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If Tomorrow Never Comes

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Dharampur is one of the largest districts of Gujarat. It lies east of Vapi and Balsar. It is one of the most backward regions of Gujarat, and is basically inhabited by the adivasis. Most of it is hilly area and once upon a time ,it was thickly forested. However, now a good amount of forest cover has disappeared by indiscriminate tree felling. There are a number of NGOS run by devoted people, which are doing excellent work for the upliftment of the advasis. We visit Dharampur a few times a year, to do our bit and give a helping hand in this work.

On our last visit, two young articled students from my office expressed their desire to come with us. I cautioned them that it was not a pleasure trip or a picnic. The visit would be hot and tiring. Yet they insisted and I am glad that they came. To my utter surprise and delight, both these young men, though not Gujarati speaking, were completely at ease with the adivasi children. They played and sang with the children, even carried them, and had great fun with them. They were happy with the kids, and the kids were happy with them. My faith in the younger generation got reaffirmed.

I also learned something valuable. One of my articled students made an interesting comment. He said that he would like to commence serving the poor when he was 40. The elder person asked “What if you do not reach 40?” Our young friend decided there and then, that good work cannot wait for tomorrow. What if tomorrow never comes? He has started contributing 50% of his stipend to assist the deserving and needy poor.

This incident took me several years back in time. I remembered a quotation in Gujarati by Father Vallace who, though Spanish by birth, a Roman Catholic and (then) a mathematics professor at St. Xavier’s College, Ahmedabad had mastered the Gujarati language and was also a renowned Gujarat author. He said:

“Tomorrow is the grave of many a heart’s noblest dreams”.

According to him ‘I will do it tomorrow ‘ is a polite way of saying “I will not do it”.

There are two things that can happen when we plan to do something tomorrow. Either tomorrow gets postponed and never comes, or we ourselves may not be there tomorrow! In either case, the work remains undone.

I was speaking at a Rotary club meeting on “Giving”. A gentleman sitting in the very front row expressed his desire to donate Rs. 1 crore. I was elated. Two days later, I was shocked to see his photograph in the obituary column. His “tomorrow” never came! I learned my lesson. The Message is: ’Do not procrastinate’. Tomorrow, like income tax, refund may never come. “tomorrow” never came! I learnt my lesson.

Friends, the worst regret we have in life is not for the wrong things we did, but for the right things we did not do.

The message I am attempting to convey by saying ‘tomorrow never comes’ is not only about ‘giving’ but also about a hundred and one things , which we go on postponing. For example, it may be reading a book, phoning a friend, calling on a sick relative, visiting our aged parents, learning something new, taking a vacation, playing with our children, or sitting by the sea shore watching the waves, admiring a sunrise, gazing at the stars and even, sometimes doing nothing. Let us live like a samurai as if each day is our last one. I conclude by quoting from a Hemant Kumar song:

It was Mark Twain who said,

So friends, let us learn to live today; for tomorrow may never come.

“Life is not about waiting for the storm to pass.

It is about learning to dance in the rain”.

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[2013] 37 taxmann.com 26 (Mumbai – CESTAT) YG1 Industries (India) (P.) Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Mumbai-III

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Whether CENVAT credit can be availed on service tax paid on input services exempted from service tax? Held, Yes.

Facts:

The Appellant manufactured drills/tools and claimed CENVAT credit on job-work charges for grooving on which the service provider charged service tax which was eligible for exemption under Notification No.8/2005-ST dated 01-03-2005. The department denied the credit on the ground that the service provider should not have charged service tax and consequently the Appellant was not eligible for any credit

Held:

The Hon. Tribunal held that, whether the service provider was entitled for exemption and not required to pay duty at all, cannot be a consideration for the jurisdictional officers at the end of service receiver. Once service tax was paid and service used in or in relation to the manufacture of the final products, the Appellant was rightly entitled to avail CENVAT credit.

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[2013] 37 taxmann.com 355 [New Delhi- CESTAT] Ajai Kumar Agnihotri vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Kanpur

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There is no fundamental distinction between hiring of a cab and renting of a cab for the levy of service tax.

Facts:

The Appellant provided motor cabs/maxi cabs (with drivers) to GAIL on monthly basis and entered into an agreement of monthly rates for specified vehicles subject to specified usage in kilometres on 24 hours basis, additional amount for excess usage, separate charges for night halts etc. Other expenses towards fuel, salary of drivers and maintenance of vehicles were the responsibility of service provider.

The department contended that the Appellant provided rent-a-cab service and demanded service tax on the same. The Appellant contended that the said activity amounted to merely “hiring of motor” vehicle and there was no ‘renting’ involved since the recipient of service had no domain or control over the vehicle and the vehicle was placed at his disposal only for temporary usage, for the duration, either in point of time or in point of distance. It was also contended that, the domain of vehicle was always with the operator i.e. Appellant who also bears the expenses and maintenance charges.

Held:

Relying upon the decision of the Hon. High Court in CCE vs. Kuldeep Singh Gill [2010] 27 STT 224, the Hon. Tribunal decided in favour of the revenue by holding that there was no fundamental normative distinction between “hiring of cab” and “renting of cab” and that the Appellant provided rent-cabservices to GAIL leviable to service tax.

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2013-TIOL-1394-CESTAT-DEL M/s ITC limited vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, Delhi.

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Where the Show Cause Notices were issued on the basis of an unreasoned prima facie assumption, they were held invalid and thus, also the adjudicating orders based on such notices.

Facts:

The department issued two Show Cause Notices for the period April 2008 to March 2011. The department just reproduced the provisions of section 65(19) relating to definition of “Business Auxiliary Services” and demanded tax along with interest and penalty without stating any reasons and on a prima facie assumption.

The appellant, apart from impeaching the adjudication order on merits, urged a preliminary ground of challenge that the Show Cause Notices were incoherent and since it did not spell out what relevant ingredients of the relevant statutory provision applied to the service so provided to warrant attribution of the liability, the initial step for initiation of proceedings leading to adjudication failed for violation of due process and transgression of principles of natural justice. Reliance was placed on United Telecom Ltd. vs. CST, Hyderabad 2011 (22) STR 571 (Tri.-Bang), Kaur & Singh vs. CCE 1997 (4) ELT 289 (SC) and M L Capoor & Others AIR 1974 SC 87 (para 10).

Held:

On analysis of the Show Cause Notices issued by the department, the Hon. Tribunal observed that since the said notices were issued on the basis of unspecified reasons and a prima facie assumption that the assessee was assessable to levy of service tax for providing Business Auxiliary Services and that mere extraction of the entire provisions of section 65(19) of the Act did not fulfill the requirement, they were invalid and that the infirmity was incurable. The Hon. Tribunal, further, quashed the adjudication orders being the consequence of the invalid Show Cause Notices and granted liberty to the revenue to act in accordance with law.

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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 71 dated 8th November, 2013 Advance Category – I Authorised Dealer Banks

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Presently, advance remittance for import of rough diamonds into India can be made to nine mining companies without any limit and without Bank Guarantee or Standby Letter of Credit, by an importer (other than Public Sector Company or Department/ Undertaking of the Government of India/State Governments), subject to certain conditions.

This circular states that the names of two of the said nine companies have been changed as under:

i. De Beers UK Ltd to De Beers Global Sightholder Sales Proprietary Ltd.

ii. BHP Billiton, Belgium to Dominion Diamond Marketing.

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Ordinance Empowers SEBI Even More – and Brings Some Ambiguities

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An Ordinance was issued on 18th July, 2013 amending
securities laws such as the SEBI Act, etc. Some provisions have
immediate effect while certain others have retrospective effect from
different dates. Some amendments are technical and meant to clear
certain doubts/concerns or strengthen the validity of certain
provisions. A couple of others are a little serious. One grants special
powers of search and seizure to SEBI. Another gives wider powers to
gather information. Yet another provision grants powers to SEBI to
arrest and jail people for strange reasons—if he does not pay penalty,
does not refund monies, or a mere nonpayment of fees, etc. Others like
special courts are meant to expedite prosecution of offenders.

The
important amendments can be briefly described as follows. The Consent
Order process, which presently operates through Guidelines, has now been
given specific legislative sanction. Special Courts are now authorised
to be set up for speedy prosecution of offences. Powers to search and
seize without need for sanction by Magistrate are given to SEBI. Powers
to recover monies from defaulting parties are also given. Disgorgement
of proceeds of unlawful transactions/activities also now has legislative
sanction. The scope of provisions relating to collective investment
schemes (CIS) has been expanded and certain large Schemes are treated as
CIS by a deeming fiction. SEBI also can now collect information from
practically anybody and not from a limited set of persons as was the
position earlier.

Similar amendments are made in regard to some
of these aspects to other securities laws—the Securities Contracts
(Regulation) Act, 1956 and the Depositories Act, 1999.

Some important amendments are discussed in a little more detail.

Collective Investment Schemes
SEBI—as
early as 1999—made fairly stringent Regulations for registration and
regulation of Collective Investment Schemes (“CISs”). It may be
recollected that CISs are schemes that pool monies from the public and
invest in certain businesses. The profits, after expenses, of such
businesses are intended to be divided amongst the investors. Often,
specific assets are earmarked to individual investors so the returns
from such assets are identifiable. The best example of this is mutual
funds, which are of course specifically excluded from the definition of
CIS but are still a good example to understand the concept.

However,
in practice, numerous schemes were introduced for fancy businesses
(teak plantations, goat raising, etc.). Some of them gave false promises
of high returns. Some were simply loans raised but disguised as CISs to
avoid various restrictions of other laws on raising of monies from the
public. Many of these schemes were found, usually too late, to be
outright Ponzi schemes where, on one hand the funds were used to pay
hefty commissions to motivate agents to collect monies and on the other,
the rest of the monies were used to repay interest and principal on
earlier loans. By the time the scam was discovered, most of the recent
investors could recover nothing.

The amendments and Regulations
of 1999 did help in closure of many leading schemes. However, recent
scams, particularly in West Bengal, showed that they had merely
re-invented themselves and, strangely, they were operating fairly
openly. One wonders whether this is not clearly a failure of the
regulator. SEBI did pass some quick orders in such cases recently but it
appears that it was too late.

Nevertheless, this Ordinance
makes certain amendments strengthening the powers of SEBI. The
definition of CISs has been enlarged to include by deeming fiction
certain large-sized schemes. Any scheme/arrangement of pooling of funds
having a corpus of Rs. 100 crore or more is now deemed to be a CIS.
Thus, it will need prior registration and compliance with several
formalities.

However, schemes which are specifically excluded
from the list will remain excluded from this deeming provision also.
Thus, public deposits raised by companies under corresponding
Rules/Directions, funds raised by mutual funds, insurance companies,
etc. will not be treated as CISs.

This deeming fiction, however, appears
to be unduly wide. The requirements for a scheme to become such a CIS
are simple and minimal (i) it has to be a scheme/arrangement (ii) it
should involve “pooling” of funds (iii) the total “corpus” should be Rs.
100 crore or more.

Would it cover investment in capital of private
limited companies? What about Inter-corporate deposits (or even bank
borrowings)? These and several other types of pooling of funds appear
prima facie to be covered by the new definition.

A question had arisen
whether the restrictions of registration, etc. on CISs were applicable
only if the CIS was set up by a company or whether it was applicable if
set up by other persons too. In Osian Art Fund’s case, for example, this
contention was raised and SEBI held that it also applied to entities
other than companies. However, to put this issue beyond doubt, the word
“company” has now been replaced by the word “person” in the Act. This
now makes it clear that the requirement of registration shall also apply
to other entities. The amendment, however, is not retrospective.

Consent Orders
The Guidelines relating to consent orders issued in 2007
enabled numerous cases to be settled without lengthy penal proceedings.
Persons accused of violations of provisions of securities laws, or even
persons who anticipated such allegations, could approach SEBI for
settlement. By payment of a settlement amount and sometimes accepting
certain non-monetary restrictions like debarment, etc. the proceedings
could expeditiously come to an end. Further, the proceedings would end
without admission or denial of guilt by such person.

While the
settlement mechanism was fairly speedy and independent, it attracted
criticism too, part of which was met by recent issuance of the revised
Guidelines. However, serious concerns were expressed over the legal
basis of the consent order guidelines. A PIL was also filed before the
Delhi High Court. If the Guidelines were set aside by the Court as being
without legal basis, hundreds of consent orders passed till now would
have got overturned. A new provision now gives retrospective validity to
the consent order process permitting SEBI to pass such consent orders.
This amendment is effective from April 2007, when the original consent
order Guidelines were issued.

Strangely, the amended provisions
specifically provide that the consent orders shall be in accordance with
Regulations
made in this regard. However, no Regulations have been
issued till date and the existing settlement scheme is in the form of
Guidelines
. This puts a question mark over all consent orders passed
till date under Consent Order Guidelines. A question arises whether any
Consent Order can be passed till Regulations on Consent Orders are
issued.

It is also provided that consent orders cannot be appealed against. The amendment, being retrospective, will thus invalidate existing appeals or future appeals against any consent order. This may make sense because consent orders are by definition by mutual consent. However, at times, SEBI may reject an application for consent. Discretion remains with SEBI whether or not to accept an application for consent. The Guidelines state that certain types of violations cannot be settled. However, in other cases too, there is discretion with SEBI. Question is whether such discretion is exercised judicially and whether it can be challenged. The new provision, however, provides that no appeal shall lie against the order passed.

The party concerned of course does not lose the right of proceeding with the adjudication or other proceedings in the normal course.

Powers of search and seizure

Till now, SEBI could initiate search and seizure under persons being investigated by making an application to a Magistrate who had jurisdiction over the persons. Certain reporting was also required to be made to the Magistrate. This requirement to apply to and obtain order from the Magistrate has now been dropped. The SEBI Chairman can now issue directions for search and seizure against persons being investigated. The powers of search and seizure have also been made more elaborate.

Powers to collect records from other entities (including telephone records)

Till now, SEBI had powers to seek information from banks or other authorities, etc. for information relating to transactions under investigation. Now the powers have been widened to include “any person”.

Disgorgement of funds

Persons may engage in transactions in contravention with the Act/Regulations and thus make gains or avoid losses. For example, a person may engage in insider trading and make profits or avoid losses. There have been concerns raised whether SEBI has adequate powers to order disgorgement of such gains/losses and direct its use, say, for credit to the Investor Protection Fund.

An explanation now introduced declares that SEBI always had powers to direct disgorgement of profits/losses from persons who have made such profits or avoided losses in contravention of the Act/ Regulations. Further, the amount disgorged shall be credited to the Investor Protection Fund.

It must be noted that disgorgement is in addition to the penalty that can be levied.

Action in case of default in payment of refund, penalty, fees, etc.

In case a person delays or defaults in payment of various types of amounts as he has been ordered or is otherwise required to pay by way of penalty, disgorgement or refund the monies raised or even dues on account of fees payable to SEBI, specific powers to recover such amounts, by attachment and sale of properties have been given.

However, there is a strange power given to SEBI. The person concerned can be arrested and imprisoned for making such defaults. Since power to attach and sell properties is given, the power to arrest and detain seems a little drastic, particularly when they cover even regular dues like fees payable to SEBI.

Conclusion

Powers of search and seizure and arrest and detention are a little scary, particularly considering how widely they are worded. However, it appears strange that instead of examining how powers given in 1999 to regulate/restrict CISs have worked, more powers in broader provisions have been given to SEBI. Based on past experience, persons are scared that the amended provisions will be arbitrarily used especially when governance (implementation and enforcement) is an issue.

Financial Statement Disclo sures — How Much is Too Much

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Now that the IASB and the FASB’s joint projects are making steady progress in addressing key accounting areas, the two Boards are spending more time at the conceptual issues such as the presentation and disclosure in the financial statements. Earlier this year, the IASB hosted a public forum to brainstorm the topic while the FASB discussed a summary of the responses to its discussion paper on the disclosure framework.

Over the last five years, the size of annual reports of companies has increased substantially. One of the reasons attributed to the global financial crisis was the off-balance sheet exposures and the lack of adequate disclosures in the financial statements relating to these exposures by the companies. This pushed regulators, standard-setters, auditors, preparers and users of the financial statements alike in working overtime to bulge the size of companies’ annual reports without much deliberation around the usefulness of enhanced disclosures or their potential implications on loss of more relevant information among the resultant disclosure ‘noise’ in the financial statements.

Soon after, the solution began to emerge itself as a problem as preparers and auditors started feeling the burden of complying with these additional reporting requirements. Many organisations were forced to expand their financial reporting teams manifold to cope with the exhaustive data collection and analyses and to upgrade their financial reporting systems. This strain pushed forward the momentum around the Boards’ respective projects addressing the presentation and disclosure and is now creating a lot of traction among those affected.

As the participants from Africa, Asia, Europe and North America continue to debate possible solutions to the issue through the IASB and FASB forums, a message that has come out loud and clear is that while the preparers think there is too much required to disclose, users, on the other side, are suffering from information indigestion. There is a lot served, but of that there is very little that’s palatable. Much of the relevant information intended to address the needs of the key stakeholders is lost in this disclosure overload. However, if the constitution of the participants is to go by, the message is crystal clear that it’s the preparers who see this as a larger issue than users of the financial statements.

There are several ideas being mulled to achieve disclosure effectiveness, as there is also a scepticism around the practicability of these ideas. Some of these are:

• Materiality – How can this be applied to qualitative disclosures

• Principles-based guidance – Is it possible to have a single source of principles-based guidance providing conceptual framework for all disclosures

• Purpose and relevance – Is it possible to provide a ‘one-size-fits-all’ definition of purpose and/or relevance of the disclosure requirements

• Offer flexibility – Move away from the words such as ‘shall’ or ‘at a minimum’ from the disclosure requirements in the existing standards; let the preparers use discretion in deciding what’s relevant for their business

• Avoid overlap – There are areas requiring disclosures in the Management Discussion & Analysis (the front half) and also within the financial statements (the back half) of an annual report. A cross-reference mechanism may be developed to avoid repetition.

There is a high degree of engagement on this issue indicating wider approval to the disclosure framework project but a near unanimous view is that there isn’t going to be an easy fix to the disclosure problem.

The key challenges expected at this stage are:

• Finding the right balance to cater to all users with different needs

• Alignment with the overall financial statement conceptual framework

• Legal, institutional barriers

• Disclose more, not less – the cost of a disclosure failure is high

The debate continues but things seem to be moving in the right direction. The problem has been diagnosed; a solution will follow in due course. Standard-setters will need to work with regulators and other bodies who have a say in imposing the disclosure requirements and expand their outreach efforts to be able to cut the clutter effectively from financial statements without losing relevance and effectiveness from the disclosures. Let’s do our bit by getting involved in these discussions and work towards achieving a better world of financial reporting.

Thought to munch – There are so many of us who cannot find enough time to read an interesting book that’s more than 200 pages long. For an annual report with more than 200 pages!! Any takers?

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PART A: High Court Decisions

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[In the H.C. of Uttarakhand: writ petition No.1814 of 2006 decided on 23-04-2013: Uttaranchal Public Services Commission vs. Chief Information Commissioner & Ors: Citation: RTI III (2013)82]

  •  Section 8(1)(d) & (j) of the RTI Act :

Information sought:

i) To provide the criteria applied in the selection procedure of the candidates to the post of Lecturer-Biology in Inter College.

ii) How many candidates appeared in the written examination for the post of lecturer Biology in Intermediate College and how many candidates were selected and how many candidates have appeared for interview before the Interview Board?

iii) To provide the details of the marks obtained by the selected candidates in the written test along with their marks in the interview and the details of their experience, educational qualification etc. with their preference/marks obtained by them.

iv) To give the details of the marks obtained by Mohd. Asif Tyagi (129639) in written test interview, educational qualification and experience etc. for the post of Lecturer-Biology.

PIO gave information on (i) & (ii) above. As regards information under (iii) & (iv), same were rejected on the ground that the said information cannot be provided in view of the provisions of section 8(1)(d) & 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act. FAA dismissed the appeal. Hence, Uttaranchal Public Service Commission (UPSC) filed a writ petition before High Court of Uttarakhand.

The Court stated:
So far as the information on point no.3 is concerned, it is stated in para-10 of the writ petition that the respondent no.2 (Shri Jakir) has sought information with respect to one candidate Mohd. Asif Tyagi under the RTI Act. It is further stated in the writ petition that respondent no. 2 was neither the candidate in the screening examination nor in the interview. Further, as per provisions of section 8(1)(j) of the Act, the information sought by the respondent no.2 with respect to Mohd. Asif Tyagi, comes under the definition of third party as per the provisions of RTI Act and the provisions of sections 8(1)(d) clearly provides that the disclosure of such information would harm the competitive position of third party and the same has been exempted from disclosure under RTI Act.

The Court held:
By a perusal of the information sought by respondent no.2, it reveals that the information sought is of a general nature and the marks obtained in a competitive examination cannot be held to be an intellectual property of an individual. The petitioner cannot deny the information as to how many marks have been obtained by Asif Tyagi and the other selected candidates and their educational qualification and experience. In my opinion, this information is not covered u/s. 8(1)(j) of the Act and the learned Chief Information Commissioner has rightly directed the petitioner to give information on point nos.3 and 4.

For the reasons recorded above, the writ petition is devoid of merit and is liable to be dismissed. The writ petition is dismissed accordingly.

[Decision of High Court of Madras in the Registrar general, High Court of Madras, Chennai vs. K.Elango & Anr: W.P.No.20485 of 2012 And M.P.No.1 of 2012 decided on 17-04-2013 Citation: RTIR III (2013) 103 (Madras)]

• In this case The Tamil Nadu Information Commission passed an order by not accepting the argument “unwarranted invasion of privacy of individuals” and allowed the appeal by directing the Registrar General, High Court of Madras to furnish the details sought for by K. Elango.

To start with the High Court of Madras noted:

It is to be borne in mind that under the Right to Information Act, 2005 an authority has a rudimentary function to perform either to furnish the information or deny the information. As a matter of fact, there is no specific Article in the Constitution of India which provides for the citizens right to know. However, Article 19(1)(a) provides for freedom of thought and expression which indirectly includes right to obtain information. Further, Article 21 guarantees right to life and personal liberty to citizens. Undoubtedly, Right to Life is incomplete if basic human right viz., ‘Right to Know’ is not included within its umbrage.

K. Elango had sought from PIO of the High Court, Madras following information:

1. How may Subordinate Judges are there in service in the state of Tamil Nadu? The district-wise list may be furnished to me as per the hierarchy.

2. How many employees are serving in the judicial department in the whole of Tamil Nadu (including the Government servants on deputation)?

3. How many judicial officers, police officers and staffs are working in the Vigilance Department of the registry of Madras High Court?

4. Does your vigilance department have any branches in the district so as to receive the complaint from the general public against the judicial officer and court staffs?

5. Does your registry have any tie-up or coordination with the office of Vigilance and Anticorruption, Rajaannamalai Puram, Chennai 28 to trap the judicial officers or court staffs on the basis of the complaints from the affected persons?

6. Does your registry have a special team for trapping the corrupt judicial officers and court staffs?

7. Between 2001 to 2010, how many complaints have been received by your Registry and Vigilance Department, kindly give complaint-wise break-up figure (that is how many complaints against DJ, ADDLJ, SJ, DMC, FTC Judges, Magistrates and Court staffs)?

8. How many complaints ended in dismissal, suspension, issuance of memo and dropping of the case and conviction between the said 2001 to 2010?

9. Between 2001 to 2010 how many complaints against High Court staffs have been received relating to bribe and the fate of those complaints?

Both the sides in this case made elaborate submission and also cited number of courts’ decisions. The Court also cited number of courts’ decisions and further stated:

• In the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.P. Gupta and others vs. President of India and others, [AIR 1982 Supreme Court 149], it is held that ‘the Right to know has been given a constitutional status by treating it as a part of speech and expression and thereby bringing this right within Art. 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India.’
• It will be quite in the fitness of things to recall the Golden words of Thomas Jefferson, who rightly said that ‘Information is the Currency of Democracy’.
• In the words of Amartya Sen, ‘the Right to Information Act, 2005 is a momentous engagement with the possibilities of freedom.’ [vide Lawz January 2008 at page 40 special page 41]
• Befittingly, we recall the observation of Lord Goff in the decision Attorney General vs. Guardian Newspapers Limited and others(No 2) 1990 1 A.P. at page 109 which runs as follows:

“Although the basis of Law’s protection of confidence is that there is a Law, nevertheless the public interest may be outweighed by some other countervailing public interest which favours disclosure.”

• It is to be pointed out that the personal information and the information between persons in fiduciary relationship are exempted from disclosure under the Right to Information Act. Also, ‘Confidence’ may be outweighed by public interest in the matter of such disclosure.

The Court then concluded:

•    On a careful consideration of respective contentions and on going through the contents of the application dated 01-11-2010 filed by the 1st Respondent/Applicant this Court is of the considered view that the information sought for by him in Serial Nos. 1 to 9 pertaining to the internal delicate functioning/administration of the High Court besides the same relate to invasion of privacy of respective individuals if the information so asked for is furnished and more so, the information sought for has no relationship to any public activity or interest. Moreover, the information sought for by the 1st Respondent/Applicant, is not to a fuller extent open to public domain. It added further, if the information sought for by the 1st Respondent/Applicant, is divulged, then, it will open the floodgates/Pandora’s Box compelling the Petitioner/High Court to supply the information sought for by the concerned Requisitionists as a matter of routine, without any rhyme or reason/restrictions as the case may be. Therefore, some self restrictions are to be imposed in regards to the supply of information in this regards. As a matter of fact, the Notings, Jottings, Administrative Letters, Intricate Internal Discussions, Deliberations etc. of the Petitioners/High Court cannot be brought u/s. 2(j) of the Right to Information Act, 2005, in considered opinion of this Court. Also that, if the information relating to Serial Nos.1 to 9 mentioned in the application of the 1st Respondent/Applicant dated 01-11-2010 is directed to be furnished or supplied with, then, certainly, it will impede and hinder the regular, smooth and proper functioning of the Institution viz. High Court (an independent authority under the Constitution of India, free from Executive or Legislature). As such, a Saner Counsel/Balancing Act is to be adopted in matters relating to the application under the Right to Information Act, 2005, so that an adequate freedom and inbuilt safeguards can be provided to the Hon’ble Chief Justice of High Court [competent authority and public authority as per section 2(e)(iii) and 2(h)(a) of the Act 22 of 2005] in exercising his discretionary powers either to supply the information or to deny the information, as prayed for by the Applicants/Requisitionists concerned.”

•    “Apart from the above, if the information requested by the 1st Respondent/Applicant, based on his letter dated 01-11- 2010, is supplied with, then, it will have an adverse impact on the regular and normal, serene functioning of the High Court’s Office on the impact on the Administrative side. Therefore, we come to an irresistible conclusion that the 1st Respondent/Applicant is not entitled to be supplied with the information/details sought for him, in his Application dated 01-11-2010 addressed to the Public Information Officer of the High Court, Madras under the provision of the Right to Information Act. Even on the ground of (i) maintaining confidentiality; (ii) based on the reason that the private or personal information is exempted from disclosure u/s. 8(1)(j) of the Act,2005; and (iii) also u/s. 8(1)(e) of the Act in lieu of fiduciary relationship maintained by the High Court, the request of the 1st Respondent/Applicant, cannot be acceded to by this Court. Also, we opine that the 1st Respondent/Applicant’s requests, suffer from want of bona fides (notwithstanding the candid fact that Section 6 of the Right to Information Act does not either overtly or covertly refers to the ‘concept of Locus’)”

•    To put it differently, if the information sought for by the 1st Respondent/Applicant, is divulged or furnished by the Office of the High Court (on administrative side), then, the secrecy and privacy of the internal working process may get jeopardised, besides the furnishing of said information would result in invasion of unwarranted and uncalled for privacy of individuals concerned. Even the disclosure of information pertaining to departmental enquiries in respect of Disciplinary Actions initiated against the Judicial Officers/Officials of the Subordinate Court or the High Court will affect the facile, smooth and independent running of the administration of the High Court, under the Constitution of India. Moreover, as per section 2(e) read with section 28 of the Right to Information Act, the Hon’ble Chief Justice of this Court is empowered to frame rules to carry out the provisions of the Act. In this regards, we point out that the ‘Madras High Court Right to Information (Regulation of Fee and Cost) Rules, 2007’ have been framed and as amended in regard to the Name and Designation of the Officers mentioned therein, the same has come into force from 18-11-2008.

•    In the upshot of quantitative and qualitative discussions mentioned supra, Information Commission, Chennai, to prevent an aberration of Justice and to promote substantial cause of Justice, this Court interferes with the order dated 10-01-2012 in Case No.10447/ Enquirt/A/11 passed by the 2nd Respondent/ Tamil Nadu Information Commission, Chennai and sets aside the same, to secure the ends of Justice Resultantly, the Writ Petition is allowed. No. costs. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petition Is closed.

Heritage TDR

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Introduction

The city of Mumbai is filled with ancient structures of neo-classical design/art deco structures which probably are the city’s last connection with its glorious past. In such a scenario, it becomes necessary to preserve this past and all things associated with it. However, there is also a need to redevelop/repair certain old structures.

To strike a balance between these two seemingly conflicting objectives, R. 67 of the Development Control Regulations for Greater Mumbai (DC Regulations) provide for the conversion of listed buildings, areas, artefacts, structures and precincts of historical and/or aesthetical/architectural/cultural value. These structures are known as “heritage buildings and heritage precincts”. A precinct generally means a space which has formal or artificial boundary lines around it. Thus, it is like an imaginary carved out area. Mumbai is the first city in India to get heritage protection.

The State Government comes out with a List of such structures and they are known as Listed Buildings/ Heritage Buildings and Listed Precincts/Heritage Precincts. The List divides the structures into three Grades—Grade I, Grade II and Grade III with Grade I being the most important and valuable.

Development/Redevelopment/Repairs of Heritage Buildings/Precincts

Carrying out any of the following activities in relation to heritage buildings/precincts requires the prior permission of the BMC Commissioner:

• Development/redevelopment
• Engineering operation • Additions/alterations/repairs/renovation
• Painting of buildings, replacement of special features
• Demolition of whole or part or plastering of the structure

The BMC Commissioner would consult the Heritage Conservation Committee of the State Government for this purpose. He has powers to overrule the Committee’s recommendations in exceptional cases. The Heritage Conservation Committee and the BMC have often been at loggerheads on several issues and the matters have gone to Court, for instance, hoardings on heritage buildings and precincts was the subject matter of dispute in the case of Dr. Anahita Pandole vs. State, 2004(6) Bom. CR.246. Hoardings in Heritage Precincts have also been the subject of other litigations, such as, Mass Holdings P Ltd vs. MCGM, 2006(1) AIR Bom. 658.

If there are any religious buildings in the List, then any changes required on religious grounds which are mentioned in any sacred texts or as a part of any holy practices shall be treated as permissible. However, they must be in consonance and in accordance with the original structure and architecture, designs, aesthetics and special features.

The above restrictions apply only to Grade I and Grade II heritage buildings.

Changes in Regulations
After consulting the Heritage Committee and with the State Government’s approval, the BMC Commissioner can alter, modify or relax the DC Regulations if it is needed for the conservation, preservation or retention of the historical, aesthetical, cultural or architectural quality of the Heritage Buildings/ Precincts. However, before carrying out any such modifications, he must hear out any persons who will suffer undue loss due to such changes.

Heritage TDR
If any application for development is refused/modified under R. 67, and such act results in depriving the owner/lessee of any unconsumed FSI, then the aggrieved shall be compensated by the grant of a Development Rights Certificate (also known as “Heritage TDR”). TDR from heritage buildings in the island city (that is, up to Mahim) may also be consumed in the same ward in which it originated. The TDR Certificate shall be governed by R. 34 and Appendix VIIA of the DC Regulations.

Before granting the TDR, the Commissioner would determine the extent to which it is required after consulting the Heritage Committee and it requires the prior sanction of the Government.

Restrictions on Heritage Structures Structures must maintain the skyline in the precinct as may be existing in the surrounding area so as not to diminish or destroy the value and beauty of the said listed Heritage Buildings. For instance, a 40-storey tower would look out of place in a group of heritage structures, all of which are 2-3 storeys tall. The tower would spoil the entire skyline of such an area. The BMC has issued Notification No. DCR. 1090/3197/(RDP)/UD-11 dated 25-04-1995 for the height of buildings in A Ward. The height after reconstruction must be limited to the existing height of the buildings of similar age in the area. Even a new building must conform to the general height pattern. In the case of listed heritage buildings and in the case of all buildings within the Fort precinct, clearance is required from the Heritage Committee. However, this restriction does not apply to the Backbay Reclamation Blocks area. Restrictive covenants imposed by the

State/BPT/Collector/BMC, etc., shall be in addition to the conditions of R. 67. However, if there is any conflict, then R. 67 shall prevail. Non-cessed buildings included in the List must be repaired by their owners/lessees and cessed buildings can be repaired by the MHADA/co-operative society/owner/ occupiers.

Grading
Grading of buildings in the List into I, II and III are carried out. Listing does not prevent change or ownership or usage. Care must be taken to ensure that the development permission relating to these buildings is given without delay. The Grading and various conditions for each Grade are as follows:


Conclusion

This is an important legislation to preserve and protect our city’s cultural heritage. Recently, the BMC has proposed to add some more structures to the Heritage List, a move which has been sharply opposed by the real estate developers and residents of those structures. While the debate over what should and what should not be included in the List would rage on, there is no denying that sustainable development with an eye on the past and future is the need in a metropolis like Mumbai.

Succession – Joint Family Property – Sale by Co-parcener without consent of others – validity: Hindu Succession Act 1956 section 30:

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The plaintiff-appellant had filed an Appeal against the judgment and decree passed by learned Additional District Judge. The plaintiff-appellant- filed the aforesaid title suit for declaration that the registered sale deed dated 30-10-1998 executed by defendant No. 2-respondent No. 2 in favour of defendant No. 1-respondent No. 1 as inoperative, illegal, without consideration and not binding on the plaintiff.

The plaintiff claimed that the defendant No. 2 sold the suit property which is joint family property without the consent of the other coparceners.

The defendants filed the contesting written statement alleging that there had already been severance of status of coparcenary and there had already been separation in the family long ago. The suit property was in possession of the defendant No. 2, therefore, he sold the same to the defendant No. 1.

The trial court dismissed the suit finding that the defendant No. 2 had the authority to sell the property. On appeal, the Lower Appellate Court recording the same finding dismissed the title appeal.

The submission of the learned counsel was that although, there was separation between the parties but there had been no partition by metes and bounds, therefore, unless a consent is obtained by other coparcener/cotenant, the defendant No. 2 could not have transferred the property to the defendant No. 1. It may be mentioned here that in the case of Kalyani vs. Narayanan, AIR 1980 SC 1173, the Apex Court has held that partition is a word of technical import in Hindu law. Partition in one sense is a severance of joint status and coparcener of a coparcenery is entitled to claim it as a matter of his individual volition. In this narrow sense all that is necessary to constitute partition is a definite and unequivocal indication of his intention by a member of a joint family to separate himself from the family and enjoy his share in severalty. Such an unequivocal intention to separate brings about a disruption of joint family status, at any rate, in respect of separating member or members and thereby puts an end to the coparcenery with right of survivorship and such separated member holds from the time of disruption of joint family as tenant-in-common. In the present case, it is an admitted fact that the parties are separate. Therefore, there is no existence of coparcenery family. Now, therefore, even if it is held that there is no partition by metes and bounds accepting the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant, then also after coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, section 30 which proves that any Hindu may dispose of by Will or other testamentary disposition any property, which is capable of being so disposed of by him or by her, in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, or any other law for the time being in force and applicable to Hindus and in the explanation, it is specifically mentioned that the interest of a male Hindu in a Mitakshara coparcenery property be deemed to be the property capable of being disposed of by him or by her within the meaning of this section. Now, therefore, even if the property is held to be the joint property then also a coparcener has the right to dispose of the same i.e. his share. The relief claimed by the plaintiff is that because the property is coparcenery property, the coparcener could not have sold the property. This relief claimed by the plaintiff is contrary to the provision as contained in section 30 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Further, in this case, separation has already been admitted. Whether there is partition or no partition is a matter that can be decided in properly constituted suit. Here, the question raised is as to whether a coparcener can sell his property or not?

In 2009(4) PLJR 225 SC (Gajara Vishnu Gosavi vs. Prakash Nanasahed Kamble & Ors.) the Apex Court has held that undivided share of a coparcener can be subject matter of sale/transfer. Therefore, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant that the coparcener cannot transfer is concerned, has got no force in the eye of law.

Brij Kishore Chaubey vs. Ramkaran Singh Yadav AIR 2013 Patna 101

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REVISED REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR AUDIT OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

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Introduction

An audit report is an opinion of an auditor regarding entity’s financial statements. It is the conclusion of an audit of financial statements is the audit report. It is only through the audit report that the statutory auditor communicates about the audit procedures followed, the auditing framework followed and whether the financial statements on which the report is given depicts a ‘True and Fair’ view.

The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI) has promulgated several standards for the conduct of audit and reporting. The SAs are divided into 2 groups:

a) Standards on Quality Control (SQC) (which apply at the firm level) and

b) Standards on Audit (SA) which apply to audits of historical financial information. SAs are further categorised as standards dealing with:

i) G eneral principles and responsibilities (issued under 200 series);

ii) Risk assessment and response to assessed risks (issued under 300 and 400 series);

iii) Audit evidence (issued under 500 series);

iv) Using work of others (issued under 600 series);

v) Audit conclusions and reporting (issued under 700 series) and

vi) Specialised areas (issued under 800 series).

ICAI had issued a new set of SAs (under 700 series) which were to be applied for audits for financial statements for the period on or after 1st April 2011. However, in view of inadequate dissemination of information about the applicability of the series 700 SAs and consequent unawareness of the same, the applicability was postponed by ICAI for audits for financial statements for the period on or after 1st April 2012. Thus, audit reports for audits conducted for the financial year 2012-13 would be the first year of applicability of the series 700 SAs. ICAI has also issued “Implementation guide on Reporting Standards” to address the concerns, apprehensions and difficulties in relation to implementation of the new reporting standards.

This article discusses the Standards on Audit Conclusions and Reporting issued under 700 series.

The new SAs are listed as under:

SAs apply to audits of general purpose financial statements (GPFS). They do not apply to engagements other than audits, where the procedures performed are ‘reviews’ or ‘compilations’ or ‘agreedupon- procedures’. GPFS generally consist of balance sheet, statement of profit and loss (or income statement), cash flow statement, significant accounting policies and notes and where applicable, statement of changes in equity.

GPFS are Financial Statements are FS prepared in accordance with a Financial Reporting Framework (FRF) and is designed to meet common financial information needs of a wide range of users. The FRF may be a ‘fair presentation framework’ or a ‘compliance framework’. Broad differences between these two frameworks are given in the Table 1.

A question which arises is that apart from audit reports of companies, whether these SAs would also apply to reports issued under the Income Tax Act, 1961 (e.g. tax audit report issued in Form 3CB)? As mentioned in 6 above, SAs apply to audits of GPFS – hence if the financial statements for which the report is issued in Form 3CB, are GPFS, then these SAs would also apply for such reporting. Para 3.4 of the Preface to the Statements of Accounting Standards issued by ICAI in 2004 states that “the term ‘General Purpose Financial Statements’ includes balance sheet, statement of profit and loss, cash flow statement (wherever applicable) and statements and explanatory notes which form part thereof, issued for the use of various stakeholders, governments and their agencies and the public…”

Further, footnote 9 to SA 800 ‘Special Considerations – Audits of Financial Statements Prepared in accordance with Special Purpose Frameworks’ states that “In India, financial statements prepared for filing with income tax authorities are considered to be general purpose financial statements”.

In view of this specific assertion from ICAI, the audit report format prescribed by SA 700(R), SA 705, SA 706 and SA 710(R) would also apply to reports issued in Form 3CB under the Income Tax Act, 1961.

The ‘Financial Reporting Framework’ (FRF) is not defined in SA 700(R). However, para 22 of SA 700 (AAS 28) mentions: “Paragraph 3 of “Framework of Statements on Standard Auditing Practices and Guidance Notes on Related Services”, issued by the ICAI, discusses the financial reporting framework. It states: “ ….Thus, FS need to be prepared in accordance with one, or a combination of:

(a) Relevant statutory requirements, e.g., the Companies Act, 1956,

(b) Accounting Standards issued by ICAI; and

(c) Other recognised accounting principles and practices, e.g., those recommended in the Guidance Notes issued by the ICAI” (emphasis supplied)

The above Framework issued in 2001 has been withdrawn pursuant to the revised “Framework for Assurance Engagements” applicable from April 1, 2008. The revised framework does not define ‘Financial Reporting Framework’. Due to this, does it imply that the other recognised accounting principles and practices, e.g., those recommended in the Guidance Notes (GN) issued by the ICAI will not form part of FRF? ICAI needs to clarify this, since, if the GNs issued by ICAI do not form part of FRF, the very mandatory nature of these GN for members of ICAI comes in doubt.

SA 700(R) requires an auditor to form an opinion on whether the FS are prepared in all material respects in accordance with the applicable FRF. To form that opinion, the auditor has to conclude, whether reasonable assurance has been obtained that the FS as a whole are free from material misstatement, whether due to fraud or error. In order to come to such conclusion the auditor shall need to take into account the following:

i)    whether Sufficient Appropriate Audit Evidence (SAAE) has been obtained in accordance with SA 330 ‘Standard on the Auditor’s Responses to Assessed Risks’;

ii)    whether uncorrected misstatements are material, individually or in aggregate in accordance with SA 450 ‘Standard on Evaluation of mis-statements identified during the Audit’;

iii)    other required evaluations related to selection, consistent application and disclosure of the significant accounting policies and reasonability of accounting estimates by management; and

iv)    In case of fair presentation framework, evaluation to also include whether FS achieve fair presentation.

SA 700(R) requires that the auditor expresses an unmodified opinion if he concludes that the FS are prepared, in all material respects, in accordance with the applicable FRF. The auditor has to, however, give a modified opinion in two situations:

i)    When the auditor has obtained SAAE but he concludes that the FS taken as a whole are not free from material misstatement(s); or

ii)    When he is unable to obtain SAAE.

In either of the above situations the auditor must give a modified opinion as per SA 705.

In case of reporting under fair presentation frame-work, if the auditor concludes that the fair presentation is not achieved, he should discuss the matter with the management to resolve the issue and based on the outcome, decide whether he should give a modified opinion or not.

As per the SA 700(R), the auditor’s report has to be in writing and should include the following:

Title

The title of an auditor’s report should clearly indicate that it is the report of an independent auditor like “Independent Auditor’s Report”. Unlike the earlier title ‘Auditor’s Report’ this title makes it very implicit that independence is one of the important considerations while doing the audit.

Addressee

The report should be addressed to those for whom it is prepared in line with the existing requirement. Typically, it is addressed to ‘the shareholders’ or ‘the members’ in case of the statutory audit under the Companies Act, 1956 or to the Board of Directors in case of Consolidated Financial Statements (CFS).

Introductory Paragraph

In this paragraph apart from identifying the entity, the title of each statements comprised in the FS and the period covered by each of the statements, a specific reference has to be made to the summary of significant accounting policies and other explanatory information given in the FS. The following illustration is given in the Appendix of the Standard:
“We have audited the accompanying financial statements of ABC Ltd, which comprise the Balance Sheet as at March 31, 20XX, and the Statement of Profit and Loss for the year then ended, and a summary of significant accounting policies and other explanatory information”.

Management’s Responsibility Paragraph

The SA requires the Auditor to describe, under a separate paragraph with heading ‘Management’s Responsibility for the financial statements’ that the management (or those charged with governance) is responsible:

•    for the preparation of FS in accordance with the applicable FRF; and

•    for the design, implementation and maintenance of the internal controls relevant to the preparation of FS which are free from material misstatement, whether due to fraud or error.

In cases where FS are prepared in accordance with a fair presentation framework, the report should refer to “the preparation and fair presentation of these FS” or “the preparation of FS that give a true and fair view”.

Auditor’s Responsibility Paragraph

The SA requires the report to state the following:

i)    that the responsibility of the auditor is to express an opinion on the FS based on the audit;

ii)    that audit was conducted in accordance with Standards on Auditing issued by ICAI and that these SAs require the auditor to:

•    Comply with ethical requirements;

•    Plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the FS are free from material misstatement.

The report should also describe an audit by stating that:

•    An audit involves performing procedures to obtain audit evidence about the amounts and disclosures in the FS;

•    The procedures selected depend on the auditor’s judgment, including the assessment of the risks of material misstatement of the FS, whether due to fraud or error.

•    In making those risk assessments, the auditor considers internal control relevant to the entity’s preparation of the financial statements in order to design audit procedures that are appropriate in the circumstances,

An audit also includes evaluation of Appropriateness of accounting policies used and Reasonableness of management’s accounting estimates; and

Overall presentation of FS

i)    Where the FS are prepared in accordance with a fair presentation framework, the description of the audit in the auditor’s report shall refer to “the entity’s preparation of FS that give True & Fair view”

ii)    The auditor’s report should also state whether the auditor believes that he has obtained SAAE to provide a basis for his opinion.

Auditor’s Opinion Paragraph

The SA requires the expression of opinion as under:

Unmodified opinion expressed

In case of Fair Presentation framework:

FS present fairly, in all material respects, in accordance with {applicable FRF}

Or

FS give a True & Fair view of in accordance with [applicable FRF]

The SA gives an illustration of an unmodified opinion in case of fair presentation framework under Companies Act, 1956 as under:

“In our opinion and to the best of our information and according to the explanations given to us, the Financial Statements give the information required by The Companies Act, 1956, in the manner so required and give a true & fair view of the financial position of ABC Ltd. As at March 31, 20xx and of its financial performance and its cash flows for the year then ended, in accordance with accounting standards referred to in section 211(3C) of the said Act”.

In case of Compliance framework:

FS are prepared, in all material respects, in accordance with [applicable FRF]

Other Reporting Responsibilities Paragraph

The SA mentions that sometimes the auditor is also required to report on other matters that are supplementary to the auditor’s responsibility to report on the financial statements. For example, report on additional specified procedures or to express an opinion on specific matters or under the relevant law or regulation. The SA provides that if the auditor addresses other reporting responsibilities in the auditor’s report on the FS that are in addition to the auditor’s responsibility under the SAs to report on the FS, they shall be addressed in a separate section in the auditor’s report that shall be sub-titled “Report on Other Legal and Regulatory Requirements,” or otherwise as appropriate to the content of the section. For e.g. reporting under CARO or for NBFCs as required by RBI, etc.. Unlike the current practice where different practices were being followed with reference to such reporting, SA 700(R) requires the same to be reported under a specific heading.

Signature

The Audit Report has to be signed in the auditor’s personal name and where a firm is appointed as auditor, report shall be signed in personal name and in name of audit firm. The report has to also mention membership number issued by ICAI and wherever applicable, the registration number of the firm, allotted by the ICAI.

Though it apparently appears from the SA that the signatures need to be in individual as well as in the name of the firm, the implementation guide to SA 700(R) issued by ICAI in Question 21 mentions that “the intention of the SA is not to have 2 separate signatures, one in personal name and one in firm name, but that the partner signing should sign in his personal name for and on behalf of the firm which has been appointed as the auditor with the name and registration number of the firm also mentioned as signatory”.

Date of Auditor’s Report

The SA mentions that the audit report cannot be dated earlier than the date on which auditor has obtained SAAE on which the auditor’s opinion is based. This is to inform users of the FS that the auditor has considered effect of events and transactions that have occurred upto that date.

Place of Signature

The SA requires that the auditor’s report has to specify location, which is ordinarily the city where the audit report is signed. Thus, in a case where the report is signed in a city other that the one where the Board has adopted the FS, the name of the city where the directors sign would be different from that where the auditor signs the report.

The SA mentions that the wording of an auditor’s report may sometimes be prescribed by the law or regulation applicable to the client. If the prescribed terms are significantly different from the requirements of SAs, SA 210 ‘Agreeing the Terms of Audit Engagement’ requires the auditor to evaluate:

•    whether users might misunderstand the assurance obtained from the audit, and if so,

•    whether providing additional explanation in the auditor’s report can mitigate such misunderstanding.

SA 705 – Modifications to the opinion in the Independent Auditor’s Report

SA 705 deals with the auditor’s responsibility to issue an appropriate report in circumstances when, in forming an opinion in accordance with SA 700(R), the auditor concludes that a modification to the auditor’s opinion on the financial statements is necessary.

SA 705 describes 3 types of modified opinions: (i) Qualified Opinion, (ii) Adverse Opinion and (iii) Disclaimer of Opinion

The decision on which type of modified opinion is appropriate depends on:

a)    Nature of matter giving rise to the modification i.e. whether the FS are materially misstated or in case of inability to obtain SAAE maybe materially misstated; and

b)    Auditor’s judgement about the pervasiveness of the effects or possible effects of the matter on the FS.

The SA mentions the circumstances when modification to opinion is required. It states that if the auditor concludes that based on the audit evidence obtained, the FS as a whole are not free from mate-rial misstatement, he can issued a modified report. This may be due to:

•    Inappropriateness of the selected accounting policies:

  •     Accounting Policies not consistent with applicable FRF;

  •     FS do not represent underlying transactions and events in a manner that achieves fair presentation;

•    Inappropriateness of adequacy of disclosures in FS

  •     FS do not include all disclosures required by applicable FRF;

  •     Disclosures not presented as per applicable FRF;

  •     FS do not contain disclosures necessary to achieve fair presentation

•    Inability to obtain SAAE

  •     Circumstances beyond control of entity; (e.g. records destroyed or seized by authorities)

  •     Circumstances relating to nature of timing of auditor’s work; (e.g. timing such that physical inventory cannot be taken )

  •     Limitations imposed by management (e.g. auditors prevented from obtaining external confirmations, etc.)

SA 705 lays down as under the criteria for deter-mining the type of modification which are given in Table 2:

The SA mentions that ‘pervasive’ effects are those that, in the auditor’s judgment:

•    Are not confined to specific elements, accounts or items of the FS;

•    If so confined, represent or could represent a substantial proportion of the FS

•    In relation to disclosures, are fundamental to users’ understanding of the FS.

The SA requires the auditor to disclaim an opinion when, in extremely rare circumstances involving multiple uncertainties, the auditor concludes that, notwithstanding having obtained SAAE regarding each of the individual uncertainties, it is not possible to form an opinion on the FS due to the potential interaction of the uncertainties and their possible cumulative effect on the FS.

SA 705 also gives the form and content of Auditor’s Report in case of Modified Opinion. It requires that

i)    In addition to other elements as per SA 700(R), the Auditor’s Responsibility statement is to be amended to provide description of matter giving rise to modification;

ii)    The placement of the same is immediately before the Opinion para with the heading “Basis for Modified Opinion”

iii)    The contents of the ‘Basis of Modification Para’ dependon the cause of modification.. The same are given in Table 3

SA 705 requires a Qualified Opinion to be given as:

“Except for the effects of the matter(s) described in the ‘Basis for qualified opinion para’’

•    In case of Fair Presentation framework:

The FS present fairly, in all material respects (or give a true and fair view) in accordance with the [applicable FRF]

•    In case of Compliance framework:

The FS have been prepared, in all material respects in accordance with the {applicable FRF}”.

SA 705 requires an Adverse Opinion to be given as:

“In the auditor’s opinion, because of the significance of the matter(s) described in the ‘Basis of Adverse Opinion para’,

•    In case of Fair Presentation framework: “The FS do not present fairly, in all material respects (or give a true and fair view) in accordance with the [applicable FRF]”.

•    In case of Compliance framework: “The FS have not been prepared, in all material respects in accordance with the [applicable FRF]”.

SA 705 requires a Disclaimer of Opinion to be given as:

“Because of the significance of the matter(s) described in the ‘Basis for Disclaimer of Opinion para’, the auditor has not been able to obtain SAAE to provide a basis for an audit opinion and accordingly, the auditor does not express an opinion on the FS.”

The SA also requires description of auditor’s responsibility to be amended when the auditor expresses a qualified or adverse opinion. In such cases, the description of the auditor’s responsibility has to be amended to state that the auditor believes that he has obtained SAAE to provide a basis for his modified audit opinion.

In case, the auditor has disclaimed an Opinion, he has to amend the introductory paragraph of the auditor’s report to state that he was engaged to audit the FS and amend the description of the auditor’s responsibility. The same should be as under:

“Because of the matter(s) described in the Basis for Disclaimer of Opinion paragraph, we were not able to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence to provide a basis for an audit opinion”

SA 706 – Emphasis of Matter (EOM) paragraph and Other Matter (OM) paragraph in the Independent Auditor’s Report

SA 706 deals with additional communication in the Auditor’s Report when auditor considers necessary to draw user’s attention to:

•    Matter(s) presented or disclosed in FS are of such importance that they are fundamental to user’s understanding of FS

Or

•    Matter(s) other than those presented or disclosed in FS that are relevant to user’s understanding of audit or auditor’s responsibilities or audit report

SA 706 has laid down the following requirements with respect to EOM para:

•    Auditor should obtain SAAE evidence that the matter is not materially misstated in the FS;

•    EOM para shall refer only to information presented or disclosed in the FS;

•    Widespread use of EOM para diminishes the effectiveness of the auditor’s communication of such matters, by implying that matter has not been appropriately presented or disclosed in FS;

•    It is to be placed immediately after Opinion para.

The SA requires that the EOM para must include a clear reference to the matter being emphasized, where the relevant disclosures that fully describe the matter can be found in FS and indicate that the audit opinion is not modified in respect of matter emphasized. An EOM para is to be included in the Auditor’s Report in the following circumstances:

•    An uncertainty relating to the future outcome of an exceptional litigation or regulatory action;

•    Early application (where permitted) of a new accounting standard that has a pervasive effect on the FS in advance of its effective date;

•    A major catastrophe that has had, or continues to have, a significant effect on the entity’s financial position.

As per the SA, if the auditor considers it necessary to communicate a matter other than those that are presented or disclosed in the FS that, in the auditor’s judgment, is relevant to users’ understanding of the audit, the auditor’s responsibilities or the auditor’s report and this is not prohibited by law or regulation, he shall do so in a paragraph in the auditor’s report, with the heading “Other Matter”, or other appropriate heading. This paragraph is placed immediately after the Opinion paragraph and any EOM paragraph.

SA 710(R) – Comparative Information – Corresponding Figures and Comparative Financial Statements

SA 710(R) deals with the auditor’s responsibilities regarding comparative information in an audit of financial statements. The nature of the comparative information that is presented in an entity’s FS depends on the requirements of the applicable FRF.

SA 710(R) mentions that there are two broad approaches to the auditor’s reporting responsibilities in respect of comparative information: (a) Corresponding Figures; and (b) Comparative Financial Statements.

The approach to be adopted is often specified by law or regulation or in the terms of engagement. SA710 (R) addresses separately the auditor’s reporting requirements for each approach.

SA 710(R) requires the auditor to determine whether FS include the comparative information required by the applicable FRF and whether such information is appropriately classified. For this purpose, the auditor has to evaluate whether:

a)    The comparative information agrees with the amounts and other disclosures presented in the prior period; and
b)    The accounting policies reflected in the comparative information are consistent with those applied in the current period or, if there have been changes in accounting policies, whether those changes have been properly accounted for and adequately presented and disclosed.

If the auditor becomes aware of a possible material misstatement in the comparative information while performing the current period audit, the auditor has to perform such additional audit procedures as are necessary in the circumstances to obtain SAAE evidence to determine whether a material misstatement exists.

The SA requires that when corresponding figures are presented, the auditor’s opinion shall not refer to the corresponding figures except in the circumstances described as under:

i)    If the auditor’s report on the prior period, as previously issued, included a qualified opinion, a disclaimer of opinion, or an adverse opinion and the matter which gave rise to the modification is unresolved, the auditor shall modify the auditor’s opinion on the current period’s financial statements. In such cases, in the ‘Basis for Modification’ paragraph in the auditor’s report, the auditor shall either:

•    Refer to both the current period’s figures and the corresponding figures in the description of the matter giving rise to the modification when the effects or possible effects of the matter on the current period’s figures are material;

Or

•    In other cases, explain that the audit opinion has been modified because of the effects or possible effects of the unresolved matter on the comparability of the current period’s figures and the corresponding figures

ii)    If the auditor obtains audit evidence that a material misstatement exists in the prior period FS on which an unmodified opinion has been previously issued, the auditor has to verify whether the misstatement has been dealt with as required under the applicable FRF and, if that is not the case, the auditor shall express a qualified opinion or an adverse opinion in the auditor’s report on the current period FS, modified with respect to the corresponding figures included therein.

iii)    If FS of prior period were audited by a predecessor auditor, and the auditor is allowed and decides to refer to the predecessor auditor’s report for the corresponding figures, then the auditor shall state in an OM para that the FS of the prior period were audited by the predecessor auditor, the type of opinion expressed by him along with the reasons for the same and the date of that report.

iv)    If the FS of prior period were not audited, the auditor has to state in an OM para that the corresponding figures are unaudited. However, it will not relieve the auditor from obtaining SAAE that the opening balances do not contain material misstatements that materially affect current period’s FS.

The SA also requires that when comparative financial statements are presented, the auditor’s opinion shall refer to each period for which financial statements are presented and on which an audit opinion is expressed.

As per the SA, when reporting on prior period FS in connection with the current period’s audit, if the auditor’s opinion on such prior period FS differs from the opinion the auditor previously expressed, the auditor will have to disclose the substantive reasons for the different opinion in an OM paragraph in accordance with SA 706. In case, however, the FS of prior period were audited by a predecessor auditor, the requirements as prescribed above in point 39 (iii) will apply, whereas if the FS of prior period were not audited, the requirements as prescribed above in point 40(iv) will apply.

