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Section 37 – Business expenditure – Capital or revenue – Test to be applied – Pre-operative expenditure of new line of business abandoned subsequently – Deductible revenue expenditure

15

Chemplast Sanmar Ltd.
vs. ACIT; 412 ITR 323 (Mad)

Date of order: 7th August,
2018

A.Y.: 2000-01

 

Section
37 – Business expenditure – Capital or revenue – Test to be applied –
Pre-operative expenditure of new line of business abandoned subsequently –
Deductible revenue expenditure

 

The
assessee was engaged in the business of manufacture of polyvinyl chloride,
caustic soda and shipping. For the A.Y. 2000-01, the A.O. disallowed the
expenditure incurred by the assessee on account of a textile project which it
had later abandoned. The A.O. held that the textile project, which the assessee
intended to start, being a totally new project distinguished from the
manufacture of polyvinyl chloride and caustic soda and the business of
shipping, in which the assessee was currently engaged, the entire expenditure
had to be treated as a capital expenditure.

 

The
Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal upheld the decision of the A.O.

 

On appeal by the assessee, the Madras High Court
reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i)   The proper test to be applied was not the
nature of the new line of business which was commenced by the assessee, but
unity of control, management and common fund. This issue was never disputed by
the A.O. or the appellate authorities.

 

ii)   The authorities had concurrently held that it
was the assessee who had commenced the business and the assessee would mean the
assessee-company as a whole and not a different entity. Therefore, when there
was commonality of control, management and fund, those would be the decisive
factors to take into consideration and not the new line of business, namely,
the textile business.

 

iii)   Before the Commissioner (Appeals) a specific
ground had been raised stating that the A.O. ought to have appreciated that the
decisive factors for allowance were unity of control, management,
interconnection, interlacing, inter-dependence, common fund, etc., and if the
above factors were fulfilled, then the expenditure should be allowed even if
the project was a new one. The Commissioner (Appeals) did not give any finding
on such a ground raised by the assessee. Therefore, it was incorrect on the
part of the department to contend that such a question was never raised before
the appellate authorities.”

Section 143 – Assessment order passed in the name and status of the HUF where the notice was issued in the name and status of an individual is invalid and such an assessment order deserves to be quashed

17 [2019] 105 taxmann.com 201
(Pune)
Pravin Tilokchand Oswal
(HUF) vs. ITO
ITA No. 1917/Pun/2018 A.Y.: 2007-08 Date of order: 4th
April, 2019

 

Section 143 –
Assessment order passed in the name and status of the HUF where the notice was
issued in the name and status of an individual is invalid and such an
assessment order deserves to be quashed

 

FACTS

The assessment order was passed in the status of the HUF,
whereas proceedings were initiated by issue of notice u/s. 143(2) of the Act in
the name of the individual. Both the individual and the HUF were assessed to
tax and had different and distinct PAN numbers. The first notice for getting
jurisdiction to make the assessment was issued u/s. 143(2) of the Act in the
name of the individual and the PAN number of the individual was clearly
mentioned. However, assessment was made in the hands of the HUF.

Aggrieved,
the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who decided it on merits but did
not decide the jurisdictional issue and passed an ex parte order against
the assessee.

 

The aggrieved assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal
where it was pointed out that the information received under the Right to
Information Act clearly mentioned that notice was issued for the individual and
proceedings were carried out for the individual. However, the assessment was
made in the name of the HUF.

 

HELD

The Tribunal held that since notice was issued in the name
of the individual and assessment completed and made in the name of the HUF, the
assessment order was invalid and bad in law. The Tribunal quashed the
assessment order. It decided in favour of the assessee.

VALUATION OF STARTUPS

Generally, the
valuation approaches or methodologies are based on the evaluation of assets,
revenue, profitability, etc. of the business. However, in case of startups,
they neither have an asset base nor revenue. For example, the valuation of
Airbnb is over twice as much as that of Hyatt – although Airbnb is effectively
the world’s largest hotel chain without owning a single hotel room! Hence, the
exercise of valuing a startup poses various challenges to the valuer.

 

In effect, valuing a startup is an exercise of calculating the best
estimate of the sum of its parts, i.e., all its resources, intellectual
capital, technology, brand value and financial assets that the startup brings
to the table. In this article we will cover the basics of startup valuation
progressing over stages of financing, need of valuing start-ups and methods of
valuation, followed by a case study in the Indian market.

 

So what does a
startup mean?

 

WHAT IS A STARTUP?

A startup is a
business enterprise incorporated to solve a problem by delivering a new product
or service under conditions of extreme uncertainty. It is a company typically
in the early stages of its development.

 

These
entrepreneurial ventures are typically started by one to three founders who
focus on capitalising upon a perceived market demand by developing a viable
product, service or platform. The founders’ effort is to turn their idea into a
repeatable and scalable business.

 

In the Indian
scenario, the Department for Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP) issued a
notification in February, 2019 defining a startup as an entity which is in
existence up to a period of ten years from the date of incorporation /
registration with a turnover for any of the financial years since incorporation
/ registration not exceeding Rs. 100 crores and working towards innovation,
development or improvement of products or processes or services or, if it is a
scalable business model, with a high potential of employment generation or
wealth creation – provided that an entity formed by splitting up or
reconstruction of an existing business shall not be considered a startup.


STAGES OF FUNDING

At the initial
stage, startups are self-funded by members of the founding team who also try to
secure funding through an investor or obtain a loan to help fund their venture.
There are various stages when a startup raises funds and its valuation differs
in each stage or round of funding.

 

1.  Angel/Seed Funding – This is typically
the very first stage where the funding is required for market research and
developing the product. At this stage the founder personally invests or raises
funds from acquaintances, or it comes from someone not known to the founder
called an ‘Angel Investor’. Seed capital is often given in exchange for a
percentage of the equity of the business, usually 20% or less;

2.  Series A Funding – It is when startups
have a strong idea about their business and product and may have even launched
it commercially. Series A Funding is typically used to establish a product in
the market and take the business to the next level, or to make up the shortfall
of the startup not yet being profitable;

3.  Series B Funding – The startup has
established itself but needs to expand, either with organic growth, with new
markets or acquisitions;

4.  Debt Funding – When a startup is fully
established it can raise money through a loan or debt that it will pay back,
such as venture debt, or lines of credit from a bank. A venture debt fund
typically lends when the startup is backed by known investor funds;

5.  Mezzanine Financing – It is also known
as bridge financing because it finances the growth of companies prior to an
IPO. This is usually short-term debt with the proceeds of the IPO or buyout
paying it back;

6.  Leveraged Buyout (LBO) – This form of
funding is made up of convertible debt or preferred shares which are more
costly and provide investors certain rights over the holder of common equity.
It is a strategy where someone acquires an existing company with a significant
amount of borrowed funds. Usually, the assets of the business being purchased
are used as leverage and collateral for the loan used to purchase it;

7.  Initial Public Offering (IPO)
– An IPO is when the shares of a company are sold on a public stock exchange
where anyone can invest in the business. IPO opening stock prices are usually
set with the help of investment bankers.

 

A point to note is
that a startup valuation is required at each stage of funding.

 

CONSIDERATIONS FOR
STARTUP VALUATION


Startup valuation
means believing in the story and the founders’ strength to turn it into
reality. It could be the sum of all resources, technology, brand value and
financial assets that the startup has developed.

 

Startups usually
have little or no revenue or profit and are still in a stage of instability.

 

For startup
businesses one should consider the top-down approach by looking at the total
market available to the product / service and derive the cash flow to the firm
/ company therefrom. The following factors need to be considered and evaluated:

 

  •     Traction –This
    includes analysis of the active and non-active user base / subscriber base /
    customers of the company for the past period since inception. How fast the
    startup is growing vis-à-vis its competitors and where it is likely to
    reach in the next 12 to 24 months;
  •     Reputation of the team
    – The assessment of the track record of the founders includes their coming up
    with good ideas or running successful businesses, or development of the product,
    procedure or service which already has a good reputation. The risk analysis of
    the ventures promoted by such a team would be a bit liberal;
  •     Prototype – Whether
    the model or release of product built to test the concept or process is ready
    and tested successfully. Any prototype that a business may have that displays
    the product / service will help;
  •     Revenues – The visibility of
    revenue-generation like charging users / subscribers / customers, etc. There is
    also a need to check how diversified is the revenue model in different target
    customers or geographies or different products;
  •     Funding supply and
    demand
    – An investor is likely to pay a premium to a startup for early
    mover advantage. Discuss, understand and analyse the visibility of a successful
    business venture in a similar space, product differentiation;  the market forces, such as at what prices are
    similar deals being priced and the amounts of recent exits can affect the value
    of startups in a specific sector;
  •     Distribution channel
    – The valuation of a startup with a proper distribution channel in place will
    certainly be higher than that of one without such a channel;
  •     Industry – In case
    of a new idea of doing traditional business, e.g., a fintech platform,
    understanding and research on a particular sector is very important. If a
    particular industry is booming or popular (e.g. gaming), the value of the
    business may be more if it falls into the right industry.

 

VALUATION APPROACHES
AND METHODS

Startups don’t have a long track record of generating cash flow and
valuations in such cases are highly subjective. While making an investment
decision, investors assess the valuation of such startups blending various
methods together.

 

The following are
the various valuation methodologies generally used to value startups.

 

VALUATION METHODS VIS-A-VIS PRINCIPLES

1   Berkus

Valuation based on the assessment of five
key success factors

2   Risk Factor Summation

Valuation based on a base value adjusted
for 12 standard risk factors

3   Scorecard

Valuation based on a weighted average
value adjusted for a similar company

4   Comparable Transactions

Valuation based on a rule of three with a
KPI from a similar company

5   Book Value

Valuation based on the tangible assets of
the company

6   Liquidation Value

Valuation based on the scrap value of the
tangible assets particularly to be used in a liquidation scenario

7   Discounted Cash Flow

Valuation based on the sum of all future
cash flows generated

8   First Chicago

Valuation based on the weighted average of three valuation scenarios

9   Venture Capital

Valuation based on the ROI expected by the
investor

10 Price of Recent Investment

Valuation based on the price of the recent
investment round in the company

 

Berkus Method

The Berkus method, developed by Dave Berkus, is used to value pre-revenue
startups and is mostly applied to technology companies. This method is based on
the assumption that the company has the potential to reach $20 million or more
in revenues by the 5th year of operation.

 

The Berkus method applies a scale to the following five components of a
startup, rating each from zero up to $0.5 million:

(a) Sound idea (attract of core business to buyer)

(b) Quality of management (good management in
place)

(c) Strategic alliance (go-to-market)

(d) Product prototype

(e) Product rollout and sales plan

 

Using this method, the highest valuation could be a maximum of up to $2.5
million and, in case of a pre-revenue startup, it could only score up to $2
million.

 

Risk Factor Summation Method

This is a slightly
more evolved version of the Berkus Method. It is widely used by Angel Investors
for pre-revenue startups when determining seed investing and subsequent
financing rounds. The method is based on the average industry pre-money
valuation and adjusted for the following 12 risk factors associated with the
startup and its industry:

 

I.      Management risk

II.     Stage of the business

III.    Legislation / political
risk

IV.    Manufacturing risk (or
supply chain risk)

V.    Sales and marketing risk

VI.    Funding / capital
raising risk

VII.   Competition risk

VIII.  Technology risk

IX.    Litigation risk

X.    International risk

XI.    Reputation risk

XII.   Exit value risk

 

Each risk factor is
assessed and scored on a scale of 5 to a range of +$500K to -$500K (+$500K,
+$250K, 0, -$250K and -$500K). The net out-ratings / scores are adjusted to the
average industry pre-money valuation to arrive at the startup’s pre-money
valuation.

 

Scorecard Method

The Scorecard
Method, developed by Bill Payne, is similar to the Risk Factor Summation and
Berkus Methods and is usually used to value pre-revenue startups. This method
uses a combination of industry data and weighted percentages based on detailed
analysis of the following quantitative and qualitative factors:

 

(1) Management team
(0-30%)

(2) Size of
opportunity (0-25%)

(3) Product /
technology or service (0-15%)

(4) Competitive
environment (0-10%)

(5) Marketing /
sales channels / partnerships (0-10%)

(6) Need for
additional investment (0-5%)

(7) Other factors
(0-5%)

The sum of the
above factors is multiplied to the industry average pre-money valuation to
arrive at the startup’s pre-money valuation.

 

Comparable Transactions Method

This method is used in case of both pre-revenue and post-revenue startup
valuation. It involves determining similar merger or investment transactions in
the recent past and in the same industry as that of the subject company
business. The relevant comparable transactions valuation is analysed based on
the relevant key metrics of the industry and a range of multiples is derived
which is used in the determination of the valuation of the subject company.

 

Book Value Method

The Book Value
Method is an asset-based valuation approach and refers to the net worth of the
company. Here, the book value is calculated by deducting the value of
intangible assets and liabilities from the value of the total tangible assets.
The value of total tangible assets in this case is the cost at which the asset
is recorded in the balance adjusted for accumulated depreciation and impairment
costs.

 

Liquidation Value Method

In this method the
assessor determines the Fair Value of an asset when the company gets liquidated
or if the asset is no longer usable. The method considers only tangible assets
like plant and machinery, fixtures, inventory, etc., and intangibles are not
considered irrespective of the value they may hold. The net liquidation value
is calculated by deducting the value of liabilities from the total liquidation
value of all the tangible assets.

 

Discounted Cash Flow Method

The Discounted Cash
Flow method determines the attractiveness of the investment in the startup
based on the present value of the cash flows and that the startup is expected
to generate in future. The investor assesses the value derived from this method
and the cost of the investment. In case of pre-revenue startups, the cash flows
are normalised based on the stage of the life cycle of its business and once
the business starts growing at a steady pace, it is believed that the business
will generate cash flows for an indefinite period.

 

First Chicago Method

This method is used
to value post-revenue startups. It is based on probabilities with the following
three scenarios of financial forecast of the startup:

1.  Worst case

2.  Normal case

3.  Best case

 

Each valuation is made with the Discounted Cash Flow Method and assigned
a percentage reflecting the probability of each scenario occurring.

 

Venture Capital Method

The Venture Capital Method, described by Prof. Bill Sahlman in 1987 at
Harvard Business School, is based on the expected future returns of the
investor.

 

In this method the investor assumes that after a span of ‘n’ years the
startup could be sold for ‘x’ amount. Based on the expected return on
investment and the sale value, the investor determines the price he / she is
willing to pay today for investing in the startup, after adjusting for dilution
and future rounds between now and the company sale.

 

Price of Recent Investment Method

The recent
investment in the business is often taken as the base value if there are no
substantial changes since the last investment.

 

The Price of a Recent Investment valuation technique is likely to be
appropriate but only for a limited period after the date of the relevant
transaction. Given the relatively high frequency with which funding rounds are
often undertaken for seed and startup situations, or in respect of businesses
engaged in technological or scientific innovation and discovery, this method
will often be appropriate for valuing investments in such circumstances.
Generally, Fair Value would be indicated by the post-money valuation. The
length of the period for which it would remain appropriate to use this
valuation technique will depend on the specific circumstances of the investment
and is subject to the judgement of the valuer.

 

ASSESSMENT OF KEY
PERFORMANCE INDICATORS AND METRICS

The application of
the above methods is based on the assessment of risk parameters and other
factors discussed earlier specific to the startup under valuation. The common
set of target milestones would be established at the time of making the
assessment; these will vary across types of investments, specific companies and
industries, but are likely to include:

Financial
Measures:

– revenue growth;

– profitability
expectations;

– cash burn rate;

– covenant
compliance.

 

Technical
measures:

– phases of
development;

– testing cycles;

– patent approvals;

– regulatory
approvals.

 

Marketing and
sales measures:

– customer surveys;

– testing phases;

– market
introduction;

– market share.

 

In addition, the
key market drivers of the company, as well as the overall economic environment,
are relevant to the assessment.

 

FACTORING SCENARIOS

Therefore, using
the scenario-based DCF method (DCF with First Chicago Method) that considers
one or more future scenarios and assigning the probability of success to each
scenario gives a reliable indication of Fair Value. Further, there is also a
probability-weighted expected return model (PWERM) whereby probabilities can be
assigned to the expected up rounds, flat rounds or down rounds to arrive at a
value.

 

The option pricing
method (OPM), a forward-looking method that considers the current equity value
and then allocates that value to the various classes of equity considering a
continuous distribution of outcomes rather than focusing on distinct future
scenarios or a hybrid of a scenario-based method and OPM, can be considered.

 

For seed, startup
or early-stage companies in the absence of significant revenues, profits or
positive cash flows, other methods such as earning multiple are generally inappropriate.
The most appropriate approach to assess Fair Value may be a valuation technique
that is based on market data.

 

It is appropriate
to use an enhanced assessment based on industry analysis, sector analysis,
scenario analysis and / or milestone analysis. In such circumstances
industry-specific benchmarks / milestones approach, which are customarily and
routinely used in the specific industries of the company to be valued, can be
used in estimating Fair Value where appropriate.

 

The DCF method may
be used as cross-check; the disadvantages inherent in DCF, arising from the
high levels of subjective judgement, may render the method inappropriate
without corroborating support.

 

CASE STUDY

Let us discuss how
one can apply the valuation approaches discussed above in a newly-started
company which operates an online fund-raising platform, which connects
fund-seekers with lenders. It is intended to be an end-to-end connected and
fully integrated system providing a one-stop solution for individual and SME
borrowers, lenders and service providers such as finance professionals and
investment bankers.

 

The company has got the necessary approvals as required by the
regulatory bodies in India. The company would further require approvals for
using bureau data, KYC data and other government data. The company has also
entered into agreements with multiple banks and NBFCs in India. However, the
revenue generation is yet to be initiated.

 

Valuation Issues:

The company is in the initial stage of business life cycle. There are
various competitor platforms available in the market selling a boutique of
similar products and allied services.

 

Revenue generation is dependent on regulatory approvals and success fee
commission from tie-ups with financial institutions.

 

The business model
shared by the company projects a revenue growth at a CAGR of 200% in the first
five years.

 

Valuation Approach & Methodology:

We start with understanding the business model, the market it addresses
and the total size of the market, percentage share of the same the business is
trying to achieve, identifying the key valuation drivers, i.e., growth rate of
subscriber base and variation in success fee.

 

We then analyse the
comparable transactions at various stages of funding similar to the target entity
(i.e., Series A and Series B).

 

The Series A
transactions were dated a year or two back to the valuation date and at a
comparatively higher valuation range due to the different market scenario at
the time of funding. Hence, a discount was applied to such valuation range
arrived. The discounted EV / revenue multiple for Series B transactions (being
the recent ones) was considered for validation check.

 

We then consider
the discounted cash flow method considering three scenarios assuming lower
growth rates and lower success fee ratios.

 

We need to consider
a higher discount rate based on the expected returns of the investors and high
risks associated with the achievement business model.

 

Valuation Conclusion:

On the basis of the above analysis, we have
arrived at a valuation range using CTM and validated based on multiple
scenarios and sensitivity analysis on projections and discounting rate as per
DCF.

TAXATION OF STARTUPS

BACKGROUND

What do you
generally mean by a startup? The Collins English Dictionary defines it in this
way: “A startup company is a small business that has recently been started by
someone.” But the Oxford English Dictionary calls it “a company that is just
beginning to operate”. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary, on the other hand,
describes it as “a fledgling business enterprise”. Therefore, any new business
in its infancy is a startup.

 

In India, the information
technology (IT) industry has been a significant driver of growth, employment
and exports. Using technology effectively, startups can ramp up scale and grow
significantly within a short period of time. The government, through the
Ministry of Commerce, has therefore been seeking to encourage startups through
initiatives such as Start-up India.

 

Initially, and with
effect from February, 2016 under the Start-up India initiative an entity was
considered a startup:

 

a. Up to five years
from the date of its incorporation / registration;

b.  If its turnover for any of the financial years
has not exceeded Rs. 25 crores; and

c.  It is working towards
innovation, development, deployment or commercialisation of new products,
processes or services driven by technology or intellectual property.

 

However, an entity
formed by splitting up or reconstruction of an existing business is not to be
considered a ‘startup’.

 

On 23rd May,
2017, the definition was amended by:

 

i.   Increasing the period from five to seven years
and, in case of startups in the biotechnology sector, from five to ten years;
and

 

ii.   Amending the nature of
activity to “working towards innovation, development or improvement of products
or processes or services, or if it is a scalable business model with a high
potential of employment-generation or wealth-creation”.

The definition was further amended on 19th February, 2019
under Start-up India; now, an entity is considered a start-up:

 

a.  Up to a period of ten years from the date of
incorporation / registration, if it is incorporated as a private limited
company (as defined in the Companies Act, 2013), or registered as a partnership
firm (registered u/s. 59 of the Partnership Act, 1932), or a limited liability
partnership (under the Limited Liability Partnership Act, 2008) in India;

b.  The turnover of the entity for any of the
financial years since incorporation / registration has not exceeded
Rs. 100 crores; and

c.  The entity is working towards innovation,
development or improvement of products or processes or services, or if it is a
scalable business model with a high potential of employment-generation or
wealth-creation.

 

One of the
categories of incentives offered to startups is of certain income tax benefits.
There are, however, other tax provisions which have been a source of harassment
to startups. What are these tax benefits and tax provisions and how well have
they achieved their purpose?

 

TAX BENEFITS

1.  Lower rate of tax –
section 115BA

One of the benefits
which was supposedly meant for startups has been section 115BA, which provides
for a lower rate of tax of 25% for eligible domestic companies with effect from
assessment year (AY) 2017-18. These eligible domestic companies are those that:

 

a.  are set up or registered on or after 1st
March, 2016;

b.  engaged only in the business of manufacture or
production of any article or thing, and research in relation to, and
distribution of such manufactured / produced articles / things; and

c.  the total income is computed without certain
incentive provisions, including additional depreciation, and deduction u/s.
80-IAC.

 

Given the fact that today most mid-sized and small companies (those
whose turnover in 2016-17 did not exceed Rs. 250 crores) are liable to pay tax
at only 25%, the tax rate of 25% u/s. 115BA is no longer an incentive rate.
Further, the restrictions for claiming a benefit under that section meant that
it was restricted only to manufacturing companies and most startups, which
provide services, were not able to avail of the benefit of this provision at
all.

 

In any case, today
most startups would qualify for the normal lower corporate tax rate of 25% of
their profits (provided, of course, if they have any taxable profits).

 

2.  Deduction of 100%
profits – section 80-IAC

This incentive
provision, meant specifically for startups, was introduced with effect from AY
2017-18. The objective of this provision, as explained in the Explanatory
Memorandum to the Finance Bill, 2016, was to provide an impetus to startups and
facilitate their growth in the initial phase of their business.

 

Under this section, an eligible startup can claim deduction for 100% of
profits and gains of eligible business for three consecutive assessment years
out of the first seven (increased from the first five, with effect from AY
2018-19) assessment years beginning from the year of its incorporation.

 

An eligible startup
is one which meets the following requirements:

 

(a) It is a company or a Limited Liability
Partnership (LLP);

(b) It carries on eligible business;

(c) It is incorporated on or after 1st April,
2016 but before 1st April, 2021;

(d) The total turnover of its business does not
exceed Rs. 25 crores in the relevant previous year;

(e) It holds a certificate of eligible business
from the Inter-Ministerial Board of Certification as notified in the Official
Gazette by the Central Government;

(f)  It is not formed by the splitting up or
reconstruction of a business already in existence; and

(g) It is not formed by transfer of
used plant or machinery to a new business. Used plant and machinery can,
however, constitute up to 20% of the total value of the plant and machinery
used in the business without it being regarded as a violation of this
condition. Further, plant and machinery used outside India is not regarded as used
plant and machinery if it is imported into India, was not previously used in
India before installation by the eligible startup, and no depreciation has been
allowed / was allowable in India on such plant and machinery for any period
prior to the date of installation by the eligible startup.

Till AY 2017-18, the definition of “eligible business” was comparatively
narrow and restrictive – “a business which involves innovation, development,
deployment or commercialisation of new products, processes or services driven
by technology or intellectual property”. From AY 2018-19, the amended
definition is “a business carried out by an eligible startup engaged in
innovation, development or improvement of products or processes or services or
a scalable business model with a high potential of employment-generation or
wealth-creation”. This wide definition has the potential of encompassing a
large number of businesses and not just those engaged in the IT sector or
providing services using technology as a disruptor.

 

Till the third week
of November, 2018, out of a total 14,036 (19,287 as of 20th June,
2019) startups registered with the Department for Promotion of Industry &
Internal Trade (DPIIT), Ministry of Commerce, Government of India under the
Startup India programme, 91 (94 till 20th June, 2019) startups had
received approval for the tax exemption. The procedure for applying for
approval is quite simple – Form 1 (which is a fairly simple form) has to be
filed along with the Memorandum of Association / LLP Agreement, board
resolution, copies of accounts and income-tax returns for the last three years.
The Board can call for further documents or information, and make enquiries,
before granting or refusing registration.

 

A partnership firm,
although it may be registered as a startup with DPIIT, is not eligible for the
benefit of deduction u/s. 80-IAC, even though an LLP, which is also taxed as a
partnership firm, qualifies for the benefit of such deduction.

 

Since this is a
deduction of profits and under Chapter VI-A such deduction may not really be of
much use to most startups which require five or more years to attain
profitability, and then, once they attain profitability, would first be setting
off their brought-forward losses before being eligible to claim exemption under
Chapter VI-A. Further, such deduction is not allowable for MAT / AMT purposes
and hence a startup would end up paying MAT / AMT at 18.5% of its profits while
claiming deduction u/s. 80-IAC in its normal computation of taxable income.
Ideally, to be really effective and meaningful, the benefit should have been
provided for any three out of the first ten years beginning from the year of
commencement of business and not from the year of incorporation, and such
deduction should have been excluded from book profits or adjusted total income.

The turnover limit of Rs. 25 crores is also too low for most startups to
be profitable and be eligible to claim the deduction – it should have been kept
at the same level as in the definition of “startup” in Startup India of Rs. 100
crores.

 

3.  Taxation of share
premium u/s. 56(2)(viib)

Section 56(2)(viib)
was introduced with effect from AY 2013-14. It seeks to tax amounts received by
a company in which the public are not substantially interested (a closely-held
company) from a resident as consideration for issue of shares at a premium, to
the extent that the consideration exceeds the fair market value of the shares.

 

If one looks at the intention behind the introduction of section
56(2)(viib), the Explanatory Memorandum to the Finance Bill 2012 lists this
amendment under “Measures to Prevent Generation and Circulation of Unaccounted
Money”.

 

The fair market
value of the shares is the higher of:

 

a.  the value determined as per Rule 11U read with
Rule 11UA, or

b.  the value as substantiated by the company to
the satisfaction of the Assessing Officer, based on the value, on the date of
issue of the shares, of its assets, including intangible assets, being
goodwill, know-how, patents, copyrights, trademarks, licences, franchises or
any other business or commercial rights of similar nature.

 

Rule 11UA(2)
permits the company to adopt either the book value (break-up value) method, or
the Discounted Free Cash Flow Method for determining the fair market value of
unquoted equity shares of the company.

 

An exemption is provided for consideration received by a venture capital
undertaking from a venture capital fund (VCF). There is also a provision for
notification of a class or classes of persons (investors) by the Central
Government for exemption. Two notifications have been issued under this clause
– Notification No. 45/2016 dated 18th February, 2016 and
Notification No. 24/2018 dated 24th May, 2018. Notification No.
45/2016 granted exemption for subscription by a resident person to a startup
company, which fulfilled the conditions of a startup as per the DIPP
Notification dated 17th February, 2016. Notification No. 24/2018
granted exemption to consideration received for issue of shares from an
investor in accordance with the approval granted by the Inter-Ministerial Board
of Certification as per DIPP Notification dated 11th April, 2018.

Again, so far as
investments by non-resident investors are concerned, the provisions of section
56(2)(viib) do not get attracted, since they apply only to investments by
resident investors.

 

Grant of approval for exemption

The procedure for
grant of approval is contained in DIPP Notification No. 364 of 11th
April, 2018 as modified by Notification No. 34 of 16th January,
2019, and further modified by DPIIT Notification No. 127 dated 19th
February, 2019.

 

Initially, the
conditions for approval were as follows:

 

i.   the aggregate amount of paid-up share capital
and share premium of the startup after the proposed issue of shares does not
exceed Rs. 10 crores;

ii.   the investor / proposed investor, who
proposed to subscribe to the issue of shares of the startup has,

(a) the average
returned income of Rs. 25 lakhs or more for the preceding three financial
years; or

(b) the net worth
of Rs. 2 crores or more as on the last date of the preceding financial year;
and

iii.  the startup has obtained a
report from a merchant banker specifying the fair market value of shares in
accordance with Rule 11UA of the Income-tax Rules, 1962.

 

The amendments
brought about by DIPP Notification No. 34 of 16th January, 2019 were
that:

 

a.  The average returned income of Rs. 25 lakhs
over the preceding three years was replaced by a returned income of Rs. 50
lakhs or more during the financial year preceding the year of investment; and

b.  The requirement of a report from a merchant
banker under Rule 11UA was done away with.

 

Significant
amendments were carried out to the conditions vide DPIIT Notification No. 127
dated 19th February, 2019 as under:

 

(1) The upper limit
for the aggregate amount of paid-up share capital and share premium of the
startup after the proposed issue of shares was increased from Rs. 10 crores to Rs. 25 crores. Further, in counting this amount
of Rs.
25 crores, amounts received from non-residents, venture capital
funds and frequently traded listed companies (whose net worth on the last date
of the financial year preceding the year in which shares are issued exceeds Rs.
100 crores or turnover for the financial year preceding the year in which
shares are issued exceeds Rs. 250 crores) are to be excluded;

(2) Further,
amounts received for subscription from such listed companies are to be exempt
from section 56(2)(viib);

(3) The requirements of investor returned
minimum income and minimum net worth were deleted; and

(4) An additional condition was inserted to the effect that the company
should not have invested in the following assets, and shall not invest in such
assets for a period of seven years from the end of the financial year in which
the approved share issue at a premium takes place:

 

a.  building or land appurtenant thereto, being a
residential house, other than that used by the startup for the purposes of
renting or held by it as stock-in-trade, in the ordinary course of business;

b.  land or building, or both, not being a
residential house, other than that occupied by the startup for its business or
used by it for purposes of renting or held by it as stock-in-trade, in the
ordinary course of business;

c.  loans and advances, other than loans or
advances extended in the ordinary course of business by the startup where the
lending of money is substantial part of its business;

d.  capital contribution made to any other entity;

e.  shares and securities;

f.   a motor vehicle, aircraft, yacht or any other
mode of transport, the actual cost of which exceeds Rs. 10 lakhs, other than
that held by the startup for the purpose of plying, hiring, leasing or as
stock-in-trade, in the ordinary course of business;

g.  jewellery other than that held by the startup
as stock-in-trade in the ordinary course of business;

h.  asset, whether in the nature of capital asset
or otherwise, specified in sub-clauses (iv) to (ix) of clause (d) of
Explanation to 56(2)(vii), viz., archaeological collections, drawings,
paintings, sculptures, works of art and bullion.

 

The Inter-Ministerial Board of Certification (IMBC), which is the
authority to grant the approval, has taken certain positive decisions in this
regard. At its meeting on 16th May, 2019 the following decisions
were taken, inter alia:

 

i.   It was observed that a large number of
applications were being rejected for availability of similar products /
services. The applications should not be rejected merely on the basis of
similar products / services as it could mean higher demand and competition.

ii.   Startups from remote / rural areas and women
entrepreneurs should be encouraged to apply.

iii.  IMBC may ask for video presentation of a
defined duration with specific areas to be covered by a startup for applying
for the tax exemption.

iv.  IMBC may also hold video conference with the
startup, if required.

 

The objective of
IMBC, therefore, clearly seems to be to encourage genuine startups to apply for
and to grant the exemption from section 56(2)(viib). One understands from press
reports that so far 672 startups have been given approval u/s. 56(2)(viib).

 

Difficulties faced by startups

So far as most
startups which are innovating are concerned, their business is based on a
novel, untested concept. Their future business projections are based on hope
that their business concept or model will succeed. Investors place faith in the
startup founders’ ability and invest in the company based on such rosy
projections, knowing full well that the business model or concept is untested
and untried and that there is a high risk that the business may not succeed.
The investor investment at high valuations is based on the small chance that
the start-up may succeed and do so well that the consequent appreciation in
value of investment may more than compensate for the loss suffered on
investment in other startups. That is why investors spread their risks by
investing across various start-ups.

 

It is quite common
for a startup investor to invest in a company at the seed stage at a premium,
when the business is yet to commence, and all that is in existence is the idea
and a business concept in the mind of the startup founder. Similarly, most such
investments are made at premium valuations when the startups are still
incurring huge losses, with no profits in sight for the next few years. The
investment and its valuation is therefore more of an expression of confidence
by the investor in the founder and his business plan and not based on the
accuracy of the future numbers.

 

The problem faced by startups was that from AY 2013-14 till almost AY
2016-17, the provisions of section 56(2)(viib) applied without the benefit of
any exemption notification being available to them. Even from February, 2016,
many startups could not meet the DIPP criteria to qualify as a startup and
hence could not avail the benefit of exemption u/s. 56(2)(viib). The April,
2018 Notification and procedure did apply to more issues by startups, but was
still comparatively restrictive. It is only with effect from 2019 that startups
really started getting the benefit of exemption. Therefore, startups faced
serious problems of large demands in assessments for earlier years, due to
additions made in respect of premiums received on share subscriptions.

 

Since a vast majority of startups do not succeed in their business, when
the assessments for the year of investment came up for scrutiny, the numbers
actually achieved by the startups came nowhere close to the numbers that they
had presented to investors at the time of investment. The valuation based on
the actual numbers was thus a fraction of the valuation at which the investment
was made a few years ago. As a result, AOs sought to use the benefit of
hindsight to reject the pre-investment valuation provided by the company based
on projected financials and substitute it with a far lower post-investment
valuation based on actual financials. Since the investments were made at a far
higher premium, the provisions of section 56(2)(viib) were invoked to tax the
startups on such alleged “excess premium”.

 

At times, where
resident investors had invested along with venture capital funds or
non-resident investors at the same valuations, it led to an absurd situation.
While the investments by the VCFs or the non-resident investors were spared
from the provisions of section 56(2)(viib), the provisions were invoked for the
similar investments by resident investors. Indeed a very peculiar situation,
given that the valuation of the resident investment was validated by the
valuation of the VCF or non-resident investment!

 

Further, the stated
purpose of section 56(2)(viib) was almost completely ignored by the AOs. Even
cases where the investments were being made out of known sources of income of
the resident they were being taxed as income of the issuer company, even though
this could in no way be regarded as generation or circulation of unaccounted
money. Therefore, such action was contrary to the purpose of the provision.

 

Pending issues

The DPIIT Notification No. 127 of 19th February, 2019 states
that the notification for exemption would apply irrespective of the dates on
which shares are issued by the startup from the date of its incorporation,
except for the shares issued in respect of which an addition u/s. 56(2)(viib) has
been made in an assessment order before the date of issue of the notification
(i.e., 19th February, 2019). Therefore, if a startup has made any
issue of shares for which assessment is pending or has not been completed prior
to 19th February, 2019, it is advisable for it to obtain such
approval from the DPIIT, with consequent approval from the IMBC. In fact, even
startups whose case has not been selected for scrutiny in the year of such
issue of shares may find it beneficial to obtain such approval, to protect
themselves from any possible reassessment proceedings.

 

The most common
issue that many startups face is the fate of pending assessments and appeals,
where large demands have already been raised. There is no express provision in
such cases and the matters would have to be decided independently in appeal in
such cases. It would have been far better if a resolution process had been laid
down in such cases, which the appellate authority could have followed. For
instance, any startup fulfilling the conditions of exemption could have been
granted relief after verification of compliance with the conditions.

 

The other issue
faced by startups is the restriction on acquiring certain specified types of
assets, before and for seven financial years after the end of the year of share
issue, which could result in loss of the exemption. There is no minimum value
for such assets. Take a few situations: A startup buys a painting for its
office, costing Rs. 2,000; a startup gives a loan of Rs. 10,000 to its
employee; a startup buys a delivery vehicle for Rs. 11 lakhs; a startup invests
Rs. 1 lakh in a subsidiary. Any of these could result in a possible loss of
exemption! Perhaps, such interpretations were not intended. The objective of
the condition of investment in assets is to ensure that under the guise of
raising capital for the business, a startup does not become an investment
vehicle, and not to prohibit such normal business transactions.

 

A startup is merely
required to file a declaration that it has not invested in such assets and
shall not invest in such assets for seven years, in Form 2 with the DPIIT,
which will forward it to the IMBC. The IMBC will then grant the exemption. The
withdrawal of exemption will also be by the IMBC. In order to avoid unnecessary
loss of exemption for certain common business transactions, it is essential
that clarifications are issued by the DPIIT, clarifying that certain normal
transactions would not attract withdrawal of exemption. So also, a minimum
limit of, say, Rs. 5 lakhs, should be prescribed, below which limit,
acquisition of the specified types of assets would not invite withdrawal of
exemption.

 

Further, no procedure has been laid down for cancellation of the
exemption notification. However, before any cancellation of exemption is
resorted to, the basic principles of natural justice would have to be followed
by IMBC. This would require that the startup would have to be given a show
cause notice for that purpose, in response to which it would have a right to be
heard.

 

4.  Set-off of Losses
under Section 79

Under section 79,
where there is a change in beneficial ownership of 51% of voting power of a
closely-held company from the end of the year in which a loss was incurred to
the end of the year in which the set-off of the loss is claimed, the benefit of
set-off and carry forward of loss is not available. The objective behind this
provision is to prevent transfer of loss-making companies for sale of losses,
where the benefit of the set-off of losses can be availed of by the acquirers.

 

In startups, such
change in beneficial ownership of voting rights is quite common on account of
dilution by the founders in each round of funding, and not by transfer of
shares. A concession has therefore been provided to startups in section 79(2)
with effect from Assessment Year 2018-19. A startup which is eligible for
deduction u/s 80-IAC can continue to obtain the benefit of carry forward and
set off of losses of the first seven years from the date of incorporation,
provided all the shareholders holding shares of the company in the year in
which the loss was incurred continue to be shareholders of the company as at
the end of the previous year in which the set-off of the loss is being claimed.

 

From the language of the section, it appears that in case of a startup
even if one shareholder transfers his nominal shareholding before set-off of
the loss, the benefit of carry forward of the first seven year losses will be
lost, as opposed to a less stringent 49% permissible transfer in case of other
closely-held companies. Also, there is a lack of clarity as to losses incurred
by startups after the first seven years – whether the
provisions of section 79(1) would apply or whether there would be no
restrictions at all.

 

CONCLUSION

Startups which have
raised funds at high valuations in recent years have faced a torrid time in the
past few years. Fortunately, the government has responded to their request for
relief and laid down a procedure which, by and large, excludes such startups
from the rigours of section 56(2)(viib). One only wishes that other businesses
were also spared from the unnecessary litigation that section 56(2)(viib) has
generated.

 

The government has spared startups from a nuisance provision. But has it
really provided enough tax incentives? The provision u/s. 80-IAC for tax
deduction of profits is not really a significant incentive. Today, compliance
involves a significant cost for most businesses, having become fairly onerous.
What startups would perhaps better appreciate is a tax regime with lesser
compliance hassles – exemption from tax deduction requirements as well as
having tax deducted at source from their incomes, exemption from scrutiny
assessment u/s. 143(3), etc. This would allow startups to focus on their
business, instead of having a part of their energies diverted towards
compliance, and definitely result in an improvement of productivity of the
startups.

 

The above provisions are based on their
legal status as on 23rd June, 2019.

STARTUPS AS AN INVESTMENT ASSET CLASS

Funding startups
is glamorous, but the big question is how much returns can they generate as an
investment asset class?

 

Start-ups are
young, emerging companies working on breakthrough innovations that would fill
the need gap or eradicate existing complexities in the ecosystem. These
companies are in a constant endeavour for new development and researching new
markets. They have agility embedded in their inventive thinking. Angel investors
fund a startup for several reasons but the first and foremost reason is that
they believe in that idea, project or passion. They want to make the
entrepreneur startup successful with the help of the disposable capital
available at their end.

 

Investing in
startups is more an art and less of a science – it isn’t meant for everyone; it
is subjective. There is no method to this madness, nor a defined college degree
to help you learn venture investing. Every deal, experience and strategy shared
in the public domain is anecdotal. Angel investors provide capital for small
entrepreneurs but are not in the money-lending or financing business.
The
finance they provide is for that first round of seed capital to make the idea /
vision into a reality. Entrepreneurs can also find angel investors in their
family and / or friends who will support them with capital on terms favouring
them. Angels risk their money in people, teams and ideas which are fragile in
nature. Hence this is termed risk capital investment.

 

Angels are
individuals who have a good, successful background; their names evoke trust in
the minds of customers or future investors. They back the startup by
associating their name with it, which provides the entrepreneurs the required
creditworthiness in the market.

 

Why I love startups
as an asset class for investment is because I can offer my time besides my
capital. In other investments like public equities or real estate I can’t
influence an outcome. Venture investing is a people business, so if you
like meeting, working and helping people, then your chances of success are very
high. With early stage startups as their lead investor, I work closely with the
founders to create a positive outcome. Before beginning a discourse on the
merits and demerits of investing in startups, let’s first understand investing
in startups from the bottom up.

 

What is investing?
It is the process of putting money into various physical or abstracted assets
with the expectation of making a profit. One can expect to make a profit on the
money invested by seeing an increase in the value of the asset – whether real
or perceived – and selling off the asset at the increased value. When you
invest in a company – public or private – you invest in the asset that is the
company itself; you get a part of the ownership of the company. As the value of
the company increases, so does the profit you can make by selling off your
stake. A key difference between investing in public companies and private ones
like startups is that in public companies selling off your stake is far easier
and near instantaneous. The same cannot be said about private investments –
hence investments in startups is one of the most illiquid asset classes. It can
give you huge profits, but those profits will be only on paper for the most
part because realising an exit takes a lot of time. It is an illiquid
investment.

 

A basic,
fundamental point that every early-stage investor should know is that startups
follow the law of power – a small percentage of the startups you invest in will
give you the majority of your profits. Take (for example) Andreseen Horowitz’s
portfolio. They’re one of the top VC firms – and about 60% of their returns
come from about 6% of their deals. What does this tell us? It means that to
truly make a profit from startup investments, you should be able to access
those 6% of deals. The rest of your investments may or may not materialise
significant returns for you – but that 6% of your portfolio is where the real
return is. If you invest in few startups it’s like buying a lottery; it’s the
portfolio approach which helps the early-stage investor create mega returns.

 

Given this
background, let us come to the question at hand, “Are startups a good
investment?” Startups are high-risk high-return investments which follow the
power law. It is not about the number of hits you have, but the magnitude of
those hits. That’s where we find the answer to our question. The wealth
creation opportunity that startup investments provide is nearly unparalleled.
But it is also extremely risky and conditional. So when are startups good
investments?

 

It is a good idea to invest in startups when one has the appetite and the
capacity for the high risk involved. The investor with the mission to give
first, to help founders and build business will win this game. One must be
capable of creating a significantly sized portfolio of investments in the hope
that some of the investments are part of the 6% and give one huge returns. One
can create a startup portfolio by investing about 5-10% of one’s total
investment capacity in such an illiquid asset class. It is worth noting that
the money invested here must be thought of as a sunk cost – until and unless an
exit is realised. The investors must be able to stay patient with their capital
– the best companies can give returns after ten years.

 

The toughest part of investing in startups is gaining access to the top
tier of deals that can give you the huge hits. When one has access to those 6%
of deals, it is a great idea to invest in startups. One cannot ascertain at the
beginning whether a particular investment will provide the returns one hopes
for – but one can invest in startups that can give the unparalleled returns
that one hopes for if they work out. To gain access to the top startups, one has
to put in time and effort to become a part of the startup ecosystem, become a
part of various investor networks and collaborate with other lead investors and
VC firms.

 

Startup investments can provide disproportionate wealth-creation
opportunities. Before investing in startups, every investor should ask himself
– Am I ready to take on the capital risk? Do I have the required time and
effort to build a portfolio? And, last but not the least, do I have the
patience to wait for the disproportionate return?

 

Investing in early stage companies is
about capturing the value between the startup phase and the public company
phase.

LANRUOJ TNATNUOCCA DERETRAHC YABMOB EHT (JACB)

TASK FORCE REPORT – HOW THE NEXT 50 YEARS
LOOK FOR JACB

 

“It is tough
to make predictions, especially about the future.”

 

Your journal
celebrated its golden jubilee anniversary this March. Like any other
responsible, accountable institution, we do understand that one cannot take
value-creating decisions without forecasting and modeling the future. Your
Journal Committee therefore deliberated the matter and accordingly decided to
set up a Task Force comprising of experts to prepare a report on what the next
50 years look like.

 

We present herein below extracts of the Task Force’s Report.

 

a)  Approach
And Methodology Used By The Task Force

 

Basis Vaangmay1 created by JACB over the past fifty years, big
data, intensive research, field study, empirical methods, qualitative insights
and scientific forecasting methods.

 

Guiding
Principle
The task force was guided by the
principle – “The old rule of forecasting was to make as many forecasts as
possible and publicise the ones you got right. The new rule is to forecast so
far in the future, no one will know you got it wrong.”
– Breakout Nations:
In Pursuit of the Next Economic Miracles.

 

1 Citation:767 (2019) 50-B/JACB

b)  The Task Force’s Report

Task Force Report: How the Next 50 Years look like for JACB

2020

2030

2040

2050

2060

2021

2031

2041

2051

2061

2022

2032

2042

2052

2062

2023

2033

2043

2053

2063

2024

2034

2044

2054

2064

2025

2035

2045

2055

2065

2026

2036

2046

2056

2066

2027

2037

2047

2057

2067

2028

2038

2048

2058

2068

2029

2039

2049

2059

2069

 

FROM UNPUBLISHED ACCOUNTS

 

Provisions

Provisions are made
for all foreseeable personal expenditure of the founder directors and their
family members including the exorbitant costs of funding a destination wedding
of the third child of the second promoter who post the event, will no longer be
classified as promoter from next quarter.

 

ETHICS AND U (TURN)

(Cloudy morning)

 

ACA Arjun (A) – Krishna, a pleasure talking to you again. Looking forward to more
valuable insights from you.

 

FCA Sri. Krishna
(S)
– My blessings to you as usual. But wait, I see
your mind seems agitated!

 

A – My duties that is….. I am seriously contemplating withdrawing
from audit engagements of listed companies.

 

S – Tch.Tch! I was afraid you would say so one of these days. Go
ahead and immerse yourself in the audits and let the truth come out in your
report.

 

A – I fear the consequences. To be specific.…. the unintended
consequences.

 

S– Consequences? Remember, no one who does good work will ever
come to a bad end, either here or in the world to come.

 

A – I wish to resign from audit engagements. You don’t seem to
appreciate the risks that I am facing. Don’t I have the right to resign? Of
course, I do have. Now, do you want me to quote the relevant sections?

 

S – Remember, your right is only to perform your duty. You do not have
right to expect any consequences there of.

A – The consequences are grave. I am totally honest and abide by
values but what appears as a good company, a good balance sheet may just blow
away. True and fair! An illusion? Maya?

 

S – You signed up to give a report – Unmodified or qualified, you need to
report. You were not appointed to quit.

 

A – Now, listen to me and understand. I am talking about
floundering management value systems, flouting of corporate governance norms,
internal controls on paper, serious accounting issues, financial
irregularities, non-disclosures, withholding of information necessary for
audits, blatant violation of rules and policies, lack of oversight by
independent directors, management override, no credible risk management,
misappropriation and what not. The consequences are…what do I say…. humongous
risks in audits….

 

(Dark clouds start gathering in the background)

 

S – (with a heavy heart) Then Resign.

 

A – (In trauma)

 

S Resign Arjun! Resign!!

 

A – What are you saying? Oh No! 
What’s happening? Have you given up on me? You are the one who lifts my
mood and spirits. You the upholder of values, want me to resign? If I resign
from all engagements, what will I bill?

 

S – I reiterate,
resign. The only solution to your dilemma is to resign.

 

Ahem! I meant resign
to your fate.

 

Resignation is as
sure for that which is appointed, as birth is for that which is dead.

 

Therefore grieve
not for what is inevitable.

(Background sound effect – conch shell blowing)

 

THE
LIGHT ELEMENTS

CA M.S. Badnaam1

 

(Kam Se KAM2)



Capitalistic as may be the World,
In a world

Where governance
does not matter…

Regulations do not
matter…

Respected Kam
Hi Kam (2)

 

In a world

Where audits do not
matter

Tax, internal or
external,

Lo! The need to
share Key Audit Matters! (2)

Kam Se KAMs?

Audit Committee;

Do not mind (2)

Ultimately, It’s my
Mind over your Matter,

The Key Audit
Matter

 

As they say

Those who matter
don’t mind

Those who mind,
doesn’t matter!

Kam Se KAM

Itna kaha hota!

(The Builder and the Home Buyer)

 

Fully I paid

?Tis Five longeth
years

Foundation, tis
still not laid

 

Woh Ghar (2)

 

Na Mera, Na Tera

umeed

shayad ab RERA3   

 

1 CA Main Shayar Badnaam

2 KAM – Key Audit Matter

3
RERA – Real Estate Regulatory Authority

 


INTERVIEW MATTHEW EMERMAN, CFO OF JIOSAAVN

From Inception,
Capital Raises to Strategic Acquisition

In this second interview of the July special issue, BCAJ Editor
Raman Jokhakar talks to Matthew Emerman, CFO of JioSaavn. The company recently
underwent a merger valued at $1 billion and was widely reported. Matt joined
Saavn since its inception in 2007 and has seen it from inside as its CFO and
Global Head of Corporate Development. This interview walks the reader through
an amazing journey of 12 years from early start up days and culminating in a
merger with one of the largest companies in India.

 

In a free
flowing interview, Matt talks about initial idea of Saavn and how it filled a
market void at that time, challenges of early stage funding, addressable market
and selecting Jio as its partner in the next leg of its journey. Matt has been
a member of the founding management team and has seen the challenges that a technology
driven startup goes through.

 

 

Q. Can you tell us a bit about Saavn the
company and its journey from its founding in 2007, to acquiring rights to about
50 million music tracks and 100 million active users – and to the recent deal
with Jio Music?

 

A. When we started in the US it was a B2B
distribution company. We were taking Indian movies, bringing them across the
cable services in North America and the UK. We realised that there was a void
in the market for Indian music when a lot of it was not digital.
Historically, it has always been mostly pirated music. So we started licensing
content exclusively from the likes of T-Series and Saregama and distributing
these to different services like iTunes and B2C platforms. When the users
started downloading say from iTunes, Indian music was difficult for consumers
to discover or search for the specific songs they were looking for. Services at
that time were not designed for Indian music. Many a times users looking for
content didn’t really know what they were searching for – they would know the
movie name, they would know the actor’s name but they would not know which song
they were looking for. So a lot of the metadata that was there was not designed
for digital.

 

So we worked really closely
with Apple and Google at that time and we decided internally that the future
was to move the business to a more direct to consumer focused model. At that
point of time we worked really closely with Google who was creating a new
Operating System that we know today as Android. And we realised that for us to
really move into the future, direct-to-consumer was the best path. 

We started our
direct-to-consumer business called SAAVN (South Asian Audio Visual Network).
This new business model approach led to us raise our first institutional
funding in June 2011 from Tiger Global. That funding really put us on the map.
From 2011 to 2017 we raised well over a hundred million dollars of
institutional funding. Over that period of time we raised capital from world
renowned institutional investors such as Bertelsmann, Liberty Media, Wellington
Management, Steadview Capital.  We also
attracted investment from some of the top global artistes and managers,
including Guy Oseary, U2 and many other top global musicians. We have been
really lucky in our journey in terms of having incredible people who believed
in us.

 

We were in a very difficult
space – in terms of having global investors that really understood India and
especially the content and entertainment eco-system. It was hard for investors
to understand the growth opportunity which was there. Building a service for
the Indian market also has a lot of challenge from a regional perspective, from
a language perspective, device capabilities and historically connectivity was
always an issue.

 

We saw the shift, this
inflection point in September, 2016 when Reliance Industries launched Jio. For
the first time, cellular streaming eclipsed Wi-Fi. This is really a systemic
change in the entire digital eco-system across the country. And we saw that
everything changed after this – our user base and our engagement increased with
introduction of 4G throughout the country.

 

In terms of how we thought
about our partnerships we have had long conversations with almost all the top
tech companies and others. India has a lot of headwinds but when you think of
the tailwinds, Jio was really doing something amazing of having 0 to 300
million subscribers till today in a short time frame. They are adding 10
million subscribers each month.  We had
20 million users at the time of the transaction that has multiplied many times
over and now we are the largest music streaming platform in the country.

 

There were various factors
which were at play. Innovation in the way they think about building businesses,
the way they truly appreciate this market and all the dynamics that are there.
Then there are regional dynamics and challenges, you have people coming online
for the first time, how do you really understand the consumer, how do you
target the consumer by saying that now you are not going to go for the pirated
experience but are going to go online, going digital and going online with
digital payments. It’s a completely new experience. When we thought of what was
that next level for Saavn, it was this $1 billion transaction.

 

Q. Way back in 2007, how did the founders come
up with this idea of Saavn? Were they trying to solve a certain problem and was
it that something like this never existed at that point in time?

 

A. Almost everything in life is about timing. Lot
of it was an opportunity where there was a void. Cable companies in the US were
losing a lot of subscribers to satellite. And we thought we want to have a
South Asian video on demand channel. There was a void in the market and
consumers were very hungry for this content. So how do we bring movies to North
America, US and UK so that cable companies have a competitive offer? People
were paying $60 – $70 per month for the services to experience the content they
were used to when they were back in India. So that is where the genesis of the
opportunity existed and slowly realising that there is a void from a music
perspective.

 

Q. You seem to have started by taking Indian
content to the other side – and now you have brought the entire thing back
here! Do you still have that set-up back there in the US?

 

A. Yes we are really a global company. We have
offices in New York, California and that is really important from a talent
perspective but also from a global tech perspective.  We have an incredible engineering team based
in Mountain View, CA. That’s a very interesting perspective that we bring to
the market.

 

What separates us from
anyone else is the data that we have. Since the launch of our streaming
services way back in 2010-11, we have terrific data of the consumers. This
(data) is in terms of their listening behaviour, patterns of listening when it
comes to music specifically, when it comes to Indian music from a regional
perspective and how that is curated is what makes our algorithms, our
technology, our backend really unique. Everything is customised and built
inhouse, nothing is outsourced. We have incredible engineering, product and
design teams split across India and the US.

 

Company
communication is so important for us, because we are working all round the
clock. And we have been really lucky from a point of view of having an
incredible culture. How we as an organisation ensured that everyone was an
actual owner of the business and incentivise the team members to be a part of
something. That’s part of the journey and it’s really important for people.
It’s happening more and more where companies are offering equity incentive
plans to their teams. There is such incredible talent that is here in India.
And what we are seeing for the first time here. Historically,  from a tech perspective, there has been brain drain. Some of the brightest
minds have historically moved abroad to work at tech companies like Microsoft,
Google, Apple, etc.

 

From a
recruiting perspective, we are getting incredible talent from the IITs. We have
a first day recruiting programme with all the IITs and it’s been phenomenal. We
are also seeing a shift in executives who have got incredible experience in the
US, want to come back because of what is happening in the eco-system here.

 

Q.What was the trigger for the alliance with
Jio?

 

 A. Like I said everything is timing. If you look
at the music space in the market you have Apple music, Spotify, Amazon, YouTube
music is here. There are local players like Gaana and Wynk. So there is a lot
of noise and a lot of perception vs. reality. There are people that make these
press announcements. And then there is a certain standard kind of matrix that
is there – industry standard like monthly active users, and streams. Some of
these press announcements give a feeling about perception vs. reality whether
you are a private company or a public company, the difference about what is
happening on the ground is different.

 

So we looked at the notion
of saying that we have brought the business to a certain level of user base and
scale. To really get to the platform where you have 200-300- 500 million users,
it was really important for us to find a strategic partner who has the vision,
who has patience from a capital perspective and a longer timeline than
institutional investors. And that from timing perspective made a lot of sense
for us. And like I said before we know and respect all the major companies
globally that are there in the music playing technology space. But there was no
better partner for us.  From the founding
team that is leading this initiative and from Reliance perspective, when you
think about the digital services business, it was important for them to find an
incredible group of entrepreneurs, a team and culture that would really fit
within the eco-system.


Q. What were some of the elements that you
looked for which helped you determine that this strategy and this partner would
really work and that this is someone you want to have an alliance with?

 

 A. I think a lot of it is looking at just the way
they built Jio and looking at what they built in terms of the digital services
business. If you use some of the services apps that are there, they have such
an incredible team, and they have done an amazing job of building what they
have built. You walk on their campus in RCP in Navi Mumbai you feel like you
are in any large tech company’s campus in California. It’s really incredible
when you talk about any large tech companies worldwide. So when you think about
that stage that they are in, it made a lot of sense. From a strategic
perspective we have an incredible team of brilliant minds collectively working
together on how do we achieve this kind of targets that we have in our
business.

 

It’s also the notion of the
actual current addressable market in India. You have 1.3 billion people here
and how do you not have 700-800 million users? You have Tencent Music which has
over 700 million users worldwide. These numbers are staggering. I think there
is the reality of what is the actual addressable market that is here. For
example you think about the users in the amount of subscribers that Jio has
today, and so it was something that we really took a lot of time to think about
what was the aspiration that we have as a business.

 

We also thought from the
perspective of giving access to content. Not just from music perspective but we
have over 50 million tracks, and from having worked very closely with all the
music labels these 10 years. We were the pioneers of other forms of audio
content – in terms of podcasting, and other shows, and original music.  We were the first ones to start doing
original music and giving the community and independent artistes’ a platform.
Historically, music consumption in India has been film based. And there are so
many incredibly talented bands and musicians that that never had a place for
the music to be heard. So we were able to give a platform to independent
artists. There has been an explosion of independent music scene here over the
last few years.

 

Q.You spoke about the valuation of over a
billion dollars and also spoke about how it worked out in terms of number of
customers and so on. Do you want to tell us a little bit more about arriving at
the value for a transaction like this one?

A. In this case it is a combination of value of
an existing business and of JioMusic and then looking at it from a value per
user basis. Generally for this type of business, and if you look at other tech
companies there is per user value that is attributed to that. There is
traditionally DCF and all that but that doesn’t generally work for technology
companies. Multiples are very different for technology companies when you
compare them to traditional companies.

 

All investors have their
target ownership, what’s been invested to date in the business on both sides,
value that is there on both sides and then the intangibles, the brand names
that are there, the consumer confidence in the businesses, all of these are
very important. All of these come together and then at the end of the day it’s
like in any other deal – negotiations.

 

We had some incredible
advisers and the deal was closed in record time of under 2 months. It required
incredible coordination amongst our legal counsels and tax advisers from both
sides.

 

It’s so
important having people you can trust in the market. We have an international
corporate structure and so we have to think how to structure this kind of a
transaction especially when it involved a public company in India. So there was
a lot of consideration that was there. Having trusted advisers by your side and
I would actually call them trusted partners. Because of the time zones that
were involved we had to be very flexible, late IST calls and early morning EST
calls. We worked Saturdays and pretty much on all Sundays. Seven days a week
throughout the transaction for six weeks or so and that takes incredible
relationship to close a deal of this magnitude in this period of time.

 

It was
a great learning experience. And what’s so important is to really have your
advisers and team members by your side from day one and that they have context
to your business.

 

Q. Would you like to share something about
what you learnt which makes a deal like this work on both sides? Especially
since it all happened within two months? Attributes that each side displayed
which you think made a deal like this work?

 

A. Incredible communication – of being able to
work so closely with people. We were partners even before the deal was closed.
It’s also very telling in terms of what the future is going to be like. If you
can close something of this size in such a short span of time imagine what you
can build together.

 

And again every deal has
its moments of complexity, there is no question about it. I think communication
across the board on both sides was important when we had aggressive timelines.
In hindsight it is really communication. As a CFO you can’t miss anything and
have to ensure full communication with teams at all times.  The passion everyone showed, seven days a
week. That’s when you talk about people feeling like an owner of the company,
part of something, you can’t teach that.
I think that’s something really incredible.

 

Q.Coming to the wider canvas of the
music-streaming world and all its bits and pieces, how do you see it going
forward? You have a vision and your perspective of the market – and you are
perhaps creating some of it. How do you see this whole thing evolve from what
we see today?

 

A. I think what you will see especially from the
India perspective is consolidation. I think one thing that you are seeing with
companies like Netflix is that consumers are really willing to pay for good
content. And I think that’s what is so unique.

 

Then there
are challenges from infrastructure point of view.  Like you go to see a big festival in India,
you know three days before it was an empty field. So that is something that is
really changing. Especially, things like Jio Garden or Jio World Center which
is completely world-class state of the art facility that will be opening
shortly. I think there is going to be a new consumer experience that is going
to happen. This is really important and people are really hungryfor it.

 

Q. On the technology landscape, do you feel
that some of this is going to get disrupted? What will improve further, or is
something else going to come up in the future in place of what we have today?

 

 A. I think what is happening more and more is
curation. From the data that we have of a user that comes to the app – we know
what kind of music he would like to listen to. Based on certain patterns – are
they in the gym in the morning and what they listen there, do they listen to
devotional content in the morning and what do they listen to when they are
driving to work for forty five minutes. So you kind of track the pattern and
from an AI perspective and Algorithm technology perspective you are delivering
a service where a consumer goes WOW – this understands me. It’s intuitive

 

And when you look at a
million peoples’ apps every user experience is customised and is unique to that
person, their behaviour and what they are listening to.

 

This is what is happening
now. And again music is so emotional and so in the core. When you think about
incredible moments in your life there are songs for them. You might watch a
movie for a few times but you will listen to the same song hundreds of times if
not thousands of times. So music has a different way of connecting us
individually with ourselves but also connect us to our friends. Look at
playlists sharing.

 

Q.Can you share some takeaways from the last
12 years? Did you ever think when you started out with Saavn that this day
would come, that you would go through what you have gone through so far?

 

A. I think it’s been an incredible journey. I
love spending time with entrepreneurs. But it’s that kind of resilience. It
takes special individuals to go through hundreds of VC pitches. And it not just
an individual but teams to go through that. It’s not easy to do it. Like
raising institutional funding, building a business, these are challenging
things. Having resilience, having really good advisers by you, it’s so
important.

 

We also found that
leadership development training and personal and professional development is
critical for the growth of teams.  I
think people really take it for granted that more you are able to invest in
people the more you are able to get out of them.

 

But besides
that what keeps the founding teams and the people together is resilience. The
notion of being positive, having a sense of humour and having the conviction
that this will work out.
The people you surround yourself with, who gave you a lot of inspiration
and advise. It’s ok to not have all the answers. I think you are really in
trouble when you think you know everything because that’s when you are going to
be taught certain lessons which you thought you are never going to experience.
So it’s really important to be really humble. And kind of being able to
appreciate what you are able to do every day! And when you are able to do that
you find things that start to come your way. Those times that were the
hardest building the business were the most humbling and those were some of the
greatest things and greatest experiences that we know.

INTERVIEW GAURAV ANAND, STARTUP CO-FOUNDER

In this interview, we talk to Gaurav Anand, co-founder of Namaste Credit, about his start-up journey. The interview walks one through the journey of a founder. Gaurav discusses how he decided to switch from a job with the largest rating agency in NYC to starting off into uncharted territory. What drives an entrepreneur and what are the challenges and how he perceives them. Gaurav also shares his views on why finding a real problem and solving that problem is the bedrock of entrepreneurship and how an enterprise needs constant passion and relentless execution.

Gaurav runs Namaste Credit, an online marketplace founded in 2014 that dynamically matches SME businesses looking for financing with lenders. It leverages on technology to obtain optimal loan products from lenders and NBFCs across India. In this interview BCAJ Editor Raman Jokhakar speaks to the young founder of a FINTECH startup to tell his tale.

Can you tell us about your background, your life journey till you reached that moment of choice, deciding that you want to start something on your own?

I am originally from Delhi, did my MBA from N.M. College, Mumbai. Along with my post-graduation, I did CFA and Financial Risk Management (FRM) as well. My first job was with Credit Suisse. I spent about four years in London as part of a training team. Then I moved to New York to work with the world’s largest rating agency Moody’s, leading the North America practice of risk analytics, advising financial institutions, including Wall Street banks. That’s where I met my co-founder Lucas Bianchi. We thought of moving from a cushy job – from monthly pay cheques to a startup life. Essentially, it was based on two key pivots – a passion and a drive to make a meaningful impact on others’ lives; and second, the supreme confidence that we can execute our ideas and our vision. These beliefs gave us the urge to take the plunge. We wanted to touch the larger eco-system, in fact, improve the eco-system – in this case the SME lending space – and impact a wider audience.

You felt that these features were not present in the system?

People are always looking for the bigger and wider spaces available in the world, where we can go and disrupt them, and also the right time to disrupt them. We chose and started in India because India has the largest SME base, and from the technology point of view, India has a large market potential. We believed this was the right time for this space to get disrupted. We saw the huge market potential and the right timing for us to start.

What were the learnings from your earlier work profiles / experiences that helped you to get the confidence to execute?

These are large institutions / corporates where you learn how to work within the rules / framework and how to be super-efficient at it. People who are very successful at large corporates are very good at working within the rules. You do not have significant room to push the envelope so you have to be super-efficient to play within the rules and yet execute very well. Whereas in the startups world, there are no rules, no regulatory body for startups, you write your own rules and play by your own rules. However, having worked in a more restrained environment, that allows you to narrow down, put your thoughts and execution plans in action and work on them. This gives you that added discipline in a startup, otherwise it is easy to get carried away with no ring-fencing.

Considering your experience, exposure and knowing where India was, you could spot the opportunity. Can you take us through the process – spotting a problem, believing that you can solve it and choosing the right time to do it?

In 2013-2015, we saw disruption happening in the developed world. Fintech had started to play a significant role in the US and European markets. There was maturity in the financial market from the Fintech point of view. If you break the developed world into smaller portions and rule out the purchasing power parity, these are small islands of opportunity for you.

Although a company like PayPal has been in the market for two decades, the new-age companies, especially in the SME lending space, were starting to take some giant strides. So, from the timing perspective, we could either be a part of a crowded market or jump into a bigger market with 50 million SMEs with hardly any technology adoption and disruption and create our own niche or brand. We chose the longer path because of lack of digital infrastructure then. The first two years were a struggle because of lack of digital infrastructure where these initiatives could be scaled up. We chose to bite the bullet and knew we could make it through our execution.

Being a founder of a startup, having an idea in place and the decision to leave the US… as a founder, what kind of challenges you had visualised – what if all this didn’t work out?

It was a big personal decision. I had the vision for this startup and my family supported me to make it work. But the real driving factor was the passion and the urge to make a much bigger impact than what I could think of making as part of the corporate world. Although we were working with the largest financial institutions in the world, we were still away from the ground reality. It was a personal decision and also a decision of the family. Had we remained in the corporate world, the impact would have been quite shielded or guarded. It would have a limited multiplier effect in a broader eco-system. Therefore, we thought that we had to develop our skills and get to the bottom of the problem to emerge with an impactful solution.

Bearing in mind the uncertainty in Indian regulations (say a sudden new tax) and where there is no answerability for such flip-flop changes, did you think of the risks while returning to India with the startup idea in mind?

The first challenge was to get a grip of the sheer size, complexity and diversity of India and assimilate certain facts. It was like dealing with 28 countries because in India each state behaves like a country. To have a pan-India presence, we have to deal with a lot of moving parts; like the Central and State Governments are at different tangents, they take whimsical decisions on the fly. Even with respect to day-to-day operations or lifestyle, we have a lot of complexity, unlike the developed world where most things are automated or pre-set. India doesn’t work as per that clock.

This was the first and the biggest challenge – setting up new and better ideas in India is difficult because everybody questions you due to lack of successful predecessors. Seriously, you have to convince yourself first, then your client and then your other stakeholders that this idea can really work in India.

The next challenge for a new venture is to have and find like-minded people, both from the aptitude and from the passion points of view. It is very important to have the right team. We have been very conscious of building the right partners in our business model, the right teams and the right functional heads. Today, we have a 300-member team and we have various leaders in each function. Like-minded and similarly driven people – from skill set, to vision and the execution point of view.

The third biggest challenge was that being in India tends to give you a false sense of security, that I have a fallback option, my family is here – they can afford it if I have to relinquish my startup and live an ordinary lifestyle. Therefore, to stay away from leaning on our support system, we set up our headquarters in Bangalore and not in Delhi – we set up in a new state and started from ground-up in a new city.

Finally, you need to have that constant drive, to literally question your instinct – day in and day out – ‘am I doing the right thing, am I on the right path?’ But then when you don’t have successful predecessors to guide you, you become your own guide and you become your own positive agent.

How would you classify the different stages of your journey, these three years since having started?

I can divide these years into broadly three stages:

1. Proving the concept, which also encapsulates the team formation (what kind of founding team); are the building-blocks strong enough or not; when you continue to get questioned on proof of concept do you prove that it works?
2. In India there is a slight advantage in proving the concept, in that you can taste some initial success. It gives you confidence that the concept is working with limited stakeholders. This is where you taste initial success;
3. The third stage, where we are right now, is how to scale it up in such a wide and diverse country; scale up consistently and at a pan-India level. How can we work it consistently and where are the levers?

Most of the foreign investment is coming to India chasing the same middle class that comprises of the top 20 to 30%. There is hope that they will become more upper class (30 to 40%) and the remaining 80% will eventually become that 20 to 30% middle class. Everybody is betting on the fact that India as a country has scale, is still growing at 7 to 7.5% average for the last four to five years, it has democracy and the rule of law. The hope is that purchasing power will eventually catch up with the advent of technology and with more globalisation.

In our business model, we also struggled with the same. We were targeted on SME lending. This has its own challenges, so the proof of concept was first to find out whether my solution is cutting across all industry and all segments of SMEs that we are dealing with. Secondly, after tasting some initial success, how can I make my solution more pervasive and more omnipresent? This is what we continue to prove. I think we have clearly emerged as one of the largest online SME lending market places. We are the only company in Fintech which licenses its technology to some of the leading financial institutions who are also suppliers of credit on our platform. Those,
I would say, are the three stages.

What kind of professional support did you receive from chartered accountants or any other professionals? Was it useful and would you like to say something about it?

In the Fintech space, the chartered accountant community has a massive role to play. In fact, in our business model, CAs played a significant role. We have a network of 7,000 influencers who work with us digitally, out of whom 2,000 plus are CA partners.

Our CA helped us incorporate our company in India and also register the patent and a company in Mauritius. He was extremely helpful as we had limited insight about the rules of the game and what regulations would apply. In my view, professional help of CAs is a must for initial infrastructure blocks and regulatory adherence. I believe the CA community has the wherewithal and carries a responsibility to play a much more active role in guiding startups, in nurturing them and also participating in their growth. The advice of a CA does influence when it comes to taking credit decisions in SMEs. It has been a great help from our CA partners network and a big thanks to the whole community.

Some startups are bootstrapped and some go for other funding options. How did funding work in your startup business?

Right from day one we approached the business with the thought that we should not be solely dependent on external funding to make our idea work. We always wanted to use external or equity funding in the business as the growth engine, but not as a proof of concept. In India, people don’t fund you on the basis of the idea; even we had to go through the path where we had to show proof of the concept’s success in the initial stage. We actually ended up scaling at profitable economics which was a great validation that this model in SME lending is a profitable venture.

You need capital to scale it up since you have to deploy a lot of capital expenditure in the business and you are trying and testing out new things, that’s where you actually end up spending most of your equity investment. However, if the fundamentals are strong enough – then if tomorrow there is no funding, your business can run on its own. Our motto was that our business model should be self-sustaining even if tomorrow there is no funding… we should run on our own lends. Funding was for growth.

And it was easy to find the right chemistry with the venture partners and all that?

I think it is not easy because in India still a lot of venture capital people do not have a real-life entrepreneur experience to understand the challenge of running a business. Most of the VCs in India are still boardroom-grown or boardroom-groomed without real-life experience of how to create scale and execute; so when we finalised with NEXUS, although we had three or four more options on the table, the reason we went ahead with them was that they had a global reach; so as and when we want to grow globally, their portfolio has a lot of global companies, which means a better eco-system and a network to leverage and penetrate. Besides, some of the partners had real-life entrepreneur experience so they could connect with the challenges, the execution, the scale and the day-to-day humdrum of the entrepreneur. We can have a much more tactical and strategic discussion and execution-oriented discussion with them rather than just having a talk on, say, this is the GMV or “this is the top ten we have to achieve by… and I don’t care how”.

But to your question – yes, it’s difficult to get the right frequency, to get the right chemistry; we have seen a lot of young entrepreneurs who are just out of college getting to the nitty-gritty of choosing the right venture / investor partners and ending up diluting the whole entrepreneurial instinct. We were lucky because we had prior experience in the corporate world, we could figure out who were the good partners; and then the conviction that we wanted like-minded people as part of the deal.

Having been part of the Fintech space in western countries, how do you see the Fintech landscape in India currently (within which you are operating) and how will it shape up in future?

In my view, Fintech is a global phenomenon which has actually matured into a global juggernaut. It is here to stay; it continues to change and create an impact in the overall financial eco-system globally.

The journey of Fintech in India for the last eight to ten years – Fintech initially starts by solving basic problems like e-commerce or payments solutions that are low value but significantly impactful solutions. This is how it happens in the western world, too. Fintech improves the core infrastructure, digitises it, automates it. The journey typically starts from B2C and then moves towards B2B since that is slightly more complex and more nuanced. Thereafter, you move up the value chain.

At Namaste Credit we are essentially solving the SMEs’ credit-lending problems. It is one of the most complex and heterogeneous spaces given the diversity of SMEs. It is a less disruptive market. We see a two-year trajectory – how Fintech is nurturing and getting into a more complex space and chipping in on edge as of now before becoming a dominant player.

We believe that the next stage is an amalgamation of AI with Fintech. We are very proud to say that we have filed three patents – two of these are an amalgamation of Fintech which is our core engine, and topping it up with artificial intelligence and machine learning. The space we operate in is more up the value chain and more complex, where we are adding the power of artificial intelligence to process the data which is a critical component in SME lending to create more predictive analytics back to the financiers, so that they can lend faster and lend more. From the SMEs’ point of view, it’s accessing the platform that uses artificial intelligence for matching which gives them the highest conversion rate for loan application and funding.

Can you tell us a bit about how the process works on your platform if someone logged into your portal?

For the B2C side, we have the origination engine for SMEs and our network of influencers. They can digitally upload the documents on the platform. Based on this, our credit under-writing engine performs the credit assessments. Afterwards, it goes into the matching algorithm, which has the policy framework of 60 large financial institutions (probable lenders). The matching algorithm closely matches and shows where this SME is most likely to get the loan from and what is the right loan product, given its requirement and credit assessment. By a combination of these two factors – credit assessment and matching – it results in an over 70% conversion rate of applications through our platforms.

The second engine we have built is an automation engine which is built on AI and machine learning, given on license to banks. The issue we are solving is, how can banks take better and faster decisions in credit and SME underwriting? In this we analyse 100 times more data points than the traditional underwriting function at banks. Since we use automation, we are able to process in 90% less time. This is the power of technology and should allow banks to disseminate credit to the SME segment which is due.

Can you explain how do machines work on uploaded documents?

We have trained our OCR to read the scanned documents from different banks. On the analytics engine it fits in the slot so that we can get a highly-qualified credit assessment. Then it gets matched with banks’ policy, which gives a super-optimal outcome. We are solving a discovery problem – that for an SME what is the right product, which is the right bank; and from the banks’ point of view, which is the right SME they should lend to? By bringing technology and by adding layers of advanced data on the core engine, we are able to make it much more intelligent. We rely less on user input data and more on credible and verified information like bank statements, financial statements, GST returns, etc., on the basis of which banks can take a credit call.

Do you feel that there is some missing link in the SME lending space? Is there a missing ‘good to have’ enabler for lending to meet its logical end?

I think in India we have somehow not been able to bridge or build a deep credit market. Whatever little credit market we have has literally been accessed by corporates. For SMEs there is still no secondary market. Due to this, banks are very selective in SME lending because they know that regulation is not hard enough for them to go after the SMEs, so they (the banks) would rather have a proven and conservative credit policy before they lend.

Imagine a scenario where you have the data being readily shared amongst the banks. Secondly, you also have a much more vibrant and deeper secondary market where you can actually float your own assets much more freely than what happens today where you have to securitise almost your entire portfolio with some other party. Securitisation is a much more illiquid form of secondary market. Imagine you have a very deep secondary market, a very clear and transparent data flow amongst the banks (not just the CIBIL score – which accounts for a tenth of the component), you still have a 90% component which is not shared amongst the banks. It allows each of the lenders to (a) risk-price the SME better, and (b) be able to freely trade or lend to the SME based on the risk-based pricing that each lender comes up with. Today, everything is an island. No data-sharing or exchange or performance data-sharing. Due to this the deserving SME gets marginalised.

For someone who is thinking of starting on their own, what are some of the lessons that you would like to share?

For any entrepreneur, it’s very important that they pick up a problem to solve that has a meaningful impact. We do come across lots of ideas but are all the ideas solving the real problems of people? That’s the first and foremost decision you need to arrive at before turning an idea into a business. Once you cross this hump, you need to put all your might and ingenious approach to make sure that your idea succeeds.

India is still a tough market to operate in, it has its own legacy issues and it has a high cost of running business. Although we hear a lot about venture capital funding in India, no one is giving funding on the basis of ideas. This is in contrast with the developed world where you can raise decent money for a solid idea. In India, despite having a good idea you need to really prove execution and you need to show some scale for anybody to trust you with funding.

VOICE-BASED VIRTUAL ASSISTANTS HAVE COME CALLING!

Gone are the days when we
said, “Lets Google it”. The millennials say, “Hey Google!”
or “Alexa!” or “Hey Siri!”

 

Haven’t we seen ads of
Alexa and Google Home on local TV where songs are played, or the latest news is
delivered, or informative general knowledge is easily dispensed just for the
asking? Such devices are getting immensely popular and changing the fabric of
how home entertainment works.

 

So, how do they work?
Essentially, these virtual assistant devices have a mic (that’s short for
microphone!) and a speaker. They have the circuitry to connect them to a WiFi.
Therefore, when you ask a question, it’s captured by the mic and sent via WiFi
to the respective server where the request is processed. The response from the
server is sent back to the device from where the content is delivered via the
speakers. This content may be a piece of information or a song. Today, you can
ask via these devices to cast a YouTube video on to your TV or even play a
Netflix film!

 

Now, voice-based virtual
assistants are available on the phone, too. No more clumsy typing or even
tapping on the screen. Just ask what you want the phone to do. This is the
future of interaction on the phone
. The creators of these technologies
initially provided a simple way to get routine mobile tasks done via voice.
These included: “Set an Alarm…”, or “Call…”, or
“Send text to…”. But that was a few years ago. Later, they added more
capability like playing songs and so on. Today, almost any information that is
available in the public domain is accessible via voice. Such apps are available
on both iPhone as well as Android phone.

 

Another popular term is
“chatbots”. This usually refers to the virtual assistants that are
available online. Customer support is the most popular application on websites
that gets millions of support requests on a daily basis. Such requests are
usually typed on a chat window on the website and are processed by a virtual
assistant at the backend. Usually, chatbots are not voice-enabled.

 

This article focuses on Google
Assistant
and how a virtual assistant can be used for an organisation or
association. But first some non-so technical understanding of how it all works.

 

The Google Assistant is a voice-enabled virtual assistant app
built by Google. It is available for free on phones (both Android and iPhones)
and allows you to ask for any information that is in the public domain. Just
open the app and ask for it. Examples of information that can be asked are:
“what is the latest news”, or “when is the next eclipse”,
or “what is today’s Sensex”, or “when was GST implemented in
India”? You will be surprised at how much of what you want to know can
just be asked and answered. Easier and quicker.

 

The only difference
between the Google Assistant app and the Google Home device is that the phone
app has a screen (the phone) to show information besides speaking out the
answer.
In fact, now both Amazon
(Alexa devices) as well as Google (Home devices) have devices with a screen.
Think of them as specialised screens meant for the Assistant app.

 

What powers the ability of
such applications and devices?

 

The first technology is
the Speech-to-Text engine, or S2T. Its job is to convert the speech into text
as accurately as possible. Imagine the challenge of such a system to understand
all the different ways in which humans speak. Each one of us has a different
tone of voice, different speeds at which we speak, the depth / shrillness of
our voice and our own style / accent while speaking. Even when watching movies
we know the difference in understanding the words spoken in an American film as
opposed to a British one, and how different it is from an Aussie accent. The
S2T engine must have the ability to support all this. To add to this is the
external noises that cannot be avoided. Imagine, you are in a local train or
bus and asking for information via the virtual assistant. It needs to recognise
the difference in the sound that comes from you and those external sounds that
penetrate the mic. Once it does that, it should ignore those extraneous sounds.
And all that is done today by the S2T engine.

Unknown to most of us,
today’s technology has been improvised thanks to the work done over decades. In
the beginning, the quality of the S2T engines was very poor and required the
user to “speak” her / his voice for a few hours to get it recognised. Today, it
works with no training or very limited training. The magic behind this is a
statistical method called “Machine Learning”. Millions of sample
voices of different dialects and regions and people have been fed into massive
computers. Each of these samples also has the actual words listed which are fed
into the computers. Statistical algorithms crunch all this data and come up
with what is called a “model”. The words spoken by the user are fed
into this model which predicts the likely text being spoken. You will be amazed
at its accuracy!

 

For this to work, the
voice spoken on the phone is sent to large servers sitting in a
“cloud” to process and return the equivalent text. This is then moved
to the next stage. In fact, in the next one year even this step of sending the
text to the “cloud” will be eliminated and the voice will get transcribed on
the phone itself, making it almost instantaneous!

 

Assuming that it has
correctly transcribed the spoken words, the system next needs to interpret them
correctly. This is the most difficult part of the entire process. It is called
“Natural Language Processing” or NLP. Some also call it “Natural Language
Understanding” or NLU. Imagine that you are a librarian who has access to a
vast body of knowledge. When someone approaches you with a question, you
understand the query and, thanks to your knowledge of the library, you go to
the right section to dig out the information and give it out. That ability is
the job of the NLP. Since the request is now known (after getting converted by
the S2T engine), the NLP needs to first figure out what the information is
about. Is it about a person, or about some geographical data, or about some
prices, or about current affairs? Possibly, for each of these categories of
information, there is a source available that can provide the information. Much
like the different sections of the library.

 

Have you tried asking any
of the virtual assistants for the latest news? If not, please do. How would
people ask for the latest news? “Tell me the latest news”, or
“What is the news now”, or “What is happening in the world
now”? People will not have a standard way of asking for a particular bit
of information. Each one of us has our own style and choice of words. The NLP
needs to understand that all these are different ways of asking and mean the
same thing, viz., “Tell me the news”. Once it has established what
the user is asking, the response will be something like, “The news as
per… is…”

What the NLP engine is
doing is simple; having interpreted the request to be asking for news, it gets
the information from one of the popular sources to which it is linked. It could
be BBC, or Times News Network, or any other source with which it has a
relationship.

