Year: 2022

1.2 With respect to the employer’s contribution, section 36(1)(iv) of the Act grants a deduction in respect of any sum paid by the assessee as an employer by way of contribution towards a recognized provident fund or an approved superannuation fund. This provision has been part of the Act from the beginning.

1.3 The Finance Act, 1983 w.e.f. 1st April, 1984 introduced section 43B to provide that certain deductions are allowed only on actual payment. In short, it provides that the items covered under this section cannot be claimed as a deduction on an accrual basis. This provision contains a non- obstante clause and accordingly overrides other provisions of the Act. This section was amended from time to time to expand the scope thereof and also for various other reasons. Presently, section 43B covers items listed in clauses (a) to (g).

1.4 Section 2(24)(x) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘the Act’) provides that any sum received by an assessee from his employees as a contribution to employees’ welfare funds (such as PF, ESI etc.) shall be treated as income of the assessee employer. Section 36(1)(va) of the Act allows deduction of such sums to which section 2(24)(x) applies if it is credited to the employee’s account in the relevant fund on or before the due date as defined in Explanation 1 to section 36(1)(va), which inter alia provides that the due date for this purpose is the date by which the assessee is required as an employer to credit an employees’ contribution to the employee’s account in the relevant fund under the respective legislations etc. Both these provisions were introduced by the Finance Act, 1987 w.e.f. 1st April, 1988.

1.5 In the context of this write-up, some amendments made in the past in section 43B are worth noting. The Finance Act, 1987 introduced two provisos in section 43B w.e.f. 1st April, 1988. The first proviso, at the time of introduction, provided that the provisions of section 43B would not apply to any sum payable by the way of tax, duty, cess or fee which is actually paid by the assessee on or before the due date for furnishing his Return of Income u/s 139(1) for that year. The second proviso to section 43B [hereinafter referred to as the said Second Proviso] provided that no deduction in respect of any sum payable by an assessee employer by way of contribution to any provident or superannuation or gratuity or any other fund for the welfare of employees shall be allowed unless such sum has actually been paid during the previous year on or before the due date defined in the Explanation to section 36(1)(va).

1.5.1. The said Second Proviso was substituted by the Finance Act, 1989 to make the condition more rigorous with which we are not concerned in this write-up. The first proviso to section 43B (as subsequently amended before 2003) granting relief for permitting payment up to the applicable due date of furnishing the Return of Income was applicable to all the items listed in section 43B, except to the contribution to welfare funds (such as PF, etc.) which was governed by the said Second Proviso and accordingly, this had no benefit of relaxation provided in the first proviso to section 43B (referred to hereinbefore) for making payments up to the applicable due date of furnishing the Return of Income. This position prevailed till the amendments were made by the Finance Act, 2003 (w.e.f. 1st April, 2004) omitting the said Second Proviso and extending the benefit of relaxation provided in the first proviso for making such payment up to the applicable due date of furnishing the Return of Income also to contribution to PF, etc. (covered in section 43B(b)). For this, consequential amendment was also made in the first proviso which was made applicable to all the items listed in Section 43B w.e.f. 1st April, 2004 (hereinafter, this amended first proviso is referred to as the said First Proviso).As such, with these amendments, all the items listed in section 43B (including items listed in section 43B(b)) got covered by the relaxation provided in the said First Proviso to section 43B (hereinafter, these amendments are referred to as Amendment of 2003).

1.5.2 After the above amendments were made, but prior to the Amendment of 2003, the debate had started as to whether the relaxation granted in Section 43B by the introduction of the original first proviso to section 43B referred to in para 1.5 above (not applicable to the items covered in section 43B(b)) is clarificatory in nature and should apply to assessment years prior to A.Y. 1988-89. This issue was finally settled by the Supreme Court in Allied Motors (P) Ltd. [(1997) 224 ITR 677 –SC], and the Supreme Court, in that case, took the view that the benefit of that first proviso will apply retrospectively and will also be available for the assessment years prior to A.Y.1988-89.

