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SICA vs. SARFAESI – And the Winner Is…..

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Introduction
The Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (“SARFAESI”) is an Act meant to protect the interests of secured creditors by giving them a mechanism by which they can enforce their secured interests without resorting to any Courts or Debt Recovery Tribunals. Thus, it is a creditor protection Act. On the other hand, the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (“SICA”) is an Act to protect and revive companies suffering from industrial sickness. Thus, it is a debtor protection Act.

A very interesting question arises here – should these two special Acts have a head-on collision, which one would prevail? This was the issue which the Supreme Court was faced with in M/s. Madras Petrochem Ltd vs. BIFR, Civil Appeal Nos.614-615/2016, (Order dated 29th January 2016). The Apex Court analysed the interplay between the SARFAE SI and the SICA.

At a time when the Indian banking system is creaking under the weight of bad loans/NPAs and we are witnessing several high-profile loan default cases, this decision has several far reaching ramifications. According to press reports, over Rs. 1.14 lakh crore of bad loans were written off by public sector banks alone in 2012-15!

Overview of the SARFAESI
According to the SARFAE SI, a secured creditor can enforce any security interest created in its favour. This can be done without the intervention of any Court or Tribunal. If the borrower fails to repay the liabilities then the creditor can adopt one or more of the measures enshrined under this Act which includes, taking possession of or taking over the management of the secured assets of the borrower including the right to transfer by way of lease, assignment or sale for realising the secured asset; appointing a manager to manage the secured assets taken over by the secured creditor; requiring any person who has acquired any of the secured assets from the borrower and who has to pay any money to the borrower, to pay such amount to the secured creditor, etc. Details of the procedures have been laid down for taking over possession of and selling of movable/ immovable assetsby the secured creditor.

Section 37 of this Act states that the provisions of the Act would be in addition to and would not override the Companies Act, the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act and the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act. Further, section 35 of this Act provides that the provisions of the SARFAE SI would have effect over any other inconsistent law.

Overview of the SICA
Under the SICA, any company whose networth has been fully eroded by its losses must make a reference to the Board of Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR). If the BIFR decides to admit the reference, then an inquiry will be made by the BIFR and efforts will be made to revive the company or if these efforts fail or are not possible, then the BIFR would order winding-up. However, no reference can be made to the BIFR where financial assets, i.e., any loan given to the sick company has been acquired by a securitisation company under the SARFAE SI. Further, if a reference is pending before the BIFR, then it would abate if 3/4th of the secured creditors decide to take recourse to the SARFAE SI to enforce their secured interest.

One of the most relevant provisions of the SICA is section 22 which provides that where any reference is made to the BIFR and it is admitted then no suit/proceedings will lie against the sick company for recovery of money or for the enforcement of any security against the sick company except with the consent of the BIFR. Thus, section 22 provides a shield to sick companies against any recovery proceedings. Accordingly, the issue before the Supreme Court in the current case was whether section 22 would bar any recovery measures by banks / FIs under the SARFAESI Act?

DRT Act
Yet another legislation to assist banks and financial institutions to deal with the menace of bad loans is the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (DRT Act) which allows banks/FIs to approach specially constituted Debt Recovery Tribunals for expeditious adjudication and recovery of debts. The Supreme Court in Mardia Chemicals Ltd. vs. Union of India (2004) 4 SCC 311 held that the SARFAE SI was enacted because the DRT Act had failed to achieve its desired results.

Contours of the 3 Statutes
The Supreme Court considered the genesis of these three legislations. It held that each of these dealt with different aspects of recovery of debts due to banks and financial institutions. Two of them referred to the creditors’ interests and how best to deal with recovery of outstanding loans and advances made by them, whereas the SICA dealt with certain debtors which were sick industrial companies and whether such debtors having become sick, were to be rehabilitated.

Interplay between SICA and Ot her Acts
The Supreme Court analysed the SICA’s relationship visa- vis other statutes. The decided cases on this issue were as follows:

(a) The SICA prevailed over the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 since both were special statutes dealing with sickness/recovery of debts and containing non-obstante clauses, but SICA was the later Act– Maharashtra Tubes Ltd vs. State Industrial and Investment (1993) 2 SCC 144.

(b) The SICA prevailed over the Interest on Delayed Payments to Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act, 1993 by virtue of an amendment in 1994 to SICA since the amendment was later than the 1993 Act – Jay Engineering Works vs. Industry Facilitation Council (2006) 8 SCC 677.

(c) The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 which contained a non-obstante clause was subordinate to SICA because the Arbitration Act’s non-obstante clause had a limited application to the extent of judicial intervention in arbitration proceedings – Morgan Securities and Credit P Ltd vs. Modi Rubber Ltd (2006) 12 SCC 642.

(d) The Companies Act being a general Act would yield to the SICA being a special Act – Tata Motors Ltd vs. Pharmaceutical Products of India Ltd (2008) 7 SCC 619. The same was the verdict in the case of Raheja Universal Ltd vs. NRC Ltd (2012) 4 SCC 148 which held that the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 being a general law was subordinate to the SICA which was a special law.

(e) The DRT Act and the SICA are both special laws – one to provide measures for restoration of sick companies and the other to provide for speedy recovery of debts of banks. However, with specific reference to sick companies, the SICA is a special law while it is a general law when it came to recovery of debts. In this respect, DRT was a special law. The DRT Act was also later in time than the SICA. However, since the DRT Act contained a specific provision in s.34(2) which provided that it would be in addition to and not in derogation of the SICA, it was held that the SICA would prevail over DRT – KSL & Industries Ltd vs. Arihant Threads Ltd (2015) 1 SCC 166.

SC’s Observations
The Supreme Court observed that section 37 of the SARFAE SI expressly provided that it would not be in derogation but in addition to 4 Acts ~ the Companies Act, the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act and the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act. The SICA was not one of these 4 Acts. Hence, the Legislature was conscious of the fact that SARFAE SI would not be in addition to the SICA and could in fact, override it. This proposition was strengthened by the fact that section 41 of the SARFAESI amended the SICA but section 37 excluded the SICA. While the DRT Act was expressly mentioned u/s. 27, the SICA was not. Therefore, the SARFAESI must be given precedence over the SICA.

Further, section37 contained the words “or any other law for the time being in force” and section 35 contained that the provisions of the SARFAE SI would override any other inconsistent law. The Supreme Court applied the harmonious construction rule and held that section 35 was subject to the 4 laws expressly carved out in section 37. Thus, as respects these 4 laws, the SARFAESI would not override them. Moreover, the words “or any other law for the time being in force” contained in section 37, when viewed in connection with the 4 securities’ market laws, would only be restricted to other laws having relation to the securities market. Even on this count, the SICA would not be included u/s. 37 since it is not a special law dealing with the securities market.

It also observed that the Companies Amendment Act, 2002 as well as the Companies Act, 2013 incorporated the provisions of the SICA by providing for a reference to be made to the National Company Law Tribunal instead of the BIFR. Neither of these have been notified but interestingly, none of these Acts contain a provision similar to section 22 of the SICA. Thus, going forward, creditors would be able to initiate recovery proceedings even when reference is pending before the Tribunal. The modified laws lean in favour of creditors being able to realise their debts outside of the court process. It analysed statistics of debt recovery which showed that of the total bad loans recovered in 2011-12, over 70% was under the SARFAESI Act and only 28% was under the DRT Act. This according to the Court, showed the efficacy of the SARFAESI Act. Hence, it concluded that it would be loathe to give an interpretation which would thwart the recovery process under the SARFAE SI, which alone seems to have worked at least to some extent. Accordingly, it held that section 22 of the SICA would have to yield way to the recovery proceedings taken by banks/FIs under the SARFAE SI and the SICA would not offer a shield to the debtor company.

The SARFAESI Act is a complete code in itself and the earlier judgments rendered under the DRT Act cannot apply to it. Further, the incorporation of certain provisions of the Companies Act in the SARFAE SI Act shows that even the Companies Act is harmonised with it – Pegasus Asset Reconstruction P Ltd vs. M/s. Haryana Concast Ltd, Civil Appeal 3646/2011 (SC).

There are many situations in which the bar u/s. 22 of the SICA would not apply, for instance a rent act eviction petition on the ground of non-payment of rent. Such eviction petitions have been held not to be suits for recovery of money – Gujarat Steel Tube Co. Ltd. vs. Virchandbhai B. Shah, (1999) 8 SCC 11. In Kailash Nath Agarwal vs. Pradeshiya Industrial & Investment Corpn. of U.P. Ltd., (2003) 4 SCC 305, the U.P. Act under which recovery proceedings initiated against guarantors at a post-decree stage were held to be outside the purview of section 22.

Recovery Matrix
The Supreme Court laid down the recovery matrix for banks/other creditors in case of a sick company as follows: (a) In all cases where unsecured creditors of a sick company are involved, the SICA would override all the recovery proceedings, including under the DRT Act.

(b) Where secured creditors of a sick company are involved, the SICA would give way to the recovery proceedings, if any, initiated by the banks / FIs under the SARFAE SI. In this event, the recovery proceedings would be as under:

(i) If there is more than one secured creditor, then 60% of the secured creditors must agree to enforce their security under the SARFAE SI. In such a case, the SICA proceedings would abate.

(ii) If 60% consent is not achieved, then the bar on legal provisions u/s.22 of the SICA would apply.

(c) If instead of taking recourse under the SARFAE SI, secured creditors decide to approach the DRT under the DRT Act, then the shelter under the SICA would continue to be available to the sick company since the Supreme Court has held that the SICA is superior to the DRT Act.

Conclusion
This is a path-breaking judgment as far as banks are concerned. There are numerous instances of sick companies taking shelter under the SICA to prevent loan recoveries by banks and FIs. This decision should act as a booster shot to the floundering banking sector. At a time when the RBI is goading the banks to fasten the recovery process, this should encourage banks and asset reconstruction companies to monetise all NPAs under the SARFAE SI. It is interesting to note that in the decision under discussion, the company was referred to the BIFR in December 1989 while the Supreme Court’s decision permitting sale came in January 2016, a time gap of 27 years! Is it not surprising that the Indian banking system is mired with bad loans?

Numerous attempts to repeal the SICA have failed with this Act yet ruling the roost. Recently, the Finance Minister blamed the slow and complex legal system plagued with delays for the bad loan mess. He also mentioned that India desperately needed a comprehensive bankruptcy and insolvency code. Till the time something urgently is done on this front, this judgment would provide some solace to the banks.

Vakalatnama – An Advocate who does not have Vakalatnama in his favour cannot concede claim or confess judgement affecting rights of party.

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Manuel Sons Financial Enterprises (P) Ltd. vs. Ramakrishnan and Ors. AIR 2016 Ker. 47.

An important and an interesting legal question arose before the Kerala High court about the authority of a counsel, who does not hold a vakalat for the party, to make an endorsement on the plaint that the party-defendant has no objection in decreeing the suit as prayed for.

In this case while the suit for redemption of mortgage was pending, one advocate by name Sri Mahadevan endorsed on the reverse of the plaint, said to be on behalf of the defendant company, that it had no objection in decreeing the suit. On the basis of this endorsement, learned trial Judge passed a decree in the suit as prayed for on 29.06.2006. Later on, the said decree was challenged by the defendant.

The High Court held that from the records of the trial court it was found that the Managing Director of the defendant company had authorised Advocate Sri Unnikrishnan by executing a vakalat to appear and act on behalf of the company. Advocate Sri. Mahadevan’s name, who made the endorsement on the reverse of the plaint on 27.06.2006 agreeing to decree the suit, was not seen mentioned in the said vakalat. Further, there was no reason brought out from the records to hold that the counsel who filed a vakalat for the defendant company had authorised another counsel to plead on his behalf for the party. Even if one assumes so, such counsel gets no authority to confess judgment against the interest of the party for whom he was only authorised to plead. In other words, an advocate cannot, unless he has filed in the court a memorandum of appearance (vakalat) prescribed by the Rules, concede the claim or confess judgment affecting the rights of a party as it exceeds the authority. The power to “plead” would include within its scope and ambit, the right to examine witnesses, seek adjournments, address arguments, etc. But such a pleader however cannot have the power to compromise a case or withdraw a case or to do any other act which may have the effect of compromising the interest of the client. No court shall accept or act on such a compromise or confession or admission without verifying whether the advocate doing so had been authorised by the party by executing a vakalatnama. A decree passed in a case on the basis of an endorsement by an advocate, who had no vakalat in the case, cannot be said to be a consent decree.

Tenants – tenants covered by the Rent Control Act cannot be dispossessed in an action initiated by the bank against the landlord debtor under the SARFAESI Act. [SARFAESI Act, 2002, Section 14 ]

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Vishal N. Kalsaria vs. Bank of India and Others. AIR 2016 SC 530

The landlords had approached the Bank of India for a financial loan, which was granted against equitable mortgage of several properties belonging to them, including the property in which the Appellant before the Apex Court was a tenant. As the landlords failed to pay the dues within the stipulated time in terms of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (the SARFAE SI Act), their account became a non-performing asset. Consequently, the Bank filed an application before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Mumbai, u/s. 14 of the SARFAE SI Act for seeking possession of the mortgaged properties which were in actual possession of the Appellant. The Appellant then filed an application as an intervenor to stay the execution of the order passed by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. The learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate vide order dated 29.11.2014 dismissed the application filed by the Appellant. The matter ultimately reached the Apex court.

The broad point which required consideration was whether a protected tenant under the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 (Rent Control Act) can be treated as a lessee and whether the provisions of the SARFAE SI Act will override the provisions of the Rent Control Act.

The Apex court also laid down the law where the tenancy is not registered. The Apex court held that the provisions of the SARFAE SI Act cannot be used to override the provisions of the Rent Control Act. Once tenancy is created, a tenant can be evicted only after following the due process of law, as prescribed under the provisions of the Rent Control Act.

The Apex Court further held that according to section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 a monthly tenancy shall be deemed to be a tenancy from month to month and must be registered if it is reduced into writing. The Transfer of Property Act, however, remains silent on the position of law in cases where the agreement is not reduced into writing. If the two parties are executing their rights and liabilities in the nature of a landlord – tenant relationship and if regular rent is being paid and accepted, then the mere factum of non-registration of deed will not make the lease itself a nugatory. Further, in terms of section 55(2) of the Rent Control Act, the onus to get such a deed registered is on the landlord. In light of the same, neither the landlord nor the banks can be permitted to exploit the fact of non-registration of the tenancy deed against the tenant.

Partition of property – A Hindu widow can on her own file suit for partition under Hindu Succession Act 1956 in respect of her husband’s share in the property. [Hindu Succession Act, 1956]

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Santosh Popat Chavan & Others vs. Mrs. Sulochana Rajiv & Others. AIR 2016 Bombay 29

The plaintiff-respondent herein, Sulochana, widow of Rajiv Chavan filed Civil Suit for partition against the brothers and sister of her deceased husband. The matter ultimately travelled to the Bombay High Court.

The Bombay High Court in the case of Ananda Krishna Tate since deceased by Legal Heirs vs. Draupadibai Krishna Tate and others; 2010 (1) BCJ 714, had taken a view that a Hindu woman (mother, in that case) had no right to file a suit for partition under the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (the Act of 1956), which was earlier available as per section 3(3) of the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act, 1937 (the Act of 1937). In the absence of any other coparcener in the joint family demanding partition of the joint family property, the suit on her own was not maintainable.

The Bombay High Court held that the Hindu Succession Act was brought into force in the year 1956 and for emancipation of right to the women, the widow was given exclusive right to the property by removing the limited right that was given to her under the Act of 1937. Thus, right to share has been given to a widow upon death of her husband as per the Act of 1956. Further, the Act of 1956 does not carve out any prohibition on her from filing the suit independently. Hence, it must be held that she has the right to file the suit independently.

Thus, the right having been given to a widow or mother or women under the Act of 1956, she cannot be told that though she has a right to get the share, she cannot file a suit for recovery of share of her deceased husband as she had no right to file a suit. When a right is given, the remedy has to be there namely remedy to file a suit for partition, which cannot depend upon the desire or demand of other coparceners in the family to have a partition of the joint family property. The decision in the case of Ananda (supra) was held to be per incuriam.

WRIT POWER OF THE HIGH COURT IN A COMMERCIAL MATTER

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Introduction
Article 226 of the Constitution of India (Constitution) confers a writ jurisdiction on a High Court. This is an extra ordinary jurisdiction and extends to the action of the State or any authority endowed with State authority and empowers the High Court to issue direction to the State and the authorities to act in accordance with those directions. Courts have time again emphasised that this extra ordinary power must be exercised sparingly, cautiously and in exceptional situations only.

Can a writ jurisdiction be exercised when the State is not acting in an administrative capacity but acting only as a party to a contract i.e in a contractual capacity? The Supreme Court of India (SC) had the occasion to reiterate some of the basic principles governing the subject recently in the case of Joshi Technologies International Inc vs. UOI in the context of section 42 of the Income-tax Act, 1961(the Act).

FACTS IN BRIEF
Joshi Technologies (Petitioner/appellant) had entered into two contracts dated 20.02.1995 with the Union of India, through Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas (MoPNG) relating to exploration of certain oil fields. These contracts were on production sharing basis (Production Sharing Contracts,i.e PSC). It started production after entering into the contract and submitted its return of income on the income generated from the aforesaid production. The appellant claimed benefit of section 42 of the Act in the return of income.

Section 42 is a special provision for deductions in the case of business for prospecting, etc. for mineral oil. It provides for certain additional deduction of expenditure as specified in the PSC. It may be noted that such allowances, as stipulated in the section, are to be specifically mentioned in the PSC as well, which is entered into with the Central Government and it is also necessary that such an agreement has been laid on the Table of each House of Parliament.

It may be noted that Article 16 of the Model Production Sharing Contract (MPSC) contained a specific provision, which provided certain financial benefits and deductions in relation to taxes etc. that would be allowed to contractors/developers, as per the requirements of section 42 of the Act. According to the appellant, since no amendments to Article 16 of MPSC had been suggested nor contemplated by the Union of India, it was (and is) the belief and legitimate expectation of the appellant that all the benefits, financial or otherwise, offered in Article 16 of the MPSC to the prospective bidders were duly included in the above two PSCs.

The Assessing Officer (AO) granted deductions u/s. 42 of the Act from the assessment year 2001-02 onwards. However, while making assessment for the Assessment Year 2005-06, the AO observed that there were no such provisions in the PSC/Agreements which were signed between the Central Government and the appellant and in the absence of such stipulation in the agreements, the appellant was not entitled to deductions u/s. 42 of the Act.

It is worth noting that the Union of India signed many PSC’s with the private developers at the relevant period of time and there were 13 PSCs which did not contain the provisions for the deduction as envisaged under Article 16 of MPSC read with section 42 of the Act. A Joint Secretary of the MoPNG vide his communication dated 11.04.2007 wrote to the MoF specifically admitting that in certain PSCs, a reference to section 42 deductions had been omitted by oversight. The MoF was, accordingly, requested to extend the benefits of section 42 to the 13 PSCs (including the appellant’s two PSCs) in line with all other signed PSCs.

Realising that the Agreements did not contain such a provision, the appellant wrote to the MoPNG stating that there was an arrangement agreed to as per the understanding between the two parties to grant deduction as envisaged u/s. 42, non-inclusion thereof was an inadvertent omission in the agreements that were signed.

The MoPNG wrote to Ministry of Finance (MoF) accepting the aforesaid omissions and requested the MoF to give clarification in this behalf. However, no clarification came from the MoF and hence, the AO disallowed the claim for deduction u/s. 42of the Act.

At this stage, the appellant preferred writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court of Delhi.

In this background, the petitioner prayed among other prayers that a writ, order or direction be issued that considering the total facts of the case the petitioner is entitled to the benefit of the said deductions u/s. 42 of the Act, from the date of these Production Sharing Contracts. The prayer did not include a specific prayer to direct the authorities to amend the PSC.

The High Court examined the notice inviting the tender (Bid documents), MPSC and other relevant documents. It noted that, no statement or promise, that advantage u/s. 42 would be available to the successful bidder, was promised or made. It concluded that appellant was fully aware of Clause 16.2 of MPSC which specifically makes reference to benefit u/s. 42 of the Act, but did not advert to and refer to the same in their tender bid and did not ask for this benefit. Therefore, it was not possible to accept the contention of the appellant that benefit u/s. 42 of the Act was inadvertently missed out, or due to an act of oversight, not included in the contract.

The High Court accepted the explanation put forth by the respondents that 13 PSCs formed a different class in as much as their contract was in respect of small oil fields which had already been discovered and, therefore, the risk factor was less. On the other hand, other PSCs were in respect of undiscovered oil fields and for this reason benefit u/s. 42 had been granted to them.

The High Court dismissed the writ petition vide its judgment dated 28.05.2012 holding that the appellant is not entitled to any deductions u/s. 42 of the Act in the absence of stipulations to this effect in the Contracts signed between the parties. The matter went to the SC.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE SUPREME COURT
One of the submissions of the counsel for the petitioner was that a writ of Mandamus be issued for amending the contract and including the clause for granting the benefit of section 42 of the Act. It was also submitted that when the other contracting parties, namely, MoPNG specifically admitted that this provision was left out inadvertently, the Court should have given a direction for amendment of the Contract and that such a direction can be issued by the High Court in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In support of his submission the counsel relied on various judicial precedents.

Opposing the said prayer for issue of a writ, the counsel for the respondent submitted that in the realm of contractual relationship between the parties, this plea was inadmissible. He pleaded that PSCs are in the nature of contract agreed to between two independent contracting parties and each of the PSCs are distinct from the other and is not a copy of MPSC. He also pointed out that before signing the PSC, the approval of the Cabinet was obtained, which meant that the PSCs as submitted to the Cabinet, had the approval of one of the contracting parties, i.e. Government of India and when signed by the other party it became a binding contract.

Therefore, the appellant could not claim to be oblivious of the provisions of law or the contents of the contract at the time of signing and was precluded from seeking retrospective amendment as a matter of right when no such right was conferred under the contract. He submitted that the doctrine of fairness and reasonableness applies only in the exercise of statutory or administrative actions of a State and not in the exercise of a contractual obligation and that the issues arising out of contractual matters will have to be decided on the basis of the law of contract and not on the basis of the administrative law. He also relied on the various precedents in support of his submissions.

The SC took note of the Article 32 of the PSC entered into between the parties and observed that Article 32.2 categorically provided that the PSC shall not be amended, modified, varied or supplemented in any respect except by an instrument in writing signed by all the parties, which shall state the date upon which the amendment or modification shall become effective. Thus, even if it is presumed that there was an understanding between the parties before entering into an agreement to the effect that benefit of section 42 shall be extended to the appellant, the understanding vanished into thin air with the execution of the two PSCs. Now, for all intent and purpose, it was only the PSCs signed between the parties, which could be looked into. Thus, unless respondents agreed to amend, modify or vary/supplement the terms of the contract, no right accrued to the appellant in this behalf.

The SC noted that the PSCs in question were governed by the provisions of Article 299 of the Constitution. These were formal contracts made in the exercise of an executive power of the Union (or of a State, as the case may be) and are made on behalf of the President (or by the Governor, as the case may be). Further, these contracts are to be made by such persons and in such a manner as the President or the Governor may direct or authorise. Thus, when a particular contract is entered into, its novation has to be on fulfillment of all procedural requirements.

Whether, in such a case, can the Court issue a Mandamus?

OBSERVATIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court among other questions framed the question whether mandamus can be issued by the Court to the parties to amend the contract and incorporate provisions to this effect? In other words, whether the Court has the power to issue a writ of mandamus or direction to the Government?

The Supreme Court observed that in pure contractual matters extraordinary remedy of writ under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution cannot be invoked. However, in a limited sphere, such remedies are available only when the non-Government contracting party is able to demonstrate that it is a public law remedy which such party seeks to invoke, in contradistinction to the private law remedy.

The Supreme Court examined various judicial precedents in this regard and observed that under the following circumstances, ‘normally’, the Court would not exercise such discretion to issue a writ:

a) the Court may not examine the issue unless the action has some public law character attached to it.

(b) Whenever a particular mode of settlement of dispute is provided in the contract, the High Court would refuse to exercise its discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution and relegate the party to the said mode of settlement, particularly when settlement of disputes is to be resorted to through the means of arbitration.

(c) If there are very serious disputed questions of fact which are of complex nature and require oral evidence for their determination.

(d) Money claims per se particularly arising out of contractual obligations are normally not to be entertained except in exceptional circumstances.

The Supreme Court examined various case laws on the subject and legal position emerging from them. The same are summarised as under:

(i) At the stage of entering into a contract, the State acts purely in its executive capacity and is bound by the obligations of fairness. In its executive capacity, even in the contractual field, the state cannot practice discrimination. It has an obligation in law to act fairly, justly and reasonably which is the requirement of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, if State or instrumentality of the State has acted in contravention of the above said requirement of Article 14 then a writ court can issue suitable directions to set right the arbitrary actions.

(ii) In cases where question is of choice or consideration of competing claims before entering into the field of contract, facts have to be investigated and found. If those facts are disputed and require assessment of evidence, the correctness of which can only be tested satisfactorily by taking detailed evidence, examination and crossexamination of witnesses, the case could not be decided in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. In such cases court can direct the aggrieved party to resort to alternate remedy of civil suit etc.

(iii) Writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 cannot be used to avoid voluntarily obligation undertaken. Occurrence of commercial difficulty, inconvenience or hardship in performance of the conditions agreed to in the contract cannot provide justification in not complying with the terms of contract which the parties had accepted with open eyes. Writ petition cannot be maintained in such cases.

(iv) Ordinarily, where a breach of contract is complained of, the party complaining of such breach may sue for specific performance of the contract, if contract is capable of being specifically performed. Otherwise, the party may sue for damages.

(v) Writ can be issued where there is executive action unsupported by law or there is denial of equality before law or equal protection of law or it can be shown that action of the public authorities was without giving any hearing and violation of principles of natural justice after holding that action could not have been taken without observing principles of natural justice.

(vi) If the contract between private party and the State/ instrumentality and/or agency of State is under the realm of a private law and there is no element of public law, writ jurisdiction generally would not survive .In such cases the aggrieved party should invoke the remedies provided under ordinary civil law.

(vii) The distinction between public law and private law element in the contract with State is getting blurred. However, it has not been totally obliterated. Dichotomy between public law and private law, rights and remedies would depend on the factual matrix of each case and the distinction between public law remedies and private law, field cannot be demarcated with precision.

Once on the facts of a particular case, it is found that the nature of the activity or controversy involves public law element, then the matter can be examined by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to see whether action of the State and/or instrumentality or agency of the State is fair, just and equitable or that relevant factors are taken into consideration and irrelevant factors have not gone into the decision making process or that the decision is not arbitrary.

(viii) Failure to consider and give due weight to reasonable or legitimate expectation of a citizen, may render the decision of the state or its instrumentality arbitrary, and this is how the requirements of due consideration of a legitimate expectation be made part of the principle of non-arbitrariness.

(ix) If the rights are purely of private character, no mandamus can be issued. The condition which has to be satisfied for issuance of a writ of mandamus is the public duty. In a matter of private character or purely contractual field, no such public duty element is involved and, thus, mandamus will not lie.

(x) Where an authority appears acting unreasonably, a writ of mandamus can be issued for enforcing it to perform its duty free from arbitrariness or unreasonableness.

(xi) when an authority has to perform a public function or a public duty if there is a failure a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable.

Keeping in mind the aforesaid principles and after considering the the facts of the case, the SC held that this was not a fit case where the High Court should have exercised discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. According to the court, the matter is in the realm of pure contract and it is not a case where any statutory contract is awarded. The SC confirmed the order of the High Court that the appellant is not entitled to benefit of deduction u/s. 42 of the Act.

CONCLUSION
It is clear from the above that the scope of judicial review in respect of disputes falling within the domain of contractual obligations may be limited. The power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not limited by any other provisions of the Constitution. The High Court having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. The Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions in the exercise of this power. This plenary right of the High Court to issue a writ will not normally be exercised by the Court to the exclusion of other available remedies unless such action of the State or its instrumentality is arbitrary and unreasonable so as to violate the constitutional mandate of Article 14 or for other valid and legitimate reasons, for which the court thinks it necessary to exercise the said jurisdiction.

The reiteration of the aforesaid principles by the Supreme Court is very important today, especially when the Government is entering into partnership with private parties for various infrastructure projects under PPP model.

It is very clear from the above that the real challenge will lie in demarcating and identifying the line between the public law domain and the private law field, identifying the public duty, public cause. It is impossible to draw the line with precision and lay down in black and white the principles governing such demarcation. The question must be decided in each case with reference to the particular action, the activity in which the State or the instrumentality of the State is engaged when performing the action, the public law or private law character of the action and a host of other relevant circumstances.

The Most Unkindest Cut of All….. Or is it?

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Introduction
It was Julius Caesar who described the backstabbing by Brutus as the most unkindest cut of all, since it came from a trusted friend. A similar feeling of distrust is brewing amongst Hindu women in India on the passage of the Repealing and Amendment Act, 2015 by the Parliament which was notified on 13th May, 2015. This is an Act to repeal certain old and obsolete Acts as a part of the Government’s push towards ease of doing business. Why then this resentment, would be the first question which crops up.

One of the several Acts which have been repealed is the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005. Jog your memory a bit and you would recall that the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 was the very same path-breaking Act which placed Hindu daughters on an equal footing with Hindu sons in their father’s HUF. Hence, after this Act has been repealed with effect from 13th May 2015 does it mean that Hindu daughters again stand to lose out on this parity with Hindu sons and are relegated to the earlier position? Has the Parliament taken away an important gender bender right? Let us unravel this seemingly Sherlockian mystery.

The 2005 Amendment Act

The Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 ushered in great reforms to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The Hindu Succession Act, 1956, is one of the few codified statutes under Hindu Law. It applies to all cases of intestate succession by Hindus. The Act applies to Hindus, Jains, Sikhs, Buddhists and to any person who is not a Muslim, Christian, Parsi or a Jew. Any person who becomes a Hindu by conversion is also covered by the Act. The Act overrides all Hindu customs, traditions and usages and specifies the heirs entitled to such property and the order or preference among them.

By the 2005 Amendment Act, the Parliament amended section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and the amended section was made operative from 9th September 2005. Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 was totally revamped. The amended section provided that a daughter of a coparcener:

a) became, by birth a coparcener in her own right in the same manner as the son;
b) had, the same rights in the coparcenary property as she would have had if she had been a son; and
c) was, subject to the same liabilities in respect of the coparcenary property as that of a son.

Thus, the amendment equated all daughters with sons and they could now become a coparcener in their father’s HUF by virtue of being born in that family. She had all rights and obligations in respect of the coparcenary property, including testamentary disposition. Thus, not only did she become a coparcener in her father’s HUF but she could also make a will for the same. The Delhi High Court in Mrs. Sujata Sharma vs. Shri Manu Gupta, CS (OS) 2011/2006 has held that a daughter who is the eldest coparcener can become the karta of her father’s HUF.

One issue which remained unresolved was whether the application of the amended section 6 was prospective or retrospective? This issue was recently resolved by the Supreme Court in its decision rendered in the case of Prakash vs. Phulvati, CA 7217/2013, Order dated 16th October 2015. The Supreme Court examined the issue in detail and held that the rights under the amendment are applicable to living daughters of living coparceners (fathers) as on 9th September, 2005 irrespective of when such daughters are born and irrespective of whether or not they are married. Thus, in order to claim benefit, what is required is that the daughter should be alive and her father should also be alive on the date of the amendment, i.e., 9th September, 2005. Conversely, a daughter whose father was not alive on that date cannot be entitled to become a coparcener in her father’s HUF.

Effect of the Repealing Act of 2015
As explained earlier, the Repealing and Amendment Act, 2015 has repealed the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005. What is the effect of this repeal? Does s.6 of the Hindu Succession Act now hark back to the preamended position? Would a daughter whose father was alive on 9th September 2005 no longer be entitled to be a coparcener in her father’s HUF? Further, if she is the eldest coparcener, would she no longer be entitled to be the karta of her father’s HUF?

The answer to these dreaded questions is an emphatic No! Recourse may be made to section 6-A of the General Clauses Act, 1897 which states that when any Act repeals any other Act by which the text of another Act was amended by express omission/insertion/substitution of any matter, then unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not affect the continuance of any such amendment made by repealed Act.

This position was also explained by the Calcutta High Court in Khuda Bux vs Manager, Caledonian Press, AIR 1954 Cal 484. In this case, the Factories Act, 1934 was repealed by section 120 of the Factories Act 1948. The Repealing and Amending Act of 1950 repealed section 120 of the 1948 Act. Hence, it was contended that even the repeal of the Factories Act of 1934 had now disappeared, because the repeal effected by section 120 of the Act of 1948 had itself been repealed. The Act of 1934 could no longer be said to have been repealed or, in any event, the Act of 1948 could no longer be said to have repealed and re-enacted it. The High Court set aside this plea and held that this was based upon a mistaken belief of the scope and effect of a Repealing and Amending Act. Such Acts had no legislative effect, but were designed for editorial revision, being intended only to excise dead matter from the statute book and to reduce its volume. Mostly, they expurgate amending Acts, because having imparted the amendments to the main Acts, those Acts had served their purpose and had no further reason for their existence. The only object of such Acts was legislative spring-cleaning and they were not intended to make any change in the law. Even so, they are guarded by saving clauses drawn with elaborate care. Besides providing for other savings, that section said that the Act shall not affect “any principle or rule of law notwithstanding that the same may have been derived by, in, or from any enactment hereby repealed.”

Thus, the repeal of an amending Act has no repercussion on the parent Act which together with the amendments remained unaffected. On the same principles is the decision of the Supreme Court in Jethanand Betab vs The State of Delhi, AIR 1960 SC 89. The Indian Wireless Telegraphy Act,1933 provided that no person shall possess a wireless telegraphy apparatus without a licence and section 6 made such possession punishable. The Indian Wireless Telegraphy (Amendment) Act,1949, introduced section 6(1A) in the 1933 Act, which provided for a heavier punishment. The Repealing and Amending Act, 1952, repealed the whole of the Amendment Act of 1949. A person was convicted u/s. 6(1A) but he contended that section 6(1A)was repealed and thus, his conviction should be set aside. The Supreme Court negated the accused’s plea and held that the general object of a repealing and amending Act is stated in Halsbury’s Laws of England, 2nd Edition, Vol. 31, at p. 563, thus:“…..does not alter the law, but simply strikes out certain enactments which have become unnecessary. It invariably contains elaborate provisos.” The Apex Court held that it was clear that the main object of the 1952 Act was only to strike out the unnecessary Acts and excise dead matter from the statute book in order to lighten the burden of ever increasing spate of legislation and to remove confusion from the public mind. The object of the Repealing and Amending Act of 1952 was only to expurgate the amending Act of 1949, along with similar Acts, which had served its purpose.

Karnataka High Court’s decision

The Karnataka High Court in Smt. Lokamani vs. Smt. Mahadevamma AIR 2016 Kar 4 had an occasion to consider the impact of the Repealing Act of 2015 on section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. In this case it was argued that section 6 of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 was now repealed by the Repealing and Amending Act, 2015. Therefore, the status of coparcener conferred on the daughter of a coparcener under the amended Act was no more available to the plaintiffs. Thus, the express question considered by the High Court was whether the Repealing and Amending Act, 2015, which repealed the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 to the whole extent, had the effect of repealing amended section 6 and restoring the old section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, and thereby took away the status of coparcener conferred on the daughters giving them equal right with the sons in the coparcenary property? The High Court negated the contention that the 2005 amendment to section 6 was repealed. It relied on section 6A of the General Clauses Act and a decision of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Shamrao Parulekar vs. District Magistrate Thana, AIR 1952 SC 324 and held that it was clear that section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 was substituted by section 6 of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005. The effect of substitution of a provision by way of an amendment was that, the amended provision was written in the place of earlier provision with pen and ink and automatically the old section was wiped out. So, there was no need to refer to the amending Act at all. The amendment should be considered as if embodied in the whole statute of which it had become apart. The statute in its old form is superseded by the statute in the amended form. The Court held that amended Section of the statute took the place of the original section, for all intent and purpose as if the amendment had always been there.

Further, the Repealing and Amending Act, 2015 did not disclose any intention on the part of the Parliament to take away the status of a coparcener conferred on a daughter giving equal rights with the son in the coparcenary property. On the contrary, by virtue of the Repealing and Amending Act, 2015, the amendments made to Hindu Succession Act in the year 2005, became part of the Act and the same is given retrospective effect from the day the Principal Act came into force in the year 1956, as if the said amended provision was in operation at that time. The Court concluded that though the Amended Act came into force on 9.9.2005, section 6 as amended was deemed to have been there in the statute book since 17.6.1956 when the Hindu Succession Act came into force.

While the Karnataka High Court’s decision on the effect of the Repealing Act is in order, the latter part of the decision (refer portion in italics above) does raise a question mark. It concluded that the amendment was given retrospective effect from the date the 1956 Act came into force. This decision was rendered prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in the case of Prakash vs. Phulavati (supra) wherein it was held that the amendment to s.6 was prospective and was applicable only to living daughters of living fathers as on 9th September 2005. The Repealing Act was neither cited nor considered by the Supreme Court. The decision of the Karnataka High Court in Smt. Lokamani’s case was also not cited before the Supreme Court. Does the ratio of the Supreme Court’s decision change in the light of the Repealing Act? Does the Repealing Act make the amendment retrospective as held by the Karnataka High Court?

In my humble submission, the Repealing Act does not change the position as laid down by the Supreme Court. This view is fortified by the fact that the Supreme Court’s decision was against the Karnataka High Court’s judgment (AIR 2011 Kar 78) in the very same case which had held that the amendment to section 6 was retrospective in nature. The Supreme Court held that an amendment to a substantive provision was always prospective unless either expressly or by necessary intendment it is retrospective. In the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, there was neither any express provision for giving retrospective effect to the amended provision nor necessary intendment to that effect. Hence, the amendment was clearly prospective.

Conclusion

Hindu daughters should rest assured that their rights are in no way abrogated by the Repealing Act of 2015. The Indian Parliament has not played a ‘Brutus’ on them. However, the issue of prospective vs. retrospective operation of the 2005 Act may yet play out before the Courts in the light of the added angle of the Repealing Act. How one craves for the usage of clear language by the draftsman when drafting a law so that such ambiguities and technicalities do not rob the sheen of the substance of the Act!

Tenant – Where partnership is held to be created to conceal the real transaction of subletting, tenant is liable to be evicted on grounds of wrongful subletting. [Bombay Rents Act, 1947, Section 13]

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Smt. Taralakshmi Maneklal vs. Shantilal Makanji Dave and Ors. AIR 2006 (NOC) 228 (BOM).

The Bombay High Court was concerned with a petition where Landlords suit for eviction of tenant on the ground of unlawful subletting without consent was dismissed by the lower court and confirmed by the appellate court. According to the tenant, whilst retaining the possession of the suit premises he had merely entered into partnership for carrying on business through the suit premises and as per the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Helper Girdharbhai vs. Saiyed Mohmad Mirasaheb Kadri & Ors. (1987) 3 SCC 538, such arrangement, does not amount to subletting. According to the Landlord, the partnership was merely a cloak to conceal the real transaction of subletting. It was held that that the clauses in the partnership deed that profit of partnership would be shared by sub-tenants only and tenant would receive fixed monthly amount irrespective of profit or loss in partnership business showed that partnership was not genuine and it was created to conceal real transaction of subletting. It was held that the tenant was liable to be evicted.

Stamp Papers – Use of old stamp papers i.e., stamp paper purchased more than six months prior to proposed date of execution may certainly be a circumstance that can be used as a piece of evidence to cast doubt on authenticity of agreement but that cannot be clinching evidence to invalidate the agreement. [Indian Stamps Act,1899, Section 54].

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Thiruvengadam Pillai vs. Navaneethammal and Anr (2008) 4 SCC 530.

In
this case, the Apex Court was concerned with the issue whether where
the stamp papers used in the agreement of sale were more than six months
old, they were not valid stamp papers and consequently, the agreement
prepared on such ‘expired’ papers was also not valid. This issue
required interpretation of section 54 of The Indian Stamps Act, 1899.

The
Apex Court held that The Indian Stamp Act, 1899 nowhere prescribes any
expiry date for use of a stamp paper. Section 54 merely provides that a
person possessing a stamp paper for which he has no immediate use (which
is not spoiled or rendered unfit or useless), can seek refund of the
value thereof by surrendering such stamp paper to the Collector provided
it was purchased within the period of six months next preceding the
date on which it was so surrendered. The stipulation of the period of
six months prescribed in section 54 is only for the purpose of seeking
refund of the value of the unused stamp paper, and not for use of the
stamp paper. Section 54 does not require the person who has purchased a
stamp paper, to use it within six months. Therefore, there is no
impediment for a stamp paper purchased more than six months prior to the
proposed date of execution, being used for a document. Even assuming
that use of such stamp papers is an irregularity, the court can only
deem the document to be not properly stamped, but cannot, only on that
ground, hold the document to be invalid.

The fact that very old
stamp papers of different dates have been used, may certainly be a
circumstance that can be used as a piece of evidence to cast doubt on
the authenticity of the agreement. But that cannot be a clinching
evidence.

Interest-tax Act – Reassessment – Where there is no assessment order passed; there cannot be a notice for reassessment inasmuch as the question of reassessment arises only when there is an assessment in the first instance.

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Standard Chartered Finance Ltd. vs. CIT [2016] 381 ITR 453 (SC)

On the return of chargeable interest filed by the appellant/assessee under the Interest-tax Act, 1974 for the assessment year 1997-98, no assessment order was passed. However, much after the last date of the assessment year was over, the Assessing Officer sought to reopen the assessment by issuing notice u/s. 10 of the Act and thereafter proceeded to reassess the interest chargeable under the aforesaid Act. The matter was carried in appeal by the assessee. The main contention of the assessee was that when there was no assessment order passed in the original proceedings there was no question of reopening the so-called assessment and make the reassessment. The Commissioner of Incometax (Appeals) accepted the aforesaid contention and set aside the reassessment order. This order was upheld by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) as well. However, in further appeal by the Revenue before the High Court, the High Court reversed the view taken by the Tribunal holding that even if there was no original assessment order passed u/s.10 of the Act, there could be a reassessment. The assessee had relied upon various judgments in support including the judgment of the Supreme Court in Trustees of H.E.H. the Nizam’s Supplemental Family Trust vs. CIT [2000] 242 ITR 381 (SC). The High Court held that the said judgment would not govern the case at hand.

The Supreme Court after hearing the learned counsel for the parties, was of the opinion that the High Court had wrongly ignored upon the ratio laid down in Trustees of H. E. H. the Nizam’s Supplemental Family Trust’s case which squarely applied in the instant case in favour of the assessee. The ratio of the said judgment was that in those situations where there is no assessment order passed, there could not be a notice for reassessment inasmuch as the question of reassessment arises only when there is an assessment in the first instance.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the order passed by the High Court.

Receipt of Interest and Full Value of Consideration

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Issue for consideration
In recent times, many cases have surfaced involving the receipt of interest by a shareholder for delay in making a public offer for sale. The magnitude becomes considerably higher where the transfer of shares is by a Foreign Institutional Investor. In many cases, the interest is paid under an order of the regulator or a court.

