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Ind-AS Carve Outs – Straightlining of leases

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The issue of straight-lining of leases is very important for many enterprises; particularly entities that obtain assets on long-term operating leases; for example, retail entities, multiplexes, telecom towers, etc. Thus, if a telecom tower was leased for nine years on a non-cancellable basis, paying rent of Rs.1,00,000 in the first year, with a 10% escalation each year, the charge in the P&L each year would be Rs.1,50,883 and not the contractual amount to be paid which is the rent for previous year plus 10% escalation. In determining the lease period for straight-lining the possibility of lease extension is also considered, and hence the impact could be much higher than one would normally anticipate.

In a recent discussion organised by an industry association on IFRS adoption, the author was surprised, when the presenter opined that operating leases should not be straight-lined under IFRS and hence a carve-out was required. The reason provided for the carve-out was that IFRS should be pain free. Interestingly, straight-lining is required under Indian GAAP (and is also clarified by an Expert Advisory Committee opinion). Thus, it was absolutely fine to give pain under the Indian GAAP but not under IFRS!

Financial statements should reflect a true and fair view, based on robust accounting standards. Whether the accounting gives pain or is pain free is not relevant. However, what is an appropriate technical approach can sometimes be very debatable. Straight-lining of leases is one such instance where there are strong arguments in favour of and against straight-lining of leases, which one should consider. Let us discuss what those arguments are.

Arguments for and against straight-lining of leases
The primary reason for straight-lining of leases is contained in paragraph 23 of AS-19 which states that “Lease payments under an operating lease should be recognised as an expense in the statement of profit and loss on a straight-line basis over the lease term unless another systematic basis is more representative of the time pattern of the user’s benefit.” In other words, in the above example of telecom towers, the benefit received from the telecom tower over the nine years is absolutely uniform and hence the charge in each of the nine years should be equal. The lessee is expected to derive the same benefit, in physical terms, from the leased asset over the lease term and, accordingly, the scheduled rent increases in the lease rental do not meet the criterion for recognising expense/ income on a basis other than straight-line basis over the lease term.

One view is that the increases in rent in the agreement may only be considered as an adjustment for inflation and hence leases should not be straight-lined. The counter argument is that inflation factor in the agreement may not be representative of the inflation index in the country. Thus, it may so happen that a 10% escalation is built in the rent agreement each year in anticipation of inflation, was not supported by the inflation index, which was expected to be 5%. In reality, it may so happen that in subsequent years rents may fall down drastically, instead of going up. In other words, the cost of operating would be cheaper in future years and hence the assumption that escalations represent future inflation may not be tenable. In India, it may be fair to state that one of the reasons for lease rentals to increase is the inflation factor. Now if the scale up on the rentals in the agreement was based on an inflation index rather than a fixed amount, the scale up would be treated as contingent rentals under AS-19 and accounted for as and when the contingent rentals become due (not on straight-line). However, if the rent increases does not represent an inflation index then straight-lining would be required. This appears to be a fair argument for straightlining leases.

It is understandable that in India people focus on contractual terms and therefore recognising any expense or income that does not represent those contractual terms makes them very uncomfortable. An interesting point would be to look at the standard on depreciation, which permits the straight-line, written down value method and other methods such as unit of production method. A lessee would depreciate an asset obtained on finance lease and capitalised by it using any of the above methods. In other words, the P&L charge would not be based on the contractual terms/payments. Thus, focusing on contractual terms/payments in the case of operating lease would also not be appropriate and would unnecessarily result in structuring possibilities.

Some argue that straight-lining results in recognising future costs. The standard ignores the fact that as time passes, costs go up (or may go down) and so does revenue. The cost of operating in 2007 would always be different from the cost of operating in 2008. The same can be said for the revenue rates; they may go up or down. To try and straight-line the cost (in the case of lessee’s) selectively for leases is a violation of sound accounting principles.

Paragraph 24 of AS-19 states that, “for operating leases, lease payments (excluding costs for services such as insurance and maintenance) are recognised as an expense in the statement of profit and loss on a straight-line basis unless another systematic basis is more representative of the time pattern of the user’s benefit, even if the payments are not on that basis.” This means that if services are provided by lessor to the lessee, for example, maintenance services with a 10% increase each year, those are not required to be straight-lined. Also when a purchaser makes an upfront commitment to purchase goods each year from a seller with a 10% increase over the previous year’s rate, one does not straight-line the cost of purchase over those years. Therefore the point is if straight-lining is not required as a principle in the framework or by other standards, then is it appropriate to apply it selectively in the case of leases?

A point to be noted is that the straight-lining under the standard is an anti-abuse measure arising out of rent-free periods. Thus, if a building is taken on operating lease for three years, with zero rent in the first two years and rent of Rs. 3 lakh for the third year, the standard would require Rs. 1 lakh to be charged each year. This is fair, because in substance there is no such thing as rent-free period. Therefore, some argue that to require straight-lining when there is no indication of deliberate ballooning is unfairly stretching the argument for straight-lining.

The straight-lining of lease rentals would result in a deferred equalisation which may be a liability or an asset. For example, if the operating lease is for two years with rental in year one, of Rs. 100 and rental in year two of Rs. 110; equalisation would result in a deferred liability of Rs. 5 in the first year (which will reverse in the following year). Now the problem with deferred equalisation is that it does not fulfill the definition of an asset or liability under “The Framework For The Preparation And Presentation Of Financial Statements” issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India. Under the framework, asset and liability is defined as follows:

(a) An asset is a resource controlled by the enterprise as a result of past events from which future economic benefits are expected to flow to the enterprise.

(b) A liability is a present obligation of the enterprise arising from past events, the settlement of which is expected to result in an outflow from the enterprise of resources embodying economic benefits.

It begs the question therefore that if deferred equalisation is not an asset or liability as defined under the Framework, then what is it doing in the balance sheet?

Overall, there appears to be good arguments for and against straight-lining of leases. Ultimately, one has to take a decision.

Overall Conclusion
The adoption of Ind-AS will bring India at par with the world (more than 120 countries) at large that has adopted IFRS. To achieve full benefit, it is imperative that Ind-AS’s are notified without any major difference from IASb IFRS. If India were to implement IFRS with too many differences,  it  would  be  akin to moving from one Indian gAAP to another Indian gAAP. This would entail 100% efforts with zero benefits. Moving from Indian GAAP to IASB IFRS would entail 100% efforts but will provide 100% benefits. By adopting IASB IFRS it would become possible  for  Indian companies to state that they are compliant with IASB IFRS, and hence those financial statements can be used globally.

It is well appreciated that accounting is an art, and not   a precise science. Primarily, financial statements should reflect and capture the underlying substance of transactions. The accounting standards are drafted to ensure that underlying transactions are properly accounted for and also aggregated and reflected transparently in the financial statements. But as already pointed out, this is not a precise science, and people may have different views as is evident from the above debate on leases. Sometimes there are no right or wrong answers, and a decision needs to be taken and people need to move ahead.

IASB IFRS is not necessarily the best cut in all cases, and there may be a few instances where the standards could have been better, from another person’s perspective. Nonetheless, the author believes that the standard setters and regulators will have to consider the benefit of these carve outs with the benefits lost as a result of departing from IASB IFRS. ultimately, it is not about one-upmanship but aligning with the world. In my view, full adoption of IASb IFRS is a goal worth pursuing. At the same time the standards setters and regulators should engage with the IASB in resolving the Indian specific issues amicably. As an alternative approach, the author suggests that companies should be allowed an option to adopt IASb IFRS, instead of Ind-AS, if they wish to.

In the long-run, the Indian standard setters and regulators should work closely with the IASB so that any differences that arise are resolved more promptly. A mutually respectable relationship can be built with the IASB, where the IASB and the world can gain from India’s participation in the standard setting process and simultaneously India can also benefit from the process in improving its financial reporting framework.

IASB certainly has a global objective of having one set  of uniform IFRS standards across the world. Therefore, if IFRS are adopted in India without any carve-outs it would be a positive development for IASB. But adopting full IFRS or providing an option to do so, would be a far bigger positive development for India.

Role of an auditor in assessing fraud risks

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Introduction
Worldwide, companies are striving to survive in adverse economic and competitive market conditions. This survival struggle often results in some of them engaging in unethical business practices such as fraud, espionage and corruption. To help organisations mitigate these risks, regulatory bodies, both international and national, have reformed and implemented several stringent laws and regulations. These include Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in the US, UK Bribery Act in UK and the new Companies Act, 2013 in India.

The Companies Act 2013 – A new era of corporate governance
According to the 13th Global Fraud Survey, 2013 by EY, 34% of India respondents said that they resorted to unethical actions in a business situation, which is the second highest amongst the surveyed nations. The Companies Act, 2013 is set to be a game changer for corporate India, paving the way for an enhanced control environment, greater transparency and higher standards of governance. Section 447, under the Act for the first time provides a definition of fraud and also makes extensive provisions for penalising fraudulent activities.

The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) has specifically outlined the Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement to adopt leading global practices on corporate governance and to make the corporate governance framework more effective. The enforcement of these norms demands organisations to provide assurance to the board, audit committee on adequacy of internal controls, effective risk management process, anti-fraud controls and effective legal compliance framework. With these changes in place, the role of an auditor has undergone a significant transformation.

Reporting on internal financial controls

Management is still dependent on auditors to provide them assurance on anti-fraud controls which are in place across businesses, together with the ability to detect and deter a potential fraud. Auditors are expected to evaluate accounting systems for weakness, reviewing and monitoring internal controls, determining the degree of fraud risks and interpreting financial data for picking up unusual trends and following up on red flags.

The Companies Act, 2013 has made it mandatory for the auditors to comment on whether the company has adequate internal financial controls system in place and operating effectiveness for such controls. Here, the term, ‘internal financial controls,’ means the policies and procedures adopted by the company for ensuring orderly and efficient conduct of its business, including the prevention and detection of frauds or errors, the accuracy and completeness of the accounting records, and the timely preparation of reliable financial information.

Evaluating fraud risks
An auditor should have the ability to understand how a fraud is committed and how it can be identified. He/ she should also understand the underlying factors that motivate individuals to commit fraud. As per the Companies Act, 2013, the term ‘fraud’ includes any act, omission, concealment of any fact or abuse of the position committed by any person, with intent to deceive, to gain undue advantage from, or to injure the interests of, the company or its shareholders or its creditors or any other person, whether or not there is any wrongful gain or wrongful loss.
• Under the Act, liability and punishment for fraud is extended to every individual who has been a party to it intentionally, including the auditors of the organisations.
• Auditors need to be involved in monitoring the whistleblowing mechanism, which is made mandatory for directors and all employees to report genuine cases of frauds.

Therefore, an auditor is expected to be in a position to identify potentially fraudulent situations during the course of the audit and play a vital role in preventing fraud and other unethical acts. It is essential they remain unbiased and must conduct the audit with a clear mind-set to catch possible material misstatements resulting from a fraud. This should be regardless of their relationship with the organisation or their belief about the management’s honesty or integrity. Objectively, the auditor is always in a better position to detect symptoms that accompany fraud, and usually has continual presence in the organisation. This provides them with a better understanding of the organisation and its internal financial controls.

With the new legislations, the auditor will now need to take responsibility over the adequacy of fraud prevention measures in various business processes. He/she is required to exercise professional scepticism, which requires an ongoing questioning of whether the information and evidence obtained suggests that a material misstatement or fraud has occurred. Sometimes, he/ she may even have to undertake extended audit procedures in areas where potential red flags were noticed. Another key consideration is the inclusion of fraud detection procedure as part of every audit and keeping an eye open for red flags.

Proactive auditing to look for fraud risks
In this new era of auditing, ushered in by the Companies Act 2013, Auditors will have to proactively look for fraud vulnerabilities and fraud risks, by extending the audit procedure to:

Examine and evaluate the adequacy and effectiveness of internal financial controls

• Unusual transactions
• Adjustments in the period-end financial reporting process
• Related party transactions

Make use of data analytics to find unfamiliar items and perform detailed analyses of high risk transactions
Identify relevant fraud risks: Understand the business environment. Review the documentation of previous and suspected frauds, monitoring the reporting through whistle-blowing mechanisms and formulating the ethics programme
Outline existing controls to potential fraud schemes and carry out a gap assessment.

In the standard audit reports that accompany corporate financial statements, the auditor’s responsibility for detecting fraud is not discussed. Indeed, the word fraud isn’t mentioned at all. The auditing profession calls the discrepancy between what investors expect and what auditors do an “expectations gap.”

In recent years, audit firms have attempted to close the gap by educating the public on their role. Even though fraud is not one of the main objectives of auditors, it has been observed in past few years they have been instrumental in detecting or raising a warning sign to the management. It has been an increasing trend that the auditors have come across a fraud or a potential fraud and highlighted the same to the management or investigating agencies. It is with their help that investigators are able to crack the toughest cases by using various forensic tools and techniques such as data analytics, disk imaging, extensive public domain searches etc. Understanding fraud risk and developing the necessary skills for fraud detection is now a necessity for auditors; as stakeholders expect them to be red flag bearers of good corporate governance within the company.

The road ahead
Going forward, the role of the auditor is expected to become much more onerous as the board, management and Independent Directors seek increased comfort on newer areas to comply with the complex regulatory environment and legal duties and responsibilities. Their role is set to evolve into a more extensive, outward, forward looking and continuous activity to help deliver a more sustainable, efficient and effective audit function.

Please note: Views expressed in this article are personal to the author.

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AMD Research & Development Center India Private Limited vs. DCIT (Unreported) ITA No 692 to 695/Hyd/14 A.Ys.:2007-08 to 2010-11, Dated: 22.10.2014

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Article 12, India-Canada DTAA – On facts, ‘reimbursement’ by Indian subsidiary to parent company held FIS since Indian company was not the exclusive beneficiary of the services procured by parent company from third party.

Facts:
The taxpayer was an Indian company, which was a subsidiary of a Canadian company (“Canada Co”). The taxpayer was set-up as an R & D Design Centre for providing captive services to its parent. The services provided mainly included design, development and support for software and hardware solutions. During the relevant tax years, the taxpayer had made certain payments to the parent company towards software and engineering services without withholding any tax. According to the taxpayer, an Indian third party had provided engineering services to the taxpayer and the payment for the same was made by the parent company. Thus, the payment made by the taxpayer to the parent company was merely reimbursement of that payment and since there was no element of profit, no tax was required to be withheld.

After further examination and noting his findings, the AO concluded that payments to the parent company were “income from other sources” under the Act and under Article 21(3) of India-Canada DTAA and the taxpayer was required to withhold tax from the payments.

Held:
No agreement was entered into either between the taxpayer and the Indian third party or between the taxpayer and the parent company. The taxpayer was to render chip designing and software development services. Since the taxpayer did not have requisite skill set, the parent company was to provide the required portion of the services by procuring from third parties. Master Transfer Pricing Agreement entered into between the taxpayer and parent company clearly provided that services contracted by one party from a third party were also meant for the benefit of other member of the group. Findings of Commissioner of Service Tax showed that benefit of services rendered by Indian third party was availed by the taxpayer. These findings were not disputed by the tax authority. Since the services procured by the parent company from the Indian third party were for the benefit of the taxpayer, the amount paid by the taxpayer to the parent company was not extra profit/cash.

However, as the benefit of services contracted from third parties was to be available to all group companies and not only the taxpayer, it cannot be said that it was a case of pure reimbursement. Thus, the parent company had also substantially benefited from the services. Further, under Contractor Services Agreement, the Indian third party had agreed that all innovations and contract work product resulting from its services will be sole and exclusive property of the parent company and had assigned all rights in favour of the parent company.

Accordingly, the payment made by the taxpayer to the parent company was neither a gratuitous payment nor reimbursement of actual expenses without any element of profit. Therefore, the payment was in nature of FIS in terms of India-Canada DTAA. Consequently, the taxpayer had defaulted by not withholding tax.

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ITO vs. Bennet Coleman & Co. Ltd. (Unreported) ITA No 57/Mum/2009 & ITA No 7315/Mum/2008 A.Y. 2007-08, Dated: 12.11.2014

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Article 12, 14, India-Switzerland DTAA; Section 9(1)(vii), the Act – Installation and commissioning of plant and machinery being “assembly”, consideration therefor is excluded under Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vii) of the Act. While the payment for classroom training would be FTS under Article 12, that for shop floor training would not be covered by Article 12.

Facts:
The taxpayer was an Indian company engaged in the business of printing and publishing of newspapers. The taxpayer entered into two contracts with a Swiss company (“Swiss Co”) – one contract was for supply of plant and machinery and second contract was for installation and commissioning of the plant and machinery and operational training of the staff. The taxpayer did not withhold tax from the payments made to Swiss Co under both the contracts.

According to the AO, the payments made under the second contract were in the nature of FTS and therefore, the taxpayer was required to withhold tax on the same. In appeal, CIT(A) concluded that 75% of the payments under the second contract were towards installation and commissioning, which was in the nature of “assembly” and therefore, was excluded in terms of Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vii) of the Act and the balance 25% being towards training of employees, was FTS.

Held:
Installation and commissioning of plant

The plant and machinery comprised of various components/ units, which had to be put together and aligned in a manner that they would function optimally. Such activity would qualify as “assembly”. Accordingly, the consideration paid to Swiss Co towards installation and commissioning will not be FTS in terms of the definition in Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vii) of the Act. ? As regards India-Switzerland DTAA, though the consideration would be FTS in terms of Article 12(4), Article 12(5)(b), inter alia, excludes services covered by Article 14 which deals with “Independent Personal Service”. Since the engineers deputed by Swiss Co had stayed in India for less than 183 days, in terms of Article 14, the consideration was taxable only in Switzerland.

As regards the issue whether Article 14 applies also to a non-individual, it may be noted that in Christiani & Nielsen Copenhagan vs. ITO [1991] 39 ITD 355 (Bom), the Tribunal had held that Article dealing with “Independent Personal services” applied only in case of individuals was in the context of India-Denmark DTAA, which specifically mentioned “individual” whereas India- Switzerland DTAA mentions “resident”, which term also includes non-individuals. However, in MSEB vs. DCIT [2004] 90 ITD 793 (Mum), in the context of India- UK DTAA, the Tribunal has held that “Independent Personal services” Article applies to all the residents. Accordingly, Swiss Co was qualified for benefit under Article 14.

Training of staff
Training services include both class room training and shop floor training (i.e., training on the machine). While the payment for classroom training would be FTS under Article 12 that for shop floor training would not be covered under Article 12.

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[2014] 51 taxmann.com 256 (Delhi – Trib.) DCIT vs. Exxon Mobil Gas (India) (P.) Ltd. A.Y.: 2004-05, Dated: 13.11.2014

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To compute net operating profit under TNMM for determining PLI of comparable company, non-operating incomes and non-operating expenses should be excluded.

Facts:
The taxpayer was a tax resident of India and a membercompany of Exxon Mobil Group engaged in oil and gas industry globally. The taxpayer was engaged in the activity of conducting market survey and performing related advisory services to its AEs. In respect of the relevant tax year, the taxpayer had reported four international transactions out of which one of the transactions pertaining to ‘conducting market survey activities and related advisory services’ was disputed by the TPO. To demonstrate the ALP of this transaction, the taxpayer had adopted TNMM as the most appropriate method and Operating Profit to Total Cost (OP/TC) as the Profit Level Indicator (PLI) and had selected twelve companies as comparable. By adopting multiple year data of these companies, the taxpayer computed average OP margin at 4.46% and showed its international transaction was at ALP.
The TPO rejected use of multiple year data and used only current year data. Since current year data for four companies was not available, TPO used only eight companies and computed OP/TC margin at 17.96%.

In respect of one of the companies, the profit margin was 37.14% whereas, according to the taxpayer, the correct OP/TC margin was 6.98% after excluding “other income”.

Held:
Major component of other income of the comparable company was interest income. TNMM contemplates using OP to a suitable base and to determine OP items of non-operating income should be excluded.
If non-operating income is to be excluded, non-operating expenses should also be excluded. Hence, the tribunal remanded the matter to AO/TPO for correct determination of OP/TC of the comparable company after excluding non-operating income as well as nonoperating expenses.

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[2014] 50 taxmann.com 379 (Delhi – Trib.) Mitsubishi Corporation India (P.) Ltd. vs. DCIT A.Y.: 2007-08, Dated: 21.10.2014

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Article 24, India-Japan DTAA; sections 40(a)
(i), (ia), the Act – the exclusion in section 40(a) (ia), and its
retrospective effect, should be read into section 40(a)(i) to achieve
deduction neutrality envisaged in Article 24(3) of India- Japan DTAA.

Facts:
The
taxpayer was a wholly owned subsidiary of a Japanese company engaged in
general import and export trading of diverse range of products (known
as ‘sogo shosha’ in Japanese). During the relevant tax year the taxpayer
made payments to certain Associated Enterprises (‘AEs’) which included
Japanese entities, towards import of goods. The taxpayer did not
withhold tax from such payments. However in case where the recipient
entity had PE in India, the recipient had furnished its return of income
including the payments received from taxpayer and had also paid taxes
on such income.

As the taxpayer had not withheld tax from the
payments made to the non-resident entities, the tax authority disallowed
the payments.

The taxpayer contended that Article 24 of
India-Japan DTAA provides protection against discrimination vis-à-vis
resident taxpayers. The taxpayer contended that since the provisions of
section 40(a)(ia) of the Act read with section 201(1) of the Act,
exclude payments made to a resident payee without withholding tax if
certain conditions are fulfilled, the payments made to non-residents too
cannot be disallowed in view of non-discrimination provision in
India-Japan DTAA.

However, the tax authority contended that the
taxpayer being an Indian resident was not entitled to access
nondiscrimination provision under India-Japan DTAA.

Before proceeding with its ruling, the Tribunal segregated the payments into three broad categories.

Category
(a): where the tax authority’s claim of recipients having a PE in India
was negated by the judicial authorities (i.e., the recipients were
found to have no PE in India).
Category (b): where there was no
material on record with the tax authority that recipients had a PE and
the same was also not in dispute before any judicial authority.
Category (c): where the recipient entity had a PE in India.

Held:
Analysis of payments

Category
(a): in absence of PE there was no income chargeable to tax in India
and accordingly, there was no liability to withhold taxes1 .
Consequently, no disallowance can be made.

Category (b): the
onus is on the tax authority to establish that the non-resident entity
had PE in India and such onus was not discharged. Accordingly, there was
no failure by the taxpayer in not withholding tax from payments made to
such entity. Consequently, disallowance u/s 40(a)(i) cannot be made.

Category
(c): the taxpayer had made payment to a Japanese entity which had a PE
in India. That entity had accepted tax liability in respect of the
payments received from the taxpayer. In this case the taxpayer had
invoked the non-discrimination provision in India- Japan DTAA and had
contended that disallowance could not be made.

Indian resident accessing deduction non-discrimination Article under DTAA
In
Daimler Chrysler India Pvt Ltd vs. DCIT (29 SOT 202) (Pune), it was
held that being resident of a treaty country is not a pre-condition to
seek non-discrimination protection under DTAA and payment to a
nonresident who is a resident of a treaty country would be adequate to
invoke non-discrimination provision.

Since the payment was made
by the taxpayer to a Japanese tax resident, the non-discrimination claim
under India-Japan DTAA was tenable2.

Scope of non-discrimination Article under India-Japan DTAA

Deduction
neutrality provision in the non-discrimination article is designed to
primarily seek parity in eligibility for deduction between payments made
to residents and those made to non-residents.
UN Model convention
commentary on Article 24(4), which is similar to Article 24(3) of
India-Japan DTAA, mentions that the relevant paragraph is designed to
end deduction discrimination where unrestricted deductions are allowed
in respect of payments made by residents to other residents but such
payments to nonresidents are restricted or prohibited.
Thus, there
cannot be discrimination regarding deductibility of expenses in respect
of payments made to Japanese residents and on which no tax has been
withheld if there is no corresponding pre-condition visà- vis payments
made to Indian residents.

Differentiation simplicitor also results in discrimination
In
Automated Securities Clearance Inc. 118 TTJ 619, the Pune Tribunal had
held that, in order to establish discrimination, the taxpayer has to
demonstrate that it has been subjected to different treatment vis-à-vis
other taxpayers, which is unreasonable, arbitrary or irrelevant.
However, since the above decision was in the context of the India-US
DTAA, it cannot be automatically applied to any other DTAA.
In
Rajeev Sureshbhai Gajwani vs. ACIT [8 ITR (Trib) 616], Special Bench of
the Tribunal has held that differentiation simplicitor in deductibility
of payment is enough to invoke non-discrimination provision.

Impact on disallowance if tax paid by recipient nonresident
Though
the exclusion in second proviso to section 40(a)(ia) is in effect from
1st April 2013, several Tribunal decisions3 have held that the amendment
is retrospectively effective from 1st April 2005 when the disallowance
provision was introduced for payments made to residents. In Bharati
Shipyard4, Special Bench of Mumbai Tribunal had observed that an
amendment of a substantive provision aimed at removing unintended
consequences to make the provision workable has to be treated as
retrospective in application.
Since section 40(a)(i) does not have
exclusion clause similar to the second proviso to section 40(a)(ia),
payments made to non-residents in similar circumstances will be
disallowable. Thus, in terms of Article 24(3) of India-Japan DTAA, it
will be discrimination. Accordingly, the exclusion in section 40(a)(ia),
and its retrospective effect, should be read into section 40(a) (i) to
achieve deduction neutrality envisaged in Article 24(3) of India-Japan
DTAA.
Therefore, payments made by Indian tax residents to Japanese
tax residents without deduction of tax cannot be disallowed u/s.
40(a)(i) if the Japanese tax residents have furnished their return of
income, accounted such payments for computing income and have paid tax
due on their declared income.

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M/S.Tata Consultancy Service vs. Commercial Tax Officer Thiruvanmiyur Assessment Circle, Chennai and Another, [2012] 54 VST 477 (Mad)

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Sales Tax- Recovery of Tax- Sale of Land On Which Unit of the Seller was Situated- Bona Fide Transaction-Notice to The Purchaser- For Recovery of Arrears Of Sales Tax Dues- Of Selling Dealer- Not Permissible-Transaction Not Void, Section 24A of The Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959.

Facts
The petitioner company had purchased land from M/S. Gum (India) Ltd. after making due enquiry and had obtained encumbrance certificate which did not disclose any encumbrance over the property in question. The sale deed was executed on 30th March, 2001. The sales tax department issued notice to the petitioner company on 26th May, 2004 to pay amount of sales tax payable by the seller namely M/S. Gum (India) Ltd. under the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959, for the period 1992-93 to 1998-99 on the ground that the land was purchased by the petitioner company knowing the fact that the selling dealer was in arrears of sales tax. The petitioner company filed writ petition before the Madras High Court to quash the notice issued by the sales tax department for payment of arrears of sales tax payable by the selling dealer.

Held
The High Court on facts of the case held that the petitioner had purchased the land from the selling dealer without notice of charge said to have been created on the property in question in respect of alleged arrears of sales tax payable by the vendor company. As long as the transaction, between the original assessee and petitioner-company, is not shown to be fraudulent in nature, it cannot be said that such transaction is void as per section 24A of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959. As the respondent had failed to establish their claim that the petitioner company had purchased the property in question, with the knowledge of liability of employees provident fund, and in respect of the arrears of sales tax said to be payable to the sales tax department, the purchase of said property by the petitioner company cannot be held as invalid in the eyes of law. Accordingly, the High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the company and set aside the impugned notice of demand issued by the sales tax department.

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Additional Commissioner of VAT-I, Mumbai vs. Gupta Metallics & Power Ltd. [2012] 54 VST 292 ( Bom)

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Value Added Tax- Set-off- Raw Material- Coal Used as Raw Material by Manufacturer of Sponge Iron- Not Used as Fuel- Full Set-Off to Be Granted, Provision To Disallow Set-Off on Purchase of Motor Spirit Except In Certain Cases Mentioned in Rule- Dealer Not Entitled to Claim Set-Off-On Purchase of High Speed Diesel- Used As Fuel, Rs. 52(1)(a), 53, 54(b) of The Maharashtra Value Added Tax Rules, 2005.

Facts
The respondent company is a manufacturer of sponge iron and used iron ore, coal and dolomite as raw materials. The respondent company claimed full set-off of tax paid on purchase of coal used as raw material and also claimed set-off of tax paid on purchase of High Speed Diesel used as fuel. The assessing authority treated use of coal partially as raw material and partially as fuel and accordingly disallowed 50% set-off of tax paid on of purchase of coal treated used as fuel. Further, it disallowed set-off of tax paid on purchase of High Speed Diesel used as fuel. The first appellate authority confirmed the action of the assessing authority. The Tribunal allowed the appeal and granted full set-off of tax paid on purchase of coal by treating it used as raw material and granted partial set-off of tax paid on purchase of High Speed Diesel used as fuel. The department filed appeal before the Bombay High Court against the judgment of Tribunal.

Held
The High Court considering chemical report held that chemical qualities of non-coking coal to generate heat were used to manufacture sponge iron. Merely because heat is generated in the process it cannot be a ground to hold that non-coking coal was used as fuel. On facts the High Court held that the coal was used as raw material and not used as fuel. Accordingly, the High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the department and confirmed the judgment of Tribunal to grant full set-off of tax paid on purchase of coal by treating it used as raw material.

As regards another issue for disallowance of set-off of tax paid on purchase of High Speed Diesel used as fuel, the High Court held that rule 54(b) creates an embargo as regards claiming set-off except cases mentioned in it, which prohibits grant of set-off on purchase of motor spirit. On account of this specific provision, the provision of rules 52 and 53 cannot be applied in favour of the respondent company. Accordingly, the High Court allowed appeal filed by the department and disallowed set-off tax paid on purchase of High Speed Diesel used as fuel.

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National Organic Chemicals Industries Ltd vs. State of Maharashtra, [2012] 54 VST 271 (Bom)

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Central Sales Tax- Works Contract- -Supply and Laying of Pipe Line- Prior to 11-05-2002-Whether Divisible or Indivisible- Issue of Invoice Showing Value of Material- For Payment of Excise Duty- Not Relevant- On Facts- Held As Indivisible Works Contract- Not Liable to Tax- Section 2(g) of The Central Sales Tax Act, 1956.

Facts
The applicant company entered in to contract for supply and laying of pipe lines for transportation of natural gas with Assam Gas. The company claimed exemption from payment of tax as no tax under the CST Act was applicable prior to amendment to section 2(g) of the CST Acti.e.11-5-2002, defining the term sale, to include transfer of property in goods involved in execution of works contract. The company claimed the transaction as indivisible works contract effected in the course of inter- State trade and in absence of definition of sale to include deemed sale no tax was paid under the CST Act. The assessing authority considering excise invoice issued by the company, in the name of Assam Gas, showing value of material for payment of excise duty and other terms of the contract held the contract as divisible works contract one for supply of pipes and other for installation and levied tax under the CST Act. The appellate authority as well as Tribunal up held the levy of tax under the CST Act by the assessing authority. The Tribunal at the instance of Company referred question of law before the Bombay High Court.

Held
The authorities below erred in placing reliance on the invoices which were raised by the applicant company to only comply with the excise duty provisions.The High Court considering various clauses of agreement held that the transaction between the company and Assam Gas was indivisible inter-State works contract. The liability to pay tax under the CST Act would arise only after 11-05-2002 from which the section 2(g) was amended. Since the transaction pertains to period prior to 11-05- 202 no tax under the CST Act is payable. The High Court accordingly answered the question of law in favour of the applicant company.

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[2014] 50 taxmann.com 435 (New Delhi – CESTAT) Commissioner of Central Excise, Allahabad vs. Amitdeep Motors

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Classification of Service – Commission received for procuring orders and peripheral activities – dominant nature of service – Not a C&F Agent Services.

Facts:
The respondent assessee was an authorized dealer of M/s. Maruti Udyog Ltd (‘MUL’). Apart from procuring orders from the Government department like BSF, CRPF & State Police etc., it conducted pre-delivery inspection, giving coupons for free after-sales services, etc. and also arranged waybill or entry permit required for the dispatch of the vehicle and received commission from MUL for such services rendered. Revenue sought to tax the activities under Clearing and Forwarding Agent’s Services stating that definition of C&F agent service was wide enough to cover these activities. Commissioner (Appeals) decided in favor of the assessee.

 Held:
The Hon’ble Delhi Tribunal held that it is an accepted fact that one of the crucial elements of C&F agent service is that it works on the direction of the principal. In the present case the respondent was actually taking orders from the Government departments and therefore it was basically facilitating the supply of cars to them and earning commission from MUL. Therefore, this crucial element was absent. This fact was also clear from the observations made by the Commissioner (Appeals). It was also noted that before the Commissioner (Appeals), assessee vehemently contended that they have never physically received and stored the goods in their premises but the goods were physically delivered by MUL to the customers. In this factual background and relying upon the decision of the Delhi Tribunal (LB) in the case of Larsen & Toubro vs. CCE 2006 (3) S.T.R. 321 (Tri. – LB), it was concluded that procuring the order from the Government departments was the main element of the impugned service and any peripheral aspects thereof would not bring it within the scope of C&F Agent Service. Note: It appears that Tribunal has taken a view that activity concerning supply of cars was in fact a service to Government departments from which assessee did not receive any consideration. The commission received from MUL was only for procuring the orders. In Larsen & Toubro’s case (supra) it was held that, clearing and forwarding activities do not flow directly or indirectly from mere procurement of orders. The activity of procuring orders is treated separately by Parliament under Business Auxiliary Service and independent of clearing and forwarding operations. This case has also been affirmed by the Hon’ble Punjab & Haryana High Court in 2008 (10) STR 229. Reader may also refer to the Tribunal decision in Transasia Sales Syndicate case which is affirmed by Hon’ble SC in [2014] 50 taxmann.com 438 (SC).

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[2014] 50 taxmann.com 434 (Ahmedabad – CESTAT) Aims Industries Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise Daman

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Repairs and maintenance of gas cylinders – no service tax paid on sale of valve which is separately indicated on invoice – CENVAT on such input requires reversal being ‘inputs’ cleared as such – matter remanded.

Facts:
Assessee was supplying valves in course of repair and maintenance of gas cylinders and
did not pay service tax thereon. CENVAT Credit was taken of duty paid on the said valves. Revenue included value of valves in the value of services. It was argued that, VAT was paid on supply of valves and therefore, same was not includible in value of services. Revenue contended that since credit was taken on valves, exemption under Notification No.12/2003-ST dated 20-06-2003 could not be allowed.

Held:
The Hon’ble Tribunal observed that from the invoices it is not clear whether VAT is paid on the sale of valves as claimed and therefore remanded the matter to the adjudicating authority for such verification. It was also held that even if it is accepted that while providing the services there is sale of valves the same will amount to clearing of inputs as such on which CENVAT Credit is required to be reversed at the time of clearance as per CENVAT Credit Rules 2004.

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Business expenditure: Disallowance u/s. 43B r.w.s. 2(24)(x) and 36(1)(va): A. Y. 2008-09: Employer’s and Employees’ contributions to Provident fund deposited before due date for filing return u/s. 139(1):

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Amount allowable as deduction: Essae Teraoka P. Ltd. vs. CIT; 366 ITR 408 (Kar):

For the A. Y. 2008-09, the assessee company had deposited the Employer’s and Employees’ contribution to the provident fund after the due date under the Provident Fund Scheme but before the due date for filing the return of income u/s. 139(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Assessing Officer added the amounts to the income of the assessee u/s. 36(1)(va) r.w.s. 2(24)(x) of the Act and did not allow the deduction. The Tribunal upheld the disallowance.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) F rom a bare perusal of clause (va) of section 36(1) of the Act, it is clear that if any sum received by the assessee employer from any of his employees towards the employees’ contribution to provident fund is deposited in the relevant fund within the time stipulated in the scheme then the assessee is straightway entitled to deduction as contemplated u/s. 36(1)(va) of the Act.

ii) Section 43B states that notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of the Income-tax Act, a deduction otherwise allowable in this Act in respect of any sum payable by the assessee as an employer by way of contribution to any fund such as provident fund shall be allowed if it is paid on or before the due date as contemplated u/s. 139(1) of the Act. This provision has nothing to do with the consequences, provided for under the Employees’ Provident Funds Act for not depositing the “contribution” on or before the due date therein.

iii) T he word “contribution” used in clause (b) of section 43B of the Act means the contribution of the employer and the employee. That being so, if the contribution is deposited on or before the due date for furnishing the return of income u/s. 139(1) of the Act, the employer is entitled to deduction.

iv) I n the result, the appeal is allowed and the substantial question of law is answered in favour of the appellantassessee and against the Revenue.”

