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(Unreported) [ITA No. 1407 & 1405/Ahd/2009] ITO vs. Dholera Port Ltd. and ITO vs. Adani Port-Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. A.Ys.: 2008-09, Decided on: 30-05-2014

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Article 13 India-UK DTAA – where the services provided by UK Company did not “make available” technical knowledge, skill etc., the payment was not taxable as FTS under Article 13 of India-UK DTAA.

Facts:
The taxpayer was an Indian company. The taxpayer had engaged a British company (“UKCo”) for conducting navigation studies to evaluate the economic feasibility of the port. For the services rendered, the taxpayer made payment to UKCo. According to the taxpayer, technical knowledge, skill or know-how was not “made available” by UKCo and hence, in terms of Article 13(4)(c) of India- UK DTAA , the payment was not FTS.1

Held:
• The agreement between taxpayer and UKCo stipulated that the report to be provided by UKCo was confidential, the taxpayer was not only prohibited from transferring the report to a third person but also prohibited from using the knowhow in performing services for any other client in future. The taxpayer was also prohibited from sub-licensing any of the rights granted.
• Based on the case law explaining the expression “make available,” the technology can be said to be “made available” only if the fruits of the services were transferred to the services recipient.
• Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the present case, the payment for the services provided was not made for “making available” technical knowledge, experience, knowhow to the taxpayer and therefore, it was not taxable as FTS under India-UK DTAA .

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ACIT vs. GMS Motors Pvt. Ltd. ITAT Delhi `C’ Bench Before R. S. Syal (AM) and H. S. Sidhu (JM) ITA No. 3530/Del/2012 A.Y.: 2007-08. Decided on: 6th August, 2014. Counsel for revenue / assessee: Satpal Singh / Sanjeev Kapoor

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S/s. 3, 28 – In a case where premises are taken on rent, manpower was hired, registration under MVAT and CST was obtained and deposit was paid to company whose vehicles were to be sold and sales of some spare parts had been sold, it cannot be said that the business of sales-cum-service centre has not been set up merely because sale of cars has not taken place.

Facts:
The assessee was to commence a business of sale-cumservice centre. During the previous year it took the premises on rent, hired man power who were paid salaries by cheque, obtained registration required under Maharashtra VAT Act, 2002 and Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 and also deposited certain amount with Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd., whose vehicles were to be sold by the assessee. The assessee had also sold some spare parts.

The Assessing Officer (AO) disallowed expenses aggregating to Rs. 56,80,117 incurred towards financial charges and staff administrative charges on the ground that the sale of cars had not taken place during the previous year and therefore the business was not set up and hence deduction of expenses was not permissible.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who allowed the appeal.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that the term `previous year’ as defined in s. 3 has a relationship with setting up of the business and not with the commencement of the business. It noted that the Apex Court has in the case of CIT vs. Ramaraju Surgical Cotton Mills Ltd. (63 ITR 478)(SC) has held that the business is set up when it is ready to discharge the functions for which it is being set up and the Delhi High Court has in the case of CIT vs. Samsung India Electronics Ltd. (356 ITR 354)(Del) has held that business commences on doing first activity like purchase of raw materials, etc.

Considering the ambit of the term `setting up of the business’ in the light of the above mentioned judicial pronouncements the Tribunal held that any income arising after the date of setting up of the business is chargeable to tax and, similarly, any expenditure incurred after the setting up of the business is deductible subject to other relevant provisions. The activities carried out by the assessee, amply demonstrate that the business was set up though sale of vehicles did not take place during the year. The Tribunal noted that it was not the case of the AO that the expenses were non-genuine or capital in nature. The Tribunal upheld the order passed by CIT(A).

The appeal filed by the revenue was dismissed.

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TS-100-ITAT-2014(PAN) V.M. Salgaocar & Bro. Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT A.Y: 2006-07 and 2007-08, Dated: 23.12.2013

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Sections. 9(1)(vi), 9(1)(vii) – Payment for sales and Marketing services does not amount to Royalty or fees for technical services (FTS) under the Act. Services do not satisfy “make available” condition under the India-USA DTAA , hence do not constitute fees for includes services (FIS)

Facts:
The Taxpayer carrying on hotel business entered into international sales and marketing agreement with a foreign company (F Co). These services included international sales and marketing services, special chain services, reservation system and special advertisement costs. F Co provided such services from outside India.

During the relevant financial year taxpayer paid sales and marketing fees and reimbursed certain expenses, without deducting taxes thereon. The Tax Authority disallowed the expenses on the ground that the Taxpayer was liable to withhold taxes on payments made to a non-resident.

Held:
Sales and Marketing services is not covered within Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vi) and hence outside the scope of royalty taxation under the Act.

The services rendered by F Co does not involve rendering of any managerial, technical or consultancy services rendered in India and therefore it cannot be regarded to be FTS u/s. 9(1)(vii) of the Act. In view of this, the income received by taxpayer cannot be deemed to accrue and arise in India.

Under the India-US DTAA, on interpretation of ‘make available’ as per Article 12, reliance was placed on Bombay Tribunal decision in Raymond Ltd (86 ITD 791) which interpreted the term “make available” to mean that the person utilising the services must be able to make use of the technical knowledge etc. by himself in his business or for his own benefit and without recourse to the performer of the services in future. In the facts as the services provided by F Co did not make available the sales and marketing services to the Taxpayer the same was outside the ambit of FIS taxation.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 81 dated 24th December, 2013

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Notification No. FEMA.287/2013-RB dated 17th September, 2013, vide G.S.R. No. 645(E) dated 20th September, 2013, read with Corrigendum dated 24th October, 2013 vide G.S.R.No.741(E) dated 19th November, 2013

Borrowing and Lending in Rupees – Investments by persons resident outside India in the tax free, secured, redeemable, non-convertible bonds

Presently, a person resident in India who has borrowed in Rupees from a person resident outside India cannot use the said funds for any investment, whether by way of capital or otherwise, in any company or partnership firm or proprietorship concern or any entity, whether incorporated or not, or for relending.

This circular now permits resident entities/companies in India who are authorised to issue tax-free, secured, redeemable, non-convertible bonds in Rupees to persons resident outside India to use such borrowed funds for lending & investment as under: –

(a) For on lending/re-lending to the infrastructure sector; and

(b) For keeping in fixed deposits with banks in India pending utilisation by them for permissible end-uses.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 78 dated December 3, 2013

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External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) by Holding Companies/Core Investment Companies for the project use in Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs)

This circular permit Holding Companies/Core Investment Companies (CIC) to raise ECB under the automatic route/approval route, as the case may be, for project use in SPV subject to the following terms and conditions:

i. The business activity of the SPV should be in the infrastructure sector as defined in the extant ECB guidelines.

ii. The infrastructure project must be implemented by the SPV established exclusively for implementing the project.

iii. ECB proceeds must be utilized either for fresh capital expenditure or for refinancing of existing Rupee loans (under the approval route) availed of from the domestic banking system for capital expenditure.

iv. ECB for SPV can be raised for up to 3 years after the Commercial Operations Date of the SPV.

v. The SPV has to give an undertaking that no other method of funding, such as, trade credit (if for import of capital goods), etc. will be used for the portion of fresh capital expenditure that is financed through ECB.

vi. ECB proceeds must be kept in a separate escrow account pending utilization for permissible end-uses and use of such proceeds must be strictly monitored by the bank for permissible uses.

vii. Holding Companies that come under the Core Investment Company (CIC) regulatory framework have to comply with the following additional terms and conditions: –

a) ECB availed is within the ceiling of leverage stipulated for CIC, i.e., their outside liabilities including ECB must not be more than 2.5 times of their adjusted net worth as on the date of the last audited balance sheet; and

b) In case of CIC with asset size below Rs. 100 crore, ECB availed of must be on fully hedged basis.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 77 dated November 22, 2013

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Overseas Foreign Currency Borrowings by Authorised Dealer Banks

Presently, banks can borrow funds from international/ multilateral financial institutions up to a limit of 100% of their unimpaired Tier I capital as at the close of the previous quarter or $ 10 million (or its equivalent), whichever is higher (excluding borrowings for financing of export credit in foreign currency and capital instruments) for the purpose of general banking business (but not for capital augmentation) and also swap the same at a concessional rate with RBI. This facility is available up to 30th November, 2013.

This circular provides that where any bank is being sanctioned any loan from any international/ multilateral financial institutions and is receiving a firm commitment in this regard on or before 30th November, 2013, it will be allowed to enter into a forward-forward swap under the first leg of which the bank can sell forward the contracted amount of foreign currency corresponding to the loan amount for delivery up to 31st December, 2013. However, if the bank is not able to deliver the contracted amount of foreign currency on the contracted date, it will have to pay the difference between concessional swap rate contracted and the market swap rate plus one hundred basis points.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 121 dated 10th April, 2014

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Trade Credits for Imports into India – Review of all-in-cost ceiling

This circular states that the present all-in-cost ceiling for trade credits, as mentioned below, will continue till 30th June, 2014: –

The all-in-cost ceiling will include arranger fee, upfront fee, management fee, handling / processing charges, out of pocket and legal expenses, if any.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 120 dated 10th April, 2014

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Rupee Drawing Arrangement – ‘Direct to Account’ Facility

This circular, subject to certain terms and conditions, now permits banks (called Partner Banks) in India to credit the proceeds of foreign inward remittances received under Rupee Drawing Arrangement (RDA) directly to the KYC compliant beneficiary bank accounts through electronic mode, such as, NEFT, IMPS, etc.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 119 dated 7th April, 2014

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Foreign investment in India in Government Securities

Presently, resident individuals are allowed to book foreign exchange forward contracts, without production of underlying documents, up to a limit of US $ 100,000 on self-declaration basis, to hedge/ manage their actual/anticipated foreign exchange exposures.

This circular now permits all resident individuals, firms and companies, to book foreign exchange forward contracts, up to US $ 250,000 on the basis of a simple declaration (as per format annexed to this Circular) without any requirement of further documentation, to hedge/manage their actual or anticipated foreign exchange exposures.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 118 dated 7th April, 2014

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Foreign investment in India in Government Securities

Presently, FII, QFI, long term investors and FPI, registered with SEBI, can invest in Government securities including T-Bills (sub-limit of US $ 5.50 billion) and dated Government Securities (sub-limit of US $ 10 billion) within the overall limit of US $ 30 billion.

This circular provides that FII, QFI, long term investors and FPI, registered with SEBI, can now invest in Government dated securities having residual maturity of 1 year and above and existing investments in T-bills and Government dated securities of less than 1 year residual maturity will be allowed to taper off on maturity/sale.

The revised position is as under: –

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 117 dated 4th April, 2014

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Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (FEMA) Foreign Exchange (Compounding Proceedings) Rules, 2000 (the Rules) – Compounding of Contraventions under FEMA, 1999 This circular has expanded the list of offences that can be compounded by Regional Offices of RBI. The expanded list is as under: –

 

The Regional offices at Panaji and Kochi can compound the above offences provided the amount involved is less than Rs. 10,000,000. All other Regional Offices can compound the above offences without any monetary limit.

For compounding of any other offence application will have to be made, as is the present procedure, to Cell for Effective Implementation of FEMA (CEFA), Foreign Exchange Department, 5th floor, Amar Building, Sir P. M. Road, Fort, Mumbai 400001.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 115 dated 28th March, 2014

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Merchanting Trade Transactions – Revised guidelines

This circular contains the revised guidelines with respect to Merchanting Trade Transactions. These guidelines will apply to merchanting trade transactions initiated after 17th January, 2014.

Merchanting traders must be genuine traders of goods and not mere financial intermediaries. Confirmed orders have to be received by them from the overseas buyers. Handling bank must satisfy themselves about the capabilities of the merchanting trader to perform the obligations under the order. The overall merchanting trade must result in reasonable profits to the merchanting trader.

The highlights of the said guidelines are as under: –

i) For a trade to be classified as merchanting trade the following conditions must be satisfied: –

a. Goods acquired must not enter the Domestic Tariff Area; and

b. The state of the goods must not undergo any transformation.

ii) Goods involved in the merchanting trade transactions (transaction) must be those that are permitted for exports / imports under the prevailing Foreign Trade Policy (FTP) of India, as on the date of shipment and all the rules, regulations and directions applicable to exports (except Export Declaration Form) and imports (except Bill of Entry), are complied with for the export leg and import leg respectively.

iii) The bank handling the transaction must be satisfied with the bonafides of the transactions.

iv) Both the legs of the transaction must be routed through the same bank.

v) The entire transaction must be completed within an overall period of nine months and there must not be any foreign exchange outlay beyond four months.

vi) The commencement date would be the date of shipment/export leg receipt/import leg payment, whichever is first. The completion date would be the date of shipment/export leg receipt/import leg payment, whichever is the last.

vii) Short-term credit either by way of suppliers’ credit or buyers’ credit will be available for merchanting trade transactions, to the extent not backed by advance remittance for the export lag, including the discounting of export leg LC by a bank, as in the case of import transactions.

viii) In case advance against the export leg is received by the merchanting trader, the bank must ensure that the same is earmarked for making payment for the respective import leg.

ix) Merchanting traders can make advance payment for the import leg on demand made by the overseas seller. In case where inward remittance from the overseas buyer is not received before the outward remittance to the overseas supplier, the bank can provide credit facility based on commercial judgement. However, where the advance payment for the import leg is more than US $ 200,000 per transaction, than advance must be given against bank guarantee/LC from an international bank of repute except in cases and to the extent where payment for export leg has been received in advance.

x) Letter of credit to the supplier is permitted against confirmed export order keeping in view the outlay involved and provided the completion of the transaction will happen within nine months.

xi) Payment for the import leg can also be made out of the balances in Exchange Earners Foreign Currency Account (EEFC) of the merchant trader.

xii) The handling bank must ensure one-to-one matching in case of each transaction and report defaults in any leg by the traders to the concerned Regional Office of RBI, on half yearly basis in the format as annexed to the circular, within 15 days from the close of each half year, i.e. June and December.

xiii) The names of defaulting merchanting traders, where outstandings reach 5% of their annual export earnings, will be caution-listed.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 114 dated 27th March, 2014

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Risk Management and Inter Bank Dealings

Presently, exporters are allowed to hedge currency risk on the basis of a declaration of exposure up to an eligible limit which is the average of the last 3 financial years’ (April to March) actual export turnover or last year’s actual export turnover, whichever is higher. Similarly, importers are allowed to hedge up to an eligible limit which is 25% of the average of the last three financial years’ actual import turnover or last year’s actual import turnover, whichever is higher. All forward contracts booked under this facility by both exporters and importers have to be on fully deliverable basis. In case of cancellation, exchange gain, if any, cannot be passed on to the exporter/importer by the bank.

This circular provides that, exporters/importers will now be entitled to the gains/losses resulting from the cancellation of up to 75% of the contracts booked within the eligible limit (as mentioned above). Contracts booked in excess of 75% of the eligible limit will be on deliverable basis and cannot be cancelled. Hence, in the event of cancellation the exporter/ importer will have to bear the loss but will not be entitled to receive the gain.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 113 dated 26th March, 2014

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External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) for Civil Aviation Sector

Presently, airlines Companies, subject to certain terms and conditions, could avail ECB for working capital up to 31st December, 2013. This circular now permits airlines Companies to raise ECB for working capital up to 31st March, 2015.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 112 dated 25th March, 2014

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Notification No. FEMA.297/2014-RB dated 13th March 2014 – G.S.R. No. 189(E) dated 19th March 19, 2014

Foreign Portfolio Investor – investment under Portfolio Investment Scheme, Government and Corporate debt

The present scheme in respect of Portfolio Investment in India by FII & QFI has been replaced by a new scheme called the Foreign Portfolio Investment Scheme.

Important features of the said new scheme are as under: –

a. Portfolio investor registered in accordance with SEBI guidelines will now be called ‘Registered Foreign Portfolio Investor (RFPI)’. All existing portfolio investor classes, namely, FII and QFI registered with SEBI will be subsumed under RFPI. b. RFPI may purchase and sell shares and convertible debentures of Indian company through registered broker on recognized stock exchanges in India as well as purchases shares and convertible debentures which are offered to public in terms of relevant SEBI guidelines / regulations.

c. RFPI may sell shares or convertible debentures so acquired:

a) In open offer in accordance with the SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) Regulations, 2011; or

b) In an open offer in accordance with the SEBI (Delisting of Equity shares) Regulations, 2009; or

c) Through buyback of shares by a listed Indian company in accordance with the SEBI (Buyback of securities) Regulations, 1998. d. RFPI may also acquire shares or convertible debentures: –

a) In any bid for, or acquisition of, securities in response to an offer for disinvestment of shares made by the Central Government or any State Government; or

b) In any transaction in securities pursuant to an agreement entered into with merchant banker in the process of market making or subscribing to unsubscribed portion of the issue in accordance with Chapter XB of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Issue of Capital and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2009.

e. Subject to applicable composite sectoral cap under FDI policy, RFPI investment will as under: –

a) The individual investment limits for RFPI will be below 10% of the total paid-up equity capital or 10% of the paid-up value of each series of convertible debentures issued by an Indian company; and

b) The aggregate investment limits for RFPI will be below 24% of the total paid-up equity capital or 24% of the paid-up value of each series of convertible debentures issued by an Indian company.

f. RFPI can open a Special Non-Resident Rupee (SNRR) account and a foreign currency account with a bank in India to transfer amounts from foreign currency account to SNRR account at the prevailing market rate for making genuine investments in securities. The bank can transfer repatriable proceeds (after payment of applicable taxes) from SNRR account to foreign currency account.

g. RFPI can invest in government securities and corporate debt subject to limits specified by the RBI and SEBI from time to time.

h. All investments by RFPI will be subject to the SEBI (FPI) Regulations 2014, as modified by SEBI /Government of India from time to time.

i. RFPI can trade in all exchange traded derivative contracts on the stock exchanges in India subject to the position limits as specified by SEBI from time to time.

j. RFPI can offer cash or foreign sovereign securities with AAA rating or corporate bonds or domestic Government Securities, as collateral to the recognized Stock Exchanges for their transactions in the cash as well as derivative segment of the market.

Any FII that holds a valid certificate of registration from SEBI will be deemed to be a RFPI till the expiry of the block of three years for which fees have been paid as per the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Foreign Institutional Investors) Regulations, 1995.

A QFI can continue to buy, sell or otherwise deal in securities subject to the SEBI (FPI) Regulations, 2014 for a period of one year from the date of commencement of these regulations, or until he obtains a certificate of registration as foreign portfolio investor, whichever is earlier.

All investments made by a FII/QFI in accordance with the regulations prior to registration as RFPI shall continue to be valid and taken into account for computation of aggregate limit.

A RFPI is required to report transactions to RBI as is presently being reported by FII in LEC Form.

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Is It Fair Not To Exclude Personal Payments By Individuals/Hindu Undivided Families (for Any of Its Members) from TDS?

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Introduction:

Provisions of Tax
Deduction at Source (TDS) contained in Chapter XVII-A of Income-tax Act,
1961 (“the Act”) impose a heavy burden on tax payers, especially
businessmen. Readers are aware of highly damaging consequences of
defaults in respect of contraventions of these provisions – viz. section
201, 40(a)(i), 40a(ia), 271-C, 272A, 276 B and so on. Having regard to
the complications in implementation and the harsh consequences of
default, law-makers in their wisdom have generally kept the common man
viz. individuals and Hindu Undivided Families (HUF) out of the
obligation to deduct tax. However, under certain circumstances, even
individuals and HUF’s are required to comply with these provisions.
These situations are:-

(a) payments of salaries

(b) payment to non-residents ; and

(c) if the individual/HUF’s business or profession was subject to tax audit u/s. 44AB under turnover criterion.

The unfairness:

Obligation
in respect of payment to non-residents is to some extent reasonable
since it entails the outflow of money from the country.

The Act
in certain sections also provides exception so that an individual/HUF,
though otherwise liable to deduct tax is not required to do so on
payments for personal purposes. Thus, s/s. (4) of section 194.C (payment
to contractors) exempts payments made exclusively for personal purpose.
(e.g., repairs/painting of the businessman’s residential house). So
also, the 3rd proviso to s/s. (1) of section 194.J (payments to
professionals) grants similar exemption. Hence, payments to lawyers,
architects, doctors for personal purposes by businessman will not
attract TDS provisions.

As against this, no such exemption is provided in respect of the following payments:-

Section 192 – Salaries (say salary payable to personal attendant for a patient/disabled person)

Section 194A- Interest other than interest on securities (say interest on housing loan taken from friends, relatives, etc.).

Section 194H- Commission or brokerage (say brokerage on sale/purchase of house/car/other assets) Section

194I – Rent for residential house, or rent for personal car/other assets.

There
appears to be no logical reason for such discrimination. Due to such
inconsistencies, the study and implementation of law also becomes
difficult.

Suggestion:

Similar exceptions should be provided in aforesaid sections as well.

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Political Contributions by Companies-Delhi High Court Reminds Us of the Wide Prohibitory Law

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Contributions from companies with more than 50% “foreign” holding prohibited

The Delhi High Court decision in the case of Association for Democratic Reforms vs. UOI ([2014] 43 Taxmann.com 443 (Del.)) is both a reminder and an eye opener, of certain very widely framed provisions of law originally of FERA times that continue to have impact. It is very timely too in this election season when many companies have given electoral contributions. Even more so considering the fact that the new section 182 of the Companies Act, 2013, has permitted a higher electoral contribution of 7.50% of profits as compared to 5% under the 1956 Act.

The Court has held that political parties/election candidates cannot accept foreign contributions – i.e., electoral contributions from an Indian company with more than 50% foreign holding, as so defined. The definition of what constitutes “foreign contribution” is so wide that it may bring numerous Indian listed and unlisted companies in its net. In short, acceptance of political contributions from certain Indian companies, whose number could be quite large, has been confirmed to be in violation of the law.

The decision deals with several issues, some of which arise out of defense offered by the political parties/Central Government who were the respondents. However, this article focusses on the core and important issue, which is, whether electoral contributions can be accepted by political parties from companies registered and operating in India but which have more than 50% foreign holding.

Misleading reports about the nature of decision and contribution from “foreign sources”

It is important to go into some details of certain facts of this case because several newspaper reports gave either incorrect facts or were misleading. The impression created was that contributions from “foreign sources” were received and these were held to be prohibited, without explaining how wide the term foreign sources was under the law. Foreign sources, as will be seen later, is defined in a wider manner than the literal meaning of the term suggests.

Some reports even said that a foreign company – Vedanta – gave the contributions. This, apart from being factually incorrect, again conveys that the decision has limited application. The impression conveyed is that it applies only to the rare situation when a political party accepts contributions from a foreign company.

Facts of the case

Here are, summarised and simplified, the facts as stated and the law as per the decision. Vedanta Resources plc is a company incorporated in England and Wales. It held majority/controlling stake in two companies registered in India – Sterlite Industries Limited and Sesa Goa Limited. Sterlite and Sesa Goa made electoral contributions to certain political parties. The question before the Court was whether the parties that accepted contributions violated the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 1976 (FCRA).

FCRA 1976 vs. FCRA 2010

At this juncture, it is important to note the law that the Court was concerned with was the FCRA 1976. The Court emphasised this and noted that the FCRA 1976 was replaced by the FCRA 2010. However, it can be seen that, on this aspect, the FCRA 2010 provisions are substantially similar to the FCRA 1976. Hence, I submit that the ratio of the Court’s decision ought to apply for the FCRA 2010 too.

What is “foreign contributions”?

The FCRA prohibits acceptance of “foreign contributions” by political parties/candidates. However, as was common with the laws introduced in the late 60s and mid 70s, they were very broadly framed and this led to a fairly complex definition, with one definition leading one to refer to another. The term “foreign contribution” is defined to mean receipt of certain things such as money, etc. from a “foreign source”. The term “foreign source” is defined to mean several entities including a “foreign company” and certain specified Indian companies. It is the definition of these two terms and, for the purposes of this article, the latter one with which we are concerned.

Contributions received from the following companies are also treated as contribution from “foreign sources”:-

“(vi) a company within the meaning of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), if more than one-half of the nominal value of its share capital is held, either singly or in the aggregate, by one or more of the following, namely,

(a) the government of a foreign country or territory,

(b) the citizens of a foreign country or territory,

(c) the corporations incorporated in a foreign country or territory,

(d) the trusts, societies or other associations of individuals (whether incorporated or not), formed or registered in a foreign country or territory,”

It can be seen from the definition given above that the foreign sources includes a company registered in India in which more than 50% shares are held by certain specified foreign parties such as foreign corporations, foreign citizens, foreign trusts/societies, etc.

It was an undisputed fact that Sterlite and Sesa Goa were both (i) companies under the Companies Act, 1956 and (ii) more than one-half of their capital was held by Vedanta, a corporation incorporated in a foreign country. Hence, the inevitable conclusion was that the contributions received from Sterlite/ Sesa Goa was a contribution from a foreign source. The FCRA specifically prohibited the acceptance of foreign contributions.

Curiously, it was also noted that Anil Aggarwal, an Indian citizen, held more than 50% capital in Vedanta. Thus, in a sense, the ultimate holder was an Indian citizen. However, since the FCRA did not make any relaxation for such companies, the Court held that the FCRA prohibition applied.

Decision of court

The Court held that there was a violation of the FCRA. It finally observed, summarising the facts, law and ratio:

“72. It is not disputed by the respondents that more than one-half of the nominal value of the share-capital of Sterlite and Sesa is held by Vedanta. It has already been held by us in the preceding paragraph that Vedanta is a corporation incorporated in a foreign country or territory within the meaning of Section 2(e) (vi)(c) of the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 1976. Therefore, this leads to the irresistible conclusion that the present case is also squarely covered under Section 2(e)(vi)(c) of the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 1976.

73. For the reasons extensively highlighted in the preceding paragraphs, we have no hesitation in arriving at the view that prima-facie the acts of the respondents inter-se, as highlighted in the present petition, clearly fall foul of the ban imposed under the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 1976 as the donations accepted by the political parties from Sterlite and Sesa accrue from “Foreign Sources” within the meaning of law.”

The Court also directed the Central Government to inquire whether contributions from other similar placed companies have been received and take necessary action within six months. It stated:

“The second direction would concern the donations made to political parties by not only Sterlite and Sesa but other similarly situated companies/corporations. Respondents No.1 and 2 would relook and re- appraise the receipts of the political parties and would identify foreign contributions received by foreign sources as per law declared by us hereinabove and would take action as contemplated by law. The two directions shall be complied within a period of six months from date of receipt of certified copy of the present decision.”

FCRA 2010

The  provisions  of  the  FCRA  2010  are  substantially similar to those of the FCRA 1976, even though the phrasing  and  structure  is  a  little  different.  Political parties  continue  to  face  total  prohibition  from  ac- cepting “foreign contribution”. Foreign contribution continues to mean receipt of specified things from “foreign sources”. And, “foreign sources” continue to include companies in which the specified foreign entities  hold  more  than  50%  of  the  capital.  These specified  foreign  entities  include  foreign  corporations, foreign citizens, foreign trusts, etc. Thus, acceptance of such foreign contributions by political parties/candidates will continue to be a violation of law, as  the Delhi High Court has  confirmed.

Companies in which specified foreign persons hold more than  50%

The  implications  of  these  provisions/decisions  are very wide. There are numerous companies in India that  have  such  foreign  holding  of  more  than  50% of  their  capital.  There  are  subsidiaries  of  foreign companies in India. There are also companies that have  more  than  50%  FDI.  So  are  companies  that have more than 50% holdings by FII/PE/non-citizens. All such companies, private, public as well as listed companies  with  a  wide  public  shareholding  would be thus covered.  The contributions accepted from them in the past and future would be under a cloud.

Contribution through Electoral Trusts

A recent variant of making electoral contribution   is through Electoral Trusts. One advantage of such trusts is that such Trusts can pool donations from various sources/entities. Thereafter, the Electoral Trust, run usually by public spirited individuals, decide which party/candidate should get and how much of the amount collected. In such a case, the receiving political party may not know who is the ultimate donor from the pool and whether it is a foreign source or not. It is submitted that the wide definitions of terms used will result in the law being still violated if the contributors are such companies. In such a situation, the responsibility would lie on the Electoral Trust to ensure that the contributions received by it are not from a foreign source.

Responsibility of the contributing Company

The  FCRA  places  the  primary  responsibility  of complying  with  the  law  on  the  receiving  political party/election candidate. As is apparent, it may be difficult  for  it  to  verify  whether  the  contributing company  has  more  than  50%  foreign  holding  and they may ask the company to confirm/certify. Even otherwise, the question is whether the contributing company  would  be  violating  the  law  if  they  gave such contributions. While the law principally applies to  the  receiving  entity  and  certain  intermediaries in  the  process,  the  way  the  law  has  been  broadly framed, it is possible that depending on the facts, the officers of the company may be held liable. For example,  the  law  also  holds  that  anyone  “assisting”  any  political  party  in  accepting  such  foreign contribution as  liable  to  punishment.

Conclusion
The fear of the foreign hand – the driving force behind this law as originally framed – is relevant today too. However, in these changed times, con- tinuing such a blanket prohibition does not seem  to make sense.

A Government that we can trust!

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By the time this issue reaches you, the elections of 2014 will be in their last phase and all of us will be waiting for the results, on 16th May. Over the past few months we have witnessed vitriolic campaigns, run by all the political parties. As in the past, emotive issues have been raised, though speeches have also been laced with the promise of development. While this election had many similarities with elections of the past, in some ways it was distinct and different. There was a large contingent of first-time voters, social media played a significant role, and there was the presence of a party which at least promised to represent the “Aam Aadmi.” These factors cumulatively may make a difference in the outcome.

Whichever government assumes power, (and one hopes that we will have a stable one), will have to meet the rising aspirations of the people. What should citizens expect from the new government? What we need is a government that “governs” and people feel that they are governed. To put it in one line we want a government in which the people of this country can place their trust.

When will such trust be created? That can happen when the government acts fairly, transparently and is accountable for its actions. These are the basic minimum attributes of governance, which have seen a steep fall in the last decade. How unfair is the administrative arm of the government will be apparent from the scathing comment of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in the Bharti Airtel’s case. The Tribunal observed “….If an action of the assessing officer is so blatantly unreasonable that such seasoned senior officers well versed with functioning of judicial forums, as the learned departmental representatives are, cannot even go through the convincing motions of defending the same before us, such unreasonable conduct of the assessing officer deserves to be scrutinised seriously. At a time when evolving societal pressures demand a greater degree of accountability in governance also, it does no good to the judicial institutions to watch such situations as helpless spectators. If it is indeed a case of frivolous addition, someone should be accountable for the resulting undue hardship to the taxpayer, rather than being allowed to walk away with a subtle, though easily discernible admission to the effect that, yes it was a frivolous addition ……. The paragraph aptly describes the conduct of the government. Those who do business expect the government of the day to act equitably, fairly. While no one denies the right of a sovereign country to collect tax, would it be wrong for businesses beyond Indian shores to expect that we will have a fair, stable and consistent tax regime?

The actions must not only be fair but they must be transparent. Let us take the legislative process as an example. The Direct Tax Code Bill, brought in with fanfare, has been hanging fire for over 4 years. Innumerable man-hours have been invested (or wasted?) in the stupendous effort of understanding, analysing the Bill and its versions to make representations thereon. After all these efforts, one feels frustrated if one does not know the outcome/response to the representation. Having received representations/suggestions, reasons as to why some of them are not accepted are never made public. While one appreciates that it is the government’s prerogative to legislate, it is equally important that the stakeholders for whom the legislation is made participate in the process and truly feel a part of it.

 Accountability is the most significant parameter of good governance. One can give innumerable illustrations of how citizens feel slighted when there is no politician or bureaucrat who takes responsibility for their actions. In the past, in our country taking responsibility for actions of one’s juniors was the norm. Such politicians/bureaucrats are now a forgotten breed, the South Korean premiere being an exception. Let us take the recent case of the deletion of a huge number of voters from the electoral rolls, with Maharashtra witnessing this problem on a very large scale. It is possible that the election commission with its limited machinery acted in an absolute bona fide manner. The problem possibly was on account of software glitches, callous data entry or equally careless data verification. Whatever be the reason, the right of franchise of an Indian citizen was lost. It may be virtually impossible to redress the same but the person responsible must be held accountable. It is only if this happens that events like this will not recur.

To ensure that the government of the day acts equitably, fairly transparently and to hold it accountable we must have a robust, consistent and responsive judicial system. We must see that justice is delivered and delivered quickly. Justice delayed is justice denied may sound a clichéd phrase, but it is true. We cannot have the situation where after more than a decade, a trial of a simple hit and run case of an eminent actor has to restart on account of a legal lacuna. Such delay virtually negates the value of any justice that may be delivered. The government that assumes office will have to address these problems, on a war footing.

Finally, if we are going to ensure that democracy survives and flourishes in our country , we the citizens and particularly the educated class will have to do their might. In the words of Alexander Woolcott, “I am tired of hearing it said that democracy doesn’t work. Of course it doesn’t work. We’re supposed to work it!” So, my fellow citizens, put your shoulder to the wheel of democracy and make it run!

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Sexual Harassment Act-II

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Synopsis

With the increasing number in women employment, their security is of paramount importance. The codification of the Sexual Harassment Act – II (‘The Act’) is a much-awaited development and a significant step towards creating awareness on the issue of workplace sexual harassment and ensuring women a safe and healthy work environment.

The author in this article has explained the key provisions of the Act, like applicability for employers to constitute an Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) to address sexual harassment complaints made by women workers, applicability of the Legal Compliance Committee where the ICC is not required, the manner in which the inquiry process is to be carried out by the ICC, etc.

Internal Complaints Committee

Every employer of a workplace, employing 10 or more workers must constitute an Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) to which aggrieved women employees can complain. Thus, if a workplace has less than 10 workers then it need not have an ICC. Note that it refers to 10 workers not 10 female workers. Hence, even if only 1 employee is a lady and the other 9 are males, an ICC is required. Further, the reference is to “workers” and not “employees”. The term workers has not been defined under the Act but one may presume it to be at par with the term “employee”. The Act is silent as to what happens when a workplace employs no women.

The constitution of the ICC should be as follows:

(a) A workplace must have an ICC for each office if the offices/administrative units are located at different places or at a divisional level.

(b) The ICC must have a minimum of 4 members of which at least half should be women.

• The Presiding Officer must always be a women employed at a Senior Level at the workplace. Hence, she must always be an internal senior employee. In case there is no senior level women employee then she can be nominated from any other workplace belonging to the same employer.

What happens if the employer has only 1 workplace and that has only 1 female employee who is not a senior level employee? Who then would be the Presiding Officer? Take a case of an office which has a receptionist as its only lady employee. Would she be the Presiding Officer even though she may be a junior level employee?

• Minimum 2 employees preferably committed to the cause of women/experience in social work or who have legal knowledge. Thus, these 2 members could be male or female.

