This Circular requires banks to certify the leverage ratio (i.e., outside liabilities/owned funds) of IFC desirous of availing ECB under the Approval Route at the time of forwarding the proposal to RBI.
Year: 2012
A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 69, dated 25- 11-2012 External Commercial Borrowings — Simplification of procedure.
(a) Cancellation of Loan Registration Number (LRN); or
(b) Change in permissible end-use for an existing ECB
This Circular has granted powers to banks to approve changes in respect of the above i.e., cancellation of LRN and change in permissible end-use, subject to certain conditions.
(a) Cancellation of LRN
Banks can directly approach DSIM for cancellation of LRN for ECBs availed, both under the automatic and approval routes, provided
(i) No draw-down for the said LRN has taken place; and
(ii) Monthly ECB-2 returns till date in respect of the LRN have been submitted to DSIM.
(b) Change in the end-use of ECB proceeds
Banks can approve requests for change in end-use in respect of ECB availed under the Automatic Route, provided
(i) The proposed end-use is permissible under the automatic route;
(ii) There is no change in the other terms and conditions of the ECB;
(iii) ECB is in compliance with the extant guidelines; and
(iv) Monthly ECB-2 returns till date in respect of the LRN have been submitted to DSIM.
However, RBI approval will be required for change in the end-use of ECB availed under the Approval Route.
REPORTING OF HOLDINGS OF PROMOTERS — SAT Decides on The Recurring Issue of Non-Compliance of Reporting
The law relating to reporting of shareholding is complicated as it is spread out over several overlapping and at times contradictory regulations or having differing requirements. For example, reporting is required under the Takeover Regulations, the Insider Trading Regulations, the Listing Agreement, etc. The timing, the persons who have to report, the information to be disclosed and the prescribed form for reporting, etc. tend to differ.
For concerns that are understandable, the definition of terms under certain regulations is fairly broad and/or are defined in a broad way prescribing other parameters under different regulations. For example, the Takeover Regulations define acquirer in a fairly broad way and the acquisitions by an acquirer mandate reporting under certain circumstances. Under the Insider Trading Regulations, however, the reporting is by a slightly different group of people and at different times.
The point is that though the reporting may be made under one set of Regulations or even by one or more persons, it may not be strictly in conformity with the provisions of other regulations. This is despite the fact that the information that is required to be placed in the public domain is duly placed, though not exactly in the manner required by law. In such a case, the issue of penalty may arise. Similarly, even though such information may be duly reported by one person, the question may remain whether non-furnishing by another person of the same information tantamounts to a violation.
A recent decision of the Securities Appellate Tribunal [O. P. Gulati v. SEBI, (2012) 111 SCL 454] highlights such a concern even though the decision is in favour of the promoters. It shows the vagaries not only of law but of practice of SEBI. Hence, there is need to take a pragmatic approach to avoid needless proceedings and litigation.
The facts as provided in the decision can be quickly summarised as follows. The promoters of a listed company consisting of husband/wife had acquired certain shares beyond the minimum percentage and thus an obligation to report arose. It may be mentioned that the acquisition was over a long period of time. It was accepted that in the initial several years, there was no requirement to report and the issue before the Tribunal was only acquisition during the later years and hence this discussion focusses on the reporting for the later years.
Regulation 7(1A) of the Takeover Regulations (‘the Regulations’) requires that if an acquirer acquires 2% or more shares, he shall report the same in the prescribed manner and within the prescribed time. The acquirer admittedly had acquired more than 2% shares and this acquisition was not reported in the prescribed manner. SEBI initiated proceedings against the acquirer and persons acting in concert which as stated above consisted of the husband and wife. The interesting point was that though the husband and wife were acting in concert, only the husband had acquired the shares while the wife had not acquired even a single share. SEBI initiated proceedings against both of them based on the finding that the prescribed reporting was not made and levied a penalty of Rs.1 lakh on each of them.
The acquirers appealed to the SAT essentially making two sets of contentions. As regards nonreporting by the husband, it was contended that it was inadvertent and a technical error and deserves condonation. However, as regards the wife, the issue raised was that though the wife was a person acting in concert with the acquirer, since she had not acquired any shares, there was no requirement of reporting by her.
The SAT rejected the argument stating that inadvertent/technical errors in reporting do not deserve to be condoned and upheld the penalty of Rs.1 lakh on the husband. As regards the wife, SAT noted that:
(1) the husband and wife fell within the definition of acquirer,
(2) the wife had not acquired any shares, and
(3) the reporting requirement was on the acquirer.
Hence, it was held that as there was no rationale in double reporting, particularly by a person who did not acquire any shares. The levy of penalty on the wife was not warranted and reversed.
It is worth considering the observations of the SAT before further comments and conclusions can be made.
“The appellant-acquirers had contended that:
(1) disclosures were made with bona fide intention though late
(2) there was no suppression of fact
(3) there was no intention to violate
(4) default, if any, was purely technical in nature, and
(5) deserves to be accepted as a bona fide inadvertent mistake.”
Against this contention, SEBI “supported the orders passed by the adjudicating officer stating that any acquirer, whether he has acquired the shares or voting rights of the company or not, if he falls within the definition of the acquirer under Regulation 2(b) of the takeover code or is a ‘person acting in concert’ within the meaning of Regulation 2(e), is required to file a declaration under Regulation 7(1A) of the takeover code. Indra Gulati, being wife of O. P. Gulati and also a promoter of the company, falls within the definition of ‘person acting in concert’ and hence an ‘acquirer’ within the meaning of Regulation 2(b) of the takeover code”.
Whilst annulling the penalty on the wife, SAT observed:
‘A person who may fall within the definition of acquirer under the takeover code but has not acquired the shares and is not a person acting in concert with the person acquiring the shares is not obliged to make disclosure under Regulation 7(1A) of the takeover code. In a given case, suppose there are 20 persons in a target company who may fall within the definition of ‘acquirer’ under the takeover code and say only two of them have purchased or sold shares aggregating two per cent or more of the share capital of the target company and these two persons are not acting in concert with any of the other eighteen persons. If the argument of learned counsel for the respondent Board is accepted, then all the twenty persons who fall within the definition of ‘acquirer’ are required to make disclosure to the company as well as to the concerned stock exchanges. Such additional disclosure by eighteen persons who have neither purchased nor sold shares, nor are persons acting in concert with the two acquirers, serves no purpose.
The fact that Indra Gulati did not acquire any share of the target company during the period in question is not in dispute. The adjudicating officer has not recorded any finding that there was any understanding or agreement, direct or indirect between O. P. Gulati and Indra Gulati to acquire the shares of the target company. In the absence of any such finding or material on record, we are of the view that the adjudicating officer erred in holding Indra Gulati guilty of violating Regulation 7(1A) of the takeover code.”
The following conclusions can be drawn from the above decision:
Firstly, the concern over multiple reporting under various regulations of information that is essentially the same though required of different people, at different stages and of different nature is justified. It is presumably settled by the observation that such multiple reporting does not serve a point except that SEBI may be obliged to initiate action. One hopes that this decision helps in a case where a person has reported under one regulation but inadvertently failed to report under another regulation would not be burdened with dual consequences.
Secondly, this decision gives some clarity on the issue that often comes up, viz., when there are numerous persons in a Promoter Group, who should report and whether all should report or whether reporting is required by only those who acquire. The above decision should be the basis for arguing that if the lead promoter reports the information required, on behalf of all those who have acquired multiple reporting is not required.
Thirdly, this case highlights the point that unlike other laws, SEBI has powers to levy huge penalties for seemingly routine and unintended non-compliances. The author believes that whilst using this power SEBI should have a pragmatic approach.
PART D: RTI & SUCESSS STORY
Since then, the site wears a deserted look. Much of the construction material too has been lifted by the Dow people, say villagers. cement bags lie torn, construction pillars with jutting out iron rods wait hopelessly and most of the makeshift offices too have been flattened. Two security guards stroll around and dare not defy clicking photographs. The land still belongs to Dow confirms the MIDC official in Pune and MPCB Pune says no directive has been given by it to the shift base. According to news reports, Dow has voluntarily decided to move out, stung by the hostility of the local residents. Well, but there are no sympathies for this turn of events.
Like they say, as you sow, so shall you reap.
When I called up the then District Collector Chandrakant Dalvi, he confirmed that “Dow is now out of Pune district.’’ It is the intense campaign by villagers taken forward by the Warkari community of entire Maharashtra that eliminated Dow from Pune. I, in the capacity of the editor of ‘Intelligent Pune’, a weekly tabloid, played a pivotal role in accessing crucial information under RTI. Inspection of files u/s.4 of the RTI Act at the Maharashtra Pollution Control Board (MPCB), Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation (MIDC) and Secretary, Environment office at the Mantralaya, Mumbai revealed shocking details.
When Dow was given a whopping 100 acres of land, it began construction sometime late 2007. Villagers were in the dark about it, they were not even told the name of the company. Former Sarpanch Panmant recollects that suddenly a 4,000 strong labour force was put to work day and night. When they tried getting information from the collector’s office, they were stonewalled. It was only in January 2008 that the company put up the board on site, namely, ‘Dow Chemicals International Ltd.’.
Sometime in January 2008 Justice (retd.) B. G. Kolshe Patil visited the village for a public programme. When he found the name ‘Dow Chemicals International Ltd.’ on the board, he asked the villagers whether they were aware of what was coming to their village. He enlightened them that it is the same company which was responsible for the Bhopal Gas Tragedy and that villagers should not allow this company to set up home here.
Thus, villagers began their agitation. They first stopped the water connection that they had willingly given to the company premises and then halted any company vehicle from entering their village. For this, they dug up superficial trenches. Newspapers reported about the warpath taken by the villagers.
I decided to find out more about permissions given to Dow. When I called up Member Secretary, MPCB, he answered that, “I have no documents. If you want, you can invoke the RTI Act.’’
I did so and literally opened up a Pandora’s Box. I broke the story in ‘Intelligent Pune’ in the 7th March cover story. It shocked Puneites and armed villagers of Shinde-Vasuli where the Dow Chemicals plant was coming up, with hardhitting ammunition in the form of the truth in black and white.
The Maharashtra Pollution Control Board (MPCB) is the prime body to give environmental clearance for such a project. The Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation (MIDC) is the body which provides land. Both are required to scrutinise the proposal of this nature thoroughly since the outfit, even if it is an R&D centre, is of a chemical nature. I carried out inspection of files u/s.4 of the RTI Act at the MIDC, Pune office. I also invoked the RTI at the MPCB office to know what kind of consent DOW had applied for and what kind of consent had the MPCB given.
Though we procured crucial correspondence, which took off the lid of DOW’s claim that it was primar-ily a research and development centre and not a manufacturing unit, vital documents pertaining to NOCs from the Ministry of Environment & Forests (MOEF) and Industrial Entrepreneurs Memorandum (IEM) — both mandatory for establishment of a chemical plant were either missing or not submitted at all. “We do not have these documents in Pune — you may try in Mumbai’’ was the chorus of the regional officers of the MIDC and MPCB.
Inspection of files at MIDC, Pune on 28th February, 2008:
Information was gathered u/s.(4) of the RTI Act wherein this writer and RTI activist, Vijay Kumbhar, undertook inspection of the file containing correspondence between MIDC and DOW. Some of the file notings reveal the hurry in which the proposal was given a green signal. The correspondence also reveals that what DOW was setting up was not primarily a research and development centre. Many files were inspected. Hereunder are the observations:
19th October, 2007: In his letter dated 19th October, 2007, Sanjay Khandare, member secretary of the MPCB has granted Dow Chemicals International Pvt. Ltd. (plot no A-1, MIDC Chakan, Phase II, Taluka Khed, District. Pune) the consent for the manufacture of the following chemical products: Polymers — 2,000 kgs per month; Catalyst organic/inorganic — 1,000 kgs per month; Surfactants — 200 kgs per month; Aliphatic organic compounds — 500 kgs per month; Aromatic organic compounds — 500 kgs per month; Inorganic salts — 500 kgs per month.
In case of accidents, the MPCB expects DOW to do a clerical post-accident action — “Whenever due to any accident or any other unforeseen act or even, such emissions occur or apprehended to occur in excess of standards laid down, such information shall be forthwith reported to Board, concerned police station, officer of director of health services, Department of Explosives, Inspectorates of factory and local body. In case of failure of pollution control equipments, the production process connected to shall be stopped.’’
Maj. Gen. SCN Jatar (retd.), a petrochemical expert and RTI activist stated that, “The authorities should not have given final approval until the environmental impact assessment (EIA) report is made. The report should be made by a well-known agency and local representatives of the citizens should be associated with its preparation.”
Pollution control board experts who scrutinised the consent by the MPCB, commented:
“The list of chemicals given which are likely to be used at the Chakan plant includes hazardous and dangerous gases as well as chemicals such as (1) gases — SO2, Acetylene, HCL. (2) Solvents — Acetone, ether, nitrite compounds, halogenetic solvents, and inorganic acids. Thus the safety-related issues arising out of handling, accidents and incidents involving above chemicals require proper storage, handling and emergency procedures. For this an environmental management plan should have been asked by the Board of Government of India’s MSIHC (manufacturing, storage, import and handling of hazardous chemicals rules 1989) as notified in the EPA Act same does not seem to have been adhered to. There does not seem to be adherence of the Chemical Accidents & Emergency Preparedness (Rules 2000) for which the company needs to submit onsite and off site disaster management plan and that includes education to the neighbourhood residents. It is the fundamental right to know what is happening in the neighbourhood.”
As a precautionary principle, environmental impact analysis should have been done by the company on its own when they claim they are a responsible corporate. Neither the board has asked for it.
I informed the villagers regarding the kind of chemical manufacturing plant and that it was not just a research centre which was coming in their neighbourhood. Bandya Tatya Kharadkar, the Warkari leader successfully led a state-wide agitation as the Indrayani river is close to the heart of this community. What makes me feel overwhelmed is the fact that it was RTI that could move a colossal multinational company which flexes its muscles in countries like India based on money power. RTI can even drive away such a powerful business enterprise!
PART A : Decision of the CIC
The applicant had sought information from the Public Health Foundation of India, New Delhi (PHFI). While PHFI provided all the information sought, it stated that it is not a ‘public authority’ as defined under the RTI Act and it is a completely autonomous institution.
The applicant wanted the Commission to rule on this point, i.e., whether PHFI, (a PPP body) is covered under the RTI Act or not.
The Commission noted as under: “From a plain reading of the section 2(h), it appears that PHFI is not covered under clauses (a), (b), (c) & (d)(ii) of section 2(h) of the RTI Act. Therefore, the issue which remains to be determined is whether PHFI gets covered under clause (d)(i) of section 2(h) or not. The said clause reads: body owned, controlled or substantially financed directly or indirectly by funds provided by the appropriate Government.”
It appears that PHFI is not ‘owned’ by the appropriate Government. As regards being ‘controlled’ by the appropriate Government, the said term has not been defined under the RTI Act. There are various forms in which the Government exercises control over an entity, which is relevant in determining whether the latter is a public authority. On perusal of the information about PHFI’s governing board, the Commission noted that amongst its 30 Board members are:
1. Dr. Montek Singh Ahluwalia, Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission, Government of India;
2. P. K. Pradhan, Secretary, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Government of India;
3. Vishwa Mohan Katoch, Secretary, Department of Health Research, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare and Director General, Indian Council of Medical Research;
4. T. K. A. Nair, Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister of India; and
5. Dr. R. K. Srivastava, Director General Health Services, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Government of India.
Thus, at least one-sixth of the members of the governing board of PHFI consist of senior public servants. At the hearing held on 24-1-2012, the respondent claimed that most of the Government officials on the board of PHFI were occupying such positions in ‘private capacity’.
This Bench is of the view that such a claim is untenable. It is difficult to assume that senior public servants can be on the board of an organisation like PHFI — which has numerous interactions with the Government, in private capacity. In fact, this would necessarily imply a conflict of interest. The Commission can only assume that such public servants must necessarily be acting on behalf of the Government — when they are required to take executive decisions as members of the board in a public-private partnership (PPP) such as PHFI. Any other conclusion would be an improper slur on their integrity. It is not possible that India’s leading public servants could be acting in any manner, but as representatives of the Government when they are on the board of PHFI. It is also true that significant funding is provided by the Government to PHFI. Hence, it is presumed that the five officials on the board of PHFI are discharging their duties as public servants.