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ITAT: Duty of Tribunal to decide appeals: Section 254(1): A. Y. 1997-98 and 1998-99: Unnecessary remand by ITAT causes prejudice and amounts to a failure to exercise jurisdiction:

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Coca-Cola India P. Ltd. vs. ITAT (Bom): W. P. No. 3650 of 2014 dated 14-08-2014:

For the A. Y. 1997-98 as regards the assessee’s claim for deduction of service charges the Tribunal had remanded the matter back to the Assessing Officer for fresh consideration. Allowing the writ petition filed by the assessee against the said order, the Bombay High Court (see 290 ITR 464) had held that as the CIT(A) had given specific grounds for the disallowance , the Tribunal ought to have decided the specific issues on merit and not simply remanded it. Thereafter, the Tribunal decided the issue on merits and allowed the assessee’s claim. For A. Y. 1998-99, though the CIT(A)’s order was passed on the same date as the order passed for A. Y. 1997-98 and the Tribunal was aware of the High Court order for A. Y. 1997-98, it still remanded the issue to the Assessing Officer for fresh consideration. Miscellaneous application filed by the assessee was dismissed on the ground that the remand order was a conscious “decision” and not an apparent mistake.

The assessee filed a writ petition challenging the order. The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

“i) T he Tribunal should not have refused to consider and decide the issue relating to service charges, more so, when an identical view taken by it earlier has not found favour of this Court. This Court repeatedly reminded the Tribunal of its duty as a last fact finding authority of dealing with all factual and legal issues. The Tribunal failed to take any note of the caution which has been administered by this Court and particularly of not remanding cases unnecessarily and without any proper direction.

ii) A blanket remand causes serious prejudice to parties. None benefits by non-adjudication or non-consideration of an issue of fact and law by an Appellate Authority and by wholesale remand of the case back to the original authority. This is a clear failure of duty which has to be preformed by the Appellate Authority in law. Once the Appellate Authority fails to perform such duty and is corrected on one occasion by this Court, and in relation to the same assessee, then, the least that was expected from the Tribunal was to follow the order and direction of this Court and abide by it even for this later assessment year.

iii) I f the same claim and which was dealt with by the Court earlier and for which the note of caution was issued, then, the Tribunal was bound in law to take due note of the same and follow the course for the later assessment years. We are of the view that the refusal of the Tribunal to follow the order of this Court and equally to correct its obvious and apparent mistake is vitiated as above. It is vitiated by a serious error of law apparent on the face of the record. The Tribunal has misdirected itself completely and in law in refusing to decide and consider the claim in relation to service charges.

iv) O rder of the Tribunal is set aside for reconsideration of the issue on service charges in accordance with law.”

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Housing projects: Deduction u/s. 80IB(10): A. Y. 2006-07: Limit on extent of commercial area of housing project inserted w.e.f. 01/04/2005 does not apply to projects approved before that date:

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CIT vs. M/s. Happy Home Enterprises (Bom); ITA No. 201 of 2012 dated 19-09-2014:

The following questions were raised in this appeal by the Revenue before the Bombay High Court.

“i) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law the Hon’ble Tribunal was right in allowing to the assessee company a deduction u/s. 80IB(10) of the Income-tax Act, for A. Y. 2006- 07 amounting to Rs. 2,11,74,864/- wherein the commercial area built by the assessee exceeded the limit specified in clause (d) to section 80IB(10) of the I. T. Act, 1961?

ii) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Hon’ble Tribunal was right in holding that the limits on commercial area provided in clause (d) to section 80IB(10) of the Act, would not be applicable even after 01-04-2005 as the projects were approved before that date even though no such exception is provided under the Income Tax Act?”

The High Court decided the questions in favour of the assessee and held as under:

“i) Clause (d) of section 80IB(10) is a condition that relates to and/or is linked with the approval and construction of the housing project and the Legislature did not intend to give any retrospectivity to it.

ii) A t the time when the housing project is approved by the local authority, it decides, subject to its own rules and regulations, what quantum of commercial area is to be included in the said project. It is on this basis that building plans are approved by the local authority and construction is commenced and completed. It is very difficult, if not impossible to change the building plans and/or alter construction midway, in order to comply with clause (d) of section 80IB(10).

iii) It would be highly unfair to require an assessee to comply with section 80IB(10)(d) who has got his housing project approved by the local authority, before 31-03-2005 and has either completed the same before the said date or even shortly thereafter, merely because the assessee has offered its profits to tax in A. Y. 2005-06 or thereafter.

iv) It would require the assessee to virtually do a humanly impossible task. This could never have been the intention of the Legislature and it would run counter to the very object for which these provisions were introduced, namely to tackle the shortage of housing in the country and encourage investment therein by private players.

v) I t is therefore clear that clause (d) of section 80IB(10) cannot have any application to housing projects that are approved before 31-03-2005.”

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Assessment – Best judgment assessment – Assessee not very educated person, not properly represented – Supreme Court refused to interfere with assessment but directed that no interest be recovered and no penalty proceedings be initiated.

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Tripal Singh and Anr. vs. CIT & Anr. [2014] 365 ITR 511 (sc)

The dispute before the Supreme Court related to the assessment year 1998-99. The petitioner-assessee failed to appear before the assessing authority which compelled the assessing authority to complete the assessment u/s. 144 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The said order is dated 29th December, 2005. The petitioner did not file any appeal, instead challenged the assessment order by filing a revision as provided for u/s. 264 of the Act before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Admn.), Muzaffarnagar. The memo of revision was dated 23rd May, 2006. The said revision was dismissed by the Commissioner of Income-tax on 25th March, 2008, as no one attended the office on the fixed date. Thereafter, an application to recall the said order was filed which was dated 9th June, 2008. The said application was dismissed by the order dated 26th October, 2010, on the short ground that there was no provision under the Income-tax Act for recalling the order passed u/s. 264 thereof. Feeling aggrieved, a writ petition was filed.

Before the High Court, Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that power to pass ex-parte order included the power to recall the same notwithstanding absence of any express provision in respect thereof. He further submitted that the Commissioner of Income-tax should have decided the revision on the merits even if the petitioner could not appear on the fixed date.

The High Court held that it was not necessary to examine the proposition as to whether the Commissioner of Incometax was right in rejecting the restoration application on the ground and on the facts of the present case that he does not possess power to recall the ex-parte order. According to the High Court, even assuming that the Commissioner had power to recall the ex-parte order on the merits, it did not find that the petitioner had been able to establish sufficient cause for his non-appearance on the date fixed. The assessment order was also passed ex parte. It appeared that the petitioner was never serious to pursue his remedies under the Act and filed the revision application as a chance petition and did not prosecute it. The High Court did not find any merit in the petition.

On further appeal, the Supreme Court observed that the facts were very peculiar in this case because the appellants, who were not very educated persons, unfortunately could not be properly represented before the Assessing Officer and, therefore, the assessment was made ex-parte for the assessment year 1998-99. The Supreme Court noted that so far as the subsequent assessment years were concerned, some relief was given to the appellants-assessees by the High Court, but so far as the assessment year 1998-99 is concerned, the assessment was over and the assessment order has become final. In these circumstances, the Supreme Court was of the view that it was not proper to interfere with the assessment order. However, it directed that no penalty proceedings would be initiated and no interest would be recovered from the appellants-assessees and that the amount of tax would be paid within 60 days and if the amount was not paid within 60 days, it would be open to the authorities to charge interest on the assessed tax.

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Accept the Vodafone decision with grace, make a new beginning!

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When one scans the morning papers one often reads about government officials acting high-handedly, irrationally and with blatant disregard for public interest. It was therefore heartening to note that the Attorney General of India had advised the government not to appeal against the decision of the Bombay High Court in Vodafone’s case. It is learnt that the CBDT chairman is of the view that the decision should be accepted. This is exactly the manner in which government officials holding high positions are expected to act. They must advise the government based on their expert knowledge of the subject and not tender that advice, which those who seek it want to hear.

When Mr. Modi assumed power at the end of May, his promise to the people was fair and equitable laws. In fact he has stated on a number of occasions that while new laws in the interest of the citizen needed to be enacted, several others which had clearly outlived their utility, and were causing unnecessary bottlenecks in the development process, needed to be annulled.

More than the complex and cumbersome laws, it is the irrational interpretation and implementation by overzealous tax officials that causes harassment to law abiding and diligent citizens. Indiscriminate additions in transfer pricing assessments is one such area. While undoubtedly, legislation in this regard was required as a large number of multinationals were shifting profits outside the country of source that is India. The object of transfer pricing legislation is to ensure that India got its fair share of tax. Unfortunately, the provisions are being treated as a revenue gathering measure with extreme interpretations and high-pitched assessments. This has created a great deal of uncertainty in the minds of the foreign investors. In fact, many transfer pricing assessments have virtually turned into tax terrorism. If the government does heed to the advice of its Attorney General, and accepts the decision of the Bombay High Court in the Vodafone case, then it will be a welcome step indeed.

While one must ensure that the unscrupulous do not get away, there needs to be a change in the mindset of officials that often tends to treat a taxpayer as a criminal. What is the need of the hour is fair laws, total transparency in legislating them, and administration of the enacted laws with a human face. A citizen would not mind paying a little higher tax if he were to be treated fairly. Those who interpret the law equitably must be encouraged. Whenever possible uncertainty must be removed. Safe harbour rules are a step in the right direction. Those, however. need to be realistic.

In the area of direct taxes, there are some provisions which treat a taxpayer unfairly. One set of them is relating to tax deduction at source. A majority of deductors discharge the obligation cast on them to deduct taxes diligently. In fact, the collection of taxes is the responsibility of the sovereign, which has been passed on to tax payers. Deduction of tax is therefore a service for which a person receives no payment. In such a situation, justice demands that as long a person acts bona fide, and discharges his obligation based on an honest interpretation of law, he must not be penalised. Similarly, in regard to the procedures for filing of statements, they must be streamlined and the processes be made more user-friendly. If the efficient discharge of this obligation can be appreciated in some mode that would be even better. So much for the deductor. As regards the recipient of income, once he establishes the fact that such tax has been withheld, then there must be a mechanism where after a due process of verification he is given credit for the same without him having to depend on the deductors filing a statement and completing all the processes. This is more so when the deductor is the government or a government undertaking. There are several instances where government departments have deducted tax but have not filed the statements. No action is taken in such cases.

Another area of grievance is adherence to timelines and efficient dispensation of justice in the tax field. While a taxpayer is required to comply with all the deadlines, in many cases there is not much of an obligation to act expeditiously on the tax administrator. While the tax payer is penalised for not acting within the time prescribed, there is no such penalty for the administrator. Whatever limitations and timelines are prescribed in the statute are for the lower end of the tax administration hierarchy. For instance, there is absolutely no time limit in which the first appellate authority needs to dispose of an appeal. There is also no timeline for disposal of the second appeal. There is no time line for disposing application u/s. 264. There may be administrative problems for which the citizen is not responsible. In this situation the hapless taxpayer is put to great hardship. Even when grievances are redressed the redress must be in substance and not in form. We often find orders passed in a cavalier manner so that the rounds of litigation increase. Each authority blames the lower one. Significant change in laws and procedures is necessary to achieve speedy dispensation of justice.

There are great expectations from the new government. At the time the Finance (No. 2) Bill, 2014 was introduced, the new Finance Minister had hardly any time to fulfil what was promised. The budget to be presented in February 2015 provides a great opportunity to this government to establish that it means business. It is time that the broom which has been thrown away by one political party in the capital is caught hold of by the Prime Minister and his men and all the cobwebs in the tax administration are cleaned. What citizens want is lesser laws but more justice.

The year 2014 is coming to an end. It has been the year in which change has occurred, and expectations are rising. One hopes that the year 2015 will see some of the dreams fulfilled.

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The Difficult Path

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“Two paths diverged in the woods. I took the one less travelled and that has made all the difference.”
–Robert Frost.

In life there are two paths. One is a well beaten path travelled upon by most of the people. It is an easy path. The journey on the same is comfortable. But at the end of the journey one, is at the same level as the one with which one started.

The other path is the one which is less travelled upon. It is difficult. It is uphill and one has to struggle to progress on this path. The end of the journey sees one at a far greater height. One may be breathless, but one would be very happy and satisfied.

The first one is called the “Preya” path in Upanishads; the second “Shreya”.

When one looks around, one finds that the present generation is better fed, better educated, lives longer, and is relatively healthier than the earlier ones. However, this is true only of the upper crust of the society. For most of the others, things have not improved. Most of them are poor and have no food, water, or shelter and no education. Closing our eyes to the problems and miseries of these people is selecting the first path. Deciding to work for them, committing our time, money and resources is the second path, the path less travelled upon. I, as at a very late age in my life decided to take the second path, and regret not having taken it earlier.

When I see the sufferings of my fellow beings, my heart bleeds. I do see around me several people who are well to do, but who are not doing anything to help the poor and needy. A question arises that though we are all good people, why do we not help? Why do we hesitate to take the second path? Those who hesitate can be divided in three different categories.

(1) The first set is of people are completely in oblivion of the plight of others. They are like Prince Siddharth before he became Gautam Buddha! They need to be awakened and made aware of the sufferings of the others.

(2) There are others who are vaguely aware of the situation but are not moved to help. Sufficient empathy has not arisen in their hearts for the suffering lot.

(3) The last class of people who are aware of the problem, who want to do something, but just do not know what to do? How to do? Where to start? They are helpless. They feel helpless.

For the first type of persons who are just unaware of the sufferings we have to make them see the sufferings of the poor. It is said that a picture is worth a thousand words. But a visit to any of these places where our poor and needy stay is worth a thousand pictures. If we can expose these people, particularly of the younger generation, to the sufferings of the poor, some of them are bound to be touched by what they see.

This applies equally to the second category of persons who lack empathy. Maybe a stronger dose of the same medicine will put them on the right path.

The third category of people is of persons who want to do, but do not know how. They have to be shown the work done with dedication without seeking rewards by our silent workers, our unsung heroes. This will give them direction and motivate them to start treading the path less travelled.

Friends, we are at a time in history when our country needs us. Quoting President Kennedy, “We have not to ask what our country would do for us, but ask ourselves what we can do for our country”. It is for us, the educated, the well to do, to make a difference in the lives of our poor and needy brethren. Let us leave our foot prints on the sands of time. Moreover, each one of us seeks happiness – nay – eternal happiness. This comes from serving the poor. Friends, let us take this path, though difficult, to live in happiness. To serve the poor is the highest form of spirituality – something which illuminates the human mind. But it is difficult. I would conclude by quoting from Kathopanishad:

“Like the sharp edge of a razor is that path, difficult to cross and hard to tread”

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 36 dated 16th October, 2014

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Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (FEMA) Foreign Exchange (Compounding Proceedings) Rules, 2000 (the Rules) – Compounding of Contraventions under FEMA, 1999

This circular states that powers of compounding have been further delegated to Regional Offices with immediate effect as under: –


Since three divisions of Foreign Investment Division (FID) viz. Liaison/Branch/Project office (LO/BO/ PO) division, Non Resident Foreign Account Division (NRFAD) and Immovable Property (IP) Division has been transferred to FED, CO Cell, Reserve Bank of India, 6, Sansad Marg, New Delhi – 110001 with effect from 15th July, 2014, the officers attached to the FED, CO Cell, New Delhi office are now authorised to compound the contraventions as under: –

The powers, as mentioned above, to compound contraventions have been delegated to all Regional Offices (except Kochi and Panaji) and FED, CO Cell, New Delhi respectively without any limit on the amount of contravention. Kochi and Panaji Regional offices can compound the above contraventions for amountof contravention below Rupees one hundred lakh (Rs.1,00,00,000/-). The contraventions of Rupees one hundred lakh (Rs.1,00,00,000/-) or more under the jurisdiction of Panaji and Kochi Regional Offices and all other contraventions of FEMA, not covered above, will continue to be compounded at Cell for Effective Implementation of FEMA (CEFA), Foreign Exchange Department, 5th floor, Amar Building, Sir P. M. Road, Fort, Mumbai 400001.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 35 dated 9th October, 2014

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Memorandum of Instructions for Opening and Maintenance of Rupee/Foreign Currency Vostro Accounts of Non-resident Exchange Houses

This circular has expanded the list of permitted transactions with respect to Vostro Accounts from 13 to 14. Accordingly, remittances to the Prime Minister’s National Relief Fund through the Exchange Houses is now permitted if the remittances are directly credited to the Fund by the banks and the banks maintain full details of the remitters. The revised list is as follows: –

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 34 dated 30th September, 2014

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Risk Management and Inter Bank Dealings : Hedging under Past Performance Route

Presently, resident importers can book contracts up to 50% of their eligible limit i.e., the average of the previous three financial years’ import turnover or the previous year’s actual import turnover, whichever is higher.

This circular has brought importers and exportors on par by pemitting resident importers to book forward contracts, under the past performance route, up to 100% of their eligible limit. Importers who have already booked contracts up to 50% of their eligible limit can book the forward contracts for difference arising as a result of the enhanced limits.

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SEBI corporate governance provisions further amended

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Background
SEBI had notified in April 2014 a fully revised Clause 49 (“the Clause”). This was immediately after the coming into force of corresponding provisions in the Companies Act, 2013, from 1st April, 2014. However, this new Clause 49 was to come into force from 1st October 2014. SEBI had issued earlier a Concept Paper to discuss proposed amendments consequent to enactment of the Companies Act, 2013, and was awaiting the provisions of that Act to come into effect. After having amended Clause 49, it had sought feedback from top 500 listed companies on issues they faced in implementing it. It had also otherwise generally sought suggestions. Based on such feedback, it made, on 15th September 2014, certain amendments to the revised Clause 49. The amendments are well in time considering that all, except one, of the provisions come into effect from 1st October, 2014. The revised Clause 49 was already discussed in an earlier article in this column. This article discusses the important amendments now made.

Applicability
Clause 49 applies to companies whose equity shares are listed on a recognised stock exchange. However, for the time being, the Clause shall not apply to following companies:-

1) Companies whose equity share capital is less than Rs. 10 crore and whose net worth is less than Rs. 25 crore. This position is with reference to the end of the previous financial year. If any of the limits are subsequently crossed, then the Company shall comply with the provisions within six months.

2) Companies whose equity shares are listed exclusively on SME and SME-ITP Platforms.

Woman Director
It was earlier required that the Board of Directors should have at least one woman director. This requirement, like other requirements, was to come into force from 1st October, 2014. It appears that SEBI has taken into account ground realities considering that it would be quite difficult for many companies to appoint a woman director by 1st October, 2014. Hence, the requirement is now amended to come into force from 1st April, 2015.

Note that no further qualifications are required for such woman director. She can be part of the Promoter Group. She can be an executive director. In particular, she need not be an Independent Director.

Independent Director – condition regarding pecuniary relationship
The “independence” of a director is judged, inter alia, with the fact whether he has or had in the past, pecuniary relationship with the Company or its holding or subsidiary companies or their Promoters or directors. Pecuniary relationship is commonly understood to be having monetary/ financial relationship.

The existing Clause provided that a person who had a pecuniary relationship in the current or two preceding financial years would not be an Independent Director. This obviously caused concern if a person had a negligible relationship which could not possibly affect his independence. Hence, now it is provided that there needs to be a material pecuniary relationship during the specified period with the specified person for a director to be said to have lost his independence.

What would constitute material has not been defined. Indeed, what constitutes a relationship is also not defined.

It also does not matter whether the relationship is or was at arm’s length and this is fair enough. A material pecuniary relationship does cast a shadow on independence.

Tenure of an Independent Director
There was a mismatch between the tenure specified under the Act and under the Clause. In particular, there was mismatch over whether the future tenure of an Independent Director could be reduced by the tenure he had already served in the past. The mismatch would have automatically resulted in a lower tenure for listed companies since in case of two provisions applicable, the stricter would have applied.

SEBI has amended the Clause to align its requirements to the Act. It has simply stated that the maximum tenure will be as per the Act and clarifications/circulars issued thereunder from time to time.

Disclosure of Independent Director’s terms of appointment
The existing Clause requires the Company to issue a formal letter of appointment to the Independent Director in the manner required under the Act. Further, this letter alongwith the profile of the Independent Director should be disclosed on the website of the Company and the stock exchanges.

The Clause has been amended in two aspects. Instead of the whole letter of appointment and the profile, only the terms and conditions of the appointment need to be disclosed. Further, such disclosure shall be only on the website of the Company.

The profile of the Independent Director does not have to be disclosed. Further, the requirement of formal letter of appointment does not apply to non-executive directors.

Training of Independent Directors
The Clause required that the Company should provide training to the Independent Directors to familiarise them with regard to the Company, their role, rights, responsibilities and certain other matters. The details of such training was required to be disclosed in the Annual report. Now, in a slight tweak to the requirement, it is required that the Company shall familiarise the Independent Directors for the same matters. Further, perhaps to save on printed pages, the information of training is now required to be given only in the website of the Company. The annual report will now give only the link to such information on the website. It is possible that the word training could have implied formal training conducted in classroom manner and hence the requirement was made less rigorous.

Chairman of Nomination and Remuneration Committee
The changed requirements now provide that the Chairman of the Company may be appointed as a member of the Nomination and Remuneration Committee. However, he cannot be Chairman of this Committee.

It may be recalled that this Committee is intended to be the screening, nomination and evaluation Committee for the Board, key managerial personnel etc.

Sale of shares/assets of subsidiaries
The Clause earlier provided that any sale of shares of a material subsidiary leading to reduction of holding to less than 50% should require a prior special resolution. Further, a similar approval was required for sale, disposal or leasing of more than 20% of the total assets of a material subsidiary. Now, an amendment provides for an exception to divestments made under a Scheme of arrangement that is duly approved by the Court/Tribunal.

Amendments related to related party transactions
There are several amendments made relating to related party transactions.

The definition of related parties has been seemingly narrowed and simplified but this is not wholly true. Earlier, the definition appeared to be quite extensive and covered several types of entities generally and specifically. Generally, persons who can control the other or have significant influence over the other were included. Having given this broad definition, certain parties were specifically included such as related parties as defined under the Act.

The amended definition has only two categories. One covers those parties as defined under the Act. Other covers those persons who are considered as related parties under applicable accounting standards. The definition under the Accounting Standards is wider and general. Hence, the list of related parties will continue to be broad.

The definition of material related party transactions has undergone a change. Earlier, a transaction or group of transactions would be material if they exceeded the higher of 5% of the annual turnover or 20% of the networth of the Company. Now, there are two changes. Firstly, the consolidated figures are used. Secondly, now there is only one criteria – the transactions would be treated as material if they exceed 10% of the annual consolidated turnover.

The definition of material related party transactions is relevant as such transactions need approval of the shareholders by way of a special resolution.

As a rule, all related parties transactions require prior approval of the Audit Committee. However, considering the fact that certain transactions may be of a similar nature and continuing throughout the year or frequent, a concept of omnibus approval has been provided for. The Audit Committee can grant such omnibus approval and then such transactions can be carried out without any further prior or post approval. However, there are certain conditions.

Firstly, the Audit Committee needs to satisfy itself that such transactions are needed and are in the interest of the Company.

The approval shall specify the name and of the related parties, the nature of the transaction, the period during which they may be carried out, and the indicative base price/current contracted price and the formula for variation if any. They may impose further conditions.

However, if the need cannot be anticipated or the details required are not available, the Audit Committee may still grant approval of upto Rs. 1 crore per transaction.

The Audit Committee would have to make a quarterly re-view of such transactions carried out pursuant to omnibus approval. The omnibus approval would have validity of one year. Related party transactions between two government companies will now not require approval of Audit Committee or of the shareholders by way of special resolution. There is a similar provision for transactions between a Company and its wholly owned subsidiary provided that the accounts are consolidated and placed before shareholders for approval.

A query had arisen regarding who can vote at the special resolution for approval of material related party transactions. It was earlier provided that “the related parties shall abstain from voting on such resolutions”. The question was where all entities that are related parties were barred from voting or whether only those related parties the transactions with whom were the subject of the special resolution. Now it is specifically clarified that all related parties are barred from voting, whether they are parties to such transaction or not.

    Conclusion

An attempt has been made to synchronise several of the requirements of Corporate Governance under the Act and under Clause 49. However, divergence remains in some areas. In case of listed companies to whom the Clause applies, such companies will have to comply with both. And in case of any overlap or contradiction, they will have to apply the narrower of the two provisions. Coupled with the requirements of e-voting which gives wider access to vot-ing to shareholders, the new requirements ensure much closer involvement of shareholders. Further, considering that (i) now a special resolution is required (ii) related parties are barred from voting, the shareholders have now an even greater say in case of related parties transactions. In these days of shareholder activism and vocal proxy advisory firms, related party transactions would particularly be under closer watch. All this augurs well for shareholder democracy in India and corporate discipline.

Section 8(1) (j) – Personal Information:

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A Few Facts of the case
The petitioner, Kashinath Shetye, was working as a junior engineer in the Electricity Department. The respondent no. 4, Dinsh Vaghela, applied to the Public Information Officer to supply information in respect of the petitioner on the following Electricity Department counts:

The information was in regard to the number of days of paid, unpaid sick, earned and casual leaves enjoyed by the petitioner.

The Public Information Officer gave notice to the petitioner to show cause as to why the information sought should not be supplied. The petitioner filed reply contending that the information being personal, should not be supplied and demanding or supplying of such information, would be an invasion of his privacy. The Public Information Officer i.e., the Superintendent Engineer, refused to supply the information on the ground that the department is exempted from supplying the information as it falls under clause (j) of section 8(1) of Right to Information Act. The respondent preferred appeal before the Chief Engineer, who dismissed the appeal. The appeal was preferred by him before the Goa Information Commissioner, which allowed the appeal and set aside the orders of the authorities below and directed that the information be supplied as sought. Hence, the petitioner has come up in writ petition.

The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the order is bad in law on two counts. (i) The information sought, is personal information and (ii) it invades the right of privacy and no larger public interest is involved.

The court noted:
The first thing that needs to be taken into consideration is that the petitioner is a public servant. When one becomes a public servant, every member of public gets a right to know about his working, his honesty, integrity and devotion to duty. In fact, nothing remains personal while as far as the discharging of duty. A public servant continues to be a public servant for all 24 hours. Therefore, any conduct /misconduct of a public servant even in private, ceases to be private. When, therefore, a member of a public, demands an information as to how many days leave were availed of by the public servant, such information though personal, has to be supplied and there is no question of privacy at all. Such supply of information, at the most, may disclose how sincere or insincere the public servant is in discharge of his duty and the public has a right to know.

“The next question is whether the applicant should be supplied the copies of the application at all. It was contended that the copies of the application should not be supplied for, they may contain the nature of the ailment and the applicant has no right to know about the ailment of the petitioner or his family. To my mind, what cannot be supplied is a medical record maintained by the family physician or a private hospital. To that extent, it is his right of privacy, it certainly, cannot be invaded. The application for leave is not a medical record at all. It, at the most, may contain ground on which leave was sought. It was contended that u/s. 8(1) (j), the information cannot be supplied. In this regard, it would be necessary to read proviso to that section. If the proviso is read, it is obvious that every citizen is entitled to have that information which the Parliament can have. It is not shown to me as to why the information as is sought, cannot be supplied to the Parliament. In fact, the Parliament has a right to know the ground for which a public servant has taken leave since his salary is paid from the public exchequer.”

In the circumstances, the court ruled that it does not find that the Information Commission committed any error in directing such information to be supplied. According to the court there was no substance in the writ petition, petition was dismissed.

[The High Court of Bombay at Goa: Writ petition No. 1 of 2009]

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Precedent – Reference to Full Bench – Cannot be made inview of larger Number of cases filed in subject matter. [Constitution of India Article 225.]

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Kalpana Rani vs. The State of Bihar AIR 2014 Patna 173 (FB)

The
reference had been made keeping in view the large number of cases filed
in the subject matter and not because the Bench did not agree with the
view expressed in the matter of Smt. Renu Kumari Pandey [(2011) (4) PLJR
297]. In the opinion of the Court, unless the latter Bench, for cogent
reasons, disagrees with the earlier view taken by the collateral Bench,
the question of referring the matter to a larger Bench shall not arise.
Reference can be had to the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in
the matter of Akhauri Krishna Kumar Sinha and Ors. vs. Mundrika Prasad
[MANU/BH/0108/1985 : 1986 PLJR 1119]. Nevertheless, as the Appeal has
come up for hearing before this Bench, the Appeal is heard and is
decided on merits.

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DCIT vs. Rajeev G. Kalathil ITAT Mumbai `D’ Bench Before Rajendra (AM) and Dr. S. T. M. Pavalan (JM) ITA No. 6727/Mum/2012 A.Y.: 2009-10. Decided on: 20th August, 2014. Counsel for revenue/assessee: J. K. Garg/Devendra Jain

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Section 28, 37 – Purchases cannot be disallowed, merely because the supplier is treated as a havala dealer by VAT authorities, if receipt of material is substantiated by delivery challan and other evidences and payment is by account payee cheque.

Facts:
In the course of assessment proceedings, the AO sent notices u/s. 133(6) to various parties at random. Of these, notices sent to two parties were returned unserved with the remarks not known. The AO asked the assessee to furnish correct address or explain why purchases of Rs. 13,69,417 (Rs. 5,05,259 from NBE and Rs. 8,64,158 from DKE) should not be treated as bogus purchases.

The assessee furnished its reply expressing inability to establish contact with the parties but furnished letter from its banker stating that the payment has been made to the two parties in subsequent year. Sample bills were also filed which had TIN Numbers.

The AO verified the TIN numbers from the official website and found that NBE was specifically mentioned as `Hawala Dealer’ and the search for DKE did not show any result. He, accordingly, added Rs. 13.69 lakh to total income of the assessee on account of bogus purchases.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) and contended that suppliers were registered dealers and were carrying proper VAT registration; bills were accounted and payments were made by cheque; certificate from banker giving details of payments made to said parties were furnished; copies of consignment note received from government approved transport contractor showing material was delivered at site were furnished to the AO; some of the items purchased from these parties were reflected in closing stock. The CIT(A) allowed the appeal.

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The AO made addition because one of the supplier was declared a havala dealer by VAT Department. According to the Tribunal, this could be a good starting point for making further investigation and to take it to logical end. Suspicion of highest degree cannot take place of evidence. According to the Tribunal, the AO could have called for details of bank accounts of suppliers to find out whether there was any immediate cash withdrawl from their account. It observed that transportation of goods to the site is one of the deciding factors to be considered for resolving the issue. It noted the finding of fact given by CIT(A) that some of the goods received were forming part of closing stock.

The Tribunal held that the decision of the Mumbai Tribunal in the case of Western Extrusion Industries (ITA /6579/ Mum/2010 dated 13-11-2013) was distinguishable since in that case there was no evidence of movement of goods and also cash was withdrawn by the supplier immediately from the bank.

This ground of appeal filed by the revenue was dismissed.

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Precedent – Binding nature – Reference to Full Bench – Co-ordinate Bench cannot decide appeal on merits by taking contrary view.

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Jagadish Deka vs. The State of Assam & Ors. AIR 2014 Gauhati 143.

Once a decision was rendered by one Division Bench in one appeal arising out of common order, a fortiorari, such decision was binding on another Division Bench (whether consisting of the same Judges or other) to avoid passing of 2 conflicting orders in one case. If for any reason, the later Division Bench did not agree to the view taken by the earlier Division Bench, then it had no option but to refer the matter to a larger bench (Full Bench) to resolve the conflict, after setting out the reasons for their disagreement and the area of difference. The later Division Bench had no jurisdiction to decide the appeal on merits by taking contrary view except to follow the reasoning and the conclusion arrived at by the earlier Division Bench and if they formed an opinion to take a contrary view then it was obligatory on the Division Bench to make a reference to the larger Bench and if they formed an opinion to take a contrary view then it was obligatory on the Division Bench to make a reference to the larger Bench to resolve the conflict. The jurisdiction to take a contrary view or/and to declare the decision “per incuriam” was with the Full Bench on a reference made by the later Division Bench and lastly: since no one brought the earlier decision to the notice of later Divison bench, a situation had arisen where a judgment came to be passed, which is in conflict with the earlier Division Bench judgment. Therefore, it has to be held as per incuriam.

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Raj Kumari Agarwal vs. DCIT ITAT, Agra Pramod Kumar (A.M.) and Joginder Singh (J.M.) I.T.A. No.: 176/Agra/2013 Assessment Year: 2008-09. Decided on July 18th, 2014 Counsel for Assessee/Revenue: Arvind Kumar Bansal/S D Sharma

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Section 57(iii) – Interest paid on loan taken against fixed deposit is deductible against interest earned on the fixed deposit.

Facts:
During the course of the assessment proceedings, the AO noticed that the assessee had made a fixed deposit of Rs. 1 crore with abank and earned interest of Rs 11.78 lakh thereon. However, whilecomputing the income from other sources, the assessee claimed a deduction of Rs. 4.37 lakh on account of interest paid on loan of Rs 75 lakh taken on the securityof deposits. When asked to justify this deduction, the assessee submitted that she needed her funds, as she had to give money to her son and with a view toavoid premature encashment of the fixed deposits, which wouldhave resulted in net loss to her, she took a loan against fixed deposit so as to keepthe fixed deposit intact and earn the interest income thereon. It was contended thatthe interest of Rs. 4.37 lakh paid on the borrowings from the Bank against security of fixed deposit, was thus made for the purpose of earning FDR interest. The AO rejected the claim of deduction observing that interest onloan has not been laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose ofmaking or earning income from FDR. On appeal the CIT(A) upheld the order of the AO.

Before the Tribunal, the assessee also justified her claim with the working showing that she has returned higher interest income of Rs. 7.41 lakh (Rs. 11.78 lakh minus Rs. 4.37 lakh paid) while if she had encashed the FDR then the interest income from FDR would had beenat lower sum of Rs. 5.38 lakh.

Held:
According to the Tribunal, the question that needs to be adjudicated was whether interest paid can be said to have been incurred “wholly and exclusively” for the purpose of earning interest income from fixed deposits.For this purpose, it referred to a decision by the coordinate bench of its own Tribunal in the case of AjaySingh Deol vs. JCIT [(91 ITD 196). Relying thereon, it observed that even in a situation in which proximate or immediate cause of an expenditure was an event unconnected to earning of the income, in the sense that the expenditure was not triggered by the objective to earn that income, but the expenditure was, nonetheless, wholly and exclusively to earn or protect that income,it will not cease to be deductible in nature (emphasis supplied). According to it, in order to protect the interest earnings from fixed deposits and to meet her financial needs, when an assessee raises a loan against the fixed deposit, so as to keep the source of earning intact, the expenditure so incurred is wholly and exclusively to earn the fixed deposit interest income. It further observed that the assessee could have gone for premature encashment of bank deposits, and thus ended the source of income itself as well, but instead of doing so, she resorted to borrowings against the fixed deposit and thus preserved the source of earning. The expenditure so incurred, according to the tribunal was an expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively for earning from interest on fixed deposits.

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ACIT vs. Iqbal M Chagala ITAT Mumbai “I” Bench Before Vijay Pal Rao (J.M.) and Rajendra (A. M.) ITA No. 877/Mum/2013 Assessment Year 2009-10. Decided on 30/07/2014 Counsel for Revenue/Assessee: Garima Singh/P J Pardiwala

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Section 14A and Rule 8D – Application of the Rule is not automatic. Disallowance cannot exceed the expenditure claimed and if no expenditure is claimed by the assessee then disallowance cannot be made

Facts:
During the assessment proceedings, the AO noted that the assessee had earned exempt income and the audit report did not show disallowance of any expenses relating to exempt income. According to the assessee, the investment transaction undertaken by him were managed by the investment advisors whose fees amounting to Rs. 5.64 lakh had been debited to the capital account of the assessee. Plus, demat expenses and security transaction tax amounting to Rs. 2.2 lakh was also debited to the capital account of the assessee. However, the AO held that looking into the fact that partof the expenses on account of salary, telephone and other administrative expenses must have been related to the activities for earning exempt income, he disallowed the sum of Rs. 16.36 lakh, being 0.5% of average investment of Rs. 32.72 crore.

On perusal of Profit and Loss Account of the assessee the CIT(A) noted that the assessee had not made any claim of expenditure incurred in relation to exempt income, therefore according to him, the provisions of section 14A (1) r.w.s.14A(2) were not attracted. Therefore, relying on the cases of Walfort Shares & Stock Brokers Pvt. Ltd.(326 ITR 1) and Godrej & Boyce Manufacturing Co. Ltd (328 ITR 81) he deleted the disallowance of Rs.16.36 lakh made by the AO.

Held:
The tribunal noted that as per the audit report filed by the assessee, expenses in respect of exempt income was Rs. Nil and the assessee had debited all expenses relating to exempt income in the capital account. The AO had merely presumed that the assessee must have incurred someexpenditure under the heads salary, telephone and other administrative charges for earning theexempt income. Further, it was noted that that the total expenditure claimed by the assessee for the year was about Rs. 13 lakh and the AO had made a disallowance of about Rs.16 lakh. According to it, the AO had just adopted the formula of estimating expenditure on the basis of investments. But, the justification for calculating the disallowance was missing. The onus was on the AO to prove that out of the expenditure incurred under various heads part related to earning of exempt income. Not only thatthe AO was required to give the basis of calculation. In any manner disallowance of Rs.16.36 lakh, as against the total expenditure of Rs.13 lakh claimed by the assessee was not justified. Provisions of Rule 8D cannot and should not be applied in a mechanical way. Facts of the case have to be analysed before invoking them. Accordingly, the appeal filed by the AO was dismissed and the order of the CIT(A) was confirmed.