What’s new in the revised audit report formats? The revised formats of audit reports given in the SAsare very specific formats for issuing unmodified reports [SA 700(R)], modified reports (SA 705) and giving Emphasis of Matter paragraphs in the audit reports (SA 706). Unlike current audit reports, where diverse practices were being followed in giving modified reports or giving emphasis of matter, the positioning of the various paras are also specifically mentioned in these SAs. This would make audit reports uniform across different audit firms and also achieve better comparability.

Conclusion

As can be seen from the above, the audit report will undergo a substantial change for audits for periods beginning on or after April 1, 2012. The new format of the report is very different from the old format and will require auditors to spend more time in redrafting their reports to be in line with SA 700(R), SA 705, SA 706 and SA 710(R). The specific elements as required by the revised report, should also, hope-fully, make reading and understanding reports easier for shareholders and analysts and have a better appreciate the role of auditors.

Service of Notice – Termination of Tenancy – Service of Notice – 15 days notice send by Registered post – Agreement Stipulated 30 days – Suit filed after 30 days of deemed receipt of Notice – Transfer of Property Act section 106, General clauses Act 1897, section 27:

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The defendant was in occupation of one flat and a car parking area in a building on Camac Street. The rent last paid was Rs. 40,000 per month. The defendant entered this flat as a licensee of the plaintiff who was its owner. The licence agreement was dated 29th May, 2006. It was for an initial period of 11 months. It could be extended at the option of the licensee for two further periods of 11 months each. There is not much of a dispute that this licence for all practical purposes was treated as a tenancy. It was extended for two terms up to 28th February, 2009. It could be extended to the maximum extent up to this date. However, Clause 17 provided that before this period the tenancy was terminable at the option of the licensor or licensee. Either party had to give one month’s prior notice.

This option was exercised in 2007. By a notice dated 17th October, 2007 the defendants were asked to vacate the flat by November of that year. Thereafter, a suit was instituted by the plaintiff in the City Civil Court. The plaintiff withdrew that suit on 22nd April, 2010.

The plaintiff issued another notice to the defendant on 16th June, 2010. It was said to be sent by Registered post. A copy of the notice was also affixed on the entrance to the flat in the presence of two witnesses. The plaintiff asked the defendant to vacate the flat. This time he gave them 15 days’ notice treating the defendant as a tenant, u/s. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Thereafter, the suit and the Chapter XIII A Application were filed.

The Hon’ble Court observed that under Chapter XIIIA the plaintiff is entitled to a summary judgment if on the available evidence on affidavits the Court is in a position to form an opinion that the defendant has no defence to the claim of the plaintiff. If the defendant is able to bring out a prima facie defence, which is equivalent to raising a triable issue, the court grants him leave to defend. Even when the defendant is unable to disclose any defence the Court may, out of sympathy, grant him leave to defend, if it forms the opinion that at a later point of time when the suit is ready for hearing, he has a very outside chance of putting forward some defence. But in that case the Court grants leave to defend upon obtaining security.

A few points of defence have been put forward by the defendant. The first is that this notice was never served. Secondly, 15 days’ notice was inadequate in terms of Clause 17 of the Licence Agreement between the parties which provided for 30 days’ notice.

The licence or lease agreement dated 29th May, 2006 was an unregistered document. Any lease of over one year’s duration can be made only by a registered document. Therefore, the agreement did not affect the property according to section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908. In other words, the document is to be treated as non est.

If the document is non est no rights are created by it. Therefore, it cannot be said that the defendant was a lessee up to 28th February, 2009. For all purposes the lease was from month to month.

If the terms of the lease or licence agreement dated 29th May, 2006 were inoperative, there was no obligation to give any notice under those terms to determine the lease or tenancy. In those circumstances, section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act came into play.

The Court observed that the notice dated 16th June, 2010 was rightly given. Only 15 days’ notice was required to be given under that section. Therefore, the notice determining the tenancy was valid.

Each of the defendants was sent the notice dated 16th June, 2010 by registered post with acknowledgment due. Each notice was delivered at the post office on 17th June, 2010. On each of the postal documents to record receipt there is a remark by the post office that an intimation was left at the office of the defendants on 19th June, 2010. Each of the notices was not claimed.

U/s. 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, if a document is required to be served by post, service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing, prepaying and posting by registered post, a letter containing the document. Unless the contrary is proved, service is deemed to have been made at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post. U/s. 106(4) of the said Act, the notice u/s.s. (1) is to be sent, inter alia, by post.

Hence it was held there was good service of the section 106 notice dated 16th June, 2010.

Ajay Kumar Singh vs. Dasa AIR 2013 Cal. 125

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Recovery – Realisation of income tax dues – Priority over secured debt – State Financial Corporations Act, 1951.

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The Petitioner, a State owned Corporation and a Financial Institution governed by The State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 (SFC Act) sanctioned a term loan of Rs. 1,25,00,000 to M/s. Veekay Developers Pvt. Ltd. to establish a Luxury Hotel on 13-09-1995, which term loan was transferred to V.K. Clubs and Homes Pvt. Ltd. By way of security, the borrower—M/s. V.K. Clubs and Homes Pvt. Ltd, created an equitable mortgage by deposit of title deeds, of the portion of land and building. By way of further security, the said borrower created equitable mortgage over freehold rights in three shops. Additional loan of Rs. 86,00,000 was also sanctioned.

The borrower, having failed to repay the amount due together with interest the petitioner invoked section 29 of the SFC Act and took over possession of the properties, mortgaged and furnished as security.

On 05-12-2000, the Tax Recovery Officer, the second respondent, passed an order attaching the immovable properties, including properties mortgaged of the petitioner invoking Rule 48 of II Schedule to the Income-tax Act, 1961 to recover Rs. 80,03,276 towards income tax dues, from Sri Vivian Kamath D’Souza, M/s. Veekay Developers Pvt. Ltd., M/s. Shalimar Constructions and M/s. Canara Builders. On 23-12-2000, he issued a public notice in Udayavani newspaper informing about the attachment of the immovable properties calling upon anybody who had any claim or right to the said properties, to furnish necessary documents in support of the claim.

On 05-01-2001, petitioner brought to the notice of the second respondent the sanction of the loan on 13-09-1995 and 20-03-1998; the mortgage of the immovable properties, as also taking possession of the said properties on 30-12-1998 and 25-02-1999, invoking section 29 of the ‘SFC Act’. This was followed by notice dated 06-05-2005 to the second respondent, in response to which, a letter dated 27-01-2006 was addressed by the Tax Recovery Officer requesting the petitioner to proceed with the sale of the immovable properties as it had the first charge and to treat the Income-tax Department as a second mortgagee and after appropriation of the sale proceeds, hand over the remainder if any, to hand over the same for appropriation towards income-tax dues. The question before the court was

“Whether realisation of income-tax dues from the assessee under the Income Tax Act, 1961 will have priority over the secured debt in terms of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951?”

The Hon’ble Court referred to the Apex Court decision in Union of India and others vs. Sicom Limited and another (2009) 2 SCC 121, observing that under Article 372 of the Constitution, as also well settled principles of law, statutory provisions will prevail over the Crown debt, and coupled with the non-obstante clause in section 46-B of the SFC Act, it would not only prevail over contracts but also other laws. In other words, the ‘SFC Act’, having provided for recovery of debt in preference to all other debts under any other law, the Financial Corporations were entitled to appropriate the sale proceeds towards the discharge of debt due to it, at the first instance.

Regards the provisions of the State Financial Corporations Act, it is clear that a first charge on the property is created giving priority to the dues of the said statutory authority over all other charges on the property, on the basis of the mortgage. The Income-tax Act, 1961 does not provide for a priority to the statutory charge over all other charges including mortgage under the ‘SFC Act’. The order of the tax recovery officer attaching property mortgaged in favour of the petitioner is quashed and the incometax authorities are restrained from interfering with the process of sale of immovable properties subject matter of mortgage in favour of the Petitioner, for recovery of its dues.

Karnataka State Industrial Investment Development Corporation Ltd vs. CIT, AIR 2013
Karnataka 104.

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If the services were received by SEZ for their SEZ operations and were ultimately consumed within SEZ, they are eligible for exemption under Notification No.4/2004-ST dated 31-3-2004. The said Notification was inconsistent with section 51 of SEZ Act – If the transaction is of sale of software and CST is paid on the same, it would not form part of value of taxable services in respect of professional services for ERP implementation – The privity of contract being between an Indian entity and a fo<

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 Facts:

Three issues were involved in the matter:

• The appellant availed benefit of exemption Notification No. 4/2004-ST dated 31-3-2004 in respect of professional services of internal audit and indirect support services, rendered to SEZ units. Department denied the exemption on the ground that the services were not consumed within SEZ. However, the appellant submitted that service receivers were granted a letter of approval by the Government of India, Ministry of Commerce to act as developer/unit and these entities were operating in SEZ and did not have other place of business. Therefore, the services were consumed exclusively for SEZ operations and within SEZ and the exemption was available to them.

• The appellants also rendered professional services in relation to ERP implementation and had purchased the software, the price of which was subsequently reimbursed by the service receiver. The department demanded service tax on such software considering it part of the value of taxable service essential for implementation of ERP system. According to the appellants, the supply of software was transaction of sale whereon CST was paid on it as there was a transfer of property in goods.

• The appellants rendered professional services for the infrastructure project in India of Indian Government for & on behalf of PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) Lanka (Pvt.) Ltd., Sri Lanka. The department demanded service tax on the ground that one of the pertinent conditions for export of services is that the services are delivered outside India and used outside India and this is not satisfactory in the present case. The appellants submitted that they did not have any privity of contract with the Indian Government and the beneficiary of services was PWC Lanka (Pvt.) Ltd., Sri Lanka outside India who was ultimately responsible for deliverables and even though the work was carried out in India, the same was delivered outside India.

Held:

• SEZs are deemed to be foreign territory for trade operations. SEZs are formed to promote exports and earn foreign exchange and for the overall economic development of India. In the present case, it was not disputed that the services were utilised by SEZ and therefore, were ultimately consumed within SEZ. The said notification used wordings consumption of services within SEZ, which were inconsistent with section 51 of the SEZ Act, 2005. Since Section 51 of SEZ Act has an overriding effect on all other laws and also having regard to the intention of the Government, the benefit of exemption was available to the appellants.

• Since the software was sold, there was no service involved and the same would not form part of the taxable value of services and as such, not leviable to service tax.

• As per the contractual arrangement, entity at Sri Lanka was beneficiary of the assignment and the services were delivered from India and used outside India. Therefore, the present case was covered under export of services not leviable to Service tax.

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Section 14A, Rule 8D – No disallowance can be made in respect of expenses in relation to dividend received from trading in shares. In view of the judgment of Karnataka High Court in the case of CCI Ltd vs. JCIT, the decision of the Special Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Daga Capital Management Pvt. Ltd. cannot be followed.

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16. Vivek Mehrotra v. ACIT
ITAT Mumbai `F’ Bench
Before Rajendra Singh (AM) and Amit Shukla (JM)
ITA No. 6332/Mum/2011 A.Y.: 2008-09.
Dated: 11-1-2013
Counsel for assessee/revenue: Rajiv Mehrotra/Om Prakash Meena

Section 14A, Rule 8D – No disallowance can be made in respect of expenses in relation to dividend received from trading in shares. In view of the judgment of Karnataka High Court in the case of CCI Ltd vs. JCIT, the decision of the Special Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Daga Capital Management Pvt. Ltd. cannot be followed.


Facts

The assessee received exempt income in the form of dividend from personal investments and also from shares held for trading. It also received tax free interest from relief bonds. The assessee maintained separate accounts including separate bank accounts and balance sheets for personal investments and trading activities in which expenses relating to these two activities were shown separately.

In the course of assessment proceedings, on being asked to show cause as to why expenses relating to such income should not be disallowed u/s. 14A of the Act, the assessee submitted that from the separate accounts maintained, it is clear that personal investments were made out of profit earned in the past and not from borrowings. It also contended that no expenses were incurred in respect of such investment. As regards shares held for trading it was contended that the provisions of section 14A are not applicable. The AO relying on the decision of the Special Bench in the case of Daga Capital Management Pvt. Ltd. (ITA No. 8057/Mum/2003) held that section 14A does apply even to shares held as stock-in-trade. The AO disallowed the expenses in respect of both shares held as personal investment as well as shares held for trading.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who held that, on facts, no disallowance was to be made in respect of shares held as personal investments. As regards shares held for trading he held that the provisions of section 14A are applicable and disallowance made by the AO was confirmed by him.

Aggrieved, both the assessee and the Revenue, preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held

The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had given a clear finding that the assessee maintained separate accounts including separate bank accounts and balance sheets for the two activities. He gave a finding that the personal investments were made out of own funds, investments in RBI Relief Bonds and LIC had been made in earlier years and since the assessee was having vast experience in these matters, he was personally handling these investments, there were no expenses required. Similarly, the shares which were of unlisted group companies held for the purpose of retaining control over these companies, did not require any day to day expenses. The Tribunal confirmed the action of the CIT(A) in holding that no disallowance is called for in relation to shares held as personal investments.

As regards the shares held for trading, the Tribunal noted that subsequent to the decision of the Special Bench of ITAT in the case of Daga Capital Management Pvt. Ltd. (supra), in which it has been held that section 14A would apply even to dividend income for trading in shares, the Karnataka High Court in the case of CCI vs. JCIT (250 CTR 290)(Kar) has in relation to trading shares held that the assessee had not retained shares with the intention of earning dividend income which was only incidental to shares which remained unsold by the assessee. The High Court held that no disallowance of expenses was required in relation to dividend from trading shares. The Tribunal also noted that the Mumbai Bench of the Tribunal in the case of DCIT vs. India Advantage Securities Ltd. (ITA No. 6711/Mum/2011, Assessment Year: 2008-09; order dated 14-9-2011) held that in view of the judgment of the Karnataka High Court in the case of CCI Ltd. vs. JCIT, the decision of the Special Bench in the case of Daga Capital Management Pvt. Ltd., could not be followed and no disallowance could be made of expenses in relation to dividend received from trading in shares. The Tribunal set aside the order of CIT(A) and deleted the disallowance upheld by him in relation to trading in shares.

 The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed and the appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed.

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Search and seizure: Authorisation u/s. 132(1) of I. T. Act, 1961: Validity: Reason to believe: Affidavit of Dy DIT stating that he got information that there was a “likelihood” of the documents belonging to the DS Group being found at the residence of the assessee: Would amount only to surmise or conjecture and not to solid information: Warrant of authorisation not valid and is liable to be quashed

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Madhu Gupta vs. DIT(Inv).; 350 ITR 598 (Del): 256 CTR 21 (Del) The assessee challenged the validity of the search action u/s. 132 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 by filing a writ petition.

The Delhi High Court allowed the petition and held as under:

“i) The warrant of authorisation can only be issued by competent person in consonance of information in his possession and after he has formed a reason to believe that the conditions stipulated in cls. (a), (b) and (c) of section 132(1) existed. The information must be credible information and there must be a nexus between the information and the belief. Furthermore, the information must not be in the nature of some surmise or conjecture, but it must have some tangible backing. Until and unless information is of this quality, it would be difficult to formulate a belief because the belief itself is not just an ipse dixit, but is based on reason and that is why the expression used is “reason to believe” and not simply “believes”.

ii) In the present case, the so-called information is undisclosed and what exactly that information was, is also not known. At one place in the affidavit of Dy. Director of IT, it has been mentioned that he got information that there was a “likelihood” of the documents belonging to the DS Group being found at the residence of the petitioner. That by itself would amount only to a surmise and conjecture and not to solid information and since the search on the premises of the petitioner was founded on this so-called information, the search would have to be held to be arbitrary. It may also be pointed out that when the search was conducted on 21-1-2011, no documents belonging to the DS Group were, in fact, found at the premises of the petitioner.

iii) With regard to the argument raised by the counsel for the Revenue that there was no need for the competent authority to have any reason to believe and a mere reason to suspect would be sufficient, it may be pointed out that the answer is provided by the fact that the warrant of authorisation was not in the name of DS Group but was in the name of the petitioner. In other words, the warrant of authorisation u/s. 132(1) had been issued in the name of the petitioner and, therefore, the information and the reason to believe were to be formed in connection with the petitioner and not the DS Group.

iv) None of the clauses (a), (b) or (c) mentioned in section 132(1) stood satisfied. Therefore, the warrant of authorisation was without any authority of law. Therefore, the warrant of authorisation would have to be quashed.

v) Once that is the position, the consequence would be that all proceedings pursuant to the search conducted on 21/01/2011 at the premises of the petitioner would be illegal and, therefore, the prohibitory orders would also be liable to be quashed. It is ordered accordingly. The jewellery/other articles/ documents are to be unconditionally released to the petitioner.”

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2013-TIOL-1369-CESTAT-DEL TSC Travel Services Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Ludhiana.

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Whether the margin on airline tickets sold to the passengers can be considered as commission and thus liable to service tax under Business Auxiliary Service? Held, No.

Facts: The appellant purchased tickets directly from airlines and sold the same for a margin to its passengers which the department adjudicated as indirect commission and confirmed tax with interest and penalties under the category of “Business Auxiliary Service”.

Held: Considering a prima facie view that the activity of the appellant was nothing but trading activity, the Hon. Tribunal granted full waiver of pre-deposit.

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2013-TIOL-1516-CESTAT-DEL M/s Mahesh Sunny Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, Delhi & Commissioner vs. Mahesh Sunny Enterprises Pvt. Ltd.

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Where it was already established that extended period was applicable on account of suppression of facts, there cannot be any reasonable failure for payment of service tax—section 80 cannot be invoked and thus penalty u/s. 78 was upheld.


Facts:

The Appellant was engaged in management of cars/ scooter parking facilities at an airport under the license obtained from the airports authority on which the department confirmed the tax under “Airport Services”. The commissioner upheld the liability but dropped the penalties u/s.s 76, 77 and 78. It was contended that the demand was time-barred for the reason that the Airports Authority of India (AAI) did not authorise them to collect service tax until 01-03-2006 and as they were working on behalf of AAI, they were not a service provider. The revenuein its appeal contended that the order of the Commissioner was bad in law inasmuch as even after finding that the appellant collected service tax for the period 10-09-2004 till 31-03-2006, there was suppression of facts and demanded tax for the longer period. Therefore the penalties u/s.s 76, 77 and 78  were dropped wrongly by granting the benefit of section 80.

Held:

Perusing the Commissioner’s order, the Hon. Tribunal, rejecting the appellant’s appeal, observed that since the Commissioner upheld extended period and confirmed the whole of the demand affirming suppression of facts by the assessee, penalty u/s. 78 was leviable.

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Exports—Exemption u/s. 10A—Matter remanded to the Tribunal to consider the transaction of earning of interest on foreign currency deposit in detail to determine whether there existed any nexus between interest and industrial undertaking.

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India Comnet International vs. ITO (2013) 354 ITR 673 (SC)

The assessee, a private limited company established under the Madras Export Processing Zone, a 100% export oriented unit, engaged in the business of development and export of software filed its return of income for the assessment year 2002- 03 on 31st October, 2002, admitting “nil” income after claiming exemption u/s. 10A amounting to Rs. 8,34,84,900. The assessment was completed u/s. 143(3) of the Act by adding to income, the interest on deposits amounting to Rs. 92,06,602. The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) confirmed the order of the Assessing Officer, namely that the interest income of Rs. 92,06,602 did not qualify for exemption u/s. 10A of the Act and the same had to be assessed to tax under the head “Income from other sources”. The Tribunal following the order of the jurisdictional High Court in the case of CIT vs. Menon Impex P. Ltd. (2003) 259 ITR 403 (Mad) dismissed the appeal filed by the assessee. The High Court confirmed the order of the Tribunal holding that the interest income was earned out of the export realisation and kept in the foreign currency deposit account, as permitted by the FERA under the banking regulations and that there was no direct nexus between the interest earned and the industrial undertaking since the interest was received on deposit made in banks and it was that deposit which was the source of income.

On further appeal, the Supreme Court held that the impugned judgment of the High Court was based on the judgment of the Madras High Court in the case of CIT vs. Menon Impex P. Ltd. (supra). The Supreme Court observed that in that case, the Madras High Court examined in detail the transaction in question and found that the assessee had set up a new industrial undertaking in Kandla Free Trade Zone for manufacturing light engineering goods. The goods therein were exported during the assessment year 1985-86. In the course of business, the assessee was required to open a letter of credit. On such deposit, the assessee earned interest. Under the said circumstances, the High Court held, following the judgment in the case of CIT vs. Sterling Foods reported in [1999] 237 ITR 579 (SC), that the interest received by the assessee was on deposit made by it in the banks; that such deposit was the source of income; and that, the mere fact that the deposit was made for obtaining letter of credit which letter was, in turn, used for the purpose of business undertaking did not establish a direct nexus between the interest and industrial undertaking. According to the Supreme Court, the judgment of the Madras High Court in Menon Import P. Ltd. ( supra) was based on the examination of the transaction in detail which exercise had not been undertaken in the present case.

For the above reasons, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgment and remitted the case to the Income-tax Appellant Tribunal for deciding the matter afresh after examining the transaction in question, as done by the Madras High Court in the case of Menon Import P. Ltd. (supra).

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Our Endless greed

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“Earth provides enough to satisfy every man’s need, but not every man’s greed” – Mahatma Gandhi
We all, as children, have heard the story of Alibaba. Alibaba discovered the cave of thieves and came to know the magic password “Open Sesame”, which opened the door of the cave. Exercising this knowledge in moderation, he became rich. His uncle Kassim also managed to know the password, entered the cave and went mad with greed, piled up huge amount of gold, and treasure and then forgot the words to open the cave. He was found inside by the robbers, killed and cut into four pieces. Yes, we know the story alright. But have forgotten the moral of the story. Do not be greedy.

Some of us may also have read a story written by Tolstoy, called ‘How much land does a man need?’ The story is about a poor peasant, eking out a living from his small plot of land. He comes to know that beyond the mountains, fertile land is available at a very cheap rate. He sells his land and buys a bigger and more fertile piece of land, and starts living a better life. The same story is repeated and each time the peasant moves to a still distant land, each time he becomes richer and richer. Ultimately, he learns that behind the distant mountain range, there was a still better opportunity. The King of the place was giving all the land a person could cover by walking from sunrise to sunset, for a hefty amount to be paid in advance. The only condition was that if one could not reach the starting point by sunset, he forfeited his entire deposit. Our friend starts walking at sunrise, finding better and better land ahead. In trying to encompass as much as he could, he loses track of time and realises that it has become very late and may not be able to reach the starting point before the sunset. He runs and runs. He staggers to the starting point with his outstretched hand. He manages to finish. But he too is finished. The cheering crowd was stunned. In his greed to cover more and more land, he had overstrained himself so much that his heart gave way. The people had to dig a grave for him and it required just six feet of land to bury our peasant friend when ;

It is truly said that while a ship needs water to sail, if the same water enters the ship, the ship sinks. Money is necessary for our necessities and comforts. But if we blindly pursue money and allow it to become our master, it is then that the problem starts. We run the risk of sinking under the weight of our wealth.

What is true of money is also true of power. It has brought about the downfall of the high and mighty like both Napoleon and Hitler. Even Alexander the Great after conquering so many countries realised that at the end everyone has to go empty handed. He directed that when his body is taken for cremation, his hands should be displayed for people to see, to realise that even Alexander the Great went empty handed.

It would do good to all of us, if we pause in this race of getting more and more riches, and think as to what is required to be truly happy.

I would end with this passage from ‘Les Miserables’ by Victor Hugo:

“Indeed, is not that all, and what more can be desired? A little garden to walk, and immensity to reflect upon. At his feet something to cultivate and gather, above his head something to study and mediate upon a few flowers on the earth, and all the stars in the sky.”

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Provisional attachment u/s. 281B: A. Y. 2008-09: Provisional attachment remains in operation only till the passing of the assessment order

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Motorola Solutions India (P) Ltd. vs. CIT; 254 CTR 569 (P&H)

In the course of the assessment proceedings for the A. Y. 2008-09, the Assessing Officer passed the provisional attachment order u/s. 281B and issued letters/ notices on 2-1-2012 to the Standard Chartered Bank and sundry debtors not to make payment to the assessee petitioner. The assessee challenged the validity of the order by filing a writ petition. In the mean while, on 8-11-2012, assessment order was passed raising a demand of Rs. 2,10,57,87,648/-. The Petitioner contended that the provisional attachment order u/s. 281B of the Act ceases to operate after passing of the assessment order on 8-11-2012. The contention of the Department was that the provisional attachment order will be in operation for a period of six months.

The Punjab and Haryana High Court accepted the contention of the Petitioner assessee and held as under:

“i) According to section 281B, during the pendency of any assessment proceeding or proceedings in pursuance to reassessment that in order to safeguard the interests of the Revenue, after recording the reasons for the same in writing and seeking the approval from the concerned authority, an order for provisional attachment can be passed. Circular No. 179 dated 30-9-1975 clearly envisages that where during the pendency of any proceeding for assessment or reassessment of any income, the raising of demand is likely to take time due to investigations and there is apprehension that the assessee may thwart the collection of that demand to be made. This supports the interpretation that it is only till actual demand is created by passing an assessment order that the provisional attachment order will remain in operation.

ii) There are sufficient provisions in the Act, like section 220(1), proviso to safeguard the interest of the Revenue in case the Assessing Officer has apprehension that the assessee by adopting extraneous method may thwart the recovery of the legitimate tax dues of the State. In view of the above, the interpretation put by the Revenue that even after passing of the assessment order, provisional attachment order shall still remain in force for six months, does not merit acceptance and is, thus, rejected.”

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Extension of time limit for form 23 AC/ACA XBRL

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Vide General Circular number 01/2013 dated 15.01.2013, time limit to file financial statements in XBRL mode (for the financial year commencing on or after 01.04.2011) without any additional fee has now been extended upto 15th February 2013 or within 30 days of AGM of the company, whichever is later.

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Amendments to Form DIN1, DIN 4 and Form 18

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The Ministry of Corporate Affairs vide Notification G.S.R (E) dated 24th December, 2012 has amended e-forms DIN 1, DIN 4 and Form 18. The new e-forms are in effect from 25th December 2012. Some of the changes are as follows:

a) The Application for Directors Identification Number vide Form DIN 1 now requires the current occupation and Educational Qualification to be filled in and the Affidavit to be attached thereto needs to be on duly notarised non-judicial Stamp Paper of Rs. 10/-.

b) DIN numbers allotted by the Central Government, if not activated within 365 days from date of allotment, can be deactivated or cancelled.

c) DIN 4 being the form for changes to DIN 1 requires the verification by a Professional that they are satisfied of the identity of the Director or designated partner and that the person is personally known to the professional or that the professional has met the person alongwith the originals of the documents attached. In case where the applicant is residing outside India, the particulars have to be verified from the documents duly attested by the attesting authority as mentioned in the instruction kit.

d) A mandatory Clause 4(b) has been introduced to the Form 18 – Form for notification of Registered Office Address as follows: “(b) Registered Office is
• Owned by company
• Owned by Director (not taken on lease by company)
 • Taken on Lease by Company
• Owned by any other entity/Person (Not taken on lease by company)”

Form 18 now requires proof of Registered Office address as a mandatory attachment alongwith a No-objection certificate from director if Registered Office is owned by director (not taken on lease by company) or a proof that the Company is permitted to use the address as the registered office of the Company if the same is owned by any other entity/Person (not taken on lease by Company).

Additionally, a mandatory verification has been inserted that: “The company undertakes to file the form 18 for change of registered office address with the ROC within prescribed period.”

Also a certificate, certifying the personal visit by CA/ CS/CWA (whosoever is certifying the form) to new address is inserted which is as follows: “I further certify that I have personally visited the new address, verified it and I am of the opinion that the premises are intended to be at the disposal of the applicant company.”

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2013 (30) STR. 586 (Del) Commissioner Of Service Tax vs. Consulting Engineering Services (I) Pvt. Ltd.

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Applicability of rate of service tax prior to introduction of Point of Taxation Rules is the rate in force as on the date of provision of service – receipt of consideration in subsequent period is of no consequence.

Facts:

Services were provided prior to 14-05-2003 and the bills were also raised prior to the said date, which facts were undisputed. However, the payment was received after 14-05-2003 and thus, the revenue sought to levy tax @ 8% as applicable with effect from 14-05-2003, placing reliance on Rule 5B of the Service Tax Rules section 67A of the Finance Act, 1994 and Rule 4(a)(i) of Point of Taxation Rules, 2011.

Held:

The Hon. High Court dismissed the appeal and held that, none of the above provisions were applicable to the facts of the present case as the relevant period was April, 2003 to September, 2003, when these provisions were not in force, In the absence of any rules, the taxable event was the provision of the taxable service which took place prior to 14-05-2003, the rate applicable prior to that date viz. 5% and not 8%.
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Nature of Lease Transaction vis-à-vis Intangible Goods

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Introduction
Transfer of right to use any goods for any purpose’ (Lease) is deemed to be a sale and liable to tax under VAT/CST Acts. Nature of lease transaction is not defined under Constitution of India or under Sales Tax Laws. Thus, the nature is required to be ascertained in light of judicial pronouncements. A few important judgments in relation to above issue can be noted as under:

Dukes & Sons (112 STC 370)(Bom)

This is one of the earliest cases dealing with nature of lease transaction vis-à-vis intangible goods. In this case, the issue before Bombay High Court was about tax on royalty amount received for leasing of Trade Mark. The argument was that since the trade mark is not given for exclusive use to one party, but is given or capable of being given for use to more than one party, there is no lease transaction. The requirement of exclusive use or exclusive possession to transferee was emphasised before the High Court. However, the Bombay High Court held that since the nature of goods, in this case, is intangible goods the condition of exclusive use cannot apply. Accordingly the High Court held that even if the goods i.e. trade mark is leased to more than one party still the transaction is taxable.

Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. (145 STC 91)(SC)

This is the latest case in the series from Hon. Supreme Court. This is a Larger Bench judgment. The issue in this case was about levy of lease tax on services provided by Telephone Companies. Supreme Court held that no such tax is leviable as the transaction pertains to service. While holding so, one of the learned judges on the Bench observed as under in para 98 of the judgment about nature of taxable lease transaction:

“98. To constitute a transaction for the transfer of the right to use the goods the transaction must have the following attributes:

a. There must be goods available for delivery;

b. There must be a consensus ad idem as to the identity of the goods;

c. The transferee should have a legal right to use the goods – consequently all legal consequences of such use including any permissions or licenses required therefore should be available to the transferee;

d. For the period during which the transferee has such legal right, it has to be the exclusion to the transferor – this is the necessary concomitant of the plain language of the statute – viz. a “transfer of the right to use” and not merely a licence to use the goods;

e. Having transferred the right to use the goods, during the period for which it is to be transferred, the owner cannot again transfer the same rights to others.”

Thus the nature of lease transaction is required to be decided in light of above parameters.

Smokin Joe’s Pizza Pvt. Ltd. (A.25 of 2004 dt. 25-11-2008)

The facts in this case were that the dealer was holding registered Trade mark “Smokin Joes” and allowed its use to its franchisees. The franchise agreement provided for non exclusive right to use the registered Trade mark. The agreement also provided for providing various services to Franchisee. Lower authorities held the transaction as taxable lease transaction. Tribunal made reference to judgments in case of Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. (AIR 1995 Supreme Court 2372) and Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. (145 STC 91) and came to the conclusion that in the given circumstances the transaction of franchise of trademark is not lease transaction but amounts to licensing transaction. At a time more than one franchise agreement can be entered into in respect of same trademark. Hence, it is a licence transaction and not lease. Therefore, Tribunal has held that no tax is payable on above transaction under Sales Tax Law. In this case Hon. Tribunal, though it referred to the Bombay High Court’s judgment in case of Dukes and Sons, in light of judgment of Hon. Supreme Court in BSNL held that the transaction is not lease transaction.

Subsequent to the above judgment there is also a judgment of Hon. Andhra Pradesh High Court in case of Nutrine Confectionery Co. Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (40 VST 327)(A.P). In this case, the transaction was for allowing use of trade mark. The said use was also on non exclusive basis. Still Hon. High Court has held that the transaction is lease transaction. Hon. High Court felt that the judgment of BSNL about exclusive use could not apply in relation to intangible goods like trade mark.

Malabar Gold Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commercial Tax Officer, Kozhikode (2013-VIL-49-KER-ST dt.24.6.2013).

This is the latest judgment of Kerala High Court. In this case, the transaction was about granting of franchise right on non exclusive basis. Hon. High Court has held that when the grant of franchise is non exclusive it is not lease transaction and not liable to VAT. In this judgment Hon. Kerala High Court has distinguished the judgment of Hon. Andhra Pradesh High Court in above case of Nutrine Confectionery Co. Pvt. Ltd. on the ground of difference in terms of agreement. Hon. Kerala High Court has also referred to Supreme Court judgments about non attraction of Service tax and VAT on same transaction. The observations of the Hon. High Court are as under:

“44. The issue therefore can be considered in the light of the dictum laid down in BSNL’s case (supra). Herein, the term ‘franchise is included in Section 65(105)(zze) of the Finance Act. The same is a taxable service and the taxable event is the service rendered by the Company. Thus, any service provided or to be provided to a franchisee will come within the purview of the said provision. The meaning of the terms franchise and franchisor u/s. 65(47) and (48) are also important. Going by the definition of franchise, it is an agreement by which the franchisee is granted representational right to sell or manufacture goods or to provide service or undertake any process identified with franchisor, whether or not a trade mark, service mark, trade name or logo or any such symbol, as the case may be, is involved. The terms of the agreement herein will show that Clause II of the Preamble has specifically given under items (i) to (v) the activities to be carried out by the franchisee which are as follows:

“i. Retailing of gold ornaments

ii. Retailing of diamond and other precious stone ornaments.

iii. Retailing of premium watches.

iv. Retailing of platinum and other premium fashion accessories.

v. Any other items introduced by MALABAR GOLD in future.”

Clause 2 under the heading “Products” will show that the franchisee cannot stock, exhibit or sell any products in the authorised showroom during the period of the agreement except the products authorised by Malabar Gold, which may include products manufactured or sourced by Malabar Gold. Therefore, the same will definitely satisfy the meaning of ‘franchise’ as contained in section 65(47) of the Finance Act, 1994. The learned Special Government Pleader for Taxes referred to the agreement herein and said that no service is referred to in the clauses therein.

We do not agree, in the light of clauses 3, 4 and 5 of the model agreement as already noticed.

Since what is termed as ‘taxable service’ is any service to be provided to a franchisee by a franchisor in relation to a franchise, the terms of the agreement will have to be understood in that context.

45.    In the light of the principles stated in para 98 of the judgment in BSNL’s case (supra), the provisions of the agreement, especially clauses (3) and (5) will show that the franchisor retains the right, effective control and possession and it is not a case of transfer of possession to the exclusion of the transferor. We notice that under clause (12) the franchisee has no right to sub-let or sub-lease or in any way sell, transfer, discharge or distribute or delegate or assign the rights under the agreement in favour of any third party, which is also significant. On termination of the agreement also, going by clause 25.3, the franchisee shall forfeit all rights and privileges conferred on them by the agreement and the franchisee will not be entitled to use the trade name or materi-als of “Malabar Gold”. Merely because, going by clause 18, the franchisee is not an agent, it will not get any other exclusive right.

46.    Since this Court in the two judgments relied upon by the learned Special Government Pleader, viz. Jojo Frozen Foods (P) Ltd.’s case {(2009) 24 VST 327} and Kreem Foods (Pvt.) Ltd.’s case {(2009) 24 VST 333} had no occasion to consider Entry 97 and the provisions u/s. 65(105)(zze) of the Finance Act and the definition of franchise and franchisor u/s. 65(47) (48) of the Finance Act, and those judgments related to transactions of pre 2003 period, we are of the view that the same are distinguishable on the facts of this case.

The judgment in Mechanical Assembly Systems (India) Pvt. Ltd.’s case (supra), as we have already explained, is a case of exclusive transfer of know-how.

47.    One of the judgments relied upon by the learned Special Government Pleader for Taxes is that of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Nutrine Confectionary Co. Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Andhra Pradesh {(2012) 20 KTR 38}. Therein, the transaction involved is by way of an agreement between the petitioner company and the assignee companies and a royalty of Rs.500/- per ton of production by the assignee, has been granted to the petitioner company for the use of trademark and logo for the goods. The matter was considered u/s. 2(h) of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957. The Bench was of the view, after going through the terms of the agreement, that “the assignee is free to make use of the trademark and logo. The petitioner does not in any manner regulate the use of trademark or logo although, “keeping in view the facilities available with the assignee, the petitioner undertook to suggest suitable terms provide formulas and recipes and suggest locations for marketing.” After analysing the agreement therein, it was held that the consideration received as royalty, is taxable u/s. 5E of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act. We have already analysed the terms of the agreement herein. Even though learned Special Government Pleader for Taxes placed heavy reliance on the judgment in Nutrine Confectionery Co. Pvt. Ltd.’s case (supra), we are of the view that the same is distinguishable on the facts of the said case and in the light of the provision u/s. 5E of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act also.

48.    Therefore, even though both sides relied upon the provisions of Articles 246 and 254 of the Constitution of India, we need not enter into a finding on the said question, as we are of the view that the tests laid down in BSNL’s case (supra) are squarely applicable here. Herein, it cannot be said that there are goods deliverable at any stage which is the test laid down by the Apex Court in paragraphs 78 and 79 of BSNL’s case (supra) and for that reason also, there is no transfer of right to user at all. Coupled with the same, is the fact that during the period in question the franchisee is having the right, it is not to the exclusion of the franchisor and as it is seen that even during the period during which the transaction is going on, the franchisor can again transfer the right to others, the tests laid down in sub paragraphs (d) and (e) under para 97 of BSNL’s case (supra) are not satisfied.”

Thus the position about nature of lease transaction vis-à -vis intangible goods can be said to be fluid and more light needs to be thrown by the Bombay High Court so far as Maharashtra State is concerned. However, from overall discussion it can be said that the latest judgment of Kerala High Court in Malabar Gold Pvt. Ltd. has interpreted the legal position from various angles which can be considered as guiding judgment.

Franchise: ‘Service’ or “Deemed Sale” of Transfer of Right to Use Trademark?

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Background: Transfer of right to use goods – a deemed sale.

Long before intellectual property service was introduced on the statute of service tax in the Finance Act, 1994 (the Act) with effect from 10th September, 2004, intellectual property right including trademark has been considered intangible goods. As such, its assignment or transfer has been exigible to sales tax. The issue for discussion however relates not to transfer or assignment of trademark but transfer of right to use trademark. In Commissioner of Sales Tax vs. Duke & Sons Pvt. Ltd. 1999 (112) STC 371 (Bom), Hon. Bombay High Court observed, “For transferring the right to use the trademark, it is not necessary to handover the trademark to the transferee or give control or possession of trademark to him. It can be done merely by authorizing the transferee to use the same in the manner required by the law as has been done in the present case. The right to use the trademark can be transferred simultaneously to any number of persons.” It is further observed, “In the instant case, there is no dispute about the fact that trademark is specifically included in the schedule of goods to the 1985 Act in entry no.7, the amount received by the assessee on the transfer of the right to use the same is therefore liable to be taxed under the said Act.” In Vikas Sales vs. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (1996) 102 STC 106, the Supreme Court held that, even incorporeal rights like trademarks, copyrights, patent and right in persona capable of transfer or transmission such as debts are also included in the ambit of the term ‘goods’. The Court further held that patents, copyrights and other rights which are not rights over land related matters are included within the ambit of movable property. In another case, viz. SPS Jayam & Co. vs. Registrar Tamilnadu Taxation Special Tribunal and Others (2004) 137 STC 117 (MAD), it was held that trademark is intangible good which is subject matter of transfer and was further observed that simply because the assessee retained the right for himself to use the trademark and reserved the right to grant permission to others to use the trademark, it would not take away the character of the transaction as one of transfer of a right to use.

It is a known fact that vide 46th Constitutional Amendment in 1982 in the Article 366, a new clause (29A) was inserted. The said Article 366(29A) of the Constitution of India in sub-clause (d) reads as follows:

“ “tax on the sale or purchase of goods” includes:

(d) a tax on the transfer of the right to use any goods for any purpose (whether or not for a specified period) for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration.”

In this frame of reference, it is also interesting to note that in case of 20th Century Finance Corporation Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra 2000 (119) STC 182, it was held, “the States in exercise of power under entry 54 of List II read with Article 366(29A)(d) are not competent to levy sales tax on the transfer of right to use goods, which is a deemed sale, if such sale takes place outside the state or is a sale in the course of inter-state trade or commerce or is a sale in the course of import or export.” Consequently, the Finance Act, 2002 with effect from 11-05-2002 amended the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 whereby the definition of sales was enlarged by incorporating transactions included in clause (29A) of Article 366 for the purpose of levy of tax on sale or purchase of goods which take place in the course of inter-state trade or commerce. Thus, for the purpose of sale, deemed sale under Article 366(29A) is included and in turn, intangible property includes a trademark and thus is always treated as ‘goods’. The Supreme Court in Tata Consultancy Service vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (2004) 178 ELT 22 (SC) held that intangibility is not something which should determine whether a property is goods for the purpose of sales tax. The test is whether the property is capable of abstraction, consumption and use and whether the same can be transmitted, transferred, delivered, stored, possessed etc. The transfer of the right to use goods is distinct from mere transfer of goods but also an activity considered as liable for tax as sale of goods. The Andhra Pradesh High Court in G.S. Lamba & Sons vs. State of A.P. 2012-TIOL-49-HC-AP-CT held “The levy of tax under Article 366(29A)(d) is not on the use of goods. It is on the transfer of the right to use goods which occurs only on account of the transfer of the right.” [emphasis supplied].

Sale vs. Service:

In terms of the judicial pronouncements cited above, it can be inferred that there is a marked distinction between transfer of right to use a trademark or a similar intellectual property and assignment of trademark. By way of assignment, the owner of the trademark/intellectual property divests his right, title or interest but while transferring the right to use the same, he does not give up his right, title or interest. However, sale or deemed sale both are exigible to VAT. Having so determined, the fact is that the transaction other than those of mere sale or transfer of intellectual property i.e. temporary transfer or permitting the use or enjoyment of any intellectual property is declared as ‘service’ u/s. 66E of the Act with effect from 01-07-2012 and under the earlier dispensation of service tax law as well, intellectual property service was defined in section 65(55b) as ““intellectual property service” means, — (a) transferring, temporarily; or (b) permitting the use or enjoyment of, any intellectual property right” and was considered “taxable service” with effect from 10th September, 2004 as stated hereinabove.

While the intent of legislation in principle is to exclude both ‘sale’ and “deemed sale” from the purview of service tax is clear in many forms, the implementation has not matched the intention always. To illustrate, the definition of ‘service’ as introduced in section 65B(44) with effect from 01- 07-2012 specifically excludes transfer, delivery and supply of goods which is deemed to be sale for the purpose of Article 366(29A) of the Constitution. However, there is a contradiction made in the law itself by defining temporary transfer or permitting the use of enjoyment of any intellectual property as declared service as stated above. Earlier, judiciary also made pronouncement on this subject matter when in Imagic Creative (P) Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes & Others 2008 (9) STR 337 (SC) wherein it was held by the Supreme Court that VAT and service tax are mutually exclusive. Thus, even though there is a settled law that a transaction cannot be simultaneously ‘sale’ and ‘service’ and therefore not exigible to both VAT and service tax, it is quite a matter of challenge to correctly determine the nature of a transaction whether of sale of goods or provision of service and consequently, should be exigible to only one of the levies. Like the declared services of development of information technology software and transfer of goods by way of hiring, leasing or licensing etc. (discussed in May, 2013 and November, 2012 issues of BCAJ respectively under this column), this is one more controversial declared service which is extremely prone to litigation on account of overlap of VAT and service tax. The law in this regard is still under evolution and hence there is no finality.

In a landmark decision of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. vs. UOI 2006 (2) STR 161 (SC), the Supreme Court observed, “……. If there is an instrument of contract which may be composite in form in any case other than the exceptions in Article 366(29A), (Note: The reference here was to works contract and catering contract) unless the transaction in truth represents two distinct and separate contracts and is discernible as such, then the State would not have the power to separate the agreement to sell from the agreement to render service and impose tax on sale. The test therefore for composite contracts other than those mentioned in Article 366(29A) continues to be – did the parties have in mind or intend separate rights arising out of the sale of goods. If there was no such intention, there is no sale even if the contract could be disintegrated. The test for deciding whether a contract falls into one category or the other is to as what is the substance of the contract. We will, for the want of a better phrase, call this the “dominant nature test”. In para 97, the Court dealt with the question as to what would constitute a transaction for the transfer of the right to use the goods exigible to VAT and held that such transactions must have the following attributes:

a. There must be goods available for delivery;

b.    There must be a consensus ad idem as to the identity of the goods;

c.    The transferee should have a legal right to use the goods – consequently all legal consequences of such use including any permissions or licenses required therefor should be available to the transferee;

d.    For the period during which the transferee has such legal right, it has to be the exclusion to the transferor this is the necessary concomitant of the plain language of the statute – viz. a “transfer of the right to use” and not merely a license to use the goods;

e.    Having transferred the right to use the goods during the period for which it is to be transferred, the owner cannot again transfer the same rights to others.

[emphasis supplied].

All the aforesaid attributes vis-à-vis “transfer of right to use goods” certainly would hold good in case of tangible goods. This aspect was also observed in G.S. Lamba & Sons (supra). However, transfer of right to use incorporeal property such as trademark would not be able to fulfill the last two tests out of the above 5 tests viz.

•    The transferee cannot use the right to use the goods to the exclusion to the transferor as the transferor of the right to use intangible can himself continue to use the said intangible goods as physical transfer is not required for intangibles.

•    Right to use intellectual property can be transferred to others simultaneously.

[This characteristic was observed in the decisions of Duke & Sons P. Ltd. (supra) and SPS Jayam & Co. (supra)].

Both the above tests are not fulfilled because of the inherent characteristic of “intangible goods” being intangible in nature as physical dispossession or transfer does not happen in this case. Heavily relying on the above, the Kerala High Court reversed its own ruling of the earlier cases in a recent judgment analyzed below:

Malabar Gold Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commercial Tax Officer 2013-TIOL-512-HC-Kerala-ST.

In this recent decision, the Division Bench of Kerala High Court was approached challenging the levy of VAT under KVAT Act on royalty received from franchisee companies. The petitioner company engaged in marketing/trading export and import of jewellery under the name “Malabar Gold” paid VAT on the sale of jewellery without any dispute. However, the appellant had entered into franchise agreements with various franchisees which sold the jewellery under the name “Malabar Gold” and interalia displayed such board with design approved by the Appellant and paid royalty to the Appellant under the franchise agreement. Admittedly, franchise service is a notified category of service taxable under the service tax law vide section 65(105)(zze) read with section 65(47) & (48) of the Finance Act, 1994 from 1st July, 2003 and the company paid service tax on royalty received in terms of the franchise agreement. The Commercial Tax Officer initiated proceedings for recovery of VAT contending that royalty received by the Appellant from its franchisees for the use of trademark was exigible to VAT as transfer of right to use any of the goods would be taxable. Relying on the decision of the Apex Court in BSNL (supra) and Imagic Creative P. Ltd. (supra), the petitioner’s stand was that the transaction being of franchise service attracted service tax alone which they had already paid. In turn, the VAT authority interalia relied on Tata Consultancy Service (supra) and Division Bench decision of Kerala High Court in Mechanical Assembly Systems (India) Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Kerala 2006 (144) STC 546.

Earlier, the single Judge in this case rejected the Appellant’s appeal reported at 2012-TIOL-1032-HC. Kerala- VAT wherein it was held that royalty received by the dealer was exigible to KVAT Act. Hence this writ petition was filed. It was pleaded for the appellant that royalty fee was paid under the franchise agreement. The concept of franchise agreement was explained and as ruled in Imagic Creative P. Ltd. (supra) by the Supreme Court, once the transaction was clearly covered under the relevant provisions for payment of service tax, then it was not liable for VAT simultaneously. As regards “right to use”, it was pleaded that in Tata Consultancy Service’s case (supra), it was clearly laid down that the item concerned should be capable of abstraction, consumption and use which can be transmitted, transferred, delivered, stored, possessed etc. and referring to various paras from the decision in BSNL (supra), it was contended that considering the peculiarities of the franchise arrangement and the concept of “right to use the goods”, the test laid down in BSNL’s case was not satisfied as the franchise was not provided to the exclusion of the franchisor. It was also submitted interalia that assuming there was a conflict between the entries in Lists I & II under the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, the Finance Act, 1994 would prevail.

Next in line, the facts in the case of Mechanical Assembly Systems P. Ltd. vs. State of Kerala (supra) were distinguishable as in that case, transfer of know- how on permanent basis was involved and it was totally different from the franchise arrangement. It was further submitted that the subsequent decisions of the Kerala High Court in Jojo Frozen Foods P. Ltd. vs. State of Kerala (2009) 24 VST 327 and Kreem Foods P. Ltd. vs. State of Kerala (2009) 24 VST 333 on the identical issue even though considered liable for sales tax, they were under the GST Act and in all the 3 decisions of the same Kerala High Court, the period prior to 2003 was involved i.e. prior to introduction of franchise service from 01/07/2003 in the service tax law and the Division Bench had no occasion to examine the effect of the provisions of the Finance Act, 1994. Further that in those cases, transfer from one dealer to another was involved whereas in the instant case license alone is involved and that the findings of those cases could not be supported in the light of pronouncement of law by the Supreme Court in BSNL’s case (supra). It was strongly pleaded that the learned Single Judge did not go into the question whether service tax alone is payable by the Appellant and did not consider the other related legal issues. Discussing the decision of the Bombay High Court in Duke and Sons Pvt. Ltd. (supra) relied upon in Jojo Foods (P) Ltd.’s case (supra) also, it was submitted that this decision based on special facts was distinguishable.

The VAT authority on the contrary contended that the 3 decisions of the Kerala High Court (referred above) would show that transactions by way of transfer of know-how as well as right to use the trademark were found covered by KVAT Act. The instant case not being different from those 3 cases, Article 366(29A)(d) would have relevance.

Considering the contentious issue, the Court ex-amined in detail provisions of franchise service in the Finance Act, 1994 and also those in relation to intellectual property service viz. section 65(55a) and 65(55b) alongside the provisions of KVAT Act as regards definition of ‘sale’ and relevant Explanation (v) thereof dealing with “transfer of right to use any goods for any purpose” and section 6 providing for levy of tax on sale or purchase of goods. All the important terms of model franchise agreement entered into by the Appellant with its franchisees were considered to examine the crux of the arrangement. In a nutshell, the franchisee was granted license to pursue retailing of gold and diamond ornaments, watches etc. at the showroom authorized by the Appellant under their trade name and logo Malabar Gold. At its own discretion, Malabar Gold provided support right from project plan to selection of product mix, implementation of system, raising of funds, specification & guidance on showroom operations etc. Franchisees were not allowed to use the showroom for any other products in their name. The relationship was defined as that of products in their name. The relationship was defined as that of principal to principal and franchisee was allowed not to act as their agent and all other responsibilities and compliances had to be solely of franchisee. Lastly on termination, interalia included non-compete clause for a 2 year period. It was noted by the Court that franchise service was introduced with effect from 01-07-2003 and KVAT was introduced from 01-04-2005. In the light of the said franchise arrangement, principles stated by the very Court in Mechanical Assembly System’s case (supra), Jojo Frozen Foods (supra) and Kreem Foods (supra) were discussed. The case of Mechanical Assembly System was distinguishable as although consideration was termed as ‘royalty’, in that case, there was an outright transfer of know-how involved and not a case of transfer of use of know-how. Therefore, question was whether dictum in the other two cases whether was distinguishable in the light of peculiar facts of the franchise arrangement in the appellant’s case and the question that whether the principles laid down in BSNL’s case would support the appellant’s case.

The  Court  noticed  that  both  appellant  and revenue relied upon relevant principles explaining the meaning of ‘goods’ in case of Tata Consultancy’s case (supra). On examining the said judgment, the Court formed the view that ‘goods’ used in Article 366(12) of the Constitution and as defined in the KVAT Act is very wide and includes all types of movable properties, tangible or intangible. Then, in juxtaposition, BSNL’s judgment was examined. On analysing relevant paras viz. 50, 56 & 57, 73, 75 of BSNL’s case (supra) as regards ‘goods’ in a sales transaction and delivery thereof, the Court observed that in the light of principles stated therein, actual delivery of the goods is not necessary for effecting transfer of right to use the goods but the goods must be deliverable and delivered at some stage and if what is claimed as goods are not deliverable at all, the question of right to use those goods would not arise. Thus if there is no deliverable, there is no transfer of user and this is true for both tangible and intangible goods. Finally the Court noted the 5 attributes contained in para 97 of BSNL’s case (supra) to constitute a transaction for transfer of the right to use the goods (provided above under sale vs. service). In terms of this test, the appellant’s case involved only a license to use trademark. The transfer of its use was not to the exclusion of the transferor i.e. the appellant retained the right to transfer it to others also. The Court also noted that BSNL’s case (supra) was also considered in Imagic Creative P. Ltd. (supra) while examining a case of composite contract. Further, referring to interalia the decision of the Bombay High Court in Rolta Computer & Industries P. Ltd. (2009) 25 VST 322 it was observed that the Bombay High Court followed the above dictum laid down in BSNL’s case (supra). In this case, an amount was paid on hourly basis for the use of CPU to process accounting applications. The sales tax authorities held that as soon as the terminal was allowed to be used, transfer of right to use took place and therefore sales tax was attracted. Following the above dictum of BSNL’s case (supra), it was held in this case that the possession of computers & terminals was never parted with. Merely when a person agrees to provide a particular customer the service during a particular period to the exclusion of other customers, it would not mean goods are delivered to the exclusion of owner himself. It was nothing more than a service contract and no sales tax was attracted.

The Court found that this judgment supported the appellant’s case besides the case of State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Rashtriya Ispat Nigam (2002) 3 SCC 314 (SC) wherein the crucial relevant factor was that there was no transfer of right to use machinery in favour of contractors to the exclusion of owner was made. The contractor was appointed to only operate the machinery for owner’s own project work in owner’s premises and therefore the effective control and possession over the machinery other than for owner’s use was never transferred to the contractor to attract sales tax. In the light of this, through appellant’s franchise agreement, franchisee did not get effective control of the trademark but got only limited rights and even during subsistence of the agreement, the appellant could use the trademark for itself and for other parties, the dictum laid down in BSNL’s case (supra) was found applicable and the Court found the transaction to be not of “deemed sale” but of “franchise service” in terms of section 65(105) (zze) read with 65(47) & 65(48) of the Finance Act, 1994 although it was strongly pleaded on behalf of the respondent that no service was referred to in the model agreement. The Court accordingly stated that Jojo Frozen Foods Ltd.’s case (supra) and Kreem Foods Pvt. Ltd.’s case (supra) had no occasion to consider entry 97 and provisions of the Finance Act, 1994. Further, the Court found that the definitions of ‘franchise’ & ‘franchisor’ were important to consider, as in terms of these definitions, granting of representational right to sell or manufacture goods or to provide service or undertake any process identified with the franchisor was covered whether or not any trademark, service mark, trade name or logo or symbol was involved. Based on this, these judgments were found distinguishable. Accordingly, the single judge’s decision that the transaction was of “deemed sale” as defined in KVAT Act was not agreed upon as in the instant case, the Court did not have to deal with a case involving transfer of intellectual property right like trademark but the matter involved was of franchise agreement and accordingly the judgment was reversed by concluding that it did not attract the provisions of KVAT Act.

Conclusion:

The above case is of a typical franchise arrangement and based on this specific arrangement, the Division Bench reached the decision as above reversing the stand taken in the two earlier cases on identical issue. However, many situations or transactions of supply of tangible goods for hire, transfer of right to use intellectual property, electronic transfer/downloads of standard software, transactions involving providing customised software etc. suffer a hanging sword of the other levy even if in good faith one of the taxes is paid with bonafide intentions. An honest tax payer is pushed to the wall to undergo strenuous, lengthy and expensive litigation deterring him to under-take business venture in India on account of the existing complex legal system. Trial and error in judiciary for interpretation of different provisions contained in both the legislations is done at the cost of an assessee – business enterprise whose interests and conveniences are considered of least importance in the gamut of tax collection and administration. Is the issue of interpretation on account of overlap between the two legislations and tug of war between the two administrations on account of revenue a simple affair for us to wrap up as professional opportunity or does it require a serious consideration for drawing attention of lawmakers to address the issue irrespective of implementation of GST?

External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) Policy – Repayment of Rupee loans and/or fresh Rupee capital expenditure – $ 10 billion scheme

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Presently, only Indian companies, in the manufacturing and infrastructure sector, who are consistent foreign exchange earners, can avail of ECB for repayment of outstanding Rupee loan(s) availed of by them from the domestic banking system and/ or for fresh Rupee capital expenditure.

 This circular grants similar facilities to Indian companies in the hotel sector (with a total project cost of Rs. 250 crore or more). As a result, these companies can now avail of ECB for repayment of outstanding Rupee loan(s) availed of by them from the domestic banking system and/or for fresh Rupee capital expenditure.

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Reporting under Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (FEMA)

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This circular states that corporates and individuals have, during the compounding process, attributed the delays in reporting to acts of omission and commission by their Banks. The circular further states that delay in reporting transactions relating to FDI, ECB & ODI affects the integrity of data and consequently the quality of policy decisions relating to capital flows into and out of the country. The circular advices Banks to take necessary steps to ensure that checks and balances are incorporated in systems relating to dealing with and reporting of foreign exchange transactions so that contraventions of provisions of FEMA, 1999 attributable to them do not occur and warns that RBI can impose a penalty on them for contravening any direction given by the RBI or failing to file any return as directed by RBI in terms of Section 11(3) of FEMA, 1999.