The RTI Act does not specify ‘complete control’ in section 2(h). As per P. Ramanatha Aiyar’s, ‘The Law Lexicon’ (2nd Ed., Reprint 2007 at p. 410), the term ‘control’ means — ‘power to check or restrain; superintendence; management . . . . . . .”. It appears that the presence of senior Government servants on the board may check or ensure that decisions taken in PHFI are in consonance with the Government’s avowed objectives. Therefore, the presence of a fair degree of Government control on the decisions of PHFI cannot be ruled out. It follows that PHFI is ‘controlled’ by the appropriate Government. This may not be complete control, but five top public servants would exercise some degree of control, which would be significant.
The respondent had doing the hearing also admitted receiving Rs.65 crore from the Government. In this regard, reliance may also be placed on the complainant’s contention that in the 20th Report of the Department-Related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Health and Family Welfare submitted to the Rajya Sabha (2007), it was noted that “The Government of India is contributing Rs.65 crore, approximately one-third of the initial seed capital required for kickstarting the PHFI and for establishment of two Schools of Public Health. The remaining amount (approximately Rs.135 crore) is being raised from outside the Government, namely, Melinda & Bill Gates Foundation (Rs.65 crore) and from high net-worth individuals. PHFI is managed by an independent governing board that includes 3 members from the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare viz. Secretary (H&FW); DG ICMR and DGHS. T. K. A. Nair, Principal Secretary to Prime Minister, Dr. M. S. Ahluwalia, Vice-Chairman, Planning Commission; Sujata Rao, AS&PD, NACO, Ministry of Health; Dr. Mashelkar, DG CSIR are also members of the governing board. The presence of the officials from Government would ensure that the decisions taken in PHFI are in consonance with the objectives for which PHFI has been supported by Government of India. It is expected that all members of the Governing Board would ensure the functioning of the Foundation as a professional organisation and with complete transparency.” (emphasis added). Thus, the Parliamentary Standing Committee also assumed that the Vice- Chairman of the Planning Commission, Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister and other public servants were ensuring that decisions of PHFI were in consonance with the Government’s objectives and complete transparency. PHFI’s refusal to accept it is coverage by the RTI Act seems at variance with this.
Further, though the term ‘financed’ is qualified by ‘substantial’, section 2(h) of the RTI Act does not lay down what actually constitutes ‘substantial financing’. It is akin to ‘material’ or ‘important’ or ‘of considerable value’ and would depend on the facts and circumstances of the case. The funding sources of PHFI are foundations, private donors and the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Government of India (MH&FW). At the hearing held on 24-1-2012, the respondent stated that PHFI was set up in 2006 with an initial fund corpus of Rs.200 crore (at present Rs.219 crore), out of which Rs.65 crore were provided as grant by MH&FW. It follows that Government funding in PHFI is to the tune of 30%, which cannot be considered as insubstantial. Moreover, even if taken on absolute terms, a grant of Rs.65 crore given by the Government from its corpus of public funds cannot be considered as insignificant and would render PHFI as being ‘substantially financed’ by funds from the Government.
Citizens have a right to know about the manner, extent and purpose for which public funds are being deployed by the Government. Having said so, not every financing of an entity in the form of a grant by the Government would qualify as ‘substantial — but certainly a grant of over Rs.1 crore would constitute ‘substantial financing’ rendering such entity a public authority under the RTI Act.
As a consequence of being a public-private partnership, PHFI has received a substantial grant of Rs.65 crore from the Government initially. Further, as per the complainant’s contention — PHFI has been receiving free land and handsome financial grants from state governments for setting up ‘Indian Institutes of Public Health’ (IIPHs) as part of the public-private partnership. For instance, the Andhra Pradesh Government provided PHFI with 43 acres of land in Rajendra Nagar area of Hyderabad free of cost and Rs.30 crore in financial grant for setting up IIPH. The Gujarat Government provided 50 acres in Gandhinagar and Rs.25 crore as grant. The Orissa Government provided 40 acres near Bhubaneswar and the Delhi Government spent Rs.13.82 crore on acquiring 51.19 acres of Gram Sabha land in Kanjhawala village for PHFI to set up IIPH. Hence, there appears to be substantial financing both directly and indirectly by the Government. It follows from the above that PHFI is controlled and substantially financed by the Government.
Therefore, this Commission rules that PHFI is a public authority u/s.2(h) of the RTI Act.
I may note that PHFI subsequent to the hearing, itself agreed to submit itself to the jurisdiction of the RTI Act and the Commission further noted as under:
“It may not be out of place to mention that in recent years, there has been an emergence of multitude of public-private partnerships in different sectors. As described above, PPPs envisage an arrangement between the Government and private entities with clearly laid down rights and obligations. By their very nature, PPPs stipulate certain contributions from the Government, which may be monetary as well as non-monetary — to which values can be attributed. Moreover, PPPs envisage a certain degree of Government control in their functioning so that the decisions taken are in accordance with the objectives for which the partnership was set up. Given the above, PPPs would come within the ambit of ‘public authorities’ as defined in the RTI Act, thereby enabling citizens to know/obtain information about them. At present, most PPPs do not even accept the applicability of the RTI Act to them and wait for the issue to be adjudicated upon at the Commission’s level. For this some citizen has to pursue this matter. Such practices are required to be brought to a minimum and PPPs must comply with the provisions of the
RTI Act.”
In this instance the Commission notes with some dismay that the highest levels of public servants in India did not accept the citizen’s enforceable Right to Information in PHFI, despite the Government substantially funding it and exercising some control.
This strengthens the plea by the Commission that all public-private partnership agreements must have a clause that they are substantially funded by the appropriate Government and hence accept that they are public authorities as defined in the RTI Act. Without this, even an Institution like PHFI which has a distinguished board tries to refuse the Indian citizen his enforceable fundamental right. Finally, the Commission ruled:
“PHFI is public authority u/s.2(h) of the RTI Act and directed the chairman of PHFI to appoint a Public Information Officer and a First Appellate Authority — as mandated under the RTI Act before 15 March 2012 and also ensure compliance with section 4 of the RTI Act.”
[Kishan Lal v. Director (Development & Strategy) Public Health Foundation of India, New Delhi, decision No. CIC/SG/C/2011001273/17356 complaint No. CIC/SG/C/2011/001273, decided on 14-2-2012]
Gaming or Gambling?
Apparently a lot, if you are considering whether a particular venture is a ‘gaming venture’ or a ‘gambling venture’. While the two terms sound similar, there is a world of a difference between the two. With India’s online gaming market growing by leaps and bounds, there is a keen interest in setting up gaming ventures and investing in/acquiring Indian gaming companies. Several venture funds/large corporations have invested in gaming ventures in India. For instance, recently Walt Disney Company has acquired 100% stake in Indiagames Ltd. by buying out 42% stake held by the promoters and others for around $ 80 million. Games2Win, one of India’s oldest gaming portals has raised over $ 11 million from various venture funds. Thus, to say that the interest in this sector is large would be an understatement.
In India, gaming is a permissible activity, but gambling is either prohibited or heavily regulated. There are several laws which are relevant when one considers the nature of a venture. This Article gives an overview of this interesting subject.
Legal ecosystem
(a) Under the Constitution of India, the Union Government is empowered to make laws regulating the conduct of lotteries.
(b) Under the Constitution, the State Governments have been given the responsibility of authorising/ conducting lotteries and making laws on betting and gambling.
(c) Hence, we must look at the Acts of each of the 28 States and 7 Union Territories regarding gambling/gaming.
(d) The following are the various laws which regulate/ restrict/prohibit gambling in India:
- Public Gambling Act, 1867: This Central legislation provides for the punishment for public gambling in certain parts of India. It is not applicable in Maharashtra and other States which have repealed its application.
- Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act, 1887 applies in Maharashtra and regulates gaming in the State.
- Other State legislations: Acts of other States, such as the Delhi Public Gambling Act, 1955, Madras Gambling Act, etc. These Acts are more or less similar to the Public Gaming Act as the object of these Acts is to ban/restrict gambling. The State Acts repeal the applicability of the Public Gambling Act in their respective States.
- Section 294-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860: This Section provides for a punishment for keeping a lottery office without the authorisation of the State Government.
- Section 30 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872: This Section prevents any person from bringing a suit for recovery of any winnings won by way of a ‘wager.’
- The Lotteries (Regulation) Act, 1998: This Central legislation lays down guidelines and restrictions in conducting lotteries.
- The Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 which requires maintenance of certain records by entities engaged in gambling. ?
- States which expressly permit gambling:
Sikkim: The Sikkim Casino Games (Control and Tax) Rules, 2002 permit setting up of casinos in Sikkim.
The Sikkim Online Gaming (Regulation) Act, 2008 + Sikkim Online Gaming (Regulation) Rules, 2009 provide for licences to set up online gaming websites (for gambling and also betting on games like cricket, football, tennis, etc.) with the servers based in Sikkim. Other than this law, India does not have any specific laws targeting online gambling or gaming.
Goa: An amendment to the Goa, Daman and Diu Public Gambling Act, 1976 allows casinos to be set up only at fivestar hotels or offshore vessels with the permission. That is the reason Goa has floating casinos or casinos at fivestar hotels.
West Bengal: The West Bengal Prize Competition and Gambling Act, 1957 excludes ‘skill-based’ card games like poker, bridge, rummy and nap from its operation. Thus, in the State of West Bengal, a game of poker is expressly excluded from the definition of gambling.
Public Gambling Act
(a) It must be a house, walled enclosure, room or place;
(b) cards, dice, tables or other instruments of gaming are kept in such place; and
(c) these instruments are used for profit or gain of the occupier whether by way of charging for the instruments or for the place.
It is a moot point whether these definitions can be extended to online gaming ventures.
Section 3 of the Act levies a penalty for owning or keeping or having charge of a common gaming house. The penalty is a fine not exceeding Rs.200 or an imprisonment for a term up to 3 months. It may be noted that the public gaming house concept can even be extended to a private residence of a person if gambling activities are carried on in such a place. Thus, casual gambling at a house party may be treated, if all the conditions are fulfilled, as gambling and the owner of the house may be prosecuted.
Exception u/s.12: Even if all the above-mentioned 3 conditions are fulfilled, if it is a game of mere skill, the penal provisions do not apply. What is a game of skill is a question of fact and has been the subject-matter of great debate. In Chamarbaugwalla v. UOI, AIR 1957 SC 628, it was held that competitions which involve substantial skill are not gambling activities.
In State of AP v. K. Satyanarayana, 1968 AIR 825 (SC), the Court analysed whether a game of rummy was a game of skill. It held as follows:
- Rummy was not a game of mere chance like three cards;
- It requires considerable skill as fall of cards is to be memorised;
- The skill lies in holding and discarding cards;
- It is mainly and preponderantly a game of skill; and
- Chance is a factor, but not the major factor.
- Held, that rummy is not a game of chance, but a game of skill.
- Gambling is payment of a price for a chance to win. Gaming may be of skill alone or skill and chance.
- In a game of skill chance cannot be entirely eliminated, but it depends upon superior knowledge, training, attention, experience and adroitness of players.
- A game of chance is one in which chance predominates over the element of skill and a game of skill is one in which the element of skill dominates over the chance element.
- It is the dominant element which determines the character of the game.
- In horse-racing the person betting is supposed to have full knowledge of horse, jockey, trainer, owner, turf, race system, etc.
- Horses are given specialised training.
- Books are printed giving details of the above which persons betting study.
Hence, betting on horse-racing is a game of skill since skill dominates over chance. In Bimalendu De v. UOI, AIR 2001 Cal. 30, Kaun Banega Crorepati aired on Star TV was held not to be a game of chance, but was held to be a game of skill. Elements of gambling, i.e., wagering and betting are missing from this game. Only a player’s skill is tested. He does not have to pay or put any stake in the hope of a prize.
In M. J. Sivani v. State of Kar, AIR 1995 SC 1770, video games parlours were held to be common gaming houses. Video games are associated with stakes of money or money’s worth on the result of a game, be it a game of pure chance or a mixed game of skill or chance. For a commoner it is difficult to play a video game with skill. Hence, they are not games of mere skill.
Thus, the facts and circumstances of each game would have to be examined as to whether it falls within the domain of mere skill and hence, is a game or is it more a game of chance and hence, gambling.
Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act, 1887
This Act is similar to the Public Gambling Act in its operation, but has some differences. It defines the term ‘gaming’ to include wagering or betting except betting or wagering on horse-races and dog-races in certain cases.
‘Instruments of gaming’ are defined to include any article used as a subject-matter of gaming or any document used as a register or record for evidence of gaming/proceeds of gaming/winnings or prizes of gaming.
The definition of common gaming house includes places where the following activities take place:
- Betting on rainfall
- Betting on prices of cotton, opium or other commodities
- Betting on stock-market prices
- Betting on cards.
The punishment under this Act is imprisonment up to two years. Police officers have been given sub-stantial powers to search and seize and arrest under this Act.
Indian Penal Code
Section 294A of the Indian Penal Code provides that whoever keeps any office or place for drawing any lottery not authorised by the Government is punishable with a fine up to Rs.1,000. What is a lottery has not been defined. Courts have held that it includes competitions in which prizes are decided by mere chance. However, if the game requires skill, then it is not a lottery. A newspaper contained an advertisement of a coupon competition which included coupons to be filled by the newspaper buyers with names of horses selected by them as likely to come 1st, 2nd, 3rd in a race. The Court held that the game was one of skill, since filing up the names of the horses required specialised knowledge about the horses and some element of skill — Stoddart v. Sagar, (1895) 2 QB 474.
Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002
The PMLA covers any designated business or profession carrying on activities of playing games of chance for cash or kind. Such a business must maintain for 10 years a record of all transactions between it and the clients.
Further, it must verify and maintain the records of the identity of all its clients/customers.
FEMA/Foreign Direct Investment Policy
Remittance abroad out of lottery winnings, out of income from racing/ridding or for purchase of lottery tickets, sweepstakes is prohibited under the Foreign Exchange Management Act.
The FEMA Regulations (FEMA 20/2000-RB) and the Consolidated FDI Policy of 2011 issued vide Circular 2/2011, state that Foreign Direct Investment of any sort is prohibited in gambling and betting including casinos. Thus, FDI is not allowed in any gambling ventures, whether online or offline. Further, foreign technology collaboration in any form, including licensing for franchise, trademark, brand name, management contract is prohibited for lottery businesses and betting/gambling activities.
However, if the ventures are gaming ventures, then there are no sectoral caps or conditions for the FDI and there are no restrictions for foreign technology collaboration agreements. 100% FDI is allowable in gaming ventures, online and offline. Thus, one comes back to the million dollar question — is the venture one of gambling or gaming? The tests explained above would be applicable even to determine whether FDI is permissible in the venture.
Role of a CA
Looking at the raging controversy over gaming versus gambling, a CA should alert his clients about the potential dangers of setting up a gambling venture or a venture where there is no clarity over whether it falls under gambling or gaming. Similarly, if he is associated with a fund/investor investing in such a doubtful venture, he should red flag the transaction for his client’s notice. He should recommend that a well-reasoned legal opinion on this aspect should be obtained and only then the transaction should be proceeded with. The risks involved with getting into a gambling venture are very high and could even lead to the arrest/prosecution of the persons involved with it. The old adage of ‘better safe than sorry’ should be the mantra in such a case.
Finally, I have to say that the most surprising aspect has been the speed at which the folks in India adapt to Western practices. They learn fast, really, really fast.
— Sanjay Kumar
Is it fair to Initiate Recovery Proceedings When Tax is Already Deducted?
One and major mode of collection of tax preferred by the Department is through Tax Deduction at Source — TDS. The other mode is to collect taxes directly from the assessee — this is used where tax deduction is not provided for or TDS is not enough to meet the tax liability — advance tax and other modes of collection prescribed in Chapter XVII. In the recent years the Income Tax Department has pursued vigorously the TDS mode of collection of taxes by extending the areas of Tax Deducted at Source — refer section 192 to section 206 of the Act.
Section 205 grants protection to the deductee assessee. This is a logical step on having adopted ‘Tax Deducted at Source’ mechanism. The section reads as under:
“205. Bar against direct demand on assessee. — Where tax is deductible at the source under (the foregoing provisions of this Chapter), the assessee shall not be called upon to pay the tax himself to the extent to which tax has been deducted from that income.”
The Plain reading of this section makes it clear that whenever and wherever tax is deductible under the provisions of this Chapter and where the tax has been so deducted, no direct demand can be raised on the deductee. This implies that to the extent of TDS, demand cannot be raised on the deductee. For raising demand on the deductor a suitable provision has been inserted in section 201 of the Act. Under this provision whenever there is a default in deducting either the whole tax or part of the tax the deductor is deemed to be an ‘assessee in default’.
