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Heading Towards Global Best Practices – Section 94b

On the auspicious day of Vasant Panchami, when Finance Minister Arun Jaitley rose to give the Budget speech for 2017-18, he reaffirmed the government’s intent to make India stand out as a bright spot in the world economic landscape and to ensure that India aligns with best global tax practices.
 
Among several tax amendments, he addressed the issue of thin capitalisation, thereby introducing section 94B to the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘the Act’). The intent to introduce this section on thin capitalisation is discussed in the forthcoming paragraphs along with the key issues surrounding this amendment.
 
Limiting deduction of interest paid to Associated Enterprises
Interest expenditure in books of Indian taxpayers is a deductible expenditure u/s. 36(1)(iii) of the Act. Thus, claiming interest expenditure makes debt a more preferable option for taxpayers over equity, by helping them reduce their taxable profits. However, in the past few years, several cases have been identified where cash rich companies have borrowed funds, often from their overseas counterparts, with an intent to shift profits to a low/ no tax jurisdiction.
 
India had no thin-capitalisation rules in place prior to the introduction of Section 94B. Thus, there have been judgements, such as that in case of DIT vs. Besix Kier Dabhol SA {[2012] 26 taxmann.com 169 (Bom)}, wherein the Honourable Bombay High Court has allowed interest expenses to the taxpayer, on the ground that there are no thin capitalisation rules in place under the law. It is pertinent to note here, that in the case at hand, the debt to equity ratio was as typically and astronomically high as 248:1.
 
Further, in line with the recommendations of OECD BEPS Action Plan 4, it has been provided that when any Indian company, or the Permanent Establishment (PE) of a foreign company in India, being the borrower, incurs any expenditure in form of interest (or of similar nature) of INR One crore or more to its Associated Enterprises (AEs), the same shall be restricted to 30% of its earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA) or the interest paid or payable to AE, whichever is less.
 
Further, the debt shall be deemed to be treated as issued by an AE, where the related party provides an implicit or explicit guarantee to the lender or deposits a corresponding and matching amount of funds with the lender.
 
In other words, the restriction is applicable where interest or similar consideration incurred to a non-resident AE lender, exceeds INR 1 crore. The excess interest is defined to mean:
 
–    Total interest paid or payable in excess of 30% of EBITDA; or
–    Interest paid or payable to an AE, whichever is less.
 
Such disallowed interest expenditure shall be carried forward up to eight assessment years immediately succeeding the assessment year for which the disallowance is first made. The deduction in the subsequent assessment year is allowed from ‘business income, subject to same restrictions as stated above. Further, this provision is not applicable to entities engaged in the business of banking and insurance. It is also interesting to note here, that the newly inserted section does not harmoniously limit the withholding tax liability or taxability of the AE on such interest income earned.
 
While break-downing section 94B, following inferences can be drawn:

Parameters

Applicability

Payer

    Indian company, other than banking or
insurance company; or

    PE of a foreign company

Payee

– 
Non-resident
Associated Enterprise; or

 

–     Third party lender to whom Non-resident Associated
Enterprise has provided a guarantee or provided matching funds

Amount
of Interest

    Excess of INR 10 million in a particular
financial year

Nature
of Interest

    Deductible expenditure against income
taxable under the head ‘profits and gains from business or profession’

Global Best Practices
Section 94B is yet another attempt by India to assert its strong support to being an active participant in the OECD Action Plans for combating Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS). BEPS Action Plan 4 speaks about limiting base erosion via interest deductions and other financial payments and is primarily designed to limit the deductibility of interest and other economically equivalent payments made to related parties as well as third parties.
 
Some pertinent similarities and deviations between Action Plan 4 and section 94B are tabulated below:
 

Highlights

Particulars

Applicability to Action Plan
4

Applicability to section 94B

Gross/ Net

Whether Gross or Net
interest can be claimed

AP 4 prescribes thin
capitalisation rules to apply to net interest

Section 94B prescribes thin
capitalisation rules to apply to net interest

Fixed Ratio Rule

Prescribing/ Setting a limit
on amount that the taxpayer can claim as deduction in a certain year

10% to 30% of EBITDA

30% of EBITDA

Recipient of Interest

Prescribing disallowance
based on the recipient of interest

AP 4 prescribes disallowance
of net interest irrespective of whether the recipient of such interest is a
group entity or an independent third party

Section 94B prescribes
disallowance on the payment of interest to AEs, beyond the prescribed ceiling

Group Ratio Rule

Prescribing/ setting a limit
on amount that the group can claim as deduction in a certain year

Recommended in AP 4

No mention in Indian
provisions

Carry Forward

Disallowed interest or the
unused interest capacity allowed to be used in subsequent years

Recommended in AP 4

Disallowed interest expense
permitted to be carried forward up to 8 assessment years immediately
succeeding the assessment year for which the disallowance is first made

Carry Back

Disallowed interest or the
unused interest capacity allowed to be used in past years

Recommended in AP 4

No mention of carry back in
Indian provisions

De minimis threshold

Prescribing applicability of
provisions only to apply to transactions above the set limit

Recommended in AP 4; no
prescribed number

Threshold of INR 10
million          (1 crore) prescribed

Definition of Interest

Section 2(28A) of the
Income-tax Act, 1961 versus A  4

    Includes interest
payable in any manner in respect of moneys borrowed or debt incurred
(including deposit, claim or other similar right or obligation);

 

–      Includes
any services fee or other charge in respect of moneys borrowed;

 

–      Includes
debt incurred in respect of any credit facility that has not been utilised

Section 2(28A) defines
interest as interest payable in any manner in respect of any moneys borrowed
or debt incurred (including a deposit, claim or other similar right or
obligation) and includes any service fee or other charge in respect of the
moneys borrowed or debt incurred or in respect of any credit facility which
has not been utilised

 
Key Issues/Queries Surrounding Section 94B
 
1.    EBITDA as per tax or as per financial statements?
    EBITDA is neither defined in the Companies Act, 2013, nor in the Income-tax Act, 1961. There is also no clarification in the section whether such item be adopted at the time of disallowance of any interest and whether EBITDA can be used as the base number or based on tax computation.
 
    Action Plan 4 recommends basis of EBITDA as per Tax rules. The idea is that by linking interest deductions to taxable earnings would mean that it is more difficult for a group to increase the limit on net interest deductions without also increasing the level of taxable income in a country. However, the Income-tax Act does not recognise any term as EBITDA or gross total income, causing ambiguity. In such a scenario and in absence of clarity, it would be a better approach to rely on EBITDA as per books of accounts.
 
2.    Double taxation on the interest income element:
    BEPS Action Plan 4 suggests implementation of such thin capitalisation norms in cases where net interest exceeds a prescribed percentage of EBITDA. As against that, Section 94B mentions interest payments (gross payments). While provisions of Section 94B are simpler to implement (since it does not warrant detailed analysis of interest income that can be set off against relevant interest payment), to such extent, it implies enforcing double taxation at the group level. For example, in case an interest payment of India to the UK AE is partially disallowed u/s. 94B in India, to the extent of such partial disallowance, UK would still bear the tax on such interest income.
 
    Unless a specific provision is introduced in tax treaties/the Multilateral instruments signed by various countries, this shall remain an open issue. In absence of requisite clarifications, taxpayers may have to resort to dispute resolution mechanisms to eliminate double taxation.
 
3.    Deemed debt scenarios:
    The first proviso to section 94B(1) speaks of deeming fiction being triggered even in case of an implicit guarantee by an AE. However, the term implicit guarantee has not been defined anywhere in the Act. Also, no such reference is provided in BEPS Action Plan 4. It is therefore a matter of concern as to how the Revenue may evaluate the presence or otherwise of an implicit guarantee from an AE, with an underlying third party debt, especially in cases  when the AE is the parent of the Indian taxpayer.
 
    Assuming a scenario where the tax authorities may allege that an implicit guarantee exists only because a certain Indian company is subsidiary of an MNC, seems too farfetched. In such cases, the onus should be on the tax authorities to justify, with adequate supporting, that an implicit guarantee exists, based on actual arrangement/conduct of the parties involved.
 
4.    Corresponding and matching amount of funds:
    Proviso to Section 94B(1) suggests that debt shall be deemed to have been issued by an AE even where debt is issued by a third party lender but an AE deposits a corresponding and matching amount of funds with the lender. What is not well defined here is where the amount deposited by the AE ought to be equivalent to the amount of debt or a percentage thereof. For example, in a case where the base debt is INR 1 crore, but the amount deposited is INR 80 lakh, will proviso to section 94B(1) be triggered in such a case? Alternatively, would the answer be any different if the deposit was merely INR 5 lakh?
 
    The intent of the law here does not seem to be to cover only those cases where the guarantee is exactly corresponding to the debt involved.  In fact, imposing the criteria of matching funds would leave taxpayers with immense opportunity to immorally avoid any implication of section 94B on their transaction. Hence, keeping the intent of law in mind, it may be understood that corresponding and matching funds is not a mandate in such a case.
 
5.    Will only funds trigger the applicability of the proviso?
    Proviso to section 94B(1) suggests that debt shall be deemed to have been issued by an AE even where debt is issued by a third party lender, but an AE deposits a corresponding and matching amount with the lender. While reading the section, there appears no clarity in a case where the AE offers a collateral to the third party lender in any form other than funds. For example, in case the AE offers an asset as collateral which is not in the form of money/ funds, will proviso to section 94B(1) apply in such a case?
 
    Similar to the point above, the purpose of the law shall be defeated if restricted to only those cases where funds are maintained as collateral. The intent of the law may be read as any form of guarantee extended by an AE, for the applicability of this section to be imposed.
 
6.    Impact of Ind AS on reading of section 94B

    Ind As places focus on substance and contractual arrangement of financial instruments over its mere legal form. Accordingly, redeemable preference shares which were treated as shareholder capital under IGAAP shall be treated as debt under Ind AS since it encompasses all features of debt (i.e. fixed and determined payout; specified maturity date etc.). Also, dividend paid on redeemable preference shares shall be treated as interest in the books of accounts as per Ind AS, as against being treated as dividend as per IGAAP.
 
    One pertinent thing to note here is, whether change in characterisation of dividend as interest under Ind AS would have any direct impact on the interest as per section 94B. While there is no direct clarity on the topic at this stage, it is important to read the same in light of Circular 24 of 2017 (dated 25th July 2017), which clarifies that such dividend on redeemable preference shares, while may be considered as interest as per Ind AS, shall continue to be treated as interest for the purposes of MAT computation. Taxpayers may draw an analogy here that similar impact is to be given when it comes to computation of tax as per normal provisions.
 
In all the above cases, it would be helpful to receive clarification or objective guidelines from the CBDT, to avoid multiple cases of controversy and litigation, and to bring peace and clarity in the minds of taxpayers. _
 

Sale In Course Of Import Vis-À-Vis Works Contract

Introduction

Under VAT era, one of the
important Constitutional exemptions was for sale in course of import. A sale
transaction taking place in course of import could not be taxed as per Article
286 of the Constitution of India. The transaction in course of import was
defined in section 5(2) of CST Act, 1956, which reads as under:

 

““S.5. When is a sale or
purchase of goods said to take place in the course of import or export –

 

(1) —-

(2) A sale or purchase of
goods shall be deemed to take place in the course of the import of the goods
into the territory of India only if the sale or purchase either occasions such
import or is effected by a transfer of documents of title to the goods before
the goods have crossed the customs frontiers of India……..”

 

It can be seen that there
are two limbs to the above section. First, sale occasioning import, and second,
sale by transfer of documents of title to goods before goods Crosses Customs
Frontiers of India. Many a time dispute arises about first limb, as to what is
its scope. There are a number of pronouncements. However, the recent one
decided by Hon. M.S.T. Tribunal in case of Larsen and Toubro Ltd. – Scomi
Engineering, BHD (VAT App.No.353 of 2015 dated 30.10.2017)
can be analysed
to see the scope of said exemption.

 

Facts of the case

Hon. Tribunal has noted
facts as under:

 

“The factual background of
this appeal can be stated as below – Appellant, M/s.Larsen and Toubro Ltd. –
Scomi Engineering, Berhad (“LTSEB” for the sake of brevity), Consortium is a
registered dealer under the Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act, 2002 (“MVAT Act”
for short) and under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (“CST Act” for short)
bearing Registration No.27870728473V and 27870728473C respectively. The Mumbai
Metropolitan Regional Development Authority invited pre-qualification
applications from entities interested for the design, development,
construction, commissioning, operation and maintenance of Monorail System on
turnkey basis in Mumbai Metropolitan Region. Since the project involved civil
work as well as manufacture of goods of rolling stock, designing etc.
and since Larsen and Toubro Ltd. is having expertise in civil work and Scomy
Engineering, Berhad (based in Malaysia) has expertise in manufacture of goods,
designing, installing etc., both of them jointly submitted an
application for qualifying to bid in response to the said request of MMRDA.
Thereafter, MMRDA issued a request for proposal inviting bids for the design,
development, construction and maintenance of Monorail System. Accordingly, the
consortium of Larsen and Toubro Ltd. and SEB submitted its response and
submitted a proposal for manufacture and import amongst others of rolling stock
from Malaysia. The joint bid was accepted by MMRDA by a letter of acceptance
dated 07/11/2008. Accordingly, a contract was executed between MMRDA on one
part and consortium of Larsen and Toubro Ltd. and SEB on the other part on
09/01/2009. By this contract, MMRDA awarded to LTSEB a contract for planning,
designing, development, construction, manufacture, supply of Monorail System
from Sant Gadge Maharaj Chowk to Wadala and from Wadala to Chembur Station.
Larsen and Toubro and SEB thereafter divided their respective scope of work in
accordance with the bid submitted by them and a contract was executed between
two members of the consortium LTSE and SEB on 29/03/2010. In this contract, the
portion of the work related to SEB was recorded for the design and supply of
certain goods i.e. rolling stock, signaling equipment, switch equipment and
deco equipment from outside India. These goods were manufactured by SEB in
Malaysia in terms of the bid submitted by MMRDA. The appellant LTSE – SEB had
filed an application for determination of disputed question to the Commissioner
of Sales Tax. By this application, the following question was referred to the
Commissioner for determination – “Whether the rolling stocks imported pursuant
to the contract with MMRDA and supplied in the course of execution of Monorail
Project constitutes a transaction in the course of import u/s. 5(2) of the CST
Act, 1956 and not liable to tax u/s.8(1) of the MVAT Act, 2002?”

 

3. After giving elaborate
hearing to both sides, the Commissioner of Sales Tax answered this question in
the negative holding that the import of rolling stocks and supplied to MMRDA in
the course of execution of Monorail Project does not constitute a transaction
in the course of import u/s. 5(2) of the CST Act and it is a local sale liable
to tax under the provisions of the MVAT Act. Being aggrieved by the order of
determination of disputed question, the appellant consortiums have approached
the Tribunal in appeal.”

 

Submission of appellant

The main submission on
behalf of appellant was that the transaction of import was integrated with
local works contract transaction.

 

For throwing light on same
various factors of transaction were explained like, specifications for
manufacture, imported goods not useable elsewhere and meant only for given
contract with MMRDA and other clauses in contract about inspection/testing etc.
were pointed out.

Based on above facts it was
submitted that either it is one direct import transaction between appellant and
MMRDA or even if they are considered to be two sales one between Scomy
Engineering, Berhad (based in Malaysia) and Consortium and other between
consortium and MMRDA, still the second transaction is exempt as it is the sale
which has occasioned import and hence exempt. Reliance was place on Hon.
Supreme Court judgment in case of K. G. Khosala (17 STC 473)(SC) and ABB Ltd.
(55 VST 1)(Delhi).

 

Submission of Department

On behalf of Sales Tax
Department, it was argued that no privity of contract has been made out. There
are two sales and the local sale cannot fall under section 5(2). Reliance was
placed in case of K. Gopinathan Nair and others vs. State of Kerala (97
STC 189)(SC)
.
The manufacturing as per specification was disputed on
ground that only requirements were stated by MMRDA and specification are given
subsequently, which cannot satisfy condition of inextricable link. Judgement in
ABB Ltd. was tried to be distinguished on above facts.   

 

Tribunal’s Observations

The Tribunal thereafter
analysed the agreements. The Tribunal found that the specifications are
mentioned in contract with manufacturing place at Malaysia. About the nature of
consortium existence and inextricable link, the Tribunal observed as under:

 

“20. The issue as to
whether a nexus appears in the contract between MMRDA and movement of goods
from Scomi Engineering, Malaysia. One has to read the terms of the contract as
a whole. It has been argued before us by the learned Senior Counsel Shri.
Sridharan that the Larsen and Toubro and Scomi Engineering formed a consortium
which is neither partnership firm nor a company and nor an association of
persons. It is an unincorporated consortium. It can be seen that unincorporated
consortium cannot be a legal entity in the eyes of law. Scomi Engineering,
which is one of the members of the consortium is itself a manufacturer and
supplier of rolling stock from Malaysia. This suggests that though consortium
members are executing the contract jointly, they have separate existence. If
the contract is perused, on page 140 of the compilation containing contract
agreement, it is mentioned in para A.1.1 that Larsen and Toubro Ltd. is India’s
largest engineering and construction conglomerate with additional interest in
electrical, electronics, etc. Whereas in the same para, it is also
mentioned that Scomi Engineering, Berhad (SEB) is a public limited company
listed on the Kuala lampur Stock Exchange. His business focus is in the energy
and logistic engineering which comprises OCTG machine shops and transportation engineering
such as monorail, buses and special purpose vehicle. It is further mentioned
that wholly owned subsidiary Scomi Rail, Berhad is renowned for its monorail
system. These recitals in the contract show that Larsen and Toubro and Scomi
though formed a consortium, they were specialised in two separate fields and
each had shared execution of that part of work in which each was specialised.
On page 70 of the contract, work share apportionment between consortium members
is demarcated. It shows that 30% of the project value of rolling stock will be
shared exclusively by Scomi Engineering. Similarly, 8% of the project value of
E & M work will be shared exclusively by Larsen and Toubro. It shows that
rolling stock is the responsibility of SEB whereas automatic fair collection
system is the responsibility of Larsen and Toubro. Thus, the contract shows
that the consortium members will operate in two separate fields, one with
engineering work and the other with manufacturing, designing and maintenance of
rolling stock. In the present case, Scomi Engineering, Berhad, Malaysia which
supplied rolling stocks is one of the members of the consortium and therefore
the question naturally arises as to whether the person can sell goods to
himself. Moreover, the parties are covered by the contract between MMRDA and
consortium and therefore we have to look into the terms and conditions of the
said contract to examine as to whether the movement of goods from Malaysia was
in pursuance of the contract between consortium and MMRDA. The terms clearly
show that the contract was executed by MMRDA with full understanding that Scomi
Engineering, Malaysia is one of the members of the consortium which is expert
and skilled in designing and manufacturing of rolling stock and the rolling stock
will be manufactured in Malaysia and will be supplied to MMRDA. Therefore,
there is merit in the argument of Shri. S. Sridharan that merely because
rolling stocks are first sent to Nhava Sheva port and they are delivered to
consortium and then consortium delivered the same to MMRDA, inextricable link
is not broken down.”

 

The Tribunal observed about
various judgments cited before it. The Tribunal also referred to various other
documents filed before it. About application of judgment cited by Sales Tax Department,
the Tribunal observed as under:

 

“38.  Since Shri Sonpal has argued that the
principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of K. Gopinathan
Nair are not fulfilled in the present case, we have perused the said authority.
The main principles laid down in that case are that a sale or purchase can be
treated to be in the course of import if there is a direct privity of contract
between the Indian importer and the foreign exporter and the intermediary
through which such import is effected merely acts as an agent or a contractor
for and on behalf of the Indian importer. Thus, it is also laid down that there
must be either a single sale which itself causes the import or is in the
progress or process of import or though there may appear to be two sale
transactions they are so integrally interconnected that they almost resemble
one transaction. If these tests are considered and the present contract is
seen, it must be seen from the documents filed by appellant that though there
was no express condition in the covenant that rolling stock should be imported
from Malaysia, such understanding between the parties can be inferred since
Scomi Engineering, BHD is one of the Member of the consortium and in the
document of contract, it is mentioned that Scomi Engineering has all the
manufacturing unit in Malaysia. Section 5(2) of the CST Act requires that
movement of the goods from foreign country should be in pursuance of the
contract. From the terms of the contract, it appears that the intended movement
of goods from Malaysia was envisaged by terms of the contract and it was within
the contemplation of the parties and therefore it can be reasonably presumed
that such movement was to fulfill the terms of the contract. When it is so, it
has to be said that the goods moved from Malaysia as a part of single
transaction. Even if for the sake of argument, it is held that there are two
transactions of sale between MMRDA and consortium and the other between Scomi
Engineering, BHD Malaysia and consortium, then also the two transactions are so
connected integrally that they are inseparable. Therefore, we are not inclined
to accept the argument of Shri. Sonpal that conditions laid down in K.
Gopinathan Nair’s case are not satisfied in this case.”

 

Observing as above, the
Tribunal concurred with appellant that the sale is in course of import covered
by section 5(2) of CST Act. 

 

Conclusion     

The nature of sale in
course of import, more particularly when the facts are complex and there is no
express condition of import, is very delicate and required to be decided based
on judgments. The above judgment will be one more important judgment to throw
light on the subject and provide necessary guidance to trade and authorities. _

 

SEZs Under GST Regime

Introduction

A business dealing with foreign customers,
whether or not exclusively, is required to compete with various foreign
competitors who may be operating in more favourable environment in their own
countries. In order to boost such businesses, who intend to pre-dominantly
engage in export activities, India had adopted a model of Special Economic Zone
(SEZ) to provide level playing field to exporters located in SEZs. Being a unit
located in SEZ or being a developer has its’ own advantages with exemptions
under both direct (income tax) as well as indirect tax laws (Service tax, Sales
tax, Central Excise, etc. upto 30th June 2017 and Goods &
Service Tax (GST) w.e.f 1st July 2017). This article primarily
analyses the impact of SEZ operations under the GST regime.

 

Background to SEZ Legislation

The law relating to SEZ is governed by the provisions
of the Special Economic Zones Act, 2005 and various rules, notifications and
circulars issued thereunder. The person who is developing the SEZ is known as
SEZ developer and businesses operating from within the SEZ are known as SEZ
Units. There are elaborate conditions and processes which need to be followed
by both, SEZ developer as well as SEZ unit for getting approvals to set-up/
operate from a SEZ / as an SEZ unit.

 

On the indirect tax background, two
important provisions of the law are Sections 51 & 52. Section 51 of the Act
provides that the provisions of the SEZ Act shall have an overriding effect
over inconsistent provisions contained under other laws while Section 52 of the
Act provides that a SEZ is deemed to be a territory outside the customs
territory of India for the purposes of undertaking the authorized operations.

 

Brief Overview of the Provisions specifically
relating to SEZ under the GST Law

    Section 7 of the Integrated Goods &
Service Tax Act, 2017 (IGST Act) deals with the provision relating to
determination of nature of supply, i.e., whether a supply is to be treated as
interstate or intrastate. Clause (b) of sub-section (5) thereof provides that
supply of goods or services or both “to or by” a Special Economic Zone
developer or a Unit shall be deemed to be a supply in the course of
inter-state trade or commerce.
This specific provision results in a uniform
treatment to supplies to SEZ / by SEZ Units across the country.

 

   Having declared all supplies to/ by an SEZ
Unit as interstate supplies, Section 16 (1) of the IGST Act provides that a
supply of goods / services or both, to a SEZ unit or developer shall be treated
as a “zero-rated supply”. It may be important to note that only supplies
to SEZ Unit/developers are treated as zero rated supplies and not supplies by
SEZ Unit/developers.

 

  Further, Section 16(3) provides that a
person making a zero-rated supply shall be eligible to claim refund under two
options, namely:

 

Outright exemption by
applying for a Letter of Undertaking or Bond and subsequently claim refund of
unutilised input tax credit in terms of provisions of section 54 of the Central
Goods & Service Tax Act, 2017 (CGST Act).

  Rebate option, wherein the
supplier shall discharge the liability on the value of zero rated supply by
utilising balance from electronic credit ledger / cash ledger and claiming
refund thereof of the entire amount of tax paid.

 

  Rule 89 of the CGST Rules, 2017 lays down
various conditions for claiming of refund by suppliers making supply to a SEZ
developer / unit (under either of the above options). Second proviso to Rule 89
(1) requires the supplier to file refund application only after:

   In case of supply of
goods, the goods have been admitted in full in the SEZ for the “authorised
operations” as endorsed by the specified officer of the Zone.

    In case of supply of
services, obtaining evidence regarding the receipt of services for authorised
operations as endorsed by the specified officer of the Zone.

 

    Proviso to section 25 (2) of the CGST Act
provides that a person having multiple business verticals in a State / Union
Territory may apply for separate registration for each business vertical.
However, for SEZs, rule 8 of the CGST Rules, 2017 provides that a unit of a
person located in an SEZ shall be deemed to be a different vertical from the
units located in DTA and mandates the need for separate registration.

 

Some Issues

 

1.   Whether Place of Supply is
relevant in case of supplies made to SEZ unit / developer?

 

  The charging section under the IGST Act
provides that the tax shall be levied on all inter-state supplies of goods or
services or both. Similarly, the charging section under the Central / State GST
Act provides for levy of tax on all intra-state supplies of goods or services or
both.

 

  What shall be treated to be inter-state or
intra-state supply is dealt with under sections 7 & 8 of the IGST Act,
2017. The general crux of the said section is that if the location of supplier
and place of supply are in same state, the transaction has to be treated as
intra-state, else it will be treated as inter-state supply. How to determine
the place of supply is also covered under Chapter V of the IGST Act.

 

   However, there are certain cases where a
deeming fiction has been introduced to treat certain transactions as
inter-state supplies. For instance, supplies in the course of import of goods /
services are deemed to be inter-state supplies u/s. 7 (2) and 7 (4)
respectively. Likewise, the supplies made to or by an SEZ developer / unit are   also  
treated   to   be an inter-state supply u/s. 7 (5) (b).

 

The question that actually arises is whether
the place of supply needs to be determined in all cases where a transaction is
entered into with / by a unit in SEZ? Let us try to understand this with the
help of the following example:

 

     ABC Limited is a SEZ
Unit. They organize a convention in a hotel located in DTA. ABC Limited has
intimated the hotel that they being an SEZ, the supply is to be treated as
inter-state supply and no tax should be charged on them on account of zero
rating u/s. 16. However, the hotel contends that in terms of provision of
section 7 (3) r.w. Section 12 (3), the location of supplier and Place of Supply
is the same, i.e., the hotel and hence the transaction is to be treated as
intra-state and CGST plus SGST will be applicable. They also claim that GST
being a consumption driven tax and consumption having taken place within the
DTA, tax is applicable.

 

    There are two aspects which need  consideration here:

 

    Whether section 7 (3) –
which deals with determination of nature of supply in case of services and is a
general provision shall prevail over a specific provision, i.e., section 7 (5)
(b) which creates a legal fiction by deeming all supplies by or to a SEZ unit /
developer as inter-state?

    Whether the nature of
supply is to be determined basis the “person”, i.e., SEZ Developer / unit or
the actual location where the consumption takes place?

 

    In legal jurisprudence, in the context of
Monopolies & Restrictive Trade Practice Act, 1969, the Supreme Court in the
case of Voltas Limited vs. Union of India [AIR (1995) SC 1881] concluded
that an agreement falling within any of the clauses (a) to (l) will be held to
be an agreement relating to restrictive trade practice because of the legal
fiction and it will be immaterial to consider whether it falls within the
definition of restrictive trade practice in section 2 (o). No exception can be
taken against this view.

 

   In similar context, if a supply is made to /
by a SEZ developer / unit, it will have to be classified u/s. 7 (5) (b) and not
section 7 (1) or section 7 (3). In fact, this can also be a basis to say that
the provisions relating to determination of place of supply covered under
Chapter V of the IGST Act are not applicable to supplies by / to SEZ as they
merely aid in determining the place of supply, which is one factor for
determining whether a transaction is interstate or intrastate. Cases where the
main section itself treats a transaction to be either interstate or intrastate
shall need no reference to the provisions relating to place of supply.

 

    Another aspect to bear in mind is that while
the general provisions u/s. 7(1) and section 7(3) are subject to sections 10
& 12 dealing with the place of supply provisions, section 7(5), which interalia
deals with supplies to or by SEZ is not subject to the provisions of
sections 10 & 12 lending further support to the contention that the place
of supply provisions are irrelevant for such supplies. 

 

    To answer the second sub-question relating
to consumption within the SEZ Area, one important distinction that needs to be
brought out is that section 7 (5) (b) is person centric and not consumption
centric, i.e., the section says supplies “to or by a SEZ developer / unit
located in SEZ” and not “in and from a SEZ developer / unit located in SEZ”.
This distinction is essential, because even for general cases for determination
of place of supply in case of services, more relevance is given to the location
of the person and not the location where the services are actually consumed.
For instance, in case of a person providing event management service to a
company located in Mumbai for the event to be held in Delhi, the place of
supply, which needs to be determined basis the location of such person (refer
section 12 (2) (a)) shall be Mumbai and not Delhi, though the services might
have actually been provided in Delhi. In similar context, even in case of SEZ
Developer / Unit, so long as the services are provided to a SEZ developer/
Unit,
the location from where the services are provided may not be
relevant.

 

    In this context, there is one more scenario
which needs consideration here. Let us take an example of a person in DTA
supplying services to a domestic client but the consumption of the service
takes place in a SEZ, for example subcontracting of services. The supplier of
service has obtained an LUT for making such zero-rated supplies. However, the
question that arises is whether this supply shall be treated as zero-rated
supply considering the fact that the supply is not made to a SEZ developer /
unit but to a contractor who in turn renders services to the SEZ Developer/unit
for consumption by a SEZ developer / unit, admittedly in SEZ Area? It can be
said that this transaction shall perhaps be covered by section 7 (1) / 7 (3)
and not 7 (5) (b). This is because while the supply is consumed in SEZ, the
same is not made to a SEZ Developer / Unit. The supply is made to a person in
DTA and hence, the Place of Supply will have to be determined as per the
provisions of Chapter V of the IGST Act. However, it cannot be said that the
said person has made a supply to SEZ developer/ unit and should be eligible for
zero rating.

 

   To summarise, it can be concluded that:

 

    In case of supplies made
to a SEZ developer / unit, the transaction always has to be treated as
inter-state supplies and the provisions relating to Chapter V of the IGST Act
are not applicable.

    It is the actual supply to
SEZ developer / unit which is relevant and not the place of consumption. There
might be a case where the supply might have been consumed in the DTA, but the
supply is made to SEZ developer / Unit in which case provisions of section 7
(5) (b) shall continue to apply and the transaction shall be treated as zero
rated supply.

 

2.   Whether the provisions
relating to Reverse Charge are applicable on supplies received by a SEZ
developer / unit?

 

    The GST law provides for two specific
instances where Reverse Charge Mechanism shall apply, one being the cases where
supply of specified goods / services is notified to be covered under reverse
charge and second being the case where the supply of goods / services, which
are other wise taxable but no tax is levied on account of the supplier being
unregistered.

 

   At the outset, it should be noted that a
SEZ developer / unit receiving inward supplies (other than those on which
reverse charge is applicable) from registered person are liable to tax subject
to LUT/ Bond. In that context, there is no reason for no tax on inward supplies
on which reverse charge is applicable. Infact, when such supplies are received
from registered suppliers, they can opt to execute LUT / Bond and state so in
their invoice, in which case, the zero rating continues to apply for the SEZ
developer/ unit as well and no tax shall be applicable.

 

    The notified reverse charge, which is in
effect today is applicable on domestic services as well as import of services.
However, the important question that arise is as per the provision of the SEZ
Act, SEZ is deemed to be outside the customs territory of India. Therefore, the
question that arise is whether the reverse charge provisions can be made
applicable to the SEZ?


    In this regard, reference can be drawn to
the decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Torrent Energy Limited
vs. State of Gujarat in Special Civil Application 14856 of 2010 decided on
16.04.2014. The facts of the said case were that the Appellants had a power
generation unit in a SEZ. Section 21 of the Gujarat SEZ Act provided for total
exemption from payment of various state taxes to the units situated in SEZ
area. However, vide a subsequent amendment to the VAT Act by introduction of
Section 5A and amendment to Section 9, a liability was created on SEZ units to
pay tax on purchase of zero rated goods used for purposes specified in Section
9 (5). In this case, the Hon’ble High Court found that the levy was not
sustainable on the grounds that any contrary intention emerging from any other
State fiscal statute would not limit the scope of the non-obstante clause when
no overriding effect is given to the provisions under the VAT Act, which were
enacted much after the SEZ Act.

 

    In this context, one can say that under
the GST law, by merely not giving an exclusion to the SEZ in the definition of
India in itself cannot make the non-obstante clause ineffective and the
provisions of the SEZ Act providing that the SEZ shall be deemed to be a unit
located outside the customs territory of India shall continue to prevail.
However, such a view may be subject to litigation at the ground level. Further,
it is important to note that the above matter is currently pending before the
Supreme Court and hence, the matter is yet to attain finality.

 

   However, a conservative view may always be
taken appreciating the fact that a person making zero rated outward supplies is
eligible for refund of accumulated input tax credit. In such a case, the onus
to discharge tax liability on the SEZ shall be as under:

 

Nature of Supply

Tax Position

Import of Services by a SEZ Unit or Developer for authorized
operations

Exempted as per Notification 18/2017 (Integrated Tax – Rate)

Procurement of goods or services notified to be liable under
RCM from registered dealer

No tax since zero rating continues in cases where the vendor
has obtained LUT

Procurement of goods or services notified to be liable under
RCM from unregistered dealer

IGST payable under RCM

Procurement of goods or services (other than notified) from
unregistered dealer

Since the operation of this provision is currently suspended,
no tax payable

 

 

3.   What are the conditions
for claiming refund of tax paid / accumulated input tax credit on supplies to
SEZ developer / unit?

 

    Section 54 of the CGST Act provides for
refund of accumulated input tax credit on account of zero rated supplies made
or taxes paid on zero rated supplies. The section further provides that the
application for refund shall be accompanied by such documentary evidences as
may be prescribed.

 

    The said documentary evidences required for
filing the refund claim have been prescribed in Rule 89 of the CGST Rules,
2017. Second proviso thereof provides that refund shall be granted only if the
supplies made are used for the authorised
operations
of the SEZ Developer / Unit. However, it is important to
note that there is no such requirement under the Act which provides that the
refund shall be allowed for zero rated supplies made. There is no provision under
the CGST Act which provides for any conditions / power to prescribe conditions
for the claim of refund for zero rated supplies, specifically supplies to SEZ
Developer /unit made. Therefore, the question that arises is whether the
provisions of Rule 89 are ultravires to the provisions of the Act or
not?

 

    However, before proceeding further, it is
also important to understand the need for answering the said question. There
can be two kinds of suppliers making supply to SEZ, one being a person
exclusively / pre-dominantly supplying to SEZ resulting in accumulated credit
and the other being a case where a person is pre-dominantly supplying in DTA
with some supplies to SEZ resulting in accumulated credits being adjusted
against liabilities on account of other supplies.

 

    In the first case, this aspect will be
important because not all supplies received by a SEZ Developer/ Unit may be
categorised as being received for authorised operations. For instance, an SEZ
unit, supplying software consultancy services, may be receiving supply from a
canteen operator which the proper officer may not certify as being used for
authorized operations & in such case, even if the supplier has opted for
LUT, he will not be able to claim refund of accumulated credits.

 

    In this context, to decide whether the Rule
89 is ultravires to the Act or not, one can refer to the provisions of
the Supreme Court decision in the case of Indian National Shipowners
Association vs. Union of India
[2010 (017) STR 0J57 (SC)]. The issue in the
said case was the validity of the provisions of reverse charge mechanism on
import of services for the period upto 18.04.2006 where the liability was
created by Rule 2(1)(d)(iv) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 without
corresponding provisions in the Finance Act, 1994. The Court confirmed by the
Bombay High Court ruling [2009 (013) STR 0235 (Bom.)] which held that the Rules
were ultravires to the provision of the Act by holding as under:

 

… Before enactment of section 66A it is
apparent that there was no authority vested by law in the Respondents to levy
service tax on a person who is resident in India, but who receives services
outside India. In that case till section 66A was enacted a person liable was
the one who rendered the services. In other words, it is only after enactment
of section 66A that taxable services received from abroad by a person belonging
to India are taxed in the hands of the Indian residents. In such cases, the Indian
recipient of the taxable services is deemed to be a service provider. Before
enactment of section 66A, there was no such provision in the Act and therefore,
the Respondents had no authority to levy service tax on the members of the
Petitioners-association.

 

21. In the result, therefore, the
petition succeeds and is allowed. Respondents are restrained from levying
service tax from the members of the Petitioners-association for the period from
1-3-2002 till 17-4-2006, in relation to the services received by the vessels
and ships of the members of the Petitioners-association outside India, from
persons who are non-residents of India and are from outside India.

 

    In similar context, till the time provisions
of section 54 are amended empowering the imposition of conditions for grant of
refund, Rule 89 should be treated as ultravires to the provisions of
section 54 and shall have no effect.

4.   How shall supplies by SEZ
to DTA be treated?

 

   While SEZs are formed with specific goal to
promote exports and units within the SEZ are required to achieve specified
export targets, there can be instances when supplies may be made to customers.
Let us try to analyse such scenarios with the help of following examples:

 

Example
relating to supply of goods by an SEZ to a unit located in DTA

 

ABC Limited is a trader and has imported
goods in its’ warehouse in Free Trade Warehousing Zone, which is located within
the SEZ in Gujarat, i.e., the goods have not crossed the customs frontier and
the Bill of Entry for Home Consumption is not filed. ABC Limited has a customer
in DTA in Gujarat willing to buy the said goods. Following issues arise in this
transaction for ABC Limited:

 

a. Will ABC Limited be required to
discharge GST on its’ sale invoice to the customer or customer will discharge
the IGST at the time of filing Bill of Entry for Home Consumption at the time
of removal of goods from the SEZ?

 

b. Whether the supply is to be treated as
intra-state considering that both the location of supplier and place of supply
are in same state?

 

    To answer the above question, let us first
refer to the proviso to section 5 (1), which is the charging section for the
levy of IGST, and provides that the integrated tax on goods imported
into India shall be levied and collected in accordance with the provisions of
section 3 of the Customs Tariff Act 1975 at the point when the duties of
customs are levied as per section 12 of the Customs Act, 1962. Further,
reference to section 7 (2) also becomes necessary which provides that the
supply of goods imported into the territory of India till they cross the
customs frontiers of India shall be treated to be a supply in the course of
inter-state trade or commerce.

 

   What is meant by “imported goods”, while not
defined in IGST Act, is defined under the Customs Act, 1962 as any goods
brought into India from a place outside India but does not include goods which
have been cleared for home consumption”.

 

    In the above example, since the goods are
being sold from the FTWZ itself, which is a bonded warehouse, in other words, a
customs area under a bill of entry for warehousing, i.e., before the goods have
been cleared for home consumption, they are imported goods. In view of section
7 (2), the supply will have to be treated as interstate supply and in view of
proviso to section 5 (1), since the goods are imported goods, there shall be no
levy under the charging section of IGST Act and tax will have to be levied
under the Customs Act only. Further, it is provided that the Bill of Entry for
Home Consumption can be filed either by the buyer in the DTA or the SEZ unit
(on authorization from the buyer) (Refer Rule 22 of Special Economic Zone
(Customs Procedure) Regulations, 2003.

 

    However, it is important to note that the
Central Board of Excise & Customs has given a contrary view in Circular
46/2017 dated 24.11.2017 wherein it has been clarified that the supply of the
nature stated in the above example squarely falls within the definition of
“supply” as per section 7 of the CGST Act and shall be liable to IGST in view
of section 7 (2) treating such supplies as interstate supplies.

 

    However, the above notification clearly
appears to be issued without considering the specific provisions of section 5
(1) clearly keeping the taxability of imported goods outside the purview of
IGST Act and imposing the levy under the Customs Act, 1962 and hence, appears
to be erroneous. Further, the proposition suggested in the Circular hints at
double taxation, as at the time of removal of goods from the SEZ, a Bill of
Entry shall also be required to be filed which will create a tax liability on
the party filing the document as well as the unit within the SEZ shall also be
required to charge IGST on its’ invoice.

 

    Section 7 (5) (b) clearly states that
supplies by SEZ are to be treated as interstate supplies and hence, if at all
ABC Limited decides to file the Bill of Entry with the authorities (after
obtaining the necessary authorisations), the applicable tax shall be IGST by
treating the transaction as an interstate supply.

 

 

   So far as supply of services by SEZ to DTA
is concerned, the same would be a taxable inter-state supply irrespective of
whether the customer is in the same state or not on account of the deeming
fiction under the law.

 

5.   Specific aspects of
dealing with / being a SEZ Developer/ Unit

 

   Dealing with SEZ developer / Unit, it has to
be noted that the supply being made to the SEZ developer / unit is never to be
questioned at the time of application of LUT. For instance, the jurisdictional
officer of the supplier cannot deny the grant of LUT on grounds that since the
supply is of a goods/ service on which credit would not have been eligible had
the zero rating not been prescribed.

 

  Registering for GST as SEZ Developer / Unit
– at the time of obtaining registration, care should be taken to ensure that
the fact the person registering is a SEZ developer/ unit is being selected in
the portal as this is expected to have its’ own challenges. For instance, if a
SEZ developer / unit is not registered as such on the portal, it will face a
peculiar situation where it would have charged IGST on all its DTA supplies
(even where the customer is in same state) but the portal will not allow the
same while filing GSTR 1 since the supplier is not registered as SEZ. This will
also impact the credit claim of the customer resulting in disputes. Similarly,
on inward side as well, all the vendors would have charged IGST but while
filing their GSTR 1, they may not be able to select IGST (of course, this
specific issue is not identified since filing of GSTR 2 has been postponed for
the time being).

 

Conclusions

While the
intention of the law is to ensure that the maximum benefits flow to the SEZ
developer / units to promote exports, the manner in which the provisions have
been drafted has increased the scope of probable tax litigation. While the law
is now in place for more than six months, there is sufficient time for business
in SEZ or dealing with SEZ to take correct tax positions to avoid future pains
!!!
 _

GST on Re-Development Of Society Building, SRA And JDA – Part I

The levy of Goods and Service Tax on land development, re-development of housing society buildings and slum rehabilitation is a contentious issue though these activities were already subject  to the levy of service tax and VAT in the pre-GST regime.
 
In this article implications of GST on the builders / developers, a co-operative housing society (society), its members, landlords, tenants and unauthorised occupants (viz. slum dwellers on encroached land) are discussed.  The most important issue is that whether there is any change under GST regime from the earlier service tax regime. In the opinion of the writers, there is a qualitative and substantive change. Under service tax, , immovable property was outside the scope by way of definition of ‘activity’. The term ‘activity’ was of wider and unrestricted implication. However, in case of GST, a ‘supply’ is liable to tax only if made in the course or in furtherance of business. This has resulted in interesting debate and complexities.
 
GST on re-development of society building
Let us say, a Co-operative Housing Society registered under the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 and its members (for the sake of brevity, the society and members are collectively referred to as ‘SM’) decide to redevelop the existing building which is in dilapidated condition and is required to be re-developed as per prevailing Development Control Regulations [DCR]. In case of re-development of the dilapidated building, the municipal regulations in Maharashtra presently allow approx. 3:1 FSI instead of 1:1 which is allowed under normal circumstance.
 
The key contents that are incorporated in the Development Agreement with the developer (DA) are discussed below:
 
SM shall allow the developer to reconstruct building by demolishing the existing one with some additional area, may be by way of constructing additional floors. The developer shall do so by employing his funds and at his attendant cost and risk. To avail the benefit of extra construction is permitted under DCR, the developer is required to purchase necessary Transferable Development Right (TDR) from permissible sources. As per the terms of DA, the developer may be required to construct some extra area for the existing members which is to be given to them free of cost to incentivise the project.
 
Out of the total constructed area after utilising full potentiality of FSI and TDR, the remaining area after allotment to the existing members as warranted by DA belongs to developers which is known as “Developer’s free sale portion” and he can sell it at his discretion and price. SM undertakes to enrol and register the purchasers of such free sale portion as the members of the society upon fulfilment of necessary formalities. The newly enrolled members are entitled to the same rights as of existing members and also have undivided share in the title of the land in the similar manner.
 
In addition to re-development, the developer shall pay to SM cash consideration in form of corpus fund, hardship allowance, rent for alternate accommodation till permanent alternate accommodation is granted in the new building, brokerage, shifting allowance etc.
 
In the above background, we will examine the incidence of GST from the point of view of:
a.The society and its members
b.The developer
 
Taxability of development right in the hands of SM

The issue here is that the SM is supplying development right to the developer to re-develop the building, putting up extra area / floor by using permissible FSI, TDR etc. in return for newly constructed flats with some additional area free of cost and some cash consideration mentioned above in terms of DA. Under GST law, SM may not be liable to tax for the following reasons:
 
Supply not in the course or furtherance of business:
 
For the purpose of determining the liability under GST, it is necessary to look into Charging Section 91  according to which central goods and services tax is leviable on all intra-State supplies of goods or services or both. Thus, ‘supply of goods or services or both’ is the vital element for charge of tax.  Section 7 (a) defining ‘supply’ require that the supply for a consideration by a person should be in the course or in furtherance of business.
 
“S.7 – For the purposes of this Act, the expression “supply” includes––
 
all forms of supply of goods or services or both such as sale, transfer, barter, exchange, license, rental, lease or disposal made or agreed to be made for a consideration by a person in the course or furtherance of business”.
 
Definition of ‘goods’ as per S. 2(52) is as follows:
 
“goods means every kind of movable property other than money and securities but includes actionable claim, growing crops, grass and things attached to or forming part of the land which are agreed to be severed before supply or under a contract of supply”.
 
Thus, goods do not include immovable property. Development right is an immovable property.
 
Definition of ‘service’ u/s. 2(102)
 
“services” means anything other than goods, money and securities but includes activities relating to the use of money or its conversion by cash or by any other mode, from one form, currency or denomination, to another form, currency or denomination for which a separate consideration is charged.

As per the above definition, everything other than goods, money and securities is service. However, the moot issue is whether an immovable property can be said to be a ‘service’. This is a contentious issue as right in land, viz. development right is a benefit arising from land is “immovable property”. This will be discussed little later, since the discussion centres right now on the treatment of immovable property under GST.
 
“Supply of goods or service or both” for the purpose of levy of GST u/s. 7,  has to be in the course or furtherance of business. The society and / or members cannot be said to be in the business of grant of development right, whether the re-development of a society building is undertaken by virtue of compulsion on account of dilapidated condition or not. A society or its members cannot be said to be involved in supply of development right to the developer in the course or in furtherance of business by entering into development agreement. By agreeing to get a new flat in lieu of the old flat, the members of society have not made any supply.  
 
Land and right / benefit in land outside the scope of GST – Sch. III of CGST Act, Transfer of  undivided right in land from the existing members to the new purchasers:
 
Various judgements of the Supreme Court and High Courts on the principle of mutuality and examination of the provisions of Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 and bye-laws of a Co-operative Societies made thereunder that the rights of a member in a co-operative housing society are a  bundle of rights including the right of possession, right to transfer and right to let-out the flats allotted to him etc., etc.
 
In Ramesh Himmatlal Shah vs. Harsukh Jadhavji Joshi, (1975) 2 SCC 105, the Hon’ble Supreme Court referred to clause 47(1)(b) of Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960 and observed that a flat in a multi-storeyed building would naturally have a corresponding right over the undivided proportionate share of the land on which the building stands and that a member of the society has interest in the property belonging to the society. In the words of the Hon’ble Apex Court:
 
“We may now turn to the relevant Rules. By Rule 9 “when a society has been registered the Bye-laws of the society as approved and registered by the Registrar shall be the Bye-laws of the society”. Rule 10 contains classification and sub-classification of societies and we are concerned with the fifth class mentioned therein, namely, the “Housing Society” which again is sub-divided into three categories and we are concerned in this appeal with the second category, namely, “Tenant Co-partnership Housing Society”, which is described therein as an example of “Housing Societies which hold both lands and buildings either on leasehold or freehold basis and allot them to their members”.
 
In Gayatri De vs. Mousumi Coop. Housing Society Ltd., (2004) 5 SCC 90, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that in the event of death of a member of a housing society, the heirs of the deceased person would inherit the flat with proportionate interest in the land. For this, the Supreme Court examined the provisions of West Bengal Cooperative Society Act, 1983, and observed as under:
 
“Section 87 of the Act deals with a member’s right of ownership and sub-section (3) of the said section makes it abundantly clear that a plot of land or a house or an apartment in a multi storied building shall constitute a heritable and transferable immovable property within the meaning of any law for the time being in force provided that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, such heritable and transferable immovable property shall not be partitioned or subdivided for any purpose whatsoever”.
 
When a person purchases a flat and incidentally becomes a member of the society, the right, title, interest over the flat is not merely a right to occupy it. It is specie of property, which can be sold. Once a member completes the procedure, the society has no option but to recognising the incoming member as the owner of the flat. The Supreme Court in the case of Hill Properties Ltd. vs. Union Bank of India, (2014) 1 SCC 635, observed as under:
 
“So far as a builder is concerned, the flat-owner should pay the price of the flat. So far as the society or company in which the flat-owner is a member, he is bound by the laws or articles of association of the company, but the species of his right over the flat is exclusively that of his. That right is always transferable and heritable”.
 
In this context, it is required to examine Sch. III of CGST Act which denotes the activities or the transactions that shall be treated neither as a supply of goods or nor supply of services –
 
“Sale of land and, subject to clause (b) of paragraph 5 of Schedule II, sale of building”.
 
In case of re-development of society building, the developer is given right to construct additional area and to sell the same to the purchasers by purchasing TDR from open market. The undivided ownership right in the land of the existing members is thus curtailed and the same is being transferred to the developer for further commercial exploitation including recouping the cost of re-construction of the existing building. Transfer of ownership right in land is out of the scope of “supply” as per Sch. III to the CGST Act.
 
Development right – a right in land being an immovable property whether outside the scope of GST?
 
The expression “land” and “building” in Schedule III includes even right in land / building.  It is relevant to note Entry 18 of List II of Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India. It reads as “Land, that is to say, rights in or over land, land tenures including the relation of landlord and tenant, and the collection of rents; transfer and alienation of agricultural land; land improvement and agricultural loans; colonization”.  Therefore, reference to land includes even rights in land.  
 
Relying on the Hon’ble Supreme Court decision in Santosh Jayaswal vs. State of M.P., (1995) 6 SCC 520, in Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 5 SCC 24 : (2009) 2 SCC (Civ) explaining the meaning of the expression, “benefits to arise out of land”, perusal of Bombay High Court’s decision in case of Chheda Housing Development Corporation vs. Bibijan Shaikh Farid,  (2007) 3 Mah LJ 402  and  other relevant decisions of the Apex courts and High Courts and various provisions of  Maharashtra Regional Town Planning Act 1966 read with section 3 of Transfer of Property Act defining immovable property  indicates the artificial manner in which the development rights are carved out from the land.  Further, sections 17(1) and 2(16) of The Registration Act r.w. S.2(16) of Indian Stamp Act  also establish that development rights are right in immovable property.
 
The expression, “immovable property” has not been defined under the GST law.  Therefore, it would be relevant to note the definition of “immovable property” under the following laws:
 
Section 3(26) of the General Clauses Act, 1897:

Definitions:
 
In this Act, and in all Central Acts and regulations made after the commencement of this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context-
 
(26) “immovable property” shall include land, benefits to arise out of land, and things attached to the earth, or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth;
 
Section 2(ja) of the Maharashtra Stamp Act:
 
In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,-
 
(ja) “immovable property” includes land, benefits to arise out of land, and things attached to the earth, or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth;
 
Section 2(6) of the Registration Act, 1908:
 
In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context-
 
(6)”immovable property” includes land, buildings, hereditary allowances, rights to ways, lights, ferries, fisheries or any other benefit to arise out of land, and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything which is attached to the earth, but not standing timber, growing crops nor grass;”
 
A perusal of the above definitions indicates that they are more or less similar.  Thus, immovable property includes interalia benefit arising out of land and things attached to the earth or permanently attached to the earth.
 
It is relevant to note the following extract wherein the expression “benefits to arise out of land” is explained:  
 
Extract from commentary on The Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (TP Act) by Sir. Dinshaw Fardunji Mulla [11th Edition – 2013]”
 
“The definition of ‘immovable property’ in S.3(26) of the General Clauses Act is not exhaustive”.
 
“Immovable property shall include land, benefits to arise out of land, and things attached to the earth, or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth”.
 
“The TP Act defines the phrase ‘attached to the earth, but gives no definition of immovable property beyond excluding standing timber, growing crops and grass.  These are no doubt excluded because they are only useful as timber, corn and fodder after they are severed from the land.  Before they are so severed, they pass on transfer of the land under S. 8 as things attached to the earth”.
 
“A ‘benefit to arise out of land’ is an interest in land and, therefore, immovable property.  The Registration Act, however, expressly includes as immovable property benefits arising out of land, hereditary allowances, rights of way, lights, ferries and fisheries”.
 
“From a combined reading of the definition of ‘immovable property’ in S. 3 of the TP Act and S. 3(5) of the General Clauses Act, it is evident that in an immovable property, there is neither mobility, nor marketability as understood in excise law”.
……
 
The definition of immovable property in the General Clauses Act, TP Act and other laws and judgements cited above have dealt with benefit and right in land. In the absence of a specific definition under GST law, general definition must prevail.
 
Consequently, Development Right being the benefit arising from the land, must be held to be immovable property and outside the scope of GST.
 
Therefore, in view of the specific provision of treating sale of land and sale of building as neither supply of service nor as supply of sale would not make the sale of land / building liable for GST as there is no charge in the first place.  Similarly, the absence of reference to right in land / building in serial no. 5 of Schedule III cannot deem the presence of a charge of GST.  The satisfaction of levy should be arrived at dehors the entries in Schedule III.
 
Whether the amounts paid by developer to SM in terms of DA like hardship allowance, rent, shifting allowance, contribution to the corpus of the society, brokerage and such other amounts as agreed upon can be treated as ‘consideration’ in the hands of SM so as to attract the levy of GST?
 
The consideration flowing from a developer to the SM, in whatever form, is not against any taxable supply. All payments from the developer to the SM is flowing out from DA. Appointing developer to re-develop the existing building is not a taxable supply as we have discussed earlier. The developer makes payment to the members of society in satisfaction of the obligation to the society and its members.  Viewed in this manner, the allotment of a new flat, the payment of compensation being rent for alternate accommodation and hardship allowance is also governed by the principle of mutuality.  Payment of corpus fund to the society by the developer is also in satisfaction of the obligation flowing out from DA as a part of design of the re-development arrangement. Therefore, the SM are not liable for GST as they have not effected any supply under the DA.
 
It may be argued that the developer makes payment to the members and /or the society as compensation for the act of agreeing to the obligation to refrain from an act, or to tolerate an act or a situation, or to do an act treated as supply of service as per section 7(1)(d) read with paragraph no. 5(e) of Schedule II. However, there is no stipulation in the DA which requires the members of society to agree to the obligation to refrain from an act or to tolerate an act or a situation, or to do an act; for which a consideration is stipulated.  The essential ingredient of the contract is redevelopment. Therefore, the members or the society are not liable to GST even under this entry.  There is no supply made by SM to developer though they have been compensated.  
 
Whether the DA involves any taxable supply by developer to SM under GST?
 
Developer is constructing the building, a part of which will be given to the members of SM. The other part of the building will be sold by it for a consideration. For the construction of the building for the members of SM, developer is not receiving any monetary consideration from them, but a right from SM is received to load TDR on its plot so that the developer  would be able to construct extra area in the building for selling  in the market. There are common facilities and common spaces which are owned and used jointly by the owners of these units. These units do not have any independent existence. Therefore, construction of entire building is necessary before handing over the units to the members. In other words, developer cannot construct the building for selling to new customers unless he would construct that part of the building which would be allotted to SM. Hence, the developer is constructing the entire building in order to sell a part of the building.
 
Effectively, the developer is providing service to both SM and the buyers of additional flats under DA as a part of a single supply. The entire revenue in this arrangement flows from the buyers of additional flats, a part of which is paid by developer to the members of SM by way of construction and monetary consideration. The proportionate ownership of the land obtained by the developer from SM would be passed on to the flat buyers. For all these efforts, the developer would be remunerated by way of sale consideration from the additional flats constructed for sale.
 
Support may be found from the definition of consideration contained under CGST Act.
 
2(31) “consideration” in relation to the supply of goods or services or both
 
includes–
 
(a) any payment made or to be made, whether in money or otherwise, in respect of, in response to, or for the inducement of, the supply of goods or services or both, whether by the recipient or by any other person but shall not include any subsidy given by the Central Government or a State Government;
 
(b) the monetary value of any act or forbearance, in respect of, in response to, or for the inducement of, the supply of goods or services or both, whether by the recipient or by any other person but shall not include any subsidy given by the Central Government or a State Government:
…………………”
 
Thus, it can be said that the SM by virtue of entering into DA, induces developer to supply works contract service and to sell additional area to outsiders to recoup the cost of construction and other monetary consideration. In turn they undertake to make the purchasers as members by allotting undivided share in land. The sale consideration will also be the consideration for re-construction of the existing building.
 
Whether the transaction between SM and the developer is barter and liable to tax as such?
 
The definition of ‘supply’ contained in S.7 (supra) includes a barter arrangement. The question arises that whether the grant of development right by SM and the construction of the building by a developer is barter. The answer is that it may be so in technical term but not liable for GST as grant of development right is not liable for GST as already discussed above.
 
Availment of input tax credit (ITC) and reversal thereof attributable to the units allotted free of cost to SM.
 
Units allotted free of cost to SM are not without consideration. The consideration flows from other persons. The service provided by developer is taxable. Hence, ITC under the law is available fully and can be used for the GST payable on the sale of under constructed flats from free sale area.  
 
Without receiving such inputs and input services, it would be impossible to construct that part of the building on which GST is payable. Therefore, it cannot be said that the entire inputs and input services used for construction of the building are not used for providing taxable supply. Therefore, ITC is eligible.  It has been discussed earlier that there is a single supply to SM and the purchasers of free sale area.
 
(To be continued – concluding part will cover taxability of slum rehabilitation projects, land development agreements.) _
 

9 Section 11(4A) – Income from pharmacy shop run by a charitable hospital – Operation of pharmacy shop was intrinsic to the activities of running of hospital and hence, did not constitute business.

DCIT
(Exemption) vs. National Health & Education Society (Mumbai)

Members: Joginder Singh (J.M.) and Manoj
Kumar Aggarwal (A.M.)

I.T.A. No.1958/Mum/2016

Assessment Year: 2012-13.  Date of Order: 10th January, 2018

Counsels for Revenue / Assessee:  H. N. Singh / S. C. Tiwari and Rituja Pawar



FACTS

The assessee trust is registered u/s. 12A
with DIT (Exemptions) and also registered with Charity Commissioner,
Bombay.  During the assessment
proceedings, the AO noted that the trust was running a pharmacy shop in the
hospital and achieved turnover of Rs.42.83 crore with net surplus of Rs.16.73
crore. The turnover of the shop constituted about 12.82% of total hospital
collections. The income from the shop, in the opinion of the AO, constituted
business income in terms of section 11(4A). The assessee defended the same on
the ground that the drugs were supplied only to in-patients upon consultant’s
prescription and the charges of the drugs formed part of final patients’ bills.
However, the AO noted that the Trust Deed did not bar the hospital from selling
medicines to outsiders and the activity of pharmacy shop was systematic
business activity. The AO further noted that the trust was not maintaining
separate books of accounts for the shop. Finally, the net surplus of Rs.16.73
crore earned from the shop was assessed as business income against which
exemption under section 11 was denied.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee contested the same
successfully before the CIT(A), where the CIT(A), relying upon the order of its
predecessor in AYs 2010-11 & 2011-12, allowed the appeal of the assessee on
the premises that operation of the pharmacy shop was intrinsic to the
activities of the assessee and not incidental, and did not constitute business
and therefore, the provisions of section 11(4A) were not applicable.

 

In appeal filed before the Tribunal, the
revenue contested the findings of the CIT(A) on the ground that the assessee
had not maintained separate books of accounts for pharmacy shop and therefore,
failed to fulfill the conditions envisaged by section 11(4A).

 

HELD

The Tribunal noted that the issue had
already been decided in assessee’s favour by first appellate authority for AY
2010-11 & 2011-12. Also, it was noted that the Mumbai Tribunal, in the
assessee’s own case vide ITA No.87/Mum/2015 order dated 17/08/2016 for AY
2010-11, after considering the judgement of the Bombay High Court in Baun
Foundation Trust vs. CCIT [2012 73 DTR 45 (Bom)]
and Mumbai Tribunal in
Hiranandani Foundation vs. ADIT [ITA Nos. 560-563/Mum/2016 order dated
27/05/2016]
had upheld the stand of the CIT(A). Since the revenue was
unable to bring any contrary facts on record and distinguish the facts of
earlier years with that of the impugned assessment year, the Tribunal dismissed
the revenue’s appeal.

8 Sections 50C and 54F – For the purpose of section 54F net consideration is the amount of sale consideration and not the deemed consideration determined u/s. 50C.

ITO vs. Raj Kumar Parashar (Jaipur)

Members: Kul Bharat (J. M.) and Vikram Singh
Yadav (A. M.)

ITA No.: 11 / JP / 2016

AYs: 
2011-12.     Date of Order: 28th September, 2017

Counsel for Revenue / Assessee:  Prithviraj Meena / Hemang Gargieya


FACTS

During the year under consideration, the
assessee had sold a property for a consideration of Rs. 24.6 lakh and deposited
the sale consideration in the capital gain account scheme for the purpose of
purchasing a new house property.  The
entire capital gain earned by the assessee was claimed as exempt u/s. 54F. The
stamp authority    adopted    the   
value   of the property sold at Rs. 96.03 lakh.  Applying the provisions of section 50C, the
AO held the assessee was required to invest / deposit the deemed sale
consideration of Rs. 96.03 lakh. Since the assessee had deposited Rs. 24.6 lakh
only, the AO computed   capital   gain 
at  Rs. 70   lakh  
after allowing Rs. 24.6 lakh as deduction u/s. 54F.

 

On appeal, the CIT(A) referred to the
definition of ‘net consideration’ as given in Explanation to section 54F and
also relying on the decision of the Jaipur bench of Tribunal in the case of Gyanchand
Batra (ITA No. 9 / JP / 2010) dated 13.08.2010
held that the deeming
provision in section 50C would not be applicable to section 54F and
accordingly, allowed the appeal of the assessee.

 

Before the Tribunal, the revenue supported
the order of the AO and contended that the order of the CIT(A) was not in accordance with the express provisions of section 50C.

 

HELD

According to the Tribunal, as per the
provisions of section 54F, where the net consideration in respect of the
original asset is fully invested in the new asset, the whole of the capital
gains is exempt and no part of the consideration can be charged u/s. 45. The
Tribunal agreed with the CIT(A) that the consideration which is actually
received or accrued as a result of transfer has to be invested in the new
asset.  In the instant case, since the
consideration which had accrued to the assessee as per the sale deed was
Rs.24.6 lakhs and the whole of the said consideration was invested in the
capital gains accounts scheme for purchase of the new house property, the
provisions of section 54F(1)(a) were complied with and the assesse was eligible
for deduction in respect of the whole of the capital gains computed u/s.
45. 

 

Introduction Of Group Taxation Regime – A Key To Ease Of Doing Business In India?

It is an undisputed fact that economic growth and tax legislation are inextricably linked together. This would concurrently boost tax revenues and bring debt ratios under control.

An excessively complex tax legislation has an adverse impact on the investment climate of the country. Laws which are unnecessary, unclear, ineffective and disjointed generate an expendable burden on the economy. Even the Guiding Principles for Regulatory Quality and Performance, endorsed by Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member countries, advised governments to “minimise the aggregate regulatory burden on those affected as an explicit objective, to lessen administrative costs for citizens and businesses”, and to “measure the aggregate burdens while also taking account of the benefits of regulation”.

In the recent Indian context, ‘Make in India’ which is a major new national programme of the Government of India, designed to facilitate investment and build best in class manufacturing infrastructure among other things in the country. The primary objective of this initiative is to attract investments from across the globe and strengthen India’s economic growth. This programme is also aimed at improving India’s rank on the ‘Ease of Doing Business’ index by eliminating the unnecessary laws and regulations, making bureaucratic processes easier, making the government more transparent, responsive and accountable. Though India has jumped up 30 notches and entered the top 100 rankings on the World Bank’s ‘Ease of Doing Business’ index, thanks to major improvements in indicators such as resolving insolvency, paying taxes, protecting minority investors and getting credit, it still has a long way to go, standing at ranking of 100 out of 190 surveyed countries. A review of the application of tax policies and tax laws in the context of global best practices and implement measures for reforms required in tax administration to enhance its effectiveness and efficiency, is the need of the hour for India. This article discusses the concept of Group Taxation Regime, a suggested effective tax reform, in line with the global best practices which could help India provide some policy support to investors and achieve its political, social and economic objectives.

GROUP TAXATION REGIME

A company diversifies into other fields of business as a part of its strategy. As a part of their strategy, the companies incorporate subsidiary companies with different business objectives due to regulatory requirement, ensure corporate governance or to invite fresh capital from other shareholders. Some businesses have a medium to long gestation period as a company takes time to establish its strategies, markets, financers. The idea of group taxation is to reduce the burden on the holding company as it may be required to inject funds into a loss making company without any reduction in corporate tax. Also, the holding company shall receive a return on its investment only when the subsidiary becomes profitable.

The group taxation regime has been adopted by several countries viz, (a) Australia; (b) Belgium (c) Denmark (d) France (e) Germany (f) Italy (g) New Zealand (h) Spain (i) United Kingdom; and (j) United States of America.    

A group taxation regime permits a group of related companies to be treated as a single taxpayer. Group taxation is designed to reduce the effect that the separate existence of related companies has on the aggregate tax liability of the group. The principles under the group taxation regime for income tax purposes are discussed below:
–    the assets and liabilities of the subsidiary companies are treated as assets and liabilities of the head company;
–    transactions undertaken by the subsidiary companies of the group are treated as transactions of the head company;
–  the head company is liable to pay instalments on behalf of the
consolidated group based upon income derived by all members of the consolidated
group;

   intra-group
transactions are ignored (for example, management fees paid between group
members are not deductible nor assessable for income tax purposes);

  the
head company is liable for the income tax-related liabilities of the
consolidated group that relate to the period of consolidation. However, joint
and several liability is imposed on members of the group in the event that the
head entity defaults;

  eliminate
income and loss recognition on intragroup transactions by providing for deferral
until after the group is terminated or the group member involved leaves the
group;  and

   permit
the offset of losses of one group member against the profits of a related group
member.

Unlike many countries, India does not have a system to consolidate the tax reporting of a group of companies or to offset the profits and losses of the members of a group of companies. The introduction of a system of group taxation would constitute a fundamental change to the Indian tax system. Such a regime could lead to significant benefits like (a) economic efficiency by better aligning the unit of taxation with integrated companies within a group (b) reduce compliance costs for taxpayers as groups of companies would have to apply a single set of tax rules across and deal with only one tax administration; (c) make certain compliance driven tax provisions like specified domestic transfer pricing redundant; (d) give flexibility to organise business activities and engage in internal restructurings and asset transfers without worrying about triggering a net tax; and (e) reduce the cost the government incurs in administration of the tax system including litigation cost.

The specific provisions of group taxation framework vary from country to country. The significant provisions relating to the regime are highlighted below:
    
Eligible Head of tax group (parent): The group tax consolidation laws in most countries consider a domestic company or a permanent establishment of a foreign company who is assessed to tax as per the domestic laws as an eligible parent company. Most of the countries restrict the definition of group companies to resident companies only and non-resident companies are excluded from this relief.  

Group company eligibility: Group taxation includes all legal entities within a group of taxable entities. The criteria is that a company is deemed to control another company if, on the first day of the tax year for which the consolidated regime applies, it satisfies certain requirements. In Spain, the controlling company must directly or indirectly hold at least 75% of the other company’s share capital. In France, at least 95% of the share capital and voting rights of the company must be held, directly or indirectly, by the French company. In New Zealand, a group of resident companies that have 100% common ownership can be considered for consolidated group regime.  The subsidiary company will be deemed to be 100% owned by the parent if the requisite degree of control is met as per the provisions of the group tax regime. The total income/ loss of the subsidiary company will be included in group taxation, even if the parent does not own 100% of a subsidiary. Prima facie, this advantage is given to the holding company of being able to utilise the losses of the subsidiary company although it does not own all the subsidiary’s shares. The minority shareholders will not be able to claim a group relief as they do not meet the requite control requirement. However, if the losses to be set off are restricted to percentage of shareholding, then it would mean that the loss making company in the group will be left with losses that cannot be set off immediately and can only be utilised against the company’s future profits.

Hence, in such scenarios, agreements, if any, made between shareholders may also be important. In several binding international rulings, it has been concluded that even if a company has the majority of the voting rights or the majority of the capital, joint taxation may still be denied due to agreement between shareholders. For instance, a minority shareholder has a veto on important decisions in the company, the majority shareholder cannot be jointly taxed with its subsidiary.  For illustration, in Denmark the tax consolidation regime provides for a cross-border tax consolidation option based on an “all-or-none principle”, which means that (i) either all foreign group entities are included in the Danish tax consolidation group or (ii) none of them are. In case of a veto power provided and exercised by the minority shareholder vide an agreement may cause hindrance for applicability of the group taxation regime for the entire group. In India, companies having 100% shareholding must only be covered within the group tax regime to avoid disparity between shareholders.

Minimum Term: The minimum term for opting for group taxation differs country to country. In Denmark, the minimum period is 10 years, in France and Germany, the minimum period is 5 years.  In Italy, Spain and USA, there is no requirement to opt for a minimum period. In India, having a minimum term of 5 years – 10 years would provide consistency and stability in the tax approach adopted by the group and as well as to the Revenue authorities from an assessment point of view.
    
Net operating loss: In all group relief provisions, only the current year losses and tax depreciation of group companies are available for set-off against the profits of the other companies in the group. In case of subsidiaries that are acquired, no  consideration needs to be given to whether the items are post or pre-acquisition as only the current year losses and tax depreciation are available for relief.

1.Worldwide Corporate Tax Guide, 2017
 2. BDO Joint Taxation in Denmark
  3. IBFD Country Tax Laws

Exiting the group:  A group member may exit the group at any point of time without terminating the group. A company will automatically exit the group as a result of liquidation or sale or merger or if the ownership requirements are not met. On exit, the adjustments made at the consolidated level maybe reassessed according to the standard rules and may give rise to additional tax liability in the hands of the exiting company. The exiting group member’s net operating loss carry forwards realised during the consolidation period would remain with the group. The losses generated while being a member of the consolidated group are transferred to the group and cannot be carried forward at the level of the exiting company when assessing its future taxable income. In France, the question was raised whether the exiting company should be compensated for the losses surrendered to the group. The Supreme Court of France ruled that the compensation given by a parent company to a loss making company subsidiary that exits a group does not constitute taxable income. Correspondingly, the payment is not a deductible expense of the parent company.  

In light of the aforesaid provisions, it can be safely stated with the introduction of group taxation regime, the compliance burden would reduce for companies as intra group taxation would be disregarded and only the ‘real income’ would be taxed. It would also promote stability in corporate structures in India and attract foreign investment in India. The Revenue authorities may be at a disadvantage due to loss of revenue due to setting off of income by way of intra group transactions. However, this is fairly insignificant as compared to the advantages that the introduction of this regime would have to offer. The introduction of a group taxation regime would be a welcome move by the Government and will allow the exchequer to tax the real income which is in line with International tax practices. For illustration, if A Co (holding company) has a profit of Rs. 2 million and A Co’s wholly owned subsidiaries B Co and C Co have a loss of Rs. 0.5 million each. With the introduction of group taxation the real income of A Co i.e Rs. 1 million (2-0.5-0.5) would be liable to tax in India.  

Currently, with the Indian Revenue authorities being well integrated with the wave of automation and digitisation lead by the current Government, the Revenue authorities can keep a real time tab on filings being made in different jurisdictions. For illustration, a company having a head office in jurisdiction X and subsidiaries in various jurisdictions like Y and Z would have to file separate return of income in each of the jurisdictions for each entity. The group taxation regime would require only the holding company to file its return of income in the jurisdiction where its head office is situated. This would lead to reduction in compliance burden for the corporates. Also, the Revenue authorities of the concerned jurisdiction i.e. Y and Z could view the filings made in jurisdiction X.  With easy accessibility of records and integration of the tax systems, a robust infrastructure system is put in place by the tax administrators which makes it feasible to implement the group taxation regime and provide ‘ache din’ to the corporates.

As aptly quoted by Edward VI, the King of England and Ireland, “I wish that the superfluous and tedious statutes were brought into one sum together, and made more plain and short”. We wait with baited breath for India to bridge the gap between its tax legislation and simplify them to further boost economic growth.

REFERENCES
–    BDO, Joint Taxation in Denmark
–   Ernst & Young, Implementation of Group Taxation in South Africa
–   IBFD, Group taxation laws
–    India Brand Equity Foundation
–    Length of a tax legislation a measure of complexity – Office of Tax Simplification, UK
–   Pre and Post Budget Representations, 2017
–    Tax Administration Reform Commission Reports
–    When laws become too complex, Review by UK Parliamentary Counsel
–   Worldwide Corporate Tax Guide, 2017 _

  4. IBFD Group Taxation in France

17 Section 32 read with Explanation 3 – Expenditure incurred on construction of road on Built, Operate and Transfer (“BOT”) basis gives rise to an intangible asset in the form of right to operate the road and collect toll charges, which is in the nature of licence or akin to licence as well as a business or commercial right as envisaged u/s. 32(1) read with Explanation 3 and hence assessee is eligible to claim depreciation on said intangible asset.

ACIT vs. Progressive Constructions Ltd.
(2018) 161 DTR (Hyd)(SB) 289 
ITA No:1845/Hyd/2014
A.Y.:2011-12
Date of Order: 14th February, 2017

FACTS

The assessee
had entered into a Concession Agreement (“C.A.”) with the Government of India
for four laning of National Highway No. 9 on BOT basis. As per this agreement
the assessee was to complete the work at its own cost and maintain the same for
a period of 11 years and seven months. The assessee had incurred a sum of
Rs.214 crores for the said project. The only right allowed to the assessee was
to operate the highway for the concession period of 11 years and 7 months and
to collect toll charges from the vehicles using the highway.

 

During the
assessment proceedings, it was noticed that depreciation at the rate of 25% was
claimed by the assessee on opening written down value of built, operate and
transfer (BOT) highway of Rs 40,07,94,526. The assessee had completed the
construction in financial year 2008-09 and had claimed depreciation @ 10% on
the said asset treating it as building. However from assessment year 2010-11,
assessee had started treating the asset as an intangible asset in terms of
section 32(1)(ii) of the Act. However, the AO disallowed the claim of
depreciation on the basis that assessee is not the owner of the asset and also
assessee has not maintained consistency in its claim of depreciation.

Thus, being
aggrieved by the disallowance of depreciation, an appeal was preferred before
CIT(A). The CIT(A) noting that the claim of depreciation being allowed by the
Tribunal in case of said assessee in preceding previous year, allowed the claim
of depreciation in the impugned assessment year. Aggrieved by the CIT(A)’s
order, the Department preferred an appeal before ITAT. A Special Bench was
constituted to dispose the appeal filed by the Department against the order of
CIT(A). The only point under consideration before Special Bench was whether the
expenditure incurred for construction of road under BOT contract with
Government gives rise to an asset and if so, whether it is an intangible asset
or tangible asset.

 

HELD

The assessee
had incurred expenses of Rs 214 crores and Government of India was not obliged
to reimburse the cost incurred. Thus, the only way in which the assessee can
recoup the cost incurred was to operate the bridge during the concession period
of 11 years and seven months and collect toll thereon. Thus, by investing such
huge sum of Rs 214 crores, the assessee had obtained a valuable business right
to operate the project facility and collect toll charges.This right in form of operating the project and collecting the toll is an intangible asset created by
the assessee by incurring expenses of Rs 214 crores.

 

It is necessary
now to examine whether such intangible asset comes within the scope and ambit
of section 32(1)(ii).It is the claim of assessee that the right acquired under
C.A to operate the project facility and collect toll charges is in the nature
of licence. Since licence is not defined under the Income-tax Act 1961, the
definition of licence under the Indian Easements Act, 1882 has to be seen. If
the facts of the present case are examined vis-a-vis the definition of licence
under the Indian Easements Act, 1882, it is clear that assessee has only been
granted a limited right by virtue of C.A. to execute and operate the project
during the concession period, on expiry of which the project/ project facility
will revert back to the Government. What the Government of India has granted to
the assessee is the right to use the project site during the concession period
and in the absence of such right, it would have been unlawful on the part of
the concessionaire to do or continue to do anything on such property. However,
the right granted to the concessionaire has not created any right, title or
interest over the property. The right granted by the Government of India to the
assessee under the C.A. has a license permitting the assessee to do certain
acts and deeds which otherwise would have been unlawful or not possible to do
in the absence of the C.A. Thus, the right granted to the assessee under the
C.A. to operate the project / project facility and collect toll charges is a
license or akin to license, hence, being an intangible asset is eligible for
depreciation u/s. 32(1)(ii) of the Act.

 

Even assuming
that the right granted under the C.A. is not a license or akin to license, it
requires examination whether it can still be considered as an intangible asset
as described u/s. 32(1)(ii) of the Act. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in CIT vs.
Smifs Securities (2012) 348 ITR 302
after interpreting the definition of
intangible asset as provided in Explanation 3 to section 32(1), while opining
that principle of ejusdem generis would strictly apply in interpreting
the definition of intangible asset as provided by Explanation 3(b) of section
32, at the same time, held that even applying the said principle ‘goodwill’
would fall under the expression “any other business or commercial rights
of similar nature”. Thus, as could be seen, even though, ‘goodwill’ is not
one of the specifically identifiable assets preceding the expressing “any
other business or commercial rights of similar nature”, however, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court held that ‘goodwill’ will come within the expression
“any other business or commercial rights of similar nature”.
Therefore, the contention of the learned Senior Standing Counsel that to come
within the expression “any other business or commercial rights of similar
nature” the intangible asset should be akin to any one of the specifically
identifiable assets is not a correct interpretation of the statutory
provisions. It has been held by the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in case of Areva
T&D India Ltd
. that the legislature did not intend to provide for
depreciation only in respect of specified intangible assets but also to other
categories of intangible assets which were neither visible nor possible to
exhaustively enumerate. It also observed that any intangible assets which are
invaluable and result in smoothly carrying on the business of the assessee
would come within the expression “any other business or commercial rights of
similar nature”. Thus, the right to operate the toll road and collect toll
charges is a business or commercial right as envisaged u/s. 32(1)(ii) read with
Explanation 3(b).

 

Further the
assessee neither in the preceding assessment years nor in the impugned
assessment year has claimed the expenditure (amount invested/ expenses
incurred) as deferred revenue expenditure, hence there is no scope to examine
whether the expenditure could have been amortized over the concession period in
terms of CBDT Circular No. 9 of 2014 dated 23rd April, 2014. The aforesaid CBDT
circular is for the benefit of the assessee and such benefits shall be granted
only if the assessee claims it. The benefit of the circular cannot be thrust
upon the assessee if it is not claimed.

 

Thus the right
granted to the assessee to operate the road and collect toll is a licence or
akin to licence as well as a business or commercial right as envisaged u/s.
32(1) read with Explanation 3 and hence, assessee is eligible to claim
depreciation on said intangible asset.

Article 13(4) of India-UK DTAA –Payments made for consultancy services cannot be termed as technical services merely because consultancy services has technical inputs-Merely because the recipient of a technical consultancy services learns something with each consultancy, it cannot be considered as satisfying the make available condition.

12.
[2018] 93 taxmann.com 20 (Ahd)

DCIT vs.
BioTech Vision Care (P) Ltd. 

ITA No. :
1388, 2766 & 3154 (AHD.) OF 2014

A.Y.s:
2009-10 to 2011-12

Date of
Order: 18th April, 2018

 

Article 13(4) of India-UK DTAA –Payments made for
consultancy services cannot be termed as technical services merely because
consultancy services has technical inputs-Merely because the recipient of a
technical consultancy services learns something with each consultancy, it
cannot be considered as satisfying the make available condition.

 

Facts

Taxpayer, an Indian entity, made payments to a UK based
company (FCo) for consultancy services in specified areas2. The Taxpayer contended that payment made
to UK Co for such services qualified as business income and in absence of a PE
of the Taxpayer in India, such income was not taxable in India. Thus, Taxpayer
made payments to FCo, without withholding taxes at source.

 

 

AO contended that the payments made to FCo were in the
nature of ‘FTS’ under Article 13 of the India-UK DTAA. Thus, the AO disallowed
the payments made to FCo u/s. 40(a)(i) for failure to withhold taxes on such
payments. Aggrieved, the Taxpayer appealed before CIT(A).

 

CIT(A) deleted the disallowance by holding that the
services rendered by FCo did not make available any technical knowledge, skill
or knowhow and hence it did not qualify as FTS under article 13 of India-UK
DTAA.

 

Aggrieved, the AO appealed before the Tribunal.

 

Held

As per the terms of service
agreement between the Taxpayer and FCo, FCo was obliged to provide technical
advices on phone/fax/ email as and when required. It also required FCo to
provide for consultancy services to the Taxpayer in the specified areas.

The make available condition in
the FTS article can be considered to be satisfied only when there is a transfer
of technology in the sense that recipient of service is enabled to provide the
same service on his own, without recourse to the original service provider.
Reliance in this regard was placed on the decision in the case of CESC Ltd.
vs. DCIT [(2003) 87 ITD TM 653 (Kol)]
.

Merely because the consultancy
services provided by FCo had technical inputs, such services do not become
technical services. Further, simply because the recipient of a technical
consultancy services learns something with each consultancy, there is no
transfer of technology in a manner that the recipient of service is enabled to
provide the same service without recourse to the service provider.

        Thus, consultancy services
rendered by FCo does not satisfy the make available condition and hence it does
not qualify as FTS under the India-UK DTAA.

[1] Exact scope of services availed is not
clear from the ruling.

Article 12 of India-USA DTAA; Section 9(1)(vii), 40(a)(i) of the Act – Rendering of service through deployment of personnel having requisite experience and skill which could not have been performed by service recipient on its own without recourse to the service provider, did not qualify as FIS under the India-USA DTAA.

11. (2018) 92 taxmann.com 407

ACIT vs.
Petronet LNG Ltd.

ITA No. :
865/Del/2011

A.Y.:
2006-07

Date of Order:
6th April, 2018

 

Article 12 of India-USA DTAA; Section 9(1)(vii), 40(a)(i)
of the Act – Rendering of service through deployment of personnel having
requisite experience and skill which could not have been performed by service
recipient on its own without recourse to the service provider, did not qualify
as FIS under the India-USA DTAA.

 

Facts

Taxpayer, an Indian company availed certain consultancy
services from a U.S. company (FCo). As part of the service agreement, FCo, was
required to evaluate different types of LNG vaporizers, recommend a suitable
form of vaporiser and study the benefits of various schemes for generating
power through utilisation of LNG study.

 

Taxpayer contended that the payments made to FCo were
covered by Article 23 (other income) of the DTAA and hence was taxable only in
the residence state i.e. US. AO however contended that the payment made by
Taxpayer was in the nature of fee for technical services (FTS) as defined u/s.
9(1)(vii) of the Act and accordingly, disallowed the payments made by the
Taxpayer for failure to withhold taxes on the same.

 

Aggrieved, the Taxpayer appealed before the CIT(A). The
CIT(A) deleted the disallowance. Aggrieved the AO appealed before the Tribunal.

 

Held

 Article 12(4) of the India-US
treaty provides for a restrictive meaning of ‘fee for included services (FIS) vis-a-vis
the meaning of FTS under the Act. Under the DTAA, FIS is defined to include
only those technical/consultancy services which are ancillary and subsidiary to
the application/enjoyment of right, property or information or which ‘make
available’ technical knowledge, skill, knowhow, process etc.

 As explained in the Memorandum of
Understanding entered into, between India and USA, technology is considered to
be ‘made available’ only when the person acquiring the service is able to apply
such technology on his own.

Services provided by FCo involved
use of technical knowledge or skill. Although mere rendering of services
involving technical knowledge, skill etc. could qualify as FTS under the
Act, it would not qualify as FIS under Article 12(4) of the DTAA.

The scope of services rendered by
FCo involved deployment of personnel having the requisite experience and skill
to perform the services. Having regard to the nature of services, it was not
possible for the Taxpayer to carry out such services in future on its own
without recourse to the service provider. Hence, services rendered by FCo did
not qualify as FIS under Article 12(4) of the India-US DTAA. The services were
not taxable in India and accordingly no disallowance is warranted for alleged
default of withholding tax.

[1] It is not clear why
taxpayer resorted to other income article rather than rely on the proposition
that non –FIS overseas services rendered by US Company does not trigger tax in
absence of PE.


Article 7(1) of India-USA DTAA; Section 9(1)(i), 40(a)(i), 195 of the Act –Support services obtained from an associate entity in USA under a service agreement- Services were rendered within India as well as from outside India – payments for services rendered from outside India not subject to withholding as there was no involvement of PE in India while rendering such services.

10.  TS-190-ITAT-2018(Mum)

DCIT vs. Transamerica Direct Marketing
Consultants Pvt. Ltd.

ITA No. : 1978/MUM/2015

A.Y. : 2010-11

Date of Order: 19th
March, 2018

 

Article
7(1) of India-USA DTAA; Section 9(1)(i), 40(a)(i), 195 of the Act –Support
services  obtained from an associate
entity in USA under a service agreement- Services were rendered within India as
well as from outside India – payments for services rendered from outside India
not subject to withholding as there was no involvement of PE in India while
rendering such services.

 

Taxpayer,
a resident company, is engaged in the business of direct marketing activities
as well as providing management, scientific, technical and advisory consultancy
services in India. It obtained bundle of support services such as information
support system, marketing and new business development, new product
development, actuarial services, accounting support services, internal audit
etc.
from its associated entity in U.S.A (FCo). The services were rendered
by FCo both from outside India as well as within India.

 

While
making payments for services, Taxpayer withheld taxes only on the amount
pertaining to services rendered within India on the basis that FCo had a
service PE w.r.t such activities and thus profits were taxable in India under
Article 7(1) of the India-US DTAA. However, no withholding was made on payments
made for services received from outside India on the basis that such services
could not be attributed to the Service PE of FCo in India and the payments were
also not in the nature of Fees for Included Services (FIS) as defined under the
treaty. Accordingly, such amounts were not claimed to be taxable in India.

 

The
AO disallowed the payments attributable to services rendered from outside India
on the basis that such services were also taxable in India since the recipient
(being beneficiary) of the services is located in India.

 

Aggrieved,
the Taxpayer appealed before CIT(A).

 

The
CIT(A) placed reliance on the decisions in cases of Ishikawajima-Harima
Heavy Industries Ltd. vs. DIT (228 ITR 408 (SC)), WNS North America Inc.(ITA
No. 8621/Mum/2010) and Morgan Stanley & Co. (292 ITR 416)
to conclude
that payments made for services, not in the nature of FIS, rendered by the FCo
from outside India were not taxable in India and hence no disallowance is
needed for alleged failure to withhold tax. Aggrieved, AO appealed before the
Tribunal.

 

Held

       As per beneficiary test laid down by AO,
if the service recipient is in India, the payments for such services are
taxable in India. However, such test is relevant for the purpose of evaluating
the taxability of ‘fees for technical services’ in the hands of non-resident
recipient u/s. 9(1)(vii) of the Act. Whereas, in this case, the amount paid to
FCo under the service agreement is in the nature of ‘business profits’ which is
taxable under Article 7 of DTAA.

Reliance placed by CIT(A) on the case of WNS
North America Inc.(ITA No. 8621/Mum/2010)
, later approved by Bombay HC, was
correct where on similar facts, Mumbai ITAT had held that the amount received
for services rendered outside India cannot be said to accrue or arise in India
or deem to accrue or arise in India. Even the existence of a service PE in
India would not impact the taxability of offsite services if there is no
involvement of the PE in rendering of such services.

Services rendered by the employees of FCo
deputed to India are attributable to the service PE in India. However, services
rendered by the employees from outside India, are not attributable to the PE in
India and thus, not liable to be taxed in India.

 



Provisions Of TDS Under Section 195 – An Update – Part I

In
view of increasing cross border transactions which Indian enterprises have with
the non-residents, section 195 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [the Act] dealing
with deduction of tax at source from payments to non-residents has assumed huge
importance over the years. Many amendments have taken place in the section(s),
relevant rules and forms relating to deduction of tax at source from payments
to non-residents. In addition, due huge litigation in this regard, there have
been plethora of judicial pronouncements and cleavage of judicial opinions on
various contentious issues. In this series of articles, we are dealing with the
amended provisions as well as various important judicial pronouncements and
practical issues relating to TDS u/s. 195.

 

In
view of the vastness of the subject, plethora of issues, judicial
pronouncements and space limitations, at various places we have only referred
to relevant statutory provisions, CBDT Circulars and Instructions and judicial
pronouncements. For a better understanding of the issues, reader is advised to
study the same in detail.

 

1.
Overview of Relevant Provisions

 

1.1     Relevant sections

 

Section

Particulars

195(1)

Scope
and conditions of applicability

195(2)

Application
by the ‘payer’ to the Assessing Officer [AO]

195(3),
(4) & (5)

Application
by the ‘payee’ to the AO, validity of certificate issued by the AO, Powers of
CBDT to make rules by issuing Notifications re s/s. (3)

195(6)

Furnish
the information relating to the payment of any sum under s/s. (1)

195(7)

Power
of CBDT to specify class of persons or cases where application to AO u/s.
195(2) compulsory

195A

Grossing
up of tax

197

Certificate
for deduction at lower rate

206AA

Requirement
to furnish Permanent Account Number

90(2)

Application
of Act or Treaty, whichever more beneficial

90(4)

Tax
Residency Certificate

94A(5)

Special
Measures in respect of transactions with persons located in notified
jurisdictional area

 

 

1.2     Other TDS provisions for payments to
non-residents

Section

Applicable to

Rate

192

Payment
of Salary

Average
Rate

194B

Winnings
from lottery or crossword puzzle or card game and other game of any sort

Rate
in force

194BB

Winnings
from horse races

Rate
in force

194E

Payment
to non-resident sportsmen or sports associations

20%

194LB

Interest
to non-resident by an Infrastructure Debt fund

5%

194LBA
(2) & (3)

Income
[referred in section 115UA of the nature referred in section 10(23FC) and
10(23FCA)] from units of a business trust to its unit holders

5%
/rate in force

194LBB

Income
[other than referred in section 10(23FBB)]in respect of units of investment
fund

Rate
in force

194LC

Interest
to non-resident by an Indian company or a business trust under approved loan
agreements or on long term Infra Bonds approved by Central Govt.

5%

194LD

Interest
to FIIs or QFIs on rupees denominated bonds or Government security

5%

196B

Income
from units u/s. 115AB purchased in foreign currency or Long-term capital
gains [LTCG] arising from transfer of such units

10%

196C

Interest,
Dividends or LTCG from Foreign Currency bonds or shares referred in section
115AC

10%

196D

Interest,
Dividends or Capital Gains of FIIs from securities (Other than interest
covered by section 194LD) referred in section 115AD (1)(a)

20%

 

 

1.3     Relevant Rules and Forms

 

Rule

Particulars

26

Rate
of exchange for the purpose of deduction of tax at Source on income payable
in foreign currency

115

Rate
of exchange for conversion into rupees of income expressed in foreign
currency

21AB

Certificate
(Form 10F) for claiming relief under an agreement referred to in section 90
and 90A

28(1),
28AA, 28AB & 29

Application
and Certificate for deduction of tax at lower rates

29B

Application
for Certificate u/s.195(3) authorising receipt of interest and other sums
without deduction of tax

37BB

Furnishing
of Information for payment to a non-resident, not being a company, or to a
Foreign Company

37BC

Relaxation
from deduction of tax at higher rate u/s 206AA

Form

Particulars

15CA

Information
to be furnished for payment to a non-resident, not being a company, or to a
Foreign Company

15CB

Certificate
of an Accountant

13

Application
for a Certificate u/s. 197

15C
& 15D

Application
u/rule 29B by a Banking Company and by any other person

10F

Information
to be provided u/s. 90(5) or 90A(5)

27Q

Quarterly
statement of deduction of tax u/s. 200(3) in respect of payments (other than
salary) made to non-residents

 

 

2.
Section 195 (1)

 

Other
sums.

 

195. (1) Any person responsible for paying to a non-resident, not being a
company, or to a foreign company, any interest (not being interest referred to
in section 194LB or section 194LC or section 194LD) or any other sum
chargeable under the provisions of this Act
(not being income chargeable
under the head “Salaries”) shall, at
the time of credit
of such income to the account of the payee or at the time of payment thereof in cash
or by the issue of a cheque or draft or by any other mode, whichever is earlier, deduct income-tax
thereon at the rates in force:

 

Provided that ….

 

Provided
further

that no such deduction shall be made in respect of any dividends referred to in
section 115-O.

 

Explanation
1
.—For
the purposes of this section, where any interest or other sum as aforesaid is
credited to any account, whether called “Interest payable account”
or “Suspense account” or by any other name
, in the books of
account of the person liable to pay such income, such crediting shall be
deemed to be credit of such income
to the account of the payee and the
provisions of this section shall apply accordingly.

 

Explanation
2.
—For
the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that the obligation to
comply with s/s. (1) and to make deduction thereunder applies and shall be
deemed to have always applied and extends and shall be deemed to have always
extended to all persons, resident or non-resident, whether or not the
non-resident person has—

 

(i) a
residence or place of business or business connection in India; or

 

(ii)        any
other presence in any manner whatsoever in India.”

2.1     Section 195(1) – Exclusions

 

The following are excluded from the scope
of section 195(1):

 

(i)  Interest
referred to in section 194LB or section 194LC or section 194LD.

(ii) Income
chargeable under the head “Salaries”.

(iii)       Dividends
referred to in section 115-O.

(iv)       Sum
not chargeable to tax in India.

 

a.  Non-chargeability
either due to Act or Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement [DTAA]. DTAA benefit
subject to obtaining TRC/Form 10F from the non-resident payee.

 

b.  Due
to scope of total income u/s. 5 or exemption u/s. 10.

 

c.  No
TDS on amounts exempt u/s. 10 – Hyderabad Industries Ltd. vs. ITO 188 ITR
749 (Kar).

 

d.  Income
from specified services such as online advertisement, digital advertising space
subject to Equalisation Levy (Chapter VIII of Finance Act 2016) – Exempt
u/s. 10(50).

 

(v) Section
172 – Profits of non-residents from Occasional Shipping Business

 

a.  CBDT
Cir. No. 723 dated 19.09.1995 – Payments to shipping agents of non-resident
ship owners – Provisions of section 172 apply and section 194C/195 will not
apply.

 

b.  CBDT
Cir. No. 732 dated 20.12.1995 – Annual No Objection Certificate u/s. 172 to be
issued by AO where Article 8 of DTAA applies – declaration that only
international traffic during period of validity of certificate.

 

c.  CIT
vs. V. S. Dempo & Co (P) Ltd. 381 ITR 303 (Bom)
– Section 195 not
applicable to shipping profits governed by section 172 and section 44B.

 

(vi)       Where
certificate is obtained by the payee u/s 197 for non-deduction of TDS and such
certificate is in force (not cancelled), then the payer cannot be treated as
assessee in default for non-deduction of TDS – CIT vs. Bovis Lend Lease
(I) Ltd. 241 Taxman 312 (SC).

2.2     Scope of section 195 (1) – Inclusions

 

(i)  Any
person
responsible for paying to a non-resident, not being a company or a
Foreign Company is covered in the scope of section 195(1). It includes all
taxable entities and there is no exclusion for individual/HUF.

 

(ii) The
term person includes a local authority. In CIT vs. Warner Hindustan
Limited 158 ITR 51 (AP),
the court while holding that the expression
“person” includes a Department of a foreign government like USAID held that “As
observed by us already the expression “person” is of wide connotation and it
includes, in our opinion, the Department of a foreign Government like USAID.
Learned counsel for the assessee invited our attention to a decision in Madras
Electric Supply Corporation Ltd. vs. Boar land (Inspector of Taxes) [1935] 27
ITR 612 (HL), to support the proposition that the expression “person” includes
Crown. We find that the above-referred decision supports the view that a
Government falls within the meaning of the expression “person”.”

 

(iii)       Section
195 includes residents as well as non-residents. Following the decision of the
Supreme Court in the case of Vodafone International Holdings BV vs. Union
of India 341 ITR 1 (SC)
, Explanation 2 has been
inserted by the
Finance Act, 2012 with retrospective effect from 1.4.1962, which clearly
provides that ‘For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that
the obligation to comply with sub-section (1) and to make deduction thereunder
applies and shall be deemed to have always applied and extends and shall be
deemed to have always extended to all persons, resident or non-resident,

whether or not the non-resident person has (i) a residence or place of business
or business connection in India; or (ii) any other presence in any manner
whatsoever in India.

 

(iv)       If
a person is treated as agent of a non-resident u/s.163, the same person cannot
be proceeded u/s. 201 at the same time for non-deduction of TDS on payment to
non-resident. CIT vs. Premier Tyres Ltd. 134 ITR 17 (Bom).

 

(v) The
term Non-Resident includes a Non-resident Indian. However, it does not include
a person who is Resident but Not Ordinarily Resident [RNOR]. It is important to
note that the term non-resident includes RNOR for the purposes of sections 92,
93 and 168 but  not for the purposes of
section 195.

 

(vi)       Residential
status of a person i.e. whether he is resident or non-resident based on the
physical presence test in India of more 182 days in the current year may not be
known till year end. A question arises as to in the initial months of a
financial year, how it has to be determined as to a person is non-resident or
not.

