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SEBI AMENDS GUIDELINES TO SETTLE VIOLATIONS — Complex Provisions Make Professional Help Inevitable

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SEBI has recently, on 25th May 2012, made significant amendments to its guidelines for settlement of violations. In the process, they have made them so complex that, from the initial do-it-yourself simple scheme, now the new Scheme has made involving lawyers and accountants almost inevitable. There are several positive changes though and particularly some of the major criticisms of the earlier scheme have been addressed.

To recollect, in 2007, SEBI had introduced guidelines for settlement of alleged violations through consent orders and, in case of prosecution, through compounding. The Scheme was very simple and widely framed in its drafting and implementation. Any violation at any stage of punitive proceedings (or, even without proceedings) could be settled. The arbiter of what should be the agreed terms of settlement was an independent Committee (called High-Powered Advisory Committee or HPAC) though, being a voluntary settlement, obviously both sides had to agree. The settlement was usually very swift in practice, the procedures being so simple that even an educated layman could apply for it — and many did. Even the HPAC was co-operative in this regard and, in fact, as an unwritten rule, legal arguments and submissions were neither required, nor generally entertained though a fair and patient hearing was granted. Simple and brief orders were passed so that the spirit of the Settlement Scheme was upheld and a person who has not been held guilty was not seemed to be held guilty by the settlement order.

But, as was almost inevitable, the seeds of malaise were in the simplicity of the Scheme itself and serious concerns were raised. A major concern was that serious violations got settled and the stringent and exemplary punishment required in some cases was avoided through monetary penalties, even if those that appeared to be large. The settlement process was also felt to be opaque. Wide differences in settlement amounts were observed with no reason expressed explaining this and the brief orders giving no further clues. Settlement proceedings were sometimes felt to be used for delaying the regular proceedings. Inevitably, allegations — though unsubstantiated — of corruption were also made.

SEBI has taken the experience and criticism both of 5 years seriously — perhaps too seriously. Several types of serious violations have been put on the negative list though a small window of discretion even for such violations has been kept open. Many of the actual procedural details of the internal process of settlement have been formalised and made transparent. The time limits of making the application — both the earliest and the last dates — have been specified. A significant amendment is the introduction of a very detailed and fairly complicated method of determining what would be the amount at which a particular type of violation having the specified features would be settled. This is obviously to partly remove the discretion involved. On the other hand, it makes the settlement process complex requiring professional help unavoidable. The process itself becomes mechanical which to some extent is antithesis of a settlement process.

Let us consider some important amendments proposed.
First is the negative list of those violations for which settlement is not permitted. But before we examine some of important items in this list, some thoughts on what is the purpose of the settlement process. The objective of settlement is quite obviously to shorten the proceedings for investigating and punishing violations of securities laws. SEBI is benefitted as it saves time and costs, has the benefit of not having to prove the violation in accordance with due process of law and often also has the benefit of the party’s cooperation. Importantly, a punishment — even if lower than what could have been levied if the allegation had been proved — is also meted out. The party accused also saves on time and costs, gets benefit of a lower penalty and also does not have a stigma of a past violation attached, at least on record. Thus, the settlement process is — or, I think, ought to be — a consideration of how the inter- ests of justice and capital markets would be achieved on the facts of the case — a careful balance between the benefit of further proceedings with attached costs and delays and the likelihood of the accused going scot-free.

The offence of Insider trading is now prohibited from being settled. There was strong criticism that inside traders were getting away by settling their cases. Insider trading is in many ways an evil of capital markets. The perpetrator takes advantage of the trust reposed on him as an insider. He makes profits illegitimately by this trust. While some argue that it is a victimless crime, I believe that other shareholders usually do pay the cost. The need to punish such perpetrators is justifiable. However, the fair criticism of disallowing settlement is that insider trading is rather difficult to investigate and prove on facts though SEBI has put in a series of deeming provisions to make up. Prohibiting settlement of allegation of insider trading means that the long process of establishing it will have to be followed in all cases. It would have made better sense to put a higher settlement amount in such cases than an absolute ban. To clarify, though, violation of insider trading cannot be settled, other violations of the insider trading Regulations such as delay/default in disclosures, etc. can be settled.

Serious fraudulent and unfair trade practices causing substantial losses to investors and/or affecting their rights cannot be settled. However, if the person makes good the losses to the investors, the case can be settled. These perhaps constitute the single largest of violations, but a more detailed analysis would be beyond the scope of this article. But suffice is to say that words such as ‘serious’, ‘substantial’, etc. are not defined and may lead to discretion.

Failure to make an open offer under the Takeover Regulations cannot be settled except where (i) the entity is willing to make an offer unless, in the opinion of SEBI, the open offer will not be in interest of shareholders or (ii) where SEBI has decided to refer the matter to adjudication.

Front running transactions also now cannot be settled. As is known, front running transactions involve trading in anticipation of information about impending large orders. As held in some earlier cases, persons connected with mutual funds, who came to know the impending large orders of the mutual funds, traded ahead (or shared such information) and the mutual fund’s investors thus had to buy/sell at a little adverse price because of the earlier orders so placed. Strangely, SEBI defines front running here — which is inappropriate since the law does not define this term — as placing or using non-public information on an impending transaction of substantial quantity. Generally, front running is understood to be a situation where a person in a position of trust having access to non-public information uses this information to carry out front running. The analogy is of an insider. And just as having unpublished information and trading on it does not necessarily make a person guilty of insider trading, the same way a person not connected with such an institution but who still in some way has information of impending large transactions cannot necessarily be held to be guilty of front running.
Other violations on the negative list include net asset value manipulation by mutual funds, failure to redress investor grievances, failure to comply with orders of specified SEBI officers, failure to comply with orders of summons, etc.

However, interestingly, discretion has been retained to settle cases even amongst the negative list, though no criteria has been laid down how such discretion will be exercised.

Another important amendment is that now time limits are specified for making the application.

First time limit is how early can the consent application be made. It is now provided that an application cannot be made before the investigation/inspection of the alleged default is complete. Earlier, the Guidelines provided that that the application could be made at any stage, but in case of serious and intentional violation, the settlement would not be made till the fact-finding process was complete. This was a sensible provision. If a person is coming forward voluntarily, then unless SEBI had indication that more violations could be detected, the matter should be taken up. An important purpose of settlement is to shorten the proceedings.

Second time limit is specification of the last date the application for settlement should be made. The earlier Guidelines had no last date. It is now provided that the application cannot be made more than sixty days from the date of serving the show-cause notice. This would sound fair. Sixty days for examining the show-cause notice, which is expected to be comprehensive, are sufficient to decide whether one wants to fight further or come forward and settle. A concern is whether the time taken for obtaining information and documents relied on in the notice but not provided upfront should be taken (though the law requires such information/documents be provided upfront, some times this is not done). However, there is discretion for extending this last date, if the delay is beyond the control of the applicant.

Repetitive consent applications are now restricted. If an alleged default takes place within two years of the last consent order, then that default cannot be settled through these Guidelines. Further, if two consent orders are already obtained, then no further applications can be made for a period of three years from the date of the last consent order. Strangely, a consent application/order once made for a certain violation, will bar consent order in the above manner for even any other type of violation. This is unlike, say, the Reserve Bank of India Regulations for compounding where restrictions are placed for repetitive compounding of ‘similar’ contraventions. Thus, one would have to be very careful in making a consent application.

A lump-sum non-refundable fee of Rs.5000 is now provided to be paid. This amount is irrespective of the amount involved in the alleged violation or its gravity.

The process of settlement has been changed. The applicant has to first appear before an internal committee of SEBI who will work out the terms of consent in accordance with the formula. These terms will then be forward to the HPAC for its recommendation. Finally, these recommendations of the HPAC will be sent to a Panel of two Whole-time Members of SEBI who will take a final decision and if they deem fit, increase or decrease the terms or reject the application. However, it is provided that this whole process should be ‘preferably’ completed within six months of registration of the consent application. While this period of six months may sound short, it may be recollected that in actual practice, earlier, the process used to be completed much earlier in many cases.

There is an elaborate and complex formula provided for determining the settlement amount. The formula is too detailed to be within the scope of this short article. Suffice is to say that the formula considers the stage at which the application is made, the nature of the violation, etc. and provides for quantitative parameters to determine the settlement amount. Clearly, this is to make the settlement more transparent and remove discretion and discrimination. Minimum amounts have also been provided depending upon the nature of the violation or the alleged perpetrator.

It has been stated — though with some ambiguity — that the minimum settlement amount for first-time applicants will be Rs.5 lac and in case of ‘name-lenders’, this minimum will be Rs.2 lac. Curiously, the minimum amount for second-time applicants is not specified. This minimum limit is strange and perhaps even inequitable. Firstly, even orders passed with due process by SEBI for minor offences have fine far less than Rs.5 lac. Secondly, this would obviously hit persons having made less serious violation. Serious violations even otherwise would be settled for, or punished with, higher amount.

Another common complaint was that the formal orders published do not bring out the facts properly and were too brief and opaque. Thus, one could not know what were the merits of the case and whether the case was fairly settled. To meet this criticism, on the one hand, as explained above, to a large extent, the discretion is diluted. On the other hand, it is now provided that the order shall be more detailed in specific matters including the facts and circumstances of the case. It will have to be seen though how much detailed the orders are in actual practice.

In conclusion, the experience of five years is brought out well in the amendments. While one will miss the simplicity of the earlier provisions and lament the complex new law requiring the need of professional help, it will be also fair to say that the earlier provisions were too simplistic. Where the basic matter itself is complex, the settlement has to be complex. A professional analysis of a complex matter is a must for fair and transparent dealing on both sides. One hopes though that in practice, the amendments are implemented in their true spirit, since the earlier Scheme, despite its short-comings, did set an enviable benchmark to settlement proceedings in India.

Rate of interest on Senior Citizens Savings Scheme 2004 increased.

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Rate of interest on Senior Citizens Savings Scheme 2004 has been increased from 9% to 9.3% p.a. and on PPF it is increased from 8.6% to 8.8% p.a. with effect from 1st April 2012 — Circular DGBA.CDD. No. H-6506/15.02.001/2011-12, dated 3rd April 2012.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 128, dated 16-5-2012 — Exchange Earner’s Foreign Currency (EEFC) Account.

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This Circular clarifies that conversion of the EEFC balances into Rupee balances will only be applicable to available balances in the EEFC account which may be arrived at by netting off earmarked amounts on account of outstanding forward/option contracts booked before May 10, 2012.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 127, dated 15-5-2012 — Foreign investment in NBFC Sector under the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Scheme — Clarification.

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This Circular clarifies that the activity ‘leasing and finance’, which is one among the eighteen NBFC activities wherein FDI up to 100% is permitted under the Automatic Route covers only ‘financial leases’ and not ‘operating leases’, insofar as the NBFC sector is concerned.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 124, dated 10-5-2012 — Exchange Earner’s Foreign Currency (EEFC) Account.

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Presently, all foreign exchange earners are permitted to retain 100% of their foreign exchange earnings in their EEFC account. This Circular has modified the position as under, for holding of foreign exchange in EEFC account, Resident Foreign Currency (RFC) Account or Diamond Dollar Account (DDA):

(a) 50% of the balances in these accounts must be converted within 15 days from the date of this Circular into Rupee balances and credited to the Rupee accounts as per the directions of the account holder.

(b) In respect of all future foreign exchange earnings, an exchange earner is eligible to retain 50% (as against the previous limit of 100%) in non-interest bearing foreign currency accounts. The balance 50% shall be surrendered for conversion to Rupee balances.

(c) EEFC account holders henceforth will be permitted to access the foreign exchange market for purchasing foreign exchange only after utilising fully the available balances in the EEFC accounts.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 123, dated 10-5-2012 — Risk Management and Inter-Bank Dealings.

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This Circular provides that the intra-day open position/ daylight limit of authorised dealers will be five times the Net Overnight Open Position Limit available to them or the existing intra-day open position limit as approved by RBI, whichever is higher, for positions involving Rupee as one of the currencies.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 122, dated 9-5-2012 — Risk Management and Inter-Bank Dealings.

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Presently, banks are permitted to deploy foreign currency funds for granting loans to their resident customers for meeting their foreign exchange requirements or for their rupee working capital/capital expenditure needs, subject to the prudential/interestrate norms, credit discipline and credit monitoring guidelines in force.

This Circular has modified the said policy and banks can now, subject to the prudential/interestrate norms, credit discipline and credit monitoring guidelines in force, use funds in FCNR(B) accounts with them for making loans to resident customers for meeting:

(i) their foreign exchange requirements or

(ii) for the Rupee working capital/capital expenditure needs of exporters/corporates who have a natural hedge or a risk management policy for managing the exchange risk.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 121, dated 8-5-2012 — Foreign investment in Commodity Exchanges and NBFC Sector — Amendment to the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Scheme.

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Presently, foreign investment in commodity exchanges is permitted subject to a composite ceiling of 49% with FDI limit of 26% and FII limit of 23% under Portfolio Investment Scheme (PIS).

This Circular clarifies that:

(a) With respect to foreign investment in commodity exchanges, the FDI component of 26% will be under the Approval Route whereas FII investment of 23% under PIS will be under the Automatic Route.

(b) 100% FDI under the Automatic Route is permitted only in case of ‘financial leases’ (financial leasing activity) and the Automatic Route is not available in case of ’operating leases’ (operating leasing activity).

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 120, dated 8-5-2012 — Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in India — Issue of equity shares under the FDI scheme allowed under the Government Route.

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Presently, under the Approval Route, equity shares/ preference shares can be issued against import of second-hand machinery. This Circular provides that now onwards equity shares/preference shares cannot be issued against import of second-hand machinery.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 119, dated 7-5-2012 — External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) Policy — Utilisation of ECB proceeds for Rupee expenditure.

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Presently, ECB proceeds can be utilised for permissible foreign currency expenditure as well as Rupee expenditure.

This Circular requires borrowers to provide bifurcation of the utilisation of the ECB proceeds towards foreign currency and Rupee expenditure in Form-83 at the time of availing Loan Registration Number (LRN). Borrowers must repatriate to India, immediately after drawn down, for credit to their Rupee accounts proceeds meant for Rupee expenditure in India. Any contravention will be viewed seriously and will invite penal action under FEMA.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 118, dated 7-5-2012 — Release of foreign exchange for miscellaneous remittances.

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Presently, up to INR307,284 or its equivalent can be remitted abroad for all permissible transactions on the basis of a simple letter from the applicant containing the basic information, viz., names and the addresses of the applicant and the beneficiary, amount to be remitted and the purpose of remittance.

This Circular has increased this limit from INR307,284 or its equivalent to INR1,536,419 or its equivalent. No documents, including Form A-2, except a simple letter containing basic information as stated above is required provided the conditions mentioned below are fulfilled:

 (a) Foreign exchange is being purchased for a permitted current account transaction.

(b) Amount does not exceed INR1,536,419 or its equivalent.

(c) Payment is made by a cheque drawn on the applicant’s bank account or by a Demand Draft.

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New form 24 aaa and modification to form 21 and 23:

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Forms 21 and 23 have been modified to include the SRN of the new Form 24 AAA pertaining to Form for filing petitions to Central Government (Regional Director) Pursuant to sections 17, 18, 19, 141 and 188 of the Companies Act.
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Form 5 INV – Returns of unclaimed amounts filed prior to 1st August 2012 should be filed again in a consolidated manner

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Form 5 INV is required to be filed by all companies annually giving complete information on unpaid/ unclaimed amounts lying with companies as on the date of the AGM of that year, pursuant to the Investor Education and Protection Fund (uploading of information regarding unpaid and unclaimed amounts lying with companies) Rules 2012, published vide Notification GSR 352(E) dated 10th May 2012. However, as some companies are filing multiple Form 5 INV, the ministry requires that if multiple form 5 INV have been uploaded for the year 2010-11 on or before the date of this circular i.e. 1st August 2012, the Company should again file Form 5 INV(single) giving details in excel template by 31st August 2012. Further Companies that have not filed their Form 5 INV are required to do so by 31st August 2012.
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(Auditor’s appointment under Company Law)

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Clause (9) Part I of first Schedule to CA Act, 1949. CA Arjuna (A) : Hey Bhagawan, last time you explained to me the importance of communicating with the previous auditor. Now what next? Bhagawan Shrikrishna (S):I told you many things. But have you understood?

A – Well, I was attentive. I did understand; but find it difficult to digest and implement.

S – That is always the situation. You are impatient to grab the audit work; and are reluctant to comply with your Institute’s rules.

A – Unfortunately, our mindset has become that way. We often think of short-cuts or bypassing the rules or complying only at the 11th hour.

S – 11th hour is also not bad. You do it at 13th hour with a backdate!

A – We always have some hypothetical fear of doing things in time. We can’t work without tension! Now tell me, if directors of a company give us an appointment letter, is it not sufficient?

S – You often behave as if you have never studied the Companies Act. You can never see anything beyond income tax! That is the whole trouble.

A – Tell me then what I need to do.

S – At least read clause (9) of the First Schedule. First see whether you are the first auditor of that company or there is a change?

A – Why? Is there a difference? I just go by the directors’ letter.

S – Oh! Very dangerous! There are many who don’t even take an appointment letter! You are little better!

A – I am talking of a private limited company. Who is going to verify? Everything is within the family.

S – Are you sure – never are there any disputes in the family? Then why did you fight with Kauravas?

A – They were our cousins! Here, they are husband-wife and their son.

S – In Kaliyuga, there are instances where husband and wife – both CAs – separated and lodged complaints against each other to the Institute!

A – Oh Lord! I must keep Draupadi and Subhadra in good mood. Otherwise, they will drag me into court!

S – Can’t rule out! So, don’t be in a slumber. Previously you were ‘innocent’; but now they will call you ‘stupid’!

A – Anyway. Then what should I see?

S – See Sections 224 and 225 of the Companies Act. If it is the first appointment, then directors can appoint the auditor. But this has to be done within 30 days from incorporation.

A – Oh! And if they don’t?

S – That was sub-section (5) of Sec 224. Otherwise, they will have to hold an extraordinary general meeting and appoint the first auditor.

A – Ah! That’s simple. These are paper meetings. I will ask my friend to write minutes. He is a company secretary.

S – Arey Arjuna, don’t take it so lightly. All formalities of EGM must be observed.

 A – Yeah! He will draft the notice and minutes. Everything is internal!

S – One should see the record of service of notice. Remember, directors and members can deny that they received the notice. They can challenge the validity of the meeting itself.

A – Why should they? It is being done in company’s interest only.

S – So you feel. When everything is smooth and amicable, they will agree. But when friction starts, they will conveniently forget it.

A – Unnecessary complications! Very disgusting

. S – Why are you so uncomfortable when the compliances are so simple? After all, it is a corporate entity. There is sanctity behind these provisions.

A – Then tomorrow, there could be disputes amongst partners also!

S – Yes. That is very common. It is inevitable. Partners are bound to dispute and separate one day or the other! For every birth, there is a death and partnership is no exception.

A – Then, do you mean we should take everything in writing?

S – If possible, you should obtain signatures of all partners on your copy of balance sheet. Do you ever read the partnership deed of a client? There is normally a clause there that accounts will be signed by all partners.

A – Ah! All those are standard clauses. I don’t even ask for the Deed. Same is the case of memorandum and articles of a company. What’s the use of all those stereotyped clauses?

S – Then be ready for trouble.

A – Now, I am in practice for 24 years! Nothing has happened so far.

S – You have not died in the last 50 years. Can you not die now?

 A – Come back to auditor’s appointment. What if there is a change of auditors?

S – You have to first ensure whether the previous auditor has resigned or was removed. He may have just given a letter expressing his unwillingness to be reappointed.

 A – Then what? Is it not sufficient?

S – It may be an item requiring special notice under section 190 of the Companies Act. You have to see all these things.

A – This is too much! If I spend time on this, when shall I audit the accounts. There are deadlines.

S – This happens because you don’t recognise any other deadline except your tax returns. Why don’t you understand that your appointment should be validly made? It is of prime importance. Why are you so casual about it?

A – Clients come to us only at the last moment.

S – So to accommodate them, you compromise everything! If they are careless, make them understand the things. If you accommodate them, they will take you for granted. As if everything is your own duty.

A – I think I should insist on a company secretary’s certificate regarding compliances.

S – That will be better. At least some safeguard!. Client must spend for it. But your basic duty still remains.

A – What duty? S – At least to see the prima facie compliance.

A – Tell me further. Board can fill up a casual vacancy. Is it not?

S – Yes. But every vacancy is not a casual vacancy. First see whether the Board has power to do so. I mean, whether the vacancy is really casual.

A – Why?

S – Don’t expect me to teach you the whole of the Company Law. Why don’t you read the publication on Code of Ethics of your Institute?

A – Where will I get it?

 S – That also you want me to tell? What kind of a CA you are! Go to WIRC. The latest edition is of January 2009 – reprinted in May 2009.

A – Okay! I will see that. There seems no escape!

S – And remember, these provisions of Companies Act and Code of Ethics are very well thought of. Don’t take them as a burden. They are designed to safeguard your own interest. Otherwise, someday, you yourself will crib about your unjust removal.

A – I agree; but our clients are like that! And other CAs also are not bothered about it.

S – Don’t let your client take your professional work for granted. Read all these carefully and update yourself regularly. They are meant for your betterment. Your conduct with the client will decide the dignity of your fraternity, not only now but also in future. If you conduct yourself very loosely before the client, I am sure your future generation will pay for it.

Om Shanti.
Note :
The above dialogue is with reference to Clause 9 of the First Schedule which reads as under:
Clause (9): accepts an appointment as auditor of a company without first ascertaining from it whether the requirements of Section 225 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), in respect of such appointment have been duly complied with;
Further, readers may also refer pages 188 to 210 of ICAI’s publication on Code of Ethics, January 2009 edition (reprinted in May 2009)
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Refund of the unlinked incorrect NEFT Payments

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The Ministry of Corporate Affairs has introduced a refund process on 16th September, 2012 for the unlinked incorrect NEFT payments, to be done through a revised refund e-Form available on the MCA21 portal.