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Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in India – Issue of equity shares under the FDI scheme allowed under the Government route

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This circular has amended the following conditions relating to issue of equity shares/preference shares under the Approval Route by conversion of import of capital goods, etc.: –

A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 74 dated 30th June, 2011

Earlier Condition

Revised condition

Para 3(I)

Import of capital goods/Machineries/ equipment (including secondhand machineries),

Import of capital goods/Machineries/ equipment (excluding secondhand machineries),

Para 3(I)(b)

There is an independent valuation of the capital goods/ machineries/ quipment (including second-hand machineries) by a third party entity, preferably by an independent valuer from the country of import along with production of copies of documents/ certificates issued by the customs authorities towards assessment of the fair value of such imports;

There is an independent valuation of the capital goods/ machineries/ equipment (excluding second-hand machineries) by a third party entity, preferably by an independent valuer from the country of import along with production of copies of documents/ certificates issued by the customs authorities towards assessment of the fair value of such imports;

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Uploading of Reports on FINnet Gateway

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This circular states that as FIU-IND has ‘gone-live’ from 20th October, 2012 authorized persons who are indian agents under MTSS must discontinue submission of reports in CD format after 20th October, 2012 and use only FINnet gateway for uploading of reports in the new XML reporting format. Any report in CD format received after 20th October, 2012 will not be treated as a valid submission by FIU-IND.

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Anti-Money Laundering (AML) standards/Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT) Standards – Cross Border Inward Remittance under Money Transfer Service Scheme

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This circular states that FATF has updated its Statement on ‘Improving Global AML/CFT Compliance: on-going process’ on 19th October, 2012 and advices authorised persons who are Indian agents under MTSS and their sub-agents to consider the information contained in the said update.

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Anti-Money Laundering (AML) standards/Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT) Standards – Money changing activities

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This circular states that FATF has updated its Statement on ‘Improving Global AML/CFT Compliance: on-going process’ on 19th October, 2012 and advices authorised persons and their agents/franchisees to consider the information contained in the said update.

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External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) Policy – Non-Banking Financial Company – Infrastructure Finance Companies (NBFC-IFCs)

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Presently, Non-Banking Finance Companies (NBFC) categorised as Infrastructure Finance Companies (IFC) can avail of ECB, including the outstanding ECB, up to 50% of their owned funds under the Automatic Route. ECB above 50% of their net owned funds can be availed of under the Approval Route. This circular has: – a. Raised this limit of 50% under to 75% and hence, permits IFC to avail of ECB, including the outstanding ECB, up to 75% of their owned funds under the Automatic Route. ECB above 75% of their net owned funds can be availed of under the Approval Route. b. Reduced the hedging requirement for IFC for currency risk from 100% of their exposure to 75% of their exposure.

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Know Your Customer (KYC) norms/Anti-Money Laundering (AML) standards/Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT) Obligation of Authorised Persons under Prevention of Money Laundering Act, (PMLA), 2002, as amended by Prevention of Money Laundering (Amendment) Act, 2009 Money changing activities.

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This circular provides that for KYC purposes, Authorised persons engaged in Money changing activities and their agents & franchisees can accept, where the address on the document submitted for identity proof by the prospective customer is same as that declared by him/her current address, the same document can be accepted as a valid proof of both identity and address. However, in cases where the address indicated on the document submitted for identity proof differs from the current address declared by the customer, a separate proof of address should be obtained.

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External Confirmations – Proving Existence with External Evidence?

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Audit evidence is considered to be more reliable when obtained in a documented form directly by the auditor from sources independent of the entity being audited. The higher the auditors’ assessment of risk of material misstatement (including risk of fraud or error), the greater would be the need to obtain persuasive evidence to address those risks. Unless, there exists reasons to conclude otherwise, the auditor would usually place a higher reliance on evidence obtained directly from third parties or corroborating evidence obtained from independent sources. SA 505 provides guidance on the auditor’s use of external confirmation procedures to obtain audit evidence.

‘External confirmations’ is a process of obtaining audit evidence through direct written communication from a third party in response to a request for information about a particular financial item in the financial statements. For certain financial captions, circularising and obtaining independent external confirmations, is one of the most reliable substantive audit procedures, to assist auditors to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence to validate the assertion of ‘existence’. Robust confirmation procedures can also serve as an effective tool to respond to fraud risks.

Confirmation requests are generally of two types:

a. Positive confirmation request—through this request, the confirming party responds directly to the auditor indicating whether the party agrees or disagrees with the information requested, or providing the requested information.

b. Negative confirmation request—the confirming party responds directly to the auditor only if the confirming party disagrees with the information provided in the request.

Usually, negative confirmations are used where there are a large number of small balances and the risk of material misstatement is assessed as low. A good example where negative confirmation can be used is for confirming vendor registration status under the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (MSMED Act, 2006). Negative confirmation requests may be sent to vendors requesting them to confirm within a stipulated time, whether they are registered enterprises under the MSMED Act, 2006, failing which these would be considered as ‘nonregistered’ enterprises. Where detection risk is high, or the materiality of the account balance is high, positive confirmation will be needed to provide substantive evidence.

In common parlance, external confirmations are understood to be restricted to only bank balances, accounts receivables and payables. External confirmations could also be circularised for investments, borrowings, related party transactions, inventory in custody of third parties, loans and advances, property title deeds mortgaged, guarantees, contingent items, litigation and claims or items that are significant or outside the normal course of business.

External confirmations may also be used to confirm terms of agreements, contracts, or transactions between an entity and other parties or the absence thereof. For example, a request for confirmation of bank balances could also include the bank to confirm whether there exists any other exposure in respect of any other facilities availed by the enterprise. These could be in the nature of letters of credit, derivative contracts, forward contracts outstanding, bank guarantees provided, etc. All these could have implications for accounting and/or disclosures in the financial statements.

Generally, enterprises from whom external confirmation is sought are likely to be independent, ensuring that the evidence is reliable. However, the auditor needs to exercise greater professional scepticism and diligence in cases of related parties or where the confirming party might be economically dependent on the entity.

General reluctance to confirm is more likely due to misunderstanding of the purpose of the request. Debtors may misinterpret the confirmation as a demand for payment. Other parties may fear that confirmation might be binding if they should subsequently discover an error in their own records. Some respondents disclaim responsibility should their response be in error. This is usually the case with bank confirmations. However, this does not necessarily compromise the reliability of the confirmation. It is also pertinent to note that confirming parties may be more likely to respond indicating their disagreement with a confirmation request when the information in the request is not in their favour, and less likely to respond otherwise.

It is interesting to note that SA 505 provides guidance on audit procedures to be followed where an enterprise uses a third party to co-ordinate and provide responses to confirmation requests. Though not prevalent in India, this is a practice widely used in the US. In fact, certain financial institutions including banks in the US have taken the position not to respond to confirmation requests that are mailed or faxed, but accept audit confirmation requests sent only through Capital Confirmation, Inc. (CCI or Confirmation.com), a third party service provider which provides secure electronic confirmation services for auditors and their shared clients. The auditor in such cases would need to consider controls over the information sent by the entity to the service provider, the controls applied on processing of the data and controls over preparation and sending of the confirmation response to the auditor.

Let us now examine the practical application of SA 505 with a case study.

Case Study

ABC Limited is in the business of manufacturing and selling of chemical products. Sales are made to various dealers across the country. The usual credit period is 90 days. The sales for the year ended 31st March 20X0 aggregated Rs. 200 crore and debtors as at 31st March 20X0 amounted to Rs. 75 crore. The debtors listing comprised 350 customers. The management does not follow the practice of obtaining balance confirmations from its debtors.

The auditors of ABC are M/s. PQR & Co (PQR).Roger Smith, Assistant Manager with PQR, was the audit in-charge posted at ABC for the yearend audit. Roger selected 30 high value debtors having debit balances aggregating to Rs. 25 crore for circularisation. In respect of one customer – Genuine Chemicals Limited (GCL), from whom the outstanding was Rs. 10 crore (a material amount outstanding beyond the due date), the management refused to allow Roger to send the confirmation request as the management represented that currently there were ongoing negotiations with GCL, the resolution of which would get impacted by an untimely confirmation request. The mailing addresses for 27 parties were obtained by Roger from ABC’s sales account manager. Since the audit was currently under progress and Roger was posted at ABC’s office premises, Roger decided to courier the physical letters through the courier agency whose services were usually availed by ABC. The proof of dispatch (POD) had to be retained by the dispatch section of ABC as supporting evidence for payment of courier charges billed by the agency. The sales manager informed Roger that in respect of the remaining 2 parties, the business operations had moved to a new location and the new mailing address was not available. Hence for these parties, he requested that e-mails be sent by Roger for balance confirmation which were sent accordingly. For both the physical and the e-mail confirmation requests, the confirmation format used was as prescribed in PQR’s audit documentation standard. Further, return self-addressed envelopes were also enclosed with the physical confirmations couriered. Roger maintained a photocopy of all the confirmation requests circularised.

The debtors ledger for the year ended 31st March 20X0 was finalised by 10th April 20X0 and confirmations were sent by Roger on 15th April 20X0. The accounts were to be cleared by 5th May 20X0 as the board meeting to approve the accounts was scheduled for 10th May 20X0.

Responses were received from only 6 debtors (out of 29 circularised) as per details below.

On enquiry with the sales account manager, Roger was explained that even in the past when balances were circularised, the response received was abysmal. The customer pattern of ABC comprised a large pool of customers with small value balances. As such, the circularisation was not done with adequate rigour. Further, given the short time period between the date of circularisation and the date of accounts finalisation, the sales account manager informed that it was quite likely that some responses could be received post audit closure. For customers from whom no response was received, Roger verified subsequent payments, to the extent these were received until the date of audit. For customers from whom responses were received, Roger compared the confirmations received with the photocopies that he had retained in his file. He believed that the confirmations were in order. In respect of amount due to Genuine Chemicals Limited, Roger felt that given the sensitivity surrounding the pending negotiations, it would be appropriate not to send a confirmation request. Roger concluded on the work paper file that adequate work was done to comply with the requirements of SA505. Was Roger right in his conclusion?
 

Case Study analysis with the requirements of SA 505.

Design and dispatch of confirmation requests
•    There was no management’s authorisation or encouragement to the customers selected for confirmation to respond to PQR’s request. Response rate to confirmation requests sent by auditors, particularly in case of debtors, is to a large extent driven by management’s intent and the degree of follow-up.

•    Only high value positive balances were selected for circularisation. Roger should have built in an element of unpredictability by selecting even credit balances, if any, in the sample. Further, some debtors with low value amounts could also have been selected.

•    For circularising balance confirmation in respect of Genuine Chemicals Limited, the management’s refusal to send a confirmation request should have been a trigger to evaluate its implication on the assessment of risk of material misstatement, including risk of fraud and whether such a refusal results in a scope limitation. Roger should have corroborated the explanations provided by the management by examining correspondence, if any, that ABC had with the customer evidencing the impending negotiations. He should have by enquiry or by performing procedures such as verifying lawyers’ confirmations/invoices deduced whether any legal case was filed against Genuine Chemicals. Further, given that the amount was material and outstanding beyond the due date, the auditor should have determined the implication of the non-recovery on the financial statements as well as on the audit opinion. This would also need to be communicated to those charged with governance at ABC.

•    SA 505 requires the auditor to determine that the requests are properly addressed including testing the validity of some or all of the addresses on confirmation requests before these are sent out. Roger merely took the addresses as furnished by the sales account manager and did not perform procedures to verify the authenticity of the addresses provided.

•    It is pertinent to note that for administrative convenience, the courier agency usually employed by ABC was used by the auditor. SA 505 stipulates that the auditor needs to maintain control over confirmation requests sent. Use of client courier may preclude maintenance of independence and control over requests sent. Where the requests are sent under the control of the auditor, he is better positioned to track the status of deliveries. As the client courier was used, proof of dispatches and deliveries was not maintained as evidence of circularisation. Reputed courier enterprises provide an online-tracking status of confirmations couriered together with delivery status. Roger should have also enquired into the status of delivery of confirmations couriered and whether there were any undelivered returns.

•    The general practice is to circularise confirmations for year-end or quarter-end balances, but given the short period of time available post year-end for audit closure, Roger could have considered circularising confirmations for balances as at 28th February 20X0 in the month of March 20X0 and then performing roll-forward procedures performed from 28th February 20X0 until 31st March 20X0.

•    SA 505 mandates the auditor to send out additional confirmation request where a reply to the previous request has not been received. There were no second/third reminders sent by Roger in the instant case.

Results of External Confirmation procedures

Roger compared the original responses received with the photocopies of the confirmations that he had retained in the file to ensure that there were no alterations made to the confirmations sent originally. This was a good verification procedure followed for testing the authenticity of responses.

Now, let us evaluate whether the response received for each of the six confirmation requests were in order.

1    Universal Chemicals

The confirmation had an exception being the difference of Rs. 3 lakh in the amount confirmed. Roger did not merely rely on the explanation provided by the sales account manager that the difference was on account of delay in accounting by Universal Chemicals. He rightly performed additional procedures to corroborate the same. He obtained confirmation over a telephonic call and further backed it up with a reconciliation explaining the difference from the customer. He also tested year-end sales to Universal Chemicals for further corroborative support.

2    Cosmos Traders

The very fact that the revised confirmation did not have any difference as against a difference of Rs. 32 lakh (in the original confirmation) should have lead Roger to use more professional scepticism and consider performing additional work like testing the transactions with Cosmos and understanding the reasons for the difference and how the same was reconciled.

3    Jupiter Chemicals

The confirmation provided was signed by the purchase executive of Jupiter. Roger should have evaluated whether reliance should be placed on the person authorising the confirmation, the purchase executive in this case. Usually depending on the size and set -up of an enterprise, one would expect accounts staff with appropriate authority to authorise the confirmation. Further, the confirmation was delivered at ABC’s address as against PQR’s office. The auditor should have insisted that the confirming party send the confirmation directly to him duly authorised by a person responsible to do so.


4    Neptune Chemicals

The confirmation was provided by Neptune Dye-Stuff, a Neptune Chemicals affiliate, i.e., not by the original intended confirming party. Such a confir-mation should have raised doubts over reliability of the response received. Further, this would also have implications on the auditor’s assessment of risk of material misstatement (including fraud risk) requiring Roger to modify the nature, timing and extent of other planned audit procedures.

5    Star Traders

This response was received electronically through an Internet email account and has a risk of reliability because proof of origin and authority of the respondent may be difficult to establish, and alterations may be difficult to detect. In this case, the confirmation was sent from an Internet e-mail account and not from the own domain of the confirming party. In such instances, it would be difficult to validate/corroborate the identity of the sender. In case of e-mail confirmations, the auditor needs to consider whether the mail was encrypted, signed electronically using digital signatures, and apply procedures to verify website authenticity. The auditor may also telephone the confirming party to determine whether the confirming party did, in fact, send the response.

6    Mars Chemitech Private Limited

Given the fact that MCPL has been making losses, Roger should have applied greater professional scepticism in evaluating MCPL’s ability to pay the debtor balance due rather than mere reliance on the confirmation provided by it directly.

Roger should have performed adequate alternate audit procedures to mitigate the risk of low response. Fewer responses to confirmation requests than anticipated may indicate a previously unidentified fraud risk factor that requires evaluation in accordance with SA 240.

Concluding remarks

One of the prominent reasons for genesis of frauds which corporate India has witnessed is the ineffectiveness in implementation of external confirmation procedures.

Obtaining external confirmations is a basic audit procedure which has been in audit theory for years but has not been practiced with the rigor that it deserves. To a large extent, the success of these procedures is driven by management’s rigour and follow -up with the confirming party to respond to the auditor which brings back the question of management’s intention to reflect a true and fair position of the enterprise’s affairs. SA 505 sets out the procedures that need to be performed for external confirmations to be an effective audit procedure which auditors should bear in mind while discharging their duties.

2012 (28) STR 426 (Mad.) Commissioner of C. Ex., Coimbatore vs. GTN Engineering (I) Ltd./2012 (281) ELT 185 (Mad)

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Refund of CENVAT Credit under Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 read with Notification No.5/2006-CE (NT) dated 14/03/2006, should be filed within 1 year from the date when the goods were cleared for export.

Facts:

The respondents filed refund claims for unutilised CENVAT credit of duty paid on inputs and capital goods used in the manufacture of export goods vide Notification No.5/2006-CE (NT) dated 14/03/2006 read with Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004. The claims were rejected as timebarred.

The revenue contended that though section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 was applicable only in respect of duty and interest and not in respect of CENVAT credit, section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 was made applicable to refund of CENVAT credit through clause 6 of the Notification No.5/2006-CE (NT) dated 14/03/2006 read with Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 providing for refund of CENVAT credit. However, CESTAT passed the order in favour of the respondents and held that as per Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, no notification was issued with respect to “relevant date” as defined u/s. 11B(5)(B) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and therefore, no period of limitation was prescribed.

Held:

It was undisputed fact that section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 was applicable only in case of duty and not with respect to CENVAT credit. However, on analysing the relevant provisions, specifically, Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, it was observed that though there is no specific “relevant date” prescribed in the notification, the relevant date should be the date on which final products were cleared for exports. The Hon’ble High Court distinguished the decision of Hon’ble Gujarat High Court’s in case of Commissioner of Central Excise and Customs vs. Swagat Synthetics 2008 (232) ELT 413 (Guj.) and departed from Madhya Pradesh High Court’s decision in case of STI India Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise, Indore 2009 (236) ELT 248 (MP) and held that the refund claims filed by respondents were time-barred. Note: In 2012 (281) ELT 227 (Mad.) Dorcas Market Makers P. Ltd. vs. CCE, Single Member Bench decided that rebate cannot be rejected on the ground of limitation. However, the said decision was considered inapplicable by the Bombay High Court in Everest Flavours Ltd. vs. UOI 2012 (282) ELT 481 (Bom.) which also ruled that limitation prescribed in section 11B applied to rebate claim as well.

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Negative List and its Implications in tht Context of Cenvat Credit Rules

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“The law must be stable, but it must not stand still.” Roscoe Pound – US Jurist
Introduction
Contrary to the expectation of the trade and industry that it might get delayed, the regime of ‘Negative List-based levy of Service Tax’ has kicked in from 1st July, 2012. The new regime replaces the 18-year old regime of ‘Positive List-based levy of Service Tax’. As is well known, the Government had, while introducing the levy in 1994, opted for ‘Selective Approach’, confining the levy initially only to three services. The Government, thereafter, continued with this approach for the next 18 years, expanding the coverage of levy by bringing in new services under the tax net, year after year. However, the Government has finally jettisoned this ‘Selective Approach’ and embraced the ‘Comprehensive Approach’ for the taxation of services. This marks a paradigm shift in the manner in which service tax is levied. In the new system of levy, all services, other than those covered by the Negative List (Section 66D) or exempted under a Notification, will be (or are intended to be) subjected to tax. A set of new and substantial provisions in the form of section 65B and sections 66B to 66E governing the new system has been inserted in the Finance Act, 1994 (‘the Act’) by the Finance Act, 2012 and the same has come into force on 01.07.2012. Simultaneously and effective from this date, the provisions of section 65, 65A, 66 and 66A have ceased to apply.

Section 66D – Negative List of Services:

Section 66B is the new charging provision governing the levy under the new system of taxation of services. The Section reads as under:

“66B. There shall be levied a tax (hereinafter referred to as the service tax) at the rate of twelve per cent on the value of all services, other than those services specified in the negative list, provided or agreed to be provided in the taxable territory by one person to another and collected in such manner as may be prescribed”.

(Emphasis Provided) It will, therefore, be observed that the services specified in the ‘Negative List’ are excluded from the scope of levy through the charging provision of section 66B itself. The term ‘Negative List’ is defined vide clause (34) of section 65B of the Act as under:

“65B(34) “negative list” means the services which are listed in section 66D”.

Thus, the list of services specified u/s. 66D constitutes the ‘Negative List’ and remains outside the purview of levy of service tax. Section 66D contains 17 entries covering a gamut of services which have been kept outside the tax net. Further, most of the entries have in-built sub-entries which significantly expand the number of services that remain outside the scope of levy. The services specified by 17 Clauses of the Section are briefly outlined below:

• Services by Government or local authority excluding specified services [Clause (a)];

• Services by the Reserve Bank of India [Clause (b)];

• Services by a foreign diplomatic mission located in India [Clause (c)];

• Specified services relating to agriculture or agriculture produce [Clause (d)];

• Trading of goods [Clause (e)];

• Any process amounting to manufacture or production of goods [Clause (f)];

• Selling of space or time slots for advertisements other than advertisements broadcast by radio or television [Clause (g)];

• Access to a road or a bridge on payment of toll charges [Clause (h)];

• Betting, gambling or lottery [Clause (i)];

• Admission to entertainment events or access to amusement facilities [Clause (j)];

• Transmission or distribution of electricity by an electricity transmission or distribution utility [Clause (k)];

• Specified Education related services [Clause (l)];

• Renting for residential purpose [Clause (m)];

• Extending loans, advances or deposits on interest or discount [Clause (n)];

• Sale/ Purchase of foreign currency amongst banks or authorised dealers [Clause (n)];

• Specified services of transportation of passengers [Clause (o)];

• Services of transportation of goods by road other than those excluded [Clause (p)];

• Services of funeral, burial, etc. [Clause (q)].

Conceptual Difference Between ‘Non-Taxable Services’ Covered By ‘Negative List’ & ‘Exempted Services’:

It is essential to understand the conceptual difference between ‘non-taxability’ of services covered by the ‘Negative List’ and ‘non-taxability’ arising in respect of ‘exempted services’. At first glance, whether the service is covered by the ‘Negative List‘ or by an exemption notification, both appear to be sitting at par in as much as service tax is not payable in either case. However, dig deeper, and the distinction becomes clear. The services specified in the ‘Negative List’ (section 66D) are excluded from the scope of levy through charging section 66B itself. Hence, such services are ‘non-taxable’ per se. This ‘nontaxability’ is akin to ‘non-excisability’ that arises in the context of Central Excise when, in a given case, the twin-tests of ‘manufacture’ and ‘marketability’ are not satisfied. On the other hand, a service which is exempted by an exemption notification does not become ‘non-taxable’, that is, it does not go outside the purview of levy of tax. It remains ‘taxable’ (just like an ‘excisable but exempted product’) but is freed from the burden of service tax for the time being in view of the exemption notification. It may be remembered that ‘exemption follows the levy but it does not determine nor precede the levy’. Whereas an exemption notification can be withdrawn or amended by the Central Government under its delegated powers at any time so as to subject the exempted service to the payment of service tax, the amendment to ‘Negative List’ would require legislative sanction which generally happens only through the Finance Act.

Here, it would be advantageous to refer to a few judicial pronouncements in the context of Central Excise and the principles of law laid down therein which apply equally in the context of Service Tax.

Hico Products vs. CCE – 1994 (71) ELT 339 (SC) – It was held that exemption by a notification does not take away the levy or has the effect of erasing the levy of duty. The object of exemption notification is to forgo the duty and confer certain benefits upon the manufacturer or buyer or consumer through manufacturer, as the case may be.

• Peekay Re-Rolling Mills vs. Assistant Commissioner – 2007 (219) ELT 3 (SC) – In this case, the court observed:

“In our opinion, exemption can only operate when there has been a valid levy, for if there is no levy at all, there would be nothing to exempt. exemption does not negate a levy of tax altogether.”

“Despite an exemption, the liability to tax remains unaffected, only the subsequent requirement of payment of tax to fulfill the liability is done away with.”
(para 35 & 39 of the judgment) The Hon’ble Apex Court quoted with approval the following observations of the Hon’ble Court in ACC Ltd. vs. State of Bihar – (2004) 7 SCC 642 rendered in the context of an exemption notification issued by the State Government reducing the liability of tax under the Bihar Finance Act to the extent of tax paid under an earlier Ordinance in respect of entry of goods:

“Crucial question, therefore, is whether the appellant had any “liability” under the Act…. The question of exemption arises only when there is a liability. Exigibility to tax is not the same as liability to pay tax.

The former depends on charge created by the Statute and latter on computation in accordance with the provisions of the Statute and rules framed thereunder if any. It is to be noted that liability to pay tax chargeable under Section 3 of the Act is different from quantification of tax payable on assessment. Liability to pay tax and actual payment of tax are conceptually different. But for the exemption the dealer would be required to pay tax in terms of Section 3. In other words, exemption presupposes a liability. Unless there is liability question of exemption does not arise. Liability arises in term of Section 3 and tax becomes payable at the rate as provided in Section 12. Section 11 deals with the point of levy and rate and concessional rate.”

    Kiran Spinning Mills vs. CCE – 1984 (17) ELT 396 (Tribunal) – It was observed as under:

“Such a notification issued under Rule 8(1) can only grant exemption — full or partial — vis-a-vis the duty leviable under the Tariff. An exemption notification clearly is not a charging provision and it cannot be interpreted so as to create a duty liability where none existed under the Tariff entry.”

•    The judgment in Kiran Spinning Mills’ case (supra) was followed by the Larger Bench of the Hon’ble Tribunal in New Shorock Mills vs. CCE – 2006 (202) ELT 192 (Tri-LB), wherein it was held that mention of an item in an exemption Notification is not determinative of its excisability.

•    Golden Paper Udyog vs. CCE – 1983 (13) ELT 1123 (Tribunal) In this case it was held:

“Exemption Notification No. 184/76 in respect of bituminised water-proof paper or paper board cannot be construed to imply a levy under Tariff Item 17(2). Where there is no levy, an exemption from levy is meaningless nor can a levy be interred from an exemption from such levy when in fact, there was none.”

•    State of Haryana vs. Mahabir Vegetable Oils P. Ltd. – (2011) 3 SCC 778 SC.
It was held that exemption is a concession. It can be withdrawn under the very power in exercise of which exemption was granted.

‘Negative List’, ‘Exempted Services’ & 13th Finance Commission’s Report:

As stated above, the coverage of ‘Negative List of Services’ by section 66D is substantially wide. Here, one may also refer to the Mega Exemption Notification No. 25/2012-ST dated 20.06.2012 (effective from 1st July, 2012) as well as other independent service-specific exemption Notifications granting exemption from payment of service tax in respect of various taxable services.

If the services covered by the ‘Negative List’ and the existing exemption Notifications are taken into account, then it can easily be said that a fairly large number of services are presently not facing the ‘axe of tax’. It will be interesting to note that the 13th Finance Commission headed by Dr. Vijay Kelkar has, in its Report presented on 25th February, 2010 recommended that only a handful of activities/sectors be kept outside the purview of ‘Goods & Service Tax’. The relevant abstract from para 5.29 of the Report is reproduced below:

“No exemptions should be allowed other than a common list applicable to all states as well as the Centre, which should only comprise: (i) unprocessed food items; (ii) public services provided by all governments excluding railways, communications and public sector enterprises and (iii) service transactions between an employer and employee (iv) health and education services.”

It will, however, be seen that the number of activities or sectors kept outside the tax net is quite large. This does not augur well for the impending GST regime. Though the introduction of GST may not materialise any time soon (in the author’s view, at least, not before F.Y. 2016-17), keeping such a large number of services outside the tax net during the intervening period will only create hurdles and roadblocks in the path of a smooth introduction of GST.

After all, the GST (or VAT), operating through ‘tax credit or invoice method’ (i.e. the subtractive/indirect method) is expected or ought to be an all encompassing, comprehensive system of taxation of goods and services. Under this system, the sectors or activities kept outside the levy (through exemption or otherwise) should ideally be bare minimum, keeping socio-economic or practical considerations in mind. There is no gain-saying that exemption creates distortions in the tax system; breaks the input-stage tax credit chain and hinders the smooth flow of credit across the supply chain of goods or services. In hindsight, one may even say that instead of solving or mitigating the problem of cascading effect of ‘tax on tax’, exemption indirectly aggravates the problem.

This idiosyncrasy of GST is best captured in the following words of a distinguished author on the subject:

“The VAT is a paradox: (using the credit method) the VAT is a tax in which those who believe themselves exempt are taxed, and those who believe themselves taxed, are generally exempt. This is not valid at the retail level; a retailer who is believed exempt is nevertheless taxed, and indeed taxed, when subject to taxation. Whoever grasps the meaning of this, will not have any trouble under-standing VAT”.

[J. Reugebrink/M.E. van Hilten, Omzetbelasting, Deventer 1997, p.40]

‘Negative List of Services’ & its implications under the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004:

In the preceding paragraphs, we have seen that there is a significant conceptual difference between the services covered by the Negative List and the ‘exempted services’. We have also seen that the policy of keeping large number of services outside the tax net may render the task of smooth and comprehensive introduction of GST extremely difficult. Not only this, if persisted, this policy may create distortions in the system and disturb the uninterrupted flow of credit across the supply chain.

But then, one may not be required to wait till GST is introduced to understand these implications of ‘non-taxability of services’, whether through Negative List or Exemption Notifications. The implications are quite evident in the context of the existing Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 (the CCR) as explained below.

Rule 2 (e) of the CCR defines the term ‘exempted service’ as under:

“R.2(e )-  ‘exempted service’ means a –

(1)    taxable service which is exempt from the whole of the service tax leviable thereon; or
(2)    service, on which no service tax is leviable under Section 66B of the Finance Act; or
(3)    taxable service whose part of value is exempted on the condition that no credit of inputs and input services, used for providing such taxable service, shall be taken;

but shall not include a service which is exported in terms of Rule 6A of the Service Tax Rules, 1994.”

The moot question here is whether the ‘non-taxable services’ i.e. the services covered by the ‘Negative List’ prescribed vide section 66D can be considered as ‘exempted services’ within the meaning of the term as defined vide Rule 2(e) of the CCR?. The answer is an unequivocal ‘yes’. As explained above, the services specified in the ‘Negative List’ are excluded from the purview of service tax vide the charging section 66B and hence, no service tax is leviable thereon at all. As a consequence, these services would be covered by clause (2) of Rule 2(e) of the CCR and considered as ‘exempted services’ as defined in the said Rule.

It may be noticed that there is a stark difference between the definition of ‘exempted goods’ given vide Rule 2(d) of the CCR and that of ‘exempted service’ given vide Rule 2(e) ibid. The definition of ‘exempted goods’ does not include ‘non-excisable goods’ i.e. the goods which are outside the purview of levy of the excise duty. The definition of ‘exempted service’, on the other hand, is quite expansive and includes even ‘non-taxable services’ i.e. the services which are outside the scope of levy of service tax.

Therefore, a manufacturer of excisable and dutiable goods or a service provider engaged in providing a taxable service, if, also simultaneously carries on any activity which is covered by the Negative List u/s. 66D, then he would be considered as being engaged in both, dutiable/taxable activity and provision of ‘exempted service’. Consequently, the provisions of Rule 6 of the CCR would stand attracted in case of such an assessee if he uses common inputs or input services for carrying on both the types of activities i.e. dutiable/taxable activity and the non-taxable activity i.e. activity covered by the Negative List and considered as ‘exempted service’. The assessee, in such a situation, will have to comply with the rigours of Rule 6 of the CCR. The course of action available to the assessee can be briefly explained below:

(a)    The assessee can avail full Cenvat Credit on the inputs or input services exclusively used for carrying on the manufacture of dutiable product or for provision of taxable service [Rule 3 (1)];

(b)    In respect of inputs or input services exclusively used for providing the ‘exempted service’ i.e. the activity covered by the Negative List, the Assessee will have to forgo the entire Cenvat Credit attribut-able to such input or input services [Rule 6 (1)];

(c)    So far as the common inputs or input services used for carrying on the dutiable/taxable activity and the exempted activity are concerned, the assessee can:

(i)    Maintain separate records and avail the Cenvat credit only on inputs or input services attributable to dutiable/taxable activity [Rule 6 (2) ]; or

(ii)    pay an amount equal to 6% of the value of the exempted goods or exempted services [Rule 6 (3)(i)]; or

(iii)    pay an amount i.e. equal to proportionate credit as determined under sub-rule (3A) of Rule 6 [Rule 6 (3)(ii)]; or

(iv)    maintain separate accounts for inputs and avail Cenvat credit on inputs attributable to dutiable/taxable activity and pay an amount i.e. proportionate credit as determined under sub-rule (3A) in respect of input services [Rule 6 (3)(iii) refers].

Thus, even though there is a conceptual and legal difference between the ‘non-taxable service’ (i.e. service covered by the Negative List and outside the purview of the tax) and ‘exempted service’, for the purposes of Cenvat Credit, the two have been treated at par by the legislature. Needless to say, this is a highly dangerous provision and the implications for the Assessees can be quite severe if they are engaged in both types of activities i.e. dutiable/taxable activity and activity covered by the Negative List and are availing the benefit of Cenvat Credit on input/input services. Such assessees may be caught unaware and are well advised to be on their guard. If Rule 6 is found attracted in a given case, then the assessee will have to carefully select from the options available to him under sub-rule (2) or (3) of Rule 6. It shall be noted that it is not uncommon for the department to raise huge demand in terms of Rule 6 (3)(i) i.e. demand of an amount equal to specified percentage of the value of exempted goods or exempted service even if a negligible credit is availed on the common input or input services used for both the types of activities.

Placing the ‘non-taxable services’ on the equal footing as ‘exempted services’ is rather unfortunate. The only justification can be that the Board might be apprehensive of the assessee availing the Cenvat Credit on all inputs or input services, regardless of whether the same are exclusively used or are common for the dutiable/taxable activity and exempted activity. However, whatever may be the reason or logic behind this provision, the fact remains that it will only lead to ‘compliance nightmare’ and more seriously, the cascading effect of tax inasmuch as non-admissibility of Cenvat Credit on input or input services may result in the increased cost of the final activity. Whether the assessee opts to maintain separate records in terms of Rule 6 (2) or to pay an amount equal to proportionate credit in terms of Rule 6 (3)(ii) or 6(3) (iii), the task of maintaining the separate records and/or determining the quantum of proportionate credit is not an easy one. On the other hand, with the bar on availing of input-stage credit due to the final activity covered by the Negative List not attracting the service tax, the cascading effect of tax will only be aggravated.

Conclusion:

The shift to ‘comprehensive approach’ or ‘Negative List-based levy of Service Tax’ was inevitable considering the fact that the GST regime is knocking at the door of the Indian economy. Besides this, the ‘selective approach’, though, served its purpose well in the initial years, with the passage of time, it was turning out to be a burden, both, for the departmental authorities and the tax payers. The advantage of ‘definitiveness’ or ‘certainty of taxation’ associated with ‘selective approach’ disappeared once more and more services were brought under the tax net. With the overlapping of services, the spectre of classification disputes had started raising its ugly head and the interpretation- related issues were arising more as a rule, than as an exception. Under these circumstances, the shift to ‘comprehensive approach’ is only to be welcomed. No doubt, the coverage of the activities vide the Negative List as also the Mega Exemption Notification No. 25/2012-ST is sufficiently large which may create complications at the time of introduction of GST. Moreover, the implications of the ‘Negative List’ in the context of Cenvat Credit Rules are also quite serious as discussed above. One can only hope that the steps would be taken to ensure, on one hand, the comprehensive coverage of services under the tax net, barring a bare minimum exceptions and on the other hand uninterrupted and unrestricted availment of input-stage Cenvat Credit to the assessees.

“Death and taxes and childbirth – There’s never any convenient time for any of them!” (Margaret Mitchell)

Taxability of Payments for Online Advertisement Charges

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Introduction
E-Commerce has changed the dynamics of doing business. Online advertising is gaining ground against the traditional print media advertising. Fixation of tax liability was easier in case of print media as compared to the online advertising, with virtual presence of the advertising companies on the internet. It is not easy to determine the place of accrual of income in the e-commerce scenario. Trade on the internet, many a time, is fully automated i.e. software driven, for e.g. advertisements are posted, monitored, displayed without human intervention. Even sale of goods, its delivery (e.g. downloading of software, book or a song) and receipt of payment are fully automated. Determination of income becomes complex with location of server, website, advertiser, search engine, internet service provider, buyer, seller and/or advertising company being located in different tax jurisdictions.

Basic Understanding of Online Transactions
Taxability of income would depend upon the place of accrual or source of income. In order to understand the concept of accrual or source of income, let us dissect various parts of a business transaction. Any transaction of services or sale can be dissected as follows:

 i) Marketing
 ii) Order Placement
 iii) Execution of Service/Manufacturing
iv) Delivery
v) Payment

Whether location of all the above aspects of business has any bearing on the source or accrual of income?

Let us understand this with the help of an illustration :

ABC Ltd. of India avails services of XYZ Inc. of USA for a Study Report in Transfer Pricing

Analysing this transaction, one would find that the mode of completion of various legs of this transaction is electronic but that per se cannot make this transaction as E-commerce. It appears that there is a human intervention in rendering/execution/delivery of services by XYZ Inc. However, with a slight variation in the above model i.e. instead of XYZ Inc., if services are rendered by the internet portal of XYZ Inc. on an automated basis, then the entire transaction would become an e-commerce transac-tion and then, the determination of source or place of accrual of income would become complex.

Again, the taxability of income in India, in the hands of the service provider (SP), would depend upon the characterisation of such income i.e. whether it is in the nature of business income or royalty or fees for technical services (FTS).

Indian Revenue Authorities hold the view that as long as the service recipient is in India the source of income for the service provider is in India regardless of the place or mode of rendering service or location of the service provider. This view was incorporated by way of amendment to section 9(1) of the Income tax Act, 1961 (the “Act”) to provide that for determining the place of accrual or arising of the income by way of royalty or FTS, the existence or otherwise of the place of business, residence or business connection of a non-resident is of no consequence whatever. Further, it provided that for the purpose of taxability of royalty and FTS, it is not necessary for the non-resident to render services in India.

However, Business Income stands on a different footing. Even though the source of income is in India, Section 9(1) of the Act, plus and the provisions of tax treaties provide that income of a service provider is taxed in the “Source State” only if the source link is powerful enough to establish “Business Connection” (BC): under the Act or “Per-manent Establishment” (PE) under a Tax Treaty.

The above discussion is based on the premise that income in the hands of service provider is neither received nor deemed to have been received in India and therefore, section 5(2)(a) of the Act has no applicability.

Even section 5(2)(b) fastens the tax liability in the hands of the SP if the income accrues or arises in India or deemed to accrue or arise in India under section 9 of the Act (as discussed above).

The term “income accruing or arising in India” as provided u/s 5(2)(b) of the Act is not defined in the Act. However, the Supreme Court, in the case of Hyundai Heavy Industries Ltd. (2007-TII-02-SC-INTL) inter alia observed as follows:

“……as far as the income accruing or arising in India, an income which accrues or arises to a foreign enterprise in India can be only such portion of income accruing or arising to such a foreign enterprise as is attributable to its business carried out in India. This business could be carried out through its branch(es) or through some other form of its presence in India such as office, project site, factory, sales outlet etc. (hereinafter called as “PE of foreign enterprise”) ……..”

Interestingly, the term PE is restrictively defined in the Act and that is in the context of transfer pric-ing and section 44DA of the Act (special provisions for taxation of royalty and FTS which are effectively connected with PE), otherwise it has its origin in the tax treaties. Definition of a PE u/s 92F (iiia) of the Act is an inclusive one, according to which, PE includes a fixed place of business through which the business of the enterprise is wholly or partly carried on. Basically, it refers to “fixed place PE” and not to other variants of PE such as “Project PE”, “Dependent Agent PE”, “Service PE” etc. as defined in a treaty . However, the Supreme Court’s observation as mentioned above [which is regarded as “judge made law” and followed in the case of ITO vs. Right Florists Pvt. Ltd. 2013-TII-61-ITAT-KOL-INTL] explains PE on the lines of a treaty definition.

One thing is clear from the provisions of section 9 and interpretation of section 5(2)(b) of the Act by the Apex Court – that in either case of a PE or BC, only so much of income would be taxed in India as is attributable to such a PE or BC in India.

Thus, taxability in India of online services can be summarised as follow:

Therefore, characterisation of income in the hands of a service provider assumes great significance.

Characterisation of income in the hands of a service provider – Royalty/FTS vs. Business Income

There are various kinds of online transactions. However, for the sake of simplicity and understanding the principles involved, let us restrict our discussion to the most frequent transaction of “online advertisement” through popular search engines, say, “Yahoo” and “Google”. However, the concepts discussed herein would be applicable to other forms of online business transactions as well.

Payment for online advertisement – Is it Royalty in the hands of the Service Provider?

Royalty and FTS are Business Income essentially. The distinction is carved out only for the purposes of taxation in the hands of the non-residents. If the income is characterised as royalty or FTS, it is taxed on gross basis unless such income is effectively connected with a PE situated in India.

Where such income is not characterised as Royalty/ FTS, it is treated as business income and is taxed in the source state (say, India) only if the foreign enterprise has a PE/BC in India. Such taxability of the business income in the source state is always on net basis i.e. net profits computed as per domestic tax laws of the source state.

Section 9(1)(vi) of the Act deals with royalty income whereas section 9(1)(vii) thereof deals with FTS. In fact, every payment must be examined from the point of view of royalty/FTS under an applicable tax treaty and also under the provisions of the domestic tax laws of the source state (India) such that the taxpayer can opt for the most beneficial provisions out of these.

Let us first examine whether payment for online advertisement can be termed as royalty income in the hands of the service provider?

The definition of royalty under section 9(1)(vi) of the Act is quite exhaustive and inter alia includes payment for computer software and the use or right to use any industrial, commercial or scientific equipment. Thus, the question arises for consideration is whether payment for online advertisement/ services can be construed as payment for the use or right to use industrial, commercial or scientific equipment or for computer software?

The payment for online advertisement/services is certainly not for buying or using computer software. Though computer software is used for delivering the services of hosting advertisement or for online selling of services/product, the payment is for ser-vices and not for the underlying computer software. Similarly, one must ask a question as to whether one is paying for the “use” of equipment or for the “services” which are provided by the “service provider” by using equipment in its possession. For example, payment for online advertisement may involve renting an earmarked space by the service provider on the website and server owned by it (i.e. equipment at its disposal and control), but one is paying for the display and advertisement and not for rent of server. The same may well be the case in respect of print media, e.g. when one advertises in a newspaper, one pays for the services of a published advertisement and not for the equipment used by the newspaper for its production.

As far as use of equipment is concerned, the issue was aptly dealt with by the Mumbai Tribunal in the recent decision of Pinstorm Technologies [54 SOT 78] / TS-536-ITAT-2012(Mum). In this case, an Indian company, which is engaged in the business of digital advertising and internet marketing, utilised the internet search engines such as Google, Yahoo etc. to buy banner advertising space on the inter-net on behalf of its clients. The Assessing Officer held that the payment was in the nature of FTS whereas the CIT(A) held that it was in the nature of royalty as Google or Yahoo etc. would allot the space to the appellant company and its clients in their server and that whenever any internet user search for certain web sites, the appellant’s or its client’s name would appear and its contents be displayed on the computer screen.

However, the ITAT observed that the search engine renders this service outside India through internet. Google does such online advertising business in Asia from its office in Ireland. The search engine service is on a worldwide basis and thus is not relatable to any specific country. The entire transaction takes place through the internet and even the invoice is raised and payment is made through internet. The ITAT relying on the decision in case of Yahoo India [140 TTJ 195] / TS-290-ITAT-2011(Mum), held that the amount paid by the assessee to Google Ireland Ltd. for the services rendered for uploading and display of banner advertisement on its portal was in the nature of business profit on which no tax was deductible at source, as the same was not chargeable to tax in India in the absence of any PE of Google Ireland Ltd. in India.

In the case of Yahoo India (supra) the assessee made payment to Yahoo Holdings (Hong Kong) Ltd. [Yahoo Hong Kong] for services rendered for uploading and display of the banner advertisement of the Department of Tourism of India on its portal. The banner advertisement hosting services did not involve use or right to use by the assessee (i.e. Yahoo India) of any industrial, commercial or scientific equipment and no such use was actually granted by Yahoo Hong Kong to the Yahoo India. Uploading and display of banner advertisement on its portal was entirely the responsibility of Yahoo Hong Kong and the Yahoo India was only required to provide the banner advertisement to Yahoo Hong Kong for uploading the same on its portal. Yahoo India thus had no right to access the portal of Yahoo Hong Kong Having regard to all these facts of the case and keeping in view the decision of the Authority of Advance Rulings in the case of ISRO Satellite Centre 307 ITR 59 and Dell International Services (India) P. Ltd. 305 ITR 37, it was held that the payment made by the assessee to Yahoo Hong Kong Ltd. for the services rendered for uploading and display of the banner advertisement of the Department of Tourism of India on its portal was not in the nature of royalty was business profit and in the absence of any PE of Yahoo Hong Kong in India, it was not chargeable to tax in India.

In the case of Dell International Services (India) P. Ltd., it was held by the AAR that the word “use” in relation to equipment occurring in clause (iva) of Explanation to section 9(1)(vi) of the Act is not to be understood in the broad sense of availing of the benefit of an equipment. The context and collocation of the two expressions “use” and “right to use” followed by the word “equipment” indicated that there must be some positive act of utilisation, application or employment of equipment for the desired purpose.

If an advantage was taken from sophisticated equipment installed and provided by another, it could not be said that the recipient/customer “used” the equipment as such. The customer merely made use of the facility, though he did not himself use the equipment. What was contemplated by the word “use” in clause (iva) of Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vi) of the Act was that the customer came face to face with the equipment, operated it or controlled its functions in some manner. But if it did nothing to or with the equipment and did not exercise any possessory rights in relation thereto, it only made use of the facility created by the service provider who was the owner of the entire network and related equipment. There was no scope to invoke clause (iva) in such a case because the element of service predominated. The predominant features and underlying object of the agreement unerringly emphasised the concept of service. That even where an earmarked circuit was provided for offering the facility, unless there was material to establish that the circuit/equipment could be accessed and put to use by the customer by means of positive acts, it did not fall within the category of “royalty” in clause (iva) of Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vi) of the Act.

Characterisation under a Treaty Scenario

The definition of royalty is narrower in scope in a tax treaty than under the Act (e.g. Computer Software is not explicitly covered under a tax treaty), therefore the above discussion would hold good even under a treaty scenario and the payment in question would not be regarded as royalty in the hands of the Service Provider.

Payment for online advertisement – Is it FTS in the hands of the Service Provider?

Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vii) of the Act defines FTS to mean “any consideration (including any lump sum consideration) for the rendering of any managerial, technical or consultancy services (including the provision of services of technical or other personnel) but does not include consideration for any construction, assembly, mining or like project undertaken by the recipient or consideration which would be income of the recipient chargeable under the head “Salaries”.

There is no doubt that providing a sponsored search facility, as also placing a banner advertisement on another person’s website would amount rendering of services to the advertiser. There is also no doubt that these services are technical in nature. However, the question here is whether these online advertising services could be covered by the connotation of ‘technical services’ as defined in Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vii) of the Act?

The Kolkata Tribunal in the case of Right Florists (supra) observed that “it is significant that the expression ‘technical’ appears along with expression ‘managerial’ and ‘consultancy’ and all the three words refer to various types of services, consid-eration for which is included in the scope of FTS. The lowest common factor in ‘managerial, technical and consultancy services’ seems to be the “human intervention”. A managerial or consultancy service can only be rendered with human interface, while technical service can be rendered with or without human interface. The Tribunal further observed that as long as there is no human intervention in a technical service, it cannot be treated as a technical service under section 9(1)(vii) of the Act. The Tribunal, in reaching this conclusion relied on the decision of the Delhi High Court, in the case of “CIT vs. Bharati Cellular Limited (319 ITR 139) [2008-TIOL-557-HC-DEL-IT) wherein it was held that “the word technical is preceded by the word managerial and succeeded by the word consultancy. Since the expression technical services is in doubt and is unclear, the rule of noscitur a sociis is clearly applicable”. [The Rule noscitur a sociis states that when two or more words which are susceptible of analogous meaning are coupled together they are to be understood in their cognate sense. They take their colour from each other, the meaning of the more general being restricted to a sense analogous to that of the less general].

Applying the above principle, the Kolkata Tribunal held that there is no human touch involved in the whole process of actual advertising service provided by Google and therefore receipts for online advertisements by the Google cannot be treated as FTS under the Act.

Characterisation under a Treaty Scenario

Google is a tax resident of Ireland. Definition of the FTS under Article 12(2)(b) of the India-Ireland tax treaty is materially similar to the definition under the Income tax Act and therefore the legal position discussed hereinabove would be equally applicable in the case of India Ireland tax treaty. In some treaties, the scope of FTS is further reduced by provision of the concept called ‘make available’ (e.g. India’s tax treaties with USA, UK, Singapore etc.). Payment to Yahoo USA would be governed by the India-US tax treaty which provides for “make available” concept in the Article on Fees for Included Services. The term “make available” was examined by, inter alia, by the Mumbai Tribunal in the case of Raymond Ltd. vs. DCIT (86 ITD 793) [2003-TII-05-ITAT-MUM-INTL] wherein it observed that “Thus, the normal, plain and grammatical meaning of the language employed, in our understanding, is that a mere rendering of services is not roped in unless the person utilising the services is able to make use of technical knowledge, etc. by himself in his business and or for his own benefit and without recourse to the performer of services.” The Tribunal also held that rendering of technical services cannot be equated with “making available” the technical services.

Thus, it can be concluded that receipt for online advertisement is neither royalty nor FTS in the hands of the service provider. Therefore, it would be considered as business income.

Business Income vis-a-vis BC and PE

As stated earlier, business income of the owners of the search engines like Yahoo or Google is taxable in India provided it has a BC or a PE in India. The concept of BC was very well explained in the CBDT Circular 23 dated 23rd July 1969. It clarified that the expression ‘Business Connection’ admits of no precise definition. ‘The question whether a non-resident has a business connection in India from or through which income, profits or gains can be said to accrue or arise to him within the meaning of Section 9 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 has to be determined on the facts of each case.’ Then the circular went on to illustrate what would constitute BC and what would not. However, the said circular was withdrawn in 2009.

The Supreme Court had an occasion to define BC in the case of CIT vs. R. D. Agarwal and Co. (1965) 56 ITR 20; wherein it held that “Business Connection” means something more than business. It presupposes an element of continuity between the business of the Non-Resident and his activity in the taxable territory, rather than a stray or an isolated transaction”.

The concept of PE was formulated in the twentieth Century prior to the advent of computers. Therefore, the rules for determination of source links through PE do not hold good in today’s virtual world of e-commerce. The need for physical presence in case of e-commerce transactions in the source State (the chief determining criterion for existence of a PE) is totally obviated. Search engines like Google or Yahoo operate through their respective websites which in turn are hosted on a server. So the question arises as to what constitutes a PE, a Website or a Server?

“Website” – Is it a PE?

The OECD commentary on its Model Convention states that “website per se, which is a combination of software and electronic data, does not in itself constitute a tangible property. It, therefore, does not have a location that can constitute “place of business” as there is no “facility such as premises or, in certain instances, machinery or equipment” as far as software and data constituting that website is concerned”.

Therefore website per se cannot constitute a PE. Thus, the traditional tests for determination of PE fail in a virtual world of E-commerce. In order to study the tax impact of e-commerce, CBDT had appointed a High Powered Committee (HPC) in the year 1999. The HPC also observed that applying the existing principles and rules to e-commerce does not ensure certainty of tax burden and maintenance of the equilibrium in the sharing of tax revenues between countries of residence and source. “The Committee, therefore, supports the view that the concept of PE should be abandoned and a serious attempt should be made within OECD or the UN to find an alternative to the concept of PE”.

Interestingly, India has expressed its reservations on the OECD Model Commentary and has taken a stand that website may constitute a PE in certain circumstances. India expressed a view that depend-ing on the facts, an enterprise can be considered to have acquired a place of business by virtue of hosting its website on a particular server at a particular location.

However, the Kolkata Tribunal in the case of Right Florists (supra) held that the reservations of the Indian Government do not specify the circumstances in which, according to tax administration, a website could constitute a PE. Therefore, in the opinion of the Tribunal, the reservations so expressed by India as of now, cannot have any practical impact on a website being treated as a PE.

The Kolkata Tribunal in the case of Right Florists (supra) concluded that “a website per se, which is the only form of Google’s presence in India – so far as test of primary meaning i.e. basic rule PE is concerned, cannot be a permanent establishment under the domestic law. We are in considered agreement with the views of the HPC on this issue.”

“Server” Is it a PE?

The server on which the website is hosted and through which it is accessed is a piece of equipment having a physical location and such location may constitute a “fixed place of business” of the enterprise that operates that server. However, if the enterprise uses the services of an Internet Service Provider (ISP) for hosting website, then the location of such server may not constitute PE for such enterprise, if the ISP is an independent contractor and acting in its ordinary course of business. In such an event even if the enterprise is able to dictate that its website may be hosted on a particular server at a particular location, it will not be in possession or control of that server and therefore, such server will not result into PE. However, if the enterprise carrying on business through a website has the server at its own disposal, e.g., it owns (or leases) and operates the server on which the website is stored and used, the place where that server is located could constitute a PE of the enterprise if the other requirements of the PE Article are met, e.g. location of server at a certain place for a sufficient period of time so as to fulfill the fixed place criterion as envisaged in paragraph 1 of Article 5 of a tax treaty.

Even when server is found to be “fixed”, and results in a PE, it may not result in any tax taxability for the enterprise, if the activities of that enterprise are not carried on through that server or activities so carried on are restricted to the preparatory or auxiliary nature such as (i) provid-ing a communication link, (ii) advertising of goods and services, (iii) relaying information through a mirror server for security and efficiency purposes,

(iv)    gathering marketing data and/or (v) supplying information etc.

Based on the above analysis, it can be concluded that search engines, which have their presence through their respective websites cannot constitute PE in India, unless their servers are located in India.

Based on the above discussions, the Kolkata Tribunal in the case of Right Florists (supra) held that “the receipts in respect of online advertising on Google and Yahoo cannot be brought to tax in India under the provisions of the Income tax Act as also under the provisions of India-US and India-Ireland tax treaty”.

Withholding tax obligation

A question often arises as to whether the payer needs to deduct tax at source if the income arising from such payment is not taxable in the hands of the recipient. The question became more serious with the decision of the Karnataka High Court in the case of CIT vs. Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd. [2010] 320 ITR 209 wherein it was held that the resident payer is obliged to deduct tax at source in respect of any type of payment to a non resident, be it on account of buying/purchasing/acquiring a pack-aged software product and as such, a commercial transaction or even in the nature of a royalty payment. Also the decision of the Supreme Court in case of Transmission Corporation of A. P. Ltd. vs. CIT (infra) was interpreted in a manner that payer has to deduct tax at source whether the income is chargeable to tax in India or not.

However, the Kolkata Tribunal in the case of Right Florists (supra) relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in the case of GE India Technology Centre P. Ltd. held that “when recipient of an income does not have the primary tax liability in respect of an income, the payer cannot have vicarious tax withholding liability either.”

All controversies arising out of interpretation of section 195 regarding non-deduction of tax at source, where the income is not taxable in the hands of the recipient, were laid to rest with the decision of the Supreme Court in case of GE India Technology Centre P. Ltd. vs. CIT [2010] 327 ITR 456 wherein the Apex Court following Vijay Ship Breaking Corporation vs. CIT [2009] 314 ITR 309 (SC) held that “The payer is bound to deduct tax at source only if the tax is assessable in India. If tax is not so assessable, there is no question of tax at source being deducted.”

The decision of GE India Technology Centre P. Ltd. (supra) assumes special significance as it explained the decision of the Supreme Court in case of Transmission Corporation of A. P. Ltd. vs. CIT [1999] 239 ITR 587 (SC) in the proper perspective. The said decision is often invoked by the Income-tax Department to fasten TDS obligation on the payer on a gross basis even when the income is not chargeable to tax in the hands of the recipient thereof. The Apex Court stated that in case of decision of the Transmission Corporation (supra), the issue was of deciding on what amount of tax is to be deducted at source, as the payment was in respect of a composite contract. The said composite contract not only comprised supply of plant, machinery and equipment in India, but also comprised the installation and commissioning of the same in India.

With the above mentioned correct interpretation of the decision in case of Transmission Corporation (supra), the Supreme Court set aside the decision of the Karnataka High Court in case of CIT vs. Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd. (supra).

Thus, the payer is not obliged to deduct tax at source if the recipient is not chargeable to tax on such income. Secondly, no disallowance can be made u/s. 40(a)(i) on account of non-deduction of tax at source by the payer where the income per se is not taxable in India.

Summation:

Determination of tax liability in an e- commerce scenario is a difficult task as the age old methods of determination of PE/BC do not hold good in the modern ways of doing business. Though existence of a BC or PE has to be case specific, broadly we can conclude that website per se does not constitute either a PE or a BC and the location of server is a determinative criterion for PE. This conclusion is only in relation to fixed place PE, whereas PE/BC may exist in the form of Dependent Agent or otherwise.

As far the withholding tax liability of the payer is concerned, one needs to look at the entire transaction from the recipient’s perspective. As long as the income from such online payment is not taxable in the hands of the non-resident service provider, the payer is not obliged to deduct tax at source. For determining the taxability in the hands of the SP, the characterisation of income is of utmost importance as income in the nature of royalty and FTS can be taxed without any PE or BC in India whereas, business income per se, is not taxable in India unless the SP has a BC/ PE in India.

Even though the taxability and characterisation of income is explained in this article by taking an example of online advertisement through search engines like Google and Yahoo, the underlying principles could help in determination of the taxability of other online transactions such as subscription of online data bases, purchase of videos, books etc.

We do hope that on the lines of recommendations of the HPC, OECD and UN may come out with alternative methods for taxing e-commerce transactions. However, we are fortunate that in absence of clarity, we have Supreme Court decisions – judge made laws, to guide us.

