be let in as additional evidence; A.Y. 2012-13

49. Gangothri Textiles Ltd. vs. ACIT [2020] 423 ITR 382 (Mad.) Date of
order: 20th November, 2019 A.Y.: 2012-13

 

Offences
and prosecution – Sections 271(1)(c), 276C(2), 278B(3) of ITA, 1961 and Section
391 of Cr.P.C., 1973 – Wilful default in payment of penalty for concealment of
income – Conviction of managing director and executive director of assessee by
judicial magistrate – Appeal – Evidence – Documents to prove there was no
wilful default left out to be marked due to inefficiency and inadvertence –
Interest of justice – Appellate court has power to allow documents to be let in
as additional evidence; A.Y. 2012-13

 

The assessee company was a textile manufacturer. It
was represented by its managing director and executive director. The Assistant
Commissioner of Income-tax filed a complaint before the Judicial Magistrate u/s
200 and 190(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 against the petitioners
for offences u/s 276C(2) read with section 278B(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961
for the A.Y. 2012-13 for wilful default in payment of penalty levied u/s
271(1)(c) of the IT Act.

 

The petitioners filed revision petitions and
contended that the trial court had failed to take into consideration the
necessity and requirement for marking the documents adduced by way of
additional evidence. The Madras High Court allowed the revision petition and
held as under:

 

‘i) Where documents of evidence are left out to be
marked due to carelessness and ignorance, they can be allowed to be marked for
elucidation of truth, in the interests of justice, by exercising powers u/s 391
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The intention of section 391 of the
Code is to empower the appellate court to see that justice is done between the
prosecutor and the prosecuted in the interests of justice.

 

ii) According to section 391
of the Code, if the appellate court opined that additional evidence was
necessary, it shall record its reasons and take such evidence itself. The
petitioners had been charged u/s 276C(2) read with section 278B(3) of the Act
for having wilfully failed to pay the penalty and having deliberately failed to
admit the capital gains that arose from the sale transactions done by the
assessee. The criminal revision petition u/s 391 of the Code had been filed by
the petitioners even at the time of presentation of the appeal. The documents
sought to be marked as additional evidence were not new documents and they were
documents relating to filing of returns with the Department in respect of the
earlier assessment years, copies of which were also available with the
Department. By marking these documents, the nature or course of the case would
not be altered. The documents had not been produced before the trial court due
to inefficiency or inadvertence of the person who had conducted the case. Where
documents were left out to be marked due to carelessness and ignorance, they
could be allowed to be marked for elucidation of truth, in the interest of
justice, by exercising powers u/s 391 of the Code.

 

iii) The petitioners should be allowed to let in
additional evidence subject to the provisions of Chapter XXIII of the Code in
the presence of the complainant and his counsel.’

 

Income – Accrual of income – Mercantile system of accounting – Business of distribution of electricity to consumers – Surcharge levied on delayed payment of bills – Assessee liable to tax on receipt of such surcharge; A.Y. 2005-06

48. Principal CIT vs. Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam
Ltd. [2020] 423 ITR 402 (P&H) Date of order: 29th November, 2018 A.Y.: 2005-06

 

Income – Accrual of income – Mercantile system of accounting – Business of
distribution of electricity to consumers – Surcharge levied on delayed payment
of bills – Assessee liable to tax on receipt of such surcharge; A.Y. 2005-06

 

The assessee distributed electricity. For the A.Y.
2005-06 the assessment was completed u/s 143(3). Subsequently, proceedings for
reassessment were initiated on the ground that the assessee had charged
surcharge on delayed payment of bill and this was charged as part of the single
bill along with the electricity charges. The assessee did not account for the
surcharge as part of its income on the ground that its recovery was not
definite. The A.O. made an addition on account of the surcharge levied but not
realised since the assessee followed the mercantile system of accounting.

 

The Commissioner (Appeals) deleted the addition
following his earlier orders. The Tribunal affirmed his order.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Punjab and Haryana
High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

‘i) As and when the assessee received payment of
surcharge, it would be obliged to pay tax on such amount. There was no
illegality or perversity in the findings recorded by the appellate authorities
which warranted interference.

 

ii) No question of law arose.’

Fringe benefits tax – Charge of tax – Section 115WA of ITA, 1961 – Condition precedent – Relationship of employer and employee – Free samples distributed to doctors by pharmaceutical company – Not fringe benefit – Amount spent not liable to fringe benefits tax; A.Y. 2006-07

47. Principal CIT vs. Aristo Pharmaceuticals P. Ltd. [2020] 423 ITR 295 (Bom.) Date of order: 23rd January, 2020 A.Y.: 2006-07

 

Fringe benefits tax – Charge of tax – Section 115WA of ITA, 1961 –
Condition precedent – Relationship of employer and employee – Free samples
distributed to doctors by pharmaceutical company – Not fringe benefit – Amount
spent not liable to fringe benefits tax; A.Y. 2006-07

 

The
following questions were raised in the appeal filed by the Revenue before the
Bombay High Court:

 

‘i)
Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the
Tribunal was right in setting aside the action of the A.O. without appreciating
the fact that the fringe benefit assessment was framed after duly considering
the CBDT Circular No. 8 of 2005 ([2005] 277 ITR (St.) 20] and the Explanatory
Notes to the Finance Act, 2005 on the provisions relating to fringe benefit
tax?

 

ii)
Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the
Tribunal was right in ignoring the fact that the Tribunal has explained
considering the case of Eskayef vs. CIT [2000] 245 ITR 116 (SC),
of the Supreme Court that free medical samples distributed to doctors is in the
nature of sales promotion and, similarly, any expenditure on free samples of
other products distributed to trade or consumers would be liable to fringe
benefit tax?’

 

The
Bombay High Court held as under:

 

‘i) From
a bare reading of section 115WA of the Income-tax Act, 1961 it is evident that
for the levy of fringe benefits tax it is essential that there must be a
relationship of employer and employee and the fringe benefit has to be provided
or deemed to be provided by the employer to his employees. The relationship of
employer and employee is the sine qua non and the fringe benefits have
to be provided by the employer to the employees in the course of such
relationship.

 

ii) The
assessee was a pharmaceutical company. Since there was no employer-employee
relationship between the assessee on the one hand and the doctors on the other
hand to whom the free samples were provided, the expenditure incurred for them
could not be construed as fringe benefits to be brought within the additional
tax net by levy of fringe benefit tax.’

Deemed income – Section 41(1) of ITA, 1961 – Remission or cessation of trading liability – Condition precedent for application of section 41(1) – Deduction must have been claimed for the liability – Gains on repurchase of debenture bonds – Not assessable u/s 41(1)

46. CIT vs. Reliance Industries Ltd. [2020] 423 ITR 236 (Bom.) Date of order: 15th January, 2019

 

Deemed income – Section 41(1) of ITA, 1961 – Remission or cessation of
trading liability – Condition precedent for application of section 41(1) –
Deduction must have been claimed for the liability – Gains on repurchase of
debenture bonds – Not assessable u/s 41(1)

 

The
assessee had issued foreign currency bonds in the years 1996 and 1997 carrying
a coupon rate of interest ranging between 10 and 11% and having a maturity
period of 30 to 100 years. The interest was payable half-yearly. According to
the assessee, on account of the attack on the World Trade Centre in the USA on
11th September, 2001, the financial market collapsed and the
investors of debentures and bonds started selling them which, in turn, brought
down the market price of such bonds and debentures which were traded in the
market at less than the face value. The assessee, therefore, purchased such
bonds and debentures from the market and extinguished them. In the process of
buyback, the assessee gained a sum of Rs. 38.80 crores. The A.O. treated this
as assessable to tax in terms of section 41(1) and made addition accordingly.

 

The
Commissioner (Appeals) deleted the addition. The Tribunal confirmed the
decision of the Commissioner (Appeals).

 

On
appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the
Tribunal and held as under:

 

‘i) For
applicability of section 41(1), it is a sine qua non that there should
be an allowance or deduction claimed by the assessee in any assessment year in
respect of loss, expenditure or trading liability incurred. Then, subsequently,
during any previous year, if the creditor remits or waives any such liability,
the assessee is liable to pay tax u/s 41(1).

 

ii) It
was not the case of the Revenue that in the process of issuing the bonds the
assessee had claimed deduction of any trading liability in any year. Any
extinguishment of such liability would not give rise to applicability of
sub-section (1) of section 41.’

Capital gains – Transfer of bonus shares – Bonus shares in respect of shares held as stock-in-trade – No presumption that bonus shares constituted stock-in-trade – Tribunal justified in treating bonus shares as investments; A.Ys. 2006-07 to 2009-10

45. Principal CIT vs. Ashok Apparels (P.) Ltd. [2020] 423 ITR 412 (Bom.) Date of order: 8th April, 2019 A.Ys.: 2006-07 to 2009-10

Capital gains – Transfer of bonus shares – Bonus shares in respect of
shares held as stock-in-trade – No presumption that bonus shares constituted stock-in-trade
– Tribunal justified in treating bonus shares as investments; A.Ys. 2006-07 to
2009-10

 

In the
appeal by the Revenue against the order of the Tribunal, the following question
was raised before the Bombay High Court.

 

‘Whether
on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Income-tax
Appellate Tribunal was justified in treating the bonus shares as investments
with a cost of acquisition of Rs. Nil for the year under consideration,
ignoring the fact that the original shares, for which bonus shares were
allotted, were present in the trading stock itself for the year under
consideration, thus the bonus shares allotted against the same were also
required to be treated as a part of trading stock itself?’

 

The
Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

‘i) In CIT
vs. Madan Gopal Radhey Lal [1969] 73 ITR 652 (SC) the Supreme Court
observed that bonus shares would normally be deemed to be distributed by the
company as capital and the shareholder receives the shares as capital. The
bonus shares are accretions to the shares in respect of which they are issued,
but on that account those shares do not become stock-in-trade of the business
of the shareholder. A trader may acquire a commodity in which he is dealing for
his own purposes and hold it apart from the stock-in-trade of his business.
There is no presumption that every acquisition by a dealer in a particular
commodity is acquisition for the purpose of his business; in each case the
question is one of intention to be gathered from the evidence of conduct and
dealings by the acquirer with the commodity.

 

ii) The
A.O. had merely proceeded on the basis that the origin of the bonus shares
being the shares held by the assessee by way of stock-in-trade, necessarily the
bonus shares would also partake of the same character. The Tribunal was
justified in the facts and circumstances of the case in treating the bonus
shares as investments.’

 

Capital gains – Exemption u/s 54 of ITA, 1961 – Sale of residential house and purchase or construction of new residential house within stipulated time – Construction of new residential house need not begin after sale of original house; A.Y. 2012-13

44. Principal CIT vs. Akshay Sobti [2020] 423 ITR 321 (Del.) Date of order: 19th December, 2019 A.Y.: 2012-13

Capital gains – Exemption u/s 54 of ITA, 1961 – Sale of residential house
and purchase or construction of new residential house within stipulated time –
Construction of new residential house need not begin after sale of original
house; A.Y. 2012-13

 

For the
A.Y. 2012-13 the assessee had claimed deduction u/s 54 in respect of capital
gains from the sale of residential house. The A.O. disallowed the deduction u/s
54 on the ground that the assessee had entered into an agreement dated 10th
February, 2006 and the date of the agreement was to be treated as the date of
acquisition, which fell beyond the one year period provided u/s 54 and was also
prior to the date of transfer.

 

The
Commissioner (Appeals) held that the assessee had booked a semi-finished flat
and was to make payments in instalments and the builder was to construct the
unfinished bare shell of a flat. Under these circumstances, the Commissioner
(Appeals) considered the agreement to be a case of construction of new
residential house and not purchase of a flat. He observed that since the
construction has been completed within three years of the sale of the original
asset, the assessee was entitled to relief u/s 54. The Tribunal upheld the
decision of the Commissioner (Appeals).

 

On
appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal
and held as under:

 

‘i)
Section 54 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 requires an assessee to purchase a
residential house property either one year before or within two years after the
date of transfer of a long-term capital asset, or construct a residential
house. It is not stipulated or indicated in the section that the construction
must begin after the date of sale of the original or old asset.

 

ii) The
assessee had fulfilled the conditions laid down in section 54 and was entitled
to the benefit under it.’

Business expenditure – Deduction u/s 42(1)(a) of ITA, 1961 – Exploration and extraction of oil – Conditions precedent for deduction – Expenditure should be infructuous or abortive exploration expenses, and area should be surrendered prior to commencement of commercial production – Meaning of expression ‘surrender’ – Does not always connote voluntary surrender – Assessee entering into production sharing contract with Government of India and requesting for extension at end of contract period – Government refusing extension – Assessee entitled to deduction u/s 42(1)(a); A.Y. 2008-09

43. Principal CIT vs. Hindustan Oil Exploration Co. Ltd. [2020] 423 ITR 465 (Bom.) Date of order: 25th March, 2019 A.Y.: 2008-09

 

Business expenditure – Deduction u/s 42(1)(a) of ITA, 1961 – Exploration
and extraction of oil – Conditions precedent for deduction – Expenditure should
be infructuous or abortive exploration expenses, and area should be surrendered
prior to commencement of commercial production – Meaning of expression
‘surrender’ – Does not always connote voluntary surrender – Assessee entering
into production sharing contract with Government of India and requesting for
extension at end of contract period – Government refusing extension – Assessee
entitled to deduction u/s 42(1)(a); A.Y. 2008-09

 

The assessee was engaged in the business of exploration and extraction of
mineral oil. It entered into a production-sharing contract with the Government
of India on 8th October, 2001 for the purposes of oil exploration.
According to the contract, a licence was issued to a consortium of three
companies, which included the assessee, to carry out the exploration initially
for a period of three years and the entire exploration was to be completed
within a period of seven years in three phases. At the end of the period,
extension was denied by the Government of India. In its Nil return of income
filed for the A.Y. 2008-09, the assessee claimed deduction u/s 42(1)(a) of the
Income-tax Act, 1961 on the expenditure on oil exploration on the ground that
the block was surrendered on 15th March, 2008. The A.O. was of the
opinion that it had not surrendered the right to carry on oil exploration since
the assessee was interested in extension of time which was denied by the
Government of India and disallowed the claim.

 

The Commissioner (Appeals) allowed the appeal. The Tribunal found that
according to article 14 of the contract, relinquishment and termination of
agreement were two different concepts and that by a letter dated 28th
March, 2007 the assessee was informed that its contract stood relinquished. The
Tribunal held that the assessee was covered by the deduction provision
contained in section 42, that such expenditure was not amortised or was not
being allowed partially year after year and it had to be allowed in full, and
therefore there was no justification to deny the benefit of deduction to the
assessee.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the
Tribunal and held as under:

 

‘i) As long as the commercial production had not begun and the expenditure
was abortive or infructuous exploration expenditure, the deduction would be
allowed. The term “surrender” itself was a flexible one and did not always
connote the meaning of voluntary surrender. The surrender could also take place
under compulsion. The assessee had no choice but to surrender the oil blocks
because the Government of India had refused to extend the validity period of
the contract. Admittedly, commercial production of oil had not commenced. The
act of the assessee to hand over the oil blocks before the commencement of
commercial production was covered within the expression “any area surrendered
prior to the beginning of commercial production by the assessee”.

 

ii)   The
provisions of section 42 recognised the risks of the business of exploration
which activity was capital-intensive and high in risk of the entire expenditure
not yielding any fruitful result and provided for special deduction. The
purpose of the enactment would be destroyed if interpreted rigidly. For
applicability of section 42(1)(a) the elements vital were that the expenditure
should be infructuous or abortive exploration expenses and that the area should
be surrendered prior to the beginning of commercial production by the assessee.
As long as these two requirements were satisfied, the expenditure in question
would be recognised as a deduction. The term “surrender” had to be appreciated
in the light of these essential requirements of the deduction clause. It was
not the contention of the Department that the expenditure was infructuous or
abortive exploration expenditure.

 

iii) The interpretation of section 42(1)(a) by the Tribunal and its order
holding the assessee eligible for deduction thereunder were not erroneous.’

i) Business expenditure – Disallowance – Sections 14A and 36(1)(iii) of ITA, 1961 – Interest on borrowed capital – Finding that investment from interest-free funds available with assessee – Presumption that advances made out of interest-free funds available with assessee – Deletion of addition made u/s 14A justified (ii) Unexplained expenditure – Section 69C of ITA, 1961 – Suspicion that certain purchases were bogus based on information from sales tax authority – Neither independent inquiry conducted by A.O. nor due opportunity given to assessee – Deletion of addition by appellate authorities justified; A.Y. 2010-11

42. Principal CIT vs.
Shapoorji Pallonji and Co. Ltd. [2020] 423 ITR 220
(Bom.) Date of order: 4th
March, 2020 A.Y.: 2010-11

 

(i) Business expenditure –
Disallowance – Sections 14A and 36(1)(iii) of ITA, 1961 – Interest on borrowed
capital – Finding that investment from interest-free funds available with
assessee – Presumption that advances made out of interest-free funds available
with assessee – Deletion of addition made u/s 14A justified

 

(ii) Unexplained
expenditure – Section 69C of ITA, 1961 – Suspicion that certain purchases were
bogus based on information from sales tax authority – Neither independent
inquiry conducted by A.O. nor due opportunity given to assessee – Deletion of
addition by appellate authorities justified; A.Y. 2010-11

 

For the
A.Y. 2010-11, the A.O. held that the purchases made by the assessee from two
sellers were bogus; according to information received from the Sales Tax
Department, Government of Maharashtra, those two sellers had not actually sold
any material to the assessee. Accordingly, he issued a show cause notice in
response to which the assessee furnished copies of the bills and entries made
in its books of accounts in respect of such purchases. However, the A.O. in his
order made addition u/s 69C of the Income-tax Act, 1961. He also made
disallowances under sections 14A and 36(1)(iii) of the Act.

 

The
Commissioner (Appeals) deleted the disallowances. The Tribunal upheld the
decision of the Commissioner (Appeals). According to the Tribunal, the A.O. had
merely relied upon the information received from the Sales Tax Department but
had not carried out any independent inquiry. The Tribunal recorded a finding
that the A.O. failed to show that the purchased materials were bogus, whereas
the assessee produced materials to show the genuineness of the purchases and
held that there was no justification to doubt the genuineness of the purchases
made by the assessee.

 

On
appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the
Tribunal and held as under:

 

‘i) On
the facts as found by the Commissioner (Appeals) and as affirmed by the
Tribunal, the presumption that if there were funds available with the assessee,
both interest-free and overdraft or loans, the investments were out of the
interest-free funds generated or available with the assessee was established.
The Tribunal had affirmed the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) deleting the
addition made by the A.O. u/s 14A on the ground that the interest-free funds
available with the assessee were far in excess of the advance given. The
principle of apportionment under Rule 8D of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 did not
arise as the jurisdictional facts had not been pleaded by the Department.

 

ii) The
finding of the Commissioner (Appeals) as affirmed by the Tribunal was that the
assessee had not utilised interest-bearing borrowed funds for making
interest-free advances but had its own interest-free fund far in excess of
interest-free advance. No question of law in respect of the deletion of the
disallowance made by the A.O. u/s 36(1)(iii) arose.

 

iii) The Tribunal was justified in deleting the addition
made u/s 69C on the ground of bogus purchases. Merely on suspicion based on the
information received from another authority, the A.O. ought not to have made
the additions without carrying out independent inquiry and without affording
due opportunity to the assessee to controvert the statements made by the
sellers before the other authority.’

Search and seizure – Sections 132, 143(2) and 158BC of ITA, 1961 – Block assessment u/s 158BC – Issue and service of notice u/s 143(2) is mandatory – Non-issuance of notice – Assessment vitiated

39. CIT vs.
Sodder Builder and Developers (P) Ltd.; [2019] 419 ITR
436 (Bom.) Date of order:
16th July, 2019

 

Search and
seizure – Sections 132, 143(2) and 158BC of ITA, 1961 – Block assessment u/s
158BC – Issue and service of notice u/s 143(2) is mandatory – Non-issuance of
notice – Assessment vitiated

 

A search and seizure operation u/s 132 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was
conducted in the assessee’s premises. A notice was issued u/s 158BC to assess
the undisclosed income. The Assistant Commissioner passed an assessment order
u/s 158BC. The records indicated that no notice u/s 143(2) was issued to the
assessee.

 

The assessee contended that non-issuance of such a notice vitiated the
assessment made under the special procedure under Chapter XIV-B. The Tribunal
accepted the assessee’s claim and allowed the appeal filed by the assessee.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of
the Tribunal and held as under:

 

‘i)   In the present case,
admittedly, no notice u/s 143(2) of the said Act was ever issued to the
assessee. By applying the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Asst.
CIT vs. Hotel Blue Moon (210) 321 ITR 362 (SC), we will have to hold
that the assessment made in the present case stands vitiated.

 

ii)   Therefore, even if we were to
hold in favour of the Revenue with regard to the other substantial questions of
law framed at the time of admission of this appeal, the assessment made in the
present matter would nevertheless stand vitiated for want of mandatory notice
u/s 143(2) of the said Act.

 

iii)  The assessment made by the
Assistant Commissioner pursuant to the notice issued u/s 158BC was vitiated for
want of the mandatory notice u/s 143(2).’

 

 

Search and seizure – Sections 68, 132, 153A and 153C of ITA, 1961 – Assessment of third person – Jurisdiction of AO – Addition made u/s 68 not based on material seized during search – Not sustainable

38. Principal
CIT vs. Ankush Saluja; [2019] 419 ITR
431 (Del.) Date of order:
14th November, 2019 A.Y.: 2007-08

 

Search and
seizure – Sections 68, 132, 153A and 153C of ITA, 1961 – Assessment of third
person – Jurisdiction of AO – Addition made u/s 68 not based on material seized
during search – Not sustainable

 

A search and seizure operation u/s 132 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was
conducted in the S group. Cash and jewellery which belonged to the assessee
were found and seized from the residence of the assessee’s father in whose name
the search warrant of authorisation was issued. The satisfaction note was
recorded by the AO in this regard and a notice u/s 153C read with section 153A
was issued against the assessee. In response thereto, the assessee filed his
return of income. The AO treated the unsecured loans as unexplained cash credit
u/s 68 of the Act and made an addition to that effect.

 

The Commissioner (Appeals) held that the addition u/s 68 was not based
on any incriminating document found and seized during the search and,
therefore, the addition could not be sustained. The Tribunal upheld the order
of the Commissioner (Appeals).

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of
the Tribunal and held as under:

‘i)   There were concurrent
findings of fact to the effect that the additions made by the Assessing Officer
u/s 68 were not based on any incriminating document found or seized during the
search action u/s 132. In this view of the matter, the assumption of
jurisdiction u/s 153C by the Assessing Officer was not justified and
accordingly the additions made u/s 68 could not be sustained.

 

ii)   No question of law arose.’

 

Reassessment – Sections 147 and 148 of ITA, 1961 – Condition precedent for notice – Tangible material to show escapement of income from taxation – Agricultural income disclosed in return and accepted – Subsequent advisory by IT Department that claims of agricultural income should be investigated – Notice based solely on advisory – Not valid

37. Ravindra
Kumar (HUF) vs. CIT; [2019] 419 ITR
308 (Patna) Date of order:
6th August, 2019 A.Y.: 2011-12

 

Reassessment –
Sections 147 and 148 of ITA, 1961 – Condition precedent for notice – Tangible
material to show escapement of income from taxation – Agricultural income
disclosed in return and accepted – Subsequent advisory by IT Department that
claims of agricultural income should be investigated – Notice based solely on
advisory – Not valid

 

For the A.Y. 2011-12, the assessee had filed return of income which
included agricultural income. On 22nd March, 2018, the AO issued
notice u/s 133(6) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 requiring the assessee to furnish
the information relating to the agricultural income disclosed in his return.
The assessee did not respond to this notice. The notice was followed by a
notice u/s 148. The reassessment notice was based on an advisory issued by the
Income-tax Department. The advisory directed the AO to verify whether there was
any data entry error in the returns filed, to provide feedback where assessment
was complete and in cases where assessment was pending, to thoroughly verify
the claims on agricultural income. The assessee filed a writ petition and
challenged the notice.

 

The Patna High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

 

‘i)   A power to reopen an
assessment would vest in the Assessing Officer only if there is tangible material
in his possession for coming to a conclusion that there was escapement of
income chargeable to tax, from assessment, and the reasons with the Assessing
Officer must have a live link with the formation of belief.

 

ii)   The Assessing Officer
mentioned in the “reasons” supplied that the assessee had not
produced certain evidence in support of agricultural income and in the absence
of which the claim towards agricultural income could not be substantiated. The
admission by the Assessing Officer regarding absence of material could not lead
to the formation of belief that the disclosure was incorrect and chargeable to
tax u/s 147 of the Act. The reason was firstly that such opportunity was very
much available to the Assessing Officer at the stage of filing of the returns
when in exercise of powers u/s 142/143 such directions could have been issued
for production of records and a failure of the assessee to satisfy the
Assessing Officer on such count could have led to a best judgment assessment
u/s 144 at the stage of original assessment; but having not done so, such
recourse could not be adopted by relying upon the statutory provisions of
section 147 of the Act.

 

iii)  Secondly such enabling powers
were only to be exercised where there was tangible material available with the
Assessing Officer and not in the absence thereof. In view of the clear fact
situation available on the record where such reopening was simply founded on
the advisory dated 10th March, 2016 issued by the Department and
where the reasons so present for the formation of belief was not resting on any
tangible material in possession of the Assessing Officer, the entire exercise
was illegal and de hors the provisions of section 147 / 148’.

 

Section 115JB – Waiver of loan would not assume the character of income and hence, not part of book profit and adjustment in accumulated debit balance of profit & loss account through restructuring account to be disregarded for the purpose of computation of brought-forward losses

11. Windsor Machines Ltd. vs. DCIT (Mumbai) Manoj Kumar Aggarwal (A.M.) and Madhumita Roy (J.M.) ITA Nos. 2709, 2710 and 4697/Mum/2019 A.Ys.: 2013-14 and 2014-15 Date of order: 28th May, 2020 Counsel for Assessee
/ Revenue: Pradip N. Kapasi and Akhilesh Pevekar / Vinay Sinha

 

Section
115JB – Waiver of loan would not assume the character of income and hence, not
part of book profit and adjustment in accumulated debit balance of profit &
loss account through restructuring account to be disregarded for the purpose of
computation of brought-forward losses

 

FACTS

The assessee was
declared a sick company under the provisions of the Sick Industrial Companies
(Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (SICA) and a rehabilitation Scheme was
sanctioned. The Scheme envisaged several reliefs and concessions from various
agencies, including certain tax concessions, viz., exemption from the
provisions of sections 41, 72, 43-B and 115JB for a period of eight years from
the cut-off date (i.e., 31st March, 2009 as per the Scheme).

The
assessee’s net worth turned positive on 31st March, 2011, hence the
BIFR discharged the assessee from the purview of SICA vide its order
dated 16th August, 2011. According to the DIT (Recovery), since the
assessee was discharged by SICA on 16th August, 2011 and its net
worth turned positive by virtue of implementation of the revival Scheme, the
assessee was precluded from relief u/s 115JB in view of Explanation 1(vii) to
section 115JB(2) and, therefore, no relief would be available to it from A.Y.
2011-12 onwards from applicability of the provisions of section 115JB. The
assessee prayed for
reconsideration of the order pleading before the DIT (Recovery) that in terms
of the BIFR Scheme, it was entitled to relief u/s 115JB for a period of eight
years, i.e., up to A.Y. 2017-18.

 

In the meantime, the A.O., referring to the
decision of the DIT (Recovery), held that the assessee would be entitled for
relief u/s 115JB only up to A.Y. 2011-12. Accordingly, he computed book profits
u/s 115JB at Rs. 1,076.27 lakhs which was nothing but profit shown by the
assessee in the financial statements (after excluding exempt dividend income).
The CIT(A), on appeal, upheld the order of the A.O.

 

HELD

According to
the Tribunal, since the assessee was discharged by SICA on 16th
August, 2011 and its net worth turned positive by virtue of implementation of
the revival Scheme, the assessee was precluded from relief u/s 115JB in view of
Explanation 1(vii) to section 115JB(2) and, therefore, no relief would be
available from A.Y. 2011-12 onwards.

 

The Tribunal
also found substance in the contention of the assessee that

(a) the
amount credited to profit & loss account on account of waiver of loan would
not assume the character of income and hence should not form part of book
profits u/s 115JB, and

(b)
adjustment in accumulated debit balance of profit & loss account through
restructuring account should be disregarded for the purpose of computation of
brought-forward losses in terms of Explanation 1(iii) to section 115JB(2),

 

However, the
Tribunal also noted that the issues had not been delved upon either by the A.O.
or by the CIT(A). Therefore, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the
Tribunal remitted the matter back to the file of the CIT(A).

 

 

 

Section 2(22)(e) – No addition can be made u/s 2(22)(e) since as per annual return filed by the assessee, he had transferred his shareholding in borrower company before the advancement of loan by the lender company to the borrowing company

19. [(2020) 117 taxmann.com 451
(Chd.)(Trib.) ACIT vs. Gurdeep Singh ITA No. 170 (Chd.) of 2018 A.Y.: 2013-2014 Date of order: 26th June, 2020

 

Section 2(22)(e) – No addition can be made
u/s 2(22)(e) since as per annual return filed by the assessee, he had
transferred his shareholding in borrower company before the advancement of loan
by the lender company to the borrowing company

 

FACTS

The assessee was a shareholder in two companies, namely, C Ltd. and J
Ltd. During the previous year relevant to the assessment year under
consideration, C Ltd. gave loans and advances to J Ltd. out of its surplus
funds. The A.O. took a view that since the assessee was holding shares in both
companies in excess of ten percent of total shareholding, the amount of loan is
to be taxed as dividend u/s 2(22)(e) of the Act.

 

The annual return
filed with the Registrar of Companies (ROC) revealed that the assessee held
only one share of C Ltd., whereas the other shares were transferred to J Ltd.
The annual return was belatedly filed with the ROC, along with payment of late
fee, which was accepted by the ROC. Based on the belatedly filed annual return,
the assessee contended that the shares were transferred prior to the
advancement of loan and, therefore, the provisions of section 2(22)(e) were not
applicable. The A.O. did not agree with the submissions made by the assessee
and held the plea of share transfer to be an afterthought since the return with
the Registrar was filed late.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who allowed the
appeal since the transfer of shares was accepted by the A.O. while framing assessments
of subsequent years, and also held that the transfer of shares had to be
considered. He also held that the transaction was commercially expedient with
no personal benefit involved.

 

Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

 

HELD

The Revenue could
not establish beyond doubt that the assessee was having substantial interest in
C Ltd. on the date of advancement of loan by C Ltd. to J Ltd. Even though the
annual return was filed belatedly, once accepted by the ROC, it was a legal and
valid document as per law and the effective date for transfer of shares should
be considered as that mentioned in the return filed. To apply a deeming
fiction, the first set of facts is to be proved beyond doubt and the deeming
fiction cannot be applied on the basis of assumption, presumption or suspicion
about the first set of facts. The Tribunal observed that it was the A.O.’s
suspicion that the assessee was holding substantial shares in C Ltd. on the
date of advancement of loan. The Revenue could not rebut the facts beyond
reasonable doubt. The Tribunal upheld the order passed by the CIT(A) and
confirmed the deletion of the addition made u/s 2(22)(e).

 

The appeal filed by
the Revenue was dismissed.

 

 

Section 115BBE, read with sections 69, 143 and 154 – Amount surrendered, in the course of survey, as undisclosed investment in stock and assessed as business income cannot be subsequently brought to tax u/s 115BBE by passing an order u/s 154

18. [(2020) 117 taxmann.com 178
(Jai.)(Trib.) ACIT vs. Sudesh Kumar Gupta ITA No. 976 (Jp) of 2019 A.Y.: 2014-2015 Date of order: 9th June, 2020

 

Section 115BBE, read with sections 69, 143
and 154 – Amount surrendered, in the course of survey, as undisclosed
investment in stock and assessed as business income cannot be subsequently
brought to tax u/s 115BBE by passing an order u/s 154

 

FACTS

During the course of survey, the assessee surrendered an amount of Rs. 21
lakhs as undisclosed investment in stock. This amount was offered to tax in the
return of income as business income. In the assessment completed u/s 143(3) of
the Act, the returned income was accepted.

 

Subsequently, the A.O. issued a notice u/s 154 proposing to tax the
undisclosed investment of Rs. 21,00,000 in stock u/s 69 and tax thereon levied
u/s 115BBE at 30%. The assessee submitted that the amount admitted as
undisclosed excess stock was on an estimated basis and it had been accepted by
the A.O. in an assessment made u/s 143(3). The A.O. rejected the submission
made by the assessee and passed an order u/s 154 and levied tax on the amount
of undisclosed investment at 30% in accordance with section 115BBE.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who allowed the
appeal holding that the A.O. was not justified in invoking the provisions of
section 69 once he had charged it to tax under the head business income while
passing the assessment order u/s 143(3).

 

Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

 

HELD

The Tribunal noted
that the amount of undisclosed investment in stock surrendered by the assessee
was offered as ‘business income’ in the return of income and was accepted by
the A.O. In the course of assessment, there was no adjustment / variation
either in the quantum, nature or classification of income offered by the
assessee. The A.O. had not called for any explanation regarding the nature and
source of such investment during the course of assessment proceedings. Further,
he had neither formed any opinion, nor recorded any satisfaction for invoking
the provisions of section 69. The Tribunal held that since the provisions of
section 69 had not been invoked at the first instance while passing the
assessment order u/s 143(3), they cannot be independently applied by invoking
the provisions of section 154.

 

The Tribunal
dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue.

Sections 2(47), 45: When the terms of the sale deed and the intention of the parties at the time of entering into the sale deed have not been adhered to whereby full sale consideration has not been discharged, there is no transfer of land, even though the sale deed has been registered, and no income accrues and consequently no liability towards capital gains arises in the hands of the assessee

17. [2020] 117 taxmann.com 424 (Jai.)(Trib.) CIT vs. Ijyaraj Singh ITA Nos. 91 and 152/Jp/2019 A.Y.: 2013-14 Date of order: 18th June, 2020

 

Sections 2(47), 45: When the terms of the
sale deed and the intention of the parties at the time of entering into the
sale deed have not been adhered to whereby full sale consideration has not been
discharged, there is no transfer of land, even though the sale deed has been
registered, and no income accrues and consequently no liability towards capital
gains arises in the hands of the assessee

 

FACTS

The assessee in his
return of income filed u/s 139(1) declared long-term capital gains of Rs.
2,51,85,149 in respect of sale of agricultural land situate in Kota. In the
course of assessment proceedings, the assessee revised his return of income
wherein the income under the head long-term capital gains was revised to Rs.
1,10,18,918 as against Rs. 2,51,85,149 shown in the original return. The reason
for revising the return was that out of three sale deeds, two sale deeds of
land executed with Mr. Rajeev Singh were invalid sale deeds and consequently no
transfer took place and hence no capital gain arises in respect of the two
invalid sale deeds. In respect of these two sale deeds, the assessee had
received only Rs. 63 lakhs towards consideration out of Rs. 803 lakhs. The
cheques received from the buyer were dishonoured and even possession was not
handed over to the buyer. The Rajasthan High Court has also granted stay on the
sale deeds executed by the assessee.

 

But the A.O. was of
the view that the contract entered into by the assessee was a legal and valid
contract entered into in accordance with the procedure laid down by law. The
assessee voluntarily agreed to register the sale deed before the Registrar and
on the date of execution and also on the date of registration there was no
dispute between the parties. The A.O. computed long-term capital gains by
considering the full value of consideration, including the two sale deeds which
were contended to be invalid, and computed the full value of consideration u/s
50C of the Act.

 

Aggrieved, the
assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who held that the transaction in
respect of the two invalid sale deeds is not chargeable to capital gains tax.

 

Aggrieved, the
Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

 

HELD

The Tribunal noted
that the question for its consideration is that where the full value of
consideration has not been discharged by the purchaser of the impugned land as
per the sale deed, and there is violation of the terms of the sale deed,
whether the impugned transaction would still qualify as transfer and be liable
for capital gains tax, given that the same is evidenced by a registered sale
deed. Having considered the provisions of sections 2(24), 2(47), 45 and 48 of
the Act, and also the decision of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in the
case of Hira Lal Ram Dayal vs. CIT [122 ITR 461 (Punj. & Har. HC)]
where the question before the Court was ‘whether it is open to the assessee to
prove that the sale transaction evidenced by the registered sale deed was a
sham transaction and no sale in fact took place’, and also the decision of the
Patna High Court in the case of Smt. Raj Rani Devi Ramna vs. CIT [(1992)
201 ITR 1032 (Patna)], the Tribunal held that the legal proposition
which emerges is that a registered sale deed does carry an evidentiary value.

 

At the same time,
where the assessee is able to prove by cogent evidence brought on record that
no sale has in fact taken place, then in such a scenario the taxing and
appellate authorities should consider these evidences brought on record by the
assessee and on the basis of an examination thereof, decide as to whether a
sale has taken place in a given case or not. The title in the property does not
necessarily pass as soon as the instrument of transfer is registered and the
answer to the question regarding passing of title lies in the intention of the
parties executing such an instrument. The registration is no proof of an
operative transfer and where the parties had intended that despite execution
and registration of sale deed, transfer by way of sale will become effective
only on payment and receipt of full sale consideration and not at the time of
execution and registration of sale deed.

 

The Tribunal noted
that no payment was received before execution of the sale deed but only
post-dated cheques were received by the assessee. It held that mere handing
over of the post-dated cheques which have been subsequently dishonoured and
returned unpaid to the assessee, cannot be held to be discharge of full sale
consideration as intended and agreed upon between the parties and there is
clearly a violation of the terms of the sale deed by the buyer.

 

Although the sale
deed has been registered, given that the terms of the sale deed and the
intention of the parties at the time of entering into the said sale deed have
not been adhered to whereby full sale consideration has not been discharged,
there is no transfer of the impugned land and no income accrues and
consequently, no liability towards capital gains arises in the hands of the
assessee. The Tribunal also held that it is only the real income which can be
brought to tax and there cannot be any levy of tax on hypothetical income which
has neither accrued / nor arisen or been received by the assessee. Since the
transaction fell through in view of non-fulfilment of the terms of the sale
deed whereby cheques issued by the buyer have been dishonoured, there is no
transfer and no income which has accrued or arisen to the assessee. There is no
real income in the hands of the assessee and in the absence thereof, the
assessee is not liable to capital gains. It observed that a similar view has
been taken by the Pune Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Appasaheb
Baburao Lonkar vs. ITO [(2019) 176 ITD 115 (Pune-Trib.)].

 

This ground of
appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed.

SET OFF OF UNABSORBED DEPRECIATION WHILE DETERMINING BOOK PROFIT u/s 40(B)

 ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION

Section 40(b)
limits the deduction, in the hands of a partnership firm, in respect of an
expenditure on specified kinds of payments to partners. Amongst several
limitations provided in respect of deduction to be claimed by the partnership
firm, clause (5) of section 40(b) limits the deduction for remuneration to the
working partners to the specified percentage of the ‘book profit’ of the firm.


The term ‘book
profit’ is defined exhaustively by Explanation 3 to section 40(b) which reads
as under:

 

‘Explanation 3 –
For the purpose of this clause, “book profit” means the net profit, as shown in
the profit and loss account for the relevant previous year, computed in the
manner laid down in Chapter IV-D as increased by the aggregate amount of the
remuneration paid or payable to all the partners of the firm if such amount has
been deduced while computing the net profit.’

 

‘Book profit’, as per Explanation 3, means the net profit as per the
profit and loss account of the relevant year, computed in the manner laid down
in Chapter IV-D. The net profit in question is the one that is shown in the
profit and loss account which is computed in the manner laid down in Chapter
IV-D. This requirement to compute the net profit in the manner laid down in
Chapter IV-D has been the subject matter of debate. Section 32, which is part
of Chapter IV-D, provides for the depreciation allowance in computing the
income of the year and, inter alia, sub-section (2) provides for the
manner in which the unabsorbed depreciation of the earlier years is to be
adjusted against the income of the year. The interesting issue which has arisen
with respect to the computation of ‘book profit’ for the purpose of section
40(b) is whether the net profit for the year should also be reduced by the
unabsorbed depreciation of earlier years and whether the amount of remuneration
to the partners eligible for deduction should be computed with respect to such
reduced amount.

 

The Jaipur bench of
the Tribunal has held that in computing the ‘book profit’ and the amount
eligible for deduction on account of the remuneration to partners, unabsorbed
depreciation of the earlier years should be deducted from the net profit for
the year as provided in section 32(2). As against this, the Pune bench of the
Tribunal has taken a contrary view and has allowed the assessee firm’s claim of
the remuneration paid to its partners which was computed on the basis of ‘book
profit’ without reducing it by the unabsorbed depreciation of the earlier
years.

 

THE VIKAS OIL MILLS CASE

The issue first
came up for consideration of the Jaipur bench of the Tribunal in the case of Vikas
Oil Mills vs. ITO (2005) 95 TTJ 1126.

 

In that case, for
the assessment year 2001-02 the A.O. disallowed the remuneration amounting to
Rs. 1,79,005 paid to the working partners on the ground that the assessee firm
had not reduced the unabsorbed brought-forward depreciation of earlier years
from the profit of the year under consideration while claiming deduction for
the remuneration payable to the partners. Since the resultant figure after
reducing the unabsorbed depreciation of earlier years from the profit of the
assessee firm was a negative figure, the A.O. disallowed the remuneration paid
to the partners. The CIT(A) confirmed this order.

 

The assessee argued
before the Tribunal that the unabsorbed depreciation was allowed to be deducted
only because of a fiction contained in section 32(2) and that otherwise the
deduction was subject to the provisions of section 72(2). Hence, unabsorbed
depreciation should not be considered for computation of net profit in Chapter
IV-D. On the other hand, the Departmental representative supported the orders
of the lower authorities by submitting that unabsorbed depreciation of earlier
years was part of the current year’s depreciation as per section 32(2) which
fell in Chapter IV-D and, therefore, for computation of book profit unabsorbed
depreciation was to be necessarily taken into account.

 

The Tribunal
concurred with the view of the lower authorities and held that the remuneration
paid to the working partners was to be reduced from the book profit as per the
provisions of section 40(b)(v). The definition of book profit was provided in
Explanation 3 as per which it was required to be computed in the manner laid
down in Chapter IV-D. Therefore, the Tribunal held that the unabsorbed
depreciation of earlier years had to be reduced as provided in section 32(2)
while determining the book profit for the purpose of determining the amount of
deductible remuneration. However, the Tribunal agreed with the alternative plea
of the assessee for allowing the minimum amount of remuneration which was
allowable even in case of a loss.

 

RAJMAL LAKHICHAND CASE

The issue
thereafter came up for consideration before the Pune bench of the Tribunal in
the case of Rajmal Lakhichand vs. JCIT (2018) 92 taxmann.com 94.

 

In this case, for
the assessment year 2010-11 the A.O. disallowed the remuneration to working
partners amounting to Rs. 17,50,000 on the ground that the unabsorbed
depreciation of earlier years was not reduced in computing the book profit
which was contrary to the provisions of section 40(b). Upon further appeal, the
CIT(A) deleted this disallowance by holding that the remuneration to partners
was to be worked out on the basis of the current year’s book profit and
therefore the remuneration was to be deducted first before allowing the set-off
of brought-forward losses. He held that the computation of book profit was as
per section 40(b) while the set-off of brought-forward losses was to be granted
in terms of section 72. Therefore, while arriving at the business income, the
deduction of section 40(b) was to be given first and then, if at all there
remained positive income, the brought-forward losses were to be set off.

 

Before the
Tribunal, the Income-tax Department assailed the findings of the CIT(A) on the
ground that the unabsorbed brought-forward depreciation became a part of the
current year’s depreciation as per the provisions of section 32(2) and that as
per Chapter IV-D, the book profit was determined only after deduction of
depreciation including unabsorbed depreciation. Since, in the assessee’s case,
there was a loss after deduction of unabsorbed brought-forward depreciation to
the tune of Rs. 10,84,75,430 remuneration to the extent of only Rs. 1,50,000
should have been allowed. Reliance was placed on the decision in Vikas
Oil Mills (Supra).

 

As against that,
the assessee submitted that the remuneration paid to the partners was to be
based on the current year’s book profit derived before deducting the unabsorbed
depreciation and that the set-off of unabsorbed losses and depreciation was
governed by section 72. The unabsorbed business losses were to be set off first
and then the unabsorbed depreciation was to be considered.

 

The Tribunal upheld
the order of the CIT(A) deleting the disallowance of remuneration paid to the
working partner by the assessee-firm. In addition to accepting the contention
of the assessee, the Tribunal also relied upon the decision of the Ahmedabad
bench of the Tribunal in the case of Yogeshwar Developers vs. ITO [IT
Appeal No. 1173/AHD/2014 for assessment year 2005-06 decided on 13th
April, 2017]. The decision of the Jaipur bench in the case of
Vikas Oil Mills (Supra) cited before the Tribunal by the Income-tax
Department was not followed by the bench.

 

OBSERVATIONS

Sub-section (2) of
section 32 provides that where full effect cannot be given to the depreciation
allowance for any previous year, then the depreciation remaining to be absorbed
shall be added to the amount of the depreciation allowance for the following
previous year and deemed to be part of the depreciation allowance for that
year. It further provides that if there is no such depreciation allowance for
the succeeding previous year, then that unabsorbed depreciation of the
preceding previous year itself shall be deemed to be the depreciation allowance
for that year. However, such a treatment of unabsorbed depreciation u/s 32(2)
is subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 72 and sub-section
(3) of section 73 under which first brought-forward business loss needs to be set
off and then unabsorbed depreciation. Therefore, in a situation where the
assessee has brought-forward business loss as well as unabsorbed depreciation,
the combined reading of sections 32 and 72 or 73 required that the
brought-forward business loss shall be set off first against the income of the
previous year and then against the unabsorbed depreciation.

 

As per
Explanation-3 to section 40(b), all the deductions as provided in Chapter IV-D
including depreciation allowance provided in section 32 have to be taken into
consideration while determining the book profit. Since the provision of section
32(2) treats the unabsorbed depreciation of earlier years at par with the
depreciation allowance of the current year, except where there is a
brought-forward business loss, the issue as to whether the unabsorbed
depreciation should also be deducted from the book profit requires deeper
analysis.

 

Though the literal
interpretation of all the provisions concerned may appear to support the view
that the amount of depreciation allowance, whether of the current year or the
one which is of the earlier years and has remained unabsorbed, should be
reduced from the net profit for the purpose of arriving at the book profit, one
needs to also consider the legislative history as well as the intent of the
provisions of section 32(2) before accepting the literal interpretation. The
present provision of section 32(2) as it stands today was brought in force by
the Finance Act, 2001 by substituting the old provision with effect from assessment
year 2002-03. The old provision of section 32(2), prior to its substitution by
the Finance Act, 2001, was effective for the assessment years 1997-98 to
2001-02 and it read as under:

 

(2) Where in the
assessment of the assessee full effect cannot be given to any allowance under
clause (ii) of sub-section (1) in any previous year owing to there being no
profits or gains chargeable for that previous year or owing to the profits or
gains being less than the allowance, then, the allowance or the part of
allowance to which effect has not been given (hereinafter referred to as
unabsorbed depreciation allowance), as the case may be,

(i) shall be set off against the profits and gains,
if any, of any business or profession carried on by him and assessable for that
assessment year;

(ii) if the unabsorbed depreciation allowance cannot
be wholly set off under clause (i), the amount not so set off shall be set off
from the income under any other head, if any, assessable for that assessment
year;

if the unabsorbed
depreciation allowance cannot be wholly set off under clause (i) and clause
(ii), the amount of allowance not so set off shall be carried forward to the
following assessment year and,

(a) it shall be
set off against the profits and gains, if any, of any business or profession
carried on by him and assessable for that assessment year;

(b) if the
unabsorbed depreciation allowance cannot be wholly so set off, the amount of
unabsorbed depreciation allowance not so set off shall be carried forward to
the following assessment year not being more than eight assessment years
immediately succeeding the assessment year for which the aforesaid allowance
was first computed.

 

It is significant
to note that for the assessment years up to 2001-02, the unabsorbed depreciation
did not become part of the current year’s depreciation and was not to be
reduced from the net profit for the purposes of section 40(b) of the Act; in
short, it was not to be reduced from the book profit. It can be noticed that
the manner in which the unabsorbed depreciation is treated under the old
provision differed greatly from the manner in which it is treated under the
present provision. One of the glaring differences is that before the amendment
it was not being treated as part of the depreciation allowance for the current
year. Instead, it was required to be set off against the profits and gains of
business or profession separately. Sub-clause (a) of clause (iii) of the old
provision made this expressly clear by providing that unabsorbed depreciation
allowance was to be set off against the profits and gains of any business or
profession assessable for the subsequent assessment year as such and not as a
part of the depreciation allowance of that year. Further, the amount against
which the unabsorbed depreciation allowance was required to be set off was the
profits and gains of any business or profession carried on by the assessee and
assessable for that assessment year. The assessable profits and gains of any
business or profession for the purpose was necessarily the profits determined
after claiming all the permissible deductions, including remuneration to the
partners, subject to the limitations provided in section 40(b). Any other
interpretation or connotation was not possible; a contrary interpretation would
have needed an express provision to that effect which was not the case.

 

As a result, the
requirement under the then Explanation-3 to section 40(b) to compute the book
profit in the manner laid down in Chapter IV-D was to exclude the set-off of
unabsorbed depreciation. Any interpretation otherwise would have led to an
unworkable situation whereunder the amount of unabsorbed depreciation which
could have been set off would then be dependent upon the amount of the
deductible remuneration, and the amount of the deductible remuneration would in
turn be dependent upon the amount of unabsorbed depreciation that could be set
off.

 

Having analysed the
position under the old provision of section 32(2), let us consider the
objective of its substitution by the Finance Act, 2001 with effect from 1st
April, 2002. The Memorandum explaining the provisions of the Finance
Bill, 2001, which is reproduced below, explains the legislative intent behind
the amendment.

 

Modification of
provisions relating to allowance of depreciation

Under the
existing provision of sub-section (2) of section 32 of the Income-tax Act,
carry forward and set off of unabsorbed depreciation is allowed for 8
assessment years.

With a view to
enable the assessee to conserve sufficient funds to replace capital assets,
specially in an era where obsolescence takes place so often, the Bill proposes
to dispense with the restriction of 8 years for carry forward and set off of
unabsorbed depreciation.

 

It can be observed
that the limited purpose of substituting the provision of sub-section (2) of
section 32 was to relax the limitation of eight years over the carry forward of
unabsorbed depreciation. It is worth noting that in order to achieve this
objective, the old provision as it existed prior to its amendment by the
Finance (No. 2) Act, 1996, was being restored. Therefore, effectively, the
present provision of sub-section (2) of section 32 is the same as the provision
as it existed prior to its amendment by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1996. It was
only for the period starting from the assessment year 1997-98 to 2002-03 that
the provision was different.

 

In the context of
the old provision prevailing up to assessment year 1996-97, the Supreme Court
in the case of CIT vs. Mother India Refrigeration Industries (P) Ltd.
(1985) 155 ITR 711 has held as follows:

 

‘It is true that
proviso (b) to section 10(2)(vi) creates a legal fiction and under that fiction
unabsorbed depreciation either with or without current year’s depreciation is deemed to be
the current year’s depreciation but it is well settled that legal fictions are
created only for some definite purposes and these must be limited to that
purpose and should not be extended beyond that legitimate field. Clearly, the
avowed purpose of the legal fiction created by the deeming provision contained
in proviso (b) to section 10(2)(vi) is to make the unabsorbed carried forward
depreciation partake of the same character as the current depreciation in the
following year, so that it is available, unlike unabsorbed carried forward
business loss, for being set off against other heads of income of that year.
Such being the purpose for which the legal fiction is created, it is difficult
to extend the same beyond its legitimate field and will have to be confined to
that purpose.’

 

In view of these
observations of the Supreme Court and the legislative intent behind section
32(2), it can be inferred that the only purpose of deeming the unabsorbed
depreciation as the depreciation allowance of the current year, post amendment,
is limited to ensuring the benefit of its set off, irrespective of the number
of years, against any income, irrespective of the head of income under which it
falls. In other words the intention has never been to treat it as  part of the depreciation of the year.