The issue under taxation that arises for consideration, in the hands of the recipient, is about the treatment of such interest, received by him for the delayed offer for sale.

Whether such a receipt would lead to increase the value of consideration and would enter into computation of the capital gains or would it be separately taxable as income from other sources. Conflicting decisions are available on the subject that requires consideration, due to sheer magnitude of the receipt.

Morgan Stanley Mauritius Co.’s case
The issue recently arose before the Mumbai bench of the Tribunal in the case of Morgan Stanley Mauritius Co. Ltd., ITA No.1625/Mum/2014 adjudicated under an order dated 29.01.2016.

The assessee company, incorporated in Mauritius, was registered with SEBI as a sub-account of Morgan Stanley and Company International Ltd. (MSCIL). It had transferred 13,79,979 shares of I-flex Solution Ltd. held by it, to Oracle Global (Mauritius) Ltd.(Oracle) under the open offer for sale made by Oracle for an agreed consideration. In addition to the said consideration, it had received an additional consideration of Rs.2.20 crore from Oracle over and above the sales consideration. The assessee had treated the said additional consideration as the part of the full value of consideration and had accordingly computed the capital gains for which it had claimed exemption from Indian taxation as per the DTAA with Mauritius. The AO held that;

the additional consideration was not linked to original consideration and hence it was to be treated and taxed separately,

the amount received by the assessee was penal in nature,

while making the payment of additional consideration the deductor i.e., Oracle had deducted TDS,

the deduction of tax proved that it was not part of sales consideration, and

the ‘penal interest’ had to be taxed @ 41.82 %.

The Commissioner (Appeals) confirmed the action of the AO.

In the appeal by the company to the Tribunal, it was contended that that the original and revised schedule to the offer proved that the additional compensation @ Rs.16 per share was paid by Oracle for a period up to January 2007 and that the compensation paid was for the delay in making the offer and not for delay in making payment and was not interest. In addition, it was contended that the additional consideration was not received in respect of any monies borrowed or debt incurred or for use of money by Oracle; that the additional consideration was also not a service fee/charge in respect of money borrowed/credit facility which was not utilised by Oracle; that the amount in question would not fall within the definition of ‘interest’ as per section 2(28A) of the Act; that for a receipt to be taxed as interest, existence of a debtor/creditor relationship was a must as per Article-11 of the DTAA ; that there was no Debtor/Creditor relationship between the assessee and Oracle; that the assessee had not made available any capital/funds to Oracle; that the money received by it constituted an integral part of the sales receipts of the shares; that the consideration and sale price arose from the same source i.e., the shares transferred to Oracle under the open offer. In the alternative, it was contended that the additional consideration could not be taxed as capital gains under Article-13 of the Treaty; that it was also not covered under any of the specific Articles of the Treaty; that it would fall under the head ‘income from other sources’ under Article-22 of the Treaty; that the assessee had no Permanent Establishment (PE) in India; that the income from other sources would not be taxable in India as per the provisions of the Act. In a further alternative, with regard to rate of tax to be levied, it was contended that AO had erred in not taxing the additional consideration in accordance with the provisions of section 115AD of the Act; that he should have applied the rate of 20.91% as against the rate of 41.82%. The assessee relied upon the order of the Tribunal dated 14.8.2013 in the case of Genesis Indian Investment Company Ltd. (ITA/2878/Mum/2006) in support of its main contention and also referred to the decisions in the cases of Sainiram Doongarmal, 42 ITR392, (SC) ; Sahani Steel Works & Press Works Ltd. 152 ITR 39(AP); K.G. Subramaniam, 195 ITR 199 (Karn.) and Hindustan Conductors P. Ltd., 240 ITR 762 (Bom).

In reply, the Department contended that the additional consideration was received for delay in making the payment of sales consideration; that it could not be taken as part of total sale value; that Oracle had deducted TDS while making payment to the assessee; that deduction of tax at source indicated that the amount was not part of sale consideration but represented the interest portion for delayed payments; that same had to be treated as income from other sources; that the letter of offer made by Oracle talked about interest payment of Rs.11.35 per share; that the assessee had accepted the open offer; that there was debtor/creditor relationship between the assessee and Oracle; that the buyer of the share should have paid the whole amount as per the scheduled dates of payments; that the nature of all consideration received by assessee was in the nature of interest; that it was governed by Article-11 of the India Mauritius DTAA ; that it could not be taxed under Article-22 of the treaty under the head “other income’; that the additional consideration was interest for late payment of the sale proceeds; that the interest income taxable in the hands of the assessee could not be treated as income from securities; and that the provisions of section 115AD were not applicable in the case under consideration.

The Tribunal found that an open offer was made by Oracle to the share holders of I-flex at the price of Rs.1,475/- per share; that the open offer indicated that additional offer of Rs.11.35 per share was to be payable to the share holders; that as per the letter of open offer the additional consideration per share was to be paid due to delay in making the open offer and in dispatching the letter of the offer based on the time line prescribed by SEBI; that later on, the consideration of open offer was revised to Rs.2,084/- per share; that the additional consideration for delay was revised to Rs.16/- per share; that the open offer letter and public announcement indicated that a revised offer of Rs.2,100/- per share (including additional consideration of Rs.16/-) was to be payable for the shares tendered by the share holders under the open offer; that in response to the open offer, the assessee tendered its holding of 13,97,879 shares of I-flex and received Rs.2,89,77,45,900/- which sum included additional consideration of Rs.2.20 crore.

The Tribunal found that the offer letter contained two schedules, original and revised, and the revised schedule contained the details of additional consideration to be paid by Oracle, which in the opinion of the Tribunal could not be treated as penal interest or interest for late payment of consideration by Oracle. It found that initially the additional consideration was fixed at Rs.11.35 per share, but, because of the delay in making the open offer and dispatching the letter of the offer, was later enhanced to Rs.16.00 per share and thus, there was increase in the offer price of the shares; it was a fact that the regulatory authority i.e. SEBI had approved the transaction; that the transaction could not be completed in due time because of certain reasons; that Oracle had revised the offer price. Considering all the factors, the Tribunal held that the additional consideration received by the assessee was part and parcel of the total consideration that could not be segregated under the heads ‘original sale consideration’ and ‘penal interest received from Oracle’. It observed that the business world was governed by its own rules and conventions and on due consideration of the time factor, if Oracle decided to increase the share price in the offer letter, it had to be taken as a part of original transaction. The Tribunal appreciated that in the original offer interest @ Rs.11.35 per share was offered by Oracle and after considering the delay in dispatch letter and other relevant factors, it decided to increase the interest @ of Rs.16 per share which was a business decision and the assessee had no control over the decision making process of Oracle. Importantly, it noted that the transaction did not have any debtor/creditor relationship between the assesse and Oracle and the sale of shares of I-flex in response to the open offer by Oracle was a pure and simple case of selling of shares; that the assessee had not entered into any negotiations with Oracle and transferred the shares as per a scheme that was approved by SEBI; that the assessee had not advanced any sum to Oracle and had not received any interest from it for delayed repayment of principal amount and in short, the additional consideration received by the assesse from Oracle was not penal interest and was part of the original consideration and was not taxable. The Tribunal noted with approval that in the decision in the case of Genesis Indian Investment Company Ltd.(ITA/2878/Mum /2006 / dated 14.08.2013) a similar issue had been decided by the Tribunal in favour of the assessee.

Dai Ichi Karkaria Ltd .’s case
The issue in the past had arisen in the case of Dai Ichi Karkaria Ltd, ITA No. 5584/Mum/2010 for A.Y. 2006- 07 decided on 28th December 2011. In that case, the assessee had raised the following issues in the appeal ;

“On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the ld CIT(A) erred in confirming the amount of Rs. 1,00,57,681/- as interest income and not allowing it as part of full value of consideration in computing long term capital gains in respect of buy back of shares and consequently erred in confirming long term capital gains at Rs.2,16,52,094/- as against Rs. 3,16,12,208 as claimed by the appellant.”

“On the facts and circumstances of the case, it is contended that the amount of interest of Rs. 1,00,57,681/- assessed by the Assessing Officer is not chargeable to tax under any provision of the I T Act.”

In that case, the assessee had computed the long term capital gains of Rs. 3,16,12,208 on transfer of shares under a scheme of buy back of shares of Colour Chem Ltd. The assessee had sold 71,233 shares @ Rs. 318 per share and had also received interest @ Rs.149.62 per share. In computing the capital gains, the assessee had added interest received as a part of sale consideration. The AO asked the assessee to explain as to why the interest of Rs. 1,06,57881, received on the investment, should not be treated as Income from other sources and taxed as such. In response, the assessee submitted that the said interest was paid by the company to eligible shareholders, including the assessee, pursuant to the order of the Supreme Court. It was explained that Colour Chem Ltd. had not deducted tax while making payment of the same, u/s. 194A of the Act, for the reason that the said payment was considered as part of sale consideration for calculating the Long Term Capital Gains.

The AO held as under: “The assessee has received interest in terms of the Supreme Court Order mentioned in the para 4.1 of the Letter of Offer to buy the shares of Colour Chem Ltd by EBITO Chemiebetelligungen AG, Claraint International Ltd and Clariant AG. The Supreme Court in its order has worked out interest at Rs. 149.62 per share. Assessee’s case falls under income by way of interest on securities which is specifically covered u/s 56(2)(id) of Income Tax Act. In fact the matter has been discussed in detail by the Hon’ble Madras High Court in the case of South India Shipping Corporation Ltd. (240 ITR 24), wherein, it has been held that the ratio of the decision of Supreme Court is applicable for existing Company also.” On appeal, the CIT(A) concurred with the view of the AO.

In an appeal to the Tribunal, it was contended by the assesseee company that the assessee had no statutory right to receive the interest or any compensation; the amount of interest received by the assessee was for the period prior to the time of the payments as well as actual transfer of the shares; the amount therefore was a part of the sale consideration and not a separate income of the assessee; there was no agreement or statutory rights to receive such interest; there was no mercantile practice to receive the interest and the amount was only compensatory in nature and could not be treated as a separate income.

It was contended that the interest paid by the acquirer of the shares was treated as the part of purchase consideration in the case of Burmah Castrol Plc., 307 ITR 324 (AAR) wherein interest paid by the acquirer was held as cost of acquisition of shares and on similar analogy, the interest received by the assessee on buyback of share, should be part of the sale consideration.

Highlighting the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Ghanshyam (HUF), 315 ITR 001(SC), it was submitted that the court in that case held that the interest payable prior to the possession taken over shall be part of the compensation. Reliance was placed on the decision in the case of Manubhai Bhikhabhai vs. CIT, 205 ITR 505(Guj).

Narrating the litigation history of the case of acquiring the shares, it was explained that the purpose of the Supreme Court in awarding interest of Rs. 149.62 per share (net of dividends) was to compensate the shareholders of the target company for the loss of time or delay in making the offer and hence, such interest could under no stretch of imagination be construed to be interest income accruing in the hands of the assessee. Attention was drawn to the provisions of section 2(28A) of the Act, defining the term ‘interest’ to contend that for a receipt to be considered as interest the amount should arise from money borrowed or debt incurred and that in the given case, the assessee had invested in shares of the target company i.e. CCL and had not given any loans and that the scope of definition could not be expanded to include in itself something which by its very basic nature, did not amount to interest.

The facts of the case, it was explained, confirmed that the compensation was not on the grounds that the acquirer delayed the payment of the consideration to the shareholders but was awarded for making good the loss caused to the shareholders of CCL, due to the delay in making the offer of buy back by the acquirer.

It was pointed out that while deciding the issue of interest, the Supreme Court had clearly held that the shareholder did not have any right to get interest and the shareholders were only to be compensated for the loss of interest and nothing more ; therefore, when there was no right or any agreement to receive the interest then, the amount received by the assessee was only a part of the sale consideration.

Lastly, it was submitted that when there was no right to receive the interest and there was no source of income then, there was no provision to tax the same, as there was no source. CIT vs. Chiranji Lal Multani Mal Rai Bahadur (P) Ltd.,179 ITR 157(P&H).

On the other hand, the Department submitted that interest was received by the assessee for delay in payment of offer price; that ‘income’ included any amount received by the assessee and would fall u/s. 56 of the I. T. Act, since the money was lying with the acquirer and the interest was a compensation for such loss; that as per the provision of section 46A, only the consideration received by the shareholder, after adjustment of the cost of the acquisition of shares was deemed as capital gains arising to such shareholder.

The Tribunal considered the rival contentions and perused the relevant material on record. It examined in detail the factual background giving rise to the dispute of interest payment and transfer of the shares under buy-back scheme. It noted that the Supreme Court while deciding the issue of rate of interest, observed that “by reason of Regulation 44, as substituted in 2002, the discretionary jurisdiction of the Board is curtailed. In terms of Regulations 1997 could award interest by way of damages but by reason of Regulation 2002, its power is limited to grant interest to compensate the shareholders for the loss suffered by them arising out of the delay in making the public offer.” The tribunal noted that it was clear from the observations of the court that interest payable as per Regulations 44 was to compensate the shareholders for loss suffered by them for delay in making the public offer and that it was not penal in nature and was not towards a statutory right or a right arising from contract but the nature of payment of interest was to compensate the loss due to the delay in the payment by the acquirer and thus, the interest was paid to compensate the shareholder who were deprived of interest payable on difference of offer price and market price.

Importantly, the tribunal extensively quoted from the decision in the case of CIT vs. Ghanshyam (HUF) (supra) wherein the court after analysing the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 had given a detailed finding on the issue of interest payable u/s. 23, 28 as well as section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act. The Supreme Court in that case had addressed the issue whether the interest paid on enhanced compensation u/s. 23,28 and section 34 would be treated as part of compensation u/s. 45(5) of the I. T. Act 1961. The Tribunal quoted the following paragraph form the said decision;

“It is to answer the above questions that we have analysed the provisions of sections 23, 23(1A), 23(2), 28 and 34 of the 1894 Act. As discussed hereinabove, section 23(1A) provides for additional amount. It takes care of increase in the value at the rate of 12 per cent. per annum. Similarly, under section 23(2) of the 1894 Act, there is a provision for solatium which also represents part of enhanced compensation. Similarly, section 28 empowers the court in its discretion to award interest on the excess amount of compensation over and above what is awarded by the Collector. It includes additional amount under section 23(1A) and solatium under section 23(2) of the said Act. Section 28 of the 1894 Act applies only in respect of the excess amount determined by the court after reference under section 18 of the 1894 Act. It depends upon the claim, unlike interest under section 34 which depends on undue delay in making the award. It is true that “interest” is not compensation. It is equally true that section 45(5) of the 1961 Act refers to compensation. But, as discussed hereinabove, we have to go by the provisions of the 1894 Act which awards ” interest” both as an accretion in the value of the lands acquired and interest for undue delay. Interest under section 28 unlike interest under section 34 is an accretion to the value, hence it is a part of enhanced compensation or consideration which is not the case with interest under section 34 of the 1894 Act. So also additional amount under section 23(1A) and solatium under section 23(2) of the 1894 Act forms part of enhanced compensation under section 45(5)(b) of the 1961 Act. ”

In the opinion of the Tribunal, there was a fine distinction between the additional amount payable u/s. 23, award of interest u/s. 28 and interest payable u/s. 34 of the Land Acquisition Act which had led the court to hold that the additional amount u/s. 23 (1A) and solatium u/s. 23(2) of Land Acquisition Act formed a part of enhanced compensation u/s. 45(5)(b) of the I. T. Act, 1961 and when the amount was paid as a compensation for enhancement in the value of the asset transferred, the same would be part of full consideration; but when the interest was paid as a compensation to loss of interest, then it could not be treated as a part of sale consideration.

The Tribunal held that the interest received by the assessee, as was held by the court, while deciding the dispute of rate of interest was only a compensation for loss of interest, which was akin to payments made due to delay in public offer and delayed payments and was not the compensation for enhancement in the value of the asset. The fact that the offer price was more than the value of the share from 24.2.1998 till 7.4.2003 weighed heavily with the Tribunal. The Tribunal accordingly held that the interest received by the assessee as per the directions of the SEBI and in pursuance of the decision of the Supreme Court could not be treated as part of sale consideration of shares and accordingly, the lower authorities had rightly treated the same as taxable under the head ‘income from other sources’.

The Tribunal noted that merely by reason that the interest paid by the acquirer would be a part of acquisition of shares would not ipso facto conclude that the said interest in the hands of the shareholder would be part of sale consideration.

Observations
The issue though moving in a narrow circle has multiple dimensions;

Does the amount go to increase the ‘full value of consideration’ for the purposes of the Income-tax Act?

Does the additional amount, received in addition to the sale consideration, represent interest or can be classified as in the nature of interest?

Can such amount be treated as ‘interest’ within the meaning of the term as defined in section 2(28A) of the Act?

Do the provisions of section 46A alter the treatment of receipt? and

Can such an amount be classified as a capital receipt not liable to tax?

The issue on hand becomes more twisted when it is examined in the context of the provisions of Double Taxation Avoidance Agreements and in particular w.r.t. certain Articles that deal with the ‘capital gains’, ‘interest’ and ‘other income’. Issue also arises as to the applicability of rate of tax and the liability to deduct tax at source under the domestic laws. But then, these are the issues that are not intended to be discussed here for the sake of focusing on the issue under debate.

There is no dispute that the amount in question in both the cases, that has been received by the shareholder, is for compensating him for the delay made by the acquirer company in making a public offer for sale. The payment is made as per the SEBI regulations to compensate the shareholder for the delay in making the offer and is calculated as per the rules of SEBI. In the matters of dispute as to the quantification and the period, the courts have the jurisdiction to intervene and provide the finality to the dispute. There is also not a dispute that the shareholders have not lent any money to the acquirer company nor is there a debtor-creditor relationship between the company and the shareholder. It is also not anyone’s case that the company had delayed the payment of the offer price or even the additional payment ordered by the SEBI.

In computing the income under the head ‘capital gains’, an assessee, to begin with, is required to reduce the cost of acquisition from the full value of consideration. The term ‘full value of consideration’ is not defined under the Income-tax Act, but is largely held to represent the sale consideration or the consideration for transfer of a capital asset. It is immaterial whether the said consideration is received in part or in full at the time of transfer, and it is also not relevant whether such consideration is received from the transferee or not.

Obviously,the compensation paid, in our respectful opinion cannot be a part of the sale consideration simply, because it is not an ‘interest’ or that it is paid for the delay in making an offer. On a first blush, the consideration moving from the company to a shareholder can be taken to be the offer price, i.e. the price at which the company has agreed to purchase or buy the shares. However, when one takes in to account the event that has preceded the actual offer, on account of which event the company has been made to offer and pay an additional amount for delaying the offer, it is appropriate to say that the shareholder in question has accepted the said offer with full knowledge of the total receipt which he is likely to receive at the time of accepting the offer and in that view of the matter, it is apt to hold that the ‘full value of consideration’ in his case represents the acceptance price, i.e the total price. It is a settled position in law that the full value of consideration referred to in section 48 does not necessarily mean the apparent consideration. It rather is the price bargained for by the parties to the transaction. ‘Full value’ is the whole price and in its whole should be capable of including the additional amount agreed to be paid before the offer is accepted.

We do not think the receipt in any manner could ever be held to be representing interest. Interest is a compensation for delay in tendering the payment of the consideration. In the case under consideration, no consideration ever became payable before the offer for sale was made and was accepted. Importantly, once it was accepted, there was no delay in the payment thereof. These aspects of the facts are even confirmed by the Tribunal in the case of Dai Ich Karkaria Ltd.(supra). It is true that the compensation for the delay is measured in terms of the period of delay and is linked to the rate of interest but the methodology adopted for quantifying the damages can not be held to change the character of the payment which remains to be compensation, and not interest.

A bare reading of section 2(28A) confirms that the receipt inn question cannot be termed as ‘interest’. Not much will turn on section2(28A) in support of the case that it represents interest. None of the parameters help the case in favour of treating the receipt as interest.

Before we deal with the last part, it is relevant to examine whether provisions of section 46A of the I. T. Act, have any implication in deciding the issue. Apparently, the scope of section 46A is restricted to the buy back of shares by the issuing company and it’s scope cannot be extended to the case of public offer by a raiding company or any person other than the issuing company. Secondly, the provision requires the difference between the cost of acquisition and the value of consideration to be taxed under the head ‘capital gains’. The ‘value of consideration’ cannot be largely different than the ‘full value of consideration’ and as such the discussion in the earlier paragraphs will largely apply to section 46A with the same force.

Lastly, whether the receipt in question could be held to be a capital receipt, not liable to taxation, is an issue that was not before the Tribunal in any of the cases, but in our opinion is a possibility worth considering, in view of the fact that the receipt is in the nature of damages and represent compensation for an injury, which can be presented to represent a capital receipt not liable to taxation.

Tax on ‘Accreted Income’ – a Draconian Proposal

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The Finance Bill, 2016 presented by the Finance Minister (FM) in the Parliament has already been discussed threadbare. The proposal to tax accumulated provident fund was vociferously opposed and the FM had to beat a hasty retreat. While the proposal to tax charitable trusts on occurrence of certain events also met with criticism, it has been somewhat muted. The Society sends a postbudget representation in which the issues arising from this proposal will be pointed out. After the Bill becomes an Act, the Journal carries a detailed article analysing the provisions. However, the provisions as proposed in regard to charitable trusts are so devastating that they merit an editorial comment.

The exemption of charitable trusts is based on the rationale that these institutions supplement the activities of a welfare state. The revenue generated is utilised for benevolent objects. It is for this reason that the government foregoes tax revenue from such institutions. The tax provisions in regard to charitable institutions have undergone substantial changes over the last two decades. The provisions in the 1922 Act were extremely lenient. The current Income-tax Act has attempted to plug loopholes which were being misused by certain persons. Over the last few years, the provisions have become much stricter, so much so that one often felt that charity was given a step-motherly treatment. While it is true that, at times, charitable trusts have been used as vehicles of tax avoidance/tax evasion, the acts of a few unscrupulous should not result in burdening genuine trusts with huge tax liabilities. While some regulation is welcome, the inability of the tax officials to bring to book the drivers of such vehicles should not lead to the painting of all charitable trusts with the same brush. This is precisely what the proposals in the Finance Bill seek to do.

There are a number of provisions in the proposed Chapter XII-EB that are blatantly unfair. The tax on trusts liability could be triggered by the occurrence of certain specified events. Once any of such events occurs, the charitable institution would be saddled with a huge tax liability which if it is required to defray will result in its activities coming to a halt. As per the proposals in the Bill, such tax liability has to be discharged in a very short time, in the case of cancellation of registration within 14 days of the cancellation order being received. In such a situation if the trust is made to pay tax even before the order is tested by a judicial forum, it would be manifestly unjust.

Another aspect of the matter, is the impact of section 2(15), which often results in an adversarial action either by way of denial of the exemption u/s. 11 or by way of cancellation of registration u/s. 12AA. It must be appreciated that if the objects of the trust from the point of time that it obtained registration have remained unchanged, merely because the proviso to section 2(15) is attracted, there should not be an impact affecting the exemption of earlier years. In the proposal, as is mooted, such an entity would be taxed on its accreted income with disastrous consequences. In certain cases entities are required to modify their objects. One has witnessed many situations, where the registering authority on an application being made notifying it of the change in objects invokes the provisions of section 2(15) and rejects the application thereby cancelling the registration u/s. 12AA. Here again, requiring the charitable institution to pay tax without the action being tested by an appellate forum is grossly unfair.

The problem is compounded / accentuated by the definition of “accreted income”. Accreted income has been defined as “fair market value of total assets on the specified date as exceeding total liabilities”. A small illustration will highlight how unjust this provision is. If a charitable trust has acquired an office of 1,000 square feet, in 1975 for a sum of say Rs. 4 lakh, the same is being used for the objects of the trust. This today would be valued at Rs. 4 crore. According to the proposal, on the cancellation of the registration of such a trust it would be liable to pay tax on the market value which is a notional income which the trust has not earned and is never likely to earn. In most other situations where the concept of fair market value is used, the sale has taken place and it is only the consideration that is being substituted. In this case the proposal brings into play two fictions the first one assumes a sale and the second assumes it to be at market value. All this in the case of a charitable trust!

Another aspect of the matter is that these taxing provisions are, in a sense, retrospective. By taxing the net worth, that is excess of assets over the liabilities and that too at fair market value, the Finance Minister is proposing to tax accumulation of the past which may have arisen out of absolute genuine charitable activity. To illustrate, an NGO may have been pursuing its objectives lawfully over say three decades. In order to ensure continuation of activity it has accumulated unspent income. In a particular year there is a small infraction of section 13 like making an advance to an interested person or an investment not qualifying u/s. 11(5). In such a case if registration is cancelled it would be a gross violation of the principle of equity and fairness.

Another unfortunate aspect of the matter is that the charitable trust will have to pay tax within a short period of 14 days of the liability arising. The provisions do not contemplate keeping the matter in abeyance till an appeal is preferred and the issue tested. If the provisions are really to be complied with, the trust would have no option but to sell off its assets with tragic consequences. In states where there are Acts governing Charitable trusts (like Maharashtra), obtaining permission to sell assets in the form of immovable property also takes months.

I am at a loss to understand, as to how the same authorities, who on the day of the budget issued a very fair and beneficial circular directing stay of demand on payment of 15% of the tax dues till the first appeal is pending can even contemplate provisions as draconian as have been discussed in the earlier paragraphs.

On a reading of the provisions, it appears that the severe impact they will have on genuine charitable institutions seems to have escaped the attention of the FM. I hope that the representations from all quarters get the attention that they deserve so that the proposals are revisited, and the much awaited “acche din” arrive for charitable institutions.

THE THREE GATES OF HELL

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‘Desire,
Anger and Greed are the three gates to Hell which destroy the Soul.
Therefore, one must give up all three of them’, says Krishna to Arjun –
in the Bhagavad Gita.

Krishna also tells Arjun that one who is
able to be free from these three gates of hell, seeks that is best and
attains the highest.

We are familiar with all three, Desire,
Anger and Greed. It is seldom that a person is completely free from all
these three. We must understand each one of these three and seek a way
to keep ourselves as free from them as possible, and to ensure that they
do not become our masters.

Desires are very natural to us.
After all, God has given us different senses; senses of touch, smell,
sight, hearing and taste. The desire to gratify these senses is inborn
in us. These five senses are God’s gift to us. God has also created
sense objects. Senses obviously are given to us for putting them to
rightful use; sense of touch to have a feel of things, sense of smell to
enjoy the scent of flowers, sense of hearing to listen to good music
and words of wise men, sense of sight to enjoy the beautiful nature
around us, and sense of taste to enjoy the various tastes in the food
that we eat.God has also created the sense objects and there is nothing
wrong in enjoying those sense objects with our senses. When desire is
spoken of as a gate to hell, it is not the normal desire that is meant.
What is meant is kama i.e., passion, uncontrolled desire which
overpowers us. By “desire” here we mean wrongful desire, compelling
desire, which takes hold of us and which has to be satisfied at any cost
and by any means even though they may be unethical or immoral. This
desire can never get satisfied. It is like a fire that cannot be
extinguished, a thirst that cannot be quenched. Their fulfillment is by
nature temporary and incomplete. Fulfillment of these only gives
temporary respite. They raise their ugly head again and again. It is
only when these sense objects get hold of us and overpower us that our
troubles start. Desires, particularly uncontrolled desires, are a
gateway to hell. They are endless.

We erroneously believe that
satisfaction of a desire gives us happiness. Our soul, by nature, is
happy. When a desire arises it comes in the way of our happiness, like a
cloud blocking the view of the sun. Satisfaction removes that
obstruction and puts us in touch with our happiness again. It does not
give happiness per se. The same result can be achieved by overcoming the
desire as by gratifying our desire. Sublimating desires frees us from
further desires, which gratification of desires does not do.

Anger
is another gate of hell. When what we desire does not happen or what we
do not desire happens, it gives rise to anger. When we are angry, we go
wild and behave in a manner which is totally irrational. We shout and
scream and cause damage not only to others but even to ourselves because
our mind is not in our control, and it makes us do things which we
repent later. Anger gives rise to tension and both mental and physical
disorders. It can result in high blood pressure, paralytic stroke or
even heart attack. It is allowing one to be controlled by anger that is
to be avoided. It is the second gate to hell.

Just as
non-fulfillment of desire leads to anger, pursuance of wrongful desires
leads to greed. Having once enjoyed the wrongful sense pleasures, one
wants more and more of them. One believes that the only way of
gratifying those desires is wealth and more wealth. This leads to greed.
For fulfilling the desire of enjoyment of sensual needs, one wants more
and more wealth.

As Mahatma Gandhi has truly said, “There is
enough for everyone’s needs but not for everyone’s greed.” Greed is a
bottomless pit and no matter how much one tries, it can never be filled
up. This greed is the third gate to hell.

We have to learn to
live a life free from such excessive desires, uncontrolled anger and
endless greed. It is for us not to enter these gates of hell, be it
desire, anger or greed. I pray that Almighty grant us the strength to
close these three gates and to lead a happy and contented life.

OVERVIEW OF TRANSITION TO AND ADOPTION OF IND-AS

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INTRODUCTION
With the notification of the roadmap by the
Ministry of Corporate Affairs for adoption of International Financial
Reporting Standards (IFRS) converged Indian Accounting Standards (Ind
AS) by all listed companies and large unlisted companies, the adoption
of the same will lead to many changes in the financial statements of
companies, both in terms of presentation and numbers.

Apart from
changes in the accounting, there are several other areas where there
would be an impact, some of which are highlighted hereunder:

Impact of transition on the profit/loss, financial position and net worth of the entity.

Communication with the Board and/or Audit Committee.

Increased volatility in the results.

Increased
disclosure requirements, both quantitative and qualitative which would
result in greater transparency. There would be significantly detailed
disclosures about management judgements and estimates.

Changes in existing information systems requirements.

Impact on reporting on Internal Financial Controls.

Need for increased availability of and enhanced capability of resources.

Greater
alignment with business operations due to increased focus on substance
rather than legal form. There would be greater emphasis on the
underlying business rationale and true economics of various transaction.

Tax implications of and the cost associated with the transition

Loan covenants

Dividend distribution

Investor relations.

An
attempt has been made in the foregoing paragraphs to briefly examine
the various practical considerations in the transition to and adoption
of Ind AS by corporates.

PREPARA TION OF IND-AS OPENING BALANCE SHEET
The
first and foremost consideration in the transition to Ind-AS is the
preparation of the opening Balance sheet. Whilst preparing the Opening
Ind-AS Balance Sheet, subject to the mandatory exceptions and
exemptions, an entity would normally require to ascertain the
adjustments under the following broad headings:

Not to recognise items as assets and liabilities, if Ind-AS does not permit their recognition.

Recognise all assets and liabilities whose recognition is required by Ind-AS.

Reclassify assets, liabilities, and items of equity as per Ind-As requirements.

Measure all assets and liabilities in accordance with Ind-AS.

Let us now examine some of the common adjustments which may be required under each of the above heads.

Not to recognise items as assets and liabilities if Ind- AS does not permit their recognition:

Some of the common adjustments which may be required in this respect are briefly discussed hereunder:

Ind-AS-10 Events after the Reporting Period does not permit recognition of proposed dividends as
an adjusting event and hence the same is not to be presented as a
liability as is the case with AS-4. The proposed dividend is only
required to be disclosed as a note.

Any deferred income or expenditure
such as premium/discount on issue/redemption of debentures / bonds or
expenses on issue of debentures or bonds recognised in terms of the
special dispensation under AS-26, and which are an integral part of the
amortised cost of financial assets and liabilities should be factored in
to determine the effective interest rate and reversed in the opening
balance sheet.

The carried forward balance of any share issue expenses
which are amortised in terms of the special dispensation under AS-26
are required to be eliminated whilst preparing the opening balance
sheet. (The treatment to be adopted if already adjusted against Securities premium Account is not clear).

Any contingent assets or reimbursements like insurance or other claims which are not virtually certain and do not meet the recognition criteria under Ind-AS-37 should be reversed in the opening balance sheet.

In the opening consolidated financial statements, assets and liabilities of joint ventures which are included under the Proportionate Consolidated method should be reversed since the same is no longer permissible

Any held for sale subsidiary, associate or joint venture should be eliminated from consolidation and disclosed as a separate disposal group.

Recognise all assets and liabilities whose recognition is required by Ind-AS.

Some of the common adjustments which may be required in this respect are briefly discussed hereunder:

All derivative financial assets and liabilities and embedded derivatives shall be recognised if not done earlier.

Certain
provisions in the nature of restructuring obligations, onerous
contracts, decommissioning liabilities, site restoration, warranties,
litigation etc. need to be recognised based on constructive obligations, which may not have been recognised earlier or were disclosed as contingent liabilities.

Various intangible assets
like brands, customer lists etc. acquired in a business combination,
which earlier were part of goodwill need to be recognised if
retrospective application of Ind-AS 103 is opted for.

Recognition of certain new investment properties
in view of the differences in the recognition criteria e.g land held
for long term capital appreciation, building that is vacant but is held
to be leased under one or more operating leases etc.

Deferred tax assets and liabilities would need to be recognised based on the Balance sheet approach.

In the consolidated financial statements investments in joint ventures need to be recognised based on the equity method.

Assets
and liabilities of any held for sale subsidiary, associate or joint
venture would need to be recognised and presented as a disposal group.

Reclassify assets, liabilities, and items of equity as per Ind-As requirements.

Some of the common adjustments which may be required in this respect are briefly discussed hereunder:

Classification of financial liabilities and equity should be based on the substance
rather than legal form e.g. redeemable preference shares would need to
be reclassified as debt, fully convertible debentures would need to be
reclassified as equity etc.

Compound financial instruments need to be split into debt and equity components e.g. partly / optionally convertible bonds.

Financial assets, notably investments, need to be reclassified into amortised cost, fair value through profit and loss, fair value through other comprehensive income etc.

Certain intangible assets acquired as part of earlier business combinations may not meet the definition of intangible assets and hence need to be included as part of goodwill e.g. certain acquisition cost, promotional cost etc.

An entity preparing consolidated financial statements
for the first time or which has not consolidated any subsidiary under
AS-21 e.g. where the control is exercised through the power to govern
the operating policies and business decisions rather than through
shareholding alone would need to incorporate the relevant assets and
liabilities.

Measure all assets and liabilities in accordance with Ind-AS.

Some of the common adjustments which may be required in this respect are briefly discussed hereunder:

In case of purchase of inventories, fixed assets and intangible assets on deferred settlement terms, the interest element would need to be segregated.

In case of fixed assets, if the fair value model is opted for, it would necessitate a remeasurement.

Government grants in the form of non-monetary assets or concessional loans are to be measured at the fair value.

Borrowing cost are to be calculated using the effective interest rate method.

Where the time value of money is material, provisions should be on a discounted basis.

Share based payment transactions need to be recognised on a fair value basis.

Assets and liabilities acquired in a business combination need to be measured at fair value.

Non-current assets held for sale and Discontinued Operations need to be measured at fair value less costs to sell.

All
Financial assets and liabilities to be initially recognised at fair
value and subsequently measured based on their classification as above.

As
part of the transition to Ind-AS entities are also required to evaluate
the various exemptions, both mandatory and voluntary, which are
provided for under Ind-AS-101, the important ones of which are briefly
discussed hereunder:

MANDATORY EXEMPTIONS TO RETRO – SPECTIVE APPLICATION OF IND-AS
A first time adopter is provided with the following key mandatory exemptions to retrospective application of certain Ind-AS:

Derecognition of Financial Assets and Liabilities

There
is no need to recognise any financial asset or liability which is
already derocognised under local GAAP. Alternatively, the entity may
apply derecognition criteria retrospectively by choosing a cut off date.


Hedge Accounting

Any transactions entered into before the date of transition are not to be retrospectively designated as hedges.

Classification and Measurement of Financial Assets and Liabilities

The
determination of cash flows for time value measurement of financial
assets on the date of transition is not required when it is
impracticable to assess the same retrospectively, subject to adequate
disclosures being made till their derecognition.

For measurement
of existing financial assets and liabilities on the date of transition,
if it is impracticable to determine effective interest rate
retrospectively, the fair value on the date of transition shall be the
new gross carrying amount or the new amortised cost for applying the
effective interest method.

Embedded Derivatives

A
first time adopter shall assess whether an embedded derivative is
required to be separated from the host contract on the basis of
conditions that existed at the later of the date it first became a party
to the contract and the date of reassessment.

Government Loans

The
benefit of a government loan at below market rate of interest is not
required to be recognised as a government grant on the date of
transition.

VOLUNTARY EXEMPTIONS TO RETRO – SPECTIVE APPLICATION OF IND-AS
A
first time adopter is provided with the following key voluntary
exemptions to retrospective application of certain Ind-AS. Understanding
the same is of critical importance since it could impact comparability
of results of entities in the same sector.

Share based Payment Transactions

Voluntary
retrospective application of fair valuation in respect of equity
instruments granted, vested and not settled or any modification made
before the date of transition is available. Similar considerations apply
to any liabilities arising out of such transactions which are settled
before the date of transition. However, an entity may adopt earlier
application if fair value disclosures have been publicly made.

Deemed Cost of Property, Plant and Equipment and Intangible Assets

The
entity can opt for the previous GAAP carrying amount as deemed cost.
Alternatively, the fair value on the date of transition can also be
considered as the deemed cost provided it is comparable with what is
required under Ind-AS. In certain cases, an event driven fair value used
during a privatisation, IPO etc. can also be considered as a deemed
cost. In case fair value is taken as deemed cost, the same should be
allocated component wise and depreciation shall be calculated
accordingly.

Deemed Cost of Investment Property

These
may be identified on the date of transition based on Ind-AS criteria of
these being used to earn rentals or for capital appreciation as against
the AS-13 criteria of it not being intended to be used or occupied
substantially in the operations of the enterprise.

Leases

Separate
classification where lease includes both land and building into the
finance (normally for land) and operating lease, as applicable on the
date of transition is permissible where there is a composite lease of
land and building.

Determining whether an arrangement contains a lease on the date of transition based on the specific assets test – fulfilment of the arrangement is dependent on the use of a specific asset or right to use of an asset.

Cumulative Translation Differences

Cumulative
translation differences for all foreign operations (Ind-AS does not
distinguish between integral and non-integral operations) on the date of
translation shall be zero; and

Gains and losses on subsequent
disposal of foreign operations shall exclude translation differences
prior to the date of transition.

Long Term Foreign Currency Monetary Items

If these are reflected under FCMDTA account, similar treatment can continue on the date of transition.

In
case these are adjusted against the carrying value of the fixed assets,
similar treatment can continue only if the entity adopts the deemed
cost model as discussed above.

Investments in Subsidiaries, Associates and Joint Ventures

Deemed
cost as per previous GAAP (i.e. fair value in the separate financial
statements on date of transition or previous GAAP carrying amount) on
the date of transition can be used.

Assets and Liabilities of Subsidiaries, Associates and Joint Ventures

If
an entity adopts Ind-AS before or simultaneously with the
parent/investor, no adjustments required. However, if the entity adopts
Ind-AS later than the parent/investor, respective carrying amounts on
the date of the investor’s/ parent’s transition can be considered.

Compound Financial Instruments

An
entity is required to split into liability and equity components
retrospectively unless liability component is no longer outstanding on
date of transition.

Designation of Previously Recognised Financial Instruments

All Financial assets are required to be classified into three types, as under:

Fair value through Profit and Loss in
cases where the holding of the financial asset helps to eliminate or
significantly reduce measurement or recognition uncertainty or holding
period is less than 12 months. It can be used irrespective of the
business model discussed below.

Fair value through other comprehensive income in
cases where the business model involves collection of contractual cash
flows either through selling the asset or through principal and interest
payments.

Amortised cost, in cases where the business model involves collection of contractual cash flows of interest and principal.

All Financial liabilities are required to be classified into two types, as under:

1. Fair value through Profit and Loss (very selectively)
2. A mortised cost.

The above designations can be either at initial recognition or on the date of transition.

The
amortised cost of financial assets and liabilities shall be determined
on the basis of the benchmark interest rate on the date of transition,
if it is impractical to determine the same retrospectively.

All
Equity instruments always to be classified at fair value – either
through Profit & Loss or through Other Comprehensive Income and no
recycling permissible if option of classifying through OCI is selected –
No specific impairment analysis required


Fair Value Measurement of Financial Assets and Liabilities on Initial Recognition

This may be applied prospectively to transactions entered into on or after the date of transition.

Decommissioning Liabilities included in Cost of Fixed Assets

Where exemption from retrospective application is sought, following needs to be done:

Measure the liability on the date of transition as per Ind-AS 37.

To
the extent it is to be included in the cost of the asset, the amount
should be estimated based on the assumption that it would be included
when the liability first arose and then discounted accordingly, using
historical risk adjusted discount rates (based on average annual
inflation, and incremental borrowing rates).

Calculate accumulated depreciation on the above amount using current estimated useful life.

Service Concession Arrangements

Recognise financial assets and intangible assets on the date of transition.

Use the previous GAAP carrying amounts.

Test for impairment at the date of transition unless impractical to do so.

Joint Venture Accounting – Transition from Proportionate Consolidation to Equity Method

Business Combinations

An entity may choose not to apply Ind-AS-3 to business combinations that occurred before the date of transition.

However, if it decides to restate any past business combinations, it should restate all business combinations after that date.

Apart from the various exemptions, certain other key considerations under various Ind-AS are discussed hereunder:

OTHER KEY CONSIDERATIONS IN TRANSITION Ind-AS-2 Inventories

In
respect of inventories acquired on deferred settlement basis, the
interest element thereon shall be excluded. This needs to be adjusted on
the date of transition.

Sale of inventories after the reporting
period would be an adjusting event under Ind-AS 10 discussed below
which would need to be adjusted on the date of transition.

Ind-AS10 Events After Reporting Period

Any
provision for proposed dividend and related dividend distribution tax
after the reporting period shall be reversed and added back to retained
earnings.

Settlement of a court case after reporting period
confirms the existence of a present obligation and accordingly the
previously created provision needs to be adjusted or fresh provision
need to be created in terms of Ind-AS-37.

An entity shall adjust
cost of assets purchased based on information available after reporting
period if it opts for carrying value as the deemed cost.

On the
date of transition any legal and/or constructive obligations after the
reporting period shall be taken into account if not considered under
previous GAAP. (see discussion on Ind-AS 19 on Employee Benefits below)

Ind-AS 19 on Employee Benefits

Actuarial
gains and losses arising on defined benefit plans and other long term
employee benefits should be recognised in the Statement of Other
Comprehensive Income and cannot be recycled to the Profit and Loss
Account.

All past service costs need to be immediately expensed off.

Instead
of recognising interest cost in the Profit and Loss Account, Ind- AS-19
requires recognition of net interest cost based on the net defined
benefit asset or liability and the discount rate at the beginning of the
year.

Other miscellaneous adjustments in the actuarial assumptions.

Revised actuarial valuation would be required.

More
specific guidance on accounting for constructive obligations i.e. as a
result of informal practices. These would need to be henceforth
recognised in the financial statements

Ind-AS 23 on Borrowing Costs

Inventories
which are manufactured or otherwise produced in large quantities on a
repetitive basis are not considered as qualifying assets even if they
take a substantial period of time to get ready for their intended use or
sale. e.g wines, cheese etc.