 

Whether earlier year’s residential status
can be adopted in such cases? The Authority for Advance Ruling [AAR] in the
case of Robert W. Smith vs. CIT 212 ITR 275 (AAR) and Monte Harris vs.
CIT 218 ITR 413 (AAR)
, for purposes of determining the residential
status of an applicant u/s. 245Q, held that it appears more practical and
reasonable for purposes of determining the residential status of an applicant
u/s. 245Q to look at the position in the earlier previous year, i.e., the
financial year immediately preceding the financial year in which the
application is made. In the Monte Harris’s case, the AAR observed as follows:

 

“An application may be presented soon
after the commencement of the financial year. It may also have to be disposed
of before the end of that financial year. In that event, both on the date of
the application as well as on the date on which the application is heard and
disposed of, it may not be possible in all cases to predict with reasonable
accuracy whether the stay of the applicant in India during that financial year
will exceed 182 days or not. In other words, it will be difficult to determine
the residential status of the applicant with reference to the previous year of
the date of application. The expression ‘previous year’ should be so construed
as to be applicable uniformly to all cases. It cannot be said that a previous
year should be taken as the financial year in which the application is made
provided the stay of the applicant up to the date of the application or the
estimated stay of the applicant in India in that financial year exceeds 182
days and that it should be the previous year preceding that financial year in
case it is not possible to determine the duration of the stay of the applicant
in India in the financial year in which the application is made. It appears
more practical and reasonable for purposes of determining the residential status
of an applicant under section 245Q to look at the position in the earlier
previous year, i.e., the financial year immediately preceding the financial
year in which the application is made. This is a period with reference to which
the residential status of the applicant in every case can be determined without
any ambiguity whatsoever. In the instant case, though the applicant was
resident in India in the financial year 1994-95 during which the application
had been made, he was non-resident in India during the immediately preceding
financial year, i.e., 1993-94. The applicant must, therefore, be treated as a
non-resident for the purposes of the instant application. The application was,
therefore, maintainable.”

 

It remains to be judicially tested as to
whether a similar stand can be taken for the purposes of section 195(1).

 

(vii) In respect of TDS from the payment
to an agent of a non-resident in the following cases it was held that the payer
is required to deduct tax at source:

   Narsee
Nagsee & Co. vs. CIT 35 ITR 134 (Bom).

   R.
Prakash [2014] 64 SOT 10 (Bang.)

 

However, in the case of Tecumseh Products
(I) Ltd. [2007] 13 SOT 489 (Hyd.), the ITAT, on the facts of the case, held
that the assessee was not liable to TDS as the primary responsibility for payment
of interest was of the Bank and not of the assessee, though later on the bank
may recover the amount of interest paid by it from the assessee. In this
regard, the ITAT held as follows:

 

“In the instant case, the question for
consideration was as to who was responsible for making payment of interest to
the non-resident bank. Admittedly, the interest was paid by Andhra Bank and not
by the assessee. The case of the department was that since the bank had paid
interest on behalf of the assessee as an agent, the assessee was responsible
for making deduction of tax before payment. It was not in dispute that in terms
of letter of credit, non-resident bank negotiated with the Andhra Bank for
payment of interest on late payment. When the supplier presented the letter of
credit and negotiated the same through non-resident bank in terms of letter of
credit, Andhra Bank was bound to pay interest in case of any late payment. The
Andhra Bank might recover the payment from the assessee, but the immediate
responsibility was that of Andhra Bank and not the assessee. The Legislature
has used the words “any person responsible for paying”. In instant
case, the responsibility was of Andhra Bank and not of the assessee. The
payment might have been made on behalf of the assessee but that did not take
away the responsibility of Andhra Bank from paying interest to the foreign
bank. Therefore, it might not be proper to say that the assessee failed to
deduct tax while paying interest to the foreign banker.”

(viii) The term ‘any person’ includes a
foreign company, whether it is resident in India or not. It also includes
Indian branch of foreign company.

a)  Section
195(3) and Rule 29B contains relevant provisions regarding grant of a
certificate by the AO authorising such a branch to receive interest or other
sum without TDS as long as the certificate is force.

 

b)  A
foreign company having a branch or office in India is also covered. ITO vs.
Intel Tech India P. Ltd. 32 SOT 227 (Bang)
.

 

However, it is to be noted that payments
to foreign branch of an Indian company is not covered under the provisions of
section 195.

 

c)  Payment
by a branch to HO/Other foreign branch.

 

There is a cleavage of judicial
pronouncements on the subject. However, in respect of payment of interest by
the PE of a foreign bank, the law has been amended by insertion of Explanation
to section 9(1)(v), which has been explained below.

 

i. TDS Required: CBDT
Circular 740 dtd 17.4.1996 – Branch of a foreign company is a separate entity
and hence payment of interest by branch to HO is taxable u/s. 115A subject to
provisions of applicable DTAA.

 

Dresdner Bank [2007] 108 ITD 375 (Mum.).

 

CBDT Circular No. 649 dated 31st
March 1993 providing for treatment of technical expenses when being remitted to
Head Office of a non-resident enterprise by its branch office in India requires
that the branch – permanent establishment – should ensure tax deduction at
source in such cases in accordance with the provisions of section 195 of the
Act.

 

ii.  TDS
Not Required:
In the following cases it was held that TDS u/s 195 is
not applicable.

 

ABN Amro Bank NV vs. CIT [2012] 343 ITR
81(Cal),

Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi Ltd vs. DIT 53
taxmann.com 105 (Cal),

 

Deutsche Bank AG vs. ADIT 65 SOT 175
(Mum),
and

Sumitomo Mitsui Bank Corpn vs. DDIT [2012]
136 ITD 66 (Mum)(SB).

 

iii. Amendment
vide Finance Act 2015 w.e.f 1.4.2016

 

Interest deemed to accrue or arise in
India u/s. 9(1)(v). Explanation inserted to section 9(1)(v) reads as follows:

 

“Explanation: for the purposes of this
clause,-

(a) it
is hereby declared that in the case of a non-resident, being
a person
engaged in the business of banking
, any interest payable by the
permanent establishment in India of such non-resident to the head office or any
permanent establishment or any other part of such non-resident outside India
shall be deemed to accrue or arise in India and shall be chargeable to tax in
addition to any income attributable to the permanent establishment in India and
the permanent establishment in India shall
be deemed to be a person
separate and independent of the non-resident person
of which it is a
permanent establishment and the provisions of the Act relating to computation
of total income,
determination of tax and collection and recovery
shall apply accordingly;”

 

Thus,

  The
aforesaid Explanation is applicable to non-resident engaged in business of
banking.

 

  Interest
payable by Indian PE to HO, any PE or any other part of such NON-RESIDENT
outside India deemed to accrue or arise in India.

 

  Chargeable
to tax in addition to any income attributable to PE in India.

 

  PE
in India deemed to be separate and independent of the NON-RESIDENT of which it
is a PE.

 

  Provisions
relating to computation of total income, determination of tax and collection
and recovery to apply accordingly.

 

2.3     Scope of section 195 (1) – Sum Chargeable
to Tax

 

(i)  Transmission
Corpn of AP Ltd. vs. CIT 239 ITR 587 (SC)

 

a)  Payment
to non-resident towards purchase of machinery and erection and commissioning
thereof.

 

b)  Assessee’s
contention – Section 195 applies only in respect of sums comprising of pure
income or profit.

c)  Held
that:                                                  

 

• TDS applicable not only to amount which
wholly bears income character but also to sums partially comprising of income.

• Obligation to deduct tax limited to
portion of the income chargeable to tax.

• Section 195 is for tentative deduction
of tax and by deducting tax, rights of the parties are not adversely affected.

 
Rights of parties safeguarded by sections 195(2), 195(3) and 197.

 
File application to AO – If no application filed, tax to be deducted.

 

(ii) GE
India Technology Centre (P.) Ltd. vs. CIT [2010] 193 Taxman 234 (SC)

 

The interpretation of the decision of SC
in the Transmission Corporation’s case (supra) was subject matter of litigation
in many cases and the issue once again came up for resolution before the
Supreme Court in this case. The SC held as under:

 

a)  The
moment there is a remittance out of India, it does not trigger section 195. The
payer is bound to deduct tax only if the sum is chargeable to tax in India read
with section 4, 5 and 9.

 

b)  Section
195 not only covers amounts which represents pure income payments, but also
covers composite payments which has an element of income embedded in them.

 

c)  However,
obligation to deduct TDS on such composite payments would be limited to the
appropriate proportion of income forming part of the gross sum.

 

d)  If
payer is fairly certain, then he can make his own determination as to whether
the tax is deductible at source and if so, what should be the amount thereof,
without approaching the AO.

 

(iii)       Instruction
No. 2 of 2014 dated 26-2-2014 directing that in a case where the assessee fails
to deduct tax u/s. 195 of the Act, the AO shall determine the appropriate proportion of the
sum chargeable to tax as mentioned in sub-section (1) of section 195 to
ascertain the tax liability on which the deductor shall be deemed to be an
assessee in default u/s. 201 of the Act, and the appropriate proportion of the
sum will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case taking into account
nature of remittances, income component therein or any other fact relevant to
determine such appropriate proportion.

 

(iv)       Tax
withholding from payment in kind / Exchange etc.

 

TDS u/s. 195 is required to be deducted.

 

a)  Kanchanganga
Sea Foods Ltd. vs. CIT 325 ITR 540 (SC).

 

b)  Biocon
Biopharmaceuticals (P) Ltd. vs. ITO 144 ITD 615 (Bang).

 

However, in the context of distribution of
prizes to customers wholly in kind (section 194B) and receipt of Certificate of
Development Rights against voluntarily surrender of the land by the landowner,
it has been held in the following cases that TDS provisions are not applicable:

 

c)  CIT
vs. Hindustan Lever Ltd. (2014) 264 CTR 93 (Kar)

 

d)  CIT(TDS)
vs. Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagar Palike (ITA No. 94 and 466 of 2015)(Kar).

 

(v) Payments
by one non-resident to another non-resident inside / outside India

 

a)  Asia
Satellite Telecommunications Co. Ltd. vs. DCIT 85 ITD 478 (Del)
– Source of
Income in India, are covered by section 195.

 

b)  Vodafone
International Holding B.V. vs. UoI [2012] 17 taxmann.com 202 (SC).

 

(vi)       For
non-compliance by a non-resident of TDS provisions, section 201 not applicable
if recipient pays advance tax.

 

a)  AP
Power generation Corporation Ltd. vs. ACIT 105 ITD 423.

2.4     Sum Chargeable to Tax – TDS Guidelines

 

Situation

Consequences

Entire payment not chargeable to tax

Not
required to withhold tax.

 Entire payment subject to tax

Tax
should be withheld.

Part of payment subject to tax

Tax
should be withheld on the appropriate proportion of sum chargeable to tax

[CBDT Instruction No. 2/2014 dated 26 February 2014].

Part of payment subject to tax in India – Payer unable to
determine appropriate portion of the sum chargeable to tax

Apply
to AO for determination of TDS.

Payer believes that tax should be withheld but payee does not
agree

Approach
the AO for determination of TDS.

 

 

2.5     Chargeability to tax governed by provisions
of Act/DTAA

 

Nature of Income

Act (Apart from section 5, wherever applicable)

Treaty

Business/Profession

Section
9(1)(i) – Taxable if business connection in India

Article
5, 7 and 14 – Taxable if income is attributable to a Permanent Establishment
in India

Salary
Income

Section
9(1)(ii) – Taxable if services are rendered in India

Article
15 – Taxable if the employment is exercised in India (subject to short stay
exemption)

Dividend
Income

Section
9(1)(iv), section 115A – Taxable if paid by an Indian Company (At present
exempt)

Article
10 – Taxable if paid by an Indian Company

Interest
Income

Section
9(1)(v), section 115A – Taxable if deemed to arise in India

Article
11- Taxable if interest income arises in India

Royalties
/ FTS

Section
9(1)(vi), section 115A – Taxable if deemed to arise in India

Article
12 – Taxable if royalty/ FTS arises in India

Capital
Gains

Section
9(1)(i), section 45 – Taxable if situs of shares / property in India

Article
13 – Generally taxable if the situs of shares/ property in India.

 

 

 

As
per the provisions of section 90(2), provisions of the Act or DTAA, whichever
is beneficial, prevails.

 

2.6     Scope of section 195 (1) – Time of
deduction

 

(i)  Twin
conditions for attracting section 195

For
payer – credit or payment of income

  For
payee – Sum chargeable to tax in India

 

(ii) On
credit or payment, whichever is earlier

  CIT
vs. Toshoku Ltd. [1980] 125 ITR 525 (SC)
;

  United
Breweries Ltd. vs. ACIT [1995] 211 ITR 256 (Kar);

  Flakt
(India) Ltd. [2004] 139 Taxman 238 (AAR)
.

  Broadcom
India Research (P) Ltd. vs. DCIT [2015] 55 taxmann.com 456 (Bang.).

 

(iii)       Merely
on the basis of a book entry passed by the payer no income accrues to the
non-resident recipient

  ITO
vs. Pipavav Shipyard Ltd. Mumbai ITAT – [2014] 42 taxmann.com 159 (Mum-Trib)
.

 

(iv)       1st
Proviso to section 195(1) provides exception for interest payment by Government
or public sector bank or a public financial institution i.e. deduction shall be
made only at the time of payment thereof.

 

(v) TDS
from Royalties and FTS at the time of payment:

  DCIT
vs. Uhde Gmbh 54 TTJ 355 (Bom) [India-Germany DTAA]

  National
Organic Chemical Industries Ltd. vs. DCIT 96 TTJ 765 (Mum) [India-Switzerland
and India-USA DTAA]

(vi)       When
FEMA/RBI approval awaited,

  United
Breweries Ltd. vs. ACIT 211 ITR 256
– Liability at the time of credit in
the books even if approval received later on.

  ACIT
vs. Motor Industries Ltd. 249 ITR 141
– It was held that the assessee was
not liable to interest u/s. 201(1A) since it was not obliged to deduct tax at source in respect of
amounts credited in its books for period when agreement was not in force as
foreign collaborator would have got a right to enforce its right to receive
payment only on conclusion of said agreement, (which was pending for approval).

 

(vii) TDS liability u/s. 195 when
adjustment of amount payable to a non-resident against dues i.e. when no
payment no credit.

  J.
B. Boda & Co. (P.) Ltd. vs. CBDT 223 ITR 271

  An
adjustment of the amount payable to the non-resident or deduction thereof by
the non-resident from the amounts due to the resident-payer (of the income)
would fall to be considered under “any other mode”. Such adjustment
or deduction also is equivalent to actual payment. Commercial transactions very
often take place in the aforesaid manner and the provisions of section 195
cannot be sought to be defeated by contending that an adjustment or deduction
of the amounts payable to the non-resident cannot be considered as actual
payment. Raymond Ltd. [2003] 86 ITD 791 (Mum).

 

(viii)
Dividend is declared but not paid pending RBI approval, then the same accrues
in the year of payment Pfizer Corporation vs. CIT (2003) 259 ITR 391 (Bom).

 

(ix) If no income accrues to non-resident
although accounting entry incorporating a liability is passed,
no liability for TDS. United Breweries Ltd. vs. ACIT 211 ITR 256.

 

(x) Payee should be ascertainable. IDBI
vs. ITO 107 ITD 45 (Mum)
.

 

(xi) Time of Deduction from the point of
view of the payer and not payee. Relevant in cases where one of them maintain
the books on cash basis and the other on accrual basis – C. J. International
Hotels Ltd. vs ITO TDS 91 TTJ (Del) 318.

 

2.7     Section 195(1) – Rates in force

 

(i)   Section
2(37A)(iii) provides in respect of Rates in Force for the purposes of section
195.

 

(ii)  Circular
728 dtd. 30-10-1995 – Rate in force for remittance to countries with DTAA.

 

(iii) Circular
740 dtd. 17-04-1996 – Taxability of interest remitted by branches of banks to
HO situated abroad.

 

(iv) No
surcharge and education cess to be added to Treaty rates.

  DIC
Asia Pacific Pte Ltd. vs. ADIT IT 22 taxmann.com 310.

   Sunil
V. Motiani vs. ITO IT 33 taxmann.com 252
;

  DDIT
vs. Serum Institute of India Ltd. [2015] 56 taxmann.com 1 (Pune Trib.).

 

(v)  Section
44DA read with 115A – Special provision for computing income by way of
royalties etc. in case of non-residents.

 

(vi) Section
44B – Non-resident in shipping business (7.5% Deemed Profit Rate [DPR])

 

(vii)      Section
44BB – Non-resident’s business of prospecting etc. of mineral oil (10% DPR)

 

(viii)     Section
44BBB – Non-resident civil construction business in certain turnkey power
projects (10% DPR)

 

(ix) Presumptive
provisions (44B, 44BB, 44BBB etc) – Section 195 applicable. Frontier
Offshore Exploration (India) Ltd vs. DCIT 13 ITR (T) 168 (Chennai)
.

 

(x)  Section
294 of the Act provides that if on the 1st day of April in any
assessment year provision has not yet been made by a Central Act for the
charging of income-tax for that assessment year, the provision of the
Income-tax Act shall nevertheless have effect until such provision is so made
as if the provision in force in the preceding assessment year or the provision
proposed in the Bill then before Parliament, whichever is more favourable to
the assessee, were actually in force.

 

2.8     Section 195(1) – Sum Chargeable to
tax-Exchange Rate Applicable

 

(i)   Rule
26 provides for rate of exchange for the purpose of TDS on Income payable in
foreign currency

 

(ii)  TDS
to be deducted on income payable in foreign currency.

   Value
of rupee shall be SBI TT buying rate.

   on
the date on which tax is required to be deducted.

 

(iii) Where
rate of exchange on date of remittance differs from exchange rate on date of
credit, no TDS to be deducted on exchange rate difference. Sandvik Asia Ltd
vs. JCIT 49 SOT 554 (Pune).

 

3.  Section 94A
– Notified Jurisdictional Areas

 

(i)   Section
94A(5) – Special measures in respect of transactions with persons located in
notified jurisdictional area

 

‘(5) Notwithstanding
anything contained in any other provisions of this Act, where any person
located in a notified jurisdictional area
is entitled to receive any sum or
income or amount on which tax is deductible under Chapter XVII-B, the tax
shall be deducted at the highest of the following rates, namely:-

 

(a) at the rate or rates in force;

(b) at the rate specified in the relevant
provisions of this Act;

(c) at the rate of thirty
per cent
.’

 

(ii)  Notification
No. 86/2013 [F. NO. 504/05/2003-FTD-I]/SO 3307(E), Dated 1-11-2013
– Cyprus
Notified.

 

(iii) Validity
of the notification upheld by the High Court of Madras in T. Rajkumar vs.
Union of India [2016] 68 taxmann.com 182 (Madras).

 

(iv) The
notification of Cyprus u/s 94A as a notified jurisdictional area for lack of
effective exchange of information, has been rescinded with effect from
1.11.2013 [Notification No. 114/2016 dated 14.12.2016]
.

 

4.
Grossing up of tax (195A)

 

(i)
Section 195A – Income payable “net of tax”

 

“In
a case other than that referred to in sub-section (1A) of section 192, where
under an agreement or other arrangement, the tax chargeable on any income
referred to in the foregoing provisions of this Chapter is to be borne by
the person by whom the income is payable, then, for the purposes of deduction
of tax
under those provisions such income shall be increased to such
amount as would, after deduction of tax thereon
at the rates
in force
for the financial year in which such income is payable, be
equal to the net amount payable
under such agreement or arrangement.”

 

(ii)  TDS Certificate to be issued even in case of
Grossing up – Circular 785 dt. 24.11.1999.

 

(iii) Absence of the words “tax to
be borne by the payer” in case of net of tax payment contracts by conduct –
Grossing up required. CIT vs. Barium Chemicals Ltd. [1989] 175 ITR 243 (AP).



(iv)
Section 195A envisages multiple grossing-up. For eg. amount payable to
non-resident is 100 and TDS rate is 10%; Gross amount for TDS purpose would be
111.11 (100*100/90)

 

(v)
No multiple grossing-up in case of presumptive tax u/s. 44BB. CIT vs. ONGC
[2003] 264 ITR 340 (Uttaranchal)
.

 

(vi)
Exemption from grossing-up u/s.10(6BB) – Aircraft and aircraft engine lease
rentals.

 

(vii)
Section 192(1A) – Tax on non-monetary perquisite – Not covered by section 195A.

 

Conclusion

In
this part of the Article, we have attempted to highlight various issues
relating to section 195(1), 195A and section 90(4) relating to TDS from
payments to non-residents.

 

In
the subsequent parts of the Article, we will deal with the other parts of
section 195 and other aspects thereof.
 

INTERVIEW | ZIA MODY

QUALITY IS THE ONLY THING,
IN QUALITY IS EVERYTHING!

In celebration of its 50th
Volume – the BCAJ brings a series of interviews with peopl
e of eminence, the
distinct ones we can look up to, as professionals. Those people who have
reached to the top of their chosen sphere, people who have established a
benchmark for others to emulate. 

This first interview is with
Mrs. Zia Mody. Zia is an advocate and solicitor, founder and managing partner
of AZB and Partners. She is considered an authority on corporate merger and
acquisition law in particular. Zia studied at Cambridge and Harvard both,
worked in the US for five years with Baker McKenzie and then in India. She
started her own firm which today is considered one of the best in India. A
wife, mother, winner of many awards, an active practitioner of the Bahai faith.

In this interview, Zia talks to
BCAJ Editor Raman Jokhakar and BCAJ Past Editors Ashok Dhere & Gautam Nayak
about her formative years, what she learnt from her mentors, the factors she
attributes to her success, the sacrifices that she had to make, her thoughts on
the laws in India, and more…..

(Raman Jokhakar): From being in employment
at a US law firm, to being a counsel, to leading your own law firm – yours has
been a multi-faceted career. Which part of it was the most enjoyable?

Well, the truth is that, in hindsight, the
most enjoyable part if you say of my career would be my time as a counsel in
the High Court. And although, I enjoy my work as M&A lawyer, for sure, I
think that the thrill of winning a matter which I got when I was younger is
probably the biggest thrill in my span as a lawyer.

(Gautam Nayak): In spite of being a first
generation law firm, I think you have overtaken most of the firms which are
much older and established firms in that sense. From being a first generation
firm to being a top rank firm is
an amazing achievement. What do you attribute your success to?

A
combination of being there at the right time. When I came back from America, I
was in court for 10 years and the opportunity to start a firm was not there.
Then after Manmohan Singh’s policy in 1991 to about 1995, in those 4 years, a
lot of foreign friends who wanted their clients to set up shop, clients wanted
to set up shop, India opened up. So I was there at the right time. Because I
had foreign education and foreign training, my acceptability was much easier
for my foreign friends and clients. Again, in comparison we were
technologically savvy. We had star programme, which the older firms who were
giants then could not have. We had a computer for each lawyer; God forbid, the
other firms didn’t have. We spent more money, invested more money in getting
technologically better and also I think, frankly, I spoke the language better
to an American General Counsel, I knew what they were looking for.

(Gautam
Nayak): Maybe the initial impetus yes, came from these factors, but as
your firm grew in size, what factors made it work later? 

 There
again, a combination of being lucky to get such good talent and though not
always successful, trying my best to retain the talent. Sometimes you can and
sometimes you can’t. Then always emphasizing to everybody who walked in and
carried our card, that quality is the only thing, and in quality is everything
– hard work, loyalty to the letterhead, loyalty to the client – all comes out
of quality. So like in any service profession – what do you want to be – you
want to be the best and how do you get to be the best – when you hire the best
and how do you make them the best – by showing them the way.

(Raman Jokhakar): Role of your Mentors: you
worked here in India and in the US all these years. Would you like to share a
trait that has stayed relevant even today or over all these years?


As
a young professional, your prayers get answered if you get a good mentor. It’s not
choosing your job, it’s choosing your boss right? And, I think for me, both my
mentors, in America and in India, were really patient human beings because they
invested time in me and had affection for me. Both of which are key. You know
if you have a good mentor but he does not love you, it does not work as much as
if he loves you. So I think, a personal connect which I had, helped me a great
deal. Therefore, the person was willing to do more than he needed to.
Therefore, my duty as a mentee was to never let that mentor waste his time; to
learn all the time; to let him know that I am learning.



(Raman
Jokhakar): And something that still rings true, even today – something that you
learnt during those times.

Honesty
to the matter. Every matter has to be dealt with honesty. You can nuance your
advice. You can have gradations of what you want to say. But stick to the
skeleton of what is an honest assessment of the matter. That is key.


(Gautam Nayak): Both you
and you
r husband have been and are very successful in your respective careers.
What is the role that you played in each other’s success?

So
I always again thank God, although my husband is a typical Gujju, he has
enormous respect for his wife. And, I think that is really why I have been able
to be successful. My profession has taken a toll in terms of time on my
marriage, not having conventional rule as a wife, not able to spend time with
my children as I would have liked to. My mother in law compensated a lot of my
absenteeism. But I think the luck that I had was that my husband was not
insecure. He is very proud of me. His father was a lawyer. So I never grew up
having to be worried about what my husband would feel. Because he was so
successful in his own mind and later on in life, that there was no feeling- How
she is so important, why is she on this TV show or something? It was– Great
that you are on this TV show! There was no competitiveness at home. This is
important.

(Raman
Jokhakar): Any special sacrifice that you felt you had to particularly make?

Time.
Time with my family.

(Raman
Jokhakar): If you look back at your career, in hindsight, is there anything
you feel you would have done differently?

No.
Except, maybe being less paranoid! (laughter)

(Gautam
Nayak): One of the significant issues which you may have faced when you
started your career, was that you were in a legal profession dominated by males
(Zia: Still is). Being a woman, how has it played out for you as a woman? For
other women professionals, what is your advice?

It
was hard. It is much better now. But it was hard. In early 1980s, as a young
woman going to court, which client is going to give you his matter to argue –
right? They would say (go away – gesture) It is much better now. I don’t
think it is much better still in Court, I think it is the same. But, in the
table space of our profession, it is much better. It is well paid – women get
more attracted to the profession. Frankly, their parents have changed. Today
our generation puts more value on a girl child than they did on our
sisters.  Our fathers are much more
vested in educating us than the previous generations. That is what is making a
change.

(Gautam
Nayak): What is your advice to women professionals that they should follow
in order to succeed?

The same story – Quality, Focus and
Sacrifice. We can keep talking about what we want to, but as women, we have to
make that sacrifice. And sometimes it’s not worth it – it’s just not worth it.
It is different for every woman. I think I overdid it. I don’t think I will
recommend my life to many people. But each one has to strike their own balance.
Because, if all this is going to make you miserable personally, why would you
do it?

(Gautam
Nayak): You are legendary for your long working hours. Even today after
having so much success, you put in long hours. What is it that drives you even
today?

I
just can’t stand not being prepared. If I have a calendar tomorrow, I will
prepare. I want to know if I can add a little more value by having a pre-discussion,
by reading, by pre-reading material: I also want to know what laws have
happened, I look at what my knowledge management team pushes out, changes in
FEMA, changes in Companies Act, I will read the headlines. I think it is the
fear of not being up to date. Then of course, long hours are also because
clients want to meet, after clients finish, partners want to meet for views.

(Ashok Dhere): What are your hobbies?

 I
had hobbies. (laughter) I used to write, I used to play the piano and I
used to do cooking classes with Tarla Dalal. But now, my only hobby today is
travelling with my family for short breaks.

(Raman Jokhakar): A Daily habit that you
have?

Prayers

(Ashok
Dhere): We have complex Laws. What do you suggest about repealing laws and
reducing complexity?

 It
is a big problem. It’s a good one. There is not one law you could repeal in
totality. Look at your Companies Act, there are lot of provisions that don’t
make sense to me but you can’t repeal that law. You have to amend them in bits
and pieces. I don’t think there is one statute that I would say – DHUM!
– kill it! There are so many statutes that need updating, fine-tuning. You take
the latest Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, it is doing a great job as a
statute, but it still needs refining. So, it is an ongoing process.

(Gautam
Nayak)
: What is your view on
Companies Act 1956 versus the current Companies Act?

 But
the 1956 Act had also outgrown its useful life. It is just that our new Act is
unfortunately a knee jerk reaction to Satyam- that is the problem. Satyam
happened 10 years ago. (Raman: We call it Roy and Raju Act). Perfect.

 (Gautam
Nayak): Some of the old laws we have such as Indian Contract Act from 1872.
As compared to that, some of the recent legislations have a lot more
litigations, a lot more ambiguity in drafting. What is your view on that?

 I
think, the old statutes are better drafted. Our current drafting is the biggest
problem.

(Raman
Jokhakar)
: The way they use English.
Imagine in a country like ours where most people can’t speak English, can’t
read English, and you have these laws which even professionals can’t
understand?

 What
to do. It’s good for Lawyers!           

(Gautam Nayak): Technology is changing,
laws are changing, and the society is changing. In that sense, going forward,
what do you see as the key attributes a professional needs to have? As in your
times, technology was the key factor, what would be the key factors now?

 A
senior professional as he climbs up the value chain, has to morph into a
Trusted Advisor. That is the biggest value you can give to the clients. You are
not a lawyer. You are a trusted advisor. Your client comes to you, to make the
company calls, real crisis calls. At that time you are not reading sections.
You are simply reading, assimilating everything.  And then taking a judgement call, which is
different for each client. One guy is risky, one risk averse, one guy is a
foreigner, one Indian, one guy is a listed company, and one guy is an unlisted
company. So you have to put everything into the mix. That’s the issue.

(Ashok
Dhere): Madam, I am a fan of your book translated (shows the book ….) into
Marathi. I read that book.

Even
Marathi one also. I know Penguin said can we get the book translated into
Marathi and I said yes – as long as it is an honest translation.

(Ashok Dhere): I was fascinated by that
judgement of Aruna Shanbag. (Zia: Right to live). At that time, Supreme Court
was shy of pronouncing it because they passed it on to the Dean. Let the Dean
decide. They were shy. Now they are bold.

They
are bold. Life has changed.

(Ashok Dhere): In Golaknath and
Keshavanand Bharati, there is a constant tussle between judiciary, executive and
parliament. Will it continue forever?

Probably,
because there is misalignment spiritually. The executive feels they need more
control over judiciary, who can otherwise keep hauling them up for contempt and
striking down their laws. Judiciary feels that they are the custodians of the
Constitution which they are spiritually duty bound to protect. There is a
misalignment. But, I am for the judiciary.

(Ashok
Dhere): What about judicial activism which is also being criticised (Zia: I
understand sometimes it is overboard but…) they are giving direction to Reserve
Bank of India…

I Understand. But if you are asking me which
balance I prefer, I prefer this one even if it has these side effects, because
without that, you can’t have a country that can be kept in check. As much as I
love Reserve Bank of India, sometimes even they may go wrong. It’s ok. I don’t
think they were right in the directions they gave. I think even Reserve Bank or
the Government or any Regulator today is concerned about what the Supreme Court
thinks of them.

 (Ashok
Dhere): What about corruption in the Judicial System in the light of recent
Supreme Court (four Judges) matter?

 I
think there is more corruption at junior level simply because pay scales are so
pathetic and there is less corruption at the higher level. I am not a believer
that there is systemic judicial corruption. I don’t think so at all.

 (Gautam Nayak): Professional Firms:
Today, do you feel there is a scope for small professional firms or are large
firms alone the future?

Boutique
firms. Specialised Boutique (firms).Otherwise big firms. Unless you have
domain and you are a boutique. Larger companies would veer towards branded
firms.

(Ashok
Dhere)
:Madam, so far as frauds and
scams happen or other activities that are in the newspapers, Chartered
Accountants are always at the receiving end (Zia: Poor guys) and everything is
always done with drafting with lawyers or law firms etc. (Zia: We protect
ourselves) Tell us a few tips for Chartered Accountants, how to protect themselves?

You
don’t have to sign balance sheets. (Laughter) and if you are smart, stay
away from being Directors.

(Gautam Nayak): Large firms that
we talked about. Do you think that now professions are becoming a business,
some of the large firms you see?

See,
it has always been a business. You can keep calling yourself a noble
profession, which of course it is. That does not mean that you are doing
charity. You are doing work for doing business. Just that you have to do it
ethically. That’s what makes it noble.

 (Ashok
Dhere)
: What do you have to say
about prohibitive cost of litigation? Sometimes, litigation in an income tax
matter is valid, but the client just does not have the capacity to pay.

Answer:
That’s life. What can you do!

(Gautam Nayak): There was a talk of legal fees, capping
that etc. that the Government is considering.

Why should they? It is a free market. How do
we hire the best, pay the best and then not charge the best? That is socialism?

 (Ashok
Dhere)
: Do you make a distinction,
M’am, between banking fraud and political corruption, say in PNB Case?

 Depends.
Depends on reason. Talk about PNB, there is no fraud proved yet at a senior
level. How are you asking to compare senior level fraud before it’s even
proved? That is pre-judging.

(Ashok
Dhere)
: What about political
overtones as in Karti Chidambaram Case? That is also fraud matter.

It
is. But let the investigation happen.

(Raman
Jokhakar)
: For the Chartered
Accountant profession, what is your advice to Chartered Accountants as you look
at them and you interact with them? Is there something that you want to tell
them?

 Be
stricter with your clients. (Raman: And in which way?)  Get proper back up, don’t stop asking
questions, be comfortable with the balance sheet you are signing and the
qualifications, and don’t be scared about losing the account. That’s all.

 The minute you can say “Go Away”,
you are capable. That’s what we do. If we are not comfortable – “We are not
going to give you that opinion.” No problem. That has been our approach right
from the day we started with twelve lawyers.  


 

AS IT WAS, IS AND MAY BE
(MUSINGS FROM THE PAST, ABOUT THE PRESENT AND THE FUTURE AS FORESEEN)

As one’s professional career inches to what would be the age
of a senior citizen one tends to look more to the past than the future. One
suddenly finds that he/she can remember what happened in 1990 more clearly than
what happened in 2016!

When the Editor of the 50th anniversary
publication of the BCAJ approached me to write an article and suggested that I
recollect real life experiences, I expressed serious reservations as to whether
anybody would really be interested in the same. I do hope the Editor does not
have cause to regret his mistaken choice (of person and subject). In any case,
my vanity ultimately prevailed and I agreed to pick up my pen and let it run
wild.

In 1952, I joined the Sydenham College of Commerce and
Economics named after Lord Sydenham, a former Governor of Bombay. At that time,
it was situated in premises belonging to the J. J. School of Arts (with two
divisions of the first year class being located in the Sukhadwala Building near
Excelsior Cinema). My father was in the first batch of students (of 1913) to
enroll in the College! My brother as well as my wife graduated from Sydenham.
It was, perhaps the only College with a tennis court! In 1955, the College
shifted to its present location on B. Road near Churchgate.

In 1956, I joined the Government Law College for the then
two-year LL.B. degree course for those who had already graduated. Surprising as
it may sound to today’s college student fraternity, at that time at least 90%
of the students attended classes regularly (the Canteen residency was limited).
For the lectures by Prof. Sanat P. Mehta on the Indian Constitution, the class
was always full even though the lectures were scheduled at a most unearthly
hour early in the morning. I understand that today the percentage is reversed
and perhaps more than 90% do not attend lectures but join private coaching
classes. In our days a student who took private tuitions was looked down upon
as being backward! What I find even more surprising, and rather intolerable, is
that I am told that today professors themselves do not attend regularly. The
other leading Counsel in the field of Tax Law at that time were Mr. R. J. Kolah
and Mr. N. A. Palkhivala. Mr. R. J. Kolah was also the foremost lawyer in the
field of labour law – if this branch did not rub off on me it was, I suppose,
because I did not labour enough. Two Solicitors: Mr. N. R. Mulla and Mr.
Tricumdas Dwarkadas also had a large practice in the Tribunal. Mr. Tricumdas
(partner in the firm of M/s. Kanga & Co.) was and has been the only person
allowed to appear before a Bench of the Tribunal, otherwise than in the
regulation coat and tie! I may in passing, mention my eternal admiration of Sir
Dinshaw Mulla (the founder of the firm of M/s. Mulla and Mulla) for the number
of classical treatises he has written on varied legal subjects. I do not think
anyone, the world over, has rivaled his achievement. 

With the confidence (arrogance) of youth I decided to take
the plunge in individual law practice as, according to me, it afforded
independence. The next question was whose Chamber I should join. At the request
of Mr. R. K. Dalal, the founding partner of the Chartered Accounting firm of
Messrs. Dalal & Shah, Mr. N. A. Palkhivala agreed to see me but not to
accept me as a Junior! Thereafter, through the good offices of Mr. Maneck P.
Mistry (popularly known as “Botty” Mistry, though I do not quite know why) I
joined the Chambers of Mr. R. J. Kolah.

The Law Chambers were at that time just newly located on the
first floor of the Annexe building which was connected by a passage to the High
Court Building. Chamber No.1 was of Sir Jamshedji B. Kanga in which Seniors of
great eminence like Mr. K. H. Bhabha, Mr. Murzban Mistree etc., who were
earlier his juniors, functioned. Chamber No. 2 was of Mr. R. J. Kohla and
chamber No.3 of Mr. N. A. Palkhivala. Prior thereto Chambers of Counsel were on
the Ground Floor of the High Court Building to the left as one entered the High
Court building from the gate near the University (and not the one near the Hong
Kong Bank building). Later in 1987, Counsel functioning from the Annexe
building received notices to quit as the High Court wanted the premises for
itself.

The atmosphere on the 1st floor was unique. There
was great fellowship between the 50 odd Counsel who occupied the 12 Chambers
situated there including the Chambers of Mr. Motilal Setalvad (the first
Attorney-General for India), Mr. M.P. Amin (Advocate-General for the State of
Bombay) and Mr. Karl Khandalawalla, a lawyer of eminence at the Criminal Bar, and
many more. Mr. Khandalawalla was a distinguished art critic. He was as devoted
to art as Mr. Kolah was to horse-racing and to dog-racing (which latter sport
he wanted to initiate at the Brabourne Stadium). Very often when Mr. Kolah was
in the Supreme Court on a Friday but his matter had not concluded, he would fly
back to Bombay on Friday night and after attending the races at Mahalaxmi on
Sunday evening proceed by the early morning flight on Monday back to Delhi. He
travelled extensively for professional work and invariably went to the then
Santa Cruz airport by the airport bus run by Indian Airlines. I still remember
a delightful photograph which was displayed in Chamber No. 2 of Mr. R. J. Kolah
in a top hat and tail coat with his devoted and charming wife Lorna, which
photograph was taken when they had attended the Epsom Derby race in
England.  

My practice as a lawyer had a slow (more accurately, a very
slow and halting) start. In the first year of my practice at the Bar I earned a
total of Rs.30 and that too not on account of any merit of mine! A brief for
applying for an adjournment at 2.45 p.m. (which was when the High Court used to
resume work at that time after the lunch break), was marked by Messrs. Little
& Co. (the instructing solicitors) for Mr. K. K. Koticha, Advocate. A fee
of 2 Gold Mohurs (GMs) which is the denomination in which advocates practicing
on the original side of the High Court traditionally marked (and some still
mark) their fees. Interestingly a Gold Mohur, a currency prevailing in ancient
times, was reckoned at Rs.15 in Bombay, Rs.16 in Delhi and Rs.17 in Calcutta!
The bearer of the brief could not locate Mr. 
Koticha in the High Court library as, (most fortunately!) he had gone
out for lunch. He noticed that (having nothing better to do) I was sitting in
the Library and offered the brief to me. This incident increased my belief in a
kind, benevolent and benign God who looked after briefless lawyers!

I may mention that Mr. Palkhivala had once offered me
employment in the legal department of Tatas at what I considered to be a
princely salary. My brother, Jal, a Chartered Accountant of great learning, was
vehemently against my accepting the offer and when I talked about it to Mr.
Kolah he was forthright, as usual, in his view. He remarked “gadhero thai
gayoch ke.”

When I commenced my practice in 1959, the Income-tax
Appellate Tribunal (Tribunal) had 2 Benches each in Bombay, Delhi and Calcutta
and one at Allahabad, Madras, Patna and Hyderabad. If I remember correctly,
there were just 2 or 3 Commissioners of Income-tax in Bombay jurisdiction. I
have lost track of the number of Principal Commissioners of Income-tax and
Commissioners of Income-tax who now hold office. The Tribunal which was formed
in 1941 was initially located in the Industrial Assurance Building near Eros
Cinema. By 1959 it had shifted to its present location. I have not been able to
discover exactly when such shift was effected. Even the Encyclopaedic Dr. K.
Shivaram, has not been able to enlighten me!

The ITAT has evolved into the leading and most satisfactorily
of all functioning Tribunals. I may refer to what I consider to be two
unfortunate administrative aberrations on its part. The Headquarters of the
Tribunal has   always been at Bombay.
Three Presidents shifted the office of the President to Delhi. Thus, during
their tenure, though the Headquarters of the Tribunal was at Bombay, the office
of the Head of the Tribunal was in Delhi! A junior lawyer appropriately
remarked, “the importance of the Headquarters of the Tribunal has now been
reduced to a quarter thereof!” Mr. Rajagopala Rao a very sincere, patient and
fair member had during his tenure as President very correctly restored the
President’s office to Bombay.

The other unfortunate administrative decision is that the
Tribunal now organizes a farewell meeting for a retiring member. The hallowed
tradition followed by the Income-tax Tribunal Bar Association, at Bombay, (in
the same manner as by the High Court Bar Association) was that it was the prerogative
of the Bar to organize a Reference to a retiring member (if the Bar felt he
merited one). The occasional decision of not granting a Reference on the
retirement of a member (considered by the Bar as not being fit to be so honoured)
was not acceptable to the authorities.

There cannot be a truer saying than “Justice delayed is
justice denied.” As major reason for the abysmal mounting arrears both in the
Tribunal and the Courts is on account of the fact that the judicial authorities
have to function much below their sanctioned strength. It is proudly claimed
that the present Government is one which works. However, there does not appear
to be any evidence in support thereof, at least in the law and judicial field.
When a vacancy will occur is known well in advance – the only exception being
the unexpected event of resignation or unfortunate premature demise. Instead of
spending time on making tax life more complicated, cannot the Ministries of Law
and Finance find time to attend to this long-standing yet unresolved problem?

The malaises of mounting arrears of tax appeals and writ
petitions in the High Courts would be alleviated if more judicial members of
the Tribunal, and perhaps even Accountant Members with appropriate judicial
qualifications, were promoted to the High Courts and special benches dealing
the year round with tax matters were set up in the High Courts. It may also be
appropriate if the Supreme Court collegium, which finally recommends persons
for promotion to the High Courts, was a little more circumspect in rejecting
proposals for such promotion made by a High Court. It is for serious
consideration whether, in the event of there being a doubt about the fitness of
a member for promotion to the High Court, it is possible to devise a system
whereunder the Collegium obtains (on the condition of maintenance of complete
secrecy) the views of Advocates of pre-eminent reputation, who have practiced
before the concerned person.

Legal practice can be broadly of 2 types: a) table practice
comprising of advisory work in conference, furnishing of written opinions and
drafting pleadings and b) arguing matters before different fora. Variety is the
spice of life and, as in life generally, it is always good to have a
combination of all possibilities. However, if I had to choose only one of the
two forms of legal practice I would certainly plump for the second alternative
as appearing before a Tribunal or Court requires one to attune one’s arguments
to what is likely to appeal to the particular judge, bearing in mind his
approach to life, his bent of mind and also brings into focus one’s ability to
respond immediately to queries (relevant and irrelevant) His Lordship or Honour
may pose. A ready repartee, a light hearted remark sometimes achieves more than
learned legal submissions based on case laws. One has also to cultivate the
ability to deal on the spot with arguments urged by the opposing Counsel. The
ability to do all this is what distinguishes an Advocate from a lawyer. Law can
be learnt from text books, – advocacy requires an inherent talent and
experience.  

The practice of tax laws is not confined just to the
provisions of the relevant Direct Tax Acts. One has to consider the provisions
of a whole range of what may be termed as “general laws” like the Transfer of
Property Act, personal laws which determine succession to a deceased’s
property, company and partnership law (including the Limited Liability
Partnership Act), stamp duty and registration provisions, and laws relating to
limitation and new financial instruments etc. Even the provisions of the
Evidence Act and of criminal law may have to be applied. A judge once addressed
Counsel arguing a tax appeal before him by saying. “You tax lawyers …” Counsel
replied, “I am not aware of any such animal!”

About 3 or 4 years after I joined the legal profession, Mr.
N. A. Palkhivala gradually shifted the field of his operation from Chamber No.3
to his office in Bombay House and became a Director of several Tata companies.
It was somewhat of a unique decision because Counsel generally prefer to
operate from their own independent chambers without being associated with a
particular business house. In retrospect I felt that it was all to the good
that he had not approved of me as a prospective junior. Unfortunately, in life
when one is faced with a disappointment it is only in retrospect that one
thinks of the disappointment as being all for the good.

Lord Macnaghten in London County Council v. Attorney-General
44 TC 265, 293, observed “Income Tax, if I may be pardoned for saying so, is a
tax on income. It is not meant to be a tax on anything else.” Our Finance
Ministers should take heed of these words of wisdom. Today, section 2(24) of
the Income-tax Act includes twenty-eight items as “income,” quite a few of
which cannot at all be regarded as “income.” The zeal of our Finance Ministers
has resulted in our presently having Volume 402 of the Income-tax Reports. The
publication of the Income-tax Report started in 1933. The proliferation of
litigation is shown by the fact that whereas till 1950 we had only one volume
of the Income-tax Reports per year, now (in 2017) we have 10 Volumes per year
and I do not know how many volumes 2018 will generate! Prior to the publication
of the Income-tax Reports we had “Income-tax Cases” which covered 10 Volumes
relating to the period from 1886 to 1937. The Tax Cases in England published
from 1876 presently are in the 80th volume. Of course, in so far as
the legal profession is concerned, the Indian overdose is all to the good! I
may note in passing something which is rather intriguing. In India we refer to
“Income-tax” but in the United Kingdom it is “Income Tax.”

There is today a strong lobby which doubts the wisdom of
several provisions in the annual Finance Bills (sometimes 2 per year) which
amend the Income-tax Act. The thought process which goes into the enactment of
the proposed amendments is best illustrated by the fact that recently the
Finance Bill, 2018, was apparently passed by the Lok Sabha without debate.

Some people today complain about the rates of tax and
surcharge making unwarranted inroads into one’s income earnings. They overlook
that during our flirtation with socialism some assessees were liable in 1972 to
1973 to pay more than 100% of their income as direct taxes (income-tax plus
wealth tax). The imposition of such draconian rates of taxes led to the
development of a tax planning industry. Some of the schemes were really
fantastic. An assessee is certainly not bound to pay the maximum amount of tax
possible. At the same time excessive and daring tax-planning is not advisable
as, in my view, a good untroubled night’s sleep is more important than the
possible increase in one’s wealth by embarking on such a scheme. I hasten to
add that tax planning is undoubtedly legal and permissible. The Duke of
Westminster’s case (19 TC 490) is a classic example of tax planning, perhaps
even stretching the permitted limits. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in Union
of India v. Azadi Bachao Andolan 263 ITR 706
observed at page 758 that the
principle in the Honourable Duke’s case “was very much alive and kicking.” Even
ignoring the exceptional 2 years in the 1970s one has ruefully to accept that
in several other years in the past the individual income-earning assessee
(Mr.A.) was a junior partner in profit sharing in the firm of the Central
Government and Mr.A!

There is no reason why we should complain about the present
rates of income-tax even though one may not be able to muster the enthusiasm of
Justice Holmes of the U.S. Supreme Court who observed “Taxes are what we pay
for civilized society. I like to pay taxes, with them I buy civilization.” Mr.
C. K. Daphtary, the first Solicitor-General of India, who was known for his
ready wit and felicity of language, in a speech when he was felicitated by the
Bombay Bar, referred to the observation of Justice Holmes and wryly commented
“If by payment of taxes one buys present-day civilization then I do not want
any part of it!” The key issue was rightly summarized by Justice Sabyasachi
Mukharji in CWT v. Arvind Narottam 173 ITR 479: “Does he with taxes buy
civilization or does he facilitate the waste and ostentation of the few. Unless
waste and ostentation in Government spending are avoided or eschewed no amount
of moral sermons would change people’s attitude to tax avoidance.” Mr. N. A.
Palkivala has pithily observed “a widespread taste for tax promises to be a
thing of slow growth.”

The prodigious and unwieldy growth of tax legislation and
amendments after the present Act came into being is evidenced by the fact that,
to cite but one example, between section 115 and section 116, more than 120
sections have been inserted at one time or the other. The total inadequacy of
the English language to provide for this overdose is shown by the fact that we
have such monstrosities as section 80JJAA and section 115BBDA!

The change in the nature of the litigation then and now is
striking. In 1959 a large part of the appeals before the Tribunal centered
around cash credits, unexplained investments, capital and revenue expenditure
etc. The litigation is now more sophisticated and with an international flavour
like the circumstances in which income earned by a non-resident from an asset
situated outside India is to be deemed to accrue or arise in India (section 9),
transfer pricing and Double Taxation Avoidance Agreements. One of the most
often cited cases today is the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of
India v. Azadi Bachao Andolan 263 ITR 706
where the Supreme Court laid down
the path-breaking interpretation to be placed on the words “may be taxed”
appearing in DTAAs. I daresay in the future, a substantial part of the
litigation will centre around Chapter XA of the Income-tax Act (concerning
General Anti-Avoidance Rule) bearing in mind the very wide, if not wild,
provisions which have been enacted.

People often condemn Treaty Shopping overlooking that
Treaties are negotiated with several political, economic and other
considerations in mind and if in achieving/implementing the same tax concessions
are available so be it. If the Government negotiates a treaty which opens a
shop it cannot complain if people resort thereto!

A matter of great importance to the well-functioning of the
Tribunal is who is appointed as its President. Previously, the Central
Government was empowered to appoint the Senior Vice-President or one of the
Vice-Presidents to be the President. Now sub-section (3) of section 252 of the
Act enables the Central Government to appoint in addition a person who is a
sitting or retired judge of a High Court and who has completed not less than
seven years of service as a judge in a High Court.

Pursuant to the newly acquired power vested in it in 2013 the
Central Government appointed a retired judge of a High Court to be the
President of the Tribunal with effect from 14th March, 2015. In my
view the conferment on the Central Government of the option to appoint a
retired High Court judge as the President is misconceived. The President has to
perform various administrative tasks relating to the functioning of the
Tribunal such as constitution of the Benches, the posting of members etc. which
requires him to be a person who has worked as a member for a long period of
time before he assumes charge as President. The President is also a part of the
Committee to select persons to function as members of the Tribunal. An existing
Vice-President, and more so the Senior Vice-President, would be fully
experienced to discharge these functions. A retired High Court Judge is not
likely to be aware of the plethora of judgements, reports, magazines etc.
dealing with the tax matters. Speaking for myself I do not think the experiment
of appointing a retired High Court judge as the President of the Tribunal was
at all successful.  

For almost two decades moves have now been afoot to redraft
our income-tax law. It was way back in 1997 that “A Working Draft of the
Income-tax Bill, 1997” saw the light of day. This was followed in August 2009
by the Direct Taxes Code. Later, the Direct Taxes Code Bill 2010 was published.
It is undoubtedly necessary to redraft the entire Act and not merely to move
piecemeal amendments. However, one has to bear in mind that several critical
sections have already been interpreted by the High Courts and the Supreme
Court. If in the process of redrafting them, different language is used, even
though the same may appear to be more elegant, it may start the ball of fresh
litigation rolling once again. This would be not only time but money consuming
and cause harassment to the assessee, though of course it may fill the pockets
of tax lawyers and practitioners. The net gain may be that the Government would
be able to collect more taxes from them!

A professional in the field of law is often asked which is
the moment in his legal practice or which is the case or matter which he has
argued or handled which has left him with a sense of enduring satisfaction. For
myself I would say that what is most satisfying is to note with admiration how
those who have passed through my Chambers have overcome that handicap and
achieved enviable eminence in their own legal careers.

Another question a lawyer is often asked is what is most
essential for success in the legal profession. My answer is simple: the ability
to find an all understanding spouse who will (a) put up with ill-temper (which
the lawyer can’t afford to exhibit in the Court room or in his Chamber and,
consequently, reserves it for the residence) (b) tolerate and overlook his
forgetting specific occasions and (c) be immune to his lack of punctuality in
attending to and looking after personal and social commitments.

One gathers from newspaper reports, instructions issued by
the CBDT and comments regarding the provisions in the Finance Bill, 2018, that
it is proposed to vest more and more powers in the Centralised Processing
Centre (CPC) in Bengaluru. Whilst such a move may be theoretically supportable
I feel that the Government should first put in place a satisfactory and
reliable mechanism to resolve grievances and objections raised by assessees.
Let me refer to only one example. Nowadays, if a refund is due to an assessee
it is adjusted against what is shown as arrears due from him in the records of
the all powerful, all knowing, but “in purdah” CPC. Protests lodged with
incontrovertible proof in support, against the proposed adjustments are dealt
with by a standard response: “Your objections ‘if any’ have been considered and
no interference is called for.” Representations and appeals for justice to the
higher authorities have invariably proved futile. The use of the words “if any”
shows a complete lack of application of mind (if any exists). Today an assessee
can contact his Assessing Officer and personally explain to him that the
alleged arrears are not outstanding by producing documents in support of such
assertion and by responding to any doubts entertained by the Officer. This
avenue is no longer open.

High sounding words and phrases are used to declare what the
Government proposes to do. For example, it is stated 1) there would now be
team-based assessments with dynamic jurisdiction 2) there would be
jurisdiction-free assessment i.e., a tax payer in Delhi could be assessed by a
tax officer situated elsewhere in India 3) the role of the tax officials will
be split into functions of assessments, verification, tax demands, recovery
etc.” What these phrases mean is not at all clear to me and perhaps not even to
the tax officers!

The new system is allegedly designed for minimizing the scope
for corruption. However, the cure seems to be worse than the disease at least
from the point of view of the honest tax payer who will now be denied the
opportunity of a direct and fair hearing.

If minimal interaction between the assessee and the tax
officials is the goal for allegedly avoiding corruption it would, perhaps, be
more meaningful to formulate rules limiting interaction between the citizen and
ministers and the citizen and powerful Government Officers as it is these
interactions which are probably most corruption prone.

I had better now conclude these ramblings before my pen runs
completely dry and before the reader, (if any), of this article wants to turn
over the pages to venture to the next article, assuming he has not already
entered slumberland. 

It is said that what distinguishes a good lawyer from the
run-of-the-mill ones is that he can articulate his views precisely and briefly.
I have hopelessly failed so to qualify as I have over-stepped the limit
suggested by the Editor for the length of this article!

I must record that the Editor had very thoughtfully and
helpfully suggested as one of the titles for my proposed article “Happy Hours
at the Bar.” I can only say that whilst young there are undoubtedly happy hours
at the Law Bar, but as one grows older, one appreciates the happier hours one
can spend at a conventional Bar which creates a feeling of solidity,induced by
consuming liquidity!  


THE EDITORIAL TRIO AND ANGEL IN HEAVEN

It is undoubtedly a historical event that BCAJ is completing
50 years of its knowledge dissemination “YADNYA” and it would be
pleasantly nostalgic to remember past Editorial Trio in heaven Sarvashree
Shamrao Argade, Bhupendra Dalal and Ajay Thakkar and our personal friend and a
permanent member of the Journal Committee Shri Jal Dastur.

It was a typical and a loving combination of knowledge, wit,
fun, hobby and a common desire to be of help to the fellow professionals
through the medium of BCA journal.

Each one had a different style, nature, professional
expertise and yet an ability to share was a common factor.

Shri Shamrao Argade was the founder Editor. He used to
write editorials in Marathi English, with an abundant sprinkling of Sanskrit
shlokas, Shri Bhupendra Dalal would write in Gujarati English with enjoyable
spread of a Gujarati poetry whereas Ajay Thakkar would write in his queen’s
English with a wide ranging background of philosophy.

Shamrao was a “DADA” to his friends and juniors. Argade would
be incomplete without a suffix of “DADA”. He had lots of interest, except a
keen interest in professional practice. He would spend a lot of time with his
political colleagues in the erstwhile Bhartiya Jan Sangh, a sizable time for
the activities of our Institute as a four time central council member and
shuttling between Mumbai and Delhi. He always had plenty of time for
establishment and taking care of BCA journal which was his baby child till the
journal reached its adolescent age, and of course time for his numerous friends
like Ambalal Kaka (Thakkar), one of the crazy seven who established BCAS on 6th
July 1949. These seven persons as founders of BCAS wanted to test limits to
their knowledge which in itself is limitless and it was reason enough for them
to establish the BCAS just 5 days after the birth of our Institute.

Besides this, Argade Dada was fond of his Lonavala farmhouse,
where there were plenty of trees, flower beds and what not and he would
genuinely love to show his garden to all his visitors.

Naturally, he had no time for his clients and office. His
clients would believe that their CA is extremely busy. In spite of all this he
called himself a practising C.A !

Shri Bhupendra Dalal was a poet president and poetic
editor. He was extremely passionate about everything that he did. However,
audit was his love bird and income tax law and more than that income tax
practice
was on his hate list. History must have been his pet subject and
even in audit,   he was fond of
historical practices. Travel, trekking and trying to catch Himalayan heights
(in literal sense) was his favourite past time. He would be more than an
enthusiastic child to make a presentation of his slide shows and narrating his
historical travels.

He was a “Laxman” for his elder cousin Shri Arvindbai
Dalal. As a result of Arvindbai’s absence from office on account of numerous
central council meetings and lecture meetings and other related work,
Bhupendrabhai would be fighting like a warrior on office front and at the same
time he had also taken the responsibility of BCAJ editorial work with equal
enthusiasm.

Shri Ajay Thakkar was a different lovable fish. He
never wanted to become a Chartered Accountant or even a commerce graduate. He
was passionate about many unknown things, but was an obedient son as well. He
wanted to keep serpents as pet. Our country lost another Baba Amte staying in a
jungle. He would find mathematical Fibonacci numbers in abundance in nature,
plant, jungle. He wanted to do his Masters in Arts and further do his PhD in
Philosophy. He was, with lot of difficulties, persuaded to be a commerce
graduate and must have created a record of all sorts by using only one 400
pages note book throughout his four years period in the college and managed to
keep that note book without a touch of pen or pencil except for the name
written on the first page.

College lecture bunking was his second nature. Once he saw
his father walking through cross maidan to go to I.T Office and Ajay could not
go back to avoid his father. He immediately sat down near a beggar hiding
himself behind a torn umbrella used by the beggar. In spite of all this, he
became a commerce graduate and then even a Chartered Accountant. His father
once told him that one is required to study to pass the CA examination. He then
hid himself in a room for about 2 months before the examination and passed.

Once a Chartered Accountant, he paid attention to whatever
work was allotted to him by his father Ambalal Kaka. He had a special passion
for income tax law and frequent appearance before Tribunal or CIT(A) became a
routine for him. With memory tips from none other than Nani Palkhiwala, he
would anytime impress the ITAT members with facts and figures on the tip of his
tongue.

As a son of a founder member Ambalal Kaka, he instantly
became a chela of Argade dada and his journey with journal was continuous till
his death. He was a philosophical editor with queen’s English and fluent
writing skills. His prose would also sound like poetry when writing editorials,
when he became editor of the journal and later as a member of editorial board.

The Editorial Trio of these persons now enjoying heavenly
hospitality would be incomplete without mentioning another heavenly personality
Shri Jal Dastur. Although Jalbhai, as he was popularly known and
affectionately called, never became an editor of BCA journal, he was a
permanent member of the Journal Committee. He would be an excellent aid to any
Editor and I can say this with personal experience during my 5 years stint as
an editor. He would always communicate with the editor through his printed
“letters to the editor” and would be a permanent guide to the editor on company
law matters.

It was a treat to see Jalbhai in his second floor office in
Dol-Bin-Shir. It was a fairly large office, but there would be a cluster of books
and files near and in his cabin. Whenever you visit his office for journal work
or even a personal query, he would immediately take out a book, Institutes’
Guidance note and file notes to give you a studied reply. To keep eye contact
with him during the course of his own study for your query, you have to see him
by bending a little and look at him through the valley created between the
books and files. You only face him straight when you are sipping hot boiling
tea offered with love and affection in a large cup. He would otherwise be
seriously immersed in books and notes to solve your problem. Other roughly 2/3rd
portion of his office would be fairly empty and lonely.

These apparently serious looking our loving friends would now
be chitchatting in heaven together. However, even during life time, behind
their serious looking face would be a naughty child with Jalbhai narrating
funny Parsi anecdotes, Bhupendrabhai narrating his gujju tales, Ajay being
master of ceremony, making you laugh with his own straight face and Dada would
pretend to be not listening while displaying a gentle smile of acknowledgement
on his face.

In the 50th year of BCA journal’s journey, I am
sure; many of us truly miss them. I am sure their good wishes would make the
journey smoother, enjoyable and lovable.   

(Shri Ashok Dhere served as the fourth Editor of
the BCA Journal from the year 2000 to 2005)

Summary Of Supreme Court’s (Sc) Judgement On Operations Of Multinational Accounting Firms (MAF) In India

Date: 23rd February, 2018

Writ Petitions:

Civil Appeal No. 2422 of 2018: Arising out
of SLP (Civil) No. 1808 of 2016 and Write Petition  (Civil) No. 991 of 2013

Issue/s Involved:

“Whether the MAFs are operating in India in
violation of law in force in a clandestine manner; and no effective steps are
being taken to enforce the said law. If so, what orders are required to be
passed to enforce the said law.”

 

Averments:

a.  MAF are operating illegally in India and
providing Accounting, Auditing, Book Keeping and Taxation Services.

b.  They are operating with the help of ICAFs
illegally.

c.  Operations of such entities are, inter alia,
in violation of Section 224 of the Companies Act, 1956, sections 25 and 29 of
the CA Act, the Code of Conduct laid down by the Institute of Chartered
Accountants of India (‘ICAI’ or ‘Institute’).

 

(Reference: Report dated 15th
September, 2003 of Study Group of the ICAI)

 

Study Group Report dated 15th September
2003:

The Study Group was constituted by the
Council of the ICAI in July, 1994 to examine attempts of MAFs to operate in
India without formal registration with the ICAI and without being subject to
any discipline and control. This was in the wake of liberalisation policy and
signing of GATT by India.

 

It was noted by the study group that the
bodies corporate formed for management consultancy services were being used as
a vehicle for procuring professional work for sister firms of Chartered
Accountants. Members of ICAI were associating with such board of directors,
managers etc. to provide escape route to MAFs. CA function must be discharged
by animate persons and not in anim bodies.

 

The concerns of various segments of CAs
noted by the Study Group are as under:

 

a)  Sharing fees with non-members;

b)  Networking and consolidation of Indian firms;

c)  Need to review the advertisement aspect;

d)  Multi-disciplinary firms with other
professionals;

e)  Commercial presence of multi-national
accounting firms;

f)   Impact of similarity of names between
accountancy firms and MAFs/Corporates engaged in MSC-Scope for reform and
regulation;

g)  Strengthening knowledge base and skills;

h)  Facilitating growth of Indian CA firms &
Indian CAs internationally;

i)   Perspective of the Government, corporate
world and regulatory bodies and role of ICAI;

j)   Introduction of joint audit system;

k)  Recognition of qualifications under Clause (4)
of Part I of the First Schedule to the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949 for the
purpose of promoting partnership with any persons other than the CA in practice
within India or abroad;

l)   Review the concept of exclusive areas keeping
in view the larger public interest involved so as to include internal audit
within it;

m) Conditionalities prescribed by certain
financial institutions/Governmental agencies insisting appointment of select few
firms as auditors/concurrent auditors/consultants for their borrowers.

 

Further allegations by the writ petitioners
directly filed in SC:

PricewaterhouseCoopers Private Limited
(PwCPL) and their network audit firms operating in India, apart from other violations,
have indulged in violation of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) policy, Reserve
Bank of India Act (RBI)/Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA) which requires
investigation. Firms operating under the brand name of PwCPL received huge sums
from abroad in violation of law and applicable policies but the concerned
authorities have failed to take appropriate action. M/s. Pricewater House,
Bangalore was the Auditor of the erstwhile Satyam Computer Services Limited
(Satyam) for more than eight years but failed to discover the biggest
accounting scandal which came to light only on confession of its Chairman in
January, 2009. The said scandal attracted penalty of US Dollars 7.5 Million
(approx. Rs.38 crores) from the US Regulators apart from other sanctions. Since
certification by Auditors is of great importance in the matter of payment of
subsidies, export incentives, grants, share of government revenue and taxes,
sharing of costs and profits in PPP (Public Private Partnership) contracts etc.,
oversight of professionals engaged in such certification has to be as per law
of the land. Accordingly, even though investigation was sought by the
petitioner vide letter dated 1st July, 2013, no satisfactory
investigation has been done.

 

ICAI Expert Group Report dated 29th July
2011 (Report made in the wake of Satyam scam):

 

The expert group constituted by the ICAI
also examined the issues concerning operation of MAFs in India. Issues
referred to the Expert Group
by the High Powered Committee group of the
ICAI are:

 

a)  Manner in which certain Indian CA firms, hold
out to public that they are actually MAFs in India, the manner in which
assignments are allotted, determination of nexus/linkage. The representatives
of certain Indian CA firms carry two visiting cards one of Indian CA firm and
another of a multinational entity. They represent the multinational entity and
seek work for Indian CA firm.

b)  Name used by auditor in his/her report – The
basic question was whether the auditors of M/s. Satyam had correctly mentioned the
name of their firm in the audit report.

c)  Terms and conditions and cost payable for use
of international brand name – No international firm will allow its name to be
used by all and sundry. The question is what is the consideration whether it is
determined as a percentage of fee or profits and whether it is within the
framework of Chartered Accountants Act, 1949, Regulations framed, thereunder
Code of Conduct and Ethics.

d)  Nature of extra benefits accrued to the Indian
CA firms having foreign affiliation.

e)  How the MAFs placed their foot in India – Long
back in a meeting with RBI it was informed that the MAFs entered in India to
set up representative offices. No documents are available as regards the terms
and conditions set out while granting them permission to operate in India.
However, the RBI vide its letter No.Ref.DBS.ARS.No.744/08:91:008 (ICAI)/
2003-2004 dated 23rd March, 2004 inter alia, mentioned that
“RBI has not permitted any foreign audit firm to set up office or to carry out
any activity in India under the current exchange control regulations.

f)   Contravention of permission originally
granted by Government – What was the original permission given for these firms
to enter into India and subsequently whether they are adhering to the terms and
conditions of that permission? If contravention was found to take up with
Government/FIPB – for approaching Government or FIPB, ICAI must have
information as to the nature of permission given. As already mentioned, no
documents are available indicating the nature of permission granted. What is
the current position of international trade in accounting and related services?
The opening up of accounting and related services, can be linked to reciprocal
opening up by developed countries.

g)  Additional powers required by ICAI to curb the
malpractices – If under the existing legislation, ICAI does not have enough
powers to curb this practice, whether they would need more powers. A separate
proposal for amendment of Chartered Accountants Act, 1949 has been sent by the
Council to the Government seeking additional powers.

 

The Expert Group observed that MAF solicits professional work in an international brand name.
They have registered Indian CA firms with the ICAI with the same brand names
which are their integral part. There is no regulatory regime for their
accountability. Thus, the principle of reciprocity u/s. 29 of the CA Act,
Section 25 prohibiting corporates from chartered accountancy practice and Code
of Ethics prohibiting advertisement and fee sharing are flouted. The MAFs also
violate FDI policy in the field of accounting, auditing, book keeping, taxation
and legal services.

The Expert Group recommended that no person or entity and specially Chartered Accountants can
hold out to public that they are operating in India as or on behalf or in their
trade name and in any other manner so as to represent them being part of or
authorised by MAFs to operate on their behalf in India or they are actually
representing MAFs or they are MAFs office/representatives in India, except
those registered with ICAI in terms of clause (Hi) as a network, in accordance
with network guidelines as notified by ICAI from time to time.

 

Status Report by the ICAI

The Institute called for information from
171 Indian CA firms perceived to be having international affiliation to examine
whether they are functioning within the framework of CA profession. However,
the said firms were reluctant to submit copies of agreements with foreign
entities and their tax returns. Certain CA firms submitted the documents by
masking certain portions contained in their agreements, partnership deeds and
assessment orders/income tax returns claiming confidentiality and commercially
sensitive nature of the documents. Some of the firms did not provide the
details. Some of the findings from the data collected were as follows:

 

a)  The multinational entity has granted
permission to the participating firms in the network to use the brand name.
This is notwithstanding the fact whether the firms have signed the License
Agreement with the entity or not. The relationship between members and firms
and how these are governed from same offices under common management and
control is not disclosed. The data disclosed on the website, however, clearly
brings out the linkage.

b)  Though some of the firms participating in the
networks have not signed the Verein document of Name License Agreement, yet
while making remittances to the multinational entity, the revenue of the entire
network is taken into account.

c)  Firms received financial grants from non-CA
firms.  A member of the Institute is prohibited
from receiving any part of profits from a non-member of the Institute. Such an
act on the part of a member/firm seems to be in violation of Item (3) of Part I
of the First Schedule to the Chartered Accountants Act 1949.

d)  The networking firms have made remittances to
a multinational entity, sharing their revenue which they have claimed to be
towards subscription fees, technology cost and administration cost etc.
in violation of Code of Ethics and regulations under CA Act.

e)  Firms used the words such as “In Association
with ….”, Associates of ……..”, Correspondents of ……” etc. on the
stationery, letter-heads, visiting cards thereby violating provisions of Item
(7) of Part I of the First Schedule to the Chartered Accountants Act,1949.  The networking firms in Network and all their
personnel are using the domain name identical to the name of the multinational
entity in their email IDs and the same is displayed in their visiting cards.

f)   The obligations set out in respect of some of
the CA firms as per the sub-licensee agreement give a clear indication that the
CA firms are under the management and supervision of a non-CA firm for matters
such as admission of partners, merger, purchase of assets, etc.

g)  Some of the firms in Network have admitted
that the global network identifies broad market opportunities, develops
strategies, strengthens network’s internal products and promotes international
brand. The member firms in India also gain access to brand and marketing
materials developed by their overseas affiliate, thereby indirectly soliciting
professional work.

h)  Most of these firms have a name license
agreement to use International brand name. One of the terms of such agreement
is that apart from common professional standards etc., the Indian
affiliates shall harmonize their policies etc. with the global policies
of the network. In this manner, matters such as selection and appointment of
partners, acquisition of assets, investment in capital etc. are
regulated through the means of such agreements and at time even the
representative voting is held by an aligned private limited company rather than
the CA firms themselves. As a consequence of this, the control of the Indian CA
firms is effectively placed in the hands of non-members/companies/foreign
entities.

i)   The member firms are required to refer the
work among themselves. In respect of some firms, referral fee is payable and
receivable. Agreements also provided for use of name and logo. Payment/receipt
of referral fee is prohibited as per code of conduct applicable to CAs.

 

In the light of the aforesaid findings,
following recommendations were made to the Council:

 

a) The Council should consider action against the
firms which had not given the full information.

b) Consider action against the firms who are
sharing revenue with multinational entity/consulting entity in India which may
include cost of marketing, publicity and advertising as against the ethics of
CAs or receiving grants from them.

c) Action to be taken against the audit firms
distributing its work to other firms and allowing them access to all
confidential information without the consent of the client;

d) Require the CA firms to maintain necessary data
about the remittances made and received on account of networking arrangement or
sharing of fee;

e) Consider action against firms being paid or
offered referral fee;

f)  To disclose their international
affiliation/arrangement every year to the Institute;

g) Council should consider action against the
firms using name and logo of international networks and securing professional
business by means not open to CAs in India;

h) Only CAs and CA firms registered with ICAI
should be permitted to provide audit and assurance services. Wherever MAFs are
operating in India, directly or indirectly, they should not engage in any audit
and assurance services without ‘No Objection’ and permission from ICAI and RBI.

 

Directives issued by the court:

 

Important observations of the SC:

 

“Though the Committee analysed available
facts and found that MAFs were involved in violating ethics and law, it took
hyper technical view that non availability of complete information and the
groups as such were not amenable to its disciplinary jurisdiction in absence of
registration. A premier professionals body cannot limit its oversight functions
on technicalities and is expected to play proactive role for upholding ethics
and values of the profession by going into all connected and incidental
issues.” (Page 68)

 

“It can hardly be disputed that
profession of auditing is of great importance for the economy. Financial
statements audited by qualified auditors are acted upon and failures of the
auditors have resulted into scandals in the past. The auditing profession
requires proper oversight.”
(Page 69)

 

On the basis of various reports and findings
as discussed aforesaid, the Court issued the following directives:

 

a)   The Union of India may constitute a three
member Committee of experts to look into the question whether and to what
extent the statutory framework to enforce the letter and spirit of Sections 25
and 29 of the CA Act and the statutory Code of Conduct for the CAs requires
revisit so as to appropriately discipline and regulate MAFs.

b)  To consider need for appropriate legislation
on the pattern of Sarbanes Oxley Act, 2002 and Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act, 2010 in US or any other appropriate mechanism for
oversight of profession of the auditors.

c)   Question whether on account of conflict of
interest of auditors with consultants, the auditors’ profession may need an
exclusive oversight body may be examined.

d)  It may also consider steps for effective
enforcement of the provisions of the FDI policy and the FEMA Regulations
referred to above.

e)   Such Committee may be constituted within two
months. Report of the Committee may be submitted within three months
thereafter.

f)   The Enforcement Directorate (ED) may complete
the pending investigation within three months.

g)  ICAI may further examine all the related
issues at appropriate level as far as possible within three months and take
such further steps as may be considered necessary.

 

(The above decision is a summery. Full
text of the decision may be read on the Supreme Court portal:
http://sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2013/35041/35041_2013_Judgement_23-Feb-2018.pdf
)


Can Box Collection By Charitable/Religious Trusts Be In The Nature Of Corpus?

Issue for
Consideration

Voluntary contributions received by a
charitable or religious trust are taxable as its income, by virtue of the
specific provisions of section 2(24)(iia) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, subject
to exemption under sections 11 and 12. Section 12(1) provides that any
voluntary contribution received by a trust created wholly for charitable or religious
purposes (not being contributions made with a specific direction that they
shall form part of the corpus of the trust), shall be deemed to be income
derived from property held under trust wholly for charitable or religious
purposes for the purposes of section 11. Section 11(1)(d) provides for a
specific exemption for income in the form of voluntary contributions made with
a specific direction that they shall form part of the corpus of the trust.
Therefore, on a comprehensive reading of sections 2(24), 11 and 12,  it can be inferred that corpus donations are
entitled to the benefit of exemption, irrespective of whether the trust has
applied 85% of the corpus donations for charitable or religious purposes, or not.

Many charitable or religious trusts keep
donation boxes on their premises for donors to donate funds to such trusts.
Such donation boxes can be seen in various temples, hospitals, etc. At
times, some of the donation boxes have an inscription or a sign nearby stating
that the donation made in that particular box would be for a particular capital
purpose, or that it is for the corpus of the trust. The question has arisen
before the various benches of the Tribunal as to whether such amounts received
through the donation boxes having such inscription or sign would either not be
regarded as income, being receipts in the nature of contributions to corpus, or
even otherwise be eligible for exemption as corpus donations u/s. 11(1)(d), or
whether such amounts of box collection would be voluntary contributions in the
nature of regular income of the trust.

While the Chandigarh bench of the Tribunal
has taken the view that such box collections are corpus donations, and
therefore not income of the trust, the Mumbai and Calcutta benches of the
Tribunal have taken the view that such box collections could not be regarded as
corpus donations.

Prabodhan Prakashan’s case

The issue first came up before the Bombay
bench of the Tribunal in the case of Prabodhan Prakashan vs. ADIT 50 ITD
135.

In that case, the main object of the
assessee was promotion and propagation of ideologies, opinions and ideas for
furtherance of national interest, and for this purpose, publishing of books,
magazines, weeklies, dailies and other periodicals, as also establishing and
running printing presses for this purpose. Contributions were invited by the
assessee from the public towards the corpus fund of the trust through an appeal
as under:

“Establishing a firm financial foundation
for Dainik Saamana and Prabodhan Prakashan is in your hands. For this strong
foundation, we are establishing a Corpus Fund. Offeratory boxes for the corpus
will be placed in today’s meeting and meetings to be held in future. In order
to assist our activities, which will always have a nationalistic fervour and social
relevance, it is our earnest request that you contribute to the Corpus Fund
Offeratory boxes to the best of your ability”.

The words “donations towards corpus” were
written on the offeratory boxes. The boxes were opened in the presence of
Trustees, and the amount of Rs. 13,77,465 found in these boxes was credited to
the account “Donations Towards Corpus”.

Before the assessing officer, it was claimed
that the donations were made to the corpus of the trust, and were therefore
exempt u/s. 11(1)(d). The assessee was asked to furnish specific letters from
the donors confirming that they had given directions that the donations were to
be utilised towards the corpus of the trust. Such letters could be furnished
only for donations of Rs. 3,90,277, but not for the balance of Rs. 9,86,188.
For such balance amount, it was submitted that the Income-tax Act did not
specify that the directions of the donors should be in writing. It was claimed
that in view of the appeal issued for donations, and the words “donations
towards corpus” on the offeratory boxes, it should be held that specific
directions were indeed given by the donors. The assessing officer did not
accept this contention, and treated donations of Rs. 9,86,188 as ordinary
contributions, which were taxable.

The Commissioner(Appeals) referred to the
provisions of section 11(1)(d), according to which, income in the form of
voluntary contributions made with the specific direction that they shall form
part of the corpus of the trust, would not be included in the total income of
the person in receipt of the income. According to him, a specific direction of
the donor was necessary, and the circumstances relevant to prove such direction
included the need to establish the identity of the donor, which was not established
in this case. According to the Commissioner(Appeals), merely writing “donations
towards corpus” on the offeratory boxes was not sufficient, since many of the
donors might not even know as to what was the corpus of the trust. The
Commissioner(Appeals) was of the view that the burden lay upon the assessee to
prove that the donations were received towards the corpus of the trust, and
that burden had not been discharged. He therefore, upheld the action of the
assessing officer in treating the donations of Rs. 9,86,188 as voluntary
contributions in the nature of income.

Before the Tribunal, on behalf of the
assessee, it was argued that the appeal had been issued for donations towards
the corpus, and the offeratory boxes had the inscription that the donations
were towards the corpus. The trust records of collection showed that the
donations were credited to the corpus account. It was argued that there was no
provision in the Act that the specific directions from the donor should be in
writing, and that the directions were to be inferred from the facts and
circumstances.

Considering the provisions of section
11(1)(d), the Tribunal noted that it was true that there was no stipulation in
that section that the specific directions should be in writing. It agreed that
it should be possible to come to a conclusion from the facts and circumstances
of the case, whether a specific direction was there or not, even where there
were no written directions accompanying the donation. However, according to the
Tribunal, at the same time, it needed to be kept in mind that the specific
direction was to be that of the donor, and not that of the donee. It was not
sufficient for the donee alone to declare that the voluntary contributions were
being allocated to the corpus, and there should be evidence to show that the
direction came from the donor.

In the opinion of the Tribunal, when there
was no accompanying letter to the effect that the donation was towards corpus,
at least such subsequent confirmation from the donor was a necessity. In the
case before it, such subsequent confirmation was also absent, and all that was
there, according to the Tribunal, was the intention of the donee and the actual
carrying out of that intention.

The Tribunal therefore held that the facts
did not fulfil the requirement of section 11(1)(d), and that it could not be
said that there was a specific direction from the donor to use the contribution
towards the corpus of the trust. It accordingly held that the amount was not
exempt u/s. 11(1)(d).

A similar view was taken by the Calcutta
bench of the Tribunal in the case of Shri Digambar Jain Naya Mandir vs. ADIT
70 ITD 121,
which was the case of a religious trust running a temple, which
had kept two boxes in the premises of the temple, one marked “Corpus Donations”
and the other marked as “Donations”. In that case, the Tribunal held that the
assessee had not made out that the donors were able to give the direction
before/at the time of donation, and that for an ordinary devotee, it was not
possible to distinguish the corpus and non-corpus funds.

Shree Mahadevi Tirath Sharda Ma Seva Sangh’s
case

The issue again came up before the
Chandigarh bench of the tribunal in the case of Shree Mahadevi Tirath Sharda
Ma Seva Sangh vs. ADIT 133 TTJ 57(Chd.) (UO)
.

In the case, the assessee was a society
registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and u/s. 12AA of the
Income-tax Act, 1961, running a temple, Vaishno Mata Temple, at Kullu. A
resolution had been passed whereby the different boxes were decided to be kept
in the temple premises for enabling the devotees to make donations according to
their discretion. It included keeping of a box for collection of donations,
which were to be used for undertaking construction of building. Any
devotee/donor desirous of making a donation towards construction of buildings
would put the money in this box. In the temple premises, donation boxes were
kept with different objectives. One donation box was kept for “Construction of
Building”, and other boxes for donations meant for langar and general purposes.
At specified intervals, the boxes were opened and the amounts collected were
put into respective accounts. The donations were duly entered in either the
building fund donation register or the normal donation account, and thereafter
entered in the books of account accordingly.

The return of income was filed, claiming
exemption for donations received in the box kept for donations for construction
of building. The donations were reflected in the balance sheet under the head
“Donation for Building Construction with Specific Directions from Individuals”.

The assessing officer however, treated such
donations of Rs. 40,55,480 as donations, and not as receipts towards corpus,
and included the donations in the total income liable to tax. It was done on
the reason that the assessee did not possess any evidence to show that the
donation credited under the Building Fund had been donated by donors with the
specific direction to utilise the same for building construction only.

The Commissioner(Appeals) rejected the
appeal of the assessee, on the ground that the assessee failed to provide the
requisite details or any documentary evidence to prove that the donations were
made with specific directions for construction of building.

Before the Tribunal, it was pointed out that
the assessee had collected donations earmarked for being spent on construction
of building in the same manner as in the past years. It was pointed out that
the amount was credited to the Building Fund in the balance sheet, which also
included the opening balance, and, on the assets side, the assessee had shown
the expenditure on construction of the building. The amount had been spent
exclusively towards construction of the building, on which there was no
dispute. The fact that the donation boxes were kept with different objectives
in the temple premises was demonstrated with the help of photographs and
certificates from the local gram panchayat, Councillor, etc. It was
claimed that the certificates testified the system evolved by the assessee
since earlier years for collection of donations towards construction of
building.

It was further argued that in view of the
nature of collection undertaken by the assessee, which was supported by past
history, the assessing officer was not justified in insisting on production of
specific names of donors.

On behalf of the revenue, it was pointed out
that the assessee could not furnish the complete names and addresses of the
donors who had made the donations with specific directions for building
construction, though such details were asked for during the course of
assessment proceedings. It was only because such information was not available
that the amounts had been treated as voluntary/general donations, and not as
corpus donations.

The Tribunal considered the various facts
placed before it, supported by photographs, testimony of the local gram
panchayat, resolution, the fact that different boxes were kept for separate
purposes, the utilisation of the Building Fund, etc. It noted the fact that the
assessee had received general donations of Rs. 19,53,094 and other incomes,
which were credited to the income and expenditure account.

Analysing the provisions of section 12(1),
the Tribunal noted that any voluntary contributions made with a specific
direction that they shall form part of the corpus of the trust were not to be
treated as income for the purposes of section 11. It observed that the moot
question was whether or not the manner in which the assessee had collected the
donations could be said to signify a direction from the donor that the funds
were to be utilised for the construction of building. It noted that the manner
in which the specific direction was to be made had not been laid down in the
Act or the Rules; there was no method or mode prescribed by law of giving such
directions. Therefore, according to the Tribunal, it was in the fitness of
things to deduce that the same was to be gathered from the facts and
circumstances of each case.

The Tribunal noted that the resolution of
the Society clearly showed that a donation box had been kept in the temple
premises with the appeal that the amount collected would be spent for building
construction. The devotees visiting the temple or other donors were depositing
money in the donation box, which was to be utilised for construction of
building only. The assessing officer had not disputed the manner in which such
donations had been collected by the assessee. The only dispute was that the
assessee could not provide the names and addresses of individual donors who had
contributed towards Building Fund. According to the Tribunal, since the
donations were being collected from the devotees at large, the insistence of
the assessing officer of production of individual names and addresses was not
justified. Further, the bona fides of such practice being carried out by the
assessee, either in the past or during the year under consideration, was not doubted.

Therefore, in the opinion of the Tribunal,
having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, the donations of Rs.
40,55,480 collected by the assessee were to be considered as carrying specific
directions for being used for construction of the building. Ostensibly, the
devotees putting money in the donation box did so in response to the appeal by
the society that the amounts collected would be used for construction of
building. Under such circumstances, the Tribunal was of the view that the assessee’s
plea, that these amount should be taken as donations towards corpus, was
reasonable.

The Tribunal accordingly held that such
amounts received in the box for construction of building would form part of the
corpus of the Society, and would not constitute income for the purposes of
section 11.

Observations

When one analyses both these decisions
(Prabodhan Prakashan & Shree Mahadevi Tirath Sharda Ma Seva Sangh), one
realises that the common thread running through both these decisions is that
both confirm that the direction of the donors, that the amount of donation is
towards corpus need not be in writing, and that it is sufficient if the
surrounding circumstances indicate that the donors intended to give the funds
put in the boxes for corpus/capital purposes, for such amounts to be treated as
corpus donations. In Prabodhan Prakashan’s case, the Tribunal went further and
held that there should be evidence to show that the direction came from the
donor, while in Shri Digambar Jain Naya Mandir’s case, the Tribunal observed
that the assessee had not made out that the donors were able to give the
direction before or at the time of donation to the corpus funds. Both the
Bombay and Calcutta decisions, therefore, placed the onus on the assessee to
show the existence of the directions from the donors.

A view similar to the Chandigarh bench’s
view has been taken by the Karnataka High Court in the case of DIT vs. Sri
Ramakrishna Seva Ashrama 357 ITR 731
, where the High Court held that it was
not necessary that a voluntary contribution should be made with a specific
direction to treat it as corpus. If the intention of the donor was to give that
money to a trust, which would be kept in a deposit, and the income from the
same was to be utilised for carrying on a particular activity, it satisfied the
definition part of the corpus. It further held that whether a donation was in
the nature of corpus or not was to be gauged from the intention of the donor
and how the recipient treated the receipt. In that case, the assessee had
received various donations for Rural Health Project, which were kept in fixed
deposits. The income derived from those deposits was utilised for carrying on
its various rural activities.

Similarly, in
the case of Shri Vasu Pujiya Jain Derasar Pedhi vs. ITO 39 TTJ (Jp) 337,
the receipts by the trust were issued under the head “Mandir Nirman”, and the
dispute was whether the donations could be said to be received with specific
directions that they shall form part of the corpus of the trust. It was held by
the Jaipur bench of the Tribunal that the donations were to be treated as
corpus donations.

In the case of Agnel Charities (Agnel
Sewa Sang) vs. ITO 31 TTJ (Del) 160
, the assessee had staged a drama for
raising funds for construction of a school building. The circular issued
relating to the drama mentioned that the assessee was inviting subscriptions
and donations for school building. The Delhi bench of the Tribunal held that
such donations received were corpus donations, entitled to exemption.

In the case of N. A. Ramachandra Raja
Charity Trust vs. ITO 14 ITD 230 (Mad)
, the receipts given to the donors
had a rubber stamp “towards corpus only” on each of the receipts. In addition,
certificates were obtained from some of the donors confirming the fact that the
donations were towards corpus. In that case, the Madras bench of the tribunal
held that it was clear from the inception that the amounts received by the
assessee and held by it were under an obligation to appropriate the same
towards the corpus of the trust alone. While so holding, the tribunal relied
upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. Bijli Cotton
Mills 116 ITR 60,
whereof the Supreme Court confirmed that certain amounts
received by the assessee and shown in the bills issued to the customers in a
separate column headed “Dharmada” was not income of the assessee, since right
from inception, these amounts were received and held by the assessee under an
obligation to spend the same for charitable purposes only, being earmarked by
the customers for Dharmada.

In Prabodhan Prakashan’s case, the
Tribunal, perhaps, was not justified in inferring  that the specific direction in that case was
that of the donee, and not that of the donor. Perhaps, in that case, the
tribunal was not convinced by the evidence placed before it that the donor was
aware of the fact that the donation was being given for a capital purpose.

The observation of the Tribunal in Shri
Digambar Naya Mandir’s case
that, for an ordinary devotee, it was not
possible to distinguish the corpus and non-corpus funds did not seem to be
justified. While a devotee may not know what is the meaning of corpus, a
devotee would certainly be aware of the purpose for which his donation into a
particular box would be used, particularly when there are clear indications in
the form of inscription or signs on the box or near the box stating the
purpose. This would be all the more relevant when there are boxes for more than
one purpose placed in the same premises, some for corpus purposes and others
for non-corpus purposes. By putting his donation in a particular box, the
devotee should be regarded as having exercised his option as to how his
donation is to be used.

Therefore, where a trust receives certain
box collections for capital purposes, the surrounding circumstances clearly
indicate that the donor intended the amounts deposited in the box to be
utilised for such capital purposes, and such receipts are bona fide for
such capital purposes (as perhaps indicated by fairly large collection for
non-corpus purposes as well), such collections should certainly be
regarded  as   corpus 
donations  eligible  for  
exemption u/s. 11(1)(d).

All the above decisions were rendered in the
context of the law prior to the insertion of section 56(2)(x), and therefore
the Tribunals did not have the opportunity to consider taxation of such box
collections under that section. Section 56(2)(x) provides that where any person
receives any sum of money aggregating more than Rs. 50,000 in a year from any
persons, such amount is chargeable to income-tax as Income from Other Sources.
There is no exemption for amounts received by a charitable or religious trust.
After the insertion of section 56(2)(x), would such box collection be taxable
under that section?

If one looks at section 2(24)(iia) and
section 12(1), these operate specifically to tax voluntary contributions
received by a charitable or religious trust as its income. Being specific
sections, these would prevail over the general provisions of section 56(2)(x),
which apply to all assessees. Therefore, in our view, section 56(2)(x) would
not apply to a charitable or religious trust, the specific exclusions u/s.12(1)
cannot be taxed by roping in the general provisions of section 56(2)(x).

One more section which needs to be kept in
mind, in the context of box collections, is section 115BBC. This section, which
does not apply to wholly religious trusts, provides that, where the total
income of an assessee referred to in section 11, includes any anonymous
donations, such anonymous donations in excess of the specified limit, shall be
chargeable to tax at the rate of 30%. Box collection of wholly religious trusts
would not be taxable under this section, whereas only donations made for the
purposes of a medical institution or educational institution would be taxable
in case of partly charitable and partly religious trusts. While this section
would apply to normal box collections of charitable trusts, the issue is
whether it would apply to box collections for a capital purpose of such
charitable trusts, which would otherwise be regarded as corpus donations?

Given the specific exclusion in section
12(1) for corpus donations, a view is possible that such corpus donations (box
collections) are capital receipts, which do not fall within the domain of
income of a charitable trust at all, and that therefore, the provisions of
section 115BBC do not apply to such box collections for capital purposes. In
fact, in DCIT vs. All India Pingalwara Charitable Society 67 taxmann.com
338,
the Amritsar bench of the Tribunal took a view that section 115BBC
does not apply at all to box collections of genuine charitable trusts.
According to the Tribunal, the object of the section was to catch the
‘unaccounted money’ which was brought in as tax free income in the hands of
charitable trusts, and this section was never meant for taxing the petty
charities. The Legislature intended to tax the unaccounted money or black money
which was brought in the books of charitable trusts in bulk, and not to tax the
small and general charities collected by genuine charitable trusts.

In Gurudev Siddha Peeth vs. ITO 59
taxmann.com 400
, the Mumbai bench of the Tribunal also held that amount of
offerings put by various devotees in donation boxes of the assessee-trust, a
sidh peeth/deity, could not be treated as anonymous donations taxable u/s.
115BBC merely on ground that assessee had not maintained any records of such
offerings. According to the Tribunal, it is clear that the provisions of
section 115BBC(1) will not apply to donations received by the assessee in
donation boxes from numerous devotees who have offered the offerings on account
of respect, esteem, regard, reference and their prayer for the deity/siddha
peeth. Such type of offerings are made/put into the donation box by numerous
visitors and it is generally not possible for any such type of institutions to
make and keep record of each of the donors, with his name, address etc.
This section is meant to curb the flow of unaccounted money into the system,
with a modus operandi to introduce such black money into accounts of
institutions such as university, medical institutions, where there is a problem
relating to the receipt of capitation fees, etc.

Therefore, a view is possible that section
115BBC does not apply at all to box collections of genuine charitable trusts.

 

 

The Finance Act 2018

1.  INTRODUCTION:

1.1  The Finance Minister, Shri Arun Jaitley, has
presented his last full Budget of the present Government for 2018-19 in the
Parliament on 1st February, 2018. This Budget can be described as
Pro-Poor and Pro-Farmer Budget. The Budget contains several schemes for
Agriculture and Rural Economy, Health, Education and Social Protection,
Encouragement to Medium, Small and Micro Enterprises (MSME), Employment
Generation, Improving Public Service Delivery etc.

1.2  The Finance Minister has summarized his views
about economic reforms in Para 3 of his Budget Speech.

1.3  In the field of Direct Taxes he has made some
amendments in the Income-tax Act. These amendments can be classified under the
following heads.

 

(i)    Tax Incentives for
promoting post-harvest activities  of
agriculture;

(ii)   Employment Generation;

(iii)   Incentive for Real
Estate;

(iv)  Incentive to MSMEs.

(v)   Relief to Salaried
Taxpayers;

(vi)  Relief to Senior
Citizens;

(vii)  Tax Incentives for
International Financial Services Centre (IFSC)

(viii) Measures to Control cash
Economy,

(ix)  Rationalisation of Long
term Capital Gains Tax.

(x)   Health and Education Cess

(xi)  E-Assessments

 

1.4  Out of the above, the
major amendment in the Income tax Act relates to levy of Long-term Capital
Gains Tax on Shares and Units of Equity Oriented Mutual Funds on which
Securities Transaction Tax (STT) is paid. Hitherto, this long term capital gain
was exempt from tax. This one proposal will bring in about Rs.20,000 crore
additional revenue to the Government. The logic for this new levy is explained
in Para 155 of the Budget Speech.

1.5  This year’s Budget and
the Finance Bill, 2018, has been passed, with some procedural amendments,
suggested by the Finance Minister, by the Parliament without any debate. The
Finance Act, 2018, has received the assent of the President on 29th
March, 2018. Most of the amendments in the Income-tax Act have come into force
from 1.4.2018 i.e. F.Y. 2018-19 (A.Y. 2019-20). In this Article some of the
important amendments in the Income-tax Act have been discussed.

 

2.  RATES OF TAXES:

2.1  There are no changes in
tax rates or tax slabs in the case of non-corporate assessees. There is no change
in the rates of surcharge applicable to all assessees. Similarly, there is no
change in the rebate from tax allowable u/s. 87A of the Income-tax Act.

 

2.2 The existing Education Cess (2%) and Secondary and Higher
Education Cess (1%) levied on tax payable has now been replaced from A.Y.
2019-20 by a new cess called “Health and Education Cess” at 4% of the tax
payable by all assessees.

 

2.3 In the case of domestic companies, there are some modifications
as under w.e.f. A.Y. 2019-20:

 

(i)  At present, where the
total turnover or gross receipts of a company does not exceed Rs. 50 cr., in
F.Y. 2015-16, the rate of tax is 25%. From A.Y. 2019-20, it is provided that
where the turnover or gross receipts of a company does not exceed Rs. 250 cr.,
in F.Y. 2016-17, the rate of tax will be 25%. This will benefit many small and
medium size companies.

 

(ii)  In the case of a
Domestic company which is newly set up on or after 1.3.2016, which complies
with the provisions of section 115BA, the rate of tax is 25% at the option of
the company.

(iii) In all
other cases, the rate of tax will be 30%.


2.4   There are no changes in the rates of tax and
surcharge chargeable to foreign companies. The rate of education cess is
increased from 3% to 4% as stated above.

2.5  As stated earlier, one major amendment this
year relates to levy of tax on long term capital gain on transfer of shares and
units of equity Oriented Mutual Funds on which STT is paid. Hitherto, this
capital gain was exempt from tax. By insertion of a new section 112A, it is now
provided that in respect of transfer of such shares or units on or after
1.4.2018, the long term capital gain in excess of Rs. 1 Lakh will be taxable at
the rate of 10% plus applicable surcharge and cess.

2.6  There is no change in the rate of Minimum
Alternate Tax (MAT) chargeable to companies. However, in the case of a Unit
owned by a non-corporate assessee located in an International Financial
Services Centre (IFSC), the rate of AMT payable u/s. 115 JC in respect of
income derived in foreign currency has been reduced from 18.5% to 9% plus
applicable Surcharge and Cess.

2.7  Section 115-O is amendment to levy tax at
the  rate of 30% plus applicable
surcharge and cess on a closely held company in respect of any loan given to a
related party to whom section 2(22) (e) applies. Hitherto, tax was payable by
the person receiving such loan u/s. 2(22)(e). This burden is now shifted to the
company giving such loan and the person receiving such will not be liable to
pay any tax from A.Y. 2019-20.

      

2.8  Section 115R has been amended to provide for
levy of tax on Mutual Fund in aspect of income distributed to Unit holders of
equity oriented mutual fund. This tax is at the rate of 10% plus applicable
surcharge and cess.

 

2.9  In view of the above, the effective maximum
marginal rate of tax (including surcharge and Health & Education Cess) for
A.Y. 2019-20 will be as under:

 

Assessee

Up to Rs. 50 lakhs

Above Rs.50 lakhs and up to Rs.1 crore.

Above Rs. 1 cr., and up to Rs.10 cr.

Above
Rs.10 cr.

Individual,
HUF etc.

31.2%

34.32%

35.88%

35.88%

Firms
(including LLP)

31.2%

31.2%

34.944%

34.944%

Domestic
Companies with turnover / gross receipts in F.Y.2016-17 not exceeding Rs. 250
cr.