Thus there are self-contained foolproof provisions in the Act to protect the deductee under Chapter XVII.
The Act provides for filing of returns of income by individuals, trusts and businesses wherein the assessee has to provide detailed information regarding the name and address of the deductor, along with the TAN of the deductor and the amount of tax deducted at source based on the certificate issued by the deductor in Form 16A. Under the previous rules these certificates were to be attached with the return of income. However, in the present era of computerisation, the tax credits can be viewed under Form 26AS online. These returns of income are also affirmed by the assessee by verification provided in the form of return of income. Thus he is held responsible for claims of tax credits he is making.
After the deductee has filed the return and complied with all the formalities, no demand can be raised against the assessee for the amount of Tax Deducted at Source.
Reality
In this case the assessee was a salaried employee and the tax deducted at source by his employer was not paid to the Government. Hence even Form No. 16 was not issued to the employee. At the time of assessment the employee produced all the proofs including salary slips to prove that ‘tax was deducted’. The Assessing Officer without paying any attention to the legal provisions u/s. 205 referred above, raised a demand on the employee and even issued order for attaching employee’s bank account. The employee-assessee even wrote letters to Income-tax Officer, TDS circle of the employer to initiate necessary proceedings against the employer. The employee challenged the action of Assessing Officer of attaching his bank account. The Court rightly held that the action of the Assessing Officer was not as per law and even if the credit of the TDS is not available to the petitioner-assessee for want of TDS certificate, the fact that the tax has been deducted at source from salary income of the petitioner would be sufficient to hold that u/s.205 of the Act, the Revenue cannot recover the TDS amount with interest from the employee. While dealing with this judgment the Court also referred and relied upon decisions reported in 242 ITR 638 (Gauhati) and 278 ITR 206 (Kar.).
Without paying any heed to such crucial decisions the Department continues its unlawful actions against thousands of assessees, mostly salaried. As a result, assessees having salary income continue to receive intimations under the section 143(1) with demands calculated along with interest and have to file rectification applications either themselves or through their chartered accountants or lawyers or ITP’s. As is the practice, the Department does not act on these rectification applications and keep on sending illegal demand notices to the employee-assessees, irrespective of the fact that there is bar against raising direct demand on the employee. Unfortunately, at times the professionals involved also do not point out the provisions of section 205. This unlawful practice continues unabated leading to harassment of the assessee and results in corruption. This author has not seen any indirect demand on the employer deductor raised by the Income-tax Department under such circumstances. However, the employees are made to dance to the tune of recovery officers and at times suffer at the half-baked computer system of the Department.
Very recently the matter again came up before the Bombay High Court in writ petition No. 6861 of 2011. The Court vide its order clearly held that the intimation demand is not correct and hence set aside the same.
Although procedural, section 205 grants protection to the employee (deductee) whose tax is fully deducted but unfortunately they are still made to visit incometax offices for no fault of theirs and in blatant violation of the legal provisions. The irony is that even the newly created CPC Bangalore has continued this unlawful practice.
This author has drawn the attention of the regulator i.e., the CBDT to stop this harassment. This step will be in the interest of the Department because of its avowed objective of being ‘assessee friendly’.
In all fairness the author advocates and expects the CBDT to issue proper instructions urgently to its officers to:
- desist from attaching assets of the deductee.
- take action against the deductor.
Judiciary — Maintenance of highest standard of propriety and probity — Rule of Law — Constitution of India Arts. 235 and 233.
The issue that was raised in the appeal by the appellant was whether the Disciplinary Authority was justified in imposing on the appellant the punishment of compulsory retirement in terms of Rule 5(1)(vii) of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1979 on the ground that the appellant-Magistrate was found travelling without ticket in a local train thrice and on each occasion, the behaviour of the appellant-Magistrate with the railway staff in asserting that the Magistrates need not have a ticket was improper and constituted a grave misconduct.
The inquiry officer held that the appellant was found travelling without ticket at least thrice and her behaviour on each occasion was far from proper and not commensurate with the behaviour of a judicial officer. The disciplinary authority considered her case and took a decision that she was guilty of misconduct and therefore decided to impose the penalty of compulsory retirement which was accepted by the State Government and consequently the impugned order of compulsory retirement was issued against the appellant.
It was submitted by the appellant that the aforesaid punishment awarded was disproportionate to the charges levelled against her and that she should at least be directed to be paid her pension which could be paid to her if she was allowed to work for another two years. It was submitted that the appellant had completed 8 years of service and if she would have worked for another two years, she would have been entitled to pension.
The Court held that it was unable to accept the aforesaid contention for the simple reason that the Court could probably interfere with the quantum of punishment only when it was found that the punishment awarded was shocking to the conscience of the Court. The case was of judicial officer who was required to conduct herself with dignity and manner becoming of a judicial officer. A judicial officer must be able to discharge his/ her responsibilities by showing an impeccable conduct. In the instant case, she not only travelled without tickets in a railway compartment thrice but also complained against the ticket collectors who accosted her, misbehaved with the railway officials and in such circumstances, how could the punishment of compulsory retirement awarded to her be said to be disproportionate to the offence alleged against her. In a country governed by rule of law, nobody is above law, including judicial officers. In fact, as judicial officers, they have to present a continuous aspect of dignity in every conduct. If the rule of law is to function effectively and efficiently under the aegis of our democratic setup, Judges are expected to, nay, they must nurture an efficient and enlightened judiciary by presenting themselves as a role model. A Judge is constantly under public glaze and society expects higher standards of conduct and rectitude from a Judge. Judicial office, being an office of public trust, the society is entitled to expect that a Judge must be a man of high integrity, honesty and ethical firmness by maintaining the most exacting standards of propriety in every action. Therefore, a Judge’s official and personal conduct must be in tune with the highest standard of propriety and probity. Obviously, this standard of conduct is higher than those deemed acceptable or obvious for others. Indeed, in the instant case, being a judicial officer, it was in her best interest that she carries herself in a decorous and dignified manner. If she has deliberately chosen to depart from these high and exacting standards, she is appropriately liable for disciplinary action.
Public document — Annual return — Liability of directors — Companies Act, 1956 sections 159, 163 and Indian Evidence Act, 1872, section 74.
The respondents filed a complaint u/s.138 of the Act against the company arraying the appellant as an accused. It was stated in the complaint that the appellant and the other accused were the directors of the company and were responsible for the conduct of the business and also responsible for the day-to-day affairs of the company and that all the accused persons, who were in charge of and were responsible to the company for the conduct of its business at the time the offence was committed shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence. The appellant filed a petition before the High Court for quashing the complaint. The High Court held that the annual return dated Sept. 30, 1999, filed by the company was not a public document, and dismissed the petition.
The Supreme Court allowing the appeal held that inasmuch as the appellant’s reply to the statutory notice contained specific information that the appellant had resigned from the company in 1998, the respondent was not justified in not referring to it in the complaint and arraying her as accused in the complaint filed in the year 2005.
Further though the appellant was unable to produce a certified copy of Form 32, as it was not available with the Registrar of Companies, a copy of Form 32 was placed before the High Court. A reading of sections 159, 163 and 610(3) the Companies Act, 1956, makes it clear that there is a statutory requirement u/s.159 of the Companies Act, that every company having a share capital shall file with the Registrar of Companies an annual return which includes details of the existing directors. Section 163 requires the annual return to be made available by a company for inspection and section 610 which entitles any person to inspect the documents kept by the Registrar of Companies. The High Court committed an error in ignoring section 74 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 which refers to public documents and s.s (2) thereof which provides that public documents include ‘public records kept in any state of private documents’. A conjoint reading of sections 159, 163 and 610(3) of the 1956 Act, read with s.s (2) of section 74 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, makes it clear that a certified copy of the annual return is a public document and the contrary conclusion arrived at by the High Court could not be sustained.
In view of the fact that the appellant had established that she had resigned from the company as a director in 1998, well before the relevant date, namely, in the year 2004, when the cheques were issued, the criminal complaint in so far as the appellant was concerned was to be quashed.
Order — Reasons — Failure to give reasons amounted to denial of justice — Karnataka Sales Tax, 1957
The petitioner, an Internet service operator extending services of broadband, web hosting, etc., provided a CD-ROM to its customers in order to access the services and recovered service charges from them. The assessment order passed on the petitioner under the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957, was challenged in appeal before the Appellate Authority who dismissed the appeal. The proceedings were remitted to the Assessing Officer by the Appellate Tribunal. The Assessing Authority rejected the contention of the petitioner that the internet services did not involve sale of CD-ROM and that the services were subjected to service tax and passed orders of assessments. The said order was challenged in writ petition before the High Court.
The Court observed that the orders impugned ex facie animate non-application of mind, as the Assessing Officer without adverting to the contentions advanced by the petitioner in the objections and recording findings over the same, held the objections untenable. Application of mind means consideration of the contentions advanced by the parties with reference to proved facts and the law applicable to the said facts. It is for the AO to consider all relevant material and eschew irrelevant material to record findings, and conclusions. Recording of reasons is a part of fair procedure. Reasons are harbinger between the mind of the maker of the decision in the controversy and the decision or conclusion arrived at. They substitute subjectivity with objectivity.
Giving of reasons in support of their conclusion by judicial and quasi-judicial authorities when exercising initial jurisdiction is essential for various reasons. First, it is calculated to prevent unconscious or arbitrariness in reaching the conclusions. The very search for reasons will put the authority on the alert and minimise the chances of unconscious infiltration of personal bias or unfariness in the concusion. It is part of fair procedure and failure to give reasons amounted to denial of justice.
Foreign currency more than US $ 5000 — Legal requirement to make a declaration — Customs Act, 1962 sections 77, 113 and 114.
Brief facts of the case are that the appellant was leaving for London on 11-2-2009 from Kolkata Airport. After completing immigration formalities while the appellant was proceeding towards the security area, one of the AIU officers intercepted him. On being asked the appellant declared of having 1500 Euro and IC Rs.5200. Not being satisfied, the person was searched which resulted in the recovery of 5200 Euro, 1000 UK Pounds, and 98 US$, collectively valued at Rs.3,73,609, kept concealed inside the brief worn by him. The appellant could not produce any licit document in support of his legal acquisition, possession and/or exportation of the said currency. Accordingly, the said currency was seized on the reasonable belief that the same was being smuggled out of the country in contravention of the provisions of the Customs Act, 1962 read with FEMA, 1999 rendering the same liable to confiscation under the relevant provisions of the Customs Act, 1962.
The said seized currency was confiscated u/s. 113(d)(1) of the Customs Act, 1962 with an option to redeem the same on payment of redemption fine of Rs.1,50,000. A penalty of Rs.75,000 was also imposed. The applicant preferred an appeal before the jurisdictional Commissioner of Customs (Appeals) who upheld the action taken by the lower authorities but reduced the redemption fine to Rs.1 lakh and penalty to Rs.50,000 only.
The appellant submitted that the foreign currency carried by him was a part of the foreign currency drawn from M/s. Clarity Financial Service Ltd. (RBI authorised money exchange), Kolkata. Due to sudden return to India, the appellant again converted the Malaysian currency into Euro & UK Pound at airport for utilising the same for subsequent visit to UK. In a hurry no money exchange receipt was obtained.
The Revisionary Authority observed that that as per Foreign Exchange Management (Import and Export of Currency) Regulations 2000, Indian National can bring any amount of foreign currency and declaration before the customs is required only if the money value exceeds US $ 5000. The money value of the unspent amount is equivalent to US $ 8500 (approx.) and non-declaration of the same has been due to impression that no declaration is required for unspent money (procured legally in India) on return.
On perusal of Regulations 5, 6 and 7 (with relevant RBI Notifications) as above, it is evident that a compulsory requirement of making a Custom Declaration Form (CDF) is the legal requirement specifically when the impugned foreign currency involved is more than US $ 5000 (or equivalent). In this case the applicant has not made any declaration in CDF. Therefore, any of the plea as made herein that impugned foreign currency is a part of his legally acquired money which was 1st taken out and then brought in after his visit abroad cannot be ‘Independently verified’. Only a proper CDF could be the connecting legal document which is very much missing in this case. In the absence of such a vital link the entire theory/submissions appears to be an after thought and excuse. Therefore taking into account a settled principle of law that ignorance of law is no excuse, the Govt. is of the opinion that the applicant(pax) had not declared the impugned foreign currency to the customs officers in contravention of section 77 of the Customs Act, 1962 and had intentionally attempted to export the same illegally.
Award — International Commercial Arbitration — Enforcement of Arbitral award in India.
The question raised was whether enforcement of the award given by the International Court of Commercial Arbitration at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Russian Federation, Moscow in favour of the Respondent was contrary to public policy of India u/s.48(2)(b) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
By a contract between PE Ltd. India and 0.0.0. Patriot Moscow Russia, a transaction relating to sale of India long grain was entered. It so happened that the vessel carrying the goods suffered an engine failure, as a result of which it was declared ‘General Average’ by the Master of the vessel. The entire cargo was sold out to compensate the cost of rescue of the vessel. The buyers lodged claim against the sellers for recovery of amount of USD 285,569.53 in the International Court of Commercial Arbitration at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation. The Arbitral Tribunal did not find any merit in the defences set up by the sellers. It held that the sellers broke the terms of the contract and shipped goods 16 days later than the stipulated time and the vessel freighted by the sellers left the port of Kandla (India) 38 days later than the time of departure stipulated in the contract. The vessel with the cargo had not arrived at the port of Novorossiysk on the date of lodging the claim (as a matter of fact the vessel never reached the port of destination). The Arbitral Tribunal therefore held that there was clear term about the commitment of the sellers to reimburse the amount paid towards goods in case of non-arrival.
The Arbitral Tribunal, therefore, split the amount of losses between the parties — buyers and sellers — in equal parts.
The buyers filed Arbitration Petition before the High Court of Bombay for enforcement of the above award. The sellers contested the petition on the ground that subject award was contrary to the principles of public policy and, therefore, the award was unenforceable. The Court did not find any merit in the objections raised by the sellers; and held that the award dated October 18, 1999 could be enforced as a decree of the Court.
On further appeal, the Supreme Court observed that a plain reading of section 74 of the Contract Act would show that it deals with the measure of damages in two classes of cases (i) where the contract names a sum to be paid in case of breach and (ii) where the contract contains any other stipulation by way of penalty. The stipulation for reimbursement in the event stated in last para of clause 4 of the contract is not in the nature of penalty; the clause is not in terrorem. It is neither punitive nor vindictive. Moreover, what has been provided in the contract is the reimbursement of the price of the goods paid by the buyers to the sellers. The clause of reimbursement or repayment in the event of delayed delivery/arrival or non-delivery was not to be regarded as damages. Even in the absence of such clause, where the seller has breached his obligations at threshold, the buyer is entitled to the return of the price paid and for damages.
The transactions covered by section 23 are the transactions where the consideration or object of such transaction is forbidden by law or the transaction is of such a nature that if permitted would defeat the provisions of any law or the transaction is fraudulent or the transaction involves or implies injury to the person or property of another or where the Court regards it immoral or opposed to public policy. Whether particular transaction is contrary to a public policy would ordinarily depend upon the nature of transaction. Where experienced businessmen are involved in a commercial contract and the parties are not of unequal bargaining power, the agreed terms must ordinarily be respected as the parties may be taken to have had regard to the matters known to them. The sellers and the buyers in the present case are business persons having no unequal bargaining powers. They agreed on all terms of the contract being in conformity with the international trade and commerce. It is the precise sum which the sellers are required to reimburse to the buyers, which they had received for the goods, in case of the non-arrival of the goods within the prescribed time.
The appeal was dismissed.
Time limit for issuing of notice : Sections 148 and 149 of Income-tax Act, 1961: A.Y. 1998-99: Assessment order u/s.143(3) passed on 28-2- 2001: Notice u/s.148 issued on 30-3-2009: Not valid: Section 149 amended by Finance Act, 2001, w.e.f. 1-6-2001 reducing the time limit from 10 years to 6 years is applicable.