• One external member from an NGO committed to the cause of women/familiar with issues relating to sexual harassment. Such person must have an expertise on issues relating to sexual harassment and may include a social worker with minimum 5 years’ experience with these issues or a person familiar with labour, service, civil or criminal law. Several organisations have nominated a Lady Lawyer or a Lady NGO worker with experience in this field. This person must always be an external person, i.e., not employed by the workplace. She could be a Consultant/Lawyer to the organisation also but not on its payroll.

• The employee members of the ICC should be replaced by new faces every 3 years.

Local Complaints Committee

For every District, a District Officer would be appointed under the Act. The District Magistrate/ Collector/Deputy Collector could act as such District Officer. Such District Officer would constitute a Local Complaints Committee (LCC) under the Act. The LCC would act as the redressal forum for all organisations not required to constitute an ICC, e.g., those which have less than 10 workers.

Complaint by Aggrieved Woman

Any aggrieved woman can lodge a written complaint of sexual harassment at a workplace with the ICC or the LCC as the case may be. The complaint must be lodged within 3 months from the incident or within 3 months from the last incident in case of a series of incidents. Hence, a stop gap has been provided for lodging the complaint. The Committee can provide a further 3 months’ extension for special cases. The complaint must be filed in 6 copies along with supporting documents and details of the witnesses, if any. The woman may chose to file a complaint under the IPC or any such Law with a Police Station. The Act does not take away this right of a lady.

The first response of the ICC/LCC before initiating an inquiry can be to propose a settlement between the respondent and the aggrieved woman through a conciliation process. However, the offer for such settlement must come from the aggrieved woman alone. Further, a monetary settlement cannot be made as the basis for the conciliation. A settlement would conclude the inquiry process under the Act.

One question which begs attention is must the respondent be a male only? If one reads the Act and the Rules, the definition of the respondent is only a person against whom a complaint is lodged. However, at several places the Rules refer to the preposition “he” for the respondent which tends to suggest that it must be a male alone. But there is no conclusive answer to this question. A similar position exists under the IPC. Recently, the Bombay High Court has raised a question “Can a woman be accused of outraging the modesty of another woman ..?”

Inquiry Process

If a settlement has not been reached/proposed, the Committee would make a thorough inquiry into the complaint against the respondent in the following manner:

(a) Forward a copy of the complaint to the respondent within 7 working days.

(b) Respondent to file his reply within 10 working days of the receipt of complaint by him.

(c) Committee to make a detailed inquiry as per the principles of natural justice. The inquiry must consider all facets. At least 3 members, including the Presiding Officer of the Committee must be present. It must complete its inquiry within 90 days.

(d) Where the Committee feels that there is a prima facie case for a criminal complaint, then it shall forward the same to the police for action under the IPC. Section 354 of the IPC deals with punishment for assault on a woman with an intent to outrage her modesty.

(e) No lawyer can represent either party before the Committee.

(f) During the inquiry the Committee may recommend that the employer transfers the aggrieved women, grants her leave up to 3 months or grants her any other relief. Other relief may include recommendations on restraining the respondent from reporting on the work performance of the aggrieved woman or supervising her academic activity in the case of an educational institution. Thus, the idea is to prevent victimisation as a result of the complaint.

(g) Based on its inquiry, the Committee must arrive at a finding whether or not the respondent is guilty. Accordingly, in cases where they feel that the allegation has been proved, the Committee must recommend to the employer or the District Officer to take action for sexual misconduct. The actions prescribed include:

• Writing a written apology
• Warning/reprimand/censure
• Withholding of promotion/increments • Termination of Service
• Undergoing Counseling sessions
• Carrying out community service – this is probably the first time that we are seeing community service as a means of reprimand. This is very common in the USA.

The Committee may also recommend to deduct such sum from his remuneration to be paid to the aggrieved woman. While determining the sum they will consider the mental suffering of the woman, loss in her career due to the incident, medical expenses incurred on physical/psychiatric treatment; respondent’s financial status.

(h)    The entire process from complaint to action, in- cluding the names and identity of the aggrieved woman, respondent, witnesses, are to be kept confidential from the public, press, media, etc. Even an RTI Query cannot be filed in respect of the same since the Act overrides the Right to Information Act, 2005. The penalty for making such information public is Rs. 5,000. However, justice meted out can be disclosed without revealing the names and identity of the aggrieved woman, respondent, witnesses, etc.

(i)    Either party may prefer an Appeal against the Committee’s Order before the Appellate Authority notified under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946.

Annual Report by ICC

Every ICC must prepare an Annual Report on their committee’s functioning and submit the same to the employer and the District Officer. It must be prepared every calendar year and should include the following:

(a)    Number of complaints received in that year

(b)    Number of complaints disposed off during that
year

(c)    Number of cases pending for more than 90 days

(d)    Number of workshops/awareness programmes
organised

(e)    Nature of action taken by the employer/District Officer.

Duties of Employer

Every employer has been given certain duties and obligations under the Act:

(a)    provide a safe working environment at the workplace and safety from the persons coming into contact at the workplace;

(b)    display at any prominent place in the workplace, the penal consequences of sexual harassments and the order constituting, the ICC;

(c)    organise workshops and awareness programmes at regular intervals for sensitising the employees with the provisions of the Act and orientation programmes for the members of the ICC- this   is an important role which employers can play. They must educate the employees as to what constitutes harassment and the consequences of the same. A standard operating policy or a manual would be very helpful and each and every employee (whether junior or senior) should be educated on the same. External help from Lawyers/NGOs may also be taken for this purpose.  It would be useful to lay down illustrations of real life situations which may be construed as harassment. Some organisations are implementing etiquette/gender sensitisation workshops/role play situations. HR Heads have a very important role to play in this respect.

(d)    provide necessary facilities to the ICC/LCC for dealing with the complaint and conducting an inquiry;

(e)    assist in securing the attendance of the respondent and the witnesses before the Committee;

(f)    make available such information to the Committee as it may require for a complaint;

(g)    provide assistance to the woman if she so chooses to file a complaint in relation to the offence under the IPC;

(h)    cause to initiate action, under the IPC against the perpetrator, or if the aggrieved woman so desires, where the perpetrator is not an em- ployee, in the workplace at which the incident of sexual harassment took place;

(i)    treat sexual harassment as a misconduct under the service rules and initiate action for such misconduct;

(j)    monitor the timely submission of the Annual Reports by the ICC and include in the same the number of case filed and their disposal. If no report is to be filed by an ICC then he must intimate this number to the District Officer.

Penalty on Employer

The employer would be penalised for his failing to comply with the provisions of the Act:

(a)    If he does not constitute an ICC although re- quired to do so;

(b)    Does not take action against a respondent on the basis of the recommendation of the ICC’s inquiry;

(c)    Contravenes any provisions of the Act.

The  first  penalty  is  a  fine  of  up  to  Rs.  50,000.  For a  second  conviction  of  the  same  offence,  he  shall be liable to twice the punishment meted out during the  first  offence.  Further,  it  could  also  lead  to  the cancellation  of  his  trade  licence/approval/registration  required  for  carrying  on  his  business.  Thus,  a repeat offence carries a very serious consequence.

Dwelling Place / House

The Act has one more interesting facet. It even applies to a dwelling place or a house. The definition of a workplace includes a dwelling place or a house. The employer is defined to include a person or a household who employs or benefits from the employment of a domestic worker. The worker could be for any time, for any nature of work, etc. Further, a domestic worker has been defined as a woman who is employed to do household work for remuneration (in cash/kind) whether directly or through a placement agency. She could  be temporary or permanent, part-time or full-time but excludes any member of the employer’s family. Interestingly, an employee is defined to include one who works without remuneration but a domestic worker must be one who works for a remuneration. In relation to a house, an aggrieved woman must be one who is employed at such house. Thus, in case of a workplace (which is not a house), any lady can allege harassment whether or not she is an employee. However, in case of a dwelling house, she must be an employee of that house. Hence, there are two major differences between a house as compared to a workplace other than a house.

All the provisions discussed above would apply even to a dwelling place/house which means that if a house employs 10 or more domestic workers/ servants (male or female) then it would have to constitute an ICC headed by a senior level lady servant and include one external NGO worker/ lawyer. So, if a household has a maid servant and 9 other male servants, drivers, cooks, gardeners, etc., it would have to form an ICC. One wonders whether domestic workers would be in a position to head and handle such an ICC? Is it feasible to ask them to conduct an inquiry, prepare reports and follow principles of natural justice?

Where the ICC/LCC feels that there is a prima facie case of sexual harassment against a domestic worker, then it shall forward the same to the police for action under the IPC.

False Complaints

One fear of this Act is that it could be misused and could go way of section 498A of the IPC (anti-dowry law which has been misused in some cases). Harsh penal provisions have been laid down as a deterrent for false complaints. In case of a false/malicious complaint by a lady, the ICC/LCC can take action against such complainant. The punishment could be on the same lines as that on the respondent    in case of a sexual harassment.

Conclusion

Let us hope that this Act achieves the true objectives for which it was enacted and does not end up becoming just another tick-the-box/compliance list. Men would be well advised to remember Shake- speare’s Henry IV, Part I: “The better part of Valour, is Discretion; in the which better part, I have saved my life”. Think before you act or repent in leisure.

PART D: GOOD GOVERNANCE

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Quote from Shashi Tharoor, Minister of State for Human Resources Development:

“The RTI ACT has changed Governance in the country, yet UPA is given no credit for it.”

Quote From Arindam Chaudhari:

“Good governance is Narendra Modi’s promise. Good governance is surety not about pointing fingers randomly at others! It is about walking the talk. And here is a man who has walked the talk for 12 years and more, and shown how to win hearts and make a progressive State with good governance.”

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Right to Information – School run by Society– Society covered under the Act. : Right to Information Act, 2005.

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Shahada Taluka Co-op. Education Society vs. Kalyan Sajan Patil 2014 (301) E.L.T. 234 (Bom.)(HC)

It is the case of the petitioner, Shahada Taluka Co-operative Education Society Limited, that the said society has been registered under the provisions of the Cooperative Societies Act in the year 1952 i.e., prior to coming into existence in the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act and the said registration is continued inadvertently and later on in the year 1955, it came to be registered under the provisions of the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950.

It is the case of the petitioner society that on 16.03.2011, the respondent No.1 herein submitted an application seeking information under the Right to Information Act, 2005 before the petitioner society in the capacity of Chairman of the Shahada Taluka Co-operative Education Society.

It is the contention of the petitioner society that, as the petitioner society is registered under the Societies Registration Act and under the Bombay Public Trust Act, as per the Right to Information Act the petitioner society does not fall under the definition of “public authority”, and hence the petitioner society is not duty bound to supply information sought by the respondent No.1.

The Court observed that it was not in dispute that the schools run by the petitioner society are receiving grant in aid from the State Government. The distinction which is sought to be made by the counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner is the Chairman of the Shahada Taluka Cooperative Education Society and the information sought is in respect of the affairs of the society and not about the school which is receiving grant in aid directly in the account of the Head Master, and therefore, the petitioner is not obliged to give information sought for. It clearly appears that the Shahada Taluka Cooperative Education Society is established for imparting education. The sole purpose of forming such society is for establishing school and imparting education.

Therefore, the distinction which is tried to be made by the petitioner, as aforementioned, needs no consideration. Though the Information Officer is appointed, the petitioner, when called upon to furnish the information, is bound to supply the same to the respondent No.1.

By way of impugned order, only direction is issued to the petitioner to furnish the information as sought by the respondent no.1 within 15 days. Acceptance of the interpretation of the arguments of the petitioner that information sought is in respect of affairs of the society and not in respect of the school receiving grant in aid, would defeat the object of introducing the Right to Information Act, 2005. The Right to Information Act, 2005 has been introduced with laudable object and said cannot be defeated by accepting narrow interpretation as canvassed by the petitioner.

In that view of the matter, the contention of the petitioner was not accepted.

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Registration – Document not compulsorily registrable: Registration Act, 1908.

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Brahaman Swarnkar Samaj, Pali & Others vs. Medh Kshatriya, Swarnkar Samaj Vikas Samiti, Pali & Another AIR 2014 Raj. 37

The respondent No.1 – plaintiff filed a suit for cancellation of a trust deed, getting it declared void and for permanent injunction against the petitioner-defendants, inter alia, seeking relief for cancellation of the trust deed registered on 31- 05-1997 by the defendant Samaj and permanent injunction in the nature of non-interference in the right of the plaintiff to worship in the temples, which were subject matter of the trust deed. The suit was, inter alia, founded on an agreement dated 15-07-1968 said to have been executed qua the temples between the parties.

The said document dated 15-07-1968 was filed and the same was sought to be exhibited in evidence; petitioner No.1 filed the application, inter alia, with the averments that as in the document dated 15-07-1968, there is a version relating to the property being joint, the same is undervalued and requires registration u/s. 17 of the Registration Act, 1908 and as the document has been undervalued and is unregistered, the same cannot be led in evidence and cannot be marked as an exhibit; it was prayed that it be held that the document was inadmissible.

The Court observed that a bare reading of the document dated 15-07-1968 reveals that the parties therein have termed the same as writing between two temples and further goes on to state that the said both temples have been joint from the beginning and the same would remain so in future also.

The contents of said document, which start with an indication that both the temples are joint merely indicate the existing state of affairs, as on the date of executing the document, recites the status from before the execution of the document and as to what was to continue in future. As per the said document, the property i.e., the temples in question were joint from the beginning and would continue to remain so, does not bring into existence any new state of affairs different from what was existing. The document thereafter merely goes on to indicate that none of the two Samaj would claim exclusive possession and both would be entitled to spend money on the said temples, but would not claim reimbursement of the same.

For a document to be compulsorily registrable u/s. 17(1)(b) of the Act of 1908, it is necessary that the same should purport or operate to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish whether in present or in future, any right, title or interest to or in the immovable property. So far as the creation of any right, title or interest as submitted by learned counsel for the petitioners is concerned, in view of the clear language of the document, which indicates a pre-existing right, it cannot be said that any right was ‘created’ by the said document in favour of any of the parties.

In so far as the ‘declaration’ as envisaged by section 17(1)(b) of the Act of 1908 is concerned, as the word ‘declare’ has been placed alongwith create, limit or extinguish and the said words imply a definite change of legal relation to the property by an expression of will embodied in the document referred to, the said word ‘declare’ has to be read ejusdem generis with the words create, assign or limit. For a document to fall within the ambit of 17(1)(b) of the Act of 1908 on its declaration, it must imply a declaration of will and not a mere statement of fact, as there is a clear distinction between a mere recital of a fact and something which in itself create a title.

Therefore, the document in question is not compulsorily registrable under provisions of section 17(1)(b) of the Act of 1908.

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Negligence-Torts–Medical Practitioner– Liability to pay damages-It does not Transcend into criminal liability as to make him liable – Section 338 of the Indian Penal Code, (1860).

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Dr. P.B. Desai vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr. AIR 2014 SC 795

In the instant case, a patient suffering from cancer was examined by the appellant, a renowned surgeon who advised an ‘Exploratory Laparotomy (Surgery)’, in order to ascertain whether the patient’s uterus could be removed in order to stop vaginal bleeding. The main allegation against the appellant was that he did not take personal care and attention by performing the operation himself. On the contrary, he did not ever bother to even remain present when another doctor started the surgical procedure and opened the abdomen. Moreover, when the other doctor, on opening of the abdomen, found that cancer was at a very advanced stage and it would not be possible to proceed because there was fluid and intestines were plastered, he called the appellant for advice. Even then the appellant did not examine the patient minutely. Instead, after seeing her from the entrance of the operating room, he advised him to close the abdomen. So such so, even after the formation of the fistula and the pathetic condition of the patient, the appellant never bothered to examine or look after her. It was thus alleged that the aforesaid acts of omission and commission amounted to professional misconduct as well as an offence punishable u/s. 338 of the I.P.C. Since there was no overt act on the part of the appellant, as the surgical procedure was performed by another doctor, the charge of abetment u/s. 109 of I.P.C. was also leveled against the appellant. Held, the decision of the appellant advising Exploratory Laparotomy was not an act of negligence, much less wanton negligence, and under the circumstances it was a plausible view which an expert like the appellant could have taken, keeping in view the deteriorating and worsening health of the patient. As a consequence, opening of the abdomen and performing the surgery cannot be treated as causing grievous hurt. It could have been only if the doctors would have faltered and acted in a rash and gross negligent manner in performing that procedure. At the same time, his act of omission, in not doing the surgery himself and remaining absent from the scene and neglecting the patient, even thereafter, when she was suffering the consequences of fistula, is an act of negligence and is definitely worthy of blame (though that is not the part of criminal charge). However, the omission is not of a kind which will give rise to criminal liability. No doubt, he did not do it himself, but it is not the case of the prosecution that another doctor did not do it deftly either. It is because of the condition of the patient, the surgery could not be completed, as on the opening of the abdomen, other complications were revealed. This would have happened in any case, irrespective of whether the abdomen was opened by another doctor or by the appellant himself. The appellant’s omission in not rendering complete and undivided legally owed duty to the patient and not performing the procedure himself has not made any difference. It was not the cause of the patient’s death which was undoubtedly because of the acute chronic cancer condition. The negligent conduct in the nature of omission of the appellant is not so gross as to entail criminal liability on the appellant u/s. 338 of the I.P.C. Thus, though the conduct of the appellant constituted not only professional misconduct for which adequate penalty has been meted out to him by the Medical Council, and the negligence on his part also amounts to actionable wrong in tort, it does not transcend into a criminal liability, and in no case makes him liable for offence u/s. 338, I.P.C. as the ingredients of that provision have not been satisfied.

If the patient has suffered because of negligent act/omission of the doctor, it undoubtedly gives the right to the patient to sue the doctor for damages. This would be a civil liability of the doctor under the law of tort/contract.

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Market Value – Sale Deed-Stamp Duty-Circle rate by itself does not provide true market value of property: Stamp Act, 1899.

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Amit Kumar Tyagi & Another vs. State of U.P. & Others AIR 2014 All 40

The issue raised in the petition was that the authorities have determined market value of the property by enhancing it by 25% without giving any reason.

The instrument was executed and registered on 13-08-2010 in respect of the house’s total area of 252.42 sq. mtrs. The proceedings u/s. 47-A(iv) of Indian Stamp Act, 1899 were initiated pursuant to a spot inspection made by the Additional District Magistrate, Finance and Revenue, Ghaziabad and his report dated 20-10-2010, stated that the value set forth in the instrument appears to be less than the minimum residential circle rate prescribed by the Collector and, therefore, the proceedings for determining market value should be initiated.

The same officer, who submitted the inspection report dated 20-10-2010 and at whose instance the proceedings were initiated, took upon himself to consider the matter finally u/s. 47-A(4) and passed order dated 23-02-2011. He held that 25% should be added to the circle rate prescribed at the relevant point of time and accordingly thereto, the market value of the property comes to Rs. 68,47,060/-, whereupon the the stamp duty payable is Rs. 4,79,300/- and since only Rs. 3,91,000/- has been paid, therefore, there was a deficiency of stamp of Rs. 88,300/-.

It is contended that on the one hand, the Assistant Collector suggested that the stamp duty was to be paid according to the prescribed circle rate/ market value of the commercial land, but while passing the impugned order he has increased the value by 25% from the circle rate for which no reason has been assigned at all. On this ground, the petitioners challenged the order.

The Hon’ble Court observed that it goes without saying that proceedings u/s. 47-A(4) can be initiated only when there exists a ground that the correct market value has not been set forth in the instrument. The determination of market value does not depend on the fancy, imagination and conjectures of the Collector or any other competent authority.

The Court further observed that under the provisions of the Act, 1899 stamp duty is payable on the market value of the property in transacted by the sale deed. It is also true that the market value does not mean the circle rate itself but it is only a guiding factor. The Collector has to determine the market value taking into account various factors. In the case in hand, the Additional Collector has simply referred to the circle rate and in a mechanical way, passed the impugned order enhancing the circle rate by 25%.

U/s. 47-A of the Act, the obligation is on the Collector to find out the correct market value of the property which is alleged to have not been mentioned in the instrument. For the purpose of determining the market value, no machinery is provided in statutory provisions. However, a procedure has now been provided vide U.P. Stamp (Valuation of Property) Rules, 1997 (hereinafter referred to as the “1997 Rules”) in accordance whereto the Collector would determine the market value.

The term “market value” has not been defined under the Act. However, there are some precedents laying down certain guidelines as to how and in what manner a market value would be determined. The consensus is that the market value of any property is the price which the property would fetch or would have fetched if sold in the open market, if sold by a willing seller, unaffected by the special need of a particular purchaser. It is interesting to note that the Act provides first for the determination of minimum value of the property and further says that if the market value of the property set forth in the instrument is less than the minimum value determined under the Act, then before registering the instrument the registering authority shall refer the instrument to Collector for determination of the market value of the property and the proper duty payable thereon. Therefore, a market value of the property in all cases cannot be said to be higher than the minimum value determined under the rules by the concerned authority, inasmuch as, it is only a kind of guideline provided to the authorities for the purpose of considering as to whether the proper stamp duty is being paid by setting forth the true market value of the property in question in the instrument. The entire object of legislature in the various provisions of the Act is to require the parties concerned to set forth the correct market value of the property at which the transaction has taken place so that appropriate duty in accordance with the Act is paid by them. The various provisions with respect to the minimum value etc. are only in aid and assistance of the authorities to find out the true amount of consideration on which the parties have entered into transaction so that the correct duty is collected therefrom.

It is thus clear that the circle rate by itself does not provide a true market value of the property, which is the subject matter of the instrument. It is only a guiding factor. In the present case, interestingly, the proceedings were initiated on the assumption that the stamp duty has not been paid according to the prevailing circle rate/market value treating the market value at par with the circle rate, but when the impugned order has been passed instead of confining to the circle rate, the Additional Collector has gone on to increase the value by 25% further to the prescribed circle rate and in doing so he has not given any reason. The proceedings in question show a complete nonapplication of mind on the part of the authorities. Such proceedings are nothing but amounting to a sheer harassment of public at large and in particular, the person who actually suffers due to such whimsical order passed by the authorities. A serious statutory duty has been cast upon the respondents but instead of doing justice with their statutory requirement, the authorities are passing unmindful, arbitrary orders, whereby not only the large public is being harassed but it also results in burdening the Courts though such litigation otherwise could have been avoided. The petition was allowed.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 106 dated 18th February, 2014

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Facilities to NRIs/PIOs and Foreign Nationals – Liberalisation – Reporting Requirement

Presently, banks are required to report on a quarterly basis to RBI details of remittances (number of applicants and total amount remitted) made by NRI, PIO and Foreign Nationals from their NRO accounts.

This circular has changed the reporting period from quarterly to monthly. As a result banks will have to report to RBI, in the revised format Annexed to the circular, details of remittances out of NRO accounts, including transfers from NRO account to NRE account made by NRI, PIO and Foreign Nationals within 7 days of the end of the reporting month.

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Wolves of Wall Street

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Bonus payments by Wall Street firm are at their highest levels since before the financial crisis of 2008, according to a report by the New York State Comptroller. The news came on the same day that a trader at Goldman Sachs was fined $825,000 for his role in a bad mortgage deal.

The record bonuses, accompanied by a rising trend of big fines for financial market crimes, should lead to a new round of debate on the role of the finance industry. Every country needs a robust financial sector, but also has to take care that its economy is not eventually sucked into what J.M. Keynes called a whirlpool of speculation.

The key to reform is not just macroprudential regulations but also a hard look at incentives for excess risk-taking by traders. JP Morgan Chase and Co. boss Jamie Dimon has got a $20 million bonus a few months after the firm paid a record $13 billion in a settlement with regulators.

(Source: The Mint Newspaper dated 14-03-2014)

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Why WhatsApp

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For some time, the behemoth social networking website Facebook has been plagued by reports that it is losing its edge with younger users. Given that explosive future growth is the source of its hefty valuation of $173 billion (Facebook trades at 50 times its 2014 earnings) as well as the fact that domination of user networks is how such websites can hope to make money, this has been a matter of concern for investors. Even US President Barack Obama, who relied heavily on Facebook for his insurgent campaign in 2008, has noticed, saying late last year in a chat with children that “it seems they don’t use Facebook any more”. The numbers back up President Obama’s assessment.

The slack has been picked up by other networks. Tumblr, for example, with its small, easy-to-link posts with high graphics content; Snapchat, which deletes posts and photos after a few seconds; Instagram, which allows users to manipulate and share photos; and, of course, Twitter. But Mark Zuckerberg of Facebook has something most of these others don’t: a war chest. And thus the purchase, for $1 billion last year, of Instagram. And now the mammoth $19-billion purchase of the instant messaging service WhatsApp. It’s obvious, really, that Facebook is not paying for extra-special technology in buying WhatsApp. Other such SMS replacement services exist. Viber dominates West Asia, and was recently bought for $900 million by a Japanese online retailer. China uses WeChat. Japan uses Line. Eastern Europe uses Telegram. WhatsApp, however, has the largest user base, and is big in Western Europe, Africa and South and Southeast Asia. And it’s the only one that charges user fees; the others get money from advertising or value-added services. But Facebook probably isn’t interested in the money that WhatsApp makes from its downloads. It is interested in WhatsApp’s users: 450 million mobile users, about half of the number that uses Facebook’s apps. And it’s adding a million users daily.

Facebook wants those users. And so it paid for them – $19 billion, which comes to $42 (about Rs 2,600) a user. This is quite a lot; it’s difficult to see how each WhatsApp user could eventually be worth that much to Facebook or its advertisers. When Viber was sold, its users were valued at $8.50 (about Rs 530) a user. Even if just the $4-billion cash portion of the Facebook-WhatsApp deal is examined, then Facebook paid more than that. And it’s clear why: Facebook is desperate. It can’t afford to fall behind in terms of dominating the market – and demographics are against it. Rather than organically growing its network with younger users, it needs to capture them outright – hence the purchase of WhatsApp. It’s betting that smart integration of the two networks will follow and help it reverse its usage decline in the 13-21 age group. Facebook itself is 10 years old now; and it is spending money like water to stay young.

(Source: Business Standard dated 24-02-2014)

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Lesson We Must Learn From Global Indian CEOS

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The rise of global CEOs who spent their formative years in India is acknowledgement that the country is doing at least some things right. Many would agree some of the qualities these leaders possess — humility, modesty and a strong work ethic — were acquired well before they left the territorial frontiers of India.

The stability of family upbringing is among the most underappreciated advantages Indians have. According to the US Census Bureau, only 61 per cent of children in the US are raised from birth to age 18 in a home where both of their birth parents reside. Contrast this with India, where parents stay together and put the happiness of their children above everything else. Some children may feel their parents aren’t perfect, but most children learn what’s best about their parents and discard the rest.

This advantage can only accrue if families stay under the same roof: the biggest lessons learnt from one’s parents are often unspoken. Scott Haltzman, a renowned US sociologist, has shown that happier families understand who they are, what they value and why. This keeps families balanced in both good and bad times as they understand that only deep contentment can transcend momentary periods of pleasure and pain.

The understated reaction of Satya Nadella’s parents to their son’s success is an embodiment of this approach. What is also noteworthy is how the Hyderabad Public School (HPS) produced four global CEOs from India: Satya Nadella (Microsoft), Shantanu Narayen (Adobe), Prem Watsa (Fairfax) and Ajay Banga (MasterCard).Of course, a first-rate educational system and a plethora of sporting activities were a definitive advantage. But it appears that two things differentiated HPS from other schools. First, there was the sterling leadership of the principal of HPS, MC Watsa. And, second, the NCC training — which involved military exercises — may have helped students develop some of the qualities they possess today.

As we share the pride of global CEOs from India, we should reflect on the gratitude we owe parents and teachers. What the lives of Satya Nadella, Shantanu Narayen, Prem Watsa and Ajay Banga teach us is that most people do not get to where they are all on their own. It’s also a reminder that most people won’t get there in isolation either.

(Source: The Economic Times of India, dated 17-02-2014)

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[2013] 39 taxmann.com 7 (Mumbai – CESTAT) – Jetking Infotrain Ltd. v. Commissioner of Service Tax, Mumbai

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Whether mere omission to declare activity before department would amount to suppression of fact and attract penalty u/s. 78 when there no suppression is alleged in the SCN.? Held, No.

Facts:
The appellant running computer coaching centres imparted computer education at different locations in India. They entered into agreements with persons to provide computer training on franchisee basis and from the fees received, they transferred the amount to the related franchise’s account after retaining 15%. The department treated this as a “franchise service” and confirmed service tax and imposed an equivalent amount of penalty apart from penalties u/s. 76 and 77 of the Act. The appellant did not contest the demand as the issue was decided against the appellant in another decision of Tribunal in similar case. For the penalty the appellant pleaded bonafide belief that the services as to non-taxability as franchise service.

Held
The penalty u/s. 78 was dropped on the ground that there is no specific allegation in the showcause notice for suppression of facts with intent to evade Service Tax and that mere omission to declare the activity would not amount to suppression of fact.

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2013 (32) STR 423 (Tri-Ahmd) Matrix Telecom P. Ltd. vs. CCE, Vadodara –II

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Whether penalty is imposable when service tax was paid before issuance of SCN and was a revenue neutral exercise.

Facts:
Appellant engaged in manufacturing of excisable goods paid the duty. Appellant received services of marketing & management consultancy from certain foreign service providers located out of India. During the course of audit, audit party pointed out the applicability of service tax on the receipt of the services from out of India. Appellant obtained the service tax registration and paid service tax with interest. Show Cause Notice was issued levying service tax, interest & penalty and were confirmed in the Order. Appellant challenged the imposition of penalty.

Held:
Since imposition of tax on import of services was under dispute at various fora and got final after the Bombay High Court gave decision in Indian National Ship Owners Association [2009 (13) STR 235 (Bom)], the Appellant deposited service tax after being pointed out by the Revenue.

Also the payment of service tax was revenue neutral exercise since it was available for credit against excise duty and therefore penalty was set aside.

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Whether reimbursement of electricity could be included in the taxable value for the purpose of renting of immovable property service?

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Facts:
Appellant provided renting of immovable property service to the tenants. Appellant charged service tax on the amount received from tenants except for reimbursement of electricity. Respondent confirmed the demand on the reimbursement of electricity.

Held:
Tribunal observed that electricity is regarded as goods as per Excise Tariff Heading 27 of CETA and as per Schedule A-20 of the Maharashtra VAT Act. Also Notification No. 12/2003 provides exemption for supply of goods and hence, service tax was held not applicable on reimbursement of electricity.

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2013 (32) STR 430 (Tri-Chennai) Cholamandalam MS General Insurance Co. Ltd vs. CCE ST-LTD Chennai.

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Whether passing of credit entry in the accounts tantamount to refund of money?

Facts:
Appellant an insurance service provider adjusted the service tax refunded to the intermediaries on the cancelled insurance policies against the service tax liability on the insurance premium for subsequent period. Revenue objected to the adjustment after noticing that in case of intermediaries, Appellant did not refund the actual amount of cancelled premium and service tax by way of cheque but had passed credit entries in the balances appearing in its books of accounts. Respondent considered this to be unsatisfactory, confirmed the demand.

Held:
Tribunal observed that, prima facie a credit in the account of intermediaries amounted to refund of money, however for the purpose of verification of the claim, the matter was remanded for de-novo adjudication.

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[2013] 40 taxmann.com 180 (Mumbai – Trib.) Platinum Asset Management Ltd vs. DDIT Asst Year: 2006-07, Dated: 4th December 2013

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Section 115AD of the Act – loss arising to a FII from index derivative transactions, is a capital loss and can be set-off against capital gains from sale of shares.

Facts:
The taxpayer was a Foreign Institutional Investor (“FII”). In respect of its two sub-accounts, the taxpayer had furnished the return of income declaring short-term capital loss. The loss had arisen from index derivative transactions. Hence, the AO concluded that it was a business loss assessable under the head ‘income from business and profession’ and not short-term capital loss as claimed by the taxpayer. The set off was denied as the taxpayer had no PE in India. In appeal, CIT(A) confirmed the order.

The issues before the Tribunal were:

• Whether the loss arising from index derivative transactions was business loss or capital loss? Whether the loss arising from index derivative transaction can be set-off against capital gains arising from sale of shares?

Held:
In terms of section 115AD of the Act, a FII is an ‘investor’ and further, income from transfer of securities is chargeable under the head ‘capital gains’ (long-term or short-term) and not business loss, and eligible for set off against capital gains.

SEBI (FII) Regulations and section 115 AD of the Act show that in case of FIIs the government has not contemplated that the tax authority should distinguish between the securities as those constituting capital asset or shock-in-trade. If a FII receives income in respect of securities or from transfer of securities, such income should be considered only u/s. 115AD(1).

Though in common parlance, shares and debentures are distinct from derivatives, such distinction is obliterated by mentioning the term ‘securities’ as defined in section 2(h) of Securities Contract (Regulation) Act, 19561 .

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2013 TIOL 1727 CESTAT Mum, Atlas Documentary Facilitators Co Pvt. Ltd vs. CST, Mumbai

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CENVAT credit cannot be denied if claimed on the basis of debit notes capturing the details in annexure to the said debit note. Further denial of CENVAT credit on the basis of all the premises from where taxable services were provided, make the provisions of centralised registration redundant.

Facts:
The Appellant provided “Business Auxiliary Services” (BAS) and had centralised registration. It provided BAS services to banks and therefore was allotted part of the bank premises and the bank charged rent plus service tax to them. The bank issued debit notes on the Appellant and all the details as stipulated under Rule 4A of the Service Tax Rules, 2004 and Rule 9 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 were provided in the annexure to the debit notes issued by the bank. The Appellant availed the credit based on the said debit notes. CENVAT credit was denied on the grounds that all the details were not mentioned on the debit note but in the annexure and the annexure cannot be treated as CENVAT document. Further that the Appellant had not registered bank premises from where the taxable service was provided.

Held:
The details as required under the provisions of law for claiming the CENVAT credit were provided and also the provisions do not lay down any particular format for the CENVAT claiming documents thus the CENVAT cannot be denied if all the details are provided as required under the law. The Appellant had obtained centralised registration and thus seeking registration of all the premises from which it provides taxable service will make the Rule 4B of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 granting centralized registration redundant and therefore the CENVAT credit cannot be denied on the grounds as implied by the department.

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2013 TIOL 1734 CESTAT – Kol, UCO Bank vs. CST, Kolkata

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CENVAT credit cannot be disallowed on adhoc basis without verification. Payments made vide wrong accounting code cannot be demanded again as tax is already paid and moreover when the department regularised the subsequent payment under the wrong code.

Facts:
The Appellant is a bank registered under centralized registration under service tax and discharged all its liabilities from its head office i.e. centralised registered premises. The Appellant took the CENVAT credit based on invoices pertaining to the head office kept at the head office and that pertaining to branch office was kept at the respective branches. During the CERA audit, invoices on which CENVAT credit was availed were demanded and the Appellant offered the invoices available at the head office but on account of huge volume, no checking was done and the CENVAT credit was denied. Secondly, the Appellant paid the service tax liability under the wrong accounting code and therefore they was asked to pay the said service tax again. Relying on the case of Arcadia Shares & Stock Brokers Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCE, Goa 2013 TIOL 1044 CESTAT Mum, the Appellant pleaded bonafides regarding use of erroneous code. However, they informed that the department itself regularised such a subsequent irregular payment and on intimation by the department and produced the relevant documents as evidence.