1.5.3 After the deletion of the said Second Proviso to section 43B and extending the benefit of relaxation provided in the said First Proviso to section 43B to all the items listed in section 43B (including items covered in section 43B(b) such as contribution to PF, etc.) by the Amendment of 2003, the issue came-up before the various benches of Tribunal and High Courts that whether the Amendment of 2003 should be considered as clarificatory and on that ground should be applied to the assessment years prior to A.Y. 2004-05 to the items covered in section 43B (b) (contribution to welfare funds such as PF, etc.) even if such contributions are belatedly deposited in the relevant Fund so long as such payments are made on or before the applicable due date of furnishing the Return of income.

1.5.4 The Apex Court in the case of Vinay Cement Ltd. (213 CTR 268) dismissed the SLP filed by the Department against the judgment of the Gauhati High Court in the case of George Williamson (Assam) Ltd. (284 ITR 619) in a case dealing with the assessment year prior to A.Y. 2004-05, by stating that the assessee will be entitled to claim the benefit in section 43B for that period also particularly in view of the fact that he has made the contribution to P.F. before filing of the return. Thereafter, the issue referred to in para 1.5.3 finally came-up before the Supreme Court in the case of Alom Extrusions Ltd. [2009] 319 ITR 306 and the Supreme Court settled the issue by taking a view that the Amendment of 2003, omitting the said Second Proviso to Section 43B is clarificatory in nature and should apply retrospectively to the assessment years prior to A.Y. 2004-05. For this, the Court also relied on its judgment of Allied Motors (P) Ltd referred to in para 1.5.2.

1.5.5 The Supreme Court judgment in the case of Allied Motors (P) Ltd. referred to para 1.5.2 above was considered and analysed in this feature in the May 1997 issue of BCAJ. Similarly, the judgment of Alom Extrusions Ltd. referred to in para 1.5.4 above was also considered and analysed in this feature in the January 2010 issue of BCAJ.

1.6 In view of the deletion of the said Second Proviso and consequential amendment in the first proviso (referred to in para 1.5.2 above) by the Amendment of 2003, a further issue also arose as to whether an assessee is entitled to a deduction u/s 36(1)(va) r.w.s. 43B of the Act in respect of employees’ contributions which have been deposited in the Funds created under the respective legislations after the due dates prescribed therein. This issue had given rise to considerable litigation and was a subject matter of dispute before different authorities/High Courts. Many High Courts such as the Bombay High Courts in CIT-4, Mumbai vs. Hindustan Organics Chemicals Ltd. [2014] 366 ITR 1 and in CIT vs. Ghatge Patil Transports Ltd. [2014] 368 ITR 749, Delhi High Court in CIT vs. Dharmendra Sharma [2008] 297 ITR 320 and CIT vs. AIMIL Ltd. [2010] 321 ITR 508, Karnataka High Court in CIT vs. Spectrum Consultants India (P.) Ltd. [2013] 215 Taxman 597 and CIT vs. Magus Customers Dialog (P.) Ltd.[2015] 231 Taxman 379, Uttarakhand High Court in CIT vs. Kichha Sugar Co. Ltd.[2013] 356 ITR 351, Patna High Court in Bihar State Warehousing Corporation Ltd. vs. CIT-1 [2016] 386 ITR 410, Calcutta High Court in CIT-1 vs. Vijay Shree Ltd. [2014] 43 taxmann.com 396, Rajasthan High Court in CIT vs. State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur [2014] 363 ITR 70, etc. decided the issue in favour of the assessee. In these cases, the High Courts have largely relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Alom Extrusions Ltd (supra) without appreciating the fact that this judgment dealt with the case of employers’ contribution to PF, etc. and omission of the said Second Proviso to section 43B by the Amendment of 2003 should not affect the cases of employees’ contribution which is governed by section 36(1)(va). On the other hand, some High Courts such as the Gujarat High Court in CIT-II vs. Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation [2014] 366 ITR 170 (Gujarat) and CIT-I vs. Checkmate Services P. Ltd. (Tax Appeal No. 680 of 2014), Kerala High Court in CIT vs. Merchem Ltd. [2015] 378 ITR 443, etc. had decided the issue against the assessee and held that employees’ contribution in such cases will be governed only by the provisions of section 36(1)(va) which requires the payment of employees’ contribution strictly within the due date prescribed under the respective legislation and section 43B had no application to employees’ contribution.