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Conditions imposed for Conversion of Ordinary Society into Producer Company, under part-IX A of the Companies Act, 1956.

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The Ministry of Corporate Affairs has vide circular No .29/2012 dated 10th September 2012 issued the conditions to be imposed for conversion of ordinary Society into producer Company, Part-IX A of the Companies Act, 1956.

On receipt of an application for conversion of a Co-operative Society into a Producer Company, the ROC’s will seek a written consent from the local Co-operative Department of the concerned state, certifying that the Society desirous of being converted into a Producer Company, under part IX A of the Companies Act, 1956, has no dues payable to the State at the time of such conversion and the Cooperative Department has ‘no objection’ to its being converted into a Producer Company. Further, the ROC’s need to satisfy themselves fully that the applicant society has indeed extended its activities outside the State where it is registered a Co-operative Society under the local/State level Law governing Co-operative Societies which are not inter State Co-operative Societies.

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Filing of B alance Sheet and Profit and Loss Account by Companies in Non-XBR L for accounting year commencing on or after 01.04.2011

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The Ministry of Company Affairs has on 3rd September 2012 issued a General Circular No. 28/2012 extending the time for filing of E-form 23AC/ACA (non-XBRL) as per revised Schedule VI without the additional Fees upto 15.10.2012 or within 30 days from the date of the AGM whichever is later. Full Circular can be accessed at http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/General_ Circular_28_2012.pdf

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 93, dated 19-3- 2012 — Investment in Indian Venture Capital Undertakings and/or domestic Venture Capital Funds by SEBI registered Foreign Venture Capital Investors.

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Presently subject to certain terms and conditions, a SEBI-registered Foreign Venture Capital Investor (FVCI) can invest in equity, equity linked instruments, debt, debt instruments, debentures of an Indian Venture capital Undertaking (IVCU) or of a Venture Capital Funds (VCF) through Initial Public Offer or Private Placement or in units of schemes/funds set up by a VCF.

This Circular permits, subject to certain terms and conditions, all FVCI to invest in eligible securities (equity, equity-linked instruments, debt, debt instruments, debentures of an IVCU or VCF, units of schemes/funds set up by a VCF) by way of private arrangement/ purchase from a third party also. This Circular further clarifies that, subject to certain terms and conditions, SEBI-registered FVCI are also permitted to invest in securities on a recognised stock exchange.

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Filing of Balance Sheet and Profit and Loss Account by Companies in Non-XBRL for accounting year commencing on or after 01.04.2011

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Vide Circular No. 21/2012 dated 2nd August 2012,
the Ministry of Corporate affairs has informed that the Forms 23 AC and
23 ACA are under finalization, as they are being revised as per the
Revised Schedule VI.

All companies who required to file Non-
XBRL e-form 23 AC and 23 ACA as per Revised Schedule VI will be allowed
to file their financial statements without any additional fees/penalty
upto 15th September 2012 or within 30 days from the date of their AGM,
whichever is later.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 92, dated 13- 3-2012 — Opening of Diamond Dollar Accounts (DDAs) — Change in periodicity of the reporting.

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Presently, banks are required to submit a monthly report to RBI, giving details of the name and address of the firm/company in whose name the Diamond Dollar Account is opened, along with the date of opening/closing the Diamond Dollar Account, by the 10th of the following month to which it relates.

This Circular has reduced the periodicity of reporting from monthly basis to quarterly basis with effect from the quarter ending March 31, 2012. As a result, banks are required to submit details of the name and address of the firm/company in whose name the Diamond Dollar Account is opened, along with the date of opening/closing the Diamond Dollar Account by the 10th of the month following the quarter to which it relates.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 90, dated 6-3- 2012 — Clarification — Liberalised remittance scheme for resident individuals.

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With regards to the Liberalised Remittance Scheme (LRS), this Circular clarifies that:

(i) This facility is available to all resident individuals including minors. Where the remitter is a minor, the LRS declaration form should be countersigned by the minor’s natural guardian.

(ii) Remittances under LRS can be consolidated in respect of family members. However, individual family members must comply with the terms and conditions of the scheme.

(iii) Remittances under LRS can, subject to provisions of other applicable laws, be used for purchasing objects of art.

The modified LRS application-cum-declaration form is also annexed to this Circular.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 89, dated 1-3-2012 — Foreign Institutional Investor (FII) investment in ‘to be listed’ debt securities.

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Presently, SEBI registered FII are allowed to invest only in listed non-convertible debentures (NCD)/ bonds issued by an Indian company.

This Circular permits SEBI registered FII/sub-accounts of FII to invest in primary issues of to be listed NCD/ bonds only if listing of such NCD/bonds is committed to be done within 15 days of such investment. In case the NCD/bonds are not listed within 15 days of issuance, then the FII/sub-account of FII must immediately dispose of these NCD/bonds either by way of sale to a third party or to the issuer. The terms of offer must contain a clause stating that the issuer will immediately redeem/buy back the said securities from the FII/sub-accounts of FII if they are not listed within 15 days of issuance.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 88, dated 1-3- 2012 — Clarification — Establishment of Branch Offices (BO)/Liaison Offices (LO) in India by Foreign Entities — Delegation of powers.

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Presently, the following powers have been delegated by RBI to banks:

(i) Acceptance of Annual Activity Certificate from BO/LO.
(ii) Extension of the validity period of LO.
(iii) Closure of BO/LO of foreign entities in India.

This Circular clarifies that powers regarding transfer of assets of LO/BO to others have not been delegated by RBI to banks. Hence, approval from Foreign Exchange Department, Central Office, RBI is required for transfer of assets by LO/BO to subsidiaries or other LO/BO or any other entity.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 87, dated 29-2-2012 — Know Your Customer (KYC) norms/Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Standards/ Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT) Obligation of Authorised Persons under Prevention of Money Laundering Act, (PMLA), 2002, as amended by Prevention of Money Laundering (Amendment) Act, 2009 — Cross-Border Inward Remittance under Money Transfer Service Scheme.

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This Circular requires, Authorised Persons (Indian Agents) to take additional steps to identify and assess their ML/TF risk for customers, countries and geographical areas as also for products/services/ transactions/delivery channels.

Authorised Persons (Indian Agents) must have policies, controls and procedures, duly approved by their boards, in place to effectively manage and mitigate their risk adopting a risk-based approach as discussed above. They must also design risk parameters according to their activities for risk-based transaction monitoring, which will help them in their own risk assessment.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 85, dated 29- 2-2012 — External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) for Infrastructure facilities within National Manufacturing Investment Zone (NMIZ).

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For the purposes of ECB, infrastructure sector includes: (i) power, (ii) telecommunication, (iii) railways, (iv) road including bridges, (v) sea port and airport, (vi) industrial parks, (vii) urban infrastructure (water supply, sanitation and sewage projects), (viii) mining, refining and exploration and (ix) cold storage or cold room facility, including for farm-level precooling, for preservation or storage of agricultural and allied produce, marine products and meat.

Presently, developers of SEZ are allowed to avail ECB to provide such infrastructure facilities within the SEZ.

This Circular permits developers of NMIZ also to avail of ECB under the Approval Route for providing infrastructure facilities within the NMIZ.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 83, dated 27-2-2012 — Import of gold on loan basis — Tenor of loan and opening of stand-by letter of credit.

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Presently, the maximum tenor of gold loan, as per the Foreign Trade Policy 2004-2009 of the Government of India, is 240 days — 60 days for manufacture and exports +180 days for fixing the price and repayment of gold loan.
The Foreign Trade Policy 2009-2014 of the Government of India has increased the period of completion for export from 60 days to 90 days. As a result, the maximum tenor of gold loan is increased from 240 days to 270 days — 90 days for manufacture and exports +180 days for fixing the price and repayment of gold loan.

Further, this Circular requires banks to see that:

(i) Maximum period of gold loan must be as per the Foreign Trade Policy 2009-14 or as notified by the Government of India from time to time.

(ii) Tenor of stand-by letter of credit, for import of gold on loan basis, wherever required, must also be in line with the tenor of gold loan.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 82, dated 21- 2-2012 — Release of foreign exchange for imports — Further liberalisation.

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Presently, advance towards imports up to US $ 500 or its equivalent can be issued for any current account transaction without any documentation formalities.

This Circular has increased that limit from US $ 500 or its equivalent to US $ 5,000 or its equivalent. Hence, advance towards imports can be made up to US $ 5,000 or its equivalent for any current account transaction without submitting any documents except for a simple letter containing basic information such as the name and address of the applicant, name and address of the beneficiary, amount to be remitted and the purpose of remittance and the application is accompanied by a cheque drawn on the applicant’s bank or demand draft.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 81, dated 21- 2-2012 — Export of goods and services — Receipt of advance payment for export of goods involving shipment (manufacture and ship) beyond one year.

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Presently, an exporter is required to obtain prior
approval of RBI for receiving advance from the foreign buyer where the
export agreement permits shipment of goods beyond one year from the date
of receipt of advance.

This Circular has granted powers to
banks to permit exporters to receive advance from the foreign buyer
where the export agreement permits shipment of goods beyond one year
from the date of receipt of advance, subject to the following
conditions:

(i) KYC and due diligence exercise has been done by the bank for the overseas buyer.
(ii) Compliance with the Anti-Money Laundering Standards has been ensured.
(iii)
Export advance received by the exporter must be utilised to execute
export and not for any other purpose i.e., the transaction is a bona
fide transaction.
(iv) Progress payment, if any, must be directly received from the overseas buyer strictly in terms of the contract.
(v) Rate of interest, if any, payable on the advance payment must not exceed LIBOR + 100 basis points.
(vi) Exporter should not have refund of amount exceeding 10% of the advance payment received in the last three years.
(vii) Documents covering the shipment must be routed through the same bank.
(viii)
If the exporter is unable to make the shipment, partly or fully, he
will have to obtain prior approval of RBI before remittance towards
refund of unutilised portion of advance or towards interest payment is
made to the foreign buyer.

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Delegation of powers to Regional Directors u/s 17, 18, 19, 141 and 188 of the Companies Act, 1956

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Vide Notification Dated 30th August 2012, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs has directed that wherever fee on cases pending u/s. 17, 18, 19, 141 and 188 of the Companies Act, 1956 have already been paid by the companies/stakeholders at the time of filing of petition, consequent upon the transfer of applications/ petitions from Company Law Board to the concerned Regional Directors, which is on account of operation of law, the company/stakeholders need not pay fee for the same petitions. Further, all pending cases before CLB under these sections stand transferred to Regional Directors and objections, if any, received by CLB with respect to these petitions shall be forwarded to the concerned RDs by the Secretary, CLB in writing.

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15 A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 31 dated 17th September, 2012

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Establishment of Liaison Office (LO)/Branch Office (BO)/Project Office (PO) in India by Foreign Entities – Clarification.

This circular clarifies that foreign Non-Government Organisations/Non-Profit Organisations/Foreign Government Bodies/Departments, by whatever name called can set-up/establish offices in India (liaison/ branch/project) only after obtaining prior approval of RBI under the Approval Route.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 30 dated 12th September, 2012

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Comprehensive Guidelines on Over the Counter (OTC) Foreign Exchange Derivatives – Cost Reduction Structures

Presently, use of cost reduction structures, i.e., cross currency option cost reduction structures and foreign currency – INR option cost reduction structures, is permitted only to hedge exchange rate risk arising out of trade transactions and the External Commercial Borrowings (ECB).

This circular permits the use of cost reduction structures, additionally, for hedging the exchange rate risk arising out of foreign currency loans availed of domestically against FCNR (B) deposits.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 29 dated 12th September, 2012

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Overseas Direct Investments by Indian Party – Rationalisation

 This circular has amended the guidelines relating to submission of Annual Performance Report (APR) as under: –

An Indian party, which has set up/acquired a Joint Venture (JV) or Wholly Owned Subsidiary (WOS) overseas, will have to submit to its designated Bank every year, an Annual Performance Report (APR) in Form ODI Part III in respect of each JV or WOS outside India and other reports or documents as may be specified by the Reserve Bank from time to time, on or before the 30th of June each year.

The APR so required to be submitted, has to be based on the latest audited annual accounts/unaudited accounts, as the case maybe, of the JV/WOS, unless specifically exempted by the Reserve Bank.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 28 dated 11th September, 2012 Trade Credits for Import into India

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Presently, trade credits upto INRNaN million per import transaction with a maturity period of more than one year and less than three years (from the date of shipment) can be availed of for the import of capital goods. This circular permits companies in the infrastructure sector to avail trade credit upto five years (instead of upto three years) for import of capital goods subject to the following: –

(i) The trade credit must be initially contracted for a period not less than 15 months and must not be in the nature of short-term roll overs.

(ii) Banks cannot issue Letters of Credit/Guarantees / Letter of Undertaking (LOU)/Letter of Comfort (LPC) in favour of the overseas supplier/bank /financial institution for the period beyond three years. The all-in-cost ceiling of the trade credit, with maturity period upto five years will be 350 basis points over six months, LIBOR for the respective currency of credit or applicable benchmark. The all-in-cost ceiling will include arranger fee, upfront fee, management fee, handling/processing charges, out of pocket and legal expenses, if any.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 27 dated 11th September, 2012 External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) Policy – Bridge Finance for infrastructure sector

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Presently, Indian companies in the infrastructure sector can, under the Approval Route, import capital goods by availing of short term credit (including buyers’/suppliers’ credit) in the nature of ‘bridge finance’, subject to the following conditions:-

(i) Bridge finance must be replaced with a long term ECB.

(ii) ECB must comply with all the extant norms.

 (iii) Prior approval of RBI will have to be obtained for replacing the bridge finance with long term ECB.

This circular permits replacement of bridge finance (including buyers’/suppliers’ credit) availed of for import of capital goods with ECB under the Automatic Route subject to the following: –

 i. Buyers’/suppliers’ credit is refinanced through an ECB before the end of the maximum permissible period of trade credit.

 ii. Import of capital goods must be verified from the Bill of Entry by the Bank.

 iii. Buyers’/suppliers’ credit availed of is compliant with the extant guidelines on trade credit. iv. The goods that are imported, comply with the DGFT policy on imports. v. The proposed ECB must be compliant with all extant ECB guidelines. vi. Banks in India cannot provide any form of guarantees for the ECB. However, the borrower will still have to obtain prior approval of RBI (under Approval Route) for availing of bridge finance.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 26 dated 11th September, 2012 External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) Policy – Repayment of Rupee loans and/or fresh Rupee capital expenditure – $ 10 billion scheme

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Presently, an Indian company in the manufacturing and infrastructure sector, which has consistent foreign exchange earnings during the last three years ,can avail, under Approval Route, ECB up to 50% of the average annual export earnings realised during the past three financial years (within the overall of ECB ceiling of INRNaN billion) for repayment of Rupee loan(s) availed of from the domestic banking system and/or for fresh Rupee capital expenditure, provided the companies are not in the default list/ caution list of the Reserve Bank of India. This circular has modified the above facility as under: –

(a) An Indian company in the manufacturing and infrastructure sector, which has consistent foreign exchange earnings during the last three years can avail ECB; i. upto 75% of the average foreign exchange earnings realised during the immediate past three financial years; or ii 50% of the highest foreign exchange earnings realised in any of the immediate past three financial years, whichever is higher.

(b) A Special Purpose Vehicles (SPV), which have completed at least one year of existence from the date of incorporation and do not have sufficient track record/past performance for three financial years, can avail ECB upto 50% of the annual export earnings realised during the past financial year.

(c) The maximum ECB that can be availed of by an individual company or group, as a whole, under this scheme is INRNaN billion.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 25 dated 7th September, 2012 Overseas Investment by Indian Parties in Pakistan

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Presently, investment in Pakistan is not permitted. This circular permits Indian parties to invest in Pakistan under the Approval Route of ODI Scheme in terms Regulation 9 of Notification No. FEMA 120/ RB-2004 dated 7th July, 2004 [Foreign ExchangeManagement (Transfer or Issue of any Foreign Security).

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 21 dated 31st August, 2012 Foreign investment by Qualified Foreign Investors (QFIs) – Hedging facilities

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This circular permits Qualified Foreign Investors (QFI) to hedge their currency risk for the following: –

 i) Entire investment in equity and/or debt in India as on a particular date through foreign currency – INR options.

ii) Initial Public Offers (IPO) related transient capital flows under the Application Supported by Blocked Amount (ASBA) mechanism through Foreign Currency – INR swaps.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 20 dated 29th August, 2012

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Non-resident guarantee for non-fund based facilities entered between two resident entities.

 Presently, a non-resident can issue a guarantee to a resident lender as security for funds lent to a resident borrower. RBI has granted general permission to resident borrower to make payment to the non-resident guarantor who has met the liability under the guarantee.

This circular grants general permission to a nonresident to issue a guarantee to a resident provider of non-fund based facilities, such as Letters of Credit/ Guarantees/Letter of Undertaking/Letter of Comfort, etc., to a resident borrower. General permission has also been granted to a resident borrower to make payment to the non-resident guarantor who has met the liability under the guarantee.

Further, annexed to this circular is a format introduced by RBI for reporting, on a quarterly basis, the issue and invocation of such guarantees. This format has to reach the Chief General Manager, Foreign Exchange Department, ECB Division, Reserve Bank of India, Central Office Building, 11th floor, Fort, Mumbai – 400 001, not later than 10th day of the following month.

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Company Law Settlement Scheme, (Jammu & Kashmir) 2012

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The Ministry of Corporate Affairs has launched the Company Law Settlement Scheme for the state of Jammu & Kashmir, as the non compliance of filing Balance Sheets and Annual returns is more critical there. The scheme condones the delay in filing of documents with the Registrar, grants immunity from prosecution and charges additional fee of 25% of the actual additional fee payable for filing belated documents under the Companies Act and Rules made there under. The scheme shall remain in force from 15.08.2012 to 14.12.2012. It applies to only Companies registered in the state of Jammu and Kashmir and foreign companies falling under section 591 of the act having their liaison office in the state of Jammu and Kashmir.
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Applicability of Service Tax on commission payable to Non- Whole Time Directors of a Company u/s 309(4) of the Companies Act, 1956

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The Ministry of Corporate Affairs has decided that any increase in remuneration of Non Whole Time Director(s) of a company, solely on account of payment of Service Tax on commission payable by the Company shall not require approval of the Central Govt. u/s 309 & 310 of the Companies Act, even if it exceeds the limit of 1% or 3% of the profit u/s 309(4) of the Company, as the case may be, in the financial year 2012-13.
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Clarification on Para 46A of Notification No. GSR 914(E) dated 29.12.2011 on AS 11 relating to “ Effects of Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates”

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In view of the several representations from industry associations, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs has vide Circular No 25/2012 dated 9th August 2012, clarified that Para 6 of of AS 11 relating to “Effects of Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates” and Para 4(e) of AS 16 relating to borrowing costs, shall not apply to a company which is applying clause 46A of AS 11.
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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 16 dated 22nd August, 2012

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Foreign Direct Investment by citizen/entity incorporated in Pakistan. Press Note No.3 (2012 Series) Press Note No.3 (2012 Series) dated: 1st August, 2012.

Presently, a citizen of Pakistan or an entity incorporated in Pakistan, is not allowed to purchase shares or convertible debentures of an Indian company under Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Scheme.

This circular permits, under the Approval Route, a person who is a citizen of Pakistan or an entity incorporated in Pakistan to purchase shares and convertible debentures of an Indian company under FDI Scheme. However, the Indian company in which FDI is received must not be engaged/must not engage in sectors/activities pertaining to defense, space and atomic energy and sectors/activities prohibited for foreign investment.

RBI HAS ISSUED NEW MASTER CIRCULARS ON 2nd JULY, 2012.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 15 dated 21st August, 2012

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Overseas Direct Investments – Rationalisation of Form ODI

The circular has amended Part E & Part F of Form ODI by adding new items to the same. The amended new Form ODI is annexed to this circular.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 12 dated 31st July, 2012

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Exchange Earner’s Foreign Currency (EEFC) Account, Diamond Dollar Account (DDA) & Resident Foreign Currency (RFC) Account – Review of Guidelines.

This circular permits EEFC/DDA/RFC account holders to credit 100% of their foreign exchange earnings to the respective accounts. However, the sum total of the accruals in the account during a calendar month will have to be converted into Rupees on or before the last day of the succeeding calendar month after adjusting for utilization of the balances for approved purposes or forward commitments.

As a result, balances outstanding in the said accounts as on 31st July, 2012 together with balances accruing on and from 1st August, 2012 to 31st August, 2012, will have to be converted into Rupee balances on or before close of business on 30th September, 2012. Similar procedure will have to be followed for accruals to the respective accounts in subsequent months.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 11 dated 31st July, 2012

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Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (FEMA)- Compounding of Contraventions under FEMA, 1999.

This circular clarifies that, whenever a contravention is identified by RBI or brought to its notice the entity concerned by way of a reference other than through the prescribed application for compounding, RBI will continue to decide: –

(i) Whether a contravention is technical and/or minor in nature and, as such, can be dealt with by way of an administrative/cautionary advice;

(ii) Whether it is material and, hence, is required to be compounded, for which the necessary compounding procedure has to be followed; or

(iii) Whether the issues involved are sensitive/serious in nature and, therefore, need to be referred to the Directorate of Enforcement (DOE).

However, once a suo moto compounding application is filed, by the entity concerned, admitting the contravention, the same will not be considered as ‘technical’ or ‘minor’ in nature and the compounding process will be initiated.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 8 dated 18th July, 2012

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Exchange Earner’s Foreign Currency (EEFC) Account

This circular states that the provisions of A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 124 dated May 10, 2012 will not apply to the Resident Foreign Currency (RFC) Accounts. As a result, the RFC account holder can now retain 100% of his/her foreign exchange earnings in the said account.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 7 dated 16th July, 2012

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Scheme for Investment by Qualified Foreign Investors (QFIs) in Indian corporate debt securities.

Presently, QFI are permitted to invest only in rupee denominated units of domestic Mutual Funds and listed equity shares.