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[2014] 149 ITD 363 (Agra) Rajeev Kumar Agarwal vs. Addl CIT A.Y. 2006-07 Order dated – 29th May, 2014

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Section 40(a)(ia) – Second proviso to section 40(a) (ia), which states that if assessee fails to deduct tax at source while making payments but the recipient has included the income embedded in the said payments in his tax return furnished u/s. 139 and had also paid the tax due thereon on such payments, then disallowance of such payments u/s. 40(a)(ia) cannot be invoked for assessee; has retrospective effect from 01-04-2005.

Facts:
The assessee had made interest payments without discharging his tax withholding obligations u/s. 194A. Therefore, the Assessing Officer disallowed payment u/s. 40(a)(ia).

The assessee contended that, in view of the insertion of second proviso to section 40(a)(ia) by the Finance Act, 2012, and in view of the fact that the recipients of the interest had already included the income embedded in the said interest payments in their tax returns filed u/s. 139, disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) could not be invoked in this case.

He also contended that since the said second proviso to section 40(a)(ia) is ‘declaratory and curative in nature’, it should be given retrospective effect from 01-04-2005, being the date from which sub-clause (ia) of section 40(a) was inserted by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2004.

Held:
The scheme of section 40(a)(ia) is aimed at ensuring that an expenditure should not be allowed as deduction in the hands of an assessee in a situation in which income embedded in such expenditure has remained untaxed due to tax withholding lapses by the assessee.

Section 40(a)(ia) is not a penalty for tax withholding lapse but it is a sort of compensatory deduction restriction to compensate for the loss of revenue for an income going untaxed due to tax withholding lapse. The penalty for tax withholding lapse per se is separately provided for in section 271C, and section 40(a)(ia) does not add to the same Thus, disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) cannot be invoked in a case, where assessee fails to deduct tax at source but recipients have taken, in their computation of income, the income embedded in the payments made by the assessee, paid taxes due thereon and filed income tax returns in accordance with the law.

The provisions of section 40(a)(ia), as they existed prior to insertion of second proviso thereto, went much beyond the obvious intentions of the lawmakers and created undue hardships even in cases in which the assessee’s tax withholding lapses did not result in any loss to the exchequer. Now that the legislature has been compassionate enough to cure these shortcomings of provision and, thus, obviate the unintended hardships, such an amendment in law, in view of the well-settled legal position to the effect that a curative amendment to avoid unintended consequences is to be treated as retrospective in nature even though it may not state so specifically, the insertion of second proviso to section 40(a)(ia) must be given retrospective effect from the point of time when the related legal provision was introduced.

Accordingly, the insertion of second proviso to section 40(a)(ia) is declaratory and curative in nature and it has retrospective effect from 01-04-2005, being the date from which sub-clause (ia) of section 40(a) was inserted by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2004.

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[2014] 149 ITD 169 (Hyderabad) Binjusaria Properties (P) Ltd vs. ACIT A.Y. 2006-07 Order dated- 4th April, 2014

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Section 2(47) of The Income-tax Act, 1961 Where assessee enters into a development agreement of land with a developer in terms of which developer has to develop property and deliver a part of constructed area to assessee, capital gains cannot be brought to tax in year of signing of development agreement if developer does not do anything to discharge obligations cast on it and it is only upon receipt of consideration in the form of developed area by the assessee in terms of the development agreement, the capital gains becomes assessable in the hands of the assessee.

Facts:

• The assesee gave its plot of Land for development and had received a refundable deposit in the relevant year. According to Development Agreement-cum-General Power of Attorney, the developer had to develop the property, according to the approved plan from the competent authority, and deliver to the assessee 38% of the constructed area in the residential part.

• No development activity was carried out by the developer in the year of the agreement and accordingly, assessee did not offer the sum for tax.

• The Assessing Officer was of the view that, in terms of the development agreement, the transfer has taken place during the year under appeal and the assessee was liable to pay capital gain taxes on the date of transfer.

• The CIT (A) confirmed the view of assessing officer and, therefore aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
• Tribunal observed the following:-

The assessee has executed a ‘Development Agreement- cum-General Power of Attorney’ which indicates that the assessee has given a permissive possession to developer.

The refundable deposit received by the assessee is to be refunded on the complete handing over of the area falling to the share of the assessee and in the event of the failure on the part of the assesee, the same shall be adjusted at the time of final delivery.

It is undisputed that there is no development activity carried out in the said relevant year. Even the approval of plan was not obtained and the process of construction has not been initiated.

• Considering specific clauses in the agreement, all abovementioned facts and circumstances and the reading of section 2(47)(v) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 alongwith section 53A of The Transfer of property Act, 1882, Tribunal held that the assessee had fulfilled its part of obligation under the development agreement but the developer had not done anything to discharge the obligations cast on it under the development agreement, the capital gains could not be brought to tax in the year under appeal, merely on the basis of signing of the development agreement .

It is only upon receipt of consideration in the form of developed area by the assessee in terms of the development agreement, the capital gains becomes assessable in the hands of the assessee.

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TDS: Salary: S/s. 192 and 201 of I. T. Act, 1961: A. Y. 2008-09: Consultant doctors employed by hospital: No administrative control: Doctors free to come at any time and treat patients: No provision for payment of provident fund and gratuity: No employer and employee relationship: Payment to doctors is not salary: Section 192 for TDS is not applicable:

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CIT vs. Yashoda Super Speciality Hospital; 365 ITR 356 (AP):

For the A. Y. 2008-09, orders u/ss. 201 and 201(1A) were passed treating the assessee hospital as an assessee in default for non deduction of tax at source u/s. 192 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 holding that the payments made by the assessee to the consultant doctors was salary. The Tribunal held that there was no employer employee relationship between the assessee and the consultant doctors and accordingly such payments did not constitute salary paid by the assessee. The Tribunal therefore set aside the said orders.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Andhra Pradesh High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) O n the facts and on examining the agreement between the consultant doctors and the assessee hospital under which the services of the doctors were engaged, the appellate authorities found that there was no relationship of employer and employee between the doctors and the hospital. The doctors were not administratively controlled and managed by the assessee and they were free to come at any point of time as far as their attendance was concerned and treat the patients. There was no provision for payment of provident fund and gratuity to them.

ii) T he only clause in the agreement was that the doctors could not take up any other assignment. The existence of one prohibitory clause did not change the basic character of the relationship between the assessee and the doctors concerned. There was no employer and employee relationship. And their payments could not be treated to be salaries and, as such, deduction of tax at source did not need to be made u/s. 192.

iii) O n a careful reading of the impugned judgment and order of the Tribunal, we are of the view that the law has been correctly applied. Therefore, we do not find any question of law involved in the matter. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.”

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Industrial undertaking: Manufacture: Deduction u/s. 80-IB: A. Ys. 2004-05 to 2007-08: Assessee buying monitor, key board, mouse etc. and assembling them and selling computers so assembled: Activity is manufacturing activity: Assessee is entitled to deduction u/s. 80-IB:

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CIT vs. Sai Infosystem India P. Ltd.; 365 ITR 433 (Guj):

The assessee bought basic computer items such as monitor, key board, mouse, etc., and was into the activity of assembling them. The assessee claimed deduction u/s. 80-IB of the Income-tax Act, 1961. For the A. Ys. 2004-05 to 2007-08, the Assessing Officer disallowed the claim holding that the activity of the assessee could not be said to be manufacturing activity so as to enable the assessee to claim the deduction. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

In appeal by the Revenue, the Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) T he Tribunal had rightly deleted the disallowance of deduction u/s. 80-IB made by the Assessing Officer. There was a specific finding of the Commissioner(Appeals) that the assessee had employed at least ten persons. This was a finding of fact and it could not be said that the assessee was not entitled to deduction u/s. 80-IB of the Act.

ii) T he questions raised in the present tax appeals are held against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee. Consequently, the tax appeals are dismissed.”

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Charitable purpose: Education: Exemption u/s. 11 r/w. s. 2(15): A. Y. 2009-10: Assessee-association conducting various continuing education diploma and Certificate Programmes, Management Development Programmes, Public Talks, Seminars, Workshops and Conferences: Assessee’s activities would fall within realm of education which is ‘charitable’ as per section 2(15): Proviso is not applicable: Assessee is entitled to exemption u/s. 11:

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DIT(E) vs. Ahmedabad Management Association: 366 ITR 85 (Guj): 47 taxmann.com 162 (Guj):

The assessee, a public charitable trust, was dedicated to pursue the objects of continuing education, training and research on various facets of management and related areas. It claimed exemption u/s. 11 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on ground that it undertook multifaceted activities comprising of conducting various continuing education diploma and certificate programmes, management development programmes, public talks, seminars, workshops and conferences which falls in the realm of “education” as the charitable purpose. For the A. Y. 2009- 10, the Assessing Officer observed that considering the nature of courses, its durations and resultant surplus from each activity, the activity of the assessee is not educational in nature. The Assessing Officer held that activities of assessee fell within scope of amendment of ‘advancement of any other object of general public utility and any other activity’ of section 2(15) and, since the aggregate value of receipts were more than Rs. 10 lakh, proviso to section 2(15) was applicable and the assessee was not entitled for exemption u/s. 11. The Tribunal had held that the activities of the assessee were in the field of education and, therefore, the assessee was eligible for exemption u/s. 11.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) I t is required to be noted that all throughout for the previous years, right from the A. Y. 1995-96 till A. Y. 2008-09 the revenue has considered the activities of the assessee as educational activity and has granted the benefit u/s. 11.

ii) H owever, subsequently and w.e.f. A. Y. 2009-10, proviso to section 2(15) has been added and section 2(15) has been amended by the Finance Act, 2008 by adding the proviso which states that the ‘advancement of any other object of general public utility’ shall not be a charitable purpose if it involves the carrying on of (a) any activity in the nature of trade, commerce or business; or (b) any activity of rendering any service in relation to any trade, commerce or business for cess or fee or any other consideration, irrespective of the nature of use or application, or retention of the income from such activity. The revenue has denied the exemption claimed by the assessee u/s. 11 mainly relying upon the amended section 2(15) by submitting that the case of the assessee would fall under the fourth limb of the definition of ‘charitable purpose’ i.e., ‘advancement of any other object of general public utility’ and, therefore, the assessee shall not be entitled to exemption from tax u/s. 11.

iii) T he activities of the assessee such as continuing education diploma and certificate programme; management development programme; public talks and seminars and workshops and conferences etc., is educational activities and/or is in the field of education.

iv) O n fair reading of section 2(15) the newly inserted proviso to section 2(15) will not apply in respect of relief to the poor; education or medical relief. Thus, where the purpose of a trust or institution is relief of the poor; education or medical relief, it will constitute ‘charitable purpose’ even if it incidentally involves the carrying on of the commercial activities.

v) I n the present case, the activities of the assessee would fall within the definition of ‘charitable purpose’ as per section 2(15) and, therefore, would be entitled to exemption u/s. 11.”

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Capital gain: Slump sale or exchange: S/s. 2(42C) and 50B: A. Y. 2005-06: Transfer of division of undertaking in exchange for issue of preference shares and bonds: No monetary consideration: Exchange and not a sale: Not a slump sale:

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CIT vs. Bharat Bijlee Ltd.; 365 ITR 258 (Bom):

In the relevant year, the asessee transferred its lift field operations undertaking to one T under the scheme of arrangement as approved by the Court in exchange for issue of preference shares and bonds. The assessee claimed that it is a case of exchange and not a case of slump sale attracting the provisions of section 50B of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Assessing Officer rejected the claim of the assessee and held that the transaction squarely fell within the definition of “slump sale” in section 2(42C) and was taxable in terms of section 50B of the Act. The Tribunal held that a reading of the clauses in the scheme of arrangement showed that the transfer of the undertaking had taken place in exchange for issue of preference shares and bonds. The scheme did not refer to any monetary consideration for the transfer. It was a case of exchange and not a sale. Therefore, section 2(42C) was inapplicable and section 50B was also inapplicable.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) I n the given facts and circumstances and going by the clauses of the scheme of arrangement and reading them harmoniously and together, the Tribunal had held that the transfer of the lift division came within the purview of section 2(47) but could not be termed as a slump sale.

ii) This finding of fact could not be said to be perverse or based on no material. It also could not be said to be vitiated by an error of law apparent on the face of the record.

iii) We do not find any merit in the appeal. It is accordingly dismissed.”

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Business expenditure: TDS: Disallowance: S/s. 9, 40(a)(i) and 195: A. Y. 2009-10: Commission paid by the assessee to the non-resident agent for procuring orders for leather business from overseas buyers – wholesalers or retailers: Services rendered by non-resident agent can at best be called as a service for completion of export commitment: Services provided by non-resident agent are not technical services: Assessee is not liable to deduct tax at source when the nonresident agent provides servi<

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CIT vs. Faizan Shoes P. Ltd.; [2014] 48 taxmann.com 48 (Mad):

The assessee is a company engaged in the business of manufacture and export of articles of leather. In the course of business, the assessee entered into an Agency Agreement with a non-resident agent to secure orders from various customers, including retailers and traders, for the export of leather shoe uppers and full shoes by the assessee. As per the terms of the Agency Agreement, the business will be transacted by opening letters of credit or by cash against document basis. The non-resident agent will be responsible for prompt payment in respect of all shipments effected on cash against document basis. The assessee undertook to pay commission of 2.5% on FOB value on all orders procured by the non-resident agent. For the A. Y. 2009-10, the Assessing Officer disallowed the claim for deduction of the said commission relying on the provisions of section 40(a)(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for non-deduction of tax at source u/s. 195 of the Act. The Commissioner(Appeals) and the Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim. The Tribunal observed that the non-resident agent was only procuring orders for the assessee and following up payments and no other services are rendered, and accordingly held that the nonresident agent was not providing any technical services to the assessee. The Tribunal also held that the commission payment made to non-resident agent does not fall under the category of royalty or fee of technical services and, therefore, the Explanation to section 9(2) of the Act has no application to the facts of the assessee’s case. The Tribunal, therefore held that the commission payments to non-resident agents are not chargeable to tax in India and, therefore, the provisions of section 195 of the Act are not applicable.

On appeal by the Revenue, Madras High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) T he services rendered by the non-resident agent can at best be called as a service for completion of the export commitment and would not fall within the definition of “fees for technical services”, we are of the firm view that Section 9 of the Act is not applicable to the case on hand and consequently, section 195 of the Act does not come into play.

ii) We find no infirmity in the order of the Tribunal in confirming the order of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals).

iii) I n the result appeal is dismissed.”

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Business expenditure: Section 36(1)(ii): A. Y. 2006-07: Commission paid to directors for providing personal guarantee to bank as precondition for grant of credit facilities cannot be disallowed stating that otherwise it would have been payable to the directors as dividend;

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Control and Switchgear Contractors Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT; 365 ITR 312 (Del):

In the A. Y. 2006-07, the assessee company had claimed deduction of Rs. 24,37,500/- being commission paid to the directors for providing personal guarantees to the bank for grant of credit facilities to the company. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim for deduction holding that the same would have been otherwise payable to the directors as dividend. The Tribunal upheld the disallowance. Assessee’s rectification application was rejected by the Tribunal.

The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee, reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The directors having provided personal guarantees had acted beyond the call of duty as employees of the assessee. It was not within the jurisdiction of the Assessing Officer to impose his views with regard to the necessity or the quantum of the expenditure undertaken by the assessee. The Assessing Officer had only to determine whether the transactions were genuine or real.

ii) The directors would not be entitled to receive the amount paid to them as commission, as dividends because even if it was assumed that non-payment of commission would add to the kitty of distributable profits these would have to be distributed pro rata to all the shareholders and not selectively to the directors. Dividend is paid by a company as distribution of profits to its shareholders in the ratio of their shareholding in the company. The directors were not the only shareholders of the company and, therefore, in the event the commission had not been paid by the assessee it could not have been distributed to them as dividend.

iii) The writ petition is allowed. The said disallowance and the additions made on this count are set aside.”

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Agent of non-resident: Section 163: A. Y. 2003- 04: Where a person in respect of whom agent is sought to be made a representative assessee, does not attain status of non-resident during relevant accounting period, provisions of section 163 cannot be invoked in such a case:

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Comverse Networks Systems India (P.) Ltd. vs. CIT; [2014] 48 taxmann.com 1 (Delhi)

One F was an employee with the petitioner. In respect of the A. Y. 2003-04, which is relevant in this case, the said F had filed the return of income and was assessed in the status of “Resident & Ordinarily Resident”. On 16/03/2010, the ACIT issued a notice u/s. 163(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 proposing to treat the petitioner as the representative agent of F for the A. Y. 2003-04. In reply, the petitioner stated that F was not a non-resident in the A. Y. 2003-04 and accordingly that the petitioner could not be treated as a representative agent of F u/s. 163(1)(c) of the Act and, therefore, the petitioner requested the ACIT to drop the proceedings. The ACIT did not agree with the submissions of the petitioner and passed an order dated 31.01.2011 treating the petitioner as the agent of F u/s. 163 of the Act for the A. Y. 2003-04. The Commissioner rejected the revision application made by the petitioner u/s. 264 of the Act.

The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the petitioner and held as under:

“i) S ection 160(1)(i) of the said Act makes it clear that the expression “representative assessee” has to seen “in respect of the income of a non-resident”. It is obvious that when we construe the expression “income of a non-resident” it has reference to income in a particular previous year/accounting year. The income of that year must be of a non-resident. If that be so, the agent of the non-resident or the deemed agent u/s. 163 of the said Act would be the representative assessee. The petitioner is not an agent of F.

ii) S ection 163(1)(c) talks about the person from or through whom the non-resident “is in receipt of any income, whether directly or indirectly”. The income bears reference to the accounting year for which the statutory agent is to be appointed. In the present case, the year in question is the year ended on 31-03-2003. During that year F was not a nonresident. Therefore, the petitioner cannot even be regarded as a deemed agent u/s. 163(1)(c) of the Act. Consequently, the petitioner cannot be considered to be the representative assessee of F in respect of the A. Y. 2003-04.

iii) T he writ petition is allowed and the impugned order is set aside.”

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Income: Deemed dividend: Section 2(22)(e): Advance or loan to a shareholder: Section 2(22) (e) cannot be invoked where the assessee is not a shareholder in the lending company:

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CIT vs. Impact Containers Pvt. Ltd.(Bom); ITA No. 114 of 2012 dated 04/07/2014:

The Assessing Officer found that the assessee company had received loans from a company and also found that the assessee had shareholding in a company which had controlling interest in the lending company. The Assessing Officer applied the provisions of section 2(22)(e) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and held that the loan received by the assessee is deemed dividend u/s. 2(22)(e) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and made the addition accordingly. The Tribunal found that the assessee company was not a shareholder of the lending company and therefore, by following the decision of the Special Bench in the case of ACIT vs. Bhaumik Colour Pvt. Ltd.; 313 ITR(AT ) 146 (Mum)(SB) deleted the addition.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) T he consistent view taken is that if the words as noted by us herein-above have been inserted in the definition so as to make reference to the beneficial owner of the shares, still the definition essentially covers the payment to the shareholder and the position of the shareholder as noted in the Supreme Court’s decision, cannot undergo any change. That legal position and the status of the shareholder being same, we do not see how the view prevailing from CIT vs. C. P. Sarthy; 83 ITR 170 (SC) is in any way said to be changed. That is how all the judgments subsequent thereto have been rendered.

ii) We have noted that the Delhi High Court, even after exhaustive amendment to section 2(22)(e) held that the payment made to any concern would not come within the purview of this sub-clause so long as it contemplated shareholders. The Division Bench of Delhi High Court has made detailed reference to all the decisions in the field. It has also referred to the order passed by the Special Bench of the Tribunal in arriving at the same conclusion.

iii) In CIT vs. Ankitech Pvt. Ltd.; 340 ITR 14(Del), The Hon’ble Delhi High Court referred to both Sarathi Mudaliar and Rameshwarlal Sanwarmal, extensively. It also referred to the arguments of the Revenue which are somewhat similar to those raised before us. It is in dealing with these arguments that the Division Bench concluded that all the three limbs of the section analysed in CIT vs. Universal Medicare; 324 ITR 263 (Bom) denote the intention that closely held companies in which public are not substantially interested which are controlled by a group of members, even though having accumulated profits would not distribute such profits as dividend because if so distributed the dividend income would become taxable in the hands of the shareholders. Instead of distributing accumulated profits as dividend, companies distribute them as loan or advances to shareholders or to concerns in which such shareholders have substantial interest or make any payment on behalf of or for the individual benefit of such shareholders. In such an event, by the deeming provision, such payment by the company is treated as dividend. The purpose is to tax dividend in the hands of the shareholder.

iv) We do not see how such a view taken by the Delhi High Court and which reaffirms that of this Court in Universal Medicare can be said to be contrary to the legal fiction or the intent or purpose of the legislature in enacting it.

v) We are of the view that so long as the Tribunal holds that the assessee company is not a shareholder in any of the entities which have advanced and lent sums, then, the addition is required to be deleted.”

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[2014] 35 S.T.R. 351 (Tri. – Ahmd.) S.V. Jiwani vs. Commissioner of Central Excise & S.T.

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Provisions of Rule 2(A) of the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006 applicable only when value cannot be determined u/s. 67(1)(2)(3) of the Finance Act and Rule 3(1) of the Works Contract (Composition Scheme for Payment of Service Tax) Rules, 2007 is optional.

Facts:
Appellant were awarded a contract for setting up plant and service tax was discharged on the entire value of the contract under works contract service and CENVAT Credit was availed on inputs and input services. Department contended that under works contact services there is no option to pay tax at the full rate and thus the availment and utilisation of CENVAT Credit was incorrect.

Held:
The expression “subject to the provisions of section 67” under Rule 2A of the Valuation Rules means that if value of services involved in execution of works contract service cannot be determined u/s. 67 then only Rule 2A would apply. Rule 3(1) of the Composition Rules is merely an option provided to discharge the service tax liability and hence CENVAT Credit on inputs and input services is available since tax has been discharged @ full rate on the entire value of the contract u/s. 67 being a statutory provision of the Act.

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[2014] 36 S.T.R. 545 (Tri.-Del) Gurmehar Construction vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Raipur

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Following Bhayana Builders free supply of material by the service recipient is not includible in the gross value of taxable service. Interest is not chargeable when CENVAT Credit is reversed before utilisation.

Facts:
The Appellant received free supply of diesel from the service recipient for rendering taxable service. The department included the value of free supplies in the assessable value u/s. 67 of the Finance Act. Further interest was demanded on wrong availment of CENVAT Credit which was reversed without utilisation.

Held:
Tribunal relying on the decision of the larger bench in the case of Bhayana Builders Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner, Service Tax, held value of free supplies is not includible in the gross amount charged. Relying on the decision of Karnataka High Court in the case of Bill Forge Pvt. Ltd 2012 (26) S.T.R. 204 (Kar), where the Court taking due note of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Ind-Swift Laboratories Ltd. 2012(25) S.T.R. 184 (S.C.) concluded “that Interest is compensatory in character and is imposed on an assessee who has withheld payment of any tax as and when it is due and payable” the Tribunal held that interest is not chargeable when CENVAT Credit was reversed without utilisation.

Note: It was noted by the Tribunal, the decision of the CESTAT, Mumbai in the case of Balmer Lawrie & Co. Ltd 2014 (301) E.L.T. 573 (Tri.) distinguishing the decision of the Karnataka High Court that when a judgment is sought to be distinguished, the difference in the facts should be such so as to have a material effect on the findings contained in the judgment. The Bench further stated that they are legally bound by the decision of the Karnataka High Court in absence of any judgment to the contrary of any other Court equivalent or superior to it.

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[2014] 36 STR 83 (Tri.-Mum.) Samarth Sevabhavi Trust vs. Commr. Of C. Ex., Aurangabad

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Activity of harvesting and transporting sugarcane does not amount to provision of supply of manpower services. Demand cannot be confirmed on the basis of wrong understanding of the Appellants or any other person i.e. merely because the Appellants had agreed that the activity to be classified as supply of manpower services in the statement recorded, the same cannot be taken as a base to confirm service tax demand.

Facts:
The farmers had contracted with the sugar factory for the sale of sugarcane. The Appellant entered into an agreement for cutting/harvesting sugarcane and transporting the same from field to factory. There was an arrangement with truck owners and their labourers to harvest sugarcane and transport it to the factory who agreed to pay charges on the basis of tonnage of sugarcane supplied. It paid commission to contractors as a percentage of harvesting and transportation charges. All the payments were first received by the Appellant and distributed to the contractors who in turn were paid supervision charges to undertake the transactions. Department classified the services as supply of manpower services. It was claimed that only payment was routed through them and there was no element of provision of supply of manpower services. Even if the services of labourers were to be taxed, the same may be classified as business auxiliary services. In absence of issuance of Show Cause Notice and issuance of order under business auxiliary services, the Show Cause Notice and Order are bad in Law.

The revenue, on the other hand, contended that the employees representing the Appellant agreed that the activities amounted to supply of manpower vide the statements recorded by the Adjudicating Authority.

Held:
After analysing the agreements, it was observed that the agreement was for cutting and transporting sugarcane and there was no provision of supply of manpower services. Relying on the decision of the Mumbai Tribunal in case of Amrit Sanjivni Sugarcane Transport Co. Pvt. Ltd. vide Order No. A/532/2013/CSTB/C-1 dated 02-04- 201302-04- 2013, it was held that the services were in the nature of business auxiliary services. Merely because in the statements, the classification of services was agreed as supply of manpower services, the same cannot be taken as a valid ground for demand of service tax. Demand should be made in accordance with the law, taking into account the nature of contract. In no case, demand should be confirmed on the basis of wrong understanding of the Appellant or any other person. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed and the department was directed to refund the amount of pre-deposit.

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[2014] 36 STR 102 (Tri.-Mum.) Calderys India Refractories Ltd. vs. C. C. E., Aurangabad

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Promptness in payment of service tax, reflection of transactions in Balance Sheets and revenue neutrality were evidences of a bonafide case for non-levy of penalty u/ss. 77 and 78 of the Finance Act, 1994.

Facts:
The Appellants on detection paid service tax with interest immediately and filed a letter with the department stating that since service tax with interest was paid and since the non-payment was unintentional, no penalties should be levied on them.

Further with effect from 10-05-2008 when section 78 is invoked, no penalty u/s. 76 of the Finance Act, 1994 is payable. It was contested that since the liability pertained to January, 2009, penalty cannot be levied under section 76 of the Finance Act, 1994. Further, the dropping of penalty u/s. 77 and 78 of the Finance Act, 1994 was pleaded on factual grounds. It was argued that they did not suppress any information with an intention to evade service tax and this was a bonafide case.

The department contended that the issue was noticed only when the audit party examined the records and therefore, there was suppression of facts.

Held:
In view of amendment to section 78 during the relevant period, penalty u/s. 76 of the Finance Act, 1994 was not sustainable in Law. The payment of service tax was made immediately on discovery and was intimated to the department much before the issuance of Show Cause Notice, the transaction was already reflected in respective Balance Sheets. Accordingly, it was evident that there was no intention to suppress facts. Further, since it was a case of reverse charge mechanism, the situation was revenue neutral in view of CENVAT Credit available to the Appellants. Relying on the decision of Ahmedabad Tribunal in case of Essar Steel Ltd. 2009 (13) STR 579 (Tri.-Ahmd.), it was held that penalty was not imposable u/ss. 77 and 78 vide section 73(3) read with section 80 of the Finance Act, 1994.

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[2014] 36 STR 199 (Tri.-Ahmd.) Toyota Constructions Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commr. of C. Ex., Daman

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Slow-down in realty sector held to be a reasonable cause for invocation of section 80 of the Finance Act, 1994.

Facts:
The Appellants filed service tax returns, however, there was a delay in payment of service tax. The department demanded interest and penalty on the same. An appeal was filed with the contention that since there was a slow-down in realty sector, they were unable to pay service tax in time.

Held:
Having regard to facts of the case, the Tribunal invoked provision of section 80 of the Finance Act, 1994 as there was a reasonable cause for failure in payment of service tax in time and penalty u/s. 76 was waived off.

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[2014] 36 STR 96 (Tri.-Mum.) Commissioner of Service Tax, Mumbai vs. Diotech India Ltd.

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Non-refundable registration fees for e-commerce forms part of value of taxable services leviable to service tax.

Facts:
The Respondents were in the business of providing website and e-learning in electronic form and were also engaged in trading of consumer goods and branded goods and were registered under the category of online information and database access or retrieval services. The department alleged that the registration fees charged should form part of value of taxable services since the same was non-refundable. The fees were adjusted in the first purchase made by the online buyer and even in case of no purchases by the online user, these fees were not refundable. Since the charges were never declared or shown in returns, extended period of limitation was invoked.

Held:
Since the registration fee was not refundable, it would be added to the gross value of taxable services, leviable to service tax. Since only on scrutiny of records by the department, the issue was noticed, it was a case of suppression of facts with intent to evade service tax and therefore, extended period of limitation was justified.

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30. [2014] 36 STR 78 (Tri.-Bang) Aacess Equipments vs. Commr. of Cus. & C. Ex., Hyderabad – IV

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Promptness in making payment could be considered to be reasonable cause to waive penalty u/s. 80 of the Finance Act, 1994.

Facts:
The Appellant contended that he was under a bonafide belief that service tax was supposed to be paid by the service provider in case of GTA services. Further, on being pointed out by the department, Service tax liability under reverse charge mechanism was paid immediately. The revenue argued that since the liability was not contested, extended period of limitation was rightly invoked and the pertinent reason for failure to pay service tax was ignorance, which was not a reasonable cause to waive off penalties.

Held:
The Appellant was a proprietorship concern and not supported by any professional person. Layman would generally believe that service tax has to be paid by service provider. Further, service tax was paid immediately with interest on detection. Accordingly, having regard to the promptness and peculiar circumstances of the case, penalty u/s. 78 of the Finance Act, 1994 was set aside by invoking provisions of section 80 of the Finance Act, 1994.

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[2014] 50 taxmann.com 389 (Karnataka) Commissioner of Central Excise & Service Tax, Large Taxpayers Unit vs. Fosroc Chemicals (India) (P.) Ltd.

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Supply of final product to SEZ ‘developer’ – Period Prior to 31-12-2008 – No reversal of CENVAT credit under Rule 6 – Notification No. 50/2008-C.E.(N.T.) dated 31-12-2008 held retrospective.

Facts:
Assessee – manufacturer made clearance of their final products to SEZ developers without payment of duty against letters of undertaking (LUT) during the period January, 2006 to December, 2006. CENVAT Credit of the duty paid on inputs attributable to supplies made to SEZ developer was not reversed. The revenue sought reversal of appropriate CENVAT Credit under Rule 6 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.

The Assessee filed an appeal before the CESTAT, Bangalore and argued that in view of amendment carried out in Rule 6(6)(i) vide Notification No.50/2008-CE(NT) dated 31-12-2008, no reversal was required in case of clearances to SEZ Developers and the said notification is clarificatory and therefore has retrospective applicability. Tribunal allowed the appeal. Aggrieved by the said order, the revenue appealed before the High Court.

Held:
The High Court observed that section 51 of the Special Economic Zones Act, 2005 overrides the provision of all other laws for the time being in force. This section therefore overreaches and eclipses the provisions of any other law containing provisions contrary to the SEZ Act, 2005. Though the definition of the word ‘export’ in the SEZ Act, in section 2(m) included supply of goods to a ‘Unit’ or ‘Developer’, in Rule 6(6)(i) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 the word ‘Developer’ was conspicuously missing and only ‘Unit’ was included before the 2008 amendment. It is in that context the aforesaid amendment by Notification No.50/2008 CE (N.T) dated 31-12-2008 was brought in, to clarify the doubt. Further, by reason of the aforementioned amendment no substantive right has been taken away nor has any penal consequence been imposed. Only an obvious mistake was sought to be removed thereby. Therefore, it was held that the said amendment is clarificatory in nature. This was also clarified from Clause 4 of CBEC circular bearing No.29/2006-Cus. dated 27-12-2006.

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[2014] 50 taxmann.com 225 (Punjab & Haryana) Neel Metal Products Ltd vs. CCE

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Section 11A of the Central Excise Act – payment of differential duty at the time of issue of supplementary invoices – SCN issued after one year for demanding ‘interest’ on such differential duties paid by the assessee – Held, such notices are barred by limitation.

Facts:
The assessee, a manufacturer of auto components, sheet metal components and tools entered into long term contracts with automobile companies for sale of finished excisable goods. On price revision, differential excise duty was paid at the time of issue of supplementary invoices. The question is whether the liability to pay interest on differential excise duty already paid at the time of issue of supplementary invoices would continue and can be demanded beyond the normal period of limitation of one year from the date of supplementary invoice u/s. 11A read with section 11AB of the Act?

Held
The High Court observed that the matter was squarely covered by its decision in the case of Jai Bharat Maruti Ltd.’s case [2014] 50 taxmann.com 224. It also observed that the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Kwality Ice Cream Company vs. UOI 2012 (281) ELT 507 (Del) and decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner vs. TVS Whirlpool Ltd. 2000 (119) ELT A 177 (SC) are the leading authorities which answer the question in favour of the assessee. The Supreme Court has held that, the period of limitation that applies to a claim for the principal amount should also apply to the claim for interest thereon. Based on this principle laid down by the Apex Court, the appeal was allowed and notices demanding interest were held without jurisdiction.

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[2014] 50 taxmann.com 31 (Allahabad) Commissioner of Customs & Central Excise vs. J.P. Transformers

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Repairs & Maintenance of Transformers – no service tax paid on material on which Excise/ Sales Tax is paid and separately indicated on invoice – Notification No. 12/2003, dated 20-06-2003.

Facts:
Assessee was engaged in the manufacture as well as repairs and maintenance of electrical transformers. By virtue of Notification No. 12/2003 dated 20-06-2003, service tax was paid only on labour charges recovered from the customer. It was contended that the contract being a composite contract of service of repairing transformers, it was required to pay the service tax on the total contracted value, including consumables and items used in the repair of the transformers. Tribunal decided the matter in favour of the Assessee. Aggrieved by the same, revenue filed appeal before the High Court.

Held:
The High Court observed that Tribunal has given its decision based on undisputed finding of fact that the value of the goods and materials utilised for repair of the transformers is separately disclosed in the agreement and in the invoices and excise duty/value added tax has been paid on goods used in the repairing process. Therefore, since there is no substantial question of law the appeal is dismissed. It was also noted that, reliance placed by the Tribunal on its own decision in the case of Balaji Tirupati Enterprises vs. CCE [2014] 43 taxmann.com 42 (New Delhi-CESTAT), which is subsequently upheld by the High Court has also not been disputed in the Appeal Memo.

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[2014] 36 STR 288 (Cal.) Mohta Technocrafts Pvt. Ltd. vs. CESTAT, Kolkata

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Stay application disposed by Tribunal on the reasons of non-coooperation with the adjudicating authority and new grounds taken before it for the first time, was held to be inappropriate.

Facts:
The Appellant filed writ petition challenging the order of the Tribunal rejecting the application for waiver of predeposit on the reasons of alleged non-cooperation at the time of adjudication and since new pleas were raised for the first time before it.

Held:
The Hon’ble High Court, held that the alleged noncooperation was absent and that the Tribunal’s finding was contrary to the records available and also reason for new plea was perverse. It was held that it is a settled position of law that Tribunal while dealing with application for seeking waiver of pre-deposit shall record the prima facie case and unjust financial hardship and thus the matter was remanded for consideration afresh.

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[2014] 36 STR 271 (Cal) Naresh Kumar & Co. Pvt. Ltd. vs. UOI

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The High Court may entertain a writ petition in spite of alternate remedy being available, if it is filed for enforcement of fundamental right or actions/proceedings initiated, are in violation of the principles of natural justice or without jurisdiction.

Facts:
The Appellant preferred writ petition against the issuance of Show Cause Notice demanding service tax under “Business Auxiliary Service” (BAS) without mentioning the sub-clause of BAS under which service tax was alleged to be leviable and extended period of limitation was invoked on account of suppression of facts and contravention of provisions with intention to evade tax. Department took preliminary objection to the maintainability of petition since Appellant had an equally efficacious alternative remedy of adjudication before adjudicating authority.

Held:
It was held that normally High Court does not entertain a writ petition where an alternate remedy is available. However, if a writ petition is filed for enforcement of fundamental right or if it proves that actions/proceedings initiated are in violation of the principles of natural justice or without jurisdiction, High Court can intervene and pass appropriate orders. From the records, it was observed that facts of the case were known to the department from beginning and a mere failure to declare does not amount to willful suppression. The initial onus of providing materials to invoke section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994, is with the department. Thereafter, the burden shifts to the assessee. In the present case, department failed to discharge their initial onus. The Show Cause Notice even did not mention the relevant sub-Clause of BAS. Accordingly, the Show Cause Notice was held to be issued without jurisdiction and was set aside.

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[2014] 36 STR 269 (All.) CC Customs & Ex. Kanpur vs. J P Transformers

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The Tribunal does not have power to extend the Stay beyond the statutory period of 365 days.

