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SA 540 Accounting Estimates

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Synopsis

An accounting estimate is defined as an approximation of the amount of an item in the absence of a precise means of measurement. There are various items in the Financial Statements that cannot be measured with precision and therefore are required to be estimated. SA 540 describes the auditor’s responsibility with respect to the auditing of accounting estimates and related disclosures made by the management. Read on to know more about SA 540 with respect to the objective of the auditor, procedure to be followed, analysis to be done, approach to be used while auditing accounting estimates with the help of two case studies.

An estimate is made when there is an absence of a precise means to measure. This applies in accounting parlance as well, whereby certain items of financial statements cannot be measured with precision and are therefore required to be estimated based on reliable information and justifiable assumptions available at a point in time.

Accounting estimates (other than fair value accounting estimates) Fa ir v alue a c c ounting estimates
Allowance for doubtful Complex financial
accounts instruments, which are not
Inventory obsolescence traded in an active and open
Warranty obligations market
Depreciation method or Share-based payments
asset useful life Property or equipment held
Provision against the for disposal
carrying amount of an Certain assets or liabilities
investment where there acquired in a business
exists uncertainty regarding combination, including
its recoverability goodwill and intangible
Outcome of long term assets
contracts Transactions involving
Costs arising from litigation, settlements and judgments. the exchange of assets or liabilities between independent parties without
monetary consideration, for example, a non-monetary exchange of plant facilities in different lines of business.

An accounting estimate is defined as an approximation of the amount of an item in the absence of a precise means of measurement. An illustrative list of financial statement captions where estimates are used is summarised below:

SA 540 describes the auditor’s responsibility with respect to the auditing of accounting estimates, including fair value accounting estimates, and related disclosures made by the management, wherein the objective of the auditor is to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence as to whether in the context of the applicable financial reporting framework:

a) accounting estimates, including fair value accounting estimates, in the financial statements, whether recognised or disclosed, are reasonable; and

b) related disclosures in the financial statements are adequate.

In order to evaluate the reasonableness of recognition of accounting estimates, the auditor shall:

a) obtain an understanding of how management identifies those transactions, events and conditions that may give rise to the need for accounting estimates to be recognised or disclosed in the financial statements and

b) understand how the estimates have been made and what data and assumptions have been used to make such estimates

The understanding so obtained will enable the auditor to assess:

a) for recurring estimates, the historical reliability of the entity’s estimates and the appropriateness of changes, if any, in the existing accounting estimates or in the method or assumptions for making them from the prior period;

b) the completeness and accuracy of key data used in making the estimate;

c) evaluation of management’s use of an expert;

d) the reasonableness of management’s significant assumptions, including any indication of management bias and, where relevant, management’s intent to carry out specific courses of action and its ability to do so;

e)    the reasonableness of management’s estimate, including whether the selected measurement basis for the accounting estimate and management’s decision to recognise or not recognise the estimate is in accordance with the require-ments of the applicable financial reporting framework;
f)    subsequent events or other subsequent information, if any, that may affect the estimate;
g)    the consistency of application of judgments or estimates to similar transactions;
h)    business or industry specific factors that may have significant effect on the assumptions

For accounting estimates that give rise to significant risks at the financial statement assertion level, the auditor needs to evaluate how management has considered alternative assumptions and their outcomes on accounting estimates and reasons for their rejection/acceptance. Such examples include estimates pertaining to useful life of tangible assets particularly for entities operating in specialised sectors such as aviation, oil exploration, power generation, infrastructure etc, estimate of useful life of intangible assets such as toll collection rights purchased by a toll operating company, cash flows from a cash generating unit for the purpose of impairment testing, allowances for doubtful debts, inventory obsolescence in technology driven industries, etc.

Sensitivity analysis is one of the methods that can be used to evaluate how an accounting estimate varies with different assumptions. The objective of this evaluation is to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence to ensure that management has assessed the effect of estimation uncertainty on accounting estimates. Where management has not considered alternative assumptions or outcomes, the auditor would need to discuss with the man-agement as to how it has addressed the effects of estimation uncertainty and where empirical external evidence is available, evaluate the appropriateness of the estimate considered by the management.

Once the auditor understands the process, there are generally two approaches that the auditor can use:
a)    test the process used by management to make the estimate, including testing the reliability of the underlying data, or alternatively
b)    develop an independent expectation of the estimate and compare this with the estimate developed by the management.

The choice between these two approaches will depend on the magnitude and complexity of the account balance. An example of the latter ap-proach is the comparison of provision for warranty costs with the estimates made by the management in recent past to determine its reasonableness.

While assessing the methods and assumptions used, the auditor may also need to consider whether management has engaged an expert having specialised knowledge or skills in determining an accounting estimate. Actuarial valuation of employee benefits by an actuary, surveyor’s estimation of the quantum of inventory in certain specialised industries using items such as coal, natural gypsum etc., certification of completion of project work by project engineers to facilitate revenue recognition in construction contracts are some of the elementary examples of involvement of an expert to determine an accounting estimate. The auditor would need to review the appropriateness of estimates made by the expert. For e.g., in case of actuarial valuation of retirement benefits, the auditor would need to evaluate the appropriateness of the estimate of discount rate by reviewing economic reports for interest rates, estimate of salary growth and attrition by reviewing industry reports, estimate of mortality by reviewing annuity/life tables used by insurance companies etc. Similarly for estimation of inventory by surveyors, the auditor would need to assess the estimation methodology used by the surveyor, quantum of inventory holding vis-à-vis consumption pattern, subsequent production of finished goods and other related factors to obtain assurance over the appropriateness of the inventory estimated by the surveyor.

Another pertinent area where estimates are used is for impairment testing for fixed assets. Asset impairment is based either on appraisal of current market value of the asset or based on estimated cash flows from the continuing use of such asset for its remaining useful life. Estimates of future cash flows provided by the management need to be analysed for the reasonableness of the assumptions and consistency with current and predicted future results.

Management may be satisfied that it has adequately addressed the effects of estimation uncertainty in accounting estimates that give rise to significant risks in the preparation of financial statements, however, the auditor may consider this to be inadequate due to non- availability of sufficient appropriate audit evidence or where the auditor believes there exists an indication of management bias in making the estimates. The auditor in such a case may evaluate the reasonableness of the accounting estimate by developing a point estimate or a range. This can be understood with the help of the following example:

Case study 1 (Accounting estimates):

XYZ Ltd (‘XYZ’) is a reputed watch manufacturer and has been in this business for the last 5 years. XYZ commenced its operations during the year ended 31st March 20X0. XYZ formulated a policy of providing free repairs to its customers for a period of 1 year from the date of sale. The sale contract gives the customer, a right to have the watches repaired free of cost for defects that get contracted within a period of one year from the date of purchase of the product. Since inception, XYZ has been providing for warranty costs @ 3% of the value of watches sold during the year.

During the year ended 31st March 20X6, XYZ upgraded its quality testing equipment enabling introduction of certain additional quality checks in the manufacturing process. Management expects that these additional checks would result in more stringent quality clearance of finished products for ultimate sale to customers. Therefore for the year ended 31st March 20X6, management decided to provide for warranty costs at a lower rate of 1% of the value of sales made during the year.

Let us examine the procedures that auditors would need to follow in terms of the requirements of SA 540:

Though the accounting framework does not prescribe a method or model to provide or compute warranty provision, management is required to make a best estimate of the warranty cost based on cumulative experience of the industry, customer base and the likely cost of repairs.

Auditors would need to review the outcome of accounting estimates included in the prior period financial statements and their subsequent re-estimation for the purpose of the current period. Auditors would need to perform a subsequent period testing to deduce actual costs incurred against the provision and effectiveness of controls on accounting of such costs.

Auditors would need to review the trend of actual repair costs incurred over the years and evaluate whether the basis of measurement (as a percentage of sales) needs modification.

Auditor would compare the nature of the earlier warranty claims and how the new machines would take care of these complaints to reduce the warranty costs.

Obtain written representations from management whether they believe significant assumptions used in making accounting estimates are reasonable.

Auditors would need to evaluate whether the management decision to change the estimate basis is indicative of a possible management bias.

Case study 2 (Fair value accounting estimate):

Double Dip Ltd. (DDL) has given 100 options to its employees to receive remuneration in the form of equity settled instruments, for rendering services over a defined vesting period of three years.

The options will vest in three tranches over a period of three years as follows:

Period within which options    % of options
will vest to the participant    that will vest

End of 12 months from the

 

date of grant of options

34

End of 24 months from the

 

date of grant of options

34

End of 36 months from the

 

date of grant of options

32

DDL measures options granted by reference to the fair value of the instrument at the date of grant. The expense is recognised in the statement of income with a corresponding increase to the share based payment reserve, a component of equity.

The fair value determined at the grant date is ex-pensed over the vesting period of the respective tranches of such grants. The stock compensation expense is determined based on DDL’s estimate of equity instruments that will eventually vest over a period of three years.

The key assumptions used to estimate the fair value of options are given below:

The options were granted on 31st December 20XX and DDL has recognized Rs. 10 crore as fair value cost of options granted.

Analysis

Risk-free interest rate

8%

Expected Life

3 years

Expected volatility

46%

Expected dividend yield

0.02%

Price of the underlying share

 

in market at the time of

 

option grant

Rs. 250

Expected forfeiture rate

3%

In the given example, the fair value of options as arrived by the management is an estimate and the same has been derived on the basis of various assumptions considered by the management.

The auditors of the Company would need to verify whether the fair value of the options as estimated by the management is reasonable. For this purpose, various assumptions considered by the management would need to be evaluated and assessed independently i.e., completeness and accuracy of data considered for arriving at business and industry specific factors like risk free interest rate etc.

The auditors would also need to consider estimation uncertainty i.e. possible effects of the various alternatives. In the given case, expected volatility is the factor wherein the auditor would need to assess various assumptions and data used to compute the volatility benchmark and what would be the possible effects on the expected volatility if there is a change in the underlying assumptions as well as the overall effect on the fair value of the options because of change in expected volatility.

The auditor needs to ensure that work done by management to mitigate the risk of estimation uncertainty is sufficient enough to support the appropriateness of the estimate. In the event where work done by management is inadequate, the appropriateness of the estimate would have to be assessed independently by the auditors, if required, through point of estimation or range. The auditor may obtain assurance on the expected volatility, based on an analysis of data of entities in similar industry having issued similar options.

Conclusion

An estimate can be significantly affected by management bias and estimation uncertainty. An estimate is a complex process of arriving to an answer where we do not have precise measure of calculating an item of provision. There are accounting estimates as well as as fair value estimates that requires thorough review by an auditor of the process and assumptions used by the management of arriving the same. As such, significant estimates require the exercise of signifi-cant judgment by the auditor and documentation of those judgments is critical to understanding how conclusions were reached. In some cases, even small changes in inputs can result in large changes in value. Hence, an estimate is an estimate; it is not a precise answer.

PART A: order of CIC

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• Central Information Commissioner, Mr. Rajiv Mathur who is in charge of appeals related to direct-tax matters has passed 8 Orders on 13-12-2013. 2 of these are summarised below:

Section 8(1) (j) of the RTI Act:

Vide an application dated 28-01-2013, the appellant had sought information on 6 points relating to Ramkumar Jalan Public Charitable Trust which included documents submitted for obtaining PAN, names of all Trustees, details of registered office address, details of Wealth Tax returns filed, TDS certificate issued and short term/long term capital gains.

Appellant observed that he was a tenant in a property which is owned by the Trust and he along with several other tenants were directly affected by the re-development work undertaken by the Trust and as such they cannot be held to be third parties.

Decision:
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Girish Ramchandra Deshpande has held that Income Tax Returns and related documents are personal information and exempt from disclosure u/s. 8(1) (j) of the RTI Act unless larger public interest is shown. In the instant case, the appellant has not been able to show any larger public interest. Accordingly, the denial of information u/s. 8(1) (j) is upheld.

[Shri Amit Shah, Mumbai vs. ITO (exam)-1 and CIT, Kolkata: CIC/RM/A/2013/000926: Order dated 13.12.2013]

• Information on TEP:

Vide an application dated 16-o2-13, appellant had sought information on 9 points relating to Tax Evasion Petition (TEP) filed by him stating that he was a victim of a false dowry case wherein his wife has alleged that her mother had paid over Rs. 30 lakh as dowry.

CPIO vide letter date 22-02-2013, informed the appellant that the complaint filed by the appellant was being enquired into.

An appeal was filed on 28-03-13 as no information was received.

AA vide order date 28-04-13 directed the CPIO to furnish information to the appellant and disposed of the appeal.

CPIO submitted that investigation into the TEP is still going on and is likely to be completed by December 2013.

Decision
It has been the consistent stand of the Commission that some sort of a feedback should be provided to the information provider once investigation into a tax evasion complaint has been finalised. The complainant has a right to know whether the information provided by him has been found to be false or true. We accordingly direct the CPIO to disclose the broad outcome of the TEP to the appellant once the enquiry is over. Details of investigation are, however, not required to be disclosed.

[Shri S. Z. Ahmed, Hyderabad vs. Income Tax Office ward 16 and Add1.CIT, Range 6, Hyderabad: Order No.CIC/RM/A/2013/000923 dated 13-12-2013]

• RTI application: Section 25(5) of the RTI Act

Decision of full Bench (3 members) of the Central Information Commission decision in connection with payment of fees for RTI application and other fees. Hereunder are reproduced paragraphs 11 & 12 of the Order. 1

1. It needs to be underlined that preamble of the RTI Act provides for setting out the practical regime of right to information for the citizenry in order to promote transparency and accountability in the working of every public authority. These words connote a pragmatic approach on the part of all concerned in implementing the provisions of this law. The Commission is aware that difficulties are being experienced by the information seekers in depositing the fee and copying charges and consequential delay in the provision of information. On a consideration of the matter, the Commission makes the following recommendations to the Ministries/Departments/Public Authorities of the Central Government u/s. 25 (5) of the RTI Act

(i) All public authorities shall direct the officers under their command to accept demand drafts or banker cheques or Indian Postal Order (IPO) payable to their Accounts Officers of the public authority. This is in line with clause (b) of Rule 6 of the RTI Rules, 2012. In other words, no instrument shall be returned by any officer of the public authority on the ground that it has not been drawn in the name of a particular officer. So long as the instrument has been drawn in favour of the Accounts Officer, it shall be accepted in all circumstances.

(ii) All public authorities are required to direct the concerned officers to accept IPOs of the denomination of higher values vis-à-vis the fee/copying charges when the senders do not ask for refund of the excess amount. To illustrate, if fee of Rs. 18/- is payable by the information seeker and if he sends IPO of Rs. 20/-, this should be accepted by the concerned officer rather than returning the same, for practical reasons. The entire amount will be treated as RTI fee.

(iii) All public authorities shall direct the CPIOs and ACPIOs under their command to accept application fee and copying charges in cash from the information seekers in line with Rule 6(a) of the RTI Rules. It is made clear that the CPIOs and APIOs will not direct the information seekers to deposit the fee with the officers located in other buildings/offices.

(iv) DoPT shall direct all the CPIOs/APIOs/Accounts Officers to accept money orders towards the deposition of fee / copying charges. This is in line with the order dated 19-09-2007 passed by the Karnataka Information Commission in B.V. Gautma vs. Dy. Commissioner of Stamps & Registration, Bangalore. (KIC 2038 CoM 2007).

(v) The Department of Posts has issued a detailed Circular No. 1031/2007-RTI dated 12-10-2007 for streamlining the procedure of handling applications by various CAPIOs which, interalia contains the following directions:-

“(1) Display of the signboard “RTI APPLICATIONS ARE ACCEPTED HERE” should be made on the notice board/prominent place in the post office. In addition, the names/ addresses of the CPIO and appropriate authorities of the Post office should also be displayed.

(9) The fee alongwith application should be accepted at the same counter and in no case the applicant should be made to visit another counter for depositing the requisite fee.”

The Department of Posts is required to ensure that the above directions are complied with by all concerned.

(vi) As noted herein above, as of now, the RTI applications and the requisite fee are being accepted by the designated Post Offices, numbering above 4700. Considering the size of the country and the number of RTI applicants/applications, the number of designated Post Offices appears to be too small. It has been brought to the notice of the Commission that there are

(vii) 25,464 Departmental Post Offices and 1,29,402 Extra Departmental Branch Post Offices. The Commission, therefore, advises the Secretary, Department of Posts, to consider designating all 25,464 Departmental Post Offices to accept RTI applications and the requisite fee.

(viii) The best solution to the fee related problems appears to be to issue RTI stamps of the denomination of Rs. 10/- by the Deptt. of Posts. It would save time and cost. The Commission would urge Department of Posts/DoPT to consider the viability of this suggestion with utmost dispatch.

(ix) The Commission also directs the CPIOs and the Appellate Authorities to mention their names, designations and telephone and fax numbers in the RTI related correspondence.

12. The Commission expects all Ministries/Departments/ Public Authorities of the Central Government to give urgent consideration to the above recommendations.

(Shri Subhash Chandra Agrawal vs. Ministry of Home Affairs. Complaint No CIC/BS/C/2013/000149/ LS, 000072/LS & 000108/LS: decided on 27-08-2013)

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Probate of Will – Delay in filing Application – May arouse suspicion – But not absolute bar of limitation : Succession Act 1925 section 222:

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Wilma Levert Canuao & Others vs. Allan Sebastian D’souza & Anr. AIR 2013 (NOC) 415 ( Bom)

The testator died on 5th September 1999. The two Respondents were the sons who are the original Plaintiffs. The testator was survived besides his two sons, by six daughters, three of whom, the Appellants, had lodged caveats in response to the Testamentary Petition seeking probate of the will alleged to have been executed by the testator on 20th March, 1989. Under his will, the testator directed his executors and trustees to pay a sum of Rs. 30,000/- to each of his daughters and an amount of Rs. 1.00 lakh to his wife. The residue was bequeathed to his two sons who are appointed as executors. Pauline, the wife of the testator, died on 20th July 1994. There were two attesting witnesses to the will of the testator. Both of them were solicitors and advocates. One of them, Jaswant Chimanlal Shah had filed an affidavit dated 18th December, 2006 in the testamentary petition. He died on 9th May 2008 before he could be examined in evidence. The second attesting witness Kantibhai R. Thakkar was also a solicitor but he too died in 1993. The learned Single Judge held that the will had been duly proved and directed that probate shall issue.

The Hon’ble Court observed that section 63 of the Succession Act, 1925 specifies the manner in which a will has to be executed. Clause (c) of section 63 requires attestation of a will by two or more witnesses each of whom has to have seen the testator sign or to have received from the testator a personal acknowledgement of the signature. Each of the two witnesses must sign the will in the presence of the testator but it is not necessary that more than one witness should be present at the same time. Section 68 of the Evidence Act specifies the requirements for adducing proof of the execution of a document which is required by law to be attested. U/s. 68, if a document is required to be attested by law, it cannot be used as evidence unless one attesting witness has been called for proving the execution of the document, if an attesting witness is alive. Section 69 deals with a contingency where no attesting witness can be found. In such a situation, section 69 requires proof that the attestation of one attesting witness at least is in his handwriting and that the signature of the person executing the document is in the handwriting of that person.

The Hon’ble Court observed that there is no warrant for the assumption that the right to apply for the grant of probate as envisaged in Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act necessarily accrues on the date of the death of the deceased. The Court held that such an application is to seek the permission of the Court to perform a duty created by the will or for a recognition as a testamentary trustee and the right to apply is a continuous right which is capable of being exercised so long as the object of the trust exists or any part of the trust, if created, remains to be executed.

Finally it was held construing the provisions of Rule 382 that while any delay beyond three years after the death of the deceased would arouse suspicion, but such delay, while it has to be explained, cannot be equated with an absolute bar of limitation.

Moreover, once the execution and attestation of will are proved a suspicion based on delay would no longer operate. In the circumstances, the contention that the delay should result in the dismissal of the suit was declined.

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Gap in GaAp – Accounting for Demerger

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Synopsis

Following the rapid ushering in of the Companies Act, 2013, MCA has also started issuing draft rules. The author highlights the glaring lacunae in the Draft Rules for Accounting for Demerger, which require the accounting to be undertaken in accordance with the current provisions under Income Tax governing demergers, instead of acceptable accounting principles.

This article deals with the issues relating to accounting for demerger, as a result of the draft rules under the Companies Act 2013. The said rules are not yet final.

As per the draft rules, “demerger” in relation to companies means transfer, pursuant to scheme of arrangement by a ‘demerged company’ of its one or more undertakings to any ‘resulting company’ in such a manner as provided in section 2(19AA) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, subject to fulfilling the conditions stipulated in section 2(19AA) of the Income Tax Act and shares have been allotted by the ‘resulting company’ to the shareholders of the ‘demerged company’ against the transfer of assets and liabilities.

As per section 2 (19AA) of the Income-tax Act, “demerger” in relation to companies, means the transfer, pursuant to a scheme of arrangement under the Companies Act, 1956, by a demerged company of its one or more undertakings to any resulting company in such a manner that—

i. all the property of the undertaking, being transferred by the demerged company, immediately before the demerger, becomes the property of the resulting company by virtue of the demerger;

ii. all the liabilities relatable to the undertaking, being transferred by the demerged company, immediately before the demerger, become the liabilities of the resulting company by virtue of the demerger;

iii. the property and the liabilities of the undertaking or undertakings being transferred by the demerged company are transferred at values appearing in its books of account immediately before the demerger;

iv. the resulting company issues, in consideration of the demerger, its shares to the shareholders of the demerged company on a proportionate basis [except where the resulting company itself is a shareholder of the demerged company];

v. the shareholders holding not less than threefourths in value of the shares in the demerged company (other than shares already held therein immediately before the demerger, or by a nominee for, the resulting company or, its subsidiary) become share-holders of the resulting company or companies by virtue of the demerger, otherwise than as a result of the acquisition of the property or assets of the demerged company or any undertaking thereof by the resulting company;

vi. the transfer of the undertaking is on a going concern basis;

vii. the demerger is in accordance with the conditions, if any, notified u/s.s. (5) of section 72A by the Central Government in this behalf.

Explanation 1—For the purposes of this clause, “undertaking” shall include any part of an undertaking, or a unit or division of an undertaking or a business activity taken as a whole, but does not include individual assets or liabilities or any combination thereof not constituting a business activity.

Explanation 2—For the purposes of this clause, the liabilities referred to in sub-clause (ii), shall include—

(a) the liabilities which arise out of the activities or operations of the undertaking;
(b) the specific loans or borrowings (including debentures) raised, incurred and utilised solely for the activities or operations of the undertaking; and
(c) in cases, other than those referred to in clause (a) or clause (b), so much of the amounts of general or multipurpose borrowings, if any, of the demerged company as stand in the same proportion which the value of the assets transferred in a demerger bears to the total value of the assets of such demerged company immediately before the demerger.

Explanation 3—For determining the value of the property referred to in sub-clause (iii), any change in the value of assets consequent to their revaluation shall be ignored.

Explanation 4—For the purposes of this clause, the splitting up or the reconstruction of any authority or a body constituted or established under a Central, State or Provincial Act, or a local authority or a public sector company, into separate authorities or bodies or local authorities or companies, as the case may be, shall be deemed to be a demerger if such split up or reconstruction fulfils such conditions as may be notified in the Official Gazette, by the Central Government.

Accounting for demerger under the draft rules issued under Companies Act 2013

The draft rules recognise that accounting standards issued under the Companies Accounting Standard Rules do not contain any standard for demergers. Till such time an accounting standard is prescribed for the purpose of ‘demerger’, the accounting treatment shall be in accordance with the conditions stipulated in section 2(19AA) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and

(i) in the books of the ‘demerged company’:-

(a) assets and liabilities shall be transferred at the same value appearing in the books, without considering any revaluation or writing off of assets carried out during the preceding two financial years; and

(b) the difference between the value of assets and liabilities shall be credited to capital reserve or debited to goodwill.

(ii) in the books of ‘resulting company’:-

(a) assets and liabilities of ‘demerged company’ transferred shall be recorded at the same value appearing in the books of the ‘demerged company’ without considering any revaluation or writing off of assets carried out during the preceding two financial years;

(b) shares issued shall be credited to the share capital account; and

(c) the excess or deficit, if any, remaining after recording the aforesaid entries shall be credited to capital reserve or debited to goodwill as the case may be.

Provided that a certificate from a chartered accountant is submitted to the Tribunal to the effect that both ‘demerged company’ and ‘resulting company’ have complied with conditions as above and accounting treatment prescribed in this rule.

Author’s Analysis

First, the draft rules are designed to ensure compliance with section 2(19AA). In the author’s view, accounting treatment should be governed by Indian GAAP, Ind-AS/IFRS or generally acceptable accounting practices; rather than, the provisions of the Income- tax Act. The requirement to record demergers at book values in accordance with section 2(19AA) may not gel well with the requirements of generally acceptable accounting practices. For example, under IFRS/Ind-AS, distribution to shareholders is recorded at fair value, whereas under the draft rules the same is recorded at book value. This anomaly should be rectified through a collaborative effort of the Institute of Chartered Accountants (ICAI), the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT). However it appears that this may not be as easy as it appears. Many issues need to be first resolved, such as, the strategy with respect to, implementation of Ind-AS/ IFRS, continuation of Indian GAAP for some entities, implementation of Tax Accounting Standards, implementation of the IFRS SME standard, etc needs to be finalised. Right now, this whole area is a maelstrom and the Government and the ICAI should provide a clear roadmap, before complicating this space any further.

Second, the draft rules and section 2(19AA) of the Income-tax Act assumes a very simple scenario of demerger. In practice, demerger may involve many structuring complexities.  The draft rules therefore are very elementary.  They focus on the accounting that is required in a narrow situation where the demerger is in accordance with section 2(19AA) of the Income-tax Act.  

Third, the draft rules on accounting of demerger is applicable only when the demerger is in accordance with section 2(19AA) of the Income-tax Act.  These accounting rules are not applicable when the   demerger is not in accordance with section 2(19AA).  For example, a company demerging one of its undertaking may be doing so, to unlock value rather than obtaining tax benefits under section 2(19AA).  For such demerger, the prescribed draft accounting rules are not applicable. Thus, as an example, the resulting company could account for the assets and liabilities taken over at fair value rather than on the basis of book values as prescribed in the draft rules.Fourth, in the books of the demerged company when the transfer to a resulting company is a net liability, the draft rules require the corresponding credit to be given to capital reserves. This accounting seems appropriate, as it could be argued that the shareholders are taking over the net liability, and hence this is a contribution by the shareholders to the company. When the transfer to a resulting company is a net asset, the draft rules require the corresponding debit to be given to goodwill.  This seems completely ridiculous as distribution of net assets to shareholders cannot under any circumstances result in goodwill for the demerged   company.  Rather it is a distribution by the demerged company of the net assets to the shareholders, and hence the debit should be made to general reserves.  This mistake should be corrected in the final rules. Fifth, in the books of the resulting company, the net assets/liabilities taken over are recorded at book values. This is designed to comply with the requirements of section 2(19AA).  As already indicated, the accounting in statutory books should not be guided by the requirements of the Income-tax Act.  In practice, the resulting company may want to record the said transfer at fair value, to capture the business valuation. Whilst for tax computation purposes, he net assets may be recorded at book values; it is inappropriate for the Income-tax Act to suggest the accounting to be done in statutory books.Lastly, in the resulting company there is no requirement in respect of how share capital is valued.  Thus the securities premium, goodwill and capital reserves can be flexibly determined by ascribing a desired value to the share capital.  This is certainly not an appropriate approach from an accounting point of view.

In conclusion, the author believes that some immediate correction is required in the draft accounting rules as suggested in this article. In the long term, accounting should be driven by sound accounting practices and not by income-tax requirements.  In this regard, ICAI, CBDT and the MCA should collaborate and establish a clear roadmap for the future.

Mortgage by conditional sale or sale with condition of repurchase – Suit for redemption – Dismissed: Transfer of property Act, 1882 section 58(c):

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Vanchalabai Raghunath/Ithape (D) by LR vs. Shankarrao Baburao Bhilare (D) by LRS & Ors A I R 2013 SC 2924

The Appellant is the legal heir of the original Plaintiff/widow who was admittedly the owner of the suit property.

Plaintiff’s case is that a deed was executed by Vanchalabai Raghunath Ithape (the original Plaintiff-now deceased) in favour of Defendant No. 1 Shankarrao Baburao Bhilare (the original Defendant/Respondent No. 1) on 12-07-1967 for a consideration of Rs. 3,000/-, by which the suit land along with 4 annas share in the mango trees was transferred to Defendant No. 1 and possession of the same was handed over, with a specific stipulation to the effect that the land was sold on the condition that after receiving Rs. 3,000/- in lump sum within 5 years before end of any Falgun month, by the Defendant, the land was to be returned to the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff’s case is that it was a mortgage transaction and the land was to be returned by the original Defendant after receiving the said consideration of Rs. 3,000/- within 5 years.

He denied of having any relationship of mortgagee and mortgagor between him and the Plaintiff. According to him, the Plaintiff had sold the suit property to him as per the said sale deed, but only as a concession the period of 5 years was mentioned in the deed to reconvey the said suit property and since there was no repayment in 5 years no re-conveyance could be claimed.

Admittedly, the Plaintiff filed the suit claiming a decree for redemption of the suit property. The trial court decreed the suit by passing a decree of redemption. The first appellate court reversed the findings recorded by the trial court and allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree of the trial court. As against that, the Plaintiff preferred the second appeal. The High Court did not interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the first appellate court.

The Court observed that the document in question has been described as Sale Deed transferring the land along with the fixtures and possession was handed over to the Defendant

From a perusal of the aforesaid provisions especially, section 58(c) it is evidently clear that for the purpose of bringing a transaction within the meaning of ‘mortgage by conditional sale’, the first condition is that the mortgagor ostensibly sells the mortgaged property on the condition that on such payment being made, the buyer shall transfer the property to the seller. Although there is a presumption that the transaction is a mortgage by conditional sale in cases where the whole transaction is in one document, but merely because of a term incorporated in the same document it cannot always be accepted that the transaction agreed between the parties was a mortgage transaction, referred the case in Williams vs. Owen 1840 5 My. and Cr. 303 : English Reports 41 (Chancery) 386.

The Court held that the instant case, the trial court committed grave error in construing the document and erroneously held that the transaction is mortgage and hence, the Plaintiff is entitled to decree of redemption.

By reading the documents as a whole, it is found that there is a debt and the relationship between the parties is that of a debtor and a creditor. This is a vital point to determine the nature of the transaction.

The Court, therefore, held that the document was not a mortgage by conditional sale, rather the document was transfer by way of sale with a condition to repurchase.

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Govt. servant – Not consumer – Dispute regarding retrial benefits, PF Gratuity cannot be entertained by consumer for a Jurisdiction – Issue – Goes to root of matter – Can be raised at any stage – Doctrine of waiver does not apply:

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Dr. Jaymattar Sain Bhagat vs. Dir, Health Services, Haryana & Ors AIR 2013 SC 3060

The Appellant joined Health Department, of the Respondent State, as Medical Officer on 05-06-1953 and took voluntary retirement on 28-10-1985. During the period of service, he stood transferred to another district but he retained the government accommodation.

Appellant claimed that he had not been paid all his retrial benefits, and penal rent for the said period had also been deducted from his dues of retrial benefits without giving any show cause notice to him. Appellant made various representations, however, he was not granted any relief by the State authorities. Aggrieved, the Appellant preferred a complaint before the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, the said Forum vide order dated 24.3.2000 dismissed the complaint on merits

The Appellant approached the appellate authority, i.e., the State Commission. The State Commission dismissed the appeal and revision application was also dismissed observing that though the complaint was not maintainable as the District Forum did not have jurisdiction to entertain the complaint of the Appellant as he was not a “consumer” and the dispute between the parties could not be redressed by the said Forum.

On further appeal the learned Senior AAG, Haryana, raised preliminary issue of the jurisdiction submitting that the service matter of a government servant cannot be dealt with by any of the Forum in any hierarchy under the Act. Therefore, the matter should not be considered on merit at all.

The Hon’ble Court observed that by no stretch of imagination a government servant can raise any dispute regarding his service conditions or for payment of gratuity or GPF or any of his retiral benefits before any of the Forum under the Act. The government servant does not fall under the definition of a “consumer” as defined u/s. 2(1)(d)(ii) of the Act. Such government servant is entitled to claim his retrial benefits strictly in accordance with his service conditions and regulations or statutory rules framed for that purpose. The appropriate forum, for redressal of any grievance, may be the State Administrative Tribunal, if any, or Civil Court but certainly not a Forum under the Act.

The Court further observed that conferment of jurisdiction is a legislative function and it can neither be conferred with the consent of the parties nor by a superior court, and if the Court passes a decree having no jurisdiction over the matter, it would amount to nullity as the matter goes to the roots of the cause. Such an issue can be raised at any stage of the proceedings. The finding of a court or Tribunal becomes irrelevant and unenforceable/inexcutable once the forum is found to have no jurisdiction. Similarly, if a Court/ Tribunal inherently lacks jurisdiction, acquiescence of party equally should not be permitted to perpetuate and perpetrate, defeating the legislative animation. The court cannot derive jurisdiction apart from the statute. In such eventuality the doctrine of waiver also does not apply.

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Dishonour of Cheque – Criminal liability – Joint Account holder -Drawer of cheque alone can be prosecuted: Negotiable Instruments Act section 138.

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Mrs. Aparna A. Shah vs. M/s. Sheth Developers P. Ltd & Anr AIR 2013 SC 3210

M/s. Sheth Developers P. Ltd. is the respondent a company engaged in the business of land development and constructions. Aparna A. Shah (the appellant) and Ashish Shah, her husband, are the land aggregators and developers and are the owners of certain lands in and around Panvel.

According to the appellant, in January, 2008 since the company was interested in developing a Township Project and a special economic Zone (SEZ) project in and around Panvel. The Broker, introduced them to the appellant and her husband as the land owners holding huge land in Panvel.

The respondent company agreed for the development of the said land jointly with the appellant herein and her husband. The appellant and her husband agreed for the same upon the entrustment of a token amount of Rs. 25 crore with an understanding between the parties that the said amount would be returned if the project is not materialise. Agreeing the same, the respondent company issued a cheque of Rs. 25 crore. However, for various reasons, the proposed joint venture did not materialise and it was claimed by the appellant herein that the whole amount of Rs. 25 crore was spent in order to meet the requirements of the initial joint venture in the manner as requested by the respondent company.

According to the appellant, again the respondent company expressed interest to start a new project. With regard to the same, the respondent Company approached the appellant herein and her husband and informed that they are not having sufficient securities to enable the bank to grant the facility and the bank is to show receivales in writing. Therefore, on an understanding between the respondent and the appellant, a cheque of Rs.25 crores was issued by the husband of the appellant from their joint account. It is the case of the appellant that in breach of the aforesamentioned understanding, on 05-02-2009, the respondent deposited the cheque with IDBI bank at Cuffe Parade, Mumbai and the said cheque was dishonoured due to “insufficient funds”.

On Complaint filed by the Respondent against the appellant the case was registered by the Magistrate the court held that u/s. 138 of the Act, it is only the drawer of the cheque who can be prosecuted. In the present case, the appellant is not a drawer of the cheque and she has not signed the same. A copy of the cheque brought to the notice of the Supreme Court though contains the name of the appellant and her husband, the fact remains that her husband alone put his signature. In addition to the same, bare reading of the complaint as also the affidavit of examination in chief of the complainant and a bare look at the cheque would show that the appellant has not signed the cheque. In case of issuance of cheque from joint accounts, a joint account holder cannot be prosecuted unless the cheque has been signed by each and every person who is a joint account holder. The said principle is an exception to section 41 of the N.I. Act which would have no application in the case on hand. The proceedings filed u/s. 138 cannot be used as an arm twisting tactics to recover the amount allegedly due from the appellant. It cannot be said that the complaint has no remedy against the appellant but certainly not u/s. 138. The culpability attached to dishonor of a cheque can, in no case “except in a case of section 141 of the N.I. Act” be extended to those on whose behalf the cheque is issued. This court reiterates that it is only the drawer of the cheque who can be made an accused in any proceeding u/s. 138 of the Act. Thus, criminal proceedings against appellant quashed.

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Compounding of offences – Can be compounded by CLB even after prosecution has been instituted: Interpretation of Statute: Companies Act

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V.L.S. Finance Ltd vs. UOI AIR 2013 SC 3182

The Registrar of Companies, NCT of Delhi and Haryana filed complaint in the Court of Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Tis Hazari, inter alia alleging that during the course of inspection it was noticed in the balance sheet of 1995-96 Schedule of the fixed assets included land worth Rs. 21 crore. According to the complaint, M/s. Sunair Hotels Ltd., for short ‘the Company”, had taken this land from New Delhi Municipal Corporation on licence and the Company only pays the yearly licence fee thereof. Thus, according to the complainant, without any right land has been shown as land in the Schedule of fixed assets, which is not a true and fair view and punishable u/s. 211(7) of the Companies Act. The Company and its Chairman-cum-Managing Director, S.P. Gupta were arrayed as accused.

From a plain reading of section 621A(1), it is evident that any offence punishable under the Act, not being an offence punishable with imprisonment only or with imprisonment and also with fine, may be compounded either before or after the institution of the prosecution by the Company Law Board and in case, the minimum amount of fine which may be imposed for such offence does not exceed Rs. 5000/-, by the Regional Director on payment of certain fine.

The punishment provided u/s. 211(7) of the Act comes under category of offences punishable with fine or imprisonment or both aforesaid. Section 621A(1) excludes such offences which are punishable with imprisonment only or with imprisonment and also with fine. As the nature of offence for which the accused has been charged necessarily does not invite imprisonment or imprisonment and also fine. Hence, the nature of the offence is such that it was possible to be compounded by the Company Law Board.

Now the question is whether in the aforesaid circumstances the Company Law Board can compound offence punishable with fine or imprisonment or both without permission of the court. It is pointed out that when the prosecution has been laid, it is the criminal court which is in seisin of the matter and it is only the magistrate or the court in seisin of the matter who can accord permission to compound the offence. The Court observed that both s/s. (1) and s/s. (7) of section 621A of the Act start with a non-obstante clause. As is well known, a non-obstante clause is used as a legislative device to give the enacting part of the section, in case of conflict, an overriding effect over the provisions of the Act mentioned in the non-obstante clause.

As is well settled, while interpreting the provisions of a statute, the court avoids rejection or addition of words and resort to that only in exceptional circumstances to achieve the purpose of Act or give purposeful meaning. It is also a cardinal rule of interpretation that words, phrases and sentences are to be given their natural, plain and clear meaning. When the language is clear and unambiguous, it must be interpreted in an ordinary sense and no addition or alteration of the words or expressions used is permissible. As observed earlier, the aforesaid enactment was brought in view of the need of leniency in the administration of the Act because a large number of defaults are of technical nature and many defaults occurred because of the complex nature of the provision.

Ordinarily, the offence is compounded under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the power to accord permission is conferred on the court excepting those offences for which the permission is not required. However, in view of the non-obstante clause, the power of composition can be exercised by the court or the Company Law Board. The legislature has conferred the same power to the Company Law Board which can exercise its power either before or after the institution of any prosecution whereas the criminal court has no power to accord permission for composition of an offence before the institution of the proceeding. The legislature in its wisdom has not put the rider of prior permission of the court before compounding the offence by the Company Law Board and in case the contention of the Appellant is accepted, same would amount to addition of the words “with the prior permission of the court” in the Act, which is not permissible.

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The Going Concern Conundrum – Should One Get Concerned About a Going Concern?

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‘Nothing lasts forever’. However, in accounting parlance, one of the fundamental accounting assumptions used by the management for preparation and presentation of financial statements is ‘Going concern’ which assumes that an enterprise will continue to exist long enough to carry out its objectives and commitments and will not liquidate in the foreseeable future. Indeed, the assumption of a going concern is critical to the decision and usefulness of financial information under the accrual basis of accounting. Investors and creditors ordinarily invest in or transact with enterprises that they expect to continue its operations in future. It is also the justification for following historical cost basis for accounting its assets and liabilities.

SA 570 lays down the auditor’s responsibility with respect to the management’s use of going concern assumption in the preparation of financial statements.

General purpose financial statements are prepared on a going concern basis, unless the management either intends to liquidate the entity or to cease operations, or has no realistic alternative but to do so. When the use of the going concern assumption is appropriate, assets and liabilities are recorded on the basis that the entity will be able to realise its assets and discharge its liabilities in the normal course of business.

An enterprise may be required by either the reporting framework or by statute to specifically state that the financial statements have been drawn up on a ‘going concern basis’. Eg., in the Indian context, directors are required to specifically assert in the directors’ report that the financial statements of the company are prepared on going concern basis. Where reporting framework does not contain an explicit requirement to assess ‘going concern’, management’s responsibility for the preparation and presentation of the financial statements nevertheless includes such a responsibility. The minimum period over which such assessment is to be made is normally one year (12 months).

The auditor is required to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence about the appropriateness of management’s use of the going concern assumption.A Based on this evidence, the auditor should evaluate management’s assessment of the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern. SA 570 envisages two scenarios:

a. Use of going concern assumption is appropriate but a material uncertainty exists

b. Use of going concern assumption is inappropriate

Under scenario (a), the auditor would need to evaluate whether a material uncertainty exists relating to events or conditions that may cast significant doubt on the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern, including evaluating mitigating factors, if any. A material uncertainty exists when the magnitude of its potential impact and the likelihood of its occurrence is such that, in the auditor’s judgment, appropriate disclosure of the nature and the implications of the uncertainty is necessary for a fair presentation of the financial statements. The disclosure would also include a statement to the effect that the entity may be unable to realise its assets and discharge its liabilities in the normal course of business. Where adequate disclosures have been made, the auditor would need to express an unmodified opinion and include an Emphasis of Matter paragraph to highlight the material uncertainty which casts a doubt on the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern. In cases where adequate disclosures have not been made, the audit report would need to be qualified.

Under scenario (b), if the auditor concludes that going concern assumption is inappropriate, the accounts cannot be prepared on a going concern basis. If these are in any case prepared on agoing concern basis, the auditor would need to express an adverse opinion.

A tabular presentation of the approach is given below:

Material uncertainty arises from conditions which cast doubt about the going concern assumption and such conditions could be financial, operational or statutory in nature. We will try to understand some of these conditions with examples.

