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2014-TIOL-150-ITAT-MUM Sudhir Menon HUF vs. ACIT ITA No. 4887/Mum/2012 Assessment Year: 2010-11. Date of Order: 12-03-2014

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Section 56(2)(vii)(c) – Provisions of section 56(2) (vii)(c) do not apply to a bonus issue. The provisions are not attracted in case of an issue of shares by a company to its existing shareholders on a proportionate basis.

Facts:
As on 01-04-2009, the assessee held 15,000 shares in Dorf Ketal Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. which represented 4.98% of the share capital (3,01,316 shares). The assessee was offered 3,13,624 additional shares, on a proportionate basis, at the face value of Rs. 100 per share. The assessee subscribed to and was allotted 1,94,000 shares on 28-01-2010. The other shareholders were allotted shares, on the same terms, not only the shares similarly offered to them on a proportionate basis, but also those not subscribed by the other shareholders as 1,19,624 (3,13,624 minus 1,94,000) shares by the assessee. The shares were received by the assessee on 10-02-2010. The book value of the shares so allotted/ received was Rs. 1,538 as on 31-03-2009.

Since the book value of the shares so received by the assessee was more than the face value thereof, the Assessing Officer held that the shares were received by the assessee for an inadequate consideration. He treated the difference between the fair market value of the shares and their face value as being chargeable to tax u/s. 56(2)(vii)(c) read with applicable rules.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who upheld the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The provision, firstly, would not apply to bonus share Issue of bonus shares is by definition, a capitalisation of its profits by the issuing-company. There is neither any increase nor decrease in the wealth of the shareholder (or of the issuing company) on account of a bonus issue, and his percentage holding therein remains constant. What in effect transpires is that a share gets split (in the same proportion for all the shareholders), as for example by a factor of two in case of a 1:1 bonus issue. There is no receipt of any property by the shareholder, and what stands received by him is the split shares out of his own holding. It would be akin to somebody exchanging a one thousand rupee note for two five hundred or ten hundred rupee notes. There is, accordingly, no question of any gift of or accretion to property; the shareholder getting only the value of his existing shares, which stands reduced to the same extent. The same has the effect of reducing the value per share, increasing its mobility and, thus, liquidity, in the sense that the shares become more accessible for transactions and, thus, trading, i.e., considered from the holders’ point of view.

The premise on which we found the issue of bonus shares as not applicable would, to the extent pari materia, apply in equal measure to the issue of additional shares, i.e., where and to the extent it is proportional to the existing shareholding.

Therefore, as long as there is no disproportionate allotment, i.e., shares are allotted pro-rata to the shareholders, based on their existing holdings, there is no scope for any property being received by them on the said allotment of shares; there being only an apportionment of the value of their existing holding over a large number of shares. There is, accordingly, no question of section 56(2)(vii)(c), though per se applicable to the transaction, i.e., of this genre, getting attracted in such a case.

A higher than proportionate or a non-uniform allotment though would, and on the same premise, attract the rigour of the provision. This is only understandable in as much as the same would only be to the extent of the disproportionate allotment and, further, by suitably factoring in the decline in the value of the existing holding. We emphasise equally on a uniform allotment as well. This is as a disproportionate allotment could also result on a proportionate offer, where on a selective basis, i.e., with some shareholders abstaining from exercising their rights (wholly or in part) and, accordingly, transfer of value/property. Take, for example, a case of a shareholding distributed equally over two shareholder groups, i.e., at 50% for each. A 1 : 1 rights issue, abstained by one group would result in the other having a 2/3rd holding. A higher proportion of `rights’ shares (as 2:1, 3:1, etc.) would, it is easy to see, yield a more skewed holding in favour of the resulting dominant group. We observe no absurdity or unintended consequences as flowing from the per se application of the provision of section 56(2)(vii) (c) to right shares, which by factoring in the value of the existing holding operates equitably. It would be noted that the section, as construed, would apply uniformly for all capital assets, i.e., drawing no exception for any particular class or category of the specified assets, as the `right’ shares.

The Tribunal held that no addition u/s. 56(2)(vii)(c) would arise in the facts of the present case.

The appeal filed by assessee was allowed.

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Recovery of tax: PPF account is immune from attachment and sale for recovery of Income-tax dues: Dineshchandra Bhailalbhai Gandhi vs. TRO:

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[2014] 42 taxmann.com 300 (Guj)

The petitioner is an individual assessee. The Tax Recovery Officer issued a notice dated 25-02-2005 u/s. 226(3) attached the assessee’s PPF account and also recovered an amount of Rs. 9,05,000/- from the said account.

The Gujarat High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee challenging the recovery of the said amount from the PPF account and held as under:

“i) Rule 10 of the Second Schedule to the Income- Tax Act, 1961 provides that All such property as is by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, exempt from attachment and sale in execution of a decree of a civil court shall be exempt from attachment and sale under this Schedule. Proviso to section 60(1) of Code of Civil Procedure contains list of properties which shall not be liable to attachment or sale which inter alia covers in Clause (ka) “(ka) all deposits and other sums in or derived from any fund to which the Public Provident Fund Act, 1968 (23 of 1968), for the time being applies, in so far as they are declared by the said Act as not to be liable to attachment.”

ii) Therefore, any amount lying in the PPF account of a subscriber is immune from attachment and sale for recovery of the Income-tax dues. As long as an amount remains invested in a PPF account of an individual, the same would be immune from attachment from recovery of the tax dues. The situation may change as and when such amount is withdrawn and paid over to the subscriber.

iii) CBDT circular dated 07-11-1990 clarifying that “Section 9 of the Public Provident Fund applies only to attachment under a decree/order of a Court of Law and not to attachment by the Income-tax Authorities is contrary to the above statutory provisions.”

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Reassessment: S/s. 147, 148 and 149: A. Y. 2003-04: Extended time limit of 6 years u/s. 149(1)(b) requires data for prima facie computation of income escaping assessment at more than Rs. 1,00,000/-:

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BBC World News Ltd. vs. ADIT; (2014) 42 taxman. com 456 (Del):

For the A. Y. 2003-04, the assessment was completed by an assessment order u/s. 143(3) dated 24-03-2006. Subsequently, the assessment was reopened by a notice u/s. 148 dated 30-03-2010. The reasons for reopening are stated to be:

“The assessment order in the case was passed on 24-03-2006 wherein the Assessing Officer has held that the assessee has an agency PE in India in the form of BBC Worldwide (India) Private Limited (BWIPL). And attributed a loss of Rs. 69,42,475 to Indian activities. While perusing the records of the case, it is noticed that during the assessment proceedings the actual expenditure incurred on the activities related to the Indian operations were not submitted by the assessee. In the orders for A.Ys. 2004-05 to 2006-07, in the case of the assessee, it has been held that the global loss, if any, is not on account of activities of the assessee in India and such loss cannot be attributed to the PE of the assessee in India. It is therefore held that the statements furnished by the assessee showing loss from Indian activities do not represent the correct position and the same has been found not reliable.

The office believes that in the absence of such crucial information assessment of the income of the assessee for the A.Y. 2003-04 could not be completed properly….”

The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and quashed the notice issued u/s. 148, inter alia for the reasons as under:

“i) There is a third reason why we think that the petitioner must succeed. Reasons to believe must have nexus and live link with the formation of opinion by the Assessing Officer that taxable income had escaped assessment. We have noted the reasons to believe mentioned above. As per mandate of section 149(1)(b), income escaping assessment should be or likely to exceed Rs. 1 lakh. This required prima facie computation of income escaping assessment. This in turn required examination of data or figures relating to “Indian operations”.

ii) If we accept the stand of the Revenue, then the said data and details were not available in the records for the assessment year 2003-04. It is not the contention of the Revenue that figures for the assessment year in question for the “Indian operation” were available in the records for subsequent or other years and were examined. Figures and data for every assessment will alter and change. This being the position and stand of the Revenue, the Assessing Officer could not have formed any prima facie or tentative opinion that income had escaped assessment as the petitioner had positive income from “Indian operations”, if we take into account “actual expenditure” incurred relating to Indian operations.

iii) In the absence of the said details, the averment made in the reasons to believe will be only a guess work or surmise and not cogent or reliable material to form a prima facie view. We understand that the Assessing Officers may be handicapped in such cases but there are sufficient provisions in the Act to get hold of the said data before proceedings are initiated or reasons are recorded. There is nothing to indicate and show the data and figures of the year in question were ascertained or gathered from records for other assessment years or otherwise.

iv) In view of the aforesaid, we allow the present writ petition and quash the reassessment proceedings initiated by issue of notice u/s. 148 dated 30th March, 2010 relating to assessment year 2003-04.

v) Copy of this order will be sent to the Chairman of Central Board for Direct Taxes for appropriate and necessary action to ensure proper record maintenance and issuance of suitable directions.”

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Industrial undertaking: Deduction u/s. 80-IB: A. Y. 2001-02: Production of article: Bottling of gas into cylinders amounts to production: Assessee entitled to deduction u/s. 80-IB:

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Puttur Petro Products P. Ltd. vs. ACIT; 361 ITR 290 (Karn):

The assessee had claimed deduction u/s. 80-IB contending that bottling of LPG gas in the cylinders amounts to production/manufacturing activity. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim. The Tribunal upheld the disallowance.

On appeal by the assessee, the High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The process of bottling of gas into gas cylinders, which requires a very specialised process and independent plant and machinery, amounts to production of “gas cylinders” containing gas for the purpose of claiming deduction u/s. 80-IB.
ii) In the circumstances, the question framed by us is answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.”

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Exemption: Share of profit of partner from firm: Section 10 (2A): A. Y. 2010-11: Partners are entitled to claim exemption u/s. 10(2A) on the share of profit received from the firm even if it includes that income also which was exempted in the hands of the firm under various provisions of section 10.

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Vidya Investment & Trading Co. (P.) Ltd. vs. UOI; [2014] 43 taxmann.com 1 (Karn)

The assessee, a private ltd. company, was a partner in a partnership firm. In the assessment order u/s. 143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, for the A. Y. 2010-11, the Assessing Officer granted exemption to the assessee u/s. 10(2A) of the Act, in respect of its share of profits from the partnership firm except to the extent of the income which was exempt in the hands of the firm under other provisions of section 10.

The assessee filed a writ petition and challenged the Explanation to section 10(2A) on the ground that it was discriminatory and in violation of Articles 14 and 265 of the Constitution. Further, a declaration was sought by the assessee that it was entitled to claim exemption u/s. 10(2A) in respect of its total share of profit received as partner of the firm which would include the income exempted from tax in the hands of the firm.

The Karnataka High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

“i) Although the dividends income and income derived from mutual funds were not includible in the taxable income of the firm yet they were nevertheless part of its profits;

ii) The expression total income of a firm in the Explanation to section 10(2A) would not mean taxable income of the firm but gross total income of a firm which included exempted income as well;

iii) The Assessing Officer had lost sight of this aspect and had held that ‘total income’ for the purpose of Explanation to section 10(2A), as defined in section 2(45), would mean the total amount of income as referred to in section 5, computed in the manner laid down in the Act; Therefore, the Assessing Officer was not right in holding that the income which was excluded from the total income of the firm u/s. 10, would have to be taxed in the hands of the partners on the reasoning that only income which was taxed in the hands of the firm would be exempted from tax in the hands of the partner;

iv) The Explanation to section 10(2A) would not call for any striking down in the hands of this Court. The Explanation could not be given a literal interpretation, so as to defeat the object of the amendment made to the Act. The object of the amendment was to make it clear that the distribution of profits and gains of a firm in the hands of the individual partners shall not be considered to be income of the partners and therefore, not includible while computing the total income of the partner under the Act;

v) Thus, the assessee was entitled to claim exemption u/s. 10(2A), on the share of profit of the firm, inclusive of the income, which is exempted under s/s. (34), (35) and (38) of section 10, as the total income referred to in section 10(2A), includes exempted income of the partnership firm.”

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Charitable purpose: Exemption u/s. 11: A. Y. 2008-09: Accumulation of income: Notice u/s. 11(2)(a) to be furnished in Form 10: Information furnished in form of letter with full detail as required in Form 10: Sufficient compliance: Assessee entitled to exemption u/s. 11:

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CIT vs. Moti Ram Gopi Chand Charitable Trust; 360 ITR 598 (All):

The assessee, a charitable Trust was registered u/s. 12A. For the A. Y. 2008-09, the Assessing Officer disallowed the claim for exemption u/s. 11 of the Act in respect of the accumulated income inter alia on the ground that the notice u/s. 11(2)(a) was not in the specified Form 10 as prescribed by Rule 17. The Tribunal found that the information with full details as required in Form 10 was furnished by the assessee by a letter. The Tribunal held that the assessee had made an investment in the next year amounting to Rs. 1,25,17,086/- and thus the purpose of the provisions of the Act had been achieved. The Tribunal accordingly allowed the claim of the assessee.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Allahabad High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) We do not find any error of law in the order of the Tribunal. When a request by way of a letter, which complies with the requirement and furnishes all the information required in Form 10 was made available on record and there was sufficient proof before the Assessing Officer that the amount was not only kept apart but was also spent in the next year, the adherence to the form and not substance was not valid exercise of power by the Assessing Officer.

ii) The questions of law are decided in favour of the assessee and against the Department.”

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Capital gain: Cost of acquisition: Market value as on 01-04-1981: Section 55A: Reference to DVO only when value of capital asset shown by assessee less than its FMV:

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CIT vs. Daulal Mohta (HUF); 360 ITR 680 (Bom):

In the relevant year, the assessee had sold a property called Laxmi Niwas which was owned by it since prior to 01-04-1981. For computing the capital gain, the assessee got the value of the property as on 01-04-1981 determined at Rs. 2,13,31,000/- from a Government approved valuer. The Assessing Officer referred the case to the DVO u/s. 55A who determined the value at Rs. 1,35,40,000/-. The Assessing Officer adopted the value determined by the DVO and computed the capital gain. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim and held that the cost of acquisition should be taken at Rs. 2,13,31,000/- as determined by the Government approved valuer.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) Reference to the DVO can only be made in cases where the value of the capital asset shown by the assessee is less than its fair market value as on 01-04-1981. Where the value of the capital asset shown by the assessee on the basis of the approved valuer’s report was more than its fair market value, reference u/s. 55A of the Income-tax Act, was not valid.

ii) The Tribunal was right in law in reversing the decision of the Commissioner (Appeals) on valuation of the property at Rs. 1,35,40,000/- made by the DVO as against the valuation done by the Government approved valuer at Rs. 2,13,31,000/-.”

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Business expenditure: Section 37: A. Y. 2006- 07: Tribunal noticing assessee’s books of account as well as sales tax records of seller and finding purchase genuine transaction: No rejection of books of account: Deletion of addition on account of purchase transactions justified:

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CIT vs. Sunrise Tooling System P. Ltd.; 361 ITR 206 (Del):

For the A. Y. 2006-07, the assessee had claimed deduction of Rs. 43,34,496/- towards the purchases from S. On the basis of the statement of a director of the assessee in the course of survey that the amount represented a non-existent or bogus transaction, the Assessing Officer disallowed the claim for deduction and made the addition. The Tribunal took note of the statement of the director and the retraction of that statement on 21st February, 2008. The Tribunal noticed that the statement was recorded in the course of survey u/s. 133A and did not have any evidentiary value. The Tribunal also took note of the fact that no copy of the statement was given to the assessee to enable it to cross-examine the director and accordingly deleted the addition.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The Tribunal could not be faulted in its approach in rendering the findings of fact. Although the Revenue endeavoured to submit that the Tribunal fell into error in overlooking and discounting the statement of the director on the ground that it was retracted, the discussion in the order of the Tribunal would show that the Tribunal took note of the materials before the Assessing Officer and the Commissioner (Appeals), which included the assessee’s books of account as well as the sales tax records of S. This established firmly and conclusively that the claim of the assessee that it had purchased goods from S were borne out.

ii) The Tribunal also noted that the Income-tax Authorities had not even rejected the books of the assessee even while finding the claim bogus.

iii) The impugned order of the Tribunal does not disclose any error, warranting framing of substantial questions of law.”

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Assessment: S/s. 143 and 144: A. Y. 2002-03: Assessment order passed without serving notice on the assesee is not valid: Burden of Revenue to prove service of notice: No evidence of service by Revenue: Assessment not valid:

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CIT vs. Gita Rani Ghosh; 361 ITR 17 (Gau):

For the A. Y. 2002-03, the Assessing Officer passed best judgment assessment order u/s. 144 claiming that the assessee did not respond to the notices issued u/s. 143(2) and 142(1) of the Act. The assessee challenged the validity of the assessment order on the ground that no such notices were served on the assessee in respect of the assessment proceedings of the assessee for the relevant year. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s appeal and held that the assessment order was illegal and void ab initio as no notice u/s. 143(2) or section 142(1) was served on the assessee. The Tribunal accordingly cancelled the assessment order.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Gauhati High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) It is settled law that to establish service of a notice upon the assessee, the initial onus is on the Revenue and unless and until this onus is discharged, the service of a notice simply, on the basis of presumption and assumption, cannot be accepted, so as to justify an ex parte best judgment assessment u/s. 144 of the Act.

ii) When the assessee had denied the receipt of the notices u/s. 142(1) and section 143(2) for the A. Y. 2002-03, it was for the Revenue to prove, by bring ing materials on record including witnesses, if any, that the notices sent to the assessee were for the A. Y. 2002-03. This was, however, not done.

iii) It was not the case that after the Assessing Officer had come to know of having issued notices in the wrong name, he had corrected the same by issuing a second set of notices. Similarly, the fact of service of notice had also not been mentioned in the order-sheet, meaning thereby that there was no evidence with the Revenue to establish its case that it was the second set of notices which were served upon the assessee as per acknowledgment.

iv) The Tribunal is correct in cancelling the best judgment assessment passed u/s. 144.”

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Appeal to CIT(A): Condition precedent to pay admitted tax before filing appeal: Section 249(4)(a): A. Y. 1996-97: Amount belonging to assessee available with Revenue far in excess of admitted tax: Requirement of section 249(4)(a) met: Appeal should be admitted:

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CIT vs. Pramod Kumar Dang; 361 ITR 137 (Del):

The Commissioner (Appeals) dismissed the appeal filed by the asessee relying on the provisions of section 249(4)(a) on the ground that the assessee appellant has failed to pay admitted tax. The Tribunal found that Rs. 4.6 lakh seized from the assessee was lying with the Department. The Tribunal held that the amount of Rs. 4.6 lakh should be treated against the payment of due tax on the returned income and directed the Commissioner (Appeals) to decide the appeal on merits.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The rationale behind section 249(4) is that where an assessee has filed a return, the tax which is admittedly payable by the assessee should be paid prior to the hearing of any appeal filed by the assessee. The rationale is very logical for the reason that no assessee can be heard in an appeal where the tax which is admittedly payable by the assessee is outstanding. It is to enforce payment of tax on the admitted income.

ii) When an assessee files the return of income then at least the tax which is payable on the returned income should be paid by the assessee. But where the assessee either has paid the tax on the returned income or sought adjustment admittedly lying with the Revenue towards the tax payable on the returned income, the assesee cannot be denied a hearing.

iii) The amount of Rs. 4.6 lakh belonging to the assessee which was admittedly available with the Department was far in excess of the amount of tax payable in terms of the returned income and even in excess of the demand of Rs. 2,15,926 created u/s. 143(1)(a). The assessee could not have been denied a hearing merely on the ground of non-payment of tax due on the returned income. Therefore, the requirements of section 249(4)(a) of the Act, were duly complied with.”

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Reassessment: S/s. 147 and 148: A. Ys. 199-00 to 2002-03: Reasons for reopening recorded after issuing notice u/s. 148: Notice u/s. 148 and reassessment proceedings are invalid:

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CIT vs. Baldwin Boys High School; [2014] 45 taxmann. com 33 (Karn):

The assessee trust, was running educational institution. For the relevant assessment years, the assessee had declared income ‘Nil’, claiming exemption u/s. 10(23C) (vi) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Assessments were completed allowing the claim. Subsequently, the assessments were reopened by issuing notices u/s. 148 of the Act dated 30-01-2004, on the ground that the assessee was not registered u/s. 12A nor had requisite approval u/s. 10(23C)(vi) of the Act. The Tribunal set aside reassessment proceedings taking a view that notices u/s. 148 to reopen assessment was issued without recording reasons as contemplated by s/s. (2) of section 148 which vitiated the whole proceedings.

On appeal by the Revenue, the following question was raised:

 “Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the notice issued by the Assessing Officer u/s. 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 without recording reasons as contemplated by s/s. (2) of section 148 of the Act would vitiate the whole proceedings? In other words, whether the reasons as contemplated by s/s.(2) of section 148 of the Act, in the present cases, were recorded after issuance of notice u/s. 148 of the Act and, therefore, the whole proceedings are bad in law?”

The Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 “i) F rom bare perusal of section 148, it is clear that the Assessing Officer is obliged to record reasons before issuing notice u/s. 148. It is true that in one of the files, there was a draft of reasons purportedly prepared by the Assessing Officer on 20-01-2004. It was not signed by the Assessing Officer. The reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer were typed, as is clear from the printout of the original reasons, on 04-02-2004. The typed date was struck off with pen and the date 30-01- 2004 was written by hand with the same pen. Though the original date (typed) was struck off with pen still the typed date is visible/could be read or is clearly seen, and it was typed as 04-02-2004.

 ii) Before the Tribunal, a controversy was raised that the printout of the reasons was computer generated and it was printed with the date of printing automatically by the Computer. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the typed date or the date of printout was 04-02-2004 and that it was changed to 30-01-2004 as the date of reasons recorded under s/s. (2) of section 148.

iii) Thus, the record was set right by showing that the date of the notice and the date on which the reasons were recorded was same. Why and how the date 04- 02-2004 is appearing on the original reasons recorded under s/s. (2) of section 148 is not explained by the Assessing Officer.

iv) On perusal of the original records, it is clear that the reasons were prepared on 04-02-2004 whereas the notice was sent on 30-01-2004. It is also pertinent to note that the contents of draft reasons and the original reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer do not tally.

v) Thus, from perusal of the order passed by the Tribunal and so also the other materials placed on record, it is clear that it is a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal holding that notice was issued even before the reasons were recorded. In such circumstances, there was no reason to interfere with the finding of facts recorded by the Tribunal.”

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DTAA: India-Singapore: Royalty: Section 9(1) (vi)(c): PE: Assessee, resident of Singapore made payment to GCC in Singapore for acquiring rights of telecasting cricket matches from Singapore: Had no connection with the marketing activities carried out through alleged PE in India: Payments could not be deemed as royalty in view of Article 12(7) of India Singapore DTAA:

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DIT vs. Set Satellite (Singapore) Pvt. Ltd.; [2014] 45 taxmann.com 100 (Bom):

The assessee is a Singapore based company engaged in the business of acquiring rights in television programmes, motion pictures and sports events and exhibiting the same on its television channels from Singapore. The assessee is a tax resident of Singapore. The assessee entered into an agreement on 25th January, 2002 with Global Cricket Corporation Private Limited (GCC), also a tax resident of Singapore. Under that agreement, GCC granted rights to the assessee throughout the licence territory. The licence territory, inter alia, included India. The assessee paid consideration to GCC for acquisition of such rights. The Assessing Officer made an addition of the amount so paid to GCC by way of disallowance on the ground that the tax was not deducted at source on such payment. The Tribunal deleted the addition. On appeal by the Revenue, the following questions were raised: “

i) Whether the payment to GCC (a Singaporean Company)for acquisition of telecasting rights were in the nature of ‘royalty’ covered by Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vi)(c)?

ii) Even if payments would be deemed as royalty, whether they would not be chargeable to tax as per Article 12(7) of India-Singapore DTAA ?

The Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The appellate authorities had already held that payment was made only for broadcasting operations carried out from Singapore, which had no connection with the marketing activities carried out through alleged Permanent Establishment (‘PE’) of assessee in India.

 ii) Thus, there was no economic link between the payments. The payer was not a resident of India and the liability to pay royalty had not been incurred in connection with and was not borne out by the PE of the payer in India.

iii) The absence of economic link was thus the foundation on which the Tribunal’s conclusions were based. Thus, the Appeal was to be dismissed as no substantial question of law was involved.

 iv) Once it does not raise any substantial question of law, then, the Appeal deserves to be dismissed. It is also dismissed because the view taken by the Tribunal in the given facts and circumstances cannot be said to be perverse or based on no material.”

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Hindu Undivided Family – Not in existence prior to the coming into force of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – Suit for Partition – Suit not maintainable

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Sushant vs. Sunder Shyam Singh AIR 2014 (NOC) 90 (Del.)

A Hindu Undivided Family was not in existence prior to the Hindu Succession Act coming into force. The Properties in question, inherited by the deceased owner on the demise of his father, would become his persona properties. The son of the deceased owner would not acquire any coparcenary share in the properties till the owner was alive. The suit property would devolve on the son of the deceased in his individual capacity on the death of the owner. Therefore, the claim of the grandson of the deceased for partition of suit properties on the grounds that the same were ancestral, was held not maintainable.

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Instrument – Chargeability to stamp duty – Document executed before Notary – Creating rights in land – Stamp Act, 1899, section 17, 2(14)

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Om Prakash Umar vs. State of U.P. through Secretary Fund & Revenue Dept. U.P. Shashan, Lucknow & Ors ARI 2013 Allahabad 209

A document before the Notary was executed on 14-12- 2009 by one Mr. Mahadeo and others by which they withdrew their rights on the abadi land admeasuring 80 ft. x 70 ft. and transferred them in favour of the petitioner for a consideration of Rs. 50,000/- only. The aforesaid document was written on a stamp paper of Rs. 150/- only. The Additional Commissioner (Stamp) vide order dated 18-04-011 held the above document to be an instrument of conveyance and assessing its market value determined the deficiency in stamp duty and imposed a penalty. The appellate authority affirmed the aforesaid order vide its order dated 25-11-2011.

The above two order dated 25-11-2011 and 18-04-2011 were under challenge by way of writ petition before the Allahabad High Court. The Hon’ble Court observed that section 17 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 provides that all instruments chargeable with duty and executed by any person in the India shall be stamped before or at the time of execution. Therefore, stamp duty on an instrument is payable at the time of execution of the instrument. The moment an instrument is executed stamp duty is payable on it. The validity of its execution or its non-registration has nothing to do with its execution and consequently the payment of stamp duty.

An instrument as defined u/s. 2(14) of the Act includes every document and record by which any right or liability is, or purports to be created, transferred, limited, extended, extinguished or recorded. The above document executed before the Notary, with whatever name it may be called, creates rights in the land in favour of the petitioners, after extinguishing those of Mr. Mahadeo and others therein. It is, therefore, undoubtedly, an instrument as defined u/s. 2(14) of the Act.

In view of the aforesaid facts the aforesaid document dated 14.12.2009 is an ‘instrument’ within the meaning of Section 2(14) of the Act and its execution is not denied, it is chargeable to stamp duty.

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Evidence – Commission of Enquiry – Statements made before commissioner cannot be used as evidence before civil or criminal court – Conclusions based on such statements cannot be used as Evidence:

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SBI through General Manager vs. National Housing Bank & Ors(2013) 180 Comp. Cas 15 (SC)

The National Housing Bank drew a cheque on 3rd January, 1992, for an amount of Rs. 95.39 crore approximately on the Reserve Bank of India in favour of the State Bank of Saurashtra, a subsidiary of the appellant, which later merged with the appellant. Towards the end of April, 1992, the National Housing Bank found that it did not possess any bank receipts or supporting documents or any securities in respect of such transaction and addressed letters to the State Bank of Saurashtra requesting it to make delivery of bank receipts/securities or for return of the amount. The state bank of Saurashtra denied the existence of any “outstanding transaction”. The National Housing Bank filed a suit before the Special Court established under the Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in securities) Act, 1992 against (i) the State Bank of Saurashtra, (ii) HM, (iii) 2 employees of HM and (iv) the Custodian appointed u/s. 3(1) of the 1992 Act for recovery of an amount of Rs. 95.39 crore with interest alleging conspiracy, collusion and fraud between the defendants in the suit thereby causing loss to the National Housing Bank. The Special Court passed a decree in favour of the National Housing Bank and against the state bank of Saurashtra. The State Bank of Saurashtra challenged that part of the decree which was against, it and the National Housing Bank challenged that part of the decree of the Special Court directing it to deliver certain amounts to the Custodian:

The Hon’ble Court observed that u/s. 9A(1) of the Act, the Special Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate any matter or claim arising out of a transaction in securities entered into during the period specified in the section in which a notified person is involved in whatever capacity. Therefore, the Special Court was authorised by law to adjudicate the claim of the defendant, HM, without being shackled by the procedural fetters imposed under the code.

Further that though the 1992 Act declares that the Special Court is not bound by the Code of Civil procedure, 1908, it does not relieve the Special Court from the obligation to follow the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The findings of even a statutory commission appointed under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952, are not enforceable proprio vigore and the statements made before such commission are expressly made inadmissible in any subsequent proceedings civil or criminal. Therefore, courts are not bound by the conclusions and findings rendered by such commissions. The statements made before such commission cannot be used as evidence before any civil or criminal court. It should logically follow that even the conclusions based on such statements can also not be used as evidence in any court.

The Special Court had based its conclusions on Janakiraman Committee Report and the correspondence between the various parties (whose details are not even specified in the judgment).

The Court observed that the course adopted by the learned Judge of the Special Court of looking into the correspondence between the parties, which even according to the learned Judge had not been proved is not permissible in law. The Special Court Act though declares that the Court is not bound by the Code of Civil Procedure, it does not relieve the Special Court from the obligation to follow the Evidence Act. Further, the learned Judge extensively relied upon the second interim report of the Jankiraman Committee on the ground that the same was tendered by the 1st Defendant.

It is well settled by a long line of judicial authority that the findings of even a statutory Commission appointed under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 are not enforceable proprio vigore as held in Ram Krishna Dalmia vs. Justice S.R. Tendolkar and Ors.: AIR 1958 SC 538 and the statements made before such Commission are expressly made inadmissible in any subsequent proceedings civil or criminal.

In our view, the courts, civil or criminal, are not bound by the report or findings of the Commission of Inquiry as they have to arrive at their own decision on the evidence placed before them in accordance with law.

Therefore, Courts are not bound by the conclusions and findings rendered by such Commissions. The statements made before such Commission cannot be used as evidence before any civil or criminal court. It should logically follow that even the conclusions based on such statements can also not be used as evidence in any Court. Janakiraman Committee is not even a statutory body authorised to collect evidence in the legal sense. It is a body set up by the Governor of Reserve Bank of India obviously in exercise of its administrative functions, The Governor, RBI set up a Committee on 30th April, 1992 to investigate into the possible irregularities in funds management by commercial banks and financial institutions, and in particular, in relation to their dealings in Government securities, public sector bonds and similar instruments. The Committee was required to investigate various aspects of the transactions of SBI and other commercial banks as well as financial institutions in this regard.

The Court dismissed the suit.

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Doctrine of merger – Appeal to Appellate Tribunal – Not applicable when appeal rejected on limitation.

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Raja Mechanical Co.(P) Ltd vs. Commissioner of C. Ex, Delhi – I 2012 (279) ELT 481 (SC)

The facts in nutshell are that the assessee is a manufacturer of dutiable excisable goods. The assessee availed a MODVAT Credit of Rs. 1,47,000/- by filing a declaration dated 30-06-1995 under Rule 57T(1), whereby it declared the receipt of the goods from M/s. DGP Windsor India Ltd. vide invoice dated 18- 06-1995, alongwith the application for condonation of delay, before the adjudicating authority/assessing authority. Accordingly, the adjudicating authority had issued a show cause notice.

As there was a delay in filing the prescribed forms before the assessing authority. Therefore, the assessing authority had rejected the claim of the assessee and accordingly, had directed him for payment of the Excise duty credit availed by the assessee. Aggrieved by that order, the assessee had belatedly filed an appeal before the proper appellate authority. Since there was delay in filing the appeal and since the same was not within the time that the appellate authority could have condoned the delay, accordingly had dismissed the same. It is that order which was questioned before the Tribunal. Before the Tribunal, as we have already noticed, the assessee had requested the Tribunal to first condone the delay and next to decide the appeal on merits, i.e. to decide whether the adjudicating authority was justified in disallowing the benefit of the Modvat credit that was availed by the assessee. The Tribunal had not conceded to the second request made by the assessee and only accepted the findings and conclusions reached by the Commissioner of Appeals, who had rejected the appeal. The assessee’s stand before the Tribunal and before this Court is that the orders passed by the adjudicating authority would merge with the orders passed by the first appellate authority and the Tribunal ought to have considered the appeal filed by the assessee on merits also. In our opinion, the same cannot be accepted. In view of the plethora of decisions of this court, wherein this court has, categorically, observed that if for any reason an appeal is dismissed on the ground of limitation and not on merits, that order would not merge with the orders passed by the first appellate authority.

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Contract of guarantee and contract of indemnity – Difference – section 124 and 126, Contract Act, 1872:

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Punjab National Bank vs. Ram Dutt Sharma & Ors AIR 2013 Allahabad 198

Plaintiffs Sri Ram Dutt Sharma and his wife Smt. Saroj, instituted a Suit, impleading New Bank of India, Sri Chhote Lal Sharma, son of Sri Khacheru Singh and Smt. Saroj, wife of Sri Shiv Charan as defendants. The relief sought in the aforesaid suit was a mandatory injunction directing defendant No. 1 to auction Truck No. UHN 1077, belong to defendant Nos. 2 and 3, and in possession of defendant-Bank towards security/ guarantee against the amount of loan, advanced to defendant Nos. 2 and 3, and realise outstanding dues, before encashing Fixed Deposit Receipts of plaintiffs, lying with defendant-Bank.

The plaintiff’s case was that defendant Nos. 2 and 3 were running a transport business. They purchased a new Truck in 1985. The financial assistance in the aforesaid transaction was tendered by the Bank, advancing a loan of Rs. 1,50,000/-, against which Truck itself was hypothecated. Besides, the plaintiffs’ FDRs of Rs. 10,000/- and Rs. 70,000/- were pledged in security for a period of three years or till repayment of loan amount, whichever is earlier. There appears to be some default towards repayment of loan amount, on the part of defendant Nos. 2 and 3, but defendant No: 1, instead of realising defaulted amount from defendant Nos. 2 and 3, by sale/auction of mortgaged vehicle, proceeded to encash FDRs of plaintiffs lying in security with the bank, hence the suit.

The Hon’ble Court observed that it would be necessary to determine the nature of contract between the plaintiffs and the Bank. The contract between the Bank and respondents 3 and 4 was admittedly that of loaner and loanee. A “contract of guarantee” is defined in Section 126 of I.C. Act, 1872. It says that a “contract of guarantee” is a contract to perform the promise or discharge liability of a third person in case of his default. The person who gives the guarantee is called “surety”, person in respect of whose default the guarantee is given is called the “principal debtor” and the person to whom the guarantee is given is called the “creditor”. In case this Court found that the plaintiffs entered into a contract of guarantee with the Bank in terms of Section 126 of I.C. Act, 1872 the plaintiffs would be “surety”, respondents 3 and 4 would be the “principal debtor”, and the Bank would be “the creditor”. A guarantee, therefore, is an accessory. It is essentially a contract of accessory nature being always ancillary and subsidiary to some other contract or liability on which it is founded without support of which it must fail.

The distinction between the “contract of guarantee” and “contract of indemnity” comes out from the definitions of two. The phrase “contract of indemnity” is defined in Section 124 of I.C. Act, 1872 which states that a contract by which one party promises to save the other from loss caused to him by the conduct of promisor himself or by the conduct of any other person is called “contract of indemnity”. One of the apparent distinctions between two is that a “contract of guarantee” requires concurrence of 3 persons, namely, the principal debtor, surety and the creditor, while “contract of indemnity” is a contract between two parties and promisor enters into such contract with other party. In other words, a person who is party to a contract, if he executes a promise to other party to save him from loss on account of promiser’s conduct or by the conduct of any other person, it, is a “contract of indemnity”, while for the purpose of “contract of guarantee”, it requires presence of three parties at least.

“Surety” is always liable to the extent of precise terms of his commitment and not beyond that. In the case of “contract of guarantee”, section 128 of I.C. Act, 1872 says that the liability of surety is co-extensive with that of principal debtor, unless it is provided otherwise by the contract.

The initial term of guarantee/surety was alleged to be three years or earlier thereto till the entire loan money is paid. The loan agreement was executed in 1985. Mere renewal of FDRs does not mean renewal of contract of guarantee between the surety and creditor. After the expiry of period of contract of guarantee, there was no occasion for the Bank to proceed to retain FDRs of plaintiffs surety as a collateral guarantee against the loan amount. Lower Appellate Court, had rightly read the averments contained in the plaint vis-à-vis the contract between the surety and the creditor that the renewal of FDRs, if matured before payment, were referable to a period prior to 3 years from the date of such contract and not to the extent of period of contract beyond 3 years. To that extent, there was a clear averment that contract was only for three years or earlier thereto when the entire loan amount was paid. The word “earlier” rules out any possibility of a continuing contract of guarantee beyond 3 years.

Collateral security of FDRs was, therefore, available to the bank for a period of 3 years only and not beyond that, unless consented by surety, i.e. plaintiffs. Admittedly, no such consent was obtained by plaintiffs-surety and, on the contrary, the Bank on its own gave extension to the principal debtor in the matter of re-payment of loan amount. The appeal was allowed.

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Managing Bosses

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To many people, the phrase “managing your boss” may sound unusual or suspicious. Because of the traditional top down emphasis in most organisations, it is not obvious why you need to manage relationships upward — unless, of course, you would do so for personal or political reasons.

But we are not referring to political manoeuvring or to apple polishing. We are using the term to mean the process of consciously working with your superior to obtain the best possible results for you, your boss and the company.

Recent studies suggest that effective managers take time and effort to manage not only relationships with their subordinates but also those with their bosses. These studies also show that this essential aspect of management is sometimes ignored by otherwise talented and aggressive managers…

The fact is, bosses need cooperation, reliability and honesty from their direct reports. Managers, for their part, rely on bosses for making connections with the rest of the company, for setting priorities and for obtaining critical resources.

If the relationship between you and your boss is rocky, then it is you who must begin to manage it. When you take the time to cultivate a productive working relationship — by understanding your boss’ strengths and weaknesses, priorities and work style — everyone wins.

(Source: The Economic Times dated 23.11.2013)
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The ‘Modinomics’ euphoria: questions

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The markets are perhaps getting a little too sanguine at this stage about a Bharatiya Janata Partyled alliance coming to power in 2014 and its likely impact on the economy and governance. Some recent poll forecasts for the current state elections do suggest a swing in favour of the BJP; but to extrapolate from that, the configuration of the coalition that comes to power in 2014 is a long stretch.

Equally importantly, there remains a big question about the nature and effectiveness of “Modinomics” (which some heavyweight brokerages seem to be drooling over) at the national level.

I think investors need to ask some basic questions before putting their shirt on the Gujarat model. First, to what extent is the Gujarat model replicable for the rest of the country, given the diverse problems in different regions? Can his almost Nehruvian commitment to big industry be used to bootstrap growth for the rest of the country? Will he, for instance, ride roughshod over the new land acquisition norms and provide cheap land for industry? Or will he ultimately have to settle for the middle ground of compromise and consensus?