Borrowing costs shall be measured
applying effective interest rate method from the date transition date.
Accordingly, ancillary borrowing cost written off earlier need to be
amortised. Earlier period borrowing costs should not be restated.

Dividend payable in respect of compulsorily redeemable preference shares
would also need to be considered as borrowing costs eligible for
capitalisation depending on the specific circumstances.

Ind-AS 12 Income
Taxes

Balance Sheet method to be adopted for computation of deferred
tax asset or liability by which the tax base is compared with accounting
base. Primary impact would be in respect of business combinations and
consolidation adjustments.

Tax base of an asset is the amount
deductible for tax purposes against any taxable economic benefits that
would flow to the entity when it recovers the carrying amount of the
asset. e.g depreciable assets, uncollected income taxed on a cash basis,
assets measured at fair value where the fair value gain is not taxed or
fair value loss is disallowed.


Tax base of a liability is its
carrying amount, less any amount deductible for tax purposes. E.g.
income received in advance taxed at a later date, loan payable having an
amortised cost.


A first time adopter would have to establish the
history of items that give rise to temporary differences and adopt
retrospective application.


Implications vis-à-vis ICDS needs to be
considered?

Ind-AS 38 Intangible Assets

Unamortised share issue
expenses need to be charged off. Amounts in the nature of transaction
cost need to be reduced from equity.

Any unamortised borrowing costs
need to be analysed. Initial transaction cost need to be reduced from
the borrowings and any ancillary cost needs to be considered in the
calculating the effective interest rate.

Revenue based amortisation
of toll roads would not be permitted for toll roads arising after the
transition date.

Amortisation of intangible assets with indefinite
useful life not permitted. E.g., Right of Way, Stock Exchange broking
card etc. These would however need to be tested for impairment.

Implications vis-à-vis adjustment against Securities Premium Account to be considered.

Ind-AS 21 Effects of Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates

The concept of functional currency introduced for the first time. No first time exemption provided. It is the currency of the primary economic environment
in which the entity operates. It is normally the currency which
influences the income and expenses the most. e. g. shipping company.

Ind-AS 37 Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets

Specific
requirement to recognise provisions in respect of constructive
obligations. AS-29 does not specifically refer to the same. It only
refers to creation of provisions arising out of normal business customs
and practices, to maintain business relations etc.

Restructuring provisions need to be made based on constructive obligations as against legal obligations in terms of AS-29.

Discounting of provisions where effect of time value of money is material.

OTHER AREAS HAVING SIGNIFICANT IMPACT

FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS

Recognition and Measurement

Greater use of fair value – use of judgement and valuation tools in many cases.

Impairment to be calculated on the Expected Credit Loss Model.


Assessment of whether there is a significant increase in the credit
risk since initial inception or there is a low credit risk; in which case
12 months expected credit losses are recognised.

– Where
significant increase in credit risk since initial inception and no
objective evidence of impairment, in which case life time expected
credit losses to be recognised on a PD basis

– Where there is
objective evidence of impairment, life time expected credit losses are
recognised and interest income is computed on the net basis (i.e. net of
credit allowances)

– The above will have a big impact on financial institutions and NBFCs which are covered at a later date. However, in the interim any loans granted by non- financial entities would still need to be evaluated since currently they are not even covered by the prudential guidelines. Financing of group entities would need closer scrutiny.

Derivative Instruments- Currently, there are diverse practices adopted. Whilst some entities were adopting AS-30 (which is recommendatory in nature), other entities are following the ICAI announcement which requires only losses to be recognised. Post adoption of Ind-AS, consistency would creep in and recognition of both gains and losses either through Profit and Loss or OCI (where hedge accounting is adopted) would be required. The impact would be greater for entities who were hitherto following the ICAI announcement and recognising only losses.

Transaction Costs
– In respect of long term borrowings, these will be recognised over the tenor of the borrowing using the effective interest rate method as against the current practice of charging off.

– In respect of financial assets, these would need to be charged off as against the current practice of capitalising the same, unless these are in respect of financial assets recorded on amortised cost basis, in which case they would need to be adjusted against the carrying value.

BUSINESS COMBINATIONS

Recognition and Measurement

Acquisition Value
– Assets and liabilities to be recognised at fair value.
– Contingent Liabilities and Intangible Assets not recognised in the acquiree’s financial statements would also need to be recognised at fair value.

– Non controlling interests to be measured at fair value.

– Significant changes in the value of goodwill reflecting a more accurate depiction of the premium paid on acquisition even though the legal form of the acquisition has not changed.

– Recording of assets at fair value will normally result in higher depreciation and amortisation – In case of intangibles with indefinite useful life or with higher useful life lower or no amortisation.

– Goodwill will not have to be amortised but tested for impairment.

– In case of a business combination in stages, the previously held equity interest to be measured at acquisition date fair value, with resultant gain or loss recognised in the Profit and Loss resulting in greater volatility in the Income Statement.

Accounting for Transaction Costs
– These need to be charged off as against the current practice of generally capitalising them.

Accounting vis-à-vis High Court Orders
– Under the Companies Act, 2013, certificate from the auditors required whether scheme is in accordance with the Accounting Standards thereby doing away with the leeway provided under the Companies Act, 1956.

– Position in the intervening period till the notification of the relevant sections under the Companies Act, 2013, especially for non-listed companies not clear.

CONSOLIDATED/GROUP ACCOUNTS

Recognition and Measurement

Preparation of Consolidated Financial statements – Many additional SPEs would get consolidated and there could be deconsolidation of certain subsidiaries since two companies cannot consolidate the same subsidiary since control can be exercised only by one entity. Investment entities are also not required to be consolidated.

– Consolidation mandated under the Companies Act, 2013 of associates and joint ventures even if there are no subsidiaries.

– Proportionate consolidation method no longer permissible.

– Definition of control is different. An investor is deemed to control an enterprise only when he has the power over the entity or when he has exposure or rights to variable returns from its involvement with the investee and has the ability/power the affect these returns. Such powers can be exercise even when there is no majority ownership. Even potential voting rights are relevant.

– Changes in ownership interest that do not result in loss of control should be adjusted against equity. No guidance under current GAAP and hence differing practices were adopted.

– Losses incurred by the subsidiary to be allocated between the controlling and non-controlling interest as against the practice under Indian GAAP of adjusting these against the majority, unless there is a binding obligation to make good the losses.

Uniform Accounting Policies
– Not very rigid and strictly enforceable under current GAAP. – Challenges could be encountered especially in case of associates over which control is not exercised.

– Many group entities would be required to change their policies, the individual impact of which would need to be evaluated.

Uniform Financial Year
– Maximum gap reduced to three months as against six months. – On adoption many entities would be compelled to change their year ends.

INCOME TAXES

Recognition and Measurement

Recognition based on Balance Sheet method for taxable temporary differences as against timing differences under the current GAAP.

Recognition of deferred tax on business combinations.

Recognition of deferred tax assets on losses is not very stringent.

Deferred tax liability required to be recognised in consolidated financial statements for all taxable temporary differences in connection with group investments unless the investor is able to control the timing of the reversal in the foreseeable future.

Significantly detailed disclosures and reconciliations.

EMPLOYEE BENEFITS AND SHARE BASED PAYMENTS

Recognition and Measurement

Actuarial gains and losses to be taken to Other Comprehensive Income which will reduce volatility.

Employee benefits are required to be recognised based on constructive obligation as against the current practice of generally recognising the same based on legal obligation.

ESOPS to be mandatorily recorded on a fair value basis which would result in increased charges and hence have a significant impact on key performance indicators like EPS.

Share based payments to non-employees like vendors against supply of goods and services would need to be recorded on a fair value basis in all cases, which is currently missing. Only fixed assets so acquired are accounted for at fair value in terms of AS-10. This could have a negative impact on the financial results and other performance indices, dividend servicing abilities and loans covenants, amongst others.

PROPERTY, PLANT AND EQUIPMENT

Recognition and Measurement

Mandatory Component Accounting

– Any cost which is significant in relation to the total cost and has a separately defined useful life need to be separately identified and depreciated accordingly.
– Residual value calculations and estimates need to be evaluated afresh.
– Even companies not adopting Ind-AS need to adopt the same in terms of the Companies Act, 2013.
– Expected to a have a material and significant impact on highly capitalised manufacturing entities and IT technology companies.
– Could have a significant impact on insurance, asset backed financing, amongst other matters.

Revaluation of Assets
– No selective revaluation permitted.
– Updation of revaluation on a regular basis.

– Depreciation charge to be charged off to Income Statement. Even companies not adopting Ind- AS need to follow the same in terms of the Companies Act, 2013

– Since it is an option it can affect comparability of results of the same class of companies and hence uniformity in terms of loan covenants including security cover etc. would be an issue.

–For companies adopting the revaluation route whilst the asset base would be higher, there would also be a higher corresponding depreciation charge

Repairs and Overhaul expenditure
– Needs to be capitalised if it satisfies the recognition criteria.

– Corresponding decapitalisation of the replaced parts.

– Closer scrutiny of the renewal and asset maintenance policies of companies, especially those which are asset heavy.

Unrealised Exchange Differences
– These are required to be charged off in all cases prospectively.
– Companies who have opted for the transitional relief for continuing treatment of capitalisation in terms of para 46A of AS-11 till the tenor of the loans or till FY 2020. This would impact comparability of results.
– Greater volatility in the results of companies who have large overseas borrowings.

INTANGIBLE ASSETS

Recognition and Measurement

Intangible assets can have indefinite useful lives, identification of which should be adequately and appropriately demonstrated and justified. Such assets need to be subjected to an annual impairment assessment.

Fair valuation is now permissible especially if an active market exists.

CONCLUSION
The above assessment is just the tip of the ice-berg and in actual practice there could be many other issues, challenges and implications which would merit a detailed assessment.

RULES FOR INTERPRETATION OF TAX LAWS – PAR T 1

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1.Introduction:
No enactment has been enacted by the Legislature for Interpretation of Statues including on Tax Laws. However, in many an acts, definition clause is inserted to mean a ‘word’ or ‘expression’. Explanations and Provisos are inserted to expand or curtail. No codified rules have been made by the rule making authority or the Legislature. Rules are judge made, keeping due regard of the objects, intent and purpose of the enacted provision. Interpretation is the primary function of a court of law. The Court interprets the provision whenever a challenge is thrown before it. Interpretation would not be arbitrary or fanciful but an honest continuous exercise by the Courts.

1.1. The expression “interpretation” and “construction” are generally understood as synonymous even though jurisprudentially both are distinct and different. “Interpretation” means the art of finding out of true sense of the enactment whereas “Construction” means drawing conclusions on the documents based on its language, phraseology clauses, terms and conditions. Rules for Interpretation of “Tax Laws” are to some extent different than the General Principles of Interpretation of Common Law. Rules of Interpretation which govern the tax laws are being dealt in this series of articles.

2. Particulars in a Statute:
Every enactment normally contains Short title; Long title; Preamble; Marginal notes; Headings of a group of sections or of individual sections; Definition of interpretation clauses; Provisos; Illustrations; Exceptions and saving clauses; Explanations; Schedules; Punctuations; etc. Title may be short or long. Preamble contains the main object. Marginal notes are given. Chapters and Headings are group of sections. In the Finance Bill, Memorandum containing explanation on every clause, intent and purpose for the proposal is given. Central Board of Direct Taxes issues Circulars explaining each clause. Finance Minister in his speech refers to the proposed insertions, amendments, alterations, modifications etc. It is highly desirable to go through such material apart from unmodified provision for proper understanding, pleadings and arguments.

3. Classification of the Statute:
Statute can be of various classifications. Providing date of commencement, territorial jurisdiction, mandatory or directory, object, whether codifying or consolidating or declaratory or remedial or enabling or disabling, penal, explanatory, amending retrospective or retroactive or repeal with savings or curative, corrective or validating. Applicability can be on all the subjects or class of persons or specified territorial area or specified industries etc. Assent of the President is a requisite condition. Rules have to be framed by the rule making authority and to be operative from specified date or notified date.

4. The General Principles of Interpretation:
Broadly, the general principles, as applied from time to time by the Courts are : The literal or grammatical interpretation; The mischief rule; The golden rule; Harmonious construction; The statute should be read as a whole; Construction ut res magis valeat quam pereat; Identical expressions to have same meaning; Construction noscitur a sociis; Construction ejusdem generis; Construction expression unius est exclusion alterius; Construction contemporanea exposition est fortissimo in lege; etc. Taxation statutes collecting taxes, duty, cess, levies, etc. from the subjects, have to be beneficially and liberally construed in favour of the tax payers. Penal statutes have to be construed strictly and the benefit of doubt to go to the culprit. Penalty provisions are a civil liability, but have to be construed reasonably. Penalty is corrective and not revenue earner. Levy of interest is compensatory and is treated as mandatory. Charge should be specific and there must be satisfaction of the authority issuing show-cause and levying penalty.

4.1. Other statutes in pari-materia have to be cautiously applied and if phraseology and intent is identical, may apply. Ratio decendai may also apply. Amending statutes are normally prospective unless specifically stated as retrospective. There are mandatory and directory or conjunctive and disjunctive enactments. There exist internal or external aids to interpretation. There can be retrospective, prospective or retroactive operation of a provision. Many maxims are used for interpretation. While interpreting tax laws ‘Double Taxation Avoidance Agreements’ have to be considered as supreme and would prevail even if meaning and language in the statute is different and there exists a confrontation. No provision should be in infringement of the Constitution and it should not be violative or unconstitutional but intravires – not ultravires. Certain issues may be resintegra or nonintegra.

4.2. There are binding precedents under articles 141 and 226 – 227 of the Constitution of India. Even order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and High Court, other than the jurisdictional High Court, have to be respected. Judgment of larger bench as well as co-ordinate bench has to be followed unless and until raised issue is referred to the President of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal or the Chief Justice, as the case may be, for constituting a larger bench. Judgment of the Constitutional Bench prevails over judgments of lower authorities and single benches. However recently it has been noticed that even orders of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal or Single or Division Bench of High Courts have been referred and considered, if no appeal has been filed by the Revenue and their ratio has been accepted impliedly or explicitly.

4.3. The General Clauses Act, 1897, contains definitions, which are applicable to all common laws including tax laws, unless and until any repugnant or different definition is contained in the definition section of the tax laws. It also contains general rules of construction, which are applied on common law as well as tax laws. Provisions of Civil Law, Criminal Law, Hindu Law, Evidence Act, Transfer of Property Act, Partnership Act, Companies Act and other specific, relevant and ancillary laws equally apply unless until a different provision is enacted in tax statute and such laws expressly excluded. As analysed, about 108 Acts other than tax statutes need be read, referred and relied upon to make an effective representation, knowledge whereof is imperative.

4.4. Ordinances are also issued, which have limited life, till the statute is enacted or for the specified period. Its purpose is to be operative during the intervening period, where after it automatically lapses. Circulars, instructions, directions are issued statutorily as well as internally, which are binding on tax administration, but not on a tax payer. By such circulars, scope of exemption, deduction or allowance can be expanded, even though literal meaning of the relevant provision may be to the contrary; being beneficial to the tax payer.

5. The Tax and Litigation:
Return is filed. Assessment is framed by the assessing authority. First appeal lies with the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), a superior assessing authority. Second appeal lies, and lis commences, on appeal to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. Income Tax Appellate Tribunal is final fact finding body. Third appeal lies with the Division Bench of the jurisdictional High Court, on substantial question of law and finality is given by the Supreme Court, where an appeal as well as a Special leave Petition can be filed. Appeal is statutory and S.L.P. is discretionary. Scope is larger on SLP. Revisional power is with the Commissioner of Income-tax u/s. 263 as well as 264. Writ remedy can be availed before the jurisdictional High Court, if there is no alternative, effective, efficacious remedy of appeal or if there is lack of jurisdiction or violation of principles of natural justice or perversity or arbitrariness, disturbing conscious of the Court. The Hon’ble High Courts are slow in permitting writ jurisdiction. Even notice u/s.148 can be challenged by writ, on lack of jurisdictional requirements. Substantial disputes can be settled through the medium of Income Tax Settlement Commission and Dispute Resolution mechanism. Interpretation of documents is a substantial question of law as held by the Apex Court in Unitech Ltd. vs. Union of India (2016) 381-ITR-456 (S.C.).

5.1. Eminent Jurist Cardozo states, “You may say that there is no assurance that judges will interpret the mores of their day more wisely and truly than other men. I am not disposed to deny this, but in my view it is quite beside the point. The point is rather that this power of interpretation must be lodged somewhere, and the custom of the Constitution has lodged it in the Judges. If they are to fulfill their function as Judges, it could hardly be lodged elsewhere. Their conclusions must, indeed, be subject to constant testing and retesting, revision and readjustment; but if they act with conscience and intelligence, they ought to attain in their conclusions a fair average of truth and wisdom.”

5.2. Article 265 of the constitution mandates that no tax shall be levied or collected except by the authority of law. It provides that not only levy but also the collection of a tax must be under the authority of some law. The tax proposed to be levied must be within the legislative competence of the Legislature imposing the tax. The validity of the tax is to be determined with reference to the competence of the Legislature at the time when the taxing law was enacted. The law must be validly enacted i.e. by the proper body which has the legislative authority and in the manner required to give its Acts, the force of law. The law must not be a colourable use of or a fraud upon the legislative power to tax. The tax must not violate the conditions laid down in the constitution and must not also contravene the specific provisions of the constitution.

5.3. No tax can be imposed by any bye-law, rule or regulation unless the ‘statute’ under which the subordinate legislation is made specifically authorises the imposition and the authorisation must be express not implied. The procedure prescribed by the statute must be followed. Tax is a compulsory exaction made under an enactment. The word tax, in its wider sense includes all money raised by taxation including taxes levied by the Union and State Legislatures; rates and other charges levied by local authorities under statutory powers. Tax includes any ‘impost’ general, special or local. It would thus include duties, cesses or fees, surcharge, administrative charges etc. A broad meaning has to be given to the word “tax.”

5.4. Taxes are levied and collected to meet the cost of governance, safety, security and for welfare of the economically weaker sections of the Society. It is well established that the Legislature enjoys wide latitude in the matter of selection of persons, subject-matter, events, etc., for taxation. The tests of the vice of discrimination in a taxing law are less rigorous. It is well established that the Legislature is promulgated to exercise an extremely wide discretion in classifying for tax purposes, so long as it refrains from clear and hostile discrimination against particular persons or classes. In Jaipur Hosiery Mills (P.) Ltd. vs. State of Rajasthan (1970) 26-STC-341; the apex court while upholding the classification made on the basis of the value of sold garments, held that the statute is not open to attack on the mere ground that it taxes some persons or objects and not others. The same view has been taken in State of Gujarat vs. Shri Ambica Mills Ltd., (1974) 4-SCC-916. In ITO vs. N. Takin Roy Rymbai (1976) 103-ITR-82 (SC); (1976) 1 SCC 916, the apex court held that the Legislature has ample freedom to select and classify persons, districts, goods, properties, incomes and objects which it would tax, and which it would not tax.

5.5. With National litigation policy of the Government of India, the Central Board of Direct Taxes issued Instruction No. 5 dated July 10, 2014 and lately in exercise of powers conferred u/s. 268(A) of the Income-tax Act issued Circular dated December 10, 2015 bearing No. 21 of 2015, enhancing monetary limits for an appeal before the Tribunal exceeding tax Rs. 10 lakh, before the High Court exceeding tax Rs. 20 lakh and before the Hon’ble Supreme Court exceeding tax Rs. 25 lakh with specified exceptions. Tax would not include interest. Same limit for penalty appeals. It applies to pending appeals and references. Writs have been excluded. The instruction will apply retrospectively to pending appeals and appeals to be filed henceforth in High Courts/Tribunals. Pending appeals below the specified tax limits may be withdrawn or not pressed. Appeals before the Supreme Court will be governed by the instructions on this subject, operative at the time when such appeal was filed.

5.6. The Hon’ble Bombay High Court in C.I.T. vs. Sunny Sounds Pvt. Ltd. (2016) 281-ITR-443 (Bom.) at 452 observed: “The need for the Central Board of Direct Taxes to issue the December 15, 2015, Circular and to clarify that it would apply retrospectively to govern even pending appeals arose on account of the enormous increase in the number of appeals being filed by the Revenue over the years”. It also observed: “This policy of non-filing and of not pressing and/or withdrawing admitted appeals having tax effect of less than Rs. 20 lakh has been specifically declared to be retrospective by the Circular dated December 10, 2015. There is no reason why the circular4 should not apply to pending references where the tax effect is less than Rs. 20 lakh as the objective of the Circular would stand fulfilled on its application even to pending references”. Ultimately reference application of the Revenue was returned unanswered. The Ahmedabad Bench of I.T.A.T. in Dy. Commissioner vs. Some Textiles & Industries Ltd. and Others (2016) 175-TTJ (Ahd.) 1 by Order dated 15.12.2015 have also held so for pending appeals. Thus cost of the Government has been saved. Fairly large number of pending appeals have been / are being withdrawn. Appeals / References which fall under the Circular as interpreted by the Courts and Tribunals need be brought to the notice of the relevant forum or the concerned Commissioner for its expeditious withdrawal. It is ‘Professional Social Responsibility’ of each one of us. I have noticed department is slack and is not filing withdrawal applications or providing lists to the I.T.A.T./ High Courts. It is improper.

5.7. Regularly at short intervals, Voluntary Disclose or Declaration Schemes and Schemes to reduce / waive outstanding demands like Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme etc. are introduced. The Finance Bill, 2016 also introduces (1) The Income Declaration Scheme, 2016; (2) The Direct Tax Dispute Resolutions Scheme, 2016, benefit whereof deserves to be availed of by the eligible persons. It is advisable to cut down tax disputes, purchase peace and concentrate on earning income after developing tax culture. Our duty is to guide clients for payment of due and legitimate taxes.

5.8. In tax administration, accountability is absent, work culture is missing and slackness is apparent. High pitched additions are made, arbitrarily, capriciously, with perversity and malafides. Corruption is flagrant. The Raja Chelliah report suggested that black marks be given to such officers, whose additions do not stand test of appeal. But the same was not accepted. However, by the Finance Bill, 2016 some steps towards accountability and expeditious are proposed. Such steps need to be implemented vigorously to usher in discipline. Many more measures are necessary and expedient in the interest of just collection.

6. Charging and Machinery Provision :

The rule of construction of a charging section is that before taxing any person, it must be shown that he falls within the ambit of the charging section by clear words used in the section. No one can be taxed by implication. A charging section has to be construed strictly. If a person has not been brought within the ambit of the charging section by clear words, he cannot be taxed at all. The Supreme Court in CWT vs. Ellis Bridge Gymkhana and Others (1998) 229 ITR 1 held: “The Legislature deliberately excluded a firm or an association of persons from the charge of wealth-tax and the word “individual” in the charging section cannot be stretched to include entities which had been deliberately left out of the charge.

6.1. The charging section which fixes the liability is strictly construed but that rule of strict construction is not extended to the machinery provisions which are construed like any other statute. The machinery provisions must, no doubt, be so construed as would effectuate the object and purpose of the statute and not defeat the same. (See Whitney vs. Commissioner of Inland Revenue (1926) AC 37, Commissioner of Income-tax vs. Mahaliram Ramjidas (1940) 8-ITR-442 (PC), India United Mills Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Excess Profits Tax, Bombay (1955) 27-ITR-20 (SC); and Gursahai Saigal vs. Commissioner of Income-tax, Punjab (1963) 48-ITR-1 (SC).

6.2. The choice between a strict and a liberal construction arises only in case of doubt in regard to the intention of the Legislature, manifest on the statutory language. Indeed, the need to resort to any interpretative process arises only when the meaning is not manifest on the plain words of the statute. If the words are plain and clear and directly convey the meaning, there is no need for any interpretation. Liberal and strict construction of an exemption provision are, as stated in Union of India vs. Wood Papers Ltd. (1991) 83-STC-251 (SC) “to be invoked at different stages of interpreting it. When the question is whether a subject falls in the notification or in the exemption clause then it being in the nature of exception is to be construed strictly and against the subject. But once ambiguity or doubt about applicability is lifted and the subject falls in the notification then full play should be given to it and it calls for a wider and liberal construction.”

6.3. The Apex Court in C.I.T. vs. Calcutta Knitwears (2014) 362-ITR-673 (S.C.) stated: “The courts, while interpreting the provisions of a fiscal legislation, should neither add nor subtract a word from the provisions. The foremost principle of interpretation of fiscal statutes in every system of interpretation is the rule of strict interpretation which provides that where the words of the statute are absolutely clear and unambiguous, recourse cannot be had to the principles of interpretation other than the literal rule”. It also observed: “Hardship or inconvenience cannot alter the meaning of the language employed by the Legislature if such meaning is clear and apparent. Hence, departure from the literal rule should only be in very rare cases, and ordinarily there should be judicial restraint to do so” and : It is the duty of the court while interpreting machinery provisions of a taxing statute to give effect to its manifest purpose. Wherever the intention to impose liability is clear, the courts ought not to be hesitant in espousing a common sense interpretation of the machinery provisions so that the charge does not fail. The machinery provisions must, no doubt, be so construed as would effectuate the object and purpose of the statute and not defeat it”.

49TH RESIDENTIAL REFRESHER COURSE (RRC ) OF BOMBAY CHARTERED ACCOUN TANTS SOCIETY (BCAS)

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49th Residential Refresher Course (RR C) of Bombay Chartered Accountants Society (BCAS) was held between 22nd January, 2016 and 25th January, 2016 at Novotel Imagica, Khopoli.

Mr. Raman Jokhakar, President of BCAS welcomed the participants and highlighted the activities of BCAS.

Mr. Uday Sathaye, Chairman, Seminar Committee gave an idea, to the participants about the 49th RRC and then introduced the Chief Guest Mr. Narendra Sarda, Past President of ICAI.
After lighting of lamp, the inaugural speech was delivered

by Narendrabhai. He dealt with the subject “Identifying, Evaluating & Mitigating Risk in CA Profession”. He presented his views considering the present scenario particularly, the extensive regulations imposed by regulators which were required to be followed by Chartered

Accountants. He explained the need for more planning and elaborate reporting to minimize risk. He emphasized the adoption of technology for survival. Both Internal and External risks were explained by him. His extempore speech in his unique style of presentation without referring to a paper was appreciated by the audience. It was indeed a great experience to learn from Mr. Narendra Sarda.

Mr. Rajesh Kadakia then replied to the issues raised by the group leaders during the course of discussion on his paper Charitable Institutions-Tax issues. He explained in his very lucid style, the various nuances of the provisions of section 11 to 13 of the Incometax Act. He pointed out that these provisions were virtually a self-contained code, and it was necessary to understand them thoroughly before dealing with taxation of charitable trusts.

The session was chaired by Mr. Pranay Marfatia, Past President of BCAS.

23rd January 2016


On 23rd January, 2016 Advocate Shailesh Sheth presented his paper on “Goods and Services Tax (GST)”. He dealt with the subject in depth and voluntarily continued the session in the evening to clarify the doubts of the members.

The session was chaired by Mr.. Govind Goyal, Past President of BCAS.

Mr. Jayesh Gandhi then elaborated “Audit Issues under Companies Act, 2013”. His Audit experience and knowledge added value to his presentation. He dealt with the various controversies arising out of the provisions of the Companies Act 2013. He pointed out that the new provisions had increased the responsibilities on auditors.

The session was chaired by Mr. Ashok Dhere, Past President of BCAS.

24th January 2016


On 24th January, 2016 Mr. Sanjeev Pandit, Past President of the Society made a presentation on “ICDS – Ease of Doing Business”. He explained the various controversies arising out of the new computation standards. He felt that the mandatory compliance with these standards would increase litigation rather than reducing it.

The session was chaired by Mr. Rajesh Shah, Past President of BCAS.

Thereafter, Mr. Jayant Gokhale dealt with “Issues and Pitfalls in Audit as per SAs (Standards on Auditing)”. His presentation on the subject was really an eye opener. Being an Auditor, many times, we miss Auditing Standards while reporting. The points discussed by him based on his experience as Former Central Council Member and Member on Accounting Standard Board was beneficial to the members. His presentation will be remembered in times to come.

The session was chaired by Mr. Rajesh Muni, Past President of BCAS. The evening was made special by Shri Mahesh Dubey. He presented Hindi Poetry. He covered many issues in a poetic manner to convey the feelings of people at large about politicians etc. Not only his presentation but the composition of poetry was also superb & meaningful.
 
25th January 2016


On 25th January, 2016 Mr. Gautam Nayak, presented his views on “Issues under Section 14A 56(2) (vii) (viia) and (viib) of Income-tax Act, 1961”. He replied to the queries raised by members during group discussion. Though the provisions of section 14A and section 56 have been on the statute book for some time the controversies and litigation showed no sign of abating. He explained to the members as to what care one needed to take to mitigate tax risks arising out of these provisions.

The session was chaired by Mr. Anil Sathe, Past President of BCAS.

Some of the members who attended the RRC for the first time gave an encouraging feedback and made suggestions about the 50th RRC to be organized next year.

RRC concluded with some of the enthusiastic members visiting the theme park adjacent to the venue. Overall, it was a very successful programme, like every year

Observations and Suggestions on GST Business Process

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22nd February 2016

To
Shri Arun Jaitley
The Finance Minister
Government of India
New Delhi

Respected Sirs,

Sub: Observations and Suggestions on GST Business Process

This is with reference to various Reports on draft business process of GST, hosted on the Website of DOR inviting comments from stake holders and public at large, we could like to take this opportunity to present before you some of the views of our members.
May we request your good selves to kindly consider the same appropriately while finalizing the actual business process on proposed Goods and Services Tax (GST).

Yours Sincerely
For Bombay Chartered Accountant’s Society

Raman Jokhakar
President
Bombay Chartered Accountants’ Society

Govind G. Goyal
Chairman
Indirect Taxes Committee

China avalanche stokes fears of global recession

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An avalanche of dollars exiting China threatens to smother all emerging markets (EMs), including India, and cause a global recession. Almost $ 600 billion have exited China in the last six months, a mammoth $100 billion per month. This would have emptied the forex reserves of almost any other country , but China still has $3.3 trillion left. However, it cannot afford a continuing outflow at this rate.

Its government placed curbs on stock markets to combat crashing values, but withdrew these when they proved ineffective. It is committed to making the yuan a reserve currency like the dollar. But this obliges it to allow capital to enter and exit reasonably freely, and hence risks further capital flight. For decades the Communist Party has firmly controlled the economy . But no more.

The Chinese avalanche has helped accelerate dollar outflows from all EMs (emerging markets). The Sensex is down from 30,000 to 24,400. The rupee has gone from Rs 62 to Rs 67.70 to the dollar. Yet India is the best EM performer: others are truly battered. Worse, the prices of oil and other commodities keep falling, a recessionary portent.

China has been slowing for two years. Pessimists like Ruchir Sharma of Morgan Stanley have long worried that total debt in China, induced by government stimuli, has shot up from 150% of GDP to 250%. History suggests that this will end in tears. The pessimists sneer at official Chinese figures showing almost 7% growth. Using alternative indicators like electricity consumption and rail freight, they argue that true growth could be just 4-5%.

However, optimists like Nicholas Lardy of the Peterson Institute say China is simply rebalancing its economy. Earlier, growth was driven by industrial exports and investment. But now China wants, correctly, to switch to an economy driven more by domestic consumption and services. This means slower GDP, but 6-7% growth is very respectable for an economy that in PPP terms is now the largest in the world. The optimists say indicators like rail freight and electricity may suggest slowing industry, but that is exactly what the Chinese government aims for by emphasizing services. So, the optimists say, there is no crisis, just sensible rebalancing.

Six months ago, one could take either view. But now the Chinese are voting for the pessimist’s version through capital flight. Individuals can remit $50,000 a year abroad. Some Chinese companies are investing abroad. But over half the outflow has a political explanation.

The fleeing billions are probably the ill-gotten gains of former Communist Party officials and their super-brats (often called “princelings”). They are being targeted by Communist Party chief Xi Jinping for corruption. Former security chief Zhou Yonkang and his colleagues have been arrested. Xi’s predecessor, Jiang Zemin, and his two sons have been placed “under control”, suggesting they may eventually be arrested. Xi is perhaps targeting the entire top leadership of the Jiang era. The resulting political struggle could have serious economic consequences.

Meanwhile Global Economic Prospects (GEP), the World Bank report on the world economy , has flagged the risk of a coming recession. The bank is too political (all its members are governments) to actually predict a recession. So, GEP forecasts world GDP growth rising from 2.4% in 2015 to 2.9% in 2016, and says the chances of a recession are low.But it then admits that EM growth has fallen below forecast levels for years. It says that if in 2016 the EMs underperform as much as in 2010-14, and if financial panic like the “taper tantrum” of summer 2013 recurs, then global growth could collapse to just 1.8%. This will be below the 2% widely used to benchmark a global recession.

Ultra-low interest rates in advanced economies have in recent years led trillions of dollars to flow to EMs in search of higher yields. A return to normal interest rates in advanced countries could induce a huge reverse flow out of EMs. That process seems to have begun with the raising of US interest rates.

In the 2000s, China accounted for half of all incremental world demand for commodities. Its slowing has caused the global demand for -and price of -commodities to collapse. Oil is now under $30barrel, one-third of its rate in 2014. Commodity exporting economies are in dire straits.Brazil and Russia are in recession. Many Asian manufacturing economies are part of global value chains using China as an assembler, and have also been hard hit by China’s slowdown. India has been a resilient exception since it is a net commodity importer, and is not part of world value chains. But if the world falls into recession, India will be dragged down too.

(Source: Article by Swaminathan S Anklesaria Aiyar in The Times of India dated 17-01-2016.)

A carrot and stick approach to reform bureaucracy is essential to improve governance

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A palpable reality for all Indian citizens is the extraordinary power the bureaucracy has over our lives. It is therefore essential for the bureaucracy to function effectively, and for the political executive to get it to do so. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s initiative, Pragati, is a stab in this direction. During a recent review, he called for tough action against officials facing repeated complaints. Modi’s approach deserves support. If his government is to fulfil its promise of better governance, bureaucracy needs to do better.

Existing laws provide the political executive with the means to make bureaucrats more accountable and efficient. To illustrate, the All India Service Rules provide for compulsory retirement of substandard bureaucrats after 15 years of service. This provision rules out the pitfalls which come with a guaranteed job for life, but unless it is utilised deadwood will stay on. A government which utilises this provision can invoke the support of the judiciary. The Supreme Court concluded, as far back as 1980, that compulsory retirement “is undoubtedly in the public interest and is not passed by way of punishment”. Similarly, successive pay commissions have pointed out that performance must influence pay for bureaucrats. The Seventh Pay Commission recommended the introduction of performance related pay for all categories of government employees.

If lifetime guarantees of a job and pay make for poor incentives, so do threats of prosecution for the wrong reasons. A considerable extent of developmental activity initiated by government is carried out through the private sector. Presumably, no private firm will bid for a contract unless there is profit. In this background, the existing law to prevent corruption needs an overhaul. According to the Prevention of Corruption Act, taking a decision which benefits somebody can be deemed an act of corruption even in the absence of evidence of a quid pro quo. This is a draconian provision which deters decision making and incentivises inaction. Bureaucrats who pursue their task with sincerity are not protected from irresponsible investigations long after retirement.

Since 2013, governments have tried to amend the law by bringing it into consonance with contemporary reality. It should not be difficult to pass this amendment as Congress and BJP are on the same page. Today there are sticks for good performance and carrots for poor performance. Turn babudom around by ensuring just the reverse is the case.

(Source: Editorial in The Times of India dated 29-01-2016)

India’s SEZs need top-class facilities, not tax breaks

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India’s exports have been declining for 13 months.

To reverse the trend, the commerce ministry wants to exempt exporters in special economic zones (SEZs) from all corporate taxes, including the minimum alternative tax (MAT). This is a bad idea. It goes counter to finance minister Arun Jaitley’s welcome proposal to abolish most tax exemptions, and have a uniform low rate that does not arbitrarily favour this unit or that region.

Favouring SEZs leads to not just a big loss of tax revenue but to cronyism (several SEZ land allocations became scams), and waste (units will shift to SEZs despite big expense and loss of productivity, just to get the tax break). Many companies that would be exporting from traditional bases anyway will shift to SEZs for the tax break. SEZ exports may look big, but may not represent additional exports or policy success. They may simply represent policy failure through export diversion and revenue loss.

India has an export problem right now but not a balance of payments problem. So there’s no need for panic or emergency measures. The current account deficit is well under control at barely 1% of GDP, since imports have fallen along with exports. China’s slowdown has led to a global export slowdown. Almost all Asian countries are suffering from falling exports, and many have suffered steeper declines than India.

In such dismal global conditions, tax breaks are irrelevant for export buoyancy. We must instead raise our competitiveness through better logistics, skills and procedures. Only then will exports boom sustainably. We cannot have lousy facilities and yet become world-class exporters through tax breaks. Ideally, the whole of India should have world-class facilities. Since resources are limited, a start can be made in SEZs.

Between 1965 and 2005, India built eight tiny export processing zones, with very limited success. By contrast, China and some other countries succeeded by creating massive SEZs. Shenzen in China covers four small districts. Chinese SEZs have world-class power, water, ports and airports, and have become world-class manufacturing clusters.

India in 2006 adopted a new SEZ policy. Units in SEZs would pay no tax for five years (not even MAT), get a 50% tax break for the next five years, and a further five-year tax break for reinvested profits. SEZ developers would also get a tax holiday for 10 years.

Instead of creating massive SEZs, this policy encouraged hundreds of small SEZs in every state. These amounted to tax shelters and a grab for land rather than world-class enclaves. No less than 564 proposals for SEZs were approved, but of these only 204 are actually functioning. Mukesh Ambani’s giant SEZ in Navi Mumbai is largely vacant. Most operating SEZs are small IT establishments that are little more than tax havens.

The 2006 Act provided that the minimum size for information technology, jewellery and biotech parks should be just 10 hectares, smaller than even some schools. Size limits were kept especially low for hilly areas, where flat land is scarce. This was a classic case of making SEZs an end in themselves rather than a means to improve competitiveness. China does not create tiny SEZs in the Gobi desert or Tibetan mountains: it creates large ones in areas with the best logistics, infrastructure, financial and transport facilities.

Exports from Indian SEZs rose from $5 billion in 2005-06 to $81 billion in 2013-14. This looks very impressive. But a lot of it is simply trade diversion. Many top IT and jewellery companies shifted their operations to SEZs for the tax break. Since units outside the SEZs continued exporting at a good rate, it is unclear whether the SEZs achieved additional exports or just diverted exports.

Because of such factors, MAT and the dividend distribution tax was imposed on SEZs in 2011-12. Industries protested that this discouraged additional investment. True, but would this fresh investment have been for export diversion or export addition? The operating profit margins of software companies often exceed 20%, so they hardly need tax breaks. Old export units in areas from textiles to engineering, many having very slim operating margins, get no tax breaks. Why should they be discriminated against?

To be competitive, India needs both competitive facilities (in and outside SEZs) plus competitive tax rates with very few exemptions. India has a corporate tax rate of 30%, and with cess and surcharge this comes to 34.5%, one of the highest in Asia. Finance minister Jaitley rightly seeks to cut this to a competitive 25 %, while removing today’s myriad exemptions so that he does not lose tax revenue. This is a laudable, far-sighted reform. It should not have holes punched in it by demands for tax breaks from SEZs or other interest groups.

(Source: Article by Shri Swaminathan S. Anklesaria Aiyar in The Times of India dated 30-01-2016.)

Reinventing Indian secularism – The old consensus on majority and minority communities no longer fits reality

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Should 21st century citizens of the world’s largest democracy live in
fear of committing the medieval crime of blasphemy? This is the question
raised by the violent rampage earlier this month in West Bengal’s
Muslimmajority district of Malda, where an enraged mob ransacked a
police station, torched two dozen vehicles, and burned shops and homes.

The
mob was protesting an obscure Hindu activist’s allegedly derogatory
comments about the Prophet Muhammad a month earlier in Uttar Pradesh.
Though UP police quickly arrested the activist, Kamlesh Tiwari of the
Hindu Mahasabha, this did not stop demonstrations from erupting across
the country. At times numbering tens of thousands, protests have roiled,
among other places, Rampur, Bhopal, Purnea and Bengaluru. Many
protestors demanded the death penalty for Tiwari.

Such
bloodcurdling displays of piety belong in a theocracy, not in a
pluralistic democracy. Their scale, spread and intensity ought to
concern anyone who cares about Indian pluralism. So must the backgrounds
– engineers, software developers, corporate executives – of many of
those arrested recently for alleged links with Islamic State.

Bluntly
put, the Indian model of secularism is floundering. It needs to be
replaced by an approach that relies less on the well-worn pieties of the
past and more on the reality of the world we live in today. The answer
does not lie with Hindu extremists, who cannot distinguish between
ordinary and radicalised Muslims. It lies in an updated secularism based
on individual rights and equality before the law.

Traditional
Indian secularism implicitly rests on three assumptions that may have
made sense 60 years ago, but are hopelessly outdated today. First, that extremists from the Hindu majority pose a greater threat than those from the Muslim minority. Second, that Indian Muslims are always victims and never victimisers. Third, that only Muslims can legitimately champion legal, social and cultural reform within their community.

In
the 1950s, the heyday of the Nehruvian project, each of these
assumptions was easily defensible. At the time, only one in ten Indians
was Muslim. The secular impulse – to protect a small community in a
defensive crouch after Partition – appealed to the best instincts of a
newly independent nation. In a rapidly modernising world, the bet that
over time Muslims would discard obscurantist ideas such as blasphemy,
and would themselves demand an end to practices such as polygamy and
triple talaq divorce appeared reasonable.

Today’s reality is
starkly different. According to the Pew Research Center, today about one
in seven Indians is a Muslim. And though the vast majority of Indian
Muslims are peaceful, the hoped for march towards secularisation
–replacing attitudes rooted in religion with those rooted in reason –
has stalled. Where once a uniform civil code for all Indians was delayed
by the majority’s forbearance, today it is blocked as much by the
minority’s intransigence.

The consequences of both shifting
demographics and patchy secularisation play out every day in public
life. Often supposedly secular politics boils down to pandering to the
most fundamentalist elements of Muslim society. Think of Mamata
Banerjee’s concerted bid to woo clerics in West Bengal, or Digvijaya
Singh’s ugly insinuation that the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh plotted
the 26/11terrorist attacks in Mumbai.

Meanwhile, for the first
time since Partition, an aggressive new breed of Muslimfirsters has
risen to prominence. To differing degrees, Azam Khan in Uttar Pradesh,
Badruddin Ajmal in Assam and Hyderabad’s Owaisi brothers represent this
trend. Both the panderers and the Muslimfirsters share a commitment to
defending Muslim personal law and extending special rights for the
community to new areas such as reservations in government jobs.

At
the same time, the international landscape has changed dramatically. In
the 1950s, secularists dominated the Muslim world – Sukarno in
Indonesia, Shah Reza Pahlavi in Iran and Kemal Ataturk’s heirs in
Turkey. But over the past 40 years a fountain of Gulf petrodollars,
tenacious religious movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood, and the
Cold War American policy of pitting hardline Islam against communism,
tipped the balance of ideological power towards Islamists, those
striving to impose sharia law on both the state and society.