Financial condition resulting in material uncertainty

Case Study 1
ABC Limited (‘ABC’) is a company incorporated in India and is a wholly owned subsidiary of PQR Investment Ltd (‘PQR’), an investment company based in Mauritius. ABC Limited is engaged in the business of process research and development and analytical services. As at 31st March 20X0, ABC has accumulated losses aggregating to Rs. 600 lakh as against paid-up capital of Rs. 250 lakh. The accumulated losses have exceeded the net worth of the Company. The current assets of the company as at 31st March 20X0 stand at Rs. 120 crore, whereas the current liabilities due for payment over the next one year are Rs. 100 crore, i.e. ABC does not have a net current liability position. Management contends that it has no intentions of discontinuing business operations and believes that the Company will be able to continue to operate as a going concern and meet all its liabilities as they fall due for payment based on support from PQR. Management provided a confirmation to this effect letter from PQR Investment Limited to the auditors as evidence of support. The accounts of ABC were prepared on a going concern basis. Was this basis appropriate per requirements of SA 570?

Analysis
The existence of accumulated losses exceeding the net worth represents a financial condition of material uncertainty. In the instant case, PQR, the parent company provided a confirmation extending financial support to ABC to enable it to continue as a going concern. While SA 570 requires auditor to obtain written confirmation from the parent confirming the support, it also makes it incumbent upon auditors to evaluate the parent company’s ability to provide the requisite financial support. It is pertinent to note that PQR is an investment company. In such a case, the auditors would need to consider additional factors like whether PQR has the necessary wherewithal to provide financial support and if PQR was a mere investment vehicle then evaluating whether the shareholders of PQR have the ability to provide support and if yes, consider obtaining confirmation from the shareholders to that effect. Mere reliance on the confirmation would not suffice. Management would need to make detailed disclosures stating that the accounts have been prepared on going concern on the basis of financial support guaranteed by the parent company would be required to be made in the financial statements. The auditor would need to include in his audit report, a Matter of Emphasis highlighting this condition. Alternatively, where the auditor is satisfied with the appropriateness of the going concern assumption, he would not be required to include a Matter of Emphasis in his audit report.

Case Study 2
XYZ Winds Limited (‘XYZ”) is in the business of manufacturing windmills. XYZ has a paid up capital and reserves of Rs. 200 crore as at 31st March 20X5. XYZ has been incurring losses for the last three years however the Company has a positive net worth as at 31st March 20X5. XYZ had borrowed funds aggregating to Rs. 150 crore by way of foreign currency convertible bonds (FCCBs) on 1st April 20X0 which were due for repayment on 1st January 20X5. In view of continuing losses, XYZ was unable to repay the FCCBs on the due date. The Company also has overdue amounts payable to creditors and certain other lenders as at 31st March 2013. The current liabilities as at 31st March 20X5 amount to Rs. 800 crore whereas current assets stand at Rs. 550 crore. The Company is in negotiations with the FCCB holders and is working on various solutions with them to ensure settlement of their dues. The Company is also taking various steps to reduce costs and improve efficiencies to make its operations profitable. The final outcome of the negotiations is pending as on the date the financial  statements  are  approved  by  the  Board. Does  this
 situation  trigger  a
 material
 uncertainty
leading  to  the  going  concern
 assumption  being challenged?

 

Analysis
The fixed term borrowings are overdue for pay- ment. The given situation
also represents a net liability or net
current liability position. The Com- pany’s ability to continue as a going concern
is  in part dependent on the successful
outcome of the discussions with the FCCB holders as well its ability to
generate/source additional cash flows to
repay its liabilities in the short-term. An assess- ment covering qualitative
and judgmental aspects needs to
be
made, an illustrative
inventory
of which could include:

 

• Whether management has a history of success- fully refinancing or renewing the entity’s debt obligations as they come due
 

• Whether management has made sufficient progress in negotiating with planned funding source(s), if any and whether management has provided evidence to support its assertions rela- tive to progress

• Whether the uncommitted funding amount is significant or insignificant relative to the total funding need
 
• Ability and willingness of the owners to provide additional capital to fund the liquidity crisis.

If based on additional procedures performed, auditors are satisfied with the appropriateness of the going concern assumption, the auditor would need to include a matter of emphasis in their re- port highlighting the fact that the accounts have been prepared on a going concern basis despite the material uncertainty. Management would need to make enhanced disclosures about the material uncertainty as well as mitigating factors. Where the auditor is not satisfied with the appropriate- ness of the going concern assumption, he would need to issue an adverse opinion.

Case Study 3

Moon Metals Limited (MML) is in the business of manufacturing of hot rolled steel plates. The paid up  capital  of  MML  as  at  31st  March  20X0  is  Rs. 2,000  crore  as  against  accumulated  losses  of  Rs. 2,250 crore. Due to the sluggish market conditions in  the  steel  industry,  high  rates  of  interest  and short tenure of loans taken, MML was unable to repay  significant  portion  of  loans  from  financial institutions/banks as per the repayment schedule. The overdue amount of such loans including over- due  interest,  as  at  31st  March  20X0  aggregates to  Rs.  1,000  crore.  Further,  loans  aggregating  to Rs.  500  crore  are  due  for  repayment  within  one year from the Balance Sheet date. The aggregate loans outstanding as  at 31st March 20X0  amount to  Rs.  4,000  crore.

In  view  of  the  deterioration  in  the  steel  market conditions, the management of MML submitted a omprehensive Financial Restructuring Plan (CFRP) in April 20X0 to the Corporate Debt Restructuring Group (CDR) consisting of all the secured lenders of the company. The CFRP, inter alia, provides for conversion  of  promoter  loans  into  equity,  buy- back  of  certain  unsecured  loans  at  a  discount, additional equity infusion by promoters, enhanced cash flow projections through cost rationalisation, operational efficiencies, renegotiation of contracts and other cost control measures to improve Com- pany’s operating results; all these factors ultimately resulting in improvement of the company’s net worth. The CFRP is under consideration by the CDR as on the date of approval of the accounts,
i.e.  30th  June  20X0.

The  liabilities  due  for  repayment  amount  to  ap- proximately Rs. 2,500 crore, which is greater than the  currently  expected  cash  flows  from  business and any committed or contracted sources of funds of the Company.   The Company’s ability to repay its  loan  and  related  liabilities  falling  due  up  to 31st  March  20X1  is  dependent  on  the  Company being  able  to  successfully  implement  the  actions proposed  in  the  CFRP.  What  factors  need  to  be reckoned, if the accounts for the year ended 31st March  20X0  were  prepared  on  a  going  concern basis  in  the  above  case?

Analysis


In this case study, the Company has been admit- ted  to  CDR  whereby  management  has  provided commitments in lieu of the CDR restructuring the loans and waiving off existing events of defaults/ penal interest and provision of further finance. In addition  to  the  factors  explained  in  the  analysis to  Case  Study  2  above,  the  auditors  would  need to  evaluate  the  following  aspects:

• Analysing and determining the reliability of cash flow, sales, profit and other relevant forecasts prepared by the management, the auditor may consider consulting corporate finance experts to validate these assumptions.

• Considering historical evidence of growth and profitability of the entity as well as the industry in which the entity operates

• Considering apparent feasibility of plans to reduce overhead (e.g. existence of labor agree- ment restrictions) or administrative expendi- tures, to postpone maintenance or research and development projects, or to lease rather than purchase assets

• Whether the company’s financial health has de- teriorated significantly or its operations changed significantly since the reporting date

• Assessing the ability and intent of the promot- ers to fulfill the funding commitment, assess- ing whether the commitment is sufficient and enforceable The time horizon over which the evaluation of the mitigating factors in this case would transcend beyond one year.

Depending on the status of approval of the CRPF and consideration of the factors listed above, the auditor would need to perform additional proce- dures to evaluate management’s assessment of going concern. Where in the auditor’s evaluation, the going concern assumption is appropriate, he would need to include a matter of emphasis in the audit report and ensure that detailed disclosures are made in the financial statements. Where the auditor is not satisfied with the appropriateness of the going concern assumption, he would need to issue an adverse opinion.

Operational condition resulting in material uncertainty

An operational condition may arise where an en- terprise is formed for achieving a stated objective and the objective is either achieved or becomes infructuous. For e.g. a project office that was constituted to execute the contract for construc- tion of a power plant for a power generating company would get annulled on completion of the project or where the contract with the power company gets cancelled.

Legal condition resulting in material uncertainty

A going concern issue may also arise where the operation of an enterprise is subject to licensing by statutory authorities and such license is with- drawn or cancelled thereby entailing a cessation to the enterprise’s existence. In the Indian con- text, a recent example of the applicability of the legal condition resulting in material uncertainty of an enterprise to continue as a going concern  is the cancellation of telecom licenses of certain operators by the telecom regulatory authorities leading to termination of business operations for those operators.

It is easier to evaluate going concern for enterprises operating in a mature industry experiencing turbulent times. However, for enterprises that operate in nascent or niche environments, this evaluation could pose difficulties. Consider the case of a company which is engaged in drug discovery and whose net worth is completely eroded. For such cases, the auditors would need to apply heightened professional skepticism to conclude appropriateness of going concern assumption, as this would involve evaluating factors such as fu- ture cash flows from development of molecules, success in clinical trials, ability to sell the product at development stage or engage a partner for further development, outsourcing of development of molecules etc.

In the Indian context, companies operating in the aviation industry have been encountering going concern issues. The operating results of these companies continue to be materially affected mostly by extraneous factors such as high aircraft fuel costs, significant depreciation in the value of currency, declining passenger traffic and general economic slowdown. Some of these companies have continued to prepare the financial statements based on their ability to explore various options to raise finance to meet short-term and long-term obligations, promoter commitment to provide op- erational and financial support and amendments to FDI policy which may improve investor sentiment towards the aviation industry.

Concluding remarks

As the world deals with the cascading impacts of the financial crisis, which continue to this day, the global economy has had to find a course through uncharted waters. The growing complexi- ties in companies’ balance sheets due to the global economic crisis and foreign exchange volatility have triggered a debate over one of the basic premises of financial accounting — every company is a ‘going concern’ that will not go out of busi- ness or liquidate in the foreseeable future. Going concern issues have significant ramifications for companies such as market capitalisation, ability to raise resources, employee retention, protection of stakeholders interests, investor confidence and so on. The significance of the going concern concept is also evident in the valuation of the assets of the business as ‘going concern’ also forms one of the basis on which businesses are valued.

Where going concern assumption is no longer appropriate, the financial statements would need to be prepared under the liquidation basis of ac- counting whereby the carrying values of all assets (including fixed assets) are presented at their estimated realisable value and all liabilities are presented at their estimated settlement amounts.

In  fact,  a  going  concern  assumption  being  invali- dated  post  the  balance  sheet  date  is  considered to be an adjusting event.   Accounting Standard 4 requires  assets  and  liabilities  should  be  adjusted for events occurring after the balance sheet date that  indicate  that  the  fundamental  accounting assumption  of  going  concern  is  not  appropriate. The  Companies  (Auditor’s  Report)  Order,  2003 specifically requires the statutory auditor to report whether  disposal  of  a  substantial  part  of  the  as- sets has affected the going concern of a company. Similarly,  the  reporting  requirement  under  CARO 2003  with  respect  to  erosion  of  net  worth  and incurrence of cash losses is also aimed at assessing the  financial  health  and  as  a  corollary,  the  going concern  of  a  company.

In practice, evaluating the appropriateness of a going concern assumption can be highly judgmental and SA 570 provides adequate guidance for an auditor to make this assessment.

Gap in Gap-Accounting for Expenditure on Corporate Social Responsibility

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In this article we discuss the accounting of CSR expenditure, particularly focusing on the issue relating to constructive and legal obligation under Indian GAAP.

Provisions relating to Companies Act, 2013 on CSR

1. The Companies Act requires that every company with net worth of Rs. 500 crore or more, or turnover of Rs. 1,000 crore or more or a net profit of Rs. 5 crore or more during any financial year will constitute a CSR committee.

2. The CSR committee will consist of three or more directors, out of which at least one director will be an independent director.

3. The CSR committee will:

(a) Formulate and recommend to the board, a CSR policy, which will indicate the activities to be undertaken by the company.

(b) Recommend the amount of expenditure to be incurred on the activities referred to in the CSR policy.

(c) Monitor CSR policy from time to time.

4. The board will ensure that company spends, in every financial year, at least 2% of its average net profits made during the three immediately preceding financial years. For this purpose, the average net profit will be calculated in accordance with the clause 198.

5. The company will give preference to local areas around where it operates, for spending the amount earmarked for CSR activities.

6. The board will approve the CSR policy and disclose its contents in the board report and place it on the company’s website.

7. If a company fails to spend such amount, the board will, in its report specify the reasons for not spending the amount.

8. Schedule VII of the Act sets out the activities, which may be included by companies in their CSR policies. These activities relate to (a) eradicating extreme hunger and poverty (b) promotion of education (c) promoting gender equality and empowering women (d) reducing child mortality and improving maternal health (e) combating HIV, AIDs, malaria and other diseases (f) ensuring environmental sustainability (g) employment enhancing vocational skills (h) social business projects (i) contribution to certain funds and other matters.

Naming and Shaming

The Companies Act does not prescribe any penal provision if a company fails to spend the amount prescribed on CSR activities. The board will need to explain reasons for non-compliance in its report. Thus many believe that there is no legal obligation to incur CSR expenditure. Creating a legal obligation under the Companies Act to incur CSR expenditure, would have created constitutional hurdles for the regulator. Hence the Government has chosen a path of applying moral pressure, by requiring disclosure of CSR expenditure. As there is no legal obligation to incur CSR expenditure, there would be no legal obligation to make good short spends of previous years or prohibition on taking credit in future years for excess amount spent on CSR.

The draft rules clarify that CSR is not charity or mere donations. CSR is the process by which an organisation thinks about and evolves its relationships with stakeholders for the common good, and demonstrates its commitment in this regard by adoption of appropriate business processes and strategies. CSR is a way of conducting business, by which corporate entities contribute to the social good. Socially responsible companies do not limit themselves to using resources to engage in activities that increase only their profits. They use CSR to integrate economic, environmental and social objectives with the company’s operations and growth.

From the draft rules, it is clear that CSR is based on shared values and should be a part of a company’s business strategy. It should not be seen as a discretionary expenditure. Certainly reputed companies can ill afford not to have CSR as part of their business strategy and spend the legislated amount on CSR. Hence, these companies would have, if not a legal obligation, atleast a constructive obligation to incur the CSR expenditure. The same cannot be said of companies that do not care about CSR or have cash flow problems and hence would not pursue CSR.

In a nutshell, as a result of the Companies Act 2013, for companies that meet the threshold, there may or may not be a constructive obligation. It is a company specific analysis that will have to be made.

Accounting of CSR expenditure

Assume, Company A meets one of the thresholds, and hence CSR is applicable to it. There are three scenarios with respect to CSR expenditure.

1. Company A spends 2% (determined in accordance with the Act) each year.

2. Company A spends nothing or less than 2% each year.

3. Company A spends more than 2% in one year, and may or may not take credit for the excess spend in future years

Scenario 1 is fairly straight-forward. Scenario 3 is not dealt with in this article. This article focusses on Scenario 2. How does Company A account for CSR expenditure in Scenario 2?

Author’s Response
To answer this question, one will have to answer three questions. Is there a legal obligation to spend on CSR? If there is no legal obligation, has the company created a constructive obligation for itself? How are constructive obligations accounted for under AS 29 – Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets?

Based on discussions above, the author believes that there is no legal obligation to incur CSR expenditure. However, companies are advised to seek legal clarity on this matter. The answer to the second question, whether or not there is a constructive obligation, would depend on facts and circumstances of each case.

Paragraph 11 of AS 29 provides some insight on constructive obligation. It states “An obligation is a duty or responsibility to act or perform in a certain way. Obligations may be legally enforceable as a consequence of a binding contract or statutory requirement. Obligations also arise from normal business practice, custom and a desire to maintain good business relations or act in an equitable manner.”

Whether or not there is a constructive obligation, will be clear from facts and circumstances of each case. Infact the requirement of Companies Act 2013, could throw some light on whether constructive obligation exists in a given fact pattern. As per the Act, the CSR committee will: (a) Formulate and recommend to the board, a CSR policy, which will indicate the activities to be undertaken by the company (b) Recommend the amount of expenditure to be incurred on the activities referred to in the CSR policy (c) Monitor CSR policy from time to time. Further, the board will approve the CSR policy and disclose its contents in the board report and place it on the company’s website. The above disclosures should throw adequate light on whether or not there is constructive obligation in a given fact pattern.

Now the million dollar question. Assuming there is constructive obligation in a given fact pattern, would a company require to make provision for the short or nil spends, on the basis that the short or nil spends will be made good in the future years. The response of the standard setters on this issue has been very confusing.

Constructive obligations should be provided

The requirements in Indian GAAP, suggesting constructive obligations should be provided for are:

(a) AS 29 defines ‘obligating event’ as an event that creates an obligation that results in an enterprise having no realistic alternative in settling that obligation. This definition is capable of being interpreted as requiring a provision based on constructive obligation criteria rather than merely on legal criteria.

(b) Paragraph 11 of AS 29 describes obligation at a constructive level rather than on a legal basis. Paragraph 11 describes obligation as follows: “An obligation is a duty or responsibility to act or perform in a certain way. Obligations may be legally enforceable as a consequence of a binding contract or statutory requirement. Obligations also arise from normal business practice, custom and a desire to maintain good business relations or act in an equitable manner”.

(c) In the case of refund by retail stores, AS 29 requires a provision based on constructive obligation criteria and not on the basis of a legal obligation.  The example contained in AS 29 is reproduced below.

Illustration 4: Refunds Policy

A retail store has a policy of refunding purchases by dissatisfied customers, even though it is under no legal obligation to do so. Its policy of making refunds is generally known. Present obligation as a result of a past obligating event – The obligating event is the sale of the product, which gives rise to an obligation because obligations also arise from normal business practice, custom and a desire to maintain good business relations or act in an equitable manner. An outflow of resources embodying economic benefits in settlement – Probable, a proportion of goods are returned for refund (see paragraph 23).

Conclusion – A provision is recognised for the best estimate of the costs of refunds (see paragraphs 11, 14 and 23).

(d)Paragraph 3 of AS 15  Employee Benefits  states that “The employee benefits to which this Standard applies include those provided:……(c) by those informal practices that give rise to an obligation. Informal practices give rise to an obligation where the enterprise has no realistic alternative but to pay employee benefits. An example of such an obligation is where a change in the enterprise’s informal practices would cause unacceptable damage to its relationship with employees.”  In the Indian context, bonus, increments, etc. are provided for based on constructive obligation rather than on the basis of a legal obligation. This is in accordance with AS-15.  Thus the concept of constructive obligation is not an alien concept and is recognized not only in AS-29, but also other Indian standards such as AS-15. (e) AS 25 – ‘Interim Financial Reporting’, requires the constructive obligation criteria to be applied in making provision for bonus in interim periods. As per AS 25, “a bonus is anticipated for interim reporting purposes, if, and only if, (a) the bonus is a legal obligation or an obligation arising from past practice for which the enterprise has no realistic alternative but to make the payments, and (b) a reliable estimate can be made.”

Only legal obligations are provided, constructive obligations are not provided The requirements in Indian GAAP, suggesting constructive obligations should not be provided for are:

1. The view that constructive obligation should not be provided for is clearly confirmed in two EAC opinions.  In a recent opinion published in The Chartered Accountant of July 2013, the EAC opined “Since as per Department of Public Enterprises Guidelines, there is no such obligation on the enterprise, provision should not be recognised. Accordingly, the Committee is of the view that the requirement in the DPE Guidelines for creation of a CSR budget can be met through creation of a reserve as an appropriation of profits rather than creating a provision as per AS 29.  On the basis of the above, the Committee is of the view that in the extant case, it is not appropriate to recognise a provision in respect of unspent expenditure on CSR activities. However, a CSR reserve may be created as an appropriation of profits.”

    Another opinion is contained in Volume 28, Query no 26.  In this query EAC opined “A published environmental policy of the company by itself does not create a legal or contractual obligation. From the Facts of the Case and copies of documents furnished by the querist, it is not clear as to whether there is any legal or contractual bligation for afforestation, compensatory afforestation, soil conservation and reforestation towards forest land. In case there is any legal or contractual obligation, compensatory afforestation, felling of existing trees or even acquisition of land could be the obligating event depending on the provisions of law or the terms of the contract.”

2.  AS 29 has rejected the concept of constructive  obligation in regard to provision for restructuring costs (e.g. voluntary retirement cost), which is required to be provided for based on a legal obligation rather than when there is an announcement of a formal and detail plan of restructuring.

3. The draft Ind-AS ED corresponding to IAS 37 Provisions, Contingent Liabilities, and Contingent Assets, identifies constructive obligation as a difference between Ind-AS and AS-29.  
This is reproduced below.

   Major Differences between the Draft of AS 29 (Revised 20xx), Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets, and Existing AS 29 (issued 2003)

    1. Unlike the existing AS 29, the Exposure Draft of AS 29(Revised 20XX) requires creation of provisions in respect of constructive obligations also. [However, the existing standard requires creation of provision arising out of normal business practices, custom and a desire to maintain good business relations or to act in an equitable manner]. This has resulted in some consequential changes also. For example, definition of provision and obligating event have been revised in the Exposure Draft of AS 29 (Revised 20XX), while the terms ‘legal obligation’ and ‘constructive obligation’ have been inserted and defined in the Exposure Draft of AS 29(Revised 20XX). Similarly, the portion of existing AS 29 pertaining to restructuring provisions has been revised in the Exposure Draft of AS 29 (Revised 20XX).

    Conclusion

     Apparently, there are internal inconsistencies in AS 29. While some requirements of AS 29 require creation of provision toward constructive obligation; other aspects may be read as if the same may not be required. Overall, it appears that the ICAI does not favour creation of a provision with respect to constructive obligation. This is particularly clear from the two EAC opinions. However, it is unclear, how the EAC opinions can override some of the requirement under AS-29 which require a provision to be created for constructive obligation. This creates a huge anomaly; one that can be resolved only by suitably amending AS-29 to bring it completely in line with the intentions of the standard setters.  The author does concede that at this stage, it may not be advisable to amend Indian GAAP. Rather it would be advisable to take swift steps to adopt IFRS/Ind-AS, and leave the past behind.

AUDITOR’S REPORTING TO THE AUDIT COMITES — A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

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Synopsis

Effective External Audit, a key pillar for having a good governance structure, is not only a statutory requirement but is also intended to be an unbiased review of the financial statements and the underlying transactions by an independent audit professional to protect the interests of all the stakeholders. In this process, communication by the auditors with those in charge of governance such as audit committees is very crucial. Regulators in various countries are seriously exploring the possibility of introducing a framework for extracting additional information from the auditors. Read on to know more about the items which are typically reported by the auditors to the audit committees based on the practices prevailing in several countries and the emerging trends in this area.

Introduction
Effective External Audit is one of the key pillars for having a good governance structure in any organisational set up especially in the corporate form. The audit process is not only a statutory requirement but is also intended to be an impartial/ unbiased review of the financial statements and the underlying transactions by an independent audit professional, which protects the interests of all the stakeholders. In this process, communication by the auditors with those in charge of governance such as audit committees is very crucial and helps in better understanding of the financial statements and the accounting aspects. Above all, it brings in enormous transparency in sharing the critical information relating to the entity with those who are legally and morally responsible for ensuring good governance. Further, these communications with the audit committee also provide auditors with an exclusive forum separate from the management to discuss matters about the audit and the company’s financial reporting process.

Currently, in addition to the standard audit report on the financial statements and the existing requirement of reporting to those in charge of governance, the regulators in various countries are seriously exploring the possibility of introducing a framework for extracting additional information from the auditors such as Auditors’ Discussion & Analysis on the financial statements similar to that of the Management Discussions & Analysis and enhancing the audit scope/reporting requirements to provide a more detailed and professional analysis to all the readers of the financial statements.

In this context, considering the ever increasing appetite for obtaining more information from the auditor, and the legal/regulatory environment, the auditing standards in general provide for reporting on various matters to those in charge of governance. This article summarises some of the items which are typically reported by the auditors to the audit committees based on the practices prevailing in several countries and the emerging trends in this area.

Reporting Framework in India and in Other Countries

Indian Standard on Auditing SA 260 -“Communication with Those Charged with Governance” deals with the reporting requirements for auditors to those in charge of governance. The SA 260 does not contain any material modifications vis-a-vis ISA 260, which is the equivalent International Auditing Standard. This standard aims at creating a platform to promote effective two-way communication between the auditor and those charged with governance and provides an overall framework for the auditor’s communication with those charged with governance and identifies some specific matters to be communicated to them. However, nothing in this SA precludes the auditor from communicating any other matters to those charged with governance.

Although the auditor is responsible for communicating matters required by this SA, the management also has a responsibility to communicate matters of governance interest to those charged with governance. Communication by the auditor does not relieve the management of this responsibility. Similarly, communication by the management with those charged with governance of matters that the auditor is required to communicate does not relieve the auditor of his responsibility to also communicate to them.

The requirement in India is similar to the reporting requirement in several other geographies where the standard establishes a framework for the auditor to communicate certain matters related to the conduct of an audit to those who have responsibility for oversight of the financial reporting process. For example, in the United States, AU Section 380 – “Communication with Audit Committees” deals with such a reporting requirement for the auditors. Recently, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), the auditing regulator in the USA, approved Auditing Standard 16 on communications with the audit committees, which substantially enhances the reporting obligations on the part of the auditors. In Australia, the auditing standard ASA 260 deals with the communication relating to those charged with governance which is very similar to the international reporting framework. The Financial Reporting Council in the UK has recently issued FRC 260, International Standard on Auditing (UK and Ireland) relating to communication with those charged with governance, which puts onerous responsibilities on the external auditors. Singapore Standard on Auditing (SSA 260) is also in line with the reporting requirements of other countries.

Whilst the basic audit committee reporting requirements on the part of the auditors remain the same in many jurisdictions, there is also an emerging trend of mandating auditors to provide more specific information on various aspects relating to the audit process and the financial statements duly considering the country specific requirements and the expectations of the stakeholders.

Matters considered for Reporting The matters which are typically included in the communications to the audit committee can be broadly classified in to two categories, namely;

• Regular Reportable Matters
• Emerging Additional Reporting Requirements

This classification is based on the general practice/ applicability in various jurisdictions and the contents could vary depending on the need/other requirements.

Regular Reportable Matters

The list of items which are included in the regular list of items to be reported would include the following:

• The Auditor’s Responsibility under Generally Accepted Auditing Standards

• Significant Accounting Policies

• Management Judgments and Accounting Estimates

• Composition of the Engagement Team

• A statement that the Engagement Team and others in the firm as appropriate, the firm and, when applicable, network firms have complied with relevant ethical requirements regarding independence

• Planned Scope of Audit

• Overview of the Audit Strategy, Timing of the Audit, and Significant Risks

• Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statements Audit

• Significant Issues Discussed with the Management prior to retention

• The form, timing, and expected general content of communications

• Disagreements with the Management

• Consultation with other accountants

• Difficulties encountered in performing the audit

• Communication about Control Deficiencies in an audit of Financial Statements

• Financial Statement Presentation

• Alternative Accounting Treatments.

• Significant Audit Adjustments

• Significant Findings from the Audit

• All written representations requested from the Management (where the Management is separate from those charged with governance)

Emerging Additional Reporting Requirements

Items which are increasingly required to be reported in communications by the auditors to the audit commit-tee depending on the various regulatory/other requirements/practices are listed below;

•    All relationships and other matters between the firm, network firms and the entity which, in the auditor’s professional judgment, may reasonably be thought to bear on the firm’s independence.

•    The related safeguards that have been applied to eliminate identified threats to independence or reduce them to an acceptable level.
•    The total fees charged by the audit firm (including network firms) for audit and non-audit services for the period covered by the financial report audit.

•    Assessment of the adequacy of the communication process, between the auditor and those charged with governance for the purposes of the audit.

•    Illegal Acts
•    Going-Concern Matters
•    Material Written Communications between the audi-tor and the Management.
•    Significant unusual transactions
•    Departure from the Auditor’s Standard Report
•    Matters that have arisen during the audit which are significant to the oversight of the financial reporting process
•    Difficult or contentious matters on which the auditor was consulted
•    Specific matters relating to the group audits to be communicated by the parent company auditors

•    Auditor’s Judgments about the quality of the entity’s accounting principles and practices
•    Auditor’s opinion on other information in any other document which contains the Audited Financial Statements
•    New accounting pronouncements and their impact on the entity

Background for the Enhanced Expectations for Additional Reporting Requirements

The emerging regulatory framework is tilted towards enhancing the relevance, timeliness, and quality of the communications between the auditor and the audit committee relative to the annual audit and related in-terim period reviews and fosters constructive dialogue between the auditor and the audit committee about significant audit and financial statement matters. The underlying reasons for enhancing the reporting requirements to the audit committee by the auditors which are emerging in several jurisdictions are explained below.

The audit committee has an important role to play in the relationship between the executive management and the external auditors. The audit committee should always make the external auditor aware of any issues which are of concern to it. Similarly, the external auditor should inform the audit committee of any concerns he has so as to ensure that the financial oversight process is complete and comprehensive. This is absolutely essential since the extent of importance provided to the audit process and the oversight provided by the audit committee is on the rise worldwide. For example, in Belgium, the statute explicitly requires that the audit committee monitors the statutory audit of the annual consolidated accounts, including the follow up of questions raised by the statutory auditor. The French Stock Exchange Authority requires the audit committees to discuss with their statutory auditors specifically and formally, any difficulties they have faced during the course of their audit.

Facing more scrutiny from regulators and investors, audit committees are continuing to challenge their roles and responsibilities. A primary responsibility of the audit committee is to oversee the integrity of the company’s accounting and reporting practices and financial statements. As financial reporting becomes more complex, the audit committee needs to make sure that the financial statements are understandable and transparent. To perform their oversight responsibilities, audit committee members need to understand what information they need, how to analyse it and what questions to ask to gain insights and make informed decisions. In view of the above, the audit committees are expecting enhanced support from the external audi-tors and candid and open communication between the external auditor and the audit committee is imperative in this regard.

The expectations from different stakeholders relating to the compliance aspects of various laws and regulations are also another reason for the enhanced reporting requirements. In some of the jurisdictions, the auditor is now required to inquire if the audit committee is aware of any matters relevant to the audit, including but not limited to violations or possible violations of laws or regulations. Further, the auditor should also assure himself that the audit committee or others with equivalent authority and responsibility is adequately informed with respect to illegal acts that come to the auditor’s attention.

Need for proactive action, understanding the nuances relating to the audit process, managing the subjective assessments, fixing the specific responsibilities have changed the entire dimension of the oversight function. This has also resulted in mandating the auditors to provide information on various significant aspects of the audit such as the planned use of other auditors to audit certain components or subsidiaries, the basis for the auditor’s determination that they can serve as the principal auditor, consultations on difficult or contentious matters outside the engagement team, specialised skill and knowledge to complete the audit, any concerns regarding the management’s anticipated application of accounting pronouncements that are not yet effective.

Audit is no longer an exercise of just ticking the numbers and confirming the mathematical accuracy of the figures provided by the management. It has changed its dimension quite drastically in the recent past and the audit process now requires thorough understanding of the business, external and the internal environments, regulatory framework in which the entity operates business and other risks, internal control framework, computer environment and much more. Currently, there is an expectation to have industry specialists in the audit field so as to bring lot more value to the audit process by demonstrating the immense industry experience. In this background, an auditor is now required to ensure that the audit committee is informed about the methods used to account for significant unusual transaction and the auditor would also be required to communicate about additional aspects of such significant unusual transactions, including the his understanding of the business rationale for them and not just the company’s methods of accounting for them.

Conclusion

Regulators worldwide believe that effective communication between the auditor and the audit committee allows the audit committee to be well-informed about accounting and disclosure matters, including the auditor’s evaluation of matters that are significant to the financial statements and to be better able to carry out its oversight role. Further, the auditor also benefits from a meaningful exchange of information regarding significant risks of material misstatement in the financial statements and other matters that may affect the integrity of the company’s financial reports.

In today’s world, the varying expectations of the stakeholders impose an onerous responsibility on the part of the audit committee and the auditors to discharge their duties properly. One should always remember that the roles of the auditors and the audit committees are critical to the efficiency and integrity of the capital markets and for protecting the interests of the various stakeholders. Considering enhanced regula-tory and legal environment and the investor activism, seamless and timely communication between the au-ditor and the audit committee is absolutely essential. This would pave the way for transparent and focused discussions and would also help in taking well informed decisions and having an effective financial oversight.

In a dynamic environment, the roles and the responsibilities keep changing and the audit profession is not an exception to this ground level reality. Hence, the audit community should rise to the occasion and use this tool of communicating with the audit committee purposefully for not only discharging their professional/ regulatory responsibilities but also for demonstrating their professional expertise and the value created by the services rendered. This would enhance the image of the profession and make the audit process more valuable and reliable.

I. T. A. No. 700/ Mum/ 2009 [Unreported] Valentine Maritime (Gulf ) LLC vs ADIT A.Ys.: 2005-06, Dated: 27 November 2013 Counsel for assessee: Hero Rai; Counsel for revenue: Ajay Srivastava

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Section 44BB of the Act – laying/installation of pipes for offshore oil exploration being ‘business of providing services and facilities in connection with extraction of mineral oils’, the payments assessable u/s. 44BB.

Facts:
The taxpayer was a non-resident company engaged in the business of providing technical/engineering services. During the relevant assessment year the taxpayer executed a contract with an Indian company (“ICo”) for laying/installation of pipes for three pipeline projects for offshore oil exploration (“the Contract”). The taxpayer contended that it was a company incorporated in UAE and accordingly, was entitled to qualify as tax resident under India UAE DTAA.

During the relevant assessment year, the taxpayer had received payments under the Contract towards materials, mobilisation, installation, etc. The taxpayer had contended that since it was engaged in the business of providing services and facilities in connection with prospecting, extraction or production of mineral oils, the payments received by it were assessable in terms of section 44BB of the Act. The AO concluded that the taxpayer did not qualify to claim benefits under India-UAE DTAA. The AO considered the payments received by the taxpayer in light of the Contract as well as original bidding documents and observed that having regard to the various clauses of the Contract pertaining to the scope of services performed by it, the taxpayer was also providing technical services. The AO further observed that in terms of the decision in Sedco Forex International Inc vs. CIT [2008] 170 Taxman 459 (Uttarkhand), deduction in respect of mobilization, demobilisation expenses was not available. The AO bifurcated the payments received by the taxpayer for assessability under two heads, namely, as deemed income section u/s. 44BB and as FTS. The CIT(A), however, concluded that the entire amount was assessable u/s. 44BB of the Act.

The issue before the Tribunal was: whether part of the payment received by the taxpayer can be assessed as FTS and whether the other part could be assessed u/s. 44BB of the Act.

Held:
the taxpayer was given a turnkey project for laying and installation of pip lines. It is a settled proposition of law that when a contract consists of a number of terms and conditions each condition does not form separate contract. The contract has to be read as a whole as laid down by the Supreme Court in case of Chaturbuj Vallabhdas [AIR 1954(SC) 236].

Perusal of various decisions cited by the taxpayer shows that works/services performed by the taxpayer do not come within the purview of section 9(i)(vii) of the Act (i.e. FTS). The AO grossly erred in considering part

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Rehabilitation & Resettlement: Future Subsistence Cost

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Synopsis:

Land acquisition now has become a crucial driver for development activities undertaken by Government and Private Sector. Central Government has proposed a combined bill on land acquisition and rehabilitation and resettlement which shall now also cover private sector. Hence it is all the more important to analyze various nuances involved in such kind of transactions. There are three types of cost involved in acquisition of land Direct compensation, future subsistence cost for displacement of livelihood of the families and community development and welfare activities in general. The author describes accounting, recognition , measurement treatment and taxation impact on such kind of costs.

Introduction

With the growing need to grow, various industrialists in developing nations like India step forward to invest in new manufacturing facilities. One of the key requisite for this activity is Land, on which the upcoming industries will be set up. Land acquisition is a crucial driver for various infrastructures projects and economic developmental activities undertaken by the Government as well as by Private sector.

Land acquisition refers to the compulsory acquisition of land by the government from the owner of land. In India it is governed under Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Land may be acquired for defence and national security; roads, railways, highways, and ports built by public as well as private sector enterprises; planned development; residential purposes for the poor and landless, etc. This Act did not include any rehabilitation or resettlement scheme or address any Social impact on such acquisition by Government. In 2003, the Central Government formulated the National Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy, which was last updated in 2007. It provides for minimum rehabilitation and resettlement expenditure that has to be incurred by the Government machinery, though State Governments can provide for additional rehabilitation avenues. In order to facilitate the process of acquisition, many private enterprises have adopted to acquire the land through Government under the provisions of the Act.

Central Government has proposed a combined bill on Land Acquisition and Rehabilitation and Resettlement in the Parliament. The proposed bill requires all Private land acquisitions also to provide rehabilitation and resettlement to displaced people if the area of acquisition is over a certain limit.

As per the existing and proposed guidelines, there are three types of costs incurred while acquiring land:

a. Direct Compensation for the fair value of the piece of land;
b. Future subsistence cost for displacement of the livelihood of the families; and
c. Community development and welfare activities in general.

To take a practical view, following are the objectives and various cost components that are part of Jharkhand Rehabilitation and Resettlement policy – 2008:

Objectives of the Policy
1. to minimise displacement and to promote, as far as possible, non-displacing or least displacing alternatives;

2. to ensure adequate rehabilitation package and expeditious implementation of the rehabilitation process with the active participation of the affected families;

3. to ensure that special care is taken for protecting the rights of the weaker sections of society, especially members of the Scheduled Tribe and Scheduled Castes with concern and sensitivity;

4. to provide a better standard of living, making concerted efforts for providing sustainable income to the affected families;

5. to integrate rehabilitation concerns into the development planning and implementation process; and

6. where displacement is on account of land acquisition, to facilitate harmonious relationship between the requiring body and affected families through mutual cooperation.

Direct Compensation – Family specific

i. Piece of land for constructing house, free of cost

ii. Construct a permanent establishment for the displaced land owner

iii. One time financial assistance in case of the family wishes to relocate.

Future Subsistence – Family specific

i. Allowance for displacement of cattle and Employment to individuals from those family

ii. Employment to family members.

iii. If employment is not given or accepted by land owner, then regular income for sustaining life of the individual for a period of 25 to 30 years depending upon State Governments i.e. Bhatta.

iv. Percentage share in net profits of the company

Community/Infrastructure Development – General

i. Expenses on village infrastructure development such as roads, water and sewerage systems, drainage systems, education, skill development, etc.

ii. Construction of Residential colonies.

Recognition and measurement With respect to compensation cost, there is no ambiguity as it represents direct cost of acquisition based on fair market value of the piece of land.

It is Rehabilitation and Resettlement (R&R) expenditure where various practices have been observed in its recognition and measurement. Some attribute a nexus to acquisition of land and capitalise the entire expected outflow on this account. While some account the R&R cost as revenue expenditure, as and when incurred.

Accounting Policy excerpt from NTPC Limited Consolidated Financial Statements 2009

“Based on the opinions of the Expert Advisory Committee (EAC) of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI) received during the year, in respect of land in possession of the company, provision of Rs. 3,197 million has been made towards expenditure on resettlement & rehabilitation activities including the amount payable to the project affected persons (PAPs) towards land for land option, resettlement grant or other grants, providing community facilities and compensatory afforestation, greenbelt development & loss of environmental value etc. based on the Rehabilitation Action Plan (RAP) of the Company or as per the agreement with/demand letters/directions of the local authorities and the same is included in the cost of land”.

Accounting Policy excerpt from NTPC Limited Consolidated Financial Statements 2012

“Fixed assets: Deposits, payments/liabilities made provisionally towards compensation, rehabilitation and other expenses relatable to land in possession are treated as cost of land.”

Accounting Policy excerpt from Coal India Limited Annual Report 2012

“Land: Value of Land includes cost of acquisition and Cash rehabilitation expenses and resettlement cost incurred for concerned displaced persons. Other expenditure incurred on acquisition of land viz. compensation in lieu of employment, etc are, however, treated as revenue expenditure.”

Looking at the compensation structure in acquisition of land, it seems to be similar to acquisition of Spectrum, which requires initial license fee and regular revenue share to the government with minimum committed every year.

In fact, the analogy also holds good in case of acquisitions of definite life assets such as Mine, Coal or an Oil Block. In these cases, since the assets are not in ready to use condition at the first instance. Government allots them at nominal value with limit on its capital exploration expenditure, as seen in case of Oil& Gas exploration. Once the asset is ready to use, there is a regular fee/royalty/revenue share based on production on an annual basis till the useful resource is depleted.

This analogy is drawn on following counts:

i. Both, the assets, ie Spectrum in specific, as well as Land, have indefinite useful life.

ii. The compensation for both types of asset acquisition is split into 3 categories

iii)immediate compensation at the time of acquisition to secure right to use the asset and
–    sustaining expenditure, in case of spectrum, it is on usage of spectrum over its life and in case of land it is R&R expenditure i.e. subsistence cost for every subsequent year’s livelihood.

–    The utilisation of natural resource also requires certain rehabilitation expenditure such as mine rehabilitation, maintenance of flaura & fauna of the place and other environmental obligations on sustaining basis.

Let us understand the facets of concerns and issues involved in measurement and recognition for accounting of various components of such rehabilitation and resettlement cost.

Recognition and Measurement:

From the accounting perspective, the following two issues arise with regard to the R&R expenditure:

i)    The timing of the creation of the provision for R&R expenditure; and
ii)    The corresponding debit in respect of the provision, i.e., whether the same should be capitalised or recognised as an expense in the statement of profit and loss.

There is no specific literature for the given case except from the Technical guide on Accounting for Special Economic Zones (SEZs) Development Activities.

It states that “in accordance with the above principles of recognition of provision as enunciated in AS 29, the provision for R & R expenditure should be created and accounted for as follows:

(i)    In respect of the R&R expenditure which arises on the acquisition of land as the lump-sum or annuity payment to be made by a Developer to the land seller, provision should be created at the time of the acquisition of the land itself. This is because the Developer has present obligation in this regard at the time of the acquisition of the land itself and the other two criteria for recognition are normally met at that point of time. The amount in respect of the provision should be capitalised as a part of the cost of the land. Similarly, provision should be created at the time of acquisition of land in respect of the other R&R expenditure with regard to which the Developer has a present obligation which cannot be avoided by the Developer by a future action.

Such expenditure should also be capitalised as part of the cost of land.

(ii)    Where a provision is not related to any asset, to be recognised as the asset of the Developer, for example, R&R incurred with respect to those assets which will not be recognised by the Developer because he would not be the owner of these assets as these will be transferred to the local area administrators, for example, village panchayats, the same should be recognised in the statement of profit and loss when the provision in this regard is made.