Works Contract vis-à-vis Service Contract – Recent Position

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Recently, Hon. Bombay High Court has decided issue about nature of Works Contract vis-à-vis Service Contract. The issue pertained to 1989-90 wherein the transaction about plate making was held as not amounting to works contract by Tribunal. From Tribunal judgment, the matter was referred to Bombay High Court by way of Reference in case of Comm. of Sales Tax, Maharashtra vs. M/s.Ramdas Sobhraj (STR No.9 of 2003 dt. 25.10.2012).

The facts are that the appellant was engaged in plate making activity. Hon’ble High Court recorded facts as under:

“c) In the job work of plate making the customers of the respondent-assessees supplies to the respondent-assessees duly grained zinc or aluminum plates. On receipt, plates are coated by dipping in water wherein gun bio chromate is dissolved. Thereafter positives are exposed on the treated plates by halogen lamps. The image is formed by the positives on the plates and the same is developed in the solution of calcium, lactic acid ferric chloride, cupric chloride and hydrochloride. The plates are thereafter washed in industrial solvent, as a result of which all the chemicals are washed out and only the images remain on the plates. Thereafter, lacquer and ink are applied on the plates. On a specific query, we were informed that lacquer and ink are applied on the plates so as to ensure that the images on the plates do not get disturbed/smudged by constant use. After the above process, the plates are dried and again washed with water and returned to the customers.”

On above facts, the arguments of Department were as under:

(i) there is a deemed sale by way of transfer of property in ink and lacquer as contemplated u/s. 2(l) of the Works Contract Act;

(ii) this is particularly so as the lacquer and ink are used by the respondent-assessee in the process of plate making, so as to ensure that images formed on the plates are not disturbed/smudged due to constant use. The lacquer and ink in plate so used get settled on the plate so as to become a part of the plate;

(iii) the Tribunal applied an incorrect test to hold that there is no transfer of property of lacquer and ink viz. the thickness of the plates continue to remain the same both before and after the process; and

(iv) in any case the issued raised in this reference stands concluded in favour of the applicant-revenue by the decision of this court in the matter of Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Matushree Textiles Limited reported in 132 Sales Tax Cases Page 539.

The arguments on behalf of dealer were as under:

(i) there has been no deemed sale by way of transfer of property in ink & lacquer while executing the job of plate making as held by the Tribunal.

(ii) the decision of this court in the matter of Matushree Textiles Ltd (Supra) will not apply in view of the subsequent decision of the Apex Court in the matter of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. v. UOI reported in 145 STC 19 which holds that there must be a transfer of goods as goods for the work Contract Act to be applicable. Similarly, the dominant intention of the transfer viz. whether to provide services or transfer of goods will be determinative of there being transfer of goods or not as held by the Apex Court in the matter of Idea Mobile Communication Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise reported in 43 VST. Page 1. In this case, there is no transfer of goods as goods nor was there any intent to transfer the ink and lacquer to its customers; and

(iii) the order of the Tribunal is unexceptionable and the Court should affirm the view of the Tribunal.

The High Court, in relation to argument about dominant object, held that the understanding on the part of the dealer is not correct. The High Court referred to following part in the judgment in the case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. (145 STC 19)(SC).

“47. In Rainbow Colour Lab v. State of M.P. (2000) 2 SCC 385, the question involved was whether the job rendered by the photographer in taking photographs, developing and printing films would amount to a “work contract” as contemplated under article 366 (29A)(b) of the Constitution read with section 2(n) of the M.P. General Sales Tax Act for the purpose of levy of sales tax on the business turnover of the photographers.

48. The court answered the questions in the negative because, according to the court:

“Prior to the amendment of article 366, in view of the judgment of this Court in State of Madras v. Gannon Dunerley & Co. (Madras) ltd. (1958) 9 STC 353; AIR 1958 SC 560, the states could not levy sales tax on sale of goods involved in a works contract because the contract was indivisible. All that has happened in law after the 46th Amendment and the judgment of this Court in Builders’ case (1989) 2 SCC 645 is that it is now open to the States to divide the works contract into two separate contracts by a legal fiction: i) contract for sale of goods involved in the said works contract, and (ii) for supply of labour and service. This division of contract under the amended law can be made only if the works contract involved a dominant intention to transfer the property in goods and not in contracts where the transfer in property takes place as an incident of contract of service. What is pertinent to ascertain in this connection is what was the dominant intention of the contract. On facts as we have noticed that the work done by the photographer which, as held by this Court in Assistant Sales Tax officer v. B.C.Kame (1977) 1 SCC 634 is only in the nature of a service contract not involving any sale of goods, we are of the opinion that the stand taken by the respondent-State cannot be sustained.”

49. This conclusion was doubted in Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs (2001) 4 SCC 593 saying :

“The conclusion arrived at in Rainbow Colour Lab case (2000) 2 SCC 385, in our opinion, runs counter to the express provision contained in article 366(29A) as also of the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Builders’ Association of India v. Union of India (1989) 2 SCC 645.

50. We agree. After the 46th Amendment, the sale elements of those contracts which are covered by the six sub-clauses of clause (29A) of article 366 are separable and may be subjected to sales tax by the States under entry 54 of List II and there is no question of the dominant nature test applying. Therefore when in 2005, C.K. Jidheesh v. Union of India (2005) 8 Scale 784 held that the aforesaid observations in Associated Cement were merely obiter and that Rainbow Colour Lab (2000) 2 SCC 385 was still good law, it was not correct. It is necessary to note that Associated Cement (2001) 4 SCC 593 did not say that in all cases of composite transaction the 46th Amendment would apply.”

Dealer also referred to the judgment of Idea Mobile Communication (43 VST 1)(SC), to substantiate its point of service nature of transaction. The High court rejected the same on the ground that it is under Service Tax and not relevant to works contract.

In relation to other argument about transfer of property in goods as goods, the High Court relied extensively upon the judgment in case of Matushree Textiles Ltd. (132 STC 539)(Bom) and reversed the judgment of the Tribunal and held the transaction as liable to tax.

Implications

The above judgment decides one of the important aspects about works contract vis-à-vis service transaction. In Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. (145 STC 91). Hon. Supreme Court amongst others, in para 44, 45 has observed as under:

“44.. Gannon Dunkerley survived the 46th Constitutional Amendment in two respects. First with regard to the definition of “sale” for the purposes of the Constitution in general and for the purposes of entry 54 of List II in particular except to the extent that the clauses in article 366(29A) operate. By introducing separate categories of “deemed sales”, the meaning of the word “goods” was not altered. Thus the definitions of the composite elements of a sale such as intention of the parties, goods, delivery, etc., would continue to be defined according to known legal connotations. This does not mean that the content of the concepts remain static. Courts must move with the times. But the 46th Amendment does not give a licence, for example, to assume that a transaction is a sale and then to look around for what could be the goods. The word “goods” has not been altered by the 46th Amendment. That ingredient of a sale continues to have the same definition. The second respect in which Gannon Dunkerley has survived is with reference to the dominant nature test to be applied to a composite transaction not covered by article 366(29A). Transactions which are mutant sales are limited to the clauses of article 366(29A). All other transactions would have to qualify as sales within the meaning of the Sales of Goods Act, 1930 for the purpose of levy of sales tax.

45.    Of all the different kinds of composite transactions, the drafters of the 46th Amendment chose three specific situations, a works contract, a hire-purchase contract and a catering contract to bring within the fiction of a deemed sale. Of these three, the first and third involve a kind of service and sale at the same time. Apart from these two cases where splitting of the service and supply has been constitutionally permitted in clauses (b) and (f) of clause (29A) of article 366, there is no other service which has been permitted to be so split. For example, the clauses of article 366(29A) do not cover hospital services. Therefore, if during the treatment of a patient in a hospital, he or she is given a pill, can the sales tax authorities tax the transaction as a sale? Doctors, lawyers and other professionals render service in the course of which it can be said that there is a sale of goods when a doctor writes out and hands over a prescription or a lawyer drafts a document and delivers it to his/her client? Strictly speaking with the payment of fees, consideration does pass from the patient or client to the doctor or lawyer for the documents in both cases.”

Therefore, once again, a controversy was arising as to dominant intention. In case of transaction involving very small value of goods and where skill was more important, there was a feeling that the transaction should not be a works contract but a service contract. However, the above judgment of Hon. Bombay High Court has dispelled any doubt about the nature of transaction and it appears that the ratio of Matushree Textiles Ltd. (132 STC 539)(Bom) will prevail for all purposes for interpretation of nature of works contract transaction.

Valuation of Taxable Services – Rule for Taxing Reimbursements Held ultra vires

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Preliminary:

Subsequent to the introduction of Negative List based Taxation of Services wef 1/7/12, no amendments were made in Section 67 of the Finance Act, 1994 (Act) and Rule 5 of Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006 [Valuation Rules] framed thereunder relating to the taxability of reimbursements. However, significant amendments were made, in regard to valuation relating to Works Contract Services (Rule 2A) and Valuation relating to Supply of Food/Outdoor Catering Services (Rule 2C).

In the meantime, in a significant recent judicial development, Rule 5 of Valuation Rules has been held to be ultra vires. Hence, considering its significant repercussions, the same is analysed and discussed in detail here. Provisions of Rules 2A and 2C of the Valuation Rules will be discussed in this feature in due course.

Delhi high court ruling in Inter Continental Consultants and Technocrats Pvt Ltd. (2012 TIOL – 966 HC – Del – ST)

In this case, the Delhi High Court was concerned with the question of law wherein it was decisively ruled that Rule 5(1) of the Valuation Rules providing inclusion of the expenditure or costs incurred by the service provider during the course of providing taxable service, to be part of the value for the purpose of charging Service tax is ultra vires Sections 66 and 67 of the Act, as the said rule travels beyond the scope and mandate of the said section 67.

Background:

In the case of Intercontinental Consultants and Technocrats Pvt. Ltd. (2012-TIOL-966-HC-DEL-ST), writ petition was filed. The petitioner company was providing consulting engineering services to National Highway Authority of India (NHAI) and charged service tax thereon and paid the same. However, during the course of providing the said service, the petitioner had incurred certain out of pocket expense like traveling, boarding and lodging, office rent, office supplies and utilities testing charges etc. These expenses were separately indicated in the invoice for recovering the same. This according to the revenue were essential expenses for providing taxable services of consulting engineers and therefore they directed the company to pay service tax on the same. While proposing the demand of service tax, the Show Cause Notice made Rule 5(1) of the Valuation Rules as its basis. Challenging the Show Cause Notice and the said Rule 5(1) of the Valuation Rules, the petitioner filed writ petition in 2008 with three prayers viz.

• quashing Rule 5 of Valuation Rules to the extent that it included reimbursable expenses in the taxable value for charging service tax;

• declaring the said rule to be unconstitutional and ultra vires section 66 and 67 of the Act;

• quashing the Show cause Notice holding it illegal, without jurisdiction and unconstitutional. In the interim order, the High Court had directed not to take coercive steps against the petitioner [reported at 2008 (12) STR 689 (Del)]. The final order dated 30th November, 2012 is reported at the above citation.

Discussion: Provisions of law:

Section 94 of the Act empowers the Central Government to make rules by issuing notifications. The rules are framed to carry out the provisions of Chapter V of the Act providing for the levy and collection of service tax. Valuation Rules were accordingly notified to come into effect from 19th April, 2006. Almost simultaneously, i.e. w.e.f. 18th April, 2006 section 67 dealing with ‘valuation’ of any taxable service also was amended to read as follows:

Section 67 (as introduced from 18/04/2006):

1. Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, where service tax is chargeable on any taxable service with reference to its value, then such value shall, –

(i) in a case where the provision of service is for a consideration in money, be the gross amount charged by the service provider for such service provided or to be provided by him;
(ii) in a case where the provision of service is for a consideration not wholly or partly consisting of money, be such amount in money, with the addition of service tax charged, is equivalent to the consideration;
(iii) in a case where the provision of service is for a consideration which is not ascertainable, be the amount as may be determined in the prescribed manner.

2 Where the gross amount charged by a service provider, for the service provided or to be provided is inclusive of service tax payable, the value of such taxable service shall be such amount as, with the addition of tax payable, is equal to the gross amount charged.

3 The gross amount charged for the taxable service shall include any amount received towards the taxable service before, during or after provision of such service.

4 Subject to the provisions of sub-sections (1), (2) and (3), the value shall be determined in such manner as may be prescribed.

Explanation – For the purposes of this section, –
(a) “consideration” includes any amount that is payable for the taxable services provided or to be provided;
(b) “money” includes any currency, cheque, promissory note, letter of credit, draft, pay order, travelers cheque, money order, postal remittance and other similar instruments but does not include currency that is held for its numismatic value;
(c) gross amount charged” includes payment by cheque, credit card, deduction from account and any form of payment by issue of credit notes or debit notes and book adjustment.

It is interesting to note that the above section 67 as amended and as it stood prior to 18/04/2006 authorised determination of the value of taxable service as, the gross amount charged by the service provider for such service provided or to be provided by him in a case where the consideration is in money. The highlighted words, “for such service” are key words in the above section read with the charging section 66 which reads as “there shall be levied a tax (hereinafter referred to as the service tax) @ 12% of the value of taxable services referred to in sub-clauses …………. of section 65 and collected in such manner as may be prescribed”. Thus, the charge of the service tax as per section 66 is on the value of taxable services. In turn, the taxable services are listed in section 65(105) and the relevant sub-clause under which the consulting engineering service is covered is sub-clause (g). Therefore, the only value which can be subjected to service tax is the value of the service provided by the petitioner to NHAI which is that of consulting engineer and nothing more. In other words, the quantified value can never exceed the gross amount charged by the service provider for such service provided by him. The petitioner thus contended that though section 94 of the Act enables the Central Government to prescribe rules, such rules can only be made to carry out the provisions of Chapter V of the Act. The power conferred cannot exceed or go beyond the section providing for them the charge or collection of the levy.

In the scenario, it is necessary to understand the subject matter of the controversy i.e. what does the said Rule 5 intend to include in the value of any taxable service. Rule 5 of the Valuation Rules reads as follows:

“(1) Where any expenditure or costs are incurred by the service provider in the course of providing taxable service, all such expenditure or costs shall be treated as consideration for the taxable service provided or to be provided and shall be included in the value for the purpose of charging service tax on the said service.”

Sub-clause (2) of the said section contains an exception to the above rule, that the expenditure or costs incurred shall be excluded from the value of taxable value when the service provider acts as a pure agent of the recipient of service subject to the conditions contained in the said sub-section. These conditions are required to be satisfied cumulatively and it is extremely hard to do so.

Further, Explanation 2 to the said Rule 5 reads as follows, followed by four illustrations:

“Explanation 2. – For the removal of doubts, it is clarified that the value of the taxable service is the total amount of consideration consisting of all components of the taxable service and it is immaterial that the details of individual components of the total consideration is indicated separately in the invoice.

Illustration 1. – X contracts with Y, a real estate agent to sell his house and thereupon Y gives an advertisement in television. Y billed X including charges for Television advertisement and paid service tax on the total consideration billed. In such a case, consideration for the service provided is what X pays to Y. Y does not act as an agent on behalf of X when obtaining the television advertisement, even if the cost of television advertisement is mentioned separately in the invoice issued by X. Advertising service is an input service for the estate agent in order to enable or facilitate him to perform his services as an estate agent.

Illustration 2. – In the course of providing a taxable service, a service provider incurs costs such as traveling expenses, postage, telephone, etc., and may indicate these items separately on the invoice issued to the recipient of service. In such a case, the service provider is not acting as an agent of the recipient of service, but procures such inputs or input service on his own account for providing the taxable service. Such expenses do not become reimbursable expenditure merely because they are indicated separately in the invoice issued by the service provider to the recipient of service.

Illustration 3. –
A contracts with B, an architect for building a house. During the course of providing the taxable service, B incurs expenses such as telephone charges, air travel tickets, hotel accommodation, etc., to enable him to effectively perform the provision of services to A. In such a case, in whatever form B recovers such expenditure from A, whether as a separately itemised expense or as part of an inclusive overall fee, service tax is payable on the total amount charged by B. Value of the taxable service for charging service tax is what A pays to B.

Illustration 4. – Company X provides a taxable service of rent-a-cab by providing chauffeur-driven cars for overseas visitors. The chauffeur is given a lump sum amount to cover his food and overnight accommodation and any other incidental expenses such as park-ing fees by the Company X during the tour. At the end of the tour, the chauffeur returns the balance of the amount with a statement of his expenses and the relevant bills. Company X charges these amounts from the recipients of service. The cost incurred by the chauffeur and billed to the recipient of service constitutes part of gross amount charged for the provision of services by the Company X.”

Perusing the above, the Court observed that the above illustration 3 amplifies what is meant by sub-rule
(1). In the illustration given, the architect who renders the service incurs expenses such as telephone charges, air travel tickets, hotel accommodation etc. to enable him to effectively perform his services. Through the illustration, the Rule clearly breaches the boundaries of section 67. In addition to traveling beyond the mandate and the scope of the section, it may also result in double taxation. For instance, air travel attracts service tax and by including it in the value of the invoice and to charge service tax thereon would be certainly paying tax twice. In this frame of reference, the Court recognised that there could be double taxation provided it is clearly intended and cannot be enforced by implication. Citing Supreme Court in Jain Brothers vs. UOI (1970) 77 ITR 107, a part of the extract of the Court’s observation reads as follows:

“It is not disputed that there can be double taxation if the legislature has distinctly enacted it. It is only when there are general words of taxation and they have to be interpreted, they cannot be so interpreted as to tax the subject twice over to the same tax (vide Channell J. in Stevens v. Durban-Roodepoort Gold Mining Co. Ltd.). The Constitution does not contain any prohibition against double taxation even if it be assumed that such a taxation is involved in the case of a firm and its partners after the amendment of section 23(5) by the Act of 1956. Nor is there any other enactment which interdicts such taxation. If any double taxation is involved the legislature itself has, in express words, sanctioned it. It is not open to any one thereafter to invoke the general principles that the subject cannot be taxed twice over.”

While the Hon. Court found adequate authority for the contention that the rules cannot overreach the provisions of the main enactment, it cited the following:

“In Central Bank of India vs. Their Workmen, AIR 1960 SC 12 the observation was, “We do not say that a statutory rule can enlarge the meaning of Section 10; if a rule goes beyond what the Section contemplates, the rule must yield to the statute. We have, however, pointed out earlier that Section 10 itself uses the word “remuneration” in the widest sense, and R.5 and Form-I are to that extent in consonance with the Section.”

Similarly, In Babaji Kondaji Garad vs. Nasik Merchants Co-operative Bank Ltd., (1984) 2 SCC 50, the Supreme Court observed “Now if there is any conflict between a statute and the subordinate legislation, it does not require elaborate reasoning to firmly state that the statute prevails over subordinate legislation and the bye-law, if not in conformity with the statute in order to give effect to the statutory provision, the Rule or bye-law has to be ignored. The statutory provision has precedence and must be complied with.”

In the light of the above observations, the Court found that the expressions “consideration in money” or “the gross amount charged” used in section 67 in widest sense are not suggestive of including the amount collected for travel, hotel stay, transportation and other out of pocket expenses, but these words are defined in the Explanation below the section. Significantly, out of pocket expenses such as travel, hotel stay, transportation etc. are not included in those expressions.

The Court also relied on the observation in Devi Datt vs. Union of India, AIR 1985 Delhi 195 “but obviously the said rule has to be construed in the light of the parent section and it cannot be construed as enlarging the scope of Section 19 itself. It is a well settled canon of construction that the Rules made under a statute must be treated exactly as if they were in the Act and are of the same effect as if contained in the Act. There is another principle equally fundamental to the rules of construction, namely, that the Rules shall be consistent with the provisions of the Act. Hence, Rule 102 has to be construed in conformity with the scope and ambit of Section 19 and it must be ignored to the extent it appears to be inconsistent with provisions of Section 19”. Similarly in CIT vs. S. Chenniappa Mudaliar, (1969) 74 ITR 41 it was held that “if a rule clearly comes into conflict with the main enactment or if there is any repugnancy between the substantive provisions of the Act and the Rules made therein, it is the rule which must give way to the provisions of the Act.” Also in Bimal Chandra Banerjee vs. State of M.P. and Ors. (1971) 81 ITR 105, the Court observed:

“No tax can be imposed by any bye-law or rule or regulation unless the statute under which the sub-ordinate legislation is made specially authorises the imposition even if it is assumed that the power to tax can be delegated to the executive. The basis of the statutory power conferred by the statute cannot be transgressed by the rule making authority. A rule making authority has no plenary power. It has to act within the limits of the power granted to it”.

The Court further relied on CIT, Andhra Pradesh vs. Taj Mahal Hotel, (1971) 82 ITR 44 and Commissioners of Customs and Excise vs. Cure and Deeley Ltd., (1961) 3 WLR 788 (QB) and made similar observation as to the canon that a rule has to be framed remaining within the scope and ambit of the Act.

For the case under examination, the Court observed that reading section 66 and section 67(I)(i) of the Act together and harmoniously, it seems clear that while valuing a taxable service, nothing more and nothing less than the consideration paid as quid pro quo for the service can be brought to charge. Sub-section (4) of the said section 67 enabling the determination of value of taxable service “in such manner as may be prescribed” is expressly made subject to the provisions of sub-section (1). The Court decisively ruled that sections 66, 67 and 94, which empower the Central Government to prescribe rules to carry out the provisions of Chapter V of the Act mean that only the service actually provided by the service provider can be valued and assessed to service tax and Rule 5(1) of the Valuation Rules runs counter and is repugnant to sections 66 and 67 of the Act and to that extent it is ultra vires. By including the expenditure and costs, it goes far beyond the charging provisions and cannot be upheld. Citing Hukam Chand vs. Union of India, AIR 1972 SC 2427, the Court concluded that simply because every rule framed by the Central Government is laid before both the Houses of the Parliament, does not confer validity on a rule if it is not made in conformity with the Act as it is a specie of a subordinate legislation.

Whether all reimbursable expenses would not attract service tax any more?

While the ruling of the Delhi High Court indeed is extremely welcome, little can be commented about its finality at this stage. A lot will depend whether the revenue chooses to file appeal against the above ruling in the Supreme Court and this is most likely to happen. The possibility of the Government bringing about retrospective amendment in section 67 itself cannot also be ruled out, considering the fact that a large number of assessees have already paid service tax on the reimbursable expenses and again a large number of them may have paid after recovering the same and of which, CENVAT credit is availed by the recipients of such services. Precedents of retrospective amendment have already been experienced in the service tax administration itself in case of renting of immovable property service and broadcasting service, besides the fact that Supreme Court struck down provisions relating to reverse charge made via subordinate legislation as ultra vires vis-à-vis services of clearing and forwarding agents and goods transport agencies. (Refer Laghu Udyog Bharti Anr. vs. UOI 1999 (112) ELT 365 (SC) and subsequent retrospective amendment made in section 68 of the Act by the Central Government to overcome the directives of the Court in the said case). Therefore, the relief or even the sense of ‘fairness’ felt on account of the above judgment may remain short-lived and plan of action on the basis of the above ruling may not be an act of prudence, as felt by many at this point in time. However, and not withstanding the outcome or the finality in the above context, it is relevant to analyse the rationale laid down by the Larger Bench of the Bangalore Tribunal in Shri Bhagawathy Traders vs. CCE, Cochin 2011 (24) STR 290 (Tri.-LB) which dealt with the issue of taxability of reimbursable expenses under the service tax law in the scenario when Rule 5(1) did not exist. In this case, issues relating to reimbursement of various expenses incurred by C. & F. Agents were discussed in detail, by the Larger Bench including various conflicting judicial views in the matter. Relevant extracts of the observations made by the Larger Bench are under.

Having analysed the various decisions cited on behalf of the assessee and on behalf of the department, it would be appropriate to consider the scope of the term “reimbursements” in the context of money realised by a service provider. ……The concept of reimbursement will arise only when the person actually paying was under no obligation to pay the amount and he pays the amount on behalf of the buyer of the goods and recovers the said amount from the buyer of the goods.

Similar is the situation in the transaction between a service provider and the service recipient. Only when the service recipient has an obligation, legal or contractual, to pay certain amount to any third party and the said amount is paid by the service provider on behalf of the service recipient, the question of reimbursing the expenses incurred on behalf of the recipient shall arise. For example, when rent for premises is sought to be claimed as reimbursement, it has to be seen whether there is an agreement between the landlord of the premises and the service recipient and, therefore, the service recipient is under obligation for paying the rent to the landlord and that the service provider has paid the said amount on behalf of the recipient. The claim for reimbursement of salary to staff, similarly has to be considered as to whether the staff were actually employed by the service recipient at agreed wages and the service recipient was under obligation to pay the salary and it was out of expediency, the provider paid the same and sought reimbursement from the service recipient.

Various Circulars of the Board relied upon by the Learned Advocate for the assessee clearly referred to amounts payable on behalf of the service recipient. For example, the Customs House Agent (CHA) paying the Customs duty to the Customs Department, paying the charges levied by the Port Trust to the Port Trust, paying the fee for testing to the Testing Organisation are clearly on behalf of the importer/exporter and the same are recoverable by the CHA as reimbursement, that too on actual basis. These Circulars cannot be held to be in support of the claim of the assessee that they can split part of the amount as reimbursable expenses and the rest as towards service charges.

The claim for reimbursement towards rent for premises, telephone charges, stationery charges, etc. amounts to a claim by the service provider that they can render such services in vacuum. What are costs for inputs services and inputs used in rendering services cannot be treated as reimbursable costs. There is no justification or legal authority to artificially split the cost towards providing services partly as cost of services and the rest as reimbursable expenses.

Keeping in view this rationale, if a simple example of architect, consulting engineer or a chartered accountant is examined wherein when an architect visits site of the client outside his home city/town and so do the engineers of a consulting engineering firm or audit team of a CA firm, the travel expenses, lodging and boarding expenses incurred and reimbursed cannot certainly form part of the ‘value’ of taxable service as the service provider has incurred such expenses only to carry out the assignment of the recipient of service and such cost does not represent its own “professional fee” that is charged for using its proficiency expertise and/or knowledge of the subject. Yet in some cases for the sake of simplicity, sometimes allowances are fixed on a daily basis for employees to avoid cumbersome paper work or to overcome practical difficulties and this many a times acts as a deterrent to prove that the ‘reimbursement’ of the expense incurred is on “actual basis” in terms of the controversial Rule 5(2) of the Valuation Rules which provides that cost incurred as “pure agent” can be excluded from the value of taxable service, subject to satisfaction of all the conditions laid down in this respect. Taking another example of a CHA or a logistics service provider, it is found that when an expense like courier charge is specifically incurred for and on behalf of the recipient and under his specific instructions or a place is acquired on rental basis on behalf of client and is client-specific and for their limited purpose, it may not form part of the cost of providing such service and therefore, service tax may not be attracted in such cases. Nevertheless, the issue is subjective as observed by the Larger Bench in Shri Bhagawathy Traders (supra) wherein admittedly the subject is dealt with a well-balanced approach. The issue therefore may be debatable and therefore litigative in many complex situations as precise parameters are not available in law for the same otherwise than Rule 5 of the Valuation Rules.

Conclusion:

Nevertheless, the draconian Rule 5(1) of the Valuation Rules and the concept of “pure agent” as enshrined in the Rule sub-clause (2) of the said Rule 5 with rigidity certainly do not deserve to exist on the statute.

In the current scenario, when all services are brought within the sweep of the service tax except the Negative List and certain exempt services, if pragmatism is applied by the Government and Rule 5 is allowed to remain struck down, to a large extent dual taxation would be avoided and guidelines by revenue may be provided on the lines ruled by the Larger Bench in the case of Shri Bhagawathy Traders (supra). Service tax administration then would not be lopsided in favour of revenue on this aspect and may extend fairness to assessees at large on the issue of levying service tax on reimbursable costs and this may also possibly cover genuine concern of many business enterprises on the open issue of leviability or otherwise of service tax on shared costs among associate/group concerns.

Amnesty Scheme notified Notification No. 10/2013 –ST Dated 13-05-2013 & Circular no. 169/4/2013 – ST dated 13-05-2013

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Service Tax Voluntary Compliance Encouragement Scheme, 2013 (STVCES) has been introduced by the Finance Act, 2013 to encourage the voluntary compliance and broaden the tax base in Service Tax. By this Notification and Circular, the “Service Tax Voluntary Compliance Encouragement Rules, 2013” have been introduced and clarifications have been issued.

Gist of the Rules is as under:-

(1) Every person who wishes to make a declaration under the Scheme shall take the registration, if not already registered;

(2) The declaration shall be made in respect of Tax Dues under the Scheme in Form VCES-1;

(3) Designated Authority shall issue an acknowledgment in Form VCES-2 within a period of seven working days;

(4) The tax dues shall be paid to the credit of Central Government. However, CENVAT Credit cannot be utilised for payment of service tax under this Scheme;

(5) Designated Authority shall issue an acknowledgment of discharge in Form VCES-3, within a period of seven days from the date of furnishing of details of payment of tax dues in full along with interest, if any.

(6) Beside interest and penalty, immunity would also be available from any other proceeding under the Finance Act, 1994 and Rules made thereunder.

(7) Tax dues in respect of which any show cause notice or order of determination u/s. 72, section 73 or section 73A has been issued or which pertains to the same issue for the subsequent period are excluded from the ambit of this Scheme.

VAT UPDATE

Furnishing Cloth exempted in the course of intere state sale :
CST Notification No. CST /1413/CR 48/Taxation -1 . Dated 30.03.2013

By this notification, sale of furnishing cloth notified under Schedule Entry C-101 of MVAT Act, 2002 , made exempt in the course of interstate sale from CST with effect from 01-04-2013.

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Abatement rate in Construction Activity Services amended :

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Notification No. 9/2013 ST dated 08-05-2013

By this Notification the existing Notification No. 26/2012 ST dated 20-06-2012 has been amended to remove the ambiguity prevailing on the rate of abatement of service tax on construction of residential units, to provide the rate of abatement in the case of construction of a complex, building, civil structure or a part thereof in the following manner:

(a) Service tax has to be paid on 25% value of a residential unit if the following two conditions are fulfilled cumulatively : (i) the carpet area of the unit is less than 2,000 sq. ft.; and (ii) the amount charged for the unit is less than Rs. 1 crore;

(b) In other cases, service tax will be paid on 30% of the value of a complex, building, or civil structure.

It is also reconfirmed that the above abatement would be available only if the (1) CENVAT credit on inputs used for providing the service has not been availed & (2) the value of land is included in the amount charged to the Service recipient.

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Due date for Return ST-3 for the period October 2012 to March 2013 extended :

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Order No. 03/2013 –ST dated 23-04-2013

The above referred date has been extended from 25th April, 2013 to 31st August, 2013.

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Exemption to Exporters against Focus Product Scheme Scrips, Focus Market Scheme, Vishesh Krishi & Gram Udyog Yojana :

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Notification Nos. 06/2013, 07/2013 & 08/2013 – Service Tax dated 18-04-2013

To promote exports from India, the Government of India had announced certain schemes like Focus Market Scheme, Focus Product Scheme and Vishesh Krishi and Gram Udyog Yojana under the Foreign Trade Policy. Under these schemes, export incentives are allowed to eligible exporters in the form of duty credit scrip at prescribed percentage of the value of goods and services exported.

Vide these notifications, exemption has been provided to services provided or agreed to be provided against duty credit scrip by a person located in taxable territory to a scrip holder subject to certain conditions specified therein.

These duty credit scrips were earlier used only for procuring duty free goods from overseas or domestic market subject to available duty credit. However, now these duty credit scrips can be used for payment of service tax on procurement of services within the legal framework of the aforesaid service tax exemption notifications. Further, a holder of the scrip shall be entitled to avail of drawback or CENVAT credit of the service tax debited in the scrips as per the rules specified in the aforesaid notifications.

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Westwell Natural Resources Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Tripura and Others, [2011] 44 VST 114 (Gau)

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VAT – Registration – Scope of Inquiry – Only for Purposes of Act and on the Basis of Relevant Materials – Failure To Produce Irrelevant Documents – Not Grounds To Refuse Registration.

Introducer Who Signed on Application For Registration – Later Withdrawing – Duty of Department – To Inform Dealer – Failure to Inform – Refusal of Registration- Not Improper—S/s. 2(18), 18(1), 19(3) of The Tripura Value Added Tax Act, 2004 – R. 11(VII) of The Tripura Value Added Tax Rules, 2005.

Facts

The dealer company applied for registration under The Tripura Value Added Tax Act and CST Act. The Superintendent of Taxes rejected the applications for registration on the ground that the company failed to produce requisite Pollution Clearance Certificate, registered deed of lease and certificate of incorporation of change in address of the company and that the introducer of the dealer, in it’s application in form 1, had withdrawn on 31st December, 2010. The dealer company filed writ petition before the Gauhati High Court against the said order refusing to grant registration under the VAT and CST Act.

Held

The basic object behind the enactment of the Tripura Value Added Tax Act, 2004 and the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 is to levy and collect tax. Registration of dealers enables the State authorities to keep track of assessable transactions and also of persons who indulge in such assessable transactions so that levy and collection of tax can be effectively ensured. If a dealer is not registered, it may be difficult for the State to know about, and/or keep track of, each of the assessable transactions, which the dealer may have entered into, and the value of the taxable goods, which the dealer sells. A dealer is not required to be compulsorily registered unless he becomes liable to pay tax.

A careful reading of section 19(3) of the 2004 Act shows that the enquiry which may be conducted by the authorities concerned, is such as is required to satisfy the authorities concerned that the application for registration is in order, meaning thereby that by such an enquiry, the authority concerned has to ascertain as to whether the particulars required to be furnished in an application for registration have or have not been furnished by the applicant. The enquiry cannot, however, be in the nature of a judicial enquiry. The enquiry, thus, must be confined to the ascertainment of the fact as to whether the information given, and/or particulars furnished, by a dealer, seeking registration are correct or not.  The satisfaction, to be arrived at by the authorities concerned, has to be relevant to the objects sought to be achieved by means of such registration.

The satisfaction to be reached by the authority concerned has to be, therefore, based on such materials, which are required under the relevant Acts and the Rules framed thereunder, and only those materials can be regarded as relevant, which have nexus with the objects sought to be achieved by way of registration of dealer. Material which has no nexus whatsoever with the objects sought to be achieved by way of registration would be irrelevant and the dealer applying for registration cannot be refused registration on the ground of failure on the part of the dealer, to furnish such irrelevant information/particulars. If the authority seeks to obtain any information which is not relevant within the ambit of the 2004 Act read with the 2005 Rules, and/or the 1956 Act, read with the 1957 Rules, the refusal to grant registration to the petitioner, as a dealer, would not be sustainable in law.

The failure to produce the pollution clearance certificate was a totally irrelevant consideration and ought not to have been taken into account by the Superintendent of Taxes for the purpose of reaching his satisfaction as contemplated by section 19(3). Rejection of the petitioner’s application for registration, on such a ground, was not sustainable.

The sales tax authorities had nothing to do with whether a lease deed was or was not registered, when the place of the business of the petitioner had been disclosed and the petitioner, being a company, had its principal place of business at its registered office. The Superintendent of Taxes could not have rejected the application seeking registration for the purpose of trading in coal in as much as the petitioner had submitted a registered lease deed of its stockyard enabling it to trade in coal.

The rejection of the petitioner’s applications seeking certificate of registration under the 2004 Act and the 1956 Act, on the ground of failure to furnish the certificate of incorporation of change of address of the petitioner-company was bad in law in as much as there was, admittedly, only one Registrar of Companies at Shillong for the North Eastern States, therefore section 17A of the Companies Act, 1956, had no application.

Form A of the Rules of 1957 relating to the grant of registration under the 1956 Act does not require any introducer for obtaining registration as a dealer and, hence, the application seeking registration under the 1956 Act, could not have been rejected on the ground that its introducer had withdrawn.

As far as the VAT Rules were concerned, form 1 thereof requires signature of a registered dealer or a responsible person as an introducer. This requirement was complied with by the petitionercompany on 27th November, 2010, at the time of submission of the application seeking registration. The application having been acted upon by the authorities, the need of the introducer’s signature became irrelevant. This apart, even if the signature of the introducer ought to have remained present all through it was the bounden duty of the authorities to inform the petitioner-company about the withdrawal of the signature by the introducer so that the petitioner could remove the defect.

In any case, the certificate of incorporation ought to have been treated as a conclusive evidence of all the requirements of the Companies Act, 1956, having been complied with by the petitionercompany. The requirement, therefore, of an introducer, in the case of an incorporated body does not arise at all. The requirement of a registered dealer or a responsible person introducing a person for being registered under the 2004 Act is a requirement meant for persons other than an incorporated body.

It would, thus, be transparent that the Superintendent of Taxes had taken into account an extraneous and irrelevant factor into consideration for rejecting the petitioner’s application for registration. The action disclosed malice in law. This was a fit case for a direction for payment of reasonable costs to the petitioner. Accordingly the High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the company with cost of Rs. 10,000. The Department was directed to grant registration certificate in accordance with law without any further delay.

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S.S. Photographic Lab Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Assam and others [2011] 44 VST 39 (Gauhati)

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Works Contract – Sale – Definitions – Contract
for Processing Exposed Photographic Film Rolls and Negatives – Not Works
Contract

Goods – Exposed Photographic Film Rolls and Negatives –
No Marketable Value – Not Goods – S/s. 2(15), (33), (38)(Iv), 8(1)(E) ;
Sch. VI, Entry 24 of The Assam General Sales Tax Act, 1993— Art.
366(12), (29A) of the Constitution of India.


Facts

The
dealer carried on the business of developing exposed photographic film
rolls into negatives and then processing the negatives into positive
photographs. They also processed negatives received from customers into
positive photographs. The developing and processing was done on a
job-work basis. Demands for sales tax under the Assam General Sales Tax
Act, 1993 were raised against the appellants and were affirmed in
appeals. The appellants filed writ petitions which were dismissed by the
single judge. The dealer filed appeal before the division bench of the
High Court against the judgment of the single judge.

Held

The
question that required to be answered was whether the transactions
entered into by the appellants are works contracts (that is composite
contracts having both a service element and a sale element) with deemed
sales or mutant sales of goods for the purposes of liability to sales
tax.

If there is an agreement both for transfer of property in
goods and for processing or otherwise treating or adapting any goods,
then the agreement is a works contract involving a sale, otherwise not.
Therefore, three ingredients are necessary:

(i) the existence of goods,
(ii) the transfer of property in those goods,
(iii) the processing or treating or adapting of those goods.

To
qualify as “goods” as defined in section 2(15) of the Act an item must
have some utility and must be marketable. Exposed photographic film
rolls and negatives are not goods per se they have absolutely no utility
for anyone—not even for the owner. It is only when they are developed
or processed that they have some personal value for the owner of the
photographs.

Therefore, if exposed photographic film rolls and
negatives are not “goods” they cannot be the subject-matter of a works
contract which concerns itself with the processing or otherwise treating
or adapting any goods as defined in section 2(38)(iv) of the Act.
Alternatively, if the transactions entered into between the appellants
and their customers are not works contracts, would the utilisation of
chemicals in developing exposed photographic film rolls into negatives
and then processing the negatives into positive photographs be a “sale”
of such chemicals?

To be a sale, there must be a transfer of
property in goods involved in the execution of a works contract.
Assuming that the chemicals used in developing exposed photographic film
rolls into negatives and then processing the negatives into positive
photographs are “goods”, these chemicals are not used in the execution
of a works contract. Therefore, there was no “sale” of chemicals within
the meaning of section 2(33) of the Act. 

Since exposed
photographic film rolls and negatives are not “goods” the provisions of
sections 7, 8 of the Act and Schedule VI thereto do not come into play
at all. When a customer goes to the appellants to have his exposed
photographic film rolls developed or negatives processed, there may be
an agreement for the transfer of property in the chemicals used in the
processing or otherwise treating or adapting the exposed photographic
film rolls and negatives. But since they are not “goods” within the
meaning of the Act, the question of taxing the “sale” of the chemicals
does not at all arise. The conversion of exposed photographic film rolls
into negatives and then into positive photographs or the conversion of
negatives into positive photographs is nothing but a rendering of
service specific to a customer and was a matter of skill and expertise
of the developer – it was not a works contract.

The High Court
further held that the case of the appellants is fully covered in their
favour by the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Bharat Sanchar Nigam
Ltd. [2006] 3 VST 95 (SC); [2006] 145 STC 91 (SC); [2006] 3 SCC 1.
Accordingly, the High Court allowed appeals and the judgment and order
of the learned single judge was set aside.

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2013 – TIOL – 675 – CESTAT – AHM – M/s Ultratech Cement Ltd. vs. CCE, Bhavnagar.

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Refund of service tax: Reclassification of the service at the recipient’s end cannot be done by authorities to deny CENVAT credit.

Facts:

The Appellant filed refund claim under Notification No.17/2009-ST dated 07-07-2009 for January-March, 2010 wherein refund of service tax was granted for specified input services used for exports on submission of documentary evidence as specified. Appellant’s refund claim was partially rejected on the ground that the input services under the head of technical testing & analysis service or custom house agent’s service were not in relation to export of goods. Appellant contended that the service provider had discharged the service tax under the above categories and thus entitled to refund. The Appellant also relied on the cases of (i) 2012-TIOL-1305-CESTAT–Ahm, Akansha Overseas, Rachana Art Prints Pvt. Ltd. vs. CST, Surat and (ii) 2012-TIOL-1264-CESTAT-MUM, Jollyboard Ltd. vs. CCE, Aurangabad.

Held:

It is a settled law that classification of service is to be done at the service provider’s end and not in the hands of the recipient. Thus, the classification as provided on the invoices of the service provider should be accepted and refund be granted in view of the decisions of Akansha Overseas and Jollyboard Ltd. (supra).
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2013-TIOL-580-CESTAT-DEL – M/s Jubilant Life Science Ltd. vs. CCE, Noida

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Issue of classification – whether lead manager’s services and underwriting services can it be considered as one single service when provided by the same service provider? Bar of limitation is applicable as the issue was open at the time of the audit and no objection was raised thereon. No liability arises under reverse charge mechanism in relation to services provided prior to 18-04-2006.

Facts:

Appellant appointed J. P. Morgan Securities Ltd., UK as the lead manager for issuance of Foreign Currency Convertible Bonds (FCCB) and also the underwriter of the issue. The services were provided by a person outside India to a person in India and hence the provisions of reverse charge mechanism were attracted. Audit was conducted agreeing that lead manager’s services were covered under “Banking & Financial Services” and underwriting services were covered under “Underwriting Services” and thus service tax was payable on “Banking & Financial Services” under reverse charge mechanism and it was paid by the Appellant. Later, on investigation conducted by the Director General of Anti-Evasion, New Delhi it was contended by the department that both the services were provided as bundled services and thus, service tax was applicable on the entire amount under reverse charge mechanism under the category of “banking & financial services”. Further, the respondent also filed an appeal in the matter of levying service tax under reverse charge on services received from outside India prior to 18-04-2006.

Held:

Dispute arises since under reverse charge mechanism, “banking & financial services” is liable to tax in respect of the location of the recipient (in the present case India) and “underwriting services” is liable to tax if performed in India (in the present case outside India) and it is the question of classification. It was held that underwriting services cannot be classified as banking & financial services as (a) underwriting services are incidental to lead manager’s services as both are totally different in nature and the remuneration is also separately fixed for both the services, (b) underwriting services are not to be provided only by the merchant bankers and thus to be considered as composite service, (c) dominant nature of the service is not the lead manager’s service and (d) underwriter’s service was covered since 1998 before the introduction of banking & financial services and hence as per section 65A(c) of the Finance Act, 1994 it will be considered as underwriter’s services only. Since underwriter’s service is subjected to tax u/s. 66A of the Act and considering that it is performed outside India, in terms of Rule 3 of the Import Rules, service tax cannot be levied.

Even on the ground of limitation, Appellant’s case is strong as the department was aware of the issue during the audit and initially the department had agreed upon the contention of the Appellant and the tax paid under the head lead manager’s service was reflected in the ST3 returns also.

Further, the services relating to FCCB were provided prior to 18-04-2006. The department’s appeal for levy of tax on services prior to 18-04-2006 would not survive in view of the ratio laid down in 2008-TIOL-633-HC-Mum-ST Indian National Shipowners Association vs. UOI which was affirmed by the Supreme Court.

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2013-TIOL-575-CESTAT-Mum – Central Railway vs. CCE & C, Nagpur.

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Whether Central Railway is not liable to service tax for providing renting of immovable property service because ‘person’ not defined u/ s. 65 of the FA, 1994?

Facts:

The appellant, Central Railways is engaged in providing taxable services of renting of immovable property services, sale of space or time for advertisement services and mandap keepers services. The Appellant contended that it was not liable to pay service tax as ‘person’ was not defined in the Finance Act, 1994 and the fact that it was introduced vide amendment in the Finance Act, 2012 in sub-clause (37) of section 65B of the Act had prospective effect only and meant that the Appellant was not liable for period earlier to 1st July 2012.

Held:

The Hon’ble CESTAT relied on the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sea Customs Act AIR 1963 SC 1760 and held that Government is liable to pay indirect taxes for taxable activities undertaken by the Government and even though the decision was in relation to excise and customs duty it will equally apply to service tax. The Hon’ble CESTAT further held that as per section 38 of the Finance Act, 1994, all the rules made there under are also placed before the Parliament, and as the Rule 2(d) being part of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 has been approved by the Parliament the ‘person’ as specified therein will include Government also. Further, in regard to the invocation of extended period of time it held that evasion of tax or suppression can not be presumed.
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2013-TIOL-566-CESTAT-MUM M/s Vodafone Essar Cellular Ltd. vs. CCE, Pune – III

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When services are rendered to a third party at the behest of one’s customer, the service recipient is the customer and not the third party.

Facts:

The appellants provided telecom services and entered into agreements with international telecom operators to provide services to the inbound roamers in India. The appellant contended that the service recipients are the international telecom operators and not their subscribers. Further, as the international telecom operators were located outside India and they had received the consideration in convertible foreign exchange, the appellant’s services constituted export of services as the conditions under Rule 3(1)(iii) and Rule 3(2) of the Export of Service Rules, 2005 were satisfied. The Appellants relied on the following:

(i) Case of 2012-TIOL-1877-CESTAT-Del, Paul Merchants Ltd vs. CCE, Chandigarh, wherein it was held that the recipient of service was Western Union and not the persons receiving the money facts of the said case being similar to that of the appellant.

(ii) Circular no.111/5/2009-ST dated 24-02-2009 for the clarification of the expression service provided from India and used outside India and contended that it provided services outside India as the service recipient was located outside India and the benefit of the services provided accrued outside India.

(iii) UK VAT Circular VATPOSS15100, wherein it is stated that place of supply of telecommunication services is where they are used and enjoyed when supplied and when they are provided by a non-EC provider to a UK customer the effective use and enjoyment takes place in UK (such element being subject to UK VAT Act).

The Respondent relied on the Circular No.141/10/2011- TRU dated 13-05-2011 and contended that the accrual of benefit is to be determined on the basis of use and enjoyment of services.

Held:

It was held that the benefit of services accrues to the foreign telecom service provider who is located outside India in view of the Circular No.111/2009-ST dated 24-02-2009. The Hon’ble CESTAT also explained that when an Indian subscriber of MTNL/BSNL goes abroad and uses roaming facility, it is MTNL/BSNL who invoices the subscriber even though the services are provided by foreign telecom service provider. Further, the Hon’ble CESTAT also relied on the decision of Paul Merchants (supra) wherein it was held that the service recipient is the foreign company and not the service recipient. Thus, the services provided by the appellant to foreign telecom services are considered as export of services and no service tax is payable.

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2013 (30) STR 92 (Tri- Del.) Soni Classes vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jaipur-1.

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Whether value of study material deductible from gross amount received against coaching services?

Facts:

The appellant was registered with the service tax department as provider of taxable services under the category “commercial training or coaching centre”. They supplied study material to its students and cost of such material was 50% of the fees charged to students. The appellant purchased the study material from the Institute run by the Appellant’s wife on the same premises. The Revenue contended that the consideration for running the coaching centre was artificially divided into two parts, one for providing coaching and the other showing sale of text books in the name of the Institute. The appellant relying on Notification No.12/2003-ST dated 20-06-2003 for exclusion of the value of the goods and materials, contended that the study material, test papers, magazines like competition success review etc. which was sold by the Institute was not forming part of the value of coaching services.

Held:

It was observed that only with a malafide view to save the service tax, bifurcation of the consideration was made into two different parts and diverted a part of the consideration to the sale of the study material. Providing study material, text books was a part of coaching service and was required to be included in the value. It was observed that it was only the extra text books or extra material, which was admittedly being sold to the students and which was also available for sale to outsiders would not form part of the taxable coaching services. Since the appellant consciously diverted part of the value of the services to M/s. Soni Patrachar and as such indulged in misstatement and suppression of facts with intent to evade payment of duty, the appeal for allowing benefit of Notification No.12/2003-ST including plea for longer period was rejected.
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Foreign Court Decree – Order awarding costs would amount to decree – Execution – CPC section 35A, 44A

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The Defendant-Judgment Debtor challenged the order dated 15th April, 2011 passed by the learned District Judge-2, Nashik, rejecting the Petitioner’s Application for declaration that the recovery proceeding filed by the Respondents-original Plaintiffs be disposed of/dismissed for lack of jurisdiction or even otherwise on facts and further holding that the execution proceeding filed by Respondents being maintainable and the judgment and order dated 19th October, 2006 passed by High Court of Justice, Chancery Division, Patents Court was executable before District Court at Nashik. The Respondents-original Plaintiffs filed a Suit against the Petitioner-original Defendant in the High Court of Justice, Chancery Division, Patents Court in England. In the said Suit, the Petitioner preferred Application dated 11th May, 2006 for declaration that the High Court of Justice, Chancery Division, Patents Court, U.K. would have no jurisdiction to entertain the Claim. The said Application was rejected by the Hon’ble High Court of Justice, Chancery Division, by an order dated 19th October, 2006 and imposed a cost in the sum of £12,429.75 equivalent to Rs. 10,16,753.55 with interest at the rate of 8% per annum. Thereafter, the Respondents-original Plaintiffs filed Special (Civil) Darkhast in the Court of District Judge-2, Nashik for execution of the order passed by the Foreign Court, for recovery of sum of Rs. 10,16,753.55 towards decretal amount under Order dated 19th October, 2006 (costs) and Rs. 67,786/- towards interest at the rate of 8% per annum on the principal amount from the date of the order date i.e. 19th October, 2006 to 14th August, 2007 and further interest till the recovery of the amount. In the said Execution Petition, the Petitioner preferred on 1st March, 2008 an application for declaration that the Execution Application filed by the Respondents is not maintainable as the same is in respect of the costs imposed by a foreign Court. At the time of dismissing the Petitioner’s Interim Application, whereas, the main matter was still pending for hearing and final disposal. This Application for declaration was rejected by the District Judge-2, Nashik by impugned order dated 15th April, 2011 and hence, the Civil Revision Application was filed before the Hon’ble Court.

The Hon’ble Court observed that the explanation in section 44A of Code of Civil Procedure shows that the legislature has intentionally included the term judgment within the meaning of the term decree, for purpose of section 44A of CPC. The intention was to expand or enlarge the scope of term decree for the purpose of this section. Therefore, an order which may not amount to a decree but may amount to judgment would be a “judgment” for the purpose of section 44A of CPC. Thus, awarding costs would amount to decree within the meaning of section 44A and these can be recovered by executing order u/s. 44A of the CPC.

The issue of jurisdiction of the Court to execute order/decree of a country having reciprocal arrangement with our country was decided by the Division Bench of the Court in the matter of Janardhan Mohandas Rajan Pillai (deceased through Lrs.) & Anr. (2010) 4 AIR Bom R. 230. Therefore, the Execution Petition filed by the Respondents for execution of the order dated 19th October, 2006 passed by the English Court was maintainable.

Alcon Electronics P. Ltd vs. Celem S A AIR 2013 Bom 108.

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Business expenditure: Disallowance u/s. 40(a) (ia): A. Y. 2008-09: Amendment of section 40(a)(ia) by Finance Act, 2010 is retrospective and is applicable for the A. Y. 2008-09 also:

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CIT vs. Naresh Kumar; 262 CTR 389 (Del):

In respect of the A. Y. 2008-09, the Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim that no disallowance u/s. 40(a) (ia) should be made in view of the amendment of section 40(a)(ia) by the Finance Act, 2010.

In appeal, the Revenue contended that the amendment is w.e.f 01-04-2010 and is not
retrospective, and accordingly, the amendment is not applicable for the A. Y. 2008-09. The Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“The Tribunal was justified in holding that the amendment made to section 40(a)(ia) by the Finance Act, 2010 should be given retrospective effect and applicable to A. Y. 2008-09 in question”

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Business expenditure: Bonus: Section 36(1) (ii): A. Ys. 2005-06 and 2006-07: Bonus paid to director as per Board resolution: Directors rendering valuable services to company: Bonus not related to shareholding: Bonus deductible:

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CIT vs. Career Launcher India Ltd.; 358 ITR 179(Del):

For the A. Ys. 2005-06 and 2006-07, the Assessing Officer disallowed the claim for deduction of the bonus paid to the directors on the ground that it would have been payable to the directors as dividend had it not been paid as bonus. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim and deleted the addition. On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) It was not disputed regarding bonus (a) that payment was supported by board resolutions, and (b) that none of the directors would have received a lesser amount of dividend than the bonus paid to them, having regard to their shareholding.

ii) Further, the directors were full-time employees of the company receiving salary. They were all graduates from IIM, Bangalore. Taking all these facts into consideration, the bonus was a reward for their work, in addition to the salary paid to them and was in no way related to their shareholding. It was deductible u/s. 36(1)(ii).”

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Assessment: Limitation: Section 158BC: Block Period ending on 14-09-2002: Exclusion of period during which assessment stayed by Court: Limitation resumes on date of vacation of stay and not from date of receipt of order by Department: Assessment barred by limitation:

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CIT vs. Drs. X-Ray and Pathology Institute Pvt. Ltd.;358 ITR 27(All)

On 14-09-2002, search was conducted at the assessee’s premises and a notice u/s. 158BC was issued on 29-04-2003. The assessee filed the return on 16-06-2003. The assessee filed writ petition and challenged the validity of search. By order dated 12-02-2004, the High Court stayed the assessment proceedings. The stay was vacated on 26-08-2009 and the copy of the order was received by the Assessing Officer on 09-11-2009. The Assessing Officer passed the assessment order on 22-06-2010. The Tribunal held that the limitation resumes on the date of vacation of the stay and accordingly the assessment was barred by limitation.

In appeal, the Revenue contended that the limitation resumes from the date of receipt of the order by the Department i.e. 09-11-2009 and accordingly the assessment was within the limitation period. The Allahabad High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The provisions of the Act for filing of the appeal from the date of service of the order would not be attracted to calculate the period of limitation to complete the assessment. This was not a case of a particular act to be performed, but the arrest of the limitation by an interim order passed by the High Court.

ii) As soon as the order was vacated, the limitation would restart and exhaust itself on the period of limitation provided under the Act. The assessment was clearly barred by limitation.”

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Reassessment – Reason to believe that income had escaped assessment – The subsequent reversal of the legal position by the judgment of the Supreme Court does not authorise the Department to reopen the assessment [beyond a period of four years in a case where original assessment is made u/s. 143(3)], which stood closed on the basis of law, as it stood at the relevant time.

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DCIT vs. Simplex Concrete Piles (India) Ltd. (2013) 358 ITR 129 (SC)

The Respondent-assessee was engaged in the business of civil construction works on contract basis and had claimed deduction u/s. 32A, 32AB, 80HH and 80HHB as under:

n the original orders of assessment for the said assessment years reliefs, inter-alia, u/s. 32A as claimed, were allowed in full for the assessment years up to 1989-90 and u/s. 32AB for the assessment year 1988-89 and 1989-90. The Respondent-assessee’s claim for relief u/s. 80HH and 80HHB was also allowed in the assessment order for assessment year 1984-85 but the claim for reliefs u/s. 80HHB for the assessment year 1985-86, 1987-88, 1988-99 and 1989-90 was not allowed in the assessments but the same were allowed in appeals by the appellate authority.

Later     on,     6     notices     all     dated     29th     July,     1994    were issued by the Petitioner u/s. 148 for reopening the assessments u/s. 147 for the assessment years 1984-85 to 1989-90, in view of the decision of the Apex Court in N.C. Budharaja and Co. (1993) 204 ITR 412, where the Supreme Court had held that an “article or “things” used in section 32A, 32AB and 80HH refers only to a movable asset and the words “manufacture or construction of an article” cannot be extended to construction of road,   building, dam or bridge, etc. and  Respondent-assessee was therefore not entitled to deduction u/s. 32A, 32AB or 80HH.

The     Respondent-assessee     filed     a    writ     petition     before the Calcutta High Court challenging all the six   notices     issued    u/s.     148.     The     single    bench    of     Judge of the Calcutta High Court (255 ITR 49) dismissed the    writ    petitions    holding    that    the    Assessing    Officer    had prima facie reason to believe that income had escaped assessment. On appeal, the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court (262 ITR 605) allowed the appeal of the Respondent-assessee. The Division Bench noted that the assessee had claimed benefit u/s. 32A/32AB and section 80HH/80HHB for the relevant assessment years. The Assessing     Officer     had     allowed     the     benefit     under     those    sections, having regard to the law as it stood then governing these provisions.  But there was divergence of opinion in the decision of the various High Courts.  Those benefits would be available only to an industrial undertaking. The assessee had claimed itself to be an industrial undertaking. But this question when came to be considered by the apex court in N.C. Budharaja and Co.’s case (supra), it held that the nature of business as were carried on by Respondent-assessee was not that of an industrial undertaking. The Division Bench held that this decision was rendered in September, 1993. Therefore, admittedly, this was the information on the basis reopening was permissible u/s. 147 but subject to  proviso thereunder. Admittedly, there was no allegation that amounts now sought to be made taxable were not disclosed and therefore it could not be said that there was any omission or failure to disclose fully and truly the materials necessary for assessment. The Petitioner had proposed to reopen the assessment only on the basis of the information derived by it from the decision in N.C. Budharaja’s case and as such the question of four years embargo would not be overcome by the Petitioner.