Second, assuming he does become prime minister, who will be his allies? Given his style of functioning – which even his staunchest admirers will concede is somewhat autocratic (and hence perhaps so effective in his own state) – how well will he lead a coalition of regional satraps who can be equally autocratic and stubborn in pushing their own narrow demands and agenda?

Third, let’s face the fact that even if Finance Minister P Chidamabaram were to produce a 4.8 per cent fiscal deficit-to-GDP ratio in 2013-14, it would not mark the end of India’s fiscal woes. The only way to compress the fisc this year is on the back of a hefty deferment of big-ticket expenditures such as subsidy payments for oil and fertilisers. These will become a drag on Mr Modi’s first budget. Besides, there would be the additional load of the full implementation of social programmes like food security. How will a new government handle this? Will it have the courage to prune or jettison some of these revenue-guzzling welfare programmes, and risk eternal damnation by voters? Can it afford to finally do away with oil and other subsidies at one shot? Or will the credit rating agencies start snapping at our heels again a couple of months after a new government takes office?

Fourth, there is a risk that Mr Modi’s appointment as prime minister will polarise Indian politics to an unprecedented degree. There could be various levels at which this plays out. For one thing, I suspect the growth (Mr Modi’s credo)-versusredistribution/ development debate will intensify. The pro-environment, pro-welfare “soft left” that has swelled in numbers over the last few years will take a harder line and the face-off could get nasty. Big industrial projects could continue to suffer. I also have no doubt that the aisle that separates the Opposition and the treasury benches in Parliament will be wider than ever. Thus, Mr Modi could face Barack Obama’s predicament, where consensus on any issue, however critical from a national perspective, is impossible to reach. Again, I would not put it past a Congress-led Opposition to take a leaf out of the BJP’s book and use the same tactics to obstruct lawmaking and the functioning of Parliament.

I am not apologetic or embarrassed about saying that I believe that Mr Modi has the “positive decisiveness” that former Goldman Sachs chief economist Jim O’ Neill so eloquently attributed to him. If a Mr Modi-led alliance does come to power, it will be a critical experiment in whether a single individual can yank an economy out of a low-growth trap created by its own diversity and the pulls and pressures of coalition politics. I am afraid that my a priori hypothesis is that the experiment will fail.

(Source: Extracts from an Article by Mr. Abheek Barua in the Business Standard dated 04.12.2013)

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China’s reform road map has lessons for India

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The detailed document on reform decisions made at Third Plenum of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party has been released. This document contains the details on reform. Since the government decided to release a more detailed “decisions taken” document, many investors have taken this to be a clear indication that China’s top leadership is serious about reform. There once again seems to be a bit of a buzz around China and its long-term growth prospects after post the release of this reform road map.

The complete “Decision on Deepening Reform” document lays out a host of major initiatives, including a decisive shift towards free markets, relaxation of the one-child policy, elimination of re-education labour camps and reforms in land tenure, state owned enterprises, taxation and migrant worker rights. This reform road map show Xi Jinping as being a far more assertive and visionary leader than his predecessor Hu Jintao. He has shown that he has a good grasp of China’s structural economic and social ailments, and is putting in place a plan to address the country’s deep rooted governance issues. He also seems to be putting in place the administrative machinery that will help him overcome deep seated resistance to change from SOEs, local government bodies, tycoons and other local officials.

These steps and announcements show that Xi Jinping has a strong vision for China and the political muscle to attempt change and to stand up to vested interests. He seems to want to move China in a more market – oriented direction than the growth trajectory of the past decade.

Three major points emerge from the document.

Xi Jinping is targeting broad reform of Chinese governance and not just tinkering with economic policies. Mr Xi’s reforms seem to be targeting not just economic development and an improvement in economic efficiency, but a more basic re-write of the function and role of government. This means pushing government agencies to stop direct intervention in markets and forcing them to focus on market regulation, public service delivery, “social management” and environmental protection. Improving governance, at both the central and local level, seems to be his main aim. This is important as most of China’s economic problems – be they excess investment spending or local government debt and the shadow financial system – can be linked to poor governance (especially local governance). Mr Xi seems determined to focus more on social services and amend the local fiscal structures to enable greater focus on these issues.

The most important signal from the party was strong support for the private sector and markets, referring to it as “non-public”. They did pledge to “unwaveringly encourage, support and guide the development of the non-public economy”. They also declared that property rights in the non-public economy may (equally with the state sector) not be violated. The document also says the party will “reduce central government management over micro-level matters to the broadest extent” and calls for an end to excessive central government intervention. The first section of the document is all about giving the markets a decisive role in resource allocation. The clear goal seems to be to reduce the ability of the government at all levels to manipulate either the prices or allocation of natural resources. While China has mostly deregulated its product markets, government bodies still can interfere in markets in many ways: subsidised capital, energy or land for favoured companies, a maze of rules and regulations that make it hard to set up new business and formal or informal restrictions on private enterprises entering certain sectors. The clear intent of the document is to chip away at all these anti-market distortions. The document also mentions “property rights as being at the core of ownership systems” and calls for fair competition and free consumer choice. The party also promised to reduce the administrative hassles and bureaucratic hurdles to doing business. The document also talks of better protection of intellectual property rights and “the lawful rights and interests of investors”, as well as a smoother bankruptcy process.

The main disappointment of the document has been the lack of aggressive state sector reform or a privatisation programme. China’s declining productivity growth and rising debt levels are both linked to the bloated SOE sector which has been guzzling a disproportionate share of bank credit but delivers declining returns on investment. It is clear that while SOEs will not be privatized, they will face much greater competition and tighter regulation. This approach seems to be in sync with the party’s view that competition, more than private ownership is the key to economic dynamism and strong productivity.

China seems to be on the march once again. It has found a strong and decisive leader, who seems to be committed to markets and improving governance. They have identified their constraints to growth and weaknesses in their prior economic model, and seem to have a game plan to address these short comings. Many investors feel comfortable underwriting 7 per cent economic growth for the country for the coming years.

The contrast between what China has just announced and demonstrated and the current situation in India cannot be more stark. Neither do we have decisive leadership, nor do we seem to have clarity on how to get back to 7-8 per cent economic growth.

India really need to get its act together and unveil a coherent road map to address our systemic weaknesses and show concrete action on the ground, more than just sound-bites. Investors will not remain patient forever.

(Source: Extracts from an Article by Mr. Akash Prakash in The Business Standard dated 22.11.2013)

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Corporate practices

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There are two reasons “why” high performance and high integrity are foundational corporate goals. First, their fusion allows organisations to avoid catastrophic risk that injures the company and its stakeholders. But it also confers affirmative benefits inside the company, in the marketplace and in the broader global society. Ultimately, performance with integrity creates the fundamental trust among shareholders, creditors, employees, recruits, customers, suppliers, regulators, communities, the media and the general public…But the hard question is “how” companies can achieve this all-important combination in a complex, fast-moving global enterprise. The fundamental task of the CEO is to create a strong, uniform and global performancewith- integrity culture, which entails shared principles (values, policies and attitudes) and shared practices (norms, systems and processes). Although this culture must include some elements of deterrence against ethical and legal wrongdoing, at the end of the day, it must be affirmative. An underlying tenet of this culture should be that people want to do the right thing because leaders make this a real company imperative. Clear lines must be set for all employees that this culture applies in every nation and cannot be bent by corrupt local practices, regardless of short-term business costs.

(Source: Extracts from “High Performance with High Integrity” by Ben Heineman – The Economic Times dated 19.11.2013)
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Foreign fund flows may get all-clear to take Cyprus route

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The shadow over Cyprus is about to be lifted. Indications are that foreign investors routing their funds through the Mediterranean island will not run into hurdles in claiming tax benefits from investments in India.

Foreign funds and private equity investors, putting money in debt as well as equity in India, were taken aback when India last month notified Cyprus as a “notified jurisdictional area” under the Indian income-tax law. This meant higher walls of compliance that made Cyprus come across as a less attractive tax haven. It’s unclear what provoked India’s stand on Cyprus. Industry circles perceive that this was a fallout of the offshore jurisdiction’s response to certain enquiries by the Indian tax department. But within a few weeks of the notification by India, the Cyprus Government initiated discussions with Indian authorities in India to sort out the matter. A Cyprus finance ministry press release hinted that the two countries could be close to finding a solution.

According to the treaty, investors from Cyprus are spared of short-term capital gains tax – a benefit that puts Cyprus at par with Mauritius – and are charged a lower withholding tax on interest earned on debt investments. Consultations were held between officials of the two governments .

According to communique to clients by PwC, “Both delegations agreed that the circumstances that had caused India to notify Cyprus as a”notified jurisdictional area” under section 94A of the Act on 1 November 2013, can be immediately addressed by: (a) agreeing to adopt the provisions of the new Article 26 of the OECD Model Tax Convention (approved by the OECD Council on 17 July 2012) relating to Exchange of Information in a new tax treaty between the two countries; (b) improving the channels of communication and exerting every effort in facilitating each other in processing requests and responses in a swift and effective manner.”

The Cyprus government release also states that once the notification of Cyprus being notified as a “notified jurisdictional area” under section 94A of the Act is rescinded, it would be done with retrospective effect from 1 November 2013 which was the date of issue of the original notification. Further, the press release also indicates that the revised tax treaty (post renegotiation) between the two countries is expected to be finalised soon.

The future of Cyprus as a tax haven had come under question earlier this year after it ran into a financial crisis with several banks looking for a lifeline.

A combination of low withholding tax and zero tax on capital gains has over the years made Cyprus more attractive as compared to tax heavens like the Netherlands and Luxembourg, to overseas investors and foreign funds buying Indian fixed income assets.

(Source: The Economic times dated 05.12.2013)

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India – State Of Four Estates – A few highprofile cases reveal how much democracy’s ‘software’ lags behind its ‘hardware’

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Administrative and legal processes are now underway to get to the bottom of four high-profile cases involving, directly or otherwise, an assault on the dignity of women. They include a Supreme Court judge, the editor and managing editor of an influential weekly magazine, a former home minister of a major state in the Union (and, possibly, its current chief minister as well) and a spiritual guru with a vast following. What is at stake in each case is abuse of power that is in flagrant violation of the laws by those who are dutybound – because of the positions they occupy – to uphold them.

The larger picture they reveal hasn’t attracted the requisite attention: the growing disconnect between the “hardware” and the “software” of Indian democracy. The “hardware” of democracy include legislative and executive institutions (Parliament, state assemblies, panchayats etc), the judiciary, official statutory and non-statutory bodies, political parties and the media. And the “software” relates to the observance of rules and regulations, conventions and precedents to enable the institutions to function in a transparent, accountable and effective manner. What is the record?

Judged according to these standards, our Parliament and state assemblies are little more than a hotbed of interminable intrigue, confrontation, mudslinging, filibustering and sometimes also outbursts of violence. This numbs the nerves of the executive and paralyses the legislature. The one cannot govern while the other cannot enact laws, adopt policies or, so far as the opposition is concerned, even act as a watch-dog of the government of the day. What stands out, therefore, is a mockery of their constitutional responsibilities.

The political parties are no better. Their public spats are less about policies and programmes and more about the acquisition of power and pelf. Many of them are akin to privately-controlled family businesses. Inner-party democracy is a rumour to them. The Congress, which has had the longest innings in power since independence, leads the pack. But others are not far behind: Thackerays and Badals, Karunanidhis and Pawars, Reddys and Yadavs. And then you have individuals without kith or kin who rule the roost in their parties: Mamata, Mayawati, Jayalalithaa, Patnaik et al. None dares cross their path. What “software” of democracy can they possibly bring to the table? Precious little.

But these permanently feuding parties from one end of the political spectrum to another can and do make common cause when their interests as a corporate class are in jeopardy. Consider their opposition to any serious effort to keep politicians with criminal backgrounds at bay. Consider, too, the alacrity with which they refused to come within the purview of the Right to Information Act. Such “software” contains far too many bugs to serve any worthwhile purpose.

The ailments of the judiciary, including, in the first place, that of the Supreme Court, are of another order. The alleged moral turpitude of some of the judges is only one of them. Even on this count, however, the judiciary is loath to allow an impartial and transparent probe by anyone other than the members of its own fraternity. The most recent instance concerns allegations of sexual misconduct against a recently retired judge of the apex court by an intern.

Add to this the growing interference of the apex court in legislative and executive areas that are, strictly speaking, beyond its remit. It is argued, doubtless with good reason, that such interference is inevitable when the government and the legislature are unable or unwilling or both to shoulder their constitutionally-mandated tasks. Governance, like nature, abhors a vacuum. But the danger in this argument is that it upsets the delicate balance of power between the three estates of the republic that the Constitution decrees. On this count, too, a lethal virus could render the “software” of democracy obsolete.

That danger is no less acute when governments, both at the Centre and in the states, deploy official agencies to get even with rivals. More often than not, such deployment is initiated outside the framework of laws, rules and regulations. Fake encounters and fabricated cases are evidence of this conceited insouciance.

But so is the intrusive surveillance of citizens suspected of making life difficult for the rulers of the day: rival politicians, nosey media persons, uncooperative civilian and police officials, NGOs. We recently witnessed such conduct in, among other states, Uttar Pradesh, Haryana and Gujarat. Surveillance of this nature, especially if it is pervasive, also contaminates the “software” of democracy.

The cases of Tarun Tejpal and Shoma Chaudhary of Tehelka and of Asaram Bapu fall in a different category. They relate to an unforgiveable betrayal of trust reposed in them by their readers, friends, colleagues and followers. What makes the betrayal odious is that these individuals professed to promote highfalutin principles of moral and spiritual rectitude. All three of them emasculated the substance of their calling and, in the process, polluted the “software” that is expected to keep state and society in India in fine fettle.

(Source: Extracts from Mr. Dileep Padgaonkar’s Article in The Times of India dated 28.11.2013)
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The Ministry of Corporate Affairs has vide General circular 19/2013 dated 10.12.2013 issued clarification on disclosures to be made with regard to applicability of Section 182(3) of Companies Act 2013 pertaining to Prohibition and restriction regarding political contributions

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As per the circular with the coming into force of the scheme relating to ‘Electoral Trust Companies’ in terms of section (24AA) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 read with Ministry of Finance Notification No. S.O.309(E) dated 31st January, 2013 pertaining to Electoral Trust Scheme 2013, it will be expedient to explain the requirements of disclosure on part of a Company of any amount or amounts contributed by it to any political parties u/s. 182(3) of the Companies Act, 2013. It is clarified that;

(i) Companies contributing any amount or amounts to an ‘Electoral Trust Company’ for contributing to a political party or parties are not required to make disclosures required u/s. 182(3) of Companies Act 2013. It will suffice if the Accounts of the company disclose the amount released to an Electoral Trust Company.

(ii) Companies contributing any amount or amounts directly to a political party or parties will be required to make the disclosures laid down in section 182(3) of the Companies Act, 2013.

(iii) Electoral Trust Companies will be required to disclose all amounts received by them from other companies/sources in their Books of Accounts and also disclose the amount or amounts contributed by them to a political party or parties as required by section 182(3) of Companies Act, 2013.

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TDS on Premium Paid for Grant of Lease

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Synopsis U/s. 194-I of the Income Tax Act, 1961, an assessee is required to deduct tax at source from payment of rent made to a resident. In some lease transactions, particularly when land is taken on a lease for a long period of time, a one-time premium is paid for the grant of lease. In addition to the premium, an annual lease rent of a nominal amount may be charged. The issue is whether the payer needs to deduct tax at source from the one-time premium paid.

The issue has been the subject matter of adjudication in various cases and judgment largely depends on the facts of the case. In this article, the authors have analysed various judicial pronouncements in this regard and have made several observations that will help the reader understand the issue in its entirety.

Issue for Consideration

Section 194-I of the Income-tax Act, 1961 requires deduction of tax at source from payment of any income by way of rent to a resident. For this purpose, ‘rent’ has been defined to mean any payment, by whatever name called, under any lease, sub-lease, tenancy or any other agreement or arrangement for the use of (either separately or together) any, land, or building (including factory building), or land appurtenant to a building (including factory building), ……………….. whether or not any one or all of the above are owned by the payee.

Very often, when land is taken on lease for a long period of time, say for 30 years, 50 years or 99 years, a premium is paid for such grant of lease, particularly when the lease is being taken from a Government Authority, such as an Industrial Development Corporation or a Regional Development Authority. In addition to the premium, annual rent may also be charged, which at times may be a nominal amount. The payment of such a premium has been the subject matter of several controversies, under the tax laws, surrounding the liability of the payer to deduct tax at source u/s. 194-I and his eligibility to claim deduction for such payment in computing his total income.

One of the issues is whether such a premium is really in the nature of rent for the purposes of section 194-I, and whether tax is deductible at source from such premium, or whether such premium is in the nature of a capital expenditure for the grant of lease of the land and no tax is deductible from such payment. While the Chennai bench of the Tribunal has taken the view that tax is required to be deducted at source u/s. 194-I from the payment of lease premium, the Delhi and Mumbai benches of the Tribunal have taken a contrary view that payment for such premium is a capital expenditure and no tax is required to be deducted at source thereon.

Foxconn India’s case

The issue first arose before the Chennai bench of the tribunal in the case of Foxconn India Developer (P) Ltd. vs. ITO 53 SOT 213.

In this case, the assessee was engaged in the business of developing a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) and had taken on lease, a plot of land of 151.85 acre for a period of 99 years from SIPCOT Ltd., a Tamil Nadu State Government Corporation engaged in industrial development, which was the nodal agency for development of land for SEZ at Sriperumbudur. The assessee paid an amount of Rs. 28.41 crore as upfront charges for the lease. The annual lease rent was Rs. 1 per year for 98 years and Rs. 2 in the 99th year, such rent also being paid in advance. The upfront fee was non-refundable and consisted of Rs. 27.09 crore towards non-refundable upfront charges and Rs. 1.32 crore for payment towards provision of water and pipeline up to the boundary limit.

The Assessing Officer (TDS) took the view that such payment came within the definition of rent as per the explanation to section 194-I, and that the assessee had failed to deduct tax at source thereon. He therefore treated the assessee as in default for non-deduction of TDS and raised a demand for the amount of TDS and interest thereon.

The Commissioner (Appeals) was of the view that the upfront fee was nothing but advance rent, since the annual rent was very small. According to the Commissioner (Appeals), such upfront payment obviated the problem of SIPCOT in collecting the rent annually. He therefore held that the assessing officer was justified in applying section 194-I and holding that the assessee had failed to deduct TDS. However, since the lessor had included upfront and water connections charges received by it as its income and paid tax thereon, he held that the TDS could not be recovered from the assessee following the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Hindustan Coca-Cola Beverages 293 ITR 226, but that interest could be levied u/s. 201(1A) up to the date of payment of final installment of advance tax by SIPCOT Ltd.

Before the Tribunal, it was argued that the upfront fee was a capital outgo, and that by such payment, the assessee derived the right of possession of the land for 99 years; that the right was an asset, giving rise to an enduring benefit; that the assessee had reflected this right acquired by such payment as an asset in its balance sheet; that no tax was deductible on a capital outgo. SIPCOT Ltd. had treated the entire amount received by it as a revenue receipt and part of its business income from the area development activity, and had accordingly treated the transaction as a deemed sale of land. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Patna High Court in the case of Traders and Miners Ltd. vs. CIT 27 ITR 341, for the proposition that lease of land was a transfer of a capital asset.

The Tribunal agreed with the assessee’s contention that it had received a benefit of enduring nature, that the outgo was on capital account and that it had acquired an asset by making such payment. It noted that the assessee had derived an interest in the property since leasehold interest was a valuable right.

However, according to the Tribunal, the question was not as to whether the outgo was capital or revenue, but as to whether the upfront fee fell within the definition of ‘rent’ under the Explanation to section 194-I. According to the Tribunal, section 194-I did not differentiate between a capital outgo and a revenue outgo. It rejected the assessee’s argument that the payment was made before the date of signing of the lease agreement, as not being relevant. According to the Tribunal, it was an accepted position that the payments were for the lease of the land, that the lease was already in contemplation and that the payment would not have been made unless the lease was at least orally agreed to between the parties. Therefore, according to the Tribunal, the payment, by whatever name called, was made under a lease agreement.

According to the Tribunal, the definition of rent would definitely include payments of any type under any agreement or arrangement for the use of land. For the purposes of section 194-I, the Tribunal was of the opinion that the normal meaning of the term rent could not be used, but that the specific definition of rent had to be applied, which, in the opinion of the Tribunal, would squarely cover the payment made by the assessee to SIPCOT Ltd.

The Tribunal therefore upheld the order of the Commissioner (Appeals), holding that tax was deductible at source. Having held that the tax was deductible at source, the Tribunal however proceeded to hold that such tax could not be recovered from the assessee as the relevant taxes had already been paid by SIPCOT Ltd., and that only interest u/s. 201(1A) could be recovered from the assessee.

Navi Mumbai SEZ’s case

 The issue again came up before the Mumbai bench of the Tribunal in the case of ITO vs. Navi Mumbai SEZ (P) Ltd., 147 ITD 261.
in this case, the assessee was a special purpose  vehicle constituted by the maharashtra Government Corporation, City and industrial development Corporation of maharashtra ltd. (CidCo) and dronagiri infrastructure Private Limited for developing and operating an SEZ at  navi  mumbai.  CidCo  was  the  town  development authority for navi mumbai, and had acquired privately owned lands in that area for development work. CidCo was also appointed as the nodal agency for setting up the SeZ at navi mumbai.

a development agreement, followed by the lease deed, was entered into between CidCo and the assessee, whereunder the assessee agreed for payment of lease premium, in respect of land acquired by CidCo and allotted to the assessee, from time to time. accordingly, the  assessee  paid  lease  premium  of  rs.  50  crore  in assessment year 2006-07, rs. 946.06 crore in assessment year 2007-08, Rs. 1,033.61 crore in assessment year 2008-09,  and  rs.  146.82  crore  in  assessment  year 2009-10.

By virtue of the lease, the assessee had acquired lease- hold rights in the land for the purpose of developing, designing, planning, financing, marketing, developing necessary infrastructure, providing necessary services, operating and maintaining infrastructure, and administering and managing the SEZ to be known as the navi mumbai SEZ. the assessee had also acquired the rights to determine, levy, collect, retain, and utilise user charges, fees for provision of services and/or tariffs under the lease deed. the lease deed and development agreement assigned to the assessee the right to develop, construct and dispose of residential and commercial spaces. the assessee was also entitled to grant a sub-lease in respect of portions of the lease land, in accordance with applicable laws and as per the lease deed. the assessee was granted the power to assign its rights, title or interest or create a security interest in respect of its right, either fully or in part thereof, in favour of lenders, including the grant of step in rights in the event of default under the financing arrangements for the purposes of obtaining finance for the SEZ. under the development agreement, the assessee acquired sole rights for marketing of the SEZ and the industrial/commercial projects to potential tenants.

The assessing officer took the view that the lease premium was ‘rent’ within the meaning of the said term u/s. 194-i and that the assessee ought to have deducted tax at source from such payment. according to the assessing Officer, almost any and every payment in relation to property under lease transactions was to be treated as rent for the purposes of section 194-i and hence lease premium partook of the character of rent. according to the ao, the various restrictive clauses in the lease agreement negated the assessee’s contention that it had acquired rights in the land and not merely rights to use the land. the ao therefore held that the assessee was in default for non-deduction of tax at source on such payment.

The  Commissioner  (appeals)  noted  that  the  assessee had been allotted land for a period of 60 years on the payment of lease premium and that the lease deed and the development agreement assigned to the assessee leasehold rights, which included a bundle of rights. he held that the payment of lease premium by the assessee was for acquiring the lease and it could not be equated with rent. The Commissioner (Appeals) noted that the definition of the term ‘rent’ specifically used the term ‘for the use of,’ and that the usage was of the utmost importance in any transaction for it to be treated as rent. according to the Commissioner (appeals), a transaction of lease might have stipulations which make it a transaction identical   to the transactions between a landlord and a tenant and that was why various terms like sub-lease, tenancy, etc. had been used in the section. however, in many cases, a lease transaction might not necessarily be similar or identical to a transaction between a landlord and tenant, and instead might indicate a sale transaction, in the sense that certain more valuable rights in the property were transferred.

The Commissioner (appeals) also drew a distinction be- tween a case where the tenant or lessee used the proper- ty for his own purposes or employed it for his own benefit, in which case the consideration would be in the nature  of rent, as against a situation where the property was exploited in a manner that its identity did not remain the same and thereafter it was sold, by the lessee, for a profit, which was the situation in the assessee’s case and hence could not be termed as a transaction between a landlord and a tenant. according to the Commissioner (appeals), the latter was a case where the lessee acquired a capital right to develop the land and exploit it. the Commissioner (appeals) therefore held that the assessee had acquired rights in land and had not paid for the use of the land, and that therefore the provisions of section 194-i were not attracted.

On further appeal by the revenue, the tribunal noted that the word ‘rent’ as defined u/s. 194-I had a wider meaning than that in common parlance. the tribunal also noted that the assessee however had paid the lease premium to acquire the leasehold land and that there was no provi- sion for refund of the lease premium paid by the assessee. it took note of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of A. R. Krishnamurthy vs. CIT 176 itr 417, wherein the apex Court held that a lease of land was a transfer  of interest in the land, that involved a transfer of title in favour of the lessee, though the lessor had the right of reversion after the period of lease terminated. it also took note of the decision of the delhi high Court in the case  of Bharat Steel Tubes Ltd. vs. CIT 252 itr 622, wherein the court held that amount paid for acquiring leasehold rights was premium, which was capital in nature, and that periodical payments made for the continuous enjoyment of the benefits under the lease amounted to rent, which was revenue in nature.

The tribunal also noted the decision of the jurisdictional Bombay high Court in the case of CIT vs. Khimline Pumps Ltd. 258 itr 459, wherein it was held that the payment made for acquiring leasehold rights from a lessee was capital in nature, and could not be treated as an advance rent. according to the tribunal, in the assessee’s case, there was a transfer of substantive interest of the lessor in the leasehold land in favour of the assessee and that the lease premium was a capital expenditure to acquire a capital asset and not for the use of the land.

The  tribunal  observed  that  in  the  case  of  foxconn  in- dia developers (supra) the Chennai bench of the tribu- nal had observed that the payment was made under the lease agreement, and had held that the payment was for use of land and not for acquisition of leasehold land. the tribunal in navi mumbai SeZ’s case therefore, was of the view that the decision of the Chennai bench in foxconn’s case was not applicable to the case before it. the tribu- nal preferred to follow the decision of the delhi tribunal in ITO vs. Indian Newspapers Society 144 itd 668, wherein it was held that the payment of the lease premium was not liable to deduction of tax at source. it also took note of the ratio of the decision of the special bench of the tribunal at mumbai in the case of Jt. CIT vs. Mukund Ltd. 13 Sot 558, where the special bench had held that premium paid for acquiring leasehold rights in land was a capital expenditure.

The mumbai bench of the tribunal therefore held that the premium paid by the assessee did not attract the provisions of section 194-i, and that no tax was required to be deducted at source on such lease premium.

A similar view had been taken earlier by the mumbai bench of the tribunal in the case of ITO vs. Wadhwa & Associates Realtors (P) Ltd. 146 itd 694, in the context of lease of land from mumbai metropolitan regional development authority.

Observations
An immovable property comprises of a bundle of rights, each of them can be separately conveyed for varied consideration to different people. for example, right to own, right to use, right to mine, right to let, right to manage and control, etc. under the general law, sale consideration is received for conveyance of absolute rights in a property while a premium is received for transfer of the partial in- terest of the owner of the property and rent is received for grant of the right to use the property for a period. each of these transfers operate in different fields and the payments there under have different implications.the receipt of the rent is in the revenue field and of the premium is in the capital field. The payment of the rent is revenue expenditure and of the premium is a capital outlay. there may be cases where it may be difficult to draw a precise line between the premium and the rent. there may also be the cases that the parties for convenient reasons chose to use such nomenclatures that do not reveal the true nature of the transactions. the distinction between premium and rent and the norms for identifying each of them is noted by the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Panbari Tea Co. Ltd. 57 itr 422 in the following words:

“The real test of a salami or premium is whether the amount paid, in a lump sum or in instalments, is the consideration paid by the tenant for being let into possession. When the interest of the lessor is parted with for a price, the price paid is premium or salami. But the periodical payments made for the continuous enjoyment of the benefits under the lease are in the nature of rent. The former is a capital receipt, and the latter are revenue receipts. There may be circumstances where the parties may camouflage the real nature of the transaction by using clever phraseology.

This section (section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act), therefore brings out the distinction between the price paid for transfer of right to enjoy the property and the rent to be paid periodically to the lessor. When the interest of the lessor is parted with for a price, the price paid is premium or salami. But the periodical payments made for the continuous enjoyment of the benefits under the lease is in the nature of rent. The former is a capital income and the latter a revenue receipt.

In some cases, the so-called premium is in fact advance rent and in others, rent is deferred  price. It is not the form, but the substance of the transaction that matters. The nomenclature used may not be decisive conclusion, but it helps the court, having regard to the other circumstances, to ascertain the intention of the parties.”

It is therefore appropriate to hold that the issue that whether a payment is a premium or a rent is largely a question of fact. the facts will decide as to what has been paid is a premium or a rent, no matter what nomenclature the parties have chosen to use; the facts will decide the character of the payment, no matter it has been paid in one go or in installments. the facts that are relevant for deciding the character are whether the payer’s interest  in the property are transferred or whether the payment is for the limited purpose of use of the property for a period. Where the payment is for use of the property, the same would be on revenue account even where paid in one go for a period exceeding one year. in contrast where the payment is for acquiring a part of the interest of the owner, the same will be on capital account even where paid in installments.

Usually in the long lease, the transaction involves a transfer of interest of the owner in part and of the right to use the property as well as the separate payment being made for each of them. in such circumstances, it is fair for the parties and also for the authorities to respect the contents of the lease deed unless they do not reveal the facts but camouflage them.

An yardstick that can be safely used, in a case where the contents of the lease deed do not clearly reveal the true nature of the transaction and of the payment, is to look for the value of the property in the open market and if the premium matches such value, with a difference attributable to the limited title, it can be said that the payment was made for transfer of interest in the property.

An additional issue is whether the distinction between the two terms is to be ignored while interpreting section 194-i, given the specific definition contained in the Explanation to that section. On the first glance, one may be tempted to hold, like what was done by the Chennai bench in foxconn’s case, that any payment made under a lease, is subjected to the provisions of tax deduction at source as such payment should be termed as ‘rent’ within its extended meaning u/s. 194-I. We are afraid that the view  of the bench requires reconsideration in as much as the term ‘rent’, even u/s. 194-I, covers a payment only where it is for the use of the properties listed therein. The definition of rent in section 194-i uses the term “for the use of” clearly indicating that it is intended to cover the subsequent periodical payments, which are meant for continuous subsequent usage of the property, and not initial capital payment, meant for acquisition of the right to use the property. had section 194-i intended to also cover payments made for acquisition of the right to use property, it would have used the term “for acquisition of the right to use, or for the use of”.

The Chennai bench of the tribunal took the view that it did not matter as to whether the payment of premium was capital in nature or revenue in nature. it proceeded on the footing that the definition of ‘rent’ in section 194-I was broad enough to cover even capital payments. however, given the use of the term “for use of” in the definition, it is clear that what is covered by the definition is only a revenue expenditure, and not a capital expenditure. the distinction, as observed by the Supreme Court in Panbari tea’s case (supra), between rent (revenue) and premium (capital) also does not seem to have been taken into account by the Chennai bench of the tribunal.

In fact, if one takes the Chennai bench’s decision to its logical conclusion, even payment for outright purchase of land or building will be covered by section 194-i, as purchase of land or building includes acquisition of the right to use the land or building. this would be an absurdity, more particularly as there is a separate provision u/s. 194-ia for deduction of tax at source from payments for acquisition of immovable property.

As rightly analysed by the Special Bench of the tribunal in mukund’s case (supra), if the premium is non-refundable and there is a provision for termination of the lease prior to the end of the lease term, without refund of any part of the lease premium for the unexpired lease term, the payment of premium cannot be regarded as a payment of advance rent. unless the agreement shows that the amount of premium was paid as advance rent for all future years and that a lump sum payment of future years’ rent was paid to avail of some concession in rent, the premium paid is to be regarded as a price for obtaining the leasehold rights. in that case, the tribunal also relied upon the Supreme Court decision in the case of Durga Das Khanna vs. CIT 72 ITR 796, where the Supreme Court took a similar view in relation to a lease agreement for a cinema hall.

The delhi high Court, in the case of Krishak Bharati Co- Operative Ltd. vs. DCIT 350 ITR 24, has pointed out that payment of lease premium is a precondition for securing possession. Where the tenure of the lease is quite substantial and the lease virtually creates ownership rights in favour of the assessee, who is at liberty to construct upon the plot, and exclusive possession has been handed over to the assessee at the time of creation of the lease, the lease premium could not be regarded as advance rent to be amortised over the period of the lease.

In the case of R. K. Palshikar HUF vs. CIT 172 ITR 311 (SC), where the lease was for a long period, namely 99 years, the assessee had parted with an asset of an enduring nature, namely, the rights to possession and enjoyment to the properties leased for a period of 99 years subject to certain conditions on which the respective leases could be terminated, and a premium had been charged by the assessee in all the leases, the Supreme Court held that the grant of the leases amounted to transfer of the capital assets.

In Krishak Bharati’s case (supra), the delhi high Court observed that all the cases where the lease premium was held to be in the nature of advance rent were fact dependent. in the case of DCIT vs. Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. 329 ITR 479 (Guj), the lease premium was held to be deductible as the annual lease rent was a token amount of rs. 40. in CIT vs. Gemini Arts (P) Ltd. 254 itr 201 (mad), the rent was a nominal amount and there was no provision for increase in rent during the period of lease.

As observed by lord Greene m.r. in henriksen vs. Grafton Hotel Ltd. 24 TC 453:

“A payment of this character appears to me to fall into the same class as the payment of a premium of a lease, which is admittedly not deductible. in the case of such a premium, it is nothing to the point to say that the parties, if they had chosen, might have suppressed the premium and made a corresponding increase in the rent. no doubt they might have done so, but they did not do so in fact.” importantly, the Supreme Court in the case of durga das Khanna (supra) held that the onus is on the revenue to demonstrate that the advance rent has been camouflaged as premium and that the premium has been inflated. According to the Supreme Court, where an arm of the government is a party to the lease agreement, the burden on the Assessing Officer to prove such camouflage would be very heavy and onerous.

Therefore, in a situation where an assessee obtains substantial domain over the immovable property by payment of the lease premium, particularly where the lease premium is paid to a Government authority, the premium would be regarded as a payment for acquisition of the property for the lease period, and not as a payment for the user of the property. therefore, the provisions of section 194-I should not be attracted to such payment of lease premium. the ratio of the decisions of the mumbai and delhi benches of the tribunal, to the effect that no tax is deductible at source in respect of such premium, therefore seems to be the better view of the matter.

Dear members of BCAS family,

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The other day I was watching the swearing in ceremony of our 15th Prime Minister, Mr. Narendra Modi. Being from the corporate sector, I immediately wondered how the HR would communicate such news to the stakeholders of a company, were Mr. Modi be appointed as the CEO of a company. I began day dreaming and in my imagination, I visualised a letter which would probably read something like this:

 “Dear Stakeholders,

As you already know, as of 26th May 2014, we have on-boarded the new CEO for our Company, Mr. Narendra D. Modi (also famously known as NaMo). He was short listed for the role a few months back and the decision to induct him for the role was taken on 16th May 2014. We are fortunate that after ages, majority of the recruitment team members have concurred on the choice of our CEO. Happily, the stakeholders across interest groups have also lent their vote to Mr. Modi. By doing so, we have strengthened his hands to enable him to steer the fortune of our company with confidence and without bottlenecks.

The new CEO is a visionary, taskmaster, focused individual and master innovator. Having appointed him for the role, we can now step back from debating between ourselves as to how the company must run, so that he could do his job effectively. For those of you who have voted for his appointment, our request is to not crush him with a mountain of expectations. For those of you who did not want his appointment, our request is to accept the wishes of the majority and join hands with him to build our company.

 Having said that, we urge you not to disrupt the growth process and allow graceful functioning of his board. Make your points eloquently and forcefully, but you may want to avoid staging dharnas, walkouts or strikes. We have had enough of that in the last few years.

Mr. Modi has been chosen for the role because of his exemplary performance in our Gujarat branch. It is expected that he will carry that experience forward and upscale it to make our company a model for others to emulate. He has assured that the top lines will grow, costs will come down, productivity will rise, leakages will be plugged, resources will be optimally used, the treasury reserves will rise and the company will have funds for future investments and contingencies.

But it is expected that his biggest achievement would be the significant increase in our bottom-line and thus, the earnings per share. There has been wide discontent in the past on account of inequitable distribution of the company’s profits. It is hoped that each shareholder will benefit under the new management, both financially and socially. But you should also be mindful of the fact that all this cannot be achieved single-handedly. We all need to chip in. Our role would be to focus on our own jobs and roles in the company, share his vision, work our hearts out and be united in our efforts.

As you would have all witnessed, Mr. Modi has extensively travelled to most of our regions and branches before he was appointed. He has already interacted with numerous stakeholders and interest groups and is likely to have gained a deep understanding of and insights into the issues and problem areas.

The CEO is cognizant of the support he has from all quarters and will surely work in the interest of all stakeholders under the parent banner of Hindustan United Family. The stakeholders from the Middle Class Co-operative, the Poor People’s Collective, the Shetkari Sanghatna and Sons, the Youth Unlimited, the Women’s Equality Society, The India Inc. and others can be hopeful of having their grievances addressed this time round.

In return, you are just expected to be patient and give him space to work out his priorities. While he has hit the ground running and hit some home runs in building relations with other CEOs and has taken some phenomenal decisions, please do not expect the world to turn upside down in the first 100 days. The damage done by the weak management of his predecessor will take time to undo. The good days have begun and will only get better. Don’t parrot it, but believe in it.

He already has a plan in place. We have given him a free hand to choose his team and are confident he will select the best person for each job. The process has already been set in motion and from the looks of it, his team has already started taking visible actions. We are hopeful that his team will not only achieve their Key Result Areas but also enter into Service Level Agreements with all their stakeholders. We are sure he is aware that it is important that not only does he himself remain above board but more importantly that he is able to inculcate the same values in his team members. So much so that good governance becomes a culture and does not remain a mere virtue, in all of us. He has gained a reputation of a workaholic. He has no familial or outside pressures nor does he have any known material hobby, interest or greed (the reasons why we are confident he will neither waver, compromise nor succumb to temptations).

Our brand name has taken a serious beating in recent times. Interest of investors and clients was on the wane. It is here that we are very excited to see Mr. Modi not only regain lost ground but to rebrand our company such that others sit up and take notice with envy and awe.