26%

26%

27.82%

29.12%

New
Domestic Companies complying with the  conditions of section 115BA

26%

26%

27.82%

29.12%

Other
Domestic Companies

31.2%

31.2%

33.384%

34.944%

Foreign
Companies

41.6%

41.6%

42.432%

43.68%

 

2.10  Commodities
Transaction Tax:

The Finance
Act, 2013, has been amended to provided that the Commodities Transaction Tax
(CTT) shall be payable at the following Rates w.e.f. 1.4.2018.

 

Sr. No.

Taxable
Commodities Transaction

Rate

Tax payable
by

1

Sale of a
Commodity derivative

0.01%

Seller

2

Sale of an
option on Commodity derivative

0.05%

Seller

3

Sale of an
option on commodity derivative, where option is exercised

0.0001%

Purchaser

 

3.   TAX DEDUCTION AT SOURCE:

(i)   7.75% Savings (Taxable) Bonds, 2018 – Section 193           

              

It is now provided
tax shall be deducted at source on interest exceeding Rs. 10,000/- payable on
the above Bonds at the rates provided in section 193.

           

(ii) Interest on Deposits by Senior Citizens – Section
194A

 

Section 194A has
been amended w.e.f. 1.4.2018 to provide that tax will not be deducted at source
by a Bank, Co-operative Bank or Post Office in respect of interest upto Rs.
50,000/- on a deposit made by a Senior Citizen. 
It may be noted that under the newly inserted section 80TTB, it is now
provided that in the case of a Senior Citizen, deduction of interest up to Rs.
50,000/- received from a bank, co-operative bank or post office on all deposits
will be allowed for computing the Total Income.

 

4.   EXEMPTIONS
AND DEDUCTIONS:

4.1  Exemption
on withdrawal from NPS  – Section 10(12A)

At present,
withdrawal by an employee contributing to National Pension Scheme (NPS),
referred to in section 80CCD, on closure of account or opting out of the Scheme
is exempt from tax to the extent of 40% of the amount withdrawn on closure of
the account or opting out of the scheme.

The benefit of
this exemption u/s. 10(12A) is now extended to all other persons who are
subscribers to the NPS from the A.Y. 2019-20 (F.Y. 2018-19). It may be noted
that the exemption given for partial withdrawal from NPS to employees u/s.
10(12B) from A.Y. 2018-19 has not been extended to other assessees.

4.2 Exemption from Long term Capital Gains Tax –
Section 10(38)

At present, long
term capital gain on transfer of equity shares of a company or units of equity
oriented Mutual Fund is exempt from tax u/s. 10(38) if STT is paid. This
exemption is now withdrawn by amendment of this section w.e.f. 1.4.2018. This
issue is discussed in detail in Para 9 under the head “Capital Gains.”


4.3  Deduction
from Gross Total Income – Section 80AC

At present,
Section 80AC provides that deductions u/s. 80 – IA, 80-IAB, 80-IB, 80-IC, 80-ID
or 80-IE will not be allowed if the assessee has not filed the return of Income
before the due date mentioned u/s. 139(1) of the Income tax Act. This section
is now amended w.e.f. A/Y: 2018-19 (F.Y:2017-18) to provide that deduction in
respect of Income under sections 80 H to 80 RRB (Part “C” of Chapter VIA) will
not be allowed if the return of Income is not filed within the time allowed
u/s. 139(1).


4.4  Deduction
for Health Insurance Premium –
Section 80D

At present, the amount paid for health
insurance  premium, preventive health
check-up or medical expenses is allowed to Senior Citizens upto Rs.
30,000/.  This limit is increased, by
amendment of Section 80D from A.Y. 2019-20 (F.Y. 2018-19), to Rs. 50,000/-.
This amendment applies to all Senior Citizens (including Very Senior Citizens).

A new subsection
(4A) is added to provide that where the amount has been paid in Lump Sum to
keep in force an Insurance Policy on the health of the specified person for
more than a year, then deduction will be allowed in each year, on proportionate
basis, during which the insurance is in force.

4.5  Deduction for
medical treatment for Special Diseases – Section 80DDB

 At present,
Section 80DDB provides for deduction for medical expenses in respect of certain
critical illness, as specified in Rule 11DD. In the case of a Senior Citizen
this deduction is allowable upto Rs. 60,000/-. In the case of a very Senior
Citizen, the limit for this deduction is Rs. 80,000/-.  By amendment of this
section from  A.Y. 2019-20 (F.Y.
2018-19), this limit for Senior Citizens (including very Senior Citizens) is
increased to Rs.1,00,000/-.

4.6  Incentives
to Start – Ups – Section 80 IAC

Section 80IAC
provides for 100% deduction of profits of an eligible start-up for three
consecutive years out of seven years beginning from the year of its
incorporation.  This section is amended
with retrospective effect from A.Y. 2018-19 (F.Y. 2017-18). Some of the
conditions for eligibility of this exemption have been relaxed as under.

(i)  At present, this benefit is available to an
eligible start-up incorporated between 01.04.2016 to 31.03.2019. Now it is
provided that this benefit can be claimed by a start-up incorporated between
01.04.2016 to 31.03.2021.

(ii)  At present, this benefit is available to an
eligible start-up only if the total turnover of the business does not exceed
Rs. 25 crore during any of the years between F.Y. 2016-17 to F.Y. 2020-21. It
is now provided that this benefit can be claimed if the total turnover of the
business in the year for which the deduction is claimed does not exceed Rs. 25
crore.

(iii)  The definition of the term “Eligible
Business” has been substituted by a new definition as under;

“Eligible
Business” means a business carried out by an eligible start-up engaged in
innovation, development or improvement of Products or processes or services or
a scalable business model with a high potential of employment generation or
wealth creation.”

From the above,
it will be noticed that the existing requirement of development of ‘new
products’ and of the business being driven by technology or intellectual
property is now removed.

4.7  Incentives
for Employment Generation – Section 80 JJAA

(i) Section 80JJ
AA has been amended from A.Y. 2019-20 (F.Y. 2018-19). This section provides for
an additional deduction of 30% in respect of salary and other emoluments paid
to eligible new employees who are employed for a minimum period of 240 days
during the year. At present, this requirement of 240 days of employment in a
year is relaxed to 150 days in the case of Apparel Industry. This concession
has now been extended to “Footwear and Leather” industry.

(ii)  The above deduction is available for a period
of 3 consecutive years from the year in which the new employee is employed. The
amendment in the section now provides that where the new employee is employed
in a particular year for less than  240 /
150 days but in the immediately succeeding year such employee is employed for
more than 240/150 days, he shall be deemed to have been employed in the
succeeding year. In such a case, the benefit of this section can be claimed in
such succeeding year and also in the two immediately succeeding years.

 4.8  Incentive to
Producer Companies – New Section 80 PA

(i)  Section 80PA is a new section inserted from
A.Y. 2019-20 (F.Y. 2018-19). This section provides that a Producer Company (as
defined in section 581 A (l) of the Companies Act, 1956) shall be entitled to
claim deduction of 100% of its profits from eligible business during 5 years
i.e. A.Y. 2019-20 to A.Y. 2024-25. This benefit can be claimed by such a
company only in the year in which its turnover is less than Rs.100 crore.

For this
purpose, the eligible business is defined to mean-

(a) The
marketing of Agricultural Produce grown by its members;                       

(b) The purchase
of agricultural implements, seeds, livestock or other articles intended for
agriculture for the purpose of supplying to its members.

(c) The
processing of the agricultural produce of its members.

(ii)  It may be noted that the provisions of
section 581A to 581 ZT of the Companies Act, 1956 are applicable also to
Producer Companies registered under the Companies Act, 2013, by virtue of
section 465 of the Companies Act, 2013. The term ‘Producer Company’ is defined
in section 581A(l) and the term “Member” of such company is defined in section
581A (d).

 (iii)  It may be noted that the above deduction u/s.
80PA will be allowed in respect of the above 100% income included in the Gross
Total Income after reducing any other deduction claimed under Chapter VIA of
the Income-tax Act. It may further be noted that the above benefit of deduction
of 100% income is not available while computing book profits u/s.115 JB.
Therefore, such producer company will be required to pay MAT under Section 115
JB.

(iv)  Further, it may be noted that the above
benefit given under sections 80IAC, 80 JJAA or 80 PA will not be available if
the assessee does not file its return of income before the due date as provided
in section 139(1) in view of the fact that section 80AC is amended from A.Y. 2019-20.

4.9  Deduction
of Interest on Bank Deposits by Senior Citizens New Section 80TTB

(i)  At present, interest received on savings
account with a bank, co-operative bank or post office upto Rs. 10,000/- is
allowed as deduction in the case of an individual or HUF u/s. 80TTA. By an
amendment of section 80TTA, it is now provided that the said section shall not
apply to a Senior Section from A/Y:2019-20 (F.Y:2018-19).

(ii)  To give additional benefit to a Senior
Citizen (An Individual whose age is 60 years or more), a new section 80TTB is
inserted from A.Y. 2019-20 (F.Y. 2018-19). This section provides that in the
case of a Senior Citizen deduction can be claimed upto Rs. 50,000/- in respect
of interest on any deposit (savings, recurring deposit, fixed deposit etc.)
with a bank, co-operative bank or post office. This deduction cannot be claimed
by a Senior Citizen who holds any such deposit on behalf of a Firm, AOP or BOI
in which he is a partner or member. As stated earlier, the bank, co-operative
bank or post office will not be required to deduct tax at source u/s. 194A from
the interest upto Rs. 50,000/- on such deposit.

 

5.   CHARITABLE
TRUSTS:

Sections 10(23C)
and 11 have been amended w.e.f. A.Y. 2019-20 (F.Y2018-19) to provide for
certain restrictions while computing the income applied for objects of the
Trust. These sections apply to Educational Trusts, Hospitals and other Public
Charitable or Religious Trusts, which claim exemption u/s. 10(23C) or Section
11. It is now provided that restrictions on cash payment u/s. 40A(3) / (3A) and
consequences of non-deduction of tax at source u/s. 40 (a)(ia) will apply to
these Trusts. In other words, any payment in excess of Rs. 10,000/- made to a
person, in a day, otherwise than by an account payee cheque / bank draft will
not be considered as application of income to the objects of the Trust. Similarly,
if any payment is made to a person by way of salary, brokerage, interest,
professional fees, rent etc., on which tax is required to be deducted at
source under Chapter XVII of the Income-tax Act, and is not so deducted or paid
to the Government, the same will not be considered as application of income to
the extent provided in section 40(a)(ia). It may be noted that u/s. 40(a) (ia),
it is provided that 30% of such payment will not be allowed as deduction. Thus,
30% of the amount paid by the Trust without deduction of tax will not be
considered as application of income to the objects of the Trust.  Therefore, all public trusts claiming
exemption under the above sections will have to be careful while making
payments for scholarships, donations, professional fees, rent and other
expenses as they have to make sure that they comply with the provisions of
section 40A(3), 40A(3A) and 40(a) (ia).

 

6.   INCOME
FROM SALARY:

Sections 16 and
17 have been amended from A.Y. 2019-20 (F.Y. 2018-19). The effect of these amendments
is
as under:

(i)  All salaried employees will now be allowed
standard deduction of Rs. 40,000/- while computing income from salary u/s 16
and 17. This deduction can be claimed by persons getting pension from the
employer.

(ii)  At present, exemption is given to the
employee in respect of reimbursement of medical expenses incurred upto Rs.
15,000/- while computing perquisites u/s 17. This exemption is withdrawn from
A.Y. 2019-20 as standard deduction is now allowed.

(iii)  At present, u/s. 10(14)(i) read with Rule
2BB, an employee can claim deduction upto Rs. 1,600/- P.M. by way of transport
allowance while computing the income from salary. As stated in Para 151 of the
Budget Speech, this benefit will be withdrawn from A.Y. 2019-20 as standard
deduction is now allowed.

The above
amendment will reduce compliance burden of providing and maintaining records
relating to medical expenditure incurred by the employees. The net effect of
the above amendment will be that a salaried employee will get additional
deduction of Rs. 5800/- in the computation of Salary Income.

7.   INCOME
FROM BUSINESS OR PROFESSION:

7.1  Compensation
or termination or modification of contracts – Section 28(ii)

Section 28(ii)
is now amended from A.Y. 2019-20 (F.Y. 2018-19) to provide that any
compensation or other payments (whether of a revenue or capital nature) due to
or received by an assessee on termination of a contract relating to its
business will now be treated as its business income. Similarly, any such amount
due or received on modification of the terms and conditions of such contract
shall also be considered as business income.

7.2  Trading
in Agricultural Commodity Derivatives

At present,
section 43(5) considers a transaction of trading in commodity derivatives
carried on a recognised association which is chargeable to Commodities
Transactions Tax (CTT) as non-speculative. Since no CTT is payable on
transactions of Agriculture Commodity Derivatives, this section is amended from
A.Y. 2019-20 (F.Y. 2018-19) to provide that in case of trading in Agricultural
Commodity Derivatives the condition of chargeability of CTT shall not apply.

7.3  Full Value of
Consideration for Transfer of assets

Section 43CA,
50C and 56(2)(X) have been amended from A/Y:2019-20  (F.Y:2018-19) giving some relief in
computation of full value of consideration for transfer of Immovable Property.
Briefly stated, the effect of these amendments is as under:

(i)  At present, section 43CA(1) provides that in
case of transfer of any land or building or both, held as stock-in-trade, the
value adopted or assessed or assessable by Stamp Duty Authority (Stamp Duty
Value) shall be deemed to be the full value of the consideration, if the actual
consideration is less. Similarly, section 50C, dealing with transfer of land,
building or both held as capital asset and section 56(2) (X) dealing with
receipt of consideration by any person on transfer of land, building or both
contains a similar provision.

(ii)  In order to provide some relief in cases of
such transactions, the above sections are amended to provide that where Stamp
Duty Value does not exceed the actual consideration by more than 5% of the
actual consideration, no adjustment under these sections will be made and
actual consideration will be considered as full value of the consideration.
Thus, if the sale consideration is Rs.1,00,000/- and the stamp duty value is
Rs. 1,04,000/- the sale consideration will be considered as full value of the
consideration.

(iii)  If, however, the Stamp Duty Value is more
than 5% of the actual consideration, the Stamp Duty Valuation will be
considered as the full value of the consideration. Thus, if the sale
consideration is Rs. 1,00,000/- and the stamp duty value is Rs. 1,06,000/-, the
stamp duty value will be considered as full value of the consideration.

7.4  Presumptive Taxation – Section 44 AE

Section 44 AE
provides for computation of income on a presumptive basis in the case of
business of plying, hiring or leasing of goods carriers carried on by an
assessee who owns not more than 10 goods carriers at any time during the year.
At present, this section does not provide for presumptive income rates based on
capacity of vehicles. Therefore, this section is amended effective from A.Y.
2019-20(F.Y. 2018-19) to provide that in respect of heavy goods vehicles (i.e.
where gross vehicle weight is more than 12000 Kilograms) the presumptive income
u/s. 44AE will be computed at the rate of Rs. 1,000/- per tonne of gross
vehicle weight or Unladen weight, as the case may be, for every month or part
of the month or such higher amount as earned by the assessee. In the case of
vehicles, other than heavy vehicles, the presumptive income shall be Rs.
7,500/- from each goods vehicle for every month or part of the month during
which the vehicle is owned by the assesse or such higher income as earned by
the assessee. The other conditions of the existing section 44 AE will continue
to apply to the assesse who opts to be assessed on presumptive income under
this section.

 7.5  Carry forward
and set-off of Losses – Section 79

At present,
section 79 allows carry forward and set off of loses by a closely held company
only if the beneficial ownership of shares carrying at least 51% of the voting
power, as on the last day of the year in which the loss is incurred, is
continued.

In order to give
relief to cases covered by Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, (IBC-2016)
this section is amended retrospectively from A.Y. 2018-19 (F.Y. 2017-18). The
effect of the amendment is that the carry forward and set off of losses shall
be allowed, even if the change in the beneficial ownership of shares carrying
voting power is more than 51% as a result of the Resolution Plan under
IBC-2016, after providing an opportunity of hearing to the concerned
commissioner of Income tax. 

7.6  Taxation of
Book Profits – Section 115JB

(i)  Section 115 JB is amended from A.Y. 2018 – 19
(F.Y. 2017-18). – By this amendment, relief is given in the case of a company
against which an application for insolvency resolution has been admitted by the
Adjudicating Authority under IBC-2016. By this amendment it is now provided
that, from A.Y. 2018-19, the aggregate of unabsorbed depreciation and brought
forward losses, as per the books, shall be reduced in computing book profit.

(ii)  At present, the provisions of section 115JB
apply to Foreign Companies. Exception is made for companies which have no
permanent establishment in India and which are residents of countries with whom
India has entered into Double Tax Avoidance Agreement (DTAA). The exception is
also made with regard to companies resident of other countries with which there
is no DTAA and which are not required to seek registration under any applicable
laws. The section is now amended retrospectively from A.Y. 2001-02 to provide
that this section will not apply to foreign companies opting for presumptive
taxation under sections 44B, 44BB, 44BBA or 44BBB, where total income of such
companies comprises solely of income from business referred to in these sections
and such income has been offered for tax at the rates specified in those
sections.

8. INCOME computation AND DISCLOSURE
STANDARDS (ICDS):

8.1  Section 145(2) of the Income-tax Act
authorised the Central Government to notify ICDS. Accordingly, CBDT notified 10
ICDS by a Notification No. 87/2016 dated 29.09.2016. These ICDS came into force
from A.Y. 2017-18 (F.Y. 2016-17). Under section 145(2), it is provided that
income from Business or Profession or Income from Other Sources should be
computed in accordance with ICDS. Further, ICDS applies to all assessees (other
than an Individual or HUF who is not required to get their accounts audited
u/s. 44AB) who follow the Mercantile System of Accounting for computation of
Income from Business or Profession or Income from Other Sources.

8.2 
The Delhi High Court, in the case of Chamber of Tax Consultants vs.
Union of India (252 Taxman 77)
have struck down some of the ICDS fully and
read down some of the ICDS partially holding them to be contrary to the
judicial precedents or the provisions of the Income-tax Act.

8.3  It may be noted that in the above judgement
of Delhi High Court ICDS –I (Accounting Policies) ICDS II (Valuation of
Inventories), ICDS VI (Effects of Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates), ICDS VII
(Government Grants), and Part “A” of ICDS VIII (Securities) have been held to
be Ultra vires the Income-tax Act and have been struck down. Further,
Para 10(a) and 12 of ICDS III (Construction Contracts), Para 5 and 6 of ICDS IV
(Revenue Recognition) and Para 5 of ICDS IX (Borrowing Costs) have been held to
be Ultra Vires the Act and therefore struck down.

8.4  In order to overcome the effect of the above
judgment of Delhi High Court specific provisions are made in sections 36(1)
(xviii), 40A(13), 43 AA, 43CB, 145A and 145B with retrospective effect from
A.Y. 2017-18 (F.Y. 2016-17). In other words, these new provisions now validate
the objectionable provisions of ICDS which were struck down by the Delhi High
Court. The provisions of the above sections are as under:

(i)  Deduction
of marked-to-market loss

A new clause
(xviii) has been inserted in section 36(1) to provide for deduction of
marked-to-market loss or other expected loss as computed in accordance with the
ICDS VI. Further, a new sub-section (13) is inserted in Section 40A, to provide
that no deduction/ allowance of any marked-to market loss or other expected
loss shall be allowed, except those which are allowable as per the provisions
of section 36(1) (xviii).

(ii) Foreign Exchange Fluctuations – Section 43AA

New Section 43AA
has been inserted to provide that any gain or loss arising on account of any
change in foreign exchange rates shall be treated as income or loss, as the
case may be. Such gain or loss shall be computed in accordance with ICDS VI and
shall be in respect of all foreign currency transactions, including those
relating to –

(a) Monetary
items and non-monetary items

(b) Translation
of financial statements of foreign operations

(c) Forward
exchange contracts

(d) Foreign
currency translation reserve

The provisions
of this section are subject to the provisions of  section 43A.

(iii)  Income from Construction and Services Contracts –
Section 43 CB

New section 43CB
has been inserted to provide that –

 (a)  Profits and gains arising from a construction
contract shall be determined on the basis of percentage of completion method in
accordance with ICDS III, notified under section 145(2).

(b)  In respect of contract for providing services

(i) Where the duration of contract is not more
than 90 days, profits and gains from such service contract shall be determined
on the basis of project completion method;

(ii) Where the
contract involves indeterminate number of acts over a specific period of time,
profits and gains from such contract shall be determined on the basis of
straight line method;

(iii) In respect
of contracts not covered by (i) or (ii) above, profits and gains from such
service contract shall be determined on percentage of completion method in
accordance with ICDS III.

(c) For the
purpose of project completion method, percentage of completion method or
straight line method revenue shall include retention money and accordingly
retention money will be considered for the above purposes. Further, contract
costs shall not be reduced by any incidental income in the nature of interest,
dividend or capital gains.

(iv) Inventory valuation – section 145A

The existing
section 145A has been replaced by a new section 145A from A.Y. 2017-18 (F.Y.
2016-17) to provide as under:

(a)  The valuation of inventory shall be made at
lower of actual cost or net realisable value computed in accordance with the
ICDS II. In case of securities held as inventory, it shall be valued as
follows:

 

Type of
Securities

Method of
Valuation

Securities
not listed on a recognised stock exchange or listed but not quoted on a
recognised stock exchange with regularity from time-to-time

At actual
cost initially recognised in accordance with the ICDS II

Securities
listed and quoted on a recognised stock exchange with regularity from
time-time

At lower of
actual cost or net realisable value in accordance with the ICDS II. The
comparison of actual cost and net realisable value shall be made category
wise.

In the case
of securities held as Inventory by a Scheduled Bank or a Public Financial
Institution

The
valuation shall be made as provided in ICDS II after taking into account the
applicable guidelines issued by the RBI

 

(b) The existing
section 145A provides for inclusion of the amount of any tax, duty, cess or fee
actually paid or incurred by the assesse to bring the goods to the place of its
location and condition as on the date of valuation of purchase and sale of
goods and inventory. The new section 145A retains the above provision and also
extends it to valuation of services. Therefore, services are required to be
valued inclusive of taxes which have been paid or incurred by the assesse.

(v)  Year of
taxability of certain Income – New section 145B

The applicable
ICDS provides for taxability of certain incomes even before they have accrued.
In order to validate such provisions of ICDS, the corresponding provisions have
also been incorporated in the new section 145B from the A.Y. 2017-18
(F.Y.2016-17) as follows:-

 

Type of
Income

Previous
year in which it shall be taxed

Any claim
for escalation of price in a contract or export incentives

Previous
year in which reasonable certainty of its realisation is achieved

Income
referred to in section 2(24) (xviii) i.e., subsidy, grant
etc.

Previous
year in which it is received, if not charged to tax in any earlier previous
year.

Interest
received by the assessee on any compensation or on enhanced compensation

Previous
year in which such interest is received


9.   CAPITAL
GAINS:

9.1  Long Term
Capital Gains On Transfer Of Quoted Shares And Securities

At present, long
term Capital Gain on transfer of quoted shares and Securities is exempt if
Securities Transaction Tax (STT) is paid on acquisition as well as on transfer
through Stock Exchange transactions. Now, under the new section 112A tax on
such long term capital gains on transfer of such shares and securities, on or
after 1.4.2018, will be payable at the rate of 10%. The rationale for this
proposal is explained by the Finance Minister in Para 155 of his Budget Speech.

9.2  Impact of New
Section 112A

The New Section
112A is inserted in the Income tax Act effective from A.Y. 2019-20 (i.e F.Y.
2018-19). Briefly stated, this new section provides as under.

(i) This section
will apply to transfer of following long term assets (hereinafter referred to
as “specified assets”) if the following conditions are satisfied.

(a) Quoted
Equity Shares on which STT is paid on acquisition as well as on sale. If such
shares are acquired before 1.10.2004 the condition for payment of STT on
acquisition will not apply. The Central Government will notify the cases where
the condition for payment of STT on acquisition will not apply.

(b) Units of
Equity Oriented Fund of a Mutual Fund and Business Trust on which STT is paid
at the time of redemption of the units. The above condition of payment of STT
will not apply where the transaction is entered into in an International
Financial Services Centre.

(ii) The rate of
tax on such Long term capital gains is 10% plus applicable surcharge and Health
and Education Cess on the capital gain in excess of Rs. 1 Lakh. If the capital
gain in any F.Y. is less than Rs. 1 Lakh no tax is payable on such capital gain

(iii) The cost
of acquisition of specified assets for computing capital gain in such cases
shall be computed as provided in section 55(2) (ac). This provision is as
under:-

If the above
specified assets are acquired before 1.2.2018 the cost of acquisition shall be
computed as per formula, given in section 55(2)(ac). According to this formula,
the cost of acquisition of the specified assets acquired on or before 31.1.2018
will be the actual cost. However, if the actual cost is less than the fair
market value of the specified assets as on 31.1.2018, the fair market value of
the specified assets as on 31.1.2018, will be deemed to be the cost of
acquisition.

Further, if the
full value of consideration on sale/transfer is less than the above fair market
value, then such full value of consideration or the actual cost, whichever is
higher, will be deemed to be the cost of acquisition.

Illustration to explain the above formula


 

A

B

C

D

Actual Cost
–Purchase prior to 1.2.2018

100

550

300

500

Market Value
as at 31/1/2018

150

350

450

300

Sale Price

500

600

350

450

 

——

——

——-

—–

Deemed Cost

150

550

350

500

Sale Price

500

600

350

450

 

——-

——-

——-

——

Capital Gain

350

50

Nil

(50)

 

——

——-

——-

——

 

(iv) No
deduction under Chapter VI A shall be allowed from the above Capital Gain.
Therefore, if Gross Total Income includes any such capital gain, deduction
under chapter VIA will be allowed from the gross total income after reducing
the above long term capital gain.

(v) Similarly,
tax Rebate u/s. 87A will be allowed from income tax on the total income after
deduction of the above long term capital gain.

(vi) For the
purpose of applicability of the above provisions for taxation of such long term
capital gains, the expression “Equity Oriented
Fund”
means a fund set up by a Mutual 
Fund specified u/s. 10(23D) which satisfies the following conditions-

A.  If such a Fund invests in Units of another
Fund which is traded on the recognised Stock Exchange-

 –  A minimum of 90% of the
proceeds are invested in units of such other Fund and

 – Such other Fund has invested 90% of its Funds in Equity Shares of
listed domestic companies.

B. In cases of
Mutual Funds, other than “A” above, minimum 65% of the total proceeds of the
Fund are invested in Equity Shares of listed domestic companies.

(vii)  The expression” Fair Market Value” as at
31.1.2018 for the Formula stated in (iii) above is defined in Explanation below
section 55 (2) (ac) to mean the highest price quoted on the Recognised Stock
Exchange. If there was no trading of a particular script on 31.1.2018 then the
highest price quoted for that script immediately prior to 31.1.2018. In the
case of Units of Equity Oriented Fund not quoted on the Stock Exchange the NAV
as on 31/1/2018 will be considered as fair market value.

(viii)  It is not clear from the above definition as
to how the highest price of a quoted script will be considered when the script
is quoted in two or more recognised Stock Exchanges. Whether highest of the
closing prices in these Stock Exchanges is to be considered or the highest
price quoted during the day in any one of the Stock Exchanges is to be
considered. This requires clarification.

(ix)  It may be noted that in respect of the
specified assets purchased on or after 1.2.2018, the Formula given in (iii)
will not apply for determining the actual cost of such specified assets. In
such a case, the actual cost of the specified assets will be deducted from the
sale price and, as stated in the third proviso to section 48, benefit of
Indexation will not be available.

(x)  It may also be noted that the above tax on
long term Capital Gain is not payable if the specified assets are sold on or
before 31.03.2018. This tax is payable only on sale of such specified assets on
or after 1.4.2018.

(xi)  Section 115 AD dealing with tax on income of
FII on Capital Gain has also been amended. It is clarified that any FII to
which section 115AD applies will have to pay tax on long term Capital Gain
arising on sale of quoted shares/units as provided in section 112A. In the case
of FII also, the rate of tax on such capital gain will be 10% in respect such
capital gain in excess of Rs. 1 Lakh in the A/Y:2019-20 (F.Y:2018-19) and
onwards.

(xii)  The exemption given to such long term capital
gain u/s. 10(38) has now been withdrawn w.e.f. 1.4.2018.

(xiii) It may be
noted that the above provisions of the new section 112A will not apply to
equity shares of a listed company acquired by an assessee after 1.10.2004 under
an off market transaction and no STT is paid. 
Similarly, where such equity shares are acquired prior to 1.10.2004 or
after that date and STT is paid at the time of acquisition, the above provisions
of section 112A will not apply if the shares are sold on or after 1.4.2018 in
an off market transaction. In such cases the normal provisions applicable to
computation of capital gain will apply and the assessee can claim the benefit
of indexation u/s 48 for computing cost of acquisition. Tax on such long term
capital gains will be payable at the rate of 20%. Therefore, the assessee will
have to ascertain, before selling the equity shares on or after 1.4.2018, the
tax impact under both the methods and decide whether to sell the shares in an off
market transaction or through Stock Exchange.

9.3  Capital Gains
Bonds

At   present,  
an   assessee   can 
claim  deduction  upto Rs. 50 lakh from
long term Capital Gain on sale of any capital asset by making an Investment in
specified bonds u/s. 54EC within 6 months of the date of sale. There is a
lock-in period of 3 years for such investment. In order to restrict this
benefit the following amendments are made in section 54EC.

(i)  The benefit of section 54EC can be claimed
only if the long term capital gain is from sale of immovable property (i.e.
land, building or both) on or after 1.4.2018. Thus, this benefit cannot be
claimed in respect of long term capital gain on any other capital asset in A.Y.
2019-20 or thereafter. The effect of this amendment will be that benefit of
section 54EC will not now be available in respect of long term capital gain
arising on or after 1-4-2018 in respect of compensation received on surrender
of tenancy rights or sale/transfer of shares, units of Mutual Fund, goodwill or
other movable assets.

(ii)  The
lock in period for this investment made on or after 1.4.2018 will be 5 years
instead of 3 years. From the wording of the amendments in section 54EC it
appears that investment in Bonds of National Highway Authority of India or
Rural Electrification Corporation Ltd., or other notified bonds made before
31.3.2018 will have a lock-in period of 3 years. In respect of investment in
bonds made on or after 1.4.2018 the lock-in period will be 5 years. Therefore,
it appears that even in respect of long term capital gain made on or before
31.3.2018 if the investment in such bonds is made within 6 months of the date
of sale but on or after 1.4.2018, the Lock-in period will be 5 years.

9.4  Conversion Of
Stock-In –Trade Into Capital Asset

(i)  The concept of conversion of a capital asset
into stock-in-trade is accepted in section 45(2) at present. It is provided in
this section that on such conversion there will be no tax liability. The tax is
payable only when the stock-in-trade is sold.

(ii)  New clauses (via) is now added in section 28
w.e.f. AY. 2019-20 (F.Y. 2018.19) to provide that “the fair market value of
inventory as on the date on which it is converted into, or treated as, a
capital asset determined in the prescribed manner” shall be chargeable to
income tax under the head “ Profits and gains of business or profession”. This
will mean that on conversion of stock-in-trade (inventory) into a capital
asset, the difference between the cost and the market value on the date of such
conversion will be taxable as business income. This will be the position even
if the stock-in-trade is not sold. It may be noted that by insertion of clause
(xiia) in section 2(24) it is now provided that such notional difference
between the fair market value and cost of stock-in-trade shall be deemed to be
income liable to tax.

(iii)  Further, section 49 is also amended by
addition of clause (9) w.e.f. A.Y. 2019-20 (F.Y. 2018-19) to provide that where
capital gain arises on sale of the above capital asset (i.e. stock-in-trade
converted into capital asset) the cost of acquisition of such capital asset
shall be deemed to be the fair market value adopted under section 28(via) on
conversion of the stock-in-trade into capital asset. By an amendment in section
2(42A), it is also provided that in such a case, the period of holding such
capital asset shall be reckoned from the date of conversion of stock-in-trade
into capital asset.

(iv)  A new Explanation (1A) has been added in
section 43 (1) to provide that, if the above capital asset (after conversion of
stock-in-trade to capital asset) is used for the business or profession, the
fair market value on the date of such conversion shall be treated as cost of
the capital asset. Depreciation on such cost can be claimed by the assessee.

9.5  Exemption Of
Specified Securities From Capital Gain

Section 47 has
been amended by insertion of a new clause (viiab) w.e.f. AY. 2019-20
(F.Y.2018.19). It is now provided that any transfer of a capital asset viz (i)
Bond or Global Depository Receipt mentioned in section 115AC(1), (ii) Rupee
Denominated Bond of an Indian Company or (iii) a Derivative made by a
non-resident on a recognised Stock Exchange located in an International
Financial Services Centre shall not be considered as transfer. In other words,
any capital gain arising by such a transaction will be exempt from capital gain
tax.

9.6  Full Value of
consideration – Section 50C

As discussed in
Para 7.3 above, concession is now given from A/Y:2019-20 (F.Y:2018-19) for the
computation of full value of consideration on transfer of Immovable
Property.  Section 50C is amended to
provide that if the difference between the actual consideration and stamp duty
value is less than 5% the same will be ignored.

9.7  Tax On
Distributed Income Of Unit Holders Of Equity Oriented Fund – Section 115-R

(i)  Section 115R dealing with tax on distributed
income to holders of units in Mutual Funds has been amended w.e.f. 1.4.2018. At
present any income distributed to a unit holder of equity oriented fund is not
chargeable to tax. Since new section 112A now provides for levy of 10% tax on
the capital gains arising to unit holders of equity oriented funds, in excess
of Rs.1 lakh, section 115R has now been amended to provide for Dividend
Distribution Tax (DDT) at the rate of 10% by the Mutual Fund at the time of
distribution of income by an equity oriented fund.

(ii)  It is stated that this amendment is made with
a view to providing a level playing field between growth oriented funds and
dividend paying funds, in the wake of the new capital gains tax regime for unit holders of equity oriented funds. 

                 

10.  INCOME FROM OTHER SOURCES:

10.1  Transfer of
Capital Asset by a Holding Company to its wholly owned subsidiary company –
Section 56(2) (x)

Section 56(2)(x) of the Income tax Act provides
that if any person receives any property without consideration or for a
consideration which is less than its fair market value the difference between
the fair market value and the value at which the property is received will be
taxable as income from other sources in the hands of the recipient. There are
certain exceptions to this rule as provided in the Fourth Proviso. Clause IX of
this Fourth Proviso is now amended from the A.Y. 2018-19 (F.Y. 2017-18) to
provide that the provisions of section 56(2) (x) will not apply to any transfer
of a capital asset by a holding company to its wholly owned subsidiary company
or any transfer of a capital asset by a wholly owned subsidiary company to its
holding company.

10.2  Gift of
Immovable Property

As discussed in
Para 7.3 above, concession is now given from A/Y:2019-20 (F.Y:2018-19) for the
computation of full value of consideration on transfer of Immovable Property.
Section 56(2)(x) is amended to provide that if the difference between the
actual consideration and stamp duty value is less than 5% the same will be
ignored for the purpose of taxation in the hands of the recipient of Immovable
Property.

10.3  Compensation
on termination /modification of any contract of employment – Section 56(2) (xi)

A   new  
clause (xi)   is   inserted  
in   section 56(2)  from A.Y. 2019-20
(F.Y. 2018-19) to provide that any compensation received by any employee on
termination or modification of the terms and conditions of the contract of
employment on or after 1.4.2018 shall be taxable as Income from Other Sources.


10.4  Deemed
Dividend

(i)  Dividend Income is taxable under the head
Income from Other Sources – Section 2(22) defines the term “Dividend”.  Under section 2(22) (a) to (e) it is provided
that distribution by a company to its members under certain circumstances shall
be deemed to be Dividend to the extent of its “accumulated profits”. The
definition of the term “accumulated profits” is given in the Explanation to the
section 2 (22). From the A.Y. 2018-19 (F.Y. 2017-18), a new explanation (2A)
has been added to provide that the accumulated profits (whether capitalised or
not) or loss of the amalgamated company, on the date of amalgamation, shall be
added / deducted to/from the accumulated profits of the amalgamating company.

 (ii)  At present, section 2(22) (e) provides that
any loan or advance given by a closely held company to a Related Party, as
defined in that section, shall be taxable as deemed dividend in the hands of
that related party to the extent of the accumulated profits of the Company.
There was some debate whether this deemed dividend can be taxed in the hands of
the related party if it is not a share holder of the company.

To eliminate
this doubt, it is now provided that the company giving such loan or advance
will pay tax at the rate of 30% plus applicable surcharge and Cess w.e.f.
1.4.2018.  Thus, the shareholder or
related party receiving such loan will not be required to pay tax on such
deemed dividend.

 

11.  TAXATION OF NON-RESIDENTS:

11.1 Expansion of scope of Business Connection –
Section 9

At present,
Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(i) defines the concept of “Business connection”
through dependent  agents. With an
objective to align with Article 12 of the Multilateral Instrument (MLI) forming
part of the BEPS Project to which India is a signatory, Explanation 2(a) has
been amended. By this amendment the term “business connection” will include any
business activity carried on through an agent who habitually concludes contract
or habitually plays a principal role leading to conclusion of contracts by the
non-resident where the contracts are:

 – In the name of
that non-resident; or

– For the
transfer of ownership of, or for granting the right to use of, the property
owned by that non-resident or that non-resident has the right to use; or

– For the
provision of services by that non-resident.

 11.2  Significant
economic presence resulting in Business Connection

(i)   At
present, section 9(1) (i) provides for physical presence based nexus for
establishing business connection of the non-resident in India. A new
Explanation (2A) to section 9(1)(i) now provides a nexus rule for emerging
business models such as digitized business which do not require physical
presence of the non-resident or his agent in India. This amendment is made from
A/Y:2019-20 (F.Y:2018-19).

 (ii) Accordingly, this amendment provides that a
non-resident shall be deemed to have a business connection on account of his
significant economic presence in India. This amendment would apply irrespective
of whether the non-resident has a residence or place of business in India or
renders services in India. The following shall be regarded as significant
economic presence of the non-resident in India.

  Any transaction in respect of any goods,
services or property carried out by non-resident in India including provision
of download of data or  software in
India, provided that the transaction value exceeds the threshold as may be
prescribed; or

  Systematic and continuous soliciting of
business activities or engaging in interaction with number of users in India
through digital means, provided such number of users exceeds the threshold as
may be prescribed.

In such cases,
only so much of income as is attributable to the above transactions or
activities shall be deemed to accrue or arise in India.

(iii)  It is further clarified in this section that
the transactions or activities shall constitute significant economic presence
in India, whether or not

 (a)  the agreement for such transactions or
activities is entered in India, or

 (b) the
non-resident has a residence or place of business in India, or

 (c) the
non-residnet renders services in India.

11.3  Exemption to
Royalty etc. under section 10(6D)

New clause (6D)
is added in section 10 from A/Y: 2018-19(F.Y. 2017-18) to grant exemption to a
non-resident.  This clause provides that
any income of a non-resident or a Foreign Company by way of Royalty from, or
fees for technical services rendered in or outside India to National Technical
Research Organisation will be exempt from tax. In view of this exemption no tax
will be deductible at source from this Royalty or Fees u/s 195.

11.4  Global
Depository Receipts – Section 47 (viiab)

As discussed in
Para 9.5 above transfer of a Bond or Global Depository Receipts (GDR) referred
to in section 115AC(1), or Rupee Denominated Bond of any Indian company, or
Derivative, executed by a non-resident on a recognized stock exchange located
in any International Financial Services Center (IFSC) shall not be considered
as a transfer under newly inserted section 47(viiab), if the consideration for
the transfer is paid in foreign currency. As a result of this amendment,
capital gains from such transaction will not be taxable.

12.  TAX ON INCOME REFERRED TO IN SECTIONS 68 TO
69D AND SECTION 115BBE:

(i)  Section 115BBE provides that income referred
to in sections 68,69,69A, 69B,69C or 69D shall be charged to tax at the rate of
60%. Section 115BBE(2) provides that no deduction in respect of any expenditure
or allowance or set off of any loss shall be allowed to the assessee under any
provision of the Act in computing his income referred to in the above sections.
However, sub-section (2) applied only to cases where such income is declared by
the assesse in the return of income furnished u/s. 139.

(ii)  Section 115BBE(2) has now been amended with
retrospective effect from A.Y.2017-18 (F.Y. 2016-17) to provide that even in
cases where income added by the Assessing Officer includes income referred to
in the above sections, no deduction in respect of any expenditure or allowance
or setoff of any loss shall be allowed to the assessee under any provision of
the Act in computing the income referred to in these sections.

13.
ASSESSMENTS AND APPEALS:

13.1 Obtaining Permanent Account Number (PAN) in
certain cases – Section 139A

To expand the
list of cases requiring the application for PAN and to use PAN as Unique Entity
Number (UEN), amendment has been made w.e.f. 01.04.2018 by way of insertion of
clause (v) and clause (vi) in section 139A as under:

(i)  A resident, other than an individual, which
enters into a financial  
transaction   of   an  
amount  aggregating  to Rs. 2,50,000 or
more in a financial year is required to apply for PAN.

(ii) Managing
director, director, partner, trustee, author, founder, Karta, chief executive
officer, principal officer or office bearer or any person competent to act on
behalf of such entities is also required to apply for PAN.

 It may be noted
that the term “financial transaction” has not been defined.

13.2  Verification
of Return in case of a company under insolvency resolution process – Section
140

Section 140 has
been amended w.e.f. 1.4.2018 to provide that, during the resolution process
under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“IBC”), the return of Income
shall be verified by an insolvency professional appointed by the Adjudicating
Authority.

13.3  Assessment
Procedure – Section 143

(i)  Section 143 (1)(a) provides that at the time
of processing of return, the total income or loss shall be computed after
adding income appearing in Form 26AS or Form 16A or Form 16 which has not been
included in the total income disclosed in the return of Income, after giving an
intimation to the assessee. A new proviso to section 143(1)(a) has been
inserted to provide that no such adjustment shall be made in respect of any
return of Income furnished for Ay 2018-19 and subsequent years.

13.4  New Scheme for
scrutiny Assessments – New Section 143(3A) 143(3B
)

A new
sub-section (3A) is inserted in section 143 w.e.f 01.04.2018. This new section
143(3A) authorises the Government to notify a new scheme for “e-assessments” to
impart greater efficiency, transparency and accountability. It is stated that
this will be achieved by-

(i) Eliminating
the interface between the Assessing Officer and the assesse in the course of
proceedings to the extent of feasibility of technology.

(ii) Optimising
utilisation of the resources through economics of scale and functional
specialisation.

(iii)
Introducing a team-based assessment with dynamic jurisdiction.

For giving
effect to the above scheme, section 143(3B) authorizes the Government to issue
a Notification directing that the provisions of the Income-tax Act relating to
assessment procedure shall not apply or shall apply with such exceptions,
modifications and adaptations as may be specified in the notification. No such
notification can be issued after 31.03.2020. The Government has set up a
technical study group to advise about the Scheme for e-assessments.

13.5  Appeal to
Tribunal against the order passed under section 271J – Section 253

Section 253 has
been amended w.e.f. 01.04.2018 to provide for filing of an appeal by the
assessee before the ITA Tribunal against an order passed by the CIT(A) levying
penalty u/s. 271J on an accountant, a merchant banker or a registered valuer
for furnishing incorrect information in their report or certificate.

13.6  Increase in
penalty for failure to furnish statement of financial transaction or reportable
account – Section  271FA

Section 271FA
has been amended w.e.f. 01.04.2018 to enhance the penalty for delay in
furnishing of the statement of financial transaction or reportable account as
required u/s. 285BA to ensure greater compliance:

 

Particulars

Penalty

Delay in
furnishing the statement

Increased
from
Rs.100 to       Rs. 500 for each
day of default

Failure to
furnish statement in pursuance of notice issued by tax authority

Increased
from
Rs. 500 to Rs. 1000 for
each day of default

13.7  Failure to
furnish return of income in case of companies –Section 276CC

Section 276CC
provides that if a person willfully fails to furnish the return of income
within the due date, he shall be punishable with imprisonment and fine.
Immunity from prosecution is granted inter alia in a case where the tax
payable on the total income determined on regular assessment, as reduced by the
advance tax, if any paid, and any withholding tax, does not exceed Rs. 3,000
for any assessment year commencing on or after 1st April 1975.  By amendment of this section, w.e.f.
1.4.2018, it is now provided that this immunity will not apply to companies.

14.  TO SUM UP:

14.1  It is rather unfortunate that this year’s
Finance Bill has been passed in the Parliament without any discussion. Various
professional and commercial organisations had made post budget representations
and expressed concerns about some of the amendments proposed in the Finance
Bill. As there was no discussion in the Parliament, it is evident that these
representations have not received due consideration.

14.2  The Finance Act has provided some relief to
salaried employees, small and medium sized companies, senior citizens, other
assessees who have invested in NPS, start-up industries, producer companies and
to employers for employment generation. There are some provisions in the
Finance Act which will simplify some procedural requirements.

14.3  Last year, several amendments were made to
tighten the provisions relating to taxation of capital gains. Most of the
assessees have not yet understood the impact of the new sections 45(5A), 50CA,
56(2)(x) etc., introduced last year. This year, the introduction of new
section 112A levying tax on capital gain on sale of quoted shares and units of
equity oriented funds is likely to create some complex issues. There will be
some resistance to this levy as there is no reduction in the rates of STT. The
levy of tax on Mutual Funds on distribution of income by equity oriented funds
will affect the yield to the unit holders. Let us hope that the above impact on
the tax liability of the investors is accepted by all assessees as this
additional burden is levied in order to provide funds for various Government
Schemes for upliftment of poor and down trodden population of our country.

14.4 The concept
of Income Computation and Disclosure Standards (ICDS) was introduced from A.Y.
2017-18. The assessees have to maintain books of accounts by adopting
Accounting Standards issued by the Institute of Charted Accountants of India.
Recently the Government has notified Ind-AS which is mandatory for large
companies. Therefore, compliance with Ten ICDS notified u/s. 145(2) of the
Income tax Act was considered as an additional burden. When Delhi High Court
struck down most of the ICDS the assessees felt some relief. Now the Finance
Act, 2018, has amended the relevant sections of the Income-tax Act with
retrospective effect from A.Y. 2017-18 to revalidate some of the provisions of
ICDS. With these amendments the responsibility of professionals assisting tax
payers in the preparation of their Income tax Returns will increase. Similarly,
Chartered Accountants conducting tax audit u/s. 44AB will now have report in
the tax audit report about compliance with ICDS.

 

14.5 Section 143
of the Income-tax Act has been amended authorising the Government to notify a
new scheme for “e-assessments” to impart greater efficiency, transparency and
accountability. Under this scheme, it is proposed to eliminate the interface
between the assessing officer and the assessee, optimise utilisation of
resources and introduce a team based assessment procedure. There is
apprehension in some quarters as to how this new scheme will function.
Considering the present infrastructure available with the Government and the
technical facilities available with the assessees, it will be advisable for the
Government to introduce the concept of ‘e-assessment’ in a phased manner. In
other words, this scheme should be made applicable in the first instance in
cases of large listed companies with turnover exceeding Rs. 500 crore. After
ascertaining the success, the scheme can be extended to other corporate assessees
after some years. There will be many practical issues if the scheme is
introduced for all assessees immediately.

14.6   Taking an overall view of the amendments
discussed in this Article, it can be concluded that the provisions in the
Income-tax Act are getting complex. There is a talk about replacing this six
decade old law by a new simplified law. We have seen the fate of the Direct Tax
Code which was introduced in 2009 but not passed by the parliament.
Let us hope that we get a new simplified tax law in the coming years.

 

VIEW AND COUNTERVIEW:NFRA: An Unwarranted Regulator?

There are at least two views, if not more, on almost everything. Call it
perspectives or facets. VIEW and COUNTERVIEW seeks to bring before a reader,
two opposite sides of a current issue and everything in between. Our world is
increasingly becoming linear and bipolar. VIEW and COUNTERVIEW aims to inform
the reader of multi dimensional totality of an issue, to enable him to see a
matter from a broad horizon.

 

This second ‘VIEW and COUNTERVIEW’ is on National Financial Reporting
Authority (NFRA). NFRA, a creation of the Companies Act, 2013, was not notified
for more than 3 years. The recent PNB scam resulted in sudden activation of
NFRA. NFRA is mandated with formulation of accounting and auditing standards,
to monitor and enforce their compliance on members and firms, and oversee the
quality of services of professions associated with compliance with such
standards. The body will have the same powers as a civil court. With NFRA, the
international practice of an ‘independent’ audit regulator has finally arrived
in India. In the USA, PCAOB has about 1,935 firms registered with it, has a
staff of about 700 people and has a budget of $259 million. Unlike in the US,
ICAI is a body formed by the parliament to regulate the audit profession.  Is it intentionally sidelined by the
government? While NFRA is a reality now, the question remains whether the audit
fraternity requires another regulator without better regulations and regulating
machinery?

 

VIEW: Without regulations another regulator may not work

 

Santanu Ghosh   

Chartered Accountant

 

The Issue:


It is
said that the government should govern the country and not run business.
Regulating business is a difficult business and requires competence, budget,
credibility and rigour. These are generally not what our administrators are
known for. 

 

Not so
long ago, the government thought it fit to step in to the domain of the
Chartered Accountants of India to pronounce accounting and auditing standards
to be followed by a section of the corporate world. In fact, Section 209 and
211 of the Companies Act, 1956 were amended to make the accounting and auditing
standards mandatory. This created a form of ‘advisory’ function by the
government within the domain of accounting and auditing. However, it was
announced that till NACAS pronounced the standards, the ICAI standards will
remain in force.

 

After
the Satyam and Global Trust Bank scams, the effectiveness of accounting
standards to avoid fraudulent transactions were put to test again by the
government and Amendments were brought about in Sections 211, which added new
Subsections- 3A, 3B, 3C in 1999 in the 1956 Act. In addition, Section 210A was
also inserted. The government was probably not satisfied with its ‘advisory’
role but thought it fit to assume ‘regulatory’ powers by creation of National
Financial Reporting Authority (NFRA). In the Companies Act, 2013, Section 132
was inserted for implementation of NFRA compliance to be effective from the
date of notification to be published in this respect. Till February 2018, such
notification was not issued but on the news of PNB Scam, very hurriedly the
notification was issued by the government.

 

NFRA: In the wake of recent
scams, post Satyam and more immediately relating to Winsome Diamonds, Nirav
Modi, Mehul Choksi, has created a belief within the government that one of the
causes could be non application of proper auditing methodology. Presumptions
are rebuttable. NFRA was notified in the wake of recent scams and rules have
been prescribed for its operations.

 

The key powers and functions of NFRA are:


a.   To investigate either Suo moto
or on the reference made by the Central Government in matters of Professional
Misconduct
committed by any member or a CA firm.


b.  To make recommendations to the
central government on formulation or laying down of accounting standards and
auditing policies by companies or their auditors.


c.   To monitor and implement
compliances relating to accounting standards and auditing policies as
prescribed.


d.  To oversee the quality of
service of professions associated with compliance of accounting standards and
auditing policies as suggested measures for improvement.


e.   To exercise powers as of a
civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.


f.   Impose penalties:


i.    Not less than 1 lakh rupees
which may extend up to 5 times of the fees received in case of individuals


ii.   Not less than 10 lakh rupees
which may extend up to 10 times of the fees received in case of firms.


g.  To consider an investigation
based on monitoring and compliance review of auditor upon audit firms upon
recommendations by member – accounting and member – auditing.


h.   To receive a final report from
the committee on enforcement on matters referred to them and issue a notice in
writing to the investigated company or the professional on whom the action is
proposed to be taken.


i.    To conduct quality review for
the following class of companies:

    Listed companies

  Unlisted companies having net worth or paid
up capitals of not less than 500 crores or annual turnover of not less than 100
crores as on 31st March of immediately preceding financial year.

 –   Companies having securities listed outside
India.


j.    To debar any member or firm
from engaging himself or itself from practice as a member of institute of
chartered accountants of India for a minimum period of six months which may
extend up to 10 years on account of proved misconduct.


k.   To accept or overrule
clarifications received or objections raised in writing.


l.    To investigate against the
auditor or audit firms which conducts


i.    200 or more companies in a
year or,

ii.   Audit of 20 or more listed
companies.


ICAI: Section 21A of the
Chartered Accountants (Amendment) Act, 2006 provides for constitution of board
of discipline and prescribes its powers which are as follows:


i.    To consider the prima
facie
opinion of the director (discipline) in respect of all information
and complaints where opinion of the director is that the member is prima
facie
guilty of professional or other misconduct mentioned in the First
Schedule to the Act and all cases where prima facie opinion is that the
member is not guilty of any professional or other misconduct irrespective of
schedules and passing of orders.

ii.   To enquire into, arrive at a
finding and thereafter award punishment in respect of guilty cases of any
professional or other misconduct in First Schedule to the Act.

iii.  To consider letter of
withdrawal from complainants and permit withdrawal if the circumstances so
warrant.


Section 21B of the Chartered Accountants (Amendment) Act, 2006 provides
for the scope of work for the committee


i.    To consider the prima
facie
opinion of the director discipline in respect of all information and
complaints where opinion of the director is that the member is prima facie guilty
of professional or other misconduct mentioned in the Second Schedule or in both
the Schedules to the Act and passing of orders.

ii.   To enquire into the
allegations of professional or other misconduct issuing notices to the
witnesses and their examinations, arrive at a finding and award punishment in
respect of guilty cases of any professional or other misconduct mentioned in
Second Schedule or in both the Schedules to the Act.

iii.  To consider letter of
withdrawal from the complainants and permit withdrawal if the circumstances so
warrant.



The Crisis:

1)   The ICAI is created by an Act
of parliament to control and regulate the profession of Chartered Accountants
in the country since 1949 and its members have creditably served the society as
professionals, as industrialists, as CFOs, as business leaders, as
parliamentarians, as social workers, as ministers in central and state
cabinets.


2) The
disciplinary directorate of the institute have been functioning also reasonably
well in spite of various external factors like injunctions, stay petitions,
interlocutory applications etc., which have mainly slowed down the process of
quasi-judicial process including delayed production of relevant details at
times by the complainants and also delayed response thereto by
the accused.


3) Mr.
Manoj Fadnis, past president of the Institute said in an interview in February
2015 as follows:-


“there
is no delay as in each case is required to be examined based on facts and
merits and due procedures under the rule has to be adhered to. The matter
(Mukesh P. Shah) is receiving due attention and it would be our endeavour for
an expeditious disposal. The matter is under examination for formation of prima
facie
opinion by the director (discipline) under Rule 9 of the Chartered
Accountants (Procedure of Investigations of professional and other misconducts
and conduct of cases) Rules 2007 and it is only thereafter the appropriate
authority-board of discipline, disciplinary committee as the case may be would
be required to consider and pass orders on the opinion.” He also stated that
there is no timeline as such prescribed in the rules notified by the government
of India for taking action against erring members. He also stated that “as on
date there are 116 cases pending before the disciplinary committee and 18 cases
before the board of discipline for enquiry.” Mr. Fadnis mentioned that between
February 12, 2014 and February 11, 2015, 53 cases have been heard and concluded
by the disciplinary committee. Board of discipline in the same time heard and
concluded 9 cases. He stated that “the delay if any, in concluding a particular
case is generally on account of adjournments sought by the concerned parties.
This could also be because of procedure required to be followed by citing and
summoning of witnesses by the parties and witnesses to make their depositions
or submissions before the committee so that interest (principle) of natural
justice is maintained.


4) The
Hon. Prime Minister himself questioned the efficacy of disciplinary mechanism.
It was alleged that in spite of so many wrong things having taken place only 25
Chartered Accountants were punished in 10 years and around 1400 cases were
pending for years. There had not been any denial or acceptance of such
accusations, at least not to my knowledge.


5)
From the foregoing paragraphs it can be seen that the charges sought to be
levelled against ICAI are:


   Inaction or delayed action

 –   Principles of natural justice sought to be
given is more in form than substance

 –  A disciplinary case may go on for a long time
because there is no time frame to conclude the proceedings, not many Chartered
Accountants were penalised

 –   An individual Chartered Accountant can be
prosecuted but not his firm

 –   Self regulation.

 Certain
suggestions are given for pondering.


6) To
my mind, the ICAI has sufficient powers under its legal mandate and
regulations/rules. Therefore, just like any other law, if the intention is to
upgrade the law to its desired level, the law itself requires amendments. The
Amendments that have taken place in the Income Tax Act, The Companies Act, the
Constitution itself are glaring examples of how the existing laws can be
upgraded or modified to the satisfaction of the legislature.


7) I
also believe that instead of amending the existing law, to its desired level,
enactment of another law and allowing the new law to coexist with the existing
law by demarcating its relative powers to judge cannot be a solution to the “so
called” problems.


8) A
regulatory mechanism that seeks to regulate listed companies, large unlisted
companies and companies listed abroad on the one side and leaving unlisted
companies of lesser dimension with the disciplinary directorate of ICAI can
have new set of challenges. Maintaining two parallel quasi-judicial authorities
is definitely not in the best interest of the country as well as the
profession.

 

9) The
speed at which the notification under NFRA was issued after the PNB scam has
raised the eyebrows.

 

10) It
is surprising that even before the due process of law could be initiated
charges and accusations have been levelled against the auditors.

 

11) It
is widely reported in newspapers and sections of the media that:

 

   There was no concurrent audit of the branch
concerned by Chartered Accountants

 –   Probably there was no inspection by RBI

 –   The branch in-charge (deputy manager) was in
the same office for 11 years and it is also reported that he himself was the
maker, checker and authoriser of the transactions routed through SWIFT without
being routed via the CBS and

 –   He was allowing ever greening of LOUs issued
without having applications for each LOU.


 12) Profession or vocations do have
few black sheep. That does not make or prove the entire profession to be full
of black sheep. Adverse criticisms are bound to demoralize the entire
community.


Suggestions for Solution:


   Amend Chartered Accountants Act /Regulations
/ rules to incorporate timeline for conclusion of proceedings of the
disciplinary mechanism.


 –   Create appellate tribunal for redressal of
grievances with respect to the orders pronounced under the Chartered
Accountants Act


 –   For consideration of points of law which are
in dispute, the aggrieved party pursuant to the order of the tribunal may
prefer to file a second appeal before the Honourable Supreme court of India.


   High Courts shall have no jurisdiction to try
any matter under the Chartered Accountants Acts and regulations.


   All applications, interlocutory applications,
stay petitions, injunctions and/ or directions under the law, be only preferred
before the tribunal


 –   If nexus can be proved, firm can also be
prosecuted together with the concerned partner. However, such action against
the firm should invariably be probed before inducting the firm as a party. The
firms that are highly professionalised may have a system where partners are
independently taking decisions with respect to handling of any client and such procedure
is duly documented. The burden of proof that such independence exists in the
firm and that the firm does not influence the partner shall rest on the firm
itself.


 –   Repeal / Delay NFRA as a regulatory body and
reintroduce NACAS as an advisory body.


The way NFRA is structured, and seemingly undermining the ICAI, will not
bring intended results. Without adequate manpower, high calibre staff,
investigative teeth, and infrastructure, NFRA could create a situation that was
sought to be overcome.


Other questions and apprehensions that need to be addressed:


a.  In terms of setting the
standards, if ICAI were to still prepare the standards and NFRA were to
approve, will it be a mere pass through or a hurdle in between?


b.  Can there be different regulators
for corporate and non corporate? It appears that NFRA will deal with large
corporate only. Will auditors now be subjected to two sets of rules – one of
the ICAI and one of NFRA?


c.  Basis on which complaints will
be accepted? How will it deal with frivolous complains? Will this body put
Chartered Accountant profession into an unwarranted round of litigation? If the
complainant is disproportionately large, how will an auditor represent himself
to get a deal?


d.  How will independence of
members of NFRA be dealt with? Will there be detailed rules framed and some
other body will regulate it?


e.  Conflict of interest with other
regulators: Say SFIO – could be a potential issue when a fraud matter is
involved. The NFRA being quasi judicial will carry out both investigative and
quasi judicial functions. Can an enforcement agency – say SFIO which is part of
MCA – be part of the NFRA?


f.   Location of NFRA needs to be
spread out and certainly not in Delhi and preferably kept where maximum
corporate economic activity takes place, such as Mumbai. 


g.  QRRB has struggled to find
people to carry out reviews. Can we expect qualified people with requisite
experience, skill and judicious predisposition to join the NFRA?


h.  Will the salary and fees be
commensurate with qualification to pay such reviewers?


i.   Will these Rules put Auditors
at a disadvantage – with companies threatening to complain against auditors?
Safeguards for false complaints are not visible.


The members of the CA Profession of their own volition have to rise and
clean up the mess we are in. We ourselves have to regulate the way a profession
should be run, as the ultimate users of our services is society at large. We
have to prove our worth and if we consciously try to keep an image of honest
professionals, then no other authority, such as NFRA would be necessary.


The ICAI has not fared badly when compared to other professional bodies
and legal machinery. Look at the way justice is denied / delayed, with almost 3
crore cases pending in Courts! So friends, revamping of existing machinery of
Regulation could have been a better proposition rather than having another
Regulator.


 

Counterview: NFRA is a change for better


 

Nawshir Mirza

Chartered Accountant

The
notification announcing the activation of a National Financial Regulatory
Authority (NFRA) has set the proverbial fox within the Institute of Chartered
Accountants of India. It is likely to see this move as a public humiliation of
the profession; as a withdrawal of the recognition that the profession had had
from Indian society in the past nearly seventy years. Long before the prime
minister of India rebuked the profession at a meeting of a “competing”
profession, the Companies Act had already framed the provision for the
setting-up of the NFRA. The question is, was this justified? Has the profession
lost the trust implicit in self-regulation: that it would always place public
interest over the interests of its own members, were there to be a conflict
between the two? It is also important to understand that trust is based on
both, fact as also perception. Indeed, because few members of the public have
access to facts, it is perception of the profession’s functioning that
determines its utility to society.


Indeed,
the NFRA is only one more amongst many independent regulators of the accounting
profession that have come up in many countries around the world. This has been
the trend in most major jurisdictions and the regulation of the profession and
the preparation of accounting standards had been taken away from professional
bodies in many places. So, to that extent the change may well have been a
result of overseas influence on the government. But, it would be self-deceiving
if we failed to look at how the profession weakened its case to remain
self-regulating, over the past couple of decades.


So
long as the ICAI leadership inspired confidence in the public and in government
officials by their intellectual breadth and dignified conduct, the profession’s
trust was secure. Members were rightly held in high regard and their voice
carried weight in business and government. Whilst there have always been black
sheep, their numbers were smaller, the media was not interested in the topic
and the high standards maintained by most members diluted the dark impact of a
few maligned individuals.


Today,
conversations with business people and other members of society clearly
indicate a collapse in the dignity of the profession. As a body representing a
profession that exists because of the capitalist system ironically it has done
everything in its power to undermine the basic philosophy of that system in its
own membership. It has created divisions in the profession between the larger
firms and their smaller counterparts. Society struggles to see how that has
been to its benefit.


The
intellectual quality of the ICAI’s output has deteriorated even as the quantity
has exploded. There is little originality in its publications and those that
attempt to be so, often suffer from poor standards of expression and
comprehension.


Whilst
the ICAI has postured to be a defender of India’s right to frame its own
accounting and auditing standards, the sad reality is very different. Its
commitments to international bodies expect it to harmonise its standards with
international ones and the exceptions that have been carved out are
comparatively trivial, giving the lie to the original posture. Whilst there
exists a mechanism for some degree of adherence to accounting standards
(independent auditors and audit committee oversight), the self-governing
mechanism that oversees adherence to auditing standards is ineffectual. The
quality reviews by peers appear to be ineffectual. Apart from the bigger audit
firms that must adhere to their respective firms’ global standards and a few of
the larger medium sized firms, the quality of audit is abysmal.


The
profession’s reputation in the field of taxation too is at a low. Whether true
or not, repeated newspaper reports now name chartered accountants complicit in
devious tax evasion schemes. The practice of “managing” public sector bank
loans has been another disgrace. The author struggles to discover any concrete
action by the institute and its office bearers to remedy this.


The
spectacle of the undignified scramble for votes every time council elections
come around, with a candidate’s community being considered the principal reason
for supporting him or her, creates the poorest of impressions. In this
free-for-all, the best suited have no chance of success and the winners do not
always prove to be thought leaders, a necessity for leadership of a learned
profession.


Sadly,
the disciplinary process too has had challenges. For one, proceedings take too
long. There are valid reasons for this, the least of which are that part time
members on the bench can only meet once a while. One can go on. To sum it up –
if members and the council failed to see in the early years of this century the
NFRA looming and to take corrective action, they have only themselves to thank.


The
NFRA has taken away three roles from the ICAI – the right to discipline
chartered accountants, the right to set accounting standards and the right to
set auditing standards.


Let me
first address the disciplinary process. I have been its object (the respondent)
several times in my career. In every case, spread from the mid-1970’s to the
Harshad Mehta scam in the early 1990’s, I was treated with spotless fairness.
Major matters such as the Harshad Mehta scam’s slew of disciplinary cases were
concluded within a relatively short time. But the final case, originating in a
dispute between two partners in a trading business (annual turnover one crore
rupees) took nearly a decade to reach conclusion. It is now slow, even when the
complainants and respondents are not the reason for delay, and it is viewed by
respondents from the large firms as not being scrupulously fair. Fair justice
is a fundamental right. If there is a continuing perception that it is not so
in even a few of those arraigned, a remedy is needed. Sadly, the ICAI did not
heed the signs. Nor did it address the core issue: why are there so many
complaints against members? Why are members with poor ethics proliferating? Why
are members in practice stooping to conduct more suited to a trader than to a
high-minded professional? What has the ICAI done effectively to set this right?


Another
point is that the NFRA may proceed more strongly against members preparing
financial statements (i.e., members in industry) and against their employers,
something the ICAI was constrained from doing because of the nature of the
process.


Moving
to the standard setting role, once again, the institute has provided poor
thought leadership. There was a time when its publications were a pleasure to
read and provided enduring guidance to preparers of financial statements. Take,
for example, the “Guidance note on Expenditure During Construction” or the one
on “The Payment of Bonus Act”. Examples of lucid expression, clarity of
thought, conceptual soundness and comprehensiveness. Something that cannot be
said for much of the material issued in recent years. It is unfair to not
recognise the guidance on Ind AS issued in the past couple of years; that has
been valuable. Transfer of this role from the ICAI to the NFRA is not a major
issue. The ICAI will continue to have the right to issue guidance to its
members. That is where the real value of its thought leadership will lie and it
will retain it. It needs to work out a process by which it does not get into
conflict with the NFRA. I read section 132 of Companies Act, 2013 to mean that
the NFRA will restrict itself to accounting standards and that it will not
issue further guidance. Were it to do so it would be important for the NFRA and
the ICAI to be in harmony.


As for
auditing standards, if all that the NFRA does is adopt the international
standards with minor modifications, they would be doing what the ICAI currently
does. However, if the NFRA seeks to impose on auditors uninformed public
expectations of them, auditors may find their work becoming unduly onerous, to
the point of impossible. That would be a matter for concern to the profession
as also to industry and commerce. Here again, the ICAI would need to build a
harmonious relationship so that auditing standards and expectations are pitched
right and so that the institute has sufficient time to prepare members for new expectations.


It is
very early days. It is not possible to state categorically that the NFRA will
be an improvement on the ICAI in the areas that are now being transferred to
it. Only time will tell as to how it functions, the extent of political and
bureaucratic influence over its functioning, its ability to remain independent
of government and its protection of the public interest. The fact that it is to
be in Delhi is an unhappy augury. Considering that most of its stakeholders
(auditors and preparers of financial statements) reside in or near Mumbai, it
should have been located there. That would have distanced it from the influence
of politicians and the bureaucracy and would have offered convenient access to
the stakeholders it has been created to deal with.


Finally,
all is not lost for the ICAI. It has had for many years an admirable record and
did command high regard from society. It is not impossible to win it back. But
it is not easy either because it would require a total change in the
profession. To do that it needs to reconsider how it has viewed its role. It is
not a trade union for its members seeking to aggrandise. For too long has its
leadership manoeuvred to win more work for its practicing members, often
regardless of industry and society that must bear the cost of that enhanced
role. The institute’s role is to ensure that its members make a positive
contribution to industry and commerce. For that it must ensure that members
undergo practical training that prepares them for making such a contribution.
It should not be licensing members who stoop to unethical practices to succeed.
The institute must be far more rigorous in vetting aspirants for its imprimatur
so that people with a weak ethical grounding do not receive it. It should be
zealous in protecting society from its cowboy members. Its leadership must not
fall into the trap of bombast and high-sounding statements whilst, at the same
time, behaving to the contrary. These leaders should demonstrate integrity in
their thought, speech and behaviour. The process by which its leaders are
selected should ensure that only individuals of such integrity and who possess
a high intellect and are well regarded for their professional knowledge go to
council.


I view
the NFRA not as a lost battle but as a wake-up call to the whole profession.
Chartered accountants have many centuries to go and one companies act does not
mean that we cannot win-back the right to regulate ourselves.


Is the
NFRA a change for the better? As with all such things, only time can answer
that question.
 

 

Editorial

The New Oil, The Rig And The Extraction



Over the centuries mankind found things that
were considered rare and precious. The Native Americans exchanged their gold
for mirrors which the Spanish brought with them to the new continent. Napoleon
III is believed to have used aluminium vessels instead of gold cutlery, as it
was believed to be rare. When oil found its new use in the twentieth century,
it was named ‘black gold.’ Oil transformed nomadic economies into some of the
wealthiest ones. Today, data is the new oil.


Recently, Facebook CEO was questioned
publicly by the US lawmakers. The testimony has raised several questions. Four
areas for public and regulatory consideration can be placed under the
following:


1. Collection of data

2. Protection of data

3. Individual Privacy

4. Data use – propaganda, surveillance,
manipulation


The world of technology is fast, vast and
tangled for a lay user. As of January 2018, about 4 billion people use the
internet, 3 billion active social media users and 5 billion unique mobile users
around the world. Questions about privacy and secrecy of personal data are
critical. The EU is implementing GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation) from
26th May 2018. The GDPR has extra territorial applicability, massive
fine (higher of 4% of annual turnover or Euro 20m) and onus of clarity in the
consent is on the data processers.


As citizens we are a subject matter of
possible if not actual digital surveillance although some of it comes across as
convenience. Consider these examples we can relate to:


1. Say you wish to buy a product. You enter
the words ‘Apple Cider Vinegar price’ in your browser. For next several hours
or days the application you use show advertisements selling that product.


2. I was travelling outside India. My phone
did not have data, wifi or local sim card. I was using the phone only for its
camera. I returned to my hotel, turned on the wifi and started to look at the
pictures I had taken during the day. Each picture showed with it, the location
where it was taken.


3. I was looking out for a new car. I searched
and clicked on a link on a browser. The website asks me my location.


Knowing about who you are, what you do, where
you go, what you buy, what you like and what you pay is invaluable. Today,
YOU are the new oil – the subject matter of digital data collection
. Data
about you is saleable and fetches big bucks. Although some services come
‘free’, they could be collecting your data in return and making use of that
data to suit their objectives. As a popular quote goes: ‘If you’re not paying
for it, you are not the customer; you are the product being sold.’


Data today can be used to control us – our
minds, opinions, judgements, and decisions. By knowing vulnerabilities of
people, technology can manipulate our individual and collective psyche to the
advantage of some. Recent reports show that personal data was sold and personal
data was used to manipulate elections. We all know how social media is used for
propaganda, fake news and to influence public opinion.


Today Facebook has 1.44 billion monthly
active users (MAU). That is 188 million more than India’s population. Alphabet,
Apple, Amazon, Microsoft and Facebook put together have market capitalisation
more than $3 Trillion. That means these companies collectively are larger than
individual GDPs of France, India, UK and Italy. However, these aren’t nations
or cooperatives; they are corporations with private ownership. Some are even
monopolies, but they seem like neutral public forums or platforms. Today we are
faced with the question: When we use an app, is it simply a ‘pass through
or is it a ‘gate keeper’ who controls what we should see?


One of the US lawmakers raised an important
question to the Facebook CEO – It is not about would you do it, it is about
could you do it! When we give access to our personal data on the phone, say our
contacts, do we know what that data will be used for? How secured it is? When
we press ‘I agree’, we hardly know what we are consenting to!


If data were new oil, your devices and apps
could well be the oil rigs. The feed you see could probably be a feed organised
by some vested interest – for propaganda, fake news or influencing your
decision. If individual freedom and liberty were to remain supreme in the
digital age, individual privacy cannot be disregarded. And if one were to
ask about the value of privacy, answer these questions – Do you like to be
spied on, stalked, watched or manipulated? Who would you want to give the right
to watch you and to what extent? What will be the dos and don’ts that you would
want an entity to follow with the information you shared?


There is no doubt that the gains of
technology outweigh most other drawbacks. At the same time, there is no legacy
more precious than individual freedom and liberty. Remaining a ‘private’
citizen is a challenge today. The question is can we even choose to be
one? 


 

Raman
Jokhakar

Editor

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Learnings From Ramayana: Steadfastness to His Word

In this series of short articles on
Ramayana, I am presuming some knowledge on the part of the readers about the
broad story of the epic. In the last month’s article, I had quoted a verse. The
correct reading of the verse is as under:

  

In this article, we will see Shree Ram’s
sense of steadfastness to his word. The strength of his word was such that
nothing could deter him from his pledge. His intention and speech were so
aligned, that he never deviated from his word by giving lame excuses or finding
loop-holes. His well-known words are
Ram never makes two (contradictory)
statements! There is no inconsistency between his utterances. Here are four
instances which demonstrate his complete alignment between what he meant and
what he said, what he said and what he did and between his utterances at
different times. In today’s world, these examples would inspire and open our
eyes.


1. When he was
going to exile, mother Kausalya tried to stop him by ‘emotional blackmailing’.
She said “Ram, do you agree that mother’s word is superior to that of the
father? Her word should prevail?” Ram nodded in approval.


“Then” she said, “Your father
Dasharatha is sending you to exile; but I am asking you not to go”.
Immediately, Ram retorted, “Mother, this command to go to exile is that of my
mother Kaikeyi only!”. He did not take shelter that Kaikeyi was his
step-mother.


2. While in exile, Ram never entered any
city. Since he had pledged to be in exile, he remained in exile.When he killed
Bali and handed over the kingdom of Kishkindha to Bali’s brother Sugreeva; Ram
refused to enter Kishkindha for attending his coronation. So also, after
killing Ravana, he installed Bibheeshana as the king of Lanka. Still, he did
not attend his coronation. Not only that, he sought his permission as a king,
to meet Seetaji as Seetaji was detained by Ravana in Lanka. This was the height
of courtesy and decorum.


3. When Bharata came to see Ram in the
forest to take him back, the sage Jabali said to Ram, “when you handed over the
kingdom to Bharata, you discharged your duty of honouring the word of your
father Dasharatha. Now, when that same Bharata is offering it back to you, what
is wrong in accepting it? There is no breach of your vow!”. “No”
Shree Ram said, “there were two parts of my father’s promise to mother Kaikeyi
– one was handing over the heirdom to Bharata; and 14 years’ exile for myself!
If I accept the kingdom, there will be a breach of the other part!”


4. While in exile, the sages and their
pupils staying in Ashramas came to request him for protection from cruel
and wicked demons. Shree Ram, duty conscious to the core, replied to them
politely, “It is a pity; rather shameful on my part that you have to
approach me with such a request! As a representative of King Bharata, it is my
bounden duty to protect all the subjects from evil. Your request clearly
reflects on my failure. Don’t worry. I will destroy the demons and make your
lives safe and comfortable”.

 

These are only a few illustrations. Ramayana
is full of such instances demonstrating a sense of duty in thought word and
deed, not only on the part of Shree Ram but also many others. We can learn from
these examples and apply them in day-to-day life.
 

 

10 Section 142(2A) – Special audit – Direction for special audit without application of mind – Objection of assessee not considered – Order for special audit not valid

1.      
(2018) 401 ITR 74 (Kar)

Karnataka
Industrial Area Development Board vs. ACIT

A.Ys.:
2013-14 & 2014-15,

Date
of Order: 02nd January, 2018


The
petitioner is a Government of Karnataka undertaking, engaged in the activities
of development of industrial areas within the State of Karnataka. The relevant
period is A. Ys. 2013-14 and 2014-15. The petitioner is already subject to
audit at the hands of the Controller and Auditor General of India (C & AG)
as well as the independent chartered accountant, and also under the provisions
of the KIADB Act itself and had already produced these two audit reports for
the said two years before the Assessing Officer. For the relevant years, the
petitioner assessee had raised its objections for the proposal for special
audit u/s. 142(2A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. However, without application of
mind the Assessing Officer issued directions for the special audit.  

 

The
petitioner assessee filed writ petition and challenged the said directions for
special audit. The Karnataka High Court allowed the writ petition and held as
under:

 

“i)   The purpose of section 142(2A) of the
Income-tax Act, 1961 is to get a true and fair view of the accounts produced by
the assessee so that the special audit conducted at the instance of the Revenue
may yield more revenue in the form of income-tax and it is not expected to be a
mere paper exercise or a repetitive audit exercise. Therefore, the special
circumstances must exist to direct the “special audit” u/s. 142(2A) of the Act
and such special circumstances or the special reasons must be discussed in
detail in the order u/s. 142(2A) itself.

 

ii)    It prima facie appeared that the assessing
authority had not only directed the special audit in the case of the assessee,
a Government undertaking already subject to audit at the hands of the C &
AG as well as the independent chartered accountant under the provisions of the
Act under which it was constituted, rather mechanically, but at the fag end of
the limitation period, perhaps just to buy more time to pass the assessment
order in the case of the assessee, which admittedly for the period in question
enjoyed exemption from income-tax under section 11.

 

iii)  The orders neither disclosed the discussion on the
objections of the assessee to the special audit and at least in one case for
the A. Y. 2013-14, the assessing authority did not even wait for the objections
to be placed on record and before they were furnished on 29/03/2016,he had already passed the order on 28/03/2016 while the limitation for passing the
assessment order was expiring on 31/03/2016. The orders u/s. 142(2A) could not be sustained.

9 Section 264(4) of I. T. Act, 1961 – Revision – Scope of power of Commissioner – Waiver of right to appeal by assessee – Appeals filed on similar issue for other assessment years – Not ground for rejection of application for revision – Revision petition maintainable

1.      
(2018) 400 ITR 497 (Del)

Paradigm
Geophysical Ltd. vs. CIT

A.Y.:
2012-13,  Date of Order: 13th Nov.,
2017


The
assessee was a non-resident company and a tax resident of Australia. It
provided and developed software enabled solutions and annual maintenance
services to the solutions supplied by it. For the A. Y. 2012-13, the assessee,
inter alia applied the provisions of section 44BB of the Income-tax Act, 1961
and filed its return. Pursuant to the scrutiny assessment, the Assessing
Officer issued a draft assessment order treating the receipts as royalty or fee
from technical services. No objections were filed u/s. 144C(2) of the Act, by
the assessee and therefore, no directions were issued by the DRP. Consequently,
the Assessing Officer passed a final order dated 11.05.2015, u/s. 144C(3)(b)
r.w.s. 143(3) of the Act confirming the adjustments made in the draft
assessment order. He applied the provisions of section 44DA and computed the
total income of the assessee. The assessee did not file any appeal against the
order of the Assessing Officer.


On
01.02.2016, the assessee filed a revision petition u/s. 264 of the Act, before
the Commissioner on the ground that the Assessing Officer had wrongly not
applied section 44BB and had incorrectly invoked and applied section 44DA. The
assessee submitted that for the A. Y. 2012-13, it had not availed of the remedy
of appeal and had invoked the alternative remedy under section 264. The
Commissioner declined to interfere with the order primarily on the ground that
on similar issue which arose in the A. Ys. 2011-12 and 2013-14, the assessee
had filed appeals before the appellate authority, and therefore, the revision
petition u/s. 264 for A. Y. 2012-13 was not maintainable. 

The
assessee filed writ petition and challenged the order of the Commissioner. The
Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

 

“i)   The Commissioner could not refuse to
entertain a revision petition filed by the assessee u/s. 264, if it was
maintainable, on the ground that a similar issue arose for consideration in
another year and was pending adjudication in appeal before another forum.

 

ii)    The time for filing appeal had expired. The
assessee had waived its right to file appeal and had not filed any appeal
against the order in question before the Commissioner (Appeals) or Tribunal.
Therefore, the negative stipulations in clause (a), (b) and (c) of section
264(4) were not attracted.

 

iii)   When a statutory right was conferred on an
assessee, it imposes an obligation on the authority. New and extraneous
conditions, not mandated and stipulated, expressly or by implication, could not
be imposed to deny recourse to a remedy and right of the assessee to have his
claim examined on merits. The Commissioner could not refuse to exercise the
statutorily conferred revisional power because the Assessing Officer was his
subordinate and under his administrative control.

 

iv)   The Commissioner while exercising power under
section 264 exercised quasi-judicial powers and he must pass a speaking and a
reasoned order. The reasoning could not be sustained for it was contrary to the
Legislative mandate of section 264.

 

v)   The matter is remanded to the
Commissioner to decide the revision petition afresh and in accordance with
law.”

 

Change before you get replaced!

On the occasion of the
launch of the Golden Jubilee year of the venerable BCAJ, I take the liberty of
doing a bit of crystal ball gazing on behalf of the tax professionals of the country.
The objective of this article is only to take a peek at what the future could
possibly have in store for us. Readers are therefore advised to not get into
technicalities. It is the message that counts and not the form.

Part I

The date is 31st
December, 2018. The time is 7.59 pm

Millions of Indians are
glued to their TV sets as their untiring and zealous Prime Minister Mr.
Narendra Damodardas Modi is about to address the nation. Several viewers are
ominously recounting his speech on the night of 8th November, 2016
when he broke the news about demonetisation. Everyone is wondering what will be
announced today.

At sharp 8.00 pm, the PM’s
face appears on TV channels. There is hushed silence as everyone strains to
catch the first words of the PM.

“Mitron”, he begins.

After the customary
pleasantries, he gets down to business and within a few seconds shocks the
nation by saying that “with effect from midnight of 31st December,
2018, there will be no tax on income. The Income-tax Act, 1961 will stand abolished
almost 57 years after it was enacted.”

For a few seconds, there
is stunned silence in all the living rooms in the country. The disbelief is
writ large on the faces of the millions glued to their television sets. But as
reality sinks in, there is chaos everywhere. As expected, people rush to their
mobile phones trying to send messages on all possible types of media. Whatsapp
crashes in a few seconds as millions of messages flood the system. Facebook
comes alive with all kinds of comments and remarks. Twitter suddenly reports
that #incometaxabolished starts trending at No. 1 spot.

As expected, television
news channels go berserk and excited reporters start shouting at the top of
their voices. There is a rush to interview Mr. Subramaniam Swamy who has been
one of the most vociferous proponents of the “abolish income-tax” suggestion.
Some of the business channels also start interviewing the stunned “tax experts”
and “tax gurus” of the country. Most questions revolved around finding out what
these experts/gurus would do once the Income-tax Act is abolished. How will
they keep themselves occupied going forward?

The new year eve parties
all over the country suddenly see a drop in attendance as thousands of affected
tax practitioners try and comprehend the impact of this huge announcement made
by the Prime Minister. The bolt from the blue which most people never expected
would ever come had actually been delivered. And what a timing!

Income-tax Act, 1961
repealed w.e.f. 1st January, 2019! Before becoming a senior citizen
the Act has been given euthanasia by the government. Chartered Accountants all
over the country suddenly open up their offices and start reviewing their
financials for past few years as well as current year. Everyone begins to
estimate how much he/she is likely to lose out in terms of gross revenues once
the Income-tax practice closes down.

There are thousands of
Chartered Accountants in India who have, over the decades, built up a large tax
practice. They have been heavily dependent on the compliance related tax
practice where thousands of tax returns, lakhs of TDS statements etc are filed
year after year. As we all know, in recent years, a large portion of the
traditional income-tax practice of Chartered Accountants has been reduced to a
compliance driven practice. With the advent of automation and e-governance,
e-filing and e-payments have become the order of the day. These have shifted
the focus of people from knowledge to data entry and computerisation. Many
Chartered Accountants who refused to see the writing on the wall,are woken up
from their self imposed slumber. The prospect of their sweat and toil of
several years being on the verge of disintegrating into nothing is real and
even closer to the present than ever imagined! Very few CAs realise that the
way technology is evolving, they could anyways be redundant. Globally, there is
greater acceptance of this fact and those of us who are not upgrading our skill
sets continually, risk being replaced by machines. The ‘routine’ tax practice
is clearly at risk.

Let us take a look at the
list of various categories of people who will be affected by this dramatic
announcement by the Prime Minister:

a)    Income-tax practitioners which would include
Chartered Accountants

b)   Employees of the Central Government posted in
the Income-tax departments across the country

c)    Middlemen who connive with the corrupt and
“fix cases” at the assessment and appellate stages

d)   Publishing houses who print thousands of
books every year on taxation

e)    Owners of several websites which provide tax
return filing services

f)    Lawyers and counsel who provide litigation
services to tax payers and their tax consultants at the various appellate
stages

g)   Television channels who spend hours discussing
the Budget and other tax matters alongwith “tax experts” and “tax gurus”

h)    Many of us at the Bombay Chartered
Accountants’ Society and other professional bodies who are part of the various
committees that spend so much time on income-tax related programs / articles
etc.

The objective of this
article is merely to prod you, our reader, into sitting up and thinking. Are
you ready for a disruption that threatens to completely change your work
profile? Are you doing anything to hone your skills towards an alternative area
of practice?
You have got a
Mediclaim policy to take care of a medical emergency and an insurance policy to
take care of your loved ones in case of the ultimate emergency. But have you
spent even one rupee on providing for a professional emergency – an emergency
of the type that artificial intelligence can bring upon you? Do you even
know that as blockchain technology becomes more and more prevalent and
pervasive, there may come a day when a taxpayer need not even have to file a
tax return? All the data that goes into the return today would anyways be
already available with the government?
Who will then come to you for filing
tax returns? What then?

Once e-assessments become
the order of the day, imagine how much time will be saved? Imagine a
possibility that the client will tell you that he does not need you to respond
to the notices.
He could sit on his laptop and respond directly to the
notices! You are not required for representing your client before a tax
officer. What then?

Today, almost every piece
of information under the sun is easily traceable on the internet with the help
of Google. For case laws, one does not need to remember citations. One does not
need to subscribe to costly magazines and/or websites. All this is virtually
floating around free of cost on the world wide web! Why would anyone call you
up to ask you about a case law? What then?

Quarterly TDS statements
are basically a compilation of data. Preparing them and filing them does not
require rocket science. All it requires is a reliable data entry operator and a
robust software. Why would a company or a partnership firm come to you for this
service? Can they not outsource this work to a BPO or to a freelance data entry
operator at a fraction of the fees that you would charge? What then?

Such simple examples are
enough to make us think hard about the harsh future ahead. The prospect of the
entire Income-tax Act, 1961 being repealed is definitely something that will
force us to think even harder.

Part II

I took the further liberty
of asking a few people known to me (and to most if not all of you) as to how
they would react to such a situation and how they would deal with this kind of
a change. Every effort has been made to speak to different categories of people
who are likely to be affected by such a change.Their interesting responses will
surely help our readers in understanding how others (who have a lot at stake in
the continuation of the Income-tax Act) would handle disruptive change that may
even do away with the Income-tax Act itself. If their thinking helps our
readers in being in a better state of preparedness for an “Apocalypse Now” type
of situation, this article would have served its purpose. Here’s what some of
the people I spoke to
have to say:

Menaka Doshi, Managing Editor, Bloomberg Quint

Question:The
citizens of India are very familiar with your face as we see you regularly in
the media. Your coverage of financial world is well appreciated by thousands. A
major chunk of the discussions that you spearhead in the media are related to
Income-tax. Surely, a lot of your own time as well as that of your team members
would be spent in researching on tax matters and in talking about it.

We want to
know what it would be like for you if the Income-tax Act, 1961 is suddenly
repealed one day! A big section of the content that you thrive on for your
career and your job would suddenly vanish. How would you adapt to this change?
If you were to start preparing for such a change in advance, what would you do?

Menaka Doshi: I can’t tell if your hypothesis is a dream or a
nightmare. Personally, what a pleasant surprise it would be to “take home” my
full salary. Professionally, yes I’d miss covering all the fiscal
ammunition.
The big retroactive landmines and the dense language of Section
9, the MAT missile and the LTCG bombs. But I wouldn’t worry about my job. After
all, there is still GST.

T. P. Ostwal (a practicing Chartered Accountant)

Question: As
someone who is very active on the international tax front, what would your
reaction be if, one fine day, we hear an announcement that the Income-tax Act,
1961 is abolished? Do you feel that tax professionals of India would be able to
survive by changing their home ground from India to other countries? Are we equipped
to provide truly international tax advice to foreigners engaged in
international trade even in those cases where the trade does not touch India?

T. P. Ostwal: The thought which you have brought about with this
question is very interesting and I wish that it should happen. I feel that it
would be a very bold decision by the Government to abolish the Income-tax Act.
The abolishment of the Income-tax Act has been immensely advocated by Dr.
Subramanian Swamy and I endorse his views. Unfortunately, neither the
Income-tax department nor the Government of India has the courage to do so. I
wish that they would do so for at least a short period on a trial and error
basis. During such period, they should abolish the Income-tax Act for 5 years
and clean up the whole system similar to the clean up being carried out under
the “Swachh Bharat Abhiyan”
. They should allow all the pending assessments
and appeals to be completed in this duration so as to start with a clean slate.
Subsequently they should introduce a simplified Income-tax law with a moderate
rate of tax. In this law, all the receipts should be treated as taxable and all
the expenditure should be allowed as a deduction. As such with the advent of
technology and with Aadhar being linked to everything, taxation of all the
transactions will be streamlined. This will give an opportunity to the people
of India to clean up their records and be straightforward in the future. It
would be pertinent to ensure that the new Income-tax Act is not being
complicated unlike the present system.

And as for your thought
that whether the professionals in India would be able to survive this
abolishment by changing their home ground and shifting to another country, this
thought is virtually an impossible task. Neither are Indian Chartered
Accountants equipped to handle international tax advices where India is the
subject matter of part of the transaction nor can they handle a transaction where
India is not a subject matter at all.
If you shift abroad on the premises
that Income-tax Act is abolished and you are going out of the country to advise
the foreigners, it is not an impossible task but we would definitely need to
gear up. There are professionals who have changed their home ground, gone
abroad and integrated themselves with the technical advancements in terms of
the laws of the world and as well advise on laws of the other countries. It is
not an unachievable task, but by and large 99% of our tax professionals are not
equipped to do that.

The Tax experts in India
can be classified in 3 categories

Domestic Tax Experts

Domestic – International
Tax Experts

International –
International Tax Experts

There are various tax
professionals in India who are well equipped to advise the clients and handle
matters within the domestic tax areas and a huge number of these professionals
are specialists. However, there are very few professionals who are specialists
on the Domestic – International tax front. Over a period of time, from 2001,
our tax professionals have gradually achieved proficiency in this field. Almost
10,000 professionals in India can handle Domestic – International tax
transactions. However, whether these 10,000 can handle International –
International tax transactions is questionable. Hardly 25-30 Chartered
Accountants may be in a position to handle international affairs entirely
outside India however, the rest of them may not be able to, in my personal
opinion.

By and large Indian tax
experts who have achieved the proficiency in advising international tax matters
can advise on the Domestic – International tax transactions as well, i.e.
application of Indian tax treaties with other countries. However, they are
neither efficient nor proficient in advising on the laws of the other
countries. This is because they are generally not expected to know the laws of
countries other than India and also practising on the laws of these other
countries may not be permissible. Consequently, they do not have expertise on
that subject.

Nevertheless,
theoretically it is quite possible to equip yourself with the knowledge of laws
of the other countries. Despite the fact that you know the laws of the other
country, the understanding of jurisprudence in that country is equally
important. Since the laws are interpreted in a particular manner by the judges
which could be different from the theoretical legal provision, this knowledge
is also extremely important. Those who keep abreast of the provisions of law
as well as the judicial interpretation in those countries can definitely embark
upon this idea of creating for themselves, professional opportunities abroad.

There are people from the large firms who have shifted abroad to their foreign
affiliates and thereby acquired that proficiency in foreign laws.
Unfortunately, if someone goes abroad for such opportunities they
settle there.

Therefore, if I am asked
this question today about the Indian experts practising in India and regarding
their ability to understand and work with these foreign laws with their current
skill set, I have my reservations. I doubt whether there are any people in a
position to do that except for the small number of 25-30 professionals I
mentioned earlier. A situation of abolishment of the Income-tax Act would
create challenges for the practitioners unless they take necessary steps. They
will have to look for other work opportunities, which fortunately, are ample in
a country like India. Taking an example of the recent case of Nirav Modi, a
forensic audit is required for such cases. There are specialists who undertake
such assignments and by becoming little more equipped, the tax professionals in
India can undertake such other assignments in India itself especially with the
ongoing Swachh Bharat Abhiyan of the Government of India, particularly Mr.
Narendra Modi.

Mr. Narendra Modi is
undertaking the responsibility of cleaning up everything and consequently the
entire system is being cleaned up as a part of the Swachh Bharat Abhiyan. I
must compliment and congratulate him and the Government for undertaking the
Swachh Bharat Abhiyan in its true sense. Mr. Modi, is neither compromising nor
allowing anybody to compromise with any of the systems of the Government. For
achieving this, actions are necessary and he is undertaking such actions. Hence
the Chartered Accountants can definitely support the Government of India in its
endeavour for creating a Swachh Bharat by undertaking different and innovative
work rather than just getting bogged down to direct taxation related work. The
field of indirect taxation is humongous, wherein we can help the tax payers and
the Government of India. Further, there are multiple opportunities in the area
of company law and other system oriented work, which are substantial in the
country. We are barely around 2,50,000 Chartered Accountants. When a company
like Tata Consultancy Services has 3,00,000 employees, getting work
opportunities for 1,50,000 Chartered Accountants (assuming that they are
presently involved in direct tax work) in different fields is not at all a
difficult job.

Sonalee Godbole (a practicing Chartered Accountant)

Question:You
practice actively in income-tax matters and handle several large litigations
for your clients. You have also been regularly appearing in the ITAT on behalf
of your clients. What would be your reaction if the Income-tax Act, 1961 is
abolished one day? How would you spend your time once there is no litigation
left on tax matters and nothing is to be represented before the income-tax
authorities?If you had sufficient notice of such an event happening in future,
how would you prepare for it?

Sonalee Godbole: Government generates revenues from levy of
various taxes to meet demands of different stakeholders in the economy and also
to meet its economic development agenda like infrastructure development,
healthcare, education etc. Income tax revenues constitute a large portion of
the overall tax collections. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that the income
tax will be abolished. If it was abolished, it shall be considered as one of
the most radical tax reforms.

If we assume that income
tax is abolished, then the consequential shortfall in income tax revenue will
have to be met through other sources like levy of some other taxes.
Introduction of new taxes will give opportunity and open new area of practice.
Knowing the past history – whenever new laws are introduced in India, due to
drafting inconsistencies, it is open field for litigation. All those who have
experience of litigation practice in the field of Income tax, will have edge
over new entrants. The introduction of new law/laws will keep us busy while we
understand, interpret and litigate.

Simultaneously,
Government will introduce several compliances for the citizens, in order to
ensure that relevant data is collected by the Government. The assignment of
doing compliances on behalf of clients will provide opportunities to
professionals.

If announcement for
abolition of income tax is made by the Government, I will start studying
various other laws which are presently applicable in the country, to look for
opportunities and also look at newly introduced laws. In our CA curriculum, we
are taught to tirelessly study and continuously update our knowledge. This will
certainly help while I explore newer areas of practice. Initially, it may cause
some hiccups but everything would fall in place in long term.

The citizen will bless the
Government for abolishing the income tax. But on a lighter note, students of CA
course will be most happy since, one of the most difficult and lengthy subjects
shall be removed from the curriculum of CA students. Such a relief!

Arun Giri, promoter, Taxsutra

Question:You
have co-founded a highly successful tax portal and have been able to create an
excellent network that goes beyond the cyber world and into the physical world.
Your business model revolves around income-tax related news. Although you do
have an indirect tax related section in your portal, the predominant brand that
you have created for your portal is in the world of income-tax. In this
scenario, how would you react to the abolition of the Income-tax Act by the
government in the near future? How would you deal with a sudden void created by
such an announcement?

Arun Giri: The abolition of income tax is an idea (better
described as ‘fantasy’) that has been advocated by some thinkers in the recent
past. It hasn’t taken off and for good reasons. Be that as it may, we enter the
fantasy land to answer this question!

A black swan event like
this gives one an opportunity to imagine and paint a different canvas … with
no scope of daily tax reporting except to the extent of past litigations, there
will be very little that will excite the Indian tax professional.That being
the case, tax professionals will have to look elsewhere… naturally they will
replace their Indian tax practice with a Asian or global tax practice. Several
hundred Indian tax firms may eye the GCC market, parts of Asian continent or
even Africa where tax laws are new/evolving, hence giving them an opportunity to
learn new tax laws and become proficient tax advisors for tax laws of other
jurisdictions.
Taxsutra will be happy to follow the customer and think
‘global.’ We would probably direct our focus towards global tax updates, with
focus on tax jurisdictions which would interest the Indian tax professional.

Associations like the
BCAS, with a glorious history, especially in tax, will also have to conduct
programs to re-skill the Indian tax advisors. Taxsutra shall probably be
partnering BCAS in this endeavour. If such a day were to ever pan out, it will
cause seismic changes in the tax world but what is life without being jolted
out of our comfort zones once in a while!