Facts:
Revenue preferred the present appeal challenging the order of Tribunal extending period of Stay beyond 365 days ignoring the third proviso to section 35C (2A) of the Central Excise Act, 1944. Further, no reason was given for not disposing appeal within 365 days.

Held:

The third proviso undoubtedly bars and prohibits Tribunal from extending the interim Stay Order beyond 365 days. It stipulates deemed vacation and imposes no fault consequences in strict terms. In the instant case, Tribunal had recorded finding that it could not dispose appeal for no fault of the assessee. The Supreme Court in case of Kumar Cotton Mills P. Ltd. 2005 (180) ELT 434 (SC) held that the amendment in third proviso to section 35C(2A) of the Central Excise Act, cannot be interpreted to give powers to the Tribunal to extend the Stay Orders indefinitely. The Tribunal was directed to dispose of the Appeal expeditiously.

(Note: On an identical issue, the Karnataka High Court in CIT, Bangalore vs. Ecom Gill Coffee Trading P. Ltd 2014 (35) STR 320 and the Delhi High Court in Comm. of Income Tax-II vs. Maruti Suzuki (India) Ltd. 2014 (35) STR 284 had held that the Tribunal cannot extend the Stay beyond statutory period of 365 days.)

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[2014] 36 STR 241 (Bom.) Tech Mahindra Ltd. vs. CCEx. Pune-III

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No refund of CENVAT Credit on the onsite services not provided from India, since it does not fulfill the conditions of export of services.

Facts:
The Appellant, an Indian entity entered into a contract to develop software for a US based customer. The offsite activities were performed in India and onsite activities were carried out by the Appellant’s US based subsidiary. There was no privity of contract between the US based subsidiary and the customer. The subsidiary billed the Appellant for the work done by it. The services provided to the customer were claimed to be export of services. For the payments made to its subsidiary, service tax was discharged considering it to be import of services and was claimed as CENVAT Credit and being unable to utilise, applied for refund.

Department after allowing refund claim in totality for initial years, rejected the claim proportionately to the extent of onsite services for subsequent years stating that onsite activities were not provided from India and therefore, there was violation of condition of Rule 3(2)(a) of the Export of Services Rules, 2005.

It was argued that if the onsite services were held to be not provided from India then the same would not take colour of import of services and therefore, service tax pad thereon should be eligible for refund u/s. 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944.

Held:
High Court observed that onsite services were admittedly rendered by the US subsidiary to the customer and there was no privity of contract between them and hence could not be regarded as export of services since the condition that the services should be provided from India, was not fulfilled and thus no refund proportionate to onsite services was granted. Further, the alternative argument in respect of refund was not entertained by the Court since an application for refund under the same was not made.

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[2014] 36 STR 3 (Guj.) Sadguru Construction Co. vs. Union of India

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Payment between 01-03-2013 and 10-05-2013, i.e., till enactment of Service Tax Voluntary Compliance Encouragement Scheme, 2013 (VCES), could be covered within the definition of “tax dues” under VCES in view of express statutory provisions.

Payments made under duress are in the nature of deposits till crystallisation of tax liability by way of passing an adjudication order, Circulars, contrary to statutory provisions, are bad in law.

Facts:
Petitioners faced an inquiry on 08-03-2013 and deposited some amount under duress between 09-03-2013 to 15-04-2013 in respect of service tax liability upto 31- 03-2013. To get immunity from interest, penalty and other proceedings, it was claimed that payments made between 09-03-2013 to 15-03-2013 were covered within the definition of “tax dues” and should be considered as made under VCES, since it remains unpaid as on 01- 03-2013. The department, following CBEC circular No. 170/5/2013-S dated 08-08-2013, contended that the amount deposited before enactment of VCES i.e. 10- 05-2013 cannot be included in the declaration under VCES. It was argued that the department cannot rely on a circular which overrides statutory provisions of the law i.e. definition of ‘tax dues’ under VCES.

Held:
Having regard to the definition of “tax dues” and provisions pertaining to the person eligible to make declaration, the Hon’ble High Court observed that the position of a declarant vis-à-vis his service tax dues would have to be ascertained as on 01-03-2013. If any proceedings were pending on 01-03-2013, then declaration cannot be accepted. Further, the arrears of tax dues between 01-10- 2007 to 31-12-2012, unpaid till 01-03-2013 could only be declared. Since there was no inquiry pending and the tax dues were unpaid as on 01-03-2013, the benefit of VCES could not be denied. The amount was under duress and was in the nature of deposit in absence of crystallisation of tax liability by passing an adjudication order. Further, clarification cannot override statutory provisions of the statute and if they are contrary to provisions, the clarifications would be invalid.

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Sale in course of export, whether within the purview of the Local Act?

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Introduction
The sales or purchases taking place in the course of import/export are immune from sales tax as per Article 286 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, such transactions are exempt from sales tax (VAT). The transactions of export sales and sale in the course of export are defined in section 5(1) & 5(3) of the Central Sales Tax Act,1956 (CST) as under;

Section 5. When is a sale or purchase of goods said to take place in the course of import or export. –

(1) A sale or purchase of goods shall be deemed to take place in the course of the export of the goods out of the territory of India, only if the sale or purchase either occasions such export or is effected by a transfer of documents of title to the goods after the goods have crossed the customs frontiers of India.

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in s/s.(1), the last sale or purchase of any goods preceding the sale or purchase occasioning the export of those goods out of the territory of India shall also be deemed to be in the course of such export, if such last sale or purchase took place after, and was for the purpose of complying with, the agreement or order for or in relation to such export.

Controversy
A controversy that had arisen and still remains, is as to whether the export sale is to be first considered as effected within the State in which the goods for export are ascertained and then categorised as ‘export sale’? If the sales are first considered as sales within the State from which export is made then they will form part of the turnover in the said State and then deduction will be given towards export sale. This will have a number of implications as per provisions of the Local Act. On the other hand, if it is considered that they are outside the purview of the Local Act then they will not form part of the turnover in that State and will remain outside the turnover. This may also have its own repercussions as per provisions of the Local Act.

Issue before the Hon’ble Bombay High Court
A controversy arose before the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in respect of interpretation of Rule 42H of the Bombay Sales Tax Rules (BST). The Hon’ble Bombay High Court has reproduced the rule, the relevant portion of which is reproduced below:

“R. 42H. Drawback, setoff etc. of tax paid on goods purchased by a dealer liable for levy of value added of sales tax on goods specified in Schedule C.

(1) While assessing the amount of tax payable by a Registered dealer (hereinafter, in this rule, referred to as “the claimant dealer”) in respect of any period starting on or after the 1st October 1995 on his sales of goods (being goods in respect of which the deduction from turnover of sales has not been allowed under sub-section (1) of section 8 because of the provision contained in s/s. (3) or, as the case may be, in sub-section (3A) of section 12A, the Commissioner shall, subject to the provisions of sub Rule (2), grant him drawback, setoff or, as the case may be, a refund of aggregate of the sums determined in accordance with the provisions of Rule 44D in respect of purchase of such goods including the goods used for packing of such goods.

Provided that, drawback, set off or, as the case may be, refund under this rule shall not exceed the tax payable on the sale of such goods, not being sales against any declaration or certificate prescribed under the Act, Rules or as the case may be, any entry of Schedule to the notification issued u/s. 41:

Provided further that, if the dealer effects any sales by way of a delivery of goods as hire purchase of any system of payment by instalments, then the amount of drawback, setoff, or as the case may be, refund under this rule shall be in proportion to the purchase price of that instalment.”

The appellant dealer has sold goods against form 14B, so as to claim exemption u/s. 5(3) of the CST Act,1956 r/w Rule 21A of the BST Rules.

The department interpreted that since the sales covered by section 5(3) cannot be said to be disallowed because of section 12A of the BST Act,1959, the set off is not admissible on the purchases relating to such sales under rule 42H. On the other hand, the dealer was canvassing that first it is a local sale covered by BST Act, 1959 and since resale is not admissible, he has sold the goods against form 14B and hence, set off is admissible.

After noting the controversy, as above, the Hon’ble High Court observed as under in relation to nature of sales effected u/s. 5(3) of the CST Act:

“13) A bare perusal of this Rule would indicate that a dealer may make a claim that he is not liable to pay tax under the BST in respect of his sale of goods on the ground that the sale of such goods is a sale in the course of export of the goods out of the territory of India within the meaning of sub-section (3) of section 5 of the CST. He can therefore produce a certificate in the Form referred by us above along with evidence of export of such goods and claim exemption in respect of the liability to pay the Sales Tax. Pertinently, this form has to be filled in and signed by the exporter to whom the goods are sold. Section 5 of the CST contains s/s. (3). Section 5 has been inserted in the CST so as to determine as to when a sale or purchase of goods can be said to be taking place in the course of import or export. Sub-Section (3) was inserted therein with retrospective effect from 1st April, 1976, which reads as under:

“(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in s/s. (1), the last sale or purchase of any goods preceding the sale or purchase occasioning the export of those goods out of the territory of India shall also be deemed to be in the course of such export, if such last sale or purchase took place after, and was for the purpose of complying with, the agreement or order for or in relation to such export.” 14) A bare perusal thereof would indicate that the same has been inserted so as to take out of the purview of the provision namely, section 5, the last sale or purchase of any goods preceding the sale or purchase occasioning the export of those goods out of the territory of India. That is also deemed to be in the course of such export, provided such last sale or purchase took place after and was for the purpose of complying with an agreement or order for or in relation to such export. Ordinarily this would not have been within the purview of sub-section (1) of section 5. Therefore, notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) of section 5, such sale or purchase is also deemed to be in the course of the export. This aspect becomes clear if one peruses section 75 of the BST, which specifically excludes, from the purview of the BST, certain sales and purchases. This section reads as under:

Section 75 Certain sales and purchases not to be liable to tax.
Nothing in this Act or the rules made thereunder shall be deemed to impose or authorise the imposition of a tax on any sale or purchase of any goods, where such sale or purchase takes place (a) (i) outside the State; or (ii) in the course of the import of the goods into the territory of India, or the export of the goods out of such territory; or (b) in the course of interstate trade or commerce, and the provisions of this Act and the said rules shall be read and construed accordingly.

Explanation. For the purpose of this section whether a sale or purchase takes place
(i) outside the State, or
(ii) in the course of the import of the goods into the territory of India or export of the goods out of such territory, or
(iii) in the course of interstate trade or commerce, shall be determined in accordance with the principles specified in section 3, 4 and 5 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956.”

15)    Therefore, the sales and purchases which are not liable to tax under the BST by virtue of section 75 have been rightly excluded or taken out of the purview of Rule 42H and that is the only interpretation which can be placed on the said Rule. If one peruses section 5 and particularly s/s. (1) and s/s. (3) of the CST together with section 75 of the BST, Rule 21A of the Bombay Sales Tax Rules, Form N14B harmoniously and together, it would be apparent that what is not within the purview of the BST can never be brought in for the purposes of claiming a deduction or setoff under Rule 42H. If that is the intent of legislature and it has been given effect to by the Tribunal in the impugned order, then we do not find that its conclusion  is vitiated.”

Conclusion

From the above  observations,  an  inference  arises  that the sales covered u/s. 5(3) of the CST Act cannot  be considered as within the purview of Local Act. The implication is that it cannot be clubbed into turnover under Local Act at all. However, there are earlier judgments like M/s. Onkarlal Nandlal vs.State of Rajasthan (60 STC 314)(SC) and also N. D. Georgopoulos vs. State of Maharashtra (37 STC 187)(bom), wherein it was held that the situs of export sale is in the State, from where the sale is effected i.e., from where the export is made. In other words, it is first considered to be within purview of the Local Act and then the deduction.

The above judgment of the Bombay High Court creates a different scenario. This will certainly be a pointer for debate and a further judgment may have to be awaited to get the clarity.

TIME LIMIT FOR AVAILING CENVAT CREDIT

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Preliminary
For the first time, since the introduction of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 (CCR, 2004) with effect from 10-09-2004, time limit has been introduced (with effect from 01-09- 2014) for availing CENVAT Credit on inputs and input services. Similar time limit was introduced under the erstwhile MODVAT Rules in the year 1995. However, the same was withdrawn in the year 2000 when CENVAT Rules were introduced in supersession of MODVAT Rules.

An analysis of implications arising from the newly introduced time limit under CCR 2004 and related larger issues are discussed hereafter.

CENVAT (earlier MODVA T) is a substantive right

Some important observations by the Supreme Court, in the context of erstwhile MODVAT Scheme, are very much relevant for CCR 2004 as well, are as under:

Observations of Supreme Court in Eicher Motors Ltd. vs. UOI (1999) 106 ELT 3 (SC)

In the context of specific provisions that were introduced under the erstwhile MODVAT Rules for lapsing of unutilised credit in specific cases, the following observations were made by the Supreme Court

Para 5
…………

In 1995-96 Budget Modvat Scheme was liberalised/ simplified and the credit earned on any input was allowed to be utilised for payment of duty on any final product manufactured within the same factory irrespective of whether such inputs were used in its manufacture or not.…….. The stand of the assessee is that they have utilised the facility of paying excise duty on the inputs and carried the credit towards excise duty payable on the finished products. For the purpose of utilisation of the credit all vestitive facts or necessary incidents thereto have taken place prior to 16-03-1995 or utilisation of the finished products prior to 16-03-1995. Thus, the assessee became entitled to take the credit of the input instantaneously once the input is received in the factory on the basis of the existing scheme….. the right to the credit has become absolute at any rate when the input is used in the manufacture of the final product. The basic postulate, that the scheme is merely being altered and, therefore, does not have any retrospective or retro-active effect, submitted on behalf of the State, does not appeal to us. As pointed out by us that when on the strength of the rules available certain acts have been done by the parties concerned, incidents following thereto must take place in accordance with the scheme under which the duty had been paid on the manufactured products and if such a situation is sought to be altered, necessarily it follows that right, which had accrued to a party such as availability of a scheme, is affected and, in particular, it loses sight of the fact that provision for facility of credit is as good as tax paid till tax is adjusted on future goods on the basis of the several commitments which would have been made by the assessees concerned. Therefore, the scheme sought to be introduced cannot be made applicable to the goods which had already come into existence in respect of which the earlier scheme was applied under which the assessees had availed of the credit facility for payment of taxes. It is on the basis of the earlier scheme necessarily the taxes have to be adjusted and payment made complete. Any manner or mode of application of the said rule would result in affecting the rights of the assessees.

Para 6

We may look at the matter from another angle. If on the inputs the assessee had already paid the taxes on the basis that when the goods are utilised in the manufacture of further products as inputs thereto then the tax on these goods gets adjusted which are finished subsequently. Thus, a right accrued to the assessee on the date when they paid the tax on the raw materials or the inputs and that right would continue until the facility available thereto gets worked out or until those goods existed.

(emphasis supplied)

Observations of the Supreme Court in CCE vs. Dai Ichi Karkaria Ltd. (1999) 112 ELT 353 (SC)

Para 17
………..
It is clear from these Rules, as we read them, that a manufacturer obtains credit for the excise duty paid on raw material to be used by him in the production of an excisable product immediately it makes the requisite declaration and obtain an acknowledgement thereof. It is entitled to use the credit at any time thereafter when making payment of excise duty on the excisable product. There is no provision in the Rules which provides for a reversal of the credit by the excise authorities except where it has been illegally or irregularly taken, in which event it stands cancelled or, if utilised, has to be paid for. We are here really concerned with credit that has been validly taken, and its benefit is available to the manufacturer without any limitation in time or otherwise unless the manufacturer itself chooses not to use the raw material in its excisable product. The credit is, therefore, indefeasible. It should also be noted that there is no co–relation of the raw material and the final product; that is to say, it is not as if credit can be taken only on a final product that is manufactured out of the particular raw material to which the credit is related. The credit may be taken against the excise duty on a final product manufactured on the very day that it becomes available.

Para 18

It is therefore, that in the case of Eicher Motors vs. Union of India (1999) 106 ELT 3 this Court said that a credit under the MODVAT Scheme was “as good as tax paid.”

(emphasis supplied)

Observations of judicial forums under erstwhile MODVAT Scheme when no time limit was prescribed

In CCE vs. Mysore Lac & Paint Works Ltd. (1991) 52 ELT 590 (CEGAT), it was held that six months is a reasonable time for taking CENVAT Credit.

In one case, it was held that in the absence of any time limit, CENVAT Credit can be taken any time – even after three or four years. – SAIL vs. CCE (2000) 41 RLT 706 (CEGAT) – followed in Steel Authority of India Ltd. vs. CCE (2001) 129 ELT 459 (CEGAT).

In Coromandal Fertilizer Ltd. vs. CCE (2009) 239 ELT 99 (Tri – Bang), it has been held that, when the law is settled on the issue, there is no justification to deny the credit on the ground that it is availed after three to seven years from the date of receipt of inputs. Further, since the CENVAT Credit Rules do not prescribe any outer limit, the Revenue’s contention that credit should be availed within reasonable period is not acceptable.

Useful reference can also be made to judicial rulings in J. V. Strips Ltd. vs. CCE (2007) 218 ELT 252 (Tri – Del) where credits taken after a considerable delay was denied to the assessee and Essar Steel vs. CCE (2008) 222 ELT 154 (Tri – Ahd).

It is evident from the above that in the absence of specific provisions in regard to time limit for availing credit, judicial authorities did consider time limit for claiming refund under Central Excise (viz., six months at the relevant time) as a reasonable time for taking credits. However, it needs to be noted that, the time limit for claiming refund under Central Excise/Service tax has since been increased from six months to one year.

Observations when time limit was prescribed under erstwhile MODVAT Scheme

Supreme Court Ruling in Osram Surya (P) Ltd. vs. CCE (2012) 142 ELT 5 (SC)

Prior to the introduction of the second proviso to Rule 57G i.e., prior to 29-06-1995, a manufacturer was en- titled to withdraw the said credit at any time without there being a limitation on such withdrawal. On 29-06- 1995, second proviso to Rule 57G was introduced by substituting the then existing proviso and the newly introduced proviso read thus : “Provided further that the manufacturer shall not take credit after six months of the date of issue of any of the documents specified in first proviso to this sub-rule:”

In the said case, the appellants who had received their inputs for the manufacture of their respective products, had taken credit under the Modvat Scheme, admittedly, six months after the date of issue of the documents specified in the said proviso to Rule 57G. Therefore, the said credit was disallowed by the authorities. This action of the authorities was questioned by the appellants before the Tribunal, contending that the benefit of the credit which had accrued to them prior to the introduction of the second proviso to the said Rule, cannot be taken away by introduction of a limitation because it was a vested right accrued to them prior to the coming into force of the said proviso to the Rule. They also contended that, the said proviso is not retrospective in its operation and is only applicable to the inputs received by a manufacturer after the introduction of the said proviso. Further, since the said proviso did not specifically state that it is taking away the vested right of a manufacturer, the proviso should be read to mean that the same is not applicable in regard to the credit accrued to a manufacturer prior to the introduction of the said Rule.

On behalf of the Revenue, it was contended that the language of the newly introduced proviso is very clear and admits no ambiguity, therefore, the question of interpretation of the Rule contrary to the said language does not arise at all and on a plain reading of the Rule, the Tribunal was justified in coming to the conclusion that after the in- troduction of the said proviso to the Rule, no manufacturer could avail of credit subsequent to a period of six months, as stipulated in the said proviso.

The observations and findings of the Supreme Court are as under:

Para 6

At the outset, we must note that none of the appellants have challenged the validity of the said proviso, therefore, we will have to proceed on the basis that the proviso in question is a valid one. In that background, the sole question that we will have to consider will be: whether the proviso to the Rule in question is applicable to the cases of manufacturers who had received their inputs prior to the introduction of the said proviso and are seeking to take credit in regard to the said inputs beyond the period of six months.

Para 7

……….by introducing the limitation in the said proviso to the Rule, the statute has not taken away any of the vested rights which had accrued to the manufacturers under the Scheme of Modvat. That vested right continues to be in existence and what is restricted is the time within which the manufacturer has to enforce that right. The appellants, however, contended that imposition of a limitation is as good as taking away the vested right. In support of their argument, they have placed reliance on a judgment of this Court in Eicher Motors Ltd. vs. Union of India [1999] 106 ELT 3 (SC)] wherein this Court had held that a right accrued to an assessee on the date when it paid the tax on the raw-materials or the inputs would continue until the facility available thereto gets worked out or until those goods existed ……. In the facts of Eicher case (supra) that was a case where- in by introduction of the Rule a credit which was in the account of the manufacturer was held not to be available on the coming into force of that Rule, by that the right to credit itself was taken away, whereas in the instant case by the introduction of the second proviso to Rule 57G, the credit in the account of a manufacturer was not taken away but only the manner and the time within which the said credit was to be taken or utilized alone was stipulated. It is to be noted at this juncture that the substantive right has not been taken away by the introduction of the proviso to the Rule in question but a procedural restriction was introduced which, in our opinion, is permissible in law. Therefore, in our opinion, the law laid down by this Court in Eicher’s case (supra) does not apply to the facts of these cases. This is also the position with regard to the judgment of this Court in Collector of Central Excise, Pune & Ors. vs. Dai Ichi Karkaria Ltd. & Ors. [1997 (7) SCC 448].

Para 8

It is vehemently argued on behalf of the appellants that in effect by introduction of this Rule, a manufac- turer in whose account certain credit existed, would be denied of the right to take such credit consequently, as in the case of Eicher (supra), a manufacturer’s vested right is taken away, therefore, the Rule in question should be interpreted in such a manner that it did not apply to cases where credit in question had accrued prior to the date of introduction of this proviso. In our opinion, this argument is not available to the appellants because none has questioned the legality or the validity of the Rule in question, therefore, any argument which in effect questions the validity of the Rule, cannot be permitted to be raised. The argument of the appellants that there was no time whatsoever given to some of the manufacturers to avail the credit after the introduction of the Rule also is based on arbitrariness of the Rule, and the same also will have to be rejected on the ground that there is no challenge to the validity of the Rule……………

Para 9

……..in our opinion the language of the proviso con- cerned is unambiguous. It specifically states that a manufacturer cannot take credit after six months from the date of issue of any of the documents specified in the first proviso to the said sub-rule. A plain reading of this sub-rule clearly shows that it applies to those cases where a manufacturer is seeking to take the credit after the introduction of the Rule and to cases where the manu- facturer is seeking to do so after a period of six months from the date when the manufacturer received the inputs. This subrule does not operate retrospectively in the sense it does not cancel the credits nor does it in any manner affect the rights of those persons who have already taken the credit before coming into force of the Rule in question. It operates prospectively in regard to those manufacturers who seek to take credit after the coming into force of this Rule………..

(emphasis supplied)

Gujarat high Court Ruling in Baroda Rayon Corporation Ltd. vs. UOI (2014) 306 ELT 551 (GUJ)

The main challenge in the petition was to the Notification No. 16/94-CE (NT), dated 30-03-1994. By virtue of the said notification, gate pass issued under Rule 52A of the MODVAT Rules as it stood prior to 01-04-1994, has been prescribed as a document for the purpose of Rule 57G of the Rules. However, the notification also provided that the documents should have been issued before 01- 04-1994 and the credit under the said Rule should have been taken on or before 30-06-1994. It is this part of the notification was challenged in the petition.

The Court observed and held as under:

Para 8
………. the right to avail of credit is conferred under Rule 57A of the Rules. Rule 57G only provides the procedure to be observed by the manufacturer. Thus, while exercis- ing powers under Rule 57G of the Rules, the Central Government is not empowered to curtail any right conferred under Rule 57A of the Rules. In the circumstances, the impugned notification issued in exercise of powers under Rule 57G of the Rules insofar as the same prescribes a time-limit for taking of credit, being in excess of the powers conferred under the said rule is ultra vires the same and as such cannot be sustained to that extent.

Para 9

Another aspect of the matter is that by curtailing the time- limit within which the credit taken is to be availed, in effect and substance the said notification provides for lapsing of the credit that has already accrued in favour of the pe- titioner. In this regard it may be noted that the petition pertains to credit taken in the year 1994.    Hence,
the present case would be squarely covered by the deci- sions of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector of Central Excise, Pune vs. Dai Ichi Karkaria Ltd, (supra) and in the case of Eicher Motors Ltd. vs. Union of India, (supra) Court.

Para 11

In view of the above discussion, the petition suc- ceeds and is accordingly allowed. The impugned No- tification No. 16/94-C.E. (N.T), dated 30th March, 1994 to the extent it provides that the credit under Rule 57G of the rules has to be taken on or before 30th June, 1994 being in excess of the powers conferred under Rule 57g of the Rules is hereby quashed and set aside.

Illustrative cases where credit was allowed after six months from the date of issue of specified documents

•    Alembic Ltd. vs. CCE (2013) 293 ELT 119 (Tri – Ahd)

•    CCE vs. Ford India Ltd. (2012) 284 ELT 202 (Tri – Chennai)

•    Banner Pharma Caps Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCE (2009) 246 ELT 364 (Tri Ahd)

Illustrative cases where credit was denied when taken after 6 months from the date of issue of the specified documents

•    BHEL vs. CC & CE(A) (2007) 219 ELT 609 (Tri Bang)

•    NVK Mohammed Sultan Rawther & Sons Ltd. vs. CCE (2009) 237 ELT 741 (Tri – Chennai)

Validity of time limit introduced under CCR 04 with effect from 01/09/2014.

Vide Notification No. 21/2014 CE (NT) dated 11-07-2014, two new provisos have been inserted in Rule 4(1) & 4(7) of CCR 2004 respectively effective 01-09-2014, providing that a manufacturer/service provider shall not take CEN- VAT credit on inputs/input services after six months from the date of any of the documents specified in Rule 9(1) of CCR 2004. As such, no reasons have been provided by the Government for the sudden introduction of time limit, 10 years subsequent to the introduction of CCR 2004.

It would appear that the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Eicher Motors & Dai Ichi discussed above, would be relevant in the context of CCR 2004 as well inasmuch as CENVAT Credit is a substantive right  of a manufacturer/service provider. The applicability of the aforesaid principles is strengthened in the scenario of substantial expansion of erstwhile MODVAT Scheme. The prevalent CCR 2004 covers the manufacturing sector substantially and more importantly services sector post introduction of Negative List based taxation of services with effect from 01-07-2012.

Hence, on the basis of principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Eicher Motors & Dai Ichi, provisos inserted in Rule 4(1) & 4(7) of CCR 2004 with effect from 01/09/2014 providing for time limit for taking CENVAT credit on inputs / input services can be challenged before a Court of law inasmuch as it curtails the substantive rights of manufacturers/service providers. Observations of the Supreme Court in Osram Surya’s case support availability of this option to a manufacturer/ service provider.

Without prejudice to the above, it would also appear that the time limit introduced with effect from 01-09-2014 could be regarded as retrospective to an extent it imposes re- strictions on CENVAT Credit entitlement in regard to duty/tax paid documents issued prior to 01-09-2014. Hence, it does curtail the substantive rights of manufacturers/service providers. Despite, the observations of the Supreme Court in Osram Surya Case, it would appear that, a strong case on this ground also can be made to advance an alternative proposition that time limit introduced with effect from 01-09-2014 should apply only to duty / tax paid documents issued on or after 01-09-2014.

Applicability of time limit to Re – Credits
Rule 4(7) of CCR 2004 allows CENVAT redit in respect of input service on or after the day on which the invoice is received by a manufacturer/service provider. However, third proviso to the said Rule 4 (7) reads as under:

“Provided also that in case the payment of the value of input service and the service tax paid or payable as indicated in the invoice, bill or as the case may be, challan referred to in Rule 9, except in respect of input service where the whole of the service tax is liable to be paid by the recipient of service , is not made within three months of the date of the invoice, bill or, as the case may be, challan, the manufacturer or the service provider who has taken credit on such input service, shall pay an amount equal to the CENVAT Credit availed on such input service and in case the said payment is made, the manufacturer or output service provider, as the case may be, shall be entitled to take the credit of the amount equivalent to the CENVAT Credit paid earlier subject to the other provisions of these rules:”

(emphasis supplied)

With effect from 01-09-2014, the sixth proviso has been inserted in Rule 4(7) of CCR 2004 which provides as under:

“….the manufacturer or the provider of output ser- vice shall not take CENVAT Credit after six months of the date of issue of any of the documents specified in sub-rule (1) of Rule 9.”

Hence, a very important practical issue arises for consid- eration is as to whether the time limit of six months would apply to cases where initial credit has been properly taken within six months but re-credit in terms of third proviso  to Rule 4(7) of CCR 2004 is taken after a period of six months from the date of issue of the tax paid document.

According to one view, in cases where re–credit taken  by the manufacturer/service provider is after the expiry of six months from the date of invoice upon payment, in light of the sixth proviso inserted with effect from 01-09- 2014 prescribing a six month time limit for availment of credit, the manufacturer/output service provider would not be entitled to take re-credit of the amount equivalent to the CENVAT Credit paid earlier. This view is supported by the terminology “subject to the other provisions of these rules” appearing in the third proviso to Rule 4(7) of CCR 2004. Hence, the sixth proviso inserted with effect from 01-09-2014, would apply in full force in such cases.

However, according to a second view, “re-credit” allowed as per the third proviso to Rule 4(7) of CCR 2004 is not taking CENVAT Credit, but it is re-credit of an “amount equivalent to the CENVAT Credit paid earlier” and hence, the sixth proviso to Rule 4(7) of CCR 2004 is not appli- cable to such cases. The time limit of six months applies to taking of CENVAT Credit for the first time and not to subsequent re-credit upon payment. Thus, once credit is validly taken within the permitted time limit of six months, subsequent re–credit upon payment pertains to reversal of amount equivalent to CENVAT Credit reversed and not taking of credit.

This view is supported by judicial rulings referred above in cases of Alembic Ltd. (supra)., Ford India Ltd. (supra) and Banner Pharma Caps Pvt. Ltd. (supra) earlier. Though in a different context, useful reference could also be made to ruling in CCE vs. Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. (2010) 259 ELT 13 (GUJ)

Rightly considering the above uncertainty, the Govern- ment has issued Circular No. 990/14/2014-CX-8 dated 19th November, 2014 whereby it is clarified at para 3 that if credit is taken for the first time within six months of the issue of the document under Rule 9(1) of CCR,2004, the condition of taking credit within six months is fulfilled. The limitation period of six months therefore would not apply for taking re-credit of amount reversed. The said clarification is also provided in respect of two more situations viz.
a)    when the value of input or capital goods on which CENVAT Credit taken is written off or such provision is made in the books of account, the manufac- turer or service provider has to reverse the credit taken (Rule 3(5B) of CCR, 2004)
b)    When inputs sent to job worker are not received back within 180 days, the manufacturer or service provider, in the first instance has to reverse the credit taken.

Thus in all the three situations, while taking re-credit, the limitation of six months would not apply if credit in the first instance is taken within the prescribed time limit of six months of the receipt of eligible document.

Conclusion

According to the Budget Estimates for the year 2014-15, collection from service tax (Rs. 2.16 lakh crore) is likely to exceed Central Excise (Rs. 2.05 lakh crore) for the first time. Further, as per the stated taxation policy of the Government, we are moving towards a GST Regime in due course of time. Hence, in that perspective, it is imperative that we have seamless flow of credits and a robust input tax credit regime in line with GST/VAT Systems prevalent worldwide. To advance this cause, the following is recommended:

a)    The time limit for availment of CENVAT credits should be done away with.

b)    Alternatively, if the time limit is to be continued, it should be increased to one year (so as to be consistent with time limit for claiming refund) and the same should be made applicable to duty/tax paid documents issued after 01-09-2014.

c)    Linkage of CENVAT Credit availment with payment to suppliers was relevant prior to the introduction of POT Rules when service tax was required to be paid to the Government after realisation from the customers. The said linkage is not required subsequent to the introduction of POT Rules. Hence, the same should be done away with.

Business expenditure: Disallowance of expenditure in relation to exempt income: Section 14A: A. Ys. 2001-02 to 2005-06: Where available interest free funds are more than the investment in tax free securities, disallowance of interest u/s. 14A will not be justified:

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CIT vs. HDFC Bank Ltd.(Bom): ITA No. 330 of 2012 dated 23-07-2014:

In the relevant years, the assessee claimed that no disallowance of interest be made u/s. 14A of the Incometax Act, 1961 in view of the fact that the asessee had interest free funds available more than the investment in tax free securities. The Assessing Officer rejected the claim and made disallowance of interest u/s. 14A on proportionate basis. The Tribunal deleted the addition.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) We find that the facts of the present case are squarely covered by the judgment in the case of Reliance Utilities and Power Ltd.; 313 ITR 340 (Bom). The findings of fact given by the ITAT in the present case is that the assessee’s own funds and other non-interest bearing funds were more than the investment in the tax-free securities.

ii) I n the present case, undisputedly the assessee’s capital, profit reserve, surplus and current account deposits were higher than the investment in the taxfree securities. In view of this factual position, as per the judgment of this Court in the case of Reliance Utilities and Power Ltd.; 313 ITR 340 (Bom), it would have to be presumed that the investment made by the assessee would be out of the interest-free funds available with the assessee.

iii) We therefore, are unable to agree with the submission of Suresh Kumar that the Tribunal had erred in dismissing the appeal of the Revenue on this ground.

iv) We do not find that the question gives rise to any substantial question of law. Appeal is therefore rejected.

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ACIT vs. Connaught Plaza Restaurants Pvt. Ltd. ITAT Delhi `B’ Bench Before G. D. Agrawal (VP) and H. S. Sidhu (JM) ITA No. 5466/Del/2013 A.Y.: 2003-04. Decided on: 1st September, 2014. Counsel for revenue / assessee: Parwinder Kaur / Rohit Gar and Tejasvi Jain

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S. 32 – Point of Sales (POS) systems qualify for depreciation @ 60% being the rate applicable to computers.

Facts:

In the course of assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer (AO) noticed from the tax audit report that additions to Computers included a sum of Rs. 65,89,449 towards POS on which depreciation was claimed @ 60%. The AO held that POS could be regarded as computer accessories but not as computer. It is only computers and computer software which qualify for depreciation @ 60%. The rate of 60% cannot be extended to computer accessories and peripherals. He rejected the contention of the assessee that the POS systems are capable of performing the basic functions performed by a computer such as data processing, storage, etc and therefore are similar to computers. The AO allowed depreciation on POS @ 25% i.e. the rate applicable to normal plant and machinery.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who following the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs. Rajdhani Powers Ltd. (ITA No. 1266/2010) decided the issue in favor of the assessee.

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had on perusing the technical specifications of POS from the brochure filed held that the POS terminal is akin to computer in terms of basic features and can be categorized as `Computers’. It also noted that he had followed the order of the jurisdictional High Court in the case of CIT vs. Rajdhani Powers Ltd. (supra) and therefore no interference was called for.

The appeal filed by the revenue was dismissed.

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M/S. Lawrence and Mayo ( India) Pvt. Ltd. vs. S.T.O. and M/S. Sokkia India (P) Ltd. vs. C.S.T.,West Bengal and Another, [2012] 51 VST 423 (WBTT)

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VAT – Classification of Goods-Surveying Instrument- Covered By Entry Relating to Plant –Taxable at 4%, Entry No. 54B, 83 (c), Part I, Schedule C, of The West Bengal Value Added Tax Act, 2003

FACTS
The dealers filed petition before the West Bengal Taxation Tribunal against the order of the Commissioner of Sales Tax holding sale of surveying instrument covered by Schedule CA of the act and taxable at 12.5%.

HELD
Survey is an integral part in the entire process of construction. In fact, the execution of work is done on the basis of data furnished by the surveying instruments. As indicated in the brochures, the surveying instruments, in India, are not just used for taking measurement only. It performs multifarious functions; taking measurement is one of its functions. Judging this aspect, it cannot be called to be a ‘measurement tool’ simpliciter. In view of amplitude of the definition of “plant”, as held in several cases, the surveying instruments squarely come within the extended meaning of ‘plant’ and would be covered by Entry No. 54B, Part I, of Schedule C of the Act. Therefore, it is taxable at 4%. Accordingly, the Tribunal allowed the petition filed by the dealers and set aside the order of the Commissioner.

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[2014] 46 taxmann.com 135 (New Delhi – CESTAT) Hema Engg. Indus. Ltd. vs. CST, New Delhi.

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Whether services provided on job work basis and exempted under Notification No. 8/2005 – ST are considered as “Exempted Services” for the purpose of Rule 6 of CENVAT Credit rules, 2004 requiring reversal of CENVAT Credit? Held, No.

Facts:
The Appellant was engaged in undertaking a job work by way of electroplating/painting on the semi-finished goods and claimed exemption in service tax vide Notification No. 8/2005 – ST. The Appellant availed the credit of service tax on various services so received for their job work and utilised the same for payment of service tax on taxable services provided by them. The Revenue contended that Appellant is providing taxable as well as exempted services hence cannot utilise CENVAT Credit more than 20% of the tax payable in terms of the provisions of Rule 6 of the CENVAT Credit Rules (CCR).