This circular has revised the definition of QFI and permitted them to also invest on repatriation basis debt securities subject to certain terms and conditions. QFI can now invest up to $ 1 billion in corporate debt securities (without any lock-in or residual maturity clause) and Mutual Fund debt schemes. This limit shall be over and above $ 20 billion for FII investment in corporate debt. For this purpose, QFI must open a single non-interest bearing Rupee Account with a bank in India for investment in all ‘eligible securities for QFI’. As per the revised definition, QFI shall mean a person who fulfills the following criteria:

(a) Resident in a country that is a member of Financial Action Task Force (FATF) or a member of a group which is a member of FATF; and
(b) Resident in a country that is a signatory to IOSCO’s MMoU (Appendix A Signatories) or a signatory of a bilateral MoU with SEBI.

PROVIDED that the person is not resident in a country listed in the public statements issued by FATF, from time to time, on jurisdictions having a strategic AML/ CFT deficiencies to which counter measures apply or that have not made sufficient progress in addressing the deficiencies or have not committed to an action plan developed with the FATF to address the deficiencies;

PROVIDED that such person is not resident in India;

PROVIDED FURTHER that such person is not registered with SEBI as a Foreign Institutional Investor (FII) or Sub-Account of an FII or Foreign Venture Capital Investor (FVCI).

Explanation – For the purposes of this clause:

(1) “Bilateral MoU with SEBI” shall mean a bilateral MoU between SEBI and the overseas regulator that, inter alia, provides for information sharing arrangements.
(2) Member of FATF shall not mean an associate member of FATF.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 5 dated 12th July, 2012

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Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 – Submission of Revised A-2 Form.

RBI has revised the purpose codes for submitting R-Returns by Banks. As a consequence of this revision, purpose codes in Form A-2 have also been revised. Annexed to this circular is the revised list of purpose codes along with Form A-2.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 1 dated 5th July, 2012

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Buyback/Prepayment of Foreign Currency Convertible Bonds (FCCBs). This circular states that RBI will permit buyback of FCCB under the approval route upto 31st March, 2013, subject to: –

a) The buyback value of the FCCB must be at a minimum discount of 5% on the accreted value.

b) In case the buyback is to be financed by foreign currency borrowing, all FEMA rules/regulations relating to foreign currency borrowing shall be complied with.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 137 dated 28th June, 2012

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Foreign Investment in India – Sector Specific conditions.

Annexed to this circular is the revised Annex A and Annex B of Schedule 1 to Notification No. FEMA 20/2000-RB dated 3rd May 2000. The revision has been made to bring uniformity in the sectoral classification position for FDI as notified under the Consolidated FDI Policy Circular 1 of 2012 dated April 10, 2012 and FEMA Regulations.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 136 dated 26th June, 2012

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External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) – Rationalisation of Form-83.

Attached to this circular is the new Form 83. This new Form 83 has to be submitted to RBI from 1st July, 2012 for obtaining Loan Registration Number (LRN).

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 135 dated 25th June, 2012

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Foreign investment in India by SEBI registered FIIs in Government securities and SEBI registered FIIs and QFIs in infrastructure debt.

This circular has increased the present limits for investment by FII and other foreign investors (Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs), Multilateral agencies, endowment funds, insurance funds, pension funds and foreign Central Banks) in Government Securities from $ 15 billion to $ 20 billion.
Conditions for investment in Infrastructure Debt Funds (IDF), within the overall limit of $ 25 billion, have been changed as under: –

  • The lock-in period for investments has been uniformly reduced to one year; and
  • The residual maturity of the instrument at the time of first purchase by an FII/eligible IDF investor must be at least fifteen months.

QFI can now invest in MF schemes that hold at least 25% of their assets (either in debt or equity or both) in the infrastructure sector, under the current $ 3 billion sub-limit for investment in mutual funds related to infrastructure.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 134 dated 25th June, 2012

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External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) – Repayment of Rupee loans.

This circular permits Indian companies in the manufacturing and infrastructure sector who have consistent foreign exchange earnings during the last three years to avail, under Approval Route, ECB for repayment of Rupee loan(s) availed of from the domestic banking system and/or for fresh Rupee capital expenditure, provided the companies are not in the default list/caution list of the Reserve Bank of India.

The overall ceiling for such ECB will be US $ 10 (ten) billion and the maximum permissible ECB that can be availed of by an individual company, based on its foreign exchange earnings and its ability to service, is limited to 50% of the average annual export earnings realized during the past three financial years. Draw down of the entire facility must be undertaken within a month after taking the Loan Registration Number (LRN) from RBI.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 133 dated 20th June, 2012

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Annual return on Foreign Liabilities and Assets Reporting by Indian Companies – Revised format.

This circular contains the new format of the annual return on Foreign Liabilities and Assets that is required to be submitted by all the Indian companies which have received FDI and/or made FDI abroad (i.e. overseas investment) in the previous year(s) including the current year. This annual return has to be submitted every year on or before 15th July, 2012, directly by Indian companies to the Director, External Liabilities and Assets Statistics Division, Department of Statistics and Information Management (DSIM), Reserve Bank of India, C-8, 3rd floor, Bandra Kurla Complex, Bandra (E), Mumbai – 400 051. The new form can be duly filled-in, validated and sent by e-mail to RBI.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 132 dated 8th June, 2012 Money Transfer Service Scheme

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Presently, a single individual beneficiary can receive for personal use upto 12 remittances not exceeding US $ 2,500 each in a calendar year.

This circular has increased the number of remittances that an individual can receive from 12 to 30. Thus, an individual can now receive for personal use upto 30 remittances each not exceeding $ 2,500 in a calendar year.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 131 dated 31st May, 2012

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Overseas Direct Investments by Indian Party – Online Reporting of Overseas Direct Investment in Form ODI.

Presently, although banks can generate the UIN online for overseas investments under the Automatic Route, reporting of subsequent remittances for overseas investments under the Automatic Route as well as the Approval Route, could be done online in Part II of Form ODI only after receipt of the letter from RBI confirming the UIN.

This circular states that, in the case of overseas investments under the Automatic Route, UIN will be communicated through an auto generated e-mail sent to the email-id made available by the Authorized Dealer/Indian Party. This auto generated e-mail giving the details of UIN allotted to the JV/WOS will be treated as confirmation of allotment of UIN, and no separate letter will be issued with effect from 1st June, 2012 by RBI either to the Indian party or to the Authorized Dealer. Subsequent remittances are to be reported online in Part II of form ODI, only after receipt of the e-mail communication/ confirmation conveying the UIN.

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AN ARBITRARY DECISION OF SEBI/SAT – overturns its own consistent interpretation and levies penalty

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A recent strange decision of SEBI, upheld by the Securities Appellate Tribunal leaves companies and others puzzled as to how at all securities laws should be interpreted and applied. Should, for example, a particular interpretation which is not only followed by SEBI, which itself confirms in writing as correct and is otherwise widely applied in practice without objection by SEBI, be overturned? And if such an interpretation which is almost certainly not harming any public interest and is well within the spirit and perhaps even the letter, should be so overturned and, moreover, a person severely penalised for it?

This is exactly what SEBI has done recently and the SAT has upheld such a decision (Order of SAT in matter of Hanumesh Realtors Private Limited v. SEBI dated 25th July 2012).

What was the issue?
The broad issue and background is explained as follows:

SEBI Takeover Regulations 1997 (“the Regulations”) require that a person who acquires substantial shares in a listed company or acquires control over it, should make an open offer to acquire shares from the public shareholders. A person already holding substantial shares can increase his holding without having to make an open offer by a small percentage only every year – normally upto 5%. This is called “creeping acquisition” in common parlance. For the purposes of the 5% limit holding not only the acquirer himself is considered but that of persons acting in concert with him is aggregated. To ensure that there is no misuse of the provisions, inter se transfer of shares amongst the persons acting in concert is allowed with certain safeguards.

In case of acquisition of shares by way of a fresh issue, a slightly peculiar situation arises on account of a calculation/mathematical issue. Take a situation where a person holds 40% of equity share capital of Rs. 10 crore. If he seeks to acquire another 5% in accordance with creeping acquisition provisions, and if he is accordingly allotted Rs. 50 lakh worth of equity shares, then his holding will increase only by 2.86% to 42.86%. The reason is that as his holding increases by Rs. 50 lakh, the equity share capital also increases by Rs. 50 lakh. Thus, his increased holding of Rs. 4.50 crore is calculated with reference to the equity share capital that has also increased to Rs. 10.50 crore. To enable him to increase his holding by 5%, he would have to be allotted equity shares of about Rs. 91 lakh, i.e., almost double.

Now, a further peculiar situation may arise when the acquirer group consists of more than one person. Unless shares are acquired by all the persons in the group in proportion of shares already held by them, there could be increase of holding of more than 5% by the acquirer and dilution of holding by those who do not acquire.

To continue the above example, let us say that the 40% or Rs. 4 crores was held by two persons – one holding Rs. 1.50 crores and another holding Rs. 2.50 crores. If shares are acquired by the person holding Rs. 1.50 crores, then his percentage holding increases from 15% to 22.09%, i.e., by 7.09%. However, the holding of the other person gets reduced by way of dilution from 25% to 22.91%. The overall holding of the two persons taken together, of course, increases to 45%, i.e., within the prescribed limits.

The question is whether the holding and the increase is to be considered individually or as a group. If it is considered individually, then the first holder may be deemed to have exceeded the limit of 5%.

Facts of the present case
The Promoter Group held 49.62% in the share capital of the Company. Further shares were allotted to a particular person in the Promoter Group. The overall holding of the Promoter Group consequent to such allotment increased from 49.62% to 54.59%, i.e., by 4.97% i.e., well within the prescribed limits. However, the individual holding of the person who was allotted shares increased from 36.62% to 42.87%, i.e., by 6.25% which is more than 5%. Needless to add, the holding of the other persons in the Promoter Group decreased by way of dilution. The question is whether such increase is to be considered on a stand alone basis or on a group basis.

SEBI had issued an interpretive letter in 2009 where SEBI had opined that if overall holding did not increase by more than 5%, there would not be any violation of the limits. To be fair, firstly, the facts in that letter were not identical to the present facts, since there was nothing on record to show that one individual’s holding increased more than 5% but was balanced by another person’s dilution of holding. However, the interpretation given was broad enough. Secondly, interpretive letters, in law, do have limited application and are even officially termed as “informal guidance”. Thus, one may not want to apply analogy of other laws such as tax laws where circulars of CBDT are given considerable weight. Still, in securities laws, a certain level of sanctity is to be given to such interpretive letters and SEBI ought to take a consistent view on the issue.

In another case, as explained in the SAT Order, SEBI even passed an adjudication order on similar principles. In that case, the holding of one acquirer increased from 0.43% to 28.22% ! In other words, he even crossed the 15% threshhold which would require an open offer to be made. However, because of non-acquisitions by other persons in the group, their holding decreased from 40.13% to 16.79%, thus the overall increase being from 40.56% to 45.01% which was within 5% limit. SEBI held that this was in consonance with law since the net increase was within 5%. Admittedly, the acquisition in that case was under the rights issue route, but the findings of SEBI were categorical enough to mean that such acquisitions through issue of new shares will be counted as a group.

However, in this particular case, SEBI took a stand and relied on a much earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Swedish Match AB’s case (Appeal No. 2361 dated 25th August 2004). In that case, there were two Promoters – an incoming foreign promoter who already held a substantial quantity of shares and the existing promoter. The incoming promoter acquired most of the remaining shares of the existing promoter and such shares were substantial in number. While deciding on the issue whether this resulted in an open offer or not, the Supreme Court analysed the provisions of Regulations 11 of the 1997 Regulations and held that the increase in holding can take place in three ways only. The acquirer may himself acquire or he may acquire through some other person or he may acquire alongwith other persons.

SEBI took a stand that this principle will have to be applied in the present case in the manner explained as follows. As soon as a person within a group acquires more than 5% shares, he will have to make an open offer even if the holding of the other person, solely on account of this mathematical peculiarity reduces and overall increase in holding remains within the limits. SEBI not only discarded its own decision and interpretation which were much later in date and consistent too, but also applied the above decision of the Supreme Court in perhaps what were different facts at least to a degree and peculiarity. SEBI levied a huge penalty of Rs. 1.87 crores on the party.

Aggrieved, the party appealed to SAT. Strangely, SAT focussed only on the decision of the Supreme Court and applying it, held that the legal position as now canvassed by SEBI was correct. It did not criticise SEBI’s stand of arbitrarily reversing its stand and then – to top it – levying severe penalty. However, SAT did reduce the penalty and while reducing it, it did take into account as part of the consideration, though not sole one, the mitigating factor being SEBI’s earlier decisions and stand. Though the penalty was reduced substantially to Rs. 10 lakhs, it is submitted that it sounds low only in comparison to the original amount. Otherwise, it still remains a substantial penalty considering, in my submission, the blameless act of the acquirer.

This decision and stand of SEBI places persons concerned with applying securities laws in a dilemma particularly since securities laws are often interpreted consistent with SEBI’s stand in practice. If SEBI takes a particular stand and also gives an interpretive circular in writing, it ought to honour it in future cases. And if it wishes to change the stand, a better view may be to give a clarification and in cases where other parties have followed the earlier stand, no action ought to have been taken. This is more so when no harm whatsoever could conceivably have been caused in the present facts.

The author has also observed in numerous other cases of acquisitions by way of issue of new shares, a similar position has existed though none of these cases were acted against. This would show that a particular practice was widely followed and the appellant had every reason to adopt it and could not be faulted particularly since no harm whatsoever could have conceivably been caused to any person.

It is also submitted that the decision of the Supreme Court could have been distinguished. That was a case of inter se transfer of shares between two distinct groups and the holding of acquirer as well as of the acquirer group both increased substantially and by more than 5%. Even the control of the company changed hands from joint control to sole control. The present case was not a case of inter se transfer of shares even if in theory one person in the group increased his holding and holding of the remaining, purely on account of dilution, decreased.

It may be mentioned that this decision is in respect of the earlier law, viz., the 1997 Regulations. Recently, the new Takeover Regulations, 2011 have been notified. Under the 2011 Regulations, it is now expressly stated that the increase in individual shareholding shall also be considered and even if the holding of the remaining shareholders in the group decreases, still, if the limits are exceeded qua a single shareholder, the open offer requirements would apply. However, it is submitted that this in fact would go to show that earlier this was not the case since otherwise, such an express provision was not required.

All in all, this represents an unhealthy trend by SEBI where persons concerned with compliance will always remain on edge as to whether SEBI would change its stand. The importance of interpretive letters – which officially of course is limited to the facts of the case and not binding interpretation of law – will further get diluted. SEBI’s stand appears almost vindictive and arbitrary, since this was a case where even if the matter was taken up for consideration, it was a fit case of not levying any penalty whatsoever while at same time laying down the law for guidance in the future for other persons. Let us hope that this decision is an exceptional decision influenced solely by the binding precedent of the Supreme Court and such arbitrary stand is not repeated in the future.

Professional ethics — It is duty of lawyer to defend, irrespective of consequences.

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[ A. S. Mohammed Raf v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors., AIR 2011 SC 308]

The Bar Association of Coimbatore passed a resolution that no member of the Coimbatore Bar will defend the accused policemen in the criminal case against them. While dealing the case the Court observed that several Bar Associations all over India, whether High Court Bar Associations or District Court Bar Associations have passed resolutions that they will not defend a particular person or persons in a particular criminal case. Sometimes there are clashes between policemen and lawyers, and the Bar Association passes a resolution that no one will defend the policemen in the criminal case in Court. Similarly, sometimes the Bar Association passes a resolution that they will not defend a person who is alleged to be a terrorist or a person accused of a brutal or heinous crime or involved in a rape case. Such resolutions are wholly illegal, against all traditions of the Bar, and against professional ethics. Every person, however, wicked, depraved, vile, degenerate, perverted, loathsome, execrable, vicious or repulsive he may be regarded by the society has a right to be defended in a court of law and correspondingly it is the duty of the lawyer to defend him. When the great revolutionary writer Thomas Paine was jailed and tried for treason in England in 1792 for writing his famous pamphlet ‘The Rights of Man’ in defence of the French Revolution, the great advocate Thomas Erskine (1750-1823) was briefed to defend him. Erskine was at that time the Attorney General for the Prince of Wales and he was warned that if he accepts the brief, he would be dismissed from the office. Undeterred, Erskine accepted the brief and was dismissed from office.

The Court observed that disturbing news was coming from several parts of the country where Bar Associations were refusing to defend certain accused persons.

Chapter II of the Rules framed by the Bar Council of India states about ‘Standards of Professional Conduct and Etiquette’, as follows :

“An advocate is bound to accept any brief in the Courts or Tribunals or before any other authorities in or before which he proposes to practise at a fee consistent with his standing at the Bar and the nature of the case. Special circumstances may justify his refusal to accept a particular brief.”

Professional ethics require that a lawyer cannot refuse a brief, provided a client is willing to pay his fee, and the lawyer is not otherwise engaged. Hence, the action of any Bar Association in passing such a resolution that none of its members will appear for a particular accused, whether on the ground that he is a policeman or on the ground that he is a suspected terrorist, rapist, mass murderer, etc. is against all norms of the Constitution, the Statute and professional ethics. It is against the great traditions of the Bar which has always stood up for defending persons accused for a crime. Such a resolution is, in fact, a disgrace to the legal community. The Court declared that all such resolutions of Bar Associations in India were null and void and the right-minded lawyers should ignore and defy such resolutions if they want democracy and rule of law to be upheld in this country. It was the duty of a lawyer to defend no matter what the consequences, and a lawyer who refuses to do so is not following the message of the Gita.

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Interpretation — Indian Succession Act, 1925.

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[ Sadaram Suryanarayana & Anr. v. Kalla Surya Kanthan & Anr., AIR 2011 SC 294] The appellants (original defendants) were are the sons of late Smt. Sadaram Appalanarasamma, while the respondents (original plaintiffs) were are her daughter and son-in-law. The property in dispute was originally owned by late Smt. Kalla Jaggayyamma, who passed away leaving behind four sons besides two daughters, named : Smt. Sadaram Appalanaras-amma and Smt. Sadaram Ramanamma. It is not in dispute that in terms of a Will dated 4th September, 1976 executed by the deceased Smt. Kalla Jaggayyamma, the property mentioned in the Will was bequeathed in favour of her two daughters mentioned above with a stipulation that the same shall after their death devolve upon their female offsprings. The case of the plaintiffs is that defendants 1 to 6 i.e., sons of late Appalanarasamma took possession of suit property comprised in the Will executed by Smt. Kalla Jaggayyamma which had devolved upon plaintiff no. 1 in her capacity as the daughter of late Appalanarasamma and the stipulation contained in the Will executed by Smt. Kalla Jaggayyamma.

The defendant (appellants in the appeal) contested the suit, inter alia, taking the plea that late Smt. Sadaram Appalanarasamma had acquired absolute title in the property under the Will executed in her favour and that in terms of a Will dated 5th January, 1981, she had bequeathed the property in question to the defendant which they were entitled to retain in possession as owners thereof.

The Trial Court held that the execution of the Will by Smt. Kalla Jaggayyamma had been proved and that according to the said Will the property would devolve absolutely upon the legatee Smt. Sadaram Appalanarasamma. The plaintiffs’ claim to the property based on the stipulation that upon the death of Sadaram Appalanarasamma the property would devolve upon her female offsprings was thus negatived. Aggrieved, the plaintiffs appealed to the High Court of Andhra Pradesh who reversed the view taken by the Trial Court and decreed the suit.

The question raised for consideration before the Apex Court was whether the testatrix Smt. Kalla Jaggayyamma, had made two bequests, one that vests the property absolutely in favour of her daughters and the other that purports to vest the very same property in their female offsprings. If so whether the two bequests can be reconciled and if they cannot be, which one ought to prevail.

The Apex Court referred to the provisions of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, Chapter VI which deals with Construction of Wills and observed that where the intention of the testatrix to make an absolute bequest in favour of her daughters in earlier part of the Will was unequivocal, use of the expression ‘after demise of my daughters the retained and remaining properties shall devolve on their females children only’ in subsequent part of Will would not strictosensu amount to a bequest contrary to the one made earlier in favour of the daughters of the testatrix. The expression extracted above does not detract from the absolute nature of the bequest in favour of the daughters. All that the testatrix intended to achieve by the latter part was the devolution upon their female offsprings all such property as remained available in the hands of the legatees at the time of their demise. There would obviously be no devolution of any such property upon the female offsprings in terms of the said clause if the legatees decided to sell or gift the property bequeathed to them as indeed they had every right to do under the terms of the bequest. Thus, there was no real conflict between the absolute bequest which the first part of the Will makes and the second part of the said clause which deals with devolution of what and if at all anything that remained in the hands of the legatees. The two parts operate in different spheres, namely, one vesting absolute title upon the legatees with rights to sell, gift, mortgage, etc. and the other regulating devolution of what may escape such sale, gift or transfer by them. The latter part is redundant by reason of the fact that the same was repugnant to the clear intention of the testatrix in making an absolute bequest in favour of her daughters. It could be redundant also because the legatees exercised their rights of absolute ownership and sale, thereby leaving nothing that could fall to the lot of the next generation females or otherwise. The stipulation made in the latter part did not in the least affect the legatees being the absolute owners of the property bequeathed to them. The corollary would be that upon their demise the estate owned by them would devolve by the ordinary law of succession on their heirs and not in terms of the Will executed by the testatrix. The appeal was allowed.

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Evidence – Admissibility of Document not duly stamped – Agreement to sell – Karnataka Stamp Act, 1957.

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[G. Raghavendra & Anr. v C. Harish & Etc. AIR 2011 Karnataka 1]

A suit was filed by one Sri Raghavendra against Sri C. Harish and three others for permanent injunction in respect of certain property.