Lastly, for those of you from the business and finance units, there’s a lot to cheer. We are aware that hopes are riding high on him urgently bringing in long awaited bills (e.g. GST), taking a relook at painful laws (e.g. Companies Act, 2013), improving tax administration (where honest tax payers are not penalised and defaulters don’t go scot free) and rationalising the indirect taxes (apply Pareto’s Principle for Service Tax and Excise so that 20% of items that fetch 80% of the revenue are retained and small items which don’t generate significant revenue are exempted).

We request you to join us in welcoming our new CEO and gear ourselves to work alongside him.
As someone famously said “Achche din aanewale hai”.

Yours truly Team HR”

Closer home, BCAS too has a new CEO in Nitin Shingala. An excellent human being, a fine professional and a devoted BCAS volunteer of many years. Having worked with him as my VP for a year I can assure you that 2014-15 will be a golden year in the journey of BCAS. Please join me in welcoming Nitin as the BCAS President for the year 2014-15.

Here’s wishing everyone happiness and love.

With Warm Regards

Naushad A. Panjwani

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Create Opportunities and Not Entitlements

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The new Government is firmly in the saddle in Delhi. After 25 years, the people of India have given a clear mandate. Right from the swearingin ceremony, this Government has made a good beginning and as they say, “well begun is half done.” The Government will now have to meet the challenge of enhanced expectations.

Subsequent to the poll results, the parties that lost have started searching for reasons for their complete rout. A number of party spokesmen have said that even though the UPA Government took substantial steps to alleviate poverty, these did not get the necessary publicity and therefore, they were unable to convince the voters. This has been cited as the prime cause of defeat. During the course of debates and discussions in the media, the ‘Food Security‘ and the ‘Right to Education’ legislations have been brandished as path breaking achievements of the UPA Government. It is this aspect of the argument that one needs to consider carefully. There can be no two views about the right of an Indian citizen to have a square meal and to avail of good education. The question is how does one achieve this? Is creating ‘entitlements‘ the correct approach or in the era of globalisation, is creation of opportunity an alternative?

The left of the Centre parties, socialists and the few surviving communists have consistently argued that globalisation is one of the prime causes of increase in poverty. They believe that the underprivileged are against globalisation and economic reforms in the manner that it is being pursued in the last 20 years. This does not appear to be the truth. If one analyses the aspirations of those sections of the public who are living in poverty, or those from the lower middle class, who are trying to make their way up the ladder, the resentment is not about those who were enjoying the good things of life, but it is about the lack of opportunity to reach where others have. As Thomas Friedman, in his book “The World is Flat” argues that voters have not said, “Stop the globalisation train, we want to get off.” They have actually said,“Stop the globalisation train, we want to get on but someone needs to help
us by building a better step stool.” This election was about envy and anger. It was a classic case of revolution, happening when things are getting better but not fast enough for many people.

The reason why the people have given such an unequivocal mandate is that they have realised that governments, both at the Centre and at the State-level have been eaten away by corruption and mismanagement and they are simply unable to deliver. It is in this context that the new Government must look at the challenges ahead. Let us consider the “Food Security” legislation. While there is no quarrel about the sentiment that every Indian must be well fed, just creating an entitlement without substantial reform in agriculture, such legislation will lead us nowhere. It would probably substitute an existing inefficient system by another. We need to create opportunities for the Indian farmer to grow more food, to store it, if necessary process it and reach it to the consumer through efficient channels of distribution where he will get the best price. The farmer needs a window of opportunity. The Indian farmer does not need doles of free power and loan waivers. What he needs is an assured supply of quality inputs and access to affordable credit. If this infrastructure is created, channels of distribution will develop and food will reach the poor at reasonable prices. Then, a far smaller number of people who do not have the requisite purchasing power will have to be supported.

Let us look at education. A young lady has taken charge of this ministry and without giving her an opportunity to function there is a controversy being raised about her educational qualification. To succeed, what is needed is not a university degree but strong political will and the desire to act honestly and fairly. The Right to Education Act creates an entitlement, but without proper planning, it will increase pressure on the existing poor education infrastructure and result in further resentment. The need is to spend more, spend well and create more quality schools which can be accessed by the lower strata of society. We have had reservations for more than six decades, and there needs to be serious debate on how far it has benefited those for whom they were meant. Apart from increase in the number of institutions, there is a need to seriously rethink about the manner of imparting education. Vocational education must be given its due share. Let us hope that the promise to spend 6% of GDP on education translates into reality and does not remain on paper.

Finally, not only must opportunities be created, but these must be created quickly. The speed of decision-making must undergo a total transition. The new Government should not attempt to be “saviours” of the poor. The endeavour must be to empower all sections of the society, to create more opportunities for wealth creation and then ensure its equitable distribution. The Indian voter has delivered. It is now the turn of the Indian politician to do so!

Anil.J.Sathe

Editor

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Quantitative Easing- An Exit In Three Acts

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The first act in the exit from extraordinary monetary stimulus in the US began in January. The Fed has been trimming its bond purchases by $10 billion a month since then. Quantitative easing will end by December at the current strike rate.

The second act could start around July 2015. Fed chairperson Janet Yellen has hinted that she may begin to push up the benchmark federal funds rate around that time if the US economic recovery stays on track.

There is a possible third act that nobody in the financial markets seems to be considering. The US central bank has quadrupled its balance sheet since September 2008—from $1 trillion then to $4 trillion now. The explosive growth in the monetary base has not been inflationary, but the return to normal monetary policy should eventually lead the Fed to monetary contraction. Such an endgame will be far more painful than what financial markets are anticipating.

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CBI Follies: This Is No Way To Check Crony Capitalism

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The Supreme Court seeks to ensure a strong, independent Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) to check corruption. Sadly, the CBI is using this enhanced power to pursue frivolous charges against honourable officials. This simply demoralizes and paralyses the bureaucracy, without catching the big fish.

If the CBI is going to chase officials long after they retire, why will they risk taking quick decisions?

The CBI has now registered ten FIRs against six companies for defaulting on loans from public sector banks. How is loan default a crime? Maybe many loans were given because of political connections, but while that’s undesirable, it isn’t criminal. Even willful default is not criminal – the answer is to seize the assets of the defaulters through court action. If the companies in question gave bribes to obtain loans or debt relief, or if they cooked their books, that is certainly criminal. But it is not clear that the CBI understands these distinctions.

Few analysts think the CBI has enough specialized domain knowledge to tackle financial crime. In the West, financial companies are constantly probed and prosecuted, but this requires high financial expertise that can match the best on Wall Street. By contrast, the CBI’s recent efforts suggest a sad lack of expertise, and even of basic financial understanding.

It must be able to distinguish between bad and criminal decisions, and between mere mistakes and crookery. Fast decision-making requires the use of discretion, short-cutting wooden procedures. To treat every use of discretion as criminal is plain wrong, and a recipe for paralyzing decision-making.

Part of the problem lies in a silly legal provision which says that if a decision benefits any private party, the bureaucrat concerned can be charged with corruption even if there is no evidence that he gained personally. A more stupid provision would be difficult to imagine. Can there be any decision that does not benefit somebody? And if indeed there are some decisions that benefit absolutely nobody, would such decisions be worth taking? The UPA government once drafted legislation to remove this provision but did not follow through.

As long as this clause remains law, the CBI can claim it is legally bound to prosecute virtually any decision-taker. Narendra Modi talks of improving governance if he comes to power. That approach must include an immediate ordinance to delete this stupid clause. Other political parties will surely support the conversion of such an ordinance into law.

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Value Every Raindrop

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There is no doubt that water will determine whether India becomes wealthy or remains poor. But the management of water is not simply about building more dams or pipelines to take the water to our cities and then more pipelines to flush the waste from our homes. The management of water is about building a relationship between society and its water, so that we can understand the value of each raindrop and understand that unless we are prudent – indeed frugal – with our use of this precious resource, there will never be enough water for all.

Water management is, then, about society and its ability to build technologies to maximise the use of water and, more importantly, technologies to share water with all. It is for this reason that we must re-learn the water wisdom of the past. In the late 1990s, the Centre for Science and Environment published its book Dying Wisdom: Rise, Fall and Potential of India’s Traditional Water Harvesting Systems, which documented the extraordinary wealth and ingenuity of the country’s people living across different ecological systems to manage water. The systems ranged from ways of harvesting glacier water in the cold deserts to delivering water with precision over long distances through bamboo drip irrigation systems in the north-eastern hills.

The kundi of the hot desert of India incorporates the simplest of technologies for powerful impact. Rain is harvested on an artificially created piece of land, which is sloped towards a well to store precious water. The water maths is equally simple; as little as 100 millimetres of rainwater harvested over one hectare of land will collect one million litres of water in this structure.

On the other hand, in the other regions of the country, people harvested floodwater. In other words, people had learnt to live with an excess of water and with its scarcity. And all the coping used the principle of rainwater harvesting in a country that gets rain for only 100 hours of the 8,760 hours in a year. They knew that all the rain of the year could come in just one cloudburst. The solution was to capture that rain and to use it to recharge groundwater reserves for the remaining year. The answer, ultimately, was to use the land for storing and channelling the rain – over or under the ground, catching water where it falls and when it falls.

This tradition of yesterday has crucial relevance in todays and tomorrows urban India. Today, our cities get their water supply from further 261 (2014) 46-A BCAJ and further away – Delhi gets Ganga water from the Tehridam; Bangalore is building the Cauvery IV project, pumping water 100 kilometres to the city; Chennai’s water will travel 200 km from the Krishna river; Hyderabad from the Manjira, and so on. The point is that the urban-industrial sector’s demand for water is growing by leaps and bounds. But this sector does little to augment its water resources – and does even less to conserve and minimise its use. Worse, because of the abysmal lack of sewage and waste treatment facilities, it degrades scarce water even further. Even so, its water greed is not met. Groundwater levels are declining precipitously in urban areas, since people bore deeper in search of the water that municipalities cannot supply.

In new India, the water imperative is that cities must begin to value their rainfall endowment. This means implementing rainwater harvesting in each house and colony. But it also means learning again about the hundreds of tanks and ponds that built, indeed nourished, the city. Almost every city had a treasure of tanks, which provided it the important flood cushion and allowed it to recharge its groundwater reserves. But urban planners cannot see beyond land. So land for water has never been valued or protected. Today, these water bodies are a shame – encroached, full of sewage, garbage or just filled up and built over. The city forgot it needed water. It forgot its own lifeline.

But the real tragedy is that we have lost knowledge of how to value the raindrop.

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The accomplice to crime of corruption is frequently our own indifference.

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The accomplice to crime of corruption is frequently our own indifference.
?Bess Myerson

No one would deny that corruption is a worldwide phenomenon.

However. the issue to be considered is the extent of it – both the amount of money changing hands and the number of citizens directly affected by it, i.e., the extent to which low-level corruption affects ordinary people. It is unfortunate that the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Bill 2013, inspite of the Parliament Standing Committee on Personnel Public Grievances Law and Justice having already submitted its report on the above bill, and presented in Lok and Rajyasabha on 8th February 2014, did not come for passing in the Parliament in its last session. Some of the proposed amendments therein included:

1) Criminalise bribe-giving to the same extent as receiving bribes (In the present Prevention of Corruption Act, 1969 only receiver of bribe is prosecuted.)

2) Expand the scope of offences that will be termed ‘corruption’;

3) Make bribe-taking and bribe-giving in the corporate sector offences; and

4) Provide for procedures to confiscate the ill-gotten gains from corruption even before the completion of the trial.

According to our Constitution, as the last Lok Sabha was dissolved before the passage of this Bill, it is deemed to have lapsed. It has dealt an enormous blow to the anti-corruption movement. However at least the whistleblowers’ Protection bill, to protect those who make public interest disclosures against corruption is passed.

The need for such a legislation has been strongly felt, as a large number of RTI activists have been targeted and killed for probing corruption. Without legislative protection for a whistleblower, the enabling RTI legislation is rendered ineffective and the fight against corruption crippled.

The corruption perception index 2013 released by Transparency International ranks India at the 94th spot on a global list. Releasing the list, Transparency International said that its “Corruption Perceptions Index 2013 offers a warning that the abuse of power, secret dealings and bribery continue to ravage societies around the world”. “The Corruption Perceptions Index 2013 demonstrates that all countries still face the threat of corruption at all levels of the Government, from the issuing of local permits to the enforcement of laws and regulations,” said Huguette Labelle, chair of Transparency International.

“Corruption within the public sector remains one of the world’s biggest challenges,” Transparency International said, “particularly in areas such as political parties, police, and justice systems.”

“It is time to stop those who get away with acts of corruption. The legal loopholes and lack of political will in the Government, facilitate both domestic and crossborder corruption, and call for our intensified efforts to combat the impunity of the corrupt,” Labelle said. On 10th February, CBI Director Ranjit Sinha addressed the 7th Interpol Global Programme on Anti-Corruption, Financial Crime and Asset Recovery for South Asia in Delhi.

He stated that India’s anti-corruption laws must focus on confiscations of ill-gotten wealth. The proposed amendments in the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Bill, 2013 include provisions for procedures to confiscate the ill-gotten gains from corruption even before the completion of the trial. Unfortunately, legislation did not see the light of the day.

The CBI director said that majority of illicit funds that are moved across the border originate from three sources; bribery and corruption, criminal activity and commercial tax evasion. Their movement is facilitated by loopholes in the international financial system.

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Criminalisation of Politics – Netas not serious about Electoral Reforms.

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Law Commission chairman and former Delhi High Court chief justice A P Shah has said the “political class doesn’t seem to be serious about electoral reforms”. This was one of the reasons why criminal elements entered politics and tainted money came into the economy, he said.

Justice Shah told that when the law panel called a meeting of major parties for consultation — just before responding to the Supreme Court on the issue of disqualification of charge-sheeted politicians from contesting elections — Aam Aadmi Party, BJP and Congress stayed away.

“When we held a national level seminar (on February 1) on this subject, all the major parties, including AAP, BJP and Congress did not attend the meet, and neither did they send any representation,” Justice Shah said. “Institutional integrity is important to preserve. Criminals should not be allowed to get elected to assemblies and Parliament as that will weaken these institutions,” he added.

The Law Commission has been entrusted with suggesting electoral reforms by the government. The apex court too, relies on the commission for its suggestion on important issues such as electoral and judicial reforms. The SC had earlier asked the commission to give its opinion on whether politicians against whom charges have been framed by a court for serious offences should be disqualified from contesting elections. The panel had in its opinion strongly backed disqualification of candidates against whom a court has framed charges for serious offences like rape, murder etc. However, the apex court has kept the case sub-judice with an interim order saying trials against lawmakers facing serious charges should be completed in a time-bound period of one year.

“All earlier suggestions made by the Law Commis- sion on electoral reforms remain unimplemented,” Justice Shah said, elaborating how in 1999, the commission had made extensive suggestions, one of which pertained to disqualification of chargesheeted politicians from participating in elections.

 “Particularly on decriminalization of politics, the 1999 report had made several suggestions but no government took any action. This is one of the reasons why criminal elements enter politics and tainted money comes into the economy,” Justice Shah said. He also emphasized how these criminal elements have the potential to subvert the judicial process. “These criminal elements have the potential to subvert the judicial process and as a result you can see trials are delayed for several years and that is the reason why the rate of conviction is less,” Shah observed.

 “Even after the Lily Thomas judgment of the Supreme Court (which struck down Sec 8(4) of the RP Act disqualifying a convicted MP/MLA from membership of the House) there has been only three disqualifications so far,” he explained, saying how the number of lawmakers facing serious criminal charges are frighteningly high. More than 160 MPs in the last Lok Sabha were those who had serious criminal charges against them.

“Earlier there was unhealthy connection between politicians and underworld. Now these criminals are seeking elections themselves,” the law panel chairman said. Law breakers should not be allowed to become lawmakers, he emphasized.

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ICAI News

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Placement Programme of ICAI

ICAI had organised placement programme for new Members in the months of February and March, 2014. Details are given on P. 1561 – 1562. Some factures are as under.

• No. of candidates interviewed 2,327

• No. of organisations participated 80

• No. of Interview Teams 136

• No. of Jobs offered 717- Accepted 681

• Highest Salary offered – Domestic posting Rs. 21 lakh P.A. and for International posting Rs. 20.25 lakh P.A

• Average CTC offered Rs. 7.30 lakh P.A. (ii) ICAI Publications (a) Compendium of opinion Vol. XXXII (12-02-2012 to 11-02-2013) (b) Study on Compliance of Financial Reporting Requirements (Vol – II) ( P. 1578 – 1579).

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Rotation of Auditors

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In February, 2014, the Journal of BCAS (P.631) the issue relating of Rotation of Auditors was discussed. It may be noted that section 139 of the Companies Act, 2013, has now come into force w.e.f. 01-04-2014. This section provides for rotation of auditors. In the case of a CA firm, the maximum period is fixed as 10 years and in the case of an Individual the period is 5 years with rest period of 5 years for audit of a company to which the section applies.

The Ministry of Corporate Affairs has now notified Companies (Audit and Auditors) Rules, 2014. These Rules have come into force on 01-0402014. Rule 5 provides that the provision for Rotation of Auditors u/s. 139 will apply to only(a) Listed Companies, (b) Unlisted Companies having paid up Share capital of Rs. 10 crore, (c) Private Companies having paid share capital of Rs. 20 crore and (d) Any Public or Private Company, not covered by (a) (b) or (c) above, which has public borrowings from financial institutions, banks or public deposits of Rs. 50 crore or more.

Rule 6 states that the period for which the auditor has held office as an auditor prior to the commencement of the Act (i.e., 01-04-2014) should be taken into account for calculating the period of 5 consecutive years (For the individuals) or 10 consecutive years (For the firm). This will mean that if a CA Firm is an auditor of a company to which the section applies for 10 years or more prior to 01-04-2014, that firm can continue as auditor of that company for grace period of 3 years only. This Rule gives a chart explaining the years for which the auditor can continue as an auditor of the specified company after 01-04-2014.

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EAC Opinion

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The accounting for Expenditure on Shared Infrastructure Facilities and Depreciation thereon:

Facts:

A company, during the year 1984-85, was engaged in the construction and operation of the thermal power plant in the State of Odisha. The company had set up two power plants. (Units I and II e.g., Stage 1) as its maiden venture in the district of Jharsuguda known as IB Thermal Power Station and the Units were commercially operated during December, 1994 and June, 1996 respectively. The company is setting up two new power plants (Units III and IV, i.e., Stage 2) at the same location. The company has stated that the power generated from Units I and II is sold to ABC Ltd., a Government of Odisha Undertaking, at a tariff determined as per bulk Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) executed during the year 1996. The company has further stated that for setting up new power plant Units III and IV (new power plant), total estimated capital cost will be met out of 75% long term loans and 25% as equity from the investors. 50% of the power generated from the new power plant is to be sold to ABC Ltd., and balance 50% of power is to be sold to different power purchasers on long term and short term basis. The new power plant will share some of the existing infrastructure facilities originally constructed for Units I and II which are under direct control of the company. The infrastructure facilities will require substantial capital expenditure for renovation, improvement and addition to make them usable in support of construction of the new power plant. Without the above proposed expenditure, the infrastructure facilities may not support the construction of Stage 2.

Query:

 In view of the above facts and accounting requirements, the company has sought the opinion of the EAC as to whether the accounting method of additional expenditure incurred for shared infrastructure facilities and calculation of depreciation separately for charging to operation for Stage 1 and expenditure during construction for capitalisation for Stage 2 as well as inclusion in the capital cost of Stage 2 is in consonance with the generally accepted accounting principles and Accounting Standards followed in India.

EAC Opinion:

After considering paragraph 23 of the Accounting Standard (AS) 10, “Accounting for fixed assets”, the Committee is of the view that expenditure on fixed assets subsequent to their installation may be categorised into (i) repairs and (ii) improvements and betterments. Normally, expenditure on repairs, including replacement cost necessary to maintain the previously estimated standard of performance, is expensed in the same period. Similarly, the cost of adopting a fixed asset to a new use or modernisation /renovation of such asset without actually improving the previously estimated standard of performance is also expensed. Expenditures that add new fixed asset units, or that have the effect of improving the previously assessed standard of performance are capitalised.

The Committee notes from the facts of the case that the capital expenditure is being incurred on existing infrastructure facilities which will support the construction as well as operation of new power plant. Further, the expenditure shall increase the future benefits from the existing asset beyond its previously assessed standard of performance and such asset will be used beyond the original useful life assessed for existing power plants. Accordingly, such additional expenditure incurred on common infrastructure facilities for new power plant can be capitalized.

Further, after considering paragraphs 12.2 of AS 10 and paragraphs 9, 23 & 24 of AS 6, the Committee is of the view that it is only an addition or extension which retains a separate identity and is capable of being used after the existing asset is dispose off, is accounted for and depreciated independently on the basis of an estimate of its useful life. However, in the company’s case, such expenditure is not creating any new asset which is separately identifiable but such asset will be used beyond useful life assessed for existing power plant. Accordingly, it should be capitalised with the cost of existing assets.

As regards the inclusion of the depreciation charged on the asset used in the construction activities of the new power plant in the cost of asset(s) capitalised, the Committee is of the view that to the extant the asset is being used for construction activity, depreciation on the asset is a directly attributable cost of bringing the asset to its working condition for its intended use and accordingly, as per paragraph 9.1 of AS 10, it should be capitalised with the cost of asset(s) as per AS 10.

Therefore, the Committee is of the opinion that the accounting treatment of the expenditure incurred on infrastructure facilities and calculation of depreciation separately for charging to the operation for the existing units and expenditure during construction for capitalisation for the new power plant as well as inclusion in the capital cost of new power plant is not inconsonance with the generally accepted accounting principals and Accounting Standards followed in India.

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Some Ethical Issues

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The Ethical Standards Board of the ICAI has given answers to some Ethical Issues on Pages 1462 to 1464 of the C.A. Journal for April, 2014. Some of these issues are as under:

(i) Issue No.1

Whether the statutory auditors consisting of ten or more members can conduct the branch audits of the same company?

The Council has prescribed certain self regulatory measures in order to ensure a healthy growth of the profession and an equitable flow of professional work among the members. One of the recommendations of this nature is that the branch audits of a company should not be conducted by its statutory auditors consisting of 10 or more members, but should be conducted by the local firms of auditors consisting of less than ten members. This should not be understood to mean any restriction on the right of the statutory auditors to have access over branch accounts conferred under the Companies Act, 1956. This restriction may not apply in the following cases:

(a) where the accounting records of the branches are maintained at the head office of the respective companies; and

(b) where significant operations of an undertaking or a company are carried out at its branch office.

(ii) Issue No.2

What should be the size of signboard for the office?

With regard to the size of the signboard for his office that a Member can put up, it is a matter in which the members should exercise their own discretion and good taste. The size of the signboard should be reasonable. The use of glow signs or lights on large-sized boards as is used by traders or shopkeepers would not be proper. A member can have a name board at the place of his residence with the designation of Chartered Accountant, provided it is a name plate or name board of an individual member and not of the firm.

(iii) Issue No.3

Can a member share profits with the widow of his deceased partner?

When there are two or more partners and one of them dies, the widow of the deceased partner can continue to receive a share of the profit of the firm. A legal representative, say widow of a deceased partner, would be entitled to share the profits only where the partnership agreement contains a provision that on the death of the partner his widow or legal representative would be entitled to such payment by way of sharing of fees or otherwise for the specified period.

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The Aayakar Seva Kendra, situated at Ground Floor, Aayakar Bhavan, Mumbai will accept the Dak/Tapal of the charges of Commissioner of Income Tax-I to Commissioner of Income Tax -13 from assesses/their representatives between 10.30 a.m. to 4.00 p.m. (Lunch Time 1.30 to 2.00 p.m.). Copy of the order available at www.bcasonline.org

A Press Note bearing No.402/92/2006-MC dated 17th April, 2014 has been issued by CBDT giving instructions to Assessing Officers, laying down Standard Operating Procedure (‘SOP’) for verification and correction of tax-demand. The taxpayers can get the outstanding tax demand reduced/ deleted by applying for rectification along with documentary evidence of tax/demand already paid. The SOP also makes special provisions for dealing with the tax demand upto Rs. 1,00,000/- in the case of Individuals a<

Intervention application opposing amalgamation – Direct Tax Circular No. 279-Misc.-M-171- 2013-ITJ dated 11th April 2014 –

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CBDT has directed the Commissioners to send comments/ objections of the Income tax department to the scheme of amalgamation, if the same is found to be prejudicial to the interest of the revenue. The comments/objections be sent to Regional Director, MCA for incorporating them in its response to the Court.

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New tax returns forms notified – Notification no- 24/2014 [S.O. 997(E) dated 1 April, 2014 – Income tax (Fourth amendment) Rules, 2014

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New forms SAHAJ (ITR-1), ITR-2, SUGAM (ITR-4S) and ITR-V” have been notified. Further Rule 12 has been amended with effect from 1st April, 2014 and provides as under :

a) Every partnership firm is required to file its return of income for A.Y. 2014-15 and in subsequent years electronically.

b) Every political party (if its income exceeds the maximum amount not chargeable to tax) is required to file its return of income for A.Y. 2014-15 and in subsequent years electronically.

c) Every Charitable officer by filing form 10. It is now provided that Form 10 is required to be filed electronically.

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Economic Governance Needs A Lighter Touch

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There is much lamentation in India about the lack of governance in general, and about poor economic governancein particular. It is important to place things in context as we try to evaluate how we have fared in this regard.

Economic governance cannot be disassociated from political governance. In his 1989 essay, Francis Fukuyama argued that while there might be many competing forms of social and political organisation, none could claim to be superior or more durable than the idea of a liberal democracy. He went further to make the case that liberal democracy works better with, and is bolstered by, free markets. Since then the global economy has suffered the Asian financial crises of 1997 and the so-called global financial crisis of 2008. This has reignited the debate about the role of markets, their efficacy, and their contribution to growing inequality. In parallel, the world has seen the spectacular economic success of the Chinese model of state capitalism. Was Fukuyama not premature in declaring the “End of History”?

Turning to India, let us first ask the question: are we a successful democracy? Whether it is life expectancy, health, nutrition, poverty or any other metric, India has not delivered as effectively as China. Does this mean that Indian democracy has failed? If China, without a free political system, can deliver substantially greater economic prosperity than India, does this mean that democracy has not been good for India? This line of reasoning may be logical, but it is troublesome. Our notion of what is good for our society must surely be anchored in some moral and philosophical value system, one in which we as Indians attach value to freedom of choice. In fact, the importance of being able to choose who governs us cannot be measured. The success or failure of governance in India cannot and must not be gauged only in terms of our economic performance. Such an evaluation must also take into account what else we have achieved.

Now let us come to the question of economic governance. Although we started our post- Independence political journey wholeheartedly embracing liberal democracy, we did not start our economic journey with the same enthusiasm for markets. On the economic front, we started with the so-called “mixed economy” model. During the first 45 years after Independence, we created a most elaborate system for managing and administering the economy, one that relied very much on state intervention. Over the years, our bureaucracy and judiciary became conditioned to that way of functioning. As a result since we started the economic reform process in 1991, we have not been very successful in changing the paradigm of state engagement with the private sector from how it was in the era of “command and control” to what it should be in the era of deregulated markets.

Twenty years after “liberalisation” the extent of state participation in the economy remains stubbornly large. In infrastructure, the entire electricity supply chain, with the exception of generation, remains dominated by government companies. In agriculture, the pricing of sugar, the procurement and exports of food grains, the marketing of agricultural commodities, are all still subject to pervasive state controls. The state continues to play an invasive role in land markets and PSU institutions still account for more than three-quarters financial sector assets. This widespread government participation in economic activity has been used to pursue the state’s political agenda in a manner that has distorted markets and undermined economic governance. Directed lending to agriculture from PSU banks, free electricity through state electricity boards, subsidised petroleum products through the oil distribution companies are but some examples.

As elsewhere, economic policy in India is hugely influenced by special interest groups. But in part, because of the widespread footprint of government in economic activity, lobbying has deteriorated into “crony capitalism”. While our politics has become more fiercely contested over time, increasing fragmentation of political power has made the Centre-state dynamic harder to harness in service of economic reforms of national importance, and pressures of coalition politics have contributed to greater populism in economic policy-making.

That economic decision-making in our country is heavily politicised may not be good from an economist’s perspective of delivering optimum economic outcomes. But this is in a sense the price we pay for democracy, the value of which cannot be measured in economic terms. The bottom line is that we cannot improve our economic governance by wishing away its underlying political drivers. To improve the quality of our economic management our bureaucracy particularly, but also our judiciary and other institutions, must evolve to higher levels of sophistication, competence and autonomy such that they facilitate, regulate and adjudicate economic activity, rather than supervise it or participate in it.

(Source: Extract from an article by Rajiv Lall in Business Standard, dated 14-02-2014 – The Writer is Executive chairman in IDFC)

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The Sorry State PSU Banks

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The recent qualified institutional placement issue by State Bank of India (SBI) was unfortunately a flop. The bank raised $1.2 billion as against the target of $1.5 billion. Less than $250 million was taken up by foreign institutional investors (FIIs). The post-issue price action was also dismal, with the stock tanking immediately.

This lack of foreign interest was a surprise, since SBI is undoubtedly the best of the public sector banks. It accounts for about 20 per cent of the banking system and has dominant market shares in government business and foreign exchange as well as strong corporate relationships. Historically, it has had the best management team among state-controlled banks; its chairman was normally appointed from within the bank itself. There was a time when SBI stock always traded at an FII premium, given foreign ownership limits, and was seen as the single best proxy for the Indian economy.

The recent lack of interest has nothing to do with SBI in particular; it reflects a general disenchantment with public sector banks. First of all, investors have by now figured that the public sector banks are seriously under capitalised. Most credible market analysts estimate that the public sector banks will need at least $35 billion to $40 billion of new capital just to fund risk asset growth of 15 to 18 per cent and meet the new tougher capital norms being put in place by the Reserve Bank of India, or RBI (Basel-III, counter-cyclical buffers and systematically important institutions). This capital requirement would rise to almost $80 billion, according to Credit Suisse, if you wanted to repair the balance sheets of these banks and take impaired asset coverage up to 70 per cent. All this capital has to be raised in the coming three or four years.

There is no way the government can fund this; there is simply no fiscal capacity. Nor do investors want to stand in front of this freight train, since the capital needs for most banks are greater than their current market capitalisation. Since these banks are mostly trading below their book value, any capital raise will dilute book value and earnings. The more the capital that is raised, the more book value will get diluted and decline in per share terms – and thus the more expensive these banks will look. Why would an investor want to own these stocks today when they are almost guaranteed to be diluted in the coming years?

However, if this capital is not found, who will fund the Indian economy? The internal capital generation of these banks will not support credit growth of more than 10 per cent – and we are talking about 70 per cent of the Indian banking system. The large Indian companies may access international capital markets and disintermediate the banks, but the small and mid-sized companies will see their credit supply choked. It is precisely these smaller companies that underpin our exports, employment generation and economic growth. Even if animal spirits revive after the elections, we do not seem to have the capacity to fund a revival.

In the last cycle of weak asset quality and capital shortage (1998-2003), a sharp decline in bond yields helped repair balance sheets. Government bond yields fell from 11.7 per cent in 2001 to five per cent in 2004. Sitting on a statutory liquidity ratio book of over 35 per cent of assets, these public sector banks booked bond gains of more than Rs 35,000 crore (70 per cent of the year 2000 system book value, according to Morgan Stanley). This windfall allowed the public sector banks to recapitalise. Such bond gains are very unlikely this time around since yields are lower, bond portfolios are smaller and the duration is truncated. Thus, we will have to raise capital from the market.

Moreover, the public sector banks have serious profitability issues. Their return on assets for this year is unlikely to cross 0.7 per cent, which means return on equity of less than 10 per cent. Given the headwinds on wages, pensions and provisioning requirements, there is no visibility on either return on assets crossing one per cent or return on equity reaching 15 per cent anytime soon. Even the poor numbers being reported today are probably overstated. For instance, about 35 per cent of SBI’s profit before taxes comes from accrued interest on both power loans and restructured loans, according to Morgan Stanley. The numbers for other public sector banks are even higher. This is non-cash earnings and something that may have to be reversed if these loans slip.

Public sector banks in India account for more than 70 per cent of the country’s banking system. We cannot fund our growth without them. They are capital-deficient and do not have the ability to earn their way out of their capital hole. Someone will have to provide them upwards of $30 billion of capital, RBI Governor Raghuram Rajan’s biggest challenge will be to put in place the systemic changes needed to attract this amount of capital.

The purpose of this piece is not to bash India’s public sector banks. They have some very good people, but are being choked by the government in terms of both capital and operational freedom. We have seen across sectors that public sector undertakings ultimately succumb to private sector competition if they are not allowed to compete on a level playing field. This cannot be allowed to happen to public sector banks. They are too important to the economy.

(Source: The Economic Times, dated 14-02-2014)

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Ending the Implementation Paralysis

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Politicians make policy, bureaucrats implement them. Trust and harmony between the two can produce amazing results. If trust and harmony decline, so do decision-making and economic performance.

Bureaucrats can function brilliantly if they get clear signals from their political bosses, and assurance that being decisive (which typically includes shortcuts through a jungle of rules) will further their careers. This explains success in states as varied as Bihar, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, and Chhattisgarh. Strong chief ministers with clear policies empower bureaucrats to implement those approaches.

But the same bureaucrats freeze into inaction when they receive mixed signals, as has been the case in New Delhi. The law today makes bureaucrats liable for corrupt outcomes even if there is no evidence of their benefiting personally. If political protection is not guaranteed, they stop moving files. Finance minister Chidambaram says, rightly, that India’s problem is implementation paralysis more than policy paralysis.

The bureaucracy has gone through four phases since 1991. In 1991-2004, bureaucrats got the signal “what do we liberalize next?” In 2004-08, this changed to “don’t liberalize more.” After 2009, the signal was “what do we regulate next?” After the anti-corruption anger in 2012, this changed to “run for cover; nobody can guarantee you safety”. This explains the rise and fall of the economy. A fifth phase is needed to lift the economy again.

When economic reforms began in 1991, bureaucrats questioned its sustainability. Many suspected that the reforms were ploys to satisfy the IMF, and might be reversed soon. Opposition parties swore to reverse the reforms if they came to power. But soon GDP growth took off, averaging a record 7.5% in 1994-97. This made the reforms irreversible. Narasimha Rao was followed by Gowda, Gujral and Vajpayee, but the direction of reform continued. Every civil servant was encouraged to ask, “What do we liberalize next?”

This phase ended in 2004. Sonia Gandhi came to power. Far from viewing liberalization as a major success, she portrayed India as tarnished, not shining, under Vajpayee. Her focus shifted from liberalization to welfarism. Bureaucrats got the signal, “Don’t liberalize more”. Thanks to earlier reforms and global buoyancy, GDP growth soared to a record 8.5%/year, but Sonia de-emphasized this.

Next came the financial crash of 2008-09 widely blamed on excessive deregulation and corporate greed. The world over, an outcry began for stiffer regulation and more controls. This had strong echoes in India too. Liberalization was seen as having gone too far, even though it was half-baked in India compared with the Asian tigers.

Bureaucrats struggling to cope with a plethora of old regulations faced an avalanche of new ones. The most onerous related to the environment, forests, tribal areas, and land acquisition. These were well intentioned, but created a new licence-permit raj. Honest business became impossible in several areas, notably natural resources and land. Dishonest business was still possible through kickbacks. However, this eventually caused popular outrage, led by the CAG, courts and Anna Hazare. The courts went after not only corrupt politicians but also bureaucrats, including those that had retired.

This guaranteed bureaucratic paralysis. The system imposes no penalty on those sitting on files, but penalizes those involved in decisions later denounced by the courts or CAG. Earlier, ministers guaranteed political protection to bureaucrats following their orders. But after the new anti-corruption mood, and activist courts, political guarantees become impossible. The new signal to bureaucrats was, “Run for cover.”

Chidambaram and Manmohan Singh endeavoured mightily to revitalize decision-making since late 2012. They devised the Cabinet Committee on Investment to spread the responsibility for decisions among relevant ministries, reducing risks for any one minister or bureaucrat. But though they cleared a mammoth Rs 6 lakh crore worth of projects, there is still no boom in capital goods or construction. Implementation paralysis continues because bureaucrats still find political signals mixed and political protection inadequate.

(Source: Extract from an article by Swaminathan Anklesaria Aiyar in The Economic Times of India, dated 09-03-2014)

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UPA hurts India as it exits

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The only plausible interpretation of the actions by Congress in the last several months is that it has adopted this scorched earth strategy as it retreats from government. Its recent actions seem to serve one principal purpose: make the restoration of growth and the task of rebuilding the nation as difficult as possible for the successor government.

The greater the failure of the successor government, the better would the outgoing government look by comparison. Ironically, the most pernicious act of the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government is related directly to land: the new land acquisition act.

The latter administers an all-round preemptive blow to efforts of a future government to put India back on its feet. For most public projects, the act makes land acquisition such a long-drawn-out affair and land prices so high that only a handful of projects will remain economically viable and capable of being implemented.

A recent report in this newspaper has this to say about the act: “The new land acquisition law that came into force this January, touted as one of the signal achievements of the UPA government, is turning into a major obstacle in the way of a key infrastructure project being pushed keenly by the Prime Minister’s Office.

The government is now back to the drawing board to figure how the project can be made viable. Even building rural roads under Pradhan Mantri’s Gram Sadak Yojana (PMGSY), a programme expressly meant to aid India’s rural poor, will turn into a nightmare.

And this will be in the name of protecting ‘poor’ landowners, notwithstanding the fact that land reform has had little success in India. Except in a handful of states, much of the land is actually owned by large and wealthy farmers.

The new land acquisition act will also make already hard to implement large-scale private projects yet harder to implement. All the provisions of the new act on compensation apply to all private acquisitions of 50 acres of land in urban and 100 acres in rural areas.

According to some calculations, this would render land an order of magnitude more expensive in almost all locations in India than in any other country on the face of the earth. This is why entrepreneurs looking for land will first look on Mars before doing so in India. Rarely has a democratic government consciously inflicted such damage on the nation at its exit.

(Source: Extract from an article by Arvind Panagariya in the Times of India, Dated 11-03-2014 –The Writer is professor of Indian political economy at Columbia University)

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Competition panel to probe ICAI’s continuing education policy

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The CA Institute’s continuing professional education (CPE) policy is under the scanner of the Competition Commission of India (CCI).The CCI has directed its investigative arm to probe an allegation that the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI) was abusing its dominant position by imposing discriminatory conditions on CPE.

The Institute declined to comment on this development even as the CCI probe may affect its revenues from organising seminars and conferences. It is probably for the first time that a nonregulatory function carried out by a regulator (ICAI is the accountancy profession regulator) is under the scanner of another regulator (CCI-competition regulator).

The complainant – Arun Anandagiri – has alleged that the CPE policy was discriminatory as it does not allow any other organisation to provide the service of organising CPE seminars. The CPE policy allowed only the institute’s recognised programme organising unit (POU) to conduct the seminars that carry CPE credits.

There seems to be force in the allegations that the restriction put by the CA institute in not allowing any other organisation to conduct the CPE seminars for CPE credits, the CCI has said in a recent order.

The allegation is that such an approach has created an entry barrier for the other players in the relevant market – “organising recognised CPE seminars/workshops/conferences in India”.