Held:
The Hon’ble Tribunal held that clearances effected in terms of the provisions of Notification No. 8/2005-S.T. cannot be held to be exempted clearance so as to invoke the provisions of Rule 6(2) of CCR. It further held that, this issue is no more res integra and stands decided by the Larger Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Sterlite Industries India Ltd. vs. CCE 2005 (183) ELT 353 (Tri- Mum.)(LB) wherein it was held that if no duty was payable in respect of goods manufactured in terms of Notification No. 214/86, i.e., job work Notification, the final product cannot be held to be exempted so as to attract the provisions of the erstwhile Rule 57CC inasmuch as the Notification No. 214/86 is pari materia to Notification No. 8/2005-S.T., the ratio of the said decision would apply.

Note: Readers may note that, same principal is also applicable in the case of exemption granted in Entry 30(c) of the mega exemption Notification No. 25/2012-ST dated 20-06-2012.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 25 dated 3rd September, 2014

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External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) in Indian Rupees

This circular permits eligible lenders of ECB to lend in Indian Rupees, subject to the following terms and conditions: –

a. The lender must mobilise Indian Rupees through swaps undertaken with a bank in India.

b. The ECB contract must comply with all other conditions applicable to the automatic and approval routes, as the case may be.

c. The all-in-cost of such ECB must be commensurate with prevailing market conditions.

The recognised lender, for the purpose of executing swaps for ECB denominated in Indian Rupees, can set up a representative office in India and also hedging their rupee exposures.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 23 dated 2nd September, 2014

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Three divisions of Foreign Exchange Department shifted to FED CO Cell at New Delhi

This circular states that, with effect from 15th July, 2014, the following three divisions of Foreign Investment Division (FID): –

a. Liaison/Branch/Project Office (LO/BO/PO) Division,
b. N on Resident Foreign Account Division (NRFAD ), and
c. Immovable Property (IP) Division

have been shifted to New Delhi. The address for correspondence for the three divisions is FED, CO Cell, Foreign Exchange Department, Reserve Bank of India, New Delhi Regional Office, 6, Parliament Street, New Delhi – 110 001, India.

This circular states that all applications, returns, etc. pertaining to the above three divisions (including extension or closure of LO/BO) must be sent to the FED CO Cell at New Delhi. Online reports for NRFAD can continue to be emailed at the same email address as earlier.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 22 dated 28th August, 2014

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Notification No. FEMA. 313/2014-RB dated 2nd July, 2014

Purchase and sale of securities other than shares or convertible debentures of an Indian company by a person resident outside India

Presently, eligible investors registered with SEBI, can purchase eligible government securities directly from the issuer of such securities or through registered stock broker on a recognised Stock Exchange in India within the limits prescribed by RBI and SEBI from time to time.

This circular has removed the restrictions on the persons from whom eligible investors can purchase eligible government securities. As a result, eligible investors can acquire eligible government securities in any manner as per the prevalent/approved market practice.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 21 dated 27th August, 2014

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Refinancing of ECB at lower all-in-cost – Simplification of procedure

Presently, refinancing of existing ECB by raising fresh ECB at lower all-in-cost is permitted under the Automatic Route if the outstanding maturity of the original loan is maintained. However, case where the Average Maturity Period (AMP) of the fresh ECB is more than the residual maturity of existing ECB need prior approval of RBI under the approval route.

This circular gives power to Banks to approve, under the Automatic Route, refinancing of existing ECB by raising fresh ECB at lower all-in-cost even if the Average Maturity Period (AMP) of the fresh ECB is more than the residual maturity of existing ECB, subject to the following conditions: –

i. Both the existing and fresh ECB must be in compliance with the applicable guidelines;
ii. A ll-in-cost of fresh ECB must be less than that of the all-in-cost of existing ECB;
iii. Consent of the existing lender must be obtained;
iv. Refinancing must to be undertaken before the maturity of the existing ECB;
v. Borrower must not be in the default/Caution List of RBI and must not be under the investigation of the Directorate of Enforcement (DoE);
vi. O verseas branches/subsidiaries of Indian banks are not be permitted to extend ECB for refinancing an existing ECB; and
vii. All requirements in respect of reporting arrangements like filing of revised Form 83, etc. must be followed.

This facility is available even in those cases where existing ECB was raised under the approval route if the amount of new ECB raised is eligible to be raised under the automatic route.

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Is It Fair to ignore prepaid taxes for penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) on escaped income?

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Synopsis
Penalty under section 271(1)(c)
has been a bone of contention between tax payers and Income-tax
Department. In this Article, the author has tried to bring out an
anomaly wherein a person who has not furnished a return of Income at all
may receive a more favorable treatment than someone who has actually
furnished a return but has failed to include a particular income
therein. He has explained this with a simple and lucid live example.

Introduction
Penalty
u/s. 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is for concealment of
particulars of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars of income.
The Income-tax Department treats the relevant income as ‘concealed’ or
‘escaping assessment’. For brevity, it will be referred to as ‘escaped
income’ in this article. Penalty is equivalent to 100% to 300% of the
‘tax sought to be avoided.’

Relevant provision
Explanation 4 to section 271(1)(c) defines the expression ‘Amount of Tax Sought to be Avoided’ (ATSA) as follows:

“(a)
in any case where the amount of income in respect of which particulars
have been concealed or inaccurate particulars have been furnished has
the effect of reducing the loss declared in the return or converting
that loss into income, means the tax that would have been chargeable on
the income in respect of which particulars have been concealed or
inaccurate particulars have been furnished had such income been the
total income;

(b) in any case to which Explanation 3 applies,
means the tax on the total income assessed [as reduced by the amount of
advance tax, tax deducted at source, tax collected at source and
self-assessment tax paid before the issue of notice u/s. 148];

(c)
in any other case, means the difference between the tax on the total
income assessed and the tax that would have been chargeable had such
total income been reduced by the amount of income in respect of which
particulars have been concealed or inaccurate particulars have been
furnished.”

Clause (a) deals with a situation of loss vis-à-vis escaped income.

Clause
(b) is relevant for this article – It refers to Explanation 3 which
deals with a situation where no return has been filed.

Explanation 3 —
“Where
any person fails, without reasonable cause, to furnish within the
period specified in sub-section. (1) of section 153 a return of his
income which he is required to furnish u/s. 139 in respect of any
assessment year commencing on or after the 1st day of April, 1989, and
until the expiry of the period aforesaid, no notice has been issued to
him under Clause (i) of sub-section (1) of section 142 or section 148
and the Assessing Officer or the Commissioner (Appeals) is satisfied
that in respect of such assessment year such person has taxable income,
then such person shall, for the purposes of Clause (c) of this s/s., be
deemed to have concealed the particulars of his income in respect of
such assessment year, notwithstanding that such person furnishes a
return of his income at any time after the expiry of the period
aforesaid in pursuance of a notice u/s. 148.”

The unfairness
In
terms of Explanation 3 – where the assessee has not filed or furnished
the IT return and any escaped income is detected then the prepaid taxes
like TDS, advance tax, tax collected at source and self assessment tax
are to be deducted from the tax on the total income for the purposes of
calculating ATSA. This is logical and fair. However, Clause (b) does not
deal with a situation where the return was duly furnished but a
particular item remained to be included in the income. This is a more
common situation particularly if the income is in the nature of only
accrual and not actually received. Sometimes there could be TDS on the
said escaped income which also remains to be claimed. It is grossly
unjust and unfair not to consider this TDS while calculating ATSA on
escaped income.

It is a different story if such inadvertent
escapement is accepted by the income tax department as non concealment.
Otherwise, it leads to an anomaly that a person who has not furnished a
return at all receives more favourable treatment than the one who
actually furnishes the return but fails to include a particular item.

Needless
to state that the particulars in Form 26AS are not necessarily complete
and reliable. Otherwise, an assessee would get a hint that some income
has remained to be included.

Live Example
An
individual’s services were transferred from Company A to Company B
within the same group. Company A credited ESOPs to his demat account and
duly deducted tax on the perquisite value. Since, it was only a
notional income, it did not occur to the assessee to obtain salary
certificate from Company A, hence purely out of oversight and ignorance,
the income remained to be included. It was revealed in the course of
assessment from Form 26AS. Therefore, although full tax @ 30% was
deducted on the perquisite value – escaped income – the definition of
ATSA does not permit the deduction of this TDS for penalty u/s.
271(1)(c).

Suggestion

The scope of Clause (b) of
Explanation 4 should be enlarged so as to cover both the situations
namely non furnishing of return as well as non inclusion of particular
income in the return filed.

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Is levy of penalty mandatory and inevitable? – is the reliance on the decision of the supreme court correct?

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Synopsis
The Supreme court decision in the case of Shriram Mutual Fund observed that penalty is attracted the moment contravention is established and the intention of the parties involved becomes irrelevant. In this article, the author discusses the application of this ratio by SEBI in levying penalty and various arguments against this approach

Sebi relies on supreme court decision and holds levy of penalty to be mandatory

Almost each and every SEBI order levying penalty relies on a Supreme Court decision in Shriram’s case (SEBI vs. Shri Ram Mutual Fund (2006) 68 SCL 216). The interpretation of SEBI is that since there is a violation, then penalty has to follow. Not only is mens rea (guilty intent) irrelevant, it is stated, but the penalty has to mandatorily follow any violation. Further, mitigating factors are irrelevant. In short, it is put forth that according to the Supreme Court decision, in case of proceedings for levy of penalty, penalty is mandatory and the Adjudicating Officer has no discretion in the matter. Is this the ratio of the decision? Should a person who has not filed a document late, or made some errors in some filings, etc. resign himself to a penalty in all circumstances?

As stated, for this purpose, SEBI almost always cites a single sentence from the Shri Ram case as if by mindless rote. Here is one example from a recent SEBI Order (in matter of M/s. Vizwise Commerce Private Limited, Order No. JJ/AM/AO-117/2014, dated 28th August 2014).

“In the matter of SEBI vs. Shri Ram Mutual Fund (2006) 68 SCL 216 (SC), the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has held that “In our considered opinion, penalty is attracted as soon as the contravention of the statutory obligation as contemplated by the Act and the regulation is established and hence the intention of the parties committing such violation becomes wholly irrelevant.” (emphasis supplied)

With such words, it would appear inevitable that even in cases of mere clerical violations, liability is strict and absolute and there is no escape to levy penalty. However, the matter does not end there. Next cited are the powers of SEBI to levy huge penalties. Most provisions allow levy of penalty of upto Rs. 25 crore or a Rs. 1 lakh per day. Citing the decision and such penal provisions, large penalties running into several lakhs are levied, which, if one compares with huge and absolute powers SEBI has, would sound almost lenient.

The mitigating factors, even if pleaded by the party, are usually brushed aside, as if the hands of SEBI are tied in view of the clear mandate of the Supreme Court.

The alleged defaulter, in the face of such words of the Supreme Court, is demoralised and believes that there is no point in filing an appeal before the Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT). It also so happens that the SAT in recent times rarely reduces or reverses such penalty. Thus, it is common to see scores of orders passed every week with large amount of penalties.

Is penalty inevitable? What did THE Supreme Court really say?
However, is levy of penalty so inevitable? Has the Supreme Court made the issue so absolute? Or are the words of the Court cited out of context? It is submitted that Supreme Court has really held something different. Moreover, it has itself considered mitigating factors and has not wholly ruled out bonafide intention. The Court has also not relieved SEBI/Adjudicating Officer from exercising judicial discretion and stated that he may choose not to levy penalty in appropriate cases.

Let us review very briefly the reported facts of Shriram’s case. Shriram was a mutual fund. Provisions made by SEBI prohibited a mutual fund from dealing with stock brokers beyond 5% of its aggregate sales/purchases. It was an admitted fact that in 12 instances Shriram violated this limit. Penalty was levied. Shriram pleaded before the SAT (the appellant did not appear before the Supreme Court) that the violation was not intentional and there were certain genuine circumstances that required them to deal with such brokers beyond the maximum limits. The SAT set aside the order of penalty “on the purported ground that the penalty to be imposed for failure to perform a statutory obligation is a matter of discretion. The Tribunal has held that the penalty is warranted by the quantum which has to be decided by taking into consideration the factors stated in section 15J.”

Question of law
The Supreme Court phrased the “question of law” before it in the following words:-

“The important question of law which arises for consideration in the present appeal is whether the Tribunal was justified in allowing the appeals of the respondent herein and that whether once it is conclusively established that the Mutual Fund has violated the terms of the Certificate of Registration and the Statutory Regulations, i.e., the SEBI (Mutual Funds) Regulation, 1996, the imposition of penalty becomes a sine qua non of the violation. In other words, the breach of a civil obligation which attracts penalty in the nature of fine under the provisions of the Act and the regulations would immediately attract the levy of penalty irrespective of the fact whether the contravention was made by the defaulter with any guilty intention or not.” (emphasis supplied).

Thus, as will seen later, the question before the Court was whether, once a violation is established, does penalty have to follow or would also have to be established that the defaulter had a guilty intention?

What The Supreme Court held

It is in this light that the Court reviewed the framework of the Act. It pointed out that broadly there were two sets of proceedings under the Act – one under which penalty is levied in civil proceedings and others which are criminal proceedings. For imposing penalty in civil proceedings, proof of a guilty intention is not required, while it is mandatory in case of criminal proceedings. Since in the present case, the proceedings were for levy of penalty under civil proceedings, there was no need to prove that Shriram had a guilty intention. It was sufficient to show that the violation was established.

Since this was done, penalty was leviable. However, is this the end of the matter? Is “intention” wholly irrelevant? Are other factors including mitigating factors wholly irrelevant? It is submitted this is not so and not only does the Act provide otherwise, but even the Supreme Court does not say so.

Factors to be considered for deciding quantum of penalty or waiving it

That penalty is not inevitable is apparent from the SEBI Act itself. Section 15J makes it clear that, in adjudication proceedings, the Officer shall have due regard to certain factors. The section reads as under (emphasis supplied):-

While adjudging quantum of penalty under section 15-I, the Adjudicating Officer shall have the due regard to the following factors, namely :-

(a) the amount of disproportionate gain or unfair advantage, wherever quantifiable, made as a result of the default;

(b) the amount of loss caused to an investor or group of investors as a result of the default;

(c) the repetitive nature of the default.”

Thus, the Act itself mandates the Adjudicating Officer to consider these three factors. This was recognised in Shriram’s case as well.

It is also submitted that in appropriate cases levy of zero penalty is also permissible. It is also submitted that other factors, apart from these three statutory factors, would also be relevant, depending on facts of each case. This is also evident from decision of Supreme Court.

For example, the Supreme Court noted that “there has been a clear violation of the statutory regulations and provisions repetitively, covering a period of 6 quarters”. In other words, the fact that the violations were repetitive over six quarters was highlighted.

The Supreme Court also reviewed the circumstances in the case to show that there were no extraordinary circumstances mitigating the violation. the Court observed, “the facts and circumstances of the present case in no way indicate the existence of special circumstances so as to waive the penalty imposed by the adjudicating officer”. Again, this shows two things. Had there been special facts/circumstances shown, then firstly, they would have to be considered. Secondly, appropriate circumstances would justify waiver of the penalty too. Indeed the Court went ahead and observed that the Officer had considered all the circumstances before levy of penalty which too was below the maximum amount.

Curiously, the Court even noted that the violation was wilful. the Court observed, “hence, we hold that the respondents have wilfully violated statutory provisions with impunity and, hence, the imposition of penalty was fully justified.” One wonders, if it was so clear that wilful intent is totally irrelevant, why was such a factor considered? if it can be clearly established in a particular case that there was no wilful violation, would penalty not be leviable? or at least penalty would be reduced? in other words, absence of mens rea is not wholly irrelevant, as SEBI orders suggest.

In light of this, it is submitted that the consistent stand of SEBI that violation has to result in penalty is an erroneous interpretation and its reliance on Shriram, far from being correct, is actually wrong and goes against what the Court held in that case. It is submitted that SEBI has to consider all mitigating factors before levy of penalty. If the appellant demonstrates that he did not have guilty intention, that too has to be judicially considered. Further, SEBI has full discretion to levy a nominal penalty or even waive penalty altogether. SEBI also has to consider the three factors that section 15J prescribes. The defaulter would also be right in questioning an order of penalty on grounds that there were mitigating circumstances or that such circumstances were not appreciated by SEBI. It is thus high time that the ghost of Shriram that haunts adjudication proceedings is exorcised, either by SEBI itself, or through a strong appeal before SAT/Supreme Court. And justice, sense of fair play and absence of arbitrariness be restored in adjudication proceedings.

It is worth drawing attention to a recent amendment to penalty provisions made by the Securities Laws Amendment Act, 2014, notified on 25th August, 2014. By the amendment, most provisions relating to penalties now provide  that  a  minimum  penalty  of  Rs.  1  lakh  would be leviable. It is submitted that despite such provision, the ratio of Shriram continues to be valid. SEBI has to consider all circumstances even for levy of minimum penalty. SEBI continues to have a power to waive penalty altogether.

Tenancy – Statutory Tenancy – Can be bequeathed by Will – Unless it is specifically barred by some provision – Powers of Appellate Court – Subsequent Events – Mould relief accordingly: Section 96 of CPC:

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Gaiv Dinshaw Irani & Ors. vs. Tehmtan Irani & Ors. AIR 2014 SC 2326

One Bomanji Irani, who was the predecessor of Appellants herein, acquired tenancy rights in respect of the premises. The premises comprised of residential Bungalow. Bomanji executed a Will dated 15th October, 1934 in favour of his children and wife Daulatbai, appointing Daulatbai as a residuary legatee of the Will. Bomanji Irani died on 27th September, 1946 leaving behind his wife Daulatbai; five sons, and three daughters. The Will was probated with consent of all the legal heirs and Daulatbai had rights over the suit premises and the tenancy rights which, as claimed, could be bequeathed as per law. Daulatbai executed a Will on 2nd January, 1949 in favour of her son Dinshaw who was the original Defendant No. 2. However, the said Will was not probated.

The then Bombay Municipal Corporation (‘BMC’) acquired ownership rights in respect of the suit premises and issued eviction notices to the heirs and legal representatives of Bomanji, comprising Daulatbai and five sons. In response to the eviction notices, the legal heirs and representatives of Bomanji objected to the same but they consented to the tenancy being transferred in the name of Dinshaw Irani (original Defendant No. 2).

Daulatbai addressed a letter to the BMC requesting for transfer of rent bills in the name of her son Dinshaw. The BMC passed an eviction order against the heirs and legal representatives of Bomanji. Against the said eviction order passed by the BMC, the heirs and legal representatives of Bomanji jointly filed a suit as joint tenants,. Daulatbai died during the pendency of this suit. On 11th July 1977, the said suit was decreed in favour of the Plaintiffs and the order passed by the BMC terminating the tenancy was set aside. By letter dated 18th September, 1981, BMC transferred the tenancies in favour of Dinshaw, subject to certain conditions. Respondent No. 1 (son and legal heir) and Respondent No. 5 (son of the legal heirs) objected to the transfer of tenancy in the name of Dinshaw Irani.

The Respondents (legal heirs of Homi and Ardeshir Irani) on coming to know about the transfer of tenancy of the suit premises, issued a notice and subsequently filed Long Cause Suit challenging transfer of tenancy before the City Civil Court at Bombay. The City Civil Court dismissed both the suits by two separate judgments.

On further Appeal, the Court observed that divesting of tenancy rights by means of a Will is a highly debated topic and is subject to the tenancy laws of the concerned State. In the present matter, the tenancies being the suit premises are owned by the local authority of Mumbai and are subject to the State Act being the Bombay Rents, Hotel And Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. The said Act, since repealed, exempts the present tenancy from its purview as per section 4(1). The BMC Act is also silent on this aspect.

In the case of Gian Devi Anand vs. Jeevan Kumar and Ors. (1985) 2 SCC 683, four Judges of a five-Judge Constitution Bench held that the rule of heritability extends to statutory tenancy of commercial as well as residential premises in States where there is no explicit provision to the contrary and tenancy rights are to devolve according to the ordinary law of succession unless otherwise provided in the statute.

The Court observed held that, in general, tenancies are to be regulated by the governing legislation, which favour that tenancy be transferred only to family members of the deceased original tenant. However, in the light of the majority decision of the Constitution Bench in Gian Devi vs. Jeevan Kumar (supra), the position which emerges is that in absence of any specific provisions, general laws of succession to apply.

The BMC by means of a letter dated 19th September, 1961 treated all the heirs of Bomanji as joint tenants; and the heirs of Bomanji by means of letter dated 25th October, 1961 also claimed themselves to be joint tenants; Daulatbai in her letter dated 3rd February, 1962 also claimed joint tenancy along with her sons and sought transfer of the rent receipts only in the name of her son Dinshaw.

The High Court taking note of the subsequent events moulded the relief in the appeal u/s. 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the same has been challenged by the Appellants. In ordinary course of litigation, the rights of parties are crystallised on the date the suit is instituted and only the same set of facts must be considered. However, in the interest of justice, a court including a court of appeal u/s. 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not precluded from taking note of developments subsequent to the commencement of the litigation, when such events have a direct bearing on the relief claimed by a party. The entire purpose of the suit the Courts taking note of the same should mould the relief accordingly. This rule is one of ancient vintage adopted by the Supreme Court of America in Patterson vs. State of Alabama 294 US 600 followed in Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul vs. Keshwar Lal Choudhury AIR 1941 FC 5. The abovementioned principle has been recognised in a catena of decisions.

The normal rule is that in any litigation the rights and obligations of the parties are adjudicated upon as they obtain at the commencement of the lis. But this is subject to an exception. Wherever subsequent events of fact or law which have a material bearing on the entitlement of the parties to relief or on aspects which bear on the moulding of the relief occur, the court is not precluded from taking a ‘cautious cognisance’ of the subsequent changes of fact and law to mould the relief.

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Precedent – Manner of citing – Whenever any issue is decided by the Supreme Court or/and High Court, it is to be first referred to by the Authorities/ Tribunals and then decision should be rendered on the issue involved in the case:

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Commr. of Customs and Central Excise vs. Advani Oerlikon Ltd (2014) (306) ELT 66 (Chhattisgarh)

The Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue and upheld the order passed by the Commissioner of appeals.

The short question that arises for consideration in the reference application before the Hon’ble Court is whether any referable legal question arises out of the order passed by the Tribunal for being answered by this Court in its reference jurisdiction.

The Hon’ble Court observed that though while deciding the issue, the Tribunal did not refer to any case law on the subject, yet the view taken by the Tribunal was in accordance with the law laid down by the Supreme Court. In fact, it would have been better if the Tribunal had taken note of the law on the subject laid down by the Supreme Court and then would have expressed its view.

The Court further observed that whenever, any issue is decided by the Supreme Court or/High Court then it has to be first referred to by the Authorities/Tribunals and then decision should be rendered on the issue involved in the case keeping in view the law laid down in decided cases.

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Coparcenary property – Right of daughter – No partition affected prior to enforcement of Amendment Act – Death of father (co-parcener) – Daughter will have right at par with son. Hindu Succession Act, 1956, Section 6 (as amended in 2005)

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Jamanbhai Maganbhai Mavani & Another vs. Bhanuben Maganbhai Mavani & Others AIR 2014 Gujarat 185

The short facts of the case are that the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were the original plaintiffs [‘Sisters’] who had filed the suit for partition of the coparcenary property of their father’s family contending inter alia that they were daughters of the deceased Maganbhai Mohanbhai Mavani and the defendants were the brothers, in possession of the family property and they were entitled to the share in the family property.

The appellant together with respondent No. 3 – the defendants resisted the suit contending inter alia that the Will was executed by the father during his lifetime in favour of the mother, original defendant No. 1 and it was contended that the partition had taken place and further, after marriage of the original plaintiffs, they were not entitled to get any share in the property.

The court observed that the Will was not proved. Apart from the said aspect, if the property was a coparacenary property, the right would accrue to the members of the coparcenary from the very beginning.

Once the partition was not proved or there was no partition, coparcenary property would continue to have same character and it cannot be said that since the right accrued on the date when the father had expired. Such right is saved by amendment made in provision of section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act. As such on the date of death of the father, if the property remained as coparcenary property and no division or partition is made prior to the amendment, the right cannot be extinguished of Hindu female in coparcenary property. There was no satisfactory evidence, produced before the trial Court nor before the High Court to show that the property was partitioned prior to the amendment. If the property was not partitioned prior to the amendment, merely, because the father, one of the coparceners of the property had expired, such right cannot be said to have extinguished nor could be it said that the right of partition had accrued only on the death of the father. If on the date of amendment, the property has continued as coparcenary property, Hindu female will have right at par with the son.

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Coparcenery property – Karta – When male member is available, female in such circumstances would not be eligible to become a karta of family–Section 6–Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

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Jagannath Rangnath Chavan vs. Suman Sahebrao Ghawte & Ors AIR 2014 (NOC) 491 (Bom)

One Mr. Nana had three children – one son by name Tukaram and two daughters Suman (Plaintiff No.1) and Shanti aka Vimal (Plaintiff No.2). The two daughters had filed a suit against the present appellant, who was defendant no.1 and another defendant, challenging the sale deed dated 28-03-1968 executed by their brother Tukaram in favour of the present appellant/defendant no.1 and, in the alternative, for partition and separate possession.

Nana had died on 19-07-1967. The plaintiff no.1, Suman was already married and had gone to reside with her husband at her matrimonial place; whereas plaintiff no.2 Shanti aka Vimal was a minor, who resided with Tukaram. Tukaram had the responsibility of marrying plaintiff no.2 Shanti aka Vimal, since there was no other male member in the family except him. Tukaram vide sale deed on 29- 12-1967 sold the suit land on 28-03-1968 to defendant no.1. As there was no other source of livelihood/income to Tukaram, he applied the sale proceeds for performing rituals, maintenance of the family and for performing marriage of Shanti aka Vimal (Plaintiff No.2). Tukaram died on 03-12-1971. After his death, both the sisters had filed the suit on 29-09-1973.

The appellant (defendant no.1) filed his written statement and contested the claim made by the plaintiffs, principally on the ground that Tukaram, after the death of Nana, became the Karta of the family, being the eldest son remaining in the family due to marriage of plaintiff no. 1 and for legal necessity, he was compelled to sell the suit land and the said transaction of sale was binding on the plaintiffs who could not have questioned the sale deed. On one of the issues, the trial Court held that Tukaram was the Karta of the family and the legal necessity was duly proved and, therefore, the sale deed was binding and could not be questioned.

The court observed that it will be revolutionary of all accepted principles of Hindu law to suppose that the seniormost female member of a joint Hindu family, even though she has adult sons who are entitled as coparceners to the absolute ownership of the property, could be the manager of the family. She would be the guardian of her minor sons till the eldest of them becomes a major, but she would not be manager of the joint family for she is not a coparcener.

Thus, the court held that a female, in normal circumstances and particularly as in the instant case when a male is available is not eligible to become a manager or Karta of the family, he being the son and, as such, it was only Tukaram the major son who was left Karta sui juris in the family. Hence, Tukaram was the only eligible and competent person of the family after the death of Nana to act as Karta/manager.

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Coparcenary property – Hindu Law – Partition – Wife cannot demand partition of joint family property – She would get a share only if partition is demanded by her husband or sons and property is actually partitioned.

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Jayamati Narendra Shah (deceased by L.Rs) and Others vs. Narendra Amritlal Shah. AIR 2014 Bombay 119.

The plaintiff was the son of the defendant (Father). The defendant’s wife, the plaintiff’s mother, expired on 10th June, 2013 leaving behind a registered will dated 2nd July 2011. The plaintiff sought administration of her estate. The plaintiff also sought disclosure of the remainder of the estate which the plaintiff had no knowledge of. The plaintiff was the sole beneficiary under the will of the deceased (Mother) which had been sought to be probated. The plaintiff claimed to be the owner of the properties bequeathed by the deceased (Mother) to him. In the suit, the plaintiff claimed partition of immovable properties that had been bequeathed to him and mandatory injunction directing the defendant to handover those properties to the plaintiff and the permanent injunctions against alienation.

The plaintiff claimed 1/2 undivided share which the deceased had in a flat. The defendant resides in that flat. The plaintiff had left that premises upon certain disputes between the parties prior to the death of the deceased.

The title of the deceased to give her a right to bequeath the property would have to be seen in the context of a HUF of her husband, the defendant herein. The husband was alive on the date of the Will as also on the date of her death. The deceased was not a widow.

In a HUF, only sons (vertically) and brothers (laterally) would constitute a coparcenary in a Joint Hindu Family. Their wives may be members of the joint Hindu family but are not coparceners. The proprietary rights are of a coparcener if the joint Hindu family owns any joint property. The wives of coparceners do not get any interest in joint property owned and held by coparceners who are co owners. The wives of the co-owners do not get any interest by virtue of their birth. It is only a Hindu widow who gets the interest of her husband in the coparcenary or joint family property upon the death of her husband. That interest enables her to claim maintenance and residence. Only a widow can demand partition of the interest which her deceased husband would have been entitled. Consequently a wife has no share, right, title or interest in the HUF in which her husband is a coparcener with his brothers, father or sons and after the amendment of section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act in 2005 with his sisters and daughters also. The wife, may be a member of a joint Hindu family. But by virtue of being a member in the joint Hindu family she cannot get any share, right, title or interest in the joint Hindu property which that family owns. A wife cannot demand partitition unlike a daughter. She would get a share only if partitition is demanded by her husband or sons and the property is actually partitioned. The claim by a wife during the life time of the husband in the share and interest which he has as a coparcener in his HUF is wholly premature and completely misconceived.

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Potato Salad and the Funny World of Finance

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If you were to do a Google search for “Potato Salad” what do you think will be the very first result?

A recipe…
An update on the nutritional value of potato salad…

A list of places that serve the ‘best’ potato salad…

You will be surprised that it is none of this. Instead, what you may find is a link to a Kickstarter fundraising project initiated by Zach Danger Brown, wanting to raise US $ 10 for his project, which he describes very simply as:

I’m making potato salad.

Basically, I’m just making potato salad. I haven’t decided what kind yet.

Zach put up this very simple project on the crowdfunding platform ‘Kickstarter’ to raise a modest US $ 10 …. And he has already got a commitment of over US $ 50,000 till date! What is even more interesting is the speed at which he has managed to raise the funds and the number of people who have chosen to contribute to the project – at the point when I am writing this article (1st August, 2014) there are 6,730 backers who have pledged a whopping US $ 54,030 against the goal of just US $ 10! Surely, Zach would not be short of US $ 10, and may be, he didn’t even want to make Potato salad… but a creative thought, the promised reward of “…you will get a ‘thank you’ posted on your website and I will say your name out loud while making the potato salad…” was enough to set the crowdfunding community amused enough to make a commitment to the project.

Well, when you ask for US $ 10 and get US $ 50000 instead, it is surely newsworthy. No wonder that the story made its way in to the Forbes e-magazine, with the title “What Potato Salad Teaches Us About Crowdfunding”. The article goes on to explain that, there are many projects that aim at alleviating poverty or making healthcare available to the needy, or making that breakthrough invention…. But every once in a while, it will happen that the project that manages to raise funds has nothing to do with charity, social relevance or technology; the project that catches the fancy of the invisible contributing community is the one that makes no lofty promises but just tickles their funny bone, or amuses them after a tiring day at work!

This brings us to crowdfunding, and what’s new in this funny world of finance.

Kickstarter is a crowd-funding platform with the stated objective of ‘bringing creative projects to life’. It allows individuals with creative ideas to conceptualise the idea, convert it to a project and seek funding for a specific amount through the website www.kickstarter.com.

The project is then hosted on the website for making commitments for contributing to the project. If the project is able to raise the requisite funding within the timeline defined by the project creator, the project goes ahead, the funds committed are collected and given to the project creator – all this for a small fee of 5% retained by Kickstarter. If the project fails to obtain full commitment for funding, it does not go ahead – it is all or none principle for fundraising.

Kickstarter has been successful is raising funds for many projects. The website claims that 6.7 million people have backed a kickstarter project till date, and many of them have backed multiple projects.

Kickstarter is just one of the many crowdfunding platforms – these platforms provide a unique option of raising funds for projects that may not be able to access the traditional banking channels or may not have the requisite commercially viable revenue model that is required under the traditional financing options. Each platform defines the elibility criteria, who can post a project and who can contribute – the rules may vary, but the underlying principle remains the same: using an internet-based platform for seeking funds from a wide and vibrant variety of internet users for ideas, projects, causes, whims and fancies. These platforms give a chance to the contributor to feel a sense of belonging to the underlying cause and feel connected with the community of contributors.

Crowdfunding has made it possible for people to fund projects in the arena of art, design, movie making, theatre, publishing, photography and more. This means of funding is equally popular for raising funds for socially relevant projects, charity, angle investing, developing technology or undertaking some extra-ordinary travel. So, if you have a great art project, an idea about an App that you are convinced will serve a useful purpose, a sculpture that you want to create, a book that you want to write, a movie that is running in your mind…..you know that there could be an eager set of contributors waiting to give you the funds to make that project happen.

I know that many of the readers would be wondering as to how the funds in the hands of the project owner would be taxed, if at all, or how will the Crowdfunding Platform accrue its income, or how do the platform creators prevent abuse and frauds…. As for me, I will stick to telling stories about people who made history in the world of finance by asking for $ 10 to make potato salad!

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New Theory of Relativity for Corporate India

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Synopsis
Compliance for Related Party Transactions has been given a new dimension by the Companies Act, 2013 and the Listing Agreement. The Governance model has been turned inside out. This article examines the requirements under these two key statutes and also highlights the other compliances which companies need to bear in mind for related party transactions. Recent relaxations under both these Laws have also been covered.

Introduction
One of the definitions of relativity is the quality or state of being relative. Albert Einstein has made relativity famous by his Theory of Relativity (E= mc2)which is now a fundamental principle of Physics.

However, Corporate India is now grappling with a new Theory of Relativity – the one propounded by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (via the Companies Act, 2013)and the SEBI (via the Listing Agreement), i.e., the Related Party conundrum!

A host of new regulations have revolutionised the concept of related party transactions. While the intention of these new regulations is very clear, i.e., safeguarding minority interest, some of the original provisions were rather harsh and may have lead to stifling the normal business operations. Accordingly, the provisions of the Companies Act, 2013 were diluted to some extent. Recently (on 15th September, 2014), SEBI also amended the original provisions of Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement. Let us, through this Article, look at these new provisions under the Companies Act as well as the Listing Agreement.

New Theory
We may rephrase Einstein’s famous theory as follows for Corporate India’s related party transactions:

R = S.2(76) + S.188 + Cl. 49 + S.40A(2)(a) + AS 18

Where the Variables of this Equation are:

R = Related Party Transactions;

Section 2(76) and S.188 of the Companies Act, 2013, both of which are effective from 1st April, 2014 for all companies;

Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement, which is effective from 1st October, 2014 for listed companies;

Section 40A(2)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and

AS 18 = Accounting Standard 18 issued by the ICAI

Let us look at these variables in detail.

Who is a Related Party?

The compliances for related party transactions (“RPTs”) are to be done under two laws – section 188 of the Companies Act, 2013 and Cl. 49 of the Listing Agreement. In effect, for listed companies, the higher (stricter) of the two laws would apply. The definition of a related party in relation to a listed company u/s. 2(76) of the Companies Act, 2013 and Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement is given in Table-1.

* U nder the Companies Act, a relative for an individual means his HUF, spouse, parents, children, siblings and spouses of children. Stepfather, step-mother, step-son, step-brother and step-sister are also relatives. However, a stepdaughter is not a relative. Further, unlike the earlier list u/s. 6 of the Companies Act, 1956, several relatives have been omitted from the definition, these include, grandparents, grand children, spouse of grand children, spouses of siblings.

Under the earlier provisions of Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement (prior to the amendment carried out on 15th September, 2014), several other entities were considered to be a related party. However, all those entities have now been replaced with one single statement – Related Parties under an Accounting Standard. A person who is not a related party under the Companies Act but is covered under an Accounting Standard would now be so even under Clause 49. Thus, listed companies have to consider the definition under the Companies Act and also the definition under the applicable Accounting Standards.

What is a RPT?
Now that we have considered who is a related party, let us also understand what constitutes a Related Party Transaction (RPT) for a listed company. Clause 49 defines the same in a very wide manner to mean a transfer of resources, services or obligations between a company and a related party, regardless of whether a price is charged. Hence, even a free service would be a related party transaction. Further, a RPT includes a single transaction or a group of transactions in a contract.

Section 188 on the other hand gives a specified list of contracts or arrangements with a related party which constitute a related party transaction. Hence, the scope of section 188 is much narrower and would only apply to the transactions specified therein. While what constitutes a contract is easy to understand, what constitutes an arrangement could be a moot point? Further, the Rules treat certain RPTs as prescribed RPTs for which a special resolution of the shareholders is required. Both these lists are given in Table-2.

Turnover. Using a consolidated turnover is a good move for Holding Companies which have little or no operations of their own.

What compliances are required?
The compliances required for RPTs under both the laws are illustrated below.

(A) If the RPT is in the Ordinary Course of Business and on an arms’ length pricing, the compliances are given in Table-3.