The first respondent sought to produce as evidence an agreement to sell dated 26-5-95 and a general power of attorney dated 30-5-95. An objection was raised by the plaintiff against admitting these documents as evidence on the ground that they were not duly stamped. The trial court held that there was no possession of the immovable property delivered under the agreement to sell dated 26-5-1995 and as such it was admissible in evidence and it was also held stamp duty paid on agreement to sell was proper and sufficient. It further held that power of attorney dated 30-5-1995 is to be impounded with a direction to pay proper stamp duty and penalty as required under Article 41(ea) of the Karnataka Stamp Act, 1957.

The Hon’ble Court, while considering the admissibility of the documents as evidence, observed that difference between section 34 of the Karnataka Stamp Act and section 49 of the Registration Act would have to be borne in mind. Section 34 of the Karnataka Stamp Act mandates that no instrument chargeable with duty should be admitted in evidence for any purpose by any person having by law or by consent of parties authority to receive evidence if instrument is not duly stamped. In effect it would mean that a document which is not duly stamped cannot be admitted at all in evidence for any purpose if not duly stamped. Thus, under sec. 34 of the Stamp Act there is an absolute bar for the document being received in evidence itself.

Section 49 of the Registration Act deals with the effect of non-registration of a document and provides that if a document which requires to be registered under law is not registered, then such document shall not affect any immovable property comprised therein, nor can it confer any power to adopt or be received as evidence of any transaction affecting such property or conferring such power. However, proviso to Section 49 provides that an unregistered instrument may be received as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific performance or as evidence as part performance of a contract for the purpose of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act or as evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by a registered instrument. The only area of controversy in regard to the use of such documents lies in determining whether the purpose for which it is sought to be used is really a collateral purpose.

Even when a document is inadmissible for want of registration, the same is admissible to show the character of the possession of the person in whose favour it is executed. There is therefore no gainsaid that the unregistered sale deed relied upon by the petitioner could for the limited purpose of proving the nature of his possession be let into evidence notwithstanding the fact that the deed was compulsorily registrable u/s. 17, but had not been so registered. So long as an instrument is chargeable with duty, the provisions of section 34 would render it inadmissible in evidence for any purpose unless the same is duly stamped. It can be seen that the under the agreement in question the vendor has agreed to handover vacant possession of the property agreed to be sold therein even before the execution of the sale deed in favour of the purchasers. Hence, the agreement to sell dated 26-5-1995 is admissible in evidence, only after payment of appropriate stamp duty as required under Article 15(e)(i) of the Karnataka Stamp Act 1957.

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Compensation — Gratuitous passenger — Liability of insurer — Motor Vehicles Act.

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[ National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Bimala Dy & Ors., AIR 2011 (NOC) 2 (Gau.)]

The deceased was travelling in a goods carriage vehicle as a gratuitous passenger. The risk of such gratuitous passenger was not covered by policy. In such a case insurer cannot be made liable to pay compensation.

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Compensation — Bona fide passenger — Railway Act.

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[ Mummidi Durga & Ors. v. UOI, AIR 2011 (NOC) 1 (AP)]

The deceased while travelling in a passenger train fell from the train and died when the train was in motion. Evidence of witness and investigating officer clearly established that the deceased had boarded the train in question. The deceased was a bona fide passenger when he slipped from the train. It was quite natural that no part of his luggage would be with him when he slipped from the train. Factum of the deceased being a bona fide passenger cannot be doubted on the ground that no luggage was found on his dead body. The railway authority would be liable to pay compensation.

The claimants were held entitled to interest at 6% per annum on compensation awarded from the date of presentation of the claim petition till the date of award and thereafter at 9% per annum till the date of realisation.

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IS IT FAIR TO ISSUE CERTIFICATES U/S. 197 WITH UNNECESSARY CONDITIONS?

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Introduction

There are many non-resident Indians having long term capital assets, particularly residential house properties in India. After the sale of such assets, many of them further propose to reinvest requisite amounts either in house property or in eligible bonds to avail benefits of section 54/54EC/54F of the Income tax Act, 1961 (‘the Act’) . Since it is a transaction with a nonresident, the issue of withholding tax arises. Ideally, since the assessee seller is going to reinvest in eligible assets u/s 54/54EC/54F, no tax should arise. However, the buyer (being the payer of the sale consideration) would be under an obligation to deduct tax for payment being made to a non resident in terms of section 195 of the Act.

In such cases, most of the non-residents opt to apply under section 197 for NIL/lower deduction certificates. An affidavit that requisite amounts would be invested in eligible assets u/s 54/54EC/54F is also submitted alongwith other documents (like sale deed, proof of being a non-resident, computation of capital gains etc.). On the basis of the same, it can be fairly decided that the buyer need not deduct any tax or deduct tax at lower rate. It has been observed that it is a normal practice within the Department to issue such certificate but with a direction to the buyer to issue a cheque of requisite amount directly in favour of REC/NHAI Bonds or Capital Gains Account Scheme (‘CGAS’).

The unfairness:

 The facility of obtaining NIL/lower deduction certificates in case of non-residents is to make matters easier for them and not to subject them to unnecessary conditions. Such directions frustrate the very purpose of applying for NIL withholding certificate. C.N.Vaze Chartered Accountant is it fair? The fact that the assessee is submitting an affidavit should be sufficient proof that he wishes to comply with the necessary provisions.

Further, where it is proposed to reinvest in house property, the direction of issuing cheques directly in favour of CGAS account is not fair as the assessee has got time upto due date of filing return of income and may like to deposit his funds in fixed deposit for the time being, to reap the benefit of higher interest rates. In an extreme illustration, sale may be effected in the month of April so that the seller has an option of making investment within six months (for section 54EC of the Act) and upto 30th September of the following year (for CGAS Scheme) as the case may be. This option is unduly curtailed by such conditions.

In many of the cases, it may really put the assessee (i.e. the non-resident seller) and the buyer in a dilemma where part payment is to be made by the bank (being housing loan obtained by the buyer) directly to the seller and part payment is made by the buyer himself. Further, it may also give rise to serious practical problems if the payment is deferred/ made in instalments. At the most, the assessee may be directed to submit the proof of such investment before the due date of filing return. Needless to state that since all documentary evidences are on record, the tax department always has power and access to catch hold of the concerned persons, if they commit any default.

Conclusion:

Such direct instruction to the buyer to issue a cheque of requisite amount directly in favour of REC/NHAI Bonds or CGAS Account would be encroaching upon assessee’s right to plan his investments. This also brings us to the question as to whether the assessing officer has the power to issue such directions to the payer.

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Transfer of property – Deed of dissolution of partnership – Receipt of assets of firm on dissolution would not construe transfer – Conveyance: Section 2(10) Stamp Act 1899:

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[Balbir Singh vs. State of U.P. and Ors. AIR 2012 Allahabad 113]

A partnership firm in the name and style of M/s Guru Govind Singh Rice Mills was constituted on 25.3.1975 consisting of petitioner and six others partners. The said partnership stood dissolved on 29.10.1984. A fresh partnership deed was executed by the petitioner with one of his ex-partners and three other partners of the dissolved firm in the name and style of M/s UP National & General Rice Mills.

One of the partners died, as a consequence of which the firm was dissolved. In this behalf, a deed of dissolution was executed between the petitioner and four partners and legal heirs of the deceased person. Two partners received a sum of Rs.1.80 and Rs.1 lakh respectively towards their share in the capital of the dissolved firm. The other two partners namely Balbir Singh and Rajesh Kumar received their shares in the shape of assets i.e. land, building, plant, machinery. After dissolution of the firm, petitioners and other partners, Rajesh Kumar entered into a fresh partnership in the name and style of the earlier dissolved firm namely UP National & General Rice Mills, which is in existence.

Report of the Deputy Registrar (Stamp) suggested that there was shortage of levy of stamp of 84,990/- and shortage in the registration fee amounting to Rs. 14,660/-. Notice was issued by Addl. Collector. A detailed reply was filed by the petitioner indicating that there was no transfer of movable or immovable property while effecting the dissolution of the firm. It was purely a share received by the petitioner upon the dissolution of the partnership and as such did not constitute ‘Conveyance’ as defined u/s 2(10) of the Indian Stamp Act. The plea of the petitioner was rejected by the Addl. Commissioner, Stamp. The appeal was also dismissed.

On further appeal, the High Court observed that in order to attract provision of explanation to section 2(10) of Stamp Act, an essential feature is that a person who is transferring his right in the property, should have a definite and assigned share in the property before its transfer to other partners. There is no assigned or definite share of the partners in the movable or immovable assets and assigning of shares on dissolution is done on the basis of the shares which the partners hold in the firm. By no stretch of imagination, does it fall within the explanation of section 2(10) of the Stamp Act.

Receipt of the assets of the firm on dissolution would not be construed as conveyance as contemplated u/s 2(10) of the Stamp Act, as the error in construing the same as conveyance/transfer is based upon the premise of treating the status of member of the partnership firm with that of a person holding joint property with definite shares. The finding that on account of dissolution of firm the assets which are distributed by the partners amongst themselves or in favour of some person who has retired from the partnership would constitute the transfer as defined in the Transfer of Property Act, is wrong.

Where the immovable properties had been allotted in the deed of dissolution to the releasees and therefore, the consequential deed of release was only based on the dissolution and in such circumstances, the document could never be treated as a conveyance. The immovable properties had been allotted in the deed of dissolution to the partners. The deed of release was only a sort of acknowledgement of the title of the partners to the immovable properties which was conferred on them by the deed of dissolution. It could not, by any stretch of imagination, be treated as a conveyance of the properties, because the releasors had no right to the properties at the time of the release. In that view, the document could not be treated as a conveyance and stamp duty cannot be demanded on that basis.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 41 dated October 10, 2012

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Foreign investment in NBFC Sector – Amendment to the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Scheme.
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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 40 dated 9th October, 2012

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External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) Policy – Review of all-in-cost ceiling.

This circular states that the below mentioned all-incost ceiling for ECB will continue till further notice: –

 Sr. No.

  Average Maturity Period

 All-in-cost over 6 month LIBOR for the respective currency of borrowing or applicable benchmark

 1.

  Three years and up to
five years

 350 bps

 2.

 More than five years

  500 bps

Doctrine of Merger: Dismissal of Appeal on ground of limitation – No Merger of order – Central Excise Act:

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Raja Mechanical Co. P. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise Delhi -1, (2012) 51 VST 447 SC

The assessee, a manufacturer of excisable goods, purchased for its manufacturing activity certain capital goods and availed of MODVAT credit by filing a declaration before the adjudicating authority along with an application for condonation of delay. Rejecting the claim, the adjudicating authority directed the assessee to pay the excise duty credit of which it had availed of. The first appellate authority dismissed the appeal filed by the assessee on the ground of delay which he could not condone. The Tribunal, on appeal, confirmed the order passed by the first appellate authority. Thereafter, the assessee filed an application for rectification before the Tribunal on the ground that the Tribunal ought to have considered the assessee’s appeal not only on the ground of limitation, but also on the merits of the case. The Tribunal rejected the application. The reference application filed by the assessee to direct the Tribunal to state case and the question of law, was dismissed by the High Court. On further appeal, the assessee contended that though the first appellate authority had rejected the appeal filed by the assessee on the ground of limitation, the orders passed by the original authority would merge with the orders passed by the first appellate authority and, therefore, the Tribunal ought to have considered the appeal filed by the assessee not only on the ground of limitation but also on the merits of the case.

The Court observed that if for any reason an appeal is dismissed on the ground of limitation and not on merits, that order would not merge with the order passed by the first appellate authority.

Accordingly, it was held in the appeal, that the high court was justified in rejecting the request made by the assessee for directing the revenue to state the case and also the question of law for its consideration and decision. Appeal was accordingly dismissed.

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Stamp Duty – Sale deed or release deed – Release of share in property by co-owner for consideration, is not sale: Stamp Act Art 47A:

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G. Dayanand S/o Late Venkaiah vs. District Registrar, Hyderabad & Anr AIR 2012 AP 129

The mother of the petitioner owned property, with cellar, ground and first floors, constructed over 513 sq. yards. It is stated that after the death of the mother, the petitioner himself and his two brothers – G. Subhash and G. Satyanarayana, succeeded to it. The two brothers of the petitioner also died and the property was owned jointly by the petitioner and the legal representatives of his brothers. The widow of one of his brothers, by name G. Rajasree, released 1/3rd share, in the property, and she was paid Rs. 20 lakhs. Accordingly, a release deed was executed by the said Rajasree, in favour of the petitioner. The document was presented before the Sub-Registrar, the respondent, for registration. Stamp duty of 1% was paid. The respondent, however, took the view that 3% of stamp duty was payable. Accordingly, he kept the document pending for registration. He issued a notice requiring the petitioner to pay the deficit stamp duty of Rs. 3,25,678/- treating the document as a sale deed. Through a final order dated 07-07-2009, the respondent took the view that the stamp duty was payable, as provided for under Article 47-A of Schedule 1-A to the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. The petitioner challenged the said order.

The case of the Petitioner was that the transaction that had taken place through the document in question was one of release of the joint ownership of one co-owner in favour of another co-owner, and that no element of sale was involved. He contended that mere payment of consideration for such release, does not amount to sale.

The Hon’ble Court observed the distinction between the transactions of ‘sale’ and ‘release’. It is too well-known that ‘sale’ as defined under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, takes place, when a person holding title in an item of immovable property, conveys his title to another, for consideration. It is also permissible for a co-owner of an immovable property, to transfer the same for consideration in favour of third party. In such a case also, the transaction would be one of sale. Delivery of the possession of tangible property, is an essential part of the transaction.

The word ‘release’ is not defined either under the Transfer of Property Act or under any other enactment, including the Stamp Act. However, its connotation is that, one of the owners of an item of property, releases himself of the legal rights and obligations in favour of the rest of the co-owners, or some of them, such release can be with or without any consideration. Though a sale and release resemble each other in the context of loss of title of the transferor or rights in favour of others, what differentiates the one for the other is that, the transferee under a sale is an altogether stranger, whereas in the case of release, he happens to be an existing co-owner. It would be a fresh and new acquisition of property by a purchaser under a sale, whereas in the case of release, it would only result in the change of the extent of shares, held by the co-owners or joint owners.

Another aspect is that delivery of possession, which is sine qua non in a sale, does not take place in the case of release, since each co-owner is in possession of every bit of the entire property.

To a large extent, release resembles a partition, wherein the shares of the existing co-owners or joint owners are determined with an element of clarity, notwithstanding the fact that the release by itself may not bring about partition. If one takes into account the fact that one of the steps in the partition is determination of the shares of respective parties, an act of release would promote such a step.

Thus, even if the release of the share in a property by a co-owner is for a consideration, its character does not change. Similarly, it is not necessary that the release must be in favour of the rest of the co-owners. As long as the undivided share in a property is not in favour of a stranger, but is in favour of another co-owner, transaction would remain one of “release’ and not a ‘sale’.

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Precedent – Judicial discipline – Co-ordinate Bench Decision – Not to take a contrary view but to refer matter to larger bench.

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U.P. Power Corporation Ltd vs. Rajesh Kumar & Ors AIR 2012 SC 2728

In an SLP, the petitioner primarily urged that during the course of the hearing before the Division Bench at Lucknow, it was brought to their notice of the judgement passed by the co-ordinate Division Bench at Allahabad in similar matter and was urged that the same was a binding precedent. But, the Bench hearing the writ petition declared the said decision as not binding and per incuriam as it had not correctly interpreted, appreciated and applied the ratio laid down in M. Nagraj AIR 2007 SC 71.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the division bench at Lucknow had erroneously treated the verdict of Allahabad bench not to be a binding precedent on the foundation that the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench in M. Nagraj (AIR 2007 SC 71:) are not being appositely appreciated and correctly applied by the bench. When there was a reference to the said decision and a number of passages were quoted and appreciated albeit incorrectly, the same could not have been a ground to treat the decision as per incuriam or not a binding precedent. Judicial discipline commands in such a situation when there is disagreement to refer the matter to a larger bench. Instead of doing that, the division bench at Lucknow took the burden on themselves to decide the case.

The Hon’ble Court observed that, when Judges are confronted with the decision of a co-ordinate bench on the same issue, any contrary attitude, however adventurous and glorious may be, would lead to uncertainty and inconsistency. There are two decisions by two Division Benches from the same High Court. The Court expressed their concern about the deviation from the judicial decorum and discipline by both the benches and expected that in future, they shall be appositely guided by the conceptual eventuality of such discipline as laid down by the Apex Court from time to time. It also observed that judicial enthusiasm should not obliterate the profound responsibility that was expected from the Judges.

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ELECTION – What’s In it for ME?

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As I pen this article, the Election process for the ICAI elections is well under way. The final list of candidates has been declared, the Code of Conduct for candidates is now effective. The candidates for the Central Council and the five Regional Councils are ramping up their campaigns, planning and emailing their manifestos, reaching out to voters and often traversing the length and breadth of their sizable constituencies. The SMS’s and emails have just begun. We are yet far from the frenzy, that will engulf the entire profession in a months’ time. And already the first murmurs of irritation are being heard.

  •  Why can’t the elections be done in a more dignified manner?
  •  Why must my privacy be invaded by umpteen messages?
  •  Can the ICAI not impose a ban on e-mails – in fact I have avoided giving my e-mail even to the Institute – the only thing I get from ICAI is this onslaught of e-mails.

Strikes a chord? Echoes your feelings? I am sure it does, for I believe 80% of our voters feel that way. Question is – are they right? Who is responsible for this, the Institute, the Council, the Candidates or the members themselves.

Admittedly, the aggressive manner of campaigning has invaded our homes, our work places, our e-mail inboxes and our mobile phones. It is equally true that a far more dignified approach is desirable, and really is expected in an election to a professional body. But we need to ponder – why has such a situation come about. I would believe that the need for such “carpet bombing” has arisen mainly because voters largely ignore the contents, the merits and demerits of information about candidates provided by the Institute. A belief, therefore, is created that since most messages are not read, if you send the message more often, the probability of it being read once improves. Hence, it is voter’s neglect that causes this response which, in fact, creates a widening of the chasm between candidates and voters.

“Whether it is ‘X’ or ‘Y’ – it really does not affect “me” or concern “me”. All I want is that the Institute should be managed well. Let those who are more aware or involved choose. [in any case I do not know most of these candidates).” That is the mindset of a large number (nearing 50%) of the voters – who do not vote. One can only remind them that “Bad Council members are elected by good, well intentioned members who do not vote1 ”.

Those who do vote realise that the way the Institute is managed has a more direct bearing on their livelihood and careers. Such voters (largely members in practice in professional firms) realise that the way the ICAI represents views of our members to the Government and regulatory authorities can make a difference to the future role of CA’s in audit. For e.g. can we have service tax audits, can CA’s be recognised abroad to facilitate better job opportunities etc. Hence, they recognise their self-interest in voting and this is not per se something negative or selfish.

Rather, it is a cornerstone of the democratic system which enables the will of the majority to prevail. The difficulty is that “self–interest”, can be viewed with a broader or narrower vision. Surely, it is in our collective interest to have a Council of persons who are capable of framing policies that will serve the interest of the profession in the long run. Last month’s editorial hit the nail on the head in saying that “I put the two – National interest and the professional interest together.” But that is a more statesman like view – unfortunately not the vision of the vast number of voters.

The “self-interest” is more often judged on more mundane criteria – which often come to the fore such as:

Whether candidate X or Y candidate

  •  Favours relaxation or less strict application of CPE norms;
  •  Is more likely to ensure that more bank audits are allotted and/or audit fees are hiked;
  •  Supports increase of articleship vacancies in big firms (my son/daughter is to do CA next year);
  •  Supports establishment of a branch in my town. I could then become office bearer – in my own town.

The list is long and subjective. Unfortunately, most of these issues are of personal interest and do not qualify as being in the “interest of the Profession”. But because they have a bearing on “what’s the benefit for me – if X rather than Y is elected”, such personal issues play a bigger role in deciding the voting preferences than interest of the profession.

But to the average member, even this poses a significant problem of choice. If one takes the trouble to go through the manifestos or brochures, most candidates seemingly have similar objectives and agendas. This happens, since most persons contesting an election do not really have a specific position on the most vexatious issues facing the profession such as rotation of auditors, authority of the council to call for data from members and take action against defaulters, a roadmap for implementation of Ind-AS, etc. Though none of the candidates really take a position on issues that matter, yet it is imperative to be seen as a person who has a stand on certain issues. It is best to address the more general and non-specific issues such as improvements in administration, governance matters, transparency and so on. This adequately serves the purpose of highlighting to the voters that the candidate has “some considered views.” While these issues steer clear of controversies, the approach identifies the candidate with the voter group from where he seeks maximum support. You will thus see that amongst the issues raised, some candidates would take pains to clearly identify themselves with the more populist issues that would appeal to the small and medium practitioners. Others, looking for more support from larger but traditional firms, would project the same issues with a slight shift in the emphasis to cater to their identified constituency, while those seeking endorsement from the largest firms would bring out the aspects that would further the interests of the highly organised and better remunerated segments of the profession – for example – the need to align with global best practices, ” raising” standards of professionalism and performance etc. While this may enable the candidate to cater to popular sentiment of his specific constituency, it leaves unresolved the problem for an informed voter of how to identify which candidate best meets his “personal interests”. At best, out of a list of say 20 candidates from whom he has to choose, the voter can negatively identify some candidates whom he clearly does not wish to go with – not because the candidate is not good – but that the positions taken by that candidate may not suit “his interest”. So the choice is usually narrowed from 20 to 15 which in real terms is not very helpful.