Held:
CENVAT credit cannot be denied without verification only because the volume is huge. Joint effort be made to conduct verification and case is remanded for verification. The payment made under wrong accounting code cannot be demanded and remanded the case for verification of the Appellant’s case that the subsequent payment was regularised by the department.

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2013 (32) STR 474 (Tri-Mumbai) Golden Tobacco Ltd vs. CCEx, Mumbai – V

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Whether Mobile/Telephone service installed at the residence of the Directors eligible for credit?

Facts:
Appellant preferred the appeal against order of Revenue denying the service tax credit on mobile/ telephone installed at the residence of the Directors of the Appellant on the reasoning that the same did not qualify as input service definition.

Held:
Tribunal referring to the decision of the Bombay High Court in Ultratech Cement Ltd.-2010 (260) ELT 369 (Bom.) which held that services used by the manufacturer of excisable goods in the course of its business activity would be entitled for credit, allowed the appeal of the Appellant.

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2013 (32) STR 525 (Tri-Chennai) Central Bank of India vs. Comm. of Ex & ST, Chennai.

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Whether is there any time limit for availing the CENVAT credit?

Facts:
Appellant had taken CENVAT credit in the year 2009 for the period pertaining to year 2004 to 2009. Respondent issued SCN and denied the credit and imposed the interest and penalties.

Held:
Tribunal observed that neither the Central Excise Act nor CENVAT Credit Rules prescribed any time limit within which credit should be taken, although it was prescribed that CENVAT credit would be available immediately. The appeal was allowed with consequential reliefs.

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2013 (32) STR 451 (Tri-Mumbai) Anand Construction Co. vs. CCEx, Kolhapur

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Whether service tax on construction of a hostel building can be confirmed on the ground of non-production of evidence for the use of the said building without any factual allegation of its commercial use?

Facts:
Appellant constructed a hostel for an educational institution which was to be used for stay by the students of the said institution. Respondent issued SCN and demanded service tax on the activity of construction of the said hostel building. Appellant contended that since the building was constructed for the purpose other than commercial purpose, service tax was not applicable and Respondent did not dispute the facts. Revenue considered it taxable as no evidence of the claim of noncommercial use was produced.

Held:
Tribunal held that since the said building was constructed for the purpose of residence of students and there was absence of allegation that building was being used for any other purpose, set aside the demand and granted the relief.

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2013 (32) STR 418 (Tri-Delhi) Indusind Media & Communication Ltd vs. CCE, Delhi

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Whether carriage fees charged for providing desired frequency for broadcasting channels signals would be classifiable under BAS or BSS?

Facts:
Appellant provided broadcasting & cable TV services and were registered as such. SCN was issued raising the demand of service tax on carriage fees received for providing desired frequency for broadcasting channels signals under business auxiliary service. Also demand was raised under Lease Circuit service for amount received for providing voice & data circuit service. Demand was confirmed with interest and penalties.

Held:
Carriage fees charged from different channels for providing desired frequency for broadcasting their channel’s signals which facilitates better quality view of channel. Better quality of channels enhanced the viewer-ship of channel and thus amounted to promotion of broadcasting channel and therefore classifiable under business auxiliary service.

Original authority classified voice & data circuit service under Lease Circuit service for a certain period and under telecommunication service for subsequent period. Appellate authority in its Order classified the said service under telecommunication service. Both the departmental authorities have not given any findings on the applicability of the said classification and therefore this issue was remanded to original authority.

Since no finding was recorded on the issue of invocation of extended period and penalties, the Appellant’s claim that proper disclosures were made in the service tax returns in respect of carriage fees, voice & data circuit fees received, the matter was remanded to the original authority.

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2013 (32) STR 407 (Tri-Bang) Ace Credit vs. CCEx, Mangalore

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Whether services of Direct Sales Associate/Agent of bank is classifiable as “provision of service on behalf of client” or “promotion/marketing of services provided by client”.

Facts:
Appellant challenged service tax under one of the sub-clause of the definition of Business Auxiliary Service (BAS) and applicability of extended period of limitation and levy of penalty.

Appellant was appointed as Direct Sales Associate/ Agent of ICICI and HDFC banks for promoting various products of these banks at relevant times. Appellant obtained service tax registration by disclosing the nature of services rendered by it under BAS category under sub-clause “provision of service on behalf of client” which was made taxable from 10-09-2004 started paying taxRespondent issued demand on the basis that the services provided by Appellant were covered not under the clause of “provision of services on behalf of client” but under sub-clause “promotion/ marketing of services provided by client” which was taxable from 01-07-2003.

Held:
Tribunal after referring the agreement entered between Appellant & Banks held that Appellant by using its expertise, staff, infrastructure was marketing the products of Banks and these were nothing but the services provided by Bank. Hence services of the Appellant were classifiable under sub-clause “Promotion/marketing of services provided by the client” which was taxable w.e.f. 01-07- 2003. Further, non-disclosure of services rendered at the time of obtaining service tax registration in the year 2004 amounted to suppression of material facts for the period prior to year 2004 and hence invocation of extended period was justified. However, since Appellant filed an application under “Extra-ordinary Taxpayer-Friendly Scheme” in the year 2004, the case was considered covered u/s. 80 for setting aside the penalties.

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2012 (32) STR 392 (Guj) C C Patel & Associates Pvt Ltd vs. UOI

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Whether refund claim for services tax paid twice can be rejected on the ground of limitation?

Facts:
Appellant preferred refund claim for service tax paid twice (second time at the instance of department) against the Order of CESTAT rejecting the appeal filed by Appellate.

Appellant deposited service tax on billing basis instead of receipt basis that too before the due date. Respondent passed the orders raising the demand of service tax on the receipts realised in subsequent period, without adjusting the service tax paid at the time of billing. Appellant deposited the service tax demanded with interest and preferred a refund claim. Respondent rejected the refund claim on the ground of limitation and also due to possibility of unjust enrichment.

Held:
High Court after referring to provisions of section 68(2) & 68(3) of the Finance Act as existed at the relevant time, held that, Appellant had already deposited the entire tax on billing basis thus had complied the requirement of section 68. The logic advanced in the Order of Respondent while demanding the tax was fundamentally incorrect. Question of limitation in case of retention of service tax which was paid twice would not arise and such retention was without authority of law. Appellant has deposited the tax separately and second time under insistence of Revenue which was the subject matter of refund, hence principal of unjust enrichment was not applicable. Appeal was allowed with direction to refund the tax paid.

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[2013] 39 taxmann.com 69 (Madras HC) – CCE vs. Salem Starch & Manufacturers’ Service Industrial Co-operative Society Ltd.

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Whether, co-operative society providing platform for the sellers and buyers to meet in a common place, providing a storage facility to the manufacturer, and organising of the sale of the products etc is liable for service tax under “clearing and forwarding” service? Held, No.

Facts:
The respondent a registered co-operative society formed with the object of improvement of tapioca cultivation and tapioca sago and starch industry and of the economic condition of tapioca cultivators and sago and starch manufacturers in some area. Their activities involved in the case were as under:

Members of the society sent their products to the society’s premises by making their own arrangements for loading, transport and unloading of the goods. The said goods were weighed and sent to the godown maintained by the society. Samples were drawn for quality testing as well  as for display in the tender hall. On receipt of the tenders from the registered merchants, who also happened to be members of the society, the higher rate offered for each lot was displayed. On confirmation of the price by the principal, the buyer was intimated suitably to make his arrangements to lift the stock. Thereupon the society prepared the statement of bill to the members, wherein, deductions were made towards advance paid, interest payable, godown services charges, godown rent, unloading charges, marking charges, bank service charges and courier charges etc. According to the society, it acted as agent between the members and buyers; provided warehousing facility and gave advance money to the members before sale if so requested by the members

As contended by the Revenue, the society received the goods from principal, effected sales only after obtaining the concurrence of the principal; they maintained the records for receipts, despatches and the stock available with them in the warehouse and therefore tax was sought to be levied under “clearing and forwarding service” and it was confirmed in the first appeal.

The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s appeal holding that the consignments of sale were brought by the principal to the premises of the society for auction and that the society did not clear the consignments from its premises. After the sale, the goods were delivered to the buyer at the sales premises by the owner/principal. As such there was no forwarding took place. Referring to the decision in Mahavir Generics vs. CCE [2007] 6 STT 523 (New Delhi-CESTAT) the Tribunal held that the assessee was not doing forwarding services and consequently, there was no liability to pay the service tax. Before Hon. High Court, the Revenue placed reliance on the CBEC Circular in F.No. B/43/7/97 TRU dated 11-07-1997 which the society contested and placed reliance on section 65A(2) (b) of the Finance Act that even assuming that there is a combination of different services, the Revenue must find out the essential character of the service to bring the society within the framework of the activity of clearing and forwarding.

High Court held as under:

• There is no evidence to show that the assessee had a responsibility of arranging despatch of goods purchased by the buyer in the auction nor had responsibility to collect the goods from the principal’s premises. It is only the principal who brought their products on the society’s premises to make use of the common market platform of the Society for its members and on the request of the principal, the society offered the storage facility.

• On reading of the nature of activity rendered by the society, it is clear that except for receiving the goods which were brought to its doorsteps by its principal and displaying the goods received for sale, practically, nothing else was done by the society in the matter of taking the goods from the principal and for further despatching of the goods to the buyer by engaging transporter or on its own. The conduct of the society, handling the goods on receipt raising invoices on sale or maintaining records as to the stock availability, rate at best, indicates it only as an agency offering storage facility. This act, per se, does not convert the assessee’s transaction as that of a clearing and forwarding agency. The essential character of the activity of providing a platform for the sellers and buyers to meet in a common place, providing a storage facility to the manufacturer, the financial help etc. do not, take the society anywhere near the activities discharged by a clearing and forwarding agent. The incidental services offered in the transaction in arranging the transporting of the goods to the buyer would not, decide the nature of the transaction as one of clearing and forwarding agency.

(Note: It may be noted that, decision of Mahaveer Generics relied upon by the Tribunal has been approved by P&H High Court in the case of CCE vs. Kulchip Medicines 2009 (14) STR 608, however it has been subsequently reversed by Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in the case of Commissioner of C.Ex (Bangalore) vs. Mahaveer Generics 2010 (17) STR 225 (Kar) distinguishing the said decision of P&H High Court (supra).

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2013 (32) STR 388 (Kar.) Prakash Retail Private Limited vs. Dy. Commissioner of Commercial Tax (Audit), Udupi

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Whether charges for transportation and installation included in the “Sale Price” of goods is subjected to VAT?

Facts:
Appellant was engaged in the trading of household articles, electrical and electronic goods and sold these goods to its customers by placing orders with various manufacturers. The terms of sale were on ex-factory basis and the sale price was charged as per price list issued by the manufactures. Thereafter Appellant arranged for the transportation from the place of manufacturer to the customers by collecting transport charges. Further Appellant charged for the installation of these items at the place of the customers. The invoices raised by it had three components – sale price, transport charges and installation charges. Appellant deposited VAT on the sale price and paid service tax on the transport charges and installation charges. Authority demanded VAT on transport and installation charges for which the present writ is filed.

Held:
The High Court after referring to section 2(36) of KVAT Act held that, the said section specifies the term ‘turnover’ which means the aggregate amount for which goods are sold shall include any sum charged for anything done by the dealer in respect of goods sold at the time of or before the delivery thereof. If the transfer of title to goods is to be at the place of seller then the subsequent charges for transporting goods & installation do not form part of the amount for which goods are sold. From the price lists and sale invoices of the Appellant, it becomes clear that the sale prices are on ex-factory basis and do not include the installation. Therefore the sale price of the goods at the ex-showroom price attracts sales tax/VAT. Subsequent to the transfer of title in goods at the place of seller, Appellant acts as agent of customers for transportation of goods and installation. Therefore the transportation and installation charges do not become part of the sale price of goods. In this case, Appellant has collected transport & installation charges and deposited service tax thus Appellant has discharged its legal obligation of paying service tax. The State Government cannot be enriched by wrongly bringing the transport and installation charges as part of sale price of the goods. Thus the writ was allowed and the order was quashed.

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Branch Transfer, Inter State Sale vis-àvis Dispatch of Semi-finished Goods

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Introduction
Under Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (CST Act), the transaction of ‘sale’ (inter- state sale) is liable to tax. A transaction of sale becomes inter-state sale, if because of such sale, there is movement of goods from one State to another State. In other words, if there is link between inter-state movement of goods and the pre-agreed sale between the transferor (seller) and the buyer then there will be inter-state sale.

However, there can be inter-state movement of goods (otherwise than an agreement to sale), like; when goods are sent from one branch in one State to another branch in other State of the same entity or to the agent or principal as the case may be (commonly known as ‘consignment transfer/branch transfer’).

There is a lot of litigation about claim of branch transfer vis-à-vis inter-state sale. The transferor branch may be transferring goods to another branch for compliance of requirement of a local customer of the transferee branch. Whether there is conceivable link between dispatch to branch and ultimate sale to the local customer will decide the nature of transaction. If there is conceivable link then the branch transfer will amount to inter-state sale. If there is no such conceivable link, then it will not amount to inter state sale and claim of branch transfer will remain allowable.

Whether there is conceivable link between branch transfer and ultimate sale will depend upon facts of each case. Therefore, there can not be any general ratio for deciding the nature of transaction.

Dispatch of Semi-finished goods
An interesting issue arose before Maharashtra Sales Tax Tribunal (MSTT) in case of Multi Flex Lami Prints Ltd. (Appeal No. 61 of 2008 dated 29.7.2013).

Facts were that the appellant/dealer was engaged in the activity of supply of packaging pouches. The packing pouches were to be supplied to one particular customer and they were printed accordingly as per his specifications. Appellant had manufacturing unit at Mahad in Maharashtra. There, on the raw materials, processes like colour separation, cylinder making, printing and lamination were carried on. After above processes, the processed goods were sent to Silvassa the unit. In the Silvassa unit, processes like slitting and pouching were done. Thereafter the pouches were supplied to the customers.

In the assessment, the branch transfer claim was allowed. However, in revision proceedings, the said claim was disallowed holding that the transfer is interstate sale. The fact of manufacturing the goods as per specification of customer in Mahad and dispatch to Silvassa was considered as the determinative factor for holding the transfer as inter state sale.

Judgment of Hon’ble Tribunal
Before the Hon’ble Tribunal, several arguments about legality of the revision order were taken. However, Hon’ble Tribunal considered the revision action as valid. On merits, Hon’ble Tribunal held that the revision is not correct. The observations of Hon’ble Tribunal are reproduced below:

“It was explained in the said letter that the processes, namely colour separation, cylinder making, printing and lamination had been carried out at the factory in Mahad and thereafter, the laminated films were dispatched to Silvassa Unit of the appellant for further processing such as slitting and pouching. It was then explained by the appellant to the revising Officer that the goods sent to Silvassa Unit were Semi finished goods and thereafter they were slit according to the specification of width given by the customer. The slit films were then stretch-wrapped and packed, which is known as primary packing. The said film rolls were thereafter put in corrugated boxes which are known as secondary packing. It was also explained by the appellant to the revising Officer that in case the customer requires the material in pouch form, the laminated/slitted films is converted into pouches of types/sizes as per specification of the customers and after quality check and packing they are dispatched to the customer. It also appears that it was explained by the appellant to the revising officer that, although the goods become identifiable to a particular customer at the time of leaving Mahad Unit but in a Semi finished condition. It was explained by the appellant that the semi finished goods received by the Silvassa Unit were subjected to further processing of slitting and pouching at Silvassa unit and were thereafter dispatched to the customers at various places outside Silvassa in finished form. It would appear that it was the case of the appellant before the revising officer that the goods sent to the branch were not delivered/ sold as such by the Silvassa branch, but they were different goods from the goods sent to the Silvassa branch. A perusal of revision order shows that the revising officer had not controverted this factual submission of the appellant and thus accepted the contention of the appellant that the goods sent by the appellant to the Silvassa unit were the goods manufactured up to lamination stage and further process such as slitting and pouching were done at Silvassa unit and the goods ultimately delivered to the buyers outside Silvassa were after slitting and pouching made at Silvassa. In support of the claim that slitting and pouching of laminated and printed packaging film amounts to manufacturing activity, the appellant has relied upon the judgment dated 24th September 2012 of the Bombay High Court in Income Tax Appeal No.741 of 2010. The revenue has however relied upon the judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of Faridabad Iron and Steel Traders Association v/s. Union of India in Civil Writ Petition Nos. 7595 of 2001 and 94 of 2002 decided on 21-11-2003 to support it’s case that slitting of laminated films does not amount to manufacture. The concept of manufacture envisages that the processes to which the goods are subjected to should not only bring about change in the goods but the change should be such that the goods after subjecting to processes emerge as a different commercial commodity. In Faridabad Iron and Steel Traders Association, it was held by the Delhi High Court that mere cutting or slitting of Steel Sheet does not amount to manufacture because the identity of the product remains unchanged. We are of the view that in the context of the facts of the present case it would be most appropriate to decide the issue relying upon the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Income Tax Appeal No.741 of 2010. We agree with the appellant that the nature of goods actually delivered to the buyers by Silvassa unit are different from the goods sent by the appellant’s factory at Mahad to it’s Silvassa Unit. This fact is borne out from the description in the stock transfer invoices raised by the appellant on its Silvassa branch and the sales invoices issued by the Silvassa branch to the buyers.”

It is further observed as under;

“In the present appeal before us, the goods manufactured and ultimately delivered to the customer by the Silvassa branch of the appellant are made as per the specifications of the customer. Manufacturing involves the processes namely, colour separation, Cylinder making, printing, lamination, slitting and pouching. Processes upto lamination stage are done at Mahad factory in Maharashtra. The goods manufactured upto lamination stages are sent to Silvassa branch. But they are not delivered to the customer in the form  in which they are received by Silvassa branch because the goods in the form in which they are received by Silvassa branch are not ready to be delivered/sold to the customers as per their requirement/orders. The goods received by Silvassa branch are subjected to further processing of slitting and pouching so as to make them appropriate for delivery to the customer as per his specification. Slitting and pouching is done at Silvassa. Thus, it is clear that the goods delivered by Silvassa branch of the appellant to the customer is a different commercial commodity from the goods sent by Mahad factory of the appellant to Silvassa branch and therefore it is difficult to hold that there is an inter-State sale of the same goods which were manufactured by the Mahad factory of the appellant and dispatched to Silvassa branch. In the case of Bharat Electronics Ltd., (46 VST179), The petitioner had manufactured night vision devices at its Machilipatnam Unit which were transferred to other units of the petitioner outside the State to be incorporated in the equipment to be manufactured at the other units which were eventually sold there from to end customers. It was held by the Andhra Pradesh High Court that it is only if the goods which move from one State to another are sold as they are would the question of such transfer of goods attracting levy of tax under the C.S.T Act as an inter-state sale arise.”

Conclusion
The above judgment will be useful for deciding the nature of transaction, when there is branch transfer of Semi-finished goods. However, the nature of processes carried out at relevant places is also required to be seen before arriving to conclusion. It is expected that above judgment will provide guidelines.

Notification No. 1513/CR 150/Taxation 1 dated 24-12-2013

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Notification No. 1513/CR 151/Taxation 1 dated 24- 12-2013

By this Notification No. 1513, sales of wine covered by entry 3A of Schedule D by certain dealers subject to conditions is made exempt with effect from 1st January, 2014.

The other Notifications are also for amending Schedule D.

Refund to Diplomatic Authorities

Notification No. VAT 1513/CR 110/Taxation 1 dated 24-12-2013

By this Notification, the earlier Notification No. Vat.1509/CR-89/Taxation -1 Dated 5th November, 2009 gets amended.

Notification No. 1513/CR 124/Taxation 1 dated 01-01- 2014

By this Notification, the late fee for filing returns for certain class of dealers has been exempted subject to conditions.

Vehicles for handicapped persons

Notification No. 1513/CR 130/Taxation 1 dated 27- 12-2013

By this Notification Entry No. 63 is inserted in Schedule A for motor vehicles having engine capacity up to 200cc adapted or modified for use by handicapped persons reducing rate of tax at Nil. Such vehicle should be certified as “invalid carriage” in the certificate of registration issued under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

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IFB Agro Industries Ltd. vs. Joint Commissioner of Income-tax In the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal ‘B’ Bench Kolkata Before P. K. Bansal (A. M.) and George Mathan (J. M.) ITA No. 1721/Kol/2012 Assessment Year: 2009-10. Decided on 12th March, 2013 Counsel for Assessee / Revenue: S. K. Tulsiyan / Ajoy Kr. Singh

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Section 2(22)(e) – Deemed dividend – Intercorporate deposit is neither loan nor advance hence not covered u/s. 2(22)(e).

Facts
The assessee had received Inter-corporate deposits of Rs. 11.20 crore. from IFB Automotive Pvt. Ltd., a company wherein the assessee held 18.82% of the shares. The said deposit was treated by the AO as a loan and invoking the provisions of section 2(22) (e), he taxed the said receipt as income of the assessee. On appeal, the CIT(A) confirmed the order of the AO.

Before the tribunal, the revenue supported the orders of the lower authorities and further relied on the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Star Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. reported in 203 ITR 11, wherein it has been held that a loan to a shareholder to the extent to its accumulated profits was liable to be treated as deemed dividend.

Held
The tribunal noted that the dispute primarily revolves around the issue as to whether the Inter corporate deposits received by the assessee from M/s. IFB is a ‘loan’ or ‘advance’ or is a ‘deposit’. It further noted that the provisions of section 2(22)(e) refers to only ‘loans’ and ‘advances’ it does not talk of a ‘deposit’. According to the tribunal, the fact that the term ‘deposit’ cannot mean a ‘loan’ and that the two terms ‘loan’ and the term ‘deposit’ are two different and distinct terms, is evident from the explanation to section 269T as also section 269SS of the Act where both the terms are used. Further, it was noted that the second proviso to section 269SS of the Act recognises the term ‘loan’ taken or ‘deposit’ accepted. The tribunal then observed that once it is accepted that the terms ‘loan’ and ‘deposit’ are two distinct terms which has distinct meaning then, if term ‘loan’ is used in a particular section, the deposit received by an assessee cannot be treated as a ‘loan’ for that section.

Further, on perusal of the decision of the Special Bench of the Ahmedabad bench Tribunal in the case of Gujarat Gas & Financial Services Ltd. reported in 115 ITD 218 which had taken into consideration the decision of the Special Bench of the Delhi Tribunal in the case of Housing & Urban Development Corporation Ltd. reported in 102 TTJ (SB) 936 and of the Bombay tribunal in the case of Bombay Oil Industries Ltd. reported in 28 SOT 383, the tribunal opined that the Inter corporate deposits cannot be treated as a loan falling within the purview of section 2(22)(e) of the Act. Accordingly, the addition representing inter-corporate deposits treated as loan by the AO and confirmed by the CIT(A) was deleted by the tribunal.

As regards the decisions relied on by the CIT(A) as also by his counsel before the tribunal, it observed that the same were on ‘loans’ and none of the decisions referred to by them discussed anywhere that deposits were to be treated as loans.

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Business expenditure: Revenue or capital: Section 37: Corporate club membership fees paid by the assessee is revenue expenditure: Deduction allowable as business expenditure:

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CIT vs. M/s. Jindal Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. (Bom): ITA No. 1567 of 2011 dated 18-03-2014:

The Assessing Officer disallowed the club expenditure of Rs. 16,15,934/- treating the same as capital expenditure. The Tribunal allowed the claim and deleted the addition.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) T he Tribunal has held by relying on the documents and record produced by the respondent assessee that the club membership is a corporate membership. The company has obtained the membership in this case for its directors and to promote the business interests of the company and as they would get in touch and come in contact with business personalities. In such circumstances, following the order passed by this court in the case of Otis Elevator Company (India) Ltd. vs. CIT; 195 ITR 682 (Bom), the Tribunal has reversed the finding and conclusion of the Assessing Officer and the CIT(A).

ii) Such finding of fact and consistent with the material produced therefore does not merit any interference in our jurisdiction u/s. 260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The appeal is therefore dismissed.”

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Exemption under Focus Market Scheme (FMS) on export of meat and meat products, cotton and cotton yarn

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Notification No. 17/2013-ST dated 26th December, 2013

Vide this Notification, Notification No. 6/2013-ST dated 18th April, 2013 has been amended by way of adding additional categories like Meat & Meat Product, Cotton & Cotton Yarn in the list of exports not eligible for exemption under Focus Market Scheme duty Credit scrip issued to an exporter by the Regional Authority.

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[2013] 144 ITD 57 (Mumbai-Trib.) IGFT Ltd. vs. ITO-2(2)(1), Mumbai A.Y. 2001-02 Date of Order: 13th May 2013

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Section 4 – Sum received for transfer of intangible assets on discontinuance of business resulting in loss of enduring trading assets considered as capital receipt not chargeable to tax.

Section 4 – Non-compete fees received on transfer of sole and main business for not carrying on the same for a limited period was considered as capital receipts not chargeable to tax during the A.Y. 2001-02.

Facts
Assessee-company was engaged in the business of merchant banking. It had transferred its business of merchant banking in the form of employees, customer and client relationship, a list of 10 largest clients and certain know-how for a sum of Rs. 25 lakh. Further, it also received a sum of Rs. 1 crore as non-compete fees for a consideration towards not carrying on the same business for a period of 3 years after its transfer.

Assessee claimed that a sum of Rs. 1.25 crore was capital receipts not chargeable to tax.

The Ld. CIT(A) upheld the order of the AO and taxed the receipts of Rs. 1.25 crore under the head business income due to the following reasons:

I. Business was hampered only for the period of 3 years and not forever. Amount was received as compensation during the course of business and there was no loss of capital assets or capital structure of the assessee’s business. Business has been continued as evident from the annual accounts of subsequent years.
II. Amount received Rs. 1.25 crore was negligible as compared to the earnings from the business of Rs. 7.5 crore and it defies business prudence of the assessee.
III. There was no basis for computing the amount of consideration of Rs.1.25 crore.

Held:
The Hon’ble ITAT held that impugned receipt of Rs. 25 lakh was a capital receipt due to the following reasons:

The assessee received the consideration for the transfer of its merchant banking business and the same was discontinued by it. Hence, compensation received cannot be considered as receipts during the course of business.

Also the Revenue failed to show as to how the agreement was not bona fide. It has been accepted that the agreement was with unrelated and unknown party which at relevant point of time was reputed international firm of chartered accountants. It was intended to be acted upon by both.

Further, it has been held that it is for the transferor to fix the consideration for the transfer. It is not at the instance of the revenue to raise any issue on its adequacy. After discontinuing the merchant banking business, assessee did not have any active source of income and its income consist of mainly dividend from shares and mutual funds, profit on sale of shares, interest income and nominal consultancy charges. Hence there was substantial fall in profit earning of the assessee. It has also been held that the transfer of business has resulted in loss of enduring trading.

Following the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.C. Shrinivasa Setty 128 ITR 294, it has been held that, as said intangible assets were self generated having no cost of acquisition the sum received from transfer of the same was not liable to tax under the head capital gains also.

The Hon’ble ITAT also held that impugned receipt of Rs. 1 crore was a capital receipt due to the following reasons:
It has been held that decisions relied by Ld. CIT(A) are not applicable to the facts of this case, as in this case sole and main business had been transferred and not one of the businesses.

Secondly, agreement was made only for a period of 3 years is not relevant as generally all the noncompete agreements are limited in point of time which prescribes period of non-competition.

Thirdly, non-competition fee is taxable capital receipt and not revenue receipt by specific legislative mandate vide section 28 (va) of Income Tax Act, 1961 and that too w.e.f. 1-04-2003. Hence, it is not applicable for relevant assessment year. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in case of Gufic Chem (P.) Ltd. vs. CIT [2011] 332 ITR 602 fees received under non-competition agreement is capital receipt as amendment does not cover the relevant assessment year.

Editor’s Note: The decision may not apply after the insertion of Section 28 (va)with effect from A.Y.2003-04

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2013-TIOL-1038-ITAT-MUM DCIT vs. Weizmann Ltd. ITA No. 770/Mum/2011 Assessment Years: 2008-09. Date of Order: 31.10.2013

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Section 32 – Dealership network is an intangible asset eligible for depreciation u/s. 32(1)(ii).

Facts
During the previous year the assessee claimed deprecation of Rs. 1,84,65,131 credit for TDS of Rs. 58,22,932

The assessee, a company which is engaged in the business of dealing in foreign exchange, filed its return of income for the year under consideration declaring total income of Rs. 9,48,61,257/-. During the course of assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer (AO) noticed that the assessee had claimed depreciation of Rs. 1,84,65,131/- @ 25% on the dealership network purchased by it in the previous year relevant to A.Y. 2007-08 from AFL.

The assessee submitted that the AFL had vast representative/dealer network in India and the same was acquired by the assessee for expanding its base and business. It was contended that the said network was in the nature of license and franchisee and therefore was eligible for depreciation @ 25% u/s. 32(1)(ii) of the Act.

The AO was of the view that the assessee could not prove that any right of the nature as provided in section 32(1)(ii) of the Act was acquired by it and that the right or advantage so acquired was depreciable over a period of time. He, therefore, disallowed the claim of the assessee for depreciation on the dealership network.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who deleted the disallowance made by the A.O. by following the order of his predecessor in assessee’s own case for A.Y. 2007-08 wherein a similar claim of the assessee for depreciation @25% on dealership network was allowed by his predecessor treating the dealership network as intangible asset eligible for depreciation u/s. 32(1)(ii) of the Act.

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held
It is observed that a similar issue was involved in assessee’s own case for A.Y. 2007-08 wherein the claim of the assessee for depreciation on dealership network is allowed by the Tribunal vide its order dated 30-03-2012 passed in ITA No. 3571/Mum/2011 holding that the consideration paid by the assessee to AFL was for the purpose of enhancing its network in the field of money transaction business by acquiring rights or infrastructure or other advantages attached to the marketing network and since the same was in the nature of intangible asset as contemplated u/s. 32(1)(ii) of the Act, the assessee was entitled to depreciation thereon @ 25%. The Tribunal following the decision of the co-ordinate Bench, in the assessee’s own case for A.Y. 2007- 08, upheld the order of the ld. CIT(A) allowing the claim of the assessee for depreciation on dealership network u/s. 32(1)(ii) of the Act and dismiss ground No. 1 of Revenue’s appeal.

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2013-TIOL-1045-ITAT-HYD NCC Maytas JV vs. ACIT ITA No. 812/Hyd/2013 Assessment Years: 2006-07. Date of Order: 13.09.2013

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Section 199, Rule 37BA – A part of TDS cannot be denied on the ground that the corresponding turnover has not been shown in the assessment year in which credit is being claimed if income relating to such TDS has already been offered for taxation in an earlier assessment year.

Facts
During the previous year the assessee claimed credit for TDS of Rs. 58,22,932 based on the certificate filed. The certificate mentioned gross receipts of Rs. 25,23,31,091. Upon being asked to explain whether these receipts are credited to the current year’s P & L Account, the assessee submitted that Rs. 23,99,32,700 were credited to P & L Account and the balance had already been offered for taxation in the preceding assessment years. The assessee submitted that the credit of TDS was not claimed in the preceding assessment years.

The Assessing Officer held that u/s. 199 credit for TDS has to be restricted to the receipts shown by the assessee. He disallowed proportionate amount of TDS and allowed credit of only Rs. 55,36,798.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who upheld the action of the AO by observing that Rule 37BA of Income-tax Rules, 1962 provided for such apportionment of TDS to different assessment years in which the income is assessable on proportionate basis.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held
The Tribunal observed that the revenue authorities have not disputed the claim of the assessee that the balance portion of the turnover was offered to tax in the earlier assessment year. Further, there was no material brought on record to show that the assessee had claimed corresponding TDS relating to the balance portion of the turnover in the concerned assessment years. The entire TDS relating to Rs.25,23,31,091/- was claimed for the impugned assessment year as the TDS certificate relates to the assessment year under dispute. The assessee having not claimed any portion of TDS in the preceding assessment years wherein a part of the turnover was offered to tax, the assessee’s claim of TDS in the impugned assessment year cannot be rejected on the ground that it relates to the turnover which has not been shown by the assessee for the impugned assessment year.

Income relating to such TDS having already been offered to tax in the earlier assessment years and since the assessee has not claimed corresponding TDS in those assessment years, no disallowance of the TDS claimed can be done. As regards reliance by CIT (A) rule 37BA the Tribunal observed that in the first place the said rule is not applicable to the assessment year under dispute as it has been inserted into the statute by IT (Sixth Amendment) Rules 2009 with effect from 1-4-2009. Even if we go by the aforesaid rule, the Assessing Officer was required to give credit to the TDS in the corresponding assessment years wherein the income was so offered which also would have resulted in refund to the assessee.

The Tribunal held that the assessee is entitled to claim credit for the entire TDS amount of Rs.55,22,932/- in the impugned assessment year. The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

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2013-TIOL-1054-ITAT-DEL DCIT vs. Usha Stud & Agricultural Farms (P) Ltd ITA No. 910 to 912/Del/2010 Assessment Years: 1998-99, 1999-2000 and 2003-04. Date of Order: 25.10.2013

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S/s. 139(1), 148, 282 – Notice issued under section 148 if not served by post has to be served in a manner provided in Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for the purposes of service of summons. Accordingly, when the copy of the notice retained by the process server did not contain the time of service nor the manner of service nor the name and address of the person identifying the service and witnessing the delivery of the notice, the same cannot be considered as a valid service of notice issued u/s. 148 though the copy retained had the signature of the receiver, date and the phone number.

Facts
For assessment year 2003-04 the Assessing Officer (AO) issued on 22-03-2005 notice u/s. 148 of the Act which according to the AO was duly served. Vide letter dated 18-10-2005 the assessee informed the AO that the said notice was not received by it and in any case the return filed u/s. 139(1) may be treated as a return in response to notice u/s. 148. Upon receiving this letter the AO wrote a letter dated 28-10-2005 informing the assessee that the notice u/s. 48 had been duly served on 24-03-2005 by the process server on the address of the company and that the same was duly acknowledged. The address where the notice was served was the declared address of the assessee company. It was only vide letter dated 13-07-2005 that the assessee had informed the AO about the change in address. A copy of the said notice was attached with the letter. The assessee filed objections in respect of reassessment proceedings u/s. 148 vide letter dated 02-12-2005, filed on 08-12-2005. The AO replied to the objections.