The concept of CPE was introduced by the CA institute for its members to maintain high standards of excellence in the professional activities. According to the CPE policy, chartered accountants (CAs) in practice have to annually attain 20 hours of structured CPE credits and 10 hours of unstructured CPE credits. CAs not holding certificate of practice have to attain 15 hours of unstructured CPE credits annually.

The present case focuses upon the structured CPE credits and organisation of the seminars/conferences/ workshops for obtaining these credits.

(Source: The Hindu dated 12-03-2014)

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 111 dated 13th March, 2014

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Rupee Drawing Arrangement – Increase in trade related remittance limit

At present, the limit for undertaking permitted transactions under the Rupee Drawing Arrangements (RDA), as mentioned in the Memorandum of Instructions for Opening and Maintenance of Rupee/ Foreign Currency Vostro Accounts of Non-resident Exchange Houses, is Rs. 2,00,000.

This circular has, with immediate effect, increased the said limit for undertaking permitted transactions under the Rupee Drawing Arrangements (RDA) from Rs. 2,00,000 to Rs. 5,00,000. Press Note No. 2 (2014 Series) D/O IPP File No: 12/10/2011-FC.1 dated 4th February, 2014

Policy on Foreign Investment in the Insurance Sector – Amendment of Paragraph 6.2.17.7 of ‘Circular 1 of 2013 – Consolidated FDI Policy’

This Press Note has, with effect from 5th April, 2013, replaced Paragraph 6.2.17.7 with respect to FDI in the Insurance Sector as under:

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 110 dated 4th March, 2014

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Money Transfer Service Scheme – ‘Direct to Account’ facility

This circular permits recipient banks to credit foreign inward remittances received under MTSS directly to the bank accounts of beneficiaries that are KYC compliant, subject to certain terms and conditions, through electronic mode, such as NEFT, IMPS, etc. The partner bank must clearly mark the direct-toaccount remittances to indicate to the Recipient Bank that it is a foreign inward remittance.

In cases where the bank accounts of the beneficiaries are not KYC compliant, the Recipient Bank has to carry out KYC/CDD before the remittance can be credited the bank account or allowed to be withdrawn.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 109 dated 28th February, 2014

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Export of Goods and Services: Export Data Processing and Monitoring System (EDPMS)

This circular states that new EDPMS has been operationalised with effect from 28th February, 2014 and the same will be available to banks from 1st March, 2014. Accordingly, banks must use the web link https://edpms.rbi.org.in/edpms for accessing the system. The user credentials for accessing the system have already been given to the banks.

As a result, entire shipping documents have to be reported in the new system. However, the old shipping documents will continue to be reported in the old system till the completion of the cycle. Both, the old and new systems will run parallel to each other for some time and the date of discontinuance of the old system will be communicated to the banks.

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SAT Discusses the Concept of “Due Diligence” – Decision Relevant to Merchant Bankers, Intermediaries, Directors and Other Professionals

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Background
A recent decision of the Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT) discusses in detail as to what constitutes “due diligence” (Keynote Corporate Services Ltd. vs. Securities and Exchange Board of India, Appeal No. 84 of 2012, dated 19th February 2014). Intermediaries, including merchant bankers, are required to be diligent in the performance of their duties and this decision is of relevance to them. For Chartered Accountants in general and Auditors in particular too, this decision has relevance for at least two reasons. Firstly, professionals like CAs are required to carry out their duties exercising care of a level higher than the “due diligence” test. Hence, what constitutes “due diligence” should be of use. Secondly, CAs connected with listed companies and the SEBI registered intermediaries, though are not being regulated directly by the SEBI, do find their work reviewed by the SEBI. Hence, generally the standards laid down in this decision have relevance to intermediaries registered with SEBI.

Brief facts
In this case, to summarise the facts as reported, a merchant banker managed a public issue. As the readers would know, the manager to a public issue (“IPO”) has the highest and broadest of responsibilities, not only in managing the issue generally but coordinating with other intermediaries. In particular, it is his prime responsibility as regards the quantity and quality of information of disclosures made in the prospectus. It was found that in an issue managed by it, certain material disclosures were not made. The Company had, immediately before the IPO, borrowed monies from certain entities and used the same for advances for capital assets and other matters. The genuineness of such outgoing/ expenditure was not accepted by Securities and Exchange Board of India. The Company, after the IPO, repaid such loans from the IPO proceeds. The SEBI alleged that this amounted to siphoning off of funds. Further, it seems that the SEBI believed that the fact that the IPO proceeds were really meant to pay off such existing liabilities would have been a material consideration for the investors. Thus, disclosure of such facts would have affected their decision in investing.

The basic facts that the amounts were borrowed, then used for certain purposes and then the IPO proceeds were utilised for repayment of such borrowings do not seem to be in dispute. Also, nondisclosure of such pre-existing borrowings was also not in dispute. The issue in question was whether the merchant banker had carried out his duty with diligence that was expected of him.

Decision and principles laid down

The SAT laid down the law relating to the duties of the merchant banker as regards due diligence. Clause 64 of the SEBI (ICDR) Regulations 2009, reads as under:

“Due diligence.

64. (1) The lead merchant bankers shall exercise due diligence and satisfy himself about all the aspects of the issue including the veracity and adequacy of disclosure in the offer documents…..”

The SAT relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Chander Kanta Bansal vs. Rajinder Singh Anand [(2008) 5 SCC 117] where due diligence was explained in the following words:

“The words “due diligence” have not been defined in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. According to Oxford Dictionary (Edn. 2006), the word “diligence” means careful and persistent application or effort. “Diligent” means careful and steady in application to one’s work and duties, showing care and effort.”

The SAT then reviewed the Memorandum of Understanding between the merchant banker and the Company and the rights of the merchant banker stated in the following clause was highlighted:

“The BRLM shall have the right to call for any reports, documents or information necessary from the Company to enable them to verify that the statements made in the Draft Red Herring Prospectus or the final Prospectus are true and correct and not misleading, and do not contain any omissions required to make them true and correct and not misleading.”

The statement in the prospectus that was found to be incorrect read as under:

“Bridge Loan: We have not entered into any bridge loan facility that will be repaid from the Net Proceeds.”

The merchant banker raised several pleas in its defence, all of which (except one, which is not relevant for this discussion) were rejected.

Firstly, the merchant banker stated that it was not informed by the company about the borrowings and that such information was indeed withheld from them. The SAT did not accept this as a valid defense. It said that the merchant banker could not expect the company to provide its information on its own with the merchant banker not taking any initiative. The SAT observed, :-

“Appellant’s plea that the information regarding ICDs was withheld from Appellant by ESL cannot be accepted. BRLM, in carrying out its functions is generally expected to act in an independent and professional manner and should not rely only on issuer company to provide them with updates, if any. Due diligence on part of Merchant Banker does not mean passively reporting whatever is reported to it but to find out everything that is worth finding out.”

The merchant banker said that it had obtained undertakings from the directors of the Company that the statements made in the prospectus are true. This too was rejected as being an insufficient defense. The SAT stated that accepting statements from the Company was no substitute for proper due diligence.

Then the merchant banker explained the manner in which he carried out his duties. He said that “when he handles IPO, he carries out random checks to verify authenticity of entities mentioned in the prospectus and has submitted documents in support of same”. In particular, the verification is “with reference to objects of issue and quotations, and in respect of IPO of ESL such checks were made in respect of major quotations submitted by ESL and, in support, Appellant submitted copies of few quotations along with nothings from concerned executive at its end, confirming veracity of offer document.”.

However, the SAT did not accept this and found that the manner in which such checks were carried out was insufficient. The Investigation had revealed that a sum of Rs. 4.75 crore from the IPO proceeds was allegedly siphoned off.

The SAT also explained the manner in which an intermediary such as a merchant banker in the present case should act while carrying out its duties with due diligence:-

“It is about making an active effort to find out material developments that would affect interest of investors. It is on faith that intermediary has conducted due diligence with utmost sincerity that investing public goes forward and decides to invest in a particular company. In present case Appellant had failed to exercise due diligence in carrying out its duties as BRLM in IPO of ESL.”

The SAT observed that the merchant banker had merely relied on certain statements provided by the Company and others. Moreover, even some of such statements were misleading or not in context of the issue before it. In any case, the SAT observed that this approach did not amount to carrying out its duties with due diligence. The SAT observed, :-

“Reliance of such documents, which in effect do not convey anything material or are misleading, infact, strengthens the case of Respondent that Appellant has done nothing to carry out due diligence and has been a passive actor, waiting for documents/information to come to him, whereas he should have been active in looking into various aspects of functioning of ESL, scrutiny of functioning of ESL, scrutiny of all relevant documents- including bank statements and order book position etc., before certifying correctnes of various statements in prospectus and issue of due diligence certificate at various stages of IPO”.


Curiously, the merchant banker pleaded that he had
a wide experience, knowledge and recognition in
the field. It had 35 years of experience in the field
and had managed more than 100 IPOs. He was a
regular speaker at various forums on the field. It
appears that this defence was raised to imply that
the merchant banker was well versed with his duties
and thus he would not have committed any
violation. However, this was actually went against
him. It was held that this past experience actually
raised the benchmark with which he ought to have
performed its duties and the facts did not evidence
‘due care’. The SAT observed,:-

“Appellant’s pleadings in Memorandum of Appeal
that the is highly experienced, and is a regular
speaker on subject of capital markets at various
forums and that he had carried out due diligence at
every stage, of issue of IPO and that he had fulfilled
all requirements of his responsibilities as BRLM/
Merchant Banker and some material disclosures
were not in issue documents, since these were done
at his back and not brought to his notice by ESL,
come to nothing, when he himself is not serious or
vigilant and is awaiting relevant information coming
to him and he then taking action on same, this
Tribunal has no hesitation is stating that Appellant
has failed in his duty to carry out due diligence, at
any stage of IPO of ESL and had failed not only the
investors in this issue but has done considerable
harm to security markets, at large.”

“….a professional person having wide knowledge
and experience in bringing out 125 IPOs during
its existence, is expected to show better professionalism
than was shown by Appellant. In the circumstances,
this Tribunal expects better standards
of performance from professionals, who charge
reasonably good fee from clients and who bring
out documents (prospectus in this case), which are
relied on by investors, at large, to take informed
decisions regarding investments in scrips/IPO and
this standard of professionalism should be higher
than a reasonable man with ordinary prudence will
demonstrate in the matter of due diligence but in
present case no mark of professionalism can be
seen from Appellant, who was merely a certificate
issue machine on dates when it was due, without
undertaking any due diligence whatsoever.”

The SAT, thus upheld the penalty levied on the
merchant banker. 

Other aspects/laws/developments



The original SEBI order, that levied the penalty
on the merchant banker, is also worth reviewing.
The SEBI reviewed several other past cases where
it was alleged that an intermediary did not carry
out its duties with due diligence. A review of such
decisions is useful to understand this concept better.
The Auditors of a listed company, apart from
of course carry out statutory audit, also carries out
limited review of financial results for disclosure. The
manner in which such limited review is carried out
can be considered by the SEBI.

All the directors of the company
(including
independent directors) shall exercise their duties with
due and reasonable care, skill and diligence;”.

The implications of this decision thus is wide and
the principles laid down by the SAT will be useful
for intermediaries including merchant bankers,
chartered accountants and others associated with

 The SEBI also expects a common and high standard
of diligence from intermediaries generally. Clause 1.3
of the Code of Conduct, which is part of the SEBI
(Intermediaries) Regulations, 2008, reads as under:- 

“1.3 Exercise of Due Diligence and no Collusion
An
intermediary shall at all times render high standards
of service, exercise due skill and diligence over persons
employed or appointed by it, ensure proper care and
exercise independent professional judgment and shall
not at any time act in collusion with other intermediaries
in a manner that is detrimental to the investor(s).” 

Further, while the SEBI (Intermediaries) Regulations
do provide for a common duty of due diligence by
intermediaries generally as stated above, individual
regulations too, provide make specific or general
requirements of performance of duties by the
respective intermediaries with due diligence. The
SEBI (Debenture Trustees) Regulations, for example,
require that the Trustees shall exercise due diligence
to ensure compliance of various laws, the Trust
Deed, etc.
The SEBI (SAST) Regulations 2011 require
that the manager to the open offer “shall exercise
diligence, care and professional judgment to ensure
compliance with these regulations”.

The Companies Act 2013 also provides in section
149(12) that an Independent Director, a non-executive
director or a key managerial personnel would be
held liable only “where he had not acted
diligently”.
Not carrying out his role with diligence would thus
subject him to severe adverse consequences under
the Act. Schedule IV of that Act further lays down
the Code for Independent Directors and a fairly
high standard of performance of duties is expected
from the Independent Directors. The explanation
of the duties in this decision of the SAT would be
of guidance.

Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement which lays
down requirements of corporate governance also prescribes duties of the directors in general and of
the Independent Directors and the members of the
Audit Committee in particular. Here too, though not
stated explicitly, similar standards may be applied.
Indeed, SEBI’s concept paper which proposes to
substantially expand the standards of corporate
governance specifically states as follows:-

“All the directors of the company (including independent directors) shall exercise their duties with due and reasonable care, skill and diligence;”. The implications of this decision thus is wide and the principles laid down by the SAT will be useful for intermediaries including merchant bankers, chartered accountants and others associated with listed companies.

Sexual Harassment Law-I

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Synopsis

The Law for prevention of sexual harassment of women at workplace has now become an Act. Up until now it was in the form of Guidelines laid down by the Apex Court. The Act is very important since it applies to all organisations, public or private, small or big and even applies to houses in certain cases. What constitutes sexual harassment is also very widely worded. Business entities should choose to ignore this Law at their own peril! We will examine this Act through a two-part Feature.

Introduction

A major landmark was achieved when the Indian Government notified, on 9th December, 2013, the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (“the Act”). The Act’s preamble states that it is to provide protection against sexual harassment of women at the workplace and for the prevention and redressal of complaints relating to sexual harassment. The Constitution of India guarantees every citizen a right to life and dignity and freedom to practice any profession/business. These are fundamental rights which are available equally to men and women. A safe working environment for women is one such fundamental right. Gender equality includes protection from sexual harassment and right to work with dignity. This Act seeks to achieve the same. Recent infamous events in corporate India have highlighted the urgent need for a Legislation such as this.

The roots of this Act may be traced to the pathbreaking judgment of the Supreme Court in Vishaka vs. State of Rajasthan (1997) 6 SCC 241 which was followed up by an equally important decision in Medha Kotwal Lele vs. Union of India, (2013) 1 SCC 297. Inspite of clear directions to the Government by the Apex Court to pass a Law on this subject, the Act saw the light of the day 16 years after Vishaka’s case. Let us examine this important piece of Law which, as we will see, impacts not only workplaces but also some households.

Vishaka’s Case
Vishaka’s judgment, for the first time, dealt with the hitherto untouched subject to women’s safety at work. In an unusual judgment, in the absence of any enacted law, the 3 Member Bench took it upon themselves to frame Guidelines to prevent sexual harassment of women at workplaces. The Court held that these Guidelines should be strictly observed in all working places by treating them as the Law of the land under Article 141 of the Constitution. It further held that the Court’s Guidelines and norms would be binding and enforceable in law until suitable legislation is enacted to occupy the field.

Inspite of the Court’s clear directions, some States were not complying with Vishaka’s Directions. Hence, the Supreme Court in Medha Kotwal Lele’s case, again issued further directions. It held that the Guidelines should be implemented in its true spirit. The Court passed a speaking Order wherein it directed all Government Organisations, Bar Associations, Medical Clinics/Hospitals, Offices of Engineers/Architects, etc., which employed women, to implement the Guidelines. It also instructed the Medical Council, Council of Architecture, our ICAI, ICSI, and other statutory institutes to ensure that organisations, bodies, persons, affiliated with them follow the Vishaka Directions. Further, for any noncompliance with Vishaka’s Guidelines, the aggrieved persons should approach respective High Courts.

It is in the light of this judicial activism that the Act has been passed. Now that this Act has been passed, Vishaka’s Directions would no longer apply. Let us now examine the Act’s salient features.

Application
The Act applies to the whole of India. It applies to every workplace owned by an employer where an employee, who is a lady, is employed and who is sexually harassed. The meaning of each of these four terms is very crucial since it forms the heart of the Act. This Act provides for civil remedy for sexual harassment of a lady.

Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) provides punishment for a harassment which is criminal in nature, i.e., if it is an assault or criminal force on the woman with intent to outrage her modesty.

Workplace
The Act applies to harassment at the Workplace and hence, it is very important to understand what constitutes a workplace? The term is defined in an inclusive manner and Table-1, given below, enlists the inclusions referred to in the definition:

Employee
Next let us understand who is an employee under the Act. The persons covered under the definition of the term employee are given below in Table-2:

It may be noted that although there is a definition of the term employee, it is not necessary that the complainant lady should be an employee of the workplace where the incident occurred. She could be any lady who was harassed at that workplace as would be evident when we see the definition of the term “aggrieved woman” given below.

Aggrieved Woman
It is important to understand who is an aggrieved woman under the Act. In relation to a workplace, it means any woman of any age, whether employed or not, who alleges to have been sexually harassed by a respondent. A respondent is a person against whom a complaint is lodged. Thus, any lady who comes to a workplace (e.g., a client, a consultant, an auditor, a patient, a student, etc.,) could allege harassment at that workplace by a respondent working there. She need not be an employee of that workplace.

However, there is some disconnect when viewed along with the definition of the term workplace. Considering again the example of the auditor-auditee, in relation to an articled clerk who alleges harassment at the auditee’s workplace by the auditee’s employee, the aggrieved woman definition is wide enough to cover an auditor who has come into an organisation. However, the definition of the auditor’s workplace includes any workplace visited by his employee. The correct forum to complain should be the ICC of the auditee since that is the workplace where the alleged incident occurred. How can the auditor’s ICC have any control over an employee of the auditee? A better clarity on this very important issue is desirable.

Employer
The obligations under the Act are cast upon the Employer. In case of a private/NGO sector, it is defined to mean one responsible for the management, supervision and control of the workplace. The term management includes the person or the Board or the Committee responsible for the formation and administration of policies for such organisation. Thus, the Board of Directors in the case of a Company, Designated Partners in case of an LLP, Partners in case of a Firm, etc., would be treated as Employers.

Sexual Harassment This brings us to the all important question, what constitutes a sexual harassment under the Act? The term “sexual harassment” is defined in a very wide and all-encompassing manner. Several people who may be under an impression that a particular act of theirs cannot constitute harassment would be in for a rude shock. It is defined to include any one or more of the following unwelcome acts or behaviour, whether directly or by implication:

a) Physical contact and advances;
b) Demand or request for sexual favours;
c) Making sexually coloured remarks;
d) Showing pornography;
e) Any other unwelcome physical, verbal or nonverbal conduct of sexual nature.


While, for some of the above acts, it is quite apparent
that they constitute sexual harassment, it
is important to fully understand the meaning of
making sexually
coloured remarks
” and “any
other
unwelcome verbal or non-verbal conduct of sexual
nature”.
Circulating
lewd text/WhatsApp messages
to female colleagues,, reading aloud vulgar jokes
to female colleagues, passing abusive remarks in
the presence of women, offensive screensavers on
laptops, commenting on women, staring, stalking,

etc.
, may all be
covered. Even something like asking
a lady colleague out for a drink may be covered
within this definition. The list cannot be exhaustive
and needs to be considered based on the facts and
circumstances, but one important parameter for an
act/behaviour to constitute harassment is that it
must be unwelcome.


In addition, the Act also states that one or more
of the following circumstances, if they occur or
are present in relation to or connected with any
act of sexual harassment, may amount to sexual
harassment:
• Implied/explicit promise of preferential or detrimental
treatment in her employment
• Implied/explicit threat of her employment status
• Interfering with her work

• Creating a hostile/offensive work environment
for her
• Humiliating treatment likely to affect her health/
safety

(…. to be continued)

PART A: ORDERS OF CIC

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Section 8(1) (j) of the RTI Act 2005:

Information sought-

The certified true copies of the original application filed by Mr. Pradeep Kumar (Director Postal Services, Mumbai Region) at the time of seeking a job at the Department of Post along with all the necessary documents attached to the original application. The information sought was from the date of appointment till date.

Decision notice-
It is fairly obvious that the information which the appellant has sought after in respect of the officer (viz. the application/documents on the basis of which he has been appointed) is in the nature of ‘personal information about third party.’ The employee might have filed these documents before the appointing authority for the purpose of seeking employment, but that is no reason enough for this information to be brought into the public domain to which anybody could have access.

It is also seen that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in its decision dated 13-12-2012 [Civil Appeal No. 9052 of 2012, Bihar Public Service Commission vs. Saiyad Hussain Abbas Rizvi & Anrs, [RTIT IV (2012) 307 (SC)]] has, inter alia, held as under:

“Certain matters, particularly in relation to appointment are required to be dealt with great confidentiality. The information may come to knowledge of the authority as a result of disclosure by others who give that information in confidence and with complete faith, integrity and fidelity. Secrecy of such information shall be maintained, thus, bringing it within the ambit of fiduciary capacity”.

“The appellant has not established any public purpose which the disclosure of this information would serve. Hence, we concur with the submissions of the CPIO that the information is exempt.”

[Pradeep Ambadas Ingole vs. CPIO & Director Postal Services, Mumbai Region, decided on 26-12-2013: RTIR I (2014) 42 (CIC)]

Section 2(f)of the RTI Act,2005 “Information”:

1. Appellant submitted RTI application dated 8th November, 2012 before the CPIO, Govt., Medical College & Hospital, Sector 32, Chandigarh; seeking information relating to break up of the class IV staff (Ward Staff) with each officer and each branch of the GMCH-32 through multiple points.

2. Vide CPIO Order dated 7th December, 2012, CPIO denied the requisite information on the ground that the requisite information is not covered u/s. 2 (f) of the RTI Act, 2005 which provides the definition of information. However, he wrote that the Applicant may get the requisite documents after inspecting the record on any working day.

Decision Notice:
“Both parties have been heard. Commission observes that the CPIO has not applied his mind while disposing the RTI application and in no way it can be construed that the information sought by the appellant is not covered under the definition of information given u/s. 2(f) of the Act. Simultaneously, CPIO has also stated that the appellant can inspect the requisite documents holding the information. Both these statements are contradictory and reflect the intention of the CPIO to avoid providing the requested information to the appellant. At the hearing also, Commission observed the reluctance of the CPIO in imparting the information which is held on record and is squarely disclosable as per the provisions of the Act. Now, CPIO is directed to provide points-wise information to the appellant within two weeks of receipt of order. Through this order, ‘Show Cause Notice’ is issued to the CPIO for attempting to obstruct the disclosure of the requested information. Date for personal hearing will be provided to him through separate notice.”

[Harmeet singh vs. Government Medical College & Hospital, UT Chandigarh: Decided on 11-12-2013: RTIR I (2014) 47(CIC)]

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Release Deed – Chargeability : Stamp Act, 1899:

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M. Suseelamma & Ors vs. The Chief Controlling Revenue Authority Chennai and Anr. AIR 2014 Madras 43.

The Late M. Krishnaiah Chetty had purchased the subject property from one, Sheela Devi. Subsequently, after the demise of M. Krishnaiah Chetty, who died intestate on 16-04-2000, leaving behind the appellants 1 to 7, wife, sons and daughters, as his class I legal heirs, a document, dated 09-10-2003, has been presented and numbered as 50 of 2003, on the file of the sub registrar (District Registrar Cadre), captioned as Deed of Release.

Where the husband of the appellant had purchased the subject property from its original owner by virtue of registered sale deed and husband died intestate leaving behind wife (appellant), sons and daughter as Class I heirs, then the wife, sons and daughter would inherit the property as Class I heirs in terms of the Hindu Succession Act. However, since the parties do not belong to HUF, the grandsons, when their father is alive would have no pre-existing right over property. Therefore, the release deed by appellant alongwith her sons, daughters and grandson in favour of another son was rightly treated as conveyance under Article 23 of Schedule.

In the light of section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, the releasees 2 to 4 do not have any preexisting right over the subject property. They have not inherited any property, as per section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act. The value of the property shown in the document is Rs. 2 lakh. As per section 5 of the Indian Stamp Act, any instrument comprising, or relating to several distinct matters shall be chargeable with the aggregate amount of the duties, with which separate instruments, each comprising or relating to one of such matters, would be chargeable under the Indian Stamp Act.

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Precedent – Ratio decidendi – Must be understood in the background of the facts of the case – Judgements are not to be read as a statute: Constitution of India.

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Arasmeta Captive Power Company P. Ltd. & Anr vs. Lafarge India Pvt. Ltd. AIR 2014 SC 525

The judgments rendered by a court are not to be read as statutes. In Union of India vs. Amrit Lal Manchanda and another (2004) 3 SCC 75, it has been stated that observations of courts are neither to be read as Euclid’s Theorems nor as provisions of a statute. The observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for Judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes.

Words used in a judgment should be read and understood contextually and are not intended to be read literally. Many a time a judge uses a phrase or expression with the intention of emphasising a point or accentuating a principle or even by way of writing style. Ratio decidendi of a judgment is not to be discerned from a stray word or phrase read in isolation.

In this context the following words of Lord Denning are significant.

“Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the path of justice, but you must cut the dead wood and trim off the side branches, else you will find yourself lost in thickets and branches. My plea is to keep the path to justice clear of obstructions which could impede it.”

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Partnership firm – Unregistered – Not be barred from enforcing their rights under Transfer of Property Act: Partnership Act 1932 Section 69(2):

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Sandhya Anthraper & Anr vs. Manju Kathuria & Ors AIR 2014 Karnataka 21

Appellants who are plaintiffs/partners of an unregistered firm of M/s. Windsor Wings Developers, filed a suit against the defendants , for the relief of declaration that the registered Sale deed dated 26.04.2003 executed by defendant No. 1 is invalid, illegal and not binding on the plaintiffs, for cancellation of the sale deed and for permanent injunction restraining the defendants 2 to 5 from selling, leasing, mortgaging or otherwise alienating and interfering with their peaceful possession of the property. It is the case of the plaintiffs that the suit property was purchased in the name of the Firm. The plaintiffs suspected the conduct of the 1st defendant and they made enquiries about the suit property in the Office of the Sub-Registrar and discovered that the 1st defendant, who had no authority to sell the immovable property belonging to the Firm, without their consent had executed a sale deed dated 26-04-2003 on behalf of the Firm, in favour of the 2nd defendant for a consideration of Rs. 16,66,620/- though the property was worth more than Rs. 30,00,000/-. It is contended that the sale deed is invalid, void, fraudulent and the same is executed clandestinely with an intention of cheating the plaintiffs.

The defendants contented that the Suit is barred u/s. 69(2) of the Partnership Act. The trial Court, after hearing on the preliminary issue, answered the same in the affirmative in favour of the defendants and dismissed the Suit as not maintainable u/s. 69(2) of the Act.

Sum and substance of s/s. (1) of section 69 of the Act is that no suit to enforce a right arising from a contract or conferred by this Act shall be instituted in any Court and the person suing as a partner in a firm against the firm or any person alleged to be or to have been a partner in the firm unless the firm is registered and the person suing is or has been shown in the Register of Firms as a partner in the firm.

The defendants have not pleaded that the suit is barred under s/s. (1) of section 69, but it is contended that the suit is not maintainable both under s/s. (1) and (2) of Section 69 of the Act.

The Hon’ble Court observed that the plaintiffs who are partners of the unregistered firm are neither enforcing their right arising from a contract nor the right conferred by the Act. The plaintiffs are enforcing their right under the contract of partnership deed dated 29-12-1995 and specifically Clause 25(d) which says that no partner of the firm shall, without the consent in writing of the other partners, be entitled to transfer immovable property belonging to the Firm, but the defendant No.1, as a partner of the partnership firm, has sold the suit land in favour of defendants 2 to 5. Though it is stated in sub-Clause (d) of Clause 25 of the partnership deed that no partner of the firm shall without the consent in writing of the other partner, be entitled to transfer immovable property belonging to the firm, the appellants/ plaintiffs seek to enforce their right conferred upon them under the Transfer of Property Act. It is well settled principle that a ‘partnership firm’ has ‘no separate legal entity’. It is always understood that ‘firm’ means ‘partners’, ‘partners’ means collectively a ‘firm’. Thus the property belonging to a partnership firm is the property of the partners of the firm.

In view of the above, under the Transfer of Property Act, each of the partner is entitled to claim his right to the immovable property of the firm, as co-owner. Under such circumstances, the contention that the suit filed by the plaintiffs enforcing their right under the contract of partnership deed, holds no water

As regards to s/s. (2) of section 69 no suit to enforce a right arising from a contract shall be instituted in any Court by or on behalf of a firm against any third party unless the firm is registered and the persons suing are or have been shown in the Register of Firms as the partners in the firm. In the instant case, there is no contract between the plaintiffs on one side and defendants 2 to 5 on the other and thus, there is no question of plaintiffs enforcing a right arising from a contract and thus the Suit is not hit under s/s. (2) of section 69 of the Act.

As per section 69(1) of the Act, an unregistered partnership firm or partners are prohibited from enforcing a right arising from a contract or the right conferred by the Partnership Act, 1932, but the provision does not take away the right of the partners of an unregistered firm to enforce their right under other enactments. According to Article 300-A of the Constitution of India, no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. The property of the partnership firm, was purchased under three registered Sale deeds dated 20-01-1996 by the partnership firm, viz., M/s.Windsor Wings Developers, out of the funds of the firm. Thus, the property becomes the property of the partners and they are co-owners. Therefore, the plaintiffs are entitled for the relief sought for. Defendant No.1 has committed breach of trust, which is an offence under the Indian Penal Code. The plaintiffs are enforcing their right as co-owners of the suit property conferred under the Transfer of Property Act and the Partnership Act does not bar the partners of an unregistered firm from enforcing their right conferred under the other enactments. In other words, at the cost of repetition, it must be mentioned that what is prohibited u/s. 69 of the Act is enforcement of contract of partnership, provisions of the Partnership Act, 1932 and enforcement of right arising from a contract (between the firm and third party) and not the rights conferred under the other enactments. Therefore, the trial Court erred in dismissing the suit as barred by s/s. (2) of section 69 of the Partnership Act, 1932.

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Lease – Amount of security deposit – No stamp duty on security deposit. Stamp Act 1899, Article 35(c):

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Moideen Koya vs. K. Girish Kumar & Anr. AIR 2014 Kerala 30

A lease agreement was executed between the landlord and the tenant on 29-09-2010, in which the monthly rent payable was fixed as Rs.3,500/. An amount of Rs. 50,000/- was given by the tenant as security deposit which was refundable on termination of the lease. The Rent Control Court refused to mark the lease agreement for the reason that the same was under stamped and the court ordered payment of the stamp duty alongwith penalty for security and the rent payable as per the lease agreement.

The legal question therefore arose as to whether Article 33(c) will cover a refundable security provided in a lease agreement, even though the same is adjustable towards the rent in arrears.

The Government letter dated 24-02-1983 addressed to the Inspector General of Registration reads as follows:

“In supersession of the instruction issued in Govt. letter No. 18769/E2/75/TD, dated 15-12-1975 and in accordance with the decision of the Delhi High Court in AIR 1980 Delhi 249, the following principles may be observed while classifying lease deeds.

(1) Duty is not chargeable under Article 35(c) of Schedule IA of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 on the amounts of security/deposit/advance, which is refundable on determination of the lease, in addition to the duty paid on the rent reserved under Article 35(a) of the Schedule.

(2) It will not make any difference in the changeability of duty, if such deposit/advance is adjustable in rent/other charges dues payable under the lease.

(3) The amount of security deposit paid for the due performance of the contract of lease is chargeable under Article 57 of the Schedule read with section 5 of the Act.

Amount of security deposit – cannot be treated as “money advanced” in terms of Article 33(c) – Fact that it is adjustable to – wards unpaid rent – Immaterial – since it paid for due performance of obligations of lease and on termination of lease, it is refundable, such an amount which is refundable will not get character of `money advanced’ – Lessor consequently not bound to pay stamp duty on security deposit.”

A reading of Article 33(a), will show that it covers cases where the rent is fixed and no premium is paid or delivered. Going by Article 33(c), the provision is attracted where the lease is granted for a premium or for money advanced and the same will be in addition to rent reserved. Apparently, the Rent Control Court has treated the security deposit as money advanced for attracting section 33(c) in addition to the rent.

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Circulars – Binding nature – Circulars cannot override statutory provisions: Administrative Law:

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Glaxo Smithkline Pharmaceuticals Ltd vs. UOI & Others, AIR 2014 SC 410

The following principles emante out of this decision of the Supreme Court in relation to the Circulars issued by the Government under the fiscal laws (Income-tax Act and Central Excise Act):

1. Although a circular is not binding on a court or an assessee, it is not open to the Revenue to raise a contention that is contrary to a binding Circular by the Board. While a circular remains in operation, the Revenue is bound by it and cannot be allowed to plead that is not valid nor that it is contrary to the terms of the statute.

2. A show cause notice and demand contrary to the existing Circulars of the Board are ab initio bad.

3. It is not open to the Revenue to advance an argument or file an appeal contrary to the Circulars.

The above legal position is re-emphasised in Commissioner of Customs vs. Indian Oil Corporation (AIR 2004 SC 2799: 2004 AIR SCW 1310) has been followed in UOI vs. Arviva Inds. (I) Ltd.: (2007) 209 ELT 5 (SC)

4. It is well settled that if the departmental Circular provides an interpretation which runs contrary to the provisions of law, such interpretation will not bind the Court.

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Private Companies under the Companies Act, 2013

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Synopsis

The regime of the Companies Act, 1956 has come to an end, with the notification of a majority of the sections of the Companies Act, 2013 . Significant changes have been brought/new concepts have been introduced like withdrawal of several relaxations enjoyed by the private Companies with added compliance burden, introduction of new concepts like OPC (One Person Company), etc. The article discusses in detail the key changes notified/ proposed with respect to Private Limited Companies and will be of relevance to a large number of readers.

Background

The Companies Act, 2013 (‘New Act’) received the assent of the President on 29th August, 2013 and was notified in the Gazette on 30th August, 2013. Of the 470 sections in the New Act, 98 sections or part thereof have been brought into force from 12th September 2013. Further, the Government has clarified that the relevant provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 (‘existing Act’) which correspond to the provisions of those 98 sections of the New Act shall cease to have effect from the said date.

The New Act has made material changes to the provisions under the existing Act. In this article the various privileges and exemptions which are available to a private company under the existing Act and the status thereof, under the New Act are discussed. The said analysis is irrespective of the fact whether all the said provisions have been notified by the Central Government or not.

1. Definition of Private company:

Under the New Act a private company is defined u/s. 2(68) as under:

“private company” means a company having a minimum paid-up share capital of one lakh rupees or such higher paid-up share capital as may be prescribed, and which by its articles,-

(i) restricts the right to transfer its shares;

(ii) except in case of One Person Company, limits the number of its members to two hundred: (emphasis supplied)

Provided that where two or more persons hold one or more shares in a company jointly, they shall, for the purposes of this clause, be treated as a single member:

Provided further that:

(A) persons who are in the employment of the company; and
(B) persons who, having been formerly in the employment of the company, were members of the company while in that employment and have continued to be members after the employment ceased, shall not be included in the number of members; and

(iii) prohibits any invitation to the public to subscribe for any securities of the company; (emphasis supplied)

The following changes in the definition of a private company may be noted:

a) Except in the case of One Person Company: maximum number of members, which a private company can have, is increased to 200 from the existing limit of 50;

b) Under the existing Act, a private company by its Articles is prohibited from inviting the public for subscription of shares and debentures. Under the New Act the prohibition applies to securities as defined u/s. 2(h) of the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 which includes not only the shares and debentures but also other securities prescribed therein;

c) Under the existing Act, in order to form a private company it is essential that its Articles contain a Clause that prohibits a company from accepting deposits from persons other than its members, directors or their relatives. The New Act does not prescribe a similar condition and thus, under the New Act, a private company can be formed without inserting in its Articles, a Clause prohibiting invitation or acceptance of deposits from persons other than its members, directors or their relatives. This however does not imply that a private company can invite or accept deposits from any person since the said restrictions are contained in section 73 (and draft Rules thereon) which deal with the provisions for acceptance of deposits.

2. Restriction on commencement of business:

As per the New Act, a private company cannot commence business or exercise borrowing powers:

• till every subscriber to the memorandum has paid the value of shares taken by him and the directors of the company have filed declaration to that effect; and
• the Company has filed with the Registrar a verification of its registered office.

Under the existing Act, a private company could commence business or exercise borrowing powers immediately on being formed/incorporated.

3. Share Capital:

a) Under the existing Act, a company is prohibited from issuing classes of shares other than equity or preference shares. Further, the Act provides that the shareholder’s voting rights should be in the same proportion to his share of the paid up equity capital of the company. However, these provisions do not apply to a private company which is not a subsidiary of a public company [section 90(2) of the existing Act]. Thus, under the existing Act, a private company not being a subsidiary of a public company is permitted to issue types of shares other than the equity share or the preference share. It can also issue shares with disproportionate rights in regard to dividend, participation in any surplus on liquidation and with disproportionate voting rights.

However under the New Act, similar exemption is not given to a private company.

b) Under the existing Act, a private company can issue further share capital to any person or in any manner as it thinks best in its own interest. Its Articles may or may not provide for pre-emptive rights of the shareholders.

Under the New Act, however, all companies including a private company, are required to offer shares to persons who, on the date of the offer, are holders of equity shares of the Company in proportion, as nearly as circumstances admit, to the paid up share capital on those shares. Thus the current practice in private companies of freely issuing shares to any outsider will be restricted.

4. Providing financial assistance for purchase of its own/holding company’ s shares:

Under the existing Act, a public company or a private company which is a subsidiary of a public company is prohibited from giving a loan, a guarantee, a security or any other kind of financial assistance to any person for the purpose of purchase of shares in the company or in its holding company.

Under the New Act, such prohibition is restricted to public company only. Accordingly, private companies, including those which are subsidiaries of a public company would be able to offer financial assistance to any person for purchase of shares in the company or in its holding company.

5. Appointment of Directors:

a) Where a person other than a retiring director stands for directorship:

U/s. 160 of the New Act, a person who is not a retiring director and desires to stand for directorship is required to give 14 days’ notice in writing and a deposit of Rs. 1 lakh or such higher amount as may be prescribed. The deposit amount would be refunded provided he gets elected or gets at least 25% vote. A private company is not excluded from the applicability of the said provisions.

U/s. 257 of the existing Act, such person was required to deposit a sum of Rs. 500 only. However, it seems that the existing provision was complied more in breach – the same may become more difficult to comply in view of the increase in the amount of deposit to Rs. 1 lakh.

b) Number of directorships:

U/s. 275 of the existing Act, a person cannot become a director in more than 15 companies. For the purpose, a person holding directorship in a private company which is neither a subsidiary nor a holding company of a public company is not considered.