(iii)The R&R expenses, which are revenue in nature, e.g., revenue expenditure in respect of Education and Health Programmes, should be recognised in the statement of profit and loss for the period in which the criteria for making the provision in this regard are met.

The Acquirer has present obligation in this regard at the time of the acquisition of the land itself, there is high probability of outflow of resources to settle the obligation and a reliable estimate can be made at that point of time. These are essentially the three criteria with regard to the timing of the creation of the provision, Accounting Standard (AS) 29, Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets.”

The Technical guide as referred above, requires all direct and indirect expenditure i.e. Compensation as well as subsistence cost, to be capitalised with the Cost of Land. For Community related expenditure, it however suggests to recognise a separate asset if the expenditure is incurred for creation of a capital asset ie roads, hospitals, buildings, etc and charge to income statement if the expenditure is for health programs and other such Corporate social responsibility measures, as and when incurred.

It is to note that all the three types of expenditure (ie direct compensation of fair value, subsistence cost and community development) is incurred only for acquiring the Land and hence there is direct nexus of such expenditure with the asset in balance sheet. It is within the direct framework of AS 10 Fixed assets to capitalise direct compensation cost to Cost of land, however, capitalising future subsistence expenditure to cost of Land seems to be little unreasonable.

Expert advisory Opinion:

Provision towards resettlement and rehabilitation schemes (Compendium of Opinions — Vol. XXVIII)

The querist had sought an opinion on recognition and measurement of expenditure incurred/to be incurred while acquiring land of project purposes.

The Committee opined as follows:

(a)In respect of the estimated amount payable to the land oustees in respect of ‘Land for Land’, re-habilitation/ resettlement grants, subsistence grant/ self-resettlement grant, a provision, on the basis of best estimate of the expenditure required to settle the obligation, should be made on the acquisition of land from the project affected persons.

(b)    In respect of infrastructural measures, a provision on the basis of best estimate of the expenditure re-quired to settle the obligation, should be made on the acquisition of land from the project affected persons.

The recognition criteria for provision is dependent on an Obligating event. The committee has considered the acquisition of Land as the obligating event for recognising a provision for future subsistence cost as well as Community development/Infrastructure related cost.

Looking at the larger picture, following aspect may be evaluated for considering the substance, while applying the recognition and measurement principles for R&R expenditure:

In a growing economy which has natural resources and tribal population residing in interior rural India, setting up a manufacturing plant requires following five major partners:

1.    Businessmen, i.e., Promoter with equity and vi-sion;
2.    Banks to support the additional capital;
3.    Government to allow use of the country’s re-sources (some having definite and some indefi-nite life)
4.    People who own a perpetual/indefinite life asset, i.e., Land; and last but not the least
5.    Environment/nature itself.

Establishment of any project in backward rural areas is possible only if it benefits all. Government Policy plays a crucial role in combining and serving the interest of all parties and executing the project.

While Promoters with equity investment earn profits from an ongoing business, Lenders earn their share of profit in terms of fixed service cost since they part their money only for short period.

Government initially recovers a fair value of the natural resource but since some of them have in-definite life, it also charges on-going basis, a share in its profits as in case of spectrum usage in Telecom i.e. Revenue Share, Revenue share in Oil & Gas and Royalty in case of mines.

Similar to Government, people who have been living and earning their livelihood also possess and own an asset with indefinite life. In order to obtain their consent, a similar policy is followed wherein they initially get the fair value of their asset and continue to earn the share of business profits for their balance life.

Their contribution to the business is more than Lenders as they have a right to share the profits in a fixed form like “Bhatta” or Share in profits till plant operation, in perpetuity as per the regulations promulgated by the State Governments. This partnership with people promises a regular income to the owner of land which is similar to the revenue share in case of Spectrum Usage, Revenue share and Royalty.

In the above presented partnership, the cost of acquisition as well as future expenditure obligations is known, but then there is no need to create a provision/capitalisation on Day 1 for the Promoter for his future share of profits, for the lender/banker for its committed interest service, Government for its future estimated royalties based on estimated business cashflows, then why should there be a provision and capitalization (in land) of future subsistence cost in case of displaced landowners !!.

Excerpts from AS 29: Provisions, Contingent Liabili-ties and Contingent assets

14. A provision should be recognised when:

(a)    an enterprise has a present obligation as a result of a past event;
(b)    it is probable that an outflow of resources embodying economic benefits will be required to settle the obligation; and

(c)    a reliable estimate can be made of the amount of the obligation.

Analysing the above requirement of the standard, all the components of R&R costs arise on account of signing an agreement with the land owners for acquiring their land and hence at any subsequent reporting date, an enterprise has obligation on account of the past event i.e. signing the land acquisition contract. However, some of the expenses are arguably not the present obligation but are future obligations.

It is probable that the obligation will lead to out-flow of resources but reliable estimate may not be done for cases that require sharing of future profits. The future estimates are though available with the Company as they are shared with various analysts, it may not be completely reliable, though contrary view exists.

Further, the future obligations under Indian GAAP are recorded at its full value instead of using dis-counted approach. In any case, if such costs are considered as part of capital costs, the actual share in profit for every year will lead to adjustment to the cost of land, which the entity will have to keep a tab till the life of asset. It is more cumbersome under IFRS, which requires use of present value principles for making a provision.

As we have broadly categorised various expenditure components of R&R cost into Compensation, Future subsistence and Community Development.

The first category that includes viz..cost of piece of land for constructing house, free of cost, construct a permanent establishment for the displaced land owner, one time financial assistance in case of the family wishes to relocate, satisfy all the three criteria for provision under AS 29 and also has a direct established nexus for acquisition of land. Thus a provision is made and amount is capitalised with the cost of Land in case of payments to landowners.

Commitments for schools, hospitals, etc. be owned by the Company but for the benefit of people are recognised as fixed assets as and when constructed, CSR activities are expensed as and when incurred. Unfinished work forms part of Commitments disclosure in Balance Sheet.

It is the cost that is in the nature of future subsis-tence that needs to be recognised and measured with its substance rather than form.

Taxation impact

Any cost capitalised as part of land is a capital cost. There is no depreciation benefit available to the Company, though the cost of land increases and the company can avail higher cost at the time of sale of such land. However, it is to note that the Company has not acquired the land for disposal, hence the cost incurred on land is essentially a sunk cost which yields no tax benefit.

Considering the tax perspective, the company sharing percentage profit every year with land owners, will not be allowed to consider as a revenue expenditure if the Company had to provide for and capitalise the entire future profits along with the cost of land.

No depreciation benefit and no direct allowable ex-pense benefit is available in income tax computation for such cost. Thus entities will have to carefully determine its accounting policy.

Points of relevance

a.    The Land is for a specific usage as per the policy of the State Government.
b.    It can be observed that the Future subsistence costs are in the nature of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) which are incurred by the Company and moreso governed by Statute.
c.    Some costs are not compensation for land but for future subsistence of displaced people till the plant is in operation and have direct nexus with Operations of the plant. For example, if the company is shut down, there will be no employment, if there is not profit, there is no share of profit.
d.    Some are in the nature of regular taxes levied by stature such as property taxes. In case of R&R these are regular income to land owners in the form of Bhatta.
e.    If the landowner agrees for employment, the amount of salary is charged to the income statement, but if he agrees for fixed income without employment, then it gets linked towards cost of land and not for future right to use on annual basis like property taxes.
f.    Payments made on account of future subsistence, if capitalised with the cost of land, then it may not be allowed as expenditure in income statement which is not the case with “Revenue share” and “Royalty”.
g.    Acquiring the land is in substance similar to a Purchase order issued by a company for future subsistence cost. Thus the obligating event is de-ferred to respective future period for provisioning.

Views that emerge
Immediate cost that is compensating the landowners immediate needs to be capitalised with cost of land.

Subsistence allowance which is committed by the Company at the time of acquisition of land is a binding commitment towards land owners. The Obligating event ie acquisition of land only gives rise to a commitment for future and should be viewed as a period cost charged to operations. Especially for clauses such as share of profits, where even determination of profit may not be a reliable estimate, though alternate view exists.

Similar to telecom and hydrocarbon businesses, land acquisition also is regulated for specific usage and regular subsistence cost based on earning. Hence recognising the future subsistence cost component in substance to be considered as part of income state-ment, as one of the charges for the usage of asset. This would to be more in line with comparative asset acquisitions (ie Spectrum, Mine, Oil & Gas) followed by enterprises and also justifies its core substance. Unrecognised commitment can be disclosed as off-balance sheet item under ‘Contractual Commitments’.

[2013] 40 taxmann.com 91 (Mumbai) Antwerp Diamond Bank NV vs. ADIT A.Y. 2005-06, Dated: 4 September 2013

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Article 7, 11 of India-Belgium DTAA – (i) interest paid by Indian branch of foreign bank deductible for computing profit attributable to PE; (ii) interest paid by branch to HO being payment to self, no taxable income in hands of HO.

Facts:
The taxpayer was Indian branch of a Belgian bank. During the relevant assessment year, the taxpayer had made payments to its Head Office (“HO”) towards interest on subordinate debts and term borrowing and had claimed the interest as an expense of the branch. The said interest was offered for taxation in the hands of the HO in terms of Article 11 of India-Belgium DTTA.

Relying on the decision in ABN AMRO Bank NV vs. ADIT [2005] 97 ITD 89, the AO disallowed interest paid to the HO. CIT(A) confirmed the order of the AO.

Held:
The decision relied on by the AO and CIT(A) has been reversed in Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corpn. vs. DDIT [2012] 136 ITD 66 (Mum.) (SB), which was in the context of India-Japan DTAA. The Tribunal in Sumitomo case held that although interest paid to the HO by Indian branch (which constitutes PE in India) is not deductible as expenditure under the domestic law being payment to self, the same is deductible while determining the taxable profit attributable to the PE in India in terms of DTAA. As per the domestic law, the said interest, being payment to self, cannot give rise to taxable income in India in the hands of HO. The same position also applies to payment of Interest by Indian branch of a foreign bank to its sister branch offices abroad.

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Exemption – Schedule D amended

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Notification No. VAT 1513/CR 106/Taxation 1 dated 24-12-2013

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Audit Report to be filed by developers for F.Y. 2012-13 Trade Circular No. 1T dated 04-01-2014 & 2T dated 07-01-2014

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Developers other than those opting for Composition Scheme are given one more month after due date to file MVAT audit report in Form 704. Thus, if audit report is filed on or before 15th February, 2014 then penalty u/s. 61 shall not be imposed.

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Sunder Deep Education Society vs. ACIT In the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal Delhi Bench ‘ G’ New Delhi Before Rajpal Yadav (J. M.) and T. S. Kapoor (A. M.) ITA No. 2428/Del/2011 Assessment Year: 2007-08. Decided on 6th December, 2013 Counsel for Assessee / Revenue: Rakesh Gupta / N. Srivastava

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Sections 11, 12 and 68 – Failure to present donors on being summoned – Donations cannot be taxed as income under section 68.

Facts
The assessee is registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and u/s. 12AA of the Income tax Act, 1961. It also enjoys exemption u/s. 80G. The assessee runs educational institutions conducting various professional courses. In respect of the voluntary contribution aggregating to Rs. 1.97 crore received during the year, the assessee was not able to produce the donors when summoned by the AO who, as claimed by the assessee, had made the said donations. Therefore, the AO held that the same were anonymous and unexplained cash credit and added the said amount as the assessee’s total income as per section 115BBC and section 68.

Before the CIT(A) the assessee submitted the name and address of the persons who had made donations alongwith other particulars prescribed by the Act. The CIT(A) agreed that the donations could not be treated as ‘anonymous’. However, according to him, since the assessee could not prove the donations amount of Rs. 1.97 crore the same was treated as unaccounted income by him and brought to tax u/s. 11(4) read with section 68/69/69C. Before the tribunal, the revenue did not challenge the CIT(A)’s finding that the donations were not anonymous but contended that as held by the CIT(A), the same were taxable u/s. 68 and 69 as income from other sources and the benefit of section 11 and 12 would not be available to the assessee.

Held
The tribunal referred to the decision of the Delhi tribunal in the case of Shri Vivekanand Education & Welfare Society (ITA No. 2592 / Del / 2012) which was based on the decision of the Delhi high court in the case of DIT(Exem) vs. Keshav Social & Charitable Trust (278 ITR 152) where the Court observed that the fact that complete list of donors was not filed or that the donors were not produced, does not necessariiy lead to the inference that the assesse was trying to introduce un-accounted money by way of donation receipts. The Court further observed that as the assesse had disclosed the donation as income, the provisions of section 68 cannot be applied. Applying the ratio, the tribunal held that the said receipts of Rs. 1.97 crore would be governed by the provisions of sections 11 and 12 of the Act and if 85% thereof is applied towards the objects of the trust, then the income assessable would be nil.

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Service Tax on services provided by Resident Welfare Association Circular No. 175/1/2014-ST dated 10th January, 2014

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Vide this Circular clarifications have been provided regarding certain doubts raised over the scope of the exemption & CENVAT Credit available to RWA to its own members under the negative list approach.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 124 dated 21st April, 2014

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Press Note No. 1 (2014 series) D/O IPP dated 8th January, 2014

Notification No. FEMA. 296/2014-RB dated 3rd March, 2014, vide G.S.R. No. 270(E) dated 7th April 2014

Foreign Direct Investment in Pharmaceuticals sector – clarification

This circular states that, with immediate effect, the ‘non-compete’ clause will not be permitted in the case of FDI in Pharmaceuticals sector, except with FIPB approval. Hence, whenever parties want to incorporate the ‘non-compete’ clause in their agreements FDI will have to be under the Approval Route.

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S/s. 43(6), 50 – The term `acquired’ used in section 50 is not synonymous with acquisition of title to the property. Use of asset is not a condition for availing the benefits of section 50. In a case where amounts are paid and registration had been complete, though possession was not received, it can be said that the assessee has acquired the property for the purpose of section 50.

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6. ITO vs. D. Chetan Kumar & Co.
ITAT  Mumbai `D’ Bench
Before Rajendra (AM) and Dr. S. T. M. Pavalan (JM)
ITA No. 6886/Mum/2011
Assessment Year : 2008-09.                                      
Decided on:  5th March, 2014.
Counsel for revenue/assessee: Sanjeev Jain/Hiro Rai.

S/s. 43(6), 50 – The term `acquired’ used in section 50 is not synonymous with acquisition of title to the property. Use of asset is not a condition for availing the benefits of section 50. In a case where amounts are paid and registration had been complete, though possession was not received, it can be said that the assessee has acquired the property for the purpose of section 50.

Facts:

The assessee had, vide agreement dated 05-04-2007, sold business premises, whose stamp duty value was Rs. 48,47,850, for a consideration of Rs. 39,00,000. Depreciation was claimed on the premises sold and they constituted part of block of asset. The assessee had purchased two new galas vide agreements dated 28-03-2008 for Rs. 27,28,462 and Rs. 12,71,538. The building in which the galas were situated were under construction and possession of these galas was not with the assessee as on 31-03-2008.

The Assessing Officer held that since the possession of new galas purchased were not with the assessee as on 31–03-2008, they could not be said to be forming part of block of assets for financial year 2007-08 and therefore when the sale consideration of the property sold is reduced from the block of assets, the block would cease to exist and the sale consideration in excess of the opening written down value would be taxed u/s. 50. Since the stamp duty value was not disputed by the assessee, the AO adopted stamp duty value to be the sale consideration. He charged Rs. 47,69,046 as short term capital gains.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who held that a reading of Clause (c) of section 43(6) would reveal that the written down value had to be adjusted by actual cost of any asset falling within the block acquired during the year. The assessee had purchased two galas and the entire amount of Rs. 40 lakh had been paid, registration had been completed, therefore, the assessee had acquired the assets as per section 43(6)(c). The term used in section 50 was “acquired during he previous year”. Referring to the decision of the jurisdictional Tribunal in the case of Orient Cartons Ltd. (60 ITD 87), he held that the use of the asset was not a condition precedent for making an adjustment in block of asset. There was no explicit requirement in the statutory provision to the effect that the new asset should also be used in a business carried on by the assessee and that if there was no business carried on by him, the deduction could not be given. He also held that the word “acquired” in section 50 was of a very amorphous word and the acquisition of the property in that section was not synonymous with acquisition of title to the property. Accordingly, he held that the assessee had acquired the premises within the meaning of section 50 of the Act and therefore was entitled for adjustment of cost of the property with that of WDV of the block of assets for the purposes of capital gains. He allowed the appeal filed by the assessee. Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:

The Tribunal noted that a similar view had been taken in the case of Lalbhai Kalidas & Co. Ltd. (ITA No. 5832/Mum/2011, AY 2007-08 dated 08-11-2013). Following the said decision, the Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A) on this ground. This ground of appeal of the revenue was dismissed.

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2014 (33) STR 704 (Tri- Kolkata) Sen Brothers vs. CCE, Bolapur

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Whether penalty u/s. 76 would be leviable where service tax was deposited along with interest before issuance of show cause notice? Held, no.

Facts:
The appellant provided taxable services of commercial or industrial construction services and manpower recruitment agency service. The appellant was registered under Service Tax and was filing Service Tax returns. Due to the acute shortage of funds, the Appellant could not deposit the Service Tax. The department initiated proceedings for the non-payment of taxes. Later on, the appellant deposited Service Tax along with interest. A show cause notice was issued demanding service tax, interest and penalty u/s. 76.

According to the appellant, when the Service Tax along with interest was deposited before issuance of the show cause notice, then issuance of SCN itself was not warranted and further imposition of penalty u/s. 76 also was not called for in view of section 73(3) of the Finance Act, 1994. The Appellant relied on the decision of the Karnataka High Court in CCE, ST, LTU, Bangalore vs. Adecco Flexione Workforce Solution Ltd. 2012 (26) STR 3 (Kar) for issue of SCN post deposit of service tax with interest and also relied on the decision of the Karnataka High Court in case of Comm. of ST vs. Master Kleen – 2012 (25) STR 439 (Ka.) for non-imposition of penalty u/s. 76 where service tax was deposited with interest and intimation was given to department. In both the cases, the High Court held that if the assessee has paid service tax along with interest before issuance of SCN, the department should not waste its time in issuing SCN.

Held:
The Tribunal relying on the above stated decisions of the High Court held that where Service Tax was deposited along with interest before the issuance of SCN, penalty u/s. 76 was not invokable.

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2014 (33) STR 701 (Tri- Ahmd) Patel Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCE, Rajkot

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Whether service would be applicable on the toll collection on highways under the category of business auxiliary service? Held, no.

Facts:
The Appellant collected toll charges from the users of highways. The department demanded service tax under business auxiliary services on the entire collection of toll. The appellant relied upon the judgement in Intertoll India Consultants (P) Ltd -2011 (24) STR 611 (Tri-Delhi) and contended non-applicability of service tax on toll collections.

Held:
The Tribunal relying upon the above stated decision held that the ratio laid down was squarely applicable to the present case and set aside the demand.

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2014 to (33) STR 711 ( Tri-Bang.) Freightlinks International (I) Pvt Ltd vs. CCEC& ST, Cochin

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Whether an Order-in-Original which does not consider or discuss various decisions cited by assessee and provides no finding regarding invocation of extended period and penalty imposition is a no speaking order? Held, yes. Matter remanded.

Facts:
The appellant was a steamer agent for a shipping company and also used to book space in the ships belonging to other companies and was collecting ocean freight from customers on behalf of the principal as well as from other shipping companies. The department took the view that service tax should have been paid on the ocean freight and confirmed the demand of service tax. The appellant argued that the lower authorities did not consider their submissions on judicial pronouncement available on the same set of facts in the case of Gudwin Logistics vs. CCE – 2010 (18) STR 348 (Tri-Ahmed), also not offered any explanation on invocation of extended period of limitation and levied penalties without any reasoning.

Held:
The Tribunal observed that the appellant in its written submission and in personal hearing relied upon number of case laws which were not at all considered by the lower authorities in the Order-in-Original. In view of the absence of findings in relation to the applicability of services tax, invocation of extended period of limitation, imposition of penalties, the Tribunal remanded the case to pass a considered and well reasoned order.

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2014 (33) STR 696 (Tri-Ahmd.) Essar Projects (India) Ltd. vs. Comm. C. Ex & ST, Rajkot

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Whether the value of free supply material be included in the gross amount charged for the purpose of calculation of Service Tax in respect of contracts executed prior to 7th July 2009? Held, no.

Facts:
The appellant entered into two contracts with its customer on 24-08-2007. One of the contracts was for supply of equipment and materials (supply contract) and the other one was for the construction/erection/ installation of the plant (construction contract). In addition, the customer also procured imported equipment and materials which were also supplied to the appellant. The department contended that as per Rule 3(1) of the Works Contract (the Composition Scheme for payment of Service Tax) Rules 2007 gross amount for the purpose of payment of Service Tax should include the value of the cost of free supplied material and accordingly service tax demand was issued on the value of free supplied material.

Held:
The Tribunal relying on the clarification issued by the CBEC Circular No. 150/1/2012-ST dated 08-02-2012 held that Rule 3(1) of the Works Contract Rules, 2007 was applicable to contracts entered after 07-07-2009 and not to ongoing contracts and accordingly held that service tax would not be applicable on the value of the free supplied material.

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2014 (33) S.T.R. 514 (Tri-Mumbai) Talera Logistics Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Pune-III

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Whether on facts of the case, the storage of spare parts for motor vehicles/their transportation/dispatch etc. would be treated as Clearing and Forwarding Agent’s Service? Held, yes.

Facts:
The appellant’s services to M/s. Ford India Ltd. were considered Clearing and Forwarding Agent’s Services by the department. However, according to the appellant, they were business support services. The spare parts of motor vehicles were kept in the godown of Ford who would manufacture motor vehicles. Further, the computers were provided to the appellant for their day-to-day operations and the appellant was not engaged in arranging transport for receiving or dispatching goods. Since the appellant was under the bonafide belief that their activities did not fall under the Clearing and Forwarding Agent’s Services, the appellant contested invocation of extended period of limitation. Demands were computed on the basis of bills raised and not on the basis of receipt. Since the appellant did not collect service tax, extension of cum duty benefit was pleaded for.

The department in terms of the agreement between the appellant and Ford, the appellant was engaged in receiving service parts, packing, etc., carry out inventory control, to maintain customer relations, to do distribution, handling shipping, documentation and outbound transportation etc. Thus, the activities were essentially in the nature of Clearing and Forwarding Services. Further, since there was no registration at Tamil Nadu and the appellant had centralised registration at Pune, the case was within the jurisdiction of the Pune Commissionerate. Since the appellant had not paid service tax and filed returns, the appellant had suppressed the facts with intention to evade service tax.

Held:
Considering the activities were to receive goods, warehouse the goods, receive and arrange dispatches, maintaining records for delivery etc. and the provisions of law, it was held that the services were Clearing and Forwarding services and not business support services. Further, the delayed registration, non-payment, non-filing of returns and disputing service tax liability at a later date post registration were the core reasons proving suppression of facts and wilful intention to evade tax. Therefore, the extended period of limitation and penalty was held justified. Since all payments were received though belatedly, the delay in receipt would not affect service tax liability except shifting of dates. Since the amounts collected were for various components of services, it could not be considered as inclusive of service tax and therefore even benefit of cum duty was not extended.

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2014 (33) S.T.R. 522 (Tri.-Del.) DCM Engineering Products vs. Commissioner. Of C. Ex. & S. T., Chandigarh-II

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Whether service tax paid for insurance of company’s vehicles used by senior officials of the company for official work and for commuting between residence and factory eligible CENVAT Credit? Held, yes.

Facts:
The appellant, a manufacturer of Iron Castings had a factory in a remote area. They provided vehicles to their senior officials to commute between residence and factory. The appellant availed CENVAT Credit of service tax paid on insurance of such vehicles. Taking a view that there is no nexus between such insurance services and manufacturing activity, the department denied CENVAT Credit on insurance services.

Held:
Tribunal observed that the vehicles were used for company’s work as well as for commutation of senior officials and it was not a welfare activity but was an activity related to business and therefore, CENVAT was held admissible.

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[2014] 43 taxmann.com 34 (Gujarat) Central Excise vs. Inductotherm India (P.) Ltd.

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Whether the exporter-manufacturer is entitled to CENVAT Credit in respect of cargo handling service under rule 2(l) of Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 (CCR) being input service used up to “place of removal.” Held, yes.

Facts:
The assessee, manufacturer – exporter claimed CENVAT credit in respect of cargo handling services. The department denied the credit on the ground that, in absence of express mention of such service in the definition Clause in Rule 2(l) of CCR, the same cannot be termed as “input service”. Both the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal held in favour of the assessee. Before the High Court, Revenue contended that cargo handling service cannot be treated as input service since the place of removal cannot be said to be the port of shipment. The question before the High Court was that, whether the input credit of Service Tax paid by the assessee-respondent on the cargo handling service would be admissible and whether the same would fall under the purview of the definition of “input service.”

Held:
The Hon’ble High Court observed that the cargo handling service is rendered on clearance of the final product from the port for the purpose of export. In light of the various decisions rendered in this area, the High Court adopted such interpretation to hold that in case of export of the final product, place of removal would be the port of shipment and not factory gate and therefore, the manufacturer would be entitled to avail the amount claimed towards cargo handling as ‘input service’ under the CENVAT Credit Rules. Considering the expression used in the ‘means’ part of the definition of “input service” in Rule 2(l) of CCR, i.e., it includes services used by the manufacturer directly or indirectly in or in relation to manufacture of the final product and in relation to the clearance of the final product from the place of removal, High Court held that, the definition is very wide in its expression, since number of services used by manufacturer are included in the same, whether used directly or indirectly.

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[2014] 43 taxmann.com 257 (Madras) CCE vs. Rajshree Sugars & Chemicals Ltd.

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Whether, accumulated CENVAT Credit of one unit can be utilised for discharging duty liability of another unit, if both the units in fact constitute single factory and had erroneously obtained two different registration certificates in the past? Held, yes.

Facts:
The assessee, a manufacturer in sugar was running two units viz. the sugar unit and the distillery unit situated in the same premises adjacent to each other. The assessee had obtained separate registration certificates in respect of both the units, although both units are under one management. The by-products arising on the manufacture of sugar in the sugar unit, namely, molasses was again used by the assessee in the manufacture of Ethyl Alcohol in the distillery unit. The assessee cleared molasses on payment of duty and availed credit of the same for the distillery unit for payment of duty on the dutiable Ethyl Alcohol. Over a period of time, there was huge accumulation of credit in the distillery unit and the same remained unutilised. Thereafter, the assessee requested the department to grant a single registration in respect of both the units and on getting the same, it sought to utilise the unutilised credit in respect of the distillery unit against the duty payable on the manufactured sugar.

The department denied credit on the ground that, there is no provision for transfer of unutilised CENVAT Credit of one registered unit to another registered unit. It further denied the CENVAT benefit on the grounds that credit of duty paid against molasses cannot be utilised for payment of duty paid against sugar since sugar was not manufactured in the distillery unit.

Held:
The High Court observed that, (i) the sugar unit and the distillery unit belonged to the self-same management and they are in the same premises. (ii) the resultant molasses from the manufacture of sugar on which duty was paid and credit was claimed was used by the assessee in the manufacture of denatured Ethyl Alcohol which is a dutiable product. (iii) although in respect of two activities, it had maintained two accounts, yet, it related to the business of the same assessee in respect of two activities, which are interconnected too. In the circumstances the High Court held that, the mere taking of a single registration as against the two registrations, would not imply that there was a merger or amalgamation or transfer to hold that the assessee would not be entitled to any credit adjustment on the duty payable on the sugar manufactured. Both before and after the so called transfer, the same management continued to be in charge of both the units and hence the alleged credit is available. The High court further observed that the credit of duty allowed in respect of any input be utilised towards the payment of duty on any other final product, is available irrespective of whether such inputs have been used actually in the manufacture of such a final product. The only condition is that the inputs should have been received and used in the factory. Hence, the revenues appeal was dismissed.

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[2014] 43 taxmann.com 363 (Madras) CST vs. Sangamitra Services Agency

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Whether, reimbursement of expenses paid by Principal to C&F Agent on actual basis are includible in the value of clearing and forwarding service? Held, no.

Facts:
The issue before the High Court was, whether various charges towards freight, labour, electricity, telephone etc, which were reimbursed by the principal to the C & F Agent on the basis of actuals, were required to be added to the value of the taxable service in relation to the clearing and forwarding services provided by a C&F agent of the Principal.

On behalf of the respondent, nobody represented the matter. The Revenue contended that, in terms of the provisions of Rule 6(8) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994, the value of taxable service in relation to the services provided by the Clearing and Forwarding Agent to the client for rendering services of the Clearing and Forwarding operations, in any manner, shall be deemed to be the gross amount of remuneration or commission (by whatever name called) paid to such agent by the client, engaging such agent and considering this, the charges collected towards freight, labour, electricity, telephone etc., in connection with the Clearing and Forwarding Services, would form part of the remuneration/commission.

Held
Rejecting the revenue’s contention, the Hon’ble High Court held that the gross amount referred to in Rule 6(8) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 would apply to receipts of such sum, which would bear the character of remuneration or commission in that. In the absence of any material to show the understanding between the Principal and the Client that the commission payable by the principal was all inclusive, it is difficult to hold that the gross amount of remuneration/commission would nevertheless include expenditure incurred by the assessee providing the services; that all incidental charges for running of the business would also form part of the remuneration or commission (by whatever name called). The phrase “by whatever name called” must necessarily have some link or reference with the nature of the receipt of remuneration or commission. Thus, if a receipt is for reimbursing the expenditure incurred for the purpose per se, would not justify that the same had the character of the remuneration or commission.

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2014 (33) STR 621 (Guj) Comm. Of C. Ex & Cust. Ahmedabad-III vs. Fine Care Biosystems

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Whether CBEC Circulars/Instructions which are administrative in nature are binding on the department? Held, yes.

Facts:
The department preferred an appeal against an Order of CESTAT dated 14-07-2007 rejecting appeal filed by the department. The issue involved was the demand of refund of Rs. 89,476/- sanctioned by the Tribunal under Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.

The department filed this appeal challenging the order passed by the CESTAT and on 25-02-2010 by way of an order the High Court formulated questions on the issue. The CBEC on 20-10-2010 issued Circular/ Instruction F. No. 390/Misc./163/2010-JC providing for monetary limits in respect of filing of appeals by the department in the Tribunal, High Court and Supreme Court. The said instruction had prescribed monetary limit of Rs. 10 lakh of tax and penalty in case appeal to be preferred by the department to the High Court. The respondent argued that, though the said Instruction was issued after the formulation of questions by the High Court in the present case, the department could not violate the CBEC instructions and since the present case is below prescribed monetary limits, department’s appeal should be dismissed.

Held:
The High Court held that the department was not authorised to prefer an appeal where the same is the below prescribed monetary limit. Though questions were framed in an earlier hearing, the High Court refrained from considering the merits of the case and dismissed the appeal as it was in violation to CBEC instructions.

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2014 (33) STR 619 (Uttarakhand) Commissioner of Central Excise, Meerut –I vs. Usha Breco Ltd.

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Whether provision of transportation service which is an ancillary to main business activity would be classified as “Tour Operator’s Service”? Held, no.

Facts:
The appellant was operating two ropeways at Haridwar at two different places. The appellant was charging fees from pilgrims for the use of the said ropeways. The distance between these two ropeways was about 3.75 kms. For those interested in using the ropeways at both places, the appellant provided transportation from one ropeway to the other by road against consideration of separate fees. The department demanded Service Tax on these fees charges for transporting pilgrims from one place of ropeway to another under “Tour Operator Service.” The appellant contended that the said service was not exigible to tax under ‘Tour Operator service’ and the appellant was not a tour operator. The Tribunal held that the appellant could not be regarded as tour operator as the transportation was not a main business of the appellant.

Held:
Since there was no change in the facts and these were considered by the Tribunal, the High Court declined to interfere and dismissed the appeal filed by the department.

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2014 (33) STR 609 (All) A C L Education Centre (P) Ltd vs. UOI

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Is Rule 5A(2) of STR 1994 which prescribes for an access by authorised officer for verification etc. and for submission of records by assessee for Service Tax Audit ultra vires? Held, no.

Facts:
The Excise Department had issued intimations on various dates under Rule 5A(2) of STR 1994 calling for certain documents for conducting the EA-2000 audit. The appellant challenged the said intimations on the vires/legality of the said intimations under the ground that the same were contrary to the provisions of section 72 of the Finance Act. The appellant further argued that, the said Rule was arbitrary and it did not provide for details like the period of audit, the qualification and manner in which the said audit will be conducted, no provisions to furnish audit report to the assessee etc. The appellant also brought to the notice of the High Court that, in an identical case, the Delhi High Court in the case of Travelite India vs. UOI WP 3774 of 2013 had passed an interim order to maintain status quo.

Held:
The High Court observed that, section 72A of the Act is applicable when the assessee is not maintaining the books of accounts properly to ascertain the Service Tax liability and to determine the correct tax, the books will have to be examined and if need be, be audited by a qualified Chartered Accountant. Rule 5A only facilitates the provisions of section 72A, as Rule 5A( 2) states that every assessee shall on demand make available records, trial balance, income tax audit report to the audit party and audit will be conducted by the qualified Chartered Accountant/Cost Accountant as deputed by the Deputy Commissioner.

In view of this, it was held that, Rule 5A of STR 1994 is not ultra vires and it is in consonance to section 72A of the Finance Act and accordingly the High Court dismissed the Writ Petitions.

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2014 (33) STR 501 (Guj.) Commissioner of C. Ex. & Customs vs. Ultratech Cement Ltd.

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Whether Service Tax paid on insurance of vehicles used for the residents of worker’s residential colony is eligible input service for availment of the CENVAT Credit? Held, no.

Facts:
The respondents, cement manufacturers availed the CENVAT Credit of Service Tax paid on insurance services for the residential colony and of the vehicles specially used for travelling of workers from their colony to the factory. Placing reliance on the decision of the Delhi Tribunal in the case of M/s. Triveni Engg & Industrial Ltd. vs. CCC, Meerut, 2008 (12) S.T.R. 330, the Tribunal had upheld the assessee’s contention that the phrase “activities in relation to business” used in the inclusive part of the definition of input services was wide enough to cover such services.

Held:
The Hon’ble High Court observed the case of Commissioner vs. Gujarat Heavy Chemicals Ltd. 2011 (22) S.T.R. 610 (Guj), wherein the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court had analysed various decisions and had held that if providing residential quarters and security services was voluntary, the activities were not covered within the definition of input services and therefore, the CENVAT Credit was not available. Relying on this, the CENVAT was not allowed as not in relation to business.

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Stainless Steel vis-à-vis Rate of Tax Under MVAT Act, 2002

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Introduction

The Commissions of Sales Tax, Maharashtra, has recently issued a Circular bearing No. 11T of 2014 dated 04-04-2014, by which it is informed that the sale of stainless steel wires will be liable to tax as non-declared goods i.e., at 12.5% in residual category, due to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Bansal Wire Industries Ltd. (42 VST 372). The declared goods are covered by entry C-55 of the MVAT Act, 2002. If the goods are so covered, the tax is 5%. However, if they get excluded from above entry, the rate becomes 12.5%. Therefore, it is necessary to see the implication of above judgment and circular.

Background
The facts in this case are that the issue arose under the UP Trade Tax Act, 1948. Originally, the dealer was assessed to tax at 4% on the sale of stainless steel wires on the grounds that it is declared goods. However, the said assessment was revised, so as to levy tax on the sale of stainless steel wires at a higher rate, considering that it is not sale of declared goods.

The Hon’ble Allahabad High Court confirmed the view of the department. Therefore, the issue was raised before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

The question which was referred to the Hon’ble Supreme Court is reproduced in the judgment as under:

“Whether stainless steel wire, a product of the appellant, on a proper reading of section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act along with the qualifying words ’that is to say’ would fall under the category ’tool, alloy and special steels of any of the above categories’ enumerated in entry (ix) of Clause (iv) or under entry (xv) of same Clause (iv)?”

Consideration by Supreme Court

Hon’ble Supreme Court has analysed the position about declared goods. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has reproduced section 14(iv) of the CST Act, 1956 which enumerates declared goods. The said section is reproduced below for ready reference.

“14. Certain goods to be of special importance in inter-State trade or commerce.—It is hereby declared that the following goods are of special importance in inter-State trade or commerce,—

. . .

(iv) iron and steel, that is to say,—

(i) pig iron and cast iron including ingot moulds, bottom, plates, iron scrap, cast iron scrap, runner scrap and iron skull scrap;

(ii) steel semis (ingots, slabs, blooms and billets of all qualities, shapes and sizes);

(iii) skull bars, tin bars, sheet bars, hoe-bars and sleeper bars;

(iv) steel bars (rounds, rods, squares, flats, octagons and hexagons, plain and ribbed or twisted, in coil form as well as straight lengths);

(v) Steel structurals (angels, joists, channels, tees, sheet piling sections, Z sections or any other rolled sections);

(vi) sheets, hoops, stripe and skelp, both black and galvanised, hot and cold rolled, plain and corrugated, in all qualities, in straight lengths and in coil form, as rolled and in riveted condition;

(vii) plates both plain and chequered in all qualities; (viii) discs, rings, forgings, and steel castings;

(ix) tool, alloy and special steels of any of the above categories;

(x) steel melting scrap in all forms including steel skull, turnings and borings;

(xi) steel tubes, both welded and seamless, of all diameters and lengths, including tube fittings;

(xii) tin-plates, both hot dipped and electrolytic and tin-free plates;

(xiii) fish plates bars, bearing plate bars, crossing sleeper bars, fish plates, bearing plates, crossing sleepers and pressed steel sleepers, rails-heavy and light crane rails;

(xiv) wheels, tyres, axles and wheel sets;

(xv) wire rods and wires-rolled, drawn, galvanised, aluminised, tinned or coated such as by copper;

(xvi) defectives, rejects, cuttings or end pieces of any of the above categories.”

The Hon’ble Supreme Court has discussed the back ground of the above entry. The Supreme Court held that each sub-group in above section 14(iv) exhaustively enumerates the kinds of goods covered by each sub-group. In this respect, the Hon’ble Supreme Court referred to its earlier judgment viz; State of Tamil Nadu vs. M/s. Pyare Lal Mehrotra (1976)(1 SCC 834).

The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the stainless steel can be covered by sub-entry (ix) and therefore the items covered by (i) to (viii), if of stainless steel, they can be covered. However, the wires are mentioned in sub-entry (xv) and said entry is separate. The sub-entry (ix) being not applicable to entry (xv), the stainless steel wires cannot be covered by any of the entries in section 14(iv). The reasoning of the the Hon’ble Supreme Court is contained in para-28 of the judgment and further elaborated in para-33. Both paras are reproduced below for ready reference.

“28. The expression “of any of the above categories” appearing in entry Nos.

(ix) and (xvi) of Clause (iv) of section 14 of the Central Act would indicate that they would each be items referred in the preceding items. Therefore, even the expression “of any of the above categories” in entry No. (ix) of Clause (iv) would only relate to steel and alloy produced for any of the materials mentioned in item Nos. (i) to (viii). Thus, “stainless steel wire” produced by the appellant cannot be read into item No. (xv) which reads as “wire rods and wires-rolled, drawn, galvanised, aluminised, tinned or coated such as by copper”.

33. It is thus clear, that the language used in entry No. (ix) is plain and unambiguous and that the items which are mentioned there are “tool, alloy and special steels”. By using the words “of any of the above categories” in entry No. (ix) would refer to entries (i) to (viii) and it cannot and does not refer to entry No. (xv). However, entry (xvi) of Clause (iv) would be included in entry (xvi) particularly within the expression now therein any of the aforesaid categories. Therefore, the specific entry “tool, alloy and special steels” being not applicable to entry (xv), the contention of the counsel for the appellant has to be rejected. It is, therefore, held that the stainless steel wire is not covered within entry (ix) of Clause (iv) of section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act.”

Conclusion
The above referred circular has taken into account above mentioned observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Accordingly, it is clarified that the items made from stainless steel mentioned in subentries (x) to (xv) will not be covered u/s. 14(iv) of CST Act, 1956 i.e., they will not be considered as ‘declared goods’ and will also not be covered by entry-C-55 of the MVAT Act, 2002.Thus, the same are liable to tax at 12.5%. Some of the items affected by the above interpretation are melting scrap, skull, turnings, borings, specified tubes and tube fittings etc., if they are of the stainless steel. The stainless steel pipes will also get excluded from entry C-55 but they will be eligible to be covered by entry C-72 which is regarding pipes of all varieties. Therefore, for stainless steel pipes, the rate will still remain 5%. However, for stainless steel tubes, the rate will be 12.5%.

The judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court is binding. However, an issue still remains about interpretation of the scope of the main heading of section 14(iv) i.e., ‘iron & steel’, whether it covers stainless steel itself? Steel is not qualified by any particular quality. Therefore, it can be argued that the above heading itself covers stainless steel also. This issue is not considered in the above judgment. Therefore, the dealer community will be required to wait till some more light is thrown on the above aspect from none other than the Supreme Court itself in some future  judgment.  Till  then,  the law will be guided by the above judgment of the Supreme Court and the circular issued by the Commissioner  of  Sales  Tax  of  Maharashtra State.

In  the  circular  the  position  as  per  the  above  judg- ment  in  the  case  of  M/s.  Bansal  Wire  Industries Ltd.  (42  VST  372)  is  sought  to  be  applied  from the  date  of  judgment  i.e.,  26-04-2011.  Therefore, dealers  will  be  liable  to  pay  a  higher  rate  from the  said  date,  which  may  attract  an  unforeseen liability  for  the  past  period  from  26-04-2011.  In fact,  the  impact  of  the  above  judgment  may be  from  the  inception  of  the  section  14(iv)  and hence  revised  rate  can  apply  even  prior  to  26-04- 2011.  However,  it  is  stated  in  the  circular  that  the matter  is  referred  to  government  for  period  prior to  26-04-2011.  It  is  common  experience  that  the dealers  have  collected  tax  at  4%  and  5%  in  respective  periods,  considering  the  impugned  goods  as ‘declared  goods’.  They  are  also  assessed  accordingly.  Therefore,  it  is  genuinely  felt  that  in  spite of  the  above  judgment,  the  government  should give necessary relief by administrative measures or by  introducing  changes  in  the  entries  and  should apply  the  law  prospectively  i.e.,  from  the  current date after giving sufficient time to the dealer com- munity  to  adjust  to  new  tax  rate.  In  fact,  by  looking  at  the  importance  of  goods,  the  rate  should be  continued  at  5%  by  introducing  new  entries as  they  are  getting  out  of  the  entry  C-55  only because  of  technical  interpretation  of  the  entry. We  expect  that  the  government  will  consider  the above  situation  and  grant  necessary  relief.