Closer
to home, Pakistan evolved in a way few would have predicted in the
1950s when a relatively Westernised elite held sway. The journalist
Zahid Hussain estimates that the number of madrassas shot up from 137 in
1947 to more than 13,000 today. In the Pakistan army and its notorious
spy agency –Inter-Services Intelligence – India faces a foe long
committed to using jihadist terrorism to keep India off balance.

What
is to be done? For starters, India should replace the shaky pillars of
the traditional secular consensus with something sturdier.

First, this means accepting that all extremists – not only the Hindu variety – threaten pluralism. Second,
it requires recognising the complexity of inter-religious conflict.
Sometimes – such as in the awful murder of Mohammad Akhlaq in Dadri –
Muslims are indeed victims. At other times, such as in Malda or the
Srinagar valley, they are the victimisers. Third, Indian
political and intellectual elites need to start treating the reform of
ideas rooted in sharia – such as a violent response to so-called
blasphemy – as a national concern, not just a narrowly Muslim concern.

In
the end, secularism makes India stronger. To save it, India needs an
updated approach rooted not in sentimentalism but in reality.

(Source:
Article By Shri Sadanand Dhume, a resident fellow at the American
Enterprise Institute, Washington DC, in The Times of India dated
29-01-2016.)

A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 52 dated February 11, 2016

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Regulatory Relaxations for Startups – Clarifications relating to Issue of Shares

This circular, with respect to facilities available to start-ups, clarifies as follows: –

1. Issue of shares without cash payment through sweat equity

Indian companies can issue sweat equity under a scheme drawn either in terms regulations issued under: –

a. The Securities Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 in respect of listed companies; or
b. The Companies (Share Capital and Debentures) Rules, 2014 notified by the Central Government under the Companies Act 2013 in respect of other companies.

2. Issue of shares against legitimate payment owed

Indian companies can issue equity shares against any other funds payable by the investee company (e.g. payments for use or acquisition of intellectual property rights, for import of goods, payment of dividends, interest payments, consultancy fees, etc.), remittance of which does not require prior permission of the Government of India or RBI under FEMA, 1999 and complies with the FDI policy and applicable tax laws.

A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 51 dated February 11, 2016

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Regulatory relaxations for start-ups – Clarifications relating to acceptance of payments

This
circular clarifies that a start-up with an overseas subsidiary, which
has a appropriate contractual arrangement between itself, its overseas
subsidiary and the customers concerned, is permitted to: –

1. O pen foreign currency account abroad to pool the foreign exchange earnings out of the exports / sales made by it.

2.
Pool its receivables arising from the transactions with the residents
in India as well as the transactions with the non-residents abroad into
the said foreign currency account opened abroad in its name.

3.
Avail of the facility for realising the receivables of its overseas
subsidiary or making the above repatriation through Online Payment
Gateway Service Providers (OPGSPs) for value not exceeding US $ 10,000
or such limit as may be permitted by RBI from time to time.

Balances
in the said foreign currency account that are due to the Indian
start-up must be repatriated to India within a period as applicable to
realisation of export proceeds (currently nine months).

A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 50 dated February 11, 2016

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Compilation of R-Returns: Reporting under FETERS This circular proposes the following changes, which have to be implemented not later than April 1, 2016: –

1. Web-based data submission by AD banks
With regards to reporting under the Foreign Exchange Transactions Electronic Reporting System (FETERS) the following changes will come into effect with respect to transactions that are to be reported from April1, 2016: –

a. The present email-based submission will be replaced by web-portal based data submission.
b. Nodal offices of banks will have to access the webportal https://bop.rbi.org.in with the RBI-provided login-name and password, to submit the required data.
c. Banks have to download RBI-provided validator template from this portal on their computer and perform off-line check of their FETERS data-file for error, if any, before its submission on the portal.
d. On uploading validated files, banks will get acknowledgment.
e. Banks can report addition of AD code and update AD category for incorporation in the AD-master database with RBI.
f. With the discontinuation of ENC.TXT and SCH3to6. TXT files in FETERS, the purpose codes P0105 [Export bills (in respect of goods) sent on collection – other than Nepal and Bhutan] and P0107 [Realization of NPD export bills (full value of bill to be reported) – other than Nepal and Bhutan] have become defunct and are, therefore, discontinued.

2. Revision in Form A2

Transactions relating to the Liberalized Remittance Scheme (LRS) in FETERS and On-line Return Filing System (ORFS), must now be reported under their respective FETERS purpose codes (e.g. travel, medical treatment, purchase of immovable property, studies abroad, maintenance of close relatives; etc.) instead of reporting collectively under the purpose code S0023. The revised purpose codes are as under: –

Revised Form A2 introducing a check-box for LRS transactions as well as clubbing the ‘Application cum Declaration for purchase of foreign exchange under the Liberalised Remittance Scheme of USD 250,000’ is Annexed to this circular.

3. Online submission of Form A2 by the remitter

Banks offering internet banking facilities to their customers must allow online submission of Form A2 and also enable uploading/submission of documents, if and as may be necessary, to establish the permissibility of the remittances. Remittances that do not require any documentation (e.g. certain transactions under the LRS) must be put through on the basis of Form A2 alone.

To start with, remittances on the basis of online submission alone will be available for transactions with an upper limit of USD 25,000 (or its equivalent) for individuals and USD 100,000 (or its equivalent) for corporates.

A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 49 [(1)/18(R)] dated February 4, 2016

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Notification No. FEMA. 18(R)/2015-RB dated December 29, 2015

Post Office (Postal Orders / Money Orders), 2015

This Notification repeals and replaces the earlier Notification No. FEMA 18/2000-RB dated May 3, 2000 pertaining to Post Office (Postal Orders / Money Orders).

A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 48 [(1)/15(R)] dated February 4, 2016

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Notification No. FEMA.15(R)/2015-RB dated December 29, 2015

Definition of “Currency”, 2015

This Notification repeals and replaces the earlier Notification No. FEMA 15/2000-RB dated May 3, 2000 pertaining to the Definition of “Currency”.

A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 47 [(1)/11(R)] dated February 4, 2016

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Notification No. FEMA.11(R)/2015-RB dated December 29, 2015

Foreign Exchange Management (Possession and Retention of Foreign Currency) Regulations, 2015

This Notification repeals and replaces the earlier Notification No. FEMA 11/2000-RB dated May 3, 2000 pertaining to Foreign Exchange Management (Possession and Retention of Foreign Currency) Regulations, 2000.

Precedent – Benefit of Judgements in rem affirmed by Supreme Court should enure to all similarly situated persons and it is impermissible for High Court to reopen such issues which are conclusively determined by previous judgements.

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Sunil Kumar Verma And ors vs. State Of Uttar Pradesh & Ors (2016) 1 SCC 397.

The U.P. State Cement Corporation Limited (for short, ‘the Corporation’) was wound up on 8th December, 1999. In the State of U.P. existed a set of rules, namely, the Uttar Pradesh Absorption of Retrenched Employees of Government or Public Corporations in Government Service Rules, 1991 (for short, ‘the 1991 Rules’).

After the Corporation was wound up, one Mr. Shailendra Kumar Pandey and some others, who were the employees of the Corporation, filed Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 36644 of 2003, seeking absorption under the aforesaid Rules. The learned Single Judge hearing the writ petition cogitated upon the U.P. Absorption of Retrenched Employees of the State Government/Public Sector Corporation in Government Service (Recession) Rules, 2003 (the 2003 Rules) and, eventually came to hold that the Absorption Rules, 1991 were applicable. This decision was confirmed by the Division Bench of the High Court as well as the Apex Court.

When the matter stood thus, all the affected employees of the Corporation felt relieved, inasmuch as the controversy had travelled to the Apex Court and was put to rest. The impugned writ petitions which were preferred in the year 2001 were still pending before the High Court and the expectation of the Petitioners therein was that similar benefits shall enure to them, for the writ petitions instituted on later dates had been disposed.

The Learned single Judge allowed the Writ petitions. However, the Division Bench dismissed the writ petition on the ground that in Mr. Shailendra Kumar Pandey and other cases, the Recession Rules 2003 were not adverted to by the division benches.

In appeal before the Apex Court, allowing the appeal the Court held that there had already been interpretation of 2003 Rules by the learned Single Judge which had been affirmed up to this Court. In such a situation, we really fail to fathom how the Division Bench could have thought of entering into the analysis of the ratio of the earlier judgment and discussion on binding precedents when the controversy had really been put to rest by this Court. The decision rendered by this Court inter se parties was required to be followed in the same fact situation. When the factual matrix was absolutely luminescent and did not require any kind of surgical dissection, there was no necessity to take a different view.

DIGITAL TRENDS IN HIGHER EDUCATION

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Let me begin by quoting a few statistics from a recently published report of the Ministry of Human Resource Development (HRD).

Gross Enrolment Ratio (GER), which is the ratio of total enrolment in Higher Education in the 18-23 years age group, as a percentage of the eligible population in that age group, has moved up to 23.5 % in 2014-15 from 21.5 % in 2012-13. For men, the ratio is 24.5 % and it is 22.7 % for women.

There were 33.3 million students enrolled in 757 universities in 2014-15, as against 32.3 million enrolled in 723 universities in 2013-14.

While the numbers can become overwhelming, it is easy to see that these statistics augur well for the country. If this trend continues, it is possible for the country to achieve the target of 30 % GER by 2020. The next target would be a GER of around 45 per cent, which is prevalent in most developed countries.

The target may be ambitious, but there are a host of issues, which need to be addressed as well – access, quality, shortage of teachers, outdated curriculum etc. In this maelstrom, will digital technology make a significant impact?

There has been a paradigm shift in the thinking process of the role of digital technology in higher education. Traditionally, it was meant to provide IT infrastructure and support all the process and routine functions. Its role has changed and it is now seen as critical for providing a digital learning experience to students.

“Student-centricity” and “delighting the student” with an amazing learning experience in the lifecycle of higher education are the new mantras of digital solutions and service providers. This fundamentally means that technology is no longer in the foreground and the centre of attention is the “learner”.

With this rapidly shifting landscape, there are three broad trends, which will make a significant impact on higher education:

1. Personalisation
2. Big Data
3. Mobility

PERSONALISATION
The traditional learning methodology was by prescription and adherence. Students were given a prescribed curriculum and had to study within the boundaries of the path laid down by the various subjects to ultimately obtain a degree.

With the use of digital resources, personalisation allows creation of custom pathways for learning. Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) has experimented with breaking its courses down into modules and then enabling students to reassemble the modules into a personalised educational pathway.

It is akin to creating a “playlist” in iTunes.

Before the opening of the iTunes store on April 28, 2003 the only choice for a music lover was to buy an entire CD of songs, even if the music lover wanted to listen to only one song. iTunes allows music lovers to pick and choose songs from various albums, to create a personalised playlist. Within a decade of its launch, Apple had announced that more than 25 billion songs were downloaded and by now, probably, more than 50 billion songs have been downloaded. This is a staggering number and has truly shaken up the music industry, giving consumers a unique listening experience. One of the clear indications of this churn is the recent press report suggesting that the iconic music store of Mumbai, “Rhythm House” will shut down soon.

Like a playlist, why can’t a student formulate a customised, multi-institutional pathway to a degree? Can a student do one subject from H.R. College, another from N.M. College and a third from St. Xaviers’ College? Or, can a student do one subject from Mumbai University, another from Delhi University and a third from Bengaluru University? And, eventually, can a student do multiple subjects from universities across the world?

Traditionally, the learning process and the eventual conferring of a degree happened in a single institution. But now, with all the digital possibilities, students should have the ability to aggregate and disaggregate subjects and courses. And more importantly, they should be able to control the pace of learning by accelerating or decelerating, depending on their individual requirements. When all of this coalesces, a student will have complete “personalisation” of his learning path to a degree.

BIG DATA
Big Data is large volume of data, structured and unstructured, which is difficult to process using traditional databases and software. A lot of IT investment in the corporate sector is going into Big Data computing, which reveals patterns, trends and associations.

There is an enormous amount of data, which gets generated in higher education institutions and the time is ripe to use Big Data techniques to mine this information and come up with meaningful patterns and trends.

Big Data can create customised reports for all the stakeholders in higher education – personalised assistance to students, dashboards to the teachers on the learning paths, reports to the heads of institutions and compliance charts to the regulators. The broad institutional goals and targets can be measured and analysed periodically. Importantly, analytics of a student’s learning path can enable intervention at an early stage.

Big Data can do the unthinkable – homework assignments that learn from students; courses tailored to fit individual students and textbooks that talk back. This is beyond online courses and MOOCs that are currently on offer. We are now looking at the education landscape of tomorrow, powered by Big Data.

A seminal work on the power of Big Data is a book written by Viktor Mayer-Schonberger and Kenneth Cukier, titled “Learning with Big Data – The Future of Education”. The authors have articulated how the ever-increasing amounts of data and its analysis will have an influence on the conduct of higher education. They have also stated how the fascinating changes are happening in measuring students’ progress and how data can be used to improve education for everyone, in real time, both online and offline.

MOBILITY
The mobile phone is now a ubiquitous device. It is with everyone and everywhere, doing multiple tasks from listening to songs to taking pictures. Talking on phone is only one of its myriad functions, and certainly not the main one.

In India, the number of mobile phone subscribers has crossed 1 billion, making it only the second country after China to have achieved this landmark. The launch of cheaper smartphones, low call rates and intense competition has accelerated the pace of growth. Interestingly, the number of smartphones has crossed 170 million and is growing at 26 per cent CAGR.

Technology, which immerses the mobile phone as its centerpiece, will become a key piece of technology in learning and teaching. Mobile technology gives unprecedented freedom to students and teachers from the constraints of the IT campus of the Institution. Now learning can happen beyond the precincts of the institution at a time and pace convenient to the learner.

There is an enormous amount of online content now available on the Internet. A teacher can make available a properly curated content to a learner and then measure and track progress. Similarly, the learner can supplement or even substitute his classroom learning, collaborate with other learners and communicate with the teacher – all of this without the constraint of time and place – on his mobile phone.

With the advent of 4G and deeper penetration of smartphones, mobile based learning is likely to make a big impact on higher education. Starting with a blended model, it will eventually keep increasing its sphere of impact and influence.

An interesting case study on the application of digital technology to higher education is the launch of the Minerva Project by Ben Nelson. Minerva Project (www. minerva.kgi.edu) is a for-profit company founded by Ben Nelson, whose goal is to provide Ivy League education at a faction of the price. The tuition fee at Minerva for an undergraduate course (called “graduate” course in India) is USD 10,000, which is a fourth of the tuition fees at Ivy League Institutions like Harvard and Columbia.

In this four-year course, the first year is at San Francisco, followed by the other years in seven cities across the world. There is no physical campus for learning. Each class has less than 20 students and lessons are delivered online in an interactive manner and are recorded. All students are visible onscreen. Professors are prohibited from droning for more than 5 minutes. Students are evaluated not only on how they participate, but also how effectively they think. There are no exams.

Ben Nelson has proclaimed, “We are building a perfect university. That’s our goal” .

Digital trends have made a huge impact on the corporate world. Sectors like banking have embraced the digital medium like a “fish takes to water”. In contrast, the education sector has been a laggard, particularly higher education. With the rapid pace of change, it is an opportune time for higher education to leapfrog its adoption and make a significant impact on the learning process and the learner.

ACCOUNTING FOR COURT SCHEMES UNDER IND-AS & ON TRANSITION DATE

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Accounting for business combinations under Indian GAAP is significantly different to that under Ind-AS. Retrospective application of Ind-AS 103 Business Combinations may be difficult and in certain cases impossible, for past business combinations. Against this background, the business combinations exemption in Ind-AS 101 First Time Adoption of Indian Accounting Standards is probably the most important exemption, as it provides a firsttime adopter of Ind-AS an exemption from restating business combinations prior to its date of transition to Ind-AS, subject to certain requirements.

A first-time adopter choosing to apply this exemption is not required to restate business combinations to comply with Ind-AS 103, if control was obtained before the transition date. A first-time adopter taking advantage of this exemption will not have to revisit past business combinations to establish fair values and amounts of goodwill under Ind-AS. However, the application of the exemption is complex, and certain adjustments to transactions under Indian GAAP may still be required.

A first-time adopter may also choose not to use the exemption and restate previous combinations in accordance with Ind-AS 103. If a first-time adopter restates any business combination prior to its date of transition to comply with Ind-AS 103, it must restate all business combinations under Ind-AS 103 which occur after the date of that combination. In simple words, a first time adopter may choose a date and restate all business combinations from that date. Business combinations before that date are not restated by using the exemption.

Using the exemption not to restate business combinations under Ind-AS 103, does not mean that the entire accounting under Indian GAAP is kosher. The exemption is only with respect to fair value accounting. Thus, if a proper asset or liability was not recognised or written off in Indian GAAP, then the same will have to be properly accounted at the transition date and on a go forward basis in the Ind AS financial statements.

On 16th February 2015, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) notified the Companies (Indian Accounting Standards) Rules, 2015 laying down the roadmap for application of IFRS converged standards (Ind-AS). As per general instructions in the MCA notification, notified Ind AS’s are intended to be in conformity with the provisions of applicable laws. However, if due to subsequent amendments in the law, a particular Ind AS is found to be not in conformity with such law, the provisions of the said law will prevail and the financial statements will be prepared in conformity with such law. Therefore, as per the Framework, law shall override the provisions of Ind-AS, unless clarified otherwise.

With the above background, let us consider two simple scenarios, for an acquirer company that is in phase 1, and has a transition date of 1st April, 2015. Prior to this transition date, the acquirer has made three acquisitions of businesses. Only Acquisition 2 was under a court scheme, in which two accounting concessions were made by the court. Acquisition 2 happened in 2009; when SEBI requirement to comply with accounting standards in a court scheme was not yet legislated. Since those acquisitions were of business divisions, rather than acquisition of an investment, those were accounted in the separate financial statements of the acquirer. The two scenarios are as follows:

1. Acquirer does not wish to restate past business combinations.

2. Acquirer wants to restate business combinations starting from acquisition 1.

Commentary on Scenario 1: Acquirer does not wish to restate past business combinations There is no issue with Acquisition 1 & 3. However, the question is with respect to Acquisition 2. Can the accounting ordered by the court be retained as it is both at the transition date and on a go forward basis? View 1 Yes, the court order is supreme and therefore it will trump the requirements of Ind-AS 101 and Ind-AS 103. Thus indefinite life intangible assets will not be resurrected in Ind-AS financial statements and impairment losses will be adjusted against reserves under Ind-AS on transition date and on a go forward basis. The court order is applicable to all statutory financial statements prepared under Indian law; and would be applicable to both Indian GAAP and Ind-AS financial statements. View 2 The court scheme was applicable to Indian GAAP financial statements and hence is not relevant for the purposes of preparing Ind AS financial statements. Therefore, on transition date the company will have to recognize intangible assets under Ind AS. Further any future impairment losses will be adjusted to P&L a/c rather than directly to reserves.

Commentary on Scenario 2: Acquirer wants to restate business combinations starting from acquisition 1

View 1
The acquirer can restate Acquisitions 1, 2 & 3. Though acquisition 2 was under a court scheme it can be restated under Ind-AS. This is on basis that the court scheme applied to Indian GAAP financial statements and not Ind-AS financial statements. When Acquisition 2 is restated in accordance with Ind AS 103, the accounting concessions provided by the court will have to be disregarded.

View 2
The acquirer can restate Acquisitions 1 & 3. However, Acquisition 2 cannot be restated because it is under a court scheme, and the court mandated accounting cannot be changed. This is on the basis that the court scheme is applicable to all statutory financial statements, and it does not matter whether those are prepared under Indian GAAP or Ind-AS.

View 3
The acquirer cannot restate acquisition 2, because it is under a court scheme. As a result, restating of Scquisition 1 is also tainted. This is because under Ind AS 101, if a first-time adopter restates any business combination prior to its date of transition to comply with Ind-AS 103, it must restate all business combinations under Ind-AS 103 which occur after the date of that combination. Therefore the acquirer can only restate acquisition 3. Acquisition 1 & 2, along with the court concession on the accounting will have to be retained under Ind AS.

Conclusion
The author believes that the current drafting of Ind AS and the MCA circular, provides a flexibility in the views that can be taken. However, the ICAI along with MCA may provide a more clear guidance and way forward on this major dilemma.

TS-724-ITAT-2015(DEL) ITO vs. Santur Developers P. Ltd. A.Y.: 2006-07, Date of Order: 24.07.2015

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Article 26(4) of India USA DTAA – In absence of similar provision for withholding taxes on payment to a resident Taxpayer on sale of land, there is no requirement to withhold taxes on sale consideration paid to Non-resident (NR) pursuant to non-discrimination Article of India- USA DTAA .

Facts
The Taxpayer, an Indian company, entered into an agreement to purchase a piece of land jointly owned by three parties. One of the co-owner of the land was a citizen of USA and a NR in India. The agreement was executed by an Indian resident who was holding the general power of attorney for the other owners.

The sale consideration was paid to the Indian resident constituted attorney in Indian rupees. The Taxpayer did not withhold taxes on such payment. The Tax authorities contended that the Taxpayer was required to withhold taxes u/s. 195 of the Act and hence, levied penalty for failure to withhold taxes.

The Taxpayer contended that since the agreement as well as payment was made to a resident in India, provision of section 195 of the Act did not apply. Further, section 195 applies only to remittance made in foreign currency, whereas in the present case since payment was made in Indian currency, tax was not required to be withheld under Act. Without prejudice to the aforesaid, it was contended that in absence of any provision relating to withholding of taxes where sale proceeds of an immovable property are paid to a resident person, there should not be any withholding requirement on payments to NRs applying the non-discrimination clause of India-USA DTAA

Held
The Tribunal did not rule on the applicability of section 195 as it was not contested before it.

In absence of a provision requiring Taxpayer to withhold tax on payment of sale proceeds to a resident, pursuant to non-discrimination article of the DTAA, Taxpayer was not required to withhold taxes on payment made to NRs.

TS-28-ITAT-2016(DEL) ACIT vs. NEC HCL System Technologies Ltd. A.Y.: 2008-09, Date of Order: 22nd January, 2016

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Section 9(1)(vii) of Act – Outsourcing fees paid by Japanese branch office of an Indian company to a non-resident (NR) and used for business development activities outside India, cannot be deemed to accrue or arise in India

Facts
The Taxpayer is a joint venture between an Indian Company (Indian JV Partner) and a Japanese Company (Japan JV Partner). The Taxpayer was engaged in the business of providing offshore software engineering services and solutions to F Co and its group companies.

The Taxpayer set up a branch office in Japan (Japan BO). The Japan BO was engaged in undertaking extensive sales and marketing activities in addition to bidding for projects and obtaining work from the customers from Japan and outside Japan (business development activities).

The Taxpayer entered into a framework agreement with Indian JV Partner and its group entity in Japan. The framework agreement was to facilitate sub-contract of software development work by Japan BO if the same could not be serviced by the taxpayer or Japan BO. During the relevant financial year, Japan BO paid certain outsourcing fee to another Japanese Company, which was group entity of Indian JV partner, without withholding taxes thereon.

The Tax authority contended that Japan BO was merely an extension of The Taxpayer and the outsourcing was undertaken by Taxpayer from India. Thus, outsourcing fee paid to Japanese Company is deemed to accrue or arise in India and the payment is therefore taxable in India. Hence, it is liable to tax withholding. Consequently, tax authority disallowed such payments made to Japanese Company in the hands of the Taxpayer for failure to withhold taxes on outsourcing fee.

The Taxpayer contended that Japan BO has an independent existence and carries on independent business in Japan. Thus, the outsourcing services are utilised by Japan BO in business carried on in Japan. Therefore, fee for such services cannot be deemed to accrue or arise in India u/s. 9(1)(vii)(c) and hence, no withholding is to be done on the payment of outsourcing fees.

Held
Taxpayer has a BO in Japan which carries on business outside India. Therefore, Japan BO creates a permanent establishment (PE) of the Taxpayer in Japan.

Japan BO had five employees as sales manager for carrying out sales and marketing activities and two managers for general administrative affairs of the company who possessed the technical skills required to understand the requirements of the projects. From the details provided about the employees in Japan and their job profile, it was clear that such employees were engaged in business development activities of Japan BO in Japan. Some of the projects obtained by Japan BO were outsourced by Japan BO as per its own business needs.

Merely because the financial statement of Japan BO is incorporated in the financial statements of the Taxpayer, the same does not conclude that the expenses are borne by the Taxpayer and not it’s Japan BO.

Payments for fee for technical services borne by the Japan BO shall not be deemed to accrue or arise in India and hence was not taxable in India. Therefore, there was no liability to withhold taxes on such outsourcing fees.

TS-72-ITAT-2016(Mum) Goldman Sachs (India) Securities Pvt. Ltd. vs. ITO (IT) A.Y.: 2011-12, Date of Order:12th February, 2016

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Article 13 of India Mauritius DTAA – Buyback transaction cannot be treated as colorable device for avoidance of tax – Buyback results in capital gain and is exempt from taxes in India under Article 13 of India-Mauritius DTAA .

Facts
The Taxpayer, an Indian resident company, is a whollyowned subsidiary of a Mauritian company (FCo). The Taxpayer undertook a buyback on account of which shares were bought back at a value higher than its face value.

The Tax Authority contended that the buyback transaction was a colorable transaction to avoid payment of dividend distribution tax (DDT). Therefore, Tax authority regarded such buyback as capital reduction and considered the excess payment over face value of shares as distribution of accumulated profits to shareholders i.e., F Co. It was further held that, since the Taxpayer had not paid DDT, dividend received by FCo would not be eligible for exemption under the Act. Accordingly, Taxpayer was held liable to withhold taxes at the rate of 5% on gross payment to FCo under Article 10 of the DTAA. Since the Taxpayer had failed to withhold taxes, the Taxpayer was held to be an assessee in default and interest was also levied for such failure apart from recovery of tax.

The Taxpayer however contended that the amount remitted under the buyback transaction was in the nature of capital gains which was exempt from taxation in India under India-Mauritius DTAA. Accordingly, neither any tax was deductible nor was there any default in withholding of tax.

Held
Buyback of shares cannot be equated with capital reduction as they are two entirely different concepts as discussed and held in the Bombay High Court (HC) decision of Capgemini India Pvt. Ltd. (Company Scheme Petition No. 434 of 2014).

CBDT Circular No. 779 dated 14th September 1999 specifically states that shareholders would not be subjected to dividend tax but taxed under capital gains provisions upon buy back of shares.

It is true that buyback transactions are subject to Income distribution tax pursuant to amendment by the Finance Act 2013. However, as the transaction under consideration pertained to a period prior to this amendment, there is no ambiguity that those provisions will not apply for buyback under consideration. Hence, the said transaction could not be regarded as deemed dividend but should be subjected to tax as capital gains.

Since Article 13 of the DTAA specifically exempts such transaction from tax in India, the Taxpayer is not liable to withhold tax under the Act. Even if the payment was considered as dividend, the requirement to pay DDT would make the payment exempt in the hands of the shareholder. Accordingly, withholding tax provisions should not apply.

By placing reliance on the observations of the Bombay HC ruling of Capgemini (supra), the Tribunal ruled that if the Taxpayer entered into a transaction which did not violate any provision of the Act, the transaction cannot be termed as a colorable device just because it results in non-payment or lesser payment of taxes in that particular year. The whole exercise should not lead to tax evasion. Non-payment of taxes by an assessee in given circumstances could be a moral or ethical issue.

A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 35 dated 10th December, 2015

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Guidelines on trading of Currency Futures and Exchange Traded Currency Options in Recognised Stock Exchanges – Introduction of Cross-Currency Futures and Exchange Traded Option Contracts

Presently, residents and eligible non-residents can trade in US $ – INR, Euro – INR, GBP – INR and Yen JPY – INR currency futures contracts and US $ – INR currency option contract on recognised stock exchanges.

This circular now permits with immediate effect,

1. Residents and FPI to also take positions, within the position limits as prescribed by the exchanges, in,

(a) Cross-currency futures in the currency pairs of EUR-USD, GBP-USD and USD-JPY

(b) E xchange traded cross-currency option contracts in EUR-INR, GBP-INR and JPY-INR in addition to the existing USD-INR option contract.

The above contracts are in addition to the existing contracts that can be undertaken without having to establish underlying exposure.

2. Banks to undertake trading in all permitted exchange traded currency derivatives within their Net Open Position Limit (NOPL) subject to limits stipulated by the exchanges.

Detailed terms and conditions are Annexed to this circular as under: –

Annex I Currency Futures (Reserve Bank) (Amendment) Directions, 2015 Notification No. FMRD. 1/ED(CS)-2015 dated December 10, 2015

Annex II Exchange Traded Currency Options (Reserve Bank) (Amendment) Directions, 2015 Notification No. FMRD. 2 /ED(CS)-2015 dated December 10, 2015

Annex III Position Limits for market participants in the Exchange Traded Currency Derivatives

2015 (40) STR 490 (Tri-Mum.) Trans Engineers India Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCE, Pune

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Extended period of Limitation cannot be invoked in second audit when during first audit the issue in question was never raised.

Facts
The assessee took registration in February, 2005 and charged service tax on invoices raised from November, 2004 to February, 2005 only for those clients who agreed to pay service tax. Therefore, charge of suppression was alleged by the department. Show cause notice (SCN) was issued in 2009 invoking extended period of limitation. It was contended that the records were already audited in 2006 by audit section and no objections were raised regarding discharge of entire service tax liability and filing of returns. Therefore, it was argued that extended period of limitation cannot be invoked during second audit.

Held
Appellant had himself discharged short payment on noticing the same and also shown the payment in returns. In the first audit, question of short payment was never raised. Therefore, during second audit, it would not be justified to invoke extended period of limitation since records were already audited once and such short payment was not detected. Accordingly, relying on High Court’s judicial pronouncements, the order was set aside on the grounds of limitation.

Notification No. FEMA 357/2015-RB dated 7th December, 2015

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Foreign Exchange Management (Manner of Receipt and Payment) (Amendment) Regulations, 2015

This Notification has amended the Regulation 5 of Notification No. FEMA 14/2000-RB dated 3rd May, 2000, (Manner of Receipt and Payment), as under: –

After sub-regulation (2)(b) following shall be added at (c), namely: – ‘Any other mode of payment in accordance with the directions issued by the Reserve Bank of India to authorised dealers from time to time.’

Notification No. FEMA 358/2015-RB dated 2nd December, 2015

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Foreign Exchange Management (Borrowing or Lending in Foreign Exchange) (Amendment) Regulations, 2015

This Notification has amended the Regulation 3 of Notification No. FEMA. 120/2000-RB dated May 3, 2000 (Transfer or Issue of Any Foreign Security), as under: –

Amendment of the Schedule I

In Schedule I, after paragraph 3, the following shall be inserted, namely: –

4. Provided that under these Regulations, the Reserve Bank may, in consultation with the Government of India, prescribe for the automatic route, any provision or proviso regarding various parameters listed in paragraphs 1 to 3 above of this Schedule or any other parameter as prescribed by the Reserve Bank and also prescribe the date from which any or all of the existing proviso will cease to exist, in respect of borrowings from overseas, whether in foreign currency or Indian Rupees, such as addition / deletion of borrowers eligible to raise such borrowings, overseas lenders / investors, purposes of such borrowings, change in amount, maturity and all-in-cost, norms regarding security, pre-payment, parking of ECB proceeds, reporting and drawal of loan, refinancing, debt servicing, etc.”

Amendment to the Schedule II

In Schedule II, after paragraph 5, the following shall be inserted, namely: –

6. Provided that under these Regulations, the Reserve Bank may, in consultation with the Government of India, prescribe for the approval route, any provision or proviso regarding various parameters listed in paragraphs 1 to 5 above of this Schedule or any other parameter as prescribed by the Reserve Bank and also prescribe the date from which any or all of the existing provisions will cease to exist, in respect of borrowings from overseas, whether in foreign currency or Indian Rupees, such as addition / deletion of borrowers eligible to raise such borrowings, overseas lenders / investors, purposes of such borrowings, change in amount, maturity and all-in-cost, norms regarding security, pre-payment, parking of ECB proceeds, reporting and drawal of loan, refinancing, debt servicing, etc.”

Notification No. FEMA 359/2015-RB dated 2nd December, 2015

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Foreign Exchange Management (Transfer or Issue of Any Foreign Security) (Amendment) Regulations, 2015

This Notification has amended the Regulation 21 of Notification No. FEMA. 120/2004-RB dated July 7, 2004 (Transfer or Issue of Any Foreign Security), as under: –

Amendment of the Regulation 21 (2) (ii)

After Regulation 21 (2) (ii), the following proviso shall be inserted, namely: –

“Provided that under these Regulations, the Reserve Bank may, in consultation with the Government of India, change / prescribe for the automatic as well as the approval route of FCCBs, any provision or proviso for issuance of FCCBs”.

Amendment to the Regulation 21 (2) (iii)

After Regulation 21 (2) (iii), the following proviso shall be inserted, namely: –

“Provided that under these Regulations, the Reserve Bank may, in consultation with the Government of India, change / prescribe any provision or proviso for issuance of FCEBs”.

[2015-TIOL-2821-HC-AHM-CUS] Ishratkhan Yusubkhan Parmar vs. Union Of India & 1

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Merely because there is a provision for predeposit for availing appeal opportunity, the same would not enable petitioner to bypass such statutory remedy and approach High Court directly by way of a writ petition.

Facts
Petitioner challenged the Order-in-Original passed by the Joint Commissioner of Customs. It was submitted that provision of mandatory pre-deposit of 7.5% would not apply since the original cause arose before the amendment in section 129E of the Customs Act brought with effect from 06/08/2014. It was also contended that the Commissioner (Appeals) would not accept the appeal without certificate of pre-deposit and filing the appeal would be beyond the condonable period.

Held
The Hon’ble High Court without judging the validity of the contention of whether the amended provision would apply held that merely because there is a provision for pre-deposit for availing appeal would not enable the petitioner to bypass such statutory remedy. Further, it was directed that the appeal and an application for waiver of pre-deposit should be filed before the Commissioner (Appeals) and the same would be entertained.

A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 32 dated 30th November, 2015

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External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) Policy – Revised framework

The circular contains the revised framework for External Commercial Borrowings. The framework will be reviewed after one year.

The revised ECB framework, which will apply in totality, comprises of the following three tracks:

Track I: Medium term foreign currency denominated ECB with Minimum Average Maturity (MAM) of 3 / 5 years.

Track II: Long term foreign currency denominated ECB with MAM of 10 years.

Track III: Indian Rupee denominated ECB with MAM of 3 / 5 years.

Involvement of Indian banks and their overseas branches / subsidiaries in relation to ECB to be raised by Indian entities is subject to prudential guidelines issued by RBI. Overseas branches / subsidiaries of Indian banks will not be permitted as lenders under Track II and III.

Entities raising ECB under the present framework can raise the said loans by March 31, 2016 provided the agreement in respect of the loan is already signed by the date the new framework comes into effect.

For raising of ECB under the following carve outs, the borrowers will, however, have time up to March 31, 2016 to sign the loan agreement and obtain the Loan Registration Number (LRN) from the Reserve Bank by this date: –
(i). ECB facility for working capital by airlines companies.
(ii). ECB facility for consistent foreign exchange earners under the USD 10 billion Scheme. (iii). ECB facility for low cost affordable housing projects (low cost affordable housing projects as defined in the extant Foreign Direct Investment policy). 55 The following 3 Forms for ECB have also be been revised and Annexed to this circular as under: –

Form 83 – Annex I
Form ECB – Annex II
Form ECB 2 – Annex III

2015 (40) STR 422 (Bom.) Vodafone India Ltd. vs. CCE, Mumbai-II

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Statutory interpretation by one Bench of High Court is binding on Co-ordinate bench of that very High Court and subsequent Bench cannot hold that particular provision was misinterpreted and re-interpret it again. The only recourse in such case is to refer the matter to Larger Bench. The way forward for appellant/respondent is to appeal before a Superior Court.

Facts
The Appellant engaged in providing of telecommunication services. Availed CENVAT credit on the duty paid on towers (in CKD/SKD form), parts of the towers, shelter/ pre-fabricated buildings purchased by them and used for providing output services. The statutory authorities contended that they were not entitled to avail CENVAT credit as per CCR and the view was upheld by CESTAT . Aggrieved by the order, in the appeal to the High Court, it was contended that the goods are capital goods or alternatively inputs under the said rules, only if any structure is attached permanently to land and cannot exist independently, the same shall be considered as immovable property. An Affidavit was filed with CESTAT providing technical details regarding set up of tower, preparation of civil foundation, erection and its dismantling. If goods have to be fastened to earth to facilitate its use, the goods do not lose the characteristics of ‘goods’. Though in an identical case, this High Court in Bharti Airtel Ltd. 2014 (35) STR 865 (Bom.) had disallowed CENVAT Credit, the case required a review since certain submissions were either not made or not considered in the said case. The respondent submitted that the issue and question of law was squarely covered by this court in case of Bharti Airtel Ltd. (Supra). Therefore, the appeal was meritless.

Held
After analysing the decision in Bharti Airtel’s case, the Hon’ble High Court observed that the said decision squarely applies to the case of the appellant as all the aspects of the subject matter were considered, the very provisions were relied upon and interpreted. Once the very rules relied upon were interpreted by the Division Bench of a Court, judicial discipline demands that this interpretation be followed by the co-ordinate bench of that very Court. It is well settled that interpretation of a statutory provision and equally a mis-interpretation by one Bench of High Court would be binding on the co-ordinated bench of that very High Court. The subsequent Bench cannot say that particular provision was misinterpreted and reinterpret it again. Therefore, the only recourse available to the subsequent Bench is to refer the matter to Larger Bench. In any case, the Court was in full agreement with the decision delivered by the co-ordinate bench and therefore, the disallowance of CENVAT Credit was upheld without referring the matter to larger bench. It was also commented that If the appellant is of the opinion that decision delivered in case of Bharti Airtel Ltd. (supra) was not appropriate, remedy to correct the same would lie before Superior Court above.

[2015] 63 taxmann.com 135 (Guj) Commissioner vs. Reliance Ports & Terminals

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Show Cause Notice is the foundation in the matter of levy and recovery of duty, penalty and interest and therefore demand cannot be confirmed on the grounds which are not raised in the Show Cause Notice.

Facts
The assessee availed CENVAT credit of service tax paid under reverse charge u/s. 66A and also on certain goods. In the Show Cause Notice, the department denied the credit on two grounds viz. (a) service tax paid under section 66A was not allowed by rule 3 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 – [CCR] and (b) Credit availed and utilized before actual installation of the capital goods was irregular. The Tribunal decided the matter in favour of the assessee holding that both the grounds were untenable. Before High Court the Department contended that Tribunal did not decide the eligibility of CENVAT credit in as much as whether the services in dispute would qualify as “input service” or as the case may be qualify as ‘capital goods’ used for providing output service i.e. port services.

Held
The Court held that, the issue as to eligibility of CENVAT credit in terms of utilisation of input services or capital goods for providing output services did not find place in show cause notice. The Court relied upon decisions of Supreme Court in the case of CCE vs. Ballarpur Industries Ltd. [2007] 11 STT 6 and of CCE vs. Gas Authority of India Ltd. 2008 taxmann.com 847, for the proposition that the show cause notice is the foundation in the matter of levy and recovery of duty, penalty and interest. Accordingly, department’s appeal was dismissed for the reason that it sought to challenge the order passed by the Tribunal on grounds which were never subject matter of the show cause notice.

Note: Readers may also refer to decision of Delhi CESTAT in the case of Computer Sciences Corp. India (P) Ltd [2015] 63 taxmann.com 211 [Para 3] where Tribunal has taken similar view that where there is no allegation raised in the show cause notice as to the total amount available as unutilized credit in the account of the appellants, it was not proper for the Commissioner (Appeals) to direct to check and verify or recompute the total credit available as unutilized credit.

A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 31 dated 26th November, 2015

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Investment by Foreign Portfolio Investors (FPI) in Corporate Bonds

This circular permits FPI to acquire NCD / bonds, which are under default, either fully or partly, in the repayment of principal on maturity or principal installment in the case of amortising bond provided: –

1. The revised maturity period of such restructured NCD / bonds, is three years or more.

2. The FPI discloses to the Debenture Trustees the terms of their offer to the existing debenture holders / beneficial owners from whom they are acquiring the NCD / bonds.

3. The investment must be within the overall limit prescribed for corporate debt from time to time (currently Rs. 2,443.23 billion).

[2015] 63 taxmann.com 266 (Guj) Ask Me Enterprise vs. UOI

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Benefit of VCES cannot be denied merely because certain payments were made under wrong accounting code as interest and penalty instead of respective service tax code, if rectification is sought from the department and the same is given effect to.

Facts
A departmental audit was conducted for the period 2008-09 to 2011-12 after the introduction of Service Tax Voluntary Compliance Encouragement Scheme, 2013 (VCES) i.e. after 13.05.2013 and in terms of audit para, part payment of service tax liability along with interest and penalties was made. The audit party did not inform the assessee about the VCES and hence only after making such part payments, a declaration was filed by the assesse declaring tax dues in respect of service tax liability computed under the audit.

The authorities were requested to adjust the part payments made as interest and penalty against service tax dues declared under the scheme. Although assessee paid amount equivalent to around 75% of the total tax dues before 31.12.2013, out of the said amount, 30% amount was paid towards interest and penalty which was adjusted by department against service tax dues after 31.12.2013 i.e. on 30.05.2014 on the basis of application of the assessee for correction of accounting codes for substituting the amounts paid as interest and penalty with service tax code.

The designated authority, refused to issue acknowledgment of discharge under form VCES-3 on the ground that the condition prescribed u/s. 107(4) of the Finance Act, 2013 with respect to full payment of tax dues declared under VCES by 31.12.2014 was not fulfilled and also held that erstwhile payment towards interest and penalty cannot be adjusted as they were liable to be recovered u/s. 87 of the Finance Act, 1994 without any immunity.

Held
The High Court observed that, it is not in dispute that amount equivalent to tax dues declared under the scheme was paid before June 2014. It was held that the respondent cannot be permitted to deny the benefit of the scheme by taking shelter of a hyper-technical plea. When a beneficial scheme is introduced the respondent in all fairness should inform about the availability and benefit of the scheme. Accordingly, the payment made was held as made on fulfillment of conditions of the scheme.

A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 30 dated 26th November, 2015

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Advance Remittance for Import of aircrafts / helicopters / other aviation related purchases

This circular states that, requisite approval of DGCA only is required for making advance remittance without bank guarantee or an unconditional, irrevocable standby letter of credit up to US $ 50 million for import of aircrafts / helicopters by a company for operating Scheduled or Non-Scheduled Air Transport Services (including Air Taxi Services). Thus, the approval from Ministry of Civil Aviation is no longer required to be obtained.

[2015] 63 taxmann.com 317 (SC) CCE vs. Otto Bilz (India) Pvt. Ltd.

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Where brand name used on the manufactured products is owned by the manufacturer himself, the benefit of small scale exemption cannot be denied.

Facts
The assessee manufactured the products in India under foreign brand name and therefore, the department contended that it is not eligible for benefit of small scale exemption under the excise law.