U/s. 165 of the New Act the said limit is increased
to 20 but it further provides that in the
said limit of 20, the number of public companies
cannot exceed 10. Further it is clarified that for
reckoning the limit of public companies, directorship
in a private company which is either a
holding or a subsidiary of a public company is
to be included. Thus under the New Act, since
directorships in private companies will also
need to be considered, it will require several
persons to reduce their number of directorships
in private companies.


c) Appointment of
directors to be voted on individually: 

U/s. 162 of the New Act where a company including
a private company, desires to appoint 2 or more persons
as directors by a single resolution, it is necessary
first to pass a resolution authorising their appointment
in that manner without even one dissentient
vote being cast against such resolution.

Under the existing Act, a private company which is
not a subsidiary of a public company is permitted to
appoint two or more persons as directors even by a
single resolution with no pre-conditions attached to it.


d)
Consent to act
as a director: 

U/s. 152 of the New Act where a person is proposed
to be appointed as a director by a company including
a private company, he is required to furnish a declaration
that he is not disqualified to become a director
under the Act. It is further provided that a person
appointed as a director shall not act as a director unless
he gives his consent to hold the office as director
and such consent has been filed with the Registrar.


Similar provisions under the existing Act were not
applicable to a private company (unless it is a subsidiary
of a public company).

6.
Appointment of Managerial Personnel:


a) As per section 269 of the existing Act, every
public company or a private company which
is a subsidiary of a public company, having a
paid up share capital of Rs. 5 crore, is required
to have a managing or whole time director or
manager.


As per section 203 of the New Act, every company
belonging to such class or classes of
companies, as may be prescribed by the Central
Government, is required to have the following
whole-time key managerial personnel:

• Managing director or Chief Executive Officer or
Manager or Whole-time director;


• Company secretary; and

• Chief financial officer.

Thus, if the specified class of companies includes
private companies above the specified threshold,
they will need to comply with the above.

b) Under the New Act, it is further specified that
a person who is the Managing director or Chief
Executive Officer cannot be appointed as the
Chairperson of the company unless Articles
of such company provide for the same or the
company carries on multiple businesses.

c) A whole-time key managerial personnel cannot
hold office in more than one company except
in its subsidiary company, though he can be a
director of any company with the permission
of the Board.

Under the existing Act a person can be appointed
as a managing director in two companies
and for the purpose, managing directorships in
a private company which is not a subsidiary of
public company is not considered;

d) As per section 196(3) of the New Act, which
applies to all types of companies, a person
cannot be appointed to the post of managerial
personnel who is below the age of 21 years or
has attained the age of 70 years.

Under the existing Act, no such age criteria
were prescribed in relation to a private company.
e) Under the existing Act, a private company (not
being a subsidiary of a public company) is not
prohibited from appointing a managing director
or a manager for a term which may exceed 5
years at a time.

Under the New Act, all types of companies, including
a private company, are prohibited from appointing
managing director or whole time director or manager
for a term exceeding 5 years at a time.

7.
Restrictions on Powers of Board: 

As per the New Act, the Board of a company, including
of a private company can exercise the following
powers only with the consent of the company by a
special resolution:


a) Sale, lease or otherwise disposal of the whole
or substantially the whole undertaking. The
term ‘substantial’ means where not less than
20% of the value of the undertaking is being
disposed off;

b) To invest, otherwise in trust securities, the
amount of compensation received by it as a
result of any merger/amalgamation;

c) To borrow money, where the money to be
borrowed, together with the money already
borrowed exceed the aggregate of its paid
up share capital and free reserves;

d) To remit, or give time for the re-payment of,
any debt due from a director;

Under the existing Act, there were no such requirements
or restrictions on a private company which is
not a subsidiary of a public company.

8. Loan to
directors:


As per section 185 of the New Act no company,
including a private company, can advance any loan
to any of its directors or to any other persons in
whom the director is interested or give guarantee
or provide any security in connection with any loan
taken by him or such other person.


The corresponding provisions of section 295 of the
existing Act were not applicable to a private company
(unless it is a subsidiary of a public company).

Section 185 has also become operative since 12th
September, 2013. Hence, in case of any fresh loans
given or renewal of loans after that date, the provisions
of the section would need to be complied with. 

9. Loans and investments by a company:


The New Act provides for the manner in which and
the limits up to which a company, including a private
company can give loan or give guarantee or provide
security in connection with a loan to any other body
corporate or person or acquire any securities of any
other body corporate. As per section 186 of the Act,
unless authorised by a special resolution passed at a
general meeting, such loans, investments,

etc.,
made
by any company cannot exceed 60% of its paid up
share capital, free reserves and securities premium account
or 100% of free reserves and securities premium
account, whichever is lower. It further provides that
the loan cannot be given at a rate of interest lower
than the prevailing yield of 1 year, 3 year, 5 year or
10 year Government security closest to the tenor of
the loan. It also empowers the Central government to
prescribe limits up to which the companies registered
u/s. 12 of the Securities and Exchange Board of India
Act, 1992 can take intercorporate loan or deposit.

Section 372A of the existing Act also restricts loans
and investments by the company. However, the
provisions under the New Act are more stringent and
restrictive. The material differences between the two
provisions are as under:

a) Section 372A is not applicable to a private
company not being a subsidiary of a public
company while section 186 applies to private
companies also;


b) New section not only covers inter-corporate
loans and investment but also to loans and
investment given to non-corporates;

c) As per section 372A, a loan cannot be made at
the rate of interest lower than the prevailing
bank rate made public u/s. 49 of the Reserve
Bank of India Act, 1934 – u/s. 186 of the New
Act, the rate of interest is linked to the prevailing
yield of Government securities;

d) Following transactions not covered (or exempted)
under the provisions of section 372A of the existing
Act gets covered u/s. 186 of the New Act:

• Investments in right issue of shares made in
pursuant of section 81(1)(a);

• Loan by a holding company to its wholly owned subsidiary;

• Guarantee given or security provided by a holding
company in respect of loan to its wholly
owned subsidiary;


• Acquisition of securities by a holding company
of its wholly owned subsidiary;

e) A new provision is inserted to prohibit investment
through more than 2 layers of investment
companies.

10. Interested director not to participate or vote in
Board’s proceedings:


As per section 184 of the New Act, every director
of a company, including of a private company, who
is concerned or interested in a contract or arrangement
entered into or proposed to be entered into
is required to disclose the nature of his concern or
interest at the meeting of the Board and he cannot
participate in proceedings of such meeting.
Similar provisions under the existing Act were not
applicable to a private company.


11. Administration related:

a) Time and Place of the Annual General Meeting:

Under the existing Act, a private company has the
option to fix the time for its annual general meeting
by its Articles or by a resolution passed in one
annual general meeting wherein time for holding
subsequent meeting is fixed/decided. In case of a
private company (unless it is a subsidiary of a public
company), it also has the option of fixing the place
of its annual general meeting in the like manner.

The New Act does not provide for similar options and
as provided in section 96(2), all companies, including
a private company, is required to hold its annual
general meeting between 9 a.m. and 6 p.m. on a day
that is not on a National holiday, at the registered
office of the company or at some other place within
the city, town or village in which the registered office
of the company is situated.


b) Meetings and Proceedings:


By virtue of the provisions of section 170 of the
existing Act, a private company by its Articles can
frame its own Rules as regards the length of notice
for calling meeting, contents and manner of service
of notice and person on whom it is to be served,
Explanatory statement to be annexed to notice,
Quorum for meeting, Chairman of meeting, Proxies
and manner of Voting on resolutions.

The New Act does not grant similar exemptions
hence, a private company is required to follow the
same rules and procedures as are applicable to a
public company.

c) Filing of the Financial Statements with the Registrar:

Proviso to section 220 of the existing Act permits a
private company to file copy of Statement of Profit
and Loss separately with the Registrar and the same
is not available to general public for inspection.

Under the New Act no such exemption is available
to a private company and all Financial Statements
filed u/s. 137 including the Statement of Profit and
Loss, would be available to the general public for
inspection.

d) Register of directors:

Under the existing Act, all companies, other than a
private company, which is not a subsidiary of a public
company are required to enter date of birth of a
director in the Register maintained. The exemption
granted to a private company has been withdrawn
under the New Act, and accordingly, the Register
maintained even by a private company shall contain
information about the date of birth of a director.

12. The following exemptions and privileges available
under the existing Act are also available under the
New Act:


(A) In the case of all types of private companies:

• Filing of statement in lieu of prospectus before
allotment of shares is not required;

• A private company need not have more than
2 directors;

(B) In the case of a private company not being
a subsidiary of a public company:


• The provisions relating to the managerial remuneration
like the extent and manner of
payment, fixing of overall maximum remuneration,
limit of minimum managerial remuneration
in the event of no profits or inadequate
profits, etc., are not applicable and such company
can remunerate its managerial personnel
by such higher percentage of profits or in any
manner as it may think fit;
• The provisions relating to the appointment,
retirement, reappointment, etc., of directors
who are to retire by rotation and the procedure
relating thereto, are not applicable and
the company can frame its own Rules for the
purpose in the Articles;
• The provisions relating to the manner of filling
up casual vacancy among the directors are not
applicable and the company can frame its own
Rules for the purpose in the Articles;
• The company can by its Articles, provide for any
disqualification for appointment as a director
in addition to those specified in the Act;
• The company may provide any other ground
for the vacation of the office of a director in
addition to those specified in the Act;

13. One Person Company (OPC):
The concept of One Person Company has been introduced
under the New Act. Section 2(62) of the Act
defines the OPC to mean a company which has only
one person as a member and as per section 3, a company
formed by one person would be a private limited
company. Thus, the OPC would enjoy all the exemptions
and privileges enjoyed by any private company. In addition,
OPC enjoys following exemptions and privileges:
a) It is not mandatory for the OPC to prepare
the cash flow statement;
b) In the absence of company secretary, the Annual
Return filed u/s. 92 can be signed by the
director;
c) The OPC is not required to hold an Annual
general meeting;
d) The provisions of section 100 to 111 which
provides for matter regarding extraordinary
general meeting, the length of notice for
calling general meeting, contents and manner
of service of notice and person on whom it
is to be served, Explanatory statement to be
annexed to notice, Quorum for the meeting,
Chairman of the meeting, Proxies and manner
of Voting on resolutions, etc., do not apply to
the OPC;
e) The financial statement need not be signed
amongst others, by the Chief Financial Officer
and the Company secretary. It is sufficient
compliance if the same is signed by one director;
f) It is sufficient compliance if the OPC has only 1
director instead of minimum 2 required in the
case of a private limited company;
g) In case of the OPC it is sufficient if at least 1 meeting of the Board of
Directors is held in each half of a calendar year.
14. Conclusion
As seen above,
the New Act has brought in many changes in the existing Act and various new
concepts have also been introduced. To some extent, the Clauses in the Articles
of the existing private companies may not be in sync with the provisions of the
New Act. The Articles of the existing private companies are based on Table A of
the existing Act which corresponds to Table F of the New Act. It will be
advisable for all private companies to compare the existing Clauses in its
Articles with Table F of the New Act and making the necessary changes as
required.
In conclusion, it may be said that the Private Limited Company is one
of the most widely used legal forms by many businessmen in India. In fact, many
of the successful business group had begun their first venture by forming a
private company, the reason being it was relatively easy to form and lesser
regulations applicable. As seen above, a number of privileges enjoyed by the
private company under the existing Act have been withdrawn under the New Act.
Due to this, a lot of companies (especially family owned) would need to
expeditiously explore whether they can really cope with the new requirements or
that they need to change to some other form of entity like Limited Liability
Partnership (LLP).

Gaps in GaAp – Core Inventories

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In a certain manufacturing or a distribution process a certain amount of core inventory is required to run the plant, transport the raw material or finished goods. Examples of core inventories are cushion gas in cavern storage facilities, crude oil used as line fill and minimum levels of some materials in non-ferrous metal refining. The essential features of core inventory are:

(a) Use: are necessary to permit a production facility to start operating and to maintain subsequent production;

(b) Physical form: not physically separable from other inventories and interchangeable with them;

(c) Removal: can be removed only when production facilities are abandoned, decommissioned or overhauled or at a considerable financial charge. Sometimes the quality of what can be removed may not be the same as the original inventory, for example, on decommissioning there could be a lot of sludge or waste material.

The issue could be material for some companies, such as in the case of an oil pipeline company where the pipeline runs into several kilometres. In such cases, the impact of the manner in accounting for the initial fill could be very significant.

Query
Whether core inventories should be classified as inventories or fixed assets? How are they subsequently measured?

View 1:
Classification under AS-2 Valuation of Inventories

Inventories are defined in AS-2 as (a) held for sale in the ordinary course of business; (b) in the process of production for such sale; or (c) in the form of materials or supplies to be consumed in the production process or in the rendering of services. Core inventories meet that definition of inventories. The rationale for classification as inventories is that core inventories are ordinarily interchangeable with other inventories, and thus, core inventories held at a particular reporting date will be either consumed or sold in the next period.

On the other hand, AS-10 Accounting for Fixed Assets, defines fixed assets as “Fixed asset is an asset held with the intention of being used for the purpose of producing or providing goods or services and is not held for sale in the normal course of business.” Core inventories do not meet this definition because they are held for sale in the normal course business. On the assumption that the unit of account is the smallest unit of the material concerned (ultimately individual atoms), core inventories are classified as inventories because they represent materials that are consumed in the production process

The two different views on subsequent measurement of core inventories are:

(a) Core inventories are measured collectively with other inventories using FIFO or a weightedaverage cost formula. These methods are supported in AS-2.

(b) Core inventories are measured separately from other inventories. The rationale for this accounting treatment is that the accounting transaction does not take place at the time of each inventory’s swap and therefore their value is not stepped up. Support for this may be found in paragraph 14 of AS-2 which states that “The cost of inventories of items that are not ordinarily interchangeable and goods or services produced and segregated for specific projects should be assigned by specific identification of their individual costs.” However, a more appropriate view may well be that measuring core inventory separately is similar to applying the base stock method which is prohibited in AS-2.

A matter of concern is that if core inventories are accounted for as inventories, an entity would in many cases, need to recognise an immediate loss on writing off to net realisable value, if the inventory is not expected to be fully recoverable when the plant is ultimately decommissioned. Either full quantity is not recovered or some recovery may be in the form of sludge. Also, the net realisable value would factor the cost incurred for recovering the inventory. At other times, such as the initial fill in the case of an oil pipeline company, the net realisable value on account of price changes could fluctuate significantly, and create volatility in the P&L A/c.

View 2: Classification under AS-10 Accounting for Fixed Assets

The rationale for classification as fixed asset is that core inventories are not held for sale or for consumption; instead, their intended use is to ensure that a production facility is operating. Even though core inventories are commingled with ordinary inventories, the characteristics and intended use of a particular part of the inventories remain the same at each individual reporting date. Thus these core inventories need to be accounted for separately.

Core inventories should be classified as fixed asset because they are necessary to bring a fixed asset to its required operating condition. Paragraph 9.1 of AS-10 states that “The cost of an item of fixed asset comprises its purchase price, including import duties and other non-refundable taxes or levies and any directly attributable cost of bringing the asset to its working condition for its intended use; any trade discounts and rebates are deducted in arriving at the purchase price. Examples of directly attributable costs are:

i. site preparation;
ii. initial delivery and handling costs;
iii. installation cost, such as special foundations for plant; and
iv. professional fees, for example fees of architects and engineers.”

If core inventories are carried as inventories, it would not properly reflect the fact that core inventories are necessary to operate another asset over more than one operating cycle. On the assumption that the unit of account is the minimum amount of material as a whole, core inventories are classified as fixed asset because they are neither held for sale nor consumed in the production process.

The classification of core inventories should be based on their intended primary use because:

(a) A part of inventories of the same quantity, characteristics and use for an entity is always in the production facility, whether this part is commingled with other inventories or not. Core inventories need to be accounted for separately from ordinary inventories.

(b) The classification based on the intended primary use, rather than on their physical form, would provide more relevant information for the users of financial statements.

The primary use of core inventories is to be held for use in the production or supply of goods or services (meets the definition of a fixed asset), rather than to be sold or consumed in the production process or in the rendering of services (does not meet the definition of inventories).

The loss of core inventories over-time should be recognised as an expense over the useful life of a fixed asset, based on the following:

(a) economic benefits associated with core inventories are consumed over the entire useful life of the fixed asset.

(b) in the case of a systematic allocation, the costs would match with the associated revenues.

Both the above would meet the spirit of the Conceptual Framework on the basis of which Indian accounting standards are drafted.

Some are of the view that only core inventories that could not be substantially recovered from the production facility form an element of fixed asset cost. Otherwise, they may be carried as inventories. The author believes that assets’ recoverability should not change their classification. The classification of core inventories should not be based on their recoverability, because this guidance is not explicitly stated in Indian GAAP. Instead, the depreciation mechanism described in AS 6 addresses accounting in such cases; i.e., core inventories that can be recovered would be depreciated to the extent of their residual value. However, due to price increases over time in core inventories, the residual value would go up significantly, leading to low or no depreciation.

The historical cost measurement is a common approach for non-current assets. However, if an entity believes that the current cost of core inventories would provide more relevant financial information to the users, a revaluation model in AS-10 may also be applied.
Overall Conclusion
The accounting practice prevalent globally on this matter is mixed. However, the predominant view, globally, is that core inventories are fixed assets.
The Expert Advisory Committee (EAC) of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India, have opined that core inventories should be classified as Inventories under AS-2. However, the author believes that there are enough provisions within Indian GAAP, that lend core inventories to be either classified as fixed assets or inventories. This choice can be eliminated only through appropriate amendment of the scoping paragraphs in the standards rather than through an interpretation by the EAC.

2013 (32) STR 657 (Tri.-Mum.) WNS Global Services Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of C. ex., Nashik

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Leasing of telecom lines are eligible input services when services are exported electronically.

Prior to 2006, there was no requirement to take input service distributor’s registration.

When data is transmitted electronically, it has to be transferred first to the server of telecom authorities in India and thereafter, it is transmitted to recipient abroad. Though delivery of services is routed through server of telecom authorities in India and is not exported directly, the services are still export of services subject to receipt of payment in convertible foreign exchange.

Facts:
The refund of CENVAT credit was rejected on the grounds that part of CENVAT Credit was distributed by Head Office as input service distributor (ISD) without registration as ISD and that the balance CENVAT credit was disallowed on the ground that services of providing leased telecommunication lines was not eligible input service. Further, the appellants have not directly exported the output services but have routed through telecom authorities located in India and therefore, the definition of export is not satisfied.

The appellants contended that they are eligible for refund as there was no statutory requirement to take ISD registration prior to 2006 and the leased telephone lines were instrumental in exporting output services and therefore, were eligible input services. Even though services were first delivered to telecom authorities in India, it was an essential exercise for processing of data which was required to be transmitted to service recipient abroad for which amount was received in convertible foreign exchange and therefore, the transaction was of export of services only.

Held:
The Tribunal observed that the dedicated lines from office to telecom authorities were essential to export services electronically and therefore, leasing of telecom lines was eligible input service. Prior to 2006, there was no requirement for ISD registration. Accordingly, if input services were used for providing output services, the same would be eligible input services. The view taken by the department, that the output services were not exported since the services were transmitted through telecom service providers in India, was held to be completely irrational. In case of electronic transmission of data, firstly the data has to be transferred to server of telecom authorities in India and thereafter, it is transmitted to abroad service recipient. Since in the present case, the service recipient abroad has received services and payments were made in convertible foreign exchange, the output services were nothing but export of services. However, the appeal was remanded for limited purpose of verification of payments received in convertible foreign exchange at the Head Office situated in other jurisdiction and refund claim was allowed.

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Giving Away Wealth

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The concept of giving is not new to us. All religions consider it virtuous to give and ask its followers to give. While people generally do have incomes to give from, relatively, a fewer people have wealth from which they could think of giving. Also wealth is required for future needs. However there are a few fortunate ones whose wealth far exceeds their own future needs and also the needs of their families and heirs for generations to come. We have in our midst people like Azim Premji, Narayan Murthy and Sudha Murthy, who are giving away large portions of their wealth. One truly admires them.

Warren Buffet, and Bill and Malinda Gates who are amongst the richest persons in the world launched the “Giving Pledge’ in 2010. Billionaires are requested to publicly commit to give away atleast 50% of their wealth either during the lifetime or on death for philanthropy. The total number of billionaires who have taken this pledge are 122. Bill and Melinda Gates who launched this “Giving Pledge Movement” have expressed themselves in the following words:

 “We have been blessed with good fortune beyond our wildest expectations, and we are profoundly grateful. But just as these gifts are great, so we feel a great responsibility to use them well. That is why we are so pleased to join in making an explicit commitment to the ‘Giving Pledge’”.

Our country has witnessed one of the most unique and the largest ever giving away of wealth. After independence, the Maharajas of 562 princely states were persuaded to give away voluntarily their entire kingdom and merge their states with the Union of India. This in an achievement, which is unparalleled in history for which our country would ever remain grateful to Sardar Vallabhai Patel.

Later, we also witnessed the ‘Bhoodan Movement’. Vinoba Bhave, by persuasion, managed to collect 47 lakh acres of land from the land owners, which would mean the area of size of a country like Kuwait. What an achievement!

One remembers Mahatma Gandhi who advocated the spirit of trusteeship which could solve this problem. These are his words: “Earn your crores by all means. But understand that your wealth is not yours, it belongs to the people. Take what you require for your legitimate needs, and use the remainder for the Society.”

 It is extremely difficult to implement this concept of “Trusteeship”. But at least, we can make a beginning and start by giving away a part of our excess wealth for charitable purposes.

We have talked about great philanthropists. However, I have come across one instance of giving away which pales into insignificance and surpasses what has been done by all these philanthropists.

Dr. Girish Kulkarni, who is a founder trustee of “Snehalaya”, an organisation which fights child prostitution and has succeeded in freeing Ahmednagar district of this evil of child prostitution narrated this to us when we had visited Snehalaya about a year and a half ago. Dr. Girish and his team is working for the welfare of commercial sex workers, their health and other problems and also looking after their children, many of whom suffer from AIDS. One day, a commercial sex worker named Sharda Gowda sought a lift from Dr. Girish to Pune from Ahmednagar. On the way, she asked Dr. Girish whether they would accept any gift from her, to which Dr. Girish replied in the affirmative. Dr. Girish was stunned when she offered a valuable piece of land at Katraj near Pune to Snehalaya. She gave away land worth over Rs. 20 lakh, on which Snehalaya has built a centre for poor children, which is used by over 150 poor children everyday!

In my 78 years, I have not come across such a magnificent act of giving away. This is why my heart bows down in Namaskaar to a woman I would never see in my life. This is Giving. “No One has ever become poor by giving”

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2013 (32) STR 625 (Tri.-Ahmd.) Vishal Enterprises vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, Ahmedabad

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Tendering of order manually by handing over the documents to the assessee is valid delivery to the assessee.

Facts:
The order-in-original was passed on 30-12-2010 and the same was served personally before 06-09-2011. The appellants argued that the order-in-original was not served through registered post with acknowledgment due (RPAD) upon the person for whom it was intended. Accordingly, procedure as required u/s. 37C of the Central Excise Act, 1944 was not followed and therefore, the order-inoriginal cannot be deemed to have been received by the appellants before 06-09-2011.

The respondents contested that section 37C of the Central Excise Act, 1944 prescribed two methods namely; tendering the decision or sending the order by registered post with acknowledgement due. Accordingly, department had very well delivered the order personally. The same was also evident from the letter dated 05-09-2011 received from the appellants demanding duplicate copy of the order-in-original since the original order was misplaced during shifting of office.

Held:
Referring to section 37C of the Central Excise Act, 1944, the Tribunal held that tendering of order can be done manually by handing over the documents to the appellants and the requirement is not strictly to be sent through RPAD only. The fact, that the order-in-original was received by the appellants, was accepted by the appellants themselves vide letter dated 05-09-2011 demanding duplicate copy of the order-in-original since the original order was misplaced. The decisions relied upon by the appellants were not applicable to the present case in view of the receipt of original order by the appellants and therefore, the order-in-appeal passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) on limitation was upheld.

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2013 (32) STR 622 (Tri.-Ahmd.) Nirma Ltd. vs. Commissioner of C. Ex. & S. T., Vadodara – I

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CENVAT credit on garden maintenance services, manpower services for garden maintenance was statutory obligation and therefore, is eligible CENVAT credit.

Construction service for compound wall of factory is to demarcate the factory, for completion of the factory and to save goods from pilferage and clandestine removal and therefore, is in relation to manufacture of excisable goods. Therefore, these services are eligible for availment of CENVAT Credit.

Facts:
The appellants took CENVAT credit on pest control services, manpower supply services required for maintaining a garden in factory premises and construction services utilised for making the compound wall of the factory. The appellants were compelled to develop 33% of the factory area to mitigate the effects of emissions around the plant vide permission by Government of India, Ministry of Environment and Forest. Further, to maintain garden, the plant had availed services of maintenance, garden development and manpower supply services for garden maintenance. The appellants relied on the decision of CCE, Bhavnagar vs. Nirma Ltd. 2010 (20) STR 346 (Tri.-Ahmd.) and with respect to construction services for compound wall of the factory, the appellants relied on the decision of CCE, Pune – II vs. Raymond Zambaiti Pvt. Ltd. 2010 (18) STR 734 (Tri.-Mum.).

Held:
Relying on the decisions cited by the appellants, the Tribunal held that services in relation to garden maintenance were to fulfil a statutory obligation and therefore, the same were eligible for CENVAT credit. Further, compound wall was essential to demarcate the factory premises and to save manufactured goods from pilferage and clandestine removal and therefore, the same was for completion of factory and an activity in relation to manufacture of excisable goods. Accordingly, CENVAT credit in respect of all disputed services was allowed.

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2013 (32) STR 610 (Tri.-Ahmd.) AIA Engineering Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Ahmedabad

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New grounds cannot be taken in the revisionary SCN issued by Commissioner.

Facts:
Original adjudicating authority sanctioned refund of terminal handling charges and repo charges. However, Commissioner started proceedings to revise the order issued by the original adjudicating authority and after issuing SCN, refund was held to be sanctioned wrongly vide Commissioner’ order on the ground that the appellants were providing services which were not specified in Notification No. 41/2007-ST dated 06-10-2007. The appellants contested that the SCN issued by the Commissioner for revision u/s. 84 travelled beyond the SCN issued by the original adjudicating authority and therefore, Commissioner’s order was liable to be dropped. However, as per revenue, the Commissioner relied on the same documents as were verified by the original adjudicating authority and reached the conclusion that the services were not specified in the said notification.

Held:
Relying on the decisions of Viacom Electronics (P) Ltd. vs. CCE Vadodara 2002 (145) ELT 563 (Tri.-Mum.), Aero Products vs. CST Bangalore 2011 (22) STR 522 (Tri.-Bang.) and Sands Hotel Pvt. Ltd. vs. CST, Mumbai 2009 (16) STR 329 (Tri.-Mum.), the Tribunal held that new ground cannot be taken in the revisionary SCN. In the present case, the original SCN was based on insufficient documentation for grant of refund, however, the revisionary SCN was on a totally new ground about ineligibility to claim refund and therefore, the appeal was allowed.

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2013 (32) STR 756 (Tri,-Ahmd) Atwood Oceanics Pacific Ltd vs. Comm. of Service Tax, Ahmd.

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Whether activities of drilling, completion or abandonment of exploratory wells would be classifiable under category of “Survey & Exploration of Mineral, Oil & Gas service” Or “Mining of mineral, oil & gas service” Or “Supply of tangible goods service”?

Facts:
The Appellant entered into an agreement for drilling, testing, completion at exploratory wells as per directions of its client. Appellant obtained service tax registration in February, 2009 under the category of “supply of tangible goods service” and started paying service tax. The Revenue entertained a view that Appellant’s activities could be classified under “Survey & Exploration of Min- eral, Oil & Gas service” from November, 2006 to May, 2007 and under “Mining of mineral, oil & gas service” from June, 2007 onwards. After verification of documents by the Respondent, Appellant deposited service tax along with interest for the period June, 2007 onwards. Thereafter, the Revenue demanded service tax for the period 2006 to 2009. The Appellant challenged the demand before the Commissioner (Appeals) and argued that their activities were post-exploration activities and as per CBEC Letter F. No. B2/8/2004-TRU dated 10-09-2004 the activities pertaining to survey and exploration were covered under “Survey & Exploration of mineral, oil & gas service” and not the activities relating to actual exploitation of mineral, oil & gas. The Commissioner (Appeals) dropped the demand pertaining to the period November, 2006 to May, 2007 under “Survey & Exploration service” but confirmed the demand from June 2007 under “Mining of mineral, oil & gas service” and consequently, Appellant as well as Respondent both preferred appeals before the Tribunal.

Held:
The Tribunal held that the activities undertaken had direct nexus with the mining as the activity undertaken is drilling of wells for exploration of minerals, therefore the said activity is classifiable under “Mining Service” from June 2007 onwards. The Tribunal observed that, even if the classification of service as interpreted by the Tribunal is held otherwise owing to the complexities involved, extended period was not applicable and service tax could not be recovered for the period prior to 01-06-2007, as SCN covering the period before June, 2007 was issued in April, 2009. The Tribunal held that the service tax was applicable from June, 2007 onwards under category of “mining service” and thereafter under “supply of tangible goods” service from 16-05-2008 onwards. The Tribunal set aside the penalties on the ground that Appellant’s act of depositing service tax along with interest before issuance of SCN shows Appellant entertained bonafide belief and intent of evasion was absent. Accordingly, the Tribunal rejected Respondent’s appeal while allowing Appellant’s appeal.

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2013 (32) STR 738 (Tri-Del.) CCEx., Chandigarh vs. U. B. Construction (P) Ltd.

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Whether explanation added on 01-07-2010 to section 65 (105) (zzzq) and 65(105) (zzzh) for expanding the scope of construction services are prospective in nature and otherwise?

Facts:
Revenue had challenged the Order passed by the Appellate Authority allowing the appeal of the Appellant which held that construction services rendered to prospective buyers of flat were to be regarded as self–service by the builder for the period upto 30/06/2010 and therefore service tax was not applicable on the amounts received till this date.

Held:
After considering the judgements quoted by the Appellant such as G. S. Promoters vs. UOI -2011 (21) STR 100 (P & H), MCHI vs. UOI-2012 (25) STR 305 (Bom) and after referring to the Board Circular No. 334/4/2010 dated 01-07-2010, Tribunal held as follows:

The Punjab and Haryana High Court rejected the challenge to the constitutional validity of the said explanation in G. S. Promoter’s case. The issue whether the said explanation is retrospective or prospective in nature was not considered nor decided by the High Court whereas the Bombay High Court in MCHI’s case considered the issue whether the said explanation is prospective in nature or otherwise. Bombay High Court held that the said explanation was specifically legislated upon to expand the concept of taxable service as prior to explanation view was taken that a mere agreement to sale does not create any interest in the property and title to the property continues to remain with the builder, no service was provided by the builder, that the service, if any would be in the nature of a service rendered by the builder to himself. The explanation inserted with effect from 01-07-2010 expands the scope of the taxable service to include the service provided by the builder to buyers pursuant to an intended sale of immovable property before, during or after the construction and therefore the provision is expansive of the existing intent and not clarificatory of the same and is consequently prospective. In view hereof, the Tribunal held that since the construction was undertaken for the period before the insertion of the explanation, there is no liability to pay service tax and the Appeal was dismissed.

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[2013] 40 taxmann.com 185 (Delhi HC) Freezair India (P) Ltd. vs. CCE, Delhi

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Whether successor company was liable to be assessed for the liabilities of the predecessor who was a sole proprietor and now the director in the company, under Central Excise Act, 1944? Held, No.

Facts:
The appellant succeeded a sole proprietorship firm M/s. Freezair India (FI) and took over all the assets and liabilities. The proprietor subsequently became the director of the said company. The department issued a show-cause notice including the duties and liabilities in respect of manufacturing and clearing operations effected by M/s. FI on the ground that prior to taking over, the Appellant company was known as M/s. FI situated at the same address and also that the proprietor had become the director. The Tribunal held that the liabilities inherited by the company from the proprietary concern included the liability to be assessed and to pay the duty of excise.

Held:
Holding that the duties and liabilities of the predecessor were not liable to be paid by the appellant, the Hon. High Court observed that a company in law was different from its subscribers of the memorandum and the promoter directors and that its independent existence was of great significance except where lifting of the corporate veil was required against the promoter directors, directors or others in charge and responsible for day to day work of the company, to enforce obligations of the corporate identity and seek performance or penalise the natural person behind the corporate cloak which had no application in the present case. The high court further observed that Rule 230(2) of the Central Excise Rules was also inapplicable since no determination of duty on the predecessor and a finding to invoke and make recovery from the successor was made by the revenue and that there had been no assessment of duty on the predecessor either before or after transfer/take over.

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2013-TIOL-1038-HC-KOL-ST Commissioner of Central Excise, Kolkata vs. M/s Vesuvious India Ltd.

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Whether outward transportation of finished goods from place of removal covered under the definition of “input service” before 01-04-2008? Held, No.

Facts:
The revenue preferred appeal against the order of the CESTAT, Kolkata allowing CENVAT credit of the amount paid towards outward transportation of finished goods from the place of removal upto the point of delivery relying solely on the case of Commissioner of C.E & S.T., LTU, Bangalore vs. ABB Limited in 2011 (23) STR 97 (Kar)

Held:
Diagreeing with the judgment of the Hon. Karnataka High Court in ABB Limited (supra), the Hon. Kolkata High Court allowing the appeal of the department held that the definition of “input service” would not include the expenses with regard to post-manufacturing stage except for the purpose of transportation of goods from one place of removal to another place of removal. They further stated that although a Board circular was issued, it cannot be to amend the rules and thus neither the services rendered to the customer for the purpose of delivering the goods at the destination was covered by the definition of input service prior to 01-04-2008 nor is the same covered after 01-04-2008.

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2013 (32) STR 530 (All.) Commissioner of Cus. & C. Ex. vs. Balaji Tirupati Enterprises

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If goods are deemed to be sold in the execution of works contract, service tax cannot be levied on the same.

Facts:
The substantial questions put forth before Hon’ble High Court were as under:

Whether composite contract of repairs can be

segregated into goods and services portion on the basis of payment of VAT on goods used during repairs?

Whether Notification No. 12/2003-ST dated 20/06/2003 is applicable when bifurcation of cost of various components is available in the contract?

Whether service tax is to be paid on total cost of repair under present composite contract?

Held:

Agreeing with the decision of Tribunal, Hon’ble High Court summarily dismissed the appeal and held that the goods which were deemed to be sold in the execution of works contract shall not be leviable to service tax.

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Film Distribution Rights, Whether Liable to Vat?

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Synopsis The authors continuing their coverage of transactions which have been subject of levy of dual taxation of sales tax and service tax, have in this feature discussed about taxability of film distribution rights in light of recent decision of AGS Entertainment Pvt. Ltd.(Mad.). The authors discuss and concur with the views of the Court that in case of temporary transfer of film distribution rights, what is transferred is only the ‘use of the goods i.e. copyright in films’ and not ‘transfer of right to use goods’, so such transaction shall be subject to service tax and not sales tax.

Introduction

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Association of Leasing and Financial Services Companies vs. Union of India & others (2 SCC 352) has observed as under;

“Today, with the technological advancement, there is a very thin line which divides a sale from service.”

In this scenario, it is very difficult to decide as to which tax will apply to the transaction/s i.e., VAT or Service Tax. One such issue arose in respect of film distribution agreements.

The film producers and distributors were under an impression that on their agreements for distribution of films with distributors, as well as between distributors and sub distributors or with theatre owners etc., they are liable to tax under State Value Added Tax Act.

However, Service Tax department also claimed tax on the said transaction under sub-clause (zzzzt) of clause (105) of section 65 as ‘transferring temporarily’ or ‘permitting the use or enjoyment of, any copyright defined in the Copyright Act,1957, except the rights covered under sub-clause (a) of the clause (1) of section 13 of the said act.’

The film producers and distributors challenged the levy of Service Tax before the Hon’ble Madras High Court. The Hon’ble Madras High Court has now delivered judgment in AGS Entertainment Pvt. Ltd. & Others (Writ Petition no. 29398 of 2010 & others dated 26.6.2013.)

Facts
In the Writ Petition, the Hon’ble Madras High Court has raised following issues for its consideration.

“17. Upon consideration of the rival contentions and averments in the Writ Petitions and counter statement, the following points arise for consideration in these Writ Petitions:-

1. Whether the taxable event provided under Section 65(105)(zzzzt) of the Finance Act, 1994 is covered by Article 366 (29A)(d), which is a “deemed sale of goods”?

2. Whether the Petitioners are right in contending that the levy of service tax on “temporary transfer or permitting the use or enjoyment of copyright“ provided u/s. 65(105)(zzzzt) of the Finance Act, 1994 is covered under Entry 54 of List II and whether it amounts to transgression by Parliament into the exclusive domain of the State Legislature?

3. Whether the Petitioners are right in contending that the copyright is goods and transfer of copyright of cinematograph films is only delivery of goods for consideration and is absolute transfer and no service element is involved?

4. Even assuming that there is an element of service involved in the nature of transaction done by the Petitioners, should the dominant intention of the transaction being transfer of goods has to be only taken into consideration?

5. Whether the Petitioners are right in contending that Parliament has no authority to dissect a composite transaction as in the case of the Petitioners and levy service tax?

6. Whether Section 65(105)(zzzzt) levying service tax on the temporary transfer or permitting the use or enjoyment of copyright is ultra vires the Constitution.”

The Hon’ble Madras High Court referred to a number of judgments about validity of levy of Service Tax and levy of tax on deemed sale by way of ‘transfer of right to use goods’. As stated above, the argument of producers was that their agreements were for transfer of right to use goods and not for rendering services. The argument of the department was that allowing temporary use was falling under the service category.

Judgments referred For arriving to the meaning of sale by way of ‘transfer of right to use goods’, amongst others, the Hon’ble Madras High Court referred to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of 20th Century Finance Corporation Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra (119 STC 182). Hon’ble High Court quoted the following paragraphs from the above judgment:

“26. Next question that arises for consideration is, where is the taxable event on the transfer of the right to use any goods. Article 366(29-A) (d) empowers the State Legislature to enact law imposing sales tax on the transfer of the right to use goods. The various sub-clauses of clause (29-A) of Article 366 permit the imposition of tax thus: sub-clause (a) on transfer of property in goods; sub-clause (b) on transfer of property in goods; sub-clause (c) on delivery of goods; subclause (d) on transfer of the right to use goods; sub-clause (e) on supply of goods; and sub-clause (f) on supply of services. The words and such transfer, delivery or supply … in the latter portion of clause (29-A), therefore, refer to the words transfer, delivery and supply, as applicable, used in the various sub-clauses. ………..

In our view, therefore, on a plain construction of sub-clause (d) of clause (29-A), the taxable event is the transfer of the right to use the goods regardless of when or whether the goods are delivered for use. What is required is that the goods should be in existence so that they may be used. ……….