For the A.Y. 1998-99 the assessment was completed u/s.143(3) on 28-2-2001. Subsequently, on 30-3-2009, a notice u/s.148 was issued for reopening the assessment. The assessee’s objections were rejected by the Assessing Officer. The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under: “
(i) The issue in dispute gained importance because the time limit for issuance of notice u/s.148 as stipulated and stated in section 149 underwent substitution by the Finance Act, 2001 with effect from 1-6-2001. By the Finance Act, 2001, the period was restricted to six years from the end of the relevant assessment year. Before the said substitution, till 31-5-2001 reassessment proceedings could be initiated for up to 10 years from the end of the relevant assessment year.
(ii) It is an accepted and admitted position that the re-assessment notice dated 30-3-2009 would be barred and beyond time, in case, the period stipulated in substituted section 149 with effect from 1-6-2001 is applied.
However, the contention of the Revenue is that the substituted section is not applicable and section 149 before its substitution by the Finance Act, 2001 would apply. It is stated that the return in question was filed on 20-11-1998 and the law/limitation period prescribed/applicable on the first day of the assessment year determines and decides the time period for issue of notice u/s.147/148. The question raised is whether the amendment substitution of the period with effect from 1-6-2001 in section 149, is procedural or substantive.
(iii) Law of limitation is a procedural law and the provision or the limitation period stipulated on the date when the suit is filed applies. Law of limitation, therefore, being procedural law has to be applied to the proceedings on the date of institution/ filing. No person can have a vested right in the procedure. Therefore, the procedural law on the date when it was enforced is applied.
(iv) Law of limitation does not create any right in favour of a person or define or create any cause of action, but simply prescribes that the remedy can be exercised or availed of by or within the period stated and not thereafter. Subsequently, the right continues to exist but cannot be enforced. The liability to tax under the Act is created by the charging section read with the computation provisions. The assessment proceedings crystallise the said liability so that it can be enforced and the tax if short-paid or unpaid can be collected. If this difference between liability to tax and the procedure prescribed under the Act for computation of the liability (i.e., the procedure of assessment), is kept in mind, there would be no difficulty in understanding and appreciating the fallacy and the error in the primary argument raised by the Revenue.
(v) It is a settled position that liability to tax as a levy is normally determined as per statute as it exists on the first day of the assessment year, but this is not the issue or question in the present case. The issue or question in the present case relates to assessment, i.e., initiation of re-assessment proceedings and whether the time/limitation for initiation of the re-assessment proceedings specified by the Finance Act, 2001 is applicable. The Court is not determining/deciding the liability to tax but has to adjudicate and decide whether the re-assessment notice is beyond the time period stipulated. This is a matter/issue of procedure, i.e., the time period in which the assessment or re-assessment proceedings can be initiated. Thus, the time period/limitation period prescribed on the date of issue of notice will apply.
(vi) In view of the aforesaid reasoning, writ petition is allowed and the re-assessment notice dated 30-3-2009 and the order passed by the Assessing Officer and Assistant Commissioner dismissing the objections of the assessee are quashed.”
Speculation business: Speculation loss: Section 73, r/w section 28(i)-: A.Ys. 1996-97 and 1998-99: Assessee-company in business of dealing in shares and also earning interest income by granting loans and advances: Incurred loss in purchase and sale of shares: Claimed set-off of above loss against interest income: AO denied set-off relying on Explanation to section 73: Tribunal held that principal business of assessee was granting of loans and advances: Allowed set-off: Tribunal is right.
The assessee-company was in the business of purchase and sale of shares and was also earning interest income by granting loans and advances. During the previous years relevant to the A.Ys. 1996-97 and 1998-99, the assessee incurred loss in the purchase and sale of shares and earned interest income from loans and advances. It claimed set-off of the above loss against the interest income. The Assessing Officer assessed the interest income as business income. He further treated the business of purchase and sale of shares as speculation business as per Explanation to section 73 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. He, therefore, considered the aforesaid loss as speculation loss and held that it would only be set off against the speculation profit in the subsequent years. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.
On appeal by the Revenue the Allahabad High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under: “
(i) Section 73(1) provides that any loss, computed in respect of speculation business carried on by the assessee, shall not be set off except against profits and gains, if any of another speculation business. Section 73(1) uses the words ‘business carried on’. The Explanation to section 73 also uses the phrase ‘where any part of the business of the company . . . . . consists in the purchase and sale of shares of other companies’. Section 28(1) provides for charging of income-tax on profits and gains of any business or profession which was carried on by the assessee at any time during the previous year. Section 28(1) r/w section 73(1) which also uses the words ‘business carried on’ clearly indicate that what is chargeable to the income-tax is the business actually carried on and profits and gains of the said business.
The Explanation to section 73 contains an exclusionary clause, according to which the following companies are excluded from the operation of the deeming clause
(i) a company whose gross total income consists mainly of income which is chargeable under the heads ‘Interest on securities’, ‘Income from house property’, ‘Capital gains’ and ‘Income from other sources’, or (ii) a company the principal business of which is the business of banking or granting of loans and advances’.
(ii) The question to be considered is as to whether a company, which fulfils the conditions as mentioned in the exclusionary categories, can be denied the benefit, if the income consists mainly of income as used in first category and the principal business of which as used in the second category from the activities and business which are not the part of the memorandum of association of the company. Section 28(1), section 73(1) and the Explanation to section 73 indicate that the income which is chargeable is the income in the relevant year arising from business or profession carried on by the company. The words ‘carried on’ mean actual carrying of the activity. The words ‘carried on has to be read in context of what actually was done by the company in the relevant year, rather than what was main object in the memorandum of association of the company. Thus, the submission of the Revenue that since in the memorandum of association the activity or business, which is shown to have been carried on by the assessee, is not included, it is not entitled to be considered in exclusionary clause, has to be rejected.
(iii) For qualifying the exclusionary categories as mentioned in the Explanation to section 73, the condition to be fulfilled is that gross total income consists mainly of income which is chargeable under the heads
(a) ‘Interest on securities’,
(b) ‘Income from house property’,
(c) ‘Capital gains’ and
(d) ‘Income from other sources’.
The said provision uses the words ‘mainly of income’. The words ‘mainly of income’ and similarly in the second category the words ‘principal business of which’ mean substantially or primarily.
(iv) In the instant case, the total gross income of the assessee, which has been shown in the assessment order, is interest income. The assessment order does not refer to any other income. Hence, the condition that income consists ‘mainly of income’ is completely fulfilled. One of the heads of the income for exclusionary category is income from other sources.
(v) The second category consists of the phrase ‘a company the principal business of which is granting of loans and advances’. The income, which has been treated to be gross income, is income from interest of the assessee from granting loans and advances. Thus, the assessee was covered by exclusionary clause of Explanation to section 73.
(vi) Therefore, the assessee was clearly covered by the exclusionary clause of Explanation to section 73 and the Tribunal rightly set off of the aforesaid loss against the income of the assessee from loans and advances.”
Settlement of case: Abatement: Sections 245C, 245D and 245HA : A.Ys. 1989-90 to 1993-94: Effect and scope of section 245HA: Where there was no fault of the applicant and he himself is not responsible for delay in getting decision on the settlement application, the application shall not abate.
Dealing with the effect and scope of section 245HA of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the Jharkhand High Court followed the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Star Television News Ltd. v. UOI, 317 ITR 66 (Bom.) and held as under: “In a case where there was no fault of the applicant and he himself is not responsible for delay in getting decision on the settlement application, in that situation, the application shall not abate. The Settlement Commission has to decide the application following the principles laid down in Star Television News Ltd.”
Penalty: Delay in filing declaration in Form No. 15H: Section 272A(2)(f): A.Ys. 1991-93, 1992-93 and 1994-95: No obligation to file declaration prior to 1-6-1992: Penalty not imposable for that period: Further the penalty to be restricted to the tax amount as per subsequent clarificatory amendment to proviso.
For the A.Ys. 1991-92, 1992-93 and 1994-95 penalty u/s.272A(2)(f) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was imposed for delay in filing declaration in Form 15H. The Tribunal held that no penalty was imposable for the period prior to 1-6-1992 because there was no statutory obligation to file the prescribed form u/s.197A. The Tribunal also held that the penalty should be restricted to the amount of tax deductible by giving retrospective effect to the proviso which is clarificatory.
On appeal by the Revenue, the Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under: “
(i) Failure to file the declaration in Form No. 15H prior to 1-6-1992 not being a default u/s. 272A(2) (f), no penalty could be levied for delay up to 1-6-1992.
(ii) In view of proviso, which is remedial in nature and consequently retrospective in operation, penalty could not exceed the tax deductible.”
PAN: TDS: Section 206AA, r.w.s. 139A: Constitutional validity; Article 14 of the Constitution of India, 1950: Requirement to furnish PAN: Section 206AA is unconstitutional and has to be read down from statute and made inapplicable to persons whose income is less than taxable limit: Therefore, banking and financial institution shall not invariably insist upon PAN from small investors as well as persons who intend to open an account in bank or financial institution.
Considering the constitutional validity of section 206AA of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the Karnataka High Court held as under: “
(i) The very intent of section 206AA is to make it conditional for every person who wish to have a transaction in the bank or financial institution including small investors/depositors, invariably to have a PAN. This runs contrary to what has been contemplated u/s.139A which was introduced by the Legislature in its wisdom. What is not in dispute is, persons whose income is below the taxable limit need not have a PAN and also they need not furnish income tax declaration/ returns. Of course, under the Finance Act, it is made clear that a person whose income is less than the taxable limit is not taxable.
(ii) Such of the small investors who come forward to invest their savings from earnings as security for their future, by virtue of the present section 206AA necessarily have to give their PAN. The poor and illiterate/uneducated persons are finding it difficult rather to approach the various Government departments, particularly the Income-tax Department to get their PAN.
(iii) It is, therefore, held that it may not be necessary for such persons whose income is below the taxable limit to obtain PAN. Such investments/ savings from their earnings or by way of agriculture or any other source, in banking and financial institutions would also further the financial position from the point of the country’s economy.
(iv) But imposing condition to invariably go for a PAN on such small depositors would cause hindrance and discourage such small investors to come forward to invest their money for secured returns and as security for their future.
(v) The difficulty expressed by the petitioners and similarly placed persons is, imposing condition to invariably go for PAN as per section 206AA would run contrary to section 139A. It is also their grievance that filing of Form 15G to seek exemption from deduction of income tax at source, also is not accepted by the 3rd and 4th respondents and acted upon unless the PAN is produced.
(vi) Section 139A which is introduced way back in April 1991 is in vogue and this provision stands the scrutiny of Article 14 of the Constitution for reasonableness. But, section 206AA which is contrary to section 139A appears to be discriminatory as if it is overriding section 139A introduced earlier.
Though the intention of the Legislature is to bring the maximum persons under the net of income tax, when necessarily it provides for exemption up to taxable limit, it may not insist such persons whose income is below the taxable limit to compulsorily go for PAN. If any mischief of avoiding of tax or any other act of concealing the income is detected, that could be taken care of by penal provisions.
vii) In that view of the matter, in view of the specific provision of section 139A, section 206AA is made inapplicable to persons and read down from the statute for those whose income is less than the taxable limit as per the Finance Act, 1991. However, it is made clear that section 206AA would of course be made applicable to persons whose income is above the taxable limit.
(viii) The banking and financial institutions shall not invariably insist upon PAN from such small investors like the petitioners as well as from persons who intend to open an account in the bank or financial institution.”
Income: Deemed to accrue or arise in India: Sections 5, 6 and 9 : A.Y. 2001-02: Assessee was an employee of an American company and non-resident from year 1991 to 1999: On termination of employment in 1999, he received certain amount from previous employer as retirement benefit/severance/ vacation engagement: Assessee not ordinary resident in relevant assessment year: Amount received by assessee had not accrued/ deemed to be accrued/paid in India in terms of section 6 and section 9(1)(ii): Amou<
The assessee was an employee of an American company from 1991 till November, 1999 and during this period he was a non-resident Indian. The employment was terminated in the year 1999. In the relevant year, i.e., A.Y. 2001-02 the assessee was ‘not ordinarily resident’. In the relevant year the assessee received certain amount as leave encashment according to the number of years of service, which was subsequently described as severance and vacation encashment paid by the erstwhile employer of the assessee in the USA for services rendered outside India.
The assessee claimed that this amount was not taxable in India under provisions of section 5(1)(c) read with section 9(1)(ii). The Assessing Officer held that the said amount was received by the assessee as his profit in lieu of salary which was payable by the employer under the employer-employee relationship and, therefore, was taxable u/s.17(3)(ii). The CIT(A) held that the receipt of the impugned amount was on account of the past services rendered by the assessee to his previous foreign employer outside India at a time when he was a non-resident and this could not be deemed to have accrued or arisen in India and would not come under the purview of section 9(1)(ii).
The Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A). On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under: “
(i) It is clear from the factual findings recorded by both the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal, that the payment in question was received towards retirement benefit/severance/vacation encashment from the erstwhile employer on termination of employment in November, 1999. The erstwhile employer was based in the USA and services were rendered to the erstwhile employer in the USA.
(ii) In view of the aforesaid factual position, elucidated and accepted by both, the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal, the said amount cannot be taxed in India, as the status of the assessee during the year in question was that of ‘not ordinary resident’. The said income did not accrue or arise in India.
(iii) The Tribunal has rightly held that in terms of section 6 and section 9(1)(ii), the amount/income had not accrued/deemed to be accrued/ paid in India.”
Depreciation: Intangible assets: Section 32(1) (ii): A.Ys. 2002-03 and 2005-06: Know-how, business contracts, business information, etc., described as goodwill are intangible assets eligible for depreciation u/s.32(1)(ii) as ‘business or commercial rights of similar nature’ specified in section 32(1)(ii).
The assessee had acquired know-how, business contracts, business information, etc., as part of the slump sale described as goodwill. The assessee’s claim for depreciation u/s.32(1)(ii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on such intangible assets was disallowed for the A.Ys. 2002-03 and 2005-06, for the reason that the same were described as goodwill. The Tribunal upheld the disallowance.
On appeal by the assessee, the Delhi High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under: “Intangible assets viz., business claims, business information, business records, contracts, employees and know-how acquired by the assessee under slump sale of running business are in the nature of ‘business or commercial rights of similar nature’ specified in section 32(1)(ii) and therefore, the same are eligible for depreciation.”
Capital gains: Sections 2(47) and 48: A.Y. 2002-03: Redemption of preference shares amounts to transfer u/s.2(47): Computation: Redeemable preference shares are not bonds or debentures: At time of redemption of preference shares, assessee would be entitled to benefit of indexation u/s.48.
In the A.Y. 2001-02, the assessee redeemed three lakh preference shares (held for 10 years) at par and claimed long-term capital loss after availing benefit of indexation and claimed the set-off of the same against the long-term capital gain on sale of other shares. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim on the grounds that —
(i) both the assessee and the company in which the assessee held the preference shares, were managed by the same group of persons;
(ii) that there was no transfer; and that the assessee was not entitled to indexation on the redemption of non-cumulative redeemable preference shares. The CIT(A) allowed the claim of the assessee. The Tribunal affirmed the view of the CIT(A).
On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under: “
(i) There is a finding of fact that the transaction was not questioned by the Revenue for over ten years: that both the assessee and the company of which the assessee held redeemable preference shares were juridical entities and the mere fact that both were under common management would not necessarily indicate that the transaction was not genuine. There is no reason for this Court to differ with the finding of the Tribunal.
(ii) The judgment of the Supreme Court in Anarkali Sarabhai v. CIT, (1997) 224 ITR 422/90 Taxman 502 concludes the issue that a redemption of preference shares by a company squarely comes within the ambit of section 2(47), since it amounts to a transfer.
(iii) The second proviso to section 48 provides for indexation where long-term capital gain arises from the transfer of a long-term capital asset. The third proviso, however, stipulates that nothing contained in the second proviso shall apply to long-term capital gain arising from the transfer of a long-term capital asset being bonds or debentures other than capital indexed bonds issued by the Government.
The Assessing Officer was of the view that the principal characteristic of a bond is a fixed holding period and a fixed rate of return. According to him, the four per cent non-cumulative redeemable preference shares which the assessee redeemed also had a fixed holding period and a fixed rate of return and on this basis denied the benefit of cost indexation to the assessee. The entire basis on which the Assessing Officer denied the benefit of cost indexation was flawed and was justifiably set right in the order of the Tribunal.
(iv) There is a clear distinction between bonds and share capital, because a bond does not represent ownership of equity capital. Bonds are in essence interest-bearing instruments which represent a loan. This distinction has been accepted by the Supreme Court in R. D. Goyal v. Reliance Industries Ltd., (2002) 40 SCL 503.