1.7 Recently, this issue of allowability of claim for deduction of belated deposit of employees’ contribution referred to in para 1.6 above came-up before the Supreme Court in the case of Checkmate Services (P.) Ltd. (and other cases), and the Supreme Court has now settled this dispute and therefore, it is thought fit to consider in this feature.

“…….In the said case before Alom Extrusions Ltd., the controversy was whether the amendment in section 43B of the Act, vide Finance Act, 2003 would operate retrospectively w.e.f. 1/4/1988 or not. It is also required to be noted that in the case before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the controversy was with respect to employers’ contribution as per section 43(B)(b) of the Act and not with respect to employees’ contribution under section 36(1)(va). Before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Alom Extrusions Ltd. (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court had no occasion to consider deduction under section 36(1)(va) of the Act and with respect to employees’ contribution. As stated above, the only controversy before the Hon’ble Supreme Court was with respect to amendment (deletion) of the Second Proviso to section 43(B) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 by the Finance Act, 1963 operates w.e.f. 1/4/2004 or whether it operates retrospectively w.e.f. 1/4/1988. Under the circumstances, the learned tribunal has committed an error in relying upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Alom Extrusions Ltd. (supra) while passing the impugned judgment and order and deleting disallowance of the respective sums being employees’ contribution to PF Account / ESI Account, which were made by the AO while considering the proviso to section section 36(1) (va) of the Income Tax Act.”

3.2 The above decision was followed by the Gujarat High Court in the case of CIT- I vs. Checkmate Services P. Ltd. (Tax Appeal No. 680 of 2014) while dealing with the same issues of belated deposit of employees’ contribution to PF and ESI for A.Y. 2009-10, and the disallowance made by the AO in this respect was upheld by the High Court reversing the decision of the Tribunal which had decided the issue in favour of the assessee.

CHECKMATE SERVICES (P.) LTD. VS. CIT-1 [2022] 448 ITR 518 (SC)

4.2 Before the Supreme Court, on behalf of various assesses, different counsels had appeared (hereinafter referred to as the assessee) and had raised various contentions to support the case of the assessee for securing the deductions in respect of such belated deposit of employees’ contribution. These inter alia include: the assessee placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Alom Extrusions (supra). It was also urged that under the respective welfare legislations the employer was liable to make a composite payment comprising of the employer’s contribution as well as the contribution collected from the employees. Accordingly, the term “sum payable by the assessee as an employer by way of contribution” in section 43B(b) meant both the employer’s contribution as well as the employees’ contribution. The assessee further submitted that the explanation to section 36(1)(va) and the said Second Proviso were brought in together. Therefore, the deletion of the said Second Proviso was intended to give relief to the assesses. It was also urged that the non-obstante clause in section 43B would override other provisions including section 36(1)(va).

4.2.1 The assessee further submitted that sections 2(24)(x) and 36(1)(va) contemplated the amount which was received from its employees as contributions and not any sum which was deducted by the employer assessee from the payments made to employees. It was also urged that ‘received’ and ‘deducted’ are two different terms and cannot be used interchangeably. It was also contended that if the employer assessee deposits the employees’ contribution after the due date prescribed under the respective legislation it is subject to fine or other adverse consequences under that legislation and that the assessee should not be subjected to disallowance under the Act so long as employees’ contribution has been deposited before the applicable due date for furnishing the Return of Income. It was also prayed that the Court should adopt an interpretation that would be pragmatic and in consonance with fairness.

4.3 On behalf of the Revenue it was pointed out that the case of Alom Extrusions Ltd. (supra) was with respect to the employer’s contribution to PF account as opposed to employees’ contribution in the present case. It was also pointed out that the Act differentiated between employer’s contribution to which section 43B applied and employees’ contribution where section 36(1)(va) applied and both these provisions operated in different fields with respect to different contributions and, therefore, section 43B was inapplicable and could not override section 36(1)(va). Based on this, the Revenue contended that the said Second Proviso applied only to employer’s contribution as section 2(24)(x) and 36(1)(va) were still retained. The employees’ contribution stood on a different footing as it was deducted from employees’ salary and was in the nature of deemed income of the assessee as specifically indicated in section 2(24)(x).

4.3.1 The Revenue further contended that the Explanation to section 36(1)(va) which contained the definition of ‘due date’ was clear and if the employer did not deposit the contribution to the respective funds, he would not be entitled to deduction in respect of such sums. It was also submitted that a contribution deducted from the employee’s salary and deposited by the employer could not be termed as employer’s contribution.