27. Article 366(29-A)(d) further shows that levy of tax is not on use of goods but on the transfer of the right to use goods. The right to use goods accrues only on account of the transfer of right. In other words, right to use arises only on the transfer of such a right and unless there is transfer of right, the right to use does not arise. Therefore, it is the transfer which is sine qua non for the right to use any goods. If the goods are available, the transfer of the right to use takes place when the contract in respect thereof is executed. As soon as the contract is executed, the right is vested in the lessee. Thus, the situs of taxable event of such a tax would be the transfer which legally transfers the right to use goods. In other words, if the goods are available irrespective of the fact where the goods are located and a written contract is entered into between the parties, the taxable event on such a deemed sale would be the execution of the contract for the transfer of right to use goods. But in case of an oral or implied transfer of the right to use goods it may be effected by the delivery of the goods..”

Thereafter, High Court referred to the scope of section 65(105)(zzzzt) about ‘temporary transfer’ under Service Tax in para -37 as under;

“37. Section 65(105)(zzzzt) seeks to tax viz., “temporary transfer or permitting the use or enjoyment” of copyright which is a service provided by the producer/distributor/exhibitor. Service Tax is a levy not on the “transfer of right to use the goods” as described under Article 366(29A) sub-clause (d); but on the temporary transfer” or “permitting the use or enjoyment” of the copyright as defined under the Copyright Act, 1957. In the case of Sales Tax Act, there would be “transfer of right to use the goods”. Whereas under the Service Tax Act what is levied is temporary transfer/enjoyment of the goods. The pith and substance of both enactments are totally different. “Temporary transfer” or “permitting the use or enjoyment of the copyright” is not within the State’s exclusive power under Entry 54 of List II. Therefore, there is no merit in the contention that the taxable event provided under Section 65(105) (zzzzt) is covered by Article 366(29A)..”

Regarding nature of transaction about transfer of right to use goods, Hon’ble High Court referred to the judgment in case of B.S.N.L. vs. Union of India (2006)(3 SCC 1) and quoted the following paragraphs.

73. No transfer of right to use:- As held by the Supreme Court in the decision of B.S.N.L. vs. Union of India, (2006) 3 SCC 1, to constitute a transaction for the transfer of the right to use the goods the transaction must have the following attributes:

a.    There must be goods available for delivery;

b.    There must be a consensus ad idem as to the identity of the goods;

c.    The transferee should have a legal right to use the goods – consequently all legal conse-quences of such use including any permissions or licenses required therefor should be available to the transferee;

d.    For the period during which the transferee has such legal right, it has to be the exclusion to the transferor – this is the necessary concomitant of the plain language of the statute – viz. a “transfer of the right to use” and not merely a licence to use the goods; e. Having transferred the right to use the goods during the period for which it is to be transferred, the owner cannot again transfer the same rights to others.”

Observations of the High Court about nature of transaction

After referring to various different kinds of agree-ments entered into in the film industry in para-65 & 66, the Hon’ble High Court observed as under;

“65. Even though it was contended that the transaction is between the producer and the distributor and the distributor gets the absolute right over the cinematograph film, in reality, the distributor does not get the absolute rights. The distributor only gets few positive prints or cubes of the picture for the exhibition of the picture in the specified area. In other words, it is a temporary transfer of the copyright or permission to use or enjoyment for the limited period in the specified area. As rightly contended by the respondents, exclusive right of copyright ordinarily vests with the producer of the film. Even in outright assignment, the transfer is not absolute. In the case of a lease, it is for a given period. The levy of tax on any transaction is based on the criterion whether the transfer of right is permanent or temporary. So long as the producer does not fully relinquish his right over the copyright held by him, transfer of the right to use is purely temporary and in those cases, levy of service tax for such transfer of copyright would apply. The Service Provider is the Producer, who is the owner of the Intellectual Property and the service receiver is the person who temporarily gets the right to use the Intellectual Property who is the Distributor and service tax is leviable on such temporary transfer of copyright.

66.    Normally, producer of a movie exploits the film in many ways i.e., assigning copyrights to distributor(s) for exhibition in theatres; or the producer himself exhibits the film by engaging the-atres; exploitation of satellite rights, T.V. channels, audio/video, etc. The right given to the distributor is restricted to exploiting the contents of the film through a film/digital format through exhibition in theatres in a specific area and for specified time. Even though the copyright of the film is assigned to a distributor for a specific area for a limited period, the producer reserves his right to exploit the film in other media. So long as the transaction does not amount to sale or permanent transfer, it is only a temporary transfer of copyright or permit its use by another person for a consideration. The Service Provider is the Producer who owns the copyright of the film and Service receiver is the

Distributor who temporarily owns the copyright of the film for consideration.”

In paras 75 & 83 Hon’ble High Court has held as under;

“75. In our opinion, none of these attributes are present in the agreement between the producer and the distributor and the distributor and the theatre owner. Even while the films were in use by the distributor/exhibitor, the same are under the effective control of the producer. The distributor is not free to make use of the same for other works like satellite rights, T.V. Channels, exploitation of song, audio/video, D.V.D. etc., The distributor can-not make use of the film according to his wishes, but there is only temporary transfer or permission to use or enjoyment for consideration as per the terms of the agreement.”

“83. Considering the nature of various arrange-ments between the producer and the distributor, distributor/subdistributor and theatre owner, we are of the view that there is only temporary transfer or permission to use or enjoyment for consideration on certain terms and conditions in a specified area. Irrespective of the arrangement of rights to the distributor to a specific area for a limited period, the producer retains the original copyrights. The sale of goods can be said to have taken place only when the producer relinquishes his right and title over the goods; but when he keeps grip over the goods transferred for temporary use or enjoyment on certain terms and conditions. When the transactions are not sale or deemed sale, the same cannot be brought under Entry 54 of List II or Entry 92A of List I.”

Conclusion

The Hon’ble High Court analysed the nature of transaction of deemed sale in relation to film distribution. It is held that unless there is case of full assignment of the copy right, whereby a producer does not retain with him any right only then can it be liable to VAT. In other words, unless it is a case of permanent assignment of the film as a whole, no liability can be attracted under MVAT Act, 2002. Today in Maharashtra, the VAT authorities are levying VAT on the film distribution agreements, considering the same as transactions of transfer of right to use goods. In light of above judgment, the said levy can be said to be illegal and unjustified. The judgment of the Hon’ble Madras High Court being under Central Enactment, it is binding on authorities in Maharashtra also. As there is no contrary judgment of the jurisdictional High Court, we hope above precedent will be followed.

Whether Outbound Tours Are Taxable Under Service Tax?

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Synopsis The authors in this feature have highlight the scope of the definition “tour operator” for taxability of outbound tours and evaluated the definition in two parts i.e. operating and arranging tours and planning, scheduling, organizing or arranging such tours. The authors analyse how the principles of apportionment are essential to determine the taxability of several operations in the composite transactions which have some operations in one territory and some in others.

Introduction:

The service of tour operators was introduced as a taxing entry in the Finance Act, 1994 (the Act) with effect from 01-09-1997. ‘Tour’ in section 65(113) of the Act is defined as:

“A journey from one place to another irrespective of the distance between such places”.

The definition of tour operator however underwent amendment thrice of which the last two definitions are reproduced below:

10-09-2004 to 15-05-2008: 65(115) “ “tour operator” means any person engaged in the business of planning, scheduling, organising or arranging tours (which may include arrangements for accommodation, sightseeing or other similar services) by any mode of transport, and includes any person engaged in the business of operating tours in a tourist vehicle covered by a permit granted under the Motor Vehicles Act,1988 (59 of 1988) or the rules made thereunder.”

16-05-2008 to 30-06-2012:

65(115) “ “tour operator” means any person engaged in the business of planning, scheduling, organising or arranging tours (which may include arrangements for accommodation, sightseeing or other similar services) by any mode of transport, and includes any person engaged in the business of operating tours in a tourist vehicle or a contract carriage by whatever name called, covered by a permit, other than a stage carriage permit, granted under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988) or the rules made thereunder.”

Taxable service in relation to this service as contained in section 65(105(n) reads as follows: “

“taxable service” means any service provided or to be provided to any person, by a tour operator in relation to a tour.”

Typically in travel and tourism industry, a bouquet of services is provided to a variety of customers. There are different taxing entries in relation to these services viz. air travel agent, tour operator service, travel agent, rail travel agent etc. Tours are often provided by way of a package also. These packages can be broadly classified into domestic tours, inbound tours and outbound tours. Whereas the first two categories do not pose much debate as service tax is by and large paid by the tour operators for these kind of tours; it is the third category of outbound tours requires examination of relevant legal provisions and analysis thereof as in this case, the service provider viz. the tour operator organizes tours outside the territory of India for tourists from India. The tour is entirely performed outside India and on account of this, the disputes arise as to their taxability. Therefore the questions that require determination are:

• Considering the scope of the definition of “tour operator”, whether “outbound tours” are outside the purview of the taxable service as described in section 65(105)(h) of the Act?

• Whether the provisions of the Act have an extra territorial jurisdiction?

• Whether outbound tours amount to export of service? If the payment for the service is not received in convertible foreign exchange, whether the service is liable for service tax?

2013-TIOL-1907-CESTAT-DEL

Recently, in a set of five appeals filed with the Principal Bench, Delhi-CESTAT reported at 2013-TIOL-1907-CESTAT-DEL, Cox & Kings India Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, New Delhi, the Division Bench comprising of President CESTAT and another technical member had an occasion to analyse the above questions, the discussion of which is summarised below:

In addition to the relevant definitions reproduced above, the Hon. Bench took note of the scope of Chapter V of the Finance Act, 1994 (service tax law or the Act) provided in section 64(1), the charging section 66 and section 66A of the Act and provided due consideration to various circulars issued by the Central Board of Excise and Customs (CBEC or the Board) on outbound tours brought on record by the appellants and/or dealt with in the orders-in-original, enumerated below:

• Madurai Commissionerate issued Trade Notice No.110/97 dated 28-08-1997 based on TRU clarification of 22-08-1997 to the effect that outbound tours would not attract service tax and that in case of composite tours combining tours within India and outside India, service tax will be levied only on services rendered for tours within India provided separate billing in such respect is done. It is to be noted here that the service of tour operator was exempted during 18-07-1998 to 31- 03-2000. So, after its reintroduction, TRU issued Circular No.1/2000 on 27/04/2000 clarifying again that outbound tour would remain outside the ambit of service tax liability.

Note: The original circular of 22-08-1997 was withdrawn vide Circular No.93/04/2007 of 10-05-2007 but Circular No.1/2000 of 27-04-2000 continued to remain.

• Board’s Circular No.36/4/2001-ST clarified that levy of service tax extends to the whole of India except Jammu & Kashmir and that the expression ‘India’ includes territorial waters of India (which would extend upto twelve nautical miles) and that Chapter V has not extended the service tax levy to designated areas in continental shelf and exclusive economic zone of India. Therefore services provided beyond territorial waters of India are not liable for service tax as service tax was not extended to such areas so far.

• Commissioner (Service Tax), CBEC vide his letter dated 12-10-2007 addressed to Commissioner of Service Tax, Delhi (in response to the latter’s inquiry) clarified the subject of levy of service tax on outbound tourism that the Board is of the view that tour operator located in India provides services to recipient located in India for planning, scheduling and organizing in relation to outbound tours. Such services would be taxable under the category of tour operator service as both service provider and service receiver are located in India and the service flows within the country. Accordingly, the place of supply of service is India and hence the service is taxable.

• On a somewhat different footing from the above reply dated 12-10-2007, the Board issued Circular No.117/11/2009 in the context of Haj and Umrah on leviability of service tax on tour operator’s service that Haj and Umrah pilgrimage is for service provided by the Government of Saudi Arabia and tour takes place outside India; that as per Rule 3(1)(ii) of the Export of Services Rules, 2005 (Export Rules), tour operator’s services would be treated as performed outside India if they are partly performed outside India and no service tax is chargeable on such tour undertaken outside India considering this as export provided they fulfil other conditions as provided in the said Export Rules.

The adjudicating authority found that in the ordersin- original, the Board’s clarification vide letter of 12-10-2007 (cited above) was not binding. However, the clarification being consistent with the service tax regime, outbound service was taxable from 10-09-2004. Since the service provider and the receiver are located in India, the service is deemed to be delivered to the recipient-tourist in India. Therefore, the condition of Export Rule is factually not fulfilled and thus the tour operator was not entitled to benefit under the Export Rules and consequently invocation of extended period of limitation, penalty, interest etc. also were confirmed.

In the background of the above dispute, the substantive issues that fell for consideration of the Hon. Bench were;

•    The scope of “tour operator” defined in section
65(115) post its amendment from 10-09-2004 and whether the amendment altered the contours of the expression and to what extent.

•    Whether “outbound tours” fall outside the pur-view of taxable service defined in 65(105)(h) of the Act.

The Tribunal’s observations are summarised as follows:

•    Prior to 10-09-2004 and during 01-09-1997 to 31-03-2000 considering the definitions of tour and tour operator (provided above), the taxable activity was a service provided or to be provided to any person by a person who holds a tourist permit granted under the rules made under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (MV Act) for undertaking a journey from one place to another of any distance. During 01-04-2000 and
09-09-2004, the definition of “tour operator” was expanded to mean that operating of tours viz. activities/services of facilitating a journey by any other person from one place to another in a tourist vehicle covered by a permit under the MV Act or rules made thereunder was a taxable service.

•    On further expansion of the definition of tour operator from 10-09-2004, a person engaged in the business of planning, scheduling, organising or arranging tours (which may include arrangement for accommodation, sightseeing or other similar services) by any mode of transport is a taxable service. The amended definition also has an inclusive clause whereby a person engaged in the business of operating tours in a vehicle covered by a permit granted under the MV Act would come within the fold of “tour operator”. Thus, the first part of the definition does not include the business of operating tours by any mode/all modes of transport. If it was included, in view of the Bench, there was no necessity to incorporate the specific inclusionary part or it would amount to a surplusage and attribution of surplusage in legislative drafting must be avoided. Consequently, the only possible interpretation of the definition would be that where a person is engaged in a composite activity of operating tours as well as planning, scheduling, organising or arranging such tours by any mode of transport other than a tourist vehicle, such activity falls outside the scope of the definition of “tour operator”. However, the activity of “planning, scheduling, organizing or arranging tours” including operating tour in a tourist vehicle covered by the permit under the MV Act falls within the ambit of tour operator as a consequence of the inclusionary clause.

•    In the case under examination, the concerned assessees are engaged in a composite activity of both “planning, scheduling, organising or arranging tours” other than by a tourist vehicle (permitted under the MV Act) and in operating such tours as well. The outbound tours whereby Indian tourists are provided services in relation to tourism outside the Indian territory, no part of the journey would be in a tourist vehicle as defined in the law. The commencement and conclusion of the journey is generally by air-transport and besides scheduling the tour package, operating the tour, fixing probable dates and venues, the itinerary, booking accommodation in hotels abroad, travel arrangements for various destinations, sightseeing, boarding, providing guide, air-ticketing, arranging visa, travel insurance etc. clearly constitute operations of tour in addition to planning, scheduling, organising or arranging tours. The nature of the composite services in relation to outbound tours is thus outside the ambit of the definition “tour operator”. The Bench specifically observed that the nature of composite services provided by the concerned assessee in relation to outbound tours fall clearly outside the first facet of the definition; as amended from 10-09-2004.

•    As regards the issue of extra-territorial reach and operation of the Act, the Tribunal’s view point is summarised below:

In All India Federation of Tax Practitioners vs. UOI 2007 (7) STR (SC), it was clarified interalia that service tax is a value added tax and which is a destination based consumption tax in the sense that it is on the commercial activities and not a charge on business but on the consumer and would logically be leviable only on services provided within the country and that performance based services like tour operators provided services outside India. The Tribunal similarly observed that Full Bench of the Delhi High Court in Home Solutions Retails (India) Ltd. vs. Union of India 2011

(24) STR 129 (Del) reiterated the doctrine that service tax is a levy on the event of service. The Tribunal in detail examined the judgment in Commissioner of Income Tax Bombay vs. Ahmedbhai Umarbhai & Co. (1950) SCR-335 as well as the Supreme Court’s observations in Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries Co. Ltd. vs. Director Of Income Tax, Mumbai 2007 (6) STR 3 (SC) and the judgment in a recent case of G. D. Builders vs. UOI & Others 2013-TIOL-908-HC-DEL. It was observed in each of the judgments viz. Ahmedbhai Umarbhai (supra), Ishikawajima-Harima (supra) that it is essential for determining the taxability of several operations to apply the principle of apportionment to composite transactions which have some operations in one territory and some in others.
To bring home this point, the recent judgment in G. D. Builders vs. UOI & Others (supra) was referred to wherein as a corollary of the said position was followed that a composite contract involving labour and deemed sale of goods could be vivisected to levy service tax on the element of service.

Summarising its conclusion, the Hon. Bench held that qua the text and context of the provisions of the Act, it is clear that service tax is a destination based consumption levy. Taxable event in all events, qua the provisions of the Act and specifically the provisions of section 65 is on the provision of taxable service.  Therefore, when a service is provided and consumed outside the territorial locus of the Act, the consideration thereof would not be exigible to the levy of service tax under the substantive and procedural provisions. The final remarks in para 17(m) are reproduced below:
“(m) On the aforesaid analysis we conclude that the consideration received for operating and arranging outbound tours, even if falling within the scope of the amended definition of “tour operator”; (provided by the assessees and consumed by their tourist customers beyond Indian territory), is not liable to levy and collection of service tax, under provisions of the Act. We hold that provisions of the Act do not have an extra territorial operation. The conclusion and analysis on this issue [Issue No. (b)] is without prejudice to our analysis and conclusion on issue No. (a), that since the assessees had provided a composite service, of operating outbound tours apart from engaging in the business of planning, scheduling, organising or arranging such tours; and by a mode of transport other than in a tourist vehicle, the service falls outside the definitional locus of “tour operator” (vide the analysis on Issue (a), at para 17 supra).” [emphasis supplied].

Nevertheless, the Tribunal noted that whether the outbound tour amounts to export of service and is thus immune to levy service tax under the Export Rules is not decided and is left open or not found necessary in the ruling on the core issue.

Conclusion:

The issue is undoubtedly painstakingly dealt with by the Tribunal. Having allowed the assessee’s appeal, it remains to be seen whether the Revenue accepts the same or further litigates the matter. However, the above would be of little help to tour operators in the scenario post July 01, 2012 i.e. negative list based taxation because under the Place of Provision of Services Rules, 2012 (which have been brought in operation in place of Export Rules and Taxation of Services (Provided from Outside India and Received in India) Rules, 2006), tours performed outside India are considered as provided in taxable territory and therefore liable for service tax.

Certificate of Lower deduction or non-deduction of tax at source under section 197 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 – matter regarding. – INSTRUCTION NO 1/2014, Dated: 15th January, 2014 (reproduced)

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All the Chief Commissioners & Directors General of Income Tax, As per the Citizens Charter the time line prescribed for a decision on application for no deduction of tax or deduction of tax at lower rate is one month. Instances have been brought to the notice of the Board, about considerable delay in issuing the lower/ non deduction certificate u/s. 197 by the jurisdictional Assessing Officers.

2. I am directed to say that the commitment to tax payers as per the Citizens Charter must be scrupulously adhered to by the Assessing Officers and all applications for lower or no deduction of tax at source filed u/s. 197 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 must be disposed of within the stipulated time frame as above.

3. This may be brought to the notice of all officers in the field for compliance. 4. Hindi version will follow. F.No.275/03/2014-IT(B)

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No TDS to be deducted on Service tax component – Circular no. 1/2014 dated 13th January 2014

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CBDT has clarified that where as per the terms of contract, service tax is indicated to be charged separately to a resident, TDS would not be deductible on such component of service tax for all items covered under Chapter XVII-B of the Act.

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Clarification on conflicting views of Courts on the issue of disallowability under Section 40(a)(ia) of the Act – CIRCULAR NO.10/ DV/2013 [F.NO.279/MISC./M-61/2012-ITJ(VOL. II)], dated 16-12-2013

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There are conflicting judgments of the High Courts, on the issue of applicability of provisions of section 40(a)(ia) of the Act. Various High Courts have taken divergent views on whether the section applies to amounts payable at the end of the year or also to the payments made during the year. CBDT has issued a circular clarifying the provision of section 40(a) (ia) of the Act would cover not only the amounts which are payable as on 31st March of a previous year but also amounts which are payable at any time during the year. For the purpose of section 40(a) (ia) of the Act, the term “payable” would include “amounts which are paid during the previous year”.

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New forms 49A and 49AA prescribed for allotment of PAN – Income –tax (19th Amendment) Rules, 2013 dated 23rd December 2013

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For Individuals who are citizens of India, HUF, company, firms (including LLPs), AOPs and BOIs formed and registered in India – Form no 49A has been prescribed and Form 49AA is prescribed for others. Specific requirements have been spelled out for each category in these Rules for documents to be considered as proof of identity, address and date of birth/incorporation.

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CBDT issues Instructions to Assessing Officers advising them to follow the Circular issues on section 10A, 10AA and 10B – Instruction No. 17/2013 (F.NO.178/84/2012-ITA.I) dated 19-11-2013 (reproduced)

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A clarificatory Circular No. 01/2013, dated 17-01-2013 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Circular’) was issued by CBDT to address various contentious issues leading to tax disputes in cases of entities engaged in export of computer software which are availing tax-benefits u/s. 10A, 10AA and 10B of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

2. Instances have been reported where the Assessing Officers are not following the clarifications so issued and are taking a divergent view even in cases where the clarifications are directly applicable.

3. The undersigned is directed to convey that the field authorities are advised to follow the contents of Circular in letter and spirit. It is also advised that further appeals should not be filed in cases where orders were passed prior to issue of Circular but the issues giving rise to the disputes have been clarified by the Circular.

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ITO vs. Haresh Chand Agarwal (HUF) ITAT Agra Bench Before A. Mohan Alankamony (AM) and Kul Bharat (JM) ITA No. 282/Agra/2013 A.Y.: 2004-05. Decided on: 20th December, 2013. Counsel for revenue/assessee: K. K. Mishra/ Deependra Mohan.

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S/s. 50C, 147 – Failure to apply provisions of section 50C does not lead to escapement of income. Section 50C is not final determination to prove that it is a case of escapement of income.

Facts:
While assessing the total income of the assessee the Assessing Officer (AO) lost sight of the provisions of section 50C of the Act and computed long term capital gains, arising on transfer of property, by adopting agreement value of Rs. 6 lakh to be the sale consideration. The stamp duty value of this property was Rs. 25,89,000.

Subsequently, the AO recorded reasons and reopened the assessment on the ground that income has escaped assessment. In reassessment proceedings, the AO rejected the contentions of the assessee that the property was rented and since the assessee was in need of funds he had to sell the property to its tenants. The AO adopted the stamp duty value to be full value of consideration. He also did not accept cost of construction declared by the assessee at Rs. 6,42,558 for computation of capital gains.

Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal to CIT(A) where it challenged the reopening and also the additions on merits. The CIT(A) held that reopening was bad in law since it was based on change of opinion as the AO did not have any tangible material in his possession except the sale deed which has already been produced before the AO at the stage of original assessment proceedings.

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal. Held: The Tribunal after considering the ratio of the various decisions of the Apex Court and the High Courts held that it is clear that AO is not justified in reopening the assessment on mere change of opinion. It is admitted fact that there is no material available with the AO to form his opinion that income has escaped assessment. All material evidences were available at the stage of original assessment proceedings and the AO merely following the provisions of section 50C, as was not considered in the original assessment proceedings, reopened the assessment. The assessee has disclosed all the facts which were known all along to the Revenue. Section 50C is not final determination to prove that it is a case of escapement of income. The report of approved valuer may give estimated figure on the basis of facts of each case. Therefore, on mere applicability of section 50C would not disclose any escapement of income in the facts and circumstances of the case. The AO at the original assessment stage considered all the documents and material produced before him and has accepted the cost of property as was declared by the assessee. Therefore, on mere change of opinion, the AO was not justified in reopening the assessment. The CIT(A) on proper appreciation of facts and law correctly quashed the reassessment proceedings.

The appeal filed by the revenue was dismissed.

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Business expenditure: Disallowance u/s. 14A: Where assessee did not earn any exempt income in the relevant year the provisions of section 14A are not applicable and disallowance u/s. 14A could not be made:

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CIT vs. M/s. Shivam Motors (P) Ltd.(All); ITA No. 88 of 2014 dated 05-05-2014: A. Y. 2008-09):

Held:
In the absence of dividend (i.e., exempt income) the provisions of section 14A of the Act is not applicable and accordingly, there can be no disallowance u/s. 14A of the Act.

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Search and seizure – Block assessment – Assessment of third person – For the purpose of section 158BD of the Act a satisfaction note is sine qua non and must be prepared by the assessing officer before he transmits the records to the other assessing officer who has jurisdiction over such other person. The satisfaction note could be prepared at either of the following stages: (a) at the time of or along with the initiation of proceedings against the searched person u/s. 158BC of the Act;

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CIT vs. Calcutta Knitwears
(2014) 362 ITR 673 (SC)

A search operation u/s. 132 of the Act was carried out in two premises of the Bhatia Group, namely, M/s. Swastik Trading Company and M/s. Kavita International Company on 05-02-2003 and certain incriminating documents pertaining to the respondent assessee firm engaged in manufacturing hosiery goods in the name and style of M/s. Calcutta Knitwears were traced in the said search.

After completion of the investigation by the investigating agency and handing over of the documents to the assessing authority, the assessing authority had completed the block assessments in the case of Bhatia Group. Since certain other documents did not pertain to the person searched u/s. 132 of the Act, the assessing authority thought it fit to transmit those documents, which according to him, pertain to the “undisclosed income” on account of investment element and profit element of the assessee firm and require to be assessed u/s. 158BC read with section 158BD of the Act to another assessing authority in whose jurisdiction the assessments could be completed. In doing so, the assessing authority had recorded his satisfaction note dated 15-07-2005.

The jurisdictional assessing authority for the respondentassessee had issued the show cause notice u/s. 158BD for the block period 01-04-1996 to 05-02-2003, dated 10- 02-2006 to the assessee inter alia directing the assessee to show cause as to why should the proceedings u/s. 158BC not be completed. After receipt of the said notice, the assessee firm had filed its return u/s. 158BD for the said block period declaring its total income as Nil and further filed its reply to the said notice challenging the validity of the said notice u/s. 158BD, dated 08-03-2006. The assessee had taken the stand that the notice issued to the assessee is (a) in violation of the provisions of section 158BD as the conditions precedent have not been complied with by the assessing officer and (b) beyond the period of limitation as provided for u/s. 158BE read with section 158BD and therefore, no action could be initiated against the assessee and accordingly, requested the assessing officer to drop the proceedings.

The assessing authority, after due consideration of the reply filed to the show cause notice, had rejected the aforesaid stand of the assessee and assessed the undisclosed income as Rs. 21,76,916/- (Rs.16,05,744/- (unexplained investment) and Rs. 5,71,172/- (profit element)) by order dated 08-02-2008. The assessing officer was of the view that section 158BE of the Act did not provide for any limitation for issuance of notice and completion of the assessment proceedings u/s.158BD of the Act and therefore a notice could be issued even after completion of the proceedings of the searched person u/s. 158BC of the Act.

Disturbed by the orders passed by the assessing officer, the assessee firm had carried the matter in appeal before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeal- II) (for short ‘the CIT(A)’. The CIT(A), while rejecting the stand of the assessee in respect of validity of notice issued u/s. 158BD, had partly allowed the appeal filed by the assessee firm and deleted the additions made by the assessing officer in its assessments, by his order dated 27-08-2008.

The Revenue had carried the matter further by filing appeal before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal (for short ‘the Tribunal’) and the assessee has filed cross objections therein. The Tribunal, after hearing the parties to the lis, had rejected the appeal of the Revenue and observed that recording of satisfaction by the assessing officer as contemplated u/s. 158BD was on a date subsequent to the framing of assessment u/s. 158BC in case of the searched person, that is, beyond the period prescribed u/s. 158BE(1)(b) and thereby the notice issued u/s. 158BD was belated and consequently the assumption of jurisdiction by the assessing authority in the impugned block assessment would be invalid.

Aggrieved by the order so passed by the Tribunal, the Revenue had carried the matter in appeal u/s. 260A of the Act before the High Court. The High Court, by its impugned judgment and order dated 20-07-2010, had rejected the Revenue’s appeal and confirmed the order passed by the Tribunal.

On appeal, the Supreme Court observed that section 158BD of the Act is a machinery provision and inserted in the statute book for the purpose of carrying out assessments of a person other than the searched person u/s. 132 or 132A of the Act. U/s. 158BD of the Act, if an officer is satisfied that there exists any undisclosed income which may belong to a other person other than the searched person u/s. 132 or 132A of the Act, after recording such satisfaction, may transmit the records/ documents/chits/papers etc., to the assessing officer having jurisdiction over such other person. After receipt of the aforesaid satisfaction and upon examination of the said other documents relating to such other person, the jurisdictional assessing officer may proceed to issue a notice for the purpose of completion of the assessments u/s. 158BD of the Act, the other provisions of XIV-B shall apply.

The opening words of section 158BD of the Act are that the assessing officer must be satisfied that “undisclosed income” belongs to any other person other than the person with respect to whom a search was made u/s.132 of the Act or a requisition of books were made u/s. 132A of the Act and thereafter, transmit the records for assessment of such other person. Therefore, according to the Supreme Court the short question that fell for its consideration and decision was at what stage of the proceedings should the satisfaction note be prepared by the assessing officer: Whether at the time of initiating proceedings u/s. 158BC for the completion of the assessments of the searched person u/s. 132 and 132A of the Act or during the course of the assessment proceedings u/s. 158BC of the Act or after completion of the proceedings u/s. 158BC of the Act.

The Supreme Court noted that the Tribunal and the High Court were of the opinion that it could only be prepared by the assessing officer during the course of the assessment proceedings u/s. 158BC of the Act and not after the completion of the said proceedings. The Courts below had relied upon the limitation period provided in section 158BE(2)(b) of the Act in respect of the assessment proceedings initiated u/s. 158BD, i.e., two years from the end of the month in which the notice under Chapter XIV-B was served on such other person in respect of search initiated or books of account or other documents or any assets are requisitioned on or after 01-01-1997.

The Supreme Court held that before initiating proceedings u/s. 158BD of the Act, the assessing officer who has initiated proceedings for completion of the assessments u/s. 158BC of the Act should be satisfied that there is an undisclosed income which has been traced out when a person was searched u/s. 132 or the books of accounts were requisitioned u/s. 132A of the Act. U/s. 158BD the existence of cogent and demonstrative material is germane to the assessing officers’ satisfaction in concluding that the seized documents belong to a person other than the searched person is necessary for initiation of action u/s. 158BD. The bare reading of the provision indicated that the satisfaction note could be prepared by the assessing officer either at the time of initiating proceedings for completion of assessment of a searched person u/s. 158BC of the Act or during the stage of the assessment proceedings. According to the Supreme  Court,  it  did not mean that after completion of the assessment, the assessing officer could not prepare the satisfaction note to the effect that there exists income belonging to any person other than the searched person in respect of whom a search was made u/s. 132 or requisition of books of accounts were made u/s. 132A of the Act. The language of the provision is clear and unambiguous. The legislature has not imposed any embargo on the assessing officer in respect of the stage of proceedings during which the satisfaction is to be reached and recorded in respect of the person other than the searched person.

Further, section 158BE(2)(b) only provides for the period of limitation for completion of block assessment u/s. 158BD in case of the person other than the searched person as two years from the end of the month in which the notice under this Chapter was served on such other person in respect of search carried on after 01-01-1997. According to the Supreme Court, the said section does neither provides for nor imposes any restrictions or conditions on the period of limitation for preparation of the satisfaction note u/s. 158BD and consequent issuance of notice to the other person.

In the result, the Supreme Court held that for the purpose of section 158BD of the Act a satisfaction note is sine qua non and must be prepared by the assessing officer before he transmits the records to the other assessing officer who has jurisdiction over such other person. The satisfaction note could be prepared at either of the following stages: (a) at the time of or along with the initiation of proceedings against the searched person u/s. 158BC of the Act; (b) along with the assessment proceedings u/s. 158BC of the Act; and (c) immediately after the assessment proceedings are completed u/s. 158BC of the Act of the searched person.

‘Additional Depreciation’ where assets used for less than 180 days

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Issue for Consideration
An assessee, in addition to the claim of the depreciation, is entitled to a claim of depreciation u/s. 32(1)(iia) (‘additional depreciation’), on purchase of new plant and machinery and installation thereof, at the rate of 20% of the actual cost of such plant and machinery that is used by the assessee in his business of manufacture or production of articles or things.

Under the second proviso to section 32(1), the depreciation allowed to an assessee is reduced to 50% of the depreciation otherwise allowable, in cases where the asset is put to use for less than 180 days in a year.

Depreciation remaining to be absorbed is carried forward to the following year and is allowed to be set off against the income of such year in accordance with the provisions of section 32(2) of the Income-tax Act.

An interesting issue has arisen, in the context of the above provisions, specifically for additional depreciation, in cases where the new plant and machinery is used for less than 180 days. The issue is about whether, in the circumstances narrated above, an assessee has the right to set off the balance 50% of additional depreciation in the year subsequent to the year of purchase and installation of new plant and machinery. While the Delhi, Mumbai and Cochin benches of tribunal have held that the balance additional depreciation can be set-off in the subsequent year, the Chennai bench of tribunal has taken a contrary view, leading us to take notice of this controversy.

Cosmo Films Ltd .’s case
The issue first came up for consideration in the case of DCIT vs. Cosmo Films Ltd., 13 ITR(T) 340 (Delhi), involving the disallowance of arrears of additional depreciation of Rs. 3,34,78,825 and negating an alternate claim for deduction of additional depreciation for assessment year 2004-05.

The assessee company had purchased new plant and machinery during the financial year 2002-03 which were eligible for additional depreciation. They were put to use in that year for less than 182 days. The company had claimed additional depreciation at 50% of the total additional depreciation for assessment year 20003-04 and the balance 50% for the assessment year 2004-05. The claim of the company was disallowed by the AO for assessment year 2004-05 and his action was confirmed by the Commissioner(Appeals).

In the appeal to the Tribunal, the assessee reiterated that, as per the provisions of section 32(1)(iia), the assessee was entitled for a further sum of depreciation equal to 15% of the actual cost of new plant and machinery acquired during the year and installed; that the assessee had been granted a statutory right by provisions of section 32(1) (iia) to claim a further sum equal to 15% of the actual cost in the year of acquisition; that it had claimed additional depreciation during the year which pertained to the additions to the fixed assets during the preceding previous year; the said additions were made during the second half of the financial year 2002-03 relevant to Assessment Year 2003-04 and the additional depreciation was claimed only for 50% of the eligible additional depreciation otherwise available on all the additions made after 30th September, 2002 on account of the second proviso to section 32(1) (ii). Hence, the same was being claimed during the assessment year 2004-05 as it was the balance of the additional depreciation.

The company further explained that the expression “shall be allowed” made it clear that the assessee was entitled to claim an overall deduction equivalent to 15 % of the actual cost of the said additions to the plant and machinery. It contended that the second proviso to section 32(1)(ii) restricted the allowance to 50% in cases where the assets were used for less than 180 days based on the period of usage and such a restriction could not have abrogated the statutory right provided to the assessee by section 32 (1)(iia). It claimed that nowhere in the Act it was prohibited that remaining balance of additional depreciation on the assets added after 30th September, should not be allowed and the second proviso to section 32(1)(ii) could not overlook the one time allowance, which was a statutory right earned in the year of acquisition; had there been intention to restrict the one time allowance to 50%, then it could have been provided in the proviso to clause (iia), as provided in respect of the second hand machines and those used in office, etc. or in respect of office appliances or road transport vehicles.

It was pointed out that the scope of the additional depreciation u/s. 32(1)(iia) introduced by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2002 w.e.f. 01-04-2003 was explained by Circular No. 8 of 2002 dated 27-08-2002 reported in 258 ITR (St.) 13 as being ‘a deduction of a further sum’ as depreciation. Therefore what was proposed to be allowed was depreciation simplicitor though it was called as additional depreciation. Therefore, any balance of the amount of additional sum of depreciation was to be considered to be available for being carried forward and set off in terms of s/s. (2) of section 32 of the Act which provided that where, in the assessment of the assessee, full effect could not be given to any allowance u/s/s. (1) of section 32 in any previous year, then the allowance should be added to the amount of allowance for depreciation for the following previous year and deemed to be part of that allowance, or if there was no such allowance for that previous year, then it would be deemed to be the allowance for that previous year, and so on for the succeeding previous year.

The company, relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bajaj Tempo Ltd. vs. CIT 196 ITR 188, claimed that a provision for promoting economic growth had to be interpreted liberally and that additional depreciation, being an incentive provision, had to be construed so as to advance the objective of the provision and not to frustrate it. The additional depreciation as provided in Clause (iia) of s/s. (1) of section 32 was a one time benefit whereas the normal depreciation was a year to year feature.;If the benefit was restricted only to 50% then it would be against the basic intention to provide incentive for encouraging industrialisation, which would be unfair, unequitable and unjust. There was no restriction provided in law which restricted the carry forward of the additional sum of depreciation which was a one time affair available to assessee on the new machinery and plant. It was also pleaded that what was expressly granted as an incentive could not be denied through a pejorative interpretation of second proviso to section 32(1)(ii), when such provision by itself did not bar consideration of the balance u/s. 32(2) of the Income-tax Act. Alternatively, it was pleaded that the provisions of section 32(1)(iia) did not stipulate any condition of put to use. Therefore, full deduction was allowable in the year of purchase itself and had to be allowed in full in the assessment year 2003-04, itself.

In reply, the Revenue submitted that the full additional depreciation could be allowed as per section 32(1) (iia) only when the assets were put to use for more than 180 days in the year of acquisition; that the additional depreciation on the assets which were put to use by the assessee for less than 180 days was restricted to 50% of the amount by the second proviso to section 32(1)(ii); that there could not be any carried forward additional depreciation to be allowed in subsequent year; and that compliance of the condition to put to use, in the year of claim, was necessary for allowing any type of depreciation.
On hearing both the sides the tribunal observed and held as under;

•    Additional depreciation was introduced for promoting investment in industrial sector.

•    The intention was clarified by the Finance Minister, the Memorandum explaining the provisions and the Circular explaining the amendments.

•    The provision contained in section 32(1)(iia) wherever desired had placed restriction on the allowance of additional depreciation.

•    The said provision did not contain any restriction on allowance of the unabsorbed additional depreciation in the subsequent year.

•    The intention was not to deny the benefit to the assesses who had acquired or installed new machinery or plant. The second proviso to section 32(1)(ii) restricted the allowance only to 50% where the assets had been acquired and put to use for a period less than 180 days in the year of acquisition which restriction was only on the basis of period of use. There was no restriction that balance of one time incentive in the form of additional sum of depreciation should not be available in the subsequent year.

•    Section 32(2) provided for a carry forward and set off of unabsorbed depreciation. The additional benefit in the form of additional allowance u/s. 32 (1)(iia) was a one time benefit to encourage industrialisation and in view of the decision in the case of Bajaj Tempo Ltd. (supra), the provisions related to it had to be constructed reasonably, liberally and purposively to make the provision meaningful while granting the additional allowance.