(v) Section 48 denies the benefit of indexation to bonds and debentures other than capital indexed bonds issued by the Government. The four percent non-cumulative redeemable preference shares were not bonds or debentures within the meaning of that expression in section 48. In these circumstances, the Tribunal was correct in its decision to that effect.”
Capital gain: Sections 48 and 55(2): A.Y. 1999- 00: Transfer of self acquired trademark and design: No cost of acquisition: Capital gain not chargeable to tax.
In the previous year relevant to the A.Y. 1999-00, the assessee transferred self acquired trademark and designs for the considerations of Rs.15 crore and Rs.20 lakh, respectively. The assessee claimed that the capital gain on such transfer is not chargeable to tax in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. B. C. Srinivasa Setty, 128 ITR 249 (SC). The Assessing Officer rejected the assessee’s claim and held that the capital gain is chargeable to tax. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal accepted the assessee’s claim.
On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under: “
(i) Prior to the amendment made to section 55(2) by the Finance Act, 2001 effective from 1-4-2002 by adding the words ‘trademark or brand name associated with the business’ self-generated assets such as trademark did not have any cost of acquisition. Therefore, for the period under consideration the computation u/s.48 fails resulting in such transfer of trademarks not being chargeable to capital gains tax.
(ii) Consequent to amendment made to section 55(2) w.e.f. 1-4-2002 by which the words trademark or brand name associated with the business was introduced into it, the computation provision becomes workable and the consideration for the sale of trademark would be subject to capital gains tax.
(iii) In fact, when the amendment was made to section 55 by the Finance Act, 2001 the CBDT had issued Circular bearing No. 14-2001 explaining the provisions of the Finance Act, 2001. From the said Circular it would be clear that the amendment bringing self-generated intangible assets such as trademarks to capital gains tax only w.e.f. A.Y. 2002-03 onwards. In this case we are concerned with the A.Y. 1999-00 and therefore, the amendment would not have any effect. Consequently, the sale of self-generated trademarks during the A.Y. 1999-00 are not chargeable to capital gains tax.
(iv) So far as the sale of self-generated designs (i.e., not acquired) the same is also not chargeable to capital gains tax not only for the reasons applicable to trademarks, but for the fact that even till this date, no amendment has been made to section 55(2) of the said Act, defining cost of acquisition of design as in the case of trademark, goodwill, etc.”
Central Sales Tax- Declared Goods-Iron and Steel- Stainless Steel Wire-Does Not Fall under Entry “Tool, Alloy and Special Steels”- section 14((iv) (ix) of the Central sales Tax Act, 1956.
Central
Sales Tax- Declared Goods-Iron and Steel-Stainless Steel Wire-Does Not
Fall under Entry “Tool, Alloy and Special Steels”- section 14((iv) (ix)
of the Central sales Tax Act, 1956.
The
appellant is engaged in manufacture and sale of Stainless Steel Wire,
and was assessed under the UP sales tax Act and CST Act for the period
1999-2000 in which the assessing authorities levied tax @ 4% on sales of
Stainless Steel Wire by treating it declared goods covered by entry(ix)
of clause (iv) of section 14 of the CST Act, relating to “ Tool, Alloy
and Special Steels of any one of the above categories”. Subsequently,
the revising authorities issued notice to reopen the assessment to levy
higher rate of tax on sales of such Stainless Steel wire being not
covered by the term iron and Steel as defined in section 14(iv) of the
CST Act. The appellant filed writ petition in the Allahabad High Court
against issue of the said notice. The High Court dismissed the writ
petition holding that “stainless steel wire” is not covered under the
item “tool, alloy and special steels” in entry (ix) and, therefore, does
not fall under “iron and steel” as defined under clause (iv)of section
14 of the Central Act and therefore the provision of section 15 of the
Central Act does not apply. The appellant filed an appeal to the Supreme
Court against the said judgment of High Court.
Held
The
language used in entry no. (ix) is plain and unambiguous and that the
items which are mentioned there are “tool, alloy and special steels”. By
using the words “of any of the above categories” in entry no. (ix),
would refer to entries (i) to (viii) and it cannot and does not refer to
entry No. (xv). However, entry (xvi) of clause (iv) would be included
in entry (xvi) particularly within the expression now therein any of the
aforesaid categories. Therefore, the specific entry “tool, alloy and
special steels” being not applicable to entry (xv). Therefore, it was
held that the stainless steel wire is not covered within entry (ix) of
clause (iv) of section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956.
Capital gain: Indexed cost: Sections 2(42A), 48 and 49 : A.Y. 2005-06: Acquisition of asset by inheritance: Indexation to be made w.r.t. the holding of asset by previous owner.
In or about the year 1942, the assessee’s father acquired the immovable property from his father. The assessee’s father expired on 21-8-1988, leaving behind a will bequeathing the property to his wife (assessee’s mother) and the assessee in equal shares. The assessee’s mother expired on 21-2-2000 and her 50% share was inherited by the assessee. In the previous year corresponding to the A.Y. 2005-06, the assessee sold the property for a consideration of Rs.9.5 crore and declared a long-term capital gain of Rs.38,44,247. While computing the capital gain the assessee considered the date of acquisition of the property to be prior to 1-4-1981 and took the cost of acquisition and indexed the same w.r.t. 1-4-1981. The AO held that for the purpose of indexation, the actual date of acquisition by the assessee must be taken. Accordingly, he indexed the cost in respect of 50% w.r.t. 21-8-1988 (date of death of father) and the balance 50% w.r.t. 21-2-2000 (date of death of mother). The CIT(A) allowed the assessee’s appeal and held that the indexation should be w.r.t. 1-4- 1981. The Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A) w.r.t. 50% of the property acquired from the father. In respect of the balance 50% acquired from mother, the Tribunal held that the indexation should be w.r.t. 21-8-1988 when the mother acquired the property from the father. The Tribunal held that for the purpose of indexation, the period of holding of the asset by the previous owner should be taken into account.
The Revenue filed appeal in respect of the 50% decided in favour of the assessee and the assessee filed cross-objection in respect of the balance 50%. The Bombay High Court dismissed the appeal and allowed the cross-objection and held as: “
(i) The Explanation to section 49(1) defines the expression ‘previous owner of the property’ to be the last previous owner thereof, who acquired it by a mode of acquisition ‘other than that referred to in clauses (i) to (iv) of s.s (1)’. The last previous owner of the property, who acquired the property by a mode of acquisition other than those referred to in clauses (i) to (iv), was the assessee’s grand-father. The assessee’s father admittedly acquired the property in 1942 from his father.
(ii) As far as the 50% portion of the property acquired by the assessee from his father is concerned, the cost of acquisition must be determined to be the cost at which the assessee’s grandfather, in any event the assessee’s father acquired the property and not the date on which the assessee acquired it. The Tribunal does not hold otherwise either.
(iii) The Tribunal however held that in respect of 50% of the property inherited by the assessee from her mother, the period of holding would start from 21-8-1988, as she became owner of her 50% share in the property only from that date. This requires consideration. The last previous owner of the assessee’s mother’s 50% share was her husband’s father and at the highest her husband. Thus the assessee must be deemed to have held this 50% share in the property also from 1-4-1981.
(iv) In the circumstances, the questions are answered in favour of the assessee. The period of holding shall be from 1-4-1981 in respect of the entire property.”
Sale in course of import vis-à-vis sale from duty-free shop
“S. 5. When is a sale or purchase of goods said to take place in the course of import or export.
(2) A sale or purchase of goods shall be deemed to take place in the course of the import of the goods into the territory of India only if the sale or purchase either occasions such import or is effected by a transfer of documents of title to the goods before the goods have crossed the Customs frontiers of India.”
It can be seen, from the above, that there are two limbs. As per the first limb, the sale/purchase occasioning the movement of goods from foreign country is considered to be in the course of import. Therefore, the transaction of direct import is covered by this category. In addition to the above, there is scope to cover further transaction also as in the course of import under this limb.
The second limb covers transactions which are effected by transfer of documents of title to goods before the goods cross the Customs frontiers of India.
In a recent judgment, the Supreme Court had an occasion to specify the scope of the above section. Reference can be made to the judgment in the case of M/s. Hotel Ashoka v. Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes & anr., (Civil Appeal No. 2560 of 2010 decided on 3-2-2012).
Facts of the case
The assessee (appellant) was M/s. Hotel Ashoka, a hotel managed by India Tourism Development Corporation Limited (ITDCL). The assessee had duty-free shops at international airports in India. At duty-free shops, the assessee sold several articles including liquor to foreigners and also to Indians going abroad or coming to India by air. The issue arose, under Karnataka Sales Tax Act, in respect of dutyfree shop at international airport at Bengaluru. For sales effected at the said place, the assessee took a stand that no tax was payable under the sales tax laws, as the goods were sold before importing the goods or before the goods had crossed the Customs frontiers of India. The sales tax authorities levied sales tax and raised demand. A writ petition was filed before the Karnataka High Court. However, the High Court rejected the writ petition holding it to be not maintainable on the ground of availability of alternative remedies. The matter came before the Supreme Court.
In respect of maintainability the Supreme Court observed that since the SLP was already admitted and the matter pertained to the year 2004-05, it would not be in the interest of justice to relegate the assessee to statutory authorities especially when the legal position is very clear and the law is also in favour of the appellant.
Judgment on merits
On merits, the Supreme Court examined the legal position. In para-18, the Supreme Court observed as under:
“18. It is an admitted fact that the goods which had been brought from foreign countries by the appellant had been kept in bonded warehouses and they were transferred to duty-free shops situated at international airport of Bengaluru as and when the stock of goods lying at the duty-free shops was exhausted. It is also an admitted fact that the appellant had executed bonds and the goods, which had been brought from foreign countries, had been kept in bonded warehouses by the appellant. When the goods are kept in the bonded warehouses, it cannot be said that the said goods had crossed the Customs frontiers. The goods are not cleared from the Customs till they are brought in India by crossing the Customs frontiers. When the goods are lying in the bonded warehouses, they are deemed to have been kept outside the Customs frontiers of the country and as stated by the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant, the appellant was selling the goods from the duty-free shops owned by it at Bengaluru international airport before the said goods had crossed the Customs frontiers.”
Further in para 23 and 24 the Supreme Court has observed as under:
“23. Looking to the aforestated legal position, it cannot be disputed that the goods sold at the duty-free shops, owned by the appellant, would be said to have been sold before the goods crossed the Customs frontiers of India, as it is not in dispute that the duty-free shops of the appellant situated at the international airport of Bengaluru are beyond the Customs frontiers of India i.e., they are not within the Customs frontiers of India.”
“24. If this is the factual and legal position, in our opinion, looking to the provisions of Article 286 of the Constitution, the State of Karnataka has no right to tax any such transaction which takes place at the duty-free shops owned by the appellant which are not within the Customs frontiers of India.”
The Sales Tax Department contented that the sale, to be in course of import, should take place beyond the territories of India and not within the geographical territory of India. Further, it was also contented that there was no evidence about sale by transfer of documents of title to goods for effecting the sales before the goods have crossed Customs frontiers of India. Both the objections were rejected by the Supreme Court observing as under:
“30. They again submitted that ‘in the course of import’ means ‘the transaction ought to have taken place beyond the territories of India and not within the geographical territory of India’. We do not agree with the said submission. When any transaction takes place outside the Customs frontiers of India, the transaction would be said to have taken place outside India. Though the transaction might take place within India but technically, looking to the provisions of section 2(11) of the Customs Act and Article of the Constitution, the said transaction would be said to have taken place outside India. In other words, it cannot be said that the goods are imported into the territory of India till the goods or the documents of title to the goods are brought into India. Admittedly, in the instant case, the goods had not been brought into the Customs frontiers of India before the transaction of sales had taken place and, therefore, in our opinion, the transactions had taken place beyond or outside the Customs frontiers of India.”
“31. In our opinion, submissions with regard to sale not taking effect by transfer of documents of title to the goods are absolutely irrelevant. Transfer of documents of title to the goods is one of the methods whereby delivery of the goods is effected. Delivery may be physical also. In the instant case, at the duty-free shops, which are admittedly outside the Customs frontiers of our country, the goods had been sold to the customers by giving physical delivery. It is not disputed that the goods were sold by giving physical possession at the duty-free shops to the customers. Simply, because the sales had not been effected by transfer of documents of title to the goods and the sales were effected by giving physical possession of the goods to the customers, it would not mean that the sales were taxable under the Act. Thus, we do not agree with the aforestated submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for the Revenue.”
Thus, the Supreme Court has finally decided the scope of section 5(2) of the CST Act, 1956.
Conclusion
This judgment can be said to be a comprehensive judgment deciding the scope of section 5(2) of the CST Act, 1956. It has resolved the issue once for all. The judgment will also be useful in respect of sale effected from bonded warehouses.
The Ministry of Corporate Affairs has decided to impose fees with effect from 22nd July 2012 on certain e-forms.
Dy. Commissioner v. MTZ Polyfilms Ltd. ITAT ‘B’ Bench, Mumbai Before N. V. Vasudevan (JM) and Pramod Kumar (AM) ITA No. 5015/Mum./2009 A.Y.: 2004-05. Decided on: 30-12-2011 Counsel for revenue/assessee: P. C. Mourya/ Jitendra Jain
Facts:
The assessee was engaged in the business of manufacturing of polyester films. It had its manufacturing facilities at GIDC, Gujarat. It was allotted plot of land by GIDC. As per the terms of allotment the assessee was required to pay the purchase consideration of the land in instalments with interest. For the year under consideration the assessee had paid the sum of Rs.99.97 lakh as interest to GIDC and the same was claimed as business expenditure. According to the AO the expenditure was of capital in nature. On appeal the CIT(A) allowed the appeal and held that the expenditure was of revenue in nature.
Before the Tribunal the Revenue supported the order of the AO and further contended that since the interest to GIDC was unpaid, it is not allowable u/s.43B.
Held:
The Tribunal, as per the order of the CIT(A), noted that the fact that the production by the assessee had commenced in October, 1988 was not controverted. Accordingly, it held that the interest paid during the year cannot be considered as capital expenditure. Further, it referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bombay Steam Navigation Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT, (1953) (56 ITR 52), where the interest paid on purchase consideration of the assets by the amalgamated company was held as allowable as business expenditure u/s. 10(2)(xv) of the 1922 Act (equivalent to section 37(1) of the 1961 Act) According to the Apex Court, the expression ‘capital’ used in section 10(2)(iii) of the 1922 Act (equivalent to section 36(1)(iii) of the 1961 Act), in the context in which it occurred, meant money and not any other asset. The Apex Court further observed that an agreement to pay the balance consideration due by the purchaser did not in truth give rise to a loan. On that basis the Apex Court held that the interest paid was not allowable as deduction u/s.10(2)(iii) of the 1922 Act, but as business expenditure u/s.10(2) (xv) of the 1922 Act. Applying the above ratio, the Tribunal held that the interest paid to GIDC by the assessee was allowable u/s.37(1). It further agreed with the assessee that the provisions of section 43B would also not apply to the facts of the present case, since unpaid sale consideration cannot be said to be monies borrowed.
Sections 28, 145 — Project completion method — In the case of an assessee following project completion method, receipts by way of sale of TDR, which TDR has direct nexus with the project undertaken, can be brought to tax only in the year in which the project is completed.
Before J. Sudhakar Reddy (AM) and R. S. Padvekar (JM)
ITA No. 193/Mum./2010
A.Y.: 2006-07. Decided on: 25-4-2012 Counsel for assessee/revenue: Vipul B. Joshi/ A. C. Tejpal
Sections 28, 145 — Project completion method — In the case of an assessee following project completion method, receipts by way of sale of TDR, which TDR has direct nexus with the project undertaken, can be brought to tax only in the year in which the project is completed.
The assessee, a partnership firm, engaged in construction activity especially the Slum Rehabilitation Programme (SRA Scheme) launched by the Government of Maharashtra, had undertaken two projects of slum rehabilitation, during the financial year 2005-06, which were not completed as on 31-3-2006. The assessee was following project completion method of accounting.
During the financial year 2005-06, the assessee sold TDR allotted to it by BMC, which TDR was directly linked to the projects undertaken by the assessee, for a consideration of Rs.2,67,29,626. Since the projects were not complete as on 31-3-2006, this amount was reflected in the balance sheet as on 31- 3-2006 as advance. The Assessing Officer (AO) rejected the contentions of the assessee and brought to tax the entire amount as income of the assessee for A.Y. 2006-07. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal where it was also submitted that the entire sale proceeds of TDR totalling to Rs.6,90,26,192 were reflected in the P & L Account for A.Y. 2008-09 and surplus income of Rs.2,78,59,939 was offered. The CIT(A) confirmed the order of the AO. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.