4.4 After considering the rival contentions, the Supreme Court proceeded to decide the issue. For this purpose, the Court considered and noted the different relevant provisions/amendments made at different points of time. The Court also noted the fact that when section 36 (i)(va) was introduced, the provisions of Section 36(i)(iv) and 43B were already there on the Statute. The Court also noted that for the purpose of section 36(1)(va), the ‘due date’ is specially defined in the Explanation. The Court also noted the time limit provided for deposit of such contribution under the relevant legislations (EPF/ESI). The Court also noted the fact that the grace period of five days was allowed under the PF Scheme and discontinuance thereof by the Circular dated 8th October, 2016 under the said legislation. The Court also considered the reasons for introduction of section 36(i)(va) as mentioned in the Finance Minister’s speech at the relevant time.

4.5 The Court then stated that the employer’s contribution and the employee’s contribution stand on a different footing as evident from the intention of the Parliament. The Court also noted that the deduction in respect of employer’s contribution to recognized provident fund, etc. is the subject matter of Section 36(iv). Sections 36(1)(va) and 2(24)(x), which deal with employees’ contribution, were introduced by the Finance Act, 1987. With respect to these amendments, the Court stated as under (paras 32 and 33):

“…….This is a significant amendment, because Parliament intended that amounts not earned by the assessee, but received by it, – whether in the form of deductions, or otherwise, as receipts, were to be treated as income. The inclusion of a class of receipt, i.e., amounts received (or deducted from the employees) were to be part of the employer/assessee’s income. Since these amounts were not receipts that belonged to the assessee, but were held by it, as trustees, as it were, Section 36(1)(va) was inserted specifically to ensure that if these receipts were deposited in the EPF/ESI accounts of the employees concerned, they could be treated as deductions. Section 36(1)(va) was hedged with the condition that the amounts/receipts had to be deposited by the employer, with the EPF/ESI, on or before the due date. The last expression “due date” was dealt with in the explanation as the date by which such amounts had to be credited by the employer, in the concerned enactments such as EPF/ESI Acts. Importantly, such a condition (i.e., depositing the amount on or before the due date) has not been enacted in relation to the employer’s contribution (i.e., Section 36(1)(iv)).

33. The significance of this is that Parliament treated contributions under Section 36(1)(va) differently from those under Section 36(1)(iv)………”

4.6 The Supreme Court further observed that the essential character of an employees’ contribution was that it is a part of the employees’ income held in trust by the employer which is underlined by the condition that it has to be deposited on or before the due date. The distinction between employer’s contribution and the employee’s contribution was explained by the Supreme Court as under (para 53):

“The distinction between an employer’s contribution which is its primary liability under law – in terms of Section 36(1)(iv), and its liability to deposit amounts received by it or deducted by it (Section 36(1)(va)) is, thus crucial. The former forms part of the employers’ income, and the later retains its character as an income (albeit deemed), by virtue of Section 2(24)(x) – unless the conditions spelt by Explanation to Section 36(1)(va) are satisfied i.e., depositing such amount received or deducted from the employee on or before the due date. In other words, there is a marked distinction between the nature and character of the two amounts – the employer’s liability is to be paid out of its income whereas the second is deemed an income, by definition, since it is the deduction from the employees’ income and held in trust by the employer. This marked distinction has to be borne while interpreting the obligation of every assessee under Section 43B.”

Dealing with the argument of the assessee with regard to the effect of non-obstante clause, the Court held that the non-obstante clause in section 43B would not override the employer’s obligation to deposit the amounts retained or deducted from the employee’s income on or before the due date under respective legislations. In this respect the Court stated that (para54):