 

Further, in a
situation where the assessee has both, i.e., unabsorbed depreciation and
business loss brought forward from earlier years, the set off of business loss
in terms of sections 72 or 73 needs to be given a preference over set-off of
unabsorbed depreciation as per section 72(2). This again confirms that the
unabsorbed depreciation is given a separate treatment than the business loss
and both are intended to be distinct and separate from each other. The Supreme
Court, in the case of CIT vs. Jaipuria China Clay Mines (P) Ltd. 59 ITR
555, had held that the reason for such order of allowance is as under:

 

‘The unabsorbed depreciation allowance is carried
forward under proviso (b) to section 10(2)(vi) of the 1922 Act and the method
of carrying it forward is to add it to the amount of the allowance of
depreciation in the following year and deeming it to be part of that allowance;
the effect of deeming it to be part of that allowance is that it falls in the
following year within clause (vi) and has to be deducted as allowance. If the
legislature had not enacted proviso (b) to section 24(2) of the 1922 Act, the
result would have been that depreciation allowance would have been deducted
first out of the profits and gains in preference to any losses which might have
been carried forward under section 24 of the 1922 Act, but as the losses can be
carried forward only for six years under section 24(2) of the 1922 Act, the
assessee would in certain circumstances have in his books losses which he would
not be able to set off. It seems that the legislature, in view of this gave a
preference to the deduction of losses first.’

 

The set off of
business loss is governed by section 72 which is part of Chapter VI and not
Chapter IV-D and, therefore, is not required to be considered while computing
the book profit for the purpose of section 40(b). Hence, it would be absurd and
contrary to the provisions to set off the unabsorbed depreciation first only
for the purpose of arriving at the book profit for the purpose of section
40(b), though unabsorbed depreciation is to be set off only after brought-forward
business losses are exhausted in accordance with section 72(2).

 

Further, if one
analyses the definition of book profits as contained in Explanation 3 to
section 40(b), it refers to ‘net profit, as shown in the profit and loss
account for the relevant previous year…’ 
Therefore, clearly, the intention is only to consider the profit of the
relevant year and not factor in adjustments permissible against such profits
relating to earlier years, such as unabsorbed depreciation.

 

The better view, in our considered opinion,
therefore is that the brought-forward depreciation should not be deducted while
computing the book profit for the purpose of
section 40(b).

Charitable purpose – Sections 2(15) and 12AA of ITA, 1961 – Registration – Cancellation of registration – Condition precedent – The assessee is hit by proviso to section 2(15) is not a ground for cancellation of registration

22. Goa Industrial Development Corporation vs. CIT [2020] 421 ITR 676 (Bom.) [2020] 116 taxmann.com 42 (Bom.) Date of order: 4th February, 2020

 

Charitable purpose – Sections 2(15) and 12AA of ITA, 1961 – Registration
– Cancellation of registration – Condition precedent – The assessee is hit by proviso
to section 2(15) is not a ground for cancellation of registration

 

The appellant is a statutory corporation established under the Goa,
Daman and Diu Industrial Development Corporation Act, 1965 (GIDC Act) with the
object of securing orderly establishment in industrial areas and industrial
estates and industries so that it results in the rapid and orderly
establishment, growth and development of industries in Goa. The appellant was
granted registration u/s 12A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on 16th
December, 1983 and the same continued until the making of the impugned orders
in these appeals. By an order dated 27th December, 2011, the
Commissioner of Income-tax withdrew the registration granted to the appellant
by observing that it is crystal clear that the activities of the appellant are
inter-connected and inter-woven with commerce or business. The Commissioner of
Income- tax has based its decision almost entirely on the proviso to
section 2(15) of the Income-tax Act which defines ‘charitable purpose’. This proviso
was introduced with effect from 1st April, 2009.

 

The Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the assessee.

 

The Bombay High Court allowed the appeal filed by the assessee and held
as under:

‘i)    The cancellation of registration has to be
initiated strictly in accordance with the provisions u/s 12AA(3) of the
Income-tax Act, 1961. The power of cancellation of registration can be
exercised by the Commissioner where the Commissioner is satisfied that the
activities of the trust or institution are not genuine or are not being carried
out in accordance with the objects of the trust or institution, as the case may
be. The powers u/s 12AA(3) cannot be exercised merely because the institution
in question may be covered under the proviso to section 2(15) after the
amendment, or that the income limit specified in the proviso is
exceeded.

 

ii)    There were no categorical
findings that the activities of the assessee were not genuine or were not in
accordance with the objects of the trust or the institution. Merely because, by
reference to the amended provisions in section 2(15), it may be possible to
contend that the activities of the assessee were covered under the proviso,
that, by itself, did not render the activities of the assessee as non-genuine
activities so as to entitle the Commissioner to exercise powers u/s 12AA(3).
The cancellation of registration was not valid.’

 

Cash credits (Bogus purchases) – Section 68 of ITA, 1961 – Assessee had declared certain purchases to be made during year and A.O. added entire quantum of purchases to income of assessee on plea that purchases were bogus purchases – Tribunal held that only reasonable profit at rate of 5% on purchases should be added back to income of assessee – Tribunal was justified in its view; A.Y.: 2010-11

21. Principal CIT vs. Rishabhdev Technocable Ltd. [2020] 115 taxmann.com 333 (Bom.) Date of order: 10th February, 2020 A.Y.: 2010-11

 

Cash credits (Bogus purchases) – Section 68 of ITA, 1961 – Assessee had
declared certain purchases to be made during year and A.O. added entire quantum
of purchases to income of assessee on plea that purchases were bogus purchases
– Tribunal held that only reasonable profit at rate of 5% on purchases should
be added back to income of assessee – Tribunal was justified in its view; A.Y.:
2010-11

 

The assessee is a company engaged in the business of manufacturing and
dealership of all kinds of industrial power controlling instrument cables and
related items. For the A.Y. 2010-11, the assessee filed return of income
declaring income of Rs. 1,35,31,757. The A.O. noticed that the Sales Tax
Department, Government of Maharashtra, had provided a list of persons who had
indulged in the unscrupulous act of providing bogus hawala entries and
purchase bills. The names of beneficiaries were also provided. The A.O. also
noticed that the assessee was one of the beneficiaries of such bogus hawala
bills. He referred to the purchases allegedly made by the assessee through four
hawala entries for the assessment year under consideration. He
disallowed the entire expenditure shown as incurred by the assessee on
purchases and made the addition.

 

The CIT(A) enhanced the quantum of such purchases from Rs. 24,18,06,385
to Rs. 65,65,30,470. The CIT(A) held that there can be no sales without
purchases. When the sales were accepted, then the corresponding purchases could
not be disallowed. Therefore, the CIT(A) held that only the profit element
embedded in the purchases would be subject to tax and not the entire purchase
amount. The CIT(A) added 2% of the purchase amount of Rs. 65,65,30,470 as
profit which worked out to Rs. 1,31,30,609 to the income of the assessee and
the balance addition was deleted. On appeal by the Revenue, the Tribunal
increased the profit element from 2% to 5% and increased the addition
accordingly.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of
the Tribunal and held as under:

 

‘i)     In Bholanath Polyfab
(P.) Ltd. (Supra), the Gujarat High Court was also confronted with a
similar issue. In that case the Tribunal was of the opinion that the purchases
might have been made from bogus parties but the purchases themselves were not
bogus. Considering the facts of the situation, the Tribunal was of the opinion
that not the entire amount of purchases but the profit margin embedded in such
amount would be subjected to tax. The Gujarat High Court upheld the finding of
the Tribunal. It was held that whether the purchases were bogus or whether the
parties from whom such purchases were allegedly made were bogus, was
essentially a question of fact. When the Tribunal had concluded that the
assessee did make the purchase, as a natural corollary not the entire amount
covered by such purchase but the profit element embedded therein would be
subject to tax.

 

ii)     We are in respectful
agreement with the view expressed by the Gujarat High Court.

 

iii)    Thus, we do not find any
merit in this appeal. No substantial question of law arises from the order
passed by the Tribunal. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed.’

Business expenditure – Allowability of (prior period expenses) – Section 37 of ITA, 1961 – Assessee had prior period income and prior period expenses – Assessee set off the two and offered only net amount of expenses for disallowance – A.O. disallowed the claim – Tribunal allowed the claim – No substantial question of law arose from Tribunal’s order; A.Y.: 2004-05

20. Principal CIT vs. Mazagon Dock Ltd. [2020] 116 taxmann.com 325 (Bom.) Date of order: 20th August, 2019 A.Y.: 2004-05

 

Business expenditure – Allowability of (prior period expenses) – Section
37 of ITA, 1961 – Assessee had prior period income and prior period expenses –
Assessee set off the two and offered only net amount of expenses for
disallowance – A.O. disallowed the claim – Tribunal allowed the claim – No
substantial question of law arose from Tribunal’s order; A.Y.: 2004-05

 

The assessee had prior period income and prior period expenses. The
assessee had set off the two and offered only the net amount of expenses for
disallowance. The A.O. did not accept the method of setting off of prior period
income with prior period expenses as claimed by the assessee and disallowed the
expenditure.

 

The Tribunal held that the assessee was justified in computing the
disallowance after setting off prior period income against the prior period
expenses. In fact, the Tribunal noted the fact that for the A.Y. 2007-08, the
Revenue had accepted the net income offered after set-off of prior period
income with prior period expenses. This is in that year where expenses of prior
period were less than prior period income. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s
claim.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the following question of law was raised:

 

‘Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law,
the Tribunal is correct in allowing the setting off of the prior period income
against the prior period expenditure without ascertaining the nexus between
income and expenditure?’

 

The Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as
under:

 

‘i)    We find that the view taken
by the Tribunal on the facts cannot be found fault with. This particularly as
the Revenue for a subsequent period accepted this practice of set-off, which
resulted in income and subjected it to tax. The basis / principles for allowing
the set-off of prior period income with prior period expenses has to be consistent
for years. Therefore, the view taken by the Tribunal cannot be faulted.

 

ii)    In view of the above, the
question as framed does not give rise to any substantial question of law. Thus,
not entertained.’

 

Business expenditure – Section 37 of ITA, 1961 – General principles – Difference between ascertained and contingent liability – Public sector undertaking – Provision for revision of pay by government committee – Liability not contingent – Provision deductible u/s 37 Income – Accrual of income – Principle of real income – Public sector undertaking – Amounts due as fees – Amounts included in accounts in accordance with directions of Comptroller and Auditor-General – Amounts had not accrued – Not assessable; A.Y.: 2007-08

19. Housing and Urban Development Corporation Ltd. vs.
Additional CIT [2020] 421 ITR 599 (Del. [2020] 115 taxmann.com 166 (Del.) Date of order: 6th February, 2020 A.Y.: 2007-08

 

Business expenditure – Section 37 of ITA, 1961 – General principles –
Difference between ascertained and contingent liability – Public sector
undertaking – Provision for revision of pay by government committee – Liability
not contingent – Provision deductible u/s 37

 

Income – Accrual of income – Principle of real income – Public sector
undertaking – Amounts due as fees – Amounts included in accounts in accordance
with directions of Comptroller and Auditor-General – Amounts had not accrued –
Not assessable; A.Y.: 2007-08

 

The assessee was a public sector undertaking. For the A.Y. 2007-08, it
claimed deduction of Rs. 1.60 crores on account of the provision for revision
of pay in its books of accounts. The deduction was made in the light of the Pay
Revision Committee appointed by the Government of India. The A.O. disallowed
the claim, holding that the expenditure was purely a provision against an
unascertained liability and could not be claimed as expenditure for the A.Y.
2007-08. The disallowance was upheld by the Tribunal.

 

The assessee was following the accrual or mercantile system of
accounting and was accounting the ‘fees’ as its revenue from the date of
signing of the loan agreement. The amount was finally realised from the loan
amount, when it was actually disbursed to the borrower. There were instances
when the loan agreement was signed and the borrower would not take the
disbursement and, accordingly, fees would not be realised. The Comptroller and
Auditor-General (CAG) objected to this on the ground that the accounting
treatment was not in accordance with the Accounting Standards issued by the
Institute of Chartered Accountants of India which provide guidance for
determination of income on accrual basis. The assessee assured the CAG that the
accounting policy was reviewed for the F.Y. 2006-07 and, accordingly, the Board
had approved the change in accounting policy in its meeting held on 27th
September, 2007. The revised accounting policy recognised the fees as on the
date of their realisation, instead of the date of signing of the loan
agreement. For the A.Y. 2007-08, the A.O. made an addition of Rs. 1.28 crores
on the ground that the change had resulted in understatement of profits and
also because the change was introduced after the closing of the financial year.
The addition was upheld by the Tribunal.

 

The Delhi High Court allowed the assessee’s appeal and held as under:

 

‘(i)   The position was that the
liability to pay revised wages had already arisen with certainty. The committee
was constituted for the purpose of wage revision. That the wages would be
revised was a foregone conclusion. Merely because the making of the report and
implementation thereof took time, it could not be said that there was no basis
for making the provision. The expenditure of Rs. 1.60 crores on account of
anticipated pay revision in the A.Y. 2007-08 was deductible.

 

(ii)   No income accrued at the
point of execution of agreement. The change in the accounting policy was a
result of the audit objection raised by the CAG. The assessee had claimed
deduction in profits in the computation of the total income and added it as
income in the subsequent assessment year, which had been accepted by the A.O.
The change was, thus, revenue-neutral. The addition of Rs. 1,28,00,000 was not
justified.’

Section 54 – Deduction in full is available to the assessee even when the new house property is purchased in the joint names of the assessee and others

6. 
Subbalakshmi Kurada vs. ACIT (Bangalore) N.V. Vasudevan (V.P.) and B.R. Baskaran
(A.M.) ITA No. 2493/Bang/2019 A.Y.: 2016-17 Date of order: 8th May, 2020 Counsel for Assessee / Revenue: V.
Srinivasan / Rajendra Chandekar

 

Section 54 –
Deduction in full is available to the assessee even when the new house property
is purchased in the joint names of the assessee and others

 

FACTS

The assessee had
sold a residential house property for a sum of Rs. 12.75 crores on 6th
November, 2015. She purchased another residential house property on 17th
February, 2016 for Rs. 11.02 crores.

 

The new house
property was purchased in the joint name of the assessee and her son. The
assessee claimed deduction of Rs. 8.47 crores u/s 54. Since the new residential
house property was purchased in the name of the assessee and her son, the A.O.
restricted the deduction u/s 54 to 50%, i.e., he allowed deduction to the extent
of Rs. 4.23 crores only. The CIT(A) also confirmed the same.

 

Before the
Tribunal, the Revenue supported the order passed by the CIT(A).

 

HELD

The Tribunal
observed that the entire consideration towards the purchase of the new
residential house had flown from the bank account of the assessee. It also
noted that the Karnataka High Court in the case of DIT (Intl.) vs. Mrs.
Jennifer Bhide (15 taxmann.com 82) had held that deduction u/s 54
should not be denied merely because the name of the assessee’s husband was
mentioned in the purchase document, when the entire purchase consideration had
flown from the assessee. Therefore, following the ratio laid down in the
said decision and the decision of the co-ordinate Bench in the case of Shri
Bhatkal Ramarao Prakash vs. ITO (ITA No. 2692/Bang/2018 dated 4th
January, 2019), the Tribunal held that the assessee was entitled to
full deduction of Rs. 8.47 crores u/s 54.

 

Sections 10(37) and 56(2)(viii) – Interest received u/s 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 treated as enhanced consideration not liable to tax

5.  Surender vs. Income-tax Officer (New Delhi) Sushma Chowla
(V.P.) and Dr. B.R.R. Kumar (A.M.) ITA No.
7589/Del/2018 A.Y.:
2013-14 Date of
order: 27th April, 2020 Counsel
for Assessee / Revenue: Sudhir Yadav / N.K. Choudhary

 

Sections 10(37) and 56(2)(viii) – Interest
received u/s 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 treated as enhanced
consideration not liable to tax

 

FACTS

The agricultural
land of the assessee was acquired by Haryana State Industrial and
Infrastructure Development Corporation Ltd. (‘HSIIDC’) u/s 4 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 (‘the Acquisition Act’). The HSIIDC had not paid the
compensation at the prevailing market rate, therefore the assessee filed an
appeal before the High Court for increase in compensation. The Court enhanced
the compensation which included Rs. 1.84 crores in interest u/s 28 of the
Acquisition Act. The assessee claimed that the amount so received was enhanced
consideration, hence exempt u/s 10(37). However, according to the A.O. as well
as the CIT(A), the amount so received could not partake the character of
compensation for acquisition of agricultural land. Hence, both held that the
sum so received was interest taxable u/s 56(2)(viii).

The question before
the Tribunal was whether the amount received can be treated as enhanced
consideration u/s 28 of the Acquisition Act and hence exempt u/s 10(37) as
claimed by the assessee, or u/s 34 of the Acquisition Act and hence taxable u/s
56(2)(viii) as held by the CIT(A).

 

HELD

The Tribunal
referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of
Income-tax, Faridabad vs. Ghanshyam (HUF) (Civil Appeal No. 4401 of 2009
decided on 16th July, 2009). As per that decision, section
28 of the Acquisition Act empowers the Court in its discretion to award
interest on the excess amount of compensation over and above what is awarded by
the Collector. It depends upon the claim by the assessee, unlike interest u/s
34 which depends upon and is to be paid for undue delay in making the award /
payment. The Apex Court in the said decision further observed that interest
awarded could either be in the nature of an accretion in the value of the lands
acquired, or interest for undue delay in payment. According to the Court,
interest u/s 28 of the Acquisition Act is an accretion to the value of the land
and thus it forms part of the enhanced compensation or consideration. On the
other hand, interest awarded u/s 34 of the Acquisition Act is interest paid for
a delay in payment of compensation.

 

Therefore, relying
on the decision of the Apex Court referred to above, the Tribunal held that
since the compensation payable to the assessee was increased u/s 28 of the
Acquisition Act as per the order of the High Court, the amount received by the
assessee was exempt u/s 10(37).

 

Section 194C r/w/s 40(a)(ia) – Even an oral contract is good enough to invoke section 194C – Payment of hire charges made by assessee to cab owners for hiring cabs for the purpose of providing transportation services to its customers would attract section 194C – Since payment is made by the assessee, the presumption would be that there was a contract for hiring of vehicles

12.
[2020] 116 taxmann.com 230 (Bang.) Singonahalli
Chikkarevanna Gangadharaiah vs. ACIT ITA No.
785/Bang/2018 A.Y.: 2014-15 Date of
order: 24th February, 2018

 

Section 194C r/w/s 40(a)(ia) – Even an oral
contract is good enough to invoke section 194C – Payment of hire charges made
by assessee to cab owners for hiring cabs for the purpose of providing
transportation services to its customers would attract section 194C – Since
payment is made by the assessee, the presumption would be that there was a
contract for hiring of vehicles

 

FACTS

The A.O. noticed
from the Profit & Loss account of the assessee that the assessee has debited
a sum of Rs. 6,18,73,785 for vehicle hire charges paid and Rs. 2,48,39,356 for
petrol and diesel expenses paid. The assessee was asked to produce details of
TDS on expenses. However, the assessee failed to do so.

 

Subsequently, the
assessee submitted the PAN cards from cab drivers and owners to whom hire
charges were paid and said that the cab drivers and owners were all regular
income tax payers and hence, as per section 194C, no TDS was made where PAN was
provided.

 

According to the
A.O., section 194C will only apply to a contractor engaged in the  business of plying, hiring or leasing goods
carriages – and not to a contractor engaged in the business of plying passenger
vehicles. Accordingly, the A.O. held that the assessee is liable to deduct
TDS and disallowed a sum of Rs. 6,18,73,785 for vehicle hire charges u/s
40(a)(ia) of the Act.

 

Aggrieved, the
assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the A.O.

 

HELD

Upon going through
the provisions of section 194C, the Tribunal held that there is no doubt that
the assessee in this case has made the payments of hire charges to cab owners.
As regards the contention of the assessee that the payments have not been made
in pursuance of any contract, the Tribunal held that a contract need not be in
writing; even an oral contract is good enough to invoke the provisions of
section 194C. The cab owners have received the payments from the assessee
towards the hiring charges, therefore, the presumption normally would be that
there was a contract for hiring of vehicles. Hence, if the assessee has made
the payment for hiring the vehicles, the provisions of section 194C are clearly
applicable.

 

The contract has to
be looked into party-wise, not on the basis of the individual. The Tribunal
held that all the payments made to a cab owner throughout the year are to be
aggregated to ascertain the applicability of the TDS provision as all the
payments pertain to a contract. A contract need not be in writing. It may infer
from the conduct of the parties. It may even be oral. The Tribunal also noted
that u/s 194C, sub-section (5) proviso thereto, if the aggregate amount
paid or credited to a person  exceeds Rs.
75,000, then the assessee shall be liable to deduct income tax at source.

 

The Tribunal then
discussed the amendment brought in by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2014 with effect
from 1st April, 2015 by virtue of which only 30% of any sum payable
to a resident is to be disallowed. It noted that in the present case the
authorities below have added the entire sum of Rs. 6,18,73,785 by disallowing
the whole amount. Though the substitution in section 40 has been made effective
from 1st April, 2015, in its view the benefit of the amendment
should be given to the assessee either by directing the A.O. to confirm from
the cab owners as to whether the said parties have deposited the tax or not,
and further restrict the addition to 30% of the disallowance. The Tribunal held
that it will be tied (sic) and meet the ends of justice if the
disallowance is only restricted to 30% of the amount liable for TDS u/s 194C.
Accordingly, this issue is partly allowed.

 

Following the decision of the Calcutta High Court in IT Appeal No.
302 of 2011, GA 3200/2011, CIT vs. Virgin Creations decided on 23rd
November, 2011, the Tribunal restored the issue to the file of the A.O.
with the direction that the assessee shall provide all the details to the A.O.
with regard to the recipients of the income and the taxes paid by them. The
A.O. shall carry out necessary verification in respect of the payments made to
the cab drivers and taxes paid on the same by the cab drivers and filing of
returns by the recipients. In case the A.O. finds that the recipient has duly
paid the taxes on the income, the addition made by the A.O. shall stand
deleted.

 

The appeal filed by
the assessee was partly allowed.

Section 54F – Even after amendment w.e.f. A.Y. 2015-16, investment of long-term capital gain in two bungalows located adjacent to each other and used as one residential unit qualifies for exemption u/s 54F – Benefit of exemption could not have been denied on reasoning that there were two different registries of buildings / properties as both properties purchased by assessee were a single property located in same geographical area

7. [2020] 114 taxmann.com 508 (Ahd.)(Trib.)

Mohammadanif Sultanali Pradhan vs. DCIT

ITA No. 1797/Ahd/2018

A.Y.: 2015-16

Date of order: 6th January, 2020

 

Section 54F – Even after amendment w.e.f. A.Y. 2015-16,
investment of long-term capital gain in two bungalows located adjacent to each
other and used as one residential unit qualifies for exemption u/s 54F –
Benefit of exemption could not have been denied on reasoning that there were
two different registries of buildings / properties as both properties purchased
by assessee were a single property located in same geographical area

 

FACTS

During the previous year relevant to the A.Y. 2015-16, the
assessee in his return of income declared income under the head capital gain at
Rs. 23,84,101 after claiming exemption u/s 54F for Rs. 1,08,00,000. In support
of the exemption claimed, the assessee contended that he has made investment in
two bungalows which are adjacent to each other, bearing Nos. 18 and 19 located
at survey No. 606/2, TPS No. 92, Sarkhej – Makarba – Okaf – Fatewadi of Mouje
Sarkhej, taluka Vejalpur, district Ahmedabad.

 

The A.O. was of the view that the assessee can claim
exemption u/s 54F with respect to the investment in one bungalow only.
Accordingly, he computed the exemption with respect to one bungalow only
amounting to Rs. 43,77,118 and thus disallowed the excess claim u/s 54F of Rs.
64,22,882.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) and
submitted that both the bungalows are in the same society, adjacent to each
other. As such both the bungalows are one unit for residential purposes.
Therefore, he claimed that he is entitled to deduction / exemption for both the
bungalows u/s 54F.

 

The CIT(A) rejected the claim of the assessee on the ground
that there is an amendment under the provisions of section 54F of the Act where
the expression previously used, ‘a residential house’, has been substituted
with ‘one residential house’. Such amendment is effective with effect from A.Y.
2015-16, i.e., the year under consideration.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

 

HELD

The Tribunal observed that:

(i) the
issue relates to whether the assessee is eligible for exemption u/s 54F of the
Act against the long-term capital gain for the investment made in the two
properties which are adjacent to each other and used as one residential unit.
It noted that indeed, the provision of the law requires that the exemption will
be available to the assessee u/s 54F for the investment in one residential
unit;

 

(ii) under
the provisions of section 54F, there is no definition / clarification provided
about the area of the residential property. It means that one assessee can buy
a huge bungalow / property of, say, one thousand square metres and can claim
the deduction subject to conditions. Similarly, another assessee acquired two
different residential properties adjacent to each other but both the properties
put together were only two hundred square metres – but he will be extended the
benefit of the exemption with respect to one unit only because there are two
different properties based on registry documents;

 

(iii) there can be a situation that the family of the assessee is quite
large, comprising of several members, and therefore he needs two properties
adjacent to each other to accommodate them. So from the point of view of the
assessee it is a single property but he got two different properties registered
as per the requirement of the builder;

 

(iv) the
assessee cannot be deprived of the benefit conferred under the statute merely
on the reasoning that there were two different registries of the buildings /
properties;

 

(v) it
is also not a case of the Revenue / assessee that both the properties purchased
by the assessee were located in different geographical areas. In such a
situation the law amended u/s 54F appears to be applicable where the assessee
buys two properties in two different areas;

 

(vi) the
principles laid down by the courts cannot be just brushed aside on the aspect
of defining one residential unit. It noted the observations of the Hon’ble High
Court of Karnataka in the case of CIT vs. D. Ananda Basappa [(2009) 309
ITR 329].

 

The Tribunal held that the assessee
is entitled to claim exemption u/s 54F in respect of investment made in two
adjacent bungalows used as one residential unit. The Tribunal deleted the
addition made by the A.O. and confirmed by the CIT(A).

 

This ground of appeal filed by the assessee was
allowed.

Section 56(2)(viib) – When there was no case of unaccounted money being brought in the garb of share premium, the provisions not attracted

11. Clearview Healthcare Pvt. Ltd. vs. ITO
(Delhi) Member: H.S. Sidhu (J.M.) ITA No. 2222/Del/2019 A.Y.: 2014-15 Date of order: 3rd January, 2020 Counsel for Assessee / Revenue: Kapil Goel /
Pradeep Singh Gautam

 

Section 56(2)(viib) – When there was no
case of unaccounted money being brought in the garb of share premium, the
provisions not attracted

 

FACTS

The issue before the Tribunal was about taxability or otherwise of share
premium received on shares issued by the assessee company u/s 56(2)(viib). The
assessee was incorporated on 29th January, 2010. During the year
under appeal, the company had issued shares at premium. According to the AO,
the difference between the share premium received and the share valuation
determined under Rule 11UA amounting to Rs. 9.20 lakhs was the income of the
assessee as per the provisions of section 56(2)(viib). On appeal, the CIT(A)
confirmed the AO’s order.

 

Before the Tribunal, the assessee referred to the Explanatory Memorandum
to the Finance Act, 2012 and contended that the legislative intent was to apply
the said provisions only where, in the garb of share premium, money was
received which was not clean and was unaccounted. According to the assessee,
the lower authorities have applied the provisions of section 56(2)(viib)
without any finding that the money was not clean money. It was also pointed out
that in the subsequent year, on 1st December, 2014, the company’s
shares were sold by one of its shareholders to a non-resident at a price which
was higher than the price at which the shares were issued by the company. And
the said price was accepted by the tax authorities in the shareholder’s tax
assessment.

HELD

The Tribunal agreed with the assessee that the provisions of section
56(2)(viib) would apply only when money received was not clean and was
unaccounted money, received in the garb of share premium as mentioned in the
Explanatory Memorandum to the Finance Act, 2012.

 

According to the
Tribunal, a subsequent transaction with a foreign buyer which was at a higher
amount and on the basis of detailed due diligence, also justified that the
share premium received by the assessee was not excessive and was fair.

 

Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case and by applying
the principles from the decision of the Chennai Tribunal in the case of Lalithaa
Jewellery Mart Pvt. Ltd. (ITA Nos. 663, 664 and 665/Chennai/2019
decided on 14th June, 2019) and legislative intent behind
the insertion of section 56(2)(viib), the Tribunal held that the addition made
by the AO on account of alleged excess share premium was unjustified when those
very shares were sold in the next financial year at a much higher amount after
proper due diligence to a non-resident buyer; and further there was no case of
unaccounted money being brought in in the garb of the stated share premium,
hence the addition made u/s 56(2)(vii) was deleted.

Proviso to section 2(15) r/w/s 11 and 12 – As part of running an educational institution and imparting training to the students, the assessee had undertaken research projects for the industry and earned consultancy fees from them – Since the dominant object was to impart education, the proviso to section 2(15) does not apply

10. Institute of Chemical Technology vs. ITO
(Mum.) Members: Saktijit Dey (J.M.) and Rifaur Rahman
(A.M.) I.T.A. Nos. 6111 and 6922/Mum/2016 A.Ys: 2011-12 and 2012-13 Date of order: 15th January, 2020 Counsel for Revenue / Assessee: Nishant Thakkar
and Jasmine Amalsadwala / Kumar Padmapani Bora

 

Proviso to
section 2(15) r/w/s 11 and 12 – As part of running an educational institution
and imparting training to the students, the assessee had undertaken research
projects for the industry and earned consultancy fees from them – Since the
dominant object was to impart education, the proviso to section 2(15)
does not apply

 

FACTS

The assessee was
established as the Department of Chemical Technology by the University of
Bombay on 1st October, 1933. With the passage of time, the assessee
was granted autonomy and subsequently got converted into an independent
institution in January, 2002. In September, 2008 the assessee was granted
deemed university status. When the assessee was a part of Mumbai (earlier
Bombay) University, the income earned by it formed part of the income of Mumbai
University and was exempt u/s 10(23C). For the impugned assessment years, the
assessee in its return of income declared nil income after claiming exemption
u/s 11.

 

During the year
under consideration the assessee had received consultancy fees. Applying the
provisions of section 2(15) read with 
sections 11 and 12, the AO disallowed its claim of exemption with regard
to the consultancy fee received. The assessee’s claim of exemption u/s 11 in
respect of other income was allowed by the AO.

 

The assessee explained that as a part of the curriculum and with a view that the students / fellows of the Institution gain
actual working experience, the assessee had undertaken research projects for
the industry and earned consultancy fees from the industry clients. Out of the
fees received, only 1/3rd amount was retained by the assessee and
the balance amount was paid to the faculty who undertook the research projects.
The amount retained by the assessee was mainly to cover the cost of
infrastructure / laboratory facilities provided for undertaking the research
and administrative expenditure. Thus, it was submitted, the activities undertaken
by the assessee were not in the nature of business but only for research and
training purposes and therefore were part of its main activity of imparting
education on the latest technical developments in the field of chemical
technology. However, the AO didn’t agree with the explanation offered by the
assessee.

 

Relying on the
decision of the Tribunal in the assessee’s own case for the assessment year
2010-11, the Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the disallowance / addition made by
the AO.

 

Before the Tribunal,
the assessee submitted that in respect of the aforesaid decision of the
Tribunal relied on by the CIT(A), the Tribunal had no occasion to consider the
assessee’s argument that the proviso to section 2(15) was not
applicable. According to the assessee, the proviso to section 2(15)
would be applicable only when the activity was for ‘advancement of any other
object of general public utility’. The assessee contended that the
consultancy service provided was part of its educational activity, therefore ancillary
and incidental to its main object of providing education. Therefore, even
though the assessee had received consultancy fee, the same was received in
furtherance of its object of educational activity, hence it cannot be treated
as an activity in the nature of trade, commerce or business and thereby treat
the same as for a non-charitable purpose.

 

HELD

The Tribunal agreed
with the assessee that applicability or otherwise of the proviso to
section 2(15) in the case of the assessee was not examined or dealt with by the
Tribunal in A.Y. 2010–11. According to it, the contention of the assessee
regarding applicability of the proviso to section 2(15) does require
examination keeping in view the decision of the Bombay High Court in DIT(E.)
vs. Lala Lajpatrai [2016] 383 ITR 345, wherein the Court held that the
test to determine as to what would be a charitable purpose within the meaning
of section 2(15) was to ascertain what was the dominant object / activity.
According to the Court, if the dominant object was the activity of providing
education, it will be charitable purpose under section 2(15) even though some
profit arose from such activity. Since the aforesaid claim of the assessee was
not examined by the Departmental authorities, the Tribunal restored the matter
to the file of the AO for re-examination and directed him to adjudicate the
issue keeping in view the additional evidence filed by the assessee and the
decisions cited before him.

 

Note: Before the Tribunal, the assessee had also alternatively claimed
exemption under sections 10(23C)(iiiab) and / or 10(23C)(vi) and furnished
additional evidence. The Tribunal directed the AO to also consider the same.

Section 80P(4): Provisions of section 80P(4) exclude only co-operative banks and the same cannot be extended to co-operative credit societies

20. [2019] 107 taxmann.com 53
(Trib.)(Ahd.)(SB) ACIT vs. People’s Co-op. Credit Society Ltd. ITA Nos. 1311, 2668 to 2670, 2865, 2866,
2871 & 2905 (Ahd.) of 2012 A.Ys.: 2007-08 to 2009-10 Date of order: 18th April, 2019

 

Section 80P(4):
Provisions of section 80P(4) exclude only co-operative banks and the same
cannot be extended to co-operative credit societies

FACTS

The assessee, a
co-operative credit society, providing credit facilities to its members and
carrying on banking business, claimed deduction u/s 80P(2)(a)(i). The AO
disallowed the same holding that provisions of section 80P(4) are applicable to
the assessee.

 

Aggrieved, the
assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who allowed the appeal.

 

The Revenue then
preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

 

HELD

In view of the
contrary decisions by various benches of the Tribunal, a Special Bench (SB) was
constituted by the President to consider the question whether a co-operative
credit society is to be considered as a co-operative bank and whether by virtue
of the provisions of section 80P(4), a co-operative credit society shall be
disentitled to claim deduction u/s 80P(2)(a)(i).

 

At the time of
hearing before the Tribunal, the learned representatives agreed that the issues
before the SB of the Tribunal are now covered in favour of the assessee by
various decisions of the Hon’ble Jurisdictional High Court – including in the
cases of Pr. CIT vs. Ekta Co-operative Credit Society Ltd. [2018] 91
taxmann.com 42/254, Taxman 33/402 ITR 85 
and CIT vs. Jafari Momin Vikas Co-operative Credit Society
Ltd. [2014] 49 taxmann.com 571/227, Taxman 59 (Mag.) 362 ITR 331 (Guj.).

 

The Tribunal, having considered the ratio of the decisions of the
Jurisdictional High Court in the cases of Pr. CIT vs. Ekta Co-operative
Credit Society Ltd. (Supra) and CIT vs. Jafari Momin Vikas
Co-operative Credit Society Ltd. (Supra), held that the legal position
is quite clear and unambiguous. As held by the Jurisdictional High Court, the
benefit of section 80P(2)(a)(i) cannot be denied in the case of co-operative
credit societies in view of their function of providing credit facilities to
the members and the same are not hit by the provisions of section 80P(4).

 

The appeals filed
by the Revenue were dismissed.

Rule 37BA(3) r/w/s 199: Credit for Tax Deducted at Source has to be allowed in the year in which the corresponding income is assessed even though the tax is deposited by the deductor in the subsequent assessment year

19. [2019] 112 taxmann.com 354 (Trib.)(Pune) Mahesh Software Systems (P) Ltd. vs. ACIT ITA No. 1288/Pune/2017 A.Y.: 2011-12 Date of order: 20th September, 2019

Rule 37BA(3) r/w/s 199: Credit for Tax Deducted at Source has to be allowed in the year in which the corresponding income is assessed even though the tax is deposited by the deductor in the subsequent assessment year

FACTS
The assessee raised an invoice and offered to tax income arising therefrom in March, 2011. The assessee claimed credit for tax deducted thereon. However, the deductor deposited TDS only in April, 2011, i.e., in the succeeding financial year. Consequently, the TDS claimed by the assessee did not appear in Form 26AS for the year in which the income was booked. The AO, relying on sub-rule (1) of Rule 37BA, did not allow the credit in A.Y. 2011-12.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who confirmed the order of the AO.

The assessee then filed an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD
The Tribunal observed that the AO had relied on sub-rule (1) of Rule 37BA for denying the benefit of TDS during the year under consideration. It provides that credit for TDS shall be given to the person to whom payment has been made or credit has been given on the basis of information furnished by the deductor. Thus, what is material for sub-rule (1) is the beneficiary of credit and not the time when credit ought to be allowed. The CIT(A), in addition, had relied on sub-rule (4) of Rule 37BA which again provides that credit for TDS shall be granted on the basis of information relating to TDS furnished by the deductor.

The Tribunal observed that the point of time at which the benefit of TDS is to be given is governed by  sub-rule (3) of Rule 37BA which very clearly provides that – ‘credit for tax deducted at source and paid to the Central Government, shall be given for the assessment year for which such income is assessable.’

In view of the above, the Tribunal held that the credit of TDS had to be allowed in the year under consideration even though the TDS was deposited by the deductor in the subsequent assessment year.

The Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by the assessee.

Section 142A(6): It is mandatory for the Valuation Officer to submit the Valuation Report within six months from the date of receipt of the reference – Delay in filing the report cannot be condoned

18. [2019] 75 ITR (Trib.) 219 (Hyd.) Shri Zulfi Revdjee vs. ACIT ITA No. 2415/Hyd/2018 A.Y.: 2013-14 Date of order: 5th September,
2019

 

Section 142A(6): It is mandatory for the
Valuation Officer to submit the Valuation Report within six months from the date
of receipt of the reference – Delay in filing the report cannot be condoned

 

FACTS

The assessee sold a
property during F.Y. 2012-13. He filed the return of income disclosing capital
gains arising from the sale of the said property. The AO sought to make an
addition u/s 50C of the Act. However, since the assessee objected to it, he
referred the file to the Departmental Valuation Officer (DVO) for valuation of
the property. The DVO submitted the report after the expiry of the period
stipulated u/s 142A(6). Further, he also considered the value of the house as
on the date of registration of agreement. The assessee, inter alia,
raised an objection that the report submitted by the DVO is beyond the
stipulated time limit of six months, as specified u/s 142A(6), and consequently
the assessment is barred by limitation.

 

The assessee
preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who dismissed the appeal. Aggrieved, the
assessee filed an appeal to the Tribunal.

 

HELD

The Tribunal
observed that u/s 142A the valuation report by the DVO has to be submitted
within six months from the date of receipt of the reference. However, the DVO
submitted his report after 15 months from the end of the month in which
reference was made to him. The Tribunal considered whether the time limit for
submission of report could be enlarged or condoned. It noted that the word used
in sub-section (6) of section 142A is ‘shall’, while in other sub-sections it
is ‘may’. In B.K. Khanna & Co. vs. Union of India and others, the
Delhi High Court [156 ITR 796 (Del.)] has held that where the words
‘may’ and ‘shall’ are used in various provisions of the same section, then both
of them contain different meanings and the word ‘shall’ shall mean ‘mandatory’.
In sub-section (6), since the word ‘shall’ is used, the time limit specified
therein is mandatory and, thus, delay cannot be condoned. The Tribunal held
that the report of the DVO had to be filed within the time limit prescribed
under section 142A(6) and, thus, the Assessment Order passed on the basis of
the DVO’s report is not sustainable.

 

The Tribunal
allowed this ground of appeal filed by the assessee.

 

Section 10AA – Profit of eligible unit u/s 10AA should be allowed without set-off of loss of other units

2.      
Genesys
International Corporation Limited vs. DCIT –-Mum.

Members: G. Manjunatha (A.M.) and Ravish Sood (J.M.)

ITA No. 7574/Mum/2019

A.Y.: 2011-12

Date of order: 4th March, 2020

Counsel for Assessee / Revenue:
V. Chandrasekhar & Harshad Shah / V. Vinod Kumar

 

Section 10AA – Profit of eligible unit u/s 10AA should be
allowed without set-off of loss of other units

 

FACTS

The assessee had filed its
return of income declaring total loss at Rs. 3.20 crores. The assessment was
completed u/s 143(3) determining the total loss at Rs. 1.68 crores. The case
was subsequently reopened u/s 147 and the assessment was completed u/s 143(3)
r.w.s. 147 determining the total income at Nil
after set-off of loss from business against profit of eligible unit
u/s 10AA.

 

Before the CIT(A) the assessee, relying on the decision of
the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Yokogawa India Ltd. (2017) 77
taxmann.com 41, contended that the profit of the eligible unit u/s 10AA
should be allowed without set-off of loss of other units. The CIT(A) rejected
the arguments of the assessee on the ground that the findings of the Supreme
Court were based on the computation of deduction provided u/s 10A, not on
computation of deduction provided u/s 10AA.

 

Revenue submitted before the Tribunal that the CIT(A) had
clearly distinguished the decision of the Supreme Court and, hence, the
findings of the Supreme Court are not applicable.

 

HELD

Referring to the decisions
of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Yokogawa India Ltd. and
of the Bombay High Court in the case of Black & Veatch Consulting
Pvt. Ltd. (348 ITR 72), the Tribunal held that the sum and substance of
the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court and the Bombay High Court is
that the profit of eligible units claiming deduction u/s 10A / 10AA, shall be
allowed without setting off of losses of other units. Therefore, it was held
that the lower authorities erred in set-off of loss of business from the profit
of eligible units claiming deduction u/s 10AA before allowing deduction
provided u/s 10AA. Accordingly, the appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

Section 54 / 54F – Exemption not denied when the property was purchased in the name of the spouse instead of the assessee Two conflicting High Court decisions – In case of transfer of case between two jurisdictions, the date of filing of appeal is the material point of time which determines jurisdictional High Court

1.       Ramphal
Hooda vs. Income Tax Officer (Delhi)

Members: Bhavnesh Saini
(J.M.) and
Dr. B.R.R. Kumar (A.M.)

ITA No. 8478/Del/2019

A.Y.: 2014-15

Date of order: 2nd
March, 2020

Counsel for Assessee /
Revenue: Ved Jain & Umung Luthra / Sanjay Tripathi

 

Section 54 / 54F – Exemption not denied when the property
was purchased in the name of the spouse instead of the assessee

Two conflicting High Court decisions – In case of transfer
of case between two jurisdictions, the date of filing of appeal is the material
point of time which determines jurisdictional High Court

 

FACTS

During the year the assessee had earned long-term capital
gain of Rs. 1.42 crores on the sale of property. This gain had been invested in
purchasing another property for Rs. 1.57 crores in the name of his wife. The
assessee claimed exemption of long-term capital gains u/s 54 / 54F. Relying on
the judgment of the jurisdictional High Court, i.e., the Punjab and Haryana
High Court, in the case of CIT Faridabad vs. Dinesh Verma (ITA No. 381 of
2014 dated 6th July, 2015) wherein it was held that ‘the
assessee is not entitled to the benefit conferred u/s 54B if the subsequent
property is purchased by a person other than the assessee…’ the A.O. had
denied the exemption.

 

It was submitted before the CIT(A) that the case of the
assessee is covered by the judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT
vs. Kamal Wahal (351 ITR 4) wherein, on identical facts, the issue had
been decided in favour of the assessee. The CIT(A), however, noted that the
assessee had filed the return with the ITO, Rohtak and the assessment was also
framed at Rohtak. Therefore, the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court
was binding on the assessee and the A.O. Accordingly, the appeal of the
assessee was dismissed.

 

The assessee submitted before the Tribunal that his PAN was
transferred from Rohtak to Delhi because he was residing in Delhi. The case of
the assessee had also been transferred to Delhi, therefore the jurisdictional
High Court should be the Delhi High Court. He relied upon the judgment of the Delhi
High Court in the case of CIT vs. AAR BEE Industries [2013] 357 ITI 542
wherein it was held that ‘It is the date on which the appeal is filed which
would be the material point of time for considering as to in which court the
appeal is to be filed’. He further pointed out that the appeal of the
assessee had been decided by the CIT(A)-28, New Delhi and the address of the
assessee was also in Delhi. Therefore, it was submitted that the Delhi High
Court is the jurisdictional High Court and its decisions are binding on the
CIT(A).

 

HELD

The Tribunal noted that the jurisdiction and PAN
of the assessee had been transferred to Delhi and the appeal was also decided
by the CIT(A), New Delhi. Therefore, the Tribunal accepted the submission of
the assessee and held that the CIT(A) was bound to follow the judgments of the
Delhi High Court. Accordingly, relying on the judgments of the Delhi High Court
in the cases of CIT-XII vs. Shri Kamal Wahal (Supra) and of CIT
vs. Ravinder Kumar Arora [2012] 342 ITR 38, the Tribunal allowed the
appeal of the assessee.

Section 143(2) – The statutory notice u/s 143(2) of the Act issued by the non-jurisdictional A.O. is void ab initio – If there are discrepancies in the details as per notice issued and details as per postal tracking report, then that cannot be considered as valid service of notice

5.       [2019]
76 ITR (Trib.) 107 (Del.)

Rajeev Goel vs. ACIT

ITA No. 1184/Del/2019

A.Y.: 2014-15

Date of order: 26th September, 2019

 

Section 143(2) – The statutory notice u/s 143(2) of the Act
issued by the non-jurisdictional A.O. is void ab initio – If there are
discrepancies in the details as per notice issued and details as per postal
tracking report, then that cannot be considered as valid service of notice

 

FACTS

The assessee’s case was selected for scrutiny by issuing
statutory notice u/s 143(2). The notice was issued by the non-jurisdictional
A.O., i.e., A.O. Circle 34(1), and without any order u/s 127 for transfer of
the case from one A.O. to another. Without prejudice to the assessee’s
contention that the notice was issued by non-jurisdictional A.O., notice u/s
143(2) was not served upon the assessee. While serving notice u/s 143(2), there
were discrepancies in the address stated in the notice and the address
mentioned in the tracking report of the post. The address mentioned in the
notice was with Pin Code 110034 and the Pin Code as per the tracking report was
110006.

 

The assessee had filed an affidavit before the A.O. claiming
that no notice u/s 143(2) was served upon him. He had produced all possible
evidences to prove that there were discrepancies while serving the said notice
and also that the assessment was initiated by non-jurisdictional A.O. These
contentions were not accepted by the A.O.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A)
claiming that the statutory notice u/s 143(2) was issued by the
non-jurisdictional A.O. and, thus, the assessment was void ab initio.
Without prejudice to this, the statutory notice u/s 143(2) was not validly
served upon the assessee. The CIT(A) held that the notice was served upon the
assessee and the assessee had failed to raise objections within the stipulated
period prescribed u/s 124(3) of the Act and hence dismissed the assessee’s
appeal.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

 

HELD

The Tribunal observed that there was a difference between the
address mentioned in the PAN database and the address mentioned in the return
of income filed by the assessee. The jurisdiction of the assessee as per his
address in the PAN database was with the A.O. Ward 39(1), whereas the
jurisdiction of the assessee as per his address in his return of income was
with A.O. Circle 47(1). However, the notice was issued by the A.O. Circle 34(1)
who had no jurisdiction over the assessee either on the basis of his
residential address or on the basis of his business address. Further, no order
u/s 127 of the Act was passed either by the Commissioner of Circle 34(1), or
the Commissioner of Circle 47(1) for transfer of the case from one A.O. to
another A.O. Thus, the notice issued by the A.O. Circle 34(1) was held to be void
ab initio as it was issued by the non-jurisdictional A.O.

 

Further, the Tribunal observed that even if the notice u/s
143(2) issued by the A.O. Circle 34(1) was considered to be valid, the notice
was not duly served upon the assessee. The address mentioned in the notice was
one of Delhi with Pin Code 110034, whereas the notice had been delivered to a
Delhi address with Pin Code 110006. As regards service of notice, the assessee
had filed an affidavit before the A.O. Circle 47(1) claiming that no notice u/s
143(2) was served upon him. The assessee had produced all possible evidences to
prove that there were discrepancies while serving notice u/s 143(2). Besides,
there was also a difference in the name mentioned in the notice which was
Rajeev Goel, whereas that mentioned in the tracking report was Ranjeev Goel.
Hence, on the basis of the aforementioned discrepancies, the notice was held to
be not validly served upon the assessee.

 

The Tribunal decided this ground of appeal in
favour of the assessee.

Section 153(1) r/w clause (iv) of Explanation 1 – Extension of time is provided to complete the assessment in a case where A.O. makes reference to the Valuation Officer only u/s 142A(1) – Where a reference is made to the Valuation Officer u/s 55A or 50C, there is no extension of time to complete the assessment

4.       [2019]
76 ITR (Trib.) 135 (Luck.)

Naina Saluja vs. DCIT

ITA No. 393/LKW/2018

A.Y.: 2013-14

Date of order: 25th October, 2019

 

Section 153(1) r/w clause (iv) of Explanation 1 – Extension
of time is provided to complete the assessment in a case where A.O. makes
reference to the Valuation Officer only u/s 142A(1) – Where a reference is made
to the Valuation Officer u/s 55A or 50C, there is no extension of time to
complete the assessment

 

FACTS

The assessee had sold her
two properties and derived income under the head ‘Capital Gains’ during the
relevant A.Y. 2013-14. While computing long-term capital gain, the assessee had
worked out the cost of acquisition on the basis of the circle rates as on 1st
April, 1981. For this purpose, the A.O. had referred the matter to the
Valuation Officer for estimating the correct fair market value of the properties
as on that date. In the meanwhile, the assessee had challenged the Stamp Duty
Value adopted and requested to refer the matter to the Valuation Cell for
valuation of the property as on the date of transfer. As the transaction was
falling under ‘capital gains’, the reference made by the A.O. to the Valuation
Officer was u/s 55A and the reference made by the assessee for valuation was
u/s 50C. The A.O. had received the second valuation report on 21st
March, 2016 and had thereafter called for objections from the assessee on the
second valuation report. The A.O. concluded the assessment and passed an
assessment order on 19th May, 2019 making an addition to the capital
gains on the basis of the said valuation report.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A)
claiming that the assessment completed was beyond the time period prescribed in
section 153 of the Act and, thus, the assessment order was barred by
limitation. However, the CIT(A) held that both the references were made u/s
142A of the Act and thereby concluded that the assessment order was not barred
by limitation. The CIT(A) upheld the assessment order and dismissed the
assessee’s appeal.

 

The assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

 

HELD

The Tribunal observed that the reference to the Valuation
Officer u/s 142A can be made for the purpose of assessment or reassessment
where the valuation is required for the purpose of section 69, 69A, 69B or
section 56(2), whereas the references u/s 55A or u/s 50C are specific for the
purpose of computation of capital gains. The provisions of section 142A do not
govern the provisions of computation of capital gains.

 

The first reference to the Valuation Officer was made for
ascertaining the value of the asset as on 1st April, 1981 when it
was sold, and the second reference was made for valuation of property as on the
date of transfer which can only be made under the provisions of section 50C(2)
of the Act. Thus, neither of the references was made u/s 142A of the Act.

 

Further, as per the provision of section 153(1) r/w
Explanation 1, the provision for extension of time for completing the
assessment is available only if the reference is made to the Valuation Officer
u/s 142A. There is no provision for extension of time for completing the
assessment in case the reference is made u/s 55A or u/s 50C. Hence, the
assessment order was to be passed by 31st March, 2016 for the
relevant assessment year. The assessment order was, however, passed on 19th
May, 2016 which was beyond the period of limitation, hence the Tribunal quashed
the assessment order.

 

The Tribunal decided this ground of appeal in
favour of the assessee.

I.Section 194H – Benefit extended by assessee to the distributor under an agreement for supply of mobile phones cannot be treated as commission liable for deduction of tax at source u/s 194H as the relationship between the assessee and the distributor was not of a principal and agent II.Section 37 – Expenditure incurred on Trade Price Protection to counter changes in price of handsets by competitors, life of model, etc. was incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business and was an allowable expenditure u/s 37(1)

11.
[2020] 114 taxmann.com 442 (Delhi) Nokia
India (P) Ltd. vs. DCIT ITA Nos.:
5791 & 5845(Del)2015 A.Y.:
2010-11 Date of
order: 20th February, 2020

 

I.   Section 194H – Benefit extended by assessee
to the distributor under an agreement for supply of mobile phones cannot be
treated as commission liable for deduction of tax at source u/s 194H as the
relationship between the assessee and the distributor was not of a principal
and agent

 

II.  Section 37 – Expenditure
incurred on Trade Price Protection to counter changes in price of handsets by
competitors, life of model, etc. was incurred wholly and exclusively for the
purpose of business and was an allowable expenditure u/s 37(1)

 

FACTS I

The assessee
company had extended certain benefits / post-sale discounts to the
distributors. These discounts / trade offers did not form part of the agreement
between the assessee and the distributors. The A.O. disallowed the expenditure
u/s 40(a)(ia) considering the fact that no TDS u/s 194H was deducted from these
amounts.