 

Can you guess what happens
when we ask the system to play a song? Well, once it establishes that it is a
song that it is being requested to play, it will immediately forward the
request to the songs library which could be Google Music or Saavn or Gaana from
where the song is played.

 

Have you tried asking
information about a person? Even if the person is not very famous, the Google
Assistant will provide some info with links to its source. How does it do it?
When it detects that you are asking about a person, it usually goes to one of
its two popular sources, Linked In or Wikipedia, and delivers the best-guess
person’s details. In case there are many people with the same name, it will use
some other criterion to decide which amongst them it would choose.

 

The effectiveness of the
voice-based digital assistant primarily lies in the NLP engine rightly
detecting what the user is asking for and retrieving the relevant information
from one of its sources. This is called determining the “Intent” of the
request.

 

Can it go wrong? Of
course! Just like humans can make mistakes, the NLP, too, would. Besides, the
NLP is not as wise as a human. It does not have the versatility of a human
being. But over time it does a pretty good job. The first point of failure can
come where the S2T engine does not transcribe your speech correctly. Perhaps,
re-asking it with greater care would solve that problem. Then, when you ask for
information about a person, it could so happen that it picks another person
with a name similar to yours. In which case, perhaps, the query should be more
refined. At times it may misunderstand the category. You are asking about a
place while it may misunderstand it to be something else. Most users of virtual
assistants accept that it is not perfect, yet it serves an important function
and seems to be improving over time.

 

Since the Google Assistant
is such a wonderful and easily-used app, how do we enable it to ask information
that is private or local to a company? For example, would it not be convenient
to query the HR manual of a company using such a feature? Or training all the
office personnel on the products of a company? Or know the rules of GST for a
particular category of products? Just by asking. Sounds like a perfect fit,
doesn’t it?

Google Assistant has a
feature whereby an organisation or association (like the BCA) can set up its
own channel. Google calls this an “Action”. In such cases, user requests are
not processed by the Google engine but by the company’s engine. Let’s take an
example. Suppose BCA wishes to provide information to its members which is
similar to what its website provides today.

 

BCA can inform Google that
it wishes to set up a Channel called, say, “Chartered News”. What
this will do is that if the user says, “Talk to Chartered News”, the
request will be passed on to the BCA’s server for processing. It will not be
processed by Google. Now, all that BCA needs to do is to have some relevant software
put in place which will “understand” the request and give a suitable
response. And this will continue for all requests that the user makes until the
user says “Goodbye”. If required, such a channel can be restricted to
only the members of BCA.

 

This is an extremely
potent manner in which the future of all information is likely to be dispensed.
There are tools available that will help organisations create such a channel
quite easily. These tools will have to be configured to understand the query
based on the content that is put up by the organisation.

 

Where is the technology
moving?

 

Well, today Google
Assistant supports Hindi and has announced that it will soon be adding other
Indian languages such as Gujarati, Kannada, Urdu, Bengali, Marathi, Urdu, Tamil,
Telugu and Malayalam. New phones (like Nokia 3.2 and Nokia 4.2) are being
introduced which have a dedicated “Google Assistant” button. This makes it more
convenient for users to access the virtual assistant. Just click on it and ask!

 

This is the new reality:
Virtual assistants are the new way to access information. If you have not
started yet, please do so or you will be left behind!

Section 54F r.w.s. 45, 2(29B) and 2(42B) – Assessee having acquired rights in a flat vide allotment letter dated 26.02.2008 issued by the builder which was an unconditional allotment, and since the agreement to sell executed by the builder in assessee’s favour subsequently on 25.03.2010 was mere improvement in assessee’s existing rights to acquire a specific property, the gains arising on the sale of the said flat on 04.04.2012 were long term capital gains; assessee was entitled to exemption u/s. 54F

13
[2019]
199 TTJ (Mumbai) 388

ACIT vs. Keyur Hemant Shah

ITA No. 6710/Mum/2017

A.Y.: 
2013-14

Dated: 2nd April, 2019

 

Section 54F r.w.s. 45,
2(29B) and 2(42B) – Assessee having acquired rights in a flat vide allotment
letter dated 26.02.2008 issued by the builder which was an unconditional
allotment, and since the agreement to sell executed by the builder in
assessee’s favour subsequently on 25.03.2010 was mere improvement in assessee’s
existing rights to acquire a specific property, the gains arising on the sale
of the said flat on 04.04.2012 were long term capital gains; assessee was
entitled to exemption u/s. 54F

 

FACTS

The
assessee filed return of income on 31.07.2013 declaring income of Rs. 185.33
lakhs. During the assessment proceedings it was found by the A.O. that the
assessee had sold a flat for a consideration of Rs. 1.20 crores in which he had
a 50% share. The long term capital gain was computed at Rs. 288.73 lakhs out
which Rs. 109.4 lakhs was claimed exempt u/s. 54F and the balance was offered
to tax. It was observed by the A.O. that the agreement for purchase of the flat
was executed on 25.03.2010 and was sold subsequently on 04.04.2012. Hence the
period of holding for the original property was less than 36 months and hence
the capital gains arising out of the same cannot be claimed for exemption u/s.
54F.

 

The
assessee defended the claim by submitting the letter of allotment of the flat
dated 26.02.2008 and asserted that substantial payments for the flat were made by that time and therefore the
period of holding exceeds the required period of 36 months to classify the flat
as long term capital asset.

 

Aggrieved,
the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A). The CIT(A) allowed exemption of
Rs. 109.40 lakhs u/s. 54F as claimed by the assessee.

 

HELD

The Tribunal held that on perusal of the facts of
the case, it emerged that the assessee had acquired rights in the flat on
26.02.2008. The letter of allotment was not conditional and did not envisage
cancellation of the allotted property. The agreement of sale was executed on
25.03.2010 which was nothing but a mere improvement of the assessee’s right
over the same transaction.

 

There was
nothing to suggest that the construction scheme promised by the builder was
materially different from the terms of allotment. Considering the same, it
confirmed that the resultant gains were long term capital gains in nature. The
assessee had made payments for the new property within the stipulated time and
obtained the new property by 14.04.2012.

 

Therefore,
all conditions of section 54F were fulfilled. There was no reason to deny
benefit of section 54F in this case.

Section 194C, r.w.s. 194-I – Deduction of tax at source – Contractors payment to – Payment was made to agencies towards lounging and catering services provided to customers of airlines as a part of single arrangement – Same would fall under generalised contractual category u/s. 194C

9

CIT (ITD)-1 vs. Jet Airways (India)
Ltd. [Income-tax Appeal No. 628 of 2018; (Bombay High Court) Dated 23rd
April, 2019]

 

[ACIT vs. Jet Airways
(India) Ltd.; Mum ITAT]

 

Section
194C, r.w.s. 194-I – Deduction of tax at source – Contractors payment to –
Payment was made to agencies towards lounging and catering services provided to
customers of airlines as a part of single arrangement – Same would fall under
generalised contractual category u/s. 194C

 

The assessee is an airlines company. As part of
its business, the assessee would provide lounge services to select customers at
various airports. In a typical case, a lounge would be rented out by an agency,
in the nature of an intermediary from the airport authority. The assessee
airlines company and other airlines as well as, in some cases, credit card
companies, would provide the lounge facility to premier class customers. As is
well known, a lounge is an exclusive secluded hall or a place at the airport
where a comfortable sitting arrangement and washrooms are provided to the
flying customers. Most of these lounges would have basic refreshments for which
no separate charge would be levied. According to the assessee, the assessee
would pay the agency for use of such lounge space by its customers as per
pre-agreed terms. While making such payment, the assessee used to deduct tax at
source in terms of section 194C of the Act, treating it as a payment to a
contractor for performance of a work.

 

The
Revenue contends that the assessee had paid rent to the agency and, therefore,
while paying such rental charges, tax at source u/s. 194-I of the Act should
have been deducted.

 

The
Tribunal by the impugned judgement referred to and relied upon a decision of
the coordinate Bench in the case of ACIT vs. Qantas Airways Ltd.,
reported in (2015) 152 ITD 434
and held that the department was not
right in insisting on deduction of tax at source u/s. 194-I of the Act.

 

Being aggrieved with the ITAT order, the Revenue
filed an appeal to the High Court. The Court held that the A.O. in the present
case had placed reliance on a decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Japan
Airlines Ltd., reported in (2009) 325 ITR 298
and United Airlines
(2006) 287 ITR 281
. The Court, however, noted that the Supreme Court in
the case of Japan Airlines Company Limited reported in (2015) 377 ITR 372
had overruled such decision of the Delhi High Court. The Supreme Court approved
the view of the Madras High Court in the case of CIT vs. Singapore
Airlines Ltd. reported in (2013) 358 ITR 237
.

 

The issue
before the Supreme Court was regarding the nature of payments made by the
international airlines to the Airport Authority of India for availing the
services for the purpose of landing and take-off of aircrafts. The Revenue was
of the opinion that the charges paid for such purposes were in the nature of
rent for use of land, a view which was accepted by the Delhi High Court in the
above-noted judgment. The Supreme Court, in the judgement in case of Japan
Airlines (supra)
, held that the charges paid by the international
airlines for landing and take-off services, as also for parking of aircrafts
are in substance not for use of the land but for various other facilities such
as providing of air traffic services, ground safety services, aeronautical
communication facilities, etc. The Court, therefore, held that the payment of
such charges did not invite section 194-I of the Act. The Court observed that
this decision of the Supreme Court does not automatically answer the question
at hand.

 

Reference
to this decision was made for two purposes. Firstly, to record that the
reliance placed by the A.O. on the decision of the Delhi High Court is no longer
valid. Secondly, for the purpose of drawing an analogy that the payment for
certain services need not be seen in isolation. The real character of the
service provided and for which the payment is made would have to be judged. In
the present case, as noted, the assessee would enter into an agreement with the
agency which has rented out the lounge space at the airport from the Airport
Authority. Under such agreement, the assessee would pay committed charges be it
on a lump sum basis or on the basis of customer flow to such an agency. This,
in turn, would enable the passengers of the airlines to utilise the lounge
facilities while in transit.

 

The Court accepted the suggestion of Revenue
that service of providing beverages and refreshments was not the dominant part
of the service. It may only be incidental to providing a quiet, comfortable and
clean place for customers to spend some spare time. However, the Court did not
see any element of rent being paid by the assessee to the agency. The assessee
did not rent out the premises. The assessee did not have exclusive use to the
lounge for its customers. The customers of the airlines, along with customers
of other airlines of specified categories, would be allowed to use all such
facilities. Section 194-I of the Act governs the situation where a person is
responsible for paying any rent. In such a situation, deduction of tax at
source while making such payment is obligated. The Revenue wrongly invoked
section 194-I of the Act. In the result, the appeal was dismissed. 

Section 271(1)(c) – Penalty – Filing inaccurate particulars of income – Revised income filed voluntarily – before detection – Reason stated: accountant error – Human error – Bona fide mistake – penalty not leviable

8

Pr. CIT-18 vs. Padmini Trust [ITA No.
424 of 2017; (Bombay High Court) Dated 30th April, 2019]

 

[Padmini Trust vs.
ITO-14(1)(4); Bench: C; Mum TAT ITA No. 5188/Mum/2013]

Dated 28th
January, 2016;

A.Y. 2009-10.

 

Section
271(1)(c) – Penalty – Filing inaccurate particulars of income – Revised income
filed voluntarily – before detection – Reason stated: accountant error –  Human error – Bona fide mistake –
penalty not leviable

 

The assessee
is a Trust. The assessee had filed a return of income for the A.Y. 2009-10. The
return was taken for scrutiny by the A.O. by issuing notice of scrutiny
assessment on 27.09.2010. When the assessment proceedings were pending, the
assessee tried to rectify the return by making a declaration and enlarging
certain liability. Commensurate additional income tax of Rs. 99,05,738 was also
paid on 26.09.2011. This was conveyed to the A.O. by letter dated 15.11.2011.
While completing the assessment, the A.O. held that the revised return was not
acceptable since it was filed after the last day for filing such a revised
return. He, however, made no further additions over and above the declaration
made by the assessee in the return. On the ground that the assessee had not
disclosed the income in the original return, he initiated the penalty
proceedings. He imposed a penalty which was confirmed by the CIT(A).

 

Being
aggrieved with the CIT(A) order, the assessee filed an appeal to the ITAT. The
Tribunal held that there is wrong categorisation of capital gains and loss and
the same are evident from the papers filed. It is a case of wrong
categorisation of the income under the wrong head. The revised computation of
income basically corrects the mistake in such wrong categorisation. It is a
case where the assessee paid taxes on the extra income computed by virtue of
the revised computation along with the statutory interest u/s. 234A, 234B and
234C as the case may be. It is a settled issue that penalty cannot be excisable
in a case where the income was disclosed but under the wrong head of income.
Accordingly, levy of penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) of the Act was deleted.

 

The Revenue was aggrieved with the ITAT order and
hence filed an appeal to the High Court. The Revenue submitted that the
assessee had filed a false declaration in the original return. But after the
return was taken in scrutiny, he attempted to revise the return. Such attempt
would not give immunity to the assessee from the penalty. The counsel relied on
the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and Ors.
vs. Dharmendra Textiles Processors and Ors. (2008) 306 ITR 277 (SC)
to
contend that mens rea is not necessary for imposition of the penalty and
the penalty is a civil consequence. He also relied on the decision of the Delhi
High Court in the case of CIT vs. Zoom Communication (P) Limited (2010)
327 ITR 510 (Delhi)
in which, highlighting the fact that very few
returns filed by assessees are taken in scrutiny, the Court held that merely
because the assessee had later on surrendered the income to tax would not mean
that the penalty should not be initiated, failing which the deterrent effect of
the penalty would disappear.

 

The assessee opposed the appeal contending that
there was a bona fide error in claiming short-term capital gain as
dividend income. This error was committed by the accountant of the assessee.
All such errors were corrected, whether the returns were taken in scrutiny or
not, demonstrating bona fide on the part of the assessee. He pointed out
that the tax on the additional income was paid even before the A.O. issued
specific queries in relation to the return filed. He relied on the decision of
the Supreme Court in the case of Price Waterhouse Coopers (P) Ltd. vs.
CIT, Kolkata
to contend that mere bona fide error in claiming
reduced tax liability would not give rise to penalty proceedings.

 

The Court agreed with the submission of Revenue
that once the assessee is served with a notice of scrutiny assessment,
corrections to the declaration of his income would not grant immunity from
penalty. Especially in a case where the assessee during such scrutiny
assessment is confronted with a legally unsustainable claim which he thereafter
forgoes, may not be a ground to delete penalty. However, in the present case
the facts are glaring. The assessee made a fresh declaration of revised income
voluntarily before he was confronted with the incorrect claim. The assessee had
blamed the accountant for an error in filing the return. An affidavit of the accountant
was also filed. As stated by the counsel, such error was committed by other
group assessees also. Some of them corrected the error even before the scrutiny
notices. In view of such facts, the Court agreed with the conclusion of the
Tribunal that the original declaration of income suffered from a bona fide
unintended error. The Income-tax appeal was dismissed.

Section 28 r.w.s. 37(1) – Business loss – Advance payment for booking commercial space – Deal failed and could not get refund – Object clause of the assessee covered this as business activities – Allowable as deduction

7

Pr. CIT-6 vs. Khyati Realtors Pvt.
Ltd. [Income-tax Appeal No. 291 of 2017; (Bombay High Court)

Dated 30th April, 2019]

 

[Khyati Realtors Pvt. Ltd.
vs. ACIT-6(2); Bench: “A”; ITA. No. 129/Mum/2014, Mum ITAT]

Dated 4th
March, 2016;

A.Y. 2009-10.

 

Section
28 r.w.s. 37(1) – Business loss – Advance payment for booking commercial space
– Deal failed and could not get refund – Object clause of the assessee covered
this as business activities – Allowable as deduction

 

The assessee,
who is a private limited company, had advanced a sum of Rs. 10 crore to one
Bhansali Developers for booking commercial space in an upcoming construction
project. For some reason, the deal failed. The assessee, despite full efforts,
could not get refund of the said advance amount. In the return of income for
the A.Y. 2009-2010, the assessee had claimed the said sum of Rs. 10 crore as a
bad debt. The A.O. disallowed the same saying that the amount could not be
claimed by way of business loss because buying and selling commercial space was
not the business of the assessee.

 

On
appeal, the CIT(A) confirmed the disallowance. The assessee suggested before
the CIT(A) an alternate plea, that deduction should be allowed u/s. 37 of the
Act if the write-off of the advance did not fall u/s. 36(2) of the Act. But the
CIT(A) declined the assessee’s claim u/s. 36(2) on the plea that the assessee
did not have a money-lending licence or an NBFC licence; therefore, the
assessee was covered by explanation to section 37(1) of the Act. The CIT(A)
also declined the claim of the assessee u/s. 37 on the plea that the claim of
bad debts fell u/s. 30 to 36 of the Act.

 

Aggrieved
with the CIT(A) order, the assessee filed an appeal to the ITAT. The Tribunal
held that it is not in dispute that the expenditure claimed by the assessee is
not covered by any of the provisions of sections 30 to 36 of the Act and being
neither a capital nor personal expenditure, and having been incurred for the
purpose of carrying on of business, is eligible for deduction u/s. 37(1) of the
Act. The amount so advanced was not in the nature of capital expenditure or
personal expenses of the assessee, but was in the nature of advance given for
reserving / booking of commercial premises in the ordinary course of the
assessee’s business of real estate development and which could not be
recovered; therefore, there is no reason to decline the assessee’s claim as a
business loss u/s. 37(1) r.w.s. 28 of the I.T. Act. Accordingly, the claim was
allowed as a business loss.

 

Being
aggrieved with the ITAT order, the Revenue filed an appeal to the High Court.
The Court held that the assessee was engaged in the business of real estate and
financing. The object clause for incorporation of the company reads as under:

 

“1. To
carry on the business of contractors, erectors, constructors of buildings,
houses, apartments, structures for residential, office, industrial,
institutional or commercial purposes and developers of co-operative housing
societies, developers of housing schemes, townships, holiday resorts, hotels,
motels, farms, holiday homes, clubs, recreation centres and in particular
preparing of building sites, constructing, reconstructing, erecting, altering,
improving, enlarging, developing, decorating, furnishing and maintenance of
structures and other properties of any tenure and any interest therein and
purchase, sale and dealing in freehold and leasehold land to carry on business
as developers of land, buildings, immovable properties and real estate by
constructing, reconstructing, altering, improving, decorating, furnishing and
maintaining offices, flats, houses, factories, warehouses, shops, wharves,
buildings, works and conveniences and by consolidating, connecting and
sub-dividing immovable properties and by leasing and disposing off the same.”

 

This clause is thus widely
worded and would cover within its fold a range of activities such as erection,
construction of buildings and houses, as also purchase, sale and dealing in
freehold and leasehold land to carry on business as developers of land,
buildings, and immovable properties. It was in furtherance of such an object
that the assessee had entered into a commercial venture by booking commercial
space with a developer in the upcoming construction of the commercial building,
the payment being an advance for the booking. The sum was not refunded. This
was thus clearly a business loss. It was also noticed that later when, due to
continued efforts, the assessee recovered a part of the said sum, the same was
offered as business income. In the result, the Revenue’s appeal was dismissed.

Sections 2(15), 10(20), 11, 251 and 263 – Revision – Powers of Commissioner – No jurisdiction to consider matters considered by CIT(A) in appeal – Claim for exemption rejected by A.O. on ground that assessee is not a local authority u/s. 10(20) – CIT(A) granting exemption – Principle of merger – Commissioner has no jurisdiction to revise original assessment order on ground A.O. did not consider definition in section 2(15)

22

CIT vs. Slum Rehabilitation
Authority; 412 ITR 521 (Bom)

Date of order: 26th March,
2019

A.Y.: 2009-10

 

Sections
2(15), 10(20), 11, 251 and 263 – Revision – Powers of Commissioner – No
jurisdiction to consider matters considered by CIT(A) in appeal – Claim for
exemption rejected by A.O. on ground that assessee is not a local authority
u/s. 10(20) – CIT(A) granting exemption – Principle of merger – Commissioner
has no jurisdiction to revise original assessment order on ground A.O. did not
consider definition in section 2(15)

 

The assessee, the Slum Rehabilitation Authority,
claimed benefit u/s. 11 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The A.O. disallowed the
claim and held that the assessee was not a local authority within the meaning
of section 10(20) and that in view of the nature of activities carried out by
it and its legal status, its claim could not be allowed. The Commissioner
(Appeals) allowed the assessee’s appeal and granted the benefit of exemption.
The Commissioner in suo motu revision u/s. 263 took the view that the
activities of the assessee could not be considered as for “charitable purpose”
as defined u/s. 2(15) and directed the assessment to be made afresh
accordingly.

 

The Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by the
assessee on the ground of merger as well as on the ground that the order of
assessment was not prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court
upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i)   The
Commissioner in exercise of revisional powers u/s. 263 could not initiate a
fresh inquiry about the same claim made by the assessee on the ground that one
of the aspects of such claim was not considered by the Assessing Officer.

 

ii)   Once
the claim of the assessee for exemption u/s. 11 was before the Commissioner
(Appeals), he had the powers and jurisdiction to examine all the aspects of
such claim. If the Department was of the opinion that the assessment order
could not have been sustained as the assessee did not fall within the ambit of
section 10(20) the ground on which the Assessing Officer had rejected the claim
and the other legal ground of section 2(15), it should have contended before
the Commissioner (Appeals) to reject the assessee’s claim on such legal ground.

iii)    The
Tribunal did not commit any error in setting aside the revision order.”

TAKE ACTION, BUT TREAD CAUTIOUSLY

SEBI oversees and regulates
dealings in shares and other securities traded on the stock exchanges. However,
for several years now it has also been regulating trading in commodity
derivatives on commodity exchanges. It has replaced the Forward Markets
Commission and the SEBI Act and Regulations / Circulars issued thereunder have
effectively replaced the Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1952.

While the regulator is
common between the two markets now, and although there are fundamental
similarities between trading in securities on stock exchanges and on commodity
exchanges, there are fundamental differences, too. The contracts in derivatives
have broad similarities in both the markets. The regulator also recognises a
fundamental similarity, that is, ensuring fair price discovery in a
regulated market that is free of wrongful influences.
Thus, for example,
price manipulation is as much a cause for worry for commodity markets as it is
for stock markets.

The volumes of trades in
commodity exchanges are fairly high. However, other than the much-discussed
matter of NSEL, there have been few orders by SEBI relating to the commodity
market. A recent SEBI order (“the Order”), which has been promptly reversed on
appeal to the Securities Appellate Tribunal (“SAT”), thus becomes a good case
study to review some broad aspects pertaining to the commodity market.

However, apart from
considering issues specific to commodity markets, this order also raises some
important issues relating to the type of orders that SEBI can pass; for
example,

  • What are the situations where SEBI can pass ex
    parte
    interim orders?
  • Under what circumstances can SEBI debar parties
    from dealing in the markets?

These questions are
important because an ex parte interim order debarring a person may not
only result in huge losses to him but may even sound the death knell for his
business.

THE BACKGROUND

One of the primary concerns
in the commodities market is the cornering of stocks in a particular commodity.
A person cornering a very large percentage of the stock of a particular
commodity can be in a position to dictate its price. Thus, SEBI has specified
limits on trades by persons and these limits apply to a single person or a
group of persons acting in concert.

To ensure that groups
acting in concert are also brought under this rule, SEBI has specified generic
and specific tests to determine whether a group of persons is acting
independently of each other or is acting in concert. Hence, having certain
specified relations or commonalities would show such persons as acting in
concert. However, the exchanges can use generic criteria based on facts of
individual cases to determine whether ‘persons are acting in concert’.

 

Cornering market beyond the
specified limits, though a violation in itself, can potentially lead to
additional violations.

The case in question, as
seen below, allegedly had both the concerns specified above.

THE FACTS AND THE SEBI ORDER

Vide an order dated 28th
February, 2019 SEBI passed an ex parte interim order against 26 persons
for certain violations while acting in concert. SEBI initiated this action
based on the advice of the commodity exchange concerned. SEBI was informed that
three persons were holding more than 75% of the total exchange deliverable
stock of mentha oil. The exchange had applied the tests specified by SEBI to
determine whether these three persons were acting in concert. These three
persons were found to have been funded by a certain person.

The large holding was
accumulated not only by purchases on the exchange platform, but also through
off-market transactions. They had transferred their purchases to the specified
three persons. These parties were also alleged to be connected with each other
on the basis of findings made by the exchange.

The acquisitions and
holdings of these parties were tabulated by SEBI over nearly a year and it was
found that the deliveries taken by them as a percentage of total deliveries
showed that the cumulative deliveries were almost 75% of the total deliveries.

The order then analysed in
detail the relationship between the parties as well as the flow of funds
between them to demonstrate that they were acting in concert.

Further, the order
highlighted an aspect that strengthens SEBI’s case. It pointed out that some of
these parties traded for the first time. A few opened their trading accounts
during this period itself. Many traded beyond their capacity (i.e., net worth)
– for example, in an extreme case, a person whose declared net worth was Rs. 15
lakhs had taken delivery of goods worth Rs. 34.94 crores, which was 23,293% of
his net worth!

The order also considered
the numerical limits specified for the commodity and noted that such persons, allegedly
acting in concert, violated these limits on most of the days.

SEBI also alleged that NEFM
who ultimately funded the transactions, ‘intentionally created false and
misleading appearance of trades’. Further, the act of concealment was devised
to ‘deliberately mislead the market and hold a dominant stock position’. These
actions were in violation of the SEBI PFUTP Regulations. The registered broker
through whom the transactions were channelled by the parties was also alleged
to have prima facie violated various provisions, including incorrect
reporting and not exercising due skill, care and diligence, etc.

SEBI held that the parties
had not only violated provisions of law and accumulated a dominant position but
such position could put them in a position to manipulate the price of the
commodity.

 

In view of the above facts
SEBI debarred the parties from dealing in or being associated with markets in
any manner till further directions. Post-order hearing was granted to the
parties since this was an interim order.

The appeal and the
order of SAT (North End Foods Marketing (P) Ltd. vs. SEBI {[2019] 105
taxmann.com 69 (SAT – Mumbai)}

The parties so debarred
appealed to the Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT) against the interim ex
parte
order debarring them from trading. SAT set aside the order on several
grounds. Interestingly, the parties sought an interim order from SAT for
immediate reliefs.

The primary appellant
contended that it was involved in the business of procurement of commodities
and warehousing of commodities for which it received orders from its clients
and, in turn, placed orders for such commodities with its agents. These agents
procured such commodities and delivered those commodities to the appellant who,
in turn, delivered such commodities to its clients. Thus, the allegation of
acting in concert was denied.

The presumptions of SEBI
were questioned. For example, it was contended that the basis of presuming the
dominance in market was incorrect. It was argued that the total volume of trades
should be taken as the basis. If that were done, then, even if all the parties
were clubbed together their delivery would be less than 2% of the total volume
of trades. Thus, there was no dominance.

It was also contended that
though the transactions were completed, none of the price manipulations that
SEBI alleged had taken place. Thus, SEBI’s fears had no basis even on facts.

The order even debarred
parties from dealing in other commodities. Many commodities had limited shelf
life and there would be financial and physical loss if these deals were not
completed.

The SAT considered the
contentions and set aside SEBI’s order.

However, SAT upheld SEBI’s
power to pass interim ex parte orders and also highlighted various
pre-conditions to be satisfied before interim ex parte orders should be
passed. There has to be urgency for passing orders without granting a hearing
to the parties and this need particularly has to be justified. Further, SEBI
has to establish that there would be serious consequences if such an order is
not passed.

SAT noted that the events
described in the SEBI order were of the past. No useful purpose would be served
by debarring the parties at this stage. The derivatives contracts entered into
by the parties had already been executed and SEBI had not recorded any finding
of manipulation that it suspected had taken place. The order debarred parties
not only from dealing in mentha oil, but also all other commodities. This
obviously was too broad and too harsh. The order had also frozen the demat
accounts and mutual fund investments of the parties which had no bearing on the
alleged violations. SAT held that no purpose would be served in preventing
their dealings through an interim order.

Thus, the order failed in
complying with the necessary basic conditions of an interim ex parte
order. SAT set aside the order, though allowing SEBI to initiate and continue
such proceedings and inquiries on the matter as it deemed fit.

CONCLUSIONS

Interim ex parte
orders are often passed and it is well settled that SEBI has powers to pass
such orders. The basic features of interim ex parte orders are:

  • No opportunity to explain is given. Restrictions
    are often placed on the activities of the parties that can cause financial and
    reputational losses. Such interim orders often continue for years pending
    inquiry and investigations;
  • Hence, SAT held that SEBI has to establish
    exceptional need to pass ex parte interim orders.

There is another aspect
that is common to all orders of debarment – whether interim or final. Debarment
in ordinary course should be for prevention. Freezing bank accounts and sale of
assets should be done to ensure that funds are not siphoned off in anticipation
of orders of penalty, disgorgement, etc. However, it is often seen that the
debarment operates as a punishment. An order debarring dealings in securities
can result in loss and even closure of business. Hence, unless it can be shown
that dealings by parties would harm the markets, interim ex parte orders
cannot be sustained and should not be passed.

 

In the author’s opinion
SAT’s order lays down certain basic precautions that need to be taken by SEBI
while passing ex parte interim orders.

Section 40A(3) r.w.r. 6DD of ITR 1962 – Business expenditure – Disallowance u/s. 40A(3) – Payments in cash in excess of specified limit – Exceptions u/r. 6DD – Payment to producer of meat – Condition stipulated u/r. 6DD satisfied – Further condition provided in CBDT circular of certification by veterinary doctor cannot be imposed – Payment allowable as deduction

14

Principal CIT vs. GeeSquare Exports;
411 ITR 661 (Bom)

Date of order: 13th March,
2018

A.Y.: 2009-10

 

Section
40A(3) r.w.r. 6DD of ITR 1962 – Business expenditure – Disallowance u/s. 40A(3)
– Payments in cash in excess of specified limit – Exceptions u/r. 6DD – Payment
to producer of meat – Condition stipulated u/r. 6DD satisfied – Further
condition provided in CBDT circular of certification by veterinary doctor
cannot be imposed – Payment allowable as deduction

 

The
assessee exported meat. It purchased raw meat paying cash. Payments made in
cash in excess of Rs. 20,000 were disallowed u/s. 40A(3) of the Income-tax Act,
1961 on the ground that in view of Circular No. 8 of 2006 issued by the CBDT
for failure to comply with the condition for grant of benefit u/r. 6DD of the
Income-tax Rules, 1962 requiring certification from a veterinary doctor that
the person issued the certificate was a producer of meat and slaughtering was
done under his supervision.

 

The
Tribunal allowed the assessee’s appeal. It held that section 40A(3) provided
that no disallowance thereunder should be made if the payment in cash was made
in the manner prescribed u/r. 6DD. The Tribunal held that the payment made to
the producer of meat in cash satisfied such requirement and that neither the
Act nor the Rules provided that the benefit would be available only if further
conditions set out by the CBDT were complied with. The Tribunal further held
that the scope of Rule 6DD could not be restricted or fettered by the circular.

 

On appeal
by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and
held as under:

 

“i)   The assessee having satisfied the
requirements u/r. 6DD could not be subjected to the disallowance of the
deduction of expenditure on purchases in cash of meat u/s. 40A(3).

ii)     The
CBDT circular could not put in new conditions not provided either in the Act or
in the Rules.”

DECLARATION OF SIGNIFICANT BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP IN A COMPANY

1. BACKGROUND

1.1
Section 90 of the Companies Act, 2013 (Act), when enacted from 01.04.2014,
provided for investigation of beneficial ownership of shares in certain cases.
This section corresponded to section 187D of the Companies Act, 1956.This
original section is replaced by a new section by the Companies (Amendment) Act,
2017 effective 13.06.2018. This new section provides that every individual or
trust having significant beneficial ownership of shares in a company (private
or public) has to file a declaration for such holding in the manner prescribed
in the Rules.

 

1.2
By a Notification dated 13.06.2018, the Companies (Significant Beneficial
Owners) Rules, 2018 were notified. These Rules came into force on 13.06.2018.
There were a lot of ambiguities about some of the provisions in these Rules.
Therefore, they were not made operative and have been amended by a Notification
dated 8.02.2019. Accordingly, the Companies (Significant Beneficial Owners)
Amendment Rules, 2019 have now come into force from 8.02.2019.

 

1.3
Section 90 has been further amended by the Companies (Amendment) Ordinance,
2018 effective 02.11.2018. Section 90 and the above Rules contain provisions
which require certain individuals having significant beneficial ownership in
shares of a company to make a declaration in the prescribed form. In this
article some of the important provisions relating to declaration of significant
beneficial ownership in a company are discussed.

 

2. DECLARATION OF BENFICIAL INTEREST IN ANY SHARE

2.1
Section 89 of the Companies Act, 2013 provides for declaration to be filed by a
shareholder in respect of beneficial interest in any shares of a company
(whether public or private). Under this section, if a shareholder of a company
has no beneficial interest in the shares of a company held by him / her, such
shareholder has to file with the company a declaration in Form No. MGT-4 giving
particulars of the beneficial owners of the shares within 30 days of acquiring
these shares. A similar declaration is also required to be filed with the
company within 30 days whenever there is a change in the particulars of the
beneficial owners. Similarly, the person having beneficial ownership in shares
of a company held in the name of any other person is required to file a
declaration in Form No. MGT-5 within 30 days of acquiring such beneficial
interest. On receipt of the above declarations, the company is required to make
a note of such declarations in the Register of Members and file Form No. MGT-6
within 30 days with the Registrar of Companies (ROC) with the prescribed filing
fees.

 

2.2 If there is default in filing the above
declarations by the shareholder or the beneficial owner of shares within time,
section 89(5) provides for levy of a fine up to Rs. 50,000. For continuing
default further fine up to
Rs. 1,000 for each day can be levied. Similarly, for default in filing Form.
No. MGT-6 in time by the company a fine will be levied on the company and every
officer in default. In this case the minimum fine will be Rs. 500 subject to
maximum of Rs. 1,000. Further, in case of continuing default by the company, a
further fine up to Rs. 1,000 per day will be levied on the company and on the
officers in default.

 

2.3 Further, if the beneficial owner does not make
the declaration u/s. 89, he / she or any person claiming through him / her
shall not be entitled to claim any right in respect of such shares. Section 89
is amended by the Companies (Amendment) Act, 2017, effective from 13.06.2018.
According to this amendment, it is provided that for the purposes of sections
89 and 90, beneficial interest in a share includes, directly or indirectly,
through any contract, arrangement or otherwise, the right or entitlement of a
person or persons to (a) exercise any or all of the rights attached to such
shares, or (b) receive or participate in any dividend or other distribution in
respect of such shares.

 

3. SIGNIFICANT BENEFICIAL OWNER

3.1 The
term “Significant Beneficial Owner” is defined in section 90(1) of the Act as
under:

(i)  This
term applies to – every individual, who acting alone or together, or through
one or more persons or trust (including a foreign trust and persons resident
outside India);

(ii)  Such
person holds beneficial interest of not less than 25%, or such other
percentage, as may be prescribed (at present the Rules prescribe 10%), in the
shares of the company;

(iii) Such person may have right to exercise or may be actually
exercising significant influence or control as defined in section 2(27) of the
Act.

 

3.2
In order to further understand who is a “Significant Beneficial Owner” we have
to refer to the Companies (Significant Beneficial Owners) Amendment Rules,
2019. This term is defined in Rule 2(h) to mean as under:

 

An individual referred to in section
90(1), who acting alone or together, or through one or more persons or trust,
possesses one or more of the following rights or entitlements in the company:

 

(i)  Holds
indirectly or together with any direct holdings not less than 10% of (a)
shares, (b) voting rights in the shares, or (c) right to receive or participate
in the total distributable dividend or any other distribution in a financial
year;

(ii)  Has
right to exercise or actively exercises significant influence or control in any
manner other than through direct holdings alone. For this purpose “Significant
Influence” is defined in Rule 2(i) to mean the power to participate, directly
or indirectly, in the financial and operating policy decisions of the company
but not control or joint control of those policies. The term “Control” includes
the right to appoint majority of the directors or to control the management or
policy decisions exercisable by a person or persons acting individually or in
concert, directly or indirectly, including by virtue of shareholding or
management rights or shareholders agreements or voting agreements or in any
other “manner”;

(iii) If an individual does not hold any right or entitlement as stated in
para 3.2(i), indirectly, he shall not be considered to be a significant
beneficial owner.

 

3.3
(i) An individual shall be considered to hold a right or entitlement, as stated
in Para 3.2(i), directly, if he / she (a) holds the shares in the company in
his own right, or (b) holds or acquires a beneficial interest in the shares of
the company as provided in section 89(2) and has made the declaration required
to be made u/s. 89;

(ii)  From
the above, it is evident that the provisions of section 90 are applicable to a
person only if he / she holds shares in the company indirectly. If he / she
holds such shares directly only, he / she has to make the declaration u/s. 89
only and not u/s. 90.

 

3.4
Explanation III to Rule 2(4) states that an individual shall be considered to
be holding a right or entitlement
in the shares of a company indirectly if he / she satisfies any of the following
criteria in respect of the member of the company:

 

(i)  Where the member of the company is a body
corporate (whether Indian or foreign), other than an LLP, and the individual
(a) holds majority stake in that member, or (b) holds majority state in the
ultimate holding company (whether Indian or foreign) of that member;

(ii)  Where the member of the company is an HUF
(through karta) then the individual who is the karta of the HUF.
This will mean that if the individual is only a member of an HUF (and not its karta),
he / she will not be considered to have indirect interest in the company;

(iii) Where the member of the company is a
partnership entity (including an LLP) and the individual is (a) a partner, (b)
holds majority stake in the body corporate which is a partner of the
partnership entity, or (c) holds majority stake in the ultimate holding company
of the above body corporate;

(iv) Where the member of the company is a trust
(through its Trustee) and the individual is (a) a Trustee in the case of a Discretionary
Trust or a Charitable Trust, (b) a beneficiary in the case of a Specific Trust,
or (c) Author or settlor in the case of a Revocable Trust. This will mean that
a settlor of an Irrevocable Trust or a beneficiary of a Discretionary Trust
will not be considered as holding indirect interest in the shares held by a
Trust;

(v) Where the member of the company is (a) A pooled
Investment Vehicle, or (b) An entity controlled by the pooled Investment
Vehicle based in Member State of the Financial Action Task Force on Money
Laundering and the Regulator of the Securities Market in such Member State is a
member of the International Organisation of Securities Commissions, and the
individual in relation to the pooled Investment Vehicle is (A) a general partner,
(B) an Investment Manager, or (C) a Chief Executive  Officer, where the Investment Manager is a
body corporate or a partnership entity. It may be noted that if the pooled
Investment Vehicle is based in a jurisdiction which does not fulfil the above
requirements, the provisions of items (i) to (iv) above will apply.

(vi) Explanation VI clarifies that any financial
instruments in the form of (a) Global Depository Receipts, (b) Compulsorily
Convertible Preference Shares, or (c) Compulsorily Convertible Debentures will
be treated as shares in the company and all the above provisions will apply to
such instruments;

(vii)
It may be noted that for the above purpose the expression “Majority Stake” is
defined in Rule 2(1)(d) to mean (a) holding more than 50% of the equity share
capital in the body corporate, (b) holding more that 50% of the voting rights
in the body corporate, or (c) having the right to receive or participate in
more than 50% of the distributable dividend or any other distribution by the
body corporate;

(viii) It may be noted that the
above provisions do not apply to the shares of the company held by the
following entities:

 

(a) The
Authority constituted u/s. 125(5), i.e., Investor Education and Protection
Fund;

(b) The
Holding Company, provided that the details of such holding company are reported
in Form No. BEN-2;

(c) The
Central Government, State Government or any Local Authority;

(d) The
Company, Body Corporate or the entity controlled by the Central Government,
State Governments or partly by Central and partly by a State Government or
Governments;

(e) SEBI-registered Investment Vehicles, Mutual
Funds, Alternative Investment Funds, Real Estate Investment Trust,
Infrastructure Investment Trusts, regulated by SEBI;

(f)  Investment
Vehicles regulated by RBI, IRDA or Pension Fund Regulatory and Development
Authority.

 

From the above discussions it is
evident that each individual will have to study the provisions of section 90
and the Rules carefully to determine whether he / she along with any other person
is holding directly and indirectly 10% or more of the specified rights or
entitlements in the shares or financial instruments such as CCPS or CCDS of the
company. This is an onerous exercise depending on the facts of each case.

 

4. DECLARATION OF SIGNIFICANT BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP

4.1
Section 90(1) further provides that the person who has significant ownership in
shares of a company should file with the company the prescribed Form No. BEN-1,
specifying the nature of his / her interest and such other particulars as
provided in the Rules. This Form is to be filed within the prescribed time
limit as under:

 

(i)  In
respect of significant beneficial ownership existing on 08.02.2019, within 90
days from the commencement of the Rules, i.e., by 07.05.2019;

(ii)  If
the significant beneficial ownership is obtained after 08.02.2019, but before
07.05.2019, the Form should be filed within 30 days after 07.05.2019.

(iii) In all other cases within 30 days of acquiring significant
beneficial ownership or changes therein.

 

4.2
Every company has to maintain a Register of Significant Beneficial Ownership in
Form No. BEN-3 as prescribed by the Rules. This Register will be open to
inspection by every member on payment of the prescribed fees.

 

4.3 Upon
receipt of such declaration in Form BEN-1 from the person who has significant
beneficial ownership in shares, the company has to file Form No. BEN-2 with the
ROC with the prescribed fees within 30 days of the receipt of such declaration.

 

4.4
If such declaration is not received by a company, it has to give a notice in
Form No. BEN-4 to the person (whether a member of the company or not) if the
company has knowledge or has reasonable cause to believe that such person:

 

(i)  Is
a significant beneficial owner of the company;

(ii)  Is
having knowledge of the identify of a significant beneficial owner or another
person who is likely to have such knowledge; or

(iii) Has been a significant beneficial owner of the company at any time
during the three years immediately preceding the date on which the notice is
issued.

 

On receipt of this notice from the
company, such person has to give the required information to the company within
30 days of the date of the notice.

 

4.5 If no information is received by
the company from the above person or the information given by such person is
not satisfactory, the company has to apply to the National Company Law Tribunal
(NCLT) within 15 days. By this application the company can apply for directions
from NCLT that the shares in question shall be subject to restrictions,
including:

 

(i)  Restrictions
on transfer of interest attached to such shares;

(ii)  Suspension
of the right to receive dividend or any other distribution in relation to such
shares;

(iii) Suspension of voting rights in relation to such shares;

(iv) Any
other restriction on all or any of the rights attached to such shares.

 

4.6
NCLT has to give notice to all concerned parties and after hearing them pass
appropriate order within 60 days or such extended period as may be prescribed.
On receipt of the order of the NCLT, the company or the aggrieved person may
apply for modification / relaxation of the restrictions within one year from
the date of such order. If no such application is made within one year, the
shares will be transferred to the Authority appointed u/s. 125(5) of the Act
for administration of the Investor Education and Protection Fund.

 

5. PUNISHMENT FOR CONTRAVENTION OF SECTION 90

Section 90(10) to 90(12) provides
for punishment for contravention of provisions of section 90 as under:

 

(i)  If
a person required to file declaration u/s. 90(1) does not file the same he
shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year
or with fine of Rs. 1 lakh which may extend to Rs. 10 lakhs, or with both. For
continuing default, there will be a further fine up to Rs. 1,000 per day till
the default continues;

(ii)  If a company required to maintain the Register
u/s. 90(2) and to file information with the ROC u/s. 90(4) fails to do so in
time or denies inspection of relevant records, the company and every officer
who is in default shall be punishable with fine which shall not be less than
Rs. 10 lakhs and may extend to Rs. 50 lakhs. In case of continuing default a
further fine up to Rs. 1,000- per day will be levied for the period of the
default;

(iii) If any person wilfully furnishes any false or incorrect information
or suppresses any material information of which he / she is aware in the
declaration filed u/s. 90, he / she shall be liable to action u/s.  447 of the Act (i.e., Punishment for Fraud).

 

6. IMPACT OF THE ABOVE PROVISIONS

Some practical issues arise from the
above provisions relating to declaration of Significant Beneficial Ownership of
shares in a company. As stated earlier, the above declaration is to be made by
the individual who has indirect beneficial interest in the shares of a company
held by any other person. Further, section 90 and the applicable Rules provide
that the company has to maintain certain records and file the declaration with
the ROC. Non-compliance with the provisions of the section and the Rules invite
stringent penalties. In view of the above, some of the practical issues are
discussed below:

(i)  If
Mr. X holds 5% of equity shares in XYZ Pvt. Ltd., but he has no beneficial
interest in such shares. Mr. M is the beneficial owner of these shares. In this
case, section 89 is applicable. Mr. X will have to file declaration in Form No.
MGT-4 within a period of 30 days from the date on which his / her name is
entered in the Register of Members of such company and Mr. M will have to file
declaration in Form No. MGT-5 with the company within 30 days after acquiring
such beneficial interest in the shares of the company. The company will have to
file the declaration with the ROC in Form No. MGT-6 within 30 days of receipt
of the Forms MGT-4 and MGT-5;           

(ii)  PB
Pvt. Ltd. is holding 8% of the equity shares of XYZ Ltd. and Mr. P is holding
4% of the equity shares in XYZ Ltd. Mr. P is also holding 51% of equity shares
of PB Pvt. Ltd. In this case, Mr. P will be deemed to be holding significant
beneficial ownership in shares of XYZ Ltd., as he is indirectly holding
interest in 8% equity shares (through PB Pvt. Ltd) and directly holding 4% of
equity shares. In this case, Mr. P will have to file declaration in Form No.
BEN-1 with XYZ Ltd.;

(iii) AB Pvt. Ltd. is holding 15% of equity shares of XYZ Ltd. Mr. A is
holding 55% of equity shares in AB Pvt. Ltd. In this case, Mr. A will be
considered as holding Significant Beneficial Ownership of more than 10% of
equity shares of XYZ Ltd. This is because Mr. A will be considered to have 15%
indirect ownership of shares of XYZ Ltd. through AB Pvt. Ltd. Therefore, Mr. A
will have to file declaration in Form No. BEN-1;

(iv) ABC
(HUF), through its karta Mr. B, is the owner of 12% equity shares of XYZ
Ltd. In this case, Mr. B will be considered as indirect owner of these shares
and he will have to file declaration in Form No. BEN-1. No other member of the
HUF has to file this declaration;

(v) Mrs.
N is a Trustee of NPS Trust. There are two beneficiaries of the trust who have
equal share. Mrs. N in her capacity of Trustee is holding 20% equity shares in
ABC Ltd. In this case, each beneficiary will be deemed to have significant
beneficial ownership in shares of ABC Ltd. Therefore, each beneficiary will
have to file declaration in Form No. BEN-1. If the trust is a discretionary
Trust, the above declaration is to be filed by the Trustee only. If the trust
is a revocable Trust, such declaration is to be filed only by the Settlor of
the Trust.

(vi) JDS
LLP is holding 25% equity shares of ABC Ltd. Mr. J, Mr. D, Mr. S and JDS Pvt.
Ltd are partners of JDS LLP. In this case Mr. J, Mr. D and Mr. S will be deemed
to be significant beneficial owners of the shares and each of them will have to
file a declaration in Form No.BEN-1. There is one Mr. R who holds 60% of equity
shares of JDS Pvt. Ltd. (one of the partners of JDS LLP).Therefore, Mr. R will
also be considered as a Significant Beneficial Owner of shares of ABC Ltd. and
he will also be required to file declaration in Form No. BEN-1.

(vii) There are the following
members in PR Ltd.:

(a)

CD Pvt. Ltd

2%

(b)

ABC (HUF) (Through Karta)

4%

(c)

PDS LLP

3%

(d)

DC (Trust) (Discretionary Trust)

5%

(e)

XYZ & Co. (Partnership Firm) (through its partner A)

8%

(f)

Others

78%

 

 

——-

 

TOTAL

100%

 

 

====

 

Mr. A holds 55% equity shares in CD
Pvt. Ltd. He is the karta of ABC (HUF). He is also a partner of PDS LLP.
and XYZ Co. and a Trustee of DC Trust. All these entities together own 22% of
equity shares in PR Ltd. Therefore, Mr. A will be treated as having Significant
Beneficial Ownership of more than 10% of equity shares of PR Ltd. and he will
have to file declaration in Form No. BEN-1.

 

7. TO SUM UP

From the analysis of the above provisions of
section 90 and the applicable Rules, it will be noticed that an onerous duty is
cast on individuals who hold indirect, together with or without direct,
interest of 10% or more in the equity shares of a company. Therefore, all
individuals who are having investments in shares of companies directly or
indirectly will have to study these provisions and file declaration in Form No.
BEN-1 within the prescribed time limit. It appears that these provisions are
made to locate persons who hold control in a company through benami
holdings. That is the reason why stringent penalties are provided in sections
89 and 90 for non-compliance by the individuals, the company and its defaulting
officers. Let us hope that these provisions will curb some unethical practices
which are at present adopted by certain individuals and companies for
exercising control over and to influence certain corporate decisions.

TDS UNDER SECTION 194A ON PAYMENT OF ‘INTEREST’ UNDER MOTOR ACCIDENT CLAIM

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION

Under the Motor Vehicles
Act, 1988 (MVA), a liability has been cast on the owner of the motor vehicle or
the insurer to pay compensation in the case of death or permanent disablement
due to a motor vehicle accident. This compensation is payable to the legal
heirs in case of death and to the victim in case of permanent disablement. For
the purposes of adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of motor
accidents, the Motor Accident Claims Tribunals (MACTs) have been established.
The MVA further provides that in case of death the claim may be preferred by
all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased. The quantum of
compensation is decided by taking into consideration the nature of injury in
case of an injured person and the age, monthly income and dependency in death
cases. The MVA contains the 2nd Schedule for compensation in fatal accidents
and injury cases claims. While awarding general damages in case of death, the
funeral expenses, loss of consortium, loss of estate and medical expenses are
also the factors that are considered.

 

The claims under the MVA may involve delay which may be due
to late filing of the compensation claim, investigation, adjudication of claim
and various other factors. A provision is made u/s. 171 of the MVA to
compensate the injured or his legal heir for the delay, which reads as under:

 

“Section 171. Award of interest where any claim is
allowed.

Where any Claims Tribunal allows a claim for compensation
made under this Act, such Tribunal may direct that in addition to the amount of
compensation, simple interest shall also be paid at such rate and from such
date not earlier than the date of making the claim as it may specify in this
behalf.”

 

CBDT circular No. 8 of 2011 requires deduction of income tax
at source on payment of the award amount and interest on deposit made under
orders of the court in motor accident claims cases. The issue has arisen before
courts as to whether tax is deductible at source u/s. 194A on such interest
awarded by the MACTs u/s. 171 of the MVA for delay.

 

While the Allahabad, Himachal Pradesh and Punjab and Haryana
High Courts have held that such payment is not income by way of interest as
defined in section 2(28A) and no tax is deductible at source u/s. 194A, the
Patna and Madras High Courts have taken a contrary view, holding that such
payment is interest on which tax is deductible at source u/s. 194A.

 

THE ORIENTAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. CASE

The issue first arose before the Allahabad High Court in the
case of CIT vs. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. 27 taxmann.com 28.

 

In this case, the
assessee, an insurance company, paid compensation and interest thereon under
the MVA to claimants without complying with the provisions of section 194A. The
assessing authority took a view that the assessee had failed to deduct income
tax on the amount of interest u/s. 194A and held that it was accordingly liable
to deposit the amount of short deduction of tax u/s. 201(1) along with interest
u/s. 201(1A) for a period of five assessment years. According to the assessing
officer, debt incurred included claims and interest on such claims was clearly
covered u/s. 2(28A). His reasoning was as below:

 

1. Interest paid under the MVA was a revenue receipt like
interest received on delayed payment of compensation under the Land Acquisition
Act. Since section 194A applied to interest on compensation under the Land
Acquisition Act, it also applied in respect of interest on compensation under
the MVA.

2. The interest element in a total award was different from
compensation. However, interest on such compensation was on account of delayed
payment of such compensation, and therefore it was clearly an income in the
hands of the recipient, taxable under the Income-tax Act.

3. The interest element
was different from compensation as provided in section 171 of the MVA  as that section provided that the tribunal
might direct that in addition to the amount of compensation, simple interest
should also be paid.

4. There was no exemption u/s. 194A for TDS on interest
payment by insurance companies on MACT awards.

5. The actual payer of interest was the insurance company and
the responsibility to deduct tax lay squarely on it. The provisions of section
204(iii) were very clear that the person responsible for payment meant “in the
case of credit or as the case may be, payment of any other sum chargeable under
the provisions of this Act, the payer himself, or, if the payer is a company,
the company itself including the principal officer thereof.”

6. Payment awarded under the MVA was identical to the award
under the Land Acquisition Act. Tax was deducted u/s. 194A on interest paid or
credited for late payment of compensation under the Land Acquisition Act.
Therefore, section 194A was also applicable in respect of interest paid or
credited on delayed payment of compensation under the MVA.

7. Interest under the MVA was similar to interest paid under
the Income-tax Act, as both arose by operation of law. The nature of payment
mentioned in both the Acts was “interest”. TDS on interest payment under the
Income-tax Act was not deductible in view of the specific exemption u/s. 194A(3)(viii).
Since there was no similar exemption for interest payment under the MVA, the
provisions of section 194A applied to these payments.

 

The Commissioner (Appeals) dismissed the appeal of the
assessee, confirming the action of the assessing authority and holding that the
interest payment awarded u/s. 171 of the MVA was nothing but interest, subject
to the provisions of section 194A.

 

In the second appeal before the tribunal, the Agra Tribunal
decided the issue in favour of the assessee, following its own earlier
decisions in the cases of Divisional Manager, New India Insurance Co.
Ltd., Agra vs. ITO [ITA Nos. 317 to 321/Agra/2003]
, which, in turn, had
followed the decision of the Delhi Tribunal in the case of Oriental
Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. ITO dated 27.9.2004
, and in Oriental
Insurance Company Ltd. vs. ITO [ITA Nos. 276 & 280/Agra/2003 dated
31.1.2005]
.

 

It was argued before the Allahabad High Court on behalf of
the Revenue that it was the responsibility of the payer of interest to deduct
tax on such payment of interest, because section 2(28A) clearly envisaged that
interest meant interest payable in any manner in respect of moneys borrowed or
debt incurred (including a deposit, claim or other similar right / obligation)
and includes any service fee or other charges in respect of the money borrowed
or debt incurred, or in respect of any credit facility which had not been
utilised. It was argued that the Tribunal had not referred to the decision of
the Supreme Court in the case of Bikram Singh vs. Land Acquisition
Collector 224 ITR 551
, in which it had been held that interest paid on
the delayed payment of compensation was a revenue receipt eligible to tax u/s.
4 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

 

On behalf of the Revenue, reliance was placed upon the following
decisions:

 

a) The Karnataka High Court in the case of CIT vs.
United Insurance Co. Ltd. 325 ITR 231
, where the court held that
interest paid above Rs. 50,000 was to be split and spread over the period from
the date interest was directed to be paid till its payment.

b) The Karnataka High Court in the case of Registrar
University of Agricultural Science vs. Fakiragowda 324 ITR 239
where
interest received on belated payment of compensation for acquisition of land
was held to be a revenue receipt chargeable to income tax on which tax was
deductible at source.

c) The Supreme Court, in the case of T.N.K. Govindaraju
Chetty vs. CIT 66 ITR 465
, in the context of interest on compensation
awarded for acquisition of land, held that if the source of the obligation
imposed by the statute to pay interest arose because the claimant was kept out
of his money, the interest received was chargeable to tax as income.

d) The Supreme Court, in the case of K.S. Krishna Rao
vs. CIT 181 ITR 408
, where interest paid on compensation awarded for
compulsory acquisition of land u/s. 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was
held to be in the nature of income and not capital.

 

On behalf of the assessee, it was argued before the Allahabad
High Court that:

 

1. The interest paid on the award of compensation was not
interest as understood in general parlance and it was not an income of the
claimant.

2. The compensation
awarded by the MACT to the claimants was a capital receipt in the hands of the
recipients, not taxable under any provision of the Income-tax Act. Since the
award was not taxable in the hands of the recipient, it was not an income but
was a capital receipt.

3. Interest paid by the insurance company u/s. 171 of the MVA
was not interest as contemplated u/s. 194A, because interest that was contented
under that section was an income taxable in the hands of the recipient, whereas
interest received by the recipient u/s. 171 of the MVA was a capital receipt in
the hands of the recipient, being nothing but an enhanced compensation on account
of delay in the payment of compensation.

 

The Allahabad High Court referred to the definition of
interest u/s. 2(28A), which reads as under:

 

“ ‘interest’ means interest payable in any manner in
respect of any moneys borrowed or debt incurred (including a deposit, claim or
other similar right or obligation) and includes any service fee or other charge
in respect of the moneys borrowed or debt incurred or in respect of any credit
facility which has not been utilised.”

 

After referring to the language of section 194A, the
Allahabad High Court referred to the CBDT circular 24 of 1976 (105 ITR
24)
, where the concept of interest had been explained. It also referred
to clause (ix) of section 194A(3), which had been inserted by the Finance Act,
2003 with effect from 1st June, 2003, which read as under:

 

“to such income credited or paid by way of interest on the
compensation amount awarded by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal where the
amount of such income or, as the case may be, the aggregate of the amount of
such income credited or paid during the financial year does not exceed Rs.
50,000.”

 

The Allahabad High Court referred to the following decisions:

 

1. The Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of CIT
vs. Chiranji Lal Multani Mal Rai Bahadur (P) Ltd. 179 ITR 157
, where it
had been held that interest awarded by the court for loss suffered on account
of deprivation of property amounted to compensation and was not taxable.

2. The National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission in Ghaziabad
Development Authority vs. Dr. N.K. Gupta 258 ITR 337
, where it had been
held that if proper infrastructure facilities had not been provided to a person
who was provided with a flat and was therefore entitled to refund of the amount
paid by him along with interest at 18%, the paying authority was not entitled
to deduct income tax on the amount of interest, as it was not interest as
defined in section 2(28A), but was compensation or damages for delay in
construction or handing over possession of the property, consequential loss to
the complainant by way of escalation in the price of property, and also on
account of distress and disappointment faced by him.

3. The Himachal Pradesh High Court in the case of CIT
vs. H.P. Housing Board 340 ITR 388
, where the High Court had held that
payment for delayed construction of house was not payment of interest but was
payment of damages to compensate the claimant for the delay in the construction
of the house and the harassment caused to him.

4. The Supreme Court, in the case of CIT vs. Govind
Choudhury & Sons 203 ITR 881
, had held that when there were
disputes with the state government with regard to payments under the contracts,
receipt of certain amount under the arbitration award and the interest for
delay in payment of amounts due to it, such interest was attributable to and
incidental to the business carried on by it. It was also held that interest
awarded could not be separated from the other amounts granted under the awards
and could not be taxed under the head “income from other sources”.

5. The Bombay High Court decision in the case of Islamic
Investment Co. vs. Union of India 265 ITR 254
, where it had been held
that there was no provision under the Income-tax Act or under the Code of Civil
Procedure to show that from the amount of interest payable under a decree, tax
was deductible from the decretal amount on the ground that it was an interest
component on which tax was liable to be deducted at source.

 

The Allahabad High Court also referred to the decisions of
the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs. Cargill Global Trading (P)
Ltd. 335 ITR 94
and CIT vs. Sahib Chits (Delhi) (P) Ltd. 328 ITR
342
, which had analysed the meaning of the term “interest”.

 

The Allahabad High Court observed that most of the rulings
relied upon by the Revenue related to interest paid on delayed payment of
compensation awarded under the Land Acquisition Act. According to the Allahabad
High Court, an award under the Land Acquisition Act and an award under the MVA
could not be equated for the simple reason that in land acquisition cases the
payment was made regarding the price of the land and on such price the
provisions of capital gains tax were attracted. On the other hand, in motor
accident claims, the payment was made to the legal representatives of the
deceased for loss of life of their bread-earner, the recipients of awards being
poor and illiterate persons who did not even come within the ambit of the
Income-tax Act, and the amount of compensation under the MVA also did not come
within the definition of “income”.

 

According to the Allahabad High Court, the term “interest” as
defined in section 2(28A) had to be strictly construed. The necessary
ingredient was that it should be in respect of any money borrowed or debt
incurred. The award under the MVA was neither money borrowed by the insurance
company nor debt incurred by the insurance company. The word “claim” in section
2(28A) should also be regarding a deposit or other similar right or obligation.

 

The Allahabad High Court observed that the intention of the
legislature was that if the assessee had received any interest in respect of
moneys borrowed or debt incurred, including a deposit, claim or other similar
right or obligation, or any service fee or other charge in respect of moneys
borrowed or debt incurred had been received, then certainly it would come
within the definition of interest. The word “claim” used in the definition may
relate to claims under contractual liability, but certainly did not cover
claims under a statutory liability, the claim under the MVA regarding
compensation for death or injury being a statutory liability.

 

Further, the Allahabad High Court referred to the insertion
of clause (ix) to section 194A(3), stating that it showed that prior to 1st
June, 2003 the legislature had no intention to charge any tax on interest
received as compensation under the MVA. According to the High Court, there was
therefore no justification to cast a liability to deduct TDS on interest paid
on compensation under the MVA prior to 1st June, 2003.

 

The Allahabad High Court also noted that u/s. 194A(1), tax
was deductible at source if a person was responsible for paying to a resident
any income by way of interest other than interest on securities. In the opinion
of the Allahabad High Court, the award of compensation under motor accident
claims could not be regarded as income, being compensation to the legal heirs
for the loss of life of their bread-earner. Therefore, interest on such award
also could not be termed as income to the legal heirs of the deceased or the
victim himself.

 

It was noted by the Allahabad High Court that an award under
the MVA was like a decree of the court, which would not come within the
definition of income referred to in section 194A(1) read with section 2(28A) of
the Income-tax Act. According to the court, proceedings regarding claims under
the MVA were in the nature of garnishee proceedings, where the MACT had a right
to attach the judgement debt payable by the insurance company. Even in the
award, there was no direction of any court that before paying the award the
insurance company was required to deduct tax at source. As held by the Supreme
Court in the case of All India Reporter Ltd. vs. Ramachandra D. Datar 41
ITR 446
, if no provision had been made in the decree for deduction of
tax before paying the debt, the insurance company could not deduct the tax at
source from the amount payable to the legal heirs of the deceased.

 

The Allahabad High Court
observed that the different High Courts in the cases of Chiranji Lal
Multani Mal Rai Bahadur (P) Ltd. (supra), Dr. N.K. Gupta (supra), H.P. Housing
Board (supra)
and Sahib Chits (Delhi) (P) Ltd. (supra),
held that if interest was awarded by the court for loss suffered on account of
deprivation of property or paid for breach of contract by means of damages or
was not paid in respect of any debt incurred or money borrowed, it would not
attract the provisions of section 2(28A) read with section 194A(1). The
Allahabad High Court, therefore, held that interest paid on compensation under motor
accident claims awards was not liable to income tax.

 

A similar view has been taken by the Himachal Pradesh High
Court in the case of Court on Its Own Motion vs. H.P. State Co-operative
Bank Ltd. 228 Taxmann 151
, where the High Court quashed the CBDT circular
No. 8 of 2011 which required deduction of income tax on award amount and
interest accrued on deposit made under orders of the court in motor accident
claims cases, and in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Indra
Devi 100 taxmann.com 160
, and by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in
the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs. Sudesh Chawla 80 taxmann.com
331.

 

THE NATIONAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. CASE

The issue again came up before the Patna High Court in the
case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. ACIT 59 taxmann.com 269.

 

In this case, the District Judge gave an award to the
claimant under the MVA of Rs. 3,70,000 plus interest at 6% per annum from the
date of filing of the claim. The amount was to be paid within two months of the
passing of the order, failing which the further direction was to pay interest
at 9% per annum from the date of the order till the date of final payment. The
insurance company deducted and deposited TDS of Rs. 24,715 u/s. 194A while
making the payment of the amount of the award. The claimant objected to the
deduction of TDS by filing a petition before the District Judge. The District
Judge held that the deduction of Rs. 24,175 by way of TDS was not sustainable
and directed the insurance company to disburse the amount to the claimant
without TDS. The insurance company filed a writ petition in the High Court
against this order of the District Judge for seeking permission to deduct tax
at source on payment of the interest on compensation.

 

Before the Patna High Court, on behalf of the insurance
company, reliance was placed upon the relevant provisions of the Income-tax Act
in support of the stand that the insurance company was under a statutory
liability u/s. 194A of the Act to have made deduction of the amount of TDS
while making payment by way of interest on the compensation amount awarded by
the MACT. The total interest component under the award came to a little over
Rs. 1,20,000, and therefore, the insurance company was bound under the Act to
make deduction of TDS while making payment; accordingly, an amount of Rs.
24,175 was to be deducted as TDS.

 

Reliance was also placed upon a decision of the Patna High
Court in C.W.J.C. No. 5352 of 2013, National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. CIT,
where the court had held as under:

 

“It appears that the Tribunal below has ignored the
statutory duty conferred upon the insurer under section 194 (1) (sic) of the
Income-tax Act. Under the said provision, the insurer is obliged to deduct tax
at source from the amount of interest paid by the insurer to the claimant. The
said amount has to be deposited with the Government of India as the income tax
deducted at source. The Tribunal below has grossly erred in directing the
insurer to pay the said sum to the claimant.”

 

Reliance was further placed upon a decision of the Madras
High Court in the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs. Mani 270 ITR
394
, in which it had been held as follows:

 

“A plain reading of section 194A of the IT Act would
indicate that the insurance company is bound to deduct the income tax amount on
interest, treating it as a revenue, if the amount paid during the financial
year exceeds Rs. 50,000. In this case, admittedly, when the compensation amount
has been deposited during the financial year, including interest, the interest amount
alone exceeded Rs. 50,000 and therefore the insurance company has no other
option except to deduct the income tax at source for the interest amount
exceeding Rs. 50,000, failing which they may have to face the consequences,
such as prosecution, even. In this view alone, when the execution petition was
filed for the realisation of the award amount, deducting the income tax at
source for the interest, since it exceeded Rs. 50,000, on the basis of the
above said provision, the balance alone had been deposited, for which the court
cannot find fault.”

 

It was highlighted that the Madras High Court in the said
case had relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bikram
Singh vs. Land Acquisition Collector 224 ITR 551
, where the Supreme
Court had held that interest received on delayed payment of compensation under
the Land Acquisition Act was a revenue receipt eligible to income tax. It was
explained that the Madras High Court in the said case had further held that the
trial court had not considered the actual effect of the amendment to section
194A, which came into effect from 1st June, 2003. The Madras High
Court observed that if the claimant was not liable to pay tax, his remedy was
to approach the department concerned for refund of the amount. According to the
Madras High Court, the executing court did not have the power to direct the
insurance company not to deduct the amount and pay the entire amount, thereby
compelling the insurance company to commit an illegal act, violating the statutory
provisions.

 

The Patna High Court examined the provisions of sections
194A(1) and (3)(ix) of the Income-tax Act. According to the Patna High Court,
it was evident from the above provisions that any person responsible for paying
any income by way of interest (other than the interest on securities) was
obliged to deduct income tax thereon. The only exception was in case of income
paid by way of interest on compensation amount awarded by MACT, where the
amount of such income or the aggregate of the amounts of such income credited
or paid during the financial year did not exceed Rs. 50,000. The court was
therefore of the view that if the interest component of the payment to be made
during the financial year on the basis of award of the MACT exceeded Rs. 50,000,
then the person making the payment was obliged to deduct TDS while making
payment.

 

The Patna High Court further held that while exercising his
jurisdiction with regard to execution of the award, the District Judge had to
be conscious of the fact that any such payment would be subjected to statutory
provisions. Since there was a clear provision under the Income-tax Act with
regard to TDS, the District Judge could not have held to the contrary. The only
remedy for the claimant under such circumstances was to approach the assessing
officer u/s. 197 for a certificate for a lower rate of TDS or non-deduction of
TDS, or alternatively to approach the tax authorities for refund of the amount
in case no tax was due or payable by the claimant.

 

The Patna High Court therefore allowed the writ petition of
the company and set aside the order of the District Judge.

 

OBSERVATIONS

Section194A requires a person responsible for payment of
interest to deduct tax at source in the circumstances specified therein. Clause
(ix), inserted with effect from  1st
June, 2003 in section 194A(3) exempted income credited or paid by way of
interest on the compensation amount awarded by the MACT where the amount of
such income or the aggregate of the amounts of such income credited or paid
during the financial year did not exceed Rs. 50,000. This clause (ix) has been
substituted by clauses (ix) and (ixa) with effect from  1st June, 2015. The new clause
(ix) altogether exempts income credited by way of interest on the compensation
amount awarded by the MACT from the liability to deduct tax at source u/s.
194A, while clause (ixa) continues to provide for exemption to income paid by
way of interest on compensation amount awarded by the MACT where the amount of
such income or the aggregate of the amounts of such income paid during the
financial year does not exceed Rs. 50,000. In effect, therefore, no TDS is
deductible on interest on such compensation which is merely credited but not
paid, or on payment of interest where the amount of interest paid during the
financial year does not exceed Rs. 50,000. The issue of applicability of TDS
therefore is really relevant only to cases where there is payment of such
interest exceeding Rs. 50,000 during the year and that, too, when it was not
preceded by the credit thereof.

 

Section 2(28A) defines the term “interest” in a manner that
includes the interest payable in any manner in respect of any moneys borrowed
or debt incurred. In a motor claim award, there is obviously no borrowing of
monies. Is there any debt incurred? The “incurring” of the debt, if at
all,  may arise only on grant of the
award. Before the award of the claim, there is really no debt that can be said
to have been incurred in favour of the person receiving compensation. In fact,
till such time as a claim is awarded there is no certainty about the
eligibility to the claim, leave alone the quantum of the claim. In our
considered view, no part of the amount awarded as compensation under the MVA
till the date of award could be considered as in the nature of interest. The
amount so awarded till the time it is awarded cannot be construed as interest
even where it includes the payment of “interest” u/s. 171 of the MVA for the
reason that such “interest” cannot be construed as “‘interest” within the meaning
of section 2(28A) of the Act and as a consequence cannot be subjected to TDS
u/s. 194A of the Act.

 

If one looks at the award of “interest” u/s. 171 of the MVA,
typically in most cases, such interest is a part of the amount of compensation
awarded and is not attributable to the late payment of the compensation, but is
for the reasons mentioned in section 171 and at the best relates to the period
ending with the date of award. This “interest” u/s. 171 for the period up to
the date of award, would not fit in within the definition of interest u/s.
2(28A). Interest for the period after the date of award, if related to the
delayed payment of the awarded compensation, would fall within the definition
of interest, being interest payable in respect of debt incurred. It would only
be the interest for the period after the date of award which would be liable to
TDS u/s. 194A of the Income-tax Act provided, of course, that the amount being
paid is exceeding Rs. 50, 000 and was not otherwise credited to the payee’s
account before the payment.

 

Looked at differently, the interest up to the date of award
would also partake of the same character as the compensation awarded, being
damages for a personal loss, and would therefore not be regarded as an income
at all, opening a new possibility of contending that the provisions of section
194A may not apply to a case where the payment otherwise is not taxable in the
hands of the recipient.

 

In cases where the payment of the awarded compensation is
delayed, the ultimate amount of payment to be made may include interest for the
post-award period. In such a case, the ultimate amount will have to be
bifurcated into two parts, one towards compensation including interest for the
pre-award period, and the other being interest which may be subjected to TDS.
This need for bifurcation of interest into pre-award interest and post-award
interest, and the character of each, is supported by the decision of the
Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Ghanshyam (HUF) 315 ITR 1,
where the Supreme Court held as under in the context of interest on
compensation under the Land Acquisition Act:

 

“To sum up, interest is different from compensation.
However, interest paid on the excess amount under section 28 of the 1894 Act
depends upon a claim by the person whose land is acquired whereas interest
under section 34 is for delay in making payment. This vital difference needs to
be kept in mind in deciding this matter. Interest under section 28 is part of
the amount of compensation whereas interest under section 34 is only for delay
in making payment after the compensation amount is determined. Interest under
section 28 is a part of enhanced value of the land which is not the case in the
matter of payment of interest under section 34.”

 

One of the side questions is whether such interest included
in MACT compensation awarded under the MVA is chargeable to tax at all? There
is no doubt that the amount of compensation awarded is for the loss of a
personal nature and is therefore a capital receipt of a personal nature, which
is not chargeable to tax at all. The payment, though labelled “interest” u/s.
171 of the MVA, bears the same character of such compensation inasmuch as it
has no relation to the dent or the period and is nothing but a compensation to
an injured person determined on due consideration of the relevant factors,
including for the period during the date of injury to the date of award.

 

The mere fact that such income credited by way of interest on
MACT compensation awards is subjected to the provisions of section 194A and the
payer is required to deduct tax at source does not necessarily mean that such
amounts are otherwise chargeable to tax. It is important to note that section
194A, in any case, refers to a person responsible for paying to a resident “any
income” by way of interest and demands compliance only where the payment is in
the nature of income. As interpreted by the Allahabad High Court and the other
courts, such income would mean income which is chargeable to tax. If the
interest is not chargeable to tax, then the question of deduction of TDS u/s.
194A does not arise.

 

The question of chargeability to tax of such income has also
been recently considered by the Rajasthan High Court in case of Sarda
Pareek vs. ACIT 104 taxmann.com 76,
where the High Court took the view
that on a plain reading of section 2(28A), though the original amount of MACT
compensation is not income but capital, the interest on the capital
(compensation) is liable to tax. The Supreme Court has admitted the special
leave petition against this order of the Rajasthan High Court in 104
taxmann.com 77
. In the case of New India Assurance Company Ltd.
vs. Mani (supra)
the Madras High Court held that the interest awarded
as a part of the compensation was income chargeable to tax; however, in a later
decision in the case of Managing Director, Tamil Nadu State Transport
Corpn. (Salem) Ltd. vs. Chinnadurai, 385 ITR 656
, the High Court took a
contrary view and held that such interest awarded did not fall under the term
“income” as defined under the Income-tax Act. An SLP is admitted by the Supreme
Court against this decision, too. Therefore, clearly the issue of chargeability
of even the post-award interest to income tax is still a matter of dispute.

 

As observed by the Allahabad High Court, the one significant
difference between the compensation under the Land Acquisition Act and under
the MVA is that the compensation under the Land Acquisition Act may be
chargeable to tax under the head capital gains, whereas the compensation under the
MVA is not chargeable to tax at all.

 

One has to also keep in mind the provisions of section
145A(b), as applicable from assessment year 2010-11 to assessment year 2016-17,
which provided that notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in
section 145, interest received by an assessee on compensation or on enhanced
compensation, as the case may be, shall be deemed to be the income of the year
in which it is received. With effect from assessment year 2017-18, an identical
provision is found u/s. 145B(1). However, the provisions of section 145A and
section 145B merely deal with how the income is to be computed and in which
year it is to be taxed, and do not deal with the issue of whether a particular
item of interest is chargeable to income tax or not. Therefore, these
provisions would apply only to interest on compensation which is otherwise
chargeable to income tax, and would not be applicable to interest which is not
so chargeable.

 

One also needs to refer to the provisions of section
56(2)(viii), which provides for chargeability under the head “income from other
sources” of interest received on compensation or on enhanced compensation
referred to in section 145A(b). Again, this provision merely prescribes the
head of income under which such interest would fall, provided such interest
income is chargeable to tax. It does not necessarily mean that the interest in
question is in the nature of income in the first place.

This is further clear from the fact that section 2(24), which
contains the definition of income, specifically includes receipts under various
clauses of section 56(2), such as clauses (v), (vi), (vii), (viia) and (x) –
gifts and deemed gifts, (viib) – excess premium received by a company for
shares, (ix) – forfeited advance for transfer of capital asset, and (xi) –
compensation in connection with termination or modification of terms of
employment for ensuring that such receipts so specified are treated as an
“income” for the purposes of the Act. In contrast, receipt of the nature
specified under clause (viii) of section 56(2) is not included in section 2(24)
indicating that such interest on compensation is not deemed always to be an
income.

 

One Mr. Amit Sahni has recently knocked the doors of the
Delhi High Court by filing a writ petition seeking quashing of the provision
which mandates deduction of tax on the interest on compensation awarded under
the MVA. The court, vide order dated 16th April, 2019, has directed
the CBDT to pass a reasoned order latest by 30th June, 2019 in
response to the representation made by the petitioner in this regard.

 

The better view, therefore, seems to be that of the
Allahabad, Himachal Pradesh and Punjab and Haryana High Courts, that no tax is
deductible in respect of interest awarded u/s. 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act,
even if such interest exceeds Rs. 50,000, unless such interest is (i)
attributable to the delay in payment of the awarded compensation and (ii)
pertains to the period after the date of the award and is (iii) calculated
w.r.t. the amount of the compensation awarded. This view is unaffected by the
fact of the insertion of clause (x) in section 194A(3), w.e.f. 1st
June, 2003 and the substitution thereof w.e.f. 
1st June, 2015.

 

Given this position, and since the issue involves TDS, which
is merely a procedural requirement, one hopes that the CBDT will come out with
a clarification explaining that the provisions of section 194A have a
restricted application to the cases involving payment of interest for the delay
in payment of awarded compensation, so that neither the insurance companies nor
the poor claimants have to unnecessarily suffer through unwarranted tax
deduction or litigation in this regard.

CHANGING RISK LANDSCAPE FOR AUDIT PROFESSION, WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON NFRA AND OTHER RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Mr. N.P. Sarda, Past President of the ICAI and a
well-known teacher to many in the profession, delivered a remarkable speech at
the BCAS on 9th January, 2019. BCAJ received requests from many
members to publish some of the key points of that talk. We are publishing this
summary just in time before the audit season for unlisted entities commences. A
summary cannot convey the full import of his presentation but we hope this
piece will enable the professionals to get a bird’s-eye view of the changing
landscape of the audit profession. We would recommend that you also watch the
two-hour-long talk on the BCAS You Tube channel.

 

In the last couple of years, the frequency and scale of
frauds revealed to stakeholders and the public at large has been astonishing.
Many would have thought that post-Satyam scandal lessons were learnt and proper
governance practices put in place. However, with irregularities at Punjab
National Bank (PNB), Infrastructure Leasing & Financial Services
(IL&FS), amongst others, coming to the fore, the burning questions about
loopholes in the system, accountability, risk management, etc., are again up
for debate in the corporate world.

 

In the aftermath of the scams, the National Financial
Reporting Authority (NFRA) was formed to tighten the regulatory aspects and
monitor the quality of audit. This led to issues such as overriding powers of
the NFRA over the ICAI, questioning auditors about the professional work, etc.
In this article, we provide various aspects of this development, the issues
therein and their impact. The following broad headings cover the key aspects
dwelt upon by Mr. Sarda.

 

INCREASING RISKS AND CHALLENGES

Economic and regulatory changes are taking place at a rapid
pace. We have witnessed substantive reforms, viz., the Companies Act, 2013, Ind
AS and Auditing standards that are aligned with International frameworks,
Income Computation and Disclosure Standards and Corporate Governance
requirements to enhance transparency and certainty. In the wake of these
developments across various regulations and rising incidents of frauds, the
risks and challenges in auditing are also increasing. This is on account of the
following:

 

  •   Increasing size and spread of business
    entities and groups (locations,  subsidiaries, geographies, SPVs, number of
    transactions, frauds
    );
  •    Multiple investments and special purpose
    entities;
  •    Multiplicity of inter-entity transactions and
    transfer of funds;
  • Rise in the volume and amount of transactions
    and of frauds;
  •    Complex nature of business transactions (complex
    instruments and contracts
    );
  •    Rapid changes and volatility (what took a
    decade now takes less than a year
    );
  •    Need for valuation and making provisions
    (towards pending demands and litigations) based on estimates at year end;
  •    Stress on fair value (subjective concept) as
    against historical cost;
  •    Increasing
    component of intangible assets and challenges in valuing them (wide variation
    in methodologies; valuation may not be valid over a period of time);
  •    Various risk factors such as market risk,
    credit risk, risk due to emerging technologies;
  •    Failure of business entities / industries;
  •    Technology tools in audit becoming a priority
    – checking controls / processes designed through computers, integration of
    different business softwares of an organisation, use of data analytics;
  •    Lack of practice of reconciliation,
    confirmations and certifications of ledger balances (through internal and
    external sources);
  •    Various checks and balances built for proper
    governance and prevention of frauds (such as concurrent audits, inspections by
    regulators, Audit Committee, Risk Management Committee, whistle-blower policy)
    may fail due to neglect or oversight and ineffectiveness of respective roles,
    leaving the statutory auditor to face all the criticism and blame;
  •    Need for investigations and forensic audit
    for a wide range of frauds involving falsification or fabrication of documents
    and records, frauds by collusion, management override of controls, frauds
    perpetrated by management;
  •    Society expects the auditor to unearth all
    frauds, while the auditors believe that such expectations are unrealistic and,
    therefore, the gaps in expectations, promises and actual performance. Though
    the primary responsibility of discovering frauds lies with the governance and
    management teams, the auditors will have to upgrade their standard of
    performance to detect all the material frauds by designing suitable audit
    programmes and procedures;
  •    Every time a scam is reported, instant
    judgements are passed in media as to why auditors did not report them. Without
    proper examination of the factual situation, audit documentation, etc. (were
    any financial statements during the period of fraud certified by the auditor,
    was it bona fide error or gross negligence, was it a planned collusion?)
    there is presumption of audit failure;
  •   Other risks like unrecorded and unusual
    transactions, significant related party transactions, doubts about going
    concern assumption, revenue recognition issues, off balance sheet items;
  •    Temptation and pressure to show improved
    results vis-à-vis last quarter, lack of emphasis on long-term
    sustainability;
  •    Frauds disguised through fraudulent reporting
    and misappropriation of assets.

 

SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF FRAUDS, SCAMS AND FAILURES

There have been several
financial scams causing distress, including with famous and reputed corporates.
The list of ten biggest corporate frauds includes Enron, World Com, sub-prime
mortgage crisis, Satyam Computers, Daewoo, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, AIG,
Phor-Mor, Bernie Madoff and Barlow Clowes. The findings reveal that these were
management-driven frauds wherein fraudulent financial reporting was resorted
to, in order to cover misappropriation of assets or a deteriorating financial
position. This requires increased professional scepticism from audit.

Let us look at some instances of fraud and the modus
operandi
followed:

1. The Harshad Mehta fraud – bank funds used to finance stock
exchange transactions using portfolio management;

2. Sub-prime mortgage crisis – the model of giving loans
solely on mortgage of immovable properties, without any requirement of
repayment of loan by borrowers
, failed as the values of the mortgaged
properties declined;

3. Satyam Computers – this involved manipulation of computer
systems, generation of fake invoices, overstating figures of revenue, profits,
bank balances. To cover up, forged bank statements, deposit receipts and
confirmations were produced by the management;

4. Kingfisher Airlines – the consortium of public sector
banks lent huge amounts of money to the airlines as part of a restructuring
exercise, after the loan account was classified as a non-performing asset.
This was questioned in the backdrop of the situation wherein the company was
reporting huge losses, the absence of adequate collateral securities, etc. The
loan funds were diverted out of India through financial transactions;

5. PNB – Letter of Undertaking to secure overseas credit from
other lenders was issued without cash margin through SWIFT system that was
not linked with Core Banking Solution
. Due to this loophole, the
undertakings issued remained outside the books and, thus, remained undetected;

6. IL&FS – short-term borrowings were used for financing
long-term projects resulting in liquidity crisis. Due to long recovery
period from large infrastructure projects, it defaulted in repayment of
short-term loans
(asset-liability mismatch).