  On appeal to the Supreme Court by the Petitioner, the Supreme Court held that there was no error in the observation made by the Division Bench of the High Court that once limitation period of 4 years provided in section 149/149(1A) expires then the question of reopening by the Department does not arise. The Supreme Court further held that in any event, at the relevant time, when the assessment order got completed, the law as declared by the jurisdictional High Court, was that the civil construction work carried out by the Respondent-assessee would be entitled to the benefit of   section 80HH which was later reversed in the case of  CIT vs. N.C. Budharaja and Co. The subsequent reversal of the legal position by the judgement of the Supreme Court does not authorise the Department to reopen the assessment, which stood closed on the basis of the law, as it stood at the relevant time. The Supreme Court dismissed civil appeals accordingly.

Appeal to High Court – Substantial Questions of Law framed for consideration by court – The High Court’s power to frame substantial question(s) of law at the time of hearing of the appeal other than the questions on which appeal has been admitted remains u/s. 260A(4) but this power is subject, however, to two conditions, (one) the court must be satisfied that appeal involves such questions, and (two) the court has to record reasons therefor

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CIT vs. Mastek Ltd. [2013] 358 ITR 252 (SC)

The appeal filed by the Revenue u/s. 260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (the “Act”) had been admitted by the High Court and following two substantial questions of law were framed for consideration of the appeal;

“(A) Whether the Appellate Tribunal has substantially erred in law and on facts in reversing the order passed by the Assessing Officer and thereby deleting the adjustment while computation of the arm’s length price of the international transactions of software services distributed by MUK (Associated Enterprise) by making an upward adjustment of Rs. 18,62,45,100?

(B) Whether the Appellate Tribunal has substantially erred in law and on facts in reversing the order passed by the Assessing Officer and thereby deleting the adjustment by way of human resource management services of Rs. 2,92,22,683 treating the same as an international transaction?”

The grievance of the Revenue before the Supreme Court was that by necessary implication, the other questions raised in the memo of appeal before the High Court stood rejected.

The Supreme Court observed that the Revenue was under some misconception. The Supreme Court noted that proviso following the main provision of section 260A(4) of the Act states that nothing stated in s/s. (4), i.e., “The appeal shall be heard only on the question so formulated” shall be deemed to take away or abridge the power of the court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such question.

According to the Supreme Court, the High Court’s power to frame substantial question(s) of law at the time of hearing of the appeal other than the questions on which appeal has been admitted remained u/s. 260A(4). This power was subject, however, to two conditions, (one) the court must be satisfied that appeal involves such questions, and (two) the court has to record reasons therefor.

In view of the above legal position, according to the Supreme Court, there was no justifiable reason to entertain the special leave petition.

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Writ – When an alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved party it must exhaust the same before approaching the writ court—order of High Court quashing the notices issued u/s. 153C as being without jurisdiction set aside by the Supreme Court.

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CIT vs. Vijaybhai N. Chandrani [2013] 357 ITR 713 (SC)

The respondent-assessee purchased a plot of land from “Samutkarsh Co-operative Housing Society” (for short “the society”) being developed by one Savvy Infrastructure Ltd. In 2008, a search was conducted u/s. 132 of the Act, 1961, in the premises of the society and also at the office of Savvy Infrastructure Ltd. During the search certain documents were seized. Upon scrutiny, it was found that the seized documents reflected names of certain individuals including the assessee. Accordingly, for further proceedings the assessing authority had transmitted the seized documents to the jurisdictional assessing authority in whose jurisdiction the assessee was being assessed. After receipt of the said information/documents, the assessing authority has recorded a satisfaction note dated 7th October 2009, that, he has reason to believe that a case of escapement of income may exist and, therefore, the assessee’s case requires to be reassessed for the assessment years 2001-02 to 2006-07 u/s. 153C of the Act, 1961.

Accordingly, the assessing authority issued six show-cause notices u/s. 153C of the Act, 1961, to the assessee for assessment of income of the aforesaid six assessment years and directed him to furnish return of income in respect of the said assessment years in the prescribed form within 30 days of the receipt of the said notices, dated 7th October 2009.

Upon receipt of the notice, the assessee by letter dated 11th November, 2009, requested the assessing authority to furnish him with the copies of the seized documents on the basis of which the said notices were issued. The assessing authority had provided the said documents to the assessee, whereafter the assessee has approached the High Court in a writ petition questioning the six showcause notices dated 7th October, 2009.

The High Court elaborately examined the case at hand and delved into the statutory scheme for assessment in the case of search and requisition as prescribed u/s. 153A, 153B and 153C of the Act, 1961, and reached the conclusion that the documents seized by the assessing authority did not belong to the assessee and, therefore, the condition precedent for issuance of the notice u/s. 153C was not fulfilled. Accordingly, the High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and quashed the said notices issued by the assessing authority.

Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgement and order passed by the High Court, the assessing authority was before the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court observed that the jurisdictional assessing authority, upon having a reason to believe that the documents seized indicated escapement of income, had issued show-case notices u/s. 153C to the assessee for reassessment of his income during the assessment years 2001-02 to 2006-07. Thereafter, upon request of the assessee, the assessing authority had furnished him with the copies of documents seized. The assessee being dissatisfied with the said documents instead of filing his explanation/reply to the show-cause notices, had filed a writ petition before the High Court.

According to the Supreme Court, at the said stage of issuance of the notices u/s. 153C, the assessee could have addressed his grievances and explained his stand to the assessing authority by filing an appropriate reply to the said notices instead of filing the writ petition impugning the said notices. The Supreme Court remarked that it is settled law that when an alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved party, it must exhaust the same before approaching the writ court.

The Supreme Court held that in the present case, the assessee had invoked the writ jurisdiction of the High Court at the first instance without first exhausting the alternative remedies provided under the Act. According to the Supreme Court, at the said stage of proceedings, the High Court ought not have entertained the writ petition and instead should have directed the assessee to file reply to the said notices and upon receipt of a decision from the assessing authority, if for any reason it is aggrieved by the said decision, to question the same before the forum provided under the Act.

In view of the above, without expressing any opinion on the correctness or otherwise of the construction that was placed by the High Court on section 153C, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgement and order of the High Court. Further, the Supreme Court granted time to the assessee, if it so desired, to file reply/objections, if any, as contemplated in the said notices within 15 days time from the date of order. If such reply/ objections were filed within time granted by this court, the assessing authority would first consider the said reply/objections and thereafter direct the assessee to file the return for the assessment years in question. The Supreme Court clarified that while framing the assessment order, the assessing authority would not be influenced by any observations made by the High Court while disposing of the writ petition and if, for any reason, the assessment order went against the assessee, he/it would avail of and exhaust the remedies available to him/it under the Income-tax Act, 1961.

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Whether Assessee is Entitled to Interest on Delayed Payment of Interest on Refund? – Section 244A – Part I

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Article 265 of the Constitution provides that no tax shall be levied or collected except by the authority of law. The Article provides that not only levy but also the collection of a tax by the Government must be under the authority of law. In pursuance of such law, the refund claims are regulated under the provisions of Chapter XIX of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (the Act). Section 237 effectively provides for refund of excess tax paid by the assessee. This is a general provision for claim of refund. A provision is also made in section 240 which effectively provides for refund of any amount that becomes due to the assessee as a result of any order passed in appeal or other proceedings under the Act. This is a special provision dealing with refund which imposes an obligation on the Assessing Officer (AO) to refund such amount for which the assessee is not required to make any claim. All the above provisions relating to payment of interest on refund provide for payment of simple interest at the specified rate and for the period specified therein. Section 241 authorising the AO to withheld refund in certain cases has been omitted from 1st June, 2001. Section 245 provides for adjustment of the amount of refund or part thereof against any sum remaining payable under the Act after giving an intimation in writing to the assessee for the proposal of such adjustment.

The Act also provided for payment of interest on refund due to the assessee under various provisions such as section 214 (excess payment of advance tax), section 243 (interest on delayed refunds), section 244 (interest on refund where no claim is needed) etc. Section becomes due to the assessee in pursuance of an order referred to in section 240. Certain amendments were made from time to time in these provisions with which we are not concerned in this write-up and hence the same are not referred to. Only relevant broad provisions dealing with interest on refunds are noted for this purpose. These provisions relating to interest on refunds are applicable in respect of assessment year 1988-89 and earlier years (old provisions of interest).

The interest u/s. 214 was payable on the excess payment of advance tax for the period from the first day of the assessment year upto the date of regular assessment. The regular assessment is defined in section 2(40) to mean the assessment made in section 143(3) or section 144. In this context, the issue had come up before the Apex Court in the case of Modi Industries Ltd. [216 ITR 759] to decide the meaning of the expression ‘regular assessment’ as High Courts had taken different views on the same. In a detailed judgment analysing various relevant provisions providing for interest on refund, and the views expressed by various High courts in that respect, the Apex Court approved the view expressed by certain High courts such as Bombay, Allahabad, Andhra Pradesh etc. which effectively held that the expression ‘regular assessment’ in section 214 means the original assessment. In the process of deciding the above issue and the impact of the provisions of section 214 as well as section 244 dealing with interest to be granted on refund, the Court also expressed the view that there is no right to get interest on refund except as provided by the statute. The Court also stated that interpretation of section 214 or any other section of the Act should not be made on the assumption that interest has to be paid whenever an amount which has been retained by the Revenue in exercise of the statutory power becomes refundable as a result of any subsequent proceeding.

Accordingly, the interest on excess payment of advance tax u/s. 214 is not payable from the date of payment of tax but from the first day of relevant assessment year nor it is payable till the date of refund but it is payable upto the date of ‘regular assessment’. Interest u/s. 243 or section 244(1) was payable upto the date of refund but only in cases where the refund was not made within the stipulated period. Interest u/s. 244 (1A) was payable in cases where the amount paid by the assessee is found in excess of his liability as result of appeal or other proceedings under the Act and such interest was payable on the excess amount from the date of payment of such amount to the date of the grant of refund. The Court also held that for the purpose of section 244(1A), the amount of advance payment of tax and the amount of tax deducted at source (TDS) must be treated as payment of income-tax pursuant to an order of assessment on and from the date when these amounts were set off against the tax demand raised in the assessment order, in other words the date of the assessment order. The Court also dealt with the other aspects of granting interest on refund with which we are not concerned in this write-up.

From the assessment year 1989-90, the provisions for interest on refund are made in section 244AA. This section effectively provides for payment of interest on any amount of refund that becomes due to the assessee under the Act to be calculated in the manner provided therein which effectively provides for payment of interest upto the date on which the refund is granted.

All the provisions relating to interest provide for the simple interest on refund amount at the specified rate which has undergone change from time to time.

In practice, in many cases, the payment of refund gets delayed for one or the other reasons and the refunds are made to the assessee without payment of interest on such delayed payment of refunds and in such cases, the payment of such interest gets delayed and the period of such delayed payment of interest sometime runs into years. In such cases, the issue has come up in the past as to whether the assessee can claim interest on such delayed payment of interest or any compensation for unjustified delay in payment of such interest.

The issue referred to in para above has been considered by the Courts in the past with different set of facts but with a common factor of inordinate delay in payment of interest that becomes due to the assessee under the provisions of the Act. In large number of cases, the Courts had found their way to compensate the assessee for the unjustified delay in payment of interest. It seems that Courts have attempted to decide such cases bearing in mind the principle of equity and fairness. In fact, the Gauhati High Court in the case of Jwala Prasad Sikaria [175 ITR 535] has gone to the extent of clearly stating that the assessee is entitled to payment of such interest due to delay even if there is no statutory provision in this regard.

1.4.1   In this context, the judgment of the Gujarat High Court in the case of D. J. Works [195 ITR 227] is worth noting.  In this case, while giving effect to the appellate orders for the assessment years 1983-84 to 1985-86, the refunds were granted without interest to the assessee on different dates.  The assessee had filed writ petition before the Gujarat High Court for non-payment of interest and pending this petition, the interest for all the three years was paid with some difference in the amount which is not relevant for the issue under consideration. The assessee had contended before the Court that the AO illegally withheld the payment of interest and since the retention or withholding of interest was without the authority of law, the Revenue is liable to pay interest on the amounts of interest wrongfully withheld. The Revenue had contended that there is no provision in the Act for payment of interest on interest. On these facts, the Court took the view that section 214(1) itself recognises in principle the liability of the Government to pay interest on excess tax paid by the assessee. The Court noted that the legislature itself has considered it fair and reasonable to avoid interest on excess tax paid by the assessee and retained by the Government. According to the Court, the same principle should be extended to the payment of interest, which has been wrongfully withheld by the AO or the Government. It is the duty of the AO to pay interest while granting refund of excess amount paid by the assessee.  If the excess tax paid cannot be retained without payment of interest, so also the interest which is payable thereon cannot be retained without payment of interest. Though there is no specific provision for payment of interest on such interest, on general principle, the Government is liable to pay interest which had been due to the assessee u/s. 244(1) at the same rate at which the refund amount carries the interest. It seems that this judgment of the Gujarat High Court was followed by the Tribunal in the case of Narendra Doshi and this decision was affirmed by the M.P. High Court (Indore Bench). The question raised before the M.P. High Court  was `Whether Appellate Tribunal was justified in law in directing to allow interest on interest, when the law points for grant of simple interest only?’ This was answered in affirmative and in favour of the assessee. This  judgment of the M. P. High Court (dated 3rd May, 1999 in ITR No. 5 of 1996) has been affirmed by the Apex Court [254 ITR 606] stating that the said judgment of the Gujarat High Court had been followed by the same High Court in the case of Chimanlal S. Patel [210 ITR 419] and both these decisions held that “the Revenue is liable to pay interest on the amount of interest which it should have paid to the assessee but has unjustifiably failed to do so.”   Having noted these facts, the Apex Court held that “The Revenue has not challenged the correctness of the two decisions of the Gujarat High Court.  They must, therefore, be bound by the principle laid down therein.  Following that principle, the question has, as we find, been rightly answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee.”  Based on this, the appeal of the Revenue against the judgment of the M. P. High Court was dismissed.  As such, the judgments of the Gujarat High Court in this respect were impliedly approved.  

1.4.2 The issue referred to in para 1.3 also came up before the Apex Court in the case of Sandvik Asia Ltd. [280 ITR 643] in which the Court dealt with the issue in detail and in a reasoned order, decided the issue in favour of the assessee. In this case, the Court also took the view that even assuming that there is no provision in the Act for payment of compensation, the compensation for delay is required to be paid in view of the decision of this Court  viz, Narendra Doshi (supra).  The similar view also emerges from the observation of the Apex Court in the case of H.E.G Ltd. [324 ITR 331].The High Courts and the Tribunal have followed these judgments in many cases and the position on this regard was largely getting settled.

1.5    In the last year, the division bench of the Apex Court in the case of Gujarat Flouro Chemicals [252 CTR 237] doubted the correctness of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Sandvik Asia Ltd. (supra).  Accordingly, the Court recommended that the issue should be referred to a larger bench.  Recently, the Apex Court in the case of Gujarat Flouro Chemicals Ltd., has, in principle, decided the issue referred to it and considering its impact, it is thought fit to consider the same in this column.

    Sandvik Asia Ltd. vs. CIT – 280 ITR 643 (SC)

2.1       In the above case, the relevant facts were :  the assessee was entitled to certain refunds for the assessment years 1977-78, 1978-79, 1981-82 and 1982-83.  After receiving the refund, the issue for non/ short grant of interest remained for which the assessee had filed a revision petition u/s. 264 before the Commissioner of Income-tax (CIT) on 27th February, 1987 which was rejected by order dated 28th February, 1990.  Against this order, it appears that the assessee had moved the Apex Court and common order dated 30th April, 1997 was passed by the Apex Court under which the matter was remanded to the CIT for considering the claim of interest in accordance with the principle laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Modi Industries Ltd. (supra).  Under these circumstances, the interest u/s. 214/ 244 was determined by the Revenue at Rs. 40,84,906 vide order dated 27th March, 1998 which appears to have been paid. In this case, there was a delay in payment of interest for various periods ranging from 12 to 17 years.

2.1.1    As a result of the above, the assessee filed a revision petition dated 3rd July, 1998 before the CIT asking for interest on delayed payment of interest upto the date of payment thereof which was rejected against  which he assessee had filed writ petitions before the Bombay High Court on 7th June, 2001 without any success.  On these facts, the issue referred to in para 1.3 above came up for consideration before the Apex Court at the instance of the assessee.  

2.2      For dealing with the appeals of the assessee, the Court noted that substantial and important questions of law of great general public importance as well as under the Act pertaining to those four assessment years have been raised.  The Court then stated that [Page No. 646] :

    “ The main issue raised in these appeals is whether an assessee is entitled to be compensated by the Income-tax Department for the delay in paying to the assessee amounts admittedly due to it?  ”

2.3      On behalf of the assessee, it was, interalia, contended that the High Court ought to have held that the assessee is entitled to compensation by way of interest for the delay in payment of amounts lawfully due to it and which were withheld wrongly and contrary to the law for an inordinately long period. The interest u/s. 214/ 244 is also a refund as contemplated in section 240 and hence, the Revenue is liable to pay interest u/s. 244 in respect of delay in payment of such interest.  The High Court has failed to appreciate that during this period, the Department has enjoyed the benefit of the funds while the assessee was deprived of the same. It was further contended that the High Court erred in the purporting  to distinguish/explain the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Narendra Doshi (supra) based on various decisions which were neither cited in the course of hearing nor were put to the counsel appearing and as such, the assessee had no opportunity  to deal with the same. It was also contended that the High Court’s decision was erroneous as it rejected assesses claim on the sole ground that as the ‘amount due’ to the assessee was of interest, no compensation could be paid to it even when gross delay in payment was admittedly made by the Revenue contrary to the law. The case of the assessee is covered by section 240 which refers to `any amount’ which becomes due to the assessee which should include interest payable under the Act.  It was further contended that in the case of Narendra Doshi (supra), the Court had set out two issues before itself, viz., whether when Revenue had not challenged the correctness of the Gujarat High Court decisions it was bound by the principle laid down therein and whether the Gujarat High Court had rightly laid down the principle that assessee would be entitled to interest on interest. The Apex Court had decided both the issues in favour of the assessee. The Bombay High Court erred in distinguishing this decision based on various decisions which were never cited during the course of hearing and which were never put to the counsel appearing for the assessee.  

2.4     On behalf of the Revenue, it was,  interalia, contended that none of the provisions of the law contained in the Act provided for payment of interest on interest and certainly not section 244(1).  In the matter of interpretation of taxing statute, there is no scope for considerations of equity or intendment and what is expected is strict interpretation.  When the statute does not permit grant of interest, it would be inappropriate to grant interest in exercise of writ jurisdiction. Strongly relying on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Modi Industries Ltd.  (supra), it was further contended that in that case the Court clarified two factors, namely, the amount on which the interest is to be granted and the time period for which it is to be granted u/s. 214/section 244. This decision does not refer to interest on interest. Considering the overall facts and in particular, the fact that the Apex Court in its earlier order passed on 30th April 1997 directed the Revenue to decide the revision petition in accordance with the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Modi Industries Ltd. (supra), the Revenue had not wrongfully withheld the assessee’s money without any authority of law.  It was also contended that the interest payable on the refund amount u/s. 244 is a simple interest and neither compounded interest nor interest on interest is payable. It was also contended that in the case of Modi Industries Ltd. (supra), the scope of section 214 of the Act was discussed and it was held that there is no right to get interest on refund except as provided by the statute and as such, the Bombay High Court was justified in rejecting the alternative claim of the assessee on this basis.

2.5    After considering the contentions raised by both the sides, the Court noted the relevant provisions of the Act and observed as under [Page 658] :

“ We have given our anxious and thoughtful consideration to the elaborate submissions made by counsel appearing on either side. In our opinion, the High court has failed to notice that in view of the express provisions of the Act an assessee is entitled to compensation by way of interest for the delay in the payment of amounts lawfully due to the appellant which were withheld wrongly and contrary to the law by the Department for an inordinate long period of upto 17 years. “

2.6    The Court then noted the judgment of the Gujarat High Court in the case of D. J. Works (supra) referred to in para 1.4.1 above and noted the fact of the view taken therein. The Court then also noted the judgment of the M. P. High Court in the case of Narendra Doshi and the question referred to before the High Court in that case and the fact that the said judgment of the M. P. High Court is affirmed by the Apex Court. The Court also noted the relevant observations from the Apex Court referred to in para 1.4.1 in that regard. The Court then stated that in the case of Narendra Doshi (supra) the Apex Court has held as under [Page No. 660]:

“The Revenue has not challenged the correctness of the two decisions of the Gujarat High Court. They must, therefore, be bound by the principle laid down therein. Following that principle, the question has, as we find, been rightly answered (by the Madhya Pradesh High Court) in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee.

The civil appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs.”

2.7    Dealing with the contention of the Revenue that section 244 provides for a simple interest and there is no provision in the Act for payment of interest on interest, the Court stated as under [Pages 663/ 664]:

“This contention, in our opinion, has no merit. Learned counsel for the assessee cited the decision Jwala Prasad Sikaria [1989] 175 ITR 535 (Gauhati) in support of his contention wherein the Gauhati High Court held that a citizen is entitled to payment of interest due to delay even if there is no statutory provision in this regard.

………    The High Court held that where an assessment is made under the Act of 1922 after the commencement of the 1961 Act and refund is granted to the assessee, interest is payable on such refund. The High Court has further held (head-note):

“The interest would, however, be deemed to have accrued after expiry of three months from the end of the month in which refund had become payable. The rate applicable would be that applicable to grant of refund under the Act of 1961 at the relevant time.”

The above decision was cited before the Bombay High Court. The High Court very conveniently omitted to consider the decision holding that the decision in Jwala Prasad Sikaria vs. CIT [1989] 175 ITR 535 (Gauhati) was in the peculiar facts of the case.”

2.8    The Court then dealt with the contentions of the Revenue that the High Court was right in law in rejecting the assesse’s claim on the sole ground that as the ‘amount due’ was of interest, no compensation could be made even when gross delay in payment was admittedly made by the Revenue. In this respect, the Court referred to the judgment of the Madras High Court in the case of Needle Industries Pvt. Ltd. [233 ITR 370] in which the Court held that the expression “amount” in section 244(1A) of the Act would include the amount of interest levied and paid u/s. 139(8) and 215 of the Act and collected in pursuance of an order of assessment which was refunded. For this, the Madras High Court agreed with the view taken by the M. P. High Court in the case of Sardar Balwant Singh Gujaral [86 CTR 64] wherein also the Court held that liability to pay interest is on the amount of refund due and the assessee would be entitled to interest on the amount of refund due which includes interest paid u/s. 139(8) and 215 of the Act.

2.9:    The Court then further took the view that assuming there is no provision in the Act for payment of compensation, compensation for delay is required to be paid in view of the decision of this Court in the case of Narendra Doshi referred to in para 1.4.1 above. In this regard, the Court further stated as under [Page 669] :

“………This is clearly a decision of this court on the merits of the matter, albeit proceeding on the assumption that there was no provision in the Act granting interest on unpaid interest, in favour of the appellant’s contentions.

In the impugned order, the Bombay High Court has held that the Madhya Pradesh High Court was not on the point of payment of interest on interest, a view which is ex facie erroneous and clearly impossible to sustain as a plain reading of the question before the Madhya Pradesh High Court will show.”

2.10: Referring to the contentions of the Revenue that the delay in the present case was justified, the Court observed as under [Page 670] :

“ In our view, there is no question of the delay being “justifiable” as is argued and in any event if the Revenue takes an erroneous view of the law, that cannot mean that the withholding of monies is “justifiable” or “not wrongful”. There is no exception to the principle laid down for an allegedly “justifiable” withholding, and even if there was, 17 (or 12) years delay has not been and cannot in the circumstances be justified.”

2.11:    Dealing with the issue as to whether the Act provides for payment of compensation for delayed payments of amounts due to an as-sessee in a case where these amounts include interest, the Court took the view as follows [Page 671] :

“In our view, the Act recognises the principle that a person should only be taxed in accordance with law and hence where excess amounts of tax are collected from an assessee or any amounts are wrongfully withheld from an assessee without author-ity of law the Revenue must compensate the assessee.”

2.11.1: The Court also did not agree with the view of the Bombay High Court that the word “refund” must mean an amount previously paid by an assessee and does not relate to an amount payable by the Revenue by way of interest on such sums. The Court also dealt with the phrase ‘any amount becoming due to an assessee’ used in section 240 of the Act and stated that section 240 provides for refund by the Revenue on appeal etc. and accordingly deals with all subsequent stages of proceedings and therefore, this phrase is used. Referring to the judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of Good Year India Ltd., [249 ITR 527], the Court stated that in this case the Delhi High Court has held that this phrase would include interest and hence the assessee was entitled to further interest on interest wrongfully withheld. The Delhi High Court also referred to the judgment of the Gujarat High Court in the case of D. J. Works (supra) and read it as taking the same view. Similar view is also taken by the Madras High Court in the case of Needle Industries Pvt. Ltd. ( supra) as well as by the Kerala High Court in the case of Ambat Echukutty Menon [173 ITR 581]. The Court then held as under [Page 672] :

“In our opinion, the appellant is entitled to interest u/s. 244 and/ or section 244A of the Act in accordance with the terms and provisions of the said sections. The interest previously granted to it has been computed upto March 27, 1981 and March 31, 1986 (under different sections of the Act) and its present claim is for compensation for periods of delay after these dates.”

2.11.2 The Court then further stated as under [Page 673] :

“In the present appeal, the respondents have argued that the compensation claimed by the appellant is for delay by the Revenue in paying of interest, and this does fall within the meaning of refund as set out in section 237 of the Act. The relevant provision is section 240 of the Act which clearly lays down that what is relevant is whether any amount has become due to an assessee, and further the phrase any amount will also encompass interest. This view has been accepted by various High Courts such as the Delhi, Madras, Kerala High Court, etc.”

2.12 Considering the observations in the case of Modi Industries Ltd. (supra) that there is no right to receive interest except as provided by the statute on which the Bombay High Court had relied to decide the issue against the assessee, the Court stated as under [Page 672] :

“…… The decision in Modi Industries Ltd.’s case [1995] 216 ITR 759 (SC), has no bearing whatsoever on the issue in hand as the issue in that case was the correct meaning of the phrase “regular assessment” and as a consequence under which provision an assessee was entitled to interest for the period up to the date of regular assessment and thereafter. The matter of what was due to it in terms of the decision in Modi Industries Ltd.’s case [1995] 216 ITR 759 (SC) is over, concluded, no longer in dispute and was agreed/ accepted on March 27, 1998 when the second respondent gave effect to the previous order of this court dated April 30, 1997. The working of the respondents itself conclusively shows, further the interest received is admittedly in accordance with the Act. The decision in Modi Industries Ltd.’s case [1995] 216 ITR 759(SC), in our view, has no bearing whatsoever on the matter in hand. The main issue now is whether an assessee is entitled to be compensated by the Revenue for the delay in paying to the assessee’s amounts admittedly due to it?”

2.13: The Court then also dealt with the issue as to whether on general principles the assessee ought to have been compensated for the inordinate delay in receiving monies properly due to it. In this context, the Court also referred to Circular dated 2nd January, 2002 issued by the Central Excise Department on the subject of refund of deposits and noted that the Revenue has decided to view cases of the delay beyond the period of three months in the cases referred to therein adversely and decided to initiate appropriate disciplinary ac-tion against the concerned defaulting officer. The Board has also decided to implement the order passed by the Tribunal for payment of interest and the interest payable shall be paid forthwith.

2.13.1: Referring to the facts of the case of the assessee the Court observed as under [Page 676] :

“Interest on refund was granted to the appellant after a substantial lapse of time and hence it should be entitled to compensation for this period of delay. The High court has failed to appreciate that while charging interest from the assesses, the Department first adjusts the amount paid towards interest so that the principal amount of tax payable remains outstanding and they are entitled to charge interest till the entire outstanding is paid. But when it comes to granting of interest on refund of taxes, the refunds are first adjusted towards the taxes and then the balance towards interest. Hence as per the stand that the Department takes they are liable to pay interest only up to the date of refund of tax while they take the benefit of the assesses funds by delaying the payment of interest on refunds without incurring any further liability to pay interest. This stand taken by the respondents is discriminatory in nature and thereby causing great prejudice to lakhs and lakhs of assesses. A very large number of assessees are adversely affected inasmuch as the Income-tax Department can now simply refuse to pay to the assesses amounts of interest lawfully and admittedly due to them as has happened in the instant case. …………. Such actions and consequences, in our opinion, seriously affect the administration of justice and the rule of law.”

2.13.2: The Court then referred to the dictionary meaning of the word ‘compensation’. The Court then stated as under [Page 677] :

“ There cannot be any doubt that the award of interest on the refunded amount is as per the statute provisions of law as it then stood and on the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case. When a specific provision has been made under the statute, such provision has to govern the field. Therefore, the court has to take all relevant factors into consid-eration while awarding the rate of interest on the compensation.”

2.14:    Considering a manner in which the mat-ter was handled by the Department, the Court found it necessary to send the copy of the judgment to the Finance Minister for taking appropriate action against the erring officers and in this context to the Court stated as under [Page 677] :

“ This is a fit and proper case in which action should be initiated against all the officers concerned who were all in charge of this case at the appropriate and relevant point of time and because of whose inaction the appellant was made to suffer both financially and mentally, even though the amount was liable to be refunded in the year 1986 and even prior thereto. A copy of this judgment will be forwarded to the hon’ble Minister for Finance for his perusal and further appropriate action against the erring officials on whose lethargic and adamant attitude the Department has to suffer financially.”

Apart from issuing general instruction (No.2, dated 28th March 2007) for granting interest alongwith refund , it is not known wheter any serious action is taken by the Government on the above recommendation of the Court.

2.15:    Finally, the Court decided the appeals in favour of the assessee and reversed the judgment of the Bombay High Court and held as under [Page 678] :

“ The assessment years in question in the four appeals are the assessment years 1977-78, 1978-79, 1981-82 and 1982-83. Already the matter was pending for more than two decades. We, therefore, direct the respondents herein to pay the interest on Rs. 40,84,906 (rounded off to Rs. 40,84,900) simple interest at 9 % per annum from March 31, 1986 to March 27, 1998 within one month from today failing which the Department shall pay the penal interest at 15 % per annum for the above said period. “

2.16:    From the above judgment, it would appear that the Court has taken a view that the expression ‘amount’ appearing in setion 244(1A) refers not only to the tax but also to the interest and it cannot be limited to the tax paid in pursuance of the assessment order. As such, in view of the express provisions of the Act, an assessee is entitled to compensation by way of interest for delay in the payment of amounts lawfully due to the assessee which are withheld wrongfully and contrary to law. Even assuming that there is no provision for payment for compensation, compensation for delay is required to be paid as the Act itself recognizes the principle that the Revenue is liable to pay interest when excess tax was retained and the same principle should be extended to cases where interest was retained. The Court has also explained that Narendra Doshi’s case (supra) was clearly a decision on the merit though it proceeded on the assumption that there was no provision in the Act granting interest on unpaid interest.

[ To be Concluded]

Whether Assessee is Entitled to Interest on Delayed Payment of Interest on Refund? – Section 244A – Part II

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Introduction

3.1   As stated in PART 1 of this write-up, the apex court in the case of Sandvik Asia Ltd. [Sandvik] took the view that the expression ‘amount’ appearing in section 244(1A) refers not only to the tax but also to the interest and it cannot be limited to the tax paid in pursuance of the assessment order. Accordingly, the Court held that in view of the express provision of the Act, an assessee is entitled to compensation by way of interest for delay in payment of amounts lawfully due to the assessee which are withheld wrongfully and contrary to law. The Court also further took the view that even if there is no provision in the Act for payment of compensation, the compensation for delay is required to be paid as the Act itself recognises the principle that the Revenue is liable to pay interest when excess tax was retained and the same principle should be extended to the cases where interest was retained. For this, the Court also relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Narendra Doshi referred to in para 1.4.1 of PART 1 of this write-up.

3.1.1   Subsequent to the judgment of the Apex Court in Sandvik’s case, the CBDT issued Instruction No. 2 dated 28th March, 2007 which is worth noting and hence the relevant part thereof is reproduced hereunder [209 CTR (Statute) 17]:

“Sub: Section 244A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 – Refunds – Interest on – Grant of interest on refunds under section 244A simultaneously with issue of refund.

In terms of section 244A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (Act), an assessee is entitled to receive interest calculated in the manner provided in the said section on the amount of refund due under the Act. The interest is to be granted simultaneously with the refund and there should normally be no reason to grant refund without adding the entitled interest. In the case of Sandvik Asia Ltd. vs. CIT (2006) 200 CTR (SC) 505 : (2006) 280 ITR 643 (SC), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, inter alia, adversely commented upon the delay in grant of interest on refund and awarded compensation to the assessee for the said delay by the Department. While taking this view, the Supreme Court referred to the judgment of the Gujarat High Court in the case of D.J. Works vs. Dy. CIT (1992) 102 CTR (Guj) 2 : (1992) 195 ITR 227 (Guj) wherein the High Court had held that though there is no specific provision for payment of interest on interest, but if interest on the refund is wrongfully retained, interest on interest would be payable. The Court further held that even assuming that there was no provision in the Act for payment of compensation, on general principles, compensation was payable to the assessee for the delayed payment of interest. The Court also recommended that action be initiated against the officers responsible for the delay.

2. It is necessary to remind all Assessing Officers that while granting refund to the assessee, care should be taken to ensure that any interest payable u/s. 244A on the amount of refund due should be granted simultaneously with the grant of refund and there should, in no case, be any omission or delay on the grant of such interest. Failure to do so will be viewed adversely and the officer concerned will be held personally accountable, inviting appropriate action.

3. These instructions may be brought to the notice of all officers working in your region for strict compliance. The Range Officers should be directed to carry out periodic test checks of cases within their jurisdiction to ensure that provisions of section 244A are scrupulously implemented. ………………”

3.1.2    After the above judgment of the Apex Court, the High Courts as well as the Tribunal have followed/ explained the same in various cases such as Motor General Finance Ltd. [320 ITR 881 (Del)], Gujarat Fourochemicals Ltd. [300 ITR 328 (Guj)], State Bank of Travancore [292 ITR (AT) 56 – Cochin), Delhi Tourism Transportation Corp. [(2012) 35 CCH 046 – Del Trib], Deutsche Bank AG [ITA Nos. 3789, 3790 & 4282/Mum/2010], etc. In these cases, the judgment of the apex court in Sandvik’s case is understood as laying down the prin-ciple that the assessee is also entitled to interest on unpaid interest receivable by him on the refund due to him. When the correct interest is paid by the Revenue along with the refund, this issue was not considered as relevant. It may also be noted that the Ahmedabad Bench (TM) of the Tribunal in the case of Nirma Chemical Works Ltd. [125 TTJ 487] did not follow Sandvik’s case on the ground that it was a case prior to the assess-ment year 1989-90 (i.e., it was not rendered in the context of the provisions of section 244A) and also on the basis that it was a case where the interest has been granted in a writ as compensation and not as interest on interest under the Act. According to the Tribunal, section 244A(1)(a) grants interest only on that amount of refund which is out of the tax paid by the assessee by way of advance tax/TDS/TCS and not on the amount of interest due to the assessee but withheld by the Revenue. Section 244A(1)(b) provides for interest on refund in any other case in which case the interest has to be calculated from the ‘date of payment of the tax or penalty’. The Tribunal also stated that the Apex Court also considered certain deci-sions laying down a ratio that “the amount of refund” includes refund of tax as well as interest. According to the Tribunal, even in such a case the assessee will not be entitled to interest as unlike section 244 which grants interest on any amount of refund, section 244A provides for grant of interest on the amount of refund out of any tax/penalty paid by the assessee or collected from him and in any case, otherwise it requires the date of payment by the assessee. Even if the inter-est due to an assessee is considered to be a ‘refund of any amount’ u/s. 240 or under the opening part of section 244A(1) as held by the courts in certain cases, ‘it would not entitle an assessee to further interest on that amount of interest either under Clause (a) of section 244A(1) as it was not a refund out of any tax paid by him or collected from him; nor under Clause (b) of section 244A(1) as the interest is to start from the date of payment of tax or penalty and in the case of refund of interest, there cannot be the date of payment by an assessee’. Further, according to the Tribunal, the Supreme Court made it clear in para 40 of the judgment that there cannot be any doubt that the amount of interest on the refunded amount is as per the provisions of law as it then stood and on the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. When a specific provision has been made under the statute, such provision has to govern the field. The Tribunal then further stated that the AO is the statutory author-ity. The Tribunal, as an appellant authority, is likewise a statutory authority. It is not a court of equity. Therefore, it has to act as per the provisions of the Act and if a benefit or a relief is not available to an assessee under the Act, it cannot be granted on the grounds of equity or the general provisions of law as can be granted by the courts in their writ jurisdiction. Referring to the full Bench Judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of Carona Sahu Co. Ltd. [146 ITR 452], the Tribunal held that though interest is compensatory in character, yet there is no right to receive interest other than by right created under a statute. According to the Tribunal, section 244A apparently reveals that there is a liability to pay interest on delayed payment of refund amount but the section does not provide for payment of any interest on interest, even though there is a delay in payment of such interest. Finally, the Tri-bunal held that looking to the language of section 244A, the assessee was not entitled to any interest on interest as it was not a case of the refund of amount out of any tax paid by or collected from the assessee nor it has a date of payment by the assessee from which it can run. It may also be noted that the phrase ‘date of payment of tax or penalty’ is also defined in the Explanation to section 244A(1) to mean that ‘the date on and from which the amount of tax or penalty specified in the notice of demand issued under section 156 is paid in excess of such demand’. However, it is worth not-ing that even u/s. 244(1A), the interest was required to be calculated from the date of excess payment and still the Apex Court in Sandvik’s case took the view that assessee is entitled to interest on unpaid amount of interest as mentioned in para 3.1 above. Under the circumstances, to what extent the distinction drawn by the Tribunal in the context of section 244A(1)(b) should hold good could be a matter of debate. It may also be noted that in this case the Tribunal did not have the benefit considering the judgment of the apex court in the case of H.E.G Ltd. and its effect referred to in para 3.1.3 to 3.1.3.3 as the same was delivered subsequently. As such, the view taken by the Tribunal in this case may not be necessarily regarded as correct.

3.1.3    The judgment of the apex court in the case of HEG Ltd. [324 ITR 331] is also worth noting. In this case, the Court was dealing with batch of appeals. At the outset, the Court stated that if a question is not properly framed then, at times, confusion arises resulting in wrong answers and the present batch of appeals is an illustration thereof. For this purpose, the Court noted the facts of the case of one of the appeals [SLP(SC) No. 18045/2009] for the assessment year 1993-94 and stated that the question framed by the Revenue with regard to the entitlement of the assessee to claim interest on interest u/s. 244A is erroneous. As such, the Court clarified that this is not a case where the assessee is claiming com-pound interest or interest on interest as is sought to be made out by the Revenue. The Court then dealt with a question as to what is the meaning of the words “refund of any amount becomes due to the assessee” in section 244A? In this context, the Court rejected the argument of the Revenue that the words “any amount” will not include the interest which accrued to the assessee for delay in refunding the amount and held as under [Page No. 333]:

“………….We see no merit in this argument. The interest component will partake of the character of the “amount due” under section 244A. It becomes as integral part of Rs. 45,73,528 which is not paid for 57 months after the said amount became due and payable. As can be seen from the facts narrated above, this is the case of short payment by the Department and it is in this way that the assessee claims interest u/s. 244A of the Income-tax Act. Therefore, on both the aforestated grounds, we are of the view that the assessee was entitled to interest for 57 months on Rs. 45,73,528. The principal amount of Rs. 45,73,528 has been paid on 31st December, 1997 but net of interest which, as stated above, partook of the character of “amount due” u/s. 244A.”

3.1.3.1 From the available facts in the above judgment, it seems that the total tax paid had two components, viz., TDS (Rs. 45,73,528) and tax paid after the original assessment (Rs. 1,71,00,320). It seems that the assessee was entitled to refund of Rs. 2,16,73,848 consisting of the above two components from which, it appears that refund of Rs. 45,73,528 (TDS component) was delayed by 57 months and the assessee had claimed statutory interest u/s. 244A for this delayed refund of Rs. 45,73,528 for a period from 1st April, 1993 to 31st December, 1997. Therefore, it appears that the amount of Rs. 45,73,528 represents the principal amount and does not seem to include any interest. As such, there is no clarity on the facts in the context of the above view expressed by the apex court.

3.1.3.2 It may be noted that in the above case, in the Head Notes of the ITR, references are given to various appeal numbers and it is also mentioned that such appeals are arising out of the judgment of the MP High Court in the case of CIT vs. H.E.G. Ltd. reported in 310 ITR 341 and of the Madras High Court in the case of Cholamandalam Investment and Finance Co. Ltd. reported in 294 ITR 438. There seem to be some confusion in this regard. The facts dealt with in the text of the judgment of the apex court are, it is stated, for the assessment year 1993-94 [seems to be in the case of H.E.G. Ltd.] and it appears that this assessment year was not covered in the judgment of the MP High Court reported in 310 ITR 341 in which the High Court has held that grant of interest on interest is permis-sible and this position does not change u/s. 244A. The judgment of the MP High Court for the assessment year 1993-94 could not be verified as the same was not available. Accordingly, in view of lack of clarity on the factual position, it seems difficult to take a view that the judgment of the MP High Court reported in 310 ITR 341 has been affirmed by the apex court as mentioned in the Head Notes of the ITR. This position gets further clarified by the fact that the apex court has also stated that the question does not relate to interest on interest. Notwithstanding this position, this judgment of the apex court supports the view that the words ‘amount due’ appearing in section 244A include interest and the interest component will partake of the character of the ‘amount due’ under section 244A. Similar view was also taken in Sandvik’s case in the context of section 244(1A) as mentioned in para 2.16 of PART 1 of this write-up.

3.1.3.3 The effect of the judgment of the apex court in H.E.G. Ltd. (supra) has been explained by the Delhi High Court in a recent judgment dated 6th September, 2013 in the case of India Trade Promotion Organisation [ITA Nos. 167 & 168 of 2012]. This judgment has been delivered in the context of claim of interest u/s. 244A on account of delayed payment of interest after granting the refund of the principal amount. The High Court explained that if the refund does not include interest due and payable on the amount refunded, the Revenue would be liable to pay interest on the shortfall. This does not amount to payment of interest on interest. The Court has also explained this with example. According to the Court, the claim of such interest is on account of the shortfall in payment of the amount due and payable (including interest) and not a claim of interest on interest.

Gujarat Flourochemicals Ltd. vs. CIT – 300 ITR 328 (Guj)

4.1 The issue with regard to the entitlement of interest on interest also came up before the Gujarat High Court in the above case after Sandvik’s case. In this case, the brief facts were: The assessee had made certain payment to a foreign company (non-resident) and in that context on making an application for non-deduction of tax, the Assessing Officer (AO) had directed the assessee to deduct tax @ 30% on the basis which the assessee had deducted certain amount of tax and paid to the Government (it seems – somewhere in June 1987). Subsequently, the assessee realised that tax deducted and paid was excess on account of non-application of the principle of grossing up to its case at the relevant time and accordingly, claimed refund for such excess payment of tax which was granted (Rs. 10,26,868) by the AO vide order dated 30th November, 1990. Subsequently, the assessee claimed interest on such refund for a period from 1st July, 1987 to 30th November, 1990. There is some confusion in facts on terminal date i.e., 30-11-1990 or 13-11-1990. However, this is not relevant. The claim of the assessee was rejected by the CIT, CCIT as well as the CBDT. On these facts, the issue of grant of interest on such refund of excess tax paid came up before the Gujarat High Court in a writ petition filed by the assessee.

4.1.1 For the purpose of deciding the issue, the Court noted that the question as to whether the assessee is entitled to compensation by way of interest for delay in payment of amount lawfully due to the assessee which are withheld wrongly and contrary to law stands concluded by the apex court in Sandvik’s case. The Court also noted the subsequent instruction (referred to in para 3.1.1) issued by the CBDT in this regard. Based on this, the Court took the view that the assessee is entitled to interest as claimed and directed the Revenue to pay interest at the rate of 9% from 1st July, 1987 to 30th November, 1990. The Court also further directed to pay running interest at the rate of 9% on the amount of interest which may be granted to the assessee in pursuance of the judgment of the High Court.

4.1.2    It may be noted that in the above case, the Gujarat High court took the view that the assessee is entitled to interest on the amount refunded to the assessee as well as interest on such interest on general principles effectively relying on the judgment of the Apex Court in Sandvik’s case.

CIT vs. Gujarat Flourochemicals – 348 ITR 319 [SC – Division Bench]

5.1    It seems that the above judgment of the Gujarat High Court came up for consideration before the Division Bench of the apex court at the instance of the Revenue. The facts are not given in the case before the apex court. The Court also stated that this controversy arises in number of cases pending before the apex court. While dealing with this case, the Court noted that the short point which arises in the present case is: “What is the character of Tax Deductible at Source (TDS)/ Advance Tax under the Income-tax Act, 1961.” The Court further stated that the question which arises in this case is, whether interest is payable by the Revenue to the assessee if the aggregate of installments of Advance Tax/TDS paid exceeds the as-sessed tax? The Court also mentioned that this controversy arises in a number of cases pending before the Apex Court. Interestingly, it seems that, this question does not refer to liability of the Revenue to pay interest on interest but only refers to the liability of the Revenue to pay interest on excess payment of tax (i.e. Advance Tax/ TDS). However, it is also worth noting that the High Court had directed the Revenue to pay running interest on the amount of interest as mentioned in para 4.1.1.

5.1.1    In the above case, the assessee had relied on the judgment of the apex court in Sandvik’s case. Referring to this, the Court stated that the main issue which arose for determination in Sandvik’s case was whether the assessee was entitled to be compensated by the Rev-enue for delay in paying to it the amounts admittedly due. The Court also doubted the correctness of the judgment in Sandvik’s case. In this context, the Court stated as under:

“The argument in Sandvik Asia [supra] on behalf of the assessee was that it was entitled to compensation by way of interest for the delay in payment of the amounts lawfully due to it which were wrongly withheld for a long period of seventeen years. Vide Paragraph (23) of Sandvik Asia [supra], the Division Bench held that, in view of the express provisions of the Act, the assessee was entitled to compensation by way of interest for the delay in payment of the amounts lawfully due to the assessee, which were withheld wrongly by the Revenue. With due respect, section 214 of the Act does not provide for payment of compensation by the Revenue to the assessee in whose favour a refund order has been passed. Moreover, in Sandvik Asia [supra], interest was ordered on the basis of equity. It was also ordered to be paid on the basis of Article 265 of the Constitution. We have serious doubts about the correctness of the judgment in Sandvik Asia [supra]. In our view, the judgment of this Court in the case of Modi Industries Limited vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, 1995 (6) S.C.C. 396 correctly holds that Advance Tax or TDS loses its identity as soon as it is adjusted against the liability created by the Assessment Order and becomes tax paid pursuant to the Assessment Order. If Advance Tax or TDS loses its identity and becomes tax paid on the passing of the Assessment Order, then, is the assessee not entitled to interest under the relevant provisions of the Act?…”

5.1.2 The Court then referred to the relevant provisions of the Act [viz. sections 195, 195A, 214, 243, 244 etc.] and took the view that Sandvik’s case has not been correctly decided and referred the above issue arising in the above case as well as in other appeals to the Hon’ble Chief Justice for decision by a Larger Bench.

Gujarat Flourochemicals – 358 ITR 291 (SC – Larger Bench)

6.1    Based on the view of the Division Bench of the apex court referred to in para 5.1.2, the question of law involved in many cases [which, it seems, included the judgment of the Gujarat High Court in Gujarat Flouro-chemicals Ltd. (supra)] was referred to the Larger Bench (consisting of 3 judges) for consideration and authoritative pronouncement. In the context of the issue to be decided, the Court noted as under:

‘The question which arises in this case is, whether interest is payable by the Revenue to the assessee if the aggregate of installments of Advance Tax or TDS paid exceeds the assessed tax?’

6.2:    Referring to the judgment in Sandvik’s case, the Court stated as under:

“We would first throw light on the reasoning and the decision of this Court on the core issue in Sandvik case (supra). The only issue formulated by this Court for its consideration and decision was whether an assessee is entitled to be compensated by the Income-tax Department for the delay in paying interest on the refunded amount admittedly due to the assessee. This Court in the facts of the said case had noticed that there was delay of various periods, ranging from 12 to 17 years, in such payment by the Revenue. This Court had further referred to the several decisions which were brought to its notice and also referred to the relevant provisions of the Act which provide for refunds to be made by the Revenue when a superior forum directs refund of certain amounts to an assessee while disposing of an appeal, revision etc.

Since there was an inordinate delay on the part of the Revenue in refunding the amount due to the assessee this Court had thought it fit that the assessee should be properly and adequately compensated and therefore in paragraph 51 of the judgment, the Court while compensating the assessee had directed the Revenue to pay a compensation by way of interest for two periods, namely; for the Assessment Years 1977-78, 1978- 79, 1981-82, 1982-83 in a sum of Rs.40,84,906/- and interest @ 9% from 31.03.1986 to 27.03.1998 and in default, to pay the penal interest @ 15% per annum for the aforesaid period.”

6.2.1    The Court then stated that the said judgment has been misquoted and misinterpreted to say that in that case the Court had taken a view that the Revenue is obliged to pay interest on interest in the event of its failure to refund the interest payable within the statutory period.

6.2.2    Finally, explaining the effect of Sandvik’s case, the Court stated as under:

“As we have already noticed, in Sandvik case (supra) this Court was considering the issue whether an assessee who is made to wait for refund of interest for decades be compensated for the great prejudice caused to it due to the delay in its payment after the lapse of statutory period. In the facts of that case, this Court had come to the conclusion that there was an inordinate delay on the part of the Revenue in re-funding certain amount which included the statutory interest and therefore, directed the Revenue to pay compensation for the same not an interest on interest.”

6.3 After explaining the effect of the judgment of Sandvik’s case as above, to decide the question of law referred to it, the Court held as under and referred back all the matters before a Division Bench to consider each case independently and take appropriate decision one way or the other:

“Further it is brought to our notice that the Legislature by the Act No. 4 of 1988 (w.e.f. 01.04.1989) has inserted section 244A to the Act which provides for interest on refunds under various contingencies. We clarify that it is only that interest provided for under the statute which may be claimed by an assessee from the Revenue and no other interest on such statutory interest.”

6.4      From the above decision of the Court, one may get an impression that the Court seems to have taken a view that Sandvik’s case was decided under pre-1989 provisions and from assessment year 1989-90, the interest on refund is payable u/s. 244A. As no reasonings are available in this judgment for the view taken by the Court, there is no clarity on this aspect. However, it would appear that the Larger Bench of the Court has not overruled the judgment in Sandvik’s case.  The Larger Bench of the Court also does not seem to have approved the view expressed by the Division Bench (referred to in para 5.1.2) that Sandvik’s case has not been correctly decided.  Instead, the Court has explained the view taken in Sandvik’s case and the effect thereof that in that case the Court had directed the Revenue to pay compensation for inordinate delay in refunding certain amount due to the assessee which included statutory interest and in that case, the Court had not decided that the Revenue is liable to pay interest on interest.    

Conclusion
7.1       From the judgment of three judge Bench of the Apex Court (Larger Bench) in the above case, it becomes clear that the assessee can claim only that interest which is provided under the Act and no other interest can be claimed by the assessee on statutory interest for delay in payment thereof. The similar approach was adopted by the three judge Bench of the Apex Court in the case of Panchanatham Chettiar [99 ITR 579]. As such, the assessee is not entitled to claim interest on interest unless there is a provision in the Act for the same.  

7.1.1     It is unfortunate that Larger Bench of the Apex Court has taken such a strict technical view of the issue which, in many cases, may involve the issue of equity and justice. In fact, with     this     judgment,    some    Revenue    Officials    may be tempted to delay payment of interest as that does not create any liability to pay further interest on the amount of interest wrongly withheld. This may happen in cases involving large amount of interest in this era of    unjustified    pressure    for    meeting    unrealistic revenue collection targets. This possibility was noted by the Apex Court in Sandvik’s case referred to in para 2.13.1 of Part 1 of this write-up wherein the Court has also opined that such actions and consequences seriously affect     the    administration    of     justice    and     the    rule of law.  It appears that this was also one of the factors considered by the Court to decide the issue in favour of the assessee in Sandvik’s case. Similar approach is found in the judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of India Trade Promotion Organisation referred to in para 3.1.3.3.  Otherwise also, this position may be open to abuse and that is not in the long term interest of fair administration of tax laws.  Somehow, the Larger Bench of the Court in the above case has not appreciated this ground reality.  To be fair to the assessee, appropriate provision should be made in the Act itself to compensate the assessee in cases of delay in payment of interest due to the assessee. We only hope that the Revenue Officials will strictly follow the directions contained in the Instruction No. 2 dated 28th March, 2007 (referred to in para 3.1.1) issued by the CBDT after the judgment of the apex court in Sandvik’s case.

7.2     From the above judgment, it seems to us that the Larger Bench in the above case has not decided that the assessee will not be entitled to claim compensation from the Revenue even if there is inordinate delay in payment of amount due to the assessee which may include statutory interest.  As mentioned in para 6.4, in the above case, the Court has not held that Sandvik’s case was wrongly decided. As such, as held in Sandvik’s case, in case of delay in payment of     ‘amount    due’     to     the    assessee     it    may    be possible for the assessee to claim compensation on such amount even if such amount includes statutory interest. Such a claim of the assessee should not be regarded as claim of interest on interest. It also appears that the claim for such compensation may be considered by the Courts and, as held by the Tribunal (TM) in the case of Nirma Chemicals (referred to in para 3.1.2), such a claim may not be entertained by the Tribunal or the lower authorities.

7.3    In the above context, it is worth noting that as mentioned in para 3.1.3.2, the Apex Court in the case of H.E.G. Ltd has held that the words ‘amount due’ appearing in section 244A include interest and the interest com-ponent will partake of the character of the ‘amount due’ u/s. 244A. It seems that this position is not disturbed by the judgment of the Larger Bench in the above case as this has not been considered in the above case. This was also not the issue before the Larger Bench in the above case. It is also worth noting that the judgment of the apex court in H.E.G Ltd was also delivered by a three judge Bench of the apex court. With this position, the claim of interest u/s. 244A on the interest component of the ‘amount due’ may be regarded as claim of interest on shortfall in payment of ‘amount due’ and not as claim of interest on interest. As such, such a claim may be regarded as the claim under the provisions of the Act. This needs consideration even after the judgment of the Larger Bench in the above case. In this context, the judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of India Trade Promotion Organisation ( supra) is worth noting. At the same time, in this context, the view expressed by the Tribunal (TM) in the case of Nirma Chemicals (supra) may also be borne in mind.

7.4    In the cases of D. J. Works [195 ITR 227] and Chimanbhai S. Patel [210 ITR 419], the Gujarat High Court had taken a view that the assessee is entitled to interest on interest. As mentioned in para 1.4.1 of Part 1 of this write- up, the judgment of the Gujarat High Court was followed by the M. P. High Court in the case of Narendra Doshi and the judgment of the M. P. High Court in the case of Narendra Doshi has been affirmed by the apex court [254 ITR 606]. This is also relied on in Sandvik’s case to take a view that even if there is no provision in the Act for payment of compensation, the compensation for delay is required to be paid. In Sandvik’s case, as mentioned in para 2.9 of Part 1 of this write-up, a view was also taken that the decision of the apex court in Narendra Doshi’s case is on the merits of the matter, though it proceeded on the assumption that there was no provision in the Act grating interest on unpaid interest. Even this judgment in the case of Narendra Doshi was delivered by a three judge Bench of the Apex Court. It is worth noting that this judgment has also not been considered by the Larger Bench in the above case. The implication of this factual position may need consideration and we will have to wait and watch for the position which may ultimately emerge from this situation.

7.4.1 When the Division Bench of the apex court finally decides the issue on merit in the case of Gujarat Flourochemicals [or in any other case from the set of appeals forming part of the judgment of the Larger Bench in the above case], some light may be thrown on the above. Let us hope for the development/ clarity in this regard at that stage.

WRIT PETITION MAINTAINABILITY

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SYNOPSIS

When an alternative remedy is
available under the Act, writ petition is not maintainable. However, in
various decisions the Hon’ble Supreme Court and High Courts have held
that if a issued is patently illegal or without jurisdiction,
notwithstanding the alternative remedy, writ is maintainable. In this
article, the author analyses of the recent SC ruling in the case of
Vijaybhai N. Chandrani which in his view is inconsistent with this
position and therefore requires reconsideration.