The assessee again contended that the notice u/s. 148 was not served and therefore the proceedings were void ab initio. The AO rejected this argument and completed the assessment.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who considering the provisions of section 282 of the Act and also the provisions of CPC held that  the mandate of section 148 is that the notice should be served on the assessee. Since the notice was served through the notice server of the Department and not by post, the procedure contemplated by the CPC under Order V for service has to be followed. Having examined the procedure laid down by CPC he held that there was no material on record to even establish the person to whom notice was allegedly served was authorised to receive the notice, rather that person was not identifiable. Despite repeated requests from the assessee and even after instructions from CIT(A) the AO was not able to name the person on whom the notice was served. If notice in some way or other reached the assessee then it cannot be treated as proper service of notice since statute prescribes specific mode of service to be followed. Acquiescence does not confer jurisdiction. He held that there was no valid service of notice u/s. 148 and consequently reassessment proceedings are void ab initio. He quashed the proceedings.

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
Service of notice is the sine qua non for a proceedings u/s. 147 of the Act to get underway. Section 148 (1) of the Act provides that the Assessing Officer shall serve a notice on the assessee, as required therein. As to the procedure for service of such notice, section 282 of the Act is the governing section and it provides that such a notice may be served either by post, or as if it was a summons issued by a court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. In the present case, evidently, the service was as a summons and not by post.

Therefore, the service is governed by the relevant provisions of the CPC, i.e., Order V thereof. As per Rule 12 of Order V, CPC, service of a summons, wherever practicable, shall be made on the defendant in person, unless he has an agent empowered to accept such service. As per Rule 16, the process server shall require the signature of the person to whom the copy of the summons is delivered. According to Rule 18, the process server shall endorse or annex, on or to the original summons, a return stating the time when and the manner in which the summons was served, and the name and address of the person identifying the person served and witnessing the delivery of the summons.

The Tribunal observed that in the present case, first of all, though there is a signature on the copy of the notice retained by the process server (APB 56) and it contains a date, i.e., 24-03-2005 and a number, i.e., 26145991, neither the time of service, nor the manner of service, nor the name and address of the person identifying the service and witnessing the delivery of the notice, are present. Thus, the requirement of Order V Rule 18 of the CPC has evidently not been met with.

Thus, the servicee of the notice has nowhere been identified in spite of repeated requests made by the assessee to the Assessing Officer to do so. In fact, in para 6.7 of the impugned order, the Ld. CIT (A) has noted that even after instructions from him [the CIT (A)], the Assessing Officer was not able to name the person on whom the notice was served. In the absence of identification of the servicee, it is, obviously, well nigh impossible to contend, much less prove, that the servicee was an agent of the assessee company. And, as such, it cannot be said that the servicee had been appointed as an agent of the assessee to accept service of notices on behalf of the assessee. This, as correctly noted by the Ld. CIT (A) stands long back settled, inter alia, in the following case laws:-

i) ‘CIT vs. Baxiram Rodmall’, 2 ITR 438 (Nagpur);
ii) ‘CIT vs. Dey Brothers’, 3 ITR 213’ (Rang); and
iii) ‘C.N. Nataraj vs. Fifth ITO’, 56 ITR 250 (Mys).

The provisions of the CPC, in keeping with those of Section 282 of the IT Act, as relevant herein, are not a mere formality. Fulfillment of the requirements therein is the sine qua non for a proper and valid service of notice. Herein, not only has the alleged servicee not been identified, the person identifying such servicee has also not been even named, thereby violating the provisions of Order V, Rule 18, CPC, as has duly correctly been taken into consideration by the Ld. CIT (A).

The Tribunal upheld the action of CIT (A) in holding that the invalid service of notice u/s. 148 of the IT Act, cannot be said to be merely a procedural defect and it cannot be cured by the participation of the assessee in the re-assessment proceedings. It confirmed the order passed by CIT(A).

The appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed.

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2013-TIOL-1063-ITAT-DEL ITO vs. Smt. Bina Gupta ITA No. 4074/Del/2012 Assessment Years: 2009-10. Date of Order: 18.10.2013

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S/s. 45, 54, 54F – Deduction u/s. 54F cannot be denied in a case where the assessee has made payment and as per agreement was scheduled to receive possession of the property but did not receive possession of the property.

Facts:
During the previous year the assessee sold a residential house on 13-06-2008 and a plot of land on 10-11-2008. Both these assets were held by the assessee as long term capital assets. The long term capital gain arising on transfer of house was Rs. 31,00,369 and long term capital gain arising on transfer of plot was Rs. 19,89,914. Thus the aggregate long term capital gain was Rs. 50,90,283. The assessee claimed exemption u/ss. 54 and 54F. The assessee entered into an agreement with Golden Gate Properties Ltd. on 18-12-2008 for purchase of a house. She paid the builder Rs. 42,50,000 on different dates between 31-05-2008 to 31-12-2008 and deposited Rs. 14,50,000 in capital gain account scheme. As per agreement, the assessee was scheduled to receive possession of the house by 30- 09-2009 i.e. within the time limit mentioned in these sections for purchase of house.

Before the AO, the assessee relied upon the ratio of the decisions in the case of CIT vs. R. L. Sood (2000) 245 ITR 727 (Del); CIT vs. Sardarmal Kothari & Another 302 ITR 286; the judgment of Karnataka High Court dated 15-02-2012 in the case of CIT vs. Sri Sambandam Udaykumar in IT Appeal No. 175/2012 (2012-TIOL-217- HC-Kar-IT); Mrs. Seetha Subramanian vs. ACIT 56 TTJ 417 (Mad) and Satish Chandra Gupta vs. AO (54 ITD 508 (Del) and argued that the delay was not due to the fault of the assessee.

The AO rejected the arguments of the assessee that there was no relationship between the assessee and the builder and hence there can be no occasion to consider connivance. He also rejected the contention that the builders had since entered into a financial arrangement with M/.s J M Financial Asset Reconstruction Co. P. Ltd. who had committed funds to the builders and the builder had communicated that construction of the flat allotted was under progress and date of possession communicated by them was December 2012 and the builders had further demanded funds of Rs. 14,17,352 vide email dated 10-03-2012 and the assessee was in the process of arranging the same.

Since the assessee had not received possession of the house, the AO denied the exemption on the ground that these sections require purchase of house within a period of two years from date of transfer and even while the assessment was going on the assessee had not received possession of the house.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who allowed the appeal.

Aggrieved the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held
The Tribunal noted that the payments were made by the assessee on the specific dates pursuant to an agreement entered with the builder on 18-12-2008 i.e. within the specified time and the delivery was scheduled to take place before 30-09-2009 i.e. very much within the stipulated time and also that since there was no relationship between the assessee and the builder no connivance or collusion can be read into the agreement. Considering these facts and also the settled legal position laid down interalia by the decision of Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs. R. L. Sood 245 ITR 727 (Del) the Tribunal confirmed the order passed by CIT(A). The appeal filed by revenue was dismissed.

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[2013] 144 ITD 668 (Delhi – Trib.) ITO vs. Indian Newspaper Society A.Y. 2007-08 & 2009-10 Date of Order – 20.06.2013

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Section 194-I – Where payment of lease premium was not made on periodical basis but it was a one time payment to acquire land with right to construct a commercial complex thereon, section 194-I had no application on deposit of such lease premium.

Facts:
The assessee was a non-profit-making company. The assessee was offered certain land on lease for a period of 80 years by the Mumbai Metropolitan Regional Development Authority (MMRDA). The Assessing Officer held that the assessee was liable to deduct tax at source on lease premium u/s. 194-I and accordingly treated the assessee as assessee-indefault u/s. 201.The CIT (A) partly allowed assessee’s claim. The CIT(A) held that as the lease premium was paid once and was paid prior to date of lease agreement, such payment being in nature of capital expenditure, does not attract section 194-I.

Held:
It is well-settled that premium and rent have distinct and separate connotations in law.

The essence of premium lies in the fact that it is paid prior to the creation of the landlord and tenant relationship that is, before the commencement of the tenancy and constitutes the very superstructure of the existence of that relationship. Its another vital characteristic is that it is a one-time non-recurring payment for transferring and purchasing the right to enjoy the benefits granted by the lessor resulting in conveyance of some of the rights, title and interest in the property out of such a bundle of rights.

In the present case the payment was done before the initiation of the tenancy relationship between the appellant and the MMRDA and consequently, a cardinal ingredient of premium is satisfied.

Hence, undoubtedly premium in relation to leased land is a payment on capital account not liable to be classified as revenue outgoing.

Readers may also refer to judgement of High Court of Delhi in the case of Krishak Bharati Co-operative Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT [(2013) 350 ITR 24 / (2012) 23 taxmann. com 265]

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Settlement Commission: S/s. 245C and 245D: Where order passed by Commission u/s. 245D(2C) was not focussed on issues and contentions raised by petitioners and by revenue, same was cryptic and was set aside:

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MARC Bathing Luxuries Ltd. vs. ITSC; [2013] 38 taxmann. com 308 (Delhi):

The petitioners had filed two applications u/s. 245C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and disclosed the entire amount of unaccounted turnover which became subject-matter of orders passed by the Settlement Commission under the Excise Act. Applications were allowed to be proceeded with and a report u/s. 245D(2B) was sought from the concerned Commissioner. The Settlement Commission, however, held that applicants was indulged in suppression of income even before Commission and rejected the application filed by the petitioners. Petitioners filed writ petitions and submitted that the two petitioners were subjected to search under the Central Excise Act, 1944 and thereafter by the Income Tax Department and the Settlement Commission was swayed by factors which even the Commissioner did not consider were relevant. The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petitions and held as under:

 “i) Facts and the dispute inter se parties have not been reflected upon and adverted to in the impugned order. It is recorded that the order under challenge is cryptic and is not focused on the issues and contentions, which were raised by the petitioners and by the Commissioner.

 ii) The Settlement Commissioner earlier had directed and decided to proceed with the applications on 14-01-2013 in the two cases. They had set out points, which had to be adjudicated and decided. These included turnover of the two applicants for the assessment years covered, determination of the issues arising out of the stock, including valuation by the Department, allowability of excise duty for the Assessment year 2009-10 and determination of year-wise additional income. All these factors and facts have been shunned and ignored. The Settlement Commission has rejected the applications for all assessment years, without referring to facts and issues relating to each year.

 iii) Once an application is filed, then the said application must be dealt with in accordance with law, i.e., refer to the contentions of the petitioners, the contention of the revenue and then an objective, considered and a reasoned decision has to be taken. This is only when the stand of the two sides are fully noticed and considered before an order u/s. 245D(2C) is passed. The impugned orders do not meet the said legal requirements.

 iv) The petitioners must come clean and be honest and admit their faults and cannot but declare their true and full undisclosed income. However, their plea and explanation that their declarations are genuine and truthful, cannot be rejected without a legitimate and fair consideration. The two searches were conducted in earlier years and not in the period relevant to the assessment year 2012-13. The Settlement Commission’s order has not referred to any specific issues and documents or made references to the contentions of the Commissioner. Facts stated are incorrect or that Commissioner had not objected to the stock reduction is not adverted to. Maybe, the applications deserve dismissal for the said reasons but full factual position should be noted, before opinion is formed whether there has been full and true disclosure. There has been error and failure in the decision making process and the failure vitiates the order passed.

v) In view of the aforesaid discussion, the impugned order dated 01-03-2013 in the case of the two petitioners is set aside and pass an order of remand.”

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Reassessment: S/s. 147 and 148: A. Y. 2006-07: Additions based on reasons recorded prior to notice deleted in appeal: Reassessment on other grounds recorded after issue of notice not valid:

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CIT vs. Living Media India Ltd.; 359 ITR 106 (Del):

For the A. Y. 2006-07, the assessment was completed u/s. 143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. On 19-01-2010, the Assessing Officer issued notice u/s. 148 on the ground that the deduction of doubtful debts of Rs. 1,87,41,755/- was wrongly allowed and accordingly there is escapement of income from tax to that extent. Subsequently, after nine months, additional reasons as regards depreciation and section 14A disallowance were supplied by the Assessing Officer. In reassessment additions were made on all the three counts. The Commissioner (Appeals) held the notice u/s. 148 was valid. He also confirmed the addition concerning the depreciation. He deleted the additions concerning bad debts and s. 14A disallowance. Before the Tribunal, the assessee challenged the validity of notice u/s. 148 and the addition concerning depreciation. The Department preferred appeal against the deletion concerning the bad debts. The Tribunal dismissed the Department’s appeal and allowed the assesee’s appeal.

 On appeal by the Revenue against the finding of the Tribunal that the proceedings u/s. 147/148 were invalid and the addition concerning depreciation, the Delhi High Court dismissed the appeal and held as under:

“i) The appeal was not concerned with the issue of bad debts and, therefore, the deletion of the addition made on account of bad debts had become final. Until and unless there was an addition on the basis of the original reasons, no other additions could be made in view of the expression “and also” used in Explanation 3 to section 147. Therefore, in the absence of any addition on the issue of bad debts no additions could have been made by the Assessing Officer.

ii) The initiation of the proceedings u/s. 147 was also bad as held by the Tribunal because of the record of the assessment completed originally nowhere showed that the assessee had claimed any deduction on account of provision for bad debt and the assessing Officer assumed jurisdiction without any material. In fact, the entire issue of the provision for bad debts was discussed by the Assessing Officer at the time of original assessment and, therefore, the Tribunal was right in holding that the attempt to reassess was based on a mere change of opinion.

iii) On the basis of the very same notice issued u/s. 148, the Assessing Officer had recorded additional reasons subsequent to the issuance of the notice and this was impermissible in law.”

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Reassessment: S/s. 147 and 148: A. Y. 2008-09: Notice u/s. 148 not to be issued on hypothesis or contingency which may emerge in future: Notice issued on alternative basis for taxing income is not valid:

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DHFL Venture Capital Fund vs. ITO; 358 ITR 471 (Bom)

The assessee, a venture capital fund claimed that contributions by its investors in terms of the trust deed and contribution agreements constituted revocable transfers under the provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and, hence, the income accruing to the venture capital fund was not liable to tax in the hands of the assessee but in the hands of the investors or contributors in proportion to their respective contributions. The Assessing Officer brought the income to tax on the basis that the status of the assessee was that of an association of persons. The Commissioner (Appeals) held that the income arising to the trust was taxable in the hands of the contributors and not in the hands of the assessee since there was a revocable transfer within the meaning of sections 61 to 63. The correctness of that determination was pending before the Tribunal. In the meanwhile, the Assessing Officer issued notice u/s. 148 on the ground that the income arising from the contributions made by the contributors to the venture capital fund was taxable in the hands of the body of contributors whose members being companies and individuals were an association of persons of the contributors if the provisions of sections 61 to 63 were attracted to the transactions between the contributors and the venture capital funds.

The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition challenging the notice u/s. 148 and held as under:

“i) Recourse to section 148 cannot be founded in law on a hypothesis of what would be the position in future should an appeal before an appellate authority, being the Tribunal or the High Court, result in a particular outcome. The statute does not contemplate the reopening of the assessment u/s. 148 on such a hypothesis or a contingency which may emerge in the future.

 ii) The whole basis of the reopening was the hypothesis that if the provisions of sections 61 to 63 were attracted as had been claimed by the assessee and the income of Rs. 32.83 crore which had been claimed by the assessee to be exempt was treated as exempt, in that event an alternative basis for taxing the income in the hands of the association of persons of the contributors was sought to be set up. The entire exercise was only contingent on a future event and a consequence that may enure upon the decision of the Tribunal, if the Tribunal were to hold against the Revenue.

 iii) A reopening of an assessment u/s. 148 could not be justified on such a basis. “Has escaped assessment” indicates an event which has taken place. Tax legislation cannot be rewritten by the Revenue or the court by substituting the words “may escape assessment” in future.”

iv) Rule is accordingly made absolute by quashing and setting aside the notice of reopening dated 18-05-2012, issued u/s. 148 of the Act.”

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Depreciation: Section 32: A. Y. 1998-99: User of machinery: Machinery kept ready for use but not used because of extraneous reasons: Assessee entitled to depreciation:

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CIT vs. Chennai Petroleum Corporation Ltd.: 358 ITR 314 (Mad):

The assessee had built the gas sweetening plant in the previous year(i.e. F. Y. 1996-97) relevant to the A. Y. 1997-98. The plant was commissioned in that year by running a test run. Considering the trial as equivalent to putting the said plant to use, depreciation was allowed by the Department in the A. Y. 1997-98. However, due to non-availability of the raw material, the plant was not run in the F. Y. 1997-98. Therefore, the Assessing Officer disallowed the claim for depreciation in the A. Y. 1998-99 on the ground that the plant was not used at any time in the relevant year. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim holding that once the plant was ready for use, the assessee was entitled to depreciation.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Madras High court applied the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Whittle Anderson Ltd. vs. CIT; (1971) 79 ITR 613 (Bom), upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 “i) So long as the business is going one and the machinery is ready for use but due to certain extraneous circumstances, the machinery could not be put to use, the fact would not stand in the way of granting relief u/s. 32 of the Incometax Act, 1961.

 ii) On the admitted case that the business was a going concern and the machinery could not be put to use due to raw material paucity, the machinery was entitled to depreciation.”

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[2013] 39 taxmann.com 26 (Agra) Metro & Metro Vs ACIT A.Ys.: 2008-09, Dated: 1 November 2013

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Section 9(1)(vii), 40(a)(i) of I T Act – Article 12 of India-Germany DTAA – (i) if no human intervention is involved in any services, they will not be considered “technical” services; (ii) source of income can be said to be outside India only if manufacturing facilities are outside India and the customers are also outside India; (iii) as, on facts, withholding of tax was not applicable at the time when charges were paid, section 40(a)(i) cannot be invoked.

Facts:
The taxpayer was a 100% EOU partnership firm engaged in the business of manufacture and export of leather goods. During the relevant assessment year, the taxpayer made certain payments to a German company (“FCo”) towards leather testing charges without withholding tax from the payments. Before the AO, the taxpayer contended that since FCo had not carried out any testing operations in India, income could not be said to accrue or arise in India and hence, the taxpayer was not liable to withhold tax from the payments.

According to the AO, the payments constituted fees for technical services in terms of Explanation to section 9(1)(vii) of the Act and hence, the taxpayer was liable to withhold tax from the payments. Since the taxpayer had not withheld tax, applying section 40(a)(i), the AO disallowed the payments. CIT(A) confirmed the order of the AO.

Before the Tribunal, the taxpayer contended that: the entire testing process was automated; since it was a 100% EOU, the source of income was outside India; and hence, the payment did not fall within the ambit of section 9(1)(vii).

Held:
(i) Taxability u/s. 9(1)(vii) and under Article 12(4) of India-Germany DTAA

As per the taxpayer, the entire testing process was automated though this aspect was not examined by the authorities below. Since the terms “managerial” and “consultancy”, which respectively precede and succeed the term “technical” in Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vii), the term “technical” would also be construed to involve human element. It is well settled that when no human intervention is involved in any services, they will not fall within the ambit of section 9(1)(vii). The question is not of more or less of human involvement but of presence or absence of human involvement.

(ii) Services utilised for income from source outside India

Even if the business is being carried on by a 100% EOU, it is a business carried on in India, and hence, it is not covered by the exception in section 9(1)(vii)(b) “where the fees are payable in respect of services utilized for the purpose of making or earning any income from any source outside India”. That exception will not apply merely because the user of services is a 100% EOU but only if the manufacturing facilities are outside India and the customers are also outside India.

(iii) Disallowance u/s. 40(a)(i)

Though the retrospective amendment is termed merely clarificatory, in view of Supreme Court’s judgment in Ishikwajima Harima Heavy Industries Ltd. vs. DIT (288 ITR 708) and in view of the fact that services were rendered outside India even if utilised in India, leather testing fees were not taxable in India in the light of the legal position as it prevailed at that point of time. Hence, at the time when the taxpayer made payments, it was not required to withhold tax and it became taxable in India only as a result of the retrospective amendment in section 9(1), the said payment cannot be disallowed by invoking section 40(a)(i). Hence, on facts, disallowance u/s. 40(a)(i) cannot be invoked.

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[2013] 40 taxmann.com 340 (AAR – New Delhi) Endemol India (P.) Ltd., In re Dated: 13 December 2013

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Section 9(1)(vii), 194C of I T Act; CBDT’s Circular No. 715, dated 08-08-1995 – services by non-resident for production of programmes for the purpose of broadcasting and telecasting are ‘work’ u/s. 194C and hence, income received would be business income, which in absence of PE in India, would not be taxable

Facts
The applicant was engaged in the business of production of television programmes for broadcasting and telecasting. Inter alia, the applicant produced a reality show (“the show”) for which the shooting took place in Argentina. For the purpose of the show, it engaged an Argentinian company for providing line production services in Argentina.

The issue raised by the applicant before the AAR was: whether the amount paid to the Argentinian company would constitute Fees for Technical Services [u/s 9(1)(vii)] or Royalty [u/s. 9(1)(vi)] or business income [u/s 9(1)(i)] and at what rate tax should be withheld from the payments?

Held
• The agreement with the Argentinian company is for composite services (mainly comprising technical crew, production crew and technical equipment) for a limited period of time and neither equipment nor local technical crew is separately provided.

• In CIT vs. Prasar Bharati, [2007] 158 Taxman 470 (Delhi) it was held that broadcasting and telecasting, including production of programmes for such broadcasting and telecasting, do not fall under the provision of section 194J as they are specifically covered by definition of ‘work’ in section 194C.

• CBDT’s circular No.715 dated 08-08-1995 states that payments made to advertising agencies for production of programmes which are to be broadcasted/telecasted would be subject to withholding tax u/s. 194C.

• Since the payments made by the applicant to the Argentinian company were for production of programmes for the purpose of broadcasting and telecasting, the services rendered would be specifically characterised as ‘work’ u/s. 194C.

• If a particular item is specifically characterized in a particular section of the Act, it will override the provision in the general section. Since the services are characterised as ‘contact work’ u/s. 194C, the income received would be necessarily treated as business income and not FTS.

• In absence of PE of the Argentinian company in India, its income would not be taxable in India.

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“International Taxation – Recent Developments in USA”

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In this Article, we have given information about the recent significant developments in USA in the sphere of international taxation. Since many Indian Corporates have substantial business interests in and dealings with USA, we hope the readers would find this information useful. This will help to create awareness about impending important changes in law and practices in USA.

1. IRS releases update on FATCA registration for financial institutions

The US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has released IRS Announcement 2014-1 to provide an update on the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) registration for financial institutions (FIs).

FIs can use the IRS FATCA registration website, which was launched on 19th August 2013, to register with the IRS under FATCA and to renew their status as a qualified intermediary (QI), withholding foreign partnership (WP), and withholding foreign trust (WT).

Announcement 2014-1 states that every FI that has made an online registration prior to January 2014 must revisit its account on or after 1st January 2014 to edit, sign its FFI agreement if registering as a participating FFI, and submit its registration information as final.

Announcement 2014-1 also states that the final FFI (Foreign Financial Institutions) agreement is expected to be published prior to 1st January 2014, that the final QI, WP, and WT agreements will be published in early 2014, and that the first IRS FFI list will be posted by 2nd June 2014. Announcement 2014-1 further states that Model 1 FIs will not need to register or obtain Global Intermediary Identification Numbers (GIINs) until on or about 22nd December 2014 to ensure inclusion on the IRS FFI list by 1st January 2015.

Announcement 2014-1 notes that the guidance in Announcement 2014-1 is consistent with the previous guidance in IRS Notice 2013-43 .

2. IRS issues Memorandum on creditable foreign taxes from inter-branch dealings

The Office of the Associate Chief Counsel (International) of the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has issued a Memorandum that discusses the determination of creditable foreign taxes for a US corporation, or a controlled foreign corporation (CFC), that engages in transactions with its foreign branch or foreign disregarded entity (DE), or with the foreign branch or DE of its affiliated corporation.

The Memorandum states that, because a foreign branch or DE and its US owner are treated as a single entity with the result that transactions between them do not give rise to income or expense for US tax purposes, an application of the arm’s length standard of the US transfer pricing rules to such disregarded transactions would not affect the amount of taxable income that the US owner recognizes for US tax purposes, and thus generally is not meaningful.

The Memorandum further states that, if the US tax owner reports too much income to the foreign country by means of non-arm’s length transfer prices and claims a foreign tax credit (FTC) for the overpaid foreign income taxes, the FTC may be disallowed under the non-compulsory payment rule of Treasury Regulation section 1.901-2(e)(5), which provides that a foreign tax is not considered paid for FTC purposes to the extent that the amount paid exceeds the amount of liability under foreign tax law.

The Memorandum concludes that the US transfer pricing principles may be relevant in determining whether non-arm’s length transfer prices result in non-compulsory payments of foreign tax to the extent foreign tax law, as modified by tax treaties, includes similar arm’s length principles, as most do, and further that taxpayers have the burden to establish to the satisfaction of the IRS that they have properly minimised their creditable foreign tax liability by exhausting all effective and practical remedies, including resort to competent authority proceedings.

The Memorandum also states that similar issues involving non-compulsory payments of foreign tax may arise in cases involving a CFC where a foreign branch or DE that is a part of a CFC engages in transactions with the CFC, a related but separately regarded CFC, a US shareholder of the CFC, or a US shareholder of a related but separately regarded CFC.

In addition, the Memorandum states that, under US tax treaties that adopt the authorized OECD approach (AOA) and thus apply the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, by analogy, in determining the profits of a permanent establishment (PE), profits of a US PE may be determined based on all of the PE’s dealings, including transactions between the US PE and the foreign corporation of which it is a part (or another branch of such foreign corporation), even though such interbranch dealings would not give rise to income, gain, profits, or loss of the foreign corporation under the US Internal Revenue Code (IRC).

3. IRS released revised user guide for FATCA registration website

The US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has released revised Publication 5118 (Rev. 12-2013), Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) User Guide.

The user guide provides instructions for using the FATCA Registration System to complete the FATCA registration process online, including what information is required, how registration will vary depending on the type of financial institution (FI), and step-by-step instructions for each question.

The FATCA Registration System is a web-based system that FIs may use to register completely online as a participating foreign financial institution (PFFI), a registered deemed-compliant FFI (RDCFFI), a limited FFI (Limited FFI), or a sponsoring entity (see United States-2, News 20 August 2013).

The IRS has also released the FATCA Registration Update Summary to provide a summary of the updates made to the FATCA Registration System. The summary indicates a last reviewed or updated date of 11th December 2013.

4 IRS issues updated Publication 54 – Tax Guide for US Citizens and Resident Aliens Abroad

The US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has released the 2013 revision of Publication 54 (Tax Guide for US Citizens and Resident Aliens Abroad). The publication is dated 3rd December 2013.

Publication 54 explains the special rules used to determine the US federal income tax for US citizens and resident aliens who work abroad or who have income earned in foreign countries.

Revised Publication 54 is intended for use in preparing 2013 tax returns. It includes the 2013 amount for the foreign earned income exclusion ( $ 97,600) and the housing expense base amount ( $ 15,616) for the housing cost exclusion u/s. 911 of the US Internal Revenue Code (IRC). The limits for the maximum amounts that can be excluded and/or deducted under IRC section 911 are also discussed.

Publication 54 discusses the following items:
– US tax return filing requirements (Chapter 1);
– Withholding of US income, social security and Medicare taxes (Chapter 2);
– US self-employment tax (Chapter 3);
– IRC section 911 foreign earned income exclusion and foreign housing exclusion or deduction (Chapter 4);
– Other applicable exemptions, deductions, and credits (Chapter 5);
– Tax treaty benefits (Chapter 6); and
– How to obtain tax information and assistance from the IRS (Chapter 7).

Publication 54 also includes a list of tax treaties, which is updated through 31st October 2013.

5.    Public comments requested on IRS Form for withholding on foreign partners

The  US  Internal  Revenue  Service  (IRS)  and the  US  Treasury  Department  have  issued  a notice  requesting  comments  on  IRS  Form 8804  (Annual  Return  for  Partnership  With- holding  Tax  (Section  1446));  IRS  Form  8804 (Schedule  A)  (Penalty  for  Underpayment  of Estimated Section 1446 Tax by Partnerships); Form  8805  (Foreign  Partner’s  Information Statement of Section 1446 Withholding Tax); and Form 8813 (Partnership Withholding Tax Payment Voucher (Section 1446)).

U/s.  1446  of  the  US  Internal  Revenue  Code (IRC),  foreign  partners  are  subject  to  US withholding  tax  on  their  allocable  share  of the US effectively connected taxable income (ECTI)  of  a  partnership  that  is  engaged  in  a trade  or  business  in  the  United  States.  The withholding  tax  is  imposed  at  the  highest income  tax  rates  applicable  to  the  foreign partner,  currently  35%  for  corporations  and 39.6%  for  individuals.  The  withholding  tax  is collected by the partnership.

IRS Forms 8804, 8805, and 8813 are used to pay and report IRC section 1446 withholding tax  based  on  ECTI  allocable  to  foreign  part- ners.

IRS Form 8804 is used to report the total liability under IRC section 1446 for the partnership’s tax year. IRS Form 8804 is also a transmittal form for IRS Form 8805. IRS Form 8804 has been modified for use in tax year 2013 to reflect the increase in the maximum tax rates for individuals to 39.6% with regard to ordinary income and to 20% with regard to capital gains.

IRS  Form  8805  is  used  to  show  the  amount of  ECTI  and  the  total  tax  credit  allocable  to the foreign partner for the partnership’s tax year. IRS Form 8813 is used to pay the with holding tax under IRC section 1446 to the United States Treasury. Form 8813 must accompany each payment of IRC section 1446 tax made during the partnership’s tax year.

The IRS requested that written comments be submitted no later than 27 January 2014. The mailing address and other contact information are listed in the notice.

6.    Public comments requested on IRS Form for claiming FTC for corporations

The US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the Treasury Department have issued a notice to announce the intention to submit an information collection request to the US Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for its review and clearance with regard to IRS Form 1118 (Foreign Tax Credit-Corporations). The Treasury Department has also requested public comments on the form.

IRS Form 1118 and separate Schedules I, J, K are used by US domestic and foreign cor- porations to claim a credit for taxes paid or accrued to foreign countries or US posses- sions under section 901 of the US Internal Revenue Code (IRC). The IRS uses Form 1118 and related schedules to determine whether the corporation has computed the foreign tax credit (FTC) correctly.

To claim a FTC, it is generally required to file IRS Form 1118 with the US income tax return. A separate Form 1118 is required for foreign taxes paid on each designated category of income (i.e. passive category income, general category income, IRC section 901(j) income, certain income re-sourced by treaty, and lump- sum distributions).

7.    Public comments requested on IRS Form for reporting transfer of property to foreign corporation

The US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the Treasury Department have issued a notice to announce the intention to submit an information collection request to the US Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for its review and  clearance  with  regard  to  IRS  Form  926 (Return by a US Transferor of Property to a Foreign  Corporation).  The  Treasury  Department has also requested public comments on the form.

IRS Form 926 is used by US persons to report exchanges or transfers of property to foreign corporations as required by section 6038B(a) (1)(A) of the US Internal Revenue Code (IRC).

Section 6038B of the IRC imposes such reporting requirements with regard to transactions involving  subsidiary  liquidations,  corporate organizations, and corporate reorganizations, as  described  in  sections  332,  351,  354,  355, 356,  and 361 of the IRC.

The US transferor must file IRS Form 926 with its  income  tax  return  for  the  tax  year  that includes the date of the transfer.

A penalty may be imposed in the amount of 10% of the fair market value of the property at  the  time  of  the  exchange  or  transfer  if the  US  transferor  fails  to  file  IRS  Form  926. The penalty is limited to USD 100,000 unless the  failure  to  file  IRS  Form  926  was  due  to intentional  disregard.  The  penalty  does  not apply if the failure is due to reasonable cause and not wilful neglect.

Moreover, under section 6501(c)(8) of the IRC, the period of limitations for assessment of tax on the exchange or transfer of the property is extended to the date that is 3 years after the  information  required  to  be  reported  is provided to the IRS.

8.    Public comments requested on tax-free merg- ers and consolidations involving foreign corporations

The US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the US Treasury Department have issued a notice requesting comments on final regulations (TD 9243, Revision of Income Tax Regulations u/s. 358, 367, 884, and 6038B Dealing with Statutory Mergers or Consolidations u/s. 368(a)(1)(A) Involving One or More Foreign Corporations).

TD  9243  was  issued  on  26TH  January  2006 to  provide  amendments  to  regulations  that were  affected  by  the  revised  merger  and consolidation rules of concurrently-issued final regulations (TD 9242,  Statutory Mergers and Consolidations) including amendments to the regulations  u/s.  367  of  the  US  Internal  Rev- enue Code (IRC), dealing with US-inbound and outbound reorganisations, amendments to IRC section  884,  dealing  with  the  branch  profits tax,  and  amendments  to  IRC  section  6038B, dealing with the tax reporting obligations for US outbound transfers.

The notice states that the collection of information under TD 9243 is necessary to preserve US income taxation on gain of certain stock.

9.    IRS proposes revised procedures for request- ing competent authority assistance

The  US  Internal  Revenue  Service  (IRS)  has issued  Notice  2013-78  to  propose  a  revised revenue procedure for requesting competent authority assistance under US tax treaties. The proposed  revenue  procedures  would  update and  supersede  the  current  procedures  in Revenue Procedure 2006-54.

The US competent authority procedures permit taxpayers to request IRS assistance when they believe that the actions of the United States, the treaty country, or both, have resulted or will result in taxation that is contrary to the provisions  of  the  treaty,  for  example,  economic  double  taxation  arising  from  transfer pricing adjustments u/s. 482 of the US Internal Revenue Code (IRC).

The proposed revenue procedure would pro- vide guidance on:

–    requesting assistance from the US competent authority under the provisions of the US tax treaties; and

–    determinations that the US competent author- ity may make on competent authority issues.

The  proposed  revenue  procedure  would include  provisions  that  reflect  the  IRS’s structural  changes  relating  to  the  US  com- petent  authority  since  2006,  including  the establishment of the IRS Large Business and International Division (LB&I) that includes the office  of  the  US  competent  authority,  and provisions  that  effect  a  limited  number  of significant substantive changes, as summarised in a table contained in Notice 2013-78.

10.    IRS proposes revised procedures for advance pricing agreements

The  US  Internal  Revenue  Service  (IRS)  has issued  Notice  2013-79  to  propose  a  revised revenue  procedure  with  guidance  on  filing advance  pricing  agreement  (APA)  requests and on the administration of APAs. The pro- posed revenue procedures would update and supersede the current procedures in Revenue Procedure  2006-9,  as  modified  by  Revenue Procedure 2008-31.

The proposed revenue procedure would pro- vide the following:

–    guidance and instructions on APAs; and

–    guidance and information on the IRS’s administration of APAs.

The  proposed  revenue  procedure  would  include  provisions  that  reflect  the  IRS’s  struc- tural changes relating to the APAs, including the  establishment  of  the  IRS  Large  Business and  International  Division  (LB&I)  and  the creation  of  the  Advance  Pricing  and  Mutual Agreement  Program  (APMA)  and  provisions that  effect  a  limited  number  of  significant substantive changes, as summarised in a table contained in Notice 2013-79.