Kamlesh Varshney, Commissioner of Income Tax (International Taxation)-2
New Delhi

Question:
Sir – you have spent several years in the service of the income-tax department
and have, over the years, risen in rank. Today, you would be heading a team of
several hundred officers and other staff in the income-tax department. Like
you, there would be hundreds of other senior officers with thousands of staff
down the line. Basically, the work that all of you are doing is totally
dependent on what is laid down in the Income-tax Act, 1961. If we suddenly have
a situation where this Act is abolished, how would you and your team react?
Obviously, the government will either have to absorb such a large work force in
other jobs or will be left with no alternative but to seek large scale job
cuts. In either case, what do you think would be the reactions of the affected
people and how would they cope?

Kamlesh Varshney: First of all, I believe that this is a
hypothetical situation, which is unlikely to happen. However, if it happens it
would definitely be a disappointment for the tax administrators since the
wealth of experience they have gained over the years in tax matters and its
implementation would suddenly be lost. So far as job is concerned that would
not be an issue as being in government job, the work force would be absorbed
somewhere else. Having said that, I believe this situation would not arise
since direct tax has a special role to perform. Direct tax is one of the
major instruments for transfer payments (from rich to poor) meeting
socio-economic objective/principles enshrined in our constitution. Consumption
or transaction based tax, though easy to implement, fails to achieve transfer
payments.
They are also more burdensome for poor people as they spend
virtually everything that they earn. Hence, for a country like India which
believes in socio-economic objectives/principles, it is virtually impossible
for any Government to abolish
income tax.

Milin Mehta (a practicing Chartered Accountant)

Question:You
have been in tax practice for more than 30 years and are a partner in a firm
that was established several decades back. You have an established client base
to whom you are providing various tax services. Lately, this has become more
and more a compliance driven practice. There is already a challenge being faced
by such practitioners from the advent of automation – particularly
practitioners based in smaller towns of India. To add to this, if, one day, the
government decides to abolish the Income-tax Act, how would you react? What
steps do you think you need to take right away so that
if such a drastic decision is taken in the near future by the government, you
will be able to continue to practice
as a CA?

Milin Mehta: At the very outset I must state that it is a very
interesting thought. I am reminded of my own words a few years ago where I wanted
the participants of the regional conference of WIRC in Mumbai to imagine a
situation where three things happen: (1) No Tax Audits (2) No audit for Private
Limited Companies and (3) No scrutiny assessment. The purpose was to encourage
members to focus on purely “value added services” from compliance oriented. I
encouraged the members at that time to move to services where importance is
given more to the quality of service than merely stamp of being a CA.

I must admit that your
thought goes beyond what I had envisaged.

Let me analyse the
situation from a different angle. In the budget estimate of FY 2018-19, Income
Tax (personal tax, corporate tax and other taxes like STT, etc.) is estimated
at Rs. 11.39 lac crore out of gross revenue receipts (tax and non-tax and
without deducting the share of the state governments from the consolidated fund
of India) of Rs. 27.81 lac crore i.e. approximately 41% of the total gross
revenue. If you exclude the share of the Central Government (CG), this % goes
up to 57 % plus. Therefore, it is impossible to abolish the income tax, without
either substituting it with some other source of revenue or drastically
bringing down the expenditure of the CG.

I as a Chartered
Accountant very strongly feel that in either of the things, the CAs will have
enough work provided we are agile and flexible to re-train or re-orient
ourselves quickly enough to seize the opportunities. Considering the speed with
which our fraternity adapted to a framework change in the indirect taxes in a short
time shows distinctly that we as community are adept at the changes, though we
resist it a lot and many times unnecessarily.

I feel that one of the
reasons why we, as a firm, remained ahead of the pack is that we have adapted
with changes faster than other firms and have seized most of the opportunities.
As a firm, we have taken the principle (and I have been talking to younger
members and others entering the profession about this) that we must consider
that the changes are inevitable and it is only your ability to make yourself
relevant with the changes which would keep you ticking. Therefore, I feel that
I (and so also my fraternity of CAs) are ready to meet with the challenges that
would be thrown if the income tax is abolished and substituted with any other
source of revenues.

Let me look at this from a
further different angle. A large portion of the tax team of any CA office goes
in the area of compliance. Second in line will be representation and
litigation. Very little time is spent in advisory in true sense. Therefore,
majority of the time goes in completely “non-value added services”. The
services in these areas are like necessary evils and completely avoidable. The
question that I ask myself and my team is that “do we want to continue to do such
work?”. The answer is a clear “NO”. I would rather want to utilise my time more
creatively. I would want to devote my time in generating wealth and well being
and not in defending my position all the time.

The abolition of income
tax will free up time of a large number of very capable people, who I am sure
will devote their time in much more creative manner. It would be a shock at the
beginning but things would settle fast and my office and so will be most of the
agile CAs be more gainfully employed. I am not sure whether the income levels
of people will go up or not, but certainly their happiness quotient or their
quotient for contribution to the society will significantly go up.

I am not even slightly
afraid of this situation. In fact, I would welcome such situation as I do not
wish to be engaged in the work which does not produce anything.

Coming specifically to my
organisation, I feel that we are already ready for such challenges to face. The
culture is already developed to expect changes and many times initiate such
changes and challenge the situation and
be ready.

Before I end, I would
want to mention that success in our profession does not depend on what you know
but it completely depends on what is your capability of learning. I would
recommend my friends to create that capability and you will be able to face the
challenges of any change, no matter how significant it is, better than your
peers.
 

Anil Sathe (former editor of BCAJ & a practicing Chartered
Accountant)

Question:You
have been the editor of the BCAJ for several years and have been a member of
the Journal Committee of the BCAS for more than a decade. You are also a senior
tax practitioner. The BCAJ has a very strong coverage of articles and features
relating to income-tax. If, one day, the government decides to abolish the
Income-tax Act, how would you react? What steps do you think you need to take
right away so that if such a drastic decision is taken in the near future by
the government, you will be able to continue to practice as a CA? Also, if you
were to become the editor of BCAJ again, how would the journal look like
without any article or feature relating to income-tax?

Anil Sathe: If income tax is abolished! When I read this
hypothetical announcement, my first reaction was that of shock, then relief,
gradually giving way to concern. My relationship with tax laws is longer than
that with my wife. My tryst with income tax began in 1978 when I began my
articleship. Gradually the liking for tax law grew into a passion. When I started
practice, though I was involved in every traditional area of practice including
accounts and audit, my first love was tax. I still recall the heated
discussions/ deliberations with friends in our office, in BCA study circles and
RRCs. As I started public speaking and writing, tax was the subject that I
chose. In practice I would spend hours in the corridors of Aayakar Bhavan
attending assessments, later appeals and finally in the courtrooms of the
Tribunal. Of course tax practice did result in a significant amount of
frustration when I realised that knowledge, effort and skill had very little
relation with the result which was what the client desired. When I joined the
Journal Committee of the BCAS, meetings were lively with seniors discussing
various tax issues threadbare. As the editor of the BCAJ, I enjoyed reading the
material that was published in each issue. Even today, income tax constitutes
around 40% of the editorial content of the journal. Without knowing it, tax law
has occupied such a position in professional life that it is difficult to
imagine its absence. So what would I do if income tax was abolished?

Yes those long waits, in
the department and in courtrooms would no longer be there. I would not have to
miss family commitments because an important matter was coming up. There would
be sufficient time to spend for myself. But what would I do for a livelihood?
Of course, if Income tax was abolished, the government would have to
necessarily replace it with some other revenue generating mechanism. One would
then have to study that legislation and, if possible, develop expertise in that
area. But all of us have to realise that traditional tax practice in the form
that we have seen it is already on the decline. For more than a decade, we have
seen the change and those who have not had the foresight to change the practice
structure are already suffering. Pure compliance practice has already declined
or shifted to other service providers and this trend would accelerate in the
days to come. Therefore, though abolition of income tax would be a shock for
thousands, the change in the practice landscape has been visible for a long
time. In fact, as professionals, we need to realise that the value addition to
client is in advising about his economic activity rather than in regard to the
output thereof. To a client, a person who advises him on how to increase the
size of the pie is more important than the one who tries to save the pie that
has already been baked. Professionals will have to get into the area of
consulting. Litigation in tax law would undoubtedly continue but would become
so costly that only a few would be able to afford it. So on the personal front,
while even after abolition of tax law, the remaining litigation might suffice
to take me through upto the end of my professional career, my firm would have
to
reinvent itself and look to continuously develop the area of business
consulting.

As for the journal, its
contents are a reflection of the needs of readers. It’s information content is
already being challenged by the onslaught of technology with information
reaching the doorstep of the reader much before it is available in the journal.
Therefore, the journal itself will have to undergo a change, even if income tax
were to continue to exist. In its absence, new areas of practice will come to
the fore, and these will fill the void in the journal. In the next decade or
so, I expect the electronic media to completely overtake the print media. This
will have to be understood and appreciated and accepted by future editors of
the journal. The form and content of the journal will undergo a change, but if
it adapts itself to the changing scene in the profession it will retain its
place of eminence.

Part III

A new beginning!

Repeal of the Income-tax
Act, 1961 may or may not happen. Even if it does happen someday, it may be in
the very distant future. The point of this article is not about the
Income-tax Act but about the challenges thrown by disruptive technology that is
fast pervading every aspect of our lives. The objective of this article is to
spur our readers into thinking outside the box.

When we are faced with a
life changing situation, the one important question that stares at us is – “did
I do anything in the past to prepare myself to face such a situation”?

In the hypothetical
situation that I have written about in Part I of this article, we talked about
reactions of people who could be affected by such a situation. In this part of
the article I would like to talk about how we could start preparing ourselves
now so that if any part of our existing practice is disrupted suddenly, we are
not caught napping! The challenge that disruption poses must be converted into
an opportunity by us. Old baggage that has been carried on for many years can
be discarded using this opportunity.

We need to understand and
accept the fact that the practice area that sustained us over the decades will
not continue to do so in the decades ahead. We have to look at alternatives. We
need to spot opportunities around us and start working on them immediately.
There are several emerging areas of practice that are clearly making their
presence felt. We need to start taking interest in them and then start focusing
on a few of them. Some such exciting and interesting areas that one could
consider are:

u   Data analytics

u   Forensic audit

u   Blockchain technology

u   Transfer pricing in other countries

u   Financial planning and wealth management

u   Rehabilitation, insolvency, liquidation
services

u   Corporate governance

u   Valuation services

u   Business / Commercial laws services

u   International trade laws

u   Climate change and carbon credit

u   Inheritance and succession planning

All in all, the objective
of this article is to provoke the reader into action. Our profession needs
to be aware of the disruptive force of technology and change that is sweeping
the globe.
We cannot afford to remain in our cocoons any longer. If we are
to survive, we need to accept the change and before that change sweeps us away,
change our course. Just as a boatman regularly adjusts his sails with every
change in the wind, so must we.

I sincerely hope that
readers of BCAJ will contribute to making the golden year of the BCAJ memorable
and momentous by reading every article relating to this theme of “disruption”
and imbibing the spirit behind the articles in their professional and personal
lives and make themselves and their teams ready for change. Unless we change
really fast, we will soon get replaced. The time to act is NOW!
 

 

Board Meetings By Video Conferencing Mandatory For Companies? – Yes, If Even One Director Desires

Background

Is a company
bound to provide facilities to directors to participate in board meetings by
video conferencing? The NCLAT has answered in the affirmative even if one
director so desires.
This is what the Tribunal has held in its recent
decision in the case of Achintya Kumar Barua vs. Ranjit Barthkur ([2018] 91
taxmann.com 123 (NCL-AT)).

Section 173(2)
of the Companies Act, 2013 provides that a director may participate in a board
meeting in person or through video conferencing or through audio-video visual
means. Clearly, then, a director has three alternative methods to attend board
meeting. The question was: whether these three options arise only if a company
provides such facility or whether a director can insist that he be provided all
the three choices the director has the option of using any one of the three.

It is clear
that, for video-conferencing to work, facilities would have to be at both ends.
Indeed, as will also be seen later herein, the company will have to arrange for
far more facilities to ensure compliance, than the director participating by
video conference. The director may need to have just a computer – or perhaps
even a mobile may be sufficient – and internet access. Apart from providing
these facilities, the process of the board meeting itself would undergo a
change in practice where meeting is held by video conference.

While one may
perceive that, particularly with internet access and high bandwith
proliferating, video conferencing would be easy. However, the formal process of
Board Meetings by video conferencing has May 2018 video conferencing article
first post board been simplified. This would not only require bearing the cost
of video conference facilities but also carrying out several other compliances
under the Companies Act and Rules made thereunder. This makes the effort
cumbersome and costly particularly for small companies. Moreover, the
proceedings would become very formal. Directors would be aware that their words
and acts are being recorded. These video recordings can be reviewed later very
closely for legal and other purposes particularly for deciding who was at fault
in case some wrongs or frauds are found in the company.

Arguments before the NCLAT

Before the
NCLAT, which was hearing an appeal against the decision of the NCLT, the
company argued that the option to attend by video conferencing to a director
arises only if the company provides such right.

It was also
argued that the relevant Secretarial Standards stated that board meeting could
be attended by video conferencing only if the company had so decided to provide
such facility.

Additional
issues raised including facts that made it difficult for the company to provide
such facility.

Relevant provisions of law

Some relevant
provisions in the Companies Act, 2013 and the Companies (Meetings of Board and
its Powers) Rules, 2014 are worth considering and are given below (emphasis supplied).

 Section 173(2)
of the Act:

173(2) The
participation of directors in a meeting of the Board may be either in person or through video conferencing or other
audio visual means, as may be prescribed, which are capable of recording and
recognising the participation of the directors and of recording and storing the
proceedings of such meetings along with date and time:

Provided
that the Central Government may, by notification, specify such matters which shall not be dealt with in a meeting through video
conferencing or other audio visual means:

Provided
further that where there is quorum in a meeting through physical presence of
directors, any other director may participate through video conferencing or
other audio visual means in such meeting on any matter specified under the
first proviso. (This second proviso is not yet brought into force)

Some relevant
provisions from the Rules:

3. A company shall comply with the
following procedure, for convening and conducting the Board meetings through
video conferencing or other audio visual means.

(1) Every
Company shall make necessary arrangements to avoid failure of video or audio
visual connection.

(2) The
Chairperson of the meeting and the company secretary, if any, shall take due
and reasonable care—

(a) to
safeguard the integrity of the meeting by
ensuring sufficient security and identification procedures;

(b) to ensure availability of proper
video conferencing or other audio visual equipment or facilities for providing
transmission of the communications for effective participation of the directors
and other authorised participants at the Board meeting;

(c) to record
proceedings
and prepare the minutes of the meeting;

(d) to store for safekeeping and marking the tape
recording(s) or other electronic recording mechanism as part of the records of
the company at least before the time of completion of audit of that particular
year.

(e) to ensure that no person other than
the concerned director are attending or have access to the proceedings of the
meeting through video conferencing mode or other audio visual means; and

(f) to ensure that participants attending the meeting
through audio visual means are able to hear and see the other participants
clearly during the course of the meeting:


What the NCLAT held

The NCLAT,
however, held that the right to participate board meetings via
video-conferencing was really with the director. This is clear, it pointed out,
from the opening words of Section 173(2) that read: “The participation of
directors in a meeting of the Board may
be either in person or through video conferencing or other audio visual means
“.
Thus, if the director makes the choice of attending by video-conferencing, the
company will have to conduct the meeting accordingly.

The NCLAT
analysed and observed, “We find that the word “may” which has been
used in this sub-Section (2) of Section 173 only gives an option to the
Director to choose whether he would be participating in person or the other
option which he can choose is participation through video-conferencing or other
audio-visual means. This word “may” does not give option to the
company to deny this right given to the Directors for participation through
video-conferencing or other audio-visual means, if they so desire.”.

The NCLAT
further stated, “…Section 173(2) gives right to a Director to participate
in the meting through video-conferencing or other audio-visual means and the
Central Government has notified Rules to enforce this right and it would be in
the interest of the companies to comply with the provisions in public
interest.”.

On the issue of
the relevant Secretarial Standard that stated that video conferencing was
available only if the company had provided, the NCLAT rejected this
argument saying that in view of clear words of the Act, such standards could
not override the Act and provide otherwise. In the words of the NCLAT, “We
find that such guidelines cannot override the provisions under the Rules. The
mandate of Section 173(2) read with Rules mentioned above cannot be avoided by
the companies.”.

The NCLAT
finally stressed on the positive aspects of video conferencing. It said that
vide conferencing it could actually help avoid many disputes on the proceedings
of the Board meeting as a video record would be available. To quote the NCLAT, “We
have got so many matters coming up where there are grievances regarding
non-participation, wrong recordings etc.”
It also upheld the order of the
NCLT which held that providing video conferencing facility was mandatory of a
director so desired, and said, “The impugned order must be said to be
progressive in the right direction and there is no reason to interfere with the
same.”
.

Implications and conclusion

It is to be
emphasised that the requirements of section 173 apply to all companies –
listed, public and private. Hence, the implications of this decision are far
reaching. Even if one director demands facility of video conferencing, all the
requirements will have to be complied with by the company.

Rule 3 and 4 of
the Companies (Meeting of Board and its Powers) Rules, 2014, some provisions of
which are highlighted earlier herein, provide for greater detail of the manner
in which the meeting through video conferencing shall be held. Directors should
be able to see each other, there should be formal roll call including related
compliance etc. There are elaborate requirements for recording decisions
and the minutes in proper digital format. 

In these days,
meetings so held can help avoid costs and time, particularly when the director
is in another city or town or in another country. However, there are attendant
costs too. Even one director could insist on attending by video conferencing
and the result is that the whole proceedings would have to be so conducted and
the costs have to be borne by the company.

Certain
resolutions such as approval of annual accounts, board report, etc.
cannot be passed at a meeting held by video-conferencing. A new proviso has
been inserted to section 173(2) by the Companies (Amendment) Act, 2017. This
proviso, which is not yet brought into force, states that if there are enough
directors physically present to constitute the quorum, then, even for such
resolutions, the remaining directors could attend and participate by video
conferencing.

Thus, in
conclusion, it is submitted that the lawmakers should review these provisions
and exclude particularly small companies – private and public – from their
applicability.
 

Note: in the april 2018 issue of
the journal, in the article titled “tax planning/evasion transactions on
capital markets and securities laws – supreme court decides”, on page 110, the
relevant citation of the decision of the supreme court was inadvertently not
given. the citation of this decision is sebi vs. rakhi trading (p.) limited
(2018) 90 taxmann.com 147 (sc).

 


 

Fugitive Economic Offenders Ordinance 2018

Introduction

Scam and Scat is the motto
of the day! The number of persons committing frauds and leaving the country is
increasing. Once a person escapes India, it not only becomes difficult for the
law enforcement agencies to extradite him but also to confiscate his
properties. In order to deter such persons from evading the law in India, the
Government has introduced the Fugitive Economic Offenders Bill, 2018 (“the
Bill
”). The Bill has been tabled in the Lok Sabha. However, while the Bill
would take its own time to get cleared, the Government felt that there was an
urgent need to introduce the Provisions and so it promulgated an Ordinance
titled, the Fugitive Economic Offenders Ordinance, 2018. This Ordinance was
promulgated by the President on 21st April 2018 and is in force from
that date.

 

Fugitive Economic Offender

The Preamble mentions that
it is an Ordinance to provide for measures to deter fugitive economic offenders
from evading the process of law in India by staying outside the jurisdiction of
Indian courts, to preserve the sanctity of the rule of law in India.

The Ordinance defines a
Fugitive Economic Offender as any individual against whom an arrest warrant has
been issued in India in relation to a Scheduled Offence and such individual
must:

(a) Have left India to avoid criminal prosecution;
or

(b) If he is abroad, refuses to return to India to
face criminal prosecution.

Thus, it
applies to an individual who either leaves the country or refuses to return but
in either case to avoid criminal prosecution. An arrest warrant must have been
issued against such an individual in order for him to be classified as a
`Fugitive Economic Offender’ and the offence must be an offence mentioned in
the Schedule to the Ordinance. The Ordinance provides for various economic
offences which are treated as Scheduled Offences provided the value involved in
such offence is Rs. 100 crore or more. Hence, for offences lesser than Rs. 100
crore, an individual cannot be treated as a Fugitive Economic Offender. Some of
the important Statutes and their economic offences covered under the Ordinance
are as follows:

 (a) Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Cheating, forgery,
counterfeiting, etc.

 (b) Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Cheque
Bouncing u/s. 138

 (c) Customs Duty, 1962 – Duty evasion

 (d) Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions
Act, 1988 – Prohibition of Benami Transactions

 (e) SEBI Act, 1992- Prohibition of Insider Trading
and Other Offences for contravention of the provisions of the SEBI Act in the manner
provided u/s. 24 of the aforesaid Act.

 (f)  Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 –
Offence of money laundering

 (g) Limited Liability Partnership Act, 2008 –
Carrying on business with intent to defraud creditors of LLP

 (h) Companies Act, 2013 – Private Placement
violation; Public Deposits violation; Carrying on business with intent to defraud creditors / fraudulent purpose; Punishment for fraud in the
manner provided u/s. 447 of the Companies Act.

(i)  Black Money (Undisclosed
Foreign Income and Assets) and Imposition of Tax Act, 2015 – Wilful attempt to
evade tax u/s. 51 of the Act. It may be noted that this offence is also a
Scheduled Cross Border Offence under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act,
2002. Thus, a wilful attempt to evade tax under the Black Money Act may have
implications and invite prosecutions under 3 statutes!

(j)  Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 –
Transactions for defrauding creditors

(k) GST Act, 2017 – Punishment for certain offences
u/s. 132(5) of the GST Act, such as, tax evasion, wrong availment of credit,
failure to pay tax to Government, false documents, etc.   

Applicability

The
Ordinance states that it applies to any individual who is, or becomes, a
fugitive economic offender on or after the date of coming into force of this
Ordinance, i.e., 21st April 2018. Hence, its applicability is
retroactive in nature, i.e., it applies even to actions done prior to the
passing of the Ordinance also. Therefore, even the existing offenders who
become classified as fugitive economic offenders under the Ordinance would be
covered.

Declaration of Fugitive Economic Offender

The
Enforcement Directorate would administer the provisions of the Ordinance. Once
the ED has reason to believe that any individual is a Fugitive Economic
Offender, then he (ED) may apply to a Special Court (a Sessions Court
designated as a Special Court under the Money Laundering Act) to declare such
individual as a Fugitive Economic Offender. Such application would also contain
a list of properties in India and outside India believed to be the proceeds of
crime for which properties confiscation is sought. It would also mention a list
of benami properties in India and abroad to be confiscated. The term `proceeds
of crime’ means any property derived directly or indirectly as a result of
criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence, and where the property is
held abroad, the property of equivalent in value held within the country or
abroad.

With the
permission of the Court, the ED may attach any such property which would
continue for 180 days or as extended by the Special Court. However, the
attachment would not prevent the person interested in enjoyment of any
immovable property so attached. The ED also has powers of Survey, Search and
Seizure in relation to a Fugitive Economic Offender. It may also search any
person by detaining him for a maximum of 24 hours with prior Magistrate
permission.

Once an
application to a Court is made, the Court will issue a Notice to the alleged
Fugitive Economic Offender asking him to appear before the Court. It would also
state that if he fails to appear, then he would be declared as a Fugitive
Economic Offender and his property would stand confiscated. The Notice may also
be served on his email ID linked with his PAN / Aadhaar Card or any other ID
belonging to him which the Court believes is recently accessed by him.

If the
individual appears himself before the Court, then it would terminate the
proceedings under the Ordinance. Hence, this would be the end of all
proceedings under the Ordinance. However, if he appears through his Counsel,
then Court would grant him 1 week’s time to file his reply. If he fails to appear
either in person or Counsel and the Court is satisfied that the Notice has been
served or cannot be served since he has evaded, then it would proceed to hear
the application.

Consequences

If the
Court is satisfied, then it would declare him to be a Fugitive Economic
Offender and thereafter, the proceeds of crime in India / abroad would be
confiscated and any other property / benami property owned by him would also be
confiscated. The properties may or may not be owned by him. In case of foreign
properties, the Court may issue a letter of request to a Court in a country
which has an extradition treaty or similar arrangement with India. The
Government would specify the form and manner of such letter. This Order of the
Special Court is appealable before the High Court.

The Court,
while making the confiscation order, exempt from confiscation any property
which is a proceed of crime in which any other person, other than the
FugitiveEconomic Offender, has an interest if the Court is satisfied that such
interest was acquired bona fide and without knowledge of the fact that
the property was proceeds of crime. Thus, genuine persons are protected.

One of the
other consequences of being declared as a Fugitive Economic Offender, is that
any Court or Tribunal in India may disallow him to defend any civil claim in
any civil proceedings before such forum. A similar restriction extends to any
company or LLP if the person making the claim on its behalf/the promoter/key
managerial person /majority shareholder/individual having controlling interest
in the LLP has been declared a Fugitive Economic Offender. The terms
promoter/majority shareholder /individual having controlling interest have not
been defined under the Ordinance. It would be desirable for these important
terms to be defined or else it could either lead to inadvertent consequences or
fail to achieve the purpose. This ban on not allowing any civil remedy, even
though it is at the discretion of the Court/Tribunal, is quite a drastic step
and may be challenged as violating a person’s Fundamental Rights under the
Constitution. Although the words used in the Ordinance are that “any Court
or tribunal in India, in any civil proceeding before it,
may, disallow
such individual from putting forward or defending any civil claim”;
it
remains to be seen whether the Courts interpret may as discretionary or as
directory, i.e., as ‘shall’?

The
Ordinance also empowers the Government to appoint an administrator for the
management of the confiscated properties and he has powers to sell them as
being unencumbered properties. This is another drastic step since a person’s
properties would be confiscated and sold without him being convicted of an
offence. A mere declaration of an individual as a Fugitive Economic Offender
could lead to his properties being confiscated and sold? What about charges
which banks/Financial Institutions may have on these properties? Would these
lapse? These are open issues on which currently there is no clarity. It is
advisable that the Government thinks through them rather than rushing in with
an Ordinance and then have it struck down on various grounds!

An
addition in the Ordinance as compared to the Bill is that no Civil Court has
jurisdiction to entertain any suit in respect of any matter which the Special
Court is empowered to determine and no injunction shall be granted by any Court
in respect of any action taken in pursuance of any power conferred by the
Ordinance.

Onus of Proof

The onus
of proving that an individual is a Fugitive Economic Offender lies on the
Enforcement Directorate. However, the onus of proving that a person is a
purchaser in good faith without notice of the proceeds of crime lies on the
person so making a claim. 

Epilogue

This
Ordinance together with the Prohibition of Benami Transactions Act, 1988; the
Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 and the Black Money(Undisclosed
Foreign Income and Assets) and Imposition of Tax Act, 2015 forms a
four-dimensional strategy on the part of the Government to prevent wilful
economic offenders from fleeing the country and for confiscating their
properties. Having said that, there are many unanswered questions which the
Ordinance raises:

 (a) Whether a mere declaration of an individual as
a Fugitive Economic Offender by a Court would achieve the purpose– Is it not
similar to bolting the stable after the horse has eloped?

 (b) How easy is it going to be for the Government
to attach properties in foreign jurisdictions?

 (c) Would a mere Letter of Request from a Special
Court be enough for a foreign Court / Authority to permit India to confiscate
properties in foreign jurisdictions?

 (d) Would not the foreign Court like to hear
whether due process of law has been followed or would it merely take off from
where the Indian Court has left?

 (e) The provision of attachment of property is
common to the Ordinance, the Prohibition of Benami Transactions Act, 1988, and
the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002. In several cases, all three
statutes may apply. In such a scenario, who gets priority for attachment? 

These and several unanswered questions
seem to create a fog of uncertainty. Maybe with the passage of time many of
these doubts would get cleared. Till such time, let us all hope that the
Ordinance is able to achieve its stated purpose of deterring economic offenders
from fleeing the Country and create a Ghar Vapsi for them…!!

Money Laundering Law: Dicey Issues

INTRODUCTION

United Nations General Assembly held a special
session in June 1998. At that session, a Political Declaration was adopted
which required the Member States to adopt national money-laundering
legislation.

On 17th January, 2001, the President
of India gave his assent to The Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002
(“PMLA”). Enactment of PMLA is, thus, rooted in the U.N. Political Declaration.


EVOLUTION OF LAW


The preamble to PMLA shows that it is an “Act
to prevent money-laundering and to provide for confiscation of property derived
from, or involved in, money-laundering and for matters connected therewith or
incidental thereto”.


After PMLA was enacted, the Government had to
deal with various issues not adequately addressed by the existing legal
framework. Accordingly, the Government modified the legal framework from time
to time by amendments to PMLA. The amendments made in 2005, 2009, 2013 and 2016
helped the Government to address various such issues which were reflected in
the Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to each amendment.


JUDICIAL REVIEW


In addition to the issues addressed by the
amendments to PMLA, many more issues came up for judicial review before Courts.
The Supreme Court and various High Courts critically examined such further
issues and gave their considered view in respect of such issues.

In this article, the author has dealt with the
following dicey issues and explained the rationale underlying the conclusion
reached by the Court.


1)  Does
possession of demonetised currency notes constitute offence of
money-laundering?

2)  Whether
a chartered accountant is liable for punishment under PMLA?

3)  Doctrine
of double jeopardy – whether applicable to PMLA?

4)  Right
of cross-examination of witness.

5)  Whether
the arrest under PMLA depends on whether the offence is cognisable?

6)  Whether
the arrest under PMLA requires the officer to follow CrPC procedure?
(Registering FIR, etc.)

7)  How
soon to communicate grounds of arrest?


1) Does possession of demonetised currency notes
constitute offence of money-laundering?


This issue was examined by the Supreme Court in a
recent decision
[1] in the
light of the following facts.


In November 2016, the Government announced
demonetisation of 1000 and 500 rupee notes. The petitioner conspired with a
bank manager and a chartered accountant (CA) to convert black money in old
currency notes into new currency notes. In such conspiracy, the CA acted as
middleman by arranging clients wanting to convert their black money. The CA
gave commission to the petitioner on such transactions.


The petitioner opened bank accounts in names of
different companies by presenting forged documents and deposited Rs. 25 crore
after demonetisation.      


Statements of 26 witnesses were recorded.
However, the petitioner refused to reveal the source of the demonetised and new
currency notes found in his premises.


The abovementioned facts were viewed in the light
of the relevant provisions of PMLA and thereupon, the Supreme Court explained
the following legal position applicable to these facts.


Possession of demonetised currency was only a
facet of unaccounted money. Thus, the concealment, possession, acquisition or
use of the currency notes by projecting or claiming it as untainted property
and converting the same by bank drafts constituted criminal activity relating
to a scheduled offence. By their nature, the activities of the petitioner were
criminal activities. Accordingly, the activity of the petitioner was replete
with mens rea. Being a case of money-laundering, the same would fall
within the parameters of section 3 [The offence of money-laundering] and was
punishable u/s. 4 [Punishment for money-laundering].


The petitioner’s reluctance in disclosing the
source of demonetised currency and the new currency coupled with the statements
of 26 witnesses/petitioner made out a formidable case showing the involvement
of the petitioner in the offence of money-laundering.


The volume of demonetised currency and the new
currency notes for huge amount recovered from the office and residence of the
petitioner and the bank drafts in favour of fictitious persons, showed that the
same were outcome of the process or activity connected with the proceeds of
crime sought to be projected as untainted property.


The activities of the petitioner caused huge
monetary loss to the Government by committing offences under various sections
of IPC. The offences were covered in paragraph 1 in Part A of the Schedule in
PMLA [sections 120B, 420, 467 and 471 of IPC].


On the basis of the abovementioned legal
position, the Supreme Court held that the property derived or obtained by the
petitioner was the result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence.


The possession of such huge quantum of
demonetised currency and new currency in the form of Rs. 2000 notes remained
unexplained as the petitioner did not disclose their source and the purpose for
which the same was received by him. This led to the petitioner’s failure to
dispel the legal presumption that he was involved in money-laundering and the
currencies found were proceeds of crime.


2) WHETHER A CHARTERED ACCOUNTANT IS LIABLE TO
PUNISHMENT UNDER PMLA?


A chartered account can act as authorised
representative to present his client’s case u/s. 39 of PMLA.


In the event of the client facing charge under
PMLA, can his chartered account be also proceeded against and punished under
PMLA?


This topical issue was examined by the Supreme
Court in the undernoted decision
[2].


In this case, CBI was investigating the charge of
corruption on mammoth scale by a Chief Minister which had benefitted his son –
an M. P. When CBI sought custody of the respondent chartered accountant, he
contended that he was merely a chartered accountant who had rendered nothing
more than professional service.


The Supreme Court rejected such contention having
regard to serious allegations against the chartered accountant and his nexus
with the main accused. The Supreme Court gave weight to the CBI’s allegation
that the chartered accountant was the brain behind the alleged economic offence
of huge magnitude. The bail granted to the chartered accountant by the Special
Court and the High Court was cancelled by the Supreme Court.


The ratio of this decision may be used by
CBI/Enforcement Directorate to rope in chartered accountants for their role in
the cases involving bank frauds and transactions which are economic offences
which are recently in the news.


3) DOCTRINE OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY- WHETHER
APPLICABLE TO PMLA


When a person facing criminal charge in a trial
is summoned under PMLA, can he raise the plea of double jeopardy in terms of
Article 20(2) of the Constitution?


This issue was examined by the Madras High Court
in the undernoted decision
[3].

In this case, the charge-sheet was filed by
police to investigate the offences of cheating punishable under sections
419-420 of the Indian Penal Code. Under PMLA, these offences are
regarded as “scheduled offences”.


When summon under PMLA was issued to the
petitioner, she pleaded that the summon cannot be issued to her. According to
her, the summon was hit by double jeopardy as police had already filed
charge-sheet alleging the offence under the Indian Penal Code.


It was held by the Madras High Court that
issuance of summon under PMLA was merely for preliminary investigation to trace
proceeds of crime which did not amount to trying a criminal case. Hence, there
was no double jeopardy as envisaged under Article 20(2) of the Constitution.


 The plea of double jeopardy was also raised in
another case
[4].


In this case, the petitioner was acquitted from
criminal charges under the Indian Penal Code. After such acquittal,
however, the proceedings under PMLA continued. Hence, the petitioner claimed
the benefit of double jeopardy on the ground that the proceedings under PMLA
regarding seized properties cannot be allowed to continue after his acquittal
from criminal charges under the Indian Penal Code.


The Orissa High Court held that even when the
accused was acquitted from the charges framed in the Sessions trial, a
proceeding under PMLA cannot amount to double jeopardy since the procedure and
the nature of onus under PMLA are totally different.


4)  RIGHT
OF CROSS-EXAMINATION OF WITNESS


Whether, at the stage when a person is asked to
show cause why the properties provisionally attached should not be declared
property involved in money-laundering, can he claim the right of
cross-examining a witness whose statement is relied on in issuing the
show-cause notice?


This was the issue before the Delhi High Court in
the under mentioned case
[5].


The Delhi High Court observed that, prior to
passing of the Adjudication Order u/s. 8 of PMLA, it cannot be presumed that
the Adjudicating Authority will rely on the statement of the witness sought to
be cross-examined by the petitioner. On this ground, it was held that the
noticee did not have the right to cross-examine the witness at the stage when
he merely received the show-cause notice.


5)  WHETHER
THE ARREST UNDER PMLA DEPENDS ON WHETHER THE OFFENCE IS COGNISABLE


 The Bombay High Court has discussed this issue in
the undernoted decision
[6].


The Court referred to the definition of ‘cognisable
offence
‘ in section 2(c) of CrPC and observed that if the offence falls
under the First Schedule of CrPC or under any other law for the time being in
force, the Police Officer may arrest the person without warrant. The Court also
referred to the following classification of the offences under the ‘First Schedule’
of CrPC.


‘cognisable’ or ‘non-cognisable’;

bailable or non-bailable

triable by a particular Court.


Under Part II of the First Schedule of CrPC,
[‘Classification of Offences under Other Laws’], it is provided that ‘offences
punishable with imprisonment for more than three years would be cognisable and
non-bailable’.


The punishment u/s. 4 for the offence of
money-laundering is described in section 3. The punishment is by way of
imprisonment for more than three years and which may extend up to seven years
or even upto ten years. Therefore, in terms of Part II of the First Schedule of
CrPC, such offence would be cognisable and non-bailable. 


In the opinion of the Bombay High Court,[7] however,
for arresting a person, the debate whether the offences under PMLA are
cognisable or non-cognisable is not relevant.


The Court explained that section 19 of PMLA
confers specific power to arrest any personif three conditions specified in
section 19 existde hors the classification of offence as cognisable.


According to section 19, the following three
conditions need to exist for arresting a person.


Firstly, the authorised officer has the reason to believe
that a person is guilty of the offence punishable under PMLA.


Secondly, such reason to believe is based on the material
in possession of the officer.


Finally, the reason for such belief is recorded in
writing.


Section 19 nowhere provides that only when the
offence committed by the person is cognisable, such person can be arrested.


6) WHETHER THE ARREST UNDER PMLA REQUIRES THE
OFFICER TO FOLLOW C
RPC PROCEDURE (REGISTERING FIR, ETC.)?


Section 19 of PMLA does not contemplate the
following steps before arresting the accused in respect of the offence
punishable under PMLA.


registration of FIR on receipt of information relating to cognisable offence.

obtaining permission of the Magistrate in case of non-cognisable offence.


 According to the Court[8], when
there are no such restrictions on the ‘power to arrest’ u/s. 19 it does not
stand to reason that in addition to the procedure laid down in PMLA, the
officer authorised to arrest the accused under PMLA be required to follow the
procedure laid down in CrPC (viz., registering FIR or seeking Court’s
permission in respect of non-cognisable offence) for arrest of the accused.


The Court observed that if the provisions of
Chapter XII of CrPC (regarding registration of FIR and Magistrate’s permission)
are to be read in respect of the offences under PMLA, section 19 of PMLA would
be rendered nugatory. According to the Court, such cannot be the intention of
the Legislature. Thus, a special provision in PMLA cannot be rendered nugatory
or infructuous by interpretation not warranted by the Legislature.


7)  HOW
SOON TO COMMUNICATE THE GROUNDS OF ARREST?


Whether the grounds of arrest must be informed or
supplied to the arrested person immediately or “as soon as possible” and
whether the same must be communicated in writing or orally.


The Bombay High Court[9] addressed
this issue as follows.


Section 19(1) of PMLA does not provide that the
grounds of arrest must be immediately informed to the arrested person. The use
of the expression ‘as soon as may be‘ in section 19 suggests that the
grounds of arrest need not be supplied at the very time of arrest or
immediately on arrest. Indeed, the same should be supplied as soon as may be.


The Court observed that if the intention of the
Legislature was that the grounds of arrest must be mentioned in the Arrest
Order itself and that, too, in writing, the Legislature would have made clear
provision to that effect by using the word ‘immediately’ or ‘at the time of
arrest’. According to the Court, the fact that the Legislature has not done so
and instead, used the words ‘as soon as may be‘, is clear indication
that there is no statutory requirement that the grounds of arrest should be
communicated in writing and that also at the time of arrest or immediately
after the arrest. The use of the words ‘as soon as may be‘ implies that
the grounds of arrest should be communicated at the earliest.


SUMMATION


All the aforementioned dicey issues considered by
the Supreme Court and High Courts have significant relevance to chartered
accountants in practice while advising their clients on the matters concerning
PMLA.


As discussed in the Supreme Court’s decision in
the case of Vijay Sai Reddy
[10], there is always a possibility that
the bail initially given to the chartered accountant by the Special Court or
High Court may be cancelled by the Supreme Court.


Hence, it is important for chartered accountants
to take a conservative view while giving their professional advice or view.
They must keep abreast of the important issues discussed in this article which
would enable them to give proper advice to their clients.

 


[1] Rohit Tandon vs. ED
[2018] 145 SCL 1 (SC

[2] CBI vs. Vijay Sai Reddy (2013) 7SCC 452

[3] M.Shobana vs. Asst
Director (2013) 4 MLJ (Cr.) 286

[4] Smt. Janata Jha vs.
Asst Director (2014) CrLJ2556 (Orri)

[5] Arun Kumar Mishra
vs. Union (2014) 208 DLT 56

[6]Chhagan Chandrakant Bhujbal vs. Union
[2017] 140 SCL 40 (Bom)

[7] Chhagan Chandrakant Bhujbal vs. Union [2017] 140 SCL 40 (Bom)

[8] Chhagan Chandrakant Bhujbal vs. Union [2017] 140 SCL 40 (Bom)

[9] Chhagan Chandrakant Bhujbal vs. Union [2017] 140 SCL 40 (Bom)

[10] CBI vs. Vijay Sai
Reddy (2013) 7 SCC 452

Daughter’s Right In Coparcenary – V

The Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (“the Act”)
was amended by the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 (“the Amending Act”)
with effect from 9th September 2005, whereby the law recognised the
right of a daughter in coparcenary. Unfortunately, the amended provisions of
section 6 of the Act has caused a lot of confusion and resulted in litigation
all over the country. My articles in BCAJ published in January 2009, May 2010,
November 2011 and February 2016 have made some attempt to analyse and explain
the legal position as per the decided case law.

When my last article was published in BCAJ
in February 2016, it was safe to assume that in view of the then latest Supreme
Court decision in the case of Prakash and others vs. Phulavati and others (now
reported in (2016) 2 SCC 36) the law was finally settled and there would be no
need for any further discussion on the subject. However, Supreme Court is
supreme. Its latest decision in case of Danamma vs. Amar (not yet
reported) has not only prompted me to write this fifth article on the subject,
but may also open floodgates of new controversy for further litigation on the
issue all over the country.

Sub-section (1) of section 6 of the Amendment
Act inter alia provides that on and from the commencement of the
Amendment Act, the daughter of a coparcener shall, by birth become a coparcener
in her own right in the same manner as the son; have the same rights in the
coparcenary property as she would have had if she had been a son; and be
subject to the same liabilities in respect of the said coparcenary property as
that of a son.

The aforesaid recent decision seems to be
contrary to the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court. With a view to understand
the issue, it may be necessary to consider the earlier case law although some
of it was already a part of my earlier articles.

The Supreme Court in the case of Sheela
Devi vs. Lal Chand [(2006), 8 SCC 581]
has clearly observed that the
Amendment Act would have no application in a case where succession was opened
in 1989, when the father had passed away. In the case of Eramma vs.
Veerupana (AIR 1966 SC 1880),
the Supreme Court has held that the
succession is considered to have opened on death of a person. Following that
principle in the case of Sheela Devi cited above, the father passed away in
1989 and it was held that the Amendment Act which came into force in September
2005 would have no application.

The same issue was considered by the Madras
High Court in the case of Bhagirathi vs. S. Manvanan. (AIR 2008 Madras 250)
and held that ‘a careful reading of section 6(1) read with section 6(3) of the
Hindu Succession Amendment Act clearly indicates that a daughter can be
considered as a coparcener only if, her father was a coparcener at the time of
coming into force of the amended provision.’

Para 14 of the said judgement reads as
under:-

“In the present case, admittedly the father
of the present petitioners had expired in 1975. Section 6(1) of the Act is
prospective in the sense that a daughter is being treated as coparcener on and
from the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005. If such
provision is read along with S. 6(3), it becomes clear that if a Hindu dies
after commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, his interest
in the property shall devolve not by survivorship but by intestate succession
as contemplated in the Act.”

In the said case, the Hon’ble Court relied
upon its earlier decision in the case of Sundarambal vs. Deivanaayagam
(1991(2) MLJ 199).
While interpreting almost a similar provision, as
contained in section 29-A of the Hindu Succession Act, as introduced by the
Tamil Nadu Amendment Act 1 of 1990 where the Learned Single Judge had observed
as under:-

“Under sub-clause (1), the daughter of a
coparcener shall become a coparcener in her own right by birth, thus enabling
all daughters of the coparcener who were born even prior to 25th
March, 1989 to become coparceners. In other words, if a male Hindu has a
daughter born on any date prior to 25th March, 1989, she would also
be a coparcener with him in the joint family when the amendment came into
force. But the necessary requisite is, the male Hindu should have been alive on
the date of the coming into force of the Amended Act. The Section only makes a
daughter a coparcener and not a sister. If a male Hindu had died before 25th
March, 1989 leaving coparcenary property, then his daughter cannot claim to be
a coparcener in the same manner as a son, as, on the date on which the Act came
into force, her father was not alive. She had the status only as a sister vis-a-vis
her brother and not a daughter on the date of the coming into force of the
Amendment Act …”.

The Madras High Court had occasion to
consider the similar issue in the case of Valliammal vs. Muniyappan (2008
(4) CTC 773)
where the Court has observed as under:-

“6. In the plaint, it is stated that the
father of the plaintiffs died about thirty years prior to the filing of the
suit. The second plaintiff as P.W.1 has deposed that their father died in the
year 1968. The Amendment Act 39 of 2005 amending S. 6 of the Hindu Succession
Act, 1956 came into force on 9-9-2005 and it conferred right upon female heirs
in relation to the joint family property. The contention put forth by the
learned Counsel for the appellant is that the said Amendment came into force
pending disposal of the suit and hence the plaintiffs are entitled to the
benefits conferred by the Amending Act.

The Amending Act declared that the daughter
of the coparcener shall have the same rights in the coparcenary property as she
would have had if she had been a son. In other words, the daughter of a
coparcener in her own right has become a coparcener in the same manner as the
son insofar as the rights in the coparcenary property are concerned. The
question is as to when the succession opened insofar as the present suit
properties are concerned. As already seen, the father of the Plaintiffs died in
the year 1968 and on the date of his death, the succession had opened to the
properties in question.  In fact, the
Supreme Court itself in the case of Sheela Devi vs. Lal Chand has
considered the above question and has laid down the law as follows:-

19.
The Act indisputably would prevail over the old Hindu Law. We may notice that
the Parliament, with a view to confer the right upon the female heirs, even in
relation to the joint family property, enacted the Hindu Succession Act, 2005.
Such a provision was enacted as far back in 1987 by the State of Andhra
Pradesh. The succession having opened in 1989, evidently, the provisions of
Amendment Act, 2005 would have no application.

In view of the above statement of law by the
Apex Court, the contention of the appellant is devoid of merit. The succession
having opened in the year 1968, the Amendment Act 39 of 2005 would have no
application to the facts of the present case.”

Even in the case of Prakash vs. Phulavati
cited above which was decided in 2016, the Supreme Court has held that
“the rights under the Amendment Act are applicable to living daughters of
living coparceners as on 9.9.2005 irrespective of when such daughters are
born”.

Thus, there is a plethora of cases deciding
that the father of the claiming daughter should be alive if the daughter makes
a claim in the coparcenary property. Moreover, it is necessary that the male
Hindu should have been alive on the date of coming into force of the Amended
Act.

With a view to understand the problem, it is
necessary to consider the facts leading to Danamma judgement. Danamma and her
sister, who were the appellants before the Supreme Court, were daughters of
Gurulingappa. Apart from these two daughters, Gurulingappa had two sons Arun
and Vijay. Gurulingappa died in 2001 leaving behind two daughters, two sons and
his widow. After his death Amar, son of Arun, filed a suit for partition. The
trial court denied the shares of the daughters. Aggrieved by the said
judgement, the daughters appealed to the High Court but the High Court
dismissed the appeal. The Supreme Court held in favour of the daughters giving
each of them shares equal to the sons. Paras 24 and 28 (part) read as follows:-

“24. Section 6, as amended, stipulates that
on and from the commencement of the amended Act, 2005, the daughter of a
coparcener shall by birth become a coparcener in her own right in the same
manner as the son. It is apparent that the status conferred upon sons under the
old section and the old Hindu Law was to treat them as coparceners since birth.
The amended provision now statutorily recognizes the rights of coparceners of
daughters as well since birth. The section uses the words in the same manner as
the son. It should therefore be apparent that both the sons and the daughters
of a coparcener have been conferred the right of becoming coparceners by birth.
It is very factum of birth in a coparcenary that creates the
coparcenary, therefore, the sons and daughters of a coparcener become
coparceners by virtue of birth. Devolution of a coparcenary property is the
later stage of and a consequence of death of a coparcener. The first stage of a
coparcenary is obviously its creation as explained above, and as is well
recognised. One of the incidents of coparcenary is the right of a coparcener to
seek a severance of status. Hence, the rights of coparceners emanate and flow
from birth (now including daughters) as is evident from sub-s (1)(a) and (b).”

“28. On facts, there is no dispute that the
property which was the subject matter of partition suit belongs to joint family
and Gurulingappa Savadi was propositus of the said joint family
property. In view of our aforesaid discussion, in the said partition suit,
share will devolve upon the appellants as well. …”

It is apparent that Gurulingappa had died in
the year 2001 i.e. before the Amendment Act came into force and the succession
opened before coming into force of the Amendment Act. That being so, if we
apply the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Sheela Devi’s case, the
daughter would not have any claim or share. The earlier case law (including
Supreme Court) contemplates that the male Hindu (in whose estate the daughter
is making a claim) should have been alive on the date of coming into force of
the Amendment Act. While in the present case, Gurulingappa had died before the
Amendment Act came into force. However, in that case the Supreme Court had no
occasion to consider its own earlier decision in case of Sheela Devi cited
above.

It is submitted
that Sheela Devi’s case was well considered and had settled the issue.
Therefore, the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Danamma’s case can
result in further litigation and court cases. I can only end with a fervent
hope that the Apex Court will review its decision in Danamma’s case so that the
apparent conflict is resolved without resulting in further litigation.

Voluntary Revision Of The Financial Statements

Background

With respect to voluntary
revision of financial statements, following is the provision of The Companies
Act, 2013 (as amended). 


131.(1)
If it appears to the directors of a company that— (a) the financial statement
of the company; or (b) the report of the Board, do not comply with the
provisions of section 129 or section 134, they may prepare revised financial
statement or a revised report in respect of any of the three preceding
financial years after obtaining approval of the Tribunal on an application made
by the company in such form and manner as may be prescribed and a copy of the
order passed by the Tribunal shall be filed with the Registrar…….


The MCA notified section
131 of the Act dealing with voluntary revision of financial statements on 1
June 2016 and the section is applicable from the notification date. In
accordance with the section, if it appears to the directors of a company that
its financial statement or the board report do not comply with the requirements
of section 129 (dealing with preparation of financial statements, including
compliance with accounting standards) or section 134 (dealing with aspects such
as signing of financial statements and preparation of the board report), then
directors may prepare revised financial statements or a revised report for any
of the three preceding financial years after obtaining the National Company Law
Tribunal (NCLT) approval. The section and related rules prescribe the procedure
to be followed in such cases. The procedure include:


The company will make an application to the NCLT in prescribed
manner.

Before passing any orders for revision, the NCLT will notify the
Central Government and the Income tax authorities and will consider
representations received, if any.

The company will file a copy of the NCLT order with the
Registrar.

 –  Detailed reasons for revision of financial statements or report
will also be disclosed in the board’s report in the relevant financial year in which such revision is being made.


Ind AS 1 Presentation of
financial statement and Ind AS 8 Accounting Policies, Changes in Accounting Estimates and Errors


A company may decide to
change one or more accounting policies followed in the preparation of financial
statements or change classification of certain items or correct an error in
previously issued financial statements. In these cases, Ind AS 8/ 1 requires
that comparative amounts appearing in the current period financial statements
should be restated.


In the case of an error,
there may be rare circumstances when the impact of error in financial
statements is so overwhelming that they may become completely unreliable. In
such cases, the company may need to withdraw the issued financial statements
and reissue the same after correction. The auditor may also choose to withdraw
their audit report. However, in majority of cases, the impact of error will not
be so overwhelming requiring withdrawal of already issued financial statements.
Rather, the company will correct the error in subsequent financial statements.
Ind AS 8 requires that comparative information presented in subsequent
financial statements will not be the same as originally published. Those
numbers will be restated/ updated to give effect to the correction of the
error. Similar treatment applies for change in accounting policy or
reclassification. The subsequent financial statements in which correction is
made will also include appropriate disclosures to explain impact of the
changes.


Issue


Whether restatement of
comparative amounts in subsequent financial statements is tantamount to
revision of financial statements? Consequently, whether such restatement will
trigger compliance with section 131 of the Act?


Author’s View


Section 131 of the Act is
triggered only in cases where the company needs to withdraw previously issued
financial statements and re-issue the same. For example, this will be required
when the impact of error on previously issued financial statements is so
overwhelming that they have become completely unreliable.


Section 131 will not be
triggered in cases related to restatement of comparative information appearing
in the current period financial statements. This view can be supported by the
following key arguments:


Restatement of comparative information appearing in subsequent financial
statements is not tantamount to change or revision or reissuance of
previously issued financial statements. If one reads section 131 carefully, it
is about preparing (and consequently reissuing) revised financial statements,
at the behest of the board of directors. It cannot be equated to restating
comparative numbers for errors or changes in accounting policies where there is
no revision or reissuance of already issued financial statements. There
is a change in the comparative numbers in subsequent financial statements; but
there is no revision or reissuance of already issued financial
statements.


Section 131 can be triggered only if
the previously issued financial statements were not in compliance with section
129. In the case of a change in accounting policy or reclassification, there
was no such non-compliance in previously issued financial statements. Hence,
section 131 does not apply. The Ind AS 8 requirement to restate an error in
subsequent financial statements is the same as change in accounting
policy/reclassification. Hence, section 131 should apply in the same manner for
correction of errors as well.

9 Section 9 of the Act; Article 12 of India-Singapore DTAA – Amounts paid to a Singapore company for providing global support services were not FTS in terms of Article 12(4)(b) of India-Singapore DTAA since no technical knowledge, experience, skill, know-how, or process was made available which enabled Taxpayer to apply technology on its own.

[2018] 92 taxmann.com 5 (Mumbai – Trib.)

Exxon Mobil Company India (P.) Ltd. vs. ACIT

I.T.A. NO. 6708 (MUM.) OF 2011

A.Y.: 2007-08

Date of Order: 21st February 2018


Facts


The Taxpayer was an Indian member-company of a global group. The
Taxpayer had an affiliate company in Singapore (“Sing Co”), which was providing
global support services to the group member-companies. During the relevant
year, the Taxpayer had made two kinds of payments to Sing Co. One, payment for
Global Information Services and two, global support service fee. Global support
service included management consulting, functional advice, administrative,
technical, professional and other support services.


The Taxpayer treated the first kind of payment as royalty and withheld
tax accordingly. The Taxpayer did not withheld tax from global support service
fee on the footing that Sing Co did not have a PE in India and since the
services were rendered outside India, the payment cannot be considered as
income deemed to accrue or arising in India u/s. 9(1)(i) of the Act.


The Taxpayer submitted that the payment made to Sing Co could not be
considered fees for technical services (“FTS”) and brought within the ambit of
section 9(1)(vii) of the Act. Further, under India-Singapore DTAA only payment
for services which result in transfer of technology could be considered FTS.


The AO observed that the payment made by the Taxpayer was in the nature
of FTS as defined in Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vii) of the Act since Sing
Co had rendered services which were highly technical in nature and involved
drawing and research. Further, since Sing Co had earned such fees because of
its business connection in India, it was liable to be taxed in India. Hence,
the Taxpayer was required to withhold the tax.


The DRP confirmed the disallowance made by the AO.


Held


   The limited question was whether the payment
made was FTS in terms of Article 12 of India-Singapore DTAA.


  The AO treated the payment made as FTS on the
footing that Sing Co had ‘made available’ managerial and technical services to
the Taxpayer.

   The expression “make available
also appears in Article 12(4)(b) of India-USA DTAA. It means that the recipient
of such service is enabled to apply or make use of the technical knowledge,
knowhow, etc., by himself and without recourse to the service provider.
Thus, “make available” envisages some sort of durability or
permanency of the result of the rendering of services.


   In CIT vs. De Beers India Mineral (P.)
Ltd. [2012] 346 ITR 467 (Kar.)
, Karnataka High Court has observed that
“make available” would mean that recipient of the service is in a
position to derive an enduring benefit out of utilisation of the knowledge or
knowhow on his own in future and enabled to apply it without the aid of the
service provider. The payment can be considered as FTS only if the twin test of
rendering service and making technical knowledge available at the same time is
satisfied.


   The agreement between the Taxpayer and Sing
Co had clearly mentioned provision of management consulting, functional advice,
administrative, technical, professional and other support services. There was
nothing in the agreement to conclude that by providing such services, Sing Co
had ‘made available’ any technical knowledge experience, skill, knowhow, or
process which enabled the Taxpayer to apply the technology contained therein on
its own in future without the aid of Sing Co.


  Accordingly, applying the aforesaid twin
tests laid down by Karnataka High Court to the facts of the present case, it cannot be said that the payment made by the Taxpayer was FTSs defined in Article 12(4)(b) of India-Singapore DTAA.
 

 

 

8 Sections – 9(1)(vi)(b), 40(a)(i), 195 of the Act – Royalty paid by an American company tax resident in India to a non-resident company for IPRs which were used for manufacturing products in India was taxable in India even if products were entirely sold outside India.

Dorf Ketal Chemicals LLC vs. DCIT

ITA NO. 4819/Mum/2013

A.Ys.: 2009-10

Date of Order: 22nd March 2018


Facts       


The Taxpayer was a LLC incorporated in, and tax resident of USA. It was
engaged in the business of trading of specialty chemicals. The Taxpayer was
100% subsidiary of an Indian company (“Hold Co”). The Taxpayer was also treated
as a tax resident of India since its control and management was situated in
India and was filing returns of its income in India as a resident company.
Thus, it was assessed to tax both in USA and India.


The Taxpayer had acquired certain patents and copyrights from an
American company for which it paid royalty computed as a fixed percentage of
sales in USA. The Taxpayer had certain customers in USA. The Taxpayer got the
products manufactured from Hold Co which were sold only in USA, and not in
India. According to the Taxpayer since the royalty was paid to an American
company (“USA Co”) for business carried out in USA, it was not required to
withhold tax from the royalty.


Hold Co had full and unconditional access to technical know-how and
information regarding manufacturing procedure and technology, which was used
for the purpose of manufacture in India. Hence, the AO held that in terms of
section 9(1)(vi) of the Act, the payment of royalty by the Taxpayer to USA Co
constitutes chargeable income, on which, tax was required to be withheld u/s
195 of the Act. Since the Taxpayer had not withheld tax, the AO invoked section
40(a)(i) and disallowed the royalty.


On appeal, the CIT(A) confirmed the order of the AO.


Held:


   The relationship between the Taxpayer and the
holding company was not merely that of a contract manufacturer. The IPRs were
utilised for manufacturing in India. Export to USA was in conjunction with this
activity and was not isolated. Hence, the CIT(A) was correct that Taxpayer
merely carried out marketing of the products which are exported by it.
Therefore, there was a business connection with India. Further, Hold Co was a
guarantor under the agreement between the Taxpayer and USA Co.


  Services were rendered in India as well as
utilised in India. Accordingly, the payment did not fall under the exception in
section 9(1)(vi)(b) of the Act. Hence, the CIT(A) was correct in disallowing
royalty paid in terms of section 40(a)(i) of the Act.


  The decision of the Supreme Court in
Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries Ltd.1 and that of Madras High
Court in the case of Aktiengesellschaft Kuhnle Kopp and Kausch2  were distinguishable on the facts of this
case.


 ___________________________________________________

1   DIT
v. Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries Ltd. [2007] 158 Taxman 259 (SC)

2     CIT v. Aktiengesellschaft Kuhnle Kopp
and Kausch [2003] 262 ITR 513 (Mad)

 

7 Section 9(1)(vi) of the Act – Domain being similar to trademark, the receipts for domain registration services were in the nature of royalty within the meaning of section 9(1) (vi) of the Act, read with Explanation 2(iii) thereto

Godaddy.com LLC vs. ACIT

ITA No 1878/Del/2017

A.Y: 2013-14

Date of Order: 3rd April 2018


Facts


The Taxpayer was a LLC in USA. However, it was not a tax resident of
USA. It was engaged in the businesses of an accredited domain name registrar
and providing web hosting services. During the relevant year, the Taxpayer had
two streams of income. First, receipts from web hosting services/on demand
sale. Second, receipts from domain registration services.


The Taxpayer had contended that: domain registration services were
provided from outside India; the business operations were undertaken from
outside India; none of its employees had visited India for this purpose; the
Taxpayer did not have any fixed business presence in India in the form of any
branch/liaison office; and the Taxpayer merely facilitated in getting domain
registered in the name of the customer who paid the consideration for availing
such services. Accordingly, the receipts in respect of domain name registration
were not in the nature of royalty as defined in Explanation 2 to section
9(1)(vi) of the Act. In support of its contention, the Taxpayer relied on the
decisions of Delhi High Court in Asia Satellite Telecommunications Co. Ltd
vs. DIT [2011] 197 Taxman 263 (Delhi)
and of AAR in Dell International
Services (India) Private Limited [2008] 218 CTR 209 (AAR).


On appeal, DRP upheld the finding of the AO.


Held

   The limited question was whether the domain
registration fee received by the Taxpayer was in the nature of royalty.


  While the facts in Asia Satellite
Telecommunications Co. Ltd. were totally different, in Satyam Infoway Ltd.
vs. Siffynet Solutions Pvt. Ltd. [2004] Supp (2) SCR 465 (SC)
, the Supreme
Court held that the domain name is a valuable commercial right, which has all
the characteristics of a trademark. Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that
the domain name was subject to legal norms applicable to trademark. In Rediff
Communications Ltd vs. Cyberbooth AIR 2000 Bombay 27
, Bombay High Court
held that domain name being more than an address, was entitled to protection as
trademark.


  It follows from the aforementioned decisions
that domain registration services are similar to services in connection with
the use of an intangible property similar to trademark. Therefore, the receipts
of the Taxpayer for domain registration services were in the nature of royalty
within the meaning of section 9(1) (vi) of the Act, read with Explanation
2(iii) thereto.


Note: In terms of Explanation 2(iii) to
section 9(1)(vi) of the Act, “royalty means consideration
for the use of any patent
, invention, model, design, secret formula or
process or trade mark or similar property”.
The decision does not make it clear how mere domain registration services
result in “use of … … trademark or similar property.

6 Ss. Section 9 of the Act; Article 16 of India-USA DTAA; Article 15 of India-Germany DTAA – Employees deputed to Germany and USA for rendering services abroad being non-residents, salary would accrue to them in respective foreign countries during period of deputation and would not be liable to tax in India

[2018] 91 taxmann.com 473 (AAR – New Delhi)

Hewlett Packard India Software Operation
(P.) Ltd., In re

A.A.R. NO. 1217 OF 2011

Date of Order: 29th January 2018


Section 9 of the Act; Article 25 India-USA
DTAA; Article 23 of India-Germany DTAA – On return to India when employees
become residents, the payment to be made being in nature of salaries, section
192(2) would apply subject to credit for taxes deducted during their deputation
outside India


Facts


The Applicant was incorporated in India and was engaged in the business
of software development and IT Enabled Services. The Applicant had sent one
each of its employees on deputation to USA and Germany, respectively.


During the deputation period, though the employees would render services
in the respective country of deputation, they would continue to be on the
payrolls of Applicant. They would regularly receive salaries in India from the
Applicant and certain allowances in the respective country of deputation to
meet local living expenses.


While on deputation, the employees would be non-residents in India
during one financial year. In the year of their return after completion of assignment,
they would be Resident and Ordinarily Resident (ROR).


The Applicant sought ruling on the following questions.


   Whether salary paid by the Applicant to the
employees was liable to be taxed in India having regard to provisions of the
Act and the DTAA?


   Whether the Applicant can take credit for
taxes paid abroad in terms of Article 25 of India-USA DTAA and Article 23 of India-Germany
DTAA while discharging its tax withholding obligations u/s. 192?


Held – 1


  The employees would render services in
USA/Germany and would be non-residents for tax purposes during one financial
year.


   As per section 4 of the Act, tax is chargeable
in accordance with, and subject to, the provisions of the Act in respect of the
total income of the previous year of every person. Section 5(2) deals with
income of non-residents. Section 5(2) is ‘Subject to the provisions of this
Act’, which brings Chapter IV (computation of total income) into play. In
Chapter IV, section 15 deals with the head ‘Salaries’. Thus, chargeability to
tax under the head ‘Salaries’ arises under section 5(2), read with section 15.
Merely because section 5(2) is the charging section, income that the employees
would receive in India should not be taxed in India.


 –   The income accrues where the services are
rendered. Though the employees are covered in section 15(a), being
non-residents, and since they would be rendering services in USA/Germany, the
salary would accrue to them in USA/Germany. Merely because the
employer-employee relationship would exist in India, and they would be paid in
India, they could not be taxed in India. Hence, the income would not be
chargeable to tax in India. This view is supported by the Explanation to
section 9(1)(ii) of the Act.


   An employer is required to deduct tax from
salary payable to an employee but only if the employee is liable to pay tax on
salary. In case of the employees, since the salary would accrue to them outside
India, the Applicant would not be required to withhold tax u/s. 192 of the Act
at the time of payment.


Held – 2


  The employees would be covered by the tax
credit provisions of Articles 25 of the India-USA DTAA and Article 23 of
India-Germany DTAA, respectively. Hence, they would be entitled to foreign tax
credit. When they become residents, and since the nature of payments made to
them would be salaries, section 192 applies. Therefore, if payments were to be
received by the employees from more than one source during a particular year,
the present employer could give credit for foreign taxes to be deducted during
their deputation outside India.

1 Section 147 – Reassessment – After the expiry of four years – No failure by assessee to truly and fully disclose all material facts – reopening is bad in law

ACIT vs. Kalyani Hayes Lemmerz Ltd.
ITA No: 802 of 2015 (Bom. HC)  
A.Y.: 2003-04      Dated: 29th January, 2018
[ACIT vs. Kalyani Hayes Lemmerz Ltd.
ITA No.2476/PN/2012;
Dated: 24th Aug., 2014 ; Pune.  ITAT]

The Assessee Company was
incorporated in 1996 with the Kalyani Group (Indian Partner), holding 75% and
Lemmerz Werke GMBH Germany (German Partner) holding remaining 25% share in it.
Thereafter, the share holding of the Assessee company, underwent a change with
the German Partners, increasing its share holding to 80% in the Assessee
Company by acquiring shares from M/s. Kalyani Group.

 

The Assessment was
completed u/s. 143 (3) of the Act after having discussed the shareholding
pattern, allowed the carried forward loss under section 79 of the Act.
Thereafter, the assessment was reopened on the point of shares holding pattern
of the company i.e  in the assessment
order, applicability of provisions of section 
79 of I.T. Act has not been considered by the AO.

 

Thereafter, the A.O passed
an order u/s.  143 read with 147 of the
Act, rejected the Petitioner’s objection, and thereafter, inter alia,
disallowed the carry forward of business losses u/s.  79 of the Act.

 

The CIT(A) allowed the
Assessee’s appeal, inter alia, holding that when all facts including the
change in shareholding pattern, had been disclosed during the regular
assessment proceedings, as is evident from the Assessment Order passed in the
regular assessment proceedings, then merely because the Assessing Officer
choose not to apply section 79 of the Act, it could not be said that the
Assessee had failed to disclose fully and truly all material facts, necessary
for assessment. This was a case where the first proviso to section 147 of the
Act will apply as the reopening notice is beyond a period of four years from
the end of the relevant AY.

 

Being aggrieved, Revenue
filed an appeal to the Tribunal. The Tribunal held that, where an assessment
order u/s. 143(3) of the Act was passed in regular assessment proceedings,
evidencing full and true disclosure of all material facts necessary for the purpose
of assessment. Then mere non consideration of section 79 of the Act by the A.O
cannot lead to the conclusion that the Assessee had failed to disclose all
material facts truly and fully, which were necessary for Assessment. The
Tribunal  relied upon the Apex Court’s
decision in Calcutta Discount Company Ltd. vs. CIT 41 ITR 191wherein
it has been held that obligation of the Asssessee is to disclose all primary
facts truly and fully to the extent relevant for the purpose of Assessment. The
Assessee is under no obligation to inform the Assessing Officer of the
interference of fact or law to be drawn from the material facts which had been
disclosed fully and truly by the Assessee.

 

Being aggrieved, Revenue
filed an appeal to the High Court. The grievance of the Revenue is that it was
obligatory on the part of the Assessee to invite the attention of the A.O to
section 79 of the Act during regular assessment proceedings. Thus, not having
done so, it is submitted that the first proviso to section 147 of the Act, can
have no application.

 

The Hon. High Court
observed that it is an undisputed fact that the regular Assessment Order had
been passed u/s. 143(3) of the Act. The reopening notice has been issued beyond
the period of four years from the end of the relevant AY. Therefore, the first
proviso to section 147 of the Act is applicable and reopening notice can only
be sustained in cases where there is failure to disclose fully and truly all
material facts necessary for assessment. The reasons in support of the impugned
notice itself records the fact that the issue of shareholding pattern of the
company was discussed by the A.O in his Assessment order passed in the regular
assessment proceedings. The only basis of reopening is that the A.O in the
regular assessment did not apply provisions of section 79 of the Act, to
determine the taxable income. This non application of mind by the A.O while
carrying out assessment cannot lead to the conclusion that there has been any
failure on the part of the Assessee to truly and fully disclose all material
facts necessary for Assessment. The Tribunal correctly placed reliance upon the
decision of the Supreme Court in Calcutta Discount Company Ltd., (supra) to
hold that not pointing out the inference to be drawn from facts will not amount
to failure to disclose truly and fully all material facts, necessary for
assessment. In view of the above the, Appeal of dept was dismissed.

17 Search and seizure – Presumption as to seized documents – Can be raised in favour of assessee -– Documents showing expenditure incurred on account of value addition to property – Failure by AO to conduct enquiry or investigation regarding source of investment or genuineness of expenditure – Expenditure to extent supported by documents allowable

CIT vs. Damac Holdings Pvt. Ltd. 401 ITR 495 (Ker); Date of Order: 12/12/2017:
A. Ys. 2007-08 and 2008-09:
Sections 37, 132 and 132(4A)


The two
assessee companies, D and R, were involved in the business of real estate,
purchased landed property and developed and sold it. D purchased a piece of
land for about Rs. 5 crore which he sold for about Rs. 13 crore and R purchased
property for about Rs. 4 crores and sold it for about Rs. 9 crore. Both
incurred certain expenditure on developing the land in order to make it fit for
selling. D’s transactions took place in the A. Ys. 2007-08 and 2008-09 and R’s
in A. Y. 2008-09. Assessments were initiated on the basis of searches conducted
u/s. 132 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, in the residence of the directors of both
the assessee-companies. The assessee’s claimed the deduction of the expenditure
incurred on developing the properties in order to make them fit for selling.
The claims were supported by the various documents seized from the assesses
during the searches conducted. The assesses claimed the benefit of presumption
u/s. 132(4A) of the Act. The Assessing Officer worked out the total expenditure
and apportioned it to the total area and computed the cost expended. However,
he disallowed the claim for deduction. He was of the view that the vendors of
the property had incurred and claimed expenditure for leveling the property and
hence, there was no requirement for the assesses to make the expenditure to the
extent claimed.

The
Commissioner (Appeals) allowed the claims of both assesses to the extent of the
cheque payments as disclosed from the documents seized from the premises and
disallowed the balance. The Tribunal allowed the entire expenses as claimed by
the assessee.  


On appeal
by the Revenue, the Kerala High Court held as under:


“i)   Section 132(4A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961
provides for presumption, inter alia, of contents of the books of
account and other documents found in the possession and control of any person
in the course of a search, u/s. 132, to be true, and the presumption applies
both in the case of the Department and the assessee and could be rebutted by
either.


ii)    The presumption u/s. 132(4A) applied in
favour of the assessee in so far as the expenditure being supported by the documents
seized at the time of search was concerned. There was no need for further proof
u/s. 37, since the Assessing Officer did not endeavour to carry out an enquiry
and investigation into the source of investment or the genuineness of the
expenditure made. However, the presumption could have effect only to the extent
of the documents seized and nothing further.


iii)   There was no basis for the Assessing
Officer’s computation of the leveling expenditure. His finding that the vendors
of the property had spent for leveling the property and hence, there was no
requirement for the assessee to make the expenditure to the extent claimed,
could not be sustained. He had proceeded on mere conjectures and had ignored
the seized documents which contained the evidence of cheque payments and
vouchers of cash payments effected for the development of the lands. He also
did not verify the source of income for such expenditure. The fact that the
sale price was astronomical as against the purchase price raised a valid
presumption in favour of the contention of the assesses that, but for the
development of the property to a considerable extent that would not have been
possible, especially when there is no unusual spurt in the land prices during that short period.


iv)   The Commissioner (Appeals) had considered the
documents produced and had allowed the claim to the extent that there were cheque
payments, as was discernible from the documents seized. Therefore, in the teeth
of the presumption as to the truth of the documents seized, no further proof
was required u/s. 37, the Department having failed to rebut such presumption.


v)   The allowance of expenditure for leveling the
land was to be confined to the documents revealed from the seized documents,
whether it was cash or cheque payments.”

 

GST

8. [2018-TIOL-04-HC-ALL-GST] M/s. Continental India Pvt. Ltd. and Another vs. Union of India
    
Respondents directed to re-open the GST portal for filing Trans-1 on account of failure of system on the due date.

    
FACTS
The petitioner seeks a writ of mandamus directing the GST council   respondent no. 2 to make recommendations to the State Government to extend the time period for filing of GST Tran-1, because his application was not entertained on the last date i.e. 27.12.2017 and application is complete for the necessary transactional credit. It was stated that despite several efforts the GST system did not respond as a result the petitioner is likely to suffer loss.

HELD
The High Court directed the Respondents to reopen the portal within two weeks from the date of the decision. In the event they do not do so, they will entertain the application of the petitioner manually and pass orders on it after due verification of the credits as claimed. The Court will also ensure that the petitioner is allowed to pay its taxes on the regular electronic system also which is being maintained for use of the credit likely to be considered for the petitioner. _

Deposition in Investigation Proccedings – Binding effect

Introduction

Under fiscal
statutes, there are provisions for investigation. Such provisions were there
under Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959 also.

Normally, when investigation action takes place, a statement (also referred to as deposition) is recorded during the course of investigation. The intention of such deposition is to get the facts recorded which can be used further for assessments and for raising liability, if applicable. However, practical experience shows that under heavy pressure and threats, etc., the contents get recorded (admitted) in favour of revenue. In other words, the concerned dealer/party is forcibly made to admit tax evasion and thus commitment is taken for discharging the liability.

The issue arises whether such statement is binding in the course of assessment.

There are various instances where the parties have retracted the statements and judiciary has approved such retraction. Normally, such retraction is required to be done immediately and as early as possible after giving the statement. It should also be supported by reasonable ground for retraction. However, in spite of above general position, it can still be said that the statement given during investigation is not binding, if by circumstances and facts, it can be shown that the statement is factually incorrect. And under such circumstances, even late retraction or no retraction is also not an issue. In other words, inspite of admission in statement or deposition, if the factual position is shown to be different with satisfactory supporting, then the judiciary will certainly take into account such a changed position.

Judgement in case of Trilok Enterprises (VAT SA No.136 to 138 of 2011 dt.19.7.2017).

Recently, Hon. M.S.T. Tribunal had an occasion to deal with such an issue in above judgement. The facts as recorded by the Tribunal are as under:

“2. The appellant, a person not registered under Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959 was visited by officers of Enforcement Branch, Mumbai on 21.01.1997. During the visit, no books of accounts found, however, details of Bank transactions were found which show that during 1994-95, 1995-96 and 1996-97, large amounts were deposited and withdrawn from the bank account. A statement of the appellant was obtained by Enforcement Officer. In this statement the appellant, viz. Bharat Deepchand Vora, proprietor of M/s.Trilok Enterprises, appears to have admitted that he has done trading with M/s. Gurjar Steel, so also business on commission basis in Iron and Steel during that period. The rate of commission is stated as 10 paise. The enforcement branch, treating the appellant as unregistered dealer, issued him notices for assessment for those three years period. The appellant is assessed on the basis of a statement of sales, furnished by him. The appellant appears to have filed return and deposited some tax with the same. The assessment orders were challenged by the appellant before the 1st Appellate authority. Main contention of the appellant was that, he has not done any business of sales and purchases, during those periods. The First appellate authority, vide its order dated 17.6.2000, had been pleased to set aside the assessment orders and remanded the matters to assessing authority, with a direction to assess the appellant afresh. On remand, it is stated, that the assessing officer gave opportunity of hearing to the appellant, and again he has passed identical assessment orders, as per earlier orders passed by him. The appellant appears to have maintained his stand in reassessment after remand that he has not done any business of buying and selling during relevant period. The assessing officer however, has assessed the appellant on the basis of record available before him and he has levied tax, interest and penalty. Against that order, passed after remand, the appellant had filed first appeal, which was dismissed on merit, by the first appellate authority, by the order impugned by the appellant in the instant appeal.”       
          
On merits, on behalf of appellant, it was argued that the party has not done any business of sale/purchase but only financial transactions. It was argued that no sales or purchases have been established. It was further argued that mere statement before the officer of Enforcement cannot be allowed to form a basis for determining sales/purchase transaction particularly in absence of other cogent, reliable and trustworthy evidence. It was further brought to notice of Tribunal that the statement was obtained under threat. The returns filing and payments were also under threat of prosecution.

On behalf of the Revenue, the star argument was that since the appellant himself has admitted sale/purchase in the deposition and by filing returns and payment, there was no need for revenue to further bring any supporting material.

Hon. Tribunal examined the factual position vis-à-vis legal position. In para 15 & 16, Hon. Tribunal made remarks about the effect of deposition. The relevant paras are reproduced for ready reference.

“15. Now if we carefully look at this statement and the statement made by the appellant before the visiting officer at the time of visit admittedly books of accounts were not found. Firstly it is unlikely that a dealer having such a volume of trading would not maintain any books of accounts. Further he certainly does not know the changes in the rate of tax S. S. Patta from 1% to 4% and it is unlikely that he would calculate the interest exactly up to the date, and would show that the same is payable. Thus, though it is signed by the appellant, in all probability, it is a statement prepared by somebody else and not by the appellant and signature of the appellant appears to have been obtained on the same.

16. If we look at the bank statement available on record, it will be seen that firstly there has been no attempt to match the same with the list of bills mentioned above. Secondly, it is seen, that the appellant has deposited amounts in cash and has issued cheques to M/s.Gurjar Steel. In this statement before investigating officer, he had stated that he was dealing with Gurjar Steel. If cheques are issued to Gurjar Steel, at the most there could have been purchases from Gurjar Steel, who was a registered dealer. Admittedly bank account of Gurjar Steel was provisionally attached by the department for recovery of the dues, but subsequently the attachment was withdrawn. If the appellant had made payment by cheques to Gurjar Steel, who is registered dealer, there was no reason for not showing these transactions as purchases as that would have been instances of resale in the hands of appellant and would not have attracted any liability for payment of tax. It does not appear from the record that department has made any attempt to confirm the genuineness of the transactions from M/s. Gurjar Steel or from any other party, despite the fact that matter was remanded back by the first appellate authority with direction to bring additional material on record to establish the factum of sales. The assessing officer, without considering these directions appears to have passed same order on remand.”      

In para 19, the Hon. Tribunal has made reference to judgement of the Hon. Supreme Court about relevance of statement, in the following words.

“19. In CBI vs. V. C. Shukla and others (1988) 3 SCC 410, Hon’ble S. C. while speaking about relevancy of evidence u/s.34 of Evidence Act has observed, that first part of section 34 speaks about relevance of entry in the books of account as evidence, and the second part speaks in a negative way, of its evidentiary value for charging a person with a liability. To make an entry relevant thereunder it must be shown that it has been made in a book, that book is book of account and that books of account has been regularly kept in the course of business. Even if, the above requirements are fulfilled and the entry becomes admissible as relevant evidence, still the statement made therein shall not alone be sufficient to accept it as substantive evidence to charge any person with liability of paying tax.”     

Observing that there is no independent evidence gathered by the revenue to establish sale/purchase transactions, the Tribunal held that the levy of sales tax on alleged sales in instant appeal is unsustainable. Accordingly, the Tribunal allowed the appeals by quashing assessment orders.

CONCLUSION  
 
The above legal position laid down by the Tribunal will also be relevant under other fiscal laws. The sum and substance is that the tax can be levied only if there are established taxable transactions and not merely on admission. Therefore, in due cases, the parties are entitled to demonstrate their non-liability inspite of any wrong admission made in assessment or in investigation proceeding. Ultimately, the correct legal position will prevail. _

IGST Framework – Constitutional Aspects

This article is limited to examining the Integrated Goods and Service Tax (‘IGST’) framework in the backdrop of the provisions of Indian Constitution. Specific case studies/ challenges arising under the IGST law would be examined in a separate article.

CONCEPT OF IGST UNDER THE INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL SCHEME
The Indian constitutional system possess features of a federation with strong unitary elements making it a ‘Union of States’. On these lines, Article 246 of the Indian Constitution provides for the demarcation of legislative powers between the Union and States, with residuary powers resting with the Union. In the context of fiscal powers, the legislative lists clearly demarcate the fields of legislation between the Union and the States and restricts each of them from encroaching the other’s arena. This constitutional set up posed a mammoth task for policy and law makers in designing a suitable GST model for India; ultimately leading to the promulgation of the 101st Constitutional Amendment.

DEVIATION FROM THE CONSTITUTIONAL SCHEME PREVALENT UNTIL NOW
The taxation scheme prevalent after the 101st Constitutional Amendment is a fundamental departure from the mutual exclusivity of fiscal powers between the Union and the States. The policy makers were faced with a tight balancing act of harmonising the tax structure in India across States on the one hand and retaining their constitutional independence on fiscal matters on the other. Instead of granting mutually exclusive taxing powers to Governments by creating specific entries in their respective list of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, it was decided to confer parallel/ simultaneous powers (not part of the Concurrent List) through a specific article in 246A. The Union and the respective States would legislate and the corresponding Governments would administer the laws within their respective territory. A parallel power structure was a conscious attempt to ensure harmony in fiscal decisions among the Union and Group of States.
 
This gave rise to the next challenge over addressing the geographical jurisdiction of States specifically over transaction such as inter state transactions, export, import etc having an element of another geography. It also leads to a supplementary issue of revenue allocation between the States on such transactions. To avoid the tax chaos prevalent in the Pre Central Sales Tax period, ie multiple States seeking to tax the same transaction on the claim that one of many aspects of a sale transaction occurred in their State (such as delivery, transfer of property, etc), which resulted in overlap in taxation on the same event, the Parliament was placed with the responsibility of laying down a robust law governing principles over the jurisdiction of transaction between the States, Dispute Resolution and also international transactions. The idea of implementation of IGST model in India was mooted to tackle this particular problem.

ECONOMICS BEHIND THE IGST LAW
Economically speaking, IGST is a bridge enabling flow of the SGST component of revenue from the Supplier State to Recipient State. Under the erstwhile origin based scheme of CST/ VAT, the State collecting the tax at the point of origination retained the revenue arising from such sale, contrary to the principle of taxing consumption. On this count, it hampered the consuming state to give any tax credit on inter-state purchases and resulted in CST being loaded on the purchase costs.

The GST law, which is guided by consumption (elaborated later) has adopted a modified version of taxing such transactions enabling the flow of revenue to the State of Consumption. The broad modalities are as follows:

–    Inter-state supplier will collect the IGST and remit it after adjusting available credit of IGST, CGST and SGST on his purchases

–    Supplier state will transfer to the Union Government the credit of SGST payment, if any, used in payment of IGST

–    Union Government would apportion the SGST component to the State in which the consumption of the supply takes place (place of supply)

–    Importing consumer will consume the goods or services in the State and the State would be entitled to retain revenue on this consumption (B2C transactions)

–    Importing dealer will claim credit of IGST while discharging his output tax liability in his own state (B2B transactions) and the chain would continue until final consumption either in the same State or else-where.

Prior to venturing into the IGST laws and the specific provisions, it would be appropriate to understand the basic concepts/ definitions of the IGST Law which would have to be applied to IGST transactions. The concepts are sequentially examined.

1.    Territorial Jurisdiction v/s Extra-territorial Nexus

Section 1 of the IGST Act defines the extent of the law and states that the Act extends to the whole of India except to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. With the Integrated Goods and Services Tax (Extension to Jammu and Kashmir) Ordinance 2017, the words “except Jammu and Kashmir were omitted”. This Ordinance came into force w.e.f. 08-07-2017.

Without examining the scope of the term India and its statutory extensions, it would be important to examine the legislative limits of the enactment. The general principle, flowing from the sovereignty of States, is that laws made by one State can have no operation in another State. An issue arises in case of transactions which are said to be undertaken wholly or partly outside India. In the context of Income tax Act, 1922 a challenge was made to the vires of the then section 4(1)(b)(ii) of the said Act  which imposed income tax on a branch of the assesse which earned income outside of British India. The Privy Council examined pari-materia provisions of the Article 245(2)  (in the Government of India Act, 1935) and upheld the imposition stating:

“The resulting general conception as to the scope of Income tax is that given a sufficient territorial connection between the person sought to be charged and the country seeking to tax him Income-tax may properly extend to that person in respect of his foreign income.”

Subsequently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Electronics Corporation vs. CIT & Anr 1989 AIR 1707 (SC) was examining whether technical services provided abroad could be taxed in India on the ground of extra-territorial applicability of law. The Court upheld the doctrine that territorial nexus is an essential ingredient for exercising jurisdiction over a transaction though it left the parameters of determination of nexus slightly open ended.

Subsequently, on a reference made in the above case to the constitutional bench in 2017 (48) S.T.R. 177 (S.C.) GVK Industries Ltd vs. Income tax Officer  wherein the Court made detailed observations on the inter-play between territorial limits and exterritorial operation of a law. Furthering the case in Electronics Corporation of India, the Court set down four extreme views for consideration on the proposition of ‘nexus’:

i.    Rigid view – State would have powers if “aspects or causes that occur, arise or exist, or may be expected to do so, solely within India”.
ii.    Slightly liberal view – State would have powers if the event had significant or sufficient impact on or effect in or consequence for India
iii.    Even more liberal view – State would have powers as long as some impact or nexus with India is established or expected
iv.    Extreme view – State has powers to legislate for any territory without any limits.

The Court also explained the contextual meaning of the terms for purpose of application of the nexus theory:

–    “aspects or causes”
    events, things, phenomena (howsoever commonplace they may be), resources, actions or transactions, and the like, in the social, political, economic, cultural, biological, environmental or physical spheres, that occur, arise, exist or may be expected to do so, naturally or on account of some human agency.

–   “extra-territorial aspects or causes”
    aspects or causes that occur, arise, or exist, or may be expected to do so, outside the territory of India

[1] [1948] 16 ITR 240
(PC) PRIVY COUNCIL Wallace Brothers & Co., Ltd. v.Commissioner of
Income-tax

[1] Article 245(2)
holds that any statute would not be declared invalid on the ground of
extra-territorial operation

–   “nexus with India”, “impact on India”, “effect in India”, “effect on India”, “consequence for India” or “impact on or nexus with India”

any impact(s)on, or effect(s) in, or consequences for, or expected impact(s) on, or effect(s) in, or consequence(s) for : (a) the territory of India, or any part of India; or (b) the interests of, welfare of, wellbeing of or security of inhabitants of India, and Indians in general, that arise on account of aspects or causes.

The Court finally held that the Parliament is certainly restricted from enacting laws with respect to extra-territorial aspects or causes which are not expected to have any direct or indirect tangible / intangible impact to the territory of India. The Court had also strongly refuted the reliance on Article 245(2) and distinguished extra-territorial ‘applicability’ from extra-territorial ‘operation’ of law.

2.    Territorial Aspects Theory

Furthering the point of the Court, we may now dissect the law to identify the ‘aspects’ the IGST law adopted in its structure:
•    Supply of Goods or services
•    Location of supplier
•    Place of supply which is inter-dependent on certain elements of a transaction
•    Location of recipient

In applying the territorial aspect theory, it may be fruitful to understand the conceptual role of each of these aspects in the GST law and look for clues which lead to a reasonable answer on the territorial nexus:

a)    Scope of Supply (Section 7 of CGST law) – while this is popularly referred as the definition of supply or as the ‘taxable event’, the placement and the verbiage do not clearly suggest so. In fact, the specific inclusion of ‘import of services’ within the scope perhaps may provide an indication that this provision also somewhere examines the situs.

b)    Location of Supplier (Section 8 and 9 of IGST Law) – this phrase assists in deciding the location of the supplier of goods or services. It plays a role in deciding the character of the transaction (inter-state or intra-state). Generally speaking, it is the supplier who is the taxable person in GST and the jurisdiction exercised by Central & State authorities is based on his location.

    While the location of supplier of goods has not been defined, the location of supplier of services has been defined. The definition states the location would generally be the place for which registration has been obtained. As it is defined, place of business refers to a physical and sufficiently permanent structures for which registration is obtained. It also states that where a service has been rendered from a fixed establishment, the said fixed establishment would be termed as the location of supplier. In case of such multiple  establishments, the establishment most concerned may be considered as the location. In the absence of any such location, the usual place of residence of the supplier. In effect, the said concept fixes the situs of the ‘from’ location of a supply of goods or services. It identifies the origination of a supply which is relevant for the purpose of collection of taxes.

c)    Place of Supply (Section 10-13 of IGST Law) – Place of supply represents the place of consumption (place of supply is a misnomer). In the context of goods, the IGST law is guided by the destination of goods to ascertain the place of supply except in stray cases where a destination cannot be pointed to a particular location (such as supply of goods on board a conveyance). Services, being an intangible activity cannot be fixed to a destination; but being an economic activity, it is generally presumed that the location of the recipient is its place of consumption (except for transaction where consumption can be clearly tagged to a location say immovable property services, etc.). Even in the context of cross border transactions, goods and services are generally considered as consumed at their destination or location of recipient of registered person.

    The Place of supply is also a proxy for the State which would be entitled to the SGST component of the revenue in terms of the Apportionment and Settlement Provisions of IGST Law (Section 17(2)(2) of IGST Law). This is significant from two counts (a) it enables transfer of GST revenue to the State of consumption; (b) enables the State to maintain the value added tax chain (in B2B transactions). Therefore, the place of supply determines the place of consumption (as per law) and the geography which is entitled to the revenue on account of its consumption. It is on this principle that exports are zero-rated as the place of consumption is said to occur outside India. Similarly, imports are taxed under reverse charge provisions on the basis that the place of consumption is in India. The IGST has pivoted on the place of supply for identification of consumption and assigning the revenues to the jurisdiction in which the consumption has taken place.

d)    Location of Recipient (Section 2(14) of IGST Law) – This aspect of a supply transaction is primarily inter-twined into the place of supply provisions for services. It is generally assumed internationally that services are consumed at the location where the recipient is located and registered. Where the services are consumed at an establishment elsewhere, the location of such establishment would be considered as the place of consumption. The location of recipient enables the law makers to fix the place of consumption of services.

GST is a fiscal law aimed at garnering revenues for a State. Among the four aspects stated above, it appears that the Place of Supply (i.e. consumption) assumes significant importance in the scheme of things. Though the place of the supplier is the point of ‘collection’ of taxes from the taxable person, it ultimately narrows down to the place of supply of every transaction. Even if a supplier state has collected taxes, it cannot retain this revenue and would have to transfer it to the account of the state where the ultimately consumption takes place. In the context of services, the State in which the recipient is located which would be entitled to revenue on this transaction.

Even placing an eye on export of goods and services, one gets a view that destination of such activity drives the benefits of zero-rating. In the context of import of services, the law makers through a provision of reverse charge directed the State of consumption itself to collect and retain the tax on such transactions.

In order to further cement one’s view on this proposition (having ramifications on cross border trade and commerce), it may be useful to extract further clues from the law on this front:
•    Proviso to section 5 of the IGST law carves out an exception from applicability of IGST law on imported goods until they cross the custom borders for home consumption. Therefore, even if goods arrive at the customs port for purpose of transhipment to another country, the IGST law refrains from taxing such transactions on the destination principle. Circular No. 33/2017-Cus dt. 01.08.2017 clarifies in the context of High seas transactions that only the last buyer of the chain would be required to pay IGST.
•    One may also test an out and out transaction from a State territory perspective and possibly extrapolate this to the Central law to examine international territorial aspects. Say A stationed in Mumbai buys goods from Madhya Pradesh and asks the transporter in Madhya Pradesh to directly deliver the same to a customer in Gujarat. Even-though the dealer is located in Maharashtra, the law makers have excluded this transaction from the purview of MH-GST and brought the same under the IGST law. Looking at it from a MH GST perspective (also see Article 286), this transaction would be an ‘outside State’ transaction for Maharashtra inspite of the supplier being located in Maharashtra. The limited point which emerges is that the location of the supplier is not a conclusive aspect for territorial nexus. Applying this at an international scenario, IGST law should also not tax goods movement from China to Singapore merely because the supplier is located in India. Now it seems simple for goods, it becomes slightly more complex for merchanting services in the absence of a physical trail of events.
•    While the law has placed dependence on the location of the supplier and recipient to identify the trail, in which case, it may be considered as import of services coupled with export of services, in cases where the services can be demonstrated to have been supplied outside India and consumed outside India, can these proxies result in a tax liability or will it amount to an extra-territorial jurisdiction?.
•    Under the IGST law, there is a residual clause (section 7(5)(c)) which deems a transaction as an inter-state transaction if it is neither classified as intra-state nor inter-state. Importantly, the clause uses the phrase ‘in the taxable territory’ implying that some aspect of the transaction (specifically the place of supply) should take place in the taxable territory for the law to apply. Simple example could be of services being delivered to off shore structures in the exclusive economic zone which would be termed as inter state supply on this count since the place of consumption is attached to the structure located therein.
•    In the context of cross border transactions (incl. tax on United Nation Organisations, and similar institutions), emphasis has been to tax the inward supply into India in the hands of the recipient. Inward supply refers to ‘receipt of goods or services’. Unless the goods or services are strictly received by the recipient of such supply, the transactions cannot be taxed in India.

In summary, among all the aspects of a transaction, is seems evident that the place of supply drives the taxability and among all aspects, the legislature intends tax on only transactions where the place of supply is in India. The location of the supplier though important in law for operation of law, it is only for the limited purpose of collection of tax. A transaction can be considered as extra-territorial if the place of supply is outside its fiscal limits.

3.    Meaning of India

“India” has been defined in section 2(56) of the CGST Act (reference from Section 2(24) of the IGST Act) to mean the territory of India as referred to in Article 1 of the Constitution, its territorial waters, seabed and sub-soil underlying such waters, continental shelf, exclusive economic zone or any other maritime zone as referred to in the Territorial Waters, Continental Shelf, Exclusive Economic Zone and other Maritime Zones Act, 1976 (80 of 1976) (Maritime Zones Act) , and the air space above its territory and territorial waters .

As per Article 1 of the Indian Constitution, India is defined as a Union of the territories of the State and Union Territories specified in the First Schedule of the said constitution. India exercises sovereign rights over this land mass. International UN convention  has laid down principles for defining the territorial jurisdiction over international waters extending beyond the land mass of coastal States. Part V of the said convention (specifically article 57 and 60) specifically grant India exclusive jurisdiction in matters of customs, fiscal, health, safety, etc over the artificial islands, installation / structures for explorative and research activities in such zone. In line with the international UN Conventions, the aforesaid Act was legislated in 1976 giving India specific powers over these Maritime zones.

Section 7 of the Maritime Zones Act grants powers to India to exercise sovereign rights over the exclusive economic in line with the rights and limitations under the UN convention. Sub-section (7) grants powers to the Central Government to notify any enactment to extend over this territory and the area would be considered as part of India under the enactment.

A question arises on whether the Central Government has to necessarily issue a notification under the IGST law for it extend to the exclusive economic zone (similar to the Customs Act) or is the definition of India spreading its wings over to such maritime zones itself sufficient. Section 7 and 8 of the Maritime Zones Act, 1976 empowered India to exercise exclusive rights for specific purposes enlisted therein (such as exploration, research, etc). Sub-clause (6) of the said sections grant powers to the Central Government to extend any enactment for the time being in force to such maritime zones. The Customs Act 1962, Excise Act 1944 contained respective notifications extending itself to the said zones. However, the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (CST) did not contain such notifications on this aspect. A challenge was made in the Gujarat High Court on the applicability of CST on transactions which were moved to the off-shore rigs in the exclusive economic zone. The High Court in Larsen & Toubro vs. Union of India (2011) 45 VST 361 (Guj) struck down the imposition on the ground that no such notification has been issued under the CST law and the enactment cannot extend to such areas until such effect is given. In the context of service tax, the Bombay High Court in Greatship (India) Ltd. vs. CST, Mumbai 2015 (39) S.T.R. 754 (Bom.) was interpreting a subsequent notification which enlarged a preceding notification with respect to the exclusive economic zone. Since the preceding notification was limited to services rendered to off-shore rigs, services by off-shore rigs was held as not taxable. The Court stated that the subsequent notification both services to or by off-shore rigs or vessels cannot be read as clarificatory.

However, it may be noted that the above propositions held good in the context of the specific laws. It can be argued that no such notification is required under the CGST/ IGST law for the Act to apply to such maritime zones on account of the following reasons:

•    The Parliament has itself defined the extent of India’s area in the enactment to spread to such maritime zones, which power it derives under Article 297(3) of the Constitution
•    The Central Government has been empowered to extend an enactment for the law which is in force at the time of enactment of the Maritime Zones Act, for obvious reasons to avoid a legislative amendment to laws prevailing at that time. Subsequent enactments which itself covers such areas need not depend on a notification for its applicability
•    The Customs law had a restricted meaning to ‘India’ to its territorial waters and hence warranted such a notification. However, the IGST law itself expands its definition to such maritime zones. When Act itself has defined India, it need not seek any support from a delegated legislation to give effect unless the enactment states so.
•    The Maritime Zones Act and the UNCLOS itself state that India can exercise ‘sovereign rights’ for specific purposes which also includes in itself taxation rights provided it is limited to the specific purposes.

Therefore, the decision of the Gujarat High Court in Larsen & Toubro’s case can be distinguished in the context of the GST Law.