Brief Factual Background of the case before the Hon’ble Supreme Court:

Recently,
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Vijaybhai N. Chandrani
[Civil Appeal No. 5888 to 5903 of 2013 dated 18.7.2013] has held that
writ petition before the Hon’ble High Court is not maintainable when
alternate remedy is available under the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘the
Act’). The brief background of the case is given hereunder:

In
the case of Vijaybhai (supra), the assessee purchased a plot of land
from Samutkarsh Co-operative Housing Society being developed by Savvy
Infrastructure Ltd. In 2008, a search was conducted u/s. 132 of the Act
in the premises of the Society and Savvy Infrastructure Ltd. During the
search, Assessing Officer (‘AO’) seized certain documents u/s. 132A of
the Act. One of the documents was loose sheet of paper containing list
of members under the heading “Samutkarsh Members Details”. One of the
names was that of the assessee and certain details were mentioned
against each name in different columns. On the basis of these documents
the AO issued notices u/s. 153C to the assessee to furnish his returns
of income for assessment years 2001-2002 to 2006-2007. Upon receipt of
the said notice, the assessee requested the AO to provide copies of the
seized material. The AO supplied copies of three loose sheets of paper
which, according to the assessee, did not belong to him. Under these
circumstances, the assessee moved a writ petition before the Hon’ble
Gujarat High Court challenging the aforesaid notices.

The
Hon’ble Gujarat High Court quashed the notices by holding that as the
said documents undoubtedly  did not belong to the assessee the condition
precedent for issuance of notice was not fulfilled and therefore the
action taken u/s. 153C of the Act stood vitiated. Though the Hon’ble
Supreme Court did not express any opinion on the correctness or
otherwise of the construction that was placed by the High Court on
Section 153C of the Act, it held that as alternate remedy was available
to the assessee, the High Court ought not to have entertained the writ
petition and instead should have directed the assessee to file reply to
the said notices. Upon receipt of a decision from the AO, if for any
reason assessee was aggrieved by the said decision, the same could be
questioned before the forum provided under the Act. Accordingly, the
order of the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court was reversed.

Supreme
Court decisions on maintainability of writ petition – against
action/notice without jurisdiction – when alternative remedy is
available

It is a settled position that, generally, when
alternative remedy is available under the Act, writ petition is not
maintainable. However, in various decisions the Hon’ble Supreme Court
and High Courts have held that if the notice issued is patently illegal
or without jurisdiction, notwithstanding the alternative remedy, writ is
maintainable. Some key decisions laying down the said ratio are quoted
hereunder:

• Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. v. ITO [1961] 41 ITR 191 (SC)

“Mr.
Sastri mentioned more than once the fact that the company would have
sufficient opportunity to raise this question, viz., whether the
Income-tax Officer had reason to believe that under-assessment had
resulted from non-disclosure of material facts, before the Income-tax
Officer himself in the assessment proceedings and, if unsuccessful
there, before the Appellate Officer or the Appellate Tribunal or in the
High Court under section 66(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act. The
existence of such alternative remedy is not however always a sufficient
reason for refusing a party quick relief by a writ or order prohibiting
an authority acting without jurisdiction from continuing such action.”
(Emphasis supplied).

• Foramer vs. CIT [2001] 247 ITR 436 (All) affirmed by Supreme Court in [2003] 264 ITR 566 (SC)

“As
regards alternative remedy, we are of the opinion since the notice
under section 148 is without jurisdiction, the petitioner should not be
relegated to his alternative remedy vide Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. v.
ITO [1961] 41 ITR 191 (SC)…. .”

• UOI & Anr vs. Kunisetty Satyanarayana [2007] 001 CLR 0067 (SC)

“No
doubt, in some very rare and exceptional cases the High Court can quash
a charge-sheet or show-cause notice if it is found to be wholly without
jurisdiction or for some other reason if it is wholly illegal.”

From
the above decisions, it is very clear that as a matter of practice writ
petition is not maintainable if alternative remedy is available under
the Act. However, in exceptional cases when the notices issued are
patently illegal or without jurisdiction, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has
held that writ petition is maintainable.

Notice u/s. 153C in the case of Vijaybhai (supra) – without jurisdiction – liable to be quashed

In
the case of Vijaybhai (supra), the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court drew
distinction between the provisions of section 153C and section 158BD.
Whereas section 158BD seeks to tax any “undisclosed income” which “belongs”
to a person other than the person in whose case search has been carried
out, section 153C seeks to tax such other person only where “money, bullion, jewellery or other valuable article or thing or books of account or documents seized” “belongs” to him. The Hon’ble High Court held “….it is an admitted position as emerging from the record of the case, that the documents
in question, namely the three loose papers recovered during the search
proceedings do not belong to the petitioner. ….it is nobody’s case that
the said documents belong to the petitioner. It is not even the case of
Revenue that the said three documents are in the handwriting of the
petitioner. In the circumstances, when the condition precedent for
issuance of notice is not fulfilled any action taken under s. 153C of
the Act stands vitiated.”
In the instant case, since it was an
admitted fact that the documents seized did not belong to the assessee,
the High Court held the notices issued u/s. 153C to be without
jurisdiction. In light of the above, having regard to the judgments
noted earlier, it is respectfully submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme
Court should have upheld the judgment of the Gujarat High Court.

An
alternate remedy against an order passed pursuant to a notice cannot be
considered as an alternate remedy available against the notice which is
patently without jurisdiction

The Hon’ble Supreme Court did
not affirm the decision of Hon’ble Gujarat High Court supposedly on the
ground that the assessee had alternate remedies under the Act against
the notices issued. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held:

“…… at the
said stage of issuance of the notices under Section 153C, the assessee
could have addressed his grievances and explained his stand to the
Assessing Authority by filing an appropriate reply to the said notices
instead of filing the Writ Petition impugning the said notices. ….

In the present case, the assessee has invoked the Writ jurisdiction of the High Court at the first instance without first exhausting the alternate remedies provided under the Act. In our considered opinion, at the said stage of proceedings, the High Court ought not have entertained the Writ Petition and instead should have directed the assessee to file reply to the said notices and upon receipt of a decision from the

Assessing Authority, if for any reason it is aggrieved by the said decision, to question the same before the forum provided under the Act. ….

Further, we grant time to the assessee, if it so desires, to file reply/objections, if any, as contemplated in the said notices within 15 days’ time from today. If such reply/objections is/are filed within time granted by this Court, the Assessing Authority shall first consider the said reply/objections and thereafter direct the assessee to file the return for the assessment years in question. We make it clear that while framing the assessment order, the Assessing Authority will not be influenced by any observations made by the High Court while disposing of the Writ Petition. If, for any reason, the assessment order goes against the assessee, he/it shall avail and exhaust the remedies available to him/it under the Act, 1961. ….”

It is respectfully submitted that if the underlined portion of the judgment was not forming part of it, the said judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court would have been on the lines of its earlier judgment in the case of GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd vs. ITO  [2003] 259 ITR 19 (SC) wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a writ challenging notice u/s. 148 had directed the assessee/AO as under:

Thus, in the absence of the underlined part in the aforesaid judgment, as has happened in several writs challenging notices u/s. 148, the assessee would be able to approach the High Court after the AO’s order dealing with or rejecting the objections of the assessee against issue of notices u/s. 153C. As evident from the underlined part of the judgment quoted above, it is respectfully submitted that it appears that the Hon’ble Supreme Court:

a)  was either under an impression that there is a remedy under the Act against issue of notice u/s. 153C; or

b)     has    failed    to    appreciate    the    difference    between    an alternate remedy available against an order passed pursuant to a notice in contradistinction with an alternate remedy available against the issuance of the notice itself.

Conclusion:
In the light of the above, it is most humbly and respectfully submitted that the aforesaid judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court requires reconsideration as:

(i)   the notice issued u/s. 153C was clearly without jurisdiction.

(ii)   there is no alternate remedy available under the Act against the issuance of notice u/s. 153C.

(iii)   in any case, as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in number of cases notwithstanding the availability of an alternate remedy, a writ is clearly maintainable against an action/notice which is issued patently without jurisdiction.

Rethinking growth strategy

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Whenever I hear a politician saying that his party will fight elections on issues of development and growth rather than those that divide society, one takes that with a huge bag of salt. Whenever the youth of this country talk of growth, one is touched by the sincerity in their voices and the dreams in their eyes .

The issue really is, what is the nature of growth that we want and what are the ways and means to achieve it? In this editorial I am placing my thoughts before readers. I must admit that inspiration for this piece was a series of essays titled “Reimagining India“ recommended by a dear friend.

The world appears convinced that India has the potential to become an economic superpower, but the tragedy is that Indians are drowned in self-doubt. We have huge untapped talent. Away from Indian shores, Indians excel in universities and corporations. In the USA, Indians are number one in terms of per capita income. We must therefore believe that we have the ability to be the best in the world.

Our diffidence probably arises on account of being constantly compared with China’s growth model. If we continue to do so, we will always label ourselves as laggards. India cannot afford to grow like China nor should that be its aim. Our democratic coalition governments cannot become as ruthlessly efficient as China’s politburo nor should they aspire to be. Though we may not realise it today, the social costs of China’s economic expansion are obvious. While it may showcase its Shanghai infrastructure, many parts of China suffer from a poor quality of life and rank extremely low on the happiness index. There is a simmering discontent among certain sections of the public. An authoritarian regime, like the one in China, in a country like ours with a religious, community and caste diversity can result in an explosive situation.

While we must not blindly ape the China model, we must admit that we have made many mistakes since independence and it is time that we rethink the future. We have in the first four decades post-independence followed a protectionism policy believing that we were a defenceless lot , while record shows that with a more open global competition Indians have fared far better.

Even after the Indian economy was unshackled, there has been excessive importance to the information technology  and software sectors without realising that these are tertiary sectors and their growth, has benefitted the white-collared employees while ignoring the blue-collar workforce which is in fact our strength. While GDP increased, its distribution was skewed. We did not pay adequate attention to primary sectors – manufacturing and agriculture. The emphasis must now shift. Liberalisation of labour laws and fast tracking agricultural reforms can give the Indian economy the requisite depth and breadth.

While I believe that one must guard against an undue socialist bias that our economic policies once had, one cannot ignore the importance of an equitable distribution of national wealth. While the government must get out of business it must actively invest and intervene in core sectors. For example, the government must give emphasis to infrastructure which would give impetus to business and increase spending on health and education which would improve the quality of life of the masses.

However in doing so, limited government resources must be spent with well-defined priorities. In infrastructure while it is important to have more and improved airports, the priority should be to build more roads, bridges and railway tracks. While the ultimate goal is that latest developments in the medical field should be available to the public at affordable rates, the emphasis must be on ensuring primary health care. In education while we must encourage top-class universities and technical institutions, the government itself must spend on primary education. The Right to Education Act is a beginning and not the end. While increasing spending in these sectors one must use leapfrogging techniques to accelerate the growth. It would be worthwhile to explore using the broadband to deliver educational content to villages rather than the brick and mortar method of increasing traditional schools.

Finally we must recognise the ground realities and our social ethos. Diversity is a unique characteristic of our country. Rather than attempting to iron out our differences we must attempt convert them into virtues rather than vulnerabilities. Rather than keeping power centralised in the fear that the States would go astray I believe that giving the States greater autonomy in economic policies may be advisable. If the States go their own way, competition will push the laggards to perform better. This will invigorate the States who will ensure that investment comes their way. The better performing States will attract resources. Shifting of Tata motors from West Bengal to Gujarat is a case in point. The Centre should aid the weaker States to overcome the infrastructure deficit and leave them to compete, with each other. For a long time the four northern States Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh were described as BIMARU. This is a thing of the past. Bihar is making great strides and Madhya Pradesh ranks very high in terms of  various growth parameters.

These are some of the growth strategies that we need to adopt if we are to become an economic superpower. The world is convinced about the India growth story. It is time that Indians believed it!

Anil J. Sathe
Editor
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In Search of Godhead

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Robin Sharma, renowned author and a leadership guru has given an interesting story in his book “Who will cry when you die?” Thousands of years ago, it was believed that every one who walked upon the earth was god. But humankind abused its limitless powers. So the Supreme God decided to hide the Godhead, the source of all of this potential, so that no one could find it. An imperative question arose, where could such thing be hidden? The first suggestion of placing it deep into the ground was rejected as some one would find it, digging deep. The other options of placing it in the deepest ocean or the highest mountain were also turned down as some one would dive deep in the ocean or scale the highest peaks and find it some day. The Supreme God then found a solution to this. He decided to put this source of all power inside the hearts of every man, woman and child as they will never think of looking there.

The story appears so very true in today’s context considering the manner in which everyone is going about looking for God. The irony is that, all our actions including the devotion seem more because of the fear of God rather than the love of God. As put beautifully in the story, how many are able to look for God in a human being or for that matter, in every being, the ones that are marvelous creations of God? The need is to distinguish between the “Man made Murats” and “God made Murats”.

Atman, the soul, the Brahmn is the same in each and every being. One that is beyond body, mind and intellect. Those who have never tried to understand anything beyond the sensually perceivable world may raise the question, “If there is God, why can’t we see him? Such a question may be a matter of laughter for many. Our identification with body, mind and intellect in all our exchanges without even having a thought of the spirit (the Atman), is an example of how ignorant we are. Whenever we interact with anyone, we identify only with the mind, body complex and not the spirit. Atman or Brahmn, in all beings is the same. Brahmn pervades all activity.

In Kenopanisad, the guru explains God, Brahmn as:

That which indeed is the Ear of the ear, the Mind of the mind, the Speech of the speech, the Vital-air of the prana and the Eye of the eye. The wise having completely freed and risen above this world become immortal. [Kenopanisad – Mantra 2]

This may sound somewhat confusing at first instance as to what could be the Ear of the ear or the Eye of the eye. The answer is simple. It is known that we see through the eyes, but there is force within that enables the eyes to see, that force is Brahmn, God. So is with the ears. If eyes could see, then the body without life could also see. This enlivening force, the Brahmn, one which is non-dual resides in the heart of every human being is the substratum of the universe.

If there is one God in all then why don’t we see it? We do not see it because we operate only through the body, mind and intellect. This can be best understood with a small experiment. When a light passes through a prism, the output of one coloured light is reflected in various different colours. Single coloured light appears in many colours on the other side of the prism. Similarly, when the Brahmn operates through the prism of the body, mind and intellect, we see different individuals distinct from the one Brahmn rooted in all.

To love God is to love all. Lord Krishna in the 12th chapter of Bhagwad Gita has enumerated 35 qualities of a devotee. The first and foremost quality stated in verse 13 is on the same thought and in fact would disqualify many devotees. “One who hates no being”. Thus to love God, one needs to identify God everywhere, love all beings because the same God lives in all beings. Loving all fellow beings has been beautifully presented in a poem Abou Ben Adhem, by James Henry Leigh Hunt. The poet has illustrated the true devotion to God. Abou dreamt of an angel who was writing the names of those who loved God. He enquired whether his name was there in the list or not. When the angel replied that his name was not in the list, he then requested the angel to write his name in the list of those who loved his fellow-men. Angel wrote the name and left. The next night the angel came with the list of those whom God loved. This list had Abou Ben Adhem’s name on the top.

levitra

Activities Relating to Purchase of Goods from India by a Liaison Office

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Synopsis
Under Section 9, income of a non-resident (NR) from a “business connection” in India would be deemed to accrue or arise in India. However, if the activities of NR are confined to purchase of goods in India for the purpose of export the deeming fiction does not apply.

The scope of the phrase “operations which are confined to the purchase of goods in India” has been a subject matter of controversy, with the Tax Department generally adopting a fairly narrow interpretation. In this feature the authors analyse the various judicial pronouncements in this regard.

Issue for consideration

An income of a foreign company or part thereof, attributable to its operations in India, is taxable in India provided such operations or activities are construed to be a ‘business connection’ within the meaning of the term as defined in Explanation 2 to section 9(1) of the Income-tax Act. Such an income is deemed to accrue or arise in India where it is found to be through or from any business connection in India, whether directly or indirectly. The said Explanation 2 provides that a business connection shall inter alia include any business activity, carried out through a person who habitually exercises an authority to conclude contracts in India on behalf of the non-resident, unless his activity is limited to the purchase of goods or merchandise for the non-resident.

Explanation 1(b) provides that income shall not be deemed to accrue or arise in India, where operations are confined to purchase of goods in India for the purpose of export.

An issue has arisen in cases where an Indian liaison office of a foreign company purchases goods from India for its head office and carries out several activities incidental thereto. The courts have been asked, under the circumstances, to define the true meaning of the term ‘confined to purchase of goods in India’ and explain whether the activities that are carried out for effecting purchase of goods in India could be considered as an independent activity or as an integral part of the purchase of goods in India. In case of the latter, the activity shall not attract Indian taxation and in case of the earlier, it may expose the income attributable to such activity to taxation in India. Recently, the Karnataka High Court has held that such activities constitute purchase of goods in India, while the Authority for Advance Ruling has held the same to be not forming part of purchase.

Columbia Sportswear Co.’s case

The issue arose before the Authority for Advance Rulings In Re Columbia Sportswear Co, 12 taxmann. com 349. The company in this case was incorporated under the laws of the USA, a multinational wholesaler and retailer of outdoors apparel with global operations. It conducted research and development to develop marketable products outside India. In the year 1995, the company established a liaison office in Chennai for undertaking liaison activities, in connection with purchase of goods in India, which activities had subsequently been expanded to Bangladesh and Egypt. Besides coordinating purchase of goods from India, the Indian liaison office also assisted the company in purchase of goods from Egypt and Bangladesh and engaged in quality monitoring and production monitoring of goods purchased from these countries. The goods procured from Egypt and Bangladesh were directly sold to the company in the United States from those countries. In the year 2000, a support office was opened by the Indian liaison office in Bangalore with the approval of the Reserve Bank of India.

The company claimed that;

• its products were produced by independent suppliers worldwide including India.

• the Indian liaison office was involved in activities relating to purchase functions for the company and incidentally was engaged in vendor identification, review of costing data, vendor recommendation, quality control and uploading of material prices into the internal product data management system of the company besides monitoring vendors for compliance with its policies, procedures and standards related to quality, delivery, pricing and labour practices.

• the Indian liaison office did not have any revenue streams; it did not source products to be sold locally in India.

• it did not sell any goods in India and therefore no income arose from its Indian operations.

• no income could be deemed to have accrued or arose in India within the meaning of section 9(1) of the Act.

• its case was covered by Explanation 1(b) of s.9(1) (i) and could not be construed as a case of business connection.

• it did not undertake any activity of trading, commercial or industrial in nature in India.

• the expenditure of the liaison office was entirely met by remittances made by the company.

On these facts, the company approached the Authority seeking a ruling on the question whether, given the nature of the activities carried on by the liaison office, any income accrues or arises in India as per section 5(2)(b) of the Act? Whether the applicant can be said to have a business connection in India as per the provisions of section 9(1)(i) of Act read with Explanation 2? Whether various activities carried out by the India LO, as listed in the Statement of relevant facts (Annexure-III), are covered under the phrase, ‘through or from operations which are confined to the purchase of goods in India for the purpose of export’ as stated in part (b) of Explanation 1 to section 9(1)(i) of the Act?

The Authority in paragraph 8 of the decision noted the following facts surrounding the activities of the LO;

“The liaison office of the applicant in India is engaged in vendor identification, review of costing data, vendor recommendation, quality control and uploading of material prices into the internal product data management system of the applicant. The liaison office monitors vendors for compliance with its policies, procedures and standards related to quality, delivery, pricing and labour practices. The liaison office is engaged in quality monitoring and production monitoring for goods purchased from Egypt and Bangladesh. It coordinates, ascertains, monitors and verifies with the vendors to develop the material in line with the quality and aesthetic requirements of the product as provided by the applicant’s product design team. It undertakes laboratory testing of fabrics/garments in India in addition to inspecting the quality of the products. It reviews production and quality assurance including the monitoring of the labour practices compliance and periodic performance reviews. It conveys the orders placed by the applicant on to the suppliers and interacts with the suppliers in relation to capacity utilisation, quality assurance, on-time delivery performance and so on. The role of the quality control team in the liaison office includes executing pre-sourcing factory evaluations to determine the vendor’s ability to manufacture the product to the expectations of the applicant. The quality control team also gives quality training to the newly selected vendors and is responsible for communicating the quality processes of the applicant and expectations to suppliers. The team also ensures that standard methods, tools, machinery and layouts are used. The liaison office also summarises seasonal vendor quality performance for the consideration of the applicant. The liaison office also ensures compliance with the quality process including seeking to ensure that the targeted defect percentage is maintained. It also ensures that the requirements of environmental laws and labour laws of the country are obeyed by the suppliers.”

The Authority concluded that the applicant could not take benefit of Explanation 1(b) to section 9(1) (i) as, in its opinion, the activities carried out by the assessee were not confined to purchase of goods in India. The following findings and observations of the Authority are pertinent;

•    The liaison office had about 35 employees divided into 5 teams dealing with material management, merchandising, production management, quality control and administration support, constituting teams from finance, human resources and information systems.

•    Activities carried on by the liaison office related to ensuring the choosing of quality material, occasionally testing them for quality, conveying of requisite design, picking out of competitive sellers, the ensuring of quality, the ensuring of adherence to the policy of the applicant in the matter of procurement and employment, in the matter of compliance with environmental and other local regulations by the manufacturers – suppliers and in ensuring that the payments made by the applicant reach the suppliers.

•    In the matter of manufacturing of products as per design, quality and in implementing policy, the liaison office was actually doing the work of the applicant, which actually was in the business of designing, manufacturing and selling branded products, brands over which it had exclusive right.

•    The activities of the liaison office were not confined to India. It also facilitated the doing of business by the applicant with entities in Egypt and Bangladesh.

•    A person in the business of designing, manufactur-ing and selling could not be taken to earn a profit only by a sale of goods. The goods as designed and styled by the applicant could not be sold without it being got manufactured and procured in the manner designed and contemplated by the applicant.

•    It would be unrealistic to take the view that all the activities other than the actual sale of the goods are not an integral part of the business of the applicant and have no role in the profit being made by the applicant by the sale of its branded products. It was difficult to accept the argument that what was done in India by the liaison office of the applicant was only to expend money and all its income accrued outside India by the sale of the products.

•    All activities other than the actual sale could not be divorced from the business of manufacture and sale especially in a case like that of the applicant, where the sale was of a branded product, designed and got made by the applicant under supervision, under a brand owned by the applicant. Therefore, the argument on behalf of the applicant that all the activities carried on in India were confined to the purchase of goods in India, could not be accepted.

•    ‘Confined’ meant, ‘limited, restricted’. ‘Purchase’ meant ‘get by payment, buy’.

The Authority observed that what section 9(1)(i), Explanation 1(b) deemed in the case of a non-resident, was that no income arose in India to a person through or from operations which were confined to the purchase of goods in India for the purpose of export but, in the case before it, the activities of the liaison office of the applicant in India were not confined to the purchase of goods in India for the purpose of export. It further observed that the applicant, in fact, transacted in India its business of designing, quality controlling, getting manufactured consistent with its policy and the laws, the branded products it sold elsewhere and that those activities could not be understood as activities confined to purchase of goods in India for export from India.

Income resulting from manufacture, purchase and sale, in the opinion of the Authority, could not be compartmentalised and confined to one arising out of a sale only, and that the whole process of procurement and sale had to be completed to generate income. Getting manufactured and purchasing formed integral parts of the process of generating income and the liaison office acted as the arm of the applicant regarding that part of the activity, and its functions were not confined to purchase or mere purchase.

Another aspect that influenced the Authority’s decision was the fact that the activities of the liaison office of the applicant in India, was not confined to India but extended to Egypt and Bangladesh. Since the activities of the applicant in India included its business in Egypt and Bangladesh, it could not be stated that the operations of the applicant in India were confined to the purchase of goods in India for the purpose of export.

The Authority therefore took the view that the activities of the liaison office gave rise to taxable income in India, not being exempt under explanation 1(b) to section 9(1)(i).

Nike Inc.’s case

The issue recently came up for consideration before the Karnataka High Court in the case of CIT vs. Nike Inc., 34 taxmann.com 170. The company in this case was engaged in the business of sports apparel with its main office in the USA and had globally located associated enterprises or subsidiaries. From its office in the USA, the company arranged for all its subsidiaries the supply of various brands of sports apparel for sale to various customers. It did not carry on any manufacture by itself. It engaged various manufacturers all over the world on a job-to-job basis and made arrangements with its subsidiaries for purchase of the manufactured goods directly and payment for the same to the respective manufacturers.

With a view to procure various apparel from manufacturers from various parts of the world, the company opened a liaison office in India and;

•    employed persons in various categories.

•    the rate or price for each apparel was negotiated by the liaison office with the manufacturer.

•    the quality of each apparel was also indicated and the samples so developed were forwarded to the US office.

•    the liaison office proposed and gave its opinion about the reasonability of the price, etc. and the US office decided about the price, quality, quantity, to whom to be shipped and billed.

•    the local manufacturer in India was conveyed of the decision by the office in the USA and once it was accepted, the local manufacturer carried on his activity.

•    the liaison office kept a close watch on the progress, quality, etc. at the manufacturing workshop and also kept a watch on the time schedule to be followed and rendered such assistance as may be required in the dispatch of the goods, including the actual buyer and the place for export.

For all these activities in India, the liaison office was receiving funds through banking channels from the USA.

For the relevant assessment years, the company filed returns of income declaring nil income. It contended that its activities were to carry on activities that were ancillary and auxiliary to the activities of its head office and other group companies and to act as a communication channel between the head office and parties in India. It claimed that in terms of Explanation 1(b) to section 9(1)(i), no income shall be deemed to accrue or arise in India to a non-resident from operations which were confined to the purchase of goods in India for the purposes of export. In terms of Circular No. 20, dated 7-7-1964, a non-resident would not be liable to tax in India on any income attributable to operations confined to purchase of goods in India for export, even though the non-resident had an office or an agency in India for the purpose, or the goods were subjected to any manufacturing process before being exported from India. Therefore, no income shall be deemed to accrue or arise in India to it, as its operations were restricted to purchase of goods in India for the purpose of export, even though it had a liaison office to facilitate sourcing of products from Indian suppliers.

The Assessing Officer held that the activities of the company were actually beyond its activities required as a liaison office and a part of the entire business was done in India through the liaison office and therefore, the income had accrued or arisen or deemed to have accrued or arisen to the company in India in view of clause (b) of s/s. (2) of section 5. He, therefore, held that the income of the company was chargeable to tax to the extent of income, which was attributable to the activities done in India or accruing or arising in India on its behalf by its liaison office. He further held that 5% of the export value could reasonably be considered as income attributable to India operations, i.e., income accruing or arising in India to the company.

On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) held that it was an admitted fact that the company was not involved in the purchase of goods in India for the purpose of export, which would have involved transfer of title of goods purchased from the seller to the purchaser and as no purchase took place in the name of the liaison office, it was not entitled to the exemption enumerated in section 9(1). He, therefore, upheld the order of the Assessing Officer.

On second appeal, the tribunal held that the case before it was a case of purchase of the goods for the purpose of export by the assessee. It observed that in the absence of there being any prima facie contract between the assessee and the local manufacturer, the status of the liaison office was that of buyer’s agent, more so when the local manufacturer knew it only as the agent of the buyer i.e., the company had placed the orders on it with a view to buy the goods in the course of export and, as directed, export it to various affiliates of the company. It held that the Explanation 1(b) to section 9(1)(i) clearly applied to the company and hence, no income was derived by the company in India through its operations of the liaison office in India. It accordingly, set aside the orders of the lower authorities and granted relief to the company.

On appeal to the High Court by Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the tribunal and held that the activities of the assesssee were confined to purchase of goods in India and could not be construed to represent any business connection nor could it be said that it resulted in any deemed accrual or arising of any income in India.

In the context of the income accruing or arising from ‘business connection’, the court observed that till 2004, the word ‘business connection’ had not been defined. However, by the Finance Act, 2003, Explanation 2 was inserted in section 9(1)(i), which, though it came into effect from o1-04-2004, was clarificatory in nature. It further took note of the deletion of the Proviso to Explanation 1(b) to section 9(1)(i) by the Finance Act, 1964, with effect from 01-04 -1964, which deletion had the effect of exempting a non-resident from tax in India on any income attributable to operations confined to purchase of goods in India for export, even though the non-resident had an office or agency in India for the purpose, or even though the goods were subjected by him to any manufacturing process before being exported from India.

In the instant case, the court noted that the as-sessee was not carrying on any business in India though it had established a liaison office in India whose object was to identify the manufacturers, give them the technical know-how and see that they manufactured goods according to its specifications, which would be sold to its affiliates. It further noted that the person who purchased the goods paid the money to the manufacturer and in the said income the assessee had no right; the said income could not be said to be an income arising or accruing in India vis-à-vis the assessee; the evidence on record showed that the assessee paid the entire expenses of the liaison office.

According to the court, the payment by the non-resident buyer of some consideration to the assessee outside India, as per the contract between the as-sessee and the buyer entered outside India, was an irrelevant factor in deciding the accrual of income in India and in any case, even if any income arose or accrued to the assessee, it was outside India.

Noting the provisions contained in Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(i) concerning the business connection and that the saving for the activities was limited to the purchase of goods or merchandise, the court observed that no income should be deemed to ac-crue or arise in India. The court observed that once the entire operations were confined to the purchase of goods in India for the purpose of export, the income derived therefrom should not be deemed to accrue or arise in India u/s. 9. It also observed that the activities of the assessee in assisting the Indian manufacturer to manufacture the goods according to its specification was to see that the said goods manufactured had an international market, and could therefore be exported. The Court concluded that the assessee was not earning any income in India, and, if at all it was earning an income outside India under a contract which was entered into outside India, no part of its income could be taxed in India either u/s. 5 or section 9.

In arriving at the conclusion in favour of the assessee, the court was guided by the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Anglo-French Textile Co. Ltd. vs. CIT ,23 ITR 101 (SC) (para 15) and CIT vs. R.D. Agarwal & Co. 56 ITR 20 (SC).

Observations

Clause (b) of Explanation 1 to section 9(1)(i) clarifies that no income shall be deemed to accrue or arise in India, in the case of a non-resident, through or from operations which are confined to the purchase of goods in India for the purpose of export. It clearly conveys that a non-resident can carry an activity in India and such activity may signify a business connection so however the income through or from such activity, if confined to purchase, shall not be deemed to accrue or arise in India.

An activity that travels beyond purchase of goods in India shall expose the income, pertaining to such an activity, to taxation in India under the deeming fiction contained in section 9(1)(i) of the Act. Such an activity may be carried out by a non-resident himself or through his agent or a liaison office.

It therefore is essential, for an exemption from tax, that the activity is confined to purchase of goods for export. The term ‘confined’ to is not defined in the Act and, as has been seen, has been the subject matter of intense conflict. One view of the matter is that the term ‘purchase’ signifies placing of an order for purchase of such goods that are exported. The other view is that the term connotes carrying out all such activities that lead to placing an order of purchase of goods for export, i.e., all activities that precede the placement of an order are ‘purchase’. In the narrowest possible view of the term ’purchase’, the activity is restricted to placing the purchase order, while taking a broader view, even the activities leading to placing an order for purchase of goods shall be included in ‘purchase’ of goods.

The term ‘confined’, in the context, is defined to mean “restrict within certain limits of scope” by the Oxford Dictionary. An activity or activities whose scope is restricted to purchase of goods can be said to be confined under the meaning supplied by the Oxford Dictionary. A plain reading explains that the dictionary does not narrow down or limit a ‘purchase’ to the activity of placing the order of purchase. Isolating activities leading to purchase from its scope is not even implied.

The important thing is to ascertain that can an order for purchase be placed without necessarily undertaking the activities that lead to such an order, such as; identifying the product and its quality, short-listing a vendor, giving product specifications, negotiating the price and fixing it, defining the logistics and specifying the delivery schedule? If the answer, in the context of clause(b) is no, then carrying on the pre- purchase activities shall not result in any deemed accrual of income.

The dictionary meaning of the term ‘purchase’ is to acquire on payment or for a consideration. It needs to be appreciated that an acquisition is not limited to placing an order of purchase but involves the series of acts carried out to successfully acquire a thing and includes the act of payment effected, post purchase, for an acquisition. It is significant to note that the word ‘purchase’ is preceded by the word ’to’, collectively reading ‘to purchase’ and so read, it sets any doubts to rest about the true un-derstanding of the law. To purchase without doubt, shall rope in all activities that enables the placement of a purchase order leading in turn to purchase or acquisition of goods.

The Authority in Columbia Sportswear Co.’s case has refused to appreciate that the activities considered by it to be constituting a business nonetheless were part of an activity of purchase without which it was not possible to purchase goods, and in that view of the mater, such activities were confined to purchase of goods alone and that they were not to be isolated from the purchase of goods as was being represented by the revenue authority.

In contrast, the Karnataka High Court in Nike Inc.’s case took a pragmatic view by holding that the pre-purchase activities were activities that were part of purchase of goods and carrying on such activities did not amount to travelling beyond the scope of the exemption contained in clause (b).

One needs to appreciate that the Reserve Bank of India while permitting a foreign company to set up a liaison office in India ensures that the operations of such an office are restricted in its scope and does not include carrying on of the business in which case, the company shall be required to set up a branch in India. In fact, carrying on of the pre- purchase activities by a liaison office is within the scope of the permission of the Reserve Bank of India.

Another aspect that requires appreciation is that pre-purchase activities and purchase represent an expenditure and not an income and therefore, even on this account, it is difficult to hold that these activities by themselves can lead to any income or even a deemed income. A right must have emerged to enable the assessee to demand and receive an income before it can be taxed in the hands of the assessee. No such right can be said to have emerged for carrying out pre-purchase activities. The Supreme court in the case of Anglo-French Textiles Co. Ltd., 23 ITR 101(SC) held that no profit could be said to have arisen on mere purchase of goods in India. For some incoherent reason this aspect was not appreciated by the Authority. Secondly, for the purpose of bringing even a deemed income to taxation, it is essential that the income pertaining to such an activity is defined and it is only then that a deemed income could be brought to taxation, as was held by the Supreme Court in the case of Anglo-French Textiles Co. Ltd., 25 ITR 27(SC). The principle so laid down by the apex court has a legislative acceptance in the form of clause (a) of Explanation 1 to section 9(1)(i) of the Act. In the said case, the court held that distribution of profits over different business operations or activities ought only to be made for sufficient and cogent reasons. The principle was reiterated in the case of R.D. Agarwala & Co. 56 ITR 20 and was expressly relied upon by the Karnataka High Court in Nike Inc.’s case and was ignored in Columbia Sportswear co’s case by the Authority.

The following observations and findings of the court in Nike Inc.’s case are helpful in appreciating the intent of the lawmakers; “If we keep the object with which the proviso to clause (b) of Explanation 1 to s/s. (1)(i) of section 9 of the Act was deleted, the object is to encourage exports thereby the Country can earn foreign exchange. The activities of the assessee in assisting the Indian manufacturer to manufacture the goods according to their specification is to see that the said goods manufactured has an international market, therefore, it could be exported. In the process, the assessee is not earning any income in India. If at all he is earning income outside India under a contract which is entered outside India, no part of their income could be taxed in India either u/s. 5 or section 9 of the Act.”

The Authority seems to have been largely influenced by the fact that the Indian office of the foreign company undertook activities of similar nature in Egypt and Bangladesh which in its opinion was outside the scope of exemption granted under clause(b) of Explanation 1 of section 9(1)(i) of the Act. This is clear from the following observations and findings; ‘There is another aspect. The activities of the liaison office of the applicant in India, is not confined to India. It also takes up the identical activities as in India, in Egypt and Bangladesh. The applicant has only pleaded that the goods procured from Egypt and Bangladesh are not imported into India and are sold only to the applicant in the US. Whether products of the applicant are sold in Egypt and Bangladesh is not clear. Whatever it be, since the activities of the applicant in India takes in, its busi-ness in Egypt and Bangladesh, it cannot be stated that the operations of the applicant in India are confined to the purchase of goods in India for the purpose of export.”

The very same Authority in IKEA Trading (Hong Kong) Ltd., 176 Taxman 344 held that re-purchase activities were a part of the purchase of goods and did not take away the benefit of clause (b) of the said Explanation. It however chose not to follow the ratio of the said decision by observing that it was delivered on the facts of that case. In that case, on a finding that the applicant therein, a foreign com-pany having a liaison office in India was engaged only in purchase operations in India for export, it was held that no income was generated by such an activity in India to be taxed in India either from the standpoint of section 5(2) or section 9(1)(i) read with Explanation 1(b) of the Income-tax Act. The AAR in Columbia Sportswear co.’s case confirmed that it was true that the activities undertaken by the applicant therein included some of the activities undertaken by the applicant before it.

The Authority, with respect, was unduly swayed by the proposition that all activities other than the actual sale cannot be divorced from the business of manufacture and sale especially in a case where the sale is of a branded product, designed and got made by the applicant under supervision, under a brand owned by the applicant. What the Authority failed to appreciate is that while what was stated by it was otherwise true but was rendered irrelevant, in the context, by virtue of clause (b) of Explanation 1 to section 9(1)(i) of the Act, which clause specifically excluded an activity of purchase from being labeled as business connection. In that view of the matter, the conclusion of the authority based on the decisions delivered without the benefit of analysing the said clause(b) cannot, with respect, be said to be laying down a good law. It was incorrect to have rejected the contention of the applicant that the decision of the Supreme Court in Anglo-French Textile Co. Ltd’s case (supra) did not govern the situation, anymore, in view of the addition of Expla-nation 1(b) to section 9(1)(i) of the Income-tax Act, taking out activities of purchase while deeming the accrual of income.

The Authority, instead of appreciating the change in law, went on to hold that the activity of purchase cannot be totally divorced from the activity of sale leading to income and this principle, in its opinion, is not affected by the Explanation which only seeks to exclude income from activities limited to purchase of goods in India for the purpose of export. The principle that a purchase of raw material, getting goods manufactured and selling the product form an integral activity remains unshaken in the opinion of the Authority and hence a deemed income arose in the hands of the applicant even on purchase of goods for export form India.

The decisions in the cases of CIT vs. N.K. Jain, 206 ITR 692 (Del.) and Mustaq Ahmed, In 307 ITR 401 (AAR) were also relied on by the applicant in Columbia Sportswear co.’s case to argue that the effect of the Explanation as understood therein supported the position adopted by the applicant. These decisions in our opinion are relevant to the issue being considered here in as much as the issue in those cases was about what constituted a business conncection in cases where the Indian arm of the non-resident was carrying out activities that preceded placing an order for purchasing goods. The Authority, however, chose to ignore these decisions on the ground that can be best explained by reproducing the words of the Authority; “There was no argument based on the decision of the Supreme Court before the High Court. There was no reference to that decision and there was no consideration of an argument that a purchase could not be totally divorced from a sale in such cases. There is no ra-tio emerging that by virtue of the addition of the Explanation, the principle set down by the Supreme Court in Anglo-French Textile Co. Ltd.’s case (supra) is no more relevant or binding.”

The Authority rather relied upon the decision In Mustaq Ahmed’s case (supra), to hold that the Authority, in that case, after noting the decision of the Supreme Court in Anglo-French Textiles’ case and the history of the Explanation to section 9(1) (i)    of the Act, confirmed after a detailed discussion on the question, that the ratio of the decision in that case remained unaffected by the addition of clause (b) to Explanation 1 in the present Act and the principle enunciated in the decision applied with equal vigour, irrespective of Explanation 1(b). Yet another decision relied upon by the applicant In Angel Garment Ltd., In 287 ITR 341, concerning the purchase of goods by a liaison office was held by the Authority to be delivered on the facts of that case and was not applied.

It is true that the activity of purchase contributes to eventual profit and therefore it may not be correct to say that such an activity does not contribute to any income. But what is needed to be appreciated is that the income attributable to such activity of purchase has been specifically excluded from the purview of taxation by the legislature on insertion of clause(b). It is this fact which appears to have been missed by the Authority when it relied on the decision in the Anglo-French Textiles’ case that was rendered on a law that did not have any such exclusion. The whole process of procurement and sale has to be completed to generate income and surely purchasing goods forms an integral part of the process of generating income, but the income, if any, pertaining to such an activity requires to be excluded by the law contained in clause(b) of Explanation 1 to section 9(1).

It is our considered view that the conflict on the issue discussed is not only avoidable but should be avoided by the Revenue by taking a pragmatic stand to include the activities leading to placing an order for purchase of goods in purchase of goods for export. In our opinion, the term purchase of goods is wide enough and should be so construed, in the present days, to include even manufacturing of goods for export out of India, more so when such goods are used for captive consumption by a non-resident.

The discussion here is valid in the context of the provisions of the Income tax Act. The taxation of the assessees governed by a Double Tax Avoidance Agreement will be determined largely by the provisions of such agreement.

Proposed Accounting for Leases – Will it Impact Business Operating Models?

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On 16th May 2013, the IASB issued an exposure draft (ED) on Leases. This is the second exposure draft issued after much internal and external deliberation by the IASB.

The leases project is one of the joint projects between the FASB and IASB which has been a focus area for the boards. The ED proposes fundamental changes to the existing lease accounting and is aimed to bring most leases on balance sheet for lessees. The first exposure draft was issued in September 2010 and since then, there have been various IASB meetings and public consultations. The second exposure draft is open for comments until September 2013. It introduces a dual-model approach for lease accounting, which would have a significant impact on the classification of leases, as well as the pattern and presentation of lease expense and income.

In this article, we will discuss some of the fundamental changes that are proposed in the Leases exposure draft.

Identification of leases

The ED defines a lease as “a contract that conveys the right to use an asset (the underlying asset) for a period of time in exchange for consideration”. An entity would determine whether a contract contains or is a lease by assessing whether:

(a) fulfillment of the contract depends on the use of an identified asset; and
(b) the contract conveys the right to control the use of the identified asset for a period of time in exchange for consideration.

A contract conveys the right to control the use of an identified asset if the customer has both the ability to direct the use and receive the benefits from use of the identified asset throughout the term of This definition encompasses the embedded leases concept currently under IFRIC 4. Hence arrangements which are not structured as leases but include an identified asset where the customer can direct the use and receive benefits will be considered leases. However, the ED puts a greater focus on the customer’s ability to direct the use of the underlying asset which means that contracts in which the customer uses substantially all of the output of an asset, but does not control its operations may not fall under the lease definition.

Lease term

The determination of the lease term is based on the non-cancellable period of the lease, together with any optional renewal periods which the lessee has a significant economic incentive to exercise and periods covered by a termination option, if the lessee has a significant economic incentive not to terminate. The proposals include many factors for an entity to consider which are contract-based, asset-based, entitybased and market-based such as the amount of lease payments in the secondary period, location of the asset, financial consequences of termination, market rentals, etc for determination of the lease term. Again, there are no bright lines for the term ‘significant economic incentive’.

These proposals are a significant change as the lease term is a crucial estimate in determining the classification and accounting for the lease.

Classification – Type A and Type B leases

The ED identifies two types of leases – Type A and Type B. These are in some ways akin to current finance lease and operating lease models under IAS 17 Leases. The classification criteria would be based on the nature of the underlying asset and the extent to which the asset is consumed by the lessee over the lease term.

If the underlying asset is not property (i.e. not land and/or a building), it is classified as a Type A lease, unless the lease term is for an insignificant part of the total economic life of the underlying asset or the present value of the lease payments is insignificant relative to the fair value of the underlying asset. An underlying asset that is property (i.e. land and/or a building), is classified as a Type B lease, unless the lease term is for the major part of the remaining economic life of the underlying asset or the present value of the lease payments accounts for substantially all of the fair value of the underlying asset.

However, in all cases, if the lessee has a significant economic incentive to exercise an option within the lease to purchase the underlying asset, then the lease is classified as a Type A lease.

The terms ‘insignificant’, ‘major part’ and ‘significant economic incentive’ are not defined in the ED and there are no explicit bright lines or threshold percentages to make this assessment.

In effect, most leases other than property would be Type A leases and most leases of property would be Type B leases unless the above presumptions are rebutted.

Example

Company A enters into a 2-year lease contract for an item of equipment which has a total economic life of 10 years. The lease does not contain any renewal, purchase, or termination options. The lease payments of Rs. 1000 per year are made at the end of the period, their present value is calculated at Rs. 1,735 using a discount rate of 10%. The fair value of the equipment is Rs. 5,500 at the date of inception of the lease.

This lease would be classified as a Type A lease since it is not property and the lease term is considered more than an insignificant part of the total economic life (20%) and the present value of lease payments is more than insignificant relative to the fair value of the equipment (31.5%).

This lease would have been classified as an operating lease under the existing principles of IAS 17. However, the Type A classification will lead to much different accounting under the ED proposals.

Accounting by lessee

In a Type A lease, the lessee would recognise a lease liability, initially measured at the present value of future lease payments, and also a right-of-use (ROU) asset measured at the amount of initial measurement of lease liability plus any initial direct costs and payments made at or before the commencement date less any lease incentives received. Subsequently, the lessee would measure the lease liability at amortised cost using the effective interest rate method and the ROU asset at cost less accumulated amortisation – generally on a straightline basis. The lessee would present amortisation of the ROU asset and interest expense on the lease liability as separate expenses on the statement of profit or loss. The ROU asset will be presented under property, plant and equipment as a separate category (bifurcated further between Type A and Type B leases residual assets).

Continuing the example above, the lessee would have recognised a lease liability and a ROU asset of Rs. 1,735. In year 1, the amortisation expense would be Rs. 867 (1735/2) and interest expense of Rs. 174 (1735*10%). In year 2, the amortisation expense would be Rs. 867 and interest expense of Rs. 91 ((1735+174- 1000)*10%). The cash outflow of Rs. 1000 will be reduced from the lease liability. Thus, under the Type A model, the lessee would see a front loading of the lease expense.

In a Type B lease, the lessee would follow the approach for Type A leases for initial measurement. Subsequently, the lessee would calculate amortisation of the ROU asset as a balancing figure, such that the total lease cost would be recognised on a straight-line basis over the lease term and would be presented as total lease cost (amortisation plus interest expense) as a single line item in the income statement. Hence, considering the example above, under the Type B model, in year 1, the lessee would record a total expense of 1000 split between interest expense of Rs. 174 and ROU amortisation of Rs. 826. This will effectively result in a straight-line recognition of the lease expense over the lease period.

Accounting by lessor

In a type A lease, on commencement, the lessor would derecognise the underlying asset and recognise a lease receivable, representing its right to receive lease payments as well as a residual asset, representing its interest in the underlying asset at the end of the lease term. The total profit i.e. difference between the fair value of the asset and the carrying amount of the asset (if any) will be divided between upfront profit and unearned profit. Upfront profit will be recognised at the lease commencement and is calculated as total profit multiplied to the proportion that the present value of the lease payments divided by the fair value of the underlying asset.

The lease receivable would initially be measured at the present value of future lease payments. The lessor would measure the lease receivable at amortised cost using the effective interest rate method. In addition, the lease receivable will be tested for impairment under IAS 39 Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement. The lessor would also be required to re measure the lease receivable to reflect any changes to the lease payments or to the discount rate. Such re measurement may be triggered due to a change in lease term, lessee having or no longer having a significant economic incentive to exercise purchase option, etc .

The residual asset would be measured at the present value of the amount that the lessor expects to derive from the underlying asset at the end of the lease term, discounted at the rate that the lessor charges the lessee adjusted for the present value of expected variable lease payments. In the balance sheet, the residual asset is presented as net residual asset after reducing the unearned profit. Subsequently the residual asset will be accreted with interest over the lease period. Also, this residual asset is subject to impairment provisions under IAS 36.

This accounting under Type A leases for the lessor is much more complex than the existing finance lease accounting model.

Continuing the example above, consider the following additional facts: the carrying amount of the equipment in lessor’s books is Rs. 5,000 on the inception of the lease. The lessor estimates that the future value of the equipment at the end of the lease term would be Rs 4,555 (the present value using 10% discount rate would be Rs. 3,765). The following entry would be recorded in the lessor’s books at commencement:

Lease receivable Dr. 1,735
Gross residual asset Dr. 3,765*
Equipment Cr. 5,000
Unearned profit Cr. 342
(500-158)
Gain on lease of equipment Cr. 158
((5500-5000)*(1735/5500))

*Rs. 3423 (3765-342) is the net residual asset to be presented in the balance sheet.

In Year 1, lessor would receive a cash flow of Rs. 1000 of which Rs. 174 (1735*10%) would be recorded as interest income and Rs. 826 would be reduced from the lease receivable. Also, the lessor will book interest income on accretion of the residual asset Rs. 375 (3765 x10%).

For Type B leases, the lessor would follow an accounting model similar to that of an operating lease per existing IAS 17 and would continue to recognise the underlying asset in its balance sheet and recognise the lease income on a straight line basis over the lease term. However, there are proposed additional disclosures requirements for lessors’ of Type B leases compared to current GAAP.

Exemption for Short-term leases

The ED gives the option to entities to elect not to apply the new accounting model to short-term leases. A short-term lease is a lease that has a maximum possible term under the contract including any renewal options of less than 12 months and does not contain any purchase options for the lessee to buy the underlying asset. Under this option, lessees and lessors would only recognise lease expense/income on a straight line basis.

Impact

The new proposals will have a significant impact on the future of lease accounting. Entities will need to reexamine lease identification and classification as per new proposals. Moreover, recognising new assets and liabilities will impact key financial performance metrics. Management will need to make new estimates and judgments. Some of these estimates and judgments need to be reassessed at each balance sheet date giving rise to volatility in the balance sheet. The new proposals may also impact the way lease contracts are structured. This ED does not propose an effective date but it is unlikely to be effective before 1st January 2017.

Integrated Reporting

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If we think that it’s only financial reporting that has seen substantial changes in the last 5 years, initiatives around better, more effective communication about an organisation’s sustainability and value creation through corporate reporting weren’t left far behind. As accountants, our professional responsibility primarily revolves around preparation, review and analysis of financial information. The management of an entity has even greater responsibility when it comes to communicating with shareholders and other stakeholders about how they are managing the business, how they are using the resources available to them and, above all, how they are creating value not just for its shareholders but for the environment at large in which it operates.

In this direction, a major milestone was achieved in April this year. The International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC) issued a consultation draft of the International Integrated Reporting Framework (the ‘Framework’). The IIRC is a global coalition of companies, investors, regulators, standard setters and other key stakeholders. The main aim of the IIRC is to create a globally accepted integrated reporting framework and to make integrated reporting a globally accepted corporate reporting norm.

The Integrated Reporting (or IR) Framework sets out the purpose, provides guidance and outlines how businesses can better explain how they create, sustain and increase their value in the short, medium and long term. The aim is also to enhance accountability and stewardship and support integrated thinking and decision making in the wake of increasing challenges to traditional business models.

What is IR?

IR is defined as a process that results in communication by an organisation, most visibly a periodic integrated report, about value creation over time. It aims to communicate the ‘integrated thinking’ through which management applies a collective understanding of the full complexity of value creation to investors and other stakeholders. An integrated report is a concise communication about how an organization’s strategy, governance, performance and prospects, in the context of its external environment, lead to the creation of value over the short, medium and long term. The length of these time frames will be decided by each the organisation differently with reference to its business strategy, investment cycles, and its stakeholders’ needs and expectations. Accordingly, there is no set answer for establishing the length for each term.

IR is intended to be a continuous process and to be most effective should connect with other elements of an organisation’s external communication, e.g. financial statements or sustainability report.

IIRC identifies those charged with governance as having the ultimate responsibility of the IR. On the other side, key audience is the providers of financial capital. At the same time, it is accepted that IR benefits all external parties interested in an organisation’s ability to create value over time, including employees, customers, suppliers, business partners, local communities, legislators, regulators, and policy-makers. It is important to note that the purpose of an integrated report is not to measure the value of an organisation or of all the capitals, but rather to provide information that enables the intended report users to assess the ability of the organisation to create value over time.

To lend further credibility to the IR process, organisations may seek independent, external assurance to enhance the credibility of their reports. The Framework provides reporting criteria against which organisations and assurance providers assess a report’s adherence; it does not yet provide the protocols for performing assurance engagements.

IR Framework

The purpose of the Framework is to assist organisations with the process of IR. In particular, the Framework establishes Guiding Principles and Content Elements that govern the overall content of an integrated report, helping organisations determine how best to express their unique value creation story in a meaningful and transparent way.

The Framework sets out six guiding principles to help preparers determine the structure of the integrated report.

These are:

• Strategic focus and future orientation
• Connectivity of information
• Stakeholder responsiveness
• Materiality and conciseness
• Reliability and completeness
• Consistency and comparability

An integrated report is structured by answering the following questions for each of its seven content elements:

• Organizational overview and external environment: What does the organisation do and what are the circumstances under which it operates?

• Governance: How does the organisation’s governance structure support its ability to create value in the short, medium and long term?

• Opportunities and risks: What are the specific opportunities and risks that affect the organization’s ability to create value over the short, medium and long term and how is the organization dealing with them?

• Strategy and resource allocation: Where does the organisation want to go and how does it intend to get there?

• Business model: What is the organisation’s business model and to what extent is it resilient?

• Performance: To what extent has the organisation achieved its strategic objectives and what are its outcomes in terms of effects on the capital?

• Future outlook: What challenges and uncertainties is the organisation likely to encounter in pursuing its strategy, and what are the potential implications for its business model and its future performance?

Pilot Programme

IR is a new concept and is in its formative stage. The IIRC acknowledges this fact. Accordingly, in order to construct and test its thoughts around the Framework, the IIRC began a Pilot Programme in October 2011. This programme was soon joined in by over 90 businesses and 30 investor organisations from around the globe. Some of the business network participants are Tata Steel, Kirloskar Brothers Limited, Unilever, The Coca- Cola Company, HSBC, Microsoft Corporation, and Prudential Financial among others. [Source: www.theiirc.org]. Version 1.0 of the Framework is expected to be published in December 2013, much before the end of the Programme in September 2014, thereby allowing participants time to test the Framework during their following reporting cycle. This will also enable the IIRC to assess IR outcomes and complete its work.

IR is still a voluntary initiative so why bother now?

Well, the key results of the Pilot Programme speak for themselves. 95% of participants find that integrated reporting provides a clearer view of the business model and increases board focus on the right KPIs; 93% feel it leads to the better data quality collection, greater focus on sustainability issues, development of improved cross-functional working processes and breaking down silos between teams; and 88% agreed that IR leads to improvements in business decision making.

Currently, the industry participation is led by financial services, while more than 50% of the geographical spread is accounted for by Europe as these were the worst affected during the financial crisis. Sustainability concerns may have sowed the seeds of the IR on a global scale, but the trends emerging from the Pilot Programme provide enough evidence of much wider benefits to the organisations and their stakeholders – now and in the future.

Let’s prepare for a world of valued corporate reporting!

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GAP in GAAP – Accounting for Associates

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Background: An entity is an investor in an associate in accordance with AS 23 Accounting for Investments in Associates in Consolidated Financial Statements. The investor accounts for its interest in the associate using the equity method in AS 23. The investor enters into a lease agreement with the associate, classified as a finance lease under AS 19 Leases. The gain on the lease transaction exceeds the carrying amount of the investor’s investment in the associate.

The author notes two views for the accounting for the gain elimination:

View A:
The gain from the transaction is eliminated only to the extent that it does not exceed the carrying amount of the investor’s interest in the associate. This view is by analogy to AS 23.18 where an entity’s share of losses of an associate ceases to be recognised when the investment carrying amount is reduced to zero. Paragraph 18 of AS 23 states “If, under the equity method, an investor’s share of losses of an associate equals or exceeds the carrying amount of the investment, the investor ordinarily discontinues recognising the share of further losses and the investment is reported at nil value.”

View B: All the investor’s share of the gain is eliminated. This view is supported by AS 23.13, which states that gains/losses from transactions are recognised only to the extent of the unrelated investors’ interests in the associate. Paragraph 13 states “In using equity method for accounting for investment in an associate, unrealised profits and losses resulting from transactions between the investor and the associate should be eliminated to the extent of the investor’s interest in the associate.”

Author supports View B. The second question therefore is – how should the gains to be eliminated, in excess of the carrying amount of the interest in the associate? Two methods are identified:

Method 1:
As deferred income

Method 2: As a deduction from the related asset recognised by the investor.

Author supports Method 1, because ‘deferred income’ shows the nature of the eliminated gains and it would enable users to readily obtain information about the amount of eliminated gains in excess of the investors interest in the associate.

Author’s Recommendation:
Author considers that AS 23 lacks guidance on the accounting for the elimination of any gain in excess of the carrying amount of the investment. The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India may consider amending AS 23 via a narrow-scope amendment to add specific guidance on how to account for the corresponding entry for the eliminated gain in excess of the carrying amount of the investor’s interest in the associate.

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TS-187-ITAT-2013(Del) Convergys Customer Management Group Inc. vs. ADIT A.Ys: 2006-07 & 2008-09, Dated: 10.05.2013

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India-US DTAA – Frequent visits of employees of FCo to premises of Indian subsidiary (IndCo), their having a “fixed place” at their disposal and their occupying key positions in IndCo constituted PE of FCo in India, which was practically the projection of FCo’s business in India. On facts, profit to be attributed to Indian PE was to be calculated based on formulary apportionment.

Facts:
Convergys Customer Management Group Inc (FCo) provides information technology (IT) enabled customer management services by utilising its advanced information system capabilities, human resource management skills and industry experience. FCo has a subsidiary in India, IndCo, which provides IT-enabled call centre/back office support services to FCo on a principal-to-principal basis.
FCo claimed that it procured from ICo services on a principal-to-principal basis and FCo’s business was not carried out in India. Furthermore, substantial risks of business such as market, price, R&D, service liability risks etc., vested with FCo outside India. Additionally, there was no tax liability as procurement of services was akin to purchasing goods/merchandise and, accordingly, the benefit of the PE exclusion for purchase/preparatory or auxiliary function should also be available.
The Tax Authority alleged that FCo, in its activities in India through its employees and subsidiary, satisfied the requirement of a fixed place, services and also a Dependant Agent PE (DAPE) in India. For the purposes of attributing profits, the Tax Authority recomputed the taxable income by allocating global revenue in proportion to the number of employees. On appeal, CIT(A) agreed with the Tax Authority that a fixed place PE was constituted. On attribution of profits, the CIT(A) however held that no further profits can be attributed to FCo’s PE as the transfer pricing (TP) study of IndCo supported that ICo was remunerated at ALP.
Both FCo and the Tax Authority appealed before the Tribunal.