11.    US Senate Finance Committee releases proposals for tax administration reform

The  US  Senate  Committee  on  Finance  has announced the issuance of a staff discussion draft on proposed reforms to the administration  of  the  US  tax  laws.  The  announcement was  made  in  a  Press  Release  dated  20TH November 2013.

The issued discussion draft is the second in a series of discussion drafts to overhaul the US tax code. The discussion draft proposes a number of reforms to modernise the tax administration, minimise compliance burdens, combat tax-related identity theft and fraud, and reduce the tax gap.

The significant proposals in the discussion draft
include, among others:

–    deadlines for filing certain information returns are accelerated to 21ST February (either on paper or electronically) so that taxpayers will receive the information needed to file their income tax returns on a more timely and orderly basis;

–    taxpayers are no longer required to file cor- rected information returns if the error is less than $ 25;

–    tax returns generated by a computer but filed on paper must contain a scannable code in order to enable the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to upload the return information more efficiently;

–    the number of returns that trigger an elec- tronic filing requirement reduces over 3 years from 250 returns per year to 25;

–    IRS Form W-2 (Wage and Tax Statement) no longer includes the taxpayer’s full social security number (SSN);

–    access to databases containing SSNs of re- cently deceased individuals is restricted for 3 years;

–    filing a  tax  return using  another person’s
identity is a felony subject to a fine of up to
$ 250,000 and/or up to 5 years in prison; and

–    banks must report the existence of bank accounts.

The discussion draft also includes a list of unaddressed issues on which public comments are requested.

The documents released by the Committee on Finance include the following:

–    Tax Administration Reform Staff Discussion Draft Legislative Language;

–    Tax Administration Reform Draft Summary;

–    Tax Administration Reform One-Pager;

–    JCT Technical Explanation of the Chairman’s Staff Discussion Draft of Tax Administration Reform;

–    Tax Administration Reform Technical Correc- tions Legislative Language;

–    JCT Explanation of Tax Administration Draft Technical Corrections; and

–    List of Provisions Identified by the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation as Potential Deadwood.

12.    US Senate Finance Committee releases pro- posals for international business tax reform

The  US  Senate  Committee  on  Finance  has announced the issuance of a staff discussion draft on international business tax reform. The announcement was made in a Press Release dated 19th November 2013.

The issued discussion draft is the first in a series of discussion drafts to overhaul the US tax code. It proposes a modern, competitive, simpler, and fairer international tax system by means of:

–    reducing incentives for US and foreign multina- tionals to invest in, or shift profits to, low-tax foreign countries rather than the United States;

–    reducing incentives for US-based businesses to move abroad, whether by re-incorporating abroad or merging with a foreign business;

–    increasing the ability of US businesses to compete against foreign businesses in foreign markets;

–    ending the lock-out effect (i.e. keeping the earnings of foreign subsidiaries offshore in- stead of repatriating such earnings to the United States); and
–    simplifying the international tax rules so that firms with the most sophisticated tax advisors are not advantaged.

The significant proposals in the discussion draft
include, among others:

–    all foreign income of US corporations is taxed immediately or permanently exempt, depend- ing on the type of the income;

–    earnings of foreign subsidiaries from periods before the effective date of the proposal that have not been subject to US tax are subject to a one-time tax at a reduced rate payable over 8 years;

–    international aspects of the “check-the-box” rules are eliminated; and

–    base erosion arrangements are addressed to prevent foreign multinationals from making such arrangements to avoid US tax.

The discussion draft also includes a list of un- addressed issues on which public comments are requested.

The documents released by the Committee on Finance include the following:

–    International Tax One Pager;
–    International Tax Summary;
–    International Tax Discussion Draft Common;
–    International Tax Discussion Draft Option Y;
–    International Tax Discussion Draft Option Z; and
–    International Tax Discussion Draft Request for Comments.

In addition, the US Joint Committee on Taxa- tion (JCT) has issued a report with a technical explanation of the provisions in the discussion draft.

13.    Joint Committee on Taxation issues report on international business tax reform proposals

The Joint Committee on Taxation of the US Congress (JCT) has released a report to provide a technical explanation of the staff discussion draft on international business tax reform issued by the US Senate Committee on Finance.

The report is entitled Technical Explanation of the Senate Committee on Finance Chairman’s Staff Discussion Draft of Provisions to Reform International Business Taxation. The report is dated 19th November 2013, and is designated JCX-15-13.

14.    US Treasury Department updates FATCA model agreements

The  US  Treasury  Department  has  released updated model Intergovernmental Agreements (IGAs) for the implementation of the Foreign Account  Tax  Compliance  Act  (FATCA).  The updated model IGAs are dated 4th November 2013.

For the purpose of defining the term “financial account” under article 1, the updated model IGAs include new provisions that explain:

–    the condition for interests to be treated as “regularly traded”;

–    the meaning of an “established securities market”; and

–    the circumstance in which an interest in a financial institution is not “regularly traded” and thus treated as a financial account.

The updated model IGAs expands the list of persons that are excluded from the definition of the term, “specified US person”. The up- dated model IGAs also modify, inter alia, the rules regarding related entities and branches that are non-participating financial institutions.

The updated model IGAs, which are available on the FATCA page of the Treasury Depart- ment website, are as follows:

–    Reciprocal Model 1A Agreement, Preexisting TIEA or DTC (Updated 11-4-2013);

–    Nonreciprocal Model 1B Agreement, Preexisting TIEA or DTC (Updated 11-4-2013);

–    Nonreciprocal Model 1B Agreement, No TIEA or DTC (Updated 11-4-2013);

–    Model 2 Agreement, Pre existing TIEA or DTC (Updated 11-4-2013);

–    Model 2 Agreement, No TIEA or DTC (Updated 11-4-2013);

–    Annex I to Model 1 Agreement (Updated 11- 4-2013);

–    Annex I to Model 2 Agreement (Updated 11- 4-2013);

–    Annex II to Model 1 Agreement (Updated 11- 4-2013); and

–    Annex II to Model 2 Agreement (Updated 11- 4-2013).

15.    Draft instructions for annual withholding form for foreign person’s US-source income issued to implement FATCA

The  US  Internal  Revenue  Service  (IRS)  has released a draft of revised Instructions for IRS Form 1042 (Annual Withholding Tax Return for US  Source  Income  of  Foreign  Persons).  The draft  instructions  are  dated  6th  November 2013.  The  IRS  previously  issued  the  revised Form 1042  in draft form.

When  adopted  as  final,  the  draft  Form  1402
and instructions will be used to report:

–    the tax withheld under chapter 3 of the US Internal Revenue Code (IRC) (dealing with the normal withholding for foreign persons) on certain US-source income of foreign persons, including non-resident aliens, foreign partnerships, foreign corporations, foreign estates, and foreign trusts;

–    the tax withheld under IRC chapter 4 (i.e. the FATCA provisions);

–    the 2% excise tax due on specified foreign procurement payments under IRC section 5000C; and

–    payments that are reported on IRS Form 1042- S under IRC chapter 3 or 4. The draft Form 1042 modifies the current Form
1042  by:

–    revising the current form for withholding agents to report payments and amounts withheld under IRC chapter 4 in addition to under IRC chapter 3;

–    requiring a reconciliation of US source fixed or determinable annual or periodical (FDAP) income payments for chapter 4 purposes;

–    including separate chapter 3 and 4 status codes for withholding agents; and

–    adding lines for reporting the tax liability under chapters 3 and 4.

The  current  Form  1042  and  the  Instructions for  the  current  Form  1042  are  available  on the IRS website (www.irs.gov).

16.    IRS issues memorandum on US tax conse- quences of payments to foreign distributors

The Office of Associate Chief Counsel (International) of the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has issued a memorandum that discusses the character and source of certain payments made to foreign distributors by a multi-level marketing company and the related withholding responsibilities.

The facts reviewed in the Memorandum in- volve payments made by a US corporation to reward its foreign distributor for recruit- ing, training, and supporting the distributor’s lower-tier distributors to cultivate a multi-level chain of distributors (the “sponsorship chain”) for the sale of the US corporation’s products.

The Memorandum discusses the tax conse- quences of the payments (the “earnings”) that the foreign distributor received from the US corporation based on purchases of products from the US corporation by lowertier distributors in the distributor’s sponsorship chain.

The Memorandum reaches the following conclusions:

– the earnings constitute income from performance of personal services;

–    the source of the earnings is based on where the services of the foreign distributor are performed with the result that income at- tributable to services performed in the United States is US source income and that income attributable to services performed outside the United States is foreign source income;

–    the US corporation is required to withhold tax on the earnings of a distributor who is a non- resident foreign individual for the performance of services within the United States;

–    the US corporation is not required to withhold tax on the earnings of a distributor that is a foreign corporation for the performance of services within the United States if the distributor provides the US corporation with IRS Form W-8ECI (Certificate of Foreign Person’s Claim That Income Is Effectively Connected With the Conduct of a Trade or Business in the United States); and

–    the earnings are not subject to US tax if the distributor is a resident of a foreign country that has an income tax treaty with the United States; does not have a fixed base or permanent establishment in the United States to which the earnings are attributable; and provides the US corporation with IRS Form 8233 (Exemption From Withholding on Compensation for Independent (and Certain Dependent) Personal Services of a Nonresident Alien Individual) (in the case of an individual distributor) or IRS Form W-8BEN (Certificate of Foreign Status of Beneficial Owner for United States Tax Withholding) (in the case of a corporate distributor).

17.    Public comments requested on IRS form for extending statute of limitations on cross- border transfers of stock and securities

The US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the US Treasury Department have issued a notice requesting comments on IRS Form 8838 (Con- sent To Extend the Time To Assess Tax Under Section 367—Gain Recognition Agreement).

IRS form 8838 is used to extend the statute of limitations for US persons who transfer stock or securities to a foreign corporation and enter into gain recognition agreements (GRAs) with the IRS. A GRA allows the trans- feror to defer the payment of US tax on the transfer.

IRS Form 8838 must be filed by a US transferor for a GRA that is entered into under section 367(a) of the US Internal Revenue Code (IRC) with regard to transfers of stock and securities to a foreign corporation in cross-border corporate transactions, i.e. incor- porations, liquidations, mergers, acquisitions and other reorganisations, as described in IRC section 367(a).

IRS  Form  8838  must  also  be  filed  by  a 80%-owned US subsidiary and its foreign parent  corporation  for  a  GRA  that  is  entered into under IRC section 367(E)(2)  with regard to a liquidation of the US subsidiary into the foreign  parent  corporation,  as  described  in IRC section 332.

The IRS uses IRS Form 8838 so that it may assess tax against the transferor after the expiration of the original statute of limitation.

18.    Public comments requested on withholding
certificates for foreign persons

The US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the US Treasury Department have issued a notice requesting comments on various IRS forms that are used as withholding certificates for foreign persons (i.e. certificates to claim reduced or zero withholding on US-source payments) and on the EW-8 MOU Program.

The following IRS forms are currently used as
withholding certificates for foreign persons:

–    Form W–8BEN (Certificate of Foreign Status of Beneficial Owner for United States Tax Withholding);

–    IRS Form W–8ECI (Certificate of Foreign Per- son’s Claim for Exemption From Withholding on Income Effectively Connected With the Conduct of a Trade or Business in the United States); –    IRS Form W–8EXP (Certificate of Foreign Gov- ernment or Other Foreign Organization for United States Tax Withholding); and

–    IRS Form W–8IMY (Certificate of Foreign In- termediary, Foreign Flow-Through Entity, or Certain US Branches for United States Tax Withholding).

The IRS is revising those forms to reflect the new withholding, due diligence, and reporting requirements under the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA). The IRS has issued the following drafts of the revised forms:

–    a draft of IRS Form W–8BEN (for foreign individuals);

–    a draft of IRS Form W–8BEN–E (for foreign entities);

–    a draft of IRS Form W–8ECI;

–    a draft of IRS Form W–8EXP; and

–    a draft of IRS Form W–8IMY.

The EW-8 MOU (Memorandum of Understand- ing) Program is a voluntary collaborative programme between the IRS and withholding agents that have systems collecting IRS Forms W-8 electronically.

5.    IRS issues Memorandum on cross-border re-organization transactions

The Associate Chief Counsel (Corporate) of the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has issued a Memorandum that discusses the US tax consequences of cross-border restructuring transactions undertaken by a taxpayer’s affiliated group.

The restructuring occurred in two stages a few months apart. The first stage (the “F Reorganization”) included a series of transac- tions that the taxpayer treated as a tax-free reorganisation described in section 368(a)(1)
(F) of the US Internal Revenue Code (IRC).

The second stage (the “Transaction”) in- volved a triangular reorganisation where a foreign  subsidiary  (F  Sub  5)  acquired  stock of  its  foreign  parent  company  (F  Sub  4)  by, in  part,  issuing  notes  (i.e.  debts)  to  F  Sub 4, and used the stock of F Sub 4 to acquire another  foreign  subsidiary  (F  Sub  6)  from  a US  subsidiary.  Subsequently,  F  Sub  5  repaid the notes to F Sub 4 (the “Payment”).

The Memorandum concludes that, based on the particular facts and circumstances of this case, the F Reorganisation and the Transac- tion should not be stepped together, or with the subsequent Payment, and should each be respected as qualifying for non-recognition treatment, respectively, under IRC sections 368(a)(1)(F) (dealing with the reorganisation of a single operating company as to the form or place of incorporation) and 368(a)(1)(C) (dealing with the acquisition of a target’s assets in exchange for an acquiring corporation’s stock). The Memorandum notes that both the F Reorganisation and the Transaction were supported by business considerations that satisfied the business purpose threshold applicable to IRC section 368 reorganisations.

The  Memorandum  next  states  that  the  fact that  the  Transaction  involved  a  leveraged buyout  (i.e.  F  Sub  5  WAS  capitalised  with lesser  capital  than  the  F  Sub  4  Stock  that  it acquired)  does  not  negate  the  fact  that  the Transaction was a value-for-value exchange.

The Memorandum also concludes that F Sub 5 is not required to recognise gain on the F Sub  4  stock  when  such  stock  was  used  to acquire  F  Sub  6  because  the  F  Sub  4  stock had  not  appreciated  while  F  Sub  5  held  the stock.  Gain  would  otherwise  be  required  to be  recognised  under  IRC  section  1032  and the  regulations  thereunder  dealing  with  the use  of  the  stock  of  a  parent  corporation  in a triangular reorganisation.

The Memorandum further concludes that, because the notes should be respected as debt, the Payment should constitute repayment of debts, not dividends or other amounts that would generate subpart F income.

The Memorandum notes that the restructuring transactions  occurred  prior  to  22ND  September 2006, and thus are not governed by IRS Notice 2006-85, which announced regulations that  were  later  adopted  under  IRC  section 367  as  final  regulations  (TD  9526).  Under the regulations, in a triangular reorganisation where a subsidiary (S) or its parent company
(P) (or both) is foreign, the property trans- ferred from S to P in exchange for P stock is treated as a distribution from S to P under IRC section 301(c) with the result that an inclusion in P’s gross income as a dividend, a reduction in P’s basis in its S or T (target) stock, and the recognition of gain by P from the sale or exchange of property may occur, as appropriate.

20.    Draft instructions for form to report foreign person’s US-source income issued for FATCA

The  US  Internal  Revenue  Service  (IRS)  has released  a  draft  of  revised  Instructions  for IRS Form 1042-S (Foreign Person’s US Source Income  Subject  to  Withholding).  The  draft instructions  are  dated  1st  November  2013. The  IRS  previously  issued  the  revised  Form 1042-S  in draft form.

The current Form 1042-S and the Instructions for the current Form 1042-S are available on the  IRS  website.  The  current  Form  1042-S is  used  to  report  amounts  paid  to  foreign persons  (including  persons  presumed  to  be foreign)  that  are  subject  to  US  withholding under chapter 3 of the US Internal Revenue Code  (IRC),  including  fixed  or  determinable annual or periodical (FDAP) income from US sources  (e.g.  US-source  interest,  dividends rent, royalties, pension, annuities).

The draft Form 1042-S revises the current form to accommodate new requirements under the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA). The  revised form contains new  boxes to re- quest withholding agents to indicate whether the withholding is made under IRC chapter 3 (i.e. the normal withholding for non-residents and foreign corporations) or under IRC chap- ter 4 (i.e. the FATCA provisions).

In addition, the draft form includes boxes requesting, among other information, the withholding agent’s Global Intermediary I dentification Number (GIIN) and additional in- formation about the recipient of the payment, including the recipient’s account number, date of birth, and foreign tax identification number, if any. GIIN indicates the identification number that is assigned to a participating foreign financial institution (FFI) or registered deemed-compliant FFI (including a reporting Model 1 FFI).

For  withholding  agents,  intermediaries,  flow- through entities, and recipients, the draft Form 1042-S  requires that the chapter 3 status (or classification) and chapter 4 status be reported on  the  form  according  to  codes  provided  in the draft instructions.

21.    IRS issues memorandum on indirect FTC rules in connection with stock redemptions

The  Associate  Chief  Counsel  (International) of the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has issued  a  memorandum  that  discusses  the interconnection  of  the  indirect  foreign  tax credit  (FTC)  rules  of  section  902  of  the  US Internal  Revenue  Code  (IRC)  and  the  stock redemption rules of IRC sections 302 and 312.

IRC  section  902  allows  a  US  corporation  to claim  an  indirect  or  deemed-paid  FTC  for foreign  income  taxes  paid  by  its  foreign subsidiary  (referred  to  as  the  “section  902 corporation”)  if  the  US  corporation  receives a dividend from the section 902  Corporation and certain conditions are met.

The amount of the foreign income taxes for which  the  indirect  FTC  may  be  claimed  is equal to the same proportion of the section 902  Corporation’s  “post-1986 foreign  income taxes” (the FT pool) that the amount of the dividend  bears  to  the  section  902  Corpora- tion’s  post-1986  undistributed  earnings  (the E&P pool) (i.e. indirect FTC = FT pool × (divi- dend received/E&P pool)).

The FT pool is defined by IRC section 902(C) as the foreign income taxes paid with respect to the taxable year in which the dividend is paid, as well as with respect to prior taxable years beginning after 31st December 1986. IRC sec- tion 902 reduces the amount of the FT pool to take into account dividends distributed by the  section  902  CORPORATION  in  prior  taxable years.

In the case reviewed in the Memorandum, a section  902  Corporation  was  60%  owned  by a  US  parent  company  (USP)  and  was  40% owned by an unrelated foreign party (FP). The section 902 CORPORATIOn redeemed all of the stock owned by FP by way of a distribution of cash. IRC section 312(A) and (n)(7) reduces the  section  902  CORPOration’s  E&P  pool  to take  into  account  the  redemption.  In  the following  year,  the  section  902  Corporation paid its entire remaining E&P to the USP as a dividend.

The  issue  of  the  Memorandum  is  whether the  section  902  Corporation’s  FT  pool  must be reduced for the purpose of calculating the USP’s indirect FTC although IRC section 302(A) treats the redemption as a sale or exchange transaction, rather than a dividend.

The  Memorandum  refers  to  Treasury  Regulation  section  1.902-1(a)(8),  which  provides that  foreign  taxes  paid  or  deemed  paid  by a  foreign  corporation  on  or  with  respect  to earnings  that  were  distributed  or  otherwise removed from E&P in prior post-1986 taxable years  must  be  removed  from  the  FT  pool. The  Memorandum  states  that  the  language “otherwise  removed”  is  broad  enough  to cover  reductions  of  earnings  under  section 312(A)-Related  redemptions  that  are  treated as a sale or exchange transaction.

The Memorandum accordingly concludes that the  section  902  Corporations’  FT  pool  must be reduced as a result of the redemption of the stock held by FP.

The Memorandum is designated AM2013-006. The  Memorandum  is  dated  30th  September 2013,  and  indicates  that  it  was  released  on 25TH  October 2013.

22.    US Senate Finance Committee releases proposals for cost recovery and tax accounting rules

The US Senate Committee on Finance has  announced  the  issuance  of  a  staff discussion draft on proposed reforms to the cost recovery and tax accounting rules. These are the rules that are used to determine when a business can deduct the cost of investments and how businesses account for their income. The announcement was made in a Press Release dated 21ST  November 2013.

The issued discussion draft is the third in a series of discussion drafts to overhaul US Internal Revenue Code (IRC). The significant proposals in the discussion draft include, among others:

–    a single set of depreciation rules apply to all business taxpayers;

–    the number of major depreciation rates is reduced from more than 40 to 5;

–    the need for businesses to depreciate each of their assets separately is eliminated, except for real property;

–    real property is depreciated on a straight-line basis over 43 years;

–    research and experimental expenditures, as well as natural resource extraction expenditures, are capitalised and amortised over 5 years;

–    the cash method of accounting and immedi- ate expensing of the cost of inventory are allowed for all businesses (other than tax shelters) with annual gross receipts under $ 10 million;

–    the IRC section 179 expensing allowance (i.e. current year deduction in lieu of capitalisation and depreciation) is permanently increased to
$ 1 million with the phase-out threshold of $ 2 million, together with an expansion of the types of qualifying property; and

–    the following rules would be repealed:

–    the LIFO (last in, first out) method of account- ing for inventory;

–    the lower of cost or market (LCM) rule for inventory;

–    the like-kind exchange rules that permit tax- free roll-over transactions; and

–    the completed contract method of accounting, except for small construction contracts.

The discussion draft also includes a list of un- addressed issues on which public comments are requested.

The documents released by the Committee on Finance include the following:

–    Cost Recovery and Accounting Staff Discussion
Legislative Language;

–    Cost Recovery and Accounting Summary;

–    Cost Recovery and Accounting One Pager; and

–    JCT Technical Explanation of Cost Recovery and Accounting Draft.

23.    Regulations issued regarding withholding on payment of dividend equivalents from US sources

The US Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) have issued final regu- lations (TD 9648) u/s. 871(m) of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) to provide guidance to non-resident individuals and foreign corporations that hold specified notional principal contracts (“specified NPCs”) providing for payments that are contingent upon or determined by reference to US source dividend payments and to withholding agents.

IRC section 871(m) treats a “dividend equiva- lent” as a dividend from sources within the United States for purposes of the US gross basis income tax and subjects such dividend equivalent, if paid to a non-resident person, to the 30% withholding tax that applies to fixed or determinable annual or periodical income (FDAP income) from US sources.

The  term  dividend  equivalent  is  defined  by IRC section 871(M)(2)  as:
–    any substitute dividend made pursuant to a securities lending or a sale-repurchase transaction (repo) that is contingent upon or determined by reference to a US source dividend payment;

–    any payment made pursuant to a specified NPC that is contingent upon or determined by reference to a US source dividend payment; and

–    any payment determined by the Treasury Department to be similar to the foregoing.

IRC  section  871(m)(3)(A)  defines  a  specified NPC  as  a  NPC  that  contains  terms  or  condi- tions  that  are  specified  in  the  statute,  and applies  this  definition  with  regard  to  pay- ments  made  between  14th  September  2010 and  18th  March  2012.  IRC  section  871(m)(3)

(B)  then  provides  that,  with  respect  to  pay- ments made after 18th March 2012, any NPC will  be  a  specified  NPC  unless  the  Treasury Department determines that such contract is of  a  type  that  does  not  have  the  potential for tax avoidance.

Temporary  regulations  (RIN  1545-BK53,  TD 9572), issued on 23RD January 2012, extended the  section  871(m)(3)(A)  statutory  definition of  a  specified  NPC  through  31st  December 2012 (see United States-1, News 25TH January 2012). The final regulations, inter alia, further extend  the  applicability  of  the  definition  to payments made before 1st January 2016.

The above definitions also apply for purposes of FATCA withholding under chapter 4 of the IRC. The Treasury Department and IRS state in the preamble to the final regulations that they will closely scrutinise other transactions that are not covered by IRC section 871(m) and that may be used to avoid US taxation and US withholding taxes.

The final regulations are designated Treasury Regulation  sections  1.863-7,  1.871-15,  1.881-2, 1.892-3,  1.894-1,  1.1441-2  through  -4,  -6,  and -7, and 1.1461-1.

The  final  regulations  are  effective  on  5Th December  2013  and  generally  apply  to  payments  made  on  or  after  23rd  January  2012 with exceptions.

In  addition,  the  Treasury  Department  and the  IRS  contemporaneously  issued  proposed regulations (REG–120282–10) to provide, inter alia,  a  new  definition  of  a  specified  NPC  for payments made on or after 1st January 2016.

24.        US Treasury Department reissues list of boy- cott countries that result in restriction of US tax benefits

The US Treasury Department has reissued its list of the countries that require cooperation with or participation in an international boy- cott as a condition of doing business.

The countries listed are Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the United Arab Emirates, and the Republic of Yemen.

The  list  is  dated  20th  November  2013  and was published in the Federal Register on 27TH September  2013.  The  new  list  is  unchanged from the list dated 26TH  August 2013.

The listed countries are identified pursuant to section 999 of the US Internal Revenue Code (IRC), which requires US taxpayers to file reports with the Treasury Department concerning operations in the boycotting countries. Such taxpayers incur adverse consequences under the IRC, including denial of US foreign tax credits for taxes paid to those countries and income inclusion under subpart F of the IRC in the case of US shareholders of controlled foreign corporations (CFCs) that conduct operations in those countries.

[Acknowledgement/ Source: We have compiled the  above  information  from  the  Tax  News Service  of  IBFD  for  the  period  01-10-2013  to 18-12-2013.]

Physical submission of Audit Report in Form 704 for the financial year 2012-13

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Trade Circular No.10T dated 16-12-2013

In this Circular, the Commissioner has prescribed the list of physical documents to be filed after electronic uploading the vat audit report . The last date for electronic uploading of Form e704 for the financial year 2012-13 is 15th January, 2014 and the last date for submission of physical documents is 25th January,2014.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 75 dated November 19, 2013

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Trade Credit for imports into India-Online submission of data on issuance of Guarantee/Letter of Undertaking (LoU) /Letter of Comfort (LoC) by ADs

This circular states that for the quarter ended September 30, 2013 reporting of data by banks to RBI on issuance of guarantees/LOU/LOC has to be done by way of a consolidated statement, at quarterly intervals using the eXtensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) platform and not by way of manual submission (followed MS-Excel file through email). For this purpose banks may login to the site https:// secweb.rbi.org.in/orfsxbrl/ using their User name, Password and Bank code.

Banks who have already submitted the manual statement (and MS-Excel file) for the quarter ended 30th September, 2013 are also required to report the same data online using the XBRL platform. From the quarter ending 31st December, 2013 onwards, the data must be submitted in soft form on XBRL platform only by 10th of the following month.

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Charitable purpose: Exemption u/s. 10(23C) (iv) r/w. section 2(15): Petitioner, a charitable society had acquired intellectual property rights qua bar coding system from ‘G’ and charged registration and annual fees from third parties to permit use of coding system: Charging a nominal fees from beneficiaries is not business aptitude nor profit intent: Assessee cannot be denied approval for exemption u/s. 10(23C)(iv) on ground that activity of assessee was in nature of trade, commerce or business<

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GS1 India vs. DGIT(E); [2013] 38 taxmann.com 364 (Delhi):

The petitioner society was registered as a charitable society under the residuary clause of section 2(15) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Income-tax department had granted registration to the petitioner u/s. 12A. The petitioner has acquired intellectual property rights qua bar coding system from GSI Global Officer, Belgium and permits use of these intellectual property rights by third parties under licence agreements for initial registration fee of Rs. 20,000 and subsequent annual registration fee of Rs. 4,000. GSI, Belgium has been granted legal status of International ‘Not-for-profit’ association under the Belgium tax law and was, therefore, not liable to pay corporation tax. The petitioner claimed approval for exemption u/s. 10(23C)(iv) of the Act. However, the Director General (Exemption) denied approval on ground that no charitable activity was involved in permitting use of intellectual property right for consideration and same was in nature of trade, commerce or business and that petitioner was not maintaining separate books of account for the business/commercial activity, i.e., licencing bar coding system, and did not intend to do so in future.

The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

“i) Legal terms ‘trade, commerce or business’ in section 2(15), means activity undertaken with a view to make or earn profit. Profit motive is determinative and a critical factor to discern whether any activity is business, trade or commerce.

ii) Business activity has an important pervading element of self-interest, though fair dealing should and can be present, whilst charity or charitable activity is anti-thesis of activity undertaken with profit motive or activity undertaken on sound or recognised business principles. Charity is driven by altruism and desire to serve others, though element of self-preservation may be present. For charity, benevolence should be omnipresent and demonstrable but it is not equivalent to self-sacrifice and abnegation. The antiquated definition of charity, which entails giving and receiving nothing in return is outdated. A mandatory feature would be; charitable activity should be devoid of selfishness or illiberal spirit. Enrichment of oneself or selfgain should be missing and the predominant purpose of the activity should be to serve and benefit others.

 iii) A small contribution by way of fee that the beneficiary pays would not convert charitable activity into business, commerce or trade in the absence of contrary evidence. Quantum of fee charged, economic status of the beneficiaries who pay, commercial value of benefits in comparison to the fee, purpose and object behind the fee etc. are several factors which will decide the seminal question, is it business?.

iv) The petitioner does not cater to the lowest or marginalised section of the society, but Government, public sector and private sector manufacturers and traders. No fee is charged from users and beneficiaries like stockist, wholesellers, government department etc. while nominal fee is only paid by the manufacturer or marketing agencies, i.e., the first person who installs the coding system which is not at all exorbitant in view of the benefit and advantage which are overwhelming. Anyone from any part of the world can access the database for identification of goods and services using global standard. The fee is fixed and not product specific or quantity related, i.e., dependent upon quantum of production. Registration and annual fee entitles the person concerned to use GSI identification on all their products. Non-levy of fee in such cases may have its own disadvantages and problems. Charging a nominal fee to use the coding system and to avail the advantages and benefits therein is neither reflective of business aptitude nor indicative of profit oriented intent.

v) Having applied the test mentioned above, including the criteria for determining whether the fee is commensurate and is being charged on commercial or business principles, the petitioner fulfils the charitable activity test. It is apparent to us that revenue has taken a contradictory stand as they have submitted and accepted that the petitioner carries on charitable activity under the residuary head ‘general public utility’ but simultaneously regards the said activity as business. Thus the contention of the revenue that the petitioner charges fee and, therefore, is carrying on business, has to be rejected. The intention behind the entire activity is philanthropic and not to recoup or reimburse in monetary terms what is given to the beneficiaries. Element of give and take is missing, but decisive element of bequeathing in present. In the absence of ‘profit motive’ and charity being the primary and sole purpose behind the activities of the petitioner is perspicuously discernible and perceptible.

vi) The statement and submission of the respondents that the petitioner was not maintaining separate books of account for commercial activity and, therefore, denied registration/notification, has to be rejected as fallacious and devoid of any merit. Similar allegation is often made in cases of charitable organisation/association without taking into account the activity undertaken by the assessee and the primary objective and purpose, i.e., the activity and charity activity are one and the same. The charitable activity undertaken and performed by the petitioner relates to promotion, dissemination of knowledge and issue of unique identification amongst third parties etc. The ‘business’ activity undertaken by the petitioner is integral to the charity/charitable activities. As noted above, the petitioner is not carrying on any independent, separate or incidental activity, which can be classified as business to feed and promote charitable activities. The act or activity of the petitioner being one, thus a single set of books of account is maintained, as what is treated and regarded by the revenue as the ‘business’ is nothing but intrinsically connected with acts for attainment of the objects and goals of the petitioner. When the petitioner is maintaining the books of account with regard to their receipts/ income as well as the expenses incurred for their entire activity then how it can be held that separate books of account have not been maintained for ‘business’ activities.

vii) The ‘business’ activities are intrinsically woven into and part of the charitable activity undertaken. The ‘business’ activity is not feeding charitable activities. In any case, when it is held that the petitioner is not carrying on any business, trade or commerce, question of requirement of separate books of account for the business, trade or commerce is redundant.

ix) On the basis of reasoning given in the impugned order, the petitioner can not be denied benefit of registration/notification u/s. 10(23C) (iv).

x) In view of the aforesaid discussion, we allow the present writ petition and issue writ of certiorari quashing the order dated 17th November, 2008 and mandamus is issued directing the respondents to grant approval u/s. 10(23C)(iv) of the Act and the same shall be issued within six weeks fr

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Capital gain: Partnership firm: Transfer: Distribution of asset on dissolution etc.: S/s. 2(47) and 45(4): Retiring partner taking only money towards value of its share: No transfer of capital asset: Section 45(4) not applicable:

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CIT vs. Dynamic Enterprises; 359 ITR 83 (Karn)(FB):

The following question was referred to the Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court for consideration:

“When a retiring partner takes only the money towards the value of his share, whether the firm should be made liable to pay capital gains even when there is no distribution of capital asset/ assets among the partners u/s. 45(4) of the Income-tax Act, 1961? or Whether the retiring partner would be liable to pay for the capital gains?” The Full Bench of the High Court answered the questions as under:

“When a retiring partner takes only money towards the value of his share and when there is no distribution of capital asset/assets among the partners there is no transfer of a capital asset and consequently no profit or gain is payable u/s. 45(4) of the Income-tax Act.”

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Business expenditure: Disallowance u/s. 40A(3): A. Y. 2008-09: Cash payment exceeding prescribed limits [Payment to Government concern]: Assessee a scrap dealer, purchased scrap from Railway by making payment in cash in excess of Rs. 20,000: Since Railway is concern of Union of India, such payment in cash had to be considered as a legal tender, and, therefore, same could not be disallowed u/s. 40A(3):

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CIT vs. Devendrappa M. Kalal; [2013] 39 taxmann. com 16 (Karn):

For the A Y 2008-09 the Assessing Officer disallowed certain expenditure and added Rs. 73,91,380/- on the ground that the assessee has made payment in cash in excess of Rs. 20,000/- in respect of a single transaction which is in gross violation of section 40A(3)of the Income-tax Act 1961. Before the Tribunal the assessee contended that all the payments were made by him to purchase the scrap from the Railways, which is run by the Union of India and any payment made to the Government is required to be considered as a legal tender and the question of adding the same by way of disallowance u/s. 40A(3) is not justified. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The revenue is not disputing that the assessee is a scrap dealer purchasing scrap from the Railways. Admittedly Railways is a concern of the Union of India. If any cash is paid towards purchase of the scrap the same cannot be disputed by the revenue since such payment has to be considered as a legal tender. If the revenue is of the opinion that no such payment has been made to the Railways, we could have considered their grievance.

 ii) In the circumstances, the appeal is dismissed.”