Held
The Court observed that the foreign company had assigned the trademark in favour of the assessee with a right to use the said trademark in India exclusively. Therefore, the assessee used the trademark in its own right as it owned the trademark and therefore, it cannot be said as use of trademark of ‘another person’ so as to disentitle the benefit of small scale exemption notification.

“Sale within State” – Nexus

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Introduction
There existed prior to the amendment in the CST Act, a controversy about determining the ‘situs’ of sale i.e. the State where the sale has taken place and which is the State eligible to levy tax on such sale? There were situations where on one sale, different States were contemplating levy of tax. The State from where goods moved used to claim tax, the State where actually delivery was given was also claiming tax as well as other States, picking up some connection of sale transaction with their State like, receiving payment, raising of invoice and so on.

This was known as nexus theory.

To avoid such a multiple claim, the CST Act was amended. Section 4 was inserted in the Act to determine the ‘situs’ of sale. Section 4(2) is as under:

“Section 4(2) in the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956
(2) A sale or purchase of goods shall be deemed to take place inside a State, if the goods are within the State—

(a) in the case of specific or ascertained goods, at the time the contract of sale is made; and
(b) in the case of unascertained or future goods, at the time of their appropriation to the contract of sale by the seller or by the buyer, whether assent of the other party is prior or subsequent to such appropriation.

Explanation.- Where there is a single contract of sale or purchase of goods situated at more places than one, the provisions of this sub-section shall apply as if there were separate contracts in respect of the goods at each of such places.”

The attempt was to crystallise the State of sale. It was provided that the sale will be in the State where the goods are ascertained in relation to contract of sale.

Thus, the nexus theory was given go by and only one State in which physically goods are ascertained in relation to contract of sale, is the State in which sale is deemed to have taken place.

Nexus Theory revisited
The issue has now again come up for discussion. Recently, the Hon. Bombay High Court had an occasion to deal with one such issue. The judgment is in the case of M/s. Raj Shipping (W.P.4552 of 2015 and others) dated 19-10-2015.

Facts of THE Case
The short facts of the case before the Hon. Bombay High Court were as under:

“In the additional affidavit, that is filed, the Petitioner states that it is engaged in the business, namely, Bunker Supplies. Bunker supplies mainly consist of supply of petroleum products such as high speed diesel oil (HSD), light diesel oil (LDO) and furnace oil (FO) to various incoming and outgoing vessels within or beyond the port limits of Mumbai Port. These outgoing vessels, to which the supplies are made, are located beyond approximately 1.55 nautical miles from the coast of Mumbai and are anchored in various anchorage points within the territorial waters of the Union of India, off the coast of Maharashtra. It is stated that the outgoing shipping vessel places an inquiry for the required quantity of HSD with the Petitioner. Pursuant to the inquiry made by the customer, the Petitioner gave a quote for their supplies. In many cases, the Petitioner enters into a formal agreement with their customers for the purchase of HSD. At page 86 of the paper book is one of the illustrative copy of such an agreement. Pages 86 to 89 of the paper book read as under….

81) Thus, pursuant to such agreement or an approval of a quote by the customer, the shipping vessel places a purchase order/nomination with the Petitioner for the required quantity and the name of the vessel to which the supplies are to be made. The illustrative copy of the purchase order/nomination is also at page 90 of the paper book. It is on receipt of the purchase order/nomination from the shipping vessel that the Petitioner, in turn, places a purchase order on any of the oil marketing companies such as M/s. Indian Oil Company Limited, M/s. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited, etc. Thereafter, the further documents are prepared, including the shipping bill, and once they are ready, the oil marketing company loads the required quantity of high speed diesel in the tank lorries, which then come to the barge loading point at Mallet Bunder along with the invoice copy of the oil marketing company.

82) The sister concern of the Petitioner owns self propelled barges having large cargo tanks (below deck) ranging from 40 thousand liters (40KL) to 200 thousand liters (200KL). The barges have pumps fitted on them with a flow meter in order to pump out the HSD to the vessel. These are similar to petrol pumps where petrol is sold to the regular customers. At the Mallet Bunder, the HSD supplied by the oil marketing company is decanted into the cargo tanks of the barges owned by the Petitioner. The entire activity of decanting is done under the supervision of a Customs Officer. After taking delivery of the HSD from the oil marketing company, the barges sail to the anchorage point of the nominated vessel.

83) Paras 12 to 15 at pages 82 and 83 of the paper book read as under:

12. After reaching the anchorage point of the nominated vessel, the HSD is pumped out of the barge into the fuel tank or bunker of the nominated vessel. Once the supply is complete, the Master or the Authorised Officer of the vessel acknowledges the receipt of the ordered quantity of HSD on the Bunker Delivery Note (BDN) and the Shipping Bill. An illustrative copy of the Bunker Deliver Note (BDN) duly acknowledged by the officer of the vessel is marked and annexed as Exhibit “7”.

13. The barges go beyond 1.54 Nautical Miles from the base line of the coast of Mumbai to deliver the HSD to the vessels anchored therein, in the territorial waters of the Union of India.

14. After the delivery of the HSD to the nominated vessel is complete, the Petitioner raises an invoice on the shipping line based on the BDN. An illustrative copy of the invoice raised by the Petitioner is marked and annexed as Exhibit “8”. The Petitioner invoices the shipping line for the quantity of HSD actually delivered, along with charges for transportation and hiring of the barge belonging to its sister concern companies. These may be way of a lumpsum rate/KL previously agreed to by the Petitioner or the charges for sale of HSD and transportation may be indicated separately in the invoice.

15) The sister concern of the Petitioner separately charges the Petitioner company for the hire of the barge by the Petitioner company for the purpose of the supplies to be made to various customers. An illustrative copy of a credit note issued by the Petitioner in favour of its sister concern is marked and annexed as Exhibit “9”.”

Arguments of Petitioner
Based on the above facts, the argument of the petitioner was that the sale cannot be said to be in the State of Maharashtra. The territorial water was contended to be not part of the State and hence, the State had no jurisdiction, when sale was taking place in the territorial waters.

Alternatively, it was contended that there could be a tax liability under CST Act but not under MVAT Act. It was also contended that if at all there was a liability in the State, then it would be exempt under the Notification issued u/s.41(4) bearing no.VAT -1505/CR-135/Taxation-1 dated 30-11-2006 wherein sale of motor spirits by retail outlet was exempted from the levy of VAT .

On behalf of Revenue, the arguments were opposed, stating that the State has power to deal with impugned sales.

Hon. Bombay High Court
After considering the facts, contentions & citations from both sides, the Hon. High Court observed as under:

“95) If we apply this principle to the facts and circumstances of the present case, we do not have any hesitation in concluding that it is the goods which have been produced or manufactured or refined by the oil companies and which are drawn from their storage tanks in fixed quantity that are supplied on demand to the Petitioner. The manufacturers as also the refineries are very much within the State of Maharashtra viz. at Mumbai. The Petitioners are at Mumbai. Meaning thereby, their place of business is at Mumbai. It is from that place that the Petitioner requests the oil companies to supply to it the high speed diesel. It is received by the Petitioner from the oil companies at Mumbai. It may be that the Petitioner treats this as a contract on which they paid the sales tax as a component of the price. However, it is that very high speed diesel and supplied to the Petitioner at Mumbai which is carried from Mumbai in furtherance of a contract with parties like M/s. Leighton, which contract is also placed and finalised from Mumbai, through the barges of the Petitioner to the vessels of M/s. Leighton and which may be stationed in the territorial waters. However, Leighton comes in the picture, as have been stated by them, for the purpose of fulfilling a contractual obligation of M/s. ONGC. It is for that obligation to be discharged that they have deployed the vessels. It is these vessels which require the bunker supplies and which supplies are met by the Petitioner. The subject matter of the contract with M/s. Leighton is this high speed diesel or motor spirit which is taken and carried from Mumbai. Therefore, there is sufficient territorial nexus for the Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act to apply and to be invoked to the later sale by the Petitioner of the same goods to M/s. Leighton and other entities similarly placed. We do not see how the Petitioner can escape compliance with this legislation and by contending that the contract of M/s. Leighton being a distinct contract, the sale taking place in territorial waters that the sales tax legislation or the VAT legislation of the Maharashtra State would be applicable. Its applicability has to be tested by applying the above principles and particularly the nexus theory. After having found sufficient territorial connection, namely, between the back to back transaction and the taxing authority that we are not in a position to agree with Mr. Sridharan that MVAT Act is inapplicable.”
Thus, the Hon. Bombay High Court observed that tax applicable can be decided on the nexus theory.

With these observations, the Hon. Bombay High Court has remanded the matter back to authorities under State Act for deciding the correction position.

In other words, there is no finality regarding the issue and it is left to the appellate authorities to decide the taxability including under MVAT /CST and exemption u/s 41(4).

Conclusion
There was a great sigh of relief with the enactment of section 4(2) in the CST Act. It was felt that once the sale is established to be out of state (on which state claimed tax) based on physical ascertainment of goods, there was no taxability in such State. Therefore, it was also felt that if sale is proved to be in an area not falling within the State claiming tax, the claim of non taxability in such State would be upheld.

Some of the expectations from above judgment were about State boundaries, the situs of actual event of sale, the fate of sale taking place in territorial waters etc., in clear terms. However, the said issues remain still burning and are left to be decided by the State Authorities. It is possible that though sale is outside State, still, based on nexus theory the State authorities may attempt to levy tax on such transactions.

Dealers/State may be required to go in for a second round of litigation after the issues are dealt with by the State authorities in assessment, appeals etc. Let’s hope for finality at the earliest.

A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 29 dated 26th November, 2015

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Import of Goods into India – Evidence of Import

Presently, either of the following documents can be submitted as proof of import of goods into India: – (a) Exchange control copy of the Bill of Entry for home consumption. (b) Exchange control copy of the Bill of Entry for warehousing, in the case of 100% Export Oriented Units (EOU). (c) Customs Assessment Certificate / Postal Appraisal Form as declared by the importer to the Customs Authorities. This circular provides that the following can also be submitted as proof of import of goods into India, in addition to the documents that are considered as proof of import at present: – (a) Ex-Bond Bill of Entry issued by Customs Authorities or by any other similar nomenclature, as evidence for physical import of goods. (b) Courier Bill of Entry.

30% INTEREST ON DELAYE D PAY MENT OF SERVICE TAX:WHETHER FAIR TO TAX PAYERS

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Background
With effect from 01/10/2014, vide Notification No.12/2014– ST dated 11/07/14 issued u/s. 75 of the Finance Act, 1994 (‘Act’), the following rates of interest have been prescribed, for delayed payment of service tax:

The intention of the government behind prescribing higher rates of interest for delayed payment service tax, brought out and as stated in the post budget press interview by the then CBEC Chairperson Ms. J. M. Shanti Sundharam, is under:

“Question
The Budget proposed an increase in the rate of interest from 18 % to 30 % on delay in payment of service tax beyond six months.

Reply
This is for service tax which is collected and not paid by a particular date. The person has used this amount. So, interest will act as a deterrent. It is only simple interest.”

However, the law as amended is not indicative of the government’s intention stated above. Hence, it is the understanding of trade & industry and tax payers generally that abnormally high rates of interest would apply to all cases of delayed payments (including tax demands arising out of actions u/s. 73 of the Act)

Concerns
The principal concerns of the trade & industry and tax payers generally are as under:

Service tax department is empowered under law to initiate actions upto 5 years (including 18 month normal period) for demanding & recovering tax with interest and penalty tax. It is common knowledge that tax litigations usually take a long time to settle (invariably litigation upto CESTAT takes around 5 years and could take upto 15 years if the matter goes upto the Supreme Court) for no fault of the tax payer. In that context, rate of interest of 30% is unjustified, unwarranted and totally unfair to tax payers.

The rate of interest is significantly higher if compared to the prevailing market rate of interest.

The rate of interest is abnormal considering the rates of interest prevalent in other Central Tax Laws / State VAT Laws / VAT GST Laws prevalent worldwide. Details are given at the end of this write up for ready reference.

For delayed payment of tax penal provisions are already existing in the Act, (viz. penalty u/s. 76, power to arrest etc.) Hence, in that context prescribing abnormally high rates of interest for delayed payments is unwarranted.

Further, it is pertinent to note that compared to the abnormally high rates of interest for delayed payment of service tax, the rate of interest payable by the government on refunds payable to a tax payer is only 6% pa. The disparity in rate of interest to be paid by a tax payer and tax department is glaring.

Recommendations
In order to avoid adverse consequences on trade & industry and tax payers generally and to promote & encourage fair tax administration practice considering the imminent introduction of GST regime, the following is suggested:

a) The rate of interest for delayed payment of service tax be restored to 18% pa with immediate effect,

b) As a deterrent, a higher rate of interest of 24% pa may be prescribed in cases where tax is collected but not paid to the government,

c) Parity should be brought in rate of interest payable by a tax payer & tax department at the earliest, under all tax laws. This would also help in establishing accountability of tax department.

(Note: Research inputs from Pradeep S. Shah & Udayan D. Choksi are acknowledged)

HUF – Coparcener – Eldest daughter is entitled to be the Karta of the HUF – Amendment to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 by the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 – All rights which were available to a Hindu male are now also available to a Hindu female. A daughter is now recognised as a co-parcener by birth in her own right and has the same rights in the co-parcenary property that are given to a son. [Hindu Succession Act 1956, Section 6]

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Sujata Sharma vs. Manu Gupta 226(2016)DLT647/ MANU/DE/4372/2015

The High Court had to consider whether the plaintiff, being the first born amongst the co-parceners of the HUF property, would by virtue of her birth, be entitled to be its Karta. HELD by the High Court upholding the claim:

(i) It is rather an odd proposition that while females would have equal rights of inheritance in an HUF property, this right could nonetheless be curtailed, when it comes to the management of the same. The clear language of section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act does not stipulate any such restriction.

(ii) The impediment which prevented a female member of a HUF from becoming its Karta was that she did not possess the necessary qualification of co-parcenership. Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act is a socially beneficial legislation; it gives equal rights of inheritance to Hindu males and females. Its objective is to recognise the rights of female Hindus as co-parceners and to enhance their right to equality apropos succession. Therefore, Courts would be extremely vigilant apropos any endeavour to curtail or fetter the statutory guarantee of enhancement of their rights. Now that this disqualification has been removed by the 2005 Amendment, there is no reason why Hindu women should be denied the position of a Karta.

(Editor’s note: Readers are advised to refer to the feature Laws and Business by Anup Shah in various issues of BCAJ for a complete understanding of the subject).

HUF – Coparcenary – Rights of daughters in the coparcenary property governed by Mitakshara law are applicable to living daughters of living coparceners as on 9th September, 2005 irrespective of when such daughters are born. [Hindu Succession Act, 1956, Section 6]

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Prakash and Ors vs. Phulavati & Ors AIR 2016 SC 769.

Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 deals with devolution of interest of Coparcenary property. With a view to confer right upon the female heirs, even in relation to the joint family property governed by Mitakshara law, the Parliament amended section 6 by enacting the Hindu Succession (Amendment Act), 2005 which came into effect from 9-9-2005. Phulavati, daughter of Late Yeshwanth Chandrakant Upadhye (died on 18-2-1988) filed suit for partition in the Civil court somewhere in the year 1992. She amended her claim in the suit in terms of the Amendment Act of 2005.

The Karnataka High Court, on interpretation of section 6, held that the Amendment Act of 2005 would be applicable to pending proceedings. The matter travelled to the Apex Court.

The Apex Court held that the text of the amendment itself clearly provides that the right conferred on a ‘daughter of a coparcener’ is ‘on and from the commencement of Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005’. Accordingly, it was held that the rights under the amendment are applicable to living daughters of living coparceners as on 9th September, 2005 irrespective of when such daughters are born. Disposition or alienation including partitions which may have taken place before 20th December, 2004 as per law applicable prior to the said date will remain unaffected. An amendment of a substantive provision is always prospective, unless either expressly or by necessary intendment it is retrospective. Even a social legislation cannot be given retrospective effect, unless so provided for or so intended by the legislature. Accordingly, the order of the High Court was set aside and the matter was remanded to the High Court for a fresh decision in accordance with law.

Discounting of Retention money under Ind-AS

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Query
A consulting company provides
project management and design services to customers on very large
projects that take significant time to complete. The company raises
monthly bills for work done, which are promptly paid by the customers.
However, the customers retain 10% as retention money, which is released
one year after the contract is satisfactorily completed. The 10%
retention money is a normal feature in the industry, and is more akin to
providing a security to the customer rather than a financing
transaction. Under Ind-AS, is the consulting company required to discount retention monies?

Response

Technical Literature

1.
Under Ind AS 18 Revenue is measured at the fair value of consideration
received or receivable. Further, Ind AS 18 states as below:

“In
most cases, the consideration is in the form of cash or cash equivalents
and the amount of revenue is the amount of cash or cash equivalents
received or receivable. However, when the inflow of cash or cash
equivalents is deferred, the fair value of the consideration may be less
than the nominal amount of cash received or receivable. For example, an
entity may provide interest-free credit to the buyer or accept a note
receivable bearing a below-market interest rate from the buyer as
consideration for the sale of goods. When the arrangement effectively
constitutes a financing transaction, the fair value of the consideration
is determined by discounting all future receipts using an imputed rate
of interest…………….The difference between the fair value and the nominal
amount of the consideration is recognised as interest revenue in
accordance with Ind AS 109.”

2. Further IAS 18 provides an example with respect to instalment sales when consideration is receivable in instalments.

“Revenue
attributable to the sales price, exclusive of interest, is recognised
at the date of sale. The sale price is the present value of the
consideration, determined by discounting the instalments receivable at
the imputed rate of interest. The interest element is recognised as
revenue as it is earned, using the effective interest method.”

3.
Ind AS 115 Revenue from Contracts with Customers prohibits discounting
of retention monies when the retention monies do not reflect a financing
arrangement. For example, the retention money provides the customer
with protection from the supplier failing to adequately complete some or
all of its obligations under the contract. Further even in arrangements
where there is significant financing component, practical expediency
not to discount was allowed, provided the financing was for a period
less than one year. Ind AS 109 Financial Instruments was aligned to Ind
AS 115, and did not require any discounting if the trade receivables did
not contain a significant financing component or when the practical
expediency was available.

4. On withdrawal of Ind AS 115, the alignment paragraph in Ind AS 109 discussed above was also removed.

Possible Views

View 1: No discounting is required

The
arrangement does not entail instalment payments nor is a financing
transaction under Ind AS 18, and hence discounting of retention money is
not required. Though Ind AS 18 does not provide further elaboration on
what constitutes a financing arrangement, guidance is available in Ind
AS 115. Based on this guidance, retention money is on normal terms and
common to the industry and represents a source of protection with
respect to contract performance rather than a source of financing.
Though Ind AS 115 is withdrawn, the guidance on what constitutes a
financing transaction, in the absence of any guidance in Ind AS 18, is
useful and may be applied.

Though Ind AS 109 requires discounting of retention money, one may argue that Ind AS 18 should be allowed to trump Ind AS 109.

View 2: Discounting is required

The
requirement in Ind AS 18 to determine revenue at the fair value of
consideration received or receivable would necessitate the discounting
of retention money. The provisions in IFRS 13 Fair Value, and Ind AS 109
Financial Instruments would also require discounting of retention
money. In essence, in any arrangement where money is not paid
instantly, there will be a time value of money, which needs to be
recognized.
The reason for which the payment is not made instantly or delayed is not relevant.

Author’s View

View
2 is the preferred view. However, View 1 should not be ruled out
because Ind AS 18 does not require discounting when the arrangement does
not effectively constitute a financing arrangement. View 1 can be ruled
out, only if Ind AS 18 is suitably amended to remove the reference to
financing arrangements. Suggest Institute should issue a clarification.

TS-126-ITAT-2016(Mum) Forbes Container Line Pte. Ltd. A.Y.: 2009-10, Date of Order: 11th March, 2016

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Section 44B of the Act and Article 8 of India-Singapore DTAA –Taxpayer providing container services cannot not be treated as engaged in shipping business. Article 8 of the DTAA and section 44B of the Act not applicable Income was liable to be taxed as business income. In absence of PE, such income is not taxable in India

Facts
The Taxpayer was a company incorporated in Singapore and engaged in the business of operating ships in international traffic across Asia and Middle East. The Taxpayer is a wholly owned subsidiary of an Indian Parent Co (ICo).

The Taxpayer filed a return of income claiming that the total income was NIL. However, AO contended that the Taxpayer had a real and intimate business connection in India for reasons that the ICo secured the business for Taxpayer in India and one of the directors of the Taxpayer was also a director in ICo, and such director looked after policy matters of the Taxpayer in India. Further, AO held that taxpayer had a fixed place of business in India. Further as ICO concluded various contracts on behalf of the Taxpayer with various Government agencies for carrying out various functions, ICo created an Agency PE for the taxpayer in India.

AO also contended that Taxpayer being a Non-vessel operating common carrier was not eligible to claim benefits under Article 8 of the DTAA, dealing with shipping income and the income of the Taxpayer would fall within the ambit of Article 7. The computation of such income would be governed by section 44B of the Act. However, the Taxpayer contended that it did not have a fixed place of business in India. Further, it was contended that as an independent entity all its decisions were taken in Singapore and ICo had no role in deciding taxpayer’s policies.

The Taxpayer appealed before First Appellate Authority (‘FAA ’). However, FAA upheld the order of AO.

Aggrieved by the order of FAA , the Taxpayer preferred an appeal before the Tribunal.

Held
On facts and records, it was clear that taxpayer was maintaining books of accounts as well as bank account in Singapore and all banking transactions were made from that account only. Nothing was brought on record to show that the effective control and management of taxpayer was in India.

Factors like staying of one of the directors in India or holding one meeting during the year under consideration or location of parent company would not decide the residential status of the Taxpayer.

The Taxpayer did not own or charter or took on lease any vessel or ship but was merely providing container services to its clients. Thus, the Taxpayer is not engaged in shipping business. This was also accepted by the AO. Therefore the provisions of section 44B dealing with income from shipping business would not be applicable in the present case.

The income of the Taxpayer had to be assessed as per Article 7 which deals with business income. In the absence of PE, such income is not taxable in India.

TS-187-ITAT-2016(Mum) Interroute Communications Limited A.Y.: 2009-10, Date of Order: 9th March, 2016

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Article 13 of India UK-DTAA – Payment for Interoute connectivity facility helping in connecting the calls to telecom operators in the end jurisdiction is neither for any scientific work nor for any patent, trademark, design, plan or secret formula or process. Payment is for a service and not for use of scientific equipment. Since service does not satisfy ‘make available’ condition, it does not qualify as Fee for technical services (FTS) under the DTAA .

Facts
The Taxpayer was a company incorporated in, and tax resident of UK. The Taxpayer was engaged in the business of providing international telecommunication network connectivity to various telecom operators around the world. The Taxpayer received certain amount from Indian customers towards the provision of virtual voice network (VVN). VVN is a standard inter-connect service provided to third party carriers. The Taxpayer contented that the income for use of VVN is in the nature of business income and since there was no PE in India, such income is not taxable in India.

The AO held that the Taxpayer provides use of its facilities/equipment/infrastructure to enable customers to interconnect with each other. Such facility includes proprietary software and hardware, technical expertise and other intellectual property. The AO observed that usage of such facilities amounted to usage of the Intellectual property held by the Taxpayer and hence, the payments received by the Taxpayer were in the nature of Royalty, or alternatively, FTS. Hence, the same was taxable in India. On further appeal, the First Appellate Authority also upheld the order of AO.

Aggrieved, the Taxpayer preferred an appeal before the Tribunal.

Held
Essentially, provision of VVN was connecting the call to the end operator, and, in that sense, it worked like a clearing house.

Payment made by the Indian entities can be held to be royalty only when it is payment for scientific work, any patent, trademark, design or model, plan, secret formula or process, or for information concerning industrial, commercial or scientific experience (‘specified items’).

In the present case, the payment is not for a scientific work nor is there any patent, trademark, design, plan or secret formula or process for which the payment is being made. The payment is made for a service, which is rendered with the help of certain scientific equipment and technology. The Taxpayer is providing a facility which is a standard facility used by other telecom companies as well. Also, merely because the payment involves a fixed as also a variable payment, the same does not alter the character of service.

Though the Taxpayer may charge a fixed amount to cover its costs in employing enhanced capacity so as not to incur losses when this capacity is not used, but what the customer is paying for is a service and not the use of equipment involved in additional capacity, nor for any scientific work, any patent, trademark, design or model, plan, secret formula or process, or for information concerning industrial, commercial or scientific experience.

The payment for a service can be brought to tax under Article 13 of DTAA only when it makes available the technology in the sense that recipient of service is enabled to perform the same service without recourse to the service provider. Though the service rendered by the Taxpayer requires technical inputs, there is no transfer of technology. Hence, the make available condition is not satisfied. Therefore such payment is outside the ambit of fees for technical services (‘FTS’) taxable under Article 13 of the DTAA .

Further, since there is no dispute that the Taxpayer does not have any permanent establishment (‘PE’) in India, the payment made by Indian customers cannot be brought to tax in India.

TS-131-ITAT-2016(HYD) GVK Oil & Gas Limited A.Y.: 2009-10, Date of Order: 9th March, 2016

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Article 12 of India-US DTAA , Article 13 of India UK DTAA – Payment for fixed period, nonexclusive licence to use a dataset consisting of scientific as well as technical information, permitting its use only as a licensee, and not involving transfer of technical knowledge or experience or making available of technology, does not amount to royalty under the DTAA .

Facts
Taxpayer an Indian company was engaged in the business of Oil and Gas exploration. Taxpayer made certain payments to a USA and UK Company (FCo) towards a non-exclusive licence and right to use a dataset for an agreed licence fee.

The Taxpayer contended that the dataset was nothing but a compilation of data and licence was only for the use of data and not for providing any experience, knowledge or skill to the Taxpayer. Taxpayer also contended that

Use of the dataset is not a transfer of the copyright but it is a copyrighted article.

It was contended that the dataset was not customized according to the requirements of the Taxpayer nor was it for the exclusive use of the Taxpayer.

In absence of provision of knowhow, such licence fee does not qualify as royalty.

Against that AO observed that
NR agreed to grant non-exclusive license/right to use certain data and derivatives in consideration for an agreed license fee.

Such information/knowledge is not available in the public domain and available to the taxpayer only on securing a valid license.

Such payment amounts to consideration for information concerning industrial, commercial or scientific experience.

(a) In any case, the Taxpayer had ordered the dataset which was customised for the taxpayer. Accordingly, when such customised data is made available upon request of taxpayer, it becomes know-how as it cannot be used by any other party.

(b) Thus the licence fee amounts to royalty both under the Act as well as the DTAA and held the Taxpayer as an ‘assessee-in-default’ or failure to withhold taxes u/s. 195.

Held
The Taxpayer obtained a fixed period licence to use a dataset which is highly technical and complicated can be accessed only on the grant of a license by the owner.

On the expiry of licence, taxpayer is required to return the product or destroy the data accessed by him during the license period. However, taxpayer is not required to destroy the product produced by him by use of such data. This indicates that the data was made available to the taxpayer to enable it to process and use it for furtherance of its objects.

The definition of ‘Royalty’ under the Act is more exhaustive as compared to the definition under the India-USA and India-UK DTAA . Under the Act, consideration for granting of a license for the use of the property is also treated as royalty whereas, there is no such provision under the DTAA .

Reference was made to principle laid down in various judgments1 wherein it has been held that unless and until the license is given to use the copyrighted property itself, the consideration paid cannot be treated as ‘Royalty’.

In the facts of the case, license is granted to use information contained in the database. Further, the licenses are non-exclusive licenses and therefore, information/ data is not customized to meet the taxpayer’s requirements exclusively.

Though the information in the database is scientific as well as technical, taxpayer is permitted to use the information only as a licensee. It does not involve transfer of technical knowledge or experience. Therefore there is no use of copyright. Thus, under the DTAA unless the license is given to use the copyright itself, the consideration paid cannot be treated as royalty.

It is clear that FCo has only made available the data available with them but are not making available any technology available for use of such data by the taxpayer. Thus, such payments are not in the nature of ‘royalty’ as per the India-USA and India-UK DTAA and hence the provisions of S. 195 are not applicable.

PS: Royalty implications under the Act were not analysed as the royalty definition under the DTAA was considered to be narrower than royalty definition under the Act.

TS-144-ITAT-2016(Mum) Siro Clinpharm Private Limited A.Y.: 2009-10, Date of Order: 31st March, 2016

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Section 92B of the Act – Finance Act 2012, inserted explanation to section 92B expanding the scope of definition of international transaction inter alia to include the transaction of guarantee within its ambit should be applicable prospectively

Facts
The Taxpayer, an Indian Company, had given a guarantee to foreign banks on behalf of its associated enterprises (‘AE’). The Taxpayer did not charge any fee or commission for issuance of these guarantees. However, the AEs duly reimbursed the Taxpayer towards the bank charges incurred by the Taxpayer.

TPO held that the corporate guarantees, as provided by the Taxpayer to the bank, were specifically covered by the definition of ‘international transaction’ u/s. 92B and charged fees by imputing at arm’s length price. The same was upheld by the First Appellate Authority (‘FAA ’). Aggrieved Taxpayer appealed before the Tribunal.

Held
Finance Act 2012 inserted explanation to section 92B expanding the scope of definition of international transaction inter alia to include the transaction of guarantee within its ambit. Such amendment was stated to be clarificatory in nature and was made applicable with a retrospective effect.

Legislature may describe an amendment as ‘clarificatory’ in nature, but a call will have to be taken by the judiciary whether it is indeed clarificatory or not. The amendment in question is related to transfer pricing provisions which are in the nature of an antiabuse legislation. An anti-abuse legislation does not trigger the levy of taxes; it only tells you what behaviour is acceptable or what is not acceptable. What triggers levy of taxes, is non-compliance with the manner in which the anti-abuse regulations require the taxpayers to conduct their affairs. In that sense, all anti-abuse legislations seek a certain degree of compliance with the norms set out therein. It is, therefore, only elementary that amendments in the anti-abuse legislations can only be prospective. It does not make sense that someone tells you today as to how you should have behaved yesterday, and then goes on to levy a tax because you did not behave in that manner yesterday. Reliance in this regard was placed on the decision of co-ordinate bench in the case of Micro Ink vs. ACIT (2016) 176 TTJ 8 (Ahd) and Bharti Airtel Ltd. (2014) 161 TTJ 428 (Delhi – Trib) and New skies (2016) 382 ITR 114 (Delhi). Hence, if the amendment increases the scope of international transaction u/s. 92B, then there is no way it could be implemented for the period prior to this law coming on the statute i.e. prior to 2012

Alternatively, the Tribunal held that if the amendment by Finance Act 2012 is considered clarificatory and does not add anything or expand the scope of international transaction defined u/s. 92B, then this provision has already been judicially interpreted in favour of the Taxpayers by the aforesaid Tribunal rulings, till it is reversed by a higher judicial forum.

Hence, Explanation to section 92B, though stated to be clarificatory and effective from 1st April 2002, has to be necessarily treated as effective from at best the AY 2013-14. Hence, the impugned adjustments must stand deleted.

TS-177-ITAT-2016(Mumbai ITAT) Capegemini S.A. A.Y.: 2009-10, Date of Order: 28th March, 2016

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Article 23 of India- France DTAA – Guarantee commission paid pursuant to a corporate guarantee agreement executed in France between a French Company and a French Bank, does not arise in India – Such commission is not taxable in India under the ‘other income’ article of the DTAA

Facts
The Taxpayer, a French Company provided a corporate guarantee to a French bank (bank). In lieu of such guarantee, the Indian branch of the bank provided loan to the Indian subsidiaries (ICo) of Taxpayer. ICo paid guarantee commission to the Taxpayer towards the guarantee given to the bank. The AO contended that the guarantee commission paid to the taxpayer arises in India and therefore, was taxable under “Other income” Article 23 of the India-France DTAA , for the following reasons

The guarantee had been provided for the purpose of raising finance by an Indian company

Finance was raised in India and the benefits were availed by Indian subsidiaries

Finance requirement was met by Indian branch of the French bank.

The Taxpayer, however, contended that guarantee commission did not arise in India and accordingly was not taxable in India.

Held
On appeal, ITAT held:

Guarantee commission received by the taxpayer does not accrue or arise in India, nor is it deemed to accrue or arise in India and therefore, it is not taxable in India under the Act.

Guarantee was given by a French company to a French bank in France. Therefore, such guarantee commission arises in France and not in India. Therefore, guarantee commission paid to the Taxpayer is not taxable in India under Article 23(3) of the DTAA .

Revised Procedure for making Remittances to Non Residents – New Rule 37BB u/s. 195(6) of the Income – tax Act, 1961

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Every resident payer has a question as to “what is the procedure for making payments to a non-resident?” This question is relevant even for non-resident payer as the obligation for withholding tax1 is cast on every payer (whether resident of India or not) if the income in the hands of the recipient is taxable in India. Recently, CBDT has amended the procedure w.e.f. 1st April, 2016 for issuance and submission of Form 15CA and 15CB which facilitates remittance of money to a non-resident person. This article highlights the salient features of the new procedure for making payment to a non-resident.

1. Purpose of section 195
Section 195 of the Act is a mechanism to deduct tax from any payment (which is chargeable to tax) made to a nonresident. The underlying philosophy behind any withholding tax provisions is “pay as you earn”. The ease and certainty of collection of taxes make such provisions attractive for any tax legislature.

2. Person responsible to deduct tax at source u/s. 195 of the Act
Section 195 casts an obligation on the person who is making any payment to a non-resident to deduct tax at source. The sweeping language of the section brings almost every payment, made to a non-resident, which is chargeable to tax, within its ambit. The only exclusion here is that of a payment of salaries. Section 192 of the Act deals with TDS provisions relating to salary paid to a non-resident, which is chargeable to tax in India.

Section 195 provides that, “Any person responsible for paying to a non-resident not being a company, or to a foreign company, any interest or any other sum chargeable under the provisions of the Act (not being income chargeable under the head “salaries”) shall, at the time of credit of such income to the account of the payee or at the time of payment thereof in cash or by the issue of a cheque or draft or by any other mode, whichever is earlier, deduct income-tax thereon at the rates in force.”

The dissection of the above provision reveals that—

(i) The obligation to deduct tax at source is cast on every person making payment, be it individual, company, partnership firm, Government or a public sector bank etc. The term ’person’ as defined in section 2(31) of the Act is relevant here.

(ii) The payee may be any type of entity (i.e. individual, company etc.).

(iii) The payee must be a non-resident under the Act.

(iv) The payment may be for interest or any other sum chargeable to tax except salaries.

(v) Tax has to be deducted at source at the time of credit or payment of the sum to the non-resident, whichever is earlier.

(vi) There is no threshold for deduction of tax at source. It therefore means payment of even one rupee to a nonresident would attract TDS provisions.

3. TDS by a non-resident from payments to another non-resident
This issue had come up for examination in some landmark cases; notable amongst them is the Apex Court’s decision in case of Vodafone International Holdings B.V. vs. Union of India, wherein the Supreme Court held in favour of Vodafone and held that indirect transfer of shares2 by one non-resident to the another non-resident did not result in taxable income in the hands of the transferor and hence, there was no obligation for the payer to withheld tax at source. The Supreme Court followed the “look at” approach, i.e. form rather than substance, and refused to lift the corporate veil to bring the capital gains arising to HTIL to tax in India. In order to discourage such kind of indirect transfers and bring them to tax (especially where such transfers derives its value from assets situated in India) section 9 of the Act was amended retrospectively to bring to tax in India the capital gains arising on transfer of any assets outside India, between two non-residents, if such transfer derives substantial value in respect of any asset situated in India.

Section 195 was also amended, to clarify that the nonresident payer is liable to deduct tax at source, if the income in the hands of payee is taxable in India.

Explanation 2 was inserted to section 195 (1) of the Act vide Finance Act, 2012 with retrospective effect from 1st April 1962, clarifying that the obligation to deduct tax at source u/s. 195 has always been there for any nonresident, whether such person has any place of business or business connection or presence in any other manner. Whether it results in an extra-territorial jurisdiction is a matter of debate. For the sake of understanding, the relevant provision is reproduced herein below:

Explanation 2.—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that the obligation to comply with sub-section (1) and to make deduction there under applies and shall be deemed to have always applied and extends and shall be deemed to have always extended to all persons, resident or non-resident, whether or not the non-resident person has—
(i) a residence or place of business or business connection in India; or
(ii) any other presence in any manner whatsoever in India.

4. Procedure for furnishing of information of deduction of tax at source u/s 195(6)
Section 195(6) of the Act provides that a person responsible for paying to a non-resident (hereafter referred to as ‘payer’) shall furnish such information as may be prescribed under Rule 37BB. The said Rule 37BB provides that Form No. 15CA and/or Form No. 15CB4 shall be furnished for the purpose of paying to a non-resident. Form No. 15CA is to be filled and submitted online by the deductor i.e. payer. Form 15CB is to be issued by the practicing Chartered Accountant (C.A) certifying (actually expressing his opinion) the taxability (chargeability) of the income in the hands of the payee and the amount of tax required to be deducted by the payer. In order to arrive at the amount of tax to be deducted the CA is required to take into account various applicable provisions of the Act (to compute the income of the non-resident payee) as well as provisions of the applicable Double Tax Avoidance Agreement (DTAA ) and other relevant supporting documents and agreement, if any.

5. Steps while making a Remittance
Form 15CA is required to be furnished by the taxpayers for the purpose of remittance to a non-resident. It may be noted that Form 15CA should be filed in every case whether the remittance amount is chargeable to Incometax or not. However, exemption from filing of Form 15CA is provided in case of certain types of remittances.

Let us first deal with cases where the income is chargeable to tax. 15CA has four parts, namely, A,B,C and D. Following flow chart will be useful in understanding which part is to be filled in and under what circumstances.

6. Procedure where a remittance is not chargeable to tax:

6.1 Such remittances are classified in the following two categories as follows:
i. Non-reportable Transaction
ii. Reportable transaction

Let us first deal with transactions which are not required to be reported, meaning there is no need to file any form with the tax authorities.

6.2 Non-reportable Transactions
In following two cases there is no requirement to furnish Form 15CA or Form 15CB.

(i) Individuals making remittances under the Liberalised Remittance Scheme of FEMA and

(ii) Certain specified remittances as listed herein below.

Specified List of payments for which Form 15CA or Form 15CB are not required to be filed:

The earlier Rule 37BB contained 28 items which did not require submission of Form 15CA or 15CB at the time of the remittance. However, the new Notification No. 93/ 2015 now expands the list to 33 items.–

6.3 Reportable Transactions

Any transaction other than the non-reportable category is considered as reportable transaction. In other words, even if the remittance is not chargeable to tax, information in respect of such remittance is required to be provided in Part D of Form 15CA.

7. What is the difference between earlier Rule 37BB and the new Rule 37BB which is effective from 1st April, 2016?
Amendments in the new Rule 37BB as compared with earlier Rule 37BB are as follows:

Form 15CA and Form 15CB will not be required if an individual is making a remittance, which does not require RBI’s approval under FEMA or under the Liberalised Remittance Scheme (LRS).

The list of items which do not require submission of Forms 15CA and Form 15CB has been expanded from 28 to 33. The newly introduced items are as under –

i. Advance Payments against imports
ii. Payment towards import settlement of invoice
iii. Imports by diplomatic missions
iv. Intermediary trade
v. Imports below Rs. 5 Lakh (For use by Exchange Control Department offices)

Only the payments which are chargeable to tax under the provisions of Act in excess of Rs. 5 Lakh would require Certificate from a Chartered Accountant in Form 15CB.

A new reporting obligation is introduced for the authorised dealers (ADs) (i.e. the Banks). ADs will have to file Form 15CC (quarterly) in respect of the foreign remittances made by them.

8. Some Practical Issues

8.1 Cases where Tax Residency Certificate (TRC ) is required

Under the provisions of section 90(2), it has been provided that provisions of the Act or the DTAA , whichever are more beneficial to the assessee, shall be applicable. This benefit is, however, subject to satisfaction of conditions provided u/s. 90(4) of the Act. In order to claim the benefit of a DTAA , it has been provided that the non-resident payee must furnish a TRC which confirms that the payee is a Tax Resident of the other State. This becomes important from the perspective of the Act as well as DTAA since Article 4 (dealing with “Residence”) of almost all the DTAA s signed by India provides that benefits of the DTAA can be claimed only by such persons who are residents of either of the contracting states. In this connection, the reader may also refer to the Rule 21AB prescribing declaration in Form 10F to be obtained from the Non-resident payee.

8.2 Is there any other alternative other than a TRC since obtaining a TRC may not be feasible sometimes?

Section 90(4) provides for mandatory submission of TRC, issued by the foreign Government or a specified territory, in order to claim benefit of the DTAA. Thus, there is no alternative to submission of TRC.

However, if any foreign Government does not have a format or provision to issue TRC, then the taxpayer at best can get the information prescribed in Form 10F certified by the revenue authorities of the concerned foreign country or territory in order to avail the DTAA benefit.

It may be possible that the format in which TRC is issued by the foreign tax authority does not contain all the details required under Form 10F. For example, US IRS issues TRC in the Form 6166 which does not contain all details required in Form 10F. Therefore, the remitter needs to keep both the documents on record and submit to the Income tax Authorities in India, if and when required.

8.3 What are the details required to be provided in Form 10F?

Form 10F requires the following details –

(i) Name, Father’s name and designation of the person signing the form

(ii) Status (individual, company, firm etc.) of the assessee;

(iii) Nationality (in case of an individual) or country or specified territory of incorporation or registration (in case of others);

(iv) Assessee’s tax identification number in the country or specified territory of residence and in case there is no such number, then, a unique number on the basis of which the person is identified by the Government of the country or the specified territory of which the assessee claims to be a resident;

(v) Period for which the residential status, as mentioned in the certificate referred to in sub-section (4) of section 90 or sub-section (4) of section 90A, is applicable; and

(vi) Address of the assessee in the country or specified territory outside India, during the period for which the certificate, as mentioned in (iv) above, is applicable.

9. How to file Form No. 15 CA electronically

Form 15CA is required to be filed by the tax payer in every case of remittance except where remittance falls within the category of non-reportable transactions. (Refer paragraphs 5 and 6 supra).

In the subsequent paragraphs step by step procedure is given for filling up Form No. 15 CA and filing it electronically:

Note: Before proceeding to e-file Part D of Form No. 15CA, keep the hardcopy duly filled in ready with you to expedite the process.

Step 1. Go to the website of incometaxindiaefiling.gov. in.

Step 2. Login using:
a. User Id- PAN
b. Password- as is used for e-filing the income tax return
c. D ate of Birth/Incorporation- as is already registered with the income tax for e- filing of return of income etc.

Step 3. Next screen will appear:
– Click on ‘e-file’
– Select “prepare and submit online Form other than ITR”.

Step 4. Next screen will appear
– Select Form Name- “15CA”
– Click on “Click here to download the DSC Utility”
– O pen the “DSC Utility” and double click on the utility
– General Instruction Page will appear on the screen
– Click on “Register DSC” tab next to the Instruction tab
– Enter e-filing User- Id- which is PAN of the assessee
– Enter PAN of the DSC- Registered in e-filing which is the PAN of the person authorized to sign Form No. 15 CA
– Go to “Select type of digital signature certificate- Click on “USB token”
– Go to “Select USB token Certificate” and
select the name of the person authorized
to sign Form No. 15CA
– Click on “Generate Signature File”
– E nter the PIN of DSC and click ok.
– Save the “DSC Signature file”
– Come back to e-filing website- Attach “DSC
Signature File”. For this, click on “Browse” and attach the signature file saved and press “continue”.
– Select Relevant Part of Form No. 15CA from the drop down- PART D
– Click on continue and Form No. 15CA will be displayed on the screen.