•    The assessee deserved to get the benefit in full when there was no restriction in the statute to deny the benefit of balance of 50% when the new plant and machinery were acquired and used for less than 180 days.

•    One time benefit extended to assessee had been earned in the year of acquisition of new plant and machinery. It has been calculated at 15% but restricted to 50% only on account of period of usage of these plant and machinery in the year of acquisition.

•    The expression “shall be allowed” confirmed that the assessee had earned the benefit as soon as he had purchased the new plant and machinery in full but was restricted to 50% in that particular year on account of period of usage. Such restriction could not divest the statutory right.

•    The extra depreciation allowable u/s. 32(1)(iia) was an extra incentive which had been earned and calculated in the year of acquisition but restricted for that year to 50% on account of usage. The incentive so earned must be made available in the subsequent year.

BRAKES INDIA LTD.’S CASE

The issue had again come up for consideration before the Chennai Tribunal in the case of Brakes India Ltd. DCIT(LTU), 144 ITD 0403.

In this case, the assessee company contested the disallowance of additional depreciation of Rs. 4,91,39,749 by the AO and confirmed by the Commissioner (Appeals), which was the balance of its claim carried forward from the preceding assessment year. The company had claimed additional depreciation for machinery newly added by it during the preceding assessment year 2006-

7.    Since the machinery were used for a period less than 180 days in the preceding assessment year, the assessee had to restrict its claim to 50% of the normal rate of additional depreciation allowed under the Act. However, for the subsequent assessment year 2007-08, the company claimed carry forward of the balance 50% of the additional depreciation. The AO was of the opinion that additional depreciation could be allowed only for new assets added during the year and since the claim of the assessee related to additions to assets made in the preceding assessment year, it could not be allowed. In other words, as per Assessing Officer, residual additional depreciation from earlier year could not be allowed for carry forward to a subsequent year. The Commissioner (Appeals) confirmed the action of the AO following the decision of the tribunal for the preceding assessment year in the company’s own case, wherein the Tribunal had confirmed the disallowance of such a claim.

In appeal before the Tribunal, the company supported its claim on several grounds on the lines of the contentions raised by it before the tribunal for assessment year 2006-07 (copy of unreported decision not available) besides contending that section 32(1 )(iia) was amended with effect from 01-04-2006. and under the amended provision, the only condition for the claim was installation of the asset on which additional depreciation was claimed and that such additional depreciation was statutorily allowable, once assets were installed.

The Tribunal noted and held as under;

•    The first requirement for being eligible for a claim of additional depreciation was that the claim should be for a new machinery or plant. A machinery was new only when it was first put to use. Once it was used, it was no longer a new machinery.

•    Admittedly, the machinery, on which carry forward additional depreciation had been claimed, was already used in the preceding assessment year, though for a period of less than 180 days.

•    Therefore, for the impugned assessment year, it was no more a new machinery or plant. Once it was not a new machinery or plant, allowance u/s. 32(1 ) (iia) could not be allowed to it.

•    Additional depreciation itself was only for a new machinery or plant. Carry forward of any deficit of additional depreciation which, as per the assessee, arose on account of use for a period of less than 180 days in the preceding year, if allowed, would not be an allowance for a new machinery or plant.

•    A look at the second proviso to section 32(1)(iia) clearly showed that it restricted a claim of depreciation to 50% of the amount otherwise allowable, when assets were put to use for a period of less than 180 days, irrespective of whether such claim was for normal depreciation or additional depreciation.

•    The intention of the Legislature was to give such additional depreciation for the year in which assets were put to use and not for any succeeding year.

•    There was nothing in the statute which allowed carry forward of such depreciation. There could not be any presumption that unless it was specifically denied, carry forward had to be allowed. What could be carried forward and set off had been specifically mentioned in the Act.

•    The Tribunal in the assessee’s own case in I.T.A. No. 1069/Mds/2010 dated 6th January, 2012, at para 15, held as under:-

“15. We have considered the rival submissions. A perusal of the provisions of section 32 as applicable for the relevant assessment year clearly shows that additional depreciation is allowable on the plant and machinery only for the year in which the capacity expansion has taken place, which has resulted in the substantial increase in the installed capacity. In the assessee’s case, this took place in the assessment year 2005-06 and the assessee has also claimed the additional depreciation during that year and the same has also been allowed. Each assessment year is separate and independent assessment year. The provisions of section 32 of the Act do not provide for carry forward of the residual additional depreciation, if any. In the circumstances, the finding of the learned CIT(A) on this issue is on a right footing and does not call for any interference. Consequently, ground No.1 of the assessee’s appeal stands dismissed.”

The tribunal upheld the orders of the AO and the Commissioner (Appeals) and held that the Commissioner (Appeals) was justified in following the view taken by co-ordinate Bench of the Tribunal for the preceding assessment year.

OBSERVATIONS

Section 32(1)(iia) was inserted by Finance (No. 2) Act, 2002 with effect from 01-04-2003. The Finance Minister, in his budget speech, stated that the provision for additional depreciation was introduced to provide incentives for fresh investment in industrial sector and that the clause was intended to give impetus to new investment in setting up a new industrial unit or for cases where the installed capacity of existing units is expanded by at least 25%. The section provided, initially, for additional depreciation at the rate of fifteen percent in respect of the new plant and machinery acquired and installed after 31st March, 2002. These provisions were substituted by the Finance (No. 2) Act of 2004 w.e.f. 01-04-2005 and in its present addition provides for additional depreciation at the rate of twenty percent in respect of the new plant and machinery acquired and installed after 31st March, 2005 by an assessee engaged in the business of manufacture or production of any article or thing. The benefit of additional depreciation is not allowed in respect of the second hand assets, assets installed in office or residence or guest-house, ship, aircraft, vehicles, etc.

The view that an assessee is entitled to claim the deduction for the balance additional depreciation in the succeeding year has been upheld by the Cochin Tribunal in the case of Apollo Tyres Ltd., 45 taxmann.com 337, the Mumbai Tribunal in the case of MITC Rolling Mills (P) Ltd., ITA No. 2789/M/2012 dated 13.05.2013 and again by the Delhi Tribunal in the case of SIL Investments, 54 SOT 54. The Chennai bench of the Tribunal however held that the claim for additional depreciation was not allowable every year but only in the year of the installation of the new asset, CRI Pumps, 58 SOT 154. It is therefore clear that but for the lone decision of the Chennai bench in Brakes India Ltd’s case, the overwhelming view is in favour of the allowance of the balance depreciation in the subsequent years.

The original provision for grant of additional depreciation, operating during the period 01-04-2003 to 31-03-2005, contained a very specific provision in the form of first Proviso, to allow a deduction in a previous year in which the new industrial undertaking began to manufacture or produce any article or thing. A specific reference was therefore made to the previous year in which the deduction was allowed. Significantly, under the new provision, no such restriction based on the year is retained, and this again confirms that the new provision effective from A.Y 2006-07, has no limitation concerning the year or years of claim.

The controversy boils down to insignificance when the Revenue realises that the assessee in no case, over a period of life of the asset, can claim a deduction on account of the depreciation as well as the additional depreciation higher than the actual cost of the asset. It perhaps needs to appreciate that there is no loss of revenue at all over a period of time, confirming the fact that the attempts of the Revenue are misdirected when it is contesting the claim of the assessee for the allowance of the balance additional depreciation.

It is true that Clause (iia) of section 32(1) does not contain any restriction or prohibition for claiming the balance additional depreciation in the subsequent year. At the same time, it is also true that the said clause does not expressly provide for such a claim. There neither is an enabling provision nor a disabling provision. In the circumstances a view favourable to the assessee is preferable, more so when the proviso to the said Clause lists several exclusions, and none of them limit the right of an assessee to claim additional deprecation in full nor deny the right of carry forward of the balance amount.

The provision admittedly has been directed towards encouraging industrialisation by allowing additional benefit for acquisition and installation of new plant and machinery. The incentive is aimed to boost new investments in preferred direction. A construction which frustrates the basic purpose of the provision should be avoided in preference of a pragmatic view.

The Finance Minister in his budget speech and the Finance Bill in the Memorandum and the CBDT in its Circular have amplified that the grant of additional depreciation is for incentivising the promotion of capital goods industry. In the circumstances, it is in the fitness of the scheme that the Revenue Department rises to supplement the intentions of the legislature, instead of frustrating the same. It is a settled position in law that an incentive provision should be liberally construed in favour of grant of the deduction. (see Bajaj Tempo Ltd., 196 ITR 188 (SC)). Even otherwise, an interpretation favourable to the assessee should be adopted in cases where two views are possible, Vegetable Products Ltd. 88 ITR 192 (SC), and for the case under consideration, surely two views are possible, as is confirmed by the conflicting decisions of the tribunal on the subject.

In our opinion, the issue under consideration has moved in a narrow compass and in the process, the larger controversy has remained to be addressed, which is, whether there ever was a need to restrict the claim of additional deprecation to 50%, of the eligible amount under the second proviso, in cases where the new asset in question was used for less than 180 days. Had this aspect been addressed by the concerned parties, the understanding of the issue on hand would have been more clear.

Our understanding of the larger issue is as under:

•    The claim for regular depreciation is made possible vide clauses (i) and (ii) of s/s. (1) of section 32 of the Act.
•    The quantum of regular depreciation, so allowed, has been circumscribed to 50% of the deprecation, otherwise allowable, by virtue of the second proviso to the said provision contained in clauses (i) and (ii) of s/s. (1) of section 32 of the Act.

•    The claim for additional depreciation is allowed under a separate Clause namely, Clause (iia) of section 32(1) of the Act, which Clause is otherwise independent of clauses (i) and (ii) above, though it does refer to clause (iia), and therefore, the claim for additional depreciation is independent of the said restrictive second proviso that has application only to the regular depreciation claim made under the said Clauses (i) and (ii).

•    The limitation contained in the said second proviso to Clauses (i) and (ii) should have no application to clause (iia) while claiming additional depreciation.

•    Clause(iia) operates in an altogether different field than that of Clauses (i) and (ii).

•    The claim for additional deprecation therefore shall be allowed in full in the first year itself, irrespective of the number of days of use and should be set off against the income of the year and importantly, to the extent not so set-off, should be carried forward to the subsequent year for being set off against the income for the succeeding year as per the provisions of s/s. (2) of section 32 of the Act.

In our respectful opinion, the additional depreciation is investment based, while the regular depreciation is period based and both are unrelated to each other. For a valid claim of additional depreciation, it is sufficient to establish that new assets are acquired and installed, and once that is proved, the claim has not to be restricted on account of use of such asset for a period of less than 180 days. The additional depreciation, in full, should be allowed, where possible, in the first year itself, and the balance, where remaining to be absorbed, should be carried forward to the succeeding year and should be allowed to be set off against the income of that year.

Future of India –Youth’s perspective

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It gives me great pleasure to place in your hands this special issue of the journal. With this issue I have completed one year as the editor of this prestigious publication. Over the past few years, as a part of its Founding Day celebrations, the Society releases a special issue which, apart from the regular features, contains contributions from authors on a specific topic.

As an editor, I felt that it would be appropriate to explain the thought process behind selection of the topic for this special issue. India has just witnessed an election and a consequent change in the government. The people of this country believe that with new government in the saddle, their dreams will be fulfilled. There is a virtually universal acceptance of the fact that the youth have been the greatest contributors to installing the new government in power.

While everyone accepts that the youth are responsible for the change, are they being given their due? In the media, whether it be print or electronic, one finds that wise men with grey hair (I belong to that community) are expounding their ideas on how the country should be run and what actions one needs to take. Speakers and authors never forget to mention that all that they have suggested is necessary to make this country to be a better place to live in for its youth. The question is do the goals of those in power, the drivers of the government and the economy match with those of the young citizens of this country? Is there a goal synchronisation? I felt that rather than preaching to the next generation as to what was appropriate for them, it would be wiser to hear their aspirations and read about their dreams.

Apart from this factor, I think it is time that we seriously lend our ears to what the new generation has to say. This generation is born in the era of globalisation. They do not carry the ‘burden of a glorious past.’ I am saying this because one often finds at various fora, speakers reminding the audience of what we have achieved in the past. What is lost sight of is, while no one denies the history, the youth are living in the present and their eyes are filled with dreams for the future. It is important that we understand their expectations and also how they believe these can be met. Whenever one talks of finding solutions to the problems that face the country, one tends to look at what actions have been taken in the past and rely on precedent. I think that there needs to be a major shift in approach. The world is no longer linear and the past track record is of limited value to what the future holds in store. As Stephen Covey, a management guru, has said, “One cannot walk into the future looking over ones shoulder. If one does so one is sure to stumble.”The Society has been, in the past year, led by an enthusiastic President, Naushad Panjwani. One of his endeavours was to encourage participation of younger professionals in the affairs of the Society. We felt that this special issue contributed by young professionals would be a fitting finale to his term.

If this country is to change for the better, the drivers will be India’s youth. We professionals have a great role to play. We should be playing the role of catalysts of change. We, therefore, requested professionals to contribute to the special issue and to express their thoughts on how they felt what India would be a decade from now, how they looked at their own profession, and what they felt that needed to change in this country. In keeping with the traditions of the journal, we merely indicated our intent and gave a total free hand to these under 35 professionals to speak their mind. Two chartered accountants, Mahesh Nayak and Pranav Vaidya; two advocates, Ms. Nazneen Ichhaporia and Mr. Sameer Pandit; a doctor, Dr. Parth Mehta, and an architect, Ms. Priya Vakil, have contributed to this issue. I am grateful to all of them for having spared their valuable time.

I hope the readers will find the issue interesting.

levitra

The Jailor

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A prisoner was sentenced to 100 lashes every day for a robbery he committed. As the jailor rose to beat him up, he shouted, “Who the hell are you to beat me? I didn’t rob anything from you. Bring the man whom I robbed and he has the right to beat me up.”

What would be the fate of the robber’s plea? Would the jailor not punish him? Certainly not. In fact, in all probability, he would get angry and beat him more.

But then, there is a point in the prisoner’s argument. Who gave the right to the jailor to beat the prisoner? Morally, the person whom the prisoner robbed should have the right to beat him up. But in the real world things do not happen like that.

So the moot question is – “Who gave the right to the jailor to beat the prisoner?” The answer in the story is simple – The Court. The Court decided on who the criminal was and the gave the jailor the right to punish him.

So can the prisoner question the jailor? No. It would not help him and on the contrary, he may be in more trouble for questioning the jailor. What is the solution then? The only solution is to be calm and quiet and let the jailor do his duty. Perhaps repeatedly beating him up and observing the silence of the prisoner, someday, the jailor may think, he seems innocent and he may stop the sentence. Perhaps he may not.

The above short story is all about our life. We are the prisoners. There is a system somewhere – HIS COURT and HE sends the jailor in our life in one form or the other. Everyone who gives pain to us in life is the jailor. We might not have done anything wrong with them, but still they give us pain. Because they have been sent by the system to punish us. We must have done something wrong to someone and HIS COURT has sent some jailor to give us pain. We have to silently bear the pain. We do not have the right to question – why is he giving pain or what wrong did we commit? We must have done somewhere something wrong, that the jailor was sent to us.

The one who ignores us, the one who abuses us, the one who takes away our wealth, the one who cheats us – are all jailors. We may wonder – this was the person whom I helped a lot, but he is cheating us now… but he is just a jailor.

Everything in life is predetermined and everything happens for good. Be calm and observe the beauty of life. See a jailor in everyone who illtreats you, and you will observe a tremendous feeling of peace. Stop making calculations in life, more so for money. We will get what we deserve and what we do not truly deserve, some jailor will come and take away. Have the satisfaction of helping someone-don’t even seek ‘thank you.’ It has been rightly said:

‘Thy right is to work only,
Never to its fruits,
Let fruits not be the motive of your action,
Let there be no attachment to results.
*( Based on the book ‘ The Jailor’ by Acharya Vijay
Abhayshekhar Suri)

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Interest expenditure: Section 57(iii): Money borrowed for investing in shares in company owning immovable property: Dividend not received: Interest not disallowable on ground that investment was not made for purpose of earning dividend:

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Sri Saytasai Properties and Investment P. Ltd. vs. CIT; 361 ITR 641 (Cal):

The assessee borrowed money for investment in shares of a company P owning an immovable property the value of which was much higher than the book value. The assessee had not received dividend. The assessee’s claim for deduction of interest on borrowed funds u/s. 57(iii) of the Income-tax Act, was disallowed by the Assessing Officer on the ground that the investment could not be said to have been made for earning dividend. The Tribunal upheld the disallowance.

On appeal by the assessee, the Calcutta High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) Even though the language of section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, is a little wider than that of section 57(iii), that cannot make any difference in the true interpretation of section 57(iii). The language of section 57(iii) is clear and unambiguous and it has to be construed according to its plain natural meaning and merely because a slightly wider phraseology is employed in another section which may take in something more, it does not mean that section 57(iii) should be given a narrow and constricted meaning not warranted by the language of the section and, in fact, contrary to such language.

ii) There was no reason why a proper expenditure should have been disallowed only because the investment was not made for the purpose of earning dividend. There is no finding that the investment was made otherwise than for the purpose of making an income. The Tribunal and the Assessing Officer were wrong in disallowing the expenditure.”

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Housing project: Deduction u/s. 80-IB(10): A. Y. 2007-08: Amendment w.e.f. 01/04/2005 requiring certificate of completion of project within four years of approval: Not applicable to projects approved prior to that date: Assessee entitled to deduction:

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CIT vs. CHD Developers Ltd.; 362 ITR 177 (Del):

The assessee, a real estate developer obtained approval for a housing project on 16-03-2005 from the Development Authority. It completed the project in 2008 and by a letter dated 05-11-2008 applied to the Competent Authority for the issue of the completion certificate. The assessee’s claim for deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) was denied inter alia, on the ground that the completion certificate was not obtained within the period of four years as prescribed by the Finance Act, 2004 w.e.f. 01-04-2005. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim for deduction accepting the assessee’s claim that, since the approval was granted to the assessee 16-03-2005 i.e., prior to 01-04-2005, the assessee was not expected to fulfill the conditions which were not on the statute when such approval was granted to the assessee.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The approval for the project was given by the Development Authority on 16-03-2005. Clearly, the approval related to the period prior to the amendment, which insisted on the issuance of the completion certificate by the end of the four year period, was brought into force. The application of such stringent conditions, which are left to an independent body such as the local authority who is to issue the completion certificate, would have led to not only hardship but absurdity.

ii) As a consequence, the Tribunal was not, therefore, in error of law while holding in favour of the assessee.”

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CBDT Circular: Binding on Revenue: S/s. 119 and 143(2): A. Y. 2004-05: Circular prescribing time limit of three months from date of filing of return for issuing notice u/s. 143(2): Return filed on 29-10-2004: Notice u/s. 143(2) issued on 14-07-2005: Not valid

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Amal Kumar Ghosh vs. ACIT; 361 ITR 458 (Cal):

For the A. Y. 2004-05, the assessee had filed return of income on 29-10-2004. The Assessing Officer issued the notice u/s. 143(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on 14-07-2005. The assessee claimed that the notice u/s. 143(2) was not valid since it has been issued beyond the period of three months of date of filing of the return as prescribed by the CBDT Circulars Nos. 9 and 10. The Tribunal rejected the assessee’s contention and dismissed the appeal filed by the assessee. The Tribunal accepted the contention of the Revenue that the Assessing Officer was competent to issue notice u/s. 143(2) after the expiry of period of three months from the date of filing of the return.

In the appeal by the asessee before the High Court, the Revenue contended that such a notice u/s. 143(2) could have been issued within 12 months from the date of filing of the return and, therefore, the notice was well within time. The Calcutta High Court allowed the assessee’s appeal, reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) Even assuming that the intention of the CBDT was to restrict the time for selection of the cases for scrutiny to a period of three months, it could not be said that the selection in the case of the assessee was made within the period. The return was filed on 29-10-2004, and the case was selected for scrutiny on 06-07-2005. By any process of reasoning, it was not open to the Tribunal to come to the finding that the Department acted within the four corners of Circular No.s 9 and 10 issued by the CBDT. The Circulars were evidently violated. The Circulars were binding upon the Department u/s. 119.

 ii) Even assuming that the circulars were not meant for the purpose of permitting unscrupulous assessees from evading tax, it could not be said that the Department, which is the State, can be permitted to selectively apply the standards set by itself for its own conduct. When the Department has set down a standard for itself, the Department is bound by that standard and cannot act with discrimination. If it does that, the act of the Department is bound to be struck down under Article 14 of the Constitution. In the facts of the case, it was not necessary to decide whether the intention of the CBDT was to restrict the period of issuance of the notice from the date of filing of the return laid down u/s. 143(2).

 iii) Thus, the notice u/s. 143(2) was not in legal exercise of jurisdiction.”

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Charitable trust: Exemption u/s. 11 : A. Y. 2009-10: Where assessee-trust, failing to use 85 % of income from property, wrote letter conveying department for option available under Clause (2) of Explanation to section 11(1) to allow it to spend surplus amount to next year, no disallowance was to be made merely on ground that declaration was not made in a prescribed manner:

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CIT vs. Industrial Extension Bureau; [2014] 43 taxmann. com 392 (Guj)

The assessee, a registered public charitable trust, being unable to utilise income from property to extent of 85 % wrote a letter conveying department to exercise option available under Clause (2) of Explanation to section 11(1) for allowing accumulation of income. The Assessing Officer added to the income of assessee on ground that for claiming exemption the assessee had to give declaration in the prescribed form which was not done by the assessee. While exercising option a mistake was committed by the assessee, as the amount was wrongly mentioned to a lower figure, but later on the same was rectified. On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) allowed only that part which was declared by the assessee in original letter before due date and disallowed remaining revised amount by observing that the revision option was not exercised within due date. On cross appeals, the Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim and deleted entire amount on ground that the mistake was bona fide and the requirement of exercising option within prescribed time was only directory in nature.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) U/s. 11, a charitable trust unable to utilise its income derived from property held under trust wholly for charitable or religious purposes to the extent of 85 % would have an option either in terms of clause (2) of Explanation to s/s. (1) thereof, or as provided u/s/s. (2). When such an option is covered u/s/s. (2) i.e., the income is sought to be accumulated or set apart for the period prescribed, that the requirement of making a declaration in the prescribed manner arises. In case of an option under Clause (2) of Explanation to s/s. (1), there is no such requirement of making declaration but the requirement is exercising of such option in writing before the expiry of the time allowed u/s/s. (1) of section 139 for furnishing the return of income.

 ii) In the present case, the assessee did exercise such option as is apparent from the letter dated 22-09-2009. In such letter, the assessee conveyed to the department that the assessee gave a notice of option exercised by the trust to allow to spend surplus amount of Rs. 59,17,600 that may remain at the end of the previous year ended on 31-03-2009, during the immediately following the previous year, i.e., 2009-10. In the caption, the assessee referred to as the subject-notice of option exercised as required under Clause (2) of Explanation to section 11(1). These things are thus abundantly clear – firstly, that such option was exercised before last date of filing the return, which was 30-09-2009 and secondly, that such option was exercised in terms of clause (2) of Explanation to section 11(1). That was clearly not an option u/s/s. (2) of section 11. The caption of the said communication dated 22-09–00- as well as the contents of the letter make this clear. If that be so, the assessee cannot be precluded from pursuing such option on the ground as was done by the Assessing Officer that no declaration in the prescribed form was made. As we have noticed that such declaration was required only if the assessee’s option was to be covered by the provision of section 11(2).

 iii) It is true that in such option exercised on 22/09/2009, the assessee indicated a smaller figure of Rs. 57,17,600 and it was only later that the same was corrected to Rs. 1,05,67,047. However, the Tribunal has taken note of facts on record namely that the option in fact was exercised within the time permitted under the statute. It was a bona fide error to indicate a wrong figure. The intention to avail carry over of the un-spend income to the next year was clear.

iv) The requirement of exercising an option within the time permitted under Clause (2) of Explanation to section 11(1) is directory and not mandatory. Substantial compliance thereof would therefore be sufficient.

v) Even otherwise, without going to the extent of holding such time limit as directory and not mandatory, in the facts of the present case, the Tribunal committed no error in granting the benefit to the assessee for the entire amount since it was a mere oversight or bona fide error in not indicating the correct and full amount for the option under clause (2) of Explanation to section 11(1).”

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Business expenditure: Disallowance: TDS: Commission/trade discount: S/s. 40(a)(ia) and 194H: A. Y. 2005-06: Assessee in business of manufacture and trade of pharmaceutical products: Incentive to dealers, distributors, stockists under different schemes: Not commission: Section 194H not applicable: Disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) not proper:

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CIT vs. Intervet India Pvt. Ltd. (Bom); ITA No. 1616 of 2011 dated 01/04/2014:

The assessee was engaged in the business of manufacture and trading of pharmaceutical products. The assessee gave incentives to its distributors/dealers/ stockists under different schemes. In the relevant year, i.e. A. Y. 2005-06, the incentive so given of Rs. 70,67,089/- was disallowed by the Assessing Officer u/s. 40(a)(ia) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, treating the same as commission, on the ground that the assessee has not deducted tax at source u/s. 194H of the Act. CIT(A) and the Tribunal deleted the addition holding that the payment was not commission and the provisions of sections 194H and 40(a)(ia) were not applicable.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The assessee had undertaken sales promotion scheme viz., product discount scheme and product campaign under which the assessee had offered an incentive on case to case basis to its stockists/ dealers/agents. An amount of Rs. 70,67,089/- was claimed as deduction towards expenditure incurred under the said sales promotional scheme. The relationship between the assessee and the distributors/ stockists was that of principle to principle and in fact the distributors were the customers of the assessee to whom the sales were effected either directly or through the consignment agent. As the distributors/ stockists were the persons to whom the product was sold, no services were offered to the assessee and what was offered to the distributor was a discount under the product distribution scheme or product campaign scheme to buy the assessee’s products.

ii) The distributors/stockists were not acting on behalf of the assessee and that most of the credit was by way of goods on meeting the sales target, and hence, it could not be said to be a commission payment within the meaning of Explanation (i) to section 194H of the Act. The contention of the Revenue in regard to the application of Explanation (i) below section 194H being applicable to all categories of sales expenditure cannot be accepted. Such reading of Explanation (i) below section 194H would amount to reading the said provision in abstract. The application of the provision is required to be considered to the relevant facts of every case.

iii) We are satisfied that in the facts of the present case that as regards sales promotional expenditure in question, the provisions of Explanation (i) below section 194H of the Act are rightly held to be not applicable as the benefit which is availed by the dealers/ stockists of the assessee is appropriately held to be not a payment of any commission in the concurrent findings as recorded by the CIT(A) and the Tribunal.

iv) We do not find that the appeal gives rise to any substantial question of law. It is accordingly dismissed.”

II. REPORTED:

1. Business Expenditure: Disallowance: Ss. 40(a)(ia), 40A(3) and 194C(2): A. Ys. 2005-06 and 2009-10: ONGC acquiring lands from farmers and others: Land losers forming society for enabling to survive by way of alternate means of plying vehicles on rent to the ONGC: Society receiving amounts from ONGC and distributing to farmers/members: Payments not expended by society and would not come within the meaning of expenditure either u/s. 40(a)(ia) or section 40A(3): No disallowance can be made: ITO vs. Ankleshwar Taluka ONGC and Land Loser Travellers Co-operative Society; A. Y. 2005-06; 362 ITR 87 (Guj): CIT vs. Ankleshwar Taluka ONGC and Land Loser Travellers Co-operative Society; A. Y. 2009-10; 362 ITR 92 (Guj):

ONGC acquired lands in a particular area from farmers and other persons. Land losers formed the assessee society to enable them to earn a source of livelihood by means of plying vehicles on rent to ONGC. The assessee society received the amounts from ONGC on behalf of the members and distributed the same amongst the members. ONGC deducted the tax at source on such payment to the assessee society.

A. Y. 2005-06:

 In the A. Y. 2005-06, the assessee society received Rs. 2,57,62,253 and distributed the same to the members. The Assessing Officer was of the view that the society was a sub-contractor and that it ought to have deducted tax at source on payments made to each of the farmers u/s. 194C(2) and disallowed the whole of the amount of Rs. 2,57,62,253/- u/s. 40(a)(ia) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. He made a further addition of Rs. 51,47,250/- being 20% of the said amount by way of disallowance u/s. 40A(3) on the ground that the said amount was paid to the members in cash. The Commissioner (Appeals) deleted the addition. He held that there was no element of works contract in terms of the provisions of section 194C in the activities performed by the society and, accordingly, set aside the disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia). He also held that there was no case for disallowance u/s. 40A(3) as no expenditure was incurred by the society in distributing the rentals to the members. The Tribunal concurred with the findings of the Commissioner (Appeals) and dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue.

In appeal before the High Court, the Revenue raised the question of disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) but did not raise the question of disallowance u/s. 40A(3) of the Act. The Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) In the light of the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Tribunal upon appreciation of evidence on record, the reasoning adopted by the Tribunal was just and reasonable.

 ii) Thus, it was not possible to state that there was any infirmity in the order of the Tribunal so as to give rise to any question of law, much less, a substantial question of law so as to warrant interference.” A. Y. 2009-10: In this year, the assessee society had received an amount of Rs. 3.79 crore from ONGC and the same was distributed by the assessee society to its members. The Assessing Officer made an addition of 20% of the said amount by way of disallowance u/s. 40A(3) of the Act, on the ground that the assessee had paid these amounts to its members in cash. The Tribunal deleted the addition.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“The view of the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal that the payments were not expended by the assessee and that, therefore, would not come within the meaning of expenditure (be it based on section 40(a)(ia) or section 40A(3) of the Act) was to be confirmed.”

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Income from property held for charitable or religious purposes – A charitable and religious trust which does not benefit any specific religious community would not be covered by section 13(1)(b) of the Act and would be eligible to claim exemption u/s. 11 of the Act.

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The respondent, a registered Public Trust under the M. P. Public Trusts Act, 1951, filed an application for registration before the Commissioner of Income Tax (for short, “the Commissioner”) as envisaged u/s. 12A read with section 12AA of the Act for availing the exemption u/s. 11 of the Act. The Commissioner, after affording an opportunity of hearing to the applicant, came to the conclusion that the respondent was a charitable trust but since the object and purpose of the trust was confined only to a particular religious community the same would attract the provisions of section 13(1)(b) of the Act and therefore, declined the prayer made for registration of the trust by his order dated 14-09-2007.

Aggrieved by the order so passed, the respondent carried the matter by way of an appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal after going through the objects of the respondent-trust came to the conclusion that the respondent was a public religious trust as the objects of the trust were wholly religious in nature and thus, the provisions of section 13(1)(b) which are otherwise applicable, in the case of the charitable trust would not be applicable and therefore, held that the respondent-trust was entitled to claim registration u/se. 12A and 12AA and accordingly, allowed the appeal and set aside the order passed by the Commissioner and further directed the Commissioner of Income-tax to grant registration u/s. 12A read with section 12AA of the Act to all the applicant-trust.

Aggrieved by the aforesaid decision passed by the Tribunal, the Revenue approached the High Court u/s. 260-A of the Act. The court primarily, was of the view that the decision of the Tribunal was rendered purely on the factual matrix of the case and therefore, it would be improper to disturb the finding of fact so arrived by the Tribunal. Secondly, the court observed that the provisions of section 13(1)(b) would not be applicable to the respondent-trust as the trust was not created or established for the benefit of any particular religious community or caste. Consequently, the court has dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue by judgment and order dated 22-06-2009.

Disturbed by the aforesaid ruling, the Revenue approached the Supreme Court.

According to the Supreme Court, the determination of the nature of trust as wholly religious or wholly charitable or both charitable and religious under the Act was not a question of fact. It was a question which required examination of legal effects of the proven facts and documents, that is, the legal implication of the objects of the respondent-trust as contained in the trust deed. It is only the objects of a trust as declared in the trust deed which would govern its right of exemption u/s. 11 or 12. It is the analysis of these objects in the backdrop of fiscal jurisprudence which would illuminate the purpose behind the creation or establishment of the trust for either religious or charitable or both religious and charitable purpose. The Supreme Court therefore held that the High Court had erred in refusing to interfere with the observations of the Tribunal in respect of the character of the trust.

Having said so, the Supreme Court proceeded to examine the question, whether the Courts below were justified in coming to the conclusion that the respondent-trust was a public religious trust and therefore, outside the purview of section 13(1) (b) and eligible for exemption u/s. 11 of the Act.

The Supreme Court noted that the Tribunal had analysed the objects of the trust in the light of the holy scriptures and the Quran and recorded its satisfaction as follows: “16… The objects of the assessee-trust reproduced above clearly refer to the religion and are supported by reference made to different pages of Holy Quran. The learned Counsel for the assessee referred to the true copies of several pages of Holy Quran written by two of the authors referred to above in which giving of food in days of hunger or orphan is considered as highly religious ceremony. Reference is also made that who will give to the people or poor then Allah will give them in return and, i.e., who will give loan then Allah will give double to them. Likewise, for helping the needy people for religious activities and to carry out religious activities or spend for good, spending wealth in the way of Allah, bestowing mercy, teaching were considered to be highly religious activities. On going through several true pages of Holy Quran written by the authors referred to above, we are satisfied that the learned Counsel for the assessee was justified in contending that all the objects of the assesee-trust are solely religious in nature because each of them refers to religious occasions, religious education or to religious activities. The learned Counsel for the assessee also explained that the words ‘Shariat-e- Mohammadiyah’ means the path shown by prophet Mohammed. Therefore, the objects of Shariat-e- Mohammadiyah are identical with those of ‘Dawate- Hadiyah’. For Dawoodi Bohras, true path shown by the prophet is the one indicated and shown by their living guide Dai-al-Mutlaq of the time who is the living and visible guide for Dawoodi Bohras. It is an undisputed fact that for the people believing in Islam, writings in Quran are words of Allah for them. The directions given in the Holy Quran are considered by the people of Islamic faith as orders from Allah and the people of Islamic faith obey such orders as holy and religious. The learned Counsel for the assessee has been able to demonstrate that all the objects of the assessee-trust, as noted above, came out from the writings in Quran and as such these are the orders for them while observing Islamic faith.”

The Supreme Court observed that unquestionably, objects (c) and (f) which provide for the activities completely religious in nature and restricted to the specific community of the respondent-trust are objects with religious purpose only. However, in respect to the other objects, in our view the fact that the said objects trace their source to the Holy Quran and resolve to abide by the path of godliness shown by Allah would not be sufficient to conclude that the entire purpose and activities of the trust would be purely religious in colour. The objects reflects the intent of the trust as observance of the tenets of Islam, but do not restrict the activities of the trust to religious obligations only and for the benefit of the members of the community. The Privy Council in Re The Tribune, 7 ITR 415 has held that in judging whether a certain purpose is of public benefit or not, the Courts must in general apply the standards of customary law and common opinion amongst the community to which the parties interested belong to. Therefore, it is pertinent to analyse whether the customary law would restrict the charitable disposition of the intended activities in the objects.
The provision of food to the public on religious days of the community as per object (a) and (b), the establishment of Madrasa and organisations for dissemination  of  religious  education  under object
(d) and rendering assistance to the needy and poor for religious activities under object (e) would reflect the essence of charity. The objects (a) and
(b)    provide for arrangement for nyaz and majlis (lunch and dinner) on the religious occasion  of  the birth anniversary and Urs Mubarak of Awliya-e- Quiram (SA) and the Saints of the Dawoodji Bohra community and for arrangement of lunch and din- ner on religious occasions and auspicious days of the Dawoodi Bohra community, respectively. Nyaz refers to the food a person makes and offers to others on any particular occasion on the occasion of the death of a saint and Majhlis implies a place  of gathering or meeting. The activity of providing for food on certain specific occasions and other religious and auspicious events of the Dawoodi Bohra community do not restrict the benefit  to  the members of the community. Neither the religious tenets nor the objects as expressed limit  the service of food on the said occasions only to the members of the specific community. Thus, the activity of Nyaz performed by the respondent-trust does not delineate a separate class but  extends the benefit of free service  of  food  to  the  public at large irrespective of their religious, caste or sect and thereby qualifies as a charitable purpose which would entail general public utility.

Further, the establishment of the Madrasa or institutions to impart religious education to the masses would qualify as a charitable purpose qualifying under the head of education under the provisions of  section  2(15)  of  the  Act.  The  institutions  established  to  spread  religious  awareness  by  means of  education  though  established  to  promote  and further religious thought could not be restricted to religious  purposes.  The  House  of  Lords  in  Barralet vs.  IR,  54  TC  446,  has  observed  that  “the  study and  dissemination  of  ethical  principles  and  the cultivation  of  rational  religious  sentiment”  would fall  in  the  category  of  educational  purposes.  The Madrasa  as  a  Mohommedan  institution  of  teaching  does  not  confine  instruction  to  only  dissipation  of  religious  teachings  but  also  contributes  to the  holistic  education  of  an  individual.  Therefore, it  cannot  be  said  the  object  (d)  would  embody a  restrictive  purpose  of  religious  activities  only. Similarly, assistance by the respondent-trust to the needy  and  poor  for  religious  activities  would  not divest  the  trust  of  its  altruistic  character.

Therefore, the objects of  the  trust,  according to the Supreme Court, exhibited dual tenor of religious and charitable purposes and activities. Section 11 of the Act shelters such trust with composite objects to claim  exemption  from  tax  as a religious and charitable trust subject to pro- visions of section 13. The activities of the trust under such object would therefore be entitled to exemption accordingly.

According to the Supreme Court, the second issue which arose for its consideration and decision was, whether the respondent-trust was a charitable and religious trust only for the purposes of a particular community and therefore, not eligible for exemption u/s. 11 of the Act in view of provisions of section 13(1)(b) of the Act.

The Supreme Court held that in the present case, the objects of the respondent-trust  were  based  on religious tenets under the Quran according to the religious faith of Islam. As already  noticed,  the perusal of the objects and purposes of the respondent-trust clearly demonstrated that the activities of the trust though both charitable and religious were not exclusively meant for a particular religious community. The objects, as explained in the preceding paragraphs, did not channel the benefits to any community if not the Dawoodi Bohra Community and thus, would not fall under the provisions of section 13(1)(b) of the Act.

In that view of the matter, the Supreme Court  held that the respondent-trust was a charitable and religious trust which did not benefit any specific religious community and therefore, it  could  not  be held that section 13(1)(b) of the Act would be attracted to the respondent-trust and thereby, it would be eligible to claim  exemption  u/s.  11  of  the Act.

Year of Taxability of Interest on Refund of Tax

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Synopsis

Section 244A of the Income Tax Act,
entitles an assessee to receive interest on amount of refund of tax due
to him. For an assessee, following the mercantile system of accounting,
the issue arises on the year of accrual of such interest and taxability
thereon.

 The issue being whether such interest is accrued in each year
and hence to be taxed by spreading it over the number of years for which
it is granted or should it be taxed in the year in which it is granted.
This issue had been a subject matter of adjudication before various
courts. Here, the author has analysed various judicial pronouncements in
this regard.

Issue for Consideration:

An assessee is entitled to
receive simple interest, on the amount of refund of tax that becomes due
to him, at the specified rate, for the period commencing from the date
of payment of tax to the date on which the refund is granted, as per the
provisions of section 244A of the Income-tax Act.