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Business expenditure: TDS: Disallowance u/s. 40(a)(i) r/w. s/s. 9(1)(vii) and 195: A. Y. 2009-10: Commission or discount paid to nonresident: Circular clarifying that tax need not be deducted if non-resident did not have PE in India: Withdrawal of circular in October 2009: Not applicable to A. Y. 2009-10: Payment not to be disallowed:

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CIT vs. Angelique International Ltd; 359 ITR 9(Del): 38 taxman.com 425 (Del):

The payments made by the assessee to the nonresidents by way of commission and discount were covered by the Circular Nos. 23, dated 23-07-1969; 163 dated 29-05-1975; and 786 dated 02-07-2000 wherein it was clarified that payments in the form of a commission or discount to a foreign party were not chargeable to tax in India u/s. 9(1)(vii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and accordingly, tax was not deductible at source. In view of these circulars the assessee had not deducted tax at source on payments aggregating to Rs. 37,87,26,158/- in the relevant year, i.e. A. Y. 2009-10. These circulars were withdrawn by circular No. 7 of 2009 dated 22- 10-2009.

In the A. Y. 2009-10, the Assessing Officer disallowed the said amount applying section 40(a) (i) of the Act and relying on the said circular No. 7 of 2009 dated 22/10/2009. The Tribunal deleted the disallowance.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under: “Circular No. 7 of 2009, cannot be classified as explaining or clarifying the earlier circulars issued in 1969 and 2000. Hence, it did not have retrospective effect. The deletion of disallowance u/s. 40(a)(i) was justified.”

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Business expenditure: Section 37: A. Y. 2004- 05: Payment to financial consultants for professional services in connection with corporate debt restructuring by negotiating with banks and financial institutions: Expenditure for purposes of business and allowable in entirety in year in which incurred: Expenditure spread over in six years by Tribunal with consent of assessee: Department not entitled to object:

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CIT vs. Gujarat State Fertilisers and Chemicals Ltd.: 358 ITR 323 (Guj):

The assessee had claimed deduction of Rs. 2.57 crore being amount paid to financial consultants who provided their professional services in connection with the scheme of corporate debt restructuring by negotiating with the banks and financial institutions, which eventually helped the reduction of interest burden of the assessee.

The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim holding that the expenditure is capital in nature. The Tribunal held that the expenditure was revenue in nature and spread it over a period of six years with the consent of the assessee considering the judgment of the Supreme Court in Madras Industrial Investment Corporation Ltd. vs. CIT (1997) 225 ITR 802 (SC).

On appeal by the Revenue, the Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) For the waiver of the loan, payment had been made to the financial consultants. This was for the purpose of business and was allowable u/s. 37(1). Once the expenditure was held to be revenue in nature incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business, it could be allowed in its entirety in the year in which it was incurred.

 ii) However, when the expenditure was spread over a period of six years and the assessee had no objection to such revenue expenditure being spread over, though it could have insisted that this amount be allowed in the year under consideration, the Department could
not challenge it as the expenditure was revenue in nature.”

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Accrual of Income – Income accrues when it becomes due but it must also be accompanied by a corresponding liability of the other party to pay to amount.

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CIT vs. Excel Industries Ltd. and Ors. [2013] 358 ITR 295 (SC)

Advance Licence Benefit and Duty Entitlement Pass Book Benefit-Income does not accrue when the benefit becomes vested but accrues when imports are actually made. The assessee maintained its accounts on a mercantile basis. In its return (revised on 31st March, 2003) the assessee claimed a deduction of Rs. 12,57,525 under the head advance licence benefit receivable.

The assessee also claimed a deduction in respect of duty entitlement pass book benefit receivable amounting to Rs. 4,46,46,976/-. These benefits related to entitlement to import duty free raw material under the relevant import and export policy by way of reduction from raw material consumption.

According to the assessee, the amounts were excluded from its total income since they could not be said to have accrued until imports were made and the raw material consumed. During the assessment proceedings, the assessee relied upon a decision of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in Jamshri Ranjitsinghji Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. vs. IAC [1992] 41 ITD 142 (Mum) and also the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) in its own case for the assessment years 1995-96 to 1997-98.

By his order dated 24th March, 2004, the Assessing Officer did not accept the assessee’s claim on the ground that the taxability of such benefits was covered by section 28(iv) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 which provides that the value of any benefit or perquisite, whether convertible into money or not, arising from a business or a profession is income. According to the Assessing Officer, along with an obligation of export commitment, the assessee gets the benefit of importing raw material duty free. When exports are made, the obligation of the assessee is fulfilled and the right to receive the benefit becomes vested and absolute, at the end of the year.

In the year under consideration, the export obligation had been made and the accounting entries were based on such fulfillment. The Assessing Officer distinguished Jamshri on the ground that it pertained to the assessment year 1985-86 when the export promotion scheme was totally different and the taxability of such a benefit was examined only with reference to section 28(iv) of the Act but in the present case the taxability of such benefit was examined from all possible angles as it formed part of the profits and gains of business according to the ordinary principles of commercial accounting. The assessee took up the matter in appeal and by an order dated 15th September, 2008, the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) referred to an earlier appellate order in the case of the assessee relevant to the assessment years 1999-2000 and 2000-01 and following the conclusion arrived at in those assessment year, the appeal was allowed and it was held that the advance licence benefit receivable amounting to Rs. 12,57,525 and duly entitlement pass book benefit of Rs. 4,46,46,976 ought not to be taxed in this year.

Reliance was also placed on the order of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in the assessee’s own case for the assessment year 1995-96. Feeling aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, which referred to the issues raised by the Revenue and by its order dated 29th April, 2011, dismissed the appeal upholding the view taken by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals).

The Tribunal held that the issued were covered in favour of the asseessee by earlier orders of the Tribunal in the assessee’s own cases. It had been held by the Tribunal in the earlier cases that income does not accrue until the imports are made and raw materials are consumed by the assessee. As regards the accounting year under consideration, it was found that there was no dispute that it was only in subsequent year that the imports were made and the raw materials consumed by the assessee.

The Tribunal also took the note of the fact in the assessee’s own cases starting from the assessment year 1992-93 onwards these issues had been consistently decided in its favour. It was also noted that for some of the assessment years, namely, 1993-94, 1996-97 and 1997-98 appeals were filed by the Revenue in the Bombay High Court but they were not admitted. Under the circumstances, the Tribunal affirmed the decision of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) on the issues raised.

The Revenue then preferred an appeal under section 260A of the Act in respect of the following substantial question of law:

“Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal is justified in law in holding by following its decision in the case of Jamshri Ramjitsinghji Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. vs. IAC [1992] 41 ITD 142 (Mum), that advance licence benefit and the DEPB benefits are taxable in the year in which these are actually utilised by the assessee and not in the year of receipts ?” By the impugned order, the High Court declined to admit the appeal filed by the Revenue under section 260A of the Act.

On further appeal to the Supreme Court by the Revenue, the Supreme Court observed that it was well settled that Income-tax cannot be levied on hypothetical income Referring to its decision in CIT vs. Shoorji Vallabhdas and Co. (1962) 46 ITR 144 (SC) and Morvi Industries Ltd. vs. CIT (Central) (1971) 82 ITR 835 (SC) in this regards, the Supreme Court noted that it has been further held, and in its view, more importantly, that income accrues when there “arises a corresponding liability of the other party from whom the income becomes due to pay that amount”.

According to the Supreme Court therefore, income certainly accrues when it becomes due but it must also be accompanied by a corresponding liability of the other party to pay the amount. Only then can it be said that for the purposes of taxability that the income is not hypothetical and it has really accrued to the assessee. The Supreme Court held that, so far as the present case was concerned, even if it was assumed that the assessee was entitled to the benefits under the advance licence as well as under the duty entitlement pass book, there was no corresponding liability on the customs authorities to pass on the benefit of duty free imports to the assessee until the goods were actually imported and made available for clearance.

The benefits represented, at best, a hypothetical income which may or may not materialise and its money value was, therefore, not the income of the assessee. Referring to its decision of Godhra Electricity Co. Ltd. vs. CIT (1997) 225 ITR 756 (SC) and applying the three tests laid down by various decisions of the apex court, namely, whether the income accrued to the assessee is real or hypothetical ; whether there is a corresponding liability of the other party to pass on the benefits of duty free import to the assessee even without any imports having been made ; and the probability or improbability of realisation of the benefits by the assessee considered from a realistic and practical point of view (the assessee may not have made imports), the Supreme Court held that, it was quite clear that in fact no real income but only hypothetical income had accrued to the assessee and section 28(iv) of the Act would be inapplicable to the facts and circumstances of the case.

The Supreme Court further held that, as noted by the Tribunal, a consistent view had been taken in favour  of  the  assessee  on  the  questions  raised, starting  with  the  assessment  year  1992-93,  that the benefits under the advance licences or under the duty entitlement pass book do not represent the real income of the assessee, and consequently, there was no reason for if to take a different view unless there were very convincing reasons, none of which were been pointed out by the learned counsel for the Revenue.

The Supreme Court observed that, it appeared from the record that in several assessment years, the Revenue accepted the order of the Tribunal in favour of the assessee and did not pursue the matter any further but in respect of some assess- ment years the matter was taken up in appeal before the Bombay High Court but without any success. That being so, according to the Supreme Court, the Revenue could not be allowed to flip- flop on the issue and it ought let the matter rest rather than spend the taxpayers’ money in pursuing litigation for the sake of it.

Lastly, the real question was the year in which the assessee was required to pay tax. The Supreme Court noted that there was no dispute that in the subsequent accounting year, the assessee did make imports and did derive benefits under the advance licence and the duty entitlement pass book and paid tax thereon. Therefore, the Rev- enue had not been deprived of any tax. Further, since that the rate of  tax remained the same  in the present assessment year as well as in the subsequent assessment year, the dispute raised by the Revenue was entirely academic or at best may have a minor tax effect. According to the Supreme Court, there was, therefore, no need for the Revenue to continue with this litigation when it was quite clear that not only was it fruitless (on merits) but also that it may not have added anything much to the public coffers.

Interest on excess refund – Section 234D is not retrospective and does not apply to assessments that are completed prior to 01-06-2003.

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CIT vs. Reliance Energy Ltd. [2013] 358 ITR 371 (SC)

The Revenue filed a Special Leave Petition against the decision of the Bombay High Court dismissing the appeal of the Department following decision in DIT vs. Delta Air Lines Inc. (2013) 358 ITR 367 (Bom.) contending that the above decision had no applicability inasmuch as the question involved was in respect of retrospectivity of section 234D of the Act. Learned counsel for the assessee placed reliance on Explanation 2 inserted in section 234D of the Act by the Finance Act, 2012, with effect from 1st June, 2003. The Supreme Court noted that Explanation 2 which has been inserted in section 234D of the Act read as under:

“Explanation 2 – For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the provisions of this section shall also apply to an assessment year commencing before the 1st day of June 2003, if the proceedings in respect of such assessment year is completed after the said date.”

The Supreme Court observed that the High Court was concerned with the appeal relating to the assessment year 1998-99. It was an admitted position that the assessment of that year was completed prior of 1st June, 2003.

The Supreme Court held that having regards to the legal position which had been clarified by Parliament by insertion of Explanation 2 in section 234D of the Act, in the present case, retrospectivity of section 234D did not arise. The Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition.

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Supreme Food Industries vs.. State of Kerala [2012] 47 VST 487 (Ker)

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VAT-Sale – Supply of Deep Freezers – By Ice Creame Manufacturing Company To Its Distributors Against Deposit – Up to full value of Cost- To be Adjusted Against Wear and Tear- In Four Equal Annual Instilments – Amounts To Sale – And Liable to Pay Tax – As well As Eligible to Input Tax Credit of Tax Paid on Purchase of Deep Freezers – The Kerala Value Added Tax Act, 2003.

Facts:
The petitioner company is engaged in manufacturing and sale of ice cream made purchase of deep freezers as an incentive and delivered same to the distributors against collection of security deposit almost equal to the value of deep freezers from each distributors. The assessing authority during the assessment for the years 2005-2006 and 2008-2009 treated such delivery of deep freezers as sale and levied tax thereon and did not grant input tax credit of tax paid on purchase of it being capital goods. The appellate authority as well as the Tribunal confirmed the assessment orders. The petitioner company filed revision petition before the Kerala High Court against such assessment orders.

Held :
The High Court rejected contention of the petitioner that there is no sale of deep freezers to the distributors because in fact it is a sale on deferred payment basis and the cost is recovered at 25 % each for the four years from the date of delivery. The transaction is a pure sale but on credit basis against payment in four installments.

As regards claim of input tax credit, the High court held that Deep freezers purchased and delivered are used for storage of ice cream by the distributors, and so much so, were capital goods for them and trading goods for the petitioner, who has purchased and sold the same to the distributors and is eligible to claim input tax credit on purchase thereof. Accordingly, the High Court allowed revision petition partly by directing assessing authority to grant input tax credit as per provisions of the law.

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TDS on Aircraft Landing & Parking Charges

Synopsis

The controversy is in regard to deductibility of tax on payments made by Airlines to Airports for use of parking and incidental. The authors analyse two deci- sions of the Delhi High court and one of the Madras High Court. The former held that the Tax should be deducted u/s. 194I considering parking and landing fees as rent. Whereas, Madras High Court held that services of landing and parking included many services in the nature of work done under the contract and covered u/s. 194C. In Authors’ view, the Madras HC decision seems to be more detailed and reasoned.

Airlines pay to airports different types of charges for use of airports and its facilities. Charges are paid for landing and take off facilities, taxiways, parking bay with necessary air traffic control, ground safety services, aeronautical communication services, navi- gation services and meteorological services besides the rent or charges for use of hangars. Landing and parking charges are paid for use of the facility of landing and parking aircrafts at airports. The land- ing charges are based on the weight of the aircraft, using the maximum permissible take-off weight of the aircraft, while parking charges are linked to the size of the aircraft and the period of parking.

Tax is deductible at source u/s. 194-C or 194-I on various types of payments made to the airport au- thorities for use of the airports or the facilities made available there at. The issue has arisen before the courts as to the categorisation of these payments for landing and parking charges for the purposes of TDS – whether it is rent falling u/s. 194-I or Pay- ments to Contractors falling u/s. 194C. Conflicting views have been taken by the Delhi and the Madras High Courts, with the Delhi High Court holding that payment of such landing and parking charges is in the nature of rent, tax being deductible u/s.194-I, and the Madras High Court holding that tax is deductible at source from such payments u/s. 194C.

United Airlines’ Case

The issue first came up before the Delhi High Court in the case of  United Airlines vs. CIT 287 ITR 281.

The Delhi High Court noted that the term “rent” as defined in section 194-I read as under:

“ ‘rent’ means any payment, by whatever name called, under any lease, sub-lease, tenancy or any other agreement or arrangement for the use of any land or any building (including factory building), together with furniture, fittings and the land appurtenant thereto, whether or not such building is owned by the payee;”

According to the court, a perusal of the above provi- sion showed that the word “rent” defined therein had a wider meaning than ‘rent’ as is understood in common parlance. It included any agreement or arrangement for use of land.

The court observed that when the wheels of an aircraft touch the surface of the airfield, use of the land of the airport immediately begins. Similarly, for parking the aircraft in that airport, again, there is use of the land. Hence, the court was of the opinion that landing and parking fee was definitely ‘rent’ within the meaning of the definition in section 194-I as they were payments made for use of the land of the airport.

The Delhi High Court dismissed the arguments of the assessee based on the intention of the provision and its background, holding that considerations of equity were wholly out of place in a taxing statute, and that a strict interpretation was called for.

In the opinion of the Delhi High Court, the definition of the word “rent” in Expln. (i) of section 194-I was very clear and the plain meaning of that provision showed that even the landing of aircraft or parking aircraft amounted to user of the land of the airport.

Hence, according to the court, the landing fee and parking fee would amount to ‘rent’ within the meaning of aforesaid provision, even if it could not be assigned such a meaning in common parlance.

This decision of the Delhi High Court was followed by it in a subsequent decision in the case of CIT vs. Japan Airlines Co. Ltd. 325 ITR 298. In this case, the court also held that a letter from Airports Authority of India stating that payment of such charges at- tract TDS u/s. 194C, was not an argument available to the assessee while deciding the issue before it, though it may be relevant in proving the bona fides of the assessee in penalty proceedings.

Singapore Airlines Case

The issue again recently came up before the Madras High Court in the case of CIT vs. Singapore Airlines 358 ITR 237.

In this case, the assessee claimed that the payments made to the International Airport Authority towards landing and parking charges would not come within the definition of “rent” under the explanation to section 194-I. The assessing officer took the view that the charges paid by the assessee towards landing and parking to the International Airport Authority of India for the use of runway for landing and takeoff and also the space in the tarmac of the airport for parking of the aircraft represented rent.

The Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the order of the assessing officer. The tribunal followed the decision of the Delhi bench of the tribunal in the case of DCIT vs. Japan Airlines 92 TTJ 687, taking the view that the payment made by the airline could not be construed as payment of rent. The tribunal took the view that the provisions of section 194C would apply to such payments (while holding that the provisions of section 194J would apply to pay- ment for navigation facilities).

Before the Madras High Court, on behalf of the revenue, reliance was placed on the definition of ‘rent’ in the explanation to section 194-I and the decision of the Delhi High Court in Japan Airlines case (supra).

On behalf of the assessee, it was argued that the Delhi High Court had considered the definition of “rent” without considering the nature of services offered by the International Airports Authority of India on the landing and parking of the aircraft. It was pointed out that the definition of rent was an exhaustive definition and that considering the preceding enumeration, namely lease, sub-lease or tenancy, the term ‘any other agreement or ar- rangement’ as appearing in the definition had to be understood by applying the principle of ejusdem generis. Therefore, the said arrangement or agree- ment had to be in respect of use of any land or any building as under a tenancy or lease for the payment to qualify as rent. It was pointed out that the Delhi High Court had not taken note of the facts that there was no use of any land as in the case of tenancy or lease and that all that the airlines had paid for was only for the services rendered by the Airport Authority in providing of facilities for landing, including the navigational facility and the payment was measured with reference to various parameters, which were given by the International Airport Authority in its various circulars.

The attention of the court was drawn, in response to the question raised as to whether the various facilities offered and the charges fixed for the same on the basis of weight for the use of the facility would amount to “use of the land” and the charges would fit in within the definition of “rent”, to the Delhi tribunal’s decision in the case of Japan Air- lines, which had considered the various aspects of the services rendered to the airlines, and to the fact that the Delhi High Court in United Airlines’ case (which was followed in Japan Airlines’ case by the Delhi High Court) had not considered any of these aspects while dealing with the issue as to whether the charges would fit in within the definition of “rent”. It was claimed that the Delhi High Court had merely interpreted the provision of law to come to a conclusion that when the wheels of an aircraft coming into an airport touches the surface of the airfield, there was a use of the land immediately, so too on the parking of the aircraft in the airport there was use of the land, and hence the parking and landing fee should be treated as rent. It was argued that the issue should be decided in the light of the various facilities offered by the Airport Authority of India.

The Madras High Court observed that the definition of ‘rent’ began with the phrase “rent to mean”, which indicated an exhaustive definition. It agreed that an arrangement or agreement must necessarily be of the same nature of character of lease, sub- lease and tenancy for it to fall within the definition of rent, following the principle of ejusdem generis. The Madras High Court observed that in United Airlines case, neither the revenue nor the assessee produced any materials on the nature of services rendered. No material was produced to show the true nature of the arrangement or agreement and show whether it was in the nature of a lease or a license for the use of the land for it being char- acterised as rent.

The Madras high court observed that the Delhi tribunal’s case of Japan Airlines was the only case where the various details regarding the nature of services rendered and the payment charged as per the guidelines and principles laid down by the Council of International Civil Aviation Organisation were considered to come to the conclusion that the charges paid did not fall within the definition of ‘rent’. The court noted that the services provided as analysed by the tribunal included charges for landing and takeoff facilities, taxiways with neces- sary draining and fencing of airport, parking route, navigation and terminal navigation. These charges were based on weight formula and maximum per- missible takeoff weight and length of stay.

The Madras High Court noted that the Delhi tribunal had held that the Airports Authority of India never intended to give exclusive possession of any specific area to the airlines in relation to the landing and parking area. Since a tenancy was created only when the tenant was granted the right to enjoyment of the property by having exclusive possession, the tribunal had held that the payment could not be called a ‘rent’.

Before the High Court, various materials, such as Airport Economic Manual of ICAO and Airports Authority of India Act, 1994, were produced to demonstrate the nature of services provided by the airports. The High Court noted that the principles guiding the levy of charges for landing and take- off showed that the charges were with reference to the number of facilities provided by the airport in compliance with various international protocols and were not for any specified land usage or area allotted. The charges were governed by various considerations on offering facilities to meet the requirements of passenger safety and for safe landing and parking of the aircraft. According to the Madras High Court, the charges were of the nature of fees for services offered, rather than in the nature of rent for use of land.

The Madras High Court observed that it was no doubt true that the Delhi High Court had pointed out that an aircraft, on coming into an airport and on touching the surface of the airfield, began the use of the land, and on parking of the aircraft, used the land however, that alone could not conclude that the use of the land led to a lease or an ar- rangement in the nature of a lease. By the very nature of things, as a means of transport, an aircraft had to touch down for disembarking passengers and goods before it took off. For this facility, the airport charged a price. Given the complexity of landing and takeoff, unlike in the case of vehicles on a road, the airport had to provide navigational facilities, and the charges were calculated based on certain criteria like the weight of the aircraft which charges could not be construed as rent.

The Madras High Court also noted that the runway usage by an aircraft was no different from the us- age of a road by a vehicle or any other means of transport. Just as the use of a road could not be regarded as a use of land, the use of the tarmac could also not be regarded as the use of land. For the purpose of considering whether the payment was rent, such use would not fall within the expres- sion “use of land”.

The Madras High Court therefore expressed its in- ability to accept the view of the Delhi High Court that the use of the land on a touchdown in the airfield would amount to a use of land for the purpose of treating the charges as rent u/s. 194-I. The Madras High Court confirmed the order of the tribunal, holding that tax was not deductible at source u/s. 194-I from such payments.

Observations

When one goes through the decisions of the Delhi High Courts and that of the Madras High Court, it is evident that the decision of the Madras High Court is a more detailed and reasoned one. The Madras High Court has considered not just the law, but has applied the law to the facts of the case before it, by examining the nature of the services provided, unlike the Delhi High Court in whose decision the facts of the case in relation to services rendered, as found by the tribunal, do not seem to have been taken into account as is observed by the Madras High Court.

The definition of the term ‘rent’ contained in the Explanation 1 to section 194-I is an exhaustive definition as is clear by the use of the word ‘mean’ in contrast to ‘includes’, therein. The term “any another agreement or arrangement” should not be widely construed, but should be read by apply- ing the principle of ‘ejusdem generis’. So read , the payment for mere usage of land without any right to enjoy the land can not amount to rent for the purposes of section 194-I , more so, where the use of land is ancillary.

The services for landing and parking includes clear approach, taxiways, light, communication facilities, aerodrome control, air traffic control, meteorologi- cal information, fire and ambulance services, use of light and special radio aids for landing, etc. The landing and parking charges are based on the weight formulae and not on area of parking and hence the parking charges are for the work done under the contract and are covered by section 194C. The Airport Economic Manual lays down different criteria for rental charges for long term use of hangars, etc., where the market value of the land and buildings involved is the criteria, which is different from the criteria used for landing and parking charges. There is a clear distinction between the rent and landing and parking charges.

Looking at the substance of the transaction involving the payment of landing and parking charges, there is clearly no lease or tenancy in land is intended to be granted nor exclusive possession of land is desired to be given. Such an arrangement cannot be treated as rent.

The view taken by the Madras High Court therefore clearly seems to be the better view of the matter, that tax is not deductible u/s. 194-I from landing and parking charges paid to the authorites for use of the airports and the airports facilities of the kinds discussed here.

State of Kerala vs. Yenkay Complex Pvt. Ltd. [2012 ] 47 VST 288 (ker)

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Sales Tax – Rate of Tax – Based on Star Hotels – Given By Tourism Department – Government of India – Special Rate Applies From Date of Approval of Star Granted – And not From 1st Day of Financial Year – Section-5B and Entry 46 of Schedule I of The Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963.

Facts:
The respondent is a resort hotel having three star approvals by Tourism Department of Government India with effect from 11-09-2002. Accordingly, the respondent paid license fee for the period up to 11/09/2002 and from 11-09-2002 paid tax on sale of Cooked Food @ special rate of 8% applicable to star hotels under Entry 46 of Schedule I of The Act.

However, the assessing officer having treated classification of three star hotels from 1st day of April 2002, applied special rate of tax of 8% from that date. The Tribunal allowed the claim of the respondent. The Department filed revision petition before the Kerala High Court against the said judgment of Tribunal.

Held:
Liability for tax on sale of cooked food which is generally served in hotel is fixed under the Statue with reference to the classification of hotels. In fact, only bar attached and star hotels are specifically covered by Entry 46 of Schedule I, attracting special rate of tax of 8 %. Other hotels are covered by section 5B, which provides for collection of license fees. The Tourism Department of Government of India is the agency constituted to declare star status of a hotel. Therefore for the purpose of Entry 46, star hotels mean only those hotels so classified by tourism department of Government of India. Therefore, the respondent is liable to pay tax at special rate of 8 % from 11-09-2002 onwards, when the approval of star was given by the tourism department and for earlier period the respondent is liable to pay license fees u/s. 5B of The Act. Accordingly, the High Court dismissed the revision petition filed by the State and approved the order of Tribunal.

levitra

Understanding provisions of Section 56(2)

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Synopsis

Introduced by Finance Act, 2012 and effective from 1st April, 2013, Section 56(2)(viib) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, provides for a specific category of income that shall be chargeable to tax under the head “Income from other sources”.

The article gives an in-depth analysis of the said section and Rule 11UA that prescribes certain modes of valuation. The author suggests that a literal interpretation of the provision may result in it failing to achieve its objective. Section 56(2)(viib) { introduced by Finance Act 2012 w.e.f 01-04-2013 } r.w.s. 2(24)(xvi), of the Income tax Act (‘the Act’) provides that where a closely held company issues shares to a resident, for an amount received in excess of the fair market value of the shares, then the said excess portion will be regarded as income of the Company and charged to tax under the head ‘Income from other sources’. The said fair market value is defined as higher of the value arrived at on the basis of the method prescribed under Rule 11UA of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 (‘the Rules’) or the value as substantiated by the Company to the satisfaction of the Assessing Officer under Explanation to section 56(2)(viib). The Company can substantiate the fair market value based on the value of the tangible and intangible assets and various types of commercial rights as stated in the section. The fair market value which may be determined under Rule 11UA and the determination of date of fair market value for the purpose of valuation is discussed separately in the ensuing paragraphs below. However, this provision will not apply to amounts received by a venture capital undertaking from a venture capital fund or a venture capital company, which terms have been defined in section 10(23FB) . Further, this provision will also not apply to amount received for issue of shares from a non-resident, a foreign company or from a class of persons as may be notified by the Government.

A better understanding of the aforesaid provisions a reference should be made to the Budget Speechby the Hon’ble Finance Minister and Notes on Clauses and Memorandum Explaining the provisions. which are reproduced at Annexure 1 separately. For section 56(2)(viib) to apply, the following conditions will have to be fulfilled:

• Recipient of consideration for issue of shares should be a closely held company i.e. a company in which the public are not substantially interested, referred to u/s. 2(18) of the Act;

 • Consideration received for issue of shares should be only from a person, who is resident and the consideration so received should exceed the face value of shares issued;

• Recipient must ‘receive’ income i.e. consideration in excess of fair market value for issue of shares in the previous year [i.e. relevant financial year]; and

• The share premium received (i.e. consideration received for value of shares issued which exceeds the fair market value of the shares), is charged as income and subjected to tax accordingly; Section 56(2)(viib) is one of the charging sections under the Act. The sections which provide for levy or charge should be strictly construed. The rule of construction of a charging section is that before taxing any person, it must be shown that he falls within the ambit of the charging section by clear words in the section. No one can be taxed by implication. Further, the word ‘receives’ as referred to in section 56(2)(viib) has been interpreted to mean: “The words ‘receives’ implies two persons – the person who receives and the person from whom he receives.”

However, it is equally true that mere receipt of money is not sufficient to attract tax. It is only on receipt of ‘income’ which would attract tax. Every receipt is not necessarily income. So, until the Company receives income as referred to in section 56(2) (viib) r.w.s. 2(24)(xvi), it cannot be taxed. In addition to above, it would be necessary to highlight the following exceptions and certain limitations, :

1. As regard to determination of the date as on which fair market value of the shares issued needs to be determined, the provisions of section 56(2)(viib) and Rule 11UA provide as under: Three modes of valuation are prescribed for determination of fair market value of shares for section 56(2)(viib), with each of them providing for different valuation dates i.e. the dates as on which the fair market value of the shares needs to be decided. While two modes of valuation are prescribed under Rule 11UA, one mode of valuation, which is generally subjective in nature, is prescribed under Explanation to section 56(2)(viib) of the Act: a. The subjective mode of valuation as prescribed under Explanation to section 56(2)(viib), provides for determination of fair market value of shares on the date of issue of shares. The said mode of valuation provides for applicability of any method to determine the fair market value of shares, as may be relevant, however it categorically requires satisfaction of the Assessing Officer to said determination of fair market value of shares; or b. Rule 11UA as mentioned above provides for two modes of valuation to determine fair market value of shares issued by the closely held company as on the valuation date. Recently, Rule 11UA(2) has been inserted and the term ‘valuation date’ was amended vide Notification No. 52 under Income-tax (Fifteenth Amendment) Rules, 2012 w.e.f. from 29th November 2012, which provides for the present two modes of valuation.

The term ‘valuation date’ is now defined under Rule 11U(j) as the date on which the consideration is received by the assessee for issue of shares. Rule 11UA(2) is specifically inserted to provide for determination of fair market value of shares u/s. 56(2)(viib) of the Act. Prior to the aforesaid amendment, Rule 11UA only provided for one method of valuation and the term ‘valuation date’ was also not defined to provide for cases covered u/s. 56(2) (viib). Further, Rule 11UA(2) provides for option to the Company to select for either mode of valuation as provided under Rule 11UA(2)(a) or Rule 11UA(2) (b) of the Rules. The said modes of valuation are explained in brief below and for better understanding :

(a) The said mode of valuation is generally based on the book value of the shares as on the latest audited balance sheet of the Company, subject to adjustments as provided for assets and liabilities of the Company. In other words, the fair market value (‘FMV’) of the shares of the Company are defined as under: FMV of unquoted equity shares = (Assets – Liabilities) x PV PE The term ‘assets’ and ‘liabilities’ as required to be considered with necessary adjustments are defined under the Rules, while PV stands for Paid up value of such equity shares and PE stands for total amount of paid up equity share capital of the Company as shown in the latest Audited balance sheet of the Company. So, the FMV of the shares under this method which is to be determined as on the valuation date, provides for consideration of values as on the latest Audited Balance sheet of the Company;

(b)    The second mode of valuation provides for FMV of the shares to be undertaken by Merchant banker or Fellow Chartered Accountant of ICAI as per the Discounted Free Cash Flow method. The second method is silent as regard to values based on which FMV needs to be computed. However, considering FMV of the shares needs to be computed as on the valua- tion date, therefore, Discounted Free Cash Flow Method will have to be determined as on valuation date i.e. date on which consideration is received by the Company for issue of shares.

So, in the light of the above discussions, it appears that the Legislature has provided for selection of either modes of valuation under Rule 11UA and selection of the highest FMV on comparison with the mode of valuation prescribed under Explanation to section 56(2)(VIib), based on which FMV of the shares issued by the Company are to be determined. However, the modes of valuation so prescribed are subject to various limitations and subjectiveness, some of which are referred above.

2.    Secondly, one finds that the taxable event of the income under discussion is based on receipt of consideration for issue of shares in the given financial year. So, it is imperative to understand the terms ‘consideration’ and ‘issue of shares’ as referred to in the section. However, the said terms are not defined under the Act.

The concept of ‘issue of shares’ could be better understood under the Indian Companies Act, 1956 (‘the 1956 Act’) with the help of the legal precedents under the 1956 Act which are referred in ensuing paragraphs who have explained the concept of ‘issue of shares’ in context of ‘allotment of shares’ as under:

“Under the Act [author’s note – i.e. Companies Act], a company having share capital is required to state in its memorandum the amount of capital and the division thereof into shares of a fixed amount. see Section 13(4). This is what is called the authorised share capital of the company. Then the Company proceeds to issue the shares depending on the condition of the market. That only means inviting applications for these shares. When the applications are received, it accepts them and this is what is generally called allotment…..

……The words ‘creation’, ‘issue’ and ‘allot- ment’ are used with the three different meanings familiar to business people as well as to lawyers. There are three steps with regard to new capital, firstly it is created, till it is created the capital does not exist. When it is created it may remain unissued for years, as indeed it was here, the market did not allow of favourable opportunity of placing it. When it is issued it may be issued on such terms as appear for moment expedient. Next comes allotment…

…Allotment means the appropriation out of the previously unappropriated capital of a company, of a certain number of shares to a person. Till such allotment, the shares do not exist as such. It is on allotment in this sense that the shares come into existence.”

The aforesaid legal proposition explaining the different stages of share capital of the Company are approved in the following legal precedents:
•    Florence Land and Public Works Company (1885)
L.R. 29 Ch.D. 421;

•    Mosely vs. Koffyfontain Mines Limited (1911) I.L.R. Ch. 73.84.;

•    Sri Gopal Jalan and Company vs. Calcutta Stock Exchange Association Ltd. (AIR 1964 SC 250); and

•    Shree Gopal Paper Mills Ltd vs. CIT (77 ITR 543) (SC);

Further, the Income tax Act, 1961 has been using the terms ‘issue of shares’ and ‘allotment of shares’ independently in different provisions at different points in time. So, the Legislature is aware of the differences between ‘issue of shares’ vis-a-vis ‘allotment of shares’ and their meanings and respective stages thereof in the share capital of the Company.

The word ‘consideration’, is defined under the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (‘the 1872 Act’) and could be considered for the purpose of understanding the meaning of the term, on account of absence of specific definition for under the Act. The word ‘consideration’ is defined u/s. 2(D) of 1872 Act as under:

“When at the desire of the promisor, the promise or any other person has done or abstained from doing, or does or abstains from doing, or promises to do or to abstain from doing, something, such act or abstinence or promise is called a consideration of the promise.”

So, existence of promisor-promisee relationship is sine qua non for ‘consideration’ under the 1872 Act. In context of share transactions relating to the companies particularly on issue of shares, the determination of promisor-promisee relationship could be explained as under:

A share is a right to a specified amount of the share capital of a company with it certain rights and liabilities, while the company is a going concern and in the winding up. The promisor- promisee relationship shall not come into existence until the offer and acceptance of offer thereof in completed in a contract. So, in context of contract of shares of the Company with the proposed shareholders, the following steps take place:

•    Step 1: Initially, the Company makes an invitation of offer to the public in general for subscription of shares at a given price for the share and other relevant conditions. This stage is referred to as ‘issue of shares’ under the legal precedents above;

•    Step 2: Out of the said invitation of offer to public, the proposed shareholders upon having accepted the terms of conditions of issue of shares of the Company makes an offer to the Company for al- lotment of shares on payment of price referred in step 1; and

•    Step 3: The Company through its Board of Directors on receipt of offer from the proposed share- holders decide in their meeting for acceptance of said offers and thereby pass resolution and undertake other compliances viz. filing of return of allotment in favour of shareholders, who are selected from the list of proposed shareholders. This stage is referred to as ‘allotment of shares’ and it is at this stage, the relationship of promisor-promisee comes into existence and simultaneously definition of ‘consideration’ under the 1872 Act is satisfied.