 

HELD I

Upon perusal of the
agreement, the Tribunal observed that the relationship between the assessee and
HCL is that of principal to principal and not that of principal and agent. The
Tribunal held that the discount which was offered to distributors is given for
promotion of sales. This element cannot be treated as commission. There is
absence of  principal-agent relationship
and the benefit extended to distributors cannot be treated as commission u/s
194H of the Act.

 

As regards the applicability of section 194J, the A.O. has not given any
reasoning or finding that there is payment for technical service liable for withholding
u/s 194J. Marketing activities had been undertaken by HCL on its own. Merely
making an addition u/s 194J without the actual basis for the same on the part
of the A.O. is not just and proper.

 

As regards the
contention of the Revenue that discounts were given by way of debit notes and
the same were not adjusted or mentioned in the invoice generated upon original
sales made by the assessee, the Tribunal observed that this contention does not
seem tenable after going through the invoice and the debit notes. In fact,
there is clear mention of the discount for sales promotion.

 

The Tribunal
allowed this ground of appeal and deleted the addition made.

 

FACTS II

The assessee
company had incurred certain expenditure on Trade Price Protection which was
extended to distributors to counter changes in the price of handsets by
competitors, protect them against probable loss, etc. The A.O. had disallowed
the expenditure questioning the commercial expediency involved in incurring the
same.

 

HELD II

The Tribunal held
that the expenditure can be treated as being incurred on account of commercial
expediency considering the modern-day technological changes which are very
fast. It observed that as per the submission made before the A.O., this
expenditure had been covered in a special clause in the Trade Schemes filed.
The Tribunal further held that expenditure incurred for Trade Price Protection
was allowed as deduction since the same was considered as being incurred wholly
and exclusively for the purpose of business.

This ground of
appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

Section 10(13A), Rule 2(h) of Fourth Schedule – For the purpose of computing qualifying amount u/s 10(13A) of the Act, the amount received as performance bonus does not assume character of salary

17. [2020] 113
taxmann.com 295 (Trib.)(Kol.) Sudip Rungta vs.
DCIT ITA No.
2370/Kol/2017 A.Y.: 2011-12 Date of order: 10th
January, 2020

 

Section 10(13A), Rule 2(h) of Fourth Schedule – For the purpose of
computing qualifying amount u/s 10(13A) of the Act, the amount received as
performance bonus does not assume character of salary

 

FACTS

The assessee was a salaried employee who, for the year under
consideration, filed his return of income declaring total income of Rs.  2,61,97,296. During the year under
consideration, he had received a basic salary of Rs. 30,00,000 and performance
bonus of Rs. 1,50,00,000. In the return he had claimed exemption of HRA of Rs.
8,47,742. The AO called for details of the rent paid and calculation of the
amount of exemption. In response, the assessee submitted that the total rent
paid during the year was Rs. 8,20,000 and for the purposes of computing
exemption, only the basic salary had been regarded as ‘salary’.

 

The AO held that
‘performance bonus’ is covered under the term ‘salary’ as per the meaning
assigned to the definition of ‘salary’ for the purpose of calculating exemption
u/s 10(13A). ‘Performance bonus’ cannot be comprehended as an allowance or
perquisite as defined in Rule 2(h) of the Fourth Schedule to be excluded from
the purview of ‘salary’. Thus, the assessee’s total salary for computation of
exemption u/s 10(13A) for the year under assessment comes to Rs. 30,00,000 plus
Rs. 1,50,00,000, which totals Rs. 1,80,00,000; and 10% of this comes to Rs.
18,00,000. Since the assessee has paid rent of Rs. 8,20,000 which is much less
than the amount of Rs. 18,00,000, the assessee is not entitled to any benefit u/s
10(13A) of the Act. Thus, the AO denied the benefit u/s 10(13A) of the Act.

 

Aggrieved, the
assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A), who only confirmed the action of
the AO.

 

The assessee then
preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where it was submitted that clause (h) of
Rule 2A  specifically provides that
‘salary’ includes dearness allowance if the terms of employment so provide, but
excludes all other allowances and perquisites. Accordingly, the performance bonus
received by the appellant did not form part of ‘salary’ for the purposes of
computing exemption u/s 10(13A) of the Act.

 

HELD

The Tribunal noted
that the decision of the Hon’ble Kerala High Court in the case of CIT vs.
B. Ghosal (125 ITR 444) is on identical facts wherein on the same set
of facts, the Court had held that ‘performance bonus’ does not form part of
‘salary’ as defined in clause (h) of Rule 2A for the purposes of section
10(13A) of the Income tax Act, 1961.

 

Considering the facts narrated above, the Tribunal noted that total rent
paid by the assessee during the year is Rs. 8,20,000. The basic salary for the
purpose of computation of house rent disallowance is Rs. 3,00,000 (10% of Rs.
30,00,000 being basic salary). Therefore, excess of rent paid over 10% of
salary is Rs. 5,20,000 (Rs. 8,20,000 minus Rs. 3,00,000). Therefore, the
assessee is entitled for house rent allowance at Rs. 5,20,000 u/s 10(13A) of
the Act. The AO is directed to allow the exemption of HRA at Rs. 5,20,000.

 

The Tribunal
allowed the appeal filed by the assessee.

 

ITP-3(1)(4) vs. M/s Everlon Synthetics Pvt. Ltd. [ITA No. 6965/Mum/2013; Date of order: 23rd May, 2016; A.Y.: 2006-07; Mum. ITAT] Section 147: Reassessment – Within four years – Regular assessment u/s 143(3) – Issue of one-time settlement with bank and consequential relief granted by the bank was discussed and deliberated by the AO – Reopening notice issued on same ground is bad in law

12. The Pr.
CIT-3 vs. M/s Everlon Synthetics Pvt. Ltd. [Income tax Appeal No. 1039 of 2017] Date of order:
4th November, 2019 (Bombay High
Court)

 

ITP-3(1)(4) vs.
M/s Everlon Synthetics Pvt. Ltd. [ITA No. 6965/Mum/2013; Date of order: 23rd
May, 2016; A.Y.: 2006-07; Mum. ITAT]

 

Section 147:
Reassessment – Within four years – Regular assessment u/s 143(3) – Issue of
one-time settlement with bank and consequential relief granted by the bank was
discussed and deliberated by the AO – Reopening notice issued on same ground is
bad in law

 

The assessee is
engaged in the business of manufacture of polyester and texturised / twisted
yarn and management consultancy. The assessee filed its return of income on 29th
November, 2006. The AO completed the assessment on 24th November,
2008 u/s 143(3) of the Act, accepting ‘Nil’ return of income as filed by the
assessee. Thereafter, on 28th March, 2011, a notice was issued u/s
148 of the Act to the assessee, seeking to re-open the assessment. The reason
in support of the re-opening notice was in regards to cessation of liability
u/s 41 of the Act.

 

The assessee
objected to the re-opening notice on the ground that it was based on ‘change of
opinion’ and, therefore, without jurisdiction. However, this contention was not
accepted by the AO. This resulted in the assessment order dated 30th
August, 2011 u/s 143(3) r/w/s 147 of the Act, adding the sum of Rs. 1.37 lakhs
to the income of the assessee by holding it to be a revenue receipt.

 

Aggrieved by
this order, the assessee company filed an appeal to the CIT(A). The CIT(A)
recorded a finding of fact that during the course of regular scrutiny
proceedings u/s 143(3), the issue of the assessee’s one-time settlement with
the bank and consequential relief granted by the bank was discussed and
deliberated by the AO. In fact, queries were raised by the AO with regard to
the one-time settlement; the assessee, by its communication dated 11th
November, 2008, responded with complete details of the one-time settlement with
its bankers, including the details of relief / waiver obtained. The CIT(A) held
the settlements to the extent of Rs. 2.06 crores as revenue receipt, as
reflected in the Profit and Loss Account, and the fact that the amount of Rs.
1.37 crores was transferred to the capital account was deliberated upon by the
AO before passing an order u/s 143(3) of the Act. Thus, the CIT(A) held that
the re-opening notice was without jurisdiction as it was based on a mere change
of opinion.

 

Being aggrieved
by the order of the CIT(A), the Revenue filed an appeal to the Tribunal. The
Tribunal held that the issue of one-time settlement with the bank and the
treatment being given to the benefit received on account of settlement, was a
subject matter of consideration by the AO. It found on facts that during the
regular assessment proceedings, the issue of one-time settlement was inquired
into by the AO and the appellant had furnished all details in its letter dated
11th November, 2008. It also records the fact that the impugned
notice was only on the basis of audit objection and the AO had not applied his
mind before issuing a re-opening notice and merely acted on the dictate of the
audit party. In the circumstances, the Tribunal upheld the view of the CIT(A)
that the re-opening notice is without jurisdiction.

 

Aggrieved by
the order of the ITAT, the Revenue filed an Appeal to the High Court. The
Revenue submitted that the issue of one-time settlement found no mention in the
assessment order passed u/s 143(3). Thus, no opinion was formed by the AO while
passing the regular assessment order. Therefore, there was no bar on him on
issuing the re-opening notice. It was, thus, submitted that the issue requires
consideration and the appeal be admitted.

 

The Court
observed that during the scrutiny assessment proceedings, queries were raised
and the petitioner filed a detailed response on 11th November, 2008
giving complete details to the AO of the one-time settlement and the manner in
which it was treated. This finding of fact was not shown to be perverse in any
manner. The re-opening notice is not based on any fresh tangible material but
proceeds on the material already on record with the AO and also considered before
passing the order u/s 143(3). The submission
of Revenue that consideration of an issue by the AO must be reflected in the
assessment order, is in the face of the decision of the Court in GKN
Sinter Metals Ltd. vs. Ms Ramapriya Raghavan 371 ITR 225 which approved
the view of the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court in CIT vs. Nirma Chemicals
Ltd., 305 ITR 607, to the effect that an assessment order cannot deal
with all queries which the AO had raised during the assessment proceedings. The
AO restricts himself only to dealing with those issues where he does not agree
with the assessee’s submission and gives reasons for it. Otherwise, it would be
impossible to complete all the assessments within the time limit available.

 

Thus, the Court held that once a query is raised during assessment
proceedings and the assessee has responded to the query to the satisfaction of
the AO, then there has been due consideration of the same. Therefore, issuing
of the re-opening notice on the same facts which were considered earlier,
clearly amounts to a change of opinion and is, thus, without jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the Revenue appeal is dismissed.

 

 

Sections 2(47), 45 – Amount received by assessee, owner of a flat in a co-operative housing society, from a developer under a scheme of re-development was integrally connected with transfer of old flat to developer for purpose of re-development, in lieu of which assessee received the said amount and a new residential flat – To be treated as income under head ‘capital gain’

3.       [2020]
115 taxmann.com 7 (Mum.)

Pradyot B. Borkar vs. ACIT

ITA No. 4070/Mum/2016

A.Y.: 2011-12

Date of order: 17th January, 2020

 

Sections 2(47), 45 – Amount received by assessee, owner of a
flat in a co-operative housing society, from a developer under a scheme of
re-development was integrally connected with transfer of old flat to developer
for purpose of re-development, in lieu of which assessee received the
said amount and a new residential flat – To be treated as income under head
‘capital gain’

 

FACTS

The assessee, an individual, filed his return of income
declaring total income of Rs. 32,30,000. The A.O., in the course of assessment
proceedings noted that the assessee has offered long-term capital gain of Rs.
31,12,638, towards sale of residential flats at C-20, 179, MIG, Bandra, Mumbai,
and has simultaneously claimed deduction u/s 54 of the Act.

 

The A.O. found that the
assessee owned a flat in the housing society which was given for development
under a scheme of re-development. As per the terms of the development agreement
between the housing society and its members, in addition to receiving a new
residential flat after re-development, each member was also entitled to receive
an amount of Rs. 53,80,500, comprising of the following:

 

Rs. 25,00,000

Compensation for
non-adherence by the re-developer to the earlier agreed terms and that the
member should be required to vacate the old flat.

 

 

Rs. 28,50,500

Beneficial right and interest
in corpus and income of the society and nuisance annoyance and hardship that
will be suffered by the members during the re-development.

 

 

Rs. 30,000

Moving or shifting cost.

 

 

The A.O. held that the amount received is not in any way related
to transfer of capital asset giving rise to capital gain. He assessed the
amount of Rs. 53,30,500 under the head ‘Income from Other Sources’.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who
confirmed the action of the A.O. The assessee then preferred an appeal to the
Tribunal.

 

HELD

The Tribunal noted that in the return of income the assessee
has offered the amount of Rs. 53,50,500 as income from long-term capital gain.
But the A.O. has held that the amount is in the nature of compensation received
due to some specific factors and not related to transfer of capital asset. He
also observed that as per the terms of the development agreement, any capital
gain arising due to re-development would accrue to the housing society.
Therefore, the compensation received, Rs. 53,50,500, cannot be treated as
capital gain.

 

The Tribunal held that the amount of Rs. 53,50,500 was
received by the assessee only because of handing over the old flat for the
purpose of re-development. Therefore, the said amount is integrally connected
with the transfer of his old flat to the developer for re-development in
lieu of which he received the said amount and a new residential flat.
Therefore, the amount of Rs. 53,50,500 has to be treated as income under the
head ‘Capital Gain’. The Tribunal observed that the decision of the Co-ordinate
Bench in Rajnikant D. Shroff [ITA No. 4424/Mum/2014, dated 23rd September,
2016] supports this view. It held that the amount of Rs. 53,50,500 has
to be assessed under the head ‘Capital Gain’.

 

This ground of appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

DEDUCTIBILITY OF FOREIGN TAXES

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION

Section 40 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 deals with amounts
that are not deductible in computing income under the head ‘Profits and Gains
of Business or Profession’. This section, in particular clause (a)(ii)
thereof,  reads as under:

 

‘Notwithstanding
anything to the contrary in sections 30 to 38, the following amounts shall not
be deducted in computing the income chargeable under the head “Profits and
gains of business or profession”, –  

(a) in the case of any assessee—

(i)  ………..

(ia) …………….

(ib) ……………

(ic)  …………….

(ii)  any sum paid on account of any rate or tax
levied on the profits or gains of any business or profession or assessed at a
proportion of, or otherwise on the basis of, any such profits or gains.

Explanation 1. —
For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that for the purposes of this
sub-clause, any sum paid on account of any rate or tax levied includes and
shall be deemed always to have included any sum eligible for relief of tax
under section 90 or, as the case may be, deduction from the Indian income-tax
payable under section 91.

Explanation 2. —
For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that for the purposes of this
sub-clause, any sum paid on account of any rate or tax levied includes any sum
eligible for relief of tax under section 90A.’

 

Explanations 1 and
2 were inserted with effect from Assessment Year 2006-07. Prior to that there
was much litigation on whether income taxes paid in a foreign country were an
allowable deduction or not. These explanations were added to prevent a double
relief or benefit , since in most cases such foreign taxes for which deduction
was being claimed were also entitled to tax relief under sections 90, 90A or
91. After the amendment, the issue still remains alive insofar as taxes which
are not entitled to the relief or even a partial relief under sections 90, 90A
or 91, and under the rules only a part of the foreign taxes paid may be
entitled to the relief u/s 90 or u/s 90A in some cases.

 

An issue has arisen
involving the deductibility of the foreign tax paid on account of the profits
or gains of a foreign business or profession in computing the income under the
head ‘profits and gains of business and profession’ under the Income-tax Act,
1961. While there have been conflicting decisions on the subject, of the Ahmedabad
bench of the Tribunal post amendment, to really understand the controversy one
would need to understand the two conflicting decisions of the Bombay High Court
on the issue, one of which was rendered after the amendment but dealt with a
period prior to the amendment.

 

THE S. INDER SINGH GILL CASE

The issue came up before the Bombay High Court in the case
of S. Inder Singh Gill vs. CIT 47 ITR 284.

 

In this case,
pertaining to assessment years 1946-47 to 1951-52, under the Income-tax Act,
1922 the assessee was a non-resident. A resident was treated as the assessee’s
statutory agent u/s 43 of the 1922 Act (corresponding to representative
assessee u/s 163 of the 1961 Act).

 

In the original
assessments, income from certain Bombay properties was assessed to tax in
computing the total income. The Income Tax Officer later found that the
assessee owned certain other properties also in the taxable territories whose
income had escaped assessment, and therefore initiated re-assessment
proceedings. In response to the notice, the assessee filed his return of
income.

 

In the return,
among other deductions the assessee claimed that in computing his world income,
the tax paid by him to the Uganda government on his Ugandan income should be
deducted. This claim of the assessee was disallowed by the tax authorities. The
assessee’s first appeal was dismissed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner.
The Tribunal also rejected the contention that tax paid to the Uganda
government on his foreign income should be deducted in determining his foreign
income and in including it in his total world income.

 

The Bombay High
Court in deciding the issue, noted that the Tribunal had observed as under:

 

‘We are not
aware of any commercial practice or principle which lays down that tax paid by
one on one’s income is a proper deduction in determining one’s income for the
purposes of taxation’.

 

The Bombay High
Court held that no reason had been shown to it by the assessee to differ from
the conclusion that the Tribunal had reached. The Court therefore rejected the
reference made to it by the assessee.

 

A similar view was
taken by the Calcutta High Court in the case of Jeewanlal (1929) Ltd. vs.
CIT 48 ITR 270, also a case under the 1922 Act, where the issue was
whether business profits tax paid in Burma was an allowable deduction.

 

Again, a similar
view was taken by the Karnataka High Court in Kirloskar Electric Co. Ltd.
vs. CIT 228 ITR 676, prior to the amendment, by applying section
40(a)(ii). Besides, the Madras High Court, in CIT vs. Kerala Lines Ltd.
201 ITR 106, has also held that foreign taxes are not allowable as a
deduction.

 

THE RELIANCE INFRASTRUCTURE CASE

Recently, the issue
again came up before the Bombay High Court in the case of Reliance
Infrastructure Ltd. vs. CIT 390 ITR 271.

 

This was a case
pertaining to A.Y. 1983-84. During the year, the assessee executed projects in
Saudi Arabia. The income earned in Saudi Arabia had been subjected to tax in
Saudi Arabia. While determining the tax payable under Indian tax laws, the
assessee sought the benefit of section 91, claiming relief from double taxation
of the same income, i.e., the Saudi income which was included in the total
income of the assessee.

 

The assessee
claimed the benefit of double taxation relief on the amounts of Rs. 47.3 lakhs,
otherwise claimed as deduction u/s 80HHB, and Rs. 5.59 lakhs on which a
weighted deduction was otherwise claimed u/s 35B. The A.O. dismissed the
assessee’s claim for relief u/s 91 on the ground that the relief u/s 91 would
be possible only when the amount of foreign income on which the foreign tax was
paid was again included in the taxable income liable to tax in India, i.e., the
relief was possible only where the same income was taxed in both the countries.

 

The Commissioner
(Appeals) rejected the assessee’s appeal, holding that the assessee had, in
respect of his Saudi income, 
claimed  deductions u/s 80HHB and
section 35B and such income did not suffer any tax in India and was therefore
not eligible for the benefit of relief u/s 91.

 

Before the
Tribunal, the assessee urged that the Commissioner (Appeals) ought to have held
that in respect of such percentage of income which was deemed to accrue in
India, and on which the benefit of section 91 was not available, the tax paid
in Saudi Arabia should be treated as an expenditure incurred in earning income,
which was deemed to have accrued or arisen in India, and reduced therefrom.

 

The Tribunal
dismissed the assessee’s appeal, holding that the issue stood concluded against
the assessee by the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of CIT
vs. C.S. Murthy 169 ITR 686. The Tribunal also held that the tax paid
in Saudi Arabia on which even where no double tax relief could be claimed, was
not allowable as a deduction in computing the income under the provisions of
the Income-tax Act. As regards tax in respect of income which had accrued or
arisen in India, the Tribunal rejected the assessee’s contention on two grounds
– that such a claim had not been raised before the Commissioner (Appeals), and
that the disallowance  was as per the
decision of the Bombay High Court in S. Inder Singh Gill’s case
(Supra).

 

It was claimed on
behalf of the assessee before the Bombay High Court inter alia that the
assessee  should be allowed a deduction
of the foreign tax paid in Saudi Arabia, once it was held that the benefit of
section 91 was not available for such tax. It was emphasised that the deduction
was claimed only to the extent that tax had been paid in Saudi Arabia on the
income which had been deemed to have accrued or arisen in India.

 

It was pointed out
to  the Bombay High Court that such a
deduction had been allowed by the Tribunal in the assessee’s own case for A.Y.
1979-80 and therefore the principle of consistency  required the Tribunal to adopt the same view
as it did in A.Y. 1979-80. It was pointed out that Explanation 1 added to
section 40(a)(ii) with effect from A.Y. 2006-07 was clarificatory in nature, as
was evident from the fact that it began with the words ‘for removal of doubts’.
It should therefore be deemed to have always been there and would apply to the
case before the High Court. It was argued that if it was held that section 91
was not applicable, then the bar of claiming deduction to the extent of the tax
paid abroad would not apply.

 

Reference was made
on behalf of the assessee to the commentary on ‘Law and Practice of Income
Tax’ by Kanga & Palkhivala (8th Edition), wherein a
reference was made to the decisions of the Bombay High Court in CIT vs.
Southeast Asian Shipping Co. (IT Appeal No. 123 of 1976) and CIT
vs. Tata Sons Ltd. (IT Appeal No. 209 of 2001)  holding that foreign tax did not fall within
the mischief of section 40(a)(ii) and that the assessee’s net income after
deduction of foreign taxes was his real income for the purposes of the
Income-tax Act.

 

It was therefore
argued on behalf of the assessee that the decision of the Bombay High Court in S.
Inder Singh Gill (Supra) would not apply and the tax paid in Saudi
Arabia on the income accrued or arising in India was to be allowed as a
deduction to arrive at the real profits which were chargeable to tax in India.

 

On behalf of the
Revenue, it was submitted that the issue stood concluded against the assessee
by the decision of the Bombay High Court in S. Inder Singh Gill (Supra).
It was submitted that the real income theory was inapplicable in view of the
specific provision of section 40(a)(ii) which prohibited deduction of any tax
paid. It was submitted that in terms of the main provisions of section
40(a)(ii), any sum paid on account of any tax on the profits and gains of
business or profession would not be allowed as a deduction.

 

It was argued on
behalf of the Revenue that the Explanation 2, inserted with effect from A.Y.
2006-07, only reiterated that any sum entitled to tax relief u/s 91 would be
covered by the main part of section 40(a)(ii). It did not take away the taxes
not covered by it out of the ambit of the main part of section 40(a)(ii).

 

The Bombay High
Court held that the Tribunal was justified in not following its order in the
case of the assessee itself for A.Y. 1979-80, as it noted the decision of the
Bombay High Court in S. Inder Singh Gill (Supra) on an identical
issue. The Court observed that the decisions in South Asian Shipping Co.
(Supra) and Tata Sons Ltd. (Supra) were rendered not at
the final hearing but while rejecting the applications for reference u/s 256(2)
and at the stage of admission u/s 260A, unlike the judgment rendered in a
reference by the Court in S. Inder Singh Gill, and therefore
could not be relied upon in preference to the decision in S. Inder Singh
Gill.

 

Further, the Court
observed that it was axiomatic that income tax was a charge on the profits or
income. The payment of income tax was not a payment made or incurred to earn
profits and gains of business. It could therefore not be allowed as an
expenditure to determine the profits of the business. Taxes such as excise
duty, customs duty, octroi, etc., were incurred for the purpose of doing
business and earning profits or gains from business or profession and
therefore, they  were allowable as
deduction to determine the profits of the business. It is the profits and gains
of business, determined after deducting all expenses incurred for the purpose
of business from the total receipts, which were subjected to income tax as per
the Act. The main part of section 40(a)(ii) did not allow deduction of tax to
the extent the tax was levied  on the
profits or gains of the business. According to the Court, it was on this
general principle, universally accepted, that the Bombay High Court had
answered the question posed to it in S. Inder Singh Gill in
favour of the Revenue.

 

The Bombay High
Court went on to observe that it would have followed the decision in the case
of S. Inder Singh Gill. However, it noticed that that decision
was rendered under the 1922 Act and not under the 1961 Act. The difference
between the two Acts was that the 1922 Act did not contain a definition of
‘tax’, unlike the 1961 Act where such term was defined in section 2(43) as
‘income tax chargeable under the provisions of this Act’. In the absence of any
definition of ‘tax’ under the 1922 Act, the tax paid on income or profits and
gains of business or profession anywhere in the world would not be allowable as
a deduction for determining the profits or gains of the business u/s 10(4) of
the 1922 Act, and therefore the decision in S. Inder Singh Gill
was correctly rendered on the basis of the law then prevalent.

 

Proceeding on the
said lines,  the Bombay High Court held
that by insertion of section 2(43) for defining the term ‘tax’, tax which was
payable under the 1961 Act on the profits and gains of business that alone was
not allowed to be deducted u/s 40(a)(ii), notwithstanding sections 30 to 38.
According to the Court, the tax, which had been paid abroad would not be
covered within the mischief of section 40(a)(ii), in view of the definition of
the word ‘tax’ in section 2(43). The Court said that it was conscious of the
fact that section 2, while defining the various terms used in the Act,
qualified it by preceding the definition with the words ‘in this Act, unless
the context otherwise requires’. It noted that it was not even urged by the
Revenue that the context of section 40(a)(ii) would require it to mean tax paid
anywhere in the world and not only tax payable under the Act.

 

The Court analysed
the rationale for introduction of the Explanations to section 40(a)(ii), as set
out in the Explanatory Memorandum to the Finance Act, 2006, recorded in CBDT
Circular No. 14 of 2006 dated 28th December, 2006. It  recorded the fact that some assessees, who
were eligible for credit against the tax payable in India on the global income
to the extent that the tax had been paid outside India u/s 90/91, were also
claiming deduction of the tax paid abroad as it was not tax under the Act. In
view of the above, the explanation would require in the context thereof that
the definition of the word ‘tax’ would also mean tax which was eligible to the
benefit of section 90/91. However, as per the High Court, this departure from
the meaning of the word ‘tax’ as defined in the Act was  restricted to the above-referred section 90/91
only and gave no license to widen the meaning of the word ‘tax’ to include all
taxes on income or profits paid abroad for the purposes of section 40(a)(ii).

 

The Court further
noted that it was undisputed that some part on which tax had been paid abroad
was on income that had been deemed to have accrued or arisen in India. To that
extent, the benefit of section 91 was not available for such tax so paid
abroad. Therefore, such tax was not hit by the Explanation to section 40(a)(ii)
and was to be considered in the nature of an expenditure incurred to earn
income. The Court then held that the Explanation to section 40(a)(ii) was
declaratory in nature and would have retrospective effect.

 

The Bombay High
Court therefore held that the assessee was entitled to deduction for foreign
taxes paid on income accrued or arisen in India in computing its income, to the
extent that such tax was not entitled to the benefit of section 91.

 

OBSERVATIONS

Before looking at
the applicability of section 40(a)(ii), one first needs to examine whether
income tax is at all an expenditure, and if so, whether it is a business
expenditure. Accounting Standard 22, issued by the Ministry of Corporate
Affairs under the Companies Act, provides that ‘Taxes on income are
considered to be an expense incurred by the enterprise in earning income and are accrued
in the same period as the revenue and expenses to which they relate.’ It
therefore seems that income tax is an expenditure under accounting principles.

 

Since only certain
types of business expenditure are allowable as deductions while computing
income under the head ‘Profits and Gains of Business or Profession’, the
question that arises is whether tax is a business expenditure. Accounting
Standard 22 states that ‘Accounting income (loss) is the net profit or loss
for a period, as reported in the statement of profit and loss, before deducting
income tax expense or adding income tax saving.’ Ind AS 12 issued by the
Ministry of Corporate Affairs states ‘The tax expense (income) related to
profit or loss from ordinary activities shall be presented as part of profit or
loss in the statement of profit and loss.’

 

However, if one
looks at the manner of presentation in the final accounts, it is clear that
income tax is treated quite differently from business expenditure, being shown
separately as a deduction after computing the pre-tax profit. Therefore, it
appears that while tax is an expense, it may not be a business expenditure.
This is supported by the language of AS 22, which states that ‘Accounting
income (loss) is the net profit or loss for a period, as reported in the
statement of profit and loss, before deducting income tax expense or adding
income tax saving.’

 

Further, the
fundamental issue still remains as to whether such foreign income taxes can
ever be a deductible expenditure under sections 30 to 38. Even on basic
commercial principles, income tax is not an expenditure for earning income; it
is a consequence of earning income. Whether such income tax is a foreign tax or
tax under the 1961 Act is irrelevant – it is still an application of income
after having earned the income. This view is supported by the decision of the
Madras High Court in the Kerala Lines case (Supra),
where the High Court observed that the payment of foreign taxes could not be
regarded as an expenditure for earning profits; they could at best be
considered as an application of profits earned by the assessee.

 

In the Reliance
Infrastructure case, the decision of the Bombay High Court was primarily
focused and based on the language of section 40(a)(ii), the Explanation thereto
read with the definition of ‘tax’ u/s 2(43). However, it needs to be kept in
mind that section 40 is a section listing out expenses, which are otherwise
allowable under sections 30 to 38, but which are specifically not allowable.
The provisions of section 40(a)(ii) will therefore come into play where an item
of expenditure is otherwise allowable as a business expenditure under sections
30 to 38. If such expenditure is in any case not allowable under sections 30 to
38, the question of applicability of section 40(a)(ii) does not arise.

 

The Bombay High
Court, in the case of CIT vs. Plasmac Machine Mfg. Co. Ltd. 201 ITR 650,
considered a situation of payment of tax liability of a transferor firm by the
transferee company, where the company had taken over the business of the
transferor firm. It held that the expenditure representing the liability of the
transferor, which was discharged by the transferee, was a capital expenditure
forming part of the consideration for the acquisition of the business and was
therefore not deductible in the computation of income. Hence, the question of
applicability of section 40(a)(ii) did not arise.

 

Under what clause
would foreign income taxes be allowable under sections 30 to 38? The only
possible provision under which such income taxes may fall for consideration as
a deduction would be section 37(1). Section 37(1) allows a deduction for
expenditure (not being in the nature of capital expenditure or personal
expenses) incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business or
profession. Is a foreign income tax an expenditure incurred wholly and
exclusively for the purpose of business or profession, or is it an application
of the income after it has been earned?

 

The House of Lords,
in the case of Commissioners of Inland Revenue vs. Dowdall O’Mahoney
& Co. Ltd. 33 Tax Cases 259, had occasion to consider this issue in
the case of an Irish company which had branches in England; it claimed that in
computing the English profits, it was entitled to deduct that proportion of the
Irish taxes attributable to those profits. The House of Lords held that payment
of such taxes by a trader was not a disbursement wholly and exclusively laid
out for the purposes of the trade and this was so whether such taxes were
United Kingdom taxes or foreign or Dominion taxes. The House of Lords further
observed that taxes like these were not paid for the purpose of earning the
profits of the trade; they were the application of those profits when made and
not the less so that they were exacted by a Dominion or foreign government. It
further observed that there was not and never was any right under the
principles applicable to deduct income tax or excess profits tax, British or
foreign, in computing trading profits. According to the House of Lords, once it
was accepted that the criterion is the purpose for which the expenditure is
made in relation to the trade of which the profits are being computed, no
material distinction remained between the payment to make such taxes abroad and
a payment to meet a similar tax at home. A similar view was taken by the Madras
High Court in Kerala Lines (Supra).

 

In the Reliance
Infrastructure case, the Bombay High Court, while referring to this
basic principle, also accepted by it in the S. Inder Singh Gill
case, did not lay down any rationale for departing from this principle while
deciding the matter. It perhaps was swayed by the Explanation to section 90/91
and section 2(43), both of which had no application on the subject of allowance
of deduction of the foreign tax in computing the business income in the first
place.

 

The issue of
deductibility of foreign taxes had also come up recently before the Ahmedabad
Bench of the Tribunal, in which the Tribunal took differing views. In both
these cases the assessee had claimed foreign tax credit under section 90/91 on
the basis of the gross foreign income, but was allowed tax credit on the basis
of net foreign income taxable in India. It alternatively claimed deduction for
such foreign taxes not allowed as credit. In the first case, DCIT vs.
Elitecore Technologies (P) Ltd., 165 ITD 153, the Tribunal held, after
a detailed examination of the entire gamut of case laws on the subject, that
foreign taxes were not a deductible expenditure. It pointed out aspects which
had not been considered by the Bombay High Court in the Reliance
Infrastructure case. In the subsequent decision in Virmati
Software & Telecommunication Ltd. vs. DCIT, ITA No 1135/Ahd/2017 dated 5th
March, 2020, the Tribunal took a contrary view, following the Bombay
High Court decision in the Reliance Infrastructure case, that
such foreign taxes not allowed credit u/s 91 were deductible in computing the
income. The Mumbai Bench of the Tribunal, in the case of Tata Motors Ltd.
vs. CIT ITA No. 3802/Mum/2018 dated 15th April, 2019, has
also followed the Bombay High Court decision in Reliance Infrastructure
and held that the deduction for foreign taxes not entitled to relief under
section 90/91 could not be the subject matter of revision u/s 263.

 

The Mumbai Bench of
the Tribunal, on the other hand, in the case of DCIT vs. Tata Sons Ltd.
43 SOT 27, has, while disallowing the claim for deduction of foreign
taxes u/s 37(1), observed that if it was to be held that the assessee was
entitled to deduction of tax paid abroad, in addition to admissibility of tax
relief u/s 90 or section 91, it would result in a situation that on the one
hand double taxation of income would be eliminated by ensuring that the
assessee’s total income-tax liability did not exceed the income-tax liability
in India or the income-tax liability abroad, whichever was greater, and, on the
other hand, the assessee’s domestic tax liability would also be reduced by tax
liability in respect of income decreased due to deduction of taxes. Such a
double benefit to the assessee was contrary to the scheme of the Act as well as
the fundamental principles of international taxation.

 

Interestingly, the
Mumbai Bench of the Tribunal, in Tata Consultancy Services Ltd. vs. ACIT
203 TTJ 146, considered a disallowance of US and Canadian state taxes
and held that such taxes were not covered by section 40(a)(ii) and were
therefore allowable.

 

A question arose in
Jaipuria Samla Amalgamated Collieries Ltd. 82 ITR 580 (SC) where
the assessee, a lessee of mines, incurred statutory liability for the payment
of road and public works cess and education cess, and claimed deduction of such
cess in its computation of income. The A.O. disallowed such claim relying on
section 10(4) of the 1922 Act, corresponding to section 40(a)(ii) of the 1961
Act. In that decision, the Supreme Court held that the words ‘profits and gains
of any business, profession or vocation’ which were employed in section 10(4),
could, in the context, have reference only to profits or gains as determined
u/s 10 and could not cover the net profits or gains arrived at or determined in
a manner other than that provided by section 10. Can one apply the ratio
of this decision to foreign income taxes, which are levied on income computed
in a manner different from that envisaged under the 1961 Act?

 

Subsequently, the
Supreme Court itself in the case of Smithkline & French India Ltd.
vs. CIT 219 ITR 581 has taken a different view in the context of surtax.
The Supreme Court observed in this case:

‘Firstly, it may
be mentioned, s.10(4) of the 1922 Act or s.40(a)(ii) of the present Act do not
contain any words indicating that the profits and gains spoken of by them
should be determined in accordance with the provisions of the IT Act. All they
say is that it must be a rate or tax levied on the profits and gains of
business or profession. The observations relied upon must be read in the said
context and not literally or as the provisions in a statute…’

 

This argument
therefore seems to no longer be valid. In this case, the Supreme Court has also
approved the Bombay High Court decision in Lubrizol India Ltd. vs. CIT
187 ITR 25, where the Bombay High Court noted that section 40(a)(ii)
uses the term ‘any’ before ‘rate or tax’. The High Court had observed:

 

‘If the word “tax” is to be given the meaning
assigned to it by s.2(43) of the Act, the word “any” used before it will be
otiose and the further qualification as to the nature of levy will also become
meaningless. Furthermore, the word “tax” as defined in s.2(43) of the Act is
subject to “unless the context otherwise requires”. In view of the discussion
above, we hold that the words “any tax” herein refers to any kind of tax levied
or leviable on the profits or gains of any business or profession or assessed
at a proportion of, or otherwise on the basis of, any such profits or gains’.

 

This view is in
direct contrast to the view expressed in the Reliance Infrastructure
case, and having been approved by the Supreme Court in the case of Smithkline
& French (Supra), this view should prevail. Perhaps, the ratio
of the Reliance Infrastructure case was largely governed by the
fact that the non-applicability of section 2(43) to section 40(a)(ii) was never
urged by the Department before it.

 

Therefore, the better view is that foreign
income taxes are not a deductible expenditure in computing income under the
1961 Act, irrespective of whether they are eligible for credit under sections
90, 90A or 91.

Reopening – Beyond four years – Assessment completed u/s 143(3) – A mere bald assertion by the A.O. that the assessee has not disclosed fully and truly all the material facts is not sufficient – Reopening is not valid

6. M/s. Anand Developers vs. Asst.
Commissioner of Income Tax Circle-2(1) [Writ Petition No. 17 of 2020] Date of order: 18th February,
2020 Bombay High Court (Goa Bench)

 

Reopening –
Beyond four years – Assessment completed u/s 143(3) – A mere bald assertion by
the A.O. that the assessee has not disclosed fully and truly all the material
facts is not sufficient – Reopening is not valid

 

The petition challenged the
notice dated 29th March, 2019 issued u/s 148 of the Income-tax Act,
1961 and the order dated 17th December, 2019 disposing of the
assessee / petitioner’s objections to the reopening of the assessment in
pursuance of the notice dated 29th March, 2019.

 

The
petitioner had submitted its return of income within the prescribed period for
A.Y. 2012-13 declaring total income of Rs. 62,233. The case was selected for
scrutiny through CASS and notice was issued u/s 143(2) of the Act and served
upon the petitioner on 28th August, 2013. Based on the details
furnished by the petitioner, the A.O. passed the assessment order dated 16th
March, 2015 u/s 143(2).

 

It was the case of the
petitioner that vide its own letter dated 20th February, 2015
in the course of the assessment proceedings before the A.O., it had itself
submitted that a few flats may have been allotted to persons in violation of
Clause 10(f) of section 80IB. It was also contended that this ought not to be
regarded as any breach of the provisions of section 80IB; in any case, this
ought not to be regarded as any breach of the provisions of section 80IB in
its entirety and at the most benefit may be denied in respect of the
transfers made in breach of Clause 10(f) of section 80IB.

 

The petitioner submitted that
through this letter it had made true and complete disclosures in the course of
the assessment proceedings itself. It was upon consideration of these
disclosures that the A.O. finalised the assessment order of 16th
March, 2015 u/s 143(3). Under the circumstances, merely on the basis of a
change of opinion, the A.O. lacked jurisdiction to issue notice u/s 148 seeking
to reopen the assessment. Since there was absolutely no failure to make true
and full disclosures, there was no jurisdiction to issue such notice u/s 148
after the expiry of four years from the date of assessment.

 

The Department submitted that
since the petitioner had admitted vide its letter dated 20th
February, 2015 that it had violated the provisions of section 80IB and further
failed to make true and full disclosures, there was absolutely no
jurisdictional error in issuing the impugned notice or making the impugned
order.

 

The High Court observed that
the factum of the address of the letter dated 20th February,
2015 is indisputable because the respondents had themselves not only referred
to it but also quoted from it in the show cause notice dated 17th December,
2019 issued to the petitioner along with the impugned order of the same date by
which the objections of the petitioner to the reopening of the assessment came
to be rejected. Even the impugned order dated 17th December, 2019
rejecting the petitioner’s objections makes a specific reference to the
petitioner’s letter of 20th February, 2015 submitted during the
assessment proceedings u/s 143(3). Both the show cause notice dated 17th
December, 2019 and the impugned order of the same date specifically state that
the petitioner in the course of the assessment proceedings had furnished a list
of flat-owners to whom flats were sold in the project ‘Bay Village’.

 

The notice and the impugned
order proceed to state that upon perusal of this list, coupled with the letter
dated 20th February, 2015, it transpires that there was non-compliance
on the part of the petitioner with the provisions of section 80IB at least
insofar as some of the sales were concerned. Since it is virtually an admitted
fact that the petitioner had submitted a list of the flat-owners and vide
its letter dated 20th February, 2015 pointed out that there may be
breach insofar as the sale of some of the flats are concerned, it cannot be
said by the respondents that there was no truthful or complete disclosure on
the part of the petitioners in the course of the assessment proceedings itself.

 

The Court observed that
merely making of a bald statement that the assessee had not disclosed fully and
truly all the material facts is really never sufficient in such matters. In the
present case as well, apart from such a bald assertion, no details have been
disclosed as to the material which was allegedly not disclosed either truly or
fully. Rather, the record indicates that the entire list of flat-owners was
disclosed. Further, vide the same letter disclosures were made in
relation to the sale transactions and it was even suggested that some of the
transactions may not be compliant with the provisions of Clause 10(f) of
section 80IB. Clearly, therefore, the Department had failed to make out any
case that there was no true and full disclosure.

 

Further, section 147 of the
IT Act empowers the A.O. who has reason to believe that any income chargeable
to tax has escaped assessment for any A.Y. to reassess such income, no doubt
subject to the provisions of sections 148 to 153 of the Act. The proviso
to section 147, however, makes clear that where an assessment under sub-section
(3) of section 143 has been made for the relevant A.Y., no action shall be
taken u/s 147 after the expiry of four years from the end of the relevant
assessment year unless any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for
such assessment year by reason of failure on the part of the assessee, inter
alia ‘to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for its
assessment for that assessment year’. This means that normally, the limitation
period for re-assessment u/s 147 is four years. However, in a case where the
assessment has been made u/s 143(3) where, inter alia, the assessee
fails to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for assessment
for that assessment year, re-assessment can be made even beyond the period of
four years in terms of section 148. Therefore, in order to sustain a notice
seeking to reopen assessment beyond the normal period of four years it is
necessary for the respondents to establish, at least prima facie, that
there was failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for
the assessment for that assessment year.

 

In the present case, the
respondents have failed to establish this precondition even prima facie.
Rather, the material on record establishes that there were full and true
disclosures of all material facts necessary for the assessment for the A.Y.
2012-13. Despite this, the impugned notice seeking to reopen the assessment for
that year has been issued beyond the normal period of four years. On this short
ground, the impugned notice dated 29th March, 2019 and the impugned
order dated 17th December, 2019 were quashed and set aside. The
Court relied on the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in the case
of Mrs. Parveen P. Bharucha [(2012) 348 ITR 325] and Zuari Foods and
Farms Pvt. Ltd. (WP No. 1001 of 2007 decided on 11th April, 2018).

 

The Court
observed that the decision in Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. [(1961) 41 ITR
191 (SC)] in fact assists the case of the petitioner rather than the
respondents. In that decision, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that it is
the duty of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all primary relevant
facts, and once all primary facts are before the assessing authority, he
requires no further assistance by way of disclosure and it is for him to decide
what inference of facts can be reasonably drawn and what legal inferences have
ultimately to be drawn. However, if there are some reasonable grounds for
thinking that there had been under-assessment as regards any primary facts
which could have a material bearing on the question of under-assessment, that
would be sufficient to give jurisdiction to the ITO to issue notice for
re-assessment. In the present case, as noted earlier, there is absolutely no
reference to any alleged material facts which the petitioner failed to disclose
in the course of the assessment proceedings. Rather, the impugned notice refers
to the list as well as the letter issued by the petitioner itself which is
sought to be made the basis for the reopening of the assessment. For the
aforesaid reasons the petition is allowed and the impugned notice dated 29th
March, 2019 and the impugned order dated 17th December, 2019
are quashed and set aside. 

 

Revision – TDS – Non-resident – Shipping business – Section 263 and section 172, r/w sections 40(a)(ia), 194C and 195 of ITA, 1961 – Where assessee had paid export freight to a shipping agent of non-resident ship-owner or charter without deduction of tax at source, provisions of section 172 would be applicable and provisions of section 194C or section 195 which provide for deduction of tax at source shall not be applicable; A.Y.: 2014-15

26. Principal
CIT vs. Summit India Water Treatment and Services Ltd. [2020]
116 taxmann.com 107 (Guj.) Date
of order: 3rd February, 2020 A.Y.:
2014-15

 

Revision –
TDS – Non-resident – Shipping business – Section 263 and section 172, r/w sections
40(a)(ia), 194C and 195 of ITA, 1961 – Where assessee had paid export freight
to a shipping agent of non-resident ship-owner or charter without deduction of tax at source, provisions of section 172 would
be applicable and provisions of section 194C or section 195 which provide for
deduction of tax at source shall not be applicable; A.Y.: 2014-15

 

For the A.Y. 2013-14, the assessee filed its return of income declaring
total loss of Rs. 1,35,18,193. By an order dated 22nd March, 2016,
the A.O. finalised the assessment u/s 143(3). The Principal Commissioner of
Income-tax (‘the PCIT’) invoked the power of revision u/s 263 of the Act, 1961
on the ground that without deducting TDS on the export freight, the assessee
company had paid export freight amounting to Rs. 2,03,66,683 to Inter-Ocean
Shipping and Logistic Services. According to the PCIT, as no TDS return showing
the details of deduction of any tax in respect of the aforesaid export freight
had been filed and as the A.O. had not verified the same, the scope of
provisions of TDS on export freight, the entire amount was required to be
disallowed u/s 40(a)(ia) of the Act. By an order u/s 263 dated 21st
March, 2018, the PCIT directed the A.O. to pass a fresh assessment order after
providing an opportunity of being heard to the assessee in view of the
observations made in the order u/s 263.

 

The Tribunal
came to the conclusion that the A.O. has accepted the total loss declared by
the assessee in the return of income and passed order u/s 143(3) dated 22nd
March, 2016. The Tribunal considered the materials placed before it and found
that the respondent assessee had made payment for export freight to the Indian
Ocean Shipping and Logistics Services, which was an Indian agent acting on
behalf of the non-resident shipping company for collecting freight demurrage
and other charges and reimbursing the same to the shipping company. Therefore,
relying on the CBDT Circular No. 723 dated 19th September, 1995, the
Tribunal held that where payment is made to the shipping agents of the
non-resident ship-owner or charter, the agent steps into the shoe of the
principal, i.e. the shipping company, and according to the provisions u/s 172
of the Act, which provides for shipping business in respect of non-residents
would be applicable and the provisions of section 194C or 195 which provides
for deduction of tax at source shall not be applicable. The Tribunal,
therefore, held that the PCIT failed to consider that the assessee had
furnished the relevant materials in respect of export freight payment and it is
also not controverted by the PCIT; and therefore, it cannot be said that the
assessment order is erroneous or prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue in
any manner. The Tribunal set aside the order of the PCIT passed u/s 263 of the
Act.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of
the Tribunal and held as under:

 

‘i)   In view of the facts emerging
from the record and the finding of facts arrived at by the Tribunal, none of
the questions can be termed as substantial questions of law from the impugned
order passed by the Tribunal.

 

ii)   The appeal, therefore, fails
and is accordingly dismissed.’

 

INTERPLAY BETWEEN DEEMING FICTIONS OF SECTIONS 45(3) AND 50C

ISSUE FOR
CONSIDERATION

Section
45(3) of the Act provides for taxation of the capital gains on transfer of a capital
asset by a person to a firm in which he is or becomes a partner, by way of
capital contribution or otherwise, in the year of transfer and further provides
that the amount recorded in the books of accounts of the firm shall be deemed
to be the full value of the consideration received or accruing as a result of
such transfer of the capital asset for the purposes of section 48. Section 50C
of the Act provides that the value adopted or assessed or assessable by the
stamp valuation authority for the purpose of payment of stamp duty in respect
of transfer of a capital asset, being land or building or both, shall for the
purposes of section 48 be deemed to be the full value of the consideration
received or accruing as a result of such transfer if it is higher than its
actual consideration.

 

Whether both
the aforesaid provisions of the Act can be made applicable in a case where the
capital asset transferred by a partner to his firm by way of his capital
contribution is land or building or both is the issue that is sought to be
examined here. Whether for the purposes of section 48 the full value of
consideration should be the amount as recorded in the books of the firm in
accordance with the provisions of section 45(3), or whether it should be the
value as adopted or assessed or assessable by the stamp valuation authority in
accordance with the provisions of section 50C? Whether in computing the capital
gains, the higher of the two is to be adopted or not?

 

The Lucknow
bench of the Tribunal has held that the provisions of section 50C shall prevail
over the provisions of section 45(3) in a case where the stamp duty value was
higher than the value recorded in the books of the firm. As against this, the
Mumbai, Kolkata, Hyderabad and Chennai benches of the Tribunal have held that
the provisions of section 45(3), ignoring the provisions of section 50C, alone
can apply in a case where land or building has been introduced by a partner by
way of his capital contribution.


THE CARLTON HOTEL
(P) LTD. CASE

The issue
first came up for consideration of the Lucknow bench of the Tribunal in the
case of Carlton Hotel (P) Ltd. vs. ACIT 35 SOT 26 (Lucknow) (URO).
In this case, during the previous year relevant to A.Y. 2004-05 the assessee
company entered into a partnership with two other persons. The assessee company
contributed 2,40,000 sq. ft. of land as its capital contribution which was
valued at Rs. 7,81,96,735 and was so recorded in the books of the partnership
firm. The assessee was given 5% share in the partnership firm, whereas the
other two partners were given 95% share.

 

For the
purposes of computing capital gains in the hands of the partner assessee on
transfer of the land to the partnership firm, the A.O. invoked the provisions
of section 50C and applied circle rates for the purpose of calculating the
consideration for transfer. He valued the consideration at Rs. 29,75,46,468
instead of Rs. 7,81,96,735 and on that basis he calculated the long-term
capital gains. The A.O. inter alia doubted the genuineness of the
introduction of land and noted that the assessee has contributed 88% of capital
in lieu of only 5% share in profits which was beyond the normal business
prudence and the transfer of the land to the firm was as good as a sale. For
the purpose of holding so, he referred to the clauses of the partnership deed
and observed that the assessee had little role to play in the partnership
business, the assessee was not a managing partner in the firm, construction on
the plot was to be carried out by another partner of the firm, the assessee was
not having any civil, criminal or financial liability, the business of the
partnership was to be exclusively carried out by other partners of the firm,
the bank account could be independently operated only by the other two
partners, whereas the assessee could operate only with joint signatures of the
other two partners; it was only the other partners who had been empowered to
introduce new partners, the assessee did not have any right over the goodwill
of the firm, was not authorised to make any change in the composition of the
board which had controlling interest in its share capital, etc.

 

Thus, the A.O. alleged that the
assessee had adopted a device to evade capital gains tax by showing lower value
of sale consideration in the books of the firm, whereas the actual market value
of the land was much higher as reflected from the circle rate. He relied on the
decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of McDowell & Co. Ltd. vs.
CTO 154 ITR 148 for the proposition that if an assessee adopts a tax
avoidance scheme, then the form can be ignored. Thus, by taking the substance
of the transaction into consideration, the market value of the land transferred
to the firm as capital contribution was adopted by invoking section 50C,
contending that mere reliance on section 45(3) in isolation would defeat the
intent and purpose of the taxing statute.

 

Importantly, the A.O. also took a
view that section 50C was applicable even in a situation covered by section
45(3). The A.O., ignoring the facts that the transfer of land as capital
contribution was not through a registered document and that the provisions of
section 50C were amended only thereafter to rope in even the transfer of
immovable property otherwise than through a registered document, applied the provisions
of section 50C.

 

Upon further appeal, the CIT(A)
confirmed the order of the A.O. confirming that the value adopted by the
assessee for transferring the land to the firm was a collusive one and that the
provision of section 50C being a specific provision was applicable even where
provisions of section 45(3) had been invoked.