Held:
On existence of a PE

Considering the entirety of facts, the view of CIT(A) on fixed place PE was upheld for the following reasons:
FCo’s employees frequently visited the premises of IndCo to provide supervision, direction and control over the business operations of IndCo. Accordingly, such employees had a “fixed place” at their disposal. IndCo was practically the projection of FCo’s business in India and IndCo carried out its business under the control and guidance of FCo, without assuming any significant risk in relation to such functions. FCo has also provided certain assets/software on “free of cost” basis to IndCo.

On attribution of profits

An overall attribution of profits to the PE is a TP issue and no further profits can be attributed once an arm’s length price has been determined for IndCo, as TP analysis subsumes the risk profile of the alleged PE. Thus, there can however be further attribution if it is found that PE has risk profile which is not captured in IndCo TP analysis.

The correct approach thereafter to arrive at the profits attributable to the PE is to compute global operating income percentage of a particular line of business as per annual report of FCo and applying such percentage to the end customer revenue with regard to contracts/projects, where services are procured from IndCo. The amount arrived at is the operating income from Indian operations and such operating income is to be reduced by the profit before tax of IndCo. This residual profit which represents income of FCo is to be apportioned to the US and India. Profit attributable to the PE should be estimated on residual profits.

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“Other Income” – Article 21- Whether Items of Income Not Taxable Under Other Articles (6 to 20) of a Tax Treaty would be Assessable Under “Other Income” Article?

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1. Background

1.1 Quite often, an item of income may not be taxed under Articles 6 to 20 of a Tax Treaty due to application of distributive rules agreed between the two Contracting States. For example, an item of income may not be taxable as “Business Profits” under Article 7 or as “Shipping or Aircraft Profits” under Article 8 or as “Fees for Technical Services” (FTS) under Article 12 of a Tax treaty either because the income does not satisfy the definition of FTS as contained in that Treaty or it does not satisfy other conditionalities stipulated in Article 12 e.g., it may not meet the test of “make available concept” embedded in a particular treaty. The item of income may also not be taxable due to various exclusions/exemptions contained in the respective Articles. Similarly, an item of Business Income may not be taxable in the Source Country (say, India) under Article 7 of the applicable Tax treaty, as the Non-Resident (NR) Assessee does not have a Permanent Establishment (PE) in India as defined in Article 5 of the Tax Treaty. In such cases, a question arises whether such an item of income would be assessable to tax as “Other Income” under Article 21 (or the corresponding Article of the applicable Tax Treaty.)

1.2 In such cases, the Tax Department argues that even if the income of a NR is not taxable in India under Article 7 as business profits or under Article 12 as fees for technical services, such income is still taxable in India as ‘Other Income’ under Article 21.

1.3 The Department’s interpretation of the scope of Article 21 is that when taxability fails under all articles of the applicable tax treaty, the taxability automatically arises under this article. In other words, for example, when a business profit is not taxable under Article 7, it is taxable under Article 21 which in turn gives right to the Source State to tax it as per its domestic tax laws.

In this article, we shall examine the limited aspect of the scope of Article 21 and the judicial interpretation thereof. We shall focus on the applicability of article 21 on “Other Income” vis-à-vis income dealt with by other articles of a tax treaty.

2. Text of “Other Income” – Article 21 of OECD MC

“21(1): Items of Income of a Resident of a Contracting State, wherever arising, not dealt with in the foregoing articles of this Convention shall be taxable only in that State.”

Paragraph 2 is not reproduced, as it is not relevant for the purpose of our discussion. Paragraph 1 of Article 21 of UN Model Convention is identical to that Article 21(1) of OECD MC.

The dispute centers around the correct interpretation of the words “not dealt with” contained in Para 1 of Article 21, as reproduced above.

3. Essar Oil Ltd. vs DCIT 2005-TII-24-ITAT-MUMINTL

The controversy was analyzed and discussed at length in this case in the context of Article 8 of India-Singapore DTAA.

3.1 Facts of the Case: The assessee, a resident company had taken a tanker on voyage charter basis from a non-resident company (HMPL) based in Singapore for transportation of petroleum products from the port of Chennai to the port of Hazira, both in India. The AO held that the assessee had defaulted in not deducting TDS while making payment since it did not operate in international waters and had a PE in India and so protection under Article 8 would not be available. Also, section 44B would be applicable in case of the non-resident company. The same was upheld by the CIT(A).

3.2 Decision: After elaborate discussion, the Tribunal decided the issue in favour of the assessee, by observing as follows:

“38. We do not also agree with the argument of the revenue that income of HMPL is straight away covered by article 23 of Singapore DTAA. Article 23 of Singapore DTAA deals with income not expressly mentioned elsewhere in the DTAA. It deals with items of income which are not expressly mentioned in the foregoing articles of the said agreement may be taxed in accordance with the taxation laws of the Contracting States.

39. Prof. Klaus Vogel, the authority on the subject, has again held that the application of the residuary provision in article 23 is very narrow and it is generally applied to such residual receipts or income such as social insurance, annuity arising out of previous contributions, maintenance payments to relatives, accident benefit payments, income from so-called derivatives, lottery winnings and income from gambling, etc. Article 23 does not cover income arising out of business. In the present case, the income earned by M/s. HMPL is income earned out of business. Income earned by an assessee out of shipping operations is invariably business income which is recognised by the provisions of Indian Income-tax Act itself. Even according to the assessing authority, if the assessee falls under article 23 of the Singapore DTAA, the assessee is governed by provisions of section 44B of the Incometax Act, 1961. The heading given to section 44B is – “Special provision for computing profits and gains of shipping business in the case of non-residents”. The Act itself provides that income earned out of shipping business by a non-resident is to be considered as profits and gains and it is for that reason the taxability of such profit has been brought u/s. 44B which is brought under Part D of Chapter IV of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Part D deals with computation of income under the head ‘Profits and gains of business or profession’ in sections 28 to 44DA. The income attributable to operations carried out by M/s. HMPL is nothing but germane to the regular business of shipping carried on by it. Therefore, by the basic concept of Indian income taxation itself is that such income is ‘income from business’. (Emphasis supplied)

4 0. ….

41. Even if, for the sake of arguments one holds that the case is not covered by article 8 of Singapore DTAA, still it does not preclude the assessee to claim the immunity under article 7. The income attributable to the Singapore shipping company is business profit and de hors article 8, the case is still coming under article 7 of the DTAA which deals with the taxability of business profit. Article 8 is a specific provision over and above the general provision of business profits provided in article 7. If the case of the assessee does not fall under the specific provision of article 8, still, the assessee could not be deprived of the benefit already available to it under the general provisions of article 7. Only for the reason that the assessee does not come under article 8, the assessee could not be placed under a lesser advantage than article 7. ………..Article 8 provides for a specific benefit carved out of the general benefit given in article 7. Therefore, if the special benefit of article 8 is not available, let the matter be closed there. One cannot go further and cannot say that the assessee is not even entitled for the benefit of article 7.

42. Therefore, we hold that the profit attributable to M/s. HMPL was in the nature of business income and business income is covered by article 7 of DTAA even if the assessee is driven out of article 8.”

4. DCIT vs. Andaman Sea Food Pvt. Ltd. 2012-TII- 67-ITAT-KOL-INTL

The controversy was again analyzed and discussed at length in this case in the context of Article 23 of India-Singapore DTAA.

4.1 Facts of the Case: In this case, the assessee did not deduct tax at source from Consultancy Charges to the Singapore based NR. The CIT(A) held that the consultancy fees paid by the assessee to the NR was not covered by the scope of the expression ‘fees for technical services’ under Article 12 of the DTAA; that since the NR did not have any PE in India, the income of the assessee was also not taxable as ‘business profits’ in India. The Tax Department argued that even if the income was not taxable in India under Article 7 as business profits or under Article 12 as fees for technical services, still the amounts were taxable as other income under Article 23 of India-Singapore DTAA.

4.2 Decision: After elaborate discussion, the Tribunal decided the issue in favour of the assessee, as follows:

a)    With regard to the Department’s Contention that the amount paid to the Non-resident fell within the category of the “other sum”, the Tribunal noted that “the CIT(A) had stated that “Section 40(a)(i) of the Income-tax Act provides that in computing income of an assessee under the head ‘profits and gains of business’, deduction will not be allowed for any expenditure being royalty, fees for technical services and other sum chargeable under the Act, if it is payable outside India, or in India to a non resident, and on which tax is deductible at source under Chapter XVII B and such tax has not been deducted”, and it was in this context that the CIT(A) noted that though the fee paid was not covered by fees for technical services, it could fall under the head ‘other sum’ but since the said other sum was not chargeable to tax in India, the assessee did not have any tax withholding obligation. This classification of income was not in the context of treaty classification but in the context of, what he believed to be, two categories of income referred to under section 40(a)(i), i.e. ‘royalties and fees for technical services’ and ‘other sums chargeable to tax’……………… What is material is that the expression ‘other income’ was used in the context of mandate of Section 40(a)(i) and not in the context of treaty classification of income.” (Emphasis Supplied).

b)    With regard to the Department’s argument that “consultancy charges, brokerage, com-mission, and incomes of like nature which are covered by the expression “other sums” as stated in Section 40(a)(i) and chargeable to tax in India as per the Income Tax Act, and also are squarely covered by Article 23 of the India Singapore tax treaty, the Tribunal observed that “This argument proceeds on the fallacious assumption that ‘other sums’ u/s. 40(a)(i) constitutes an income which is not chargeable under the specific provisions of different articles of India Singapore tax treaty, whereas not only this expression ‘other income’ is to be read in conjunction with the words immediately following the expression ‘chargeable under the provisions of this (i.e. the Income-tax Act 1961) Act’, it is important to bear in mind that this expression, i.e. ‘other sums, also covers all types of incomes other than (a) interest, and (ii) royalties and fees for technical services. Even business profits are covered by the expression ‘other sums chargeable under the provisions of the Act’ so far as the provisions of section 40(a)(i) and section 195 are concerned and, therefore, going by this logic, even a business income, when not taxable under article 7, can always be taxed under article 23. That is clearly an absurd result.”

c)    The Tribunal further observed that “A tax treaty assigns taxing rights of various types of income to the source state upon fulfill-ment of conditions laid down in respective clauses of the treaty. When these conditions are satisfied, the source state gets the right to tax the same, but when those conditions are not satisfied, the source state does not have the taxing right in respect of the said income. When a tax treaty does not assign taxation rights of a particular kind of income to the source state under the treaty provision dealing with that particular kind of income, such taxability cannot also be invoked under the residuary provisions of Article 23 either. The interpretation canvassed by the learned Departmental Representative, if accepted, will render allocation of taxing rights under a treaty redundant. In any case, to suggest that consultancy charges, brokerage and commission can be taxed under article 23, as has been suggested by the learned Departmental Representative, overlooks the fact that these incomes can indeed be taxed under article 7, article 12 or article 14 when conditions laid down in the respective articles are satisfied.” (Emphasis Supplied)

d)    The Tribunal held that “It is also important to bear in mind the fact that article 23 begins with the words ‘items of income not expressly covered’ by provisions of Articles 6-22. There-fore, it is not the fact of taxability under articles 6-22 which leads to taxability under article 23, but the fact of income of that nature not being covered by articles 6-22 which can lead to taxability under article 23. There could be many such items of income which are not covered by these specific treaty provisions, such as alimony, lottery income, gambling income, rent paid by resident of a contracting state for the use of an immovable property in a third state, and damages (other than for loss of income covered by articles 6-22) etc. In our humble understanding, therefore, article 23 does not apply to items of income which can be classified under sections 6-22 whether or not taxable under these articles, and the income from consultancy charges is covered by Article 7, Article 12 or Article 14 when conditions laid down therein are satisfied. Learned Departmental Representative’s argument, emphatic and enthusiastic as it was, lacks legally sustainable merits and is contrary to the scheme of the tax treaty.” (Emphasis Supplied).

e)    The Tribunal referred to and relied upon certain observations of the AAR in the case of Gearbulk AG – 318 ITR 66 (AAR) (2009-TII-09-ARA-INTL), discussed below.

5.    ADIT vs. Mediterranean Shipping Co., S.A. [2012] 27 taxmann.com 77:

5.1  Facts of the case:

•    Assessee was a Swiss company engaged in the business of operations of ships in the international waters through chartered ships. During the A.Y. 2003-04, the assessee had total collection of freight to the tune of Rs. 295.63 crore on which a sum of Rs. 9.33 crore was paid towards the tax liability. In its return of income, however, the assessee declared ‘nil’ income on the ground that there was no article in the Indo-Swiss treaty dealing specifically with taxability of shipping profit; that article 7 of the treaty, dealing with the business profits, specifically excluded profits from the operation of ships in international traffic; that article 22 of the treaty, dealing with other income, subjected shipping profits to tax only in the State of residence, i.e., the Switzerland. Accordingly, the stand of the assessee was that the international shipping profits was not taxable in India and the entire tax of Rs. 9.33 crore paid was liable to be refunded.

•    The Assessing Officer, however, rejected the stand of the assessee relying upon the CBDT Circular No. 333, dated 02-04-1982 whereby it was clarified that where there is no specific provision in the agreement, it is the basic law, i.e., the Indian Income-tax Act which will govern the taxation of the income. Accordingly, the shipping profits of the assessee were held taxable under section 44B of the Income-tax Act at the rate of 7.5 per cent of the total freight collection of Rs. 295.63 crore.

•    On appeal by the assessee, the Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the claim of the assessee that article 22 applied to the profits earned from shipping business in question. The Commissioner (Appeals), however, proceeded to determine as to whether the case of the assessee was covered under article 22(2), which provides for an exception to the applicability of article 22. Under sub- article (2) of article 22 it is provided, inter alia, that provisions of article 22(1) shall not apply to income if the recipient of such income, being a resident of contracting state, carries on business in the other contracting State through a PE therein and the right or property in respect of which income is paid is effectively connected with such PE. After referring to the relevant clauses of the agreement of assessee with MSC, the Commissioner (Appeals) held MSC to be assessee’s PE in India.

•    After holding MSC to be assessee’s PE in India, the Commissioner (Appeals) proceeded to examine as to whether the shipping prof-its derived from operation of ships were effectively connected with said PE; and held that they were not. Accordingly, the Commissioner (Appeals) held that article 22(1) was applicable in the case of the assessee and, therefore, the profits from shipping business was taxable in Switzerland and not in India.

5.2 Decision:

The Tribunal decided the issue in favor of the assessee. The Tribunal observed and held as under:

“A reading of article 22 especially paragraph 1 thereof makes it clear that the items of income of a resident of a contracting State, i.e., Switzerland which are not dealt with in the foregoing articles of the Indo-Swiss treaty shall be taxable only that State. In the instant case, the assessee company being a resident of Switzerland, the income, wherever arising, would fall within the scope of the residuary article 22 if the same is not dealt with in any other articles of the treaty.

The question, therefore, is whether the shipping profits are dealt with in any other articles of the Indo-Swiss treaty or not. The contention raised by the revenue is that by agreeing to exclude the shipping profits from article 8 as well as article 7 of the Indo-Swiss treaty, India and Switzerland had agreed to leave the shipping profits to be taxed by each State according to its domestic law and this undisputed position prevailing up to 2001 did not change as a result of introduction of article 22 of the treaty with effect from 01-04-2001. The contention cannot be agreed with. It is held that as a result of introduction of article 22, the items of income not dealt with in the other articles of the Indo-Swiss treaty are covered in the residuary article 22 and their taxability is governed by the said article with effect from 01-04-2001. Articles 7 and 8 of the treaty, therefore, cannot be relied upon to say that by agreeing to exclude the shipping profits from said articles, the shipping profits are left to be taxed by each contracting State according to its domestic law. It is no doubt true that this was the position prior to introduction of article 22 in the Indo-Swiss treaty in the year 2001 but the same was altered as a result of introduction of the said article inasmuch as it become necessary to find out as to whether shipping profits have been dealt with in any other article of the treaty. Mere exclusion of shipping profits from the scope of treaty could have resulted in leaving the same to be taxed by the concerned contracting State according to its domestic law prior to introduction of article 22. However, such exclusion alone will not take it out of the scope of article 22 unless it is established that the shipping profits have been dealt within any other article of the treaty. The language of article 22(1) in this regard is plain and simple and the requirement for application of the said article is explicitly clear. [Para 33]

In order to say that a particular item of income has been dealt with, it is necessary that the relevant article must state whether Switzerland or India or both have a right to tax such item of income. Vesting of such jurisdiction must positively and explicitly stated and it cannot be inferred by implication as sought to be contended by the revenue relying upon articles 7 and 8 of the treaty. The mere exclusion of international shipping profit from article 7 can-not be regarded as an item of income dealt with by the said article as envisaged in article 22(1). The expression ‘dealt with’ contemplates a positive action and such positive action in the instant context would be when there is an article categorically stating the source of country or the country of residence or both have a right to tax that item of income. The fact that the expression used in article 22(1) of the Indo-Swiss treaty is ‘dealt with’ vis-a-vis the expression ‘mentioned’ used in some other treaties clearly demonstrates that the expression ‘dealt with’ is some thing more than a mere mention of such income in the article. The international shipping profits can at the most be said to have mentioned in article 7 but the same cannot be said to have been dealt with in the said article. [Para 35]

Up to assessment year 2001-02, international ship-ping profits no doubt were being taxed under the domestic laws as per the provisions of section 44B. However, it was not because of the exclusion contained in Article 7 that India was vested with the authority to tax such international shipping profit but it was because there was no other article in the Indo-Swiss treaty dealing with international shipping profits which could override the provisions of section 44B in terms of section 90(2) being more beneficial to the assessee. This position, however, has changed as a result of introduction of article 22 in the Indo-Swiss treaty which now governs the international shipping profits not being dealt with specifically by any other article of the treaty and if the provisions of article 22 are beneficial to the assessee, the same are bound to prevail over the provisions of section 44B. [Para 41]

It is held that the item of income in question, i.e., international shipping profit cannot be said to be dealt with in any other articles of the Indo- Swiss treaty and the taxability of the said income, thus, is governed by residuary article 22 introduced in the treaty with effect from 01-04-2002. [Para 48]”

We may mention that Article 8 of the Indo-Swiss DTAA has been amended vide Notification dated 27-12-2011 to include Shipping Profits within its scope and accordingly, the controversy no longer survives.

6.    AAR Ruling in the case of Gearbulk AG – 318 ITR 66 (AAR) (2009-TII-09-ARA-INTL)

6.1 Similar issue arose in the case of Gearbulk AG, a Shipping Company, in the context of India-Switzerland DTAA. In this case, the Applicant, a Swiss Company, had income from Shipping Business. At the relevant point in time, Article 8 of India-Switzerland DTAA dealt with only profits from the operation of Aircraft and did not deal with profits from Operation of Ships. The issue before the AAR was whether tax-ability of such Shipping Profits was governed by Article 7 of India – Swiss DTAA or whether the same was taxable in India in terms of “Other Income” – Article 22 of the Treaty.

6.2 After discussing the meaning of the expression ‘deal with’ as given in various dictionaries, the AAR held in favor of the revenue. The AAR held that the Freight Income received by the Applicant is liable to be taxed in India under the provisions of the Income-tax Act and that such income is not covered by he provisions of Indo-Swiss DTAA.

7.    ACIT vs. Viceroy Hotels Ltd. Hyderabad 2011-TII-97-ITAT-HYD-INTL

7.1 In this case, the assessee, engaged in the business of running a Five Star Hotel by the name of “VICEROY”, was being converted into Marriott Chain Hotel under the franchisee granted by the International Licensing Company SARL (Marriott USA). To meet the standard for Marriott Group, the assessee embarked upon an expansion programme by way of adding new blocks in the hotel and also upgradation by way of bringing about interior and exterior changes, landscaping etc. For this purpose the assessee entered into four separate and independent agreements with one Anthony Corbett & As-sociates of UK; Marriott International Design &    Constructions of USA; Bensly Design Group International Construction Company Ltd., Thailand and Lim Hong Lian of Singapore.

7.2 With regard to payment of landscape architectural consultancy services to a Thai Company, the issue arose whether in the absence of an Article relating to fee for technical services in the India-Thailand DTAA, services of landscape architectural consultancy can be taxed under the residuary Article 22 of the DTAA.

7.3 With regard to non deduction of tax at source on the amount paid to M/s. Bensly Design, Thailand which is engaged in the business of landscape architectural consultancy, the lower authorities were of the opinion that though the DTAA does not clearly spell out the taxation of fees for technical services, the amount paid by the assessee to M/s Bensly group would fall within the purview of article 22 of the Agreement which is residuary clause dealing with other income not expressly dealt in other articles of DTAA.

7.4 According to lower authorities, the services rendered by Bensly group do not constitute professional or independent personal services under article 14 of the DTAA between India and Kingdom of Thailand. Without prejudice to this, the A.O. observed that even if the payments made to the NR is treated as fees for professional services or independent activities within the meaning of article 14 of the DTAA, then also such fees can be taxed under the IT Act. It is because, the exemption provided under article 14 is available only to such payments that are not borne by an enterprise or a PE situated in India. In the present case, the payment has been made by an enterprise situated in India and accordingly, the non-resident company is not entitled to claim any exemption on the strength of Article 14 of the DTAA.

7.5 The A.O. also stated that the instruction con-tained in CBDT circular No. 333 (F.506/42/81-FTD) dated 02-04-1982 is in effect complementary to Article 22 of the DTAA which provide that where there is no specific provision under the DTAA, it is the basic law which will govern the taxation of the income of the non-resident. Following the aforesaid stand, the A.O. invoked provision of section 9(1) r.w.s. 115A(1)(b)(B) of the IT Act and treated the entire fees as income chargeable to tax in India since all the expenses of the NR were reimbursed by the assessee deductor. The A.O. further stated that the agreement under which the technical services are rendered is neither approved by the central govt. nor does it relate to a matter included in the industrial policy and hence the deductor should have deducted tax at source at the rate of 40% plus surcharge as prescribed in the relevant Finance Act for any other income arising to a non resident company in India and since the deductor had failed to discharge its statutory obligation, the assessee was treated as an assessee in default.

7.6 According to the assessee, as there is no PE for M/s Bensly Design, Thailand in India, and no foreign employee stayed in India for more than 90 days, the CIT (A) should have exempted the business profit of the company from taxation in India. Under Article 7 of the DTAA income earned by a NR in India under the head business, can be taxed in India only if the NR has a PE in India. If the business is carried on through employees and if those employees stay in India for less than 183 days in the case of Thailand, there will be no PE in India and the corresponding business profit of the NR becomes non taxable. According to the assessee, as per Indo-Thai DTAA, there is no article in the relevant DTAA dealing with fees for technical services, there is only an article dealing with royalties, and of course, there is an article dealing with business profits. The A.O. wrongly applied the residuary Article 22 and taxed the income arising in India for the Thai company at the rate of 40%.

7.7 The Tribunal negatived the contentions of the Tax Department and held, “The fees paid to M/s Bensly Design, Thailand for rendering services of landscape architectural consultancy is not covered as per the DTAA since there is no article in the relevant DTAA dealing with this nature of payments. There is only one article dealing with Royalties and another dealing with business profit. Under Article 7 of the DTAA, income earned by a non resident in India under the head ‘business’ can be taxed in India only if the non-resident has a permanent establishment in India. In this case, the business was carried on through employees and there is no record that these employees stayed in India for more than 183 days. Accordingly there is no PE in India and corresponding business profit of non-resident cannot be taxed in India and provision of section 195 is not applicable.”

8.    Credit Suisse (Singapore) Ltd. vs. ADIT – 2012-TII-214-ITAT-MUM-INTL

8.1 In this case, the assessee company incorporated in Singapore and a tax resident there was registered with SEBI as a sub-account of Credit Suisse. The assessee had inter alia, conducted portfolio investments in Indian securities. The assessee had shown net short-term capital loss from sale of shares and sale of shares underlying FCCBs besides gains from exchange traded derivative contracts. The net resultant gains were claimed as exempt under Article 13(4) of the tax treaty. The dividend income was also claimed as exempt u/s. 10(34).

8.2 The assessee also claimed that gains made by it from cancellation of forward contracts were not chargeable to tax. The assessee claimed that the foreign exchange forward contracts were entered to hedge its exposures in respect of its Indian Investments being shares/exchange traded derivative contracts; that being an FII sub-account, in view of the provisions of Section 115AD, wherein the transactions in underlying assets against which the foreign exchange forward cover contracts were entered into, were taxed as ‘capital gains’, the foreign exchange forward cover contracts also took on the color of their underlying assets, being capital assets. Consequently, the gains realised from cancellation of such forward cover contracts had to be regarded as capital gains, which were not liable to tax in India as per Article 13(4) of the tax treaty. It was claimed that although these gains could be taxed as business profits since the assessee did not have a PE in India, the same could not be taxed in India.

The AO rejected the assessee’s explanation and held that the transaction in forward purchase of foreign exchange and settlement could not be said to be resulting in capital gains as the same was never held by the assessee as capital asset but was meant to be settled by price difference. Also, as the assessee was not eligible to carry on business in India as per SEBI regulations, the income arising from settlement of forward contracts could not be treated as business income. Thus, the AO held that the assessee’s income from cancellation of foreign exchange forward contracts was neither capital gains income nor business income but ‘income from other sources’ under Article 23 of the tax treaty. However, the Tribunal, relying on the decisions in the case of Citicorp Investment Bank (Singapore) Ltd. vs. Dy. Director of Income Tax (International Taxation)(2012-TII-86-ITAT-MUM-INTL) and Citicorp Banking Corporation, Bahrain vs. Addl. Director of Income Tax (International Taxation) (2011-TII-40- ITAT-MUM-INTL), held that gains arising from early settlement of forward foreign exchange contract has to be treated as capital gain and that the A.O. and the DRP were not justified in treating the said gain as ‘income from other sources’.

8.3 We may mention that the Tribunal, while deciding the issue in favour of the assessee, did not discuss the controversy of application of Article 23 vis-à-vis application of Article 7 or Article 13 of India – Singapore DTAA.

9.    Lanka Hydraulic Institute Ltd (2011-TII-09-ARA-INTL)

9.1 In this case, the applicant, a Tax Resident of Sri Lanka, had sought an advance ruling from the Authority on the taxability of the payment received under its contract with WAPCOS and in the absence of a specific article for the taxation of fees for technical services, in the India-Sri Lanka DTAA, whether this payment would be governed by Article 7 of the tax treaty which dealt with taxation of business profits.

9.2 The AAR held, without much discussion and reasoning, as follows:

“It is true that the treaty does not contain a specific article for the taxation of fees for technical services. In that event reference is to be made to Article 22 of the Tax Treaty which reads as follows:

‘Item of income of a resident of a Contract-ing State which are not expressly mentioned in the foregoing Article of this Agreement in respect of which he is subject to tax in that state shall be taxable only in that state.’

Accordingly, the fees for technical services shall be governed by Article 22 of the Tax Treaty and not as per Article 7 of the Tax Treaty which deals with taxation of business profits.”

We may mention that, effectively the Ruling was in favor of the Sri Lankan Applicant since Indo-Sri Lankan DTAA provides that income falling under the scope of Article 22 shall be taxable only in the state of the Resident i.e. in Sri Lanka. However, since the income in question was essentially in the nature of Business Profits, in our humble opinion, in the absence of FTS Article in Indo-Sri Lankan DTAA, such income should be taxable in accordance with provisions of Article 7 and not in accordance with provisions of Article 22 of the DTAA. Thus, in principle, we are not in agreement with the aforesaid AAR Ruling.

9.3 Following its Ruling in the case of Lanka Hydraulic Institute Ltd (2011-TII-09-ARA-INTL), similar view was taken by the AAR in case of XYZ (AAR Nos. 886 to 911, 913 to 924, 927, 929 and 930 of 2010)(2012) 20 taxmann.com 88 (AAR); and held that in absence of FTS Article, services would get covered by “Other Income” Article. In this case the income was in the nature of inspection, verification, testing and certification services (IVTC).

In our humble opinion, both the AAR Rulings mentioned herein above are not in accordance with Principles of Interpretation of Tax Treaties and require reconsideration.

10.    Conclusion

In some Indian DTAAs, under Article 21 exclusive right of taxation is given to source state like Brazil, United Mexican States, Namibia and South Africa. In few Indian DTAAs, Right of taxation is in accordance with laws of the respective Contracting States/both the contracting states like in case of Singapore and Italy. India’s DTAAs with Greece, Netherlands and Libya does not contain ‘Other Income’ Article. In many other Indian DTAAs, Primary right of taxation to ‘State of Residence’ and Correlative right to the ‘State of Source’. In such cases, issue regarding applicability of Article 7 instead of Article 21, is of great relevance.

The issue is yet to be tested before the higher judiciary. However, in our humble view, the analysis and reasoning advanced by the Tribunal in the case of DCIT vs. Andaman Sea Food Pvt. Ltd appears to be very sound and in accordance with well accepted principles of Interpretation of Tax Treaties and is worth following.

Order No.A/700-703/13/ (STB/C-I dated 15/03/2013) Commissioner of Service tax, Mumbai vs. TCS.E-Serve Ltd.

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Whether service tax is payable under reverse charge on the amount paid for using international private leased circuit provided from abroad?

Facts:

Appellant provided call centre services, computerised data processing services etc. to customers in India and abroad and accordingly was registered under Business Auxiliary Services and Business Support Services. Appellant used international private leased circuit service provided by a Singapore company and as such paid charges to the foreign company. The dispute related to whether service tax was payable u/s. 66A for availing the said lease circuit/telecommunication service from abroad. The Appellant contested the levy on the ground that the service provider was not a “telegraph authority” as per definition of the term contained in section 65(111) and thus did not provide taxable service for the provisions relating to telecommunication service. Further, CBEC vide its circular 137/21/2011 dated 15-07-2011 clarified to the effect that foreign vendors being not licensed under Indian Telegraph Act were not covered by section 65(109a). Appellant placed reliance on Karvy Consultants Ltd. 2006 (1) STR 7 (AP) which dealt with a similar situation in the context of banking and other financial service. It was contended that under GST Act of Singapore, telecommunication service including international leased circuit line or network, if provided from a place in Singapore to a place outside Singapore, was treated as a taxable supply but qualified for zero rating. Hence, the same could not be subjected to tax in India. The revenue strongly contended that the service in question was specified in section 65(105) and the provider of service was licensed to provide such service under the Singapore Telecommunication Act. Further, section 66A created a deeming fiction and thus, the foreign service provider not being a telegraph authority should not come in the way of enforcing the said section. The circular/letter referred above being internal correspondence between the Board and the field formation would not have any binding force and reliance was placed by the revenue on Unitech Ltd. 2008 (12) STR 752 wherein on architect’s service received from a commercial concern abroad, reverse charge applicability was upheld.

Held:

Service tax was leviable u/s. 66 of the Act on taxable services referred to in section 65(105). Consequently, service tax was leviable u/s. 66A only in case of taxable services as covered by section 65(105). Thus, if a service was not covered by section 65(105), it could neither be liable u/s. 66 nor u/s. 66A. Thus for a leased circuit service to be taxable as per section 65(105) read with 65(111), the foreign service provider who was not a telegraph authority as defined under the law was not liable u/s. 66 or u/s. 66A. This legal position was evident from the Board’s clarification vide its above cited letter of 15-07-2011. The Bench also relied on the ratio of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Karvy Consultants Ltd. (supra) wherein it was held that in order that NBFC would be covered under net of service tax as banking and financial service provider, mere registration as NBFC was not enough but its principal business should be of receiving deposits/ lending. Further, the facts obtained in the case of Unitech Ltd. (supra), were also distinguished and the appeal was allowed on merits.
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2013 (30) STR 369 (Tri. – Bang) Balarami Reddy & Co. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Hyderabad

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Whether the order-in-original sent by speed post considered proper service?

Facts:

An order dated 26-09-2008 was issued to the appellant vide speed post. The appellant, on nonreceipt of the said order, collected the same from the Superintendent of Central Excise on 06-01-2010 and filed an appeal with the Commissioner (Appeals) on 05-02-2010. The appellate authority took the view that the order must have been served on the assessee as early as September 2008 and consequently the appeal was dismissed considering it heavily time-barred.

Held:

The Hon. Tribunal held that, the copy of the order-in-original was sent to the assessee by speed post whereas the legal requirement was to send it by registered post with acknowledgement due. Dispatch of order-in-original by speed post was not in accordance with section 37C of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and thus, the impugned order was set aside.
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2013 (30) STR 385 (Tri-Del.) Sarvashaktiman Traders Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Kanpur

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What will be the date of receipt for the purpose of payment of service tax? – cheque was received on 04-01-2007, deposited in bank on 05-02-2007 and service tax paid on 05-03-2007.

Facts:

The appellant provided business auxiliary services. For the services provided till December, 2006, the bills were raised in December, 2006 but the payment was received in January and the cheque deposited in the bank on 05-02-2007; as such the service tax was paid on 05-03-2007. The original adjudicating authority imposed penalties u/s. 76, 77 and 78 of the Finance Act, 1994. On appeal against the above order, Commissioner (Appeals) set aside the penalty imposed u/s. 78 and 77 but upheld penalty u/s. 76.

Held:

The Tribunal held that, section 76 provided for imposition of penalty where the person liable to pay service tax in accordance of section 68 failed to pay such tax. In the present case, although the cheque was received on 04-01-2007, the same was actually deposited in the bank on 05-02-2007 and thus, it was to be considered as if the consideration was received in the month of February itself, requiring them to deposit the tax in March, 2007. There being no delay in depositing the service tax, penalty u/s. 76 was set aside with consequential relief.
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2013 (30) STR 402( Tri.-Kolkata) Reliance Telecom Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, Kolkata

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Whether service tax is applicable on MRP of RCV (Recharge Coupons Vouchers) or on amount actually received from distributors after reduction of their commission?

Facts:

The appellant provided telecommunication service and charged their customers for the services to be provided by them as per the value of the recharge vouchers (RCV) purchased. While arriving at the taxable value, the appellant deducted the discount offered to their distributors from the value of the voucher and contended that it had service tax liability only to the extent of the amount received by them. As per section 67 of the Act, the value of any taxable service ought to be the gross amount charged by the service provider for such service provided or to be provided by him and thus, service tax was payable on the amount charged or consideration received by them from the distributors. The appellant further submitted that there was a clear principal to principal relationship between them and the distributors. Hence, service tax was payable on the discounted price and not on the MRP printed on the RCV’s. According to the revenue, since the RCV’s were sold on MRP, they were treated as OTC (over the counter) goods in the market and issuance of receipt for OTC goods being rarely practiced, production of the document in support of the allegation that RCV’s were sold on MRP was not feasible.

Held:

As per the provisions of section 67, if the provision of service is for a consideration in money, then the taxable value was the gross amount charged by the service provider for such service provided or to be provided by him and thus, the service was provided to the consumer and not to the distributor. The Tribunal further held that, where it was established that the charges collected from the consumers in lieu of the RCV’s was a service charge and not a sale, it was automatically established that the amount deducted by the dealer was nothing but commission to be included in the taxable income of the Appellant and thus, directed the appellant to pre-deposit 25% of the demand.
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2013 (30) STR 371 (Tri-Del.) Pooja Forge Lab vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Faridabad

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Whether CENVAT credit of service tax paid on GTA services is available where the appellant has entered into Free on Road (FOR) contract with the customers?

Facts:

The appellant was engaged in the manufacture of nuts and bolts, wire equipment etc. and entered into an FOR contract with their customers. As such, the transportation of the said goods being the responsibility of the appellant, they paid service tax under GTA and claimed CENVAT on the same. The Revenue contended that with the amendment in the definition of input services with effect from 01-04-2008 the appellant was not entitled to avail the credit.

The appellant contended that their sales were on FOR basis and, as such, place of removal gets extended to the buyer’s premises. They produced on record the purchase order as also the invoices along with a Chartered Accountant’s certificate in support of their claim and relied upon Ambuja Cements Ltd. vs. Union of India reported at [2009 (236) ELT 431 (P & H)] where the Board’s Circular of 2007 was examined and it was held that they were entitled to the benefit of CENVAT credit of service tax paid on the GTA services.

Held:

There was no justifiable reason to uphold the finding of the lower authorities where the Chartered Accountant’s certificate stated to the effect that sale was on FOR basis and all the expenses incurred up to the buyer’s premises formed part of the cost of final product. Further, the appellant were the owners of the goods up to the place of delivery i.e. the buyers’ premises and as such the GTA services so availed by them, were to be treated as input service and, thus, they were entitled to the credit.

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(2012) 54 SOT 44 (Hyd.) J.V.Krishna Rao vs. Dy. CIT ITA Nos.1866 & 1867 (Hyd.) of 2011 A.Y.2008-09. Dated 15-06-2012

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Sections 54F – Exemption is available even if borrowed funds are used for investment.

Facts

For the relevant assessment year, the assessee’s claim for exemption u/s. 54F was denied by the Assessing Officer on the ground that the assessee’s deposit in the `Capital Gains Accounts Scheme’ included borrowed funds. The CIT(A) upheld the disallowance.

Held

The Tribunal, relying on the decisions in the following cases, allowed the exemption u/s. 54F :

a. Muneer Khan V. ITO (2010) 41 SOT 504 (Hyd.)

b. Sita Jain V. Asst. CIT (IT Appeal Nos.4754, 4755 and 5036 (Delhi) of 2010, dated 20-5-2011

c. Bombay Housing Corpn. vs. Asst. CIT (2002) 81 ITD 545 (Mum.) d. Mrs.Prema P.Shah vs. ITO (2006) 100 ITD 60 (Mum.)

The Tribunal noted as under :

The capital gains earned by the assessee can be utilised for other purposes and as long as the assessee fulfils the condition of investment of the equivalent amount in the asset qualifying for relief u/s.54F by securing the money spent out of the capital gains from other sources available to him, either by borrowing or otherwise, he is eligible for relief u/s. 54F in respect of the entire amount of capital gains realised.

In this case, even though part of those capital gains were utilised for other purposes, the assessee made deposits of the amounts equivalent to the capital gains in Capital Gains Account Scheme, by borrowing the amount equivalent to such utilised funds. Therefore, he is entitled to relief u/s. 54F as ultimately the assessee deposited the requisite amount in the Capital Gains Account Scheme within the time stipulated by the statute.

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Precedent, Consistency, Limitation ……..Need for a Rethink

“I agree with you but I am bound by the actions of my predecessor”. This is a phrase that most of my colleagues would have heard in their careers from various authorities. With any forum be it judicial or administrative the weight of a precedent is enormous. The importance of precedent as a part of judicial discipline is well understood. The question is whether a precedent is a support or a millstone around your neck. Must the weight of a precedent force you to drown and then be rescued by a lifeline, or can one attempt to get rid of it and swim ashore? The doctrine of precedent is often misapplied either deliberately or through ignorance. One understands that in certain areas one must follow the decisions of a concurrent jurisdiction, for not to do so will result in anarchy. However, this principle cannot be used as a fortress to withstand the attack on the correctness of the decision of a predecessor.

Like precedents, we all swear by the principle of consistency. Undoubtedly, one must be consistent but such consistency must not be of mistake or inaction. The reason why precedent and consistency are treated as sacrosanct is that we tend to judge and evaluate the action of any person not on the touchstone of whether he acted diligently, correctly or reasonably, but whether he followed the past. Any departure from the past is looked upon with suspicion, with regard to the integrity of the person who takes a different decision. This results in an attempt by senior officers to fix responsibility on a junior official or pass the buck upward.

If an officer comes to a conclusion that his predecessor has made an error, he must not only be entitled to do what is required to rectify that error, but also be duty bound to not compound the mistake by repeating it. Such a departure should be evaluated based on the merit of the decision and it should not affect the careers of both these officers if they have acted bonafide. A system has to be evolved, whereby this can be achieved. Not only should one officer be required to rectify past erroneous action, the same officer should also be required to make a different decision from the one he made in the past, if he truly believes that it was erroneous and he must not be hounded for this if it satisfies the acid test of bonafide action.

Another aspect which needs reconsideration is the law of limitation qua certain events, actions obligations and claims. A striking example of this is that, for a citizen the period of limitation to claim a debt is three years while the State can raise a claim for taxes pertaining to a period from which 30 years have elapsed. Must we therefore accept that the government can function with only one tenth of the efficiency of a citizen? I am conscious that what I said sounds simplistic but the attempt is only to illustrate the stark contrast. If the State makes a claim which is three decades old, it must establish beyond doubt that the claim is valid and subsisting, and not shift this onus on the hapless citizen. Like the law of limitation for making a claim there must be a timeframe within which action, whether civil or criminal, ought be initiated. Further, there must be a limitation of time from an event, within which investigation must commence. No purpose will be achieved by investigating an event of 1984 and 1992 and utilise precious national resources in that activity. So much water has flown under the bridge that many of the perpetrators of the alleged crime as well as the victims have receded into oblivion. Investigation into events older beyond a certain period should not be started, for it is unlikely to unearth anything worthwhile. If an investigation for an event beyond the decided period of limitation has not reached a particular stage, it should be abandoned. Many would be critical of this suggestion as it will mean that certain criminals and fraudsters will go scot-free and unpunished. But for a nation with scarce resources, I believe, that the priority should be preventing crime rather than attempting to bring to book someone for an event which has faded from national memory.

We are a nation with a glorious past, living in a turbulent present. If we are to have a great future, for which we have the requisite potential, the principles, precedent consistency and limitation to which I made a reference, need a serious rethink.

2013 (30) STR 357 (Tri.-Ahmd.) Oracle Granito Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Ahmedabad

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Whether CENVAT credit is allowed on service tax paid in respect of renting of immovable property used for displaying finished goods?

Facts:
The appellants were manufacturers of vitrified tiles and availed CENVAT credit of duty paid on inputs, capital goods and input services in accordance with the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004. The appellants also availed CENVAT of service tax paid of Rs. 1,11,240/- on the rent charged at the premises used for facilitating display of the appellants’ goods. The department disallowed the credit and levied interest and penalties. The Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the order. The appellants contended that, the property taken on rent for the purpose of displaying its vitrified tiles were in line of its business and relied on Bharat Fritz Werner Ltd. 2011 (22) STR 429 (Tri.- Bang) and Micro Labs Ltd. 2012 (26) STR 383 (Kar.) = 2011 (270) ELT 156 (Kar.).

The ld. Respondent contended that, in the present case, the appellants failed to demonstrate that the amount of service tax paid by them was included in the final value of the products manufactured and cleared by them which has to be satisfied by the Appellant.

Held:

It was undisputed that the properties were taken on rent by the appellants for display of vitrified tiles and that the service provider had discharged the service tax under the category of renting of immovable property services. Further, the appellants also produced the chartered accountant’s certificate and thus, the services were utilised by the appellants for the purpose of enhancement of their business. Also, since the services were directly or indirectly used for the purpose of their business, credit could not be denied.

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2013 (30) STR. 435 (Tri.-Delhi) Bhavik vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jaipur- I

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Whether service tax under reverse charge is applicable on the services of erection & commissioning of an imported machinery by foreign party’s technicians where no separate consideration was mentioned in the agreement towards installation?

Facts:
The appellant imported textile machinery form Japan, Italy etc. under a contract with the foreign exporter and discharged duty thereon. The agreement also included installation and erection to be done by the foreign supplier who would send his technical persons to do the job.

Revenue initiated the proceedings on the installation and erections done by foreign technical personnel and confirmed the demand of Rs. 37,35,730/- for the period post 18-04-2006 on the basis of the valuation done with recourse to Notification No. 19/2003-ST dated 21-08-2003 and Notification No. 1/2006-ST dated 01-03-2006 along with imposition of penalties u/s. 76 and 78. The appellant contended that the foreign exporter had office in India in which case service tax liability would not fall upon the recipient of services. Also, they had discharged customs duty on the entire value of the textile machinery and that the notifications referred to by the Commissioner were optional granting abatement to the persons who are otherwise liable to pay the service tax. The revenue stated that payment of customs duty on the value of the goods has got nothing to do with the payment of service tax. The said duties were separate duties and the appellant was liable to pay service tax on that part of the value of contract which related to the services provided by the foreign persons. They further contended that the adjudicating authority was correct in arriving at the value of services in terms of said notifications.

Held:

The Hon. Tribunal, granting stay unconditionally, held that, there being only one contract between the appellant and the foreign supplier, such supply of textile machinery included the work of installation, erection and commissioning. Further, customs duty was paid on the entire value in the agreement and as such, it was not proper to artificially segregate it into two parts i.e. value of the machinery and value of services. Further, the adoption of notification for arriving at the artificial deemed value of the services was also not proper inasmuch as the said notification provided option to the assessee to seek abatement of 67% in the value of services for payment of service tax and the same have no applicability to the facts of the present case.

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2013-TIOL-789-CESTAT-MUM Ane Industries Pvt. Ltd./Shri Gagandeep Singh vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Mumbai.

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Whether interest amount would accrue on credit taken but not utilised?
Facts:
The appellant rendered services of mining and availed ineligible CENVAT credit to the extent of Rs. 47,79,078/- but did not utilise the same. Interest and penalties were confirmed. The appellant relied on the case of Bill Forge Pvt. Ltd. 2012 (26) STR 204 (Cal) where it was held that interest liability would not accrue if there was no liability to pay duty.

Held:
The Hon. Tribunal relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Ind-Swift Laboratories Ltd. 2011 (265) ELT 3 (SC) held that that there was no difference between the expression “credit taken” and “credit utilised” for the purpose of recovery of wrongly availed credit in terms of Rule 14 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 and accordingly ordered deposit of Rs. 15 lakh.

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2013-TIOL-734-CESTAT-MUM M/s. GMMCO Ltd. vs. CCE, Nagpur

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When VAT is payable on a transaction, whether service tax is payable? Held, No. Pre-deposit stayed.

Facts:
The appellant was engaged in renting of earthmoving equipment such as caterpillar, excavators, etc. to various customers and discharged VAT liability on the same. The department contended that the effective possession and control was with the appellant as emerging from the agreement with one of their customer and thus, the transaction was one of “Supply of Tangible Goods” service liable to service tax. The appellant contended that the activity undertaken by them was one of leasing on which VAT liability was to be discharged as per the Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act, 2002. They also relied on Circular MF (DR) 224/1/2008-TRU dated 29/02/2008 and on the case of G. S. Lamba & Sons vs. State of A.P. 2012-TIOL-49-HC-AP-CT in support of their claim.

Held:
On perusal of the agreement entered into by the appellant and applying the ratio in the decision of G. S. Lamba & Sons (supra), it was held that the transaction prima facie was for “transfer of right to use” which was deemed to be ‘sale’ and not “supply of tangible goods for use service” and as such, full waiver of pre-deposit was granted.

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2013-TIOL-441-HC-DEL-ST Commissioner of Central Excise and Service Tax v. Simplex Infrastructure and Foundary Works.

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Whether the term ‘firm’ also included a private limited company for the purpose of the definition of Consulting Engineer? Held, No.

Facts

The Appellant contended that the respondents; a private limited company was included in the definition of Consulting Engineers having recourse to section 3(42) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 which defined the term ‘person’ to include any company or association or body of individuals whether incorporated or not.

Held:

The Hon. High Court dismissing the appeal held that the definition prior to 01-05-2006 included the term firm only and only post 01-05-2006, the term body corporate was introduced. Further, reliance was also not placed on the definition of person in section 3(42) of the General Clauses Act was incorrect, as nowhere the term ‘person’ was used in the definition of “Consulting Engineer”.

[Note: This decision did not consider and is opposed to the decision in case of M. N. Dastur & Co. Ltd. vs. UOI 2006 (4) ST R 3 (Cal)]

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Global review lauds CAG reports

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An international peer review of the CAG has appreciated its audit framework as “conceptually sound” while noting that stakeholders, including government departments, appreciate its reports as “valuable information”.

The CAG requested an international peer review in August 2011, less than a year after it submitted the 2G scam audit. The peer review team was led by the Australian National Audit Office and included representatives from audit bodies of Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands and the US.

“The objective of the peer review was to assess the extent to which the performance audit function of the Supreme Audit Institution (SAI) India adheres to applicable standards of professional practice; and to identify opportunities for improvement,” the report said.

 “During the peer review, we met with a range of SAI India’s stakeholders, including the PAC and COPU (Committee on Public Undertakings) members, and senior government officials. They advised that SAI India’s performance audits provide valuable information, often not otherwise available, on the performance and on-the ground impact of government programs and funding. Stakeholders also provided positive feedback on the quality of recent performance audit reports,” the report said.

The peer review team also recorded that the CAG’s Audit Quality Management Framework (AQMF) “is conceptually sound”, but there was a “need to strengthen the AQMF to increase the level of assurance provided to the CAG that these auditing requirements are consistently being met”. The review covered 35 performance audits from April 2010 to March 2011 that covered the period when the 2G audit was also submitted.

The peer group found that there was “variability” in CAG’s adherence to applicable standards of professional practice across the performance audit function. “Individual audit guidelines, which outline the plan for each audit, were developed for all but one of the performance audits in the peer review sample,” it said. The CAG “also interacted with the audited entities in accordance with accepted conventions, including seeking to conduct entry and exit conferences and providing a draft audit report to the audited entity for comment. The peer group said areas where CAG could improve in “the application of reporting standards” to make them more “balanced, fair, persuasive, and satisfy audit objectives.” It also said that there was scope in about half of the considered reports to be more balanced in content and tone.

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2013 (29)S.T.R. 499 (Tri- Ahmd) Shree Gayatri Tourist Bus Service vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Vadodara.

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Is service tax attracted on hiring of vehicles where Cab provider is required to maintain the said vehicles and also required to do repairing, fuelling etc. under Rent a cab operator’s service?

Facts:
Service tax was demanded from the Appellant as Rent-a-cab operator. The scope of contract with the client stipulated that vehicles were required for transportation of personnel of client under their instructions/directions and vehicles would move on official duty to outstation, depending upon exigencies of client work for which no other extra charge was to be paid. Further, vehicles were provided normally on the basis of 12 hours of duty in a day.

Hiring charges were calculated for actual number of working days on pro rata basis and maintenance etc. was responsibility of the assessee and no extra charge was to be paid. Assessee was assured minimum fixed charges per vehicle per month yet was required to maintain log book and invoices had to be based on the usage.

Held:
Vehicles were not rented to client-had it been otherwise, client would have to ensure maintenance, repairing, proper running and fuelling of the vehicle. Possession and ownership of vehicle remained with assessee and he was only required to provide service for 12 hours in a day. In case of rent, owner of property is de-possessed and possession passes on to person who has taken it out for usage. It was immaterial whether hiring of vehicle is for a day or a month. The fact that payment had to be made after verification of log book showed that monthly payment may vary from vehicle to vehicle based on kilometres run and not on monthly rent basis.

Payment of minimum fixed charges per vehicle per month was only a safety measure to ensure some minimum payment to avoid nil payment, if client did not use the vehicle at all, and could not lead to conclusion that vehicle was let out on rent and liable to service tax u/s. 65(91) of the Finance Act, 1994- Section 65(105)(o).

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2013 (29) S.T.R. 648 (Commr. Appl.) In re: Sundaram Clayton Limited

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Whether realisation for forex a condition under Notification No.41/2007-ST?

Facts:
The appellant was a manufacturer exporter. The appellant sent certain documents, samples and goods via courier to their foreign client and claimed refund of service tax under Notification No.41/2007-ST. Courier services is specifically mentioned as one of the services under the said notification. The said claim was rejected only on the ground that the sending of documents, samples did not yield into realisation of forex. The appellant submitted that the realisation of forex was not one of the conditions to claim refund under the said notification. The refund is awarded to exporters with the intention to neutralise all taxes and duties borne by the exporter in the course of exports.

Held:
The appellant vide documentary evidence proved that the courier services were used for export of goods and thus the appellant was entitled to claim the refund of the service tax paid on courier services.

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2013 (29) S.T.R. 620 (Tri- Chennai) Commissioner of Service Tax, Chennai vs. Heidelberg India Pvt. Ltd.

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Remittance towards reimbursement of expenses incurred abroad not tantamounting to training abroad.

Facts:
The respondent was in the business of procuring orders for the company located in Germany for machineries supplied to persons in India and also installed and maintained the machinery during the warranty period. The respondent’s employees went to Germany for the training. Revenue demanded service tax on expenditure captured in forex alleging that it was towards the training fees paid to the parent company while the respondent submitted that it was reimbursement of expenses of the employees who went for training to Germany. The first appellate authority in the order recorded the finding that the respondent had produced evidence that no training fees were paid and it was supported by the certificates of the parent company. Further sample invoices were submitted by the respondent to support his contention that the payments were only reimbursement of expenses namely, travel, accommodation, etc. incurred during their stay in Germany and thus it cannot be contended that the balance amount pertained to training fees.

The demand was confirmed by invoking Rule 3(ii) of the Services (Provided from outside India and Received in India) Rules, 2006, whereby the service was held taxable if it was partly performed in India. The adjudicating authority had not recorded that the services were partly performed in India and hence the contention of the respondent was accepted. The first appellate authority also held that as the respondent filed returns for the relevant period, thus the department was aware of the activities of the respondent and hence the extended period was not invokable.

The Tribunal held that not finding any infirmity in the order and upheld the order and dismissed the appeal of the revenue.

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2013 (29) S.T.R. 521 (Tri- Ahmd) Commissioner of Service Tax, Ahmedabad vs. Sun- N-Step Club Ltd.

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Whether when tax was paid by reverse calculation on entry fees received from non-members would tantamount to unjust enrichment and thus denial of refund?

Facts:
Service tax erroneously paid by assessee club on entry fee received from non members by working backwards from the gross fee as the same was not collected. The invoices evidenced this fact. Both lower authorities held that the assessee club was not liable to service tax. The refund claim for the mistakenly paid tax was rejected by the department. However, the revisionary authority held that the respondent was eligible for refund. Relying on the case of V. S. Infrastructure Ltd. 2012 (25) STR 170 (Tri–Del) containing identical fact, it was pleaded that there was no unjust enrichment. Revenue filed an appeal on the grounds that the charges collected from both members and non-members were inclusive of service tax. Thus, service tax was said to be collected from the client. Thus, the amount so collected as representing service tax was required to be paid u/s. 73A(2) which was rightly done. Thus, subsequent refund of such amount did not arise as it would tantamount to unjust enrichment. According to the Respondent, the adjudicating authority, in his order specifically recorded the finding “copy of the invoice reflects that there is no service tax and consequently receipt of non-membership income is without service tax.”

Held:
The Respondent paid service tax on the income received from the non-members, working backwards to determine service tax liability. Adjudicating authority recorded a factual finding that the respondent did not charge service tax on any amount which had been charged to the nonmembers and the provisions of section 73A of the Finance Act, 1994 are not attracted. The facts of the case V. S. Infrastructure (supra) being similar to the facts herein, it is settled that the question of unjust enrichment does not arise.

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2013 (29) S.T.R.527 (Tri.- Del.) Commissioner of Central Excise, Chandigarh vs. Green View Land & Buildcon Ltd.

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Whether amendment of taxing activity of selling under construction flats retrospective in nature?

Facts:
The appellants engaged in construction of residential complexes sold the same to the prospective buyers. During the period October, 2005 to July, 2006 they did not pay any service tax for advances received during the said period for such activity. A Show Cause Notice was issued in this regard and adjudicated confirming a demand for tax amount of Rs. 14,50,311/- along with interest and penalty as revenue’s view was that service tax was payable on such activity u/s. 65(105)(zzzh) of the Finance Act, 1994 read with section 65(30a) of the Finance Act, 1994 during the stated period. The lower appellate authority set aside the adjudication order on the ground that the appellant had engaged their own labour and constructing buildings on lands owned by themselves and thus there was no service provided by the appellant to the prospective buyers and placed reliance on the clarificatory letter issued by CBEC vide F. No. 332/35/2006-TRU, dated 01-08-2006. The Revenue contending that the Respondent received advances from the prospective buyers for the flats and therefore there was a service rendered in terms of the explanation inserted u/s. 65(105)(zzzh) by the Finance Act, 2010. Revenue relied on the decision of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of G.S. Promoters vs. UOI, 2011 (21) S.T.R. 100 (P&H).

Held:
The explanation added at the Finance Act, 2010 was not effective retrospective and this issue was already decided by the Tribunal vide Final Order No. ST/A/190-197/2012 of 13-03-2012 in Appeal No. S.T./463/2008 (Delhi) and Others in the case of CCE, Chandigarh vs. M/s. Skynet Builders, Developers, Colonizer and others – 2012 (27) STR 388 (T). It was held that the decision of Punjab & Haryana High Court in G S Promoters (supra) did not examine service tax liability for the period prior to the date of the explanation, therefore not applicable in the instant case. Appeal by the department was dismissed accordingly.

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IFRS Conceptual Framework – Time to Revise

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In July 2013, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) issued a discussion paper on review of the Conceptual Framework for financial reporting for comment only. Comments on this paper need to be given by 14th January, 2014.

The IASB’s discussion paper on the Conceptual Framework provides a welcome opportunity to set out the fundamental principles of accounting necessary to develop robust and consistent standards. Although this is not an immediate project, it would set the tone for the future direction of accounting.

Need for a review of the Conceptual Framework

In recent times, there have been many discussions regarding the extent of fair value accounting under IFRS, the measurement of performance, keeping assets on or off balance sheet etc. which raise questions on the fundamentals of accounting under IFRS. In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, as the accounting complexities increase, the IASB’s thinking about some of these fundamentals has also evolved. This gave rise to the need for a revised Conceptual Framework which reflects the recent changes in accounting and provides a backbone for future changes.