So, at the time of issue of shares, the receipt of money from the proposed shareholders by the Company cannot partake the nature of consid- eration, since no promisor-promisee relationship exists between the proposed shareholders and the Company. The promisor-promisee relationship comes into existence at the time of ‘allotment of shares’ by the Company; which is a stage anterior to ‘issue of shares’.

In light of above averments, it may be possible to urge that the charging provisions of section 56(2) (viib) of the Act may fail to satisfy the taxable event provided therein at the time of ‘issue of shares’, because the receipt of money at the time of ‘issue of share’ fails to satisfy the definition of ‘consideration’ under the 1872 Act. Further, the condition of ‘consideration’ is satisfied only at the time of allotment of shares because the shares also come into existence at the said stage of share capital and accordingly the incidence of share premium [which is sought to be taxed u/s. 56(2)(Viib)] is also established at that stage and not at ‘issue of shares’.

Alternatively, one may want to debate that in light of the intention of the Legislature to tax the share premium received at the time of issue of share above the fair market value, the averments as referred in above paras may require reconsideration. One may want to dispute the above understanding of the ‘issue of shares’ and distinguish it for want of relevance restricted to Companies Act, 1956 and thereby giving the term ‘issue of shares’ as a general meaning instead. In light of said understanding, one may argue that charging provisions of section 56(2)(VIIB) are satisfied and share premium shall be taxed accordingly in the hands of the Company at the time of issue of shares.

So, until the Courts of India decide upon the issue and/or clarification on the above contrary interpretation of the provision is given by the Legislature, it would be difficult to reach to any conclusions. As a way forward until any clarity is received, on a conservative basis, one may want to suggest that advance tax and/or self assessment tax, as the case may be, be paid considering the alternative interpretation as discussed later [i.e. in the immediately preceding para above] for the income under consideration be taxed u/s. 56(2)(VIIB) and at the time of filing the return of income, one may take an aggressive position of not subjecting the income under consideration to tax and a suitable note substantiating the said position be disclosed in the return of income. With this there may be limited chances of penalty and interest provisions being attracted to the transaction at the time of assessment of the company in the income-tax proceedings.

Annexure 1

Relevant extracts of Budget Speech of Finance Bill, 2012

“Para 155.    I propose a series of mea- sures to deter the generation and use of unaccounted money. To this end, I propose:

(i)    ……,

(ii)    ……,

(iii)    Increasing the onus of proof on closely held companies for funds received from sharehold- ers as well as taxing share premium in excess of fair market value.”

Relevant extracts of Budget Speech while moving in amendments to Finance Bill, 2012 “It has been proposed in the Finance Bill, 2012 that any consideration received by closely held company in excess of fair market value would be taxable. Exemption is provided to angel investors who invest in start-up company”

Memorandum explaining the provisions of Finance Bill, 2012

“Share premium in excess of the fair market value to be treated as income…….Section 56(2) provides for the specific category of incomes that shall be chargeable to income- tax  under  the  head  “Income  from  other sources”…. The new clause will apply where a company, not being a company in which the public are substantially interested, receives, in any previous year, from any person being a resident, any consideration for issue of shares. This amendment will take effect from 1st April 2013 and will accordingly apply in relation to AY 2013-14 and subsequent AYs”

Supplementary Circular explaining the amendments to the provisions of Finance Bill, 2012

“Company which receives any consideration for issue of shares and the consideration for issue of such shares exceed the fair market value of the share then the aggregate consideration received for such shares as exceeds the fair market value of the share shall be chargeable to tax”

Notes on Clauses to Finance Bill, 2012 “….Company receiving the consideration for issue of shares shall be provided an opportunity to substantiate its claim regarding the fair market value of shares”.

Transfer Pricing – the concept of Bright Line Test

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Synopsis

Transfer Pricing Litigation concerning Advertising marketing and sales promotion (AMP Expenses) and creation of Marketing Intangibles for the Foreign Associated Enterprise, has come to the fore in recent years. In the absence of statutory law on the subject, the law is getting developed purely through judicial pronouncements and the same is still at a very nascent stage.


The purpose of this Article is to acquaint the reader with the basic concepts, the issues involved and broad thrust of judicial pronouncements. To gain an in-depth understanding of the concepts, issues involved, rival contentions and judicial thought process, the reader would be well advised to critically study and analyse relevant judicial pronouncements. As the stakes involved are very high, the matter would be settled only at the Apex Court level.

 1. Overview

In a typical MNC business model, the Indian subsidiary acts as a distributor/provider of goods/services and incurs AMP expenses for the promotion of its products or services. The Assessees have contended that the AMP expense is incurred necessarily for the purpose of selling its products/services in the Indian market. In the past, there have been instances of the Tax Department not allowing a tax deduction for such expenses on the basis that the expenses promote the brand of the foreign Associated Enterprise (‘AE’) in India and resultantly since the expenses benefit the foreign AE such expenses should not be allowed as a tax deduction in the determination of taxable income of the Indian AE. Various judicial pronouncements have held that where the expenditure has been incurred for the purposes of business of the Indian company, the payment should be allowed as a deduction. Resultantly, the issue (incurring of AMP expenses and creation of Marketing Intangibles) has now entered the realm of transfer pricing controversy. The contention of the Tax Department has been that since the Indian company incurs expenses which benefit the foreign AE, the Indian company should be reimbursed for such expenses. In fact, the proposition has been that by promoting the brand in India, the Indian subsidiary is providing a service to the foreign AE, for which it should receive due compensation (which could be the recovery of expenses incurred plus an appropriate mark-up over and above such expenses). It is contended by the Tax Department that such advertisement and brand promotion expenses resulted in creation of marketing intangibles which belong to the AE and appropriate compensation for such advertisement and brand promotion expenses was required to be made by the Foreign AE. Accordingly, the Transfer Pricing Officers (“TPOs”) in India, applying the ‘Bright Line Test’ as laid down in the decision of US Tax Court in DHL Inc.’s case, have held that the expenditure on advertisement and brand promotion expenses which exceed the average of AMP expenses incurred by the comparable companies in India, is required to be reimbursed/ compensated by the overseas associated enterprise. The principle followed by the Tax Department is that the excess AMP expenditure incurred by the Indian AE contributes towards the development and enhancement of the brand owned by the parent of the multinational group (the foreign AE). This perceived enhancement in the value of the brand is commonly referred to as ‘marketing intangibles’. The issue for consideration here is that where an Indian AE is engaged in distributing branded products of its foreign AE, and the Indian AE incurs AMP expenditure for selling the products, whether such expenses have been incurred for marketing of the product or for building the brand of the foreign AE in India. The Tax Department ought to appreciate the difference between product promotion and brand promotion. Product promotion primarily targets an increase in the demand for a particular product whereas Brand Promotion results in creation of Marketing Intangibles. There have been many decisions (mainly Tribunal Decisions) which have discussed the aspect of AMP expenditure and TP adjustments in respect thereof which lead to creation of marketing intangibles for the foreign AEs who have derived benefits. However, the Tribunals in the decisions pronounced prior to the retrospective amendments made by the Finance Act, 2012, in this regard, have held that since the specific international transactions pertaining to AMP expenses have not been referred to the TPO by the Assessing Officer (‘AO’) the assumption of the jurisdiction by the TPO in working out the ALP of the AMP transaction is not justified. Furthermore, assessees, prior to the amendments introduced by Finance Act, 2012, have contended that marketing intangibles per se were not covered under the meaning of the term “international transaction”. However, the amendments brought by Finance Act, 2012 in the Indian Transfer Pricing Regulations empower the TPO to scrutinise any international transactions which the TPO deems fit and additionally, the definition of the term international transaction has been broadened to bring within its ambit provision of services related to the development of marketing intangibles.

2 Concept of Marketing Intangibles


Intangible Property :

Para 6.2 of Chapter VI of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines 2010 (‘OECD TP Guidelines’) defines the term “intangible property” as “intangible property includes rights to use industrial assets such as patents, trademarks, trade names, designs or models. It also includes literary and artistic property rights, and intellectual property such as know-how and trade secrets.

Commercial Intangibles : OECD TP Guidelines defines the term commercial intangibles as “Commercial intangibles include patents, know-how, designs, and models that are used for the production of a good or the provision of a service, as well as intangible rights that are themselves business assets transferred to customers or used in the operation of business (e.g. computer software).”

Marketing Intangibles : Marketing intangibles generally refers to the benefits like brand name, customer lists, unique symbols, logos, distribution/dealership network etc. which are not normally measured or recognised in the books of account. Marketing intangibles are created over a period of time through brand building, large-scale marketing of product, distribution network etc.

OECD TP Guidelines on Marketing Intangibles :
Para 6.3 and 6.4 of Chapter VI of the OECD TP Guidelines defines the term marketing intangibles as a special type of commercial intangibles which include trademarks and trade names that aid in the commercial exploitation of a product or service, customer lists, distribution channels, and unique names, symbols, or pictures that have an important promotional value for the product concerned. Some marketing intangibles (e.g. trademarks) may be protected by the law of the country concerned and used only with the owner’s permission for the relevant product or services. The value of marketing intangibles depends upon many factors, including the reputation and credibility of the trade name or the trademark, quality of the goods and services provided under the name or the mark in the past, the degree of quality control and ongoing R&D, distribution network and availability of the goods or services being marketed, the extent and success of the promotional expenditures incurred for familiarising potential customers with the goods or services.

3. TP Issues surrounding Marketing Intangibles/ AMP Expenses

The Transfer Pricing Issues surrounding Marketing Intangibles/AMP Expenses may be crystallized as follows:

i)    Whether when the assessee has incurred AMP expenses for promotion of brand belonging to its holding company, the Tax Department can make an addition against the assessee on account of royalty or brand development fee, computed on sales turnover and on excess AMP expenditure determined on the arm’s length principle?

ii)    Whether when the assessee has incurred AMP expenses for promotion of brand belonging to its holding company, the Tax Department is justified to apply the Bright Line Test for determination of Arms Length Price (ALP) of AMP?

iii)    Whether the Bright Line Test applied by the Tax Department for determination of ALP of AMP fit is an appropriate method?

4.    Origin of Dispute in USA – DHL Case

To understand the issue better, it would be relevant to look at the genesis of the transfer pricing con- troversy around marketing intangibles. This issue first came up for consideration in the case of DHL before the US Tax Court. This was primarily on ac- count of the 1968 US Regulations which propounded an important theory relating to ‘Developer-Assister rules’. As per the rules the developer being the person incurring the AMP spends (though not being the legal owner of the brand) was treated as an economic owner of the brand and the assister (being the legal owner of the brand), would not be required to be compensated for the use or exploitation of the brand by the developer. The rules lay down four factors to be considered:

  • the relative costs and risks borne by each controlled entity
  •  the location of the development activity
  •  the capabilities of members to conduct the activity independently
  •  the degree of control exercised by each entity.

The principal focus of these regulations appears to be equitable ownership based on economic expenditures and risk. Legal ownership is not identified as a factor to be considered in determining which party is the developer of the intangible property, although its exclusion is not specific. However, the developer-assister rule were amended in 1994, to include, among other things, consideration of ‘legal’ ownership within its gamut, for determining the developer/owner of the intangible property, and provide that if the intangible property is not legally protected then the developer of the intangible will be considered the owner.

However, the US TPR recognise that there is a distinction between ‘routine’ and ‘non-routine’ expenditure and this difference is important to examine the controversy surrounding remuneration to be received by the domestic AE for marketing intangibles.

In the context of the above regulations, the Tax Court in the case of DHL coined the concept of a ‘Bright Line Test’ (‘BLT’) by differentiating the routine expenses and non-routine expenses. In brief, it provided that for the determination of the economic ownership of an intangible, there must be a determination of the non-routine (i.e. brand building) expenses as opposed to the routine expenses normally incurred by a distributor in promoting its product.

An important principle emanating from the DHL ruling is that the AMP expenditure should first be examined to determine routine and non-routine expenditure and accordingly, if at all, compensation may be sought possibly for the non-routine expenditure.

5.  Origin of Dispute in India – Maruti Suzuki’s Case

It is pertinent to note that the Indian TPR does not specifically contain provisions for benchmarking of marketing intangibles created by incurring non-routine AMP spends. In the Indian context, the issue in respect of marketing intangibles was dealt extensively by the Delhi High Court in the case of Maruti Suzuki India Ltd vs. ACIT (2010-TII-01-HC-DEL-TP). In this case, the assessee, Maruti Suzuki India Limited (‘MSIL’), an Indian company had entered into a license agreement with Suzuki Motor Corporation (‘SMC’) for the manufacture and sale of automotive vehicles including certain new models. As per the terms of the agreement, MSIL agreed to pay a lump sum amount as well as running royalty to SMC as consideration for technical assistance and license. MSIL started using the logo of SMC on the cars and continued using the brand name ‘Maruti’ along-with the word ‘Suzuki’ on the vehicles manufactured by it. MSIL had also incurred significant AMP spends for promoting its products.

In connection with the AMP spends incurred by MSIL, the Delhi High Court laid down the following guidance:

•  If the AMP spends are at a level comparable to similar third party companies, then the foreign entity i.e. SMC would not be required to compensate MSIL.

•  However, if the AMP spends are significantly higher than third party companies, the use of SMC’s logo is mandatory and the benefits derived by SMC are not incidental, then SMC would be required to compensate MSIL.

However, it is important to note that the Supreme Court has directed the TPO to examine the matter in accordance with law, without being influenced by the observations or directions given by the Delhi High Court.

6.    Concept of Bright Line Test

6.1)    As discussed above, the US Tax Court in the case of DHL Inc., propounded the ‘Bright Line Test’ for distinguishing between the routine and non-routine expenditure incurred on advertisement and brand promotion. The US Tax Court in that case laid down that AMP expenses, to the extent incurred by uncontrolled comparable distributors is to be regarded within the ‘Bright Line limit’ of the routine expenses and AMP expenses incurred by the distributors beyond such ‘Bright Line limit’ constituted non routine expenditure, resulting in creation of economic ownership in the form of market intangibles which belong to the owner of the brand.

It may be noted that the aforesaid decision in case of DHL, sought to be relied upon by the Revenue for making adjustment on account of AMP expenses, applying Bright Line Test, was rendered in the con- text of a specific law, viz. Developer-Assister Rule, in US TPR (US Reg. 482-4). Similar provision for benchmarking of marketing intangibles allegedly created by incurring non-routine AMP expenses is not provided in the Transfer Pricing Regulations in India.

6.2 OECD’s  Position:

Paragraph 6.38 of the OECD Guidelines on Transfer Pricing read as follows:

“6.38 Where the distributor actually bears the cost of its marketing activities (i.e., there is no arrangement for the owner to reimburse the expenditures), the issue is the extent to which the distributor is able to share in potential benefits from those activities. In general, the arm’s length dealings the ability of a party that is not the legal owner of a marketing intangible to obtain the future benefits of marketing activities that increase the value of that intangible will depend principally on the substance of the rights of the party. For example, a distributor may have the ability to obtain benefits from its investments in developing the value of a trademark from its turnover and market share where it has a long term contract of sole distribution rights/or the trademarked product. In such cases, a distributor may bear extraordinary marketing expenditures beyond what an independent distributor in such a case might obtain an additional return from the owner of a trademark, perhaps through a decrease in the purchase price of the product or a reduction in royalty rate.”

The Transfer Pricing regulations in India being, by and large, based on OECD Transfer Pricing guidelines, the said guidelines are usually referred to in explaining and interpreting the Transfer Pricing provisions under the Income-tax Act to the extent that they are pari materia with the OECD guidelines. However, the recommendations of the OECD guidelines could not be applied in absence of a specific enabling provision or method provided under the Transfer Pricing Regulations in India to deal with such extraordinary marketing expenditure.

7.    Special Bench Decision in the case of L.G. Electronics: (2013) 29 taxmann.com.300

The Special Bench of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Delhi (“the Tribunal”) held by majority that the advertising, marketing and promotion (“AMP”) expenses incurred by a assessee constitute an “in- ternational transaction” and that bright line test is acceptable for determining the arm’s length price (“ALP”) of such transactions. It further held that while expenses incurred directly on promotion of sales, leads to brand building, the expenses in connection with sales are only sales specific and are not a part of AMP expenses.

Facts:
•    L.G. Electronics India Private Limited (“the assessee”) is a subsidiary of L.G. Electronics Inc., Korea (“the AE”). Pursuant to Technical Assistance and Royalty agreement, the assessee obtained a right from the AE to use technical information, designs, drawings and industrial property rights for the manufacture, marketing, sale and services of agreed products, for which it agreed to pay royalty @ 1 per cent. The AE allowed the assessee to use its brand name and trademarks to products manufactured in India “without any restriction”.

•    The Transfer Pricing Officer (“TPO”) concluded that the assessee was promoting LG brand as it had incurred expenses on AMP to the tune of 3.85% of sales vis-à-vis 1.39% incurred by a comparable. Accordingly, TPO held that the assessee should have been compensated for the difference.

•    Applying the Bright Line Test, the TPO held that the expenses in excess of 1.39 % of the sales are towards brand promotion of the AE and proposed a transfer pricing adjustment.

•    The Dispute Resolution Panel (“DRP”) not only confirmed the approach of the TPO, but also directed to charge a mark-up of 13 % on such AMP expenses towards opportunity cost and entrepreneurial efforts.

Issues:
•    Whether transfer pricing adjustment can be made in relation to advertisement, marketing and sales promotion expenses incurred by the assessee?

•    Whether the assessee ought to have been compensated by the AE in respect of such AMP expenses alleged to have been incurred for and on behalf of the AE?”

Observations & Ruling

The Tribunal has held as follows:

•    Confirmed validity of jurisdiction of the TPO by observing that the assessee’s case is covered u/s. 92CA(2B) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (‘the Act’) which deals with international transactions in respect of which the assessee has not furnished report, whether or not these are international transactions as per the assessee.

•    The incurring of AMP expenses leads to promotion of LG brand in India, which is legally owned by the foreign AE and hence is a transaction. The said transaction can be characterised as an inter- national transaction within the ambit of Section 92B(1) of the Act, since (i) there is a transaction of creating and improving marketing intangibles by the assessee for and on behalf of its AE; (ii) the AE is non-resident; and (iii) such transaction is in the nature of provision of service.

•    Accepted Bright Line Test to determine the cost/value of the international transaction, in view of the fact that the assessee failed to discharge the onus by not segregating the AMP expense incurred on its own behalf vis-à-vis that incurred on behalf of the AE.

•    The transfer pricing provisions being special pro- visions, override the general provisions such as section 37(1) / 40A(2) of the Act.

•    For determining the cost/value of international transaction, selection of domestic comparable companies not using any foreign brand was relevant in addition to other factors.

•    The Supreme Court of India in Maruti Suzuki’s case examined the issue of AMP expenses where it directed the TPO for a de novo determination of ALP of the transaction. The direction by the Supreme Court recognises the fact of brand building for the foreign AE, which is an international transaction and the TPO has the jurisdiction to determine the ALP of the transaction.

•    The expenses incurred “in connection with sales” are only sales specific. However, the expenses “for promotion of sales” leads to brand building of the foreign AE, for which the Indian entity needs to be compensated on an arm’s length basis by applying the Bright Line Test.

•    With regard to the DRP’s approach, of applying a mark-up on cost for determining the ALP of the international transaction, on the ground that the same has sanction of law under Rule 10B(1)(c)(vi) of the Income Tax Rules, 1962 WAS accepted.

•    The case was set aside and the matter was restored to the file of the TPO for selection of appropriate comparable companies, examining effect of various relevant factors laid down in the decision and for the determination of the correct mark-up.

8.    Chennai ITAT decision in the case of Ford India Pvt. Ltd (2013-TII-118-ITAT-MAD-TP)

The Chennai Bench of the Tribunal, in the case of Ford India Private Limited, followed the Special Bench ruling in the case of LG Electronics India Pvt. Ltd (supra) in applying Bright-Line Test (BLT) to arrive at the adjustment towards excess AMP expenditure. Further, the Tribunal ruled that the expenditure directly in connection with sales had to be excluded in computing the AMP adjustment. The Tribunal deleted the hypothetical brand development fee adjustment computed at 1 % of sales made by the TPO, and provided relief upto 50 % with respect to adjustment made by the TPO for Product Develop- ment (PD) expenditure held as recoverable from the parent company.

Though the Tribunal has relied on the Special Bench decision in the case of LG Electronics India Pvt. Ltd on issues of principle, the distinguishing facts between the assessee and LG Electronics India Pvt. Ltd were analysed thoroughly and the Tribunal has passed a speaking order.

On selection of comparables, the Tribunal has agreed with the assessee’s contentions that the comparables selected by the TPO were not comparable to the assessee, and has stated that such comparables selected (same as in the Maruti ruling – Tata Motors, Mahindra and Hindustan Motors) were not appropriate. Interestingly, the Tribunal has further stated that even the same comparables provided in the Maruti ruling can be considered, with proper adjustments carried out on the figures for making good the deficiencies noted in such comparables.

The Tribunal has disregarded the concept of add on brand value on normal sales and add on brand value on additional sales brought by the tax department to justify two additions in relation to brand building, and deleted the brand development fees computed at 1 % of sales. However, in relation to adjustment towards product development expenditure, the Tribunal has not provided the rationale behind the 50 % adjustment in the hands of the assessee.

9.    Delhi ITAT decision in the case of BMW Motors India Pvt. Ltd. (2013-TII-168-ITAT-DEL-TP)

In a recent decision in the case of BMW Motors India Pvt. Ltd., the Delhi Bench of Tribunal has distinguished the Special Bench Ruling in case of LG Electronics India Private Limited vs. ACIT (2013) 29 taxmann.com.300 (‘SB Ruling’) with regard to issue of marketing intangibles in the context of a distributor. The Tribunal adjudged that if the distributor was sufficiently compensated by the foreign principal through the pricing of products, i.e. through higher gross margins, the same would have catered to extra AMP expenses, if any, spent by the distributor as compared to the comparables. Accordingly, no separate compensation in the form of reimbursement of excess AMP expenses was required from the principal when the assessee was already earning premium profits as compared to comparables with similar intensity of functions.

The Tribunal acknowledged that in absence of a specific provision in Income – tax Act, the Tax Department could not insist that the mode of compensation for AMP expenses by foreign principal to Indian assessee (who is a distributor) necessarily be direct reimbursement and not pricing adjustment. The said remuneration for extra AMP could well be received through the pricing of imported products, namely through a commensurately higher gross margin.

After a spate of negative rulings on the issue of marketing intangibles following the SB Ruling in the case of LG Electronics (supra), this is the first favour- able ruling on marketing intangibles at the Tribunal level. In terms of key takeaways, the following points which have been acknowledged by the Tribunal in the instant ruling are worth a mention:

•    In the first ruling of its kind, the Tribunal has upheld the contention that no separate compensation is needed for excessive AMP expenditure, when the distributor receives sufficient profits/ rewards as part of the pricing of goods imported from its foreign principal.

•    The Tribunal has upheld the contention that a judgement or a decision considered as a binding precedent necessarily has to be read as a whole. To decide the applicability of any section, rule or principle underlying the decision or judgement which would be binding as a precedent in a case, an appraisal of the facts of the case in which the decision was rendered is necessary. The scope and authority of a precedent should not be expanded unnecessarily beyond the needs of a given situation.

•    The Tribunal acknowledged that transfer pricing litigation and adjudication is a fact-intensive exercise which necessarily requires due consideration of the assessee’s business model, contractual terms entered into with the AEs and a detailed FAR analysis, so as to appropriately characterise the transactions and the business model. The Tribunal has also supported the fact that there can be no straitjacket to decide a transfer pricing matter.

•    The Tribunal has dwelt on this aspect and categorically acknowledged existence of a fine line of distinction between the FAR profiles of a manufacturer vis-à-vis that of a distributor. Consequently, the remuneration model and the transfer pricing analysis for one could vary from the other.

•    The Tribunal also affirmed that in the absence of suitable aids or guidelines in the Indian tax laws or jurisprudence, there is no bar/prohibition to refer to international jurisprudence/guidelines.

The Tribunal has made an important distinction on the AMP issue for a distributor from that of a licensed manufacturer. While drawing the distinction in the facts of the assessee with that of the LG India’s case, the Tribunal has provided commendable clarification on how the typical AMP issue for distributors is to be analysed.

The Tribunal’s ruling that premium profits earned by the assessee, a distributor, compensates for the excessive AMP expenditure is distinguished from the contrary findings in the case of LG India, wherein the SB held that entity level profits do not benchmark all the international transactions of LG India and that a robust profit margin at entity level would not rule out AMP expense adjustment.

The findings of the Tribunal in this case is a greater acceptance of the well accepted international practice incorporated in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, the ATO’s Guidelines (Australian Tax Office) related to Marketing Intangibles and the OECD Discussion Draft on Intangibles. Transfer pricing litigation and adjudication being fact based, necessarily requires consideration of the business model of the assessee and the contractual terms with AEs, along with a detailed FAR analysis to characterise the transactions. The Tribunal’s consideration of and reliance on the same for distinguishing this case from the LG India’s case, underscore the importance of an extensive FAR analysis, inter-alia, for the AMP issue.

The Tribunal made an important observation that the orders and judgments of co-ordinate division benches or special benches of the Tribunal, or the High Court and Supreme Court, particularly in transfer pricing adjudication cannot necessarily always be taken as a binding precedence ‘unless facts and circumstances are in pari material in a case cited before the court’.

It is worth noting that in a later decision in the case Casio India Co. Pvt. Ltd. [TS-340-ITAT-2013(DEL)-TP] a distributor of Watches and Consumer Information and other other related products of Casio Japan, in India, the Delhi Tribunal has expressly dissented from the coordinate bench’s decision in the case of BMW India Pvt. Ltd. and has followed SB decision in the case of LG Electronics. In Casio’s case, the Tribunal observed that the special bench decision in the case of L.G. Electronics is applicable with full force on all the classes of the assessees, whether they are licensed manufacturers or distributors, whether bearing full or minimal risk; that special bench order has more force and binding effect on the division bench order in BMW India’s case on the same issue.

10.    Scope of/exclusions from, AMP Expenses

In Canon India vs. DCIT (2013-TII-96-ITAT-DEL-TP),
the Delhi Tribunal relying on Special Bench Ruling in case of L.G. Electronics (supra) and Chandigarh Tribunal’s Ruling in the case of Glaxo Smithkline Consumer Healthcare Ltd. [TS-72-ITAT-2013 (CHANDI)-TP/2013-TII-71-ITAT-CHD-TP] held that, while computing TP Adjustment for marketing intangibles, expenses on Commission, Cash Discount, Volume Rebate, Trade Discount etc. and AMP Subsidy received by the assessee from the Parent Company should be excluded from the total AMP Expenses. In Glaxo’s case, the Chandigarh Tribunal also held that the Con- sumer Market Research Expenses and AMP Expenses attributable to various domestic brands owned by the assessee should be excluded from the ambit of AMP Expenses and no adjustment is required to be made in respect of the same. Similarly, in Maruti Suzuki India Limited (2013-TII-163-ITAT-DEL-TP), the Delhi Tribunal held that the expenditure in connection with sales cannot be brought within the ambit of AMP Expenses.

In order to avoid unnecessary confusion and consequent litigation, the assessees should be very careful in properly accounting for various sales related expenses and adequately documenting and distinguishing the same from various AMP Expenses, which are subject matter of TP Adjustments.

11.    Conclusion

One of the most challenging issues in transfer pricing is the taxation of income from intangible property. The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines recognise that difficult TP problems can arise when marketing activities are undertaken by enterprises that do not own the trademarks they are promoting. According to the Guidelines, the analysis requires an assessment of the obligations and rights between the parties. The United Nations Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing for Developing Countries – released in 2013 (UNTPM) also states that marketing related activities may result in the creation of marketing intangibles depending on the facts and circumstances of each case. The Chapter of the UNTPM dealing with Emerging TP Challenges in India however is more explicit when it states that an Indian AE needs to be compensated for intangibles created through excessive AMP expenses and for bearing risks and performing functions beyond what an independent distributor with similar profile would incur or perform.

While the SB ruling in case of L.G. Electronics does not seem to have specifically dealt with the issue in light of the above principles, some of the concepts articulated by the OECD Guidelines and the UNTPM may be implicit in the factors identified by the SB for undertaking a comparability analysis. These principles may also be inferred by the Delhi High Court decision in the case of Maruti Suzuki. The SB does not seem to have discussed the key issue of who benefits from the AMP spend incurred by the Assessee, even assuming it is excessive – i.e., the Assessee or the foreign AE. The SB has also not ad- dressed the issue of whether the benefit, if any, to the foreign AE may largely be incidental. However, by recognising that the Delhi High Court ruling in the case of Maruti Suzuki is still relevant, it would appear that these principles that were enunciated by the High Court would also need to be given due consideration while examining the issue.

It is important to note that the SB has also rejected a mechanical application of the bright line test by a mere comparison of the AMP to sales ratios. It may be noted that the level and nature of AMP spending can be affected by a variety of business factors, such as management policies, market share, market characteristics, and the timing of product launches.

The benefits of the AMP spend may also be realised over a period of time, even though from an account- ing perspective the amounts are expensed in the year in which they are incurred. Further, the ‘bright-line’ between routine and non-routine AMP expenses could vary for each industry and even within the same industry it could be quite company specific.

The SB’s ruling relies extensively on the facts particularly relevant to the Assessee in this case and therefore its impact on other assessees may need to be examined based on their specific facts. The applicability of a transfer pricing adjustment for AMP expenses may arise where there is influence of an AE in advertising and marketing function of the Indian affiliate. Further, the quantification of excessive AMP expenditures may also not necessarily be based on a bright line test if assessees are able to provide information related to brand promotion.

Transfer pricing aspects of marketing intangibles has been the focus of the Indian tax authority for the last few years. In light of the above, it would be useful for multinational enterprises with Indian affiliates to review their intra-group arrangements relating to sales and marketing and use of trademarks/ brand names in light of the judicial pronouncements.

In the interest of reducing avoidable, time consuming and costly litigation which benefits nobody and for providing certainty to foreign investors and encouraging inflow of much needed FDI, the Finance Ministry should issue necessary detailed fair, reasonable and equitable/balanced guidelines with suitable illustrations and examples on the lines of Australian Tax Office’s Guidelines or bring in necessary statutory amendments in Indian Transfer Pricing Regulations. The Guidelines/Statutory Amendments should be framed keeping in mind the business realities which Foreign Businessmen have to face in India; particularly the fact that, in view of accelerating changes in technology, the shelf life of a product or service is very short, such that an Electronic Product (Smart- phone, Tablet, Laptop etc.) tends to get outdated within 6-9 months of its launch. This necessitates recoupment of expenditure on product research and development by garnering significant level of market share, in a very short time by means of aggressive expenditure on advertisement, marketing and sales promotion, leaving the competition well behind.

2013-TIOL-1806-CESTAT-MUM Kumar Beheray Rathi, K K Erectors, Kumar Builder, Kumar Builders vs. CCE, Pune-III

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Builders/Developers are not liable to pay service tax on “one-time maintenance charges” collected from buyers under the category of “Maintenance or Repair Services”.

Facts:
The Appellants were builders/developers of residential flats and various commercial premises and recovered one-time maintenance deposit from each of the customers to whom they sold the flats. The department contended to levy tax on the said amount under the category “Maintenance or Repair Services” along with interest and penalty. The Appellants contended that they were only working as an agent/trustee of the funds of the flat owners and was statutory obligation under Maharashtra Ownership Flats (Regulation of the Promotion of construction, sale, management and transfer) Act, 1963.

Held:
Analysing the agreement, the Hon. Tribunal held that the Appellants were not providing any maintenance or repair service to the buyers of the flats and thus allowed the appeal.

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Section 9(1)(i) of the Act – no income arises to a LO of a non-resident whose activities are confined to sourcing of goods for export.

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Section 9(1)(i) of the Act – no income arises to a LO of a non-resident whose activities are confined to sourcing of goods for export.

Facts:
HKCo was a company incorporated in Hong Kong and a member of an international Group of companies. HKCo acted as a sourcing channel for the entire Group. It sourced products internationally at competitive prices and of quality standard prescribed by the Group and resold goods to the affiliates. HKCo had established a Liaison Office (“LO”) in India for acting as a communication channel between HKCo and apparels manufacturers in India. Indian suppliers raised invoice on HKCo and HKCo, in turn, raised invoice on the buyer entities without any mark up. HKCo charged 5% commission to the buyer on the invoice value. LO also monitored the progress, quality, etc., at the manufacturing facilities and also the time schedule.

The AO concluded that the activities of LO pertained to supply chain management activities of HKCo. Hence, the exclusion in Explanation 1(b) to section 9(1)(i) of the Act did not apply and passed draft assessment order accordingly. Relying on the decision in Columbia Sportswear Company, In re, [2011] 12 taxmann.com 349 (AAR), the DRP accepted the conclusion of the AO and directed him to make the assessment.

Held:
The LO was engaged in (i) identification of the vendors in India; (ii) communication of the requirements with regard to design and specifications to the vendors; (iii) receipt of the prototype from the vendor; (iv) quality check for the products before production of goods; and (v) tracking the production and delivery including forecasting and scheduling of the order.

Considering the activities carried on by the LO of HKCo, the activities squarely fall within the ambit of explanation 1(b) to section 9(1)(i) of the Act. Further, there is no evidence to suggest that LO had indulged in commercial activities. In arriving at the conclusion of non taxability, strong reliance is placed on the decision of the Karnataka High Court in Nike Inc. (34 taxmann. com 170).

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2013-TIOL-1838-CESTAT-MUM Sodexho Pass Services India Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, Mumbai

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Whether Sodexho meal vouchers promote sale of goods/services and are similar to credit/debit cards?

Facts:
The Appellant is in the business of issuing meal/gift coupon vouchers after entering into an agreement with affiliates such as restaurants, eating places, other establishments etc. and issue such coupons to the customers, generally in corporates who in turn would distribute among its employees as fringe benefit. The Appellant received service charges from its affiliates as well as from customers which the department contended to levy tax on and thus issued a show-cause notice on 28-04-2006 which the Commissioner partly confirmed by dropping the demands on amount received from customers. The department and the Appellant both were in appeal against the said order of the said Commissioner.