 

NFRA

To ensure greater reliability of financial statements,
section 132 of the Companies Act, 2013 introduced the provisions relating to
NFRA. These were notified on 13th November, 2018.

 

Applicability

The classes of companies and body corporates governed by NFRA
(Rule 3) include:

(a) Companies whose
securities are listed on stock exchange in / outside India

(b) Unlisted public
companies

– paid up capital not less
than Rs. 500 crores

– annual turnover not less
than Rs. 1,000 crores

– loans, debentures,
deposits not less than Rs. 500 crores

(monetary thresholds – as
on 31st March of the preceding year)

(c) Insurance, banking,
electricity companies, etc.

(d) A subsidiary or
associate company outside India having income or net worth exceeding 20% of the
consolidated income or net worth of the Indian company.

 

Functions

The main functions of NFRA (Companies Act read with NFRA
Rules, 2018) are:

 

a. Make recommendations on Accounting and Auditing Policies
and Standards (after receiving recommendations from the ICAI);

b. Monitor and enforce compliance with Accounting Standards:

– may review financial statements of company / body corporate

– may require them to produce further information /
explanation

– may require presence of officers of company / body
corporate and its auditor

– based on inquiry, any fraud above Rs. 1 crore will be
reported to government;

c. Monitor and enforce compliance with Auditing Standards:

– may review working papers and audit communications

– may evaluate sufficiency of the quality control system and
manner of documentation

– may perform other testing of audit supervisory and quality
control procedures

– may require an auditor to report on its governance
practices and internal processes designed to promote audit quality and reduce
risk

d. Oversee the quality of service of the profession
associated with ensuring compliance with such standards and suggest measures
for improvement in quality of service; may refer cases to Quality Review Board
constituted under the Chartered Accountants’ Act and call for information, and
/ or a report from them;

e. Maintenance of details of auditors of companies specified
in Rule 3;

f. Promote awareness on compliance of accounting and auditing
standards;

g. Co-operate with national and international organisations
of independent audit regulators.

 

Powers

NFRA is entrusted with powers to investigate either suo
motu
or on a reference made to it by the Central Government (for prescribed
class of companies) into matters of professional or other misconduct (as
defined in the Chartered Accountants Act). As per the Supreme Court decision in
the case of Gurvinder Singh, other misconduct will include any act that brings
disrepute to the profession, whether or not related to his professional work
and not necessarily done in his capacity as a CA. It is also provided that
where NFRA has initiated the investigation, no other institute or body can
initiate or continue any proceedings in such matters.

 

Where professional or other misconduct is proved, the
consequences are two-fold:

 

a. Penalty: For individuals – Rs. 1 lakh, may extend to 5
times the fees

For firms – Rs. 10 lakhs, may extend to 10 times the fees

b. Debarring the member or the firm from practice for a
minimum period of 6 months, not exceeding 10 years, applicable even to company
/ body corporate not governed by Rule 3.

 

NEED OF NFRA – ARGUMENTS

Several perceptions had led to the constitution of the NFRA.
We have analysed them below with valid arguments:

 

1. Frauds like Satyam and PNB – the disciplinary
mechanism of the ICAI being a creation of its own members, is ‘not independent’

The ICAI functions under the Ministry of Corporate Affairs,
the disciplinary procedure is laid down in the Act itself and government
nominees are present in every proceeding. As against the earlier practice of
involvement of Council members twice (at stages of prima facie and final
decision), after amendment to the Chartered Accountants Act in 2006, the
Director of Discipline (not a member of the Council) reports cases to the Board
of Discipline (Schedule I cases) and the Disciplinary Committee (Schedule II
cases). The government nominees are present in all the 3 bodies.

 

No allegation of bias has ever been raised – that the process
is not carried out judiciously. Rather than creating a separate body, the NFRA,
the government can appoint more nominees in the disciplinary mechanism of the
ICAI.

 

No other institute or body has taken such strict disciplinary
action against its own members as has been done by the ICAI. This is evidenced
by the fact that in the Satyam case various members have been debarred for
life, while in the PNB case the ICAI started suo motu action, without a
formal complaint. As for the member, such disciplinary proceedings are a
punishment in itself and result in loss of reputation. The ICAI has made
tremendous efforts to formulate and spread knowledge of compliance with standards
as part of CPE. QRB, FRRB and Peer Review are some other mechanisms that have
been working effectively.

 

2. Delay in disciplinary proceedings of ICAI

While this was true earlier, through amendments to the
Chartered Accountants Act in 2006, appointment of multiple Directors of
Discipline or Disciplinary Committees was allowed in order to avoid delays.

 

During the process, requests for adjournments and stay (for
proceedings ongoing with other regulatory authorities or Courts) caused delays
as this is a judicial process. Against this, the NFRA rules provide for a
summary procedure within 90 days where an opportunity for personal hearing may
or may not be given. It is important to strike a balance between the two
extremes – that the opportunity granted for hearing may be misused, but a
contrary stand can be harsh on the member.

 

3. With amounts and frequency of corporate and bank
frauds rising, the authorities had to take drastic action

It is assumed that all problems will be solved once NFRA sets
in. However, what kind of action is envisaged under it? Prevention and
detection of fraud is a very large area. NFRA provisions don’t address the
aspect of prevention of fraud; they are restricted to limited areas of action
against statutory auditors for gross misstatement in financial statements on
account of non-compliance of accounting and / or auditing standards. The
consideration is that there was something wrong in the accounting and auditing
standards and that was the reason of misconduct by the members.

 

It is presumed that if action is taken against the member,
frauds will not take place. But there are no steps for the detection of fraud
until certification of the financial statements by the auditor (exception fraud
noticed during search, later reported to government). The functions of NFRA do
not include aspects of deterrent action on perpetrators of fraud and / or other
checks and balances for prevention of fraud. In short, the focus of NFRA is
on the police and not on the thief!

 

4. Non-detection of
fraud by an auditor considered as fraudulent act and a case of professional
misconduct. Strict regulation could reduce such instances

In the backdrop of failure
to report frauds, fingers are pointed at auditors with allegations that the
auditors colluded with management and it is an intentional act involving gross
negligence. However, it is not prudent to draw any conclusion without examining
the facts. It could be a bona fide omission (not part of audit sample
selection), or an error of judgement, or that the time available to auditor was
not commensurate with the volume of business. May be, the skills of the auditor
have not kept up with those of the fraudster! The presumption that
non-detection of fraud is a fraudulent act or is professional negligence / misconduct
and that frauds can be reduced by a strict regulation like NFRA is far-fetched.

 

Importantly, enough stress has to be placed on relevant
internal controls, internal checks and balances required in the management and
governance of large entities. If they are not adequate, the statutory audit, on
its own and on a standalone basis, will not be effective. If negative
presumptions about the role of auditors continue, then new talent may hesitate
to enter the auditing profession.

 

NFRA AND OTHER REGULATORS – A TUSSLE

The question arises whether
it was necessary to have a separate disciplinary mechanism when ICAI already
has one. The ICAI had urged the Central Government against setting up the NFRA
(a legal fight is not possible because the ICAI functions under the Ministry of
Corporate Affairs). This, in fact, is the legal opinion of Mr. Mukul Rohatgi,
former Attorney General, that the NFRA encroaches on the powers of the ICAI.
Under the Constitution, if any institution has specific powers (ICAI in this case
regarding disciplinary mechanism), other institutions cannot have the same
mandate.

 

In a case filed before the
Delhi High Court by the Chartered Accountants’ Association, the Court has
granted stay on initiation of disciplinary action by NFRA. The final verdict is
pending on the matter of SEBI debarring PwC for 2 years (stay by the Supreme
Court).

 

The overlap and conflict between NFRA and other bodies gives
rise to the following issues:

 

1. Where NFRA has not initiated the proceedings, can ICAI do
it (different language in Act and Rules)?

2. Whether NFRA’s jurisdiction would apply to every act of
misconduct of a chartered accountant, or only relating to financial statements?

3. Would NFRA apply to the auditor of every branch of all
banks?

4. If an auditor is debarred by NFRA, the impact will extend
to his every audit appointment including for companies not covered by Rule 3.

5. There is no provision in the NFRA rules for complaints by
any stakeholder against Rule 3 companies. It is restricted to cases referred by
government or suo motu action. Even ICAI would not have jurisdiction to
address such complaints.

 

While the guilty must be punished, it is equally important
that innocents are not harassed.

 

ROLE OF ICAI POST-NFRA

The ICAI will make recommendations on Accounting and Auditing
Standards to NFRA. The role of Quality Review Board to oversee the quality of
audit service rendered would continue. Towards this, an effective role can be
played by having efficient structure and process of inspection. The aspect of
improving and strengthening the expertise and quality of work of internal
auditors, experts in designing and implementing internal controls, computer
controls, etc. also needs be seen.

 

There is no change in
jurisdiction and powers of ICAI over auditors, other than those of Rule 3
entities. The ICAI ought to regulate over matters not governed and administered
by NFRA provisions, as discussed above.

 

ACTION FOR AUDITORS

The change in the regulatory environment and expectations
demands that auditors develop and deliver high-quality service to reinforce the
relevance of audit. The skill sets and manner of executing audit need to
evolve. We have highlighted below the perspective for the auditors about what
they need to do.

a. Focus on upgrading
professional skills (including industry specialisation);

b. Audit firms to devise
and implement quality controls and best practices;

c. Appropriate audit
planning considering industry, client, nature of business, controls in place,
systems and procedures, accounting policies followed;

d. Undertake risk
assessment on the basis of evaluation of internal controls and computer
controls;

e. Design audit procedures
based on findings of risk assessment (e.g. special procedures may be required
for unusual transactions and evaluation of uncertainties and estimates;

f. Apply audit techniques
including computer-aided tools;

g. Develop expertise on
Accounting and Auditing Standards and strictly adhere to them;

h. Have a trained and
talented audit team for execution;

i. Stress on detailed
documentation
;

j. Exercise
professional scepticism
;

k. Quality control in
Audit Firms
;

l. Consultation with other
experts, wherever required;

m. Constructive
discussions and communication with management and with those charged with
governance on internal controls, risk management and provide valuable insights;

n. Giving value-added
insights;

o. Appropriate reporting
of Key Audit Matters.

 

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The success of NFRA would depend upon the constitution of its
members, the experts appointed, their expertise and approach, its finance and
infrastructure, the effectiveness of coordination with ICAI in respect of
Accounting and Auditing Standards and assistance of the Quality Review Board.

 

Risks are becoming the focal point. The
responsibilities of the auditor are increasing. With public sentiment turning
negative and some lowering of confidence in the independent auditor’s work,
there is a fear that professionals may stay away from the audit domain.

UNIFIER IN CHIEF

The twenty
third day of May, 2019, saw a historic event unfold. Prime Minister Narendra
Modi showed his ability to convert hope into confidence, a rare feat in recent
Indian electoral history, and that, too, through sheer performance. This vote
of trust I hope will result in transforming the governance machinery which can
be trusted as much as the trust in a person.

 

Industrialist Anand Mahindra’s tweet hit the nail
on the head: “Size of the country (Land mass + population) X Size of the
Economy X Size of the election mandate = Leader’s Power Quotient. By the
measure of this crude formula, @narendramodi is about to become the most
powerful, democratically-elected leader in the world today…”

 

The power of
the people comes across through this mandate. Many of the 350 million people
earning Rs. 33 / day refused the promise (rather a bribe to vote) of Rs. 72,000 / year
and instead voted for leadership. It is quite clear that people have voted for
trust, integrity and decisiveness that are critical for the future of India.
Past governments, through doles and freebies, had turned people into beggars.
Rarely would you find a country where segments of society wish to get
classified as backward to seek some government entitlement. Obviously, giving
doles was the strategy of ‘deception’ of past rulers – to get votes, cover up
non-performance and continue to divide the society. This vote is a long-overdue
moment where people chose decisive, strong, trustworthy and goal-oriented
leadership. Moreover, this happened in spite of the strongly negative,
concocted and vicious atmosphere created by media and politicians.

 

There is little doubt that allegations of
corruption at high places during the last five years have been reduced to
nothing. Money and tangible government benefits reaching people are provable. A
taxi driver was telling me that he went to his village 500 km. away to vote for
Modi. Another from near Varanasi told me about dramatic changes he saw in his
village. I have been to Varanasi before 2014 and the oldest living holy city
had turned into an unpleasant place. I went there in 2018 and saw the change.
People saw that the tone at the top also translated into actual delivery.

It is
important to note who and what got defeated. Dynasts – all across – people rejected
family-owned party systems and the entitled vote-seekers who didn’t show vision
or performance and only sought power and power alone. The 21-party
power-seeking group who couldn’t give any alternative narrative (couldn’t even
give a PM face) except projecting a monster out of Modi, were rejected. The
second set of losers is Communists – the Tukde Tukde gang, the
breaking-India forces – they got ‘Azadi’ from being in the Lok Sabha! The third
set of losers is in the media – I have never seen such consistent, slimy and
vulgar stooping down. Bias without basis, propping a disproportionate one-sided
view, pelting negativity and uttering utter lies. It was shocking to see the
likes of TIME magazine and NY Times also roped into this.

 

The vote was
a buy-in for the Modi story of New India. His Articulation and Eloquence, Will
and Work, Intention and Execution, balance between Idealism and Realism, and
above all demonstrable love for the nation came across loud and clear. And so
the ‘Chowkidar’ did turn out to be a ‘Chor’ – he stole the hearts of people and
even the votes which opponents may have got if they had remained sincere and
discreet.

 

The vote is a unifying one. People seem to have overcome decades of divisions
and seem to have voted for leadership and cohesion. I hope this will see a
beginning of end of divisions and divisiveness and people seeing themselves as
Indians above all. Perhaps the winners will understand that poverty alleviation
does not need division- based benefits. For this change to come, the citizens
will have to assimilate what the victor meant when he said (and I paraphrase): There
will remain only two jaatis (segments) in the country – The poor who
want to come out of poverty and (the second will be) those who want to bring
the poor out of poverty. This is the dream we should carry.

 

Raman Jokhakar

Editor

(Tring! Tring!)

Mr. Phonewala was a very busy Chartered
Accountant practising over three decades; always running around income tax
offices, sales tax and service tax offices, audit clients, and many other
places. He could hardly sit peacefully in his office. Even while in office,
there was constant disturbance of phone calls, visitors, compliance deadlines
and so on.

 

He had come up
in life the hard way. He slogged and struggled a lot to establish his practice.
He sacrificed his family life and the many other pleasures of life; and was
dedicated to the profession round the clock. One secret of his success was his
soft-spokenness, public relations and goodwill. He never learnt to say ‘No’ to
anyone. Another quality (?) of his was that he was ‘always available’!
Naturally, everyone took him for granted. He did join some courses of time-management,
leadership training, delegation, etc.; but he remained the original ‘Phonewala’
only.

 

Once he was
sitting in his office. A client came with an appointment at 2:30 pm. Mr.
Phonewala entered his office, back from the income tax department at 3 o’clock,
sweating and talking on his cell-phone. He just gave a smile to the client who
was waiting patiently and entered his cabin. After finishing the phone-call, he
called the client inside. Mr. Phonewala had had no time to have his lunch so he
ordered sandwiches. By that time some staff and articles entered his cabin with
many questions and queries of many clients. The receptionist entered and gave
him a list of messages. The client was sitting patiently as he had been
associated with him for 25 years! The client shared the sandwich and had a cup
of tea, watching Mr. Phonewala’s hectic activity – firefighting on many fronts.
At 3:45 pm he could utter his first sentence – “You see, Mr. Phonewala, I
have a property at Lonavala……
…” and there was a ring! Mr. Phonewala took
the call. There were so many interruptions –

  •    Calls on landline and mobile
    were simultaneously received – every five minutes.
  •    There were a couple of
    intruders dropping in for ‘five minutes’ but consuming 20 minutes.
  •    Phone-calls were from
    clients, tax departments, staff, friends, bank loan offers, booksellers, credit
    card offers; and also from his residence for the evening programme. He gave
    detailed advice to many persons on the phone.

 

In turn, Mr. Phonewala also called back many
persons who had called in his absence.

 

After a gap of every 20 to 25 minutes, the
client sitting in front attempted to speak. But he never went beyond the first
sentence, “I have a property at Lonavala ………”, and Mr. Phonewala sweetly
apologised for every interruption.

 

Finally, at 5:30 pm, his secretary entered
and said she wanted to leave early. Mr. Phonewala suddenly remembered some
urgent matter for which he wanted to dictate a letter. He requested the client
very politely to bear with him for about 30 minutes!

 

The client coolly said, “No problem I
will just have a stroll around and come.
You finish off your work”.
And he went away. After just two minutes, Mr. Phonewala received a call on
landline. The secretary sitting in front of him took it and said, “Mr.
Phonewala is not there in office”.

 

The caller said, “Madam, I am the same
person who was sitting in your office since 2:30. Just give it to Mr.
Phonewala”.
Mr. Phonewala had no option! He took it and the client said,
“Sir, I observed that you always give priority to phone-callers; rather than to
the person sitting before you. So I tried this trick! You see, Sir, I have a
property at Lonavala …………….”!
 

 

 

COURT AUCTION SALES: STAMP DUTY VALUATION

Introduction


Last month, we examined a
decision of the Bombay High Court rendered by Justice Gautam Patel in respect
of stamp duty on antecedent title documents. That was a pathbreaking decision
which will help ease the property-buying process. This month, we will examine
another important decision, again rendered by Justice Gautam Patel and again in
the context of the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958.

 

The issue before the Bombay
High Court this time was what should be the value on which stamp duty should be
levied in the case of sale of property through a Court public auction. Would it
be the value as mentioned by the Court on the Sale Certificate, or would it be
the value as adjudicated by the Collector of Stamps? This is an important issue
since many times the Stamp Duty Ready Reckoner rate is higher than the value
arrived at through a public auction.

 

THE CASE


The decision was rendered
in the case of Pinak Bharat & Co. and Bina V. Advani vs. Anil Ramrao
Naik, Comm. Execution Application No. 22/2016, Order dated 27.03.2019 (Bom).

The facts of the case were that there was a plot of land at Dadar, Mumbai which
was being auctioned to satisfy a Court decree. The Court obtained a valuation
which pegged the value at more than Rs. 30 crore. It was then sought to be sold
through a Court-conducted public auction twice but both attempts failed.
Finally, the claimants offered Rs. 15.30 crore as the auction price for the
property. Their bid was accepted by the Court which issued a Sale Certificate
in their favour. The Sheriff’s Office directed the Stamp Office to register the
sale certificate on the basis of the auction price of Rs. 15.30 crore.

 

When the purchasers went to
register the Sale Certificate, the Collector first stated that the fair market
value as per its adjudication was Rs. 155 crore. Aggrieved, the purchasers
moved the High Court since they would have had to pay stamp duty based on the
valuation of Rs. 155 crore and there would also have been adverse consequences
u/s. 56(2) of the Income-tax Act for the buyers.

 

At the hearing, the
Collector stated that the earlier assessment was tentative or preliminary, without
having all necessary information at hand. Now that additional material was
available, including a confirmation that there were tenants, the market value
had been reckoned again and was likely to be assessed in the region of about
Rs. 35 crore. This value, too, was more than double the Court-discovered price
of Rs. 15.30 crore. Hence, the question before the Court was which valuation
should be considered – the adjudication by the Collector or the
Court-discovered public auction price?

 

COURT’S ORDER


The Bombay High Court held
that the questions that arose for determination were that when a sale
certificate issued under a Court-conducted public auction was submitted for
adjudication under the Maharashtra Stamp Act, how should the Collector of
Stamps assess the ‘market value’ of the property? Was he required to accept the
value of the accepted bid, as stated in the Court-issued Sale Certificate, or
was he required to spend time and resources on an independent enquiry? Could a
distinction be drawn between sales by the government / government bodies at a
predetermined price, which had to be accepted by the Collector as the market
value, and a sale by or through a Court?

 

For
this purpose, Article 16 of Schedule I to the Maharashtra Stamp Act provides
that a Certificate of Sale granted to the purchaser of any property sold by
public auction by a Court or any other officer empowered by law to sell
property by public auction was to be stamped at the same duty as is leviable on
a conveyance under Article 25 on the market value of the property. Thus,
it becomes necessary to determine the market value of the property.
When an instrument comes to the Collector for adjudication, he must determine
the duty on the same. If he has reason to believe that the market value of the
property has not been truly set forth in the instrument, he must determine ‘the
true market value of such property’ as laid down in the Maharashtra Stamp
(Determination of True Market Value of the Property) Rules, 1995.

 

Thus, the Collector is not
bound to accept as correct any value or consideration stated in the instrument
itself. Should he have reason to believe that it is incorrect, he is to
determine the true market value. Rule 4(6) of these Rules states that every
registering officer shall, when an instrument is produced before him for
registration, verify in each case the market value of land and buildings, etc.,
as the case may be, determined in accordance with the above statement and
Valuation Guidelines issued from time to time (popularly, known as the Stamp
Duty Ready Reckoner). However, it provides an important exception inasmuch as
if a property is sold or allotted by government / semi-government body /
government undertaking or a local authority on the basis of a predetermined
price, then the value determined by said bodies shall be the true market value
of the subject matter property. In other words, where the sale is by one of the
government entities, then the adjudicating authority must accept the
value stated in the instrument as the correct market value. He cannot make any
further enquiry in this scenario. However, it is important that this exception
makes no mention of a sale through a Court auction!

 

The Court raised a very
important question that why should a sale through a Court by public auction on
the basis of a valuation obtained, i.e., by following a completely open and
transparent process, be placed at any different or lower level than the
government entities covered by the first proviso? It observed that the process
that Courts follow was perhaps much more rigorous than what the exception
contemplates, because the exception itself did not require a public auction at
all but only that the government body should have fixed ‘a predetermined
price’. The Court explained its system of public auction:

 

(a) A sale through the Sheriff’s Office was always
by a public auction.

(b) If it was by a private treaty, it required a
special order.

(c) A sale effected by a Receiver was not,
technically, a sale by the Court. It was a sale by the Receiver appointed in
execution and the Receiver may sell either by public auction or by private
treaty.

(d) Wherever a sale took place by public auction,
there was an assurance of an open bidding process and very often that bidding
process took place in the Court itself.

(e) Courts always obtained a valuation so that they
could set a reserve price to ensure that properties were not sold at an
undervaluation and to avoid cartelisation and an artificial hammering down of
prices.

(f)  The reserve price was at or close to a true
market value. Usually, the price realised approximates the market value.
Sometimes the valuation was high and no bids were at all received. However, in
such a scenario, the decree holders could not be left totally without recovery
at all and it was for this reason that Courts sometimes permitted, after
maintaining the necessary checks and balances, a sale at a price below the
market value even by public auction.

 

The Court held that if the
sale by the Deputy Sheriff or by the Court Receiver was by a private treaty,
then it was definitely open for the adjudicating authority to determine the
true market value.

 

However, it held that
totally different considerations arose where there was a sale by a
Court-conducted public auction and such a sale was preceded by a valuation
obtained beforehand. The Court held that such a sale or transaction should
stand on the same footing as government sales excluded in Rule 4. The correct
course of action in such a situation would be for the adjudicating authority to
accept the valuation on the basis of which the public auction was conducted as
fair market value; or, if the sale is confirmed at a rate higher than the
valuation, then to accept the higher value, i.e., the sale amount accepted.

 

The Court
laid down an important principle that there could not be an inconsistency
between the Court order and a Court-supervised sale on the one hand and the
adjudication for stamp duties on the other. This was the only method by which
complete synchronicity could be maintained between the two. It held that
consistency must be maintained between government-body sales at predetermined
prices and Court-supervised sales.

 

If a Court was satisfied
with the valuation and accepted it, then it was not open to the adjudicating authority
to question that valuation. The Court emphatically held that it was never open
to the adjudicating authority to hold, even by implication, that when a Court
sold the property through a public auction by following due process, it did so
at an undervaluation! The seal / confirmation of the Court on the sale carries
great sanctity. It held that if the validity or the very basis of the sale was
allowed to be questioned by an executive or administrative authority, then it
would result in the stamp authority calling into question the judicial orders
of a Court. This, obviously, cannot be the case!

 

An important principle
reiterated by the Court was that the Stamp Act was not an Act that validated,
permitted or regulated sales of property. It only assessed the transactions for
payment of a levy to the exchequer. The stamp adjudicating authority can only
adjudicate the stamp duty and can do nothing more and nothing less. It cannot,
therefore, question the sale in any manner. Hence, the Court-discovered public
auction price could never be questioned by the stamp office. The Court,
however, added a caveat that this principle would only apply to a situation
where the Court had actually obtained a fair market value of the property
before confirming the sale (even if the sale took place at a value lower than
such a valuation). If there was no fair market valuation obtained by the Court,
or an authenticated copy of a valuation was not submitted along with the sale
certificate, then the adjudicating authority must follow the usual provisions
mentioned in the Rules.

 

Hence,
the Court laid down a practice that in all cases where the Deputy Sheriff
lodges a sale certificate for stamp duty adjudication, it must be accompanied
by a copy of the valuation certificate which must be authenticated by the
Prothonotary and Senior Master of the High Court. It negated the plea of the
government to use the valuation carried out by the Town Planner’s office in all
public auctions conducted by the Court. It held that the discretion of a Court
could not be limited in such a manner. The Court could use such a valuation, or
it may prefer to use the services of one of the valuers on its panel, or may
even obtain a valuation from an independent agency. That judicial discretion
could not be circumscribed on account of a Stamp Act requirement.

 

Finally, the Court laid
down the following principles when it came to levying stamp duty on
Court-conducted sales:

 

(a)    Where there was a sale by a private treaty,
the usual valuation rules stipulated in the Maharashtra Stamp Act would apply,
i.e., adjudication in accordance with the Reckoner;

(b)   Where the sale was by the Court, i.e., through
the office of the Sheriff, or by the Court Receiver in execution, and was by
public auction pursuant to a valuation having been  previously obtained, then –

 

(i)     If the sale price was at or below the
valuation obtained, then the valuation would serve as the current market value
for levying stamp duty;

(ii)    If the final sale price, i.e., the final bid,
was higher than the valuation, then the final bid amount and not the valuation
would be taken as the current market value for the purposes of stamp duty;

(iii)   Where multiple valuations were obtained, then
the highest of the most recent valuations, i.e., most proximate in time to the
actual sale, should be taken as the current market value.

 

Accordingly, since in the
case at hand the valuation was obtained at Rs. 30 crore, that value was treated
as the value on which stamp duty was to be levied. Thus, the lower auction
price of Rs. 15.30 crore was not preferred but the valuation of Rs. 30 crore
was adopted.

 

CONCLUSION


The above judgement would
be relevant not only for levying stamp duty in Court-conducted public auctions,
but would also be useful in determining the tax liability of the buyer and the
seller. The seller’s capital gains tax liability u/s. 50C of the Income-tax Act
or business income u/s. 43CA of the Income-tax Act, are both linked with the
stamp duty valuation. Similarly, if the buyer buys the immovable property at a
price below the stamp duty valuation, then he would have Income from Other
Sources u/s. 56(2)(x) of the Income-tax Act. Several decisions have held in the
context of the Indian Stamp Act and the Stamp Acts of other States that the
Ready Reckoner Valuation is not binding on the assessees. Some of the important
decisions which have upheld this view are Jawajee Nagnatham (1994) 4 SCC
595 (SC), Mohabir Singh (1996) 1 SCC 609 (SC), Chamkaur Singh, AIR 1991 P&H
26.
This decision of the Bombay High Court is an additional step in the
same direction.

 

However, it must be
remembered that in cases where the valuation is higher than the auction price,
the auction price would be considered for levying stamp duty. Hence, this
decision has a limited applicability to those cases where the Reckoner Value is
higher than the valuation report and the public auction price.
 

 

 

IMPACT OF ORDINANCE DATED 20th SEPTEMBER, 2019

The tax ordinance of
September, 2019 has made significant changes in the income-tax provisions and
the income-tax rates.

 

Prior to
this, existing domestic companies were liable to tax at the basic rate of
either 25% or 30%. The effective tax rate ranged from 26% to 34.94% after
considering surcharge of 7% / 12% and health and education cess of 4%.

 

The tax rate of 25% was
applicable to two types of domestic companies, viz., (a) those having turnover
or gross receipts not exceeding Rs. 400 crores in tax year 2017-18; and (b) new
domestic manufacturing companies set up and registered on or after 1st
March, 2016 fulfilling specified conditions.

 

With
effect from the tax year 2019-20, domestic companies shall have an option to
pay income tax at the rate of 22% plus 10% surcharge and 4% cess, taking the
effective tax rate (ETR) to 25.17%, subject to the condition that they will not
avail specified tax exemptions or incentives under the ITA. Such an option,
once exercised, cannot be subsequently withdrawn. Companies exercising such option will not be required to pay Minimum Alternate Tax (MAT).

 

Domestic companies claiming
any tax exemptions or incentives shall also be eligible to exercise such an
option after the expiry of the tax incentive period.

 

Subsequently, the CBDT has
clarified that domestic companies opting for the 22% concessional tax rate
(CTR) will not be allowed to set off the following while computing the total
income and their tax liability:

 

(i) Brought forward ‘losses’
on account of additional depreciation arising in any tax year prior to opting
for the 22% CTR;

(ii) Brought forward credit of
taxes paid under MAT provisions of the Indian Tax Law (ITL) in any tax years
prior to opting for the 22% CTR in view of inapplicability of MAT provisions to
a domestic company which opts for the 22% CTR.

 

Further, the CBDT clarified
that in the absence of any time-line for exercising of option to claim 22% CTR,
the domestic company, if it so desires may opt for the 22% CTR after it has
exhausted the accumulated MAT credit and unabsorbed additional depreciation by
being governed by the regular taxation regime existing under the ITL prior to
the ordinance.

 

The comparative effective tax
rates before and after exercise of the option are as follows:

 

Sr

Nature of domestic
company

Current ETR (%)

ETR on Exercise of
Option (%)

Reduction in tax
liability

1

Total
turnover or gross receipts = INR4b during FY 2017-18 or new manufacturing
companies incorporated between 1st March, 2016 and 30th
September, 2019

 

Income < INR
10m

Income > INR
10m, but < INR 100m

Income > INR
100m

26%

27.82%

29.12%

25.17%

25.17%

25.17%

0.83%

2.65%

3.95%

2

Optional
tax rate for new manufacturing companies incorporated on or after
1st October, 2019

 

Income < INR
10m

Income > INR
10m, but < INR 100m

Income > INR
100m

26%

27.82%

29.12%

17.16%

17.16%

17.16%

8.84%

10.66%

11.96%

3

Other
domestic companies

 

 

Income < INR
10m

Income > INR
10m, but < INR 100m

Income > INR
100m

31.2%

33.38%

34.94%

25.17%

25.17%

25.17%

6.03%

8.21%

9.77%

 

There are numerous tax issues
relating to the recent ordinance. From an accounting perspective, it converges
to a few important questions. These are discussed below and are equally
applicable to AS (Indian GAAP) as well as Ind AS.

 

Question

Does the ordinance have any
effect on the 31st March, 2019 financial statements (which were yet
to be issued at the time the ordinance was announced)?

 

Response

The ordinance was not an
enactment / substantive enactment at the balance sheet date, i.e. 31st
March, 2019. Consequently, the tax charge and deferred taxes are based on the
pre-ordinance rates / income tax provisions. However, it is a subsequent event
which needs the disclosure below in the notes to accounts. This disclosure may
need suitable modification to the fact pattern. For example, the impact
quantification may not be appropriate / required where the impact cannot be
estimated with reasonable certainty or is not material.

 

Pursuant to the Taxation Laws
(Amendment) Ordinance, 2019 (Ordinance) issued subsequent to the balance sheet
date, the tax rates have changed with effect from 1st April, 2019
and the company plans to pay tax at the revised rates. If those changes were
announced on or before reporting date, deferred tax asset (or / and deferred
tax liability) would have been reduced by xxxx. The tax charge or (credit) for
the year would have been increased / (decreased) by xxxx.

 

Question

The company currently has MAT
credit and unabsorbed depreciation. It is currently evaluating the tax position
and has not decided whether it should adopt new rates now or later. How should
the matter be dealt with in the quarter ended September, 2019 interim results?

 

Response

The ordinance is an abiding
law that came into force in September, 2019. Accordingly, the impact on tax
expenses based on the option elected by the company needs to be considered in
the September quarter financial results. Merely stating that the company is in
the process of evaluating the impact will not comply with Ind AS / AS
requirements. It is also possible that a decision made in the September, 2019
quarter may change at the year-end. The impact of change on the tax expense
will constitute a change in the accounting estimate which will have to be
properly explained both under Ind AS and AS.

 

Question

On transition to Ind AS 115 /
Ind AS 116, the transition adjustment along with deferred tax impact was
recognised in equity. Where should the subsequent changes in deferred taxes due
to the ordinance be recognised?

 

Response

The subsequent changes to
deferred tax impact is taken to P&L and not to equity even if the earlier
deferred tax was charged or credited to equity; for example, deferred tax
impact taken to equity on transitioning to Ind AS 115 / 116 or transitioning to
Ind AS under Ind AS 101. In the author’s view, the fact that deferred tax was
charged / credited to opening equity does not mean that subsequent changes in
the deferred tax asset or liability (for example, as a result of change in tax
rates) will also be recognised in equity. Rather, management needs to determine
(using the entity’s new accounting policy) where the items on which the
deferred tax arose would have been recognised if the new policy had applied in
the earlier periods (backward tracing). Therefore, if Ind AS 115 / 116 was
always applicable, the adjustment made to equity on transition would have ended
up in the P&L. Consequently, the subsequent changes in deferred tax due to
change in tax rates should also be taken to the P&L account.

 

Question

With
respect to 31st March, 2020 accounts, whether the full tax impact is
considered in the September, 2019 quarter or spread over the three remaining
quarters, namely, September, 2019; December, 2019; and March, 2020?

 

Response

Due to the change in tax rates
/ provisions, there may be a substantial adjustment to the DTA / DTL balance.
For example, a company may be availing tax incentives due to which huge amounts
of DTA / DTL may have got accumulated. If the company decides to fall in the
new regime of taxation, a significant amount of DTA / DTL will need to be
adjusted. The impact of the adjustment has to be taken to the P&L and
cannot be deferred beyond the financial year in which the change occurs. There
are two acceptable approaches, viz., considering the full impact in the
September quarter, and the alternative approach of spreading it over the three
quarters. The reason for two acceptable approaches is as follows:

 

In determining the effective
average annual tax rate as required by Ind AS 34, it is necessary to estimate closing
deferred-tax balances at the end of the year because deferred tax is a
component of the estimated total tax charge for the year. This conflicts with
Ind AS 12 which requires deferred tax to be measured at enacted or
substantially enacted tax rates. It is therefore not clear as to when in the
annual period the impact of remeasuring closing deferred tax balances for a
change in tax rate is recognised. Consequently, two practices have emerged to
determine the tax charge for the interim period:

(a)   The estimated tax rate does not include the impact of remeasuring
closing deferred tax balances at the end of the year. It is not included in the
estimated ‘effective’ average annual tax rate. Consistent with the treatment of
tax credit granted in a one-off event, an entity may recognise the effect of
the change immediately in the interim period in which the change occurs
(Approach 1).

(b)   The estimated rate includes the impact of
remeasuring closing deferred tax balances at the end of the year. In this
approach the effect of a change in the tax rate is spread over the remaining
interim periods via an adjustment to the estimated annual effective income tax
rate (Approach 2).

 

It’s an accounting policy
choice to be followed consistently. The example below explains the two
approaches:

 

Example: Impact of change
in tax rate on tax charge / (credit) in the interim period

 

Company X’s applicable tax
rate in first quarter (June, 2019) was 40%. In the second quarter (September,
2019) the tax rate was changed retrospectively from 1st April, 2019
to 25%. Opening temporary difference on which deferred tax asset was created is
Rs. 40,000, which is expected to reverse after three years.

 

Approach
1 – Adjust the impact of change in tax rate in the quarter in which change occurs

Quarter profit

Profit for the
quarter as per statutory

books (A)

 

Incremental
depreciation in tax books (B)

Tax (loss) / profit
for the quarter as per tax return

C = A-B

 

Tax rate (D)

Tax charge in books
(excluding effect of change in tax rate)
E = A*D

Impact of change in
tax rate (F)1

Total tax charge in
books (including deferred tax) G = E + F

ETR (G/A)

June

50,000

50,000

40%

20,000

 

20,000

40%

Sep

40,000

35,000

5,000

25%

10,000

(1,500)

8,500

21%

Dec

40,000

25,000

15,000

25%

10,000

 

10,000

25%

March

30,000

(10,000)

40,000

25%

7,500

 

7,500

25%

 

1,60,000

1,00,000

60,000

 

 

 

46,000

 

 

Approach
2 – Adjust the impact of change in tax rate over the period of remaining
quarters (the impact cannot be carried forward beyond the end of the financial year)

 

Quarter profit

Profit for the quarter as per

statutory books (A)

 

Incremental depreciation in tax books
(B)

Tax (loss) / profit for the quarter as
per tax return

C = A-B

 

Tax rate (D)

Tax charge in books (excluding effect of
change in tax rate)

E = A*D

Impact of change in tax rate (F)2

Total tax charge in books (including
deferred tax)

G = E+F

ETR (G/A)

June

50,000

50,000

40%

20,000

20,000

40%

Sep

40,000

35,000

5,000

25%

10,000

(545)

9,455

24%

Dec

40,000

25,000

15,000

25%

10,000

(545)

9,455

24%

March

30,000

(10,000)

40,000

25%

7,500

(410)

7,090

24%

 

1,60,000

1,00,000

60,000

 

 

 

46,000

 

 

2Reversal of excess provision made in 1st
quarter, i.e., 50,000*15% = 7,500 and reversal of opening deferred tax asset
created at higher rate, i.e., 40,000*15% = 6,000, i.e., 1,500 over the next
three quarters in the ratio of book profits (40000:40000:30000) minus
non-deductible temporary difference (zero in this fact pattern).

 

CONCLUSION

The author believes that both
views discussed above are based on sound arguments and are equally acceptable.

 

 

UNDUE INFLUENCE AND FREE CONSENT

Introduction

One of the biggest
issues with a Will is whether it has been obtained by fraud or undue influence.
If yes, then it is invalid. Section 61 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925
states that any Will which has been caused by such importunity which takes away
the free agency of the testator is void. The Law Lexicon, 4th
Edition, Lexis
Nexis, states that importunity (insistence
or cajolery) must be such which the testator is too weak to resist; which would
render the act no longer the act of the deceased, not the free act of a capable
testator.

 

Similarly, in the
context of a contract, the Indian Contract Act, 1872 states that all
agreements are contracts only if they are made by the free consent of the
parties. Free consent is that which is not caused by undue influence. Section
16 of this Act defines ‘undue influence’ as follows:

 

‘(1)      A contract is said to be
induced by undue influence where the relations subsisting between the parties
are such that one of the parties is in a position to dominate the will of the
other and uses that position to obtain an unfair advantage over the other;

(2)        In particular and
without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing principle, a person is
deemed to be in a position to dominate the will of another:

(a)    where he holds a real or
apparent authority over the other or where he stands in a fiduciary relation to
the other; or

(b)    where he makes a contract
with a person whose mental capacity is temporarily or permanently affected by
reason of age, illness, or mental or bodily distress

(3)        Where
a person who is in a position to dominate the will of another enters into a
contract with him, and the transaction appears on the face of it or on the evidence
adduced, to be unconscionable, the burden of proving that such contract was not
induced by undue influence shall lie upon the person in a position to dominate
the will of the other.’

 

Hence, both in the
context of a Will and a contract, ‘undue influence’ is a major factor. While it
would render a Will void, it makes a contract voidable at the option of the
party whose consent was so caused.

 

Let us examine this very
vital concept in a bit more detail, especially in the light of a Supreme Court
decision rendered in the case of Raja Ram vs. Jai Prakash Singh, CA No.
2896/2009, order dated 11th September, 2019 (SC).
What makes
this decision even more important is that the facts are such that they could be
relevant even in a host of cases. The key questions considered in this decision
were whether mere old age and infirmity of the executor of an agreement could
be considered as grounds for undue influence? Further, whether the fact that
the agreement was executed by the executor in favour of those with whom he was
living was also grounds for undue influence? While the Supreme Court examined
these questions in the context of a non-testamentary instrument, i.e., a sale
deed, they would be equally relevant in the case of a Will.

 

FACTS
OF THE CASE

The decision in the case
of Raja Ram (Supra) would be better appreciated in the light of
its facts. The opposite parties to the case were two brothers and their
respective families. The parents of the brothers were living with one of the
brothers. The father was 80 years old. He executed a registered sale deed of a
parcel of land in favour of the son with whom he was living. The father died
within ten months of executing the sale deed.

 

The other brother
alleged that the deed was obtained by his brother fraudulently, by deceit and
undue influence because of old age and infirmity of the father who was living
with him. It was alleged that the father was old, infirm and bedridden and sick
for the last eight years; his mental faculties were impaired and he was
entirely dependent upon the defendants who were in a position to exercise undue
influence over him. It was pleaded that the father by reason of age and
sickness was unable to move and walk and had a deteriorated eyesight due to cataract.
It was also pleaded that he was deaf.

The Supreme Court stated
that there were two main questions which it had to consider:

(a)   The physical condition of the
father and his capacity to execute the sale deed; and

(b)  Whether the defendants could exercise
undue influence over the father.

 

DECISION
OF THE COURT

The Court considered the
definition of undue influence as appearing in section 16 of The Indian
Contract Act (Supra).
It also noted that under the Indian Evidence Act,
1872 the onus of proving good faith in a transaction is on the party who is in
a position of active confidence to another. It noted the following facts and
gave important verdicts on each of them:

 

(a)   Except for a mere statement,
no evidence was produced to show that the father’s mental capacity was
impaired. Mere old age cannot be a presumption of total loss of mental
faculties, such as in the case of senility or dementia. The father had executed
another sale deed in favour of a third party and the same was not challenged.
There was no evidence of rapid deterioration in condition after the same.

(b)   Merely being old, infirm and
having a cataract cannot be equated with being bedridden. The fact that the
father went to the Sub-Registrar’s office for registration demolishes the
theory of him being bedridden. Hardness of hearing could not be equated with
deafness.

(c)   The Court referred to its
earlier decision in the case of Subhas Chandra Das Mushib vs. Ganga
Prosad Das Mushib and Ors., 1967 (1) SCR 331
wherein it was held that
there was no presumption of imposition or fraud merely because a donor was old
or of weak character.

 

Thus, as regards the
first question, the Court concluded that the physical condition of the father
and his capacity to execute the sale deed was not in doubt.

 

It next turned to the
important question of undue influence. The allegations of the same were
completely bereft of any details or circumstances with regard to the nature,
manner or kind of undue influence exercised by the defendants over the father.
A mere bald statement was made attributed to the infirmity of the deceased. The
Court held that the defendants were in a fiduciary relationship with the
deceased and their conduct in looking after him and his wife in old age may have
influenced the thinking of the deceased. However, that, per se, could
not lead to the only irresistible conclusion that the defendants were therefore
in a position to dominate the will of the deceased, or that the sale deed
executed was unconscionable. The Court held that the onus of proving there was
no undue influence would come on the defendants only once the plaintiffs
established a prima facie case.

 

The Supreme Court
referred to its earlier decision in the case of Anil Rishi vs. Gurbaksh
Singh, (2006) 5 SCC 558
where it had held that under the Indian
Evidence Act if the plaintiff fails to prove the existence of the fiduciary
relationship or the position of active confidence held by the
defendant-appellant, the burden would lie on him as he had alleged fraud. Next,
it proceeded to lay down certain important principles in the context of whether
undue influence could be presumed merely because a relative is taking care of
his / her elders:

 

(i)    In every caste, creed,
religion and civilized society, looking after the elders of the family was a
sacred and pious duty;

(ii)   If one were to straightway
infer undue influence merely because a sibling was looking after the family
elder, it would result in an extreme proposition which could not be allowed
without sufficient and adequate evidence. The Court held that any other
interpretation by inferring a reverse burden of proof straightway, on those who
were taking care of the elders, as having exercised undue influence, could lead
to very undesirable consequences;

(iii)  While such a contrary view
might not lead to neglect of the elders, it would certainly create doubts and
apprehensions leading to lack of full and proper care under the fear of
allegations with regard to exercise of undue influence;

(iv)  If certain members of the
family were looking after the elders (either by choice or out of compulsion)
there was bound to be more affinity between them and the elders. This is a very
crucial principle established by
the Court.

 

The Court reiterated the
principles laid down by it in its earlier decision of Subhas Chandra Das
(Supra)
wherein it was held that merely because two parties were
closely related to each other no presumption of undue influence could arise.
Even if one party naturally relied upon the other for advice, and the other was
in a position to dominate the will of the first, it only proved ‘influence’.
Such influence might have been used wisely, judiciously and helpfully. However,
the law required that more than mere influence, there was undue influence. In
that decision the Supreme Court observed that Halsbury’s Laws of England,
Third Edition, Vol. 17
, states that there was no presumption of fraud
merely because a donor was old or of weak character and there was no
presumption of undue influence in the case of a gift to a son, grandson, or
son-in-law, although made during the donor’s illness and a few days before his
death. In Poosathurai vs. Kappanna Chettiar, (1920) 22 BomLR 538, the Bombay High Court
held that where the relation of influence has been established, and it is also
made clear that the bargain is with the ‘influencer’ and is in itself
unconscionable, then the person in a position to use his dominating power has
the burden thrown upon him of establishing affirmatively that no domination was
practised so as to bring about the transaction.

 

The Apex Court also
distinguished its earlier decision rendered in the case of Krishna Mohan
Kul vs. Patima Maity, (2004) 9 SCC 468.
In that case, it was established
that the executor of a deed was more than 100 years of age. He was paralytic
and his mental and physical conditions were not in order. He was practically
bedridden with paralysis and though his left thumb impression was stated to be
affixed on the document, there was no witness who could substantiate that he
had in fact put his thumb impression. Hence, based on such specific facts, it
held that the executant was an illiterate person, was not in proper physical
and mental state and, therefore, the deed of settlement and trust was void and
invalid. Hence, the Apex Court concluded that Raja Ram’s case
could be distinguished on facts from this decision.

 

APPLICABILITY
TO WILLS

As
discussed above, the applicability of the ratio descendi of the case of Raja
Ram
is pari passu applicable to Wills. A similar decision was
rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of Surendra Pal vs. Saraswati
AIR 1974 SC 1999.
In that case, a testator under his Will bequeathed
his entire estate to his second wife, excluding his first wife and her
children. The excluded relatives alleged undue influence on the part of the
second wife. The Supreme Court set aside such allegations. It held that if
undue influence, fraud and coercion is alleged, the onus is on the person
making the allegations to prove the same. If he does not discharge this burden,
the probate of the Will must necessarily be granted if it is established that
the testator had full testamentary capacity and had, in fact, executed it
validly with a free will and mind. In order to understand what the testator
intended and why he intended so, one had to sit in his armchair to ascertain
his frame of mind and the circumstances in which he executed the Will. The
Court observed that the testator was at complete loggerheads with the children
from his first marriage. Hence, with a family so hostile towards him, it was
but natural for the testator to provide for his second wife even without her
asking him or importuning him to do so. There was no suggestion that the
testator was feeble-minded or completely deprived of his power of independent
thought and judgement.

 

In
the case of Bur Singh vs. Uttam Singh (1911) 13 BOMLR 59, it was
held that in order to set aside a Will there must be clear evidence that the
undue influence was in fact exercised, or that the illness of the testator so
affected his mental faculties as to make them unequal to the task of disposing
of his property.

 

In
several cases, the testator excludes a close relative from his Will. In such
cases, the question of undue influence of the beneficiaries inevitably crops
up. Various Supreme Court decisions have time and again held that such
circumstances alone cannot lead to an inference of the Will being void due to
undue influence. In the cases of Uma Devi Nambiar vs. TC Sidhan (2004) 2
SCC 321 and Rabindra Nath Mukherjee vs. Panchanan Banerjee, 1995 SCC (4) 459
,
the Supreme Court held that deprivation of the natural heirs by the testator
should not raise any suspicion because the whole idea behind execution of a
Will was to interfere with the normal line of succession. So natural heirs
would be debarred in every case of a Will; it may be that in some cases they
are fully debarred and in others only partially. Again, in Pentakota
Satyanarayana vs. Pentakota Seetharatnam (2005) 8 SCC 67
, this view was
held when the testator’s wife was given a smaller share than others.

 

Similarly,
in Mahesh Kumar (D) By Lrs vs. Vinod Kumar, (2012) 4 SCC 387, the
Supreme Court was dealing with a case where a testator bequeathed all his
wealth to one son in preference to the others since he was living with that son
and the attitude of the other sons was extremely hostile towards their parents.
The Court held that the fact that one son took care of the parents in their old
age showed that there was nothing unnatural or unusual in the decision of the
testator to give his property only to him. Any person of ordinary prudence
would have adopted the same course and would not have given anything to the
ungrateful children from his / her share in the property. Thus, the Court held
that there was nothing invalid in the Will.

 

In the case of Narayanamma
vs. Mayamma, 1999 (5) KarLJ 694
, the Karnataka High Court held that no
cogent reason was given in the Will as to why one daughter of the testator was
preferred over the other two daughters and hence the Will appeared circumspect.
While one may not entirely agree with the reasoning of this decision, it is
always advisable that in all such cases an explanation is given in the Will as
to the reason why the natural heirs are excluded. It is better to play safe and
avoid protracted litigation for the beneficiaries.

 

CONCLUSION

To sum up, the question
of free consent in the case of a Will / contract would always be one which
would be decided on the basis of surrounding facts and circumstances. Those
deprived, in most cases, might raise an objection of undue influence. However,
as the above decisions have very clearly established, mere old age or closeness
of relations or taking care of the executor is no ground for undue influence.
 

 

 

WISE OR OTHERWISE

‘Bachcha, kabil bano, kabil… kamyabi
toh jhak maarke peeche bhagegi’
(become capable, my
son, become capable… success will follow you no matter what).

 

Even after ten years this line still strikes
a chord in my heart. It got me thinking that our minds from an early age are
conditioned to believe that completing the task at hand quickly leads to
success. As professionals, do we strive to build our capabilities, or do we
just aim to be successful at the task at hand?

 

In these past ten years I have transitioned
from being a student to becoming a professional. As students, we must get the
best scores to get admissions in good colleges. As professionals, we should
perform and deliver results in order to be ahead of others. As students we work
towards building our capabilities so that we would be successful in our chosen
area of work and in our chosen profession. However, as professionals do we
constantly keep challenging ourselves? With easy access to opportunities, the
world today has become far more competitive and everyone is in a hurry to climb
the ladder of success. We are concerned only with achieving the outcome – that
is, success.

 

Students want
to score good marks and are not keen to understand concepts; so they end up
mugging up from textbooks. Many of us are comfortable submitting work which is
80% good quality work instead of 100%. Striving towards completion of the work
rather than striving for excelling at the work often decides the quality of
work. In both these scenarios we choose quantity over quality. But would it be
wise to choose quantity over quality? An 80% good quality work might come back
for a re-work; however, a 100% good quality work would not require re-work and
thus would give us more time to take up more work. So, wouldn’t it be wise to
work towards building our skills to do error-free or 100% work in one go rather
than otherwise?

 

One of the topics in modern management
training programmes is, ‘Do it right the first time’ – meaning, it will save a
lot of the time and energy required in setting wrong things right. Or, as a
previous generation believed, ‘A stitch in time saves nine’. One can achieve
this by proper planning and focused execution.

 

As
professionals or as students, we should not become complacent by just
completing the work at hand, we should constantly strive at completing and
excelling at the work at hand. One of the quotes sums it up very well, ‘Success
is a journey, not a destination’. And in this journey of success we must
constantly keep working on our capabilities and skills (kabiliyat) to
achieve success (kamyabi).

 

For each one of us it is an individual
choice – whether we want to be wise or otherwise!

RULING OF SAT IN PRICE WATERHOUSE / SATYAM CASE: SUMMARY AND SOME LESSONS FOR AUDITORS

BACKGROUND

Recently, on 9th September, 2019,
the Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT) overturned the SEBI order banning 11
firms of chartered accountants of the ‘Price Waterhouse group’ (PW) for two
years. The ban was on carrying out audits, certification, etc. of listed
companies / intermediaries associated with the capital markets. It was in
connection with the audit by one such firm in the Satyam Computer Services
Limited (Satyam) case where massive frauds were found consequent to a
confession by Satyam’s Chairman. The SEBI order disgorging the fees earned by
PW from the audit of Satyam of about Rs. 13 crores plus interest was, however,
upheld. Essentially, what SAT held was that PW did not participate knowingly in
the fraud though there was negligence involved to an extent. Several other
conclusions were drawn. Whether, when and to what extent are auditors subject
to the jurisdiction of SEBI was something analysed in great detail. Two
important aspects were particularly discussed. Whether SEBI can ban auditors if
they are negligent in their professional duties, or whether this is the domain
of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India? In case of alleged fraud /
connivance in fraud by auditors, does SEBI have to provide direct evidence or
will it be enough to show this by ‘preponderance of probabilities’, as the
Supreme Court has held in certain cases?

 

Needless to say, this decision will have
far-reaching implications for auditors of listed companies / intermediaries /
entities associated with the capital markets. Many auditors have been banned in
the past and this decision creates a path-breaking precedent for a modified
viewpoint over future cases. It is also possible that SEBI may, apart from
possibly appealing to the Supreme Court against this SAT order, seek amendments
to the law to seek wider jurisdiction over auditors.

 

Some major conclusions and observations by
SAT are discussed in this article.

Quick summary and background of matter
leading to this decision

Readers may recollect that the Chairman of
Satyam, Mr. B. Ramalinga Raju, had, in January, 2009, sent a ‘confession email’
to SEBI of massive frauds in Satyam. This had resulted in its bank balances /
fixed deposits with banks, revenues, debtors, profits, etc. being overstated.
The amount involved was in thousands of crores of rupees. Several criminal and
other proceedings were initiated against the Chairman, directors and certain
officers, the signing partners of the auditors and the Price Waterhouse group.
However, for purposes of this article, the focus is on the proceedings against
the PW group by SEBI. Against these proceedings, PW petitioned the Bombay High
Court claiming, inter alia, that SEBI did not have any jurisdiction over
auditors who are chartered accountants and over whom only the Institute of
Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI) has jurisdiction. The High Court rejected
this contention and upheld SEBI’s jurisdiction over auditors albeit with
certain conditions. Thereafter, SEBI issued an order on 10th
January, 2018 banning the PW group of 11 firms for two years from performing
certain audit / certification work in relation to listed companies, etc. It
made a finding that PW had committed / connived in fraud and was negligent. It
also ordered that the fees earned by it be disgorged – with interest @ 12% pa.
Now, SAT has partially overturned this order.

 

BOMBAY HIGH COURT’S DECISION

PW had filed a petition before the Bombay
High Court claiming that SEBI had no jurisdiction over auditors who, being
chartered accountants, were subject to action only by the ICAI. The Court (Price
Waterhouse & Co. vs. SEBI [2010] 103 SCL 96 [Bom.])
rejected this
contention but with certain riders which can be summarised as follows: It said
that auditors in general were primarily subject to ICAI. If the auditors were
negligent in their duties, it is the ICAI that can take action against them.
However, SEBI is a body that has been formed for the protection of investors
and safeguarding the integrity of capital markets. Auditors perform an
important role of attestation of financial statements that are relied on by
shareholders. If they themselves carry out a fraud or participate / connive in
fraud in the entity they audit, SEBI does have a role – to take action.
However, this has to be established by evidence by SEBI. If the auditor has
been negligent in performance of his duties but it cannot be shown that he has
committed or connived in fraud, SEBI does not have jurisdiction. It is these
comments by the Court that became the core point on which SAT rendered its
decision.

 

What are the tests by which SEBI can
prove a person is guilty of fraud in securities markets?

This was an important aspect discussed in
the decision and indeed was the turning point. SEBI had charged PW with fraud
under multiple provisions of the SEBI Act and Regulations. But what were the
valid criteria that were sufficient to establish fraud under these provisions?
SEBI applied the more liberal criterion of ‘preponderance of probabilities’. It
stated that PW was negligent on so many counts and over so many years, that it
was far more likely than not that it had connived in the fraud.

 

However, the SAT made an important
distinction. It analysed the relevant decisions of the Supreme Court on frauds
under the securities laws. It held that the criteria were different for persons
who dealt in securities and those who did not. In respect of persons who dealt
in securities, the test of preponderance of probabilities applied. However, PW
could not be said to have dealt in securities and hence this test could not be
used to prove fraud. Hence, for such persons direct evidence was needed that
they connived in fraud and that such fraud induced others to deal in
securities. SAT held that SEBI had not provided any such evidence. Negligence,
even if on repeated counts, did not become fraud once this test and standard
was applied.

 

Thus, the SAT held that SEBI had not
provided evidence that PW had committed fraud. The order of banning the PW
group failed on this ground.

 

Whether SEBI can ban 11 firms en masse in the PW group?

 

SEBI had banned 11 firms which according to
it were operating under the Price Waterhouse banner. SEBI also showed several
direct and indirect associations amongst the firms operating under this banner.
There was, for example, sharing of resources, there were common partners
amongst some firms and so on.

 

The SAT
analysed the relations in context of the law relating to partnerships and LLPs,
the relevant guidelines of ICAI, the fact that there were several partners
among those who joined as such much after this event / audit, etc. It also
noted that it was a ‘signing partner’ who certified the audit of companies. SAT
held that in these circumstances, it could not hold the whole group liable for
fraud in Satyam. A blanket ban on the group was thus not warranted.

 

Important concepts like negligence, role of
management / auditors, etc. discussed

SAT discussed extensively on what
constituted negligence and also discussed the role of management and the
auditors. In particular, it highlighted the role of the auditor to display
professional scepticism, to act as watchdog and not a bloodhound, to not be
aggressively looking for fraud all the time which is really the role of a
forensic auditor. It also emphasised that an audit cannot guarantee absence of
all fraud as long as the auditor utilises a process that demonstrates a
reasonable professional skill and approach to the audit. SAT also discussed
various applicable auditing standards. Finally, and above all, it stated that
cleverly designed and implemented fraud cannot necessarily be uncovered by an
auditor. The audit cannot be so extensive and detailed, considering the time
and cost constraints, to uncover all frauds; and the scope for such
sophisticated frauds by persons high in management has to be considered.

 

Remedial orders vs. preventive orders
vs. orders to ban amounting to penalising a person

An order
banning a person from being associated with the securities markets can be for
one or more reasons. The SEBI Act permits directions by SEBI to debar a person
from being associated with the capital markets for preventive or remedial
reasons. Banning a person to punish him for wrongs done by him is, however, a
punitive action.

 

SAT held that debarring a person can, of
course, be for remedial / preventive reasons. If a person has committed such a
wrong that has harmed investors it may be better to keep him away from the
stock markets for a time (or even permanently in appropriate cases) so that
others (more people) are not harmed.

 

On the facts of
the case, SAT held that debarring PW served neither a preventive nor a remedial
purpose. It was seen that more than a decade had passed since the uncovering of
the fraud. PW had continued to serve other entities in the securities market
without any complaints. It had, to the satisfaction of even US authorities who
had initiated proceedings against it, taken necessary corrective actions to
prevent such things from happening again. To prohibit PW now from being
associated with the capital markets did not serve any preventive or remedial
purpose.

 

This is again a relevant test which would
apply to proceedings in other cases against auditors where there may be similar
facts.

 

Disgorgement of fees

As noted earlier, negligence in performance
of professional work by auditors does not by itself amount to fraud under
securities laws. For holding an auditor guilty of having committed such fraud
direct evidence has to be provided. However, SAT affirmed that the auditors
were negligent in performance of their duties as auditors on certain counts. It
thus upheld the direction of SEBI to disgorge the fees earned by PW from the
performance of the audit of Satyam.

 

CONCLUSION

Clearly, the order has far-reaching effects
on auditors and even other persons associated with the capital markets. The
order is of course on the facts of the case which SAT took pains to mention and
repeat. But the circumstances and criteria under which auditors can be
proceeded against are now far clearer than before. The decision of the Bombay
High Court which upheld the jurisdiction of SEBI against auditors was
reconciled with decisions of the Supreme Court and it was shown that SEBI had
power and jurisdiction which was narrower. In these times, when auditors face
multiple regulators, it is a relief that there is clarity on who plays what
role and of what nature.

 

This order will also be relevant for others
who are not directly associated with the capital markets and who do not deal in
securities. These may include independent directors and directors in general,
company secretaries, lawyers, etc. While each group will have to examine how
this decision is relevant for them, there is still some guidance available. For
example, for holding them liable for fraud, direct evidence has to be shown.

 

Partners of firms of auditors will also have
less cause for worry if, despite reasonable efforts and systems, their partners
are negligent and / or commit fraud. The other partners of such firms will not
be held liable and acted against merely for the faults of one partner.
 

 

Article 13(4) and (5) of India-UAE DTAA – As Article 13(4) covered only gains from ‘share’, gains from ‘unit’ of mutual fund were subject to Article 13(5) under India-UAE DTAA

8. DCIT vs. K.E. Faizal ITA No.: 423/Coch/2018 A.Y.: 2012-13 Date of order: 8th July, 2019

 

Article 13(4) and (5) of India-UAE DTAA –
As Article 13(4) covered only gains from ‘share’, gains from ‘unit’ of mutual
fund were subject to Article 13(5) under India-UAE DTAA

 

FACTS

The assessee was a
non-resident under the Act. He was located in UAE and qualified for benefit
under the India-UAE DTAA. During the relevant year he sold units of
equity-oriented mutual funds and derived short-term capital gain (STCG). The
assessee claimed that the STCG derived by him was not chargeable to tax in
India in terms of Article 13(5) of the India-UAE DTAA.

 

The AO noted that the underlying instrument of an equity-oriented mutual
fund was nothing but a ‘share’. Accordingly, the AO held that in terms of
Article 13(4) of the India-UAE DTAA, STCG was chargeable to tax in India.

 

The CIT(A) held
that the units were not ‘shares’. Hence, in terms of Article 13(5) of the
India-UAE DTAA, STCG from units was not chargeable to tax in India.

____________________________________________

3.  CIT vs. Tata Autocomp Systems Ltd. [2015] 56
taxmann.com 206/230 taxman 649/374 ITR 516; CIT vs. Great Eastern Shipping Co
Ltd. [2018] 301 CTR 642

 

 

HELD


(a)         Article 13(4) of the
India-UAE DTAA provides that income arising to a resident of the UAE from the
transfer of shares in an Indian company other than those specifically covered
within the ambit of other paragraphs of Article 13, may be taxed in India.
Article 13(5) provides that income arising to such a resident from transfer of
property, other than shares in an Indian company, is liable to tax only in the
UAE.

(b)   Article 13(4) covers within
its purview capital gains arising from transfer of ‘shares’ and not any other
property. Therefore, units of a mutual fund could be covered under Article
13(4) only if they could be considered as shares.

(c)   Since the DTAA does not define
‘share’ in terms of Article 3(2), the definition under the Companies Act, 2013
should be referred. Further, as per SEBI regulations, a mutual fund can be
established only as a ‘trust’. Therefore, the units issued by an Indian mutual
fund could not be considered a ‘share’.

(d)   Under the Securities Contract
(Regulation) Act, 1956 a ‘security’ is defined to include inter alia
shares, scrips, stocks, bonds, debentures, debenture stock or other body
corporate and units or any other such instrument issued to the investors under
any mutual fund scheme.

(e)   From the definition of
‘securities’, it is clear that ‘share’ and ‘unit of a mutual fund’ are two
separate types of securities. Hence, gains arising from transfer of units of a
mutual fund would not be covered within the ambit of Article 13(4).
Consequently, it would be covered under Article 13(5).

(f)    Therefore, the assessee was
not liable to tax in India in respect of STCG arising from the sale of units.
 

 

 

ERRATA: In BCAJ September, 2019
issue in the feature TRIBUNAL AND AAR INTERNATIONAL TAX DECISIONS, on page 58
in the 2nd paragraph under ‘HELD – PAYMENT FOR SIMULATOR’, the last
line should read as ‘Hence, the charges paid by the assessee for use of
simulator were not “royalty”. It may be noted that while the catch notes (page
57) correctly mentioned ‘not’, inadvertently the word ‘not’ was omitted in the
gist.

 

 

 

 

Section 92C of the Act, Article 11 of India-Germany DTAA – In respect of loans advanced to AE, arm’s length rate of interest should be determined on the basis of the rate prevalent in the country where loan is given – EURIBOR / LIBOR is not average interest rate at which loans are advanced and hence, they cannot be considered comparable uncontrolled rate of interest

7. [2019] 109 taxmann.com 48 (Trib.) Pune DCIT vs. iGate Global Solutions Ltd. ITA No.: 286 (Bang.) of 2013 A.Y.: 2007-08 Date of order: 5th August, 2019

 

Section 92C of the Act, Article 11 of
India-Germany DTAA – In respect of loans advanced to AE, arm’s length rate of
interest should be determined on the basis of the rate prevalent in the country
where loan is given – EURIBOR / LIBOR is not average interest rate at which
loans are advanced and hence, they cannot be considered comparable uncontrolled
rate of interest

 

FACTS

The assessee, an
Indian company, was a subsidiary of an American company. It acted as a single
source of a broad range of information technology applications, solutions and
services that included client / server position and development. The assessee
advanced loans to its German AE in Euro and to its American AE in USD. The
assessee had charged interest @ 1.50% to its German AE and @ 6% to its American
AE.

 

 

The TPO observed
that the arm’s length interest rate on such loans should be the rate which the
assessee would have earned if it had advanced loan to an unrelated party in
India. Applying the Comparable Uncontrolled Price (CUP) method as the Most
Appropriate Method (MAM), the TPO determined the arm’s length rate interest as
per BBB bonds in India and accordingly recommended transfer pricing adjustment.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee
appealed before the CIT(A). The CIT(A) held that the domestic Prime Lending
Rate would have no application and the interest rate prevalent in the country
in which the loan is received should be considered for determining arm’s length
rate of interest. Since the loan was given
in Germany and in the USA, international rates like LIBOR or EURIBOR should be
considered.

________________________________

2.  Functional and risk analysis was recorded in
the transfer pricing study report. The report was accepted by the Transfer
Pricing Officer both, in case of I Co and in case of the assessee

 

 

HELD

1. There is almost
judicial3  consensus ad
idem
at the higher appellate forums that the arm’s length rate of interest
on loans advanced to the AEs should be considered with reference to the country
(in this case, Germany / USA) in which the loan was received and not from where
it was paid. Since India was the lender country, it was not correct to
determine the rate of interest in India as arm’s length rate of interest.

2. EURIBOR was
merely a reference rate calculated on the basis of the average rate at which
Euro Zone banks offer lending in the inter-bank market. Similar was the case
with the LIBOR, Thus EURIBOR / LIBOR could not per se be considered as
comparable uncontrolled rate of interest at which loans were advanced in
Germany.

3. Thus, the
impugned order was set aside and the matter was remanded to the AO for
considering EURIBOR plus 2% as arm’s length rate of interest.

 

Section 9 of the Act, Article 5 of the India-USA DTAA – Though Indian company was controlled by foreign company, since all economic risks were borne by Indian company no fixed place PE was constituted – Since services were rendered outside India and no personnel had visited India, no service PE was constituted – Indian company neither had authority to conclude, nor had it concluded, contracts and since it had also not secured orders for foreign company, no agency PE was constituted

6. [2019] 109 taxmann.com 99 (Trib.) Mum. Gemmological Institute of America, Inc. vs.
ACIT ITA No.: 1138 (Mum.) of 2015
A.Y.: 2010-11 Date of order: 21st June, 2019

 

Section 9 of
the Act, Article 5 of the India-USA DTAA – Though Indian company was controlled
by foreign company, since all economic risks were borne by Indian company no
fixed place PE was constituted – Since services were rendered outside India and
no personnel had visited India, no service PE was constituted – Indian company
neither had authority to conclude, nor had it concluded, contracts and since it
had also not secured orders for foreign company, no agency PE was constituted

 

______________________________________________

1.  (2012) 52 SOT 93 (Mum.)(Trib.) – In Daimler
Chrysler (DC), it was held that: the subsidiary of a company cannot be regarded
as PE; since sales of completely knocked down (CKD) kits were made by DC to the
Indian company on principal-to-principal basis, they became property of the
Indian company and did not constitute the Indian company as sales outlet or
warehouse of DC; as the Indian company had not carried out any operation in
India in respect of sales of CKD kits on behalf of DC, it could not be
considered as PE of DC in India

 

 

FACTS

The assessee was an
American company and a tax resident of USA. It was engaged in the business of
diamond grading and preparation of diamond dossiers. The assessee also owned
100% shares in an Indian company (I Co) which was also engaged in similar
services. Whenever I Co faced capacity and / or technical constraints, it would
send precious stones to the assessee for grading.

 

During the relevant
year, the assessee earned ‘Instructor Fee’ from I Co for rendering diamond
grading services. The AO contended that the assessee and I Co had established a
JV business in which both operated as partners. Consequently, he held that I Co
constituted a PE of the taxpayer in India.

 

The assessee
claimed that the impugned receipts were in the nature of business profits and,
in the absence of any PE in India, the said income was not chargeable to tax in
India in terms of the DTAA.

 

HELD

As regards
fixed place PE

In a joint venture,
each party contributes its share to undertake an economic activity under joint
control. The arrangement between I Co and the taxpayer could not be considered
a joint venture for the following reasons:

(a)   I Co had independent
expertise. It used the services of the assessee only when it faced technical or
capacity constraints. Thus, this was a sub-contracting arrangement;

(b)   I Co entered into agreement with the clients.
All the economic risks in relation to the agreement, viz., credit risk, risk of
loss or damage to articles while in transit, etc., were borne by I Co.

 

Merely because a
company has controlling interest in the other company would not by itself
constitute the other company’s (its) PE in terms of Article 5(6) of the
India-USA DTAA. Accordingly, the assessee did not have a ‘’fixed place’ PE in
India.

 

As regards
service PR

(i)    The assessee rendered services to I Co only
when I Co was facing capacity or technical constraints and requested the
assessee for providing services. The assessee rendered these services outside
India. None of the employees / personnel of the assessee had visited India for rendering
services;

(ii)    Two graders who were earlier employed with
the assessee were employed with I Co and were on the payroll of I Co. They were
working under the control and supervision of I Co.

 

Therefore, no
service PE was constituted in India in terms of the India-USA DTAA.

 

As regards
agency PE

Considering the
functions and the risks assumed2 
by I Co vis-à-vis its business activities in India, I Co was an
independent and separate legal entity incorporated in India. I Co had also
borne all the economic risks. Further, I Co did not have any authority to
conclude contracts and had not concluded any contracts on behalf of the
assessee. It had also not secured any orders for the assessee in India. Thus, I
Co could not be said to have constituted agency PE of the assessee in India.

 

Section 5 of the Act – Article 9 of India-Germany DTAA – Foreign car manufacturing company sold completely built-up cars to Indian company on principal-to-principal basis – Indian company sold such cars to dealers on principal-to-principal basis, each transaction constituted a separate and independent activity, and since Indian company was not acting on behalf of the foreign company, the foreign company could not be said to have PE in India, either u/s 9 of the Act or under article 5 of India-Germany DTAA

5. TS-548-ITAT-2019
(Mum.)
Audi AG vs. ADIT ITA No.:
1781/Mum/2014
A.Y.: 2010-11 Date of order: 3rd
September, 2019

Section 5 of the
Act – Article 9 of India-Germany DTAA – Foreign car manufacturing company sold
completely built-up cars to Indian company on principal-to-principal basis –
Indian company sold such cars to dealers on principal-to-principal basis, each
transaction constituted a separate and independent activity, and since Indian
company was not acting on behalf of the foreign company, the foreign company
could not be said to have PE in India, either u/s 9 of the Act or under article
5 of India-Germany DTAA

 

FACTS

The assessee was a
car manufacturer based in Germany (F Co). It was a tax resident of Germany. F
Co was inter alia engaged in the business of selling its cars globally
under its own brand name (F Co Brand).

 

It had appointed an
Indian company (I Co 1), which was its associated enterprise (AE) as its
exclusive distributor for sale of F Co Brand cars in India. During the relevant
year, the assessee had sold completely built-up cars (CBU cars) and accessories
to I Co 1. The assessee also had another AE (I Co 2) in India. The assessee
sold parts and accessories to I Co 2 from which I Co 2 manufactured F Co Brand
cars in India. I Co 2 sold these cars to I Co 1 who, in turn, distributed them
to the dealers / distributors.

 

 

The assessee
offered only fees for technical services for tax under the India-Germany DTAA.
However, on the basis of the following observations, the AO held that the
assessee had a business connection and a PE in India in terms of Article 5(1)
and 5(5) of the India-Germany DTAA.

 

(i)    I Co 1 was an exclusive distributor and its
only business activity and source of income was from the sale of F Co Brand
cars;

(ii)    Activities of the assessee and I Co 1
complemented each other and I Co 1 was functioning as an extended arm of, and
replaced, the assessee in India;

(iii)   The assessee and I Co 1 jointly established
sales targets;

(iv)   Most of the senior officials working with I Co
1 had come from F Co group; and

(v)   The activities of storage, marketing,
soliciting with clients and potential customers, after-sales services and
support services, supply of spare parts and accessories, taking part in Auto
Expo were undertaken in India by I Co 1 on behalf of the assessee.

 

The DRP upheld the
order of the AO. Aggrieved, the assessee appealed before the Tribunal.

 

HELD

(a)   The manufacture of cars was completed by the
assessee outside India. Hence, it constituted a separate and independent
activity;

(b)   The sale of cars was also completed outside
India. Hence, income arising from sales could not be taxed in India;

(c)   The assessee had contended
that the cars were sold to I Co 1 on principal-to-principal basis outside India
and I Co 1 had sold these on principal-to-principal basis to dealers. I Co 1
was not acting on behalf of the assessee and the assessee was not selling cars
through I Co 1. Income from sale of such cars in India was taxed separately in
the hands of I Co 1 in India. The AO did not bring any material to counter
this. Thus, I Co 1 did not constitute a PE of the assessee in India and income
from sale of cars is not taxable in India. The Tribunal relied on the decision
in the case of ACIT vs. Daimler Chrysler AG1 .

 

Section 74 – Long-term capital loss on sale of listed equity shares is allowed to be carried forward

5.  United Investments vs. ACIT (Kol.) Members: A.T.
Varkey (J.M.) and M. Balaganesh (A.M.) ITA No.:
511/Kol/2017
A.Y.: 2013-14 Date of order:
1st July, 2019

Counsel for
Assessee / Revenue: S. Jhajharia / Sankar Halder

 

Section 74 –
Long-term capital loss on sale of listed equity shares is allowed to be carried
forward

 

FACTS

The assessee
was engaged in the business of horse-racing and also as a commission agent. It
had deployed its surplus funds by way of investments in listed shares and
securities. During the year it had derived long-term capital gain of Rs. 0.77
lakh and suffered long-term capital loss of Rs. 6.05 lakhs on the sales of
listed shares. In the return of income, the assessee carried forward the
long-term capital loss. However, the CIT(A) rejected the same since, according
to him, the gain derived from the sales of listed shares was exempt.

 

Being
aggrieved, the assessee appealed before the Tribunal where the Revenue
supported the orders of the lower authorities and submitted that the term
‘income’ included negative income, i.e., loss as well. Thus, when the profit
from transfer of shares of listed companies was exempt u/s 10(38), then as a
corollary the loss arising from such source also cannot be set off against any
other income which is chargeable to tax.

 

HELD

The Tribunal
noted that the judicial authorities, including the Apex Court in the case of CIT
vs. J.H. Gotla (156 ITR 323)
, have held that the expression ‘income’
includes loss. The Tribunal further noted that the decision of the Apex Court
was in the context of clubbing of a minor’s income with that of the parents u/s
64, when the Court held that the loss legally assessable in the hands of the
minor was also required to be clubbed in the hands of the parent. In the said
case, according to the Tribunal, the Revenue had not proved that the source
from which the minor earned income or incurred loss was outside the purview of
the tax provisions. Although, admittedly, the source of income in the hands of
the minor was such that it was liable to tax and if there had been any income,
then the same would have been included in the hands of the parent. In the light
of this factual and legal position, the Tribunal noted that the Supreme Court
held that if the income was liable for clubbing in the hands of the parent,
then equally the same principle will apply with respect to loss which was negative
income.

 

According to
the Tribunal, the judicial concept that the term ‘income’ includes loss can be
applied only when the entire source of such income falls within the charging
provisions of the Act. Accordingly, in a case where the source of income is otherwise
chargeable to tax, but only a specific specie of income derived from such
source is granted exemption, then in such a case the proposition that the term
‘income’ includes loss will not be applicable. It is only when the source which
produces ‘income’ is outside the ambit of the taxing provisions of the Act, in
such a case alone the ‘income’ including negative income can be said to be
outside the ambit of taxing provisions, and therefore the negative income is
also required to be ignored for taxation purposes. Therefore, where only one of
the streams of income from the ‘source’ is granted exemption by the Legislature
upon fulfilment of specified conditions, then the concept of ‘income’ includes
‘loss’ will not apply.

 

According to
the Tribunal, on conjoint reading of the provisions of section 2(14) which
defines the term capital assets; section 45 which lays down the charge of tax
on gain arising on transfer of ‘capital asset’; section 48 which provides for
the manner and mode of computation of long-term capital gain; and section 74
providing for manner for claiming set-off of long-term capital loss / its carry
forward, nowhere had any exception been made with regard to long-term capital
gain / loss arising on sale of equity shares. The Tribunal further noted that
the same is liable to income tax like any other item of capital asset.
Therefore, it cannot be said that the source, viz., transfer of long-term
capital asset being equity shares, by itself is exempt from tax so as to say
that any ‘income’ from such source shall include ‘loss’ as well.

 

Therefore, relying on the decisions of the
Calcutta High Court in the case of Royal Calcutta Turf Club vs. CIT
[1983] 144 ITR 709/12 Taxman 133
and the Mumbai Tribunal in the case of
Raptakos Brett & Co. Ltd. vs. DCIT (69 SOT 383), the Tribunal
held that the claim of the assessee for carry forward of long-term capital loss
be allowed.

Section 154 – Denial of deduction u/s 80HHC on sale proceeds of DEPB license, which was contrary to the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court, can be termed as a ‘mistake’ apparent from record and can be rectified u/s 154

4. Anandkumar
Jain vs. ITO (Mum.)
Members: G.S.
Pannu (V.P.) and Ravish Sood (J.M.) ITA No.:
4192/Mum/2012
A.Y.: 2003-04 Date of order:
20th August, 2019

Counsel for
Assessee / Revenue: Jitendra Sanghavi and Amit Khatiwala / Rajesh Kumar Yadav

 

Section 154 –
Denial of deduction u/s 80HHC on sale proceeds of DEPB license, which was
contrary to the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court, can be termed as a
‘mistake’ apparent from record and can be rectified u/s 154

 

FACTS

The assessee is
an individual engaged in the business of manufacturing and export of garments.
In his return of income for assessment year 2003-04 he had claimed deduction
u/s 80HHC. During the course of the assessment, the AO, amongst other
adjustments made, re-computed the deduction u/s 80HHC by reducing 90% of the
duty drawback, excise duty refund and sale proceeds of DEPB license from the
profits of the business of the assessee. On further appeals, both the CIT(A) as
well as the Tribunal upheld the order of the AO.

 

Thereafter, the
Special Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Topman Exports vs. ITO (OSD)
(33 SOT 337 dated 11th August, 2009)
decided a similar issue
in favour of the appellant. In view thereof, the assessee filed a rectification
application u/s 154. The AO rejected the application holding that the issue was
debatable and the Department was in appeal against the order in the Topman
Exports
case. According to the CIT(A) this cannot be termed as a
mistake apparent from record and hence the same cannot be rectified u/s 154. He
also agreed with the AO that the issue was debatable. On merits, the CIT(A)
held that the issue of allowance of deduction u/s 80HHC had been decided
against the assessee by the Bombay High Court in the case of Kalpataru
Colours, 192 taxman 435.
Accordingly, the CIT(A) dismissed the appeal
of the assessee vide order dated 24th January, 2011. The assessee
did not prefer further appeal against the order of the CIT(A).

 

Subsequently,
the Supreme Court in the case of Topman Exports vs. CIT (342 ITR 49)
reversed the decision of the Bombay High Court in the Kalpataru Colours
case vide its order dated 8th February, 2012. Thereafter, the
assessee filed the instant appeal before the Tribunal against the order of the
CIT(A) on 15th June, 2012 which was after a delay of 420 days, with
a request for condonation of delay.

 

Before the
Tribunal, the Revenue objected to the assessee’s application for condonation of
delay and relied upon the decision in the case of Kunal Surana vs. ITO in
ITA No. 3297/Mum/2012
wherein the application filed by the assessee for
condonation of delay of four months was rejected. Further, it was contended
that since the issue was debatable at the relevant point of time, it cannot be
said to be a mistake apparent from record and hence cannot be rectified u/s
154.

 

HELD

The Tribunal
noted that the delay in filing the appeal was solely on the ground that the
CIT(A) had decided the issue against the assessee following the decision of the
jurisdictional High Court in the case of Kalpataru Colours; and,
as such, based on the advice of the consultant, the assessee did not prefer
further appeal before the Tribunal. Subsequently, when the Supreme Court passed
a favourable order in the case of Topman Exports, based on the
advice from his consultant the assessee filed the present appeal which was
after a delay of 420 days. According to the Tribunal, the assessee had a valid
reason for the delay and hence, relying on the decisions in the cases of Magnum
Exports vs. ACIT (ITA No. 1111/Kol/2012)
and Pahilajal Jaikishan
vs. JCIT (ITA No. 1392/Mum/2012)
, it condoned the delay.

 

As regards the
issue whether it was a ‘mistake’ apparent from record in terms of section 154,
the Tribunal referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of ACIT
vs. Saurashtra Kutch Stock Exchange Ltd. (173 Taxman 322)
relied on by
the assessee. As per the said decision, according to the Tribunal, the Hon’ble
Courts do not make any new law when the order is pronounced; the Courts only
clarify the legal position, which was not correctly understood. Therefore, the
legal position so clarified by the Courts has an effect which is retrospective
in nature. Therefore, the Tribunal observed, any order passed in contravention
of such legal position would be considered as a mistake apparent from record
which can be rectified u/s 154. Accordingly, the contention of the assessee was
accepted and it held that the order passed by the AO and CIT(A) can be
rectified u/s 154.

 

On merit, the Tribunal relied on the Supreme
Court decision in the case of Topman Exports (Supra) and directed
the AO to re-compute the deduction u/s 80HHC on the sale proceeds of the DEPB
license in light of the said decision of the Supreme Court and allowed the
appeal filed by the assessee.