 

Upon further appeal to the
Tribunal, it was contended on behalf of the assessee that the provisions of
section 45(3) and section 50C were mutually exclusive; where section 45(3) was
applicable, section 50C would not be applicable and vice versa. It was
further submitted that section 45(3) created a deeming fiction whereby the
consideration recorded by the firm in its books was deemed to be the full value
of consideration for the purpose of computing capital gains. Section 50C was
another deeming section which empowered the A.O. to substitute the valuation
done by the stamp valuation authority as sale consideration in place of
consideration shown by the parties to the transaction. Once one deeming section
was invoked, another deeming section could not be made to nullify the effect of
the earlier deeming section. The application of section 50C in such a situation
would render section 45(3) otiose. Regarding the allegation that the assessee
had entered into a collusive transaction and accordingly had shown lower value
of consideration in the books of the firm, it was submitted that the firm would
be paying tax upon its further sale by adopting the value of land as recorded
in the books and, hence, there would not be any revenue loss.

 

On the other hand, the Revenue
supported the order of the A.O. and the CIT(A) and claimed that the form of the
transaction had to be ignored and its substance had to be considered, since the
assessee had entered into a collusive transaction.

 

The Tribunal
for the reasons recorded in the order rejected one of the contentions of the
Revenue that since section 50C required adoption of the circle rates for the
purpose of levy of the stamp duty which rates, once declared, could be
‘adopted’ for the purpose of substituting the full value of consideration for
section 48 and it was not necessary that the document for transfer of asset was
actually registered before invoking section 50C.

 

On the issue under consideration,
however, the Tribunal held that the provisions of section 50C could be invoked
even though the case was otherwise covered under section 45(3); section 50C
would override section 45(3). Section 45(3) was a general provision, while
section 50C was a special provision which would override section 45(3). In the
final analysis, however, the Tribunal rejected the action of the A.O. in
applying the provisions of section 50C on the ground of non-registration and
non-payment of the stamp duty.

 

It may be noted for the record
that the Revenue had filed a further appeal before the Allahabad High Court
against the decision of the Tribunal mainly for pleading that the transaction
was a colourable transaction executed with the intention to evade the tax
liability. And the High Court upholding the contention held that there existed all
the facts and circumstances to show prima facie that the entire
transaction of contribution to partnership was a sham and fictitious
transaction and an attempt to devise a method to avoid tax and remanded the
matter back to the Tribunal to look into this aspect of the matter, which was
an issue directly raised by the Revenue right from the stage of assessment. No
findings have been given by the High Court with respect to the issue of
applicability of section 50C to the transaction of introduction of capital
asset by the partner in the firm which is otherwise covered by section 45(3).


AMARTARA PVT. LTD.
CASE

Thereafter,
the issue came up for consideration of the Mumbai bench of the Tribunal in DCIT
vs. Amartara Pvt. Ltd. 78 ITR (Trib.)(S.N.) 46 (Mum).

 

In this
case, during the previous year relevant to A.Y. 2012-13 the assessee entered
into a limited liability partnership with the object of developing,
constructing and operating resorts, hotels and apartment hotels and / or for
carrying out such other hospitality businesses. The assessee transferred an
immovable property, being a plot of land admeasuring 6,869.959 metres situated
at Powai, Mumbai, as its capital contribution to the newly-created LLP vide
a supplementary agreement dated 29th December, 2011.

 

The said
plot of land was valued at Rs. 5.60 crores on the basis of the valuation report
obtained and it was recorded at that value in the books of the LLP. The
assessee, while computing capital gains on transfer of land into the
partnership firm in accordance with the provisions of section 45(3), had taken
the value as recorded in the books of the firm, i.e., Rs. 5.60 crores, as the
full value of the consideration deemed to have been received or accrued as a
result of transfer of capital asset to the partnership firm. The supplementary
agreement through which the said plot of land was introduced by the assessee
into the LLP was registered on 24th April, 2012 and the stamp duty
authority had determined the market value of the property for the purpose of
payment of stamp duty at Rs. 9,41,78,500.

 

The A.O.
invoked the provisions of section 50C and adopted the amount of Rs.
9,41,78,500, being the value determined by the stamp valuation authority at the
time of registration of the supplementary partnership deed, as the full value
of consideration for the purpose of computing capital gains. He observed that
the provisions of section 45(3) did not begin with a non-obstante clause
and, therefore, there was no specific mention of non-applicability of section
50C in the cases covered by section 45(3). He also relied upon the Lucknow
Tribunal decision in the case of Carlton Hotel (P) Ltd. (Supra)
for the proposition that section 50C, being a specific provision, would
override the provisions of section 45(3). The CIT(A) confirmed the order of the
A.O. by following the said decision in the case of Carlton Hotel (P) Ltd.
(Supra).

 

On further
appeal before the Tribunal, the assessee contended that sections 45(3) and
45(4) were special provisions for computation of capital gains on transfer of
capital assets between the partnership firm and the partners and that both the
provisions were deeming fictions created for the purpose of taxation of
transfers of capital assets in such special cases; importing another deeming
fiction to determine the full value of consideration in such special cases was
incorrect in view of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of CIT
vs. Moon Mills Ltd. 59 ITR 574. It was submitted that the decision
rendered by the Lucknow bench of the Tribunal was per incuriam, in the
light of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs.
Moon Mills Ltd. (Supra), as per which a deeming fiction could not be
extended by importing another deeming fiction for the purpose of determination of
the full value of consideration.

 

It was also
contended on behalf of the assessee that section 50C of the Act had no
application where no consideration was received or accrued, and hence,
computing full value of consideration by applying the provisions of section 50C
in a case where there was a transfer between partners and the partnership firm
without there being any actual consideration received or accrued, was
incorrect.

 

In reply,
the Revenue heavily relied upon the said decision of the Lucknow bench of the
Tribunal in the case of Carlton Hotel (P) Ltd. (Supra) and
contended that section 50C overrode the provisions of section 45(3) once the
document of transfer was registered as per the provisions of the Registration
Act, 1908 and the stamp duty was paid for the registration of such document.

 

The Tribunal held that the
purpose of insertion of section 45(3) was to deal with cases of transfer
between a partnership firm and partners and in such cases the Act provided for
the computation mechanism of capital gains and also provides for consideration
to be adopted for the purpose of determination of full value of consideration.
Since the Act itself provided for deeming consideration to be adopted for the
purpose of section 48 of the Act, another deeming fiction provided by way of
section 50C could not be extended to compute the deemed full value of
consideration as a result of transfer of capital asset. It held that the
Lucknow bench had simply observed that the provisions of section 50C overrode
the provisions of section 45(3) but had not given a categorical finding.
Accordingly, the addition made towards the long-term capital gain by invoking
the provisions of section 50C
was deleted.

 

This decision of the Mumbai bench
of the Tribunal has been subsequently followed by the Tribunal in the cases of ACIT
vs. Moti Ramanand Sagar (ITA No. 2049/Mum/2017); ACIT vs. Kethireddy Venkata
Mohan Reddy (ITA No. 259/Hyd/2019); and ITO vs. Sheila Sen (ITA No.
554/Kol/2016).

 

OBSERVATIONS

The issue
under consideration arises due to two conflicting provisions of the Act which
can be invoked for a given transaction wherein the capital asset transferred by
a partner to his firm, as a capital contribution or otherwise, is land or
building. Section 45(3) provides for the amount recorded in the books of
accounts of the firm as deemed consideration. Section 50C provides for the
value adopted, assessed or assessable by stamp valuation authorities as deemed
consideration, if it exceeds the consideration received or accruing. Thus, both
the provisions deal with the determination of the full value of consideration
for the purpose of computation of capital gains by creating a deeming fiction.
Apart from considering the legislative intent behind both the provisions in
order to resolve the conflict between these two provisions, there are various
other aspects which are also required to be considered, like whether two
deeming fictions can operate simultaneously with respect to the same component
of the computation; whether one of these two provisions can be considered as a
general provision and the other one as a special provision whereby it can
override the general one; and which one will prevail if both the provisions are
required to be considered as special provisions.

 

Sub-section (3) was inserted in
section 45 by the Finance Act, 1987 with effect from A.Y. 1988-89. Prior to the
insertion of sub-section (3), the issue of taxability of the transfer of
capital asset by a partner to his firm was decided by the Supreme Court in the
case of Sunil Siddharthbhai vs. CIT 156 ITR 509. In this case,
the Supreme Court held that when the assessee brought his personal assets into
the partnership firm as his contribution to the capital, there was a transfer
of a capital asset within the meaning of the terms of section 45. This was
because the asset which was, till the date of such bringing in as firm’s
capital, an individual asset, after bringing it in became a shared asset. The
Supreme Court further held that the transfer of asset by the partner to the
firm as capital contribution would not necessarily result in receipt of any
consideration by the assessee so as to attract section 45 and the credit entry
made in the partner’s capital account in the books of the partnership firm did
not represent the true value of consideration. It was a notional value only,
intended to be taken into account at the time of determining the value of the
partner’s share in the net partnership assets on the date of dissolution or on
his retirement.

Therefore,
according to the Supreme Court, it was not correct to hold that the
consideration which a partner acquires on making over his personal asset to the
partnership firm as his contribution to its capital can fall within the
provisions of section 48. Since section 48 was fundamental to the computation
machinery incorporated in the scheme relating to determination of charge
provided in section 45, the Supreme Court held that such a case must be
regarded as falling outside the scope of capital gains taxation altogether.

 

It was in
this background that the legislature had introduced a specific provision so as
to bring the transfer of the capital asset by a partner to his firm to tax, as
is evident from Circular No. 495 dated 22nd September, 1987, the
extract from which is reproduced below:

 

Capital
gains on transfer of firms’ assets to partners and vice versa and by way of compulsory acquisition

24.1 One of
the devices used by assessees to evade tax on capital gains is to convert an
asset held individually into an asset of the firm in which the individual is a
partner. The decision of the Supreme Court in Kartikeya V. Sarabhai vs. CIT [1985] 156 ITR 509 has set at rest the controversy as to whether such a conversion amounts
to transfer. The Court held that such conversion fell outside the scope of
capital gains taxation. The rationale advanced by the Court is that the
consideration for the transfer of the personal asset is indeterminate, being
the right which arises or accrues to the partner during the subsistence of the
partnership to get his share of the profits from time to time and on
dissolution of the partnership to get the value of his share from the net
partnership assets.

 

24.2 With a
view to blocking this escape route for avoiding capital gains tax, the Finance
Act, 1987 has inserted new sub-section (3) in section 45. The effect of this
amendment is that profits and gains arising from the transfer of a capital
asset by a partner to a firm shall be chargeable as the partner’s income of the
previous year in which the transfer took place. For purposes of computing the
capital gains, the value of the asset recorded in the books of the firm on the
date of the transfer shall be deemed to be the full value of the consideration
received or accrued as a result of the transfer of the capital asset.

 

In view of
the above, it is clear that but for the specific provision of section 45(3),
the transfer of any capital asset by a partner to his firm could not have been
charged to tax under the head capital gains. In addition to providing for the
chargeability, section 45(3) also addresses the lacuna of the inability of
section 48 to cover such transfer within its ambit which was noticed by the Supreme
Court in the case of Sunil Siddharthbhai (Supra), by deeming the
amount recorded in the books of accounts of the firm as the full value of
consideration received or accruing as a result of such transfer.

 

Therefore,
it is obvious that section 45(3) needs to be invoked in order to charge the
capital gains tax in respect of transfer of a capital asset by a partner to his
firm. Having invoked the provisions of section 45(3) for the purpose of
chargeability, it needs to be applied in full and the alteration in the
computation mechanism as provided in that section also needs to be considered.
It would not be possible to invoke the provisions of section 45(3) only for the
purpose of creating a charge and, then, compute the capital gain in accordance
with the other provision, i.e., section 50C, by ignoring the computational
aspect of section 45(3) altogether.

 

The Mumbai
bench of the Tribunal in the case of ACIT vs. Prem Sagar (ITA No.
7442/Mum/2016) has held that both the limbs of section 45(3), i.e.,
charging provision and deeming fiction providing for the full value of
consideration, go hand in hand for facilitating quantification of the capital
gains tax. In case the quantification of the capital gains tax as envisaged in
section 45(3) is substituted by section 50C, then the charging to tax of the
transaction under consideration would in itself stand jeopardised and the
section would be rendered inoperative.

 

Having said
that the computation of capital gains needs to be made in accordance with the
provisions of section 45(3), the question may arise as to whether the amount of
consideration as decided in accordance with it can then be amended by invoking
the provisions of section 50C, in a case where the valuation adopted, assessed
or assessable by the stamp valuation authority is found to be higher than the
amount recorded in the books of the firm. For the purpose of section 50C the
comparison is required to be made between the consideration received or
accruing as a result of the transfer of the capital asset and the value
adopted, assessed or assessable by the stamp valuation authority for the
purpose of payment of stamp duty in respect of such transfer. Here, the
consideration received or accruing should be the real consideration received or
accruing, and not the consideration which is deemed to have been received or
accrued. This is because the expression ‘the consideration received or accruing
as a result of the transfer’ cannot be construed to include the consideration
deemed to have been received or accrued.

Wherever
required, the legislature has included a specific reference to something which
has been deemed to be so, in addition to the reference of the same thing in
simple terms. For example, section 9 provides for incomes which shall be deemed
to accrue or arise in India under certain circumstances. For the purpose of
including such income which is deemed to accrue or arise in India within the
scope of total income, clause (b) of section 5(1) makes specific reference to
it in addition to referring to the income which accrues or arises (in real and
not on deemed basis). The relevant clause is reproduced below:

 

(b) accrues
or arises or is deemed to accrue or arise to him in India during such year

 

There was no
need to make such a specific reference to the income which is deemed to accrue
or arise in India, if a view is taken that the income which accrues or arises
in India will in any case include the income which is deemed to accrue or arise
in India. As a corollary, the expression ‘the consideration received or
accruing as a result of the transfer’ as used in section 50C cannot include the
consideration deemed to be received or accrued in terms of the provisions of
section 45(3).

 

Further,
section 45(3) deems the amount recorded in the books of accounts of the firm as
a consideration only for the purpose of section 48. Therefore, the deeming
fiction created in section 45(3) has limited applicability and it cannot be
extended to section 50C, to deem the amount so recorded in the books of
accounts of the firm as consideration received or accruing for the purpose of
making its comparison with the valuation adopted, assessed or assessable by the
stamp valuation authorities. As a result, the provisions of section 50C cannot
be made applicable to the transfer of a capital asset by a partner to his firm
for which the true value of consideration received or accruing cannot be
determined, as held by the Supreme Court in the case of Sunil
Siddharthbhai (Supra).

 

The Supreme
Court in the case of CIT vs. Moon Mills Ltd. 59 ITR 574 has held
that one fiction cannot be imported within another fiction. Two different
provisions of the Act are providing for a fiction by deeming certain amounts as
the full value of consideration for the purpose of computation of capital gains
as per section 48. Section 45(3) deems the amount recorded in the books of the
firm as the full value of consideration and section 50C deems the value
adopted, assessed or assessable by the stamp valuation authority as the full
value of consideration. If section 50C has been made applicable over the amount
deemed to be the full value of consideration in terms of section 45(3), then it
will amount to superimposing a fiction upon a fiction – which would be contrary
to the decision of the Supreme Court.

 

In the case
of ITO vs. United Marine Academy 130 ITD 113 (Mum)(SB), a special
bench of the Tribunal has dealt with the interplay of deeming fictions as
provided in sections 50 and 50C and has observed as under:

 

For the
reasons given above and on interpretation of the relevant provisions of
sections 48, 50 and 50C, we are of the view that there are two deeming fictions
created in section 50 and section 50C. The first deeming fiction modifies the
term ‘cost of acquisition’ used in section 48 for the purpose of computing the
capital gains arising from transfer of depreciable assets, whereas the deeming
fiction created in section 50C modifies the term ‘full value of the
consideration received or accruing as a result of transfer of the capital
asset’ used in section 48 for the purpose of computing the capital gains
arising from the transfer of capital asset being land or building or both. The
deeming fiction created in section 50C thus operates in a specific field which
is different from the field in which section 50 is applicable. It is thus not a
case where any supposition has been sought to be imposed on any other
supposition of law. On the other hand, there are two different fictions created
into two different provisions, and going by the legislative intentions to create
the said fictions, the same operate in different fields. The harmonious
interpretation of the relevant provisions makes it clear that there is no
exclusion of applicability of one fiction in a case where another fiction is
applicable. As a matter of fact, there is no conflict between these two legal
fictions which operate in different fields and their application in a given
case simultaneously does not result in imposition of one supposition on another
supposition of law.

 

Thus,
insofar as transfer of an asset forming part of a block is concerned, the
Tribunal has held that both the provisions of the Act, i.e. sections 50 and
50C, can operate simultaneously. This is primarily for the reason that they
operate in different fields of the computation of capital gains. It was
categorically observed by the Tribunal that it was not a case where any
supposition has been sought to be imposed on another supposition of law.
Therefore, the inference which can be drawn indirectly on the basis of these
observations of the special bench is that two deeming fictions cannot operate
simultaneously if they operate in the same field like in the issue under
consideration.

 

It is also a
settled principle of interpretation that if a special provision is made on a
certain matter, the matter is excluded from the general provisions. This
principle is expressed in the maxims Generalia specialibus non derogant
(general things do not derogate from special things) and Generalibus
specialia derogant (special things derogate from general things).

 

However, it won’t be correct to
claim here that either of the two sections is a special one and, hence, it
overrides the other. Section 45(3) is a special provision insofar as
computation of capital gains resulting from capital contribution made by a
partner to the firm is concerned, and section 50C is a special provision
insofar as transfer of immovable property is concerned. Therefore, the issue
can better be resolved having regard to the other considerations as discussed
instead of merely relying upon these principles of interpretation.

 

In Canora
Resources Ltd., In Re 180 Taxman 220, the AAR was dealing with a case
where the transfer pricing provisions contained in sections 92 to 92F were also
becoming applicable to the transaction of the type which was covered by section
45(3). In this case, the AAR rejected the contention of the assessee that
section 45(3) being a special provision shall prevail over the general
provisions of sections 92 to 92F with regard to the transfer pricing.
Considering the purpose for which the transfer pricing provisions have been
made, the AAR held that section 45(3) would not apply to international
transactions and they should be dealt with in accordance with the transfer
pricing provisions. Insofar as such purposive interpretation is concerned with
respect to the issue under consideration, recently, the Chennai bench of the
Tribunal in the case of Shri Sarrangan Ashok vs. ITO (ITA No.
544/Chny/2019) has held that had it been the intention of the
legislature to make section 50C applicable even to the transaction of the
contribution of immovable property by a partner into the firm, the Parliament
could have repealed section 45(3) while introducing the provisions of section
50C. However, the fact that Parliament in its wisdom had retained section 45(3)
shows that Parliament intended to apply only the provisions of section 45(3) to
such transfer of capital assets by the partner to his firm.

 

The better view in our considered opinion, therefore,
is that the provisions of section 50C cannot be made applicable to a
transaction which falls within the scope of the provisions of section 45(3).

Domestic Tax Considerations Due To Covid-19

Background

The intensifying Covid-19
pandemic and the looming uncertainty on future business outlook have put the
emergency brakes on India Inc. Sudden lockdown, supply side disruption, adverse
foreign exchange rate, travel restriction as also uncertainty on vaccine to
cure the misery have added to the uncertainty, pushing Captains of India Inc.
into rescue mode. Clearly, while the immediate focus is to save the ship from
sinking, tax considerations also require due consideration in time to come.
This article focuses on some of the direct tax issues which are likely to be
faced by Indian taxpayers.

 

Deduction
of expenses incurred on Covid 19

As the pandemic increased its
spread into the country, India Inc. rose to the occasion and started supporting
various noble causes of the society in terms of supplying food, medical
supplies, setting up of quarantine centres, etc. Most of the corporates joined
hands in the national interest and contributed to PM CARES and CM Covid-19
Funds to support frontline workers and assist in the medical war. MCA, with a
noble intention, amended Schedule VII of the Companies Act, 2013 (‘Cos Act’) to
include Covid-19 expenditure as eligible CSR expenditure in compliance with CSR
law.

 

Explanation 2 to section 37(1) of
the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘the Act’) provides that any expenditure incurred by
an assessee on the activities relating to corporate social responsibility referred
to in section 135 of the Companies Act, 2013 (18 of 2013) shall not be deemed
to be an expenditure incurred by the assessee for the purpose of the business
or profession.

 

The amendment to Schedule VII of
the Companies Act read with the Explanation 2 to section 37(1) of the Act
raises the following issues:

 

a)   Whether the expenditure on Covid-19 is tax deductible for an
assessee not required to comply with CSR regulations of the Companies Act,
2013?

b)   Can an assessee claim business expenditure for
Covid -19 related expenditure which he does not claim to be CSR for the purpose
of compliance with section 135 of Cos Act?

It is possible to take a view
that Explanation 2 to section 37(1) of the Act is applicable only to those
assessees who are covered by section 135 of the Companies Act. Thus, if an
assessee is not covered by the said regulation, the limitation of Explanation 2
to section 37 is not applicable. Courts have held that factors like meeting
social obligation, impact on goodwill on contribution to society, etc. meet the
test of commercial expediency and deduction has been granted1. Thus,
onus will be on the assessee to prove nexus of the expenditure with the
business and the positive impact on business to perfect the claim of deduction.
Branding of company on distribution of food and essential requirements, images
of employees wearing company branded shirts and supporting larger cause, media
reports, posting on social websites will all support the claim for deduction.

 

The issue arises in the second
category i.e. an assessee who is otherwise covered by section 135 of Companies
Act who does not claim Covid-19 related expenditure for compliance with CSR
laws. The difficulty arises as Explanation 2 to section 37(1) disallows
expenditure ‘referred to in section 135’. Referred to would mean ‘mentioned’ in
section 135 of the Companies Act. Explanation 2 to section 37(1) fictionally
deems such expenditure as not being for business purpose. Whilst argument in
favour of deduction seems a better view of the matter, it is recommended that
assessee should take fact-specific legal advise before claiming deduction.

 

Impact on lease rental

Lockdown and
social distancing are likely to have significant impact on lease rentals. The
impact may be deep for let-out properties in shopping malls and hotels.
Further, the sudden lockdown may have resulted in economic disruption of
business of the lessee, impairing its ability to pay rent. Following situations
are likely to arise:

 

a)   Lessee does not pay rent for lockdown period by invoking force
majeure, which is accepted by the lessor;

b)   Lessee invokes force majeure which is not accepted by the
lessor;

c)   Lessor and lessee defer rent for a mutually
agreed period;

d)   Lessee is unable to pay rent and vacates the
premises;

e)   Lessor is subsequently unable to find a
lessee for the property either on account of lockdown or lower rental yield;

 

In case of situation a), act of force
majeure goes to the root of the contract making the contract unworkable. On
account of the said event, a view could be taken that the property ceases to be
a let-out property. Accordingly, it may be possible for the lessor to seek
benefit of vacancy allowance u/s 23(1)(c). The said provision states that in
case actual rent received or receivable is less than deemed Annual Let out
Value (ALV) on account of vacancy then, actual rent received or receivable will
be deemed to be ALV. In this case, vacancy arises contractually. In other
words, even though goods or assets of lessee may continue to be lying in said
property but still it has to be treated as not let out, absolving the  lessee from the liability to pay rent.
Vacancy in the context in which it is used in section 23(1)(c) will need to be
interpreted as the antithesis of let out.

 

Situation b) is tricky as there
is a rent dispute during the lockdown period. Section 23(1)(b) provides that
when actual rent received or receivable is higher than ALV, then said amount
will be treated as ALV. ‘Receivable’ postulates concept of accrual. As per one
option, lessor may treat same amount as unrealised rent and offer the same in
the year of receipt u/s 25A. However, if it is required to keep rent as
receivable in books of accounts to succeed under the Contract Act, then in such
an event, tax liability will arise.

 

Situation c) involves mere
deferment of payment of rent and accordingly lessor will be required to pay tax
on rent component as it fulfils the test of receivable u/s 23(1)(b). 

 

Situation d) is a case comparable
to unrealised rent. Explanation to section 23 read with Rule 4 provides for
exclusion of such rent if the conditions prescribed in Rule 4 are complied
with.

 

Issue in case of situation e)
arises as section 23(3) permits only two houses to be treated as self-occupied.
Situation narrated in e) needs to be distinguished from a situation wherein
assessee in past years has offered income from more than two houses under the
head Income from house property. Conclusion does not change for such assessee.
Situation e) deals with a situation wherein assessee desires to actually let
out his house but could not find a tenant. In such situations, the Tribunal2  has held that even if the house remains
vacant for the entire year despite the best attempts of the assessee, then
benefit of vacancy allowance u/s 23(1)(c) should be granted to the assessee and
accordingly ALV for such property would be Nil. Against this proposition, there
is also an adverse decision in the case of Susham Singla [2016] 76
taxmann.com 349 (Punjab & Haryana)3. Perhaps a
distinguishing feature could be that in cases where vacancy allowance was
granted by the Tribunal, the assessee was able to demonstrate efforts made to
let out property.

 

Impact on business income


Revenue
recognition

Revenue recognition for computing
income under the head ?profits and gains of business or profession’ is governed
by the principles of accrual enshrined in section 4 as also ICDS IV dealing
with revenue recognition. ICDS IV permits revenue recognition in respect of
sale of goods only if the following criteria are met:

 

  •     Whether significant risks and rewards of ownership have been
    transferred to the buyer and the seller retains no effective control
  •     Evaluate reasonable certainty of its ultimate collection

 

These criteria are relevant for
revenue recognition for F.Y. 2019-20. On account of lockdown and logistics
issues, it is possible that goods dispatched could not reach the customer.
Contractually, even though the transaction may have been concluded, the seller
was obliged to deliver goods to the buyer. In such a case, because of lockdown,
goods may be in transit or in the seller’s warehouse. In such a situation,
significant risk and reward of ownership continues to be with the seller.
Accordingly, the seller may not be required to offer the said amount to tax.
Further, economic stress may change the credit profile of the customer, raising
a question on the realisability of sale proceeds of the goods sold even
pre-Covid-19 outbreak. In such a case, even though the test of accrual would be
met, since there is uncertainty in ultimate collection, the assessee may not
recognise such revenue. This criterion is also important as the customer may
invoke force majeure clause or material adverse clause and turn back
from its commitment. 

 

Section 43CB of the Act read with
ICDS IV requires the service industry to apply Percentage of Completion Method
(POCM). If duration of service is less than 90 days, the assessee can apply
Project Completion Method (PCM) and offer revenue to tax on completion of the
project. Disruption caused due to pandemic and work from home is likely to
impact numerous service contracts. Assessee will have to determine stage of
completion of contract on 31st March 2020 for each open contract at
year end to determine its chargeable income. It is equally possible that a
contract which was estimated to be completed in less than 90 days may take more
time and accordingly move from PCM to POCM basis of recognition. Thus, it is
possible that an income which was estimated to be offered to tax in F.Y.
2020-21 may partially be required to be taxed in F.Y. 2019-20, changing the
assumptions at the time of computing advance tax. An issue which judiciary is
likely to face is whether the 90 days period should be read as a rigid test or
exceptional events like Covid-19 can be excluded for computing the 90 days’
periods. 

 

Provision
for onerous contract

Ind AS 37 requires recognition of
provision for onerous contract. An onerous contract is a contract in which the
unavoidable costs of meeting the obligations under the contract exceed the
economic benefits expected to be received under it. If an entity has a contract
that is onerous, the present obligation under the contract shall be recognised
and measured as a provision.

 

Section 36(1)(xviii) of the Act
provides that mark to market (M2M) loss or other expected loss shall be
computed in accordance with ICDS. Section 40A(13) of the Act provides that no
deduction or allowance shall be allowed in respect of any M2M loss or expected
loss except as allowable u/s 36(1)(xviii). ICDS 1 provides that expected loss
shall not be recognised unless the same is in accordance with other ICDS. ICDS
X provides that no provision shall be recognised for costs that need to be
incurred to operate in the future. On co-joint reading of aforesaid law, no
deduction shall be allowed for onerous contract under normal provisions.
However, for MAT purposes, such provision will be deductible as it cannot be said
that such provision is for unascertained liability. This treatment will require
an assessee to accurately track expenses incurred on such contract in future
years and claim it as deduction in year of incurrence.

 

Liquidated
damages

Disruption in the supply chain
may result in claims or counter claims as it is possible that the assessee
would not be in a position to meet its contractual obligations. The contract
may provide for payment of liquidated damages. Courts have held that such
payment is tax deductible4.

 

Remeasurement
of provision

Lockdown and social distancing
have resulted in India Inc. rethinking on extension of warranty and service
period in respect of goods sold prior to Covid-19. This is likely to result in
change in warranty provision. Provision for warranty is tax deductible if
otherwise the requirements of ICDS X are met. Practically for companies
following Ind AS, warranty provisions are discounted to fair value. However,
ICDS X expressly prohibits deduction based on discounting to net present value
basis. This mismatch will require an assessee to accurately reconcile claims
made in the past ignoring NPV basis, revise the provision and ignore NPV
discounting for claiming deduction. This is much easier said than done.

 

Further, companies following Ind
AS are required to make provision for debtors based on Expected Credit Loss
(ECL) method. This method requires consideration of not only the historic data
but also of the future credit risk profile of debtor. In turbulent times like
these, making an estimate of the future profile of a customer is likely to be
challenging since the business outlook is uncertain. Further, the impact of
lockdown on each customer, its ability to raise finances and stay afloat
involves significant assumptions and customer-specific data. Normative
mathematical models cannot be relied upon. It is possible that ECL provision
may increase for F.Y. 2019-20. Such provision may not be tax deductible under
normal computation provisions [Explanation 1 to section 36(1)(vii)]. As regards
MAT, the issue is debatable. Gujarat High Court’s Full Bench in case of CIT
vs. Vodafone Essar Gujarat Ltd5  has held that if the provision is accounted
as reduction from debtor / asset side and not reflected separately in
liabilities side then, in such case said provision is not hit by any limitation
of Explanation 1 to section 115JB and is tax deductible.

 

Inventory
valuation

ICDS 2 permits valuation of
inventory at cost or Net Realisable Value (NRV) whichever is lower. It is
possible that on account of prolonged shutdown, disruption in supply chain,
overhaul of non-essential commodities, some of the inventory which may be lying
in warehouse or stuck in transport may no longer be marketable e.g perishable
goods, inventory with short shelf life (food products) may be required to be
disposed of. In such case, it should be possible to recognise NRV at Nil. Care
should be taken to obtain corroborative 
evidence in terms of internal technical reports, subsequent measures to
dispose of, etc. to substantiate Nil realisable value.

Fixed
Asset

The spread of Covid-19 has had a
differing impact on various nations. It is possible that some of the fixed assets
acquired could not be installed on account of cross border travel prohibitions
not only in India but across the globe. In such a case, such assets which were
earlier contemplated to start active use in F.Y. 2019-20 will miss the
deadline. In absence of satisfaction of the user test, no depreciation can be
claimed in F.Y. 2019-20. Further in terms of ICDS V – tangible fixed assets,
cost attributable to such fixed asset may also be required to be capitalised.
Further, if such asset is purchased out of borrowed funds, interest expenditure
will be required to be capitalised. Unlike Ind AS 23, ICDS IX does not suspend
capitalisation when active development is suspended. This mismatch will require
the assessee to accurately determine interest cost which is expensed for books
purpose and capitalise it as part of borrowing for tax purposes. It is equally
possible that unexpected delay may impact advance tax projections made for F.Y.
2019-20.

 

Shares and securities

The Act provides special
anti-abuse provisions in respect of dealing in shares and securities. Sections
50CB and  56(2)(x) regulate transactions
where actual consideration is less than fair market value. Rule 11UA provides a
computation yardstick to compute fair market value. The economic downturn may force
some promoters to sell their shares at less than Rule 11UA value to genuine
investors either to repay debts borrowed on pledge of shares or to raise
capital for future survival. Provisions of sections 50CB and 56(2)(x), if
invoked, may result in additional tax burden. Fortunately, Mumbai Tribunal in ACIT
vs. Subhodh Menon  relying on the
Supreme Court decision in the case of K P Varghese  read down the provision to apply only in
abusive situations.

 

Further, the pandemic may require
promoters to pump in capital into the company. Section 56(2)(viib) regulates
share infusion by a resident shareholder. The provision proposes to tax
infusion of share capital above the fair market value as computed by a merchant
banker. DCF is a commonly accepted methodology to value business. DCF requires
reasonable assumption of future cash flows, risk premium, perpetuity factor
etc. Considering that the present situation is exceptional, it may involve
significant assumptions by the valuer as also the company. Further, there will
be an element of uncertainty, especially when the business outlook is not
clear. It is possible that the actual business achievements may be at material
variance with genuine assumptions.

 

In contrast, the existing
situation may have an impact on capital infused in the past, say 2-3 years,
which were justified considering the valuation report availed from the Merchant
Banker at the said time. Tax authorities may now rely upon actual figures and question
the valuation variables used by the Merchant Banker. Tax authorities may
attempt to recompute fair value considering actual figures. In such a
situation, the onus will be on the assessee to demonstrate impact of Covid-19
on valuation assumptions made in the past. Evidence such as loss of major
customer, shutdown in major geographies, increased cost of borrowing, capacity
underutilisation will support the case of the assessee to justify valuation
done before Covid-19 breakout. 

 

Conclusion

One hopes normalcy returns soon.
Aforesaid are some of the issues which, in view of the authors, are only the
tip of the iceberg. If the pandemic deepens its curve, it is likely to result
in significant business disruption. Every impact on business has definite tax
consequences and tax professionals have a special role to play.   

 

________________________________________________

1   CIT vs. Madras Refineries Ltd., (2004) 266 ITR 170 (Mad);
Orissa Forest Development Corporation Ltd. vs. JCIT, (2002) 80 ITD 300
(Cuttack); Surat Electricity Co. Ltd. vs. ACIT, (2010) 5 ITR(Trib) 280 (Ahd)

2   Sachin R. Tendulkar vs.
DCIT [2018] 96 taxmann.com 253 (Mumbai – Trib.); Empire Capital (P.) Ltd vs.
DCIT [2018] 96 taxmann.com 253 (Mumbai – Trib.); Ms. Priyananki Singh Sood vs. ACIT [2019] 101 taxmann.com 45 (Delhi –
Trib.)

3   SLP dismissed by Supreme Court [2017] 81 taxmann.com 167 (SC)

4    PCIT vs. Green
Delhi BQS Ltd [2019] 417 ITR 162 (Delhi); CIT vs. Rambal
(P.) Ltd [2018] 96 taxmann.com 170 (Madras); PCIT vs. Mazda Ltd
[2017] 250 Taxman 510 (Gujarat) ; Haji Aziz and Abdul Shakoor Bros [1961] 41
ITR 350 (SC)

5    [2017] 397 ITR 55 (Gujarat)

6    [2019] 103 taxmann.com 15 (Mumbai)

7    [1981] 131 ITR 597 (SC)

ACCUMULATION OF INCOME U/S 11(2) – STATEMENT OF PURPOSES

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION

A
charitable institution registered u/s 12A or 12AA of the Income-tax Act, 1961
can claim exemption of its income from property held for charitable or
religious purposes u/s 11(1) to the extent of such income applied or deemed to
be applied for charitable or religious purposes. In addition, exemption is also
available in respect of income not so applied but accumulated or set apart u/s
11(2), for such purposes for a period not exceeding five years, by filing a
statement of such accumulation in form No. 10. Section 11(2) requires the
institution to state the purpose for which the income is being accumulated or
set apart and the period for which the income is to be accumulated or set apart
in form No 10.

 

One of the longest running
controversies for the last 29 years has been about whether the purpose required
to be stated in form No. 10 can be general in nature, such as mere reference to
or reproduction of the objects of the trust, or that the statement has to be
specific in nature. In other words, should it be held to be a sufficient
compliance where the accumulation is stated to be for any medical and / or
educational purpose, or the statement should specify that the accumulation is
for the building of a hospital or a school, or anything else. While the
Calcutta and Madras High Courts have taken a view that a mention of a specific
purpose, and not just the general objects, is necessary, a majority of other
Courts, including the Delhi, Karnataka, Punjab and Haryana, Gujarat and Andhra
Pradesh and Telangana High Courts, have taken a contrary view holding that a
mere specification of the broad objects in the statement would suffice for this
purpose.

 

THE SINGHANIA CHARITABLE
TRUST CASE

The issue first came up for
discussion before the Calcutta High Court in the case of DIT(E) vs.
Trustees of Singhania Charitable Trust 199 ITR 819.

 

In this case, the assessee, a public
charitable trust, had claimed exemption u/s 11 for A.Y. 1984-85, including for
accumulation u/s 11(2), for which purpose it had filed form No. 10. In the said
form, as purposes of accumulation of income, the assessee had listed all the charitable
objects for which it was created.

 

These were:

(i) To
assist, finance, support, found, establish and maintain any institution meant
for the relief of the poor, advancement of education and medical relief;

(ii) To open, found, establish or finance, assist and contribute to the
maintenance of hospitals, charitable dispensaries, maternity homes, children’s
clinics, family planning centres, welfare centres, schools, colleges and / or
institutions for promotion of research and education in medical science,
including surgery;

(iii) To maintain beds in hospitals and make research grants for the
promotion and advancement of medical science in India;

(iv) To help needy people in marriage, funeral and cremation of the
dead;

(v) To
found, establish, maintain and assist leper asylums or other institutions for
the treatment of leprosy;

(vi)  To open, found, establish, assist and maintain schools, colleges
and boarding houses;

(vii) To open, found, establish contribute to the maintenance of
orphanages, widows’ homes, lunatic asylums, poor houses;

(viii) To open, found, establish and assist schools, colleges and
hospitals, for the physically or mentally handicapped, spastics, the blind, the
deaf and the dumb;

(ix) To distribute dhotis, blankets, rugs, woollen clothing,
quilts or cotton, woollen, silken or other varieties of clothes to the poor;

(x) To
grant fees, stipends, scholarships, prizes, books, interest-free loans and
other aid for pursuing studies, training or research;

(xi) To establish, found and maintain libraries, reading rooms for the
convenience of the public;

(xii) To establish scholarships, teaching and research chairs in Indian
universities and contribute towards installation of capital equipment in
educational and research institutes;

(xiii) To print, publish, distribute journals, periodicals, books and
leaflets for the promotion of the objects of the society;

(xiv) To establish or support or aid in the establishment or support
of any other associations having similar objects;

(xv) To assist, support and to give monetary help to any individual in
distress, poor or poor(s) for his or their medical treatment, advancement of
education;

(xvi) To start, maintain and assist in relief measures in those parts
of India which are subjected to natural calamities such as famine, epidemics,
fire, flood, dearth of water, earthquake.

 

The resolution passed by the Board
of Trustees of the trust was to the effect that the balance of unapplied income
of the year was to be accumulated and / or set apart for application to any one
or more of the objects of the trust as set out in item numbers (i) to (xvi)
under paragraph 1 of the deed of the trust.

 

Its
assessment was completed, allowing the exemption u/s 11, including accumulation
u/s 11(2). Subsequently, a notice was issued by the Commissioner for revision
u/s 263. According to the Commissioner, section 11(2) contemplated only
specific or concrete purposes and since those were not specified by the
assessee, the assessment order was erroneous and prejudicial to the interests
of the Revenue. The Commissioner called for the revision of the order of
assessment u/s 263, setting aside the assessment order and directing the A.O.
to redo the assessment taking into account the correct position of facts and
law. The Commissioner observed that it would be a mockery of the section if, in
the application for accumulation, all the objects of the trust were listed out
and the period was mentioned as ten years, which was the maximum then
permissible under law.

 

On appeal, the Tribunal held that on
an examination of the scheme of the Act since a plurality of charitable
purposes was not ruled out under it, no objection could possibly be taken to
the assessee’s listing out all the objects of the trust in form No. 10. The Tribunal
held the act of the assessee to be in compliance with the provisions of the Act
and disagreed with the findings of the Commissioner.

 

Before the Calcutta High Court, it
was contended on behalf of the assessee that one purpose of accumulation was
interlinked with the other and, therefore, the mention of all the purposes did
not make any difference and satisfied the requirements of section 11(2).

The Calcutta High Court observed
that the Tribunal’s decision overlooked the scheme relating to the accumulation
of income for a particular future use. It noted that section 11(1) itself
provided for marginal setting apart and accumulation of up to 25% (now 15%) of
the income of the trust. According to the High Court, section 11(1)
accumulation could be taken for the broad purposes of the trust as a whole and
that is why the statute in section 11(1) did not require an assessee to state
or specify the purpose. Such setting apart u/s 11(1) for any of the purposes of
the trust was, however, a short-term accumulation, in view of the Court, not to
exceed beyond the subsequent year. The High Court noted that it was sub-section
(2) which provided for the long-term accumulation of the income where it was
obvious that the long-term accumulation thereunder should be for a definite and
concrete purpose or purposes.

 

The High Court noted that the
assessee had sought permission to accumulate not for any determinate purpose or
purposes, but for the objects as enshrined in the trust deed in a blanket or
global manner which, in its view, was definitely not in the contemplation of
section 11(2) when it was construed in its setting. The High Court held that
accepting the assessee’s contention that saving and accumulation of income for
future application of the income was for the purposes of the trust in the
widest terms so as to embrace the entirety of the objects clause of the trust
deed, would render the requirement of specification of the purpose for
acquisition in that sub-section redundant.

 

The High Court observed that the
purpose of accumulation could not tread beyond the objects clause of the trust,
the legislature could not have provided for the period of accumulation if it
did not have in mind the particularity of the purpose or purposes falling
within the ambit of the objects clause of the trust deed. The High Court was of
the view that when section 11(2) required the specification of the purpose, it
did so with the objective of calling an assessee to state some specific purpose
out of the multiple purposes for which the trust stood; had it not been so,
there would have been no mandate for such specification since, in any case, a
charitable trust could, in no circumstances, apply its income, whether current
or accumulated, for any purposes other than the objects for which it stood; the
very fact that the statute required the purpose for accumulation to be stated
implied that such a purpose be a concrete one, an itemised purpose or a purpose
instrumental or ancillary to the implementation of its object or objects; the
very requirement of specification of purpose predicated that the purpose must
have an individuality.

 

According to the High Court, the
provision of section 11(2) was a concession provision to enable a charitable
trust to meet the contingency where the fulfilment of any project within its
object or objects needed heavy outlay calling for accumulation to amass
sufficient money to implement it and, therefore, specification of purpose as
required by section 11(2) admitted of no amount of vagueness about such
purpose.

 

The
High Court observed that it was not necessary that the assessee had to mention
only one specific object; there could be a setting apart and accumulation of
income for more objects than one, but whatever the objects or purposes might
be, the assessee must specify in the notice the concrete nature of the purposes
for which the application was being made; plurality of the purposes of
accumulation might not be precluded, but it must depend on the exact and
precise purposes for which the accumulation was intended; the generality of the
objects of the trust could not take the place of the specificity of the need
for accumulation.

 

The Calcutta High Court, therefore,
remanded the matter to the Tribunal to allow the assessee to adduce fresh
evidence, whether in the form of any resolution or otherwise, showing that the
specific purpose for which the trust required the accumulation of the income
existed and, if such resolution or evidence was placed before the Tribunal, the
Tribunal was directed to consider whether the obligation cast on the assessee
u/s 11(2) had been discharged and the exemption might accordingly be granted to
the assessee.

 

This decision of the Calcutta High
Court was referred to with approval by the Madras High Court in the case of CIT
vs. M. CT. Muthiah Chettiar Family Trust 245 ITR 400, though the Court
did not decide on the issue under consideration, since the issue before it
pertained to the taxation of the unutilised accumulation u/s 11(3), and it was
conceded by the Department that it was not in a position at a later date to
challenge that the form No. 10 filed in the year of accumulation was invalid
for not having stated a specified purpose for accumulation.

 

THE HOTEL AND RESTAURANT
ASSOCIATION’S CASE

The issue subsequently came up
before the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs. Hotel and Restaurant
Association 261 ITR 190.

In this case, pertaining to A.Y.
1992-93, the assessee, a company registered u/s 25 of the Companies Act, 1956
was also registered u/s 12A of the Income-tax Act. For the relevant year the
assessee accumulated its income for a period of ten years for fulfilment of the
objects for which it had been created. Notice to that effect was given by
filing form No. 10, giving particulars of the income sought to be accumulated.

 

During the assessment proceedings,
the A.O. declined to take into consideration the amount so accumulated on the
ground that in form No. 10 the specific object for which the income was sought
to be accumulated was not indicated. Accordingly, exemption in respect of such
accumulation was not allowed.

 

The Commissioner (Appeals) held that
the assessee was entitled to the exemption for the accumulation since the
assessee had passed a resolution to accumulate income so as to apply the same
in India in the next ten years to achieve the objects for which it had been
incorporated, and notice of this fact had been given to the A.O. in the
prescribed format. The Tribunal confirmed the view taken by the Commissioner
(Appeals).

 

Before the High Court, it was
submitted on behalf of the Revenue that the appellate authorities had failed to
appreciate that in the prescribed form the assessee had failed to indicate the
specific purpose for which the income was sought to be accumulated and,
therefore, the statutory requirement had not been strictly complied with,
disentitling the assessee from relief u/s 11(2).

 

The Delhi High Court, disagreeing
with the Revenue’s contentions, observed that while it was true that
specification of a certain purpose or purposes was needed for accumulation of
the trust’s income u/s 11(2), the purpose or purposes to be specified could not
have been beyond the objects of the trust; plurality of purposes of
accumulation was not precluded but depended on the precise purpose for which the
accumulation was intended.

 

The Delhi High Court noted that the
appellate authorities below had recorded a concurrent finding that the income
was sought to be accumulated by the assessee to achieve the objects for which
the assessee was incorporated. It further noted that it was not the case of the
Revenue that any of the objects of the assessee company were not for charitable
purposes. The findings of fact by the Tribunal gave rise to no question of law.
The Delhi High Court therefore declined to entertain the appeal.

This decision of the Delhi High
Court was followed in subsequent decisions of the same High Court and other
High Courts in the following cases:

 

(1) DIT(E)
vs. Daulat Ram Education Society 278 ITR 260 (Del.) – in this case, out
of 29 objects stipulated in the Memorandum of Association, the assessee had
specified eight objects;

 

(2) DIT(E)
vs. Mamta Health Institute for Mother and Children 293 ITR 380 (Del.) –
in form No. 10, the purpose of accumulation was stated to be as per the  resolution passed by the assessee; and in the
resolution the purpose specified was that of financing of the ongoing
programmes and of furtherance of the objects of the society;

 

(3) Bharat
Kalyan Pratishthan vs. DIT(E) 299 ITR 406 (Del.) – in this case the
resolution was to the effect that the amount accumulated be utilised for the
purposes of the trust, where the trust had only three objects, viz., medical
relief, help to the poor and educational purposes;

 

(4) DIT
vs. Mitsui & Co. Environmental Trust 303 ITR 111 (Del.) – in form
No. 10 it was mentioned that the amount accumulated would be utilised for the
objects of the trust;

 

(5) Bharat
Krishak Samaj vs. DDIT(E) 306 ITR 153 (Del.) – here, the accumulation
was for the objects of the trust;

 

(6) CIT
vs. National Institute and Financial Management 322 ITR 694 (P & H)
– the purpose of the accumulation stated was for expenditure on the building
fund and equipment fund;

 

(7) DIT(E)
vs. NBIE Welfare Society 370 ITR 490 (Del.) – in form No. 10, the
purpose stated for accumulation was for ‘further utilisation’;

 

(8) Samaj
Seva Nidhi vs. ACIT 376 ITR 507 (AP & T) – form No. 10 stated that
the accumulation was for general objects, but by a subsequent letter it was
stated that the amount was for the welfare of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled
Tribes, Vanvasis and socially and economically weaker sections of the society
as mentioned in a specific clause of the trust deed;

 

(9) DIT(E)
vs. Envisions 378 ITR 483 (Kar.) – in this case, three out of the 14
objects were reproduced in form No. 10, viz., conduct of various activities in
the field of academics, architecture, music and literature for preservation of
heritage; to run and maintain educational or other institutions for providing
and promoting education for the poor and weaker sections of society; and to
run, maintain or assist any medical institution to grant assistance to indigent
needy people for meeting the cost of medical treatment;

 

(10) CIT(E) vs. Gokula Education Foundation 394 ITR 236 (Kar.)
– in form No. 10, the purpose of accumulation stated was to improve / develop
the buildings of the trust and to conduct educational / charitable activities;
a special leave petition against the order of the High Court has been granted
to the Income Tax Department by the Supreme Court [248 Taxman 13(SC)];

 

(11) CIT(E) vs. Ohio University Christ College 408 ITR 352 (Kar.) –
three purposes were stated in form No. 10, which were all charitable, but
details of such purposes were not given;

 

(12) CIT(E) vs. Bochasanwasi Shri Akshar Purshottam Public Charitable
Trust 409 ITR 591 (Guj.) – in form No. 10, the purpose stated was for
providing medical facilities at various centres; the resolution had specified
purposes such as for future hospital of the trust, for purchase of necessary
equipment, ambulance van, furniture and fixtures and further expenditure for
modernisation of the hospitals.

 

OBSERVATIONS

Section 11(2) of the Income -tax Act
permits accumulation or setting apart of an income of a charitable institution
which is otherwise not applied or is not deemed to have been applied for the
charitable or religious purposes during the year. The income so accumulated or
set apart for application to such purposes is not included in the total income
for the year, provided the conditions specified in section 11(2) are complied
with. These conditions are:

 

(a) a
statement is furnished, in the prescribed form and manner, to the A.O. (form
No. 10 under Rule 17), stating therein the purpose for which the income is so
accumulated or set apart and the period for which the income is to be
accumulated or set apart and which period shall not exceed five years;

(b) the
money so accumulated or set apart is invested or deposited in the specified
form or mode;

(c) the
statement in form No. 10 is furnished by the due date for furnishing the return
of income u/s 139(1);

(d) form
No. 10 is furnished electronically under the digital signature or an electronic
verification code.

 

On
an apparent reading of the provision, it is gathered that an assessee, in cases
where the income is accumulated or set apart, is required to state the purpose
of accumulation and also state the period of accumulation in form No. 10. Once
this is dutifully complied with, no other prescription is provided for in the
Act. In other words, the assessee is to state the purpose of accumulation and
the period thereafter. The law apparently does not limit the purpose of
accumulation to a single purpose and further does not require such accumulation
for a dedicated project or a task within the objects of the institution. It
also does not call for passing of a resolution or enclosing of a copy of such
resolution with form No. 10.

 

There is no disagreement amongst the
High Courts about the need for a trust to spend its income, including the
accumulated income, only for those charitable or religious purposes specified
in its objects as per the Trust Deed. While granting registration u/s 12A/12AA,
the Commissioner would already have examined whether such objects qualify as
public charitable and religious purposes. It is also not in dispute that the
accumulation can be for more than one purpose; plurality of purposes is not
prohibited; there is no prohibition on a trust accumulating its income for all
of its activities. The obvious corollary to this undisputed position is that
while stating the purpose of accumulation in form No. 10, the assessee instead
of reproducing the list of all such activities, specifies that it is for its
objects, which have already been found to be charitable or religious in nature,
that should suffice for the purposes of section 11(2).

 

The 25% (now 15%) accumulation u/s
11(1) is not a short-term accumulation only for one year but is in fact for the
life-time of the trust and this factor should not have influenced the Calcutta High
Court to hold that for the purposes of section 11(2) accumulation there was a
need to state a specific purpose and not the general one by simply referring to
the objects clause.

 

If one examines the various types of
exemption u/s 11, one can see that all of these are for any of the objects of
the trust – the spending during the year u/s 11(1), the 15% accumulation u/s
11(1), the option to spend in the subsequent year under the explanation to
section 11(1). If that be the position, the legislature cannot be said to have
intended to restrict only the accumulation u/s 11(2) to a limited part of the
objects.

 

The requirement to specify the
purposes of accumulation can perhaps have been intended to ensure that the
accumulation is spent within the specified time and to tax it u/s 11(3) if it
is not spent within that time. But that purpose would be met even if all the
objects are specified for accumulation or setting apart.