Controversy: Interest on Cenvat Credit Wrongly Taken and (or) Utilised

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Background

The issue whether interest is leviable at the point of time when the CENVAT Credit is wrongly taken or at the point of utilisation has been a matter of extensive judicial considerations. Further, an important amendment was made in Rule 14 of the CENVAT Rules through Notification dated 17-03-2012. This subject was discussed in the June 2012 issue of the BCAJ in the backdrop of an important ruling of the Karnataka High Court. However, subsequent to the said ruling, divergent views have been expressed by different judicial authorities (in particular recent ruling of CESTAT – Mumbai). Hence, since the issue has become highly controversial, the same is being discussed hereafter in the backdrop of divergent judicial rulings.

Relevant Statutory Provisions

• Rule 14 of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 (“CCR”)

” Where the CENVAT Credit has been taken or utilised wrongly or has been erroneously refunded, the same along with the interest shall be recovered from the manufacturer or provider of the output service and the provisions of the sections 11A and 11AB of the Excise Act, or sections 73 and 75 of the Finance Act, shall apply mutatis mutandis for effecting such recoveries.”

[Note – The words “taken or utilised wrongly” have been substituted by the words “taken and utilised wrongly vide Notification No. 18/2012 – CE(NT) dated 17-03-12]

• Rule 4(1) of CCR

“The CENVAT credit in respect of inputs may be taken immediately on receipt of the inputs in factory of the manufacturer or premises of provider of output service………..”

• Rule 4(2) (a) of CCR

“The CENVAT Credit in respect of capital goods …….. at any point of time in a given financial year shall be taken only for an amount not exceeding 50 % of duty paid on such capital goods in the same financial year.“

• Rule 4(7) of CCR

“The CENVAT Credit in respect of input service shall be allowed, on or after the day on which payment is made of the value of input service and service tax paid or payable as indicated in Invoice…………”

Analysis of Credit ‘wrongly’ ‘taken’ / ‘utilised’

To understand the difference (if any) between the terms ‘wrongly’ ‘taken’ and ‘utilised’, the meanings attributed to these words used in Rule 14 of CCR is given hereafter for ready reference :

• ‘Taken’ means “to gain or receive into possession, to seize, to assume ownership” (Black’s Law Dictionary).
• ‘To take’, signifies “to lay hold of, grab, or seize it, to assume ownership etc.” (Advance Law Lexicon – 3rd Edition).
• ‘Utilise’ means “to make practical and effective use of” (Compact Oxford Dictionary Thesaurus).
• ‘Utilise’ means “to make use of, turn to use” (The Chambers Dictionary).
• ‘Wrongful’ – “characterised by unfairness of injustice, contrary to law” (Concise Oxford Dictionary)
• ‘Wrong’ – “any damage or injury, contrary to right, violation of right or of law” (P. Ramanatha Aiyer’s Law Lexicon)

Reversal of CENVAT Credit before Utilization – Settled Position

• In a landmark ruling in Chandrapur Magnet Wires (P) Ltd. vs. CCE (1996) 81 ELT 3 (SC), it has been held by the Supreme Court that, when the MODVAT Credit taken is reversed, it would mean that the MODVAT Credit has not been taken at all. This principle is relevant for the CENVAT Credit as well. Relevant observations of the Supreme Court are reproduced hereafter :

Para 7

In view of the aforesaid clarification by the department, we see no reason why the assessee cannot make a debit entry in the credit account before removal of the exempted final product. If this debit entry is permissible to be made, credit entry for the duties paid on the inputs utilised in manufacture of the final exempted product will stand deleted in the accounts of the assessee. In such a situation, it cannot be said that the assessee has taken credit for the duty paid on the inputs utilised in the manufacture of the final exempted product under Rule 57A. In other words, the claim for exemption of duty on the disputed goods cannot be denied on the plea that the assessee has taken credit of the duty paid on the inputs used in the manufacture of these goods.

The above stated principle laid down by the Supreme Court has been followed in a large number of cases. [For e.g. CCE vs. Ashima Dyecot Ltd. (2008) 232 ELT 580 (GUJ)].

Similarly, the said principle was also asserted by the Hon. Supreme Court in CCE, Mumbai vs. Bombay Dyeing & Mfg. Co. Ltd. 2007 (215) ELT 3 (SC) wherein it was held “whenever duty is paid on the input, the assessee is entitled to credit under CENVAT Credit Rules, 2002 however availment of credit takes place later on when the assessee makes adjustments of duty paid on input against duty paid on final product. In the present case, before the account could be debited and before the assessee could avail CENVAT Credit, assessee has reversed CENVAT Credit which would amount to the assessee not taking credit for duty paid on input. Learned counsel submitted that the assessee was free to reverse the credit before utilization of such credit.” This decision was also accepted by the Gujarat High Court in CCE vs. Dynaflex Ltd. 2011 (266) ELT 41 (Guj).

Department clarification

The CBEC had vide Circular No. 897/17/2009 – CX, dated 03-09-2009 has clarified as under:

“The Tribunal decision and the High Court judgment referred to above, was delivered in the context of erstwhile Rule 57 I of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 and that the Supreme Court order under reference is only a decision and not a judgment. Since, the Rule 14 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, is clear and unambiguous in the position that interest would be recoverable when CENVAT Credit is taken or utilised wrongly, it is clarified that the interest shall be recoverable when credit has been wrongly taken, even, if it has not been utilised, in terms of wordings of the present Rule 14.”

It may be noted that erstwhile Rule 57 I of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 did not specifically provide for any interest payment along with reversal of wrongly taken credit while present Rule 14 of CCR provides for payment of interest along with the reversal of wrongly taken credit.

Interest on Credit taken but not utilized – Judicial Views

• In CCE vs. Maruti Udyog Ltd. (2007) 214 ELT 173 (P & H)], the Hon’ble Punjab & Haryana Court agreed with the views of the Hon’ble CESTAT that the assessee was not liable to pay interest as the credit was only taken as entry in the MODVAT record and was in fact not utilised. The SLP filed by the revenue against this order of the Hon’ble Punjab & Haryana High Court was dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court (2007) 214 ELT A 50 (SC) on 10-10-2006.

In the case of Maruti Udyog, the assessee claimed the Modvat credit which was not allowable in the absence of the requisite certificate under Rule 57E of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 being produced within six months but still the assessee claimed the same and credited the amount in RG – 23A Part II. The authorities disallowed the Modvat credit relying upon judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Osram Surya (P) Limited vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Indore (2002) 142 ELT 5 (SC).

The Tribunal, however, had held that the assessee was not liable to pay interest as the credit was only taken as an entry in the Modvat record and was not in fact utilised. The Tribunal held that in absence of utilisation of credit, the assessee was not liable to pay interest.

The P & H High Court held as under :

“Learned Counsel for the appellant is unable to show as to how the  interest  will  be  required to be paid when in absence of availment of Modvat Credit in fact, the assessee was not liable to pay any duty. The Tribunal has clearly recorded a finding that the assessee did not avail of the Modvat Credit in fact and had only made an entry.

In view of this factual position, we are unable to hold that any substantial question of law arises”.

•    Attention is particularly drawn to the ruling of the Punjab & Haryana High  Court  in  the  case of Ind – Swift Laboratories Ltd. vs. UOI (2009) 240 ELT 328 (P & H), relevant extracts from which, are reproduced hereafter for reference:

Para 9

•    The Scheme of the Act and the CENVAT Credit Rules framed thereunder permit a manufacturer or producer of the final products  or a provider  of taxable service to  take  the  CENVAT  Credit in respect of duty of excise and such other duties as specified. The conditions for allowing the CENVAT Credit are contained in Rule 4 of  the Credit Rules contemplating that the CENVAT Credit can be taken immediately on receipt of the inputs in the factory of  the  manufacturer or in the premises of the provider of output service. Such CENVAT Credit can be utilised in terms of Rule 3(4) of Credit Rules  for payment of any duty of excise on any final product  and  as contemplated in the aforesaid sub-rule. It, thus, transpires that the CENVAT credit is the benefit of duties leviable or paid as specified in Rule 3(1) used in the manufacture of intermedi- ate products etc. In other  words,  it  is  a  credit of the duties already leviable or paid. Such credit in respect of duties already paid can be adjusted for payment of duties payable under the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. U/s. 11AB of the Act, liability to pay interest arises     in respect of any duty of excise has not been levied or paid or has been short levied or short paid or erroneously refunded from the first day of the month in which the duty ought to have been paid. Interest is leviable if duty of  excise has not been levied or paid. Interest can be claimed or levied for the reason that there is delay in the payment of duties. The interest is compensatory in nature as the penalty is charge- able separately.

Para 10

•    In Pratibha Processors vs. Union of India, 1996
(88)  ELT  12  (SC)  =  (1996)  11  SCC  101,  it  was  held that  interest  is  compensatory  in  character  and is  imposed  on  an  assessee  who  has  withheld payment  of  any  tax  as  and  when  it  is  due  and payable.  Similarly,  in  Commissioner  of  Customs vs.  Jayathi  Krishna  &  Co.  –  2000  (119)  ELT  4(SC) (2000)  9  SCC  402,  it  was  held  that  interest  on warehoused goods is merely an accessory to the principal  and  if  the  principal  is  not  payable,  so is  it  for  interest  on  it.  In  view  of  the  aforesaid principle,  we  are  of  the  opinion  that  no  liability of  payment  of  any  excise  duty  arises  when  the petitioner availed the CENVAT Credit. The liability to pay duty arises only at the time of utilisation. Even  if  the  CENVAT  Credit  has  been  wrongly taken, that does not lead to the levy of interest as a liability of payment of excise duty does not arise  with  such  availment  of  the  CENVAT  Credit by an assessee. Therefore, interest is not payable on  the  amount  of  the  CENVAT  credit  availed  of and  not  utilised.

Para 11

•    Reliance of respondents on Rule 14 of the Credit Rules that interest u/s. 11AB of the Act is payable even if the CENVAT Credit has been taken.  In our view, the said Clause  has to be read down  to mean that where the CENVAT Credit taken and utilised wrongly. Interest cannot be claimed simply for the reason that the CENVAT  credit has been wrongly taken as such availment by itself does not create any  liability  of  payment of excise duty. On a conjoint reading of section 11AB of the Act and that of Rules  3  and  4  of the Credit Rules, we hold that interest cannot  be claimed from the date of wrong availment   of the CENVAT Credit. The interest shall be pay- able from the date the CENVAT Credit is wrongly utilised.

•    In an important ruling the Supreme Court,  in  the case of Ind-Swift Laboratories Ltd. (2011)  265 ELT 3 (S.C.)], set aside the order passed by the  Punjab  &  Haryana  High  Court  (2009)  240 ELT  328  (P  &  H)]  on  the  question  of  charging interest  on  the  CENVAT  Credit  wrongly  taken, but  not  utilised.  By  interpreting  the  expressions and  words  used  in  the  provisions  of  Rule  14  of CCR,   the Supreme Court concluded that interest is  payable  on  the  CENVAT  Credit  wrongly  taken even  if  such  Credit  has  not  been  utilised.

The issue for consideration is whether an assessee can be made liable to pay interest for taking wrong credit if such credit has not been utilised inasmuch he has not derived any  benefit  out  of his wrong action.

The more important observations of the Supreme Court are reproduced hereafter for ready reference:

“17. Xxxxxxxxxx In our considered opinion, the High Court misread and misinterprets the aforesaid Rule 14 and wrongly read it down without properly appreciating the scope and limitation thereof. A statutory provision is generally read down in order to save the said provision from being declared un- constitutional or illegal. Rule 14 specifically provides that where the CENVAT Credit has been taken or utilised would be recovered from the manufacturer or the provider of the output service.  The issue is  as to whether the aforesaid word “OR”  appear- ing in Rule 14, twice,  could  be  read  as  “AND” by way of reading it down as has been done by    the High Court. If the aforesaid provision is read    as a whole we find no reason to read the word “OR” in between the expression ‘taken’ or ‘utilised wrongly’ or has been erroneously refunded’ as the word “AND”. On the happening of any of the three aforesaid circumstances such credit becomes recoverable along with interest.

18. We do not feel that any other harmonious con- struction is required to be given to the aforesaid expression/provision which is clear and unambigu- ous as it exists  all by itself. So far as section  11AB    is concerned, the same becomes relevant and ap- plicable for the purpose of making recovery of the amount due and payable. Therefore, the High Court erroneously held that interest cannot be claimed from the date of wrong availment of the CENVAT Credit and that it should only be payable from the date when the CENVAT Credit is wrongly utilised. Besides, the rule of reading down is in itself  a Rule of harmonious construction in a different name. It is generally utilised to straighten the crudities or ironing out the creases to make a statue workable. This court has repeatedly laid down that in the  garb of reading down a  provision  it  is  not  open to read words and expressions not found in the provision statute and thus venture into a kind of judicial legislation. It is also held by this Court that the Rule of reading down is to be used for the limited purpose of making a particular provision workable and to bring it in harmony with other provisions of the statute.

The interpretation made by the Honorable Supreme Court considering the specific circumstances of a case involving evasion of duty,  has been a matter  of extensive deliberation by the experts and rightly so inasmuch as, if the same is applied generally, it would mean unsettling the settled law.

•    Important judgment of Karnataka High Court in CCE & ST vs. Bill Forge  Pvt. Ltd. (2012) 26 STR 204 (KAR) [Bill Forge Case]

?  However, observations of the Karnataka High Court  in  the  Bill  Forge  case  are  very  impor- tant,  inasmuch  not  only  has  it  distinguished facts  of  the  case  of  UOI  vs.  Ind-Swift  Labo- ratories  Ltd.  (2011)  265  ELT  3  (SC)  but  it  has made  a  fine  distinction  between  making  an entry in the register and credit being ‘taken’ to  drive  home  the  point  that  interest  is  pay- able  only  from  the  date  when  duty  is  legally payable  to  the  Government  and  the  Govern- ment  would  sustain  loss  to  that  extent.

? In the Bill Forge case, the High Court referring to the Apex Court’s judgment in case of UOI vs. Ind-Swift Laboratories Ltd. observed as under:

Para 18

“In fact, in the case before the Apex Court, the assessee received inputs and capital goods from various manufacturers/dealers and availed the CENVAT Credit on the duty paid on such  materi- als. The investigations conducted indicated that the assessee had taken the CENVAT Credit on fake invoices. When proceedings were initiated, the assessee filed applications for settlement of proceedings and the entire matter was placed before the Settlement Commission. The Settlement Commission held that a sum of Rs. 5,71,47,148.00 is the  duty  payable  and  simple  interest  at  10%  on  the CENVAT  Credit  wrongly  availed  from  the  date  the duty became payable as per section 11AB of the Act till  the  date  of  payment.  The  Revenue  calculated the said interest upto the date of the appropriation of  the  deposited  amount  and  not  upto  the  date  of payment.  Therefore,  it  was  contended  that  inter- est  has  to  be  calculated  from  the  date  of  actual utilisation  and  not  from  the  date  of  availment. Therefore,  an  application  was  filed  for  clarification by  the  assessee.  The  said  application  was  rejected upholding  the  earlier  order,  i.e.  interest  is  payable from  the  date  of  duty  becoming  payable  as  per section  11AB.  Therefore,  the  Apex  Court  interfered with the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court  and  rightly  rejected  by  the  Settlement  Com- mission  as  outside  the  scope  and  they  found  fault with  the  interpretation  placed  on  Rule  14.”

“It is also to be noticed that in the aforesaid  Rule, the word ‘avail’ is not used. The words used are ‘taken’ or “utilised wrongly”. Further the said provision makes it clear that the interest shall be recovered in terms of section 11A and 11B of the Act………”

Para 20

From the aforesaid discussion what emerges is that the credit of excise duty in the register maintained for the said purpose is only a book entry.  It might  be utilised later for payment of excise duty on the excisable product……… Before utilisation of such credit, the entry has been reversed, it amounts to not taking credit.”

para 22

“Therefore interest is payable from that date though in fact by such entry the Revenue  is  not put to any loss at all. When once the wrong entry was pointed out, being convinced, the assessee has promptly reversed the entry. In other words,  he did not take the advantage of wrong entry. He did not take the CENVAT Credit or utilised the CENVAT credit. It is in those circumstances that the Tribunal was justified in holding that, when the  assessee has not taken the benefit of the CENVAT Credit, there is no liability to pay  interest.  Before  it  can be taken, it had been reversed. In other words, once the entry was reversed, it is as if that the CENVAT credit was not available. Therefore, the said judgment of the Apex Court* has no application to the facts of this case It is only when the assessee  had taken the credit, in other words by taking such credit, if he had not paid the duty which is legally  due to the Government, the Government would have sustained loss to that extent. Then the liability to pay interest from the date the amount became due arises u/s. 11AB, in order to compensate the Government which was deprived of the duty  on  the date it became due.”

•    The ruling of Karnataka High Court in Bill Forge case, has been followed in large number of subsequent decided cases For e.g.:

?  CCE  vs.  Pearl  Insulation  Ltd.  (2012)  27  STR  337 (KAR)

?  CCE vs. Gokuldas Images (P) Ltd. (2012) 28 STR 214  (KAR)

?  Sharvathy  Conductors  Pvt.  Ltd.  vs.  CCE  (2013) 31  STR  47  (Tri  –  Bang)

?  CCE  vs.  Sharda  Enargy  &  Minerals  Ltd.  (2013) 291  ELT  404  (Tri  –  Del)

?  Gary Pharmaceuticals (P) Ltd vs. CCE (2013) 297 ELT  391  (Tri  –  Del)

?  CCE  vs.  Balrampur  Chinni  Mills  Ltd.  (2014)  300 ELT  449  (Tri  –  Del)

However, in many cases, [For e.g., CCE vs. Kay Bouvei Engineering Pvt. Ltd.  (2014)  301  ELT 100  (Tri –  Mum- bai)], the Bill Forge case has not been followed and instead,  the  position  held  by  the  Supreme  Court  in Ind  Swift  case  followed.

Important amendment in Rule 14 of CCR

In  a  very  significant  amendment  in  Rule  14  of  CCR, with  effect  from  17-03-2012,  the  words  CENVAT Credit  has  been  “taken  or  utilised  wrongly”  has been  substituted  by  the  words  “taken  and  utilised wrongly”.

This amendment strongly reinforces the interpreta- tion placed by the  Punjab  &  Haryana  High  Court in Maruti Udyog & Ind Swift Laboratories and Karnataka High Court in the Bill Forge case to the effect that, no interest can be recovered in cases where the CENVAT Credit has been wrongly taken but not utilised by an assessee.

Recent  Tribunal  Ruling  in  Balmer  Lawrie  &  Co.  Ltd vs.  CCE  (2014)  301  ELT  573  (Tri  –  Mumbai)

This  ruling  is  very  important  inasmuch  as,  it  not only  distinguishes  the  Karnataka  High  Court  ruling in  the  Bill  Forge  case,  but  it  also  discusses  the applicability  of  the  amendment  in  Rule  14  of  CCR vide  Notification  dated  17-03-2012.

In  this  case,  the  appellant  is  a  manufacturer  of lubricating  oil  availing  the  Cenvat  Credit  on  various inputs  and  capital  goods  as  provided  for  under (CCR).  They  availed  the  Cenvat  Credit  amounting to  Rs.  1,61,04,675/-  of  the  CVD  paid  on  imported base  oil.  The  base  oil  so  obtained  on  which  credit was  taken,  was  returned  by  the  appellant  to  M/s. VCL  and  M/s.  Ultraplus  Lube  Pvt.  Ltd.  and  the  ap- pellant  paid  excise  duty  equivalent  to  the  credit taken  on  such  base  oil  returned.  The  department was  of  the  view  that  the  taking  of  credit  by  the appellant  was  not  permitted  under  law  inasmuch as  the  goods  were  not  intended  for  use  in  the manufacture  of  excisable  goods  and,  therefore, credit  was  not  admissible  under  CCR  ab  initio.  Ac- cordingly,  a  show  cause  notice  dated  02-06-2008 was  issued  to  the  appellant  proposing  to  recover the  credit  taken  along  with  interest  thereon  under the provisions of Rule 14 of the CCR read with Sec- tion  11A(1)  and  section  11AB  of  the  Central  Excise Act,  1944.  It  was  also  proposed  to  impose  penalty on  the  appellant  under  Rule  15  of  the  said  Rules read  with  section  11AC  of  the  said  Central  Excise Act.  The  said  notice  was  adjudicated  and  duty  de- mand was confirmed by denying the Central Excise credit  of  Rs.  1,61,04,675/-  and  interest  on  the  said credit wrongly taken was also confirmed. A penalty of equivalent amount was also imposed on the ap- pellant  under  Rule  15  of  Cenvat  Credit  Rules,  2004 read  with  section  11AC  of  the  said  Act.  In  addition, a  fine  of  Rs.  1  crore  was  imposed  on  the  goods i.e.,  base  oil  on  the  grounds  that  the  same  was liable  to  confiscation  and  hence,  fine  is  imposable u/s.  34  of  the  Central  Excise  Act,  1944.

The Learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that inasmuch as the appellant had reversed the credit taken at the time of clearance of the base   oil to M/s. VCL and Ultraplus Lube Pvt. Ltd., the question  of  reversal  of  credit  once  again  does  not arise and, therefore, the demand is not sustainable. It  was  further  pointed  out  that  the  appellant  had reflected  the  taking  of  the  Cenvat  Credit  on  base oil  received  from  VCL  in  their  monthly  ER-1  returns and,  therefore,  the  department  was  aware  of  the fact of taking of Cenvat credit by the appellant and hence  no  suppression  of  facts  on  the  part  of  the appellant could be alleged. It is also argued that the said  credit  was  available  in  the  books  of  accounts of  the  appellant  during  the  entire  period  and  the appellant  had  never  utilised  the  credit.  Therefore, the question of liability to pay any interest thereon would  not  arise  at  all.  Reliance  was  placed  on  the decisions  of  the  Hon’ble  Karnataka  High  Court  in the  case  of  CCE  &  S.T.  vs.  Bill  Forge  Pvt.  Ltd.  (2012) 26  STR  204  (KAR);  CCE  vs.  Gokaldas  Images  (P)  Ltd. (2012)  28  STR  214  (KAR);  &  CCE  vs.  Pearl  Insulation Ltd.  (2012)  27  STR  337  (KAR.)  and  the  decisions  of the  Hon’ble  High  Court  of  Allahabad  in  the  case of  CC  &  Central  Excise,  Meerut  vs.  Rana  Sugar  Ltd. (2010) 253 ELT 366 (ALL). The Learned Counsel has further contended that Rule 14 of the Cenvat Credit Rules,  2004,  was  amended  vide  a  Notification  No. 18/2012-C.E.  (N.T.),  dated  17-03-2012  WHEReby  the phrase  “Cenvat  credit  has  been  taken  or  utilised wrongly”  was  substituted  by  the  words  “Cenvat credit  has  been  taken  and  utilized  wrongly”.  Since the  words  have  been  substituted,  the  substitution will have retrospective effect and, therefore, unless the  appellant  utilises  the  credit,  the  question  of recovery of Cenvat credit or interest thereon would not  arise.  Reliance  was  placed  on  the  decisions  of Supreme Court in Indian Tobacco Association (2005) 187 ELT 162  (SC) and W.P.I.L. Ltd. vs. CCE  (2005)  181 ELT  359  (SC)  in  support  of  this  proposition.
 
The  Honorable  Tribunal  held  as  under:  Para  5.2
The  next  issue  for  consideration  is  whether  the appellant  is  liable  to  pay  any  interest  on  the  credit taken.  During  the  period  involved,  Rule  14  of  the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 provided for the recovery of  interest  on  the  Cenvat  Credit  taken  or  utilised wrongly under the provisions of the said Rule read with  section  11AB  of  the  Central  Excise  Act,  1944. The issue also came up for consideration before the Hon’ble  Apex  Court  in  the  case  of  Union  of  India vs.  Ind  –  Swift  Laboratories  Ltd.  (2011)  265  ELT  3 (SC)  (2012)  25  STR  184  (SC).  The  question  before the  Honorable  Apex  Court  was  “when  interest  on irregular credit arises, is it from the date of availing of  such  credit  or  from  the  date  of  utilisation?”  The Hon’ble Apex Court held that Rule 14 of the Cenvat Credit  Rules,  2004  specifically  provides  for  interest on  the  Cenvat  Credit  taken  or  utilised  wrongly  or erroneously refunded. Therefore, interest on irregu- lar  credit  arises  from  the  date  of  taking  of  such credit.  Accordingly  it  was  held  that  if  the  Cenvat Credit  taken  is  irregularly,  though  not  utilised,  the liability  to  pay  interest  would  arise  from  the  date of  taking  of  the  credit  till  the  date  of  reversal  of the  credit.  In  view  of  the  above  decision  by  the Hon’ble Apex Court, the ratio of which is applicable to  the  present  case,  it  becomes  evident  that  the appellant  is  liable  to  discharge  interest  liability  on the  Cenvat  Credit  wrongly  taken  from  the  date  of taking  of  the  Cenvat credit  till  the  date  of  reversal. The  reliance  placed  by  the  appellant  on  the  deci- sion  of  the  Hon’ble  Karnataka  High  Court  in  the case  of  Bill  Forge  Pvt.  Ltd.  (supra)  and  the  other decisions  will  not  apply  to  the  facts  of  the  present case.  In  the  case  of  Bill  Forge  Pvt.  Ltd.  (supra)  the appellant  therein  took  the  credit  and  also  reversed the  credit  within  the  same  month,  i.e.,  before  any liability  to  pay  any  duty  arose.  It  was  in  that  con- text  the  Hon’ble  High  Court  held  that  if  a  credit has  been  taken  but  reversed  before  any  liability to  pay  duty  arose  then  no  interest  liability  would accrue.  Those  are  not  the  facts  obtaining  in  the present  case.  It  is  not  the  case  of  the  appellant that  between  the  date  of  taking  the  credit  and the date of reversal when the base oil was cleared, liability  to  pay  duty  did  not  arise  at  all.  In  fact  the clearance has been spread over several months and years.  Therefore,  the  facts  of  the  case  before  us are  clearly  distinguishable  from  the  facts  involved in  Bill  Forge  Pvt.  Ltd.  cited  (supra)  and  hence  ratio of  the  said  decision  would  not  apply.  Since  Pearl Insulation Ltd. (supra) and Gokaldas Images (P) Ltd. (supra)  also  follow  the  ratio  of  the  Bill  Forge  Pvt. Ltd  they  would  also  not  apply  to  the  facts  of  the present  case.  As  regards  the  reliance  placed  in  the case  of  Rana  Sugar  Ltd.  (supra),  it  is  true  that  the Hon’ble  Allahabad  High  Court  had  held  that  if  the reversal  of  credit  has  been  done  before  its  utilisa- tion, demand of interest would not arise. However, the said order was passed much before the decision in Ind-Swift Laboratories Ltd. (supra) by the Hon’ble Apex  Court  was  pronounced.  Therefore,  the  ratio of  Ind-Swift  Laboratories  Ltd.  would  prevail  over all  the  other  decisions  of  various  Courts.

Para  5

As regard the argument advanced by the appellant that  since  the  expression  “Cenvat  Credit  taken  or utilised  wrongly”  had  been  substituted  effective from  17-03-2012  WITH  the  words  “Cenvat  Credit taken  and  utilised  wrongly”,  the  same  would  have retrospective  effect  and,  therefore,  inasmuch  as the  appellant  has  not  utilised  the  credit  there  will not  be  any  liability  to  interest,  this  argument  is misplaced.  Rule  14  of  the  the  Cenvat  Credit  Rules, 2004 was amended by a Notification No. 18/2012-C.E. (N.T.),  dated  17-O3-2012  and  amendment  effected in  Rule  14  of  the  Cenvat  Credit  Rules,  2004  read follows:-

“In Rule 14 of the said Rules, with effect from the 17th  day  of  March,  2012,-

a) For the words “taken or utilised wrongly”, the words “taken and utilised wrongly” shall be substituted;

This  amendment  rule  makes  it  absolute  clear  that the  amendment  is  with  effect  from  17-O3-2012  (in- advertently  mentioned  as  17-03-2004  in  the  ruling) and  not  before.  In  view  of  the  express  provisions in  the  Amendment  Rules,  the  argument  of  the appellant  that  amendment  being  in  the  nature  of substitution would have retrospective effect cannot be  accepted.  It  is  a  trite  law  that  every  statutory provision  is  prospective  only  unless  it  is  explicitly provided  that  it  is  retrospective  in  nature  and  the legislature  provides  for  such  retrospective  operation. In the present case, no such retrospective view has  been  provided  by  the  legislature  in  respect  of Notification  18/2012  –C.E.  (N.T.),  dated  17-03-2012 and, therefore, the argument of the Counsel in this regard  and  the  decisions  relied  upon  in  support  of the  same  cannot  be  accepted.

It appears that, the factual position that appellants claimed credit to which they were not  entitled  at all, could have had a bearing on the conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal.

Conclusion

The Honorable Supreme Court in the Ind – Swift case has unsettled the judicially settled principle under the MODVAT (relevant for CENVAT Credit) that no interest is payable in cases where MODVAT Credit is wrongly taken but not utilised. Possibly, the specific circumstances of the case involving evasion of duty, had a bearing on the conclusion arrived at by the Apex Court.

It would appear that,  it  was  correctly  observed  by the Honorable Punjab & Haryana High Court in Ind – Swift case that, interest is compensatory in character and is imposed on nonpayment/delayed payable. No liability of payment of any excise duty arises when the CENVAT Credit is availed. The li- ability to pay duty arises only at the time of utilisa- tion. Even if the CENVAT Credit is wrongly taken, that does not lead to levy of interest as liability of payment of excise duty does not arise with such availment of the CENVAT Credit by an assessee. Availment and utilisation of credit cannot be placed at equal footing for the purpose of charging inter- est. Availment of credit is only a book entry and does not result in any gain for the tax payer. The  use of the credit results into benefit and  that  is the time which is relevant for charging interest.

With  due  respect,  the  judgment  of  the  Honorable Supreme  Court  in  the  Ind  –  Swift  case  which  has generated  extensive  judicial  controversy,  needs  a serious reconsideration more particularly to advance the  cause  of  the  CENVAT  Credit  Scheme  which  is essentially  a  beneficial  piece  of  legislation.  Pending judicial resolvement of the controversy, Government could  consider  a  clarificatory  amendment  to  the effect  that  the  amendment  in  Rule  14  of  CCR  vide Notification  No  18/  2012  –  CE  (NT)  dated  17-03-2012 would  have  retrospective  operation.

1st YOUTH RESIDENTIAL REFRESHER COURSE (YRRC) HELD AT THE BYKE RESORT MATHERAN FROM 21st FEBRUARY to 23rd February 2014

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4i Committee
Uday V. Sathaye

Chairman
Himanshu V. Kishnadwala
Co-Chairman
Chirag A. Chauhan, Nandita P. Parekh and Pinky H. Shah
Convenors

A REPORT

The 1st YRRC organised by the BCAS was a funfilled learning program for the young Chartered Accountants. The YRRC saw a diverse mix of chartered accountants under-35 years of age, from different areas of practice and industry, from all over India. Designed with the intent to share knowledge in an unconventional manner using a youth friendly approach, the YRRC was structured with group discussions, presentations, workshop, indigenous newspapers, networking and entertainment.

During the group discussions on case studies, the four groups – Game Changers, Orbit Shifters, Ice Melters and Mountain Breakers – were seen involved in deep and intense discussions, result of adequate advance preparations and research by the participants and the group leaders. While the days were filled with technical sessions, the evenings provided some respite by way of sight-seeing, music, networking, singing and dancing.

There was high level of camaraderie seen between the participants and the speakers, who enjoyed each


1st Youth Residential Refresher Course

others’ company till the wee hours of the morning. The bonds formed during the YRRC have lasted even thereafter, through a “WhatsApp” group of the participants, enabling professional as well as personal connect between them.

Summarised below is a snapshot of the technical sessions.

DAY 1: Friday, 21st February 2014

Inauguration Session by President, Mr. Naushad Panjwani, Vice-President, Mr. Nitin Shingala and Chairman of 4i committee, Mr. Uday Sathaye


In his opening remarks, Vice-President, Mr. Nitin Shingala and Chairman, Mr. Uday Sathaye shared with the participants the history and the concept behind holding a Residential Refresher Course and how the participants could gain maximum benefit of the course.

In line with his personality, the President, Mr. Naushad Panjwani inaugurated the course with a unique self realisation game. This set the tone and momentum for all the 3 days of brilliant participation. He involved everybody with to-do game cards aimed at instilling the feeling of gratitude in humans.

SESSION 1 – PRESENTATION – OPPORTUNITIES FOR CAs IN POLITICS
Speaker: Mr. Ravindra P. Singh


The speaker emphasised the requirement of educated people to be more involved in politics and how CAs can participate in areas like preparation of Financial Statements, Managing Funds, taking financial decisions and monitoring finances. He also discussed with the participants on the aspect of how remunerative such activities could be. He further emphasised that when it comes to choosing a particular political party, there may not be a definite black or white, but, one could definitely find “the lightest shade of grey”. The session helped the participants in discovering this unexplored area of the profession.

SESSION 2 – PRESENTATION – FDI AND PE FUNDING
Speaker: Mr. Anup P. Shah


This was a comprehensive session covering all facets of the Private Equity (‘PE’) funding cycle and Foreign Direct Investment (‘FDI’). The speaker presented the features, advantages, types and all the stages of the PE funding/ FDI process – from Information Memorandum/ Business Plan to Negotiations to Term Sheets to Due Diligences and Regulatory Approvals to Definitive Agreements (SHA/SSA) to Modification of Articles and relevant nuances at each stage. He also explained how to resolve valuation differences, use convertibles and earn-outs, have floor and caps, monitor use of proceeds. He then explained the board representation rights, information and veto rights, right of first refusal, tag along and drag along rights and exit rights that PE funds demand. He further spoke about the regulatory aspects of FDI and various instruments as well as differences across geographies such as Mauritius, Singapore and Cyprus. The session was very well received by the participants with high participation.

SESSION 3 – WORKSHOP – NETWORKING
Conducted by: Ms. Vandana Saxena


Ms. Vandana, an acclaimed, well read and successful speaker, conducted the workshop in a highly interactive manner engaging all the participants throughout the session. Citing examples from her life, she demonstrated what networking is all about and how it helped her achieved many things in life, professionally as well as personally. The workshop involved some short exercises to help participants practically understand and experience networking. It also helped the participants get a further understanding of their fellow participants which acted as a good ice-breaker.

DAY 2: Saturday, 22nd February 2014

SESSION 1 – PRESENTATION– CASE STUDIES IN COMPANIES ACT, 2013
Opening remarks by session Chairman: Mr. Kamlesh Vikamsey, Past President, ICAI


The Session Chairman got the ball rolling with his opening remarks on the Companies Act, 2013. He explained how the Satyam fraud and Sahara case have had a significant impact on the policy makers of the new Companies Act. He further shed light on how many substantive provisions have been left to delegated legislation in the form of Rules, National Financial Reporting Authority, Class Action Suits, sweeping changes to the role of Auditors including detecting frauds and detailed role of Independent Directors.

Presentation by Paper Writer & Speaker: Mr. Anand Bathiya


Mr. Anand Bathiya, a participant of the YRRC, presented the subject with the genesis behind the evolution of the Companies Act, 2013 and went on to detail the high impact areas including significant applicability to Private Limited Companies, Consolidation under the new Act, etc. He comprehensively solved the case studies and also involved the group leaders to present their view points on the case studies. Sections 185 and 186 dealing with loans including inter-corporate loans, capital raising and accounting provisions with focus on depreciation were explained in a detailed manner. Queries raised by participants were satisfactorily answered by him.

SESSION 2 – PRESENTATION – CASE STUDIES IN PERSONAL FINANCIAL PLANNING

Presentation by Paper Writer & Speaker, Mr. Ankur Nishar; supplemented by session Chairman, Mr. Kartik Jhaveri


This innovative session kicked off with the speaker and chairman giving a briefing to the participants on the basics of personal financial planning. Subsequently, the 4 groups were given a unique case study to internally discuss, come up with a financial plan and present the same to the assembly. The speakers fine-tuned the financial plan prepared by the groups and further explained the nuances of personal financial planning like goal setting, power of money compounding, iinflation factoring and mix of investment sectors across Equity, Debt, Insurance, Real Estate and other assets. This provided an opportunity to the participants to go about making a financial plan by themselves and there was tremendous knowledge transfer.

SESSION 3 – PRESENTATION – UNDERSTANDING WORLD ECONOMICS
Speaker: Mr. Rutvik Sanghvi

The presentation started with
the speaker highlighting the
significance of economic events
on our careers and the rationale
behind studying economics. He
went on to detail the present,
past and future of world
economics. Very passionate
about the subject, the speaker
touched upon the effect of various countries (USA/
USSR/China, etc.) and currencies (US$, Euro, JPY,
etc.) have on the world economics and the impact
of geo-politics on economics and consequential
effect on India. He also shared great insights on the
economic factors for growth and where we, as CAs,
come in.
SESSION 1 – CASE STUDIES ON VALUATION FOR
M&A

Presentation by Paper Writers & Speakers: Mr.
Gaurav Kedia and Mr. Abhinandan Prasad
After the case study discussion by the 4 group, the
speakers spoke about the different methods of
valuation like:
• Earnings focused (Discounted Cash Flows, Free
Cash Flow, Sum of Parts Valuation),
• Asset Focused (Book Value, Replacement Value,
Liquidation Value),
• Market Focused (Internal Transaction Price,
Market Value Method, Comparable Companies Market Multiples Method, Comparable Transaction Multiples Method), etc.
The speakers explained
the nuances and relevance
of each method and the
approach to each method
with the case study as an
example in the backdrop.
Lastly, the concept of
Mergers versus Acquisitions
was taken up and the
financial impact of synergies
arising out of a merger on a swap ratio was also
discussed including buyer’s and seller’s walk-away
prices. There were discussions on how valuation
as a practice is an area which young CAs should
definitely consider as an area of practice considering
the relative shortage of professionals in that area
and the rewarding promise it holds for young CAs.
Concluding session:

This 1st YRRC was concluded with a very positive
note to meet again next year with many more
subjects of interest to the youth. Mr. Naushad
Panjwani, the President, thanked everybody for
their participation in this YRRC. He also requested
all the young members to give their suggestions for
many more such programmes. Mr. Uday Sathaye-
Chairman 4i Committee thanked all young organisers
Kinjal Shah, Naman Shrimal, Chirag Doshi, Jinal Shah,
Ravi Shah and Mahesh Nayak for ably organising
the 1st YRRC. He also thanked all the members who
participated in the 1st YRRC particularly for being a
part of this new chapter in the history of the BCAS.
Everybody parted with sweet memories of this
YRRC with a commitment to meet again next year.

Letter

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The Editor,                                                                                                     24th aMrch, 2014
BCAJ,
Mumbai.

Dear Sir,

Re: Blatantly frivolous & unsustainable Additions to Income

Recently, in the case of Bharti Airtel Limited vs. ACIT, the ITAT Delhi, hauled up the Assessing Officer and the DRP for making and sustaining blatantly frivolous and unsustainable additions.

The Tribunal while allowing the appeal observed:
“If an action of the AO is so blatantly unreasonable that such seasoned senior officers well versed with functioning of judicial forums, as the learned DRs are, cannot even go through the convincing motions of defending the same before us, such unreasonable conduct of the AO deserves to be scrutinised seriously. If it is indeed a case of frivolous addition, someone should be accountable for the resultant undue hardship to the taxpayer -rather than being allowed to walk away with a subtle, though easily discernable, admission to the effect that yes it was a frivolous addition, and, if it is not a frivolous addition, there has to be reasonable defence, before us, for such an addition.

…. The fact that even such purely factual issues are not adequately dealt with by the DRPs raises a big question mark on the efficacy of the very institution of Dispute Resolution Panel. One can perhaps understand, even if not condone, such frivolous additions being made by the AOs, who are relatively younger officers with limited exposure and experience, but the Dispute Resolution Panels, manned by very distinguished and senior Commissioners of eminence, will lose all their relevance, if, irrespective of their heavy work load and demanding schedules, these forums do not rise to the occasion and do not deal with the objections raised before them in a comprehensive and effective manner.

Let us not forget that the majesty of law is as much damaged by not rendering justice to the conduct which cannot be faulted as much it is damaged by a wrongdoer going unpunished; not giving relief in deserving cases is as much of a disservice to the cause of justice and the cause of nation as much a disservice it is , to these causes, by granting undue reliefs. The time has come that a strong institutional check is put in place for dealing with such eventualities and de-incentivising this kind of a conduct.”

The Tribunals and Courts have passed severe strictures against the Tax Officers, DRP and the First Appellate Authorities from time to time, against their high handed actions. However, it appears that the Revenue Officers have become immune and insensitive to such criticism by the Tribunals and the Courts. Many times such high handed actions (including High Pitched Assessments, as in Bharti’s case, repetitive appeals, unjustified reopening of the assessments, grossly wrongful and wilful attachment of bank accounts and other properties and forcible recovery of taxes etc. ) amount to nothing but Fiscal Terrorism, eroding the Citizen’s Trust and faith in the Tax Administration. It appears that some Senior Revenue Officers consider themselves not accountable to any one and to be above the Law.

It is high time that the Finance Minister and the CBDT should institutionalise processes for taking action against such errant Tax Officials, particularly those against whom strictures/adverse comments have been passed by various Appellate Authorities

Yours sincerely,,
Tarun Singhal.

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Arvind Singh Chauhan vs. ITO [2014] 42 taxmann.com 285 (Agra – Trib.) A.Ys.: 2008-09 and 2009-10, Dated: 14 February 2014

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S/s.- 6 – (i) Salary earned outside India cannot be said to accrue in India merely because employment letter is issued in India, or salary is received in India; (ii) ‘non-resident’ cannot be deemed ‘resident’ by applying section 6(5) since it has become redundant since 1989-90.

Facts:
The taxpayer was employed by a Singapore company (“SIngCo”) for working on merchant vessels and tankers plying on international routes. Apart from salary income, he received pension and bank interest. During the relevant year, his stay in India was less than 182 days, and he was a ‘non-resident’, which was not disputed. The taxpayer did not offer the salary received from SingCo for tax since salary income in respect of ship crew is accruing and arising outside India.