Assuming that we are dealing with an “informed and enlightened voter”, who has taken the trouble to read the broad positions taken by the candidates, he is still unable to make the real choice on the basis of what is truly in the interest of the profession or even his own interest. In the absence of any other criteria for selecting the right candidate, voters then turn to simpler criteria which can be identified without much effort. These are the criteria which are applied in practice. Some of which are given below by way of illustration.

a)    Whether the candidate belongs to my community:- While cultural affinity undoubtedly gives a certain comfort level; the fact that a particular candidate belongs to the same community, residential area, religion, etc. have no relevance to the manner he would perform as a Council Member and fails to recognise the candidate’s individual abilities or track record. The effort required on the part of the voter is minimal because, usually the name of the candidate gives a clear indication of the community to which he belongs. Success in a professional election can be determined largely by this factor.

b)    Has the candidate phoned or met me?
This criteria is simple to apply because not more than 8 to 10 candidates may be able to speak to the voter in person. It thus requires less mental effort to make a selection as the choices automatically narrow down. This approach is more prevalent amongst seniors and is a throwback to elections 30 years ago, when it was possible and often expected that the candidate would have some personal interaction with the voter. Given the increase in membership, this expectation is rendered impractical. However, such approach survives because it also embeds within it an element of ego on the part of the voter that “I and my vote are important – and the candidate must demonstrate this by making every effort to contact me.”

c)    Bosses directions – Often cited (to my amazement) is that “my boss has instructed everybody in office to vote for Candidate M”. One can understand if a member comes to a conclusion that the candidate M is best suited to represent the interest of the firm, or the class of firms or industry in which the voter is employed or engaged in. To a lesser extent, one could even appreciate that if a senior whose opinion you respect recommends a particular candidate very highly, the voter can be significantly influenced. But to vote in favour of a particular candidate M – merely on instructions throws all notions of “independent choice” for a toss. The voter does not know what the candidate stands for, his competence or abilities but is more concerned about the consequences “if my boss finds out – that I did not vote for candidate M.”

Numerous examples of such superficial, extraneous and inappropriate criteria can be given. All this is happening because, most of the members (or the silent majority) are well-intentioned persons who feel that this entire election process is extraneous to him, as he does not have an answer to the question that bothers him – “what’s in it for me?”

The members are not indifferent, not negative but are simply exercising what economic theory refers to as “Rational Ignorance”. The use of the word “ignorance” may sound harsh – but this is a phrase used in the economic and political theory. The phrase was coined by Mr. Anthony Downs in his seminal work “An Economic Theory of Democracy” where it is mentioned that – Rational ignorance occurs when the cost of educating oneself on an issue exceeds the potential benefit that the knowledge would provide2. In the context of ICAI elections, one can understand “rational ignorance” to mean that the perception of the voter is that going through the various e-mails, brochures or taking an active interest in the election process and ranking of candidates has very little outcome on the ultimate choice of who gets elected or on what policies are adopted for the ICAI. If this is understood by the member in an absolute context, that his choices make no difference whatsoever, the members show no commitment or inclination to even go and cast their votes. In economic terms, there is no “payback”, for the time likely to be spent in evalu-ation of candidates and in voting.

Since these members do not vote, and therefore do not affect the outcome of the election, one needs to see the factors that influence those members who do vote. Members who do vote, generally appreciate that at least in the narrow realm of their direct concerns (such as CPE, Bank Audit, SMP issues as mentioned earlier), electing a person who will further these interests is beneficial. However, they are also of the view that their own impact on the ultimate outcome is marginal and that the management of affairs of the Institute would most likely continue in the same direction so long as the few persons who are on the negative list are not elected. Therefore, such voters, generally, recognise their interest, but also exercise the logical choice of “rational ignorance”, in the belief that disruption of their personal/professional time, going through numerous brochures, manifestos, e-mails and SMS’s is not relevant, as it does not further the objective of making a rational choice amongst candidates. It is, therefore, much easier to adopt the very elementary criteria (community, firm, recommendation etc.) rather than exercising vigilance and due care in choice of specific candidates. That this approach is not driven by indifference but by “rational ignorance”, can be very easily established. Experienced candidates will confirm that persons going for voting, often go with a clear decision (based on the elementary criteria) about their Central Council preferences. But even when they reach the polling booth, they may be unaware of the candidates contesting the Regional Council. This will show that such voters are aware that although their overall impact on the election results may be minimal, getting a suitable person who will further their interests (such as bank audits and Big firm vs SMP issues) at the policy-making level i.e. Central Council is necessary and “is in his interest”. The Regional Council election will have virtually no direct impact on their personal issues ,and therefore the degree of “rational ignorance”, in regard to the regional Council elections is higher.

It would appear from the above, that the voter behaviour does not arise out of apathy or indifference, but is the logical preference for “rational ignorance”. If this is so, well-meaning professionals, professional organisations like the BCAS and the ICAI itself, would appear to be wrong in their attempt to create greater involvement and participation in the election process. But such a conclusion would be incorrect, because there is a fallacy in the above reasoning. The voters exercising “rational ignorance” do so in the mistaken belief that the impact on their own interest is marginal and that irrespective of who is elected, the affairs of the Institute would be guided by the best interests of the majority of members. But in reality, this is not so, as explained in another economic theory – the Public Choice Theory3 . A study of this well accepted political and economic theory would show (and I have learnt from experience) that the fundamental assumption that the Institute would continue to work in the interests of the majority of members is incorrect. If the large mass of voters opt for “rational ignorance”, or abstain from voting, then the policies adopted would be influenced by the lobby or group that is more organised, and therefore, more influential. Would the policies be more influenced by members in the SMP segment (who constitute more than 80% of the membership), or is it the larger firms which would wield greater influence. The public choice theory clearly lays down that, whichever group is able to exercise influence in an organised manner will drive the policy in the direction favoured by such a lobby or group. It is for us to test whether this theory is simply an academic issue or something that really works at the ground level. I would leave it for readers to judge by evaluating the policies of the ICAI in the recent past. By way of an example, I may only draw attention to the composition and policies of Professional Accountancy Councils in Europe and USA (which are broadly similar to the ICAI Council). You will probably recognise the public choice theory in application in those circumstances, if you consider the composition of those councils and the policies framed by them. In almost all these countries, their policy formulation is overwhelmingly dominated by large firms who have a disproportionately higher representation as compared to the SMPs in those countries. This is apparently because though the SMPs even in those countries are larger in number; they seem to be less organised in terms of electoral groupings. This would indicate that the public choice theory does apply even to professional bodies and I see no reason why ICAI can be an exception to the theory.

If members consider the above points, it would be clear to each one of them that exercising “rational ignorance”, in such circumstances, may not be the appropriate choice because there is a lot at stake for each member. This is even more so for the members in the 25 to 55 age group (who incidentally constitute a large chunk of the electorate). These members will be significantly impacted by these policy decisions – irrespective of whether they are in practice or in employment. Where this profession and its members will be two decades from now could well be decided by certain approaches and policies chosen today. These issues could have significant impact on the nature and size of practice, on the entry and training requirements of our students and the way Indian professionals will perform in the global economy. Issues such as the road map for adoption of Ind AS, role of ICAI as a regulator, requires an informed debate which is usually not possible in the din of elections. But, it will be our elected representatives who will lay down the milestones for policy in this regard.

If all these facts are considered, it will be apparent that there is a lot at stake for every member who is conscious of the larger picture. In order to effectively shape and influence ICAI policy in the medium and long-term, it is imperative for every voter to see what is in it for us rather than for me (as a selfish, narrower horizon). Further, when the voter considers us, he has to recognise that it is not merely a big firm vs SMP issue. The us can refer to various interest groups within the profession which may have certain common objectives or interests. For example, recently certain interest groups have very actively sought to use the Internet to activate a common platform in regard to allotment of bank branch audit and influence the approach of members across the country to voting for candidates based on their response to this issue. This is a pressure group or lobby that fits perfectly in the parameters of the public choice theory. I personally believe that this is not in the larger interests of the profession- i.e. it is not in the interest of the majority of members to approach matters in this manner. However, the public choice theory indicates, that such a group (or any other organised interest group) may be able to drive a policy away from the larger interests of the profession and in the direction preferred by such a group. If the common member feels that the actions of a certain organised group are not in his interest and/ or in the interest of the profession, his only response in the democratic process – is to make his view known – through his vote. So if the member has a view in regard to the ICAI, its affairs, its policies and its future – it is not enough to vote on the basis of simplistic and superficial criteria adopted, consequent to opting for ‘rational ignorance’ approach. If the members really want to influence the way the Institute deals with the future challenges (our future as professionals), you must realise and accept that pro-active, logical voting is in your and our own interest. There is everything at stake for us. You need to make your vote count if you are concerned with OUR future – that’s the “pay off” for each individual who votes – there is everything in it for you.

FDI Framework: Whither are we Bound?

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Introduction
India received Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) worth US $ 176 billion during the 12-year period of April 2000 to July 2012. This highlights the importance of FDI to the Indian economy. FDI is a much preferred form of foreign investment as compared to other forms, such as, Portfolio Investment, Foreign Institutional Investment, etc. This is because, the FDI flows are considered to be relatively more long-term in nature. One peculiar nature of the FDI Framework in India is that it is governed by multiple laws/policies/regulations and it has more than one Ministry/ Regulator/ Agency to deal with. Often one finds that a stance taken by one Agency in relation to FDI, has not yet been endorsed by another or is exactly opposite to the stance of the other. Such a scenario, creates unnecessary confusion and pollutes the investment climate. The story of India’s FDI Framework is complex and compelling, and through this Article, I hope to highlight some of these qualities.

Regulations & Agencies
The FDI Framework in India stands on a threelegged tripod consisting of three Regulations ~ the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 along with its Regulations, the Consolidated FDI Policy, and the Circulars to Authorised Person issued from time to time by the Reserve Bank of India.

Interestingly, just as there are three Regulations, there are also three Agencies/Ministries/Regulators which are involved in the FDI Regime – the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP), Ministry of Commerce & Industry and the Foreign Investment Promotion Board (FIPB), Ministry of Finance. Each of these three agencies has an important role to play.

FEMA and RBI
The Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (FEMA) is a Central Statute of the Parliament and is the supreme Act, when it comes to regulating all foreign transactions in India, including those pertaining to FDI. The FEMA also consists of Regulations issued by the RBI from time to time. The relevant Regulations for FDI are the Foreign Exchange Management (Transfer or Issue of Security by Persons Resident Outside India) Regulations, 2000 (Notification No. FEMA 20/2000-RB dated May 3, 2000). U/s. 46 of the FEMA, the RBI has power to make Rules to carry out the provisions of the Act. Further, u/s. 47, it has the powers to make Regulations to carry out the provisions of the Act and the Rules.

The RBI is the nodal regulatory authority for all matters connected with foreign exchange transactions in India. It is the authority which has powers to launch prosecution, levy penalties, allow compounding of offences, etc., as well as the agency which lays down rules for valuation, reporting requirements, etc.

One feature of the FEMA Regulations is the Directions issued by the RBI u/s. 10(4) and 11(1) of the FEMA to various Authorised Persons, popularly known as “A.P.(DIR Series) Circulars”. Authorised Persons are Authorised Dealers, Money Changers, Banks, etc., who are authorised by the RBI to deal in foreign exchange. Thus, these Circulars are operational instructions from the RBI to Banks, etc. The legal validity of these Circulars has been upheld by the Bombay High Court in the case of Prof. Krishnaraj Goswami v. the RBI, 2007 (6) Bom CR 565. The Court held as follows:

“………the Reserve Bank of India issued the impugned circular by way of directions as contemplated under Sections 10(4) and 11(1) of the Act. A bare reading of these provisions clearly show that the Reserve Bank of India has the power to issue directions to the authorised persons and this power is wide enough to cover any kind of directions so far it provide for the regulation of the Foreign Exchange management. We are unable to find any merit in the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner that the Reserve Bank of India has no jurisdiction to issue such circulars. Section 10(4) of the Act clearly stipulates that an authorised person shall, as contemplated under Section 10(1) of the Act, in all his dealings is bound by the directions, general or special, issued by the Reserve Bank of India. Similarly, Section 11(1) of the Act provides that the Reserve Bank of India may, for the purpose of securing compliance with the provisions of the Act and of any Rules, Regulations and directions made under the provisions of the Act, give to the authorised persons any direction in regard to making of payment or the doing or desist from doing of any act relating to foreign exchange or foreign security….”

Once a year on 1st July of every year and occasionally, on a half-yearly basis, the RBI issues a Master Circular which consolidates all the existing Circulars at one place. Master Circulars are issued with a sunset clause of one year. Master Circulars were introduced in accordance with the recommendations of the Tarapore Committee. This Committee recommended that every year, the RBI should consolidate all the instructions and Regulations on each subject into a Master Circular for use by the public. It also recommended that the Master Circulars should be prepared in an unambiguous language without using jargons.

Whilst the FEMA, the Rules and the Regulations have legal force, the Circulars and Master Circulars are only directions.

CFIP and DIPP
The DIPP frames the Foreign Direct Investment Policy in India which lays down the sectors in which FDI is allowed, the conditions attached and the sectoral caps. It also lays down the sectors in which FDI is Automatic and those in which it requires Approval of the Government of India. The FDI Policy is prepared in the form of the Consolidated FDI Policy (“CFDIP”). The Policy defines FDI to mean investment by non-resident entities in the capital of an Indian company under Schedule 1 of FEMA No. 20/2000-RB dated 3rd May, 2000.

Earlier, the DIPP used to issue Press Notes from time to time, which used to lay down the FDI Policy and changes made to the same. Since the past two years, it has started the practice of preparing a Consolidated FDI Policy which subsumes all Press Notes/Press Releases/ Circulars issued by DIPP till date. In the first two years, the DIPP came out with a Consolidated FDI Policy twice a year, i.e., on a half-yearly basis – in April and in October. However, it has now clarified that henceforth, it would be an annual event. Thus, the next CFDIP would be in April 2013.

The power of the Government to lay down economic policy has been the subject-matter of great judicial interest. In Balco Employees Union v UOI, (2002) 2 SCC 333, the Supreme Court laid down the prerogative of the Government to frame the economic policy:

“……The Courts have consistently refrained from interfering with economic decisions as it has been recognised that economic expediencies lack adjudicative disposition and unless the economic decision, based on economic expediencies, is demonstrated to be so violative of constitutional or legal limits on power or so abhorrent to reason, that the Courts would decline to interfere. In matters relating to economic issues, the Government has, while taking a decision, right to “trial and error” as long as both trial and error are bona fide and within limits of authority. ….”

Again in Federation of Railway Officers Association v. UOI (2003) 4 SCC 289, the Apex Court laid down the following principle:


“……In examining a question of this nature where a policy is evolved by the Government judicial review thereof is limited. When policy according to which or the purpose for which discretion is to be exercised is clearly expressed in the statute, it cannot be said to be an unrestricted discretion. On matters affecting policy and requiring technical expertise Court would leave the matter for decision of those who are qualified to address the issues. Unless the policy or action is inconsistent with the Constitution and the laws or arbitrary or irrational or abuse of the power, the Court will not interfere with such matters.”

The validity of the FDI Policy laid down by the Government, has come in for review by the Courts. In the decision of Radio House v UOI, 2008 (2) Kar. LJ 695 (Kar), the Karnataka High Court held while dealing with the definition of ‘wholesale trading’ laid down in an earlier version of the FDI Policy:

“………The task of defining the term ‘cash and carry wholesale trade’ is to be best left to the Government, which has formulated the policy of inviting the FDI. No directions can be given to the Government to accept a particular definition of the term ‘cash and carry wholesale trade’ in preference to or to the exclusion of its other definitions from other sources. Therefore the challenge to the approval order, dated 5th December, 2000 (Annexure-B) fails. …………..

………But it is for the Government to evolve a policy to safeguard the interest of the retailers. It is trite position in law that the Court should not substitute its wisdom for the wisdom of the Government in policy matters.”

The FDI Policy on Wholesale Trading was also the subject-matter of review in the case of Federation of Associations of Maharashtra v UOI, W.P. (C) Nos. 9568-70 of 2003 (Del) where the Court held as follows:

“…….The aforesaid is apparent from the fact that no one is disputing the right of the Government to lay down its policy……….. once it is recognised that the Government can amend its policy, nothing pre-cludes the Government from issuing a clarification even if it is read in the nature of an amendment of the policy. ……………The matter in issue is not even of any statutory interpretation, but of the policy. The policy-framer is the concerned Ministry which itself has issued the clarification / modification. The learned ASG is right in his submissions that the matter is one of policy decision and allocation of businesses and FIPB functions as part of the concerned Ministry. ………The relevant authority is the Government itself which had framed the policy. ……………..

59.    The interpretation of the Government is also not out of thin hair. It is trite to say that with the expansion of international commerce and trade, there are certain internationally understood concepts, which have come into play. Is the Court to look to the traditional definition of what may be wholesale or retail as may be considered in the dictionaries and in the country earlier or is the Court to accept the definition adopted by the Government on international practice? The Government’s view is based on the WTO definition of wholesale trade. The Government can hardly be faulted on this account and it is not for the Court to go into this question……….….This being the position, it is the stand of the Government, which has to be given the greatest weight in such matters. There cannot be any knit-picking on this issue of the definition when the stand of the Government has come clearly in its affidavit as enunciated by its clarification. The Government wants B2B sales to form a part of wholesale cash and carry business. So be it.”

A decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Putzmeister India Private Limited and others vs. UOI, W.P.(C) 5633-35/2006 Order dated July 1, 2008 (Del) is also relevant. This case examined the validity of the erstwhile Press Note 1 of 2005 issued by the DIPP requiring the FIPB’s permission in cases where the foreign investor had a prior joint venture in the same / allied field:

“27. Issues pertaining to foreign investment and attendant modalities are largely a matter of executive policy; to some extent, these are also governed by provisions of the Foreign Exchange Management Act and the guidelines issued by the Reserve Bank of India. The three press notes fall in the domain of enunciation of executive policy………A large number of decisions have ruled that the wisdom of an executive policy does not fall within the domain of judicial review; nor does Article 226 permit High Courts to sit in appellate judgment over executive decisions, made in legitimate bounds of exercise of power……….When two views are reasonably possible about the interpretation of an executive order, the court is of the opinion that unless strong and compelling reasons exist, it should not supplant the views of the executive government.”

FIPB

The Foreign Investment Promotion Board (FIPB) is a part of the Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance. As explained above, FDI could be Automatic or it may require the Approval of the Government of India. The FIPB is a nodal authority for approving all FDI proposals which require prior Government Approval. The FIPB provides a single-window mechanism for all such FDI proposals, which are not permissible under the automatic route. The FIPB has been a part of several Ministries. It initially started as a part of Prime Minister’s Office, later on it became a part of the DIPP and now is a part of the DEA, Ministry of Finance. All FDI proposals up to an investment amount of Rs. 1,200 crores are approved by the Finance Minister, while those in excess of Rs. 1,200 crores are approved by the Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs (CCEA). The FIPB consists of Secretaries from various Ministries, such as, Finance, DIPP, External Affairs, Department of Commerce, etc.

It may be noted that the FIPB is a body without any statutory backing nor can it make any law. In the case of Zippers Karamchari Union vs. UOI, 2000 (10) SCC 619, the Supreme Court while dealing with the grant of an approval by the FIPB to YKK, Japan to set up a subsidiary in India, held as follows:

“….It is a matter of government policy and in our opinion no sustainable ground was urged before us to hold that the approval granted to YKK was contrary to the government policy. The Court would not be justified in interfering in such matters when it is satisfied that a grant of approval to YKK was neither irrational, nor for any extraneous consideration….”

CFDIP or FEMA, Which One Prevails?

One question which has often been raised has been-which one is supreme – the FDI Policy or the FEMA Regulations? The answer to this is very simple. It is the FEMA and the Regulations issued thereunder which are superior to the FDI Policy. The Policy is notified by the RBI as amendments to the Foreign Exchange Management (Transfer or Issue of Security by Persons Resident Outside India) Regulations, 2000. Schedule 1 of these Regulations deals with “Foreign Direct Investment Scheme”. Para 2 of Schedule 1 gives recognition to the FDI Policy by providing that the Automatic Route for FDI is available to a company in accordance with Annex B to the Schedule and the provisions of the FDI Policy, as notified by the Ministry of Commerce, from time to time. Annex B contains the “Sectoral Specific Policy for Foreign Investment”. This Annex B is based on the FDI Policy issued by the DIPP.

The FDI Policy itself provides that in the case of any conflict with the FEMA Regulations, the FEMA Notifications would prevail.

Thus, the descending order of hierarchy amongst various pronouncements would be: FEMA -> Rules & Regulations ->  AP Dir Circulars ->  Master Circulars -> FDI Policy by DIPP -> Press Notes/Clarifications by DIPP.

PIL before SC

An interesting question recently arose before the Supreme Court in a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) – Manohar Lal Sharma v UOI, Writ Petition (Civil) 417 of 2012 (SC), Order dated 15th October, 2012. Before going into the facts of this case, a background to this case merits attention. The DIPP vide Press Note No. 5 of 2012 dated 20th September 2012, permitted FDI in Multi-brand Retail Trading under the Approval Route of the FIPB. Prior to this, FDI in this sector was altogether prohibited. Annex A to Schedule 1 of the Foreign Exchange Management (Transfer or Issue of Security by Persons Resident Outside India) Regulations, 2000 as well as the CFDIP both provided that FDI in “Retail Trading (except single brand product retailing)” is a “Sector prohibited for FDI”. Press Note 5/2012 modified the CFDIP by permitting 51% FDI in Multi-brand Retail Trading. Subsequently, the RBI issued Directions to Authorised Persons vide A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 32 dated 21st September 2012, specifying that the FDI Policy has been modified to permit 51% FDI in Multi-brand Retailing. It also mentioned that neces-sary amendments to the FEMA Regulations are being notified separately.

However, the FEMA Regulations No. 20-2000/RB have yet not been modified. They yet contain the old Annex B which provides that FDI is not permitted in Multi-brand Retailing. Thus, a PIL was filed which stated that in the absence of amendment to the FEMA Regulations, the FDI Policy could not prevail over it and hence, a petition was made to the Supreme Court asking for a stay on the Press Notes allowing FDI in Multi-brand Retailing.

In the above-mentioned PIL, the Supreme Court up-held the superiority of the FEMA Regulations over the FDI Policy. However, it also upheld the amendments to the FDI Policy on Retail Trading but asked the Government to bring the FEMA Notifications up to date with the FDI Policy. The Court held that amending the FEMA Regulations is a legal process which has to be taken to logical conclusion. It is a routine thing and it has to be done. It also held that not amending the FEMA Regulations was at best, an irregularity that is curable and as soon as amendment is brought, it would be cured.