 

In any case, almost all the High
Courts, except the Calcutta and the Madras High Courts, have held that so long
as the purpose of accumulation is clear from either the resolution or
subsequent correspondence or surrounding circumstances, that should suffice as
specification of the objects. This also seems clear from the fact that while
the Supreme Court has admitted the special leave petition against the Karnataka
High Court decision in Gokula Education Foundation (Supra), it
has rejected the special leave petition against the decision of the Gujarat
High Court in the case of Bochasanwasi Shri Akshar Purshottam Public
Charitable Trust (Supra).

 

The Tribunal in the case of Associated
Electronics Research Foundation 100 TTJ 480 (Del.) has held that it
would be a sufficient compliance of section 11(2) where the purpose of
accumulation can be gathered from the minutes of the meeting wherein a decision
to accumulate is taken and such decision is recorded in the minutes.

 

In the end, the assessee, in the
cases of deficiency or failure, may consider the possibility of making up for
such deficiency or failure by prescribing the purpose of accumulation or
setting apart during the course of assessment or before or thereafter. The
Gujarat High Court in the case of Bochasanwasi Shri Akshar Purshottam
Public Charitable Trust (Supra) has permitted the institution to
specify and to state the purpose of accumulation, subsequent to the filing of
the return of income. The special leave petition filed by the Income-tax
Department has been rejected by the Supreme Court in 263 Taxman 247 (SC).

 

The Calcutta High Court view seems to require
reconsideration, or should be read in the context of the matter, and the view
taken by the other High Courts seems to be the better view. One can only hope that the Supreme Court speedily decides this long-standing controversy which
has resulted in litigation for so many trusts.

Section 56 read with sections 22 and 23 – Compensation received under an agreement entered into with a tenant granting him an option to take on lease other units which belonged to the assessee is taxable under the head Income from Other Sources

10.
[2020] 116 taxmann.com 223 Redwood
IT Services (P) Ltd. vs. ITO(10)(2)(2), (Mum.) ITA No.
1309(Mum) 2018 A.Y.:
2011-12 Date of
order: 28th February, 2020

 

Section 56 read with sections 22 and 23 –
Compensation received under an agreement entered into with a tenant granting
him an option to take on lease other units which belonged to the assessee is
taxable under the head Income from Other Sources

 

FACTS

The assessee acquired an immovable property which was divided into four
units of which two units, viz. Unit Nos. 3 and 4, were let out. In terms of the
agreement entered into by the assessee with the tenant, the assessee had
granted an option to the tenant to take the other two units, viz. Units 1 and 2,
on lease. Under the option agreement, the assessee agreed to lease the property
in future and restrained itself from leasing it to any other person during the
period for which the option was granted. In consideration of such a covenant,
the assessee received from the tenant a compensation of Rs. 33,75,000 which was
offered by him under the head Income from Other Sources.

 

The A.O. considered
the two units in respect of which option was granted to be deemed let-out units
and charged tax on their market rent, and after allowing the standard deduction
taxed a sum of Rs. 76,64,328 under the head ‘Income from House Property’.

 

Aggrieved, the
assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the A.O.

 

HELD

The Tribunal held that for income to be assessable under the head Income
from House Property, it should be out of the property let out or deemed to be
let out for the relevant period. In this case the property is neither let out
nor vacant. The compensation cannot, therefore, be assessed under the head
Income from House Property.

 

The amount received
by the assessee is in the nature of compensation for not letting out property
to any third party for a specified period. The meaning thereof is that by
entering into an option agreement, the assessee had renounced its right to let
out Unit Nos. 1 and 2 for a period of nine months from the date of the option
agreement and any amount received in pursuance of the said agreement is in the
nature of compensation which is assessable under the head Income from Other
Sources.

 

The Tribunal held
that the A.O. as well as the CIT(A) were incorrect in coming to the conclusion
that the property is deemed to be let out and income from the said property
needs to be computed u/s 22 of the Act.

 

The Tribunal directed
the A.O. to delete the additions made towards Income from House Property.

 

This ground of appeal filed by the assessee was
allowed.

Business expenditure – Obsolescence allowance – Sections 36 and 145A of ITA, 1961 – Assessee following particular accounting policy from year to year consistent with provisions of section 145A – Concurrent finding of fact by appellate authorities that stock had been rendered obsolete – Loss allowable

1. CIT vs. Gigabyte
Technology (India) Ltd.

[2020] 421 ITR 21 (Bom.)

Date of order: 7th
January, 2020

 

Business expenditure –
Obsolescence allowance – Sections 36 and 145A of ITA, 1961 – Assessee following
particular accounting policy from year to year consistent with provisions of
section 145A – Concurrent finding of fact by appellate authorities that stock
had been rendered obsolete – Loss allowable

 

In its return, the assessee
claimed losses towards stock obsolescence in respect of laptops and
motherboards. The A.O. held that the laptops and the motherboards which had a
long shelf life could not be considered to have become obsolete and disallowed
the losses in his order passed u/s 143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

 

The Commissioner (Appeals)
allowed the appeal filed by the assessee. The Tribunal held that the obsolete
stock which was not disposed of or sold was allowable as expenditure and
dismissed the appeal filed by the Department.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the
Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

‘i)    There were concurrent findings of fact recorded by the
Commissioner (Appeals) as well as the Tribunal that the laptops and
motherboards had been rendered obsolete. There were findings of fact in respect
of the assessee consistently following a particular accounting policy from year
to year, which was consistent with the provisions of section 145A.

 

ii)    The Tribunal was right in holding that the obsolete stock which
was not disposed of or sold was allowable as expenditure.’

REMUNERATION BY A FIRM TO PARTNERS: SECTION 194J ATTRACTED?

From the remuneration payable by a
firm to its partners in pursuance of section 40(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961
(‘the Act’), the firm does not deduct any tax at source (hereinafter also
referred to as ‘TDS’) under any provision of the Act. This position has been
undisputedly settled and accepted by the Income-tax Department for over 25
years since the new scheme of taxation of firms and partners was brought on the
statute book by the Finance Act, 1992 from the assessment year 1993-94.

But in a recent case I came across an
overzealous officer of the Income-tax Department adopting the stand that a firm
is liable to effect TDS u/s 194J of the Act @ 10% from the remuneration payable
to its partners as, in their view, the services rendered by the partners to the
firm are in the nature of ‘managerial services’ which fall within the scope of
the term ‘technical services’ employed in section 194J. Apart from a huge demand
of tax u/s 201(1), a substantial amount of interest u/s 201(1A) is also being
charged. This is playing havoc with the taxpayers, especially when the partners
have already paid tax on their remuneration in their respective individual
returns and the credit for such tax paid allowable under the first proviso
to sub-section (1) of section 201 is being denied on procedural technicalities.

Therefore, before proceeding further,
it is fervently pleaded that to alleviate the hardships faced by the taxpayers
and to avoid unnecessary litigation, the Central Board of Direct Taxes (‘CBDT’)
needs to urgently issue a circular clarifying the position on this subject, to
be followed (if necessary) by an appropriate legislative amendment in section
194J expressly excluding such remuneration from the purview of section 194J.

 

CLEAR LEGISLATIVE INTENT

Principally, it is submitted that the
remuneration payable by a firm to its partners cannot be subjected to TDS u/s
194J. In this regard the following propositions are submitted:

(1)  Firstly,
the legislative intent has always been clear beyond doubt that under the new
scheme of taxation of firms and partners, interest and remuneration payable by
a firm to its partners are not liable to TDS since by nature, character and
quality any such payment by a firm to its partners is nothing but a share in
the profits of the firm, though called interest or remuneration and though
deductible u/s 40(b). This legislative intent is manifestly evident from the
following:

 

ACCEPTED FOR OVER 25 YEARS

(a)  When
the new scheme of taxation of firms and partners was introduced by the Finance
Act, 1992 with effect from A.Y. 1993-94, section 194DD1 was also
proposed to be inserted in the Act which provided for TDS2 both from
interest and remuneration payable by a firm to its partners. But section 194DD
was dropped during the process of the Finance Bill, 1992 becoming an Act,
because the legislature was conscious that, conceptually, under the new scheme
of taxation of firms and partners, both interest and remuneration payable by a
firm to its partners are only a mode of transferring profits from the firm to
the partners for tax. This is fortified from the statutory provision that the
remuneration (as well as interest) received by a partner from the firm is treated
as business income in the individual hands of the partner u/s 28(v)3
of the Act4;

(b)  Explanation
2 below section 15 unambiguously provides that any salary, bonus, commission or
remuneration, by whatever name called, due to, or received by, a partner from
the firm shall not be regarded as ‘salary’. Consequently, provisions of section
192 relating to TDS from salaries are not attracted. This is statutory
recognition of the principle that there cannot be an employer-employee
relationship between a firm and its partners and as such no tax is required to
be deducted from such remuneration u/s 192;

(c)  Section
194A(3)(iv), likewise, expressly provides that no tax is to be deducted at
source from the interest payable by a firm to its partners;

(d) As
a matter of fact, any firm deducting tax at source under any provision of the
Act, including section 194J, from the remuneration payable to its partners is
unheard of in India and this position has been undisputedly, ungrudgingly and
eminently accepted by the Income-tax Department for over 25 years since the new
scheme of taxation of firms and partners came on the statute book;

(e)  Section 194J was introduced in the Act by the
Finance Act, 1995 with effect from 1st July, 1995 for TDS from fees
for professional services5  and fees for technical services6.
Later, by the Finance Act, 2012 a new category was added by inserting clause
(ba) in sub-section (1) of section 194J with effect from 1st July,
2012 which mandates TDS from ‘any remuneration or fees or commission, by
whatever name called, other than those on which tax is deductible u/s 192, to a
director of a company’. Thus, whenever the legislature intended that tax should
be deducted u/s 194J from the remuneration payable, it has expressly provided
for it in so many words as is the case with clause (ba) above applicable to
remuneration payable by a company to its directors. But no such specific clause
is inserted with regard to the remuneration payable by a firm to its partners;
while inserting clause (ba), the Memorandum explaining the provisions in the
Finance Bill, 2012 ([2012] 342 ITR [St] 234, 241) visibly
acknowledges that there is no specific provision for deduction of tax on the
remuneration paid to a director which is not in the nature of salary.
Furthermore, it is also judicially held7  that prior to insertion of the above referred
clause (ba) with effect from 1st July, 2012, no tax was deductible
u/s 194J from the commission / remuneration payable by a company to its
directors. It follows, therefore, that in the absence of any such specific
clause in section 194J postulating TDS from the remuneration payable by a firm
to its partners, the legislative intent is loud and clear – that no tax is
deductible u/s 194J by a firm from such remuneration.

 

A FIRM HAS NO LEGAL EXISTENCE

(2)  A
firm and its partners are treated as separate assessable entities for the
limited purpose of assessment under the Act, but, in law, as is settled
judicially for ages, a firm has no legal existence of its own, separate and
distinct from the partners constituting it, and the firm name is only a
compendious mode of describing the partners constituting the partnership. As
such, a person cannot render services to himself and there cannot be a contract
of service between a firm and its partners. Therefore, a firm cannot be
expected or made liable to deduct tax at source u/s 194J from such remuneration.


In CIT vs. R.M. Chidambaram
Pillai [1977] 106 ITR 292 (SC) the Apex Court observed that a firm is
not a legal person even though it has some attributes of a personality; and
that in income-tax law a firm is a unit of assessment by special provisions,
but not a full person.

The Supreme Court then unequivocally
held that since a contract of employment requires two distinct persons, viz.,
the employer and the employee, there cannot be a contract of service, in
strict law, between a firm and its partners8.

 

SHARE OF PROFITS OF THE FIRM

(3)  A
partner works for the firm since he is duty-bound to do so under the deed of
partnership as well as in terms of the provisions of the Indian Partnership
Act, 19329  and therefore
there is no relationship of service provider or consultant and client between
the partners and the firm.

(4)  Under
the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 since there is a relationship of ‘mutual
agency’ among the partners, there cannot be a relationship between a firm and
its partners which could give rise to a liability to deduct tax at source u/s
194J.

(5)  Conceptually,
whatever may be the amount received by a partner from the firm, whether called
salary or remuneration, it is not expenditure of the firm (though allowed as
such u/s 40[b]), nor in the nature of compensation for services in the hands of
the partner, but it is in the nature of a share of profits from the firm as is
settled judicially, including by the Supreme Court. In CIT vs. R.M.
Chidambaram Pillai (Supra) it was categorically held that payment of
salary to a partner represents a special share of the profits of the
firm and salary paid to a partner retains the same character of the
income of
the firm.

(6)  Even
under the statutory provisions embodied in section 28(v) of the Act, both
interest and remuneration received by a partner from the firm are expressly
assessed as business income in the hands of the partner and as such interest
and remuneration both are statutorily recognised as in the nature of a share of
profits from the firm10.

 

RULE OF CONSISTENCY

(7)  Since
generally the remuneration payable to the partners is a percentage of the
profits of the firm determined at the end of the year, which keeps on varying with
the amount of profits and is not reckoned with with reference to the quantity
and quality of services rendered by the partners to the firm, the same is a
mode of transferring a share of the profits of the firm to the partners and not
a compensation for the services rendered by the partners to the firm, and hence
the question of invoking section 194J does not arise.

(8)  Inasmuch
as the position that no tax is required to be deducted by a firm from the
remuneration payable to its partners is undisputedly and consistently accepted
by the Income-tax Department for over a quarter of a century now, even the rule
of consistency11 obligates
that this position should not be disturbed by the Income-tax Department at this
stage.

(9) It
can also be contended that by nature the services rendered, if any, by a
partner to the firm do not fall within the connotation of either ‘professional
services’ or ‘technical services’ as defined and understood for the purposes of
section 194J.

(10) No tax is levied under the laws
relating to Goods and Services Tax (‘GST’) on the remuneration received by a
partner from the firm. Thus, the remuneration received by a partner from the
firm is not treated as consideration for the supply of services to the firm but
as a share of profits even under the GST laws.

One arm of the Union Government (the
Income-tax Department) cannot adopt a stand conflicting with the view accepted
by another arm of the same Union Government (GST Department). In Moouat
vs. Betts Motors Ltd. 1958 (3) All E R 402 (CA) it was held that two
departments of the government cannot, in law, adopt contrary or inconsistent
stands, or raise inconsistent contentions, or act at cross purposes. Lord
Denning in this case succinctly summed up the principle in his inimitable
style: ‘The right hand of the government cannot pretend to be unaware of what
the left hand is doing.’ To the same effect was the Supreme Court decision in M.G.
Abrol, Addl. Collector of Customs vs. M/s Shantilal Chhotelal & Co. AIR
1966 SC 197, holding, to the effect, that the customs authorities12
cannot, in law, take a stand or adopt a view which is contrary to that taken by
the licensing authority under the Export (Control) Order, 195413.
This principle of law has been consistently applied for income-tax purposes as
well in a variety of contexts under the Act14.

In view of the foregoing discussion,
it is submitted that the remuneration payable by a firm to its partners cannot
suffer TDS u/s 194J of the Act.  

__________________________________________________________________

1   Clause 74 of the Finance Bill, 1992: [1992]
194 ITR (St) 68-69

2   At the average rate of income-tax computed on the basis of the
rates in force for the financial year concerned

3   Read with section 2(24)(ve)

4      See
also CBDT Circular No. 636 dated 31st August, 1992: [1992] 198
ITR (St) 1, 42-43

5   Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 194J

6   Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 194J

7      See, among others, Dy. CIT vs. ITC
Ltd. [2015] 154 ITD 136 (Kol.) and Dy. CIT vs. Kirloskar Oil
Engines Ltd. [2016] 158 ITD 309 (Pune). See also Bharat Forge
Ltd. vs. Addl. CIT [2013] 144 ITD 455 (Pune) (pre-2012 period) (sitting
fees to directors not ‘fees for professional services’ u/s 194J)

8   While reaching this conclusion, the Supreme
Court referred to, among others, Dulichand Laxminarayan vs. CIT [1956] 29
ITR 535 (SC); CIT vs. Ramniklal Kothari [1969] 74 ITR 57 (SC); and
Addanki Narayanappa vs. Bhaskara Krishnappa AIR 1966 SC 1300

9      See sub-sections (a) and (b) of section 12
along with sub-section (a) of section 13 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932

10  See also CBDT Circular No. 636 dated 31st
August, 1992: [1992] 198 ITR (St) 1, 42-43

11     The rule of consistency is settled by
countless judicial precedents. See, for example, Radhasoami Satsang vs.
CIT [1992] 193 ITR 321 (SC); Berger Paints India Ltd. vs. CIT [2004] 266 ITR 99
(SC); Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. vs. UOI [2006] 282 ITR 273 (SC); CIT vs. Neo
Poly Pack (P) Ltd. [2000] 245 ITR 492 (Del.); CIT vs. Leader Valves Ltd. [2007]
295 ITR 273 (P & H); CIT vs. Darius Pandole [2011] 330 ITR 485 (Bom.);
and Pr. CIT vs. Quest Investment Advisors Pvt. Ltd. [2018] 409 ITR 545
(Bom.)

12  Under the Sea Customs Act, 1878

13  Issued under the Import and Export (Control)
Act, 1947

14  See, for instance, Mobile
Communication (India) P. Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT [2010] 33 DTR (Del) (Trib) 398, 416

Section 56(2)(vii)(b) dealing with receipt of immovable property for inadequate consideration will not apply to a case where the agreement for purchase was made before amendment of this section, substantial obligations discharged and rights accrued in favour of assessee but merely registration was on or after amendment of said section Interest under sections 234A and 234B is chargeable with reference to the returned income and not the assessed income

12. Bajrang Lal Naredi vs. ITO (Ranchi) Pradip Kumar Kedia (A.M.) and Madhumita Roy
(J.M.) ITA No. 327/Ran/2018 A.Y.: 2014-15 Date of order: 20th January, 2020

Counsel for Assessee / Revenue: Anand Pasari
with Nitin Pasari / Nisha Singhmarr

 

Section
56(2)(vii)(b) dealing with receipt of immovable property for inadequate
consideration will not apply to a case where the agreement for purchase was
made before amendment of this section, substantial obligations discharged and
rights accrued in favour of assessee but merely registration was on or after
amendment of said section

 

Interest under sections 234A and 234B is
chargeable with reference to the returned income and not the assessed income

 

FACTS I

The assessee, in the year under consideration, registered in his name an
immovable property on 17th June, 2013 against the actual purchase of
property done on 15th April, 2011 in financial year 2011-12. The
purchase consideration was determined at Rs. 9,10,000 at the time of agreement
for purchase in financial year 2011-12; accordingly, the payment was made at
the time of such agreement to the vendor. The registration was, however,
carried out at a belated stage on 17th June, 2013 on which date the
stamp duty valuation stood at a higher figure of Rs. 22,60,000. The A.O.
noticed the alleged under-valuation in the purchase price of the property qua
stamp duty valuation and applied provisions of section 56(2)(vii)(b) of the Act
and worked out the adjusted purchase consideration of Rs. 18,89,350. The A.O.,
accordingly, treated the difference of Rs. 9,79,350 as ‘deemed income’ having
regard to the provisions of section 56(2)(vii)(b) of the Act as amended by the
Finance Act, 2013 and applicable from assessment year 2014-15 onwards.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who confirmed
the action of the A.O. Next, the aggrieved assessee preferred an appeal to the
Tribunal.

 

HELD I

The Tribunal noted
that it is the applicability of section 56(2)(vii)(b) of the Act as amended by
the Finance Act, 2013 and applicable to A.Y. 2014-15 which is in question. The
Tribunal observed that as per the pre-amended provisions of section
56(2)(vii)(b) of the Act, where an individual or HUF receives from any person
any immovable property without consideration, the provisions of amended section
56(2)(vii)(b) of the Act would apply. This position was, however, amended by
the Finance Act, 2013 and made applicable to A.Y. 2014-15 onwards. As per the
amended provisions, the scope of the substituted provision was expanded to
cover the purchase of immovable property for inadequate consideration as well.

 

It observed that there is no dispute that purchase transactions of
immovable property were carried out in financial year 2011-12 for which full
consideration was also parted with the seller. Mere registration at later date
would not cover a transaction already executed in the earlier years and
substantial obligations already been discharged and a substantive right accrued
to the assessee therefrom. The Tribunal held that pre-amended provisions will,
thus, apply and therefore the Revenue is debarred to cover the transactions
where inadequacy in purchase consideration is alleged. The Tribunal deleted the
addition made by the A.O. and confirmed by the CIT(A).

 

The Tribunal allowed this ground of appeal filed by the assessee.

 

FACTS II

The second issue in
the appeal filed by the assessee was raised by filing an additional ground. The
issue for consideration of the Tribunal was whether interest u/s 234B of the
Act is chargeable on assessed income qua return income.

 

HELD II

The Tribunal noted that an identical issue had come up before the coordinate
bench of the ITAT in ITO vs. M/s Anand Vihar Construction Pvt. Ltd. ITA
No. 335/Ran/2017 order dated 28th November, 2018. Having
noted the ratio of the decision of the coordinate bench of the Tribunal,
it held that interest under sections 234A and 234B of the Act is chargeable
with reference to returned income only.

 

 

Sections 32, 37, 45, 50 – Where the business of the assessee came to a halt, expenses incurred by the assessee for maintaining its legal status and disposing of the assets are allowable u/s 37(1) of the Act Assessee owned leasehold rights in the land and a building was constructed thereon; on transfer of the same, capital gains were to be bifurcated as long-term capital gains on transfer of land u/s 45 and short-term capital gains on transfer of building u/s 50 Unabsorbed depreciation is deemed to be current year’s depreciation and it can therefore be set off against capital gains

25. [2019] 202 TTJ (Bang.) 893 Hirsh Bracelet India (P) Ltd. vs. ACIT ITA No. 3392/Bang/2018 A.Y.: 2015-16 Date of order: 3rd July, 2019

 

Sections 32,
37, 45, 50 – Where the business of the assessee came to a halt, expenses
incurred by the assessee for maintaining its legal status and disposing of the
assets are allowable u/s 37(1) of the Act

 

Assessee owned
leasehold rights in the land and a building was constructed thereon; on
transfer of the same, capital gains were to be bifurcated as long-term capital
gains on transfer of land u/s 45 and short-term capital gains on transfer of
building u/s 50

Unabsorbed
depreciation is deemed to be current year’s depreciation and it can therefore
be set off against capital gains

 

FACTS

The assessee company was engaged in the
business of manufacturing wrist watch straps. The assessee had taken land on
lease for a period of 99 years and set up a unit for designing, importing,
exporting, dealing in and manufacturing wrist watch straps. In view of
continued losses and several operational difficulties, the business of the
assessee had to be closed down. The assessee had declared capital gains on the
sale of leasehold rights in land and building as short-term capital gain in the
return of income and, after adjusting current year’s expense and depreciation,
returned a total income.

 

During the course of the assessment
proceedings, the assessee claimed that sale of leasehold rights in land would
result in long-term capital gains. But the A.O. taxed the capital gains as short-term
and did not allow set-off of brought forward business losses. Further, the A.O.
had disallowed the expenditure u/s 37(1), contending that the same could not be
allowed as there was no business in existence.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the CIT(A) who dismissed the appeal.

 

HELD

The various expenses incurred by the
assessee were to maintain its legal status as a company until the assets were
disposed of and the liabilities paid. The Tribunal held that it was essential
for the assessee to incur these expenses and neither the A.O. nor the CIT(A)
has doubted the incurring of the expenditure. The assessee held leasehold
rights in land and it required permission from the Government for transfer of
such rights. This permission was received by the assessee only in the previous
year, 2013-2014. Therefore, even though the business of the assessee had come
to a halt in 2010, it was necessary to maintain the legal status until all the
assets were liquidated. Thus, the expenses incurred by the assessee were to be
allowed as a deduction in computation of income.

 

The assessee had made a claim for the
bifurcation of capital gains into long-term capital gains on transfer of
leasehold rights in land and short-term capital gains on transfer of building,
being a depreciable asset, in accordance with the provisions of section 50. The
assessee was entitled to bifurcate the capital gains and the provisions of
section 50 would be made applicable in computation of capital gains arising
from transfer of building.

 

Unabsorbed depreciation is deemed to be
current year’s depreciation and the same can be set off against capital gains
under the provisions of section 71.

 

These grounds of appeal filed by the
assessee were allowed.

 

Deemed income – Section 41(1) of ITA, 1961 – Section 41(1) will not apply to waiver of loan as waiver of loan does not amount to cessation of trading liability; A.Y.: 2003-04

25. Principal CIT vs. SICOM Ltd. [2020] 116 taxmann.com 410 (Bom.) Date of order: 21st January, 2020 A.Y.: 2003-04

 

Deemed income – Section 41(1) of ITA, 1961 – Section 41(1) will not
apply to waiver of loan as waiver of loan does not amount to cessation of
trading liability; A.Y.: 2003-04

In the
assessment proceedings for the A.Y. 2003-04, the A.O. considered the issue of
waiver of loan by the Government of Maharashtra and held that an amount of Rs.
114.98 crores covered by the loan given by the Government of Maharashtra is
taxable under sections 28(iv) and 41(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
Accordingly, the said amount was treated as income of the assessee for the year
under consideration and added back to its total income.

 

The CIT(A)
and the Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim and deleted the addition.

 

On appeal by
the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held
as under:

 

‘i)    The first appellate authority had followed
the decision of this Court in Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. (Supra)
in deleting the addition made by the A.O. on account of remission of loan. The
decision of this Court in Mahindra & Mahindra (Supra) was
contested by the Revenue before the Supreme Court in Commissioner vs.
Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. [2018] 404 ITR 1. The issue before the
Supreme Court was whether waiver of loan by the creditor is taxable as
perquisite u/s 28(iv) of the Act or taxable as remission of liability u/s 41(1)
of the Act. The Supreme Court held as under:

(a)   Section 28(iv) of the IT Act does not apply
in the present case since the receipts of Rs 57,74,064 are in the nature of
cash or money.

(b)   Section 41(1) of the IT Act does not apply
since waiver of loan does not amount to cessation of trading liability.

 

ii)    On careful examination of the matter, we are
of the considered opinion that the decision of the Supreme Court is squarely
applicable to the facts of the present case.

 

iii)    Consequently, we do not find any merit in
the appeal to warrant admission. Appeal is accordingly dismissed.’

Section 147, Explanation 3 & Section 154 – The powers conferred on the A.O. by Explanation 3 to section 147 cannot be extended to section 154 – Any discrepancy that was not a subject matter of reassessment proceedings cannot, subsequently, upon conclusion of reassessment proceedings, be brought up by the A.O. by recourse to section 154

24 [2019] 202 TTJ (Del.) 1014 JDC Traders (P) Ltd. vs. DCIT ITA No. 5886/Del/2015 A.Y.: 2007-2008 Date of order: 11th October, 2019

 

Section 147,
Explanation 3 & Section 154 – The powers conferred on the A.O. by
Explanation 3 to section 147 cannot be extended to section 154 – Any
discrepancy that was not a subject matter of reassessment proceedings cannot,
subsequently, upon conclusion of reassessment proceedings, be brought up by the
A.O. by recourse to section 154

 

FACTS

The assessee was a company engaged in the
business of trading, export and printing. For A.Y. 2007-2008 it submitted its
return of income and the same was processed u/s 143(1) of the Act. Reassessment
proceedings were initiated against the assessee for the assessment year in
question after recording reasons for the same. Certain travel expenditure
claimed by the assessee was disallowed and addition was made for the same. On
conclusion of the reassessment proceedings and perusal of the assessment
records by the A.O., he noticed a discrepancy in the amount of stock appearing
in the statement of profit and loss and in the notes to financial accounts. The
A.O. issued a notice u/s 154 to the assessee as regards the difference. The
assessee submitted that the amount stated as closing stock at the time of
preparation of accounts had been inadvertently missed out to be corrected
post-finalisation of accounts and stock reconciliation. The assessee also
submitted that after reconciliation the mistake was detected and corrected. The
A.O. made an addition for the amount of difference in the amounts of closing
stock stated at different values.

The assessee preferred an appeal with the CIT(A).
However, the CIT(A) did not agree with its contention and stated that under the
provisions of Explanation 3 to section 147, the A.O. was justified in assessing
/ reassessing the income which had escaped assessment. Further, there was
nothing wrong in the A.O. rectifying the mistake in the order under sections
147 / 143(3). The assessee then filed an appeal with the ITAT.

 

HELD

The issue relating to the discrepancy in the
value of closing stock was not taken up by the A.O. at the time of reassessment
proceedings u/s 147. A reading of section 147 shows that it empowers the A.O.
to assess or reassess income in respect of any issue which had escaped
assessment, irrespective of the fact whether such aspect was adverted in the
reasons recorded u/s 147. The A.O. had resorted to section 154 to make addition
in respect of the issue of discrepancy in closing stock on conclusion of the
reassessment proceedings. The powers under Explanation 3 to section 147, if
extended to section 154, would empower the A.O. to make one addition after the
other by taking shelter of Explanation 3 to section 147. It was also not the
case that the A.O. had invoked section 154 with respect to the original
assessment finalised u/s 143(3).

 

Thus, the powers of Explanation 3 to section
147 cannot be extended to section 154, and the addition made by the A.O. for
discrepancy of closing stock values upon conclusion of reassessment proceedings
was beyond his jurisdiction.

 

The appeal filed by the assessee was
allowed.

 

Section 64 – Entire loss arising to wife of assessee in the business of Futures and Options (F&O) which business was started by her during the previous year with contribution from assessee in shape of gifts, was liable to be clubbed in hands of assessee in terms of Explanation 3 read in conjunction with section 64(1)(iv) – Assessee was entitled to club full loss from business of F&O in his personal income

8. [2020] 113 taxmann.com 378 (Pune)(Trib.)

Uday Gopal Bhaskarwar vs. ACIT

ITA No. 502/Pune/2019

A.Y.: 2014-15

Date of order: 20th January, 2020

 

Section 64 – Entire loss arising to wife of assessee in the
business of Futures and Options (F&O) which business was started by her
during the previous year with contribution from assessee in shape of gifts, was
liable to be clubbed in hands of assessee in terms of Explanation 3 read in
conjunction with section 64(1)(iv) – Assessee was entitled to club full loss
from business of F&O in his personal income

 

FACTS

The assessee, in the return of
income filed by him, clubbed the loss from the business of his spouse amounting
to Rs. 31,56,429 in view of the provisions of section 64. In the course of
assessment proceedings, on being called upon to justify such a claim, the
assessee submitted that during the year under consideration he gifted a sum of
Rs. 94.50 lakhs to Mrs. Priti Bhaskarwar, his wife, who started a business of
Futures and Options (F&O) on 18th September, 2013. The assessee
claimed that she incurred a loss of Rs. 31,56,429 in the business which was
clubbed in his hands.

 

The A.O. accepted the primary claim
of the assessee of his wife having incurred a loss of Rs. 31.56 lakhs in the
business of F&O, which was set up on 18th September, 2013, and further that
the loss from such business was eligible for set-off against the income of the
assessee in terms of section 64(1)(iv) read with Explanation 3 thereto. He,
however, did not accept the assessee’s contention that the entire loss of Rs.
31.56 lakhs be set off against his (the assessee’s) income. Considering the
mandate of Explanation 3 to section 64(1), the A.O. held that only that part of
the business loss incurred by the assessee’s wife could be set off against the
assessee’s income which bears the proportion of amount of investment out of the
gift on the first day of the previous year to the total investment in the
business as on the first day of the previous year.

 

He, therefore, computed the amount
of loss eligible for set-off against the assessee’s income at Rs. 9,72,563 by
multiplying Rs. 31,56,429 (loss incurred by wife in the business) with Rs.
25.00 lakhs (gifts made by the assessee to his wife up to 18th
September, 2013) as divided by Rs. 81,13,648 (opening capital as on 1st April,
2013 as increased by the gift of Rs. 25.00 lakhs given by the assessee up to 18th
September, 2013).

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an
appeal to the CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO.

 

Still aggrieved, the assessee
preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

 

HELD

The Tribunal noted that the core of
controversy is the computation of eligible amount of loss incurred by the
assessee’s wife which is eligible for set-off against the assessee’s income.

 

On going through the mandate of
section 64(1)(vi) of the Act in juxtaposition with Explanation 3 to the
sub-section, it transpires that there can be two possible situations of
utilisation of the assets transferred by husband to wife triggering the
clubbing provision. The first situation can be where the amount of assets
received by the wife is exclusively invested in an asset and further there is
no investment by the wife in such a new asset. The full income resulting from
such an exclusive investment is liable to be clubbed with the total income of
the husband. An example of such a situation can be a wife making a fixed
deposit with a bank, etc. out of the gift of money received from her husband.
The full amount of interest income arising on such FDR is liable to be clubbed
with the income of the husband.

 

The second situation can be where
the amount of assets received by the wife as a gift from her husband is not the
exclusive investment in the business carried on by her. Rather, she has also
made separate investment in the said business. In such a situation of a common
pool of unidentifiable investments in the business, there arises difficulty in
precisely attributing the income of such a business to the investments made out
of the gift received from the husband attracting clubbing and to investments
made out of funds other than the gift received from the husband not attracting
the clubbing provision. It is in such a scenario that the prescription of
Explanation 3 comes into play by providing that the amount of income from the
combined business as relatable to the assets transferred by the husband should
be computed by taking the income from such business earned during the year as
multiplied with the amount of assets received by the wife from her husband as
invested in the business and divided by her total investment in the business,
including the amount of assets received from the husband.

 

In a nutshell, there are three
components in this formula. The first component is the income of the business,
which is to be considered for the year. The second is the amount of assets
received by the wife from her husband as invested in the business, and the
third is the total investment in the business including the amount of assets
received from the husband. The latter two figures are required to be taken as
on the first day of the previous year. Section 3 defines ‘Previous year’ to
mean ‘the financial year immediately preceding the assessment year.’ The proviso
to section 3 states that, in the case of a business newly set up in a financial
year, the previous year shall be the period beginning with the date of the
setting up of the business and ending with the said financial year. Since the
wife of the assessee started the new business of F&O on 18th
September, 2013, the extant case is, ergo, covered by the proviso
to section 3.

 

Having examined the factual position
in detail, the Tribunal held that the entire amount of loss resulting from the
business of F&O started by Mrs. Priti Bhaskarwar with the gifts received
from the assessee is liable to be clubbed in the hands of the assessee.

 

This ground of appeal filed by the assessee was
decided in favour of the assessee.

M/s JSW Steel Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT; [ITA Nos. 33, 34 & 35/Mum/2015; Date of order: 28th September, 2016; A.Y.: 2008-09; Mum. ITAT] Section 153A – Once the assessment gets abated, the original return filed u/s 139(1) is replaced by the return filed u/s 153A – It is open to both parties, i.e., the assessee and Revenue, to make claims for allowance or disallowance – (Continental Warehousing Corporation 374 ITR 645 Bom. referred)

16. The Pr. CIT-2 vs.
M/s JSW Steel Ltd. (Successor on amalgamation of JSW Ispat Steel Ltd.) [Income
tax Appeal No. 1934 of 2017] Date of order: 5th
February, 2020 (Bombay High Court)

 

M/s JSW Steel Ltd. vs.
Dy. CIT; [ITA Nos. 33, 34 & 35/Mum/2015; Date of order: 28th
September, 2016; A.Y.: 2008-09; Mum. ITAT]

 

Section
153A – Once the assessment gets abated, the original return filed u/s 139(1) is
replaced by the return filed u/s 153A – It is open to both parties, i.e., the
assessee and Revenue, to make claims for allowance or disallowance – (Continental
Warehousing Corporation 374 ITR 645 Bom. referred)

 

The assessee is a widely-held public
limited company engaged in various activities, including production of sponge
iron, galvanised sheets and cold-rolled coils through its steel plants located
at Dolve and Kalmeshwar in Maharashtra. The company filed its original return
of income on 30th September, 2008 for A.Y. 2008-09 declaring loss at
Rs. 104,17,70,752 under the provisions of section 139(1) of the Act.

 

During pendency of the assessment
proceedings, a search was conducted u/s 132 on the ISPAT group of companies on
30th November, 2010. Following the search, a notice u/s 153A was
issued. In response, the assessee filed return of income declaring total loss
at Rs. 419,48,90,102 on 29th March, 2012. In this return, the
assessee made a new claim for treating gain on pre-payment of deferred VAT /
sales tax on the Net Present Value (NPV) basis for an amount of Rs.
318,10,93,993 as ‘capital receipt’.

 

This new / fresh claim of the assessee
was disallowed by the A.O. while finalising the assessment u/s 143(3) r/w/s
153A of the Act by considering the same as ‘revenue receipt’ instead of
‘capital receipt’. The reasoning given by the A.O. was that the assessee had
availed of the sales tax deferral scheme and the State Government had permitted
premature re-payment of deferred sales tax liability on the NPV basis.
Therefore, according to the A.O., the assessee treated this as capital receipt
even though the same was credited to the assessee’s profit and loss account
being the difference between the deferred sales tax and its NPV.

 

However, the
primary question that arose before the A.O. was whether the claim which was not
made in the earlier original return of income filed u/s 139(1) could be filed
and considered in the subsequent return filed by the assessee in pursuance of
notice u/s 153A of the Act (which was consequent to the search action conducted
u/s 132). The A.O. held that the assessee could not raise a new claim in the
return filed u/s 153A which was not raised in the original return of income
filed u/s 139(1). Thereafter, the claim was disallowed and was treated as
‘revenue receipt’.

 

Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the
assessee preferred an appeal before the CIT(A) who upheld the order passed by
the A.O.

 

Still aggrieved, the assessee filed an
appeal to the Tribunal. The Tribunal held that the assessee could lodge new
claims, deductions, exemptions or relief (which the assessee had failed to
claim in his regular return of income) which came to be filed by the assessee
under the provisions of section 153A of the Act.

 

But the Revenue, aggrieved by the order
of the ITAT, filed an appeal to the High Court. The Court held that in view of
the second proviso to section 153A of the Act, once assessment got
abated, it meant that it was open for both the parties, i.e., the assessee as
well as Revenue, to make claims for allowance, or to make disallowance, as the
case may be. That apart, the assessee could lodge a new claim for deduction,
etc. which remained to be claimed in his earlier / regular return of income.
This is so because assessment was never made in the case of the assessee in
such a situation. It is fortified that once the assessment gets abated, the
original return which had been filed loses its originality and the subsequent return
filed u/s 153A of the Act (which is in consequence to the search action u/s
132) takes the place of the original return. In such a case, the return of
income filed u/s 153A(1) would be construed to be one filed u/s 139(1) and the
provisions of the said Act shall apply to the same accordingly. If that be the
position, all legitimate claims would be open to the assessee to raise in the
return of income filed u/s 153A(1).

 

The Court further emphasised on the
judgment passed by it in the case of Continental Warehousing (Supra) which
also explains the second proviso to section 153A(1). The explanation is
that pending assessment or reassessment on the date of initiation of search if
abated, then the assessment pending on the date of initiation of search shall
cease to exist and no further action with respect to that assessment shall be
taken by the A.O. In such a situation, the assessment is required to be
undertaken by the A.O. u/s 153A(1) of the Act.

 

In view of the second proviso to
section 153A (1), once assessment gets abated, it is opened both ways, i.e.,
for the Revenue to make any additions apart from seized material, even regular
items declared in the return can be subject matter if there is doubt about the
genuineness of those items, and similarly the assessee also can lodge new
claims, deductions or exemptions or relief which remained to be claimed in the
regular return of income, because assessment was never made in the case /
situation. Hence, the appeal filed by the Revenue is liable to be dismissed.

 

DCIT-1(1) vs. M/s Ami Industries (India) Pvt. Ltd. [ITA No. 5181/Mum/2014; Date of order: 28th August, 2016; A.Y.: 2010-11; Mum. ITAT] Section 68 – Share application money – The assessee had furnished PAN, ITR of the investors to prove genuineness of the transactions – For credit worthiness of the creditors, the bank accounts of the investors showed that they had funds – Not required to prove ‘source of the source’ – Addition is justified [PCIT vs. NRA Iron & Steel 412 ITR 161 (SC) distinguished]

15. The Pr. CIT-1 vs. M/s Ami
Industries (India) Pvt. Ltd. [Income tax Appeal No. 1231 of 2017] Date of
order: 29th January, 2020 (Bombay High Court)

 

DCIT-1(1) vs. M/s Ami Industries
(India) Pvt. Ltd. [ITA No. 5181/Mum/2014; Date of order: 28th
August, 2016; A.Y.: 2010-11; Mum. ITAT]

 

Section 68 – Share application money –
The assessee had furnished PAN, ITR of the investors to prove genuineness of
the transactions – For credit worthiness of the creditors, the bank accounts of
the investors showed that they had funds – Not required to prove ‘source of the
source’ – Addition is justified [PCIT vs. NRA Iron & Steel 412 ITR 161
(SC) distinguished]

 

In the assessment proceedings, the A.O.
noted that the assessee had disclosed funds from three Kolkata-based companies
as share application money amounting to Rs. 34.00 crores (Parasmani Merchandise
Pvt. Ltd. Rs. 13.50 crores; Ratanmani Vanijya Pvt. Ltd. Rs. 2.00 crores and
Rosberry Merchants Pvt. Ltd. Rs. 18.50 crores).

The A.O. issued a
notice to the assessee on the ground that the whereabouts of the above
companies were doubtful and their identity could not be authenticated. Thus,
the genuineness of the companies became questionable.

 

After considering the reply submitted
by the assessee, the A.O. treated the aforesaid amount of Rs. 34 crores as
money from unexplained sources and added the same to the income of the assessee
as unexplained cash credit u/s 68 of the Act.

 

Aggrieved by the order, the assessee
preferred an appeal before the CIT(A). The CIT(A) held that the assessee had
discharged its burden u/s 68 by proving the identity of the creditors; the
genuineness of the transactions; and the credit worthiness of the creditors.
Consequently, the first appellate authority set aside the addition made by the
A.O.

 

Being aggrieved by the order of the
CIT(A), the Revenue filed an appeal to the Tribunal. The Tribunal noted that
the A.O. had referred the matter to the investigation wing of the Department at
Kolkata for making inquiries about the three creditors from whom share
application money was received. Though the report from the investigation wing
was received, the Tribunal noted that the same was not considered by the A.O.
despite mentioning of the same in the assessment order; besides, he had not
provided a copy of the same to the assessee. In the report by the investigation
wing, it was mentioned that the companies were in existence and had filed income
tax returns for the previous year under consideration but the A.O. recorded
that these creditors had very meagre income as disclosed in their returns of
income and, therefore, he doubted the credit-worthiness of the three creditors.

 

Finally, the Tribunal held that as per
the provisions of section 68 of the Act, for any cash credit appearing in the
books of an assessee, the assessee is required to prove the following: (a)
Identity of the creditor, (b) Genuineness of the transaction, and (c)
Credit-worthiness of the party. In this case, the assessee had already proved
the identity of the share applicants by furnishing their PAN and copies of
their IT returns filed for the A.Y. 2010-11.

 

Regarding the genuineness of the
transaction, the assessee had filed a copy of the bank accounts of the three
share applicants from which the share application money was paid and the copy
of the account of the assessee in which the said amount was deposited and which
had been received by RTGS. Regarding the credit-worthiness of the parties, it
has been proved from the bank accounts of the three companies that they had the
funds to make payments for the share application money and a copy of the
resolution passed in the meetings of their Boards of Directors. Regarding ‘the source
of the source’, the A.O. has already made inquiries through the DDI
(Investigation), Kolkata and collected all the materials required which proved
‘the source of the source’, though as per the settled legal position on this
issue the assessee need not prove ‘the source of the source’. The A.O. has not
brought any cogent material or evidence on record to indicate that the
shareholders were benamidars or fictitious persons, or that any part of
the share capital represented the company’s own income from undisclosed
sources. Accordingly, the order of the CIT(A) was upheld.

 

Aggrieved by the order of the ITAT, the
Revenue filed an appeal to the High Court. The Revenue submitted that it cannot
be said that the assessee had discharged the burden to prove the
credit-worthiness of the three parties. Further, it contented that the assessee
is also required to prove ‘the source of the source’. In this connection, the
Department placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in Pr. CIT
vs. NRA Iron & Steel Pvt. Ltd.

 

The assessee submitted that from the
facts and circumstances of the case, it is quite evident that the assessee has
discharged its burden to prove the identity of the creditors, the genuineness
of the transactions and the credit-worthiness of the creditors. The legal
position is very clear inasmuch as the assessee is only required to explain the
source and not ‘the source of the source’. The decision of the Supreme Court in
NRA Iron & Steel Pvt. Ltd. (Supra) is not the case law for
the aforesaid proposition. In fact, the said decision nowhere states that the
assessee is required to prove ‘the source of the source’. Further, it is also a
settled proposition that the assessee is not required to prove ‘the source of
the source’. In fact, this position has been clarified in the recent decision
in Gaurav Triyugi Singh vs. Income Tax Officer-24(3)(1)2 dated 22nd
January, 2020.

 

The Court found that the identity of
the creditors was not in doubt. The assessee had furnished the PAN, copies of
the income tax returns of the creditors, as well as copies of the bank accounts
of the three creditors in which the share application money was deposited in
order to prove the genuineness of the transactions. Insofar as the
credit-worthiness of the creditors was concerned, the Tribunal had recorded
that the bank accounts of the creditors showed that they had funds to make
payments for share application money and, in this regard, resolutions were also
passed by the Board of Directors of the three creditors. Although the assessee
was not required to prove ‘the source of the source’, nonetheless, the Tribunal
took the view that the A.O. had made inquiries through the investigation wing
of the Department at Kolkata and collected all the materials which proved ‘the
source of the source’.

 

In NRA Iron & Steel Pvt. Ltd.
(Supra), the A.O. had made an independent and detailed inquiry,
including survey of the investor companies. The field report revealed that the
shareholders were either non-existent or lacked credit-worthiness. It is in
these circumstances that the Supreme Court had held that the onus to establish
the identity of the investor companies was not discharged by the assessee. The
aforesaid decision is, therefore, clearly distinguishable on the facts of the
present case. Therefore, the first appellate authority had returned a clear
finding of fact that the assessee had discharged its onus of proving the
identity of the creditors, the genuineness of the transactions and the
credit-worthiness of the creditors, which finding of fact stood affirmed by the
Tribunal. There are, thus, concurrent findings of fact by the two lower
appellate authorities. Under these circumstances, the appeal is dismissed.

 

Reassessment – Sections 147 and 148 of ITA, 1961 – Notice after four years – Failure to disclose material facts necessary for assessment – No duty to disclose investments – Notice for failure to disclose investment – Not valid

36. Bhavik
Bharatbhai Padia vs. ITO; [2019] 419 ITR
149 (Guj.) Date of order:
19th August, 2019 A.Y.: 2011-12

 

Reassessment –
Sections 147 and 148 of ITA, 1961 – Notice after four years – Failure to disclose
material facts necessary for assessment – No duty to disclose investments –
Notice for failure to disclose investment – Not valid

 

For the A.Y. 2011-12, the assessee-petitioner received a notice u/s 148
of the Income-tax Act, 1961 dated 30th March, 2018. The reasons
assigned by the AO for reopening are as under:

‘As per information available with this office during the year under
consideration the assessee had made investment of Rs. 50,00,000 in the pension
policies of LIC of India. The assessee has filed his return of income for the
A.Y. 2011-12 declaring total income at Rs. 72.78 lakhs. The information was
received from the Income-tax Officer (I & CI)-1, Ahmedabad on 27th
March, 2018. On a perusal of the information, it is found that the assessee has
made investment of Rs. 50,00,000 in the pension policies of LIC of India during
the F.Y. 2010-11 relevant to the A.Y. 2011-12. During the inquiries conducted
by the Income-tax Officer (I & CI), the investment of Rs. 50,00,000 made by
the assessee remains unexplained. Thus, there is an escapement of Rs. 50,00,000
and the case requires to be reopened u/s 147 of the Act.’

 

The assessee filed his objections to the notice
issued u/s 148 of the Act pointing out that he had disclosed all the income
liable to be offered and to be brought to tax in its return of income. The
assessee further pointed out in his objections that as the assessee did not
have any business income during the A.Y. 2011-12, he was not obliged to
disclose his investment of Rs. 50,00,000 in the pension policies of the LIC of
India in his return of income. The assessee further pointed out that he had
salary, income from other sources and capital gains and in such circumstances,
he was required to file form ITR-2 for the A.Y. 2011-12. It was also pointed
out that the Form ITR-2 does not include the column for the disclosure of
investments. In such circumstances, the assessee could not have been expected
to disclose his investments in his return of income. The assessee further
pointed out that his total income for the A.Y. 2011-12 was Rs. 71.50 lakhs. He
had sufficient past savings and the current year’s income to make an investment
of Rs. 50,00,000 in the LIC policies. He also pointed out to the respondent
that just because he had made an investment of Rs. 50,00,000 his case should
not be reopened, as he could be said to have made full and true disclosure of
his income. By an order dated 8th October, 2018, the AO rejected the
objections. The assessee filed a writ petition and challenged the order.

 

The Gujarat High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

 

‘The notice for reassessment had been issued after four years on the
ground that the assessee had failed to disclose investments. It was not in
dispute that the form of return of income, i.e., ITR-2, then in force had no
separate column for the disclosure of any investment. The notice was not
valid.’

 

 

Income Declaration Scheme, 2016 – Scope of – Amount paid as advance tax can be adjusted towards amount due under Scheme

35. Alluri
Purnachandra Rao vs. Pr. CIT; [2019] 419 ITR
462 (Tel.) Date of order:
18th September, 2019 A.Ys.: 2010-11
to 2015-16

 

Income
Declaration Scheme, 2016 – Scope of – Amount paid as advance tax can be adjusted
towards amount due under Scheme

The petitioner filed the subject declaration under the Income
Declaration Scheme, 2016 in Form 1 on 30th June, 2016 for the A.Ys.
2010-11 to 2015-16 declaring undisclosed income of Rs. 40,98,706. In terms of
the Income Declaration Scheme, the petitioner was liable to pay a sum of Rs.
18,44,418 towards tax, surcharge and penalty on this undisclosed income. In
that regard, the petitioner claimed credit of a sum of Rs. 12,11,611 being his
tax deducted at source (TDS). He also claimed credit of a sum of Rs. 1,10,000,
being the advance tax / prepaid tax paid by him for the assessment year
2013-14. After adjusting the aforesaid credits, he paid the balance sum of Rs.
5,22,807 in three instalments as required.

 

The Principal Commissioner of Income Tax-6, Hyderabad, rejected the
declaration filed by the petitioner on the ground that he had failed to pay the
tax, surcharge and penalty on the undisclosed income declared by him before the
due date, i.e., 30th September, 2017. This was because he did not
give credit to the advance tax of Rs. 1,10,000 paid by the petitioner for the
A.Y. 2013-14. The petitioner filed a writ petition and challenged the order of
the Principal Commissioner.

 

The Telangana High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

 

‘i)   The Income Declaration
Scheme, 2016, was promulgated under sections 184 and 185 of the Finance Act,
2016 enabling an assessee to pay tax at 30% on undisclosed income along with
surcharge and penalty at 25% on the tax payable. Under section 187 of the Act,
read with Notification No. S. O. 2476(E) dated 20th July, 2016
([2016] 386 ITR [ST] 5), the tax, surcharge and penalty were to be paid in
three instalments between 30th November, 2016 and 30th
September, 2017.

 

ii)   The Central Board of Direct
Taxes issued Circular No. 25 of 2016, dated 30th June, 2016 ([2016]
385 ITR [ST] 22), furnishing clarifications on the Income Declaration Scheme;
question No. 4 thereunder was whether credit for tax deducted at source, if
any, in respect of the income declared should be allowed. The answer to this
was in the affirmative and to the effect that credit for tax deducted at source
should be allowed in those cases where the related income was declared under the
Scheme and credit for the tax had not already been claimed in the return of
income filed for any assessment year. Once the tax deducted at source relevant
for the period covered by the declaration filed under the Income Declaration
Scheme is given credit in accordance with the clarification of the Central
Board of Direct Taxes itself, there is no reason why advance tax paid for the
very same period, which has not been given credit to earlier, should not be
adjusted against the amount payable under the Scheme.