4.    Applicability of the above Concepts

We would apply the above concepts in a merchanting trade transaction. Assuming the IGST law has to be applied on A located in Maharashtra (India), certain variants have been tabulated and the possible views have been provided:

[3] The said Act was
legislated drawing powers from Article 297 of the Indian Constitution which
stated inter-alia that all resources of exclusive economic zone vest with the
Union of India

[4] Geneva Conventions
on Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, Continental Shelf and High Sea, and the
United Nations Conventions on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) which was adopted on
29 April 1958 and 10 December 1982

No

Scenario – Supply of Goods

Taxability

Reasoning

1

Goods purchased from UK and directly shipped to USA
from UK

Neither purchase nor sale transaction is taxable on
extra-territorial grounds.

 

Of course, additional customs duty equivalent to IGST
can be imposed u/s.3(7) of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975

‘Place of Supply’ – Aspect and impact of law is
outside India and hence outside the scope of IGST Law.  Moreover, proviso to section 5(1) of IGST
law excludes its applicability until the goods are imported into India (i.e.
territorial waters)

2

Goods purchased from UK and transferred by
endorsement in High Seas (beyond 200 Nautical Miles) to a person outside
India

Neither purchase nor sale transaction is taxable on
extra-territorial grounds.

Same as above, with additional reliance from the
Customs Circular 33/2017 dt. 01.08.2017 which states that High Sea Sales are
not taxable and it is only the last buyer in the chain who clears the goods at
the customs station that would subject to tax.

3

Goods purchased from UK and document to title of
goods was transferred while the goods are within 12 nautical miles from India

Neither purchase nor is taxable on account of proviso
to section 5(1) of the IGST Law.  One
cannot take the plea of extra-territorial levy

Place of supply may be said to be in India but the
proviso to section 5(1) excludes such transactions from the purview of IGST
law.  The customs law on the other hand
imposes the duty (incl. IGST) only at the time of custom clearance.  Above customs circular supports this
position. 

4

Goods purchased from UK and document to title of
goods was transferred to a person in India while goods in continental shelf

Same as above

Same as above. 
Moreover, rights of taxation under the Maritime law is limited to
explorative activities only. 

5

Goods purchased from UK and document of title of
goods transferred to a person in India while the goods are under customs
bonding

Same as above

Same as 3. 
Customs law has exclusive rights to tax this transaction.  Until the goods form part of home
consumption, IGST law has no powers to tax this transaction.  Customs Circular No. 46/2017-Cus dt.
24.11.2017 has failed to articulate the tax position clearly (refer note
below).

6

Goods purchased from UK and re-exported to Singapore
while under customs bonding

Same as above

Same as 3. 
Section 69 of the Customs law permits re-export of warehoused goods
without payment of import duty.

Note – CBEC Circular 46/2017-Cus has taken a contradictory stance while clarifying the taxability of Bond to Bond Transfers.

In short, the said Circular states that sales while the goods are under bonding are subject to IGST in the hands of the seller in terms of section 7(2) read with section 20 on the entire sale price. Further, the customs duty applicable on import transaction would be payable at the time of ex-bonding of goods for home consumption. The circular is incorrect in its interpretation on account of the following:

•    The circular failed to appreciate the presence of proviso to section 5(1) of the IGST law which excludes the applicability of GST until clearance of home consumption of such goods
•    It has also lost sight of its preceding Circular No. 11/2010-Cus., dated 3-6-2010 which categorically states that the levy of custom duty is fixed at the time of import and filing of the into-bond bill of entry and deferred until ex-bonding of such goods.

Incidentally, the Finance Bill, 2018 has proposed an amendment to the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 which requires that additional customs duty (in the form of IGST) in case of bonded goods would be calculated on the last transaction value of such goods prior to de-bonding (ie purchase consideration of the last buyer). Use of last transaction value as the basis of collection of IGST, by implication, affirms the stand that only the last buyer of the chain is liable to pay IGST. The law does not intend to tax the intermediate transactions under the IGST law. It is a case of deferment of payment of tax until clearance of such goods for home consumption.

5.    Implications from this conclusion

It should be appreciated that the IGST model is a novel idea for implementation of GST. Many federations across the globe have struggled to implement a hybrid model. India has taken the bold step of implementing such a model in the form of a IGST law. The Centre is given more importance in this scheme. It would receive its share of revenue (CGST component) one way or the other. The tussle would be on the SGST component wherein each State may claim to be the Consumption State and extract a share of the IGST revenue. While the industry would hope that it is not transported back to the pre-CST period, certain pockets of the IGST law would require intervention of the Courts, else the tax payer would be sandwiched in this tussle for tax revenue. Other detailed aspects of the law would be examined in a subsequent article. _

GST on Re-development of Society Building, SRA and JDA – Part II

In Part-I, we discussed the taxability of
Development Rights and Re-development of Co-operative Housing Society
Buildings. In this part, we shall discuss the issue of taxability of
Transferable Development Rights, Slum Rehabilitation Projects and Land Development
Agreements, popularly known as Joint Development Agreements (‘JDA’) under GST.

 

Taxability of Transferable Development Rights
(‘TDR’)

 

Taxability of TDR can be examined in two
different situations:

 

When
granted by a local authority

  When
sold by one developer to another

 

a.    Taxability of TDR when granted by a local authority:

 

Let us examine the taxability of TDR granted
by a local authority in pursuance of Development Control Regulations (‘DCR’).
In lieu of the area relinquished or surrendered by the owner of the land, the
Government allows construction of additional built-up area. The landowner can
use extra built-up area, either himself or transfer it to another who is in
need of the extra built-up area for an agreed sum of money. TDR is, thus, an
instrument issued by the government authorities which gives the right to person
to build over and above the permissible Floor Space Index (FSI) within the
permissible limit of DCR. The TDR certificates can also be traded in the market
for cash. Developers purchase and utilise them for increasing their development
rights.

 

Against this factual background, it is to be
considered whether TDR is ‘goods’ or ‘services’ and whether the ‘supply’
thereof is taxable under the GST laws or not.

FSI vs. TDR

Not all development rights are TDR as grant
and use of FSI is development right, a specie of right in land embedded in the
same piece and parcel of land and cannot be divested to another piece of land
to load development potential on it. FSI is not transferable for use of
development on another piece of land unlike TDR which is transferable for use
on any other piece of land and therefore tradable by its very name and nature.
Secondly, TDR is initiated and issued by a local authority unlike FSI which a
private land owner also owns or possess as incorporeal right in his land with development potential as per prevailing town planning or DCR.

 

Is TDR an ‘Immovable Property’?

We shall now examine whether TDR or right to
obtain extra FSI is an ‘immovable property’ or not. The expression ‘immovable
property’ has not been defined under the GST law. It is, therefore, relevant to
note the definition of ‘immovable property’ under other enactments. Some of
these enactments are General Clauses Act, 1897, Transfer of Property Act, 1882,
Maharashtra Stamp Act, Registration Act, 1908, The Real Estate (Regulation and
Development) Act, 2016. The definition of ‘immovable property’ contained these
legislations are given in the previous article and hence not repeated here.

 

A perusal of the definitions in the
aforesaid enactments would show that they are more or less similar. Thus, the
definition of “immovable property” not only includes land but also the benefit
arising out of land and the things attached to the earth or permanently
fastened to anything attached to the earth. The scope of the term ‘immovable
property’ is not restricted to mere land or a building but extends even to the
benefits arising out of land.

 

The “benefit to arise of land” is that
benefit whose origin can be traced to existence of land. It owes its source to
land. Such benefit is inextricably linked to land.

 

The expression “development right” is not
defined in DCR issued under the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act,
1966. However, a careful perusal and harmonious reading of various provisions
of the DCR as also various judicial pronouncements show the artificial manner
in which ‘development rights’ are carved out of the land. This would
establish that ‘development rights’ are the ‘rights in immovable property’.

 

In Chheda Housing Development
Corporation vs. Bibijan Shaikh Farid – (2007) 3 Mah LJ 402,
the
Division Bench of the Hon’ble Bombay High Court has held that “FSI/TDR being
a benefit arising from the land, consequently must be held to be immovable
property and an Agreement for use of TDR consequently can be specifically
enforced, unless it is established that compensation in money would be an
adequate relief”
.

 

After having explained that FSI / TDR is a
right in immovable property, the next issue to be addressed is whether the
transfer of such right is liable to GST or not.

 

Is TDR/FSI ‘goods’ or ‘service’?

GST is a levy on supply of goods or services
or both for a consideration by a person in the course or furtherance of
business.

 

Section 2(52) of the CGST Act defines
“Goods” as under:

“S.2(52)
“goods” means every kind of movable property other than money and securities
but includes actionable claim, growing crops, grass and things attached to or
forming part of the land which are agreed to be severed before supply or under
a contract of supply”

 

A perusal of section 2(52) would show that
it is an exhaustive definition. It includes every kind of movable property
including actionable claims. It also includes growing crops, grass and things
attached to or forming part of the land provided they are agreed to be severed
before supply or under a contract of supply. It does not include money and
securities.

 

Section 2(102) of CGST Act defines
“services” as under:

“S.2(102)
“services” means anything other than goods, money and securities but includes
activities relating to the use of money or its conversion by cash or by any
other mode, from one form, currency or denomination, to another form, currency
or denomination for which a separate consideration is charged”.

 

A perusal of the definition of “services”
would show that it is an exhaustive definition and it encompasses anything
other than goods. Just because it includes anything other than goods, does it
mean it can include anything which normally not understood as service? Can it
include living beings? Answer is no. Though the expression “services” means
anything other than goods, it cannot include anything which is not normally
understood as service. Service is never understood to include property.  Though service is defined under indirect tax
laws, it is defined in certain other laws. These definitions were considered by
the Hon’ble Gauhati High Court in Magus Construction (P.) Ltd. vs. UOI
[2008] (11) STR 225
,
wherein it has explained the meaning of the word
“service”. After considering the definition of ‘services’ in various enactments
like MRTP Act, 1969, Consumer Protection Act, 1986, FEMA, 1999, amongst other
enactments, the Hon’ble High Court observed that “…one can safely define
‘service’ as an act of helpful activity, an act of doing something useful,
rendering assistance or help. Service does not involve supply of goods;
‘service’ rather connotes transformation of use/user of goods as a result of
voluntary intervention of ‘service provider’ and is an intangible commodity in
the form of human effort”.

 

Therefore, the expression ‘services’ as
defined in section 2 (102) of the CGST Act cannot include ‘immovable property’.
Therefore, transfer of immovable property or right in immovable property cannot
be treated as supply of service.

 

Section 7(2) of the CGST Act reads as under:

 

“S.7(2)
Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1),––

(a) activities or
transactions specified in Schedule III; or

(b) such
activities or transactions undertaken by the Central Government, a State
Government or any local authority in which they are engaged as public
authorities, as may be notified by the Government on the recommendations of the
Council, shall be treated neither as a supply of goods nor a supply of
services.”

 

Serial no. 5 of Schedule III of the CGST
Act  specifying activities or
transactions which shall be treated neither as a supply of goods nor a supply
of service reads as under:

“5. Sale of land
and, subject to clause (b) of paragraph 5 of Schedule II, sale of building.”

 

Therefore, by virtue of section 7(2) read
with Schedule III, sale of land and sale of building are treated neither as
supply of goods nor as supply of services. Issue is “can one state that as
serial no. 5 of Schedule III uses the expression “land” and “building”, the
benefit of this entry is not available to right in land or building?” The
answer is no. We have already explained that transfer of immovable property is
not liable for GST as it is neither goods nor service. Immovable property, by
definition, includes even right in immovable property.  Therefore, just because right in immovable
property has not been specifically stated in Schedule III, it doesn’t mean that
they are liable for GST. It is a well-settled legal principle that exemption
doesn’t pre-suppose a charge.

 

Even otherwise, the expression “land” and
“building” in Schedule III includes even right in land/building. This is
evident from Entry 18 of List II of Seventh Schedule of The Constitution read
with Entry 49 of the same list.

 

It is, therefore, viewed that TDR/FSI is
neither ‘goods’ nor ‘services’ and hence, cannot be subjected to levy of GST.

 

Can TDR be considered as an ‘Actionable
Claim’?

 

The entire issue of the ‘taxability of TDR’
can be looked at from a different perspective also.

 

TDR is a right which has been conferred by
the Government. It is transferrable by endorsement and delivery. When it is
transferred and can be used on any other land, there is no connection with any
particular land. TDR can change many hands before it is used in a particular
land for availing construction right.

 

Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act,
1882, defines ‘actionable claim’ as “a claim to any debt, other than the
debt secured by mortgage of immovable property or by hypothecation or pledge of
movable property or to beneficial interest in movable property.”
It means
that any beneficial interest in a movable property is actionable claim if the
same is not in the possession of the claimant. ‘Movable property’ has been
defined in section 3 (36) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, as ‘property of any
description except immovable property’. TDR is not a right in respect of an
“immovable property” as defined in section 3 (26) of the General Clauses Act
1897, and, therefore, it is a beneficial interest arising out of a “movable
property” as per the section 3 (36) of the Act. This right is intangible, and
it cannot be said that it is capable of being in physical possession of anyone.
Any movable property that can be possessed, can be handed over by the owner to
another for use. But in case of intangible property, the right to use such
property can be transferred by an agreement and the transferee can enforce the
right, in case of dispute, by going to the Court. Therefore, TDR should be
construed as an actionable claim. Therefore, its arrangements are transactions
in actionable claims. Support can be taken from the Apex Court’s decisions in Sunrise
Associates vs. Government of NCT of Delhi, 2006 (145) STC 576 (SC)
and
Vikas Sales ([1996] 102 STC 106 (SC)) (1996) 4 SCC 433.

 

Applying the ratio of Sunrise Associates’
case (supra), it can be construed that TDR is an intangible valuable
right which can be sold and purchased independent of land and should be
considered as an actionable claim. Actionable claim is also out of the scope of
supply in terms of paragraphs 6 of Schedule III of the CGST Act. Accordingly,
GST is not payable by any person when he transfers TDR to another.

 

In view of the above, TDR whether as
‘immovable property’ or ‘actionable claim’ remains outside the scope of
levy of GST.

 

Leviability of GST in case of Slum
Rehabilitation Authority (SRA) Projects

 

In case of slum encroached private land, the landlord approaches the Slum Rehabilitation Authority (SRA), a
governmental authority covered under Article 243W of the Constitution which
declares the land as slum land and issues order for rehabilitation of slum
dwellers (in pursuance of DCR 33(10) of Brihan Mumbai Municipal Corporation,
and similar regulations in other metropolitan cities). The landlord approaches
a developer to develop the land and SRA grant extra FSI to the developer for
construction of rehabilitation of slum dwellers as per DCR. The developer
constructs a building for slum dwellers and another for landlord including free
sale area and for himself to recover the cost of construction. As an incentive
to construct building for slum dwellers, SRA may issue TDR in form of DRC
(Development Right Certificate) which can be used on another plot or even may
be sold in open market by endorsement and delivery. Registration of document of
transfer of DRC with local authority is a regulatory requirement. Stamp duty is
paid for transfer of TDR as moveable property but is not required to be
registered under Registration Act as conveyance. Over and above this, the
developer may pay cash consideration to the landlord.

 

In another scenario, the land may belong
to the Government
that has been encroached upon by
the slum dwellers. In such a case, the Developer may agree to develop the land,
construct the building for the slum dwellers and allotment of units therein
free of cost to the slum dwellers in terms of the agreement entered into with
SRA. As against this, the Developer would be granted TDR as may be permitted by
the town planning regulations on the recommendations of SRA which can be
exploited by the Developer to construct another building, the units in which
can be freely sold by him. The Developer may even decide to sell TDR in open
market.

 

A perusal of the regulations relating to
slum rehabilitation schemes would show that it is an integral scheme. The
developer is required to carry out the work of construction of tenements for
slum-dwellers. Some portion of the built-up area is also allotted to the Land
Owner as per terms of DA. The remaining constructed area belongs to the
developer which is freely saleable by the Developer to recover the cost of
construction of the entire project alongwith his margin for the risk and
reward.

 

Therefore, it is a single contract for
construction under an integral scheme. The entire supply involves
consideration. Just because the scheme states that certain share in the
built-up area is to be handed over free of cost to slum dwellers and land
owner, it is not free in the legal sense. There is consideration for the
built-up area handed over to all them. It is to be noted that the FSI / TDR
that is sanctioned to the developer would enable him to construct units out of
which portion of it is available to him as freely saleable area. Alternatively,
the developer would be able to sell TDR in open market and monetize the same.
Once an area is declared as slum area and SRA frames slum rehabilitation
scheme, Regulation 33(10) of DCR is required to be followed. Once the
redevelopment / construction is carried out in accordance with Regulation
33(10), there are various conditions to be fulfilled. Therefore, different
events cannot be broken to ascertain the GST liability. The supply is only one.
Section 2(31) of the CGST Act defines ‘consideration’, the relevant portion of
which is reproduced below:

 

“S.2(31)
“consideration” in relation to the supply of goods or services or both
includes––

(a) any payment
made or to be made, whether in money or otherwise, in respect of, in response
to, or for the inducement of, the supply of goods or services or both, whether
by the recipient or by any other person but shall not include any subsidy given
by the Central Government or a State Government;

 

(b) the
monetary value of any act or forbearance, in respect of, in response to, or for
the inducement of, the supply of goods or services or both, whether by the
recipient or by any other person but shall not include any subsidy given by the
Central Government or a State Government”.

 

The above would show that consideration is
linked to supply. The expression consideration should not be read in isolation
of supply and scope of supply should not be read independent of the word
consideration. Consideration can move even from third person as per the
definition of consideration as given in section 2(31). This concept is also
recognized u/s. 2(d) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. 

 

Whether the landlord can be considered to
have made any supply in the above case and whether the free of cost area
allotted by the developer to the landlord in the newly constructed building
(with or without additional cash payment to the landlord) would constitute
‘consideration’ in the eyes of law?

 

In the first scenario, the landowner whose
land has been encroached by the slum dwellers engages the developer to
construct a building for rehabilitation of the slum dwellers as mandated by the
authorities to make the rest of the land free from such encumbrance and another
building or buildings which is to be shared by the developer and landlord in
agreed manner. Effectively, the land owner is sharing his land with the
developer as against which the constructed area is being shared between them as
per the terms of DA. Hence, landowner is transferring his ownership right in
the land for area of construction of his share as well as construction of the
building required for rehabilitation of the slum dwellers. Transfer of land is
specifically excluded from the meaning of supply on which GST is not payable.
However, the building constructed by developer for landlord is in form of works
contract service, depending on the, terms of contract that whether the land is
transferred to the developer or mere development right is granted. In the first
case, the service may be termed as Construction Service covered in Entry 5(b)
of Schedule II of CGST Act and in later case, it may be termed as Works
Contract Service covered in Entry 6(a) of the same Schedule.

 

Alternatively, it can be argued that the
Developer constructing building for Landlord and slum dwellers is, in lieu of,
free sale area received by Developer. Viewed from this angle, the consideration
is the market value of land portion received by the Developer and GST is
payable. In this scenario, if the development right is considered taxable under
GST, the land owner may issue invoice for transfer of development right. Based
on this, the developer shall be entitled to avail ITC against under constructed
flats sold from free sale area.

 

In case of Government land, TDR is issued
against construction of building for slum dwellers which may be encashed by
selling the same in open market. In such a case, the realized value of TDR may
be liable as consideration for construction of SRA building.

 

In the case of Sumer Corporation vs.
State of Maharashtra – (2017) 82 Taxmann.Com 369 (Bombay)
,
the Hon’ble
High Court has held TDR to be a valuable consideration equivalent to money.
However, we may here hasten to add that the Hon’ble High Court has, with due
respect, not examined certain broader issues as accepted by itself in the
judgment. The Hon’ble Court has confined itself only to finding out whether
consideration was present or not and have held that TDR is a consideration for
the Works Contract Services.

 

Nevertheless, one may be adopt a
conservative view and apply the ratio of the decision of the Hon’ble High Court
supra. If the TDR is used on the same plot of land to construct a
building for the land owner, slum dwellers and free sale area for the
developer, it can be said that the consideration received from free sale area
shall cover the consideration for the entire works contract for slum
rehabilitation and the landowner’s portion. It may be pointed out here that SRA
being covered by Article 243W of the Constitution, neither SRA nor the
Developer will be liable to GST in respect of issue of TDR by SRA.

 

In view of the entire transaction being
single supply, it is possible to avail full input tax credit on entire
construction and set off against the sale of under constructed flats.

 

Leviability of GST on Joint Development
Agreement (JDA)

JDA signifies a landlord entering into
Development Agreement with a Developer to develop his land having development
potential (FSI) and JV is formed. The landlord contribute his land into JV and
transfer the same by virtue of JDA or promise to convey the land to the society
of the purchasers of flats as may be formed by the JV. The landlord may have a
passive or active role in JV. In most of the cases, landowner is not having any
active role in the venture except giving his land for construction through this
arrangement. Contribution in form of land is a form of sale of land and outside
the scope of GST. Even when the development right is granted instead of
transfer of land per se, it is normally in form of available FSI of the
same plot of land on which it is consumed. Grant of FSI is certainly the right
arising out of the land and even on better footing than TDR which is
transferrable. Thus, grant of development right is outside the scope of GST.

 

We may, however, hasten to say here that the
joint control of the partners over a venture is the essential criterion for
considering such association as joint venture. The landowner has no role to
play after handing over the land to the developer for construction, whether the
revenue is shared or developed area is shared between the owner and the
developer. Hence, there is no joint venture between the landowner and the
developer. The landowner is giving up part ownership of the land to the
developer in exchange for getting share in revenue of constructed area.

 

Generally, two models are in vogue in case
of JDA between the landowners and a Developer, viz:

 

1. Revenue Sharing Model

2.  Area Sharing Model.

 

a)  Revenue Sharing Model:

 

In case of a landlord entering into Joint
Development Agreement with Developer wherein development right of the land is
granted to JDA for exploiting full potential of land on the following terms and
conditions:

 

  Value
of land (FSI value) is credited to the landlord’s capital account;

  All
expense from plan approval to construction cost, supervision, etc. is to be
borne by JDA to be funded by the Developer. In most of the cases landlord has
no further role to play;

   Upon completion of construction, net profit will
be shared between the Landlord and Developer in agreed ratio.

 

b)  Area sharing Model:

 

Alternative structure of the transaction is
that the landlord appoints the developer by transfer of development right of
the entire portion of the land and in turn the developer agrees to give agreed
percentage of constructed area to the landlord. Balance area shall be retained
and sold in open market by the Developer.

 

Can the relationship between the landlord
and the developer in area sharing model be considered as ‘barter’ so as to
constitute ‘supply’ and attract the levy of GST ?

 

In area sharing model, the landowner is
giving development right to the developer in exchange for getting share of
constructed area (works contract service). This is a case of barter. Taking
conservative view, both the landlord and developer will be required to pay GST,
however albeit with entitlement of input tax credit.

 

However, in case the developer is obliged to
give constructed area to the landlord against the part ownership of land under
the terms of JDA, both the transactions are outside the ambit of GST.

 

In revenue sharing model, no service is
provided by the developer or JV to the landlord. In fact, the JV sell the flats
and the revenue is to be distributed between the developer and the landlord in
the agreed ratio. The amount received by the landlord is towards sale /
transfer of land which is outside the scope of GST as per Sch. III of CGST Act.
Hence, no GST liability can arise on revenue sharing model.

 

Time of payment of GST on supply of under
on development right – NN. 4/2018 CT (Rate) dtd. 25.1.2018

 

By virtue of this notification, the
liability of payment of CGST is deferred from the date of supply of development
rights, i.e. date of entering into DA/JDA to date of grant of possession or
right in the constructed complex by entering into conveyance deed or similar
instrument (eg. Allotment letter). However, the notification can be said to be
a facilitation measure. The developer is not prevented from making payment even
before grant of such possession and avail input credit of the same against the
sale of under constructed units.

 

Conclusion:

From the indirect tax perspective, the
issues plaguing the Real Estate/Construction Sector are varied and complex. We
have made an attempt to deal with certain crucial issues and shed light on the
legal position and principles set by the judiciary.

 

What is required is a very critical
examination of the issues and the interpretation of relevant statutory
provisions in light of the principles of the law settled by various judicial
pronouncements. Needless to say, the readers may apply the views expressed in
this article based on the fact of this case and after obtaining expert opinion.
_ 

 

55 TDS – Section 194J – A. Ys. 2009-10 to 2012-13 – Fees for professional and technical services – Scope of section 194J – State Development Authority newly constituted getting its work done through another existing unit – Reimbursement of expenses by State Development Authority – Not payment of fees – Tax not deductible at source

Princ. CIT vs. H. P. Bus Stand Management and Development Authority; 400 ITR 451 (HP):

The assessee, the H. P. Bus Stand Management and Development Authority, an entity established for development and management of bus stands within the State of Himachal Pradesh, was established w.e.f. April 1, 2000. Prior thereto, such work was being carried out by the State Road Transport Corporation itself. Since the assesee had no independent establishment and infrastructure of its own to carry out the objects, a decision was taken to have the same executed through the employees of the Corporation. This arrangement was to continue till such time as the assessee developed its own infrastructure. Since ongoing projects were required to be executed, which was so done in public interest, as per the arrangement arrived at, certain payments were released by the assessee in favour of the Corporation. The expenditure was to be shared by way of reimbursement. Since the assesee did not deduct any amount in terms of section 194J of the Act, with respect to the amount paid to the Corporation, the Assessing Officer disallowed the deduction of the amount paid to the Corporation for failure to deduct tax at source. The Commissioner (Appeal) and the Tribunal deleted the addition.

On appeal by the
Revenue, the Himachal Pradesh High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal
and held as under:

 

“i) The
arrangement arrived at between the two entities could not be said to be that of
rendering professional services. No legal, medical, engineering, architectural
consultancy, technical consultancy, accountancy, nature of interior decoration
or development was to be rendered by the Corporation. Similarly, no service,
which could be termed to be technical service, was provided by the corporation
to the Development Authority, so also no managerial, technical or consultancy
services were provided.

ii) The arrangement was
simple. The staff of the corporation was to carry out the work of development and management of the
Development Authority till such time as, the assessee developed its
infrastructure and the expenditure so incurred by the Corporation was to be
apportioned on agreed terms. It was only pursuant to such arrangement, that the
assessee disbursed the payment to the Corporation and no amount of tax was
required to be deducted at source on the payment.” _

54 Special deduction u/s. 80-IA – A. Y. 2008-09 – Development or operation and maintenance of infrastructure facility – Scope – Deduction is profit linked – Ownership of undertaking is not important – Successor in business can claim deduction

Kanan Devan Hills Plantation Co. P. Ltd. vs. ACIT; 400 ITR 43 (Ker):

The assessee took over the going concern, a tea estate with all its incidental business. A power distribution system with a network of transmission lines was part of that acquisition. The assessee maintained that in 2007-08, it renovated and modernised the transmission lines by investing huge amounts. So for the A. Y. 2008-09, it claimed tax benefits u/s. 80-IA of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim for deduction u/s. 80-IA of the Act. Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal upheld the disallowance.

On appeal by the assessee, the Kerala High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i)    Section 80-IA applies to an “undertaking” referred to clause (ii) or clause (iv) or clause (vi) of sub-section (4) if it fulfills the enumerated conditions. The assessee’s undertaking fell in clause (iv) of sub-section (4). In accordance with the conditions stipulated, the assessee ought not to have formed the undertaking by splitting up or reconstructing an existing business. Here there was neither splitting up nor reconstructing the existing business. The assessee had produced an audited certificate that the written down value of the plant and machinery as on April 1, 2004 was Rs. 89,39,340. It claimed that it spent for the A. Y. 2008-09 Rs. 50.31 lakhs to renovate and modernise its transmission network. So, the amount spent was over 50% of the then existing establishment book value. The undertaking squarely fell u/s. 80-IA(4)(iv)(c) of the Act.

ii)    The renovation or modernisation, admittedly took place between April 1, 2004 and March 31, 2011. In the circumstances the Assessing Officer’s disallowing Rs. 58,91,000 u/s. 80-IA of the Act, as affirmed by the appellate authority and the Tribunal, could not be sustained. So we answer the question of law in the assessee’s favour. As a corollary, we set aside the Tribunal’s impugned order and allow the appeal.”

53 Reassessment – Sections 147 and 148- A. Y. 2008-09 – Notice on ground that shareholders of company were fictitious persons – Shareholders other public registered companies – Notice based on testimony of two individuals who had not been cross-examined – Notice not valid

Princ. CIT vs. Paradise Inland Shipping P. Ltd.; 400 ITR 439 (Bom):

For the A. Y. 2008-09, the assessment of the assessee company was reopened on the ground that the shareholders of the assessee – company were fictitious persons. The Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal held that the reopening was not valid.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:
“i)    The notice of reassessment had been issued on the ground that the shareholders of the assessee-company were fictitious persons. The shareholders were other companies. The documents which had been produced were basically from public offices, which maintain records of companies. The documents also included the assessment orders of such companies for the three preceding years. Besides the documents also included the registration of the companies which disclosed their registered addresses.

ii)    The Commissioner (Appeals) as well as the Tribunal on the basis of the appreciation of the evidence on record, concurrently came to the conclusion that the existence of the companies was based on documents produced from public records.

iii)    The Revenue was seeking to rely upon the statements recorded of two persons who had admittedly not been subjected to cross-examination. Hence the question of remanding the matter for re-examination of such persons would not at all be justified. The notice was not valid and had to be quashed. The appeal stands rejected.”

52 Penalty – Concealment of income – Section 271(1)(c) – A. Y. 2009-10 – Claim for deduction – Difference of opinion among High Courts regarding admissibility of claim – Particulars regarding claim furnished – No concealment of income – Penalty cannot be levied

Principal CIT vs. Manzoor Ahmed Walvir; 400 ITR 89 (J&K):
 
For the A. Y. 2009-10, the assessee had made a claim and had disclosed the relevant facts. The claim involved the interpretation of section 40(a)(ia) of the Act, and in particular the word “payable. There were different judgments of the High Courts both in favour of the assessee and against the assessee. The claim was disallowed by the Assessing Officer. On that basis, the Assessing Officer also imposed penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) of the Act for concealment of income. The Tribunal deleted the penalty.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Jammu and Kashmir High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i)    There had been disallowance by interpreting the word “payable” in section 40(a)(ia) to include payments made during the year. Some High Courts had taken the view that the expression “payable” did not include amounts paid, while others had taken the view that the expression “payable” included amounts paid during the year. The Supreme Court finally resolved the controversy in Palam Gas Services vs. CIT; 394 ITR 300 (SC) holding that the expression “payable” included not only the amounts which remained payable at the end of the year, but also the amounts paid during the year.

ii)    When the assessee made the claim, this issue was debatable and, therefore, in so far as the deduction of tax at source on amounts paid was concerned, the position was that, while it could be made the subject of disallowance, it could not form the basis for imposing a penalty. The deletion of penalty by the Tribunal was justified.”

51 Loss – Carry forward and set off – Section 72(1) – A. Y. 2005-06 – Loss of current year and carried forward loss of earlier year from non-speculative business can be set off against profit of speculative business of current year

CIT vs. Ramshree Steels Pvt. Ltd.; 400 ITR 61 (All)

The assessee filed Nil return for A. Y. 2005-06, after setting off loss of the earlier year to the extent of profit. The Assessing Officer computed the total income at Rs. 2,17,46,490, treating the share trading business as speculative profit to an amount of Rs. 3,84,09,932. The Commissioner (Appeals) enhanced the income and held that the amount of Rs. 3,84,09,932 was to be taxed and the business loss of Rs. 1,66,63,443 was to be carried forward after verification by the assessing authority. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s appeal and directed the Assessing Officer to allow the set off of loss from non-speculative business against profit from speculative business.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Department contended that section 72(1) provided that the non-speculative business loss could be set off against “profit and gains, if any, of any business or profession” carried on by the assessee and was assessable in that assessment year, and when it could not be so set off, it should be carried forward to the following assessment year.

The Allahabad High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“The order of the Tribunal, based on material facts and supported by the decisions of Supreme Court and the High Court, need not be interfered with. The appeal filed by the Department is accordingly dismissed.”

50 Recovery of Tax – Company in liquidation – Liabilities of directors – Section 179 – A. Ys. 2006-07 to 2011-12 – Assessee was a director of private limited company – She filed instant writ petition contending that order passed against her u/s. 179(1) was without jurisdiction because no effort was made by revenue to recover tax dues from defaulting private limited company – Held: Assessing Officer can exercise jurisdiction u/s. 179(1) against assessee only when it fails to recover its dues from Private Limited Company, in which assessee is a director – Such jurisdictional requirement cannot be said to be satisfied by a mere statement in impugned order that recovery proceedings had been conducted against defaulting private limited company – Since, in instant case, show cause notice u/s. 179(1) did not indicate or give any particulars in respect of steps taken by department to recover tax dues from defaulting private limited company, impugned order was to be set aside

Madhavi Kerkar vs. ACIT; [2018] 90 taxmann.com 55 (Bom)

The assessee was a director of private limited company. The Assessing Officer passed an order u/s. 179(1) against her for recovery of the tax dues of the company from her. She filed a writ petition challenging the validity of the said order u/s. 179(1). According to the assessee, in terms of section 179(1) the revenue was clothed with jurisdiction to proceed against directors of a private limited company to recover its dues only where the tax dues of the Private Limited Company could not be recovered from it. It was the case of the assessee that no effort was made to recover the tax dues from the defaulting private limited company.

The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

“i)    The revenue would acquire/get jurisdiction to proceed against the directors of the delinquent Private Limited Company only after it has failed to recover its dues from the Private Limited Company, in which the assessee is a director. This is a condition precedent for the Assessing Officer to exercise jurisdiction u/s. 179 (1) against the director of the delinquent company. The jurisdictional requirement cannot be said to be satisfied by a mere statement in the impugned order that the recovery proceedings had been conducted against the defaulting Private Limited Company but it had failed to recover its dues. The above statement should be supported by mentioning briefly the types of efforts made and its results.

ii)    Therefore, appropriately, the notice to show cause issued u/s. 179 (1) to the directors of the delinquent Private Limited Company must indicate albeit, briefly, the steps taken to recover the tax dues and its failure. In cases where the notice does not indicate the same and the assessee raises the objection of jurisdiction on the above account, then the assessee must be informed of the basis of the Assessing Officer exercising jurisdiction and the notice’/directors response, if any, should be considered in the order passed u/s. 179 (1) of the Act.

iii)    In this case the show-cause notice u/s. 179 (1) did not indicate or give any particulars in respect of the steps taken by the department to recover the tax dues of the defaulting Private Limited Company and its failure. The assessee in response to the above notice, questioned the jurisdiction of the revenue to issue the notice u/s. 179 (1) and sought details of the steps taken by the department to recover tax dues from the defaulting Private Limited Company. In fact, in its reply, the assessee pointed out that the defaulting company had assets of over Rs.100 crore.

iv)    Admittedly, in this case no particulars of steps taken to recover the dues from the defaulting company were communicated to the assessee nor indicated in the impugned order. In this case except a statement that recovery proceedings against the defaulting assessee had failed, no particulars of the same are indicated, so as to enable the assessee to object to it on facts. In the above view, the impugned order is set aside.”

49 Income – Expenditure – Sections 2(24) and 36(1)(v) : A. Ys. 2002-03 and 2003-04 – Grant received from Government – Assessee a sick unit, receiving grant for disbursement of voluntary retirement payments – Grant received by assessee from Government cannot be treated as income – Payment to employees towards voluntary retirement scheme from grant allowable as deduction – Payment of gratuity from fund granted by Government is deductible u/s. 36(1)(v)

Scooters India Ltd. vs. CIT; 399 ITR 559 (All):

The assessee, a company owned by the Government of India, manufactured and marketed three wheelers. The assessee was a sick unit and was implementing revival or rehabilitation approved by the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction. The Government of India remitted a grant out of the national renewal fund for implementation of a voluntary retirement scheme. Payment was made by the assessee to the employees towards the voluntary retirement scheme out of the grant. For the A. Y. 2002-03, the assessee furnished the return showing income at Rs. 2,51,25,472 for the current year and setting off part of brought forward losses against the income. The Assessing Officer treated the grant as income of the assessee and disallowed the expenditure incurred by it on voluntary retirement scheme and also disallowed gratuity. The Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal confirmed this.  

On appeal by the assessee, the Allahabad High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i)    The grant or subsidy was forwarded by the Government of India to help the assessee in its revival by making payment to employees towards voluntary retirement scheme. It was a voluntary remittance fund by the Government of India to the assessee. The Department failed to show anything so as to bring “grant” or “subsidy” it within any particular clause of section 2(24) of the Act. The amount of grant received by the assessee from the Government of India could not be treated as income.

ii)    The payment to employees towards voluntary retirement scheme was to be allowed. The narrow interpretation straining language of section 36(1)(v) of the Act so as to deny deduction to the assessee should not be followed since the objective of the fund was achieved. The payment of gratuity was to be allowed.”

48 Export business – Special deduction u/s. 10B – A. Y. 2008-09 – Gains derived from fluctuation in foreign exchange rate – Receipt on account of export – Is in nature of income from export – Entitled to deduction u/s. 10B

Princ. CIT vs. Asahi Songwon Colors Ltd.; 400 ITR 138 (Guj):

For the A. Y. 2008-09, the Assessing Officer disallowed the deduction u/s. 10B of the Act, on profits arising due to the foreign exchange rate fluctuation on the ground that it was not income derived from the Industrial undertaking. The Commissioner (Appeals) deleted the disallowance and the deletion was confirmed by the Tribunal.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i)    The income or loss due to fluctuation in the exchange rate of foreign currency that arose out of the export business of the assessee did not lose the character of income from assessee’s export business. Deduction u/s. 10B was permissible if profit and gains were derived from export. The exact remittance in connection with such export depended on the precise exchange rate at the time when the amount was remitted.

ii)    The receipt was on account of the export made, and therefore, the fluctuation thereof must also be said to have arisen out of the export business. Merely because of fluctuation in the international currencies, the income did not get divested of the character of income from export business.
iii)    Therefore, the Tribunal did not commit any error in deleting the addition made on account of fluctuation in foreign exchange rates from the deduction u/s. 10B. No question of law arose.”

Sale Vis-À-Vis Service Qua Treatment In Hospital

Introduction

In pre GST era, whether a particular
transaction is sale or service has always remained debatable issue. There are a
number of judgements involving the above controversy. Recently, in Maharashtra,
there arose a controversy about nature of transaction in treatment of in-house
patients in a hospital. In hospital, when the patient is admitted, he is given
medical treatment. The treatment includes services of doctors as well as giving
medicines as may be required. In this transparent era, normally, hospitals show
charges towards medicines separately and other charges like bed charges, room
charges etc., separately. Although, this entire in-house treatment is
generally considered as single transaction of service, thus not liable for VAT.
But, in case of Saifee Hospital, while deciding first appeal, the
first appellate authority took a view that the receipts toward medicines are
liable to tax under MVAT Act. Similarly, estimations were made towards food
supply out of composite charges for room. There were also receipts towards
special beds and mattresses. These charges were also held to be liable to VAT
under ‘Transfer of right to use goods’.

 

Against the above first appeal order, second
appeal was filed before Hon. M.S.T. Tribunal. Hon. Tribunal has recently delivered
judgment in case of Saifee Hospital (Second Appeal No.190 of 2016 dated
8.12.2017).

 

Issues raised by
first appeal order

 The
Hon. Tribunal has noted that the following issues are raised by the first
appellate authority and after giving hearing, the first appellate authority
held them as liable to tax under MVAT Act.

 

“According to the first appellate authority,
the following transactions were liable to tax,

 

1) The supply of drugs and
medicines and other surgical goods effected by pharmacy/drugstore to indoor
admitted patients, is a sale liable to VAT.

2)  Provision of food in hospital to admitted patients received in
the composite charges received from patients for the bed charges is a sale of
food and liable to VAT.

3) Supply of dental materials/implants
by dental Department is a sale liable to VAT.      

4)  Hire charges for mattresses
are liable to VAT.

5)  Provisions of goods like
special beds and equipments where hire charges have been received from patients
is deemed sale in the nature of transfer of right to use any goods.”

 

Arguments on
behalf of the appellant

The Hon. Tribunal has noted the submissions
made by the appellant in detail. The indicative grounds of appeal are as under:

 

1. On introduction of VAT,
specific query was made with the Commissioner of Sales Tax about liability of
tax on medicines administered to in-patients for treatment.

     The Commissioner of Sales
Tax, vide letter dated 26.12.2007, has clearly stated that the dominant
intention in administering medicines to in-patients is treatment of diseases
and not supply/sale of medicines consumables or implants.

2.  The department has further
issued circular no.7A of 2008 dated 13.3.2008, wherein also, following BSNL,
same position is reiterated.

3.  Even if pharmacy from where
medicines are supplied is owned by hospital, so far as supply of medicines for
treatment to in-patients is concerned it is not sale. So far as sale by
pharmacy over counter to outpatients or general public is concerned, it is
considered as sale under MVAT Act and due VAT has been discharged.        

4.  Various judgements on very
same issue were cited like:

(a) Dr. Hemendra Surana (90 STC
251) wherein it is held that taking x-ray and giving report is not a works
contract activity. 

(b) Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. (145 STC 91)(SC), where it is observed
that medicines provided by doctor/hospital is not sale.

(c) International Hospital Pvt.
Ltd. (Writ Tax No. 68 of 2014 decided on 6.2.2014) in which use of stents for
treatment of patient is held as not amounting to sale.

(d) Tata Main Hospital (2208
NTN Vol-36 149) and Fortis Healthcare (CWP 1922 to 1924 of 2012 dated
23.1.2015).

 

In the above judgements, the respective High
Courts have held that treatment of in-house patients is not amounting to
sale.  

 

5.  Even the extended meaning
of ‘sale’ under Article 366 (29A) does not cover such services. Various
judgements were cited in support of the same.

 

6.  In relation to charging the
medicines at MRP used for in-patient, it was contended that there is no tax
collection. Reliance was placed on the judgement of Hon. Supreme Court in case
of Hindustan Lever Ltd. (93 VST 452).

 

Arguments on
behalf of Department

Supporting the order of the first appellate
authority, the department made elaborative arguments. Indicative arguments are
noted as under:

 

(1) In pharmacy, there is common stock and there is no difference
between supplying medicines over the counter and supplied for treatment of
in-patient.

 

(2) To show sales of goods,
Department also cited instances that the patients take away unused medicines
with them while taking discharge.

 

(3) Judgements cited, including
BSNL were tried to be distinguished on ground that they relate to composite
transaction sand not the one where sale is discernible.

 

(4) The judgments relating to
medicine services were also tried to be distinguished on ground that the facts
were different, mainly that there was no sale from pharmacy owned by very same
hospital.

 

(5) Judgements of Kerala High
Court in case of Malankara Orthodox Syrian Church (135 STC 224)(Ker) and
PRS Hospital vs. State of Kerala, 2003 (11) KTR 176 were relied
upon. In those judgements, based on facts and legal position under respective
Act, the activity of Hospital was held as covered by Sales Tax Acts.

 

(6) The arguments were also
made to treat these transactions as deemed sales by Works Contract or transaction
of hotel service on ground there is transfer of medicines/food for human
consumption.

 

(7) The provisions of MRP/Drug
Price Control Order relied upon to suggest that the prices are inclusive of
tax. It was contended that tax is collected which cannot be allowed to be
retained by hospital.     

 

The Hon. Tribunal has analysed arguments
from both sides in elaborate manner.

 

The Hon. Tribunal held that the basic nature
of transaction is of rendition of services. The intention of parties is not to
sell/purchase medicines, but to be administered by doctors in course of
treatment.

 

The Hon. Tribunal examined position whether
there is discernible sale or not, in following words.

     

“44. The next question is whether the supply
of medicine in the course of treatment are discernible sale so as to attract
the main definition of sale i.e. sale as per the Sales of Goods Act. The
Appellant Officer in para 116 of his order remarks that intention of private
hospital is to sell the medicine and earn profit. This may be so, but whether
the patient intends to purchase medicine when admitted to hospital? Even in a
composite contract, for a sale to be discernible, it must satisfy all the
criteria for sale as per sale of goods Act. In Gannon Dunkerley (8 STC) the concept
of sale has been discussed.

 

In para 16 the Court has said :

 

“.. In order to constitute a sale, it is
necessary that there should be an agreement between the parties for the purpose
of transferring goods which of course presupposes capacity to contract, that it
must be supported by money consideration and that as a result of the
transaction property must actually pass in goods. Unless all these elements are
present, there can be no sale.”

 

“We are accordingly of the opinion that on
true interpretation of expression ‘sale of goods’ there must be an agreement
between the parties for the sale of very goods in which property eventually
passes.”

 

45.Thus, when a patient is admitted to
hospital, his intention is not to buy medicines, nor the medicines identified
or agreed to be delivered to patient before administering the same during
course of the treatment. It is not correct to say that as soon as bills are
prepared by pharmacy, the goods are ascertained and delivered to the patients.
These bills to inpatient according to appellate authority himself, are as per
requirement of DCPO and for the purpose of books to be maintained according to
DCPO. In large organisations, which to an outsider is single entity, there may
be internal divisions incorporating the concept of profit centre for each
division. Such divisions do not make them a separate entity from the single
whole for transaction with outside person. Internal dynamism may allow pharmacy
to operate as a profit Centre, treating everything issued from it same as any
other sale, but that does not make it a sale same as over the counter sale to
customer. The fact that billing from over the counter and to a patient in same
and same price is charged also does not make it different. In a restaurant,
there may be sale from counter as well as service. The billing may be same and
even  price may be same for the both
types of sales, yet first is sale simplicitor and second is a deemed sale.”

The Tribunal refuted each and every argument
of department by giving elaborate explanation.

 

The argument that it can be deemed sale
under clauses 366(29A) is also rejected.

 

It is held that the circular issued by
Commissioner of Sales Tax is binding. It is also held that though charges for
medicines are at MRP, there is no collection of tax but it is price.

 

The Hon. Tribunal thus concurred with
appellant hospital and set aside the order of first appellate authority.

 

In respect of argument about charges for
special bed etc. also the Tribunal held that there is no lease
transaction. The patient cannot take such goods outside. Therefore, there is no
lease sale in respect of such goods also.

 

Similarly, there cannot be tax on food
included in room rent as it is not separable nor provided for in Rules. Rule 59
of MVAT Rules is meant for hotels and not for hospitals. Tribunal deleted such
levy also.

 

Finally, the Hon. Tribunal allowed appeal in
favour of appellant in all respects.      

 

Conclusion     

The judgement will definitely give respite
to worried hospitals. The Hon. Tribunal has set guidelines for levying tax
under MVAT Act. This judgement will be useful in various other situations. _

 

13 Section 12A(2) – First proviso to section 12A(2) inserted by the Finance Act, 2014, with effect from 1.10.2014, being a beneficial provision intended to mitigate hardships in case of genuine charitable institutions, has to be applied retrospectively.

[2017] 87
taxmann.com 113 (Amritsar – Tribunal.)

Punjab
Educational Society vs. ITO

ITA No. :
459/Asr/2016

A.Y. : 2011-12                                                                    
Date of Order:  20th  November, 2017


FACTS 

The assessee, an educational institution,
filed its return of income for AY 2011-12 on 29.09.2011, declaring total income
at Rs. Nil. During the course of assessment proceedings the Assessing Officer
(AO) observed that the assessee society during the year under consideration had
shown excess of income over expenditure of Rs. 34,31,521 which was transferred
to its Reserves and Surplus account. Since the gross receipts of the assessee
society, which was neither registered u/s. 12A nor approved u/s. 10(23C)(vi) of
the Act had during the previous year relevant to assessment year 2011-12
exceeded Rs. One crore, the AO called upon the assessee to explain why the same
may not be brought to tax in his hands. 

 

The assessee submitted that it was
registered u/s. 12AA(1)(b)(i) of the Act with the competent authority with
effect from AY 2012-13, therefore, it being a charitable society which was
running an educational institution, could not be denied exemption for the
reason that its gross receipts had exceeded Rs. One crore. It also submitted
that it had applied its income purely for accomplishment of its objects as per
section 11(5), therefore, its income could not be subjected to tax.

 

The AO taxed the sum of Rs. 34,31,521 as the
assessee society had not applied for the grant of registration u/s. 12AA with
the prescribed authority nor was approved u/s. 10(23C)(vi) or (via) for AY
2011-12.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
before the CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO.

 

HELD

The Tribunal observed that the issue
involved in the present appeal lies in a narrow compass viz. as to whether the
CIT(A) was right in concluding that the first proviso of section 12A(2) would
be applicable to the facts of the present assessee or not. It noted that the
first proviso of section 12A(2) had been made available on the statute vide
the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2014, with effect from 01.10.2014. It also observed
that a perusal of the Explanatory notes of the Memorandum to Finance (No. 2)
bill, 2014 explaining the objects and reasons for making available the first
proviso to section 12A(2) on the statute reveals that it was in order to
mitigate the hardships caused to charitable institutions, which despite having
satisfied the substantive conditions rendering them eligible for claim of
exemption, however, for technical reasons were saddled with tax liability in
the prior years, due to absence of registration u/s. 12AA.

 

It noted that the issue as to whether the
beneficial provisions made available on the statute by the legislature in all
its wisdom, vide the Finance (No. 2) ‘Act’, 2014 with effect from
01.10.2014 were to be given a retrospective effect, or not, had already
deliberated upon and adjudicated by this Tribunal in bunch matters of St.
Judes Convent School vs. Asstt. CIT [2017] 164 ITD 594/77 taxmann.com 173
(Asr.).

 

The Tribunal, having given a thoughtful
consideration to the aforesaid observations of the Tribunal, found itself to be
in agreement with the view taken therein. The Tribunal held that the first
proviso of section 12A(2) as had been made available on the statute vide
the Finance (No. 2) ‘Act’. 2014, with effect from 01.10.2014, being a
beneficial provision intended to mitigate the hardships in case of genuine
charitable institutions, would be applicable to the case of the present
assessee. It set aside the order of the CIT(A) and consequently deleted the
addition of Rs.34,31,521/- sustained by her.

 

The appeal filed by the assessee was
allowed.

12 Sections 115JAA, 234B – For the purposes of calculating the levy of interest u/s. 234B of the Act, amount of “assessed tax” is to be determined after reducing the entire MAT credit (including surcharge and cess) u/s. 115JAA.

2017] 88 taxmann.com 28 (Kolkata – Trib.)

Bhagwati Oxygen Ltd. vs. ACIT

ITA No. : 240(Kol) of 2016

A.Y.: 2011-12     
Date of Order:  15th November,
2017


FACTS

The assessee, a private limited company,
electronically filed its return of income for the assessment year 2011-12
disclosing total income of Rs. 1,41,26,460/. The assessee computed the tax
liability at Rs. 46,92,789/- including surcharge and cess under the normal
provisions of the Act.  The assessee
computed the book profit u/s. 115JB of the Act at Rs. 92,42,889/- and
determined the tax payable thereon at Rs. 17,13,632/- including surcharge and
cess. The assessee computed the MAT credit u/s. 115JAA of the Act to be
adjusted in future years at Rs. 29,79,157/- ( 46,92,789 – 17,13,632).

 

This return was processed u/s. 143(1) by
Centralized Processing Centre, Bangalore (in short “CPC”) wherein the
total income under normal provisions of the Act was determined at Rs.
1,41,27,460/- and tax @ 30% thereon was determined at Rs. 42,38,238/-. In the
said intimation u/s. 143(1) the book profit u/s. 115JB of the Act was
determined at Rs. 92,42,889/- and tax @ 18% was determined at Rs. 16,63,720/-.
Accordingly, the CPC in the intimation u/s. 143(1) of the Act determined the
MAT credit u/s. 115JAA of the Act at Rs. 25,74,518/- (4238238 – 1663720). While
determining the MAT credit u/s. 115JAA CPC completely ignored the surcharge
portion and cess portion computed by the assessee, both under normal provisions
of the Act as well as under computing the tax liability u/s. 115JB of the Act.
In view of this, the assessee was fastened with a demand payable.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to CIT(A). In the course of appellate proceedings the assessee placing reliance
on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. K.
Srinivasan [1972] 83 ITR 346,
among other decisions, pleaded that surcharge
and cess are nothing but a component of tax. The CIT (A) however, was not
convinced with the argument of the assessee and upheld the demand raised by the
CPC in the intimation u/s. 143(1).

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the Tribunal.

 

HELD 

The Tribunal observed that –

 

(i)   the issue under dispute
has been addressed against the assessee by the decision of Delhi Tribunal in
the case of Richa Global Exports (P.) Ltd. vs. Asstt. CIT [2012] 25
taxmann.com 1/54 SOT 185
;

(ii)  the issue under dispute
is covered in favour of the assessee by the Co-ordinate Bench of Hyderabad
Tribunal in the case of Virtusa (India) (P.) Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT [2016] 67
taxmann.com 65/157 ITD 1160
;  

(iii)  the Hyderabad Tribunal
after considering the decision of Delhi Tribunal (supra) and after
considering the decision of the Apex Court in the case of K. Srinivasan
(supra)
had held that tax includes surcharge and cess and accordingly the
entire component of taxes including surcharge and cess shall have to be
reckoned for calculating the MAT credit u/s. 115JAA of the Act;  

(iv) the Hon’ble Apex Court had
in the case referred to supra, had held that meaning of word ‘surcharge’
is nothing but an ‘additional tax’.

 

It held that this understanding of surcharge
and cess being included as part of the tax gets further sanctified by the
amendment which has been brought in section 234B of the Act in Explanation 1
Clause 5, while defining the expression ‘assessed tax’. Having considered the
language of Explanation 1 to section 234B of the Act it observed that from the
said provisions it could be inferred that the legislature wanted to treat the
payment of entire taxes (including surcharge and cess) eligible for MAT credit
u/s. 115JAA while calculating the interest on ‘assessed tax’ u/s. 234B of the
Act, meaning thereby, the assessed tax shall be determined after reducing the
entire MAT credit u/s. 115JAA of the Act for the purpose of calculating
interest u/s. 234B of the Act. It observed that this is clinching evidence of
the intention of the legislature not to deprive any credit of any payment of
surcharge and cess made by the assessee either in the MAT or under the normal
provisions of the Act. It noted that it is not in dispute that the surcharge
and cess portion was not paid by the assessee along with the tax portion. The
bifurcation of the total payment of taxes by way of tax, surcharge and cess is
only for the administrative convenience of the Union of India in order to know
the purpose for which the said portion of amounts are to be utilised for their
intended purposes. Hence, the bifurcation is only for utilisation aspect and
does not change the character of payment in the form of taxes from the angle of
the assessee. As far as assessee is concerned, it had simply discharged the
statutory dues comprising of tax, surcharge and cess to the Union of India and
hence if paid in excess, would be eligible for either refund or adjustment as
contemplated u/s. 115JAA of the Act. It observed that if the version of the
CIT(A) is to be accepted, then it would result in an situation wherein if the
assessee is entitled for refund, he would not be entitled for refund on the
surcharge and cess portion. This cannot be the intention of the legislature and
it is already well settled that the tax is to be collected only to the extent
as authorised by law in terms of Article 265 of the Constitution and the
department cannot be unjustly enriched with the surcharge and cess portion of
the amounts actually paid by the assessee. It held that the reliance placed on
behalf of the assessee on the decision of Hyderabad Tribunal is well founded
and squarely applies to resolve the dispute in the present case.

 

The Tribunal allowed this ground of appeal
filed by the assessee.

11 Section 201(1A) – Interest u/s. 201(1A), on delay in deposit of TDS, is to be calculated for the period from the date on which tax was deducted till the date on which the tax was deposited.

[2017] 88 taxmann.com 103 (Ahmedabad)

Bank of Baroda vs. DCIT

ITA No. : 1503/Ahd./2015

A.Y.: 2014-15                     
Date of Order:  30th November,
2017


FACTS 

The assessee, a branch of a nationalised
bank, deposited tax deducted at source, u/s. 194A of the Act, for the month of
September 2014 on 8th October, 2014. While processing the TDS return
u/s. 200A, a sum of Rs. 2,78,607 was charged as interest for delay in
depositing the tax at source, for a period of two months, i.e. September and
October 2014. This interest amount of Rs.2,78,607/- was sought to be recovered
by the Assessing Officer.

 

Aggrieved, by the action of levying interest
for a period of two months, assessee carried the matter in appeal before the
CIT(A) who observed that the issue in dispute is whether the day on which tax
was deducted is to be excluded or not. Relying on the decision of the Hon’ble
Apex Court in Criminal Appeal No.1079 of 2006 in case of Econ Antri Ltd. vs.
Ron Industries Ltd. & Anr,
in order dated 26-03-2013 he held that for
the purpose of calculating period of one month, the period has to be reckoned
by excluding the date on which the cause of action arose. He held that the
assessee was liable to pay interest for a period of one month.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the Tribunal.

 

HELD  

The Tribunal observed that the time limit
for depositing the tax deducted at source u/s. 194A, as set out in rule
30(2)(b) – which applies in the present context, is “on or before seven
days from the end of the month in which the deduction is made”. It noted
that since the TDS was deposited on 8th of October 2014, admittedly
there was clearly a delay in depositing tax at source. It noted that the
contention on behalf of the assessee is that the levy of interest should be
reduced to actual period of delay in depositing the tax at source, i.e. from
the date on which tax was deducted and till the date on which tax was
deposited. It is only if such a period exceeds one month, then the question of
levy of interest will arise. It observed that what has been done in the present
case is that the interest has been charged for two calendar months, i.e.
September and October. It held that the question of levy of interest for the
second month can arise only if the period of time between the date on which tax
was deducted and the date on which tax was paid to the Government exceeds one
month. The Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to re-compute the levy of
interest u/s. 201(1A) accordingly.

 

10 Section 201(1)/201(1A) r.w.s 191- Before treating the payer as an assessee in default u/s. 201(1), since the ITO(TDS) did not requisition information from the recipients of income to ascertain whether or not taxes have been paid by them, there is violation of mandate of explanation to section 191 and thus invocation of jurisdiction u/s. 201(1)/(1A) is void.

Aligarh Muslim University vs. ITO

(2017) 158 DTR (Agra) (Trib) 19

ITA No: 191/Agra/2016

A.Y.:2015-16
Date of Order: 15th May, 2017

FACTS

The assessee/deductor university paid salary
to its employees after deducting tax u/s. 192. The ITO (TDS) noticed that the
assessee was allowing exemption u/s. 10(10AA)(i) on the payment of leave salary
at the time of retirement/superannuation to its employees, considering them as
employees of Central Government. The Assessing Officer treated the assessee as
an assessee in default u/s. 201/201(1A) for short deduction of tax due to
allowing the exemption u/s. 10(10AA)(i) beyond the maximum limit of Rs. 3 lakh.

 

On appeal to the CIT(A), the CIT(A) directed
the ITO(TDS) to allow the assessee to adduce evidence that the deductees had
themselves paid due tax on their leave salary and then, to recompute the
amounts in respect of which the assessee would be an assessee in default u/s. 201(1).

 

The assessee preferred an appeal to the
Tribunal and argued that in order to declare the assessee as assessee in default,
the condition precedent is that the payee had failed to pay tax directly and it
is only after the finding that the payee had failed to pay tax directly, that
the assessee could be deemed to be an assessee in default in respect of such
tax.

 

HELD

A bare perusal of the Explanation to section
191 itself makes it clear that it is only when the employer fails to deduct the
tax and the employee has also failed to pay tax directly, that the employer can
be deemed to be an assessee in default. In other words, in order to treat the
employer as an assessee in default, it is a pre-requisite that it be
ascertained that employee has also not paid the tax due.

 

The CIT (A) has stated that before him, no
evidence was produced to show as to which of the employees of the University
had paid due taxes in respect of leave salary income on which TDS was not made
properly and that it was therefore, that he was unable to quantify the relief
that can be allowed in respect of such employees.

 

The Tribunal held that it was not within the
purview of the CIT(A) to fill in the lacuna of the ITO (TDS). In fact,
it was for the ITO (TDS) to ascertain the position, as prescribed by the
Explanation to section 191, that is, as to whether the deductee had failed to
pay the due tax directly, and only thereafter to initiate proceedings to deem
the assessee as an assessee in default u/s. 201(1) of the Act. As observed by
the Allahabad High Court in the case of Jagran Prakashan Ltd vs. DCIT
reported in 345 ITR 288,
this is a foundational and jurisdictional matter
and therefore, the Appellate Authorities cannot place themselves in the
position of the ITO (TDS) to ratify a jurisdiction wrongly assumed.

 

The only prerequisite was that the details
of the persons to whom payments were made, should be available on record. And
once that is so, i.e., the assessee has submitted the requisite details to the
ITO (TDS), it is for the ITO (TDS), to ascertain, prior to invoking section
201(1) of the Act, as to whether or not the due taxes have been paid by the
recipient of the income.

 

The show cause notice issued to the
University contains the names of 237 persons with full details of payments made
to them by the University. Therefore, it is amply clear that at the time of
issuance of notice dated 02.03.2015, u/s. 201/201(1A) to the University, the
ITO (TDS) was in possession of the requisite details of the recipients of the
income. As such, the legislative mandate of the Explanation to section 191 of
the Act was violated by the ITO (TDS), by not requisitioning, before issuing
the show cause notice to the University, information from the recipients of the
income, as to whether or not the taxes had been paid by them, nor seeking such
information from the concerned Income-tax Authorities.

 

As observed, this is a foundational
jurisdictional defect going to the root of the matter. Violation of the mandate
of the Explanation to section 191 is prejudicial to the invocation of the
jurisdiction of the ITO (TDS) under sections 201/201(1A). In absence of such
compliance, the invocation of the jurisdiction is null and void ab initio.

 

As a consequence, the order under appeal no
longer survives and it is cancelled.

 

8. Depreciation – trial production – even if final production is not started – as the expenses incurred thereafter will have to be treated as incurred in the course of business and on the same basis the depreciation is admissible.: Section 32

The Pr.CIT-4
vs. Larsen and Toubro Ltd. [Income tax Appeal no 421 of 2015 dt : 06/11/2017
(Bombay High Court)].

[Larsen and
Toubro Ltd. vs. The Pr.CIT-4. [ITA No. 4771 & 4459/Mum/2005; Bench : J ;
dated 27/08/2014 ; AY 1997-98 Mum. ITAT ]

 

The assessee
had claimed depreciation in respect of the machineries which were stated to
have been installed and put to use in the production of clinker which is
intermediates stage for production of cement. The AO observed that even if the
assessee had produced 100 MT of clinker it was only a trial run for one day and
this quantity was minuscule compared to the intended production capacity and
that the assessee was not able to prove that after the trial run, commercial
production of clinker was initiated within reasonable time. The AO pointed out
that the trial runs continued till October 1997 before the reasonable quantity
of clinker was produced. The AO held that use of machinery for trial production
cannot be deemed to be user for the purpose of business and therefore
depreciation on plant and machinery used in production of clinker cannot be
allowed. The AO disallowed the claim of depreciation of Rs. 34,79,40,576/-.

 

The CIT(A) confirmed the disallowance by
observing that as per section 32 the depreciation can be allowed, only if the
assets have been used for the purpose of business carried on during the year.
The expression ‘used for the purpose of business or profession means that the
assets were capable of being put to use and were used for the purpose of
enabling the owner to carry on the business or profession. The user of assets
during the year should be actual, effective and real user in the commercial
sense. In the case of the appellant as has been pointed out by the AO, even if
it is accepted that plant and machinery used for production of intermediate
stages are eligible for depreciation, is accepted, the trial production took
place only for one day. It appears that some technical snag developed in the
plant and, therefore, immediately the trial run was stopped. The AO has stated
that the trial run continued at least till October, 1997.

 

The appellant has not produced any evidence
to show as to when exactly the commercial production started. In the present
case, the trial production by the assessee cannot be considered as the date of
user by the assessee. One cannot ignore the facts that there was substantial
gap between the first trial run and subsequent trial runs and commercial
production. From the long gap between the first trial run and subsequent trial
runs it can be said that the installation of plant and machinery even for
production of clinkers was not satisfactorily completed and was still in installation
stage. The CIT(A) confirmed the action of the AO.

 

The assessee
filed appeal before ITAT. The Tribunal observed that there is no merit in the
action of the lower authorities for denial of claim of depreciation in respect
of plant and machinery which has been put to use even for trial production,
which is also for the purpose of assessee’s business of manufacture of clinker.
The Hon’ble Gujarat High Court in the case of ACIT vs. Ashima Syntex, 251
ITR 133 (Guj)
held that even trial production of a machinery would fall
within the ambit of “used for the purpose of business” .Further, it
was held that as the statute does not prescribe a minimum time limit for
“use” of the machinery, the assessee cannot be denied the benefit of
depreciation on the ground that the machinery was used for a very short
duration for trial run. Furthermore, the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case
of CIT vs. Industrial Solvents & Chemicals Pvt. Ltd., (Mumbai) (119
ITR 615)
held that once the plant commences operation and reasonable
quantity of product is produced, the business is set up. This is so even if the
product is sub-standard and not marketable.

 

Industrial
Solvents & Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. was entirely a new company. The Court held
that once the business is set up, the expenses incurred thereafter will have to
be treated as incurred in the course of business and on the same basis, the
depreciation and development rebate admissible to the assessee company would
have to be determined. Even use of machine for one day will entitled the
assessee for claim of depreciation. Since it is not clear from the record as to
the period for which machinery was actually used by assessee, we direct the AO
to verify the period of used and restrict the claim of depreciation to 50%, if
he finds that machinery was used for less than 180 days during the year under
consideration.

 

The Revenue filed appeal before High Court. The Court observed that the issue is no longer res integra in view of the decision of Industrial Solvents & Chemicals (P) Ltd. (supra). The court observed that the Order of the Tribunal cannot be faulted inasmuch as the jurisdictional High Court has already held that once plant commences operation and even if product is substantial and not marketable, the business can said to have been set up. Mere breakdown of machinery or technical snags that may have developed after the trial run which had interrupted the continuation of further production for a period of time cannot be held ground to deprive the assessee of the benefit of depreciation claimed. In the above view, the appeal was dismissed. _

7. Revision – Difference of view – it is not open to CIT to revise it – Further CIT has considered wrong facts – revision not permissible : Section 263

Commissioner
of Income Tax-III, Pune vs. V. Raj Enterprises. [Income tax Appeal no 1335 of
2014 dt : 31/01/2017 (Bombay High Court)].

 

[V. Raj
Enterprises vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, [dated 30/09/2013 ; A Y: 2007-08
.Pune   ITAT ]

 

The Assessee is
engaged in the business of arbitrage and jobbing through various share broking
firms. For the subject AY in its ROI, assessee returned an income of Rs.2.10
crore. The AO by an order dated 30/11/2009 u/s. 143(3) of the Act, determined
the income at Rs.2.11 crore.

 

Thereafter, the
CIT in exercise of its powers u/s. 263 of the Act, by order dated 30/3/2012
revised the assessment order. The CIT held that the Assessee was not entitled
to rebate u/s. 88E of the Act in respect of STT (Security Transaction Tax) paid
as it was a share broker. Moreover, it helds that this aspect was not examined
by the AO while passing the Assessment Order.

 

Being aggrieved,
the Assessee carried the issue in appeal to the Tribunal. The Tribunal held
that the AO while passing the Assessment Order u/s. 143(3) of the Act had
verified and examined the Contract Notes, Bills of respective brokers etc.,
before granting the rebate of STT paid u/s. 88E of the Act as claimed by the
Assessee. Further, on same set of facts, the Assessee’s claim for rebate u/s.
88E of the Act had been allowed by the Revenue in the earlier Assessment Years.
Further, the order also notes that the CIT while revising the order of
Assessment proceeded on an incorrect assumption of fact that the Assessee is a
share broker. This is contrary to the facts on record as the Assessee was doing
the work of jobbing through different share brokerage firm. Thus, for the above
reasons, the Tribunal allowed the appeal and set aside the CIT order dated
30/3/2012 , passed in exercise his powers u/s. 263 of the Act. 

 

The grievance
of the Revenue in appeal before High Court was that the Assessee is not
entitled to the benefit of rebate of STT u/s. 88E of the Act. The High Court
noted that the issue arising in the appeal was a jurisdictional issue of the
powers of the CIT to exercise his powers of Revision u/s. 263 of the Act in the
present facts. The grievance of Revenue on merits of the dispute would merit
examination only if the exercise of jurisdiction u/s. 263 of the Act, is
proper. As noted by the Tribunal, the entire basis of exercising jurisdiction
u/s. 263 of the Act is on the basis of assumption of incorrect fact that the
Assessee is a share broker. This, in fact, is not so. Where the basic facts
have been misunderstood by the CIT, the exercise of powers of Revision is not
sustainable.

 

Moreover, the
same issue also arose for the earlier AYs i.e. 2005-06 and 2006-07. The Revenue
had accepted the Assessee’s claim for rebate u/s. 88E of the Act to the extent
STT is paid. Last but not the least, Revenue is not able to dispute the fact
that the AO while passing the Assessment Order dated 30th November,
2009 had granted the claim of the Petitioner for benefit u/s. 88E of the Act on
examination and verification of the Contract Notes, Bills of respective brokers
etc. Thus, on the basis of the records available and examination by the
AO, a view has been taken by the AO and it is not open to CIT to revise it
merely because his view on the same facts, is different, as held by the Apex
Court in Malbar Industrial Co. Ltd., vs. CIT 243 ITR 83 (SC).

 

In view of the
above, the revenue Appeal was dismissed.

36. Section 144C and CBDT Circulars No. 5 of 2010 dated 03/06/2010 and Circular No. 9 of 2013 dated 19/11/2013- International transactions – A. Y. 2009-10 – Transfer pricing – Arm’s length price – Assessment order – Procedure to be followed – Issuance of draft assessment orders by AO mandatory – Failure to do so – Not mere procedural error – Failure makes assessment order invalid – Circular clarifying that requirement u/s. 144C applies to all orders passed after 01/10/2009 irrespective of A. Y. – Department not entitled to rely on earlier circular saying provision applicable for A. Y. 2010-11 onwards

CIT vs. C-Sam (India) Pvt. Ltd.; 398 ITR 182 (Guj):

 

For the A. Y. 2009-10, upon a scrutiny
assessment and applying transfer pricing on account of assessee’s international
transactions with associated persons against the nil returned income, the
Assessing Officer computed the assessee’s income at Rs. 2.86 crores making
various additions and deletions according to the order of the Transfer Pricing
Officer (TPO). In appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) the assessee
challenged the validity of the assessment order and the additions on the ground
that the procedure laid down u/s. 144C of the Income-tax Act, 1961, was not
followed by the Assessing Officer. The Commissioner (Appeal) allowed the
assessee’s claim and quashed the assessment order passed u/s. 143(3) of the Act
without complying with the requirement of section 144C(1) of the Act. The
Tribunal dismissed the Department’s appeal and confirmed the order of the
Commissioner (Appeal).

 

On appeal by the Revenue, The Gujarat High
Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i)   The
procedure laid down in section 144C of the Act, is mandatory. Before the
Assessing Officer can make variations in the returned income of an eligible
assessee, section 144C(1) lays down the procedure to be followed
notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Act. This non
obstante
clause thus gives an overriding effect to the procedure. When an
Assessing Officer proposes to make variations in the returned income declared
by an eligible assessee he has to first pass a draft order, provide a copy
thereof to the assessee and only thereupon the assessee could exercise his
valuable right to raise objections before the Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP) on
any of the proposed variations. In addition to giving such opportunity to an
assessee, the decision of the DRP is made binding on the Assessing Officer. It
is therefore not possible to say that such requirement is merely procedural.
The requirement is mandatory and gives substantive rights to the assessee to
object to any additions before they are made and such objections have to be
considered not by the Assessing Officer but by the DRP. The legislative desire
is to give an important opportunity to an assessee who is likely to be
subjected to upward revision of income on the basis of transfer pricing
mechanism. Such opportunity cannot be taken away by treating it purely
procedural in nature.

ii)   Circular dated June 3,
2010 was an explanatory circular issued by the Finance Ministry in which it was
provided that the amendments (which include section 144C of the Act) are made
applicable w.e.f. October 1, 2009 and will accordingly apply in relation to A.
Y. 2010-11 and subsequent years. In the clarificatory circular dated November
19, 2013, it was provided that section 144C would apply to any order which is
being passed after October 1, 2009 irrespective of the assessment year. The
latter circular clarified what all along was the correct position in law.
Section 144C(1) itself in no uncertain terms provides that the Assessing
Officer shall forward a draft order to the eligible assessee, if he proposes to
make any variation in the income or loss which is prejudicial to the interest
of the assessee on or after October 1, 2009. The statute was thus clear,
permitted no ambiguity and required a procedure to be followed in case of any
variation which the Assessing Officer proposed to make after October 1, 2009.
The earlier circular dated June 3, 2010 did not lay down the correct criteria
in this regard.

iii)   The upward revision was
made in the income of the assessee on the basis of the order of the TPO and was
done without following the mandatory procedure laid down u/s. 144C. When the
statute permitted no ambiguity and required the procedure to be followed in
case of any variation which the Assessing Officer proposed to make after
October 1, 2009 the assessee could not be made to suffer on account of any
inadvertent error which ran contrary to the statutory provisions.

iv)  No question of law arises.
Tax appeal is therefore dismissed.”

 

35. Sections 144C(1), 156 and 271(1)(c) – International transactions – A. Ys. 2007-08 and 2008-09 – Transfer pricing – Arm’s length price – Scope of section 144C(1) – Issuance of draft assessment orders by AO mandatory – Condition not fulfilled – Assessment orders, consequent demand notices and penalty proceedings invalid

Turner International India Pvt. Ltd. vs.
Dy. CIT; 398 ITR 177 (Del):

 

The assessee was a wholly owned subsidiary
of T engaged in the business of sub-distribution of distribution rights and
sale of advertisement inventory on satellite delivered channels. For A. Ys.
2007-08 and 2008-09, the Assessing Officer made a reference u/s. 92CA of the
Act, to the Transfer Pricing Officer (TPO) who passed separate orders in
respect of the distribution activity segment. On that basis, the Assessing
Officer passed orders. The Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP) concurred with the
orders of the TPO and the final orders were passed by the Assessing Officer.
The Tribunal held that neither the assessee nor the TPO had considered the
appropriate comparables and therefore, the determination of the arm’s length
price (ALP) was not justifiable. It set aside the orders of the DRP and
remanded the matter to the Assessing Officer for undertaking a transfer pricing
study afresh and accordingly make the assessments. The TPO issued fresh notices
u/s. 92CA(2) and passed separate orders proposing upward adjustments.
Subsequently, the Assessing Officer passed orders in respect of both assessment
years confirming the additions proposed by the TPO. He also issued demand
notices u/s. 156 and notices u/s. 271(1)(c) initiating penalty proceedings.

 

The assessee filed writ petitions and
challenged the assessment orders, demand notices u/s. 156 and the notices u/s.
271(1)(c). The assessee contended that there was non-compliance with the
provisions of section 144C(1) which required the Assessing Officer to first
issue draft assessment orders.

 

The Delhi High Court allowed the writ
petitions and held as under:

“i)   The legal position is
unambiguous. The failure by the Assessing Officer to adhere to the mandatory
requirement of section 144C(1) and first pass draft assessment orders would
result in invalidation of the final assessment orders and the consequent demand
notices and penalty proceedings.

ii)   The final assessment
orders dated 31/03/2015 passed by the Assessing Officer for the A. Ys. 2007-08
and 2008-09, the consequent demand notices issued by the Assessing Officer and
the initiation of penalty proceedings are hereby set aside.”

GST – Case Studies On Valuation (Part-2)

This feature of the article
contains certain case studies where the valuation principles discussed in the
first part are given a practical perspective. 

 

Case
Study 1 : Barter/ Exchange Transactions (say Redevelopment Projects)

 

In a typical redevelopment
project, the developer agrees to deliver redeveloped flats to the existing
occupants in exchange for land/development rights. A diagrammatic presentation
of the arrangement is as follows:

 


 

 

The developer provides
construction services to two categories of customers (a) existing
occupants/land owner; and (b) new occupants/customers. As regards the former,
the developer delivers newly constructed flats of similar or larger areas (S1);
provides alternative accommodation until delivery of the new flat and also
provides some monetary payment (especially where the value of the land rights
given up is substantially high in comparison to the construction cost: S3
should be understood as excess of C1 over S1 & S2). These are in exchange
for undivided rights over the land as well as entitlement for additional flat
construction over the existing superstructure for sale to new occupants. As
regards the latter, the developer constructs the new flats and allots the same
to its customers for monetary consideration (C2). For the purpose of examining
the valuation provisions, the said transactions are assumed to be taxable in
terms of section 7 r/w Schedule II of the CGST Act.

 

Developer-Land Owner Arrangement

Section 15 of the CGST Act
states that the transaction value (being the price) would be the taxable value
of this transaction. In this transaction set-up, the developer receives
development rights as the consideration for the construction services. There is
no price (money consideration) which is agreed between the developer and the
land owner and therefore, reference would have to be made to the valuation
rules as per section 15(4) of the said Act. Valuation norms under Rule 27 may
be applied as follows:

 

(a)    OMV
of such supply (identical value of S1 and S2):
Under this
clause, the money value of an identical supply at the same time at which the
supply being made to land owners would have to be ascertained. The subject
matter of valuation is the supply (ie. value of developed flats (S1)
and not the non monetary consideration/development rights (C1). The
flats which are sold to external customers may not qualify as identical flats
since the valuation of those flats includes a host of other costs (such as land
value, etc.) which are not present in the value of flats delivered to
the existing occupants. Further, the risks undertaken by the external customers
are distinct from the risks taken by the existing occupants. At times, the
amenities are also different. Therefore, the OMV rule fails to provide a
reliable basis of valuation.

 

(b)    Monetary
value of non-monetary consideration (C1):
Unlike its
predecessor, this clause attempts to identify the monetary value of the
consideration rather than its supply i.e. value of the development rights
should be ascertained and not the value of the developed flats. It is
practically impossible to identify the monetary value of the development rights
associated with a particularly property as there is no open market for such
rights. However, in most of the cases, the development agreements attract
payment of stamp duty and hence, there is a ready reckoner valuation of the
development rights on the basis of which the stamp duty is calculated. It can
be argued that this valuation which is endorsed by the stamp duty authorities
can be the basis for identification of the monetary value of non-monetary
consideration.

 

(c)    Value
of like kind or quality (comparable value):
If the above clause fails, then
we need to proceed to this clause. This clause attempts to ascertain the value
of similar supplies i.e. value of similar flats in the same society. While the
flats can be said to be similar on parameters such as quality, materials,
reputation, etc., the value of such flats also includes the value of
land, etc. which does not form part of the bargain between the developer
and the existing occupant. The general practice of using the guideline value of
land and extracting this value does not have legal force under this rule (refer
2016 (43) S.T.R. 3 (Del.) Suresh Kumar Bansal vs. Union Of India).

Therefore, resorting to this practice at the first instance without testing
other rules may not be advisable (until Rule 31 is invoked). Hence this rule
also fails to provide a reliable basis of valuation.

 

(d)    Cost
of non-monetary component:
This clause invokes Rule 30 which requires that
the cost of provision of the service with a 10% markup can be adopted as the
value of construction service. In the absence of clear costing guidelines on
‘provision of service’, principles issued by autonomous professional bodies
could be relied upon. For example, as per the revised AS7 – Construction
Contracts issued by ICAI, contract cost is defined to comprise the following:

   Costs directly relatable to the contract;

    Costs attributable to contract activity in
general; and

   Such other Costs as are specifically
chargeable to the customer under the terms of the contract.

 

The developer can ascertain
the cost of construction of a project and allocate the costs to the respective
flats using the accounting/costing principles and load such value with the 10%
markup. In effect, cost of S1 and S2 would be the value of the development
rights in terms of section 15 of the GST law. S3 cannot be adopted as the cost
of the developed flats since it is a payment towards value of land/development
rights (excess of land value over construction value). Though this rule is
optional for service providers, it may be beneficial to opt for this rule in
projects (say Mumbai CBD) where land value is substantially high in comparison
to the construction costs. Moreover, with the advent of Real Estate Regulatory
Authority Act being legislated, project wise bank accounts would give
additional information to the builders to identify the cost of construction.

 

(e)    Residual
Rule:
Rule 31 can be invoked only when it is established that all preceding
rules have failed to provide a value in such exchange transaction. Moreover,
the option of skipping Rule 30 vests in the hands of the tax payer and not the
Revenue. Therefore, unless the revenue authorities categorically conclude that
Rule 30 is not providing a reliable basis of valuation in such arrangements,
the residual rule cannot be invoked.

 

Comparison with Service Tax Valuation
Rules

The valuation scheme under
the Service tax regime was not as comprehensive as present in the GST Law.
Section 67 followed a pattern of first identifying the money value of the
non-monetary component (C1); else, obtaining the value of similar services (C2)
and if both these mechanisms failed, it permitted the assessee to arrive at a
value not below the cost of services.

 

However, the CBEC vide
its Circular No. 151/2/2012-S.T., dated 10-2-2012 had stated that in
such cases, value of similar flats to the new occupants (C2 excluding the land
value) would form the basis of valuation for flats delivered to the existing
occupants, in a way bypassing the statutory scheme of valuation and directly looking
for an external value. On the contrary, the CBEC education guide (which was
subsequently withdrawn by a High level Committee report dated 20-1-2016) stated
that the value of land would form the basis of valuation in such scenarios.
Under the GST law, Q17 of a FAQ issued for builders has toed the line of its
earlier CBEC circular and stated that value of similar flats should be adopted
for the purpose of valuation. The said FAQ has deviated from the structured
valuation mechanism in Rule 27 and consequently gives contradictory results. In
view of the author, either the value of development rights or the cost of
construction can be adopted as the basis of valuation for land owner’s share of
flats.

 

Case
Study 2 – Exclusion on account of Pure Agency (say CHA services/ Advertising
Agency services)

 

Rule 33 provides a specific
exclusion for recoveries towards expenditure or costs incurred by a supplier as
a pure agent of the recipient. The said rule provides multiple conditions in
order to be termed as a pure agent.

But prior to examining the
issue of exclusion from the point of pure agency, one should first examine
whether the said amount is includible in taxable value in the first place.
‘Price’ is considered narrower than the phrase ‘gross amount charged’. Price
refers to the money consideration for supply and the term ‘consideration’ has
been defined in a very concise manner to mean such payments/acts (i.e.
monetary/ non-monetary) which are in respect of or in response to
or as an inducement of the supply (refer discussion on nexus theory in
earlier article). These phrases suggest that there has to be direct nexus
between the payment and the supply for the said payment to be termed as
consideration and cannot include extraneous recoveries by the supplier. Thus,
where an expense recovery is excludible from price itself and not part of any
other inclusion under valuation, the pure agency tests have no application at
all.

 

Further, the tests of pure
agency are relatively liberal in comparison to the erstwhile service tax
regime. A comparative chart of these tests under both regimes has been
provided:

 

Service Tax Law

GST Law

Implications

Section
67 used the words “gross amount charged”

Section
15(1) uses the word “price”

The
word ‘price’ is narrower than gross amount charged

Rule
5(1) specifically included all costs incurred during the course of provision
of service

No
similar inclusion. Section 15(2)(c) is restricted to pre-supply expenses
recovered which are incidental in nature

Extraneous
expense recoveries (including post delivery expense recoveries) are
excludible from valuation

Rule
5(2) exclusion subject to 12 (8+4) conditions as under:

Rule
33 exclusion subject to 7 (3+4) conditions as under:

 

(i)
    the service provider acts as a pure
agent of the recipient of service when he makes payment to third party for
the goods or services procured;

the
supplier acts as a pure agent of the recipient of the supply, when he makes
the payment to the third party on authorisation by such recipient;

Refer
discussion on pure agent below

(ii)
   the recipient of service receives and
uses the goods or services so procured by the service provider in his
capacity as pure agent of the recipient of service;

 Deleted

Supplier
need not establish receipt and use by recipient

(iii)
   the recipient of service is liable to
make payment to the third party;

Deleted

Supplier
can claim deduction even if the invoice is not directly addressed to the
recipient

(iv)
  the recipient of service authorises
the service provider to make payment on his behalf;

 Deleted, can be inferred from clause (i)

Similar
provisions

(v)
   the recipient of service knows that
the         goods and services for which
payment has been made by the service provider shall be provided by the third
party;

Deleted,
can be inferred from clause (i)

Similar
provisions

(vi)
  the payment made by the service
provider on behalf of the recipient of service has been separately indicated
in the invoice issued by the service provider to the recipient of service;

the
payment made by the pure agent on behalf of the recipient of supply has been
separately indicated in the invoice issued by the pure agent to the recipient
of service

No
change

(vii)
  the service provider recovers from the
recipient of service only such amount as has been paid by him to the third
party; and

Deleted,
Can be inferred from Clause (d) – One can argue on difference between
incurred and paid

No
substantial change

(viii)
the goods or services procured by the
service provider from the third party as a pure agent of the recipient of
service are in addition to the services he provides on his own account.

the
supplies procured by the pure agent from the third party as a pure agent of
the recipient of supply are in addition to the services he supplies on his
own account.

No
change

Explanation 1. – For the purposes of sub-rule (2), “pure agent” means a
person who –

Explanation  – For the purposes of
this rule, “pure agent” means a person who –

 

(a)
   enters into a contractual agreement
with the recipient of service to act as his pure agent to incur expenditure
or costs in the course of providing taxable service;

enters
into a contractual agreement with the recipient of supply to act as his pure
agent to incur expenditure or costs in the course of supply of goods or
services or both;

No
change

(b)    neither intends to hold nor holds any title
to the goods or services so procured or provided as pure agent of the
recipient of service;

neither
intends to hold nor holds any title to the goods or services or both so
procured or supplied as pure agent of the recipient of supply;

No
change

(c)
   does not use such goods or services
so procured; and

does
not use for his own interest such
goods or services so procured

Permits
use of the services by the supplier though chargeable to the account of the
recipient (eg. lodging in a hotel during an audit of a client)

(d)    receives only the actual amount incurred
to procure such goods or services.

receives
only the actual amount incurred to procure such goods or services in addition
to the amount received for supply he provides on his own account.

No
change

 

As is evident from the
above table, the pure agency test has been substantially borrowed from the
service tax law. Unlike the GST law, valuation under the service tax law is
focused on the ‘Gross Amount Charged’ which is definitely wider than the term
‘price/ consideration’. This is also evident from the Explanation to section 67
which stated that all amounts payable for services provided would be includible
as ‘consideration’. Moreover, by Finance Act, 2015 the service tax law
specifically included reimbursements as part of the Gross Amount Charged.
However, the GST law is narrower to the extent it focuses on the ‘price’ agreed
between the contracting parties – the intention emerging from the contract
plays a pivotal role in drawing the line between price and other amounts
charged. Further, section 15(2)(c) only includes expenses which are incidental
to the supply and incurred prior to the delivery/ completion of the supply.
Therefore, an assessee is definitely in a better position to claim the benefit
of pure agency vis-à-vis the earlier service tax law.

 

Case Study
2A : Travel/ Lodging Costs during Audit

 

An auditor during the
course of audit incurs certain expenses which are to the account of the auditee
(such as travel/lodging costs, reprography costs, etc.) and reimbursable
to an auditor. The auditor claims these expenses are part of the Out of Pocket
Expenses (OPE) while invoicing its client for the audit services. These expense
recoveries do not fall within the scope of the term ‘price’ of the audit
services. But, such expenses can be considered as incidental expenses which are
incurred prior to supply of services and hence included by virtue of section
15(2)(c) of the GST law. Now, by applying the pure agency tests, an auditor can
claim such expense recoveries as an exclusion on account of the following:

 

   Though the Travel and lodging services are
used by the auditor, they are incurred during the course of and for the
purposes of the audit assignment and not for the auditor’s own account.

   Audit engagement letters contain an
authorisation to incur OPEs for the purpose of conduction of an audit which
stand recoverable from the auditee.

   The auditor does not hold any title or claim
ownership over the said services.

   The auditor recovers only the actual expense
from the supplier.

 

Thus, OPE expenses are
excludible from taxable value in view of the pure agency rule. This is a clear
departure from the service tax regime where the practice of applying service
tax even on the OPE component was prevalent on account of the fairly stringent
pure agency tests provided under that law.

 

Case Study
2B : Custom House Agency Services

 

Typically, the role of a
CHA is to clear the goods at the customs port and place the goods on a
conveyance for delivery to the factory premises. In the process, a CHA agent
incurs many expenses on behalf of the importer for clearance of the goods and
delivery upto the factory /premises of the importer. The CHA directly interacts
with multiple agencies in view of their proximity with such agencies such as
Port Trust, Steamer Agents, Cargo Handlers, Warehouse keepers, Packers, Goods Transport Agents.

 

The service tax law was
plagued with disputes over inclusion of many costs incurred by such an agent.
The CBEC Circular No. 119/13/2009-S.T dated 21-12-2009 had in substance
clarified that the pure agency tests would have to be complied with in order to
claim exclusion of any expense incurred by the CHA. However, Tribunals (relying
on the Delhi High Court in case of Intercontinental Consultants &
Technocrats Pvt. Ltd.)
have consistently held that as long as the expenses
were in the nature of reimbursements, they are excludible from the value of the
CHA services itself. The Tribunals have not resorted to the pure agency tests
to reach such a conclusion.

 

In the context of GST, a
question arises with respect to inclusion of expense recoveries u/s. 15(2) (b)
or (c). Clause (b) is applicable only in reverse scenarios i.e. where the
primary responsibility of incurring the costs is on the supplier but is
eventually borne by the recipient, whereas in a CHA’s case, the expenses are
primarily required to be incurred by the recipient, but incurred by the CHA.
Clause (c) applies to all incidental expenses which are charged in respect of
and until supply of services.

 

The role of a typical CHA
is to perform the customs clearance formalities. Services are said to be
completed once all custom clearance formalities are completed and the goods are
available for dispatch to the relevant destination. Expenses incurred until
customs clearance would definitely be included under this clause (such as
customs duty, port charges, steamer agent charges, DO charges, etc.).
But, post customs clearance expenses may technically not fall within this
clause, even if it is said to be incidental in nature to the CHA services.

 

Thus, an expense recovery
should be tested on two grounds i.e. firstly, whether it is incidental in
nature and secondly, whether the same is until completion. In cases of
pre-supply incidental expenses, pure agency tests become relevant since they
are includible by virtue of section 15(2)(c). However, post supply expense
recoveries need not comply with the pure agency tests as long as they are
claimed as reimbursements – such expense recoveries are neither forming part of
price nor includible u/s. 15(2)(c).

 

Case Study
2C : Advertisement Agencies

Advertisement Agencies
provide a bundle of both creation and production work for their clients.
Typically, once the creative work is completed, the advertisement is required
to be posted on a particular media (such as newspaper, television, radio, etc.).
Where the contracts entered into by Advertisement agencies are lumpsum
contracts inclusive of the cost of production, the said services would be taxed
at the gross value including the production work. In contracts where the
production work is separately chargeable, it is important to apply the pure
agency test and ascertain the includibility of such incidental recoveries.

 

In such contracts, the
appropriate media is mutually decided between the advertisement agency and the
customer. The invoice raised by the media agency is addressed to the customer
with reference of the advertisement agency through which the advertisement is
placed. The media agency collects the invoice from the advertisement agency and
recovers the costs from the customer by way of a reimbursement. The
advertisement agency also earns a sales commission from the media agency as an
incentive.

 

In such cases, the question
which arises is whether the advertisement agencies can claim the media costs as
a reimbursement under pure agency rules inspite of the fact that it makes a
profit on an overall basis. If we are to dissect the transaction, there are two
distinct transactions in this arrangement – the first pertains to the media
agency recovering the costs of the advertisement from the customer and the
second pertains to payment of commission to the advertisement agency as an
incentive. In the first leg, the advertisement agency acts as a pass through
and recovers the actual media cost. The invoice is addressed to the end
customer with the payment being routed through the advertisement agency. The
second leg is an independent leg wherein the advertisement agency claims its
commission/ incentive from the media agency. Thus, there is a good case to take
a stand that the commission generated does alter the character of reimbursement
by the advertisement agency and hence such reimbursement satisfies the pure
agency tests under Rule 33.

 

The CBEC has issued a press
release on the point of inclusion of advertisement costs in print media as
follows:

a.   Where
an advertisement agency works on a principal to principal basis (i.e. profit
model), it would be liable to tax on the entire value of such transaction but
at the rate applicable to sale of advertisement space.

b.   Where
an advertisement agency works as an agent (i.e. commission model), it would be
liable to tax only on the commission generated from such business.

 

This press release can
certainly be resorted to contend that the production costs are excludible even
if commission is generated from the media agency. More importantly, the press
release has not specifically resorted to the pure agency tests to conclude that
the advertisement costs with the media are excludible and GST is limited to
commission earned from the media.

 

Case
Study 3 – Grossing up of TDS, esp. on foreign exchange payments

 

Income tax law requires the
assessee making foreign exchange payments to gross-up the TDS component for
calculation of TDS, particularly in contracts where the agreed price is net of
Indian taxes (section 195A of the Income-tax Act, 1961). In such cases, a
question arises is whether the gross up component is includible in calculation
of taxable value for discharging the GST on reverse charge basis. Section
15(2)(b) of GST law requires that the taxable value should include all costs/
expenses which are liable to be incurred by the supplier but incurred by the
recipient.

 

Income tax law collects
taxes in three ways: direct levy (advance tax/ self-assessment tax), tax
deduction at source (TDS) and tax collected at source (TCS). Direct levy
implies imposition of tax on the person earning the taxable income. TDS/ TCS
are part of machinery provisions where the obligation to remit the taxes is
placed on the payer/ seller but subject to a final assessment in the hands of
the person earning the income.

 

Section 191 of the Income
Tax Act, 1961 provides that even in cases where TDS / TCS is not deducted, the
assessee earning the income is liable to pay the income tax on such income.
This is a clear indication that the primary liability of payment of income tax
always rests on the person earning the income. TDS/TCS provisions are purely
mechanisms to collect the income at source from the income earner. Section
195A, which is part of the TDS provisions, is also based on this principle that
the income chargeable to tax in the hands of the foreign recipient is the
grossed up value (TDS being a mechanism of collection) and not just the
contractual price agreed between the parties.

 

Applying the above
understanding, the TDS component borne by the remitter should ideally stand
included in the taxable value in terms of section 15(2)(b) of the GST law, in
other words the income tax liability (payable as TDS) of the supplier is borne
by the recipient (as a remitter). Reverse charge tax should hence be computed
on the grossed up value of the remittance in such cases.

 

 

Comparison with Service Tax Valuation
Rules

This issue fell under
debate before the Tribunal in Magarpatta Township Dev. & Construction
Co. Ltd. vs. C.C.E., PUNE-III
1,  wherein it was held by reference to the
earlier Rule 7 of the Service Tax Valuation Rules, 2006 that such TDS cannot be
included in the taxable value. Rule 7 refers to actual consideration ‘charged’
for the purpose of determination of taxable value which is unlike the GST law
wherein all costs incurred by the recipient on behalf of the supplier fall
within the ambit of taxation. Hence, in view of the author, TDS gross up is
includible in the taxable value of import of service transactions.

________________________________________________

1   2016
(43) S.T.R. 132 (Tri. – Mumbai)

 

 

Case
Study 4 – Valuation in case of notified Valuation schemes (say Air Travel
Agents)

 

The valuation scheme for
air travel agents can be understood as follows:

 

  This scheme is applicable to services in
relation to book of air tickets by an air travel agent

   The term ‘air travel agent’ has not been
defined, but if understood as per industry norms, refers to the persons who
perform the service of booking of air tickets on behalf of the airline (as per
International Air Travel Association (IATA) policy)

   Air travel agents charge a commission from
the airline, receive a booking fee from customers and in many cases make a
profit on the booking fee (especially in inventory models where ATAs hold
inventory of seats in specific sectors)

   The scheme overrides the other valuation
provisions and requires tax to be computed only 5%/ 10% of the base fare.

 

The primary question that
arises is whether all the three sources of income of an ATA are includible in
the said valuation scheme. If yes, the ATA has to merely charge GST on 5%/10%
of the base fare as applicable and need not separately charge/ collect GST. The
ambiguity arises since the provision does not refer to any particular service/
HSN category, rather states that services ‘in relation to’ booking of tickets
are covered under the said scheme. It must be appreciated that the phrase ‘in
relation to’ is much wider than ‘in respect of’ and a broader scope should be
attributed to it. In the view of the author, all the three categories of income
stand included in the scope of the valuation scheme as all the three sources of
income arise from the booking of air tickets. The phrase ‘in relation to
booking’ certainly widens the scope of the subject matter, of valuation and
hence such a stand can be taken by ATAs on their booking services.

 

Case
Study 5 – Discount Policy variants

 

Companies have
innovative/peculiar methods of passing on benefits of discounts through the
supply chain. Though there is no exhaustive list, the general terminology used
are – trade/ invoice discount; discount on list price, cash discount,
turnover/off-take/target discount, seasonal discounts, gold/ silver incentive,
price protection/support, free/ promotion items etc. The GST law
classifies discounts given by supplier into two broad categories – pre-supply
discounts and post supply discounts. As stated in the earlier article,
pre-supply discounts are eligible on the invoice value itself and post supply
discounts are eligible for deduction by issuance of credit notes with
corresponding matching and input tax credit reversal by the recipient. While
trade/invoice discounts fall within the ambit of pre-supply discounts, the rest
would generally fall within the scope of post supply discounts, since they are
provided after the transaction of supply.

 

In the case of post supply
discount, can a supplier issue a credit note without any GST impact and
overcome the rigours of Credit note matching? The answer is a definite ‘Yes’.
The GST law prescribes the issuance of a credit note (with GST reversal) only
if the supplier wishes to avail a reduction from his taxable turnover. This
does not prohibit a supplier from issuing a commercial/accounting document for
settlement of transactions/accounts in respect of a particular sale/purchase
transaction. It is not necessary that a supplier should always link an
accounting/ commercial credit note with its original supply invoice for
commercial purposes. In contract law terminology, it is merely an alteration of
the original contract price (section 62 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872). GST
law cannot override the contract/commercial terms and make it mandatory for the
supplier to raise a credit note with a GST reversal.