The Bench added that there is no question of any stay on the FDI policy. It held that the FDI policy was prepared by the Central Government and it is not that RBI had been kept in the dark by the Centre. RBI had already issued a Circular amending the FDI limits but it had not formally amended the Regulations. Accordingly, the Court asked the Attorney General when RBI would do so. It gave RBI time to do so by noting as follows:

“….but you have to give the policy a legal shape by amending the regulation. These matters have huge impact….”

On the allegation in the PIL that the Centre’s notification was issued without the authority of law as approval of neither the President nor the Parliament was secured, the Supreme Court rejected the same by saying that the assumption that the policy has to be in the name of the President is flawed and unfounded. It further said that a policy is never required to be placed before the Parliament.

This decision clearly establishes the supremacy of the FEMA Regulations over the FDI Policy and that the Regulations must be amended to reflect the FDI Policy.


Contrasting Stands

The above was an instance where the RBI had not yet modified the FEMA Regulations to be in touch with the CFDIP. However, what about cases where the RBI’s view is exactly opposite to that of the CFDIP? A case in point is the issue of FDI instruments with Put and Call Options. Since the last 2-3 years, the RBI has been taking a view that exit options, such as put and call options, attached to Compulsorily Convertible Debentures/Preference Shares/Equity Shares for FDI are not valid. The view being taken was that, a fixed exit option makes the equity instrument equivalent to a debt instrument. The DIPP in its CFDIP issued vide Circular 2/2011, contained a Clause that only instruments with no in-built options of any type would qualify as eligible instruments for FDI. Instruments issued/transferred to non-residents with in-built options would lose their equity character and such instruments would have to comply with the ECB guidelines. Within a month of its issuance, the CFDIP was modified and a Corrigendum was issued by the DIPP deleting the above Clause. Thus, the DIPP’s stance on the issue is now very clear, i.e., FDI can have in-built options. However, the RBI’s stance on this issue has yet not mellowed. Such divergent views between the FDI Policy and the FEMA Regulations are best avoided, since they do nothing but add to the regulatory confusion and mayhem.

FDI v FII / PIS
While on the subject of FDI, it would not be out of place to highlight the distinction between FDI inflows on the one hand and inflows from Foreign Institutional Investment (FII) / Portfolio Investment Schemes (PIS) on the other hand. FDI is primary market investment by non-resident entities in the capital of an Indian company, i.e., money directly comes to the Indian company. FII and PIS on the other hand are secondary market investments, in which foreign investment is made by acquiring the shares of an Indian company from other resident/non-resident shareholders. It may be noted that FII investment is not subject to the sectoral caps and conditions laid down in the CFDIP. In cases where the RBI also wants to prevent, investment under the FII/PIS, it has expressly done so. For instance, earlier, FII/NRI investment was prohibited under the print media sector. No such restriction is now found.

Another analogy is in the real estate sector. Under the PIS, FIIs can also acquire shares of real estate company making an IPO. The conditions of lock-in, minimum capitalisation, minimum area, etc., which are associated with FDI in real estate are not applicable to a Portfolio Investment made by FIIs, including that made under the IPO of a real estate company. However, FII investments in any pre-IPO placement are treated on par with FDI and are subject to all conditions of the erstwhile Press Note 2 /2005.

Conclusion
India’s FDI Policy is multi-faceted and is often prone to pulls and tugs from within the system. Is it not strange that for a country which aims to be the cynosure of the global attention and which is constantly vying with China, Brazil, Russia, etc., for FDI, India continues to have contrasting stands from Ministries and Regulators on the FDI Policy. FDI loves certainty as explained by Justice Kapadia, in the celebrated decision of Vodafone International Holdings, 341 ITR 1 (SC):

“…FDI flows towards location with a strong governance infrastructure which includes enactment of laws and how well the legal system works. Certainty is integral to rule of law. Certainty and stability form the basic foundation of any fiscal system…”

Maybe it is time to disband multiple agencies, such as, the FIPB and the DIPP and replace them with one Super Regulator for all things connected with FDI in India. Should we not get over our hangover of the “Licence Raj” once and for all? It would be desirable if we have a clear FDI Policy devoid of confusion and ambiguity. One may sum up with a quote from Henry Miller, the noted American Author:

“Confusion is a word we have invented for an order which is yet not understood!”

A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 19 dated 28th August, 2012

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Issue of Indian Depository Receipts (IDRs)

 – Limited two way fungibilty. Presently, automatic fungibility of IDR is not permitted. This circular, subject to compliance with SEBI (Issue of Capital and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2009, permits a limited two way fungibility for IDR. It imposes an overall ceiling of INRNaN billion on raising of capital by foreign companies by issuance of IDR. It also states that re-issuance of IDR would be allowed only to the extent of IDR that have been redeemed/converted into underlying shares and sold.

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Refund of stamp duty — Withdrawal of document from being registered — Karnataka Stamp Act, sections 52 and 52A.

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[ A. Ramakrishna v. State Govt. Bangalore & Anr., AIR 2012 Karnataka 3]

The case of the petitioner is that he intended to purchase property. The deed of conveyance was executed on 30-9-2008 with the owner of the property one Smt. Kusum Thayal. The petitioner purchased the stamp duty of Rs.10,51,875 and presented the sale deed by using the said stamp duty along with payment of registration charges of Rs.1,23,750.

It was the case of the petitioner that both the amounts, towards registration fee and the stamp duty have been paid by way of Demand Draft. However, due to some litigation and difficulty in the title of the ownership, which the petitioner claims to have noticed subsequently, the sale deed could not be registered. As a result the petitioner requested for withdrawal of the document and also the registration of the sale deed from the Sub-Registrar Office on 23-11-2009 and requested for refund of the entire stamp duty and the registration charges.

Thereafter an impugned Govt. order is passed in exercise of the powers conferred u/s.52-A of the Karnataka Stamp Act, 1957 holding that the petitioner was entitled for refund after deducting 25 paise per rupee on the amount paid towards stamp duty.

The Court observed that there was nothing in Rules 193 and 194 of the Karnataka Registration Rules, 1965 which confers a right on the petitioner to seek refund of the amount of stamp duty paid towards registration. Rule 193(i) of the Karnataka Registration Rules, 1965 states that before an order of registration is passed, if the party makes a request in writing to the Registering Officer seeking to withdraw the document from being registered, then the officer concerned may pass an order to that effect permitting such withdrawal whereupon, one half of the registration fee and all the copying fees in respect of such document can be refunded. Therefore, Rules 193 and 194 of the Karnataka Registration Rules, 1965 do not come to the aid of the petitioner, nor do they clothe him with a right to seek refund of the stamp duty. The relevant provisions which may come to the help of the petitioner was sections 52 and 52-A of the Karnataka Stamp Act, 1957 (i.e., Allowance for stamps not required for use).

It was brought to the notice of the Court that a Govt. order dated 21-2-2009 in exercise of the powers conferred u/s.52A of the Karnataka Stamp Act, 1957 and on the basis of the recommendation made by the 2nd respondent, the State Govt. has specified the amount to be deducted while refunding the stamp duty paid by the concerned person regarding the document presented for registration which has been subsequently withdrawn that can be classified as spoiled or unusable stamp. According to the said Govt. order, if an application seeking refund is made after one year but before the expiry of two years from the date of purchase of the stamp duty, the deduction shall be at 25 paise per rupee.

Neither the rules framed nor the provisions of the Karnataka Stamp Act, 1957 clothe the petitioner with any other right to seek refund of amount in excess of what has been provided as per the Govt. order dated 21-2-2009. Therefore, the present writ petitions field by the petitioner seeking refund of the entire amount of stamp duty paid, cannot be entertained.

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Precedent — Unjust enrichment — Meaning — Tribunal cannot ignore the High Court decision merely because the appeal is pending in the Apex Court.

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[ Sudhir Papers Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Bangalore-I, (2012) 276 ELT 304 (Kar.)]

The claim for refund of excise duty pre-supposes that excise duty in excess of what is legally due has been paid. The demand on which the excise duty is paid is on the clearance of the goods. The claim for refund arises when subsequently if it is shown that what is paid is an excess of what is legally payable. Section 11-B deals with claim for refund of duty. The condition precedent for making a claim for refund of duty is that the incidence of such duty had not been passed on by the assessee to any other person. The assessee-company had raised the plea of refund of excise duty on the ground of unjust enrichment.

The said principle has been the subject-matter of interpretation by the Apex Court from time to time. A nine-Member Bench of the Apex Court in the case of Mafatlal Industries Ltd. v. Union of India reported in (1997) 89 ELT 247 (SC) has laid down the law on the point.

“The doctrine of unjust enrichment is just and statutory doctrine. No person can seek to collect the duty from both the ends. In other words, he cannot collect the duty from the purchaser at one end and also collect the same duty from the State on the ground that it has been collected from him contrary to law. The power of the Court is not meant to be exercised for unjustly enriching person. The doctrine of unjust enrichment, is, however, inapplicable to the State. State represents the people of the country. No one can speak of the people being unjustly enriched.”

A claim for refund made under the provisions of the Act can succeed only if the assessee states and establishes that he has not passed on the burden of the duty to any person/other persons. His refund claim shall be allowed/decreed only when he establishes that he has not passed on the burden of duty or to the extent he has not so passed on, as the case may. Where the burden of duty has been passed on, the claimant cannot say that he has suffered any real loss or prejudice. The real loss or prejudice is suffered in such a case by the person who has ultimately borne the burden and it is only that person who can ultimately claim its refund.

It is only if the assessee claims refund on the ground that he has not passed on the burden of duty to his customer by a specific plea and substantiating the same by producing acceptable evidence, then the appropriate authority shall direct payment of the refund amount to the assessee.

The High Court further observed that the adjudicating authority or the Appellate Authority denied relief relying on the judgment of the CESTAT in Addison’s case, when that judgment had been set aside by the Madras High Court, the Tribunal erred in following the judgment and dismissing the appeal of the assessee. Merely because the matter was pending before the Apex Court, that could not be the reason to disregard the judgment of the High Court. The High Court had set aside the judgment rendered by the CESTAT and the said judgment was not operating and therefore the Tribunal was wrong in ignoring the judgment of the Madras High Court.

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Precedent — Judicial discipline — Commissioner (Appeals) must follow declaration of law by higher forum.

[Nirma Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Ahmedabad, 2012 (276) ELT 283 (Trib.) (Ahd.)]

  In a matter on interpretation of Rule 6(3)(b) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004, the Tribunal observed that the Commissioner (Appeals) while granting stay held that issue was covered by earlier order of ITAT in the appellant’s own case and granted unconditional stay. However while deciding the main appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) did not follow the earlier order of the Tribunal.

  The Tribunal on the above aspect observed that the Commissioner (Appeal) in his order is not disputing the fact that the issue is covered by the earlier decision of the Tribunal. However, he has observed that the Tribunal’s order relied on Mumbai High Court’s judgment in the case of M/s. Rallis India Ltd. (2009) 233 ELT 301 (Bom.) which was misplaced. The Tribunal observed that if the Revenue was aggrieved with the earlier order of the Tribunal, it was open for them to file an appeal thereagainst before higher Appellate forum. The judicial discipline requires the lower authority to follow the declaration of law by higher Appellate forum. Reference in this regard was made to Mumbai High Court’s judgment in the case of  CCE, Nasik v. M/s. Jain Vanguard Polybutylene Ltd., (2010) 256 ELT 523 (Bom.) as also the Tribunal’s decision in the case of M/s. Gujarat Composite Ltd. v. CCE, Ahmedabad (2006) 195 ELT 310 (Tri. Mum.). Therefore, it was not open to the Commissioner (Appeals) to take a different view when an identical issue was decided in the same party’s case by the earlier order of the Tribunal.

A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 39 dated 9th October, 2012

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Trade Credits for Imports into India – Review of all-in-cost ceiling.

This circular states that the below mentioned all-incost ceiling for trade credit for imports into India will continue till further notice: –

 Maturity period 

 All-in-cost ceilings over 6 months LIBOR for the respective currency of credit or applicable benchmark

 Up to 1 year

 350 basis points

 More than 1 year and up to 3 years

 More than 3 years and up to 5 years

A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 36 dated 26th September, 2012

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Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in India – Allotment of Shares to person resident outside India under Memorandum of Association (MoA) of an Indian company–Pricing guidelines.

Presently, a non-resident, under the FDI Scheme, can purchase shares or convertible debentures of an Indian company based on the valuation method prescribed under paragraph 5 of Schedule 1 of Notification No. FEMA 20/2000 -RB dated May 3, 2000.

This circular has relaxed the said guidelines and permits eligible non-residents (including NRI) investors who are subscribers to Memorandum of Association of the investee company to subscribe for shares at face value.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 35 dated 25th September, 2012

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Establishment of Liaison Offices (LO)/Branch Offices (BO)/Project Offices (PO) in India by Foreign Entities– Reporting requirement.

This circular has prescribed certain additional reporting requirements both for new as well as existing LO /BO/PO. The format for reporting the information is annexed to this circular.

New LO/BO/PO
The new LO/BO/PO will have to submit the information (as per the annexed format) within 5 working days of the LO/BO/PO becoming functional to the DGP of each state in which LO/BO/PO has established its office.

Existing/New LO/BO/PO
They will have to submit a copy of the information (as per the annexed format) with the DGP of each state as well as its Bank on an annual basis along with a copy of the Annual Activity Certificate/Annual report, as the case may be.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 34 dated 24th September, 2012

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Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 – Import of gold in any form including jewellery made of gold/ precious metals or/and studded with diamonds/semi precious/precious stones – clarification

This circular clarifies that trade credit way of Suppliers’/ Buyers’ credit, including the usance period of Letters of Credit, for import of gold in any form including jewellery made of gold/precious metals or /and studded with diamonds/semi-precious /precious stones must not exceed 90 days, from the date of shipment.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 32 dated September 21, 2012 Foreign investment in Single–Brand Product Retail Trading/ Multi- Brand Retail Trading/Civil Aviation Sector/ Broadcasting Sector/Power Exchanges – Amendment to the Foreign Direct Investment Scheme

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Amendment of existing policy on Foreign Direct Investment in Single-Brand Product Retail Trading Press Note No. 4 (2012 Series) dated 20th September, 2012

Single-Brand Product Retail Trading
Press Note No. 4 has modified the existing conditions in respect of the Foreign Investment in Single- Brand Product Retail Trading by removing the Brand Ownership criteria and providing that only one non-resident entity, whether owner of the brand or otherwise, will be permitted to undertake single brand product retail trading in the country, for that specific brand. It also provides that the company receiving FDI cannot undertake retail trading, in any form, by means of e-commerce.

Review of the policy on Foreign Direct Investment – allowing FDI in Multi-Brand Retail Trading

Press Note No. 5 (2012 Series) dated September 20, 2012

Multi-Brand Retail Trading

Press Note No. 5 has: –

a. Substituted the list of ‘Prohibited Sectors’ i.e. sectors in which FDI is prohibited. The new Paragraph 6.1 of “Circular 1 of 2012 – Consolidated FDI Policy” issued on April 10, 2012 reads as follows: –

“6.1 Prohibited Sectors:

FDI is prohibited in:
 
(a) Lottery Business, including Government/ private lottery, online lotteries, etc.
(b) Gambling and Betting, including casinos etc.
(c) Chit funds
(d) Nidhi company
(e) Trading in Transferable Development Rights (TDRs)
(f) Real Estate Business or Construction of Farm Houses
(g) Manufacturing of Cigars, cheroots, cigarillos and cigarettes, of tobacco or of tobacco substitutes
(h) Activities/sectors not open to private sector investment e.g. Atomic Energy and Railway Transport (other than Mass Rapid Transport Systems).

Foreign technology collaboration in any form, including licensing for franchise, trademark, brand name, management contract, is also prohibited for Lottery Business and Gambling and Betting activities.”

b. It has inserted a new Paragraph 6.2.16.5 in the “Circular 1 of 2012 – Consolidated FDI Policy” issued on 10th April, 2012 containing the terms and conditions relating to FDI in Multi-Brand Retail Trading. The broad guidelines are: –

a. This is an enabling clause in regard to implementation of the policy and the State Governments/Union Territories will have to decide for themselves whether to permit the same or not.
b. FDI up to 51% is permitted under the Approval Route.
c. Multi-Brand retailing will be permitted in all products, subject to certain terms and conditions.
d. Minimum investment by the foreign investor will be US $ 100 million.
e. At least 50% of the total FDI will have to be invested in ‘back-end’ infrastructure, excluding land cost and rentals, within 3 years of bringing in the 1st tranche of FDI.
f. At least 30% of the value of manufactured /processed products purchased by the company will have to be from Indian ‘small industries’.
g. Retail sales outlet can be set-up in cities with a population of more than 10 lakh as per 2011 Census only.
h. Retail trading, in any form, by means of e-commerce cannot be undertaken by the company.

Review of policy on Foreign Direct Investment in the Civil Aviation sector

Press Note No. 6 (2012 Series) dated 20th September, 2012

Civil Aviation Sector

Press Note No. 6 has amended Paragraph 6.2.9.3 of “Circular 1 of 2012 – Consolidated FDI Policy” issued on 10th April, 2012, so as to permit foreign airlines to invest up to 49% under the Approval Route, subject to certain terms and conditions, in the capital of Indian companies operating scheduled and non-scheduled air transport services. The investment limit of 49% will include FDI as well as FII investment.

Review of the policy on Foreign Investment (FI) in companies operating in the Broadcasting Sector

Press Note No. 7 (2012 Series) dated 20th September, 2012

Broadcasting Sector

Press Note No. 7 has substituted Paragraph 6.2.7 of “Circular 1 of 2012 – Consolidated FDI Policy” issued on April 10, 2012. Major changes in the substituted Paragraph pertain to: –

a. Teleports (setting up up-linking HUBs Teleports); Direct to Home (DTH); Cable Networks (MSOs operating at National or State or District level and undertaking upgradation of networks towards digitalization and addressability):

In this case, limit on Foreign Investment has been increased from 49% to 74%. Foreign investment up to 49% is permitted under the Automatic Route, while foreign investment beyond 49% and up to 74% is permitted under the Approval Route.

b. Mobile TV:

Foreign Investment is permitted up to 74%. Foreign investment up to 49% is permitted under the Automatic Route, while foreign investment beyond 49% and up to 74% is permitted under the Approval Route.

The above investment is also subject to the terms and conditions issued by the Ministry of Information & Broadcasting.

Policy on foreign investment in Power Exchanges

Press Note No. 8 (2012 Series) dated 20th September, 2012

Power Exchanges
Press Note No. 8 has inserted a new Paragraph 6.2.26 in the “Circular 1 of 2012 – Consolidated FDI Policy” issued on April 10, 2012 containing the terms and conditions relating to FDI in Power Exchanges. Major terms and conditions are: –

a. The Power Exchange must be registered under the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (Power Market) Regulations, 2010.
b. Foreign investment up to 49% is permitted – FDI 26% under Approval Route & FII 23% under Automatic Route.
c. FII purchases must be restricted to secondary markets only.
d. No single non-resident investor/entity, including persons acting in concert, can hold more than 5% of the equity of the Power Exchange Company.

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How Final are Consent Orders?

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A recent order of the SEBI is disturbing as it appears thereby, as if the whole purpose of settlement by Consent Orders (also known as ‘plea bargaining’ in the West) is defeated. An implicit assumption – having some support in law too – is that when a matter is settled by mutually agreed consent order, it is settled fully. The regulator should not be able to start proceedings for the same matter under a different provision or for a different type of punishment. This is so, of course, if further action is not explicitly reserved or if the applicant knowingly applies for settlement for only some part of the actions possible against him.

This recent order is in the case of Arun Jain (No. WTM/RKA/ID7/48/2012 dated 9th October 2012) debarring him for two years for insider trading raises the question, to reiterate, the perceived sanctity and finality of consent orders and whether settlement by consent settles all actions possible for a particular act or omission. Or whether, even after the settlement and payment of settlement amount, SEBI may yet take action under another set of provisions. Applicants for consent orders may now rightly feel uncertain whether and how to apply for application for a consent order.

As readers are aware, the consent order process enables a person against whom proceedings are initiated for violation of securities laws, to apply for settlement in the form of a consent order. Often, this application is made as soon as a show cause notice is received and at times even before that or even at a very late stage. The objective is to expeditiously close proceedings in respect of a particular act or omission alleged to be in violation of law. The concern the recent SEBI Order raises is ‘whether a person can be punished again for the same act/omission under another provision of law’.

Let us consider, summarily, what were the broad facts in this case.

Adjudication proceedings were initiated against Arun Jain in 2005 for alleged insider trading asking why a monetary penalty should not be levied. In respect of these proceedings (with a short detour to the High Court against such proceedings) Arun Jain applied for ‘consent order’. A ‘consent order’ settling these proceedings was passed in 2008 (under the Guidelines of 2007, which have undergone a substantial change recently, as discussed later) for a settlement amount of Rs. 7,00,000.

In the normal course, that would have been the end of the matter. However, in December 2011, a show cause notice (SCN) was issued against him for the same matter – that is – violation of insider trading regulations. This time, however, the SCN asked why directions should not be issued under Sections 11, 11B and 11(4) read with Regulation 11 of the Insider Trading Regulations. The directions, the SCN stated, could be in the form of debarring him in various manners as specified. Rejecting the contentions of Arun Jain, including the contention that the matter was already settled by a consent order, the SEBI debarred him for a period of two years from buying/selling securities, etc.

The merits of the case are not discussed here and for this purpose, let us assume that Arun Jain was guilty of insider trading when shares were sold by a company promoted by him, while in possession of unpublished price sensitive information. Though a possibly valid point, the issue whether the violation was serious in nature and therefore deserved more punishment than the amount settled through the consent order, is also not discussed here.