“ ……… The non-obstante clause has to be understood in the context of the entire provision of Section 43B which is to ensure timely payment before the returns are filed, of certain liabilities which are to be borne by the assessee in the form of tax, interest payment and other statutory liability. In the case of these liabilities, what constitutes the due date is defined by the statute. Nevertheless, the assessees are given some leeway in that as long as deposits are made beyond the due date, but before the date of filing the return, the deduction is allowed. That, however, cannot apply in the case of amounts which are held in trust, as it is in the case of employees’ contributions- which are deducted from their income. They are not part of the assessee employer’s income, nor are they heads of deduction per se in the form of statutory pay out. They are others’ income, monies, only deemed to be income, with the object of ensuring that they are paid within the due date specified in the particular law. They have to be deposited in terms of such welfare enactments. It is upon deposit, in terms of those enactments and on or before the due dates mandated by such concerned law, that the amount which is otherwise retained, and deemed an income, is treated as a deduction. Thus, it is an essential condition for the deduction that such amounts are deposited on or before the due date……”

4.8 The Court also considered the effect of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Alom Extrusions Ltd. (supra) on the issue under consideration as the assessee as well as various High Courts (deciding the issue in favour of the assessee) had largely relied on the same. For this, the Court referred to various findings given in that judgment and noted that the same was concerned with employer’s contribution. Finally, considering the issue on hand, the Court in this respect stated as under (para 45):

“A reading of the judgment in Alom Extrusions, would reveal that this court, did not consider Sections 2(24)(x) and 36(1)(va). Furthermore, the separate provisions in Section 36(1) for employers’ contribution and employees’ contribution, too went unnoticed……”

4.9 Considering the principles of interpretations, the Supreme Court observed that the general principle is that the taxing statutes are to be construed strictly, and that there is no room for equitable considerations. Further, one of the rules of interpretation of a tax statute is that if a deduction or exemption is available on compliance with certain conditions, the conditions are to be strictly complied with. For this, the Court referred to its various earlier decisions. As such, the prayer of the assessee to adopt an interpretation that would be pragmatic and in consonance with fairness did not find favour with the Supreme Court.

4.10 The Supreme Court concluded that employees’ contribution would be allowed as deduction only if payments are made before the due dates prescribed under the respective legislations and accordingly, dismissed the appeals of various assessees against the judgments of High Courts which had decided the issue against the assessees. As such, the judgments of all the High Courts (such as Bombay High Court etc.) referred to in para 1.6 above, in which the issue was decided in favour of the assessee, are no longer good law.

5.2 The assessee employers should ensure that each monthly payment of employees’ contributions is deposited as per the respective due dates. The deposit of such contribution for a particular month, if delayed by say even by few days will also be subjected to disallowance under the Act. In such cases, that would be a permanent loss of the deduction.

5.3 It is worth noting that the Court in the above case was concerned with the cases of admitted delay in case of employees’ contribution to PF, etc., beyond the due date provided in the Explanation (presently, Explanation 1 to section 36(1)(va)) and was not concerned with the determination of the due date in these cases. Therefore, in each case such due date will have to be determined first under the said Explanation which defines the ‘due date’ as the date by which such contribution is required to be credited to the employee’s account under the relevant fund under “any Act, rule, order or notification issued thereunder or under any standing order, award, contract of service or otherwise”. As such, the due date for this purpose will have to be determined on this basis considering the facts of each case. In the context of the issue raised before the Supreme Court in the above cases (regarding delay in deposit of employees’ contribution towards PF and ESI), the Court has held that such due date will have to be as per the respective legislations. As such, the emerging principle is that the due date for this purpose will have to be determined only on the basis of exhaustive definition of ‘due date’ given in the Explanation to section 36(1)(va) and the provisions of section 43B have no application to the cases of employees’ contribution.

5.4 The Finance Act, 2021 introduced Explanation 2 in section 36(1)(va) of the Act w.e.f. 1st April, 2021, clarifying that the provisions of section 43B shall not apply and shall be deemed never to have been applied for the purposes of determining the “due date” u/s 36(1)(va). The Finance Act, 2021, also introduced Explanation 5 in section 43B w.e.f. 1st April, 2021, clarifying that the provisions of section 43B shall not apply and shall be deemed never to have been applied to a sum received by the assessee from any of his employees to which the provisions of section 2(24)(x) apply. The Delhi High Court in the case of Pr. CIT vs. TV Today Network Ltd. [2022] 141 taxmann.com 275 (Delhi) held that these amendments made by the Finance Act, 2021 are prospective in nature and would take effect from 1st April, 2021.