ALP = Arms’ Length Pricing basis, i.e., an RPT conducted as if it were between unrelated parties so that there is no conflict of interest. To demonstrate that the RPT is on an ALP, the Company may consider comparable uncontrolled prices or such other available illustrations which would demonstrate that the transaction has been carried out on an arms’ length price. The concept of ALP is relevant only qua the Companies Act since Cl. 49 makes no distinction between an RPT at ALP or otherwise.

* What is an ordinary course of business has not been defined and would have to be ascertained on a case-by-case basis. The Memorandum of Association, Financial Statements, Board Minutes, history of past transactions, etc., could be some of the indicators of what is ordinary for a company. For instance, purchase of shares of the promoter’s private company would not be in the ordinary course of business even though it may be on an arms’ length pricing.

* The twin conditions or ALP and ordinary course of business need to be satisfied for a company to get out of the provisions of section 188(1) of the Act. Compliance with any one is not enough.

(B) If the RPT is not in the Ordinary Course of Business and/or not on an arms’ length pricing, the compliances are given in Table-4.


The  rules  earlier  prescribed  that  a  company  having  a paid-up capital of rs. 10 crore or more shall not enter into any RPT which is not on an ALP and not in the ordinary course of business without a special resolution. thus, for such companies the requirement of checking whether the RPT was a prescribed RPT was not relevant. However, by virtue of an amendment dated 14th august 2014, the MCA has removed this clause. Hence, as the law stands currently, the threshold requirement of Rs.10 crore of capital stands removed to determine whether an RPT requires a special resolution.

Thus,  the  standards  prescribed  under  Clause  49  are more stringent than those u/s. 188. While section188 provides a gateway in the form of ordinary course of business which is at an arms’ length price, there is no such gateway under Clause 49.

How is the Voting for RPTS to be carried out?

We have seen that shareholders’ approval is required either  under  the  Companies  act  or  under  the  listing agreement  or  both.  This  gives  rise  to  several  issues, some of which are enumerated below.

All for One and One for All?

Section188 provides that no member of the company shall vote on any special resolution, to approve any RPT which may be entered into by the company, if such member is a related party.

A question which arises is that in a transaction between two related parties would all other related parties also be disentitled from voting or would only the ones affected by the transaction be disentitled? for instance, would a director who is a shareholder be disentitled merely because he is a director even though he has no special interest in a transaction? Thus, does the Three Musketeers’ slogan apply – all related parties would be clubbed together even if they have no interest in the transaction?

The MCA issued a clarification in this respect that related party has to be construed with reference to/in the context of the contract or arrangement for which the special resolution  is  being  passed.  this  is  a  very  important clarification that was eagerly awaited. The impact of the same may be illustrated as follows:

Illustration 1
a holding company is entering into a transaction with its substantially owned subsidiary, which is now treated as a related party. the managing director and other directors of the holding company are also treated as related parties u/s. 2(76) of the act. however, if they are shareholders they can vote on this transaction since they are not related parties in the context of the contract being considered.

Illustration 2
A company proposes to enter into a contract with the MD’s wife. here, the md would have to abstain from voting as a shareholder since he is a related party in the context of the contract being considered. however, other directors of the holding company can vote on this transaction if they are shareholders.

To add more spice to the flavour, SEBI has come out with an interesting amendment. It states that for RPTs all entities falling under the definition of related parties shall abstain from voting, irrespective of whether the entity is a party to the   particular transaction or not. this sets at naught the exemption given by the mCa! a classic case of “What the Left Hand Giveth, the Right Hand Taketh  Away.”  thus,  under  the  illustration-1  explained above, the directors of the holding company would have to abstain from voting even though they are not related to the transaction in question. A very strange and harsh requirement.

Father-Son Transactions

In the case of an RPT with a wholly owned subsidiary, the MCA has clarified that special resolution passed by the holding company would suffice under the Act for entering into transactions between the wholly owned subsidiary and the holding company.

Taking a cue from the MCA, the SEBI has also issued a relaxation. neither prior approval of the audit Committee nor shareholders’ special resolution is required for a transaction between a holding company and its wholly owned subsidiary whose accounts are consolidated with such holding company and placed before the shareholders at the general meeting for approval. however, this exemption is only for a 100% subsidiary.

Past Life Benefit?
The MCA has also clarified that related party contracts entered into by companies, after making necessary compliances u/s. 297 of the Companies act, 1956, which contracts came into effect before the commencement of section 188 of the Act, will not require fresh approval u/s. 188 of the act till the expiry of the term of original contract. However, if a modification in such contract is made on or after 1st April 2014, then the requirements u/s. 188 will have to be complied with.

Blanket Exemption?
Further, section 188 does not apply to transactions arising out of compromises, amalgamations, arrangements, etc., dealt with under specific provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 or Companies act, 2013. Clause 49 does not carry a similar exemption.

Before or After?
Should the consent of the Board be obtained prior to     or after entering into the RPT? For prescribed RPTs, shareholders’ resolution is required to be passed prior  to the transaction but in other cases, no such express provision is made. Further, the section 188 provides that in case of a contract or arrangement entered into by a director or any employee without approval of the Board/Company, such contract may be ratified by post-facto consent within 3 months.

The   provisions   of   Clause   49   are   applicable   to   all prospective RPTs entered into after 1st October 2014. All existing material related party contracts or arrangements as on the date of this circular which are likely to continue beyond 31st march, 2015 must be placed for approval of the shareholders in the first General Meeting subsequent to 1st october, 2014. However, a company may choose to get such contracts approved by the shareholders even before 1st october, 2014. In case of a listed company, the shareholders’ resolution would also require an e-voting facility.   The   amended   Clause   49   permits   the  audit Committee to grant an omnibus approval for RPTs subject to certain conditions.

Consequences     of Non-Compliance The Act provides that any RPT which is not in compliance with section 188 may be  voidable  at  the  option  of  the Board.  The  director  or the employee concerned who authorised such contract or arrangement with the related party will be liable to indemnify the company for any loss incurred by it. Further, the company can proceed against such  director or employee for recovery of any loss it sustains due to such RPT.

The   punishment   for   non-compliance   of   section   188 on a director/employee in case of a listed company is imprisonment for a term of up to 1 year and/or fine of Rs. 25,000 to rs. 5 lakh. in case of an unlisted company the punishment is a fine of Rs. 25,000 to Rs. 5 lakh. Further, a person who has been convicted of an offence u/s.   188 at any time during the last 5 years is not eligible for appointment as a director of a company. the  punishment  for  non-compliance  with  the  listing Agreement has been laid down under the Securities Contract (regulation) act, 1956 and can extend up to a term of a maximum of 10 years and/or a fine of up to a maximum of Rs. 25 crore.

Reporting and Accounting requirements
Disclosures about RPTs are to be given under 3 Regulations – Section 188, Clause 49 and AS 18:

Section 188
of the Companies Act

clause 49 of
the listing agreement

Accounting
Standard 18 on Related

Party disclosures

Every
RPT (other than one at ALP and in the ordinary course of business) must be
referred to in the Board of Directors’ Report along with justifications.

Details
of all materials RPTs shall be disclosed quarterly along with the compliance
report on corporate governance

Accounting
for transactions with those related parties as defined in AS 18 are to be
given in the Financial Statements.

The Explanatory Statement to the Notice
calling a General Meeting (if any)
for passing a Special Resolution must mention the prescribed particulars.

The
Related Party Policy should be disclosed on the company’s website and also in
its Annual Report. The url to the web page should also be provided in the
Annual Report.

The
manner and nature of accounting is also given under AS 18.

A
Register of Contracts or Arrangements in which Directors are interested must
be maintained in the prescribed form.

The  Standard  on  Auditing  (SA)  550  Revised-  related Parties lays down the auditor’s responsibilities with respect to related party relationships and transactions while auditing financial statements.

Specified Domestic Transactions
How can there be any major development in india without the income-tax act having its share of the pie? the last piece of this jigsaw puzzle is s. 40a(2)(a)of the income-tax act which has introduced the concept of Specified Domestic Transactions. Any payments made by an assessee to related parties as specified under the income-tax act which are excessive or unreasonable may be disallowed to the extent of such excess. Further, certain related party transactions need to comply with the prescribed documentation, reporting and audit requirements in a manner similar to international transactions under the Transfer Pricing Regime. A  recent  delhi  tribunal  decision  in  the  case  of  Jai Surgicals Ltd vs. ACIT, reported at 534(2014) 46-A, BCAJ has held that payments made to a related party without obtaining approval under the erstwhile section 297 of the Companies act, 1956 cannot be treated as an offence or being prohibited by law. hence, such payment would not be disallowed u/s. 37(1) of the income-tax act.

Conclusion
SEBI has clearly thrown down the gauntlet to listed companies to carry out related party transactions both in letter and in spirit of the law. A plethora of regulations would force companies to have a relook at such transactions and ensure better minority protection. However, while we welcome better governance, let us not lose sight of the difference  between  governance  and  regulation.  these regulations  should  not  end  up  leading  to  more  law, but no order!!

Comments on Exposure Draft – Guidance Note on Accounting for Service Concession Arrangements by Concessionaires

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28th August 2014

The Secretary,
Accounting Standards Board,
The Institute of Chartered Accounts of India,
Indraprastha Marg,
ICAI Bhawan, Post Box No. 7100,
New Delhi – 110002

Dear Sir,

Subject: Comments on Exposure Draft – Guidance Note on Accounting for Service Concession Arrangements by Concessionaires

We have pleasure in forwarding herewith Comments of Bombay Chartered Accountants’ Society on Exposure Draft – Guidance Note on Accounting. The Exposure Draft was discussed in detail by our Accounting and Auditing Committee and on the basis of the same we are sending our comments. We hope that our comments will receive due consideration.

Thanking you.

Bombay Chartered Accountants ‘ Society

Nitin Shingala                                                                                         Harish N. Motiwalla
President                                                                                                Chairman
                                                                                                Accounting & Auditing Committee

Comments on Exposure Draft – Guidance Note on Accounting for Service Concession Arrangements by Concessionaires Para 14 Here it is stated as follows:

“The concessionaire should recognize and measure revenue in accordance with Accounting Standard (AS) 7, Construction Contracts, and Accounting Standard (AS) 9, Revenue Recognition, for the construction or upgrade and operating the services it performs, respectively. If the concessionaire performs more than one service under a single contract or arrangement, consideration received or receivable should be allocated by reference to the relative fair values of the services delivered.

Comment
If the concessionaire performs service and books its income on the basis of its performance, the consideration received or receivable should also be allocated by reference to the relative fair values of the services performed and not delivered.

As such, there may be difference between the services performed and considered as delivered, which would be the billed revenue. However, there is a possibility where the concessionaire would consider certain services being already performed and accordingly would book the same as revenue though, the difference between the income recognized as performed and delivered would be treated as Unbilled Revenue.

In view of the adoption of new IFRS 15 – Revenue Recognition, which replaces IAS 11 – Construction Contracts as well as IAS 18 – Revenue Recognition, when a contract contains more than one distinct performance obligation, an entity allocates the transaction price to each distinct performance obligation on the basis of relative stand alone selling price.

Considering the above scenario, kindly provide guidance as to whether the concessionaire can allocate consideration by reference to the fair values of the services on the basis of the Input Method (on the basis of the cost incurred towards each distinct performance obligation to the overall cost of the contract).

Para 18
Here it is stated as follows:

“AS 10, Accounting for Fixed Assets, requires that ‘when a fixed asset is acquired in exchange for another asset, its cost is usually determined by reference to the fair market value of the consideration given. It may be appropriate to consider also the fair market value of the asset acquired if this is more clearly evident’. Thus, in accordance with AS 10, service concessions arrangement which is compensated by grant of a right to collect fees from users of the public service would require the acquired ‘intangible asset’ to be recorded at a value which represents the fair value of the construction services rendered.”

Comment
As per AS 26 – Intangible Assets, Para 23 states “An intangible asset should be measured initially at cost.” Hence if there is to be capitalization of cost incurred for receiving a right to charge users of the public service by the concessionaire, the same has to be on the basis of the identifiable component of cost incurred which can be categorized for the receipt of such rights. The reference is the Guidance should be through AS 26 which is the standard specifying treatment for intangibles.

The reference to AS 10, it is felt deals with situation of exchange of tangible asset with a tangible asset. In the case of concessionaire, the cost incurred may not be creation of any tangible asset, since the ownership will be with the operator. Hence the determination of fair value on the basis of treating the cost incurred for construction of a certain asset which does not belong to the concessionaire and treating the said cost towards exchange for another asset which is also not a tangible asset, seems to be faulty.

Para 23
Here it is stated as follows:

“………These contractual obligations to maintain or restore infrastructural facilities, except for any upgrade element (see paragraph 14), ……..”

Comment
Reference to “(see paragraph 14)” should be “(see paragraph 15)”.

Para 25 & 26

Receivable

25 The amount due from or at the direction of the grantor is accounted for as a receivable

26 In case of an annuity, interest element should be segregated and should be recognized in the statement of profit and loss at the rate implicit in the annuity contract.”

Comment
Clarification in cases where the Concessionaires have already recognized financial asset in accordance with 2008 Guidance note in its financial statements.

The 2014 Guidance Note deals only with accounting of Receivable and not financial asset except in cases where the amounts are in nature of Annuity Para 26 of GN provides the segregation of interest.

However since there may be Concessionaires who may have early adopted the 2008 Guidance note (as early adoption was allowed), in cases where such entities have recognized Financial asset in accordance with Para 23 to 25, it will be required to derecognize the same under 2014 GN as no similar provisions have been made. Guidance Note should provide the manner in which such changes will be incorporated in financial statements.

Para 28

Here it is stated as follows:
“The,  depreciable amount of the intangible asset recognized according to paragraph 27 should be allocated on a systematic basis over the best estimate of its useful life.”
 
Comment
Intangible asset has to be amortized over its useful life and hence the word “depreciable amount” should be replaced with “amortizable amount”.

Para 28 & 29
Here    it    is    stated    as    follows:
“28  the depreciable amount of the intangible asset recognized according to paragraph 27 should be allocated on a systematic basis over the best estimate of its   useful life.

29  the amortisation method used should be in accordance    with    the    principles    laid    down    in    AS    26.”

Point 16 of Example 2 of Illustration
Here    it    is    stated    as    follows:
“16         In    accordance    with    AS    26,     the     intangible asset    is amortized over the period in which it is expected to be available for use by the concessionaire, i.e. years 3–10. for the purpose of this example, the depreciable amount of the intangible asset (rs.1, 084) is allocated using the straight-line method.  the annual amortization charge is therefore  rs.1, 084 divided by 8 years, i.e.  Rs.135   per year.”

Comment
Para    28/29    of    GN    prescribes    the    method    of    amortization    as    per    AS    26    (para    73).    Point    16    of    Example    2    provides     the    amortization on straight line method over the concession period.     However,     Schedule     II     of     Companies     Act     2013    specifically     provides     that     the     amortization     will     be     in    
accordance expected revenue for the year as compared to the total revenue during the concession period.  to this extent the Gn will have to be amended for the Concessionaires who are covered by the provisions of the Companies   act, 2013

Para 33
Here    it    is    stated    as    follows:
“in those service concession arrangements, where the concession fees or periodic premium payable to the grantor is of the nature of  revenue sharing arrangement, i.e., the concessionaire acts as the agent of the grantor as a collector of fees from the users of the public service, the amount of fees collected is adjusted for the concession fees or premium paid to the grantor.”

Comment
If the concessionaire is acting as an agent, guidance and clarity is sought as to whether the fees collected by the concessionaire should be accounted on gross basis or on Net basis.

Is an auditor expected to be omniscient?

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Auditors are experts in accounting and auditing matters, but are they expected to possess competencies in fields not usually related to their profession? Quite frequently, auditors are confronted with situations which require expertise that transcends well beyond the realm of accounting and auditing. Consider for instance the following scenarios:

• For an oil exploration company, if the results of exploration and drilling indicate the presence of oil and gas reserves which are considered to be commercially viable, the expenditure incurred on exploration and drilling is capitalised and amortised (depleted) on a ‘unit of production’ basis computed based on proved reserves in the oilfield. How would an auditor estimate the quantum of oil reserves in an oil field?

• In case of a coal mining company, it is necessary to remove overburden and other barren waste materials from the land pit to access ore from which minerals can economically be extracted. Costs incurred for removal of such waste materials during the initial development phase of the mine are generally capitalised. These costs are usually amortised using a proportion of the quantity of ore extracted during a period over the estimated ore reserves. How would one estimate the ore reserve in a mine?

• How would an auditor obtain assurance over the reported liabilities of a company that has made a provision for costs arising as a consequence of an environmental disaster for which the company is culpable?

• How would an auditor obtain sufficient appropriate evidence to support the ‘true and fair’ opinion on the financial statements of a company that owns expensive jewelry, works of art or antiques, either as trading or as investment assets.

The above scenarios present situations where it is imperative to involve an expert to provide necessary information for preparation of the financial statements.

Other areas where experts may be involved are actuarial valuation of liabilities associated with insurance contracts and employee benefit plans, valuation of intangible assets such as brands, patents and trademarks, site clean-up costs, interpretation of contracts, laws and regulations, analysis or valuation of complex derivatives or financial instruments etc.

Depending on the nature, significance and complexity of the matter that requires the involvement of an expert, an auditor may determine whether he has the expertise to evaluate the work of the expert engaged by the management (known as management’s expert), or whether he needs to engage an ‘auditor’s expert’ so as to decrease the risk that material misstatement will not be detected.

An ‘auditor’s expert’ is an individual or organisation possessing expertise in a field other than accounting or auditing, whose work in that field is used by the auditor to assist him in obtaining sufficient appropriate audit evidence. An auditor’s expert may be either an auditor’s internal expert (from within his own firm) or an external expert. It is pertinent to note that an auditor’s expert is engaged by the auditor and not by the client (‘auditee’).

In the present article, we will focus on aspects that an auditor would need to consider where he himself chooses to evaluate the work of the expert rather than employing an ‘auditor’s expert’.

SA 500 Audit Evidence provides guiding principles for auditors where information to be used as evidence has been prepared using the work of a management’s expert.

Having regard to the significance of the expert’s work for audit purposes, the auditor would need to evaluate the competence, capabilities and objectivity of the expert when assessing the risk of material misstatements; obtain an understanding of the work performed by him and evaluate the appropriateness of the expert’s work as audit evidence for the relevant assertion.

Let us understand the application of SA 500 with certain practical real-life scenarios.

1. Actuarial valuation of retirement benefits

Use of actuaries in valuation of retirement benefits/longterm employee benefits is one of the most common practice followed by enterprises world over. While auditors are not expected to re-work the valuation performed by the actuary, an auditor is expected to be cognisant of key factors considered in the valuation and to perform corroborative audit procedures. An illustrative inventory of procedures that need to be performed are as under:

i. Testing the assumptions and methods used by the actuary with empirical data available in public domain as well as historical data of the enterprise. The procedures that could be followed while testing some of these assumptions are listed below –

a. Salary increments – could be tested based on past history of increments given by the enterprise and the general level of increment in the industry in which the enterprise operates.

b. Mortality – could be tested by reference to the mortality tables used by insurance companies

c. Attrition – could be tested based on past history/ experience of employees exiting the enterprise. The workforce could be categorised into various age profiles and a graded attrition rate be applied to each profile.

d. Discount rate – could be tested by reference to yields on government bonds with a maturity that corresponds to the remaining service life considered by the actuary.

e. Expected return on plan assets – could be tested by reviewing the profile of investments comprised in the plan.

f. An analytical review of the various components of the actuarial valuation such as current service costs, return on plan assets, actuarial gains/losses, past service costs etc. in relation to the previous year may also provide directional insights to the auditor.

ii. T esting whether the assumptions and methods are generally accepted by the actuarial profession and are appropriate for financial reporting purposes

iii. Testing whether the source data provided by the enterprise to the actuary was relevant, complete and accurate, for e.g., employee data provided by the enterprise relating to salary, date of joining, leave policy and accumulated leave balances (in case of valuation of compensated absences) etc.

iv. Whether the actuary is a member of any statutory professional body governing the actuarial profession and is subject to ethical/accreditation standards of that body.

v. T he auditor could also consider discussing with the actuary on any aspect relating to the actuarial valuation where clarifications are needed. The personal experience with previous work of the expert could also assist the auditor in evaluating the competence of the actuary.

vi. T he auditor should also be mindful of circumstances that would impair objectivity of the actuary, for e.g. , whether the actuary has any financial interest in the enterprise, whether he provides other services and has any business/personal relationships with the enterprise (other than the engagement for actuarial services).

vii. I t may however be noted that the auditor continues to be responsible for opining on the financial statements which incorporate the retirement benefits liability accounted using the valuation provided by the actuary.

2. Valuation of employee stock option plans

Generally, listed companies in india which issue employee stock options (ESOP) are required to obtain a valuation of the ESOP using an appropriate valuation model for the purpose of determining the fair value of the options for accounting/disclosure purposes. Such valuations are performed by a valuation expert using an appropriate model such as Black Scholes or Binomial models. Usually, in such cases, an auditor does not engage an ‘auditor’s expert’ for evaluating the work performed by the  management  expert.  though  the  valuation  may  be performed by the management expert, the auditor can validate the same by independently testing some of the assumptions/data used by the management expert in valuing the options such as –

i.    dividend yield – by reviewing the past dividend history to validate this assumption
ii.    Volatility – by reviewing the fluctuation in the share prices of the Company over the valuation period
iii.    testing the number of options granted,  exercised and lapsed during the qualifying period

Even in this case, the auditor continues to be responsible while opining on the financial statements which include the ESOP charge accounted based on the valuation provided by the management’s expert.

3.    Estimation of reserves in an oilfield

Enterprises engaged in such industries would  have  their own internal team of professional engineers and geologists or may seek the services of external experts to deduce the expected reserves in an oil field. Such a team of experts may evaluate data to determine whether oil can be economically produced from the well, whether infrastructure exists to enable the marketing of production to be obtained from the field, findings from prior years, their own knowledge of relevant formations and drilling, completion and production techniques applied by the Company etc.

Some of the significant points of focus for oil reserve valuation by an expert could be –

i.    The nature, scope and objectives of the expert’s report – whether the report is prepared solely for the exclusive use of the enterprise and forms the basis for the assessment of impairment of property, plant and equipment.

ii.    Whether the expert acknowledges the fact that the auditors use the report for the purposes of the year end audit?

iii.    Whether the evaluation of reserves is a routine part of the expert’s business?

iv.    Are these experts employed by other oil and gas development and exploration companies to perform such evaluations and thus have established procedures and guidelines that are followed as part of the reserve evaluation process?

v.    Whether the expert  compares  the  data  provided  by the management with public information before incorporating the data in to the model used for computing the reserve. Whether assumptions are reviewed and tested  by  management  to  ensure  the reliability and consistency of the output with expectations and actual results?

vi.    Whether the expert is required to comply with the ethical standards of any governing body and whether the report issued has under any statutory sanction?

vii.    Whether the expert has any direct or indirect interest in the enterprise which could impair his objectivity?

viii.    Based on the complexity involved, the auditors could consider incorporating a ‘matter of emphasis’ in the audit report clearly expressing his reliance on the technical evaluation done by the expert of the expected oil reserves which has formed basis of providing for amortization of the exploratory and drilling costs of the oil well.

4.    Valuation of Artworks

Where an enterprise is engaged in trading of artworks/ antiques, one would need the involvement of a valuation expert to test whether the net realisable value of such items exceeds the cost so as to comply with the requirements of AS 2 – Valuation of inventories.

The valuation of artworks is influenced by factors such as the identity of artist, the art style deployed (such as contemporary, modern etc.), the age of the artwork, the medium used i.e., whether  the  artwork  is  on  canvas or paper, at what price have the paintings of the artist concerned been sold in the recent past, recognition of the artist by art galleries/auctioneers, demand and supply of the artworks of the concerned artist etc. In addition to the generic audit procedures discussed in the preceding cases, the auditor would need to be aware of these nuances while verifying the valuation performed by the expert.

5.    Physical verification of stock pile of minerals

For enterprises that transact in/consume minerals such as natural gypsum (usually found in rock form) or coal, it may not be practical to conduct a physical verification of the entire stock by weighment, where the quantum of stock at the year-end is substantial. In such cases, the enterprise may engage a surveyor to certify the quantum of stock based on volumetric measurement.   The auditors in such cases should not merely rely on the report furnished by the surveyor but perform alternative procedures such as an overall reconciliation of quantity of materials purchased, expected material consumption (relative to finished goods produced) and derived closing inventory.

Concluding Remarks
Where enterprises involve experts to provide information necessary for preparation of the financial statements, auditors would need to decide whether they have the requisite knowledge and experience to evaluate the  work performed by the experts and not merely rely on their reports. ultimately, the audit opinion is the sole responsibility of the auditor, and that this responsibility is not reduced by reliance on the work performed by   the expert.

Contingent Pricing of Fixed Assets and Intangible Assets

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In most cases, fixed assets and intangible assets are purchased at a certain price and the accounting is fairly straight forward. Purchase of an asset on credit gives rise to a financial liability when the asset is delivered. The buyer makes the payment to the seller and relinquishes the financial liability. However, more complex contracts are emerging, where the payments could be contingent upon one or more variables. This is generally referred to as contingent consideration.

Some payments are dependent on the purchasers future activity derived from the underlying asset. For example, a contract for the purchase of a licence may specify that payments are based on a specified percentage of sales derived from that licence. Some payments could depend upon the performance of the asset, for example whether the asset acquired complies with agreed-upon specifications at specific dates in future, such as standard production capacity or a standard performance. Other payments may be dependent on an index or a rate. For example, an operator in a service concession agreement agrees to pay an annual concession fee to the grantor, with the principal amount increasing at the end of each year based on the consumer price index.

The provisions relating to AS 10 Accounting for Fixed Assets, AS 6 Depreciation Accounting and AS 26 Intangible Assets are set out below.

AS 10 Accounting for Fixed Assets
9.1 The cost of an item of fixed asset comprises its purchase price, including import duties and other non-refundable taxes or levies and any directly attributable cost of bringing the asset to its working condition for its intended use; any trade discounts and rebates are deducted in arriving at the purchase price. Examples of directly attributable costs are:

i. site preparation;
ii. initial delivery and handling costs;
iii. installation cost, such as special foundations for plant; and
iv. professional fees, for example fees of architects and engineers.

The cost of a fixed asset may undergo changes subsequent to its acquisition or construction on account of exchange fluctuations, price adjustments, changes in duties or similar factors.

11.2 When a fixed asset is acquired in exchange for shares or other securities in the enterprise, it is usually recorded at its fair market value, or the fair market value of the securities issued, whichever is more clearly evident.

AS 26 Intangible Assets
25. The cost of an intangible asset comprises its purchase price, including any import duties and other taxes (other than those subsequently recoverable by the enterprise from the taxing authorities), and any directly attributable expenditure on making the asset ready for its intended use. Directly attributable expenditure includes, for example, professional fees for legal services. Any trade discounts and rebates are deducted in arriving at the cost.

26. If an intangible asset is acquired in exchange for shares or other securities of the reporting enterprise, the asset is recorded at its fair value, or the fair value of the securities issued, whichever is more clearly evident.

AS 6 Depreciation Accounting
6. Historical cost of a depreciable asset represents its money outlay or its equivalent in connection with its acquisition, installation and commissioning as well as for additions to or improvement thereof. The historical cost of a depreciable asset may undergo subsequent changes arising as a result of increase or decrease in long-term liability on account of exchange fluctuations, price adjustments, changes in duties or similar factors.

16. Where the historical cost of an asset has undergone a change due to circumstances specified in para 6 above, the depreciation on the revised unamortised depreciable amount is provided prospectively over the residual useful life of the asset.

Author’s point of view
Neither AS-10 Accounting for Fixed Assets nor AS 26 Intangible Assets provides any clear guidance on how to account for such contingent pricing arrangement for acquisition of fixed assets and intangible assets. Theoretically many views are possible.

View 1.1
The fixed asset and the liability can be measured at cost on date of acquisition. The cost would be the amount paid on the date of acquisition. In the case of fixed assets, based on paragraph 9.1 of AS-10, any subsequent change in the liability or consideration is capitalised to the cost of fixed asset. This can be used by analogy for intangible assets as well. AS 6 is also clear that any such changes to the fixed asset cost are depreciated prospectively. This is not clear in the case of intangible assets; however the same analogy may be used.

View 1.2
A variation of View 1.1 is that any change to the cost of the asset is not included in cost of the asset, but the impact is taken to P&L. This view is supportable as paragraph 9.1 of AS-10 includes price adjustments, which is not the same as contingent consideration. In other words paragraph 9.1 does not clearly deal with accounting for contingent consideration and hence it is arguable that the changes to the liability are included in the P&L.

View 2
On the date the fixed asset or intangible asset is purchased, the control is transferred to the buyer and consequently a debit to fixed asset or intangible asset and a credit to liabilities would arise equal to the fair value of the contingent payment. Paragraph 11.2 of AS 10 and paragraph 26 of AS 26 support this view, though those paragraphs apply to consideration by way of shares or securities.

The core issue would then be whether the remeasurement of the liability on account of changes in the consideration should be recognised in the profit or loss or included as an adjustment to the cost of the asset. This is a major issue that is not clear even under International Financial Reporting Standards and is a matter of significant debate in the International Financial Reporting Interpretations Committee (IFRIC).

Paragraph 9.1 requires subsequent changes in cost to be included as cost of fixed assets. However those costs do not include contingent consideration adjustment. Therefore there are supportable arguments that subsequent changes in the remeasurement of liability may be recognised in the profit or loss.

Conclusion
In this article, we have simplified the issue of contingent payments and not taken into consideration the various complex arrangements that may be involved and their impact on accounting. Take for example, the contingent payments based on a quoted index. Under IFRS typically one would make an assessment of whether there is an embedded derivative, and whether that embedded derivative needs to be valued and accounted for separately or not. Indian GAAP does not contain any guidance on this matter. The ICAI should participate in the current discussions of IFRIC on this subject and arrive at an amicable conclusion as this would also be relevant for the purposes of interpretation of Ind-AS.

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Exemption – Educational Institute – Application for grant of certificate u/s. 10(23C)(vi) was rejected for the reason that the applicant was not using the entire income for the educational purposes – In view of the amendment to the objects, the Supreme Court set aside the orders of the High Court and authorities concerned with liberty to apply for registration afresh.

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Om Prakash Shiksha Prasar Samiti & Anr. vs. CCIT & Ors. [2014] 364 ITR 329 (SC)

The appellants had applied for grant of a certificate u/s. 10(23C)(vi) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, inter alia, requesting the authorities to grant certificate to claim exemption under the provisions of the Act. The said certificate was not granted by the authorities primarily on the ground that the appellants were not using the entire income for the educational purposes for which purpose the trust was established.

Being aggrieved by the order passed by the Chief Commissioner of Income-tax, the appellants approached the High Court. The writ petitions were dismissed by the High Court.

During the course of hearing before the Supreme Court the learned counsel for the appellants stated that the appellants had amended the objects of the society, with effect from 31st March, 2008. The Supreme Court was of the view that if that was so, the appellants should make an appropriate application before the authorities for grant of certificate u/s. 10(23C)(vi) of the Act for the assessment years 2002-03 to 2007-08 along with the amended objects of the society.

In view of this subsequent development and keeping in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the Supreme Court set aside the order passed by the High Court and the authorities concerned and permitted the appellants to file a fresh application within a month’s time from the date of the order. The Supreme Court directed that if such application is filed within the time granted the authority would consider the same in accordance with law, keeping in view the amended objects of the society, with effect from 31st March, 2008. All the contentions of both the parties were left open by the Supreme Court.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 1 dated 3rd July, 2014

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Financial Commitment (FC) by Indian Party under Overseas Direct Investments (ODI ) – Restoration of Limit

Presently,
the limit for Overseas Direct Investments (ODI) /Financial Commitment
(FC) to be undertaken by an Indian Party under the automatic route is
100% of the net worth of the Indian Party as per its last audited
balance sheet.

This circular has restored the said limit to the
one that existed prior to 14th August, 2013. Hence now the limit for
Overseas Direct Investments (ODI)/Financial Commitment (FC) to be
undertaken by an Indian Party under the automatic route is 400% of the
net worth of the Indian Party as per its last audited balance sheet.
However, where the financial commitment of the Indian Party exceeds US$ 1
billion (or its equivalent) in a financial year prior permission of RBI
will need to be obtained even if the total FC of the Indian Party is
within the limit of 400% of its net worth as per the last audited
balance sheet.

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Naresh T. Wadhwani vs. Dy. Commissioner of Income Tax In the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal Pune Bench “A”, Pune Before G. S. Pannu (A. M.) and R. S. Padvekar (J. M.) ITA Nos.18, 19, 20, 60 & 61/PN/2013 Assessment Years : 2007-08, 2008-09 & 2009-10. Decided on 28.10.2014 Counsel for Assessee/Revenue: V. L. Jain/M. S. Verma

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Section 80 IB (10)(c) and (14)(a) – Open terrace cannot be a part of the ‘built-up area’

Facts:
The assessee’s claim for deduction u/s. 80IB(10) was rejected by the lower authorities on the ground that the condition prescribed in clause (c) of section 80IB(10) was not complied with. As per sub-Clause (c) of section 80IB(10) the residential units in the housing project cannot have built-up area of more than 1,500 sq.ft. The housing project of the assessee in Pune city was approved by the local authority on 29.07.2005. The AO applied the definition of ‘built-up area’ contained in section 80IB(14) (a). According to him, as per the said definition, the area comprising of the projected terrace was also to be considered as part of the ‘built-up area’. Based thereon the AO computed the area and found that six of the residential units of the housing project were having built-up area in excess of 1500 sq.ft. Therefore, he denied the claim of the assessee for deduction u/s. 80IB(10) of Rs.1.4 crore. On appeal the CIT(A) upheld the stand of the AO that the built-up area of the aforesaid six units was violative of the condition prescribed in Clause (c) of section 80IB(10). He, however, allowed pro-rata deduction in respect of profits from the residential units of the project which complied with the requirements of section 80IB(10)(c) of the Act. Not being satisfied with the order of the CIT(A), assessee as well as the Revenue are in appeal before the tribunal.

Before the Tribunal, the revenue submitted that open terrace was a private terrace which was available for use of the owner of the unit to the exclusion of others. It also relied on the decisions of the Hyderabad Tribunal in the case of Modi Builders & Realtors (P.) Ltd., (2011) 12 taxmann. com 129 and of the Mumbai Tribunal in the case of Siddhivinayak Homes, Mumbai vs. Department of Income Tax, vide ITA No. 8726 / Mum / 2010 order dated 26.09.2012, for the proposition that all projections and elevations at the floor level are liable to be included in the definition of ‘built-up area’ for the purposes of examining the condition prescribed in Clause (c) of section 80IB(10) of the Act. According to it, the built-up area for the purpose has to be understood in the light of what has been sold by the assessee builder to the respective customers.

Held:
Relying on the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of M/s. Ceebros Hotels Private Limited vs. DCIT (Tax Case (Appeal) No. 581 of 2008 order dated 19.10.2012) the Tribunal held that the area of open terrace cannot be a part of the ‘built-up area’ in a case where such terrace is a projection attached to the residential unit and there being no room under such terrace, even if the same is available exclusively for use of the respective unit holders. The Tribunal also observed that as per the said decision, terrace area would not form part of the built-up area even if the assessee sold it to the purchaser as a private terrace.

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Recovery of tax – Section 226(3)(vi) – Garnishee objecting to liability and payment and filing affidavit in this regard – No further proceedings for recovery can be made against garnishee – TRO cannot discover on his own that statement on oath by garnishee was false – Provision applies only to an admitted liability and not to disputed liability:

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Uttar Pradesh Carbon and Chemicals Ltd. vs. TRO; 368 ITR 384 (All):

The petitioner company was engaged in the business of financial services. One assessee RCFSL, which had become defaulter of income-tax dues for Rs. 3.2 crore claimed that an amount of Rs. 1.55 crore was due to it from the petitioner. On the basis of the claim of the assessee, the TRO issued garnishee notice u/s. 226(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 requiring the petitioner to pay the said amount to the TRO towards the tax dues of the assessee. Since there was no response, the TRO attached 4,24,910 shares of the petitioner in Jhunjhunwala Vanaspati Ltd., and also the bank balance of Rs. 28,988.78 in ICICI bank and also got the shares and the amount transferred to the TRO. Being aware of the said action of the TRO the petitioner appeared before the TRO and raised objections and also claimed that the garnishee notice was not served on the petitioner and accordingly the garnishee proceedings are invalid. The petitioner also produced the books of account as required by the TRO and explained that there is no outstanding payable to the assessee. The petitioner also filed an affidavit denying the liability as required u/s. 226(3)(vi) of the Act. However, the TRO did not accept the petitioner’s claim.