The AO noted that the taxpayer got right to receive the salary by receiving the appointment letter and details of salary to be paid; appointment letter was issued by foreign employer’s agent in India; the salary was deposited in bank account in India in US dollars; and hence, the salary was deemed to accrue in India. The AO further referred to section 6(5) and noted that if a taxpayer is resident for one of the sources of income, he is deemed to be resident for all the sources of income. Since the taxpayer was ‘resident’ for pension and interest, his status was ‘resident’ for all sources.

Held:
The Tribunal held as follows.

• An employee has to render the services to get a right to receive the salary and not merely by receiving appointment letter. Salary accrues at the place where services are rendered or performed
• It is wholly incorrect to assume that an employee gets right to receive the salary just by getting the appointment letter.
• If non-resident offers income accruing in India to tax, it cannot be said that he has accepted residential status of a ‘resident’.
• Salary earned abroad cannot be taxed in hands of a non-resident by invoking section 6(5) as section 6(5) has become redundant since 1989-90.
• Receipt of income in India refers to the first occasion when the taxpayer gets money in his control, whether real or constructive.
• Where salary accrued outside India and thereafter, by an arrangement, amount is remitted to India, it will not constitute first receipt in India so as to trigger receipt based taxation u/s. 5(2)(a) of the Act.

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Smita Anand, China, In re [2014] 42 taxmann.com 366 (AAR – New Delhi) A.A.R. No. 1091 of 2011, Dated: 19 February 2014

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S/s.- Explanation (b) to section 6(1) of the Act – person returning to India after leaving overseas job could not be said to be on “visit” to India and hence, Explanation (b) to section 6(1) was not applicable.

Facts:
The Applicant was working with a Chinese company (“ChinaCo”). The applicant left India in September 2007 and her employment with ChinaCo commenced on 1st October, 2007. While employed in China, she had visited India but her stay in India in a particular year never exceeded 182 days. She resigned from her employment in China with effect from 31st January, 2011 and returned to India on 12th February, 2011. During financial year 2010-11 (being the relevant year), her total stay in India was 119 days.

The Applicant contended that she was only on “visit” to India, and accordingly, in terms of Explanation (b) to section 9(1), she was a non-resident because:

• her employer card was valid upto 31-03-2012;
• she was considerably exploring possibility of job outside India;
• her residential house was let out till June, 2011;
• she visited her friends and relatives in different parts of India and also travelled to different locations on holidays;
• her children continued to stay abroad, etc.

Held:
The AAR held as follows.

• There was no information whether after resigning her employment and coming to India, the applicant again left India for any employment.
• The activities mentioned by the Applicant need not be proof of a “visit” since even a person staying permanently in India also does those activities.
• Since the Applicant returned to India after resigning from her employment in China, the reason does not seem to be only for a “visit”.
• On facts and circumstances of the case, Explanation (b) to section 6(1) is not applicable to the Applicant’s case.

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K. Sambasiva Rao vs. ITO [2014] 42 taxmann.com 115 (Hyderabad – Trib.) A.Y. 2002-03, Dated: 22 January 2014

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S/s.- Explanation (a) to section 6(1) of the Act – ‘leaves India for the purposes of employment’ in Explanation (a) to section 6(1) would include travelling abroad to take up any employment or travelling abroad on business visa for any business carried outside India.

Facts:
The taxpayer was engaged to provide technical services for setting-up a hospital in Saudi Arabia. During the relevant year, he had earned consultancy income for such services. He claimed that during the year he was not a resident within the meaning of section 6(1) and hence, the income was not taxable.

On examination, the AO found that taxpayer was not regularly employed abroad, but worked as a consultant for a foreign company and he continued to render technical services in India and also earned income in India. He held that the amount was taxable as:

• The taxpayer was resident of India and was not entitled to benefit of extended stay of 180 days in terms of Explanation (a) to section 6(1) as he did not leave India ‘for the purposes of employment’. The term ‘for the purposes of employment’ should be interpreted in the context of employeremployee relationship and should be given a restrictive meaning. After considering the terms of the offer letter, the AO concluded that there was no employer-employee relationship between the taxpayer and the foreign company and accordingly, Explanation (a) to section 6(1) was not applicable in case of the taxpayer and therefore, the taxpayer was a resident chargeable to tax in respect of global income.
• In any case, the income was earned in India. While the taxpayer claimed that he travelled abroad to provide services, the taxpayer did not establish the nexus between his travels abroad and the consultancy services rendered by him.

Held:
The Tribunal held as follows.
• Section 6 does not require that taxpayer should leave India permanently. Hence, the argument that taxpayer did not permanently leave and was not stationed outside India is not material. Even if the taxpayer had visit outside India such that he was in India for a period or periods of 181 days or less, the condition specified in section 6(1) is satisfied.
• In CBDT vs. Aditya V. Birla [1988] 170 ITR 137, Supreme Court has held that employment does not mean salaried employment but also includes self-employment/professional work. Therefore, the taxpayer’s earning from foreign enterprise and visit abroad for rendering consultation could be considered for the purpose of examining whether he was resident or not.
• Going abroad for the purpose of employment only means that the visit and stay abroad should not be for purpose other than employment or any vocation. The AO can verify the same by examining the visas as also correlating the foreign exchange drawn by the taxpayer and reimbursed by the foreign company. Accordingly, the matter was remanded to the AO.

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Business expenditure: Section 37: A. Y. 2006- 07: Expenditure on foreign education of employee (son of director) is deductible if there is business nexus:

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Kostub Investment Ltd. vs. CIT (Del); ITA No. 10 of 2014 dated 25-02-2014:

In the relevant year, the assessee company had claimed the deduction of an expenditure of Rs. 23,16,942/- being expenditure on higher education of an employee, who happens to be the son of directors, for undertaking an MBA course in the UK. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim for deduction and the Tribunal upheld the disallowance.

The Delhi High Court allowed the appeal filed by the assessee, reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) Whilst there may be some grain of truth that there might be a tendency in business concerns to claim deductions u/s. 37, and foist personal expenditure, such a tendency itself cannot result in an unspoken bias against claims for funding higher education abroad of the employees of the concern. As to whether the assessee would have similarly assisted another employee unrelated to its management is not a question which this court has to consider. But that it has chosen to fund the higher education of one of its director’s son in a field intimately connected with its business is a crucial factor that the Court cannot ignore.

ii) It would be unwise for the Court to require all assesses and business concerns to frame a policy with respect to how educational funding of its employees generally and a class thereof, i.e., children of its management or directors would be done. Nor would it be wise to universalise or rationalise that in the absence of such a policy, funding of employees of one class – unrelated to management – would qualify for deduction u/s. 37(1). We do not see such a intent in the statute which prescribes that only expenditure strictly for business can be considered for deduction. Necessarily, the decision to deduct is to be case dependent.

iii) In view of the above discussion, having regard to the circumstances of the case, this Court is of the opinion that the expenditure claimed by the assessee to fund the higher education of its employee to the tune of Rs. 23,16,942/- had an intimate and direct connection with its business, i.e., dealing in security and investments. It was, therefore, appropriately deductible u/s. 37(1).

iv) The Assessing Officer is thus directed to grant the deduction claimed.”

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Offences and Prosecution – Section 276CC applies to situations where an assessee has failed to file a return of income as required u/s. 139 of the Act or in response to notice issued to the assessee u/s. 142 or section 148 of the Act.

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Sasi Enterprises vs. ACIT (2014) 361 ITR 163(SC)

M/s.
Sasi Enterprises was formed as a partnership firm by a deed dated 6th
February, 1989, with N. Sasikala and T. V. Dinakaram as its partners,
which was later reconstituted with effect from 4th May, 1990, with J.
Jayalalitha and N. Sasikala as partners. The firm did the business
through two units, namely, M/s. Fax Universal and M/s. J. S. Plan
Printers, which, inter alia, included the business in running all kinds
of motor cars, dealing in vehicles and goods, etc.

The
Partnership deed dated 4th May, 1990, stated that the partners, are
responsible and empowered to operate bank accounts, have full and equal
rights in the management of the firm in its business activities, deploy
funds for the business of the firm, appoint staff, watchman, etc., and
to represent the firm before Income-tax, sales tax and other
authorities.

M/s. Sasi Enterprises, the firm, did not file any returns for the assessment years 1991-92 and 1992-93.

J.
Jayalalitha and N. Sasikala filed their individual returns for the
assessment years 1991-92 and 1992- 93, though belatedly on 20th
November, 1994, and 23rd February, 1994, respectively. In those returns
it was mentioned that the accounts of the firm had not been finalised
and no returns of the firm had been filed. J. Jayalalitha and N.
Sasikala did not file returns for the assessment year 1993-94.

In
the complaint E.O.C.C. No. 202 of 1997 filed before the Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate Egmore, M/s. Sasi Enterprises was shown as the
first accused (A-1) and J. Jayalalitha and N. Sasikala were shown as
(A-2) and (A-3), respectively, who were stated to be responsible for the
day-to-day business of the firm during the assessment years in question
and were individually, jointly and severally made responsible and
liable for all the activities of the firm.

The Assistant
Commissioner of Income-tax in his complaint stated that the firm through
its partners ought to have filed its returns u/s. 139(1) of the Act for
the assessment year 1991-92 on or before 31st August, 1991, and for the
assessment year 1992-93 on or before 31st August, 1992, and A-2, in her
individual capacity, also should have filed her return for the year
1993-94 u/s. 139(1) on or before 31st August, 1993, and A-3 also ought
to have filed her return for the assessment year 1993-94 on or before
31st August, 1993, as per section 139(1) of the Act. The accused
persons, it was pointed out, did not bother to file the returns even
before the end of the respective assessment years, nor had they filed
any return at the outer statutory limit prescribed u/s. 139(4) of the
Act, i.e., at the end of March of the assessment year. It was also
pointed out the a survey was conducted in respect of the firm u/s. 133A
on 24th August, 1992, and following that a notice u/s. 148 was served on
the partnership firm on 15th February, 1994, to file the return of
Income-tax for the years in question. Though notice was served on 16th
February, 1994, no return was filed within the time granted in the
notice. Neither the return was filed, nor were particulars of the income
furnished. For the assessment year 1991-92, it was stated that
pre-assessment notice was served on 18th December, 1995, notice u/s.
142(1)(ii) giving opportunities was also issued on 20th July, 1995. The
Department made the best judgment assessment for the assessment year
1991-92 u/s. 144 on a total income of Rs. 5,84,860 on 8th February,
1996, and tax was determined as Rs. 3,02,434 and demand notice for Rs.
9,95,388 was issued as tax and interest payable on 8th February, 1996.

For
the assessment year 1992-93, the best judgment assessment u/s. 144 was
made on 9th February, 1996, on the firm on a total income of Rs.
14,87,930 and tax determined at Rs. 8,08,153, a demand notice was issued
towards the tax and interest payable.

So far as A-2 was
concerned, the due date for filing of return of income as per section
139(1) of the Act for the assessment year 1993-94 was 31st August, 1993.
Notice u/s. 142(1)(i) was issued to A-2 calling for return of income on
18th January, 1994. The said notice was served on her on 19th January,
1994. Reminders were issued on 10th February, 1994, 22nd August, 1994
and 23rd August, 1995. No return was filed as required u/s. 139(4)
before 31st March, 1995. The Department on 31st July, 1995, issued
notice u/s. 142(1)(ii) calling for particulars of income and other
details for completion of assessment. Neither the return of income was
filed nor were the particulars of income furnished. Best judgment
assessment u/s. 144 was made on 9th February, 1996 on a total income of
Rs. 1,04,49,153 and tax determined at Rs. 46,68,676 and demand of Rs.
96,98,801, inclusive of interest at Rs. 55,53,882 was raised after
adjusting pre-paid tax of Rs. 5,23,759. The Department then issued
show-cause notice for prosecution u/s. 276CC on 14th June, 1996. Later,
sanction for prosecution was accorded by the Commissioner of Income-tax
on 3rd October, 1996.

A-3 also failed to filed return of income
as per section 139(1) for the assessment year 1993-94 before the due
date, i.e., 31st August, 1993. Notice u/s. 142(1)(i) was issued to A-3
calling for filing of return of income on 8th November, 1995. Further,
notice was also issued u/s. 142(1)(ii) on 21st July, 1995, calling for
particulars of income and other details for completion of assessment.
Neither the return of income was filed nor the particulars of income
were furnished. Best judgment assessment u/s. 144 was made on 8th
February, 1996, on a total income of Rs. 70,28,110 and tax determined at
Rs. 26,86,445. The total tax payable, inclusive of interest due was Rs.
71,19,527. After giving effect to the appellate order, the total income
was revised by Rs. 19,25,000, resulting in tax demand of Rs. 20,23,279,
inclusive of interest levied. Later, a show-cause notice for
prosecution u/s. 276CC was issued to A-3 on 7th August,1996. A-3 filed
replies on 24th November, 1996, and 24th March, 1997. The Commissioner
of Income-tax accorded sanction for prosecution on 4th August, 1997.

The
final tax liability, so far as the firm was concerned, was determined
as Rs. 32,63,482 on giving effect to the order of the Income-tax
Appellate Tribunal (B-Bench), Chennai dated 1st September, 2006 and
after giving credit of prepaid tax for the assessment year 1991-92. For
the assessment year 1992-93 for the firm, final tax liability was
determined at Rs.52,47,594 on giving effect to the order of the
Income-tax Appellate Tribunal (B-Bench), Chennai dated 1st September,
2006, and after giving credit of pre-paid tax. So far as A-2 was
concerned for the assessment year 1993-94 final tax liability was
determined at Rs. 12,54,395 giving effect to the order of the Income-tax
Appellate Tribunal (B-Bench), Chennai dated 11th October, 2008, after
giving credit to pre-paid tax. So far as A-3 was concerned, for the
assessment year 1993-94, the final tax liability was determined as Rs.
9,81,870 after giving effect to the order of the Income-tax Appellate
Tribunal (B-Bench), Chennai dated 14th September, 2004, and after giving
credit to pre-paid tax.

For not filing of returns and due to
non-compliance with the various statutory provisions, prosecution was
initiated u/s. 276CC of the Act against all the accused persons and the
complaints were filed on 21st August, 1997, before the Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate which the High Court by its order dated 2nd
December, 2006 had permitted to go on by dismissing the revision
petitions filed by the firm and the two partners against the dismissal
of their discharge petitions by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate.

On appeal, the Supreme Court held that section
276CC applies to situations where an assessee has
failed to file a return of income as required u/s.
139 of the Act or in response to notice issued to
the assessee u/s. 142 or section 148 of the Act.
The proviso to section 276CC gives some relief to
genuine assessees. The proviso to section 276CC
gives further time till the end of the assessment
year to furnish return to avoid prosecution. In
other words, even though the due date would be
31st August of the assessment year as per section
139(1) of the Act, as assessee gets further seven
months time to complete and file the return and
such a return though belated, may not attract
prosecution of the assessee. Similarly, the proviso
in Clause (ii)(b) to section 276CC also provides
that if the tax payable determined by regular assessment
as reduced by advance tax paid and tax deducted at source does not exceed Rs. 3,000,
such an assessee shall not be prosecuted for
not furnishing the return u/s. 139(1) of the Act.
Resultantly, the proviso u/s. 276CC takes care of
genuine assessees who either file the returns belatedly
but within the end of the assessment year
or those who have paid substantial amounts of
their tax dues by pre-paid taxes, from the rigour
of the prosecution u/s. 276CC of the Act.
Section 276CC, takes in s/s. (1) of the section 139,
section 142(1)(i) and section 148. But the proviso
to section 276CC takes in only s/s. (1) of section
139 of the Act and the provisions of section 142(1)
(i) or section 148 are conspicuously absent. Consequently,
the benefit of the proviso is available
only to voluntary filing of return as required u/s.
139(1) of the Act. In other words, the proviso
would not apply after detection of the failure to
file the return and after a notice u/s. 142(1)(i) or
section 148 of the Act is issued calling for filing
of the return of income. The proviso, therefore,
envisages the filing of even belated return before
the detection or discovery of the failure and issuance
of notice u/s. 142 or section 148 of the Act.
The Supreme Court referred to s/s. (4) of section
139 wherein the Legislature has used an expression
“whichever is earlier”, and observed that
both section 139(1) and s/s. (1) of section 142 are
referred to in s/s. (4) to section 139, which specify
time limit, therefore, the expression “whichever is
earlier” has to be read within the time if allowed
under s/s. (1) of section 139 or within the time allowed
under notice issued under s/s. (1) of section
142, whichever is earlier. The Supreme Court held
that so far as the present case was concerned, it
was noticed that the assessee had not filed the
return either within the time allowed under s/s. (1)
of section 139 or within the time allowed under
notice issued under s/s. (1) of section 142.
The Supreme Court noted that on failure to file
the returns by the appellants, the Income-tax Department
made a best judgment assessment u/s.
144 of the Act and later show-cause notices were
issued for initiating prosecution u/s. 276CC of the
Act. The Supreme Court held that the proviso to
section 276CC nowhere states that the offence
u/s. 276CC has not been committed by the categories
of assesses who fall within the scope of
that proviso but it is stated that such a person
shall not be proceeded against. In other words,
it only provided that under specific circumstances
mentioned in the proviso, prosecution may not be
initiated. An assessee who comes within Clause
(2)(b) of the proviso, no doubt he has also committed
the offence u/s. 276CC but is exempted
from prosecution since the tax falls below Rs.
3,000. Such an assessee may file belated return
before the detection and avail of the benefit of
the proviso. The proviso cannot control the main
section, it only confers some benefit to certain
categories of assesses. In short, the offence u/s.
276CC is attracted on failure to comply with the
provisions of section 139(1) or failure to respond
to the notice issued u/s. 142 or section 148 of the
Act within the time limit specified therein.
Applying the above principles to the facts of
the case in hand, the Supreme Court held that
the contention of the learned senior counsel for
the appellant that there has not been any willful
failure to file their return could not be accepted
and on facts, offence u/s. 276CC of the Act had
been made in all these appeals and the rejection
of the application for the discharge called for no
interference by it.
The Supreme Court also found no basis in the
contention of the learned senior counsel for the
appellant that pendency of the appellate proceeding
was a relevant factor for not initiating prosecution
proceedings u/s. 276CC of the Act. According
to the Supreme Court, section 276CC contemplates
that an offence is committed on the non-filing of
the return and it is totally unrelated to the pendency
of assessment proceedings except for the
second part of the offence for determination of
the sentence of the offence, the Department may
resort to best judgment assessment or otherwise
to past years to determine the extent of the
breach. If it was the intention of the Legislature
to hold up the prosecution proceedings till the
assessment proceedings are completed by way of
appeal or otherwise the same would have been
provided in section 276CC itself.
The Supreme Court was also of the view that the
declaration or statement made in the individual
returns by partners that the accounts of the firm
were not finalised, hence no return had been
filed by the firm, would not absolve the firm in
filing the statutory return u/s. 139(1) of the Act. The firm was independently required to file the
return and merely because there had been a best
judgment assessment u/s. 144 would not nullify
the liability of the firm to file the return as per
section 139(1) of the Act.
The Supreme Court further held that, section
278E deals with the presumption as to culpable
mental state, which was inserted by the Taxation
Laws (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions)
Act, 1986. The question is on whom the burden
lies, either on the prosecution or the assessee,
u/s. 278E to prove whether the assessee has or
not committed willful default in filing the returns.
The court in a prosecution of offence, like section
276CC has to presume the existence of mens rea
and it is for the accused to prove the contrary
and that too beyond reasonable doubt. Resultantly,
the appellants have to prove the circumstances
which prevented them from filing the returns as
per section 139(1) or in response to notice u/s.
142 and 148 of the Act.

Taxability of Long Outstanding Liability Not Written Back

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Synopsis

Section 41(1) applies when an assessee gets a remission or benefit in respect of trading liability cessation thereof,or by a unilateral act by the assessee by way of writing back of such liability in his accounts.

The question that arises is if any benefit has been obtained in respect trading liability by remission or cessation, when a creditor’s balance has remained unpaid for a long period of time, though it has not been written back to the profit and loss account, particularly if the recovery of such amount is barred by the law of limitation.

Issue for Consideration

Section 41(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 provides that where an allowance or deduction has been made in the assessment for any year in respect of loss, expenditure or trading liability incurred by the assessee and subsequently during any previous year, the assessee has obtained, whether in cash or in any other manner whatsoever, any amount in respect of such loss or expenditure or some benefit in respect of such trading liability by way of remission or cessation thereof, the amount obtained by such person or the value of benefit accruing to him shall be deemed to be profits and gains of business or profession and accordingly chargeable to Incometax as the income of that previous year.

The provisions of this section, therefore, come into play only when the assessee has “obtained any amount in respect of such loss or expenditure or some benefit in respect of such trading liability by way of remission or cessation of such liability”.

Explanation 1 to this section, inserted with effect from Assessment Year 1997-98, further provides that the expression “loss or expenditure or some benefit in respect of any such trading liability by way of remission or cessation thereof” shall include the remission or cessation of any liability by a unilateral act by the assessee by way of writing off such liability in his accounts.

The question has arisen before the courts as to whether any benefit has been obtained in respect of trading liability by way of remission or cessation when a creditor’s balance has remained unpaid and outstanding for a long period of time, though it has not been written back to the profit and loss account, particularly if the recovery of such amount is barred by the law of limitation.

The Delhi High Court has taken two different views of the matter, one in the case of sundry creditors, and the other in the case of unpaid dues of employees. In one case, it has held that the amount is not taxable u/s. 41(1), while in the other, it is held that such outstanding amount of liability is taxable.

Shri Vardhman Overseas’ Case
The issue first came up before the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs. Shri Vardhman Overseas Ltd. 343 ITR 408.

In this case, relating to the Assessment Year 2002- 03, the assessee was a company engaged in the manufacture of rice from paddy. It also sold rice after purchasing it from the local market. The Assessing Officer, while verifying the sales and sundry debtors, decided to verify the sundry creditors shown in the books of account. He asked the assessee to submit confirmation letters from the sundry creditors. The assessee did not submit the confirmation letters, on the ground that it was not aware of the present whereabouts of the creditors after a lapse of 4 years, and whatever addresses were available had been given by the suppliers at the time that the purchases were made from them. The assessing officer added the amount of sundry creditors to the assessee’s income.

On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) held that the assessee’s conduct clearly showed that the liability shown in the sundry creditors account in its books did not exist. He, therefore, held that the liabilities had ceased to exist, and therefore, the addition made by the assessing officer was held to be justified, but confirmed as taxable u/s. 41(1).

The Tribunal held that since the amounts payable to the sundry creditors were not credited to the profit and loss account for the year but continued to be shown as outstanding as at the end of the year, the tribunal held that the provisions of section 41(1) were not attracted, in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT v Sugauli Sugar Works (P) Ltd. 236 ITR 518. According to the Tribunal, this decision of the Supreme Court applied with greater force since, in that decision, the assessee had credited the profit and loss account with the amount standing to the credit of the sundry creditors, whereas in the case before the Tribunal, the amounts payable to the sundry creditors were not credited to the profit and loss account for the year and were still shown as outstanding as at the end of the year. The Tribunal, therefore, deleted the addition made by the assessing officer.

Before the Delhi High Court, on behalf of the revenue, attention was drawn to the fact that the assessee itself had admitted that the amount was outstanding for more than 4 years, and therefore, the assessee had obtained a benefit in the course of its business, which was assessable u/s. 41(1). It was argued that it would make no difference that the liabilities were not written back to the profit and loss account for the year under consideration, because what was to be seen was whether the assessee had obtained a benefit in a practical sense. It was claimed that since the amounts remained unpaid for 4 years, there was a reasonable inference that the assessee was no longer liable to pay those parties. According to the revenue, the benefit arose on account of the fact that the debts were more than 3 years old, and were, therefore, not recoverable from the assessee in view of the law of limitation.

It was argued that Explanation 1 to section 41(1) was not relied upon by the revenue, but the writing back of the accounts of the sundry creditors in the profit and loss account was only one of the many unilateral acts which could be done by the assessee, and even in the absence of such a write back, there could be remission or cessation of the trading liability which resulted in a benefit to the assessee.

The Delhi High Court agreed that the Explanation 1 was not applicable, but observed that it must be established that the assessee had obtained some benefit in respect of the trading liability which had earlier been allowed as a deduction. It noted that there was no dispute that the amounts due to the sundry creditors have been allowed in the earlier assessment years as purchases in computing the business income of the assessee. The question was whether by not paying them for a period of 4 years and above, the assessee had obtained some benefit in respect of the trading liability allowed in earlier years. It observed that the revenue’s argument that, non-payment or non-discharge of liability resulted in some benefit in respect of such trading liability in a practical sense or common sense overlooked the words “by way of remission or cessation thereof”. It observed that it was not enough that the assessee should derive some benefit in respect of such trading liability, but it was also essential that such benefit should arise by way of remission or cessation of the liability.

Analysing the meaning of the terms “remission” and “cessation”, the Delhi High Court noted the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bombay Dyeing and Manufacturing Company Ltd. vs. State of Bombay AIR 1958 SC 328, where the Supreme Court held that when a debt becomes time-barred, it does not become extinguished, but only unenforceable in a court of law. The Supreme Court had also held that modes in which an obligation under contract becomes discharged were well-defined, and the bar of limitation was not one of them. This was the view also taken by the Supreme Court in the case of Sugauli Sugar Works (supra), which was a case where the credits were outstanding for almost 20 years and were written back by credit to the profit and loss account. The Delhi High Court noted that in the Sugauli Sugar Works case, a contention was advanced before the Supreme Court on behalf of the revenue that since the liability remained unpaid for more than 20 years, there was practically a cessation of the debt, which resulted in a benefit to the assessee, which should be brought to tax u/s. 41(1). This argument was not accepted by the Supreme Court in that case.

The Delhi High Court, therefore, held that, as there was no write back of the accounts of the sundry creditors to the profit and loss account, the amount of outstanding liabilities was not taxable u/s. 41(1).
This decision was followed by the Delhi High Court on the same date in the case of CIT vs. Hotline Electronics Ltd. 205 Taxman 245, taking an identical view.
Chipsoft Technology’s Case
The issue again came up before the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs. Chipsoft Technology (P) Ltd. 210 Taxman 173 (Del)(Mag). In this case, relating to assessment year 2006-07, the assessee had outstanding liabilities on account of employee dues, some of which pertained to salary for the Assessment Year 2005-06, and the balance related to earlier years, extending to as far back as Assessment Year 2000-01.
The Assessing Officer called for confirmations from the employees. The assessee was able to furnish confirmations from only 3 employees out of 170 employees whose dues were outstanding. The Assessing Officer held that there was a cessation of the assessee’s liabilities and that he had obtained benefit in respect of these amounts, and he, therefore, added these amounts to the assessee’s income u/s. 41(1).
The Commissioner (Appeals) allowed the assessee’s appeal, holding that the liability was outstanding in the books of account, and that it did not, therefore, amount to cessation of liability. The Tribunal upheld the Commissioner(Appeals) order.
Before the Delhi High Court, on behalf of the Revenue, it was argued that the amount due to 170 employees remained unchanged and static for about 6 or 7 years and no payment was made during the intervening period. It was pointed out that the assessee did not claim that the employees were actively pursuing their claims and had taken any steps to recover their dues. No correspondence with the employees was filed to substantiate its argument that the amount was still outstanding, and even in the assessment proceedings it was unable to furnish full particulars about its employees. It was, therefore, argued that the liability had ceased. It is further argued that even if it was assumed that at some point the liability existed, the lapse of time and the resultant defence available to the assessee under the Limitation Act justified inclusion of these amounts as the income of the assessee on the ground of cessation of liability. It was claimed that the tribunal had not appreciated that the benefit had accrued to the assessee by virtue of the wage liability becoming time-barred.
The Delhi High Court noted the decisions cited on behalf of the revenue in the case of Kesoram Industries and Cotton Mills Ltd vs. CIT 196 ITR 845 (Cal), and in the case of CIT vs. Agarpara Co. Ltd. 158 ITR 78, where the Calcutta High Court had held, in the context of bonus payable to workmen which had remained outstanding for several years, that once bonus had been offered by the employer, but remained undrawn, it cannot be said that the liability subsisted even after the expiry of the time prescribed by the statute, particularly when there was no dispute pending regarding the payment of bonus. The Calcutta High Court had observed that under these circumstances, it may be inferred that  unclaimed or unpaid bonus was in excess of the requirement of the assessee, and therefore, to that extent, the liability had ceased.
The Delhi High Court observed that the view that the liability did not cease as long as it is reflected in the books and that mere lapse of the time given to the creditor or the workmen to recover the amount due did not efface the liability though it barred the remedy, was an abstract and theoretical one and did not ground itself in reality. According to the Delhi High Court, interpretation of laws, particularly fiscal and commercial legislation, was increasingly based on pragmatic realities, which meant that even though the law permitted the debtor to take all defences and successfully avoid liability, for abstract dualistic purposes, he would be shown as a debtor. According to the Delhi High Court, it would be illogical to say that the debtor or an employer holding
onto unpaid dues should be given the benefit of his showing the amount as a liability, even though he would be entitled in law to say that the claim for its recovery was time-barred, and continue to enjoy the amount.
The Delhi High Court also observed that Explanation 1 to section 41(1) used the term “shall include” and not the term “means”, which meant that there could be other means of deriving benefits by way of cessation or remission of liability. According to the Delhi High Court, even omission to pay over a period of time and the resultant benefit derived by the employer/assessee would qualify as a cessation of liability, though by operation of law. The Delhi High Court rejected the assessee’s argument that no period of limitation was provided for under the Industrial Disputes Act, by referring to the Supreme Court decision in the case of Nedungadi Bank Ltd. vs. K. P. Madhavankutty AIR 2000 SC 839, when the Supreme Court held that even though no period of limitation had been prescribed under that Act, a stale dispute where the employee approached the forum under the said Act after an inordinate delay could not be entertained, or adjudicated.
The Delhi High Court, therefore, held that there was a benefit derived by the employer by cessation or remission of liability and that the amount of outstanding workmen dues was taxable u/s. 41(1).
Observations
Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides that every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence. Section 18(1) of that Act provides that where, before the expiration of the prescribed period for a suit or application in respect of any property or right, an acknowledgment of liability in respect of such property or right has been made in writing signed by the party against whom such property or right is claimed, or by any person through whom he derives his title or liability, a fresh period
of limitation shall be computed from the time when the acknowledgment was so signed.
Therefore, the law of limitation merely bars filing of a suit for recovery of debts beyond the period of limitation. It does not bar payment of such amounts, where the debtor is willing to pay the liability.
As rightly observed by the Delhi High Court in Vardhaman Overseas’ case, as well as by other Courts, including the Supreme Court, the mere fact that recovery of a liability has been barred by limitation does not mean that the liability has ceased to exist. The assessee may still have the intention of paying off the liability, as and when demanded. Under such circumstances, taxing such liability would not be justified. Further, if such liability is subsequently paid off, the assessee would not be able to claim a deduction in the year of payment. Therefore, taxation of such outstanding amount, which is not written back, does not seem to be justified.
The Delhi High Court, in Chipsoft’s case, did not consider various other decisions of its own High Court, where the High Court had observed that disclosure of a liability in its Balance Sheet has the effect of extending the period of limitation, since it amounts to an acknowledgement of debt by the company for the purposes of section 18 of the Limitation Act. Further, it’s attention was also not drawn to its own earlier decisions in the case of Vardhaman Overseas and Hotline Electronics, where it had held that such amounts, suits for recovery of which may be barred by limitation, did not result in a benefit due to cessation or remission of liability.
Given the express observations of the Supreme Court in Bombay Dyeing’s and Sugauli Sugar Works’ cases, to the effect that a remission of a liability can only be granted by a creditor, and a cessation of the liability can only occur either by reason of operation of law, or by the debtor unequivocally declaring his intention not to honour his liability
when payment is demanded by the creditor, or by a contract between the parties or by discharge of the debt, the Delhi High Court does not seem justified in preferring to follow decisions of another High Court in preference to the decisions of the Supreme Court.
In Chipsoft’s case, the Delhi High Court relied to a great extent on the decisions of the Calcutta High Court in Agarpara’s and Kesoram’s cases. If one looks at the logic behind Agarpara’s case, it proceeds on the footing that the unpaid provision for bonus was an excess provision than that required under the law, and that it was, therefore, no longer
payable. Kesoram’s case dealt with unpaid wages, which were written back to the Profit & Loss Account. Following Agarpara’s case, the Calcutta High Court in Kesoram’s case held that considering the facts that the employer himself came to the conclusion that the unpaid amount of wages would not be claimed by the concerned employees, that it proceeded to forfeit such amount and wrote it back to the credit of the Profit & Loss Account, the reasonable inference that would follow from these facts and circumstances and the conduct of the assessee was that the amount which was provided for was not necessary and was an excess provision.
These facts were not present in Chipsoft’s case, as neither the employer had credited the amounts to the Profit & Loss Account nor were there any actions of the assessee to indicate that such amounts were no longer payable. In Chipsoft’s case, it was not proved by the revenue that such provision was an excess provision. Therefore, the application of the ratio of Agarpara’s and Kesoram’s cases to Chipsoft’s case does not seem to have been justified.
The decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Kohinoor Mills Ltd. vs. CIT 49 ITR 578, which was also a case dealing with unpaid wages, though these were written back to the Profit & Loss Account, was not brought to the attention of the Delhi High Court. The Bombay High Court, in that case, held:
“Where wages are payable but they are unclaimed and their recovery is barred by limitation, the position in law is that the debt subsists, notwithstanding that its recovery is barred by limitation. There is in such a case no ‘cessation of trading liability’ within the meaning of section 10(2A) and the amount of such wages cannot be added to the income.”
This view had been also confirmed by the Bombay High Court in the case of J. K. Chemicals Ltd. vs. CIT 62 ITR 34.
It also needs to be kept in mind that Explanation 1 to section 41(1) was inserted to expressly cover amounts written back by credit to the Profit & Loss Account. If the intention was to cover all liabilities outstanding beyond the period of limitation or beyond a particular period of time, whether written back or not, the explanation would have read differently. It would have provided for the specific year in which such debt, barred by limitation, is deemed to be income.
The view taken by the Delhi High Court in Vardhaman Overseas’ case, that such long outstanding amounts continuing as liabilities in the accounts, cannot be taxed u/s. 41(1), therefore, seems to be the better view of the matter.

Ring in the new!

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The month of April, the first month of the financial year, will witness events which will bring in significant changes in our lives. The first and foremost is the voting for the 16th Lok Sabha, which will commence this month. The world’s largest democracy is witnessing many firsts. A large number of youth (approximately 10 crore) will vote for the first time to make a difference. These are young citizens who were born at a time ,when, the Indian economy opened its doors to the world. They have not witnessed the freedom struggle or the License Raj that followed and have aspirations of achieving standards of living that match global standards.

The voters have three or four choices, the incumbent 10 year old coalition led by India’s oldest political party, which is challenged by a party whose face is perceived by some, to be that of a firm decision maker with a track record of development in his state while others see him as a force that will divide the nation, and the third choice is from a large number of regional outfits who have the interests of their respective States at heart. However, the most interesting is the fourth, a party who has been born out of a common man’s agitation against corruption, and claims to represent the “Aam Admi.” Another unique feature of this election is an option given to the voters to reject all candidates. I am hopeful that this election will strengthen our vibrant democracy. The only thing that is to be ensured is that all of us participate in this process and discharge our duty. This is the time to ink your finger and let it dry. What needs to rub off is your enthusiasm to vote and not the ink!

The second event is an attempt by the Apex Court to clean up the body that lords over India’s largest religion “cricket”. The court has given a lease of life to cricket’s most entertaining event, and has placed it in charge of a man who has always played with a straight bat. There are many who believe that the orders of the court transgress administrative rules and regulations. However, if these very same rules have been misused by those in charge, the Courts have very little choice. There may be many views on how the game should be played and how spectators should be entertained, but there can be no doubt that the game must be played honestly. Any person not doing so must face punishment. The players may earn as much as they can, but they must play the game with dignity and honour.

The third significant event is that of the notifications of 183 new sections of the Companies Act, 2013. They are to become effective from 1st April, 2014. The provisions and the draft rules substantially affect our profession. While many of us would believe that the responsibility cast is even more ominous than it was earlier, we will have to rise to the challenge. In the coming months, a lot will be written about these amendments.

The last but not the least important event is with respect to this Journal, our Society’s flagship. For 45 years this Journal has been a treasure of knowledge and has earned the respect of its readers. There are eminent professionals who have contributed to this Journal for decades, helping it to attain the stature that it enjoys. The Society has always kept pace with the times. It has recognised that the modes of communication have undergone a substantial change in the last decade. This generation reads newspapers on the net. When tax provisions have to be referred to, I instinctively reach for the Income-Tax Act, while my juniors reach for the mouse.

The decision to publish the BCAJ in the e-form, was taken during the time of my predecessor but the process took some time. The endeavour was that all the capabilities of the electronic medium should be utilised when the Journal is made available on the web. For this purpose, a dedicated website has been created. The issues of the past 10 years were uploaded on that website and a search facility was developed. The Journal website is www.bcajjournal.com .

From the month of April, the BCAJ will be available in e-form on the above website. To all the members of the Bombay Chartered Accountants’ society and the Journal subscribers the Journal will be available both in printed form as well as on the web. In order to give our readers across the globe who have not subscribed to the Journal or those who are only in netizens, a feel of the Journal, the access to the website will be available to all for one month from the publication of the April issue. The modalities will be announced on the Society’s website as well as the Journal website. Like all free things in life, this facility will be available for a limited time. From the month of May onwards, those who find our Journal valuable and I am sure many will, subscription will be available, details of which will be on both the sites referred to above.

Our endeavour is to maintain the highest standards of the journal and strive towards excellence. My appeal to all our readers whether subscribers or not, is to give us their feedback. We at the Society welcome it. So to all the Journal lovers, from the month of April, happy reading and happy viewing!

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The Piecemeal Living

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From the moment we are born, Mother Nature readily starts bestowing her grace upon us. Everything necessary for a smooth and healthy start of life is readily made available to us. All necessities are being taken care of with an utmost ease, as if Somebody is perfectly executing a well designed plan. From the very first breath, enlivening sunlight, mother’s feed, nature’s warmth and all other essentials are provided without any hassle. All things are beautifully and perfectly placed as if Someone has meticulously worked out our grand entry on this magnificent stage called world. Has it ever been heard that a baby is born with an anxiety of the source for his first breath? No, because all things generally necessary for a good, healthy, and sustainable living are adequately provided.

A question arises that if all is so skillfully worked out for us, why mankind is in a state of despair? Why are many of us living a life in piecemeal instead of enjoying it to the fullest? The answer to this is simple. As we grow, ignorance creeps in. Everything that is made available in abundance is neglected and attention shifts from “haves” to “have nots”. The feeling of being in a state of emptiness sets in; unaware of the fact that one is full in all respects. The irony is that we want more and more, not knowing that we already have plenty. The appreciation for having this beautiful life, fresh air, sound sleep, good family, caring friends has lost its way to gadgets, big cars and foreign holidays. Materialistic pleasures have taken over ‘true happiness’.

Today, one is not able to control one’s ‘desires’. Craving for material objects is affecting prudent decision making, in other words, prudent living. All actions are performed on selfish interests. There is an emphasis on wealth rather than values. Wealth is accumulating but man is decaying. Luxury is preferred over necessities and priorities are changing. Until a generation back, it was observed that the entire family saved on all fronts, to first own a house before anything else. Instances today are easily observed where even the learned professionals are found of preferring a car over a house. Availability of easy finances to meet indulgences in cars, mobile phones or holidays is changing our priorities. We are forgetting that it is easy to borrow for our comforts, but takes a lot to repay. It is not just the money that gets repaid in installments but life itself gets into an ‘installment mode’ and piecemeal living”.

It is easy to get out of this type of life. As a commerce student and accounting professional one has studied the principle of accounting for personal accounts – Debit the Receiver – Credit the Giver. From the very first day of our birth, there have been innumerable receipts in various forms from the world. Someone, above in the heavens, is debiting the account of every receiver for every single grabbing from the world. What would be the position of our account if we only receive and do not pay back in some form? There would be no credits in the account and one would depart indebted – which should not be the case.

The first step for repaying our debt is to start acknowledging the fact that God has been kind to grant us all that is necessary. It is only when we begin counting our blessings, will we be overwhelmed with gratitude for all that has been bestowed upon us – this would generate a feeling of abundance which would compel us to share with others, and get our account credited in Lord’s book of account s and make us live our life to its fullest potentials. I would conclude by saying:

Without any bounds, it is Lord’s grace,
All in plenty for mankind to embrace,
But mean is the world, thus lacking in His praise,
And searching for more in a strange race.
Forever let down with an attitude to seize,
Beautiful gifted life though, living in a piece,
Just a shift in view to see all’s there
Abundance on offer for a life of flair.

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The Editor, BCAJ, Mumbai.

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Dear Sir, Re: Accelerating Economic Growth – India needs State Level Reforms & Liberalisation

India’s GDP growth has halved from over 9% in 2010-11 to just 4.5% in the current year. Many economists, industrialists, investment analysts and business observers & advisors are demanding more economic reforms from the Government. Recently, the Union Cabinet has cleared projects worth more than Rs. 3 lakh crore. Yet, industrial growth remains below 2%, and the index of industrial production has actually fallen.

One really wonders: why so much effort is producing so little result? There are many shades of opinions, answers & suggestions. One of the important reasons is that though economic reforms at Central Level are essential they have stagnated. In a Federal Structure, we also need additional economic reforms at the State Level.

Gone are the days when an industrial licence was the key hurdle. Today, not just Union Government but the State Governments too have, in their worthy search for inclusiveness, created voluminous laws and regulations regarding conservation of environment, forests, tribal areas and land acquisition etc.

Even central regulations have to be implemented by officials in the State Secretariats and at district levels. The states themselves have to approve / grant many clearances / licenses/ permits/ NOCs relating to forests, tribal areas, environment, mining rights, pollution and land acquisition, power / water supply etc. Thus, hundreds of projects do not move forward.

The States need to rethink their approach towards economic growth. They have limited technical and bureaucratic capacity, and cannot easily handle even public law & order and task of providing various basic services to the public. The Doing Business 2013 report of the World Bank ranks India at only 134th of 189 countries in ease of doing business. India comes only 179th in ease of starting a business, 182nd in ease of getting a construction permit, 111th in getting an electric connection, 158th in paying taxes, 92nd in ease of registering property and 186th in enforcing contracts.