 

iii)  The assessee’s declaration
pertained to the A.Ys. 2010-11 to 2015-16. Advance tax of Rs. 1,10,000 had been
paid by him for the A.Y. 2013-14. Admittedly, there was no regular assessment
for that year, whereby the advance tax could have been adjusted. Therefore,
there was no rationale in denying the assessee credit of this amount while
computing the amount payable by him under the Income Declaration Scheme. If the
amount paid by the assessee for the A.Y. 2013-14, being a sum of Rs. 1,10,000,
were adjusted, the payments made by him on 21st November, 2016 (Rs.
1,50,000), 28th March, 2017 (Rs. 1,50,000) and 27th
September, 2017 (Rs. 2,22,807) would be sufficient to discharge his liability
in respect of the tax, surcharge and penalty payable by him towards his
undisclosed income declared under the Income Declaration Scheme. Hence the
rejection of the declaration was not valid.

 

iv)  The writ petition is
accordingly allowed setting aside the impugned proceedings dated 6th
February, 2018 passed by the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax-6, Hyderabad,
rejecting the declaration filed by the petitioner under the Income Declaration
Scheme, 2016. The said declaration shall be considered afresh by the Principal
Commissioner of Income Tax-6, Hyderabad, duly giving credit not only to the tax
deducted at source but also to the advance tax paid by the petitioner for the
A.Y. 2013-14. This exercise shall be completed expeditiously and, in any event,
not later than four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of the order, be
it from whatever source.’

 

 

Exemption u/s 10(10AA) of ITA, 1961 – Leave salary (government employees) – Government employees enjoy protection and privileges under Constitution and other laws which are not available to other employees and government employees form a distinct class; they are governed by different terms and conditions of employment – Consequently, retired employees of PSUs and nationalised bank cannot be treated as government employees and, thus, they are not entitled to get full tax exemption on leave encashment after retirement / superannuation u/s 10(10AA)

34. Kamal Kumar
Kalia vs. UOI; [2019] 111
taxmann.com 409 (Delhi) Date of order:
8th November, 2019

 

Exemption u/s
10(10AA) of ITA, 1961 – Leave salary (government employees) – Government
employees enjoy protection and privileges under Constitution and other laws
which are not available to other employees and government employees form a
distinct class; they are governed by different terms and conditions of
employment – Consequently, retired employees of PSUs and nationalised bank
cannot be treated as government employees and, thus, they are not entitled to
get full tax exemption on leave encashment after retirement / superannuation
u/s 10(10AA)

 

The petitioners, who were employees of Public Sector Undertakings and
nationalised banks, filed a writ contending that although they were Central and
State Government employees, they were discriminated against. They were granted
complete exemption in respect of the cash equivalent of leave salary for the
period of earned leave standing to their credit at the time of their
retirement, whether on superannuation or otherwise. However, all others,
including the employees of PSUs and nationalised banks, are granted exemption
only in respect of the amount of leave salary payable for a period of ten
months, subject to the limit prescribed.

 

The Delhi High Court dismissed the writ petition and held as under:

 

‘i)   So far as the challenge to
provisions of section 10(10AA) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on the ground of
discrimination is concerned, there is no merit therein. This is because
employees of the Central Government and the State Government form a distinct
class and the classification is reasonable having nexus with the object sought
to be achieved. The Central Government and State Government employees enjoy a
“status” and they are governed by different terms and conditions of employment.
Thus, Government employees enjoy protection and privileges under the
Constitution and other laws, which are not available to those who are not
employees of the Central and State Governments.

 

ii)   There is no merit in the
submission of the petitioner that the employees of PSUs and nationalised banks
are also rendering services for the government and such organisations are
covered by Article 12 of the Constitution of India as “State”. Merely because
PSUs and nationalised banks are considered as “State” under article 12 of the
Constitution of India for the purpose of entertainment of proceedings under
Article 226 of the Constitution and for enforcement of fundamental rights under
the Constitution, it does not follow that the employees of such public sector
undertakings, nationalised banks or other institutions which are classified as
“State” assume the status of Central Government and State Government employees.

 

iii)  Therefore, the instant
petition is rejected, insofar as the petitioners’ challenge to the provisions
of section 10(10AA) is concerned.’

 

Charitable purpose – Meaning of – Sections 2(15) and 11 of ITA, 1961 – Preservation of environment is an object of general public utility – Polluting industries setting up company for prevention of pollution – Object not to earn profit – Fact that members of company would benefit is not relevant – Company entitled to exemption u/s 11

33. CIT vs.
Naroda Enviro Projects Ltd.; [2019] 419 ITR
482 (Guj.) Date of order:
29th July, 2019 A.Ys.: 2009-10

 

Charitable
purpose – Meaning of – Sections 2(15) and 11 of ITA, 1961 – Preservation of environment
is an object of general public utility – Polluting industries setting up
company for prevention of pollution – Object not to earn profit – Fact that
members of company would benefit is not relevant – Company entitled to
exemption u/s 11

 

The assessee company was incorporated on 19th October, 1995
and was later converted into a company limited by shares incorporated u/s 25 of
the Companies Act, 1956. The assessee company was engaged in the activity of
preservation of environment by providing pollution control treatment for
disposal of liquid and solid industrial waste. The assessee company was
registered u/s 12AA of the Income-tax Act, 1961 as a charitable institution.
For the A.Y. 2009-10 the assessee had filed its return of income declaring total
income (loss) of Rs. 258 (Rupees two hundred and fifty eight only) along with
the auditor’s report u/s 12A(b) of the Act in Form 10B claiming exemption u/s
11 of the Act. The AO took the view that the assessee company is not entitled
to seek exemption u/s 11 and held as under:

 

‘i)   The assessee is carrying on
business activity under the pretext of charitable activity. The incidental
profit cannot be for all the years and not to the extent reflected in the table
given in the order.

 

ii)   The objects specified in the
memorandum of association are important but the same have to be considered with
reference to the real practice adopted for running the activity, i.e., whether
it is charitable or for the purpose of making profit. The object included in
definition of “charitable purpose” as defined in section 2(15) should be
evidenced by charity; otherwise even environment consultant will also claim
exemption u/s 11 being a trust or a company u/s 25.

 

iii) The action is carried out for
the benefit of members to discharge their onus of treatment of chemicals, etc.
with substantial charge with intention to earn profit under the shelter of
section 25 of the Companies Act.

 

iv) Hence it is held that the assessee is rendering service of pollution
control as per the norms laid down by the Gujarat State Pollution Control Board
or any other authority responsible for the regulation of pollution in relation
to any trade, commerce or business carried out by the industries located in the
industrial area of Naroda, Vatva and Odhav for a uniform cess or fee or any
other consideration, irrespective of the nature of use or application, or
retention, of the income of such activity. Since the aggregate value of
receipts are more than Rs. 10,00,000 both the provisos to section 2(15)
are applicable to the assessee company and it is not entitled for exemption.’

 

The Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal held that taking an overall
view, the dominant objects of the assessee were charitable as the dominant
object was not only preservation of the environment, but one of general public
utility and, therefore, the assessee was entitled to seek exemption u/s 11 of
the Act.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of
the Tribunal and held as under:

 

‘i)   The assessee was a company
engaged in the activity of preservation of the environment by providing
pollution control treatment for disposal of liquid and solid industrial waste.
The benefit accrued to the members of the company. The members were none other
than the owners of the polluting industries. These members were obliged in law
to maintain the parameters as prescribed by the Gujarat Pollution Control Board
and in law for the purpose of discharge of their trade effluents, in other
words, discharge of solid and liquid waste. If they did not do so, they would
be liable to be prosecuted and their units would also be liable to be closed.

 

ii)   However, this, by itself, was
not sufficient to take the view that the company had not been set up for a
charitable purpose. The birth of this company also needed to be looked into
closely. The fact that the members of the assessee company were benefited was
merely incidental to the carrying out of the main or primary purpose and if the
primary purpose was charitable, the fact that the members of the assessee
benefited would not militate against its charitable character nor would it make
the purpose any less charitable.

iii)  Prior to the introduction of
the proviso to section 2(15) of the Act, the assessee company was
granted registration u/s 12A of the Act. From this it was clear that prior to
the introduction of the proviso to section 2(15) of the Act, the
authority, upon due consideration of all the relevant aspects, had arrived at
the satisfaction that the assessee company was established for charitable
purposes. The company continued to be recognised as a charitable institution.
The certificate issued u/s 12A, after due inquiry, was still in force.

 

iv)  The driving force was not the
desire to earn profit, but the object was to promote, aid, foster and engage in
the area of environment protection, abatement of pollution of various kinds
such as water, air, solid, noise, vehicular, etc., without limiting its scope.
In short, the main object was preservation and protection of the environment.

 

v)   The Commissioner (Appeals) and
the Appellate Tribunal had concurrently held that taking an overall view, the
dominant objects of the assessee were charitable as the dominant object was not
only preservation of the environment, but one of general public utility and,
therefore, the assessee was entitled to seek exemption under section 11 of the
Act. The Tribunal was the last fact-finding body. As a principle, this court
should not disturb the findings of fact in an appeal under section 260A of the
Act unless the findings of fact are perverse.’

 

Capital gains – Exemption u/s 54 of ITA, 1961 – Scope – Additional cost of construction incurred within stipulated time though not deposited in capital gains account – Entitled to deduction

32. Venkata Dilip Kumar vs. CIT; [2019] 419 ITR 298 (Mad.) [2019] 111 taxmann.com 180 (Mad.) Date of order: 5th November, 2019

 

Capital gains – Exemption u/s 54 of ITA, 1961 – Scope – Additional cost
of construction incurred within stipulated time though not deposited in capital
gains account – Entitled to deduction

 

The assessee had long-term capital gain on transfer of a residential
house and invested the same in a new residential house. The assessee claimed
deduction u/s 54 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, an amount of Rs. 1.5 crores being
paid to the builder for the new house. This was allowed by the AO. The assessee
had also claimed further deduction of Rs. 57.25 lakhs u/s 54 contending that
though such sum was not deposited in the capital gains deposit account, it was
utilised for the purpose of additional expenditure towards the construction
cost and that the sum was drawn out of the capital gains deposited in the same
bank branch, although in a savings bank account. The AO refused to grant
deduction u/s 54. This was confirmed by the Tribunal.

 

The Madras High Court allowed the appeal filed by the assessee and held
as under:

 

‘i)   Section 54 of the Income-tax
Act, 1961 deals with profits on sale of property used for residence. The
capital gains so arising in the hands of the assessee, instead of being dealt
with as income, will be dealt with by giving deduction to such capital gains,
provided the assessee satisfies the requirement contemplated under the
provision. For seeking benefit of deduction u/s 54, the assessee should have
purchased one residential house either one year before the transfer or two
years after the date of such transfer, or constructed a residential house
within a period of three years after the date of such transfer. Meeting the
expenses towards the cost of construction of the house within a period of three
years entitles an assessee to the deduction u/s 54.

 

ii)   Section 54(2) contemplates
that if the amount of the capital gains is not appropriated by the assessee
towards purchase of the new asset within one year before the date on which the
transfer of the original asset took place, or is not utilised by him for the
purchase of the new asset before the date of furnishing the return of income
u/s 139, he has to deposit the sum in an account in any such bank and utilise
in accordance with any scheme which the Central Government may, by
notification, frame in that behalf. In other words, if the assessee has not
utilised the amount of the capital gains either in full or part, such
unutilised amount should be deposited in a capital gains account to get the
benefit of deduction in the succeeding assessment years. Section 54(2) cannot
be read in isolation and on the other hand, application of section 54(2) should
take place only when the assessee fails to satisfy the requirement u/s 54(1).
While the compliance with the requirement u/s 54(1) is mandatory and if
complied with, has to be construed as substantial compliance to grant the
benefit of deduction, the compliance with the requirement u/s 54(2) could be
treated only as directory in nature. If the assessee with material details and
particulars satisfies that the amount for which deduction is sought u/s 54 is
utilised either for purchasing or constructing the residential house in India
within the time prescribed u/s 54(1), the deduction is bound to be granted
without reference to section 54(2). Mere non-compliance with a procedural
requirement u/s 54(2) itself cannot stand in the way of the assessee getting
the benefit u/s 54, if he is, otherwise, in a position to satisfy that the
mandatory requirement u/s 54(1) is fully complied with within the time limit
prescribed therein.

iii)  The
assessee had claimed that it had utilised the disputed sum towards the cost of
the additional construction within the period of three years from the date of
the transfer and therefore, if such contention were factually correct, the
assessee had to be held to have satisfied the mandatory requirement u/s 54(1)
to get the deduction.

iv)  Matter remanded to verify
whether the sum was utilised by the assessee within the time stipulated u/s
54(1) for the purpose of construction. If such utilisation was found to have
been made within such time, the Department was bound to grant deduction.’

 

[Appellate Tribunal in I.T.A. No. 5535/Mum/2014; Date of order: 11th January, 2017; A.Y.: 2003-04; Bench ‘F’ Mum.] Appeal u/s 260A – Penalty u/s 271(1)(c) – The question relating to non-striking off of the inapplicable portion in the section 271(1)(c) show cause notice goes to the root of the lis and is a jurisdictional issue – Issue can be raised first time before High Court – Penalty cannot be imposed for alleged breach of one limb of section 271(1)(c) of the Act while proceedings are initiated for breach of the other limb of section 271(1)(c) – Penalty deleted

7. Ventura Textiles Ltd. vs. CIT –
Mumbai-11 [ITA No. 958 of 2017 Date
of order: 12th June, 2020 (Bombay
High Court)

 

[Appellate
Tribunal in I.T.A. No. 5535/Mum/2014; Date of order: 11th January,
2017; A.Y.: 2003-04; Bench ‘F’ Mum.]

 

Appeal u/s 260A – Penalty u/s 271(1)(c) – The question relating to
non-striking off of the inapplicable portion in the section 271(1)(c) show
cause notice goes to the root of the lis and is a jurisdictional issue –
Issue can be raised first time before High Court – Penalty cannot be imposed
for alleged breach of one limb of section 271(1)(c) of the Act while
proceedings are initiated for breach of the other limb of section 271(1)(c) –
Penalty deleted

 

The issue involved in the
above appeal related to the imposition of penalty of Rs. 22,08,860 u/s
271(1)(c) of the Act by the A.O. on account of disallowance of Rs. 62,47,460
claimed as a deduction u/s 36(i)(vii) on account of bad debt and subsequently
claimed as a deduction u/s 37 as expenditure expended wholly and exclusively
for the purpose of business.

 

The assessee company filed
its ROI declaring total loss at Rs. 4,66,68,740 for A.Y. 2003-04. During the
assessment proceedings, it was found amongst other things that the assessee had
debited Rs. 62,47,460 under the head ‘selling and distribution expenses’ and
claimed it as bad debt in the books of accounts, thus claiming it as a
deduction u/s 36(1)(vii). Subsequently it was found that the aforesaid amount
was paid to M/s JCT Ltd. as compensation for the supply of inferior quality of
goods. Thus, the A.O. held that the amount of Rs. 62,47,460 claimed as bad debt
was not actually a debt and therefore it was not allowable as a deduction u/s 36(1)(vii).
The A.O. further held that the said claim was also not admissible even u/s
37(1), with the observation that payment made to M/s JCT Ltd. was not wholly
and exclusively for business purposes but for extraneous considerations. In
view thereof, the assessee’s claim was rejected. The A.O. initiated penalty
proceedings u/s 271(1)(c) of the Act for furnishing inaccurate particulars of
income.

The A.O. issued notice u/s
274 r/w/s 271 on the same day, i.e., on 28th February, 2006, to the
assessee to show cause as to why an order imposing penalty should not be made
u/s 271. It may, however, be mentioned that in the pertinent portion of the
notice the A.O. did not strike off the inapplicable portion.

 

The assessee had challenged
the disallowance of bad debt along with other disallowances in the assessment
order by filing an appeal before the CIT(A) who, by an order dated 14th
November, 2012, confirmed the disallowance of bad debt while deleting other
disallowances.

 

In the penalty proceedings,
the A.O. took the view that the assessee’s claim was not actually bad debt but
represented payment made to M/s JCT Ltd. which was also not incurred wholly and
exclusively for the purposes of business. Thus, by the order dated 14th
February, 2014, the A.O. held that by making an improper and unsubstantiated
claim of bad debt of Rs. 62,47,460, the assessee had wilfully reduced its
incidence of taxation, thereby concealing its income as well as furnishing
inaccurate particulars of income. Therefore, the A.O. imposed the minimum
penalty quantified at Rs. 24,99,200 which included penalty on another
disallowance.

 

The CIT(A) deleted the
penalty on the other disallowance. Regarding the penalty levied on Rs.
62,47,460 claimed as bad debt in the assessment proceedings, the CIT(A) held
that the assessee had made a wrong claim by submitting inaccurate particulars
of income by claiming bad debt which was not actually a debt and also not an
expenditure allowable u/s 37(1). Thus, it was held that the assessee had
wilfully submitted inaccurate particulars of income which had resulted in
concealment. Therefore, the penalty amount of Rs. 62,47,460 levied was upheld.

 

The Tribunal upheld the order
of the CIT(A) and rejected the appeal of the assessee. According to the
Tribunal, it was rightly held by the CIT(A) that the assessee had made a wrong
claim by submitting inaccurate particulars of income by claiming a bad debt
which was not actually a debt and also not an expenditure allowable u/s 37(1).
Therefore, the finding recorded by the CIT(A) that the assessee had wilfully
submitted inaccurate particulars of income which had resulted in concealment
was affirmed.

 

Before the High Court the
first contention was raising a question of law for the first time before the
High Court though it had not been raised before the lower authorities; the
Court referred to a series of decisions, including of the Supreme Court in
Jhabua Power Limited (2013) 37 Taxmann.com 162 (SC) and of the Bombay
High Court in Ashish Estates & Properties (P) Ltd. (2018) 96
Taxmann.com 305 (Bom.) wherein it is observed that it would not
preclude the High Court from entertaining an appeal on an issue of jurisdiction
even if the same was not raised before the Tribunal.

 

The Court further noted and
analysed the two limbs of section 271(1)(c) of the Act and also the fact that
the two limbs, i.e., concealment of particulars of income and furnishing
inaccurate particulars of income, carry different connotations. The Court further
noted that the A.O. must indicate in the notice for which of the two limbs he
proposes to impose the penalty and for this the notice has to be appropriately
marked. If in the printed format of the notice the inapplicable portion is not
struck off, thus not indicating for which limb the penalty is proposed to be
imposed, it would lead to an inference as to non-application of mind.

 

Therefore, the question
relating to non-striking off of the inapplicable portion in the show cause
notice which is in printed format, thereby not indicating therein as to under
which limb of section 271(1)(c) the penalty was proposed to be imposed, i.e.,
whether for concealing the particulars of income or for furnishing inaccurate
particulars of such income, would go to the root of the lis. Therefore,
it would be a jurisdictional issue. Being a jurisdictional issue, it can be
raised before the High Court for the first time and adjudicated upon even if it
was not raised before the Tribunal.

 

The Hon. Court relied on
decisions of SSA’s Emerald Meadows (2016) 73 Taxmann.com 241 (Karnataka);
Manjunath Cotton & Ginning Factory 359 ITR 565 (Kar.); and
Samson Pernchery (2017) 98 CCH 39 (Bom.) wherein the issue was
examined, i.e. the question as to justification of the Tribunal in deleting the
penalty levied u/s 271(1)(c). It was noted that the notice issued u/s 274 was
in a standard proforma without having struck off the irrelevant clauses
therein, leading to an inference as to non-application of mind.

 

A similar view had been taken
in Goa Coastal Resorts & Recreation Pvt. Ltd. (2019) 106 CCH 0183
(Bom.); New Era Sova Mine (2019) SCC OnLine Bom. 1032; as well as Shri
Hafeez S. Contractor (ITA Nos.796 and 872 of 2016 decided on 11th
December, 2018).

 

On the facts of the present
case, the Court noticed that the statutory show cause notice u/s 274 r/w/s 271
of the Act proposing to impose penalty was issued on the same day when the
assessment order was passed, i.e., on 28th February, 2006. The said
notice was in printed form. Though at the bottom of the notice it was mentioned
‘delete inappropriate words and paragraphs’, unfortunately, the A.O. omitted to
strike off the inapplicable portion in the notice. Such omission certainly
reflects a mechanical approach and non-application of mind on the part of the
A.O. However, the moot question is whether the assessee had notice as to why
penalty was sought to be imposed on it?

 

The Court observed that in
the present case, the assessment order and the show cause notice were both
issued on the same date, i.e., on 28th February, 2006, and if they
are read in conjunction, a view can reasonably be taken that notwithstanding
the defective notice, the assessee was fully aware of the reason as to why the
A.O. sought to impose penalty. It was quite clear that the penalty proceedings
were initiated for breach of the second limb of section 271(1)(c), i.e., for
furnishing inaccurate particulars of income. The purpose of a notice is to make
the noticee aware of the ground(s) of notice. In the present case, it would be
too technical and pedantic to take the view that because in the printed notice
the inapplicable portion was not struck off, the order of penalty should be set
aside even though in the assessment order it was clearly mentioned that penalty
proceedings u/s 271(1)(c) had been initiated separately for furnishing
inaccurate particulars of income. Therefore, this contention urged by the
appellant / assessee was rejected.

 

Having held so, the Court
went on to examine whether in the return of income the assessee had furnished
inaccurate particulars. As already discussed above, for the imposition of
penalty u/s 271(1)(c) either concealment of particulars of income or furnishing
inaccurate particulars of such income are the sine qua non. In the
instant case, the penalty proceedings u/s 271(1)(c) were initiated on the
ground that the assessee had furnished inaccurate particulars of income.

 

The Court observed that in
the assessment proceedings the explanation of the assessee was not accepted by
the A.O. by holding that the subsequent payment made to M/s JCT Ltd. would not
be covered by section 36(1)(vii) since the amount claimed as bad debt was
actually not a debt. Thereafter, the A.O. examined whether such payment would
be covered u/s 37(1) as per which an expenditure would be allowable as a
deduction if it pertains to that particular year and has been incurred wholly
and exclusively for the purpose of business. The A.O. held that the assessee’s
claim was not admissible even u/s 37(1) as the circumstances indicated that the
payments were not made wholly and exclusively for business purposes. While
disallowing the claim of the assessee, the A.O. took the view that since the
assessee had furnished inaccurate particulars of income, penalty proceedings
u/s 271(1)(c) were also initiated separately.

 

The Court noticed that in the
statutory show cause notice the A.O. did not indicate as to whether penalty was
sought to be imposed for concealment of income or for furnishing inaccurate
particulars of income, although in the assessment order it was mentioned that
penalty proceedings were initiated for furnishing inaccurate particulars of
income. In the order of penalty, the A.O. held that the assessee had concealed
its income as well as furnished inaccurate particulars of income.

 

But concealment of
particulars of income was not the charge against the appellant, the charge was
of furnishing inaccurate particulars of income. As discussed above, it is trite
that penalty cannot be imposed for alleged breach of one limb of section 271(1)(c)
while penalty proceedings are initiated for breach of the other limb of the
same section. This has certainly vitiated the order of penalty. In the appeal,
the CIT(A) took a curious view, that submission of inaccurate particulars of
income resulted in concealment, thus upholding the order of penalty. This
obfuscated view of the CIT(A) was affirmed by the Tribunal.

 

While the charge against the
assessee was of furnishing inaccurate particulars of income whereas the penalty
was imposed additionally for concealment of income, the order of penalty as
upheld by the lower appellate authorities could be justifiably interfered with,
yet the Court went on to examine whether there was furnishing of inaccurate
particulars of income by the assessee in the first place because that was the
core charge against the assessee.

 

The Court referred to the
decision of the Supreme Court in Reliance Petroproducts Pvt. Ltd. 322 ITR
158 (SC) wherein it was held that mere making of a claim which is not
sustainable in law by itself would not amount to furnishing inaccurate
particulars regarding the income of the assessee. Therefore, such claim made in
the return cannot amount to furnishing inaccurate particulars of income.

The Court noted that this
decision was followed by the Bombay High Court in CIT vs. M/s Mansukh
Dyeing & Printing Mills, Income Tax Appeal No. 1133 of 2008, decided on 24th
June, 2013. In CIT vs. DCM Ltd., 359 ITR 101, the Delhi
High Court applied the said decision of the Supreme Court and further observed
that law does not debar an assessee from making a claim which he believes is
plausible and when he knows that it is going to be examined by the A.O. In such
a case, a liberal view is required to be taken as necessarily the claim is
bound to be carefully scrutinised both on facts and in law. Threat of penalty
cannot become a gag and / or haunt an assessee for making a claim which may be
erroneous or wrong. Again, in CIT vs. Shahabad Co-operative Sugar Mills
Ltd., 322 ITR 73, the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that the
making of a wrong claim is not at par with concealment or giving of inaccurate
information which may call for levy of penalty u/s 271(1)(c) of the Act.

 

In view of the above, in the
present case it is quite evident that the assessee had declared the full facts;
the full factual matrix of facts was before the A.O. while passing the
assessment order. It is another matter that the claim based on such facts was
found to be inadmissible. This is not the same thing as furnishing inaccurate
particulars of income as contemplated u/s 271(1)(c).

 

Thus, on an overall
consideration, the appeal was allowed and the order of penalty as affirmed by
the appellate authorities was set aside. 

 

 

 

 

 

Search and seizure – Assessment u/s 153A of ITA, 1961 – Scope of section 153A – Assessee can raise new claims for deduction in return filed u/s 153A; A.Y. 2008-09

33. Principal
CIT vs. JSW Steel Ltd. [2020]
422 ITR 71 (Bom.) Date
of order: 5th February, 2020 A.Y.:
2008-09

 

Search and
seizure – Assessment u/s 153A of ITA, 1961 – Scope of section 153A – Assessee
can raise new claims for deduction in return filed u/s 153A; A.Y. 2008-09

 

The assessee is a widely-held public limited company engaged in various
activities including production of sponge iron, galvanised sheets and
cold-rolled coils through its steel plants located at Dolve and Kalmeshwar in
Maharashtra. For the A.Y. 2008-09, the assessee had filed return of income on
30th September, 2008 under the provisions of section 139(1) of the
Income-tax Act, 1961, declaring loss at Rs. 104,17,70,752. The assessee’s case
was selected for scrutiny and notice u/s 143(2) was issued on 3rd
September, 2009. During the pendency of the assessment proceedings, a search
was conducted u/s 132 of the Act on the ISPAT group of companies on 30th
November, 2010. Following the search, notice u/s 153A was issued. In response,
the assessee filed return of income declaring total loss at Rs. 419,48,90,102
on 29th March, 2012. In this return of income, the assessee made a
new claim for treating gain on prepayment of deferred value added tax / sales
tax on the net present value (NPV) basis for an amount of Rs. 318,10,93,993 as
‘capital receipt’. This new / fresh claim of the assessee was disallowed by the
A.O. while finalising the assessment u/s 143(3) read with section 153A. The
primary question that arose before the A.O. was whether the claim which was not
made in the earlier original return of income filed u/s 139(1) could be
considered in the subsequent return filed by the assessee in pursuance of
notice u/s 153A? The A.O. held that the assessee could not raise a new claim in
the return filed u/s 153A which was not raised in the original return of income
filed u/s 139(1). Thereafter, the claim was disallowed and was treated as
‘revenue receipt’.

 

The Tribunal
allowed the assessee’s claim.

 

On appeal by
the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held
as under:

 

‘i)   Section 153A of the Income-tax Act, 1961
provides for the procedure for assessment in search cases. The section starts
with a non-obstante clause stating that it is notwithstanding anything
contained in sections 147, 148 and 149. Further, clause (a) of section 153A(1)
provides for issuance of notice to the persons in respect of whom search was
conducted u/s 132 to furnish a return of income. However, the second proviso
to section 153A makes it clear that assessment relating to any assessment year
filed within a period of the six assessment years pending on the date of search
u/s 132 of the Act shall abate.

 

ii)   Thus, if on the date of initiation of search
u/s 132 any assessment proceeding relating to any assessment year falling
within the period of the six assessment years is pending, it shall stand abated
and the assessing authority cannot proceed with such pending assessment after
initiation of search u/s 132. The crucial expression is “abate”. To
“abate”, as applied to an action, is to cease, terminate, or come to an
end prematurely. Once the assessment abates, the original return which had been
filed loses its originality and the subsequent return filed u/s 153A takes the
place of the original return. In such a case, the return of income filed u/s
153A(1) would be construed to be one filed u/s 139(1) and the provisions of the
Act shall apply to it accordingly.

 

iii)  If that be the position, all legitimate claims
would be open to the assessee to raise in the return of income filed u/s
153A(1). It is open for the assessee to lodge a new claim in a proceeding u/s
153A(1) which was not claimed in his regular return of income.’

 

Loss – Set-off of – Sections 72(2), 72A and 263 of ITA, 1961 and sections 18 and 32(2) of SICA, 1985 – Amalgamation of companies – Provision for carry forward by amalgamated company of accumulated loss and unabsorbed depreciation of amalgamating company – Sick industrial company – Sanction of scheme by Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction implies that requirements of section 72(2) satisfied; A.Y. 2004-05

32. CIT
vs. Lakshmi Machine Works Ltd. [2020]
422 ITR 235 (Mad.) Date
of order: 13th February, 2019 A.Y.:
2004-05

 

Loss –
Set-off of – Sections 72(2), 72A and 263 of ITA, 1961 and sections 18 and 32(2)
of SICA, 1985 – Amalgamation of companies – Provision for carry forward by
amalgamated company of accumulated loss and unabsorbed depreciation of
amalgamating company – Sick industrial company – Sanction of scheme by Board
for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction implies that requirements of
section 72(2) satisfied; A.Y. 2004-05

 

Two spinning
units of a company amalgamated with the assessee under a rehabilitation scheme
under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 by an order
of sanction by the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction. The
assessee claimed the carried forward loss u/s 72A of the Income-tax Act, 1961
in its return. The A.O. issued notices under sections 142(1) and 143(2) of the
1961 Act and required the assessee to show compliance with the conditions laid
down u/s 72A. The assessee submitted that it was entitled to the claim for
carry forward of loss u/s 72A by virtue of the scheme having been sanctioned by
the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction which took into account the
provisions of that section as well. The A.O. agreed with the view of the
assessee and allowed the claim in his order u/s 143(3). But the Commissioner
was of the view that there was no application of mind by the A.O. while he
allowed the claim made by the assessee u/s 72A and that there were no reasons
in support thereof. Accordingly, he passed a revision order u/s 263 of the 1961
Act.

 

The Tribunal
held that the very fact that the Board for Industrial and Financial
Reconstruction had sanctioned the scheme was sufficient and no further
compliance was called for in regard to the conditions set out u/s 72A as the
provisions of the 1985 Act overrode those of the 1961 Act, and confirmed the
order of the A.O. allowing the claim of the assessee for the carry forward of
loss. Accordingly, the Tribunal set aside the order of the Commissioner passed
u/s 263.

 

On appeal by
the Revenue, the Madras High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held
as under:

 

‘i)   The financial viability or otherwise of the
amalgamating company has to be determined first in order to attract the
provisions of section 72A of the Income-tax Act, 1961. After the enactment of
the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 and the
constitution of the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction, the
question of sickness or robust health of the entity is to be determined by the
Board. It is only when the Board is satisfied that it would have entertained
applications for revival, sanctioning an appropriate scheme for rehabilitation.
Thus, a sanction by the Board for the scheme of amalgamation implies that the
requirements of section 72A have been met.

 

ii)   The view taken by the A.O. to the effect that
the claim of the assessee u/s 72A of the 1961 Act was liable to be allowed in
the light of the provisions of section 32(2) of the 1985 Act and its
interpretation by the Supreme Court was the correct one. Section 263 of the
1961 Act empowered the Commissioner to revise an order of assessment if it was
erroneous or prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. Both conditions were
to be satisfied concurrently. The action of the A.O. though prejudicial, could
hardly be termed “erroneous” insofar as the A.O. had followed the dictum laid
down by the Supreme Court in the case of Indian Shaving Products Ltd. vs.
BIFR [1996] 218 ITR 140 (SC). Thus, in the absence of concurrent
satisfaction of the two conditions u/s 263 of the 1961 Act, the action of the
Commissioner was contrary to the statute and was therefore to be set aside.

 

iii)  The appeal filed by the Revenue is dismissed.
The substantial question of law is answered in favour of the assessee and
against the Revenue.’

Exemption u/s 10(17A) of ITA, 1961 – Award for meritorious service in public interest – Scope of section 10(17A) – Approval of State Government or Central Government – Formal approval not mandatory – Approval may be implied; A.Y. 2010-11

31. K.
Vijaya Kumar vs. Principal CIT [2020]
422 ITR 304 (Mad.) Date
of order: 26th February, 2020 A.Y.:
2010-11

 

Exemption
u/s 10(17A) of ITA, 1961 – Award for meritorious service in public interest –
Scope of section 10(17A) – Approval of State Government or Central Government –
Formal approval not mandatory – Approval may be implied; A.Y. 2010-11

 

The
petitioner has had a distinguished career in the Indian Police Service and is
at present engaged as a senior security adviser to the Union Home Ministry. In
the course of his service, he had been appointed as the Chief of the Special
Task Force (STF) leading ‘Operation Cocoon’ against forest brigand Veerappan,
leading to Veerappan’s fatal encounter on 18th October, 2004. In
recognition of the special and commendable services of the STF, the Government
of Tamil Nadu had issued G.O. Ms. No. 364, Housing and Urban Development
Department, dated 28th October, 2004 instituting an award in
national interest to STF personnel for the valuable services rendered by them
as part of the team. Pursuant thereto, the petitioner had received a cash award
of Rs. 1,08,43,000 in the F.Y. 2009-10, relevant to A.Y. 2010-11. This amount
was sought to be assessed as income by the Commissioner u/s 263 of the
Income-tax Act, 1961 for which the assessee claimed exemption u/s 10(17A). The
Commissioner directed the A.O. to allow the claim of exemption u/s 10(17A) only
if the assessee was able to produce an order granting approval of exemption by
the Government of India u/s 10(17A)(ii).

 

The assessee
filed a writ petition and challenged the order of the Commissioner. The Madras
High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

 

‘i)   The object of section 10(17A) of the
Income-tax Act, 1961 is to reward an individual who has been recognised by the
Centre or the State for rendition of services in public interest. While clause
(i) of section 10(17A) is concerned with an award whether in cash or in kind,
instituted in public interest by the Central or any State Government or
instituted by any other body and approved by the Central Government in this
behalf, clause (ii) refers to a reward by the Central or a State Government for
such purposes as may be approved by the Central Government in this behalf in
public interest.

 

ii)   No specification or prescription has been set
out in terms of how the approval is to be styled or even whether a formal
written approval is required. Nowhere in the rules or forms is there reference
to a format of approval to be issued in this regard. That apart, one should
interpret the provision and its application in a purposive manner bearing in
mind the spirit and object for which it has been enacted. It is clear that the
object of such a reward is by way of recognition by the State of an
individual’s efforts in protecting public interest and serving society in a
significant manner. Thus, the reference to “approval” in section 10(17A) does
not only connote a paper conveying approval and bearing the stamp and seal of the
Central Government, but any material available in the public domain indicating
recognition for such services rendered in public interest.

 

iii)  The assessee had been recognised by the
Central Government on several occasions for meritorious and distinguished
services and from the information available in the public domain, it could be
seen that he was awarded the Jammu and Kashmir Medal, Counter Insurgency Medal,
Police Medal for Meritorious Service (1993) and the President’s Police Medal
for Distinguished Service (1999). Specifically for his role in nabbing
Veerapan, he was awarded the President’s Police Medal for Gallantry on the eve
of Independence Day, 2005. The assessee was entitled to exemption on the awards
received from the State Government. The writ petition is allowed.’

Deduction u/s 80-IB(10) of ITA, 1961 – Housing projects – Scope of section 80-IB(10) – Not necessary that developer should be owner of land – Joint venture agreement showing assessee was developer – Assessee entitled to special deduction u/s 80-IB(10); A.Y. 2010-11

30. Bashyam
Constructions P. Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT [2020]
422 ITR 346 (Mad.) Date
of order: 30th January, 2019 A.Y.:
2010-11

 

Deduction
u/s 80-IB(10) of ITA, 1961 – Housing projects – Scope of section 80-IB(10) –
Not necessary that developer should be owner of land – Joint venture agreement
showing assessee was developer – Assessee entitled to special deduction u/s
80-IB(10); A.Y. 2010-11

 

A claim for deduction u/s 80-IB(10) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was
allowed by the Commissioner (Appeals) but denied by the Tribunal. The reason
assigned by the Tribunal for reversing the order passed by the Commissioner
(Appeals) was that the assessee could not be considered a developer of the
housing project, as a joint venture would happen only when the owner, that is,
the assessee, treated the land as stock-in-trade in its books of accounts.

 

The Madras
High Court allowed the appeal filed by the assessee and held as under:

 

‘i)   A plain reading of section 80-IB(10) of the
Income-tax Act, 1961 makes it clear that deduction is available in a case where
an undertaking develops and builds a housing project. The section clearly draws
a distinction between “developing” and “building”. The provision does not
require that the ownership of land must vest in the developer for it to qualify
for such deduction.

 

ii)   The joint venture agreement clearly showed
that the assessee was the developer and ETA was the builder and mutual rights
and obligations were inextricably linked with each other and undoubtedly, the
project was a housing project. Therefore, the assessee would be entitled to
claim deduction u/s 80-IB(10).’

 

Business expenditure – Disallowance u/s 40(a)(ia) of ITA, 1961 – Amounts not deductible – Payments liable to deduction of tax at source – Failure to deduct tax at source – Law applicable – Effect of amendment of section 40(a)(ia) with effect from 1st April, 2013 providing for cases where recipient has declared income in question and paid tax thereon – Amendment retrospective – Non-deduction of tax at source not causing loss to Revenue – Disallowance not applicable; A.Y. 2005-06

29. CIT
vs. S.M. Anand [2020]
422 ITR 209 (Kar.) Date
of order: 23rd August, 2019 A.Y.:
2005-06

 

Business
expenditure – Disallowance u/s 40(a)(ia) of ITA, 1961 – Amounts not deductible
– Payments liable to deduction of tax at source – Failure to deduct tax at
source – Law applicable – Effect of amendment of section 40(a)(ia) with effect
from 1st April, 2013 providing for cases where recipient has
declared income in question and paid tax thereon – Amendment retrospective –
Non-deduction of tax at source not causing loss to Revenue – Disallowance not
applicable; A.Y. 2005-06

 

In the
appeal by the Revenue, the following question of law was raised:

 

‘Whether the
second proviso to section 40(a)(ia) of the Act inserted by the Finance
Act, 2012 is clarificatory and retrospective in nature and cancellation of the
disallowance u/s 40(a)(ia) by the Tribunal is justifiable where the recipient
of the amount has already discharged his tax liability therein?’

 

The
Karnataka High Court held as under:

 

‘i)   The scheme of section 40(a)(ia) of the
Income-tax Act, 1961 is aimed at ensuring that an expenditure should not be
allowed as deduction in the hands of an assessee in a situation in which income
embedded in such expenditure has remained untaxed due to tax withholding lapses
by the assessee. It is not a penalty for tax withholding lapse but a sort of
compensatory deduction restriction for an income going untaxed due to tax
withholding lapse. The penalty for tax withholding lapse per se is
separately provided for in section 271C and section 40(a)(ia) does not add to
it. The provisions of section 40(a)(ia), as they existed prior to insertion of
the second proviso thereto, went much beyond the obvious intentions of
the lawmakers and created undue hardships even in cases in which the assessee’s
tax withholding lapses did not result in any loss to the exchequer.

 

ii)   In order to cure these shortcomings of the
provision, and thus obviate the unintended hardships, an amendment in law was
made. In view of the well-settled legal position to the effect that a curative
amendment to avoid unintended consequences is to be treated as retrospective in
nature even though it may not state so specifically, the insertion of the
second proviso must be given retrospective effect from the point of time
when the related legal provision was introduced. The insertion of the second proviso
to section 40(a)(ia) is declaratory and curative in nature and it has
retrospective effect from 1st April, 2005, being the date from which
sub-clause (ia) of section 40(a) was inserted by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2004.

 

iii)  It was not disputed that the payments made by
the assessee to the sub-contractors had been offered to tax in their respective
returns of income, uncontroverted by the authorities. There was no actual loss
of revenue. Hence, section 40(a)(ia) was not applicable.

 

iv)  Accordingly, we answer the substantial
question of law against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee.’

 

Business expenditure – Section 37 of ITA, 1961 – General principles – Donations made by company under corporate social responsibility – Deductible u/s 37; A.Y. 2010-11

28. Principal CIT vs. Gujarat Narmada
Valley Fertilizer and Chemicals Ltd. [2020]
422 ITR 164 (Guj.) Date
of order: 16th July, 2019 A.Y.:
2010-11

 

Business
expenditure – Section 37 of ITA, 1961 – General principles – Donations made by
company under corporate social responsibility – Deductible u/s 37; A.Y. 2010-11

 

The assessee
was engaged in the business of manufacturing, sale and trading of chemical
fertilizers and chemical industrial products. The company was also engaged in
the business of information and technology. For the A.Y. 2010-11 the assessee
claimed expenditure of Rs. 17,50,36,756 u/s 37(1). Such claim was put forward
in fulfilment of its corporate social obligation and responsibility. The A.O.
disallowed the claim. The Appellate Tribunal relied on its order passed for
A.Y. 2009-10 and took the view that the assessee was entitled to claim
deduction towards the expenditure incurred for discharging its corporate social
responsibility u/s 37(1).

 

On appeal by
the Revenue, the Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and
held as under:

 

‘The word
“business” used in section 37(1) in association with the expression “for the
purposes of” is a word of wide connotation. In the context of a taxing statute,
the word “business” would signify an organised and continuous course of
commercial activity, which is carried on with the end in view of making or
earning profits. Under section 37(1), therefore, the connection has to be
established between the expenditure incurred and the activity undertaken by the
assessee with such object. The concept of business is not static. It has
evolved over a period of time to include within its fold the concrete
expression of care and concern for society at large and the people of the
locality in which the business is located in particular. It is not open to the
Court to go behind the commercial expediency which has to be determined from
the point of view of a businessman.

 

The test of
commercial expediency cannot be reduced to a ritualistic formula, nor can it be
put in a water-tight compartment. As long as the expenses are incurred wholly
and exclusively for the purpose of earning income from the business or
profession, merely because some of these expenses are incurred voluntarily,
i.e., without there being any legal or contractual obligation to incur them,
those expenses do not cease to be deductible in nature.

 

Explanation 2 to section 37(1) comes into play with effect from 1st
April, 2015. This disallowance is restricted to the expenses incurred by the
assessee under a statutory obligation u/s 135 of the Companies Act, 2013, and
there is thus now a line of demarcation between expenses incurred by the
assessee on discharging corporate social responsibility under such a statutory
obligation and under a voluntary assumption of responsibility. As for the
former, the disallowance under Explanation 2 to section 37(1) comes into play,
but for the latter there is no such disabling provision as long as the
expenses, even in discharge of corporate social responsibility on voluntary
basis, can be said to be “wholly and exclusively for the purposes of business”.

 

The assessee company was a polluting company. The assessee company was
conscious of its social obligations towards society at large. The assessee
company was a Government undertaking and, therefore, obliged to ensure
fulfilment of all the protective principles of State policy as enshrined in the
Constitution of India. The moneys had been spent for various purposes and could
not be regarded as outside the ambit of the business concerns of the assessee.
The order passed by the Appellate Tribunal was just and proper and needed no
interference in the present appeal.’

Appeal to Appellate Tribunal – Duty of Tribunal to decide appeal on merits – Rule 24 of ITAT Rules, 1963 Rectification of mistakes – Section 254 of ITA, 1961 – Order of Tribunal dismissing appeal ex parte for non-prosecution – Rejection of application for recall on ground of limitation – Not justified – Assessee granted liberty to apply for recall of order; A.Y. 2006-07

27. Golden
Times Services Pvt. Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT [2020]
422 ITR 102 (Del.) Date
of order: 13th January, 2020 A.Y.:
2006-07

 

Appeal to
Appellate Tribunal – Duty of Tribunal to decide appeal on merits – Rule 24 of
ITAT  Rules, 1963

 

Rectification
of mistakes – Section 254 of ITA, 1961 – Order of Tribunal dismissing appeal ex
parte for non-prosecution – Rejection of application for recall on ground
of limitation – Not justified – Assessee granted liberty to apply for recall of
order; A.Y. 2006-07

 

The relevant
year is the A.Y. 2006-07. In an appeal before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal,
the petitioner company had challenged the addition of Rs. 19,00,000 which was
confirmed by the Commissioner (Appeals). The appeal was filed on 11th
December, 2014 and was heard on 30th August, 2016. The appeal was
dismissed by an order dated 18th October, 2016. In the said order,
the Tribunal, while noting that no one was present on behalf of the assessee at
the time of hearing, proceeded to dispose of the appeal, observing that notice
was sent to the assessee on 15th July, 2016 at the address mentioned
in the memo of appeal but despite that the assessee remained unrepresented. It
was further noted that the notice had come back unserved with a report that the
property was locked for quite some time. It was also noted that the earlier
notice, sent on 1st June, 2016 on the same address of the assessee,
had also been received back unserved with similar comments. The Tribunal, thus,
held that the assessee was presumably not serious in pursuing the appeal and
dismissed the same in limine. At the same time, the assessee was granted
liberty to approach the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal for a recall of the order
if it was able to show a reasonable cause for non-appearance. Thus, there was
no adjudication on the merits of the appeal.

 

On 8th February,
2018 when an inquiry was made about the status of the appeal, the petitioner
came to know that the appeal had been dismissed ex parte for
non-prosecution. Thereafter, on 8th March, 2018 an application was
filed for recall of the order dated 18th October, 2016. The petitioner
filed the application giving the grounds for non-appearance, with an
explanation that the absence was beyond its control. However, the application
was dismissed by an order dated 30th August, 2019 on the ground that
the same is barred by limitation u/s 254(2) of the Act.

 

The
petitioner filed a writ petition and challenged the order of the Tribunal. The
Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

 

‘i)   Rule 24 of the Income-tax (Appellate
Tribunal) Rules, 1963 mandates the Appellate Tribunal to decide the appeal on
its merits. It is the duty and obligation of the Appellate Tribunal to dispose
of the appeal on merits after giving both the parties an opportunity of being
heard. No limitation is provided in Rule 24 of the Rules.

 

ii)   Section 254(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961
refers to suo motu exercise of the power of rectification by the
Appellate Tribunal, whereas the second part refers to rectification and
amendment on an application being made by the Assessing Officer or the assessee
pointing out the mistake apparent from the record. Section 254(2) was amended
by the Finance Act, 2016 with effect from 1st June, 2016 and the
words “four years from the date of the order” were substituted by
“six months from the end of the month in which the order was passed”.

 

iii)  Section 254(3) stipulates that the Appellate
Tribunal shall send a copy of the order passed by it to the assessee and the
Principal Commissioner. Further, Rule 35 of the Income-tax (Appellate Tribunal)
Rules, 1963 also requires that the orders are required to be communicated to
the parties. The section and the Rule mandate the communication of the order to
the parties. Thus, the date of communication or knowledge, actual or
constructive, of the orders sought to be rectified or amended u/s 254(2) of the
Act becomes critical and determinative for the commencement of the period of
limitation.

 

iv)  The appeal had been dismissed ex
parte for non-prosecution. At the same time, the assessee was granted
liberty to approach the Appellate Tribunal for recall of the order if it was
able to show a reasonable cause for non-appearance. Thus, there was no
adjudication on the merits of the appeal. The dismissal of the application for
recall of the order on the ground of limitation was not valid.

 

v)  The course adopted by the Appellate Tribunal
at the first instance, by dismissing the appeal for non-prosecution, and then
compounding the same by refusing to entertain the application for recall of the
order, cannot be sustained. We, therefore have no hesitation in quashing the
impugned order. Accordingly, the present petition is allowed. The order dated
30th August, 2019 is quashed and the matter is remanded back to the
Income-tax Appellate Tribunal with a direction that they shall hear and dispose
of I.T.A. No. 6739/Del/2014 on merits.’

FAILURE TO CLAIM DEDUCTION IN RETURN OF INCOME AND SECTION 80A(5)

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION

Section 80A(5)
provides for denial of deduction under sections 10A, 10AA, 10B, 10BA, or under
any of the provisions of part C of Chapter VIA (‘specified deductions’) of the
Income-tax Act in cases where the assessee fails to make a claim in the return
of income. It is usual to come across cases where assessees have failed to make
a specific claim for deduction in computing the total income and, as a
consequence, in claiming the same in the return of income, or where the
assessees try to cover up the failure by filing a revised return.

 

This disabling
provision has been introduced by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2009 with
retrospective effect from 1st April, 2003. On introduction of the
new provision, an issue has arisen about the eligibility of an assessee to qualify
for the specified deductions in cases where the assessee has staked the claim
for the specified deduction for the first time in the revised return of income
and such return is filed beyond the time permissible in law but before the
completion of assessment. Conflicting decisions of the Tribunal are available
in the context of the new provision of section 80A(5) on the subject. The ratio
of such decisions is discussed here to highlight the difficulty and the
possible steps that may be taken to mitigate the hardship.

 

THE
OLAVANNA SERVICE CO-OP. BANK CASE

The issue arose in the case of M/s Olavanna Service Co-op. Bank ITA
No. 398/Coch/2014 dated 21st November, 2017 (unreported-Cochin).
The only issue in the appeal for assessment year 2010-11 was with regard to the
denial of deduction u/s 80P by invoking the provisions of section 80A(5). The
assessee, a co-operative bank registered under the Kerala Co-operative
Societies Act, 1969, had failed to file return of income for the A.Y. 2010-11.
The AO had issued notice u/s 142(1) requiring the assessee to file the return
of income but the assessee neither complied with the notice nor filed a return
of income. The AO initiated best judgment proceedings u/s 144 and called for
the details, at which point in time the assessee filed the return of income on
20th March, 2013 which was beyond the time limit prescribed u/s 139
and the time limit prescribed in notice u/s 142(1) and, therefore, the AO treated
the same as invalid. On the basis of the material gathered during the course of
assessment, the AO worked out the total income of the assesse from business and
in completing the assessment he disallowed the claim of deduction u/s 80P by
invoking the provisions of section 80A(5).

 

On appeal, the CIT(A) relied on the decision of the ITAT, Cochin Bench in
the case of Kadachira Service Co-op. Bank Ltd. & Ors., 153 TTJ
(Cochin) 129 wherein it was held that 
the assessee was not entitled for deduction u/s 80P for the A.Y. 2009-10
if the return of income had not been filed within the prescribed time. The
CIT(A) dismissed the appeal as, in his opinion, the factual matrix was the same
in both the cases. Against this order of the CIT(A), the assessee filed an appeal
before the Tribunal.

 

It was contended
before the Tribunal on behalf of the assessee that the assessee had filed the
return of income before the assessment proceedings were completed and,
therefore, the return filed should have been considered for the purpose of
making the assessment. It was further submitted that the AO should have
regularised the return of income u/s 148 of the Act, considering the fact that
the proceedings had been initiated on the basis of the reason to believe that
the income had escaped assessment. Further, it was submitted that since the
income had been assessed u/s 144 relying on all the materials, deeds and
documents submitted by the assessee in the course of the assessment proceedings
in response to the directions of the AO, he should have granted the deduction
as provided u/s 80P of the I.T. Act.

It was explained
that the assessee was a co-operative society coming under the classification of
Primary Agricultural Credit Society or Primary Co-operative Agricultural and
Rural Development Bank carrying on the business of banking, providing credit
facility to its members for agricultural purposes and, therefore, the claim of
exemption u/s 80P should have been allowed and that, even if it was held that
the assessee was doing banking business, proportionate exemption should have
been granted in respect of the agricultural credit facilities given to its
members, instead of disallowing the entire claim of deduction u/s 80P of the
Act.

 

The Tribunal, on
hearing both the sides, noted that a similar issue had come up for
consideration in the case of Kadachira Service Co-op. Bank Ltd. &
Ors., 153 TTJ (Cochin) 129. The relevant portion of the observations in
the said case were referred to by the Tribunal to hold that unless the Central
Government, by a notification in the official gazette, exempted the
co-operative societies from filing the returns, they had to file the return of
income and the co-operative societies could not have been under the impression
that they need not file their returns of income since their income was
exempted; a statutory liability of filing the return under the Income-tax Act
could not be disowned on the ground of a bona fide impression that no
return of income was required to be filed. It was observed that when the language
of the provision was plain and unambiguous, the language employed in the
statute was determinative of the legislative intent.