Sections 28(ii), 45 – Amount of Rs. 1.75 crores received by assessee towards professional goodwill was not chargeable u/s 28(ii)(a) as no case was made out by AO to establish that the assessee was the person who was managing the whole or substantially the whole of the affairs of the company Section 55(2) does not specify cost of acquisition of management right. There is no deemed cost of acquisition in the statute. Therefore, the charge u/s 45 never intended to levy a tax on transfer of management rights

6. [2019] 201 TTJ (Rai.) 683 DCIT vs. Dr. Sandeep Dave ITA No.: 175/Rpr/2013 A.Y.: 2009-10 Date of order: 1st July, 2019

 

Sections 28(ii), 45 – Amount of Rs. 1.75
crores received by assessee towards professional goodwill was not chargeable
u/s 28(ii)(a) as no case was made out by AO to establish that the assessee was
the person who was managing the whole or substantially the whole of the affairs
of the company

 

Section 55(2) does not specify cost of
acquisition of management right. There is no deemed cost of acquisition in the
statute. Therefore, the charge u/s 45 never intended to levy a tax on transfer
of management rights

 

FACTS

The assessee received a certain amount from company CARE. According to
it, the amount was received as professional goodwill and was liable to be
treated as capital receipt not liable to capital gain. The AO observed that the
amount was received by the assessee on account of relinquishment of his rights
in the management of a company in favour of CARE, and not on account of
relinquishment of any right relating to professional expertise or acumen as
surgeon. The AO, accordingly, brought the amount to tax holding that it was
covered under the provision of section 28(ii)(a). On appeal, the Commissioner
(Appeals) deleted the addition made by the AO. Aggrieved by this order, the
Revenue filed an appeal.

 

HELD

The Tribunal held
that the work of management was entrusted to different committees and such
committees had other members / doctors apart from the assessee. Therefore, it
was incumbent on the Revenue to establish that in spite of there being other
members on various managerial committees, it was the assessee alone who was
actually managing the affairs of different committees. In such a case, it is
the board of directors collectively who can be said to be managing the business
affairs of the company.

 

Management right
has now been included in the definition of ‘property’ and, therefore, is a
‘capital asset’ u/s 2(14). This being so, the taxability of any amount received
against relinquishment of ‘management right’ has to be tested on the touchstone
of provisions relating to computation of capital gain. The assessee argued that
since management right is a capital asset, provisions relating to capital gain
will apply and when such computation provisions are applied, they are
unworkable. It is true that under the scheme of taxation of capital gain it is
not the entire sale consideration of an asset which is chargeable to tax but it
is the ‘profit or gain’ arising on transfer thereof which is taxable. This
observation is subject to the specific provisions of law which prescribe that
in case of some category of capital assets, cost of acquisition is considered
to be nil and, in those cases, full consideration accruing on transfer will
become taxable. In the instant case, it is the stand of the assessee that cost
of acquisition of management right being indeterminate, no capital gain can be
worked out and so the provisions are not workable.

 

Section 55(2) does
not specify the cost of acquisition of ‘management right’. There is no deemed
cost of acquisition provided in the statute. No case has been made out by the
AO to show as to what was the cost of management right in the hands of the
assessee. Therefore, what has been brought to tax is the entire consideration
for relinquishment of management right which runs contrary to the settled
proposition of law, which was laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of CIT
vs. B.C. Srinivasa Setty [1981] 5 Taxman 1/128 ITR 294.
In this
decision, the Supreme Court has laid down the proposition that machinery and
charging provisions constitute an integrated code and in the situation where
the computation provision fails, it has to be assumed that such a transaction
was not intended to be falling within the charging section and, therefore, the
charge on account of capital gain must fail.

 

It is evident that
the Revenue has not established that the assessee was managing the whole or
substantially the whole of the affairs of the company as no case has been made
out by the Revenue that the amount received by the assessee from CARE was on
account of relinquishment of any managerial rights. Even assuming that the
amount received by the assessee is relatable to relinquishment of any
managerial right, in view of the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the
case of B.C. Srinivasa Setty (Supra), the cost of any such
managerial right being indeterminate, provisions relating to computation of
capital gain are not workable and, consequently, it has to be held that the
charge u/s 45 never intended to levy a tax on such a transaction. Therefore,
the amount received by the assessee is neither chargeable u/s 28(ii)(a) nor
under the head capital gain.

TIME OF SUPPLY UNDER GST

INTRODUCTION


1.  It’s a trite law that for a tax
law to survive there needs to be a levy provision which determines when
the levy of tax would be triggered, i.e., when the taxable event takes place;
and a collection provision which determines when the levy of tax
triggered can be collected by the Department. The levy provision precedes the
collection provision and in the event the levy is not triggered, the collection
provision also does not get triggered. In other words, without levy getting
triggered, the collection mechanism fails. This distinction between the levy
and collection provisions has been dealt with by the Supreme Court on multiple
occasions.

 

2.  In this article, we shall
discuss in detail the provisions relating to collection of tax dealt with in
Chapter IV of the CGST Act, 2017.

 

TIME OF SUPPLY – CASES UNDER FORWARD CHARGE
(OTHER THAN CONTINUOUS SUPPLY)


3.  Section 9, which is the charging
section for the levy of GST, provides that the tax shall be collected in such
manner as may be prescribed. The manner has been prescribed u/s. 12 to 14 of
the CGST Act, 2017. Sections 12 and 13 thereof deal with time of supply of
goods and services, respectively, while section 14 deals with instances when
there is a change in the rate of goods / services supplied.

 

4.  Sections 12 (1) and 13 (1)
thereof provide that the liability to pay tax on supply of goods and / or
services shall arise at the time of supply of the said goods and / or services
and then proceeds to list down events when the time of supply shall be
triggered in the context of goods and services, respectively. The provisions
relating to time of supply, in cases where the tax is liable under forward
charge, is tabulated alongside:

Time of supply in
the case of supply of goods

Time of supply in
the case of supply of services

Section 12 (2):

The time of supply shall be earliest of:

  •  Date
    of issue of invoice by supplier or the last date on which the invoice is
    required to be issued u/s. 31 (1) with respect to the supply [Clause (a)]
  •  Date on which the supplier receives the payment for
    such supply [Clause (b)]

Section 13 (2):

The time of supply
shall be earliest of:

  •     If
    the invoice is issued within the time prescribed u/s. 31 (2) – date of issue
    of invoice OR the date of receipt of payment, whichever is earlier [Clause
    (a)]
  •     If
    the invoice is not issued within the time prescribed u/s. 31 (2) – the date
    of provision of service OR the date of receipt of payment, whichever is
    earlier [Clause (b)]
  •     If
    the above does not apply – date on which the recipient shows the receipt of
    service in his books of accounts [Clause (c)]

 

 

5.  As can be seen from the above,
sections 12 (2) and 13 (2) provide that in normal cases, the time of supply
shall be determined based on the issuance of invoice within the timeline
prescribed u/s. 31. The time limit for issuing invoice u/s. 31 is as under:

 

In case of supply of
goods

In case of supply of
services

Section 31 (1):

Invoice shall be
required to be issued before or at the time of

  •     Removal
    of goods for supply to recipient, where supply involves movement of goods
  •     Delivery
    of goods or making available thereof to the recipient in any other case

Section 31 (2):

Invoice shall be required to be issued before or after
the provision of service
, but within prescribed time limit of issue of
the invoice, which has been prescribed as 30 days u/r. 47 of CGST Rules, 2017

 

6.  From the above, it is evident
that in case of goods, the time of supply is determined based on the nature of
goods. For tangible goods, there are two scenarios envisaged, namely:

 

  •    Where there is movement of goods involved –
    this would cover both, ex-works as well as CIF contracts. Before the movement
    of goods is initiated, the supplier will have to issue the invoice,
    irrespective of whether the risk and rewards associated with the goods have
    been transferred or not;
  •    Where there is no movement of goods – this
    would cover situations where the supply of goods takes place only by way of
    transfer of title. For instance, transactions in a commodity exchange, where
    the sale has culminated and ownership changed hands, but the movement of goods
    does not take place. Instead there is merely an endorsement on the warehouse
    receipts. In such cases, the invoice will have to be issued before the
    endorsement takes place. Further, there are transactions wherein a supplier is
    required to keep a bare minimum stock of goods for a particular customer and
    the said stock cannot be sold to a third party. In such cases also, when the
    goods are appropriated for a particular customer, though the delivery is not
    taken by the customer, the time of supply shall get triggered at the moment
    when the appropriation towards a particular customer takes place.

7.  However, in case of intangible
goods, since the question of movement does not arise, in such cases the time of
supply shall be the date when the transfer takes place. For instance, in a
transaction involving permanent transfer of copyrights, time of supply shall be
the date when the transfer is executed, i.e., when the ownership of the rights
is transferred as per the provisions of the Copyright Act.

 

PROVISION OF SERVICE – ISSUES


8.  However,
the issue arises in the case of services since the triggering of time of supply
is predominantly based on completion of provision of service. However, what is
meant by completion of provision of service is a subjective issue and has its
own set of implications as discussed below:



  •    Method of accounting – it is possible that
    the supplier of service would be required to recognise revenue on accrual
    basis; however, the provision of service may not have been completed. It is
    possible that the Department may treat that the accrual is on account of
    completion of service, without appreciating the fact that the service provision
    might not have been completed in toto and, therefore, the supplier is
    not in a position to issue invoice for claiming the amount from the recipient,
    though he may have been required to accrue the invoice as per the accounting
    standards.

  •    Client
    approval of work proof of completion of service – There are instances when the
    actual execution of service might have been completed, but the confirmation of
    the same by the client might be pending. For instance, in case of contractors
    there is an industry practice of lodging a claim with their principal by
    raising a Running Account Bill which contains the detail of work done by the
    contractors, which would be then certified by the principal for its correctness
    and based on the certification alone would payment be made to the contractor.
    In such cases (assuming this is not classifiable as continuous supply of
    services), the question that arises is whether the completion of service shall
    be on raising the RA bill or when the same is approved by the client? The
    answer to this question can be derived from the CBEC Circular 144 of 2011 dated
    18.07.2011 which was issued in the context of Point of Taxation Rules, 2011
    under the erstwhile service tax regime and clarified as under:




2. These representations have been examined. The
Service Tax Rules, 1994 require that invoice should be issued within a period
of 14 days from the completion of the taxable service. The invoice needs to
indicate inter alia the value of service so completed. Thus it is important
to identify the service so completed. This would include not only the physical
part of providing the service but also the completion of all other auxiliary
activities that enable the service provider to be in a position to issue the
invoice. Such auxiliary activities could include activities like measurement, quality
testing, etc., which may be essential prerequisites for identification of
completion of service. The test for the determination whether a service has
been completed would be the completion of all the related activities that place
the service provider in a situation to be able to issue an invoice.

However, such activities do not include flimsy or irrelevant grounds for delay
in issuance of invoice.

 

CASES WHERE INVOICE HAS NOT BEEN ISSUED BUT
RECEIPT OF SERVICE ACCOUNTED BY RECIPIENT


9.  A specific anomaly lies in
section 13 (2). Clauses (a) and (b) thereof provide for determination of time
of supply of service where the invoice has been issued within the prescribed
time limit or not issued within the prescribed time limit. In other words,
these two scenarios can be there in any supply. However, clause (c) further
introduces a new scenario where neither clause (a) nor (b) applies. Clause (c)
deals with a situation wherein the recipient has accounted for receipt of
service. The question that therefore arises is whether the recipient accounting
for receipt of service can be a basis to say that the provision of service has
been completed? There can be cases where the recipient has merely provided for
expenses on accrual basis, though the service provision may not be completed.

 

TIME OF SUPPLY – CONTINUOUS SUPPLY


10. However, the above general rule
for cases covered under forward charge mechanism will not be applicable in
cases where the supply is classifiable as continuous supply of goods / services
as defined u/s. 2. and reproduced below for ready reference:

 

Continuous supply of goods

Continuous supply of services

(32) “continuous supply of goods” means a supply of
goods which is provided, or agreed to be provided, continuously or on
recurrent basis, under a contract, whether or not by means of a wire, cable,
pipeline or other conduit, and for which the supplier invoices the recipient
on a regular or periodic basis and includes supply of such goods as the
government may, subject to such conditions as it may deem fit, by
notification specify;

(33) “continuous supply of services” means a supply of
services which is provided, or agreed to be provided, continuously or on
recurrent basis, under a contract, for a period exceeding three months with
periodic payment obligations and includes supply of such services as the
government may, subject to such conditions as it may deem fit, by
notification specify;

 

 

11. The question that therefore
arises from the above, is what shall be covered within the purview of
continuous supply? In the view of the authors, what would classify as
continuous supply would be instances where the supply of goods / service is
continuous in the sense that whenever the recipient, say, starts his stove, the
goods are available. Similarly, renting of immovable property service would
also qualify as continuous supply since the service is continuous in nature.

 

12. On the other hand, recurrent
supply would mean a supply which is provided in the same form over and over
again, but not on a continuous basis. For instance, a GST consultant has agreed
to file the returns of his client on a monthly basis. This would classify as
recurrent service which the consultant keeps on providing over a period of time
and therefore classified as being in the nature of continuous supply.
Similarly, even in the context of goods, there can be examples of recurrent
supply. A mineral water supplier supplying two bottles of water on a daily
basis is an example of recurrent supply. All such supplies shall qualify as
continuous supply and accordingly the time limit for issuance of invoice shall
be as follows:

In case of
continuous supply of goods

In case of
continuous supply of services

Section 31 (4):

Where successive statements of accounts or successive
payments are involved, the invoice shall be issued before or at the time when
such successive statements are issued or each such payment is received.

Section 31 (5):

Invoice shall be
issued:

  •    Where
    due date of payment is ascertainable from the contract – on or before the due
    date of payment.
  •    Where
    due date of payment is not ascertainable from the contract – before or at the
    time when the supplier receives the payment.
  •    Where
    payment is linked to completion of an event – on or before the date of
    completion of event.

 

 

TIME OF SUPPLY – REVERSE CHARGE CASES


13. Sections 12 (3) and 13 (3) deal
with the provisions relating to time of supply in cases where reverse charge
mechanism is applicable. The relevant provisions are tabulated below for ready
reference:

 

Time of supply in
case of supply of goods

Time of supply in
case of supply of services

Section 12 (3):

The time of supply shall be earliest of:

  •     Date of receipt
    of goods.
  •     Date of payment
    as entered in the books of accounts of the recipient or the date on which the
    payment is debited in the books of account.
  •     Date
    immediately following 30 days from the date of issue of invoice or any other
    document by the supplier.

 

If time of supply cannot be determined as per the above,
the same shall be the date of entry in the books of accounts of the recipient
of supply.

Section 13 (3):

The time of supply shall be earliest of:

  •     Date of payment
    as entered in the books of accounts of the recipient or the date on which the
    payment is debited in the books of account.
  •     Date
    immediately following 60 days from the date of issue of invoice or any other
    document by the supplier.

 

If time of supply cannot be determined as per the above,
the same shall be the date of entry in the books of accounts of the recipient
of supply or date of payment, whichever is earlier.

 

Further in case of supply by associated enterprises
located outside India, the time of supply shall be the date of entry in the
books of accounts of recipient / date of payment, whichever is earlier.

 

 

CASES WHERE THERE IS A DELAY IN ACCOUNTING
THE INVOICE


14. At times, it so happens that the
recipient receives the invoice after the lapse of the prescribed time limit,
thus resulting in delay in accounting such invoices as well as discharge of
liability. In such cases, the question that arises is whether there is a delay
in accounting the invoice on account of factors beyond the control of the
recipient; for instance, in non-receipt of invoice within the prescribed time
limit, can interest liability be triggered for late payment of tax? In this
regard it is important to note that the provisions of section 12 (3) as well as
section 13 (3) clearly provide for triggering of liability upon completion of
the event, without any scope of exception.

 

Therefore, on a literal reading of the provisions, it is evident that interest
would be payable in such instances.

15. However, a contrary view can be
taken that the provision imposes a condition on the recipient which cannot be
fulfilled. It can be argued that the principle of lex non cogitadimpossibilia
is triggered, i.e., an agreement to do an impossible act is void and is not
enforceable by law. This principle has been accepted in the context of indirect
taxes as well1. Based on the same, it can be argued that since on
the date of expiry of 30 / 60 days period the invoice itself was not available
with the recipient, it was not possible for him to discharge the tax liability
and therefore it cannot be said that the recipient has failed to make payment
of tax and is therefore liable to pay interest.

 

TIME OF SUPPLY IN CASE OF VOUCHERS


16. The term voucher has been
defined u/s. 2 (118) to mean

“an instrument where there is an obligation to
accept it as consideration or part consideration for a supply of goods or
services or both and where the goods or services or both to be supplied or the
identities of their potential suppliers are either indicated on the instrument
itself or in related documentation, including the terms and conditions of use
of such instrument”.

 

17. Vouchers are generally
classified as Prepaid Instruments and are governed by the Payment &
Settlement Systems Act, 2007 read with RBI Circular DPSS/2017-18/58 dated
11.10.2017 wherein it has been provided that there can be two type of vouchers,
namely:

 

  •    Closed System PPI – wherein the voucher is
    issued directly by the supplier (for example, recharge coupons issued by
    telecoms, DTHs, etc.) for facilitating the supply of their own goods /
    services. In fact, closed system PPI can be used for specific purposes only.
    For instance, hotel vouchers issued by various hotel brands can be used for
    availing specific service that would be mentioned on the voucher only;
  •    Semi-closed System PPI – wherein the voucher
    is issued by a system provider which can be used by the voucher holder to
    purchase goods / services from suppliers who are registered as system
    participant (for example, Sodexo, Ticket Restaurant® Meal Card, etc.). Such
    semi-closed system PPI can be used for procuring any supplies that the system
    participant would be making. For example, Sodexo voucher can be used for buying
    food-grains as well as vegetables from the system participant.

18. In view of this distinct nature
of the vouchers, depending on the nature of voucher and the underlying
deliverable from the voucher, the time of supply provisions have been prescribed
as under:

 

In case the voucher
is consumed / to be consumed towards procuring goods

In case the voucher
is consumed / to be consumed towards procuring services

The time of supply,
if voucher used / to be used for supply of goods shall be:

  •     If
    underlying supply is identifiable at the time of supply of voucher, the date
    of issue of voucher.
  •     In
    other cases, the date of redemption of voucher.

The time of supply,
if voucher used / to be used for supply of service shall be:

  •     If
    underlying supply is identifiable at the time of supply of voucher, the date
    of issue of voucher.
  •     In
    other cases, the date of redemption of voucher.

 

 

TIME OF SUPPLY – RESIDUARY PROVISIONS


19.     Further,
sections 12 (5) and 13 (5) provide that in case the time of supply of goods /
services is not determinable under any of the above sections, the same shall be
determined as under:

  •    If periodical return is to be filed, the date
    on which such return is to be filed.
  •    Else, the date on which tax is paid.

20. In addition, sections 12 (6) and
13 (6) provides that the time of supply in case of addition in value of supply
on account of interest, late fee or penalty for delayed payment of
consideration received from customer, shall be at the time of receipt of such
amount and not at the time of claiming the same from the customer.

 

TIME OF SUPPLY – TAX ON ADVANCES


21. Sections 12 (2) as well as 13
(2) provide that in case the earliest event is the date of receipt of payment,
in such a scenario tax shall be payable at the time of receipt of such advance
consideration. However, it has to be noted that such advance payment has to
pass the test of consideration, as per the definition provided u/s. 2 (31)
which is reproduced below for ready reference:

 

(31) “consideration” in relation to the supply of goods or services
or both includes —

 

(a) any payment made or to be made, whether in
money or otherwise, in respect of, in response to, or for the inducement of,
the supply of goods or services or both, whether by the recipient or by any
other person but shall not include any subsidy given by the Central government
or a State government;

(b) the monetary value of any act or forbearance,
in respect of, in response to, or for the inducement of, the supply of goods or
services or both, whether by the recipient or by any other person but shall not
include any subsidy given by the Central government or a State government:

 

Provided that a deposit given in respect of the
supply of goods or services or both shall not be considered as payment made for
such supply unless the supplier applies such deposit as consideration for the
said supply.

 

22. From the above, it is more than
evident that for any payment received to be considered as supply, it has to be
in relation to the supply of goods or service. If such relation cannot be
established, the payment would not partake the character of consideration and
therefore tax would not be payable on the same. In fact, in the context of
service tax, the Mumbai Bench of the Tribunal has in the case of Thermax
Instrumentation Limited vs. CCE [2017 (51) STR 263]
held as under:



8. In the present case the advance is like earnest
money for which a bank guarantee is given by the appellant. It is a fact that
the customer can invoke the bank guarantee at any time and take back the
advance. Hence the appellant does not show the advance as an income, not
having complete dominion over the amount, and therefore, the same cannot be
treated as a consideration for any service provided.
Therefore, the
findings lack appreciation of the complete facts and evidences (only relevant
extracts).

 

23. It is also pertinent to note
that proviso to sections 12 (2) as well as 13 (2) provide that if a supplier
receives an excess payment up to Rs. 1,000 in excess of the amount indicated in
the tax invoice, the time of supply of such excess payment shall be the date of
issue of invoice in respect of such excess payment, at the option of the
supplier.

24. However, it is important to note
that the tax payable on receipt of advance for supply of goods has been
exempted vide notification 40/2017 – CT dated 13.10.2017 for taxable person having
aggregate turnover not exceeding Rs. 1.5 crore. The same has been further
extended to all taxable persons vide notification 66/2017 – CT dated
15.11.2017.

 

TIME OF SUPPLY – IN CASE OF CHANGE IN RATE OF
TAX


25. Section 14 deals with the
provisions relating to determination of time of supply in cases where there is
a change in the rate of tax in respect of goods / services / both based on the
following:

 

Provision of Service

Issuance of Invoice

Receipt of Payment

Effective tax rate
as applicable on

Before change in tax
rate

After change in tax
rate

After change in tax
rate

The date of invoice
or payment, whichever is earlier

Before change in tax
rate

Before change in tax
rate

After change in tax
rate

The date of invoice

Before change in tax
rate

After change in tax
rate

Before change in tax
rate

The date of receipt
of payment

After change in tax
rate

Before change in tax
rate

After change in tax
rate

The date of receipt
of payment

After change in tax
rate

Before change in tax
rate

Before change in tax
rate

The date of invoice
or payment, whichever is earlier

After change in tax
rate

After change in tax
rate

Before change in tax
rate

The date of invoice

 

 

26. However, it is important to note
that the above table will apply only in case where there is a change in rate of
tax or a supply which was earlier exempted becomes taxable and  vice versa. This position has been
settled under the pre-GST regime in the case of Wallace Flour Mills Company
Limited vs. CCE [1989 (44) ELT 598 (SC)]
wherein the Court held that if at
the time of manufacturing, goods were exempted but the same was withdrawn
during removal, they would be liable to duty on the date of their removal.

27. However, the above cannot be
applied in case an activity which was not classifiable as supply is made liable
to tax in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector
of Central Excise vs. Vazir Sultan Tobacco Company Limited [1996 (83) ELT 3
(SC)]
wherein the Court held that once the levy is not there at the time
when the goods are manufactured or produced in India, it cannot be levied at
the stage of removal of the said goods.

 

CONCLUSION


28. Under the pre-GST regime, the
tax payers were saddled with multiple provisions relating to levy and
collection. The same situation continues even under the GST regime, with levy
being consolidated into a single event of supply and the collection provisions
continue to be complicated with distinct provisions prescribed for goods as
well as services.

29.          Failure to comply with the collection
provisions may not only expose the taxable person to interest u/s. 51 in case
of self-determination of such non-compliance, but may also expose them to
recovery actions u/s. 73 if action is initiated by the tax authorities.
Therefore, all taxable persons will have to be careful while dealing with the
provisions relating to time of supply of goods and / or services to avoid such
consequences.

THE FUGITIVE ECONOMIC OFFENDERS ACT, 2018 – AN OVERVIEW – PART 2

In Part 1 of the
article published in the April, 2019 issue of the Journal, we have covered the
need and rationale for the FEO Act, an overview of the Act and the Rules framed
thereunder, and various aspects relating to a Fugitive Economic Offender.

 

In this
concluding Part 2 of the article, we have attempted to give an overview of some
of the remaining important aspects of The Fugitive Economic Offenders Act, 2018
[the FEO Act or the Act].

 

1.  SCHEDULED OFFENCES


Section
2(1)(m) of the Act defines the Scheduled Offences as follows:

 

(m) “Scheduled Offence” means an offence specified
in the Schedule, if the total value involved in such offence or offences is
one hundred crore rupees or more;”

 

The Schedule
to the Act lists out offences under 15 different enactments and 56 different
sections/sub-sections. The Schedule of the FEO Act is given in the Annexure to
this article for ready reference.

 

The Schedule covers offences under the Indian
Penal Code, 1860; Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Reserve Bank of India  Act, 1934; Central Excise Act, 1944; Customs
Act, 1962; Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988; Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988; Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992;
Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002; Limited Liability Partnership Act,
2008; Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 2010; Companies Act, 2013; Black
Money (Undisclosed Foreign Income and Assets) and Imposition of Tax Act, 2015;
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; and Central Goods and Services Tax Act,
2017.

 

It is
pertinent to note that the aforesaid list of 15 enactments does not include the
offences under the Income-tax Act, 1961, though it includes offences under the
Black Money Act, PMLA and the Benami Act.

 

In order to
ensure that courts are not overburdened with such cases, only those cases
where the total value involved in such offences is Rs. 100 crore or more

are covered within the purview of the FEO Act.

 

2.  DECLARATION OF AN INDIVIDUAL AS AN FEO


Section 12(1)
of the Act provides that after hearing the application u/s. 4, if the Special
Court is satisfied that an individual is a fugitive economic offender (FEO), it
may, by an order, declare the individual as an FEO for reasons to be recorded
in writing. The order declaring an individual as an FEO has to be a speaking
order.

 

Section 16
deals with rules of evidence. Section 16(3) of the Act provides that the
standard of proof applicable to the determination of facts by the Special Court
under the Act shall be preponderance of probabilities. Preponderance of
probabilities means such proof that satisfies the Special Court that a certain
fact is true rather than the reverse. The proof of beyond reasonable doubt
applicable to criminal law is not applicable in case of the FEO Act.

 

3.  CONSEQUENCES OF AN INDIVIDUAL BEING DECLARED AS AN FEO

3.1  Confiscation
of Property

3.1.1  Section 12(2) of the Act provides that on a
declaration u/s. 12(1) as an FEO, the Special Court may order that any of the
following properties stand confiscated by the Central government:

 

(a)  the proceeds of crime in India or abroad,
whether or not such property is owned by the FEO; and

(b)  any other property or benami property in
India or abroad owned
by the FEO.

Article 2(g)
of the UNCAC defines confiscation as follows: “Confiscation”, which includes
forfeiture where applicable, shall mean the permanent deprivation of property
by order of a court or other competent authority. It results in the change of
ownership and property vesting in the government, which is irreversible unless
the individual declared as an FEO succeeds in appeal.

 

Section
2(1)(k) defines proceeds of crime as follows:

 

“proceeds
of crime” means any property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly,
by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a Scheduled Offence,
or the value of any such property, or where such property is taken or
held outside the country, then the property equivalent in value held within the
country or abroad.

 

The fact that
the benami property of an FEO can be confiscated shows that section 12(2)
emphasises de facto ownership rather than de jure ownership.

 

3.1.2  Section 21 of the FEO Act provides that the
provisions of the Act shall have effect, notwithstanding anything inconsistent
therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force. Section 22
provides that the provisions of the Act shall be in addition to and not in
derogation of any other law for the time being in force.

 

A question
arises for consideration as to whether adjudication under Prohibition of the
Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988 [Benami Act] is necessary for
confiscation of the benami property of the FEO. From the aforesaid provisions,
it appears that if the alleged FEO does not return to India and submit himself
to the Indian legal system, the Special Court can order confiscation of benami
properties of the FEO after adjudicating whether property is benami property
owned by the FEO or not.

 

It is
important to note that adjudication and confiscation of benami property under
the Benami Act will apply when the individual returns to India and submits
himself to the Indian legal process.

 

The
confiscation of benami property under the FEO Act will apply when an individual
evades Indian law and is declared an FEO and consequently confiscation is
ordered by the Special Court.

 

It is
important to note that the adjudication and confiscation under the Benami Act
would cover only benami property in India, whereas under the FEO Act benami
property abroad of the FEO can also be confiscated.

 

3.1.3  Section 12(3) of the Act provides that the
confiscation order of the Special Court shall, to the extent possible, identify
the properties in India or abroad that constitute proceeds of crime which
are to be confiscated
and in case such properties cannot be identified,
quantify the value of the proceeds of crime.

 

Section 12(4)
of the Act provides that the confiscation order of the Special Court shall separately
list any other property owned
by the FEO in India which is to be
confiscated.

 

3.1.4  As pointed out in para 2.1 of Part 1 of the
article, the non-conviction-based asset confiscation for corruption-related
cases is enabled under provisions of the UNCAC. The FEO Act adopts the said
principle and accordingly it is not necessary that the FEO should be
convicted for any of the scheduled offences
for which an arrest warrant was
issued by any court in India.

 

3.1.5  A further question arises as to whether
confiscation can be reversed if the FEO returns to India and submits himself to
the court to face proceedings covered by his arrest warrant. The answer appears
to be “No”, as once an individual is declared an FEO and his assets are
confiscated, his return to India will not reverse the declaration or the
confiscation.

 

3.2  Disentitlement
of the FEO as well as his Companies, LLPs and Firms to defend civil claims

Section 14 of the Act provides that
notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in
force,

 

(a)  on a declaration of an individual as an FEO,
any court or tribunal in India, in any civil proceeding before it, may disallow
such individual from putting forward or defending any civil claim; and

(b)  any court or tribunal in India in any civil
proceeding before it, may disallow any company or LLP from putting forward or
defending any civil claim, if an individual filing the claim on behalf of the
company or the LLP, or any promoter or key managerial personnel or majority
shareholder of the company or an individual having a controlling interest in
the LLP, has been declared an FEO.

 

3.3 Individual found to be not an FEO

Section 12(9)
of the Act provides that where, on the conclusion of the proceedings, the
Special Court finds that the individual is not an FEO, the Special Court shall
order release of property or records attached or seized under the Act to the
person entitled to receive it.

 

4.  POWERS OF AUTHORITIES

4.1  Power
of Survey

Section 7 of
the FEO Act contains the provisions relating to power of survey. It appears
that power of survey may be exercised at any time before or after filing an
application u/s. 4 for declaration as an FEO.

 

Section 7(1)
provides that —

 

  •     notwithstanding anything
    contained in any other provisions of the FEO Act,
  •     where a director or any
    other officer authorised by the director,
  •     on the basis of material in
    his possession,
  •     has reason to believe (the
    reasons for such belief to be recorded in writing),
  •     that an individual may be
    an FEO,
  •     he may enter any place –

(i)   within the limits of the area assigned to
him; or

(ii)   in respect of which he is authorised for the
purposes of section 7, by such other authority who is assigned the area within
which such place is situated.

 

Section 7(2)
provides that if it is necessary to enter any place as mentioned in s/s. (1),
the director or any other officer authorised by him may request any proprietor,
employee or any other person who may be present at that time, to – (a) afford
him the necessary facility to inspect such records as he may require and which
may be available at such place; (b) afford him the necessary facility to check
or verify the proceeds of crime or any transaction related to proceeds of crime
which may be found therein; and (c) furnish such information as he may require
as to any matter which may be useful for, or relevant to, any proceedings under
the Act.

 

Section 7(3)
provides that the director, or any other officer acting u/s. 7 may (i) place
marks of identification on the records inspected by him and make or cause to be
made extracts or copies therefrom; (ii) make an inventory of any property
checked or verified by him; and (iii) record the statement of any person
present at the property which may be useful for, or relevant to, any proceeding
under the Act.

 

4.2  Power
of Search and Seizure

Section 8 of
the Act and Fugitive Economic Offenders (Procedure for Conducting Search and
Seizure) Rules, 2018 contain the relevant provisions and procedure to be
followed in respect of search and seizure.

 

Section 8(1)
of the Act provides that:

 

Notwithstanding
anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, where the
director or any other officer not below the rank of deputy director authorised
by him for the purposes of this section, on the basis of information in his
possession, has reason to believe (the reason for such belief to be recorded in
writing) that any person –

 

(i)   may be declared as an FEO;

(ii)   is in possession of any proceeds of crime;

(iii)  is in possession of any records which may
relate to proceeds of crime; or

(iv)  is in possession of any property related to
proceeds of crime,

then, subject
to any rules made in this behalf, he may authorise any officer subordinate to
him to —

 

(a)  enter and search any building, place, vessel,
vehicle or aircraft where he has reason to suspect that such records or
proceeds of crime are kept;

(b)  break open the lock of any door, box, locker,
safe, almirah or other receptacle for exercising the powers conferred by
clause (a) where the keys thereof are not available;

(c)  seize any record or property found as a result
of such search;

(d)  place marks of identification on such record
or property, if required, or make or cause to be made extracts or copies
therefrom;

(e)  make a note or an inventory of such record or
property; and

(f)   examine on oath any person who is found to be
in possession or control of any record or property, in respect of all matters
relevant for the purposes of any investigation under the FEO Act.

 

Section 8(2)
of the Act provides that where an authority, upon information obtained during
survey u/s. 7, is satisfied that any evidence shall be or is likely to be
concealed or tampered with, he may, for reasons to be recorded in writing,
enter and search the building or place where such evidence is located and seize
that evidence.

 

4.3  Power
of Search of Persons

Section 9 of
the Act contains provisions relating to power of search of persons and it
provides as follows:

(a)  if an
authority, authorised in this behalf by the Central government by general or
special order, has reason to believe (the reason for such belief to be recorded
in writing) that any person has secreted about his person or anything under his
possession, ownership or control, any record or proceeds of crime which may be
useful for or relevant to any proceedings under the Act, he may search that
person and seize such record or property which may be useful for or relevant to
any proceedings under the Act;

(b)  where an authority is about to search any
person, he shall, if such person so requires, take such person within
twenty-four hours to the nearest Gazetted Officer, superior in rank to him, or
a Magistrate. The period of twenty-four hours shall exclude the time necessary
for the journey undertaken to take such person to the nearest Gazetted Officer,
superior in rank to him, or the Magistrate’s Court;

(c)  if the requisition under clause (b) is
made, the authority shall not detain the person for more than twenty-four hours
prior to taking him before the Gazetted Officer, superior in rank to him, or
the Magistrate referred to in that clause. The period of twenty-four hours
shall exclude the time necessary for the journey from the place of detention to
the office of the Gazetted Officer, superior in rank to him, or the
Magistrate’s Court;

(d)  the Gazetted Officer or the Magistrate before
whom any such person is brought shall, if he sees no reasonable ground for
search, forthwith discharge such person but otherwise shall direct that search
be made;

(e)  before making the search under clause (a)
or clause (d), the authority shall call upon two or more persons to
attend and witness the search and the search shall be made in the presence of such
persons;

(f)   the authority shall prepare a list of records
or property seized in the course of the search and obtain the signatures of the
witnesses on the list;

(g)  no female shall be searched by anyone except a
female; and

(h)  the authority shall record the statement of
the person searched under clause (a) or clause (d) in respect of
the records or proceeds of crime found or seized in the course of the search.

 

5. CONCLUDING REMARKS

In response
to unstarred question No. 3198, the Minister of State in the Ministry of
External Affairs on 14-03-18 answered in the Parliament that as per the list
provided by the Directorate of Enforcement, New Delhi, 12 persons involved in
cases under investigation by the Directorate of Enforcement are reported to
have absconded from India who include Vijay Mallya, Nirav Modi, Mehul Choksi
and others. In addition, as per the list provided by the CBI, New Delhi, 31
businessmen, including the aforementioned Vijay Mallya, Nirav Modi and Mehul
Choksi are absconding abroad in CBI cases.

 

It is hoped
that the stringent provisions of the FEO Act creating a deterrent effect would
certainly help the government in compelling FEOs to come back to India and
submit themselves to the jurisdiction of courts in India.

Annexure

THE SCHEDULE

[See section 2(l) and (m)]

Section

Description of offence

I.

Offences under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860)

 

120B read with any offence in this Schedule

Punishment of criminal conspiracy.

 

255

Counterfeiting Government stamp.

 

257

Making or selling instrument for counterfeiting Government
stamp.

 

258

Sale of counterfeit Government stamp.

 

259

Having possession of counterfeit Government stamp.

 

260

Using as genuine a Government stamp known to be counterfeit.

 

417

Punishment for cheating.

 

418

Cheating with knowledge that wrongful loss may ensue to
person whose interest offender is bound to protect.

 

420

Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property.

 

421

Dishonest or fraudulent removal or concealment of property to
prevent distribution among creditors.

 

422

Dishonestly or fraudulently preventing debt being available
for creditors.

 

423

Dishonest or fraudulent execution of deed of transfer
containing false statement of consideration.

 

424

Dishonest or fraudulent removal or concealment of property.

 

467

Forgery of valuable security, will, etc.

 

471

Using as genuine a forged [document or electronic record].

 

472

Making or possessing counterfeit seal, etc., with intent to
commit forgery punishable u/s. 467.

 

473

Making or possessing counterfeit seal, etc., with intent to
commit forgery punishable otherwise.

 

475

Counterfeiting device or mark used for authenticating
documents described in section 467, or possessing counterfeit marked
material.

 

476

Counterfeiting device or mark used for authenticating
documents other than those described in section 467, or possessing
counterfeit marked material.

 

481

Using a false property mark.

 

482

Punishment for using a false property mark.

 

483

Counterfeiting a property mark used by another.

 

484

Counterfeiting a mark used by a public servant.

 

485

Making or possession of any instrument for counterfeiting a
property mark.

 

486

Selling goods marked with a counterfeit property mark.

 

487

Making a false mark upon any receptacle containing goods.

 

488

Punishment for making use of any such false mark.

 

489A

Counterfeiting currency notes or bank notes.

 

489B

Using as genuine, forged or counterfeit currency notes or
bank notes.

II.

Offences under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of
1881)

 

138

Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the
account.

III.

Offences under the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 (2 of
1934)

 

58B

Penalties.

IV.

Offences under the Central Excise Act, 1944 (1 of 1944)

 

9

Offences and Penalties.

V.

Offences under the Customs Act, 1962 (52 of 1962)

 

135

Evasion of duty or prohibitions.

VI.

Offences under the Prohibition of Benami Property
Transactions Act, 1988 (45 of 1988)

 

3

Prohibition of benami transactions.

VII.

Offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of
1988)

 

7

Public servant taking gratification other than legal
remuneration in respect of an official act.

 

8

Taking gratification in order, by corrupt or illegal means,
to influence public servant.

 

9

Taking gratification for exercise of personal influence with
public servant.

 

10

Punishment for abetment by public servant of offences defined
in section 8 or section 9 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

 

13

Criminal misconduct by a public servant.

VIII.

Offences under the Securities and Exchange Board of India
Act, 1992 (15 of 1992)

 

12A read with section 24

Prohibition of manipulative and deceptive devices, insider
trading and substantial acquisition of securities or control.

 

24

Offences for contravention of the provisions of the Act.

IX.

Offences under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002
(15 of 2003)

 

3

Offence of money-laundering.

 

4

Punishment for money-laundering.

X.

Offences under the Limited Liability Partnership Act, 2008 (6
of 2009)

 

Sub-section (2) of section 30

Carrying on business with intent or purpose to defraud
creditors of the Limited Liability Partnership or any other person or for any
other fraudulent purpose.

XI.

Offences under the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act,
2010 (42 of 2010)

 

34

Penalty for article or currency or security obtained in
contravention of section 10.

 

35

Punishment for contravention of any provision of the Act.

XII.

Offences under the Companies Act, 2013 (18 of 2013)

 

Sub-section (4) of section 42 of the Companies Act, 2013 read
with section 24 of the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 (15
of 1992)

Offer or invitation for subscription of securities on private
placement.

 

74

Repayment of deposits, etc., accepted before commencement of
the Companies Act, 2013.

 

76A

Punishment for contravention of section 73 or section 76 of
the Companies Act, 2013.

 

Second proviso to sub-section (4) of section 206

Carrying on business of a company for a fraudulent or
unlawful purpose.

 

Clause (b) of section 213

Conducting the business of a company with intent to defraud
its creditors, members or any other persons or otherwise for a fraudulent or
unlawful purpose, or in a manner oppressive to any of its members or that the
company was formed for any fraudulent or unlawful purpose.

 

447

Punishment for fraud.

 

452

Punishment for wrongful withholding of property.

XIII.

Offences under the Black Money (Undisclosed Foreign Income
and Assets) and Imposition of Tax Act, 2015 (22 of 2015)

 

51

Punishment for wilful attempt to evade tax.

XIV.

Offences under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (31
of 2016)

 

69

Punishment for transactions defrauding creditors.

XV.

Offences under the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017
(12 of 2017)

 

Sub-section (5) of section 132

Punishment for certain offences.  

 

 

Ind AS ACCOUNTING IMPLICATIONS FROM SUPREME COURT RULING ON PROVIDENT FUND

For many small entities,
the Supreme Court (SC) order will have a crippling effect at a time when they
are already suffering the blow of demonetisation. The ruling may also trigger a
whole litigious environment not only on Provident Fund (PF), but also around
other labour legislation such as bonus, gratuity, pension, etc. This article
deals only with the limited issue of accounting and disclosure under Ind AS
arising from the SC ruling on PF. Entities are required to do their own legal
evaluation or seek legal advice and consider an appropriate course of action.

 

BACKGROUND

Under the PF Act, the PF
contributions are required to be calculated on the following:

 

  •    Basic wages;
  •    Dearness allowance;
  •    Retaining allowance; and
  •    Cash value of any food
    concession.

 

An allowance like city
compensatory allowance, which is paid to compensate/neutralise the cost of
living, will be in the nature of dearness allowance on which PF contributions
are to be paid u/s. 6 of the EPF Act.

 

The term ‘basic wages’ is
defined to mean all emoluments which are earned by an employee in accordance
with the terms of contract of employment and which are paid or payable in cash,
but does not include the following:



  •    Cash value of any food
    concession;
  •    Dearness allowance, house
    rent allowance, overtime allowance, bonus, commission or any other similar
    allowance payable in respect of employment;
  •    Present made by the
    employer.

 

Multiple appeals were
pending before the SC on the interpretation of definition of ‘basic wages’ and
whether or not various allowances are covered under its definition for
calculation of PF contributions. The Court pronounced its ruling on 28th
February, 2019 on whether various allowances such as conveyance allowance,
special allowance, education allowance, medical allowance, etc. paid by an
employer to its employees fall under the definition of ‘basic wages’ for
calculation of PF contributions. It ruled that allowances of the following
nature are excluded from ‘basic wages’ and are not subject to PF contributions:



  •    Allowances which are
    variable in nature; or
  •    Allowances which are
    linked to any incentive for production resulting in greater output by an
    employee; or
  •    Allowances which are not
    paid across the board to all employees in a particular category; or
  •    Allowances which are paid
    especially to those who avail the opportunity, viz., extra work, additional
    time, etc.

 

The SC placed reliance on
the following rulings:

 

  •    Bridge and Roof Co.
    (India) Ltd. vs. Union of India
    – The crucial test for coverage of allowances
    under the definition of ‘basic wages’ is one of universality. If an allowance
    is paid universally in a particular category, then it must form part of ‘basic
    wages’. It also held that the production bonus which is paid based on
    individual performance does not constitute ‘basic wages’.

 

  •    Muir Mills Co. Ltd. vs.
    Its Workmen
    – Any variable earning which may vary from individual to
    individual according to their efficiency and diligence will be excluded from
    the definition of ‘basic wages’.

 

  •    Manipal Academy of
    Higher Education vs. PF Commissioner
    – A component which is universally,
    necessarily and ordinarily paid to all across the board is included. The
    question was whether the amount received on encashment of earned leave has to
    be reckoned as ‘basic wages’. The Court answered the query in the negative and
    held that ‘basic wages’ never intended to include the amount received for leave
    encashment. It held that the test to be applied is one of universality. In the
    case of encashment of leave, the option may be available to all the employees,
    but some may avail of it and some may not. That does not satisfy the test of
    universality.

 

  •  Kichha Sugar Company Limited through General Manager vs. Tarai
    Chini Mill Majdoor Union, Uttarakhand
    – The dictionary meaning of ‘basic
    wages’ is a rate of pay for a standard work period exclusive of such additional
    payments as bonuses and overtime.

 

Employers paid various
allowances such as travel allowance, canteen allowance, special allowance,
management allowance, conveyance allowance, education allowance, medical
allowance, special holidays, night shift incentives and city compensatory
allowance to their employees. Most employers have not considered these cash
allowances as part of ‘basic wages’ for calculation of PF contributions.
Consequently, many employers will suffer huge financial and administrative
burden to comply with the SC order.

 

INTERIM ACCOUNTING GUIDANCE
ON PF MATTER


For the
year ended 31st March, 2019 in Ind AS financial statements (and
Indian GAAP), should a provision on the incremental PF contribution be made
prospectively or retrospectively?

 

The SC ruling has clarified
the term ‘basic wages’, but has created huge uncertainties around the following
issues:



  •    From which date will the
    order apply?
  •    Whether HRA that is paid
    across the board to all employees should be included or excluded from ‘basic
    wages’?
  •    For past periods, whether
    employer’s liability is restricted to its own contribution or will also include
    the employees’ contribution, in accordance with the PF Act?
  •    A review petition has been
    filed in the SC by Surya Roshni Ltd., raising several issues. What will
    be the outcome of this petition?
  •    What is the impact of the
    SC order on employees drawing ‘basic wages’ greater than Rs. 15,000?
  •    How will the order be
    complied with for employers using contract labour?

 

A very vital aspect will
arise for the consideration of the employers and the PF authorities as to the
date from which the judgement should be made effective. It will all depend upon
the position to be taken by the PF authorities and the position taken by the
employers. The SC only interprets the law and does not amend the law. The
interpretation laid down by the Hon’ble SC to any particular statutory
provisions shall always apply from the date the provision was introduced in the
statute book, unless it is a case of prospective overruling, i.e., the Court,
while interpreting the law, declares it to be operative only prospectively so
as to avoid reopening a settled issue. In the instant case, there is nothing on
record to even remotely suggest that the order pronounced by the Hon’ble SC is
prospective in its operation.

 

The PF law does not lay down
any limitation period and/or look back period for determination of dues u/s. 7A
of the EPF & MP Act, 1952. This may cause grave and undue hardship to the
employee as well as the employer if the demands for the prior period without
imputing a reasonable time limitation is sought to be recovered from the
employer. Therefore, in the event any differential contribution is sought to be
recovered from employers by the PF authorities, the employers may press the
plea of undue hardship to salvage and/or limit their liability for the prior
period by referring to the decision of the Hon’ble SC rendered in the case of Shri
Mahila Griha Udyog Lijjat Papad vs. Union of India & Ors. reported in 2000
.

 

Alternatively, it can also
be argued that the employers in any event cannot be saddled with the liability
to pay the employees’ contribution for the retrospective period given that the
employer has no right to deduct the same from the future wages payable to the
employees as held by the Hon’ble SC in the case of District Exhibitors
Association, Muzaffarnagar & Ors. vs. Union of India reported in AIR (1991)
SC
. There is no settled jurisprudence on what would constitute a reasonable
period.

 

Given the uncertainty at
this juncture, it would be advisable for the employers to comply with the said
Judgement dated 28th February, 2019 prospectively, i.e., effectively
from 1st March, 2019 and thereafter, if any claims are made by the
PF authorities for the retrospective period, the same can be dealt with
appropriately having regard to the facts and circumstances of each case.

 

There is uncertainty on the
determination of the liability retrospectively, because theoretically there is
no limit on how much retrospective it can get, and can begin from the very
existence of the company or the beginning of the law. Additionally, the review
petition and the fact that the PF department will need to consider hardship
before finalising a circular to give effect to the SC order, is exacerbating
the uncertainty. Furthermore, companies are not required to retain accounts for
periods beyond certain years. In rare cases, when a liability cannot be
reliably estimated, Ind AS 37, paragraph 26 states as follows, “In the
extremely rare case, where no reliable estimate can be made, a liability exists
that cannot be recognised. That liability is disclosed as a contingent
liability.” This approach can be considered for the purposes of Ind AS (and
Indian GAAP) financial statements for the year ended 31st March,
2019.

 

It should also be noted
that there is little uncertainty that the order will at the least apply from 28th
February, 2019. Consequently, a provision for both employers’ and employees’
contribution for the month of March, 2019 along with likely interest should be
included in the provision. However, any provision for penalty at this stage may
be ignored. For the purposes of an accounting provision, HRA should be excluded
from ‘basic wages’ even if these are paid across the board to all employees,
because under the PF Act ‘basic wages’ excludes HRA. However, the SC order has
created uncertainty even on this issue and employers may take different
positions on this matter.

 

The above position will
remain dynamic and may change with further developments. The following note
should be included in the financial statements as a contingent liability:

 

“There are numerous
interpretative issues relating to the SC judgement on PF dated 28th
February, 2019. As a matter of caution, the company has made a provision on a
prospective basis from the date of the SC order. The company will update its
provision, on receiving further clarity on the subject.”

 

The above
note is a contingent liability and not a pending litigation. Therefore, this
matter should not be cross-referenced as a pending litigation in the main audit
report.

 

SHOULD
A PROVISION BE MADE FOR EMPLOYEES DRAWING SALARY ABOVE Rs. 15,000 PER MONTH,
SINCE PF DEDUCTION FOR THESE EMPLOYEES IS IN ANY CASE VOLUNTARY?


Domestic
workers with basic salary exceeding Rs. 15,000 per month may not get impacted
due to this ruling – where PF contributions are made by the employer on full
basic salary or on minimum Rs. 15,000 per month. Such domestic workers may be
covered under proviso to Para 26A of the PF Scheme. The SC has not dealt with
this aspect in its ruling. At the outset, it may be noted that the provisions
of the EPF Scheme do not, inter alia, apply to an employee whose pay
exceeds Rs. 15,000 per month. Such an employee is construed as an excluded
employee within the meaning of Para 2(f)(ii) of the EPF Scheme and an excluded
employee is not statutorily entitled to become a member of the statutory PF
under Para 26(1) of the EPF Scheme. Even if the membership of the PF is
extended to such an employee in terms of Para 26(6) of the EPF Scheme, the PF
contribution statutorily required to be made by the employer in respect of such
an employee is restricted to Rs. 15,000 per month in terms of the proviso to
Para 26-A(2) of the EPF Scheme.

 

Even otherwise, it is well
settled by the decision of the Hon’ble SC rendered in the case of Marathwada
Gramin Bank Karamchari Sanghatana & Ors. vs. Management of Marathwada
Gramin Bank & Ors.
that the employer cannot be compelled to pay the
amount in excess of its statutory liability for all times to come just because
the employer from its own trust has started paying PF in excess of its
statutory liability for some time. Therefore, no obligation can be cast upon the
employer to remit PF contributions in excess of its statutory liability under
the EPF Scheme. Having said that, the service regulation and/or contract of
employment entered into by the employer with the employees should not be
inconsistent and/or should not provide otherwise.

 

Another view is that the
employees in the workman category may demand the PF contributions on the
increased basic wages. If the demand is not met, they can raise an industrial
dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 for grant of such increase. In
the case of management staff, though they cannot take up the matter under the
Industrial Disputes Act, in law, they can enforce their right through a Civil
Court. Whether or not the bargaining staff or the management staff will demand
the enhanced basic wages is altogether a different matter, but in law they have
a right to raise a demand.

 

For the purposes of an
accounting provision, most employers will assess that Ind AS 37 does not
require a provision with respect to PF contributions for employees drawing
salary greater than Rs. 15,000 at this juncture, because the liability is
remote.
 

 

TDS – YEAR OF TAXABILITY AND CREDIT UNDER CASH SYSTEM OF ACCOUNTING

ISSUE FOR
CONSIDERATION


Section 145
requires the assessee to compute his income chargeable under the head “Profits
and gains of business or profession” or “Income from other sources” in
accordance with either cash or mercantile system of accounting, which is
regularly followed by the assessee. The assessee following cash system of
accounting would be offering to tax only those incomes which have been received
by him during the previous year. On the other hand, most of the provisions of
Chapter XVII-B provide for deduction of tax at source at the time of credit of
the relevant income or at the time of its payment, whichever is earlier.
Therefore, often tax gets deducted at source on the basis of the mercantile
system of accounting followed by the payer, which requires crediting of the
amount to the account of the assessee in his books of account. However, the
underlying amount on which the tax has been deducted at source is not
includible in the income of the assessee till such time as it has been received
by him.

 

Section 198
provides that all sums deducted in accordance with the provisions of Chapter
XVII shall be deemed to be income received, for the purposes of computing the
income of an assessee.

 

Till Assessment Year 2007-08, section 199 provided for grant of credit
for tax deducted at source to the assessee from income in the assessment made
for the assessment year for which such income is assessable. From Assessment
Year 2008-09, section 199 provides that the CBDT may make rules for the
purposes of giving credit in respect of tax deducted or tax paid in terms of
the provisions of Chapter XVII, including rules for the purposes of giving
credit to a person other than the payee, and also the assessment year for which
such credit may be given.

 

The corresponding
Rule 37BA, issued for the purposes of section 199(3), was inserted with effect
from 01.04 2009. The relevant part of this Rule, dealing with the assessment
year in which credit of TDS can be allowed, is as follows:

 

(3) (i) Credit
for tax deducted at source and paid to the Central Government, shall be given for
the assessment year for which such income is assessable.

 

(ii) Where tax
has been deducted at source and paid to the Central Government and the income
is assessable over a number of years, credit for tax deducted at source shall
be allowed across those years in the same proportion in which the income is
assessable to tax.

 

After the amendment, though the section does not expressly provide for
the year of credit as it did prior to the amendment, Rule 37BA effectively
provides for credit  similar to the erstwhile
section. In fact, under Rule 37BA, more clarity has now been provided in
respect of a case where the income is assessable over a number of years.

 

In view of these
provisions, an issue has arisen in cases where the assessee’s income is
computed as per the cash system of accounting regarding the year in which the
TDS amount is taxable as an income, and the year of credit of such TDS to the
assessee, when the underlying income from which tax has been deducted is not
received in the year of deduction. The Delhi bench of the Tribunal took a view
that the income to the extent of TDS has to be offered to tax as an income as
provided in section 198 in the year of deduction, and the credit of TDS is
available in such cases in the year of deduction, irrespective of Rule 37BA. As
against this, the Mumbai bench of the Tribunal did not concur with this view,
and denied credit of TDS in the year of deduction.

 

CHANDER SHEKHAR
AGGARWAL’S CASE


The issue had come
up before the Delhi bench of the Tribunal in the case of Chander Shekhar
Aggarwal vs. ACIT [2016] 157 ITD 626.

 

In this case, the
assessee was following cash system of accounting. He filed his return of income
for A.Y. 2011-12, including the entire amount of TDS deducted during the year
as his income, claiming TDS credit of Rs. 80,16,290.

 

While processing
the return u/s. 143(1), the Assessing Officer allowed credit of only Rs.
71,20,267, on the ground that the income with respect to the balance amount was
not included in the return filed by the assessee. The assessee appealed to the
CIT (A), disputing the denial of credit of the differential amount of TDS.
Placing reliance on Rule 37BA, the CIT (A) concluded that the assessee was not
entitled to credit for the amount though mentioned in the certificate for the
assessment year, if income relatable to the amount was not shown and was not
assessable in that assessment year.

 

The assessee
contended before the Tribunal that the amount equivalent to the TDS had been
offered as income by him in his return of income. This was in accordance with
the provisions of section 198, which mandates that all sums deducted under
Chapter XVII would be deemed to be income received for the purposes of computing
the income of an assessee. It was argued that the provisions of Rule 37BA are
not applicable to assessees following cash system of accounting. Since, as per
provisions of section 199, any deduction of tax under Chapter XVII and paid to
the Central Government shall be treated as payment of tax on behalf of the
person from whose income deduction of tax was made, it was pleaded that the
credit of the disputed amount should be allowed to the assessee.

 

The Tribunal duly
considered the amended provisions of section 199 as well as Rule 37BA. It
concurred with the view that once TDS was deducted by the deductor on behalf of
the assessee and the assessee had offered it as his income as per section 198,
the credit of that TDS should be allowed fully in the year of deduction itself.
Once an income was assessable to tax, the assessee was eligible for credit,
despite the fact that the remaining amount would be taxable in the succeeding
year.

 

With regard to Rule
37BA(3)(ii) providing for proportionate credit across the years when income was
assessable over a number of years, the Tribunal held that it would apply where
the entire compensation was received in advance but was not assessable to tax
in that year, but was assessable over a number of years. It did not apply where
the assessee followed cash system of accounting.

 

This was supported by an illustration – suppose an assessee who was
following cash system of accounting raised an invoice of Rs. 100 in respect of
which deductor deducted and deposited TDS of Rs. 10. Accordingly, the assessee
would offer an income of Rs. 10 and claim TDS of Rs. 10. However, in the
opinion of the Revenue, the assessee would not be entitled to credit of the
entire TDS of Rs. 10, but would be entitled to proportionate credit of Re. 1
only. Now let us assume that Rs. 90 was never paid to the assessee by the
deductor. In such circumstances, Rs. 9 which was deducted as TDS by the
deductor would never be available for credit to the assessee though the said
sum stood duly deposited to the account of the Central Government. Therefore,
as per the Tribunal, Rule 37BA(3) could not be interpreted so as to say that
TDS deducted at source and deposited to the account of the Central Government,
though it was income of the assessee, but was not eligible for credit of tax in
the year when such TDS was offered as income.

 

The Tribunal also
placed reliance upon the decisions of the Visakhapatnam bench in the case of ACIT
vs. Peddu Srinivasa Rao Vijayawada [ITA No. 234 (Vizag.) of 2009, dated
03.03.2011
] and of the Ahmedabad bench in the case of Sadbhav
Engineering Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT [2015] 153 ITD 234
. In these cases, it was
held that the credit of tax deducted at source from the mobilisation advance
adjustable against the bills subsequently was available in the year of
deduction, though it was not considered while computing the income of the
assessee.

 

Accordingly, the
Tribunal held that the assessee would be entitled to credit of the entire TDS
offered as income in the return of income.

 

SURENDRA S. GUPTA’S
CASE


A similar issue
recently came up for consideration before the Mumbai bench of the Tribunal in
the case of Surendra S. Gupta vs. Addl. CIT [2018] 170 ITD 732 .

 

In this case, the assessee, following cash system of accounting, did
not offer consultancy income of Rs. 83,70,287 to tax, since the same was not
received during the relevant A.Y. 2010-11. However, he offered corresponding
TDS to tax in respect of the same, amounting to Rs. 8,41,240, and claimed the
equivalent credit thereof in the computation of income. The  Assessing Officer, applying Rule 37BA(3)(i),
restricted the credit to proportionate TDS of Rs. 84,547, against income of Rs.
8,41,240 offered to tax by the assessee, and disallowed the balance credit of
Rs. 7,56,693.

 

The assessee contested the denial of TDS credit before the CIT (A),
who upheld the order of the Assessing Officer, and directed that credit for the
balance amount should be given in the subsequent years in which income
corresponding to such TDS is received.

 

On the basis of
several decisions of the co-ordinate bench on the issue, the Tribunal noted
that there were two lines of thought on the issue; one which favours grant of
full TDS credit in the year of deduction itself, and the other which, following
strict interpretation, allows TDS credit in the A.Y. in which the income has
actually been assessed / offered to tax. Reference was made to the following
decisions wherein the former view was taken –

 (i). Chander
Shekhar Aggarwal vs. ACIT (supra)

(ii).  Praveen Kumar Gupta vs. ITO [IT Appeal No.
1252 (Delhi) of 2012]

(iii). Anil Kumar Goel vs. ITO [IT Appeal No. 5849
(Delhi) of 2011]

 

The Tribunal found
that in none of the above cases was the decision of the Kerala High Court in
the case of CIT vs. Smt. Pushpa Vijoy [2012] 206 Taxman 22 considered by
the co-ordinate bench. In this case, the Kerala High Court had held that the
assessee was entitled to credit of tax only in the assessment year in which the
net income, from which tax had been deducted, was assessed to tax. Following
this decision, the Tribunal rejected the claim of the assessee to allow the
full credit of TDS.

 

OBSERVATIONS

There are two
aspects to the issue – the year in which the amount of TDS should be regarded
as income of the assessee chargeable to tax (the year of deduction, or the year
in which the net income is received by the assessee), and accordingly accounted
for under the cash system of accounting; and secondly, to what extent credit of
the TDS is available against such income.

 

Therefore, it
becomes imperative to analyse the impact of the provisions of section 198 with
respect to the assessment of the income of an assessee who is following cash
system of accounting. Section 198 provides as under:

 

All sums
deducted in accordance with the foregoing provisions of this Chapter shall, for
the purpose of computing the income of an assessee, be deemed to be income
received.

 

It can be seen that
section 198 creates a deeming fiction by considering the amount of TDS as
deemed receipt in the hands of the deductee, though it has not been received by
him. This deeming fiction operates in a very limited field to consider the
unrealised income as realised. It appears that the legislative intent behind
this provision is to negate the probability of exclusion of the amount of TDS
from the scope of total income by the assessee, on the ground that it amounted
to a diversion of income by overriding title. It also precluded the deductee
from making a claim on the payer for recovery of the amount which had been deducted
at source in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XVII-B. But, this
section, by itself, does not create a charge over the amount of tax deduction
at source.

 

A careful reading
of this provision would reveal that it does not provide for the year in which
the said income shall be deemed to have been received. In contrast, reference
can be made to section 7, which also provides for certain incomes deemed to be
received. It has been expressly provided in section 7 that “the following
incomes shall be deemed to be received in the previous year….” unlike section
198. Therefore, it would not be correct to say that, once the sum is deducted
at source, it is deemed to be the income received in the year in which it has
been deducted and assessable in that year, de hors the other provisions
determining the year in which the said income can be assessed.

 

For instance, the
buyer of an immovable property may deduct tax at source u/s. 194-IA on the
advance amount paid to the assessee transferring that property. In such a case,
the capital gain in the hands of the transferor is taxable in the year in which
that immovable property has been transferred as provided in section 45.
Obviously, tax deducted at source u/s. 194-IA cannot be assessed as capital
gain in the year of deduction merely by virtue of section 198, if the capital
asset has not been transferred in the same year.

 

Similarly, in case
of an assessee who is following cash system of accounting, it cannot be said
that the amount of tax deducted at source is deemed to have been received in
the very same year in which it was deducted. Section 145 governs the
computation of income, which is in accordance with the method of accounting
followed by the assessee. The income equivalent to the amount of tax deducted
at source cannot be charged to tax de hors the method of accounting
followed by the assessee. In case of cash system of accounting, unless the
balance amount is received by the assessee, the amount of tax deducted at
source cannot be included in the income on the ground that it is deemed to be
received as per section 198. The reference to ‘sums deducted’ used in section
198 should be seen from the point of view of the recipient assessee and not the
payer. The ‘deduction’, from the point of view of the recipient, would happen
only when he receives the balance amount, as prior to that, the concerned
transaction would not be recognised at all in the books of account maintained
under the cash system of accounting.

 

In the context of
section 198 and the pre-amended provisions of section 199, in a Third Member
decision in the case of Varsha G. Salunkhe vs. Dy CIT 98 ITD 147, the
Mumbai Bench of the Tribunal has held as under:

 

“Both the sections, viz., 198 and 199, fall within
Chapter XVII which is titled as ‘Collection and recovery – deduction at
source’. In other words, these are machinery provisions for effectuating
collection and recovery of the taxes that are determined under the other
provisions of the Act. In other words, these are only machinery provisions
dealing with the matters of procedure and do not deal with either the
computation of income or chargeability of income
….

 

Sections 198 and
199 nowhere provide for an exemption either to the determination of the income
under the aforesaid provisions of sections 28, 29 or as to the method of
accounting employed under section 145 which alone could be the basis for
computation of income under the provisions of sections 28 to 43A. Section 198
has a limited intention. The purpose of section 198 is not to carve out an
exception to section 145. Section 199 has two objectives – one to declare the
tax deducted at source as payment of tax on behalf of the person on whose
behalf the deduction was made and to give credit for the amount so deducted on
the production of the certificate in the assessment made for the assessment
year for which such income is assessable. The second objective mentioned in
section 199 is only to answer the question as to the year in which the credit
for tax deducted at source shall be given. It links up the credit with
assessment year in which such income is assessable. In other words, the
Assessing Officer is bound to give credit in the year in which the income is
offered to tax.

 

Section 199 does
not empower the Assessing Officer to determine the year of assessability of the
income itself but it only mandates the year in which the credit is to be given
on the basis of the certificate furnished. In other words, when the assessee produces
the certificates of TDS, the Assessing Officer is required to verify whether
the assessee has offered the income pertained to the certificate before giving
credit. If he finds that the income of the certificate is not shown, the
Assessing Officer has only not to give the credit for TDS in that assessment
year and has to defer the credit being given to the year in which the income is
to be assessed. Sections 198 and 199 do not in any way change the year of
assessability of income, which depends upon the method of accounting regularly
employed by the assessee. They only deal with the year in which the credit has
to be given by the Assessing Officer.

 

It could not be
disputed that according to the method of accounting employed by the assessee,
the income in respect of the three TDS certificates did not pertain to the
assessment year in question but pertained to the next assessment year and, in
fact, in that year, the assessee had offered the same to tax. Therefore, the
credit in respect of those three TDS certificates would not be given in the
assessment year under consideration, but in the next assessment year in which
the income was shown to have been assessed.”

 

Following this
decision, the Bilaspur bench of the Tribunal, in the case of ACIT vs. Reeta
Loiya 146 TTJ 52 (Bil)(URO)
, has held as under:

 

“It is a settled
proposition that the provisions of s. 198 are merely machinery provisions and
are not related to computation of income and chargeability of income as held by
the Bombay Tribunal in the case of Smt. Varsha G. Salunke (supra). In
the absence of the charging provisions to tax such deemed income as the income
of the assessee, the provisions of s. 198 of the Act cannot by themselves
create a charge on certain receipts.”

 

The Mumbai bench of
the Tribunal, in the case of Dy CIT vs. Rajeev G. Kalathil 67 SOT 52
(Mum)(URO)
, observed:

 

“It is a fact
that deduction of tax for the payment is one of the deciding facts for
recognising the revenue of a particular year. But TDS in itself does not mean
that the whole amount mentioned in it should be taxed in a particular year,
deduction of tax and completion of assessment are two different things while
finalising the tax liability of the assessee and Assessing Officer is required
to take all the facts and circumstances of the case not only the TDS
certificate.”

 

In the case of ITO
vs. Anupallavi Finance & Investments 131 ITD 205
, the Chennai bench of
the Tribunal, while dealing with the controversy under discussion, has dealt
with the impact of section 198 as follows:

 

We are unable to
understand as to how the said provision assists the assessee’s case. All the
section says, to state illustratively, is that if there is deduction of tax at
source out of income of Rs. 100 [say at the rate of 10 per cent], crediting or
paying assessee Rs. 90, the same, i.e., Rs. 10 is also his income. It nowhere
speaks of the year for which the said amount of TDS is to be deemed as income
received. The same would, understandably, only correspond to the balance 90 per
cent. As such, if 30 per cent of the total receipt/credit is assessable for a
particular year, it shall, by virtue of section 198 of the Act be reckoned at
Rs. 30 [Rs. 100 × 30 per cent] and not Rs. 27 [Rs. 90 × 30 per cent]. Thus,
though again a natural consequence of the fact that tax deducted is only out of
the amount paid or due to be paid as income, and in satisfaction of the tax
liability on the gross amount to that extent, yet clarifies the matter, as it
may be open to somebody to say that TDS of Rs. 10 has neither been credited nor
received, so that it does not form part of income received or arising and,
thus, outside the scope of section 5 of the Act. That, to our mind, is sum and
substance of section 198.

 

Similar
observations have been made by the Mumbai bench of the Tribunal in the case of ITO
vs. PHE Consultants 64 taxmann.com 419
which are reproduced hereunder:

 

It is pertinent
to note that the provisions of sec. 198, though states that the tax deducted at
source shall be deemed to be income received, yet it does not specify the year
in which the said deeming provision applies. However, section 198 states that
the same is deemed to be income received “for the purpose of computing the
income of an assessee.” The provisions of section 145 of the Act state
that the income of an assessee chargeable under the head “Profits and
gains of business or profession” or “Income from other sources”
shall be computed in accordance with either cash or mercantile system of
accounting regularly employed by the assessee. Hence a combined reading of
provisions of section 198 and section 145 of the Act, in our view, makes it
clear that the income deemed to have been received u/s. 198 has to be computed
in accordance with the provisions of section 145 of the Act, meaning, thereby,
the TDS amount, per se, cannot be considered as income of the assessee by
disregarding the method of accounting followed by the assessee.

 

The Kerala High
Court has also expressed a similar view as extracted below in the case of Smt.
Pushpa Vijoy (supra), although without referring expressly to section 198.

 

We also do not
find any merit in the contention of the respondents-assessees that the amount
covered by TDS certificates itself should be treated as income of the previous
year relevant for the assessment year concerned and the tax amount should be
assessed as income by simultaneously giving credit for the full amount of tax
remitted by the payer.

 

Further, deeming
the amount of tax deducted at source as a receipt in the year of deduction and
assessing it as income of that year would pose several difficulties. Firstly,
the assessee might not even be aware about the deduction of tax at source on
his account while submitting his return of income. This may happen due to delay
on the part of the deductor in submitting the TDS statement and consequential
reflection of the information in Form 26AS of the assessee. Secondly, the tax
might be deducted at source while making the provision for the expenses by the
payer following mercantile system of accounting. For instance, tax is deducted
at source u/s. 194J while providing for the auditor’s remuneration. In such a
case, treating the amount of tax deducted at source as income of the auditor in
that year, would result into taxing the amount, even before the corresponding
services have been provided by the assessee.

 

Moreover, for an
amount to constitute a receipt under the cash method of accounting, it should
either be actually received or made available unconditionally to the assessee.
As held by the Supreme Court in the case of Keshav Mills Ltd. vs. CIT 23 ITR
230
, “The ‘receipt’ of income refers to the first occasion when the
recipient gets the money under his own control.”
In case of TDS, one can
take a view that such TDS is not within the control of the payee until such
time as he is eligible to claim credit of such TDS. That point of time is only
when he receives the net income after deduction of TDS, when he is eligible to
claim credit of such TDS.

 

Since the amount of
tax deducted at source cannot be charged to tax in the year of deduction merely
by virtue of section 198, no part of that income is assessable in that year, in
the absence of any receipt, in view of the cash system of accounting followed
by the assessee. The Delhi bench of the Tribunal in the case of Chander Shekhar
Aggarwal (supra) has decided the whole issue on the basis of the fact
that the amount equivalent to TDS was being offered to tax by the assessee in
accordance with the provision of section 198. Since the income was assessed to
that extent, the Tribunal opined that the assessee was eligible for full credit
of TDS, notwithstanding Rule 37BA(3)(ii), which provided for allowance of
proportionate TDS credit when the income was not fully assessable in the same
year. Thus, the very foundation on the basis of which the Delhi bench of the
Tribunal has allowed the full credit of TDS to the assessee in the case of
Chander Shekhar Aggarwal (supra) appears to be incorrect.

 

Having analysed the provisions of section 198, let us now consider the
issue about the year in which the credit for tax deducted at source is
allowable. As per section 4, the tax is chargeable on the ‘total income’ of the
assessee for a particular previous year. When the assessee pays the income-tax
under the Act, he does not pay it on any specific income but he pays it on the
‘total income’. Thus, it cannot be said that a particular amount of tax has
been paid or payable on a particular amount of income. However, when it comes
to TDS, the erstwhile provision of section 199 expressly provided that its
credit shall be given for the assessment year in which the relevant income is
assessable. After its substitution with effect from 01.04.2008, new section 199
has authorised CBDT to prescribe the rules which can specifically provide for
the assessment for which the credit may be given. As per the mandate given in
section 199, Rule 37BA provides that the credit shall be given for the
assessment year for which the concerned income is assessable. In view of such
express provisions, the credit cannot be availed in any year other than the
assessment year in which the income subject to deduction of tax at source is
assessable.

 

The Delhi bench of the Tribunal took a view that Rule 37BA does not
apply where the assessee follows cash system of accounting insofar as it
provides for the year in which the credit is available. In order to support its
view, it has been pointed out that the credit would not be available otherwise
in a case where the assessee does not receive the underlying income at all.
Certainly, the law does not provide about how the credit would be given for
that amount of TDS which was deferred for the reason that the relevant income
is assessable in future but, then, found to be not assessable at all for some
reason. However, this lacuna under the law can affect both types of assessees,
i.e., assessees following cash system of accounting, as well as assessees
following mercantile system of accounting.



Circular No. 5
dated 02.03.2001 has addressed one such situation wherein the tax has been
deducted at source on the rent paid in advance u/s. 194-I and subsequently the
rent agreement gets terminated or the rented property is transferred due to
which the balance of rent received in advance is refunded to the tenant or to
the transferee. It has been clarified that in such a case, credit for the
entire balance amount of tax deducted at source, which has not been given
credit so far, shall be allowed in the assessment year relevant to the
financial year during which the rent agreement gets terminated / cancelled or
rented property is transferred and balance of advance rent is refunded to the
transferee or the tenant, as the case may be. Similarly, in a few cases, the
Courts and Tribunal have held that where income has been offered to tax in an
earlier year, but tax has been deducted at source subsequently, credit for the
TDS should be allowed in such subsequent year [CIT vs. Abbott Agency,
Ludhiana 224 Taxman 350 (P&H), Societe D’ Engineering Pour L’ Industrie Et.
Les Travaux Publics, (SEITP) vs. ACIT 65 SOT 45 (Amr)(URO)].

 

Therefore, in our
view, the mere probability of income not getting assessed in future cannot by
itself be the reason for not applying the express provision of the law, unless
suitable amendment has been carried out to overcome such difficulty. Taking a
clue from the CBDT’s clarification vide aforesaid Circular, it is possible to
take a view that the credit of TDS should be made available in the year in
which the assessee finds that the relevant income would not be assessable at
all due to its irrecoverablity or any other reasons.

 

The view taken by the Mumbai bench of the
Tribunal in the case of Surendra S. Gupta (supra) by following the
decision of Kerala High Court in the case of Pushpa Vijoy (supra)
therefore seems to be the more appropriate view. The amount of tax deducted at
source is neither assessable as income nor available as credit in the year of
deduction, if the assessee is following the cash system of accounting, and has
not received the balance amount in that year. The taxation of the entire
amount, as well as credit for the TDS, would be in the year in which the net
amount, after deduction of TDS, is received. In case the net amount is received
over multiple years, the TDS amount would be taxed proportionately in the
multiple years, and proportionate TDS credit would also be given in those
respective years.

Section 147 – Reassessment – Natural justice – Order passed without disposing of objections raised by assessee to the report of DVO – reopening was improper and null and void

6. Pr
CIT-17 vs. Urmila Construction Company [ITA No. 1726 of 2016, Dated 18th
March, 2019 (Bombay High Court)]

 

[Urmila
Construction Company vs. ITO-12(3)(4); dated 06/11/2009; ITA. No.
2115/Mum/2009, A.Y. 2005-06 Mum. ITAT]

 

Section
147 – Reassessment – Natural justice – Order passed without disposing of
objections raised by assessee to the report of DVO – reopening was improper and
null and void

 

The assessee was engaged in
the business of building development. During such proceedings, the A.O. had
disputed the valuation of the work in progress in relation to the incomplete
construction work on a certain site. The A.O., therefore, referred the
valuation to the Departmental Valuation Officer (DVO) on 30.12.2007. The report
of the DVO did not come for some time. In the meantime, the assessment was
getting barred by limitation on 31.12.2007. The A.O., therefore, on 27.12.2007
passed an order of assessment u/s. 143(3) of the Act. This assessment was
subject to receiving the report of the DVO. The DVO report was received on
3.12.2009. Thereupon, the A.O. reopened the assessee’s return for the said assessment year, relying upon the report of the DVO.

 

Being aggrieved with the
A.O order, the assessee filed an appeal to the CIT(A). The CIT(A) upheld the
action of the A.O.

 

Being aggrieved with the
CIT(A) order, the assessee filed an appeal to the ITAT. The Tribunal held that
the report of the DVO cannot be the basis for reopening the assessment. The
Tribunal relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Asst.
CIT vs. Dhairya Construction (2010) 328 ITR 515
and other decisions of High
Courts.

 

Being aggrieved with the
ITAT order, the Revenue filed an appeal to the High Court. The Court held that
the notice of reopening of assessment was issued within a period of four years
from the end of the relevant assessment year. The original assessment was
completed, awaiting the report of the DVO. Under such circumstances, whether,
upon receipt of such report of DVO, reopening of the assessment can be validly
made or not, is the question.The court observed that it was not inclined to
decide this question. This was so because of the reason that once the A.O.
reopened the assessment, the assessee had strongly disputed the contents of the
DVO report. Before the A.O. the assessee had highlighted various factors as to
why the report of the DVO was not valid. The A.O., instead of deciding such
objections, once again called for the remarks of the DVO. The response of the
DVO did not come and in the meantime, the re-assessment proceedings were
getting time-barred. The A.O., therefore, passed an order of assessment under
section 143(3) r.w.s. 147 of the Act on the basis of the report of the DVO,
without dealing with the objections of the assessee to such a report.

 

The methodology adopted by
the A.O. in such an order of reassessment was wholly incorrect. Even if the notice
of reassessment was valid, the A.O. was to pass an order of reassessment in
accordance with the law. He could not have passed a fresh order without dealing
with and disposing of the objections raised by the assessee to the report of
the DVO. On this ground, the Revenue’s appeal was dismissed. 

 

Section 28(ii)(c) – Business income – Compensation – the agreement between assessee and foreign company was not agreement of agency but principal-to-principal – compensation received for terminated contract could not be taxed u/s. 28(ii)(c)

5. Pr.
CIT-2 vs. RST India Ltd. [Income tax appeal No. 1798 of 2016, Dated 12th
March, 2019 (Bombay High Court)]

 

[ITO-2(3)(1)
vs. RST India Ltd., dated 03/02/2016; ITA. No. 1608/Mum/2009, A.Y. 2005-06;
Bench: D, Mum. ITAT]

 

Section
28(ii)(c) – Business income – Compensation – the agreement between assessee and
foreign company was not agreement of agency but principal-to-principal –
compensation received for terminated contract could not be taxed u/s. 28(ii)(c)

 

The assessee had entered
into an agreement with US-based company Sealand Service Inc. Under the
agreement the assessee was to solicit business on behalf of the said Sealand
Service Inc. After some disputes between the parties, this contract was
terminated pursuant to which the assessee received a compensation of Rs. 2.25
crore during the period relevant to the A.Y. in question. The assessee claimed
that the receipt was capital in nature and therefore not assessable to tax. The
AO, however, rejected the contention and held that it would be chargeable to
tax in terms of section 28(ii)(c) of the Act.

 

The CIT (A) allowed the
assessee’s appeal holding that there was no principal agent relationship
between the parties and the contract was on principal-to-principal basis and
therefore section 28(ii)(c) would not apply.

 

In further appeal by the
Revenue, the Tribunal confirmed the view of the CIT Appeals, inter alia
holding that the entire source of the income was terminated by virtue of the
said agreement and that in view of the fact that there was no
principal-to-agent relationship, section 28(ii)(c) will not apply.

 

Being aggrieved with the
ITAT order, the Revenue filed an appeal to the High Court. The Court held that
it is not disputed that upon termination of the contract the assessee’s entire
business of soliciting freight on behalf of the US-based company came to be
terminated. It may be that the assessee had some other business. Insofar as the
question of taxing the receipts arising out of the contract terminating the
very source of the business, the same would not be relevant. The real question
is, was the relationship between the assessee and the US-based company one in
the nature of an agency?

 

Section 28(ii)(c) of the
Act makes any compensation or other payment due, i.e, the receipt by a person
holding an agency in connection with the termination of the agency or the
modification of the terms and conditions relating thereto, chargeable as profits
and gains of business and profession. The essential requirement for application
of the section would therefore be that there was a co-relation of agency
principal between the assessee and the US- based company. In the present case,
the CIT (A) and the tribunal have concurrently held that the relationship was
one of principal-to-principal and not one of agency.

 

The Court further observed
that the true character of the relationship from the agreement would have to be
gathered from reading the document as a whole. This Court in the case of Daruvala
Bros. (P). Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Income Tax (Central), Bombay, reported in
(1971) 80 ITR 213
had found that the agreement made between the parties was
of sole distribution and the agent was acting on his behalf and not on behalf
of the principal. In that background, it was held that the agreement in
question was not one of agency, though the document may have used such term to
describe the relationship between the two sides. In such circumstances the Revenue’s
appeal was dismissed.

Section 271(1)(c) – Penalty – Concealment – Merely because the quantum appeal is admitted by High Court penalty does not become unsustainable – However as issue is debatable, therefore penalty could not be imposed

4. The
Pr. CIT-1 vs. Rasiklal M. Parikh [Income tax Appeal No. 169 of 2017, Dated 19th
March, 2019 (Bombay High Court)]

 

[Rasiklal
M. Parikh vs. ACIT-19(2); ITA. No. 6016/Mum/2013, Mum. ITAT]

 

Section
271(1)(c) – Penalty – Concealment – Merely because the quantum appeal is
admitted by High Court penalty does not become unsustainable – However as issue
is debatable, therefore penalty could not be imposed

 

The assessee is an
individual. He filed his ROI for the A.Y. 2006-07. The assessment of his return
gave rise to disallowance of exemption u/s. 54F of the Act. During the year the
assessee had transferred the tenancy rights in a premises for consideration of
Rs. 1.67 crore and claimed exemption of Rs. 1.45 crore u/s. 54F of the
investment in residential house. Such exemption was disallowed by the A.O. He
also initiated penalty proceedings. The disallowance was confirmed up to the
stage of the Tribunal, upon which the Assessee filed an appeal before the High
Court, which was admitted. The A.O. imposed a penalty of Rs. 50 lakh.

 

This was challenged by the
Assessee before the CIT (A) and then the Tribunal. The Tribunal, by the
impugned judgement, deleted the penalty only on the ground that since the High
Court has admitted the assessee’s quantum appeal, the issue is a debatable one.

 

Being aggrieved with the ITAT order, the
Revenue filed an appeal to the High Court. The High Court was not in agreement
with the observations of the Tribunal that merely because the High Court has
admitted the appeal and framed substantial questions of law, the entire issue
is a debatable one and under no circumstances the penalty could be imposed. In
this context, reference was made to a decision of a division bench of the
Gujarat High Court in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Dharamshi
B. Shah [2014] 366 ITR 140 (Guj)
.



However, the Hon’ble Court
held that despite the above-cited decision, this appeal need not be
entertained. This is so because independently, too, one can safely come to the
conclusion that the entire issue was a debatable one. The dispute between the
assessee and the Revenue was with reference to actual payment for purchase of
the flat and whether, when the assessee had purchased one more flat, though
contagious, could the assessee claim exemption u/s. 54F of the Act.