Held:
The Tribunal noted that admittedly the two slum rehabilitation projects were not completed in A.Y. 2006-07 and also that the TDR in quesetion had direct nexus with the two projects undertaken by the assessee. It found that the contention of the assessee is supported by the decision of the jurisdictional High Court in the case of CIT Central I, Mumbai v. Chembur Trade Corporation, (ITA No. 3179 of 2009) order dated 14-9-2011 and also the decision of Mumbai Bench of ITAT in the case of ACIT v. Skylark Building, 48 SOT 306 (Mum.) and also that the assessee has offered the amounts in A.Y. 2008- 09 when the projects were completed.
The Tribunal accepted the contention of the assessee and restored the matter back to the file of the AO with a direction to verify whether the assessee has offered sale consideration of TDR in question in A.Y. 2008-09. If it has so offered, then the same should not be taxed in A.Y. 2006- 07.
The Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by the assessee.
(2012) 49 SOT 387 (Delhi) Harnam Singh Harbans Kaur Charitable Trust v. DIT (Exemption) Dated: 16-12-2011
The assessee-charitable trust’s recognition for exemption u/s.80G expired on 31-3-2011. The assessee made an application in Form No. 10G seeking exemption for the period after 31-3-2011. The Director of Income-tax (Exemption) rejected this application for renewal of exemption and also held that assessee was earning huge money/fees in the name of medical treatment which was nothing but income from commercial activity carried out under the name of medical relief and, accordingly, invoked section 2(15) for withdrawing exemption.
The Tribunal held in favour of the assessee. The Tribunal noted as under:
(1) Proviso to clause (vi) of section 80G(5) has been omitted by the Finance Act, 2009 with effect from 1-10-2009. This proviso imposing the limitation of five years was omitted by the Finance Act, 2009 with effect from 1-10-2009 to provide that the approval once granted shall continue to be valid in perpetuity.
(2) The impact and scope of the omission of proviso to clause (vi) of s.s (5) of section 80G has been explained by the Board in its Circular No. 5, dated 3-6-2010 clarifying that the existing approval expiring on or after 1-10-2009 will be deemed to have been extended in perpetuity unless specifically withdrawn.
(3) Therefore, in the instant case, the filing of an application for renewal of exemption after the expiry of the same on 31-3-2011 by the assessee was not required. Once the exemption granted stands extended in perpetuity by operation of law, merely moving an application by the assessee would not divest it of the assessee’s right to treat the exemption to have been extended in perpetuity, which right had accrued to the assessee in view of the aforesaid Circular and the amendment made in the Act.
(4) Proviso to section 2(15) inserted w.e.f. 1-4-2009, provides that the advancement of any other object of general public utility shall not be a charitable purpose if it involves carrying on of any activity in the nature of trade, commerce or business, or any activity of rendering any service in relation to any trade, commerce or business, for a cess or fee or any other consideration, irrespective of the nature of use or application or retention of the income from such activity.
(5) It is clear that this proviso is applicable in respect of charitable institutions engaged in the activity of advancement of any other object of general public utility i.e., the 4th limb of section 2(15). The first three limbs i.e., relief of the poor, education and medical relief are outside the purview of the aforesaid proviso inserted to section 2(15). It has been admitted by the Director of Income-tax (Exemption) himself that the assessee-society has been registered u/s.12A as charitable trust and is running dispensary and health centre, which makes it clear that the charitable purpose for which the assessee-society is established includes medical relief and it is not a case of advancement of any other object of general public utility. Therefore, applying the provisions of proviso to section 2(15) to the instant case by the Director of Income-tax (Exemption) is also totally misplaced and for that reason, the assessee cannot be said to be not eligible for exemption u/s.80G.
Section 54 — Exemption from capital gains tax provided the amount is invested in purchase or construction of a flat within the prescribed time period — Held that (1) booking of the flat with the builder is to be treated as construction of flat; (2) the extended period u/s.139(4) has to be considered for the purposes of utilisation of the capital gain amount.
Section 54 — Exemption from capital gains tax provided the amount is invested in purchase or construction of a flat within the prescribed time period — Held that (1) booking of the flat with the builder is to be treated as construction of flat; the extended period u/s.139(4) has to be considered for the purposes of utilisation of the capital gain amount.
- The assessee along with his wife was joint and equal owner of the property being a residential flat at Mumbai which had been purchased by them in April 2002 for a consideration of Rs.21 lac. The flat was sold by them on 7-3-2006 for a consideration of Rs.45 lac in which the share of the assessee was Rs.22 lac. The assessee computed the long term capital gain from sale of the flat after deducting the indexed cost of acquisition at Rs.9.98 lac. The assessee purchased another flat jointly along with his wife for a total consideration of Rs.35 lac. The assessee had made total payment of Rs.14.62 lac till 16-2-2009. The assessee, therefore, claimed that he was entitled to claim exemption u/s.54 of the Act as the capital gain had been invested in the new residential flat. The claim for exemption was denied by the AO because the assessee: Failed to deposit the balance amount in the account in any of the specified bank as required u/s.54 and utilise the same in accordance with the scheme framed by the Government; and
- Could not produce evidence regarding taking possession of the new flat. On appeal, the CIT(A) confirmed the disallowance made by the AO. Before the Tribunal, the Revenue strongly supported the orders of the authorities below.
Held:
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had booked the new flat with the builder and as per agreement, the assessee was to make payment in instalments and the builder was to hand over the possession of the flat after construction. Based on the clarification of the CBDT vide its Circular No. 472, dated 16-12-1993 read with Circular No. 471 dated, 15-10-1986 and the decision of the Mumbai Bench of the Tribunal in the case of ACIT v. Smt. Sunder Kaur Sujan Singh Gadh, (3 SOT 206), the Tribunal noted that the case of the assessee was to be considered as construction of new residential house and not purchase of a flat. Thus, the Tribunal held that in case the assessee had invested the capital gains in construction of a new residential house within a period of three years, this should be treated as sufficient compliance of the provisions of section 54. According to it, it was not necessary that the possession of the flat should also be taken within the period of three years. For the purpose, it relied on the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT v. Mrs. Hilla J. B. Wadia, (216 ITR 376). As regards the default pointed out by the authorities below regarding non-deposit of unutilised amount of capital gain in the Capital Gain Account Scheme, the Tribunal noted the submission of the assessee that it was only due to ignorance of law and intention of the assessee was always to utilise the amount for construction of flat and the assessee had kept the amount in the savings bank account which was utilised towards the construction of flat. According to the Tribunal, this was only a technical default and on this ground alone the claim of exemption cannot be denied, particularly when the amount had been actually utilised for the construction of residential house and not for any other purpose. The view was supported by the decision of the Jodhpur Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Jagan Nath Singh Lodha v. ITO, (85 TTJ 173). The Tribunal also agreed with the assessee’s contention that the due date of filing of return of income u/s.139(1) has to be construed with respect to the due date of section 139(4) as the s.s (4) provides for the extended period for filing return as an exception to the section 139(1) and considering this, there was no default as the entire amount of capital gain had been invested within the due date u/s.139(4). For the purpose, reliance was placed on the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Ms. Jagrity Aggarwal (339 ITR 610).
(1) Section 54F — Exemption of long-term capital gains where sales consideration is invested in purchase of a house — Whether purchase of house jointly with spouse is eligible — Held, Yes. (2) Section 94(7) — Purchase of units and sale thereof at loss after earning dividend — If date of tender of cheque for purchase of shares was considered as the date of purchase, then the sale was not within three months of purchase — Whether the provisions of section 94(7) attracted — Held, No.
Before Vijay Pal Rao (JM) and N. K. Billaiya (AM)
ITA No. 4285/Mum./2009
A.Y.: 2004-05. Decided on: 6-6-2012
Counsel for assessee/revenue: C. N. Vaze/ Rajan
Section 54F — Exemption of long-term capital gains where sales consideration is invested in purchase of a house — Whether purchase of house jointly with spouse is eligible — Held, Yes.
Section 94(7) — Purchase of units and sale thereof at loss after earning dividend — If date of tender of cheque for purchase of shares was considered as the date of purchase, then the sale was not within three months of purchase
— Whether the provisions of section 94(7) attracted — Held, No.
(1) The assessee had made long-term capital gain on sale of shares. The sales proceeds were invested in purchase of row house and exemption u/s.54F was claimed. One of the grounds on which the exemption was denied by the AO was that the house purchased by the assessee was in the joint name of his wife.
(2) The assessee had purchased units of mutual funds of Rs.3 crore on 26-12-2003. On the very same date, the assessee received a dividend of Rs.1.16 crore. On 29-3-2004, the assessee redeemed the units for Rs.1.7 crore and thereby booked a shortterm capital loss of Rs.1.3 crore. The AO found that the cheque of Rs.3 crore for the purchase of units was actually realised on 30-12-2003 and therefore, according to him, the period of holding before the redemption of the said units on 29-3-2004 was only 88 days i.e., less than 3 months. Therefore, according to him, the transaction was hit by the provisions of section 94(7) of the Act. The AO was also of the view that the entire transaction of sale and purchase of mutual fund units was nothing but a colourable device for setting off of the capital gains arising on sale of shares. Accordingly, the set off of short term capital loss claimed by the assessee was denied. On appeal the CIT(A) confirmed the denial of exemption u/s.54F. While on the issue regarding applicability of section 94(7) he noted that the provisions of section 94(7) lays down three cumulative conditions, the non-fulfilment of any one of the conditions would result into non applicability of section 94(7). Thus, if the date of the purchase as claimed by the AO was 30-12-2003, then it cannot be said that the units were purchased within three months prior to the record date because the record date was 26-12-2003 when the dividend was declared. Thus, one of the conditions essential for application of section 94(7) is not fulfilled. Secondly, the CIT(A) noted that the mutual fund had accepted 26-12-2003 as the date on which the units were allotted to the assessee. Based on the said date, the second conditions viz. that the units are sold within a period of three months was also not fulfilled. Accordingly, it was held that the provisions of section 94(7) were not applicable. As regards the point raised by the AO that the entire transaction was a colourable device, the CIT(A) relying on the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT v. Walfort Share & Stock Brokers Pvt. Ltd., Appeal No. 18 of 2006 held that as the conditions of section 94(7) have not been fulfilled, no disallowance was permissible.
Held:
(1) The Tribunal noted that the total consideration for the house had been met by the assessee. According to it the assessee had added the name of his wife only for the sake of convenience. It also drew support from the provisions of section 45 of the Transfer of Property Act which provides that the share in the property will depend on the amount contributed towards the purchase consideration. Further, relying on the decisions listed below, the Tribunal held that since the total consideration for the house had been paid by the assessee, the exemption cannot be denied on this ground.
- The decisions relied on are as under: ITO v. Arvind T. Thakkar in ITA No. 7338/Mum./2005 vide order dated 29-4-2011;
- Ravinder Kumar Arora v. ACIT in ITA No. 4998/ Del./2010 vide order dated 11-3-2011; and
- DIT v. Mrs. Jennifer Bhide, (2011) 15 Taxmann 82 (Kar.). (2) As regards section 94(7) The Tribunal noted that the whole issue revolved around the date of purchase of units. The Tribunal agreed with the findings of the CIT(A) and the appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed.
(2012) 49 SOT 312 (Delhi) Dhoomketu Builders & Developers (P.) Ltd. v. Addl. CIT A.Y.: 2006-07. Dated: 30-11-2011
For the relevant assessment year, the assessee, which was a 100% subsidiary of DLF Ltd., filed its return of income declaring a loss. The assessee company borrowed Rs.186 crore from DLF Ltd. and the paid the same amount as earnest money deposit for a tender for sale of land. This deposit was received back along with interest of Rs.0.62 crore and the assessee, in turn, returned the amount to DLF Ltd. and paid interest of Rs.1.79 crore, resulting in a net loss of Rs.1.17 crore. The Assessing Officer disallowed the loss on the ground that the assessee had not commenced any business activity and, therefore, it was not entitled for interest expenses as claimed by it. Similarly, the interest income received by the assessee deserved to be assessed as an ‘income from other sources’ and not as a business income.
The CIT(A) allowed the adjustment of interest received against the interest paid and determined the net loss of Rs.1.17 crore under ‘Income from Other Sources’, but did not allow carry forward of this loss.
The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim. The Tribunal noted as under:
(1) Participation in the tender was starting of one activity which enabled the assessee to acquire the land for development. The actual development of the land is immaterial for construing that business of the assessee has been set up.
(2) The investment of Rs.186 crore was not as a deposit out of surplus funds; rather it was earnest money paid by the assessee for the purchase of land. Thus, the assessee had demonstrated that its business was set up during the accounting period relevant for this assessment year.
(3) Therefore, income of the assessee had to be assessed under the head ‘business income’ and consequently loss computed by the first appellate authority at Rs.1.17 crore deserved to be permitted for carry forward.
(2012) TIOL 64 ITAT-Bang. Shakuntala Devi v. DCIT A.Y.: 2007-08. Dated: 20-12-2011
Facts:
The assessee, a non-resident Indian, owned eight properties in India. During the relevant previous year, four properties were let out, whose annual value was offered for taxation under the head ‘Income from House Property’. Annual value of one property was claimed to be ‘nil’ on the ground that it be regarded as self-occupied property. For the other 3 properties in Mumbai annual value was regarded as ‘nil’ under the provisions of section 23(1)(c) of the Act. Before the AO it was submitted that of these 3 properties — one was old and was not in a habitable condition. The second property was let out in the earlier year and also in the subsequent year. It was contended that despite the best efforts, the assessee could not find a tenant for this property. As for third property it was purchased during the year and was let out in subsequent year. The AO held that since the assessee had not shown any proof regarding the efforts made to let out these three properties, it was quite inconvincible that there can be any hardship faced in letting out since these properties were located in prime localities like Bandra and Andheri (East) in Mumbai. He considered 70% of the rent received in subsequent year for each of the two properties to be their annual value. Accordingly, he added Rs.6,95,555 to the total income of the assessee.
Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who held that the annual value of these properties needs to be computed u/s.23(1)(a) of the Act.
Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.
Held:
The Tribunal noted that the Lucknow ‘B’ Bench has, in the case of Smt. Indu Chandra v. DCIT, (ITA No. 96 (Lkw)/2011, dated 29-4-2011, for A.Y. 2004- 05), following the decision of the Mumbai Bench in the case of Premsudha Exports (P) Ltd. v. ACIT, [110 ITD 158 (Mum.)] decided the issue in favour of the assessee. The Tribunal also noted that the facts involved in the present case are similar to the facts before the Lucknow Bench in the case of Smt. Indu Chandra. Accordingly, following the decision of the Lucknow Bench, the Tribunal deleted the addition made by the AO and sustained by the CIT(A).
The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.
Sections 40(a)(ia), 194H — Commission retained by credit card companies out of amounts paid to merchant establishment is not liable for deduction of tax at source u/s.194H.
ITAT ‘B’ Bench, Hyderabad
Before D. Karunakararao (AM) and Saktijit Dey (JM)
ITA No. 905/Hyd./2011
A.Y.: 2007-08. Decided on: 10-4-2012
Counsel for revenue/assessee: Dr. B. V. Prasad Reddy/None
Sections 40(a)(ia), 194H — Commission retained by credit card companies out of amounts paid to merchant establishment is not liable for deduction of tax at source u/s.194H.
The assessee-company, engaged in business of direct retail trading in consumer goods, had claimed a deduction of Rs.16,34,000 on account of commission paid to credit card companies, which amount was disallowed by the AO u/s.40(a)(ia) on the ground that assessee failed to deduct tax at source u/s.194H of the Act. Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) where it contended that the assesee only receives payment from bank/credit card companeis after deduction of commission thereon, and thus, this is only in the nature of a post facto accounting and does not involve any payment or credit to the account of the banks or any other account before making such payment by the assessee. The CIT(A) accepted the claim of the assessee for deduction of Rs.16,34,000 and observed as follows: “9.8 On going through the nature of transactions, I find considerable merit in the contention of the appellant that commission paid to the credit card companies cannot be considered as falling within the purview of section 194H. Even though the definition of the term ‘commission or brokerage’ used in the said section is an inclusive definition, it is clear that the liability to make TDS under the said section arises only when a person acts on behalf of another person. In the case of commission retained by the credit card companies however, it cannot be said that the bank acts on behalf of the merchant establishment or that even the merchant establishment conducts the transaction for the bank. The sale made on the basis of a credit card is clearly a transaction of the merchants establishment only and the credit card company only facilitates the electronic payment, for a certain charge. The commission retained by the credit card company is therefore in the nature of normal bank charges and not in the nature of commission/brokerage for acting on behalf of the merchant establishment. Accordingly, concluding that there was no requirement for making TDS on the ‘Commission retained by the credit card companies, the disallowance of Rs.16,34,000 is deleted . . . . .” Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.