The department held a view that the assessee promoted the business of the affiliates inasmuch a user/employee had to purchase goods and services from one of the affiliates and cannot use these vouchers in any other establishments or for any other purposes and thus taxable under “Business Auxiliary Services”. The assessee contended that their services were similar to debit/credit cards and therefore, such transactions were covered under “Business Support Service” and thus not-taxable prior to 01-05-2006. Further, they also contended that providing a list of affiliates would not amount to promotion or marketing of affiliates as it was merely a facilitating mechanism.

Held:
Affirming the commissioner’s view and observing the definition of “Business Auxiliary Services” effective from 10-09-2004, the Hon. Tribunal also upholding penalty held that the service charges received from affiliates were taxable and rejected the contentions of the assessee that the same were similar to credit/debit cards.

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Grant of Refund ITC denied due to purchase from non-filers supplier.

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Trade Circular No.9T dated 11-12-2013

In this Circular the Commissioner has explained the procedure to grant refund to those dealers who were denied refund on account of purchases from non filers of returns and in whose cases the supplier has subsequently filed the returns and paid the due tax.

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Applicability of Set-off to developers of SEZ and units in Special Economic Zone Trade Circular No. 8T dated 29-11-2013

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In this Circular Commissioner has explained that the developer of SEZ and units in processing area of SEZ will be entailed to set-off in respect of their purchase as per the New Rule 55B inserted wef 15-10-2011.

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Correction of mistakes made by the dealers or miscellaneous refunds of excess payment of taxes

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Trade Circular No. 7T dated 21-11-2013

In this Circular the Commissioner has laid down procedure for correction of mistakes made by dealers and the banks while making e-payment.

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Vces- Clarifications Circular No.174/9/2013 – ST dated. 25.11.2013

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The Service Tax Voluntary Compliance Encouragement Scheme (VCES) has come into effect from 10 -05-2013. Most of the issues raised with reference to the Scheme have been clarified by CBEC vide circular Nos. 169/4/2013-ST, dated 13-05-2013 and No. 170/5/2013-ST, dated 08-08-2013. In the recently held interactive sessions, at Chennai, Delhi and Mumbai, which were chaired by the Hon’ble Finance Minister, certain queries/issues were raised by the trade/industry. Certain issues which have not been specifically clarified hitherto or clarified adequately, have been clarified by this Circular.

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[2013] 40 taxmann.com 345 (AAR) Endemol India (P.) Ltd., In re Dated: 6th December 2013

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Section 9(1)(vii) of the Act; Article 12 of India- Netherlands DTAA – while in terms of the Act, the consideration paid for the services was FTS, since the recipient was not enabled to independently apply the technology, knowledge or expertise, the payment was not FTS under India-Netherlands DTAA, which in absence of PE in India, was not taxable in India.

Facts:
The Applicant was an Indian tax resident company and a member of an international group of companies. The Applicant was engaged in the business of providing and distributing television programmes and it mainly produced reality shows and recently, also soap operas. DutchCo was also a member company of the Group. The Applicant entered into Consultancy Agreement with DutchCo under which DutchCo was to provide certain services such as, General Management, International Operations, Legal and Tax Advisory, Controlling and Accounting, Corporate Communications, Human Resources, Corporate Development, Mergers & Acquisitions, etc. These services were provided by DutchCo outside India. According to the Applicant these were administrative services.

The Applicant approached the AAR for its ruling on the following issues.

(i) Whether the payments made by the Applicant to DutchCo for administrative services would be in the nature of FTS under Article 12 of India- Netherlands DTAA?

(ii) If the payments were not FTS, would they be Business Income, which in absence of PE of DutchCo in India, would not be chargeable to tax in India?

(iii) If the payments were not FTS, would they be subject to withholding under section 195 of the Act?

Held:
As regards the Act The services rendered by DutchCo require technical knowledge, experience, skill, know-how or processes and hence, cannot be termed merely as administrative and support services as tried to be made out by the Applicant.

As per The consultancy agreement, DutchCo was to render its ‘considerable experience, knowledge and expertise’ and the payments were to be made therefor.

The definition of FTS in Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vii) of the Act, includes managerial, technical or consultancy services. Hence, the consideration paid for the services rendered by DutchCo were covered by the said definition of FTS.

As regards India-Netherlands DTAA

Definition of FTS in Article 12(5) of India-Netherlands DTAA, contains ‘make available’ clause, which would require that the Applicant should be enabled to independently apply the technology, knowledge or expertise. The Applicant merely took assistance of DutchCo in its business activities and there was nothing to suggest that it was enabled to independently apply the technology, knowledge or expertise and thus, ‘make available’ requirement was not satisfied.

DutchCo did not have any PE in India. Hence, the consideration paid for the services rendered was not taxable in India.

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Lowering of threshold limit for mandatory e-payment of central excise duty and service tax to Rs. 1 lakh – Notification No. 16/2013 – ST dated 22nd November, 2013

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Notification No. 15/2013 – CE (NT) dtd 22/11/2013 as well as this Notification have been issued to lower the threshold limit of mandatory e-payment from Rs. 10 lakh to Rs. 1 lakh for both Central Excise and Service Tax payment with effect from 1st January, 2014.

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Time limit prescribed for filing form A-3 BY SEZ UNIT / SEZ DEVELOPER – Notification No. 15/2003-ST dated 21st November 2013

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Notification No. 12/2013 exempts the services received by units located in SEZ or SEZ Developers for authorised operations subject to condition that the SEZ unit or SEZ Developer has to furnish declaration in Form A-3 on quarterly basis providing details of the specified services received by it without payment of Service Tax.

Notification No. 15/2003 – ST has amended the above condition by providing the time period by which such quarterly statement is to be filed. Accordingly SEZ unit or SEZ Developer is required to file Form A-3 by 30th of the month following the particular quarter. Further, the Notification also provides that Form A-3 pertaining to period July 2013 to September 2013 shall be furnished by 15th December, 2013.

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State of Tamil Nadu vs. Essar Shipping Limited [2012] 47 vst 209 (mad)

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Sales Tax – Sale – Transfer of Right to Use – Time Charter Party Agreement – To Hire Out Ship – No Transfer of Possession or Control – Not Taxable.

Sales Tax – Location of Goods at The Time of Contract of Sale Entered – Sale of Named Ship – Not in State – Sale outside the State – Not Taxable – Section 3A of The Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959

Facts :
The assessee company, owner of ships, had let on hire 11 ships to various parties, within and out side the State of Tamil Nadu and collected charges on rendering services. The assessee had entered into Time charter party agreement for letting ship on hire to transport goods mentioned therein. The assessee had also effected sale of old ships. The assessing authorities treated time charter party agreement as transfer of right to use ships and levied tax on charges collected thereon and also levied tax on sale of named ships as local sale although ships were not in the State at the time of sale. The Tribunal held that time charter party agreement is taxable as transfer of right to use goods but accepted the plea of the assessee that the transactions is in the course of inter-State trade as such not taxable u/s. 3A of The Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act. The Tribunal in respect of sale of Ships held that it is not taxable as at the time of sale it was not located in the State. The State filed revision petition before the Madras High Court against the Judgment of Tribunal.

Held :
A reading of the various clauses enumerated in the charter shows that the contract is not for the hire of the vessel but hiring of the services to be provided by the owner as a carrier to carry goods which are put on board of the ship by the time charterer. The Tribunal committed a serious error in its understanding of what possession would mean, in the face of the time charter agreement. The High Court accordingly held that the time charter party agreement is one for services, hence not taxable under the provisions of the sales tax act.

As regards sale of named ships, the High Court held that the location of the goods at the time of sale determines the jurisdiction of that State to levy sales tax under the local Act. Thus, in the case of ascertained goods, the place where goods are at the time of contract is the State which has the jurisdiction to assess the transaction. Admittedly on the date of sale, the agreement was for named ships which were nowhere near the jurisdiction of the State of Tamil Nadu. The mere fact that the contract was entered into in the State of Tamil Nadu or for that matter the assessee had sought for registration under the State act, by itself, would not confer jurisdiction on the State to impose tax on the sale of assets located outside the State. The Tribunal found that at time of sale of Ships, all the named ships were positioned out side the State as such the Tribunal was right in holding the transaction not taxable in the State of Tamil Nadu.

Accordingly, the High Court dismissed the revision petition filed by the State.

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India Exports vs. State of U.P. and others [2012] 47 vst 126(Allahabad).

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Sale – Sales from SEZ – Not a Sale In The Course of Import – Taxable, Section 5(2) of The Central Sales Tax Act, 1956

Facts:
The Petitioner having a unit in Special Economic Zone, cleared furniture manufactured therein, for sale to Domestic Tariff Area (DTA Units) under section 2(i) of The SEZ Act, 2005. The petitioner claimed exemption from payment of tax on such sale of goods u/s. 5(2) of The Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, being sale in course of import as whole of India excludes areas of SEZ under the SEZ Act. The assessing authorities imposed tax on impugned transactions, against which petitioner filed writ petition before the Allahabad High Court.

Held:
The SEZ Act, 2005 has provided for amendment of various taxing statues or modified them for fulfilling object and purpose of the Act. Section 57 of the said Act amends the enactment specified in the Third Schedule, which are amended by SEZ Act, 2005. The Central Sales Tax Act is not included in any of these Schedules. The sales from SEZ Unit to Unit in DTA cannot be deemed to be imports. No such presumption can be drawn from section 5(2) of The CST Act or any of the provisions of SEZ Act as such it is taxable. Accordingly, the High Court dismissed the Writ Petition filed by the Petitioner.

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[2013] 39 taxmann.com 9 (New Delhi – CESTAT) Kamal Engineering Co. vs. CCE, Lucknow

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Whether, filing of fresh appeal beyond the prescribed time, after removing defects pointed out by office of Commissioner (Appeals) in the Original appeal which was otherwise filed in time, is liable to be dismissed as ‘time barred’ in the absence of application for condo nation of delay? Held, No.

Facts:
The Appellant filed appeal before Commissioner Appeals in time. However, on defects being pointed out by the office of Commissioner (Appeals), the appeal was filed afresh removing those defects, which led to 10 days delay. The Appellant did not file any application for condonation of delay. The Commissioner (Appeals) dismissed the appeal on the ground of limitation.

Held:
Tribunal held that, since there was no delay in filing the original appeal and the new appeal was filed only to remove the defects pointed by office of Commissioner (Appeals) there cannot be said to be delay and matter was remanded to Commissioner (Appeals) for adjudication on merit.

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[2013] 39 taxmann.com 37 (Delhi HC) Indus Towers Ltd. vs. Union of India

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Whether, in the facts and circumstances, the provision of passive infrastructure services by the applicant to sharing operators would tantamount to ‘Transfer of right to use goods u/s. 2(l)(zc)(vi) of the Delhi VAT Act, 2004 liable to VAT.? Held, No.

Facts:
Indus is a company registered with the Department of Telecommunication for providing ‘passive infrastructure services’ and ‘related operations and maintenance services’ to various telecommunications operators in India on a shared basis. Its business is to provide access to the telecom operators, on shared basis to the telecom towers installed by it and to a shelter which is a construction. It would also provide diesel generator sets, airconditioners, electrical and civil works, DC power system, battery bank, etc. All these are known as “passive infrastructure”.

Inside the shelter the telecom operators are permitted to keep and maintain their base terminal stations (BTS), associated antenna, back-haul connectivity to the network of the sharing telecom operator and associated civil and electrical works required to provide telecom services. This is known as the “active infrastructure”.

Whereas the active infrastructure is owned and operated by the sharing telecom operator, passive infrastructure is owned by Indus. There could be several operators who may use the tower and shelter which are parts of the passive infrastructure by keeping their BTS, etc., therein and sharing the entire passive infrastructure on an agreed basis.

The active infrastructure which is owned and put up by the sharing telecom operators needs certain conditions for proper functioning and uninterrupted telecom network/signals. These conditions are maintenance of a particular temperature, humidity level, safety, etc. which are ensured by the passive infrastructure made available by the petitioner to the sharing telecom operators.

Issue:
The issue involved in the case was in the context of section 2(l)(zc)(vi) of the Delhi VAT Act, 2004 that, whether, in the facts and circumstances, the provision of passive infrastructure services by the applicant to sharing operators would tantamount to ‘Transfer of right to use goods.

VAT authority considered the entire amount of consideration received for providing access to the passive infrastructure as one for “transfer of the right to use goods.

The Petitioner contended that there was no transfer of the right in any goods by the petitioner to the sharing telecom operators and therefore the levy of VAT on the assumption to the contrary was wholly untenable.

Held
On examination of various clause of sample Master Service Agreement (MSA), High Court held as under:

• The right to use the goods—in this case, the right to use the passive infrastructure—can be said to have been transferred by Indus to the sharing telecom operators only if the possession of the said infrastructure was transferred to them. They would have the right to use the passive infrastructure if they were in lawful possession of it. There has to be, in that case, an act demonstrating the intention to part with the possession of the passive infrastructure.

• Various aspects in the MSA clearly provided that Indus had to be in possession of the passive infrastructure and cannot part with the same in favour of the sharing telecom operators.

• The High court also referred to various provisions in the agreement while examining the contents of the agreement and observed that with several restrictions and curtailment of the access made available to the sharing telecom operators to the passive infrastructure and with severe penalties prescribed for failure on the part of the Indus to ensure uninterrupted and high quality service provided by the passive infrastructure, it is difficult to imagine how Indus could part with the possession of part of the infrastructure.

• Therefore, it was held that, the limited access made available to the sharing telecom operators could not be considered transfer of “right to use” the passive infrastructure when the possession of the said infrastructure always remained with Indus. The sharing telecom operators did not therefore, have any right to use the passive infrastructure. The High Court placed reliance on decision of Indus Towers Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT (2013) 29 taxmann.com 301 (Kar)

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[2013] 39 taxmann.com 8 (Mumbai – CESTAT) CCE, Pune – III vs. Maharashtra State Bureau of Text Books Production & Curriculum Research

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Whether, letter rejecting application for centralised registration stating reasons therein is an appealable order? Held, yes

Facts:
The respondent’s request for centralised registration as service receiver in respect of GTA service was rejected by the department. CCE (Appeals) admitted appeal against the impugned letter of rejection and allowed centralised registration to the respondent on the ground that in respect of GTA service, the recipient of the service has to discharge tax liability and if the recipient maintains centralised accounting system in the head office, such office can be allowed to be registered with the department for discharging service tax liability.

The Revenue filed appeal against this order before Tribunal on two grounds viz. the letter rejecting respondent’s request for centralised registration is not an appealable order and therefore the appellate authority should not have entertained the appeal. Secondly, as per Rule 4(2) of the Service Tax Rules, only service providers are eligible for centralised registration subject to certain conditions and not service recipients.

Held
As regards the first ground, it is the settled position of law that if a letter conveys the ground of rejection and also the rejection, the same can be treated as an order eligible for appellate remedies. In Bhagwati Gases Ltd. vs. CCE 2008 (226) ELT 468 (Tri – Delhi) in a similar situation, this Tribunal held that “where the order impugned determines the right of the party or is likely to affect its rights, communication thereof cannot be said to be a communication simplicitor” and appeal against such communication should be maintainable. As regards the second ground that the respondent being a service receiver is not eligible for centralised registration, it was observed that it would defeat the objective of registration. The purpose of registration in indirect tax laws is to identify the taxpayer. In this particular case, the taxpayer or the person liable to pay tax is the receiver of the service and for making the payment of service tax, the respondent is required to get registered with the department. Hence there is no reason that the benefit of centralised registration cannot be granted, if the person satisfies the conditions for such centralised registration.

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2013-TIOL-1765-CESTAT-MUM Swapnashilp Travels vs. CCE. Nagpur & CCE., Nagpur vs. Swapnashilp Travels

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Whether payment on per kilometre basis attracts service tax under the category of rent a cab operator services?

Facts:
Appellant provided services of transportation of answer sheets from various district collection centres and delivered to Nagpur University and consideration was received on per kilometre basis. The lower authority held that the Appellant provided ”rent a cab operator’s services” and liable for service tax for the extended period also but restricted the penalty u/s. 78 upto 25%.

Held:
No evidence was provided by the Revenue that the Appellant was hired on monthly, weekly or daily basis and therefore the services of transportation of answer sheets could not be termed as “Rent a cab operator’s services”. Thus the demand as well as the penalty was set aside.

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2013 (32) STR 481 (Tri.-Bang.) Jumbo Mining Ltd. vs. CCE, Hyderabad

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Whether rebate claim can be rejected on the failure to mention details of exporter’s details on lorry receipts?

Facts:
Appellant, an exporter of goods, paid service tax on the transportation of goods from its mine to port and on stockyard rent and filed rebate claim. The claim was rejected for service tax on transportation on the ground that the exporter’s Invoice details were not mentioned on the lorry receipts which was in contravention to condition mentioned in the Notification No. 41/2007 ST as amended by Notification No. 3/2008 ST and further there was no co-relation between stockyard rent and export of goods.

Held:
Though the exporter’s invoice details were not mentioned on the Lorry receipts, the compliance with the conditions of the above Notifications could have been done by broad correlation of evidence of transportation with the service tax paid thereon and quantity exported and hence the Appellant was entitled to the rebate of service tax on transportation. For the rebate of service tax on the stockyard rent, it was held that, since the Appellant was unable to establish nexus between the input service (stockyard rent) and exported goods, the claim was not admissible. Thus claim was allowed partially.

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2013-TIOL-1805-CESTAT-DEL M/s Bansal Classes vs. Commissioner of Customs & Excise, Jaipur

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CENVAT credit of catering and photography services for encouraging students succeeded in coaching is inadmissible.

Facts:
The appellant provided commercial training and coaching services and availed input services of catering, photography, tent, maintenance & repair, rent for hiring examination hall and travelling expenses. The department contended to disallow the same and issued a show-cause notice demanding service tax along with interest and penalty.

Held:
Partly allowing the appeal, the Hon. Tribunal disallowed the CENVAT on photography services and catering services held that the said services cannot be said to have received in the course of providing the services as the same were used for encouraging the students who had already succeeded in the coaching.

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2013 (32) STR 577 (Tri.-Kol.) Karamchand Thapar & Bros. (Coal Sales) Ltd. vs. C.S.T., Kolkata.

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Any services in connection with clearing and forwarding operations are covered by the definition of clearing and forwarding agent’s services. Mere inaction is not sufficient but some positive action with intent to evade payment of service tax should be present for invoking extended period of limitation. The burden to prove malafide intention is on the revenue.

Facts:
The appellants were engaged in providing various services relating to movement of goods from collieries to clients at pre-defined destination. The demand with penalty was confirmed by the Commissioner considering the services to be clearing and forwarding agent services. Accordingly, the appeal was made on the following grounds:

• The branches billed from respective locations and they did not opt for centralised registration as there was no centralised accounting system but the accounts were merely consolidated. Therefore, territorial jurisdiction was challengeable. The appellants were engaged in supervision and liaisoning work with respect to loading of coal. Accordingly, they provided business auxiliary services of procurement of goods or services which were inputs for clients except two special clients; namely; for Tamil Nadu State Electricity Board (TNEB) at Paradip Port, the appellants provided composite services of cargo handling services and for Maharashtra State Electricity Board (MSEB), the appellants had a pending at CESTAT, Mumbai.

• Relying on the clarification vide Circular F. No. B43/7/97-TRU dated 11-07-1997 it was contended that their services were not in the nature of clearing and forwarding agent’s services since at no point of time they took custody or possession of coal and the transaction of sale was directly between the purchaser and seller and the destination for delivery was also known to both the parties and the appellants had no role to play in any of the activities of clearing and forwarding.

• In case of Larsen & Toubro Ltd. vs. Commr. Of Central Excise, Chennai 2006 (3) STR 321 (Tri.-LB), the Larger Bench had held that the words ‘directly’, ‘indirectly’ and ‘in any manner’ used in the definition of clearing and forwarding agent should not be read in isolation. Further that the decision of Coal handlers Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCE 2004 (171) ELT 191 (Tri.-Kol.) did not apply to them as it was based on Prabhat Zarda Factory (India) Ltd. vs. CCE, Patna 2002 (145) ELT 222 (Tri.) which was specifically overruled by the Larger Bench in Larsen & Toubro Ltd. decision (supra).

• The appellants received service charges from freight financing activity in the form of prepayment of railway freight under separate and independent contract and transport of goods by rail was covered by the service tax net only in the year 2009 and therefore was not subject to service tax.

• The case was barred by limitation as they had a bonafide belief as to non-taxability based on trade notice and legal opinions.

The department contested the appeal on the grounds that the point of jurisdiction was never raised in reply to SCN or before the adjudicating authority. Since it was a mixed question of law as well as facts and the facts were not determined at adjudication level, the appellants were not to be allowed to raise the point directly before Tribunal. In any case, the appellants had centralised accounting system and therefore, the Commissioner at Kolkata had full jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter. Further, the words ‘directly’, ‘indirectly’ and “in any manner” employed made the gamut of definition very wide and it covered all services connected with clearing and forwarding operations.

Held:

The Tribunal observed and held that issue of jurisdiction could be raised at any stage of proceedings. However, since territorial jurisdiction is a mixed question of facts and law, the same should be raised before adjudicating authority to record findings on the facts. However, since the facts were not in dispute and were available on record, the Tribunal taking opportunity to deal with the issue observed that necessary data was provided by the appellants at Kolkata from time to time and consolidated profit and loss account and balance sheet were prepared at Kolkata and held that there was centralised accounting system and the option given for centralised registration was only for administrative convenience and to avoid overlapping of jurisdiction and conflicting views in assessment. Accordingly, it was held that the Commissioner at Kolkata had jurisdiction to decide the matter of all branches of the appellants. Referring Halsbury’s Laws England (Fourth Edn. – Vol. V), the Tribunal observed the scope of forwarding agent and concluded that there was no need to have custody or possession of goods to be a forwarding agent and the person acting as an agent for movement of goods can be regarded as forwarding agent. The Larger Bench in case of Larsen & Toubro (supra), had concurred with the width and amplitude of meaning of ‘directly’, ‘indirectly’ and “in any manner”, laid down in Prabhat Zarda Factory (Pvt.) Ltd.’s case (supra) and only had not agreed to the conclusions arrived at by the Bench of the facts of the relevant case. Therefore, principle laid down in Prabhat Zarda Factory (Pvt.) Ltd.’s case (supra) and followed later in Coal Handler’s case (supra) was absolutely valid. The instant matter being identical to Coal Handler’s case (supra) wherein it was concluded that even indirect services connected with clearing and forwarding operations i.e. services rendered for movement of coal would be clearing and forwarding services. The services mentioned in Circular and Trade Notice were illustrative and therefore, any service satisfying all ingredients of the definition as discussed in the Circular were covered under clearing and forwarding agent’s services. Freight financing was connected with clearing and forwarding operations and hence, should be chargeable to service tax. The amendment in section 73 of the Finance Act, 1994 with effect from 10-09-2004 was significant and accordingly, relying on various decisions, it was held that mere inaction is not sufficient but some positive action with intent to evade payment of service tax should be present for invoking extended period of limitation and the burden to prove malafide intention is on the revenue. In absence of any evidence and reasoning by department and having regard to the facts of the case, it was observed that although the appellants were negligent while merely placing reliance on the Circular or Trade Notice, the receipts were recorded appropriately in the books of accounts and therefore, no attempt of suppression existed and the appellants were bonafide. Accordingly, extended period of limitation was not invokable.

With respect to certain computational issues on TNEB and MSEB contracts, the matter was remanded to the Commissioner with appropriate directions.

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Winds of change

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When this issue reaches you, the year 2014 would have been ushered in. As I write this editorial, preparations are on to bring down the curtains on 2013. While 31st December celebrations are an annual event, the year 2014 promises to be significantly different. The winds of change are here.

Media coverage is full of reports of a new political party coming to power in the capital of the world’s largest democracy. It will be interesting to see how this outfit discharges the responsibility of governing Delhi. The party has made promises which are difficult to fulfil. What one only expects is a sincere and honest attempt to deliver them.

This party has come to power on the shoulders of a public movement against corruption. It is on the basis of this mass movement that one feels that a change is on the horizon. Public movements have always taken place. The difference between public protests of the past and those which have taken place within the last couple of years is the spontaneity, intensity and speed with which these protests occurred as well as the impact they have made. In addition, there is a difference between the composition of participants of earlier movements and those who took to the streets an year ago for the Lokpal Bill or to protest against the ghastly event on 16th December last year.

 There are a few other reasons for the belief that a change is in the offing. There is a major shift in demographics. If 35% people in our country are below the age of 35, we have a critical mass of population which is well-informed, well networked and can be motivated. There is an increase in the number of people which can be called the middle-class. Globalisation which kicked in around two decades ago has brought about substantial connectivity on the commercial and business side. The social and political consequences of this connectivity need to be understood by those in power.

The requirement to cope up with a multitude of economic, financial, cultural and social differentials has resulted in an effect on society which is probably more intense than what society itself is prepared for. We are living in a flat world where interaction has become very easy. This enables a quick comparison of circumstances which sharpens frustrations. We have had a glorious past, and the country has been a home to individuals who were titans in their respective fields. However that has been our past. Rendering sermons on the past cannot satisfy the aspirations of the youth and such attempts are likely to be rejected with anger. It is precisely this aspect that our political and business leaders need to realise. 25 or 30 years ago the youth held their leaders in awe. It was far easier to preach to them and they were willing to be patronised.

Today they demand information as stakeholders and they are ready to challenge what is put before them with facts and figures, in what leaders perceive as an irreverent manner. A great facilitator in this change has been technology. In case of any major event or occurrence in the world one had to rely on what information the government gave out. Even if the people did not trust government controlled media they had very little option. Today, people know with reasonable accuracy what is happening in any part of the world, and are able to share and spread information. Social media reporting has become a very powerful tool of information and opinion building. As a consequence, public perception is a very important aspect of the lives of all, particularly those in the public eye. Apart from media, tools like the Right to Information Act have accentuated transparency in public life. While all information being in the public domain has its own advantages it is not without the flip side. Because every decision is open to public scrutiny, those in administration tend to worry more about how a decision will look in the public eye rather than the correctness of the decision itself. Every person is spending extraordinary time in documenting the process that he has followed in making the decision. This is because he anticipates that any decision can be questioned, and even worse judged in hindsight. If an administrator has the slightest inkling about a decision not going down well with the public, he will refuse to take it and will merely pass the buck. Political leaders, economists and analysts are openly admitting that decision-making has taken a beating. Because of the danger of even honest, bonafide decisions being questioned, officials tend not to take decisions.

This results in furtherance of public anger. Public or civil servants who were respected a few decades ago have been gradually referred to as bureaucrats and now derisively as “babus”. While one welcomes the change at our doorstep, this aspect needs to be addressed. In the same manner that social media castigates, criticises wrong decisions, it must laud those who are acting quickly and decisively in public interest. In a district of Maharashtra when an upright official was being shunted out of office, people of that district rose in unison against the decision. Such events will neutralise the negative impact I referred to earlier. In this process of transition how is our profession responding?

I think the response is inadequate. In professional institutions the change in demography is not being adequately reflected and seniority in age is still at a premium. While youth has entered the profession in a large number, its needs and aspirations have not been addressed. Unfortunately many of my colleagues still consider regulators and legislation as being the source of employment and opportunity, without realising that it is only excellence in service that will ensure survival. The winds of change have reached our profession. They need to blow harder even at risk of damaging some established structures, as they inevitably will.

To conclude 2014 promises to be an exciting and significant year in history. Let me take this opportunity in wishing all of you and your families that the year is a joyous , prosperous and eventful one.

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[2014] 41 taxmann.com 207 (AAR) Aircom International Ltd., United Kingdom, In re Dated: 10th January 2014

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Section 245R(2) of the Act – where scrutiny notice u/s. 143(2) of the Act is issued after the date of filing of application before the AAR, bar in section 245R(2) is not attracted.

Facts:
The Applicant was a company incorporated in the UK. The Applicant had a wholly owned subsidiary in India (“ICo”) that was engaged in the business of software, sales and consultancy in the area of tele-communications. The Applicant entered into Management Services Agreement (“MSA”) with ICo. ICo had made certain payments under the MSA to the Applicant.

The Applicant applied to the AAR for its ruling on the assessibility of the payments received from ICo.

While ICo had filed the return of its income before the application was made by the Applicant to the AAR, the AO of ICo had issued the notice u/s. 143(2) of the Act to ICo after the application was filed before the AAR.

Held:
Following the ruling in Hyosung Corporation Korea, In re, [2013] 36 taxmann.com 150 (AAR), the AAR held that mere filing of the return of income does not attract the bar on the admission of the application as provided in section 245R(2) of the Act. The question raised in the application can be considered as pending for adjudication before the tax authority only when issues are referred to in the return and notice u/s 143(2) is issued.

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2014 (34) STR 165 (Del.) Frankfinn Aviation Services P. Ltd. vs. Asst. Commr., Designated Authority, VCES, Service Tax

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Whether pendency of “any issue” or determination before any tax authorities or Tribunal would warrant Designated Authority to reject the declaration of tax dues made pursuant to service tax VCES, Scheme 2013? Held no.

Facts:
Appellant provided vocational training for Air Hostess/ stewards, hospitality and management sector and furnished declaration under the aforesaid scheme for the period from April – December, 2012 for availing immunity from prosecution and penalty. As per the condition of the scheme, no notice or order of determination should have been received previously by a person. Appellant filed an appeal in Tribunal for the notice/order concerning the past six year period between September – February, 2012. The designated authority rejected its declaration on the premise of existence of dispute in the previous periods before the CESTAT .

It was contended that the criteria for debarring the declaration provided in proviso to section 106 had limited application. In that, the ‘issue’ covered should be identical to the subject matter of declaration. It is contended that the subject matter of controversy pending before the Tribunal pertained to its eligibility to avail the exemption notification dated 10-09-2004 meant for vocational training institutes and entirely different from the issue covered by the declaration. More so, CBEC Notification issued dated 27- 02-2010 has laid down the criterion of vocational training institutes covered under service tax net and thereby petitioner was paying service tax for the period till 31-03-2012 but later on could not deposit the tax because of some unavoidable reasons. Petitioner prayed that recourse to the Scheme was available.

Held:
The Hon’ble High Court observed that, as per the principles of interpretation, a proviso prescribes an exception from the operation of the main provision. Thus, “any issue” mentioned must mean that, the issue for service tax liability or quantum of liability itself for a given period must be pending before any tax authority or Tribunal or issue should have been determined. In case of distinct period other than above wherein, the subject matter of declaration is not pending or determined earlier will not be covered by the above exception.

Allowing the petition, it was held that, pendency of distinct issue of Assessee’s liability for the past period could not bar the remedy as per the Scheme.

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2014 (34) STR 35 (Guj) Utkarsh Corporate Services vs. Comm. Ex & ST

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Whether new/additional legal grounds arising from existing facts on records can be taken first time at the stage of appeal? Held yes.

Facts:
Appellant provided security services and was registered under service tax. In the matter of three show cause notices, short payment of service tax was demanded and interest and penalty u/s. 76 was imposed. Appellant deposited the service tax and preferred appeal for challenging of penalty. Appellant had raised additional legal grounds in the appeal proceedings. The said authority after referring to provisions of Rule 5 of the Central Excise (Appeal) Rules 2001 did not consider these grounds and rejected the appeal. Thereafter Appellant preferred an appeal before Tribunal raising the same contentions. The Tribunal upheld the decision of the first appellate authority and rejected the Appellant’s appeal without considering the additional grounds. Appellant filed miscellaneous application for rectification of mistake before Tribunal. Tribunal rejected the said application for the reason that there was no mistake committed since appeal was dismissed by Tribunal as there were no apparent reasons to interfere with the order-in-original and order in appeal. Appellant preferred an appeal before the High Court challenging the said rejection by Tribunal.

Held:

High Court observed that:

• Appellant had raised new/additional grounds before the first appellate authority which were legal grounds based on the facts on the records which could be raised before an authority at any stage.

• First Appellate Authority has chosen not to adjudicate on any of these grounds raised before it and instead held that satisfactory reasons have not been provided by the Appellant while raising these grounds.

• First Appellate Authority and Tribunal have erred in not considering the additional grounds legal in nature and therefore there was a need to interfere with the orders passed.

• Setting aside both the orders, the First Appellate Authority was directed to examine all the grounds raised before it.

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2014 (34) STR 16 (Bom.) Kandra Rameshbabu Naidu vs. Superintendent (AE) ST, Mumbai-II

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For arrest of the assessee for non-deposit of service tax collected exceeding Rs.50 lakh as per amendment to section 89 (1)(d) (ii) w.e.f from 10-05-2013, whether service tax collected till the date of amendment is to be considered OR tax collected from the date of amendment is to be considered?

Facts:
Appellant (Director of two companies) was collecting service tax from its customers and collected Rs. 2.59 crore during the period 2010-11 to 2013-14 but did not deposit it except Rs.15 lakh. Appellant though registered under service tax law, never filed its service tax returns. Appellant was arrested under amended section 89(1)(d)(ii) as the service tax collected amount was exceeding Rs.50 lakh. Appellant filed Criminal Bail application before the Bombay High Court for obtaining bail and pleaded that the amendment in penal provision was not retrospective in nature and the service tax collection from the date of amendment till the initiation of investigation was less than Rs. 50 lakh and therefore section 89(1)(d) (ii) was not applicable to the case.

Held:
High Court observed that non-deposit of service tax collected from customers was a continuing offence and service tax collected till date of amendment exceeded Rs.50 lakh and therefore total arrears accrued as on date of amendment was exceeding Rs. 50 lakh and the investigation was not completed. Court dismissed the Bail application.

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DTAA: India-UK: Article 18(2): The assessee, an event management company, engaged the services of a non-resident agent to bring the foreign Artists to India. The assessee paid remuneration to the Artists and commission to the agent. It deducted tax on the remuneration paid to the Artists but did not deduct tax on reimbursements to Artists and the commission paid to the agents. The sum paid to agent could not be deemed to have arisen from the personal activities in a contracting State in status

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DIT vs. Wizcraft International Entertainment (P.) Ltd.; [2014] 45 taxmann.com 24 (Bom):

The assessee was an event management company. The assessee engaged the services of a non-resident agent to bring the foreign Artists to India. The assessee paid remuneration to the Artists and commission to the agent. It deducted tax on the remuneration paid to the Artists but did not deduct tax on reimbursements to the Artists and the commission paid to the agents. The Assessing Officer held that the assessee should have deducted tax on reimbursements and payments to the agent and accordingly treated the assesses as an assessee in default. CIT(A) and the Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The Artists had performed in India and for that expenses have to be incurred and reimbursement of such expenses do not constitute income derived by these Artists from their personal activities so as to be taxable under Article 18 of the Indo-UK DTAA. Thus, the reimbursement of expenses is not taxable in India.

ii) The finding of fact is that the income of the agent is not arising from the personal activities in a contracting status of entertainer or athlete. The payment in relation thereto is not in terms of Clause (2) of Article 18. It is in these circumstances that the commission income of the agent cannot be said to be taxable in India. This Clause was not applicable to him.

iii) The appeal, therefore, does not raise any substantial question of law. It is accordingly dismissed.”

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