 

It can thus be seen that
the Assessee had made a bona fide claim. Neither any income nor any
particulars of the income were concealed. As per the settled legal position,
merely because a claim is rejected it would not automatically give rise to
penalty proceedings. Reference in this respect can be made to the decision of
the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax, Ahmedabad vs.
Reliance Petroproducts Pvt. Ltd.
Under the above circumstances, for the
reasons different from those recorded by the Tribunal in the impugned
judgement, the Revenue’s appeal was dismissed.

Section 194-IA and 205 – TDS – Bar against direct demand on assessee (Scope of) – Assessee sold property – Purchaser deducted TDS amount in terms of section 194-IA on sale consideration – Amount of TDS was not deposited with Revenue by purchaser – As provided u/s. 205, assessee could not be asked to pay same again – It was open to department to make coercive recovery of such unpaid tax from payer whose primary responsibility was to deposit same with government Revenue promptly because, if payer, after deducting tax, fails to deposit it in government Revenue, measures could always be initiated against such payers

13. Pushkar
Prabhat Chandra Jain vs. UOI; [2019] 103 taxmann.com 106 (Bom):
Date
of order: 30th January, 2019

 

Section
194-IA and 205 – TDS – Bar against direct demand on assessee (Scope of) –
Assessee sold property – Purchaser deducted TDS amount in terms of section
194-IA on sale consideration – Amount of TDS was not deposited with Revenue by
purchaser – As provided u/s. 205, assessee could not be asked to pay same again
– It was open to department to make coercive recovery of such unpaid tax from
payer whose primary responsibility was to deposit same with government Revenue
promptly because, if payer, after deducting tax, fails to deposit it in
government Revenue, measures could always be initiated against such payers

 

The petitioner sold an immovable property for Rs. 9 crore. The
purchasers made a net payment of Rs. 8.91 crore to the petitioner after
deducting tax at source at 1% of the payment in terms of section 194-IA of the
Income-tax Act, 1961. The petitioner filed the return of income and claimed
credit of TDS of Rs. 10.71 lakh. The Income-tax department noticed that only an
amount of Rs. 1.71 lakh was deposited with government Revenue and, thus, gave
the petitioner credit of TDS only to the extent of such sum. In an intimation
issued by the respondent u/s. 143(1), a demand of Rs. 10.36 lakh was raised
against the petitioner. This comprised of the principal tax of Rs. 9 lakh and
interest payable thereon. Subsequently, the return of the petitioner was taken
in limited scrutiny. During the pendency of such scrutiny assessment
proceedings, the Revenue issued a notice to the branch manager of the bank
attaching the bank account of the assessee. A total of Rs. 3.68 lakh came to be
withdrawn by the department from the petitioner’s bank account for recovery of
the unpaid demand.



The
assessee objected to attachment of the bank account on the ground that the
purchasers had deducted the tax at source in terms of section 194-IA. Further,
the petitioner had already offered the entire sale consideration of Rs. 9 crore
to tax in the return filed. The petitioner referred to section 205 and
contended that in a situation like the present case, recovery could be made
only against the deductor-payer. The petitioner could not be asked to pay the
said amount again. However, the respondent did not accept the representation of
the petitioner, upon which the instant petition has been filed.

 

The Bombay
High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

 

“i)   The purchasers paid the petitioner only Rs.
8.91 crore retaining Rs. 9 lakh towards TDS. The department does not argue that
this amount of Rs. 9 lakh so deducted is not in tune with the statutory
requirements. It appears undisputed that the deductor did not deposit such
amount in the government Revenue. Under the circumstances, the petitioner is
asked to pay the said sum again, since the department has not recognised this
TDS credit in favour of the petitioner.

ii)   Section 205 carries the caption ‘Bar against
direct demand on assessee’. The section provides that where tax is deducted at
the source under the provisions of Chapter XVII, the assessee shall not be
called upon to pay the tax himself to the extent to which tax has been deducted
from that income.

iii)   The situation arising in the present petition
is that the department does not contend that the petitioner did not suffer
deduction of tax at source at the hands of payer, but contends that the same
has not been deposited with the government/Revenue. As provided u/s. 205 and in
the circumstances of the instant case, the petitioner cannot be asked to pay
the same again. It is always open for the department, and in fact the Act
contains sufficient provisions, to make coercive recovery of such unpaid tax
from the payer whose primary responsibility is to deposit the same with the government
Revenue scrupulously and promptly. If the payer after deducting the tax fails
to deposit it in the government Revenue, measures can always be initiated
against such payers.

iv)  The Revenue is correct in pointing out that
for long after issuing notice u/s. 226(3), the petitioner has not brought this
fact to the notice of the Revenue which led the Revenue to make recoveries from
the bank account of the petitioner. In that view of the matter, at the best the
petitioner may not be entitled to claim interest on the amount to be refunded.

v)   Under the circumstances, the respondents
should lift the bank account attachment. Further, the respondent should refund
a sum of Rs. 3.68 lakhs to the assessee.”

 

 

Sections 245 and 245D – Settlement Commission – Procedure on application u/s. 245C (Opportunity of hearing) – Section 245D(2C) does not contemplate affording an opportunity of hearing to Commissioner (DR) at time of considering application for settlement for admission and, at best, Commissioner (DR) may be heard to deal with any submissions made by assessee, if called upon by Settlement Commission; however, under no circumstances can Commissioner (DR) be permitted to raise objections against admission of application at threshold and to make submissions other than on basis of report submitted by Principal Commissioner – Since, in instant case, Settlement Commission had first heard objections raised by Commissioner (DR) against admission of application for settlement based on material other than report of Principal Commissioner and thereafter had afforded an opportunity of hearing to assessee to deal with objections raised by Commissioner (DR) and had thereafter proceeded to declare appl

12. Akshar
Developers vs. IT Settlement Commission; [2019] 103 taxmann.com 76 (Guj):
Date
of order: 4th February, 2019

 

Sections
245 and 245D – Settlement Commission – Procedure on application u/s. 245C
(Opportunity of hearing) – Section 245D(2C) does not contemplate affording an
opportunity of hearing to Commissioner (DR) at time of considering application
for settlement for admission and, at best, Commissioner (DR) may be heard to
deal with any submissions made by assessee, if called upon by Settlement
Commission; however, under no circumstances can Commissioner (DR) be permitted
to raise objections against admission of application at threshold and to make
submissions other than on basis of report submitted by Principal Commissioner –
Since, in instant case, Settlement Commission had first heard objections raised
by Commissioner (DR) against admission of application for settlement based on
material other than report of Principal Commissioner and thereafter had
afforded an opportunity of hearing to assessee to deal with objections raised
by Commissioner (DR) and had thereafter proceeded to declare application
invalid based on material pointed out by Commissioner (DR), Settlement
Commission had clearly violated provisions of section 245D(2C) by providing an
opportunity of hearing to Commissioner (DR) to object to admission of application
instead of rendering a decision on the basis of report of Principal
Commissioner as contemplated under said
sub-section

 

A raid
came to be carried out in the case of the assessee u/s. 132 of the Income-tax
Act, 1961 and some documents came to be seized. The assessee preferred
application u/s. 245(C)(1). The form was filled by the assessee along with
which the statement of particulars of issues to be settled, as well as the
statement showing full and true disclosure came to be submitted. The matter came
up for the purpose of admission and the Settlement Commission admitted the
application u/s. 245(D)(1). Thereafter, the Principal Commissioner submitted a
report u/s. 245D(2B). The assessee filed a rejoinder to the above report u/s.
245D(2B) meeting with the objections raised by the Principal Commissioner. The
matter was heard for the purposes of decision u/s. 245D(2C). The Commissioner
(DR) had raised objection based on several materials other than the report of
the Principal Commissioner, whereupon the Settlement Commission passed an
adverse order u/s. 245D(2C) rejecting the application of the assessee.

 

The
assessee filed a writ petition and challenged the order. The assessee contended
that the Settlement Commission, instead of passing the order on the basis of
the report of the Principal Commissioner as clearly laid down in section
245D(2C), had passed the order on the basis of what was not in the report,
which rendered such order bad in law. It was not open for the Commissioner (DR)
to raise objections and the Commissioner had gone beyond what his superior
Principal Commissioner had stated in the report, and if there was any
objection, it was for the Principal Commissioner to take such objection in the
report. There was grave error on the part of the Settlement Commission
permitting the Commissioner (DR) to raise objections to the admission of the
application and more so in permitting him to go beyond the report.

 

The
Gujarat High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

 

“i)   After amendment, section 245D
contemplates three stages for dealing with an application made u/s. 245C(1).
The scheme of admission of a case has been completely altered with effect from
01.06.2007 and now there are two stages for admission of the application. The
third stage is for deciding the application. In the first stage, on receipt of
an application u/s. 245C, the Settlement Commission is mandated to issue a
notice to the applicant within seven days from the date of receipt of the
application, requiring him to explain as to why the application made by him be
allowed to be proceeded with, and on hearing the applicant, the Settlement
Commission is further mandated to either reject the application or allow the
application to be proceeded with by an order in writing, within a period of
fourteen days from the date of the application. The proviso thereto provides
that where no order has been passed within the aforesaid period by the
Settlement Commission, the application shall be deemed to have been allowed to
be proceeded with. Thus, at the first stage, no report or communication from
the department is required for the Settlement Commission to decide whether or
not to allow an application to be proceeded with.

ii)   Thus, the Principal Commissioner has not
stated in the report that there is no full and true disclosure by the assessee,
but has raised certain doubts about the adequacy of the disclosure and has
reserved the right to comment at a later stage of the application on the basis
of the material seized.

iii)   The Settlement Commission in the impugned
order has recorded that the Commissioner (DR) has objected to the admission of
the settlement applications for the reason that the applicants have not made
full and true disclosure in the petitions. In the opinion of this court,
section 245D(2C) does not contemplate any such objection being raised by the
Commissioner (DR). Section 245D(2C) contemplates hearing to the applicant only
in case the Settlement Commission is inclined to declare the application
invalid. In case the report does not say that there is no full and true
disclosure and the Settlement Commission is inclined to accept such report, it
is not even required to hear the applicant. Therefore, when the sub-section
which requires an opportunity of being heard to be given to the applicant only
if the application is to be declared invalid, the question of Principal
Commissioner or Commissioner raising any objection to the application at this
stage, does not arise.

iv)  A perusal of the impugned order reveals that
the Settlement Commission has first heard the objections raised by the
Commissioner (DR) to the admission of the applications based on material other
than the report, and thereafter has afforded an opportunity of hearing to the
applicants to deal with the objections raised by the Commissioner (DR) and has
thereafter proceeded to declare the application invalid based on the material
pointed out by the Commissioner (DR) from the seized material. On a plain
reading of section 245D(2C) it is evident that it contemplates passing of order
by the Settlement Commission on the basis of the report of the Principal
Commissioner or Commissioner. Therefore, the scope of hearing would be limited
to the contents of the report. The applicant would, therefore, at this stage be
prepared to deal with the contents of the report and if any submission is made
outside the report, it may not be possible for the applicant to deal with the
same. On behalf of the respondents it has been contended that the Commissioner
(DR) has not relied upon any extraneous material and that the arguments are
made on the basis of the seized material and the evidence on record. In the
opinion of this Court, insofar as the record of the case and other material on
record is concerned, consideration of the same is contemplated at the third
stage of the proceedings u/s. 245D(4) and not at the stage of s/s. (2C).

v)   Sub-section (2C) of section 245D contemplates
a report by the Principal Commissioner/Commissioner and consideration of such
report by the Settlement Commission and affording an opportunity of hearing to
the applicant before declaring the application to be invalid. The sub-section
does not contemplate an incomplete report which can be supplemented at the time
of hearing. While the sub-section does not contemplate hearing the Principal
Commissioner or Commissioner at the stage of section 245D (2C), at best,
requirement of such hearing can be read into the said sub-section for the purpose
of giving an opportunity to the Commissioner (DR) to deal with the submissions
of the applicant in case the Settlement Commission hears the applicant. But the
sub-section does not contemplate giving an opportunity to the Commissioner (DR)
to raise any objection to the admission of the application and hearing him to
supplement the contents of the report. The report has to be considered as it is
and it is on the basis of the report that the Settlement Commission is required
to pass an order one way or the other at the stage of section 245D(2C). Going
beyond the report at a stage when the order is to be passed on the basis of the
report, would also amount to a breach of the principles of natural justice.
Moreover, no grave prejudice is caused to the Revenue if the application is
admitted and permitted to be proceeded with inasmuch as in the third stage, the
entire record and all material including any additional report of investigation
or inquiry if called for by the Settlement Commission would be considered and
the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner would be granted an opportunity of
hearing.

vi)  The Settlement Commission was, therefore, not
justified in permitting the Principal Commissioner to supplement the report
submitted by the Commissioner by way of oral submissions which were beyond the
contents of the report. At best, if the applicant had made submissions in
respect of the report, the Commissioner may have been permitted to deal with
the same, but under no circumstances could the Commissioner be permitted to
raise objection to the admission of the application and be heard before the
assessee and that, too, to supplement an incomplete report on the basis of the
material and evidences on record. As already discussed hereinabove, any hearing
based upon the material and evidences on record is contemplated at the stage of
section 245D(4), and insofar as sub-section (2C) of section 245D is concerned,
the same contemplates a decision solely on the basis of the report of the
Commissioner.

vii)  Section 245D(2C) does not contemplate
affording an opportunity of hearing to the Commissioner (DR), and at best, the
Commissioner (DR) may be heard to deal with any submissions made by the
assessee, if called upon by the Settlement Commission. However, under no circumstances
can the Commissioner (DR) be permitted to raise objections against the
admission of the application at the threshold and to make submissions on the
basis of material on record to supplement the report submitted by the Principal
Commissioner in the manner as had been done in this case.

viii) In the light of the above discussion, the
impugned order passed by the Settlement Commission being in breach of the
provisions of section 245D(2C) and also being in breach of the principles of
natural justice inasmuch as at the stage of section 245D(2C), the Settlement
Commission has placed reliance upon material other than the report, cannot be
sustained. The impugned order passed by the Settlement Commission is hereby
quashed and set aside.”

Sections 147 and 148 – Reassessment – Notice after four years – Validity – Transfer of assets to subsidiary company and subsequent transfer by subsidiary company to third party – Transaction disclosed and accepted during original assessment – Notice after four years on ground that transaction was not genuine – Notice not valid

10. Bharti
Infratel Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT; 411 ITR 403 (Delhi):
Date
of order: 15th January, 2019 A.Y.:
2008-09

 

Sections
147 and 148 – Reassessment – Notice after four years – Validity – Transfer of
assets to subsidiary company and subsequent transfer by subsidiary company to
third party – Transaction disclosed and accepted during original assessment –
Notice after four years on ground that transaction was not genuine – Notice not
valid

 

BAL
transferred telecommunications infrastructure assets worth Rs. 5,739.60 crores
to the assessee, its subsidiary (BIL), on 31.01.2008 for Nil consideration
under a scheme of arrangement approved by the Delhi High Court. According to
the scheme of arrangement, BIL revalued the assets to Rs. 8,218.12 crore on the
assets side of the balance sheet for the year ending 31.03.2008. Within 15 days
of the approval of the scheme of arrangement, a shareholders’ agreement on
08.12.2007 was entered into by BIL whereby the passive infrastructure was
transferred by it to a third party, namely, I. The return for the A.Y. 2008-09
was taken up for scrutiny assessment by notices u/s. 143(2) and 142 of the
Income-tax Act, 1961. Questionnaires were issued to which BIL responded
furnishing details and documents. Assessment was made. Thereafter, reassessment
proceedings were initiated and notice u/s. 148 issued on 01.04.2015.

The
assessee filed a writ petition and challenged the validity of the notice. The
Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

 

“i)   Explanation 1 to section 147 would not apply
as all the primary facts were disclosed, stated and were known and in the
knowledge of the Assessing Officer. This would be a case of ‘change of opinion’
as the assessee had disclosed and had brought on record all facts relating to
transfer of the passive infrastructure assets, their book value and fair market
value were mentioned in the scheme of arrangement, as also that the transferred
passive assets became property of I including the dates of transfer and the
factum that one-step subsidiary BIV was created for the purpose.

ii)   These facts were within the knowledge of the
Assessing Officer when he passed the original assessment order for A.Y.
2008-09. The notice of reassessment was not valid.”

 

 

THINK BEFORE YOU SPEAK, MR. CHAIRMAN!

The Securities and Exchange Board of India
(SEBI) recently charged the Chairman of a major listed FMCG company with making
a fraudulent/misleading statement. The reason? He had allegedly said to a
leading newspaper that he was interested in buying out a large competitor
listed company. According to SEBI, this resulted in a substantial rise in the
price of the shares of the competitor. Such rise in price is an expected result
when there is news that an acquisition is likely.

 

But soon, both the Chairman and his company,
as well as the competitor, clarified that no such buyout plans were afoot and
the price of the shares fell. SEBI alleged that this was a fraudulent/reckless
statement. Public shareholders who may have bought the shares on the basis of
the statement would have suffered a loss on account of this. Therefore, SEBI
levied a monetary penalty on the said Chairman.

 

While the Securities Appellate Tribunal
(SAT) exonerated the Chairman pointing out several errors of fact and law in
the SEBI order, this case raises critical issues, reminders and lessons on how
such price-sensitive matters should be handled. There are several provisions of
law that prescribe for care in dealing with price-sensitive information. It has
been found that companies/promoters deliberately and fraudulently “create”
price-sensitive information so that the market price rises owing to public
interest and then they can offload their shares (often held in proxy names) and
profit. Even in cases where there is no fraudulent intent, the concern may be
whether there was an element of negligence or irresponsibility.

 

Securities laws have several provisions for
handling price-sensitive information. These include prohibitions against abuse,
illegal leaking, timely disclosures, etc.

 

Let us consider this case first in a summary
manner and then consider the provisions of the law and also some related,
relevant issues.

 

SEBI’S ORDER LEVYING PENALTY AND THE SAT ORDER REVERSING IT


It appears that the Chairman of a leading
listed FMCG company gave an interview to a large daily newspaper. The reporter
asked whether his company was in the process of acquiring a leading competitor.
This was in the context of significant interest in the shares of the competitor
with there being higher volumes of trading and rapid rise in price; there also
appeared to be rumours of a significant acquisition of shares by a specified
but unnamed entity. The Chairman reportedly said that he would be interested to
buy out the competitor, though he added that he did not know who had acquired
that significant lot of shares in that company. SEBI alleged that the
publishing of this news resulted in a sharp increase in price and volumes.
Later, indeed on the afternoon of the very next trading day, the Chairman, his
company as well as the competitor company clarified that no such buyout was
envisaged. SEBI alleged that the price and volumes immediately fell the day
after that. The Chairman was alleged to have violated the provisions relating
to fraudulent/unfair trade practices and a penalty of Rs. 8 lakh was levied on
him (vide order dated 27.12.2017).

 

On appeal, SAT reversed the penalty [R.
S. Agarwal vs. SEBI (Appeal No. 63 of 2018, order dated 13.03.2019)]
. It
was noted that the rise in both price and volumes was much prior to the said
statement. Thus, there was already a market interest. It was pointed out that
analysts had projected higher profits/EPS for the company and that was also a
contributing factor. The Chairman or his company had not acquired/sold any
shares. The SAT even raised doubts about the authenticity of the press report.
Even otherwise, it does not make sense that a potential acquirer would make a
statement that may result in further increase in the price. As an important
point of law, SAT highlighted that the onus of proving such a serious
allegation of fraud in such a background rested on SEBI, which onus it did not
fulfil.
In conclusion, SAT reversed the order of penalty.

 

 

IMPORTANT PROVISIONS OF SECURITIES LAWS DEALING WITH PRICE-SENSITIVE INFORMATION


Proper handling of price-sensitive
information is a very important tenet of safeguarding the integrity of capital
markets as provided in securities laws. Price-sensitive information is required
to be carefully guarded. It should be disclosed in a timely manner – neither
too early so as to be premature and thus misleading, nor too late that there
are chances of leakage and abuse and that the public may be deprived of
knowledge of such significant price-sensitive information. It should be clear,
complete and precise, neither understating nor exaggerating anything.

 

Several provisions in the SEBI Insider
Trading Regulations, in the SEBI Regulations relating to Fraudulent and Unfair
Trade Practices (FUTP) and in the SEBI Listing Obligations and Disclosure
Requirements Regulations (“the LODR Regulations”), make elaborate provisions
relating to price-sensitive information.

 

The insider trading regulations have
price-sensitive information at the core. Insiders have access to
price-sensitive information and they are required to carefully handle it. The
Regulations have been progressively broadened over the years. There are several
deeming provisions. The Regulations even require a formal code of disclosure of
price-sensitive information to be made along prescribed lines that the company
must scrupulously follow. One requirement of this code, for example, requires
that selective disclosures should not be made to a section of public/analysts,
and if at all it is anticipated that this may happen, there should be parallel
disclosure for all. Dealings in shares by “designated persons”, who are close
insiders, are required to be carefully monitored and they can deal in them only
after prior permission and that, too, during a period when the trading window
is open.

 

The LODR Regulations require that material
developments be disclosed well in time. An elaborate list has been provided of
what constitute such material developments and an even more elaborate process
by which they should be decided upon and disclosed.

 

The FUTP Regulations particularly have
several provisions that deal with such price-sensitive information and how they
could constitute fraud. There are generic provisions which prohibit “any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance” or engaging in “any act,
practice, course of business which operates or would operate as fraud or deceit
upon any person in connection with any dealing in or issue of securities…”.
There are several specific provisions. One such provision, for example,
prohibits “publishing or causing to publish or reporting or causing to report
by a person dealing in securities any information which is not true or which he
does not believe to be true prior to or in the course of dealing in
securities”. Yet another provision prohibits “planting false or misleading news
which may induce sale or purchase of securities”. These practices are
considered fraudulent practices and can result in stiff penalties, prosecution
and other adverse consequences.

 

Thus, price-sensitive information has to be
handled delicately, and with full realisation of the impact it may potentially
have if there is under- or over-disclosure, too early or too late disclosure,
or misleading, fraudulent or even negligent disclosure. While there are
provisions that deal with fraudulent practices, even unintentional
acts/omissions would be severely dealt with. It is not surprising that
companies have — and are expected to have —carefully-laid-down procedures and
systems for dealing with such information.

 

ROLE OF CHAIRMAN / TOP MANAGEMENT IN DEALING WITH THE MEDIA OR OTHERWISE SHARING INFORMATION


The Chairman, the Managing Director, the
Company Secretary, etc., are often approached by the media for their views on
developments or even generally. Such persons may even engage on social media
(as in the recent Tesla case, discussed separately below). Often, even
authorities such as exchanges approach a company for a response to certain
rumours or news. Thus, engaging with outsiders is common and even expected of
the company executives. However, even one loose statement can have disastrous
consequences.

 

It is also important for promoters and
others to be aware that there are elaborate procedures and governance
requirements which have to be complied with. In the present case, the question
is whether the Chairman’s statement could be seen to be that of the company?
This is relevant because even the law requires approval of the Board and
recommendation/clearance of the Audit Committee in important matters. The
public does not view a statement by a Chairman or Managing Director as subject
to such conditions. Internal requirements are presumed to have been complied
with. A declaration by the Chairman, for example, that his company would be
buying out another company would be taken at face value and will have a market
reaction leading to unwanted consequences. Hence, it is important that
statements by such persons should be carefully worded. Ideally, a well-reviewed
press release should be released.

 

 

TESLA’S CASE


The importance for top management to be
careful while interacting with the public becomes even more important in these
days of social media where posts and comments are made several times a day,
often on the spur of the moment and without a second thought. Last year, it was
reported that Elon Musk, the Chairman of Tesla, tweeted that he intended to take
the company private and that funding for this purpose was secured. It was
alleged that this statement did not have sound basis. Eventually, in a reported
settlement, Musk had to resign as Chairman, accept a ban from office for at
least three years and he and Tesla had to pay $ 20 million each.


In addition, the company was required to add two independent directors and the
Board was required to keep a close watch on his public communications.

 

CONCLUSION

Corporate communications are no more meant
to be merely for public relations but have to be increasingly in compliance
with securities laws that require deft treading as in a minefield. Social media
is particularly vulnerable as proved by the Elon Musk episode. We have seen how
SEBI is monitoring and scrutinising social media reports and has even made
adverse orders relying on “friendships” and other connections. Messaging apps
like WhatsApp have also been reported to be used for sharing inside
information. On the other hand, there is often pressure, both internal and
external, to make statements. Exchanges, for example, want prompt responses to
rumours/news in the media to ensure that the official position of the company
is known to the public. The LODR Regulations provide for fairly short time
limits for sharing of material developments. In short, sharing of information,
plans and developments about the company requires more careful handling than
ever before.

 

The moral of the episode is: Think before you speak, Mr. Chairman,
though speak you must!

  

 

Section 54 – Condition of not owning more than a residential house on the date of transfer of the original asset would mean absolute ownership and does not cover within its sweep a case where the assessee jointly owns residential house together with someone else

16[2019] 105 taxmann.com 204 (Mum) Ashok G. Chauhan vs. ACIT ITA No. 1309/Mum/2016 A.Y.: 2010-11 Date of order: 12th
April, 2019

 

Section 54 –
Condition of not owning more than a residential house on the date of transfer
of the original asset would mean absolute ownership and does not cover within
its sweep a case where the assessee jointly owns residential house together
with someone else

 

FACTS

The
assessee, an individual, filed his return of income after claiming deduction
u/s. 54F of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (“the Act”) in respect of capital gains
arising from transfer of tenancy rights. In the course of re-assessment
proceedings, the Assessing Officer (AO) observed that the assessee was owner of
two residential houses, one of which was jointly held by him with his wife. The
AO rejected the claim for deduction u/s. 54F on the ground that the assessee
owned two flats on the date of transfer of tenancy rights.

 

Aggrieved,
the assessee preferred an appeal to the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals)
who upheld the order passed by the AO.

 

HELD

The
Tribunal observed that the Legislature has used the word ‘a’ before the words
‘residential house’ and held that what was meant was a complete residential
house and not shared interest in a residential house. It held that joint
ownership is different from absolute ownership and that ownership of
residential house means ownership to the exclusion of all others. The Tribunal
relied on the judgement of the Supreme Court in the case of Seth Banarasi
Dass Gupta vs. CIT [(1987) 166 ITR 783]
wherein it is held that a
fractional ownership was not sufficient for claiming even fractional
depreciation u/s. 32 of the Act.

 

The
Tribunal noted that because of this judgement, the Legislature had to amend
section 32 with effect from 1st April, 1997 by using the expression
‘owned wholly or partly’. But while the Legislature amended section 32 it chose
not to amend section 54F. The Tribunal held that since section 54F has not been
amended the word ‘own’ in section 54F would include only the case where a
residential house is fully and wholly owned by the assessee and consequently
would not include a residential house owned by more than one person.

 

Hence
it was held that the claim for exemption u/s. 54F could not be denied. The
appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

HAPPINESS

When you change the way you look at things, the
things you look at change
Wayne Dyer

 

Who does not want to be happy! However, the fact is that happiness
eludes us despite the fact that all our actions are motivated to be ‘happy’.
The issue is: can one predict or plan happiness or does ‘happiness happen’?
I believe when we plan for happiness it does not happen, because by nature we
harbour a doubt about whether our plan will work. There is a good old
saying ‘when you doubt power, you give power to doubt’.

 

I also believe ‘happiness happens’ because we have experienced
happiness without any effort on our part – for example, we are happy seeing a
flower bloom, the rising sun, the view of a beautiful moon or even a glance of
appreciation from another human being. Even a bird’s singing makes us happy.
What is the reason for this? This is because happiness is our nature. Happiness
has no reason – it happens when we are free from our concerns and worries even
for a second.

 

Despite the fact that we are all seekers of happiness – happiness is not
there. Have we stopped to observe in an elevator, or on the road, in a train or
bus, or even in a restaurant that people rarely sport a smile? A smile
represents happiness. So the issue is: where has happiness vanished? This is
despite the fact that according to every concept our nature is happiness and
all religions guide us to be happy – even an atheist seeks happiness. Nerenberg
says ‘we are living in a society that is overly serious’.

 

The fact is that
we have managed to cover happiness with our problems and concerns. To be happy
let us do our best and leave the result to HIM and, believe me, we will always
be happy. It is rightly said that effort and action are in one’s hands but not
the result. Acceptance of result is karma – based on the concept that
every action has a reaction and reaction is not in our hands. Accept the result
and be content with everything as the play of destiny – Destiny rules.

The irony is: “We confuse ‘happiness’ with ‘pleasure’
forgetting that ‘pleasure’ is transitory and ‘happiness’ is eternal because it
is our nature”. According to Dada Vaswani, happiness depends on our peace of
mind and peace of mind is not dependant on possessions. Let us celebrate what
we have. Oprah Winfrey says,

 

‘The more you celebrate your life, the more there
is in life to celebrate’

 

Happiness is not in possession or fame. Happiness is in living,
practising forgiveness and being consciously considerate to others and
ourselves and, above all, being conscious of the fact that happiness is our
nature – the source of ‘happiness’ is contentment.

 

I would conclude by quoting Bertrand Russell:

 

‘To be without some of the things you want is an
indispensable part of happiness’

 

To be happy,
do your best and be contented.



Section 4 of ITA, 1961 – Income – Capital or revenue – Sale of shares upon open offer letter – Additional consideration paid in terms of letter of open offer due to delay in making offer and dispatch of letter of offer – Additional consideration part of share price of original transaction not penal interest for delayed payment – Additional consideration was capital receipt

26 CIT vs. Morgan Stanley
Mauritius Co. Ltd.; 41 ITR 332 (Bom)
Date of order: 19th
March, 2019

 

Section 4 of ITA, 1961 – Income – Capital or revenue –
Sale of shares upon open offer letter – Additional consideration paid in terms
of letter of open offer due to delay in making offer and dispatch of letter of
offer – Additional consideration part of share price of original transaction
not penal interest for delayed payment – Additional consideration was capital
receipt

 

An
open offer was made by Oracle to the shareholders of I-flex at the price of Rs.
1,475 per share. The letter of open offer stated that additional consideration
per share would be paid due to delay in making the open offer and dispatch of
the letter of offer based on the time-line prescribed by the Securities and
Exchange Board of India. The consideration was revised to Rs. 2,084 per share
and the additional consideration for delay was revised to Rs. 16 per share. In
response to the open offer, the assessee tendered its holding of 13,97,879
shares in I-flex and received Rs. 2,89,77,45,900, which included additional
consideration of Rs. 2.20 crores. The Department contended that the additional
sum received was a revenue receipt and taxable in the hands of the assessee.

 

The
Tribunal held that the additional consideration received was for delayed
payment of principal and that it was part of the original consideration and
hence not taxable.

 

On
appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the
Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i)   The additional amount received by the
assessee was part of the offer from the sale of shares made by it. The reason
to have increased the sum per share by the company Oracle to the shareholders
of I-flex might be on account of delay of issuance of the shares, but it was
part of the sale price of the share. The revised offer which the company
announced for issuance of the shares included the additional component of the
increased sum per share and was embedded in the share price. This component
could not be treated as interest on delayed payment on price of the share.

 

ii)   The additional sum was part of the sale price
and retained the same character as the original price of the share. The
additional receipt of the assessee relatable to this component was a capital
receipt.”

Section 80-IB(10) of ITA, 1961 – Housing project – Special deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) – No condition in section as it stood at relevant time restricting allotment of more than one unit to members of same family – Allottees later removing partitions and combining two flats into one – No breach of condition that each unit should not be of more than 1,000 sq. ft. – Assessee entitled to deduction

25  Prinipal CIT vs. Kores India Ltd.; 414 ITR 47 (Bom) Date of order: 24th
April, 2019
A.Y.: 2009-10

 

Section 80-IB(10) of ITA, 1961 – Housing project –
Special deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) – No condition in section as it stood at
relevant time restricting allotment of more than one unit to members of same
family – Allottees later removing partitions and combining two flats into one –
No breach of condition that each unit should not be of more than 1,000 sq. ft.
– Assessee entitled to deduction

 

The
assessee was engaged in the business of constructing residential houses. He
constructed residential houses of less than 1,000 sq. ft. and claimed deduction
u/s. 80-IB(10) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The AO rejected the claim on the
ground that the assessee has breached the condition of 1,000 sq. ft. per flat
as several units adjacent to each other were allotted to members of the same
family.

 

The
Tribunal allowed the claim.

 

On
appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the
Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i)   At the relevant time when the housing project
was constructed and the residential units were sold, there was no condition in
section 80-IB(10) restricting the allotment of more than one unit to the
members of the same family. The assessee was therefore free to have allotted
more than one unit to members of the same family.

 

ii)   According to the materials on record, after
such units were sold under different agreements, the allottees had desired that
the partition wall between the two units be removed. It was the decision of the
members to remove the walls and not a case where the assessee had, from the
beginning, combined two residential units and allotted such larger unit to one
member.

 

iii)   The order of the Tribunal rejecting the
objections raised by the Department was not erroneous. No question of law
arose.”

 

Section 10(23C)(iiiab) of ITA, 1961 – Educational institution – Exemption u/s. 10(23C)(iiiab) – Condition precedent – Assessee must be wholly or substantially financed by Government – Meaning of “substantially financed” – Subsequent amendment to effect that if grants constitute more than specified percentage of receipts, assessee will be deemed “substantially financed” by Government – Can be taken as indicative of Legislative intent – Assessee receiving grant from Government in excess of 50% of its total receipts – Assessee entitled to benefit of exemption for years even prior to amendment

24  DIT (Exemption) vs. Tata Institute of Social Sciences; 413 ITR 305
(Bom)
Date of order: 26th
March, 2019
A.Y.s: 2004-05, 2006-07 and
2007-08

 

Section 10(23C)(iiiab) of ITA, 1961 – Educational
institution – Exemption u/s. 10(23C)(iiiab) – Condition precedent – Assessee
must be wholly or substantially financed by Government – Meaning of
“substantially financed” – Subsequent amendment to effect that if grants
constitute more than specified percentage of receipts, assessee will be deemed
“substantially financed” by Government – Can be taken as indicative of
Legislative intent – Assessee receiving grant from Government in excess of 50%
of its total receipts – Assessee entitled to benefit of exemption for years
even prior to amendment

 

The
assessee was a trust registered u/s. 12A of the Income-tax Act, 1961. For the
A.Y.s 2004-05, 2006-07 and 2007-08, it sought exemption u/s. 10(23C)(iiiab) on
the ground that it was substantially financed by the government. It was
submitted by the assessee before the AO that it was an institution solely for
educational purposes and that the grants received from the government were in
excess of 50% of the total expenditure incurred and the total receipts during
the years. The AO denied the benefit u/s. 10(23C)(iiiab) on the grounds that
the assessee was not substantially financed by the government and that the
grant received was less than 75% of the total expenditure. He referred to
section 14 of the Controller and Auditor General (Duties, Powers and Conditions
of Service) Act, 1971 and applied the measure of 75%.

 

The
Commissioner (Appeals) held that the 1971 Act was not applicable in the absence
of any reference to it and allowed the assessee’s appeal. The Tribunal found
that the grant from the government was approximately 56% of the total receipts
and upheld the order of the Commissioner (Appeals).

 

On
appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the
Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i)   Subsequent legislation might be looked at in
order to see what was the proper interpretation to be put upon the earlier
legislation, where the earlier Act was obscure or ambiguous or readily capable
of more than one interpretation. The same principle would apply to an amendment
made to an Act to understand the meaning of an ambiguous provision, even when
the amendment was not held to be retrospective. The Explanation to section
10(23C)(iiiab) inserted w.e.f. 1st April, 2015 which provides that
where the grant from the government was in excess of 50% of the assessee’s
total receipts, it would be treated as substantially financed by the
government, could be taken as the exposition of Parliamentary intent of the
unamended section 10(23C)(iiiab). The assessee was entitled to the benefits of
exemption u/s. 10(23C)(iiiab) for the assessment years prior to the
introduction of the Explanation.

 

ii)   The vagueness attributable to the meaning of
the words ‘substantially financed’ was removed by the addition of the
Explanation to section 10(23C)(iiiab) read with rule 2BBB of the Income-tax
Rules, 1962. The Explanation to section 10(23C)(iiiab) was introduced by the Finance
(No. 2) Act, 2014 w.e.f. 1st April, 2015 to clarify the meaning of
the words ‘substantially financed by the government’. It stated that the grant
of the government should be in excess of the prescribed receipts in the context
of total receipts (including voluntary donations). Rule 2BBB provided that the
government grant should be 50% of the total receipts. The assessee admittedly
satisfied the test of ‘substantially financed’ for the A.Y.s. 2006-07 and
2007-08 as the AO had recorded a finding in his order which was not disputed.
If the Explanation was to be read retrospectively, the orders of the
authorities would be required to measure the satisfaction of the words
‘substantially financed’ in terms of Explanation, i.e., qua total
receipts and not qua total expenditure.”

Sections 37 and 43B of ITA 1961 – Business expenditure – Deduction only on actual payment – Nomination charges levied by State Government emanating from a contract of lease – Not statutory liability falling under “tax, duty, cess or fee” by whatever name called in section 43B – Provision for allowance on actual payment basis not applicable

23 Tamil Nadu Minerals Ltd. vs. JCIT; 414 ITR 196
(Mad)
Date of order: 22nd
April, 2019
A.Y.: 2004-05

 

Sections 37 and 43B of ITA 1961 – Business expenditure
– Deduction only on actual payment – Nomination charges levied by State
Government emanating from a contract of lease – Not statutory liability falling
under “tax, duty, cess or fee” by whatever name called in section 43B –
Provision for allowance on actual payment basis not applicable

 

The
assessee was a State Government undertaking engaged in mining, quarrying,
manufacture and sale of granite blocks from the mines leased out to it by the
State. For the A.Y. 2004-05, the Assessing Officer (AO) disallowed u/s. 43B of
the Income-tax Act, 1961 the sum paid by the assessee as nomination charges at
the rate of 10% of the turnover to the State Government on the ground that the
payment was not made within the stipulated time allowed to file the return.

 

The
Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal upheld the AO’s order.

 

On
appeal by the assessee, the Madras High Court reversed the decision of the
Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i)   The object and parameters of section 43B are
defined and do not permit transgression of ‘other levies’ made by the State
Government in the realm of contractual laws to enter the specified zone of
impost specified in it.

 

ii)   The nomination charges specified and
prescribed by the State Government through various orders were none of the four
imposts, namely, tax, duty, cess or fees, specified u/s. 43B, which had to be
paid on time. It was only a contractual payment of lease rental specified by
the State Government being the lessor for which both the lessor and the lessee
had agreed at a prior point of time to fix and pay such prescription of
nomination charges. A mere reference to rule 8C(7) of the Tamil Nadu Minor
Minerals Concession Rule, 1959 did not make it a statutory levy, in the realm
of ‘tax, duty, cess or fees’. The reasons assigned by the authorities below on an
incorrect interpretation for application of section 43B made to the levy in
question were not sustainable.

 

iii)   Since section 43B did not apply to the
payments of ‘nomination charges’ the question of applying the rigour of payment
within the time schedule would not decide the allowability or otherwise of such
payment under the section, which would then depend upon the method of
accounting followed by the assessee; and if the assessee had made a provision
for the payment in its books of accounts and had claimed it as accrued
liability in the assessment year in question, it was entitled to the deduction
in the assessment year in question without any application of section 43B.”

GST @ 2 – A SHORT WISH LIST

The Editor of BCAJ assigned me the responsibility of writing an
article with the above title. What a thoughtful title this is! GST was launched
two years ago with much fanfare and celebrations on 1st July, 2017
and has substantially lived up to the expectations. The fireworks are now over.
The benefits of GST are there for the country to see. However, as it completes
two years of existence, the million-dollar question is “What next?” The
question begs attention also in the context of the results of the Lok Sabha
elections and the re-institution of the NDA government in its second term. With
the government looking towards a “New India” and simplified taxation under the
leadership of a new Finance Minister, it is now time to look at new ideas and
present a wish list which could capitalise on the journey traversed so far and
take India to the next trajectory in terms of consolidation, improving “Ease of
Doing Business” and putting the country on the path towards achieving a $5
trillion economy. So here we go:

 

1. EXPAND THE COVERAGE OF PRODUCTS AND
SERVICES UNDER GST


The success of GST is there for all to see. If, as legislators, we
believe that GST has been a path-breaking reform towards simplification of
indirect taxes, what forces us to exclude certain pockets of industry from reaping
the benefits of this simplification? The unanimity of numerous decisions taken
in the GST Council over the last couple of years has shown that the dynamics of
conflicting Centre-State interests no longer takes precedence over national
interest and that where there is a will, there is a way. If that be so, it’s
time to step away from the easy approach of providing excuses and postponing
the inevitable – and to take that bold step to include petroleum, real estate
and electricity into the GST Net.

 

Despite all noble intentions, exemptions from payment of tax are provided
under the legislation. At first brush, the industry welcomes such exemptions
and resists the withdrawal of such exemptions. However, as reality sinks in,
the industry realises that each exemption results in additional costs in terms
of denial of credits. Also, the innovative minds of the tax administrators can
result in a treatise of narrow interpretation of exemption entries resulting in
virtual uncertainty and rude shocks – a recent advance ruling denying the
benefit of exemption to skill development courses on a hyper-technical
distinction between the words ‘course’ and ‘programme’ being a case in point.
It is, therefore, time to relook at the list of exemptions and specifically identify
those that primarily pertain to the B2B sector. It may make sense to engage
with the impacted stakeholders and build a consensus towards moving from
exemption to a preferential rate of tax with seamless credits.

 

2. DO NOT DEVIATE – COME BACK TO THE CENTRAL
THEME OF SEAMLESS CREDITS


That brings us to the unique selling proposition (USP) of GST –
availability of seamless credits reducing the cascading impact of taxes across
the supply chain. This has been talked about so often that it has perhaps lost
its context. How else does one explain the deviations from this concept of
seamless credits in the case of restaurants and real estate developers? Let’s
look at the background of the changes in this regard. The GST rate of 12% and
18% on restaurants started impacting the consumer prices of food. The
government wants to control inflation and therefore decides to reduce the rate
to 5% – so far so good. But the government has revenue considerations as well
and finds it easy to deny input tax credit in such cases.

 

While trying to balance the interests of all stakeholders, we now end up
in a situation of damaging the core of the GST legislation, i.e., seamless
credits. And knowingly or unknowingly, we cooked up a recipe for endless
litigation – a series of advance rulings where the authorities need to
interpret the distinction between a restaurant and a shop are clearly
necessitated by such differential tax treatments for similar products. A
similar initiative to reduce the rate of tax on under-construction units coupled
with denial of credit to the real estate developer is another example, but
let’s leave the analysis thereof for some other time.

 

The impact is loud and clear – a lower output tax rate with denial of
input tax credit effectively means taking money out of businesses and putting
it in the hands of the consumer. While this objective sounds laudable, we need
to understand the economics of the free market which effectively nullifies this
objective in the shortest possible timeframe as businesses will increase the
base price to absorb the loss of input tax credit. An even louder and clearer
message – there should be no case of absolute denial of input tax credit. A
lower rate of output tax neither justifies nor empowers the government to
deviate from the core of GST, i.e., seamless credits.

 

Let’s also remember that we actually started with some deviation in the
form of ‘blocked credits’ right from 1st July, 2017. While the
hangover of the earlier tax regimes resulted in that deviation to start with,
there is no reason to continue with that deviation forever. Don’t we all
(including the government) believe and agree that the earlier tax regimes were
archaic and unjust? If that is the collective consensus, what makes us
collectively reconcile ourselves to some traces of such archaic laws with a
myopic vision? The wish list therefore is to eliminate altogether or at
least prune the list of goods and services which form a part of blocked
credits.

 

One more deviation from the core of GST is the concept of ‘reverse charge
mechanism’. While a cross-border reverse charge mechanism is understandable, a
domestic reverse charge mechanism is perhaps unique to India. To what extent is
it logical to shift the burden of levy from the supplier to the recipient? How
far is it correct to expect the recipient to not only pay the tax but also
maintain extensive documentation in the form of payment vouchers and ‘self
invoices’ – a term invented specifically for this context? And while expecting
the honest tax payer to do all this, we must not lose track of the fact that
all of this dilutes and interferes with the fundamental principles of GST like
credits, exemptions and the like.

 

Well, it’s time to accept that you cannot travel long distances in a
vehicle that’s in reverse gear – an accident is in the making. Can we not
eliminate all cases of domestic reverse charge mechanism? Remember, excise law
never had the reverse charge mechanism and many VAT laws had, out of
experience, dumped the obnoxious purchase tax (a simpler cousin of the reverse
charge mechanism) and the administrators were able to administer the law
without these crutches.

 

3. RESPECT LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES


Legislatures in India have been known to possess wide powers of
delegation. However, the legislature cannot delegate, in the words of the
Supreme Court, “unchannelised and uncontrolled power”. Thanks to the long-drawn
process of bringing about an amendment, the last two years witnessed only one
legislative amendment. However, what is important and bewildering is the countless
changes brought about through amendments in rules, removal of “difficulty”
orders, notifications and the like (averaging at more than one a day – see the
next point for statistics). Whether it be suspension of tax on advances for
goods, or the composition option provided to service providers, the
substitution of the return filing process, or a fundamentally new scheme of
apportionment of credit based on carpet area for real estate developers, all of
these conveniently found place through such non-legislative processes.

 

History is full of situations where courts have interfered and placed a
very low priority on such provisions not contained in the Act but in the rules
and notifications. It’s time to learn from such experiences and not place the cart
before the horse. It really is time to comprehensively review the legislation
and bring about amendments in the law to simplify processes, realign to ground
level realities and synchronise the government intent with that prescribed in
the law. At the end of the day, the law is the best reflection of government
intent.

 

4. CONSOLIDATE THE JOURNEY SO FAR


The journey of two years resulted in the issuance inter alia of
179 Central tax notifications, 87 Central tax rate notifications, 19 integrated
tax notifications, 90 integrated tax rate notifications, 101 Central tax
circulars, four integrated tax circulars, 17 Central tax orders and ten removal
of difficulty orders. Coupled with UT tax notifications and circulars, ignoring
state tax notifications and circulars to avoid duplication, we still end up
with a total count of 773 documents at an average of more than one per day!

 

We are yet to factor in the sector-specific booklets, FAQs, press
releases, Twitter responses, flyers and what not! Time and again, governments
have realised that such overdose has resulted in chaos rather than clarity. The
concept of master circulars and notifications is not alien to our legislators.
Before things really go out of control, it is time to have one master
notification covering all exemptions and concessions and one master
clarification (like an education guide) replacing all existing circulars and
clarifications.

 

5. LOOK AT THE BIGGER PICTURE


Along with the comprehensive review of the legislations and the
amendments, it is also time to have a relook at the policy. As accountants, we
understand the concept of materiality. In management parlance, we say “look at
the big picture”. If there are hardly any exemptions or exclusions, does it
make sense to have a complicated mechanism to determine the proportion of
ineligible credits? How does one reconcile to the requirement of reverse
credits on account of transactions in securities? What is the revenue generated
by the government and whether the time and efforts of millions of tax payers,
their accountants and consultants is justified in generating this revenue? Can
we not liberate ourselves from these shackles? What is the rationale of
demanding interest on gross tax before utilisation of credit? Why can’t the
processes for export refunds be simplified? Why is such an elaborate definition
of “business” required?

 

At one point of time, we had wealth tax and it was observed that the cost
of collecting wealth tax was more than the revenue it generated. Naturally,
wiser counsel prevailed and we scrapped the tax itself. While there is no case
for scrapping GST, it’s definitely time to carry out an analysis of each of the
provisions of the law and review the revenue generated vis-à-vis the time and
efforts involved in compliance with every specific provision. The data will
speak for itself and guide us on the way forward for substantial simplification
in the law and processes.

 

6. IN AN OCEAN, EACH DROP COUNTS


Having highlighted the need to not miss the woods for the trees, it is
also important to count the trees. After all, in an ocean each drop counts.
Many associations and chambers including ICAI and BCAS have time and again sent
representations to highlight the difficulties in the existing legislation. This
article is not one where the entire laundry list can be reproduced or
discussed. But an indicative sample will definitely not be out of place:

 

a.  Delete definitions which are
obsolete and realign conflicting definitions. The legislature is not expected
to miss words or to add superfluous words in the statute. Let’s align the GST
legislation with this time-tested expectation. For example, how does one
justify the simultaneous existence of the definition of ‘associated
enterprises’ and ‘related person’?

b.  While it is notable that levy of
GST is restricted to supplies made in the course or furtherance of business,
the very wide definition of business, and even wider interpretation canvassed
by a few advance rulings, virtually make the definition redundant. It’s time to
realign the definition to what it could logically mean.

c.  The term ‘service’ is defined to
mean anything other than goods. While the definition is picked up from
international experiences, the framework is not comparable. In the absence of a
full-fledged GST, such a wide definition of service results in indirectly
taxing subjects which are outside the purview of GST (for example, development
rights in land). A more specific definition like the one under the erstwhile
service tax legislation may be a good reference point.

d.  The benefit of refunds on
account of inverted rate structure needs to be extended to services as well.

e.  The advance ruling authority
should also consist of judicial members. Similarly, the appellate Tribunal
should have more or at least equal numbers of judicial and non-judicial
members.

 

7. SIMPLIFY PROCESSES

It is often said that a bad law which is administered well is better than
a good law which is not administered well. Tax collection and administration
processes should be such that they are simple, stable and fair. While use of
technology for tax collection and administration cannot be disputed, the
processes will have to consider situations where the technology or systems
fail. A human touch may then be required. Having said that, the element of subjectivity
needs to be kept at the bare minimum in such face-to-face interactions. Again,
a lot has been said and written about the desired process improvements, but let
me just take the case of returns. There is really no reason not to permit the
revision of returns filed. After all, we know that to err is human. And if so,
an opportunity to revise the return has to be provided.

 

8. DON’T OVERSTRETCH INTERPRETATIONS

Taxation of
services always flummoxed the administrators. Fearing the risk of ridicule and
censure from the CAG, it was not uncommon for the superintendents to
overstretch the interpretations to factual situations. When an employee resigns
from the company and the company recovers notice period pay from his full and
final settlement, a view is canvassed that the company renders a service to the
employee – the service of tolerating the act of the employee prematurely
terminating his employment! Is this not an overstretched interpretation?

 

Again, when a
cost-benefit analysis is undertaken, where do we see the data point in terms of
cost of compliance and revenue generated? When the CFO of a company
headquartered in Maharashtra attends a tax hearing in Delhi, does the
Maharashtra branch render services to the Delhi branch? If yes, we enter the fragile
territory of interpretations – one could even contend that the Delhi branch
rendered services to the Mumbai branch by facilitating the CFO to attend the
hearing. We may even end up with a maze of dotted lines with absolute zero
clarity on the head or the tail of each arrow. It’s time to live naturally and
not overstretch and draw unnecessary dotted lines.

 

9.    SWIM
WITH THE TIDE

It is generally understood that tax is a sub-set of business. It is
expected to facilitate business and not conflict with the natural flow of
business. Let’s take the case of the supply chain of pharmaceuticals. Due to
the peculiar nature of the products, there is reverse logistics in the form of
rejections and sales returns. Necessarily, such rejections and sales returns go
on to reduce the sales of the organisation and are supported by credit notes.
But a clarification in GST law permits the buyer to issue a tax invoice for
such rejections. Is this not swimming against the tide? Could this have
implications in terms of accounting and legal relationships? Let’s not create
conflicting sets of documentation and then aim for reconciliations between
them.

 

10.     BURY
THE PAST

In one of the earlier wish lists, the problem of overstretched
interpretation was highlighted. The earlier tax regimes generated sufficient
baggage of litigation which still exists in the pipeline. Showing their wisdom,
many state governments announced amnesty schemes to reduce litigation under the
VAT regimes. It is time for the Central government to take a cue from this and
announce an amnesty scheme for pending litigation under the service tax, excise
duty and customs duty laws. This will help bury the past.

 

CONCLUSION

I can go on and on. However, the Editor has cautioned me to restrict
myself to around 2,500 words. I am sure that there are many more items which
could enter this wish list but I have chosen to limit myself to ten important
wishes at a macro level. This article is not a balance sheet of the GST law but
only suggests a few critical action points for the way forward!

 

Over to you,
Madam Finance Minister.

STARTUPS

The best
education that anyone can have is getting out there and doing it

Richard Branson

 

Entrepreneurship
is one of the finest expressions of the human spirit. Over the ages we have
seen and benefited from this quality of bringing thought to fruition, of being
able to imagine something and also making it happen. Very few things exhilarate
a person more than creating something. It’s magical, but it’s not a trick. The
movement from I CAN DO IT to DOING IT actually, is often difficult but
invigorating.

 

Entrepreneurship
is one of the oldest human endeavours. It has a multi-dimensional impact from
the social to the financial arena. Many startups have made millionaires out of
ordinary people. It not only works for founders but entire founding teams and
others. It injects competition and innovation. It disrupts and yet creates. An
important point is the attitude startups have towards innovation compared to
large companies. Startups innovate in breakthrough technologies and large
companies mostly in incremental ones (predictable and risk-controlled).
Startups have a wave effect. Many founders worked previously with other
startups. The chance of winning is low but the winner gets colossal returns.

 

This
Annual Special issue of BCAJ is focussing on startups. Recently, India has seen
huge growth in this area. Almost everyone has been touched by them in some way
or other – digital wallets, taxis, e-commerce, food delivery, online insurance
and loans, software as a service (SaaS), hotel aggregator, messaging app,
online grocery, music streaming and more. Twenty six of them have become
‘unicorns’ at the end of 2018. (China created one unicorn every 3.8 days in
2018 in comparison and had 186 unicorns in total with a combined valuation of 1
trillion Yuan.) India still remains the third largest in terms of number of
unicorns.

 

A recent
news report1  from a survey of
33,000 startups in India said corruption and bureaucracy were the biggest
challenges. Only 88 startups have benefited from section 80-IAC. According to
the definition in this section, even Facebook and Apple would not have
qualified for the benefits had this section been there at the time of their
inception! Clearly, the landscape and policies need to be conducive and
constructive.

 

Take the issue
of registering a patent. Patent registration takes four to six years in India.
If bureaucrats decide eligibility, there is no light at the end of the tunnel;
115BBF should be allowed to all and not just patent-registered startups. The
preposterous attitude of government is perhaps the single largest impediment to
business today. It’s late, yet the government must understand the hundreds of
benefits arising out of having a healthy startup eco-system. Take the case of
China where 80,000 companies in strategic emerging industries received services
from government-run incubators. The Chinese government runs a 40-billion Yuan
fund. The Beijing City government has set up a fintech and blockchain
industrial park as part of its selective resource allocation and favourable
regulatory environment and drives it as a national agenda. The Chinese central
bank is one of the world’s largest patent-holders in blockchain technology. The
startup eco-system could therefore be one of the finest ways to increase the
tax base and generate meaningful and gainful employment.

 

This
Annual Special issue covers three important topics – valuation of startups,
startups as an investment class and taxation of startups. We also carry two
very interesting interviews – one with the co-founder of an early-stage fintech
startup and another with the CFO of a 12-year-old company that recently had a
merger valued at $1 billion with Jio Music. I hope you enjoy reading these
alongside the budget proposals!


 

Raman
Jokhakar

Editor

 

CO-OWNERSHIP AND EXEMPTION UNDER SECTION 54F

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION

An assessee,
whether an individual or an HUF, is exempted from payment of income tax on
capital gains arising from the transfer of any long-term capital asset, not
being a residential house, u/s. 54F of the Income-tax Act on the purchase or
construction of a residential house within the specified period. This exemption
from tax is subject to fulfilment of the other conditions specified in section
54F. One of the important conditions required to be satisfied in order to be
eligible for claiming exemption u/s. 54F is about the ownership of another
residential house, other than the one in respect of which the assessee intends
to claim the exemption, as on the date of transfer of the asset.

 

This limitation on ownership of another
house is placed in the Proviso to section 54F(1). Till the assessment year
2000-01, the condition was that the assessee should not own any other
residential house on the date of transfer other than the new house in respect
of which the assessee intends to claim the exemption. Thereafter, the rigours
of the Proviso to section 54F(1) were relaxed by amending the same by the
Finance Act, 2000 w.e.f. 1st April, 2001 so as to provide that the
assessee owning one residential house as on the date of transfer of the
original asset, other than the new house, is also eligible to claim the
exemption u/s. 54F. This condition prescribed by item (i) of clause (a) of the
Proviso to section 54F(1) reads as under: “Provided that nothing contained
in this sub-section shall apply where – (a) the assessee – (i) owns more than
one residential house, other than the new asset, on the date of transfer of the
original asset; or…”

 

Therefore, ownership of more than one
residential house, on the date of transfer, is fatal to the claim of exemption
u/s. 54F.

 

In respect of this condition, the
controversy has arisen in cases where the assessee is a co-owner of a house
besides owning one house on the date of the transfer. The question that has
arisen is whether the residential house which is not owned by the assessee
exclusively but is co-owned jointly with some other person should also be
considered while ascertaining the number of houses owned by the assessee as on
the date of transfer of the original asset. The issue involves the
interpretation of the terms ‘owns’ and ‘more than one residential house’ as
used in the provision concerned.

 

The Madras High Court has allowed the
exemption by holding that the co-ownership of a house as on the date of
transfer of the original capital asset was not an impediment in the claim of
exemption, while the Karnataka High Court has denied the benefit of exemption
by considering the house jointly owned by the assessee with others as the house
owned by the assessee which disqualified the assessee from claiming the
exemption.

 

The conflict was first examined by BCAJ
in March, 2014 when the controversy was fuelled by the two conflicting decisions
of the appellate Tribunal. In the case of Rasiklal N. Satra, 98 ITD 335,
the Mumbai bench of the Tribunal had taken a stand that the co-ownership of a
house at the time of transfer does not amount to ownership of a house and is
not an impediment for the claim of exemption u/s. 54F; on the other hand, the
Hyderabad bench of the Tribunal had denied the benefit of section 54F in the Apsara
Bhavana Sai case, 40 taxmann.com 528
where the assesses have been found
to be holding a share in the ownership of the house as on the date of transfer
of the asset. This difference of view continues at the high court level and
therefore requires a fresh look.

 

THE DR. P. K. VASANTHI RANGARAJAN CASE

The issue first came up for consideration of
the Madras High Court in the case of Dr. P.K. Vasanthi Rangarajan vs. CIT
[2012] 209 Taxman 628 (Madras)
. In this case, the long-term capital
gains arising from the execution of a joint development agreement was offered
to tax in the return of income for the assessment year (AY) 2001-02 and the
corresponding exemption was claimed u/s. 54F on reinvestment of such gains in
purchasing the residential premises. However, considering the fact that
possession of the property was handed over in the previous year relevant to AY
2000-01, the assessee finally conceded the view of the  assessing officer that the gains were taxable
in AY 2000-01. So, the exemption provisions contained in section 54F, as it
then stood prior to the amendment by the Finance Act, 2000, effective from 1st
April, 2001, were applicable to the case.

 

So far as the exemption u/s. 54F was
concerned, the AO observed that the assessee owned 50% share in the property
situated at 828 and 828A, Poonamallee High Road which consisted of a clinic on
the ground floor and a residential portion on the first floor. The balance 50%
share was owned by the husband of the assessee. In view of the fact that the
assessee owned a residential house as on the date of transfer of the rights by
virtue of the development agreement, the exemption u/s. 54F was denied by the
AO as the conditions prescribed therein in his opinion were not satisfied. The
CIT (A) confirmed the rejection of the claim by the AO.

 

On appeal by the assessee, the Tribunal
rejected the assessee’s claim u/s. 54F on the ground that the assessee was the
owner of 50% share in the residential property on the date of transfer and as a
result was disentitled to the benefit of section 54F inasmuch as she was found
to be the owner of the premises other than the new house on the date of
transfer. It was held that even though the property was not owned fully, yet, as
the assessee was having 50% share in the residential property, the conditions
envisaged u/s. 54F were not fully satisfied, hence the assessee was not
entitled to exemption u/s. 54F.

 

It was innovatively claimed before the High
Court on behalf of the assessee that the assessee’s share in the property was
to be taken as representing the clinic portion alone and that the residential
portion being in the name of her husband, the proviso denying the exemption
u/s. 54F had no application to the assessee’s case. However, this contention
was found to be contrary to the facts of the case by the High Court. The
assessee as well as her husband had offered 50% share each in the income of the
clinic in the income-tax assessment and had claimed depreciation thereon. Besides,
50% share in the said property in the wealth tax proceedings was offered by the
assessee and her husband.

 

It was further argued that for grant of
exemption u/s. 54F, the limitation applied only where the premises in question
were a residential house, was owned in the status as an individual or an HUF as
on the date of the transfer; that holding the house jointly could not be held
to be owned in the status of individual or HUF. As against this, the Revenue
contended that the co-ownership of another house as on the date of transfer,
even in part, would disentitle the assessee of the benefit of section 54F and
the proviso would be applicable to her case.

 

Given the fact that the assessee had not
exclusively owned the house, but owned it jointly with her husband, the High
Court held that unless and until the assessee was the exclusive owner of the
residential property, the harshness of the proviso to section 54F could not be
applied to deny the exemption. A reading of section 54F, the court noted, clearly
pointed out that the holding of the residential house as on the date of
transfer had relevance to the status of the assessee as an individual or HUF
and when the assessee, as an individual, did not own any property in the status
of an individual as on the date of transfer, joint ownership of the house would
not stand in the way of claiming an exemption u/s. 54F. Accordingly, the High
Court allowed the exemption to the assessee.

 

THE M.J. SIWANI CASE

The issue, thereafter, came up for
consideration of the Karnataka High Court in CIT vs. M.J. Siwani [2014]
366 ITR 356 (Karnataka)
.

 

In this case,
the assessee and his brother, H.J. Siwani, jointly owned a property at 28,
Davis Road, Bangalore which consisted of land and an old building. During the
year relevant to the assessment year 1997-98, they transferred this property by
executing an agreement to sell. The resultant long-term capital gains arising
on the transfer of the said property was claimed to be exempt u/s. 54 or, in
the alternative, u/s. 54F. The claim of exemption was denied on various grounds
including for owning few more houses as a co-owner on the date of the transfer.

 

The claim of exemption u/s. 54F was denied
since as on the date of transfer, both the assessees owned two residential
houses having one-half share each therein. As the assessee was in possession of
a residential house on the date on which the transaction resulting in long-term
capital gains took place, the AO as well as the first appellate authority
refused to grant any benefit either u/s. 54 (for reasons not relevant for our
discussion) or u/s. 54F in respect of capital gains income derived by the
assessees.

 

The Tribunal, on appeal, however, reversed
the findings of the authorities below holding that ‘a residential house’ meant
a complete (exclusively owned) residential house and would not include a shared
interest in a residential house; in other words, where a property was owned by
more than one person it could not be said that any one of them was the owner. A
shared property, as observed by the Tribunal, continued to be of the co-owners
and such joint ownership was different from absolute ownership. The Tribunal
relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Seth Banarasi Dass Gupta
vs. CIT [1987] 166 ITR 783
wherein it was held that a fractional
ownership was not sufficient for claiming even fractional depreciation u/s. 32
as it stood prior to the amendment with effect from 1st April, 1997 whereby the
expression ‘owned wholly or partly’ was inserted.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the High Court,
allowing the appeal held that even where the residential house was shared by
the assessee, his right and ownership in the house, to whatever extent, was
exclusive and nobody could take away his right in the house without due process
of law. In other words, a co-owner was the owner of a house in which he had a
share and that his right, title and interest was exclusive to the extent of his
share and that he was the owner of the entire undivided house till it was
partitioned. The Court observed that the right of a person, might be one half,
in the residential house could not be taken away without due process of law and
such right continued till there was a partition of such residential house.
Disagreeing with the view of the Tribunal, the High Court decided the issue in
favour of the Revenue denying the exemption u/s. 54F to both the assessees by
holding that the ownership of a house, though jointly, violated the condition
of section 54F and the benefit could not be granted to the assessees.

 

OBSERVATIONS

The issue as to whether the expression “owns
more than one residential house” covers the case of co-ownership of the house
or not can be examined by comparing it with the expressions used in other
provisions of the Act. In this regard, a useful reference may be made to the
provisions of section 32 which expressly covers the cases of whole or part
ownership of an asset for grant of depreciation. The term ‘wholly or partly’
used after the term ‘owned’ in section 32(1) clearly conveys the legislative
intent of covering an asset that is partly owned for grant of depreciation. In
its absence, it was not possible for a co-owner of an asset to claim the
depreciation as was held in the case of Seth Banarasi Dass Gupta (Supra).
In that case, a fractional share in an asset was not considered as coming
within the ambit of single ownership. It was held that the test to determine a
single owner was that “the ownership should be vested fully in one single
name and not as joint owner or a fractional owner”. The provisions of
section 32 were specifically amended thereafter to insert the words ‘wholly or
partly’ in order to extend the benefit of depreciation to the assessee owning
the relevant assets in part.

 

Since the words ‘wholly or partly’ have not
been used in the Proviso to section 54F(1), its scope cannot be extended to
even include the residential house which is owned partly by the assessee or is
co-owned by him and to deny the benefit of exemption thereby. The Tribunal did
decide the issue in the case of M.J. Siwani (supra) by relying
upon the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Seth
Banarasi Dass Gupta (Supra)
.Following the very same decision of the
Supreme Court, very recently, the Mumbai bench of the Tribunal has also decided
this issue in favour of the assessee in the case of Ashok G. Chauhan
[2019] 105 taxmann.com 204.

 

Further, section 54F uses different terms,
‘a residential house’, ‘any residential house’ and ‘one residential house’ at
different places. It is also worth noting that one expression has been replaced
by another expression through the amendments carried out in the past as
summarised below:

AMENDMENTS
AND THEIR EFFECT

Prior to the Finance Act, 2000

Main provision of section 54F(1) used the term ‘a
residential house’, the purchase or construction of which entitled the
assessee to claim the exemption;

Proviso to section 54F(1) used the term ‘any
residential house’, the ownership of which disentitled the assessee to claim
the exemption

Amendment by the Finance Act, 2000

A new Proviso was inserted replacing the old Proviso
whereunder the expression ‘more than one residential house’ was used.
After the amendment, the assessee owning more than one residential house was
disentitled to claim the exemption; The main provision remained unchanged

Amendment by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2014

The main provision was also amended replacing the expression
‘a residential house’ by ‘one residential house’

 

The expression ‘one
residential house’ used in the Proviso in contrast to the other expressions
would mean one, full and complete residential house, exclusively owned, as
distinguished from the partial interest in the house though undivided. Holding
such a view may cut either way and might lead to the denial of exemption in the
case where the assessee has acquired a partial interest in the residential
house and seeks to claim the benefit of exemption from gains on the strength of
such reinvestment. The main operative part of section 54F itself now refers to
‘one residential house’.

 

In our opinion, for
the benefit of reinvestment of gains the case of the assessee requires to be
tested under the main provision and not the Proviso thereto. One should be able
to distinguish its implication on the basis of the fact that the subsequent amendment
replacing ‘a residential house’ by ‘one residential house’ in the main
provision is intended to deny the exemption where  more than one house is acquired and not for
denying the exemption in cases where a share or a partial interest in one house
is acquired. In any case, the provisions being beneficial provisions, the
interpretation should be in favour of conferring the benefit against the denial
thereof, more so where two views are possible.

 

Further, since the
provisions of section 54F apply only to an individual or an HUF, owning of the
house by the assessee in his status as individual or HUF is relevant for the
purpose of Proviso to section 54F(1) as held by the Madras High Court. If the
residential house is owned by a group of individuals and not by the individual
alone, then that should not be considered as impediment in the claim of
exemption.

The ratio of the
Supreme Court decision in the case of
Dilip Kumar
and Co. (TS-421-SC-2018)
holding that the
notification conferring an exemption should be interpreted strictly and the
assessee should not be given the benefit of ambiguity, would not be applicable
where two views are legitimately possible and the benefit is being sought under
the provisions of the statute and not under a notification. The inference that
ownership of the house should not include part ownership of the house flows
from the Supreme Court decision in the case of Seth Banarasi Dass Gupta
(Supra)
and it can be said that there is no ambiguity in its
interpretation.

 

It may be noted that the assessee had filed
a Special Leave Petition before the Hon’ble Supreme Court against the decision
of the Karnataka High Court in the case of M.J. Siwani (supra) which
has been dismissed. However, as held by the Supreme Court in the case of Kunhayammed
vs. State of Kerala [2000] 113 Taxman 470 (SC),
dismissal of SLP would
neither attract the doctrine of merger so as to stand substituted in place of
the order put in issue before it, nor would it be a declaration of law by the
Supreme Court under Article 141 of the Constitution for there is no law which
has been declared. Therefore, it cannot be said that the view of the Karnataka
High Court has been affirmed by the Supreme Court.

 

The better view, in our considered opinion,
is that the premises held on co-ownership should not be considered to be
‘owned’ for the purposes of the application of restrictions contained in
Proviso to section 54F(1) of the Income-tax Act so as to enable the claim of
exemption.

THE ANCESTRAL PROPERTY CONUNDRUM

INTRODUCTION

Hindu Law is often difficult to understand because most of it
is uncodified and based on customs and rituals, while some of it is based on
enactments. One feature of Hindu Law which attracts a lot of attention is “ancestral
property
”. After the 2005 amendment to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 this
issue has gained even more traction. One controversy in this area is whether
ancestral property received by a person can be transferred away.

 

WHAT IS ANCESTRAL PROPERTY?

Under the Hindu Law, the term “ancestral property” as
generally understood means any property inherited from three generations above
of male lineage, i.e., from the father, grandfather, great grandfather. The
Punjab and Haryana High Court has held that property inherited by a Hindu male
from his father, grandfather or great grandfather is ancestral for him – Hardial
Singh vs. Nahar Singh AIR 2010 (NOC) 1087 (P&H)
. Hence, property
inherited from females, such as mothers, etc., would not fall within the
purview of ancestral property. The same High Court, in the case of Harendar
Singh vs. State (2008) 3 PLR 183 (P&H)
, has held that property
received by a mother from her sons is not ancestral in nature. Further, three
generations downwards automatically get a right in such ancestral property by
virtue of being born in the family. Thus, the son, grandson and great grandson
of a Hindu all have an automatic right in ancestral property which is deemed to
be joint property. This view has also been held by the Privy Council in Muhammad
Hussain Khan vs. Babu Kishva Nandan Sahai, AIR 1937 PC 238.

 

View-1: Ancestral property cannot be alienated

One commonly accepted view in relation to ancestral property
is that if the person inheriting it has sons, grandsons or great grandsons,
then it becomes joint family property in his hands and his lineal descendants
automatically become coparceners along with him. In Ganduri Koteshwaramma
vs. Chakiri Yanadi, (2011) 9 SCC 788
, the Court held that the effect of
the 2005 amendment to the Hindu Succession Act was that the daughter of a
coparcener had the same rights and liabilities in the coparcenary property as
she would have had if she had been a son and this position was unambiguous and
unequivocal. Thus, on and from 9th September, 2005, according to this view, the
daughter would also be entitled to a share in the ancestral property and would
become a coparcener as if she had been a son.

 

A corollary of property becoming ancestral property is that
it cannot be willed away or alienated in any other manner by the person who
inherits it. Thus, if a person receives ancestral property and he has either a
son and / or a daughter then he would not be entitled to transfer such ancestral
property other than to his children. Hence, he cannot under his Will give it to
his son in preference over his daughter or vice versa. This has been the
generally prevalent view when it comes to ancestral property as modified by the
Hindu Succession Act amendment which placed daughters on an equal footing with
sons. Of course, if a person inherits ancestral property and he has no lineal
descendants up to three degrees downwards, male or female, then in any event he
is free to do what he wants with such property. Further, this concept only
applies to inheritance of property, i.e., property received on intestate
succession of the deceased.

 

JURISPRUDENCE ON THE SUBJECT

This concept of ancestral
property automatically becoming joint coparcenary property has undergone
significant changes. The Supreme Court in the case of CWT vs. Chander Sen
(1986) 161 ITR 370 (SC)
examined the issue of whether the income /
asset which a son inherits from his father when separated by partition should
be assessed as income of the HUF of the son or as his individual income /
wealth? The Court referred to the effect of section 8 of the Hindu Succession
Act, 1956 which lays down the general rules of succession in the case of males.
The first rule is that the property of a male Hindu dying intestate shall
devolve according to the provisions of chapter II and class I of the schedule
provides that if there is a male heir of class I, then upon the heirs mentioned
in class I of the schedule. The heirs mentioned in class I of the schedule are
son, daughter, etc., including the son of a predeceased son but does not
include specifically the grandson, being a son of a son living.

 

Therefore, the short
question is, when the son as heir of class I of the schedule inherits the
property, does he do so in his individual capacity or does he do so as karta
of his own undivided family? The Court held that in view of the preamble to the
Act, i.e., that to modify where necessary and to codify the law, it was not
possible that when schedule indicates heirs in class I to say that when son
inherits the property in the situation contemplated by section 8 he takes it as
karta of his own undivided family. The Act makes it clear by section 4 that one
should look to the Act in case of doubt and not refer to the pre-existing Hindu
law. Thus, it held that the son succeeded to the asset in his individual
capacity and not as a karta of his HUF.

 

Again, in Yudhishter vs. Ashok Kumar, 1987 AIR 558,
the Supreme Court followed its aforesaid earlier decision and held that it
would be difficult to hold that property which devolved on a Hindu under
section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 would be HUF property in his hand
vis-a-vis his own sons. Thus, it held that the property which devolved upon the
father of the respondent in that case on the demise of his grandfather could
not be said to be HUF property.

 

Once again, in Bhanwar Singh vs. Puran (2008) 3 SCC 87,
it was held that having regard to section 8 of the Act, the properties ceased
to be joint family property and all the heirs and legal representatives of the
deceased would succeed to his interest as tenants-in-common and not as joint
tenants. In a case of this nature, the joint coparcenary did not continue. The
meaning of joint tenancy is that each co-owner has an undefined right and
interest in property acquired as joint tenants. Thus, no co-owner can say what
is his or her share. One other important feature of a joint tenancy is that
after the death of one of the joint tenants, the property passes by
survivorship to the other joint tenant and not by succession to the heirs of
the deceased co-owner. Whereas tenants-in-common is the opposite of joint
tenancy since the shares are specified and each co-owner in a tenancy in common
can state what share he owns in a property. On the death of a co-owner, his
share passes by succession to his heirs or to the beneficiaries under the Will
and not to the surviving co-owners.

The Supreme Court in Uttam vs. Saubhag Singh, Civil
Appeal 2360/2016 dated 02/03/2016
held that on a conjoint reading of
sections 4, 8 and other provisions of the Act, after joint family property has
been distributed in accordance with section 8 on principles of intestacy, the
joint family property ceases to be joint family property in the hands of the
various persons who succeeded to it and they hold the property as tenants in
common and not as joint tenants.

 

View-2: Ancestral Property becomes Sole Property

The Delhi High Court has
given a very telling decision and a diametrically opposite view in the case of Surender
Kumar vs. Dhani Ram, CS(OS) No. 1732/2012
dated 18/01/2016.
In this case, the issue was whether the properties of the deceased were HUF
properties in the hands of his legal heirs. The grandson of the deceased
claimed a share as a coparcener in the properties since they were inherited by
his grandfather as joint family properties and hence, they continued to be so.
The Delhi High Court negated this claim and laid down the following principles
of law as regards joint family properties:

 

(a) Inheritance of
ancestral property after 1956 (the year in which the Hindu Succession Act was
enacted) does not create an HUF property and inheritance of ancestral property
after 1956 therefore does not result in creation of an HUF property;

(b) Ancestral property can
only become an HUF property if inheritance is before 1956 and such HUF property
which came into existence before 1956 continues as such even after 1956;

(c) If a person dies after
passing of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and there is no HUF existing at the
time of the death of such a person, inheritance of an immovable property of
such a person by his heirs is no doubt inheritance of an “ancestral property”
but the inheritance is as a self-acquired property in the hands of the legal
heir and not as an HUF property, although the successor(s) indeed inherits
“ancestral property”, i.e., a property which belonged to his ancestor;

(d) The only way in which a
HUF / joint Hindu family can come into existence after 1956 (and when a joint
Hindu family did not exist prior to 1956) is if an individual’s property is
thrown into a common hotchpotch;

(e) An HUF can also exist if paternal ancestral properties
are inherited prior to 1956, and such status of parties qua the properties has
continued after 1956 with respect to properties inherited prior to 1956 from
paternal ancestors. Once that status and position continues even after 1956 of
the HUF and of its properties existing, a coparcener, etc., will have a right
to seek partition of the properties;

(f) After passing of the
Hindu Succession Act, 1956, if a person inherits a property from his paternal
ancestors, the said property is not an HUF property in his hands and the
property is to be taken as self-acquired property of the person who inherits
the same.

 

Accordingly, the Court held that a mere averment that
properties were ancestral could not make them HUF properties unless it was
pleaded and shown that the grandfather had inherited the same prior to 1956 or
that he had actually created an HUF by throwing his own properties into a
common hotchpotch or family pool. A similar view was expressed by the Delhi
High Court earlier in Sunny (Minor) vs. Raj Singh CS(OS) No. 431/2006;
dated 17/11/2005.

 

AUTHOR’S VIEW

It is submitted that the
view expressed by the Delhi High Court in the case of Surender Kumar
(supra)
is correct. A conjoined reading of the Hindu Succession Act,
1956 and the decisions of the Supreme Court cited above show that the customs
and traditions of Hindu Law have been given a decent burial by the codified Act
of 1956! The law as understood in times of Manusmriti is not what it is today.
Hence, a parent is entitled to bequeath by his Will his ancestral property to
anyone, even if he has a son and / or a daughter. It is not necessary that such
ancestral property must be bequeathed only to his children. The property (even
though received from his ancestors and hence ancestral in that sense) becomes
the self-acquired property of the father on acquisition and he can deal with it
by Will, gift, transfer, etc., in any manner he pleases.

 

CONCLUSION

“Ancestral property” has
been and continues to be one of the fertile sources of litigation when it comes
to Hindu Law. Precious time and money is spent on litigating as to whether the
same can be alienated or not. It is time for the government to revamp the Hindu
Succession Act en masse and specifically address such burning issues! 

RECENT IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS – PART I

In this issue we are covering recent major developments in the field of
International Taxation and the work being done at OECD in various other related
fields. It is in continuation of our endeavour to update readers on major
International Tax developments at regular intervals. The items included here
are sourced from press releases of the Ministry of Finance and CBDT
communications.

 

DEVELOPMENTS IN INDIA
RELATING TO INTERNATIONAL TAX

 

(I) CBDT’s proposal for amendment of Rules
for Profit Attribution to Permanent Establishment

 

The CBDT vide its communication dated 18th
April, 2019 released a detailed, 86-page document containing a proposal for
amendment of the Rules for Profit Attribution to Permanent Establishment, for
public comments within 30 days of its publication. The CBDT Committee suggested
a ‘three-factor’ method to attribute profits, with equal weight to (a) sales,
(b) manpower, and (c) assets. The Committee justifies the three-factor approach
as a mix of both demand and supply side that allocates profits between the
jurisdictions where sales takes place and the jurisdictions where supply is
undertaken. The CBDT Committee has recommended far-reaching changes to the
current scheme of attribution of profits to permanent establishments.

 

The report outlines the formula for
calculating “profits attributable to operations in India”, giving weightage to
sales revenue, employees, wages paid and assets deployed.

 

The relevant portion of the ‘Report on
Profit Attribution to Permanent Establishments’
containing the
Committee’s conclusions and recommendations in paragraphs 179 to 200 is given
below for ready reference:

 

“Conclusions and
recommendations of the Committee

179.   After detailed analysis of the issues related to attribution of
profits, existing rules, their legal history, the economic and public policy
principles relevant to it, the international practices, views of academicians
and experts, relevant case laws and the methodology adopted by tax authorities
dealing with these issues, Committee concluded its observations, which are
summarised in following paragraphs.

 

11.1 Summary of Committee’s
observations and conclusions

 

180.   The business profits of a non-resident enterprise is subjected to
the income-tax in India only if it satisfies the threshold condition of having
a business connection in India, in which case, profits that are derived from
India from its various operations including production and sales are taxable in
India, either on the basis of the accounts of its business in India or where
they cannot be accurately derived from its accounts, by application of Rule 10,
which provides a wide discretion to the Assessing Officer. Where a tax treaty
entered by the Central government is applicable, its provisions also need to be
satisfied for such taxation. As per Article 7 of UN model tax convention (which
is usually followed in most Indian tax treaties, sometimes with variations),
only those profits of an enterprise can be subjected to tax in India which are
attributed to its PE in India, and would include profits that the PE would be
expected to make as a separate and independent entity. Under the force of
attraction rules, when applicable, it would include profits from sales of same
goods as those sold by the PE that are derived from India without participation
of PE. Profits attributable to PE can be computed either by a direct accounting
method provided in paragraph 2 or by an indirect apportionment method provided
in paragraph 4 of Article 7.

 

181.   An analysis of Article 7 and its legal history shows that there
are three standard versions. The Article 7 which exists in UN model tax
convention is similar to the Article 7 as it existed in the OECD model
convention prior to 2010, except that the UN model tax convention allows the
application of force of attraction rules and restricts deduction of certain
expenses payable to the head office by the PE. This Article in the OECD model
convention was revised in 2010. Under the revised article the profits
attributable to the PE are required to be determined taking into account the
functions, assets and risk, and the option of determining them by way of
apportionment has been excluded.

 

182.   One of the primary implications of the 2010 revision of Article 7
by OECD was that in cases where business profits could not be readily
determined on the basis of accounts, the same were required to be determined by
taking into account function, assets and risk, completely ignoring the sales
receipts derived from that tax jurisdiction. This amounts to a major deviation,
not only from the rules universally accepted till then, but also from the
generally applicable accounting standards for determining business profits,
where business profits cannot be determined without taking sales into account.

 

183.   Economic analysis of factors that affect and contribute to
business profits makes it apparent that profits are contributed by both demand
and supply of the goods. Accordingly, a jurisdiction that contributes to the
profits of an enterprise either by facilitating the demand for goods or
facilitating their supply would be reasonably justified in taxing such profits.
The dangers of double taxation of such profits can be eliminated by tax
treaties. If taxes collected facilitate economic growth in that jurisdiction,
the demand for goods rises, which in turn also benefits the tax-paying
enterprise, resulting in a virtuous cycle that benefits all stakeholders. On
the contrary, if the jurisdiction is unable to collect tax from the
non-resident suppliers, it would be forced to collect all the taxes required
from the domestic tax-payers, which in turn would reduce the ability of
consumers to pay, reduce their competitiveness, hurt economic growth and the
aggregate demand, resulting in a vicious cycle, which will adversely affect all
stakeholders, including the foreign enterprises doing business therein.

 

184.   Broadly, possible approaches for profit attribution can be summed
in three categories – (i) supply approach allocates profits exclusively to the
jurisdiction where supply chain and activities are located; (ii) demand
approach allocates profits exclusively to the market jurisdiction where sales
take place; (iii) mixed approach allocates profits partly to the jurisdiction
where the consumers are located and partly to the jurisdiction where supply
activities are undertaken.