Step 5. Fill up the details of the Remitter from the Hardcopy of PAR T D- Form No. 15CA.
– Following details are to be selected from the drop down
– State
– Country
– Status of the Remitter
– R esidential status of the remitter

Step 6. Fill up the details of the “Remittee”
– Following details are to be selected from the drop down
– State- Select “State outside India”
– Country- Select the Country of Residence of the remmittee
– Country to which remittance is to be made- Select the country of remittee
– Currency- Select the currency of remittance
– Country to which recipient of remittance is resident if available – Select the country of residence

Step 7. Fill up the details of “Remittance”
– Following details are to be selected from the drop down
– Name of the bank through which the remittance shall be made

Step 8. Fill up the “Nature of Remittance”
– Nature of Remittance as per the agreement / document is to be selected from the list of 65 categories of remittance mentioned in the Drop Down

Step 9. Fill up the “Relevant purpose code as per RBI”
– 1st Drop Down- Select the category of remittance from the list of 24(Twenty Four) categories mentioned
2nd Drop Down- Select the purpose code and description of remittance as mentioned in the hardcopy of Part D of Form No. 15CA

Step 10. Click on PAR T D- Verification tab next to Form 15CA on the top of the page.
– Fill up the details of the person authorized to sign “Form No. 15CA”
– Click on “Submit” button on the top of the page.
– Part D – Form No. 15 CA will be uploaded successfully.

Step 11. A fter filing Part D. Click on “My Account” tab nd Click on “View Form No. 15CA”

Step 12. Click on the Acknowledgement No link on the screen and then click on “ITR/FORM”.

Step 13. To open the PDF file enter the password. The password for the same is PAN in small letter with Date of birth/incorporation in continuation without using any special character.

Step 14. After downloading the PDF file, Save and print the same.

10. How to file Form No. 15 CB electronically

Step by step procedure for E-filing of Form Nos. 15 CA and 15 CB is as follows:

PRE-REQUISITES

In order to file Form 15CB, Tax payer must add CA. To add CA, Please follow the steps given below:

Step 1 – Login to e-filing portal, Navigate to: My Account? Add CA”.

Step 2 – E nter the Membership Number of the CA

Step 3 – Select 15 CB as Form Name and click submit.

Once the taxpayer adds the CA, the CA can file Form 15 CB in behalf of taxpayer.

In order to file Form 15CB, Chartered Accountant must follow the below steps.

Step 1 – U ser should be registered as “Chartered Accountant” in e-Filing. If not ready registered, user should click the link Register Yourself in the homepage.

Step 2 – Select “Chartered Accountants” under Tax Professional and click continue.

Step 3 – E nter the mandatory details and complete the registration process.

FILING PROCESS
Note:

Before proceeding to e-file Form No. 15CB keep the hardcopy duly filled in ready with you to expedite the process.

Kindly note that all the amounts to be entered in INR unless and until specifically required to be filled in Foreign Currency.

Step 1 – Go to the website of incometaxindiaefiling.gov.in.

Step 2 – on “Forms Other than ITR” on the Right Hand Side of the Website.

Step 3 – Download “Form No. 15CB

Step 4 – on “ITD_EFILING_FORM15CB_PR1.jar

Step 5 – General instruction page will appear on the screen

Step 6 – Click on “Form 15CB” tab on the Top left hand side
– F ill up Form 15CB from the hard copy of the Form 15CB prepared. Step 7 – Point No. 6 of Form 15CB
-1st Drop Down- Select “Nature of remittance” from 65 categories stated in drop down.

Step 8 – Point No. 7 of Form 15 CB
– 1st Drop Down- Select “Relevant Purpose Group Name” of remittance from 24 categories from the drop down.
– 2nd Drop Down- Select “Relevant Purpose Code and Description” of remittance.
– 3rd Drop Down- Select Yes or No for “In case the remittance is net of taxes, whether tax payable has been grossed up”

Step 9 – After filling up the details- Click on “Save Draft”
Step 10 – Click on “Validate”
Step 11 – Click on “Generate XML” and save the XML file.
Step 12– Go to “incometaxindiaefiling.gov.in” website and Login using:

a. User Id- PAN
b. Password- as is used for e-filing the income tax return
c. D ate of Birth/Incorporation- as is already registered with the income tax for e-filing of return of income etc.

Step 12 – Click on “e-file” – “Upload Form”

Step 13 – Fill up the following details
– PAN/TAN of the Assessee (Remitter)
– PAN of CA (for example: Name of CA – PAN of the CA)
– Select Form Name- 15CB
– Select filing type- Original
– A ttach the “XML” file saved
– A ttach “DSC of CA”
– Click on submit- Form No. 15CB will be submitted successfully

Step 14 – After filing Form 15CB Click on “My Account” tab and Click on “e-filed returns/forms”
– Click on PAN/TAN of assessee (Remitter)
– Click on relevant Acknowledgement Number link
– Click on ITR/FORM
– To open the PDF file, enter the password.
The password for the same is PAN in small letter with Date of birth/incorporation in continuation without using any special character.-
– After downloading the PDF file, Save and print the same.
– Click on “Receipt”
– Save and print the same.

11. Summation
Amendments to Rule 37BB though appearing complicated will reduce the compliance burden of the tax payer. It also provides the much needed certainty by specifying various transactions for which reporting is not required. Small value transactions not exceeding Rs. Five lakh per year are exempted from the cumbersome procedure of reporting by e-filing. However, a word of caution here is that the transactions not exceeding Rs. Five lakh per year are exempted only from reporting and not from the obligation of withholding tax wherever applicable. Therefore, the tax payer may have to deduct tax at source in an appropriate case even if the transaction value is less than Rs. Five lakh. Similarly, robust documentation would be required to justify the non-reporting or non-deduction transactions as hitherto. In order to determine whether the tax is deductible or not, the remitter would be required to ascertain the taxability of payment in the hands of the non-resident and that will require knowledge of the legal provisions governing Taxation of Cross Border Transactions. The remitter would be faced with a number of issues such as (i) Classification/ Characteriation of the payment (e.g. Business Income vs. Capital Gains or FTS or Royalty); (ii) Existence or otherwise of a PE (iii) Quantum of Income to be attributed to the PE (iv) Eligibility to access a Tax Treaty, (v) Application of the provisions of a DTAA vs. the Income-tax Act, (iv) issues relating to Interpretation and application of a DTAA , etc. In many cases although prima facie the remitter is not required to deduct tax at source and the new procedure also does not require him to obtain a CA Certificate in Form 15 CB, it would be advisable that he obtains CA Certificate in the Form 15 CB for NIL TDS because the CA would be able to substantiate the non-deduction of tax at source with valid documentation, judicial support and detailed and sound reasoning. In such a case, the remitter may fill up Part C of the Form 15 CA along with Form 15 CB.(However, in view of the language of Part D of Form 15CA, there is ambiguity as to whether Part C has to be filled up or Part D. In our view, once Form 15CB is obtained and uploaded electronically and acknowledgment number of such Form 15CB is filled in by the remitter in Form 15CA, Part C of Form 15CA will be automatically filled in). The issue needs to be clarified by the CBDT about the procedure to be followed by the remitter in case he desires, out of abundant caution, to obtain a CA Certificate in Form 15CB to be absolutely certain about taxability or otherwise of a particular remittance under the provisions of the Income-tax Act and/or the applicable Tax Treaty. Presently, the consequences of non-deduction of tax at source are very serious as it would not only lead to disallowance of the payment u/s. 40(a)(i) but also penalty u/s. 271C and levy of Interest u/s 201 of the Act. Many a time, the Assessing Officers are prone to summarily disallow all remittances from which tax has not been deducted at source and hence it may land the tax payer into a long drawn litigation. However, if the remitter has obtained a CA certificate for non-deduction of tax, it would help him in the Assessment and Penalty Proceedings, if any.

M/s. Naulakha Theatre vs. State of , [2013] 64 VST 481 (P & H)

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Entertainment Tax – Promissory Estoppel – Concessions Announced in Annual Budget Based On Decision Taken In Cabinet – Subsequently Not Implemented – State Not Bound To Grant Concession, Punjab Cinemas (Regulation) Act, 1952.

Facts
The petitioners, owners of cinema theatre, made various representations to the Government for concession in payment of entertainment tax. In response, the Government took a decision to give 33% concession in the entertainment tax, if the tax is deposited in lump sum. Such decision was taken by the cabinet and was incorporated in the annual budget for the year 2003-04 presented before the Legislative Assembly on March 24, 2003. The petitioners have allegedly deposited the lump sum entertainment tax in pursuance of such budget proposal. It was later somewhere in September, 2004, the demand was raised against the petitioners on the ground that the petitioners have deposited entertainment tax availing of rebate of 33%, whereas no notification has been issued by the Punjab Government. The Petitioners filed writ petition, before the Punjab High court against such demand.

Held

The issue, whether entertainment tax can be permitted to be paid in lump sum or not, is a matter of policy. Such policy could be given effect to only by amending the Punjab Entertainment Tax (Cinematograph Shows) Rules, 1954. Neither the budget proposal nor the earlier statement of Chief Minister is to the effect that it has been decided to permit the payment of entertainment tax in lump sum. The representation is only that the State Government has proposed the payment of entertainment tax in lump sum so as to grant concession up to 33%. No promissory estoppel can be raised against the State on the basis of such promise, when the levy of entertainment tax is statutory.

One of the essential ingredients so as to invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel is altering of position by a person. However, the averments do not show that the petitioners have altered their position on the basis of representation of the functionaries of the State. The petitioners were running cinemas and continued to run cinema even after the speech of the Chief Minister/ Finance Minister. If the petitioners have provided better facilities and infrastructure though in the absence of any material, such fact cannot be taken into consideration; still such better facilities do not lead to alteration of positions by the petitioners on the strength of promise made. It is the convenience of the visitors, which was taken care of by the cinema owners, when they provided better facilities and infrastructures or when they screen big budget films, which will obviously gave better revenue to the petitioners as well. Therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioners have altered their position to their detriment on the basis of speech of the Finance Minister proposing the reduction of the entertainment tax. Accordingly, the High Court dismissed the writ petition filed by the petitioners.

Depreciation – Carry forward and set off – Amendment to section 32(2) by the Finance (No.2) Act, 1996 – Effect – Unabsorbed Depreciation as on 1-4-1997 can be set off against income from any head for assessment year immediately following 1-4-1997 and thereafter unabsorbed depreciation if any to be set off only against business income for a period of eight assessment years.

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Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. vs. CIT [2016] 380 ITR 165 (SC)

The Tribunal had held that under the provisions of section 32(2)(iii)(a) and (b) the amount of unabsorbed depreciation allowance shall be set off against the profits and gains, if any, of any business or profession carried on by him and assessable for that assessment year; if not wholly so set off, the amount of unabsorbed depreciation allowance not so set off shall be carried forward to the following assessment year not being more than eight assessment years immediately succeeding the assessment year for which the aforesaid allowance was first computed.

The Tribunal further held that since in this case, business income after adjusting brought forward business loss had been determined at nil, therefore, in the absence of any other business income, the amount of brought forward unabsorbed depreciation allowance shall not be set off from the other income, i.e., income from “house property” and “Other Sources” and shall be carried forward to the following assessment year(s) as per the provisions of section 32(2)(iii)(a) and (b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

The High Court admitted the appeal on the following questions:

(i) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal erred in construing the amendment of section 32(2) by the Finance (No.2) Act, 1996, as retrospective in effect so as to preclude the assessee’s claim for adjustment of accumulated unabsorbed depreciation allowance brought forward as on the 1st April, 1997, from earlier years against income from house property and income from other sources for the assessment year 1998-99 ?

(ii) Whether the assurance of the Finance Minister in Parliament that set off of the cumulative unabsorbed depreciation brought forward from earlier years as on April 1st, 1997, can be set off against the profits and gains of a business or profession or any other income of the taxpayer for the assessment year 1997-98 and subsequent year forms part of the legislative intent and any construction contrary thereto is erroneous?

The High Court held that the provisions introduced suggest that where the unabsorbed depreciation allowance could not be wholly set off against the profits and gains, if any, of any business or profession carried on by the assessee, the unabsorbed depreciation allowance could be set off from the income under any other head during the assessment year 1997-98. If the unabsorbed depreciation allowance could only be wholly set off during the assessment year 1997-98, the left over could only be set off against the profits and gains, if any, of the business or profession in the assessment year 1998-99.

The High Court therefore answered both the question in the negative and in favour of the Revenue.

On further appeal, the Supreme Court dismissed the SLP subject to the observation that the unabsorbed depreciation as on April 1, 1997, can be set off against the income from any head for the immediate assessment year following April 1, 1997 and thereafter if there still is any unabsorbed depreciation the same can be set off only against the business income for a period of eight assessment years.

ACIT vs. Rupam Impex ITAT, Rajkot bench, Rajkot Before Pramod Kumar (A.M.) and S S Godara (J.M.) I.T.A. No.: 472/RJT/2014 A.Y.: 2008-09 Date of Order: 21st January, 2016 Counsel for Assessee / Revenue : Vimal Desai / Yogesh Pandey and C S Anjaria

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Section 154 – Who is responsible for the mistake is not material for the purpose of proceedings u/s. 154; what is material is that there is a mistake – AO directed to rectify the mistake even though it was alleged to have been made by the assessee.

Facts
In the assessment order passed by the AO u/s. 143(3) of the Act, the assessee noted that the AO had erred in computing its assessed income on account of the following discrepancies in the order passed:

The AO was, accordingly, urged to rectify the mistake which was apparent on record. However, the AO rejected this request primarily on the ground that the assessee himself had computed the income on the basis of these figures. On appeal, the CIT(A) held the action of the AO as incorrect and directed the AO to rectify the mistakes u/s. 154.

Before the Tribunal, the revenue justified the stand of the AO and submitted that since the claim of the assessee, as made in the income tax return, was accepted, the assessee could not make a fresh claim without a revised return.

Held
According to the Tribunal, a lot of emphasis was placed by the AO on the fact that the mistake was committed by the assessee ignoring the fact of the complete non-application of mind by him to the facts of the case and making a mockery of the scrutiny assessment proceedings. According to the Tribunal who is responsible for the mistake was not material for the purpose of proceedings u/s. 154; what is material is that there is a mistake – a mistake which is clear, glaring and which is incapable of two views being taken. According to the Tribunal, the fact that mistake has occurred was beyond doubt. It is attributed to the error of the assessee does not obliterate the fact of mistake or legal remedies for a mistake having crept in. According to it, the income liable to be taxed has to be worked out in accordance with the law as in force. In this process, it is not open to the Revenue authorities to take advantage of mistakes committed by the assessee. Tax cannot be levied on an assessee at a higher amount or at a higher rate merely because the assessee, under a mistaken belief or due to an error, offered the income for taxation at that amount or that rate. It can only be levied when it is authorised by the law, as is the mandate of Article 265 of the Constitution of India. According to it, a sense of fair play by the field officers towards the taxpayers is not an act of benevolence by the field officers but it is call of duty in a socially accountable governance.

Dismissing the appeal of the revenue the Tribunal made it clear that it was not awarding any costs but put in a word of caution. It pointed out that there has to be proper mechanism to ensure that such frivolous appeals are not filed. And if that does not happen and the frivolous appeals continue to clog the system, it is only a matter of time that the Tribunal would start awarding costs, as a measure to deterrence to the officers concerned.

[2016] 67 taxmann.com 65 (Hyderabad ) Virtusa (India)(P.) Ltd. vs. DCIT A.Y.: 2012-13 Date of Order: 4th March, 2016

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Section 115JAA – Reliance by the assessee on ITR-6 format to arrive at the total liability as well as MAT credit calculations, for payment of tax, is proper. Addition made by the AO by making calculations applying his own interpretation which is not in line with ITR 6 needs to be deleted.

Facts
The assessee company filed its return of income for assessment year 2012-13 on 30.11.2012 admitting a total income of Rs. 42,87,89,690. The return of income was processed by CPC, Bangalore u/s. 143(1) raising a demand of Rs. 32,06,700. The difference in computation of tax by the assessee and the AO was on account of the Assessing Officer (AO) computing MAT credit without including surcharge and education cess while arriving at the amount of tax payable under normal provisions of the Act and u/s. 115JB of the Act.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who relying on the decision of the Tribunal in the case of Richa Global Exports Pvt. Ltd. confirmed the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held
The Tribunal held that as per section 115JAA(2A), tax credit to be allowed shall be the difference of tax paid for any assessment year under sub-section (1) of section 115JB and the amount of tax payable on his total income computed in accordance with the other provisions of the Act. The important word used is tax paid and as per the Hon’ble Apex Court decision in the case of K. Srinivasan vs. CIT [1972] 83 ITR 346 (SC), the term `tax’ includes surcharge.

The Tribunal observed that sub-section (5) of section 115JAA grants set off in respect of brought forward tax credit to the extent of the difference between tax on his total income and the tax which would have been payable u/s 115JB, as the case may be for that assessment year. It noted that the term used is `tax’ and not `income-tax’ or any other term. It held that the term `tax’ includes surcharge.

The Tribunal noted that the provisions of sub-section (5) of section 115JAA are applied in ITR-6. It observed that ITR-6 form is designed and approved by the apex body CBDT and this form is universally used by all the company assessees. It observed that these are standard forms which are expected to be followed by all the assessees. It noted that the format of ITR-6 was amended w.e.f. AY 2012-13 by CBDT. It held that the AO cannot overlook these formats and (interpret in his own method of calculating tax credit while making assessment u/s. 143(1) of the Act) proceed to calculate the MAT credit to compute assessment u/s. 143(1) applying different methods when the proper and correct method is proposed by CBDT in ITR-6. The AO is expected to follow ITR-6 format to complete the assessment u/s. 143(1) or 143(3) of the Act.

As regards the decision of the Delhi Bench of ITAT in the case of Richa Global Exports Pvt. Ltd., the Tribunal held that the decision of Apex Court in the case of K. Srinivasan may not have been brought to the knowledge of the Delhi Bench.

It noted that earlier judgments in the cases of Universal Medicare, Valmet India and Wyeth Limited were decided relying on ITR-6 as applicable in those assessment years. Applying the ITR-6 format, which was applied by the assessee as well, the Tribunal deleted the addition made.

This ground of appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

(2016) 156 ITD 524 (Delhi ) ITO (Exemption) v. Satyug Darshan Trust A.Y.: 2009-10. Date of Order: 4th November, 2015

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Section 115BBC – Where assessee established for charitable and religious purposes receives anonymous donation without any specific direction that such donation is for any university or other educational institutions or any hospital or other medical institutions run by the assessee, then such donation cannot be taxed by invoking provisions of section 115BBC(1).

Facts
The assessee was a religious and charitable trust registered u/s. 12AA and its income was exempt u/s.11. The assessee was running Satyug Darshan Sangeet Kala Kendra and also running a school under the name and style of Satyug Darshan Vidhyalaya.

The AO noticed certain sum under the head ‘Donation Golak’. The explanation of the assessee that the said amount was less than 5 per cent of the total receipt was not accepted by the AO and the AO invoking the provisions of section 115BBC(1) taxed the said sum as the income of the assessee.

On appeal, the CIT(A) deleted the addition holding that the assessee was a charitable and religious trust and provisions of section 115BC would not be applicable to it. Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal before the Tribunal.

Held
The AO while framing the original assessment had categorically stated that the activities of the assessee are charitable within the meaning of section 2(15) and there was no change in the aims and objects of the assessee as compared to the earlier years.

The provisions of section 115BBC(1) are applicable for the anonymous donations received by any university or other educational institution or any hospital or any trust or institution referred to in sub-clauses (iiiad) or (vi) or (iiiae) or (via) or (iv) or (v) of clause (23C) of section 10. However, sub-section (2) of section 115BBC carves out exceptions to provisions of section 115BBC(1).

In the present case, the assessee is established for religious and charitable purposes and the anonymous donation was received without any specific direction that such donation is for any university or other educational institution or any hospital or other medical institution run by the assessee trust and therefore, the ld. CIT(A) had rightly deleted the said addition in view of the provisions of section 115BBC(2)(b) of the Act.

In the result, the appeal filed by the department is dismissed.

Salary – Section 17(3) – A. Y. 1994-95 – Premature termination of service in terms of service rules – Payment of sum by employer to employee voluntarily with a view to bring an end to litigation – No obligation on employer to make such payment – Payment not compensation – Not profits in lieu of salary – Not liable to tax

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Arunbhai R. Naik vs. ITO; 379 ITR 511 (Guj):

The assessee was discharged from his services. Against the order of termination, he preferred an appeal to the higher authority in the company but did not succeed. In writ petition filed by the assessee the Single Judge directed reinstatement of his services. During the pendency of the appeal preferred by the employer against the order of the single judge, the assessee and the employer arrived at a settlement, in terms whereof, the amount was to be computed in the manner stated therein and was to be paid to the assessee. The assessee claimed that the amount of Rs. 3,51,308/- so received was capital receipt and was not liable to tax. The Assessing Officer did not accept the claim and the amount was added to the total income. The Tribunal held that the amount was taxable u/s. 17(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

On appeal by the assessee, the Gujarat High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The services of the assessee were terminated in terms of the service rules and the amount was paid only in terms of the settlement, without there being any obligation on the part of the employer to pay any further amount to the assessee with a view to bring an end to the litigation.

ii) There was obligation upon the employer to make such payment and, therefore, the amount would not take the character of compensation as envisaged u/s. 17(3)(i). The amount would, therefore, not fall within the ambit of the expression “profits in lieu of salary” as contemplated u/s. 17(3)(i). The Tribunal was, therefore, not justified in holding that the amount of Rs. 3,51,308 received by the appellant pursuant to the judgment of the High Court was income liable to tax u/s. 17(3) of the Act.”

References and appeals to High Court – Sections 256 and 260A – Revised monetary limit of tax effect of Rs.20 lakh in CBDT’s Circular No. 21/2015 shall apply to pending references in High Courts u/s. 256 as they apply to pending appeals u/s. 260A as the objective of the Circular would stand fulfilled on application to references u/s. 256 pending in HCs where tax effect is less than Rs.20 lakh

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CIT vs. Sunny Sounds (P.) Ltd.; [2016] 65 taxmann.com 162 (Bom):

By a Circular No. 21/2015, CBDT prescribed tax limit of Rs.20 lakh for filing appeals before the High Court and the said limit is applicable for pending appeals also. The Bombay High Court has clarified that the circular is equally applicable to the pending references. The High Court held as under:

“Revised monetary limit of tax effect of Rs.20 lakh in CBDT’s Circular No. 21/2015 shall apply to pending references in High Courts u/s. 256 as they apply to pending appeals u/s. 260A as the objective of the Circular would stand fulfilled on application to references u/s. 256 pending in HCs where tax effect is less than Rs.20 lakh. Accordingly, since tax effect less than Rs.20 lakh, instant reference application returned unanswered and question of law raised left open to be considered in an appropriate case.”

Appeal – A. Y. 2006-07 – CIT(A) can consider the claim though not made in the return or the revised return

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Principal CIT vs. Western India Shipyard Ltd.; 379 ITR 289 (Del):

For the A. Y. 2006-07, the Assessing Officer rejected the assessee’s claim made by way of a letter, during the assessment proceedings, for deduction of the bad debts written off by it on the ground that it could have only been made by way of revised return u/s. 139(5). CIT(A) accepted the claim and granted the deduction. The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) could have considered such claim even during the course of appellate proceedings otherwise than by way of a revised return, he did not examine whether, in fact, the assessee had taken such debts into consideration while computing its total income. For that purpose, the Tribunal remanded the matter to the Assessing Officer for a decision afresh.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The Tribunal was right in holding that while there was a bar on the Assessing Officer entertaining such claim without a revised return being filed by the assessee, there was no such restraint on the CIT(A) during the appellate proceedings. However, while permitting such a claim he ought to have examined whether in fact the bad debts were written off by the assessee in the first instance in the accounts and then taken into consideration while computing the income.

ii) Remand of the matter to the Assessing Officer for that purpose was, therefore, justified.”

Charitable purpose – Exemption – Sections 2(15), proviso, 11 – A. Y. 2009-10 – Object of trust to provide training to needy women in order to equip or train them in skills and make them self reliant – Nursing training provided at centre of Trust free of cost – Occasional sales or generation of funds for furthering objects but not indicative of trade, commerce or business – Proviso to section 2(15) not applicable – Trust entitled to exemption

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DIT vs. Women’s India Trust; 379 ITR 506 (Bom):

The assessee-trust formed to carry out the object of education and development of natural talents of people having special skill, more particularly women. It trained them to earn while learning. It educated them in the field of catering, stitching, toy making, etc. While giving them training, it used material brought from the open market. In the process some finished product such as pickles, jam, etc., were produced and which the assessee sold through shops, exhibitions and personal contacts. The Director of Income-tax held that the assessee has shown sales to the tune of 69,72,052/-. He accordingly held that the proviso to section 2(15) is applicable and hence the assessee was not entitled to exemption. The Tribunal found that the motive of the assessee was not the generation of profit but to provide training to needy women in order to equip or train them in these fields and make them self confident and self reliant. The Tribunal took the view that occasional sales or the trusts own fund generation were for furthering the objects but not indicative of trade, commerce or business. The proviso did not apply. The Tribunal held that the assessee is entitled to exemption.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) Considering the fact that the trust had been set up and was functional for the past several decades and it had not deviated or departed from any of its stated objects and purpose, utilisation of the income, if at all generated, did not indicate the carrying on of any trade, commerce or business.

ii) The Tribunal’s view was to be upheld. The view was taken on an overall consideration and bearing in mind the functions and activities of the trust. In such circumstances it was not vitiated by any error of law apparent on the face of the record.”

Depreciation – Plant – Pond specifically designed for rearing/breeding of the prawns had to be treated as tools of business of the assessee and the depreciation was admissible on these ponds. Judicial Discipline – Division Bench bound by a decision of a co-ordinate Bench – In case of different view, must refer the matter to a larger Bench

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ACIT vs. Victory Aqua Farm Ltd. (2015) 379 ITR 335 (SC)

The
question of law that fell for consideration before the Supreme Court
was as to whether ‘natural pond’ which as per the assessee was specially
designed for rearing prawns would be treated as ‘plant’ within section
32 of the Act for the purposes of allowing depreciation thereon. The
Supreme Court, at the outset, noted that one Division Bench of the High
Court of Kerala in the case of the same assessee (271 ITR 528) had on
earlier occasion decided the aforesaid question in the negative holding
that it is not a ‘plant’. However, another Division Bench by the
impugned judgment dated 14.10.2014, (271 ITR 530) even after noticing
the earlier judgment, had not agreed with the earlier opinion and has
rendered contrary decision.

The Supreme Court, therefore, was
constrained to remark that the Division Bench which has given the
impugned judgment dated 14.10.2004 should have referred the matter to a
larger Bench as otherwise it was bound by the earlier judgment of the
coordinate Bench.

However, since appeals were filed against both
the judgments and the validity of the judgment rendered in the first
case was also questioned by the assessee, the Supreme Court was of the
view that it was necessary to decide these appeals on merits, rather
than remanding the case back to the High Court to be considered by a
larger Bench.

The Supreme Court noted that the assessee was a
company doing business of ‘Aqua Culture’. It grew prawns in specially
designed ponds. In the income tax returns filed by the assessee, the
assessee had claimed depreciation in respect of these ponds by raising a
plea that these prawn ponds were tools to the business of the assessee
and, therefore, they constituted ‘plant’ within the meaning of section
32 of the Act. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim of the
assessee. The two Benches of the High Court took contrary views. The
Supreme Court observed that it was not in dispute that if these ponds
were ‘plants’, then they were eligible for depreciation at the rates
applicable to plant and machinery and case would be covered by the
provisions of section 32 of the Act.

According to the Supreme
Court, it was not even necessary to deal with this aspect in detail with
reference to the various judgments, inasmuch as the Supreme Court in
Commissioner of Income Tax, Karnataka vs. Karnataka Power Corporation
[247 ITR 268] had held that the building which could not be separated
from the machinery and the machinery could not work, without such
special construction had to be treated as plant.

The Supreme
Court recorded that an attempt was made by the learned counsel for the
Revenue to the effect that the pond in question was natural and not
constructed/ specially designed by the assessee. According to the
Supreme Court, it was not so. In the judgment dated 14.10.2004 of the
High Court, which had decided in favour of the assessee, the High Court
had specifically mentioned that the prawns were grown in specially
designed ponds. Further, this very contention that these were natural
ponds had been specifically rejected as not correct. Moreover, from the
order passed by the Assessing Officer, the Supreme Court found that this
was not the reason given by the Assessing Officer to reject the claim.
Therefore, finding of fact on this aspect could not be gone into at this
stage. According to the Supreme Court, the judgment dated 14.10.2004
rightly rested this case on ‘functional test’ and since the ponds were
specially designed for rearing/breeding of the prawns, they had to be
treated as tools of the business of the assessee and the depreciation
was admissible on these ponds. The Supreme Court, therefore, decided the
question in favour of the assessee and as a consequence, appeals of the
Revenue were dismissed and that of the assessee are allowed.

Income – Accrual – As the amounts of interest earned on the share application money to the extent to which it is not required for being paid to the applicants to whom moneys have become refundable by reason of delay in making the refund will belong to the company, only when the trust (in favour of the general body of the applicants) terminates and it is only at that point of time, it can be stated that amount has accrued to the company as its income.

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CIT vs. Henkel Spic India Ltd. (2015) 379 ITR 322(SC)

The assessee, a public limited company, came out with a public issue of shares on January 29, 1992, and the issue was closed on February 3, 1992. The application money received by the company was deposited with collecting banks or the bankers of the company, to which the amounts were transferred for 46 days. The interest earned on such deposits was sought to be taxed by the Assessing Officer as income for the assessment year 1992-93. The assessee’s contention was that the application money which had been received from the applicants for the allotment of shares was required to be and was kept in a separate bank account as required by section 73(3) of the Companies Act and that the interest earned on those moneys could not have been treated as income accrued to the company even before the allotment process was completed. The allotment process was completed only in the following assessment year after receipt of approval for listing the company’s share in Madras, Delhi, Ahmedabad and Bombay Stock Exchanges such approvals having been received on April 27, 1992, May 8, 1992 and July 6, 1992 respectively.

The Assessing Officer, though he had some doubt as to when the interest was credited to the account whether before or after March 31, 1992, counted the period of 46 days from the date of deposit and on that basis, held that the amount of interest accrued for the period prior to March 31, 1992, was liable to be taxed under the head, “Income from other sources” as the assessee had not commenced business in that year.

On appeal, the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) concurred with the view of the Assessing Officer and held that the interest that had accrued on the application money which had been kept in short-term deposits belonged to the assessee and was liable to be taxed in the hands of the assessee on the basis of accrual. The Tribunal, on further appeal by the assessee, upheld the assessee’s view and set aside the orders of the Commissioner as also the Assessing Officer.

On appeal by the Revenue, the High Court held that the company is not, u/s. 73, required to keep the money in a bank account which yields interest. There is, however, no prohibition in sub-section (3) or sub-section (3A) of section 73 against the money being kept in a bank account which yields interest. The interest so earned, however, cannot be regarded as an amount which is fully available to the company for its own use from the time the interest accrued, as that interest is an amount which accrues on a fund which itself is held in trust until the allotment is completed and moneys are returned to those to whom shares are not allotted. No part of this fund, either principal or interest accrued thereon, can be utilised by the company until the allotment process is completed and money repayable to those entitled to repayment has been repaid in full together with such interest as may be prescribed having regard to the length of period of delay in the return of money to them. It is only after the allotment process is completed and all moneys payable to those to whom moneys are refundable are refunded together with interest wherever interest becomes payable, the balance remaining from and out of the interest earned on the application money can be regarded as belonging to the company. The application money as also interest earned thereon will remain within a trust in favour of the general body of the applicants until the process outlined above is completed in all respects. The prohibition contained in sub-section (3A) of section 73 against the moneys standing to the credit in a separate bank account being utilised for purposes other than those mentioned in that sub-section, is absolute and the interest earned on the amounts in such separate bank account will remain a part of that separate bank account and cannot be transferred to any other account. As the amounts of interest earned on the application money to the extent to which it is not required for being paid to the applicants to whom moneys have become refundable by reason of delay in making the refund will belong to the company only when the trust terminates and it is only at that point of time, it can be stated that amount has accrued to the company as its income.

On further appeal, the Supreme Court noted that it was not in dispute that in the year 1993-94, the assessee had shown the income on account of interest received in the income tax returns and paid the tax thereon. The Supreme Court held that there was no error in the order passed by the High Court holding that the interest income accrued only in the assessment year 1993-94 and was taxable in that year only and not in the assessment year 1992-93. The Supreme Court accordingly dismissed the appeal.

Business Income- Remission or Cessation of Trading Liability – Settlement of deferred Salestax liability by an immediate one-time payment to SICOM – Sales-tax Authorities declining to grant credit of payment made to SICOM – No remission or cessation of liability – Section 41(1) (a) not attracted.

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CIT vs. S.I. Group India Ltd. (2015) 379 ITR 326 (SC)

The assessee had an industrial unit in the district of Raigad which was a notified backward area. The Government of Maharashtra issued a package scheme of incentives in 1993 by which a scheme for the deferral of sales tax dues was announced. The assessee had during the period May 1, 1999 and March 31, 2000 collected an amount of Rs.1,79,68,846 towards sales tax. Under the scheme, the amount was payable in five annual installments commencing from April 2010 and the liability was treated as an unsecured loan in the books of account of the assessee. The State Industrial and Investment Corporation of Maharashtra Limited (SICOM) offered to the assessee an option for the settlement of the deferred sales tax liability by an immediate one-time payment. The assessee paid an amount of Rs.50,44,280 to SICOM which, according to the assessee, represented by net present value as determined by SICOM. Payment was made by the assessee to SICOM on June 26, 2000. The difference between the deferred sales tax and its present value amounting to Rs.1.29 crore was treated as a capital receipt and was credited in the books of the assessee to the capital reserve account.

The Assessing Officer in the assessment order for the assessment year 2000-01 brought the aforesaid difference of Rs.1.29 crore to tax u/s. 41(1) of the Incometax Act 1961. The appeal filed by the assessee before the Commissioner (Appeals) for 2000-01 as well as the appeal for 2001-02 came to be dismissed by the appellate authority. The Tribunal dismissed the appeals filed by the assessee for these two assessment years by a common order. The assessee then moved the Tribunal in a miscellaneous application u/s. 254 which was dismissed.

The main contention of the assessee before the High Court was that the principal requirement for the applicability of section 41 of the Act is that the assessee must obtain a benefit in respect of a trading liability by way of a remission or cessation thereof. He argued that in the present case, there was no cessation of the liability of the assessee in respect of the payment of the sales tax dues and even if there was such a cessatioin, no benefit was obtained by the assessee. This contention was supported by the fact that the issue pertaining to the sales tax liability was decided by the Sales Tax Tribunal by its judgment dated February 8, 2008, and the Tribunal had specifically upheld the decision of the assessing authorities declining to grant credit to the assessee of payment which was made to State Industrial and Investment Corporation of Maharashtra Limited (SICOM) of Maharashtra. This contention is accepted by the High Court holding that the net result of the order of the Sales Tax Tribunal dated February 8, 2008, was to uphold the decision of the assessing authority declining to grant credit of the payment made by the assessee to SICOM towards discharge of the deferred sales tax liability. As a matter of fact, on July 22, 2008, a notice of demand was issued under section 38 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act of 1959 to the assessee by the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax, Navi Mumbai in the total amount of Rs.1,33,13,555. Having regard both to the order passed by the Sales Tax Tribunal on February 8, 2008, and the notice of demand issued on July 22, 2008, it was not possible for the court to accept the contention that there was a remission or cessation of liability. Since the record before the court did not disclose that there was a remission or cessation of liability, one of the requirements spelt out for the applicability of section 41(1)(a) had not been fulfilled in the facts of the present case.

According to the Supreme Court, the aforesaid facts, clearly demonstrated that the assessee had not been granted the benefit of the said cession for the assessment years in question. According to the Supreme Court, the High Court had rightly held that one of the requirements for the applicability of section 41(1)(a) of the Act had not been fulfilled in the present case.

The Supreme Court did not find any error in the order of the High Court and the appeals were accordingly dismissed.

Carry Forward of Loss and SECTION 79

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Issue for Consideration
Any loss incurred in the case of a company in which the public are not substantially interested (“closely held company”), in any year prior to the previous year shall not be carried forward and set-off, if there is change in the persons beneficially holding shares of such company with 51% voting power. In other words, the persons holding such voting power as on the last day of the previous year in which such set off is claimed are the same as the persons in the year or years prior to the previous year in which the loss was incurred.

The limitation contained in section 79 is relaxed in cases of change in the voting power in the following cases – (a) death of the shareholder, (b) gift to any relative of the shareholder, or (c) amalgamation or demerger of a foreign holding company, subject to prescribed conditions.

The relevant part of section 79 reads as “Notwithstanding anything contained in this Chapter, where a change in shareholding has taken place in a previous year in the case of a company, not being a company in which the public are substantially interested, no loss incurred in any year prior to the previous year shall be carried forward and set-off against the income of the previous year unless- (a) on the last day of the previous year the shares of the company carrying not less than fifty-one per cent of the voting power were beneficially held by persons who beneficially held shares of the company carrying not less than fifty-one per cent of the voting power on the last day of the year or years in which the loss was incurred.”

It is common to come across cases wherein shares of a closely held company carrying 51% of voting power or more are held by another company (‘immediate holding company’), which company in turn is the subsidiary of yet another company (‘ the ultimate holding company’). An interesting controversy has recently arisen as regards application of section 79 in cases where shares with such voting power held by the immediate holding company are transferred to yet another immediate holding company of the same ultimate holding company.

Can such a change of shareholding from one subsidiary to another subsidiary company of the same holding company disentitle the closely held company from setting-off the carried forward loss, is a question that the courts have been asked to examine. While the Karnataka High Court has held that the closely held company shall be entitled to set-off the carried forward losses, the Delhi High Court has recently prohibited such set-off, ignoring its own decision in an earlier case.

AMCO Power Systems Ltd .’s case
The issue arose before the Karnataka High Court in the case of CIT vs. AMCO Power Systems Ltd. 379 ITR 375, wherein the court was asked to consider the question: “Whether the Tribunal was correct in holding that the assessee would be entitled to carry forward and setoff of business loss despite the assessee not owning 51% voting power in the company as per Section 79 of the Act by taking the beneficial share holding of M/s. Amco Properties & Investments Ltd.?”

Admittedly, up to the assessment year 2000-01, all the shares of the company Amco Power Systems Ltd. were held by AMCO Batteries Ltd.(‘ABL’). In the assessment year 2001-02, the holding of ABL was reduced to 55% and the remaining 45% shares were transferred to its subsidiary, namely AMCO Properties and Investments Limited (‘APIL’). In the assessment year 2002-03, ABL further transferred 49% of its remaining 55% shares to Tractors and Farm Equipments Limited (‘TAFE ‘) and consequently ABL retained only 6% shares, its subsidiary APIL held 45% shares and the remaining 49% shares were with TAFE . Similar shareholding continued for the assessment year 2003-04. For easy understanding, shareholdings of the company for the relevant assessment years is given in the chart below:

For the assessment year 2003-04, the company filed its return of income on 28.11.2003, wherein NIL income was shown, after setting off losses brought forward from earlier years. The return of income was processed u/s. 143(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and the returned income was accepted on 6.2.2004. Subsequently, the case was taken up for scrutiny, and assessment u/s. 143(3) of the Act was completed. The income of the company for the year was determined at Rs.1,34,03,589/. The assessment order did not allow the set off of losses of the earlier years, by invoking section 79 of the Act.

Aggrieved by the order of assessment passed u/s. 143(3) of the Act, the company preferred an appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals), inter alia, for denial of set-off of brought forward business loss, on the ground that the provisions of section 79(a) of the Act were not complied with. The Commissioner (Appeals) order confirmed that the company was not found to be entitled to set-off of the brought forward losses, considering the change in beneficial holding of 51% or more, as provided u/s. 79 of the Act.

Being aggrieved by the order of the Commissioner (Appeals), the company filed an appeal before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, challenging the denial of the benefit of set-off of brought forward losses. The Tribunal allowed the appeal of the company, by allowing the benefit of set-off of brought forward losses. The Tribunal, in accepting the submission of the company, held that 51% of the voting power was beneficially held by ABL during the assessment years 2002-03 and 2003-04 also, and the company was thus entitled to carry forward and set-off the business losses of the previous years.

In appeal to the Karnataka High Court, the Revenue urged that, up to the assessment year 2001-02, there was no dispute that ABL continued to have 51% or more shares as its shareholding, as in that assessment year, ABL was holding 55% shares, and its subsidiary APIL was holding 45% shares. For the assessment year 2002-03, when ABL transferred 49% shares (out of its 55%) to TAFE , ABL was left with only 6% shares, meaning thereby, it was left with less than 51% shares. It was contended that, consequently, its voting power was also reduced from 55% to 6%, and the remaining 94% was divided between TAFE and APIL at 49% and 45% respectively. As a result the company was disentitled to claim carry forward and set-off of business losses in the assessment years 2002-03 and 2003-04. It was further submitted that even though APIL was a wholly owned subsidiary of ABL, both companies were separate entities, and could not be clubbed together for ascertaining the voting power. By transfer of its 49% shares to TAFE , the shareholding of ABL was reduced to 6% only. Thus, the provisions of section 79 of the Act were attracted for denial of the benefit of carry forward of losses to the company.

On behalf of the company, it was submitted that it was not the shareholding that was to be taken into consideration for application of section 79, but it was the voting power which was held by a person or persons who beneficially held shares of the company, that was material for carry forward of the losses. It was thus contended that as ABL was holding 100% shares of APIL, which was a wholly owned subsidiary of ABL, and fully controlled by ABL, even though the shareholding of ABL had been reduced to 6%, yet the voting power of ABL remained more than 51%. As such, the provisions of section 79 of the Act would not be attracted in the present case.

The Karnataka High Court noted the fact that ABL was the holding Company of APIL, which was a wholly owned subsidiary of ABL. The Board of Directors of APIL were controlled by ABL, a fact that was not disputed. The submission of the company that the shareholding pattern was distinct from voting power of a company, had force, in as much as, what was relevant for attracting section 79 was the voting power.

The High Court further noted that the purpose of section 79 of the Act was that the benefit of carry forward and setoff of business losses for previous years of a company should not be misused by any new owner, who might purchase the shares of the company, only to get the benefit of set-off of business losses of the previous years against the profits of the subsequent years after the take over. It was for such purpose, that it was provided that 51% of the voting power, which was beneficially held by a person or persons, should continue to be held for enjoyment of such benefit by the company. The court observed that though ABL might not have continued to hold 51% shares, it continued to control the voting power of APIL, and together, ABL had 51% voting power. Thereby, the control of the company remained with ABL as the change in shareholding did not result in reduction of its voting power to less than 51%. Section 79 dealt with 51% voting power, which ABL continued to have even after transfer of 49% shares to TAFE .