On a writ petition challenging the garnishee action taken by the TRO, the Allahabad High Court held as under:

“i) Under Clause (vi) of section 226(3) of the Act, a limited enquiry can be conducted by the TRO to find about the genuineness of the affidavit. He is required to give notice to the person giving the affidavit that he is going to hold an enquiry for the purpose of determining whether the statement made on oath on behalf of the garnishee is correct or false. The ITO cannot discover on his own that the statement on oath made on behalf of the garnishee was false in any material particular and cannot subjectively reach a conclusion that in his opinion the affidavit filed by the garnishee was false in any material particular.

ii) Further, this provision is intended to apply only to an admitted liability where a person admits by word or by conduct that any money is due to the assessee or is held by him for or on account of assessee. The authorities under the garb of the inquiry cannot adjudicate upon a bona fide dispute between the garnishee and the assessee.

iii) Section 226(3) is not a charging section nor does it give any power to the TRO to adjudicate a dispute. Bona fide disputes, if any, between the garnishee and the assessee cannot be adjudicated by the authorities u/s. 226(3). The Legislature could not have meant to entrust the authority with the jurisdiction to decide questions relating to the quantum of such liability between the garnishee and the assessee, which matter is within the purview of the civil courts.

iv) The assessee asserted that it had advanced certain sums of money to the petitioner and, therefore, the petitioner was its debtor but the petitioner had denied this assertion. No steps had been taken by the assessee for recovery of that amount before any forum or any appropriate court of law.

vi) Pursuant to the affidavit filed by the petitioner before the TRO denying its liability to pay any amount and further denying that any sum is or was payable to the assessee, no steps had been taken by the TRO to cross check with the assessee or inquire into the genuineness of the affidavit filed by the petitioner. Since the petitioner had appeared and participated in the proceedings, the order of the TRO treating the petitioner as an assessee in default could not continue any longer.

vii) In view of the categorical denial by the petitioner to pay any amount, the attachment made by the TRO could not continue any further, especially as till date no inquiry had been made by the Revenue into the genuineness of the affidavits filed by the petitioner.

viii) Income Tax Department was restrained from alienating the shares, which were transferred to the demat account of the TRO. The order of the TRO treating the petitioner as a assessee in default could not be sustained and was quashed. Within two weeks the TRO to transfer the shares to the petitioner and also the amount of Rs. 28,988.78/- with interest”

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[2014] 148 ITD 129 (Mumbai – Trib.) Johnson & Johnson Ltd vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax A.Y. 2002-03 Order dated- 28th August 2013

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Section 92C
A. Where the assessee entered into a royalty payment agreement with its AE and made the payment of the same after taking approval from the RBI, then the payment of the said royalty made by the assessee in such circumstances is to be allowed and it cannot be said that the RBI’s approval cannot be considered as an arm’s length benchmark.
B. When taxes on royalty paid is to be borne by the assessee, on account of a commercial arrangement, the said taxes borne by the assessee should not be questioned while calculating arm’s length price.

Facts I:
The assessee, ‘J&J India’, had entered into international transactions with its AE, ‘J&J US’. It had paid the brand name royalty and the trademark royalty net of taxes at the rate of 1% of net sales to ‘J&J US’ for the use of brands and trademarks as per the terms of the brand usage agreement and also paid technical know-how royalty at the rate of 2% to ‘J&J US’ for the technical/marketing know-how provided to the assessee as per the terms of the know-how agreement entered into between the assessee and ‘J&J US’.

The assessee adopted the Transactional Net Margin Method (TNMM) for determining the arm’s length price (ALP) of its international transactions.

TPO made the following disallowances
1. A s per the agreement entered into by the assessee with ‘J&J US’, the assessee was not required to bear the tax liability of ‘J&J US’ arising out of payment of trademark/brand name royalty. Thus, the taxes borne by the assessee on the trademark/brand name royalty paid to ‘J&J US’ was disallowed by the TPO.

2. T he TPO was of the opinion that royalty on sales of traded finished goods was already part of the brand royalty and no royalty was required to be paid for the traded products and hence disallowed the same.

3. T he TPO restricted the technical know-how royalty paid at the rate of 2% to 1%.

4. T he TPO disallowed corresponding taxes and Research & Development Cess on technical knowhow royalty.

On appeal, the CIT(A) confirmed the disallowance of taxes paid by assessee on payment of trademark/ brand name royalty to ‘J&J US’ whereas deleted the other disallowance made by the TPO.

The cross appeals by the assessee and the Revenue were directed against the order of the Ld. CIT(A). Also on second appeal, the assessee submitted that the royalty payments had been approved by RBI.

Held I:

1 T axes paid by assessee on trademark/brand name royalty
The application made by the assessee to RBI for brand usage agreement specifically mentions that the royalty is to be remitted net of taxes. Further, the approval was received from the RBI to remit the royalty on brand usage by the assessee at the rate of 1% net of taxes. Considering the brand usage agreement vis-à-vis the approval granted by RBI, it can be safely inferred that the taxes were liability of the assessee under the terms of agreement. The assessee has entered into a commercial arrangement with ‘J&J US’ and it has been so arranged that the payment of taxes have to be borne by the assessee being a commercial arrangement, the same should not be questioned while calculating arm’s length price. Considering the entire facts in totality in the light of the brand usage agreement and the approval of the RBI, the findings of the CIT(A) is set aside and the AO is directed to delete the addition of the said taxes paid by assessee on trademark/brand name royalty.

2. Royalty payment on sales of traded finished goods

It is already held that the agreements between the assessee and ‘J&J USA’ for payment of royalty have to be considered in the light of the approval of the RBI. There is no substance in the findings of the TPO that there is no need for paying royalty on sales of traded finished goods. There is also no force in the findings of the TPO that this royalty is deemed to be included in the Brand royalty. Therefore, findings of the Ld. CIT(A) were not interfered with.

[The contention of the assessee before CIT(A), on the basis of which CIT(A) had deleted the addition made by TPO of royalty on sales of traded finished goods, was as follows-

Even if the products under consideration are old that does not debar the assessee from paying the royalty now. It was further contended that the assessee continues to get new products from time to time and also gets updates on existing products. The assessee pointed out that the allegation of the TPO that the royalty is covered by Brand Royalty does not hold any water as there is no co-relation between the two. It was claimed that Brand Royalty is paid for the use of the brand names owned by ‘J&J USA’ whereas the royalty for sales of traded finished goods is paid, apart from manufacturing rights; on the know how relating to sale, distribution and marketing. Therefore, it is incorrect to say that this royalty is included in brand royalty.]

3. T echnical know-how royalty

It is already held that the payment of royalty has to be considered in the light of the agreement between the assessee and ‘J&J USA’, for the same reasons. There is no reason to interfere with the findings of the CIT(A).

4. Corresponding taxes and research and development (R&D) cess on technical know-how royalty
The Ld. CIT(A) has confirmed the decision of the TPO holding that withholding tax and R&D Cess can be allowed only to the extent they are payable on allowable royalty. As it is already held elsewhere that royalty payments have been approved by the RBI and therefore, deserves to be allowed. Accordingly as the payments have been made in the light of the agreement with J&J US and as per the approval/guidelines of the RBI, there is no reason to disallow the tax and R&D Cess paid on technical royalty, and accordingly the AO is directed to delete the addition made on this account.

Section 92C read with Section 37(1)
Where, the assessee, who carries on a business finds that it is commercially expedient to incur certain expenditure directly or indirectly, it would be open to such an assessee to do so notwithstanding the fact that a formal deed does not precede the incurring of such expenditure.

Facts II:
The assessee had entered into a brand usage royalty agreement with its AE on 14-03-2002.

The TPO had held that the brand usage royalty paid by assessee was at arm’s length price.

However, the CIT(A) disallowed the brand royalty paid during the period 01-07-2001 to 14-03-2002 on the ground that there was no agreement in place during the said period indicating the intention to pay royalty with effect from 01-07-2001.

On appeal before the Tribunal, it was mentioned that the assessee had submitted a draft agreement alongwith the application to RBI on 10.8.2001 and thus the royalty was paid as per the guidelines issued by the RBI,

Held II:
The agreement for payment of brand usage royalty was entered into only on 14-03-2002. However, at the same time, the CIT(A) has erred in ignoring the copy of draft brand usage royalty agreement which was submitted by the assessee alongwith application to the RBI on 10-08-2001. The assessee received approval from the RBI on 20-11- 2001 and after receiving the approval from the RBI, the assessee entered into brand usage royalty agreement with ‘J&J US’ by which it was agreed to pay the royalty from 01-07-2001. The date being the same, as agreed in the draft agreement filed with the application made to the RBI, therefore, the observations made by the CIT(A) that there was no tacit agreement does not hold any water.

Assuming, yet not accepting, that there was no agreement, the payments made having regard to the commercial expediency need not necessarily have their origin in contractual obligations. If the assessee, which carries on a business finds that it is commercially expedient to incur certain expenditure directly or indirectly, it would be open to such an assessee to do so notwithstanding the fact that a formal deed does not precede the incurring of such expenditure.

Considering the facts in totality there is no merit in the enhancement made by the CIT(A). The findings of the CIT(A) are set aside. The AO is directed to delete the addition made by the CIT(A).

Business expenditure – Section 37(1) – A. Y. 2005- 06 – Payments for advertising and publicity to residents by assessee resident agent – Deduction u/s. 37(1) cannot be denied by invoking transfer pricing provisions merely because foreign principals (TV Channels) also benefit by the expenditure especially when benefit to foreign principals defy quantification – Such payments are not required to be reflected in Form No. 3CEB as these are resident to resident payments and not international

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CIT vs. N. G. C. Network (India) (P) Ltd.; (2014) 50 taxmann.com 240 (Bom):

The assessee is a company incorporated in India and engaged in the business of distribution of T.V. channels popularly known as National Geographic and History Channel. The assessee also acts as airtime advertising Sales Representative for its foreign principals NGC Asia and FOX. For the A. Y. 2005-06, the assessee had claimed expenditure of Rs. 6,21,31,262/- u/s. 37(1) of the Act being the amount paid to residents for advertising and publicity. The Assessing Officer held that the benefit of the expenditure was not only to the assessee but also to the foreign principals. He found that such benefit was not disclosed in Form 3CEB. He allowed only one third of the expenditure and disallowed the balance two third. CIT(A) allowed full expenditure. He held that since expenses were made to Indian residents they were not covered in Form 3CEB as section 92 covers only international transactions. The Tribunal upheld the decision of the CIT(A). On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The main grounds on which the revenue has questioned the order of the tribunal are (a) non-disclosure in form 3CEB of the fact that the principal is also a beneficiary of the advertising expenses; (b) that the advertising and promotional expenses are not wholly for the benefit of the assessee but it also benefited the principal who was an associated enterprise; (c) that advertising and publicity expenses were far higher than the amount of revenue earned and lastly, that although foreign principals i.e. Associated Enterprise benefited from advertising and publicity no compensation was paid by the foreign principals to the assessee to avail of such benefits.

ii) It was admitted position that the assessee is a agent of foreign principal and would naturally benefit from advertising carried on by agent in India. However, these benefits were not ascertainable. The contention of the assessee that the benefits were not ascertainable or taxable in view of extra territory appears to be correct and justified. In the instant case we find that the assessee has not suppressed any information. It has offered to tax its income from both business, namely, distribution business as well as advertisement and promotion business. In the assessment year in question, the Assessing Officer has proceeded to grant 33.33% of the total advertising expenses as allowable deduction. We do not find any justification for such restriction of the same.

iii) The contention that the expenditure should have been wholly and exclusive for the purpose of business of the assessee u/s. 37(1) read with provisions of section 40A(2) as being excessive and unreasonable does not appeal to us. There can be no doubt in the instant case, that in view of decision of the Supreme Court in Sassoon David (supra) it cannot be said that the expenditure was not wholly or exclusively for benefit of the assessee. The mere fact that foreign principals also benefited does not entail right to deny deduction u/s. 37(1). Furthermore, it is seen that all the amounts earned by the assessee were brought to tax, especially in view of the fact that the payment of expenses were made to Indian residents and there payments were not required to be included in Form 3CEB since section 92 which governs the effect of Form 3CEB covers only international transactions. Furthermore, it is seen that the respondents income from subscription fee is variable and through commission received on the advertising sales is 15% of the value of Ad-sales. The Assessing Officer’s contention that the assessee received fixed income is not justified and there is certainly, in our view, a direct nexus between the amount spent on advertising and publicity, and the appellant’s revenue

iv) Advertisers who advertise on these channels act through media houses and advertising agencies and they work to media plans designed in the manner so as to maximise value for the advertiser. They will evaluate expenditure with channel penetration in the market place inasmuch as only channels with high viewership would justify the higher advertising rates which is normally sold in seconds. Merely having high quality content will not ensure high viewership. This content has to be publicised. The great reach of the publicity, the higher chances of larger viewership. The larger the viewership, the better chances of obtaining higher advertisement revenue. The higher advertisement revenue, the higher will be commission earned by the respondent-assessee. Accordingly, we have no doubt that there is a direct nexus between advertising expenditure and revenue albeit the fact that there may be a lean period before revenue picks up notwithstanding high amount spent on such publicity. This justifies the higher expenditure vis-a-vis revenue noticed by the department.

v) It is also not necessary that the foreign enterprises must compensate the Indian agent for the benefit it receives or it may receive from the advertisement and promotion of its channels by agent in India. The agent in India earns commission from ad-sales and distribution revenue, both of which have sufficiently compensated the assessee. We would not expect the revenue to determine the sufficiency of the compensation received by the agent and as such we do not find any justification in this ground either.

vi) In the circumstances we answer questions of law in the affirmative in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. In the result the appeal is dismissed.”

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2014 (34) STR 546 (All.) Indian Coffee Workers’ Society Ltd. vs. CCE & ST., Allahabad

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Whether supply of food, edibles and beverages to persons within a canteen provided by the company would attract service tax as outdoor catering services? Held – Yes.

Facts:
Appellant entered into agreements for running and maintenance of an administrative building canteen. Appellant supplied food, edibles and beverages to the individual customers in accordance with the rate specified in the agreement. Appellant was provided a place for running the canteen by the Company. Department had contended that Appellant was providing “Outdoor catering services.”

Held:
The High Court held that supplier was an outdoor caterer by plain and literal construction of the provisions and definition, which included service provided by the caterer at a place other than his own. Once, the services of an outdoor caterer was provided to another person, its chargeability gets attracted, irrespective of extent of its consumption by the person who have engaged such service. The charge of tax in the cases of VAT was distinct from the charge of tax for service tax. VAT was paid on the sale of goods involved in the supply of food and beverages by the assessee would not exclude his liability for the payment of service tax in respect of taxable service was provided as an outdoor caterer.

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SECONDMENT/DEPUTATION OF EMPLOYEES SERVICE TAX IMPLICATIONS

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Introduction
Secondment/Deputation of
employees within group companies has been a very common feature in
almost all major business houses in India. The globalisation of the
Indian economy has resulted in substantially increased presence of
Multi-National Companies (MNC) in India and Indian companies in the
markets abroad. This gave rise to cross-border secondment/deputation of
employees within a group.

Several issues have arisen as regards
service tax implications on secondment/deputation of employees within a
group (either based in India or abroad) resulting in extensive
litigation. The same is being discussed hereafter.

Relevant Statutory Provisions
a) Provisions Prior to 1/7/12


“manpower recruitment or supply agency” means any person engaged in
providing any service, directly or indirectly, in any manner for
recruitment or supply of manpower, temporarily or otherwise, to any
other person.”

Section 65(105)(k) of the Act

“taxable service means any service provided or to be provided –

to
any person, by a manpower recruitment or supply agency in relation to
the recruitment or supply of manpower, temporarily or otherwise, in any
manner.

Explanation

For the removal of doubts, it
is hereby declared that for the purposes of this sub-clauses,
recruitment or supply of manpower includes services in relation to
prerecruitment screening, verification of the credentials and
antecedents of the candidate and authenticity of documents submitted by
the candidate.”

b) Provisions with effect from 01/07/2012

Section 65B (44) of the Act


“Service” means any activity carried out by a person for another for
consideration, and include a declared service, but shall not include –

……..
(b) a provision of service by an employee to the employer in the course of or in relation to his employment.”

Rule 2(1) (g) of Service tax rules, 1994 (Rules)


“Supply of manpower” means supply of manpower, temporarily or
otherwise, to another person to work under his superintendence or
Control.”

Relevant Extracts from Draft CBEC Circular No. 354/127/2012 TRU dated 27-07-2012

A. Scope of Manpower Supply

2.
After the negative list coming into force, the erstwhile definition of
the manpower recruitment or supply agency is no more applicable. Thus,
the words manpower supply would have to be given their natural meaning.
The manpower supply is understood to mean when one person provides
another person with the use of one or more individuals who are
contractually employed or otherwise engaged by the first person. The
essence of the employment should be that the individuals should be
employed by the provider of the service and not by the recipient of the
service.

3. There could be certain contracts in which such
manpower is made available to execute another independent contract by
the service provider. For example, a person may agree to carry out
construction or a manufacture for another in which certain manpower may
be engaged. As long as such manpower is not placed operationally
under the superintendence or control of the recipient, it shall not be a
case of manpower supply, though it will continue to be judged
independently whether it comprises any other taxable service.

4. There
are also cases of secondment whereby certain staff belonging to an
organisation is placed at the disposal of a subsidiary company or any
other associate company. Such cases will be covered by the definition of
manpower supply as the contractual employment continues to be with the
parent company.

B. Joint Employment

5. T here
can also be cases where staff is employed by one or more employers who
normally share the cost of such employment. The services provided by
such employee will be covered by the exclusion provided in the
definition of service. However, if the staff has been engaged by one
employer and only made available to other for a consideration, it shall
not be a case of joint employment.

6. Another arrangement could
be where one entity pays the salary and other expenses of the staff on
behalf of other joint employers which are later recouped from the other
employers on an agreed basis on actuals. Such recoveries will not be
liable to service tax as it is merely a case of cost reimbursement.

Service tax implications

As regards the provisions applicable prior to 01-07-2012, most of the
litigation is centered around applicability under the taxable service
[section 65(68) /65(105)(k) of the Act] of “manpower recruitment or
supply agency service”. Under the said provisions the following
conditions had to be fulfilled so as to bring the subject activities
within the scope of taxable service viz.:

The service provider
should have been engaged in providing the service of recruitment or
supply of manpower, temporarily or otherwise to any other person; and

the
individuals had to be contractually employed by the manpower supply
agencies and there was no employee – employer relationship between the
individual and the service recipient.

• Under the negative list
regime, introduced with effect from 01-07-2012, service tax is payable
on all activities for consideration carried out by one person or another
for consideration, except those excluded from the definition of
‘service’ or specified in the negative list of services and the
exemption notifications. The services provided by an employee to the
employer, if provided in the course of or in relation to employment,
have been specifically excluded from the definition of ‘service’.

Further,
since the categorisation of taxable services has been done away with,
the condition of a person being engaged in the business of supply of
manpower is no more relevant. However, Rule 2(1)(g) of the Rules,
defines “supply of manpower” for the purpose of reverse change
provisions. .

Considering the specific exclusion from the
definition of service, the aspect of employer-employee relationship
assumes greater significance, insofar as the applicability of service
tax is concerned.

Employer – Employee relationship and Joint Employment
In
case of secondment/deputation of employees of an overseas based company
to an Indian company, the concept of joint employment becomes relevant,
provided the expatriate is also employed by the Indian company, in
terms of the relevant Indian laws are concerned. The issue which is
being deliberated is, whether the concept of joint employment can help
MNCs to arrange their affairs in a lawful manner so as to get the
benefit of exclusion from the definition of service. Hence, it is very
important to analyse and understand the concept of employment and
thereafter the concept of joint employment.

The Honorable
Supreme Court has from time to time expressed a view that the test of
supervision and control is a crucial point for determining the employer –
employee relationship. [Refer Shivanandan Sharma vs. Punjab National
Bank AIR 1955 SC 404]. However, it needs to be noted that the Honorable
Supreme Court has also held that since the nature of supervision and
control varies from business to business, it becomes difficult to
precisely define the degree of such supervision and control & lay
down a single formula or test for the same.

The Gujarat High Court in Satish Plastics vs. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner – 44 FLR 207 (Guj.) has summarised the tests for ascertaining master-servant relationship as under:

i) Was he doing the work for monetary payment?

ii)    Was the work done by him the work of the establishment or had a nexus with such work?

iii)    Was the payment made as wages, in the sense of being remuneration for the physical or mental effort in connection with such work?

iv)    Was the work such that it had to be done as directed by the establishment or under its supervision and control to the extent that supervision and control are possible having regard to the specialised nature of the work or the skill needed for its performance?

v)    Was the work of such a nature and character that ordinarily a master–  servant  relationship  could  exist and, but for the agreement styling it as a contract, common sense would suggest a master– servant bond?

vi)    Was the relation indicative of master–servant status in substance having regard to the economic realities irrespective of the nomenclature devised by the parties?

vii)    Was he required to do the work personally without the liberty to get it done through someone else?

The above can serve as a useful guide for ascertainment of employer–employee relationship.

In overseas jurisdictions, the test is that of the economic reality rather than various factors discussed above. however, no single or uniform test has been laid down by the Courts to determine the economic reality. Many factors such as the extent of the skill and initiative of an employee being an  integral  part  of  the  employees  business,  the permanency of their relationship, the nature and degree of employer’s control, etc., have been considered by the Courts in the peculiar facts and circumstances of a given case.

The absence of defined principles for the application of the test of economic reality has posed challenges before the Courts in determining the existence of employment relationship. Apart from the principle of economic reality, the Courts have also considered the principle of mutuality of obligation for determining the presence of a contract of service.

The  concept  of  joint  employment  has  been  recognized and given effect to in many overseas jurisdictions including US & UK in particular. However, the concept of joint employment and economic reality is comparatively new in india. further, the variety of tests propounded for establishing the employer- employee relationship has brought in more uncertainty. draft CBeC Circular referred above does briefly cover the concept. However, it does not provide any finality as to the Government’s perspective on the concept & service tax implications arising therefrom. the joint employment concern is necessarily an application of the principle of “substance over form”. But how far such relationships can actually sustain in employment laws is a difficult question for which there are no ready answers.

Analysis of some decisions:

•    Ruling in Volkswagen India (Pvt.) Ltd. vs. CCE (2014) 34 STR 135 (Tri – Mumbai)

The brief facts of the case were that the appellant was a manufacturer of passenger vehicles and was registered under service tax for various taxable services like, management or business consultant’s service, consulting engineer’s service, etc.

Due to nature of the business, the appellant required people with specialised skill and experience and accordingly, the appellant employed many foreign nationals (called as global employees), who were previously employed with other group entity. there was an “inter Company employment agreement” between the appellant and its holding company namely Volkswagen AG, a company registered in Germany, which facilitatesd employment of personnel from other group companies. The  said  personnel  were  relieved  by  the  other  group company and were put at the disposal of the appellant and they function as whole time employees of the appellant– indian company and worked solely under the control, direction or supervision of the appellant in accordance with its policies, rules and guidelines generally applicable to the employees of the appellant company during the period  of  such  employment.  The  terms,  conditions  and place of employment of such global employee and their designation was in accordance with the terms and conditions agreed between indian company and the respective global employee. In particular, following agreement terms need to be noted:

•    The employment of such global employee shall be in his personal capacity only and not for and on behalf of the foreign company. the appellant also have a right to promote/discipline/suspend/take any action/terminate the services of such global employee at any point of time in accordance with its applicable policies without seeking any permission from the foreign company;

•    The other group company/foreign company will not have any obligation towards the appellant with regard to the performance of the global employee nor the foreign company shall enjoy any right, title to or interest in or be responsible for the work of global employee or assume any risk for the results produced from the work performed by the global employees while under employment with the appellant;

•    During the period of employment with the appellant, the holding company shall not in any way interfere with the working and/or the terms and conditions of such employee nor such employee shall be subject to any instruction or control of the foreign holding company;

•    The salary (including other entitlements) of such global employee shall be the liability of and decided and paid by the indian company i.e. the appellant based on its policies and guidelines and in case of default by the appellant, the foreign/global company will not be liable towards such global employee;

•    If the foreign/global company makes any payment to any third party (salary, etc.) in the home country of the global employee on behalf of the indian company, the foreign company will be entitled to be reimbursed by the indian company to the extent of such payment;

•    The foreign company will not be under any obligation to replace any of the global employees in the event the employment of any of the global employees is terminated by the global employee or the indian company, for any reason, nor the foreign company    is responsible for any loss or damage caused to the appellant or any action of such global employee;

•    The agreement does not create any service provider and client relationship between the foreign company and the appellant nor it would be construed that the foreign company is providing any type of  services with regard to employment of the global employees with the appellant;

•    Clearly provided that there is no direct or indirect consideration/charges (in cash or kind) payable by the indian company to the foreign company or vice-versa in this connection;

•    The remuneration clause provided is as follows:-
Your remuneration will be paid as follows:-
F Part of your net salary will be paid by the company into your valid account in Germany (through the disbursing agent, (VW aG) at the end of each calendar month).

F The  balance  part  of  your  net  salary  as  mutually agreed upon between you and company will be paid by the company into your valid account in india at the end of the calendar month.

Details of your remuneration will be communicated to you separately. your salary to be paid to Germany as above, would be paid subject to approvals as may be required under the indian exchange control regulations. the gross remuneration is subject to statutory withholding/indian income taxes as applicable.

The   company   shall   deduct   the   applicable   individual income-tax payable at source and make payment of the same.  The  company  shall  furnish  you  with  necessary certificates and any other documents evidencing the payment of this tax to the authorities as may be required by law.

…………..

•    The Visa clause of the agreement shows that such global employees are in the control and disposal and also command of the appellant and there is employer– employee relationship between them.

The revenue treated the aforementioned arrangement as “supply of manpower” by the foreign holding company to the appellant and issued show cause notice demanding service tax etc.

For  the  appellants,  it  was  submitted  that  there  was  no supply of labour or manpower, and/or recruitment service provided by the holding company of the appellant. as  per the requirement and request of the appellant, for skilled personnel, the holding company  facilitated  in  the identifying such foreign personnel, who were then employed by the appellant under separate agreement with each employee as aforementioned. Such global employees worked under the control and supervision of the appellant as its employees. Salary for such work done by the global employees was directly paid by the appellant and such income earned by the global employees was taxable as salary under the provisions of the income-tax act, 1961. Further, the appellant deducted income-tax at source from the salary of such global employee of the appellant as per the provisions of the income-tax act. the appellant had also issued necessary TDS certificate in capacity of employer.

Further,  a  part  of  the  salary  of  such  global  employees was remitted abroad in their home country, the same was done using the services of the holding company or other group companies as applicable and such amounts were reimbursed to the other company. It was further contended that apart from the part salary of the global employees (by way of reimbursement), the appellant had not paid any amount to their holding/foreign company. Merely because a part of the salary of such global employee was paid in their home country through the holding/foreign company, it could be said that the foreign/ holding company rendered supply of manpower or labour to  the  appellant. Reliance  was  placed  on  the  decisions in the case of ITC Ltd. vs. (2013) 29 STR 387 (Tribunal) and Paramount Communication Ltd. vs. (2013) 29 STR 317 (Tribunal).

It was further contended that the holding/foreign company was not a “manpower recruitment or supply agency service” as required u/s. 65(105)(k) of the Finance Act, 1994. Further, reliance was placed on C.B.E & C Circular No. 96/7/2007-S.T. dated 23-08-2007, wherein it has been clarified that in the case of supply of manpower, individuals are contractually employed by the manpower recruitment  or  supply  agency.  The  agency  agrees  for use of the services of an individual, employed by him, to another person, for a consideration. Employer–employee relationship in such case exists between the agency and the individual and not between the individual and the person who uses the services of the individual.

On  behalf  of  the  revenue,  it  was  contended  that  the indian entity should have paid full salary directly to the employee of the appellant company and not routed through the foreign/holding company. It is also the contention of the revenue that after a period of 3-4 years such global employees go back to the foreign/holding company and even during the intervening period, during the employment in the appellant company, the social security liability was discharged in their home country. Accordingly, it was submitted that the transaction is one of supply of labour/manpower by the foreign company to the appellant – indian company.

The tribunal held, “in view of the clauses of agreements noticed herein above and other facts, the global employees working under the  appellant  are  working  as their employees and having employee-employer relationship.  Further  there  is  no  supply  of  manpower service rendered to the appellant by the foreign / holding company. the method of disbursement of salary cannot determine the nature of transaction. Further, in view of the rulings relied upon by the appellant as aforementioned, we find that the facts are covered on all four corners and accordingly, the appeals are allowed and orders–in– original are set aside.”

•    Ruling in CST vs. Arvind Mills Ltd (2014) 35 STR 496 (GUJ)

In this case, the issue in brief was whether the respondent is a manpower supply or recruitment agency.

The  brief  facts  were  that  respondent  had  a  composite textile mill and was engaged in manufacturing of fabrics and readymade garments. in order to reduce its cost, the respondent deputed some of its employees to its group company, who were also engaged in similar businesses. Reason for such deputation was also on certain occasions stipulated work arising for a limited period. The tribunal recorded that there was no allegation  of  finding  that the respondent had deputed employees to any other concerns outside its own subsidiary companies and also recorded that undisputedly the employees deputed do not work exclusively under the direction or supervision of the subsidiary company and upon completion of the work they were repatriated to the respondent company. On such basis, the tribunal held that the respondent could be said to be manpower supply recruitment agency and, therefore, not exigible to service tax.

The Revenue contended that the definition of manpower supply recruitment agency was very wide and would include range of activities of supply of manpower either temporarily or permanently and submitted that sizable manpower was required for the respondent from the group companies for deputation of the staff and also drew attention to the amendment of such definition to contend that after the amendment, the definition was widened.

The Court observed that the definition of manpower supply recruitment agency was wide and would cover within its sweep range of activities provided therein. However, in the present case, such definition would not cover the activity of the respondent as rightly held by the tribunal. to  court  observed,  “the  respondent  in  order  to  reduce his cost of manufacturing, deputed some of its staff to its subsidiaries or group companies for stipulated work or limited period. All throughout the control and supervision remained with the respondent. As pointed out by the respondent, company is not in the business of providing recruitment or supply of manpower. Actual cost incurred by the company in terms of salary, remuneration and perquisites is only reimbursed by the group companies.” There was no element of profit or finance benefit. The subsidiary companies could not be said to be their clients. deputation of the employees was only for and in the interest of the company. There was no relation of agency and client. it was pointed out that the employee deputed did not exclusively work under the direction of supervision or control of subsidiary company. All throughout he would be under the continuous control and direction of the company. The court further noted:
“We have to examine the definition of manpower supply recruitment agency in background of such undisputable facts. The definition though provides that manpower recruitment supply agency means any commercial concern engaged in providing any services directly or indirectly  in any manner for recruitment or supply of manpower temporarily or otherwise to a client, in the present case, the respondent cannot be said to be a commercial concern engaged in providing such specified services to a client. It is true that the definition is wide and would include  any such activity where it is carried out either directly or indirectly supplying recruitment or manpower temporarily or otherwise. However, fundamentally recruitment of the agency being a commercial concern engaged in providing any such service to client would have to be satisfied. In the present case, facts are to the contrary.”

In the result, the Court held that no question of law was involved.

Conclusion
•    For the period prior to 01-07-2012, as analyzed and held in judicial rulings, in order to be made liable to service tax, it would be essential to satisfy the test of existence of a manpower supply or recruitment agency as defined under the Act at the relevant time.

•    After introduction of negative list regime with effect from 01-07-2012, since the term ‘service’ has been very widely defined, it would be essential to satisfy  the test of employer – employee relationship so as    to be excluded from the definition of ‘service’. As discussed, the Courts have held that it is very difficult to lay down a single test or formula in this regard. hence, though guidance may be available from Court rulings, existence of employer–employee relationship would have to be determined considering the facts & circumstances of a given case.

•    It is  unfortunate  to  note  that  despite  the  fact  that a draft circular dated 27-07-2012 was issued by CBEC clarifying scope  of  Manpower  Supply  &  Joint Employment, CBEC has not issued a final Circular setting out Government’s perspective, in particular, as regards taxability of secondment/ deputation of employees. It is felt that issue of a CBeC Circular, would provide finality on the issue and avoid extensive litigation.

TS-400-ITAT-2014 (Del) GE Energy Parts Inc. vs. ADIT A.Ys.: 2001-02, Decided on: 04-07-2014

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The Tribunal admits Linkedin profiles of expatriate employees as additional evidence to determine the existence of PE in India.

Facts:
The
tax authority had conducted a survey at the premises of Liaison Office
(“LO”) of GE International Operations Company Inc. In the course of
survey, the tax authority obtained certain documents, recorded
statements of various persons and inquired about income-generating
activities of GE group, employees working from LO and their roles and
responsibilities, etc.

It was found that generally the business
heads were expatriates appointed to head Indian operations and the
support staff being provided by GE India Industrial Private Limited and
other third parties. While the expatriates were on the payroll of GE
International Inc., they worked for various GE group businesses.

The
tax authority sought information in respect of expatriate employees
such as nature of job, duties and responsibilities, terms, conditions
and duration of employment, entity for which they were working,
emoluments and basis of incentives/bonuses, self-appraisal of work done
in India, etc. The tax authority received only part response mentioning
that the employees were merely acting as communication channel for the
overseas entity.

Hence, in absence of necessary facts, the tax
authority furnished additional evidence in the form of Linkedin profile
of the employees and contended that since these were available in public
domain, they should be admitted as additional evidence. The additional
evidence was provided to disprove the claim that these employees were
merely acting as a communication channel. This evidence was never
refuted.

Held:
• Linkedin profiles are not hearsay
because it is the employee himself who has given the details relating to
him and no third party is involved in creating the profiles. The data
is in public domain.

• In terms of section 60 of the Evidence
Act, oral evidence must be direct. It is well-settled law that admission
though not conclusive is binding and decisive unless it is withdrawn or
proved to be erroneous. Linkedin profiles are in the nature of
admission of the person whose profile it is.

• It is up to the taxpayer to rebut the information contained in Linkedin profiles by bringing on record contrary facts.


The evidence sought to be filed by the tax authority was only
supporting in nature and it would assist in appreciating the facts in
judicial manner.

Accordingly, the Tribunal admitted Linkedin
profiles as additional evidence. However, in the interim order, the
Tribunal did not conclude on the existence of PE.

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TS-355-ITAT-2014(Del) Nortel Networks India International Inc. vs. DDIT A.Ys.: 2003-04, 2004-05 & 2005-06, Decided on: 13-06-014

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Article 5, 7 India-USA DTAA – On facts, having regard to the activities performed in India, the Indian group company was PE of the USA company and 50% of profit was attributable to the PE.

Facts:
The taxpayer was a company incorporated in USA and member-company of Nortel group. Nortel group was a leading supplier of hardware and software products for GSM cellular radio telephone system.

Nortel group also had an Indian company (“ICo”), which had entered into a composite contract with an Indian telecom company (“TelCo”) for supply of equipment. Immediately after signing the contract, ICo assigned it in favour of the taxpayer without any consideration.

The equipment to be supplied under the contract was acquired by the taxpayer from its group company in Canada. The Canadian company had a Liaison Office (“LO”) in India. Employees of various Group companies visited India for facilitating execution of the contract and worked from the premises of the LO or ICo.

The performance under the contract was guaranteed by Nortel group.

The AO was of the view that the taxpayer was merely a “paper company” created to avoid taxes in India by assignment of the contract by ICo and the overall execution/ work was done through ICo only. The Taxpayer thus triggered a Permanent establishment (PE) in India by virtue of activities done by ICo, the LO and the services provided by employees of Group companies visiting India.

Held:
• The contract was indivisible turnkey contract for supply, installation, testing, commissioning, etc. Responsibility for negotiating, securing and executing the contract as well as installation and commissioning were undertaken by ICo. Accordingly, ICo was a fixed place of business and dependent agent PE of the taxpayer.
• The LO of Canadian company was rendering all kinds of services to all group companies including the taxpayer. Hence, it constituted fixed place PE of the taxpayer.
• The taxpayer approached the customer, negotiated the contract; installed and tested the equipment. All these activities were undertaken through ICo and LO. Experts of group companies visited India in connection with the project and carried out business of the taxpayer through the premises of the LO and ICo. The contract did not merely require loading the equipment in ship but a number of other activities which were carried out in India and remuneration for these activities was included in consideration payable for the contract. Though represented as sale consideration for the equipment, the amount represented payment for works contract under which entire installation and customisation were carried out in India.

• The activities of the taxpayer in India through ICo, LO and employees of Group companies constituted its PE under Article 5 of India-USA DTAA . These activities were core activities of the taxpayer and hence, they were not preparatory and auxiliary activities.

• The accounts furnished by taxpayer, being not audited, had no sanctity. The only explanation for the trading loss in an intra-group transaction could be avoidance of tax. Hence, the group accounts should be examined to have correct picture. Computation of income of PE depends on the facts of each case and in the present case, after allowing expenses relatable to PE, selling, general marketing and R&D expenses, attribution of 50% of the profits to PE would be reasonable.

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TS-341-ITAT-2014(Del) Jyotinder Singh Randhawa vs. ACIT A.Y. 2009-10, Decided on: 16-06-2014

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Section 6, the Act – Benefit u/s. 6 to Indian citizens leaving India ‘for the purposes of employment outside India’ also applies to selfemployed professionals going abroad for business or profession.