This discussion paper is designed to obtain initial views and comments on a number of matters, and focuses on areas that have caused problems in practice for standard setters as well as companies. It also sets out the IASB’s preliminary views on some of the topics under discussion.

Key changes envisaged

Revised definitions of assets and liabilities

The revised Conceptual Framework proposes to clarify the existing definitions of assets and liabilities. Rather than the focus of the current definition on inflow or outflow of resources, the proposals suggest that the focus should be on underlying resources or obligations as the basis for determining the recognition of an asset or liability. Given below are the proposed definitions:

(a) an asset is a present economic resource controlled by the entity as a result of past events.

(b) a liability is a present obligation of the entity to transfer an economic resource as a result of past events.

(c) an economic resource is a right, or other source of value, that is capable of producing economic benefits.

Additional guidance on applying the definitions of assets and liabilities

The IASB proposes to provide additional guidance on the meaning of economic resource, control, transfer of economic resource, constructive obligations and present obligation. Additional guidance would be provided also on reporting the substance of contractual rights and contractual obligations and executory contracts. These would be helpful to support the proposed new definitions of asset and liability explained above.

Revised guidance on when assets and liabilities should be recognised

The IASB’s preliminary view on recognition is that an entity should recognise all its assets and liabilities unless the IASB decides when developing or revising a particular standard that an entity need not, or should not, recognise an asset or a liability either because of cost benefit considerations or that such recognition would not be a faithful representation.

New guidance on when assets and liabilities should be derecognised

The existing Conceptual Framework does not address derecognition in a comprehensive manner. The IASB’s preliminary view is that an entity should derecognise an asset or a liability when it no longer meets the recognition criteria. However, for cases in which an entity retains a component of an asset or a liability, the IASB should determine, when developing or revising the standards, how the entity would best portray the changes that resulted from the transaction. This could be achieved by way of enhanced presentation or disclosure or continuing to recognise the original asset or liability and treating the proceeds received or paid for the transfer as a loan received or granted.

New way to present information about equity claims against the reporting entity

Financial statements currently do not clearly show how equity instruments with prior claims against the entity affect possible future cash flows to investors. Also, the IASB proposes to address the distinction between equity and liability, specifically the problems of applying the definition of liability consistently within IFRS.

Measurement requirements

This section of the discussion paper provides guidance to assist the IASB in developing measurement requirements in new or revised standards. The proposals state that there are different bases of measurement i.e cost, market prices including fair value and other cash flow based measurements. These bases should be applied based on their relevance, cost benefit analysis and their impact on the profit and loss/other comprehensive income (OCI) statement.

Principles for distinguishing profit or loss from OCI

The extant Framework does not provide guidance on presentation and disclosure. The reporting of financial performance (including the use of OCI and recycling) is a key topic that needs to be addressed. Further, the IASB proposes to provide more guidance in the area of materiality.

This Discussion Paper incorporates the views received through the IASB’s public consultation carried out in 2011. It has detailed discussions around the key topics mentioned above and other topics where different views have been deliberated and the IASB’s preliminary views have been stated out for comment. This is an important project for the IASB as it not only addresses concerns around the fundamental areas as they exist today but also set the principles for standards to be developed in the future.

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2013 (29) S.T.R. 545 (Del.) Wipro Ltd. vs. Union of India

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Is Filing of declaration after date of export of services a non compliance as to disentitle exporter from rebate in terms of paragraph 3 of the Notification No. 12/2005-ST ?

Facts:
The appellant engaged in the rendering of IT- enabled services such as technical support services, back office services, customer care services etc. to its clients situated outside India were taxable services under the Act.

Rule 5 of the said Export Rules provided for “Rebate of Service Tax” which, interalia, provided that where any taxable service was exported, the rebate of service tax paid or duty paid on input services or inputs would be available subject to conditions or limitations as specified in the notification issued for the purpose. Accordingly, Notification No. 12/2005-ST dated 19-04-2005 provided that, rebate of the duty on inputs or service tax and cess paid on all taxable input services used in providing taxable service exported out of India will be granted subject to conditions and procedures specified. The appellant lodged two claims for rebate in respect of service tax paid on input services like night transportation, recruitment, training, bank charges etc. However, the declaration required to be filed in terms of the Notification was filed after the date of export of taxable service. The rebate claims were rejected on the ground of late filing of the declaration beyond the date of export.

Held:
The very bedrock of the business of Call Centre relates to attending of calls on a continuous basis. It is difficult to conceive of any possibility as to how the appellant could not only determine the date of export but also anticipate the call so that the declaration could be filed prior to the date of export. Further, filing of declaration after date of export of services is not such a non-compliance as to disentitle exporter from rebate. Nature of service is such that they are rendered seamlessly, on continuous basis without any commencement or terminal points, and it is difficult to comply with requirement ‘prior’ to the date for export, except for description of services. Estimation is ruled out because of the words “actually required”. However, if particulars in declaration are furnished to Service Tax authorities, within a reasonable time after export, along with necessary documentary evidence, and are found to be correct and authenticated, object/purpose of filing declaration would be satisfied and appeal, thus, was allowed.

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2013 (29) STR 557 (Ker.) All Kerala Association of Chit Funds vs. Union of India

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Amendment of Finance Act, 1994 in 2007 deleted the words “but does not include cash management’ from section 65(12)(a)(v) defining banking and other financial services – Later CBEC vide Circular No. 96-07-2007-ST dated: 23-08-2007 clarified that chit funds, was cash management service provided for consideration and, therefore, liable to service tax under “banking and financial services”- whether members of the chit fund association providing cash management services liable?

Facts: The appellants were running chit business in the State of Kerala and contended that they are not covered by the Kerala Chitties Act, 1975 as the Chit Funds Act, 1982 was not notified within the State of Kerala. Appellants also contended that service tax can be imposed only vide positive incorporation of the particular service and not by way of deletion vide a circular by invoking powers u/s. 37 of the Central Excise Act, 1984 read with section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994. According to the Appellants, Chit fund was a systematic and periodic contribution of fixed measure of funds deposited with a trustee. It was disbursed to needy persons through draw of lots (Chit/Kuri/Kurip). Trustee/ Foreman had his share as well as commission. It was not a money lending business and there was no debtor-creditor relationship between subscriber and foreman. It essentially was management of cash/fund generated and distributed without much time gap.

Held:
High Court held that liability to service tax of chit fund was sustainable as it was based on statutory provisions, and not on CBEC circular ibid. Plea that tax liability could not be imposed by deletion from existing provisions, rejected as power to tax includes amendment either by incorporation or by deletion. If statute grants power to tax particular instance, but gives some exclusion, and when the exclusion is deleted by amendment, it comes within the taxable net. After the amendment, all forms of cash management were liable for service tax, and it was not necessary to enumerate each of them. Reference to section 45(1) of RBI Act, 1934 was only made in the CBEC circular to show that financial institutions carried out the chit business as well. The plea that despite its existence since enactment of Finance Act, 1994 till the amendment in the year 2007, chit business was not made taxable does not provide any estoppel against the provisions of law. It was held that procurement of funds from different subscribers, putting it together, sharing dividend, disbursement of amount to prized subscriber after commission payable to foreman etc. was a service liable to service tax in the hands of a financial institution and power of exemption is inclusive of power to modify or withdraw it.

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GAP in GAAP— Fair Value of Revenue

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Background

Company A sells handsets—either for upfront cash or for payment in installments. Until recently, its pricing was:

• Rs. 810 for upfront cash; or
• 36 monthly installments of Rs. 25 (total Rs. 900), implying an interest rate of 7% pa on the cash price of Rs. 810.

New competitors that sell handsets for cash but not on credit have entered the market—this has led to a drop in the cash sale price to Rs. 621 but A still makes most of its sales on credit on the same terms as before (i.e. Rs. 25 a month for 36 months).

This gives an imputed interest rate of 29% pa on the installment contract relative to the new cash price of Rs. 621. A believes this implied interest rate is unreasonably high. It sells some receivables on a non-recourse basis at yields approximating 7-8% pa.

How should A measure its revenues from handsets?

Options under Indian GAAP

View 1-The fair value of the consideration is the cash sale price (i.e. Revenue Rs. 621)

Since the handsets sold have a cash alternative price that is clearly determinable, revenue should be recognised at this price. In addition, even if the fair value of the consideration were higher than the cash sale price, this premium represents a payment for services to be received (financing services) that should be recognised over the service period as part of finance income rather than immediately as part of revenue from selling the handset.

The support for this view can be found in AS-9 itself. As per the illustration in AS 9 Revenue Recognition, “When the consideration is receivable in installments, revenue attributable to the sales price exclusive of interest should be recognised at the date of sale. The interest element should be recognised as revenue, proportionately to the unpaid balance due to the seller.” Though this paragraph supports the discounting of the installments, it does not provide any guidance on how the interest is determined. Therefore it is possible to determine the cash sale price based on an observable market and to treat the residue as interest, though that interest amount is much higher than the market.

View 2-The fair value of the consideration is the price derived by discounting the installment payments using market-based interest rates (i.e. Revenue Rs. 810)

The support for this view can be found in AS-9 itself. As per the illustration in AS 9 Revenue Recognition, “When the consideration is receivable in installments, revenue attributable to the sales price exclusive of interest should be recognised at the date of sale. The interest element should be recognised as revenue, proportionately to the unpaid balance due to the seller.” Though this paragraph supports the discounting of the installments, it does not provide any guidance on how the interest is determined. Therefore, it is possible to determine the cash sale price by discounting the installments at the market yield of 7% p.a.

In addition, Paragraph 47 of AS 30 Financial Instruments Recognition and Measurement (not yet mandatory) states that the initial measurement of financial assets should be based on their fair value and the receivables are the consideration being valued. Therefore, under this view the fair value of the consideration should be derived by discounting the future cash flows using market-related interest rates.

View 3–No discounting (i.e. Revenue Rs. 900)
The illustration in AS-9 requires discounting in the case of installment sales. If the fact pattern was somewhat different, so that the payment was not based on installments, but the sales were on deferred payment terms, then discounting may not be required. For example, sale was made at Rs. 900 but entire payment of Rs. 900 is collected after six months. In such a case, it may be argued that the illustration in AS-9 which applies to installment sales does not apply in this case. This may be particularly true in schemes where a customer paying upfront or a customer paying over a short period, say 6 months, ends up paying the same amount. In other words, there is no interest amount to be imputed or the interest amount is immaterial. An interesting point to note is that under IAS 18 Revenue, revenue is always recognised at fair value of the consideration, and hence discounting is mandatory unless immaterial. Unlike IAS 18, under AS-9 there is no requirement to recognise revenue at fair value. The illustration in AS 9 to discount and separate revenue and finance income is only applicable when the sales are made purely on an installment payment scheme.

View 4-Accounting policy choice
In the absence of any detailed guidance, the author believes that either of the views above can be accepted. I suggest that the Institute should provide guidance as the object of an accounting standard is to eliminate diverse accounting practices.

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Entry Tax on Goods

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Under The Maharashtra Tax on the Entry of Goods into Local Areas Act, 2002 (Entry Tax Act, 2002), tax is levied on notified goods imported from outside the state of Maharashtra. For example, if the building contractor imports tiles from Gujarat and uses it in his contract activity, the issue can arise whether he is liable for entry tax on tiles? The contractor must be discharging liability on such contract under the MVAT Act, 2002. On the above facts, the issue about levy of Entry Tax can be examined as under:

Under Maharashtra Tax on the Entry of Goods into Local Areas Act, 2002, tax is attracted on tiles imported from outside the State of Maharashtra for consumption, use or sale. The charging section 3 of the said Act provides as under:

“3 (1) There shall be levied and collected a tax on the entry of the goods specified in column (2) of the Schedule, into any local area for consumption, use or sale therein, at the rates respectively specified against each of them in column (3) thereof and different rates may be specified in respect of different goods or different classes of goods or different categories of persons in the local area. The tax shall be levied on the value of the goods as defined in clause (n) of sub-section (1) of section 2. The State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, from time to time, add, modify or delete the entries in the said Schedule and on such notification being issued, the Schedule shall stand amended accordingly;

Provided that, the rate of tax to be specified by the Government in respect of any commodity shall not exceed the rate specified for that commodity under the [the Value Added Tax Act] or, as the case may be, the Maharashtra Purchase Tax on Sugarcane Act, 1962:

Provided further that, the tax payable by the importer under this Act shall be reduced by the amount of tax paid, if any, under the law relating to General Sales Tax in force in the Union Territory or the State, in which the goods are purchased, by the importer:

Provided also that no tax shall be levied and collected on specified goods entering into a local area for the purpose of such process as may be specified, and, if such processed goods are sent out of the State.

Explanation – No tax shall be levied under this Act on entry of any fuel or other consumables contained in the fuel tank fitted to the vehicle for its own consumption while entering into any local area.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), there shall also be levied a tax in addition to the tax leviable in accordance with sub-section (1) on the entry of Petrol and High Speed Diesel Oil in any local area for consumption use or sale therein at the rate of one rupee per litre.
(3) …
(4) …


(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (1) and (2), no tax shall be levied on the specified goods, imported by a dealer registered under the [the Value Added Tax Act], who brings goods into any local area for the purpose of resale in the State or sale in the course of inter-State trade or commerce or export out of the territory of India:

Provided that, if any such dealer, after importing the specified goods for the purpose of resale in the State or sale in the course of inter-State trade or commerce or export out of the territory of India, consumes such goods in any form or deals with such goods in any other manner except reselling the same, he shall inform the assessing authority before the 25th day of the month, succeeding the month in which such goods are so consumed or dealt with and pay the tax, which would have been otherwise leviable under sub section (1) or (2).

(6) If any dealer having imported the specified goods for the ostensible purpose of resale or, as the case may be, sale, deals with such goods in any other manner or consumes the same and does not inform the assessing authority as provided in sub-section (5) or does not pay the tax as required under sub-section (5) within the specified period, the assessing authority shall assess the amount of tax which the dealer is liable to pay under subsection (1) or (2) and also levy penalty equal to the amount of tax due. ….”

It may be noted that section 3(5) exempts from levy, the specified goods, which are for resale.

 Thus, if the tiles are held to be imported for resale, no Entry Tax can be attracted. The issue will be whether use of tiles in works contract will be considered to be ‘resale’, so as not to attract any liability under Entry Tax Act?

Section 2(2) of Entry Tax Act, 2002 provides as under:

“2 (2) Words and expressions used but not defined in this Act but defined in the [the Value Added Tax Act, or the Maharashtra Value Added Tax Rules, 2005] shall have the meanings respectively assigned to them under that Act or the Rules.”

Therefore the terms not defined in Entry Tax Act will carry the meaning as given in MVAT Act, 2002.

The term ‘resale’ is defined in section 2(22) of MVAT Act, 2002 as under:

“(22) ‘resale’ means a sale of purchased goods-

(i) in the same form in which they were purchased, or

(ii) without doing anything to them which amounts to, or results in, a manufacture, and the word ‘resell’ shall be construed accordingly;”

As per facts, as stated above, the tiles are used by contractor in construction activity and they will be used in the same form as they are ready tiles for fitting. It is also a fact that works contract is a ‘sale’ transaction. This position is clear from definition of ‘sale’ in section 2(24) of MVAT Act, 2002, which defines ‘sale’ as under:

““(24) “sale” means a sale of goods made within the State for cash or deferred payment or other valuable consideration but does not include a mortgage, hypothecation, charge or pledge; and the words “sell”, “buy” and “purchase”, with all their grammatical variations and cognate expressions, shall be construed accordingly;

Explanation,-—For the purposes of this clause,—

(a) a sale within the State includes a sale determined to be inside the State in accordance with the principles formulated in section 4 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956;

(b) (i) the transfer of property in any goods, otherwise than in pursuance of a contract, for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration;

(ii) the transfer of property in goods (whether as goods or in some other form) involved in the execution of a works contract including, an agreement for carrying out for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration, the building, construction, manufacture, processing, fabrication, erection, installation, fitting out, improvement, modification, repair or commissioning of any movable or immovable property…”

Thus it can be concluded that ‘works contract’ is a transaction of sale.

In works contract, tax is levied on the basis that there is sale of individual items used in the contract. It is due to the above position, the contractor is liable to pay tax under MVAT Act, 2002 as per goods involved and transferred during the execution of works contract. The net result is that there is sale of tiles by use in works contract and it is ‘resale’ within the meanings of section 2(22) of MVAT Act, 2002. Under the above circumstances, no Entry Tax is attracted on the contractor. This will be the position whether the contractor is discharging liability by statutory method of Rule 58 of MVAT Rules or under Composition method.

This position will apply to all notified goods which are used as it is in ‘works contract’ and on which tax liability under MVAT Act is discharged.

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Software: Taxable as Service or Goods or Both?

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Introduction:
The term ‘software’ is not defined in the Finance Act, 1994 (the Act). However, in Commissioner of Customs vs. Hewlett Packard India Sales Pvt. Ltd. 2007 (215) ELT 484, the Supreme Court referred to the meaning of software as given in Computer Dictionary by Microsoft 5th Edition:

“Software—Computer programs; instructions that make hardware work. Two main types of software are system software (operating systems), which controls the workings of the computer, and applications, such as word processing programs, spreadsheets, and databases, which perform the tasks for which people use computers. Two additional categories, which are neither system nor application software but contain elements of both, are network software, which enables groups of computers to communicate, and language software, which provides programmers with the tools they need to write programs. In addition to these task-based categories, several types of software are described based on their method of distribution. These include packaged software (canned programs), sold primarily through retail outlets; freeware and public domain software, which are distributed free of charge; shareware, which is also distributed free of charge; although users are requested to pay a small registration fee for continued use of the program; and vaporware, software that is announced by a company or individuals but either never makes it to market or is very late. See also application, canned software, freeware, network software, operating system, shareware, system software, vaporware, Compare firmware, hardware, liveware.”

Software under the description Information Technology Software (IT Software) was brought into the net of service tax with effect from 16th May, 2008 by defining the term “Information Technology Software” and introducing clause (zzzze) in section 65(105) of the Finance Act, 1994 (the Act) wherein various items were listed as taxable services in relation to IT software. From 1st July, 2012, under the new regime of negative list based taxation of services, “Development, design programming, customization, adaptation, upgradation, enhancement, implementation of information technology software” is specified in section 66E of the Act as one of the 9 declared services. In turn, the definition of ‘service’ includes a declared service in its purview. Service tax levied on IT software has been a matter of debate as it has been subject to multiple taxes. Under the VAT laws of the States, all types of software are treated as goods. This is because in a landmark ruling of the Supreme Court in Tata Consultancy Services vs. State of Andhra Pradesh’ (2004) 178 ELT 22 (SC) [TCS] where the question before the Court was whether Packaged Software was goods, the proposition argued before the Court was that software was intangible, and therefore not goods. The Court held as under :

“A software programme may consist of various commands which enable the computer to perform a designated task. The copyright in that programme may remain with the originator of the programme. But the moment copies are made and marketed, it becomes goods, which are susceptible to sales tax. Sale is not just of the media which by itself has very little value. The software and the media cannot be split up. Thus, a transaction of sale of computer software is clearly a sale of “goods” within the meaning of the term as defined in the said Act. The term “all materials, articles and commodities” includes both tangible and intangible/incorporeal property which is capable of abstraction, consumption and use and which can be transmitted, transferred, delivered, stored, possessed etc. The software programmes have all these attributes.”

The Central Government under the service tax law treats software as service except packaged or canned software. Section 65B(28) of the Act defines IT software as under:

“information technology software” means any representation of instructions, data, sound or image, including source code and object code, recorded in a machine readable form, and capable of being manipulated or providing interactivity to a user, by means of a computer or an automatic data processing machine or any other device or equipment”.

Chargeability to Central Excise Duty
Introduction of levy on Packaged Software

• Extracts from Finance Minister’s Budget Speech on 28.2.2006 :

Para 138 “I propose to impose an 8 per cent excise duty on packaged software sold over the counter. Customized software and software packages downloaded from the internet will be exempt from this levy”.

• Entry 27 – General Exemption Notification 6/06 – CE

“Any customised software (that is to say any custom designed software developed for a specific user or client) other than packaged software or canned software.”

Explanation: For the purpose of this entry packaged software or canned software means software developed to meet the needs of variety of users and it is intended for sale or capable of being sold off the shelf.”

In the TCS case, the Supreme Court has observed as under:

Para 26

“…….. We are in agreement with Mr. Sorabjee when he contends that there is no distinction between branded and unbranded software. However, we find no error in the High Court holding that branded software is goods. In both cases, the software is capable of being abstracted consumed and use. In both cases the software can be transmitted, transferred, delivered, stored, possessed etc. Thus even unbranded software, when it is marketed/sold, may be goods. We, however, are not dealing with this aspect and express no opinion thereon because in case of unbranded software other questions like situs of contract of sale and/or whether the contract is a service contract may arise”

For the purpose of Central excise, so long as software does not fit within the ambit of Packaged Software, which is capable of being sold off the shelf, there would be no question of excise duty.

Can the Concept of “manufacture” apply to Software at all?

Interestingly, even assuming software is considered as goods and packaged software is considered as excisable goods, excise duty can be imposed only if there is an “activity of manufacture” in terms of Section 2(f) of CEA.

The Supreme Court in the case of Seelan Raj and Other vs. Presiding Officer, First Additional Labour Court, Chennai – 2001 AIR SC 1127 was considering the issue under the Industrial Disputes Act. It was the contention of company that it was rendering computer services and developing customised soft-ware application. Dispute arose which was referred to the Labour Court and it was contended by the Company that it was a manufacturer of software and therefore it is not an establishment under the Industrial Disputes Act and much less a factory under the Factories Act and therefore the dispute should not be referred to Labour Court as it is not an industrial dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act. The Labour Court overruled the objection and held that legislation covers the establishment of the company and directed the reinstatement of the workmen back with wages. It was also held that the company was factory and had to comply with the Industrial Disputes Act. After various rounds of litigation, the matter landed before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court observed that there is a distinction between packaged software and custom-built software. Standard Packaged Software is marketed as a standard product, to meet the requirements of a large number of users whereas customised software is meant to meet the particular requirement of the user. The hybrid form of software also exists whereby the standard package is altered so that it fits the customised needs more clearly adopting a basis of customisation. The Supreme Court, taking into account the debate on various aspects and the questions with reference to software, referred the dispute to the Larger Bench of the Supreme Court.

In the case of CCE vs. Acer India Ltd. (2004) 172 ELT 289 (SC) the following was observed by the Supreme Court:

“Para 81


We, however, place on record that we have not applied our mind as regards the larger question as to whether the information contained in a software would be a tangible personal property or whether preparation of such software would amount to manufacture under different statutes.”

CETA is aligned to the Customs Tariff and software is identically classified under entry 8523 80 20 as (Information Technology Software) under Chapter Heading 8523. Again, the CETA is only set out for tangible goods, and the software and the media cannot be split. Attention is drawn to Chapter Note 10 to Chapter 85 of CETA which states as under:

“For the purposes of heading 8523 ‘recording’ of sound or other phenomena shall amount to manufacture”.

In other words, the recording of software on a medium could be an activity of manufacture which would attract a charge of Central Excise duty.

CETA Classification for “Software” is entry 8523 80 20 (Information Technology Software). Information Technology software is then carved up into customised software (defined as custom designed software developed for a specific user or client) and packaged or canned software (defined as software designed to meet the need of variety of users and is intended for sale or capable of being sold off the shelf), and separate notifications set out the effec-tive rates of duty in respect of these two.

By Notification No. 6/2006-CE dated 1.3.2006, the effective rate for Customised Software is nil. Ac-cordingly, CVD on imports of Customised Software is also nil.

In this regard, attention is invited to the decision in Steag Encotec India Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Customs (2010) 250 ELT 287 (Tri – Mumbai). In the facts of the case, the software, which was imported for use in coal based plants, required to be modified according to the needs to each of the plants on the basis of design and operating conditions which varied from one plant to another. The question before the CESTAT was whether such modification of the software would suffice to give it the character of customised software so as to qualify it for the aforesaid exemption. The CESTAT held that the exemption notification would not apply, as only software which “has to be developed from the basic building blocks, whereby a new software product should emerge as per the specific requirement of the client” would qualify as CS, and that software which has just been modified from PS would not.

Chargeability to Customs Duties

Section 12 of the Customs Act, 1962 [‘CA ’62] provides that customs duty shall be levied on goods imported into India. Section 2(22) of ‘CA ’62 defines goods to include “(a) vessels, aircrafts and vehicles; (b) stores, (c) baggage; (d) currency and negotiable instruments; (e) any other kind of movable property”. Therefore, for customs duties to apply on an import of software, it must answer to this definition of goods.

In Associated Cement Companies Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Customs (2001) 128 ELT 21 (SC), the Supreme Court had occasion to examine the scope of this definition. In the context of import of designs and drawings on paper, it was contended before the Court that the transactions were for a transfer of technology which was intangible, and that the medium was only a vehicle of transmission and incidental to the main transaction. It was accordingly contended that even though the technology was put onto a medium, it would not get converted from an intangible to a tangible thing which could be subject to customs duties. The Court did not accept these contentions, and held that all tangible movable articles would fall within the ambit of the definition of goods u/s. 2(22) (e) of CA ‘62, and that it was immaterial as to what types of goods were imported or what is contained in them or recorded thereon. In other words, if there was an import of tangible movable articles, there would be a levy of customs duty on these articles without any exclusion for an intangible contained in the articles. The Court went on to say, on the related subject of valuation of the imported goods, that once the intellectual property had been incorporated on the medium, the value of the medium would get enhanced, and customs duties would apply on this enhanced value. In the words of the Court:

“It is misconception to contend that what is being taxed is intellectual input. What is being taxed under the Customs Act read with Customs Tariff Act and the Customs Valuation Rules is not the input alone but goods whose value has been enhanced by the said inputs. There is no scope for splitting the engineering drawing or the encyclopedia into intellectual input on the one hand and the paper on which it is scribed on the other.”

The Supreme Court ruling in ACC’s Case seem to imply that, though the definition of “goods” in CA ‘62 is set out in the same terms as the Constitution and various Sales tax/VAT provisions, the goods must be tangible for a levy of customs duty to apply. Such a position appears to be inconsistent with the view taken in TCS and BSNL that the ambit of the term “goods” extends to intangibles. Then, a question arises as to why, the import of intangibles does not attract a levy of customs duty.

A possible answer could be that though intangibles are goods, as the taxable event of import, i.e. crossing the customs barrier, cannot arise (given the intangible nature of the goods), there cannot be a charge to customs duty. This would be in line with the Geneva Ministerial Declaration on Global Electronic Commerce, 1998 WT/MIN (98)/ DEC/2, according to which member countries are to “continue their current practice of not imposing customs duties on electronic transmission”.

What follows from above is that only software recorded on a tangible medium is liable to customs duty. In this connection, it is relevant to note that software is classified under Tariff Entry 8523 80 20 (Information Technology software) under chapter heading 8523 (Discs, tapes, solid-state non–volatile storage devices, “smart cards” and other media for the recording of sound or of other phenomena, whether or not recorded, including matrices and masters for the production of discs, but excluding products of Chapter 37) of the Customs Tariff. This classification accords with the position set out in TCS that the software and medium cannot be split up, and the implication that follows in respect of valuation of the medium. The classification also provides yet another answer as to why intangibles (like software), though constituting goods, are not liable to customs duty, i.e. the fact that the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 (“CTA”) is only set out for tangible goods. The Customs Tariff rate for entry 8523 80 20 (IT Software) is “Free”

This means that a packaged or a canned software is goods and when it is capable of being used by a large number of users, it also amounts to manufacturing of goods whereas customised software is fully exempt goods. Board’s Instruction F, no.354/189/2009-TRU dated 04-11-2009 also clarified in this regard that so far as excise duty/CVD is concerned, packaged software attracts duty @ 8% while customised software is fully exempted.

The question therefore arises is that if both packaged or canned software and customised software are ‘goods’ for the purpose of CEA, CA, 62, one dutiable and the other ‘exempt’, whether customised software can simultaneously be considered service for the purpose of service tax law?

Packaged/canned software vs. customised software:

So far as packaged or canned software is concerned, time and again, CBEC provided indication that it is considered goods and not exigible to service tax. Education Guide dated 20-06-2012 released along with the introduction of negative list based tax on services at Guidance Note No.6.4.1 & 6.4.4 has referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Tata Consultancy Services vs. State of Andhra Pradesh 2004 (178) ELT 22 (SC) and stated that sale of pre-packaged or canned software is in the nature of sale of goods and is not covered by the entry for declared service of development, design etc. of IT software. The Education Guide also states that the judgment of Tata Consultancy Services (supra) is applicable in case the pre-packaged software is put on a media before sale. “In such a case, the transaction will go out of the ambit of the definition of service as it would be an activity involving only a transfer of title in goods.” It is thus not a matter of doubt or debate that packaged or canned software is ‘goods’ both for the purpose of VAT laws of the States and the Central Excise law at least when canned/packaged software is made available on any tangible medium. The question however remains open in regard to customised software. In the Tata Consultancy’s case (supra) the Honourable Supreme Court did not decide as to whether unbranded software is considered ‘goods’ or not. This is mainly because whether uncanned software (unbranded software) were goods or not was not at all an issue before the Supreme Court in that case. However, the Court was in agreement with the submission made by the petitioner in the case that there was no distinction between branded and unbranded software. The majority opinion in the said judgment held that as they did not deal with the unbranded software when it is marketed or sold as goods and therefore did not express opinion on the same. In this regard however, the Supreme Court in Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. & Another vs. UOI 2006 (2) STR 161 (SC) at Para 56 and 57 upheld that software whether customised or non-customised would become goods provided it satisfies the attributes of goods, namely (a) its utility (b) its capability of being bought and sold and (c) capability of being transmitted, transferred, delivered, stored or possessed.

Considering all the above, the issue that arises is:

When an item is specifically exempted under an exemption notification of the Central Excise Tariff Act, could it not mean that it is primarily ‘goods’ though exempted. Without having characteristic of goods, why would it find place as exempted item under the Central Excise law? Viewing this from another angle, we find similar inconsistencies in the service tax law also. For instance, process amounting to manufacture and trading in goods are listed along with other non-taxable services in section 66D when the activities per se do not have characteristic of a ‘service’, whether they can find place in the “negative list” of services. Under the earlier dispensation of law, notifying the value of goods and material sold by the service provider to the recipient of service as exempt under Notifica-tion No.12/2003-ST dated 20-06-2003 was also along the same lines. Nevertheless, this does not whittle down the fact that even customised software is more akin to being goods than a service as it can be utilised, transmitted, transferred, delivered and stored and possessed. As a matter of fact, it can be used only when it is stored on a tangible medium of the hardware. The Madras High Court in the case of Infosys Technologies Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes 2009 (233) ELT 56 (Mad) relying on the decision in the case of TCS (supra) held that unbranded/customised software developed and sold by the petitioner, with or without obligation for system upgradation, repairs and maintenance or employee training, satisfies the Rules as ‘goods’, it will also be ‘goods’ for the purpose of sales tax. However amidst controversy, service tax is levied on customised software considering it as ‘service’.

Software: Can it be goods as well as service at the same time?

The question therefore arises is whether an activity or a transaction can be considered ‘goods’ as well as ‘service’ under different statutes and therefore exigible to tax more than once. Since the Central Excise law and Service Tax law are under a com-mon administration, dual levy generally here would not be attracted, yet by interpreting a transaction to be either ‘service’ or ‘goods’ and offering tax accordingly, one may have to face litigation from the administration of the other levy. In Yokogowa India Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Customs, Bangalore 2008 (226) ELT 474 (Tri.-Bang), the Indian company imported a software and claimed that it was a customised software, unique to only their usage and claimed exemption under Notification No. 6/2006-CE (referred above) for countervailing duty. The appellant in this case made a number of submissions in support of its claims that the software that it imported was not capable of being bought off the shelf and that this software was designed on the basis of their unique requirement. However, it was held that the software imported by the as-sessee consisted of several standard packages and only after further modification, it would acquire characteristic of custom designed software. What was imported was packaged software and therefore benefit of Notification No. 6/2006-CE was not available.

Later, however the Government issued Notification No. 53/2010-ST dated 21/12/2010 whereby packaged/ canned software was exempted subject to the condition that the value of such packaged/canned software had suffered excise duty when domestically produced or additional customs duty along with appropriate customs duty in case of imported packaged/canned and that the service provider made a declaration on the invoice that no amount in ex-cess of retail sale price declared on the said goods (packaged/canned software) is recovered from the customer. Similarly, the tug of war between the State law relating to VAT and service tax law of the Central Government being more intense, it makes tax compliant software businesses go through a rough bet of interpretation as to whether the transaction is of sale or of a service and have to bear consequent litigation cost for no fault of theirs. In the case of Sasken Communication Technologies Ltd. vs. Joint Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Appeals), Bangalore (2011) 16 taxmann.com 7 (Kar.), VAT was demanded from the assessee who entered into an agreement for development of software for a client as per client’s specification & expressly agreed that software when brought into existence would be absolute property of the client. The Court observed that the assessee gave up their rights before software was developed. The agreement did not have any indication for purchase of software. It was provided in the agreement that all ideas, inventions, patentable or otherwise, as a result of programming or other services would be exclusive property of the client as it would be considered as work made on hire. The deliverable was entirely related to development. In short, software prior to being embedded on a material object, belonged to the client and the entire work was done through capable employees of the assessee & no indication existed in the agreement as to purchase of software even from the market and improvement thereon by the assessee. The court, therefore, held that the contract was for a service simplicitor.

The principle that a transaction cannot simultaneously be both for goods and services is recognised at various levels. The Supreme Court in All India Federation of Tax Practitioners 2007 (7) STR 625 (SC) observed that the word ‘goods’ has to be understood in contradistinction to the word ‘services’. In BSNL’s case (supra) it was categorically held that a transaction cannot be both for goods and services. Nevertheless, there being a thin line of divide between the two or both intertwined in many situations, there lacks clarity on the subject until a common code by way of Goods and Services Tax (GST) is implemented.

Software downloaded electronically:

The following is extracted from the Finance Minister’s Budget Speech on 28-02-06:

“Para 138

I propose to impose an 8% excise duty on packaged software sold over the counter. Customised Software and Software Packages downloaded from the internet will be exempt from this levy.”

In cases where the software is made available only through the medium of internet there is no express exclusion in Entry 27 stated above. However, the Explanatory Notes, which forms part of the Budget Papers read as under:

“Excise duty of 8% is being imposed on packaged software, is also known canned software on electronic media (software downloaded from the internet and customised software will not attract duty). [Serial 27 of Notification No. 6/2006)”]

The Central Excise Rules, 2002 contemplate payment of excise duty at the time of removal of excisable goods from the factory and at the rates prevalent on the date of removal from the factory. Where a customised software solution is sold to the customer through the medium of internet, the transaction can be considered as an e-commerce transaction and there is no physical removal of goods in a tangible form from the factory gate which is the requirement of levy of excise duty. Further, the software is not available in any medium for it to be considered as goods as per the rationale of the Supreme Court in TCS case.

The following judicial considerations need to be noted:

The Supreme Court in the case of Associated Cement Company vs. CC (2001) 128 ELT 21 held that where any drawings or designs or technical materials are put in any media or paper, it becomes goods. Hence, only if an intellectual property is put in a media, it is to be regarded as an article or goods.

In Digital Equipment (India) Ltd. vs. CC (2001) 135 ELT 962 Tribunal held that information transmitted via e-mail cannot be akin to import of record media in 85.23. In an e-mail transfer, no media as a movable article is crossing the international boundaries and there is no movable property movement involved. Therefore, transfer of information or idea or knowledge on e-mail transfer would not be covered within the ambit of goods under the Customs Act. If they are not goods, then they cannot be subject to any duty.

In Multi Media Frontiers vs. CCE (2003) 156 ELT 272 the Tribunal has observed that a software cannot exist by itself and for it to be put to use it has to necessarily exist on some suitable media such has floppy disc, tape or CD.

In Pantex Geebee Fluid Power Ltd vs. CC (2003) 160 ELT 514 (Tri), it was held that, a transfer of intellectual property by intangible means like email would not be liable to customs duty.

The Geneva Ministerial Declaration on Global Electronic Commerce Document WT/MIN (98) DEC/2 dated 25-05-1998 which is a declaration of an intent by members of WTO that they would continue their current practice of not imposing customs duty on electronic declaration.

Annual maintenance contract for electronically downloaded software:

When a software is bought and sold, annual or ongoing maintenance service is important for the user. Generally, under an Annual Maintenance Contract (AMC), upgradation or updation is done by way of installation of upgraded version of the software already sold or available with the user. It is common to provide license to such versions electronically vide internet or through paper licenses. Since this is part of the obligation of the AMC along with other maintenance services like debugging, troubleshooting etc. agreed to be provided during the currency of the AMC, the value of the licensed updation is also contained in the AMC and because it is difficult to determine the said value at the time of signing of AMC, it remains inseparable. Therefore, liability under both the laws is attracted, viz., VAT law of the State and the Service Tax law’], as the sale of license to use software is goods under deemed sale concept and providing upgradation, enhancement etc. is a ‘service’ with effect from 16-05-2008 as well as “declared service” with effect from 01-07-2012. In this context, Education Guide comments at para 6.4.4 are extracted for easy reference:

“6.4.4 Would providing a license to use pre-packaged software be a taxable service?

•    ‘Transfer of right to use goods’ is deemed to be a sale under Article 366(29A) of the Constitution of India and transfer of goods by way of hiring, leasing, licensing or any such manner without transfer of right to use such goods is a declared service under clause (f) of section 66E.

•    A license to use software which does not involve the transfer of ‘right to use’ would neither be a transfer of title in goods nor a deemed sale of goods. Such an activity would fall in the ambit of definition of ‘service’ and also in the declared service category specified in clause (f) of section 66E.

•    Whether the license to use software is in the pa-per form or in electronic form makes no material difference to the transaction.

•    However, the manner in which software is transferred makes material difference to the nature of transaction. If the software is put on the media like computer disks or even embedded on a computer before the sale the same would be treated as goods. If software or any programme contained is delivered online or is down loaded on the internet the same would not be treated as goods as software as the judgment of the Supreme Court in Tata Consultancy Service case is applicable only in case the pre-packaged software is put on a media before sale.

•    Delivery of content online would also not amount to a transaction in goods as the content has not been put on a media before sale. Delivery of content online for consideration would, therefore, amount to provision of service.” [emphasis supplied].

It is noted here that although in the Education Guide the Ministry of Finance has placed reliance on the TCS decision (supra), it has made it applicable in the manner it suits its own interpretation that mode of delivery of the software would determine whether it is ‘goods’ or the ‘service’. Thus, service tax is certainly made applicable as the license to use software is considered service. The ‘rationale’ as explained by the Education Guide that the manner of delivery of a software or a programme determines the character of the transaction is hard to digest.

Whether intangible nature of the ‘goods’ capable of being bought and sold, utilised, transmitted & transferred (electronically) and stored and possessed by the user ultimately loses its characteristic of being ‘goods’ and becomes ‘services’? The issue is certainly disputable. In practice, it can be observed that most of the AMCs entered into by IT sector carry both VAT and service tax at applicable rates.

Further, introduction of repairs and maintenance contracts in the execution of works contract vide Notification No. 24/2012-ST has added further confusion. Most contractors of AMCs treat AMCs as works contracts, given the fact that value of license or goods which is deemed sale as per VAT laws is inseparable. Accordingly, in many cases it is observed that persons entering into AMC charge and recover VAT at applicable rate (depending on whichever option under the VAT law is exercised) and service tax of 12.36% is charged and recovered on 70% value (effective rate of 8.652%) in terms of Rule 2A of the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006 introduced with effect from 1st July, 2012. Whether this practice is correct in terms of discussion here is an issue by itself as the service tax administration considers license to use software acquired electronically as pure service. In this sce-nario, would service tax be not demanded on full value of AMC considering it a service contract?

Applicability of VAT indeed would not be influenced by this interpretation as it independently treats the subject matter as sale of goods and therefore VAT is attracted at applicable rate. Thus, uncertainty and diverse practices would continue to persist till the issue is settled judicially as tremendous litigation would be generated on account of overlap. One such attempt made in Infotech Software Dealers Association vs. UOI 2010 (20) STR 289 (Mad) hardly provided any definite direction. In this case, the petitioner challenged legislative competency of the Parliament to levy service tax under the relevant clause section 65(105)(zzzze). The High Court in this case considered the incidental question that the transaction of the software in all cases amounted to sale or in some transactions, it could be considered ‘service’. The member of the Association in this case, supplied software to their customers pursuant to end user license agreements. To this, the High Court held that it is not sale of software but only the contents of the data stored in the software were provided and this amounted to service. It was further observed that to bring the “deemed sale” concept, there must be transfer of right to use any goods and when the goods as such is not transferred, the question of deeming sale does not arise and in that sense, transaction would be of service and not a sale.

The High Court further observed that the challenge to the amended provisions was only on the ground that software is goods and all transactions would amount to sale whereas the transactions may not amount to sale in all cases and it may vary depending upon the end user license agreement Therefore, competence of Parliament to levy service tax cannot be challenged so long as the residuary power is available under Entry 97 of the List-I and finally held “the question as to whether a transaction would amount to sale or service depends upon the individual transaction and on that ground, the vires of provision cannot be questioned”. The issue therefore remains open for interpretation when a dealer in software merely passes on license to the end user without any value addition to the license, whether it would still be treated as service.

Paradoxically, in spite of the fact that software sold electronically is notified as service, in case of Microworld Software Services P. Ltd. vs. CCE, MUM-I 2012-TIOL-1044-CESTAT-MUM, the company engaged into manufacturing software cleared packaged soft-ware on payment of appropriate duty. They also effected sale of software through internet. Central Excise authorities demanded and confirmed the duty and imposed penalties. At the lower appellate stage, 25% pre-deposit on duty and penalty was directed to be paid to hear the appeal. The pre-deposit of duty was paid and for the pre-deposit on the penalty portion, modification application was filed. Both modification application and appeal were dismissed for non-compliance of the order.

Appellant’s plea to CESTAT was that from F. Y. 2008-09, they had started paying service tax considering software cleared in tangible form attracted excise duty whereas Board’s Circular dated 29- 02-2008 clarified that service tax was payable on electronically supplied software. Further, they had informed revenue that they claimed exemption under Notification No. 6/06-CE for electronic supply of software. The revenue argued that Tariff heading 8524 covers software on floppy, disc/media/ CD Rom and also covers software on other media and the term “other media” covers electronically supplied internet. Based on the above submissions of the Appellant and considering their service tax payment and letter informing revenue about claim of the exemption under Notification No. 06/2006, the Bench found 25% pre-deposit of duty amount sufficient to hear the appeal and also found the case arguable and directed the Commissioner (Appeals) to hear the appeal on merits as the same was dismissed for non-compliance of section 35F without going into merits.

Considering the above process undergone by the Appellant, the following extract of TRU letter F. No. 334/1/2008 dated 29-02-2008 may be noted:

“4.1.3 Packaged software sold off the shelf, being treated as goods, is leviable to excise duty @ 8%. In this budget, it has been increased from 8% to 12% vide notification No. 12/2008-CE dated 01-03 -2008. Number of IT services and IT enabled services (ITES) are already leviable to service tax under various taxable services.

4.1.5 Software and upgrades of software are also supplied electronically, known as digital delivery. Taxation is to be neutral and should not depend on forms of delivery. Such supply of IT software electronically shall be covered within the scope of the proposed service.”

Relying on the above and taking action thereon and given the fact that both excise duty and service tax are administered by CBEC, it can be observed that litigation cannot be avoided by law-compliant assesses as well.

Conclusion:

Given various contradictions in interpretations by different agencies of the Government machineryas regards software, IT sector as a whole and consequently the economy is imparted by not only multiplicity of taxation but also by increasing frivolous and lengthy litigation process. This could be minimised if single Government agency deals with the concept of deemed sale, intangible goods and services for implementing fair tax system in the matter at different levels and avoid hardship of the tax payers considering that the tax payer is an important part of the system of revenue collection.

Checklist received from CIT (TDS), Mumbai listing basic details to be submitted alongwith the application u/s. 197 for lower deduction/ Nil deduction of tax at source.

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(a) Projected Profit and Loss Account for Financial Year 2013-14

(b) Annual Report for AY 2011-12, 2012-13 and 2013-14 (if not finalised, submit unaudited results)

(c) Tax Audit Report for AY 2011-12, 2012-13 and 2013- 14 (if finalised)

(d) Wherever there is delay in payment of TDS as per Tax Audit Report, attach proof of payment of interest.

(e) List of parties included in the projected receipts with their TAN and expected amount.

(f) If there is fall in net profit for Financial Year 13-14 as compared to earlier three years then reasons for fall in net profit.

(g) Copies of Provisional TDS statement of FY 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13.

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Clarification regarding conditions relevant to identify development centres engaged in contract R & D services with insignificant risk – Circular 3/2013 dated 26th March, 2013

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Development centre in India may be treated as a contract R & D service provider with insignificant risk if the following conditions are cumulatively complied with:

(a) Foreign principal performs most of the economically significant functions involved in research or product development cycle whereas Indian development centre would largely by involved in economically insignificant functions;

(b) The principal provides funds. capital and other economically significant assets including intangibles for research or product development and Indian development centre would not use any other economically significant assets including intangibles in research or product development;

(c) Indian development centre works under direct supervision of foreign principal who not only has capability to control or supervise, but also actually controls or supervises research or product development through its strategic decisions to perform core functions as well as monitor activities on regular basis;

(d) Indian development centre does not assume or has no economically significant realised risks. If a contract shows the principal to be controlling the risk but conduct shows that Indian development centre is doing so, then the contractual terms are not the final determinant of actual activities. In the case of foreign principal being located in a country/territory widely perceived as a low or no tax jurisdiction, it will be presumed that the foreign principal is not controlling the risk. However, the Indian development centre may rebut this presumption to the satisfaction of the revenue authorities; and

(e) Indian development centre has no ownership right (legal or economic) on outcome of research which vests with foreign principal, and that it shall be evident from conduct of the parties.

Further, it has been clarified that all the above conditions should be actually proved by conduct of parties and not mere contractual terms.

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Clarification regarding selection of profit split method as most appropriate method – Circular 2/2013 dated 26th March, 2013

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The circular lists the factors to be borne in mind while selecting Profit Split method as most appropriate method, while determining the arms length price for transfer pricing purpose.

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Article 12 of Indo US DTAA – Co-ordination fees business profits under DTAA – No PE and hence not chargeable to tax – Creative fees and database costs chargeable as they are not royalties and services not ancilliary or subsidary to enjoyment of property

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15. DDIT v Euro RSCG Worldwide, inc (ITA No
7094/Mum/2010) (unreported)
Asst Year: 2010-11. Dated 27-11-2012

Article 12 of Indo US DTAA – Co-ordination fees business profits under DTAA – No PE and hence not chargeable to tax – Creative fees and database costs chargeable as they are not royalties and services not ancilliary or subsidary to enjoyment of property


Facts:

The taxpayer was an American company, which was a resident of USA (“USCo”). USCo was acting as a communicating interface between its Group entities and multinational clients. To ensure work of international standards that would meet client’s expectations, USCo had set up a team of persons to coordinate between a Group entity and a client.

USCo incurred expenditure on providing the coordination services. Hence, it charged the Group entities for these services. Further, it also provided need-based business development and managerial assistance to Group entities. During the year, USCo provided certain assistance to a Group entity in India (“ICo”) and received consideration thereof, which was split into creative fees, database costs and coordination fees. USCo contended that the consideration was in the nature of business profits under Article 7 of India-USA DTAA, and since USCo did not have a PE in India, the consideration was not chargeable to tax in India.

However, the AO concluded that the consideration was in the nature of royalties and was chargeable to tax @15% under India-USA DTAA.

The CIT(A) held that client coordination fees were in the nature of business profits, which, in absence of PE in India, were not chargeable to tax in India. As regards the creative fees and the database costs, he held that they were in the nature of FIS and accordingly, were chargeable to the tax in India. While the taxpayer accepted the findings of CIT(A), the tax department appealed to Tribunal against the order of CIT(A).

Held

The Tribunal observed and held as follows.

(i) The Tribunal concurred with the finding of the CIT(A) that USCo maintained communication channel between ICo and the clients. These services did not involve consideration for use of, or right to use, any of the specified terms in Article 12(3) of India-USA DTAA. Hence, the consideration was not royalties but business profits. As USCo did not have a PE in India, the question of taxability of consideration did not arise.

(ii) In terms of Article 12(2)(b) of India-USA DTAA, royalties (under Article 12(3)) and FIS (under Article 12(4)) are chargeable to tax @10%. However, payments for the creative fees and the database costs were neither royalties as defined in Article 12(3)(b) nor the services were ancillary or subsidiary to enjoyment of property. Hence rate of 10% was not applicable. As there was nothing on record to indicate that the rate specified under Article 12(2)(b) was applicable, rate specified under Article 12(2)(a)(ii) was applicable. Hence, the creative fees and the database costs were chargeable to tax @15%.

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(2012) 150 TTJ 159 (Mumbai) BSEL Infrastructure Realty Ltd. vs. Asst. CIT ITA No.6559 (Mum.) of 2011 A.Y.2007-08 Dated 13-04-2012

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Section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act 1961 – Penalty cannot be levied when additions were made while computing the total income under normal provisions of the Income-tax Act but finally the assessee’s income was determined on the basis of book profit u/s. 115JB.

Facts

For the relevant assessment year, the Assessing Officer made disallowances/additions to the assessee’s income as per normal provisions of the Income Tax Act. Finally, however, income was determined and tax was computed u/s. 115JB. The Assessing Officer, thereafter, levied penalty on all the disallowances/additions. The CIT(A) deleted the penalty on certain additions, while confirming the same on other additions.

Held

The Tribunal, relying on the decisions in the following cases, deleted the penalty:
a. CIT vs. Nalwa Sons Investments Ltd.(2010) 235 CTR (DEL.) 209/(2010) 45 DTR (Del.) 345/(2010) 327 ITR 543 (Del.)
b. Ruchi Strips & Alloys Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT ITA Nos.6940 & 6941 (Mum.) 2008 The Tribunal noted as under:

1. If book profits are deemed to be the total income of the assessee in terms of section 115JB and is more than income under the normal provisions of the Act, then by legal fiction such a book profit will be deemed to be the total income of the assessee.

2. Therefore, if tax has been imposed and collected on the deemed income u/s. 115JB in the assessment, then the tax under the normal provisions/computation is not leviable or charged.

3. Therefore, if any addition or disallowance has been made in the normal provisions/computation of the Income Tax Act and finally assessment has not been completed or tax has not been levied on such normal computation, then such additions/disallowances cannot be a subject matter of penalty because no tax has been levied on such additions/disallowances.

4. When income tax is paid on the book profits by a legal fiction, such a legal fiction has to be taken to its logical conclusion and it cannot be held that for the purpose of penalty, normal computation would be considered even though tax has not been levied under the normal provision/ computation. Therefore, penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) cannot be imposed because there was no tax sought to be evaded.

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Ss. 40 (a) (i) 195, Article 12 of Indo US DTAA On facts, marketing, quality assurance, e-publishing and turnkey services provided by American company to Indian company did not ‘make available’ knowledge, etc. Hence, payment was not Fees for Included Services (FIS)

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14. ACIT v Tax Technology International Pvt Ltd
[2012] 27 taxman.com 190 Chennai
A.Y.: 2007-08. Dated: 11-10-2012

Ss. 40 (a) (i) 195, Article 12 of Indo US DTAA on facts, marketing, quality assurance, e-publishing and turnkey services provided by American company to Indian company did not ‘make available’ knowledge, etc. Hence, payment was not Fees for Included Services (FIS)


Facts:

The taxpayer was an Indian company (“ICo”) engaged in the business of e-publishing. ICo had an American Subsidiary (USCo”). ICo executed three types of Agreements – Marketing Agreement, Offshore Development Agreement and Overseas Services Agreement – with USCo. The services provided under the respective agreement were as follows.

Marketing Agreement

USCo was to provide support to the customers and also provide market information to ICo.

Offshore Development Agreement

USCo was to scan manuscripts, upload them to India and intimate ICo by e-mail. After ICo had done typesetting in India and uploaded it to USCo, USCo was to download it, print pages and courier it to customers.

Overseas Services Agreement

USCo was to use its expertise, tools and infrastructure for e-publishing and preparation and typesetting of manuscript of printing pages and delivering it to customers. 14 For the aforementioned services, during the year, ICo made certain payments to USCo. ICo did not withhold tax from the same as, according to it, USCo was only a marketing agent and no technical services were ‘made available’ by USCo.

According to AO, USCo was rendering technical services and pursuant to introduction of Explanation u/s. 9(2) of I T Act, business connection or territorial nexus with India was not required. Further, if according to ICo, tax was not required to be withheld, it should have obtained the relevant certificate u/s. 195(2) or (3). Since neither tax was withheld nor certificate was obtained, section 40(a)(i) was attracted and the payment was disallowable.

 Held:

The Tribunal observed and held as follows. To constitute FIS under Article 12(4)(b) of India-USA DTAA, it is necessary that technical knowledge, etc should be ‘made available’.

Definition of FTS under Explanation No 2 to section 9(1)(vii) of I T Act is not in pari materia with definition of FIS in Article 12(4) of India-USA DTAA. Services provided by USCo could be FIS only if such services ‘made available’ technical knowledge, etc. The Tribunal considered the scope of services under each Agreement as follows. No technical service was involved in respect of services under Marketing Agreement as no technical knowledge was ‘made available’;

Scope of services under Overseas Services Agreement, clearly indicated that USCo was to use its expertise, tools and infrastructure for receiving manuscripts for production of book using its own resources, including servicing the customers and effecting dispatches to customer locations. In other words, it provided comprehensive services. If entire work was done by USCo, it cannot be said that ICo was receiving any technical knowledge, etc.

As regards Offshore Development Agreement: In terms of Clause 3.1 USCo processed customer materials, prepared instructions and prepared files. Based on these, ICo carried out e-publishing services. Though the services provided by USCo involved technical know-how, they were not FIS as they did not ‘make available’ technical knowledge (which will give enduring benefit) to ICo. In terms of Clause 3.3, USCo was to provide quality assurance. While this too may involve some technical expertise, it cannot be said that USCo ‘made available’ such technology to ICo.

 In terms of Clause 3.2, USCo provided files and instructions for carrying out digitalization services to ICo. The instructions would constitute FIS if they resulted in ICo imbibing technical expertise, etc. that gave it an enduring benefit in its e-publication business. Separate invoices were raised by USCo on ICo under three different agreements. Hence, three agreements did not constitute a composite agreement. On the issue of ‘making available’:

Based on this interpretation of the term ‘making available’ in CIT v De Beers India Minerals P Ltd [2012] 346 ITR 467 (Karn), services performed were not FIS since they were not ‘made available’. Income in respect of any service under Marketing Agreement and Overseas Services Agreement was not covered under Article 12(4) of India–USA DTAA. Therefore, ICo had no obligation to deduct tax at source.

One of the services under Offshore Development Agreement could be considered FIS since it could involve ‘making available’ technical knowledge to ICo in which case section 195 of I T Act could apply. As ICo had not applied for lower/nil deduction u/s. 195, section 40(a)(i) could be attracted. Hence, the issue in respect of payments made under Offshore Development Agreement was remitted to AO for reconsideration.

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Ss. 9 40 (a) (i), Article 12 of Indo/US DTAA – Voice call charges to USCO not managerial, technical or consultancy services – USCO having no PE in India – Payment not chargeable to tax section 195, 40 (a) (i) not applicable

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13. Clearwater Technology Services Pvt Ltd v
ITO [2012] 27 taxman.com 238 (Bang)
A.Y.: 2008-09. Dated: 28-9-2012

Ss. 9 40 (a) (i), Article 12 of Indo/US DTAA – Voice call charges to USCo not managerial, technical or consultancy services – USCo having no PE in India – Payment not chargeable to tax section 195, 40 (a) (i) not applicable


Facts:

The taxpayer was an Indian company (“ICo”) engaged in providing voice based call centre services to its clients in USA. An American telecom voice service provider (“USCo”) assisted ICo in connecting to the American telecom network in respect of the calls made to USA by ICo, or calls received from USA by ICo.

During the year, ICo had made certain payments to USCo for its services. However, ICo did not withhold tax from these payments since USCo had no PE in India.

According to AO, the payments made by ICo to USCo were in the nature of Fees for Technical Services (FTS) and subject to withholding of tax u/s. 195 of I T Act. Further, since no tax was withheld, the entire expenditure was disallowable u/s. 40(a)(i).

Held:

The Tribunal observed and held as follows. Neither the I T Act nor DTAA has defined the term managerial, technical and consultancy. Hence, dictionary meaning of those terms should be referred to. On the basis of dictionary meanings, payments made to a non-resident in respect of telecom services cannot be termed as FTS.

The Tribunal referred to the following decisions : In CIT v De Beers India Minerals P Ltd [2012] 346 ITR 467 (Karn), services performed using technical knowledge, etc. were not considered as FTS since they were not ‘made available’.

Further, in DCIT v Sandoz (P) Ltd [2012] 137 ITD 326 (Mom), the Tribunal has held that even if payment for advertisement could be assessed as business profits under section 9, in absence of PE in India they could not be charged to tax. In GE India Technology Centre P Ltd v CIT [2010] 327 ITR 456 (SC), Supreme Court has held that the obligation to withhold tax u/s. 195 arises only if the income is chargeable to tax. If income is not chargeable to tax, provisions of section 40(a)(i) do not apply.

Therefore, the Tribunal held that ICo had no obligation to withhold tax on payment made to USCo. Accordingly, the payment cannot be disallowed u/s. 40(a)(i).

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