The Karnataka High Court noted that the Apex court, while dealing with a case u/s. 79(a) in CIT vs. Italindia Cotton Private Limited, 174 ITR 160 (SC), held that the section would be applicable only when there was a change in shareholding in the previous year, which might result in change in control of the company, and that every such change of shareholding need not fall within the prohibition against the carry forward and set-off of business losses. In the present case, the Karnataka High Court observed that though there might have been change in the shareholding in the assessment year 2002-03, yet, there was no change in control of the company, as the control remained with ABL, in view of the fact that the voting power of ABL, along with its subsidiary company APIL, remained at 51%.

The court also relied on the observation of the apex court in that case to the effect that the object of enacting section 79 appeared to be to discourage persons claiming a reduction of their tax liability on the profits earned in companies which had sustained losses in earlier years. The Karnataka High Court held that, in the case before them, the control over the company, with 51% voting power, remained with ABL. As such, the provisions of section 79 of the Act were not attracted. The court accordingly confirmed the finding of the Tribunal in this regard.

Yum Restaurants (India) Private Limited’s case
The issue came up again recently before the Delhi High Court in the case of Yum Restaurants (India) Private Limited vs. ITO in ITA No. 349 of 2015 dated 13th January, 2016 for the Assessment Year 2009-10.

The assessee, Yum Restaurants (India) Private Limited (‘Yum India’), was a part of the Yum Restaurants Group, whose 99.99% shares were held by its immediate holding company Yum Restaurants Asia Private Ltd.(‘Yum Asia’), with its ultimate holding company being Yum! Brands Inc. USA (Yum USA). 99.99% of shares of Yum India, initially held by ‘Yum Asia’, were transferred, pursuant to restructuring within the group, after 28th November 2008, to Yum Asia Franchise Pte. Ltd. Singapore (‘Yum Singapore’). The group decided to hold shares in Yum India through Yum Singapore and, therefore, the entire share holding in Yum India, was transferred from one immediate holding company, viz., Yum Asia, to another immediate holding company, Yum Singapore, although the ultimate beneficial owner of the share holding in Yum India remained the ultimate holding company viz., Yum USA.

The total income of Yum India was proposed to be assessed at Rs.40,65,40,535 in the draft order framed by the AO. In doing so, the AO, inter alia, disallowed the set off and carry forward of business losses incurred till AY 2008-09. By its order, the DRP upheld the conclusions reached by the AO and rejected Yum India’s submission as regards set off and carry forward of business losses. On the basis of the DRP’s order, the AO completed the assessment and assessed the income of Yum India.

In appeal to the ITAT , Yum India challenged the disallowance of the carry forward of business losses. By its order, the ITAT upheld the disallowances of the carry forward of business losses of earlier years. The ITAT referred to the change in immediate share holding of Yum India from Yum Asia to Yum Singapore and held that, by virtue of section 79 of the Act, since there had been a change of more than 51% of the share holding pattern of the voting powers of shares beneficially held in AY 2008- 09 of Yum India, the carry forward and set off of business losses could not be allowed.

In the appeal filed by Yum India to the Delhi High Court, the company challenged the order of the ITAT , questioning the denial of the carry forward of accumulated business losses for the past years and set off u/s. 79 of the Act.

The Delhi high court noted that the AO did not accept the contention of Yum India, that since the ultimate holding company remained Yum USA, it was the beneficial owner of the shares, notwithstanding that the shares in Yum India were held through a series of intermediary companies.; In his view, section 79 required that the shares should be beneficially held by the company carrying 51% of voting power at the close of the financial year in which the loss was suffered; the parent company of Yum India on 31st March 2008 was the equitable owner of the shares but it was not so as on 31st March 2009; accordingly, Yum India was not permitted to set off the carried forward business losses incurred till 31st March 2008.

The court also noted that, in dealing with the issue, the ITAT had in its order analysed section 79 of the Act and noted that the set off and carry forward of loss, which was otherwise available under the provisions of Chapter VI, was denied if the extent of a change in shareholding taking place in a previous year was more than 51% of the voting power of shares beneficially held on the last day of the year in which the loss was incurred. The ITAT had noted that, in the present case, there was a change of 100% of the shareholding of Yum India. Consequently, there was a change of the beneficial ownership of shares, since the predecessor company (Yum Asia) and the successor company (Yum Singapore) were distinct entities.The fact that they were subsidiaries of the ultimate holding company, Yum USA, did not mean that there was no change in the beneficial ownership. Unless the assessee was able to show that notwithstanding shares having been registered in the name of Yum Asia or Yum Singapore, the beneficial owner was Yum USA, there could not be a presumption in that behalf.

Having examined the facts as well as the concurrent orders of the AO and the ITAT , the Delhi high court found that there was indeed a change of ownership of 100% shares of Yum India from Yum Asia to Yum Singapore, both of which were distinct entities. Although they might be Associated Enterprises of Yum USA, there was nothing to show that there was any agreement or arrangement that the beneficial owner of such shares would be the holding company, Yum USA. The question of ‘piercing the veil’ at the instance of Yum India did not arise. In the circumstances, it was rightly concluded by the ITAT that in terms of section 79 of the Act, Yum India could not be permitted to set off the carried forward accumulated business losses of the earlier years.

Consequently, the Court declined to frame a question at the instance of Yum India on the issue of carry forward and set off of the business losses u/s. 79 of the Act.

Observations:
A company is required to show that there was no change in persons beneficially holding the shares with the prescribed voting power on the last day of the previous year in which the set off is desired. The key terms are; ‘beneficial holding’ and ‘ holding voting power’, none of which are defined in the Act nor in the Companies Act. The cases of fiduciary holding are the usual cases which could be safely held to be cases of beneficial holding. The scope thereof however should be extended to cases of holding through intermediaries, where the ultimate beneficiary is the final holder, who enjoys the fruits of the investment.

This principle can be applied with greater force in cases where the control and management rests with the ultimate holding company. Again ‘holding of voting power’ is a term that should permit inclusion of cases where the shares are held through intermediaries, and the final holder has the exclusive power to decide the manner of voting. If this is not holding voting power, what else could be?

Both the terms collectively indicate the significance of the control and management of the company. In a case where it is possible to establish that there has not been any change in the control and management of the company, that the control and management has remained in the same hands, the provisions of section 79 should not be applied.

The Apex court, in Italindia Cotton Private Limited’s case (supra), held that section 79 would be applicable only when there was a change in shareholding in the previous year which might result in change of control of the company, and that every change of shareholding need not fall within the prohibition against the carry forward and set-off of business losses. The findings of the Apex court have been applied favourably by the Karnataka High Court in AMCO’s case (supra) to hold that, though there might have been a change in the shareholding in the assessment year 2002-03, yet, there was no change of control of the company., The control remained with ABL in view of the fact that the voting power of ABL, along with its subsidiary company APIL, remained at 51%. It is this reasoning that was perhaps missed in the case of Yum India (supra).

In another similar case, Indrama (Investments) Pvt. Ltd., (‘IIPL’) a company held 98% of the shares of one Select Holiday Resorts Private Ltd.(‘SHRPL’) and the balance shares of SHRPL were held by four individuals, who inter alia held 100% shares of IIPL. On merger of IIPL into SHRPL, the shares held by IIPL stood cancelled and the four individuals became 100% shareholders of SHRPL. The claim of the set off of carried forward of loss of prior years by SHRPL was rejected by the AO for assessment years 2004-05 and 2005-06, by application of section 79, holding that there was a change of shareholders holding 51% voting power.

The appeal of SHRPL was allowed by the Commissioner(Appeals) and his order was upheld by the ITAT in ITA No. 1184&2460?Del./2008 dt. 23.12.2010 in the case of DCIT vs. Select Holiday Resorts Private Ltd. The appeal of the Income tax Department to the Delhi High Court was dismissed by the court, reported in 217 Taxman 110. The Special Leave Petition of the Income tax Department was rejected by the Supreme Court. The high court, in this case, equated the case of transfer of shares on a merger, with that of the transmission of shares to the legal heir on death, to hold that there was no change of voting power for attracting provisions of section 79 to enable the AO to deny the set off of the carried forward losses.

The ratio of the decision of the court in SHRPL was not brought to the attention of the ITAT as also of the high court in Yum Restaurant’s case. Also the findings of the Karnataka high court in AMCO’s case(supra) were not brought on record. We are sure that had the judicial development on the subject been brought to the attention of the Delhi High Court in the case of Yum Restaurants (supra), the outcome would have been different.

Section 79 has been amended by the Finance Act, 1988 by the insertion of the first Proviso, that excludes cases of change in shareholding consequent to death or gift. The scope of the amendment has been explained by Cir. No. 528 dated 16.12.1988 and in particular by paragraph 26.3. The CBDT clarifies that the objective behind the amendment is to save the genuine cases of change from the hardships of section 79 of the Act. Kindly see Circular No. 576 dated 31.08.1990. The section has been further amended by the Finance Act, 1999, by insertion of the second Proviso to provide for exclusion of cases involving change in shareholding of an Indian subsidiary on account of amalgamation or demerger of a foreign company – again to save genuine cases of change from hardship of section 79 of the Act.

Clause(b) of section 79(now deleted) provided for nonapplication of section 79 in cases where the change was not effected to avoid payment of taxes or for reduction of taxes. The objectives behind introduction of section 79 and the development in law thereon, as also the amendments made therein from time to time, clearly show that the right to set off of carried forward losses of prior years should not be denied in genuine cases. Kindly see CIT vs. Italindia Cotton Private Limited, 174 ITR 160 (SC), where the court observed to the effect that, the object of enacting section 79 appeared to be to discourage persons claiming a reduction of their tax liability, on the profits earned in companies after take over, which had sustained losses in earlier years.

The Delhi High Court, in Yum India’s case(supra), importantly observed that the company had failed to show that there was any agreement or arrangement that the beneficial owner of such shares would be the holding company, Yum USA. In our opinion, the situation otherwise could have been salvaged, had the company produced evidence to demonstrate that the beneficial owner of shares was Yum USA.

It may not be proper, in our considered opinion, to be swayed by the status of the subsidiaries for taxation of the dividend or other income. It would well be perfectly harmonious to hold the immediate holding company liable for taxation and, at the same time, to look through it for the purposes of section 79, right up to the ultimate holding company. Such an approach would not defeat the purposes of the Act but would serve the cause of the scheme of taxation.

Income characterisation on sale of tax-free bonds

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Taxation in India existed since ancient times. It was a ‘duty’ paid to
the rulers. The incidence and rules of tax have changed. A peep into the
Indian history reveals that income was formally made a subject matter
of tax by Sir James Wilson in 1860. Over these years, the legislation
has been grappling with the ever-evolving concept of income. One of the
biggest ironies of income-tax statute today is its inability to define
‘income’. The reason is its dynamic characterisation.Levy and quantum of
tax in India depends on the genre of income. It is thus critical to
reckon the characterisation of income to impose the appropriate levy.
This exercise of characterising has only become complex with the
evolution of business. A recent addition to this complexity has been
introduction of Income Computation and Disclosure Standards (“ICDS”).

The
objective of introducing ICDS (previously styled as Tax Accounting
Standards) was (i) reduction of litigation; minimization of alternatives
and giving certainty to issues. The prescribed standards (in the form
they are currently) could have far reaching ramifications. It needs to
be closely examined if they have achieved the core objectives with which
they were introduced or are in the process of drifting away into a new
quagmire of controversies. A discussion is inevitable important to have a
firm ground to pitch in the newness that ICDS seeks to inject. This
write-up initiates a discussion on one such instance which interalia
finds no clarity or certainty under the ICDS regime:

An
assessee holds certain tax free bonds. These bonds are sold before the
record date for payment of interest. The question is whether the
difference between the sale price and the purchase price is to be
treated as capital gain or to be segregated into capital gain and
interest accrued till the date of sale? In other words, whether interest
accrues only on the record date or accrues throughout the year?

The
question under consideration is the ‘characterisation of receipt’ on
sale of the bonds before the record date. Whether such receipts in
excess of the purchase price is wholly chargeable to tax as ‘capital
gains’ or should it be apportioned between ‘capital gains’ and ‘tax free
interest income’? A corollary question which crops up is whether such
tax-free interest accrues only on the record date or throughout the year
on a de die in diem basis?

Section 4 of the Income-tax Act,
1961 (“the Act”) imposes a general charge. The ambit of the charge is
outlined in section 5. Section 5 encompasses not only income actually
accruing in India, but also income deemed to accrue in India. ‘Accrual’
as a legal concept refers to the right to receive. It represents a
situation where the relationship of a debtor and creditor emerges.
Section 5 focuses on ‘accrual of income’, but does not outline the
timing of such accrual. Initially, accrual of interest income chargeable
to tax under the head ‘Income from other sources’ is being examined.

Time of accrual of interest income:
Section 56 of the Act mandates that interest on securities is
chargeable to tax under the head ‘Income from other sources’ if not
chargeable as ‘Profits and gains from business or profession’. The term
‘securities’ is not defined in the section. One may possibly borrow the
meaning of ‘securities’ from The Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act,
1956 (“SCRA”). SCRA defines securities to include bonds. Accordingly,
interest on tax free bonds is enveloped within the provisions of section
56. Section 56 (although a charging section) does not provide for time
of accrual of interest income.

Section 145 of the Act requires
that income ‘chargeable’ under the head “Profits and gains from business
or profession” and “Income from other sources” be computed as per the
cash or mercantile system of accounting regularly employed by the
assessee. Section 145(2) empowers the Central Government to notify
Income Computation and Disclosure Standards (“ICDS” for brevity) to be
followed by any class of assessees or in respect of any class of income.
The Central Government has currently notified 10 ICDS(s) vide
Notification No. 32/2015 dated 31.3.2015. These standards are to be
followed in computing the income where the ‘mercantile system’ of
accounting is adopted.

On traversing through the various
ICDS(s), two standards may be relevant in the present context – namely,
ICDS I & IV. The following paragraphs discuss the impact of these
standards on the issue under consideration:

ICDS I [Accounting policies] deals
with three accounting assumptions. The third accounting assumption is
that revenues and costs accrue as they are earned or incurred and
recorded in the previous year to which they relate. Incomes are said to
accrue under the ICDS when they are ‘earned’ and ‘recorded’ in the
previous year to which they relate. The cumulation of ‘earning’ and
‘recording’ of income connote accrual under ICDS.

Accrual as
understood u/s. 5 means a “right to receive” in favour of the assessee.
It is indicative of payer’s acknowledgement of a debt in favour of the
assessee. The question is whether ‘accrual’ u/s. 5 as hitherto
understood, is now to undergo changes in the light of the definition of
the said term under ICDS.

Lack of clarity in ICDS I:
Applying the ICDS definition, interest income accrues when it is earned
and recorded in the previous year. The Standard neither clarifies the
connotation of the term ‘earn’ nor does it specify the time and place of
recording the interest. “Earn” as per the Shorter Oxford English
Dictionary means – “Receive or be entitled to in return for work done or
services rendered, obtain or deserve in return for efforts or merit”.
Earning is a phenomenon of the commercial world. It is depictive of an
event warranting a reflection in the financial statements. Accrual in a
legal sense traverses a little further. The earning of an income has to
translate/transform into a right to receive. An earning of income is the
cause of its accrual. Earning therefore precedes accrual. A lag is thus
conceivable between the two caused by time or other factors. ICDS in
attempting to equate the two is trying to blur the difference. The
attempt may not achieve its purpose as the definition (of accrual) is in
the realm of accounting and not in the sphere of section 5.

Even
otherwise, earning of income can be said to occur – (i) at the time of
investment; (ii) on a de die diem basis; or (iii) specific record dates
given in the instruments. As regards recording, a further question could
be, should the recording be done in – books of accounts or return of
income. Recording is generally referred to in relation to books of
account. If this were to be the inference, what about those assessees
who do not maintain books of account but earn interest? Throughout the
notification [notification no. 32/2015], it is clarified that ICDS does
not apply for the purposes of maintenance of books of accounts, although
the standard applies only to those who adopt the mercantile basis of
accounting. Interestingly therefore, it is arguable that ICDS would not
apply unless the mercantile basis of accounting is adopted. If no
accounting is employed, as books are not maintained, ICDS may not apply.
Although income is offered for tax on accrual basis, being one of the
parameters of section 5.

Ambiguity in ICDS I enhanced by the
language in ICDS IV: ICDS IV [on revenue recognition] provides revenue
recognition mechanism for sale of goods; provision of services and use
of resources by others yielding interest, royalty or dividends. Para 7
of the Standard deals with interest income. It reads as under:

“7.
Interest shall accrue on the time basis determined by the amount
outstanding and the rate applicable. Discount or premium on debt
securities held is treated as though it were accruing over the period to
maturity.”

The Standard specifies that interest shall accrue on
‘time basis’. Accrual of income under ICDS I refers to culmination of
earning and recording. Under ICDS IV, interest as one of the streams of
income, accrues on ‘time basis’. Time basis under ICDS IV is said to
satisfy the criteria of ‘earning’ and ‘recording’. The import of the
expression ‘time basis’ is however not clarified. Interest is inherently
a product of ‘time’. There cannot be any dispute about the involvement
of ‘time factor’ in quantification and claim to receive interest. The
Standard merely states that accrual of interest happens on time basis.
It is not clarified whether time based accrual means (i) an
‘on-going/real time’ accrual or (ii) an accrual based on the ‘specific
timing’ prescribed by the concerned instrument. Both these are offshoots
of time basis. The Standard does not pinpoint the mechanism of
determining the time of accrual. The latter portion of paragraph (7)
explicitly mentions that discount or premium on debt securities accrue
over the period of maturity. It is not a single point accrual. Such
clarity is conspicuously missing in the first portion of the para
dealing with interest income.

Role of Accounting Standards in ICDS interpretation: One
may observe that the language employed in all the notified ICDS is
largely influenced by the Accounting Standards. ICDS IV owes its genesis
to AS 9 [Revenue recognition]. Para 8.2 of the AS 9 mirrors para 7 of
ICDS IV. Para 13 of AS 9 reads as follows:
“13. Revenue arising from
the use of others of enterprise resources yielding interest, royalties
and dividends should only be recognised when no significant uncertainty
as to measurability or collectability exists. These revenues are
recognised on the following bases:
(i) Interest: on a time proportion basis taking into account the amount outstanding and the rate applicable.”

The
aforesaid AS deals with recognition on ‘time proportion basis’. The use
of the term ‘proportion’ in this expression is indicative of the
concept of recognising ‘part or share’ of income or part of a year.
Interest under the AS has thus been viewed to be a time based
phenomenon. The interest is thus mandated to be recognised on a spread
out basis. It is not on one specific date. However, ICDS IV does not
employ the term ‘proportion’. One could therefore believe that the
understanding in AS 9 cannot be imported into ICDS. The conspicuous
absence of ‘proportion’ in ICDS paves way for an interpretation which is
different from that of AS 9. The expression ‘time basis’ employed in
ICDS IV definitely appears to deviate from AS 9 theory of
proportionality. Thus, if interest is to be paid on specific dates,
‘time basis’ could mean accrued on those specific dates. Whereas ‘time
proportion basis’ would have meant accrual upto the year end at least,
if such date happens to be an intervening event between the specified
dates.

“Tax accounting” should not essentially be different from
commercial accounting. Tax accounting recognises and accepts commercial
accounting if it is consistent and statute compliant. Income recognised
as per such commercial accounting is the base from which the taxable
income is determined. Tax laws incorporate specific rules that cause a
sway from commercial accounting in determining the taxable income. This
disparity is caused by the different purposes of commercial accounting
and taxation; difficulties in precise incorporating economic concepts in
tax laws, etc. To reiterate, one of the issues where commercial
accounting may not synchronise with tax principles is “accrual of
income”.

The Guidance Note issued by ICAI on ‘Terms Used in
Financial Statements’ defines accrual and accrual basis of accounting as
under:

“1.05 Accrual
Recognition of revenues and
costs as they are earned or incurred (and not as money is received or
paid). It includes recognition of transactions relating to assets and
liabilities as they occur irrespective of the actual receipts or
payments.

1.06 Accrual Basis of Accounting
The method
of recording transactions by which revenues, costs, assets and
liabilities are reflected in the accounts in the period in which they
accrue. The ‘accrual basis of accounting’ includes considerations
relating to deferrals, allocations, depreciation and amortisation. This
basis is also referred to as mercantile basis of accounting.”

The
accounting definition of accrual and the definition provided by the
ICDS I is similar. The Guidance note on the “Terms used in financial
statements” explains that accrual basis of accounting may involve
deferral, allocation or non-cash deductions (such as depreciation/
amortisation).

For the reasons already detailed earlier, accrual
for tax purposes is different. This could be better appreciated on a
consideration of ICDS III which deals with Percentage of Completion
Method. Under this method, revenue is matched with the contract costs
incurred in reaching the stage of completion. This results in
recognising income attributable to the proportion of work completed
having satisfied the test of ‘earning’ and hence accrual from an
accounting perspective. Such accounting accrual may not satisfy the tax
concept of accrual which connotes a right to receive. Accounting accrual
is driven more by matching principles. Such a method cannot however
alter the meaning of accrual as understood in the context of section 5.
Judiciary, at various fora, has explained the meaning of the term
‘accrual’ in context of section 5. It may be relevant to quote two among
those several judgments on this matter:

(a) The Apex Court in
the case of E.D. Sassoon & Co. Ltd. vs. CIT (1954) 26 ITR 27 (SC)
discussed the concepts of ‘accrual’, ‘arisal’ and ‘receipt’. The
relevant observations are as under:

“’Accrues’, ‘arises’ and
‘is received’ are three distinct terms. So far as receiving of income is
concerned there can be no difficulty; it conveys a clear and definite
meaning, and I can think of no expression which makes its meaning
plainer than the word ‘receiving’ itself. The words ‘accrue’ and ‘arise’
also are not defined in the Act. The ordinary dictionary meanings of
these words have got to be taken as the meanings attaching to them.
‘Accruing’ is synonymous with ‘arising’ in the sense of springing as a
natural growth or result. The three expressions ‘accrues’, ‘arises’ and
‘is received’ having been used in the section, strictly speaking
accrues’ should not be taken as synonymous with ‘arises’ but in the
distinct sense of growing up by way of addition or increase or as an
accession or advantage; while the word ‘arises’ means comes into
existence or notice or presents itself. The former connotes the idea
of a growth or accumulation and the latter of the growth or accumulation
with a tangible shape so as to be receivable
. It is difficult to
say that this distinction has been throughout maintained in the Act and
perhaps the two words seem to denote the same idea or ideas very
similar, and the difference only lies in this that one is more
appropriate than the other when applied to particular cases. It is
clear, however, as pointed out by Fry, L.J., in Colquhoun vs. Brooks
[1888] 21 Q.B.D. 52 at 59 [this part of the decision not having been
affected by the reversal of the decision by the Houses of Lords [1889]
14 App. Cas. 493] that both the words are used in contradistinction to
the word ‘receive’ and indicate a right to receive. They represent a
state anterior to the point of time when the income becomes receivable
and connote a character of the income which is more or less inchoate”

(b) The Apex Court in CIT vs. Excel Industries Limited (2013) 358 ITR 295 (SC) observed:

“19.
This Court further held, and in our opinion more importantly, that
income accrues when there “arises a corresponding liability of the other
party from whom the income becomes due to pay that amount.”

Thus,
judicially ‘accrual’ has been defined to mean enforcement of a right to
receive (from recipient standpoint) with a corresponding obligation to
pay (from payer’s perspective). It has the attribute of accumulation
inherent in it and a growth sufficient to assume a taxable form. It
denotes that the payer of the sums is a debtor. Interestingly, the
position in a construction contract is just the reverse, with the
contractor denoting the sums received as a liability in his books and
hence acknowledging himself to be debtor – a position contrary to what
the tax law demands for accrual.

Supremacy of section 5:
Section 5 outlines the scope of total income. It encompasses income
within its fold on the basis of accrual, arisal or receipt subject to
the residential status of the assessee and locale of income. Thus,
accrual, arisal and receipt form the basis for taxing incomes. This
canon of taxation is sacrosanct and has to be strictly adhered to. ICDS
owes its genesis from a notification which springs out of section 145.
It does not in any manner trespass the supremacy of section 5. It is
pellucid that the scope of the term ‘accrual’ in the context of section 5
remains sacrosanct and immune to ICDS. The definition of ‘accrual’ in
ICDS is the same as the definition housed in Accounting Standard I
issued u/s. 145(2).

This definition of AS 1 u/s. 145(2) has been
in existence from 1996. The presence of such definition, was not
understood to alter the understanding of section 5. The section should
not be different under the ICDS regime. The definition at best has a say
in accounting.

In such setting, ICDS should not in any manner
influence or affect the point of accrual in case of interest income. The
existing understanding of the term ‘accrual’ in the context of section 5
should hold good. The contours of our existing understanding of the
expression ‘accrual’ should be held as steadfast.

Point of accrual of interest income: The
point of accrual of interest income has been addressed by judicial
precedents. The dictum of the Courts does not appear to be unanimous.
The variety in the judgments is captured below:

(a) Interest on securities would be taxable on specified dates when it becomes due and not on accrual basis

In DIT vs. Credit Suisse First Boston (Cyprus) Ltd. 351 ITR 323 (Bombay), the Mumbai High Court observed as under:

“When
an instrument or an agreement stipulates interest to be payable at a
specified date, interest does not accrue to the holder thereof on any
date prior thereto. Interest would accrue or arise only on the date
specified in the instrument. A creditor has a vested right to receive
interest on a stated date in future does not constitute an accrual of
the interest to him on any prior date. Where an instrument provides for
the payment of interest only on a particular date, an action filed prior
to such date would be dismissed as premature and not disclosing a cause
of action. Subject to a contract to the contrary, a debtor is not bound
to pay interest on a date earlier to the one stipulated in the
agreement / instrument. In the present case, it is admitted that
interest was not payable on any date other than that mentioned in the
security.”

(b) Interest gets accrued normally on a day to
day basis, but when there is no due date fixed for payment of interest,
it accrues on the last day of the previous year.

In CIT vs.
Hindustan Motors Ltd. (1993) 202 ITR 839 (Calcutta), the
assessee-company did not charge interest for the relevant previous year
on the amount due to it by its 100% subsidiary. It was explained that
owing to difficult financial position of the subsidiary company, the
board of directors decided not to charge interest in order to enable the
subsidiary to tide over the financial crisis. The Revenue authorities
held that interest accrued on day to day basis whereas the decision not
to charge interest was taken by the assessee-company after the end of
the relevant accounting year, i.e., long after the accrual of interest.
In this context, the Calcutta High Court observed as under:

“In
our view, the income by way of interest on the facts and circumstances
of this case had already accrued from day to day and, in any event, on
31-3-1971, being the last day of the previous year relevant to the
assessment year 1971-72. Therefore, the passing of resolutions
subsequently on 10-5-1971, and/ or on 21-8-1971, in the meeting of board
of directors of the assessee- company is of no effect.”

(c) Interest accrues de die in diem [daily]

The Apex Court in the case of Rama Bai vs. CIT (1990) 181 ITR 400 (SC)

“…we
may clarify, is that the interest cannot be taken to have accrued on
the date of the order of the Court granting enhanced compensation but
has to be taken as having accrued year after year from the date of
delivery of possession of the lands till the date of such order.”

The
accrual of interest on de die in diem basis has been approved by CIT
vs. MKKR Muthukaruppan Chettiar (1984) 145 ITR 175 (Mad).

Apart
from these schools of thought, various circulars have propounded the
proposition that interest income must be offered to tax on an annual
basis. Some of such circulars are as under (although not in the context
of tax free bonds):

(a) Circular no. 243 dated 22.6.1978

Whether
interest earned on principal amount of deposits under reinvestment
deposit/recurring deposit schemes, can be said to have accrued annually
and, if so, whether depositor is entitled to claim benefit of deduction
in respect of interest which has accrued

1…..

2..

3.
The question for consideration is whether the interest at the
stipulated rate earned on the principal amount, can be said to have
accrued annually and if so whether a depositor is entitled to claim the
benefit of deduction, u/s. 80L, in respect of such interest which has
accrued.

4. Government has decided that interest for each
year calculated at the stipulated rate will be taxed as income accrued
in that year. The benefit of deduction u/s. 80L will be available on
such interest.

This was a concessional circular to help
assessees avail the benefit of section 80L over the years. The circular
does not provide any definitive timing of accrual. As evident in para 4,
the timing of taxation was a ‘decision’ of the Government and not the
enunciation of any principle.

(b) Circular no. 371 dated 21.11.1983

Interest on cumulative deposit scheme of Government undertakings – Whether should be taxed on accrual basis annually
1.
The issue regarding taxability of interest on cumulative deposit scheme
announced by Government undertakings has been considered by the Board.
The point for consideration is whether interest on cumulative deposit
scheme would be taxable on accrual basis for each year during which the
deposit is made or on receipt basis in the year of receiving the total
interest.

2. The Central Government has decided that the
interest on cumulative deposit schemes of Government undertakings should
be taxed on accrual basis annually.

3. The Government
undertakings will intimate the accrued interest to the depositors so as
to enable them to disclose it in their returns of income filed before
the income-tax authorities.

This circular also provides for
annual accretion of interest. Accrual does not await the due or maturity
date. The above convey a ‘decision’ of the Government. It does not
enunciate a principle of law.

(c) Circular no. 409 dated 12.2.1985

Interest on cumulative deposit schemes of private sector undertakings – Whether should be taxed on accrual basis annually

1.
The issue regarding taxability of interest on cumulative deposit
schemes of the private sector undertakings has been considered by the
Board. The point for consideration is whether interest on cumulative
deposit schemes would be taxable on accrual basis for each year during
which the deposit is made or on receipt basis in the year of receiving
the total interest.

2. The Central Government has decided that
interest on cumulative deposit schemes of private sector undertakings
should be taxed on accrual basis annually.

3. The private sector
undertakings will intimate the individual depositors about the accrued
interest so as to enable them to disclose it in their returns of income
filed before the income-tax authorities.

(d) Circular 3 dated 2.3.2010 [relevant extracts]

“In
case of banks using CBS software, interest payable on time deposits is
calculated generally on daily basis or monthly basis and is swept &
parked accordingly in the provisioning account for the purposes of
macro-monitoring only. However, constructive credit is given to the
depositor’s/ payee’s account either at the end of the financial year or
at periodic intervals as per practice of the bank or as per the
depositor’s/payee’s requirement or on maturity or on encashment of time
deposits; whichever is earlier.

4. In view of the above
position, it is clarified that since no constructive credit to the
depositor’s/ payee’s account takes place while calculating interest on
time deposits on daily or monthly basis in the CBS software used by
banks, tax need not be deducted at source on such provisioning of
interest by banks for the purposes of macro monitoring only. In such
cases, tax shall be deducted at source on accrual of interest at the
end of financial year or at periodic intervals as per practice of the
bank or as per the depositor’s/payee’s requirement or on maturity or on
encashment of time deposits; whichever event takes place earlier;

whenever the aggregate of amounts of interest income credited or paid or
likely to be credited or paid during the financial year by the banks
exceeds the limits specified in section 194A.

The circular
states that there could be multiple point of accrual for interest
incomes. It seeks to fasten tax withholding at the earliest point in
time.

Thus, the issue of time of accrual has received varied
interpretation on the basis of source of interest (vide a decree,
compensation, investment, etc.), terms of interest (whether payable on a
specific due date or otherwise), legal obligation and surrounding
circumstances. The alternatives discussed above can be captured in the
flowchart below:

Based on the alternatives outlined above, it is
to be examined whether interest accrues on the date of sale of bonds.
The question is whether timing of accrual (of interest) has a bearing on
the characterisation of receipts from sale of bonds. The impact can be
understood under the twin possibilities envisaged in the above diagram
as discussed below:

*
This principle may not apply in the present context since generally
interest is payable either on the stipulated dates or on withdrawal/
maturity. The case on hand contemplates a sale of instrument. The terms
of the bond may not permit interest receipt upto the date of transfer of
bonds

(a) If interest is payable on specific dates:

When
interest payable on specific due dates, the accrual of income concurs
with such dates (for the reasons already detailed earlier). If the due
date falls prior to the sale, the interest accrues in the hands of the
seller. If it is subsequent to the date of sale, the interest accrues in
the hands of buyer. The accrual of interest is distinct from sale of
bonds and the consideration involved therein.

Tax free bonds are
‘capital assets’ for the investor (assuming that the concerned assessee
is not in the business of investment in bonds). Sale of such capital
asset should culminate in capital gains or loss. There is no interest
receipt from the third party buyer as there is no debt due by the buyer
to the seller. The third party buyer of bonds is under no obligation to
pay ‘interest’. The liability to pay interest lies with the company
issuing the bonds. The diagram below explains the flow of transaction.

(b) If the interest is not payable on specific dates:

As
mentioned earlier, interest may not be received upto the date of
transfer of bonds. The receipt in such situations could be on maturity
if not on specific dates. The receipt of interest would be by the buyer
(on maturity) or specific dates. Interest accumulates, but does not
become ‘due’ and ‘payable/receiveable’ till the appointed date. The
seller thus parts away with the bonds and the legal right to receive
interest. Correspondingly, the payment made by the buyer is towards the
principal and interest element inbuilt in the bond. The question in such
an eventuality is whether the consideration receivable by the seller on
sale of bonds:

(a) Should be wholly considered as full value of consideration for sale of bonds [taxable as capital gains]; or

(b)
Should the consideration be split into consideration for sale [as
capital gains] and interest income [as other sources income].

As
mentioned earlier, tax free bonds are capital assets. Consideration on
transfer of bonds would ordinarily result in capital gains. Even if the
sale is made on ‘cum interest’ basis, one could still argue that the
amount received would constitute full value of consideration towards
transfer. Although the price paid by the third party may factor in the
interest component, the amount paid is towards ‘value’ of the bond. It
is not interest payment.

Accumulation of interest would step-up
the sale consideration. It does not alter the characterization of income
from capital gains to interest. At best, one could split the
consideration between ‘purchase price’ (of the bond) and ‘right to
receive interest’ (assuming interest component is factored in the
price). In which case, it would be sale of two separate capital assets
or an asset (tax bonds) along with congeries of rights associated
therewith.

It may be relevant to quote the observation of the
Mumbai High Court in the case of DIT vs. Credit Suisse First Boston
(Cyprus) Ltd. (referred above) wherein the Court observed:

“12.
The appellant’s submission ignores the fact that such securities or
agreements do not regulate the price at which the holder is to sell the
same to a third party. The holder is at liberty to sell the same at any
price. The interest component for the broken period i.e. the period
prior to the due date for interest is only one of the factors that may
determine the sale price of the security. There are a myriad other
factors, both personal as well as market driven, that can be and, in
fact, are bound to be taken into consideration in such transactions. For
instance, a person may well sell the securities at a reduced price in
the event of a liquidity crisis or a slow down in the market and/or if
he is in dire need of funds for any reason whatsoever. Market forces
also play a significant part.

For instance, if the rate of
interest is expected to rise, the securities may well be sold at a
discount and conversely if the interest rates are expected to fall, the
securities may well earn a premium. This, in turn, would also depend
upon the period of validity of the security and various other factors
such as the financial position and commercial reputation of the debtor.

13.
The appellant’s contention is also based on the erroneous presumption
that what is paid for is the face value of the security and the interest
to be paid for the broken period from the last date of payment of
interest till the date of purchase. What, in fact, is purchased is the
possibility of recovering interest on the date stipulated in the
security. It is not unknown for issuers of securities, debentures and
bonds, to default in payment of interest as well as the principal. The
purchaser therefore hopes that on the due date he will receive the
interest and the principal. The purchaser therefore, purchases merely
the possibility of recovery of such interest and not the interest per
se. It would be pointless to even suggest that in the case of Government
securities, the possibility of a default cannot arise. The
interpretation of law does not depend upon the solvency of the debtor or
the degree of probability of the debts being discharged. Indeed the
solvency, reputation and the degree of probability of recovering the
interest are also factors which would go into determining the price at
which such securities are bought and sold. There is nothing in the Act
or in the DTAA, to which we will shortly refer that warrants the
position in law being determined on the basis of such factors viz. the
degree of probability of the particular issuer of the security, bond or
debenture or such instruments, honouring the same.”

Based on
the above, one can conclude that excess of receipt on sale of bonds
over their costs should be categorised as ‘capital gains or loss’. The
splitting of consideration into two heads of income (with interest
falling under Income from other sources) is not a natural phenomenon. It
should be done when statutorily provided for. The law has specifically
provided for such split mechanism wherever deemed necessary. For
instance, circular 2 of 2002 explains tax treatment of deep discount
bonds. It provides that such bonds should be valued as on the 31st March
of each Financial Year (as per RBI guidelines).

The difference
between the market valuations as on two successive valuation dates will
represent the accretion to the value of the bond during the relevant
financial year and will be taxable as interest income (where the bonds
are held as investments) or business income (where the bonds are held as
trading assets). Where the bond is transferred at any time before the
maturity date, the difference between the sale price and the cost of the
bond will be taxable as capital gains in the hands of an investor or as
business income in the hands of a trader. For computing such gains, the
cost of the bond will be taken to be the aggregate of the cost for
which the bond was acquired by the transferor and the income, if any,
already offered to tax by such transferor (in earlier years) upto the
date of transfer. Thus, gains from such bonds, is specifically split
into interest and capital gains by a specific mechanism provided by the
circular.

Similarly, section 45(2A) [conversion of capital
assets into stock-in-trade] splits consideration into business income
and capital gains income. The statute may also provide for the reverse.
If the consideration includes more than one form of income, the statute
could conclude the whole of such consideration to be one form of income.
Further, section 56(2)(iii) [composite rent] concludes the whole of
consideration to be income from other sources although it contains
portion of rental incomes. Such ‘dissecting’ or ‘unified’ approach is
not prescribed for sale of bonds (whether sold cum-interest or
ex-interest).

The term ‘accrual’ connotes legal right to
receive. It is the enforcement of right to receive (from a recipient’s
standpoint) with a corresponding obligation to pay (from payer’s
perspective) [Refer CIT vs. Excel Industries Ltd (2013) 358 ITR 295
(SC)]. Thus, for an income to accrue, the right (of the income
recipient) and obligation (of the payer) must co-exist. Applying this
theorem in the present context, the question is whether the company
issuing bonds is under an obligation to pay interest when such bonds are
sold on ‘cum interest’ basis. Generally, interest on bonds would be
payable either on a periodic basis or on maturity. Bonds which are
issued without any terms on interest payouts are seldom in vogue. If
this proposition is accepted, then interest can be said to accrue only
on specific dates (being on periodic payout dates or maturity date). In
which case, interest always accrues to the buyer if the bonds are sold
on cum-interest basis. Consequently, consideration received on sale of
bonds would wholly constitute full value of consideration on transfer.
There is no interest element therein.

It may also be relevant to note that the definition of interest provided in the Act. Section 2(28A) defines interest as under:

“(28A)
“interest” means interest payable in any manner in respect of any
moneys borrowed or debt incurred (including a deposit, claim or other
similar right or obligation) and includes any service fee or other
charge in respect of the moneys borrowed or debt incurred or in respect
of any credit facility which has not been utilised”

The definition can be bisected as under –

(a)
interest payable in any manner in respect of any moneys borrowed or
debt incurred (including a deposit, claim or other similar right or
obligation); or

(b) any service fee or other charge in respect
of the moneys borrowed or debt incurred or in respect of any credit
facility which has not been utilised.

In the present context,
the payment is not towards moneys borrowed or debt or any service fee or
other charge in this regard. It is for purchase of assets. One cannot
therefore ascribe the color of interest to a consideration paid for
purchase of assets. The receipt of consideration cannot partake the
character of interest as there is no debt owed by the buyer to the
seller. There is a ‘seller-purchaser’ relationship. Thus, unless there
is a ‘lender-borrower’ relationship, the liability to pay or right to
receive interest does not arise.

The discussion would be
incomplete without a reference to the Apex Court verdict in the case of
Vijaya Bank Limited vs. CIT (1991) 187 ITR 541 (SC). In this case, the
assessee (bank) received interest on securities purchased from another
bank (as well as in the open market). The assessee claimed that
consideration paid towards acquisition of these securities was
determined with reference to their actual value and interest which
accrued to it till the date of sale. Accordingly, such outflow should be
allowed as a claim against interest income earned by the assessee
subsequent to purchase. In this context, the Apex Court observed as
under:

“In the instant case, the assessee purchased
securities. It is contended that the price paid for the securities was
determined with reference to their actual value as well as the interest
which had accrued on them till the date of purchase. But the fact is,
whatever was the consideration which prompted the assessee to purchase
the securities, the price paid for them was in the nature of a capital
outlay and no part of it can be set off as expenditure against income
accruing on those securities. Subsequently when these securities yielded
income by was of interest, such income attracted section 18.”

The
Apex Court adjudged that consideration paid for purchase of securities
is in the nature of ‘capital outlay’. It is not expenditure on revenue
account having nexus to interest income which it earned subsequently.
The entire consideration was thus concluded to be towards purchase of
bonds. When this dictum is viewed from seller’s standpoint, the entire
consideration received should constitute capital gains. There is no
interest element therein.

The possible counter to the aforesaid
discussion is that interest accrues on a de die diem basis.
Consideration received from the buyer which factors the interest element
has to be split between capital receipt and interest income. If such
split is not carried out, there may be a dual taxation. This could be
better explained through an illustration:

Mr X purchased a bond
for Rs.100. He wishes to sell this bond to Mr Y on a cum interest basis
at Rs.110. Interest accrued till the date of sale is Rs.10. In such an
eventuality, Mr X would have to bear capital gains tax on Rs.10 [being
110 (sale consideration) – 100(cost)]. Mr Y would have to discharge tax
on interest income (of Rs.10). Therefore, on an interest income of Rs.10
paid by the company, there is a taxable income of Rs.20 (being Rs.10
factored in capital gains computation of Mr X and Rs.10 as interest
income in the hands of Mr Y). One may argue that such absurd result is
unintended and cannot be an appropriate view.

However, this line
of argument can be answered by stating that there is no equity in tax.
This is an undisputed principle. The parties to the transaction being
taxed on Rs.20 (although being economically benefited by Rs.10) would
only reflect a bad bargain. Further, Mr Y would have to shoulder tax on
interest income (Rs.10) but would avail a deduction or a loss
subsequently of Rs.10 (being part of the purchase consideration of
bonds).