Held:
The Tribunal found no infirmity in the reasoning given by the CIT(A). It upheld the order passed by the CIT(A). The Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue.
(2012) TIOL 63 ITAT-Mum. Savita N. Mandhana v. ACIT A.Y.: 2006-07. Dated: 7-10-2011
Facts:
The assessee along with other shareholders of Mandhana Boremann Industries Pvt. Ltd., who were all family members of the assessee, transferred their shares to Paxar BV, a Dutch Company. The shares were acquired by Paxar BV for a consideration of Rs.570 per shares which worked out to Rs.45.60 crore for the shares held by Mandhana family. All the shareholders in Mandhana family entered into an agreement with Paxar BV for the purpose of this transfer of shares, and one of the clauses in the agreement also provided that the transferor shall not carry on, or be interested in, any business which competes with the business of Mandhana Boremann. The AO held that a part of the sale consideration of Rs.570 is attributable to the non-compete covenant and is liable to be taxed in the hands of the assessee u/s.28(va). The AO computed the value of shares, by break-up method, at Rs.365. Accordingly, the balance amount of Rs.205 per share was treated as towards non-compete fee and brought to tax u/s.28(va) in the hands of the assessee.
Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who upheld the action of the AO in principle, but held that only Rs.41 per share can be attributed to non-compete fees. He also held that the decision of a Co-ordinate Bench in the case of Homi Aspi Balsara v. ACIT, (2009 TIOL 789 ITAT-Mum.) does not help the assessee as there is specific mention of non-compete obligations in the share sale agreement, and therefore, part of the sale consideration of shares is attributable to the non-compete obligations.
Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal and contended that no part of consideration can be attributed to non-compete fees.
Held:
The Tribunal noted that the even in the case of Homi Aspi Balsara there was a specific non-compete obligation and yet the Co-ordinate Bench had taken a view that no part of sale consideration of shares could be attributed to be taxed in the hands of the assessee as business income u/s.28(va).
Following the ratio of the decision of the Mumbai Tribunal in Homi Balsara the amounts held to be attributable to non-compete obligations are taxable as capital gains and not as business income. To this extent it reversed the order of the CIT(A). It observed that since the entire consideration was already offered for taxation as capital gains, the bifurcation between consideration attributable to sale of shares and for non-compete obligations is rendered academic and infructuous. It also noted that since it was uncontroverted position that the assessee was not actively engaged in the business it was not necessary to examine the matter any further. The Tribunal upheld the stand of the assessee in treating the entire consideration received on sale of shares as taxable under the head ‘capital gains’.
Section 14A — Disallowance u/s.14A applies to partner’s share of profits in a firm — ‘Depreciation’ is not an expenditure but an allowance, hence the same cannot be disallowed u/s.14A.
ITAT Special Bench, Ahmedabad
Before G. E. Veerabhadrappa (President),
G. C. Gupta (VP) and K. G. Bhansal (AM)
ITA No. 3002/Ahd./2009
A.Y.: 2006-07. Decided on: 25-5-2012
Counsel for assessee/revenue: Sunil H. Talati/S. K. Gupta with Kartarsingh
Section 14A — Disallowance u/s.14A applies to partner’s share of profits in a firm — ‘Depreciation’ is not an expenditure but an allowance, hence the same cannot be disallowed u/s.14A.
The assessee, a partner in the firm, derived income by way of remuneration and interest from the firm in addition to the share of profits in the firm which was exempt u/s.10(2A). Apart from the income from the firm, the assessee also had income under the head house property, capital gains, interest income and dividend income. The assessee had suo motu disallowed 1/10th of depreciation allowance of motor car. The Assessing Officer (AO) disallowed expenditure u/s.14A. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who held that since the share of profits from the firm is exempt u/s.10(2A), expenditure was required to be disallowed u/s.14A. Since the assessee derived 76% of professional income as share from firm and balance 24% by way of remuneration and interest income, the CIT(A) allocated the expenses to income not includible in total income u/s.10(2A). Thus, business income by way of remuneration and interest from firm was taxed in the hands of the assessee u/s.28(v) after allowing 24% of the expenditure. 76% of the expenditure was disallowed. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.
Held:
A firm is not a separate entity under the general law, whereas under the Income-tax Act, it is a separate entity distinct from its partners. Remuneration and interest on capital of partners is allowed as a deduction to the firm and the same are taxable in the hands of the partners u/s.28(v), whereas the profits of the firm, after deducting remuneration to partners and interest on capital of partners, are taxed in the hands of the firm. The partners do not pay tax on the share of profits from the firm since the same are exempt u/s.10(2A). Section 10(2A) provides that the share of partner shall not be included in his total income, hence it is not possible to hold that share of profit is not excluded from the total income of the partner because the firm has already been taxed thereon. Since share of profits are excluded from the total income of the partner, section 14A would apply and any expenditure incurred to earn the share of profits needs to be disallowed. In the case of Hoshang D. Nanavati v. ACIT, (ITA No. 3567/Mum./2007 for A.Y. 2003-04, order dated 18-3- 2011), while considering the question as to whether depreciation is an expenditure or not, it has been held that section 14A deals only with the expenditure and not any statutory allowance admissible to the assessee. A statutory allowance u/s.32 is not an expenditure. Being in agreement with the decision of the DB in the case of Hoshang Nanavati (supra), the SB held that depreciation cannot be disallowed u/s.14A.
(2012) TIOL 65 ITAT-Mum. Tanna Agro Impex Pvt. Ltd. v. Addl. CIT A.Y.: 2007-08. Dated: 29-7-2011
Facts:
The assessee was engaged in export, import and wholesale trade of agro products. Since the assessee had not deducted tax at source from payments of Rs. 4,61,769 made towards brokerage on commodities hedging transactions, the AO disallowed the same u/s.40(a)(ia).
Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who confirmed the order of the AO.
Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.
Held:
The Tribunal noted that the payment towards commission or brokerage in respect of transactions in ‘securities’ is not covered by the scope of tax deduction at source requirements and as per Explanation (iii) to section 194H the meaning assigned to the expression ‘securities’ is the same as assigned to it in clause (h) of section 2 of Securities Contracts (Regulations) Act, 1956 which covers transactions of derivatives. It held that hedging transactions of commodities, if in the nature of derivatives transactions, will be outside the ambit of transactions on which TDS requirements come into play. Since this aspect of the matter was not clear from the material on record, the Tribunal remitted the matter to the file of the AO for fresh adjudication in the light of the abovementioned observations. The Tribunal also clarified that except in the abovementioned situation, commission paid on transactions of sales and purchases of commodities through commodities exchange are clearly covered by the scope of section 194H.
(2011) 130 ITD 137/9, Chennai Bench D ACIT v. Harshad Doshi A.Y.: 2006-07. Dated: 23-4-2011
Facts:
The assessee was managing director in DHL Ltd. The company was engaged in the business of development of property. The company advanced funds to purchase plot of lands in the name of the assessee on understanding that land is to be given to DHL for development. The AO on scrutiny of books of DHL Ltd., discovered that there is advance of Rs.3.59 crore and rental advance of Rs.19.89 lakh issued to the assessee. The AO applied provisions of deemed dividend u/s.2(22)(e) on these advances. In order to support its contention the AO also relied on the capital gain shown by the assessee in his books.
Appeal was filed by the assessee to the CIT(A). The assessee contended that advance of Rs.3.59 crore was taken to acquire land which was to be developed by DHL. The main intention behind bifurcating ownership of land and development rights was to reduce the cost of stamp duty so that they remain competitive in this fierce market. The CIT(A) deleted the above addition except sum of Rs.39.62 lakh accepting the fact that transaction was motivated by business consideration and commercial expediency.
The CIT(A) also deleted the addition of lease advance of Rs.19.89 lakh accepting holding it to be advance given for lease of building to be used as office by DHL Ltd.
Aggrieved by the order of the CIT(A), the AO filed appeal before the ITAT.
Held:
Trade advance and monies given for business expediency could not be taxed as dividend. In order to bring any advance within the four corners of section 2(22)(e), advance should carry an obligation of repayment.
Advance given by the company to managing director to purchase the land in its name and then transfer the development rights to the company was a business arrangement made with a view to avoid payment of stamp duty twice, first on land and then on proposed construction of flats.
The assessee was well within the law to adopt such practice which would reduce the cost incidence to the ultimate customer. The AO’s contention that bifurcation was done with an intention to circumvent provisions of the Tamil Nadu Stamp Act could not be accepted being for an unlawful purpose.
Also, the project executed by DHL Ltd. does not appear in the capital gain computation of lands as disclosed by the assessee. So there was no direct nexus as alleged by the AO.
Catching Inside Traders – A Slippery Job Insider Trading Blatant in India, but Law is Hit or Miss
One continues to be surprised by how blatantly insiders carry out insider trading, though the law prohibiting it is in place for more than 20 years now. This is particularly so in case of some Independent Directors who think that inside information is a perk of the office! On the other hand, it is equally strange that even after the experience of 20 years, the law framed by SEBI is so clumsy that, often, only by a little stretched interpretation of law it can catch and punish such offenders. A recent decision of the Securities Appellate Tribunal (“SAT”) is interesting in this context. This is in the case V. K. Kaul vs. SEBI (Appeal No. 55 of 2012 dated 8th October, 2012).
Relevant Law
Insider trading is often wrongly perceived in India. The general impression of insider trading is that it is profiting unfairly from unpublished inside information by insiders of that company. To that extent, it is surely true. For example, the CFO of a listed company may know in advance that the Company is going to declare far larger profits that would result in the market price to soar. He may thus buy shares before this information is made public officially and then sell shares at a higher price after the information is made public. This is the commonly understood concept of insider trading.
However, the actual legal concept of insider trading is much wider, particularly as a result of amendments over the years. Firstly, the inside information may not be merely about the company in relation to which a person may be an insider. It can be even about another company with which the first company may be dealing in. For example, Company X may be in the process of giving a huge contract to Company Y whereby the share price of Company Y may get a boost. This is also an inside information that the insiders of Company X are prohibited by law to deal in.
Secondly, a person who even receives or has access to unpublished inside information, is deemed to be an insider and hence his deals may amount to inside trading, though he may not be connected with the Company the way directors, officers, auditors, etc. are connected. This is an unduly wide and badly drafted provision though.
In context of the present case, the facts were Company X, through one of its controlled companies, sought to acquire substantial shares, of Company Y. This information was admittedly price sensitive in the sense that if known to the market, would have resulted in increase in the price of the shares of Company Y. The issue was, can persons connected with Company X (such as a non-executive director) deal in the shares of Company Y on the basis of such information?
Facts of the Case
In the present case, the facts (as reported in the decision cited above) were as follows. Ranbaxy Laboratories Limited (“Ranbaxy”) was a company in which one Mr. V was a non-executive director. Ranbaxy had two wholly owned subsidiaries which, in turn, jointly and wholly owned another company, Solrex Pharmaceuticals Limited (“Solrex”). Ranbaxy decided to acquire the shares of Orchid Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (“Orchid”), a listed company. The quantity of shares proposed to be acquired were substantial enough for it to be taken as accepted that such proposed acquisition was a price-sensitive information, which if made known to the markets would result in an increase of the price of the shares of Orchid. Solrex did not have funds to make this acquisition and the funds would have come from Ranbaxy.
The Board of the two subsidiaries held a meeting on 20th March 2008, to open a demat account for the purposes of such acquisition of shares on behalf of Solrex. Ranbaxy held a Board Meeting on 28th March 2008 to approve use of funds for such acquisition of a sum upto Rs. 800 crore (though actual acquisition was of Rs. 151 crore).
V transferred funds to his wife’s bank account and 35000 shares of Orchid were acquired by her at an average price of Rs. 131.71 on 27th and 28th of March 2008. These shares were sold on 10th April 2008 at an average price of Rs. 219.94. Solrex had made its acquisition of shares of Orchid from 31st March 2008 onwards. The proceeds of sale of such shares were transferred to the account of V from his wife’s account. The broker through whom such transactions were carried out was the same broker through which Solrex bought the shares of Orchid.
It was found that V was in constant touch with decision makers in respect of such purchases by Solrex.
The question was whether V and his wife were guilty of insider trading. SEBI held on the facts that they were guilty and, accordingly, levied a penalty of, in the aggregate, Rs. 60 lakh.
V and his wife appealed against this decision before the SAT.
Decision by SAT
The main contention raised before SAT was that, insider trading can only be in respect of a company in relation to which a person is an insider. In essence, the contention was that V could have been an insider only in respect of inside information in relation to Ranbaxy. The information of proposed purchase of shares of Orchid was not price sensitive information as far as Ranbaxy was concerned. As far as Orchid was concerned, V was not an insider. Further, even if the information was price sensitive as far as share prices of Orchid was concerned, legally speaking, so the appellant argued, it was not covered by the definition of unpublished price sensitive information. The appellant contended that the framework of law was such that the unpublished price sensitive information could only be in relation to the acquirer company and not the company whose shares were being acquired. Such latter company, it was argued, may not even be aware of such proposed acquisition.
The SAT did not accept this contention. However, it is interesting to see how weak the provisions of law are on the basis of which the appellants, perhaps because of special facts, were confirmed to be guilty.
The provisions of law relating to insider trading are scattered and even undefined to some extent. On the other hand, they are so broadly framed that even unintended cases may be covered.
Section 12A of the SEBI Act prohibits insider trading. It also prohibits dealing in shares on the basis of “material or non-public information”, etc. In addition but without directly linking to these express provisions, there are the SEBI (Prohibition of Insider Trading) Regulations 1992, which provide a very detailed set of provisions in relation to prohibition of insider trading.
The appellants had submitted that they could be held to be guilty of insider trading, only if they dealt in the shares of the company with respect of which they were insiders. The SAT pointed out that this was not the law. They can be insiders with respect to the company with which they were connected. However, the inside information and also the ban on trading of shares was in respect of any company. In the present context, though the appellant was a director of Ranbaxy and thus a connected person/ insider with respect to it, the inside information may be in respect to any other company also. Thus, the SAT held that the prohibition on dealing in shares on the basis of inside information was in respect of the shares of another company too.
The SAT thus held that since the appellants, who were insiders with respect to Ranbaxy, dealt in the shares of Orchid on the basis of unpublished price sensitive information in respect to shares of Orchid, they were guilty of insider trading.
Thus, the SAT confirmed the penalty of Rs. 60 lakh.
Problems in law
While the decision of SAT cannot be faulted either in law or in facts, the loose and vague framework of law as well as its extreme wide nature comes to light.
The scheme of law generally was indeed what the appellants argued and that it is framed in respect of insider trading with respect of the shares of the company with whom a person is an insider. However, by partial amendment of the law later, it has been provided that an insider with one company can still be prevented from dealing in shares of another company.
Thus, a person who is not an insider with respect to a company may still be held to be guilty of insider trading of the company. However, the narrow wording of the provisions itself, has the seeds of its own failure. For example, a person would still need to be insider with respect to another company. On one hand, this is too narrow a definition and on the other hand, this connection obviously does not always make sense.
At the same time, the dual and unconnected provisions – one in the Act and one in the Regulations – make the provisions too broad. The Act does not define many things including what is insider trading.
Perhaps, in this case, the findings of facts as stated in the decision were so glaring that they may have made it difficult for the parties to pursue a purely technical stand. V was a non-executive director. The purchases by him of shares were quite near the dates when the important decisions in relation to purchase of shares were taken. The price rose substantially by more than 60% in barely a couple of weeks. V/his wife purchased and sold the same number of shares and through the same broker.
However, it may happen in other cases that the facts may not be so glaring. It is possible that owing to such provisions of law that are porous on one hand and over-broad on the other, may not always have the desired effect and consequences that were intended of it.
The obvious reason for this is that the amendments have been made piecemeal, sometimes in the Regulations and sometimes in the Act. An rehaul of the provisions is desirable. At the same time, a far higher consciousness and law abiding approach is also required. As an ending point, it is also worth pointing out that the SAT referred to and, to an extent, relied on the observations in the most recent US decision in Rajratnam’s case in relation to insider trading.