185.   The mixed approach appears to have been most commonly adopted in
international practices, though in some cases demand approach has also been
favoured. In contrast, supply side does not appear to have been adopted
anywhere, except in the 2010 revision of Article 7 of the OECD model
convention, which requires determination of profits without taking sales into
account. As a consequence, the contribution of demand to profits is completely
ignored.

 

186.   A purview (sic) of academic literature and views suggests a
wide acceptance in theory that demand, as represented by sales, can be a valid
ground for attribution of profits. There also exists a diversity of views among
academicians and experts on the validity of the revised OECD approach for
profit attribution contained in the AOA. A number of international authors
disagree with it and many have been critical of this approach.

 

187.   The AOA approach can have significant adverse consequences for
developing economies like India, which are primarily importers of capital and
technology. It restricts the taxing rights of the jurisdiction that contributes
to business profits by facilitating demand, and thereby has the potential to
break the virtuous cycle of taxation that benefits all stakeholders. Instead,
it can set a vicious cycle in place that can harm all stakeholders.

 

188.   The lack of sufficient justification or rationale and its
potential adverse consequences fully justify India’s strongly-worded position
on revised Article 7 of OECD model convention, wherein India has not only found
it unacceptable for adoption in Indian tax treaties, but also rejected the
approach taken therein. This view of India, that since business profits are
dependent on sale revenues and costs, and since sale revenues depend on both
demand and supply, it is not appropriate to attribute profits exclusively on
the basis of function, assets and risks (FAR) alone, has been communicated and
shared with other countries consistently and on a regular basis.

 

189.   Since, the revised Article 7 of OECD model tax convention has not
been incorporated in any of the Indian tax treaties, the question of AOA being
applicable on Indian treaties or profit attributed therein cannot arise. For
the same reason, additional guidance issued by OECD with reference to AOA in
respect of the changes in Article 5 introduced by the Action 7 of the BEPS
project on Artificial Avoidance of PE Status, also does not have any relevance
to Indian tax treaties. This, however, means that India cannot depend on OECD
guidance and gives rise to a need for India to consider ways and means for
bringing greater clarity and objectivity in profit attribution under its tax
treaties and domestic laws, especially in consequence to the changes introduced
as a result of Action 7.

 

190.   An analysis of case laws indicates that the courts have upheld the
application of Rule 10 for attribution of profits under Indian tax treaties. In
several such cases, the right of India to attribute profits by apportionment,
as permissible under Indian tax treaties, has also been upheld by the courts.
The judicial authorities do not appear to have insisted on a universal and
consistent method. They have also upheld the wide discretion in the hands of
the Assessing Officer under Rule 10 of the Rules, but corrected or modified his
approach for the purpose of ensuring justice in particular cases. Thus, diverse
methods of attributing profits by apportionment under Rule 10 of the Rules are
in existence. In the view of the Committee, the lack of a universal rule can
give rise to tax uncertainty and unpredictability, as well as tax disputes.
Thus, there seems to be a case for providing a uniform rule for apportionment
of profits to bring in greater certainty and predictability among taxpayers and
avoid resultant tax litigation.

 

191.   A detailed analysis of methods adopted by tax authorities for
attributing profits in recent years also highlights similar diversity in the
methods adopted by assessing officers for attribution of profits, which
reaffirms the need to consider possible options that can be consistently
adopted as an objective method of profits attribution under Rule 10 of the
Rules, and bring greater clarity, predictability and objectivity in this
exercise. Any options considered for this purpose must be in accordance with
India’s official position and views and must address its concerns.

 

192.   Accordingly, the Committee considered some
options based on the mixed or balanced approach that allocates profits between
the jurisdiction where sales take place and the jurisdiction where supply is
undertaken. The Committee did not find the option of formulary apportionment
method apportioning consolidated global profits feasible, in view of the
practical constraints in obtaining information related to jurisdictions outside
India. Thus, the Committee considers that it may be preferable to adopt a
method that focuses on Indian operations primarily and derives profits applying
the global profitability, with necessary safeguards to prevent excessive
attribution on the one hand and protect the interests of Indian revenue on the
other.

 

193.   The Committee found the option of Fractional
Apportionment based on apportionment of profits derived from India permissible
under Indian tax treaties as well as Rule 10, and relatively feasible as it is
based largely on information related to Indian operations. Out of various
possible options of apportioning profits by a mixed approach, the Committee
found considerable merit in the three-factor method based on equal weight
accorded to sales (representing demand) and manpower and assets (representing
supply, including marketing activities).

 

194.   After taking into account the principle laid down by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of DIT vs. Morgan Stanley, and the need to avoid
double taxation of profits from Indian operations in the hands of a PE, which
is primarily brought into existence either by the presence of an Indian
subsidiary carrying on parts of an integrated business, whose profits are
separately taxed in its hands in India, the Committee found it justifiable that
the profits derived from Indian operations that have already been subjected to
tax in India in the hands of a subsidiary should be deducted from the
apportioned profits. The Committee observed that in a case where no sales takes
place in India, and the profits that can be apportioned to the supply
activities are already taxed in the hands of an Indian subsidiary, there may be
no further taxes payable by the enterprise.

 

195.   In this option, in order to ensure objectivity and certainty,
profits derived from India need to be defined objectively. The Committee considers
that the same can be arrived at by multiplying the revenue derived from India
with global operational profit margin [in order to avoid any doubt the global
operational profit margin is the EBITDA margin (earnings before interest,
taxes, depreciation and amortization) of a company]. However, the Committee
also noted the need to protect India’s revenue interests in cases where an
enterprise having global losses or a global profit margin of less than 2%,
continues with the Indian operations, which could be more profitable than its
operations elsewhere. In the view of the Committee, the continuation of Indian
operations justifies the presumption of higher profitability of Indian
operations, and in such cases a deeming provision that deems profits of Indian
operations at 2% of revenue or turnover derived from India should be
introduced.

 

196.   After taking into account the developments in taxation of digital
economy and the new Explanation 2A, inserted by the Finance Act, 2018,
explicitly including significant economic presence within the definition of
business connection, the Committee considered it necessary to take into account
the role and relevance of users in contributing to the business profits of
multi-dimensional business enterprises. Users can be a substitute to either
assets or employees and supplement their role in contributing to profits of the
enterprise.

 

197.   After considering various aspects of users’ contribution, the
Committee came to the conclusion that user data and activities contribute to
the profits of the multi-dimensional enterprises and there is a strong case of
taking them into account, per se, as a factor in apportionment of profits
derived from India by enterprises conducting business through multi-dimensional
business models where users are considered crucial to the business. The
Committee concluded that for such enterprises, users should also be taken into
account for the purpose of attribution of profits, as the fourth factor for
apportionment, in addition to the other three factors of sales, manpower and
assets.

 

198.   Although a recent amendment of the 2016 proposal for CCCTB has
proposed assigning a weight to the users that is equal to the other three
factors of sales, manpower and assets, the Committee found it preferable to assign
a relatively lower weight of 10% to users in low and medium user intensity
models and 20% in high user intensity models at this stage, with the
corresponding reduction in the weightage of employees and assets except for
sales being assigned 30% weight in apportionment in both the fact patterns.
Given the rapid expansion of digital economy and the ongoing developments
related to rules governing its taxation, it may be necessary to monitor the
role of users and their contribution to profits in future and accordingly
assess the need for considering a review of the weight assigned to users in
subsequent years.

 

11.2 Recommendations

 

199.   In view of the above, the Committee makes the following
recommendations:

 

(i)   Rule 10 may be amended to provide that in the case of an assessee
who is not a resident of India, has a business connection in India and derives
sales revenue from India by a business all the operations of which are not
carried out in India, the income from such business that is attributable to the
operations carried out in India and deemed to accrue or arise in India under
clause (i) of sub-section(1) of section 9 of the Act, shall be determined by
apportioning the profits derived from India by three equally weighted factors
of sales, employees (manpower and wages) and assets, as under:

 

Profits attributable to
operations in India =

‘Profits derived from
India’ (“Profits derived from India” = Revenue derived from India x Global
operational profit margin as referred in paragraph 159.) x [SI/3xST + (NI/6xNT)
+(WI/6xWT) + (AI/3xAT)]

 

Where,

SI = sales revenue derived
by Indian operations from sales in India

ST = total sales revenue
derived by Indian operations from sales in India and outside India

NI =number of employees
employed with respect to Indian operations and located in India

NT = total number of
employees employed with respect to Indian operations and located in India and
outside India

WI = wages paid to
employees employed with respect to Indian operations and located in India

WT = total wages paid to
employees employed with respect to Indian operations and located in India and
outside India

AI = assets deployed for
Indian operations and located in India

AT = total assets deployed
for Indian operations and located in India and outside India

 

(ii)  The amended rules should provide that ‘profits derived from Indian
operations’ will be the higher of the following amounts:

a. The amount arrived at by
multiplying the revenue derived from India x Global operational profit margin,
or

b. Two percent of the
revenue derived from India

 

(iii) The amended rules should provide an exception
for enterprises in case of which the business connection is primarily
constituted by the existence of users beyond the prescribed threshold, or in
case of which users in excess of such prescribed threshold exist in India. In
such cases, the income from such business that is attributable to the
operations carried out in India and deemed to accrue or arise in India under
clause (i) of sub-section (1) of section 9 of the Act, shall be determined by
apportioning the profits derived from India on the basis of four factors of
sales, employees (manpower and wages), assets and users. The users should be
assigned a weight of 10% in cases of low and medium user intensity, while each
of the other three factors should be assigned a weight of 30%, as under:

 

Profits attributable to
operations in India in cases of low and medium user intensity business models =

‘Profits derived from
India’ x [0.3 x SI/ST + (0.15 x NI/NT) + (0.15 x WI/WT) + (0.3 x AI/3xAT)] +
0.1]

In case of digital models
with high user intensity, the users should be assigned a weight of 20%, while
the share of assets and employees be reduced to 25% each after keeping the
weight of sales as 30% as under:

 

Profits attributable to
operations in India in cases of high user intensity business models =

‘Profits derived from
India’ x [0.3 x SI/ST + (0.125 x NI/NT) + (0.125 x WI/WT) + (0.25 AI/3xAT)] +
0.2]

 

(iv) The amended rules should also provide that where the business
connection of the enterprise in India is constituted by the activities of an
associate enterprise that is resident in India and the enterprise does not
receive any payments on accounts of sales or services from any person who is
resident in India (or such payments do not exceed an amount of Rs. 10,00,000)
and the activities of that associated enterprise have been fully remunerated by
the enterprise by an arm’s length price, no further profits will be
attributable to the operation of that enterprise in India.

 

(v) However, where the
business connection of the enterprise in India is constituted by the activities
of an associate enterprise that is resident in India and the payments received
by that enterprise on account of sales or services from persons resident in
India exceeds the amount of Rs. 10,00,000 then profits attributable to the
operation of that enterprise in India will be derived by apportionment using
the three factors or four factors as may be applicable in his case and
deducting from the same the profits that have already been subjected to tax in
the hands of the associated enterprise. For this purpose, the employees and
assets of the associated enterprise will be deemed to be employed or deployed
in the Indian operations and located in India.

 

200.   The Committee recommends the amendment of Rule
10 accordingly. The Committee also recommended that an alternative can be
amendment of the IT Act itself to incorporate a provision for profit
attribution to a PE.”


The Bombay Chartered Accountants’ Society has also given its comments and
suggestions in this regard. The final rules based on the public comments
received are awaited.

 

(II)    Finance Minister N. Sitharaman bats for
‘SEP’-based solution to vexed digitalisation issue at G-20 meet (Source:
Press Release of Ministry of Finance dated 9th June, 2019)

The Union Minister for Finance and Corporate
Affairs, Mrs. Nirmala Sitharaman, attended the G-20 Finance Ministers’ and
Central Bank Governors’ meeting and associated events and programmes on 8th
and 9th June, 2019 at Fukuoka, Japan. She was accompanied by Mr. Subhash C. Garg, Finance Secretary and Secretary,
Economic Affairs, Dr. Viral Acharya, Deputy Governor of the RBI, and other
officers.

 

Mrs. Sitharaman flagged serious issues
related to taxation and digital economy companies and to curb tax avoidance and
evasion. She highlighted the issue of economic offenders fleeing legal
jurisdictions and called for cohesive action against them.

 

The Finance Minister noted the urgency to fix
the issue of determining the right nexus and profit allocation solution for
taxing the profits made by digital economy companies. Appreciating the
significant progress made under the taxation agenda, including the Base Erosion
and Profit Shifting (BEPS), tax challenges from digital economy and exchange of
information under the aegis of G-20, she congratulated the Japanese Presidency
for successfully carrying these tasks forward.

 

She noted that the work on tax challenges
arising from the digitalisation of economy is entering a critical phase with an
update to the G-20 due next year. In this respect, Mrs. Sitharaman strongly
supported the potential solution based on the concept of ‘significant economic
presence’ of businesses taking into account the evidence of their purposeful
and sustained interaction with the economy of a country.
This concept has
been piloted by India and supported by a large number of countries, including
the G-24. She expressed confidence that a consensus-based global solution,
which should also be equitable and simple, would be reached by 2020.

 

Welcoming the commencement of automatic
exchange of financial account information (AEOI) on a global basis with almost
90 jurisdictions successfully exchanging information in 2018, the Finance
Minister said this would ensure that tax evaders could no longer hide their
offshore financial accounts from the tax administration. She urged the G-20 /
Global Forum to further expand the network of automatic exchanges by
identifying jurisdictions, including developing countries and financial centres
that are relevant but have not yet committed to any timeline. Appropriate
action needs to be taken against non-compliant jurisdictions. In this respect,
she called upon the international community to agree on a toolkit of defensive
measures which can be taken against such non-compliant jurisdictions.

 

Earlier, she participated in the Ministerial
Symposium on International Taxation and spoke in the session on the ongoing
global efforts to counter tax avoidance and evasion. During the session, she
also dwelt on the tax challenges for addressing digitalisation of the economy
and emphasised that nexus was important. Mrs. Sitharaman also raised the need
for international co-operation on dealing with fugitive economic offenders who
flee their countries to escape from the consequences of law. She also
highlighted the fugitive economic offenders’ law passed by India which provides
for denial of access to courts until the fugitive returns to the country. This
law also provides for confiscation of their properties and selling them off.

 

She drew attention to the practice permitted
by many jurisdictions which allow economic offenders to use investment-based
schemes to obtain residence or citizenship to escape from legal consequences
and underlined the need to deal with such practices. She urged that closer
collaboration and coordinated action were required to bring such economic
offenders to face the law.

 

India’s Finance Minister highlighted the need
for the G-20 to keep a close watch on global current account imbalances to
ensure that they do not result in excessive global volatility and tensions. The
global imbalances had a detrimental effect on the growth of emerging markets.
Unilateral actions taken by some advanced economies adversely affect the
exports and the inward flow of investments in these economies. She wondered if
the accumulation of cash reserves by large companies indicated the reluctance
of these companies to increase investments. This reluctance could have adverse
implications on growth and investments and possibly leading to concentration of
market power. She also urged the G-20 to remain cognizant of fluctuations in
the international oil market and study measures that can bring benefits to both
the oil-exporting and importing countries.

In a session on infrastructure investment,
Mrs. Sitharaman emphasised on the importance of making investments in
cost-effective and disaster resilient infrastructure for growth and
development. She suggested the G-20 focus on identifying constraints to flow of
resources into the infrastructure sector in the developing world and solutions
for overcoming them. She also took note of the close collaboration of India,
Japan and other like-minded countries, aligned with the Sendai Framework, in
developing a roadmap to create a global Coalition on Disaster Resilient
Infrastructure.

 

The Japanese Presidency’s priority issue of
ageing was also discussed. Mrs. Sitharaman highlighted that closer
collaboration between countries with a high old-age dependency ratio and those
with a low old-age dependency ratio was necessary for dealing with the policy
challenges posed by ageing. She suggested that if ageing countries with
shrinking labour force allow calibrated mobility of labour with portable social
security benefits, the recipient countries can not only take care of the aged
but also have a positive effect on global growth. She said that India’s
demography presented a dual policy challenge since India’s old-age dependency
ratio is less than that of Japan, while at the same time India’s aged
population in absolute numbers exceeds that of Japan. She detailed the policy
measures that the Government of India is taking to address these challenges.

 

While speaking on the priority of Japanese
Presidency on financing of universal health coverage (UHC), she emphasised the
importance of a holistic approach which encompasses the plurality of pathways
to achieve UHC, including through traditional and complementary systems of
medicine.

 

(III) Ratification of the
Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty-Related Measures to Prevent
Base Erosion and Profit Sharing (Source: Press Release of the Ministry of
Finance dated 12th June, 2019)

 

Text of the Press Release
of the Ministry of Finance dated 12th June, 2019:

 

“Ratification of the
Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty-Related Measures to Prevent
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting.

 

The Union Cabinet, chaired
by the Prime Minister, Mr. Narendra Modi, has approved the ratification of
the Multilateral Convention
to Implement Tax Treaty-Related Measures to
Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (MLI).

 

IMPACT

The Convention will modify India’s treaties
in order to curb revenue loss through treaty abuse and base erosion and profit
shifting strategies by ensuring that profits are taxed where substantive
economic activities generating the profits are carried out and where value is
created.

 

DETAILS

i. India has ratified the
Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty-Related Measures to Prevent
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, which was signed by the Hon’ble Finance
Minister, Mr. Arun Jaitley, at Paris on 7th June, 2017 on behalf of
India;

ii.   The Multilateral Convention is an outcome of the OECD / G-20
Project to tackle Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (the “BEPS
Project”) i.e., tax planning strategies that exploit gaps and mismatches
in tax rules to artificially shift profits to low or no-tax locations where
there is little or no economic activity, resulting in little or no tax being
paid. The BEPS Project identified 15 actions to address base erosion and profit
shifting (BEPS) in a comprehensive manner;

iii.  India was part of the ad hoc group of more than 100 countries
and jurisdictions from G-20, OECD, BEPS associates and other interested
countries which worked on an equal footing on the finalisation of the text of
the Multilateral Convention, starting May, 2015. The text of the Convention and
the accompanying Explanatory Statement was adopted by the ad hoc Group on 24th
November, 2016;

iv.  The Convention enables all
signatories,
inter alia, to meet treaty-related minimum
standards that were agreed as part of the final BEPS package, including the
minimum standard for the prevention of treaty abuse under Action 6;

v. The Convention will
operate to modify tax treaties between two or more parties to the Convention. It
will not function in the same way as an amending protocol to a single existing
treaty
, which would directly amend the text of the Covered Tax Agreement. Instead,
it will be applied alongside existing tax treaties, modifying their application
in order to implement the BEPS measures;

vi.  The Convention will modify India’s treaties in order to curb
revenue loss through treaty abuse and base erosion and profit shifting
strategies by ensuring that profits are taxed where substantive economic
activities generating the profits are carried out and where value is created.

BACKGROUND

The Convention is one of
the outcomes of the OECD / G-20 project, of which India is a member, to tackle
base erosion and profit shifting. The Convention enables countries to implement
the tax treaty-related changes to achieve anti-abuse BEPS outcomes through the
multilateral route without the need to bilaterally re-negotiate each such
agreement which is burdensome and time-consuming. It ensures consistency and
certainty in the implementation of the BEPS Project in a multilateral context.
Ratification of the multilateral Convention will enable application of BEPS
outcomes through modification of existing tax treaties of India in a swift
manner.

 

The Cabinet Note seeking
ratification of the MLI was sent to the Cabinet on 16th April, 2019
for consideration. Since the said Note for Cabinet could not be taken up in the
Cabinet due to urgency, the Hon’ble Prime Minister, vide Cabinet Secretariat
I.D. No. 216/1/2/2019-Cab dated 27.05.2019 has approved ratification of MLI and
India’s final position under Rule 12 of the Government of India (Transaction of
Business) Rules, 1961 with a direction that
ex-post facto approval
of the Cabinet be obtained within a month. Consequent to approval under Rule
12, a separate request has already been sent to the L&T Division, MEA, for
obtaining the instrument of ratification from the Hon’ble President of India
vide this office OM F.No. 500/71/2015-FTD-I/150 dated 31/05/2019.”

 

In Part II of the Article, we will cover
various developments at the OECD relating to International Taxation. We sincerely
hope that the reader would find the above developments to be interesting and
useful. 

 


 

LESSEE’S LEASE OBLIGATION – BORROWINGS VS. FINANCIAL LIABILITY

ISSUE

Ind AS 17 Leases required lessees to
classify leases as either finance leases or operating leases, based on certain
principles, and to account for these two types of leases differently. The asset
and liability arising from finance leases was required to be recognised in the
balance sheet, but operating leases could remain off-balance sheet.

 

Information reported about operating leases
lacked transparency and did not meet the needs of users of financial
statements. Many users adjusted a lessee’s financial statements to capitalise
operating leases because, in their view, the financing and assets provided by
leases should be reflected on the balance sheet. Some tried to estimate the
present value of future lease payments. However, because of the limited
information that was available, many used techniques such as multiplying the
annual lease expense by eight to estimate, for example, total leverage and the
capital employed in operations. Other users were unable to adjust and so they
relied on data sources such as data aggregators when screening potential
investments or making investment decisions. These different approaches created
information asymmetry in the market.

 

The existence of two different accounting
models for leases, in which assets and liabilities associated with leases were
not recognised for operating leases but were recognised for finance leases,
meant that transactions that were economically similar could be accounted for
very differently. The differences reduced comparability for users of financial
statements and provided opportunities to structure transactions to achieve an
accounting outcome.

 

To bridge the problems discussed above, IFRS
16 Leases was issued. Correspondingly, in India the Ministry of
Corporate Affairs issued Ind AS 116 – ‘Leases’, which is notified and
effective from 1st April, 2019 and replaces Ind AS 17. Ind AS 116 requires
lessees to recognise a liability to make lease payments and a corresponding
asset representing the right to use the underlying asset during the lease term
for all leases, except for short-term leases and leases of low-value assets, if
the lessee chooses to apply such exemptions. For lessees, this means that more
liabilities and assets are recognised if they have leases, compared to the
earlier standard, Ind AS 17.

 

Ind AS 116 requires lease liabilities to be
disclosed separately from other liabilities either in the balance sheet or in
the notes to accounts. However, Indian companies are also required to comply
with the presentation and disclosure requirements of division II – Ind AS
Schedule III to the Companies Act, 2013 (Ind AS-compliant Schedule III). As per
the Schedule III format, under financial liabilities – borrowings are required
to be presented separately. Borrowings need to be further bifurcated and
presented in the notes to accounts as follows:

 

Borrowings shall be classified as: (a) Bonds
or debentures; (b) Term loans (i) from banks or (ii) from other parties; (c)
Deferred payment liabilities; (d) Deposits; (e) Loans from related parties; (f)
Long-term maturities of finance lease obligations; (g) Liability
component of compound financial instruments; (h) Other loans (specify nature).

 

Neither Schedule III nor the guidance note
on Schedule III issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India has
been revised to take cognisance of the change in the lease accounting (due to
introduction of Ind AS 116), under which there is no classification as finance
leases or operating leases for lessees. On implementation of Ind AS 116 w.e.f.
1st April, 2019 lessees will not bifurcate leases into finance leases and
operating leases and all leases will be capitalised (subject to a few
exemptions). To comply with the disclosure requirement mentioned in the
preceding paragraph, there is confusion whether (a) all lease liabilities
should be classified as borrowings; or (b) all lease liabilities should be
shown as financial liabilities because the requirement to disclose finance
lease obligation as borrowings by lessees no longer applies (the lessee does
not distinguish between operating and finance lease); or (c) for purposes of
disclosure only, the lessee distinguishes the lease as finance and operating
and discloses the finance lease obligations as borrowings and operating leases
as financial liabilities.

 

If lease obligations are presented as
borrowings in the financial statements, it will negatively impact debt
covenants, the debt-equity ratio, and will have other significant adverse
consequences for lessees. It may be noted that globally, under IFRS, companies
will not be subjected to such adverse consequences because they do not have to
comply with Schedule III or an equivalent requirement.

 

In summary, the following questions emerge:

 

1. On application of Ind AS 116, whether
lessee would disclose the entire lease obligation in its financial statements
under financial liabilities or borrowings?

2. Though not required under Ind AS 116,
whether lessees need to bifurcate all leases into finance lease and operating
lease only for the limited purpose of complying with the disclosure requirements
of Ind AS-compliant Schedule III?

 

RESPONSE

The following three views are theoretically
possible:

 

OPTIONS AND RATIONALES

 

Options

Rationale

Option 1 –

Present entire lease
obligation under financial liabilities as separate line item either on the
face of balance sheet or in the notes to accounts

Ind AS 1 deals with the presentation of financial
statements and it does not require borrowings to be presented as a minimum
line item on the face of the balance sheet. As per para 54(m) – Financial
liabilities [excluding amounts shown under 54 (k) – Trade and other payable
and 54 (l) – provisions] need to be presented as minimum line item on the
face of the balance sheet.

 

Accordingly, in the absence of
Schedule III, borrowings would have been presented as financial liabilities
in the financial statements. Under IFRS, this is indeed the case and there is
no requirement to show borrowings separately from financial liabilities;

 

Ind AS 116 requires lease liabilities to be disclosed
separately from other liabilities either in the balance sheet or in the notes
to accounts. It does not require such financial liabilities to be termed as
borrowings;

 

Schedule III requires finance lease obligation to be
disclosed under borrowings. However, under Ind AS 116, there is no finance
lease classification for lessees and all leases are capitalised, subject to
some exemptions. Since there is no finance lease obligation under Ind AS 116,
nothing is required to be presented as borrowings;

 

Further, Schedule III states the following which may
be used as the basis to present it separately from borrowings:

 

“Line items, sub-line items and sub-totals shall be
presented as an addition or substitution on the face of the Financial
Statements when such presentation is relevant to an understanding of the
company’s financial position or performance, or to cater to industry or
sector-specific disclosure requirements, or when required for compliance with
the amendments to the Companies Act, 2013, or under the Indian Accounting
Standards.”

 

It may be noted that Option 1 is completely in
compliance with the accounting standards.

Option 2 –

Present entire lease obligation as borrowings

As Ind AS 116 does not require bifurcation of leases
into finance and operating and requires all leases (other than short-term and
low-value leases) to be capitalised, the entire lease liabilities need to be
disclosed in borrowings to comply with the spirit of Ind AS-compliant
Schedule III requirements;

 

Further, this will also eliminate the difference
between the two categories of companies, i.e., Borrow to buy vs. Leasing the
assets.

Option 3 –

Bifurcate leases into finance and operating and
disclose only finance lease obligations as borrowings. Operating leases will
be presented as financial liabilities

Though Ind AS does not require bifurcation but to
comply with the Schedule III one may need to do such bifurcation;

 

Accordingly, disclose finance lease obligations as
borrowings and operating lease obligations as financial liabilities.

 

 

 

CONCLUSION AND THE WAY FORWARD

The author does not believe that Option 3
is appropriate, because it is not so intended under the Standard or Schedule
III. Additionally, this issue has arisen because Schedule III is not amended
post -Ind AS 116, to either eliminate the requirement to disclose finance lease
obligations as borrowings, or alternatively to require all lease obligations
(other than low-value and short-term leases) to be disclosed as borrowings.

 

Between Option 1 and 2, MCA
needs to make its position clear, either through a separate notification or by
amending Schedule III. In the absence of that, an ITFG clarification will be
necessary to ensure consistency in the financial reporting.  

 

Section 28 (i) – Business income vs. income from house property – Income received from leasing out of shops and other commercial establishments – Also received common amenities charges, maintenance charges, advertisement charges – Held to be assessable as business income

12 Pr. CIT-6 vs. Krome Planet
Interiors Pvt. Ltd. [Income-tax appeal No. 282 of 2017; dated 15th
April, 2019 (Bombay High Court)]

 

[Krome Planet Interiors Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT; A.Y.:
2008-09; Mum. ITAT]

 

Section 28 (i) – Business income vs. income from house
property – Income received from leasing out of shops and other commercial
establishments – Also received common amenities charges, maintenance charges,
advertisement charges – Held to be assessable as business income

 

The
assessee is a private limited company engaged in the business of leasing out
shop space in shopping malls. The assessee had filed his return for the A.Y.
2008-2009 declaring the income received from such activity of leasing out of
shops and other commercial establishments to various persons as business
income. In addition to rental income, the assessee had also received certain
charges from the licensees such as common amenities charges, maintenance
charges and advertisement charges.

 

However,
the assessing officer (AO) held that the income was from house property and not
business income.

 

The
issue eventually reached the Tribunal. The Tribunal, by the impugned judgement
held that the income was business income. It noted that the assessee had
entered into a leave and license agreement with the licensee which shows that
the building was constructed for the purpose of a shopping mall with the
approval of the Pune Municipal Corporation. The assessee was providing various
facilities and amenities apart from giving shopping space on lease. The
agreement contained the list of facilities to be provided by the assessee. The
charges for the facilities and utilisation were included in the license fees
charge for leasing the shop space. The additional charges towards the costs of
electricity consumed would be payable by the licensees. The period of license
was 60 months. The Tribunal also noted that no space in the shopping mall was
given on rent simplicitor. The Tribunal, therefore, held that the object of the
assessee to exploit the building as a business is established. The assessee had
also taken a loan facility from a bank for the shopping mall project.

 

Being
aggrieved with the ITAT order, the Revenue filed an appeal to the High Court.
The Court held that the assessee had obtained a loan from a bank for its mall
complex project; that the assessee had entered into leave and license
agreements with individuals for letting out commercial space; a majority of the
licenses were for 60 months; in addition to providing such commercial space on
lease, the assessee also provided a range of common amenities, a list of which
is reproduced earlier. These facilities included installation of elevators,
installation of a fire hydrant & sprinkler system, installation of central
garbage collection and disposal system, installation of common dining
arrangement for occupants and the staff, common water purifier and dispensing
system, lighting arrangement for common areas, etc.

 

Thus,
in plain terms, the assessee did not simply rent out a commercial space without
any additional responsibilities. He executed leave and license agreements and also
provided a range of common facilities and amenities upon which the occupiers
could run their business from the leased out premises. The charges for such
amenities were also broken down in two parts. Charges for several common
amenities were included in the rentals. Only on a consumption-based amenity,
such as electricity, would the occupant be charged separately. All factors thus
clearly indicate that the assessee desired to enter into a business of renting
out commercial space to interested individuals and business houses.

 

The Revenue, however, strongly relied on
the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Raj Dadarkar &
Associates vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, reported in (2017) 81
taxmann.com 193
. It was, however, a case in which on facts
the Supreme Court held that the assessee was not engaged in systematic activity
of providing service to occupiers of the shops so as to constitute the receipt
as business income. In the result, the Revenue appeal was dismissed.

Section 80-IB(11A) – Profits derived from the business of the industrial undertaking – Subsidies – Eligible for deduction u/s. 80-IB – Liberty India 317 ITR 218 (SC) is distinguishable on facts

11 Pioneer Foods & Agro
Industries vs. ITO-18(3)(4) [ITA No. 142 of 2017; dated 22nd April,
2019 (Bombay High Court)]

 

[Pioneer Foods & Agro Industries vs. ITO-18(3)(4);
dated 20th July, 2016; A.Y.: 2009-10; ITA No. 6088 &
6089/Mum/2013, Mum. ITAT]

Section 80-IB(11A) – Profits derived from the business
of the industrial undertaking – Subsidies – Eligible for deduction u/s. 80-IB –
Liberty India 317 ITR 218 (SC) is distinguishable on facts

 

The assessee is a partnership firm engaged in the business
of manufacturing and exporting honey. The assessee had filed return of income
for the A.Y. 2009-10. In relation to the export of the said product, the
assessee had claimed deduction u/s. 80IB(11A) of the Act in relation to benefit
received by the assessee for the export under the Vishesh Krishi and Gram Udyog
Yojana (“VKGUY” for short).

 

The AO having disallowed the claim, the issue eventually
reached the Tribunal. The Tribunal, by the impugned judgement, upheld the
addition. On appeal before the High Court, the assessee had confined its
grievance in relation to the benefits received under the VKGUY scheme.

 

The
assessee submitted that the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs.
Meghalaya Steels Ltd. [2016] 383 ITR 217 (SC)
had an occasion to
examine a case where the assessee was engaged in the business of manufacture of
steel and ferro silicon and had claimed similar subsidies. The assessee had
claimed deduction u/s. 80IB(4) of the Act in relation to such subsidies. The AO
had disallowed the claim. The issue reached the Supreme Court.

 

The
Supreme Court noted the speech of the Finance Minister while presenting the
budget for the assessment year 1999-2000 in relation to the Government of
India’s Industrial Development Policy for the North-Eastern region. It also
noted the distinction between the expressions “attributable to” and “derived
from” as discussed in various earlier judgements. The Supreme Court
distinguished the judgement in the case of Liberty India (supra),
observing that in the said case the Court was concerned with the export
incentive which is far remote from the activity of export. The profit,
therefore, cannot be said to have been derived from such activity. In the
opinion of the Court, the case on hand was one where the transport and interest
subsidy had a direct nexus with the manufacturing activity inasmuch as these
subsidies go to reduce the cost of production.

 

In the present case, the Court observed that the objective
of the VKGUY scheme was to promote the export of agricultural produce and their
value-added products, minor forest produce and their value-added variants, gram
udyog products, forest-based products and other produces as may be notified. In
relation to the exports of such products, benefits in the form of incentives
would be granted at the prescribed rate. The objective behind granting such
benefits was to compensate the high transport cost and to offset other
disadvantages. In order to make the export of such products viable, the
Government of India decided to grant certain incentives under the said scheme.
Clearly, thus, the case was covered by the decision of the Supreme Court in the
case of Meghalaya Steels Ltd. (supra). This was not a case akin
to export incentives such as DEPB which the Supreme Court in the case of Liberty
India (supra)
held was a benefit far remote from the assessee’s
business of export. In the result, the assessee’s appeal was allowed.

 

Section 54F – Capital gains – Investment in residential house – Flat was owned by a co-operative housing society on a piece of land which was granted under a long-term lease – Eligible for deduction

10  Pr. CIT-23 vs. Jaya Uday Tuljapurkar [Income tax appeal No. 53 of 2017;
dated 22nd April, 2019 (Bombay High Court)]

 [ACIT vs. Jaya Uday Tuljapurkar; dated 28th September,
2015; Mum. ITAT]

 

Section 54F – Capital gains – Investment in
residential house – Flat was owned by a co-operative housing society on a piece
of land which was granted under a long-term lease – Eligible for deduction

 

The
assessee, an individual, was a joint owner of a residential property in the
nature of a flat. He had received the said property under a Will dated 15th
October, 2006 made by his father. The flat complex was owned by a co-operative
housing society on a piece of land which was granted under a long-term lease.
The father of the assessee was a member of the said society and owned the flat.
After his death, the assessee received half a share, the other half going to
his mother. These co-owners sold the flat under a registered deed dated 18th
July, 2008 for a sale consideration of Rs. 23 crores. The assessee, after
the sale of the flat, invested a part of the sale consideration of Rs. 2.89
crores in the purchase of a new residential unit. In his return of income filed
for the A.Y. 2009-2010, he had shown the sale consideration of Rs. 11.50 crores
which was his share of the sale proceeds by way of capital gain. He claimed the
benefit of cost indexation and also claimed exemption of the sum of Rs. 2.89
crores while computing his capital gain tax liability in terms of section 54 of
the Act.

 

The
assessing officer (AO) rejected his claim on the ground that the assessee had
not transferred the building and the land appurtenant thereto. In the opinion
of the AO, since this was a pre-condition for application of section 54 of the
Act, the assessee was not entitled to the benefit of exemption as per the said
provision.

 

On appeal to the CIT(A) it was held that the fact that the
residential building in which the flat was situated was constructed on a leased
land, would not change the nature of transaction. He accepted the assessee’s
contention that as per the provisions of the Maharashtra Ownership Flats
(Regulation of the Promotion of Construction, Sale, Management and Transfer)
Act, 1963, the assessee would be the owner of the flat in law. The Commissioner
(A) also held that for applicability of section 54, the assessee had to sell a
capital asset in the nature of building or land appurtenant thereto. The word
‘or’ cannot be read as ‘and’ in the context of the said provision.

 

The Revenue carried the matter in appeal before the
Tribunal. The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue’s appeal, upon which the appeal
was filed before the Hon’ble High Court.

The
Revenue submitted that for availing benefit of section 54 of the Act, the
assessee has to sell a capital asset in the nature of building and land
appurtenant thereto. In the present case, the complex was situated on land
which itself was granted on lease. The co-operative housing society was not the
owner of the land. Therefore, what the assessee had transferred under a
registered sale deed was a mere building and not the land appurtenant thereto.
In support of his contention that in the context of section 54 of the Act the
word ‘or’ should be read as ‘and’, the Revenue relied on the commentaries of
certain renowned authorities on income-tax law.

 

The
Court held that the facts noted above were not in dispute. The father of the
assessee was allotted a flat in a residential complex in a co-operative housing
society. The complex was constructed on land which was not owned by the society
but was being enjoyed on long-term lease. According to the Revenue, the sale of
a flat in such a society and investing any sale proceeds for acquisition of a
new residential unit would not satisfy the requirements of section 54 of the
Act. Firstly, there is no such prescription u/s. 54(1) of the Act. Secondly,
such a rigid interpretation would disallow every claim in case of transfer of a
residential unit in a co-operative housing society.

 

The
very concept of such a society is that the society is the owner of the land and
continues to be so irrespective of the coming and going of members. A member of
such a society has a possessory right over the plot of land which is allotted
to him. In case of a constructed building of a co-operative housing society,
the member owns the constructed property and along with other members enjoys
the possessory rights over the land on which the building is situated. In
either case, a member of the society, even when he sells his house, never
transfers the title in land to the purchaser. The present case is no different.
Merely because the housing complex in the present case is situated on a piece
of land which is occupied by the co-operative housing society under a long-term
lease, would make no difference. In the result, the Department appeal was
dismissed.

 

Section 80-IA(2A) of ITA, 1961 – Telecommunication services – Deduction u/s. 80-IA(2A) – Scope – Payment by third parties for availing of telecommunication services of assessee – Late fees and reimbursement of cheque dishonour charges received from such third parties – Income eligible for deduction u/s. 80-IA(2A)

30  Principal CIT vs. Vodafone Mobile Services Ltd.; 414 ITR 276 (Del) Date of order: 3rd
December, 2018
A.Y.: 2008-09

 

Section 80-IA(2A) of ITA, 1961 – Telecommunication
services – Deduction u/s. 80-IA(2A) – Scope – Payment by third parties for
availing of telecommunication services of assessee – Late fees and
reimbursement of cheque dishonour charges received from such third parties –
Income eligible for deduction u/s. 80-IA(2A)

 

The
assessee was engaged in the business of providing telecommunication services.
For the A.Y. 2008-09, the AO denied the benefit of section 80-IA(2A) of the
Income-tax Act, 1961 on the profits and gains earned by the assessee from
sharing of infrastructure facilities in the form of cell-sites and fibre cable
with other companies or undertakings engaged in “telecommunication services”.
This, he held, would amount to leasing of the assets to third parties and
income from the leasing would not be income derived from “telecommunication
services”. The assessee had also paid bank charges as cheques issued by some of
the customers had been dishonoured. These charges were also levied to the
customers but the entire amount could not be recovered. The AO held that late
payment charges or cheque dishonour charges were in the nature of penalty and
not income derived from telecommunication business and hence not eligible for
deduction u/s. 80-IA(2A).

 

The
Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal allowed the claims.

 

On
appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal
and held as under:

 

“i)   The finding of
the Assessing Officer that income from sharing fibre cables and cell-sites was
income by way of leasing and hence not includible in revenue earned for
computing profits from ‘telecommunication service’ was far-fetched and
misconceived. The assets, i.e., cell-sites and fibre cables, were not
transferred. Third parties wanting to avail of the spare capacity were only allowed
usage of the facilities for consideration. Payments so made by the third
parties were to avail of and use the telecommunication infrastructure. They
would qualify as payments received for availing of ‘telecommunication
services’. The income from sharing of fibre cables and cell-sites qualified for
deduction u/s. 80-IA(2A).

 

ii)   The Tribunal was also justified in upholding
the reasoning and order of the Commissioner (Appeals) on cheque dishonour and
late payment charges.”

Sections 147, 148,159 and 292B of ITA, 1961 – Reassessment – Valid notice – Notice issued in name of dead person – Effect of sections 159 and 292B – Objection to notice by legal representative – Notice not valid

29  Chandreshbhai Jayantibhai Patel vs. ITO.; 413 ITR 276 (Guj) Date of order: 10th
December, 2018
A.Y.: 2011-12

 

Sections 147, 148,159 and 292B of ITA, 1961 –
Reassessment – Valid notice – Notice issued in name of dead person – Effect of
sections 159 and 292B – Objection to notice by legal representative – Notice
not valid

 

The
petitioner is the son of the late Mr. Jayantibhai Harilal Patel who passed away
on 24th June, 2015. The AO issued notice u/s. 148 of the Income-tax
Act, 1961 dated 28th March, 2018 in the name of the deceased for
reopening the assessment for the A.Y. 2011-12. In response to the said notice,
the petitioner vide communication dated 27th April, 2018 objected to the
initiation of reassessment proceedings and informed that his father had passed
away on 24th June, 2015 and urged the AO to drop the reassessment
proceedings. The petitioner maintained the objections in the subsequent
proceedings. By an order dated 14th August, 2018, the AO rejected
the objections and held that in the absence of knowledge about the death of the
petitioner’s father, it cannot be said that the notice of reassessment is bad
in law and that the reassessment proceedings may be carried out in the name of
the legal heirs of the late father of the petitioner. Being aggrieved, the petitioner
filed a writ petition before the High Court and challenged the order.

 

The
Gujarat High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

 

“i)   A notice u/s. 148 is a jurisdictional notice
and existence of a valid notice u/s. 148 is a condition precedent for exercise
of jurisdiction by the Assessing Officer to assess or reassess u/s. 147.

 

ii)   Clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 159
of the Act provides that any proceeding which could have been taken against the
deceased if he had survived may be taken against the legal representative.
Section 292B, inter alia, provides that no notice issued in pursuance of
any of the provisions of the Act shall be invalid or shall be deemed to be
invalid merely by reason of any mistake, defect or omission in such notice if
such notice, summons is in substance and effect in conformity with or according
to the intent and purpose of the Act.

 

iii)   A notice issued u/s. 148 of the Act against a
dead person is invalid, unless the legal representative submits to the jurisdiction
of the Assessing Officer without raising any objection. Therefore, where the
legal representative does not waive his right to a notice u/s. 148, it cannot
be said that the notice issued against the dead person is in conformity with or
according to the intent and purpose of the Act which requires issuance of
notice to the assessee, whereupon the Assessing Officer assumes jurisdiction
u/s. 147 of the Act and consequently, the provisions of section 292B of the Act
would not be attracted.

 

iv)  The case fell within the ambit of section
159(2)(b) of the Act. The notice u/s. 148, which was a jurisdictional notice,
had been issued to a dead person. Upon receipt of such notice, the legal
representative had raised an objection to the validity of such notice and had
not complied with it. The legal representative not having waived the
requirement of notice u/s. 148 and not having submitted to the jurisdiction of
the Assessing Officer pursuant to the notice, the provisions of section 292B of
the Act would not be attracted and hence, the notice u/s. 148 of the Act had to
be treated as invalid.”

Section 115JB of ITA, 1961 – MAT (Banking Companies – Provisions of section 115JB as it stood prior to its amendment by virtue of Finance Act, 2012 would not be applicable to a banking company governed by provisions of Banking Regulation Act, 1949

28  CIT vs. Union Bank of India; [2019] 105 taxmann.com 253 (Bom) Date of order: 16th
April, 2019
A.Y.: 2005-06

 

Section 115JB of ITA, 1961 – MAT
(Banking Companies – Provisions of section 115JB as it stood prior to its
amendment by virtue of Finance Act, 2012 would not be applicable to a banking
company governed by provisions of Banking Regulation Act, 1949

 

The
assessee bank filed its return for the A.Y. 2005-06 declaring certain taxable
income. The AO completed assessment u/s. 143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. He
also computed the book profits u/s. 115JB for determining the assessee’s tax
liability.

 

The
Tribunal held that the provisions of section 115JB were not applicable to the
assessee bank.

 

On
appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the
Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i)   The question
that calls for consideration is whether the machinery provision provided under
sub-section (2) of section 115JB is workable when it comes to the banking
companies and such other special companies governed by the respective Acts. In
this context, the question would also be of the legislative intent to cover
such companies within the sweep of section 115JB of the Act. These questions
arise because of the language used in sub-section (2) of section 115JB. As per
sub-section (2) of section 115JB, every assessee being a company would for the
purposes of the said section prepare its profit and loss account for the
relevant previous year in accordance with the provisions of Parts II and III of
Schedule VI of the Companies Act, 1956. It is undisputed that the assessee a
banking company is not required to prepare its accounts in accordance with the
provisions of Parts II and III of Schedule VI of the Companies Act, 1956. The
accounts of the banking company are prepared as per the provisions contained in
the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. The Department may still argue that
irrespective of such requirements, for the purposes of the said Act and special
requirements of section 115JB, a banking company is obliged to prepare its
profit and loss account as per the provisions of the Companies Act, as mandated
by sub-section (2) of section 115JB of the Act. The assessee’s contention would
be that such legislative mandate is not permissible.

 

ii)   This legal dichotomy emerging from the
provisions of sub-section (2) of section 115JB particularly having regard to
the first proviso contained therein in case of a banking company, would
convince the Court that machinery provision provided in sub-section (2) of
section 115JB of the Act would be rendered wholly unworkable in such a
situation.

 

iii)   For the completeness of the discussion, one
may note that section 211 of the Companies Act, 1956 pertains to form of
contents of balance sheet and profit and loss account, sub-section (1) of
section 211 provided that every balance sheet of a company shall give true and
fair view on the state of affairs of the company at the end of the financial
year and would be subject to the provisions of the said section and be in the
form set out in the Forms 1 and 2 of schedule VI. This sub-section contained a
proviso providing that nothing contained in said sub-section would apply to a
banking company or any company engaged in generation or supply of electricity
or to any other class of company for which a form of balance sheet shall be
specified in or under the Act governing such company. Thus, Companies Act, 1956
excluded the insurance or banking companies, companies engaged in generation or
supply of electricity or companies for which balance sheet was specified in the
governing Act, from the purview of sub-section (1) of section 211 of the
Companies Act, 1956 and as a consequence from the purview of section 115JB of
the Act.

iv)  There are certain significant legislative
changes made by the Finance Act, 2012 which must be noted before concluding
this issue. It can be seen that sub-section (2) of section 115JB has now been
bifurcated into two parts covered in the clauses (a) and (b). Clause (a) would
cover all companies other than those referred to in clause (b). Such companies
would prepare the statement of profit and loss in accordance to the provisions
of schedule III of the Companies Act, 2013 (which has now replaced the old Companies
Act, 1956). Clause (b) refers to a company to which second proviso to
sub-section (1) of section 129 of the Companies Act, 2013 is applicable. Such
companies, for the purpose of section 115JB, would prepare the statement of
profit and loss in accordance with the provisions of the Act governing the
company. Section 129 of the Companies Act, 2013 pertains to financial
statement. Under sub-section (1) of section 129 it is provided that the
financial statement shall give a true and fair view of the state of affairs of
the company, comply with the accounting standard notified under section 113 and
shall be in the form as may be provided for different classes of companies.

 

v)   Second proviso
to sub-section (1) of section 129 refers to any insurance or banking companies
or companies engaged in the generation or supply of electricity or to any other
class of company in which form of financial statement has been specified in or
under the Act governing such class of company. Combined reading of this proviso
to sub-section (1) of section 129 of the Act, 2013 and clause (b) of
sub-section (2) of section 115JB of the Act would show that in case of
insurance or banking companies or companies engaged in generation or supply of
electricity or class of companies for whom financial statement has been
specified under the Act governing such company, the requirement of preparing
the statement of accounts in terms of provisions of the Companies Act is not
made. Clause (b) of sub-section (2) provides that in case of such companies for
the purpose of section 115JB the preparation of statement of profit and loss
account would be in accordance with the provisions of the Act governing such
companies. This legislative change thus aliens class of companies who under the
governing Acts were required to prepare profit and loss accounts not in
accordance with the Companies Act, but in accordance with the provisions
contained in such governing Act. The earlier dichotomy of such companies also,
if one accepts the Revenue’s contention, having the obligation of preparing
accounts as per the provisions of the Companies Act has been removed.

vi)  These amendments in section 115JB are neither
declaratory nor classificatory but make substantive and significant legislative
changes which are admittedly applied prospectively. The memorandum explaining
the provision of the Finance Bill, 2012 while explaining the amendments under
section 115JB of the Act notes that in case of certain companies such as
insurance, banking and electricity companies, they are allowed to prepare the
profit and loss account in accordance with the sections specified in their
regulatory Acts. To align the Income-tax Act with the Companies Act, 1956 it
was decided to amend section 115JB to provide that the companies which are not
required under section 211 of the Companies Act to prepare profit and loss
account in accordance with Schedule VI of the Companies Act, profit and loss
account prepared in accordance with the provisions of their regulatory Act
shall be taken as basis for computing book profit under section 115 JB of the
Act.

 

vii)  Further, Explanation (3) below section
115JB(2) starts with the expression ‘For the removal of doubts’. It declares
that for the purpose of the said section in case of an assessee-company to
which second proviso to section 129 (1) of the Companies Act, 2013 is
applicable, would have an option for the assessment year commencing on or
before 1st April, 2012 to prepare its statement of profit and loss
either in accordance with the provisions of schedule III to the Companies Act,
2013 or in accordance with the provisions of the Act governing such company.
This is a somewhat curious provision. In the original form, sub-section (2) of
section 115JB of the Act did not offer any such option to a banking company,
insurance company or electricity company to prepare its profit and loss account
at its choice either in terms of its governing Act or as per terms of section
115JB of the Act. Secondly, by virtue of this explanation if an anomaly which
has been noticed is sought to be removed, it cannot be said that the
Legislature has achieved such purpose. In plain terms, this is not a case of
retrospective legislative amendment. It is stated to be a clarificatory
amendment for removal of doubts. When the plain language of sub-section (2) of
section 115JB did not permit any ambiguity, one cannot say that the Legislature
by introducing a clarificatory or declaratory amendment cured a defect without
resorting to retrospective amendment, which in the present case has admittedly
not been done.

 

viii) In the result, it is held that section 115JB as
it stood prior to its amendment by virtue of Finance Act, 2012 would not be
applicable to a banking company. In the result, Revenue’s appeal is dismissed.”

Section 244A(2) of ITA, 1961 – Interest on delayed refund – Where issue of refund order was not delayed for any period attributable to assessee, Tribunal was correct in allowing interest to assessee in terms of section 244A(1)(a) – Just because the assessee had raised a belated claim during the course of the assessment proceedings which resulted in delay in granting of refund, it couldn’t be said that refund had been delayed for the reasons attributable to the assessee and assessee wasn’t entitled to interest for the entire period from the first date of assessment year till the order giving effect to the appellate order was passed

27  CIT vs. Melstar Information Technologies Ltd.; [2019] 106 taxmann.com
142 (Bom)
Date of order: 10th
June, 2019

 

Section 244A(2) of ITA, 1961 – Interest on delayed
refund – Where issue of refund order was not delayed for any period
attributable to assessee, Tribunal was correct in allowing interest to assessee
in terms of section 244A(1)(a) – Just because the assessee had raised a belated
claim during the course of the assessment proceedings which resulted in delay
in granting of refund, it couldn’t be said that refund had been delayed for the
reasons attributable to the assessee and assessee wasn’t entitled to interest
for the entire period from the first date of assessment year till the order
giving effect to the appellate order was passed

 

The
assessee had not claimed certain expenditure before the AO but eventually
raised such a claim before the Tribunal upon which the Tribunal remanded the proceedings
to the CIT (A). The additional benefit claimed by the assessee was granted.
This resulted in refund and the question of payment of interest on such refund
u/s. 244A of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

 

The
Tribunal came to the conclusion that the delay could not be attributed to the
assessee and therefore, directed payment of interest.

 

On
appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the
Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i)   As is well
known, in case of refunds payable to the assessee, interest in terms of
sub-section (1) of section 244A would be payable. Sub-section (2) of section
244A, however, provides that if the proceedings resulting in the refund are
delayed for reasons attributable to the assessee whether wholly or in part, the
period of delay so attributable, would be excluded from the period for which
interest is payable under sub-section (1) of section 244A of the Act.


ii)   The Revenue does not dispute either the
assessee’s claim of refund or that ordinarily under sub-section (1) of section
244A of the Act such refund would carry interest at statutorily prescribed
rate. However, according to the Revenue, by virtue of sub-section (2) of
section 244A of the Act, since the delay in the proceedings resulting in the
refund was attributable to the assessee, the assessee would not be entitled to
such interest.

 

iii)   Sub-section
(2) of section 244A of the Act refers to the proceedings resulting in the
refund which are delayed for the reasons attributable to the assessee. There is
no allegation or material on record to suggest that any of the proceedings hit
the assessee’s appeal before the Tribunal or remanded the proceedings before
the CIT (A) whether in any manner delayed on account of the reasons
attributable to the assessee. The Tribunal, was, therefore correct in allowing
the interest to the assessee.”

ACCOUNTING OF DIVIDEND DISTRIBUTION TAX

Started as “Accounting Standards” in
August, 2001. Dolphy Dsouza was the first contributor and had at that time
“agreed to write a series of eight articles on AS 16 to AS 23”. However, till
date – to the joy of the readers – continues as the sole contributor giving the
most important aspects of accounting standards. The feature got a suffix to its
name in July, 2002 – gap in GAAPs – and was called “Accounting Standards: Gap
in GAAPs”. Since the arrival of Ind AS it is renamed as at present.

This monthly feature carries
clarifications, commentary, comparison, and seeks to clarify about accounting
concepts and practices. The author says, “Accounting was never a debated topic
in India as much as tax is. Hopefully, my feature has a small hand in bringing
accounting to the centre stage” He shared another secret benefit: “People know
me because they have seen an unusual name in the BCA Journal for the last 18
years.  I once even got a hefty hotel
discount, as the hotel owner was a CA and an avid reader of the BCAJ!”

 

ACCOUNTING OF DIVIDEND DISTRIBUTION TAX

 

Prior to 1st June, 1997,
companies used to pay dividend to their shareholders after withholding tax at
prescribed rates. The shareholders were allowed to use tax deducted by the
company against tax payable on their own income. Collection of tax from
individual shareholders in this manner was cumbersome and involved a lot of
paper work. To make dividend taxation more efficient, the government introduced
the concept of dividend distribution tax (DDT). Key provisions related to DDT
are given below:

 

(a) Under DDT, each company distributing dividend
needs to pay DDT at stated rate to the government. Consequently, dividend
income will be tax free in the hands of shareholders.

(b) DDT is payable even if no income-tax is payable
on the total income, e.g., a company that is exempt from tax on its entire
income will still pay DDT.

(c) DDT is payable within fourteen
days from the date of (i) declaration of any dividend, (ii) distribution of any
dividend, or (iii) payment of any dividend, whichever is earliest.

(d) DDT paid by a company in this manner is treated
as the final payment of tax in respect of dividend and no further credit
therefore can be claimed either by the company or by the recipient of dividend.
However, dividend received is tax free in the hand of all recipients (both
Indian/ foreign).

(e) Only dividend received from domestic companies
is exempt in the hands of recipient. Dividend received from overseas companies
which do not pay DDT is taxable in the hands of recipient, except for the
impact of double tax relief treaties, if any.

(f)  No DDT is required to be paid by the ultimate
parent on distribution of profits arising from dividend income earned by it
from its subsidiaries. However, no such exemption is available for dividend
income earned from investment in associates/ joint ventures or other companies.
Also, no exemption is available to a parent which is subsidiary of another
company.

 

DDT accounting under Ind AS 12 involves
certain issues. The most important issue is that for the entity paying
dividend, whether DDT is an income-tax covered within the scope of Ind AS 12?
Will DDT be an equity adjustment or a P&L charge or this is an accounting policy
choice?

 

Consider that in the structure below,
company B distributes dividend to its equity shareholders, i.e., company A and
pays DDT thereon.

 

 

For DDT accounting in SFS and CFS of B, one
may consider paragraphs 52A/ 52B and 65A of Ind AS 12.

 

“52A     In
some jurisdictions, income taxes are payable at a higher or lower rate if part
or all of the net profit or retained earnings is paid out as a dividend to
shareholders of the entity. In some other jurisdictions, income taxes may be
refundable or payable if part or all of the net profit or retained earnings is
paid out as a dividend to shareholders of the entity. In these circumstances,
current and deferred tax assets and liabilities are measured at the tax rate
applicable to undistributed profits.

 

52B      In
the circumstances described in paragraph 52A, the income tax consequences of
dividends are recognised when a liability to pay the dividend is recognised.
The income tax consequences of dividends are more directly linked to past
transactions or events than to distributions to owners. Therefore, the income
tax consequences of dividends are recognised in profit or loss for the period
as required by paragraph 58 except to the extent that the income tax
consequences of dividends arise from the circumstances described in paragraph
58(a) and (b).”

 

“65A.    When
an entity pays dividends to its shareholders, it may be required to pay a
portion of the dividends to taxation authorities on behalf of shareholders. In
many jurisdictions, this amount is referred to as a withholding tax. Such an
amount paid or payable to taxation authorities is charged to equity as a part
of the dividends.”

 

One may argue that DDT is in substance a
portion of dividend paid to taxation authorities on behalf of shareholders. The
government’s objective for introduction of DDT was not to levy differential tax
on profits distributed by a company. Rather, its intention is to make tax
collection process on dividends more efficient. DDT is payable only if
dividends are distributed to shareholders and its introduction was coupled with
abolition of tax payable on dividend. DDT in substance does not adjust the
corporate tax rate, and is a payment to equity holders in their capacity as
equity holders. This aspect is also recognised in the IASB framework. Thus, DDT
is not in the nature of income-taxes under paragraphs 52A and 52B. Rather, it
is covered under paragraph 65A. Hence, in the SFS and CFS of company B, the DDT
charge will be to equity. The Accounting Standards Board (ASB) of the ICAI has
issued a FAQ regarding DDT accounting. The FAQ confirms this position with
regard to accounting SFS and CFS of company B. However, this position is very
contentious globally and there is a strong argument to treat DDT as an
additional tax in substance. Therefore, though there is no difference in the
Ind AS and IFRS standard on DDT, the practice applied in India may be different
from the practice applied globally.

 

In the SFS of the company receiving
dividend, i.e., company  A, net dividend
received is recognised as income. In CFS of company A, there is no dividend
distribution to an outsider. Rather, funds are being transferred from one
entity to another within the same group, resulting in DDT pay-out to an entity
(tax authority) outside the group. Hence, in the CFS of company A, DDT cannot
be treated as equity adjustment; rather, it is charged to profit or loss.

 

If company B as well as company A pay
dividend in the same year, company B will pay DDT on dividend distributed.
Under the income-tax laws, DDT paid by company B is allowed as set off against
the DDT liability of company A, resulting in reduction of company A’s DDT
liability to this extent. In this scenario, an issue arises how should the
company A treat DDT paid by company B in its CFS?

 

One view is that DDT paid relates to company
B’s dividend. From a group perspective, for transferring cash from one entity
to another, cash/tax was paid to the tax authorities. Hence, it should be
charged to P&L in company A’s CFS. The other view is that due to offset mechanism,
no DDT in substance was paid on dividend distributed by company B. Rather,
company A has paid DDT on its dividend distribution to its shareholders. Hence,
DDT should be charged to equity in company A’s CFS to the extent of offset
available.

 

The ITFG has clarified that second view
should be followed. Under this view, the following table explains the amount to
be charged to P&L and to equity in company A’s CFS:

 

Scenario 1

DDT paid by B

A’s DDT liability

Offset used by A

Equity charge in A’s CFS

P&L charge in A’s CFS

I

30,000

30,000

30,000

30,000

Nil

II

30,000

20,000

20,000

20,000

10,000

III

30,000

40,000

30,000

30,000 + 10,000

Nil

 

 

The above is a simple example where both
parent and subsidiary pay dividends concurrently.  It may so happen that a subsidiary has
distributable profits, but will distribute those, beyond the current financial
year.  In such a case, in parent’s CFS, a
DTL should be recognised at the reporting date in respect of DDT payable on
dividend expected to be distributed by the subsidiary in near future. Absent
offset benefit, the corresponding amount is charged as expense to P&L.
However, there is no direct requirement related to recognition of asset toward
offset available.

 

Considering the above, the ITFG (Bulletin 9)
has stated that at the reporting date, the parent in its CFS will recognise DTL
in respect of DDT payable on dividend to be distributed by subsidiary. The
corresponding amount is charged to P&L. In the next reporting period, on
payment of dividend by both entities and realisation of offset, the parent will
credit P&L and debit the amount to equity. Effectively, the ITFG views
require DDT on expected distribution to be charged to P&L in the first
reporting period which will be reversed in the immediate next period. The
authors believe that the ITFG view does not reflect substance of the
arrangement. Moreover, such an approach will create an unwarranted volatility
in P&L for two reporting periods which should be avoided. The standard
requires creation of a DTA if there is a tax planning opportunity in place. If
the parent company has a strategy in place to distribute dividends to its
shareholders out of the dividends it receives from its subsidiaries, within the
same year, then it will be able to save on the DDT. Consequently, corresponding
to the DTL, an equivalent DTA should also be recognised in the first reporting
period. We recommend that ITFG may reconsider its views on the matter.

 

ITFG (Bulletin 18) has subsequently changed
its position and clarified that accounting treatment of DDT credit depends on
whether or not it is probable that the parent will be able to utilise the same
for set off against its liability to pay DDT. This assessment can be made only
by considering the particular facts and circumstances of each case including
the parent’s policy regarding dividends, historical record of payment of
dividends by the parent, availability of distributable profit and cash,
etc.  The revised ITFG position is a step
in the right direction.

 

In light of the ITFG 18, a few important
questions and clarifications are given below:

  •     Firstly, whether the ITFG
    is mandatory? The answer to this would depend upon an assessment of whether the
    ITFG interpretation reflects a reasonable and globally acceptable
    interpretation of the standard. The view in ITFG 18, is in my opinion a
    reasonable and correct interpretation, and should therefore be considered
    mandatory.
  •     Secondly, when changing the
    practice to comply with ITFG 18, would it be a change in estimate or change in
    policy or an error?  In line with global
    practice with respect to issuance of IFRICs from time to time the author
    believes that the change is a change in an estimate rather than a change in an
    accounting policy or an error.
  •     Lastly, should the ITFG be
    implemented as soon as it is issued? This is more of a practical issue. It may
    not always be possible for entities to comply with an ITFG in the accounts of
    the quarter in which it is issued. 
    Nonetheless, entities should give effect to the ITFG in the following
    quarter.
     

 

 

INTERCEPTION, INSPECTION, DETENTION OR SEIZURE, CONFISCATION

 

GST law had
promised to usher in a host of reforms on hastle free movement goods across the
country. Some of the promising features of GST involved abolition of
check-posts, common way bill management systems, uniformity in law enforcement
across the country thus boosting business efficiency in logistics. This has certainly
freed business enterprises from shackles of traditional law enforcement and is
on course to digitization of enforcement to improve the administrative
effectiveness and minimise hurdles to trade and commerce.

 

In-transit
inspection plays a critical role in law enforcement. Interception, detention
and seizure provisions of the GST law perform the function of administrating
law on a real-time basis to check tax evasion during movement of goods. Section
68 of Chapter XIV contains enforcement provisions and grants wide powers to the
tax administration. Active tax enforcement not only detects tax evasion but
also acts as a deterrent. This article is an attempt to elaborate provisions in
detail and identify the critical areas one needs to address in such matters.

 

GENERAL UNDERSTANDING OF INTERCEPTION, DETENTION & SEIZURE


‘Interception’ is generally understood as the act of preventing someone or
something from continuing to a destination. Black’s Law dictionary states: “the
term usually refers to covert reception by a law enforcement agency” and P
Ramanatha Iyer’s Law Lexicon states interception as “seize, catch or
stop (letter etc.) in transmit”.

 

‘Detention’ is understood as the act of taking custody over someone or
something. Black’s law dictionary states “the act or an instance of holding a
person in custody; confinement or compulsory delay”; Law Lexicon states
“the action of detaining, the keeping in confinement or custody, a keeping from
going on or proceeding”.

 

‘Seizure’ is understood as the act of capturing or confiscating something by
force (i.e. against the will of the person having possession). Black’s Law
states “the act or an instance of taking possession of a person or property by
legal right or process, esp, in constitutional law, a confiscation or arrest
that may interfere with a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy; Law
Lexicon
explains seizure as taking possession of property by an officer
under legal process.

 

‘Confiscation’ means permanent deprivation of property by order of a court of
competent authority (Law Lexicon). Black’s Law states “seizure of
property for the public treasury”.

 

One would observe
from the ensuing paragraphs, that each term represents a different stage in a
proceeding and the rigours increase as the stage progresses. For eg.
Interception requires a simple reporting and release of goods but as soon the
goods are proposed for detention and seizure, the intensity of the powers of
the officer increasing. Same goes with once the goods enter confiscation
proceedings, the power of the officers over the goods are more stringent than
in cases of detention. Rights and obligations of the officer and the tax payer
are different at each level of the proceeding and hence one needs to be mindful
of the stage of the proceedings while addressing the questions of the officer.

 

IN-TRANSIT DOCUMENTATION U/S. 68(1) R/W RULE 138A


Section 68 provides
for carrying specified documents/ devices along with the conveyance of
consignment during the transportation of goods. The section empowers the
‘proper officer’ to intercept the conveyance at any place and require
the ‘person in charge’ of the conveyance to produce the prescribed
documents/devices for verification and allow inspection of goods. The term
proper officer has been defined to mean the officer who has been assigned the
powers of interception by the respective Commissioners of the CGST/SGST. While
determining the proper officer care should be taken that the said officer has
territorial and functional jurisdiction at the point of interception. ‘Person
in charge’ of conveyance has not been defined and should be understood as
referring to the transporter and driver of the conveyance performing the
movement of goods.

 

Rule 138A (inserted
w.e.f. 30-08-2017) provides for the requirement of carrying a tax invoice, bill
of supply, bill of entry or delivery challan and e-way bill (as applicable). In
terms of section 138A(5), the Commissioner in special cases is permitted to
waive the requirement of e-way bill. The contents of a tax invoice, bill of
supply, delivery challan and e-way bill are prescribed in Rule 46, 46A and 49.
In addition to the said manual documents, e-way bill requirements as generated
from the common portal were mandated vide Notification 27/2017-CT dt.
30.08.2017 w.e.f. from 01/02/2018 but ultimately implemented from 01-04-2018.
Certain States (like Karnataka) implemented these provisions even prior to the
Centre invoking the E-way bill provisions for intra-state transactions.

 

INTERCEPTING POWERS U/S. 68(2) R/W RULE 138 B


Section 68(2) r/w
Rule 138B grants the powers to the Commissioner or proper officer to intercept
any conveyance for verification of the e-way bill for all inter-state and
intra-state movement. Physical verification of the intercepted vehicle should
be carried out only by empowered officers. In terms of CBIC Circular
3/3/2017-GST dt. 05.07.2017, the Inspector of Central Tax and his superiors
have been granted powers of interception. The proviso of the said rule states
that in case of receipt of any specific information of tax evasion, physical
verification of the conveyance can be carried out by any other officer after
obtaining necessary approval from the Commissioner.

 

INSPECTING POWERS U/S. 68(2) R/W RILE 138 C


Section 68(2) r/w
Rule 138C requires that every inspection of goods in transit would have to be
recorded online by the proper officer within 24 hours of inspection and the
final report recorded within 3 days of inspection (in Form EWB-03). Sub rule
(2) states that where any physical verification of goods has been performed
during transit in one State or in any other State, no further physical
verification of the said conveyance should be carried out again in the State
unless specific information of evasion is available with the officer
subsequently. Rule 138D specifies that the detention of the vehicle for the
purpose of inspection should not exceed 30 minutes and the transporter can
upload the details in cases where the detention is beyond 30 minutes.

 

DETENTION & SEIZURE POWERS U/S.129


The proper officer
is empowered to detain the conveyance and the goods during its transit in case
of any contravention of the provisions of the Act (report of detention in Form
EWB-04). The detention proceedings require issuance of a notice, seeking a
reply and concluding the proceeding by way of a detention/seizure order. In
terms of the CBIC Circular dt 05.07.2017 (supra) detention powers can be
exercised only by the Asst/Dy. Commissioner of Central Tax. The goods would be
released by the proper officer only on payment of the applicable tax and
penalty or submission of a security in prescribed form.

 

The said section
also prescribes the procedure to be adopted on detention of the goods in
transit. In this regard, CBIC has issued circulars (Circular 41/15/2018-GST dt.
13-04-2018; No 49/23/2018-GST dt. 21-06-2018 and No 64/38/2018-GST dt.
14-09-2018) which specify the detailed procedure and forms to the followed
(MOV-01 to MOV-11) by the Central Tax officers in matters of interception,
inspection and detention. Key points emerging from the Circular are as follows:

 

  •     The jurisdictional
    Commissioner or the designated proper officer is permitted to conduct
    interception and inspection of conveyances within the jurisdictional area
    specified by the Commissioner. One should verify whether the locational
    Commissionerate of the region has issued any such trade notice assigning
    functional/ geographical jurisdiction.
  •     The proper officer believes
    that the movement of goods is with an intention of evading tax, he may directly
    invoke section 130 where a fine in lieu of compensation may be imposed.
  •     Where an order is passed
    under the CGST Act, a corresponding order shall also be passed under the
    respective State laws as well.
  •     Demand of the tax, penalty,
    fine or other charges would be uploaded on the electronic liability register
    and in case of unregistered persons a temporary ID would be created for
    discharge of the liability posted on the common portal.
  •     In cases of multiple
    consignments, only goods or conveyance in respect of which there is violation
    of the provisions of the Act should be detained while the rest of the
    consignment should be permitted to be released by the proper officer.
  •     Consignment of goods should
    not be detained where there are clerical errors such as spelling mistakes in
    name of consignor/ee, PIN code, locality, document number of e-way bill,
    vehicle number, etc. in cases of clerical errors, a maximum penalty of Rs. 500
    each under respective law could be imposed.
  •     Section 129 does not
    mandate payment of tax in all cases and the owner of goods scan exercise the
    option of furnishing a security (in prescribed form and a bond supported by a
    bank guarantee equal to amount payable).

 

CONFISCATION POWERS U/S.130


In cases where the
proper officer has formed the view that any of the five circumstances exists,
the goods are liable for confiscation – where any person:

 

i.    Supplies or receives goods in contravention
of the provisions of Act/ rules with intention of tax evasion

ii.   Does not account for goods liable for paying
tax

iii.   Supplies goods without obtaining a
registration number

iv.  Contravenes any provision of the Act with
intention of tax evasion

v.   Uses any conveyance as means of transport for
tax evasion unless the owner of the conveyance has no knowledge of this action

 

The fine legal
difference between detention and confiscation is that detention is invoked only
on suspicion over tax evasion whereas confiscation require reasons beyond doubt
that the goods are a result of tax evasion [Kerala High Court in Indus
Towers vs. Asst. State Tax officer 2018 (1) TMI 1313
]

 

In terms of the
CBIC Circular dt 05.07.2017 (supra) confiscation powers can be exercised only
by the Asst/Dy Commissioner of Central Tax. In cases of confiscation, the title
over the goods shall vest upon the Government and the owner of the goods cannot
exercise any rights over the goods. Whenever any confiscation of goods is
ordered, the owner of the goods has the option to pay a fine in lieu of
confiscation which shall not exceed the market value of goods confiscated less
the tax chargeable thereon, and shall in no case be less than the amount
specified u/s. 129. In cases of confiscation of the conveyance itself, the fine
shall not exceed the tax payable on the goods under conveyance.

 

APPROPRIATE TAX ADMINISTRATION


Though GST has been
built on a national platform, legislative powers under IGST, CGST and SGST Act
have certain inherent geographical limitations. In addition to that, the Centre
and State have notified the respective workforce for administration. It would
be thus important to identify the ‘proper officer’ having geographical
jurisdiction over goods under transit.

 

We can take an
example of a case where goods under inter-state movement from Kerala (KL) to
Delhi (DL) are intercepted by a State officer in Maharashtra (MH) and detained
for lack of proper documentation. Whether the intercepting officer in MH could
be considered as the ‘proper officer’ for interception, detention, seizure,
inspection and adjudication of the goods under movement which is an inter-state
supply from KL to DL? The practical experience thus far is that the State
officers detain the goods and direct the assessee to open a temporary ID in
their State and discharge the taxes as if it is an intra-state sale within MH.

 

Primarily, three
theories can exist (A) Only Origin State authorities have jurisdiction over
interception; or (B) All state authorities (including origin and destination
state) have jurisdiction over the goods under transit as long as the goods are
physically present in their state boundaries during exercise of powers or (C)
While state authorities have powers of interception, the final assessment of
the tax involved would be made by the officer in the State of origin based on
the detention report.

 

A) Geographical
jurisdiction

Article 246A(1)
empower both the Centre and State to make laws pertaining to goods and service
tax imposed by the Union or State. 246A(2) grants exclusive powers to Centre to
legislate on matters of inter-state trade of commerce. Article 286 places a
clear embargo on the State to impose a tax on supply of goods or services ‘outside
a State
’ and or ‘in course of import or export of goods or services’.
Article 258 provides for the Union to confer powers to the State or its
officers either conditionally or unconditionally, with consent of the President
of India and the Governor of the respective State, in relation to any matter to
which the Executive of the Union extends. Where such powers have been conferred
by the Union to the State, administration costs attributable to the staff
empowered would be payable by the Centre to State. The IGST has not invoked
Article 258 but empowered the State workforce through statutory provisions.

 

In terms of Article
286(2), the Centre has been placed with the responsibility to formulate the
principles of determining where the supply takes place. It is in exercise of
these powers that the IGST Act has formulated provisions for ascertaining the
character of supply (i.e. intra-state vs. inter-state) based on the place of
supply of such services: Chapter IV and V of the IGST Act read together answer
(a) the characterisation of the supply (inter-state or intra-state); and (b)
where locus of the supply. This is broadly akin to the provisions of section 3,
4 and 5 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (CST law).

 

In the context of
administration, the GST council has decided that Centre & State’s
administration would be a unified force. Discussions on cross empowerment in
GST council involved five options which were discussed at length and the fifth
option attained consensus only in the 9th GST Council meeting (para
28 of minutes of meeting). The key thrust of the decisions where (a) Unified
tax payer and administration interface;(b) Allocation of tax payer base between
the Centre and State based on statistical data for administering the CGST/SGST
Acts (b) Concurrent enforcement powers to Centre & State on entire value
chain based on intelligence inputs of respective field formations; (c) Powers
under IGST law to be cross empowered on the same basis as that of CGST/ SGST
Act. However, Centre has exclusive powers to administer issues around ‘place of
supply’, ‘export’, ‘imports’ etc. These decisions were translated into the CGST
and SGST Act as follows:

 

  •     Section 6 of CGST/ SGST
    cross empowers the corresponding officer as per the allocation criteria agreed
    at the GST Council (stated above). Further, it has been agreed that where an officer
    has initiated any proceeding on a subject matter under an Act, no proceeding
    shall be initiated by the officer of the corresponding administration on the
    same subject. This ensured that unified interface was maintained.
  •     In respect of the IGST Act,
    section 20 does not borrow the cross-empowerment provisions of the CGST Act.
    The IGST Act has a different mechanism of empowerment of both Central/ State
    officers. Section 3 grants powers to central tax officers for exercise of all
    powers of the Act. The CBIC has issued Circulars No. 3/3/2017dt 05.07.2017
    assigning powers to the Central Tax Officers. Section 4 also authorises
    officers appointed under the State GST Acts as proper officers under the IGST
    Act subject to exceptions and conditions of the GST Council.
  •     The Commissioner of the
    State would have thus issued appropriate notifications under their respective
    State laws assigning the jurisdiction of enforcement action to the officers and
    by virtue of the said notification, they would acquire enforcement jurisdiction
    even under the IGST Act. Therefore State officers who are empowered under the
    State GST to perform enforcement activity would also be empowered to perform
    the enforcement function under the IGST Act.

 

We may recollect
that CST law empowered the ‘appropriate state’ from where the movement of goods
commenced to collect and enforce payment of tax through their general sales tax
law (Section 9). This enabled the origin state to acquire jurisdiction on
inter-state sale movement and enforcement action. Transit states acquired
enforcement jurisdiction over such inter-state movement through transit pass
and way bill provisions which setup a presumption that the goods have been sold
within the State on failure to produce such documentation. The IGST Act is on a
different footing. Firstly, States do not have the same autonomous powers akin
to section 9(2) of CST Act in matters of collection and enforcement provisions.
The IGST Act is a self-sufficient Act containing its own collection and enforcement
provisions. Secondly, IGST Act has limited itself to appointing the State
officers as proper officers for the purpose the IGST Act (section 4) rather
adopting the provisions of the respective State law. Thirdly, IGST does not
provide for any presumption as to the sale of goods within a state in the
absence of any prescriptive documentation. In other words, the character of the
transaction being an inter-state transaction does not get altered during the
process of detention and/or seizure and tax due on such transaction should be
assessed from the Origin State. Even in case there is a dispute on the
inter-state character, the Centre has exclusive domain over examining its
nature in view of Article 286(2) and the decision of the 9th GST Council meeting.

 

The following
overall inferences can be formed from above analysis:

 

  •     Power of legislation is
    distinct from the power of administration and it is not necessary that the
    power of legislation and enforcement are with the same authority (eg. CST Act).
    The administrative provisions of IGST act are self-contained in the said
    enactment itself.
  •     IGST Act only borrows the
    work force of the State for implementing the Act. State work force is required
    to follow the Circulars, Notifications of the CBIC / Central Tax office while
    exercising their powers under the IGST Act. The statutory powers are not
    sourced from the State legislation independently like section 9(2) of the CST
    law (refer discussion below).
  •     There is no specific
    notification or circular issued under the IGST Act assigning the functions and
    territorial limits to the State workforce. In the absence of a specific
    notification or circular one may view that (a) each state workforce would
    operate within the respective State boundaries and the role assigned by the
    State Commissioner (enforcement, vigilance, audit, range, etc) in that boundary
    would operate equally for the IGST Act or (b) the State workforce would have
    pan India powers on inter-state transactions and would exercise these powers
    under IGST law in the absence of any geographical limits over the officers
    under the IGST law. The former seems to be a more plausible approach to
    resolving the issue on jurisdiction.

 

  •     The power of collection on
    inter-state supplies from State X lies with the Centre. However, State X in
    terms of Article 286 is precluded over imposing tax on supplies occurring in
    all other States or in import/ export transactions. Therefore intercepting
    officers in State X should refrain imposing any tax on inter-state
    movement u/s. 129.

 

Coming to the issue
taken up earlier, MH State should not be considered as the ‘proper officer’ for
the inter-state movement from KL to DL as the jurisdiction of administration is
between the Centre/ State workforce operating from the State of Kerala. An
alternative view would be that the IGST Act being a pan Indian enactment has
borrowed the State officers across India for the purpose of enforcement in
their respective geographical area. MH State may not have administrative power
over the ‘transaction of supply’ but it could have powers over the ‘goods under
movement’ for the limited purpose of interception, inspection, detention and
seizure.



Though the above
powers of interception, detention and release would be exercised by the MH
officer under the IGST Act, the final assessment of the liability on the goods
will have to take place at the Origin State (KL) either by the Central/ State
administration depending on the allocation.

 

FUNCTIONAL JURISDICTION


Section 2(91) defines the proper officer to mean the person who has been
assigned the function by the Commissioner. CBEC has in its Circular No.
3/3/2017-GST dt. 05-07-2017 designated the Inspector of Central Tax with powers
of interception and the Asst./Dy. Commissioner of Central Tax with the powers
of adjudication over the matter of release of goods u/s. 129. These powers
would be exercised by the respective officers within the confines of the
geography assigned to the said officers. It is expected that similar
Circulars/notifications are issued by the respective State Commissioners
assigning the functional jurisdiction to their officers. Therefore, one would
have to carefully peruse the relevant notification/ circulars under the States
for consideration to establish the function and geographical jurisdiction over
a particular transaction/goods.

 

OVERALL SCHEME OF SECTION 129


Some important
questions arise on the overall scheme of section 129:

 

Whether
proceedings u/s. 129 is interim in nature and subject to the final assessment
in the hands of
the supplier?

 

Section 129
provides for detention, seizure and release of goods by following a prescribed
procedure of issuance of a notice, seeking a reply and furnishing a release
order. A key feature is that it permits release of the goods on furnishing a
security in the prescribed form, indicating that the goods are being released
on a provisional basis and the assessment would be finalised subsequently. But
the provision subsequently goes on to state that on payment of the amount, all
proceedings in respect of the notice would deemed to the concluded. There seems
to be a divergence in the way the provisions are drafted. One theory suggests
that the proceedings are interim in nature and subject to its finalisation
before the assessing authority who would take cognizance of the entire
proceeding u/s. 64, 73, 74 and complete the assessment of the supplier taking
into account the report of the inspecting authority. This was the manner in
which the VAT law was also being enforced across States. The other theory
suggests that the proceedings are conclusive and no further action needs to be
taken at the assessing officer’s end on the subject matter. Now there could be
instances where the supplier would have already reported the transaction in its
GSTR-3B/GSTR-1 and discharged the applicable taxes. If the goods in transit are
subjected to the said provisions and cleared on payment of applicable tax and
penalty, it would result in a double taxation of the very same goods which
clearly does not seem to be the intent of law. It appears to the author that
the scope of section 68 r/w 129 is to examine the completeness of documents and
provide information to the assessing authority, which could be obtained only
from real time enforcement, for finalisation of the assessment and not just to
conclude the entire proceeding at the place of interception. The term
‘contravention’ in section 129 should be understood contextually on with
reference to the compliance of documentation during the movement of goods and
not beyond that. The author believes that all these proceedings would finally
culminate by way of an assessment u/s. 64, 73 or 74.

 

How do we
harmoniously apply the penalty imposable u/s. 129 vs. 122(1) (i), (ii), (xiv),
(xv), (xviii) vs. 122(2) : specific vs. general : lower vs. higher penalty?

 

Both section 129
and 122 are penal provisions imposing penalty for offences under the Act. There
is an overlap of the scope of the said sections resulting in ambiguity. The
said sections are briefly extracted below

 

Section 129

Section 122(1) (i), (ii), (xiv), (xv),
(xviii)

Section 122(2)

Penalty for contravention of goods in
transit

Specific Penalties for movement of goods
without invoice/ documents, evasion of tax, goods liable for confiscation,
etc

Penalty where tax has not been paid or
short paid

100% of tax payable (in case of exempted
goods – 2% of value of goods) (OR)

50% of value of goods less tax paid (5%
in case of exempted goods)

Penalty of 10,000 or 100% of tax evaded
w.e.h.

Penalty of Rs. 10,000 or 10% of the tax
due w.e.h.