The assumption that parties often seem to have, and which assumption now seems fallacious, is that consent orders are generally an end of the matter in terms of all actions that SEBI may take in respect of a particular act or omission. The order shows that SEBI would – if it deems fit – take action again under other provisions where available. It appears that it may even prosecute the party for the same violation.

It cannot be denied that the SEBI does have powers to initiate multiple and sequential proceedings for the same act/omissions. A particular act/omission may be punishable under different Regulations as a different type of violation and a particular act/omission may also attract multiple types of actions too.

SEBI can – as in the present case of insider trading – initiate adjudication proceedings for levy of monetary penalty, proceedings for debarment and even prosecution proceedings. Such proceedings need not necessarily be parallel or in the same SCN and can be sequential. It may be expected that each proceeding would take into account the punishment already meted out under other proceeding for the same matter but it cannot normally be denied that the SEBI does not have powers to initiate multiple proceedings and punish the party in multiple forms.

A question arises as to: ‘whether punishing a person twice or more for the same act amounts to “double jeopardy” which is not allowed under the Constitution of India. This issue was in fact, raised before the SEBI and, it is submitted, rightly rejected by the SEBI. The principle of double jeopardy as laid down under the Constitution of India, relate to criminal proceedings while in the present case, both the proceedings were civil ones. In fact, the SEBI even kept the possibility open that even in this case, after punishing the party twice under two civil proceedings, it could also initiate criminal proceedings.

However, often, the party assumes that settlement through a consent order would be the end of the matter. He would offer and agree to a settlement amount, assuming that this is a one-time settlement for all actions that are possible. Also, even though, strictly speaking, settlement of prosecution proceedings would be by way of compounding, the implicit assumption often in minds of the party is that a consent order would mean the end of the matter. And thus, not only other proceedings for the same action, but even prosecution would not be initiated.

This assumption does have some basis in law, even if not strong. For example, the applicant is required to give the following statement as part of the prescribed undertaking form as part of the application for consent order:-

“The Order passed pursuant to this application shall conclude any/all disciplinary action that SEBI could bring against us, for the conduct (cause of action) set forth in this application.’

Thus, arguably, the whole basis of making of the application for the consent order and the consent order itself is on the understanding that “any/all disciplinary action” that the SEBI could bring for the conduct/cause of action shall be “concluded”.

Consider also another statement that the undertaking form contains:-

“Any plea of limitation for reopening the case, if I violate/do not comply with the consent order subsequently, and SEBI shall be free to take any enforcement action including initiation of adjudication/prosecution proceedings against me for such violation/non-compliance of the consent order.”

Thus, again, the applicant has some basis in assuming that only if he violates the terms of the consent order, that the settled proceedings could be reopened and further proceedings of all types possible could be initiated.

Thus, the applicant party does seem to have a reasonable basis even in law, to expect that the consent order shall conclude actions that the SEBI may take for a particular cause of action.

Of course, as often debated, the basis of consent orders, unfortunately, itself is not wholly satisfactory in law. For example, except by way of generally providing for settlement by consent and that too in not very clear and exhaustive terms, the parent enactments such as SEBI Act, Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act and the Depositories Act, do not lay down comprehensively the consequences of a settlement through a consent order. Thus, in theory, it becomes a case by case settlement.

It can be expected that a party, who is already facing multiple proceedings for the same matter, would either apply for consent for all proceedings or none at all. However, he does not expect that proceeding of one nature would be initiated at the first stage and he settles the same through consent order and then it is followed by yet another proceeding and perhaps thereafter even by prosecution.

While the above was under the Guidelines for consent order of 2007, the SEBI has issued amended Guidelines in May 2012, which have also been discussed earlier in this column. The revised Guidelines are a little more explicit and specific on the matter of multiple proceedings and their settlement. It seems that the concern that the order in Arun Jain’s case raises may still arise in the minds of applicant parties. Consider the following extracts from the 2012 Guidelines (emphasis supplied):-

“One application may be considered for a single proceeding or multiple proceedings arising from the same cause of action but in no case, shall one application be considered for multiple proceedings arising from different causes of action.”

“In case, more than one proceeding arising from the same cause of action has been initiated against the applicant, the IA shall be increased by 15%.”

The undertaking under the revised Guidelines also contains a similar clause:-

“6. The Order passed pursuant to this application shall conclude any/all disciplinary action the SEBI could bring against me/us for the conduct (cause of action) set forth in this application (SCN).”

Thus, the concern would still remain. For example, if a SCN for adjudication is issued for an alleged violation and settled, can yet another SCN and/or prosecution be issued and punishment meted out?

The present Order and stance of the SEBI is worrisome for parties seeking to apply for consent orders in the future and even for pending applications. Of course, it may make the parties more alert and they may insist on comprehensive settlement, where all possible consequential actions that the SEBI could take are covered by such settlement or none at all. Alternatively, and which seems to be the better course, is that we learn further from the Western experience of decades of plea bargaining and provide for comprehensive final settlement terms where the parties know, at one place, what allegations/ violations are settled and what he has agreed in return.

Right to Information – Public authority – Co-operative societies registered under Kerala Co-op Societies Act are public authority: Right to Information Act, section 2(4):

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[Mullour Rural Co-operative Society Ltd, Trivandrum vs. State of Kerala & Ors. AIR 2012 Kerala 124]

The issue arose for consideration as to whether a co-operative society registered under the Kerala Co-op Societies Act was a `public authority’ u/s. 2(h) of RTI Act. It is fundamental that every member of the society, every depositor and every one interested in the affairs of the society, are entitled to get all information relating to the society, which is possible only if RTI Act is implemented against co-operative societies. However, it may be noticed that sufficient safeguard is made in section 8 of the RTI Act which prohibits furnishing of certain items of information on which statutory immunity is provided thereunder, for obvious reasons. Subject to the exceptions contained in that section, any other information relating to a co-operative society should be made available to the public on application, is what is contemplated under the RTI Act.

 The attitude of the managing committee of a society to refuse to furnish information relating to the Society itself, should be a matter of serious concern by the Joint Registrar, because people tend to cover up only wrong things and not things which are properly done. The Court observed that the completion of statutory audit of societies is delayed by four to five years and most of the managing committees escape from being caught for mismanagement only because of delay in auditing, detection of irregularities and delay in initiation of proceedings thereafter. The court was of the view that atleast vigilant members and the public, by obtaining information through RTI Act, will be able to detect and prevent mismanagement in time. Therefore, the RTI Act will certainly help as a protection against mismanagement of the societies by the managing committee and by society employees.

Therefore, it was held that Co-operative Societies registered under the KCS Act are “public authorities” within the meaning of section 2(h) of the RTI Act. The applicability of the RTI Act to Co- operative Societies was upheld. Therefore, even if society by itself does not answer the description of “public authority”, the statutory authorities under the KCS Act being public authorities within the meaning of clause (c) of section 2(h), are bound to furnish information after accessing the same from the co-operative society concerned.

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HUF — Joint Hindu family property — Minor had an undivided share — Karta sold the property — Legal necessity — Permission from Court not required — Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, sections 6 and 12.

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[ M. Harish v. Kum. Sindhu & Anr., AIR 2012 Karnataka 1.]

The plaintiffs, represented through their guardian maternal grandmother, filed the suit seeking for partition and separate possession declaration and mesne profits against the defendants. The 1st defendant the father of the plaintiffs, had sold the suit property under a registered sale deed dated 5-9-2009 for legal necessities. The matter was contested by the 2nd defendant purchaser. However, the 1st defendant father of the plaintiffs did not contest the matter. The Trial Court referring to the Amended Act, 2005 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, had allowed the suit filed by the plaintiffs. As against which, the 2nd defendant who was the purchaser of one of the items of the joint family property, filed appeal before the High Court on various grounds.

The Court observed that the suit property, which came to the share of the 1st defendant (father), was sold by him in favour of the 2nd defendant. It was specifically mentioned in the recitals of the sale deed that the sale was made in order to repay the loan borrowed from the Tobacco Board and the State Bank of Mysore, Abburu Branch.

The clearance of the debt was also an obligation on the part of the joint family when it was incurred towards legal necessities i.e., for the development of the joint family. In such a situation, the 1st defendant had disposed of the property.

The Court further observed that the Apex Court in the case of Sri Narayan Bal and Others v. Sridhar Sutar and Others reported in AIR 1996 SC 2371, wherein it is clearly held that the joint Hindu family property in which minor had an undivided share is sold/disposed of by Karta, as per section 8, previous permission of the Court before disposing of immovable property is not required. Further, it is held that the joint Hindu family by itself is a legal entity capable of acting through its Karta and other adult members of the family in management of the joint Hindu family property. Thus, sections 6 and 12 excludes the applicability of section 8 insofar as joint Hindu family property is concerned.

Thus it was clear that the property in question was a joint Hindu family property, it may not be necessary for the 1st defendant to seek prior permission of the Court before alienating the suit property.

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Right to Information – Public Interest – Disclosure of information regarding Vigilance matter – Section 8(1)(e); 8(1)(g) and 8(1)(j) of RTI Act

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[UPSC vs. R.K. Jain (2012) (282) ELT 161 Del]

The respondent by an application filed u/s. 6 of the Act, sought the Information from the petitioner (UPSC) namely, inspection of the records, documents, note sheets, reports, office memorandum, part files and files relating to the proposed disciplinary action and/or imposition of penalty against Shri G.S. Narang, IRS, Central Excise and Customs Officer of 1974 Batch and also inspection of records, files, etc., relating to the decision of the UPSC thereof.

The Central Public Information Officer (CPIO) of the petitioner, however, declined to provide the same on the ground that the information sought pertained to the disciplinary case of Shri G. S. Narang, which was of personal nature, disclosure of which has no relationship to any public activity or interest. It further stated that the disclosure of the same may infringe upon the privacy of the individual and that it may not be in the larger interest. The petitioner, therefore, claimed exemption from disclosing the information u/s. 8(1)(j) of the Act.

The Appellate Authority dismissed the Appeal on the same ground that the information sought was exempted from disclosure u/s. 8(1)(j) of the Act. The Respondent preferred an appeal before the CIC. The CIC set aside the decision of the First Appellate Authority and held that opinions/advices tendered/given by the officers (public officials) can be sought for under the Act, provided the same have not been tendered in confidence/secrecy and in trust to the authority concerned, i.e. to say, in a fiduciary relationship. Since the petitioner has not been able to set up the same in the present case, as aforesaid, the claim of exemption u/s. 8(1) (e) stands rejected.

The court observed that a bare perusal of section 8(1)(g) of the Act, makes it clear that the exemption would come into operation only if the disclosure of information would endanger the life or physical safety of any person or would identify the source of the information or assistance given in confidence for law enforcement or security purposes. The opinion/advice, which constitutes the information in the present case, cannot be said to have been given “in confidence for law enforcement or security purposes”, as aforesaid. Therefore, that part of the clause would be inapplicable and irrelevant in the present case. So far as the petitioner’s submission, that the disclosure of Information would endanger the life and safety of the officers who tendered their opinion/advices, is concerned, as aforesaid, in the facts of the present case, may be addressed – by resorting to section 10 of the Act. The exemption u/s. 8(1)(g) of the Act, therefore, as claimed by the Petitioner, would be no ground for disallowing the disclosure of the information (sought by the Respondent) in the facts of the present case.

The other information sought related to the note sheets and final opinion rendered by the UPSC regarding imposition of penalty/punishment on the charged offer. Such information, as is evident from a plain reading, relates to noting and opinion post investigation i.e., after the investigation is complete. Disclosure of such information cannot, by any means whatsoever be held to “impede the process of investigation” which could be raised only when an investigation is ongoing. As such, the exemption u/s. 8(1)(h) of the Act also cannot be raised by the petitioner in the present case.

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Registration of Marriage – Personal appearance of parties to marriage not necessary for presenting application – All marriage solemnised within state should be compulsorily be registered irrespective of religion of parties: Kerala Registration of Marriage (common) R ules, 2008:

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[Najma Sirajudden Musliyar vs. Registrar General of Marriages/Deputy Director of Panchayath & Anr AIR 2012 Kerala 115]

The Petitioner was aggrieved by the non acceptance of an application submitted before the second respondent for registration of her marriage, under the provisions of Kerala Registration of Marriage (Common) Rules, 2008. According to her, she married a person of Indian origin, who subsequently acquired citizenship of United Arab Emirates (UAE). The marriage was solemnised as per religious rites and customs and it is registered at ‘Kottol Mahallu Juma Masjid’. The Secretary of the Juma Masjid had issued Marriage Certificate about conduct of the marriage as per religious rites. The Complaint of the petitioner was that 2nd respondent had not received the application for registration submitted stating reasons that, both the spouses should appear in person for submitting such application and that a marriage in which a foreign national is one of the parties cannot be registered under the said Rules.

The Hon’ble Court held that there was no need for personal appearance of the parties to the marriage, for presenting the application for registration. The court further relied on the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Seema v. Aswani Kumar (2006 (1) KLT 791 (SC)) in which a direction was issued to all state Governments to formulate Rules for compulsory registration of marriages, irrespective of religion of the parties. The Rule 6 indicates that all marriage solemnised within the state should compulsorily be registered, irrespective of religion of the parties. Nowhere in the Rules, it can be noticed of any insistence about the nationality of the parties contracting the marriage. On consideration of the relevant personal law (Mohammedan Law), no prohibition can be pointed out with respect to a foreign national marrying an Indian lady, if both of them are professing the religion of Islam. Hence, the objection raised by the 2nd respondent for registration of marriage was unsustainable.

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Guarantor liability – Co-extensive with that of debtor – Financial institution – Not to act as property dealers: Contract Act 1872, sec. 128:

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[ Ram Kishun & Ors vs. State of UP and Ors AIR 2012 SC 2288.]

One Ganga Prasad had taken an agricultural loan to the tune of Rs.8,425/- from the Union Bank of India on 20.3.1982 and Chuni Lal, father of the Appellant stood guarantor. Ganga Prasad, debtor died in 1985 and Chuni Lal died in 1986. Ganga Prasad could not pay the loan during his life time. Therefore, the bank initiated the proceedings for recovery and ultimately sent the matter to the District Collector, Banda, for realisation of the loan amount as an arrear of land revenue.

In order to make the recovery, land belonging to said Ganga Prasad was put to auction and it could fetch only a sum of Rs. 6,000/-. In order to recover the balance amount, the proceedings were initiated against the Appellants as their father had stood guarantor. The Appellants raised objections that instead of putting their property to auction, the loan amount be recovered from legal heirs of Ganga Prasad as he had left movable/immovable properties and livestocks and other assets to meet the recovery of the bank loan. Their objections were not accepted and the land of the Appellants was put to auction. Respondent No. 4 purchased the said land for Rs.25,000/-. The sale was confirmed and sale certificate was issued by the Collector in favour of Respondent No. 4 and he was put in possession. Aggrieved, the Appellants approached the Board of Revenue, U.P. by filing Revision. However, the same was dismissed. The High Court upheld the said revisional order of the Commissioner.

The Court, on further appeal, observed that there can be no dispute to the settled legal proposition of law that in view of the provisions of section 128 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, the liability of the guarantor/surety is co-extensive with that of the debtor. Therefore, the creditor has a Dr. K. Shivaram Ajay R. Singh Advocates Allied laws right to obtain a decree against the surety and the principal debtor. The surety has no right to restrain execution of the decree against him until the creditor has exhausted his remedy against the principal debtor, for the reason that it is the business of the surety/guarantor to see whether the principal debtor has paid or not. The surety does not have a right to dictate terms to the creditor as to how he should make the recovery and pursue his remedies against the principal debtor at his instance. Section 146 of the Contract Act provides that co-sureties are liable to contribute equally. Thus, in case there are more than one surety/guarantor, they have to share the liability equally unless the agreement of contract provides otherwise.

A person cannot be deprived of his property except in accordance with the provisions of statute. (Vide: Lachhman Dass vs. Jagat Ram and Ors.: (2007) 10 SCC 448; and Narmada Bachao Andolan v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr. AIR 2011 SC 1589). Thus, the condition precedent for taking away someone’s property or disposing of the secured assets, is that the authority must ensure compliance of the statutory provisions.

 Therefore, it becomes a legal obligation on the part of the authority that the property be sold in such a manner that it may fetch the best price. Thus essential ingredients of such sale remain a correct valuation report and fixing the reserve price.

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PART A : Decision of CIC & Supreme Court

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Personal Information, section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act, 2005

CPIO vide letter dated 21.12.2010 stated that information relating to PAN and other information relating to PAN such as address, documents submitted as proof of identity and address is personal information of the PAN holder and subject to confidentiality u/s. 138 of IT Act. Moreover, the information submitted by applicant along with PAN application form is held by the department in a fiduciary capacity and is of a personal nature, hence exempt from disclosure u/s. 8(1)(e) and 8(1)(j) unless the competent authority is satisfied that larger public interest warrants disclosure of such information. The CPIO also quoted several CIC orders including the case of Ms. Anumeha dated 29.04.2008.

Decision:
The information sought is of a personal nature. CPIO had issued a notice u/s. 11(1) and the Globe Transport Corporation had urged the CPIO not to share any personal information with the appellant. The Commission agrees with the stand taken by the CPIO/AA that the information sought is exempt from disclosure u/s. 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act.

[H K Sharma vs Income Tax Department, New Delhi: CIC/DS/A/2011/001229/RM: Decision dated 08-06-2012]

Facts:

Vide RTI application dated 14-10-2010, the appellant had sought certified copies of IT returns and supporting documents filed by Hrishikesh Gaderia during the last 20 years.

CPIO vide his letter dated 11-11-2010 informed the appellant that a notice u/s. 11(1) had been served on Shri Gaderia, who had opposed sharing of any information pertaining to his IT returns etc. Shri Gaderia had submitted that “the applicant has no right to demand any personal information or any information relating to his business. The information in respect of his business, insurance paid and information in respect of taxes paid is confidential and personal in nature and hence may not be supplied to the applicant, as there will be heavy financial and business loss, if this information is supplied to the applicant or to any third person”. The CPIO held that information furnished to the IT department is strictly in trust, being in fiduciary capacity and no public interest is involved. In view of the above, the CPIO denied information u/s. 8(1)(d), 8(1)(e) and 8(1)(j).

Decision:
In the case of Milap Choraria dated 15-06.2009, a Full Bench of the CIC had upheld the decision of the CPIO and AA in holding that the Income Tax Returns are ‘personal information’ exempted from disclosure u/s. 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act. In the instant case, the AA has correctly applied exemption u/s. 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act from disclosure of information. The decision of the AA is therefore upheld.

[Farid Shaikh vs Income Tax Department, Thane: CIC /DS/A/2011/001338/RM: Decision dated 21.06.2012]

Facts:
Applicant submitted RTI application dated 31st May 2011 before the CPIO, United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Aliganj, Lucknow to obtain information broadly through five points pertaining to time gap between date of issue of policy bond and date of transfer of the policy bond to the TPA along with copy of the agreement between Company and the TPA.

Decision
After hearing both parties and on perusal of the facts on record the Commission directed as follows:

Point 1: With reference to the information sought under this point by the appellant, we find that it is necessary to strike a fine balance between disclosure of information in larger public interest and simultaneously ensure that the privacy of the policy holder is protected as per the provisions of section 8(1)(j). Therefore, Commission directs the CPIO to provide the appellant with the total number of Mediclaim policies which were dispatched to the TPA after one week of the date of issue.

Point 2
: Respondent to provide the appellant with a copy of the agreement between United India Insurance Co. and E-Meditak (TPA) Services Ltd., Gurgaon.

Point 3
: Appellant insists on having specific information and is not satisfied with the term “immediately”. Accordingly, respondent is directed to provide the appellant with copy of the Company’s rule governing this issue.

Information as above to be provided within one week of the order.

Commission is satisfied that the subject matter of this RTI application pertains to an issue of larger public interest in that, it touches upon that moment in the life of the insured when he is suffering from ill health and requires urgent support from the umbrella provided to him through the Mediclaim policy taken by him. Therefore, under the provisions of section 4, section 8(2) and section 25(5) of the RTI Act, Commission recommends to CMD, Head Office, United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Chennai to give directions to all Branch Managers to put up on the Company’s website the following information:

i) Number of the Mediclaim policies (no names are required to be given).

ii) Date of issue of Mediclaim Policy Bond.

iii) Date of transfer of the said policy bond to the TPA.

CPIO, Head Office is directed to follow up on this matter. Compliance be done by 16th August 2012. Such disclosure will undoubtedly strengthen the safety net to the insured and also cement the relationship of trust between the Insurance Company and insured, thereby strengthening the foundation of the Insurance Industry. Since this is a matter of larger public interest, using this as test case, Commission will review compliance of this order on 28.8.2012 at 3.00 PM at NIC Video conferencing, Room No. 110, 1st Floor, Yojana Bhavan, No 9, Sarojini Naidu Marg, Lucknow-22 6001 (UP), Contact Officer Mr Diwan Singh, Scientist-D and Contact Nos: 0522-2238059/2298822/2298823 on which date respondent CPIO is directed to appear before the Commission via video conferencing.

[Dr Anshu Agrawal vs United India Insurance Co Ltd: CIC/DS/A/2011/003245: Decision dated 28.06.2012]

Facts:

The Petitioner had submitted an application on 27.8.2008 before the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner (Ministry of Labour, Government of India) calling for various details relating to third respondent, (i.e. Mr. Lute) who was employed as an Enforcement Officer in Sub-Regional Office, Akola, now working in the State of Madhya Pradesh. As many as 15 queries were made to which the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Nagpur gave the following reply on 15.9.2008:

“As to Point No.1: Copy of appointment order of Shri A.B. Lute, is in three pages. You have sought the details of salary in respect of Shri A.B. Lute, which relates to personal information, the disclosures of which has no relationship to any public activity or interest, it would cause unwarranted invasion of the privacy of individual, hence denied as per the RTI provision u/s. 8(1) (j) of the Act.