The learned author Sampath Iyengar in his treatise Law
of Income tax (11th edition at page 2661 – Volume II) has made a
reference on this matter (although in the context of section 18 of the
Act):

“15. Charge of interest on sale or transfer of
securities – (1) No splitting of interest as between seller and
purchaser – When an interest bearing security is sold during the
currency of an interest period, the question arises as to how far the
purchaser is liable in respect of interest accrued due before the date
of his purchase. It frequently happens that the purchaser pays to the
seller the value for interest accrued till the date of the sale, and
that the seller receives the equivalent of interest up to the date of
the sale from the purchaser. Nevertheless, for the purposes of revenue
law, the only person liable to pay tax is the person who is the owner of
the securities at the date when the interest falls to be paid. Such
owner is the person liable in respect of the entire amount of interest.
Though as between the transferor and the transferee, interest may be
computed de die in diem, it does not really accrue from day to day, as
it cannot be received until the due date. This section makes it clear
that the assessment is upon the person entitled to receive, viz, the
holder of the security on the date of maturity of interest. Further, the
machinery sections of the Act do not provide for taking separately the
vendor and the purchaser or to keep track of interest adjustments
between the transferor and transferees. Tax is exigible when the income
due is received and is on the person who receives. The principle is that
the seller does not receive interest; he receives the price of
expectancy of interest, and expectancy of interest is not a
subject-matter of taxation. The only person who receives interest is the
purchaser. Where an interest bearing security is sold and part of the
sale price represents accrued but hitherto unpaid interest that accrued
interest is not chargeable to tax, unless it can be treated as accruing
from day to day.”

To conclude, accrual is an intersection of
legal right to receive and a corresponding obligation to pay. Accrual
of interest on bonds is influenced by the contractual terms. A holder of
bond contractually holds the right to receive the interest. The
transfer of bonds results in passing on the interest (receivable from
the bond-issuing company) from the seller to the buyer. This benefit of
accumulated interest is discharged by the buyer in form of
consideration. The payment made by the buyer is for acquisition of bonds
which factors the interest element. The buyer however does not pay
‘interest’ to the seller. It is only the purchase consideration. It is
inconceivable that the purchaser would step into the shoes of the bond
issuing company and pay interest along with consideration for purchase
of bonds. Payment receivable by the seller of bonds would wholly be
included in the capital gains computation. There is no interest element
contained therein.

Financial statements form the substratum for
income-tax laws. They are two sides of the same coin, yet they operate
in their individual domains. There are inherent variations in commercial
and tax profits. Today’s accounting norms are distilled, refined and
robust. With an ‘ever evolving’ story of tax and accounting world, the
relationship remains complementary but not interchangeable. In any departure, commercial accounting norms would be subservient to tax principles.
Therefore, the attempt by ICDS to elevate the accounting principles to
match with the concept of accrual under the tax principles may not have
achieved its avowed objective.

Justice Easwar Committee Report – A Real Godsend

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When the Modi Government came to power there were huge expectations that significant tax reforms would be initiated. However, the first one and a half year belied these expectations. While the Prime Minister talked about ease of doing business, adopting a liberal tax regime, the situation on the ground has been totally different.

Possibly the disappointment of the business community, coupled with electoral reverses has spurred the government into action. The first indications of this change came in the form of the recent circulars issued by the CBDT. The circular raising the monetary limits in regard to litigation pursued by the Income tax department, before the Tribunal and High Courts, and that too with retrospective effect, reduced the pendency before these two forums. The instructions in regard to the manner in which scrutiny assessments were to be completed, when the selection was under CASS, also reflected a refreshing change in attitude.

In this light, the first recommendations of the Justice Easwar Committee are commendable and deserve to be substantially accepted by the Finance Ministry. The Committee was formed on 27th October 2015, to suggest amendments to the Income-tax Act 1961 (the Act), and the procedures thereunder. The terms of reference of the Committee were:

(a) identifying provisions that gave rise to litigation on account of difference in interpretation,
(b) studying provisions that hampered ease of doing business,
(c) identifying provisions of the act for simplification, and
(d) suggesting alternatives and modifications to ensure certainty and predictability of tax laws.

The Committee has a term of one year from the date of its constitution and was to issue its first recommendations by 31st January 2016. The Committee adhered to the timeline and its suggestions are indeed laudable. A perusal of the first batch of suggestions in the draft report indicates that, they are fair, recognise the problems faced by taxpayers on the ground and are capable of immediate implementation. The recommendations have been divided into two parts – one constituting amendments to the Act itself which could be incorporated in the Finance Bill and the other being directions to be issued by the CBDT in the form of circulars or instructions.

The Committee has addressed a number of provisions which have resulted in substantial litigation. The treatment of transaction in shares and securities as business income instead of capital gains, the irrational disallowances under section 14A, the problems caused by the invoking of section 50C at the time of registering of the conveyance when the transaction of transfer had taken place earlier, the notional income arising in the hands of the purchaser of property on account of difference between the purchase price and the stamp duty valuation have all been dealt with.

The problems faced by assessees on account of overzealous bureaucrats have also been mentioned. Audit objections, which are often the result of either an erroneous interpretation of the law or non-appreciation of the ambit of provisions, resulting in reopening and revision of assessments, even though the department really does not agree with the objections. This results in a spate of litigations and with the assessee succeeding in a majority of cases, there is no real ultimate collection of revenue. The amendments suggested to section 147 and 263 of the Act will effectively reduce this menace.

While the implementation of the above suggestions will reduce litigation, other recommendations reflect a fair mind. It is proposed that if an assessee has bona fide, relied on a decision of the Tribunal, a High Court or the Supreme Court and an addition is made to his income, no penalty should be levied. One really wonders whether the department would be in a position to accept this proposal, but it certainly establishes the principles of justice and equity have been recognised. It has also been recommended that even if penalty is levied, the collection should be kept in abeyance if the appeal on merits is pending adjudication before the Tribunal.

For more than a decade, high-pitched assessments and the consequential coercive collection of taxes has made the life of tax payers miserable. The pressure of unreasonable collection targets often forced even wellmeaning officers to resort to irrational assessments. A rethink about the stay provisions which have been recommended by the Committee would go a long way in reducing if not solving the problem.

Though the principle that a tax proceeding is not adversarial is well established, it is rarely adhered to on the ground. A specific provision enabling a taxpayer to make a fresh claim for an exemption, deduction or relief after he has filed the return of income, during the course of an assessment is welcome. If this suggestion is accepted it may reduce unnecessary litigation.

On the equity front the Committee has suggested substantial changes in regard to issue of refunds, interest thereon and adjustment of refunds against tax dues which are really not collectible. Obtaining tax credit is another area which was a headache for both, the assessees and the professionals. The Committee has also dealt with this area and the recommendations are pragmatic.

Finally, the proposal to postpone, the implementation of the Income Computation Disclosure Standards (ICDS), will be welcomed by both, taxpayers and professionals. In fact, the Committee has aptly indicated reservations of tax payers concerning ICDS in their present form.

In all, the first batch of suggestions are worthy of an applause. However, much more needs to be done on the front of accountability of the tax administration. There are suggestions in regard to time limits for disposal of petitions under sections 273A, 220(2A) etc., but a lot more is expected from the Committee. Structural changes, reform in tax policy may possibly be done in the second instalment of the report.

One hopes that the Finance Minister accepts the recommendations of the Committee and proposes appropriate amendments through the Finance Bill while presenting the forthcoming budget. Coupled with this, if there is a change in the mindset of the tax officers and reduction in corruption, a healthy atmosphere where doing business is really easy will have been created. It is said that taxes are the price one pays for civilisation. If taxes are administered fairly and humanely, citizens of this country will be more than willing to pay this price.

I’M NEVER GONNA DIE

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This statement ‘I am never going to die’ gives a feeling of ego. People find it as a manifestation of an egoistic mind. But actually looking from a different perspective, e – represents effective and go – indicates movement. The word ‘ego’ means going effectively.

Right from our childhood and also while studying we are taught that the soul is immortal and only the body dies, yet we seek immortality. Immortality can be achieved only by ‘going effectively’. ‘Going effectively’ means leaving footprints on the ‘sands of time’. When I recollect the people who had / have made an impact on the life of others, then many names surface on the sea of my mind and some will also come in your mind. Some of these are Mother Teresa, Swami Vivekanand, Mahatma Gandhi and even Steve Jobs. The issue is: are they alive today? The answer is yes because they have impacted the life of others. Hence, in order to remain alive as an immortal soul even after death, one requires great perseverance, a selfless dedication to rise as a phoenix from any difficulty for the service of mankind even after falling again and again.

In order to attain this immortality, one has to strive. It is not just visualisation, but efforts are required to crystallise this and to achieve this we have to develop patience and have patience to listen to and patience to learn to serve others.

When I ask someone ‘How are you?’; I need to actually listen to the reply. I need to absorb and understand what he wants to say. Only then I can be a good listener and will be able to serve the person better.

Why worry and hurry on an ongoing basis. Life is a gift of God in a box with different compartments, I need to open it in a gentle way and feel the magic of every moment and what each compartment has in store for me.

Though, while living, I feel that this life is too short to cherish each and every moment and to take part in this wonderful voyage. It is almost difficult with all kinds of flaws and weaknesses to enhance value in the society. Even then one has to utilise this greatest gift from the Almighty to add beauty to the deeds and actions carried out and to covet for immortality. I need to dance with the rhythm of God. I need to accept what the divine power has bestowed upon me and he will guide me in finding a place in the heart of those I serve.

I would further add that there is no need to drink nectar to remain alive. In the true sense, there is no death. Death is when people forget us. There will be a day when your remains will leave this world, but your aroma will still be there. The fragrance of your thoughts, the charm of your dreams will be in the breeze. The only essence one requires is a calm conscience, a profound silence with the inner self, an ethical and rational life and by rendering lasting service. Service in the welfare of others is the best way of achieving immortality.

Now, the answer to the question: Where I am going to live after disappearance of the physique? Well, I am going to find address in people’s heart. It is possible for each (one) of us to develop this within us, the desire to serve others without seeking even a ‘thank you!’

I would conclude by quoting:

I will be a shining star which will pass on little light even in darkest time.
I will be available in the colours of leaves to fulfill achievable desires of the world.
I will be the clear water to let you feel profoundness of life.
I will accompany the first ray from the sun to enlighten light in life.
I will be the innocent smile on the face to make your soul feel happy.
I will be the rainbow to fill your life with all the colours to make you feel bliss.
I will be the calm moonlight to make you free from all the worries of the world.
I will be the whole ocean to give you the feeling of deepest thoughts and the shells of happiness.

If nothing else, by this communication to wish you all a healthy and happy life, and with this wish arising from my heart – I will live in your heart.

M/s. D. A. Sons v. Addl. CCT [2013] 63 VST 111(Karn)

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VAT – Classification of Goods – Sale of Mango Chutney, Mango Garlic Chutney, Mango and Saffron, etc.- Are Processed Fruit and Vegetables.

VAT – Classification of Goods – Exercise Books with Cartoons to be Painted by Children – With Appropriate Colours – Are Printed Books – Exempt from Payment of Tax, Entry 3 of Schedule III and section 4 (1)(b) of The Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003.

FACTS
The appellant trading in edible products and other stationery products, sold Mango Chutney Mango Garlic chutney, Mango and saffron and other processed fruit and vegetables as well as exercise books meant for young children which contain cartoons and the children have to paint it with appropriate colours. The assessing authority held that above paste items sold by the appellant are not processed fruit and vegetables and levied tax under residential entry. As regards sale of exercise books it was not considered as exempt and taxed under entry II of the First Schedule to the Act. The appellate authority allowed the appeal. The Addl. Commissioner of Sales Tax revised the appeal order and restored the assessment order. The appellant filed appeal against revision order passed by the Addl. Commissioner before the Karnataka High Court.

HELD
Entry 3 of the Third Schedule to the Act covers all processed fruit and vegetable including Fruit Jams, Pickle, Fruit Squash, Paste, Fruit Drink and Fruit Juice (whether in sealed container or otherwise). The paste items used in preparation of vegetable items are basically made out of fruit and vegetables and the said paste is processed products.

The view of revisional authority that the above paste items contain other spicy ingredients, which do not constitute fruit or vegetable and therefore, they have to be excluded from the meaning of Processed fruit and vegetables as per entry 3 is an untenable argument. What is required to be seen in a matter like this would be that, in the given items of paste in question, what is the dominant ingredient, and it may be that there would be composition of other ingredients that would be the decisive criteria. In that view, the paste in question would come within the purview of entry 3 of the Third Schedule to the Act.

With regards to exercise books, the High Court held that they are in the nature of exercise books containing cartoons. The young children are expected to colour it with appropriate colour crayons. The purpose of the said exercise books is to inculcate the basic art of painting. Therefore, the said exercise books do constitute printed books to be exempted from the tax.

Accordingly, the High court allowed the appeal.

State of Haryana vs. Glaxo India Ltd. And Another [2013] 63 VST [P&H]

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Sales Tax – Sale of “Feed Supplements” – Covered by the Term “Poultry Feed” – Exempt From Payment of Tax, Entry 53 of Schedule B to The Haryana General Sales Tax Act, 1973.

FACTS
The respondent Company was assessed for the year 1996-1997 treating sale of “Feed Supplements” tax free covered by the term“poultry feed” falling in entry 53 of Schedule B to the Haryana General Sales Act, 1973. Subsequently the assessment order was revised by holding that sale of one or other constituent of “Poultry Feed” could not be taken as poultry Feed and levied tax. The Tribunal allowed the appeal and restored the assessment order allowing claim of tax free sales. The State filed appeal against thejudgment of Tribunal before The Punjab and Haryana High Court.

HELD
The benefit of exemption is given on the ground that the sale of feed supplements such as protein, salts and minerals, vitamins, antibiotics, etc., would also constitute “Poultry Feed”. The very fact that each of the feed supplements can individually be given to the cattle, shall not exclude such feed from the exemption clause as object of giving exemption to the “poultry Feed” under the Act is to promote sale of “poultry feed/Supplements”. Consequently, the High Court found that no substantial question of law required for consideration by it. Accordingly, the appeals were dismissed by the High Court.

(2016) 156 ITD 528 (Delhi .) A.K. Capital Markets Ltd. vs. Deputy CIT A.Y.: 2006-07. Date of Order: 4th December, 2015.

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Section 73 read with Sections 56 and 72 – Where assessee earns positive income, falling under head ‘Income From Other Sources’, in form of dividend income and interest income, assessee would fall within purview of exception carved out in Explanation to section 73 and therefore would be entitled to claim set-off of loss arising out of trading in Futures and Options/derivatives against such other income.

Facts
During the year under consideration, the assessee had earned dividend income of Rs. 14.64 lakh and interest income amounting to Rs. 39,236. In the return so filed it had also declared loss of Rs. 3.93 crore arising out of trading in Futures and Options/derivatives and had claimed set-off of the same against such other income.

The AO disallowed the set-off claimed by the assessee on the grounds that the case of the assessee was covered by Explanation to section 73. The CIT (A) upheld the order of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal before the Tribunal.

Held
A bare reading of the Explanation to section 73 clarifies that where any part of the business of a company other than the investment company or banking company or finance company relates to the purchase and sale of shares, such company shall for the purpose of this section be deemed to be carrying on a speculative business to the extent the business consists of purchase and sale of shares. However, the Explanation also states that if the gross income of the company consists mainly of income which is chargeable under the heads – interest on securities, income from house property, capital gains and income from other sources then this Explanation is not applicable.

In the instant case, the AO himself had admitted in the assessment order that the only positive income earned by the assessee was Rs. 14.64 lakh on account of the dividend which was claimed as exempt. It is also noticed that an interest income of Rs. 39,236 was received by the assessee.

The dividend income and interest income come under the definition of ‘income from other sources’ as per the provisions of section 56. The assessee is having the income only under the head ‘income from other sources’. Profit or loss on account of share trading is not to be considered as income of the assessee while computing the gross total income. If the said loss is to be considered as income of the assessee, then it will be adjustable u/s. 72 which is exactly prohibited by the provisions of section 73. Moreover, section 72(1) prohibits inclusion of the speculation loss for computing the income. In the instant case, for computing the gross total income, the only positive income is under the head ‘income from other sources’. Therefore, the assessee would not be deemed to be carrying on speculative business for the purpose of section 73(1).

In view of the aforesaid, the assessee was entitled to claim set-off of loss in question against other income.

M/S.Christy Raj Hospital vs. State of Kerala [2014] 53MTJ284SC, Civil Appeal No 1119 of 2006, and 975 of 2014, dated 22nd January, 2014.

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Sales Tax – Dealer – Hospital – Activity of Buying and Selling Medicines Through its Pharmacy – May be Business – Direction by VAT Department for Registration Under Sales Tax Law – Writ Petition Dismissed by High Court- Affirmed by SC – With a Permission to Raise All Grounds At The Stage of Assessment, Sections 16 and 17 of The Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963.

FACTS
The Appellant, Trust running a Hospital, had filed Writ Petition before the Kerala High Court challenging the direction given by the Sales Tax Department to obtain registration as dealer under the Kerala General Sales Tax Act. The appellant contended before the High Court that hospitals are not liable to be registered under KGST Act as they werewnot doing any business. The High Court dismissed the writ Petition.

The High Court held that though it is true that doctors of various specialties doing service in hospital by their intellectual skill in the matter of treating the patients by itself may not be a business activity and that is only a profession but various other facilities provided in the hospital cannot be said to be non business activity for example, a clinical laboratory, can independently function outside a hospital and do business. The fact that it is housed in a hospital will not make the service rendered a non-business activity. The activity in the hospital may involve business activities and non- business activities as well.

The appellant filed appeal before the Supreme Court against the judgment of Kerala High Court dismissing Writ Petition.

HELD
The Supreme Court disposed the appeal and affirmed the judgment and order passed by the High Court and granted permission to the appellant to raise all such grounds which are available to it, including certain grounds raised in appeal before SC at the stage of assessment. The assessing authorities were directed to look into those grounds, advert to them and pass a reasoned and speaking order. It was also clarified by SC that it has not examined the constitutional validity or otherwise of ‘Dealer’ as well as ‘Business’.

[2016-TIOL-556-HC-PATNA-ST]Shapoorji Paloonji and Company Pvt. Ltd vs. Commissioner Customs, Central Excise and Service Tax.

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II. High Court

The IIT, a governmental authority – services not taxable under 2(s) of the Mega Exemption Notification-25/2012-ST an independent provisions and the expression “90% or more equity participation….” not applicable.

Facts
The Petitioner was awarded a works contract for construction of an academic complex of Indian Institute of Technology, Patna (IIT) by a project consultant appointed by IIT. On payment of appropriate taxes, a refund claim was filed contending that the activity was exempted under clause 12(c) of the Mega Exemption Notification as services were provided to a governmental authority by way of construction of a structure meant predominantly for use as an educational institution. According to the revenue, only an authority with 90% or more participation by way of equity or control to carry out any function entrusted to a municipality under Article 243W of the Constitution alone is a governmental authority and thus the refund claim was inadmissible.

Held
The High Court observed that the provisions contained in sub-clause (i) and (ii) of clause 2(s) of the Mega Exemption Notification-25/2012 are independent disconjunctive provisions and the expression “90% or more participation…..” is related to sub-clause (ii) alone. Since the clause (i) is followed by “;” and the word “or” it is an independent provision. Accordingly, IIT set up by the Act of Parliament i.e. Indian Institutes of Technology Act, 1961 not subjected to the condition of 90% or more participation… is a governmental authority and thus the construction activity is exempted and the tax paid is to be refunded. Further, it was also observed that as per the terms of contract with the project consultant, the service tax paid challans were to be submitted by them and the same would be reimbursed on receipt of the amount from IIT and accordingly, since the tax was paid by the petitioner alone, it was not a case of undue enrichment.

Note: It is important to note that in the present case, the contract is entered into between the Petitioner and the Project Consultant of IIT. However, since the transfer of property in goods takes place from the petitioner to IIT, the works contract service is determined to be provided directly to the governmental authority and thus is eligible for the benefit of the exemption notification.

DIPP – Press Note No. 12 (2015 Series) dated 24th November, 2015

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Review of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) policy on various sectors

This Press Note has made major changes, with immediate effect, to the FDI Policy. Overall there are approximately 24 changes – both major and minor. Some of the important areas where changes have been made are – investment in LLP, real estate sector, defense sector, single brand retail trading, investment in banks.

Gift of Tenanted property – Under Mohammedan law, if the donor and donee being husband and wife are residing in the same property it is not essential that the donor should depart from the premises to deliver possession to the donee and same law will apply even when part of the premises are occupied by the tenants.

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Mehmood and Ors. vs. Nargis Begum and Ors. AIR 2016 (NOC) 172 (Cal).

A
suit was brought about by the children of first wife of one Md. Bashir,
a Mohammedan, against his widow and the off-springs through his second
marriage for a declaration that the transfer by Md. Bashir of certain
premises to his widow by the alleged registered deed of gift dated 3rd
August, 2003 is voidable.

The alleged deed of gift was
challenged on the ground that under Mohammedan law, a gift of immovable
property is complete and valid only by delivery of possession. 80% of
the property was tenanted and that to make the gift complete and valid
there had to be delivery of possession of the tenanted portion by the
tenants attorning the tenancy in favour of the donee. Further, Md.
Bashir continued to issue rent receipts in his own name. No mutation of
the property with Kolkata Municipal Corporation was made.

The
court held that Chapter VII of the Transfer of Property Act relating to
gifts specifically stipulates in section 129 thereof that the provisions
in the Chapter do not “affect any rule of Mohammedan law.” This simply
meant that the gift would have to be justified in terms of Mohammedan
law.

Under the Mohammedan law, if the donor and donee are
residing in the same property, it is not essential that the donor should
depart from the premises to deliver possession to the donee. The gift
is completed by any overt act on the part of the donor to divest himself
of the control over the property. (paragraph 152 (2) of Mohammedan law
by Mulla). In paragraph 153, Mulla says that the same rule applies in
the case of husband and wife where the property is used for the joint
residence or is let out to tenants or partly used for residence and
partly let out to tenants. The husband is the natural manager of the
wife. Even if after gift of the property the husband collects rents from
the tenants, he is deemed to be doing so as the manager of his wife.
(paragraph 153 of Mulla). Hence, there were sufficient overt acts to
make the gift valid.

Advance Tax – Interest – Under the provisions of section 234B, the moment an assessee who is liable to pay advance tax has failed to pay such tax or where the advance tax paid by such an assessee is less than 90 per cent of the assessed tax, the assessee becomes liable to pay simple interest at the rate of one per cent for every month or part of the month – Form No.ITNS150 which is a form for determination of tax payable including interest is to be treated as a part of the assessment order.

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CIT vs. Bhagat Construction Co. Pvt. Ltd.. [2016] 383 ITR 9 (SC)

The
Supreme Court noted that on the facts of the case, it was an admitted
position that the assessment order dated March 29, 1995 of the Assistant
Commissioner of Income –Tax , New Delhi, did not not contain any
direction for the payment of interest. The appellate order merely stated
that interest was payable u/s. 234B of the Income-tax Act, 1961. In the
first round, before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, the Income-tax
Appellate Tribunal’s attention was not drawn to the payment of interest
at all.

On an application made, the Income-tax Appellate
Tribunal by its order dated November 12, 2002, specifically held that
since no direction had actually been given in the assessment order for
payment of interest, the assessee’s case would be covered by the
decision of the Supreme Court reported in CIT vs. Ranchi Club Ltd.
[2001] 247 ITR 209 (SC).

In an appeal to the High Court of Delhi
u/s. 260A of the Act, the impugned judgment dated July 23, 2003 merely
reiterated that the issue involved in the appeal had been decided by the
judgment in CIT vs. Ranchi Club Ltd. [2001] 247 ITR 209 (SC) referred
to above.

Before the Supreme Court the Revenue relied upon the
decision in Kalyankumar Ray vs. CIT (1991) 191 ITR 634 (SC) to contend
that the interest u/s. 234B is, in any case, part of Form I.T.N.S. 150
which is not only signed by the Assessing Officer but is really part of
the assessment order itself. It was submitted that the judgment in
Ranchi Club Ltd.’s case (supra) was distinguishable inasmuch as it arose
only in a writ petition and arose in the context of best judgment
assessment whereas on the facts of the present case, there was a
shortfall of advance tax that was paid, which, therefore, led to the
automatic levy of interest u/s. 234B. In addition, it was argued that
not only was section 234B a provision which was parasitic in nature, in
that, it applied the moment there was shortfall of advance tax or income
tax payable under the Act but that it was compensatory in nature.
Countering this submission, the counsel appearing for the respondent
assessee, supported the judgment of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal
and the High Court by stating that the judgment in Ranchi Club Ltd.’s
case (supra) squarely covered the facts of this case.

According
to the Supreme Court, there was no need to go into the various
submissions made by Revenue as the appeal could be disposed of on a
short ground. The Supreme Court noted that In a three-judges Bench
decision, viz., Kalyankumar Ray v. CIT (supra) it took note of a similar
submission made by the assessee in that case and repelled it as
follows:

“In this context, one may take notice of the fact that
initially, rule 15(2) of the Income-tax Rules prescribed Form 8, a sheet
containing the computation of the tax, though there was no form
prescribed for the assessment of the income. This sub-rule was dropped
in 1964. Thereafter, the matter had been governed by Departmental
instructions. Under these, two forms are in vogue. One is the form of,
what is described as, the ‘assessment order’, (I.T. 30 or I.T. N.S. 65).
The other is what is described the ‘Income Tax Computation Form’ or
‘Form for Assessment or Tax/Refund’ (I.T.N.S. 150). The practice is that
after the ‘assessment order’ is made by the Income-tax Officer, the tax
is calculated and the necessary columns of I.T.N.S. 150 are filled up
showing the net amount payable in respect of the assessment year. This
form is generally prepared by the staff but is checked and signed or
initialed by the Income-tax Officer and the notice of demand follows
thereafter. The statute does not in terms require the service of the
assessment order or the other form on the assessee and contemplates only
the service of a notice of demand. It seems that while the ‘assessment
order’ used to be generally sent to the assessee, the other form was
retained on file and a copy occasionally sent to the assessee. I.T.N.S.
150 is also a form for determination of tax payable and when it is
signed or initialed by the Income-tax Officer it is certainly an order
in writing by the Income-tax Officer determining the tax payable within
the meaning of section 143(3). It may be, as stated in CIT vs. Himalaya
Drug Co. [1982] 135 ITR 368 (All), is only a tax calculation form for
Departmental purposes as it also contains columns and code numbers to
facilitate computerization of the particulars contained therein for
statistical purposes but this does not detract from its being considered
as an order in writing determining the sum payable by the assessee. We
are unable to see why this document, which is also in writing and which
has received the imprimatur of the Income-tax Officer should not be
treated as part of the assessment order in the wider sense in which the
expression has to be understood in the context of section 143(3). There
is no dispute in the present case that the Income-tax Officer has signed
the form I.T.N.S. 150. We therefore, think that the statutory provision
has been duly complied with and that the assessment order was not in
any manner vitiated.”

The Supreme Court also noted that its judgment in the Ranchi Club Ltd.’s case (supra) was a one line order which merely stated:

“We
have heard learned counsel for the appellant. We find no merit in the
appeals. The civil appeals are dismissed. No order as to costs”.

The
Supreme Court observed that the High Court judgment which was affirmed
by it as aforesaid arose in the context of a challenge to the vires of
sections 234A and 234B of the Act. After repelling the challenge to the
vires of the two sections, the High Court found that interest had been
levied on tax payable after assessment and not on the tax as per the
return. Following this court’s judgment in J.K. Synthetics Ltd. vs.
Commercial Taxes Officer [1994] 94 STC 422 (SC), the High Court had held
that the assessee was not supposed to pay interest on the amount of tax
which may be assessed in a regular assessment u/s. 143(3) or best
judgment under section 144 as he was not supposed to know or anticipate
that his return of income would not be accepted. The High Court further
held that interest was payable in future only after the dues were
finally determined.

The Supreme Court further observed that
under the provisions of section 234B, the moment an assessee who is
liable to pay advance tax has failed to pay such tax or where the
advance tax paid by such an assessee is less than 90 per cent of the
assessed tax, the assessee becomes liable to pay simple interest at the
rate of one per cent for every month or part of the month.

The
Supreme Court therefore held that the counsel for the Revenue was right
in stating that levy of such interest was automatic when the conditions
of section 234B were met.

According to the Supreme Court, the
facts of the present case were squarely covered by the decision
contained in Kalyankumar Ray’s case (supra) inasmuch as it was
undisputed that Form I.T.N.S. 150 contained a calculation of interest
payable on the tax assessed. This being the case, it was clear that as
per the said judgment this Form must be treated as part of the
assessment order in the wider sense in which the expression had to be
understood in the context of section 143, which was referred to in
Explanation 1 to section 234B.

This being the case, the Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the High Court and allowed the appeal of the Revenue.

[2015] 64 taxmann.com 374 (Bombay) Commissioner of Central Excise & Service Tax, Kolhapur Commissionerate vs. Karan Agencies

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Activity of conducting or managing business for owner cannot be classified under category of ‘Business Support Services’ and profits retained therefrom are not liable to service tax.

Facts
The Assessee entered into a contract with the owner for conducting business of manufacturing and sale of liquor. Under the agreement, a fixed amount was paid to the owner and entire balance profit was retained by assessee. The books of accounts were maintained in the name of owner. Revenue raised demand of service tax under category of ‘Business Support Services’. The Tribunal held that, ‘Business Support Service’ covers only services of supporting nature to main activity and in the instant case, principal activities are done (i.e. activities of manufacturing and sale of liquor) for the owner. It was also noted that owner has paid service tax on fixed charges paid/retained by him under ‘franchisee services’. Aggrieved by the same, the Department preferred an appeal before the High Court.

Held
The Hon. High Court held that findings in the Tribunal’s order are essentially based on clauses of conducting agreement which has been referred to extensively and read together and harmoniously to conclude that the arrangement or deal in the present case is of such a nature that a unit is taken over for conducting and managing by the Assessee. The Assessee is responsible for any profits being generated or losses sustained. The nature of the transaction therefore would not fall within the meaning of support services for business or commerce.

[2016] 68 taxmann.com 336 (Chennai – Trib.) DCIT vs. Alstom T & D India Ltd A.Ys.: 2001-02, 2003-04 and 2004-05, Date of Order: 31st March, 2016

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Section 9, 40(a)(i) of the Act – to fall within the second exception provided in section 9(1)(vii) (b) of the Act, the source of income, and not the receipt, should be situated outside India.
Facts

The Taxpayer, an Indian company, was engaged in the business of manufacture of heavy electrical equipment. The Taxpayer had developed prototypes of certain equipment. As per the standards prescribed by the industry regulatory body, prototype development could be complete only after performance of certain design tests on the equipment. These tests were to be performed by an accredited international testing laboratory. The Taxpayer could not have exported the equipment to the international market unless these tests were completed and the results were benchmarked to the standards prescribed. Accordingly, the Taxpayer engaged an international testing laboratory for testing the prototypes and paid testing charges.

The Taxpayer remitted the testing charges to the laboratory without withholding tax.

In the course of the assessment, the AO invoked provisions of section 40(a)(i) of the Act and disallowed the payment. In appeal, CIT(A) relied on decisions in Havells India Ltd v ACIT 47 SOT 61 (URO) (Del) and held that the payment was covered by the second exception in section 9(1)(vii)(b) of the Act and hence, income accrued or arose in India. Consequently, tax was not required to be withheld from the payment. The tax department filed further appeal to the ITAT.

Held

  • Section 9(1)(vii)(b) provides for two exceptions. First exception is where the payment is made is respect of services utilized for business or profession carried on outside India. Second exception requires utilization of services for earning any income from source outside India.
  • For falling within the first exception, it is not sufficient to prove that the services are not utilised for business activities of production in India, but it is furthernecessary for to show that the technical services are utilised in a business carried on outside India. Nothing was brought on record to support this.
  • Without prejudice, the Taxpayer was concluding the export contracts in India. The products were manufactured in India and exported from India in fulfillment of the export contracts. Therefore, the Source of income was created when the export contracts were concluded.
  • Though the importer of the products was situated outside India, the importer was merely the source of money received.
  • The second exception in section 9(1)(vii)(b) requires the source of income, and not the receipt, to be outside India.
  • Since this condition was not satisfied, the payment was taxable in India.

MVAT Rules Amendment (3rd Amendment), 2016

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Notificaiton VAT 1516/CR 64/Taxation -1 dated 29.04.2016

Maharashtra Government has notified further amendments in the Maharashtra Value Added Tax Rules, 2005 with effect from 26.04.2016

MVAT Rules Amendment (2nd Amendment), 2016

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Notificaiton VAT 1516/CR -52/Taxation-1 Dated 22.04.2016

Maharashtra Government has notified amendments in the Maharashtra Value Added Tax Rules, 2005 with effect from 01.04.2016.

Changes in : Rates of tax under the Mvat Act, Modifications in the Composition Schemes, Entry Tax on slabs of marbles and granites

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Trade Circular 9T of 2016 dated 22.04.2016

Schedule A & C of the Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act, 2002 have been amended, the revision in the tax rates and amendments to MVAT schedule entries are explained in this Circular. The Composition Schemes have been modified. Details of the amendments and amendments to the Schedule under the Maharashtra Tax on Entry of goods into Local Areas Act,2002 are explained in the this Circular.

Settlement of Arrears in Dispute under the various Acts administered by the Sales Tax Department

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Trade Circular 10T of 2016 dated 03.05.2016

To unlock the arrears pending at appellate forum under various Acts administered by the Maharashtra Sales Tax Department, “The Maharashtra Settlement of Arrears in Dispute Acts,2016” is passed with a view to provide the settlement of arrears in dispute. Salient features and related procedural aspects are explained in this Circular.

Profession Tax – Exemption of late fee to the Government aided educational institutions.

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Trade Circular 11T of 2016 dated 06.05.2016

This Circular explains the conditions and procedure granting exemption for late fees payable by educational institutions which receive grant- in -aid from State government which have not filed PT e-returns though PT for the said returns period has been deducted and paid in the Government treasury for all return periods starting from 01.04.2006 to 31.03.2016 if e returns for such periods are filed up to 30.6.2016.

Profession Tax Enrolment Amnesty Scheme 2016

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Trade Circular 12T of 2016 dated 06.05.2016

Government of Maharashtra has declared Amnesty Scheme for persons who have not obtained Enrollment Certificate yet. Accordingly, if a person makes an application for enrolment during the period from 1.4.2016 to 30.9.2016 or his application for enrolment is pending on 1.4.2016 and if enrolment certificate is obtained under the “Professional Tax Enrolment Amnesty Scheme 2016” then Profession tax and Interest prior to 1.4.2013 will be waived in full and penalty u/s. 5(5) of the Profession Tax Act, 1975 will not be imposed. Detailed procedure has been explained in this Circular.

Grant of Administrative Relief

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Trade Circular 13T of 2016 dated 06.05.2016

This Circular explains amendments in the authorities to whom application for administrative relief is to be made.

Amendments to Acts, Rules and Notifications to give effect of Budget Proposals

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Trade Circular 14T of 2016 dated 07.05.2016

To give effect of Budget proposals for the year 2016-17 a bill (Legislative Assembly Bill No. XVIII of 2016) to amend various Acts, administered by the Sales Tax Department has been passed by the legislature and has received assent of the Governor on 26.04.2016. The Act (Maharashtra Act No.XV of 2016) is published in the Maharashtra Government gazette dated 26.04.2016. In this Circular, all the amendments have been explained in detail.

Registration- Permanent Place of Residence- Documents required as proof

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Trade Circular 15T of 2016 dated 09.05.2016

By this Circular, regarding proof of permanent place of registration, more relaxation has been provided by allowing to submit any two documents from the list of 13 documents specified in Trade Circular 7T of 2015 & 4T of 2016 as proof permanent residential place at the time of registration.

Designation of Wednesday as Taxpayers’ Day

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Trade Circular 17T of 2016 dated 09.05.2016

Maharashtra Vat department has designated one day of the week viz. the Wednesday (2pm to 5pm) as Taxpayers’ Day wherein Zonal/Divisional/Unit heads of all offices will meet the taxpayers/other stakeholders in their chamber without any prior appointments in order to address their grievances relating to sales tax expeditiously.

SAP based new registration functionality

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MVAT UPDATES

Trade Circular 18T of 2016 dated 24.05.2016

Maharashtra VAT department is implementing new SAP based system in phased manner. In this Circular, changes in the process of registration, free billing software, transition issues relating to registration and about providing help from offices have been explained. The new functionality of registration based on SAP will go LIVE after 3 pm of 25.05.2016.

No Service Tax on pilgrimage to Haj Mansarovar from 01.07.2012 to 19.08.2014

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Notification No. 25/2016 dated 17.05.2016

Service Tax on Services provided by the specified organisation in respect of a religious pilgrimage facilitated by the Ministry of External Affairs of the Government of lndia, under bilateral arrangement is not required to be paid for the period commencing on and from the 1st day of July, 2012 and ending with the 19th day of August, 2014.

Extension to file Service Tax Return upto 29.042016

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SERVICE TAX UPDATES

Order No. 01/2016-ST dated 25.04.2016

Due to difficulties faced by the Service Tax Assessees in accessing Service Tax Applications, CBEC vide this Order has extended time to file Service Tax Return (ST-3) for the period 01.102015 to 31.03.2016 upto 29-04-2016.

State of Tamil Nadu vs. M/s. Plastic Craft Industries, [2013] 66 VST 62 (Mad).

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Central Sales Tax- Sales Price-Excise Duty Paid on Past Transaction – In absence of Evidence of Its Collection-Does Not Form Part of Sale Price- Section 2(h) of The Central Sales Tax Act, 1956.

Facts
The assesse manufacturer of plastic components did not charge excise duty on certain transaction of sales on a bonafide belief that it is not payable. However, later on paid excise duty after taking licence under Central Excise provisions but did not collected the same from the buyers. The department based on proceedings from the excise authority, levied tax on excise duty paid by the dealer for past transactions although not collected from buyers. On appeal tribunal allowed appeal against which the department filed revision petition before the Madras High Court.

Held
As per definition of sale price contained in section 2(h) of the CST Act, what is charged as consideration alone could be considered as turnover of sales. Admittedly, the fact is, on the date of sale, the petitioner had collected as sale consideration and did not collect excise duty paid by it from the buyers and no evidence was available subsequent to payment of excise duty whether the portion of such payment had been passed over to the customer as a part of consideration. Therefore, the excise duty paid by the dealer and not collected from the customer cannot form part of sales turnover for levy of tax. Accordingly, the High Court dismissed the revision petition filed by the department and confirmed the order of the Tribunal.

State of AP vs. M/s. Sree Akkamamba Textiles Ltd. [2013] 66 VST 37 (AP).

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Central Sales Tax – Inter-State Sale or Stock Transfer-Dispatch of Goods to Branch Outside the State to Agents/Branch- In Absence of Documentary Evidence of Prior Contract – Is Stock Transfer. Section 6A of The Central Sales Tax Act, 1956.

FACTS
M/s. Akkamamba Textiles Ltd., Tanuku was manufacturing, selling and transferring the cotton yarn and waste. It was finally assessed by the C.T.O., Tanuku-I circle, for assessment year 1993-94, under Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. The assessing authority had allowed exemption on inter-state stock transfer to its Maharashtra (Bombay and Ichalkaranji), West Bengal and Tamil Nadu based four selling depot-agents under section 6A of the CST Act upon production of requisite Forms. The Deputy Commissioner (CT), Eluru Division, took up suo moto revision of the CTO ‘s order, disallowing exemption as turnover, relating to the sales said to have been made through depots, branch in Maharashtra, West Bengal and Tamil Nadu on certain grounds. Aggrieved by the aforesaid revision orders of the Deputy Commissioner (CT), Eluru division, the dealer preferred appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal allowed the appeal and remanded the matter to the DC (CT), Eluru, to give fair and reasonable opportunity to the appellantsassessee. In pursuance of these remand orders, the revisional authority passed consequential orders levying tax once again on the disputed turnovers under section 3(a) of the CST Act. Aggrieved of these orders the dealer preferred another appeal before the STAT , A.P. This time the appeals were allowed in favour of the assesse holding that these disputed transactions are not inter-state sales but are mere stock transfers to the four non-resident selling depot agents. The department filed revision before the Andhra Pradesh High Court.

HELD

In the considered opinion of the high court, the questions of law said to have been arisen are not the questions of law in as much as all the questions relate to the finding of facts. The assessing authority, after examination of returns filed by the dealer and on scrutiny of the books of accounts, granted exemption relating to depot/branch transfer of cotton yarn made from Tanuku to Maharashtra (Bombay-Ichalkaranji), West Bengal and Tamil Nadu and allowed the exemption of the turnovers in exercise of the powers conferred u/s. 6A of the CST Act. The tribunal also recorded finding of facts and stated in its order that the revisional authority had reversed the order of the dealer merely on surmises and conjecture without citing specific instances and without any additional material. The finding of facts recorded by the tribunal is not challenged before the High Court. Accordingly, the High Court held that there is no question of law that is required to be answered, thus dismissed the revision petitions filed by the department and confirmed the order of tribunal allowing claim of stock transfer under section 6A of the CST Act.

2016 (41) STR 330 (A.A.R.) North American Coal corporation India Pvt Ltd.

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Salary paid to the secondment employees in terms of employment agreement is not liable for service tax.
Facts

The applicant is a subsidiary (Indian) of the foreign (US) company. It required services of a consultant who was in employment with the foreign company. Accordingly, a tripartite agreement was entered between employee, Indian company and US company for usage of the services of the employee by the Indian company for a particular term. During the consultants’ stay in India, he is to be treated as an employee of the Indian company while his social security interests continue to be taken care of by the foreign company. After the advent of the negative list, all earlier definitions got obliterated and new definition of ‘service’ was enacted under section 65(44) wherein service provided by an employee to the employer in the course of employment was granted exclusion from the definition of service. Social security costs were not reimbursed by the Indian company to the US company. Department contended that social security expenditure incurred by foreign company amounts to consideration paid by the applicant for employing the consultant and shall not be covered by the exclusion. Further, RBI circular was relied upon.

Held
The agreement explicitly mentioned that the consultant would be considered as an employee of the Indian company during his stay in India although his social security interests shall be borne by the US company. No salary was received from the US company during his stay in India and hence salary granted by Indian company and US company were mutually exclusive. In view of the clear provision, service of the consultant cannot be regarded as otherwise than a service provided by employee to the employer even though social security costs were paid by the US company. RBI circular is irrelevant for interpretation of the term ‘service’. Indian company is not liable to service tax on salary and allowances paid to the employee in terms of employment agreement.

[2016-TIOL-14-ARA-ST] M/s Akqa Media India P. Ltd

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In absence of any legal/contractual obligation to pay volume discounts which is purely gratuitous and discretionary on the part of media owners, such receipts are not exigible to service tax.

Facts
The Applicant intends to provide services of an advertising agency providing professional services to the advertisers in relation to placement of advertisements in various media. They propose to follow two business models- viz. placement of advertisement on behalf of the advertiser wherein they would raise an invoice on the advertiser charging service tax on the agency commission and secondly engage in buying and selling of advertising inventory on its own account wherein the applicant charges a consolidated amount which includes the cost to the media owner and their margin. They could also entail incentive/volume discount from the media owners. The question before the authority was whether the incentive/ volume discount received in both the above business models is liable for service tax.

Held
The Authority noted the definition of ‘service’ provided u/s. 65B(44) of the Finance Act, 1994 and stated that there has to be a nexus between activity and consideration. The term “activity for a consideration” involves an element of a contractual relationship which could be express or implied. The revenue has no evidence to indicate that an activity was undertaken resulting in giving volume discount by the media owner especially when the choice of selecting the media owner was of the advertiser. Further it was held 43 that volume discount is gratuitous and there is no legal/ contractual obligation to give such discounts and therefore the incidental receipt of incentives/volume discounts are not liable to service tax.