 

 

The field
formations are consistently applying the provisions which results in a higher
collection without assessing the applicable section under which penalty are
imposable. While certainly section 129 is specific to cases where goods are in
transit, section 122 also provides for cases of imposition of penalty where
goods are transported without cover of documents. One possible resolution to
this conflict may be as follows:

  •     Section 129 is specific to
    cases of non-compliance identified during transit and section 122(1)
    applies only to cases where the transportation has completed and the
    non-compliance is identified after the goods have reached their
    destination (say the registered premises)

 

  •     Section 122(1) is narrower
    in its scope in so far as it requires tax to be evaded for its application.
    There could be cases where goods have reached the destination without
    appropriate documents but duly accounted for in the books of accounts. In such
    cases, section 129 cannot be imposed and section 122(1) would apply to cases
    involving tax evasion.
  •     Section 122(2) on the other
    hand being a general provision for penalty should not apply since section
    122(1) and 129 are more specific contenders on this subject matter

 

PRACTICAL ISSUES ON INTERCEPTION / INSPECTION / DETENTION & SEIZURE

Apart from the
legal analysis, the trade and community are facing multiple challenges at the
ground level on matters of such matters. The issues are tabulated below for
easy reference:

 

S No

Issue

Possible resolution

1

E-way bill not containing key particulars such as
Invoice No., Taxable value, Tax , etc OR E-way bill not generated

Supreme Court in Guljag Industries (below) has
stated that mens-rea need not be examined in cases of statutory offences.
Therefore, tax & penalty can be imposed u/s 129 equivalent to the tax in
cases of such violations. Recent decision of MP High Court in Gati
Kintetsu Express Pvt ltd vs. CCT 2018 (15) GSTL 310
affirmed penalty in
case of violation and distinguished Allahabad High Court’s decision in VSL
Alloys (India) Pvt Ltd vs. State of UP 2018 (5) TMI 455.

2

E-way bill & Invoice is valid and containing
accurate particulars but quantity reported is higher than the physical
quantity in the conveyance (due to evaporation, wastage, water content, etc)

Taxable quantity/value being higher than the physical
quantity, there is no short payment of tax and hence detention would be
incorrect. At the most in case where there is an error, general penalty of
Rs. 25,000/- may be imposed for discrepancies.

3

E-way bill is valid and generated but invoice/ delivery
challan is not carried along with consignment – all particulars in e-way bill
match with consignment

Rule 138A and CBEC Circular require both the
self-generated document (invoice/delivery challan) and e-way bill to be
carried. E-way bill is a system generated document containing all particulars
of the invoice and a verifiable/non-destructible document and hence superior
in status vis-à-vis the invoice. Ideally no penalty should be imposed in such
scenarios.

4

E-way bill not reconciling with the some valuation
particulars of Invoice – such as Taxable Value, Tax etc but matching with
other particulars

Officers may disregard the e–way bill entirely and
state that conveyance is without e-way bill in which case the entire penalty
would be imposable. Alternatively, if it is established that e-way bill
relates to the very same consignment, then possibly e-way bill would be
considered for examination, ignoring the invoice and the physical
verification would be performed accordingly. Any excess stock/ value above
the e-way bill may be subject to penalty.

 

 

 

5 & 6

Delivery challan & e-way bill issued and officer contesting
that Invoice should be issued (OR) Wrong Tax Type recorded in the E-way bill
& Invoice i.e. IGST instead of CGST/SGST

Intercepting officer is only required to assess with
the prescribed documents are being carried and they reconcile with the physical
movment of goods. Any dispute on the type of documentation, etc., is not with
the domain of intercepting officer and is for the assesing authority to
examine and take a legal position on that front.

7

Goods sent on approval and at particular location for
sale within the six months time limit but e-way has expired

This is a tricky issue. Whether goods sent on approval
and retained by the recipient for approval for six months are required to be
under a live e-way bill. While one may say that this is incorrect another
argument would be that goods should be either under a live e-way bill or at
the registered presmises of the supplier and hence registration should be
obtained for places where goods are temporarily stored.

8

Alternative/ Wrong route adopted by the transporter but
e-way bill valid

Not a contravention of any provision and section 129
cannot be invoked unless the officer is establish tax evasion.

9

Difference between invoice date : e-way bill date
(could range from few months to year) especially in case of goods consigned
after auction

Inspecting officers are intercepting goods where
invoice is significantly prior to e-way bill. Section 31 permits invoice to
be raised on or before removal of goods. A tax invoice is a permanent
document & does not have any expiry date unlike e-way bill which has is a
temporary document. Therefore, such action is incorrect in law.

10

Owner of goods – Ex-works/ FOB contracts, etc.

Section 129 requires the owner to come forward for the
entire proceedings. There have been cases where the officer has rejected the
purchaser from hearing the matter. There have been cases where the officer
has called upon the purchaser rather than the seller since the purchaser
resides in the same State. This is a challenge since ownership is differently
understood from the term supplier and recipient.

11

Whether inspecting officer can question the veracity of
the delivery address (eg. Delivery at a fourth location not belonging to the
customer)

Section 129 is invoked only where there is a
contravention of provisions during movement of goods. Being tax paid goods,
there is nothing which is further payable irrespective of the destination of
goods. Unless there is specific information of tax evasion, the officer
cannot question the veracity of the delivery address.

12

Multiple consignment – detain only goods in respect of
violation : multiple invoice vs. multiple quantity

CBIC circular (supra) states that in case of multiple
consignments, detention proceedings should be applied only on the consignment
under which there is a violation. In certain cases where an invoice has
multiple line items and the discrepancy is only with respect to one line
item, equity demands that detention proceedings should be restricted only to
the said line item in respect of which there is a violation and the rest of
the consignment should be related without any delay.

13

Officers not accepting the security for release of
goods u/s. 129

This is clearly violation of statutory mandate by the
Officers.

 

 

SOME LEGAL PRECEDENTS


Some judicial
precedents on this subject are as follows:

  •     Failure to report material
    particulars on the statutory documents under movement is a statutory offence.
    Penalty is for this statutory offence and there is no question of proving of
    intention or of mens-rea as the same is excluded from the category of essential
    element for imposing penalty. Guljag Industries vs. CTO [2007] 9 VST 1 (SC).
  •     Declaration uploaded on the
    website after the detention of goods does not absolve the penalty of the
    assessee. The time of declaration is critical. Asst. State Tax officer vs.
    Indus Towers Ltd 2018 (7) TMI 1181
    (Ker-HC)
  •     Squad / enforcement
    officers cannot detain goods over dispute on HSN/ classification. This is under
    the domain of the assessing authority. At the most, the squad officer could
    report this discrepancy to the assessing authority for further action at their
    end. Jeyyam Global Foods (P) Ltd., vs. UOI 2019 (2) TMI 124 (Mad-HC)
  •     Supreme Court CST vs. PT
    Enterprises (2000) 117 STC 315 (SC)
    – The inspecting authority has the
    powers to question the valuation of the goods under the Madhya Pradesh Sales
    Tax Act. This decision was rendered in view of the specific requirement that
    inspecting authority could detain goods in case of evasion on the value
    of goods.

 

CONCLUSION


Provisions of
interception, detention and seizure are open ended giving wide powers to the
officer. This could result in dual taxation of the very same goods without any
input tax credit in the hands of the recipient. Moreover, diverse practices are
being followed among the field formations across the country leading to
inequities in application of law. Certain legal provisions are overlapping
giving choices to the administration over the subject goods and the inclination
of the administration is to choose a stricter provision thereby making the other
provision practically redundant.  There
are multiple challenges on the front of administration, appeal, etc., which
needs to be addressed both at the macro and micro level by the GST council.
Therefore, it is imperative that the GST council and the Government take
proactive steps in cleansing the entire scheme in order to bring uniformity in
implementation of law across the country.

 

DEBT OF GRATITUDE

We are profoundly grateful to the members of the Editorial Board for their long and consistent years of guidance and single-minded dedication. Editorial Board was first formed in 1990. It consists of past editors and committed contributors. The Board deals with policy matters and serves as a brainstorming platform and a sounding board for the Editor. The Board also gives valuable critique to ensure that the Journal runs on basic principles and yet evolves with time.

Kishor B. Karia

Member since
November, 1990
till date

Ashok K. Dhere

Member since
November, 1990
till date

Kahan Chand Narang

Member since
August, 2000
till date

Gautam S. Nayak Member since
August, 2003 till date

Sanjeev R. Pandit

Member since
August, 2004 to
July, 2006 &
August, 2007 till date

Anil J. Sathe

Member since
August, 2004 to
July, 2009 &
August, 2011 till date

Anup P. Shah

Member since
August, 2008

Raman H. Jokhakar

Editor
Member since
August, 2016

Pooja Punjabi

Convenor of Journal Committee

Namrata Dedhia

Convenor of Journal Committee

Akshata Kapadia

Convenor of Journal Committee

Sunil B. Gabhawalla

Ex Officio

Manish Sampat

Ex Officio

BCAJ FEATURES

Features are the bedrock of the BCAJ. Some features report
and digest. Some others explain and analyse. Some provide inspiration or probe
unfairness in laws. The following list gives the statistics of continuing
features that are more than five years old:

 

 

Feature

Started in the Year

Number of years

1

Tribunal
News

1969-70

50

2

In
the High Courts

1971–72

48

3

From
Published Accounts

1980-81

39

4

Controversies

1981-82

38

5

Closements

1982-83

37

6

Miscellanea

1984-85

35

7

Is
It Fair

1996-97

23

8

Allied
Laws

1996-97

23

9

International
Taxation

1997-98

22

10

Corporate
Law Corner

1988-89 to 2006 &

2015-16 till date

18

4

11

Glimpses
of Supreme Court Rulings

2001-02

18

12

Ind
AS / IGAAP – Interpretation & Practical Application

2001-02

18

13

Light
Elements

1995-96 to 2004

2006-07 to 2012

2014-15

2017 till date

9

6

1

2

14

Laws
& Business

2002-03

17

15

Namaskaar

2002-03

17

16

Right
to Information

2004-05

15

17

Securities
Laws

2006-07

13

18

VAT
(Sales Tax Corner)

1995-96

24

19

Indirect
Taxes – Recent Decisions

2009-10

10

20

Ethics
& You

2012-13

7

 

 

CAESAR’S WIFE SHOULD BE ABOVE SUSPICION

BACKGROUND

On 30th April,
2019, SEBI passed orders in the matter of the National Stock Exchange. The
principal issue was the alleged preferential access accorded to some parties to
the stock market order mechanism whereby they could profit and also allegedly
giving them preference over other investors, brokers, etc. Further, there are
two other orders passed by SEBI that deserve consideration. They effectively
exhibit SEBI’s new approach to widen the scope of the liability of persons
associated with the capital market, especially of those connected with listed
companies such as directors, auditors, key executives, etc.

 

These two orders deal with
the alleged abuse of position by some people close to NSE whereby they profited
from certain data preferentially and exclusively obtained from NSE which was
used to develop products that were sold in the market. Worse, the implication
that appears to be brought out is that these products enabled the users to
profit at the cost of other investors.

 

The orders make stringent
adverse comments and issue directions against the two groups of investors. The
first group comprises those who were close to the NSE and which closeness was
used to obtain and use NSE data exclusively. The second group consists of the
exchange itself and its two key officials at the relevant time. SEBI found that
the officials did not carry out the required diligence expected of them. The
adverse directions are fairly stringent and harsh and if they acquire finality,
have the potential to harm careers and reputations, especially of the involved
key persons.

 

However, on appeal to SAT,
the operation of these orders has been stayed as regards some of the key
management persons. Despite the fact that the issues are in appeal because of
the new approach of SEBI, we are reviewing these decisions because a very
interesting approach has been taken in relation to the duties and liabilities
of key management persons. The orders have wider implications and in a manner
are cautionary for several groups who may be in a similar situation; they are,
independent directors, non-executive directors, promoter directors and other
entities associated with the capital markets. These entities often enter into
profitable associations with their companies. Key and even mid-level executives
should examine these transactions. A fairly broad level of performance is
expected from these persons, which are far beyond the literal requirements of
the law. For the purposes of this academic analysis, the statements in the SEBI
orders are taken to be true, though, on facts / law, it is possible that they
may be reversed.

 

THE ALLEGATIONS

SEBI alleged, in the first
order, that there were 5 persons (4 individuals and 1 company) close to the
NSE. This closeness arose primarily because of the closeness of one person over
a long period of time and who, it is stated, was very influential and respected
in NSE. SEBI alleged that he used his position to get certain contracts in
favour of a company associated with his extended relatives. It was alleged that
under this arrangement certain data of NSE was preferentially / exclusively
given to this company. This data was used to develop software products that
could be sold to market operators whereby they could profit and also perhaps
have an edge over other operators in the market. In view of these facts,
allegations of having violated several provisions of Securities Laws, including
those relating to fraud and unfair trade practices, were made.

 

In the second order, based
broadly on the same facts, SEBI has alleged that NSE and its two top officials
failed to exercise due diligence in relation to such contracts, especially
where the parties involved were close to the exchange.

 

THE DEFENCES OFFERED

SEBI relied on certain
emails exchanged between some of the persons covered by the order. According to
SEBI the emails record confidential information which was preferentially given
by NSE. The parties responded that the emails were being taken out of context.

 

The parties also generally
and specifically denied any wrong-doing, particularly relating to profiting
unduly from such information, and also contended that the software products did
not harm the interests of other investors.

 

NSE and its officials also
denied any wrong-doing. They, inter alia, stated that the contracts were
of such size and nature that they do not deserve close attention of the top
officials of the Exchange. They stated that the alleged effects of the
contracts were effectively inconsequential. Further, the contracts did receive
the attention and diligence they deserved.

 

CONCLUSIONS OF SEBI

SEBI rejected these
defences and described how the parties were very close to the Exchange and thus
influenced NSE’s decision-making process. Further, SEBI

 

  • brought out and emphasised the personal
    relations between some of the parties;
  • it particularly highlighted that the manner
    in which the information was provided was exclusive and hence irregular;
  • concluded that proper safeguards were not put
    in place for protecting the data from being shared;
  • SEBI also pointed out that mere disclosure by
    a party that it is interested in a contract is not sufficient and not a
    substitute for diligence by NSE’s key personnel.

 

ORDERS PASSED

Two orders have been
passed. These debar the individuals from, inter alia, holding positions
in prescribed entities. NSE has been issued several directions relating to
strengthening of its internal systems. Further, SEBI has directed legal action
against specified individuals and companies for abuse of the data, etc. As
stated above, on appeal, the operation of SEBI’s orders has been stayed.

 

IMPLICATIONS FOR INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS,
OTHER DIRECTORS AND SENIOR OFFICIALS OF VARIOUS ENTITIES ASSOCIATED WITH
CAPITAL MARKETS, AUDITORS, ETC.

The orders deal with certain
specific facts and also relate to the case of a stock exchange that has certain
duties to the market. However, the principles involved also have relevance to
other entities, for example, independent directors, executive and non-executive
directors, CFOs, key personnel such as company secretaries, lawyers, auditors,
etc.

 

It is very common, for
example, to have contracts and arrangements with directors and / or persons
connected with them. There are requirements under law whereby directors and key
management personnel have to disclose their interest in the contracts and
arrangements with the company. There are also provisions relating to
related-party transactions. However, the orders suggest that complying with
even such broad and comprehensive requirements may not be enough. As a matter
of fact, where such connection exists, arrangements with persons close to the
company ought to require a higher degree of diligence on the part of the
company, its CEO, etc. If it is found later that the contracts bestowed undue
favour or better terms than others or there is non-compliance of law, lack of
action against the party, etc., then the company, its officials and the parties
involved could face scrutiny and possibly action from SEBI.

 

The orders also deal with
confidential and valuable information about the company and the safeguards the
company and the parties who have access to the information would have to take
to ensure that there is no abuse. Conceptually, this is similar to unpublished
price-sensitive information for which there are extensive regulations relating
to insider trading. Abuse of such information may result in loss to the company
and / or loss to investors or may impact the credibility of entities in the
markets.

 

The fact that top
executives (both former Managing Directors) have been debarred from holding
office for a period of three years (though these actions have been stayed by an
appellate order) is another area of concern. The contracts in question were,
relatively speaking, of small amounts in the context of the size of NSE. There
is, I submit, validity in their defence that such contracts are largely handled
at the functional level. However this defence was not accepted.

 

SEBI has expressed that
even if the contracts are small in value, if they are with parties close to the
company, then the contracts / arrangements need a closer watch at a senior
level; because issues, especially those related to confidential data, could
have wider ramifications if abused. Hence, I now perceive that key management
executives will henceforth be expected to look at and monitor closely contracts
with persons close to the company. SEBI has alleged that NSE did not take due
action for violation because the parties who violated the contracts were close
to and influential in NSE.



The other point to
emphasise is that the usual concepts and definition of “persons interested in
contracts” have been given a broader interpretation. Hence, mere disclosure of
interest or even complying with the procedural / approval requirements may not
be enough. Further, even if a person involved is not deemed to have interest as
defined in law or is not a related party as defined in law, the management will
have to demonstrate that due “care and diligence” was carried out at the time
of entering into a contract / arrangement with such person/s.

 

To conclude, the adage Caesar’s wife should be above
suspicion
applies today even more than ever
.

ORDINANCE FOR CO-OPERATIVE HOUSING SOCIETIES

INTRODUCTION

The Maharashtra Government has introduced the Maharashtra
Ordinance No. IX of 2019 dated 09.03.2019 to amend the Maharashtra Co-operative
Societies Act, 1960 (“the Act”). This Ordinance would remain in
force for a period of six months, i.e., up to 8th September, 2019
after which it would lapse unless the Government comes out with an Amendment
Act or renews the Ordinance. A new Chapter, XIII-B, consisting of section 154B
to 154B-29, has been inserted in the Act specifically dealing with co-operative
housing societies.

 

One of the complaints against the Act was that it was geared
more towards general co-operative societies and did not have special provisions
for co-operative housing societies. That issue is sought to be addressed by
this new Chapter. While the Ordinance has made several amendments to the Act,
it has introduced key changes to the concepts of membership of a co-operative
society. This article examines some of the amendments made by the Ordinance in
relation to membership of a co-operative housing society.

 

NEW CATEGORIES OF MEMBERSHIP

The Ordinance has introduced new categories of membership in
a co-operative housing society. A “Member” has been defined to mean:

 

(a) a person joining in an application for the registration
of a housing society; or

(b) a person duly admitted to membership of a society after
its registration;

(c) an Associate or a Joint or a Provisional Member.

 

Thus, an Associate Member has now also been classified as a
Member. A Joint Member has also been categorised as a Member. Further, a new
category of membership called Provisional Member has been introduced. A house
construction co-operative housing society; tenant ownership housing society;
tenant co-partnership housing society; co-operative society; house mortgage
co-operative societies; premises co-operative societies, etc., are all included
in the definition of a housing society.

 

An “Associate Member” has been defined to mean any of the
specified ten relations of a Member; these are the husband, wife,
father, mother, brother, sister, son, daughter, son-in-law, daughter-in-law,
nephew or niece of a person duly admitted to membership of a housing society.
For this purpose, there must be a written recommendation of a Member for the
Associate Member to exercise his rights and duties. Further, an Associate
Member’s name would not appear in the Share Certificate issued by the society
to the Member. Hence, it is evident from this definition that only one of the ten
relatives can be inducted as an Associate Member. It is worth noting that the
Ordinance has some drafting errors in the definition of Associate Member in the
English text. However, on a reading of the Marathi version the position becomes
clearer.

 

A “Joint Member”, on the other hand, has been defined to mean
a person who either joins in an application for the registration of a housing
society or a person who is duly admitted to membership after its registration.
The Joint Member holds share, right, title and interest in the flat jointly but
whose name does not stand first in the share certificate. Thus, a Joint Member
would not be the first name holder in the share certificate but would be the
second or third name holder. Thus, the difference between an Associate Member
and a Joint Member is as follows:

 

The Act defines an Associate Member as a member who holds
jointly a share in the society but whose name does not appear first in the
share certificate. Thus, this existing definition in the Act (applicable for
co-operative societies) is a combination of the definitions for Associate and
Joint Members introduced by the Ordinance which would now be applicable for
co-operative housing societies. Further, this existing definition treats any
person as an Associate Member, whereas as per the Ordinance only ten specified
relatives can be Associate Members. The existing definition under the Act would
apply to general co-operative societies while the definitions introduced by the
Ordinance would apply only for co-operative housing societies. Thus, there
would be two separate definitions.

 

The society may admit any person as an Associate, Joint or
Provisional Member. However, this has to be read in the context of the
definition of the term Associate Member which states that only the specified
relatives of a Member can be admitted as Associate Members.

 

VOTING RIGHTS OF MEMBERS

A Member of a society shall have one vote in its affairs and
the right to vote shall be exercised personally. It is now expressly provided
that an Associate Member shall have right to vote but can do so only with the
prior written consent of the main Member.

 

In case of Joint Member, the person whose name stands first
in the share certificate has the right to vote. In his absence, the person
whose name stands second, and in the absence of both, the person whose name
stands third shall have the right to vote. However, this is provided that such
Joint Member is present at the General Body Meeting and he is not a minor.

 

Based on the above, the differences between an Associate and
a Joint Member can be enumerated as follows:

Associate Member

Joint Member

Only one of ten
specified relatives can be treated as an Associate Member

Any person can be made a
Joint Member

An Associate Member’s
name cannot be entered in the share certificate issued by the Society

A Joint Member’s name is
entered in the share certificate issued by the Society

An Associate Member can
vote only with the prior written permission of the Member. It does not state
that this can be done only if the main Member is absent. Hence, an Associate
Member can vote even if the main Member is present provided he has got his
prior written consent

A Joint Member can vote
only if the main Member is absent. 
Thus, if the main Member is present, a Joint Member cannot vote even
with the prior written permission of the main Member

 

PROVISIONAL MEMBER

One of the perennial issues
in the case of a housing society has been that of the role that a nomination
plays in the case of the demise of a Member. A nomination continues only up to
and till such time as the Will is executed. No sooner is the Will executed,
than it takes precedence over the nomination. A nomination does not confer any
permanent right upon the nominee nor does it create any legal right in his
favour. Nomination transfers no beneficial interest to the nominee. A nominee
is for all purposes a trustee of the property. He cannot claim precedence over
the legatees mentioned in the Will and take the bequests which the legatees are
entitled to under the Will. In spite of this very clear position in law,
several cases have reached the High Courts and even the Supreme Court. The
following are some of the important judicial precedents on this issue:

 

(1) The Bombay High Court in the case of Om Siddharaj
Co-operative Housing Society Limited vs. The State of Maharashtra & Others,
1998 (4) Bombay Cases, 506,
has observed as follows in the context of a
nomination made in respect of a flat in a co-operative housing society:

 

“…If a person is
nominated in accordance with the rules, the society is obliged to transfer the
share and interest of the deceased member to such nominee. It is no part of the
business of the society in that case to find out the relation of the nominee
with the deceased Member or to ascertain and find out the heir or legal
representatives of the deceased Member. It is only if there is no nomination in
favour of any person that the share and interest of the deceased Member has to
be transferred to such person as may appear to the committee or the society to
be the heir or legal representative of the deceased Member.”

 

(2)  Again, in the case of Gopal Vishnu
Ghatnekar vs. Madhukar Vishnu Ghatnekar, 1981 BCR, 1010
, the Bombay
High Court has observed as follows in the context of a nomination made in
respect of a flat in a co-operative housing society:

 

“…It is very clear on the
plain reading of the Section that the intention of the Section is to provide
for who has to deal with the society on the death of a Member and not to create
a new rule of succession. The purpose of the nomination is to make certain the
person with whom the society has to deal and not to create interest in the
nominee to the exclusion of those who in law will be entitled to the estate.
The purpose is to avoid confusion in case there are disputes between the heirs
and legal representatives and to obviate the necessity of obtaining legal
representation and to avoid uncertainties as to with whom the society should
deal to get proper discharge. Though in law the society has no power to
determine as to who are the heirs or legal representatives, with a view to
obviate similar difficulty and confusion, the Section confers on the society
the right to determine who is the heir or legal representative of a deceased
Member and provides for transfer of the shares and interest of the deceased
Member’s property to such heir or legal representative.

 

Nevertheless, the persons
entitled to the estate of the deceased do not lose their right to the same…
the provision for transferring a share and interest to a nominee or to the heir
or legal representative as will be decided by the society is only meant to
provide for the interregnum between the death and the full administration of
the estate and not for the purpose of conferring any permanent right on such a
person to a property forming part of the estate of the deceased. The idea of
having this Section is to provide for a proper discharge to the society without
involving the society into unnecessary litigation which may take place as a result
of dispute between the heirs’ uncertainty as to who are the heirs or legal
representatives…

 

It is only as between the society and the nominee or heir or
legal representative that the relationship of the society and its Member are
created and this relationship continues and subsists only till the estate is
administered either by the person entitled to administer the same or by the
Court or the rights of the heirs or persons entitled to the estate are decided
in the court of law. Thereafter, the society will be bound to follow such
decision… To repeat, a society has a right to admit a nominee of a deceased
Member or an heir or legal representative of a deceased Member as chosen by the
society as the Member.”

 

(3) A single judge of the
Bombay High Court in Ramdas Shivram Sattur vs. Rameshchandra Popatlal
Shah 2009(4) Mh LJ 551
has held that a nominee has no right of
disposition of property since he is not an absolute owner. It held that the law
does not provide for a special Rule of Succession altering the Rule of
Succession laid down under the personal law.

 

(4) The position of a
nominee in a flat in a co-operative housing society was also analysed by the
Supreme Court in Indrani Wahi vs. Registrar of Co-operative Societies, CA
No. 4646 of 2006(SC)
.This decision was rendered in the context of the
West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1983.The Supreme Court held that there
can be no doubt that the holding of a valid nomination does not ipso facto
result in the transfer of title in the flat in favour of the nominee. However,
consequent upon a valid nomination having been made, the nominee would be
entitled to possession of the flat. Further, the issue of title had to be left
open to be adjudicated upon between the contesting parties. It further held that
there can be no doubt that where a Member of a co-operative society nominates a
person, the co-operative society is mandated to transfer all the share or
interest of such Member in the name of the nominee.

 

It is also essential to
note that the rights of others on account of an inheritance or succession are a
subservient right. Only if a Member had not exercised the right of nomination,
then and then alone, the existing share or interest of the Member would devolve
by way of succession or inheritance. It clarified that transfer of share or
interest, based on a nomination in favour of the nominee, was with reference to
the co-operative society concerned and was binding on the said society. The
co-operative society had no option whatsoever, except to transfer the
membership in the name of the nominee but that would have no relevance to the
issue of title between the inheritors or successors to the property of the
deceased. The Court finally concluded that it was open to the other members of
the family of the deceased to pursue their case of succession or inheritance in
consonance with the law.

 

Taking a cue from these
cases, the Ordinance seeks to make certain changes to the Act. It has
introduced the concept of a Provisional Member. This is defined to mean a person
who is duly admitted as a Member of a society temporarily after the death
of a Member on the basis of nomination till the admission of
legal heir or heirs as the Member of the society in place of the deceased
Member. The salient features of Provisional Membership are as follows:

 

a)
It is temporary in nature;

b)  It comes into force only once the main Member
dies;

c)  It can apply on the basis of a valid
nomination;

d)  It would continue only till the legal heirs of
the deceased Member are admitted as members of the society. This could be by
way of a Will or an intestate succession.

 

Thus, the Ordinance seeks to clarify the legal position which
has been expounded by various Court judgements, i.e., the Provisional Member
would only be a stop-gap arrangement between the date of death and the
execution of the estate of the deceased. However, it proceeds on one incorrect
assumption. It states that such membership will last till such time as the
legal heirs of the deceased Member are made members. What happens in case of a
Will where the Member has bequeathed his right in favour of a beneficiary who
is not his legal heir? A legal heir is not defined under any Act. It is a term
of general description. The Law Lexicon by Ramanatha Aiyar (4th
Edition) defines it as including only next of kin or relatives by blood. It is
known that a person can make even a stranger a beneficiary under his Will. In
such an event, a strict reading of the Ordinance suggests that the Provisional
Membership would also continue since the legal heirs of the deceased have not
been taken on record.

 

However, that would be an absurd construction since once the
Will is executed, it is the beneficiary under the Will who should become the
Member. Hence, it is submitted that this definition needs redrafting. The
position has been correctly stated in the proviso to section 154B-13
also introduced by the Ordinance. This correctly states that the society shall
admit a nominee as a Provisional Member after the death of a Member till the
legal heirs or person who is entitled to the flat and shares in accordance with
succession law or under Will or testamentary document are admitted as Member in
place of such deceased Member. Hence, this recognises the fact that a person
other than legal heirs can also be added as a Member.

 

The Ordinance also provides for the contingency of what
happens if there is no nomination. In such cases, the society must admit such
person as Provisional Member as may appear to the Managing Committee to be the heir
/ legal representative of the deceased Member. It further states that a
Provisional Member shall have right to vote.

 

PROCEDURE ON THE DEATH OF A
MEMBER

Normally, in the case of a housing society, any transfer of
share or interest of a Member is not effective unless the dues of the society
have been paid and the transferee applies and acquires membership of the
co-operative housing society. However, this provision does not apply to the
transfer of a Member’s interest to his heir or to his nominee.

 

The Ordinance introduces
section 154B-11 which states that on the death of a Member of a society, the
society is required to transfer the share, right, title and interest in the
property of the deceased Member in the society to any person on the basis of:

 

  • Testamentary documents, i.e., a Will;
  • Succession certificate / legal heirship
    certificate – in case of intestate succession;
  • Document of family arrangement executed by
    the persons who are entitled to inherit the property of the deceased Member; or
  • Nominees.

 

This is the first time that
a document of family arrangement has been given statutory recognition. The
amendment equates a Memorandum of Family Arrangement to be at par with a
testamentary or intestamentary succession document. Scores of Supreme Court
judgements, such as Ram Charan Das vs. Girja Nandini Devi (1955) 2 SCWR
837; Tek Bahadur Bhujil vs. Debi Singh Bhujil, (1966) 2 SCJ 290; K. V.
Narayanan vs. K. V. Ranganadhan, AIR 1976 SC 1715,
etc., have held that
a family arrangement does not amount to a transfer and hence there is no need
for registration of a Family Settlement MOU. In spite of this, in several cases
the Registration Authorities are reluctant to mutate the rights in the Property
Card or the Record of Rights based on an unregistered Family Settlement MOU. In
several cases, even co-operative societies do not agree to transfer the share
certificates based on the Family Settlement MOU unless it is registered and
stamped.

 

The Ordinance now provides that the society must transfer the
flat based on a Document of Family Arrangement executed by the persons who are
entitled to inherit the property of the deceased Member. However, this has
restricted the transfer only to those persons who are entitled to inherit the
property of the deceased. For instance, in the case of an intestate Hindu male,
his Class I heirs, Class II heirs, agnates and cognates are entitled to inherit
his property. Thus, a document signed between any of these relatives should be
covered under this provision.

 

CONCLUSION

The Ordinance has made
significant changes for co-operative housing societies especially in the area
of Membership. The concept of Provisional Member is also a welcome amendment.
However, one feels that the Ordinance has been drafted in a hurry resulting in
some drafting errors. It would be desirable that these are rectified when the
Amendment Bill is tabled by the Government.

LANRUOJ TNATNUOCCA DERETRAHC YABMOB EHT (JACB)

SPECIAL EDITORIAL

We bring you a special edition of the JACB journal.
The January, 2019 editorial carried these words of wisdom:

“Friends, the word of the year declared by two prominent dictionaries recently gives it away: Toxic and Misinformation. Both words articulate the stark realities of our times ….”.

This feature is based on the above theme.

If you have any comments/views on this feature please feel free to draft a mail to us, and keep it in your draft folder. Even if you send it, it makes no difference. To quote George Bernard Shaw, “The single biggest problem in communication is the illusion that it has taken place”.

Happy Golden Jubilee reading!
*ditor

*E Edited

GOLDEN CONTENTS AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPACT – EXTRACTS FROM WHITE PAPER

JACB brought to its esteemed readers Golden Contents over the course of the last twelve months to commemorate its golden jubilee. We have been overwhelmed with the responses received thereby encouraging us to come out with a white paper. We provide below extracts from the white paper that will shortly be published in full in resplendent colors. You may place orders for the same at
your own risk.

Abstract of White Paper – “Golden Contents and Its Economic Impact”

Introduction

Economic development is understood in many different ways but it is clear that there has always been a close correlation and vital linkage between human endeavor and civilisation’s economic relationships.

Golden Contents and Its Direct and Indirect Impacts

  • Cost Effective

No making charges on golden content

  • Economic Impact

Since the golden content cannot be used as a collateral to raise high-cost loans, subscribers have benefited significantly by not paying huge interest costs on such non-availed loans. There is significant social benefit too since these non-availed funds can now be utilised by banks to provide loans to critical sectors of the economy.
This in turn leads to economy, efficiency and transparency in functioning of our financial institutions and markets and reinforces investor confidence, thereby reducing the cost of capital and boosting private consumption expenditure and private investment positively impacting economic growth rates.This is expected to add 50 basis points to the economy’s GDP growth rate on a secular basis over the next 5 years. Tax revenues are also expected to increase marginally, in line with the contributory increase to GDP.

Conclusion

The velocity of an economy is limited by the speed at which innovation can take place. The Golden Contents, a path-breaking innovation, is expected to propel the economy towards its potential growth trajectory.

QUOTE OF THE MONTH

FROM THE DESK OF THE PRESIDENT

Subscribers to our JACB journal receive mailers “From the Desk of the President” much before they get to see the printed version of it in the journal. Readers have all along been eager to know what exactly is in that desk.
What we got from the desk of the President:

  • Old calculator (not functioning).
  • A blue ballpoint pen (functioning).
  • Income tax ready reckoner (AY 1987-88).
  • JACB journal (April, 2001 without front cover).
  • Old spectacle case of a former president.
    (sd/- Forensic auditors)

KNOW YOUR JOURNAL

The BCA Journal is also available in two formats, offering twin benefits.

GOLDEN CONTENT INTERVIEW: EMINENT PERSONALITY, YOUNGEST CA

JACB: Tell us a bit about yourself.

MM: I am CA Mutandis…..Mutatis Mutandis. Youngest CA. 83 years old.

JACB: How do you see the profession developing?

MM: Nemo debet esse judex in propria qusa. (No one can be a judge in his own cause)

JACB: Huh! Could you please share your views on ethics in profession?

MM: Ubi jus, ibi officium (Where there is a right, there is also a duty)

JACB: What are your views on usage of fair values in financial reporting?

MM: Nemo tenetur ad impossible. (No one is required to do what is impossible)

JACB: Sir, your responses using legal maxims makes it very difficult for me to understand. Since when did you get into this habit?

MM: Ab initio.

JACB: I do not understand what you are saying sir.

MM: Ignorantia legis jurisneminem excusat.

JACB: ***&%…..How long do you think we can go on like this?

MM: Ceteres paribus, in praesenti.

JACB: I better close this, Sir. Thank you very much for sparing your valuable time. In closing could you explain in plain English how you claim to be the youngest CA when you are claiming super senior citizen tax benefits.

MM: I cleared yesterday…. CA Results were announced yesterday you see.

TAX PLANNING – HOW TO SAVE TAXES (INDIVIDUAL ASSESSEES)

  • Resign from high-paying job and one saves taxes on income under the head salaries. The tax savings will be on monthly fixed salary, bonuses, perquisites, as well as on stock options.
  • If one has a second house, demolish it (if it is say an apartment on the 14th floor, we do understand you have a challenge) that is self-occupied so that you do not pay tax on notional income. Note: Our sympathies are with those who took our advice and demolished their second home considering the interim budget proposals. But take heart, it is just an interim budget.
  • We have refrained from providing any inputs for Business income since we understand all have expertise in saving taxes under the income head of business and professional income.
  • Attend AGMs of companies where you hold shares and vociferously protest dividend payments and exercise your right to disapprove board-recommended dividends. You save dividend taxes at 10% if your dividend income was expected to be above threshold.

GLIMPSES FROM SUPREME COURT

In Camera – In this issue we bring you photographs shot from various angles from different perspectives and using drones that provide good glimpses from the Supreme Court.

*ditorial note: Glimpse photos not published since the matter is sub-judice.

NAMASKAAR

FROM UNPUBLISHED ACCOUNTS

Compilation From Notes
Basis of Preparation of Financial Statements

  • These financial statements are prepared in accordance with the whims and fancies of our management under the historical cost convention on accrual basis except for most transactions and events that are reported on a convenience accounting basis.

Use of Judgments and Assumptions

  • The preparation of financial statements in conformity with the applicable accounting framework requires management to make estimates, judgments and assumptions. Management has made an assumption that users of financial statements can easily be tricked into believing the contents of the financial statements.
  •  Management estimates used in the preparation of financial statements are aimed at underestimating expenses and liabilities and overestimating income and assets.

Disclosures

  • Included in land is a large parcel of land amounting to Rs. 14,000 crore measured using the revaluation model that actually belongs to our neighbouring company.
  • The fair valuation of our assets is based on stooping to levels that are lower than Level 3.
  • We have not disclosed many liabilities as well as contingent liabilities considering the material impact that it could have on our investors’ well-being and on the health of their investment portfolio.

NEW FEATURES THAT WE EXPECT TO INRODUCE SHORTLY IN YOUR JOURNAL

  • Birth Taxation
  • Inheritance Taxation
  • Inter-planetary Taxation
  • Internal audit of statutory audit
  • Independence movement of Independent Directors
  • And more!!!

JACB GOLDEN JUBILEE SPECIAL ANNOUNCEMENT

Sections 2(28A), 10(23G), 36(1)(viia)(c) and 36(1)(viii) – Exemption u/s. 10(23G) – Assessee providing long-term finance for infrastructure projects and facilities – Exemption of interest – Definition of “interest” – Borrowers liable to pay “liquidated damages” at 2.10% in case of default in redemption or payment of interest and other moneys on due dates, for period of default – Liquidated damages fall within purview of word “interest” – Assessee entitled to exemption

21

Infrastructure Development Finance
Co. Ltd. vs. ACIT; 412 ITR 115 (Mad)

Date of order: 1st March,
2019

A.Y.: 2002-03

 

Sections
2(28A), 10(23G), 36(1)(viia)(c) and 36(1)(viii) – Exemption u/s. 10(23G) –
Assessee providing long-term finance for infrastructure projects and facilities
– Exemption of interest – Definition of “interest” – Borrowers liable to pay
“liquidated damages” at 2.10% in case of default in redemption or payment of
interest and other moneys on due dates, for period of default – Liquidated
damages fall within purview of word “interest” – Assessee entitled to exemption

 

Business
expenditure – Provision for bad and doubtful debts – Deduction u/s. 36(1)(viii)
and section 36(1)(viia)(c) to be allowed independently

 

The
assessee provided long-term finance to enterprises which developed, maintained
and operated infrastructure projects and facilities. For the A.Y. 2002-03 the
assessee claimed exemption u/s. 10(23G) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in respect
of the interest earned by it from the long-term finance provided and the
liquidated damages received from the borrowers on account of default on their
part in making payments according to the terms of the loan agreements. The
assessee also claimed deductions u/s. 36(1)(viia)(c) and independently u/s.
36(1)(viii) in respect of provision made for bad and doubtful debts.

 

The A.O. rejected the claim for exemption u/s.
10(23G) on the ground that the amounts earned by the assessee did not
constitute “interest” as defined u/s. 2(28A). He further held that the claim
for deduction u/s. 36(1)(viia)(c) was allowable only after reducing from the
assessee’s income, the deduction allowable u/s. 36(1)(viii) and that deduction
could not be granted independent of each provision.

 

The Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal
affirmed the order of the A.O.

 

On appeal by the assessee, the Madras High Court
reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i)   The
liquidated damages earned by the assessee were admittedly on account of
defaults committed by the borrowers. According to the terms of the agreement
with the borrowers, in case of default in redemption or payment of interest and
all other money (except liquidated damages) on their respective due dates,
liquidated damages at the rate of 2.10% per annum were levied and payable by
the borrowers for the period of default. Though the term “liquidated damages”
was used in the agreement, it actually signified the interest claimed by the
assessee. This term “interest” would come within the word “charge” as provided
under the definition of interest.

 

ii)   It was
an admitted fact that the assessee fell within the definition of a “specified
entity” and it carried on “eligible business” as provided u/s. 36(1)(viii).
Clauses (i) to (ix) of section 36(1) did not imply that those deductions
depended on one another. If an assessee was entitled to the benefit under
clause (i) of section 36(1), he could not be deprived of the benefits of the
other clauses. This is how the provision was arrayed. The computation of amount
of deduction under both these clauses had to be independently made without
reducing the total income by deduction u/s. 36(1)(viii).

 

iii)   Accordingly,
both the questions of law are answered in favour of the appellant assessee.”

Section 12AA – At the time of granting of registration u/s 12A, the only requirement is examining the objects of the trust / society and genuineness of its activities

5. [2019] 72 ITR 14
(Trib.) (Amrit.)
Acharya Shri Tulsi
Kalyan Kendra vs. CIT(E) ITA No.: 335
(Amritsar) of 2017
A.Y.: 2017-18 Date of order: 28th
January, 2019

 

Section 12AA – At
the time of granting of registration u/s 12A, the only requirement is examining
the objects of the trust / society and genuineness of its activities

 

FACTS

The assessee is a
trust. It had applied for registration u/s 12A of the Act. However, the CIT(E)
denied the said registration citing the following reasons:

(i)    The assessee had carried out certain
activities which were not covered under charitable purposes u/s 2(15) of the
Income-tax Act, 1961;

(ii)    Complete inactivity since inception in 1979
till the sale of land in 2007 reflects that the activities were not in sync
with the stated objects;

(iii)   The registration was sought to be obtained
after a gap of ten years after the sale of land in 2007, indicating
unwillingness to carry out charitable activities;

(iv)   Amendment of the trust deed incorporating the
dissolution clause and at the same time introduction of new trustees indicated
that the motive of the applicant to seek registration under this section was
merely to save on taxes on interest income;

(v)   Changes in the trust deed do not have proper
legal sanction and though a supplementary deed was submitted to the
sub-registrar, his jurisdiction to accept the same was questionable.

 

Aggrieved by the
rejection order passed by the Commissioner, the assessee preferred an appeal to
the Tribunal.

 

HELD

The Tribunal
observed the following in relation to the reasoning given by the Commissioner:

 

It is trite to say
that at the time of registration u/s 12AA, the CIT(E) has to consider the twin
requirements of (a) objects of the assessee society, and (b) genuineness of its
activity. Nowhere in the order had the CIT(E) either pointed out any defect in
the objects of the society and / or the activities of the applicant assessee
society, or doubted the genuineness of the activities specifically. Therefore,
the Tribunal concluded that the assessee is carrying out its activities in
accordance with its objects specified in the trust deed and for charitable
purposes. As a matter of fact, the Tribunal found that the trust also carried
out other charitable activities as per its objects.

 

The trust was in
operation since 1979. However, much activity was not carried out until 2007 due
to paucity of funds. When the trust had accumulated a good amount of funds from
rollover of investments after sale of land in 2007, it constructed certain
halls / rooms which were used in the course of its charitable activities. This
fact was clearly demonstrated by the assessee and the same was considered to be
a logical reason for not carrying out any activity previously. The main reason
for rejection of registration was that amendment of the trust deed
incorporating the dissolution clause and at the same time introduction of new
trustees indicated the motive of the applicant to seek registration under this
section was merely to save on taxes on interest income. This reasoning given by
the CIT(E) was merely a general remark without considering the intricacies of
the law and therefore the reason was illogical.

 

Considering the
above, the Tribunal directed the CIT(E) to grant registration to the trust. It
further clarified that the CIT(E) while granting the registration shall be at
liberty to endorse the condition, if any, he finds to be reasonable in accordance
with law.

 

Section 43D – Public financial institutions, special provisions in case of income of (Interest) – Where income on NPA was actually not credited but was shown as receivable in balance sheet of assessee co-operative bank, interest on NPA would be taxable in year when it would be actually received by assessee bank

9. Principal
CIT vs. Solapur District Central Co-op. Bank Ltd.; [2019] 102 taxmann.com 440
(Bom):
Date
of order: 29th January, 2019 A.Y.:
2009-10

 

Section
43D – Public financial institutions, special provisions in case of income of
(Interest) – Where income on NPA was actually not credited but was shown as
receivable in balance sheet of assessee co-operative bank, interest on NPA
would be taxable in year when it would be actually received by assessee bank

 

During the
assessment for A.Y. 2009-10, the Assessing Officer noticed that the assessee
co-operative bank had transferred an amount of Rs. 7.80 crore to the Overdue
Interest Reserve (OIR) by debiting the interest received in profit and loss
account related to Non-Performing Assets. He was of the opinion that the
assessee-bank had to offer the interest due to tax on accrual basis. The
explanation of the assessee-bank was that the Reserve Bank of India guidelines
provide that income on Non-Performing Assets (‘NPA’) is not to be credited to
profit and loss account but instead to be shown as receivable in the balance
sheet, and it is to be taken as income in the profit and loss account only when
the interest is actually received. It was also pointed out that, as per the
Reserve Bank of India norms, interest on assets not received within 180 days is
to be taken to the OIR account. Similarly, the interest which was not received
for the earlier years was also taken into OIR account. In this manner, only the
interest received during the year was credited to profit and loss account and
offered to tax. However, the Assessing Officer discarded the explanations of
the assessee, principally on the basis of accrual of interest income and
assessed such interest to tax.

 

On the
assessee’s appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) confirmed the decision of the
Assessing Officer. On appeal, the Tribunal reversed the decisions of the
Revenue authorities. The Tribunal broadly relied upon the principle of real
income theory and referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in case of CIT
vs. Shoorji Vallabhdas & Co. [1962] 46 ITR 144 (SC)
.

 

On appeal
by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and
held as under:

 

“i)   The issue is squarely covered by the
judgements of Gujarat High Court and Punjab & Haryana High Courts. The
Gujarat High Court in case of Pr. CIT vs. Shri Mahila Sewa Sahakari Bank
Ltd. [2017] 395 ITR 324/[2016] 242 Taxman 60/72 taxmann.com 117
had
undertaken a detailed exercise to examine an identical situation. The Court
held that the co-operative banks were acting under the directives of the
Reserve Bank of India with regard to the prudential norms set out. The Court
was of the opinion that taxing interest on NPA cannot be justified on the real
income theory.

ii)   The Punjab & Haryana High Court in case
of Pr. CIT vs. Ludhiana Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. [2018] 99 taxmann.com
81
concluded that the Tribunal while relying upon the various
pronouncements had correctly decided the issue regarding taxability of interest
on NPA in favour of the assessee as being taxable in the year of receipt; the
Tribunal had upheld the deletion made by the CIT(A) on account of addition of
Rs. 3,02,82,000 regarding interest accrued on NPA and that there was no
illegality or perversity in the aforesaid findings recorded by the Tribunal.

iii)   The issue is thus covered by the decisions of
two High Courts. Against the judgement of the Gujarat High Court, the appeals
have been dismissed by the Supreme Court. Thus, the Supreme Court can be seen
to have approved the decision of the Gujarat High Court. Therefore, there is no
reason to entertain these appeals, since no question of law can be stated to
have arisen.

iv)  For the reference, it may also be noticed that
subsequently, legislature has amended section 43D. Section 43D essentially
provides for charging of interest on actual basis in case of certain special
circumstances, in the hands of the public financial institutions, public
companies, etc. Explanation to section 43D defines certain terms for the
purpose of the said section. Clause (g) was inserted in the said Explanation by
Finance Act, 2016 which provides that for the purpose of such section,
Co-operative Banks, Primary Agricultural Credit Society and Primary
Agricultural and Rural Development Bank shall have meanings, respectively
assigned in Explanation to sub-section 4 of section 80B. By virtue of such
insertion, the co-operative banks would get the benefit of section 43D. One way
of looking at this amendment can be that the same is curative in nature and
would, therefore, apply to pending proceedings, notwithstanding the fact that
the legislature has not made the provision retrospective.

v)   As per the Memorandum explaining the
provision, the insertion of clause (g) to the Explanation was to provide for a
level playing field to the co-operative banks. This may be one more indication
to hold a belief that the legislature, in order to address a piquant situation
and to obviate unintended hardship to the assessee, has introduced the amendment.
However, in the present case, there is no need to conclude this issue and leave
it to be judged in appropriate proceedings.”

WHAT’S IN A NAME? PREFERENCE SHARE VS. FCCB

Query


Top Co, whose functional
currency is INR, has issued preference shares to a foreign investor. As per the
terms, at the end of 3-years from the issuance date, the holder has the option
to either redeem each preference share for cash payment of USD 10 or to get 10
equity shares of Top Co for each preference share. Whether the equity
conversion option represents an equity instrument or a (derivative) financial
liability of Top Co?

 

Response


ITFG
responded to a similar issue in Bulletin No. 17 and its view is reproduced
below.

 

ITFG view


Ind AS 32,
Financial Instruments: Presentation lays down the principles for the
classification of financial instruments as financial assets, financial
liabilities or equity instruments from the issuer’s perspective. As per
paragraph 11 of Ind AS 32, “A financial liability is any liability that is:

 

(a)  a contractual obligation :

(i)    to deliver cash or another financial asset
to another entity; or

(ii)    to exchange financial assets or financial
liabilities with another entity under conditions that are potentially
unfavourable to the entity; or

(b)   a contract that will or may be settled in the
entity’s own equity instruments and is:

(i)    a non-derivative for which the entity is or
may be obliged to deliver a variable number of the entity’s own equity
instruments; or

(ii)    a derivative that will or may be settled
other than by the exchange of a fixed amount of cash or another financial asset
for a fixed number of the entity’s own equity instruments. For this purpose,
rights, options or warrants to acquire a fixed number of the entity’s own
equity instruments for a fixed amount of any currency are equity instruments if
the entity offers the rights, options or warrants pro rata to all of its
existing owners of the same class of its own non-derivative equity instruments.
Apart from the aforesaid, the equity conversion option embedded in a convertible
bond denominated in foreign currency to acquire a fixed number of the entity’s
own equity instruments is an equity instrument if the exercise price is fixed
in any currency. …….

 

As per the
above definition, as a general principle, a derivative is a financial liability
if it will or may be settled other than by the exchange of a fixed amount of
cash or another financial asset for a fixed number of the entity’s own equity
instruments. The term ‘fixed amount of cash’ refers to an amount of cash fixed
in functional currency of the reporting entity. Since, an amount fixed in a
foreign currency has the potential to vary in terms of functional currency of
the reporting entity due to exchange rate fluctuations, it does not represent
“a fixed amount of cash”. However, as an exception to the above general
principle, Ind AS 32 regards the equity conversion option embedded in a
convertible bond denominated in a foreign currency to acquire a fixed number of
entity’s own equity instruments to be an equity instrument if the exercise
price is fixed in any currency, i.e., whether fixed in functional currency of
the reporting entity or in a foreign currency. [It may be noted that the
corresponding standard under IFRSs (viz., IAS 32) does not contain this
exception].

 

Ind AS 32
makes the above exception only in the case of an equity conversion option
embedded in a convertible bond denominated in a foreign currency, even though
it explicitly recognises at several places that other instruments can also
contain equity conversion options. Given this position, it does not seem that
the above exception can be extended by analogy to equity conversion options
embedded in other types of financial instruments denominated in a foreign
currency such as preference shares.

 

In view of
the above, the equity conversion option forming part of terms of issue of
preference shares under discussion would be a (derivative) financial liability.

 

Authors’ point of view


  •  It appears that the above opinion provides unwarranted emphasis
    on the nomenclature of the instrument rather than the terms and conditions of
    the instrument. It may be noted that an instrument is classified based on its
    terms and conditions under Ind AS, rather than its nomenclature. In other
    words, from an Ind AS perspective, there is no difference in how the preference
    share or the bond is accounted, if they contain similar terms and conditions.
    From that perspective, it appears unreasonable that the exemption of treating
    the conversion option fixed in foreign currency as equity is allowed only for
    conversion options in bonds and not for conversion options in preference
    shares, though both instruments are similarly accounted under Ind AS.
  •  Whilst a preference share and a bond under the Indian Companies
    Act have different liquidation rights, from the point of view of RBI
    regulations and Ind AS accounting there is no difference. Consequently, all
    that an entity has to do is to nomenclate a preference share as a bond or
    structure it like a bond. Sometimes debt covenants with existing bond holders
    may prohibit an entity from issuing new bonds. In those cases, there will be a
    restriction on the entity from raising funds using a bond. On the other hand,
    raising foreign funds using a preference share with a conversion option may be
    debilitating from an accounting and balance sheet perspective.
  •    The ITFG opinion has not
    provided a strong case or basis for making a difference between accounting for
    conversion option contained in a bond and that contained in a preference share.
    Neither has it defined the term bond and preference share, which may result in
    different interpretation. However, common practice will be to use the same
    definition contained in the Companies Act. The exemption for a bond and not for
    a preference share appears arbitrary and rule based, rather than based on sound
    and solid accounting principles.

 

Final Remarks


The ITFGs main argument is
that the carve-out from IAS 32 was meant to operate more like an exemption
rather than based on a sound principle. In the long run carve-outs is not the
preferred option, particularly if those are not supported by a strong basis of
conclusion or a well-defined principle. In addition to the possibility of
multiple interpretation of the carve-out, it will camouflage gearing in
financial statements and create confusion in the minds of investors. The
International Accounting Standard Board has issued a discussion paper titled Financial
Instruments with Characteristics of Equity (FICE)
. The objective of the
discussion paper is to clearly set out the principles of debt vs. equity.
Indian standard setters will have an opportunity of participating in this
discussion and eliminating any differences between the IFRS and Ind AS standard
with respect to debt vs equity classification.

 

At last, I am reminded of a
quote from Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet – “What’s in a name? that which we
call a rose by any other name would smell as sweet.
” The ITFG has proved
him wrong!!
 

 

 

 

PERIOD OF LIMITATION PROVIDED IN SECTION 154(7) VIS-À-VIS DOCTRINE OF MERGER

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION

Section 154 empowers the income-tax
authority to amend any order passed by it under the provisions of Act with a
view to rectifying any mistake apparent from the record. Sub-section (7) of
section 154 provides for the time limit within which the order can be amended
for this purpose. It provides that no amendment u/s. 154 shall be made after
the expiry of four years from the end of the financial year in which the order
sought to be amended was passed.

 

Under the Act, many times, more than one
order is framed in the case of the assessee for the same assessment year, . For
instance, the reassessment order is passed u/s. 147 after the assessment order
u/s. 143(3) has already been passed, or the order is passed for giving effect
to the order passed by the appellate authorities while adjudicating the appeal
filed against the order passed by the lower authorities. Quite often, the issue
arises in such cases about the limitation period; whether it should be counted
from the date of the original order or from the date of the subsequent order.

 

In the case of Hind Wire Industries Ltd.
vs. CIT 212 ITR 639
, the Supreme Court has dealt with an  issue where an  order was sought to be rectified for the
second time, on an issue which was not the subject matter of the first order.
The Supreme Court in the facts of the case held that the word ‘order’ in the
expression ‘from the date of the order sought to be amended’ in section 154(7)
as it stood at the relevant assessment year had not been qualified in any way,
and it did not necessarily mean the original order. It could be any order,
including the amended or rectified order. Accordingly in the facts of the case,
it was held that the time limit as provided in section 154(7) should be
reckoned from the date of rectified order, and not from the date of original
order. This finding of the Supreme Court has been relied upon by the different
high courts to support the conflicting decisions delivered by them.    

 

Section 263 authorising Pr. CIT or CIT to
pass the order of revision also contains an express provision whereby an order
of revision is not allowed to be passed after the expiry of two years from the
end of the financial year in which the order sought to be revised was passed.
In the case of CIT vs. Alagendran Finance Ltd. 293 ITR 1, in the context
of section 263 , the Supreme Court held that the period of limitation provided
for under sub-section (2) of section 263 would begin to run from the date of
the order of original assessment and not from the order of reassessment, if the
issue on which the order was sought to be revised was not the subject matter of
the reassessment. It was held that the doctrine of merger will have no
application in such a case. In deciding the case, the Supreme Court had
referred to its earlier decision in the case of Hind Wire Industries Ltd.
(supra)
.

 

In a situation where the order giving effect
to an appellate order has been passed subsequent to the assessment order, and
the Assessing Officer wishes to rectify the mistakes arising from his original
order, the High Courts have given conflicting decisions in so far as the period
of limitation provided in section 154(7) is concerned. The Delhi High Court has
held that the period of limitation would begin from the date of order giving
effect to that appellate order. As against this, the Allahabad High Court has
held that it would begin from the date of original order which contained the
mistake apparent from the record.

 

Tony Electronics’ case:The issue first came up before the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT
vs. Tony Electronics Ltd. 320 ITR 378 (Delhi)
.

 

In this case, the assessment order passed
u/s. 143(3) had been challenged by filing an appeal before the Commissioner
(Appeals). The order was also passed  by
the Assessing Officer giving effect to the Commissioner (Appeals)’ directions.
Thereafter, the notice u/s.154 was issued for rectifying the mistake apparent
from record in the latest order. The relevant dates on which different types of
orders and notices issued were as follows:

 

24-11-1998

Assessment order
u/s. 143(3) was passe.

20-5-1999

Appeal against
assessment order dated 24-11-1998 was disposed of by the
Commissioner(Appeals).

8-5-2003

The appeal effect
order u/s. 143(3)/250 was passed.

28-6-2004

Appeal against the
appeal effect order dated 8-5-2003 was disposed of by the
Commissioner(Appeals).

23-7-2004

Second Order u/s.
143(3)/250 giving effect to the second order of Commissioner(Appeals) dated
28-6-2004 was passed.

30-1-2006

Notice u/s. 154 of
the Act, alleging that there was mistake in the second order dated 23-7-2004
.

26-4-2006

Order u/s. 154 of
the Act was passed.

 

 

In this case, while making the assessment
originally, the AO had discussed in the order that the depreciation amounting
to Rs. 6,28,842 claimed by the assessee was to be disallowed however, in the
final computation of assessed income, had under an error failed to reduce the
said amount of disallowed depreciation. The assessee not having any grievance,
had not filed any appeal against the said order proposing for the withdrawal of
depreciation. Therefore, the same was required to be reduced from the total
amount of depreciation of Rs. 54,86,162 and only the balance depreciation of
Rs. 48,57,200 was allowable to the assessee. The lapse of the AO had resulted
into under assessment by Rs. 12,57,688. In short, the mistake was that
disallowed depreciation, instead of being added to the income, was reduced from
the income, resulting in double deduction. The notice issued u/s.154 stated
that the amount of assessed income taken as the basis while passing the latest
order dated 23-7-2004 giving effect to the Commissioner (Appeals)’s order was
mistakenly taken lower by Rs. 12,57,688.

 

The assessee questioned the jurisdiction of
the Assessing Officer to pass the rectification order u/s. 154 on the ground
that in view of sub-section (7) of section 154, such a rectification order
could be passed within four years “from the end of the financial year in
which the order sought to be amended was passed”. According to the
assessee, since the assessment was framed on 24-11-1998, the period of four
years had lapsed long ago and, therefore, the proposed action on the part of
the Assessing Officer was time-barred. The Assessing Officer did not accept the
plea while passing the order dated 26-4-2006. According to him, the period of four years was to be counted from
23-7-2004 when the Assessing Officer had passed an order for giving appeal
effect.

 

The Commissioner(Appeals) confirmed the
action of the Assessing Officer and dismissed the appeal filed by the assessee.
However, the Tribunal quashed the Assessing Officer’s order on the ground that
the action of rectification u/s. 154 was barred by limitation. The Revenue
challenged the findings of the Tribunal before the High Court.

 

Before the High Court, the contentions of
the Revenue were two fold namely:

 

1.   The Assessing Officer had inherent power to
rectify a totalling mistake which crept in computation. For correcting a
totalling mistake, limitation prescribed under sub-section (7) of section 154
was not even applicable. Otherwise, it would frustrate the object and purpose
of determining the taxable income and to collect the tax thereon.

2.   Even if it was held that
limitation under sub-section (7) of section 154 was applicable, then also it
would start to run from the last order, i.e. order dated 23-7-2004, and not
from the original order. The revenue sought to invoke the doctrine of Merger
and submitted that since the mistake had occurred at the time of passing order
dated 28-6-2004, while giving effect to the decision of the
Commissioner(Appeals), limitation should start from that date.

 

The assessee submitted that the appellate
orders dealt with altogether different issues while the impugned mistake sought
to be rectified had crept in the original order dated 24-11-1998 and was not
the subject-matter of appeals. It was not a mistake in the amount of income
taken to be the basis, which had occurred in the order dated 23-7-2004, as
stated in his notice by the Assessing Officer u/s. 154, but it was a mistake
that had taken place in the original order by not reducing the amount of
depreciation disallowed in computing the assesse income. The doctrine of merger
would be applicable
only in respect of those issues that were before the appellate authorities.

 

The High Court duly noted that both
Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal had recorded a finding that the mistake
was in the original order dated 24-11-1998 and not in the order dated 23-7-2004
but hereafter went on to hold that the doctrine of merger applied to the said
order and the order merged with the latest order.

 

The High Court relied upon the decision of
the Supreme Court in the case of Hind Wire Industries Ltd. (supra) and
observed that, the Supreme Court, in that case, was of the view that the word
‘order’ used in the expression “from the date of the order sought to be
amended” occurring in sub-section (7) of section 154 had not been
qualified in any way and it did not necessarily mean the original order. The
Court was further of the view that once a reassessment order or rectification
order was passed giving effect to the order of the appellate forum, the
original order ceased to operate.

 

By relying upon
the understandings  of the Courts with regard
to the Doctrine of Merger[1],
the High Court also held that once an appeal against the order passed by an
authority is preferred and is decided by the appellate authority, the original
order merged into the order passes subsequently.With this merger, order of the
original authority ceased to exist and the subsequent order prevailed, in which
the original order merged. For all intent and purposes, it was the subsequent
order that was to be seen.

 

The High Court noted that the counsel for
the assessee agreed that the order of re-assessment substituted the initial
order that did not survive in any manner or to any extent. The High Court
extended the principle to a case where the assessment order wass challenged in
appeal and the appellate authority passed an order at variance with the order
passed by the Assessing Officer, on the basis of which a fresh order u/s.143(3)
r.w.s 250 was required to be passed by the Assessing Officer giving effect to
the order of the appellate authority.

 

Accordingly, the High Court upheld invoking
of the provisions of section 154 by the Assessing Officer in this case, on the
ground that the assessment order had merged with the order of
Commissioner(Appeals) passed on 28-6-2004, the limitation for the purpose of
sub-section (7) of section 154 was to be counted from the said date.

 

SHREE NAV DURGA COLD STORAGE & ICE FACTORY’S CASE

A similar issue recently came up for
consideration before the Allahabad High Court in the case of Shree Nav Durga
Cold Storage & Ice Factory vs. CIT 397 ITR 626 (Allahabad).

 

In this case,
for Assessment Year 2003-04, various orders were passed as explained below in
the chronological order:

 

31-3-2006

Assessment order u/s. 143(3) was passed.

27-12-2006

Appeal against assessment order dated 31-3-2006 was disposed
of by the Commissioner(Appeals).

13-6-2008

ITAT passed the order remanding the matter back to the
Assessing Officer for the limited purpose of arriving at the fair market
value on the date of transfer by referring to the Valuation Authority and,
accordingly, recalculate the long-term capital gain.

31-12-2009

The fresh assessment order was passed by the Assessing
Officer but without the benefit of report of Valuation Officer.

25-1-2011

Upon receipt of the report of the Valuation Officer, the
order was passed in exercise of power u/s. 154, 254, 143(3) re-determining
the amount of long-term capital gain.

9-5-2011

The assessee filed the application u/s. 154 for rectification
of mistake stating that long-term capital loss which was brought forward from
earlier years had to be set off against capital gain for the year but the
same had been missed by Assessing Officer

 

This application made u/s. 154 was rejected
by the Assessing Officer. Both, the Commissioner(Appeals) and ITAT, confirmed
the order of the Assessing Officer rejecting the application of the assessee by
observing that the purpose of section 154, the limitation would commence from
assessment order dated 31.03.2006 and not subsequent orders.

 

On behalf of the assessee, it was contended
before the High Court that the Assessing Officer was under a statutory
obligation to allow set off of brought forward capital loss and since the last
order was passed by him on 25.01.2011, for the purpose of section 154 (7),
limitation would count from the date of the said order, and in any case, from
the date of the order dated 31.12.2009 which was passed after remand by the Tribunal.
It was argued that the order dated 31.03.2006 merged in the judgment of the
Tribunal dated 13.06.2008 whereby the matter was remanded to the Assessing
Officer. Reliance was placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Hind
Wire Industries Ltd. (supra)
and Delhi High Court in Tony Electronics
Ltd. (supra).


On the facts, the High Court observed that
the issue of set off of brought forward capital loss had already attained
finality when assessment order dated 31.03.2006 was passed by the Assessing Officer
since in the appeal before Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal, the
Assessee did not raise that plea at all. The order of remand passed by the
Tribunal was only confined to determination of long-term capital gain for the
year and not for any other purpose. It was a limited and partial remand,
confined to a particular purpose.

 

In the light of these facts, the High Court
observed that the legislature had not thought it fit to apply the general
doctrine of merger, but the doctrine of ‘Partial Merger’ had been adopted. The
High Court drew support from the relevant provision of section 263 which
permitted the Commissioner to exercise revisional power over such matters as
had not been considered and decided in the appeal.

 

Once the issue of merger was governed by
statutory provisions, then, obviously, it was the statute which shall prevail
over the general doctrine of merger. Accordingly, the High Court rejected the
appellant’s contentions and held that the order in which the amendment was
sought was the original order dated 31-3-2006 and, hence, limitation would
count from the date of that order.

 

With regard to the Delhi High Court’s
decision in the case of Tony Electronics Ltd.(supra), the Allahabad High
Court held that the inference drawn therein from reading of the judgement in Hind
Wire Industries Ltd.
was much more then what had actually been said by the
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court had held as follows in Hind Wire Industries
Ltd.:

 

“word “order” has not been
qualified in any way and it does not necessarily mean the original order. It
can be any order, including the amended or rectified order.”

 

The aforesaid word “including”
made it very clear that an amended or rectified order would not result in
nullifying the original order and to say that the original order would cease to
exist. To read it as if, once the rectified order was passed, the original
order would disappear, would result in nullifying the effect of the word
“including” in the observations made by the Supreme Court, while
reading the meaning of the word “order” in section 154(7).
Accordingly, the Allahabad High Court disagreed with the view taken by the
Delhi High Court in the case of Tony Electronics Ltd,(supra) and held that the
rectification was barred by limitation.

 

OBSERVATIONS

Under the Income tax Act, an assessment
order or an order giving appeal effect 
is usually passed by an Assessing officer. This order can be later on;

?   rectified by him

?   revised by the Commissioner,

?   modified by the
Commissioner(Appeals) or other appellate authorities,

?   set aside by the
Commissioner or the appellate authorities,

?   reopened and reassessed or
specially assessed by him (only assessment order)

?   substituted by him by giving
effect to the order of the higher authorities,

?   substituted by passing fresh
order when set-aside by the higher authorities.

 

Unless any of the above happens, the order
passed by the AO attains finality. Once, any one of the above orders are
passed, the original order, till then final, becomes disturbed or vitiated, and
the question arises whether the order originally passed is substituted or
survives or it partially survives. The Act by itself does not provide for an
answer to this question and with that throws open challenging situations in
applying the provisions that stipulate time limits for actions w.r.t the date
of an order.

 

Ordinarily, where an appeal is provided
against an order passed by an authority, the decision of the appellate
authority, when passed, becomes the operative decision in law. If the appellate
authority modifies or reverses the decision of the authority, it is the
appellate decision that is effective and can be enforced. In law the position
would be just the same even if the appellate decision merely confirms the
decision of the authority. As a result of the confirmation or affirmance of the
decision by the appellate authority the original decision merges in the
appellate decision and it is the appellate decision alone which subsists and is
operative and capable of enforcement. The act of fusion of the one order in to
another is enshrined in ‘doctrine of merger’ which again is neither a doctrine
of constitutional law nor a doctrine statutorily recognised. It is a common law
doctrine founded on principles of propriety in the hierarchy of justice
delivery system. Please see Kunhayammed vs. State of Kerala, 245 ITR 360
(SC)
which reiterates the position affirmed by various courts over a period
of time.

 

The merger doctrine in civil procedure
stands for the proposition that when the court order replaces  an order of the authority with that of the
court , it is the order of the court that prevails. The logic underlying the
doctrine of merger is that there cannot be more than one decree or operative
orders governing the same subject-matter at a given point of time. When a
decree or order passed by inferior court, tribunal or authority was subjected
to a remedy available under the law before a superior forum then, its finality
is put in jeopardy. Once the superior court has disposed of the lis before it
either way – whether the decree or order under appeal is set aside or modified
or simply confirmed, it is the decree or order of the superior court, tribunal
or authority which is the final, binding and operative decree or order wherein
merges the decree or order passed by the court, tribunal or the authority
below.

 

This doctrine
however is not of universal or unlimited application and is not rigid in its
application. The nature of jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the
content or subject-matter of challenge laid or which could have been laid shall
have to be kept in view. If the subject matter of the two proceedings is not
identical, there can be no merger. The doctrine of merger does not by default
mean that wherever there are two orders, one by the inferior authority and the
other by a superior authority, passed in an appeal or revision there is a
fusion or merger of two orders irrespective of the subject-matter of the
appellate or revisional order and the scope of the appeal or revision
contemplated by the particular statute. The application of the doctrine depends
on the nature of the appellate or revisional order in each case and the scope
of the statutory provisions conferring the appellate or revisional
jurisdiction.

 

The Courts are clear that the doctrine of
merger cannot be applied rigidly in all cases. Its application varies from case
to case keeping in mind the subject matter and the nature of jurisdiction
exercised by the authority. It is this flexibility of the doctrine that has
been beautifully explained by the Supreme court in the case of Hind Wires
Industries Ltd. when it stated that “word “order” has not
been qualified in any way and it does not necessarily mean the original order.
It can be any order, including the amended or rectified order.”
Both
the courts, Allahabad and Delhi, have heavily relied on these findings of
flexibility to deliver conflicting decisions in some what similar
situations. 

 

The doctrine
may apply differently in each of the situations referred to earlier in this
part; in some cases the original order will survive and the limitation may
apply from its date; in other cases, the limitation may begin from the
substituted order while for some items in some cases, the limitation may apply
from the date of the order and for the rest of the items it may apply form the
date of the later order.  

 

The real issue therefore before both the
courts was whether the original order survived or not. Application of period of
limitation would begin with the date of the order that subsisted. There could
be cases where both the orders survive which happens in cases of a partial
application of doctrine whereunder a part of the order passed in respect of
some items has remained intact and undisturbed by the later events and the
other part has been unsettled by later events. In such cases, the limitation
will apply from the date of the first order in respect of settled or
undisturbed items and would apply w.r.t the date of later order in respect of
the disturbed or unsettled items of the first order. Applying this
understanding , the Allahabad high court in the case of Shree Nav Durga Cold
Storage & Ice Factory (supra)
correctly held that the claim for set off
of brought forward losses could not be claimed on application u/s. 154 in as
much as the same was time barred for the reason that the issue of set –off of
losses was not the subject matter of the appeal and had become final on passing
of the first order and in that view of the matter could not have been affected
by the appellate order or the order giving effect to the appellate order.

 

The Allahabad High Court in the context has
observed that what has been adopted in the Income-tax Act is the doctrine of
partial merger and not the full merger on the basis of the following provisions
of the Act:

?    Even in a case where the
order of the lower authority had been the subject matter of the appeal, section
263 permits the Pr. CIT or CIT to pass the order of revision but only in
respect of such matters as had not been considered and decided in such appeal.

?    Where the earlier
assessment made has become the subject matter of any appeal, reference or
revision, the Assessing Officer is still permitted to reopen the assessment
u/s. 147 for reassessing the other incomes which are not subject matter of any
such appeal, reference or revision.

?    Sub-section (1A) of section
154 inserted w.e.f. 6th Oct., 1964 by the Direct Taxes (Amendment)
Act, 1964 also embodies the doctrine of partial merger. It lays down that where
any matter had been considered and decided in any proceeding by way of appeal
or revision relating to an order referred to in s/s. (1), the authority passing
such order may, notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time
being in force, amend the order under that sub-section in relation to any
matter other than the matter which had been so considered and decided.

 

The decision of the Supreme Court in the
case of Hind Wire Industries Ltd. which has been relied upon by the
Delhi High Court dealt with a case, wherein the original as well as amended
order were passed by the same authority i.e. the Assessing Officer. Further,
the Delhi High Court proceeded on the basis of the principle that when the
reassessment order is passed, the initial order of assessment does not survive
in any manner or to any extent and extended this principle to decide the issue
before it. Had the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of
Hind Wire Industries Ltd. been properly explained the Delhi High Court, we are
sure that the decision could have been different in the case of Tony Electronics
wherein it ordered for rectification of a mistake contained in the original
order overlooking the fact that the mistake was not the subject matter of the
appeal and therefore that part of the order containing the mistake had become
final and did not get substituted by the order giving effect to the appellate
order. 

 

In view of the above, the period of
limitation provided in section 154(7) should be reckoned from the date of such
order under which the issue sought to be rectified had become final which could
either be  the original assessment order
or the subsequent order. What is important is to figure out the order in which
the mistake has occurred and to find out whether the mistake has been the
subject matter of the orders passed by the higher authorities or even by the AO
himself in some cases.  Having said this,
the limitation will have a fresh lease of life from the date of the later order
in all cases where a fresh order is passed under the provisions of the Act or
in pursuance of the set-aside of the entire order by the higher authorities or
where the direction for passing a fresh order is issued. In such a case, if the
mistake sustains in the fresh order, it will be rectified within the time limit
determined w.r.t the date of passing the fresh order.
 

 



[1] Gojer Bros. (P.)
Ltd. vs. Ratan Lal Singh [1974] 2 SCC 453 and CIT vs. Amritlal Bhogilal &
Co. [1958] 34 ITR 130 (SC).

Main object is carry out infrastructure projects – Amendment in object clause as do business in futures and options – Amended clause to be considered

15. Pr.CIT-1 vs. Triforce Infrastructure
(India) Pvt. Ltd [ Income tax Appeal no 888 of 2016 Dated: 11th
December, 2018 (Bombay High Court)]. 

 

[DCIT-1(3) vs. Triforce Infrastructure
(India) Pvt. Ltd; dated 12/06/2015 ; ITA. No 1890/Mum/2014, Bench : SMC  AY: 2007-08 , 
Mum.  ITAT ]

 

Main object is carry out infrastructure
projects –  Amendment in object
clause  as do business in futures and
options – Amended clause to be considered



The
assessee had in its return of income declared nil income. During assessment
proceedings, the A.O noted from the Profit & Loss Account that the assessee
was in receipt of speculation gain, dividend income and gain on Options
aggregating to Rs. 6.11 lakh. Against the above, the expenditure claimed was
Rs.42.45 lakh. Out of the above, expenditure claimed as loss on futures was
Rs.42.40 lakh. The A.O in assessment proceedings u/s. 143(3) of the Act
disallowed the loss on account of futures and options on the ground that the
object clause of Memorandum of Association (MOU) did not authorise the company
to do business in futures and options.

Being
aggrieved with the asst  order, the
assessee filed an appeal to the CIT(A). The CIT(A) while allowing the appeal
reproduced clauses 21 and clause 68 of the MOU. In fact, clause 68 was
introduced into the MOU w.e.f. 30th December, 2005. It was further
held that clause 21 could itself permit the assessee to deal with the shares,
futures and options. Nevertheless, on 31st December, 2005 clause 68
of the MOU specifically enabled the assessee to do business in futures and
options i.e. before starting the business in futures and options. As the
relevant assessment year is 2007-08, the CIT(A) allowed the assessee’s appeal
holding that loss incurred in futures and options as well as trading in shares
is a part of its business loss.

Being
aggrieved with the order of the CIT(A), the Revenue filed an appeal to the
Tribunal. The Tribunal find that the main business of the assessee is to carry
out infrastructure projects for which the assessee company collected share
application money also. As per the assessee, due to unfavourable circumstances,
the assessee did not get any infrastructure contract, therefore, he decided to
deploy the available surplus funds, collected for infrastructure activity, in
the stock exchange market. The assessee furnished all these details to the A.O
regarding the receipt of share application money, loss incurred in future and
options transactions, share business along with the details of business
expenditure incurred by the assessee. The A.O without providing due opportunity
to the assessee, as has been claimed, in the same breath, assess the income
from speculation business of shares and gains in the future options transactions.
The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue’s appeal upholding the order of the CIT(A).

 

Being
aggrieved with the order of the Tribunal, the Revenue filed an appeal to the
High Court. The Court find that the view taken by the CIT(A) as well as the
Tribunal, cannot be faulted with. The losses on futures and options was
incurred post 30th December, 2005 i.e. after clause 68 was
introduced in the MOU by an amendment. This appeal is in respect of A.Y.
2007-08 when clause 68 of the MOU was in existence. This entitled the assessee
to do business in Futures and Options. In the above view, the question as
proposed does not give rise to any substantial question of law. The appeal is
dismissed.
  

 

 

Section 37 (1): Business expenditure – books of accounts, and details not produced – being destroyed due to flood – filed evidence indicating the destruction of physical accounts due to heavy rains – Allowable as deduction – ‘best judgment assessment’ should not be made as a ‘best punishment assessment’.

14. Pr CIT-19 vs. Rahul J Jain [ ITA no
857 of 2016 Dated: 11th December, 2018 (Bombay High Court)]. 

 

[Asst CIT 16(3)  vs. Rahul J Jain ; dated 28/09/2015 ; ITA. No
5986/Mum/2013, AY : 2009-10, Bench : D 
Mum.  ITAT ]

 

Section 37 (1): Business expenditure – books
of accounts, and details not produced – being destroyed due to flood – filed
evidence indicating the destruction of physical accounts due to heavy rains –
Allowable as deduction –  ‘best judgment
assessment’ should not be made as a ‘best punishment assessment’.

 

The
assessee is engaged in the business of trading in ferrous and nonferrous
metals. During the scrutiny proceeding, the assessee was unable to produce its
physical books of accounts, evidences for sales, purchases and expenses claimed
in the view of the same being destroyed due to flood on 8th July,
2009. The assessee filed necessary evidence indicating the destruction of
physical accounts due to heavy rains on 8th July, 2009. Besides, it
also filed evidences of its sellers and buyers to support its claim of loss.
However, the A.O assessed the income of the assessee at Rs. 57.95 lakh under
the head ‘business’ as against the loss of Rs.18.74 2 lakh as shown by the
assessee in its return of income.

 

The
CIT(A) allowed the assessee’s appeal inter alia by noting the fact that the
assessee had produced various documents in support of its claims for expenses,
after recording the fact that various confirmation letters from the parties who
had made purchases were also filed. However, the A.O did not carry out any
further verification in regard to it. The CIT(A) also recorded the fact that
the return as submitted should be accepted keeping in view of the fact that
there was a sharp and continuous fall in nickel prices which is the main
ingredient in stainless steel. Further, the assessee has made more than 90 % of
the sale during the year, out of the opening stock held by it as a carried
forward from the earlier year. Moreover, it also takes cognizance of the fact
that the assessee’s book results were also accepted by the Sales Tax and
Central Excise authorities. For all the above reasons, the appeal of the
assessee was allowed by order of the CIT(A).

 

Being
aggrieved with the order of the CIT(A), the Revenue filed further appeal to the
Tribunal. The Tribunal find that the documentary evidence to support the
assessee’s claim containing sufficient particulars on the basis of which
requisite verification from the parties mentioned therein could have been done
by the A.O, if he has any doubt in regard to the documents submitted. Further,
the Tribunal notes that the documents submitted in support of their claim were
not disputed by the Revenue before the Tribunal. Further, the impugned order
also records fall in the prices of the steel in the global market which lead to
a loss of the sales made by the assessee. In these circumstances, the appeal of
the Revenue was dismissed.

 

The Tribunal in its order
observed as under :- “We can very well appreciate that at times,  the A.O has no choice but to make a best judgment
assessment.

But in our considered view,
the fairness of justice demands that ‘best judgment assessment’ should not be
made as a ‘best punishment assessment’.


Being aggrieved with the order of the ITAT,
the Revenue filed further appeal to the High Court. The court find that both
the CIT(A) and the Tribunal on examination of the facts have come to the
conclusion that there was material evidence available before the A.O for him to
carry out necessary investigation to determine whether or not the loss suffered
by the assessee  was justifiable. The
best judgment assessment can certainly be resorted to by the A.O in the absence
of any record, but it cannot be arbitrary. This is more particularly so when
various supporting documents justifying their loss return was filed before the
A.O and he had completely ignored the same. We find that this appeal
essentially is in respect of question of facts. In the above view, the appeal
was dismissed. 

Section 68 : Cash credits – Unsecured loans received – Confirmation, balance sheet and bank accounts of creditor was produced – A.O has not made enquiry in respect of the creditors – Deletion of addition was held to be justified.

13.  The Pr. CIT-27 vs. Parth Enterprises [ Income
tax Appeal no 786 of 2016 Dated: 11th December, 2018 (Bombay High
Court)].

[ITO-22(1)(4) vs.
Parth Enterprises; dated 10/06/2015; ITA. No 976/Mum/2013, Bench : C , AY:
2009-10     Mum.  ITAT ]

 

Section 68 : Cash credits – Unsecured loans
received – Confirmation, balance sheet and bank accounts of creditor was
produced – A.O has not made enquiry in respect of the creditors –  Deletion of addition was held to be justified.

 

The
assessee is engaged in the business of builders and developers. During the
year, the assessee had taken unsecured loans from 90 persons. However,
confirmations were filed only in respect 77 persons. The AO conducted enquiry
from external sources on the basis of information available on record and on
test check basis on 01.12.2011. Enquiries were conducted in a few cases, based
on the statement given by those parties . During  a survey action u/s.  133A of the IT Act at the premise of one
Deepak Kapadia CA by the DDIT (investigation), unit IX(3), Mumbai his statement
was also recorded, that in his statement he admitted that he had provided
entries for loans in lieu of cash received from the assessee and also explained
that the modus operandi is of giving cheques and receiving cash back which were
then returned to those parties whose names are appearing as unsecured creditors
in the books of account of the appellant.

 

This
resulted in the A.O concluding that unsecured loans to the extent of Rs. 3.35
crore were hit by section 68 of the Act. Thus, added to the income of the
assessee.

 

Being
aggrieved by the assessment order the assessee filed an appeal to the CIT(A).
The CIT(A) found that creditworthiness of the parties were not doubted. On
facts, it came to the conclusion that out of 90 parties, loan reflected in the
names of 13 parties was hit by Section 68 of the Act. Accordingly, an addition
of Rs.36 lakh was confirmed against the addition of Rs. 3.35 crore made by the
A.O. In regard to the balance of Rs. 2.99 crore, the CIT(A) found that the
loans were genuine and therefore not hit by section 68 of the Act resulting in
its deletion.

 

Being
aggrieved by order, further appeals were filed by the Assessee as well as
Revenue to the Tribunal. The Revenue challenged the deletion of Rs. 2.99 crore
while the assessee challenged the upholding of addition of Rs. 36 lakh.