 

Even speaking from a
practical perspective, a tax officer cannot recover any additional tax from the
supplier since no tax benefit has been claimed by the supplier in this case.
From a recipient’s perspective, as long as the conditions of section 16 are
complied with, input tax credit cannot be denied merely on account of an
additional discount given by the supplier. The additional discount is a
mechanism of settlement of accounts between the parties and the proviso of
non-payment cannot be invoked against the recipient. Moreover, since this
transaction is revenue neutral without any revenue loss to the exchequer, it is
definitely permissible for suppliers to issue credit notes without any GST
reversal to their customers.

 

Summary

In the context of
valuation, the biggest challenge that anyone would face is to reconcile certain
elements of a duty based law (such as excise/customs) with certain elements of
a transaction based law (such as sales tax/ service tax). Both are distinct
fields of taxation and GST being a composition of both would certainly create
confusion over the interpretation of the law. The litigation on this front
would also depend on the background of the assessing authority. An erstwhile
excise/customs official would certainly lean towards applying legacy duty based
principles and an erstwhile VAT official may follow the contractual terms.
There is bound to be some disparity in administration of tax laws itself and
the Government(s) should take proactive steps to issue appropriate circulars
clarifying legal position in order to maintain uniformity in administration.

 

From an economic perspective,
transaction value approach ensures that economy drives tax collection and not
the other way around. The revenue has to appreciate that in a multi-point tax
system where credit flow is robust, it is only the last leg of the value chain
which would generate revenues for the government. The purpose of introduction
of GST was to facilitate market forces to operate independent of tax
structures. It is in light of this principle, the rigours of valuation as
existed in the First and the Revised Model GST law have been diluted and the
discretion granted to revenue authorities on the point of valuation is fairly
limited. Unless the revenue authorities appreciate the larger picture, disputes
around valuation would ultimately burden the industry with onerous taxes. _

8 Sections 69B and 147 – Reassessment – Undisclosed investment – Where as per rule 11UA, value of shares was less than Rs. 5, but assessee purchased same at Rs. 10 per share and disclosed all facts in return, reassessment notice for valuing these shares at Rs. 35 as per valuation by Government valuer was not justified

[2018] 90 taxmann.com 284 (Bom)
Shahrukh Khan vs. DCIT
A.Y.: 2010-11, Date of Order: 08th Feb., 2018

In the A. Y. 2010-11, the assessee had purchased 1,10,00,000 shares at the rate of Rs. 10 per share. The Assessing Officer received information that Government valuer has determined fair market value of the said shares at Rs. 33.35/- per share. Therefore, on the basis of the said information, the Assessing Officer issued notice u/s. 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on the reason to believe that 1,10,00,00 shares were purchased at an undervaluation of Rs. 25.69 crores. Objections filed by the assessee were rejected.

The assessee filed writ petition challenging the reassessment proceedings. The Bombay High Court admitted the writ petition and held as under:

“i)    The assessment order itself mentions that the value of shares is less than Rs. 5 per share on application of Rule 11UA of the Income-tax Rules. There was a complete disclosure of all facts during regular assessment proceedings. Prima facie, the order disposing of the objections, while dealing with the objection of no reason to believe that income has escaped assessment on application of section 56(2)(vii), has completely ignored the Explanation thereto. The Explanation to section 56(2)(vii) states that the fair market value is to be determined in accordance with the Income-tax Rules. On application of Rule 11UA of the Income Tax Rules, the value per share came to less than Rs. 5 per share.

ii)    In the circumstances, the impugned notice indicates a change of opinion, as this very issue namely – valuation of share was a subject matter of consideration during the regular assessment proceedings. Besides, on the application of method of valuation as mandated by the Explanation to section 56(2)(vii), prima facie, the Assessing Officer could not have had reason to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment.

iii)    In the above view, prima facie, the impugned notice is without jurisdiction. Accordingly, there shall be interim relief in terms of prayer clause (d).”

34. Section 37- Income – Charge of tax – Commission – Business expenditure – A. Ys. 1997-98 and 1998-99 – Assessee receiving 95% of payments against invoices after deduction of commission of 5%. – Finding of fact by Tribunal – Liability to tax only actual receipts

CIT vs. Olam Exports (India) Ltd.; 398 ITR 397 (Ker):

 

For the A. Ys.
1997-98 and 1998-99, the assessee claimed dediction u/s. 37 of the Act, of the
amounts payed towards commission to a concern, LE, for consignment sales. The
Assessing Officer disallowed the claim on the ground that the existence of such
an agent itself was in doubt. The Tribunal found that the evidence indicated
that the assessee had received only 95% of the invoice price and held that the
assessee could not have been taxed for the income which the assessee had not
received.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Kerala High
Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i)   The assessee could only
be taxed for the income that it had derived. There were transactions between
the assessee and LE and the invoices which were raised by the assessee in the
name of the agent contained the gross sale prices and the net amount payable
after recovery of 5% towards commission and other expenses due. Based on such
transactions, the amounts were realised by the assessee through banks and the F
form under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 were also obtained from the agent.

ii)   Those admitted facts,
therefore, showed that the assessee had received only 95% of the gross price
and the Department had no material before it to show that the assessee had
received anything in excess thereof, either directly or otherwise. If that was
so, despite the contentions raised by the Department regarding the doubtful
existence of the agent, the assessee having received only 95% of the gross
value, it could have been taxed only for what it had actually received.

iii)   Therefore, the Tribunal
was justified in coming to the factual conclusion that the assessee could not
have been taxed for anything more than what it had received. No question of law
arose.”

Building The Firm Of The Future

We live in
an era of profound change. While change is inevitable, the continued success of
individual accounting firms is not.
To cope with an increasingly turbulent
environment, firms need to develop new strategies that are better adapted to a
modern marketplace.

Change is
arriving from many sources, and its pace is accelerating. One way to measure
this acceleration is to examine the half-life of knowledge — how long it takes
for half of humanity’s knowledge to be supplanted by new information.

For much of human history, this
half-life could be measured in hundreds of years. By the 1920s, the
half-life of knowledge was 35 years. In the 1960s, it was 10 years. By 2000, it
was down to 5 years. Today, it is estimated to be about 2.5 years, and experts
expect it to continue dropping.

Change can come from many
directions, as well. For instance, a simple change in the threshold that
triggers mandatory audits can decimate demand. And international competition,
deregulation and new business models can dramatically impact entire industries.
The winds of political change are often unpredictable.

Technology, of course, is a primary
agent of change. It has already made real-time communications inexpensive and
almost universal. Artificial intelligence can do your taxes and keep the books.
There is even speculation that block-chain transactions may replace the need
for required audits.

Demographics also drive change. The
workplace is steadily being taken over by individuals who have grown up with
digital technology. These digital natives have different life experiences and
expectations than the generation they are replacing in the workforce.

In this article, we will identify
emerging global marketplace trends that are most likely to impact Chartered
Accountancy practices. We will then identify specific strategies and tactics
that are effective today — and should continue to work for the foreseeable
future — at accelerating the growth and profitability of accounting firms
around the world. We believe that these proven strategies provide a practical
template for the firm of the future.

Market
Trends Shaping the Future of Accounting

While many forces are shaping
accounting’s future market environment, some carry more weight than the others.
We’ve identified five emerging market trends likely to have the biggest impact
on the industry.

1.    The
commoditization of routine professional services

There was a time when Chartered
Accountants were rare. Fees were stable and relatively high, even for widely
used services such as tax and audit.

But over time, many of these
services became widely available as accounting practices proliferated. In
addition, lower-cost alternatives, such as tax filing software, entered the
marketplace.

These innovations exerted downward
pressure on fees. Today, services are increasingly viewed as commodities and
providers as interchangeable. In this scenario, the only selection criteria of
significance are cost and payment terms.

How do we remedy this race to the
bottom?
The answer is expertise. Figure 1
shows the relationship between the level of perceived expertise and the billing
rates clients are willing to pay. It is anchored at US$100 for a professional
of “average” expertise. The results show that the higher the level of
expertise, the more clients are willing to pay.

Figure 1. Relative hourly rates buyers will
pay, by Visible Expert level1

________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

1.    Source: The Visible Expert,
2014, p. 42, https://hingemarketing.com/library/article/the-visible-expert


2.    The
expectation of full transparency

Today’s consumers expect complete
transparency, a trend that is driven by people’s daily experiences online. An
individual can go online and find ratings and reviews for everything from
restaurants and movies to cameras and cars, and — for better or for worse —
this crowd-sourced phenomenon is now being applied to professional services.
Buyers have begun to expect that they will be able to use websites, online
tools and social media to understand a firm’s services and approach, as well as
assess its strengths and weaknesses. If buyers aren’t able to find information
on a firm relatively quickly, they often move on.

In fact, a recent study of referrals
showed that over half (52%) of the prospects receiving referrals ruled out a
firm they were referred to before even talking with them. The most
common reason cited for ruling out a firm was that its website or online
presence did not adequately demonstrate how the firm could help the buyer
.2

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2.    Source: Referral Marketing
for Professional Services Firms Research Report, 2015, p. 14,
https://hingemarketing.com/library/article/referral-marketing-for-professional-services-firms

3.    Specialized
expertise is assumed

Today’s sophisticated buyers have
come to expect that for any given problem they have they will be able to find a
specialized solution — and more often than not this solution can be found
online. From personalized services to downloadable apps, these solutions come
in many guises.

The same should apply to
professional services. If a company has a business challenge, it should easily
be able to find a firm that specializes in solving that specific problem.This
tilt towards specialists is already happening in the marketplace. In our recent
study of accounting firms, we found that specialists grew twice as fast as
generalists (see Figure 2).3

Figure 2. Median growth of generalist and
specialized accounting & financial services firms


_______________________________________________________________________________________________________

3     Source: Accounting & Financial
Services Research, 2017, p. 10,
https://hingemarketing.com/library/article/2017-accounting-financial-services-research-summary-marketing-growth-insights

4.    Expert
advice is freely available

Have a question? Want to research a
business issue?  Free advice from a
knowledgeable expert is only a few clicks away — whether it is a blog post,
webinar, video or whitepaper.

We live in an age when professional
services buyers expect to be able to educate themselves for free on any
business issue they encounter.
 If a firm fails to meet this expectation, one
of its competitors will. A firm’s ability to develop and promote educational
content is important because when buyers are ready to hire a new firm, they
often will think first of the experts they have come to rely upon for the
information they need. Feeding prospective clients’ ongoing need for
information is a new and powerful way of building competitive advantage.

The power of this approach is nicely
demonstrated by a recent study of referrals. This study compared several of the
most common approaches to generating more referrals.

Figure 3 shows the probability of
receiving a referral based on each technique.4 Note that visible
expertise (i.e, sharing your expertise in an educational context) was the most
powerful approach — far more powerful than a referral from a client or a
friend.

_______________________________________________________________________

4.             Source: Referral
Marketing Study, 2016, p.9, https://hingemarketing.com/library/article/referral-marketing-study

Figure 3. Factors that increase the
probability of referrals


Figure 4 shows how referral sources
learn about a firm’s expertise5. Note how many of the activities in
this figure are ways of sharing knowledge and educational content.

 Figure 4. How referral sources discover experts


_________________________________________________________________________

5 Source: Referral
Marketing for Professional Services, 2016, p.11,
https://hingemarketing.com/library/article/referral-marketing-for-professionalservices-firms

5.    A
time-pressured marketplace moves online

“I want what I want and I want it
now” could well be the rallying cry of today’s overworked business
professional. Psychological studies have shown that managerial and professional
positions are among the most stressful and time pressured. And in many (perhaps
most) cases, these are your potential clients. No wonder they value getting
fast answers to their business questions.

Of course, there is no better medium
to satisfy this need for speed than the internet. Social media is faster than
face-to-face networking. And online search takes only a few seconds. “Faster”
and “easier” are very appealing concepts to prospective clients. As a result,
the business advantage of having a robust online presence is clear.

So what is the likely result of
these changing marketplace expectations?

Winners
and Losers in the Emerging Marketplace

If there is one clear consequence of
these emerging trends, it is this: there will be winners and losers. Some firms
will adapt to the changing marketplace and settle into market niches in which
they can grow and prosper. Other firms will ignore the changes around them.
Many firm principals believe (or hope) that these market forces will not affect
their clients, and they continue to rely on “tried-and-true” business
development techniques that have worked for them in the past.These firms are
not likely to thrive much longer.

This sorting into winners and losers
is not just a theoretical possibility. It is already well under way. Almost 10
years ago, my agency identified a group of firms that consistently outperformed
their peers on almost every measure of financial performance. We call them High
Growth firms.

High Growth firms grow five to ten
times faster than their average-growth peers, and this growth does not come at
the expense of profitability. According to our most recent study, High Growth
firms are twice as profitable as their peers. And they achieve this performance
while spending no more on marketing than their slower-growing competitors.6

___________________________________________________________________________________________

6.    Source: 2017 High Growth
Study, p. 10-11,
https://hingemarketing.com/library/article/2017-high-growth-research-study-research-summary

Far more often than not, firms that
achieve these levels of growth and profitability have a clear strategy that
gives them a competitive advantage. They also tend to receive much higher
valuations when they are acquired or merge with another firm.

One study of firm value showed that
High Growth firms receive valuations of multiples up to 10 times higher than
average.7

How are these firms able to
accomplish this impressive growth in the face of a turbulent, highly
competitive global business environment?

___________________________________________________________________________

7.    Source:
Top Dollar: How to Achieve a Premium Valuation for Your Professional Services
Firm, 2008, p. 8,
https://hingemarketing.com/library/article/high_growth_professional_services_firm_how_some_firms_grow_in_any_market

In our attempt to answer this
question, we have learned that there are certain principles and practices that
allow these firms to adapt quickly to emerging marketplace changes. While every
firm faces different business and market challenges, there are some practical
approaches that seem to cut across industries, markets and cultures. We explore
these approaches in the next section.

Becoming
the Firm of the Future

There is no single technique or
business strategy that guarantees future success. But our research has
uncovered several practices that significantly improve a firm’s ability to
align its business approach with the needs and expectations of an evolving
marketplace. Below are six strategies that a firm can begin using today to
prepare for the uncertainties of tomorrow.

1. Create a Culture of Learning and
Change

The biggest barrier to building the
firm of the future often lies between our ears. Fear of change and a desire to
minimize risk by avoiding the new and untested can blind us to the implications
of an evolving world. Instead of seeking to understand the change around us and
embracing it, many firms look to others in the accounting industry for
leadership and inspiration. They model their approach to business development,
marketing and operations after competitors whom they admire.

While such apparent caution may seem
less risky, it is in fact very dangerous. It will erode any competitive
advantage a firm has developed, stifle innovation and prevent a firm from
recognizing and serving emerging client needs.

A far safer course is to be
proactive and monitor the evolving marketplace. Equipped with this knowledge, a
firm can develop services and strategies that address emerging client needs
long before competitors catch on. In the next section, we will explore how to
achieve this level of market insight.

Before firms retool their marketing,
however, they must develop a firm culture that supports learning and change. One
way a firm can make learning an integral part of its culture is to implement a
training schedule.
For example, one of our clients — an international law
firm based in Mumbai — devotes one hour each workday morning to formal
training. While this level of training may sound excessive (and it probably
isn’t necessary at most firms), it sends a powerful message to potential
clients and employees.

Another way firms can foster a
culture of ongoing change is to adopt a practice of continually introducing and
testing new services. We call this the Test–Measure–Learn cycle.
When they assume this mindset, employees realise that innovations and
improvements are inherently uncertain and must be tested and refined.

Figure 5. The Test–Measure–Learn cycle

 

 For example, suppose you have an
idea for a new service that helps clients use financial information to improve
operational efficiencies. You start the cycle by testing the idea and measuring
the results. Did it work as expected?

What were the unanticipated results?
Over time, your accumulated insights allow you to learn from that experience
and apply that learning to your next test. Each successive iteration should add
value or reduce cost.

While some individuals may follow
this pattern instinctively, we find that most do not. Introducing a
Test–Measure–Learn policy makes learning and continual improvement a part of
the culture. Firms that institute this kind of process find that uncertainty is
less daunting and their approach to the marketplace becomes more flexible and
adaptable.

2.    Research
Based Marketplace Insights

Perhaps the biggest challenge in
becoming a firm of the future is finding a way to discover clients’ changing
needs and business priorities.
 Their industries, after all, are facing their
own risks and opportunities. So you should try to understand those first. The
problem is that most professionals feel as though they already know their
clients and their business challenges. However, this belief is an illusion.

As humans, we have blind spots. We
think we understand something when we, in fact, do not. Our clients don’t
always communicate their true feelings or concerns to us. And we bring our own
histories and motivations to every interaction. The net result is that almost
every firm operates with dangerously flawed assumptions about what clients want
and how they think about critical business issues.

The antidote for this problem is
research. Firms that conduct systematic research on their target client group
have a more objective view of their challenges and priorities. They are able to
base their decisions on empirical evidence rather than assumptions or
instincts. It equips them to anticipate trends and offer highly relevant new
services. In short, research reduces risk.

This effect is powerful: firms
that conduct formal research on their target client group grow faster and are
more profitable. In a recent study we found that 34% of High Growth firms carry
out systematic client group research at least each business quarter.
None
of their slow-growth peers did similar research.8

_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________

8     Source: 2017 High Growth
Study, p. 17, https://hingemarketing.com/library/article/2017-high-growth-research-study-research-summary

Figure 6. Percent of firms, by type, that
conduct frequent research (quarterly or more often)


3.    A
Focused Strategy

The firm of the future will benefit
from a narrowly focused strategy. In a turbulent environment, the firm that
tries to be everything to everyone is likely to discover that it is nothing
special to anyone.

We’ve already seen this effect in
play — buyers favour specialists over generalists. While it may seem intuitive
that offering more services to more audiences creates greater opportunity for
growth, the opposite is true. The more a firm broadens its appeal, the bigger
its pool of competitors grows and the more difficult it becomes to stand out to
prospective buyers.

So how do firms establish
competitive advantage? By offering superior client service? In fact, this is a
very popular strategy, used by two thirds of firms today. Unfortunately, it
doesn’t work. Firms that attempt to differentiate themselves on superior
client service actually grow 250% slower than firms that employ other
differentiators.

Keeping in mind that every firm
operates in its own competitive environment and needs its own strategy, there
are a few differentiators that consistently work better than others. One approach
is to offer a niche service. Firms that take this approach are 25% more likely
to be High Growth firms. Another proven differentiation approach is to
specialize in an industry. These businesses are 89% more likely to become High
Growth firms.

Why are these niche approaches so
effective? We’ve identified three reasons:

First, having a niche allows a firm
to be more visible to its target audience. When an audience is smaller, it is
easier and less expensive to reach them.

Second, firms that specialize are
more likely to be perceived as top experts in their field. Top experts are able
to close business more quickly, are less likely to offer commoditized services
and can charge premium fees.

Third,a niche firm’s smaller,
well-defined market makes it easier to understand and monitor its market. As a
result, these firms are well positioned to introduce innovative solutions as
their clients’ needs evolve.

4.    An
Expertise Centered Brand

Perceived expertise is critical to
the future success of accounting firms. According to our research, expertise is
the number one selection criteria when prospective clients seek out a firm to
hire. Even more impressive, in nearly three out of four searches (72%)
expertise is the factor that tips the scale in favour of the final choice.

As evolving technology and
increasing global competition push more traditional accounting services into
the commodity category, expertise will become the primary way that the firm of
the future will compete.

But there is a problem with
competing on expertise. Expertise is invisible. A buyer cannot assess
expertise by looking at or meeting a person. To address this problem, firms
have to find ways to make their expertise broadly visible to their target
client groups.
The most effective way to build this visibility is to bring
their expertise directly to their audience, even before they are ready to buy —
by speaking at events, publishing educational articles and blog posts and
putting on free webinars, to name just a few common tactics.

Centering a firm’s brand on
expertise is not only effective today, it is a strategy that will contribute to
the firm’s future relevance and competitive advantage.

5. A Balanced Approach to Practice
Development

When reviewing Figure 4 above, you
may have noticed that referral sources learn about expertise in many ways. They
gather their information from a variety of offline (e.g., speaking engagements)
and online (e.g., blogging or social media) sources. In fact, firms that generate
leads from both online and traditional sources tend to grow faster and are more
profitable than those that solely rely on traditional sources. Our research
tells us that these firms can grow up to four times faster and be more than
twice as profitable than firms that follow an unbalanced approach.
9
These firms are also better prepared for an increasingly digital future than
those that rely heavily on traditional business development techniques.

__________________________________________________________________

9.    Source: Online Marketing for
Professional Services, 2012, p. 58,
https://hingemarketing.com/library/article/online_marketing_for_professional_services

6.    A
Magnet for Top Talent

Professional services firms are only
as good as their talent. After all, it is their professionals’ expertise that
firms are selling
. But many firms struggle
to attract and retain top talent. A lack of qualified job candidates can
severely limit a firm’s future prospects and put a ceiling on growth

For this reason, a firm would be
wise to invest in its employer brand: What is the firm’s reputation as a place
to work? Does the employer brand attract top talent or keep them away? Is it
consistent with the firm’s client-facing brand?

When building its employer brand, a
firm must first understand what job candidates are looking for in a firm. A
recent study on employer brands provides a few helpful clues. When asked what
they care about most, employees’ top response was to work with a growing firm.
Their next most common response was having the ability to work remotely or
telecommute. Interestingly, obtaining the highest available salary came in
third place.10

__________________________________________________________________________________________________

10.  Source: Employer Brand Study,
p. 18, https://hingemarketing.com/library/article/employer-brand-study.


Firms must also understand that
generational differences will play a growing role in the war for talent. While
many of today’s leaders lament the changing expectations and priorities of the
rising generation (those born after 1980 and sometimes referred to as
Millennials), these young professionals open up many opportunities for the firm
of the future.

For example, Millennials are eager
to build personal brands in their industry. This ambition is completely
consistent with a firm’s goal to make its expertise more visible. And firms
that encourage the development of their experts’ personal brands may have a
recruiting edge when competing for this demographic.

Millennials are also adept at
representing the firm on social media, an advantage in a world that is tilting
steadily towards online communication. Characteristics that may be an
uncomfortable fit in today’s firm are likely to become valuable assets to the
firm of tomorrow.

A Final Thought

Building the firm of the future may
seem like an impossible task. The future is always uncertain, after all, and
the pace of change has never been faster. But there are compensating factors.
Times of great change can also produce great opportunities.

We can see some of these
opportunities already in the extraordinary growth enjoyed by firms that have
embraced emerging market realities and are leveraging new business strategies
and tactics. There will be winners and there will be losers in this race to the
future. Which path will your firm choose to take?
_

Supreme Court Freezes Assets Of Independent Directors – A Thankless Job Made Worse

Background

 

In a recent ruling, the Supreme Court has
directed a freeze on assets of all the directors, including independent
directors, owing to certain defaults by the Company. They have also been
required to be personally present at hearings of the Court. At this stage,
there does not appear to be any conclusive finding about the guilt of the
independent directors and the matter is still sub judice. But this order
does raise concerns about the liabilities and inconveniences that independent
directors can be subjected to. As will be discussed later herein, being an
independent director is in a sense a thankless job. Their remuneration is
subject to statutory limits while their liability is enormous. There have
already been several orders by SEBI, that has taken different types of actions
against them. The defences available in law owing to recent changes appear to
have been diluted. Let us consider this decision (Chitra Sharma vs. UOI,
dated 22nd November 2017) generally in the light some existing
provisions.

 

Needless to emphasise, Chartered
Accountants, Company Secretaries, lawyers, etc. are sought after persons
to fill in the posts of independent directors in listed companies and also
committees like Audit Committee. They too will warily see the developments in
law and court rulings.

 

Role of independent directors

 

Independent directors are a major pillar of
good corporate governance. They are meant to balance against the control of
Promoters, and directly or indirectly protect the interests of minority/public
shareholders and even other stakeholders. Committees like Audit Committee or
Nomination and Remuneration Committee are to have majority or at least half of
the number of members as independent directors.

 

The Companies Act, 2013 (“the Act”) lays
down in Schedule IV a very detailed code for independent directors. Their role
and obligations are laid down broadly and generally as well as specifically.

 

Apart from the specific code for independent
directors, there is a very detailed role under the SEBI (Listing Obligations
and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015 (“the Regulations”) for the
Board generally.

 

Powers of independent directors

 

The powers of independent directors are, in
comparison, relatively scanty. They do have powers as part of the Board generally.
They have right of information as part of the Board/Committee. However, these
are available few times a year when the Board/ Committee meets. Between these
meetings, they do not have direct substantive powers, either individually or
collectively. In meetings too, they individually do not have powers except to
participate and vote and perhaps require that their dissenting views be
recorded.

 

Remuneration

 

Independent directors are in a peculiar
position. They cannot be paid too much simply because they would lose their
independence since they would become dependent on the Company. Paying them too
less means that they do not have enough compensation and incentive to do
justice to their efforts and the risks that the position carries, of action by
regulators.

 

Typically, independent directors are paid by
way of sitting fees and, where the Company is profitable and if the Company so
decides, payment by way of commission as a percentage of profits. Sitting fees
are, however, limited to Rs. 1,00,000 per meeting (in practice, often a lesser
amount). Such level of remuneration in many cases would not be adequate for
many competent directors to accept the responsibilities and liabilities that
law imposes.

 

Kotak Committee appointed by SEBI has
recently recommended certain minimum remuneration for independent and
non-executive directors and though it still does not appear to be adequate in
proportion to liability, it is clear that attention is being given to this
area.

 

Liability of independent directors generally

 

Non-executive directors usually do not have
specific and direct liability under the Act/Regulations. Generally, executive
directors, key managerial personnel, etc. are taken to task first, for their
respective general or specific role in defaults. Non-executive directors who
are promoters may of course face action under certain circumstance. But
generally, non-executive directors can ensure that due role is formally
apportioned to competent persons so that they do not face actions on matters so
delegated. However, under the Act and even the Regulations, this has changed to
an extent. Under section 149(12) of the Act and the Regulations, some further
relief is sought to be given. Essentially, an independent director will be
liable, only if the default is with his knowledge through board proceedings.
This does help him because, unless the matter is brought before and part of
board proceedings, he may not be held liable. However, this is subject to the
condition that he should have acted diligently. This provision has not been
tested well and it will have to be seen how much it helps.

 

Orders/actions against independent directors

 

SEBI has general and special powers by which
it can pass adverse orders against independent directors. And it has passed
such orders. SEBI can, of course, take action for violation of specific
provisions of the Regulations applicable to them. However, depending on their
role, SEBI can use its general powers to pass orders against them. This may
include debarring them from acting as independent directors of listed
companies.

 

The Order in case of Zenith Infotech as
originally passed is particularly noteworthy. (Order No. WTM/RKA/ISD/11/2013
dated 25th March 2013). In this case, SEBI had alleged diversion of
funds of Zenith. SEBI ordered the whole Board, including the independent
directors, to provide personal bank guarantee to the extent of $33.93
million for the losses suffered by Zenith. The guarantee was to be provided
without use of the assets of Zenith. Needless to emphasise that, independent
directors, particularly professionals, would usually not be able to provide
such guarantees. Professional directors would then face further adverse
directions for not complying with orders which may include prosecution.

 

Order of the Supreme Court

 

The Company concerned here is facing
insolvency proceedings. Numerous persons have booked flats and it appears that
the buyers are looking at loss of advances paid for purchase of flats. The
Supreme Court had earlier required the promoters to infuse funds in the
company. However, this apparently was not done to the extent ordered. The
Supreme Court has thus ordered that, inter alia, the independent directors
and their dependents will not transfer any of their assets till further notice.
The Court ordered:-

 

(d) Neither the independent
directors nor the promoter directors shall alienate their personal properties
or assets in any manner, and if they do so, they will not only be liable for
criminal prosecution but contempt of the Court.

 

(e) That apart, we also direct
that the properties and assets of their immediate and dependent family members
should also not be transferred in any manner, whatsoever.

           

      Matters be listed on 10.1.2018. On that day, all the independent
directors and promoter directors of Jaiprakash Associates Limited, shall remain
present.

     

Thus, the directions are (i) the assets of
the independent directors and their immediate and dependent family
members are frozen (ii) the independent directors are required to be personally
present before the Court at the hearing of the case.

 

The broad based order means that independent
directors’ business/professional and even personal activities are seriously
affected.

At this stage, there does not appear to be
any final ruling of the guilt of the independent directors. It is also not
clear whether there is any finding of complicity or even negligence of their
duties as independent directors. Even if such a direction is reversed in the
future, in the interim, the independent directors face serious difficulties.

 

As stated earlier, there are some defences
available to independent directors in case of wrong doings by the company. If
they have taken due safeguards and carried out their role with diligence, they
may not ultimately be held liable. But in the interim, such orders are
effectively a punishment.

 

Recent order of SEBI exonerating
independent directors where they exercised diligence.

 

In the case of Zylog Systems Limited (Order
dated 20th June 2017), there was a finding that the Company declared
dividends but did not pay it. The question arose as to the role of the Board
generally and also of the independent directors in particular. SEBI issued show
cause notices to, inter alia, the independent directors, alleging
violations and seeking to pass adverse directions. The independent directors
explained in detail their role as independent directors generally and as
members of the Audit Committee. They explained how they brought to notice such
non payment of dividends to the Board of Directors of the company. When the
Board of Directors did not still take steps to pay the dividends, the said directors resigned. SEBI dropped the
proceedings against them and observed.

 

I have considered the charges alleged in
the SCN and replies filed by the noticees. I note that the Independent
Directors do have an important role to play in guiding the management so that
the interest of the Company and the minority shareholders are protected.
Further, the Independent directors will also have to ensure that the
functioning of the Company is in full compliance with the applicable laws. In
this case, I have noted that noticees after noticing the violation of non-payment
of dividend have taken strong stands to convince the Company’s Board about the
necessity of ensuring that the statutory dues and the dividends are paid
without any delay, in the Board meeting held on November 14, 2012. As the
company failed to comply, the two noticees resigned from the Company ’s Board.

 

Considering the above facts and
circumstances of the case, I am of the view that since both the noticees did
not have any role in the day-to-day management of the company and have
discharged their responsibility as Independent Directors putting in their best
efforts, I do not deem it fit to pass any directions under section 11 and 11B
of the SEBI Act, 1992 against Mr. S. Rajagopal and Mr. V. K. Ramani. The SCN is
disposed of accordingly.

 

Conclusion

 

Many of the cases till now where independent
directors have faced adverse actions are fairly glaring cases of serious
alleged violations causing losses to shareholders/others. Clearly, if
independent directors are complicit with such violations, adverse action
against them is expected and inevitable. However, adverse directions before
such allegations are proved can cause losses. Even otherwise, proving their
innocence or that they exercised diligence in their duties can itself be an
expensive affair. It is submitted that specific and general guidelines should
be framed both by Ministry of Corporate Affairs and SEBI. There should be
guidance as to the specific steps an independent director should take to
discharge his duties with diligence on one hand and clear examples where they
can be held liable. Else, there will be increasing disillusionment amongst
existing and potential independent directors. In the absence of clarity, the
intention of the lawmakers to have good corporate governance may fall flat. _

Insolvency And Bankruptcy Code: An Inordinate Ordinance?

Introduction

The first batch of the Insolvency and
Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“the Code”) has been enforced with effect from 1st
December 2016 and has met with mixed success. Attention of the readers is
invited to the columns which appeared in this Feature in the months of October
and November where the Code was analysed in detail. While the Code has been
successful in transforming corporate debtors from being debtor driven to
creditor driven, at the same time there have been certain gaps which needed to
be addressed on an urgent basis.

 

Background for the Ordinance

One of the key concerns under the Code was
whether a promoter of a corporate debtor could be a bidder for the very same
debtor under the resolution process? There had been several instances under the
Code where promoters had bid for the very same companies which they were
earlier running. India is one of the only nations where the powers of the Board
of Directors is superseded by the resolution professional (“RP”) during
the resolution process. Further, in other nations, there is no bar on promoters
bidding for their own stressed assets. 

 

Interestingly, the Insolvency and Bankruptcy
Board of India (“IBBI”) had in November 2017 amended the Insolvency and
Bankruptcy Board of India (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons)
Regulations, 2017 to provide for enhanced disclosures with respect to all
corporate resolution applicants. It provided that a resolution plan shall
contain details of the resolution applicant and other connected persons to
enable the Committee of Creditors (“CoC”) to assess the credibility of
such applicant and other connected persons to take a prudent decision while
considering the resolution plan for its approval. The details to be given in the plan are as follows:

(a)   identity of the applicant
and connected persons;

 

(b)   conviction for any
offence, if any, during the preceding five years;

 

(c)   criminal proceedings
pending, if any;

 

(d)   disqualification, if any,
under the Companies Act, 2013, to act as a director;

 

(e)   identification as a
wilful defaulter, if any, by any bank or financial institution or consortium
thereof in accordance with the guidelines of the RBI;

 

(f)   debarment, if any, from
accessing to, or trading in, securities markets under any order or directions
of the SEBI; and

 

(g)   transactions, if any,
with the corporate debtor in the preceding two years.

 

Thus, the IBBI put the onus on the CoC to
take an informed decision after due regard to the credibility of the bidder for
the corporate debtor. It also put a great deal of responsibility on the
shoulders of the RP.

 

It was in this backdrop that a burning question
cropped up – should the promoter who was in charge of the downfall in the first
place be given a second chance – and this was both a legal and an ethical
issue! While there are no easy answers to the ethical dilemma, the Government
has tried to address the first question, i.e., the legal question. It has done
so through the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Ordinance, 2017 (“the
Ordinance”
) which was promulgated by the President on 23rd November,
2017 (nearly a year after the Code was enforced). Let us examine this Ordinance
and also whether it suffers from the vices of extremity or is it a necessary
evil?

Interesting Preamble

The Ordinance states that it has been
enacted to strengthen further the insolvency resolution process since it has been
considered necessary to provide for prohibition of certain persons from
submitting a resolution plan who, on account of their antecedents, may
adversely impact the credibility of the processes under the Code. Thus, it
seeks to prohibit certain persons who have questionable antecedents as these antecedents
may adversely impact the credibility of the resolution process.
The Ordinance enlists these antecedents.

 

Criteria for the Resolution Applicant

The Code earlier described a resolution
applicant as any person who submits a resolution plan to the RP. Thus, he would
be the person interested in bidding for the corporate debtor or its assets. The
Ordinance now defines this term to mean a person, who individually or jointly
with any other person, submits a resolution plan to the resolution professional
pursuant to the invitation made by the RP. One of the key duties of the RP,
earlier included inviting prospective lenders, investors and other persons to
put forth resolution plans for the corporate debtor.

 

This duty has now been significantly
amplified by the Ordinance to provide that it would include inviting
prospective resolution applicants, who fulfil such criteria as may be laid down
by the RP with the approval of the CoC, having regard to the complexity and
scale of operations of the business of the corporate debtor and such other
conditions as may be specified by the IBBI, to submit a resolution plan.

 

Thus, the CoC and the RP would jointly lay
down the criteria for all resolution applicants. This criteria would be fixed
after considering the regulations issued by the IBBI in this respect and the
complexity and scale of operations of the business of the corporate debtor.
Hence, again a very onerous duty is cast on both the CoC and the RP to fix the
criteria after considering various subjective and qualitative conditions. 

 

Ineligible Applicants

While the Ordinance seeks to formulate
certain subjective criteria for barring prospective bidders, it also lays down
objective conditions under which any person would not be eligible to submit a
resolution plan under the Code. What is interesting to note is that the bar
operates not just in respect of the plan for the corporate debtor under
question but also for any other resolution plan under the Code. Hence, there is
a total embargo on such debarred persons from acting as a resolution applicant
applying under the Code.

 

A person ineligible to submit a resolution
plan/act as a resolution applicant under the Code, is anyone who, whether alone
or jointly with anyone else:

 

(a)   is an undischarged
insolvent;

 

(b)   has been identified as a
wilful defaulter under the RBI Guidelines. The RBI’s Master Circular on Wilful
Defaulters dated 1st July 2015 states that a ‘wilful default’ would
be deemed to have occurred if any of the following events is noted:

(i)    The unit has defaulted
in meeting its payment / repayment obligations to the lender even when it has
the capacity to honour the said obligations.

(ii)   The unit has defaulted
in meeting its payment /repayment obligations to the lender and has not
utilised the finance from the lender for the specific purposes for which
finance was availed of but has diverted the funds for other purposes.

(iii)   The unit has defaulted
in meeting its payment /repayment obligations to the lender and has siphoned
off the funds so that the funds have not been utilised for the specific purpose
for which finance was availed of, nor are the funds available with the unit in
the form of other assets.

(iv)  The unit has defaulted in
meeting its payment /repayment obligations to the lender and has also disposed
off or removed the movable fixed assets or immovable property given for the
purpose of securing a term loan without the knowledge of the bank/lender.

 

(c)   whose account is
classified as an NPA (non-performing asset) under the RBI Guidelines and a
period of 1 year or more has lapsed from the date of such classification and
who has failed to make the payment of all overdue amounts with interest thereon
and charges relating to non-performing asset before submission of the
resolution plan – this is the only case where a promoter though barred can
become eligible once again to bid. As long as the promoter makes his NPA account
a standard account by paying up all overdue amounts along with
interest/charges, he can submit a resolution plan. However, this is easier said
than done. The account became an NPA because the promoter was unable to pay up.
Now that it has become an NPA, it would be a herculean task for him to find a
financier who would lend him so that the NPA becomes a standard account!

 

(d)   has been convicted for
any offence punishable with imprisonment
for 2 years or more – this is a very harsh condition, since any conviction for
2 years or more would disentitle the applicant. Consider the case of a person
who has been implicated in a case which is actually a civil dispute, but
converted into a criminal case of forgery and he is convicted by a lower Court
for 2 years or more. Ultimately, his case may be overturned and he may be
acquitted by a Higher Court. In the absence of an express provision, it is
possible that such a person, although acquitted, would be ineligible. Hence,
the amendment should provide that once conviction is set aside, he would again
become eligible.

 

(e)   has been disqualified to
act as a director under the Companies Act, 2013 – this would impact several
directors who have been recently disqualified as directors u/s. 164(2) of the
Companies Act, 2013 on account of failure of the companies to file Annual
Returns and other documents. Several independent directors have also been
disqualified by virtue of the Ministry of Corporate Affair’s drive against
supposed shell companies. All such directors would also become ineligible to
submit applications. 

 

(f)   has been prohibited by
the SEBI from trading in securities or accessing the securities markets – this
embargo is quite severe. The SEBI has been known to prohibit several persons
from trading in securities or accessing the securities markets. Many of the
SEBI’s Orders in this respect have been overturned by the Securities Appellate
Tribunal. What happens in such a case? 

 

(g)   has indulged in
preferential transaction or undervalued transaction or fraudulent transaction
in respect of which an order has been made by the Adjudicating Authority under
the Code – this is to prevent promoters who have entered into fraudulent
transactions with the corporate debtor or transactions to defraud creditors.

 

(h)   has executed an
enforceable guarantee in favour of a creditor, in respect of a corporate debtor
under the insolvency resolution process or liquidation under the Code – this
again ranks as a surprising exclusion. Merely because a person has provided a
guarantee for a company which is undergoing a corporate resolution process, he
is being penalised. Not all cases of insolvency are because of fraud or
misfeasance. Some are genuine cases because of changes in market circumstances
or spiralling of raw materials/oil prices, etc. In such cases, why
should a person who was not even in charge of the debtor be debarred. In fact,
he had provided a guarantee in favour of the creditors which could have been
enforced and some dues could be recovered. Many persons may now think twice
before standing as corporate guarantors.

(i)    Is a connected person in
respect of a person who meets any of the criteria specified in clauses (a) to
(h) would also be ineligible. A connected person is defined to mean

 

(1)   any person who is the promoter
or in management/control of the resolution applicant.

 

(2)   any person who is the
promoter or in management/control of the business of the corporate debtor
during the implementation of the resolution plan.

 

(3)   the
holding/subsidiary/associate company or related party of the above two persons.
The term related party is defined u/s. 5(24) of the Code and includes a long
list of 13 persons. Thus, all of these would also be disqualified if a promoter
becomes ineligible and none of these could ever submit a resolution application
for any company/LLP under the Code.             

 

(j)    has been subject to any
disability, corresponding to the above clauses under any law in a jurisdiction
outside India –thus, even if a person has acted as a guarantor for a small
foreign company which is undergoing bankruptcy proceedings abroad, then he
would be ineligible from participating in the bidding process. This is indeed a
strange provision.      

 

A related provision is that the CoC cannot
approve a resolution plan which was submitted before the commencement of the
Ordinance in a case where the applicant became disqualified by virtue of the
amendments carried out by the Ordinance. Moreover, if no other resolution plan
is available before the CoC other than the one presented by the now
disqualified bidder, then the CoC would be required to ask the RP to invite a
fresh plan. Clearly, this is a very tough task to follow in practice. An actual
case of this nature has occurred in Gujarat NRE Coke Ltd. where, other than the
promoters, there were no other bidders and the promoters have now been
disqualified under the Ordinance. It would be interesting to see what happens
next in this case. However, it is clear that there would be several more such
cases.

 

Conclusion

As it is, RPs are finding it tough to get
resolution applicants. The problem is even more severe in the case of SME
corporate debtors undergoing insolvency resolution. This is now going to get
worse with a whole slate of applicants becoming disqualified by virtue of the
Ordinance. It has painted all applicants by the same brush and even their
related parties and associate companies. If one were to try and plot a tree of
disqualified bidders, one could end up with a forest! This Ordinance while
laudable in its objective of keeping out unscrupulous promoters from gaining a
backdoor re-entry, may in practice become a pain point for RPs.

 

Considering that the IBBI had amended its
Regulations to provide full disclosure about applicants and asked the CoC and
the RP to take more responsibility about applicants, the Ordinance may appear
excessive in its outreach. In fact, this may further lower the value which the
stressed assets could fetch! One only hopes that the Ordinance does not cause
inordinate harm to the already overburdened bad loans’ market. _

ICDS – Post Delhi High Court Decision

The Central Government (CG)
has notified 10 Income Computation and Disclosure Standards (ICDS) u/s. 145(2)
of the Income-tax Act (ITA). Section 145 of the ITA provides that the taxable
income of a taxpayer falling under the heads “Profits and Gains from Business
and Profession” (PGBP) or “Income from Other Sources” (IFOS) shall be computed
in accordance with either the cash or mercantile system of accounting,
whichever is regularly employed by the taxpayer. Section145(2) grants power to
the CG to prescribe the ICDS to be followed by any class of taxpayers or in
respect of any class of income. The notified ICDS are applicable from 1st
April, 2016, (financial year 2016-17) to taxpayers following the mercantile
system of accounting and for the computation of income chargeable under the
heads PGBP or IFOS. They do not apply to taxpayers who are individuals or Hindu
Undivided Families, which are not liable for tax audit under the provisions of
the ITA.

 

A writ petition was filed
by The Chamber of Tax Consultants (Chamber) on the constitutional validity of
section 145(2) as also the validity of notified ICDS, to the extent they are in
conflict with the principles laid down in binding judicial precedents rendered
prior to ICDS. The Chamber urged that while section 145(2) of the ITA permits
the CG, as a delegate of the Legislature, to notify ICDS, it cannot be read as
granting unfettered powers to the CG, in the guise of delegated legislation, to
notify ICDS modifying the basis of taxation which can, if at all, be done only
by the Parliament by amending the ITA. The notified ICDS, to the extent they
seek to unsettle binding judicial precedents and modify the basis of
chargeability and computation of taxable income, are ultra vires the ITA
and the Constitution of India.

 

The Chamber further argued
that “the accounting standards (AS) issued by the ICAI were applicable to all
corporate entities and non-corporate entities following the mercantile system
of accounting. ICDS was applicable only to taxpayers following mercantile
system of accounting (i.e. to all assesses except individuals and HUFs whose
accounts are not required to be audited u/s. 44B of the Act). There was no
reasonable basis on which such differentiation or classification can be made
for the applicability of the ICDS, since the Assessee following the cash system
of accounting would escape from the implications and compliance requirements of
the ICDS. This is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.”

 

The Delhi High Court (HC)
upheld the constitutional validity of section145(2), but struck down several
contentious provisions of individual ICDS. In a landmark ruling, the HC held
that ICDS cannot override binding judicial precedents or statutory provisions.
It held that the force of judicial precedents can be overridden only by a valid
law passed by the Parliament. Such power cannot be exercised by the Executive.
The provisions of ICDS, being a delegated legislation, have to be so read down
such that they do not modify the basis for computation of taxable income as
recognised by the provisions of the ITA or the binding judicial precedents laid
down by the Supreme Court (SC) or High Courts.

 

In the following
paragraphs, we discuss the provisions of individual ICDS that are struck down
by the HC.

 

ICDS I on Accounting Policies

  ICDS I provides that expected or mark to
market (MTM) losses are not to be allowed as deduction, unless specifically
permitted by any other ICDS and, thus, does away with the concept of
“prudence”, which was present in the earlier Tax Accounting Standard (TAS) I.

  The provision of ICDS I is contrary to the
settled judicial position. Many High Court rulings have recognised the
principle of ”prudence” by allowing deduction for provision for expected losses
on contracts recognised in the books of account by the taxpayer in compliance
with GAAP.

  The ITA also grants deduction for revenue
expenses “laid out” or “expended” for the purpose of business in which the
concept of “prudence” is inherent.

   The removal of the concept of prudence is
also not consistent with the prudence principles inherent in other ICDSs. A few
examples are given below.

    Inventory
valuation at lower of cost and market price (ICDS II).

    Provision
for expected losses on contracts in ICDS III, with the only modification that
the said loss will be allowed in proportion of completion of the contract,
rather than allowing the same for the unfinished portion of the contract. This
was primarily for bringing horizontal equity of treating the contract profit
and contract loss on the same principle.

    The
principle of reasonable certainty is adopted for recognising revenue in ICDS
IV.

    Provision
for the losses on forward cover transactions in the nature of hedging (except
to the extent the same pertains to highly probable transactions or firm
commitment) in ICDS VI.

    Valuation
of inventory (of investments) under ICDS VIII at lower of cost and market price

    Recognising
provisions for present obligation of future liabilities in ICDS X.

  Accepting the above contentions, the HC held
that non-acceptance of the “prudence” concept is contrary to the ITA and,
hence, ICDS I is unsustainable to that extent.

   It may be noted that the CBDT Circular (No 10
dated 23rd March, 2017) provides horizontal equity by not taxing MTM
gains.

 

ICDS II on Valuation of Inventory

   As per the settled judicial position, if the
business of a partnership firm continues after dissolution of the firm, then
the inventory has to be valued at lower of the cost and the market price. On
the other hand, if the business is discontinued on dissolution of the firm,
then the inventory has to be valued at market price.

   ICDS II requires that inventory, as on the
date of dissolution of the firm, is to be valued at market price, irrespective
of continuance or discontinuance of the business. This leads to notional
taxation of income contrary to the judicial position.

   Furthermore, there is a specific provision of
the ITA [section 145A], which provides that the inventory shall be valued as
per the method of accounting regularly employed by the taxpayer.

   The HC held that: (a.) It is not permissible
for ICDS II to override the settled judicial position. (b.) Where the taxpayer
follows a certain method of accounting for valuation of inventory, the same
shall override ICDS II by virtue of the specific provision in the ITA. Thus,
the HC held that ICDS II is ultra vires the ITA and, to that extent, it
is struck down.

 

ICDS III on Construction Contracts –
Retention money

  ICDS III provides that retention money should
form part of the contract revenue and taxed on the basis of percentage of
completion method (POCM). The CBDT Circular reiterates this position.

  However, as per the settled judicial
position, retention money accrues to the taxpayer only when the defect
liability period is over and the Engineer-in-Charge certifies that no liability
is attached to the tax payer. Retention money cannot form part of the revenue
unless the same has accrued as “income” as per the charging provisions of the
ITA.

   The HC held that taxation of retention money
would need to be seen on a case-to-case basis depending upon the contractual
terms, conditions attached to such amount and keeping in mind the settled tax
principles of accrual of income. ICDS III, to the extent it seeks to bring
retention money to tax at the earliest stage even when the receipt is uncertain
or conditional, is contrary to the settled position. Therefore, to that extent
ICDS III was struck down.

   Whilst as per law, retention money is taxable
on completion of defect liability period, in practice, many companies prefer to
offer it for tax on its recognition in the accounts, which is much earlier than
completion of the defect liability period. This is done predominantly because
it is the method of accounting regularly followed by the tax payer (section
145) and to avoid any possible litigation. Since the item involves mere timing
difference, tax payers find it convenient to offer retention money for tax as
per accounts, and thereby avoid cumbersome offline calculation for tax
purposes. It also meets the Tax Officers’ intent of taxing it at the earliest
point of time. Therefore, the risks and consequences to the tax payer of
continuing with its existing practice is very limited.

 

ICDS III on Construction Contracts –
Incidental income

 

   The SC, in the case of CIT vs. Bokaro
Steel Ltd.,
held that receipts which are inextricably linked to the setting
up of plant or machinery can be reduced from the cost of asset.

   However,
ICDS III, read with the provisions of ICDS IX on Borrowing Cost, provides that
incidental income earned cannot be reduced from the borrowing cost forming part
of the cost of the asset.

   The
HC held that, to the extent the provisions of ICDS III are contrary to the settled
judicial position, they are not sustainable.

 

ICDS IV on Revenue Recognition – Export
incentives

 

   As
per the SC ruling in the case of CIT vs. Excel Industries Ltd., export
incentives are taxable only in the year in which the claim is accepted by the
Government, as the right to receive the payment accrues in favour of the
taxpayer when the corresponding obligation to pay arises for the Government.

   However,
ICDS IV requires recognition of such income in the year of making claim if
there is a reasonable certainty of ultimate collection.

   ICDS
IV, being contrary to the SC ruling, is ultra vires the ITA provisions
and, hence, struck down to that extent.

  In
the case of Excel Industries, exports were made in Year 1, which
entitled the tax payer to duty free imports. The benefit arising to the tax
payer on exports was recognised in the books in Year 1 and duty free imports
were made in Year 2. In other words, from an accounting parlance, the incentive
was earned in Year 1 and utilised in Year 2. Taxpayer claimed that for tax
purposes, the benefit is taxable in Year 2 when there is corresponding
liability on Government to pay which was upheld by the SC. In more complicated
export incentives or Government grants, the taxability will depend upon facts
and circumstances and may not be straight-forward. As already explained in the
context of retention monies, most tax payers may be offering these incentives
for tax in the year in which it is accrued in the accounts.

 

ICDS IV on Revenue Recognition –
Completed contract method (CCM)

   Accounting
principles (AS-9) permit the taxpayer with respect to service related contracts
to follow either CCM or POCM for revenue recognition. As per AS-9, the choice between CCM and POCM is
dependent on whether there is only a single act in performance of service
contract or more than one act. It may be noted that the AS are not binding on
all categories of assesses, firms, etc. Such assessees are free to
follow any method of accounting.

   Judicial
precedents have recognised both methods as valid for tax purposes under the
mercantile system of accounting.

   ICDS
IV, which only permits POCM, is contrary to the above judicial position and,
hence, liable to be struck down to that extent.

   It
may be noted that with respect to construction contracts (not service contracts,
covered under AS-9), AS-7, permits only POCM. ICDS III on Construction
Contracts also allows only POCM. The HC did not strike down ICDS III, on this
account, probably because the POCM method is the only acceptable method
provided under AS-7 for construction contracts.

 

ICDS IV on Revenue Recognition – Interest
Income

   The
Chamber contended that under ICDS IV, interest income on non-performing assets
(NPAs) of Non-banking Financial Companies (NBFCs) would become taxable on time
basis even though such interest is not recoverable.

  The
HC noted that the CBDT Circular clarifies that while interest income is to be
taxed on time basis alone, bad debt deduction, if any, can be claimed under the
provisions of the ITA. Furthermore, the Parliament has inserted a specific
provision in the ITA to grant bad debt deduction for incomes recognised under
ICDS (without recognition in the books) in the year in which they become
irrecoverable.

  The
HC held that this provision of ICDS IV cannot be held to be ultra vires
since a corresponding bad debt deduction can be claimed by the taxpayer if the
amount of interest is irrecoverable. Also, the Chamber has not demonstrated
that ICDS IV is contrary to any ruling of the SC or any other Court.

  The
HC further observed that once interest income is offered to tax on time basis
by claiming corresponding bad debt deduction, if the amount is not recoverable,
ICDS creates a mechanism to track unrecognised interest amounts for future
taxability, if so accrued.

 

ICDS VI on Foreign Exchange Fluctuations

   The
SC held, in the case of Sutlej Cotton Mills Ltd .vs. CIT, that exchange
fluctuation gain/loss in relation to loan utilised for acquiring a capital item
would be capital in nature.

   ICDS
VI provides that exchange fluctuation loss/gain in case of foreign currency
derivatives held for trading or speculation purposes shall be allowed on actual
settlement, and not on MTM basis. The HC held that this is not consonant with
the ratio laid down by the SC in the Sutlej Cotton Mills ruling and,
therefore, struck it down.

   The
CBDT Circular clarifies that the opening balance of Foreign Currency
Translation Reserve Account as on 1 April 2016 (i.e., on the date ICDS first
became applicable), which comprises of accumulated balance of exchange
fluctuation gains/losses in relation to non-integral foreign operations, is
taxable to the extent it relates to monetary items.

   In
line with the SC decision in the case of Godhra Electric Supply Company Ltd
vs. CIT
, the HC held that valuation of monetary assets and liabilities of
the foreign operations as at the end of the year cannot be treated as real
income as it is only in the nature of notional or hypothetical income which
cannot be subjected to tax.

 

ICDS VII on Government Grants

   ICDS
VII provides that recognition of government grants cannot be postponed beyond
the date of actual receipt. This is in conflict with the accrual system of
accounting since, many times, conditions are attached to the receipt of
government grant which need to be fulfilled in the future. In such instance, it
cannot be said that there is any accrual of income although the money has been
received in advance.

   Therefore,
the HC struck down ICDS VII to that extent.

 

ICDS VIII on Securities held as Inventory

   ICDS
VIII provides for valuation of securities held as inventory and is divided into
two parts.

   Part
B of ICDS VIII, which applies to banks and public financial institutions,
provides that recognition of securities should be in accordance with the RBI guidelines.

   Part
A applies to taxpayers other than banks and public financial institutions. It
requires valuation of inventory on “bucket approach” i.e., category-wise
application of lower of cost and market instead of individual valuation of each
security. However, this is different from the normal accounting principles and,
thus, taxpayers will need to maintain separate records for tax purposes every
year.

  The
HC held that Part A of ICDS VIII, which prescribes “bucket approach”, differs
from ICDS II on valuation of inventory which, under similar circumstances, does
not prescribe the ”bucket approach”. This shows that ICDS has adopted separate
approaches at different places for valuation of inventory. This change is not
possible without a corresponding amendment in the ITA. Hence, to that extent,
Part A of ICDS VIII is ultra vires the ITA.

 

Comparison between Indian GAAP, ICDS and Delhi HC Decision

Point  of Difference

Indian GAAP

ICDS

Delhi HC Decision/Judicial pronouncements

Revenue
during early stage of construction, when outcome cannot be estimated
reliably.

Revenue
recognised to the extent costs are recoverable. No threshold is prescribed
for early stage.

Same
as Indian GAAP. However, the early stage shall not extend beyond 25%
completion. (ICDS III – Construction Contracts).

No
change.

Retention
money.

Forms
part of contract revenue and POCM is applied to entire contract revenue.

Same
as Indian GAAP (ICDS III – Construction Contracts).

Retention
money accrues to the taxpayer only when the related performance conditions
are fulfilled, for eg. when the defect liability period is over and the
Engineer-in-Charge certifies that no liability is attached to the tax payer.
Retention money cannot form part of the revenue unless the same has accrued.

Export
incentive.

When
it is reasonably certain that all conditions will be fulfilled and the
ultimate collection will be made.

In
the year of making claim, if there is a reasonable certainty of ultimate
collection. (ICDS VII – Government Grants).

Income
will not accrue, till the time conditions attached to it are fulfilled and
there is corresponding liability on Government to pay the benefit. (SC in Excel
Industries
case).

Revenue
from construction contracts.

POCM

POCM

Not
discussed.

Revenue
from service contracts.

POCM
or CCM

u  Only POCM for long duration contracts (>
90 days).

u   CCM permitted for short duration contracts (< 90 days) (ICDS
IV – Revenue Recognition).

Accounting
principles and Judicial precedents permit, both POCM and CCM.

Real
estate developers.

As
per Guidance Note on Accounting for Real Estate Transactions, only
POCM is allowed.

No
ICDS for real estate developers. 
Judicial precedents will apply. 
Therefore, POCM or CCM will be allowed per the method of accounting
regularly employed by the taxpayer. 
The acceptance of CCM by the tax authorities for real estate
developers is a contentious issue and generally resisted by the Tax
Department. There are also cases where CCM has been disallowed by courts.
Currently, if taxpayer is following POCM in books, it would be bound u/s.145,
which requires income to be computed as per method of accounting regularly
followed by the taxpayers in its books. Most corporate real estate developers
follow POCM. A few corporates and non-corporates that followed CCM had to
face severe litigations and an audit qualification from the auditor on the
financial statements.

Not
discussed.

Onerous
Contract.

Expected
losses are recognised as an expense immediately.

Losses
incurred on a contract will be allowed only in proportion to the stage of
completion (ICDS III – Construction Contracts).

Prudence
is inherent in section 37(1) and hence expected losses allowable as per
judicial precedents.

Borrowing
Cost capitalisation – whether substantial period of time is required.

Applies
only when assets require substantial period of time for completion.

No
condition w.r.t substantial period of time except for inventory and general
borrowing costs ( 12 months) (ICDS IX – Borrowing Costs).

No
change.

Capitalisation
of specific borrowing cost.

Actual
borrowing cost.

Actual
borrowing cost.

No
change.

Capitalisation
of general borrowing cost.

Weighted
average cost of borrowing is applied on funds that are borrowed generally and
used for obtaining a qualifying assets.

Allocation
is based on average cost of qualifying asset to average total assets (ICDS IX
– Borrowing Costs).

No
change.

Borrowings
– Income on temporary investments.

Reduced
from the borrowing costs eligible for capitalisation.

Not
to be reduced from the borrowing costs eligible for capitalisation. Thus, it
will be taxable income (ICDS IX – Borrowing Costs).

Accounting
principles and Judicial precedents permit reduction of incidental income
where it has close nexus with construction activity. (SC in Bokaro Steel).

Contingent
Assets.

Recognition
is based on virtual certainty.

Recognition
is based on reasonable certainty (ICDS X – Provisions, Contingent Liabilities
and Contingent Assets).

Test
of ‘reasonable certain’ is not in accordance with S. 4/5 of ITA. Hypothetical
income not creating enforceable right cannot be taxed.

Government
Grant
classification.

u   Income related grant

u   Assets related grant

u   Grant in the nature of promoter’s contribution (credited to
capital reserve).

u     Income related grant

u     Assets related grant

     (ICDS VII – Government Grant).

 

No
change.

Government
Grant – recognition.

Not
recognised until there is a reasonable assurance that the entity shall comply
with the conditions attached to them and the grants will be received.

Similar
to Indian GAAP, except recognition is not postponed beyond the date of actual
receipt. (ICDS VII – Government Grant).

Taxable
when conditions attached to the receipt of government grant are fulfilled
and, there is corresponding liability on Government to pay.

Capitalisation
of exchange differences on long term foreign currency monetary item for
acquisition of fixed assets
(AS 11.46A).

Paragraph
46/ 46A of AS 11 provides option for capitalisation.

u   On imported assets S43A allows capitalisation

u   On local assets S43A does not apply.

u     With respect to local assets, all MTM exchange differences are included
in taxable income (ICDS VI – Foreign Exchange)

Distinguish
between capital and revenue nature of exchange fluctuation (
Sutlej Cotton Mills).  Thus, exchange
differences on local capital assets, are not revenue in nature; nor, are
capitalisable under 43A.

Forward
contracts under AS 11 for hedging purpose.

Premium/
discount to be amortised over the contract period. Spot-to-spot gains/ losses
are recognised in P&L.

Same
as Indian GAAP. (ICDS VI – Foreign Exchange).

No
change.

Foreign
currency risk of a firm commitment or a highly probable forecast transaction.

As
per Guidance Note on Accounting for Derivative Contracts (GN)
derivatives are measured at fair value through P&L, if hedge accounting
is not applied.

Premium,
discount or exchange difference, shall be recognised at the time of
settlement. (ICDS VI – Foreign Exchange).

ICDS
cannot override judicial precedents (which will implicitly include SC ruling
in Woodward Governor’s case (312 ITR 254) which upheld MTM treatment
as per accounting principles). Thus MTM losses/gains are deductible/taxable.

Foreign
currency risk on contract for trading or speculative purposes.

As
per GN, derivatives are measured at fair value through P&L.

Premium,
discount or exchange difference shall be recognised at the time of
settlement. (ICDS VI – Foreign Exchange).

MTM
losses are tax deductible

[SC
in Sutlej Cotton Mills
].

MTM
gains – No clarity but on principles, it is taxable.

MTM
losses on commodity derivatives.

As
per GN, derivatives are measured at fair value through P&L, if hedge
accounting is not applied.

u   MTM losses are not tax deductible. (ICDS I – Disclosure of
Accounting Policies)

u     CBDT Circular – MTM Gains are not taxable.

u     Consequently, tax will apply on settlement.

ICDS
cannot override judicial precedents (which will implicitly include SC ruling
in Woodward Governor’s
case (312 ITR 254) which
permitted MTM treatment as per accounting principles).  Thus MTM losses/gains are
deductible/taxable.

 

The Road Ahead

The ICDS has far-reaching implications on tax
liability of assessees, which are debilitating. The introduction of Ind AS
should have been tax neutral, with minimal or no impact on tax liability. It is
unfortunate that Ind AS was used as an excuse to introduce ICDS that had severe
tax consequences on tax payers, which were mostly negative. The standards were
framed by a part time committee and that too in a great hurry. The ICDS
standards appear to be one sided, determined to maximise tax collection, rather
than routed in sound accounting principles. Such a backhanded and concealed
manner of bringing in an important piece of legislation, many of the provisions
of which were in conflict with the ITA or judicial precedents was deservedly
struck down by the HC. To the extent, the provisions were in conflict with the
ITA, the ICDS itself provided that those would prevail over ICDS. However,
there was no such exemption for ICDS provisions that were in conflict with
judicial precedents. The CBDT’s clarification in the Circular that ICDS shall
prevail over judicial precedents on ‘transactional issues’ was also highly
unsatisfactory.

 

There were also many interpretative
challenges that could have created a very litigious environment. Consider this;
the preamble of the ICDS states that where there is conflict between the
provisions of the ITA and ICDS, the provisions of the ITA shall prevail to that
extent. If a company has claimed mark-to-market losses on derivatives as
deductible expenditure u/s. 37(1) of the ITA – Can the company argue that this
is a deductible expenditure under the ITA (though the matter may be sub
judice
) and hence should prevail over ICDS which prohibits mark-to-market
losses to be considered as deductible expenditure?

 

Some of the transitional provisions in ICDS
had significant unanticipated effect. For example, the ICDS requires contingent
assets to be recognised based on reasonable certainty as compared to the
existing norm of virtual certainty. Consider a company has filed several
claims, where there is reasonable certainty that it would be awarded
compensation. However, it has never recognised such claims as income, since it
did not meet the virtual certainty test under AS 29 Provisions, Contingent
Liabilities and Contingent Assets
. Under the transitional provision, it
will recognise all such claims in the first transition year 2016-17. If the
claim amounts are significant, the tax outflow could be devastating. This could
negatively impact companies that have these claims. The interpretation of “reasonable
certainty” and “virtual certainty” would also come under huge stress and
debate.  This may well be another
potential area of uncertainty and litigation.

 

The struck down ones of some contentious
provisions of ICDS by the HC is a huge relief to tax payers. It will not only
bring fairness and tax neutrality but will also avoid a litigious environment,
provided the HC decision is upheld by the SC and not contested by the
Government.

 

Taxpayers which have already filed returns
for tax year 2016-17 can explore revising their returns on the basis of the law
laid down by the present ruling. While there may be no difficulty in case of
the SC ruling which is binding on all lower Courts in India, there could be
difficulties in the case of a High Court ruling. A High Court ruling would be
binding on a lower judicial authority in the jurisdictional area of the High
Court. Whether a High Court ruling would bind lower judicial authority in other
jurisdictional areas is a highly contentious and debatable matter.

 

In this respect, different High Courts have
taken different views. If other High Courts step into this issue, the situation
can get very muddy and complicated, particularly if they take a conflicting
position from that taken by the Delhi HC. Therefore, it is natural to expect
that the CG may intervene, either by filing a special leave petition with the
SC for stay of the HC decision or alternatively, incorporating the ICDS as part
of the Act. _

17 Section 9 of the Act; Articles 12, 23 of India-UK DTAA – Guarantee fee received by UK company from its Indian subsidiaries is not in the nature of ‘Interest’, business income or FTS; such income qualifies as ‘Other Income’.

[2017] 88 taxmann.com 127 (Delhi – Trib.)

Johnson Matthey Plc v. DCIT

A.Y.: 2011-12, Dated: 06thDecember,
2017


Facts

The Taxpayer was a company incorporated in,
and resident of, the UK. ICo 1 and ICo 2 were two Indian subsidiary companies
of the Taxpayer. The Taxpayer, inter alia, provided guarantees for
credit facilities provided by foreign banks to ICo1 and ICo 2. The Taxpayer
offered the guarantee fees received from ICo 1 and ICo 2 as ‘Interest’ taxable
at the rate of 15%, under Article 12 of India-UK DTAA.

 

The AO concluded that the guarantee fee was
‘Other Income’ under Article 23 of India-UK DTAA and accordingly, was subject
to tax at the rate of  40%.

 

The Taxpayer contended that the guarantee
fee was in the nature of business income and such fee was not taxable in India,
in absence of a PE. The Taxpayer further contended that it offered the fee to
tax as ‘Interest’ out of abundant caution.

 

Held

    The term “interest” in Article
12(5) of DTAA and section 2(28A) of the Act is to be understood in the context
of the other words and phrases used in the definition. The term “interest”, in
its widest connotation, will indicate the payments made by the receiver of some
amount, pursuant to a loan transaction. Even the expressions “claims of
any kind” or “service fee or other charge” as appearing in the
DTAA or in the Act, are to be understood in relation to the transaction or
contract of loan.

 

    A payment can be treated as interest only in
the context and privity of loan contract. though no creditor-debtor
relationship may exist. Payments made to strangers cannot be treated as
interest, even where such payments are incidental to a loan.

 

    The Taxpayer was a stranger to the privity
of loan transactions as the contract of loan was different from the contract of
guarantee.

 

    Accordingly,
scope of the expressions “debt claims of any kind” or “the
service fee or other charge in respect of moneys borrowed or debt
incurred” cannot be extended to payment of guarantee commission as the
Taxpayer was a stranger to the privity of contract of loan.

 

    The Taxpayer was manufacturing
technologically advanced chemicals and was not in the business of providing
corporate/bank guarantee to earn guarantee commission. It had provided
guarantee only to secure finance for its subsidiaries and not to earn fee.
Hence, the fee cannot be considered ‘business profit’ under Article 7 of
India-UK DTAA.

 

    Such fee was neither for rendering any
technical or consultancy service nor for making available any knowledge,
experience, skill know-how or process, nor was it for any development or
transfer of a technical plan or a technical design. Further, it was also not
covered within Explanation to section 9(1)(vii) of the Act. Hence, it could not
not be considered Fee for technical service (FTS).

 

    Accordingly, guarantee fee was taxable as
‘Other Income’ in terms of Article 23(3) of India-UK DTAA. _

16 Section 9 of the Act; Article 5 of India-USA DTAA – Income of US company could not be taxed in India since non-exclusive advertising and sales agent for canvassing channel airtime sales did not constitute PE of US company in India

[2017] 87 taxmann.com 345 (Mumbai – Trib.)

SPE Networks India Inc. vs. DCIT

A.Ys: 2005-06 to 2010-11,

Date of Order: 08th November,
2017


Facts

The Taxpayer was a company incorporated in,
and a resident of, USA. It was engaged in the business of operating, marketing
and distribution of the television channels and related activities. For
marketing two of its channels the Taxpayer had appointed its group company in
India (“ICo”) as a non-exclusive advertising and sales agent for canvassing
airtime for its channel. The Taxpayer was to receive substantial portion of the
share of revenue collected by ICo from distribution of channels. The Taxpayer
claimed that since it did not have PE in India, in terms of Article 7 of
India-USA DTAA, its income was not taxable in India.

 

For the following reasons, AO contended that
ICo was a dependent agent of the Taxpayer and hence, the Taxpayer had a
business connection and Dependent Agency PE in India.

 

(i)   The Taxpayer carried on
the telecasting business in India by extensively utilising the services of ICo
for sale of advertisements and distribution of channels.

(ii)  Activities of both the
Taxpayer and ICo were interlaced, interconnected, inter dependent and interlinked.

(iii)  The agreement was a
revenue sharing arrangement which depended upon the gross advertisement airtime
revenue and not purchase and sale of advertisement airtime.

(iv) ICo had an authority to
conclude contracts on behalf of the Taxpayer in India .

 

     Accordingly, AO held that
15% of the net revenue received by the Taxpayer from ICo was taxable in India.

 

Held

?   Taxpayer had entered into two agreements
with ICo, which gave rise to two revenue streams for the Taxpayer i.e
advertisement revenue and distribution revenue. Advertisement revenue was
generated from advertisement broadcasted on the channel and distribution
revenue was generated by distributing the viewership rights to the customers
through cable operators.

 

?   Perusal of the agreements clearly showed
that: (a) the Taxpayer was carrying on its operations from USA and not from
India; (b) both sale of advertisement and distribution of channels were not
carried out in India; (c) the Taxpayer did not have any office premises or a
fixed place of business in India at its disposal; and (d) none of its employees
were based in India through whom it could render the services in India. Thus,
there was neither fixed base PE nor service PE in India.

 

?    Though CIT(A) endorsed the view of the AO
that the Taxpayer had Agency PE, nothing was brought on record to prove that
the agreements between the Taxpayer and ICo were not on Principal-to-Principal
basis. Tribunal noted that: (i) ICo had no authority to conclude contract on
behalf of the Taxpayer; (ii) while selling the airtime and distributing
channels, ICo was acting in its own right and not on behalf of the Taxpayer:
(iii) ICo was not dependent on the Taxpayer economically or legally; and (iv)
ICo also carried out significant marketing activities for other channels.
Hence, it was an independent entity carrying on its own business. 

 

?  ICo
purchased airtime from the Taxpayer and sold in its own right and the Taxpayer
had no control over it. The revenue earned by ICo was not on behalf of the
Taxpayer. ICo made payment to the Taxpayer for the purchases. ICo was not
subject to any control of the Taxpayer for conducting business in India. Its
activities were not devoted wholly or almost wholly for the Taxpayer.
Similarly, revenue of the Taxpayer was not entirely dependent on the earning of
ICo. Thus, it cannot be treated as a dependent agent, of the Taxpayer.

 

?   The AO had not alleged that the transactions
between the Taxpayer and ICo were not at arm’s length. The TPOs had held that
no TP adjustments were required to be made to the income of the Taxpayer on
account of advertisement revenue or distribution revenue.

 

?  Accordingly, the Taxpayer did not have any
business connection or agency PE or fixed base PE in India and ICo was not an
agent of the Taxpayer. Hence, the AO had wrongly invoked Rule 10.

15 Articles 4, 8, 29 of India-UAE DTAA – Since India-Germany DTAA also provided benefits similar to India-UAE DTAA, it could not be said that incorporation of the company in UAE was for availing DTAA benefits merely because it was owned by German shareholders.

[2017] 88 taxmann.com 102 (Rajkot – Trib.)

ITO vs. Martrade Gulf Logistics FZCO-UAE

A.Y. 2008-09, Date of Order: 28th
November, 2017

Facts       

The Taxpayer was a company incorporated in
UAE engaged in the business of shipping. It had filed return u/s. 172(4) of the
Act. The Taxpayer was held by German shareholders. The Taxpayer claimed that
the income earned out of the operations of ships in international waters was
not taxable in India by virtue of India-UAE DTAA.

 

The AO noted that: (i) the meeting of its
shareholders was held outside UAE; (ii) its directors were not residents of
UAE; (iii) its shareholders were not residents of UAE; (iv) the Taxpayer was
not liable to tax in UAE; and (v) the Taxpayer only had its registered office
in UAE with some senior employees. Hence, the AO concluded that effective
control and management of the Taxpayer was not situated in UAE and denied
India-UAE DTAA benefit. Further, the AO contended that the Taxpayer was merely
registered in UAE for doing the business of the German entities. Thus, owing to
Article 29 of India-UAE DTAA, benefit of Article 8 cannot be granted to the
Taxpayer.

 

However, the Taxpayer contended that despite
the fact that its shareholders and directors are non-UAE residents, it was managed
and controlled wholly from UAE, and the business was also carried on from UAE.
Hence, it was eligible for India-UAE DTAA benefits.

 

On appeal, the CIT(A) observed that the
place of effective management of the Taxpayer was UAE. Further, UAE had also issued
Residency Certificate, Incorporation Certificate, Trading License and other
documents. Hence, the CIT(A) concluded that the Taxpayer was a resident of UAE
and consequently, eligible for treaty benefit.

 

The CIT(A) further referred to explanation
u/s. 115VC of the Act which defines the place of effective management in case
of a ship operating company and stated that since all the board meetings were
regularly conducted in UAE, the control and management was situated in UAE.
Accordingly, he held that the AO had wrongly determined the residential status
of the Taxpayer by considering the nationality of the directors. Therefore,
having regard to Article 8, read with Article 4, of India-UAE DTAA, profits
from operations of ship in international waters was not taxable in India.

 

Held

?  On account of its incorporation in UAE, the
Taxpayer was liable to tax in UAE. Therefore, it was “resident of Contracting
State” under Article 4(1) of the India-UAE DTAA.

 

?    Tribunal further relied on its earlier
decision in ITO vs. MUR shipping DMC Co. (ITA No. 405/RJT/2013) and
observed that:

    All that is necessary for
the purpose of being treated as resident of a Contracting States under
India-UAE DTAA is that the person should be liable to tax in that Contracting
State by reason of domicile, residence, place of management, place of
incorporation. Reliance in this regard was placed on the decision of ADIT
vs. Green Emirate Shipping and Travels, (2006) 100 ITD 203 (Mum).

 

    Being ‘liable to tax’ in
the Contracting State does not necessarily imply that the person should
actually be liable to tax in that Contracting State by virtue of an existing
legal provision but would also cover the cases where that other Contracting
State has the right to tax such persons, irrespective of whether or not such a
right is exercised by the Contracting State.

 

    Since the Taxpayer was not
a resident of India, the question of applying the POEM test under the
tie-breaker rule in Article 4(4), which the AO had emphasised, was irrelevant.

 

    For invoking Article 29,
it should be established that if the Taxpayer was not to be incorporated in
UAE, it would not have been entitled for such benefits. However, India-Germany
DTAA also provided such benefit. Hence, even if the Taxpayer was incorporated
in UAE but its entire share capital was held by German entities shall not
affect the taxability of shipping income. This is for the reason that  similar benefit with regard to taxability of
shipping profits is available even under India-Germany treaty. Therefore, the
requisite condition for invoking Article 29 was not fulfilled.

 

14 Articles 8, 24 of India-Singapore DTAA – Distinction between ‘liable to tax’ and ‘subject to tax’; expression ‘exempt from tax’ implies, treaty benefit of non-taxation in source state depends on taxability in residence state; remanded to CIT(A) for proper deliberation on whether treaty benefits can be granted in source state, where such benefit results in double non-taxation.

TS-556-ITAT-2017(Rjt)

BP Singapore Pte Ltd. vs. ITO

A.Y.: 2015-16,

Date of Order: 28th November,
2017


Facts

A Singapore Company (“the Taxpayer”) was
engaged in the business of operation of ships in international waters. The
Taxpayer had claimed exemption under Article 8 of the DTAA in respect of the
freight income.

 

The Assessing Officer (“AO”) contended that
Article 24 of the India-Singapore treaty grants benefits of an exemption or
lower rate of taxation under the treaty only where income was taxed in
Singapore and since there was no evidence indicating that the freight income
was taxed in Singapore, AO applied Article 24 and denied the treaty benefits to
the Taxpayer.

 

The Taxpayer contended that as per Article
8, India has no right to tax shipping income. Hence, the income cannot be said
to be “exempt from tax in India”. Therefore, Article 24 was not applicable to
the facts of the case. Further, since the income was taxable in Singapore on
accrual basis1 , even for this reason, Article 24 could not be
applied.

_________________________________________________________

1   Though
the Taxpayer had claimed that the income was taxed in Singapore on accrual
basis, during the proceedings before Tribunal, it mentioned that because of
applicability of an incentive provision, such freight income was not taxed in
Singapore.

 

 

Held

?    The income was liable to tax in Singapore as
the fiscal domicile of the Taxpayer was in Singapore. However, it was not
actually taxed because of the incentive provision. In other words, though it
was “liable to tax”, the income was not “subjected to tax”

?    On the issue of whether income was “exempt
from tax in India”, Tribunal held as follows:

 

    Article 3(2) requires
contextual interpretation of the undefined terms. Even where there is a
domestic law meaning to the undefined term, the contextual meaning will have
precedence.

 

    The expression ‘exempt
from tax’ in Article 24, essentially implies that the treaty benefit of
non-taxation of an income, or its being taxed at a lower rate in a contracting
state (in this case, India), depends on the status of taxability in other
contracting state (in this case, Singapore).

 

    Irrespective of whether
the treaty grants taxing rights exclusively to resident state (like the
language used in Article 8) or exempts the income in the source state the
impact on source state taxation remains the same, especially if seen in the context
of the provisions
of the treaty where a benefit being granted is dependent
on the taxation in resident state.

 

?    Thus, technically, Article 24 was applicable
to the facts of the case.

 

?    However, noting that granting of treaty
benefits in the facts of the case, would lead to double non-taxation of income,
the matter was remanded back to CIT(A) for adjudication de novo on the issue of
whether, having regard to the underlying objective of the treaty to avoid
double non-taxation, treaty benefits in the source state (i.e India) can be
granted in respect of an income which is exempt from tax in resident state.

 

?    The Tribunal noted that this issue would
impact a large number of Singapore companies and may be difficult to adjudicate
without proper deliberation, backed by the submissions of the parties. Hence,
the Tribunal remanded the matter to the CIT(A) to consider the issue and
directed both the parties to provide detailed arguments before CIT(A).

Impact Of Multilateral Instrument On India’s Tax Treaties From An Anti-Abuse Rules Perspective

BACKGROUND

On 7th June 2017, representatives
of 68 jurisdictions met at the OECD headquarters in Paris to sign the
multilateral instrument[1]
(MLI). The MLI is an outcome of the Base Erosion and Profit Sharing (BEPS)
Action 15, which specifically addresses the issue of how to modify existing
bilateral tax treaties in order to implement BEPS tax treaty measures. The
MLI is an innovative and swift way of modifying bilateral tax treaties without
getting caught in the time-consuming process of re-negotiating each tax treaty.

The implementation of the MLI is expected to have a far-reaching impact on the
existing bilateral tax treaties. The OECD estimates that potentially 1,100
existing bilateral tax treaties are set to be modified. This is a turning
point in the history of international taxation.

 

SCOPE OF MLI FROM INDIA’S PERSPECTIVE

As of now, the MLI is signed but not yet
effective. The MLI will enter into force on the first date of the month after
three calendar months from the date when at least five countries deposit the
instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval; detailed provisions are
also there for entry into effect of the MLI.

 

Once the MLI is effective, it will modify an
existing bilateral tax treaty only if both the countries have notified the tax
treaty for the purposes of MLI. Under the MLI framework, such a tax treaty is
referred to as the covered tax agreement (CTA). India has notified all its tax
treaties (such as tax treaties with USA, UK, Singapore, Netherlands, Japan,
Luxembourg, etc.) as CTAs for the purposes of MLI. However, there are
some countries such as Mauritius, Germany and China who have chosen not to
notify their tax treaty with India – accordingly, the MLI will not apply to
India’s tax treaties with Mauritius, Germany and China. Further, USA and Brazil
are not signatories to the MLI itself. Accordingly, apart from tax treaties
with a few countries, most of India’s tax treaties will stand modified when the
MLI becomes effective
.

 

It may be noted that all tax treaties will
not stand modified at the same time. The effective date of MLI for each
signatory country will vary depending upon when that country signed the MLI.
The MLI provisions will apply only after the MLI has become effective for both
countries.

 

MINIMUM STANDARDS OF BEPS ACTION 6
IMPLEMENTED THROUGH MLI

The MLI implements two minimum BEPS
standards relating to prevention of tax treaty abuse (BEPS Action 6) and
improvement of dispute resolution (BEPS Action 14). In this article, we are
discussing the impact of MLI on India’s tax treaties with respect to BEPS
Action 6
.

 

The BEPS Action
6 identified treaty abuse, and in particular treaty shopping, as one of the
most important sources of BEPS concerns.Taxpayers engaged in treaty shopping
and other treaty strategies claim treaty benefits in situations where these
benefits are not intended to be granted, thereby depriving countries of tax
revenues. Therefore, countries have come together to include anti-abuse
provisions in their tax treaties, including a minimum standard to counter
treaty shopping. The BEPS Action 6 includes three alternative rules to address
tax treaty abuse:

 

1.  Principal purpose test
(PPT) rule (a general anti-abuse rule based on the principal purpose of
transactions or arrangements)

 

2.  PPT rule, supplemented with
either simplified or detailed limitation of benefits (LOB) rule (a specific
anti-abuse rule which limits the availability of treaty benefits to persons
that meet certain conditions)

 

3.  Detailed LOB rule,
supplemented by a mechanism that would deal with conduit arrangements not
already dealt with in tax treaties.

PPT rule

The MLI presents the PPT rule as the
default option (as the PPT rule meets the minimum standard recommended under
BEPS Action 6 on a standalone basis).
Being a
minimum standard, these are mandatory provisions of the MLI and therefore, the
countries who have signed the MLI cannot typically opt out of these provisions.
As an exception, the countries can opt out if a tax treaty already meets the
minimum standards or if it is intended to adopt a combination of a detailed LOB
provision and either rules to address conduit financing structures or a PPT.
Accordingly, generally speaking, PPT rule of the MLI will replace the existing
anti-abuse provision in the tax treaty, or will be inserted in the absence of
anti-abuse provision in the tax treaty. For example, India’s tax treaties with
Canada, Denmark, France, Ireland, Japan, Netherlands, and Sweden do not have an
anti-abuse provision and therefore, the PPT rule of the MLI will be inserted
into those tax treaties.

 

The PPT rule of the MLI provides that a
benefit under a tax treaty shall not be granted if it is reasonable to
conclude, having regard to all relevant facts and circumstances, that obtaining
the benefit was one of the principal purposes of any arrangement or transaction
that resulted directly or indirectly in that benefit. A classic example is
where the PPT rule addresses treaty shopping by multinational companies who set
up ‘letterbox’ or ‘conduit’ companies which do not have substance in reality
and exist only to take advantage of the tax treaty. With the operation of the
PPT rule, the tax treaty benefits would be denied to such ‘letterbox’ or
‘conduit’ companies which are set up primarily with the intention to take
advantage of a favourable tax treaty. However, such benefit may be granted if
it is established that granting that benefit in these circumstances would be in
accordance with the object and purpose of the relevant provisions of the tax treaty.

 

The explanatory statement to the MLI
clarifies that the PPT rule of the MLI will not only replace the existing PPT
rules that deny all tax benefits under a particular tax treaty (a general
anti-abuse rule) but also those existing rules that deny tax benefits under
specific articles such as dividends, royalties, interest, income from
employment, other income and elimination of double taxation. This will ensure
that narrower provisions are replaced by the broader PPT rule of the MLI. In
case of a tax treaty that does not already contain a PPT rule, the PPT rule of
the MLI will be added. All these changes to the tax treaty are going to make
treaty shopping difficult. The amendments to the tax treaty arising from
operation of MLI will be prospective. Further, there is no grandfathering
clause available under the MLI provisions for the existing structures. The taxpayers
may have to evaluate how to align their structures with the amended tax
treaties.

 

The PPT rule of the MLI refers to “one of
the principal purpose” as opposed to “principal purpose” or “main purpose” or
“primary purpose”. Thus, the PPT rule of the MLI is broader than some of the
existing PPT rules contained in tax treaties which only refer to main or
principal or primary purpose. Therefore, the PPT rule of the MLI, once
incorporated into the tax treaties may broaden the scope of anti-abuse provision.
Existing structures which have been put in place simply to take advantage of
the tax treaties and which do not have any substance would be adversely hit by
the amended tax treaties.

 

Simplified LOB rule

In addition to the PPT rule under the MLI, a
country may also opt to apply a simplified or detailed LOB rule. Under the MLI,
an optional provision will be applicable to a tax treaty only if both the
countries have opted for such provision. If one of the countries has not opted
for it, the optional provision will not be applicable to the CTA. Thus, the
simplified LOB rule (an optional provision) will be applicable to a particular
tax treaty only if both the countries to the tax treaty have exercised the
choice to opt for it. While India has chosen to apply the simplified LOB, very
few other countries[2]
have made a similar choice. Practically, simplified LOB will not get
incorporated into India’s tax treaties, except where the other country has also
opted for such rule (such as, Bulgaria, Colombia, Indonesia, Russia, Slovak
Republic and Uruguay). Though the inclusion of PPT rule and simplified LOB rule
makes the anti-abuse provisions in the tax treaty stronger, from an India tax
treaty perspective, the PPT rule is going to be relevant as very few countries
have opted for simplified LOB rule.

 

Detailed LOB

The detailed LOB is out of the ambit of the
MLI and does not provide for the text of the detailed LOB as it requires
substantial bilateral customisation. Instead, countries that prefer to address
treaty abuse by adopting a detailed LOB provision are permitted to opt out of
the PPT and agree instead to endeavour to reach a bilateral agreement that
satisfies the minimum standard.

 

IMPACT ON SELECT INDIA’S TAX TREATIES

 

India-UK

 

Article 28C of the India-UK tax treaty,
which is a general anti-abuse provision, will stand replaced by the PPT rule of
the MLI as India and UK both have notified Article 28C for the purposes of MLI.
The PPT rule of the MLI provides for a carve-out in case where the tax benefits
are in accordance with the purpose and object of the tax treaty whereas Article
28C of India-UK tax treaty does not have such a carve-out. Therefore, the
replacement of the PPT rule in place of Article 28C of the India-UK tax treaty
may lead to relaxation of the general anti-abuse provision in the tax treaty.

 

The UK has also notified anti-abuse
provisions contained in Articles 11(6), 12(11) and 13(9) of the India-UK tax
treaty for the purposes of application of MLI; however, India has not notified
these provisions leading to notification mismatch. Based on the step-by-step
process outlined by the OECD, the PPT rule of the MLI will supersede these
articles to the extent they are incompatible with the PPT rule. India and UK
are not on the same page in case of Articles 11(6), 12(11) and 13(9) of the
India-UK tax treaty.

 

India-Singapore

 

The India-Singapore tax treaty contains
specific anti-abuse provisions which deny tax treaty benefits in relation to
capital gains. These provisions are in the nature of a specific anti-avoidance
rule (SAAR) and will not be impacted by the PPT rule. The PPT rule will
accordingly co-exist with the capital gains SAAR. At this stage, it is unclear
as to how this will play out. It will suffice to say that MLI will make this
treaty one of the most complicated.

 

India-Mauritius

 

Mauritius has not notified the
India-Mauritius tax treaty as a CTA, and accordingly, the PPT rules will not be
included as part of the tax treaty.

 

India-Luxembourg

 

The general anti-abuse provision contained
under Articles 29(2) and (3) of the India-Luxembourg tax treaty can be regarded
as broader in scope than the PPT under the MLI. As India and Luxembourg have
notified the Articles 29(2) and (3), the PPT under the MLI will replace the
aforementioned articles of the India-Luxembourg tax treaty. Thus, there is a
relaxation of the threshold.

 

India’s tax treaties with Canada, Denmark,
France, Ireland, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden

 

These tax treaties do not have an anti-abuse
provision and therefore, the PPT rule of the MLI will be inserted into the tax
treaty.

 

INTERPLAY BETWEEN PPT RULE OF THE MLI AND
GENERAL ANTI-AVOIDANCE RULE (GAAR) UNDER THE INCOME-TAX ACT, 1961

 

Scope of PPT rule of the MLI and GAAR

 

The scope of operation of the PPT rule of
the MLI and GAAR are different; whereas the PPT rule applies only to tax treaty
abuse, the GAAR applies to all kinds of abuse of the tax provisions (including
tax treaty abuse). The PPT rule of the MLI is different than GAAR when it comes
to the use of the terms “one of the principal purposes” as opposed to “main
purpose” under the GAAR. An arrangement which has more than one principal/main
purpose (of which obtaining tax benefit is one, but is not the main purpose)
may get covered under the PPT rule of the MLI, but may not attract GAAR.
Moreover, for GAAR to apply, the transaction should also not be at arm’s
length/ result in abuse of provisions of law/lack or deem to lack commercial
substance/is not bona fide. In contrast, the PPT rule of the MLI
provides a carve-out in terms of which the tax benefits will not be adversely
impacted by the PPT rule of the MLI, if such tax benefits are in line with the
purpose and objects of the tax treaty. Therefore, it cannot be generalised
whether PPT rule of the MLI or GAAR is broader in scope.

 

Interaction between PPT rule and GAAR

 

Let’s consider a situation where if the PPT
rule were applied, the tax treaty benefits would be denied; however, if the
GAAR were invoked, the tax treaty benefits would not be denied. The Income-tax
Act, 1961 (ITA) broadly provides that a taxpayer can apply the provisions of
the ITA or the tax treaty, whichever is beneficial. Relying on this provision,
can a taxpayer contend that it wants to be governed by the provisions of the
GAAR under the ITA and not the PPT rule under the tax treaty? This seems a
difficult proposition, as once the taxpayer elects to claim the benefits of a
tax treaty (say, reduced withholding tax on technical service fees), the entire
treaty (including the PPT rule) has to be considered, leading to the benefit
not being available.

 

To summarise, once a taxpayer seeks to claim
a tax treaty benefit, the PPT rule is to be examined to see whether the benefit
is to be granted or not. Thereafter, even if the PPT rule is not triggered, it
may be open to the tax authorities to deny the tax treaty benefit by invoking
the GAAR.

 

Implementation and administration of GAAR

 

The Indian tax authorities have the right
to deny tax treaty benefits if the GAAR is invoked in a particular case.
It all boils down to how the Indian tax authorities will administer
the GAAR. In the context of the LOB rule, the Indian tax authorities have
clarified that GAAR will be invoked in cases where they believe that anti-abuse
rules under the tax treaty have fallen short of preventing the mischief of tax
treaty abuse. There are checks and balances provided under the GAAR in order to
prevent an overzealous tax officer from involving GAAR in every case. Any
proposal to invoke GAAR will be vetted by senior tax authorities at the first
stage and by another panel at the second stage that will be headed by a High
Court Judge. However, time will be the best judge of how Indian tax authorities
implement and administer the GAAR.

 

It is pertinent to note that these processes
and safeguards for invoking GAAR are strictly not applicable to the PPT rule.
We will need to see whether these processes and safeguards are
extended for applying the PPT rule as well – clarifications on this are awaited
from the Indian tax authorities.

 

CONCLUSION

India is at the forefront in the fight
against tax avoidance and black money. The BEPS project and its implementation
through the MLI is an important opportunity available to the Indian and foreign
governments to strengthen their tax treaties to tackle the issue of tax treaty
shopping. _



[1] Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Related Measures to
Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting

[2] Argentina, Armenia, Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, Indonesia, Mexico,
Russia, Senegal, the Slovak Republic and Ururguay.

7 Sections 80-IA(4), 147 and 148 – Reassessment – Where AO rejected claim of assessee of deduction u/s. 80-IA(4) and, Commissioner (Appeals) allowed said claim of deduction in its entirety, thereafter AO could not reopen this very claim of deduction for disallowance u/s. 148

[2018] 91 taxmann.com 186 (Guj)
Gujarat Enviro Protection & Infrastructure Ltd. vs. DCIT
A.Y.: 2010-11, Date of Order: 19th February, 2018    

For the A. Y. 2010-11, the assessee filed return of income after claiming deduction u/s. 80-IA(4). The return of the assessee was taken in scrutiny by the Assessing Officer. During such scrutiny assessment, the Assessing Officer examined the assessee’s claim of deduction u/s. 80-IA and disallowed the claim of deduction. On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) allowed the assessee’s claim.

Thereafter, the Assessing Officer issued reassessment notice u/s. 148 on grounds that on perusal of records, it was seen that the amount on which the assessee had claimed exemption u/s. 80-IA included the interest income assessable under the head ‘Income from other sources’. On verification of bifurcation of interest income, it was clear that this interest income was not derived from the infrastructure development activity of the undertaking. Hence, it was not to be considered for the purpose of deduction under section 80-IA. Thus, deduction so allowed on the interest income was not allowable. The objection filed by the assessee were rejected.

The assessee filed writ petition challenging the reopening. The Gujarat High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

“i)    The assessee’s reply to the Assessing Officer would show that out of the total interest income, the assessee had attributed a sum of certain amount as business income. It is this claim of the assessee of the interest income of certain amount, as being part of its business income which is a focal point of the reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer for reopening the assessment. He contends that the interest income cannot be treated as arising out of the assessee’s business, and therefore, deduction u/s. 80-IA(4) would not be allowable. However, this is for later. For the present, one may record that the Assessing Officer passed an order of assessment in which he rejected the assessee’s claim of deduction under section 80-IA. He therefore had no occasion to separately comment on the assessee’s claim of interest income being eligible for such deduction. Be that as it may, the assessee carried entire issue in appeal before the Commissioner. The Commissioner (Appeals) by his order, allowed the assessee’s claim of deduction u/s. 80-IA in toto. Record is not clear whether the revenue has carried the order of Commissioner (Appeals) before the Tribunal or not. However, this by itself may not be a determinative factor.

ii)    At that stage, after the Commissioner allowed the assessee’s appeal, the Assessing Officer issued the instant reassessment notice. Since the notice was issued beyond the period of four years from the end of relevant assessment year, the requirement of the assessee to make true and full disclosure, and the failure to make such disclosures leading to income chargeable to take escaping the assessment becomes crucial. In this context, the record would show that the crucial requirement arising out of the proviso to section 147 is not satisfied. The Assessing Officer has, in fact, in the reasons recorded itself proceeded on the basis of ‘on verification of record’. Thus, clearly the Assessing Officer proceeded on the basis of disclosures forming part of the original assessment. Even otherwise, as noted, during the original assessment, the Assessing Officer had called upon the assessee to clarify on the interest income which include the assessee’s claim of certain amount as business income and, therefore, eligible for deduction u/s. 80-IA(4). There was no failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all relevant facts.

iii)    There is yet another and equally strong reason to quash the impugned notice. Before elaborating on this, it is recorded that the assessee’s contention of possible change of opinion cannot be accepted. The Assessing Officer had rejected entire claim of deduction u/s. 80-IA(4). He, therefore, had no occasion to thereafter comment on a part of such claim relatable to the assessee’s interest income. Had the Assessing Officer accepted in principle the assessee’s claim of deduction under section 80-IA(4) and thereafter, after scrutiny not made any disallowance for interest income forming part of such larger claim, the principle of change of opinion would apply. In the present case, once the Assessing Officer rejected the claim of deduction u/s. 80-IA(4) in its entirety, there was thereafter no occasion and any need for him to dissect such claim for rejection on some additional ground.

iv)    The second reason which it is referred to is of merger. The Assessing Officer having rejected the claim of deduction u/s. 80-IA(4), the issue may be recalled was carried in appeal by the assessee and the Commissioner (Appeals) allowed the claim in its entirety. It would thereafter be not open for the Assessing Officer to reopen this very claim for possible disallowance of part thereof. When the Commissioner (Appeals) was examining the assessee’s grievance against the order of Assessing Officer disallowing the claim, it was open for the revenue to point out to the Commissioner (Appeals) that even if in principle the claim is allowed, a part thereof would not stand the scrutiny of law. It was open for the Commissioner to examine such an issue, even suo motu. If one allow the claim in its entirety, the Assessing Officer thereafter cannot re-visit such a claim and seek to disallow part thereof. This would be contrary to the principle of merger statutorily provided and judicially recognised. Even after the Commissioner (Appeals) allow such a claim and the revenue was of the opinion that he has not processed it and committed an error, it was always open for the revenue to carry the matter in appeal. At any rate, reopening of the assessment would simply not be permissible. Reassessment carried an entirely different connotation. Once an assessment is reopened, the same gives wider jurisdiction to the Assessing Officer to examine the claims which had been formed part of the reasons recorded, but which were not originally concluded.

v)    In the result, impugned notice is quashed. Petition is allowed and disposed of accordingly.”

6 Section 43(6) – Depreciation – WDV – While computing written down value u/s. 43(6) for claiming depreciation, depreciation allowed under State enactment cannot be reduced

[2018] 90 taxmann.com 420 (Ker)
Rehabilitation Plantations Ltd. vs. CIT
A.Y.: 2002-03, Date of Order: 29th Jan., 2018

The assessee was engaged in the business of manufacture and sale of centrigued latex and rubber. For the A. Y. 2002-03, it claimed depreciation of the entire cost of the plant and machinery to the extent of 35 per cent treating it as the actual cost allowable on which the allowable deduction for depreciation is computed. The Assessing Officer found that the depreciation on assets used in the plantations, including for manufacturing activity, was found to have been claimed by the assessee-company for more than two decades. It was found that earlier the assessments had not been taken under the Income-tax Act, 1961, since the entire income was assessable under the Kerala Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1991 (AIT Act). It was found that as per section 32(1) of the IT Act, depreciation on building, machinery, etc. is to be allowed on the written down value of the assets, owned by the assessee and used for the purposes of the business. The written down value of the assets as per section 43(6) is the actual cost when the assets were acquired before the previous year. Otherwise the written down value shall be the actual cost of the assets less all depreciation actually allowed under the IT Act. The assessee had been claiming depreciation in computing the income from plantations, and if the actual cost of the assets is adopted it would lead to the assessee getting a double benefit on the same component of cost, to the extent of 35 per cent. Hence, the written down value for the previous year was only permissible to be claimed as depreciation, was the specific ground on which such claim was rejected. The Assessing Officer allowed depreciation on written down value after reducing the depreciation claimed under AIT Act from the actual cost.