As to Point 2: Copy of order of granting Enforcement Officer Promoting to Shri A. B. Lute, is in 3 Number. Details of salary to the post along with statutory and other deductions of Mr Lute is denied to provide, as per RTI provisions u/s. 8(1)(j) for the reason’s mentioned above

As to Point No. 3: All the transfer orders of Shri A. B. Lute, are in 13 Number. Salary details is rejected.

As to Point No. 4: The copies of memo, show cause notice, censure issued to Mr Lute, are not being provided on the ground that it would cause unwarranted invasion of the privacy of the individual and has no relationship to any public activity or interest.

As Point No. 5: Copy of EPF (Staff & Conditions) Rules 1962 is in 60 pages.

As Point No. 6: Copy of return of assets and liabilities in respect of Mr. Lute cannot be provided.

As to Point No. 7: Details of investment and other related details are rejected.

As to Point No. 8: Copy of report of item wise and value wise details of gifts accepted by Mr. Lute is rejected.

As to Point No. 9: Copy of details of movable, immovable properties of Mr Lute, the request to provide the same is rejected.

As Point No. 10, 11& 12 are not relevant, are not covered here.

As to Point No. 13: Certified True copy of complete enquiry proceeding initiated against Mr. Lute – It would cause unwarranted invasion of privacy of individuals and has no relationship to any public activity or interest.

As to Point No. 14: It would cause unwarranted invasion of privacy of individuals and has no relationship to any public activity or interest.

As to Point 15: Certified true copy of second show cause notice – would cause unwarranted invasion of privacy of individuals and has no relationship to any public activity or interest.

Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner approached the CIC. The CIC passed the order on 18.6.2009, the operative portion of the order reads as under:

“The question for consideration is whether the aforesaid information sought by the Appellant can be treated as ‘personal information’ as defined in clause (j) of section 8(1) of the RTI Act. It may be pertinent to mention that this issue came up before the Full Bench of the Commission in Appeal No.CIC/ AT/A/2008/000628 (Milap Choraria v. Central Board of Direct Taxes) and the Commission vide its decision dated 15.6.2009 held that “the Income Tax return have been rightly held to be personal information exempted from disclosure under clause (j) of section 8(1) of the RTI Act by the CPIO and the Appellate Authority, and the appellant herein has not been able to establish that a larger public interest would be served by disclosure of this information. This logic would hold good as far as the ITRs of Shri Lute is concerned. I would like to further observe that the information which has been denied to the appellant essentially falls in two parts – (i) relating to the personal matters pertaining to his services career; and (ii) Shri Lute’s assets & liabilities, movable and immovable properties and other financial aspects. I have no hesitation in holding that this information also qualifies to be the ‘personal information’ as defined in clause (j) of section 8(1) of the RTI Act and the appellant has not been able to convince the Commission that disclosure thereof is in larger public interest.”

The CIC, after holding so, directed the second respondent to disclose the information at paragraphs 1, 2, 3 (only posting details), 5, 10, 11, 12, 13 (only copies of the posting orders) to the appellant within a period of four weeks from the date of the order. Further, it was held that the information sought for with regard to the other queries did not qualify for disclosure.

Aggrieved by the CIC’s said order, the petitioner filed a writ petition No.4221 of 2009, which came up for hearing before a learned Single Judge and the court dismissed the same vide order dated 16.2.2010. The matter was taken up by way of Letters Patent Appeal No.358 of 2011 before the Division Bench and the same was dismissed vide order dated 21.12. 2011. Against the said order, this special leave peti-tion has been filed. Supreme Court passed the following order:

“We are, in this case, primarily concerned with the scope and interpretation to clauses (e), (g) and (j) of section 8(1) of the RTI Act.

We are in agreement with the CIC and the Courts below that the details called for by the petitioner i.e. copies of all memos issued to the third respondent, show cause notices and orders of censure/punishment etc. are qualified to be personal information as defined in clause (j) of section 8(1) of the RTI Act. The performance of an employee/ officer in an organisation is primarily a matter between the employee and the employer and normally those aspects are governed by the service rules which fall under the expression “personal information”, the disclosure of which has no relationship to any public activity or public interest. On the other hand, the disclosure of which would cause unwar-ranted invasion of privacy of that individual. Of course, in a given case, if the Central Public Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer or the Appellate Authority is satisfied that the larger public interest justifies the disclosure of such information, appropriate orders could be passed, but the petitioner cannot claim those details as a matter of right”.

“The details disclosed by a person in his income tax returns are “personal information” which stand exempted from disclosure under clause (j) of section 8(1) of the RTI Act, unless it involves a larger public interest and the Central Public Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer or the Appellate Authority is satisfied that the larger public interest justifies the disclosure of such information”.

“The petitioner in the instant case has not made a bona fide public interest in seeking information, the disclosure of such information would cause unwarranted invasion of privacy of the individual u/s. 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act”.

“We are, therefore, of the view that the petitioner has not succeeded in establishing that the information sought for is for the larger public interest. That being the fact, we are not inclined to entertain this special leave petition. Hence, the same is dismissed”.

[Girish Deshpande vs CIC and others: Special Leave Petition (Civil) No 27734 of 2012: Order dated 03.10.2012]

Is It Fair to Levy stt on Traders?

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Stock Exchanges play a very important role in the economy of a country – helping to raise capital for businesses, mobilising savings for investment, creating investment opportunities, assisting the government to raise funds for various development projects, etc. It is aptly said “the stock exchange is the barometer of the economy”.

For the proper and efficient functioning of the stock exchanges, apart from investors, various other types of players like speculators, jobbers, traders, hedgers and arbitrageurs, etc. are not only necessary but obligatory. They are referred to as market participants and each of them plays a specific role in the stock market. While speculators and jobbers provide liquidity as well as volume to the market, hedgers provide depth to the market. Traders help in volume and price discovery whereas arbitrageurs fine-tune prices by correcting price abnormalities. Investors usually invest and hold shares for a comparatively longer period of time.

Currently, the stock market is in a pathetic situation. Markets have become stagnant and trade in a narrow range. Sometimes, on getting news of some event, the market becomes highly volatile and individual stocks show very erratic movements which is due to the lack of depth in the market. The stagnancy in the market is the result of lack of many of market participants like traders, jobbers as well as speculators, who have either deserted the market or are unwilling to initiate trades due to excessive transaction costs. Even arbitrageurs are finding it difficult to use any opportunity, since the costs of transaction are greater than the arbitrage difference. The combined effect of all these is that the investors, especially small investors, are unable to get proper prices to buy/sell their investments, which in turn has resulted in increased impact costs for them.

Earlier, when the transaction costs were not so high, there was room for every market participant to function in the market and trade without restraint of prohibitive costs. However, with the introduction of the Securities Transaction Tax (STT), the costs have escalated to such a level that it has become difficult for the market participants to survive. They desist from entering into transactions due to entry level tax (STT, which is levied at the time of transaction) and thus, overall market liquidity, volume and depth have been impacted adversely.

It was announced in the budget speech that the STT is introduced to avoid the differential tax treatment meted out to capital gains. So, only those investors (actually, bigheads like promoters, FIIs, etc.) whose income from share transactions is taxed as “Capital Gains” are benefited by the imposition of STT with favourable tax treatment whereas, a majority of the market participants like speculators, jobbers, traders, hedgers, arbitrageurs who have income from share transactions which is taxable as “Business Income”, under the head “Profits and Gains of Business or Profession” are left high and dry without any tax benefit on such income, despite the transactions entered into by them also bear the charge of STT.

Let us understand the above with the help of an example, when two identical transactions in shares are executed – one by an investor and another by other market participant, say, a jobber. At first stage, both of them will be charged STT on the transactions executed. However, the income of the investor from that transaction will be exempt from tax thereafter, whereas, the income of the jobber will be taxed again at regular rates. Thus, the market participants have been subjected to double taxation and meted out a stepmotherly treatment under the STT regime. If the favourable treatment is granted only to “Capital Gains” income, then only those transactions pertaining to the income taxable under the head “Capital Gains” should have been subjected to the STT and all other transactions should have been exempted from the STT. Doing otherwise not only impacts the market participants adversely, but also violates “principle of natural justice” and “law of equity”.

Although initially, some relief was granted in the form of tax rebate, the same was discontinued without assigning any reasons whatsoever. Ultimately, the new scheme of taxation on securities transactions has miserably failed to bring win-win situation for all. It has only helped the FIIs, promoters and to an extent, a small class of investors at the cost of all other market participants, who are also equally important for the functioning of the stock market. Slowly and steadily, market participants are drifting away from the stock market which in the long run, has impaired the proper functioning of the stock markets.

To remedy the situation and help the market participants survive, it is suggested to grant proper tax treatment to the market participants, keeping in view the legal principles of natural justice and equity. This can be achieved by segregating the stock market transactions into “taxable transactions” and “exempt transactions” based on whether the order is a “client type/Institution ID” or “Trd category” (i.e trading category). Alternatively, the rebate allowed earlier u/s. 88 E may be restored.

This will ensure that there is no undue high trading costs to the market participants.

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Recovery of tax – Director of a company not personally liable for sales tax dues of company: Gujarat Value Added Tax Act 2003:

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C.V. Cherian vs. C.A. Patel (2012) 51 VST 71 (Guj.)

Whether for the purpose of recovery of sales tax dues under the Gujarat Value Added Tax Act and Gujarat Sales Tax Act against a private limited company, the personal property belonging to the managing director of such company can be attached and sold for realisation of the dues against the company?

The said proceedings are challenged on the ground that the company and its directors being separate legal entities, the liability of the company to pay sales tax cannot be fastened on the directors personally or on the personal properties of the directors, in the absence of any provision to that effect under the Gujarat Sales tax Act, 1969.

The property in question at no point of time belonged to the company nor is it the case that the managing director is holding property as “benamdar”. In that view of the matter, the attachment and proposed auction of the residential building was on the face of it without jurisdiction. The Hon’ble Court relied on its earlier order in case of Choksi vs. State of Gujarat (2012) 51 VST 73 (Guj.)

The Court observed that the respondents were not in a position to point out any statutory provision empowering the sales tax authorities to fasten the liability of company on its directors in the matter of payment of sales tax dues. The section 26 containing the said provision regarding liability to pay tax in certain cases, covers several contingencies such as the liability in respect of the business carried on by an individual dealer after his death, the liability in respect of the dues where the dealer was an HUF and there is partition amongst various members or group of members; there is dissolution of a partnership firm and also in case of transfer of business in whole or in part. Unlike section 179 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, there is no provision in the Sales Tax Act fastening the liability of the company to pay its sales tax dues on its directors.

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Books of account – Rejection without assigning reason – Not justified: U.P. Trade Tax Act, 1948

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Sardar Mini Rice Mill vs. Commissioner, Trade Tax, U.P. Lucknow (2012) 51 VST 283 (All)

The petitioner dealer was a proprietary concern engaged in manufacturing and trade of rice and rice bran. A survey was conducted in the business premises of dealer on March 15, 2003. Neither the accountant nor the proprietor was available on the spot during the survey. The aged father of the proprietor was present who stated that the proprietor has gone outside. The books of account were produced later, but were rejected and assessment made on estimate basis. This was affirmed by the Tribunal.

On a revision petition, the High Court observed, that in the absence of the books of account at the time of survey, the stocks were not verified but the fact remained that, at a later stage, the books of account were produced by the dealer but were rejected without assigning any reason. There was no finding by the Tribunal that the dealer failed to show the cash book at the time of survey with mala fide intention. On the facts, the Tribunal was in error in affirming the rejection of the books only on the ground that the cash book could not be shown at the time of survey. The version of the dealer on the facts and circumstances of the case should have been accepted. The assessing officer directed to accept the books of account maintained by the dealer and make de novo assessment accordingly.

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Compensation — Deceased persons were gratuitous passengers — Insurance company not liable; Motor Vehicle Act, 1988.

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[ Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Raigarh (CG) v. Keshav Agrawal & Ors., AIR 2011 Chhattisgarh 169.]

The controversy in the appeals, was as to whether the persons travelling in the truck were gratuitous passengers or sitting in the truck in their capacity as owners of the goods being carried in the truck, in terms section 147(1)(b)(i) of the Motor Vehicle Act.

The High Court observed that a bare perusal of final report would show deceased Vijay Kumar Agrawal and Suresh Shah along with other deceased/injured persons were travelling in the truck in question as gratuitous passengers and not in their capacity as owners of the goods being carried in the vehicle.

The Act does not contemplate that a goods carriage shall carry a large number of persons with a small percentage of goods as considerably the insurance policy covers the death or injuries either of the owner of the goods or his authorised representative. Further, the owner of the goods means only the person who travels in the cabin of the vehicle and travelling with the goods itself does not entitle anyone to protection u/s.147 of the Act.

The Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Cholleti Bharatamma and Others, (2008) 1 SCC 423, AIR 2008 SC 484, held as under:

“It is now well settled that the owner of the goods means only the person who travels in the cabin of the vehicle.”

By applying the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case referred hereinabove, the Court held that deceased Vijay Kumar Agrawal and Suresh Shah were travelling in truck as gratuitous passengers and not as owners of the goods being carried in the truck. Thus statutory liability of the insurance policy cannot be extended to cover the risk of gratuitous passengers sitting in the goods carriage vehicle.

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IS IT FAIR TO LEVY MAT

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The economics behind direct taxation is twofold:

i. Collection of revenue for the State in a manner to reduce the inequality in the distribution of wealth, and

ii. Using it as a fiscal tool for channelisation of the economy into desired sectors.

The first objective is achieved by enacting the Direct Taxes Laws and empowering the State to alter the tax rates annually while preparing the Budget for the ensuing financial year. The second objective is achieved by providing various tax incentives in the form of tax holiday (deduction or exemption), accelerated depreciation, etc. Needless to mention that various tax incentives provided by the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘the Act’) have contributed to a large extent in the development of the Indian economy to bring it to its present state.

The above two objectives are conflicting with each other, in a way. Hence a proper balance has to be maintained between the two. But this is often lost sight of by the law-makers.

A typical example is levy of Minimum Alternate Tax (MAT) on book profits of companies. MAT was introduced for the first time in India u/s.115J by the Finance Act, 1987 and later removed, reintroduced and amended from time to time. This article is intended to raise a basic question whether levy of MAT is at all justified in the light of the second objective stated above.

The advocates of MAT basically give the argument that corporates should not be allowed to have two faces — one for the shareholders and the other for the State. In simple words, when they have huge profits in books of account but no or lesser ‘total income’ under ‘the Act’, they should pay MAT. But then, how did the corporates have no or lesser ‘total income’ under ‘the Act’? It was only because of tax incentives given by the State. For example, a company engaged in development of infrastructure facility is allowed a 100% deduction of profits derived from such business for a period of 10 consecutive years out of a total period of 20 years. Now assuming that it is the sole business of the company, its ‘total income’ under ‘the Act’ shall be nil (subject of course to the enormous litigation on the word ‘derived from’) but will have a positive book profits, on which it has to pay MAT @ 18%. It indirectly implies that deduction allowed u/s.80IA becomes only 40%. This result could have been achieved by simply amending section 80IA and restricting the deduction to 40% (Tax on 60% of the profits @ 30% is nothing but MAT of 18% on 100% profits). The same situation can be visualised in several other tax incentives like:

i. Deduction u/s.80IB to u/s.80IE
ii. Deduction u/s.10A, u/s.10B & u/s.10AA
iii. Additional depreciation @ 20% for new machineries (for manufacturers)
iv. Allowance of capital cost u/s.35AD for eligible business (obviously in books, these exp. will be capitalised giving rise to huge difference between book profits and total income)
v. Weighted deduction of 175% or 200% for R&D
vi. LTCG u/s.10(38) [when it is said that exemption u/s.10(38) is in lien of STT, where comes the need for MAT on such LTCG for corporates, as if they don’t pay STT?]
vii. Exemption u/s.54EC or u/s.54D or u/s.54G or u/s.54GA.
viii. Subsequent deduction u/s.40(a)(ia) or u/s.43B because of late compliance.

If the above situations are to be taxed anyway, then those sections themselves can be amended or deleted. No doubt, MAT credit is allowed to be carried forward u/s.115JAA; but its utilisation in future is subject to many contingencies and restrictions and we accountants are well aware of the time value of money.

We must debate on the question whether it is justified to levy MAT on book profits especially on tax incentives like 10AA or 80IA, etc.? I believe, it is a violation of the principle of ‘Promissory Estoppel’ ! ! !

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New Rules for the availability of names have been issued by the Central Government ‘Companies (Name Availability) Rules, 2011’.

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Please visit MCA website for complete text of the circular:

http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/Companies_ rules_15Mar2011.pdf

The following Notifications for affecting sections 5, 6, 20, 29, 30 & 31 of Competition Act have been issued vide Notification dated 4-3-2011.

1. In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (a) of section 54 of the Competition Act, 2002 (12 of 2003), the Central Government, in public interest, hereby exempts an enterprise, whose control, shares, voting rights or assets are being acquired has assets of the value of not more than Rs.250 crores or turnover of not more than RS.750 crores from the provisions of section 5 of the said Act for a period of five years.

2. In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (a) of section 54 of the Competition Act, 2002 (12 of 2003), the Central Government, in public interest, hereby exempts the ‘Group’ exercising less than 50% of voting rights in other enterprise from the provisions of section 5 of the said Act for a period of five years.

3. In exercise of the powers conferred by subsection (3) of section 1 of the Competition Act, 2002 (12 of 2003), the Central Government hereby appoints the 1st day of June, 2011 as the date on which sections 5, 6, 20, 29, 30 and section 31 of the said Act shall come into force.

4. In exercise of the powers conferred by subsection (3) of section 20, of the Competition Act, 2002 (12 of 2003), the Central Government, in consultation with the Competition Commission of India, hereby enhance, on the basis of the wholesale price index, the value of assets and the value of turnover, by 50% for the purposes of section 5 of the said Act.

Please visit MCA website for complete text of the notification:

http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/notification/pdf/ Notification_4mar2011(4).pdf

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Simplification of DIN Rules.

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In order to speed up and simplify the process to obtain a DIN, the below mentioned procedure has been recommended:

1. Application for DIN will be made on eForm. No physical submission of documents shall be accepted and for this purpose. Scanned documents along with verification by the applicant will be attached with the eForm. Only online fee payment will be allowed i.e., No challan payment.

2. The application can also be submitted online by the applicant himself using his DSC.

3. DIN 1 eForm can be digitally signed by the professional who shall also confirm that he has verified the particulars of the applicant given in the application.

4. Where the DIN 1 is verified by the professional, the DIN will be approved by the system immediately online.

5. In other cases the DIN cell will examine the application and the same shall be disposed of within one or two days.

6. Companies (Directors Identification Number) Rules, 2006 are being amended on the above lines.

7. Penal action against the applicant and professional certifying the DIN application in case of false information/certification as per provisions of section 628 of the Act will be taken in addition to action for professional misconduct and revocation of DIN, allotted on false information.

8. The above procedures is expected to enable allotment of DIN on the same day.

9. The above procedures applies to filing of DIN 4 intimating changes in particulars of Directors.

A Notification to notify the aforesaid procedure is being issued. After issue of necessary Notification, the applicant/professionals/DIN cell are advised to follow the notified procedures for allotment of DIN.

Please visit MCA website for complete text of the Circular: http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/ Circular_04Mar2011.pdf

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Process of incorporation of companies (Form-1) and establishment of principal place of business in India by foreign companies (Form-44) — Procedure simplified.

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General Circular No. 6/2011 — In order to speed up and simplify the process of incorporation of companies and establishment of principal place of business in India by foreign companies for reduction in time taken by Registrar of Companies, the belowmentioned procedure has been recommended:

1. Only Form 1 shall be approved by the ROC Office Form 18 and 32 shall be processed by the system online.

2. There shall be one more category, i.e., Incorporation Forms (Form 1A, Form 37, 39, 44 and 68) which will have the highest priority for approval.

3. Average time taken for incorporation of company should be reduced to one (1) day only.

A Notification to notify minor changes in e-forms 18 and 32 to enable them to be taken on record through STP mode for aforesaid procedure is being issued separately. Please visit MCA website for complete text of the circular: http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/ Circular_6-2011_8mar2011.pdf

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Payment of MCA fees — Only in electronic mode — Up to Rs.50000 w.e.f. 27-3-2011.

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In the interest of stakeholders, with a view to improving service delivery time, the Ministry has decided to accept payments of value up to Rs.50,000, for MCA 21 services, only in electronic mode w.e.f. 27th March, 2011.

For the payments of value above Rs.50,000, stakeholders would have the option to either make the payment in electronic mode, or paper challan. However such payments would also be made in electronic mode w.e.f. 1st October, 2011.

Please visit MCA website for complete text of the circular: http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/ Circular_9mar2011.pdf

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Exemption from taking Central Government for managerial remuneration.

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The MCA has granted a general relaxation to companies from the requirement for taking an approval of the Central Government for making payment of remuneration by way of commission to its non-whole-time director(s) in addition to the sitting fee, if the total commission to be paid to all those non-whole-time directors does not exceed:

1% of net profit of the company if it has one or more whole-time director

3% of the net profits of the company if it does not have a managing director or whole-time director(s). Please visit MCA website for complete text of the Circular: http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/ Circular_4-2011_4mar2011.pdf

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Indian Accounting Standards converged with IFRS — Notified.

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The MCA has notified thirty five Indian Accounting Standards (Ind-AS) converged with International Financial Reporting Standards and placed them on its website. The date of implementation of the Ind- AS will be notified by the MCA at a later date.

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Revised Schedule VI

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Revised Schedule VI which is available on the MCA website is applicable for Balance Sheet and Profit and Loss Account to be prepared for the financial year commencing on or after 1-4-2011 [Refer Notification No.50447CE dated 28th February as amended by notification dated 28th March 2011]. For details visit MCA website www.mca.giv.in

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General exemption under section 211 for companies

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The Central Government has issued a press release informing that a general exemption has been given to certain categories of companies from giving some specific disclosures required in part I of Schedule VI to the Companies Act.

Please visit the MCA website for the complete text of the press release:

http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/press/press/Press_ Note_No.2_08feb2011.pdf

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