Facts:
The taxpayer was an Indian citizen. He was a professional golfer. During the relevant tax year his stay in India was 167 days. While filing his tax return, the taxpayer claimed his residential status as non-resident.

According to the AO, the contention of the taxpayer that he had left India for the purpose of employment and therefore, should be entitled to the benefit under Explanation to section 6(1) of the Act was not valid. Hence, the AO concluded that the taxpayer could be treated as non-resident only if he was in India for less than 365 days during the 4 years preceding the relevant tax year, and was in India for less than 60 days during the relevant tax year. Since the taxpayer could not prove this, the AO treated him as resident during the tax year and accordingly, added the income which had accrued to, and received by, the taxpayer outside India .

Held:
The taxpayer is a professional golfer and a self-employed professional sports person who participates in Golf tournaments conducted in various countries. Relying on the decision of Kerala High Court in CIT vs. Abdul Razak [2011] 337 ITR 350 (Ker), the Tribunal held that to determine residential status under the Act, the term ‘leaves India for the purposes of employment outside India’ also means going abroad in the course of self-employment for own business or profession and accordingly, treated him as non-resident.

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TS-383-ITAT-2014(HYD) GFA Anlagenbau Gmbh vs. ACIT A.Ys.: 2005-06, 2006-07, 2007-08, 2008-09, 2009- 10, Decided on: 02-07-2014

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Section 9(1)(vii) of the Act; Article 5, 12, India-
Germany DTAA – in absence of a building or construction site owned or
operated by German company, mere rendition of supervisory services will
not constitute supervisory PE; the payment for such services should be
taxable as Fee For Technical Services (FTS).

Facts:
The
taxpayer was a company incorporated in Germany. It was engaged in
supervision, erection and commissioning of plant and machinery for steel
and allied plants in India. During the relevant tax year, it had
rendered technical and supervisory services to several Indian companies
by engaging experienced foreign technicians at the work sites and other
locations in India to carryout technical and supervisory services. The
taxpayer categorized the receipts for such services as FTS u/s.
9(1)(vii) of Act, as also under Article 12 of India-Germany DTAA .

The
total stay of technicians for one of the project in India exceeded 183
days. The AO contended that PE of the taxpayer was constituted in India
in terms of Article 5(2)(i) of India-Germany DTAA as the activities of
the taxpayer in India continued for a period exceeding 6 months.

Further,
since the activities were effectively connected with the PE, in terms
of Article 12(5) read with Article 7, receipts from the services was
taxable as business profits and consequently, in terms of section 44DA
was chargeable to tax @40%.

Held:
As regards the Act
Relying
on the decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Clouth Gummiwerke
Aktiengesellschaft vs. CIT [1999] 238 ITR 861 (AP), the Tribunal held
that payments received for the supervisory activities carried out in
India were taxable in terms of section 9(1)(vii) of the Act as FTS.

Further,
as the taxpayer had rendered the services at the project sites of its
clients and since it did not own and operate such sites independently,
they did not constitute the fixed place PEs under the Act.

As regards India-Germany DTAA
Relying
on the decision of Special Bench of the Tribunal in Motorola Inc vs.
DCIT [2005] 95 ITD 269 (Delhi)(SB) and the decision of Mumbai Tribunal
in Airlines Rotables Ltd vs. JDIT [2011] 131 TTJ 385 (Mum), the Tribunal
held that the taxpayer did not have a fixed place PE in India under
Article 5(1).

Supervisory activities by themselves cannot
constitute PE under Article 5(2)(i) if they were not in connection with
building, construction or assembly activities of the taxpayer. In the
present case, since the taxpayer was merely providing supervisory
services, without having a building or construction site or fixed place
at its disposal,it did not constitute a PE.

Thus, the activities
being technical in nature, they were clearly covered under the FTS
definition of the India- Germany DTAA and the same were not ‘effectively
connected’ to a PE as the taxpayer did not have a fixed place of
business through which its activities were carried out.

Relying
on Valentine Maritime (Gulf) LLC vs. ADIT [2011] 45 SOT 359 (Mum), the
Tribunal also observed that unless the contracts are otherwise linked
with each other they should be considered individually for the duration
test.

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(Unreported) [ITA No 80/Del/2013] JC Bamford Investments vs. DDIT A.Y.: 2008-09, Decided on: 04-07-2014

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Article 13(2), India-UK DTAA – though recipient of royalty was not beneficial owner, DTAA benefit cannot be denied since the beneficial owner as well as recipient of income was resident of UK.

Facts:
The taxpayer was a company incorporated in, and tax resident of, the UK. The taxpayer was a member of a group of companies. Another UK company (“UKCo”), also a member-company of the group, had entered into a Technology Transfer Agreement (“Agreement”) with a third group company incorporated in, and a tax resident of, India (“IndCo”) for grant of license to certain intellectual property (“IP”).

Subsequently, UKCo, IndCo and the taxpayer entered into a tripartite agreement under which UKCo sub-licensed IP to the taxpayer in consideration of the payment of royalty by the taxpayer to UKCo. Hence, IndCo was required to pay royalty to the taxpayer. The taxpayer, in turn, paid 99.5% of the royalty to UKCo and retained merely 0.5% with it.

According to the taxpayer, the payment received by it was subject to concessional tax rate of 15% in terms of Article 13(2) of India-UK DTAA . According to the tax authority, Article 13(2) applied only if the recipient of royalty was “beneficial owner” of the royalty whereas the taxpayer was merely a conduit between UKCo and IndCo and not a “beneficial owner” and hence, the normal tax rate of 20% was applicable.

Held:
In terms of section 90(2) of the Act, between the provisions of the Act and DTAA, whichever is more beneficial should apply. In case of the taxpayer, since provisions of DTAA are more beneficial, they should apply. However, the relevant DTAA provision is subject to the condition that the recipient of the royalty should be “beneficial owner”.
The phrase “beneficial owner” is not defined under the Act or DTAA. In common parlance, a “beneficial owner” is one who is entitled to income in his own right. Also, “Beneficial owner” is one who is free to decide: (a) whether or not the capital or other assets should be used or made available for use by others; or (b) on how the yields there from be used; or (c) both. Sometimes, a “beneficial owner” may turn out to be a person different from the immediate recipient or formal owner or recipient of the income.

The benefits of DTAA are meant to be given only to the resident of either State and not to a resident of a third State. Benefit of lower rate under Article 13(2) should not be given if the “beneficial owner” is not a resident of UK. However, the benefit is not lost merely because the formal recipient, a resident of UK, is not the beneficial owner. The underlying intention is to give benefit only to a resident of UK. In the present case, since the recipient as well as the beneficial owner were both resident of UK, benefit of lower rate of tax under DTAA cannot be denied.

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Impact of Retrospective Amendments to Section 9 of the Income-tax Act, 1961

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Fundamental principles for retrospective amendments to tax laws (especially direct taxes) are that such amendments should be made in exceptional cases and should be constitutionally valid. India has witnessed a series of retrospective amendments in its Income-tax law in the past decade. Most or a majority of them are to subvert the decisions of Judicial Authorities in favour of the tax payers resulting into uncertainty, distrust and ambiguity in tax laws. This article throws light on retrospective amendments in Indian Tax Law, their impact and resulting issues, primarily in the arena of taxation pertaining to non-residents.

1.0 Introduction
“Government should collect taxes from citizens the way a bee collects honey from the flowers – quietly without inflicting pain.” – Chanakya.

There are three pillars of Tax System in India- namely, Legislature, Execution/Administration and the Judiciary. The Parliament has the sovereign right to legislate tax laws, which are executed or administered by the tax department and the judiciary keeps watch, vigil and resolves disputes through just and proper interpretation of the law. All the three pillars derive their powers and limitations from the Indian Constitution.

Entry 82 of the List I to the Seventh Schedule, referred to in Article 246 of the Constitution of India, gives power to the Union Government to levy “Taxes on income other than agricultural income” and Entry 85 of the same Schedule gives power to levy “Corporation tax”.

2.0 Constitutional Validity of Retrospective Amendments

A question arises whether enactment of retrospective legislation is within the powers conferred by the Constitution?

The Parliament has the sovereign power to legislate and this includes prospective as well as retrospective legislations. Where the legislature can make a valid law, it may provide not only for the prospective operation of the material provisions of the said law, but it can also provide for the retrospective operation of the said provisions1.

In the undernoted cases, the Supreme Court examined the validity of retrospective amendments to laws and accorded them Constitutional validity.

(i) Chhotabhai Jethabhai Patel and Co. vs. UOI and another 2
(ii) Rai Ramakrishna vs. State of Bihar1
(iii) I. N. Saksena vs. State of M.P.3
(iv) National Agricultural vs. UOI4

To be constitutionally valid, any retrospective amendment has to broadly satisfy the following tests:

i) T he retrospective operation of the Act should not alter the character of the tax imposed by it so as to make the state incompetent to legislate5;
ii) R estrictions imposed by the Act should not be so unreasonable that they contravene the fundamental rights of the tax payer granted by the Constitution of India under Article 19(1)(g)6;
iii) R etrospective legislation should not be violative of a constitutional provision.

In Kesavananda Bharati’s case, the Supreme Court held that any legislation which has an impact of amending the basic structure of the Constitution or denying the fundamental rights, is considered as unconstitutional.

3.0 I mpact of Retrospective Amendments

3.1 Can the payer be held in default for failure to deduct tax at source u/s. 201 of the Income-tax Act, 1961?

Deduction of tax at source is a machinery provision. Section 195 of the Act casts obligation on every payer to deduct tax at source from the payment made to a nonresident. There is no threshold for the same. In case a payer fails to deduct tax at source, he will be held as an assessee in default u/s. 201 of the Act and shall be liable to pay the amount of tax together with interest thereon.

Therefore, in case of Vodafone International Holdings’ case where it acquired the shares of a Non-Resident (NR) company from the Hutch Group, which through its step down subsidiaries ultimately held the Indian telecommunication business of the erstwhile Hutch in India; it was held to be assessee in default u/s. 201 of the Act for failure to deduct tax at source while making payment to the NR company of Hutch Group. Vodafone contended that no tax was required to be deducted as shares were located outside India and the income of the NR Company was not taxable in India u/s. 9 of the Act. Vodafone won the case in the Supreme Court of India where the Apex Court held that the present provisions do not cover a situation of indirect transfer to the Indian tax net by adopting “look at” approach.

Subsequently, section 9 of the Act was amended vide the Finance Act, 2012 with retrospective effect from 01-04- 1962 to bring indirect transfer of shares within the ambit of deemed income in India by providing for “look through” approach whereby corporate veil of intermediary companies can be lifted to determine whether the substantial value of the transfer is attributed to assets located in India.

Since the amendment is made retrospective, it has an impact of nullifying the Supreme Court decision in favour of Vodafone, subject to the outcome of the writ petitions challenging constitutional validity of such retrospective amendment

The Expert Committee in its draft report on Retrospective Amendments Relating to Indirect Transfer has recommended that “no person should be treated as an assessee in default u/s. 201 of the Act read with section 9(1)(i) of the Act as amended by the Finance Act, 2012, or as a representative assessee of a non-resident, in respect of a transaction of transfer of shares of a foreign company having underlying assets in India as this would amount to the imposition of a burden of impossibility of performance.”

The recommendation of the Expert Committee is justified in the sense that how can one deduct tax at source when the income is brought to tax by retrospective amendments. The only argument in favour of revenue could be that it claims that these amendments were only clarificatory in nature. Courts have upheld retrospective application of amendments where they were found to be in the nature of explanatory, declaratory, curative or clarificatory nature.10

3.2 Can the expenses be disallowed u/s 40(a)(i) in the hands of the payer for failure to deduct tax at source?

In the case Metro and Metro vs. Additional Commissioner of Income-tax11, the Agra bench of the ITAT held that testing fees paid by the Indian company without deduction of tax at source to the TUV Product Und Umwelt GmbH – a tax resident of Germany, cannot be disallowed u/s. 40(a)(i) of the Act on the ground that the payer failed to deduct tax at source. In the instant case such fees became taxable in India only as a result of the amendment in section 9(1), by virtue of the Finance Act, 2010. The assessee relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ishikawajimaharima Heavy Industries Ltd. vs. DIT12 to conclude that fees paid by it were not taxable as services were rendered outside India.

The ITAT ruled in favour of the assessee and held that no disallowance can be made in view of the decision of the coordinate bench in the case of Channel Guide India Ltd vs. ACIT13 wherein, following the views expressed by the Ahmedabad bench in the case of Sterling Abrasives Ltd. vs. ITO (ITA No. 2234 and 2244/Ahd/2008; order dated 2008), it is held that law cannot cast the burden of performing the impossible task of tax withholding with retrospective effect, and, accordingly, the disallowance u/s. 40(a)(i) cannot be made in a situation in which taxability is confirmed only as a result of retrospective amendment of law.

The Cochin Bench of the income-tax appellate tribunal14 [ITAT] in case of Kerala Vision Ltd. vs. ACIT held that the payment made for pay channel charges is taxable as royalty with the introduction of retrospective amendments in the act, but the same could not be disallowed u/s. 40(a)(i)Of the act, as it was not taxable before the introduction of the amendment.

3.3    Can Assessee be asked to pay interest and penalty for shortfall in payment of Tax?

Article 20 (1) of the indian Constitution provides that (i) no person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in force at the time of the commission of the act charged as an offence and (ii) he shall not be subjected to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the  offence.  thus,  penal  laws  generally,  cannot  have retrospective operation.15

Expert Committee headed by dr. P. shome recommended that no penalty should be levied in respect of the income brought to tax on application of retrospective amendments u/s. 271(1)(c) (for concealment of income) and 271C (for failure to deduct tax at source) of the act.

Similarly, the expert  Committee  also  recommended  that in all cases where demand of tax is raised on account of the retrospective amendment relating to indirect transfer u/s. 9(1)(i) of the act, no interest u/s. 234a, 234B, 234C and 201(1a) of the act should be charged in respect of that demand, so that there is no undue hardship caused to the taxpayer.

3.4    Reopening of Assessments:

In Babu Ram vs. C. C. Jacob and others16 the supreme Court held that the retrospective amendment is not applicable to the matter which has already attained finality before  introduction  of  the  amendment.  The  apex  Court further observed that the prospective declaration of law is  a devise innovated by the apex Court to avoid reopening of settled issues and to prevent multiplicity of proceedings. It is also a device adopted to avoid uncertainty and litigation. By the very object of prospective declaration of law, it is deemed that all actions taken contrary to the declaration of law, prior to its date of declaration are validated. This is done in the larger public interest. in matters, where decisions opposed to the said principle have been taken prior to such declaration of law, cannot be interfered with on the basis of such declaration of law.17

It would be interesting to note here that where the supreme Court has expressly made its ratio prospective, the high Court cannot give it retrospective  effect.  By  implication, all contrary actions taken prior to such declaration stand validated.18

Post retrospective amendments to section 9 vide the finance act, 2012, for taxing indirect transfer to tax in india, CBdt has issued a letter to CCits and dgits19    stating that the amended laws would not be applicable to assessments that are already completed. the  letter states that “in case where assessment proceedings have been completed u/s. 143(3) of the act, before 1st april, 2012 and no notice for reassessment has been issued prior to that date; such cases shall not be re-opened u/s. 147/148 of the act on account of the above mentioned clarificatory amendments introduced by the Finance Act, 2012.” It further clarifies that “assessment or any other order which stand validated due to the said clarificatory amendments in the Finance Act, 2012 would of course be enforced.” this will have an impact on all cases which are pending at different stages of appeal.

Thus, the  letter seem to be providing relief to only those tax payers whose assessments have been completed and no appeals are pending at any level.

4.0 Retrospective Amendments and Tax Treaties

Tax  treaties,  being  bilateral  agreements,  signed  by  two sovereign states, would prevail over domestic tax laws wherever there are conflicting provisions. Section 90 (2) provides  that  between  provisions  of  the  act  and  a  tax Treaty, whichever is more beneficial to the tax payer shall apply. Various terms are defined in Article 3 of a Tax Treaty or certain articles dealing with different types of income, for example,  dividend,  interest,  royalty,  fees  for  technical services (fts) etc.

Wherever, any particular term is defined in the tax treaty, and if there is a retrospective amendment to the definition of that term in the act, then such amendment will have no impact on provisions of tax treaty. For example, in CIT vs. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft20 the Bombay high Court held that the amendment in the definition of the “Royalty” with retrospective date will have no impact on interpretation of tax treaty. Payments made by the indian Company (BHEL) were held to be in the nature of “commercial profits” under the  india-germany  tax  treaty  (old)  and  were  held  not to be taxable in india in absence of Pe. The income-tax department’s argument of applying ambulatory approach for interpretation of the term “royalty” in view of its amendment under the income-tax act, was overruled by the high Court stating that, assessee has right to opt for provisions of the tax treaty u/s. 90(2) read with CBdt Circular 333 dated 2nd April, 1982 as they are more beneficial to him.

In B4U International Holdings Ltd. vs. DCIT21, the mumbai tribunal  held  that  hire  charges  for  transponder  satellite would not constitute “royalty” applying provisions of india- usa dtaa, notwithstanding retrospective amendments in the definition of “Royalty” u/s. 9(1)(vi) of the Act by the finance act, 2012.

In Sanofi Pasteur Holding SA vs. Dept. of Revenue22 the A. P.  high Court held that “the retrospective amendment   to section 9(1) so as to supersede the verdict in Vodafone international and to tax off-shore transfers does not impact the provisions of the india-france dtaa because the dtaa overrides the act.” the Court also rejected the revenue’s contention that as the “alienation” is not defined in the dtaa, it should have the meaning of the term “transfer” in section 2(47) as retrospectively amended. The Court ruled that as per article 31 of the Vienna Convention, a treaty has to be interpreted in good faith and in accordance with the ordinary meaning. it further held that, though article 3(2) provides that a term not defined in the treaty may be given the meaning in the act, this is not applicable because the term “alienation” is not defined in the Act.

In Director of Income-tax vs. Nokia Networks OY23, it was held that the assessee had opted to be governed by the dtaa and the language of the dtaa differed from the amended  section  9  of  the  act.  The  amendment  cannot be read into the DTAA. On the wording of the dtaa, a copyrighted article does not fall within the purview of royalty.

Article 3 of the un model Convention (MC) and the OECD MC as well as almost all indian tax treaties provide that any term not defined in the tax treaty shall have the meaning that it has at that time under the laws of that state, for the purpose of taxes to which the treaty applies. In other words, the meaning of a particular term is not defined in the treaty, then tax laws of the state which applies provisions  of a  tax treaty (i.e., state of source generally for determining taxability  of  income)  would  be  applicable.  for  example, the term “FTS” is not defined in India’s tax treaties with mauritius and uae. In such a scenario amendments made to the term fts in the act with retrospective effect would be applicable to any entity earning such income from india who is resident of these countries.

Article 7 in certain tax treaties (for example,  dtaa  with usa and uK) provide that  deductibility  of  expenses  of  the Permanent establishment (Pe) shall be subject to the provisions of the domestic tax laws. In such a scenario, if there is a retrospective amendment in the act, concerning computation of business profits of a PE, then such revised provisions would be applicable.


5.0 Expert Committee on Retrospective Amendments to section 9 relating to indirect Transfer of Shares

Retrospective  amendments  are  supposed  to  cure  the unintended  defect  or  lacuna  in  the   legislations   and/  or to bring clarity in law. However, the recent trend of retrospective amendments is very disturbing, which is to overrule or nullify the effect of favourable decisions of the Courts  and  tribunals  in  favour  of  the  tax  payer,  albeit, the Government has inherent right to correct infirmities in the law which may have been surfaced in a decision of a Court or tribunal resulting in a favourable decision to the tax payer. Thus, any retrospective amendment which may have an effect of neutralizing a Court ruling, by itself, would not render it unconstitutional unless, it alters the character of the tax imposed by the state so much, that it renders  the state incompetent to legislate and/or  its  operation  is so unreasonable that it results in to contravention of the fundamental rights of tax payers guaranteed by indian Constitution. At the same time, where the retrospective legislation is introduced to overcome a judicial decision,  the power cannot be used to subvert the decision without removing the statutory basis of the decision.24  further, such amendment cannot be made retrospectively only for the purpose of nullifying a judgment where there was no lacuna or defect in the original law.25

In 2012, the then Prime minister constituted an expert Committee  on  general  anti  avoidance  rules  (gaar), to undertake stakeholder consultations and finalise the guidelines for gaar after far more widespread consultations so that there is a greater clarity on many fronts26.

In the meantime the finance act, 2012, inserted following two explanations to section 9(1)(i) of the act with retrospective effect from 01-04-1962.

“Explanation  4.—for  the  removal  of  doubts,  it  is  hereby clarified that the expression “through” shall mean and include and shall  be  deemed  to  have  always  meant and included “by means of,” “in consequence of” or “by reason of.”

Explanation  5.—for  the  removal  of  doubts,  it  is  hereby clarified that an asset or a capital asset being any share or interest in a company or entity registered or incorporated outside india shall be deemed to be and shall always be deemed to have been situated in india, if the share or interest derives, directly or indirectly, its value substantially from the assets located in india.”

The above explanations were inserted to nullify the effect of the land mark decision of the supreme Court in case of Vodafone International Holdings BV vs. Union of India27 where in the apex Court held that indirect transfer of asset (in this case it was “shares”) by one non-resident to another non-resident of a foreign company which owned an indian company through various intermediary companies, was not covered by section 9 of the act and hence not taxable in india. as the stake involved was very high (about rs. 14,200 crore), government amended section 9 of the income-tax act with retrospective effect. However, it resulted in lot of opposition, criticism and negative impact about stability  and reliability of indian tax laws in the minds of foreign investors, thus impacting flow of foreign investments. At that time the expert Committee headed by dr. Parthasarathy shome was already examining gaar provisions. So, the government expanded the scope of the expert Committee on gaar to include the examination of the applicability of the amendment on taxation of non-resident transferring assets, where the underlying asset is in india.

The said expert Committee submitted its draft report in 2012 titled “draft report on retrospective amendments relating to indirect transfer”, wherein it concluded that “retrospective application of tax law should occur in exceptional or rarest of rare cases, and with particular objectives:

(i)    to correct apparent mistakes/anomalies in the statute;
(ii)    to apply to matters that are genuinely clarificatory in nature, i.e., to remove technical defects, particularly in procedure, which have vitiated the substantive law; or,
(iii)    to “protect” the tax base from highly abusive tax planning schemes that have the main purpose of avoiding tax, without economic substance, but not to “expand” the tax base.

Moreover, retrospective application of a tax law should occur only after exhaustive and transparent consultations with stakeholders who would be affected.”

The   “Tax  Administration   Reform   Commission”   (TARC) headed by Dr. Parthasarathy shome harshly criticised “Retrospective Amendments.” TARC submitted its first report   on   30th   may,   2014.   the   report28   states   that: “retrospective amendments have further undermined the trust between taxpayers and the tax administration. Many seem to feel that it has become the order of the day. Many of the retrospective amendments  have  been  introduced to counter interpretation in favour of the taxpayer upheld earlier by the judiciary. the most famous is the introduction of provisions for taxation of ‘indirect transfer’ with effect from 1st april, 1962, to overrule a supreme Court judgment which held that indian tax authorities did not have territorial jurisdiction to tax offshore transactions, and therefore, the taxpayer was not liable to withhold the taxes29. An overnight change in the interpretation of a provision, which earlier held ground for decades, provides scope for tax officials to rake up settled positions. This approach to retrospective amendments has resulted in protracted disputes, apart from having deeply harmful effects on investment sentiment and the macro economy.

6.0 Some Typical Retrospective Amendments pertaining to Non-residents have been tabulated in the table on the following page:

Reflecting the challenges behind just and correct application of retrospective amendments there is a constitutional or statutory protection against it in several countries. Countries such as Brazil, Greece, Mexico, Mozambique, Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela, Romania, Russia, Slovenia and sweden have prohibited retrospective taxation30.

7.0 Conclusion
The Parliament has the sovereign right to amend the income-tax act and such amendments can be retrospective in nature. however, retrospective  amendments  results in uncertainty and distrust between tax payers and tax department. Imagine the plight of a tax payer who fights through various stages of appeal up to supreme Court by substantial devotion of time, efforts and money, gets  a favourable judgment and the act is amended to render the said judgment ineffectual. Retrospective amendments results in tremendous hardships to tax payers especially in a scenario where there is no accountability on the part of the tax administration.

TRAC has recommended that retrospective amendment should be avoided as a principle. it further commented that “retrospective amendments clustered during 2009- 12 may reflect this lackadaisical approach. In turn, this reflects complete lack of accountability at any level except on grounds of lagging behind in revenue collection.”

Retrospective amendments to section 9 of the act vide finance  act,  2012  to  tax  indirect  transfers  vitiated  the investment climate in india. Taking a cue from the criticism by the expert Committee and protest from tax payers, the present nda government has taken a stand to exercise the power of retrospective amendments with extreme caution and judiciousness keeping in mind the impact of each such measure on the economy and over- all  economic  climate.  The  finance  minister  in  his  Budget speech has stated that NDA government will not ordinarily bring about any change retrospectively which creates a fresh liability. Such an assurance on the floor of the Parliament will certainly boost investors’ and tax payers’ confidence.

Place of Provision of Services Rules

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Notification No. 14/2014-ST dated 11th July, 2014

Place of Provision of Service Rules, 2012 were provided in the principal Notification No. 28/2012 – Service Tax, dated 20th June, 2012 vide number G.S.R. 470 (E), dated 20th June, 2012. The same are now amended vide this Notification No. 14/2014. These amendments are going to bring a major shift on the liability of service tax in respect of some services.
Commission Agent service: Under the amended rules, commission agent is covered under Rule 9(c) of the POP Rules, which means, the place of provision of service will 89 be the location of service provider. So, if an overseas agent provides commission agent service to an Indian exporter, it will not attract reverse charge as the location of service provider is in non-taxable territory. Consequently, if any commission agent renders service in India for any foreign goods, the commission agent is liable to pay service tax, even though he may receive the commission in foreign exchange.

Hiring of Aircrafts or Vessels: Rule 9(d) of the POP Rules, 2012 has been amended to exclude Aircrafts and Vessels from the scope of this rule. Before this amendment, Aircrafts or Vessels taken or hire from abroad up to a period of one month did not attract service tax under reverse charge. But, now that these two modes of transport are excluded from Rule 9(d), the place of provision is the location of service recipient as per Rule 3. Therefore, from 1st October 2014, if Aircraft or Vessel is taken on hire from a non-taxable territory for a period up to one month, it attracts service tax under reverse charge.

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Changes in Point of Taxation Rules, 2011

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Notification No. 13/2014-ST dated 11th July, 2014

The Point of Taxation Rules, 2011 were framed by the principal Notification No. 18/2011 – Service Tax, dated 1st March, 2011 vide number G.S.R. 175 (E), dated 1st March, 2011 and amended by Notification No. 37/2012-Service Tax, dated 20th June, 2012 vide number G.S.R.479 (E), dated 20th June, 2012.

Now, by this Notification No. 13/2014, certain amendments have been made to the earlier notifications as summarised below:

1. Determination of point of taxation in case of specified services or persons: Rule 7:

The point of taxation for the services specified in section 68(2) that is services falling under the ambit of reverse or partial charge mechanism shall be the month in which the payment is made to the vendor, subject to a condition that such payment is made within six months from the date of invoice. If the payment is not made within six months, the point of taxation shall be determined as if this rule does not exist.

However, the point of taxation shall be date immediately following three months if the payment is not made within three months from the date of invoice. Hence, effectively the time period has been reduced from six months to three months.

2. Rule 10: POT for instances where invoice for reverse or partial charge has been issued before 01-10- 2014 and payment is pending as on said date:
The new rule provides that notwithstanding anything contained vide first proviso to Rule 7, if the invoice in respect of a service for which POT is determinable vide Rule 7 has been issued before 01-10-2014 but payment has not been made as on the said day, the POT shall be:
i. If payment is made within a period of six months from the date of invoice – POT Is the date of invoice; ii. If payment is not made within a period of six months from the date of invoice – POT shall be determined as if this rule does not exist.

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Interest on delayed payment of service tax

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Notification No. 12/2014-ST dated 11th July, 2014

Vide this notification, varying rates of interest on the basis of extent of delay in payment of service tax have been provided as under:

New rates shall be applicable w.e.f. 1st October, 2014.

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Service Tax (Determination of Value ) Rules, 2006- Changes

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Notification No. 11/2014-ST dated 11th July, 2014

In Rule 2A of the Service Tax Valuation Rules, category ‘B’ and ‘C’ of works contract i.e.,

(a) the services of maintenance or repair or reconditioning or restoration or servicing of any goods;

(b) maintenance or repair or completion and finishing services such as glazing or plastering or floor and wall tiling or installation of electrical fittings of immovable property; are merged into one single category, with service portion as 70%. This change will come into effect from 1st October, 2014.

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Reverse or Partial Charge Mechanism- Changes

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Notification No. 10/2014-ST dated 11th July, 2014

In this connection, the principal notification notification No. 30/2012 – Service Tax, dated 20th June, 2012, vide number G.S.R. 472 (E), dated 20th June, 2012 was last amended by notification No. 45/2012-Service Tax, dated 7th August, 2012 vide number G.S.R. 621 (E), dated 7th August, 2012.

Now, by this Notification No.10/2014, certain amendments have been effected in percentages of service tax payable by the service provider and service recipient for certain specified services, which are summarised as under:

In relation to services provided by a recovery agent to a banking company or financial institution or NBFC – the recipient of service has to pay 100% of service tax.

In relation to services provided by director of a company or body corporate – the recipient of service has to pay 100% of service tax.

In relation to services provided or agreed to be provided by way of renting of a motor vehicle designed to carry passengers on non-abated value to any person who is not engaged in the similar line of business – the percentage has been revised from 60:40 to 50:50 by service provider and service receiver respectively.

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E-payment of service tax made mandatory

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Notification No. 09/2014-ST dated 11th July, 2014

With effect from 01-10-2014, electronic payment of service tax is made mandatory for all assessees. However, a proviso has been added wherein the powers have been given to the Assistant Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner to allow the assessees for reasons recorded in writing to deposit service tax by any mode other than internet banking.

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Abatements – changes

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Notification No. 08/2014-ST dated 11th July, 2014

Various abatements have been granted by the principal Notification No. 26/2012 – Service Tax, dated 20th June, 2012, vide number G.S.R. 468 (E), dated the 20th June, 2012 and amended by notification No.9/2013- Service Tax, dated the 8th May, 2013 vide G.S.R. 296 (E), dated 8th May, 2013. Now this Notification No. 08/2014 makes further amendments as follows :

1. For services of GTA in relation to transportation of goods:

The condition of non-availment of CENVAT Credit on inputs, input services and capital goods is required to be satisfied by the service provider. The ambiguity whether the same is not to be availed by the service provider or receiver is ironed out by inserting the phrase ‘by service provider’ in Entry 7.

2. For services provided in relation to Chit:
The following condition has been added stating that CENVAT Credit on inputs, capital goods and input services, used for providing the taxable service, has not been taken under the provisions of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.

3. For services of renting of any motor vehicle designed to carry passengers:

i. The phrase ‘motor vehicle designed to carry passengers’ is replaced with ‘motor cab’. Hence, effectively the services of renting of motor cab is only covered under this entry.
ii. The following conditions are substituted for the existing conditions:
CENVAT Credit on inputs and capital goods are not to be taken;

CENVAT Credit of input services of rent a cab has been taken as under:

Full credit if received from a person who is paying service tax on 40% of value; Upto 40% of such credit, if service tax is paid on the entire value,

CENVAT Credit of input services other than above shall not be taken.

4. For services of transport of passengers by a contract carriage other than motor cab:

i. A new entry since the services provided by contract carriage is brought into tax net in this notification. The abatement specified for such services shall be 60% subject to a condition that CENVAT Credit on inputs, capital goods and input services, used for providing the taxable service, has not been taken under the provisions of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.
ii. Further, this entry also covers the services provided by radio-taxis from the date the phrase ‘radio taxi’ is deleted from the negative list to be notified by the Central Government in the Official Gazette.

5. For transport of goods in a vessel:
The abatement has been increased from 50% to 60%.

6. For services provided by a tour operator:

The credit of input services received from tour operator is being made available which is not allowed hitherto.

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Changes in exemption procedure for SEZs

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Notification No. 07/2014-ST dated 11th July, 2014

Services provided to developer of or unit in SEZ are exempted by adopting certain procedure laid out in the principal Notification No. 12/2013 – Service Tax, dated 1st July, 2013, vide number G.S.R. 448 (E), dated 1st July, 2013 and amended by Notification No. 15/2013-Service Tax, dated 21st November, 2013 vide number G.S.R. No.744 (E), dated 21st November, 2013.

In order to remove certain time delays and simplify certain benefits, Notification No. 07/2014 makes following amendments in the earlier notifications:

(a) Central Excise Officer would issue Form A-2, within 15 days from receipt of Form A-1;

(b) Exemption would be available from the date when list of services on which SEZ is entitled to upfront exemption is endorsed by the authorised officer of SEZ in Form A-1, provided Form A-1 is furnished to the jurisdictional Central Excise Officer within 15 days of its verication. If furnished later, exemption would be available from the date on which FormA-1 is so furnished;

(c) Pending issuance of Form A-2, exemption will be available subject to condition that authorisation issued by the Central Excise officer will be furnished to the service provider within a period of three months from provision of service;

(d) For services covered under reverse charge, the requirement of furnishing service tax registration number of service provider shall be dispensed with;

(e) A service shall be treated as exclusively used for SEZ operations if the recipient of service is a SEZ unit or developer, invoice is in the name of such unit/developer and the service is used exclusively for furtherance of authorised operations in the SEZ.

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Changes in Mega Exemption Notification

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Notification No. 06/2014-ST dated 11th July 2014

The
exemptions to certain activities are governed by the principal
Notification No 25/2012-ST dated 20-06-2012 have been amended by
Notification No.04/2014 – Service Tax, dated 17th February, 2014, vide
number G.S.R. 91(E), dated 17th February, 2014.

Now, by
this Notification No. 6/2014-ST dated 11-07- 2014, amendments have been
made to the said principal notification. Such amendments are summarised
below :

(a) E xemption to Services by way of technical testing
or analysis of newly developed drugs, including vaccines and herbal
remedies, on human participants is now withdrawn;
(b) E xemption to Services provided for transportation of passengers by air-conditioned contract carriage is withdrawn;
(c)
E xemption in respect of services provided to the Government or local
authority or the governmental authority, will be limited to services by
way of water supply, public health, sanitation conservancy, solid waste
management or slum improvement and upgradation;
(d) S ervices provided by common bio-medical waste treatment facility operators to clinical establishments are exempted;
(e)
S ervices by way of transportation by rail or vessel from one place in
India to another of the following goods are exempted : i. organic
manure, ii. cotton, ginned or baled;
(f) S ervices by way of
transportation by GTA , by way of transport in a goods carriage the
following goods are exempted : i. organic manure, ii. cotton, ginned or
baled;
(g) S ervices by way of loading, unloading, packing, storage or warehousing of rice, cotton, ginned or baled are exempted;
(h)
Life micro-insurance products as approved by the Insurance Regulatory
and Development Authority, having maximum amount of cover of Rs. 50,000
are exempted;
(i) S ervices received by the Reserve Bank of India,
from outside India in relation to management of foreign exchange
reserves are exempted;

(j) S ervices provided by a tour operator
to a foreign tourist in relation to a tour conducted wholly outside
India are exempted;
(k) T he concept of ‘auxiliary educational services is omitted and exempted services are notified as under:
(i) transportation of students, faculty and staff;
(ii) catering services including any mid-day meals scheme sponsored by the Government;
(iii) security or cleaning or house-keeping services in such educational institutions;
(iv) services relating to admission to such institution or conduct of examination;

(l) T he exemption of renting of immovable property service received by educational institutions, stands withdrawn;
(m)
S ervices provided by hotel, inn, guest house, club or campsite, by
whatever name called, for residential or lodging purposes, having
declared tariff of a unit of accommodation of Rs. 1,000 or more per day
are taxable. The word ‘commercial’ has been deleted to cover the
services provided by dharmashalas or ashrams or any other such entities;
(n)
Selling of space or time slots for advertisements has been excluded
from negative list with the exception of selling of space for
advertisements in the print media.

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Maharashtra Act No. XXVII of 2014

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Maharashtra Act No. XXVII of 2014 published after having received assent of the governor in the Maharashtra Government Gazette on 26-06-2014.

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Notification No. VAT 1514/CR 46/Taxation 1 dated 11-07-2014

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By this notification, the government of Maharashtra amends Schedule A and C with effect from 01-08-2014.

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Notification No. VAT 1514/C.R.44/Taxation-1 dated 09-07- 2014

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By this notification Government of Maharashtra has exempted late fees above Rs.1,000/- for dealers who have not filed any returns for the period up to February, 2014 on condition that they file returns up to 30-09-2014 along with payment of tax and interest applicable.

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