The Tribunal held that there could be no claim for the assessee over and above the written down value as per the books of account and upheld the decision of the Assessing Officer.

On appeal by the assessee, the Kerala High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i)    It is seen from the report filed by the Assessing Officer under the AIT Act that the assessee has claimed depreciation in the earlier years when filing returns under the AIT Act. The report of the Assessing Officer under the IT Act also indicates that the assets pertaining to the agricultural income has not been projected for depreciation under the IT Act for the previous years. The Assessing Officer points out that depreciation was claimed in the years 1998-99 to 2001-02 with respect to the building and plant & machinery of rubber sheeting factory, the income derived from which, being a manufacturing activity, however is not covered under the AIT Act. In such circumstances, one has to look at whether in allowing the depreciation on the basis of the written down value as available in section 43(6)(b), the entire cost of the building and plant and machinery for the purpose of generation of agricultural income has to be allowed or not.

ii)    There need not be any controversy raised on the interpretation of the provision of section 43(6) at sub-clause (b). What can be reduced from the actual cost to the assessee is all depreciation actually allowed under the IT Act, 1961 or the IT Act, 1922 or any Act repealed by that Act or any executive orders issued when the Indian Income-tax Act, 1886 was in force. The AIT Act having not been specifically noticed and the depreciation allowed with respect to the income assessed to tax under any other enactments having not been excluded, there is no reason for this Court to come to a different finding as to the written down value which could be claimed as depreciation on the first year in which the assessee is assessed under the IT Act. The assessee was earlier assessed under the IT Act, but for its manufacturing activity and not its agricultural operations, the income from which was assessed under the AIT Act. The assets employed for agricultural operations were never accounted for computing the depreciation under the IT Act, since that income, prior to rule 7A, was not exigible to tax under the IT Act.

iii)    The question arise since the entire income generated from the agricultural income was assessable to tax under the AIT Act, a State enactment. Only in the relevant assessment year i.e. 2002-03, the provision for a separate assessment under the AIT Act and IT Act came into force by virtue of the Income-tax Rules. Income from the manufacture of rubber which was earlier treated as agricultural income was made assessable under the IT Act to the extent of 35 per cent of the income derived from the business. Hence, the assessee would be entitled to claim only 35 per cent of the depreciation for the relevant assessment year. However, in computing such depreciation, should one adopt the entire cost of the plant and machinery or that shown as the written down value after reducing the depreciation allowed under the AIT Act, is the vexing question.

iv)    As noticed, the deeming provision is very clear and there is nothing to exclude from the computation of the cost of the assets; the depreciation allowed under the AIT Act. The revenue would contend that this Court has ample powers to iron out the creases and avoid a double benefit being conferred on the assessee. There is no doubt of such powers, but, whether it could be exercised in the present case is the question. In ironing out creases one should not be accused of burning the cloth, by adding words into the statute to digress from the essential unambiguous intention.

v)    The rule providing division of income to be assessed respectively under the AIT Act and the IT Act was brought in the year 2002. The Government was quite aware of the provision available in the IT Act, 1961 by which the depreciation in cases, where it was not being claimed under the enactments as specified in section 43(6)(b), can only be excluded and otherwise the written down value has to be deemed to be the cost of the assets. On apportioning the income from agriculture to be assessed under the respective enactments of the State and the Union; amendments ought to have been brought in accordingly to ensure that no double benefit accrues on an assessee.

vi)    Such amendments were brought in with prospective effect as is seen from Explanation 7 to section 43(6) of the IT Act which got inserted by the Finance Act, 2009 with effect from 1-4-2010. The Explanation takes in the specific defect of double benefit being conferred on the assessee. The legislature thought it fit to give it effect from 1-4-2010. The assessment year herein is 2002-03 relating to the income of the previous year being 2001-02. The amendment does not apply to that year. The amendment brought in without any retrospective effect, further makes it clear that the legislature cured the defect, but however, did not do so for the years previous to the amendment and not for the relevant assessment year. This is not a situation in which casus omissus could be supplied.

vii)    On the above reasoning, the disallowance of the depreciation and the computation made of the written down value cannot be accepted. The Assessing Officer is directed to employ the deeming provision for computing the written down value de hors the depreciation granted under the AIT Act and take 35 per cent of the cost of the total assets as written down value, allowing the depreciation for the relevant assessment year to that extent. The Assessing Officer shall deem the written down value to be the cost of the assets and compute the depreciation allowable at 35 per cent of such deemed written down value and apply it to the portion of the income derived from the agricultural business, that is assessable under the IT Act. The appeal is allowed with the above observations.”

5 Section 32(2) – Unabsorbed depreciation – Law applicable – Effect of amendment to section 32(2) by Finance Act, 2001 – Removal of restriction of eight years for carry forward and set off – Unabsorbed depreciation or part thereof not claimed till relevant year – Carry forward and set off permitted

(2018) 400 ITR 569 (Delhi)
Principal CIT vs. British Motor Car Co. (1934) Ltd.
A.Y.: 2010-11, Date of Order: 09th January, 2018

The relevant period is the
A. Y. 2010-11. The assessee had the accumulated carried forward depreciation
u/s. 32(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 starting from the A. Y. 1998-99. In the
A. Y. 2010-11, the assessee claimed set off of the carried forward
depreciation. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim in respect of amounts
carried forward from the years prior to A. Y. 2002-03 on the ground that the
amendment to section 32(2) of the Act, which removed of eight years limit, was
prospective and effective only from 01/04/2002.

 

The Commissioner (Appeals)
reversed the order and his decision was upheld by the Tribunal.

 

In
appeal by the Revenue, on the question whether section 32(2) as amended by the
Finance Act, 2001, w.e.f. 01/04/2002 could be given effect beyond the period of
eight years prior to its commencement, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision
of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i)   The rationale for the amendment of section
32(2) the restriction against set off and carry forward limited to eight years,
beyond which the benefit could not be claimed under the provisions of the 1961
Act, was for the reasons deemed appropriate by Parliament.

ii)    The limit was imposed in the year 1996
through the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1996. Had the intention of Parliament been
really to restrict the benefit, of unlimited carry forward prospectively, there
were more decisive ways of doing so, such as, an express provision or an
exception or proviso. The absence of any such legislative device meant that the
provision had to be construed in its own terms and not so as to restrict the
benefit or advantage it sought to conform. No question of law arose.”

 

4 Section 54EC – Exemption of Capital gain – Time of six months from date of transfer for investment – Transfer effected only on transfer of physical possession of property and not on date of execution of development agreement – Investment made by assessee falling within time specified u/s. 54EC

(2018) 401 ITR 96 (Bom)
CIT vs. Dr. Arvind S. Phake
A.Y. 2008-09, Date of Order: 20th Nov., 2017

The assessee entered into a
registered development agreement dated 23/09/2017 in respect of certain
property. The total consideration agreed was Rs. 5,32,00,000/. Physical
possession was given on 01/03/2008. For the A. Y. 2008-09, a return was filed
by the assessee declaring his income on account of long term capital gain on
sale of the immovable property. The assessee claimed exemption u/s. 54EC of the
Income-tax Act, 1961 in respect of investment of Rs. 50,00,000/- in bonds of
the NHAI made on 28/03/2008 and Rs. 50,00,000/- in bonds of RECL on 22/08/2008.
The Assessing Officer held that the investment of the bonds of NHAI was within
the period specified u/s. 54EC of the Act and the investment of Rs. 50,00,000/-
in the bonds of RECL was beyond the period provided in section 54EC in as much
as the investment made on 22/08/2008 was not within six months from the date of
transfer of assets.

The Tribunal found that on
the date of execution of the development agreement, i.e., on 13/09/2007, full
consideration was admittedly not paid, and therefore the transfer was not
effected on 13/09/2017. Therefore, taking the date of transfer as 01/03/2008 on
which date physical possession of the property was delivered, the investment made
on 22/08/2008 was well within the time specified under section 54EC of the Act.
The Tribunal, accordingly allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue,
the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The Tribunal considered
various clauses in the development agreement. Sub clause (d) of clause (3) of
the agreement provided that after full payment of consideration, the
construction would be undertaken by the developer. Admittedly, on the date of
execution of the development agreement, the entire consideration was not
received by the assessee.

ii)    Physical possession of the property, the
subject matter of development agreement was parted with by the assessee on
01/03/2008. It was on that day that complete control over the property was
passed on to the developer.

iii)   After having perused the various clauses in
the agreement and the factual aspects, the Tribunal rightly took 01/03/2008 as
the date of transfer and the investment made on 22/08/2008 was well within the
time specified u/s. 54EC of the Act. Therefore, no substantial question of law
arose.”

3 Section 14A – Business expenditure – Disallowance – Assessing Officer cannot attribute administrative expenses for earning tax free income in excess of total administrative expenditure

[2018] 91 taxmann.com 29 (Guj)
Principal CIT vs. Adani Agro (P.) Ltd.
Date of Order: 05th February, 2018

The assessee incurred administrative expenses amounting to Rs. 30 lakhs. The Assessing Officer was of the view that the assessee failed to fully disclose the expenditure for earning the exempt income and based on the format provided under rule 8D, made the disallowance to the tune of Rs. 60 lakhs.

The Tribunal noted that the entire administrative expenses of the assessee was Rs. 30 lakhs, out of which, the assessee had offered Rs. 10 lakhs i.e., 1/3rd of the total administrative expenditure for earning income covered u/s. 14A. The Tribunal was of the opinion that even after completing the format, the disallowance cannot exceed the total administrative expenditure incurred by the assessee.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i)    Under no circumstances, can the Assessing Officer attribute administrative expenses for earning tax free income in excess of the total administrative expenditure incurred by the assessee.

ii)    If it is a case where Assessing Officer disputes, question and disallow the very declaration of the assessee regarding total administrative expenditure, the issue can be somewhat different. Nevertheless, when the Assessing Officer has in the present case did not disturb the assessee’s declaration that total administrative expenses incurred by the assessee for all its activities was Rs. 30 lakhs, there was no question of disallowing administrative expenses to the tune of Rs. 60 lakhs u/s. 14A with the aid of rule 8D.”

2 Sections 40(a)(ia), 194H and 194J – Business expenditure – Disallowance – Payments subject to TDS – Compensation paid to joint venture partner under MOU – Finding that agreement not sham – Payment cannot be treated as expenditure required to deduct tax at source – Disallowance for failure to deduct tax not attracted

1.      
(2018) 400 ITR 521 (Cal)

Principal
CIT vs. Entrepreneurs (Calcutta) Pvt. Ltd.

A.Y.:
2006-07, Date of Order: 13th Sept., 
2017


For the A. Y. 2006-07, the
assessee claimed as expenditure a sum of Rs. 5,17,48,439 paid to company A, as
compensation in connection with a land transaction. The assessee’s explanation
was that the amount was paid in performance of its obligation under a
memorandum of understanding with A under which A and the assessee were to share
the profit on sale of land in the ratio of 75% to A and 25% to the assessee,
that the services to be rendered by A included identifying the buyer and also
carrying out various other tasks in respect of the sale of the landed property
involved. The Assessing Officer was of the view that A was a sham company. He
treated the entire sum of compensation paid to A as the assesee’s income
chargeable to tax, on the grounds that the transaction was a sham, and that the
assessee had not deducted tax at source on the amount, invoking the provisions
of section 40(a)(ia).

 

The Tribunal held that the
transactions were made by a valid written contract on various terms and
conditions between the parties, which were essential for a joint venture
project. Such facts were not denied nor were any defects found in the agreement
by the Assessing Officer. It further held that the transaction was in lieu of
the agreement and the Assessing Officer was not justified in treating the
payment of compensation as an expenditure and that no tax at source was
required to have been deducted on the profit so shared between the two joint
venture partners and deleted the addition.   

 

On appeal by the Revenue,
the Calcutta High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i)   Whether a transaction was sham or not was a
question of fact. The Commissioner (Appeals) had found the Assessing Officer’s
conclusion that it was sham transaction between assessee and A to be in direct
conflict with the Assessing Officer’s own acceptance that the services rendered
by A were of specialised, professional and technical in nature. Upon analyzing
the memorandum of understanding and other materials on record, the Commissioner
(Appeals) had accepted the contention of the assessee that the compensation paid
was not an expenditure incurred so as to attract the provisions of sections
194H and 194J requiring tax deduction at source. As a consequence, the question
of disallowance of the payments applying the provisions of section 40(a)(ia)
could not have arisen.

 

ii)   The findings of the Commissioner (Appeals),
concurred with by the Tribunal, were based on appreciation of material on
record. Further, the Tribunal had recorded that the Assessing Officer did not
point out any defect in the “settlement/contract”. There was no perversity in
the findings of the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal. No question of law
arose.”

1 Section 143(3) – Assessment – Construction business – Estimate of cost of construction – Reference to DVO – Books of account maintained by assessee not rejected – AO cannot refer matter to DVO

(2018) 401 ITR 285 (Mad)
CIT vs. A. L. Homes
A.Y.: 2009-10, Date of Order: 20th Sept., 2017    


The assessee was in
construction business. In the course of the assessment for the relevant year,
the Assessing Officer made a reference to the District Valuation Officer (DVO)
for estimation of the cost of construction. The estimated cost of construction
by the DVO was higher than that found according to the books of account of the
assessee. The valuation report was objected to by the assessee, on the ground
that it had been maintaining regular books of account and that reference could
not have been made to the DVO without rejecting the books of account. However,
the Assessing Officer added the difference in the cost of construction, as
unaccounted investment to the income of the assessee.

 

The Commissioner (Appeals)
deleted the addition and held that the Assessing Officer could not have made a
reference to the DVO for estimation, when the books of account of the assessee
had not been rejected. He further held that the difference between the cost
shown in the books of account and the estimation by the DVO was only 6.85%,
whereas, statutorily a reference for valuation could be made only if, in the
opinion of the Assessing Officer, the difference would have exceeded 15%. The
Tribunal found that the assessee had sold the flats and that most of the
purchasers had occupied the flats and that the cost improvements made had to be
considered as income of the purchasers. It upheld the deletion made by the
Commissioner (Appeals).

 

On appeal by the Revenue,
the Madras High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i)   The appellate authorities had concurrently
found that the books of account of the assessee had not been rejected by the
Assessing Officer and therefore, the matter ought not to have been referred to
the DVO for estimation of the cost of construction.

 

ii)    The reliance placed on the report of the DVO
for making the addition was misconceived. No question of law arose.”

The Journey of the Journal

Decades ago a handful of professionals did
something extraordinary. Bound by a common vision, they conceived and evolved
the idea of a Journal for Chartered Accountants. Those committed volunteers,
embarked on an uncharted journey to bring knowledge – which was scarce in those
days – to the desks of their fellow professionals. That journey of the Bombay
Chartered Accountant Journal – is entering its 50th Volume this month. I
feel honoured to extend my delightful thanks to you – the reader – our
consistent focus, motivation and inspiration on this journey.

BCAJ demonstrates what independent
volunteers connected by a common vision can accomplish to serve a larger
professional community.
So many professionals have
contributed to make the BCAJ what it is today. The innumerable writers,
contributors, poets, cartoonists, well wishers, our publishers and the editors
have given their time – a part of their lives – for a cause larger than
themselves.  BCAJ will remain ever so grateful
to all of them.

The journal over the years has been a part
of many a professionals’ journey. BCAJ has strived to present depth and breadth
of themes and topics to a Chartered Accountant. What started off with giving
economic news and then tribunal judgments is now covering a broad spectrum of
topics to make complete professional reading every month. Despite the wave of
‘specialisation’, BCAJ has remained relevant due to the quality of its content
and detailed analysis by experienced practitioners. In an interlocked world,
every professional will need to read about developments that could influence
his domain. Today, no area of practice can remain an island which cannot be
approached without crossing the waters of other spheres of influence.

The early years of the BCAJ, were times of
scarcity and restrictions. Today things have swung to the other extreme – we
are surrounded by a deluge of information seeking our attention – from a lack
of access
to clutter of excess. 
However, a professional is still faced with the same fundamental
problem – how to find a dependable, comprehensive and balanced source of
professional reading?
This problem and its solution are expressed in this
verse:

 

Endless
is the material to read; Time is short and difficulties many.

One
should therefore absorb the essence,

like
a swan who discerns between water and milk.

The BCAJ, then and now, strives to answer
that question. I wish and pray that BCAJ will serve its readers by curating the
essence and giving them balanced, succinct, comprehensive and dependable
technical reading every month. The reader is and always will be at the heart of
the BCAJ.

Over the years, the BCAJ has evolved its website
www.bcajonline.org which contains digitised issues of last 17 years. Many
subscribers read the digital version of BCAJ in flipbook format. We would like
more engagement, feedback and conversation with the subscribers to allow the
contributors to enhance their offering. Reader expectations matter the most,
especially now. Do write to us at journal_feedback@bcasonline.org.

The 50th Volume, starting this
month, will contain Golden Contents – pages with special articles, interviews,
musings, nostalgia, and more. This issue covers all of these to make it a
special one. The rest of the 50th Volume will continue to have such
Golden Contents. The usual monthly features and articles will of course
continue. I hope, you the discerning reader will relish this labour of love and
catch the essence. 


Every journey
has milestones and a destination. And every milestone and destination stirs you
to take another journey. The journey of the journal is one such journey, where
every milestone inspires us to reach higher and every destination will open up
a new vista to look farther. 

 

Learnings from Ramayana


The meaning of this shloka (verse) is that:-

There was a herculean task of conquering the mighty kingdom of Lanka, the ocean was to be crossed on foot, the opponent was the most powerful demon Ravana; and the only assistance available was that from monkeys. Despite this, Shree Ram alone killed all the demons. The moral is – the success of true heroes is attributable to their own valour and qualities; and does not depend on assistants and equipment.

In this series of a few articles, I intend to bring out the noteworthy aspects from Valmiki-Ramayana that are useful for all human beings at large and for professionals in particular. Shree Ram is believed to be an incarnation of Lord Vishnu. In that sense, he is worshipped as God. He had divine qualities, but never wielded divine powers. He never performed any Leela, Chamatkar, magic or super-human feats. He was and always acted as a human being. Valmiki is believed to be a contemporary of Shree Ram and Valmiki Ramayana which is believed to be the first and most ancient epic, is nothing but the narration of Shree Ram’s life-story. The sole objective of Shri Valmiki seems to be to project Shree Ram as an ideal, duty conscious king or ruler. Shree Ram demonstrates all emotions of a human mind but ultimately the duty consciousness prevails – duty as a king rather than in any other relation.

Many intellectuals criticize him for being too idealistic. They say it is not possible to emulate him in today’s practical life. They feel, Shri Krishna was more practical and that everyone should be like Shree Ram at home; but act as Shri Krishna outside. A few others blame him for abandoning his wife Seeta at the comment made by a dhobi. However, very few people know that after abandoning Seeta, Shree Ram lived as a Brahmachari.

I am not going to enter into any controversies as such. My aim is to tell the secret of Ramarajya –the state of most ‘ideal governance’, what made him a true leader. He is described as Maryada Purshottam. – i.e. the height or ultimate of any virtue. Be it honesty, be it bravery, be it modesty, be it leadership – whatever good qualities one can think of Shree Ram was the ‘Maryada’ or boundary. No one can surpass him in any quality. Ramayana is also popular in many countries outside India – such as Thailand, Indonesia, and Mauritius.

In the next few months, I will try to deal with this theme with practical relevance to today’s life.

TaxFunwithBCAS

Budget is not merely a financial event
but an emotion in India. It evokes vociferous and often acrimonious discussions
across the country and one cannot even dream of social media not being
bombarded with Budget related posts and forwards. This year the Taxation
Committee of the BCAS tried to make the Budget-2018 even more interesting and
engaging by inviting members to post humorous/witty/out of the box messages
relating to the Budget, on any of the three Social Media websites – Facebook,
Twitter, LinkedIn where @bcasglobal has a presence – using the hashtag
‘#TaxFunwithBCAS’. And thanks to all our followers, we received an overwhelming
response to this initiative.  As
informed, we are truly glad to publish some of the popular ones in our BCA
Journal, given below.

1) Sunil Gabhawalla? @sbgco Feb 6

Equity and tax can need strangers. But
do they need to be enemies? Mr. Dastur at his witty best TaxFunwithBCAS @bcasglobal

2) Ameet Patel?
@patelameet Feb 1

Confused. Whether to watch TV and
listen to experts commenting on the Budget without having read it or To
download the budget and read it myself first. Budget2018withBCAS
@bcasglobal TaxFunwithBCAS

3) Naman Shrimal?
@CANamanShrimal Feb 1

5 lakh WiFi spots for benefit of 5
crore rural citizens… Now please don’t bother us with irrelevant demands like
water, food, road and safety !!! taxfunwithBCAS
JSCO budget2018

4) Paras Gandhi?
@Parasgandhi69 Feb 1

2 min silence for cryptocurrency
holders bitcoincrash jiocoin Budget2018 Budget2018WithTaxmann
TaxFunwithBCAS

5) Rutvik Sanghvi?
@zanyrutvik Feb 1

After zandu balm and Bata shoes, it’s
now time for Hawai chappals. Hope the company tries suing the FM. It’ll be fun
to see the arguments. Budget2018withBCAS
TaxFunwithBCAS @bcasglobal

6) Siddharth Banwat? @sidbanwat Feb 1

TaxFunwithBCAS
– Post Budget 2018
Resolution – Let’s become part of rural population to get benefit of good
governance

7) Ameet Patel?
@patelameet Feb 1

Will the FM bring a tax on corruption?
Will the FM reduce tax on honesty? @bcasglobal
Budget2018withBCAS TaxFunwithBCAS
 _

2 Article 12 of India-USA DTAA; Section 9(1)(vi), 40(a)(i), 195 of the Act – payments made to the parent company on a cost to cost basis for availing lease line services from third party service provider does not qualify as royalty; it qualifies as a reimbursement, not subject to tax in India.

TS-70-ITAT-2018
T-3 Energy Services India Pvt. Ltd. v. JCIT
ITA No.826/PUN/2015
A.Y- 2010-11;
Date of Order: 2nd February, 2018
 

Facts

Taxpayer, an Indian company, was an affiliate of FCo. FCo had entered
into an agreement with a third party service provider for providing
bandwidth/lease line services for the global business of the FCo’ group
including the Taxpayer. FCo raised back to back invoices on Taxpayer in respect
of Taxpayer’s share of lease line charges.

 

The Taxpayer contended that payment made to FCo was not in the nature of
royalty but in the nature of reimbursement and hence there was no obligation to
withhold taxes on such payments.

 

AO contended that the amount remitted to the third party was not a
reimbursement of expenses but was in the nature of payment made to the service
provider for lease line services through its associated enterprise (AE).
Further, it contended that such lease line charges constituted royalty under
the Act as well as the DTAA basis the amended definition of royalty under the
Act and hence would be subject to withholding u/s. 195 of the Act.

 

Aggrieved by the order of AO, Taxpayer appealed before CIT(A). CIT(A)
observed that in case payments were directly made to third party service
provider, it would have been taxable in the hands of the service provider and
would attract withholding obligations for the Taxpayer. Merely because the
payment is routed through FCo on back to back basis, it cannot be treated as
reimbursement of expenses. Payment made by Taxpayer is taxable in India and
will be subject to withholding.

 

Aggrieved, the Taxpayer appealed before the Tribunal

 

Held

The
agreement with the service provider was a commercial transaction, in terms of
which FCo contracted the service provider to provide lease line services for
global business of FCo group and was not limited to the Taxpayer alone.

 

   The understanding
was between FCo and the service provider. Though the Taxpayer benefited from
the negotiated price under the agreement, it was not a party to the agreement.

 

  The
privity of the agreement was between FCo and service provider, whereby FCo obtained
the services from the service provider and passed it to its affiliates
including the Taxpayer on cost to cost basis. Thus there was no income element
involved in payments made by Taxpayer to FCo.

 

   Without
prejudice, the contention of AO that it is not case of reimbursement but a case
of payment to third party through its AE and hence qualifies as royalty, cannot
be accepted. This is because the term ‘royalty’ is defined under the DTAA and
it does not cover payments made towards lease line charges.

 

  Further,
the amended definition of royalty u/s 9(1)(vi) of the Act cannot be read into
the DTAA. Reliance in this regard was placed on Delhi HC decision in the case
of New Skies Satellite BV.

 


18 TDS – Certificate for deduction at lower rate/nil rate – Cancellation of certificate – Judicial order – Recording of reasons is condition precedent – No change in facts during period between grant of certificate and order cancelling certificate – No valid or cogent reasons recorded and furnished to assessee for change – Violation of principles of natural justice – Order of cancellation quashed

Tata Teleservices (Maharashtra) Ltd. vs. Dy.
CIT; 402 ITR 384 (Bom); Date of Order:16-25/01/2018:

A.
Y. 2018-19:

Section
197; R. 28AA of ITR 1962; Art. 226 of Constitution of India


The
assessee provided telecommunication services. For the A. Ys. 2014-15 to
2016-17, it filed return declaring loss aggregating to Rs. 1330 crore and
making a claim of refund of an aggregate sum of Rs. 121 crore. In the course of
its business, the assessee received various payments for the services rendered
which were subject to tax deduction at source (TDS) under Chapter XVII of the
Income-tax Act, 1961. According to the assessee it was not liable to pay
corporate tax in the immediate future in view of the likely loss for the A. Y. 2018-19
and the carried forward losses. Therefore, it filed an application/s. 197 of
the Act for a certificate for nil/lower TDS to enable it to receive its
payments from various parties which were subject to TDS, without actual
deduction at source. On 04/05/2017, the Dy. Commissioner (TDS) issued a
certificate u/s. 197 and directed the deduction of tax at nil rate by the
various persons listed in the certificate while making payments to the assessee
u/ss. 194, 194A, 194C, 194-I, 194H and 194J. Thereafter, the Dy. Commissioner
(TDS) communicated that he was reviewing the certificate u/s. 197 which had
been issued, in respect of cases in which outstanding tax demand was pending.
Consequently, the assessee furnished the details of tax outstanding. The Dy.
Commissioner (TDS) issued a show cause notice and granted a personal hearing to
the assessee. By an order dated 23/10/2017, the certificate dated 04/05/2017
issued u/s. 197 was cancelled on the ground that any future tax payable might
not be recoverable from the assessee and that there was an outstanding tax
demand of Rs. 6.90 crore payable by the assessee.


The Bombay
High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee, quashed the order
of the Dy. Commissioner (TDS) dated 23/10/2017 cancelling the certificate and
held as under:


“i)   The issuance of the certificate was the
result of an order holding that the assessee was entitled to a certificate u/s.
197. In the absence of the reasons being recorded, the certificate u/s. 197
would not be open to challenge by the Department, as it would be impossible to
state that it was erroneous and prejudicial to the Revenue. The recording of
reasons was necessary as only then it could be subject to revision by the
Commissioner u/s. 263. Therefore, there would have been reasons recorded in the
file before issuing a certificate dated 04/05/2017 and that ought to have been
furnished to the assessee before contending that the aspect of rule 28AA was
not considered at the time of granting the certificate. Further, if the Department
sought to cancel the certificate on the ground that a particular aspect had not
been considered, before taking a decision to cancel the certificate already
granted, it must have satisfied the requirement of natural justice by giving a
copy of the same to the assessee and heard the assessee on it before taking a
decision to cancel the certificate.


ii)    The notices which sought to review the
certificate did not indicate that the review was being done as the certificate
dated 04/05/2017 was granted without considering the applicability of rule 28AA
in the context of the assessee’s facts. Therefore, there was no occasion for
the assessee to seek a copy of the reasons recorded while issuing the
certificate. Moreover, it was found on facts that there was no change in the
facts that existed on 04/05/2017 and those that existed when the order dated
23/10/2017 was passed. Thus, there was a flaw in the decision-making process
which vitiated the order dated 23/10/2017. The grant or refusal to grant the
certificate u/s. 197 had to be determined by parameters laid down therein and
rule 28AA and it could not be gone beyond the provisions to decide an
application.


iii)   The order dated 23/10/2017 did not indicate,
what the profits were likely to be in the near future, which the Department
might not be able to recover as it would be more than the carried forward
losses. However, such a departure from the earlier view had to be made on valid
and cogent reasons. Therefore, on the facts, the basis of the order, that the
financial condition of the assessee was that any further tax payable might not
be recoverable, was not sustainable and rendered the order bad.


iv)   Neither section 197 nor rule 28AA provided
that no certificate of nil or lower rate of withholding tax could be granted if
any demand, however miniscule, was outstanding. Rule 28AA(2) required the
authority to determine the existing estimated liability taking into
consideration various aspects including the estimated tax payable for the
subject assessment year and also the existing liability. The existing and
estimated liability also required taking into account the demands likely to be
upheld by the appellate authorities. The assessee’s appeal with respect to the
demand of Rs. 6.68 crore was being heard by the Commissioner (Appeals) and no
order had been passed thereon till date.


v)   The order in question did not deal with the
assessee’s contention that the demand of Rs. 28 lakh was on account of mistake
in application of TRACE system nor did it deal with the assessee’s contention
that the entire demand of Rs. 6.90 crore could be adjusted against the
refundable deposit of Rs. 7.30 crore, consequent to the order dated 27/05/2016
of the Tribunal in its favour. The order dated 23/10/2017 seeking to cancel the
certificate dated 04/05/2017 was a non-speaking order as it did not consider
the assessee’s submissions. Therefore, the basis of the order cancelling the
certificate, that there was outstanding demand of Rs. 6.90 crore payable by the
assessee, was not sustainable.


vi)   In the above view, the impugned order dated
23/10/2017 is quashed and set aside.”

1 Article 5(4), 7 & 8 of India-Mauritius DTAA –When place of effective management is not situated in one of the contracting states but in a third country, Article 8 of DTAA (shipping income) does not apply where an agent has more than one principal, he cannot be treated as an exclusive agent for the purposes of Dependent Agent PE (DAPE)

TS-73-ITAT-2018(Mum)
ADIT (IT) vs. Baylines (Mauritius)
I.T.A. No. 1181/Mum/2002
A.Ys: 1998-99 to 2012-13,
Date of Order: 20th February, 2018

Facts

Taxpayer, a company incorporated in Mauritius carried on the shipping
business in India. Taxpayer held a TRC indicating that it was a resident of
Mauritius for the relevant financial year. Taxpayer had an agent in India (ICo)
who concluded the contracts on behalf of the Taxpayer in India.

 

Taxpayer filed its return of income in India and claimed that the income
from shipping business was exempt from tax by relying on Article 8 of the India
Mauritius DTAA dealing with taxation of shipping income.

 

Article 8 of the India-Mauritius DTAA provides that income from shipping
business is taxable in the contracting State in which the POEM of the Taxpayer
is located. AO noted that the place of effective management (POEM) of the
Taxpayer was situated in UAE, a third country. Consequently AO held that
Article 8 of the DTAA was not applicable to the Taxpayer. Further AO held that
ICo created a dependent agent PE (DAPE) for the Taxpayer in India and
accordingly taxed the income from shipping business as per Article 7 of the
DTAA.

 

Aggrieved by the order of AO, Taxpayer appealed before CIT(A).

 

CIT(A) upheld AO’s contention that Article 8 of the DTAA was not
applicable to the Taxpayer. CIT(A) however, held that ICo did not create a DAPE
of the Taxpayer in India. Accordingly, in the absence of PE, shipping income
was held to be exempt from tax in India under the DTAA.

 

Aggrieved, both the Taxpayer and AO appealed before the Tribunal.

 

Held 1

  On
the basis of following observations, it was held that merely holding of two board
meetings in Mauritius is not sufficient to support that the POEM was in
Mauritius.

  Only two Mauritian directors
attended the first board meeting in person, while the remaining two UAE
directors of the Taxpayer attended these meeting via phone. The only business
transacted in that meeting was the appointment of the auditors.

    The business transacted in the
second board meeting was with regard to approval of accounts. It is surprising
how the annual accounts a company could be approved on telephone. This
indicates that the directors of Mauritius were on the Company’s Board only to
satisfy the conditions of the regulatory requirements of Mauritius Government.

 

   The
fact that ICo was appointed as an agent on a letter head showing its UAE
address and a letter addressed by Taxpayer to AO also originated from UAE
indicated that the major policy decisions were taken in UAE.

 

  In
case where the POEM is not in one of the contracting States, Article 8 becomes
inapplicable. Reliance in this regard was placed on the commentary by Professor
Klaus Vogel

 

Thus
whether or not shipping income is taxable in India will have to be evaluated
basis Article 7 of the DTAA.

 

Held 2

  For
the following reasons it was held that ICo qualified as an agent of independent
status and hence did not create a DAPE for the Taxpayer in India:

 

    ICo carried on the activities
of the Taxpayer in the ordinary course of its business.

    Article 5(5) of DTAA between
India and Mauritius requires that when the activities of the agent are devoted
exclusively or almost exclusively on behalf of the foreign enterprise, the
agent will not be considered to be an agent of an independent status.

    The dictionary meanings of the
term ‘exclusively’ clearly suggests that the agent should earn 100% or something
near to 100% from the principal to qualify as its dependant agent. Reliance in
this regard was also placed on the decision of Mumbai ITAT in case of Shardul
Securities Ltd. vs. JCIT (115 lTD 345
).

    In the facts of the case, ICo
worked on behalf of other principals as well, apart from the Taxpayer and
earned a substantial part of its income from them. Thus ICo’s activities were
not devoted exclusively or almost exclusively on behalf of the Taxpayer.

    Reliance was placed on the
decision of Mumbai ITAT in the case of DDIT(IT) vs. B4U International
Holdings Ltd. (137 lTD 346)
which was upheld by Mumbai High Court in
support of the proposition that for the determination of independence for the
purpose of DAPE, one should look at the activities of the agent and whether or
not the agent works exclusively for one principal.

 

   The
fact that the principal has only one agent in India who undertakes all the
activities for the principal is not relevant in determination of independence
or otherwise of the agent.

 

  Thus,
in absence of a PE in India, the income from shipping business is not taxable
in India.

Royalty–The Digital Taxation Debate

1.  Background

Characterisation
of payments for digital goods and services has been a contentious issue,
especially in Indian context. Taxation of payments in the digital economy
segment has been a subject matter of considerable litigation for quite some
time now in India and even globally. In digital economy, delivery of services
can be easily done from overseas without necessitating any part of the activity
being performed or any employees being hired in the country where customers are
located, thereby avoiding taxable presence.

 

The BEPS
Action 1 Report ‘Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy’ states
that because the digital economy is increasingly becoming the economy itself,
it would be difficult, if not impossible, to ring-fence the digital economy
from the rest of the economy for tax purposes. The digital economy and its
business models present however some key features which are potentially
relevant from a tax perspective.

 

In India, with respect to online advertising, we have following ITAT
decisions:

 

a) Yahoo India (P.) Ltd. vs. DCIT
[2011] 11 taxmann.com 431 (Mumbai-Trib)

b) Pinstorm Technologies (P.) Ltd.
vs. ITO [2012] 24 taxmann.com 345 (Mumbai-Trib)

c) ITO vs. Right Florists (P.)
Ltd. [2013] 32 taxmann.com 99 (Kolkata-Trib.)

In
these decisions, the ITAT has held that payments made for online advertising
would not constitute “royalty” and in absence of any Permanent Establishment
[PE] in India of the foreign companies, the same would not be taxable in India.

In
the earlier decision of Yahoo India, the ITAT had held that services rendered
by Yahoo Holdings (Hong Kong) Ltd. for uploading and display of the banner
advertisement of the Department of Tourism of India on its portal would not
amount to ‘royalty’. In that decision, the ITAT had observed that advertisement
hosting services did not involve use or right to use by the Indian company of
industrial, commercial or scientific equipment. Further, the Indian company had
no right to access the portal of Yahoo Hong Kong. Based on these facts, the
ITAT concluded that the payment made to Yahoo Hong Kong would be in the nature of business income and not royalty income.

Similar findings have been arrived at in the case of Pinstorm and Right
Florists.


In para 21 of the decision in Right Florist (supra), it
was held as under:


“21. That takes us to the
question whether second limb of Section 5(2) (b), i.e. income ‘deemed to accrue
or arise in India’, can be invoked in this case. So far as this deeming fiction
is concerned, it is set out, as a complete code of this deeming fiction, in
Section 9 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and Section 9(1) specifies the incomes
which shall be deemed to accrue or arise in India. In the Pinstorm
Technologies (P.)
Ltd.’s case (supra) and in Yahoo India (P.)
Ltd’s case (supra), the coordinate benches have dealt with only one
segment of this provision i.e. Section 9(1) (vi), but there is certainly much
more to this deeming fiction. Clause (i) of section 9(1) of the Act provides
that all income accruing or arising whether directly or indirectly through or
from any ‘business connection’ in India, or through or from any property in
India or through or from any asset or source of income in India, etc. shall be
deemed to accrue or arise in India. However, as far as the impugned receipts
are concerned, neither it is the case of the Assessing Officer nor has it been
pointed out to us as to how these receipts have arisen on account of any
business connection in India. There is nothing on record do demonstrate or
suggest that the online advertising revenues generated in India were supported
by, serviced by or connected with any entity based in India.
On these
facts, Section 9(1)(i) cannot have any application in the matter. Section
9(1)(ii), (iii), (iv) and (v) deal with the incomes in the nature of salaries,
dividend and interest etc, and therefore, these deeming fictions are not
applicable on the facts of the case before us. As far as applicability of
Section 9(1)(vi) is concerned, coordinate benches, in the cases of Pinstorm
Technologies (P.) Ltd.
(supra) and Yahoo India (P.) Ltd. (supra),
have dealt with the same and, for the detailed reasons set out in these erudite
orders – extracts from which have been reproduced earlier in this order,
concluded that the provisions of Section 9(1)(vi) cannot be invoked. We are in
considered and respectful agreement with the views so expressed by our
distinguished colleagues.”

 

2.  Recent Decision in case of Google India- ITAT
Bangalore


Recently,
ITAT Bangalore in the case of Google India Pvt. Ltd. [Google India] vs.
ADCIT [2017] 86 taxmann.com 237 (Bengaluru-Trib)
dealt with the issue as to
whether payment by Google India to Google Ireland Ltd. [Google Ireland] under
‘Adwords Program’ Distribution Agreement is royalty. The ITAT held that the
said payment is taxable as royalty under the provisions of the Income-tax Act,
1961 [the Act] as well as under the India-Ireland tax treaty [DTAA] and treated
the Indian company as an assessee in default for not complying with the
withholding tax provisions.


A. Google AdWords


Google
AdWords is an online advertising service developed by Google, where advertisers
pay to display brief advertising copy, product listings, and video content
within the Google ad network to web users. The program uses the keywords to
place advertisements on pages where Google thinks they might be most relevant.
Advertisers pay when users divert their browsing to click on an advertisement.
AdWords enables an advertiser to change and monitor the performance of an
advertisement and to adjust the content of the advertisement.

The
advertisers get their advertisement uploaded into Adword program and log on the
Adword program website owned by Google. It follows the various steps to create
the Adword account for itself. The advertisers select the key words, content
and presentation related to its ads and place a bid on the online system for
the price it is willing to pay every time its user clicks on its advertisement.
Once the advertiser creates the account and uploads advertisement, the same
automatically gets stored on Adword platform owned by Google on the servers
outside India and the ads are displayed in the manner determined by the
programs running on automated platform. Google India periodically raises the
bill on advertisers for advertising spend incurred by the advertiser on clicks
through the users.


B. Brief Facts


a. Google India is a wholly owned subsidiary
of Google International LLC, USA. Google India was providing following services
to its overseas associate Google Ireland, under 2 separate agreements:

i.    Information technology (IT)
and IT enabled services (ITES) [Service Agreement]

ii.   Marketing and
distributorship services under a non-exclusive distributor agreement for resale
of online advertising space under the Adwords program to advertisers in India [Distribution
Agreement]
. In addition to marketing and distribution services provided to
Google Ireland, under the Distribution Agreement, Google was also required to
provide pre-sale and post-sale / customer support services to the advertisers.

b. For the purpose of sales and marketing the
space, work wise flow of activities of the Google India and advertiser were as
under:

 i. Enter into resale agreement with Google Ireland and resale on
advertising space under the Adword program under the Indian advertisers.

 ii.   Perform marketing related
activities in order to promote the sales of advertising space to Indian
Advertisers. After training to its own sale force about the features/tools available
as part of Adword program, to enable them to effectively market the same to
advertisers.

 iii.   Enter into a contract with
Indian advertisers in relation to sale of space under the Adword program.

 iv.  Provide assistance/training
to Indian advertisers if needed in order to familiarize that with the
features/tools available as part of Adword product.

 v.   Resale invoice to the above
advertisers.

 vi.  Collect payments from the
aforesaid advertisers.

 vii.  Remit payment to Google
Ireland for purchase of advertising space from it under the resale agreement.

c. Under the distribution agreement, Google
India made a payment aggregating to Rs. 1,457 crore for the period from F.Y.
2005-06 to F.Y. 2011-12. On the premise that it is merely a reseller of advertisement
space, Google India had categorised this payment as Google Ireland’s business
income and in the absence of a PE of Google Ireland in India, the payment was
made without withholding any tax at source. Neither Google India nor Google
Ireland had obtained any order from the tax department for Nil tax withholding.

d.  As
Google India had not complied with the provisions of section 195, the tax
authorities started the proceedings u/s. 201 of the Act. Before the Assessing Officer [AO], Google India
filed the detailed reply for all the years. However, not convinced with the
reasoning of Google India, the AO, on a conjoint reading of Adword program
distribution agreement and service agreement, treated the payment as ‘royalty’
under Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vi) of the Act as well as DTAA between
India and Ireland and determined the withholding tax liability.

e. The findings of the AO were as under:

i.    The `distribution rights`
were `Intellectual Property’ [IP] rights covered by `similar property` under
the definition of royalty and the distribution fee payable was in relation to
transfer of distribution rights.

ii.   Google Ireland had granted
Google India the right access to confidential information and intellectual property rights.

iii.   Google India had been
allowed the use or the right to use of a variety of specified IP rights and
other IP rights covered by “similar property”.

iv.  Grant of distribution right
also involved transfer of right in copyright.

v.   By exercising its right as
the owner of copyright in the software, Google Ireland had authorized Google
India to sell or offer for sale, i.e., marketing and distribution of Adwords
Software to various advertisers in India.

vi.  The consideration paid by
Google India was for granting license/authorization to use the copyright in the
AdWords program and not for purchase of such software.

vii.  Google India had been given
right to use Google Trademarks and other Brand Features in order to market and
distribute of Adwords program.

viii. Grant of distribution right
also involved transfer of know-how.

ix.  Google Ireland was obliged to
train the distributor so that Appellant could market and distribute AdWords
program.

x.   Referring to Non-Disclosure
Agreement [NDA] clauses forming part of Distribution Agreement, it was held
that Google Ireland, being the copyright holder of the AdWords program, was in
a position to share confidential information whenever required with Google
India.

xi.  Grant of distribution right
also involved transfer of process.

xii.  Without access to the
back-end, Google India could not perform its marketing and distribution
activities. Google India had access to the processes running on the data
centres, based on the distribution rights granted to it by Google Ireland.

xiii. Google India was granted the
use or the right to use the process in the Adwords platform for the purpose of
marketing and distribution.

xiv. Grant of distribution right
also involved use of Industrial, commercial and scientific equipment.

xv. Adwords program, in one way,
was also commercial cum scientific equipment and without having access to
servers running the AdWords platform, Google India could not perform its
functions as per the Distribution Agreement.

f. 
Aggrieved by the order of the AO, Google India preferred an appeal
before CIT(A). However, even the CIT(A) concurred with the view of the AO and
treated the payment to be in the nature of ‘royalty’. Aggrieved by the CIT(A)’s
order, Google India preferred an appeal before ITAT.


C. Main Issue for
consideration before ITAT


The
main issue before ITAT was whether the amounts credited in Google India’s books
to Google Ireland’s account constituted business income or royalties for use of
software, trademarks and other intellectual property rights.


D. Google’s Arguments


Before
the ITAT, Google India extensively argued that the said payment merely
represented purchase of advertisement space and it does not amount to ‘royalty’
and is in the nature of ‘business income’. Google India’s main arguments were
as under:

a)   It
was merely a reseller of advertising space. It only performed market related
activities to promote the sales of advertising space. No right or intellectual
properties were transferred by Google Ireland to Google India or to the
advertiser.

b)   The
brand features were predominantly commercial rights and were incidental to the
distribution activity and did not involve transfer of any separate right.

c)   Google
India had no control or access to the software, Algorithm and data centre. The
server on which the Adword program runs were located outside India over which
it was not having control. Google India or the advertisers did not have any
right of any use or exploitation or the underlying IP and software. None of
these parties were concerned with the back end functioning of the Adwords
program which was solely carried out by Google Ireland. Their objective was to
benefit from the services of Google and they were not interested in the use of
search service.

d)   Reliance
was also placed on the reports of High Powered Committee of the CBDT as well as
Technical Advisory Group of the OECD which had concluded that the payments in
relation to advertisement fees were not in the nature of royalty. Accordingly,
when the payments made directly by advertisers to Google Ireland could not be
regarded as royalty, the payments made by the distributor for the same ad space
also could not be characterised as royalty.

e)   Clauses
containing protection of confidential information and non-disclosure were
generic and these clauses per se could not establish that there was grant of
right to use any IP.

f)    Also,
what was envisaged in the exhibits of the agreement pertaining to after sales
services were that Google India responded to all routine queries of customers
and Google Ireland was to respond to the advertisers issues or technical
issues. Thus, no right to use any IP was granted to Google India.

g)   The
Google brand features are predominantly commercial rights and are incidental/
consequential to the distribution activity and does not involve transfer of any
separate right. In this regard, reliance was placed by Google India on the
decisions in the case of Sheraton International Inc vs. DDIT [2009) 313 ITR
267 (Delhi HC)
and Formula One World Championship Ltd. vs. CIT [2016]
176 taxmann.com 6 (Delhi HC)
.

h)   Google
India relied upon the decisions of the coordinate bench in Right Florist
(P.) Ltd. (supra), Pinstorm Technologies (P.) Ltd. vs. ITO (supra) and Yahoo
India (P.) Ltd. vs. DCIT
(supra) to prove that the issue of online
advertisement had been considered in all the decisions and it was held that the
payment made by the advertiser to the website owner was business profit and in
the absence of any business connection and PE in India and not the Royalty.


E. Tax Authorities’ Arguments


The
tax authorities argued that the payments to Google Ireland constituted
royalties on the following grounds:

a)  Google India’s marketing and
distribution functions involved the sale of certain rights in the AdWords
Program, for which Google India required a license to use the AdWords Program.
The distribution rights granted to Google India under the Distribution Agreement
were therefore in effect a license to use Google Ireland’s IP i.e., inter
alia
the copyright in the underlying software code of the AdWords Program.

b)  The tax authorities concluded
that the license of Google Ireland’s IP to Google India under the Services
Agreement was actually for the purpose of providing the post-sale services
under the Distribution Agreement, and therefore the payments made to Google
Ireland constituted royalties.

c)  The Non-Disclosure Agreement
which is Exhibit-B of the distribution agreement clearly demonstrated that by
virtue of the disclosure of the confidential information and access provided to
the confidential information to the Google India by Google Ireland, the sums
payable by Google India to Google Ireland is for information, know-how and
skill imparted to Google India.

d)  Google India has been
permitted to use Google Ireland’s trademarks and brand features in order to
market and distribute the AdWords Program.

e)  The grant of distribution
rights involves transfer of rights in ‘similar property’ (Explanation 2 to
section 9(1)(vi)). The grant of distribution rights also involves the transfer
of right to use Google Ireland’s industrial, commercial and scientific
equipment i.e., the servers on which on which the Ad Words Program runs.

f)   The grant of distribution
rights also involves transfer of right in processes, including Google Ireland’s
databases software tools etc., without which it would not be able to perform
its marketing and distribution functions.


 F. ITAT Decision


The
ITAT, to get an understanding as to how Google AdWord program works, relied on
the information obtained through the written submission of Google India, the
books available in public domain on Google AdWord and Google analytics and also
through the website of the Google and the AdWords links therein. Based on its
understanding, the ITAT observed that:

a)  The entire agreement was not
merely to provide the advertisement space but was an agreement for facilitating
the display and publishing of an advertisement to the targeted customer.

b)  The arrangement was not
confined to use of space but also for the use of patented tools and software of
Google Ireland.

c)  Google India got an access to
various information and data pertaining to the user of the website in the form
of their name, age, gender, location, phone number, IP address, habits,
preferences, online behavior, search history etc. and it used this information
for the purpose of selecting the ad campaign and for maximising the impression
and conversion of the customers to the ads of the advertisers.

d)  By using the patented
algorithm, Google India decided which advertisement was to be shown to which
consumer visiting millions of website/search engine.

e)  The ITAT held that there is no
sale of space, as concluded hereinabove rather it is a continuous targeted
advertisement campaign to the targeted and focused consumer in a particular
language to a particular region with the help of digital data and other
information with respect to the person browsing the search engine or visiting the
website.

 f)   The ITAT did not agree that
advertisement distribution agreement and the service agreement were two
independent arrangements. According to the ITAT, both the agreements were
connected with the naval chord with each other.

 g)  The ITAT further held that the
payments made by the assessee under the agreement was not only for marking and
promoting the Ad Word programmes but was also for the use of Google brand
features. Needless to add that the said Google brand features were used by the
appellant as marketing tool for promoting and advertising the advertisement
space, which is main activity of Assessee and is not incidental activities.

The
use of trademark for advertising marketing and booking in the case of Hotel
Sheraton
(Supra) as well as in the case of Formula 1 were
incidental activities of the assessee therein as the main activities in the
cases were providing Hotel Rooms and organizing Car Racing respectively whereas
in the present case the main activity of the assessee is to do marketing of
advertisement space for Google Adwords Programme. Therefore, these two
judgments are not applicable to the facts of the present case. Hence, for this
reason also the payment made by Google India to Google Ireland also falls
within the four corners of royalty as defined under the provisions of Act as
well as under the DTAA.

h)  The ITAT has held that the
findings of the High Powered Committee would not be applicable here as this was
not case of placement of the advertisement simpliciter but there was a module
for targeted advertisement/focus marketing campaigns using the Google software
and algorithm, patented technology, secret process, use of trade mark etc.

i)   The reliance placed by Google
India on the decisions of Pinstorm, Yahoo India, Right Florists have been
brushed aside since the ITAT felt that the facts relating to the working of the
AdWords program stood on a different footing.

j)   The ITAT held that IP of
Google vested in the search engine technology, associated software and other
features, and hence, use of these tools by Google India, clearly fell within
the ambit of ‘Royalty’. The ITAT held that as no tax was withheld by Google
India on payments to Google Ireland, Google India was an assessee in default.

k)  The ITAT was of the view that
the Ad Words Program gives an advertiser a variety of tools to enable it to
maximize attention, engagement, delivery and conversion of its advertisements.
The tools are provided using Google’s IP, software and database with Google
India acting as a gateway.

l)   The ITAT was of the view that
the use of customer data for providing services under the Service Agreement was
also utilized for marketing and distribution functions under the Distribution
Agreement. It concluded that the use of customer data and confidential
information should be regarded as the use of Google Ireland’s intellectual
property by Google India.

m) The ITAT concluded that it is
through use of Google’s intellectual property that the AdWords tools for
performing various activities are made available to Google India and the
advertisers. Therefore, payments made to Google Ireland for use of its intellectual
property would therefore clearly fall within the ambit of “Royalty”.


3.  Observations


a)     The ITAT appears to have
undertaken an intensive fact-finding mission to unearth the technological
workings of the Google AdWords Program on the basis of which it has concluded
that the distribution rights involved a grant of license to IP and
advertisements fees were in the nature of royalties.

b)    The ITAT’s ruling is clear
break with earlier positions taken on the characterization of advertisement
revenue, and payments made under distribution arrangements. Where it ruled the
payments to be in the nature of business income. In these cases, the question
is usually whether the foreign entity has a PE in India for income to be
taxable in India. In fact, the issue in such cases has been on the
determination of a PE on account of a fixed place or dependent agent rather
than whether such an arrangement will result in royalty income.

c)     In fact, it was for this
very reason that the equalization levy was introduced to capture advertising
fees within the Indian tax net, in cases where the non-resident does not have a
PE in India.

d)    The ITAT has taken an
aggressive approach where it has read two independent agreements in relation to
services provided by two different units of Google India together to show that
there was utilization of IP by the Indian entity and re-characterized the
nature of income. The decision does not provide for reasons of tax avoidance
for clubbing the two agreements.

e)     The ITAT’s decision could
have far reaching implications from businesses across the board. Utilization of
IP such as customer data, confidential information for performing services is a
fairly common industry practice and the decision raises concerns on these type
of arrangements.

f)     The above decision is very
crucial and is going to impact many cases which have the similar structure and
in such cases issue would arise as to whether such payment is in the nature of
‘royalty’.

However, one could still examine and contend that ultimately the
objective was to place the advertisement and Google India or the advertisers
were not interested in the back end process of Google Ireland and hence such
payment should constitute business income.

g)    It appears that ITAT in
Google’s case has tried to distinguish the earlier decisions by holding that
Google was not only a simpliciter provider of advertisement space but it also
provided access to software, patented tools, information, etc. which helped
Google India in targeting the customers. The ITAT has also gone into
considerable depth to understand as to how these advertisements are placed on
the website of Google, how it was ensured that large number of customers visit
those advertisements, how the bidding by the advertisers take place etc. and
based on this it came to conclusion that Google India plays a pivotal role in
all these and it was not merely placing the advertisement simpliciter.


4.     Equalisation Levy [EL]


a)     The Finance Act, 2016 has
introduced an ‘Equalisation Levy’ (Chapter VIII) in line with the
recommendation of the OECD’s Base Erosion and Profit Shifting [BEPS] project to
tax e-commerce transactions. It provides that the equalisation levy is to be
charged on specified services (online advertising, any provision for digital
advertising space or facilities/service for the purpose of online
advertisement, etc.) at 6% of the amount of consideration for specified
services received or receivable by a non-resident payee not having a PE in
India. The Equalisation Levy Rules, 2016 have also been issued by CBDT to lay
down the compliance procedure to be followed for such levy. The Rules came into
effect from 1st June 2016.

b)    Further income from such
specified services shall be exempt u/s. 10(50) of the Act. Accordingly, with
effect from 1st June, 2016, such income will not be taxed as royalty
or business income but it would be subject to equalisation levy.

An
interesting issue would arise as to whether payments made after 1st June
2016 would be liable to EL or would it still attract withholding tax treating
it as royalty based on Google India’s decision. It is notable that withholding
tax may be creditable in the country of residence of the payee but no credit is
available for EL.


5. Proposed
amendments in Section 9(1)(i) by the Finance Bill, 2018 – ‘Business Connection’
to include ‘Significant Economic Presence’


Currently,
section 9(1)(i) provides for physical presence based nexus for establishing
business connection of the non-resident in India. A new Explanation 2A to
section 9(1)(i) is proposed to inserted to provide a nexus rule for emerging
business models such as digitised businesses which do not require physical
presence of the non-resident or his agent in India.

This
amendment provides that a non-resident shall establish a business connection on
account of his significant economic presence in India irrespective of whether
the non-resident has a residence or place of business in India or renders
services in India. The following shall be regarded as significant economic
presence of the non-resident in India.

    Any transaction in respect of
any goods, services or property carried out by non-resident in India including
provision of download of data or software in India, provided the transaction
value exceeds the threshold as may be prescribed; or

    Systematic and continuous
soliciting of business activities or engaging in interaction with number of
users in India through digital means, provided such number of users exceeds the
threshold as may be prescribed.

In such cases, only so much of income as is attributable to above
transactions or activities shall be deemed to accrue or arise in India.


 6. Conclusion


The
Google India’s decision will have a significant impact on how other digital
economy related payments are characterised for tax purposes in India. It would
also influence other pre 1st June 2016 cases that relate to online
advertising.

In
view of the ITAT’s observation that both the Associated Enterprises are trying
to misuse the provision of tax treaty by structuring the transaction with the
intention to avoid payment of taxes, and in view of General Anti Avoidance
Rules provision under the Income-tax Act and India’s commitment to implement
Multilateral Instrument under the BEPS initiative, the taxpayers should take
appropriate caution before entering into any arrangement/structure especially
if it is to avail any tax benefit.

It
appears that the law on this issue will continue to remain somewhat unsettled
until resolved by the higher judiciary.

The
understanding of modern day developments around digital space, the complexities
surrounding it and tax implications on such transactions need a holistic
review. It is time for India to develop a framework for digital transactions.
This would be one important aspect in India’s attempts in its endeavour of ease
of doing business. 

 

Sale In Course Of Export U/S. 5(3) – An Update

Introduction

Under
VAT era, import and export transactions were exempted from levy of sales tax
(Vat). The export transaction is defined in section 5(1) of the CST Act.
However, section 5(1) granted exemption to direct export sale. Therefore, the
sale prior to export i.e. penultimate sale was deprived of exemption as export.

 

To
mitigate the said issue section 5(3) was inserted. The said sub-section is
reproduced below for ready reference.

 

“S.5.   When is a sale or
purchase of goods said to take place in the course of import or export. –

 

(3) 
Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the last sale or
purchase of any goods preceding the sale or purchase occasioning the export of
those goods out of the territory of India shall also be deemed to be in the
course of such export, if such last sale or purchase took place after, and was
for the purpose of complying with, the agreement or order for or in relation to
such export.”

 

Thus
one sale prior to export is also exempt. However, the real issue is
interpretation of the scope of said sub-section.

 

Till
today, there are a number of judgements on this issue. However, still it cannot
be said that the issue is fully resolved.

 

Recent judgement

Recently
Hon. Kerala High Court had an occasion to decide one such issue about scope of
section 5(3) in case of Gupta Enterprises vs. Commercial Tax Officer,
Munnar and Ors. [2018] 48 GSTR 252 (Kerala).

The
petitioner was purchasing goods in auction and was objecting to charging of tax
on him by seller on ground that his purchase i.e. corresponding sale by seller
to him is covered by section 5(3) and no tax is applicable. Not able to
succeed, this petition was filed.  

 

Facts
of case, as narrated by High Court, are as under:

 

“3. The appellant filed
W.P. (C). No. 6210/2005 inter alia contending that he is an exporter of
sandalwood and on receipt of prior orders and satisfying the same, he attended
the auction held by the respondents. The sale was eventually confirmed in his
favour. He was called upon to pay the entire sales tax along with the balance
amount. He replied that the transaction is exempted u/s. 5(3) of the Central
Sales Tax and sought for release of the goods against his furnishing bank
guarantee. The authorities refused to release the goods. But the respondents
insisted on payment of tax before the goods are released. Placing reliance on
the decision of the Madras High Court in W.A. Nos. 94 to 96/2000 it was
contended that the demand is against the dictum laid down in the said decision
and being aggrieved by the insistence of the Sales Tax Authorities, writ
petition was filed for the following reliefs:

 

(i)    Issue a writ of mandamus
directing respondents 3 and 4 to release the goods purchased vide Ext. P. 3
without collecting sales tax and on the petitioner furnishing documents in
support of claim of exemption u/s. 5(3) of the CST Act and on the petitioner
paying the amount due under the auction,

(ii)   Direct respondents 3 and 4
to release the goods without collection of sale tax land on the petitioner
furnishing bank guarantee for the entire tax amount pending adjudication on
sales tax exemption by the 2nd respondent and other consequential
reliefs.”

 

The
issue which arose was, whether the purchase of sandalwood was in course of
export u/s. 5(3). If goods purchased are exported in same form then the
exemption is invariably allowable. However, where goods purchased are processed
then question of integrated connection between export and prior purchase
arises. If no integrated connection or inextricable link is proved, the prior
transaction cannot fall u/s. 5(3). Hon. Kerala High Court referred to
historical background about interpretation of this section and then arrived at
conclusion.

 

The
observations of High Court are as under:    

 

“7.  The learned Single Judge after referring to the relevant provisions of
the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992, (FDTR Act), held that
while export of sandalwood can be only in such forms permitted by the DGFT,
there can be no export of sandalwood in any other form. Any export of
sandalwood except in the forms permitted by the DGFT would be an illegal export
contravening the provisions of the FTDR Act and the Customs Act. Placing
reliance on Ext. R. 3(a) addressed by the Zonal Joint DGFT to the Conservator
of Forests and Ext. R. 3(b) public notice issued by the DGFT in exercise of the
powers under “exim policy” show that sandalwood is not covered by
open General Licence, but one falling under the restricted list for which an
exporter has to make specific request for licence to DGFT, who releases quota
from time to time and that the categories of Sandalwood allowed for export are
“sandalwood chip class” in the form of heart wood chips upto 50
grams, mixed chips upto 50 grams, flakes upto 20 grams of the sandalwood
classes (Jajpokal I class, Jajpokal II class, Antibagar, Cheria Milvanthilta,
Basolabjukni, saw dust, charred billets), sandalwood chips/power sandalwood
dust obtained as waste after the manufacturing process and sandalwood in any
other form as approved by the Exim Facilitation Committee in the Directorate
General of Foreign Trade. Ext. P. 18 export licence was also issued to the
petitioner under the FTDR Act and licence to export is granted only for the
categories mentioned therein. The learned Single Judge also entered a positive
finding after referring to Ext. P. 18 export licence issued to the petitioner
under the FTDR Act that licence to export is granted only for the categories
mentioned therein, namely, sandalwood in the form of heart wood chips upto 50
grams, mixed chips not exceeding 30 grams and flakes upto 20 grams of the
sandalwood classes, Jajpokal I class, Jajpokal II class, Antibagar, Cheria
Milvachilta, Basolabukhi, saw dust, charred billets, sandalwood power, dust,
chips and flakes.

 

The
petitioner placed reliance on Ext. P. 17, the rules regarding selection,
cleaning, classification and disposal of sandalwood etc. issued by the
Tamil Nadu Forest Department and it was contended based on Ext. P. 17 that
various classes of sandalwood are described in Ext. P. 17 and it will be seen
therefrom that the classification is purely on the basis of weight of billets,
defects noticed in the billets and the length of the billets etc. and
these are not different types or varieties of sandalwood. The learned Single
Judge exhaustively referred to various items in Ext. P. 17 and found that the
classification of sandalwood as per Ext. P. 17 when juxtaposed with the
documents evidencing the items bid by the petitioner, as evidenced by different
documents and were put in a tabular form in paragraph 22 of the judgement. It
was concluded that export orders of foreign buyers produced by the petitioner
evidenced that they were only sandalwood chips, below 50 grams.

 

After
referring to the various materials as noticed above, the learned Single Judge
found that on facts the sandalwood as purchased by the petitioner from the
Forest Department is in the form of billets, roots, or even chips weighing over
50 grams, could not have been exported in consonance with exim policy and the
export licence, without converting the same into chips of the description
covered by the export licence.

 

There
is a prohibition, in law, for export of sandalwood in any form, other than that
permitted under the exim policy and the export licence, with an order releasing
quota for the export. So much so, the sandalwood purchased form the Forest
Department as billets, roots etc. had to be converted into flakes, power
etc. weighing below not more than 50 grams to make them exportable
goods. In commercial parlance, the goods prohibited from being exported stood
converted to exportable goods. It is also held that for the purpose of section
5(3), what is relevant for consideration is whether the goods that formed the
subject matter of the penultimate sale or purchase are the self-same goods that
are exported and in the light of the decision in Sterling Foods vs. State of
Karnataka (MANU/SC/0423/1986
:

 

(1986)
3 SCC 469) of the Apex Court, the words “those goods” in section 5(3)
are clearly referable to “any goods” mentioned in the preceding part
of that sub-section and it is, therefore, obvious that the goods purchased by
the exporter and the goods exported by him must be the same. On the other hand,
in the present case the goods purchased by the assessee from the Forest
Department are those which were incapable of being exported in terms of the
relevant laws. The only types of goods that can be exported as sandalwood are
those which fall under the categories permitted for export. Hence, the goods
purchased by the petitioner from the Forest Department had to undergo the
change from the commercial status of non-exportable goods to that of exportable
goods, by change in its form from billets, roots etc. to flakes of the
dimension or as dust, permitted for export, in terms of the laws relating to
export. Thus, there occurs a conversion of the goods purchased so as to facilitate
the export and as such ceased to be “such goods” which were purchased
from the Forest Department. Hence, the claim for exemption u/s. 5(3) of the CST
Act was negatived.

 

Though
the appellant placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Consolidated
Coffee vs. Coffee Board, Bangalore (AIR 1980 SC 1403)
, the learned Single
Judge accepted that merely on the  basis
of the condition of sale notice, one could not be compelled to pay tax provided
the exemption applies. But the decision in W.A. Nos. 94 to 96/2000 of the
Madras High Court, which in turn referred to the case of Consolidated Coffee’s
case (supra) did not support the case of the petitioner on the issue
regarding the identity of the goods to be found among that purchased and those
exported. In the Madras decision the goods purchased by the appellant therein
(petitioner herein) were contended to be different from the goods sought to
export. But the said contention was not pursued further by the Tamil Nadu
Government.

 

The
different varieties of sandalwood purchased by the appellant were reduced to
small pieces for the purpose of export, though noticed by the court in the said
decision, none of the decisions on which reliance was placed by the learned
Single Judge, were referred to and there was no serious argument raised by the
State of Tamil Nadu in that regard and it was in such circumstances that the
Court accepted the assessee’s case therein.”

 

Further
para 9 reads as under:

“9. It was then contended by the learned
counsel that the Apex Court in the decision reported in State of Karnataka
vs. Azad Coach Builders Pvt. Ltd. (MANU/SC/8024/2006

: (2006) 145 STC 176), has
doubted the correctness of the decision in Sterling Food’s case
(MANU/SC/0423/1986 : (1986) 3 SCC 469) and also the decision in Vijayalaxmi
Cashew Company’s case ((MANU/SC/1015/1996 : (1996) 1 SCC 468), and has referred
the case to a larger Bench. It is true, the Court observed, that the said
decisions need reconsideration and the matter is placed before the larger
Bench. In the above case M/s. Tata the exporter and also a manufacturer of
chassis had a pre-existing order of export of ‘Buses”. The chassis were
moved under customs bond for body building and export to the premises of the
assessee (Bus body builder).

 

The
assessee then delivers the completed bus which is moved under the bond directly
to the port and exported, so that chain never breaks. The question arose was
whether in such circumstances the bus body builder is entitled to claim the
benefit u/s. 5(3) of the CST Act. It is in that context the Apex Court
considered the expression “in relation to such exports” which did not
get due weightage in the earlier decision.

 

But
even in the said case, the assessee only contended that the test of “the
same goods” is evolved only to explain that the exporter should not have
undertaken any process to change the identity of the goods brought by him in
order to confer the benefit of exemption on the penultimate sale. Thus there
was no dispute that if the goods undergo changes in the hands of the exporter
after the purchase and before export, he will not be entitled to claim the
benefit of section 5(3) of the CST Act, which is the main issue in the present
case. Be that as it may until a final decision is rendered by the Apex Court pursuant
to the reference order in State of Karnataka vs. Azad Coach Builders Pvt.
Ltd. (MANU/SC/8024/2006 : (2006) 145 STC 176)
, the decision in Sterling
Food’s case and Vijayalaxmi Cashew Company’s case beholds the field as a
binding precedent under Article 141 of the Constitution of India.”

 

Observing
as above Hon. High Court rejected claim of section 5(3).

 

Conclusion     

The
judgement is well reasoned to understand the scope of section 5(3) of CST Act
and more particularly, the effect of judgment of Supreme Court in case of State
of Karnataka vs. Azad Coach Builders Pvt. Ltd. (145 STC 176)(SC
).

We
hope above will be a guiding judgement for deciding further cases.
 

 

Place Of Supply – Immovable Property Based Services

Introduction

In the previous article, we had examined the Integrated Goods and
Service Tax (‘IGST’) framework in the backdrop of the provisions of the
Constitution. The IGST framework dealt with the concept of location of supplier
and place of supply (‘POS’) which aids in determining whether a supply is to be
treated as intrastate or interstate and accordingly, helps in determining the
applicable tax (CGST + SGST in case of intra-state and IGST in case of
interstate).

There are specific provisions prescribed for determination of place
of supply for both goods as well as services under Chapter V of the IGST Act.
Sections 10 & 11 thereof deal with goods while Section 12 deals with
services where both the supplier as well as recipient are located in India and
section 13 deals with services where either the supplier or recipient is
located in India.

The general rule for determination of place of supply is that the
location of the recipient is to be treated as POS except for cases where the
recipient is unregistered and his address on record is not available, in which
case location of supplier is treated as the POS.

This general rule
is subject to various exceptions where the POS is to be determined in a
different manner. One such exception pertains to cases where services relate to
immovable property and the same is covered u/s. 12 (3) in cases where both the
service provider and the service recipient are located in India. In cases where
either the service provider or the service recipient is located outside India,
Section 13(4) is applicable. In this article, we shall specifically deal with
the said exception and the issues revolving around it.

 

Relevant
Provisions

Section 12
of the IGST Act

(3) The
place of supply of services–

(a) directly in relation to an immovable
property, including services provided by architects, interior decorators,
surveyors, engineers and other related experts or estate agents, any service
provided by way of grant of rights to use immovable property or for carrying
out or co-ordination of construction work; or

(b) by way of lodging accommodation by a
hotel, inn, guest house, home stay, club or campsite, by whatever name called,
and including a house boat or any other vessel; or

(c) by way of accommodation in any
immovable property for organising any marriage or reception or matters related
thereto, official, social, cultural, religious or business function including
services provided in relation to such function at such property; or

(d) any
services ancillary to the services referred to in clauses (a), (b) and (c),
shall be the location at which the immovable property or boat or vessel, as the
case may be, is located or intended to be located:

Provided
that if the location of the immovable property or boat or vessel is located or
intended to be located outside India, the place of supply shall be the location
of the recipient.

Explanation.––Where the immovable
property or boat or vessel is located in more than one State or Union
territory, the supply of services shall be treated as made in each of the
respective States or Union territories, in proportion to the value for services
separately collected or determined in terms of the contract or agreement
entered into in this regard or, in the absence of such contract or agreement,
on such other basis as may be prescribed.

 

Services directly in relation to Immovable
Property

The practice of treating the place of supply as the location of
property in case of transactions involving immovable property is not new. Even
under the service tax regime, Rule 5 of the Place of Provision of Service
Rules, 2012 which dealt with the determination of place of provision of service
was similarly worded. However, with the concept of dual GST, this provision has
its’ own ramifications. This is because GST is a state specific law. Therefore,
deciding the type of GST applicable (CGST + SGST vs. IGST) is very important.
More importantly, in cases where the recipient of supply is not registered in
the State where the immovable property is located, the credit is lost even if
the recipient uses the services in the course of his business.

For instance, if a supplier is providing services of renting of
immovable property, in such a case, he will have to consider the Place of
Supply as the state in which the immovable property is located, whether or not
the recipient is registered in that state. Same position will apply even in
case of other transactions such as supply of maintenance and repair services
relating to immovable property. All these services apparently have a direct
relation with an immovable property and therefore, would rightly get classified
under this particular rule.

While in general, the recipient of renting service would be
registered in the state where the immovable property is located if he is into
business, the challenge may arise in case of hotels. Most companies use hotel
facilities in other states for the stay of their executives while on business
trips. Such companies may not have any branches or fixed establishments in
other states and therefore may be unregistered. This results in loss of credit
since the hotel would charge CGST & SGST relevant to that State in view of
the place of supply provision mentioned above.

Moving forward, what is meant by the phrase “directly in relation to
immovable property” needs to be analysed, as there are many other transactions
where the services involve use of immovable property as well, but there are
other factors which are also related with the supply of service and hence,
classification under this rule might not be applicable. Let us understand this
with the help of following examples:

Example 1 – ABC is a container freight
station located in Nhava Sheva. DEF, a manufacturer exporter has received an
order for export of goods from Nhava Sheva and has accordingly dispatched the
goods from his factory. When the goods reach Nhava Sheva, the exporter is
informed that the ship in which the goods are to be exported out of India will
berth at the port after 15 days and hence, DEF is required to make temporary
arrangements to store his goods. DEF enters in to a contract for the same with
ABC. The issue in this case would be whether the POS is Maharashtra, being the
location of immoveable property or Gujarat, being the location of recipient? If
ABC, taking a conservative view, classifies the service under this clause, it
would impact the credit availment for DEF as they are registered only in
Gujarat and hence, the credit of taxes for supplies consumed in Maharashtra
would not be available to them. Therefore, they are contending that the
exception clause is not applicable as the services provided by DEF are not
directly in relation to the immovable property.

Example 2 – An advertising service provider provides service in the
context of Out Of Home Advertisements. Under this model, the advertiser takes
on rent advertising space across the country by entering into agreements with
various landlords. Subsequently, the service provider enters into advertising
contract with various clients to allow the display of the advertisements from
such locations. In this context, while the services supplied by the landlords are
directly in relation to an immovable property, can the same be said for the
second leg of the transaction since the service is in relation to advertising
activity, which is distinct from leasing of an immovable property?

Before actually
analysing the above issues, we shall first discuss the following two terms,
which form the crux of this particular entry:

Scope of the phrase
in relation to

Directly in relation to – to be applied to what extent

The scope of the phrase “in relation to” has been dealt with by the
Supreme Court in the case of Doypack Systems Private Limited vs. Union of
India [1988 (036) ELT 0201 SC]
in the context of Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co.
Limited (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1966. The issue was
whether the investments owned by the undertaking were also covered under the
provisions of the said Act and liable for acquisition? The Act provided that on
the appointed day “every textile undertaking” and “the right, title and
interest of the company in relation to every textile mill of such textile
undertakings” were transferred to and vested in the Central Government and such
textile undertakings would be deemed to include “all assets”. The contention of
the Appellants was that the investment in shares of the company were not in
relation to textile mills/undertakings and hence, they were not liable for
nationalisation.

The Supreme Court in the above case held that the expression “in
relation to” is a very broad expression which pre-supposes another subject
matter. These are words of comprehensiveness which might both have a direct
significance as well as an indirect significance depending on the context. The
Court also referred to 76 Corpus Juris Secundum at pages 620 and 621
where it is stated that the term “relate”’ is defined as meaning to bring into
association or connection with. It has been clearly mentioned that “relating
to” has been held to be equivalent to or synonymous with as to “concerning
with” and “pertaining to”. The expression “pertaining to” is an expression of
expansion and not of contraction.

From the above, it is more than evident that the term “in relation
to” has to be given a very wide interpretation. This however gives rise to the
next issue, and that is when a service is said to be in relation to immovable
property. While the GST law is silent about this respect, under the service tax
regime, the Education Guide issued by CBEC at the time of introduction of
negative list-based taxation explained that for a service to be considered in
relation to immovable property, the same should consist of lease, right to use,
occupation, enjoyment or exploitation of an immovable property or service
should have to be performed on the immovable property.

In this background, let us try to understand the above clarification
with an example. A lawyer, having his office in Delhi, provides chamber
consultancy in the form of discussion with client (based in Mumbai) on a legal
matter concerning a real estate in his Delhi Office. The client had travelled
from Mumbai for the specific meeting. Can it be said that the services in this
case are in relation to immovable property and not legal advisory?

Taking a more practical approach to the above aspect, let us take
another example of a supplier providing document management services.
Generally, this service includes receiving the documents from the customer,
scanning & storing them at supplier location. Only when the customer
requires them, they are retrieved from the respective warehouse and provided to
the customers. The customer is not aware about the location where his documents
are stored. In this context, can it be said that the services are in relation
to an immovable property merely because in supplying the services, there is an
element of immovable property involved. Both the above situations clearly
demonstrate that the service in none of the cases is in relation to immovable
property, if the interpretation of the Education Guide is accepted.

In fact, this distinction was applied even under the service tax
regime wherein Rule 4 specifically dealt with the aspect of place of provision
for performance-based services in the context of which, the Education Guide had
provided that the service of storage of goods is actually in relation to goods
and not immovable property. Relevant extracts are reproduced for reference:

5.4.1 What are the services that are provided “in respect of goods
that are made physically available, by the receiver to the service provider, in
order to provide the service”? – sub-rule (1):

Services that are related to goods, and which require such goods to
be made available to the service provider or a person acting on behalf of the
service provider so that the service can be rendered, are covered here. The
essential characteristic of a service to be covered under this rule is that the
goods temporarily come into the physical possession or control of the service
provider, and without this happening, the service cannot be rendered. Thus, the
service involves movable objects or things that can be touched, felt or possessed.
Examples of such services are repair, reconditioning, or any other work on
goods (not amounting to manufacture), storage and warehousing, courier service,
cargo handling service (loading, unloading, packing or unpacking of cargo),
technical testing/inspection/certification/ analysis of goods, dry cleaning
etc. ….

The above interpretation has been followed even in the context of EU
VAT which contains similar provision for determination of place of supply of
services. In this context, reference to the decision of the First Chamber Court
in the context of EU VAT in Minister Finansow vs. RR Donnelley Global
Turnkey Solutions Poland (RRD)
is also relevant. The issue in the said case
was that RRD was engaged in providing a complex service of storage of goods
involving storage, admission, packaging, loading / unloading, etc. The issue
was whether the service could be classified under Article 47 or not, which deal
with supply of services connected with immovable property. The same is
reproduced below for ready reference:

The place of
supply of services connected with immovable property, including the services of
experts and estate agents, the provision of accommodation in the hotel sector
or in sectors with a similar function, such as holiday camps or sites developed
for use as camping sites, the granting of rights to use immovable property and
services for the preparation and coordination of construction work, such as the
services of architects and of firms providing on-site supervision, shall be the
place where the immovable property is located.

From the above, it is evident that Article 47 is worded similarly to
section 13 (4). In the context of Article 47, the Court had held as under:

Article 47
of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of
value added tax, as amended by Council Directive 2008/8/EC of 12 February 2008,
must be interpreted as meaning that the supply of a complex storage service,
comprising admission of goods to a warehouse, placing them on the appropriate
storage shelves, storing them, packaging them, issuing them, unloading and
loading them, comes within the scope of that article only if the storage
constitutes the principal service of a single transaction and only if the
recipients of that service are given a right to use all or part of expressly
specific immovable property.

In fact, Article 47 has been amended w.e.f 1st
January 2017 to specifically provide transactions which shall be treated as
being in connection with an immovable property and transactions which shall not
be treated as being in connection with an immovable property. Some specific
inclusions and exclusions are tabulated below:

 

 

 

 

 

In Connection with Immovable Property

Not in connection with Immovable property

u Drawing up of plans for a building /
parts of a building designated for a particular plot of land

u On site Supervision / Security services

u Survey and assessment of risk and
integrity of the immovable property (Title search by advocates)

u Property management services (other than
REITs)

u Estate agent services

u Drawing up of plans for a building /
parts of a building not designated for a particular plot of land

u Storage of goods in an immovable
property if no specific part of immovable property earmarked for the
exclusive use of the said customer

u Provision of advertising, even if
involves use of immovable property (Out of Home Advertising)

uIntermediation in the provision of hotel
accommodation services acting on behalf of another person

uBusiness exhibition services

uPortfolio management of investments in
real estate (REIT)

 

 

One another issue that is being faced
is from the view point of location of supplier where the services are in
relation to an immovable property. For example, ABC is a property investment
company which has acquired commercial / residential property across the country
and provides the same on lease basis to various customers. ABC has physical
presence only in Mumbai. All the lease agreements specifically provide that the
agreement has been entered into with ABC, Mumbai and the customer for leasing
the respective property which may be located anywhere across India. While
admittedly the POS in case of transactions entered in to by ABC will have to be
the location where the immovable property is situated, the issue that arise is
whether ABC is required to bill the customer from the locations where the
immovable property is located or can they continue to bill from Mumbai treating
Mumbai as the location of supplier of service?

In this regard, reference to Section 22 of the CGST Act might be
necessary which provides that registration has to be taken in each state from
where the taxable supply is being made. Therefore, it needs to be analysed as
to whether the location of supplier of service in this case will be Mumbai or
the respective locations where the property is situated? To analyse the same,
let us refer to the definition of location of supplier of service which
provides that the location of supplier of services shall mean:

(a) where a supply
is made from a place of business for which the registration has been obtained,
the location of such place of business;

(b) where a supply
is made from a place other than the place of business for which registration
has been obtained (a fixed establishment elsewhere), the location of such fixed
establishment;

(c) where a supply
is made from more than one establishment, whether the place of business or
fixed establishment, the location of the establishment most directly concerned
with the provisions of the supply; and

(d) in absence of such places, the location of the usual place of
residence of the supplier;

As can be seen from the above, location of supplier of service has
to be either a Place of Business or a Fixed Establishment, which have been
defined under the GST law as under:

Place of Business

Fixed Establishment

(85) “place of business” includes––

(a) a place from where the business is
ordinarily carried on, and includes a warehouse, a godown or any other place
where a taxable person stores his goods, supplies or receives goods or
services or both; or

(b) a place where a taxable person
maintains his books of account; or

(c) a place where a taxable person is
engaged in business through an agent, by whatever name called;

(50) “fixed establishment” means a place (other than the
registered place of business) which is characterised by a sufficient degree
of permanence and suitable structure in terms of human and technical
resources to supply services, or to receive and use services for its own
needs;

 

 

 

While there is no concern in treating the
Mumbai office of ABC as its Place of Business, the issue arises in the context
of other locations where ABC owns immovable property. Whether they can be
classified as POB/ FE? Evidently, ABC does not carry out any business from such
locations. The business continues to be carried out from Mumbai, only the
underlying service is delivered at such locations and hence, it can be
concluded that clause (a) of the definition of POB will not be applicable.
Similarly, clause (b) and (c) shall also not be applicable. Therefore, the only
question that needs to be determined is whether such locations can be treated
as FE or not? Even that seems improbable because for a place to be classified
as FE, the same needs to be characterised by
a sufficient degree of permanence and suitable structure in terms of human and
technical resources to supply services, or to receive and use services for its
own needs
. While one can say that the locations have a sufficient
degree of permanence, the second limb, that is human & technical resources
to make the supply will not get satisfied. That being the case, such locations
cannot be even classified as FE.

Therefore, it would be safe to conclude that such locations, since
not classifiable as either POB/ FE, the question of the same being classifiable
as Location of Supplier of Service may not arise.

In this context,
one may even refer to the FAQ issued by the CBEC in this context where in one
of the questions, it was clarified that there can be interstate billing for
rental services as well.

 

Service by
way of lodging accommodation

This clause applies to lodging accommodation services provided by a
hotel, inn, guest house, home stay, club or campsite including a house boat.
This rule makes lodging accommodation costly as in cases where the supplier and
recipient are located in different states, it makes the transaction tax
ineffective. For example, if a hotel in Maharashtra provides accommodation
service to an employee of Gujarat based company, even if the transaction is B2B
in nature, yet the company in Gujarat will not be able to claim the credit of
taxes as the POS will be Maharashtra. In fact, the businesses are in a losing
situation as credit was eligible under the pre-GST regime.

However, one particular issue for this kind of transaction is where
transactions are routed through online portals / agents. As stated above, this
entry is applicable only in cases where the services are provided by hotel,
inn, guest house, home stay, club or campsite including a house boat.
Therefore, in cases where the transaction is routed through online
portals/agents, the rule may not apply. Let us try to understand with the help
of following example.

A Hotel in Goa has entered into a contract with two selling agents,
one located in Bangalore and another in Mumbai. The arrangement with the
Bangalore selling agent is on a Principal to Principal basis wherein the Hotel
blocks specified number of rooms for the Bangalore based agent to sell and
whether or not the Bangalore agent is able to sell the rooms, the charges are
recovered from the agent. However, the terms of the transaction with the Mumbai
based agent are different. In that case, it is provided that the Mumbai based
agent shall merely facilitate the supply on behalf of the hotel for which they
would charge service charges.

The issue arises in the case of transactions through Bangalore
agent. The reason being:

In case of billing by Hotel to Agent – whether the supply is to be
treated of lodging / accommodation service or some other service? In case the
same is treated as lodging / accommodation, the POS will be Goa, and since the
agent is located in Bangalore, credit will not be eligible resulting in a tax
inefficient structure. Further issue arises when the agent bills to the
customer. The agent is not registered in Goa. Will he treat the place of supply
as Goa or will he treat the place of supply to be that of the recipient of the
service? Will one consider the service as directly in relation to an immoveable
property and covered under sub clause (a) or will one believe that sub clause
(b) is applicable? If sub clause (b) and not subclause (a) should be the
correct classification, the issue is that the service provider is not a hotel,
inn, guest house, home stay, club or campsite including a house boat though the
actual provision of service might be by a hotel and in such a case, one can
take a view that since the supply is not by the specified class of supplier,
the exception is not applicable and accordingly, POS may have to be determined
as per the general rule. This position will have to be tested at judicial
forums.

Similarly, in the
case of second set of transactions routed through Mumbai agent, since the Hotel
will be billing directly to customer, the POS will be determined as per the
exception. The Mumbai agent billing to Hotel / Customer for arrangement fees
will be as per the applicable rule and may not get classified under this
basket.

There is one more aspect on credit front in case of B2B transactions
involving lodging accommodation. Let us take an example of a company having
operations in two states, say Maharashtra & Gujarat and hence, registered
in the two states. An employee working with Gujarat office travels to Mumbai
for a client meeting and stays in hotel. Since the company is registered in
Maharashtra, he provides the company with the GSTIN of Maharashtra and asks the
hotel to issue invoice to Mumbai office. Is there any issue in this practice?

The probable answer
to the above question may be found in section 16 of the CGST Act, which
provides that every registered person shall be entitled to take credit of input
tax charged on supply of goods / services which are used / intended to be used
in the course or furtherance of his business. The issue that can be raised here
is whether the credit can be denied on the grounds that the invoice pertained
to a different registered person (being Gujarat) and was used in the course or
furtherance of a different registered person. If this conservative view is
accepted, the credit claim might be in danger. However, to counter this view,
can it be argued that while the GST law provides for deeming branches in
different states as distinct person, the same does not apply for business? That
is, the concept of business will have to be considered at entity level and not qua
the registration and accordingly, credit should be available.

 

Immovable property in multiple states –
Determining POS

There can be transaction for supply of services wherein under a
single contract, services for multiple immovable properties located across
multiple states might be provided. Lets’ take an example of Clean Ganga
initiative undertaken by the Central Government and awarded to an engineering
company. The river passes through multiple states.

The Government has entered into a single contract with the company
for undertaking the task of cleaning the river. Evidently, there is no issue
with respect to whether the services are in relation to an immovable property
or not? The only issue here that arises is how the POS has to be determined as
one can say that the POS is all such states through which the river flows.

While the proviso to section 12 (3) does deal with such a scenario,
it merely provides that the supply shall be treated as made in each of the
respective States / UT in proportion to the value for service separately
collected / determined in terms of the contract or agreement and in absence of
such contract/ agreement, the POS shall be determined on such other basis as
may be prescribed.

Therefore, in cases where the agreement provides for breakup of
consideration basis the work done in each state, the POS shall be determined
accordingly. However, in case the agreement is silent, one needs to be
determined in the prescribed manner. Unfortunately, no such manner has been
prescribed as on date for determining POS for such supplies. Even if the manner
for determination of POS is prescribed, even then it has to be noted that there
is no provision under the GST law for splitting of value / supply itself. The
provisions exist only for splitting of POS.

Therefore, the
issues that arise is whether the levy will sustain in the absence of proper
provision for determination of value of supply, even if the notifications are
issued in this regard? In this context, reference can be made to the decision
of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. B. C. Srinivasa Shetty wherein
it was held that the charging sections and the computation provisions together
constitute an integrated code and the transaction to which the computation
provisions cannot be applied must be regarded as never intended to be subjected
to charge of tax.

 

Conclusion

While there are
specific provisions for determining the place of supply in the context of
property-based services, the same has its’ own share of interpretation issues
as well as interlinkages with other aspects of the law, viz., valuation,
credits, registration, etc. and such exception rules can result in breaking the
credit chain and the intent of the GST Law to enable free flow of credit and
open up trade and commerce amongst the States.
 

 

1 Section 54 – Two separate contracts for purchase of flat viz. one for house property and the other for furniture, etc. considered, in substance, as the one only and deduction allowed in full.

Rajat B. Mehta vs. Income Tax Officer
(Ahmedabad)
ITA No. 19/Ahd/16
A.Y: 2011-12. Date of Order: 9th February, 2018
Members: Pramod Kumar (A.M.) and S. S.
Godara (J.M.)Counsel for Assessee / Revenue:  Urvashi Shodhan / V. K. Singh


FACTS

The assessee is a non-resident who sold off a house for a consideration of Rs 2.46 crore and earned long term capital gain of Rs. 1.9 crore. He invested a portion of the sale proceeds, Rs. 78 lakhs, in another residential unit and claimed a deduction u/s. 54. The AO noted that the assessee had entered into two separate contracts viz., for purchase of house property and another for purchase of furniture and fixtures therein. The payment of Rs. 60 lakhs was for the purchase of house property and Rs. 18 lakhs was for the purchase of furniture and fixtures. The AO was of the opinion that the assessee had executed two separate deeds to save stamp duty on it, (and) now the assessee is trying to evade income tax. He was further of the view that most of the furniture items are removable, and, that it cannot be said that furniture was purchased to make the house habitable. Therefore, the AO declined deduction u/s. 54 F to the extent of Rs 18 lakhs paid under a separate agreement for furniture and fixtures in the residential property purchased by the assessee.

HELD
Analysing the provisions of section 54, the Tribunal noted that the expression used in the statute is “cost of the residential house so purchased” which according to it does not necessarily mean that the cost of the residential house must remain confined to the cost of civil construction alone. A residential house may have many other things, other than civil construction and including things like furniture and fixtures, as its integral part and may also be on sale as an integral deal. Further, it noted that there are, for example, situations in which the residential units for sale come, as a package deal, with things like air-conditioners, geysers, fans, electric fittings, furniture, modular kitchens and dishwashers. If these things are integral part of the house being purchased, the cost of house has to essentially include the cost of these things as well. In such circumstances, what is to be treated as cost of the residential house is the entire cost of house, and it cannot be open to the AO to treat only the cost of only civil construction as cost of house and segregate the cost of other things as not eligible for deduction u/s. 54.

However, from the arrangement in which the transaction was entered into, the Tribunal noted that in substance and in effect the house was sold for Rs 78 lakhs. Even if the assessee was to buy the house, without the furniture, it would have been for Rs 78 lakhs – as was clearly specified in the agreement to sell. The cause or trigger for the splitting of the consideration was not relevant and it had no bearing on de facto consideration for purchase of house property. The two agreements, according to it, cannot be considered in isolation with each other on standalone basis, and have to be considered essentially as a composite contract, particularly in the light of the undisputed contents of the agreement to sale. Given these facts, the Tribunal held that the cost of the new asset has to be treated as Rs 78 lakhs. Accordingly, the Tribunal directed the AO to delete the disallowance of deduction u/s. 54 to the extent of Rs 18 lakhs.

4 Section 54 – The exemption u/s. 54 cannot be denied even in a case where the assessee has utilised the entire capital gain by way of making payment to the developer of flat but could not get possession of the flat as the new flat was not completed by the developer. Section 54(2) does not say that in case assessee could not get possession of property, he was not entitled for exemption u/s. 54.

[2018] 91 taxmann.com 11 (Chennai-Trib.)
ACIT vs. M. Raghuraman
ITA No. : 1990/Mds/2017
A.Y.: 2013-14                               
Date of Order: 08th February, 2018

FACTS

The assessee, in his return
of income, claimed exemption u/s. 54 of the Act.  The claim for exemption was made on the basis
of payments made to the developer for sale consideration. The flat, however,
was not completed even though payment was made to the promoter. The possession
was not yet given to the assessee.

 

The Assessing Officer (AO)
denied deduction on the ground that construction is not completed and
therefore, the assessee is not eligible to claim exemption.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee
preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who allowed the claim of the assessee.

 

Aggrieved, the revenue
preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

 

HELD 

A bare reading of section
54 clearly says that in case the assessee purchased a residential house in
India or constructed a residential house in India within a period stipulated in
section 54(1), the assessee is eligible for exemption u/s. 54. Section 54(2)
clearly says that in case the capital gain, which is not appropriated by the
assessee towards purchase of new asset or which is not utilised in purchase of
residential house or construction of residential house, then it shall be
deposited in a specific account. It is not the case of the revenue that capital
gain was not appropriated or it was not utilised. The fact is that the entire
capital gain was paid to the developer of the flat. In other words, the
assessee has utilised the entire capital gain by way of making payment to the
developer of the flat.

 

Section
54(2) does not say that in case the assessee could not get the possession of
the property, he is not entitled for exemption u/s. 54. The requirement of
section 54 is that the capital gain shall be utilised or appropriated as
specified in section 54(2). The assessee has complied with the conditions
stipulated in section 54(2). Therefore, the Commissioner (Appeals) has rightly
allowed the appeal of the assessee. The Tribunal held that it did not find any
reason to interfere with the order of the lower authority and accordingly, it
confirmed the same.

 

The appeal filed by the Revenue
was dismissed.

 

3 Section 47(iv) – Transaction of transfer of shares by a company to its second step down 100% subsidiary cannot be regarded as ‘transfer’ in view of the provisions of section 47(iv) of the Act. A second step down subsidiary company is also regarded as subsidiary of the assessee company under Companies Act, 1956 as the term ‘subsidiary company’ has not been defined under the Act.

[2018] 91 taxmann.com 62 (Kolkata-Trib.)
Emami Infrastructure Ltd. vs. ITO
ITA No. : 880/Kol/2014
A.Y.: 2010-11: Date of Order: 28th February, 2018

FACTS
The assessee filed its return of income declaring therein a total income of Rs. 88,79,544. In the return of income, the assessee also claimed that it has incurred a long term capital loss of Rs. 25,05,20,775 which it carried forward. The Assessing Officer (AO), assessed the total income of the assessee to be Rs. 29,99,30,657.

During the previous year under consideration, on 31.3.2010, the assessee sold 2,86,329 shares of Zandu Realty Ltd., at the rate of Rs. 2100 per share, to Emami Rainbow Niketan Pvt. Ltd., a 100% subsidiary of the assessee’s subsidiary viz. Emami Realty Ltd. The sale was in accordance with the decision taken by the Board of Directors on 23.3.2010 and also in accordance with the valuation report of SSKM Corporate Advisory Pvt. Ltd.

The Assessing Officer found that the assessee had sold shares of Zandu Realty Ltd. at a price ranging from Rs. 6200 per share on 23.12.2009 to Rs. 4390 per share on 11.2.2010. He asked the assessee to show cause why the sale price per share of Zandu Realty Ltd. should not be taken at Rs. 3989.80 being the average price traded at NSE as on 31.3.2010 against the sale price of Rs. 2100 per share taken by the assessee.

The AO held that he found the explanation of the assessee to be not acceptable. Considering the huge price variance between the quoted price in NSE and the off-market selling price shown by the assessee he held that when the shares are traded in stock exchange the best way to determine the selling price of a share is the price quoted in the stock exchange. Accordingly, he determined the long term capital gain to be Rs. 29,05,83,769, by considering the sale price to be Rs. 3989.80 per share as against Rs. 2100 per share taken by the assessee, as against the claim of loss of Rs. 25,05,20,775 shown by the assessee in the return of income.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO by relying on the ratio of the decision of Gujarat High Court in the case of Kalindi Investments Pvt. Ltd. vs. CIT (256 ITR 713)(Guj.)

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD
The Tribunal noted that the assessee sold equity shares of Zandu Realty Ltd. to Emami Rainbow Niketan Pvt. Ltd based on price of shares determined by Corporate Advisory Pvt. Ltd.  It also noted that the buyer Emami Rainbow Niketan is a 100% subsidiary of Emami Realty Ltd. Emami Realty Ltd. is a 100% subsidiary of Emami Infrastructure Ltd, the assessee. The Tribunal observed that the two issues which arise for its adjudication are –

(i)    whether there is a transfer of shares in view of the provisions of section 47(iv) of the Act; and

(ii)    if the transaction in question is not covered by section 47(iv) of the Act, then whether the computation of capital gains as made by the AO and confirmed by the CIT(A) is correct or not and whether the AO can substitute the sale consideration of the shares sold with FMV as determined by him?

The Tribunal observed that if it comes to the conclusion that this is not a transfer then the assessee’s claim that it had incurred a long term capital loss and same has to be carried forward cannot be allowed. Similarly, capital gain computed by the AO based on fair market value computed by him and substituted for the sale consideration agreed to by the seller and buyer has to be cancelled.

The Tribunal noted that the transfer is to a second step down 100% subsidiary of the assessee. The issue is whether provisions of section 47(iv)(a)(b) are applicable to a second step down subsidiary. It noted the following two divergent views on this issue –

(i)    the Bombay High Court in the case of Petrosil Oil Co. Ltd. vs. CIT (236 ITR 220)(Bom.) has, in the context of provisions of section 108 of the Act, held that a 100% owned sub-subsidiary of a 100% owned subsidiary would be a subsidiary within the meaning of section 4(1)(c) of the Companies Act and also within the meaning of section 108(a) of the Act;

(ii)    the Gujarat High Court has in the case of Kalindi Investments Pvt. Ltd. (256 ITR 713)(Guj) held that there is no justification for invoking clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 4 of the 1956 Act while interpreting the provisions of clauses (iv) and (v) of section 47.

Applying the decision of the Bombay High Court (supra), the transaction in question cannot be regarded as a transfer in view of provisions of section 47(iv) of the Act, as it is a transfer of a capital asset by a company to its subsidiary company and as a second step down 100% subsidiary company is also a subsidiary of the assessee company under the Companies Act, 1956 as the term ‘subsidiary company’ has not been defined under the Income-tax Act.