Most hurdles to doing business in India require state-level reforms, not just the central level. State governments are important actors in granting permissions / approvals / clearances to commence a business (particularly an Industrial Project), notably in the conversion of agricultural land into an industrial land.

Businessmen pay both central and state taxes, several times a year. They pay Corporate tax, Service tax, Excise Duty, Customs duty, Octroi, Municipal taxes, Sales tax / VAT, Entry tax and a host of other minor imposts, each entailing hours of paperwork. It is ridiculous that India is 158th in this respect despite having some of the best software companies in the world, which can surely devise simplified, quick tax payments.

One rarely hears a Chief Minister or a state level Finance Minister, Law Minister, Industries Minister, Revenue Minister or Urban Development Minister ever talking about State Level Economic Reforms or laying Road-map for the same. Therefore, we need to stop focusing on just macroeconomic or central government reforms. The most urgent reforms in many fields are needed at the state level and the time has come for voters to demand similar economic reforms in various arenas in their state.

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CA P. D. Kunte – A Tribute

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On the early morning of 21st December when I got the sad news of the demise of Mr. P. D. Kunte, I thought that it was truly the end of an era. Mr. Kunte or “Kuntesaheb” as we all respectfully addressed him, was a Guru for many of us who worked as his juniors.

Mr. Kunte came from a small town of Alibag in Raigad district. He came from a very humble background and stayed with his elder sister while doing his articleship in Mumbai. He started his firm around 1956 in Mumbai. During the first decade of his practice, he did not have too much work. He spent these years reading and gathering knowledge. He would tell us that this helped him a great deal when work started pouring in.

Around 1966-67, he started acquiring bigger clients like Aptes in Mumbai and Chowgules in Goa. These were followed by many more in the next few years – from Hero Group in Ludhiana, Kirloskar and Kalyani in Pune, Ghatge Patil in Kolhapur, Alfa Laval, WIMCO in Mumbai and so on. By mid-seventies, he had set up offices in as many as seven – eight cities across India and one at Dubai. At a time when most of the prominent firms were operating only out of Mumbai, he set up offices in smaller cities to cater to the local clients. Till mid-eighties, he would travel for more than 20 days in a month and work for 12 to 14 hours a day.

Mr. Kunte had many exceptional aptitudes. He had a deep knowledge of almost all the relevant Civil laws of the land. His speciality was to interconnect the provisions of different laws. He was brilliant in tax planning and used novel ideas which were his own. For example, in the early seventies, he created capital structure of two types of equity shares with different rights for private companies of his clients which helped to reduce wealth tax liability. For a few clients, he set up trusts in which creditors of the settlor were the primary beneficiaries and receipt by these creditors from the trusts were repayment of their dues and hence not an income. One important rule followed by Mr. Kunte was to read the relevant provisions of applicable laws before giving answer to any query. He would say that when you read the section from the angle of the problem, it gives you a new perspective. He would urge us to first read the sections, form our opinion and only then read the commentary and case laws. He never believed in giving off-the-cuff replies.

Mr. Kunte followed a strict regime of a very ethical practice. As a strict rule, neither he nor any of the partners or employees were allowed to acquire shares of companies that were clients of the firm. In 1985, he was a director in an MNC and was offered 50,000 shares at par whose market price on listing was expected to be much higher. He, however, refused the offer. His view was that a consultant should have absolutely no conflict of interest which would affect the fairness of his advice. This was at a time when there were no Insider Trading Regulations.

Mr. Kunte was a humble and simple man. Though he was advisor to many big industrialists, his personal ideology was of a socialist. He was philanthropic and would urge all of us to spend a portion of the income on charity. He himself set up a number of charitable trusts. One of the trusts ran a blind girls’ institution at Goregaon. He also helped many charitable organisations but strictly on anonymous basis. In the late seventies, he even donated his office at Hamam Street to Bombay Chartered Accountants’ Society. Through trusts on which he was a trustee, he helped BCA to set up a research fund and a library fund.

Finally, the biggest and lasting contribution of Mr. Kunte to the profession is the army of juniors that he trained. The training he imparted to all of us was exceptional. He would throw the problems at us and urge us to form our opinion and then discuss with him. During his professional career, he may have trained more than 20 highly successful juniors all of whom owe their success to him. He was the Guru to them in a truly “Gurukul” tradition where the juniors would stay at his house for many days and get trained. Although, his body has ceased to exist in this world, his soul would continue to live through all of us juniors whom he had trained.

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A Step Forward For Judicial Appointment

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One of the extraordinary features of the Indian system is the number of things, both big and small, that it eventually manages to get right. A recent example of the former was the decision by the Cabinet to install a Judicial Appointments Commission (JAC). Questions then arose about its status and the government has now decided to make it a constitutional body. Whenever this is done – and one must hope that it is done very soon – it will mark a fundamental change in the way India’s judiciary is run.

Article 124 of the Constitution says that the President of India, in consultation with the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, would appoint the judges. The Supreme Court took this to mean that neither the executive nor the legislature could have a say in the appointment and transfers of judges. The convention in respect of this is laid down very firmly indeed in the S. P. Gupta case in 1981, when memories of what the government had done to the judiciary during the Emergency were still very fresh and strong. The government has been grumbling since then. In 1993, the Supreme Court instituted a collegium system, which apparently diluted the power of the Chief Justice but did not abridge the judiciary’s right to appoint its own. In 1998, then President K. R. Narayanan made a Presidential reference questioning the collegium system. While this resulted in more guidelines for appointments and transfers, the core power remained with the judiciary. Since then, the executive has tried hard to put a different appointment system in place. The JAC is the final result.

The JAC will be headed by the Chief Justice of India. The other members are the law minister, two of the senior-most judges of the Supreme Court, the law secretary and – in an idea that has been borrowed from the United Kingdom – two “eminent” persons, to be chosen by the prime minister, the Chief Justice of India and leaders of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha. It would seem that in the ordinary course of things, there are now enough checks and balances. The criteria for becoming a member of the JAC should now be spelt out clearly. One niggling question remains, however: will this system abridge the independence of the judiciary in some unforeseen way? By its very nature, the unforeseen cannot be anticipated. However, it is possible that – just as it happens in any selection done by committees – there will still be some room for bargaining, which leads to the best judges not being appointed. Such outcomes could be minimized by ensuring open hearings, which limit the scope of such backroom deals. In any case, a simple application of a brute majority decision rule does not always lead to the best results; at the very least, such voting should also be embedded in an open and transparent exchange of reasons.

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DCIT vs. Virola International [2014] 42 taxmann.com 286 (Agra – Trib.) A.Y.: 2008-09, Dated: 14 February 2014

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S/s. 40(a)(i), 195 of the Act – retrospective amendment to law cannot result in tax deduction default and consequent disallowance u/s. 40(a)(i) as section 40(a)(i) is attracted only to payments subject to tax deduction at the time of payment.

Facts:
The taxpayer was an exporter. During the relevant year, it had made payments to certain non-residents for ‘design and development expenses’ without deducting tax u/s. 195 of the Act. According to the taxpayer, the payments were not in nature of FTS, either u/s. 9(1)(vii) or under the relevant DTAAs. Further, none of the payees had a PE in India. Hence, there was no obligation on the taxpayer to deduct tax. However, invoking section 40(a)(i) of the Act, the AO disallowed the payments.

Held:
The Tribunal held as follows.

• Under Article 141 of the Constitution of India, the law laid down by Supreme Court, in Ishikawajma- Harima Heavy Industries Ltd. vs. DIT was binding. Accordingly, unless the technical services were rendered in India, the fees for such services could not be taxed u/s. 9(1)(vii).

• Tax withholding obligation depends on the law existing at the point of time when payments subject to withholding obligation are made. At the time when the taxpayer made the payments to nonresidents and till 8th May 2010, the law laid down by Supreme Court was binding.

• Disallowance u/s. 40(a)(i) is attracted not per se to payments made to non-residents but for payments which are subject to tax deduction but tax has not been deducted4 .

• There was no material to establish that the services, for which payments were made, were rendered in India. Therefore, there was no obligation on taxpayer to deduct tax u/s. 195 r.w.s. 9(1)(vii).

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Sumitomo Corporation vs. DCIT [2014] 43 taxmann.com 2 (Delhi – Trib.) A.Ys.: 1992-93 to 1996-97, Dated: 27 February 2014

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Article 5(4), 7, 12 of India-Japan DTAA; S/s. 115A of the Act – On facts, supervision fee was not effectively connected with LO or other PEs. Also, minimum period for service PE was not met; and hence, supervision fee was taxable as FTS under Article 12 and not as business profit under Article 7.

Facts:
The taxpayer was a Japanese company. The taxpayer had established a Liaison Office (“LO”) in India to facilitate1 imports for certain projects that it has undertaken in India. The taxpayer established three project offices (“POs”) in connection with its three projects in India. The contracts for these projects were secured by the Head Office (“HO”) of the taxpayer. One of the projects was for Maruti Udyog Ltd (“MUL”). While in some of the contracts the taxpayer was to supply and install the equipment, under other contracts, MUL was to install the equipment and the taxpayer was merely to supervise the installation. For such supervision, it received supervision fee for supervising installation of equipment supplied by it.

According to the taxpayer, it did not have PE in India and hence, supervision fee could not be taxed as business profit under Article 7 of India-Japan DTAA but was taxable as FTS under Article 12(2).

However, according to the AO, LO and POs of the taxpayer constituted its PE; it was not necessary to have different PE for each project; and supervision period for all projects was to be aggregated to count the threshold period for a PE. The AO concluded that supervision fee received by taxpayer was effectively connected with PE and was taxable under Article 72 .

Held:
The Tribunal held as follows3.

Existence of PE for supervision activities.

• Article 12(5) is on the line of OECD Model Convention which provides that income should arise as a result of the activities of the PE and that only profits which are economically attributable to a PE are taxable. The state where the PE is located can tax the income only if a connection exists, between the income and the PE. Thus, Article 12(5) of the tax treaty does not have force of attraction principle.

• Article 7 will apply if the beneficial owner of the FTS carries on business in India (in which the FTS arises) through a PE and the contract in respect of which FTS is paid, is effectively connected with that PE. Though the taxpayer had PE in respect of two projects, supervision fee was not attributable to either PE.

• Under Article 12(5), to be ‘effectively connected’, apart from the economic connection with the PE, the connection must be real in substance and income producing activities should be closely connected. LO was only facilitating communication and nowhere involved in supervision. Mere existence of LO cannot result in taxpayer having supervisory PE in India.

Different projects and threshold period for service PE.

• Each purchase order was procured by head office of taxpayer through competitive bidding on global tender floated by MUL under different terms and conditions and none was linked to others.

• Different performance guarantees were given for different work.

• Installation and supervision under each purchase order was done independently. Also, no purchase order was dependent on completion of work under any other purchase order.

• Test of minimum period had to be determined for each site or installation project and period of supervision under each contract was less than the requirement of 180 days under Article 5(4).

• Therefore, no PE of taxpayer existed in India. Accordingly, supervision fee had to be taxed as FTS under Article 12 and not as business profit under Article 7 of India-Japan DTAA.

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Exemption from late fee u/s. 20(6) of the MVAT Act Trade Circular 8T of 2014 dated. 11-03-2014.

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By this Circular, the Commissioner has explained different contingencies in which late fee would be exempt.

Notification No. VAT 1513/CR-109/Taxation-1 dated 13-01-2014

By this Notification Schedule Entry D-11 has been amended to add more areas.

Notification No. VAT 1514/CR-8/Taxation-1 dated 20-02-2014

By this Notification Schedule Entry A-9A: paddy rice, wheat, etc.; A-51: papad, gur, etc.; A-59: raisins and currants, C-108: tea in leaf or powdered form etc., have been amended by extending the period up to 31st March, 2015.

Notification No. VAT 1514/CR-10/Taxation-1 dated 20-02-2014

By this Notification Schedule Entry B-1, B-2 has been amended by reducing rate from 1.1% to 1 % again.

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Revised returns to be filed by developers Trade Circular 7T of 2014 dated. 21-02-2014

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In terms of amendment in Rule 58 of the MVAT Act, the developers can file revised returns for the period from 20-06-2006 to 31-12-2013 up to 30-04-2014. The developer who have already been assessed can make their claim before the Appellate Authority. In case of cancellation of the assessment u/s. 23(11), they can claim, before the Assessing Authority passing, the fresh assessment order. Developer can revise the returns even in cases where notice of assessment is received.

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Extension for filing Audit Report in Form 704 for F.Y. 2012-13 by developers

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Trade Circular 6T of 2014 dated 21-02-2014

In case of the developers (Other than those opting for composition scheme), if MVAT Audit report for the F. Y. 2012-13 is filed up to 31st March, 2014 it is decided administratively not to levy penalty u/s. 61(2) of the MVAT Act.

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Exemption w.r.t. rice

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Notification No. 04/2014-ST read with Circular No.177/03/2014 – ST dated 17th February, 2014

This Notification has been issued by CBEC for implementing the changes proposed in the Interim Budget presented by the Finance Minister.

The Notification amends Mega Exemption Notification No. 25/2012-ST to provide that service tax would not be payable on rice from the staple’s loading to the storage stage. It may be noted that rice was originally exempt from service tax. However, later, the Finance Ministry had taken a view that only paddy is an agricultural produce, while rice is a processed item.

This notification also exempts services provided by cord blood banks by way of preservation of stem cells or any other service in relation to such preservation.

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Hotel Ashoka (Indian Tour. Dev. Cor. Ltd) vs. Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes and Another, [2012] 48 VST 443 (SC).

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Sale in Course of Import or Export – Sale of
Goods In Air Port – By Duty Free Shop – Is Sale in Course of Imports,
section 5 (2) of The Central Sales Tax Act, 1956.

FACTS:
The
appellant dealer is managed by the Indian Tourism Department
Corporation having duty free shops at all major international air ports
in India. At the duty free shops, the dealer sold several articles
including liquor to foreigners and also to Indians, who are going abroad
or coming to India by air. The dealer claimed the sale of goods to
customers as sale in course of Import and the goods were delivered
before importing the goods or before the goods had crossed the customs
frontiers of India. The Karnataka sales tax authorities levied tax while
passing an assessment order on such sales made by the duty free shop at
Bengaluru. The dealer filed writ petition before the Karnataka High
Court against the said assessment order. The Karnataka High Court
dismissed the Writ Petition on the ground that the dealer had not
exhausted equally efficacious alternative remedy available to it under
the provisions of the Act. The dealer filed a special Leave Petition
before the SC against the said judgment of the High Court.

HELD:
It
is an admitted fact that the goods were imported by the dealer from
foreign countries and were kept in a bonded warehouse and they were
transferred to duty free shops situated at the Bengaluru International
Airport, as and when the stock of goods lying at the duty free shops was
exhausted. When the goods are kept in bonded warehouses, it cannot be
said that the said goods had crossed the customs frontiers of India. The
goods are not cleared from the customs till they are brought in India
by crossing the customs frontiers. When any transaction takes place
outside the customs frontiers of India, the transaction would be said to
have taken place outside India. Though the transaction might take place
within India but technically looking to the provisions of section 2(11)
of the Customs Act and Article 286 of the constitution, the said
transaction would be said to have taken place outside India.

The
SC further held that submissions of the department with regard to the
sale not taking effect by transfer of document of title to the goods are
absolutely irrelevant. The Transfer of document of title to the goods
is one of the methods whereby delivery of goods is effected. The
delivery may be physical also. At the duty free shops, goods are sold to
the customers by giving physical delivery, it would not mean the sales
were taxable under the Act. Accordingly, the SC allowed the SLP filed by
the dealer and quashed the assessment so far as the transactions which
were the subject matter of the litigation.

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Larsen & Turbo Limited vs. State of Orissa And Others, [2012] 48 VST 435 (or Orissa)

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Value Added Tax – Works Contract – Taxable Turnover – Deduction Provided For Other Like Charges – No Rules Framed to Prescribed “Other Like Charges” –Provisions Uncertain and Unworkable, section 11(2) ( c) of The Orissa Value Added Tax Act, 2004 and R 6(e) of The Orissa Value Added Tax Rules 2005.

FACTS:
The dealer filed a Writ Petition before The Orissa High Court to declare Provision of section 11(2) (c) of The Orissa Value Added Tax Act, 2004 as well as rule 6(e) of The Orissa Value Added Tax Rules, 2005 unworkable.

HELD:
Section 11(2)( c) of The Act provides for deduction towards labour, service charges and other like charges, the Rule 6(e) provides for deduction of labour and service charges only from the gross turnover to arrive at the taxable turnover in respect of works contract. Thus, even though section 11(2) (c ) provides deduction towards “ Other like charges” besides labour and service charges, the rules do not provide any such deductions. When the statute provides that something is to be prescribed in the rules then that thing must be provided in the rules with a view to making the provision workable and valid. Thus, if the measure of tax is not provided either under the Act or under the rules, the levy itself becomes uncertain and such uncertainty proves fatal to the validity of the taxing statute. To avoid such uncertainty, the State Government was directed by the High Court to amend rule 6(e) to bring in line with judgment of the SC in the Gannon Dunkerley’s case [1993] 88 STC 204 (SC) and the Commissioner of Sales Tax was directed to issue suitable instructions to all the taxing authorities to allow various deductions from the gross turnover to arrive at the taxable turnover in respect of the works contract in terms of decision of the SC in the Gannon Dunkerley’s case. The High Court allowed writ Petitions with the aforesaid directions/observations.

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Commissioner of Trade Tax U. P. Lucknow vs. Project Technologist Pvt. Ltd. [2012] 48 VST 406 (All)

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Central Sales Tax – Penalty- Issue of C Form- Representation That Goods Purchased are Covered by Registration Certificate-No Mensrea- Penalty Not Justified, SS 10(b) and 10A of The Central Sales Tax Act, 1956.

FACTS:
The dealer purchased cable and light fittings against Form C, thereby giving a declaration that the goods purchased are covered by a registration certificate. The department imposed penalty u/s. 10A read with section 10(b) of the CST Act on the ground that the goods were not covered by a registration certificate issued to the dealer. In appeal, filed by the dealer, the Tribunal set aside the order levying penalty. The department filed a revision Petition before the Allahabad High Court against the said order of the Tribunal.

HELD:
In view of provisions of sections 10(b) and 10A of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, a penalty can be imposed if the dealer has made a false representation. Where there is a bona fide act of the dealer, being under a bona fide belief that the goods in question are covered by the registration certificate then the provision for imposing penalty u/s. 10(b) does not apply. Thus, no penalty can be imposed. Though, under the registration certificate the dealer was authorised to import ‘consumables’, the items “cables and light fittings” were not specifically mentioned in the registration certificate, still the use of the word “ consumables” in the registration certificate showed that the dealer did not import “cables and light fittings” under any mala fide intentions. Accordingly, the High Court dismissed the revisions petition filed by the department and confirmed the order of the Tribunal knocking off the levy of penalty imposed by the lower authority.

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[2014] 42 taxmann.com 396 (New Delhi – CESTAT) – Aksh Technologies Ltd. vs. CCE.

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Whether CENVAT credit can be disallowed in the hands of the service receiver on the ground that it was subsequently held that the input services were not liable to tax – Held, No.

Facts:
The three issues involved in this case were, (i) whether the appellant was required to pay Service tax on services received prior to 18-04-2006 when section 66A was introduced in the Finance Act, 1994 (ii) whether Service tax liability in such cases could have been discharged through the CENVAT credit (iii) whether the appellant could have taken credit of the Service tax paid by debiting the CENVAT account (since the services itself were not liable to Service tax).

Held:
The first two issues were decided in favour of the assessee relying upon the decision of Indian National Shipowners Association vs. Union of India [2009] 18 STT 212 (Bom.) and Nahar Industrial Enterprises Ltd. [2012] 35 STT 391 (Punj. & Har) respectively. As regards the third issue, the Hon’ble Tribunal held that, there was no dispute that the impugned services were input services and then in such circumstances, the credit taken under CENVAT Credit Rules cannot be disputed for the reason that later it was decided that the appellant need not have paid the service tax.

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[2014] 42 taxmann.com 51 (Allahabad) – CCE vs. Juhi Alloys Ltd.

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Rule 9(3) of CCR- What constitutes reasonable steps to ensure the validity of the CENVAT?

Facts:
The Assessee took credit of duty paid on inputs based on invoices issued by the First Stage Dealer (FSD). Inputs were used for the manufacture of final products which were cleared against the payment of duty. The Department sought to deny credit on the ground that original manufacturer of said goods was found to be non-existent.

The Commissioner (Appeals) observed that in terms of Rule 7(4) read with Rule 9(5) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2002 (CCR), the assessee submitted Form 31 issued by Trade Tax Department, the ledger account evidencing payments by cheques made to the FSD and Form RG 23-A, Part-II. It was held that the assessee had received goods against the invoices of FSD for which payment was made by cheque and that the manufactured goods were cleared against the payment of central excise duty. He, therefore, allowed the Appeal on the ground that the transaction was bona fide and a buyer can take only those steps which are within his control and would not be expected to verify the records of the supplier to check whether, in fact, he had paid duty on the goods supplied by him. Tribunal also observed that, the fact that FSD is a registered dealer is undisputed and held that, it would be sufficient for the assessee to buy the goods from the FSD whose status he has checked and verified and dismissed the Revenue’s Appeal.

Before the High Court, the Revenue contended that the assessee ought to have made an enquiry which would have indicated that the original manufacturer that had supplied the raw material was a fictitious entity.

Held:
The Hon’ble High Court while examining the provisions of Rule 9(3) of CCR held that, the Explanation to Rule 9(3) provides a deeming definition as to when a manufacturer or a purchaser of excisable goods would be deemed to have taken reasonable steps. However, even in a situation where the Explanation to Rule 9(3) is not attracted, it would be open to an assessee to establish independently that he had in fact taken reasonable steps. Whether an assessee has in fact taken reasonable steps, is a question of fact. The High Court observed that both fact finding authorities found that assessee have duly acted with all reasonable diligence in its dealings with the first stage dealer and held that, the assessee has taken reasonable steps to ensure that the inputs for which the CENVAT credit was taken were the goods on which appropriate duty of excise was paid within the meaning of Rule 9(3) of CCR.

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[2014] 42 taxmann.com 64 (Jharkand HC) – CCE vs. Tata Motors Ltd

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Whether the CENVAT Credit on inputs can be denied to the receiver of input on the grounds that supplier of raw materials did not deposit duty to the Government? Held, No.

Facts:
The assessee claimed the MODVAT credit in respect of the inputs supplied to the assessee on the strength of invoices issued to it. The full amount of invoices was paid by the appellant to the supplier. The inputs supplied were excisable items was also not in dispute. The MODVAT credit was denied only on the ground that the supplier did not actually deposit the excise duty payable on the said inputs supplied to the assessee. The Revenue relying upon Rule 57G contended that, unless the duty was paid on inputs, no MODVAT credit can be availed by the assessee. Reliance was also placed on the decision in the case of IDL Chemicals Ltd. vs. CCE 1996 (88) ELT 710 (Tri – Cal.).

Held:
The Hon’ble High Court held that, once a buyer of inputs receives invoices 17 of excisable items, unless factually established to the contrary, the buyer is entitled to assume that the excise duty has been/ will be paid by the supplier on the excisable inputs. It would be most unreasonable and unrealistic to expect the buyer of such inputs to go and verify the accounts of the supplier or to find out from the department of Central Excise whether duty has actually been paid on the inputs by the supplier. No business can be carried out like this and the law does not expect the impossible. The High Court overruled the decision in the case of IDL Chemicals relied upon by the Revenue holding it as incorrect.

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[2014] 42 taxmann.com 347 (Mumbai – CESTAT) – Umasons Auto Compo (P.) Ltd.

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In respect of services covered under RCM, if service tax is undisputedly paid by the service provider, whether it can be once again demanded from service receiver? Held, No.

Facts:
Both the adjudication authority and the Commissioner (Appeals) confirmed the demand on the ground that the appellant being recipient of GTA service is liable to pay Service tax. The Appellant contended that, he has paid Service tax to the service provider and service provider in turn has paid the same to the Government. The revenue submitted that, in such case, service receiver was not discharged of its statutory liability and if the Service tax is paid by service provider he can seek refund thereof.

Held:
The Tribunal observed that there is no dispute regarding payment of Service tax by the provider of GTA service and therefore held that once the amount of Service tax is accepted by the Revenue from the provider of GTA service, it cannot be again demanded from the recipient of the GTA service.

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[2014] 42 taxmann.com 343 (Chennai – CESTAT) (LB)- Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd vs. Commissioner of Service Tax.

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Whether the CENVAT Credit can be utilised for payment of Service tax on GTA service under reverse charge for the period post 19-04-2006? Held, Yes

Facts:
The Assessee received goods transport agency’s (GTA) service and paid Service tax thereon under reverse charge utilising the CENVAT credit during the period April 2006-September 2006.

The Revenue’s contention was that since the GTA service were not output service, they are not entitled to use the CENVAT credit for payment of Service tax on such services. The Revenue further contended that since the issue was from April, 2006 to September, 2006 and the legal fiction given to the said service to treat as output service, as defined in Rule 2(p) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 (CCR) was withdrawn with effect from 19-04-2006 inasmuch as Explanation thereto was deleted, the ratio of Nahar Industrial Enterprises Ltd. [2012] 35 STT 391 (Punj. & Har) (which was in the context of pre-amended period) is not applicable to this case. The Revenue also relied upon the decision of Single Member Decision in the case of Uni Deritend Ltd. vs. CC&CE [2012] 34 STT 356/17 taxmann.com 102 (Mum) rendered in the context of post amendment period in support of its contention.

The Assessee contended that, the fact of withdrawal/ deletion of explanation to Rule 2(p) of CCR did not have much effect inasmuch as no amendment was made in the provisions of Rule 2(r) “provider of taxable service” of CCR which included a person liable to pay Service tax. Assessee submitted that, since the assessee was liable to pay Service tax in respect of GTA service received by him, he is a provider of taxable service and consequently he is covered by the definition of output service. He also relied upon the decision of Division Bench in the case of Shree Rajasthan Syntex Ltd. 2011 (24) STR 670 (Tri-Del).

Held:
Accepting the assessee’s contention and approving the decision in the case of Shree Rajasthan Syntex (supra), it was held that the assessee being recipient of services from the GTA was liable to pay the Service tax and as such, he is provider of taxable Service in terms of Rule 2(r) and consequently gets covered by output service definition as appearing in Rule 2(p) of the Rules. It further held that deletion of explanation with effect from 18-04-2006 from Rule 2(p) of the CCR would not make much difference.

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2014 (33) STR 422 (Tri-Chennai) Uniworld Logistics Private Limited vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, Chennai

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Whether profit earned on ocean freight is exigible to Service tax under ‘Business Auxiliary Service’?

Tribunal took a prima facie view that, Service tax is not applicable on the profit earned on ocean freight by Appellant and its foreign counterparts while granting unconditional stay against Order of department demanding Service tax under ‘Business Auxiliary Service’.

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2014 (33) STR 376 (Tri-Delhi) Ester Industries Limited vs. CCE, Meerut –II

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Whether shortage of materials in an internal statement of stock taking is a ground for denial of CENVAT credit?

Facts:
The Appellant, a manufacturer of Polyester Films, availed the CENVAT credit on various inputs and capital goods. During the departmental audit, Revenue noticed shortage in raw materials as per internal stock statement and accordingly, demanded the duty to the extent of credit involved in the differential value of materials. The Appellant contended that there were no actual shortage and offered to provide the reconciliation.

Held:
The Tribunal observed that the entire case was on account of shortage of cenvatable inputs as per statement of the Appellant and there was no allegation or evidence that the said inputs were not received or cleared without duty payment, hence the order was set aside.

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[2014] 41 taxmann.com 287 (New Delhi – CESTAT) Roca Bath Room Products (P.) Ltd. vs. CCE, Jaipur

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Pre-deposit waiver – Reversal of CENVAT credit in respect of inputs, input services used in manufacture of non-dutiable capital goods used and thereafter sold as scrap.

Facts:
The Appellant, a manufacturer of sanitary-ware made Plaster of Paris (POP) moulds. For the manufacture of POP moulds, it used propane gas and input services in respect of which the CENVAT credit was taken. After its use, the POP moulds were sold as waste. The department was of the view that since, in respect of manufacture of POP moulds, CENVAT credit on inputs and input services has been availed, as per the provisions of Rule 3(5A) of CCR, 2004, at the time of clearance of such scrap, an amount equal to excise duty on transaction value shall be payable. The Appellant contended that, Rule 3(5A) of CCR, 2004 is applicable only where the CENVAT credit taken on capital goods have been cleared after use, as scrap, while in this case, neither any duty has been paid on POP moulds nor credit of that duty has been taken; that POP scrap is non-excisable and hence in any case, no duty is payable on POP scrap.

Held:
Tribunal held that, prima facie, Rule 3(5A) of CCR, 2004 applies to those cases where the CENVAT credit was availed on capital goods after use in the factory are cleared as scrap and waste and only in such situation an amount equal to the duty on transaction value of such scrapped capital goods is required to be reversed. In this case, POP moulds cannot be said to be cenvated capital goods, as the CENVAT credit has been taken of the duty/service tax paid on inputs/input services, not of excise duty on POP moulds. Accordingly pre-deposit of duty, interest and penalty was waived.

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DCIT vs. Swarna Tollway Pvt. Ltd. In the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal Hyderabad Bench ‘A’, Hyderabad Before Chandra Poojari, (A. M.) and Asha Vijayaraghavan, (J. M.) ITA No. 1184 to 1189/Hyd/2013 Asst. Years : 2005-06 to 2010-11. Decided on 16.01.2014 Counsel for Revenue/Assessee: P. Soma Sekhar Reddy/I. Rama Rao

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Facts:
The assessee was awarded the contract by the NHAI for widening, rehabilitation and maintenance of the existing two-lane highway into a four-lane on BOT basis. The entire cost of construction of Rs. 714.61 crore was borne by the assessee. The assessee claimed depreciation for the years under appeal. The AO held that no ownership, leasehold or tenancy rights were ever vested with the assessee for the assets in question, i.e., roads, in respect of which it had claimed depreciation and, therefore, disallowed the depreciation claimed on the highways.

On appeal by the assessee, the CIT(A) observed that though the NHAI remained the legal owner of the site with full powers to hold, dispose of and deal with the site consistent with the provisions of the agreement, the assessee had been granted not merely possession but also right to enjoyment of the site and NHAI was obliged to defend this right and the assessee has the power to exclude others. In view thereof and relying on certain decisions he held that the assessee was entitled for depreciation. Against this, the Revenue went in appeal before the tribunal.

Held:
The tribunal referred to the decision of the Apex court in the case of Mysore Minerals Ltd. vs. CIT (239 ITR 775) wherein the meaning of word “owner” was explained. In the said case, the Court had allowed the assessee’s claim for depreciation where the title deeds were not executed and possession was given. Further, the tribunal referred to the case of CIT v. Podar Cement (P.) Ltd. (226 ITR 625) (S.C.) where the Court considered the meaning of the word “owner” in section 22 and held that the owner is a person, who is entitled to receive income from the property in his own right. Further, relying on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of R.B. Jodha Mal Kuthiala vs. CIT (82 ITR 570), the Allahabad High Court in the case of CIT vs. Noida Toll Bridge Co. Ltd. (213 Taxman 333) and of the Hyderabad tribunal in the case of M/s. PVR Industries Ltd. (ITA No. 1171, 1175/Hyd/07 and 1176, 1196/Hyd/08 dated 08-06- 2011), dismissed the appeal filed by the revenue.

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Sale vs. Exchange

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Synopsis

This Article explores the difference in law between the terms “sale” and “exchange” which are both a mode of transferring property. Various Supreme Court and Other decisions have analysed this difference. The difference also has a bearing on the tax treatment of a sale and an exchange. Recently, the issue has gained importance because of the question of taxation of a slump exchange as compared to a slump sale.

Introduction

“A Rose by Any Other Name Smells As Sweet”— Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet

While Shakespeare may be right in several cases, when it comes to the transfer of property, there is a difference between ‘Sale’ and ‘Exchange’. Property, whether movable or immovable, can be transferred in a variety of ways, such as, sale, gift, lease, mortgage, exchange, etc. Each of these terms has a different meaning and are not synonyms for one another. What is a sale and what is an exchange has often been the subject-matter of discussion under Tax and other Laws since the consequences of the same vary. Recently, the issue has come into sharp focus because of various decisions under the Income-tax Act dealing with the concept of Slump Exchange. Let us examine the meaning associated with these terms in law.

Meaning of Sale The Transfer of Property Act, 1882 defines sale (in respect of immovable property) to mean a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promise or part-paid and part-promised. In Samaratmal vs. Govind, (1901) ILB 25 Bom 696. The word ‘ price’ as used in the sections relating to sales in the Transfer of Property Act was held to be in the sense of money.

The Sale of Goods Act, 1930 which deals with the law relating to sale of goods is also relevant. It defines a contract of sale to mean a contract whereby the seller transfers property in goods to the buyer for a price. Where under such a contract, the goods are transferred by the seller, then the contract is called a sale. Thus, price is an essential element under both the Acts. This Act defines the term price to mean money consideration for a sale of goods. Thus, the Sale of Goods Act is very specific in respect of the definition of ‘price’.

Meaning of Exchange An exchange on the other hand, is defined by the same Act to mean a mutual transfer of the ownership of one thing for the ownership of another thing and neither thing nor both thing being money only. The definition of exchange covers both immovable property as well as novable property/goods. Thus, the absence of money is the hallmark of an exchange. A part of the consideration may be in the form of money but there must be something more which must be in kind. E.g., Mr. A lives on a 3 bedroom flat on the 1st floor of a building and he also owns a 2 bedroom flat on the 5th floor of the same building. His neighbour Mr. X lives in a 2 bedroom flat on the 1st floor of the same building. Mr. A and Mr. X agree to swap their 2 bedroom flats, by which Mr. A becomes the owner of both the flats on the 1st floor while Mr. X now owns a flat on the 5th floor. This is a transaction of exchange. In case the properties are of different values, then some money consideration may be paid to neutralise the exchange. However, the transaction yet remains one of an exchange – Fathe Singh vs. Prith Singh AIR 1930 All 426.

Difference As opposed to a sale transaction, the fundamental difference is the absence of money as consideration. However, a sale can also take place where instead of the buyer paying the seller, some debt owed by the seller to the buyer is set-off. That does not make the transaction one of an exchange. For instance in Panchanan Mondal vs. Tarapada Mondal, 1961 (1) I.L.R.(Cal) 619, the seller agreed to sell a property to the buyer for a certain price by one document and by a second document he also agreed to buy another property of the buyer for the same amount. Instead of the buyer paying the seller and vice-versa, they agreed to set-off the two amounts. It was held that the transactions were for execution of two Sale Agreements and not for a Deed of Exchange.

The distinction between a sale and an exchange transaction has been very succinctly brought out by three Supreme Court decisions under the Income-tax Act:

(a) CIT vs. Ramakrishna Pillai (R.R.), 66 ITR 725 (SC)

The Court explained the distinction between an exchange and a sale by an illustration of a person selling his business to a company in exchange for its shares and a person selling his business for money and using that money for subscribing to the shares of that company. The Court held,

“……….. Where the person carrying on the business transfers the assets to a company in consideration of allotment of shares, it would be a case of exchange and not of sale,..”

(b) CIT vs. Motors and General Stores (P.) Ltd., 66 ITR 692 (SC)

This was also a case of a sale of business to a company in exchange for shares of that company. The board of directors of a company executed a deed styled “exchange deed” whereby the company transferred all the assets of its cinema house for a consideration in the shape of certain preference shares in a sugar company. The question was whether the transaction was a sale? The Supreme Court held:

“………..that in essence the transaction …….was one of exchange and there was no sale of the assets of the cinema house for any money consideration …………

Sale is a transfer of property in goods ………… for a money consideration. But in exchange there is a reciprocal transfer of interest in immovable property, a corresponding transfer of interest in movable property being denoted by the word “barter”. The difference between a sale and an exchange is this, that in the former the price is paid in money, whilst in the latter it is paid in goods by way of barter .The presence of money consideration is an essential element in a transaction of sale. If the consideration is not money but some other valuable consideration it may be an exchange or barter but not a sale.”

(c) CIT vs. B. M. Kharwar 72 ITR 603 (SC) ” Where the person carrying on the business transfers the assets to a company in consideration of allotment of shares, it would be a case of exchange, and not of sale, ……. ”

These decisions have very clearly laid down that the difference between a sale and an exchange is that in a sale the price is always paid in money, whilst in an exchange it is always paid in goods by way of barter. The presence of money consideration is an essential element in a transaction of sale. If the consideration is not money but some other valuable consideration it may be an exchange or barter but not a sale.

Each of the parties to an exchange are both a buyer and a seller of property and hence, each of them has the rights which a seller has and is subjected to the liabilities and obligations of a buyer. This is an unique feature of an exchange since a person plays a dual role of a seller as well as a buyer. The decision in the case of Kama Sahu vs. Krishna Sahu, 1954 AIR(Ori) 105 also throws light on this issue:

“…..It appears from this definition that a sale should always be for a price, but in the case of exchange the transfer of the ownership of one thing is not for any price paid or promised, but for transfer of another thing in return….. If in case a transfer of ownership of an immovable property is exchanged for money, then the transaction cannot be an exchange, but a sale. It being so, unless the properties of both parties are simultaneously transferred in favour of each other, the title to the property cannot pass in favour of the one when the other party does not execute any such document in favour of the other. Exchange can be effected either by one document or by different documents. The consideration for the one document executed in pursuance of an agreement for exchange is the execution of a document by the other party. Unless it is so done, the party who has taken the deed from the other party without himself executing any document in favour of that other party, cannot claim to have got a valid title to the property until and unless he executes a similar document transferring his interest in favour of that other party. …… In the case of an exchange, the intention of parties cannot but be that there should be a reciprocal transfer of two things at the same time and that until such a thing is done, the passing of title under the one document executed in pursuance of the contract, should always be postponed till after the execution of the another document by the other party…”

There cannot be an exchange if the parties to the transaction are not the same. In the case of Than Singh and Ors. vs. Nandu Kirpa Jat and Ors., 1978 AIR(P&H) 94, a Deed of Exchange was executed for two immovable properties between two persons. On the very same day, one of the persons to the Deed of Exchange executed a Sale Deed in respect of the property which she received under the Deed of Exchange. It was contended that the exchange was actually a sale. The Court considered the definition of the terms and held:

“….The deed in question fully complies with the requisites of exchange in terms of S. 118 of the Transfer of Property Act and it admits of no other interpretation except that of exchange. The subsequent transaction may be on the same day but it is not between the same parties. Hence it cannot be said that the deed in fact is a cloak on sale and is not an exchange…”

In Sardara Singh vs. Harbhajan Singh, 1974 AIR(P&H) 345, the Court held that Chapter III of the Transfer of Property Act deals with sales of immovable prop-erty, Chapter IV deals with mortgages of immovable property and charges, Chapter V deals with leases of immovable property, and Chapter VI deals with exchanges. Hence, the very scheme of the Act clearly shows that the sales, mortgages, leases and exchanges of the immovable property are dealt with on totally different footings and it is futile to urge that one takes colour from the other.

Tax Consequences of an Exchange
An exchange is a transfer u/s. 2(47) of the Income-tax Act. Hence, an exchange would give rise to capital gains in the hands of the transferor. If the property is immovable property then the provisions of section 50C / section 43CA of deemed sale consideration would also apply. The transferor would be taxed with reference to the fair market value of the property received by him in exchange for the property given up by him. Thus, it becomes important to arrive at a valuation of the property received as well as the property transferred. Unlike in the case of a sale, where the full value of consideration is to be taxed (except in case of deeming fictions, such as, section 50C) , in the case of an exchange one taxes the fair market value of the property received in exchange. This is a very important distinction between the two.

Stamp Duty is payable on an Deed of Exchange. The higher of the values of the two properties would form the basis for levying stamp duty. The rate of stamp duty is the same as applicable on a conveyance.

Taxation of a Slump Exchange
While on the subject of Sale vs. Exchange, we may also consider the position of a ‘slump exchange’. In the case of a slump exchange, all the assets and li-abilities relating to an undertaking is transferred to a buyer company and in consideration for the same, the buyer company issues its equity shares to the seller entity. Section 2(42C) of the Income-tax Act, defines a slump sale as transfer of one or more undertaking for lump sum consideration without values being assigned to individual assets and liabilities in such a sale. The capital gain arising on a slump sale is computed as per the provisions of section 50B of the Income-tax Act.

However, how does one compute capital gains in the case of a slump exchange? As discussed above, a sale requires that the consideration be in the form of money, whereas in case of a slump exchange, the consideration is shares of the buyer company.

The Mumbai Tribunal in the case of Bharat Bijilee Ltd, TS-96-ITAT-2011 (Mum), has examined the issue of tax-ability of a slump exchange. It held that in order to constitute a “slump sale” u/s. 2(42C), the transfer must be as a result of a “sale” i.e., for a money consideration and not by way of an “Exchange”. In that case, it was held that as the undertaking was transferred in consideration of shares and bonds, it was a case of “exchange” and not of “sale” and so section 2(42C) and section 50B would not apply. As regards taxability u/ss. 45 and 48, it was held that the “capital asset” which was transferred was the “entire undertaking” and not individual assets and liabilities forming part of the undertaking. In the absence of a cost/date of acquisition of the undertaking, the computation and charging provisions of section 45 fail and the transaction cannot be assessed. Hence, there was no tax on the transaction.

A similar view has been taken in the recent decision of Zinger Investments (P.) Ltd (2013) 38 taxmann. com 388 (Hyd).

In Avaya Global Connect Ltd., 26 SOT 397(Mum), the Tribunal held that section 2(42C) only deals with a transfer as a result of sale that can be construed as a slump sale. Therefore, any transfer of an undertaking otherwise than as a result of sale would not qualify as a ‘slump sale’. It was further held that if the transfer is as a result of a Court-approved Scheme of Arrangement under which no monetary consideration is paid, then it is not a sale of an undertaking by the assessee.

However, in Virtual Software and Training (P), (2008) 116 TTJ 920 (Delhi) , there was a transfer of an undertaking as a going concern in consideration for an issue of equity shares of the buyer company. The Delhi Tribunal held that such a transaction would also be covered under the definition of slump sale under the Income-tax Act. Even if the trans-action did not constitute a sale under the Sale of Goods Act or Transfer of Property Act, it would still constitute a transfer u/s. 2(47) of the Income-tax Act.