 

On examination of
section 80A(5), the Tribunal noted that the intention of the legislature in
introducing the provision was to avoid multiple deductions in respect of the
same profit and for that the legislature had imposed three conditions for
claiming deduction under sections 10A, 10AA, 10B, 10BA, or under any provisions
of part C, Chapter VIA. One of the conditions required that there should be a
claim made in the return of income. The legislature, in its wisdom, thought it
fit that implementation of these three conditions would prevent misuse and
avoid multiple claims of deduction under sections 10A, 10AA, 10B, 10BA, or under
any provisions of part C, Chapter VIA. A plain reading of the language of
sections 80A(4) and 80A(5) made clear the purpose and intent of the legislature
in a manner that did not require any further interpretation.

 

The Tribunal
examined the other provisions of the Act that provided for a deduction, to
appreciate the provisions of section 80A(5) of the Act, noting that while other
provisions required filing of return u/s 139(1), section 80A(5) did not carry
any such limitation. That being so, even if a return was filed u/s 139(4) it
would not dilute the infraction in not furnishing the return in due time as
prescribed in section 139(1). In section 80A(5) the legislature obviously
omitted to mention the words ‘in due time’. What it says is that where the taxpayer
fails to make a claim in the return of income, no deduction shall be allowed.
It does not say that the return of income shall be furnished in due time. The
return might be filed either u/s 139(1), or 139(4), or in pursuance of a notice
issued u/s 142(1) or 148 of the Act.

 

On the question of
when there was a failure on the part of the taxpayer to file return of income
within the time limit provided u/s 139(1) or 139(4), or within the time
specified in the notice u/s 142(1) or 148, the Tribunal held that the return of
income filed belatedly could not be treated as return of income.

 

While dealing with
the contention that when the return was filed before completion of the
assessment proceedings, the AO ought to have issued notice u/s 148 for regularising
the returns, the Tribunal held that the AO had no jurisdiction to issue notice
u/s 148 for assessing the income of the taxpayer. In other words, no income
could be said to have escaped assessment at that point of time. Therefore, the
contention of the assessee that notice ought to have been issued u/s 148 had no
merit at all. It referred to the decision in the case of Sun Engineering
Works (P) Ltd., 198 ITR 297, 320 (SC) to hold that proceedings u/s 147
were for the benefit of the Revenue.

 

The Tribunal held
that accepting the plea of the assessee that the deduction be allowed even
where no return was filed, would mean that a person who had not filed a return
would get benefit but a person who filed the return but failed to make a claim
either by ignorance or otherwise may not get the benefit at all. The Tribunal
was of the considered opinion that such could certainly not be the legislative
intent.

 

In conclusion, the
Tribunal held that it was a settled principle of law that in order to avail benefits
under the beneficial provision, the conditions provided by the legislature had
to be complied with, and therefore, the Tribunal was of the considered opinion
that in view of the mandatory provisions contained in section 139(1) r/w/s
80A(5) of the Act, it was mandatory for every co-operative society for claiming
deduction u/s 80P to file the return of income and to make a claim of deduction
u/s 80P in the return itself. If the return was not filed either u/s 139(1) or
139(4), or in pursuance of notice issued u/s 142(1) or 148, the taxpayer was
not entitled for any deduction u/s 80P.

 

CASE OF KAMDHENU BUILDERS AND DEVELOPERS

A similar issue was
examined in yet another case, of Kamdhenu Builders and Developers vs.
DCIT, ITA No. 7010/Mum/2010 (unreported-Mumbai) for A.Y. 2007-08 dated
27th January, 2016. The assessee in that case, a partnership firm,
was engaged in the business of building housing projects and doing real estate
development. The original return of income for A.Y. 2007-08 was filed on 18th
October, 2007 declaring total income from the housing project at Rs.
1,94,12,489. During pendency of assessment proceedings, the assessee had filed
a revised return of income on 31st August, 2009 declaring Nil
income, as the entire profit of Rs. 1,94,12,489 was claimed to be allowable as
deduction u/s 80IB(10) of the Income-tax Act. The AO had not allowed the claim
of deduction on the ground that revised return of income was furnished on 31st
August, 2009, which was beyond the date by which the revised return of
income should have been furnished as per the provisions of law u/s 139(5) of
the Income-tax Act. According to the AO, the claim of deduction u/s 80IB was
also inadmissible on account of the provision of law u/s 80A(5) of the
Income-tax Act.

 

On appeal, the
CIT(A) allowed the assessee’s claim. The Tribunal, on further appeal by the
Revenue, has largely relied upon the order of the CIT(A) and has reproduced
extensively his observations and findings in its order, some of which were as
under:

 

‘I have circumspected
the entire spectrum and circumstances of the case and considered finding of the
AO, remand report, written submission of the appellant and counter
representation vis-à-vis  provision of
law and  various decisions of the Hon’ble
ITAT, High Court and  Supreme Court  relevant to the issue. It transpires from the
assessment order and remand report of AO dated 7th June, 2010 that
Ld. AO had denied or is not willing to give deduction u/s 80IB(10) merely on
the ground of provision of law u/s 80A(5) irrespective of fulfilment of all the
conditions prescribed by the appellant to be entitled for legal claim of
deduction u/s 80IB(10) of the Act. This approach and contention of the Ld. AO
is not tenable because of obvious facts of fulfilment of all the conditions by
the appellant. There is no bar of furnishing of revised return of income u/s
80A(5) and the decision of the Hon’ble ITAT, High Courts and Supreme Court over
such issues support the appellant. Under section 80A(5), there is an insertion
of new provision of law with effect from 1st April, 2003 providing
that where the assessee failed to make claim in his  return of income for any deduction u/s 10(A),
or section 10(AA), or section 10(B), or section 10(BA), or under any provision
of Chapter VIA under the head in C – deduction in respect of certain income, no
deduction shall be allowed to him thereunder, means there is no restriction
about  the revised return of income but
there is a provision of law for claiming such deduction through return of
income only. This provision of law does not limit the date of filing of return
of income to be either as provided u/s 139(1) or 139(4) or 139(5) of the
Income-tax Act. As such, there is no ambiguity regarding interpretation or
understanding of this provision of law. The provision of section 80A(5) does
not provide that return of income through which the deduction has to be claimed
should be filed on or before the due date specified under these sections, it is
worthwhile to mention that whenever legislature intends to provide a law with
reference to the prescribed date of return of income before any specified date, it has
clearly identified and mentioned in expressed word.’

 

The CIT(A) cited
the examples of section 80AC where a return of income had to be filed prior to
due date as per section 139(1) and of section 54(2) which referred to the date
of furnishing return as per section 139 and also of section 139(3) where carry
forward of loss was permitted only if such return of loss was filed within the
time limit provided by section 139(1). He noted that for claiming any such
deduction under these sections, return of income had to be filed within the
specified date  u/s 139(1), whereas u/s
80A(5) there was no such specific limitation of date; therefore, in absence of
any specific limitation of date, the words ‘return of income’ provided u/s
80A(5) had to be construed to mean any such return of income filed prior to the
completion of assessment or a return of income filed during the assessment
proceedings, provided the original return of income was filed within  the time limit prescribed u/s 139(1).

 

He further held: ‘Obviously,
appellant complies with the provision of section 80AC of the Income-tax Act.
When the original return of income has been filed well within the due date, the
revised return filed thereafter before the completion of assessment proceedings
or assessment order is passed, it is a valid return of income to be considered
by the Assessing Officer, otherwise every purpose of giving such right to such
appellant would be frustrated. The revised return of income is essential for
removal of defects of original return. It obviously corrects shortcomings from
which it suffered. The revised return must therefore be considered as it was
originally filed vide Thakur Dharmapur Sugar Mills Ltd. vs. CIT (1973) 90
ITR 236, 239 & 240 (All.) and Gopaldas Parshottamdas vs. CIT
(1941) 9 ITR 130 (All.). It is important to point  out that when a revised return cures the
defects in the original return and does not obliterate the latter, the
assessment means on the basis of original return of income ignoring the revised
return is liable to be set aside vide CIT vs. Chitranjali (1986) 159 ITR 801
(Cal.). Similar view has also been taken in the case of CIT vs.
Bansidhar Dalal and Sons, 207 ITR 494 (Cal.).’

 

The CIT(A) observed
that an AO’s functions encompassed power as well as duty to be exercised within
the ambit of law. Relying on various court pronouncements, he observed that it
was only the true and correct total income of every person which was assessable
u/s 4 of the Act and, consequently, the tax collector was rather duty-bound to
collect the legitimate tax due on such total income – neither a penny less nor
a penny more, and the determination / assessment of total income would depend
on the relevant provisions of the Act irrespective of the nature of return
filed by any person; and that an income which was not taxable could not be
taxed merely because the assessee forgot to claim the exemption / deduction
under some mistaken belief. Rather, it was the duty of the Assessing Officer to
allow such deduction or exemption to which the assessee was entitled on the
basis of material placed on record. Therefore, the assessee was entitled to
claim deduction if such claim was made by the assessee before the completion of
assessment proceedings. He relied on the findings in the case of Anchor
Pressings (P) Ltd., 161 ITR 159 (SC) in which case the claim for
deduction u/s 80-O was made by the assessee before completion of assessment
proceedings by way of a revised return filed after expiry of period specified
u/s 139(5), it was held that the assessee was entitled to the said deduction in
computing his total income.

 

The CIT(A) relying
on the cases of Lucknow Public Educational Society, 318 ITR 223 (All.);
Gujarat Oil & Allied Industries, 109 CTR (Guj.) 272, 201 ITR 325 (Guj.); and
Berger Paints (India) Ltd., 174 CTR (Cal.)269: 254 ITR 503 (Cal.)
held that the mistake was procedural in nature. The mistake was a technical
breach and the AO was duty-bound to ask for details before denying the claim.
In the instant case, the AO had not asked any information before denying the
exemption for which the assessee was legally entitled. On the other hand, he
had rejected the second return which enclosed the necessary documents for
claiming the exemption.

 

The CIT(A) noted
with approval the decision in the case of Emerson Network Power India (P)
Ltd., 122 TTJ/27 SOT/19 DTR where it had been held that any claim made
at the time of assessment but not made in the original return, nor made by way
of valid revised return, could not be denied and the AO was obliged to give due
relief to the assessee or entertain its claim if admissible as per law, even
though the assessee had not filed the revised return, and that the legitimate
claim of the assessee should not be rejected on technical grounds. In the
background of all the decisions and facts of the case, the denial of claim of
deduction of the appellant made through revised return of income during the
course of assessment proceedings and well before the passing of assessment
order, according to the CIT(A), was not tenable in the eye of law.

 

Against the above
order of the CIT(A), the Revenue filed an appeal to the Tribunal on the
following grounds:

 

‘(i)  On the facts and circumstances of case and in
law, the Ld. CIT(A) erred in holding that the assessee is entitled to deduction
u/s 80IB(10) of Rs. 1,94,12,489 in spite of the fact that the claim for
deduction was not made in the original return and was only made in the return
filed for A.Y. 2007-08 on 31st August, 2009, which is not a valid
return in the eye of law and also cannot be treated as revised return u/s
139(5).

(ii) On the
facts and circumstances of the case and law, the Ld. CIT(A) erred in allowing
the deduction u/s 80IB(10) of Rs. 1,94,12,489 as the same is contrary to the
provisions of section 80A(5), effective from 1st April, 2003, which
does not permit allowance of deduction unless the claim for deduction is made
in the return of income.

(iii)  On the facts and circumstances of case and in
law, the Ld. CIT(A) erred in allowing the deduction u/s 80IB(10) as the same
only means that deduction can be claimed just by filling revised return u/s
139(5)… has already elapsed, in the course of assessment proceedings, which is
not at all acceptable in the light of amended provisions of section 80A(5),
vide Finance (No. 2) Bill, 2009.’

 

It was contended by
Revenue that as per the provisions of section 80A(5), effective from A.Y.
2003-04, the assessee was not entitled for deduction unless the claim of
deduction was made in the original return filed by him. On the other hand, the
assessee contended that original return was filed well within the time, and the
revised return was filed to correct the omission in the original return.
Nowhere had the AO alleged that the assessee had not complied with any of the
conditions prescribed for claim of deduction u/s 80IB(10). A legal claim, even
if not made in the original return or even in the revised return, but made by
the assessee before the AO completing the assessment, should be allowed.

 

The Tribunal in its
considered view noted that section 80A(5) only required filing of return.
Nowhere is it suggested that claim should be made in the original return and
not by way of revised return. It further noted that when the original return of
income had been filed well within the due date, the revised return filed
thereafter, before the completion of assessment proceedings, was a valid return
of income to be considered by the AO; that the assessee had been given
opportunity to file revised return u/s 139(4) for removal of any defect in the
original return; the CIT(A), considering the remand report and the written
submission of the assessee, and after applying various judicial pronouncements,
recorded a finding to the effect that the assessee had filed a revised return
claiming deduction u/s 80IB(10) before completion of assessment, and following
the judicial pronouncements laid down by the Allahabad High Court in the case
of Thakur Dharmapur Sugar Mills Ltd. 90 ITR 236, held that
revised return must be considered as it was originally filed; it was the duty
of the AO to allow legal claim if made before him and provided it fulfilled all
the conditions of the claim; nowhere had the AO alleged that the assessee has
failed to comply with any of the conditions of section 80IB(10); the only
grievance of the AO was that the claim was not made in the return filed u/s
139(1); the CIT(A) recorded a finding to the effect that both the original
return was filed well within the time limit prescribed under the law and the
revised return was filed before the AO completed the assessment, that the
assessee had fulfilled all the conditions u/s 80IB(10) and, therefore was
entitled for deduction in respect of the housing project.

 

The Tribunal noted
that the findings recorded by the CIT(A) had not been controverted by the
Department by bringing any positive material on record and the Tribunal did not
find any reason to interfere in the order of the CIT(A) in allowing the
assessee’s claim for deduction u/s 80IB(10) of the Act.

 

OBSERVATIONS

Section 80A(1)
stipulates that in computing the total income of an assessee, there shall be
allowed the deductions specified in sections 80C to 80U of the Act. Section
80A(5) reads as follows: ‘Where the assessee fails to make a claim in his
return of income for any deduction under section 10A or section 10AA or section
10B or section 10BA or under any provision of this Chapter under the heading
“C  Deductions in respect of certain
incomes”, no deduction shall be allowed to him thereunder’.

 

On a plain reading
of the provision it is clear that the disabling provision is activated only in
the case of an ultimate failure to make a claim in the return of income. The claims
though not made in the return of income u/s 139(1), would continue to be valid
as long as the claim for specified deduction is made in any of the returns
filed u/s 139(3), 139(4) and 139(5), or even in response to notices u/s 142(1)
or 148 of the Act, subject to compliance of the independent conditions of the
respective provisions under which a specified deduction is being claimed.

 

In cases where it
is necessary for the taxpayer to file the return of income within a specified
date, the legislature has inserted the words  ‘before the due date specified’ or ‘in due
time’  or ‘within the time limit’. In
section 80A(5), the legislature expressly omitted to include the words ‘within
the time limit’ or ‘before the due date specified’ or ‘in due time’. Therefore,
for the purpose of Chapter VIA the legislature intended not to make compulsory
the filing of return of income within the specified time or in due time as
provided in section 139(1) of the Act. In fact, section 80 r/w/s 139(3) of the
Income-tax Act, which provides for carry forward of losses, requires the
taxpayer to file the return of income within the time allowed u/s 139(1).

 

While introducing
section 80A(5), the legislature was well aware that not only for carry forward
of losses but also for deductions u/s 10A and 10B, the taxpayer has to file the
return of income within the time limit prescribed u/s 139(1) of the Act. In
spite of that, the legislature omitted to mention the words ‘within due time’
in section 80A(5). Therefore, the return of income filed within the time limit
provided in section 139(1) or 139(4), or the time specified in the notice u/s
142(1) or 148 can be considered as return of income. The issue, therefore, is
limited to the belated return filed beyond the time limit provided u/s 139(1)
or 139(4), or the time specified in notice u/s 142(1) or 148 of the Act.

 

The challenge
therefore is in respect of a case where no claim at all is made in the return
of income, or a case where such a claim is made in the return of income that is
filed, not under any of the above referred provisions, but before the
assessment. Nonetheless, such a challenge may also be faced in a case where the
assessee for the first time seeks to claim one of the specified deductions
before the appellate authorities. For brevity’s sake, however, the discussion
here is mainly restricted to a case where a deduction has been claimed in the
revised return of income filed beyond the permissible time but before the
assessment is completed; it is this aspect of section 80A(5) that has been
examined under the conflicting decisions discussed above.

 

The Notes to Clauses and the Explanatory Memorandum issued at the time of
introduction of the provision by the Finance (No. 2) Bill, 2009 are reported in
315 ITR (Stat) 81 and 82. The intention of the legislature in enacting sections
80A(4) and 80A(5) is to avoid multiple deduction in respect of the same profit.
The legislature prescribed three conditions in sections 80A(4) and 80A(5) which
are: (i) If a deduction in respect of any amount was allowed u/s 10A, 10AA
or 10B or 10BA or under provisions of Chapter VIA under the head  ‘C – Deductions in respect of certain
incomes’ in any assessment year, then the same deduction in respect of the same
profit & gains shall not be allowed under any other provisions of the Act
for such assessment year; (ii) The aggregate deduction under various provisions
shall not exceed the profit and gains of the undertaking or unit or enterprise
or the business profit, as the case may be; and (iii) There shall be a claim
made in the return of income. The legislature in its wisdom thought that
the above three conditions would avoid multiple deductions in respect of the
same profit. One of the conditions prescribed by the legislature in section
80A(5) is to make a claim in the return of income. The Delhi High Court in the
case of Nath Brothers Exim International Limited, 394 ITR 577
examined and upheld the constitutionality of the provision of section 80A(5).

 

A reference may also
be made to the Circular No. 37 of 2016 dated 2nd November, 2016
clarifying that an increased claim for deduction would not be denied in cases
where such increase is on account of the additions or disallowances made in
assessment of the total income. In this context, a useful reference may be made
to the decision in the case of Oracle (OFSS) BPO Services Limited, 307
CTR (Delhi) 97, which, independent of circulars, supports such a claim.
[Also see Influence, 55 taxmann.com 192 (Delhi) and E-Funds
International India (P) Limited, 379 ITR 292 (Delhi).]


In a case where the
assessee cannot claim the deduction for want of positive profits, or where the
electronic return does not permit to record the eligibility to the claim for
deduction, or where a return carries a note, as was in the case of DIC
Fine Chemicals Limited, 202 TTJ (Mum.) 378, highlighting its inability
to claim deduction for want of profits, or the inability to disclose, the
deduction should not be denied; the deduction, in such cases, on assessment,
would be well within the provision of section 80A(5) and would in any case be
saved by the said circular and the said decisions. Such cases cannot be
attributed to the failure of the assessee to claim a deduction in the return of
income.

 

The issue of the failure to claim a deduction in the return of income has
in fact been examined by the Delhi and the Bombay High Courts in the cases of Nath
Brothers, 394 ITR 577 and EBR Enterprises, 107 taxmann.com 220,
respectively. The Courts, in these cases, have held that not only the provision
of section 80A(5) is constitutional, as it is based on a reasonable
classification, but it also denies the right to claim the specified deduction
in a case where an assessee fails to claim such deduction in the return of income.
The Bombay High Court in the EBR Enterprises case specifically
disapproved the decision of the Mumbai Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Madhav
Constructions (Supra) where the Tribunal had held that the deduction
was not limited by the provisions of section 80A(5). The High Court, however,
in the very same Madhav Constructions case had refused to admit
the appeal of the Revenue against the order of the Tribunal

 

The case of the
assessee for the claim of deduction is likely to be on a better footing where a
claim is staked before the AO, before completion of assessment, by filing a
return of income, revised or otherwise. Please see Chirakkal Service
Co-op. Bank Ltd., 384 ITR 490 and The Pazhavangadikara Service
Co-op. Bank (Cochin-unreported) ITA No. 200/Coch/2018 dated 9th
July, 2018. In these cases, a claim made vide a belated return of
income, filed in response to notice u/s 148, was allowed as a deduction.

 

Outside of section
80A(5), it is a settled position in law that an AO is duty-bound to allow all
those deductions, reliefs and rebates otherwise allowable irrespective of the
claim by the assessee. This position of law articulated by the CBDT in Circular
No. 14(XL-35) of 1955 dated 11th April, 1955 has been approved by
several decisions of the courts rendered from time to time.

It is also a settled position in law that an assessee is entitled to
place a fresh claim for deduction or relief or rebate before the appellate
authorities, for the first time. Similarly, there is no bar on the AO to
entertain a claim made outside the return of income during the course of
assessment proceedings. Likewise, no special emphasis is required in stating
that a mere failure to stake a claim at a specific point of time or in a
specified format should not result in the frustration of a valid claim.

In view of the overwhelming position in law
in favour of allowance of a lawful claim, we are of the considered view that
the courts should favour an allowance of a lawful claim, even in the cases
where there is an express stipulation for denial of the benefits on the grounds
of non-compliance of a technical requirement, as long as the assessee has
finally corrected himself by compliance before the authorities. The court, in
such cases, should not only entertain the claim but is also obliged to allow
the reliefs to avoid unjust enrichment of the State.

I.Section 43(6), Explanation 2 – In Explanation 2 to section 43(6), deprecation actually allowed shall not include any unabsorbed depreciation – The WDV in the hands of the amalgamated company is to be calculated without considering the unabsorbed depreciation of the amalgamating companies, for which set-off was never allowed II.When a receipt is held to be capital in nature and not chargeable to tax under the normal provisions of the Act, the same cannot be taxed u/s 115JB of the Act as well III.Section 234B r/w/s 115JB – Interest u/s 234B cannot be levied where liability arises on account of retrospective amendment in the Act

16. [2019] 112
taxmann.com 55 (Trib.)(Mum.) ACIT vs. JSW Steel
Ltd. ITA No.
156/Bang/2011; CO No. 59/Mum/2012 A.Y.: 2006-07 Date of order: 29th
November, 2019

 

I.  Section 43(6), Explanation 2 – In Explanation
2 to section 43(6), deprecation actually allowed shall not include any
unabsorbed depreciation – The WDV in the hands of the amalgamated company is to
be calculated without considering the unabsorbed depreciation of the
amalgamating companies, for which set-off was never allowed

 

II. When a receipt is held to be capital in nature
and not chargeable to tax under the normal provisions of the Act, the same
cannot be taxed u/s 115JB of the Act as well

 

III.        Section 234B r/w/s 115JB – Interest u/s
234B cannot be levied where liability arises on account of retrospective
amendment in the Act

 

FACTS I

In the return of
income filed by the assessee for the year of amalgamation, i.e., A.Y. 2006-07,
the assessee computed WDV in respect of the assets transferred by the
amalgamating companies by reducing the amount of deprecation (‘actually
allowed’) in A.Y. 2005-06 in accordance with the provisions of Explanation (2)
to section 43(6) of the Act.

 

The AO observed
that the closing WDV of the amalgamating company becomes the WDV in the hands
of the amalgamated company and accordingly determined the WDV of the assets
acquired on amalgamation after considering normal depreciation allowed on
assets of the two amalgamating companies; consequently, he disallowed excess
depreciation of Rs. 6,81,27,607 (being 15% of the difference in the WDV of Rs.
45,41,84,048).

 

However, the AO was
of the view that Explanation (3) has to be read into Explanation (2) and
accordingly the WDV of the assets transferred on amalgamation has to be
computed after reducing the total depreciation in the hands of the amalgamated
companies.

 

Aggrieved, the
assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who allowed the appeal and directed
the AO to allow depreciation on the increased written down value of the assets.

 

Being aggrieved,
the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

 

HELD I

The Tribunal
observed that

(i)   the only dispute under consideration is
whether the WDV of the assets transferred on amalgamation was to be computed in
the hands of the amalgamated company considering the unabsorbed depreciation,
i.e., depreciation not given effect to, in the assessment of the amalgamating
companies;

(ii)   the provisions of Explanations (2) and (3) to
section 43(6) explains what will be the WDV of assets in the hands of the
amalgamated company in cases of amalgamation. Similarly, section 32(2) provides
for carry forward of unabsorbed depreciation and section 72A provides for carry
forward of business loss and unabsorbed depreciation in the hands of the
amalgamated company in cases of amalgamation;

(iii) on going through Explanation (2) to section
43(6), it is very clear that it speaks about depreciation ‘actually allowed’ in
relation to the said preceding year in case of the amalgamated company.

 

The Tribunal held
that in view of Explanation (2) to section 43(6) of the Act, the WDV in the
hands of the assessee as on 1st April, 2005 (the appointed date)
would be the WDV of block of assets as on 31st March, 2004 as
reduced by the depreciation ‘actually allowed’ during the said preceding year,
i.e., F.Y. 2004-05, in the hands of the amalgamating companies. Accordingly,
the WDV of assets transferred on amalgamation in the hands of the amalgamating
company has to be necessarily computed in terms of Explanation (2) to section
43(6) of the Act. In terms of this Explanation, while computing the WDV on
amalgamation, the depreciation actually allowed has to be reduced.

 

Since the case of
the AO was that Explanation (3) has to be read into Explanation (2) and,
accordingly, the WDV of assets transferred on amalgamation has to be computed
after reducing the total depreciation in the hands of the amalgamated
companies, the Tribunal found it necessary to read and comprehend as to why the
provision of section (3) to section 43(6) of the Act cannot be applied in the
facts of the present case. It held that Explanation (3) to section 43(6) states
that any depreciation which is carried forward u/s 32(2) shall be deemed to be
depreciation actually allowed. Further, it observed that Explanations (2) and
(3) to section 43(6) of the Act both used the term depreciation actually
allowed. However, as against Explanation (2), Explanation (3) to section 43(6)
of the Act operates as a deeming fiction, wherein depreciation which is carried
forward u/s 32(2) of the Act is deemed to have been actually allowed.

 

The Tribunal held
that in its view Explanation (3) being a deeming fiction, operates only in
particular conditions and in order to remove an anomaly which otherwise would
have been created under the other provisions of the Act. It held that while
interpreting Explanation (3) one needs to be aware of the intention of the
statute. These provisions, along with their intent, have been explained
elaborately by the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of Hindustan
Petroleum Corporation Limited where it was held that Explanation (3) to
section 43(6) seeks to find certain anomalies which would have otherwise
existed under the Act. The intention of Explanation (3) is not simply to
nullify the provision of Explanation (2) to section 43(6), as has been read by
the AO. This is also evident from the fact that Explanation (2) has been
introduced from 1st April, 1988, whereas Explanation (3) was always
on the statute, which clearly implies that Explanation (3), which is a legal /
deeming fiction, was not introduced to nullify the impact of Explanation (2) of
the Act.

 

Accordingly, in
terms of Explanation (3) to section 43(6), in the present case, unless the
unabsorbed depreciation of the amalgamating companies is carried forward in the
hands of the amalgamated company u/s 32(2), Explanation (3) cannot be read into
Explanation (2) to simply conclude that depreciation ‘actually allowed’ also
includes unabsorbed depreciation.

 

It observed that in
view of the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT
vs. Doom Dooma India Ltd. [2009] 310 ITR 392, the words actually
allowed under Explanation (2) only mean depreciation, which has been given
effect to in the computation of income of the amalgamating companies and will
not include unabsorbed depreciation. This legal proposition, it observed, is
also supported by the decision in the case of Silical Metallurgic Ltd.
where the Hon’ble Court held that the statutory provision makes it clear that
the WDV of the asset would be the actual cost of the assets of the assessee
less depreciation allowed to the company. Any unabsorbed depreciation, which
was not set off for carry forward could not be taken into account.

 

A similar view was
taken by the Bombay High Court in the case of Hindustan Petroleum Corpn.
Ltd. and a Special Leave Petition filed against the aforesaid High
Court decision has been dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on merits in SLP
(C) No. 19054 of 2008 (SC). A similar proposition has been laid down by
the Hon’ble Madras High Court in the case of EID Parry India’s vs. CIT
[2012] 209 Taxmann 214. The Courts have, considering the applicability
of provisions of section 72A, held that deprecation actually allowed shall not
include any unabsorbed depreciation.

 

The Tribunal held
that the WDV in the hands of the amalgamated company was to be calculated
without considering the unabsorbed depreciation of the amalgamating companies,
for which set-off was never allowed. The Tribunal upheld the findings of the
CIT(A) and dismissed this ground of the appeal of the Revenue.

 

FACTS II

The assessee
received a sales tax subsidy of Rs. 36,15,49,828 from the Karnataka Government
for setting up a new industrial unit in the backward area of the state. The
refund of sales tax subsidy was routed through the profit and loss account and
hence the same was considered as part of the book profits u/s 115JB of the I.T.
Act, 1961. Subsequently, the assessee realised that sales tax subsidy being
capital receipt as held by the CIT(A), the same is not taxable under the MAT
provisions; accordingly, the issue was raised before the Tribunal and this
ground was taken by the assessee in the cross-objections filed by it.

 

HELD II

The Tribunal noted
that

(i)   the Coordinate Bench of the ITAT, Mumbai
Tribunal, in the assessee’s own case for A.Y. 2004-05 in ITA No. 923/Bang/2009,
had considered an identical issue and held that where a receipt is held to be
capital in nature not chargeable to tax under the normal provisions of the Act,
the same cannot be taxed u/s 115JB of the I.T. Act, 1961;

(ii)   the Hon’ble Kolkata High Court, in the case of
Pr. CIT vs. Ankit Metal & Power Ltd. [2019] 109 taxmann.com
93 had considered an identical issue and after considering the decision
of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Apollo Tyres Ltd. (Supra)
held that when a receipt is not in the character of income as defined u/s 2(24)
of the I.T. Act, 1961, then it cannot form part of the book profit u/s 115JB.
The Court further observed that the facts of case before the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the case of Apollo Tyres Ltd. were altogether different,
where the income in question was taxable but was exempt under a specific
provision of the Act, and as such it was to be included as a part of book
profit; but where the receipt is not in the nature of income at all, it cannot
be included in book profit for the purpose of computation u/s 115JB.

 

The Tribunal
further noted that to a similar effect was the ratio of the following
decisions:

(a)   Sutlej Cotton Mills
Ltd. vs. Asstt. CIT [1993] 45 ITD 22 (Cal. Trib.) (SB);

(b)   Shree Cement Ltd. vs.
Addl. CIT (2015) 152 ITD 561 (Jai. Trib.);

(c)   Sipca India (P) Ltd.
vs. Dy. CIT [2017] 80 taxmann.com 87 (Kol. Trib.).

 

As regards the case
laws relied upon, on behalf of the Revenue, the Tribunal held that the Tribunal
or High Court in those cases came to the conclusion that the capital receipt is
in the nature of income, but by a specific provision the same has been exempted
and hence came to the conclusion that once a particular receipt is routed
through the profit and loss account, then it should be part of book profit and
cannot be excluded while arriving at book profit u/s 115JB of the Act, 1961.

 

The Tribunal held
that when a particular receipt is exempt from tax under the Income tax Law,
then the same cannot be considered for the purpose of computation of book
profit u/s 115JB. It directed the AO to exclude the sales tax subsidy received
by the assessee amounting to Rs. 36,15,49,828 from the book profits computed
u/s 115JB.

 

The cross-objection
filed by the assessee was allowed.

 

FACTS III

Section 234B
r/w/s 115JB – Interest u/s 234B cannot be levied where liability arises on
account of retrospective amendment in Act

 

While completing
the assessment, interest of Rs. 9,84,94,367 was levied on total income computed
u/s 115JB on account of retrospective amendment to section 115JB. In the profit
and loss account for the year ended 31st March, 2006, the assessee
had debited provision for deferred tax of Rs. 433.61 crores. In the return of
income filed for A.Y. 2006-07, the aforesaid provision was not added back while
computing book profit u/s 115JB. However, subsequently the Finance Act, 2008
made a retrospective amendment to section 115JB by inserting clause (h) in
Explanation 1 to section 115JB according to which book profits are required to
be increased by an amount of deferred tax and provision thereof; the said
amendment was made with retrospective effect from A.Y. 2001-02. Accordingly,
during the course of assessment proceedings while computing book profits u/s
115JB, the AO, in view of the insertion of clause (h) in Explanation 1 to
section 115JB by the Finance Act, 2008 with retrospective effect, added the
provision for deferred tax liability and consequently interest u/s 234B was
levied which interest arose on account of the retrospective amendment to
section 115JB.

 

Aggrieved, the
assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who allowed the appeal on the ground
that no liability can be fastened onto the assessee on the basis of
retrospective amendment to the Act.

 

HELD III

The Tribunal noted
that whether interest us/ 234B can be charged on the basis of a retrospective
amendment on recomputed book profit is no longer res integra. The
Coordinate Bench of the ITAT Bangalore Tribunal, in the assessee’s own case for
A.Y. 2005-06 in ITAT No. 924/Bang/2009, had considered an identical issue and
held that no interest can be levied u/s 234 B where liability arises on account
of retrospective amendment in the Act.

 

It observed that in the current year as well, the liability for interest
u/s 234B has arisen only on account of a retrospective amendment to the
provision of section 115JB. Accordingly, the assessee would not have
anticipated the retrospective amendment at the time of making the payments for
advance tax, but would have estimated the liability to pay advance tax on the
basis of the then existing provisions. The Tribunal found no error in the
findings recorded by the CIT(A), while deleting the interest liability u/s 234B
of the Act. The Tribunal upheld the findings of CIT(A) and rejected the ground
taken by the Revenue. This ground of appeal of the Revenue was dismissed.

Section 69C – Unexplained expenditure – Bogus purchases – Mere reliance by the A.O. on information obtained from the Sales Tax Department, or the statements of two persons made before the Sales Tax Department, would not be sufficient to treat the purchases as bogus

5. Pr. CIT-13 vs. Vaman International Pvt. Ltd. [Income tax Appeal
No. 1940 of 2017]

Date of order: 29th January, 2020

ACIT vs. Vaman International Pvt.
Ltd. [ITA No. 794/Mum/2015; Date of order: 16th November, 2016;
A.Y.: 2010-11; Bench ‘F’]

 

Section 69C – Unexplained
expenditure – Bogus purchases – Mere reliance by the A.O. on information
obtained from the Sales Tax Department, or the statements of two persons made
before the Sales Tax Department, would not be sufficient to treat the purchases
as bogus

 

The assessee is a company engaged
in the business of trading and sale of furniture and allied items on wholesale
basis. The A.O. doubted the expenditure of Rs. 4,75,42,385 stated to be on
account of purchases from two parties, viz., Impex Trading Co. (for an amount
of Rs. 2,90,80,292) and Victor Intertrade Pvt. Ltd. (Rs. 1,84,62,093). The A.O.
acted on the basis of information received from the office of the
Director-General of Income Tax (Investigation), Mumbai and from the Sales Tax
Department that in the list of bogus sales parties the names of the two
aforesaid parties were included which rendered the purchase transaction
doubtful.

 

The A.O. observed that the
assessee did not produce lorry receipts and other related documents to reflect
the movement of goods sold and purchased which were crucial for determining the
genuineness of the purchase transaction. In the absence thereof, the A.O. added
the said amounts to the total income of the assessee u/s 69C by treating the
expenditure as bogus purchases.

 

The first appellate authority
held that such addition by the A.O. could not be sustained. Accordingly, he deleted
the addition of Rs. 4,75,42,385. The Tribunal, by an order dated 16th
November, 2016, upheld the order of the first appellate authority and dismissed
the appeal of the Revenue.

 

On further appeal, the Hon. High
Court observed that section 69C deals with unexplained expenditure. But it also
contains a deeming provision which states that if an assessee incurs any
expenditure in the relevant previous year but offers no explanation about the
source of such expenditure or part thereof, or if the explanation provided is
not satisfactory to the A.O., then the amount covered by such expenditure or
part thereof shall be deemed to be the income of the assessee; and once it is
so deemed, the same shall not be allowed as a deduction under any head of
income.

 

The Court relied on the Gujarat
High Court decision in Krishna Textiles vs. CIT, 310 ITR 227  wherein it has been held that u/s 69C the
onus is on the Revenue to prove that the income really belongs to the assessee.

 

The Hon. Court observed that the
A.O. did not doubt the sales and stock records maintained by the assessee. By
submitting confirmation letters, copies of invoices, bank statements, payment
orders, payment by account payee cheques, etc., the assessee had proved that
the sales and purchases had taken place. By highlighting the fact that all the
payments against the purchases were made through banking channels by way of
account payee cheques, the first appellate authority held that the source of
expenditure was fully established by the assessee beyond any doubt. He had
further recorded that during the appellate proceedings the assessee had
furnished complete quantitative details of the items of goods purchased during
the year under consideration and their corresponding sales. Mere reliance by
the A.O. on information obtained from the Sales Tax Department, or the
statements of two persons made before the Sales Tax Department, would not be
sufficient to treat the purchases as bogus and thereafter to make the addition
u/s 69C.

 

The Tribunal also held that if
the A.O. had doubted the genuineness of the purchases, it was incumbent upon
him to have caused further inquiries in the matter to ascertain the genuineness
or otherwise of the transactions and to have given an opportunity to the
assessee to examine / cross-examine those two parties vis-a-vis the
statements made by them before the Sales Tax Department. Without causing such
further inquiries in respect of the purchases, it was not open to the A.O. to
make the addition u/s 69C of the Act. 


_____________________________________________________________________________________________________

 

 

Errata

IN THE HIGH COURTS, March 2020 

 

We regret to point out a typographical error
on Page 51 of the caption issue in respect of the following decision:

The Pr CIT -1 v/s M/s. Ami Industries (India)
P Ltd [ Income tax Appeal no 1231 of 2017 dt : 29/01/2020
(Bombay HighCourt)].

where “Addition is
not justified “ should be replaced in place of “Addition is justified” and be
read accordingly.

Condonation of delay – 458 days – Belated appeal against section 263 order before ITAT – Appeal filed after consequential assessment order and dismissal of appeal – Delay condoned on payment of costs

4. Procter & Gamble Hygiene and Healthcare Ltd. vs.
Commissioner of Income Tax-8 [Income tax Appeal No. 1210 of 2017]

Date of order: 4th February, 2020

 

Procter & Gamble Hygiene
& Healthcare Ltd. vs. CIT, Range-8 [ITA No. 4866/Mum/2015; Date of order:
30th November, 2016; A.Y.: 2008-09; Bench ‘H’ Mum.]

 

Condonation of delay – 458 days –
Belated appeal against section 263 order before ITAT – Appeal filed after
consequential assessment order and dismissal of appeal – Delay condoned on
payment of costs

 

The issue involved in the appeal
is condonation of delay in filing of the appeal u/s 254 of the Act by the
appellant before the Tribunal. The A.O. passed the assessment order on 1st
February, 2012 in which certain deductions were allowed u/s 80IC. The
CIT-8, Mumbai was of the view that the A.O. had wrongly allowed deduction u/s
80IC. He was of the further view that the assessment order so made was
erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue. Accordingly, he
invoked jurisdiction u/s 263 and vide an order dated 31st
March, 2014 set aside the assessment order by directing the A.O. to pass a
fresh assessment order by taxing the interest income earned by the petitioner
on the amount covered by the deduction sought for u/s 80IC under the head
‘income from other sources’. The A.O. passed the consequential assessment order
dated 9th June, 2014. It was against this assessment order that the
assessee preferred an appeal before the CIT(A)-17.

 

However, by
the appellate order dated 28th August, 2015 the first appellate
authority dismissed the appeal of the assessee, holding that it was not
maintainable as the A.O. had only given effect to the directions given to him
by the CIT, relying on the decision in Herdillia Chemicals Ltd. vs. CIT
[1997] 90 Taxman 314 (Bom.). Aggrieved by this, the petitioner
preferred an appeal before the Tribunal which was registered as ITA No.
5096/Mum/2015. In the meanwhile, the assessee, having realised that the order
passed by the jurisdictional administrative commissioner u/s 263 of the Act had
remained unchallenged, belatedly filed an appeal before the Tribunal which was
registered as ITA No. 4866/Mum/2015. In the process there was a delay of 450
days. The assessee filed an application before the Tribunal for condonation of
delay in filing ITA No. 4866/Mum/2015 and in support thereof also filed an
affidavit dated 12th September, 2016 explaining the delay. The
assessee stated in its affidavit that the appellant did not prefer an appeal as
the Learned CIT had set aside the assessment so that the issues involved would
be agitated before the A.O. or the appellate authorities, i.e., against the
order of the A.O.

 

Both the appeals were heard
together and by a common order dated 30th November, 2016 both the
appeals were dismissed. The appeal ITA No. 5096/Mum/2015 was dismissed on the
ground that there was no question of any consequential assessment as per the
revision order. The assessee’s appeal was rightly dismissed by the CIT(A).

 

Insofar as
ITA No. 4866/Mum/2015 was concerned, the same was dismissed as being
time-barred as the delay in filing the appeal was not condoned. The ITAT
observed that the assessee had clearly, and presumably only on the basis of a
legal opinion, taken a conscious decision not to appeal against the revision
order. No reasonable, much less sufficient, cause had been advanced for
condonation of delay. It also stated that there was no basis for the said bona
fide belief which is stated as the reason for the assessee having not
preferred an appeal against the revision order.

 

The
Hon. High Court observed that when the Tribunal had entertained the appeal
arising out of the consequential assessment, it was not justified on the part
of the Tribunal to have rejected the appeal filed by the appellant against the
order passed by the jurisdictional administrative commissioner u/s 263 of the
Act because that was the very foundation of the subsequent assessment
proceedings. Therefore, in the interest of justice the delay in filing appeal
was condoned and the said appeal was directed to be heard on merit by the
Tribunal. The appellant was directed to pay costs of Rs. 25,000 to the
Maharashtra State Legal Services Authority.

Complaint filed u/s 276C (1) of the Act – Wilful attempt to evade tax – Appeal pending before CIT(A) – Criminal proceedings kept in abeyance

3. M/s Beaver Estates Pvt.
Ltd vs. The Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax Corporate Circle 1(1);
OP(Crl.) No. 400 of 2019

Date of order: 23rd
October, 2019

(Kerala High Court)

 

[Complaint filed CC No. 65/2015
of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate (E&O), Ernakulam]

 

Complaint filed u/s 276C (1) of
the Act – Wilful attempt to evade tax – Appeal pending before CIT(A) – Criminal
proceedings kept in abeyance

 

In the instant case, the
prosecution was launched u/s 276C(1) of the Act for wilful attempt to evade tax
before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate’s Court (Economic Offences),
Ernakulam. The first petitioner is a company and the second petitioner is the
Managing Director of the said company.

 

The plea of the petitioners was
that they have filed an appeal before the statutory authority challenging the
assessment and that the decision in the appeal has got a bearing on the
prosecution against them; therefore, the criminal proceedings pending against
them may be kept in abeyance till the disposal of the appeal. The petitioners
contended that if the statutory appeal filed by them under the Act is allowed,
it would knock down the very basis of the prosecution against them and,
therefore, the criminal proceedings may be ordered to be kept in abeyance.

 

The Hon. Court noticed that
section 276C provides the punishment for wilful attempt to evade tax, penalty
or interest. Section 278B provides for offences by companies. In the instant
case, the prosecution is u/s 276C(1) for wilful attempt to evade tax. The
decision of the statutory appellate authority regarding the assessment and
computation of tax would have a bearing on the prosecution against the
petitioners.

 

The Court relied on the decision
of the Apex Court in the case of K.C. Builders vs. Assistant Commissioner
of Income Tax (2004) 2 SCC 731 wherein it held that the levy of
penalties and prosecution u/s 276C are simultaneous and, hence, once the penalties
are cancelled on the ground that there is no concealment, the quashing of
prosecution u/s 276C is automatic. In the instant case, the prosecution is u/s
276C(1) for wilful attempt to evade tax. The decision of the statutory
appellate authority regarding the assessment and computation of tax would have
a bearing on the prosecution against the petitioners.

 

Similarly, in Commissioner
of Income Tax vs. Bhupen Champak Lal Dalal AIR 2001 SC 1096, the Court
had observed that the prosecution in criminal law and proceedings arising under
the Act are undoubtedly independent proceedings and, therefore, there is no
impediment in law for the criminal proceedings to proceed even during the
pendency of the proceedings under the Act. However, a wholesome rule will
have to be adopted in matters of this nature where courts have taken the view
that when the conclusions arrived at by the appellate authorities have a
relevance and bearing upon the conclusions to be reached in the case,
necessarily one authority will have to await the outcome of the other
authority.

 

The Department relied on the
decision of the Apex Court in Sasi Enterprises vs. Assistant Commissioner
of Income Tax (2014) 5 SCC 139. The Court held that the decision in Sasi
Enterprises (Supra) has got no application to the present case because
the prosecution against the petitioners is for committing the offence u/s 276C
and not for the offence u/s 276CC.


The
Court held that the decision of the statutory appellate authority regarding the
assessment and computation of tax would have a bearing on the prosecution
against the petitioners for wilful attempt to evade tax. Therefore, the
Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate (Economic Offences), Ernakulam was
directed to keep in abeyance all further proceedings against the petitioners in
the criminal case till the disposal of the appeal filed before the Commissioner
of Income Tax (Appeals), Kochi.

Search and seizure (presumption u/s 132[4A]) – Section 132(4A) of ITA, 1961 – No addition could be made on account of undisclosed income only on basis of presumptions u/s 132(4A) without recording any findings as to how loose sheets found during search were linked to assessee – In absence of corroborative evidence, Tribunal was not justified in reversing finding of CIT(A)

18. Ajay Gupta vs. CIT

[2020] 114 taxmann.com 577 (All.)

Date of order: 13th November, 2019

 

Search and seizure (presumption u/s 132[4A]) – Section 132(4A) of ITA, 1961 – No addition could be made on account of undisclosed income only on basis of presumptions u/s 132(4A) without recording any findings as to how loose sheets found during search were linked to assessee – In absence of corroborative evidence, Tribunal was not justified in reversing finding of CIT(A)

 

The residential premises of the assessee were searched u/s 132 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on 28th February, 2000. Pursuant to a notice u/s 158BC, the assessee filed return of income declaring NIL undisclosed income. The A.O. assessed the undisclosed income at Rs. 65,33,302.

 

The CIT (Appeals) partly allowed the appeal of the assessee. The CIT (Appeals) deleted the addition of Rs. 5,58,870 made by the A.O. on account of papers found during the search. The Tribunal reversed the order of the CIT (Appeals) and restored that of the A.O. The appeal by the assessee was admitted on the following questions of law:

 

‘1. Whether the presumption u/s 132(4A) of the Income-tax Act can be raised in the assessment proceedings?

 

2. Whether, apart from section 132(4A) of the Act, the burden to explain the documents seized from the possession of the assessee during search is upon him, and if it is so, then has he discharged the burden?’

 

The Allahabad High Court allowed the appeal and held as under:

 

‘i) It is not in dispute that two loose papers were found during search from the premises of assessee, however, during block assessment proceedings, the assessee had denied the documents and statement was recorded by Deputy Director of Investigation; he had submitted that he had no concern with the said documents so seized. Further, the A.O. while passing the assessment order, had only on basis of the loose papers found during search made addition to the undisclosed income of the assessee while the entries of said papers remained uncorroborated.

 

ii) This Court, in the case of CIT vs. Shadiram Ganga Prasad, 2010 UPTC 840, has held that the loose parchas found during search at the most could lead to a presumption, but the Department cannot draw inference unless the entries made in the documents so found are corroborated by evidence.

 

iii) As section 132(4A) of the Act provides that any books of accounts, documents, money, bullion, jewellery or other valuable articles or things found in possession of, or in control of any person in course of search may be presumed to be belonging to such person, and further, if the contents of such books of accounts and documents are true. But this presumption is not provided in absolute terms and the word used is “may” and not “shall”, as such the Revenue has to corroborate the entries made in the seized documents before presuming that transactions so entered were made by the assessee. Presumption so provided is not in absolute terms but is subject to corroborative evidence.

 

iv) In the present case, the Tribunal only on basis of presumption u/s 132 (4A) of the Act, reversed the finding of CIT (Appeals) without recording any finding as to how the loose sheets which were recovered during search were linked with the assessee. In the absence of corroborative evidence, the Tribunal was not justified in reversing the finding by the CIT (Appeals).

 

v) In view of the above, we are of the considered view that the order passed by the Tribunal reversing the finding of CIT (Appeals) in regard to deletion of the addition made of Rs. 5,58,870 and restoring the order of the A.O. on mere presumption is unsustainable. The order dated 12th March, 2010 is set aside to that extent and the matter is remitted back to the Tribunal to decide afresh as far as addition of Rs. 5,58,870 is concerned, within a period of three months from today.’

Revision – Business loss – Allowable (as share trading) – Section 28(i) r.w.s. 263 of ITA, 1961 – Assessee company, engaged in business of financing and trading in shares – During assessment, A.O. before accepting assessee’s claim of operational loss in share trading, verified demat accounts, sale, purchase and closing stocks of assessee company and inquired about said loss – Show cause notice u/s 263 for revising assessment could not be issued on the basis that said accounts were to be examined

17. Principal CIT vs. Cartier Leaflin (P) Ltd.

[2019] 112 taxmann.com 63 (Bom.)

[2020] 268 Taxman 222 (Bom.)

Date of order: 15th October, 2019

A.Y.: 2011-12


Revision – Business loss – Allowable (as share trading) – Section 28(i) r.w.s. 263 of ITA, 1961 – Assessee company, engaged in business of financing and trading in shares – During assessment, A.O. before accepting assessee’s claim of operational loss in share trading, verified demat accounts, sale, purchase and closing stocks of assessee company and inquired about said loss – Show cause notice u/s 263 for revising assessment could not be issued on the basis that said accounts were to be examined

 

The assessee was engaged in the business of financing and trading in shares. In its return of income, the assessee declared a total loss of Rs. 11.29 crores. In assessment, the A.O. made a few additions / disallowances which resulted in the assessee’s taxable income reaching Rs. 35.50 crores. Subsequently, the Principal Commissioner opined that the amount of Rs. 8.79 crores shown under ‘other operating losses’ seemed to be a trading loss incurred by the assessee company out of its business of financial and capital market activities, which was its main business activity. He opined that on perusal of the assessment records, it was noticed that no examination of the books of accounts, transaction accounts of the share trading activity carried out by the assessee company vis-a-vis the demat accounts was carried out by the A.O. and that the entire operating loss as mentioned was accepted without any verification or proper application of mind. He, thus, held that the assessment order passed by the A.O. appeared to be erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of Revenue. Notice u/s 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was issued by the Principal Commissioner.

 

On the assessee’s appeal, the Tribunal noted that from the records available it was evident that complete details in support of the claim of operating loss of Rs. 8.79 crores were made available by the assessee company to the A.O. In fact, the manner in which the operating loss was arrived at was submitted in a tabulated form along with item-wise details of all transactions during the assessment proceedings. Thus, the Tribunal concluded that the show cause notice u/s 263 by the Principal Commissioner was issued without examining the assessment records and the view taken by the A.O. after examination of exhaustive details and evidence was a possible view. The Tribunal held that the notice u/s 263 is not valid.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

‘i) The finding of fact in the order of the Tribunal is that the proceedings u/s 263, on the face of it, have been initiated without examination of records before the A.O. is not shown to be perverse. It is clear that the show cause notice proceeds on the basis that the books of accounts, transaction accounts of share trading carried out by the assessee vis-a-vis demat accounts have not been examined by the A.O. during the course of assessment proceedings. However, in the assessment order dated 28th March, 2014 itself, the A.O. had recorded that he examined the demat account in order to verify the share trading activities claimed by the assessee. Moreover, before passing the assessment order, sale, purchase and closing stocks were also examined by the A.O.

 

ii) Thus, the basis to invoke section 263 factually did not exist as there was due inquiry by the A.O. during the assessment proceedings leading to the assessment order. Thus, it is amply clear that the A.O. had applied his mind while accepting the claim of the assessee of operating loss of Rs. 8.79 crores making the proceedings u/s 263 bad in law. In any event, the view taken on facts by the A.O. is a possible view and the same is not shown to be bad.

 

iii) In the above view, the question as proposed does not give rise to any substantial question of law. Thus, not entertained. And appeal is, therefore, dismissed.’

I – Section 115JB – Provision for leave encashment is not to be added back to the book profit for computation u/s 115JB as it is an ascertained liability determined on actuarial basis II – Provision for wealth tax was not to be reduced from book profit to be computed u/s 115JB

6. [2020] 114 taxmann.com 538 (Mum.)(Trib.)