Upon going through the two judgments, the Tribunal held that it prefers to follow the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Petrosil Oil Co. Ltd. (supra) as in its view a second step down 100% subsidiary is also covered by the provision of section 47(iv) of the Act, as this is the letter and spirit of the enactment.

Following the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Petrosil Oil Co. Ltd. (supra), the Tribunal held that the transaction of sale of shares of Zandu Realty by assessee to Emami Rainbow Niketan Ltd. is not regarded as transfer in view of section 47(iv) of the Act. Hence, the question of computing either the capital loss or capital gain does not arise. The Tribunal held that the assessee is not entitled to carry forward the capital loss of Rs. 25 crore as claimed.

This ground of appeal of assessee was dismissed.

2 Sections 2(29A) r.w.s. 2(42B) and 251 – Gain arising on sale of shares of a private limited company, offered in the return of income as `short term capital gain’ can be claimed, for the first time, to be `long term capital gain’ before appellate authority even without filing a revised return of income.

 .       2018] 91 taxmann.com 28 (Mumbai – Trib.)

Ashok Keshavlal Tejuja vs. ACIT

ITA No. : 3429 (MUM.) of 2016

A.Y.: 2011-12: Date of Order: 15th
February, 2018


FACTS

During the previous year
relevant to assessment year 2011-12, the assessee had sold shares of a private
limited company. Gain arising on sale of these shares was shown in the return
of income, filed by the assessee, as short term capital gains. In the course of
assessment proceedings, the assessee, without having revised the return of
income, filed a letter and also a revised computation of income thereby making
a claim that the gain arising on sale of shares of private limited company need
to be considered as `long term capital gains’. This additional claim was denied
to the assessee.

Aggrieved by the assessment
made, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) and in the course of
appellate proceedings the assessee raised the said claim before the CIT(A). The
CIT(A) did not entertain the claim made by the assessee on the ground that it
was made otherwise than by filing a revised return of income.

Aggrieved,
the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where the assessee brought to
the notice of the Tribunal the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Goetze
(India) Ltd. vs. CIT [2006] 284 ITR 323 (SC)
and also the decision of the
Bombay High Court in the case of CIT vs. Pruthvi Brokers & Shareholders
[2012] 349 ITR 336 (Bom
.).

HELD

The Tribunal noted that the
Supreme Court in the case of Goetze India Ltd. (supra) and also the
Bombay High Court in the case of Pruthvi Brokers & Shareholders (supra)
has clearly held that the additional claim can be filed before the appellate
authorities even if the same is not filed by way of revised return of income.
Since the assessee had filed the claim before the AO as well as before the
CIT(A) to bring to tax the capital gains as long term capital gains on sale of
share of private limited company instead of short term capital gain as declared
in the return of income, the Tribunal admitted the claim filed by the assessee.

The Tribunal remitted the
matter to the file of the AO for considering the aforesaid additional claim
raised by the assessee on merits after hearing the contention of the assessee
and evaluating the evidences filed / to be filed by the assessee on merits in
accordance with law.

 This ground of appeal filed
by the assessee was allowed.

1 Section 253 – An erroneous disallowance made by the assessee in its return of income on account of non-deduction of tax at source which disallowance was not contested before CIT(A) can be challenged by the assessee, for the first time, before the Tribunal.

[2018] 90 taxmann.com 328 (Kolkata-Trib.)
Allahabad Bank vs. DCIT
ITA No. : 127/Kol/2011
A.Y.: 2007-08 and 2009-10                  
Date of Order:   07th February, 2018

If the stand of the
assessee is found to be correct and if it results in income being assessed
lower than returned income, that would be the true and correct income of the
assessee and it would be the duty of the revenue to assess the correct tax
liability of the assessee.

 

FACTS 

The assessee, in his return
of income for AY 2007-08, disallowed a sum of Rs. 3,17,32,735 u/s. 40(a)(ia) of
the Act.  Since this disallowance was
made voluntarily in the return of income, the assessee did not contest it in an
appeal filed before CIT(A) against the assessment order. 

 

In Assessment Year 2008-09,
the deduction was claimed in the return of income and same was disallowed by
the Assessing Officer (AO). This disallowance was contested in an appeal before
CIT(A) who allowed the deduction to the extent of Rs. 96,38,366 after
examination of copies of challans and other documents.

 

Subsequent to the passing
of the order by CIT(A), the assessee bank observed that in respect of
disallowance amounting to Rs. 99,32,277 out of Rs. 3,17,32,735, the provisions
of TDS are not applicable at all and consequently the provisions of section
40(a)(ia) are not attracted.

 

For the first time in an
appeal before the Tribunal, the assessee took an additional ground that the AO
be directed to allow deduction of Rs. 99,32,277 after verification of all
necessary documents in support of the claim of the assessee.

 

Before the Tribunal, it was
contended that the assessee never had an occasion to address this issue before
the lower authorities and hence had no option but to file an additional ground
before the Tribunal. It was also submitted that since the issue has not been
examined by the lower authorities, in order to appreciate the contentions of
the assessee, it could be remanded to the file of the AO. The revenue had no
objection except that it would result in an assessment being framed at lesser
than returned income.

 

HELD 

As regards the contention
of the revenue that the assessment would be framed at lesser than returned
income, the Tribunal noted the observations of the Calcutta High Court in the
case of Mayank Poddar (HUF) vs. WTO [2003] 262 ITR 633 (Cal.) and
observed that it is now well settled that there is no estoppel against the
statute. It observed that the assessee is only pleading for claim of deduction
which had been erroneously disallowed by it in the return of income and
considered as such by the AO in the assessment. Though there was no occasion
for the revenue to adjudicate this issue on merits, the revenue could not take
advantage of the mistake committed by the assessee. The scheme of taxation is
primarily governed by the principles laid down in the Constitution of India and
as per Article 265 of the Constitution of India, no tax shall be levied or
collected unless by an authority of law. When a particular item is not to be
taxed as per statute, then taxing the same would amount to violation of
constitutional principles and revenue would be unjustly enriched by the same.
Hence, in the process of verification by the AO, if the stand of the assessee
is found to be correct and if it results in income being assessed lower than
the returned income, that would be the true and correct income of the assessee
and it would be the duty of the revenue to assess the correct tax liability of
the assessee.

 

Having made the aforesaid
observations, the Tribunal, in the interest of justice and fair play, remanded
the issue to the file of the AO for adjudication of merits.

 

The additional ground of
appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

4 Section 4 – Charge of income-tax – Interest on advance – if the income does not result at all – then the same cannot be taxed – even though an entry is made in the books of account about such a hypothetical income – which has not been materialised.

1.      
CIT vs. Godrej Realty Pvt.
Ltd.

ITA
No.: 264 of 2015  (Bom High Court)

AY:
2008-09 Dated: 11th December, 2017 

[Godrej
Realty Pvt. Ltd v. ITO; ITA No.: 4487/Mum/2012; 
Dated: 04th June, 2014; Mum. ITAT]


The Assessee Company had
entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with M/s. Desai & Gaikwad
to develop residential project on a plot of land, belonging to M/s. Desai &
Gaikwad at Pune. In terms of the MoU, the Assessee had given an advance to M/s.
Desai & Gaikwad and the assessee was entitled to receive from M/s. Desai
& Gaikwad interest at 10% p.a. on the aforesaid project advance. However,
the obligation to pay interest on M/s. Desai & Gaikwad to the assessee, was
from the date of execution of the development agreement. In its return for the
subject AY, the assessee did not offer to tax any interest on the aforesaid
advance with M/s. Desai & Gaikwad.

 

However, the A.O, brought
to tax the amount of interest on advance. This on the basis of M/s. Desai &
Gaikwad’s ledger account showed an aggregate of advance and interest, as
payable by it to the assessee. Thus, concluding that interest had accrued to
the assessee, as it follows the mercantile system of accounting. Therefore,
interest is includable in its total income.

The CIT(A) dismissed the
assessee appeal. Thus, upholding the view of the A.O that as M/s. Desai &
Gaikwad had shown interest liability to the assessee as expenditure in its
books of account, it follows that interest has accrued to the assessee.
Therefore, the interest was includable in the total income subject to tax.

 

The Revenue case is that,
assessee was following the mercantile system of accounting. Therefore, it was
obligatory on its part to account for its accrued interest, which had so
accrued in terms of MoU. This accrual of interest is further supported,
according to him by the fact that M/s. Desai & Gaikwad has shown in its
books the above amount as a liability to the assessee. In support of the
proposition that in a mercantile system of accounting, the income is said to
accrue, when it becomes due and the postponement of the date of payment or non
receipt of the payment, would not affect the accrual of interest, he places
reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Morvi Industries Ltd.
vs. CIT (1971) 82 ITR 835.

 

The Tribunal records the
fact that in terms of MOU, M/s. Desai & Gaikwad was liable to pay interest
at 10% p.a. on the advance from the date of the execution of the development
agreement and the undisputed position is, it has not been executed. The debit
note sent by the assessee to M/s. Desai & Gaikwad towards the interest chargeable
on the advance was returned by M/s. Desai & Gaikwad, denying its liability
to pay any interest as demanded. Moreover, the board of directors of the
assessee had recording the no acceptance of the debit note towards the interest
payable, decided to waive the interest chargeable which is to be recovered from
M/s. Desai & Gaikwad.

Being aggrieved, the
Revenue carried the issue in appeal to the High court. The Hon. Court observed
that, in fact, there was no accrual of income in the present case. This for the
reason that there was no right to receive income of Rs.1.98 crores as interest
as admittedly development agreement has not been executed. The interest in
terms of the MoU would only commence on development agreement, being executed.
Admittedly, this is not done. Further, the return of the debit note by M/s.
Desai & Gaikwad was also an indication of the fact that M/s. Desai &
Gaikwad did not accept that interest is payable to the Assessee. Consequently,
there was no amount which had become due to the Assessee.

 

The entire grievance of the
Revenue before us is that the entries made by M/s. Desai & Gaikwad in its
ledger account, indicating that interest was payable, by itself, lead to the
conclusion that interest had accrued to the assessee is not correct.
Particularly, in the context of the MoU and return of debit note. Moreover, the
board of directors of assessee had passed a resolution, waiving the interest
receivable from M/s. Desai & Gaikwad. This, on account of non acceptance of
liability to interest by M/s. Desai & Gaikwad. Therefore, it was not an
unilateral giving up of accrued income but acceptance of the rejection of debit
note by M/s. Desai & Gaikwad. Moreover, the reliance upon Morvi Industries
Ltd., (supra) is inapplicable for the reasons on facts, the accrual of
income in this case would only arise after the execution of the development
agreement. Undisputedly, it has not taken place. Thus, as no income i.e.
interest has accrued or has been received, the occasion to levy tax on such
hypothetical income, cannot arise. Accordingly, Revenue appeal was dismissed.
 


3 Income in respect of sale of flats – accrued when possession of the flat was given – not when allotment letter was issued.

CIT vs. Millennium Estates Private Ltd.
ITA No.: 853 of 2015 (Bom. High Court)
A.Y.: 2007-08      Dated: 30th January, 2018
[Millennium Estates Private Ltd. v. DCIT; ITA No. 517/Mum/2011;  Dated: 16th May, 2012; Mum.  ITAT]

The assessee carries on
business as a contractor and developer. During the scrutiny proceedings the A.O
found that an amount was shown under the head current liabilities i.e. as
advances received from it buyers. The A.O did not accept the contention of the
Assessee that the aforesaid amounts from M/s. Siddhi Vinayak Securities Pvt.
Ltd. and M/s. Manomay Estates Pvt. Ltd. were received as advance at the time of
allotment on 14 & 15 March 2007 and that further consideration was received
on 1 April 2007, when the possession of the flats was given, thus chargeable to
tax in the next AY. The A.O made addition the aggregate amount received from
M/s. Siddhi Vinayak Securities Pvt. Ltd and M/s. Manomay Estates Pvt. Ltd. as
accrued income in the subject Assessment Year. 

 

Being aggrieved, the
assessee carried the issue in appeal to the CIT (A). The CIT (A) dismissed the
Assessee appeal.

 

On further Appeal, the
Tribunal  allowed the Assessee appeal.
Thus  after being examined all the
clauses of the allotment letter as well as the clauses of the possession letter
concluded that the sale of the flats took place only in the subject Assessment
Year i.e. on 1 April 2007 i.e. when the possession of the flats was given and
the balance amount was paid. The accrual of income took place in the next year.
Till then, the amount received was only in the nature of advances. The Tribunal
also records the fact that it was not the case of the Revenue that the possession
letter dated 1 April 2007 was not genuine. Nor has the Revenue brought on
record any evidence to show that the possession was given to M/s. Siddhi
Vinayak Securities (P.) Ltd. and M/s. Manomay Estates (P.) Ltd. prior to 1
April 2007. In the above view the addition was made by the A.O and upheld by
the CIT (A) was deleted.

 

The Tribunal also records
the fact that in the next AY , the Assessee has offered the income on the sale
of the flats to M/s. Siddhi Vinayak Securities Pvt. Ltd. and M/s. Manomay
Estates Pvt. Ltd. to tax. The same has also been accepted by the Revenue as
taxable income for the next AY.

 

The grievance of the
Revenue is that the sale of the flats under consideration had in fact taken
place on 14 and 15 March 2007 when they were allotted under an allotment
letters to M/s. Siddhi Vinayak Securities Pvt. Ltd. and M/s. Manomay Estates
Pvt. Ltd.

 

Being aggrieved, further
Revenue filed an appeal to the High Court. The Hon. High Court observed that
the Tribunal has reproduced the relevant clauses of the allotment letter dated
15 March 2007 which is similar to the allotment letter dated 14 March 2007 and
the relevant clause. The Tribunal, held that the amount of Rs.2.14 Crores was
an advance during the subject AY. It thus held that part of the above amount
had accrued as income during the AY 2007-08. From the above clauses of the
allotment letter and clause 9 of the possession letter referred to by the
Tribunal it is very evident that the possession of the flats was given on
receipt of total consideration only on 1 April 2007. The Tribunal records as a
matter of fact that there is no dispute about the genuineness of the letter of
possession dated 1 April 2007. Moreover, no statement of the buyers or other
evidence, even circumstantial in nature, was brought on record to indicate that
the facts are different from what has been recorded in the possession letter
dated 1 April 2007. In the aforesaid facts, the view taken by the Tribunal on
the self evident terms of allotment and possession letter does not give rise to
any substantial question of law. Accordingly, Appeal of dept was  dismissed.

 

33. U/s. 80HHC – Export Business – Deduction – A. Y. 1996-97 – Supporting manufacturer – Application by exporter for renewal of trading house certificate pending before concerned authorities – Does not disentitle supporting manufacturer to the deduction u/s. 80HHC – Exporter gave disclaimer certificate with details of export – Supporting manufacturer entitled to benefit of deduction u/s. 80HHC(1A)

CIT vs. Arya Exports and Industries; 398 ITR 327 (Del):

 

The assessee was a supporting manufacturer
of an export trading house, R. In its return for the A. Y. 1996 97, the assessee claimed deduction u/s. 80HHC(1) on the net profit
shown in the profit and loss account. It had dispatched the supplies prior to
31/03/1995 and on various dates between 01/04/1995 to 05/06/1995 and the goods
were exported by R which had issued a disclaimer certificate on 29/08/1996. It
submitted the certificate in form 10CCAB, which was issued by the export
trading house R, confirming that no deduction u/s. 80HHC(1) had been claimed by
R in respect of the export turnover shown by the assessee. The certificate
contained the particulars which related to the supporting manufacturers and the
export trading house, also included the invoice numbers, dates of invoice,
shipping bill numbers, nature of goods with quantities, etc. R had a
trading house certificate, valid up to 31/03/1995 and had filed an application
for renewal of its trading house certificate by a receipt dated 16/10/1995, and
had not received any communication to indicate that its application for renewal
was rejecetd. The Assessing Officer held that it was obligatory on the part of
R, the export trading house, to obtain a certificate from the concerned
Government authorities and that without the renewal certificate, the claim for
deduction u/s. 80HHC by the assessee, a supporting manufacturer, was not valid
and that therefore, the exports done after 01/04/1995 were not entitled to
deduction u/s. 80HHC. The Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal allowed the
assessee’s claim for deduction.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High
Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i)   The assessee was entitled
to the deduction u/s. 80HHC(1A) for the A. Y. 1996-97. The legislative scheme
which emanated from sub-section (1A) of section 80HHC was to treat the
supporting manufacturer and its entitlement to deduction separately from that
of the exporter. The words “assessee” used throughout s/s. (1) referred only to
the exporter whereas the same word used throughout s/s. (1A) referred to the
supporting manufacturer. There was a discernible distinction, in the
legislative scheme of section 80HHC between, the deduction that could be
claimed by an exporter and the deduction that could be claimed by a supporting
manufacturer. While the supporting manufacturer has to fulfil the condition of
a certificate having been issued by the exporter/export trading house to avail
the benefit of a deduction from the turnover that had been made available to
the supporting manufacturer, expressly u/s. 80HHC(1A), the deduction did not
hinge upon the eligibility of the exporter for the deduction u/s. 80HHC(1).
Further, a perusal of form 10CCAB showed that there was a separate certificate
to be issued in favour of the supporting manufacturer where the exporter made a
declaration that it had not claimed a deduction u/s. 80HHC(1) and there was a
counter verification by the chartered accountant of such a certificate. It was,
therefore, clear that there was no double deduction claimed in respect of the
export, which was consistent with the legislative intent of extending the
benefit u/s. 80HHC either to the exporter or to the supporting manufacturer and
not to both.

 

ii)   Even
after the period for which the renewal of the trading house certificate was
sought, R continued to be treated as an export house according to the facts
that had emerged before the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal. R filed an
application for renewal of its trading house certificate, which was pending
before the relevant authorities for four years and was pending even on the date
of the assessment order.

 

iii)   The export import policy
for the relevant period expressly stated that during the interim period the
export trading house would be eligible to claim all the facilities and benefits
of the exporter and, therefore, the further benefit of the supporting
manufacturer as well. The benefit u/s. 80HHC was, therefore, available to R for
the exports made during the period in question. However, R having issued the
disclaimer, did not, in fact, claim the deduction. The mere non-grant of the
renewal of the trading house certificate by the Director General of Foreign
Trade could not deprive the assessee as a supporting manufacturer of the
deduction it was entitled to u/s. 80HHC(1A).”

32. Sections 2(15) and 12AA – Charitable Trust – Registration – A. Y. 2012-13 – Meaning of charitable purpose – Institution for training Government officials in water and land management – Direct connection with preservation of environment – Institution entitled to registration

CIT vs. Water and Land Management
Training and Research Institute; 398 ITR 283 (T&AP):

 

The assessee is an institution established
in the year 1983, under the control of the Irrigation Department of the
Government of Andhra Pradesh. The assessee applied for registration u/s. 12AA
of the Act. The Director of Income Tax (Exemptions) observed that though the
institute was mainly functioning as a training institute for the purpose of
training Government officials in the field of water and land management, the
institute was also providing guidance to farmers and rendering consultancy
services to various organisations for a fee. With this view, the Director of
Income-tax (Exemptions) rejected the application for registration. The Tribunal
allowed the appeal and directed registration u/s. 12AA. 

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Telangana and
Andhra Pradesh High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as
under:

 

“i)   A careful reading of the
definition of the expression “charitable purpose” appearing in section 2(15) of
the Act, 1961 would show that it is an inclusive definition. This is clear from
the usage of the word “includes”. The definition “includes” within its ambit,
(a) relief of the poor, (b) education, (c) yoga, (d) medical relief, (e)
preservation of environment including waterheads, forests and wildlife, (f)
preservation of monuments or places or objects of artistic or historic interest
and (g) the advancement of any other object of general public utility.
Interestingly, the first proviso does not deal with anyone of the first six
items. The first proviso as it stood before April 1, 2016 or even as it stands
after April 1, 2016 deals only with one of the seven items covered by the
substantive part of the definition, namely, “advancement of any other object of
general public utility”. The second proviso takes away from the ambit of the
first proviso, even an activity relating to the advancement of any other object
of general public utility, if the aggregate value of the receipts from the
activities referred to in the first proviso is 
Rs. 25 lakhs or less in the previous year.

 

ii)   It is only after an
institution is granted registration u/s. 12AA of the Act; that the examination
of the gross receipts year after year for the purpose of finding out the
eligibility for exemption would arise. This has also been clarified by the CBDT
Circular No. 21 of 2016, dated May 27, 2016.

 

iii)   Charitable purpose
includes preservation of environment including waterheads, forests and
wildlife. The activity carried out by the assessee had a direct casual
connection to the activity of preservation of environment. The Tribunal was
correct and the assessee was entitled to registration.”

31. Section 2(47) – Capital gain – Computation – Transfer – A. Y. 1995-96 – Transfer of land to developer – 44% of land transferred in exchange for 56% of built-up area – Consideration for transfer of land was cost of construction of 56% of built up area – Cost of acquisition of land was its market value on 01/04/1981 – Land and development charges deductible from sale consideration

CIT vs. Vasavi Pratap Chand; 398 ITR 316 (Del):

 

A piece of land
was owned by co-owners. They entered into an agreement with A on 02/05/1984. In
terms of the agreement, the building on the land was to be demolished and an
apartment complex was to be constructed thereon. It was agreed that the
co-owners would get built up area of 89,136 sq. ft. which constituted 56% of
the total built up area. 44% of the built-up area would belong to A. The entire
cost of construction was to be met by A. The co-owners entered into agreements
with various flat buyers and ultimately sold constructed flats during the
assessment years 1993-94 to 1995-96. In the A. Y. 1995-96, the three co-owners
sold 18,636 sq. ft. of built up area for a total consideration of Rs.
4,72,98,075. Each co-owner disclosed a loss of Rs. 31,30,663 under the head
“capital gains” in his individual return. The Assessing Officer held that the
cost of acquisition of property (one-third share) would be only Rs. 2,03,334.
In other words, the Assessing Officer adopted the computation of cost of
acquisition in the manner indicated in section 49(1)(i) of the Wealth-tax Act,
1957. The Tribunal held that the figure indicated in the wealth-tax return
filed by the assessee could not be taken to be the basis for determining
capital gains. It held that the agreement of sale clearly showed that 56% of
the built-up area including the land would be retained by the assessee and 44%
by the builder. There was simultaneous transfer of possession of 44% of land by
the assessee to the builders and possession of 56% of the built-up area by the
builder to the assesses in the financial year 1991-92 in terms of section 2(47)
of the Income-tax Act, 1961 read with section 53A of the Transfer of Property
Act. The Tribunal further held that the cost of acquisition of land had to be
its market value as on 01/04/1981. It did not reduce the land and development
charges from the sale consideration.

 

On appeal, the Delhi High Court held as under:

 

“i)   There was transfer of
title to the land by the assessee in favour of A. What was transferred under
the collaboration agreement was only 44% of the land owned by them in exchange
for 56% of the built-up area and not the entire land. Further, the assesee not
only transferred the flats to the buyers but the proportionate right in the
appurtenant land as well. There was transfer of possession of 44% of the land
by the assesee to the builder and possession of 56% of the built-up area by the
builder to the assessee in terms of section 2(47) of the 1961 Act read with
section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act.

 

ii)   The consideration for the
transfer of 44% land was the cost of construction of the 56% built-up area. The
land and development charges had to be reduced from the sale consideration.

 

iii)   The value declared in
the tax return filed by the assessee under the Wealth-tax Act could not be
taken to be the cost of acquisition in the hands of the assessee. The cost of
acquisition of land had to be the market value of land as on 01/04/1981.”

30. Section 153 – Assessment – Limitation – Computation of period – Exclusion of time during which assessment proceedings stayed by Court – Expl. 1 – A. Y. 2006-07 – Effect of section 153 – Period between vacation of stay and receipt of order by Income Tax Department not excluded – Vacation of stay on 09/11/2016 – Order of reassessment passed on 30/01/2017 – Barred by limitation

Saheb Ram Omprakash Marketing P. Ltd. vs.
CIT; 398 ITR 292 (Del):

 

In the case of the assessee, a notice u/s.
148 of the Act, was issued on 27/03/2012 for reopening the assessment for the
A. Y. 2006-07. The assessee filed a writ petition and challenged the validity
of the notice and the reassessment proceedings. The High Court granted stay of
the reassessment proceedings by an order dated 18/03/2013. The stay was vacated
by an order dated 09/11/2016. According to the assessee, on the date of the
stay order being vacated i.e., on 09/11/2016, there were only 13 days left for
passing the reassessment order where period is extended to 60 days by
Explanation 1 to section 153. Therefore, the assessee claimed that a valid reassessment
order could have been passed only up to 08/01/2017, i.e. within 60 days from
09/11/2016; the date on which the stay was vacated by the Court. The Department
rejected the assessee’s claim. It was the claim of the Department that the said
order of the Court dated 09/11/20016 was received by the Department on
02/12/2016 and therefore, the Department would have 60 days from 02/12/2016 to
pass the order of reassessment. Accordingly, the Assessing Officer passed the
reassessment order on 30/01/2017. 

 

The assessee filed a writ petition and
challenged the validity of the reassessment order on the ground of limitation.
The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

 

“i)   In terms of explanation 1
to section 153 of the Act, in computing the period of limitation “the period
during which the assessment proceedings are stayed by an order or injunction by
the court” shall be excluded. In terms of the first proviso to Explanation 1,
where, after the vacation of stay, the period available to the Assessing
officer to complete the reassessment proceedings is less than 60 days, then
such remaining period shall be extended to 60 days and the period of limitation
shall be deemed to be extended accordingly.

 

ii)   Clause (ii) of
Explanation 1 only excludes from the computation of limitation, “the period
during which the assessment proceeding is stayed by an order or an injunction
of any court”. It does not exclude the period between the date of the order of
vacation of stay by court and the date of receipt of such order by the
Department.

 

iii)   Circular No. 621 dated
19/12/1991, issued by the CBDT, while explaining the reason for introduction of
the proviso to Explanation 1, acknowledged that the time remaining after
vacation of stay in terms of section 153(2) of the Act may not be sufficient to
complete the reassessment proceedings which is why the language used in the
first proviso is that the period “shall be extended to 60 days” for passing the
assessment order in terms of section 153(2) of the Act, if the period remaining
within limitation after the excluded period has elapsed, is less than 60 days.

 

iv)  The Revenue could not take
advantage of the fact that it received the copy of the order dated 09/11/2016
of the Court only on 02/12/2016 to contend that the assessment order having
been passed on 30/01/2017 within 60 days of the date of receipt of the order of
the High Court, was not issued (passed) beyond the period stipulated u/s.
153(2) of the Act read with the proviso to Explanation 1 thereof.

 

v)   Even otherwise, the
assertion that the Revenue was aware of the order only on 02/12/2016 was not
correct. The Revenue had been unable to dispute the fact that, on 30/11/2016, a
notice was issued by the Assessing Officer u/s. 142(1) of the Act and this was
pursuant to the order passed by this Court on 09/11/2016. Clearly, therefore,
on the date such notice was issued, the Assessing Officer was aware of the
order dated 09/11/2016 of the Court. Also, the order dated 09/11/2016 was
passed in the presence of counsel of the Revenue and, therefore, the Revenue
clearly was aware of the order on that date itself.

 

vi)  The order dated 30/01/2017
was time-barred.”

29. Section 254 –Appellate Tribunal – Power and duties as final fact finding authority –A. Y. 2009-10 and 2010-11 – Must reappraise and reappreciate all factual materials – Failure by Tribunal to render complete decision in terms of powers conferred on it – Matter remanded to Tribunal

Thyrocare Technologies Ltd. vs. ITO(TDS);
398 ITR 443 (Bom):

 

The assessee
is a sample testing laboratory. The Assessing Officer was of the view that the
sample collectors were not independent persons but were agents of the assessee
which was the principal and that it was an arrangement with the sample
collectors to avoid the obligation to deduct tax at source. The assessee
submitted before the Commissioner (Appeals) that the samples were not collected
directly by it from the patients, but by the sample collectors who visited the
patients and thereafter, brought the samples to it for testing. It was also
submitted that there was no privity of contract between it and the patients and
that the sample collectors did not collect the samples exclusively for it, but
were free to send the samples collected by them for testing to any other
laboratories and therefore it was a principal to principal relationship. The
order of the Assessing Officer was set aside by the Commissioner (Appeals). The
Tribunal held that the payments made by the assessee to the sample collectors
were in the nature of commission or brokerage which was evident from the
affidavit-cum-undertaking executed by the sample collectors and their
application forms for appointment as sample collectors and also from the
statements recorded during the survey u/s. 133A of the Income-tax Act, 1961
(Hereinafter  for the sake of
brevity  referred to as the “Act”).
It also held that the assessee did not satisfactorily explain the queries
raised. It further held that the Commissioner (Appeals) erred in not correctly
appreciating the nature of the payments made to the sample collectors, that
there was a principal and agent relationship between the assessee and the
sample collectors and deleting the interest levied u/s. 201(1A).

 

In appeal before the High Court, the
assessee raised the issue whether the findings of the Tribunal that the
assessee had not “satisfactorily explained the queries”, “not produced any
documents to substantiate the contention” and “not discharged the burden”, were
perverse, contrary to the facts on record and that it never indicated during
the hearing that it was not satisfied with the evidence. The Bombay High Court
remanded the matter back to the Tribunal and held as under:

“i)   The order of the Tribunal
was vitiated not only by non-application of mind but also by misdirection in
law. The Tribunal as the last fact finding authority, failed to make any
reference to the observations, findings and conclusions in the order of the
Assessing Officer and that of the first appellate authority.

 

ii)   It termed certain facts
as undisputed, whereas, they were very much disputed such as the non-admission
by the assessee that the service providers were its agents or that they were
allowed to collect the necessary charges from its clients for collecting the
sample and delivering the reports. There was no reference to any communication
or any document which indicated that the Tribunal’s queries had not been
satisfactorily answered by the assessee.

 

iii)   The
Tribunal should, independent of the statements recorded during the survey u/s.
133A, have referred to such of the materials on record which disclose that the
assessee had entered into such arrangements so as to have avoided the
obligation to deduct tax at source. If the arrangements were sham, bogus or
dubious, then such a finding should have been rendered.

 

iv)  The Tribunal was obliged,
in terms of the statutory powers conferred on it, to examine the matter,
reappraise and reappreciate all the factual materials satisfactorily. It had
not rendered a complete decision and its order was to be set aside.

 

v)   We direct the Tribunal to
hear the appeals afresh on the merits and in accordance with law after giving
complete opportunity to both sides to place their versions and arguments. The
Tribunal shall frame proper points for its determination and consideration and
render specific findings on each of them.”

28 Sections 253 and 254 –Appeal to Appellate Tribunal – Condonation of delay – A. Ys. 1994-95 and 1996-97 – Delay of 2984 days in filing appeal – Request for condonation of delay not to be refused unless delay is shown to be deliberate and intentional – Orders of Tribunal rejecting condonation of delay based on irrelevant factors – erroneous – delay condoned – Appeals filed by assessee to be restored for adjudication by Tribunal

Vijay Vishin Meghani vs. Dy. CIT; 398 ITR
250 (Bom):

 

For the A. Ys. 1994-95 and 1996-97, the
assessee filed appeals before the Appellate Tribunal against the orders of the
Commissioner (Appeals) with a delay of 2,984 days. The assessee made applications
for condonation of delay. The assessee submitted an affidavit stating that he
followed the advice given by his chartered accountant not to file further
appeals before the Tribunal for the A. Ys. 1994-95 and 1996-97, as the issue
involved was    identical to the appeal
filed before the Tribunal for the A. Y. 1993-94, which was then pending before
the Tribunal, to avoid multiplicity of litigation and that after the
adjudication of appeal for the A. Y. 1993-94 by the Tribunal, he could move a
rectification application before the Assessing Officer to bring the assessment
order in conformity with the decision of the Tribunal. In support of the
averments made in the affidavit, the assessee also filed an affidavit by one of
the partners of the firm of chartered accountants.

 

The Tribunal dismissed the appeal in limine
and observed that a chartered accountant could not have given an absurd advice.
The affidavit filed by the firm of chartered accountants was rejected. The
affidavit filed by the assessee was also rejected on the ground that it gained
strength only from the affidavit filed by the firm of chartered accountants.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had failed to show the reasons for the
entire period of delay, i.e., no reason was given for the delay that occurred
between periods and therefore, the delay in filing the two appeals could not be
condoned. In a miscellaneous application u/s. 254(2).

 

The Bombay High Court allowed the appeals
filed by the assessee against the said orders of the Tribunal dismissing the
appeals as barred by limitation and held as under:

 

“i)   None should be deprived
of an adjudication on the merits unless the Court or the Tribunal or appellate
authority found that the litigant had deliberately and intentionally delayed filing
of the appeal, that he was careless, negligent and his conduct lacked
bonafides. Those were the relevant factors.

 

ii)   The Tribunal’s order did
not meet the requirement set out in law. It had misdirected itself and had
taken into account factors, tests and considerations which had no nexus to the
issues at hand. The Tribunal, therefore, had erred in law and on the facts in
refusing to condone the delay. The explanation placed on affidavit was not
contested nor could it have been concluded that the assessee was at fault, that
he had intentionally and deliberately delayed the matter and had no bona
fide
or reasonable explanation for the delay in filing the proceedings. The
position was quite otherwise.

 

iii)   In the light of the
above discussion, we allow both the appeals. We condone the delay of 2,984 days
in filing the appeals but on the condition of payment of costs, quantified
totally at Rs. 50,000. Meaning thereby,  
Rs. 25,000 plus 25,000 in both appeals. The cost to be paid in one set
to the respondents within a period of eight weeks from today. On proof of
payment of costs, the Tribunal shall restore the appeals of the assessee to its
file for adjudication and disposal on the merits.”

 

Analysis Of Decisions Taken At The 22ND & 23RD Meetings Of The GST Council

This article provides an analysis of the
changes made or proposed in the 22nd and 23rd GST Council
meetings. A wide range of changes have been brought about in these Council
meetings which seem to aim at reducing the tax and compliance burden. One gets
a feeling that GST is turning out to be another law entangled in a complex web
of notifications which is perceived to be more dynamic than the stock exchange.
Some attribute the dynamics to a premature introduction of the law.

There were lots of speculations around the
outcome of the 23rd Council meeting after the Hon’ble Prime Minister
had promised relief. The top most highlight of all proposals was the relocating
of almost 178 items from the 28% slab to 18% slab. On one hand, it appears that
the rate change was purely to please the aam aadmi, while on the other hand it
seems the move is aimed at discouraging tax evasion on fast moving consumer
goods. If we consider this as a move to discourage tax evasion, it may lead to
tax buoyancy with more transactions in these goods coming into the system. In
the subsequent paragraphs, the major changes brought about by the 22nd
and the 23rd Council meetings are analysed.

 

1.  REDUCTION IN TAX RATES

     The reduction of GST rate
on almost 178 items from 28% to 18% is a major move by the Government. Most of
the daily use items like chocolates, custard powder, polishes, sanitary ware,
etc. are the goods where the rate reduction is done. However, luxury and sin
goods like pan masala, aerated water and beverages, cigars and cigarettes,
tobacco products, cement, paints, perfumes, ACs, dish washing machines, washing
machines, refrigerators, vacuum cleaners, cars and two-wheelers, aircraft and
yacht continue to be in the highest tax bracket of 28%.

 

     The rates were reduced
with effect from 15th November 2017; however, the goods bearing the
original MRP were in stock with the distributors and retailers. Most of the big
players have announced that they will ask their logistical partners to ensure
that the rates that get charged to consumers are below the MRP affixed on the
package to take care of the rate reduction.  

 

2.  5% GST RATE FOR RESTAURANTS

     As a consequence of
recommendations of the GST Council, another major move affecting the restaurant
industry was notifying 5% GST for restaurants. Prior to this change in rate of
tax, airconditioned       restaurants and
restaurants serving liquor had to bear GST @ 18% and other restaurants had to
bear 12% GST. As per the amended rate notification, the rate of GST on certain
restaurants, eating joints including canteen or mess has been notified @ 5%
(with no Input Tax Credit). It is felt that this change seems like a mandatory
scheme for eateries. Prior to introducing this change, the Hon’ble Finance
Minister had stated that all members of the Council felt that restaurants were
not passing on the benefit of ITC to consumers and GST was being levied on
existing card rates. There is no doubt in the fact that we all must have felt
our restaurant bills going up post implementation of GST. The million dollar
question that comes up here is whether this change is going to actually reduce
our restaurant bills.

 

     Few questions that arise
in this regard are enumerated hereunder:

 

     Is the amendment against
the objective of GST

     GST as we all know is a
value added tax and the objective of this tax is to allow seamless flow of
credit. Such a move of restricting the ITC in the hands of eateries may go
directly against the stated objective.

 

     The terms ‘restaurant’
& ‘eating joint’ is not defined

     The rate notification (5%)
covers within its ambit restaurants, eating house including mess or canteen.
This implies that this rate applies only in case where the activity of supply
of food is undertaken by a restaurant, eating joint including a mess or
canteen. This also means that when the food is supplied by a retail outlet like
a banya shop or a super market, 5% rate shall not apply. There is no clarity on
status of bakeries located in hotels (run by third parties), standalone ice
cream parlours. These tax payers are nothing but re-sellers of ready to eat
food and in most cases there is no preparation or serving done at the store or
retail outlet. There is an urgent need for the Government to clarify the
coverage of this entry, else the basic objective for which the GST rates were
reduced may not get fulfilled. Rather, there is always a possibility that end
consumer prices may increase to cover the increase in cost of supply due to denial of ITC.     

 

     Whether charging 5% is
mandatory

     On a perusal of the
notification it is apparent that the rate of 5% prescribed in the notification
at Entry no. 7(i) is subject to the condition that no ITC on inward supplies of
goods or services that are used for providing the service is claimed. A
residuary entry at serial no. 7(ix) which prescribes 18% rate for all
accommodation, food and beverage services that are not covered by other entries
excludes restaurants and eating joints covered by entry no 7(i). Further, an
explanation in entry 7(ix) specifically excludes restaurants covered by entry
at serial no. 7(i). A question that arises here is whether 5% is a mandatory
rate or a rate that is conditional to not claiming ITC. On a strict and
conservative interpretation, 5% seems to be mandatory rate for those covered by
entry 7(i) of the above notification.

 

     Another school of thought
is that 5% rate attaches a condition to it and hence is applicable only where
the condition is satisfied. Hence, it cannot be read to be mandatory. Then in
such a case where should such cases get classified. Can they be classified
under entry 35 as “Other miscellaneous services not covered elsewhere” is a
question which needs immediate attention of the government. 

 

     Would the move lead to a
reduction in restaurant bills?

 

     Every business activity is
run with an intention to earn profit and it is a simple math that profit is
sales – cost. Tax is charged on sales value. Hence, there is no doubt that 5%
should be charged on the base sale price. So let’s go back to base sales price.
Base sale price would be decided based on a certain mark up over the cost. With
the denial of ITC under the 5% scheme the operating costs are bound to go up
(especially across the counter sale of ready food). The logical outcome would
be increase in base sale price. Most of the restaurants operate in leased
premises and the lease rentals are liable for payment of GST. This would
constitute a huge ITC loss for the restaurants. The amount of ITC that shall
hit the Profit and Loss account debit side would vary from restaurant to
restaurant and only restaurants that operate on a low ITC may perhaps be in a
position to reduce the base sale price along with the reduction in the rate of
tax. 

 

3.  CHANGES IN COMPOSITION
SCHEME

     (A)   Changes already implemented

 

    The 22nd GST
Council meeting proposed an increase in the threshold limits for composition.
Section 10 of the CGST Act, 2017 empowers the Government to raise the maximum
threshold as under:

Rs. in lakhs

States

Old Threshold

New Threshold

Special Category

50

75

Other States

75

100

 

 

    Subsequent to the above
change an order1 was issued to clarify certain aspects relating to
composition scheme. This order was issued in terms of powers of the Government
to remove difficulties arising in giving effect to any provisions of the Act.
The following was clarified in the above order:

 

a)  A tax payer engaged in
supplying restaurant and other services specified in Para 6(b) of Schedule II
to the Act and also supplying exempt services (including interest income) shall
be allowed to go for composition u/s. 10 if all other conditions are satisfied.

 

b)  Further, it was clarified
that while computing his aggregate turnover for determining eligibility for
opting for composition, the value of these exempt services shall not be
included.

 

     As per the Press Release
dated 06-10-2017, it was also decided to constitute a Group of Ministers who
shall work towards making composition scheme even more attractive.

[1] Order No. 01/2017-CT, dated 13-10-2017 issued
under section 172 of the CGST Act, 2017.

(B) Changes proposed at 23rd
GST Council meeting to be implemented after making legislative changes

 

(i)  It has been proposed to
enhance the current threshold to 200 Lakhs. However, this proposal can come
into effect only after making changes to the law       

 

(ii) Uniform composition rate
of 1% to be made applicable to manufacturers and traders. However, no change is
proposed to composition rate applicable to restaurants.

 

(iii) Supply of services up to
Rs. 5 lakh per annum will be allowed by exempting the same

 

The notifications relating to (ii) and (iii)
above are still awaited. It may be noted that the changes as per 22nd Council
meeting and proposals by 23rd Council meeting would imply the
following:

 

(i)  Rule 3(3A) has been
inserted in the CGST Rules,2017 allowing entry into composition scheme any time
till 31-03-2018.

 

(ii) The option for composition
shall be applicable only in the month succeeding the month in which the option
opting for composition is exercised by filing Form GST CMP-02.

 

(iii) Such persons shall also
have to intimate details of inputs and capital goods in stock and pay ITC
attributable to such stock as per section 18(4) and computed in the manner
prescribed in Rule 44 of the CGST Rules. The intimation has to be given in Form
GST ITC-03.

 

The question here is whether introducing
such changes in the scheme of composition would really make it attractive at a
time when we are approaching the end of the financial year. 

 

4.  RELIEF IN COMPLIANCE
PROCEDURES PROPOSED AT THE 22
nd AND 23rd GST COUNCIL MEETINGS

 

A.  Filing of GSTR-2, 3
suspended:

 

     Inspite of the glitches
and the OOPS! on the GSTN portal tax payers did manage to file returns in Form
GSTR-3B and GSTR-1. However, when it came to furnishing details of inward
supplies, it seemed to be a task on hand for matching various elements (with
the biggest challenge being Invoice number and date). It was highly unfair for
a genuine tax payer where his credit claim is made depended on the timely
furnishing of outward supplies by his vendor. Considering the hardships faced
by tax payers, the Government has suspended filing of GSTR-2 which is viewed as
a very practical and bold step.

 

     It
may be noted here that filing of GSTR-2 has been suspended for the time being
but at some point in time this compliance has to be faced.The press release
dated 10-11-2017 states that a committee of officers would work out the time period for filing of GSTR-2 and
3.

 

From an industry perspective, what seems to
be the most desirable is:

 

a)  Invoice number level and
date matching should be done away with and only the tax element be matched.

b)  Alternatively the matching
of ITC may be done after the end of the financial year or on a quarterly basis
instead of monthly basis.

c)  If the ITC matching is done
on an annual or quarterly basis Forms GSTR-1, 2 and 3 should be consolidated
and a single return containing details of outward and inward supplies and the
tax computation for each period should be filed at the end of the month or
quarter, as the case may be.

 

B.  Quarterly returns for SME
sector

     Another welcome move
relates to reduced periodicity of filing of returns by small and medium sized
businesses with annual aggregate turnover up to Rs. 1.5 crore, and  it was proposed at the 22nd
council meeting to allow such SME businesses to file GSTR-1, 2 and 3 and
also pay taxes on quarterly
basis. Consequent to the 22nd
council meeting, the notification giving effect to this proposal was long
awaited.

 

     However, the above
decision was tweaked at the 23rd council meeting where filing of
GSTR-2 and 3 was suspended for the time being for all tax payers and quarterly
filing due dates and eligibility for the SME sector were notified as under:

 

Quarter for
which details to be furnished in Form GSTR-1

Due Date

Jul-Sep,
2017

31-12-2017

Oct-Dec,
2017

15-02-2018

Jan-Mar,
2018

30-04-2018

 

     Form 3B and payment of
taxes continue to be a monthly affair

     It may be noted here that
even though periodicity has been changed for filing Form GSTR-1, the
periodicity for payment of taxes and filing of Form GSTR-3B is still a monthly
affair for all tax payers (unlike what was the original proposal at the 22nd
Council Meeting).

 

     The efforts that are
required for computing the tax liability for a month and preparing Form 3B are
no less than filing of Form GSTR-1. In such a situation, would just changing
periodicity of filing GSTR-1 to quarterly really help the SME sector?

 

     Clarity on applicability

     The eligibility of a tax
payer for filing quarterly returns as notified2 is reproduced here
under:

 

     “The registered persons
having aggregate turnover of up to 1.5 Crore rupees in the preceding financial
year or the current financial year,
as the class of registered persons who shall follow the special procedure as
detailed below for furnishing the details of outward supply of goods or
services or both

 

     The confusion that is created
here is the reading of the word “or” used in the notification. Whether a tax
payer whose turnover in the preceding year was below the 1.5 crore mark but who
has crossed this threshold already in the current year can still avail the
benefit of quarterly filing. The same question arises in a vice versa
situation. However, if we go by the intention, it seems that the word “or”
should be read literally and not as “and”. Hence, even if the aggregate
turnover is above 1.5 crore in the current year, the benefit should be
available.

 

5.  NO GST PAYABLE ON ADVANCES
RECEIVED FOR SUPPLY OF GOODS

     The liability to pay tax
arises when the time of supply gets triggered. The provisions relating to time
of supply state that the liability shall arise on the earlier of the date of
invoice or date of receipt of payment. This implies that GST becomes payable on
advances received prior to making of the supply. While the service tax law
already contained provisions for taxing advances, similar provisions were not
present under the VAT laws and central excise law. The concept of taxing
advances relating to supply of goods was fairly new to suppliers of goods under
the GST law and had its own inherent issues, especially when it is difficult to
determine the classification of the goods to be supplied at the time when the
advance is received. Further, at times, it was also difficult to determine the
location of the supplier where advances were centrally received at the head
office.

 

     As proposed by the council
at its 22nd Council Meeting, the requirement for making payment of
GST on advance was exempted only in cases of tax payers (not being under
composition) whose preceding year turnover did not exceed Rs. 1.5 crore or
current year turnover is not likely to exceed the above threshold3.
At the 23rd Council Meeting, this relaxation was extended to all
suppliers of goods4. It may be noted that in case of supplier
of services the tax shall be payable on advances received.
 

[2] Notification No. 57/2017-CT, dated 15-11-2017  

 

6.  CLARIFICATION IN CASE OF
INTER-STATE MOVEMENT OF RIGS, TOOLS, ETC.

     It has been clarified5
that inter-state movement of various modes of conveyances between distinct
persons carrying passengers, goods or for repairs and maintenance shall neither
be treated as a supply of goods or services and hence, no IGST shall be
payable.

 

     A similar issue was faced
in case of inter-state movement of rigs, tools and spares, and all goods on
wheels like cranes. These goods may move to various locations for providing
services. The press release states that no IGST shall be payable in case these
goods move for the purpose of providing services to customers or for the
purpose of getting these goods repaired. The press release further states that
applicable tax shall be payable on services that are provided using such goods.

 

     Consequent to the Council
decision, a clarification6 in this regard was issued which simply
states that circular 1/2017 shall mutatis mutandis apply to inter-state
movement of such goods, and except in cases where movement of such goods is for
further supply of the same goods, such inter-state movement shall be treated
‘neither as a supply of goods or supply of service,’ and consequently, no IGST
would be applicable on such movements. It further states that the applicable
GST shall be payable on repairs of such goods. There seems to be a disconnect
between the press release and the Circular to the extent that there is no
specific mention that no GST shall be payable even when these goods are used
for providing services to customers located in other States.

 

     Further, it is not clear whether the clarification would hold good where
the distinct person is registered in the other State and the billing location
is from that State.

 

[3] Notification No. 40/2017-CT, dated 13-10-2017

[4] Notification No. 57/2017-CT, dated 15-11-2017 

[5] Circular No. 1/1/2017-IGST, dated 07-07-2017

[6] Circular No. 21/21/2017-GST, dated 22-11-2017

7.  Other
changes

a)  Tax payers who have paid
late fees for July, August and September, 2017 shall be re-credited to their
Cash ledger under the “Tax” head.

 

b)  Late fees for return in Form
3B
for the period Oct-2017 onwards have been reduced7 as
provided in the table below. It may be noted that the waiver applies only
for Form 3B and not other returns
.

 

Particulars

Original Late Fees per day

Reduced Late Fee per day

 

CGST

SGST

CGST

SGST

Cases where tax payable is NIL

100

100

10

10

Other Cases

100

100

25

25

 

 

[7] Notification No. 64/2017-CT, dated 15-11-2017

c)  A facility for manual
filing of advance ruling applications has been introduced. Rule 97A has been
inserted in the CGST Rules8.        

 

d)  Exemption from registration
in case of small service providers (having aggregate turnover less than Rs. 20
lakh making inter-state or intra state supply of services through an E-Commerce
operator)9.

 

e)  Input Tax Credit has been
allowed10 in respect of supply of services to Nepal and Bhutan
despite the said services being treated as exempted services.

 

f)   Date for filing Form
TRAN-1 extended to 27-12-201711.

 

g)  Date for furnishing details
of goods sent to job worker in Form ITC-04 extended12 to 31-12-2017
for the period Jul. to Sept., 2017. _

______________________________________________________________________

8      Notification No. 55/2017-CT, dated 15-11-2017
9      Notification No. 65/2017-CT, dated 15-11-2017  issued under section 23(2) of the CGST Act, 2017
10    Explanation inserted in Rule 43 of the CGST Rules, 2017 vide Notification No. 55/2017-CT, dated 15-11-2017
11    Order No. 9/2017-GST, dated 15-11-2017
12    Notification No. 63/2017-CT, dated 15-11-2017

Can There Be A Levy Of IGST On Actual Imports?

Introduction

1.  It is common knowledge that
the levy of additional duty of customs, commonly known as CVD and special
additional duty, commonly known as SAD, have been replaced for many products
with the IGST, also known as integrated tax on imports of goods. In this
article, we examine whether there can be a levy of such integrated tax on the
activity of actual imports into the country using the present wordings in the
statute.

 

Legal Analysis

 

IGST or the integrated tax is a tax which is
levied on inter-State supplies of goods or services. The levy is under an
enactment called Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

 

2.  The charging provision is
section 5 which levies a tax on all inter-State supplies of goods or services.
Proviso to section 5(1) of the IGST Act reads as under:

 

     “Provided that the
integrated tax on goods imported into India
shall be levied and collected in accordance with the provisions of section 3 of
the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 on the value as determined under the said Act at
the point when duties of customs are levied on the said goods under section 12
of the Customs Act, 1962.”

 

3.  Section 7 of the IGST Act,
2017 would talk of determination of what is inter-State supply. For our
purposes, section 7(2) of the IGST Act states that “Supply of goods imported into the territory of India, till they
cross the customs frontiers of India
, shall be treated to be a
supply of goods in the course of inter-State trade or commerce”.

 

4.  If one compares the
language used in section 7(2) and proviso to section 5(1), the events
considered are different. Section 7(2) talks about “imported into territory
of India, till they cross the customs frontiers of India….”
Proviso to
section 5(1) talks about “goods imported into India”. While the former
deals only with determining what is inter-State supply and states that till
goods cross the customs frontiers, they are treated as supply in the course of
import or export of goods, the latter is the charging section which states that
the charge on goods imported is determined by the Customs Tariff Act.
Therefore, the two seem to operate in two different fields. While one talks of
“in the course of imports or exports”, the other talks of “goods imported into
India”. The former would probably cover instances such as high sea sales, while
the latter deals with actual imports into the country.

 

5.  The net effect of this
would be that u/s. 7, transaction in high seas, would be termed as in the
course of imports or exports and would be treated as inter-State supply of
goods or services. Though the proviso to section 5(1) states that integrated
tax on goods imported into India would be levied and collected in accordance
with the provisions of section 3 of the Customs Tariff Act, there is no fiction
created to stipulate that goods imported into India would be treated as supply
in the course of inter-State trade or commerce.
The fiction created in
section 7(2), it seems to the authors, is not sufficient to take care of direct
imports because of inappropriate language used in section 7(2). If this
position is true, then the charge of integrated tax on direct imports is on
precarious grounds. We could read it this way too – the charge under IGST Act
is restricted to tax only on transactions at the high seas or before customs
clearances and cannot be fastened on goods actually imported.

 

6.  We now have to look at the
Constitution of India. The Constitution 101st Amendment Act has
already created a fiction as to what kind of supply vis-à-vis imports is
deemed to be in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. The Explanation to
Article 269A(1) reads as under:

 

     “For the purposes of this
clause, supply of goods, or of services, or both in the course of import
into the territory of India shall be deemed to be supply of goods, or of
services, or both in the course of inter-State trade or commerce.”

 

7.  The above would show that
extent to which fiction can be created by Parliament to treat any supply vis-à-vis
import is already specified in the Constitution. Only supply in the course of
import into the territory of India alone is deemed to be supply in the course
of inter-State trade or commerce. Direct imports are not covered. This is quite
clearly the case as direct imports were already covered under the customs
legislation.

 

8.  Such being the case,
Parliament cannot create any fiction vis-à-vis imports to treat them as
supply in the course of inter-State trade or commerce except to the extent
provided in the Explanation to Article 269A(1). No fiction can be created by
the Parliament to treat direct imports as supply in the course of inter-State
trade or commerce because the scope of fiction is already defined in the
Constitution i.e., Explanation to Article 269A(1). Article 269A(5) confers
power on the Parliament to formulate the principles for determining the place
of supply, and when a supply of goods, or of services, or both takes place in
the course of inter-State trade or commerce. Section 7 of the IGST Act has been
enacted pursuant to the powers granted by Article 269A(5). The powers given by
Article 269A(5) should be read along with section 269(1). While formulating the
provisions regarding place of supply, the Parliament cannot go beyond
Explanation to Article 269A(1) create any fiction with respect to direct
imports as the scope of fiction is already defined in the said Explanation.

 

9.  We can look at this in
another way too – Article 246A which was introduced by the above Amendment Act,
is a special provision with respect to goods and services tax and therefore, to
that extent would override Article 246 in the matter of vesting legislative
powers. Parliament already had powers under Article 246 read with Schedule VII
List 1 entry 83, to levy a duty of customs and therefore, the special
provisions for levy of GST on goods or services supplied can be restricted to
only two things:

 

a.  Tax on goods or services
supplied inside India

b.  Tax on goods or services
supplied in the course of export or import and not on actual imports or exports
which is covered by the customs legislation already.

 

     This reading would clearly
harmonise the two Articles in the Constitution as otherwise, the state
legislatures would have the power to levy import duties which is clearly not
the case.

 

10. As we are dealing
with the subject of imports, it would be relevant to note what is import.
Section 2(10) of the IGST Act, 2017 defines import of goods to mean bringing
goods into India from a place outside India. Section 2(23) of the Customs Act,
1962 has the same definition. Therefore, we have to examine some decisions on
the concept of import. The Hon’ble Supreme Court discussed when import is said
to take place.

 

   Kiran
Spg. Mills vs. Collector of Customs
, (2000) 10 SCC 228

 

     6. Attractive, as the
argument is, we are afraid that we do not find any merit in the same. It has
now been held by this Court in Hyderabad Industries Ltd. v. Union of India
[(1999) 5 SCC 15 : JT (1999) 4 SC 95] that for the purpose of levy of
additional duty Section 3 of the Tariff Act is a charging section. Section 3
sub-section (6) makes the provisions of the Customs Act applicable. This would
bring into play the provisions of Section 15 of the Customs Act which, inter
alia, provides that the rate of duty which will be payable would be (sic the
rate in force) on the day when the goods are removed from the bonded warehouse.
That apart, this Court has held in Sea Customs Act [ Sea Customs Act, S. 20(2),
Re, AIR 1963 SC 1760 : (1964) 3 SCR 787, 803], SCR at p. 803 that in the case
of duty of customs the taxable event is the import of goods within the customs
barriers. In other words, the taxable event occurs when the customs barrier is
crossed. In the case of goods which are in the warehouse the customs barriers
would be crossed when they are sought to be taken out of the customs and
brought to the mass of goods in the country. Admittedly this was done after
4-10-1978. As on that day when the goods were so removed additional duty of
excise under the said Ordinance was payable on goods manufactured after
4-10-1978. We are unable to accept the contention of Mr. Ramachandran that what
has to be seen is whether additional duty of excise was payable at the time
when the goods landed in India or, as he strenuously contended, they had
crossed into the territorial waters. Import being complete when the goods
entered the territorial waters is the contention which has already been
rejected by this Court in Union of India v. Apar (P) Ltd. [(1999) 6 SCC 117]
decided on 22-7-1999. The import would be completed only when the goods are to
cross the customs barriers and that is the time when the import duty has to be
paid and that is what has been termed by this Court in Sea Customs case [ Sea
Customs Act, S. 20(2), Re, AIR 1963 SC 1760 : (1964) 3 SCR 787, 803] (SCR at p.
823) as being the taxable event. The taxable event, therefore, being the day of
crossing of customs barrier, and not on the date when the goods had landed in
India or had entered the territorial waters, we find that on the date of the
taxable event the additional duty of excise was leviable under the said
Ordinance and, therefore, additional duty under Section 3 of the Tariff Act was
rightly demanded from the appellants.”

 

One may see with profit the following decisions also:

   The
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Apar (P) Ltd., (1999) 6 SCC
117

   Bharat
Surfactants (P) Ltd. vs. Union of India,
(1989) 4 SCC 21

   Further,
we can see the decision of the Supreme Court in Garden Silk Mills Ltd. vs.
Union of India, (1999) 8 SCC 744

 

     17. It was further
submitted that in the case of Apar (P) Ltd. [(1999) 6 SCC 117: JT (1999) 5 SC
161] this Court was concerned with Sections 14 and 15 but here we have to
construe the word “imported” occurring in Section 12 and this can only mean
that the moment goods have entered the territorial waters the import is
complete. We do not agree with the submission. This Court in its opinion in
Bill to Amend Section 20 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 and Section 3 of the
Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, Re [AIR 1963 SC 1760 : (1964) 3 SCR 787 sub
nom Sea Customs Act (1878), S. 20(2), Re] SCR at p. 823 observed as follows:

     “Truly speaking, the
imposition of an import duty, by and large, results in a condition which must
be fulfilled before the goods can be brought inside the customs barriers, i.e.,
before they form part of the mass of goods within the country.”

 

     18. It would appear to
us that the import of goods into India would commence when the same cross into
the territorial waters but continues and is completed when the goods become
part of the mass of goods within the country; the taxable event being reached
at the time when the goods reach the customs barriers and the bill of entry for
home consumption is filed.

 

   Hotel
Ashoka vs. ACCT
2012(276) E.L.T. 433 (S.C.)

 

     18. It is
an admitted fact that the goods which had been brought from foreign countries
by the appellant had been kept in bonded warehouses and they were transferred
to duty free shops situated at International Airport of Bengaluru as and when
the stock of goods lying at the duty free shops was exhausted. It is also an
admitted fact that the appellant had executed bonds and the goods, which had
been brought from foreign countries, had been kept in bonded warehouses by the
appellant. When the goods are kept in the bonded warehouses, it cannot be said
that the said goods had crossed the customs frontiers. The goods are not
cleared from the customs till they are brought in India by crossing the customs
frontiers. When the goods are lying in the bonded warehouses, they are deemed
to have been kept outside the customs frontiers of the country and as stated by
the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant, the appellant was
selling the goods from the duty free shops owned by it at Bengaluru
International Airport before the said goods had crossed the customs frontiers.

 

     19. Thus,
before the goods were imported in the country, they had been sold at the duty
free shops of the appellant.

 

     20. In view of the
aforestated factual position and in the light of the legal position stated
hereinabove, it is very clear that no tax on the sale or purchase of goods can
be imposed by any State when the transaction of sale or purchase takes place in
the course of import of goods into or export of the goods out of the territory
of India. Thus, if any transaction of sale or purchase takes place when the
goods are being imported in India or they are being exported from India, no
State can impose any tax thereon.

 

     The legal position
therefore is that only when duty is paid can it be said that the goods are
imported.

11.        But what do we mean
by the terminology “in the course of import or export”?

 

12.        Article 286 of the
Constitution prior to its amendment read as under:

 

     286. (1) No law of a
State shall impose, or authorise the imposition of, a tax on the sale or
purchase of goods where such sale or purchase takes place—

 

(a) outside the State; or

(b) in the course of the import of the goods into, or export of the
goods out of the territory of India.

(2) Parliament may by law formulate principles for determining when
a sale or purchase of goods takes 
place  in   any  
of   the   ways
mentioned in clause (1).

 (3) Any law of a State shall,
in so far as it imposes, or authorises the imposition of,—

(a) a tax on the sale or purchase of goods declared by Parliament by
law to be of special importance in inter-State trade or commerce; or

(b) a tax on the sale or purchase of goods, being a tax of the
nature referred to in sub-clause (b), sub-clause (c) or sub-clause (d) of
clause (29A) of article 366, be subject to such restrictions and conditions in
regard to the system of levy, rates and other incidents of the tax as
Parliament may by law specify.

 

13.  Section 5(2) of the
CST Act was enacted pursuant to Article 286. Section 5(2) read as under:

 

     “(2) A sale or purchase
of goods shall be deemed to take place in the course of the import of the goods
into the territory of India only if the sale or purchase either occasions such
import or is effected by a transfer of documents of title to the goods before
the goods have crossed the customs frontiers of India.”

 

14. The above fiction gives
an idea as to what can be treated as to be in the course of imports. It doesn’t
include direct imports and rightly so. No doubt section 5(2) is a fiction. But
the manner in which it is worded, it essentially encompasses the natural
meaning of the expression “in the course of import”. Section 5(2) of CST Act
doesn’t cover direct imports. It covers only sale which occasions import or
sale by transfer of document of title to goods before the goods have crossed
the customs frontier. It is understandable too as the customs legislation is
the one which should cover it.

 

15. Article 286 has been
amended by the Constitution 101st  Amendment
Act. The amended Article reads as under:

     286. (1) No law of a State
shall impose, or authorise the imposition of, a tax on the supply of goods or
of services or both, where such supply takes place —

     (a) outside the State; or

     (b) in the course of the
import of the goods or services or both into, or export of the goods or
services or both out of, the territory of India.

     (2) Parliament may by law
formulate principles for determining when a supply of goods or of services or
both takes place in any of the ways mentioned in clause (1).

 

   This
is also best expressed in the words of the Supreme Court in State of
Travancore-Cochin vs. Bombay Co. Ltd
., 1952 SCR 1112 : AIR 1952 SC 366 :
(1952) 3 STC 434 [popularly known as First case of Travancore].

 

     10. We are clearly of
opinion that the sales here in question, which occasioned the export in each
case, fall within the scope of the exemption under Article 286(1)(b). Such
sales must of necessity be put through by transporting the goods by rail or
ship or both out of the territory of India, that is to say, by employing the
machinery of export. A sale by export thus involves a series of integrated
activities commencing from the agreement of sale with a foreign buyer and
ending with the delivery of the goods to a common carrier for transport out of
the country by land or sea. Such a sale cannot be dissociated from the export
without which it cannot be effectuated, and the sale and resultant export form
parts of a single transaction. Of these two integrated activities, which
together constitute an export sale, whichever first occurs can well be regarded
as taking place in the course of the other. Assuming without deciding that the
property in the goods in the present cases passed to the foreign buyers and the
sales were thus completed within the State before the goods commenced their
journey as found by the Sales Tax Authorities, the sales must, nevertheless, be
regarded as having taken place in the course of the export and are, therefore,
exempt under Article 286(1)(b). That clause, indeed, assumes that the sale had
taken place within the limits of the State and exempts it if it took place in
the course of the export of the goods concerned.

            ………

 

     12. It was said that,
on the construction we have indicated above, a “sale in the course of export”
would become practically synonymous with “export”, and would reduce clause (b)
to a mere redundancy, because Article 246(1), read with Entry 83 of List I of
the Seventh Schedule, vests legislative power with respect to “duties of
customs including export duties” exclusively in Parliament, and that would be
sufficient to preclude State taxation of such transactions. We see no force in
this suggestion. It might well be argued, in the absence of a provision like
clause (b) prohibiting in terms the levy of tax on the sale or purchase of
goods where such sales and purchases are effected through the machinery of
export and import, that both the powers of taxation, though exclusively vested
in the Union and the States respectively, could be exercised in respect of the
same sale by export or purchase by import, the sales tax and the export duty
being regarded as essentially of a different character. A similar argument
induced the Federal Court to hold in Province of Madras v. Boddu Paidanna and
Sons [1942 FCR 90] that both central excise duty and provincial sales tax could
be validly imposed on the first sale of groundnut oil and cake by the
manufacturer or producer as “the two taxes are economically two separate and
distinct imposts”. Lest similar reasoning should lead to the imposition of such
cumulative burden on the export-import trade of this country which is of great
importance to the nation’s economy, the Constituent Assembly may well have
thought it necessary to exempt in terms sales by export and purchases by import
from sales tax by inserting Article 286(1)(b) in the Constitution.

 

     13. We are not much
impressed with the contention that no sale or purchase can be said to take
place “in the course of” export or import unless the property in the goods is
transferred to the buyer during their actual movement, as for instance, where
the shipping documents are indorsed and delivered within the State by the
seller to a local agent of the foreign buyer after the goods have been actually
shipped, or where such documents are cleared on payment, or on acceptance, by
the Indian buyer before the arrival of the goods within the State. This view,
which lays undue stress on the etymology of the word “course” and formulates a
mechanical test for the application of clause (b), places, in our opinion, too
narrow a construction upon that clause, in so far as it seeks to limit its
operation only to sales and purchases effected during the transit of the goods,
and would, if accepted, rob the exemption of much of its usefulness.

 

     14. We accordingly hold
that whatever else may or may not fall within Article 286(1)(b), sales and
purchases which themselves occasion the export or the import of the goods, as
the case may be, out of or into the territory of India come within the
exemption and that is enough to dispose of these appeals.

 

16. In our view, the above
passage does conclude that the sale and purchase in the course of import should
be widely construed to cover integrated activities. If that be so, it would
become crystal clear that activities covering actual imports and exports would
be taxed under the customs legislations and other activities relating to or in
the course would not suffer any tax under the earlier regime to soften the tax
impact on such transactions. If this proposition was accepted, then the entire
IGST mechanism should be restricted only to transactions that occur in the
course of import or export and not actual imports or exports themselves.

 

17. Now it becomes clear that actual imports are covered by customs
legislation and IGST Act can only cover the supply in the course of imports or
exports. Further, as import of goods is already covered under the customs
legislation, it cannot be termed as a supply under the CGST Act, 2017 itself
which definition applies to the IGST Act also. Having understood this, we may
have to look at whether the customs legislation can impose an integrated tax.

 

18. The expression
‘integrated tax’ has a specific connotation. It is defined by section 2(12) of
IGST Act as means the integrated goods and services tax levied under this
Act;

 

19. Proviso to section
5(1) states that the integrated tax on goods imported into India shall be levied
and collected in accordance with the provisions of section 3 of the Customs
Tariff Act, 1975
on the value as determined under the said Act at the point
when duties of customs are levied on the said goods u/s. 12 of the Customs Act,
1962.

 

20. An Act cannot create
a charge on a particular transaction under some other Act. IGST Act cannot
create a charge under Customs Act in respect of a taxable event. The main
provision of section 5(1) does not cover import [ie., there is no fiction
created in the main provision of section 5(1) that inter-State supplies include
imports]. The proviso to section 5(1) is misplaced. It cannot be read as
proviso to section 5(1). There is no provision similar to section 7(4) of IGST
Act so far as import of goods are concerned. A fiction should have been created
similar to section 7(4) of IGST Act so far as import of goods are concerned. So
howsoever one interprets Explanation to Article 269A(1) or Article 286, there
is no provision in IGST Act to create charge on imports. Therefore, the proviso
to Section 5(1) to the IGST Act is completely superfluous and redundant. It can
be saved only by stating that it was done ex abundanti cautela.

 

21. Section 3(7) of
Customs Tariff Act states that “any article which is imported into India
shall, in addition, be liable to integrated tax at such rate, not
exceeding forty per cent. as is leviable under section 5 of the Integrated
Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 on a like article on its supply in India, on
the value of the imported article as determined under sub-section (8).”

 

22. Section 3(7) of the
Customs Tariff Act is creating a charge of integrated tax on imports which is
not permitted, as the customs legislation does not define what is an integrated
tax. As stated earlier, integrated tax has specific connotation. It is a levy
under IGST Act. One might compare the language used in section 3(7) with that
used in sections 3(1) and 3(5) of the Customs Tariff Act [Sections 3(1) and
3(5) deal with additional customs duty]. Sections 3(1) and 3(5) read as under:

 

     3. (1) Any article which
is imported into India shall, in addition, be liable to a duty (hereafter in
this section referred to as the additional duty) equal
to
the excise duty for the time being leviable on a like article
if produced or manufactured in India and if such excise duty on a like article
is leviable at any percentage of its value, the additional duty to which the
imported article shall be so liable shall be calculated at that percentage of
the value of the imported article:

 

     (5) If the Central
Government is satisfied that it is necessary in the public interest to levy
on any imported article [whether on such article duty is leviable under
subsection ( 1) or, as the case may be, sub-section ( 3) or not] such
additional duty as would counter-balance

the sales tax, value added tax, local tax or any other charges for the time
being leviable on a like article on its sale, purchase or transportation in
India, it may, by notification in the Official Gazette, direct that such
imported article shall, in addition, be liable to an additional duty at a rate
not exceeding four per cent. of the value of the imported article as specified
in that notification.

 

23. A perusal of the
above would show that additional duty equivalent to excise duty and sales tax
is levied. Therefore, the nature of duty remained as customs duty. Only the
rate is equivalent to excise duty or the sales tax rate.

 

24. All along, whenever
any additional duty of customs equivalent to excise duty or special additional
duty equivalent to sales tax were levied on imported goods, the relevant
provisions were made in the Customs Tariff Act. It used the expression
“equivalent to”.

 

25. A perusal of section
3(7) would show that what is leviable u/s. 3(7) is not additional duty
equivalent to rate of integrated tax
. Section 3(7) stipulates levy of
integrated tax
on imports. Customs Tariff Act cannot levy integrated tax.
Integrated tax is levied under IGST Act which is a law made pursuant to Article
246A read with Article 269A. Article 269A does not empower levy of tax on
direct imports. Integrated tax which takes its power under Article 269A cannot
be levied on imports. So, can one counter this argument to say that the
terminology used should be ignored, as Parliament has power to make laws with
respect to imports as well as inter-State supplies?  

 

26. One cannot read the
words ‘integrated tax’ in section 3(7) of Customs Tariff Act to mean customs
duty. It is also interesting to note section 17 of IGST Act which deals with
apportionment of ‘integrated tax’.Section 17 states that:[relevant extract]

     17. (1) Out of the
integrated tax paid to the Central Government,––

     ……….

 

     (d) in respect of
import of goods or services or both by an unregistered person or by a
registered person paying tax under section 10 of the Central Goods and Services
Tax Act;

 

     (e) in respect of import
of goods or services or both where the registered person is not eligible for
input tax credit;

 

     (f) in respect of import
of goods or services or both made in a financial year by a registered person,
where he does not avail of the said credit within the specified period and thus
remains in the integrated tax account after expiry of the due date for
furnishing of annual return for such year in which the supply was received, the
amount of tax calculated at the rate equivalent to the central tax on similar
intra-State supply shall be apportioned to the Central Government.”

 

27. If integrated tax on
imports is to be read as customs duty, how can section 17 of IGST Act deal with
its apportionment.

 

28.        Section 2(62) of
CGST Act defines ‘input tax’ as under: [relevant extract]

 

     “(62) “input tax” in
relation to a registered person, means the central tax, State tax, integrated
tax or Union territory tax charged on any supply of goods or services or both
made to him and includes—

 

(a) the integrated goods and services tax charged on import
of goods;”

 

29.        Section 42 of CGST Act
reads as under:

 

     42. (1) The details of
every inward supply furnished by a registered person (hereafter in this section
referred to as the “recipient”) for a tax period shall, in such manner and
within such time as may be prescribed, be matched––

     (a) with the
corresponding details of outward supply furnished by the corresponding
registered person (hereafter in this section referred to as the “supplier”) in
his valid return for the same tax period or any preceding tax period;

     (b) with the integrated
goods and services tax paid under section 3 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 in
respect of goods imported by him
; and

 

     (c) for duplication of
claims of input tax credit.

 

30. If integrated tax in
section 3(7) of Customs Tariff Act were to be understood as customs duty,
section 2(62) and section 42 of CGST Act should not have been so worded. The
use of integrated tax in section 3(7) of Customs Tariff Act has been
consciously taken, which is vindicated from the language in section 17 of IGST
Act and sections 2(62) and 42 of IGST Act.

 

31. Taxable event of
import cannot suffer a levy under IGST Act. Customs Act alone can create charge
on imports. Import is a taxable event under the Customs Act. It is not a
taxable event under IGST Act. The same aspect [i.e., import] cannot be taxed
under two Acts. So howsoever one chooses to interpret Explanation to Article
269A(1) or Article 286, charge on imports cannot be created under IGST. Article
286, even prior to its amendment, did not empower levy of CST on imports. Imports
were not treated as part of inter-State trade or commerce. This is evident from
entry 41 and 42 of List I to Seventh Schedule. So, section 3(7) of Customs
Tariff Act and proviso to section 5(1) of IGST Act fail to create a valid charge of integrated tax on imports.

 

32. Rag-bag legislation
acknowledged by the Hon’ble SC in Ujagar Prints’s case 1989 (38) ELT 535 was vis-à-vis
entries in List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. It stated that
if one entry doesn’t empower Parliament to make law vis-à-vis a
particular levy, there is no prohibition on relying on the residual entry to
find the source for power to make law in respect of such levy. The Hon’ble SC
did state that Parliament has exclusive power to make laws in respect of those
matters which are not covered either by List II or List III. Would this
principle apply to harmonious interpretation of Article 246, 246A and 269A? If
one were to apply rag-bag legislation principle, one of the fall outs would be
that Parliament is empowered to make law, prescribing two levies in respect of
very same aspect [Factually, Parliament has prescribed only one levy;
Theoretically, it is empowered to prescribe two levies in respect of the same
aspect].  IGST Act has been enacted
pursuant to Article 246A read with Article 269A of the Constitution. Customs
Act has been enacted pursuant to Article 246. Article 269A does not empower levy
of GST on direct imports. Can the Customs Act which is enacted under Article
246 levy integrated tax [though integrated tax is a levy pursuant to Article
269A which doesn’t empower levy of integrated tax on direct imports] on
imports? The Hon’ble SC did not consider a situation where Parliament made
enactment pursuant to two different Articles of the Constitution. If Parliament
is said to be empowered to make a law in respect of a particular levy under
more than one Article, doesn’t it render one of the Articles otiose. Is
it not against the principles of harmonious construction?

  

33. Interestingly, if
one were to interpret that Explanation to Article 269A(1) and Article 286
empower levy on direct imports, not only 3(7) of Customs Tariff Act but even
the main levy on imports i.e., basic customs duty [i.e., section 12 of Customs
Act read with section 2 of Customs Tariff Act] would fail. This is because if
one were to interpret that Explanation to Article 269A(1) and Article 286
empower levy on direct imports, it means that direct imports are deemed to be
inter-State supplies. Levy on inter-State supplies are governed by IGST Act. So
the natural fall out is that direct imports which are deemed to be inter-State
supplies should be liable only to integrated tax and not customs duty.

 

34. It would also be
interesting to note that the recent clarification by the government stating
that customs duty would be levied only on actual imports but would include the
price charged in several high sea sale transactions for the purpose of customs
valuation shows that when actual imports do take place, it is only the customs
legislation which would be relevant.

 

35. Though we have made
passing references to high sea sales while talking about section 7(2) of the
IGST Act at few places in this article, we wish to opine that there is no valid
levy of IGST on high sea sales. The purpose of this article is not to examine
the levy of IGST on high sea sales. Therefore, without going into details, we
would like to mention that the intention of legislators to levy IGST on high
sea sales is not achieved by the manner in which section 7(2) of the IGST Act
is worded. Though the Explanation to Article 269A(1) and Article 286(1)(b) is
intended to empower levy of IGST on high sea sales, the said intention is not
carried out by the legislators. This is because the language used in section
7(2) should have been similar to that in the section 5(2) of CST Act or at the
least, the language similar to Explanation below Article 269A(1) or Article
286(1)(b) should have been replicated in section 7(2). Section 7(2) doesn’t use
the expression “in the course of”. The levy of IGST, therefore, fails
even in case of high sea sales.

 

Though Article 286 has been amended, there
is no provision similar to section 5(2) of CST Act in IGST Act. This argument
would give additional support to the view that high sea sales are not liable to
IGST.

 

Conclusion

The conclusions reached could be summarised as under:

 

a.  Levy of customs duty on
actual imports can arise only under the Customs Act, 1962.

 

b.  Levy of integrated tax on
supplies in the course of import or export excluding actual imports/exports can
be made under the IGST Act, 2017, but the present wordings fall short of what
is used in the Constitution and therefore, the same does not seem to extend to
transactions such as on high sea sales.

 

c.  The present levy u/s. 3(7)
of the Customs Tariff Act which states that there shall be levied an integrated
tax is clearly beyond the legislation itself, as the customs legislation can
only levy a customs duty equivalent to the integrated tax and not an integrated
tax per se. This would now need legislative amendments. _

Loan Or Advance To Specified ‘Concern’ By Closely Held Company Which Is Deemed As Dividend U/S. 2 (22) (E) – Whether Can Be Assessed In The Hands Of The ‘Concern’? – Part II

(Continued
from the last issue)

 

2.6     As stated in para 1.4
of Part I of this write-up, under the New Provisions, loan given to two
categories of persons are covered u/s. 2(22) (e) viz. i) certain shareholders
(first limb of the provisions) and ii) the ‘concern’ in which such shareholder
has substantial interest (second limb of the provisions). As mentioned in para
1.5 of Part I of this write-up, in cases where the requisite conditions of the
second limb of the New Provisions are satisfied, the issue is under debate
that, in such cases where the loan is given to a ‘concern’, whether the amount
of loan is taxable as deemed dividend in the hands of the shareholder or the
‘concern’ which has received the amount of the loan. As also mentioned in that
para, the judicial precedents [including the Special Bench in Bhaumik Colour’s
case reported in (2009) 18 DTR 451] largely, directly or indirectly, showed
that, in such cases, deemed dividend should be taxed in the hands of the
shareholder and on the other hand, in CBDT circular [No. 495 dtd. 22/9/1987], a
view is taken that the same should be taxed in the hands of the ‘concern’. As
further mentioned in para 2.5       read
with para 2.4 of Part I of this write-up, the Delhi High Court decided this
issue in favour of the assessee company on the short ground that the deemed
dividend can not be assessed in the hands of the assessee company which was not
a shareholder of the lending company [i.e. BPOM] as dividend can be assessed
only in the hands of the shareholder of the lending company and can not be
assessed in the hands of a non-shareholder. For this, the Delhi High Court
merely relied on its judgement in the case of Ankitech P. Ltd. [ITA No
462/2009] and passed a short order to this effect (Ref: para 2.4 of Part I of this
write-up). Therefore, it is necessary to analyse, that judgement of the Delhi
High Court also, more so as that has been ultimately approved by the Apex
Court.

 

         CIT vs.
Ankitech[P]Ltd[(2012)40ITR14(Del)-ITA No. 462/2009]
& connected Appeals

 

3.1     In the above, the High Court dealt with and simultaneously
disposed of number of appeals relating to different assessees by a common order
by taking the facts of the case of Ankitech P. Ltd. [ITAT No.462/2009] as the
base.

 

3.2     In the above case, the brief facts were that the assessee company
had received advances of Rs. 6,32,72,265 by way of a book entry from M/s
Jackson Generator (P) Ltd. [JGPL]. There was sufficient accumulated profit with
JGPL to cover this amount. So far as the shareholding pattern of the two
companies is concerned, the undisputed facts revealed that the same
shareholders (Guptas) were holding (it seems beneficially) more than 10% of
equity shares carrying voting power in JGPL and the same shareholders were also
holding (it seems beneficially) equity shares carrying voting power in the
assessee company much more than 20% and accordingly, were having substantial
interest therein. As such, the facts would reveal that the conditions of the
second limb of the New Provisions were satisfied. It is also worth noting that
the assessee company itself was neither a registered shareholder nor the
beneficial shareholder in JGPL(i.e. lending company). On these facts, the
Assessing Officer (AO), while completing the assessment for the Asst. Year. 2003-04,
assessed the above referred amount of advances as deemed dividend in the hands
of the assessing company. While doing so, the AO rejected the specific
contention raised by the assessee company that since the assessee company is
not a shareholder in JGPL, the provisions of section 2(22) (e) will not be
attracted as one of the essential conditions for taxing deemed dividend u/s.
2(22) (e) was that such income is to be assessed in the hands of the
shareholder. The view of AO was confirmed by the Commissioner of Income-tax
(Appeals). However, the Tribunal deleted the addition by taking a view that
though the amount received by the assessing company by way of book entry is
deemed dividend u/s. 2(22)(e), the same cannot be assessed in the hands of the
assessee company as it was not a shareholder in JGPL and a dividend cannot be
paid to a non-shareholder.

 

        The Tribunal also took the view that it would
have to be taxed, if at all, in the hands of the shareholders who have
substantial interest in the assessee company and also holding not less than 10%
shares carrying voting power in the lending company. For this, it appears that
the Tribunal had relied on the Special Bench decision in Bhaumik Colour’s case
(supra).

 

3.3     When the issue came-up
before the High Court at the instance of the Revenue with four questions
raised, the Court, in this context, felt that real question is one and stated
as under [pg 16]:

 

          “Though as many as
four questions are framed, it is with singular viz., whether the assessee who
was not the shareholders of M/S. Jackson Generators (P) Ltd. (JGPL) could be
treated as covered by the definition of “dividend“ as contained in section
2(22)(e) of the Income-tax Act (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”).”

  

 3.3.1 To decide the issue,
the Court referred to the relevant provisions of section  2(22) (e) along with the share holding
pattern of both the companies and stated that the payment of advance given by
JGPL to the assessee company (‘concern’) would be treated as deemed dividend u/s.
2(22)(e). With these undisputed facts, the Court, in the context of the issue
on hand, stated as under [pg 19]:

 

          “…….. The dispute
which has arisen, in the scenario is to whether this is to be treated as
dividend income in the form of dividend advance of the shareholders or advance
of the said concern,(i.e. the assessees herein). Whereas the Department has
taken it as income at the hands of the assessee, as per the assessee it cannot
be treated as dividend income to their account. The Tribunal has accepted this
plea of the assessee holding that such dividend income is to be taxed at the
hands of the shareholders.” 

 

3.3.2 The Court then referred to the historical background of the
provisions from 1922 Act to the New Provisions narrated by the Special Bench in
Bhaumik Colour’s case (supra) and observed as under [pg 21]:

 

          “It is clear from the
above that under the 1922 Act, two categories of payments were considered as
dividend viz., (a) any payment by way of advance or loan to a shareholder was
considered as dividend paid to shareholder; or (b) any payment by any such
company on behalf of or for the individual benefit of a shareholder was
considered as dividend. In the 1961 Act, the very same two categories of
payments were considered as dividend but an additional condition that payment
should be to a shareholder being a person who is the beneficial owner of shares
and who has a substantial interest in the company, viz., shareholding which
carries not less than twenty per cent. of voting power, was introduced, By the
1987 amendment with effect from April 1, 1988, the condition that payment
should be to a shareholder who is the beneficial owner of shares (not being
shares entitled to a fixed rate of dividend whether with or without a right to
participate in profits) holding not less than ten per cent. of the voting power
was substituted. Thus, the percentage of voting power was reduced from twenty
per cent. to ten per cent. By the very same amendment, a new category of
payment was also considered as dividend, viz., payment to any concern in which
such shareholder is a member or a partner and in which he has a substantial interest.
Substantial interest has been defined to mean holding shares carrying 20 per
cent. of voting power.”

 

3.3.3  After referring to the
above referred historical background, the Court noted that the controversy in
the present case refers to the second limb of the New Provisions. The Court
then stated that a Special Bench in Bhaumik Colour’s case has analysed the New
provisions and spelt out the conditions [Ref. para 1.4.1. of Part I of this
write-up] which are required to be satisfied for attracting this category of
the New Provisions. These include the view that the expression ‘such
shareholder’ found in the second limb of the New Provisions refers to
registered shareholder [for this, basically reliance was placed on Apex Court’s
judgement in the case of C. P. Sarathy Mudaliar (supra)] and the
beneficial holder of the shareholding carrying 10% voting power. In this
context, the Court also referred to the relevant part of the order of the
Special Bench and noted that the Special Bench held that the intention behind
this provision is to tax dividend in the hands of the shareholders. The Court
then also referred to the judgements of the Bombay High Court in the case of
Universal Medicare (P) Ltd [(2010)324 ITR 263] and Rajasthan High Court in the
case of Hotel Hilltop [(2009) 313 ITR 116] in which also similar view was
taken.

 

 3.4 The Court then noted that
despite the above referred judgements of the High Courts of Bombay and
Rajasthan, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Revenue (Ms. Bansal)
made a frantic afford to persuade the Court to take a contrary view. Her
endeavour was to demonstrate on first principle that by this deeming provision
fictionally the ‘concern’ which receives the amount would be treated as
shareholder for the purpose of this provision and the same should be treated as
dividend in the hands of the recipient (i.e. ‘concern’). In this regard, her
contention was that under the New provisions, deeming fiction is specifically
created to tax the amount of such loan given to a ‘concern’ as deemed dividend
and when this legal fiction is created, it was to be taken to its logical
conclusion and as such, the ‘concern’ which had received the amount should be
taxed. For this, she placed reliance on certain judgements including of the Apex
Court dealing with the effects of creation of a legal fiction. According to
her, this is the effect of the second limb of the New Provisions read with Explanation 3. She also relied on the
CBDT Circular No. 495 dtd 22/9/1987 in which such a view is taken (Ref. para
2.6 above)

 

3.4.1  The Court then dealt
with the contentions of the learned counsel for the Revenue and pointed out
that we have already referred to the relevant provisions of section 2(22)(e)
and requisite conditions for invoking the same as well as the historical
background of section 2(22)(e). Considering the intention behind enacting these
provisions, the Court stated as under [pg 35]:

 

          “…… The intention behind the provisions of section 2(22)(e)
of the Act is to tax dividend in the hands of shareholders. The deeming
provisions as it applies to the case of loans or advances by a company to a
concern in which its shareholder has substantial interest, is based on the
presumption that the loans or advances would ultimately be made available to
the shareholders of the company giving the loan or advance. “

 

3.4.2 The Court then proceeded
further to deal with the contention with regard to creation of deeming fiction
and its effects and stated as under [pg 35]:

 

          “Further, it is an
admitted case that under the normal circumstances, such a loan or advance given
to the shareholders or to a concern, would not qualify as dividend. It has been
made so by a legal fiction created u/s. 2(22)(e) of the Act. We have to keep in
mind that this legal provision relates to “dividend”. Thus, by a deeming
provision, it is the definition of dividend which is enlarged. Legal fiction
does not extend to “shareholder”. When we keep in mind this aspect, the
conclusion would be obvious, viz., loan or advance given under the conditions
specified u/s. 2(22) (e) of the Act would also be treated as dividend. The
fiction has to stop here and is not to be extended further for broadening the
concept of shareholders by way of legal fiction. It is common case that any
company is supposed to distribute the profits in the form of dividend to its
shareholders/members and such dividend cannot be given to non members. The
second category specified u/s. 2(22) (e) of the Act, viz., a concern (like the
assessee herein), which is given the loan or advance is admittedly not a
shareholder/member of the payer company. Therefore, under no circumstances, it
could be treated as shareholder/member receiving divided. If the intention of
the Legislature was to tax such loan or advance as deemed dividend at the hands
of “deeming shareholder”, then the Legislature would have inserted a deeming
provision in respect of shareholder as well, that has not happened. Most of the
arguments of the learned counsel for the Revenue would stand answered, once we
look into the matter from this perspective.”

 

3.4.3 Finally, rejecting the argument with regard to creation of
deeming fiction and its logical effect as contented by the learned counsel for
the Revenue, the Court stated as under [pg 36]:

 

          “No doubt, the legal
fiction/deemed provision created by the Legislature has to be taken to “logical
conclusion” as held in Andaleeb Sehgal [2010] 173 DLT 296 (Delhi) [FB].
The revenue wants the deeming provision to be extended which is illogical and
the attempt is to create a real legal fiction, which is not created by the
Legislature. We say at the cost of repetition that the definition of
shareholder is not enlarged by any fiction.”

 

3.4.4 With regard to the view
expressed in the CBDT Circular, the Court stated that it is inclined to agree
with the observations of the Special Bench in Bhaumik Colour’s case (supra)
that the same is not binding on the courts. In this regard, the Court further
observed as under [pg 36]:

 

          “…..Once it is found that such loan or advance cannot be
treated as deemed dividend at the hands of such a concern which is not a
shareholder, and that, according to us, is the correct legal position, such a
circular would be of no avail. ”

 

3.5    Having taken a view
that such deemed dividend cannot be assessed in the hands of the assessee
company which is not the shareholder of JGPL, the Court further concluded as
under [pg 36]:

 

          “Before we part with,
some comments are to be necessarily made by us. As pointed out above, it is not
in dispute that the conditions stipulated in section 2(22)(e) of the Act
treating the loan and advance as deemed dividend are established in these cases
Therefore, it would always be open to the Revenue to take corrective measure by
treating this dividend income at the hands of the shareholders and tax them
accordingly. As otherwise, it would amount to escapement of income at the hands
of those shareholders.”

 

3.6         In the above
judgement, the Court took the view that once the requisite conditions of the
second limb of the New Provisions are satisfied, the amount of loan can be
assessed as deemed dividend in the hands of the shareholder only and not in the
hands of a ‘concern’ (non-shareholder). On this basis, the Court also
simultaneously disposed of all other connected appeals. However, in addition to
this, the Court also passed further orders in respect of four other appeals,
which are based on specific facts of these cases with which we are not
concerned in this write-up. These additional four orders are in the cases of
Timeless Fashions Pvt Ltd. [ITA No. 1588 of 2010], Nandlala Securities Pvt.
Ltd. [ITA No. 211 of 2010], Roxy Investment [ITA No. 2014 of 2010] and Indian
Technocraft Ltd. [ITA No. 352 of 2011].

 

         CIT vs. Madhur Housing
and Development Company
(Appeal No. 3961 of 2013-
SC)

 

4.1     As mentioned in para 2.6 above, in the above case, the Delhi High
Court decided the issue of taxation of deemed dividend in the hands of the
assessee company [i.e. ‘concern’] on the short ground that the deemed dividend
cannot be assessed in its hands, as it was not a shareholder of the lending
company (i.e. BPOM) and for that purpose, the Court merely followed its earlier
decision in the case of Ankitech (P) Ltd. [ITA No 462/2009] (supra).

 

4.2   The above judgement of
the Delhi High Court along with number of appeals relating to different
assessees invoking similar issue came-up before the Apex Court and the Apex
Court disposed of all of them, by a common order, by referring to the judgement
and the order of the Delhi High Court in the above case (i.e. Madhur Housing’s
case) by passing the following order: 

 

          “The impugned
judgement and order dated 11.05.2011 has relied upon a judgement of the same
date by a Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi in ITA No. 462 of 2009.
Having perused the judgement and having heard arguments, we are of the view
that the judgement is a detailed judgment going into section 2(22)(e) of the
Income-tax Act which arises at the correct construction of the said Section. We
do not wish to add anything to the judgment except to say that we agree
therewith.

 

         These appeals are
disposed of accordingly. “

 

4.3   
From the above, it would appear that the Apex Court took note of the
fact that the judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of Ankitech (P) Ltd.
(supra) is a detailed judgement considering this aspect of the
provisions of section 2(22)(e) of the Act and approved the same. It is worth
noting that the Apex Court has approved the judgement of the Delhi High Court
only in the case of Ankitech (P) Ltd. [ITA No 462/2009] which is analysed in
para 3 above. For this purpose, it seems that the Apex Court has not considered
separate orders simultaneously passed by the Delhi High Court in four other
connected appeals [Ref. para 3.6 above].

 

Conclusion

 

5.1    The above judgement of
the Division Bench of the Apex Court directly dealt with and decided the issue
referred to in para 2.6 above [read with para 1.5 of Part I of this write-up]
that in a case where the conditions for invoking the second limb of the New
Provisions of section  2(22) (e) are
satisfied, the amount of loan given to a ‘concern’, which is treated as deemed
dividend, should be assessed only in the hands of the common shareholder with
requisite shareholding in the lending company and who is also having
substantial interest in the ‘concern’ and not in the hands of the ‘concern’
receiving the loan. As such, the issue referred to in para 2.6 above read with
para 1.5 of part I of this write-up now could be treated as settled. Based on
this, the judicial precedents supporting this view, referred to in para 1.5 of
Part I of this write-up, could also be treated as impliedly approved. In this
respect, based on this, the view expressed in the CBDT Circular [No. 495 dtd.
22/9/1987] referred to in para 2.6 above could be treated as incorrect position
in law.

 

5.1.1  In the above case, the
Apex Court has also specifically considered the effect of a legal fiction
created in section 2(22)(e) and its logical effect. In this context, the Court
has emphatically taken a view that the legal fiction created in   section 2(22)(e) only expands the meaning of
the expression ‘dividend’ and it does not, in anyway, enlarge the meaning of
the expression ‘shareholder’ as contemplated in the said provisions. In fact,
this and the general principles that dividend can be paid by the company only
to its shareholders/members and it cannot be given to non-shareholders/members
are the main basis of conclusion arrived by the Apex Court in the above case.

 

5.2     Interestingly, as
mentioned in para 1.6 of part I of this write-up, the Division Bench of the
Apex Court in the case of Gopal and Sons HUF [ (2017) 391 ITR 1] also had an
occasion to indirectly deal with similar issue of the type referred to in para
2.6 above [read with para 1.5 of part I of this write-up] in the context of a
case of a loan given by closely held company to an HUF, which was the
beneficial owner of the shares with requisite shareholding in the lending
company. In that case, there was some debate as to whether the HUF itself was a
registered shareholder or its Karta was the registered shareholder of the
lending company. On these facts, the following question was raised before the
Apex Court:

 

          “Whether in view of the settled principle that
HUF cannot be a registered shareholder in a company and hence, could not have
been both registered and beneficial shareholder, loan/ advances received by HUF
could be deemed as dividend within the meaning of section 2(22)(e) of the
Income-tax Act, 1961 especially in view of the term “concern” as defined in the
Section itself?”

 

5.2.1  Under the above
circumstances, in that case, the Apex Court, on peculiar facts of the case,
took the view that the amount of loan in question should be treated as deemed
dividend under the second limb of the New Provisions and it should be taxable
as such in the hands of the HUF, as the Karta of the HUF is having undisputedly
substantial interest in the HUF. The Court also further concluded that even if
it is presumed that HUF itself is not a registered shareholder of the lending
company, as per the provisions of section 2(22)(e), once the payment is
received by the HUF (which was admittedly beneficial owner of the shares) and
the registered shareholder of the lending company [it’s Karta] is a member of
the said HUF with substantial interest, the payment made to the HUF constitutes
deemed dividend u/s. 2(22) (e) and taxable as such in the hands of HUF.
According to the Court, that is the effect of Explanation 3 to the said
section. According to the Court, the judgment of C.P. Sarathy Mudaliar (supra)
will have no application as that was delivered u/s. 2(6A)(e) of the 1922 Act,
wherein     there was no provision like
Explanation 3. Effectively, the Court concluded that, in view of the
Explanation 3 to section 2(22)(e), the amount of loan constitutes deemed
dividend under the second limb of the New Provisions of section 2(22)(e) in the
hands of the HUF, even if one presumes that HUF itself is not a registered
shareholder of the lending company.

 

5.2.2  From the above, it
would appear that in Gopal and Sons HUF’s case (supra), the Apex Court
impliedly decided the issue referred to in para 2.6 above read with para 1.5 of
Part I of this write-up, by taking a view that the deemed dividend under the
second limb of the New Provisions is taxable in the hands of the ‘concern’
(i.e. HUF). This gives support to the opinion expressed in CBDT circular
referred to in that para. This judgement has been analysed by us in this column
in April and May, 2017 issues of this journal. 

 

5.3    Interestingly, in the above judgement of the Apex Court in the case
of Madhur Housing and Development Company, the Apex Court’s  judgement in Gopal and Sons HUF’s case (supra)
has not been referred to or considered. Apex Court in the above case referred
to the judgement of the Delhi High Court in the case of Ankitech (P) Ltd. (Ref.
para 4.2 above) and approved the same and the judgement of the Apex Court in
the case of Gopal and Sons HUF(supra), which is the recent one, was not
available before the Delhi High Court in that case.

 

5.3.1  It is also worth noting
that in the case of Gopal and Sons HUF (supra), the facts were peculiar
and it was also noted that though the share certificates were issued in the
name of the Karta of the HUF but in the annual returns of the company filed
with the ROC, HUF was also shown as registered shareholder. Whether this
factual position could be regarded as relevant in the context of the issue on
hand (i.e. to determine the taxable person of deemed dividend) to distinguish
the effect of Gopal and Sons HUF’s case (supra) may be a matter of
consideration. However, this would be an uphill task in view of the conclusion
of the Apex court in the case of Gopal and Sons HUF (supra) referred to
in para 3.9 read with para 3.8 of part II of the write-up on that judgement
appeared in May, 2017 issue of this journal.

 

5.4          In
view of the above, an interesting issue is likely to come-up for consideration
as to which judgement of the Apex Court, between the two of the above, would be
relevant, for the purpose of determining the taxable person under the second limb
of the New Provisions in cases where the loan is given to a ‘concern’ and the
other conditions for treating such a loan as deemed dividend under these
provisions are satisfied.
_