The Delhi High Court in the case of SREI Infrastructure Finance Ltd, TS-237-HC-2012 (Del) had an occasion to consider a case where a sale of an undertaking was carried out by way of a Court-approved Scheme of Arrangement for consideration in cash. The Court held that the definition of slump sale was wide enough to cover sales which took place under Court Schemes also. It may be noted that this was not a case of a slump exchange but was actually a sale by virtue of a Court Scheme.

Conclusion

The way in which a transaction is structured and its documentation drafted would determine its tax and other consequences. Unintended consequences could follow if proper care is not taken while structuring and drafting.

Exercise of due care and caution is required and we need to remember that sale and exchange are as apart as chalk and cheese and never the twain shall meet!

Securities Laws

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Synopsis

On 9th January 2014, SEBI has notified the final Regulations for settlement of violations of various securities laws. A better set of provisions have replaced the earlier ones which have stronger base in law, but are complex. These new settlement terms are more certain now and leave lesser discretion for the authorities. The author discusses the importance of settlement route, the scheme of the Regulations and also, highlights some issues relating to the same.

Background

SEBI has notified, after consultations, trials and errors, on 9th January 2014, the final Regulations for settlement of violations of various securities laws. This culminates a long journey since 2007 when the first Guidelines were issued, then revised in 2011 and then, after certain changes to SEBI Act and other statutes, finally made formal and detailed Regulations.

Importance of settlement route to cure violations The importance of settlement proceedings lies in the fact that, on the one hand, the securities laws have become exceedingly elaborate and complex. On the other hand, the powers of SEBI to punish in various ways violations have only increased. A Supreme Court decision in Shriram Mutual Fund’s case (AIR 2006 SC 2287) is regularly relied on, mistakenly to some extent in my view, to take a view that penalty has to follow any violation. This mens rea, intention, etc. do not have to be established. For most persons associated with securities markets, the punishment is not just the penalty but the prolonged and legal costly proceedings. In comparison, the procedure of settlement is quick, relatively cheap and generally taint-free. Indeed, the settlement mechanism of SEBI compares quite favorably in many ways with corresponding settlement mechanism under other laws. However, with the passage of time the simple mechanism of the original 2007 Guidelines have inevitably become complex.

While the Regulations are largely an improved version of the Guidelines of 2011, which have been briefly discussed earlier in this column, it would be necessary to summarise the scheme of the Regulations here and highlight some issues.

At the outset, however, it is important to mention the reason why formal Regulations had to be issued and why the Guidelines were not found sufficient. A public interest litigation has been filed in Delhi High Court questioning the power of SEBI to settle violations under the Guidelines. The concern that exists is that the cases settled from 2007 till date may get affected if the Court gives any adverse decision. To alleviate this concern, the SEBI Act and other statutes were amended by a recent ordinance to empower SEBI to formulate regulations permitting settlement of cases.

Scheme of the Regulations The procedure remains broadly the same as under the original Guidelines of 2007. Any person who faces or could face charges for having violated any of the specified securities laws can apply to SEBI for settlement. An independent high power advisory committee (HPAC) would consider the application and clear the same for acceptance and the settled amount paid. In such case, no further proceedings would be taken in respect of such violations. If rejected, the proceedings may be initiated or continued.

However, there are several changes from the 2007 Guidelines and there are other aspects that need discussion too.

There is a three-step formal procedure for consent now. The application would be first placed before an internal committee of SEBI which will examine it in light of the Regulations, ask for further documents and call for personal appearance by the applicant (personally and/or through authorised representative). If the settlement can be finalised at this stage, the application would be forwarded to the HPAC which will then examine it and if required remit it back to the internal committee for reconsideration. Once the settlement is finalised and recommended by the HPAC, it goes to a Panel of two Whole-time Members of SEBI. Here again, if the Panel disagrees with the settlement, it may send the matter back to the Internal Committee where it starts all over again. Or, it may simply reject the application. However, if it finds the settlement to be in order, the applicant would be informed within seven days. Thereafter, the applicant would have to pay the amount of settlement and a final and formal order would be issued.

It may appear that considerable to and fro may arise between the three authorities set up to consider the application. However, it is likely, as seen from past experience, that, except where the matter involved is sensitive/serious or some other important factors/ complexities are involved, the process ought to be smooth and fast. It is likely that the recommendation of the internal committee would be accepted by the HPAC and similarly also accepted by the Panel. Alternatively, it may be rejected by the HPAC and that would be the end of the matter. This is even more likely considering, as also discussed later herein, that the settlement terms are more certain now and have considerably less discretion.

Which violations can be settled? Generally, any violation of the securities laws can be settled. However, a few violations have been stated as generally not capable of being settled. For example, insider trading violations as a rule cannot be settled. Serious cases of market manipulation, frauds, front running, etc. also generally cannot be settled. Non-settling of investor grievances, non compliance of SEBI notices/summons, etc. are some such others. However, the applicant can still apply in such a case where it feels there are reasons enough to make an exception and in case the reasons are found to be adequate, the case may be settled.

Settlement through monetary and non-monetary means Normally, the settlement is by offering a sum in money. However, depending upon the violation and circumstances involved, the settlement may also be through a monetary and/or settlement in kind. Thus, the applicant may offer (or may be asked to offer) settlement some another manner. For example, he may agree not to close his business for a specified period of time and/or remove a certain person from management, profits unjustly made may be disgorged. If accepted these would become part of the settlement terms.

However, unlike the monetary settlement amount, which has detailed formula for calculation that reduces discretion and arbitrariness, the settlement non-monetary settlement has no such formula.

Considerations for settlement

The determination of the amount of settlement is, in most cases, through a specified formula. However, for consideration of the application for settlement generally, there are certain qualitative factors also specified. Thus, even though the applicant may offer the full specified amount as settlement, still, the application would be subject to these qualitative factors. For example, the nature and gravity of the violations would be considered. The harm caused to investors would also be a factor. In case the applicant is a part of a group that has carried out the violation, the exact role by the applicant would also be considered. If the applicant has already undergone any other enforcement action for the same violation, then this also would be considered. And so on.

Formulae specified for determination of settlement amount
Though, as stated above, qualitative factors are also taken into account, and there are non -monetary punishments also possible, the amount of settlement is now provided with a fair degree of certainty in several types of common violations. It is seen over the experience of nearly two decades now that the most common violations are, for example, disclosures as are required under various securities laws are not made or an open offer under the Takeover Regulations has not been made or made belatedly. Price manipulation, unfair practices, frauds, violations by stock brokers of applicable law/code of conduct in dealings with their clients etc. SEBI has carefully considered the implications of these violations in monetary terms and accordingly provided various formulae corresponding to each of these types of violations. Thus, it is likely that applicants of such violations would know what would be the amount of settlement in the normal course.

Stage at which settlement is applied for

One of the fundamental principles of settlement is that the more the applicant saves SEBI time and efforts in the actual proceedings, the better the terms of settlement he would be eligible to. Thus, the formula for determination of settlement amount provides for two important qualitative fac-tors. Firstly, how early the applicant comes forward for settlement. For example, a person who waits till the last moment till a formal adverse order is passed against him for settlement has made SEBI go through the whole process. On the other hand is a person as soon as he becomes aware of the violation, comes forward on his own and makes an application for settlement. Considering this, the Regulations lay down factors that would decrease or increase the amount of settlement based on at which stage of the proceedings that the applicant comes forward.

Another factor is past orders against the applicant, for which also a multiplying factor is provided, for determination of the settlement amount.

Repetitive settlements

Repetitive applications for settlements are not al-lowed. The settlement process is not to encourage/ condone frequent violators because otherwise, the sanctity and respect of the law may be disregarded. Thus, an applicant cannot make another application for settlement within 24 months of an earlier settlement. Further, if, in the 36 months preceding the application, two settlement orders have been passed for the applicant, the application cannot be made.

Strangely, this bar is applicable even for non-similar violations. For example, a violation of a disclosure requirement and a violation of a more serious nature are both treated the same. Ideally, repetitive violations of the same type ought to have been barred.

Rejected application

The information submitted or representation sub-mitted by an applicant in an application cannot be used as evidence before any Court/Tribunal, in case the application is rejected. However, this does not apply where the settlement order is revoked or withdrawn in specified cases. In any case, it appears that information independently collected may still be evidence.

Time limit for making of application

The application for settlement has to be made within sixty days of the receipt of a show cause notice.

Retrospective application

A clause that may sound like a transitional one but is intended to resolve a nagging problem is Regula-tion 1(2) . It provides that the Regulations shall be deemed to have come into force from 20th April 2007. It appears that it aims at giving legitimacy to settlement orders and proceedings prior to the notification of these Regulations. As stated earlier, a matter is pending before the Delhi High Court as to whether SEBI has powers to settle proceedings through Guidelines issued on 20th April 2007 (revised in 2011). An Ordinance was recently notified which inserted a new section 15JB in the SEBI Act, also with retrospective effect from 20th April 2007, stating that cases may be settled in accordance with Regulations issued in this behalf. The present Regulations are thus issued in this context. The retrospective effect of these provisions/Regulations is, in my view, legally uncertain. One will have to see, however, how the Delhi High Court views the matter, considering also the fact that hundreds of settlements have already taken places and proceedings closed.

Conclusion

The settlement procedure now is speedy but com-plicated. Serious violations are unlikely to be settled though in some cases may be settled if the circumstances demand with perhaps higher settlement amount. The revised formulae provides for higher settlement amounts as compared to earlier settle-ment amounts seen in practice. This discourages the assumption that violations would be settled as easily. The certainty of amounts is helpful as the party can weigh carefully whether the proceedings ought to be settled. The fact that the party continues to have the option not to admit the violation also helps considering also the fact that often settlements are carried out to buy peace and reduce the efforts involved in settlement. All in all, a better set of provisions have replaced the earlier ones with stronger base in law, certainty though at the cost of being complex.

Is it fair?

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Introduction:

Members of our profession are being increasingly subjected to disciplinary cases for misconduct. The complainants are often not aware of the grave consequences on the member concerned; or sometimes they knowingly do so to harass the CA with an ulterior motive to exert pressure on a rival party. CA being a soft target is often victimised. Our Council is realising this; but is helpless due to the system.

It is observed that many a time, an altogether stranger to the dispute files a case and makes the life of our member miserable.

Consequences of a complaint:

For items specified in First Schedule to our CA Act, the prescribed punishments are any one or more of – (a) reprimand, (b) fine upto Rs. 1 lakh and (c) suspension of membership for a period up to 3 months.

For items in Second Schedule, any one or more of – (a) reprimand, (b) Fine upto Rs. 5 lakhs and (c) suspension for any length of time, including forever.

However, it is to be noted that the process of disposal of complaint is likely to cause more stress than these prescribed consequences.

Firstly, it takes at least 3 years from initiation of complaint to its disposal (if not contested in appeal). One has to carry the sword hanging on one’s head. It is a great mental agony. It involves expenditure – on paper work, counsel’s fees, traveling (at times to Delhi) to the place of hearing and so on. Most importantly, if one is held prima facie guilty, one is deprived of bank audits, Government audits ( C & AG), etc. This is a great monetary loss.

After all, it is a stigma on one’s professional career.

Locus Standi: For information of the readers, I wish to clarify the distinction between the items of First and Second Schedule. First Schedule contains offences within the members’ community while Second Schedule contains items affecting the outsiders. The latter is considered more serious.

The proceedings are considered as quasi criminal proceedings. Any person can file a complaint. If complaint is not validly made, the Disciplinary Directorate can initiate suo moto action based on ‘information’.

I have come across many cases where the complainant was strictly not concerned with the type of misconduct alleged. Particularly, in First Schedule, the items affect the rights of other members.

For example:

In one case, a company did not appoint its first auditor in the board meeting. (Section 224 (5) of Companies Act, 1956) It was advised to appoint auditor in EGM – section 224 (5)(b). They issued appointment letter which unfortunately did not mention them to be the first auditors. It was implied and understood. Auditors filed form 23 B to ROC. Later on there was a dispute between two groups of management. The Indian group, both the directors being CAs, fabricated the records so as to ‘create’ one more auditor before the EGM! They closed the accounts out of the way – contrary to a different accounting year stated in articles, and filed a frivolous complaint that the auditors (innocent, appointed in EGM) did not communicate with previous auditor! And the alleged ‘previous auditor’ did not even turn up during the proceedings. Complainants admitted that they had manipulated the records. The proceedings stretched over a period of 5 years and a very senior, reputed firm was the victim.

In the second case, there was a change-over in management. The old management, proved to be unscrupulous, created an ‘auditor’ in similar manner and filed similar complaint. The new auditor (genuine) communicated with previous auditor on record (he who signed last audit, and who according to the new management was the previous auditor). The innocent new auditor had no clue whatsoever to indicate the existence of any such ‘previous auditor’.

The third case is more serious. There was a split in management. Two brothers who were directors separated from each other. The outgoing auditor supplied information to an outside lawyer. He was staying in Rajasthan while the company had all its operations in Mumbai. The outsider was not a shareholder, director, employee, supplier, customer and had no connection with the company at all! He filed a case of negligence (Schedule 2) against the auditor ‘claiming himself to be a responsible citizen’ of our country. He found a few minor arithmetic errors in stock valuation sheets which contained hundreds of items (in 12 sheets). Those were human, inadvertent errors, having no material impact. Again the proceedings stretched over 5 years!

During the hearing, he never appeared and it transpired that he was a professional blackmailer.

Conclusion:
Unfortunately, the normal principle of a complainant coming with clean hands is not followed in disciplinary proceedings. Council claims to be concerned (rightly so) only with the members’ conduct and not that of an outsider. Therefore, complaints even from a criminal who is behind bars are entertained. So also, for First Schedule cases, like previous auditors communication, non-payment of undisputed fees, solicitors, advertisement, sharing with non-members, charging fees on percentage basis, etc. a stranger is no way concerned. When previous auditor is not complaining, how is a stranger concerned? This results in lot of burden on Disciplinary Directorate and on the respective committees of the Council as well.

It is suggested that locus standi, materiality and the like concepts be given due weightage in the proceedings.

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LECTURE MEETING:

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LECTURE MEETING:

Panel Discussion on Industry Vs. Practice, 13th December 2013


Panelist of the Panel Discussion on Industry v/s. Practice

The Society had organised a Panel Discussion on Industry vs. Practice. The Objective of the discussion was to present to fresh Chartered Accountants and those still exploring various options, the various aspects of being in Practice or pursuing a career in the Industry.

At this event the publication “RTI for ITI” co-authored by Mr. Narayan Varma, Chartered Accountant and Ms. Shraddha Bathija was released at the auspicious hands of Mr. Pradeep Shah, Chartered Accountant


Release of BCAS Publication under BCAS Foundation ‘RTI for ITI – Right to Information for Income Tax Issues’

The panel of experienced Chartered Accountants from the Industry and practice, namely, Mr. Ashok Wadhwa, Mr. Gautam Doshi, Mrs. Bhavna Doshi, Mr. Naushad Panjwani, Mrs. Nandita Parekh were joined by Mr. Ronnie Screwvala, an eminent business person from the Media and Entertainment Industry who shared their experiences and views.

The Discussion ended with an interactive session, where concerns and questions raised were answered by the panelists. The event was attended by about 500 participants.

Video of the Panel Discussion is available free for viewing at www.bcasonline.tv for all to benefit from.

Other Programmes :

Seminar on “Scrutiny Assessments, Appeals, Penalties & Recovery”, 14th December 2013

This Seminar was organised with the objective of updating professionals on legal and procedural intricacies in Assessments, Appeals before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeal) and Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and related recovery proceedings. 200 participants attended the programme.

The presentations, made by the faculties were highly educative. The speakers clarified the legal issues and responded to all the questions posed by participants. The study material given by the speakers were also very helpful.


L to R: Mr. Gautam Nayak, Mr. Yogesh Thar (Speaker), Mr. Naushad Panjwani (President), Mr. Mukesh Trivedi

Professional Accountant Batch XVI, 19th November 2013

The inauguration ceremony of the Professional Accountant Course batch XVI was jointly organised by HR Committee of BCAS & H.R. College of Commerce and Economics. The ceremony was graced by President Mr. Naushad Panjwani, Chartered Accountant, Mr. Manish Reshamwala, Chartered Accountant & Mr. Parag Thakkar, Vice Principal of HR College.


L to R – Mr. Manish Reshamwala, Prof. Mr. Parag Thakkar and Mr. Naushad Panjwani (President)

The course is designed to train individuals from Accounts field in regard to the various aspects of Accounting from the perspective of a Chartered Accountant. The course saw an opening day with more than 40 participants being greatly motivated by the experiences shared by the Dignitaries.

Seminar on Labour laws, 23rd November 2013

Indirect Taxes & Allied Laws Committee of Bombay Chartered Accountant Society jointly with Chamber of Tax Consultants had organised the seminar on Labour Laws, where Mr. Ramesh Soni, eminent Labour Law Consultant, explained to the participants various aspects of the Laws viz. Employees State Insurance Act, 1948, The Payment of Bonus Act, 1965, The Employees Provident Fund & Miscellaneous Provisions, 1952, The Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 & The Contract Labour and Abolition Act, 1970.


L to R: Mr. Naushad Panjwani (President), Mr. Ashok Sharma, Mr. Ramesh Soni, Mr. Yatin Desai (President of The Chamber of Tax Consultants), Mr. Suhas Paranjpe

More than 100 Participants registered and benefited immensely by the knowledge shared by the learned speaker.

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PART A: orders of the court & CIC

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Section 8(1) (e), (g) & (j) of the RTI Act:

There were four writ petitions before the court.

In these petitions, the issue involved was whether the copies of office notings recorded on the file of Union Public Service Commission (UPSC) and the correspondence exchanged between UPSC and the Department seeking its advice can be accessed in the RTI Act or not by the person to whom such advice relates.

When one G.S. Sandhu sought information from UPSC to furnish him in respect of departmental proceedings against him, information sought was denied by PIO & FAA. However the Central Information Commission directed the UPSC to disclose the nothings relating to the matter in hand to the respondent, with liberty to the petitioner-UPSC to obliterate the name and designation of the officer who made the said notings.

Before the H.C.of Delhi, UPSC assailed the Commission on four different grounds as under:

(I)There is a fiduciary relationship between UPSC and the department which seeks its advice and the information provided by the Department is held by UPSC in trust for it. The said information, therefore, is exempted from disclosure u/s. 8(1) (e) of the Act, (ii) the file notings and the correspondences exchanged between UPSC and the department seeking its advice may contain information relating not only to the information seeker but also to other persons and departments and institutions, which, being personal information, is exempt from disclosure u/s. 8(1) (j) of the Act, (iii) the officers who record the notings on the file of UPSC are mainly drawn on deputation from various departments. If their identity is disclosed, they may be subjected to violence, intimidation and harassment by the persons against whom an adverse note is recorded and if the said officer of UPSC, on repatriation to his parent department, happens to be posted under the person against whom an adverse noting was recorded by him, such an officer may be targeted and harassed by the person against whom the note was recorded. Such an information, therefore, is exempt from disclosure u/s. 8(1) (g) of the Act and (iv) the notings recorded by UPSC officer on the file are only inputs given to the Commission to enable it to render an appropriate advice to the concerned department and are not binding upon the Commission. Therefore, such information is not really necessary for the employee who is facing departmental inquiry, since he is concerned only with the advice ultimately rendered by UPSC to his department and not the noting meant for consideration of the Commission.

After detailed discussion & analysis of two Supreme Court decisions in (i) Central Board of Secondary Education and Another vs. Aditya Bandopadhyay & Ors. (ii) Bihar Public Service Commission vs. Saiyed Hessian Abbas Rizvi & Another, the High Court of Delhi issued the following directions:

(i) The copies of office notings recorded in the file of UPSC as well as the copies of the correspondence exchanged between UPSC and the Department by which its advice was sought, to the extent it was sought, shall be provided to the respondent after removing from the notings and correspondence, (a) the date of the noting and the letter, as the case may be; (b) the name and designation of the person recording the noting and writing the letter and; (c) any other indication in the noting and/or correspondence which may reveal or tend to reveal the identity of author of the noting/letter, as the case may be;

(II) If the notings and /or correspondence referred in (i) above contains personal information relating to a third party, such information will be excluded while providing the information sought by the respondent;

[Union Public Service Commission vs. G.S. Sandhu & Ors: Decided on 10.10.2013; RTIR IV (2013)216 (Delhi)]

Section 6 (1) of the RTI Act, 2005:

K.K. Mishra, the appellant through his RTI application dated 16.01.2012 sought certified copies in respect of M/s. Nandi Infrastructure Corridor Enterprises Ltd., Bangalore showing composition of Board of Directors and Members/Shareholders of the Company as filed by the Company from time to time with ROC, Karnataka Bangalore from 1.1.2000 onwards.

The CPIO responded by citing one earlier decision of the Commission wherein it was held as under:

“The Registrar of Companies has already put in place system for disclosure of information including the procedure for payment of cost for providing the information. There is no denial of information to the applicant. There is, therefore, no reason why the procedure of the Registrar of Companies in respect of disclosure of information should not be adhered to and followed. As the working of the Office of Registrar of Companies is transparent in so far as public activities are concerned, there is no justification for invoking the cost and fee rules as prescribed under the RTI Act. In case, however, there is any hindrance in providing access to the documents which are expected to be in the public domain, the provisions of the RTI Act could be invoked. In view of this, there is no justification for not respecting the fee and cost rules of the Registrar of Companies as per the relevant provisions under Section 610 of the Companies Act”.

Before the Commission, the appellant stated that for getting the information, he has to first register himself before he can access the information and thereafter pay Rs. 50/- for viewing the information for three hours. Whereas, under RTI Rules, the inspection of documents is free for first hour and thereafter the charges are Rs. 5/- for every 15 minutes. The appellant states that he paid Rs. 50/- through internet banking, but thereafter there were no instructions on the website as to how to access the information on net, the fee payable is Rs. 25/- per page as against Rs. 2/- per page prescribed under RTI Rules. The appellant contested that it would not be appropriate for the CIC to allow ROC to charge such exorbitant rates for information which is in direct conflict with the provisions of the RTI Act and rules. The appellant stated during that hearing that in the above said order specifically mentioned that in case of hindrance in providing access to the documents, the provisions of the RTI Act could be invoked. The respondent CPIO on the other hand stated that in case the appellant is not able to access the information from the website of the ROC, he can approach the help Desk which is placed In their Office to assist the people to access information on the website.

The Commission then quoted from one order of the High Court of Delhi (in the matter of Registrar of Companies & Ors. vs. Dharmendra Kumar Garg & Another) as under:

34.    “The mere prescription of a higher charge in the other statutory mechanism (in this case section 610    of the Companies Act), than that prescribed under the RTI Act does not make any difference whatsoever. The right available to any person to seek inspection/copies of documents under sec-tion 610 of the Companies Act is governed by the Companies (Central Government) General Rules & Forms, 1956, which are statutory rules and prescribe the fees for inspection of documents etc. in Rule 21A. The said rules being statutory in nature and specific in their application do not get overridden by the rules framed under the RTI Act with regard to prescription of fee for supply of information, which is general in nature, and apply to all kinds of applications made under the RTI Act to seek information. It would also be complete waste of funds to require the creation and maintenance of two parallel machineries by the ROC – one u/s. 610 of the Companies Act, and the other under the RTI Act to provide the same information to an applicant. It would lead to unnecessary and avoidable duplication of work and consequent expenditure.”

35.    “The right to information is required to be balanced with the need to optimize use of limited fiscal resources. In this context I may refer to the relevant extract of preamble to the RTI Act which, inter alia, provides……………………………………………..”

41.    “Firstly, I may notice that I do not find anything inconsistent between the schemes provided u/s. 610    of the Companies Act and the provisions of the RTI Act. Merely because a different charge is collected for providing information under Section 610 of the Companies Act than that prescribed as the fee for providing information under the RTI Act does not lead to an inconsistency in the pro-visions of these two enactments. Even otherwise, the provisions of the RTI Act would not override the provision contained in Section 610 of the Com-panies Act. Section 610 of the Companies Act is an earlier piece of legislation. The said provision was introduced in the Companies Act, 1956 at the time of its enactment in the year 1956 itself. On the other hand, the RTI Act is a much later enactment, enacted in the year 2005. The RTI Act is a general law/enactment which deals with the right of a citizen to access information available with a public authority, subject to the conditions and limitation prescribed in the said Act. On the other hand Section 610 of the Companies Act is a piece of special legislation, which deals specifically with the right of any person to inspect and obtain records i.e. information from the ROC. Therefore, the later general law cannot be read or understood to have abrogated the earlier special law.”

In view of above Order, the Commission found no reason to disagree with the reply of office of the Register of companies, Karnataka, Bangalore

[K.K. Mishra vs. office of the ROC, Karnataka, Ban-galore decided on 20.09.2013 in CIC/SS/A/2012/2005: RTIR IV (2013)181(CIC)]

 Section 6 of the RTI Act, 2005

In a short order of CIC, it is decided that paying application fees through money order is as good as paying cash and hence the RTI application cannot be rejected on the ground that mode of paying fees is not as per rules. Also in the Order, the Commission referred to the full bench decision reported in BCAJ of January 2014.

In the light of above the Commission decided that the CPIO should have accepted the RTI application and dealt with the same as per the provisions of the RTI Act

[S. Viswanatha Rao vs. Department of Posts, Secunderabad: decided on 27.09.2013: CIC/ BS/C/2012/000279/3569: RTIR IV (2013) 163 (CIC)]


Accounting & Auditing Committee

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Report on Two- Day Non-Residential Refresher Course (NRRC) on Important Provisions of Companies Act, 2013

DAY 1:

The Companies Act, 2013 received the President of India’s assent on 29th August, 2013 and was notified on 30th August, 2013. The Companies Act, 2013 is contemplated to improve transparency and accountability in the corporate sector. To better understand the intricacies of various aspects of controlling, managing, operating and complying in the new regulatory environment of the Companies Act, 2013 and to provide a holistic view of some of the important provisions of the Act, Bombay Chartered Accountants’ Society had organised a two-day Non-Residential Refresher Course on 12th and 13th December, 2013 at hotel The Leela, near International Airport, Andheri (East), Mumbai. The course was designed in a unique style of imparting knowledge with four intensive sessions of group discussion with case studies on different aspects of relevance. The four sessions were addressed by eminent faculties specialising in corporate laws.

The course started with the inaugural address by the President of BCAS, Mr. Naushad Panjwani. He informed the participants about the encouraging response received to the course, with 145 participants enrolled for the course. The mix of the participants


Inauguration of the Course by lighting the lamp


Inaugural speech by President of BCAS, Mr. Naushad Panjwani

were also interesting, with 61 participants who were below the age of 30. He informed that the importance of topic and popularity of BCAS can be gauged from the fact that there were 21 outstation delegates who had travelled from various parts of India. Later, there were introductory remarks on the design of the course by the Chairman of the Accounting and Auditing Committee Mr. Harish Motiwalla. Then there was lighting of the lamp by all the dignitaries present to commence the course.

There was a group discussion on the first paper on the topics of provisions relating to private limited companies, one person company (OPC), share capital, issue of shares through prospectus, private placement and allotment of securities, which was followed with the presentation on the topics by the paper writer Ms. Shashikala Rao, Company Secretary. The paper writer had raised very topical issues and was discussed in great depth by the three groups. The session was chaired by Mr. Harish Motiwalla, Chairman, Accounting & Auditing Committee.


Ms. Shashikala Rao, Company Secretary

The second paper was on provisions relating to accounts/audit, dividends, auditors, holding/subsidiary companies and acceptance of deposits. The paper writer Mr. Nilesh Vikamsey , Chartered Accountant, had raised very relevant and burning issues on the allotted provisions, on which there was a very healthy debate during the group discussion. This was followed by the presentation on the relevant provisions by the paper writer Mr. Nilesh Vikamsey, wherein he provided great insight into the thought process involved and suggestions provided by the professional bodies on the draft rules which are in the process of finalisation. The session was ably chaired by Mr. Narendra Sarda, who in his inimitable style provided his valuable inputs on the provisions dealt by the paper writer.

Day 2
:


Mr. Nilesh Vikamsey, Chartered Accountant

The second day started with the group discussion on the provisions regarding management and administration of companies, directors (incl. remuneration), loans to directors, loans/investments by companies and related party transactions. The groups had lively discussion on contentious provisions relating to loans/investments by companies and related party transactions. Later, the paper writer Mr. Jigar Parikh, Chartered Accountant, provided the participants his viewpoints, during the presentation on the provisions dealt by him in his discussion paper and also addressed the issues raised during the group discussion. The session was chaired by Mr. Kanu Chokshi, Co-Chairman, Accounting & Auditing Committee.


Mr. Jigar Parikh, Chartered Accountant

The concluding session was on the provisions relating to cross border mergers & acquisitions, minority buyouts, exit options to dissenting shareholders , demergers, class action suits and rehabilitation of financially distressed companies. There were very interactive group discussions on some novel provisions incorporated for the first time in the Act and participants tried to address the issues raised by the paper writer Mr. Sanjay Buch, Advocate & Solicitor. The group discussion was followed by the presentation by the paper writer on the provisions he had dealt in the paper. He also provided insight into the positive and negative aspects of the provisions affecting the minority shareholders and simplified process of M & A. The session was ably chaired by the past president of BCAS, Mr. Uday Sathaye.


Mr. Sanjay Buch, Advocate & Solicitor

During the concluding session, some of the participants gave their views on the course and conveyed their satisfaction to the format and structure of the course. The feedback to the course was encouraging and many of them were keen to attend such course in future. Mr. Kanu Chokhsi acknowledged the contribution of the paper writers in the success of the course and also thanked participants for their active participation.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 123 dated 16th April, 2014

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Press Note No. 1 (2011 series) D/O IPP dated 20th May, 2011

Notification No. FEMA. 298 /2014-RB dated 13th March, 2014 c.f. G.S.R. No.190(E) dated 19th March, 2014

Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Limited Liability Partnership (LLP)

 This
circular permits Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Limited Liability
Partnerships (LLP) that are formed and registered under the Limited
Liability Partnership Act, 2008.

The details scheme, procedure and forms to be used for the same are annexed to this Circular.

Highlights
of the scheme – called Foreign Direct Investment (FDI-LLP) in Limited
Liability Partnerships (LLPs) formed and registered under the Limited
Liability Partnership Act, 2008 – are as under: –

1. Eligible Investors

A
person resident outside India or an entity incorporated outside India
shall be eligible investor for the purpose of FDI in LLP. However, the
following persons shall not be eligible to invest in LLP: –

(i) A citizen/entity of Pakistan and Bangladesh or

(ii) A SEBI registered Foreign Institutional Investor (FII) or

(iii) A SEBI registered Foreign Venture Capital Investor (FVCI) or

(iv) A SEBI registered Qualified Foreign Investor (QFI) or

(v)
A Foreign Portfolio Investor registered in accordance with Securities
and Exchange Board of India (Foreign Portfolio Investors) Regulations,
2014 (RFPI).

2. Eligibility of LLP for accepting foreign Investment

(i)
An LLP, existing or new, operating in sectors / activities where 100%
FDI is allowed under the automatic route of FDI Scheme is eligible to
receive FDI.

(ii) An LLP engaged in the following sectors / activities is not eligible to accept FDI: –

a)
Sectors eligible to accept 100% FDI under automatic route but are
subject to FDI-linked performance related conditions (for example
minimum capitalisation norms applicable to ‘Non-Banking Finance
Companies’ or ‘Development of Townships, Housing, Built-up
infrastructure and Construction-development projects’, etc.); or

b)
Sectors eligible to accept less than 100% FDI under automatic route; or
c) Sectors eligible to accept FDI under Government Approval route; or

d) Agricultural/plantation activity and print media; or

e)
Sectors not eligible to accept FDI i.e. any sector which is prohibited
under the extant FDI policy as well as sectors / activities prohibited
in terms of Regulation 4(b) to Notification No. FEMA 1 / 2000-RB dated
3rd May 2000.

3. Eligible investment

Contribution
to the capital of a LLP would be an eligible investment under the
Scheme. Note: Investment by way of ‘profit share’ will fall under the
category of reinvestment of earnings

4. Entry Route

Any
FDI in a LLP will require prior Government/ FIPB approval. Any form of
foreign investment in an LLP, direct or indirect (regardless of nature
of ‘ownership’ or ‘control’ of an Indian Company) will require
Government/FIPB approval.

5. Pricing

FDI in an
LLP either by way of capital contribution or by way of
acquisition/transfer of ‘profit shares’, will have to be more than or
equal to the fair price as worked out with any valuation norm which is
internationally accepted/adopted as per market practice (hereinafter
referred to as “fair price of capital contribution/profit share of an
LLP”) and a valuation certificate to that effect shall be issued by a
Chartered Accountant or by a practicing Cost Accountant or by an
approved valuer from the panel maintained by the Central Government.

In
case of transfer of capital contribution/profit share from a resident
to a non-resident, the transfer will have to be for a consideration
equal to or more than the fair price of capital contribution/profit
share of an LLP. Further, in case of transfer of capital
contribution/profit share from a non-resident to a resident, the
transfer will have to be for a consideration which is less than or equal
to the fair price of the capital contribution/profit share of an LLP.

6. Mode of payment for an eligible investor

Payment
by an eligible investor towards capital contribution/profit share of
LLP will be allowed only by way of cash consideration to be received: –

i) By way of inward remittance through normal banking channels; or

ii) By debit to NRE/FCNR(B) account of the person concerned.

7. Reporting

(i)
LLP must report to the Regional Office concerned of RBI, through its
bank, at the earliest but not later than 30 days from the date of
receipt of the amount of consideration:

(a) Details of the
receipt of the amount of consideration for capital contribution and
profit shares in Form FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT – LLP (I) together with a
copy/ies of the FIRC/s evidencing the receipt of the remittance
(b) KYC report on the non-resident investor
(c) Valuation certificate (as per paragraph 5 above) as regards pricing.

The Regional Office concerned, will allot a Unique Identification Number (UIN) for the amount reported.

(ii)
The bank in India, receiving the remittance must obtain a KYC report in
respect of the foreign investor from the overseas bank remitting the
amount.

(iii) Disinvestment/transfer of capital contribution or
profit share between a resident and a non-resident (or vice versa) must
be reported within 60 days from the date of receipt of funds in Form
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT – LLP (II).

8. Downstream investment

a)
An Indian company, having foreign investment (direct or indirect,
irrespective of percentage of such foreign investment), will be
permitted to make downstream investment in an LLP only if both, the
company as well as the LLP, are operating in sectors where 100% FDI is
allowed under the automatic route and there are no FDI-linked
performance related conditions. Onus will be on the LLP accepting
investment from the Indian Company registered under the provisions of
the Companies Act, as applicable, to ensure compliance with downstream
investment requirement as stated above.

b) An LLP with FDI under this scheme will not be eligible to make any downstream investments in any entity in India.

9. Other Conditions

(i)
In case, an LLP with FDI, has a body corporate as a designated partner
or nominates an individual to act as a designated partner in accordance
with the provisions of section 7 of the Limited Liability Partnership
Act, 2008, such a body corporate must be a company registered in India
under the provisions of the Companies Act, as applicable and not any
other body, such as an LLP or a Trust. For such LLP, the designated
partner “resident in India”, as defined under the ‘Explanation’ to
Section 7(1) of the Limited Liability Partnership Act, 2008, will also
have to satisfy the definition of “person resident in India”, as
prescribed u/s. 2(v)(i) of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999.

(ii)
The designated partners will be responsible for compliance with all the
above conditions and also liable for all penalties imposed on the LLP
for their contravention, if any.

(iii) Conversion of a company
with FDI, into an LLP, will be allowed only if the above stipulations
(except the stipulation as regards mode of payment) are met and with the
prior approval of FIPB / Government.

(iv) LLP cannot avail External Commercial Borrowings (ECB).

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 122 dated 10th April, 2014

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External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) Policy — Review of all-in-cost ceiling

This circular states that the present all-in-cost ceiling for ECB, as mentioned below, will continue till 30th June, 2014: –

The all-in-cost ceiling will include arranger fee, upfront fee, management fee, handling / processing charges, out of pocket and legal expenses, if any.

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India’s Gridlock

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Given the fluid nature of circumstances, both globally and domestically, it would be almost foolhardy to crystal-gaze into what awaits India in 2014. At the same time, though, there may be a less speculative way to gain insights into next year: how India deals with its inheritance.

More worrying, from the point of view of an incoming regime, is the logjam that the country has witnessed between the haves and the have-nots—breaking this gridlock is a necessary condition for the Indian economy to regain its momentum. While the haves define policy change, the politically empowered have-nots can stall its implementation.

Both anecdotally and empirically—captured so well in the jobless growth phenomenon of the first decade of the new millennium and growing inequality—it is a fact that few have gained from India’s remarkable economic turnaround over the last three decades.

No matter where we look—whether it be about targeting of subsidies, mining for precious resources, people-centric urbanization, developing new infrastructure like roads/highways (more recently the Navi Mumbai airport project, or setting up of the Kudankulam nuclear power plant in Tamil Nadu)—there is an unresolved face-off. And this gulf is only widening. More often than not, these disputes are now ending up in courts and the judiciary is forced to be the referee.

This is a less than optimal situation because differences of such nature mirror the political pulls and pressures in society and hence, should ideally be resolved by elected politicians. So far, politicians have struggled to come up with a template to resolve such vexing face-offs where there can never be a winner. Whether it is environment versus development, paying subsidies in cash or in kind, tariffs for electricity or water, there is no black and white answer. This is because there are far more stakeholders in the economy today than ever before, with varying degrees of economic capacity (or the lack of it).

This is what makes the 2014 general election so significant.

The country is on a cusp. Not since it gained independence has the country needed a visionary— who will have the political courage to attempt out-of-the-box solutions to end this deadlock— at the helm more than it does now. It will not be about strong or weak leadership, secular or communal leaders. Instead, it will be the ability to throw up a person who has the vision to redefine the “grammar of governance” in sync with contemporary India. So think hard before you vote this summer.

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AAP Breaks Mainstream Politics’ Entry Barriers

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The Arvind Kejriwal-led Aam Aadmi Party’s (AAP) spectacular debut in the Delhi elections has buoyed the confidence of corporate leaders, who are lining up to join the party. Former chief financial officer and board member of Infosys, V Balakrishnan (Bala) has announced his decision to join the party. He could even contest an election on an APP ticket from Karnataka, if the party decides so. Bala joins the likes of Adarsh Shastri, the grandson of former prime minister Lal Bahadur Shashtri, who resigned from his cushy job in Apple to join AAP.

According to experts, the newest party is providing an attractive platform for professionals to realise their ambition of entering mainstream politics. There is a general perception that people with non-political lineage find it very difficult to join a traditional political party, let alone contest elections. With faces such as Bala on-board along with AAP’s success in Delhi is expected to prompt more professionals to join the party. Moreover, the trend is also expected to influence the national parties to become more open while choosing their candidates.

N. C. Saxena, member of the National Advisory Council, said it is believed the route to political power is only “via caste, criminal record or through money”, but AAP has put forward a different kind of values and idealism. The question is not just of whether it is easy or difficult to join the party, it is about the values it projects which people can relate to, Saxena added.

AAP, which has made anti-corruption as its prime agenda, has attracted people from multiple fields. While some have quit their day jobs to join the party, others have supported the movement by lending their expertise and through donations.

Raman Roy, one of the pioneers of the Indian business process outsourcing (BPO) industry, said AAP has demonstrated there can be a professional way to do politics in the country. “The perception is that entering politics is very messy and even if somebody wanted to enter it actively, it will be impossible to get a ticket from a leading political party.” However, AAP has given professionals an opportunity to get their hands dirty. “Professionalizing of politics will be a game-changer for India.”

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A Time To Introspect

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Every day, 50% of Copenhageners commute to work or school by cycles. There is no law forcing them to do so, nor any real incentive. Most cycle because they want to. To support their interest, the local administration has built nearly 400km of bike lanes across the city.

As societies evolve, individuals take over the responsibility of social progress. Monarchs, governments and other authority figures are required only till such time as citizens take over the running of their lives. Sadly, Indian society hasn’t yet reached that point. The Indian tendency to rail against authority is evident in the Devyani Khobragade incident as much as in blaming the police alone for the rise in crimes against women.

It is time to look inwards, where there is a lot that is wrong. Our sense of entitlement, as well as the wretched, fatalistic attitude we have inherited, blinds us to personal shortcomings—our biases and prejudices, our inability to follow reasonable civic rules, or do something about our abysmal creativity and productivity levels. We pride ourselves on being tolerant but are blatantly racist, with each other and with people from other nations who have a different color of skin or a different way of speaking English. We believe the Taj Mahal is the greatest architectural marvel ever created, not because we have compared it with others, but merely because we don’t, and don’t want to, understand or appreciate the architecture of other nations. That xenophobia blinds us. So the only alternative to Hindi movies is Hollywood pulp, to the utter disregard of masterpieces from Kerala or Iran. We wallow in the mediocrity of our film music, insulting not just a glorious tradition but also the universality that it should bring. So no wedding in the vast Hindi heartland, encompassing some eight states, ever resonates to the soothing notes of Carnatic music.

The insularity is compounded by our preference for jugaad over original invention and discovery. For the former, we credit our ability to cut corners, get the job done, no matter what the ecological or social cost. For the latter, we blame the government.

Nor is this lack of creativity in India stemming from an overt focus on hard work. No one will accuse us of high levels of productivity though the sheer number of hours we spend at our workplace should raise hopes of it. According to the Asian Productivity Organization’s Databook 2013, India’s per capita gross domestic product (GDP), an index of its labour productivity, was 7.5% of that in the US in 2011, lower even than that of countries like Fiji, Mongolia and the Philippines. The fate of nations like Italy and Greece shows the ill effects of chronically low productivity levels. Indeed, there is empirical evidence to suggest that productivity growth is a major factor in pushing economic growth as well as the standard of living of a nation, as seen in the case of both Germany and Singapore. Higher productivity leads to increased profitability as costs fall. The sharp recovery in the US despite the financial meltdown shows how higher productivity can lead a nation out of economic gloom.

Nations that are driven by the vim and the vigor of their people exude a soft power that far exceeds mere economic or military might. Germany, Monocle magazine’s leader of the year in its annual ranking of countries by soft power, receives 30.4 million tourists a year. India by contrast gets 6.5 million though its 28 UNESCO World Heritage Sites compares well with Germany’s 38.

The world lauds individual initiative and talent, which is why Scandinavian countries are routinely at the top of any ranking of most respected countries. Creativity and productivity are virtues that need little support from the state. It is about time we turned our attention to our poor performance on both counts.

This is the fourth in a series of essays in which Mint’s editors take stock of 2013 and look at what the new year holds for India.

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On Abolition Of Income Tax – Need the facts on taxation in India.