 

The
Tribunal find that there were total 90 loan creditors from whom unsecured cash
credit amounting to Rs. 3,35,00,000 had been introduced in the books of accounts
by the assessee, that out of the 90 loan creditors confirmations were submitted
only in the case of 77 parties and for the remaining 13 parties confirmation
were not furnished during the assessment proceedings, that during the course of
appellate proceedings  the remaining loan
confirmation were filed along with other supporting documents. The FAA after
considering the remand report and reply of the assessee – decided the matter.
Thus the ITAT decided the effective ground of appeal against the assessee with
regard to the creditors who had advance Rs.36 lakh to it. Further it held that
the FAA had rightly deleted the addition of Rs. 2.99 crore. The AO had made no
effort to verify the details filed by the assessee before him.


Being aggrieved with the order of the ITAT, the Revenue filed the Appeal before
High Court. The Hon. Court find that there are concurrent finding on facts
rendered by the CIT(A) and the Tribunal holding that only Rs. 36 lakh can be
added to the declared income and the balance amount of Rs. 2.99 crore was not
hit by section 68 of the Act. This finding is premised on the fact that no
enquiry was made in respect of 76 creditors out of 77 creditors and the
assessee had provided required documentary evidence in respect of the 76 creditors.
Thus, these are essentially finding of fact and the view taken by the Tribunal
is a possible view on these facts. In view of the above, the question raised
does not give rise to any substantial question of law. Accordingly, appeal was
dismissed.

Time limit for issuing notice u/s. 148 – Amendment to section 149 by Finance Act, 2012, which extended limitation for reopening assessment to sixteen years, could not be resorted for reopening proceedings concluded before amendment became effective

50. Brahm Datt vs. ACIT; [2018] 100 taxmann.com 324
(Delhi)
Date of order: 6th December, 2018 A. Y. 1998-99 Section 149 of ITA and Finance Act, 2012

 

Time limit for issuing notice u/s. 148 – Amendment to
section 149 by Finance Act, 2012, which extended limitation for reopening
assessment to sixteen years, could not be resorted for reopening proceedings
concluded before amendment became effective

 

The assessee was a senior citizen aged about 84 years. From A. Ys.
1984-85 to 2003-04, he was a non-resident/not ordinarily resident of India. He
was previously working and residing in foreign countries, viz; Jordan and Iraq
and while so, he derived income primarily from salary and professional
receipts. The assessee during the course of search clarified that he did not
maintain any foreign bank account in his personal capacity, he, however had
contributed an amount of approximately US$ 2-3 million at the time of settling
of the offshore Trust, when he was a non-resident, out of his income earned
from sources outside India. The revenue primarily relying upon his statement,
issued impugned notice dated 24/03/2015 u/s. 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961
seeking to initiate reassessment proceedings for A. Y. 1998-99, on the
suspicion that the, income of the assessee had escaped assessment. The
Assessing Officer rejected the assessee’s contention that limitation for
re-assessment for A. Y. 1998-99 had expired on 31/03/2005 and therefore, re-assessment
was bared by limitation. The Assessing Officer contended that the proceedings
were initiated within the extended period of 16 years from the end of the
relevant assessment year by relying on section 149(1)(c), introduced by the
Finance Act, 2012, with effect from 01/07/2012.

 

The assessee filed writ petition challenging the notice u/s. 148 on the
ground of limitation. Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition and held as
under:

 

“i)   The revenue had sought to
contend that the amendment (to section 149) is merely procedural and no one has
a vested right to procedure; and that procedural amendments can be given effect
any time, even in ongoing proceedings.

ii)   The question of revival of
the period of limitation for reopening assessment for A. Y. 1998-99 by taking
recourse to the subsequent amendment made in section 149 in the year 2012,
i.e., more than 8 years after expiration of limitation on 31/03/2005, has been
dealt with by the Supreme Court in K.M. Sharma v. ITO [2002] 122 Taxman 426/254
ITR 772(SC).

iii)  Assessment for A. Y. 1998-99
could not be reopened beyond 31/03/2005 in terms of provisions of section 149
as applicable at the relevant time. The assessees return for A.Y. 1998-99
became barred by limitation on 31/03/2005.

iv)  In view of the above
discussion, it is held that the petition has to succeed; the impugned
reassessment notice and all consequent proceedings are hereby quashed and set
aside. The writ petition is allowed.”

 

TDS – Payment to non-resident – Effect of amendment to section 195 by F. A. 2012 with retrospective effect from 01/04/1962 – No change in condition precedent for application of section 195 – Income arising to non-resident must be taxable in India

49. Principal CIT vs. Motif India Infotech (P) Ltd.; 409
ITR 178 (Guj)
Date of order: 16th October, 2018 A. Y. 2009-10 Sections 9(1) and 195 of ITA 1961

 

TDS – Payment to non-resident – Effect of amendment to
section 195 by F. A. 2012 with retrospective effect from 01/04/1962 – No change
in condition precedent for application of section 195 – Income arising to
non-resident must be taxable in India

 

The assessee was a company engaged in software development. It provided
software related services to its overseas clients. In the course of assessment
proceedings for the A. Y. 2009-10, the Assessing Officer found that the assesse
had made payment of Rs. 5.51 crore to a foreign based company towards fees for
technical services without deducting tax at source. The assessee argued that
the payment received by the non-resident was not taxable and that therefore,
there was no requirement for deducting tax at source while making such payment.
However, the Assessing Officer disallowed the expenditure relying on section
40(a)(i) of the Act holding that the tax was deductible at source.

 

The Commissioner (Appeals) accepted the assessee’s claim and held in
favour of the assessee observing that there was no dispute that the services
were in the nature of technical services, but would be covered under the
Explanation clause contained in section 9(1)(vii)(b) of the Act. He was of the
opinion that the services were utilised outside India in a business or
profession carried outside India, or for the purpose of earning any income
outside India. This was upheld by the Tribunal.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of
the Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i)   In the case of GE India
Technology Centre P. Ltd. Vs. CIT; 327 ITR 456 (SC), the ratio laid down by the
Supreme Court was that mere remittance of money to a non-resident would not
give rise to the requirement of deducting tax at source, unless such remittance
contains wholly or partly taxable income. After the judgment was rendered, the
Legislature amended section 195 by inserting Explanation 2 by the Finance Act,
2012, but with retrospective effect from 01/04/1962. The Explanation provides
that for removal of doubts, it is clarified that the obligation to comply with
sub-section (1) of section 195, and to make deduction as provided therein
applies and shall be deemed to have always applied to all persons, resident or
non-resident, whether or not the non-resident person has a residence or place
of business or business connection in India; or any other presence in any
manner whatsoever in India. Mere requirement of permanent establishment in
India was thus done away with. Nevertheless, the basic principle that
requirement of deduction of tax at source would arise only in a case where the
payment made to a non-resident was taxable, still remains.

ii)   The Commissioner (Appeals)
and the Tribunal had accepted the assessee’s factual assertion that the
payments were for technical services provided by a non-resident, for providing
services to be utilised for serving the assessee’s foreign clients. Clearly,
the source of income namely the assessee’s customers were the foreign based
companies.

iii)  We are fortified in the view
by a judgment of the Karnataka High Court in the case of CIT Vs. ITC Hotels;
(2015) 233 Taxman 302 (Karn), in which it was held that where the recipient of
income of parent company is not chargeable to tax in India, then the question
of deduction of tax at source by the payer would not arise.

iv)  In the result, the tax appeal
is dismissed.”

 

Settlement of cases – Construction business – Receipt of on money – Additional disclosure of undisclosed income for one assessment year during settlement proceedings – Does not amount to untrue disclosure for other assessment years under settlement proceedings – Commission accepting disclosures made by assessees and passing orders on their settlement applications – Order of Settlement Commission not erroneous

48. Principal CIT vs. Income-Tax Settlement Commission
and another; 409 ITR 495 (Guj)
Date of order: 13th June, 2017 A. Ys. 2012-13 to 2014-15 Sections 245C and 245D of ITA 1961 and Article 226 of
Constitution of India

 

Settlement of cases – Construction business – Receipt of
on money – Additional disclosure of undisclosed income for one assessment year
during settlement proceedings – Does not amount to untrue disclosure for other
assessment years under settlement proceedings – Commission accepting
disclosures made by assessees and passing orders on their settlement
applications – Order of Settlement Commission not erroneous

 

For the A. Ys. 2012-13 to 2014-15 the assesse filed applications before
the Settlement Commission for settlement of disputes that arose out of pending
assessments. In the settlement applications the assessees made additional
disclosure of undisclosed income on account of receipt of on money through sale
of constructed properties. The assessees projected 15 % profit on the turnover.
On the basis of the turnover of unaccounted receipts disclosed and 15 % profit
rate claimed by them, the assessees made disclosure of additional income in
their applications for settlements. The Department contended before the
Settlement Commission that further inquiry was necessary and that the rate of
15 % profit was on the lower side as in similar business the rate of return was
much higher. The Settlement Commission accepted the disclosure of the turnover
made by the assesse as the Department did not bring any contrary material on
record in that respect and held that the 15 % rate of profit out of the
turnover was reasonable. The Settlement Commission further recorded that during
the course of the proceedings, each of the assessees made a voluntary
disclosure of an additional sum of Rs. 2 crore, i.e., a sum of Rs. 50 lakh each
for the A. Y. 2014-15 “in a spirit of settlement and to put a quietus to the
issue”. Accordingly, the Settlement Commission passed an order u/s. 245D on
21/01/2016.

 

The Revenue filed a writ petition and challenged the validity of the
order. The Gujarat High Court dismissed the writ petition and held as under:

 

“i)   It is true that before the
Settlement Commission, the assesses indicated that the additional disclosure of
Rs. 50 lakh each may be accounted for the A. Y. 2014-15. However, we cannot
lose sight of the fact that such disclosures were made in the spirit of
settlement and to put an end to the controversy. The assessees therefore cannot
be pinned down to effect such disclosures in the A. Y. 2014-15 alone.

ii)   We cannot fragment a larger
picture and telescope the additional disclosures for a particular year and
taking into account the comparable figures for that year decide whether such
disclosures would shake the initial disclosures and to hold that the initial
disclosures were untrue projecting the additional disclosures for all the
assessment years, the assessees had sought for settlement.

iii)  We find the Commission
committed no error in accepting them (additional disclosures) and in proceeding
to pass final order on such settlement applications. In the result, the
petitions are dismissed.”

Recovery of tax – Stay of demand when assessee in appeal before Commissioner (Appeals) – Discretion of AO to grant stay – CBDT Office Memorandum cannot oust jurisdiction of AO to grant stay – Prima facie case showing high pitched assessment and financial burden on assesse – Stay on condition of deposit of 20% of amount demanded – Not justified

47.  SAMMS Juke Box
vs. ACIT; 409 ITR 33 (Mad);
Date of order: 28th June, 2018 A. Y. 2015-16

Section 220(6) of ITA 1961 and Article 226 of
Constitution of India

 

Recovery of tax – Stay of demand when assessee in appeal
before Commissioner (Appeals) – Discretion of AO to grant stay – CBDT Office
Memorandum cannot oust jurisdiction of AO to grant stay – Prima facie
case showing high pitched assessment and financial burden on assesse – Stay on
condition of deposit of 20% of amount demanded – Not justified

 

For the A. Y. 2015-16, the assessee’s assessment was completed u/s.
143(3) of the Act. The assessee had receipts of Rs. 28,05,852/- from Conde Nast
(India) Limited for the year. However, by mistake, M/s. Conde Nast (India)
Limited had deducted excessive TDS and accordingly in Form 26AS the receipts
were shown to be Rs. 6,62,03,927/. The assessee did not claim the excessive
credit of TDS. The assessee also took steps to make the necessary corrections.
However, in the meanwhile, the Assessing Officer completed the assessment on
the basis of the receipts as shown in Form 26AS resulting in high pitched
assessment. The assesse preferred appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) and
made an application to the Assessing Officer for stay of the demand u/s. 220(6)
during the pendency of the appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals). The
Assessing Officer passed order and directed the assesse to deposit 20 % of the
demand for grant of the stay as per the CBDT Office Memorandum dated
31/07/2017. The assesse filed writ petition and challenged the said order.

 

The Madras High Court allowed the writ petition, set aside the said
order and held as under:

 

“i)   Before whatever forum when an
application for interim relief is sought, the authority has to be necessarily
guided by the principles governing the exercise of jurisdiction under Order
XXXIX, rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code 1908. Thus, the authority while
examining an application for grant of stay should consider whether the
applicant has made out a prima facie case, whether the balance of convenience
is in his favour, and if stay is not granted whether the applicant would be put
to irrepairable hardship.

 

ii)   Thus, when a statutory
authority exercises power to grant interim relief, he cannot be weighed down by
directives, which leave no room for discretion of the authority. Though the
CBDT’ Office Memorandum dated 31/07/2017 appears to fix a percentage of tax to
be paid for being entitled to an order of stay, it carves an exception in the
very same instruction and this is clear from the Office Memorandum dated
29/02/2016, in paragraph 4(B(b)). Thus, CBDT did not completely oust the
jurisdiction of the Officer, while examining a prayer for stay of the demand of
tax pending appeal.

 

iii)  The respondent could not have
passed the order without taking note of the assessee’s case and without
considering whether the assesse had made out a prima facie case for grant of
interim relief. The assesse had specifically pointed out its financial position
and the prejudice that was being caused to it on account of the high pitched
assessment. It had specifically pleaded that its income of the year was one
fourth of the tax assessed. This aspect was not dealt with by the respondent,
while passing the order. The order was not valid.

iv)  I find that the information
furnished by the Assessing Officer in the para-wise comments are not contained
in the impugned order. The respondent cannot improve upon the impugned order by
substituting fresh reasons in the form of a counter-affidavit. Thus, the
information furnished to the learned standing counsel for the Revenue would
clearly demonstrate that at the time of passing the impugned order, no such
reasons weighed in the minds of the respondent and therefore, the respondent
cannot justify his order by substituting fresh reasons, after the order is put
to challenge.

 

v)   In the result, the writ
petition is allowed, the impugned order is set aside and the matter is remanded
to the respondent for fresh consideration and to pass an order on merits and in
accordance with law after affording an opportunity of hearing to the assessee.”

 

Loss – Capital or revenue loss – Investment in shares as stock-in-trade – Loss in sale of portion of shares – Transaction in course of business – Revenue in nature – Not capital loss

46.  Calibre
Financial Services Ltd. vs. ACIT; 409 ITR 410 (Mad)
Date of the order: 31st October, 2018 A. Y. 2001-02 Section 45 of ITA 1961


Loss – Capital or revenue loss – Investment in shares as
stock-in-trade – Loss in sale of portion of shares – Transaction in course of
business – Revenue in nature – Not capital loss

 

The assessee was engaged in financial advisory and syndication services
and the memorandum of association of the company authorised it to deal in
shares and stocks. For the A. Y. 2001-02, the Assessing Officer treated the
loss that arose from the transaction of sale of mutual fund units as capital
loss as against the claim of the assesee that it was revenue loss and passed an
order u/s. 143(3) of the Act accordingly.

 

The Commissioner (Appeals) allowed the appeal and held that it was a
revenue loss. The Tribunal reversed the order and held that there was no
evidence available to indicate that the intention of the assessee to treat the
holding as stock-in-trade.

 

The Madras High Court allowed the appeal filed by the assesse and held
as under:

 

“i)   The Tribunal erred in concluding
that there was no evidence available on record to indicate that the intention
of the assessee was to treat the holding as stock-in-trade. The Assessing
Officer had extracted the written submission made by the assesse, in which it
had stated that the assesse was a financial service company which rendered
financial advisory and syndication services and also traded in shares, units of
mutual funds, etc. The memorandum of association of the assessee authorised it
to deal in shares and services. Further, it stated that as authorized, the
assessee had purchased mutual fund units during the financial year 2000-2001
and sold the units during the same year. The trading in such units was done in
the ordinary course of its business and the loss was revenue in nature.

ii)   Further, the assessee had
stated that it had treated the transaction as revenue transaction and debited
the loss incurred to the profit and loss account as in the earlier financial
year also, in which it was allowed by the Assessing Officer. Similar
transactions had been held to be revenue in nature. For the A. Y. 2006-07, the
Assessing Officer did not agree with the assessee but the Commissioner
(Appeals), had held that the assessee had acquired equity shares, which it held
as stock-in-trade and out of which, a portion was sold incurring a loss which
was accounted as business expenditure and that the method of accounting and the
principle of accounting for loss or gains from investments or stock-in-trade
had been consistently and regularly followed by the assesse and accordingly,
the claim of the assessee with regard to loss that arose from trading in shares
was to be allowed as a business loss as claimed by the assesse.

iii)  Thus, for the above reasons,
we are of the considered view that the Tribunal fell in error in reversing the
order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals). In the result, the appeals filed by
the assessee are allowed and the orders passed by the Tribunal, which are
impugned herein, are set aside. Accordingly, the substantial questions of law
are answered in favour of the assesse and against the Revenue.”

Income Declaration Scheme 2016 – Determination of sum payable and payment of first instalment by assessee – Rejection of application pursuant to issue of notice for assessment – Tax already deposited under scheme to be adjusted by Department

45.  Sangeeta
Agrawal vs. Principal CIT; 409 ITR 254 (MP)
Date of order: 3rd August, 2018 A. Y. 2014-15 Section 191 of F. A. 2016 (Income Declaration Scheme,
2016); Article 226 of Constitution of India and section 143(2) of ITA 1961

 

Income Declaration Scheme 2016 – Determination of sum
payable and payment of first instalment by assessee – Rejection of application
pursuant to issue of notice for assessment – Tax already deposited under scheme
to be adjusted by Department

 

The assessee made an application under the Income Declaration Scheme,
2016, and offered an amount as undisclosed income for the A. Y. 2014-15. The
total tax payable thereon was determined and she paid the first instalment of
tax. Thereafter, a notice u/s. 143(2) of the Act, was issued and the
application under the Scheme was rejected. Since according to section 191 of
the Finance Act, 2016, any amount paid under the Scheme was not refundable, the
assesse prayed for adjustment of the amount already paid. The Department
rejected the application for adjustment or refund of the amount paid under the
Scheme.

 

The assesee filed a writ petition and challenged the order of rejection.
The Madhya Pradesh High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

 

“Considering the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of
Hemalatha Gargya Vs. CIT; (2003) 259 ITR 1 (SC) as well as the Bombay High
Court in Sajan Enterprises Vs. CIT; (2006) 282 ITR636 (Bom), we quash the
impugned order and direct the respondent-Revenue to adjust the amount of Rs.
3,28,068 which has been deposited by the petitioner in the relevant A. Y.
2014-15.”

Charitable or religious trust – Denial of exemption – Section 13(2)(c) – In order to invoke provisions of section 13(2)(c), it is essential to prove that amount paid to person referred to in sub-section (3) of section 13 is in excess of what may be reasonably paid for services rendered

44. CIT vs. Sri Balaji Society; [2019] 101 taxmann.com 52
(Bom)
Date of order: 11th December, 2018 A. Ys. 2008-09 and 2009-10 Sections 12AA and 13 of ITA, 1961

 

Charitable or religious trust – Denial of exemption –
Section 13(2)(c) – In order to invoke provisions of section 13(2)(c), it is
essential to prove that amount paid to person referred to in sub-section (3) of
section 13 is in excess of what may be reasonably paid for services rendered

 

The assessee was a charitable trust and enjoyed the registration u/s.
12AA. During relevant years, the assessee had incurred expenditure, some of
which was paid to one SBC towards advertisements in various magazines and
souvenirs. The Assessing Officer noticed that said SBC was a partnership firm
consisting of three partners who happened to be trustees of the assessee-trust.
The Assessing Officer opined that the firm i.e., SBC was a firm covered u/s.
13(3)(e) vis-a-vis trust. The Assessing Officer thereafter carried out the
analysis of the expenditure in connection with the advertisements with a
special focus on the payments made to the SBC. He thus denied the benefit u/s.
11 relying upon the provisions of section 13(2)(c).

 

The Commissioner (Appeals) allowed the appeal. He examined the material
on record at length and came to the conclusion that the Assessing Officer had
incorrectly invoked the said provision in making the disallowance. He was of
the opinion that the payments made by assessee were not in excess of what may
be reasonably paid for the services in question. The Tribunal confirmed order
passed by the Commissioner (Appeals).

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of
the Tribunal and held as under:



“i)   Clause (c) of sub-section (2)
of section 13 can be invoked, if any amount is paid by way of salary, allowance
or otherwise to any person referred to in sub-section (3) out of resources of
the trust for services rendered to the trust and the amount so paid is in
excess of what may be reasonably paid for such services. Thus, essential
requirement for invoking the said provision is that the amount paid was in
excess of what may be reasonably paid for the services.

 

ii)   In the present case, the
Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal had elaborately examined the accounts
of the assessee, the payments made to the SBC, the payments made to other
agencies for similar work, comparative rates of payments and came to the
conclusion that no excess payment was made to the related person.

 

iii)  Essentially, this is a pure
question of fact. No question of law arises.”

Section 40A(3) – No Disallowance u/s. 40A(3) when genuineness of the transaction is not doubted and incurring of such cash expenses was necessary as part of business expediency.

37.  [2018] 66 ITR (Trib.) 371 (Delhi-Trib.) KGL
Networks (P) Ltd. vs. ACIT ITA No.:
301/Del./2018
A.Y.:
2014-2015 
Dated: 2nd July, 2018

 

Section 40A(3) – No Disallowance u/s.
40A(3) when genuineness of the transaction is not doubted and incurring of such
cash expenses was necessary as part of business expediency.

 

FACTS


The assessee-company
was a clearing and forwarding agent and had made payments to various reputed
airlines. The Assessing Officer (AO) noted from the tax audit report that the
assessee-company had incurred expenditure amounting to Rs.8,17,807/- in cash.
The A.O. accordingly disallowed the same in light of section 40A(3), being in
excess of Rs. 20,000/-.

The assessee-company challenged the addition
before the Ld. CIT(A) stating that payments were made to various reputed
airlines whose PAN had been duly submitted. The genuineness of the payment was
not doubted, therefore, no disallowance could be made u/s. 40A(3) of the Act.
The CIT(A), however, did not accept the contention of assessee-company and
noted that Rule 6DD had been amended in 2008. The CIT(A) held that the Rule in
its present form does not include any such circumstances like business
expediency or exceptional circumstances, under which, such cash payments could
be made as a business expenditure u/s. 40A(3).

Aggrieved by the order, Assessee Company filed
appeal to ITAT.

 

HELD


The
Tribunal relied on the decision of Attar Singh Gurmukh Singh vs. ITO (1991)
191 ITR 667 (SC)
wherein it was held that section 40A(3) of the Income-tax
Act, 1961, is not arbitrary and does not amount to a restriction on the fundamental
right to carry on business. Consideration of business expediency and other
relevant factors are not excluded. Genuine and bonafide transactions are
not taken out of the sweep of the section. It will be clear from the provisions
of section 40A(3) and Rule 6DD that they are intended to regulate business
transactions and to prevent the use of unaccounted money or reduce the chances
to use black money for business transactions. The contention of the assessee
that owing to business expediency, obligation and exigency, the assessee had to
make cash payment for purchase of goods so essential for carrying on of his
business, was also not disputed by the AO.




It was also held that the primary object of
enacting section 40A(3) was twofold, firstly, putting a check on trading
transactions with a mind to evade the liability to tax on income earned out of
such transaction and, secondly, to inculcate the banking habits amongst the
business community. The ITAT concluded that Even though there was an amendment
in Rule 6DD of I.T. Rules as is noted by the Ld. CIT(A), but in section 40A(3)
of the I.T. Act, 1961 itself, an exception is provided on account of nature and
extent of banking facilities available, consideration of business expediency
and other relevant factors. The nature of business of assessee-company and the
agency carried on by the assessee-company on behalf of others clearly showed
that for business expediency in the line of business of assessee-company,
sometimes cash payments were made to complete the work on behalf of Principal.



The
assessee-company, under such compelling reasons, made payments in cash. The AO
and CIT(A) had not doubted the identity of the payee and the genuineness of the
transaction in the matter. The source of payment was also not doubted by the
authorities. ITAT mainly relied on the decision of ITAT, Delhi in the case of ACIT
vs. Marigold Merchandise (P) Ltd (ITA No. 5170/Del./2014)
.

 

Thus, in the
opinion of the ITAT no disallowance u/s. 40A(3) could be made when genuineness
of the transaction was not doubted and incurring of such expenses was necessary
as part of business expediency.

Section 40(a)(ia) – No Disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) for non-deduction of TDS u/s. 194C if no oral or written contract between the contractor and contractee.

36.  [2018] 66 ITR (Trib.) 525 (Vizag. – Trib.) ACIT vs.
A. Kasivishwanadhan ITA No.:
138/Viz/2017
A.Y.:
2012-13
Dated: 20th July, 2018

 

Section 40(a)(ia) – No Disallowance u/s.
40(a)(ia) for non-deduction of TDS u/s. 194C if no oral or written contract
between the contractor and contractee.




FACTS


In this case assessee was engaged in the business
which required large labour force within short notice of time. Assessee had
incurred labour expenses and payments were made through maistries who procured
the labour as per the need of the assessee. The Assessing Officer (AO) inferred
that there is a principal/agent relationship between the assessee and Maistry
and the transactions were in the nature of supply of labour contract and
accordingly held that such payments are liable for deduction of tax at source
u/s. 194C of Act. Since the assessee had not deducted TDS on labour charges,
the AO disallowed the expenditure u/s. 40(a)(ia) of Act.

 

Aggrieved by
the order of the AO, the assessee appealed before the CIT(A). The assessee
submitted before the CIT(A) that there was no agreement written or oral between
the assessee and the maistries and in the absence of any contract between both
the parties, it cannot be construed that there exists any principal agent
relationship/contract between them. The Assessee argued that the maistries were
not the labour contractors and they were randomly the first among the group of
few people claiming to be the leader of that group. They procured the labour
along with them as when required and for the sake of convenience, the assessee
made the payments to one of the maistries or group leader who in turn
distributed the payments to the rest of the group members. There was no implied
or express contract for supply of labour between the assessee and the maistry.
Thus there was no contract and the question of deduction of tax at source did
not arise. The CIT(A) observed that the labour maistries were not the labour
contractors and the payments made to labour maistries did not bear the
character of contract payment as contemplated u/s.194C of Act, accordingly held
that the payments made to the maistries did not attract deduction of tax at
source u/s. 194C of the Act and accordingly directed the AO to delete the
addition.

 

Aggrieved by the order, revenue filed appeal
to ITAT.

 

HELD


The Tribunal concluded that the assessee was
engaged in labour oriented industry which required labour at irregular
intervals yet urgently. It was not convenient to find individual labourers and
hence, the assessee identified some of the maistries or group leaders to
procure the labour who can work as per the requirement of the job. As stated by
the AR, the group leaders were only responsible for procuring the labour and
work was done under the assessee’s personal supervision. There was no written
or oral agreement or contract between the maistries and the assessee for
getting the work done through the maistry or to supply the labour as it was a
general practice used for convenience of obtaining distant labourers. Neither
there was a contract for supply of labour nor there was contract for getting
the work done through labour by the assessee with the maistries. The AO simply
considered the payments made to the group leaders and landed in a presumption
that there was contract in existence for supply of labour between the maistries
and the assessee. The AO did not examine the maistries before coming to such
conclusion. As per the provisions of section 194C of the Act, there must be
contract for deduction of TDS including supply of labour for carrying out any
work.

 

Thus, in the
opinion of the ITAT No Disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) for non deduction of TDS
u/s. 194C if no oral or written contract exist between the contractor and
contractee.

 

Section 153A – Copies of sale deeds of land found during the course of search operation which were already considered by the AO while framing the assessment u/s. 143(3) cannot be considered as incriminating material and, therefore, the assessment framed u/s. 153A on the basis of the contents of the same sale deeds is bad in law.

35.  [2019] 197 TTJ 502 (Delhi – Trib.) Lord Krishna
Dwellers (P) Ltd vs. DCIT ITA No.:
5294/Del/2013
A.Y.:  2006-07. Dated: 17th December, 2018.

 

Section 153A – Copies of sale deeds of land
found during the course of search operation which were already considered by
the AO while framing the assessment u/s. 143(3) cannot be considered as
incriminating material and, therefore, the assessment framed u/s. 153A on the
basis of the contents of the same sale deeds is bad in law.

 

FACTS


A search operation
was conducted at the premises of the assessee on 21.01.2011. Original return of
income was filed on 21.11.2006 and the assessment was framed u/s. 143(3) of the
Act vide order dated 13.05.2008. During the course of original assessment
proceedings the details of vendors from whom the land was purchased during the
F.Y. 2005-06 alongwith copies of land deed were furnished for verification.
After considering all this, the Assessing Officer framed the assessment. The
same sale deeds were found during the course of search operation and on the
basis of the very same sale deeds, the Assessing Officer came to the conclusion
that an amount of Rs.1.05 crore has been paid to various persons in cash.

 

Aggrieved by
the assessment order, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A). The
CIT(A) confirmed the same.

 

HELD 


The Tribunal
held that the sale deeds, transactions when duly recorded in the regular books
of account, could not be considered as incriminating material found during the
course of search operation. It was not the case of the Revenue that if the
search and seizure operation had not been conducted, the Revenue could never
have come to know that the assesse had entered into various purchase
transactions of land. The contention of the Departmental Representative that
though the deeds were before the AO, but he examined the deeds only to
ascertain the circle rate vis a vis the transaction rate and never went into
the cash transactions reflected in the land deed was not acceptable. Once a
document is filed before the AO during the course of search proceedings it is
assumed that he has gone through the contents of those documents and has
verified the same.

 

The copies of sale deed filed by the revenue
were the same which were considered by the AO while framing assessment u/s.
143(3). Therefore the assessment framed u/s. 153A was bad in law and was
quashed.

Section 54F r.w.s 50 – Deeming fiction of section 50 cannot be extended to the deduction allowable u/s. 54F and therefore, assessee is entitled for deduction u/s. 54F on the capital gains arising on the sale of depreciable assets as these assets were held for a period of more than thirty-six months.

34.  [2019] 197 TTJ 583 (Mumbai – Trib.) DCIT vs.
Hrishikesh D. Pai ITA No.:
2766/Mum/2017
A.Y.:
2012-13
Dated: 26th September, 2018

           

Section 54F r.w.s 50 – Deeming fiction of
section 50 cannot be extended to the deduction allowable u/s. 54F and
therefore, assessee is entitled for deduction u/s. 54F on the capital gains
arising on the sale of depreciable assets as these assets were held for a
period of more than thirty-six months.

 

FACTS


The assessee, a doctor by profession, had
sold a property, which was used by him for commercial purposes for his clinic and
on which depreciation was also claimed u/s. 32. The said property was held by
the assessee for a period of more than thirty six months before being sold.
Further, the assessee had purchased a new residential flat from the
consideration received from sale of the above property. The assessee claimed
deduction under section 54F on the capital gains arising from the sale of
aforesaid property.

 

The Assessing Officer treated the aforesaid
property as short-term capital assets within the deeming provision of section
50 and held that the assessee was not entitled for deduction u/s. 54F with
respect to short-term capital gains arising on sale of such short term capital
assets, as the deduction u/s. 54F was available only on the long-term capital
gains arising from transfer of long-term capital assets.

 

Aggrieved by the assessment order, the
assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A). The CIT(A) allowed the deduction
u/s. 54F to the assessee. Being aggrieved by the CIT(A) order, the Revenue
filed an appeal before the Tribunal.

 

HELD


The Tribunal
held that section 50 created a deeming fiction by modifying provisions of
sections 48 and 49 for the purposes of computation of capital gains chargeable
to tax
u/s. 45 with
respect to the depreciable assets forming part of block of assets and there was
nothing in section 50 which could suggest that deeming fiction was to be
extended beyond what was stated in provisions of section 50 and it couldnot be
extended to deduction allowable to the assessee
u/s. 54F which was an independent section operating in
altogether different field.

 

Thus, the assessee was entitled for
deduction u/s. 54F on the capital gains arising on the sale of depreciable
assets being commercial property.

 

In view of the aforesaid, the appeal filed
by the revenue deserved to be dismissed.

Section 23 – Assessee is entitled to claim benefit u/s. 23(1)(c) if assessee intended to let out property and took efforts in letting out of property and the property remained vacant despite such efforts made by the assessee.

33. 
[2019] 101 taxmann.com 45 (Delhi-Trib.)
Priyankanki Singh Sood vs. ACIT ITA No.: 6698/Del./2015 A.Y.: 2012-13 Dated: 13th December, 2018

 

Section 23 – Assessee is entitled to claim
benefit u/s. 23(1)(c) if assessee intended to let out property and took efforts
in letting out of property and the property remained vacant despite such
efforts made by the assessee.

 

FACTS


In the course
of assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer (AO) observed that the assessee
owned a property at Madras and that the assesse had not offered any income
under the head `Income from House Property’ in respect of the said house
property at Madras. The AO considered the annual value of the property to be
the sum for which the property might reasonably be expected to be let out and
after allowing standard deduction of 30% as per provisions of section 24(a) of
the Act, he made an addition of Rs. 49,849 under the head income from house
property.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the CIT(A) who upheld the action of the AO.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the Tribunal,

 

HELD


The Tribunal
noted that the assessee purchased the said property in 1980 and the same was
continuously let out upto assessment year 2001-02 and thereafter from
assessment year 2002-03, suitable tenant could not be found and hence the
property remained vacant. The Tribunal observed that section 23(1)(c) was
attracted only upon fulfilment of the three conditions cumulatively. Upon cumulative
satisfaction of the three conditions the amount received or receivable shall be
deemed to be the annual value. The three conditions, according to the Tribunal,
are-

  the property or part thereof must be let; and

  it should have been vacant during the whole
or any part of the previous year; and

owing to such
vacancy the actual rent received or receivable by the owner in respect thereof
should be less than the sum referred to in the clause

 

Further, the Tribunal also observed that
clause (c) would not apply in situations where the property was not let out at
all during the previous years or even if let out was not vacant during whole or
any part of the previous year.

 

The Tribunal observed that the property at
Madras which was in dispute remained vacant after assessment year 2002-03 till
date. The Tribunal noted that since the property could not be let out due to
inherent defects and the property remained vacant, the assessee had rightly
applied section 23(1)(c) of the Act. The said property after being vacant also
was not under self-occupation of the assessee. Further, it was not the case of
the revenue that the property was not let out prior to assessment year 2002-03.
Under the circumstances, the Tribunal, following the decision of the co-ordinate
bench in Premsudha Exports (P.) Ltd. vs. ACIT [2008] 110 ITD 158 (Mum.)
held that the assessee was entitled to benefit u/s. 23(1)(c) of the Act. The
appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

CBDT Circulars – CBDT Circular No. 3 of 2018 dated 11th July, 2018 which specifies the revised monetary limits for filing appeal by the department before Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, High Courts and SLPs/appeals before the Supreme Court is applicable even in respect of the appeals filed prior to the date of circular

32. 
[2019] 101 taxmann.com 248 (Ahmedabad-Trib.)
DCIT vs. Shashiben Rajendra Makhijani ITA No.: 254 and 255/Ahd./2016 A.Y.: 2009-10 and 2010-11 Dated: 17th December, 2018

 

CBDT Circulars – CBDT Circular No. 3 of
2018 dated 11th July, 2018 which specifies the revised monetary
limits for filing appeal by the department before Income-tax Appellate
Tribunal, High Courts and SLPs/appeals before the Supreme Court is applicable
even in respect of the appeals filed prior to the date of circular

 

FACTS


During the course of appellate proceedings,
the assessee submitted that the appeals filed by the revenue were to be
dismissed on account of low tax effect in view of the CBDT Circular No. 3 of
2018 dated 11th July, 2018.

 

HELD


The Tribunal observed that, indeed, the tax
effect in the instant appeals was less than the limit of Rs. 20 lakh prescribed
by CBDT Circular No. 3 of 2018 dated 11th July, 2018. The Tribunal
observed the assessee’s case was not covered within the exemption clause,
clause (10) of the said CBDT Circular and since tax effect was less than Rs. 20
lakh, the appeals were held to be not maintainable.

Section 56(2)(vii)(b) – Agricultural land falls within the definition of immovable property and covered within the scope of section 56(2)(vii)(b) irrespective of whether the same falls within the definition of capital asset u/s. 2(14) of the Act or otherwise.

This is the first
and oldest monthly feature of the BCAJ. Even before the BCAJ started, when
there were no means to obtain ITAT judgments – BCAS sent important judgments as
‘bulletins’. In fact, BCAJ has its origins in Tribunal Judgments. The first
BCAJ of January, 1969 contained full text of three judgments.

We are told that the first convenor of
the journal committee, B C Parikh used to collect and select the decisions to
be published for first decade or so. Ashok Dhere, under his guidance compiled
it for nearly five years till he got transferred to a new column Excise Law
Corner. Jagdish D Shah started to contribute from 1983 and it read “condensed
by Jagdish D Shah” indicating that full text was compressed. Jagdish D Shah was
joined over the years by Shailesh Kamdar (for 11 years), Pranav Sayta (for 6
years) amongst others. Jagdish T Punjabi joined in 2008-09; Bhadresh Doshi in
2009-10 till 2018. Devendra Jain and Tejaswini Ghag started to contribute from
2018. Jagdish D Shah remains a contributor for more than thirty years now.

While Part A covered Reported Decisions,
Part B carried unreported decisions that came from various sources. Dhishat
Mehta and Geeta Jani joined in 2007-08 to pen Part C containing International
tax decisions.

The decisions earlier were sourced from
counsels and CAs that required follow up and regular contact. Special bench
decisions were published in full. The compiling of this feature starts with the
process of identifying tribunal decisions from a number of sources. Selection
of cases is done on a number of grounds: relevance to readers, case not
repeating a settled ratio, and the rationale adopted by the bench members.

What keeps the contributors going for so
many years: “Contributing monthly keeps our academic journey going. It keeps
our quest for knowledge alive”; “it is a joy to work as a team and contributing
to the profession” were some of the answers. No wonder that the features
section since inception of the BCAJ starts with the Tribunal News!

31.  [2019] 101 taxmann.com 391 (Jaipur-Trib.) ITO vs.
Trilok Chand Sain ITA No.:
499/Jp./2018
A.Y.:
2014-15
Dated: 7th January, 2019

 

Section 56(2)(vii)(b) – Agricultural land
falls within the definition of immovable property and covered within the scope
of section 56(2)(vii)(b) irrespective of whether the same falls within the
definition of capital asset u/s. 2(14) of the Act or otherwise.

 

FACTS


The assessee, an individual, purchased three
plots of land and claimed that the said plots of land did not fall within the
definition of capital asset as per section 2(14) of the Income-tax Act, 1961
(“the Act”). The Assessing Officer (AO) invoked provisions of section
56(2)(vii)(b) of the Act and made addition of Rs. 1,51,06,224 being the difference
between the sale consideration as per the sale deed and the value determined by
the stamp valuation authority.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the CIT(A). The CIT(A) held that land in question being agricultural land is
not a capital asset and the said transaction of purchase of land did not
attract the provisions of section 56(2)(vii)(b) of the Act. He further held
that the assessee was in the business of sale/purchase of property and the land
so purchased was his stock-in-trade and since the stock-in-trade is also
excluded from the definition of capital asset, provisions of section
56(2)(vii)(b) of the Act were not applicable. He deleted the addition of Rs.
1,51,06,224 made to the total income of the assessee.

 

Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal
to the Tribunal.

 

HELD


Section 56(2)(vii)(b) refers to any
immovable property and the same is not limited to any particular nature of
immovable property. The Tribunal also held that the section refers to
`immovable property’ which by its grammatical meaning would mean all and any
property which is immovable in nature i.e. attached to or forming part of earth
surface. The issue as to whether such agricultural land falls in the definition
of capital asset u/s. 2(14) or whether such agricultural land is part of
stock-in-trade could not be read into the definition of any immovable property
used in the context of section 56(2)(vii)(b) of the Act and is therefore not
relevant.

 

The appeal filed by the Revenue was
dismissed by the Tribunal.

 

Business expenditure – Deduction u/s. 35AD – Specified business – Hotel Business – Commencement of new business not disputed by Department and income offered to tax accepted – Certification of hotel as three-star category hotel in subsequent year – Time taken by competent authority for certification beyond control of assesse – Assessee not to be denied deduction u/s. 35AD on the ground that the certification was in the later year

43.  CIT vs.
Ceebros Hotels Pvt. Ltd.; 409 ITR 423 (Mad)
Date of order: 13th November, 2018 A Y. 2011-12 Section 35AD of ITA 1961

 

Business expenditure – Deduction u/s. 35AD – Specified
business – Hotel Business – Commencement of new business not disputed by
Department and income offered to tax accepted – Certification of hotel as
three-star category hotel in subsequent year – Time taken by competent authority
for certification beyond control of assesse – Assessee not to be denied
deduction u/s. 35AD on the ground that the certification was in the later year

 

The assessee was in the hotel business running a three-star hotel. The
assessee commenced the business in the A. Y. 2011-12 but the certification of
the three-star was received only in the subsequent year. For the A. Y. 2011-12,
the Assessing Officer denied the benefit of deduction u/s. 35AD(5)(aa) of the
Act on the ground that the assesse obtained classification as three-star
category hotel only during the subsequent year, i.e., A. Y. 2012-13.

 

The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim and held that once the
Department had accepted the income of the assessee offered to tax from the
hotel business, which was newly established and became fully operational in the
year 2010, the assessee was eligible for the investment allowance, that once
the application for star category classification was not rejected and after
inspection no discrepancy was found and the assessee was recommended for
classification under the three-star category the assessee could not be
penalised for the delay on the part of the Hotel and Restaurant Approval and
Classification Committee to inspect the Hotel before the end of the financial
year.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Madras High Court upheld the decision of
the Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i)   The reasons assigned by the
Tribunal for grant of deduction to the assessee u/s. 35AD(5)(aa) were just and
proper and the findings rendered by it were right.

 

ii)   The application filed by the
assesse for classification was made on 19/04/2010 and thereafter certain
procedures were to be followed and an inspection was required to be conducted
for such purpose. The manner in which the inspection was conducted and the time
frame taken by the competent authority were beyond the control of the assessee.
The Department had not disputed the operation of the new hotel from the F. Y.
2010-11 as it had accepted the income, which was offered to tax from the newly
established hotel which became fully operational in the year 2010.

iii)  Nowhere in the clause (aa) of
sub-section (5) of section 35AD was it mandated that the date of the
certificate was to be with effect from a particular date. Therefore, the
provision which was to encourage the establishment of hotels of a particular
category, should be read as a beneficial provision and therefore, the
interpretation given by the Tribunal were valid and justified. Therefore, the
Tribunal was right in concluding that the assesse is entitled to claim
deduction u/s. 35AD(5)(aa) for the A. Y. 2011-12.”

 

INDIAN BANKING: HOW BAD ASSETS WERE CREATED AND WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS

The CEOs of
India’s debt-laden state-owned banks probably celebrated Christmas ahead of its
arrival in December – after an extremely stressful year, relentlessly chasing
rogue corporate borrowers for recovery of the monies lent. Finance Minister
Arun Jaitley played Santa Claus for them by seeking Parliament’s approval for Rs.
410 billion capital infusion in these banks.

 

The government
had budgeted for Rs. 650 billion fund infusion during the current year, of
which Rs. 420 billion is still to be allotted. This means, Rs. 830 billion will
flow into the public sector banks (PSBs), taking the total sum to Rs. 1.06
trillion by March, 2019.

 

In October,
2017, the government had announced a staggering Rs. 2.11 trillion capital
infusion in phases into PSBs that have little less than 70% share of the assets
of the Indian banking industry. The new package, for which Parliament’s nod has
been sought, is part of that.

 

Incidentally,
between 1985-86 and 2016-17, in little over a decade, the government had
injected Rs. 1.5 trillion into these banks; the bulk of this flowed in since
the global financial crisis of 2008, triggered by the collapse of the iconic US
investment bank Lehman Brothers Holding Inc.

 

To ward off the
impact of the crisis, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) flooded the banking
system with money and brought down the policy rate to a historic low, less than
the savings bank rate which was regulated then. With too much money, coupled
with pressure from various quarters to lift consumption, banks lent recklessly
and that led to the creation of bad assets.

 

IS THE SCENE GETTING BETTER?

 

In September,
2018, after the annual ritual of a review meeting with the chiefs of PSBs,
Jaitley said that non-performing assets (NPAs) with these banks were on the
decline and Rs.1.8 trillion worth of recovery of bad loans could happen during
fiscal year 2019.

 

According to
him, in the first quarter of the year (April-June, 2018), the lenders recovered
Rs. 365.5 billion. This is 49% higher than the corresponding quarter of the previous
year. During the entire 2018 fiscal year, banks recovered Rs. 745.6 billion.
“It’s still early days of the IBC (Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code), but already
the impact is clearly visible,” Jaitley said.

 

He also said
that the NPAs with the PSBs were declining.
“The last quarter saw PSU banks with a net profit. On the basis of the
last quarter and what their expectations are looking ahead, the good news is
that NPAs are on the decline because recoveries have picked up.”

 

Indeed, the
recovery of bad loans at PSBs gained momentum in the June, 2018 quarter; their
operating profits rose and the overall asset quality improved. Besides, the
provision coverage ratio of these banks has gone up to 63.8%, he pointed out.

 

The listed
banks’ kitty of gross NPAs dropped marginally—a little more than 2% from
Rs.10.25 trillion in March to Rs. 10.03 trillion in June. For PSBs, the drop is
2.5%, from Rs. 8.97 trillion to Rs. 8.74 trillion. In September, it dropped
further – Rs. 8.69 trillion.

 

Clearly, the
pace of fresh slippage has slowed. Aided by provision and aggressive
write-offs, the net NPAs of all listed banks have dropped a little over 6%,
from Rs. 5.18 trillion to Rs. 4.85 trillion in June and Rs. 4.83 trillion in
September.

 

Incidentally,
the PSBs’ share in bad loans is far higher than their share in banking assets.

 

All these data
say that things are getting better, but a closer look at some of the banks’ bad
loan pile-ups clearly signal that the party time has not arrived as yet.

 

Let us take a
look at some individual banks. Twelve of the 21 PSBs were in losses in
September, 2018. Among them, IDBI Bank posted loss in 10 of the past 12
quarters, since December, 2015 (when the NPAs of the banking system started
rising following the RBI intervention), to the tune of Rs. 236 billion. The
trio of Indian Overseas Bank, Central Bank of India and Uco Bank have made losses in all 12
quarters (collectively, Rs. 375 billion). Dena Bank and Bank of Maharashtra
seem better off – they have recorded losses in 11 quarters (Rs. 94 billion).

 

Overall, during
this period, the PSBs recorded Rs. 1.84 trillion losses, around 1.2% of India’s
GDP. This also exceeds the total capital infusion in 31 years between 1986 and
2017, one-third of which — Rs. 500 billion — flowed in 2016 and 2017. By the
December quarter, the losses will probably exceed the big bang recap of Rs. 2.1
trillion.

 

Four PSBs’
advance portfolios declined in the September quarter compared with June and, if
we compare them with a year-ago period, as many as 11 of them have shrunk their
loan books. For two of them, the drop is as much as 10% or more. Similarly for
PSBs, the deposit kitties shrank in the September quarter compared with June;
if we compare them with the year-ago period, then seven banks have shrunk their
deposit portfolios. The RBI restrictions do not impact deposit mobilisation.

 

Finally, six
banks’ gross NPAs surged in September from the June level. Ditto about five
banks’ net NPAs. In September, at least one bank (IDBI Bank) had more than 30%
gross NPAs and another five (Uco
Bank, Indian Overseas Bank, Dena Bank, United Bank, Central Bank) more than 20%
but less than 25%, even as six banks had more than 15% gross NPAs. When it
comes to net NPAs, nine of them had more than 10% and up to 17.3%; for a few of
them the asset quality deteriorated further in September.

 

THE NPA SAGA

 

The NPA saga
started in 2014 but gained momentum in 2016 after the Reserve Bank of India
(RBI), under former Governor Raghuram Rajan, instituted an asset quality review
(AQR) whereby the inspectors of the Central bank audited the banks’ loan books
and identified bad assets. The exercise was completed in October, 2015 and the
banks were directed to come clean in six quarters between December, 2015 and
March, 2017.

 

In a detailed presentation
to a Parliamentary Committee, Rajan has explained what went wrong in the Indian
banking system.

 

According to
him, a larger number of bad loans originated in 2006-2008 when the Indian
economy grew at over 9% for three years in a row. “This is the historic
phenomenon of irrational exuberance, common across countries at such a phase in
the cycle.”

 

In the
aftermath of the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the world witnessed an
unprecedented liquidity crisis and India too could not escape the fallout. The
strong demand projections for various projects started looking increasingly
unrealistic as domestic demand slowed down.

 

Around the same
time, a variety of governance problems, such as the suspect allocation of coal
mines coupled with the fear of investigation, slowed down the government
decision-making. As a result of this, cost overruns escalated for stalled
projects and they became increasingly unable to service debt.

 

And, once the
projects got delayed to the extent that the promoters had little equity left in
the project, they lost interest. “Ideally, projects should be restructured at
such times, with banks writing down bad debt that is uncollectable, and
promoters bringing in more equity, under the threat that they would otherwise
lose their project. Unfortunately, until the Bankruptcy Code was enacted,
bankers had little ability to threaten promoters, even incompetent or
unscrupulous ones,” Rajan has said.

 

He has also
mentioned that unscrupulous promoters who had inflated the cost of capital equipment
through over-invoicing were rarely checked and the PSBs continued financing
promoters even as the private sector banks were getting out. Finally, too many
loans were made to well-connected promoters who had a history of defaulting on
their loans.

 

What Rajan has
not mentioned is that most Indian banks do not have the expertise for project
financing. Till the late 1990s when RBI pulled down the walls between
commercial banks and development financial institutions (DFIs) and the DFIs
were allowed to die while the commercial banks turned themselves into universal
banks, these banks were primarily into financing the working capital needs of
corporations. They got into term lending after the demise of DFIs but never
acquired the expertise to do so.

 

Do all these
banks know how to lend? Had they known, they would not be in such a mess.
Typically, the PSB bosses blame the state of the economy for the rise in bad
loans but this is not convincing as the private banks too
operate in the same milieu and many of them have far better asset quality.

 

 

BANK RECAPITALISATION

 

Officially, the
government does not want to treat this as a dole. Both the government and the
RBI seem to be keen that banking reforms and recapitalisation must go
hand-in-hand. In other words, the taxpayers’ money will not be continuously
pumped in just to keep PSBs alive.

 

To put the
story of bank recapitalisation in context, capital is core to banks for
expanding credit, earning interest and growing their balance sheets so that
they can drive economic activities. The government is the majority owner of
PSBs in India. The statutory requirement in the Banking Companies (Acquisition
and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970/1980, and the State Bank of India Act,
1955, ensure that the Indian government shall, at all times, hold not less than
51% of the paid-up capital in such banks.

 

In 2010, the
Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs (CCEA), after taking into account the
trends of the economy, had decided to raise government holding in all PSBs to
58%. The objective was to create a headroom and enable PSBs to raise capital
from the market when they need it, without compromising their public sector
character.

 

Subsequently,
in December, 2014, the CCEA decided to allow PSBs to raise capital from the public
markets through instruments such as follow-on public offer or qualified
institutional placement by diluting the government holding up to 52%, in a
phased manner.

 

The regulatory
requirements of capital adequacy and credit growth are the two main drivers for
bank capitalisation. The regulatory architecture is globally framed by the
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision — a committee of bank supervisors
consisting of members from representative countries. Its mandate is to
strengthen the regulation, supervision and practices of banks and enhance
financial stability.

 

So far, three
sets of Basel norms have been issued. The Basel I norms were issued in 1988 to
provide, for the first time, a global standard on the regulatory capital
requirements for banks. The Basel II norms, introduced in 2004, further
strengthened the guidelines for risk management and disclosure requirements.

 

This called for
a minimum capital adequacy ratio (CAR) — or, capital to risk-weighted assets
ratio (CRAR) as it is the ratio of regulatory capital funds to risk-weighted
assets — which all banks with an international presence are to maintain. These
norms were revisited again in 2010 — known as Basel III norms — in the wake of
the sub-prime crisis and large-scale bank failures in the US and Europe. Basel
III emphasised on capital adequacy to protect shareholders’ and customers’
risks and set norms for Tier I and Tier II capital.

 

The capital can
come either from their dominant shareholder (the government of India) or the
capital market. The PSBs’ underperformance and the pile of bad loans leading to
low book value come in the way of accessing the capital market. There is a
significant gap between the book value and market value of PSB shares, with
most PSBs having a lower market value, compared with their book values. Hence,
the government as the majority stakeholder needs to step in to rescue PSBs.

 

THE FUTURE TRAJECTORY

 

How long will
it take for the Indian banks to bring down their NPAs? The December, 2017
Financial Stability Report of the RBI, a bi-annual reality check of the Indian
financial system, had suggested that the gross NPAs in the Indian banking
system may rise from 10.2% in September, 2017 to 10.8% in March, 2018, and an
even higher 11.1% by September, 2018. The actual bad loan figure of March, 2018
was higher than the estimate.

 

And the June,
2018 Financial Stability Report said the gross NPAs may rise from 11.6 % in
March, 2018 to 12.2% by March, 2019. Besides, the system-level
capital-to-risk-weighted assets ratio (CRAR) may come down from 13.5% to 12.8%
during the period; 11 public sector banks under prompt corrective action
framework may experience a worsening of their gross NPA ratio from 21% in March
2018 to 22.3% with six PSBs likely experiencing capital shortfall relative to
the required minimum CRAR of 9%.

 

The AQR is just
the beginning of the RBI actions to unearth the mound of NPAs. At the next
stage, the Central bank took a series of steps to force the banks to chase the
defaulters for recovery as well as punish the banks for not doing enough to
clean up their balance sheets.

 

MORE DISCLOSURES

 

In April, 2017, an RBI notification
said, “There have been instances of material divergences in banks’ asset
classification and provisioning from the RBI norms, thereby leading to the
published financial statements not depicting a true and fair view of the
financial position of the bank.” The regulator advised the banks to make
adequate disclosures of such divergences in the notes to accounts in their
annual financial statements.

 

RBI inspectors
found these when they took a close look at the loan books of all banks while
carrying out the asset quality review in 2015.

 

Under the
regulatory norms, when a borrower is not able to service a loan for three
months, it becomes an NPA and the lender needs to set aside money or provide
for it. However, there could be divergence as under certain circumstances, one
can take a “view” on whether a particular loan is good or bad. For instance,
when the principal or interest payment for a particular loan is overdue between
61 and 90 days (and not exceeding 90 days), this becomes a special mention
account-2 ( SMA-2). If a loan exposure continues to be in this category for
months, a prudent banker would prefer to classify it as an NPA even though
technically it can continue to be treated as a standard asset.

 

Then, there are complexities for some of the
restructured infrastructure loans. There have been cases where banks have given
the borrowers more time, depending on the date of commencement of commercial
operations. Many such loans have been restructured twice and continue to be
tagged as standard assets in banks’ books. Often, the date of commencement of
commercial operations is subject to interpretation and the RBI may not be
comfortable with such cases.

 

While
conducting the AQR, RBI inspectors had found many instances of the same loan
exposure being classified as bad by one bank but good by another.

 

The annual
reports of quite a few banks in the past two years showed “divergence” or a
difference – which in some cases was quite huge – between the lender’s
assessment of bad loans and that of the RBI. As a result of this divergence,
the difference in provisioning is also stark and banks have shown lesser NPAs
than what the RBI assessment had suggested. In other words, had there been no
divergence, these banks would have shown lesser profit and higher NPAs.

 

Subsequently,
in May, 2017, the RBI was empowered through an Ordinance to issue directions to
banks to initiate insolvency proceedings against borrowers for resolution of
stressed assets. The Banking Regulation (Amendment) Ordinance, 2017 was
promulgated on 4th May, 2017. This Ordinance empowered the RBI to
direct banking companies to initiate insolvency proceedings in respect of a
default under the provisions of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC).
It also enabled the RBI to constitute committee/s to advise banking companies
on resolution of stressed assets.

 

Armed with the
Ordinance, the Central bank in June, 2017 asked banks to initiate insolvency
proceedings against 12 large bank defaulters with a total debt of over Rs. 2
trillion, around 25% of the banking system’s bad assets at that time.

 

It followed
this up in August, 2017 by sending a second list of 28 defaulters to the
lenders to initiate debt resolution before December 13, failing which these
cases would have to be sent to the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) before
December, 2017. Between them, these 40 loan accounts have roughly 40% share of
the Rs. 10 trillion bad assets in the Indian banking system.

 

THE FEBRUARY 2018 CIRCULAR

 

Finally, in February,
2018, the RBI tightened its rules on bank loan defaults, sought to push more
large defaulters towards bankruptcy courts and abolished all existing
loan-restructuring platforms. The objective was to speed up the process of
resolution of the bad loans.

 

The recovery
drive for the banking industry started with the Debts Recovery Tribunals
(DRTs), set up under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial
Institutions (RDDBFI) Act, 1993. Almost a decade later, the Securitisation and
Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interests
(SARFAESI) Act, 2002 came into force to help banks and financial institutions
enforce their security interests and recover dues. Still, the recovery did not
get momentum. For instance, in 2013-14 recovery under DRTs was Rs. 305.9
billion while the outstanding value of debt sought to be recovered was close to
Rs. 2.37 trillion.

 

The platforms
such as corporate debt restructuring (CDR), strategic debt restructuring (SDR)
and the scheme for sustainable structuring of stressed assets (S4A) which were
used to clean up the bank balance sheets were all abolished late night on 12th
February, 2018.

 

SDR, introduced
in June, 2015, gave banks the power to convert a part of their debt in stressed
companies into majority equity, but it didn’t work because promoters delayed
the restructuring, dangling the promise of bringing in new investors. Before
that, in February, 2014, RBI had allowed a change in management of stressed
companies. The principle of the restructuring exercise was that the
shareholders must bear the first loss and not the lenders; and the promoters
must have more skin in the game.

 

This was done
after the regulator realised that the CDR mechanism, put in place in August,
2001, could not do much to alleviate the pain of the lenders. Any loan exposure
of Rs. 10 crore and more (including non-fund limits) and involving at least two
lenders could have been tackled on this platform.

 

The S4A scheme
allowed the banks to convert up to half the loans of stressed companies into
equity or equity-like securities. Meant for restructuring companies with an
overall exposure of at least Rs. 500 crore, this scheme could come into play
only when the bankers were convinced that the cash flows of the stressed
companies were enough to service at least half of the funded liabilities or
“sustainable debt”. Not much, however, could get resolved under this scheme
either.

 

After ushering
in a new bankruptcy regime in 2016, the RBI got more powers in 2017 to force
the lenders to deal with 40 biggest corporate loan defaulters. The February,
2018 norms took the story forward.

The rules,
released on 12th February, stipulate that starting 1st
March, lenders must implement a resolution plan within 180 days for defaulted
loan accounts above Rs. 2,000 crore. Failing to do so, the account must be
referred to insolvency courts. They also mandate banks to report defaults
weekly to RBI, even if loan payments are delayed by a day. These norms replaced
earlier schemes such as strategic debt restructuring, 5/25 refinancing, the
Corporate Debt Restructuring Scheme, and the Scheme for Sustainable Structuring
of Stressed Assets, among others, with immediate effect. “All accounts,
including such accounts where any of the schemes have been invoked but not yet
implemented, shall be governed by the revised framework,” the RBI said.

 

It warned that
any failure on the part of banks to meet the prescribed timelines, or any
actions they take to conceal the actual status of accounts or evergreen
stressed accounts, will expose banks to stringent actions, including monetary
penalties.

 

The rules
around resolution plans were also tightened and restructuring of large accounts
with loans of Rs.100 crore or more would need independent credit evaluation by
credit rating agencies authorised by the Central bank. Loans of Rs. 500 crore
or more would need two such independent evaluators.

 

NO LONGER IN A DENIAL MODE

 

As a result of
the series of steps taken by the regulator, Indian banks are no longer in
denial mode. Indeed, in the past, they were slow in recognising bad assets as
such recognition hits their profitability since they need to provide for or set
aside money for NPAs. Which is why, traditionally, bankers try hard not to
allow any loan to slip into NPAs through various ways. But the relentless
pressure of the banking regulator has changed the scene. The bankers are not
taking any chances for any loan account any more. Once it’s gone bad, they are
swift in classifying it as an NPA and providing for it.

 

Once shy in
recognition and resolution of NPAs for fear of being hit on profitability and a
backlash from investors, bankers are now bold and walking the extra mile to
settle with loan defaulters. They don’t care much about the depth of the
haircut and impact on their balance sheets.

 

However, this
detoxification exercise has its own challenges through early recognition of
stressed assets and increased provisioning. To add to the banker’s woes,
frequent involvement by investigative agencies, arrests of a few bankers and
stripping the powers of a few others have created a fear psychosis. Bankers are
tending to opt for a relatively safer and optically transparent path, even at
the cost of recovery maximisation.

Today, the
impact of major economic reforms such as Demonetisation, GST, RERA has
stabilised and recognition of the bad loans has largely been done. We are
probably at the final stage of detoxification.

 

Though this
period has been mired by quite a few litigations, which were expected, IBC
being a new legislation, the message has been conveyed aptly to the corporate
world. The IBC has not only provided a legal framework to systematically
address the NPAs of the banking system with a strong armoury to lenders, but
also put borrowers who were looking for an easy escape route from the situation
on the back foot.

 

Japan, which
introduced the bankruptcy law in 2004, takes six months to settle a case and
the recovery rate is close to 93%. For UK, which introduced it in 2002, the
recovery rate is 88.6% and settlement within a year, while US, where insolvency
law is 40 years old, it takes 18 months to settle a case at a recovery rate of
80.4%. It’s still early days in India but the IBC has made a new beginning for
the banking system. With the recovery picking up, albeit slowly, the banks are
being encouraged to lend and support economic growth. The first signs of this
are already visible – the credit growth in India is at a four-year high.

 

 

Section 50C – Proviso to section 50C inserted by Finance Act, 2016 w.e.f. 1.4.2017 being curative in nature is retrospective.

19.  [2018] 100 taxmann.com 334 (Delhi-Trib.) Amit Bansal vs.
ACIT ITA No.:
3974/Delhi/2018
A.Y: 2012-13 Dated: 22nd November, 2018

 

Section
50C – Proviso to section 50C inserted by Finance Act, 2016 w.e.f. 1.4.2017
being curative in nature is retrospective.

 

FACTS


For
the assessment year under consideration, the assessee, an individual filed his
return of income declaring total income of Rs.10,20,270/-. During the year
under consideration, the assessee has shown net profit from sale/purchase of
properties under the head ‘Income from other sources’ at Rs.1,33,200/-. 

 

In
the course of assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer (AO) asked the
assessee to provide the details of sale and purchase of property as well as to
justify why the income from sale of property is not to be assessed as ‘Capital
gain’ as against the ‘Income from other sources’ treated by the assessee. He
also asked the assessee to justify the impact of section 50C on the said
transaction.

 

The assessee submitted that he has sold the property held
by him jointly with Vikas Bansal on 22nd July, 2011 with net
consideration of Rs. 42 lakh which was purchased by him on 28th
July, 2010 for the sale value of Rs.39,33,600/- and has declared one half share
of profit on sale/purchase of property at Rs1,33,200/-. The assessee further
submitted that he has entered into an agreement to sell the property on 25th
March, 2011 with buyer Phool Pati and taken a part payment of Rs.10 lakh and no
possession was taken on that date. Thereafter, the assessee entered into an
agreement dated 22nd July, 2011 with buyer Phool Pati for final sale
and gave possession of the property in continuation of earlier agreement dated
25th March, 2011 in which the terms of payment were also specified.

 

It
was submitted that there is no registered conveyance deed and the transaction
was entered into just to earn profit from this venture of sale/purchase.
Alternatively, it was argued that the same may be treated as business income as
against ‘Income from other sources’ and not the ‘Capital gains’ in the hands of
the assessee. So far as the application of provisions of section 50C is
concerned, it was submitted that since the transaction is not in the nature of
capital gains, the provisions of section 50C are not applicable.

 

The
AO held that since the agreement of purchase as well as sale of plot involved
the possession of sale of property to be taken or retained in part performance
of a contract of the nature referred to in section 53A of Transfer of Property
Act, 1982, the property was a capital asset as prescribed in section 2(47)(v).
Therefore, it had to be treated as a capital asset and the asset was a
short-term capital asset in the hands of the assessee. The Assessing Officer
further noted that the circle rate of the property as on 22-7-2011 was Rs.
16,000/- per sq. yard as against the circle rate of Rs. 11,000/- as on
25-3-2011. Applying the provisions of section 50C, he determined the full value
of consideration at Rs. 57,21,600/- as against the actual sale consideration of
Rs. 42 lakh. Accordingly, the Assessing Officer determined the short-term
capital gain and made addition.

 

Aggrieved,
the assessee preferred an appeal to the Commissioner (Appeals) who confirmed
the action of the AO including the action of taking the circle rate of Rs.
16,000/- per sq. yard as on 22-7-2011.

 

Aggrieved
the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where, on behalf of the
assessee, relying on the ratio of the following decisions

(i)  Rahul G. Patel vs. Dy. CIT [(2018) 173 ITD 1
(Ahd. – Trib.)];

(ii) Smt. Chalasani Naga Ratna Kumaris vs. ITO
[(2017) 79 taxmann.com 104 (Vishakhapatnam – Trib.)];

(iii)       Hansaben Bhaulabhai Prajapati vs. ITO,
ITA No.2412/Ahd/2016 (ITAT, Ahmedabad).

 

it
was submitted that in view of the proviso to section 50C(1), where the date of
the agreement fixing the amount of consideration and the date of registration
for the transfer of the capital asset are not the same, the value adopted or
assessed or assessable by the stamp valuation authority on the date of
agreement may be taken and, thus, it had correctly adopted the rates applicable
on the date of the agreement as against the date of actual sale.

 

HELD


The
Tribunal noted that the proviso to section 50C was inserted by the Finance Act,
2016 with effect from 1-4-2017. It observed that the question that has to be
decided is as to whether the above amendment is prospective in nature i.e.,
will be applicable from assessment year 2017-18 or is retrospective in nature being
curative in nature.

 

The
Tribunal noted that identical issue had come up before the Ahmedabad Bench of
the Tribunal in the case of Dharamshibhai Sonani [2016] 75 taxmann.com
141/161 ITD 627 (Ahd. – Trib.)
where it has been held that amendment to
section 50C introduced by the Finance Act, 2016 for determining full value of
consideration in the case of involved property is curative in nature and will
apply retrospectively. It then proceeded to observe that various other
decisions relied on by the Ld. counsel for the assessee also support the case
of the assessee that where the date of the agreement fixing the amount of
consideration and the date of registration regarding the transfer of the
capital asset in question are not the same, the value adopted or assessed or
assessable by the stamp valuation authority on the date of the agreement is to
be taken for the purpose of full value of consideration.

The
Tribunal accepted the argument made on behalf of the assessee in principle and
restored the issue to the file of the AO with a direction to verify necessary
facts and decide the issue in the light of the above observations directing to
adopt the circle rate on the date of agreement to sell in order to compute the
consequential capital gain.

 

The
appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

 

Article 13 of DTAAs; Section 9(1)(vii) – Payment made to non-resident LLPs towards professional services qualified as IPS.

21. TS-10-ITAT-2019 (Del) ACIT vs. Grant Thornton Date of Order: 10th January, 2019 A.Y.: 2010-11

 

Article 13 of DTAAs; Section 9(1)(vii) –
Payment made to non-resident LLPs towards professional services qualified as
IPS.

 

FACTS


Taxpayer, an Indian company was engaged in
providing international accountancy and advisory services to various clients in
India and abroad. During the year under consideration, Taxpayer availed
services2 of various foreign limited liability partnerships (NR
LLPs) to render services to its clients abroad and paid fees to such NR LLPs
without withholding tax. The taxpayer contended that services obtained from NR
LLPs were in the nature of ‘Independent Personal Services’ (“IPS”) rendered
outside India and in absence of a fixed base of the NR LLPs in India, tax was
not required to be withheld on such payments under the relevant DTAA.

 

The AO, however contended that services
rendered by NR LLPs were technical services which accrued or arose in India
u/s. 9(1)(vii). Further, the IPS article under the treaty applied only to an
individual (both in his own capacity or as a member of a partnership) and not
to an LLP. Thus, in absence of any withholding, AO disallowed the payments made
to NR LLPs.

 

Aggrieved, Taxpayer appealed before the
CIT(A) who reversed AO’s order on the ground that income derived by an
individual or a partnership firm by rendering professional services is exempt
from tax in India by virtue of IPS article. Further, as the services rendered
by the NR LLPs did not make available any technical knowledge or skill, it did
not qualify as FIS under the relevant DTAA.

_______________________________

2.  Professional services pertaining to the
field of lawyering (giving reviews and opinions) and accounting e.g. SAS70
engagement, review and filing of form number1120, due diligence, review of US
GAAP financials etc

 

 

Consequently, AO appealed before the
Tribunal.

 

HELD

  •    There is no dispute that the
    services rendered by NR LLPs were professional services. The IPS article in
    some of the DTAAs applied in respect of payments made to “residents”, while in
    some other DTAAs, it applied to individual (both in his own capacity or as a member
    of a partnership). Thus, there was no infirmity in the order of CIT(A) who had
    upheld the applicability of IPS article on payments made to NR LLPs.
  •    Further, in absence of
    satisfaction of make available condition, the payment made to NR LLPs did not
    qualify as FTS under respective DTAAs.
  •    Thus, in absence of
    chargeable income, there was no obligation on Taxpayer to withhold taxes on
    payments made to NR LLPs.

Article 12(1) of India-Israel DTAA and India -Russia DTAA – since charge of tax on royalty arises only at the time of payment, tax is not required to be withheld when provisions for payment of royalty is made.

20. TS-676-ITAT-2018(Ahd) Sophos Technologies Pvt. Ltd. vs. DCIT Date of Order: 16th November,
2018
A.Y: 2012-13

 

Article 12(1) of India-Israel DTAA and
India -Russia DTAA – since charge of tax on royalty arises only at the time of
payment, tax is not required to be withheld when provisions for payment of
royalty is made.

 

FACTS


Taxpayer was a private Indian Company
engaged in the business of development of network security software product. As
part of its business, Taxpayer procured anti-virus software and anti-spam
software from suppliers in Russia and Israel respectively and bundled them with
its own software product. This bundled software was sold by the Taxpayer to the
end customers.

 

In terms of the
understanding with the suppliers, Taxpayer was liable to pay royalty in respect
of such anti-virus and anti-spam software only on activation of the license key
by the end customer (i.e. the ultimate user of the bundled software).
Withholding obligation on such royalty payment was also discharged at the time
of actual payment to the suppliers. 
Taxpayer recognised the income at the time of sale of the bundled
software and correspondingly made a provision for payment of the royalty in its
books of accounts. Withholding obligation on such royalty payment was
discharged at the time of actual payment to the suppliers and not at the time
of making provision in the books.

 

Taxpayer contended that the liability to
withhold taxes arises only on the activation of the key by the actual customer.

 

The AO, however, was of the view that
Taxpayer was required to withhold taxes at the time of making the provision for
royalty and as Taxpayer had failed to withhold taxes at that time, AO
disallowed the expenses claimed towards such provision.  Aggrieved, the Taxpayer appealed before the
CIT (A) who upheld AO’s order.

 

Aggrieved, the Taxpayer appealed before the
Tribunal.

 

HELD

  •    Article 12(1) of
    India-Russia DTAA and India-Israel DTAA are identically worded and provide that
    “royalty arising in a Contracting State and paid to a resident of the other
    Contracting State may be taxed in that other State”. Thus, in terms of the
    DTAA, royalty is taxable only at the point of time when the royalty is paid to
    the resident of the other Contracting State.
  •    The liability to deduct tax at source arises
    only when the income embedded in the relevant payment is eligible to tax.
  •    In the present case, royalty
    in respect of the bundled product became payable when the product was activated
    and not at the point of sale of bundled software. Thus, the taxes were also
    required to be withheld only upon activation of license keys.

Article 5(2)(h) of India-UAE DTAA – Grouting activity undertaken in India by UAE Company for a period of 9 months does not result in construction PE under India-UAE DTAA

19. 
TS-741-ITAT-2018 (Del)
ULO Systems LLC vs. ADIT Date of Order: 29th December,
2018
A.Y.: 2007-08

 

Article 5(2)(h) of India-UAE DTAA –
Grouting activity undertaken in India by UAE Company for a period of 9 months
does not result in construction PE under India-UAE DTAA

 

FACTS


Taxpayer, a UAE company, was engaged in
providing grouting and precast solutions to support and protect subsea
pipelines, cables and structures. As part of grouting activity, a neat mixture
of cement and water (grout) is mixed and pumped into water in certain shapes
and forms, which acts as a support and stabilises the subsea pipelines and
cables. It also helps in preventing the corrosion of the pipelines.

 

During the year
under consideration, Taxpayer undertook several projects in India for which it
was present in India for an aggregate period of 264 days. Further, presence for
any single project did not exceed the threshold specified in India-UAE DTAA.
Also, the projects were unconnected and were performed for unrelated
third-party customers in India.

 

Taxpayer believed that the grouting activity
carried out in India was in the nature of construction activity as contemplated
in Article 5(2)(h) of India-UAE DTAA, and as the presence in India did not
exceed 9 months, it did not create its Permanent Establishment (“PE”) in India.
Further, since the contracts were not inter-connected, time spent on such
projects could not be aggregated for calculating the 9-month threshold.

 

The AO, however, held that that the grouting
activity would create a fixed place PE under Article 5(1) of the DTAA. AO also
alleged that Taxpayer circumvented the 9-month threshold by manipulating the
number of days of presence in India.

 

Aggrieved, the Taxpayer approached the
Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP) which confirmed AO’s order.

 

Aggrieved, the Taxpayer appealed before the
Tribunal.

 

HELD


  •      It is a settled legal
    principle that a specific provision would override a general provision. Thus,
    Article 5(1) could not be applied where activities are covered under the
    specific construction PE article [Article 5(2)(h)] of the DTAA.
  •    Article 5(2)(h) does not
    differentiate between a simple/complex construction work. Thus, the fact that
    grouting activity is not a simple masonry work and involves complex aspects is
    not relevant for determining whether it is covered by construction PE article.
  •    Evaluation of whether there
    exists a PE needs to be made on a year to year basis.
  •    While construction PE clause
    of some treaties (like India-Australia and India-Thailand) are worded in a
    manner to specifically aggregate the time spent on multiple projects, Article
    5(2)(h) of India-UAE DTAA is worded differently and uses singular expressions ‘a
    building, site or construction or assembly project
    ’. Thus, time spent on
    multiple projects in India cannot be aggregated for calculating the threshold
    period under India-UAE DTAA.
  •    Since the Taxpayer’s
    presence in India in the relevant year for carrying on each of the grouting
    project was less than 9 months, there was no construction PE of the Taxpayer
    was constituted in India.

Article 2 & Article 12 of India-Japan DTAA; rate prescribed in DTAA is total withholding rate inclusive of surcharge and cess.

18. 
TS-721-ITAT-2018 (Ahd)
ACIT vs. Panasonic Energy India Co. Ltd. Date of Order: 3rd December, 2018 A.Y.: 2008-09

 

Article 2 & Article 12 of India-Japan
DTAA; rate prescribed in DTAA is total withholding rate inclusive of surcharge
and cess.

 

FACTS


Taxpayer, a private limited company was
engaged in the business of manufacturing, trading, and export of dry Batteries
along with spare parts of dry batteries. During the year under consideration,
the Taxpayer paid brand usage fee and royalty fee to a Japanese company (FCo)
after withholding tax on such sum at the rate of 20%1 on the gross
amount.

 

The Assessing Officer (AO), however, was of
the view that the taxes were required to be withheld at the rate of 22.66%
after considering surcharge and education Cess of 2.66% and thus disallowed the
proportionate expenditure on account of short deduction of taxes on such
payments to FCo.

______________________________________

1.  India-Japan DTAA provided ceiling of 10%.
However, it is not clear from the decision as to why the Taxpayer withheld tax
@20%.

 

 

Taxpayer argued that the scope of Article 2
of the DTAA covered both surcharges and education cess. Even otherwise, as per
the provision of Article 12 of the DTAA, the payment was liable to tax at the
rate not exceeding 10% whereas Taxpayer had withheld tax @20% which was
adequate to cover the amount of surcharge and education cess. However, AO disregarded
the Taxpayer’s contentions and disallowed the proportionate expenses on account
of short withholding of tax. 

 

Aggrieved, the Taxpayer filed an appeal
before the CIT(A) who reversed AO’s order on the ground that disallowance can
be made only if there was either no deduction or after deduction of tax, the
same was not paid on or before due date of filing of return. However, since
Taxpayer had withheld taxes appropriately at the rates prescribed in DTAA and
also paid the same before the due date of filing of return, no disallowance
could be made.

 

Aggrieved, the AO appealed before the
Tribunal.

 

HELD


  •  Article 2 of
    India-Japan DTAA provides that the term “taxes” referred to in the DTAA for
    Indian purposes means the income tax including surcharge thereon. A plain
    reading of the provisions of DTAA reveals that the amount of tax includes
    surcharge.
  •  Further as
    per Article 12, the tax that can be charged on royalty is restricted to 10% of
    the gross amount of royalty. Having regard to the definition of “taxes” in
    Article 2, the total tax including surcharge is restricted only to 10% under
    Article 12. Therefore, Taxpayer was not liable to withhold tax on the payment
    made to FCo after including the surcharge over and above the tax rate as
    specified under Article 12 of India-Japan DTAA.
  •  Further, as
    held in the case of DIC Asia Pacific Pte. Ltd. (18 ITR 358), since
    education cess is charged on the income tax, it partakes the character of the
    surcharge. Therefore, Taxpayer was not liable to include education cess over
    and above the taxes withheld by the Taxpayer.

Sections 28(iv), 68 – The fact that premium is abnormally high as per test of human probabilities is not sufficient. The AO has to lift the corporate veil and determine whether any benefit is passed on to the shareholders/directors.

9. 
Bharathi Cement Corporation Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT (Hyderabad)
Members: P. Madhavidevi, JM and S. Rifaur
Rahman, AM ITA Nos.: 696 & 697/Hyd./2014
A.Y.s: 2009-10 and 2010-11 Dated: 10th August, 2018 Counsel for assessee / revenue: Nageswar Rao
/ M. Kiranmayee

 

Sections 28(iv), 68 – The fact that premium
is abnormally high as per test of human probabilities is not sufficient.  The AO has to lift the corporate veil and
determine whether any benefit is passed on to the shareholders/directors. 

 

FACTS


During the previous
year relevant to the assessment year under consideration, the assessee company,
filed its return of income declaring total income of Rs. 2,91,01,250.  This income comprised of interest on fixed
deposits which was offered for taxation under the head `Income from Other
Sources’. The Company had not commenced its business activity of manufacture
and sale of cement at its manufacturing unit in Andhra Pradesh and did not have
any income chargeable under the head `Profits and Gains of Business or Profession’.  

 

The Assessing
Officer (AO) in the course of assessment proceedings observed that the share
capital of the assessee company was held by Y S Jagmohan Reddy (66.43%) and
Silicon Builders (P.) Ltd. (33.15%), a company was owned and controlled by Y S
Jagmohan Reddy.  The directors of the
Company were Y S Jagohan Reddy; Harish C. Kamarthy,  J Jagan Mohan Reddy, Ravinder Reddy and V. R.
Vasudevan. 

 

During the
previous year relevant to assessment year 2009-10 the assessee company issued
0% convertible preference shares with a face value of Rs. 10/- per share and a
premium of Rs. 1,440 per share on a private placement to 3 investors viz.
Dalmia Cements Ltd., India Cements Ltd., and Suguni Contructions Pvt. Ltd., a
company belonging to Sri Nimmagadda Prasad. 
The aggregate amount received by the company on account of issue of
share capital was Rs. 70.32 crore comprising of 
Rs. 48.50 lakh towards face value of shares issued and Rs. 69.84 crore
towards the amount of share premium. 

 

The AO observed
that the investments made by the investors are not technical investments but
are an arrangement between the investors and directors of the assessee company
to pass on the funds through the assessee. 
He held that this was a method adopted by the directors, who were influential
persons in the then State Govt. of A.P., to pass on contracts and other
facilities to the beneficiaries.  To
investigate the investments made by the subscribers, the AO issued summons u/s.
133(1) of the Act to the investors and senior officers attended but none of
them agreed that they had invested under any sort of influence. The AO brought
on record various incidences in which the investors (in the capital of the
company) were benefitted from the State Government policies and he treated the above
receipt of share premium by the assessee as income u/s. 28(iv) of the Act.

 

Aggrieved, the
assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who based on appraisal of evidence
on record as also further evidence held that the investments made by the
investors and the benefits and concessions received by them from Government of
A.P. were part and parcel of one integrated plan for quid pro-quo. He
also made comparison with the investments made in assessee company and shares
available in the market of same industry and not only upheld the action of the
AO but also enhanced the total income to make addition even for the face value
of the share capital issued.  However, he
held the amounts to be taxable under the head `Income from Other Sources’.

 

Aggrieved, the
assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

 

HELD


The Tribunal
observed that the assessee had allotted 0% convertible preference shares on
private placement basis to three investors. 
The investors were well known companies in the industry.  The shares were issued at a huge
premium.  While the premium was
determined without any basis, the issue and allotment was within the four
corners of law.  It noted that the AO /
CIT(A) have not brought on record any issues with the issue and allotment of
shares since the allotment was in accordance with the provisions of the
Companies Act and the Rules as they existed at the time of issue and
allotment.  It observed that while the
determination of premium may not be in accordance with the industry norms, it
was accepted by the investing parties. 

 

The Tribunal
also observed that the arrangement and the circumstances leading to the issue
and allotment of shares may draw some doubts that certain benefits may have
passed on to the directors but the question is whether the directors/shareholders
have really benefitted with this arrangement and the assessee company was used
as an arrangement to pass on the benefit. 
It held that the revenue has to prove that the investors have passed on the
benefit to the shareholders/directors through this arrangement by bringing
cogent material. The Tribunal held that since the assessee is artificial person
created by the statute, we cannot trespass the legal entity. It cannot (sic
can) be trespassed provided the authority has evidence to prove that this legal
person was used to pass on the benefit to the interested shareholders by
lifting the corporate veil. In this case, no such evidence was brought on
record rather circumstantial evidence and test of human probabilities were
applied to convert the capital transaction, as per Companies Act, into revenue
transaction under the Income-tax Act.

 

The Tribunal
held that it cannot presume or apply test of human probabilities, it observed
that it is dealing with the business transaction, it has to based on cogent
material.  Considering the whole
situation, the Tribunal observed that the AO/CIT(A) have restricted themselves
tby stopping the investigation based on circumstantial evidence and applying
test of human probabilities.  In order to
lift the corporate veil for the purpose of determining whether any benefit is
passed on to the shareholders/directors, they have to bring on record proper
evidence/cogent material. 

 

The Tribunal
directed the AO to redo the assessment keeping in mind that no doubt the
assessee has received this capital receipt and what circumstances which lead to
investment is not important but whether the assessee company was used as a
vehicle to pass on the benefit to shareholders/directors.