Such interest is
usually chargeable to tax under the head “Income From Other Sources” and
is computed in accordance with the method of accounting regularly
employed by the assessee. This interest is taxed in the year of receipt,
in case of an assessee following the cash system of accounting, and in
case of an assessee following the mercantile system of accounting, is
taxed in the year of the accrual of such interest.

The period for which
such interest is granted usually exceeds 12 months. The quantum of
interest also varies in many cases on passing of orders from time to
time, subsequent to the intimation or the first order, ranging from
assessment orders to appellate orders. Again, in many cases, the
assessees are forced to pay taxes towards demands raised in pursuance of
orders that finally do not stand the scrutiny of the appellate
authorities. In all these cases, barring a few cases, the assessee
receives interest only on the final settlement of the disputes
concerning computation of the total income by the highest appellate
authority.

The issue that arises, for consideration, in all such cases
of receipt of interest, is about the year or years of taxation of such
interest, for the period exceeding 12 months, in the hands of the
assessees following the mercantile system of accounting. The issue in a
nutshell is about ascertaining the year of accrual of such interest.
Does such interest, under the mercantile system, accrue from year to
year from the date of payment of tax till the date of the receipt of
such interest or does it accrue only when the refund is ordered by an
authority and interest thereon is granted to the assessee? In the first
case, the interest so received is taxable in more than 1 year, on the
understanding that the interest accrues on a daily basis and is taxable
in more than 1 assessment year while in the later case, it is taxed only
in the year of the passing of an order grating interest.

 The courts
have been asked to adjudicate as to whether such interest accrued form
year to year and is therefore to be taxed by spreading it over the
number of years for which it is granted or should it be taxed in the
year in which it is granted. Recently, the Andhra Pradesh High Court has
held that such interest accrued from year to year and for taxation, it
should be spread over the number of years for which interest is granted
dissenting from the decisions of the Kerala, Orissa and Allahabad High
Court.

Smt. K. Devayani Amma’s case

The issue of years of accrual of
interest on refund, granted u/s. 244, was examined by the Kerala High
Court in the case of Smt. K. Devayani Amma vs. DCIT, 328 ITR 10. In that
case, the Court was asked, by the assessee, to decide whether the
Tribunal was justified in holding that interest received by the assessee
on refund was assessable in the assessment year in which such interest
was granted. In that case, the Assessing Officer granted an amount of
interest of Rs. 2,87,537, u/s. 244, on refund of tax computed in
pursuance of the order passed to give effect to an appellate order for
A.Y. 1983-84, that was decided in favour of the assessee. The order of
refund was passed in the previous year relevant to A.Y. 1994-95 and the
refund together with interest was also received in the said year. The
Assessing Officer taxed the entire interest of Rs. 2,87,537 in the A.Y.
1994-95, by treating such interest as the income of A.Y. 1994-95, on the
ground that interest had accrued during that year.

The assessee
however, contested the liability for tax on the entire interest in one
assessment year on the ground that the interest in question accrued from
year to year, from the date of payment of excess tax till the date of
refund. The contention of the assessee was upheld by the CIT(A), but the
Tribunal agreed with the Assessing Officer by holding that the said
interest accrued in A.Y. 1994-95, only, following the decisions in the
case of CIT vs. Sri Popsingh Rice Mill, 212 ITR 385 (Orissa) and J.K.
Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. vs. Addl. CIT, 104 ITR 695 (All.). The
assessee, in the appeal before the High Court, contended that interest
income was assessable on a year to year basis, spread over the period
commencing from the year in which the tax was paid and ending with the
year in which it was refunded together with interest thereon, by relying
on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Rama Bai vs. CIT,
181 ITR 400.

In reply, the standing counsel for the Income-tax
Department submitted that the interest income accrued only on passing of
the order for granting refund. He also submitted that the decision in
Rama Bai’s case (supra) was delivered in respect of an interest received
under the Land Acquisition Act and was not relevant for determining the
year of taxation of interest received under the Income-tax Act. He also
pointed out that the decision in the case of Sri Popsingh Rice Mill
(supra), delivered by the Orissa High Court, had followed the subsequent
decision of the Supreme Court in preference to its decision in Rama
Bai’s case to hold that the interest was taxable in the year of grant
thereon.

The Kerala High Court noted that the decision in Rama Bai’s
case(supra) concerned itself with taxation of interest under the Land
Acquisition Act and was not binding for deciding an issue of taxation of
interest, granted under the Income-tax Act and that the issue therefore
was required to be considered in light of the statutory provisionsof
the Income-tax Act. The court also observed that the law declared by the
Supreme Court was neutralised by the amendments in section 145A(b) and
section 56(viii) by the Finance (no.2) Act, 2009 concerning the year of
taxation of interest received on compensation or enhanced compensation
for compulsory acquisition .

The Kerala High Court found that the
assessee’s eligibility for interest arose only when the effect was given
to the appellate order and till such time the assessee was not entitled
to any refund at all; that the right to interest on refund arose only
when the refund was ordered in favour of the assessee. Accordingly, in
view of the Court, interest accrued only when the assessee was found to
be eligible for refund of the excess tax, based on the revision of the
assessment order. The Court took notice of the fact that not only the
interest was granted during A.Y. 1994-95, but was also paid during the
said assessment year. The assessee’s appeal was dismissed and the order
of the Tribunal was confirmed by the Court by holding that interest on
refund of tax accrued in the year of passing the order granting refund .

M. Jaffersaheb (Decd.)’s case
The  issue  once  again  arose  recently,   before  the Andhra  Pradesh  High  Court,  in  the  case  of  Shri  M. Jaffer  Saheb  (Decd.)  vs.  CIT,  43  taxmann.com,123. The facts in this case were that for the assessment year 1982-1983, an assessment was completed with substantial additions resulting into a huge demand for  payment  of  taxes.  The  assessee  paid  the  de- manded  tax  and  thereafter  availed  the  appellate remedies and in that process the appellate tribunal finally passed an order granting substantial relief to the assessee on 16-06-1989. The AO gave effect to the  order  of  the  Tribunal  by  an  order  dated  18-09- 1989, refunding the excess amount paid along with interest of Rs. 79,950/- for the period 30-10-1985 to 31-08-1989  which  was  received  thereafter.  The  AO brought  to  the  tax  the  amount  of  interest  in  the assessment year 1990-1991, ignoring the claim of the assessee  to  spread  over  the  said  amount  for  the assessment  years  starting  with  assessment  orders 1985-1986 to 1988-1989. The Appellate Commissioner allowed the claim of the assessee and directed that the  interest,  other  than  the  part  pertaining  to  the assessment year 1990-91, be taxed in the preceding previous years. The Tribunal, on further appeal by the Revenue, reversed the order of the Appellate Commissioner and restored the assessment order passed by the A.O.

At the instance of the assessee, the following two questions of law for the assessment year 1990-1991 were referred to the Andhra Pradesh High Court :

1)    “Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, is the Appellate Tribunal correct in law in holding that interest U/S.244(1A) of the Income-tax Act on the refund due accrues on the date when the Appellate Tribunal passed order and did not accrue on any day anterior to the date of the Tribunal order?”

2)    “Whether on the facts and in the circumstances  of the case, the Appellate Tribunal is correct in law;  in refusing to accept the contention of the applicant that interest on the refund accrued from the previous year relevant to the assessment year 1982-1983 and interest is chargeable to tax in the respective years for which interest is paid?”

The   assessee  submitted  before  the  High  Court that  he  was  entitled  to  the  refund  from  the  date of  payment  of  the  tax  till  the  date  of  granting  of the  refund  and  that  such  interest  accrued  on  day to  day  basis  on  the  excess  amount  paid.  He  submitted  that  the  entitlement  of  the  interest  was  a right conferred by the statute that did not depend on  the  order  for  the  refund  being  made  which was  only  consequential  and  in  law  was  required to  be  made  more  in  the  nature  of  complying  with the  procedural  requirement,  but  his  right  to  claim interest was a statutory right conferred by the Act and  in  that  view  of  the  matter,  it  was  but  fair  to spread the interest amount in the respective years in issue. He relied on the judgment of the Calcutta High Court in the case of   CIT vs. Hindustan Motors Ltd.,   202  ITR   839     for  the  proposition  that  “Accrual  of  interest  takes  place  normally  on  day  to  day basis. Where there is no due date fixed for payment of  interest,  interest  accrues  on  the  last  day  of  the previous  year.  Accrual  of  interest  does  not  depend upon making up of the accounts.” He also relied on the  judgment  of  the  Kerala  High Court  in  the  case of  Peter  John  vs.  CIT,  157  ITR   711  (Ker)(FB)  for  the proposition  that  “Interest  is  separate  from  refund. Interest whether statutory or contractual represents profit  the  creditor  might  have  made  if  he  had  used that money or loss he suffered because he had not that use. It is something in addition to the refund (capital amount) though it arises out of it.” He also relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court  in the case of Ramabai vs. CIT, 181 ITR 401 (SC).

On  the  other  hand,  the  Income-tax  Department submitted  that  the  right  to  claim  interest  by  the assessee was dependent on an orders being passed u/s. 240 and section 244 of the Income-tax Act and in that view of the matter, the right to claim interest  accrued  to  the  assessee  only  on  the  date  of consequential  order  passed  pursuant  to  the  order of the Appellate Authority and as such, the interest income was assessable in the assessment year 1990- 1991.  Reliance was placed on the judgments of the Orissa, Kerala and Allahabad High Courts in the cases of Commissioner of Income-Tax vs. Sri Popsingh Rice Mill,  212 ITR 385 (Orissa), Smt. K. Devayani Amma vs. Deputy Commissioner of Income-Tax and Another 328 ITR 10 (Ker),)and J.K. Spinning and Weaving Mills Co., vs. Additional Commissioner of Income-Tax, Kanpur104 ITR 695  (Allahabad).

The  Andhra  Pradesh  High  Court  examined  the provisions  of  sections  237,  240,  244  and  244A  for ascertaining the statutory position relating to grant of refund and interest thereon. A close scrutiny of the sections 237 and 240, revealed to the Court  that the statutory right was conferred on the assessee to get refund of the excess tax paid and such refund was made available to the asssessee even without his  having  to  make  any  claim  in  that  behalf   in  as much  as  section  244A  of  the  Act  entitled  the  assessee  to  get  interest  on  the  refund  amount  and such  interest  was  payable  from  the  date  of  payment  of  tax  or  payment  of  penalty  from  the  date till  refund was granted.

It  was  clear  to  the  High  Court,  from  the  statutory provisions as applicable to the relevant assessment years, that there was no requirement of the assessee for making a claim either for refund or for interest. As a matter of fact, the Court noticed that sections 243 and 244, were made inapplicable in respect of any assessment for the assessment year commenc- ing on the first day of April, 1989 or any subsequent assessment years.

On a detailed analysis of the decisions of the various Courts in the cases of   Rama Bai vs. CIT, 181 ITR 401 (SC),  CIT  vs.  Sankari  Manickyamma  105  ITR  172  (AP).

Mrs. Khorshed Shapoor Chinai vs. ACED 90 ITR 47 (AP), CIT vs. Govindarajulu Chetty (T.N.K.) 165 ITR 231 (SC),T.N.K.  Govindarajulu  Chetty  vs.  CIT  87  ITR  22  (Mad.), CIT vs.Dr. Sham Lal Narula, 84 ITR 625 (P&H), and CIT, Mysore vs. V.Sampangiramaiah, 69 ITR 159 (Kar), the court  significantly  noted  that   the  principle  which could be culled out was that once the income had legally  accrued  to  the  assessee,  i.e.,  the  assessee had  acquired  a  right  to  receive  the  same,  though its valuation might   be postponed to a future date, the determination or quantification of the amount did  not  postpone  the  accrual.  In  other  words,  if the right had legally accrued to the assessee, then the right should be deemed to have accrued in the relevant  year,  even  though  the  dispute  as  to  the right  was  settled  in  the  later  year,  by  the  one  or the  other  of  the  authorities in the  hierarchy.

The Andhra Pradesh High Court expressly dissented with the decision of the Kerala High Court in the case of Smt. K. Devayani Amma (supra) by observing that;

•    though the Kerala High Court, in the said judge- ment, referred the case of Rama Bai (supra), there was no discussion about the principles that were approved in the judgment of the Supreme Court;

•    though the provisions of sections 240 and 244(1A) of the Act were referred to, the Kerala High Court held that interest on refund arose only on passing an order in favour of the assessee;

•    the eligibility of interest u/s. 244(1A) of the Act arose on an order of revision of assessment passed pursuant to the appellate order which led to grant of refund of excess tax paid by the assessee;

•    the reading of sections 237, 240 and 244(1A) cast a duty on the AO to charge that much of tax which the assessee was liable to pay and mandated the refund of the excess amount along with interest;

•    the hierarchy of appeals provided were only to ensure that the tax authorities adhere to strict rules of taxation and the statutory provisions. Even the final order that might be passed by the higher authority in the hierarchy of authorities provided under statue was also an order of assessment only for the simple reason that the final order passed was nothing but a correction of the original assessment order, which was erroneous.

•    the opinion expressed by the Kerala High Court that interest u/s. 244(1A) of the Act accrued to the assessee only, when it was granted to the assessee along with the refund order issued u/s. 240 of the Act was not correct, especially,   in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court as quoted in the judgment of the Madras High Court in T. N. K. Govindarajulu Chetty’s case (supra).

•    The court was unable to accept the judgment of Kerala High Court reported in K. Devayani Amma’s case (supra) on the issue.

The  judgment  of  the  Allahabad  High  Court  in  J.K. Spinning  and  Weaving  Mills  Co.  (supra)  was  found to  be  distinguishable  and  not  applicable  in  view of  the  variance  in  the  statutory  scheme  contained in  the  provisions  contained  in  Indian  Income-tax Act,  1922,  with  the  statutory  scheme  under  the Income-tax Act, 1961 and the Allahabad High Court had  taken  into  consideration  that  interest became payable to the assessee only when the assessments for  the  years  in  dispute  were  made  which  were  in fact  made  in  1956,  though  the  assessments  were 1951-1952 and  1952-1953.

The Andhra Pradesh High Court was  unable to agree with  the  reasoning  of  the  judgment  of  the  Orissa High Court in Sri Popsingh Rice Mill case (supra), as the  question  considered  by  the  Orissa  High  Court was in relation to section 244 of the Act and not in relation  to  section  244A  of  the  Act  and  the  Orissa High  Court  had  failed  to  notice  the  judgments  of the  Supreme  Court  and  instead  relied  on  three judgments  which  were  not  dealing  with  interest. Likewise, the other two judgments referred to in the said   judgment also were found to be not relevant for  the  purpose of  deciding the  issue.

The court accordingly answered the questions referred to it in favour of the assessee and against the revenue by holding that the interest on refund accrued from year to year and was not to be taxed in the year of the order granting refund.

Observations
An assessee, following the mercantile system of accounting, is taxed on his income, including interest income, in the year in which the income accrues or arises. An income, in ordinary circumstances, is said to have been accrued on vesting of a legal right to receive such income irrespective of whether it is received or not. Such accrual, based on a right to receive, is independent of the order of any Court  or an authority passed for confirming such right to receive, for the reason that such right to receive arises to a person on the basis of the terms of the agreement or the statutory provisions of any law.

It is an accepted position in law that interest accrues from day to day, in case of a person maintaining books of account and accrues on yearly basis   in case of a person not maintaining the books of account. In both the cases, the interest income is spread over number of years and is taxed on year to year basis.

The Supreme Court in E.D. Sassoon Company Ltd. vs. CIT, 26 ITR 51, observed that the computation of the profits,  whenever  it  may  take  place,  cannot  possi- bly be allowed to suspend its   accrual. The accrual happens  irrespective  of  the   quantification  of  the profits, and is not always linked to computation. For attracting the charge of taxation, what has however got to be determined is whether the income, profits or  gains  accrued  to  the  assessee;  before  it  can  be said  to  have  accrued  to  him,  it  is  necessary  that he must have acquired a right to receive the same or  that  a  right  to  the  income,  profits  or  gains  has become vested in him though its valuation may be postponed or its material station depends on some contingency.

The Supreme Court in Rama Bai (supra)’s case was concerned  with  the  taxability  of  interest  received on account of enhanced compensation, where the assessee’s lands were acquired and not being satis- fied  with  the  compensation  awarded  by  the  Land Acquisition  Officer,  the  assessee  appealed  to  the higher  Courts  and  finally  received  enhanced  com- pensation  along  with  interest  payable  u/s.  28  and 34  of  the  Land  Acquisition  Act.  The  said  amounts were  received  in  the  year  1967  and  were  sought to be assessed in the year 1968-1969. The assessee claimed  that  interest  was  allocable  and  assessable in  different  assessment  years  as  it  accrued  from year  to  year  and  only  that  portion  of  the  interest relating  to  the  period  April,  1967  to  March,  1968 was assessable for the assessment year 1968-1969. The Tribunal referred the following question to the Supreme  Court:  “Whether,  on  the  facts  and  in  the circumstances  of  the  case,  the  interest  received  by the  assesses  as  per  the  City  Civil  Court’s  award  for the period commencing from the date of possession till  31st  March,  1968,  was  entirely  assessable  for  the assessment  year  1968-1969?”  The  Supreme  Court answered  the  question  in  favour  of  assessee  and against the revenue by following its earlier judgment in  the  case  of  CIT  vs.  Govindarajulu  Chetty  (T.N.K.) 165  ITR  231  (SC)  wherein  in  a  short  judgment,  the Apex Court approved the judgment of the Madras High  Court  in  the  case  of  T.  N.  K.  Govindarajulu Chetty  vs.  CIT,  87  ITR  22  (Mad.).  The  Madras  High Court held that;   “11. In this case the liability to pay interest would arise when the compensation amount due  to  the  assessee  had  not  been  paid,  in  each  of the relevant years. Therefore, the accrual of interest has to be spread over the years between the date of acquisition  till  it  was  actually  paid.  We  are  not  in  a position to accept the contention of the revenue that …………… basis for assessing the income. When a statute brings to charge certain income, its intention is to enforce the charge at the earliest point of time.”

The  Supreme  Court  has  pointed  out  in  Laxmipat Singhania  vs.  CIT,72  ITR  291,  that:  “Again,  it  is  not open  to  the  Income-tax  Officer,  if  income  has  accrued to the assessee, and is liable to be included in the  total  income  of  a  particular  year,  to  ignore  the accrual and thereafter to tax it as income of another year on the basis of receipt.” Similar view was taken by the Panjab & Haryana High Court in the case of CIT  vs.  Dr.  Sham  Lal  Narula,  84  ITR  625   and  by  the Karnataka High Court in the case of CIT, Mysore vs. V.  Sampangiramaiah,  69  ITR  159   where  under  the question  which  was  considered  was  “Whether,  on the  facts  and  in  the  circumstance  of  the  case,  the Appellate  Tribunal  was  right  in  law  in  holding  that the  entire  interest  amount  of  Rs.  87,265/-  was  not assessable  in  the  assessment  year  1962-63  and  that only  the  proportionate  interest  referable  to  the  assessment  year  1962-63  was  assessable  in  that  year?” The  Karnataka  High  Court  answered  the  question in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee and against the  revenue.

The  right  to  receive  interest  u/s.  244A  is  entirely based  on  the  right  to  refund  u/s.  240  of  the  Act. Unless an assessee is entitled to a refund of taxes, no  right  to  receive  an  interest  arises  in  his  favour. The  key  consideration  therefore  is  the  right  to a  refund  of  excess  taxes  paid.  Whether  such  a right  to  refund  arises  on  passing  of  an  order  by an  Income-tax  Authority,  for  granting  a  refund,  or that such a right arises with payment of taxes and is  independent  of  the  order  of  the  authority.  The fact that interest u/s. 244A, whenever granted and paid,  is  paid  for  the  period  commencing  with  the date  of  payment  of  tax,  apparently  conveys  that such a right is associated with the payment of excess taxes and only its (interest) payment is deferred to the  year  of  grant  by  an  authority.  This  prima  facie understanding is, further confirmed by the amendments  in  section  145A(2)(B)  and  section  56(2)(Viii) of  the  Act  by  the  Finance  (NO.2)  Act,  2009,  that expressly  provide  that  interest  on  compensation shall  be  taxed  in  the  year  of  receipt  only.  In  other words,  in  the  absence  of  any  provision  for  taxing the  interest income  in  the  year  of  receipt, interest will be taxed in the year of accrual and when such interest pertains to a period exceeding 12 months, its  accrual  happens  on  year  to  year  basis  in  more than 1  assessment year.

On a conspectus reading of the scheme of refund, contained  in  Chapter  XIX  u/s.  237  to  245,  it  is gathered  that  the  right  to  refund  of  excess  taxes paid  is  independent  of  any  requirement  to  claim such  refund.  While  it  is  true  that  an  assessee  is entitled  to  a  refund  of  the  excess  taxes  paid,  only on  satisfaction  of  the  A.O  that  the  taxes  paid  by him  exceeds  the  amount  of  tax  payable  by  him,  it none  the  less  is  independent  of  any  order  section 237  does  not  require  an  Assessing  Officer  to  pass an  order  of  refund,  it  rather  requires  an  Assessing Officer to refund the excess taxes. Likewise, section 244A entitles an assessee to simple interest on the amount of  refund that becomes due to  him.

An assessee is entitled to receive interest u/s. 244A(1) where refund of any amount becomes due to him. The  language  of  section  244A  (1)  may  convey  that unless  an  assessee  becomes  entitled  to  a  refund, he is not entitled to interest and as a consequence of  such  an  understanding,   entitlement  to  interest is  postponed  to  the  time  when  a  refund  becomes due  to  him;  no  interest  therefore  accrues  to  him till  such  time  an  order  of  refund  is  passed.  Such an understanding, we feel, is not supported by the scheme of the Act and in particular by the scheme of  the  refund  and   the  grant  of  interest  thereon. Under  the  scheme,  the  moment  an  excess  tax  is paid,  the  refund  thereof  becomes  due  to  him  and the  entitlement  to  interest  runs  with  the  right  to receive  refund  which  right  arises  with  payment  of taxes, irrespective of an order of refund. This understanding is fortified with the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Jaffersaheb’s case, in as much as the issue therein concerned  taxation of interest received u/s. 244A   in assessment year 1990-91 and the  Court  while  deciding  the  issue  of  the  year  of taxation, examined the implications of the provisions of section 244A w.r.t to the scheme of refund and applied  the  ratio  of  the  decision  of  the  Supreme Court  in  Rama  Bai’s  case.  In  our  considered  view, no  material  difference  exists  between  the  interest that  was  granted  u/s.  244  r.w.s  240  and  the  one now being granted u/s. 244A   r.w.s 240   of the Act as  regards  the  time  of  entitlement.  In  conclusion, it  is  safe  to  hold  that  the  right  to  refund  and  the right to interest thereon are statutory rights which rights arise  on payment of  excess taxes.

The case for the taxation of interest, received under the Income-tax Act, on the year to year basis, by yearly spread over, is greater as compared to the interest received under the Land Acquisition Act for the reason under the scheme of taxation, an amount of refund becomes due, the moment an assessee pays excess tax which is neither dependent on the claim for refund nor on the order of the authorities. Accordingly the decisions of the courts, holding that the interest under the Land Acquisition Act is taxable on the year to year basis, shall apply with greater force, to the cases of receipt of interest, under the Income-tax Act.

Having so concluded that interest is taxable on year to year basis, an assessee is placed in an unenviable position in a case where an Assessing Officer makes substantial additions to the returned income and demands additional tax instead of granting refund. The issue that is required to be considered is about the liability to pay tax on interest that could be said to have accrued, even though the eligibility to refund and consequent interest thereon depends on the outcome of the appeal filed to contest the aforesaid additions to the returned income. While the assessee may not be asked to make the payment of regular taxes but may be required to pay taxes on the accrued interest, which is included in the assessed income, in the hope that he will suc- ceed in the appeal and will be entitled to refund and interest thereon. Nothing  could  be  more  confusing  than  this  in  as much  as,  it  leads  to  an  inference  that  interest  on refund  accrues,  even  before  the  finality  of  refund itself. This confusion is aptly conveyed by Palkhivala’s words  when  he  states  that  ‘one  of  the  delights  of income tax law is occasional incongruities’.  The Bombay  High  Court  noticing  the  confusion  in  the  case of CIT vs. Abbasbhoy, 195 ITR 28, arising on account of the contrasting decisions of the Supreme Court in  the  case  of  Govindarajulu  Chetty  (supra)  and the earlier decision in the case of CIT vs. Hindustan Housing  ,  161  ITR  524,   with  the  hope  that  the  Su- preme Court will resolve the controversy observed that  “the incongruity does not end here. Despite the conclusion  that  interest  in  such  cases  accrues  from year to year, it is doubtful whether it will be possible to hold the assessee responsible for not disclosing interest income in the past on accrual basis.” Kanga & Palkhivala in the 4th edition of their book titled The Law  and  Practice  of  Income  tax  have  commented on  the  assessee’s  obligation  to  return  income,  on account of accrued interest, where the refund is in dispute  in  the  following  words  ,”the  assessee  can always  take  a  stand  that  the  amount  of  compensation  including  enhanced  compensation  or  damages having  been  determined  subsequently,  he  could  not possibly  anticipate  accrual  of  interest”.  Kindly  also see,   pg.  1085  of  volume  1  of  the  10th  edition  of Sampath Iyengar’s Law  of  Income Tax.

This unenviable situation may however be remitted by resorting to rectification proceedings u/s. 154 for amending the order where such interest on disputed refund is taxed on accrual basis. Please see Garden Silk  Mills  Ltd., 221 ITR 861(Guj.)

Rules prescribed under Companies Act 2013:

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The Following rules under the Companies Act 2013 have been prescribed on 27th March, 2014

• Chapter III – The Companies (Prospectus and Allotment of Securities) Rules, 2014.

• Chapter IV – The Companies (Share Capital and Debentures) Rules, 2014.

• Chapter VI – The Companies (Registration of Charges) Rules, 2014.

• Chapter VII – The Companies (Management and Administration) Rules, 2014.

• Chapter VIII – The Companies (Declaration and Payment of Dividend) Rules, 2014.

• Chapter IX – The Companies (Accounts) Rules, 2014.

• Chapter XI – The Companies (Appointment and Qualification of Directors) Rules, 2014.

• Chapter XII – The Companies (Meetings of Board and its Powers) Rules, 2014.

The following Rules under the Companies Act 2013 have been prescribed on 31st March 2014

• Chapter I – The Companies (Specification of definitions details) Rules, 2014.

• Chapter II – The Companies (Incorporation) Rules, 2014.

• Chapter V – The Companies (Acceptance of Deposits) Rules, 2014.

• Chapter X – The Companies (Audit and Auditors) Rules, 2014.

• Chapter XIII- The Companies (Appointment and Remuneration of Managerial Personnel) Rules, 2014.

• Chapter XIV- The Companies (Inspection, Investigation and Inquiry) Rules, 2014.

• Chapter XXII- The Companies (Registration of Foreign Companies) Rules, 2014.

• Chapter XXI -The Companies (Authorised to Registered ) Rules, 2014.

• Chapter XXIV – The Companies (Registration Offices and Fees) Rules, 2014.

• Chapter XXVI – Nidhi Rules, 2014.

• Chapter XXIX – The Companies (Adjudication of Penalties) Rules, 2014.

• Chapter XXIX – The Companies (Miscellaneous) Rules, 2014.

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Clarification regarding maintenance of books of accounts and preparation of financial statements:

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Vide General Circular No. 08/2014 dated 04-04-2014 the Ministry of Corporate Affairs has clarified regarding that the provisions of the Companies Act 2013 with regard to maintenance of books of accounts and preparations/adoption/filing of financial statements, Auditors Report, Board Report and attachments to such statements and reports would be applicable for financial Years commencing from 1st April 2014.

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Fees Table notified

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The Ministry of Corporate Affairs has issued the Table of Fees (pursuant to Rule 12 of the Companies’ (Registration of Offices and Fees ) Rules 2014.

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Waiver of fees for all event based filing for April 2014 :

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Vide Circular No. 6/2014, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs has on 28th March informed that it shall waive fees for all event based filing whose date falls between 01-04-2014 to 30-04-2014. Only few forms can be filed presently mostly relating to filing of annual accounts, annual return, appointment of Cost Auditors , FTE ( Fast Track Exit Mode) Form , and Form 21 pertaining to Order of court / Authority till 14-04-2014. A list of New Forms along with the Old Form (in case any) have been given in the Circular.

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Enabling payment of Stamp Duty and Court fees through MCA site:

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Vide Circular No. 5/2014 dated 28th March 2014, The Ministry of Corporate Affairs has tried to remove the delay in the issue of Certified Copies filed with the ROC. The Ministry has enabled the payment of Stamp Duty and Court Fee online through the MCA portal. The circular is effective from 31st March 2014.

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Clarification in respect of resolutions u/s. 293 of Companies Act, 1956 wrt to compliance u/s. 180 of Companies Act, 2013:

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Vide General Circular No. 4/2014, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs has issued clarification to Section 180 of Companies Act 2013 referring to borrowings and or creation of security based on Ordinary resolution. The ministry has clarified that where before 12th September 2013, the resolution u/s. 293 of the Companies Act 1956 have been passed, they will be considered sufficient compliance u/s 180 of Companies Act 2013 for a period of 1 year from the date of notification of Section 180 of the Act.

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Central Government notifies 183 additional new sections:

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The Central Government has on 26th March 2014 has notified 183 additional new sections in addition to the earlier 99 notified provisions of the Companies 2013 and Rules made thereunder, forms under the new Act are mandatorily numbered alpha-numeric. Initial of forms is to be started with alphabet of two or three letters based on the subject of the Chapter, followed by serial number of the form. This will define the nature of the forms and would be easy to recognise.

There are total 29 chapters under the Companies Act, 2013. Chapters I and XXIII have been notified but no form is prescribed under these chapters. Following table is the summary of chapter wise nomenclature of forms Act 2014 which come into effect from 1st April 2014.

A ready reckoner Table containing provisions of Companies Act, 2013 as notified up to date and corresponding provisions thereof under Companies Act, 1956 and corresponding provisions of Companies act 1956 which shall remain in force.

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Names of Forms for e-filing on the MCA site have been Changed:

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To facilitate easy understanding of the e-forms being rolled out under the provisions of Companies Act,
 

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Change in Depreciation Rates:

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The Central Government has notified an Amendment to Schedule II of Companies Act 2013 which pertains to the Useful Lives to compute depreciation.

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D/o IPP F. No. 5(1)/2014-FC.I dated the 17-04- 2014

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Consolidated FDI Policy Circular of 2014

The DIPP has announced the yearly FDI Policy Circular. The said Circular is effective from 17th April 2014. This Circular consolidates, subsumes and supersedes all Press Notes/Press Releases/Clarifications/ Circulars issued by DIPP, which were in force as on 16th April, 2014 and reflects the FDI Policy as on 17th April, 2014.

This Circular will remain in force until superseded in totality or in part thereof. Reference to any statute or legislation made in this Circular will include modifications, amendments or re-enactments thereof. This circular is divided into 7 Chapters and contains 11 Annexures.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 82 dated December 31, 2013

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Import of Gold by Nominated Banks/Agencies/ Entities

This circular clarifies that: –

1. Refineries are allowed to import dore up to 15% of their gross average viable quantity based on their license entitlement in the first two months for making this available to the exporters on First in First out (FIFO) basis. Thereafter, the quantum of gold dore to be imported has to be determined lot-wise on the basis of export performance.

2. Before the next import, not more than 80% can be sold domestically.

3. The dore so imported must be refined and must be released on FIFO basis following the 20:80 principle.

4. Subsequent imports will be allowed only up to 5 times the quantum for which proof of export has been submitted and this will be on accrual basis.

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Sebi and Saving Schemes Gold Saving/Purchase Schemes – How Far Legal? – Review, in Context of Recent Bombay High Court Decision

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Synopsis

In the recent past, there have been many instances where companies have lured customers to invest in ponzi schemes by promising high return for instalment schemes, few of them being with the intent to defraud the public . The SEBI regulations havey defined Collection Investment Scheme (‘CIS’) , in a broad manner wherein such schemes are liable to be classified as CIS including the Gold Savings / Purchase Scheme.

Read on to know the view of the Author on the Gold Savings / Purchase Schemes being CIS and the recent judgement by the Bombay High Court in a public interest petition filed towards seeking clarity on legality of such schemes.

Consumer friendly savings schemes

Often, companies engaged in various types of businesses set up consumer friendly schemes which unwittingly violate law, with potentially serious consequences. A good example is an instalment scheme for customers which helps them save and accumulate to buy something. In a sense, they are the reverse of instalment purchase in which the gold is purchased, delivered and enjoyed but the payment is made over a period of time in the future. The saving-instalment method, however, provides for periodic payment and then using the accumulated amount plus interest to buy the product. What is not realized is that this latter scheme could in many cases violate the SEBI Regulations on Collective Investment Schemes (CIS).

Such schemes, in themselves, may be well intended. They, on one hand, enable customers to exercise discipline of saving in advance for buying something, instead of buy-now-pay-later attitude. On the other hand, they enable businesses to sell goods, with added benefit of not worrying about recovery of payment for goods.

Wide and strict law relating to CIS
However, there has been rampant misuse of such Schemes, particularly by companies who use such schemes as a disguise for simply raising monies as deposits without having any underlying business. The recent scams in West Bengal and elsewhere are just examples of what has happened often in the past. In 1999, to prevent scams and regulate such Schemes, SEBI notified the CIS Regulations. They have extensive requirements including of registration, valuation, minimum net worth, etc. and a stringent review of the persons behind such companies/Schemes, before registration.

The term CIS is very widely defined. Essentially, however, they mean those schemes which involve raising and pooling of monies from investors with a view to return them with income/profits/products at a future date. There are other conditions too. While classic schemes of teak plantation, goat farming, etc. were kept in mind since these had become common, as several sunbsequent decisions of courts and SEBI showed, they could cover a wide variety of other cases including those for purchase of immovable property.

This broadly worded law, however, would cover many other schemes. Consider an increasingly common scheme in recent times, set up by scores of companies, including some very reputed houses. These are gold savings/purchase schemes known by various names. While the details may vary from company to company, they can be described as under.

What are gold-saving schemes and how they may violate the law

A customer is required to deposit with the business a certain sum of money, periodically, usually every month. At the end of the period, the amount accumulated plus a sum, called “bonus” by some, which seems to be disguised interest, is used to sell gold jewellery to the customer. Thus, for example, a customer may deposit Rs. 2,500 every month for eleven months, thus collecting Rs. 27,500. The shop may add a bonus to this and give some concession in making charges and thus give him 10 grams worth of gold jewellery.

However, in my view, though the detailed facts of schemes by different companies are not known, in principle, many of such schemes are liable to be classified as CISs. And if they are set up without being duly registered with SEBI, they may be deemed to be violations of the Act/Regulations. It is also possible that they may be yet another variant of disguised deposit-raising schemes, as the scams of recent past have shown. And thus, not eligible for registration as CIS Schemes

Recent Bombay High Court decision Considering this, a public interest petition was filed before the Bombay High Court seeking directions from the Court to SEBI and other authorities to look into the legality of such Schemes. However, the Bombay High Court rejected this PIL. (Sandeep Agrawal vs. SEBI [2013] 39 taxmann.com 139 (Bom.)). In a brief decision of less than half a page, the Court essentially held that these contracts are private commercial contracts and do not require interference by SEBI. The Court observed, “If any shop owner is running such a scheme and the consumers are voluntarily taking part in such a scheme, it is purely a commercial transaction between a businessman and a consumer”.

It is submitted that this decision requires reconsideration.
It also appears that the necessary facts and law were not presented well before the Court, since the Court observed, “If the petitioner so desires to bring it in the nature of public ambit the least that is expected is to point out as to under what statutory provisions or the rules framed thereunder the said scheme is prohibited. Nothing is placed on record in that regard.”.

In other words, the petitioner does not seem to have laid down the detailed facts of the schemes, the specific provisions in the SEBI Act and the CIS Regulations that make such schemes to be CIS and thus subject to registration, etc. In absence of submissions explaining how SEBI could take action against such schemes or under which specific provision of law they are liable to be registered but not registered, the Court seems to have rejected the petition.

However, it is difficult to see how most of such schemes are not CISs. Section 11AA of the SEBI Act, which defines CISs widely, seems to be clearly applicable and the conditions specified therein are attracted.

While there are several reputed names who have set up in such schemes, the number of entities engaged in such schemes are numerous. It will not also be surprising of this model is adopted in other businesses too. Such schemes are ripe for misuse, assuming SEBI takes a view that the provisions relating to CIS do not apply.

Misuse of such Schemes
Consider, how the terms and conditions of the scheme can be structured which can eventually could be potential scams:

• An entity other than a gold-jewellery shop may set up such a scheme. The gold-jewellery purchase form may thus become a front.

• Then, the scheme may be for a long period of, say, three to five years. Longer the period, the greater the risk of the monies being lost.

• Huge incentives may be offered to agents to get such customers to accept such schemes.
• Also, without it being regulated, there is no control over where the amounts raised would be applied – even existing schemes do not seem to provide for assurance that the amounts raised would be used to buy gold which would be earmarked for the customer. The monies raised thus may be diverted into other businesses where there are risk of the monies being lost or blocked.

• The entity may offer an unduly higher “bonus” (which as stated really seems to be disguised interest) to attract customers. The higher the interest rate, the greater the risk of the entity not being able to fulfil its promises.

• It is easy to provide a cash alternative at time of maturity in form of ruling price of gold, which in any case can be assured, apart from “bonus”. Thus, effectively, the customer can obtain fixed interest on the amounts paid. Indeed, as past scams investigated by SEBI have shown, the schemes were actually marketed as deposit raising schemes with assured interest, with the paper work of being advance against goods being bogus.

It is arguable that each case would have to be decided on facts and perhaps some of such schemes may not attract the provisions. Also, most of the schemes may not have any intention of giving a cash alternative or be really in the form of deposit raising. In other words, many of such schemes may not be deposit raising exercises in disguise, as was found in many of the schemes that went bust in West Bengal and elsewhere.

However, while such disguised-deposit schemes would be blatantly illegal, even genuine schemes would require, in most of the cases, registration with SEBI as CIS. The Regulations provide for several levels of checks, at the time of entry and later too, to safeguard the interests of customers/investors.

In either case, the risks of such schemes are too many to be ignored. In the backdrop of recent scams in West Bengal and elsewhere, it is surprising that these schemes have not received closer attention. Ideally, and at the very least, SEBI should have assured the Court that it is looking into the schemes, more so since it was made a party to the petition.

Conclusion
In conclusion, it must also be stated that the Bombay High Court decision should not be treated as a precedent holding that such schemes are valid in law. The decision is on facts, or rather absence of facts. No real question of law was placed before the Court. The provisions of the Act and/or the Regulations were also not placed before the Court. On the other hand, though not specifically on gold-savings schemes, there have been numerous decisions of courts and SEBI that have, on facts, held what are CISs. The ratio of these decisions as well as the provisions of law are clear enough to hold such Scheme as requiring registration, with SEBI.