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Tax /GDP ratio is partly a function of the year. In a good year, interpreted as a year in which growth is good, it touched 12% of GDP, almost 6% direct and the rest indirect. The direct part is divided into a shade over 2% for personal income tax and a shade below 4% for corporation tax. The indirect part consists of customs, excise and service tax. There are bits of the direct part connected with expenditure, wealth, gift and estate duty, but those aren’t quantitatively significant.

Two figures are often bandied around . First, only 35 million people pay income tax. Second, only 42,800 people have annual income more than Rs. 1 crore. Both involve minor misstatements : 35 million is the number of people who submit income-tax returns. In a pedantic sense, they may or may not pay income tax. Even if they do, tax paid could be marginal.

And that 1-crore figure for 42,800 is taxable income. There are 78.9 million urban households in India. Half of them can be expected to be below the threshold. Indeed, there is some multiplicity: in a single urban household, there can be more than one individual who submits income-tax returns.

But the illustrative point remains . Since rural households are outside the ambit of income taxes, 35-40 million is the maximum income tax base we can get. Why are we so shocked that just 3% of the population pays personal income tax?

Since 2006-07,Budgets have had a tax revenue foregone statement. For direct taxes, this is divided into corporates, non-corporate firms and individual taxpayers. Notice that all tax exemptions are implicit subsidies to preferred categories of taxpayers. In individual taxpayer category, around half are salaried. Salaried taxpayers are entitled to limited deductions. That’s not true of non-salaried taxpayers. They are entitled to several profit-linked deductions too. And there are many deductions for non-corporate firms too.

Depending on what GDP figure you take, all those exemptions, direct as well as indirect, amount to anything between 5% and 5.5% of GDP. That 12% figure doesn’t include all state level or local-body taxes. If you include those too, the tax/GDP ratio would be around 17%. However, if all exemptions were to go, tax/GDP ratio would be in excess of 22%.

Also, if all subsidies, Centre as well as state, explicit as well as implicit , are included, subsidies amount to 14% of GDP. Before considering abolition of a tax, we, therefore, need to ask questions. Where will the revenue come from? Which expenditure item will be slashed on a continuing basis, not as a one-shot revenue realization from asset sales (such as privatization)?

When figures like 35 million are cited, there is an impression there’s tax evasion. There certainly is evasion . But there’s an important difference between evasion and tax avoidance . When arguments are made about middle class — not all middle class people are salaried or urban — suffering from income tax, it’s really an argument about limited tax avoidance options being available to salaried people.

Second, as long as there are exemptions , compliance costs cannot be reduced significantly. One needs to pin down the expression compliance costs. Does it mean administrative costs of collection? Does it mean costs to taxpayers, including harassment and bribes? And does it include other social costs?

For income tax, administrative costs aren’t actually that high. For every Rs. 100 collected, it’s around 60 paise . Through the large taxpayer unit, it’s around 4.50 paise. That’s today. Studies done 10 years ago suggest if all compliance costs are included, compliance costs are 49% of personal income-tax collections and the system is regressive. Of course, there’s an argument for simplification . DTC was meant to do that, but has deviated from original intent. And, yes, one should simplify the appellate and refund process.

If income tax is scrapped, what will replace it? Every economist should argue direct taxes are superior. If income tax is scrapped, it can’t be scrapped only for personal income, retaining it for corporate taxation. So, there will be a transition from direct to indirect taxation.

While actual revenue numbers depend on elasticities, we need a rough doubling of indirect tax rates, which are inherently regressive. The only argument in favour of indirect taxation is that it’s easier to enforce . Since we can’t or won’t tax rural income, let’s do it via the indirect route. This isn’t a new idea either.

For those who are advocating an abolition of income tax, there also seems a presumption that compliance costs will be zero under the new framework, whatever that new framework is. The argument that there are countries with no personal income taxation won’t wash either. Those are either tax havens or those with large natural resource bases. Besides, precedence is no argument . Just because Peter the Great taxed beards, should we?

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The Digital Classroom

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The credential — the degree or certificate — has long been the quintessential value proposition of higher education… Higher education, however, is in the midst of dramatic, disruptive change. It is, to use the language of innovation theorists and practitioners, being unbundled.

And with that unbundling, the traditional credential is rapidly losing relevance. The value of paper degrees lies in a common agreement to accept them as a proxy for competence and status, and that agreement to accept them as a proxy for competence and status, and that agreement is less rock solid than the higher education establishment would like to believe.

The value of paper degrees will inevitably decline when employers or other evaluators avail themselves of more efficient and holistic ways for applicants to demonstrate aptitude and skill. Evaluative information like work samples, personal representations, peer and manager reviews, shared content, and scores and badges are creating new signals of aptitude and different types of credentials.

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Working with the Large Taxpayer Unit System

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Globally, large corporates including MNCs find themselves in the harsh spotlight of the tax administration. While India is no exception, recent interactions between many large corporate tax- payers and tax departments have largely been confrontational. Often, ever-burgeoning tax collection targets are said to be the primary culprit behind large tax demands, which often don’t stand the test of tribunals and courts.

Lack of understanding of cross-border business operations is another root cause of agony for MNCs, as has been witnessed in the spate of transfer pricing litigation relating to marketing intangibles. In this backdrop, there is an urgent need for the Tax Administration Reform Commission, headed by Parthasarathi Shome, to look into the tax administration of large corporate taxpayers.

One may have thought the Large Taxpayer Unit (LTU) system, a single-window tax facilitation centre, would have been welcomed by India Inc. Under the LTU system, each large taxpayer who has opted to be covered is assigned a senior tax official as a single-point contact. Taxpayers engaged in the manufacture or service sector that have paid excise or service tax dues of more than Rs 5 crore or advance corporate tax of Rs 10 crore or more can opt to be covered by an LTU. In addition, the option to transfer any excess Cenvat credit – of central excise duty or service tax – accumulated in one unit to any other eligible unit is a big advantage for taxpayers having pan- India manufacturing units.

On paper, the LTU system is designed to reduce tax compliance costs and delays for large taxpayers. In turn, it also facilitates tax administration to ensure tax compliance: data mining, for instance is easier. Large corporate taxpayers anywhere in the world place a premium on the ability to finalize their tax positions in real time, which helps them minimize unpredictability in business operations.

LTUs are used by governments to create mutual trust, usher transparency and resolve issues in a time-bound manner, resulting in effective tax administration and collection. It is important for officials manning LTUs to understand business perspectives – an improved economic and com- mercial understanding is vital. Unfortunately, in India, LTUs are perceived as hunting grounds for tax administrators.

The Large Business Service (LBS) system in the UK currently covers 770 companies. It is structured on sectoral lines that aids in understanding the dynamic commercial environment in which different businesses operate. The sector leader also supports client relationship managers (CRMs) who are allocated to each taxpayer.

Following discussions with each taxpayer and consultation with tax and sector specialists, CRMs compile a report of perceived tax risks and tax positions and share this with the large corporate taxpayer. Any differences in view are identified and resolved, and the way forward is agreed. To deal with the complexities of transfer pricing, an internal board has been set up, which results in speedy resolutions in a time-bound manner.

Most importantly, LBS officials also recommend changes to legislation when it finds there are gaps or defects in law. Recently, the large corporate forum, comprising of nominated members of large corporate taxpayers and LBS officials, was relaunched. Periodic meetings help in better understanding of business needs and compliance burdens.

LTUs in India first need to adopt such tax-friendly measures, only later can mandatory coverage be contemplated.

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Taxing Environment Of Ministerial Laxity

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Jayanthi Natarajan, it would appear, has done immense damage to the economy and to her own party’s electoral prospects. She had, it has been reported, been sitting on hundreds of files for no plausible reason, delaying their clearance for months on end, some of them for years. This amounted to criminal negligence, aborting new projects at a time of waning economic sentiment and slowing investment. It is amazing that she was given such a long rope and not relieved of her ministerial responsibility earlier. The long rope, instead of tripping her up, has choked off the economy’s oxygen supply. The fall in real capital formation as a share of GDP by about six percentage points is at the root of the slowdown in economic growth over the last several quarters.

Now, these files accumulated with Natarajan – 180 of them unsigned, 169 signed but still withheld – for reasons that the former minister has not chosen to share with the public. It is tempting to accept the charge, made by Narendra Modi, that the files piled up because of non-payment of a “Jayanthi tax”, unless Natarajan comes up with a credible explanation for this strange hoarding of vital clearances. Regardless of the explanation, the conduct has been inexcusable. The development further strengthens the case for transferring the job of according environmental clearances to an independent authority with expertise and the requisite staff strength. The environment ministry’s job should be to formulate policy and the norms that the regulator would use to accord or deny clearance, or suggest compensatory measures.

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Clarification with regard to Holding of shares or exercising power in a fiduciary capacity – Holding and Subsidiary relationship u/s. 2(87) of Companies Act 2013

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The Ministry of Company Affairs has clarified vide Circular No. 20/2013 dated 27th December that it has received a number of representations consequent upon notifying section 2(87) of the Companies Act, 2013 which defines “subsidiary company” or”subsidiary”. The stakeholders have requested this Ministry to clarify whether shares heldor power exercisable by a company in a ‘fiduciary capacity’ will be excluded while determining if a particular company is a subsidiary of another company. The stakeholders have further pointed out that in terms of section 4(3) of the Companies Act, 1956, suchshares or powers were excluded from the purview of holding-subsidiary relationship. The Ministry has thus clarified that the shares held by the company or power exercisable by it in another company in a ‘fiduciary capacity’ shall not be counted for the purpose of determining the holding-subsidiary relationship in terms of the provision of section 2(87) of the Companies Act, 2013.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 97 dated 20th January, 2014

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Know Your Customer (KYC) norms / Anti-Money Laundering (AML) standards / Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT) Obligation of Authorised Persons under Prevention of Money Laundering Act, (PMLA), 2002, as amended by Prevention of Money Laundering (Amendment) Act, 2009 Money changing activities

This circular contains the amended the instructions issued to Authorised Money Changers (AMC) with respect to establishment of business relationships by corporates. The revised guidelines are as under: –

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 95 dated January 17, 2014

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Facilities for Persons Resident outside India – Clarification

This circular clarifies that a foreign investor is free to remit funds on cash/TOM/spot basis through any bank of its choice for any permitted transaction. The funds so remitted must be transferred to the designated custodian bank through the banking channel. KYC in respect of the remitter, wherever required, will be the joint responsibility of the bank that has received the remittance as well as the bank that ultimately receives the proceeds of the remittance. The remittance receiving bank is required to issue a FIRC to the bank receiving the proceeds to establish the fact the funds had been remitted in foreign currency.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 94 dated 16th January, 2014

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Conversion of External Commercial Borrowing and Lumpsum Fee/Royalty into Equity

Presently, an Indian company can issue equity shares against its liability in respect of External Commercial Borrowings (ECB), import of capital goods, lump sum fees/royalties, etc.

This circular clarifies that the rate of exchange prevailing on the date of the agreement between the parties concerned has to be applied at the time of conversion of foreign currency liability in respect of External Commercial Borrowings (ECB), import of capital goods, lump sum fees/royalties, etc. into Indian rupees, for the purpose of issue of equity shares/other securities, as the case may be, against the same. However, the Indian company is free to issue equity shares for a rupee amount less than that arrived at based on the rate of exchange prevailing on the date of the agreement by a mutual agreement with the lender/supplier.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 93 dated 15th January, 2014

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Notification No. FEMA.293/2013-RB dated 12th November, 2013, vide G.S.R. No. 767(E) dated 6th December, 2013

Clarification- Establishment of Liaison Office/ Branch Office/Project Office in India by Foreign Entities- General Permission

Presently, no entity or person, being a citizen of Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Iran or China is permitted to establish in India, a branch office or a liaison office or a project office or any other place of business by whatever name called, without obtaining prior permission of RBI.

This circular clarifies that the said restrictions also apply to entities from Hong Kong and Macau. As a result, prior permission of RBI is required to be obtained by entities from Hong Kong and Macau to setup, in India, a Liaison/Branch/Project Offices or any other place of business by whatever name.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 92 dated 13rd January, 2014

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Risk Management and Inter Bank Dealings

Presently, residents (other than exporters and importers) cannot cancel and rebook forward contracts, involving Rupee as one of the currencies, booked by them to hedge current and capital account transactions. Exporters are allowed to cancel and rebook forward contracts to the extent of 50% of the contracts booked in a financial year for hedging their contracted export exposures and importers are allowed to cancel and rebook forward contracts to the extent of 25% of the contracts booked in a financial year for hedging their contracted import exposures.

This circular now permits everyone with a contracted exposure to freely cancel and rebook forward contracts in respect of all current account transactions as well as capital account transactions with a residual maturity of one year or less. In the case of FII/QFI/other portfolio investors, forward contracts booked by them, once cancelled, can be rebooked up to the extent of 10% of the value of the contracts cancelled. However, forward contracts booked by them can be rolled over on or before maturity.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 90 dated 9th January, 2014

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Provisions u/s. 6 (4) of Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 – Clarifications

Section 6 (4) of FEMA, 1999 permits a person resident in India to hold, own, transfer or invest in foreign currency, foreign security or any immovable property situated outside India if such currency, security or property was acquired, held or owned by such person when he was resident outside India or inherited from a person who was resident outside India.

This circular clarifies that the following transactions are covered u/s. 6(4) of FEMA, 1999: –

(i) Foreign currency accounts opened and maintained by such a person when he was resident outside India.

(ii) Income earned through employment or business or vocation outside India taken up or commenced while such person was resident outside India, or from investments made while such person was resident outside India, or from gift or inheritance received while such a person was resident outside India.

(iii) Foreign exchange including any income arising therefrom, and conversion or replacement or accrual to the same, held outside India by a person resident in India acquired by way of inheritance from a person resident outside India.

(iv) Persons resident in India can freely utilise all their eligible assets abroad as well as income on such assets or sale proceeds thereof received after their return to India for making any payments or to make any fresh investments abroad without RBI approval if the cost of such investments and/or any subsequent payments are met exclusively out of funds forming part of eligible assets held by them and the transaction is not in contravention of the provisions of FEMA.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 88 dated 9th January, 2014

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Memorandum of Instructions for Opening and Maintenance of Rupee/Foreign Currency Vostro Accounts of Non-resident Exchange Houses

This circular has expanded the scope of the Rupee Drawing Arrangements (RDA) by including the following items under the list of Permitted Transactions: –

1. Payments to utility service providers in India, for services such as water supply, electricity supply, telephone (except for mobile top-ups), internet, television etc.

2. Tax payments in India.

3. EMI payments in India to Banks and Non- Banking Financial Companies (NBFCs) for repayment of loans.

The detailed list under Part (B) of Annex-I is annexed to the circular.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 87 dated 9th January, 2014

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Resident Bank account maintained by residents in India – Joint holder – liberalisation

Presently, individuals resident in India can include Non-Resident Indian (NRI) close relative(s) as defined in Section 6 of the Companies Act, 1956 as a joint holder(s) in their resident savings bank accounts on “former or survivor” basis. However, such NRI close relatives cannot operate the said account during the life time of the resident account holder.

This circular provides that individuals resident in India can now include NRI close relative(s) as defined in Section 6 of the Companies Act, 1956 as a joint holder(s) in their new/existing resident savings bank accounts/other bank accounts on “either or survivor” basis. The NRI has to give a declaration in the prescribed format stating that he/she will not use the proceeds lying in the above account for any transaction in contravention of FEMA and in case of any violation he/she will be responsible for the same.

The above liberalisation is subject to the following: –

a) The said account will be treated as resident bank account for all purposes and all regulations applicable to a resident bank account will be applicable.

b) Cheques, instruments, remittances, cash, card or any other proceeds belonging to the NRI close relative cannot be credited to the said account.

c) The NRI close relative can operate the said account only for and on behalf of the resident for domestic payment and not for creating any beneficial interest for himself.

d) Where the NRI close relative becomes a joint holder with more than one resident in the said account, such NRI close relative must be the close relative of all the resident bank account holders.

e) Where due to any eventuality, the non-resident account holder becomes the survivor of the said account the same must be categorised as Non- Resident Ordinary Rupee (NRO) account and all such regulations as applicable to NRO account shall be applicable. Onus will be on the NRI account holder to inform the Bank to get the account categorised as NRO account.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 86 dated 9th January, 2014

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Foreign Direct Investment – Pricing Guidelines for FDI instruments with optionality clauses

This circular permits the issue of equity shares and compulsorily and mandatorily convertible preference shares/debentures under FDI Scheme to a person resident outside with an “optionality clause”. Under this clause, after a minimum lockin period of one year or a minimum lock-in period as prescribed under FDI Regulations, whichever is higher (e.g. defence and construction development sector where the lock-in period of three years has been prescribed), the non-resident investor exercising option/right of buy-back will be eligible to exit without any assured return at the price prevailing/ value determined at the time of exercise of the option. The lock-in period will be effective from the date of allotment of such shares or convertible debentures unless otherwise prescribed.

Valuation will be as under: –

(i) In case of a listed company, the market price prevailing at the recognised stock exchanges.

(ii) In case of unlisted company, price not exceeding that arrived at on the basis of Return on Equity (i.e. Profit After Tax/Net Worth – where Net Worth would include all free reserves and paid up capital) as per the latest audited balance sheet.

(iii) Compulsorily Convertible Debentures (CCD) and Compulsorily Convertible Preference Shares (CCPS) are to be transferred at a price worked out as per any internationally accepted pricing methodology at the time of exit and which is to be duly certified by a Chartered Accountant or a SEBI registered Merchant Banker.

All existing contracts will also have to comply with the above conditions to qualify as FDI compliant.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 85 dated 6th January, 2014

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External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) Policy – Liberalisation of definition of Infrastructure Sector

This circular provides that ‘Maintenance, Repairs and Overhaul’ (MRO) will also be treated as a part of airport infrastructure for the purposes of ECB. As a result, MRO will be considered as part of the sub-sector of Airport in the Transport Sector of Infrastructure.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 84 dated 6th January, 2014

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Issue of Non-convertible/redeemable bonus preference shares or debentures – Clarifications This circular grant general permission, as against the present system of case-to-case approval, to Indian companies for issue of non-convertible/redeemable preference shares or debentures by way of distribution as bonus from the general reserves, to nonresident shareholders, including the depositories that act as trustees for the ADR/GDR holders, under a Scheme of Arrangement approved by a Court in India under the provisions of the Companies Act, as applicable, subject to no-objection from the Income Tax Authorities.

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[2013] 145 ITD 491(Mumbai- Trib.) Capital International Emerging Markets Fund vs. DDIT(IT) A.Y. 2007-08 Order dated- 10-07-2013

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i. Capital Loss from share swapping is allowed.

Facts:
Assessee-company, a Foreign Institutional Investor, was engaged in business of share trading.

The assessee received shares in ratio of 1 : 16 shares held by it in a company. This resulted in long term capital loss. AO disallowed the assessee’s claim of long term capital loss, on swap transaction. When the matter was referred to DRP, it was held that no sound reason was furnished by the assessee to explain as to why it entered in an exchange transaction that resulted in huge loss, that no prudent businessman would enter in to such a transaction, that swap ratio of shares transacted was not done by the competent authority i.e. a merchant banker.

Held:
Swapping of shares was approved by an agency of Govt. of India i.e. FIPB and it had approved the ratio of shares to be swapped. In these circumstances to challenge the prudence of the transaction was not proper. Even if the transaction was not approved by the Sovereign and it was carried out by the assessee in normal course of its business, the Ld AO/DRP could not question the prudence of the transaction. Genuiuness of a transaction can be definitely a subject of scrutiny by revenue authorities, but to decide the prudence of a transaction is prerogative of the assessee. A decision as to whether to do / not to do business or to carry out/not to carry out a certain transaction is to be taken by a businessman. If it is proved that a transaction had taken place, then resultant profit or loss has to be assessed as per the tax statutes. Therefore by casting doubt about the prudence of the transaction, members of the DRP had stepped in to an exclusive discretionary zone of a businessman and it is not permissible.

ii. Set off of short term capital loss subject to STT allowed against short term capital gain not subjected to STT

Facts:
Assessee has claimed set off of short-term capital loss subjected to Securities Transaction Tax(STT) against the short-term capital gains that was not subjected to STT. The AO held that as both the transactions were subject to different rates of tax, the set off of loss is not correct. He held that in order to set off the short term capital loss, there should be short term capital loss and short term capital gain on computation made u/s. 48 to 55. The assessee was entitled to have the amount of such short term capital loss set off against the short term capital gain, if any, as arrived under a similar computation made for the assessment year under consideration.

Held:
The phrase “under similar computation made” refers to computation of income, the provisions for which are contained u/ss. 45 to 55A of the Act. The matter of computation of income was a subject which came anterior to the application of rate of tax which are contained in section 110 to 115BBC. Therefore, merely because the two sets of transactions are liable for different rate of tax, it cannot be said that income from these transactions does not arise from similar computation made as computation in both the cases has to be made in similar manner under the same provisions. The Tribunal therefore, held that short term capital loss arising from STT paid transactions can be set off against short term capital gain arising from non SIT transactions.

Note: Readers may also read following decisions of Mumbai Tribunal:

• DWS India Equity Fund [IT Appeal No. 5055 (Mum.) of 2010]

• First State Investments (Hong Kong) Ltd. vs. ADIT [2009] 33 SOT 26 (Mum)

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Natural justice – Bias – Judicial conduct– No one can act in judicial capacity if his previous conduct gives ground for believing that he cannot act with an open mind or impartially

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Narinder Singh Arora vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) 2012 (283) ELT 481 (SC)

The Appellant had filed a complaint against the Respondents. Subsequently, the charges were framed against the Respondents u/s. 498A, 304B read with section 34 and Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code by Shri. Prithvi Raj, learned Additional District & Sessions Judge dated 15-05-1995. Thereafter, the case was listed before Shri. S.N. Dhingra, Additional Sessions Judge for the trial, however, the learned Judge had recused from hearing the matter for personal reasons vide Order dated 25-09-2000.

Accordingly, the case was withdrawn from the Court of Shri. S.N. Dhingra, Additional Sessions Judge and transferred to the Court of Shri. S.M. Chopra, Additional Sessions Judge vide the Order dated 29-09- 2000 of the Sessions Judge. Eventually the accused Respondents were tried and acquitted vide judgment and Order dated 22-03-2003 passed by Ms. Manju Goel, Additional Sessions Judge. Being aggrieved by the judgment and Order, the Appellant preferred a revision petition before the High Court. The same was dismissed vide impugned final judgment and Order dated 01-09-2010 passed by learned Judge, Shri. Justice S.N. Dhingra.

The Court observed that it is apparent that the fact of earlier recusal of the case at the trial by learned Shri Justice S.N. Dhingra himself, was not brought to his notice in the revision petition before the High Court by either of the parties to the case. Therefore, Shri Justice S.N. Dhingra, owing to inadvertence regarding his earlier recusal, has dismissed the revision petition by the impugned judgment. In our opinion, the impugned judgment, passed by Shri Justice S.N. Dhigra subsequent to his recusal at trial stage for personal reasons, is against the principle of natural justice and fair trial. It is well settled law that a person who tries a cause should be able to deal with the matter placed before him objectively, fairly and impartially. No one can act in a judicial capacity if his previous conduct gives ground for believing that he cannot act with an open mind or impartially. The broad principle evolved by this Court is that a person, trying a cause, must not only act fairly but must be able to act above suspicion of unfairness and bias.

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[2013] 145 ITD 111 (Hyderabad – Trib.) SKS Micro Finance Ltd. vs. DCIT A.Y. 2006-07 & 2008-09 Order dated- 21-06-2013

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Section 32 – Assessee acquired entire business of ‘S’ – Depreciation claimed by assessee on acquisition of rights of clients of ‘S’ contending that consideration paid towards transfer of clients was an intangible asset eligible for depreciation – AO and CIT(A) disallowed the claim holding that the right acquired was not an intangible asset – Tribunal held that by acquiring the customer base the assessee has acquired business and commercial rights of similar nature and hence eligible for depreciation.

Facts:
The assessee was engaged in the business of Micro Financial Lending Services through small joint liability groups and direct micro loans. The assessee entered into memorandum of understanding (MOU) with ‘S’, another company which was also engaged in the business of micro finance and acquired the entire business of ‘S’. This also included the acquisition of rights over more than 1.10 lakhs existing clients of ‘S’. The assessee claimed depreciation on the amount contending that the consideration paid to ‘S’ towards transfer of clients was for an intangible asset eligible for depreciation. It was contended that the customers were a source of assured economic benefits over the next 5 years and in that process, the assessee capitalised the cost in the books and amortised the cost over a period of 5 years.

The AO disallowed depreciation holding that the intangible asset claimed to have been acquired by the assessee does not come under any of the identified assets appearing in the depreciation schedule (intangible asset) i.e. know-how, patents, copy rights, trade marks, licenses, franchises or any other business or commercial rights of similar nature. The AO held that as the assessee had acquired part of the already existing business of ‘S’, the said asset had not been created during the course of business of the assessee and hence cannot be considered to be a business or commercial rights of similar nature.

The CIT (A) held that the customer base acquired by the assessee cannot be considered a licence or business or commercial right of similar nature as it does not relate to any intellectual property whereas section 32(1)(ii) contemplate depreciation in respect of those licenses or rights which relate to intellectual property.CIT(A) relied on decision of the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in case of CIT vs. Techno Shares & Stocks Ltd. [2009] 184 Taxman 103.

Held:
The customer base acquired by the assessee has provided an impetus to the business of the assessee as the customers acquired are with proven track record since they have already been trained, motivated, credit checked and risk filtered. They are source of assured economic benefit to the assessee and certainly are tools of the trade which facilitates the assessee to carry on the business smoothly and effectively. Therefore, by acquiring the customer base the assessee has acquired business and commercial rights of similar nature.

The Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of Areva T & D India Ltd. ([2012] 345 ITR 421) while interpreting the term “business or commercial rights of similar nature” has held that the fact that after the specified intangible assets the words “business or commercial rights of similar nature” have been additionally used, clearly demonstrates that the Legislature did not intend to provide for depreciation only in respect of specified intangible assets but also to other categories of intangible assets. In the circumstances, the nature of “business or commercial rights” cannot be restricted to only know-how, patents, trade marks, copyrights, licences or franchisees. All these fall in the genus of intangible assets that form part of the tool of trade of an assessee facilitating smooth carrying on of the business.

The CIT(A) while coming to his conclusion had relied upon the decision of the Bombay High Court in case of CIT vs. Techno Shares & Stock Ltd. wherein the High Court while considering the issue of transfer of membership card of Bombay Stock Exchange has held that it does not Constitute an intangible asset. However, this decision of the High Court has been reversed by the Supreme Court in the case of Techno Shares and Stocks Ltd. vs. CIT [2010] 327 ITR 323. The SC has held that intangible assets owned by the assessee and used for the business purpose which enables the assessee to access the market and has an economic and money value is a “licence” or “akin to a licence” which is one of the items falling in section 32(1) (ii) of the Act.

Based on all the above decisions, it was held that the specified intangible assets acquired under slump sale agreement were in the nature of “business or commercial rights of similar nature” specified in section 32(1)(ii) of the Act and were accordingly eligible for depreciation under that section.

Readers may also read Mumbai Tribunal decision in case of India Capital Markets (P.) Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT [2013] 29 taxmann.com 304/56 SOT 32 (Mum.)

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2013-TIOL-802-ITAT-AHD Kulgam Holdings Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT ITA No. 1259/Ahd/2006 Assessment Years: 2002-03. Date of Order: 21.06.2013

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S/s. 28, 45 – For the purpose of deciding whether the Deep Discount Bond is a short term capital asset or a long term capital asset the holding period has to commence from the date of allotment of the DDB and not from the date of its listing on the National Stock Exchange.

Income does not accrue on a day to day or year to year basis on Optionally Fully Convertible Premium Notes where the terms of the issue provide that the holder of OFCPN could only in the last quarter of the 5th year decide to convert or not to convert the OFCPN into equity shares and in the event of his deciding not to convert the OFCPN into equity shares becomes entitled to Face value being a sum greater than issue price.

Facts I:

On 18-03-2002, the assessee sold 330 Deep Discount Bonds (DDBs) Series A of Nirma Ltd. of Rs. 330 lakh for a consideration of Rs. 4,02,92,630. The DDBs were allotted to the assessee vide letter of allotment dated 28-07-2000. The debenture trust deed was dated 27-04-2001 and certificate of holding to the assessee was issued on 10-05-2001. These DDBs were made available for dematerialisation on 24-09- 2001 and were listed in NSE on 20-09-2001.

The surplus arising on sale of DDBs was returned by the assessee as long term capital gain and benefit of section 54EC was claimed.

The Assessing Officer held that for deciding whether the DDBs are long term capital asset or short term capital asset the holding period should commence from the date of listing of the DDBs on NSE and not from the date of allotment as was the case of the assessee. He, accordingly, considered the gain to be short term capital gain and denied the benefit of section 54EC of the Act.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who upheld the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held I :
The Tribunal observed that in the case of Karsanbhai K. Patel (HUF) (ITA No. 1042/Ahd/2006 dated 09-10- 2009; assessment year 2002-03) the Tribunal was considering an identical issue on identical facts. In the said case, the Tribunal held that the period of holding has to be counted from the date of allotment. Following the ratio of the said decision, the Tribunal held that the holding period be counted from the date of allotment. If the holding period was counted from the date of allotment, in the present case, the gain arising on transfer of DDBs would be long term capital gain and the assessee would be entitled to claim benefit of section 54EC. The Tribunal decided the issue in favor of the assessee.

Fact II:

The assessee held Optionally Fully Convertible Preference Notes (OFCPN) of Nirma Industries Ltd. which were acquired by the assessee on 25- 03-2002 i.e. after the date of issue of CBDT Circular No. 2 dated 15-02-2002. The assessee was following mercantile system of accounting.

The OFCPN were of the face value of Rs. 33,750 and were issued for Rs. 25,000. The Tenure was five years from the date of allotment. The terms of the issue provided that the investor had an option to put the OFCPN in the last quarter of 5th year. The investor also had an option to convert each of the OFCPN at the end of 5th year from the date of allotment into 2,500 equity shares of Rs. 10 each at par but no interest would be payable till maturity. If the assessee opts for conversion, it would get 2,500 equity shares of Rs. 10 each at par in lieu of one OFCPN of issue price of Rs. 25,000 and the assessee will not get any monetary gain in the form of interest or otherwise and only if the assessee does not exercise this option then the assessee will get Rs. 33,750 after the expiry of the period of 5 years from the date of allotment.

In view of the terms of the issue, the assessee was of the view that no interest accrued on day to day basis or on year to year basis. However, the Assessing Officer (AO) made an addition of Rs. 47,812 to the total income of the assessee on account of notional accrued interest on OFCPN.

This issue was raised as an additional ground and was admitted. The Tribunal observed that since this issue was not raised before the lower authorities normally it would be restored to the file of the CIT(A) or the AO but since a legal issue had to be decided as to whether as per the terms of the OFCPN of Nirma Industries Ltd., it can be said that any income is accruing on year to year basis or not and since the terms of the issue were before the Tribunal and also before the authorities below the Tribunal decided to decide the issue rather than restore it back to the file of the lower authorities.

Held II:

The Tribunal noted that, as per the terms of issue, in the initial 4 years, the assessee is not eligible to decide as to whether he is going to exercise the option of convertibility or not and such option is to be exercised only in the last quarter of the 5th year and the assessee will get shares at the end of the period of 5 years and no interest as such is payable till maturity even if the assessee does not opt for conversion. If the assessee does not opt for conversion into equity shares he will get Rs. 33,750 for each OFCPN after the expiry of period of 5 years from the date of allotment. The debentures are transferable during the period of 5 years and company is also eligible to purchase debentures at discount, at par or at premium in the open market or otherwise. Hence, in the earlier period also, if the assessee is not opting for conversion in the equity shares, the assessee can sell the debentures in the open market or to the issuer company and it is quite natural that in the open market, such debentures will command such price which will include offer price plus proportionate accretion on account of difference in the issue price and the face value which can be considered as interest although no such nomenclature is given for accretion in the issue details.

The Tribunal held that the issue details suggest that no income is guaranteed to the assessee even after 5 years period from the date of allotment if the assessee opts for conversion and the assessee will get the income being difference between the face value and the issue price only if such option of conversion is not exercised by the assessee which he can exercise only in the last quarter of 5th year. There was an argument forwarded by the learned DR that before the last quarter of the 5th year, the assessee has an option to sell these OFCPNs because these OFCPNs are transferable and in that situation, the assessee will get at least issue price plus proportionate accretion till date of transfer over and above the issue price. This may be correct but in our considered opinion, even in the light of these facts, it cannot be said that any income is accruing to the assessee on day to day or year to year basis. The OFCPN may be held by the assessee as investment or trading item. If the assessee is holding OFCPN as a trading item and till the same is sold by the assessee, it has to be considered by the assessee as closing stock which has to be valued at the cost or market price whichever is lower and in that situation, even if the market price is more than the cost price i.e. issue price, then also this income is not taxed till the sale takes place. Although, if the market price goes down below the cost price i.e. issue price then in that situation, the assessee can claim loss to that extent by valuing the closing stock of OFCPN at market price but in case the market price is more than the cost price, no income is accruing to the assessee till the same is sold.

In another situation, where the assessee is holding these OFCPNs as investment then also, the income if any in respect of such capital asset is taxable only as capital gain and that too after the capital asset in question is transferred by the assessee. Till the actual transfer takes place, neither any income is taxable in the hands of the assessee even if the market value of the asset has gone up nor any loss is allowable to the assessee even if market value of the asset has gone down. It is not the case of the AO that the assessee has sold or transferred these OFCPNs in the present year. In the absence of this, it cannot be said that any income has accrued to the assessee even if it is accepted that the market value of these OFCPNs till the last date of the present year is more than cost price i.e. issue price which can be issue price plus proportionate accretion and the difference between the face value and issue price.

We have already discussed that the nature of OFCPN is not that of a fixed deposit and it is also not of the nature of DDB because of convertibility option and uncertainty about receipt of any extra amount over and above the issue price. Even on conversion, shares are to be allotted at par and not at premium i.e. face value.
Considering all these facts, we hold that in the facts of the present case, it cannot be said that any income has accrued to the assessee on account of these OFCPNs of Nirma Industries Ltd. because no sale has taken place and there is no guaranteed income to the assessee even after 5 years in case the assessee opts for conversion into shares at par.

The Tribunal allowed this ground of appeal of the assessee.

2013-TIOL-885-ITAT-MUM Citicorp Finance (India) Ltd. vs. Addl. CIT ITA No. 8532/Mum/2011 Assessment Years: 2007-08. Date of Order: 13-09-2013

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Form 26AS – Department is required to give credit for TDS once valid TDS certificate had been produced or even where deductor has not issued TDS certificates on the basis of evidence produced by the assessee regarding deduction of tax at source and on the basis of indemnity bond.

Facts:
For assessment year 2007-08 the assessee claimed total credit for TDS of Rs. 21,51,63,912 – claim of Rs 16,52,09,344 was made in the original return and further claim of Rs 1,42,71,296 was made in revised return filed on 13-04-2009 and a claim of Rs. 3,56,83,272 was made vide letter, dated 28-12-2010, filed in the assessment proceedings. The Assessing Officer (AO) granted credit of TDS only to the tune of Rs. 11,89,60,393. The AO did not grant credit claimed because of discrepancy with respect to credit shown in Form No. 26AS.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who directed the assessee to furnish all TDS certificates in original before the AO and directed the AO to verify the claim of credit of TDS and to allow TDS as per original challans available on record or as per details of such TDS available on computer system of the department.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where it was contended that credit of TDS has to be given on the basis of TDS certificates and in case TDS certificates are not available, on the basis of details and evidence furnished by the assessee regarding deduction of tax at source. Reliance was placed on the decision of Bombay High Court in the case of Yashpal Sawhney vs. ACIT (293 ITR 593). Reference was also made to the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Court on its own Motion vs. CIT (352 ITR 273).

Held:
The Tribunal noted that the credit of TDS has been denied to the assessee on the ground that the claim for TDS was not reflected in computer generated Form No. 26AS. It observed that the difficulty faced by the tax payer in the matter of credit of TDS had been considered by the Hon’ble High Court of Bombay in the case of Yashpal Sawhney vs. DCIT (supra) in which it has been held that even if the deductor had not issued TDS certificate, the claim of the assessee has to be considered on the basis of evidence produced for deduction of tax at source as the revenue was empowered to recover the tax from the person responsible if he had not deducted tax at source or after deducting failed to deposit with Central Government. The Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in case of Court on its Own Motion v. CIT (supra) have also directed the department to ensure that credit is given to the assessee, where deductor had failed to upload the correct details in Form 26AS on the basis of evidence produced before the department. Therefore, the department is required to give credit for TDS once valid TDS certificate had been produced or even where the deductor had not issued TDS certificates on the basis of evidence produced by the assessee regarding deduction of tax at source and on the basis of indemnity bond.

The Tribunal modified the order passed by the CIT(A) on this issue and directed the AO to proceed in the manner discussed above to give credit of tax deducted at source to the assessee.

This ground of appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

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2013-TIOL-959-ITAT-DEL ITO vs. Tirupati Cylinders Ltd. ITA No. 5084/Del/2012 Assessment Years: 2004-05. Date of Order: 28.06.2013

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S/s. 148, 151, 292B – U/s. 151 approval for issue of notice u/s. 148 has to be granted only by the Joint Commissioner or the Additional Commissioner. If the approval is not granted by the Joint Commissioner or the Additional Commissioner but is instead granted/taken from the Commissioner of Income-tax then notice for reassessment issued u/s. 148 would not be valid and assessment done pursuant to such notice would be liable to be quashed.

Facts:
For the assessment year 2004-05, the assessee filed a return declaring income of 31-08-2004. The return was processed u/s. 143(1) of the Act. Subsequently a notice was issued u/s. 148 of the Act. In response to this notice, the assessee filed a letter asking the Assessing Officer (AO) to treat the return filed u/s. 139 to be a return in response to the said notice. In an order passed u/s. 143(3) r.w.s. 147 of the Act, the AO made an addition of Rs. 10 lakh u/s. 68. In the order passed u/s. 143(3) r.w.s. 147 the AO mentioned that no notice u/s. 143(2) of the Act was served to the assessee within the statutory time limit during the original assessment proceedings. In the reassessment proceedings, the AO had mentioned that as a matter of precaution permission of CIT was obtained.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who held that the reassessment to be null and void, since it was not in accordance with the provisions of the Act.

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that the Delhi High Court has in the case of CIT vs. SPL’s Siddhartha Ltd. (345 ITR 223)(Del) held that u/s. 151 of the Act it was only the Joint Commissioner or the Additional Commissioner who could grant the approval of the issue of notice u/s. 148 of the Act. The court has further held that if the approval was not granted by the Joint Commissioner or the Additional Commissioner and instead taken from Commissioner of Income-tax, then the same was not an irregularity curable u/s. 292B of the Act and consequently notice issued u/s. 148 was not valid.

Following this decision of the Delhi High Court, the Tribunal decided the issue in favor of the assessee and held that the reopening of assessment was not in accordance with law and was liable to be quashed.

The appeal filed by revenue was dismissed.

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Recovery of tax: Reduction of period for payment: Section 220(1) proviso: A. Y. 2010-11: Budget deficit of Income Tax Department is not a ground for reduction of period:

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Amul Research and Development Association vs. ITO; 359 ITR 549 (Guj):

The assessee is a charitable trust which enjoyed exemption u/s. 11 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. For the A. Y. 2010-11 exemption u/s. 11 was denied by an order u/s. 143(3) of the Act and a demand of Rs. 1,41,07,755/- was raised. A period of seven days was granted instead of statutory period of 30 days from the date of service of the notice as prescribed u/s. 220 of the Act. Assessee preferred an appeal and also filed stay application before Commissioner(Appeals). In the mean time, the Assessing Officer recovered a sum of Rs. 1,39,70,275/- from the bank account of the assessee on 28th March, 2013.

The Gujarat High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee, set aside the demand notice dated 13/03/2013, with a formal direction to the Revenue to refund the amount of Rs. 1,39,70,275/- by way of a cheque to be issued in favour of the assessee within two weeks and held as under:

“i) S/s. (1) of section 220 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, any amount otherwise than by way of advance tax, specified as payable in a notice of demand to be issued u/s. 156 of the Act, needs to be paid within 30 days of the service of the notice. However, the proviso to section 220(1) of the Act gives discretionary powers to the Assessing officer to reduce such period.

ii) Two conditions are required to be fulfilled before the Assessing officer resorts to this exception of the statutory period of 30 days. Firstly, he must have a reason to believe that the grant of the full period of 30 days would be detrimental to the interest of the Revenue and, secondly, prior permission of the Joint Commissioner requires to be obtained. The words “reason to believe” must have the same flavor as one finds in the case of exercise of powers by a reasonable man acting in good faith, with objectivity and neutrality based on material on record or exhibited in the order itself. The prior permission of the superior officer is to ensure that the powers are not exercised arbitrarily and there is a safeguard of a higher officer applying his mind independently to the issue in question when such belief is communicated by the Assessing Officer.

iii) If the demand is not likely to be defeated by any “abuse of process by the assessee”, belief cannot be sustained on the ground that availing of the full period would be detrimental to the interest of the Revenue.

iv) The reason given for reduction of the period for payment of taxes was that in the assessee’s place of assessment there was a budget deficit in the Income-tax Department. It was the budget deficit which was the very basis for making such a formation of belief. Another reason given was that the assessee had a rich cash flow and if the period of 30 days was reduced, the budget deficit would be met and the target set by the Department would be achieved.

v) The reasoning was contrary to the very object of introducing the proviso for giving discretion to the Assessing Officer. It clearly and unequivocally indicated that the Assessing Officer had completely misread the provision and his belief was neither of a reasonable man nor at all based on a rational connection with the conclusion of reduction of the period on account of it being detrimental to the Revenue.

vi) While issuing notice to the bank u/s. 226(3) of the Act for making payment, a notice has also to be given to the assessee which in this case was on the very day when the notice was issued to the bank. No opportunity had been given to the assessee for meeting such a notice issued to the bank. The sizeable amount of Rs. 1.39 crore had been withdrawn and deposited in the account of the Revenue on the very same day. Notice was an illusory and empty formality. This arbitrary exercise of withdrawal of amount from bank also required interference.

vii) Moreover, when the very action of the Assessing Officer was held to be contrary to the provisions of the law, the assessee’s not resorting to note (3) of the demand notice u/s. 156 of the Act or its having resorted to an alternative remedy was not bar to the court exercising the writ jurisdiction.”

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