5.5 The Supreme Court in the case of ACIT vs. Saurashtra Kutch Stock Exchange Ltd. [2008] 305 ITR 227 (SC) has observed that it is a well-settled principle that a judicial decision acts retrospectively and that Judges do not make law, they only discover or find the correct law. Accordingly, the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in Checkmate Services (P.) Ltd. with respect to the deductibility of employees’ contribution would apply even for the past assessment years, and the decision of Delhi High Court in TV Today Network (supra) with respect to the prospective application of the amendments by the Finance Act, 2021 would lose its significance. In our view, considering the nature of details required to be given in clause 20(b) of Form No 3CD for the purpose of Tax Audit u/s 44AB, the above judgment dated 12th October, 2022 should not have any direct impact on this reporting requirement.

5.5.1 As the above judgment of the Supreme Court will affect past assessment years also (pending/completed/ in litigation), the liability to pay interest (unless waived, more so in the jurisdictions of High Courts [referred to in para 1.6 above], where the issue was decided in favour of the assessee) is also likely to arise for the past years in many cases. In our view, for the past years, the question of penalty u/s 271(1)(c)/ 270A should not arise as a large number of High Courts had decided the issue in favour of the assessee, more so in the jurisdictions of such High Courts. Knowing how the Department functions in levy of such penalty, especially at the ground level, it would be just and fair for the CBDT to issue general instructions to not levy this penalty in such cases to avoid fruitless litigations on the penalty issue.

5.6 Literally construed, it would appear that the judgment in the above case is correct. The liberal approach adopted by many High Courts (referred to in para1.6 above) has not found favour with the Supreme Court in the above case and the Court applied the principle of strict construction while interpreting taxing statute and interpreted the provisions of section 36(1)(va) on that basis, more so because of the historical background of various amendments made in this respect including in section 43B revealing that even the intention of the Parliament in enacting section 36(1)(va) dealing with employees’ contribution to the PF, etc. is to treat employer’s and employee’s contribution towards PF etc. differently under the Act.

5.7 The possible debate in this respect could be whether the judgment is fair and just. While fairness and justice are not relevant for interpreting a taxing statute as held by courts from time to time in the past, they also are not enemies of taxing statute. One way of looking at the above judgment is that it is fair and just, as Revenue would like to believe, on the ground that the employers having retained the money of the employees, as a trustee, cannot delay the deposit thereof in the relevant fund beyond the prescribed/ specified period. Ideally, this could be true, but the larger question is: is it correct, or even in the national interest, to draft and interpret such laws bearing in mind the ideal situation (which, in practice, is nothing but a myth) as this ignores the ground reality of the way in which the business affairs are run, more so by small and medium business entities in this country. The business entities have to comply with numerous laws and regulations in this country and face the music from officials administering such laws and regulations, apart from running their business and dealing with business-related issues on a day-to-day basis. To comply with the requirements of such laws and regulations of the kind in question, business entities have to depend on lower staff, and some unintended mistakes do take place in real-life situations. No human being can claim that he is perfect. Apart from this, there could be many unforeseen contingencies (such as loss of power or internet connectivity, fire, etc.) leading to such delays. As such, the business entities should not be penalized with permanent disallowance even in such cases of bona fide and/or short delay (even of 1 day in this case), more so without considering reasons for the delay. We should also not forget that the Revenue Department also keeps on making many mistakes of such nature day in and day out while administering the taxing statute, and even the Courts have often pointed out this fact, of course, by and large, without any consequences. If we genuinely desire to make the tax laws fair and just to the extent possible (to achieve the proclaimed goal of achieving ‘ease of doing business’ in real terms), the Act in this regard should be amended to provide (possibly, with retrospective effect) that if such belated payments are made within a reasonable time (say, 6 months), then the deduction should be allowed in the year of actual payment so that such cases do not suffer permanent disallowance. Such an amendment would meet the ends of justice and could be a step forward in reducing the ‘trust deficit’ between the taxpaying community and the tax administration.

5.8 Of course, a larger debate still remains on whether the Government, as a policy, should use the Income-tax Act for compliance with other laws or that should be left to the provisions contained in other laws under which the consequences are already provided for this kind of default. If we genuinely desire to have workable simplified tax laws (and to achieve the goal of ‘ease of doing business’ in the real sense), this debate is absolutely necessary. Let us hope that one day the Government will start thinking of such a debate for a policy decision on issues like this for appropriate decision.