Caprihans India Ltd. vs. DCIT

ITA No. 4252/Mum/2011

A.Y.: 2005-06

Date of order: 23rd December, 2019

 

I – Section 115JB – Provision for leave encashment is not to
be added back to the book profit for computation u/s 115JB as it is an
ascertained liability determined on actuarial basis

 

II – Provision for wealth tax was not to be reduced from
book profit to be computed u/s 115JB

 

FACTS I

While assessing the total income of the assessee u/s 153C
r.w.s. 143(3) of the Act, the A.O. for the purpose of computing book profits
added the amount of provision for leave encashment of Rs. 15,30,070 on the
ground that it was an unascertained liability. He held that the liabilities
pertaining to leave encashment were not ascertained by the end of the financial
year, therefore the assessee had made a provision for the same.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who
upheld the action of the A.O.

 

The assessee then preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where,
relying on the ratio of the decision of the Punjab & Haryana High
Court in the case of CIT vs. National Hydro Electric Power Corporation
Ltd. [2010] 45 DTR 117 (P&H) it was contended that the provision
for leave encashment was made in the books on actuarial basis, therefore the
same could not be held to be in the nature of a provision for an unascertained
liability.

 

HELD I

The Tribunal held that if a business liability had definitely
arisen in the accounting year, the deduction should be allowed although the
liability may have to be quantified and discharged at a future date.

 

It observed that this view is fortified by the judgment of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bharat Earth Movers vs. CIT
[2000] 245 ITR 428 (SC). In the said case, it was observed by the
Hon’ble Apex Court that what should be certain is the incurring of the
liability and the fact that the same is capable of being estimated with
reasonable certainty, although the actual quantification may not be possible.
The Apex Court had observed that the provision for meeting the liability for
encashment of earned leave by the employees is not a contingent liability and
is admissible as a deduction.

 

In view of the above, the Tribunal held that as the provision
for leave encashment had been made by the assessee on actuarial basis,
therefore the same being in the nature of an ascertained liability could not
have been added by the A.O. for the purpose of determining the ‘book profit’
u/s 115JB. This ground of appeal of the assessee was allowed.

 

FACTS II

The assessee, while computing the ‘book profit’ u/s 115JB had
added back the amount of the wealth tax provision. On appeal, the assessee by
way of a specific ground had assailed the addition of the provision for wealth
tax while computing the ‘book profit’ u/s 115JB. However, the CIT(A) declined
to accept the aforesaid claim. Observing that the said provision was covered
u/s 115JB, the CIT(A) had upheld the view taken by the A.O.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal
where it was contended that as the provision for wealth tax does not fall
within any of the items of the ‘Explanation’ to section 115JB, the same could
not be added back while computing the ‘book profit’ under the said statutory
provision. In support of the aforesaid contention, reliance was placed on the
order of the ITAT, Kolkata, Special Bench in the case of JCIT vs. Usha
Martin Industries Ltd. [2007] 104 ITD 249 (SB).

 

HELD II

The Tribunal observed that an addition to the
‘book profit’ which during the period relevant to the year under consideration
was computed as per Part II of Schedule VI of the Companies Act, 1956 could be
made only if the same was permissible as per Item No. (a) to (k)
of the Explanation to section 115JB. As contemplated in clause (a) of
the ‘Explanation’ to this section, ‘the amount of Income-tax paid or payable,
and the provision therefor’ was liable to be added for computing the ‘book
profit’ u/s 115JB. However, as there was no such provision for making the
addition with regard to wealth tax, the A.O. could not have added the same for
computing the ‘book profit’ of the assessee company u/s 115JB. It observed that
its view is fortified by the order of the ITAT, Kolkata, Special Bench in the
case of JCIT vs. Usha Martin Industries Ltd. [2007] 104 ITD 249 (SB).
The Tribunal directed the A.O. to rework the ‘book profit’ u/s 115JB after
deleting the provision for wealth tax. This ground of appeal of the assessee
was allowed.

Return of income – Filing of, in electronic form (set-off and carry-forward of losses) – Section 139D r.w.s. 72 of ITA, 1961 and Rule 12 of ITR, 1962 – Procedure of filing electronic return as per section 139D r.w. Rule 12 cannot bar assessee from making claim which he was entitled to – Assessee was directed to make representation before CBDT where he was not able to reflect set-off available in terms of section 72 in prescribed return of income in electronic form

16. Samir Narain Bhojwani
vs. Dy.CIT

[2020] 115 taxmann.com 70
(Bom.)

Date of order: 22nd
October, 2019

A.Y.: 2019-20

 

Return of income – Filing of, in
electronic form (set-off and carry-forward of losses) – Section 139D r.w.s. 72
of ITA, 1961 and Rule 12 of ITR, 1962 – Procedure of filing electronic return
as per section 139D r.w. Rule 12 cannot bar assessee from making claim which he
was entitled to – Assessee was directed to make representation before CBDT
where he was not able to reflect set-off available in terms of section 72 in
prescribed return of income in electronic form

 

The assessee was obliged u/s 139D
of the Income-tax Act, 1961 read with Rule 12 of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 to
file his return of income electronically with his digital signature. However,
he was not able to reflect in the prescribed return of income in electronic
form the set-off available in terms of section 72, i.e., setting off of current
year’s business income against the carry-forward loss from the earlier years.
This was because the return which was filed electronically required certain
columns to be filled in by the petitioner while the other columns were
self-populated. The assessee was thus unable to change the figures and make a
claim for set-off u/s 72 in the present facts. This resulted in excess income
being declared, resulting in an obligation to pay more tax on income which in
terms of section 72 was allowed to be set off against carried-forward losses of
earlier years.

 

Therefore, the assessee filed a
writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and sought a
direction from the High Court to the Respondent No. 1, the A.O., and Respondent
No. 2, the CBDT, to accept the petitioner’s return of income for A.Y. 2019-20
in paper form u/s 139(1) of the Act and the same be taken up for assessment in
accordance with the Act.

 

The Bombay High Court allowed the
writ petition and held as under:

 

‘i) The claim sought to be urged by the assessee,
viz., set-off of business profits of this year offered to tax under the head
“capital gain” being set off against carried-forward loss is prima facie
supported by the decisions of the Tribunal in the case of M.K. Creations
vs. ITO [IT Appeal No. 3885 (Mum.) of 2014, dated 7th April, 2017]
and in ITO vs. Smart Sensors & Transducers Ltd. [2019] 104 taxmann.com
129/176 ITD 104 (Mum.–Trib.). It is also not disputed by the Revenue
that the return of income in electronic form is self–populated, i.e., on
filling in some entries, the other entries in the return are indicated by the
system itself. Thus, the petitioner is unable to make a claim which according
to him he is entitled to in law. In case the petitioner is compelled to file in
the prescribed electronic form, it could be declared by the A.O. as defective
(if all entries are not filled), or raise a demand for tax on the basis of the
declared income u/s 143(1), or if the assessment is taken to scrutiny u/s
143(3), then the petitioner will not be entitled to raise a claim of set-off
u/s 72 during the assessment proceedings. This, in view of the decision of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Goetze (India) Ltd. vs. CIT [2006]
157 Taxman 1/284 ITR 323 wherein it has been held that if a claim is
not made by the assessee in its return of income, then the A.O. would have no
power to entertain a claim otherwise than by way of revised return of income.
The revised return of income, if the petitioner attempts to file it, would
result in the petitioner not being able to make the claim for which the revised
return is filed as the revised return of income would also have to be filed in
the prescribed electronic form which does not provide for such an eventuality.
Thus, for the purposes of the subject assessment year if the return of income
is filed electronically, it (the assessee) would have given up, at least before
the A.O., his claim to benefit of section 72; this, whether the return of
income is processed u/s 143(1) or undergoes scrutiny u/s 143(3).

 

ii) The purpose and object of e-filing of return is simplicity and
uniformity in procedure. However, the above object cannot in its implementation
result in an assessee not being entitled to make a claim of set-off which he
feels he is entitled to in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The
allowability or disallowability of the claim is a subject matter to be
considered by the A.O. However, the procedure of filing the return of income
cannot bar an assessee from making a claim under the Act to which he feels he
is entitled.

 

iii) It is true that in terms of Rule 12 of the Rules the returns are
to be filed by the petitioner only electronically and he is bound by the Act
and the Rules, thus (the Department) cannot accept the paper return. However,
in terms of section 139D, it is for the CBDT to make rules providing for filing
of returns of income in electronic form. This power has been exercised by the
CBDT in terms of Rule 12 of the Rules. However, the form as prescribed does not
provide for (the) eventuality that has arisen in the present case and may also
arise in other cases. Thus, this is an issue to be brought to the notice of the
CBDT, which would in case it finds merit in this submission, issue necessary
directions to cover this gap.

 

iv) In the normal course, the petitioner would have been directed to
file representation with the CBDT making a demand for justice, before
considering issuing of a writ of mandamus. However, in the peculiar
facts of this case, the petitioner is required to file return of income by 31st
October, 2019. It is only when the petitioner was in the process of
filing his return electronically that he realised that he is unable to make a
claim of set-off u/s 72, even though the claim itself is prima facie
allowable in view of the decisions of the Tribunal in M.K. Creation
(Supra) and Smart Sensors & Transducers Ltd. (Supra). In the
absence of the petitioner filing its return of income on or before 31st
October, 2019, the petitioner is likely to face penal consequences. The issue
raised is a fundamental issue, which needs to be addressed by the CBDT.

 

v) Therefore, it would be appropriate that the petitioner make a
representation on the above issue to the CBDT, who would then consider it in
the context of the facts involved in the instant case and issue necessary
guidelines for the benefit of the entire body of assessees if the petitioner is
right in his claim that the prescribed return of income to be filed
electronically prohibits an assessee from making its claim. However, in the
meantime, the petitioner, without prejudice to his rights and contentions, would
file the return of income in electronic form on the system before the last
date. Besides, (he would) also file his return of income for the subject
assessment year in paper form with the A.O. before the last date. This return
of income in paper form would be accepted by the A.O. without prejudice to the
Revenue’s contention that such a return cannot be filed.

 

vi) In the meantime, till such time as the
CBDT takes a decision on the petitioner’s representation, the Revenue would not
act upon the electronically filed return of income so as to initiate any
coercive recovery proceedings.’

Recovery of tax – Stay of demand pending first appeal – Section 220(6) of ITA, 1961 and CBDT Circular No. 530 dated 6th March, 1989 – The Circular stating that a stay of demand be granted if there are conflicting views of High Court can be extended to conflicting views of different Benches of Tribunal as well

15. General Insurance
Corporation of India vs. ACIT

[2019] 111 taxmann.com 412
(Bom.)

[2019] 267 Taxman 596 (Bom.)

Date of order: 14th
October, 2019

A.Y.: 2017-18

 

Recovery of tax – Stay of demand
pending first appeal – Section 220(6) of ITA, 1961 and CBDT Circular No. 530
dated 6th March, 1989 – The Circular stating that a stay of demand
be granted if there are conflicting views of High Court can be extended to
conflicting views of different Benches of Tribunal as well

 

For the A.Y. 2017-18, the
assessee filed an appeal against the assessment order. The assessee also filed
an application for stay of demand u/s 220(6) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The
assessee was directed to deposit 20% of tax demand during pendency of appellate
proceedings.

 

The assessee filed a writ
petition challenging the order and claimed that the assessee is entitled to
unconditional stay till disposal of appellate proceedings in view of the fact
that there were conflicting decisions of co-ordinate Benches of the Tribunal so
far as the merit of the assessee’s case was concerned. The Bombay High Court
allowed the writ petition and held as under:

 

‘i) The CBDT Circular No. 530 dated 6th March, 1989 states that stay
of demand be granted where there are conflicting decisions of the High Court.
This principle can be extended to the conflicting decisions of the different
Benches of the Tribunal. Thus, in the above facts a complete stay of the demand
on the above head, i.e., Item No. 1 of the above chart, was warranted in the
petitioner’s favour.

ii) Therefore, unconditional stay was to be granted to assessee till
disposal of appellate proceedings.’

Reassessment – Sections 147, 148 and 151 of ITA, 1961 – Where A.O. issued reassessment notice on basis of sanction granted by Chief Commissioner – Since Chief Commissioner was not specified officer u/s 151(2) to grant such sanction, impugned notice was to be quashed

14. Miranda Tools (P) Ltd.
vs. ITO

[2020] 114 taxmann.com 584
(Bom.)

Date of order: 14th
November, 2019

A.Y.: 2014-15

 

Reassessment – Sections 147, 148
and 151 of ITA, 1961 – Where A.O. issued reassessment notice on basis of
sanction granted by Chief Commissioner – Since Chief Commissioner was not
specified officer u/s 151(2) to grant such sanction, impugned notice was to be
quashed

 

The petitioner is a company
engaged in the business of manufacture and marketing of fabrics. The petitioner
filed its return of income for the A.Y. 2014-15 on 22nd September,
2014 declaring NIL income. The assessment was completed u/s 143(3) of the
Income-tax Act, 1961 by an order dated 1st September, 2016.
Thereafter, on 26th February, 2019, the A.O. issued a notice u/s 148
of the Act on the ground that he has reason to believe that the income
chargeable to tax in respect of share application money for the relevant
assessment year has escaped assessment. The petitioner submitted its
objections. The A.O. rejected the objections.

 

The assessee filed a writ
petition and challenged the reopening of the assessment. The Bombay High Court
allowed the writ petition and held as under:

 

‘i) As per the provisions of section 151(2) of the Act, a sanction to
issue notice for reopening u/s 148 of the Act has to be given by the Joint
Commissioner of Income Tax in case the reassessment is sought to be done before
(or within) four years. Under section 2(28C) of the Act, a Joint
Commissioner also means Additional Commissioner of Income Tax. In the present
case, the A.O. submitted a proposal to the Principal Chief Commissioner of Income
Tax for reopening the assessment u/s 148 on 6th February, 2019.

 

ii) The question arises whether the sanction granted by the Chief
Commissioner of Income Tax would fulfil the requirement of section 151. It has
long been settled that when the statute mandates the satisfaction of a
particular authority for the exercise of power, then it has to be done in that
manner only. Adopting this principle, the Division Benches of this Court in the
cases of Ghanshyam K. Khabrani vs. Asstt. CIT [2012] 20 taxmann.com
716/210 Taxman 75 (Mag.)/346 ITR 443 and CIT vs. Aquatic Remedies
(P) Ltd. [2018] 96 taxmann.com 609/258 Taxman 357/406 ITR 545 have held
that sanction for issuance of reopening notice has to be obtained from the
authority mentioned in section 151 and not from any other officer, including a
superior officer. In the present case the Chief Commissioner of Income tax is
not the officer specified in section 151 of the Act. There is thus a breach of
requirement of section 151(2) of the Act regarding sanction for issuance of
notice u/s 148 of the Act. Consequently, the impugned notice and the impugned
order cannot be sustained in law. The petitioner, therefore, is entitled to
succeed.

 

iii) Accordingly, the impugned notice dated
26th February, 2019 and the impugned order dated 15th
July, 2019 are quashed and set aside.’

Charitable or religious trust – Registration procedure (Deemed registration) – Sections 12AA and 13 of ITA, 1961 – Where Commissioner (Exemption) did not decide application u/s 12AA within six months from date on which matter was remitted by Tribunal, registration u/s 12AA(2) would be deemed to be granted to assessee society; A.Ys.: 2010-11 to 2014-15

24. CIT(E) vs. Gettwell Health and Education Samiti [2020] 115 taxmann.com 66 (Raj.) Date of order: 15th March, 2019 A.Ys.: 2010-11 to 2014-15

 

Charitable
or religious trust – Registration procedure (Deemed registration) – Sections
12AA and 13 of ITA, 1961 – Where Commissioner (Exemption) did not decide
application u/s 12AA within six months from date on which matter was remitted
by Tribunal, registration u/s 12AA(2) would be deemed to be granted to assessee
society; A.Ys.: 2010-11 to 2014-15

 

The assessee
is a society registered under the Rajasthan Societies Registration Act, 1958 vide
registration certificate dated 3rd January, 2008. Its main object is
to provide medical facilities in the State of Rajasthan. The assessee is
running a hospital at Sikar in the name of Gettwell Hospital & Research
Centre. The assessee filed an application in Form 10A seeking registration u/s
12AA of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on 19th January, 2010. The
Commissioner of Income Tax (Exemptions) [‘the CIT(E)’] rejected that
application by an order dated 23rd July, 2010. By an order dated 22nd
July, 2011, the Tribunal set aside the order dated 23rd July, 2010
and remanded the matter back to the CIT(E) on the ground that it had not
communicated the A.O.’s report to the assessee and therefore restored the issue
of registration back on the file of the CIT(E) with a direction that the
assessee should be given an opportunity before deciding the issue of
registration and should be confronted with all the materials which are
considered adverse to the assessee. After remand of the matter, the CIT(E)
passed a fresh order on 9th October, 2015 and rejected the
application of the assessee, holding that the assessee was running the hospital
for the benefit of the family members of Shri B.L. Ranwa and there was no
charity in it.

 

The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s appeal.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Rajasthan High Court upheld the decision
of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

‘i)    The Tribunal also noted that once the matter
was remanded back to the CIT(E) then the limitation for passing the order /
decision cannot be more than the limitation provided for deciding the
application u/s 12AA of the Act. There is no dispute that as per the provisions
of section 12AA(2) of the Act the limitation for granting or refusing the
registration is prescribed as before the expiry of six months from the end of
the month in which the application was received. Relying on the judgment of the
Supreme Court in CIT vs. Society for the Promotion  of Education [2016] 67 taxmann.com 264/238
Taxman 330/382 ITR 6 which upheld the judgment of the Allahabad High
Court and judgment of this Court in CIT vs. Sahitya Sadawart Samiti
[2017] 88 taxmann.com 703/396 ITR 46 (Raj.), the Tribunal held that
once the limitation prescribed u/s 12AA of the Act expired and the
consequential default on the part of the CIT(E) in deciding the application,
would result in deemed grant of registration is a settled proposition.

 

ii)    Therefore, it has been held
by the Tribunal that the judgment of the CIT(E) is reversed on merits and
registration would stand granted to the assessee by prescription of law made in
section 12AA(2) of the Act. The Tribunal in this behalf relied on the judgment
of the Lucknow Bench of the Tribunal in Harshit Foundation vs. CIT [2013]
38 taxmann.com 309/60 SOT 147 (URO) in which case it was held that
where the Commissioner does not pass any order even after six months from the
receipt of the Tribunal’s order remitting the matter to him, the registration
will be deemed to have been granted.

 

iii)    This is subject to exercise
of the Commissioner’s power u/s 12AA(3) of the Act in appropriate cases.

iv)   In view of the above, we
hardly find any justification in admitting this appeal as in our considered
view it does not raise any question of law, much less substantial question of
law. The appeal is therefore dismissed.’

 

Charitable purpose – Section 2(15) r/w sub-sections 11, 12 and 13 of ITA, 1961 – Where India Habitat Centre, inter alia set up with primary aim and objective to promote habitat concept, was registered as a charitable trust, principle of mutuality for computation of its income was not required to be gone into as income was to be computed as per sections 11, 12 and 13; A.Y.: 2012-13

23. CIT (Exemption) vs. India Habitat Centre [2020] 114 taxmann.com 84 (Del.) Date of order: 27th November, 2019 A.Y.: 2012-13

 

Charitable purpose – Section 2(15) r/w sub-sections 11, 12 and 13 of
ITA, 1961 – Where India Habitat Centre, inter alia set up with primary
aim and objective to promote habitat concept, was registered as a charitable
trust, principle of mutuality for computation of its income was not required to
be gone into as income was to be computed as per sections 11, 12 and 13; A.Y.:
2012-13

 

For the A.Y.
2012-13, the assessee filed its return of income on 28th September,
2012 in the status of ‘Trust’, declaring ‘Nil income’. Its assessment was
framed u/s 143 (3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, computing total income as Rs.
5,86,85,490 and holding that the activities of the assessee are hybrid in
nature; they were partly covered by provisions of section 11 read with section
2(15), and partly by the principle of mutuality. It was held by the A.O. that
since the assessee is not maintaining separate books of accounts, income cannot
be bifurcated under the principle of mutuality or otherwise. The entire surplus
in I&E account, amounting to Rs. 5,83,92,860, was treated as taxable income
of the assessee.

The CIT(Appeals) allowed the appeal of the assessee by relying upon the
judgment of the Delhi High Court in the assessee’s own case dated 12th
October, 2011 for A.Ys. 1988-89 to 2006-07 and the decision of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of Radha Soami Satsang vs. CIT [1992] 193 ITR
321/60 Taxman 248. The Tribunal confirmed the decision of the
CIT(Appeals).

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of
the Tribunal and held as under:

 

‘i)    The fundamental question is
that if the assessee has taken the plea of mutuality, whether it could be
deprived of the benefit of section 2(15) of the Act. On this aspect, the A.O.
has proceeded to classify the assessee’s activities as ?hybrid”, holding that
part of the activities are covered by provisions of section 11 r/w section
2(15) and part by principle of mutuality. The CIT(A), after examining the records,
has given a categorical finding that the activities of the centre fall within
the meaning of the definition of ?charitable activities” as provided u/s 2(15)
of the Act.

 

ii)    Applying the test of profit motive, it was
held that the surpluses generated by the assessee are not being appropriated by
any individual or group of individuals. Merely because the assessee is charging
for certain goods and services it does not render such activities as commercial
activities, and the fact that the A.O. has accepted that the assessee is
promoting public interest as provided in the proviso to section 2(15),
there cannot be any doubt that the assessee should be regarded as a charitable
organisation and given the full benefit of exemption provided to such
organisations under the Act. Relying on this premise, it has been held that
since the assessee has not generated any surpluses from anyone, members or
non-members, it was not correct to say that the assessee has claimed relief
partly as charitable organisation and partly as mutual association.

 

iii)    Further, it was rightly
held that the principle of mutuality becomes superfluous in view of the fact
that the activities were held to be charitable. Applying the principle of
consistency, the CIT(A) held that there is no fundamental change in the nature of
activities of the assessee for the period prior to A.Y. 2008-09 and subsequent
years. The ITAT has confirmed the findings of the CIT(A). Though the principles
of res judicata are not applicable to the income tax proceedings,
however, at the same time, one cannot ignore the fact that there is no dispute
with respect to the consistency in the nature of activities of the assessee.
All the income tax authorities have held that the assessee is a charitable
institution and this consistent finding of fact entitles the assessee to have
its income computed under sections 11, 12 and 13 of the Act.

 

iv)   In this background, we find
no ground to disentitle the assessee to the benefits of section 2(15) of the
Act. This being the position, we find no perversity in the impugned decision
and, therefore, no question of law, much less substantial question of law,
arises for consideration. As a result, the appeal of the Revenue is dismissed.’

Sections 144C(1), 143(3) – For the period prior to 1st April, 2020 in case of an eligible assessee, draft assessment order u/s 143(3) r.w.s. 144C(1) is not required to be passed in cases in which no variation in returned income or loss is proposed Mere issuance of draft assessment order, when it was legally not required to be issued, cannot end up enhancing the time limit for completing the assessment u/s 143(3)

2.       [2020]
115 taxmann.com 78 (Mum.)

IPF India Property Cyprus (No. 1) Ltd. vs. DCIT

ITA No. 6077/Mum/2018

A.Y.: 2014-15

Date of order: 25th February, 2020

 

Sections 144C(1), 143(3) – For the period prior to 1st April,
2020 in case of an eligible assessee, draft assessment order u/s 143(3) r.w.s.
144C(1) is not required to be passed in cases in which no variation in returned
income or loss is proposed

 

Mere issuance of draft assessment order, when it was legally
not required to be issued, cannot end up enhancing the time limit for
completing the assessment u/s 143(3)

 

FACTS

The A.O., for A.Y. 2014-15, passed a draft assessment order
u/s 143(3) r.w.s. 144C(1) even when no variation was proposed therein to the
income or loss returned by the assessee.

 

The assessee challenged the correctness of the DRP’s order
dated 26th July, 2018 in the matter of assessment u/s 144(C)(1)
r.w.s. 143(3) of the Act. It contended that the A.O. had erred in passing a
draft assessment order u/s 143(3) r.w.s. 144C(1) of the Act, even when no
variation has been proposed therein to the income or loss returned by the
assessee and in passing the final assessment order u/s 143(3) of the Act, after
the due date provided u/s 153 of the Act, thus making the final assessment
order illegal, bad in law and non-est.

 

HELD

The Tribunal observed that the short question for
adjudication is whether or not the A.O. was justified in passing a draft
assessment order on the facts of the case, and whether the fact that the A.O.
chose to issue the draft assessment order even though he was not required to do
so, would result in affecting the normal time limit within which the normal
assessment order u/s 143(3) is to be issued. It also observed that there are no
variations in the returned income and the assessee income.

 

The controversy is thus confined to the question as to what
will be the rate on which income returned by the assessee is to be taxed. While
the assessee has claimed taxation @ 10% under article 11(2) of the India-Cyprus
DTAA, the A.O. has declined the said treaty protection on the ground that the
assessee was not beneficial owner of the said interest and, accordingly,
brought the income to tax @ 40% thereof. The Tribunal observed that there is,
quite clearly, no variation in the quantum of income.

 

The Tribunal observed that the assessee before it is a
non-resident company incorporated, and fiscally domiciled, in Cyprus.
Accordingly, in terms of section 144C(15)(b)(ii), the assessee is an eligible
assessee but then there is no change in the figure of income returned by the
assessee vis-a-vis the income assessed by the A.O. It held that there
is, therefore, no question of a draft assessment order being issued in this
case. It noted that the Finance Bill, 2020 proposes to make the issuance of
draft assessment orders in the case of eligible assessees mandatory even when
there is no variation in the income or loss returned by the assessee, but then
this amendment seeks to amend the law with effect from 1st April,
2020. Since the amendment is being introduced with effect from that date, the
Tribunal held that it is beyond any doubt that so far as the period prior to 1st
April, 2020 is concerned, in the cases in which no variations in the returned
income or loss were proposed, the draft assessment orders were not required to
be issued. The Tribunal upheld the plea of the assessee on this point.

 

The Tribunal noted that if no draft assessment order was to
be issued in this case, the assessment would have been time-barred on 31st
December, 2017 but the present assessment order was passed on 17th
August, 2018. It held that since no draft assessment order could have been
issued in this case, as the provisions of section 144C(1) could not have been
invoked, the time limit for completion of assessment was available only up to
31st December, 2017. The mere issuance of a draft assessment order,
when it was legally not required to be issued, cannot end up enhancing the time
limit for completing the assessment u/s 143(3). The Tribunal held the
assessment order to be time-barred.

 

The Tribunal allowed these grounds of appeal filed by the
assessee.

Sections 23, 24(b) – Where assessee is receiving rent from his own son and daughter who are financially independent, property is both a self-occupied and a let-out property – Consequently, interest claim cannot be allowed in full and shall have to be suitably proportioned, restricting the interest claim relatable to the self-occupied part thereof to Rs. 1.50 lakhs

1.       [2020]
115 taxmann.com 179 (Mum.)

Md. Hussain Habib Pathan vs. ACIT

ITA No. 4058/Mum/2013

A.Y.: 2009-10

Date of order: 5th March, 2020

 

Sections 23, 24(b) – Where assessee is receiving rent from
his own son and daughter who are financially independent, property is both a
self-occupied and a let-out property – Consequently, interest claim cannot be
allowed in full and shall have to be suitably proportioned, restricting the
interest claim relatable to the self-occupied part thereof to Rs. 1.50 lakhs

 

The children of the assessee were financially independent;
so instead of just transferring some money to their father, they wanted it to
be regarded (by mutual agreement) as rent – They believed that thus he would
receive funds in the shape of rent and that would also help meet their father’s
(the assessee’s) interest burden and help him with some tax savings – It was to
be regarded as a genuine arrangement in order to minimise assessee’s tax
liability

 

FACTS

The assessee claimed a loss of Rs. 15,32,120 qua his
residential house property in Mumbai. He claimed that he had incurred interest
on borrowed capital of Rs. 21,62,120 which was adjusted against rental income
of Rs. 9,00,000; this (rent), on a field inquiry, was found by the A.O. to be
from the assessee’s major son and major daughter residing in the said property
along with other family members of the assessee.

 

The A.O. was of the view that nobody would charge rent (for
residence) from his own son and daughter, particularly considering that both
are unmarried and living together with their family at its self-owned abode.
The arrangement was therefore regarded as merely a tax-reducing device adopted
by the assessee and liable to be ignored. Treating the house property as a
self-occupied property, the A.O. restricted the claim of interest u/s 24(b) to
Rs. 1,50,000.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who
confirmed the action.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal
where he contended that there is nothing to show that the arrangement, which is
duly supported by written agreements furnished in the assessment proceedings,
is fake or make-believe. Rental income cannot be overlooked or disregarded
merely because it arises from close family members. However, on a query from
the Bench, the counsel for the assessee was not able to state the status, i.e.,
self-occupied or rented, of the said premises for the earlier or subsequent
years, though he submitted that this is the first year of the claim of loss. He
was also unable to tell the Bench about the area let out, i.e., out of the
total area available, inasmuch as other family members, including the assessee,
were also residing in the same premises.

 

The Revenue’s case, on the other hand, was of no cognisance
being accorded to an arrangement which is against human probabilities and
clearly a device to avoid tax.

 

HELD

The Tribunal observed that the arrangement is highly unusual,
particularly considering that the rent is in respect of a self-owned property
(i.e., for which no rent is being paid), which constituted the family’s
residence, and with the assessee’s son and daughter both being unmarried.
However, the Bench felt that that may not be conclusive in the matter. Being a
private arrangement not involving any third party, not informing the
co-operative housing society was also found to be of not much consequence. It also
observed that the Revenue has rested on merely doubting the genuineness of the
arrangement without probing the facts further. What was the total area, as well
as its composition / profile? How many family members, besides the assessee
(the owner) and the two ‘tenants’, were resided thereat? Has the area let out
been specified, allowing private space (a separate bedroom each) to the son and
the daughter who would in any case be also provided access to or use of the
common area – specified or not so in the agreement/s, viz. kitchen, balcony,
living area, bathrooms, etc.? How had the rent been received, in cash or
through a bank and, further, how had it been sourced, whether from the assessee
(or any other family member), or from the capital / income of the ‘tenants’?
Why was there no attempt even to inquire whether the arrangement was a
subsisting / continuing one, or confined to a year or two, strongly suggestive
in the latter case of a solely tax-motivated exercise?

 

The Tribunal held that it could, however, well be that the
assessee’s major son and daughter are financially independent (or substantially
so), with independent incomes, sharing the interest burden of their common
residence with their father. As such, instead of transferring funds to him have
decided by mutual agreement to give the amounts as rent as that would, apart
from meeting the interest burden to that extent, also allow tax saving to the
assessee-father. A genuine arrangement cannot be disregarded just because it
results in or operates to minimise the assessee’s tax liability. The Tribunal
found itself in agreement with the assessee’s claim inasmuch as there was
nothing on record to further the Revenue’s case of the arrangement not being a
genuine one, but just that it was an unusual one.

 

However, on quantum the Tribunal found the stand of the
assessee infirm. It held that the house property, that is, the family residence
of the Pathan family, was both a self-occupied and a let-out property in view
of the rent agreements. It observed that the interest claimed (Rs. 21.62 lakhs)
is qua the entire property, which therefore cannot be allowed in full
against the rental income, which is qua only a part of the house
property. The assessee’s interest claim therefore cannot be allowed in full and
shall have to be suitably proportioned, restricting the interest claim
relatable to the self-occupied part thereof to Rs. 1.50 lakhs as allowed. The
assessee shall provide a reasonable basis for such allocation as well as the
working of the area let out. It observed that it may well be that in view of
the joint residence, no area (portion) is specified in the rent agreements. The
number of family members living jointly; their living requirements – which may
not be uniform; fair rental value of the property; etc. are some of the
parameters which could be considered for the purpose. The Tribunal directed the
A.O. to adjudicate thereon per a speaking order, giving definite reasons for
being in disagreement, whether in whole or in part, with the assessee’s claim
within a reasonable time.

 

The Tribunal allowed this ground of appeal filed by the
assessee.

VVF Ltd. vs. DCIT-39; [ITA. No. 9030/Mum/2010; Date of order: 31st August, 2016; A.Y.: 2007-08; Bench: F; Mum. ITAT] Section 37 – Business expenditure – Salary paid to director – The expenditure may be incurred voluntarily and without any necessity – So long as it is incurred for the purposes of business, the same is allowable as deduction

The Pr. CIT-3 vs. VVF Ltd.
[Income tax Appeal No. 1671 of 2017]

Date of order: 4th
March, 2020

(Bombay High Court)

 

VVF Ltd. vs. DCIT-39; [ITA. No.
9030/Mum/2010; Date of order: 31st August, 2016; A.Y.: 2007-08;
Bench: F; Mum. ITAT]

 

Section 37 – Business expenditure
– Salary paid to director – The expenditure may be incurred voluntarily and
without any necessity – So long as it is incurred for the purposes of business,
the same is allowable as deduction

 

A search and seizure action u/s
132(1) of the Act was carried out by the Department in the case of the assessee
and its group associates, including its directors, on 3rd January,
2008. In A.Y. 2002-03, the A.O. made an addition of Rs. 13,00,000 which
represented the salary paid to Shri Faraz G. Joshi, its Director.

 

The A.O. disallowed the salary
paid to Shri Joshi primarily relying on a statement recorded during the course
of the search u/s 132(4) of the Act. The A.O. noted that in the course of the
search it was gathered that Shri Joshi was not attending office on a day-to-day
basis and no specific duties were assigned to him except some consultation.

 

The assessee had pointed out
before the A.O. that Shri Joshi was a whole-time Director and was performing
his duties as Director of the assessee-company and was being paid remuneration
in accordance with the limits prescribed under the Companies Act, 1956.

 

The A.O. disagreed with the
assessee and concluded that the payment made to Shri Joshi in the form of
salary was an expenditure not expended wholly and exclusively for the purposes
of business and, therefore, disallowed the same u/s 37(1) of the Act.

 

The CIT(A) also sustained the
action of the A.O. by noting that Shri Joshi had specifically admitted in the
statement recorded at the time of the search that he was not attending office
for the last six years and no specific duties were assigned to him.

 

The Tribunal held that the
assessee has appropriately explained the statement rendered by Shri Joshi. His
answer has to be understood in the context of the question raised. In this
context, attention has been drawn to the relevant portion of the statement,
which reads as under:

 

‘Q.9: What is the nature of
business conducted by the company, i.e., M/s VVF Ltd.?

A.9:  The company deals in Oleo-Chemicals. We also
work on contract basis for Jhonson & Jhonson (sic)
& Racket – Colman (sic). (Johnson & Johnson; Reckitt-Coleman.)

Q.10: Who looks after the day to
day activity of that company and what are the duties assigned to you?

A.10: I am not aware about the
person who looks after the day to day business activity. Since last 6 years I
am not attending the office nor any duty is assigned to me except
consultation.’

 

It has been explained that the
answer by Shri Joshi was in response to the question put to him which was as to
whether he was involved in the day-to-day management of the company. It was in
this context that the answer was given. However, it is sought to be pointed out
that the said Director was rendering consultation and advisory services which,
in fact, is the role of a Director. Therefore, it has to be understood that
services were indeed being rendered by the said Director to the assessee
company. The Tribunal observed that the overemphasis by the Revenue on the
wordings of the reply of Shri Joshi has led to a wrong conclusion.

 

Further, Shri
Joshi was one of the two main Directors of the assessee company and that
historically such salary payments had been allowed as a deduction. In fact,
there is no negation to the plea of the assessee that for A.Ys. 2009-10 to
2012-13, such salary payments stood allowed and such assessments have been
completed even after the search carried out on 3rd January, 2008. It
is judicially well settled that it is for the assessee to decide whether any
expenditure should be incurred in the course of carrying on of its business. It
is also a well-settled proposition that expenditure may be incurred voluntarily
and without any necessity and so long as it is incurred for the purposes of
business, the same is allowable as deduction even though the assessee may not
be in a position to show compelling necessity of incurring such expenditure. In
support of the aforesaid proposition, reliance can be placed on the judgment of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sasoon J. David & Co. P.
Ltd., 118 ITR 261 (SC).

 

Being aggrieved, the Revenue
filed an appeal to the High Court. The Court held that in response to the
specific query the answer given by Shri Joshi was quite reasonable and no
adverse inference could be drawn therefrom. Besides, the Tribunal also found that
in all the assessments made up to the date of the search, the salary payment to
Shri Joshi was allowed. Even post-search, from A.Y. 2009-10 onwards where
assessments have been made u/s 143(3) of the Act, salary paid to Shri Joshi was
not disallowed.

 

The Supreme Court in the case of Sassoon
J. David & Co. Pvt. Ltd. vs. CIT (Supra), examined the expression
‘wholly and exclusively’ appearing in section 10(2)(xv) of the Income tax Act,
1922 which corresponds to section 37 of the Act. Sub-section (1) of section 37
says that any expenditure not being expenditure of the nature described in
sections 30 to 36 and not being in the nature of capital expenditure or
personal expenses of the assessee, laid out or expended wholly and exclusively
for the purposes of the business or profession, shall be allowed in computing
the income chargeable under the head ‘Profits and gains of business or
profession’.

 

It was observed that the expression ‘wholly
and exclusively’ appearing in the said section does not mean ‘necessarily’.
Ordinarily, it is for the assessee to decide whether any expenditure should be
incurred in the course of his business. Such expenditure may be incurred
voluntarily and without any necessity. If it is incurred for promoting the
business and to earn profits, the assessee can claim deduction u/s 10(2)(xv)
even though there was no compelling need for incurring such expenditure. The
fact that somebody other than the assessee is also benefited by the expenditure
should not come in the way of an expenditure being allowed by way of deduction
u/s 10(2)(xv) of the Act. In the light of the above, the Revenue appeal was
dismissed.

 


M/s Sunshine Import and Export Pvt. Ltd. vs. DCIT; [ITA No. 4347/Mum/2015; Date of order: 9th September, 2016; Bench: B; A.Y.: 2008-09 to 2010-11; Mum. ITAT] Section 133A – Survey – Statement of directors of company recorded u/s 133A – No incriminating evidence and material – No evidentiary value – Any admission made in course of such statement cannot be made basis of addition

The Pr. CIT-4 vs. M/s Sunshine Import and Export Pvt. Ltd. [Income
tax Appeal Nos. 937, 1121 & 1135 of 2017]

Date of order: 4th March, 2020

(Bombay High Court)

 

M/s Sunshine Import and Export
Pvt. Ltd. vs. DCIT; [ITA No. 4347/Mum/2015; Date of order: 9th September,
2016; Bench: B; A.Y.: 2008-09 to 2010-11; Mum. ITAT]

 

Section 133A – Survey – Statement
of directors of company recorded u/s 133A – No incriminating evidence and
material – No evidentiary value – Any admission made in course of such
statement cannot be made basis of addition

 

The assessee is engaged in the
business of manufacturing and trading in precious and semi-precious stones and
jewellery. It has two Directors, Shri Paras Jain and Shri Saurabh Garg. A
survey u/s 133A of the Act was carried out in respect of the assessee. During
the post-survey proceedings, the statement of one of the Directors, Shri
Saurabh Garg, was recorded. He was reported to have stated that the assessee
company provided only bill entries and there was no actual transaction of
purchase and sale. Subsequently, the statement of the other Director, Shri
Paras Jain, was also recorded. From the latter statement, the A.O. came to the
conclusion that he was a person of no means and drew the inference that the
assessee was engaged in the activity of issuing accommodation bills for the
sale and purchase of diamonds, apart from acting as a dummy for importers.
Holding the transactions as not reliable, the A.O. rejected the books of
accounts of the assessee company. He assessed 2% as the rate of commission of
the assessee on account of import purchases, i.e., for acting as a dummy. That
apart, commission @ 0.75% on sales bills was also assessed.

 

The CIT(A) confirmed the action
of the A.O., whereupon the assessee filed an appeal to the Tribunal.

 

The Tribunal held that the
assessee is mainly engaged in the import of diamonds and their sale in local
markets to exporters. The import of diamonds is done through customs
authorities and banking channels in India. The import of diamonds undergoes the
appraisal process by appraisers appointed by the custom authorities. The officers
appointed by the Government of India verify physically each and every parcel of
diamonds in order to ascertain the quality, quantity, rate, value and place of
origin against the declaration made by the importers. Further, all the
transactions of purchase, sales, import are made through account payee cheques
and not a single payment is made to any party by way of cash. All the purchase
and sales transactions are carried out with reputed parties in the diamond
trade and all the payments received from debtors are through account payee
cheques; similarly, all payments to creditors are through account payee
cheques.

 

As such, the A.O. cannot
allegedly consider the import of goods as providing accommodation bills in the
market when physical delivery of goods was confirmed by the other arm of
government, i.e., the custom authorities. From the record it is noted that the
sales were made to reputed exporters who are assessed to tax and their
identities are known to the Income Tax Department. The customers are registered
under state VAT laws. The company has received payments against sales proceeds
by account payee cheques. The company has also purchased from local parties to
whom payment was made by account payee cheques. To discharge the onus of
proving the transactions as genuine and to substantiate that all purchases and
sales made are genuine, the assessee has submitted various documents and
submissions; copies of bank statement for the relevant year; ledger copies of
various purchases from parties for A.Y. 2008-09 and 2009-10; photo copies of
purchase invoices of parties for A.Y. 2008-09 and 2009-10; the relevant copies
of the daily stock register; confirmation from various sale parties; details of
interest received from various parties; details of unsecured loans along with
confirmation; and so on. These documents prove that the assessee is not engaged
in issuing accommodation bills and acting as a dummy for importing diamonds.
Thus, the contention of the A.O. that the bills issued by the assessee are all
accommodation bills is wrong. Just on the basis of one recorded statement he
cannot reach the conclusion that the assessee has issued accommodation bills
and reject the books of accounts of the assessee.

 

Being aggrieved by the order of
the ITAT, the Revenue filed an appeal to the High Court. The Court held that in
arriving at such a finding, the Tribunal had noted that the survey party did
not find any incriminating evidence and material that could establish the stand
taken by the A.O. There was no disputing the fact that no incriminating
evidence was found on the day of the survey. It was also noted that merely on
the basis of the statement of one of the directors, Shri Saurabh Garg, and
that, too, recorded after 20 to 25 days of the survey, could not be sufficient
for bringing into assessment and making any addition to the income without
further supporting or corroborative evidence. The statement recorded u/s 133A
of the Act not being recorded on oath, cannot have any evidentiary value and no
addition can be made on the basis of such a statement.

 

In CIT
vs. S. Khader Khan Son 300 ITR 157, the Madras High Court had concluded
that a statement recorded u/s 133A of the Act has no evidentiary value and that
materials or information found in the course of survey proceedings could not be
a basis for making any addition; besides, materials collected and statements
obtained u/s 133A would not automatically bind the assessee. This was affirmed
by the Supreme Court by dismissing the civil appeal of the Revenue in CIT
vs. S. Khader Khan Son (Supra). In view of the above, the Revenue
appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed.

Settlement of cases – Section 245D of ITA, 1961 – Proceedings for settlement are not adjudicatory proceedings – Assessee disputing liability but offering to pay additional tax – No non-disclosure of full and true facts – Order of Settlement Commission accepting offer of assessee is valid

8. Principal CIT vs.
Shreyansh Corporation

[2020] 421 ITR 153 (Guj.)

Date of order: 7th
October, 2019

A.Y.: 2004-05

 

Settlement of cases – Section
245D of ITA, 1961 – Proceedings for settlement are not adjudicatory proceedings
– Assessee disputing liability but offering to pay additional tax – No
non-disclosure of full and true facts – Order of Settlement Commission accepting
offer of assessee is valid

On an application for settlement
after considering the issues put forth by the Principal Commissioner in the
report u/r 9 of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 and the rejoinders of the assessees
and the documents submitted along with the statement of facts and the
submissions of the respective parties, the Settlement Commission noted that
insofar as the addition to partner’s capital was concerned, the assessees had
submitted affidavits made by M and the two assessees and it was further stated
that if at any stage these affidavits were found to be false, it may be treated
as a misrepresentation of facts u/s 245D(6) of the Act and the consequences as
u/s 245D(7) of the Act may follow in the case of the two assessees. The
Settlement Commission further noted that the assessees had offered additional
income for bringing quietus to certain issues in the spirit of a
settlement.

 

Taking into account all the facts
and discussions on record, the Settlement Commission was of the view that the additional
income offered during the section 245D(4) proceedings by the applicant’s letter
dated 8th June, 2018 over the additional income disclosed in the
settlement applications could be accepted with reference to the income
disclosed in the settlement applications. It further noted that the
Commissioner and the A.O. also did not make any further submissions. The
Settlement Commission accordingly settled the cases of the assessees on the
terms and conditions set out in the order.

 

The Principal Commissioner filed
writ petitions and challenged the order of the Settlement Commission. The
Gujarat High Court dismissed the petitions and held as under:

 

‘i)    The proceedings before the Settlement Commission are in the
nature of settlement between the parties and are not strictly speaking
adjudicatory proceedings. On a perusal of the order passed by the Settlement
Commission it was abundantly clear that the assessees had not accepted the
liability of 5% of trading expenses but in the spirit of settlement offered to
pay the amount computed by the A.O. with a view to bring quietus to the
matter and buy peace of mind. The offer to pay such amounts in addition to the
amounts disclosed in the applications u/s 245C of the Act could not be said to
be disclosure of any further amounts under that section as they had been
offered only to bring about a settlement.

 

ii)    The fact that the assessees had offered to pay such amounts, the
liability whereto they had not accepted, could not be termed as non-disclosure
of full and true facts in the applications u/s 245C of the Act.


iii)  Under the circumstances, considering
the amounts so offered by way of settlement, which were quite meagre
considering the overall disclosure made, there was no infirmity in the order
passed by the Settlement Commission warranting interference in exercise of
powers under article 226 of the Constitution of India’.

Revision – Section 264 of ITA, 1961 – Application for revision – Powers of Commissioner – Powers u/s 264 are very wide – Mistake in computation of income and revised return barred by limitation – Commissioner finding that mistake was inadvertent and claim for deduction bona fide – Order rejecting application for revision is not valid Income-tax – General principles – Effect of Article 265 of the Constitution of India – No tax collection except by authority of law

7. Sharp Tools vs. Principal
CIT

[2020] 421 ITR 90 (Mad.)

Date of order: 23rd
October, 2019

A.Y.: 2013-14

 

Revision – Section 264 of ITA,
1961 – Application for revision – Powers of Commissioner – Powers u/s 264 are
very wide – Mistake in computation of income and revised return barred by
limitation – Commissioner finding that mistake was inadvertent and claim for
deduction bona fide – Order rejecting application for revision is not
valid

 

Income-tax – General principles –
Effect of Article 265 of the Constitution of India – No tax collection except
by authority of law

 

The assessee
filed its return of income for the A.Y. 2013-14. It then received an intimation
u/s 143(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 accepting the returned income.
Thereafter, the assessee realised that a mistake had inadvertently crept in
while filling up the quantum in column 14(i) of the return. Therefore, on 9th
January, 2016, the assessee filed a revised return rectifying the mistake. The
return was not processed by the Central Processing Centre, since it was
considered as a revised return filed beyond the specified time u/s 139(5) of
the Act. The assessee made an application to the A.O. for rectification u/s
154. The A.O. rejected the plea,  stating
that the claim was belated. Thereafter, the assessee filed a revision petition
u/s 264. Though the Principal Commissioner found that the mistake was inadvertent
and that the claim was bona fide, he rejected the revision petition.

 

The assessee filed a writ
petition against the order. The Madras High Court allowed the writ petition and
held
as under:

‘i)    A careful perusal of section 264 of the Income-tax Act, 1961
would show that it empowers the Principal Commissioner or the Commissioner to
exercise the revisional jurisdiction over “any order” other than the
order to which section 263 applies. Such power is wider and confers on such
authority the responsibility to set things right wherever he finds that an
injustice has been done to the assessee. Before passing any order u/s 264 of
the Act, it is open to the authority to make such inquiry or cause such inquiry
to be made. However, such order should not be prejudicial to the assessee.

 

ii)    Article 265 of the Constitution of India specifically states that
no tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law. Therefore, both
the levy and collection must be with the authority of law, and if any levy or
collection is later found to be wrong or without authority of law, certainly
such levy or collection cannot withstand the scrutiny of the Constitutional
provision and would be in violation of article 265 of the Constitution of
India.

 

iii)   A mere typographical error committed by the
assessee could not cost it payment of excess tax as collected by the Revenue.
The denial of repayment of such excess collection would amount to great
injustice to the assessee. Even though the statute prescribes a time limit for
getting the relief before the A.O. by way of filing a revised return, there was
no embargo on the Commissioner to exercise his power and grant the relief u/s
264. The order rejecting the application for revision was not valid.

 

iv)    Accordingly, this writ petition is
allowed and the impugned order is set aside. Consequently, the matter is
remitted back to the respondent for considering the claim of the petitioner and
to pass appropriate orders in the light of the observations and findings
rendered supra. The respondent shall, accordingly, pass such fresh order
within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.’

Recovery of tax – Company in liquidation – Recovery from director – Section 179 of ITA, 1961 – Where A.O. issued a notice u/s 179 against assessee director of a company seeking to recover tax dues of the company, since such notice was totally silent regarding fact that tax dues could not be recovered from company and, further, there was no whisper of any steps being taken against company for recovery of outstanding amount, impugned notice u/s 179 against director was to be set aside

6. Ashita Nilesh Patel vs.
ACIT

[2020] 115 taxmann.com 37
(Guj.)

Date of order: 20th
January, 2020

A.Ys.: 2011-12 to 2014-15

 

Recovery of tax – Company in
liquidation – Recovery from director – Section 179 of ITA, 1961 – Where A.O.
issued a notice u/s 179 against assessee director of a company seeking to
recover tax dues of the company, since such notice was totally silent regarding
fact that tax dues could not be recovered from company and, further, there was
no whisper of any steps being taken against company for recovery of outstanding
amount, impugned notice u/s 179 against director was to be set aside

 

The assessee was a director in
the company TPPL which failed to make payment of outstanding tax demand of
certain amount. The A.O. observed that it was noticed from the records of the
company that there were no recoverable assets in the name of the assessee
company. In such circumstances, proceedings u/s 179 of the Income-tax Act, 1961
were initiated by way of issuing of notice to the assessee treating her as
jointly and severally liable for payment of such tax.

 

The assessee filed a writ
petition challenging the notice. The Gujarat High Court allowed the writ
petition and held as under:

 

‘i)    Section 179(1) provides for the joint and several liability of
the directors of a private company, wherein the tax dues from such company in
respect of any income of any previous year cannot be recovered. The first
requirement, therefore, to attract such liability of the director of a private
limited company is that the tax cannot be recovered from the company itself.
Such requirement is held to be a pre-requisite and necessary condition to be
fulfilled before action u/s 179 can be taken. In the context of section 179
before recovery in respect of the dues from a private company can be initiated
against the directors, to make them jointly and severally liable for such dues,
it is necessary for the Revenue to establish that such recovery cannot be made
against the company and then alone can it reach to the directors who were
responsible for the conduct of the business during the previous year in
relation to which liability exists.

 

ii)    There is no escape from the fact that the perusal of the notice
u/s 179 reveals that the same is totally silent as regards the satisfaction of
the condition precedent for taking action u/s 179, viz., that the tax dues
cannot be recovered from the company. In the show cause notice, there is no
whisper of any steps having been taken against the company for recovery of the
outstanding amount. Even in the impugned order, no such details or information
has been stated.

 

iii)   In the circumstances referred to above, the question is whether
such an order could be said to be sustainable in law. The answer has to be in
the negative. At the same time, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the
case and, more particularly, when it has been indicated by way of an additional
affidavit-in-reply as regards the steps taken against the company for the
recovery of the dues, one chance is to be given to the Department to undertake
a fresh exercise so far as section 179 is concerned. If the show cause notice
is silent including the impugned order, the void left behind in the two
documents cannot be filled by way of an affidavit-in-reply. Ultimately, it is
the subjective satisfaction of the authority concerned that is important and it
should be reflected from the order itself based on some cogent materials.

 

iv)   The impugned notice as well as the
order is hereby quashed and set aside. It shall be open for the respondent to
issue fresh show cause notice for the purpose of proceeding against the writ
applicant u/s 179.’