Insertion of Rule 4BBB to Companies (Central Government’s) General Rules and Forms.
(a) Section 17 — Special resolution and confirmation by Central Govt. required for Alteration of Memorandum for change of Registered Office from one state to another and alteration of objects clause.
b) Section 141 — For Rectification by Central Government of Register of Charges.
(c) Section 188 — Circulation of Members Resolutions. A new Form 24AAA for filing petitions to the Central Government/Regional Director under these sections is prescribed. The rules come into effect from 12th August 2012.
Filing of Cost Audit Report (Form I) and Compliance Report (Form A) in the XBRL mode.
Extension of time in filing Annual Return by Limited Liability Partnerships.
Filing of Balance Sheet and Profit and Loss Account in Extensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) — Mode for financial year commencing on or after 1-4-2011.
It has now been decided by the Ministry to mandate the following select class of companies to file their Balance Sheet and Profit & Loss Account in XBRL mode for the financial year commencing on or after 1-4-2011:
(i) all companies listed with any stock ex-change(s) in India and their Indian subsidiaries; or
(ii) all companies having paid-up capital of Rupees five crore and above; or
(iii) all companies having turnover of Rupees one hundred crore and above; or
(iv) all companies who were required to file their financial statements for F.Y. 2010-11, using XBRL mode.
However, banking companies, insurance companies, power companies and Non-Banking Financial Companies (NBFCs) are exempted from XBRL filing till further orders.
The applicable taxonomy as per Schedule VI of the Companies Act, 1956 has already been placed on the Ministry’s website www.mca.gov.in. The Business Rules, validation tools, etc. required for preparing the financial statements in XBRL format, as per the revised Schedule-VI and Accounting Standards, are under preparation and would soon be made available by the Ministry. The actual date for enabling XBRL filing will be intimated separately.
All companies referred to above, will be allowed to file their financial statements in XBRL mode without any additional fee/penalty up to 15th November, 2012 or within 30 days from the date of their AGM, whichever is later.
SEBI’s amended Consent Order Guidelines-2 — the Determination of Settlement Amount
The formula, parameters, etc. are quite complex, but since now these would be the very basis of the settlement process, an introduction to the process is worth considering.
The quantification process, formula, parameters, etc. are aimed at making the settlement and perhaps even the penal process rational rather than subjective and discretionary. An attempt has been made by SEBI to find out what are the losses that the investors/public/markets face, what are the gains made by the parties, etc. and then relate the settlement amount to such amounts rather than an arbitrary figure arrived on a caseto- case basis. However, the qualitative aspect has also been considered by providing for a varying base settlement amount depending upon who is the person accused. For example, promoters of a company face a higher base penalty as compared to others and so do asset management companies, etc. Thus, on the one hand, the losses/ gains are taken into account duly quantified, and on the other hand higher punishment is ensured on those who should know the law better.
Under the earlier Guidelines, there was no basis for an applicant to even arrive at a preliminary amount, much less know at what amount the final settlement could take place. Other orders of similar facts often showed a wide variance in the settlement amount and the rationale for such different settlement terms were not known. To worsen this, SEBI often took a stand that other consent orders were not relevant and are not to be taken as a benchmark which an applicant could use. However, now, SEBI has provided a fairly detailed and complex method of determining the indicative settlement amount. Unless the facts are special or serious, it would appear that the settlement would be at or nearabout this amount arrived as per the prescribed formula.
However, as stated, the formula and parameters are fairly complex to determine. There are other concerns too, but first, a broad description of how the settlement amount is arrived is made. Thereafter, a specific type of violation is taken and the formula and parameters applied.
The basic objective is to determine the Indicative Amount. This is the basic amount that is arrived at without negotiation and purely as a result of applying quantitative parameters to the particular set of violations.
Included in Indicative Amount are the legal costs that appear to be on actuals and hence do not require further consideration here.
Indicative amount is arrived at by taking into account various parameters, weights, etc. There is a Proceeding Conversion Factor (PCF) and the Regulatory Action Factor (PCF) and there is a Benchmark Amount. The Benchmark Amount is an absolute rupee amount that is worked out by applying certain factors depending upon the nature of the violation. The PCF and RAF are then applied to this Benchmark Amount as qualitative weights to increase or decrease it.
Thus, for example the PCF applies weights ranging from 0.75 to 1.20 depending upon when the initiative is taken for coming forward to settle the proceedings. Thus, if a party comes forward for settlement even earlier to the issuance of the showcause notice, then, the settlement amount would be just 0.75 times the Benchmark Amount. However, if he delays the matter to passing of the order by the SAT or the Court, then the settlement amount actually increases by 20% by it being multiplied by a factor of 1.20.
To the above factor, PCF, the Regulatory Action Factor is added. The objective is to further give due weight to earlier adverse actions taken by SEBI against the party in the past. For each such action, a certain weight, depending upon the nature of adverse direction given, is added. For example, if a warning was given, then 0.015 is added. In certain cases of suspension order, the factor can be as high as 0.3.
Next comes the ‘Benchmark Amount’. This can be viewed as the basic settlement amount. This amount varies depending upon the nature of violations alleged. It would be different for, say, non-disclosure of certain information or non-filing of information, for price manipulation, etc.
For price manipulation, it is arrived at by taking into account several factors involved in each case, such as volumes traded, price change during the relevant period, adding a time value for money for the illegal gains, the profits made/losses avoided and even a reputation risk.
For non-disclosure of information as for example under the Takeover Regulations, the Benchmark Amount is calculated as the product of a Base Value and a Base Amount. The Base Value is a weight that takes into account qualitative factors such as multiplicity of violations, size of company, etc. The ‘Base Amount’ is calculated as the higher of a certain fixed amount depending on factors such as percentage of holding not disclosed and period of delay.
Similarly, for other types of violations, certain factors are laid down to help calculate the Benchmark Amount.
There is a fair concern that even now, substantial discretion still remains and is possibly even further entrenched. However, considering that very specific parameters have been laid down, SEBI may need to apply its mind why it accepted a higher or lower settlement amount in a particular case.
Interestingly, now, a host of non-monetary adverse directions can be made part of the settlement including voluntary debarment, sale of shares, dis-gorgement, voluntary surrender of certificate of registration. Thus, the settlement need not be purely on monetary terms, but non-monetary terms may also be added to the settlement amount.
An interesting thing to watch for as the new settlement scheme is applied in various cases is – will SEBI levy penalty that is higher than the amount as per formula under the Consent Guidelines? There are two ways to view this issue. One way is that SEBI should levy higher penalty than the minimum amount as per the Consent formula. The party who makes SEBI go through the whole adjudication process makes it incur additional costs and efforts. Further, in such a case, the charges were proved by SEBI while in case of consent, there is no proof or admission of proof of the violation. The other way to look at it is that the minimum settlement amount as per Consent formula takes into account the fact that the party goes free from stigma. There should be a cost to this. Further, while SEBI saves time, the party also saves time and efforts.
However, there is also a case for delinking the two processes. Settlement is under a different principle and, further, it takes into account only the allegations. However, the adjudication process should not be burdened with this formula. It should examine the exact nature of the facts and circumstances that are found to be proved and the other surrounding circumstances including those statutorily prescribed (such as repetitive nature of violation, gains made, losses caused to public, etc.) and then levy appropriate penalty. If, for example, the violation is proved to be serious and intentional, a high penalty may be levied. If, however, it is technical without any gains to the person or losses to the public, and there are mitigating circumstances, then the penalty may be lower or none.
In the end, the issue that arises is, should a person opt for settlement or not? While obviously the answer will vary from case to case, some general thoughts can be shared. Some parties may not want any stigma of contravention of law on the record and for them, settlement is the only choice except of course where the violation is not permitted under the Guidelines to be settled or where they are fairly confident that they will eventually win, even if appeal is required. For some others, if the violation is technical in nature, it can be explained to concerned parties such as shareholders, etc. and thus they may not opt for settlement if it entails a higher penalty. For most people, it would have to be a careful evaluation of the settlement amount that can be worked out from the formula and the facts of the case. It would also be a matter of principle for parties to clear its name when the allegation is misconceived.
PART C: Information on Around
- Nexus between officers of BMC and professional complainants:
The alleged “criminal conduit” between executive engineer Ajit Karnik and local RTI activist Mukesh Kanakia was exposed by Municipal Commissioner, R.A. Rajeev after Ajit Karnik reportedly asked a Naupada-based doctor to pay Rs. 2.75 lakh to Kanakia to get him to withdraw his complaint about a nursing home being set up in a residential flat.
“It is a case of collusion. As an executive engineer, Karnik is tasked with the key role of scrutinising building plans, verifying legal papers and recommending sanctions for construction projects. He chose to act as a go-between for Kanakia and the doctor for which he would get his share of money,” Rajeev said.
The episode, however, has opened a Pandora’s Box of the goings-on in the town planning department which has been accused of being the hotbed of corruption in the Thane corporation. Mr. Rajeev suspended Mr. Karnik.
- Information: Now More Powerful Than Money?
The Right To Information can help people get an answer from an unresponsive bureaucracy, but what if it could do more than that? Could it clean up the system? A study by two Yale political scientists show that this might just be true.
Leonid V. Peisakhin and Paul Pinto, two PhD candidates at Yale University’s department of political science, conducted a field experiment in a Delhi slum among residents who were trying to apply for a ration card. Peisakhin and Pinto found that putting in an application for ration card and then filing an RTI request checking on its status, was almost as effective as paying a bribe. Most significantly, when poor people filed an RTI request, it erased the class disadvantage they otherwise faced, and their applications were cleared as fast as those of middle class.
- Gift to Foreign Guests:
The Government has spent Rs. 43.31 lakh on the Myanmar delegation that traveled to Delhi, Gurgaon and Mumbai.
The Speaker of the lower house of the Myanmar Parliament, Thura Shwe, was gifted a wooden elephant and all others with him took back dancing peacock statuettes worth Rs. 7,550; the total spend on the gifts to them was Rs. 1.11 lakh.
Similarly, Rs. 36.36 Lakh was spent during a goodwill visit of a German Delegation that journeyed to Delhi, Amritsar, Jodhpur and Mumbai. When a delegation from Cuba visited Delhi and Agra, the government spent Rs. 4.61 lakh on hosting them. “These were the years when the government had declared its austerity drive. But the RTI response reveals that millions of rupees were spent on putting up foreign dignitaries. All of them were flown to various parts of India and put up in five-star hotels,” said Agrawal. “One fails to understand why those who accompaning dignitaries cannot be put up in government guesthouses.”
- Foreign trip of Sonia Gandhi:
- The government spent Rs. 15.5 lakh on UPA chairperson Sonia Gandhi’s visit abroad between 2006 and 2011, according to data accessed through RTI.
In addition, Rs. 64.76 lakh was spent by Indian missions across the world on the SPG which travelled with Sonia.
Sonia is Z-plus security protectee with a high level of threat perception.
- According to replies given by Indian mission to Hisar based RTI applicant Ramesh Verma, Sonia travelled to South Africa, China, Germany and Belgium, expenses for which were paid for by the government.
PART D: Read , understand & take some action please
We have to sham this attitude of ‘Sab Chalta Hai’ and the attitude that nothing can move without Corruption.
— Kanwaljeet Arora, CBI judge
We need to keep up the fight against corruption which stifles innovation and is one of the biggest barriers to job creation and economic growth around the world.
— US President, Barack Obama
Please respond and let us do something to contain cancerous corruption which prevents happiness to be reality for large number of citizens.
RTI Clinic in August 2012: 2nd, 3rd and 4th Saturdays, i.e., 11th, 18th, and 25th, 11.00 a.m. to 13.00 p.m. at BCAS premises.
PART A: High Court Decision
Information in relation to the donations made by the President from time to time was not disclosed by the President’s Secretariat by invoking section 8(1)(j) of the Act i.e. by treating the information as personal information, the disclosure of which was stated to be not in the public interest. CIC rejected the said defence of the petitioner and directed the disclosure of the information.
The submission of learned ASG Sh. A. S. Chandhiok firstly, was that the CIC has equated donations made by the President with subsidy, which is not the case. It was also submitted that the learned CIC has not dealt with the petitioner’s submissions founded upon section 8(1)(j) of the Act. It was also argued that the right to privacy of third parties would be breached, in case such disclosure is made. In any event, the right of third parties/recipients of the donation, to oppose disclosure by resorting to section 11 has not been dealt with. It was argued that the matter requires reconsideration, and the petition should be admitted for further hearing by the court.
A perusal of the impugned order, showed that the donations made by the President are out of public funds. Public funds are those funds which are collected by the State from the citizens by imposition of taxes, duties, cess, services charges, etc. These funds are held by the State in trust, for being utilised for the benefit of the general public.
The reliance was placed by the petitioner on the earlier decision of the CIC dated 18-12-2009, pertaining to the disclosure of information under the Act in relation to the Prime Minister’s Relief Fund. Commission had held that it has no relevance to the facts of the present case, assuming for the sake of argument that the said decision of the CIC takes the correct view. The Delhi High Court noted that it was concerned with the disclosure vis-à-vis the Prime Minister’s Relief Fund, and hence the said issue was not dealt in the present writ petition. The Court further noted: “In any event, unlike in the case of the Prime Minister’s Relief Fund, in the present case, the donations have been made by the Hon’ble President of India from the tax payers’ money. Every citizen is entitled to know how the money, which is collected by the State from him by exaction has been utilised. Merely because the person making the donations happens to be the President of India, is no ground to withhold the said information. The Hon’ble President of India is not immune from the application of the Act. What is important is, that it is a public fund which is being donated by the President, and not his/her private fund placed at his/her disposal for being distributed/donated amongst the needy and deserving persons.”
The learned ASG had submitted that the disclosure of information with regard to the donations made by the President would impinge on the privacy of the persons receiving the donations, as their financial distress, other circumstances, and need would become public. The Court responded:
“I do not find any merit in the aforesaid submission of the learned ASG. Firstly, I may note that the learned CIC has directed disclosure of some basic information, such as the names of the recipients of the donations, their addresses and the amount of donation made in each case. Further details i.e. the facts of each case, and justification for making donation, have not been directed to be provided. Even if further details are sought by a querist in relation to any specific instance of donation made by the President, the same would have to be dealt with in terms of the Act. There could be instances where the entire details may not be disclosed by resorting to section 8, 10 and 11 of the Act. However, it cannot be said that mere disclosure of the names, addresses and the amounts disbursed to each of the donees would infringe the protection provided to them u/s. 8(1)(j) of the Act.”
“The donations made by the President of India cannot be said to relate to personal information of the President. It cannot be said that the disclosure of the information would cause unwarranted invasion of privacy of, either the President of India, or the recipient of the donation. A person who approaches the President, seeking a donation, can have no qualms in the disclosure of his/her name, and address, the amount received by him/her as donation or even the circumstance which compelled him or her to approach the First Citizen of the country to seek a donation. Such acts of generosity and magnanimity done by the President should be placed in the public domain as they would enhance the stature of the office of the President of India. In that sense, the disclosure of the information would be in the public interest as well.”
“The submission of Mr. Chandhiok that the learned CIC has confused donations with subsidy is not correct. The CIC has consciously noted that donations are being made by the President from the public fund. It is this feature which has led the learned CIC to observe that donations from out of public fund cannot be treated differently from subsidy given by the Government to the citizens under various welfare schemes. It cannot be said that the CIC has misunderstood donations as subsidies.”
“For all the aforesaid reasons, I find no merit in this petition and dismiss the same. The interim order stands vacated.”
[President’s Secretariat vs. Nitish Kumar Tripathi W.P. (C ) 3382/2012 dated 14-06-2012. Citation- RTIR IV (2012) 92 (Delhi) delivered by Vipin Sanghi. J]
Maharashtra Housing (Regulation and Development) Act, 2012 (Part I)
Sometime back, the Government of India introduced the draft of the Real Estate (Regulation of Development) Act (“RERA”).
While this is yet to become law, the Maharashtra Government has
introduced a Bill for passing Maharashtra Housing (Regulation and
Development) Act, 2012 (“MHRD”). This Bill was passed by both
Houses of the State in July 2012 and press reports indicate that the
Governor has given his oral assent. However, a formal Notification in
the Official Gazette is yet awaited. Once it is notified, the Bill would
become an Act. On coming into force, one important consequence that it
will have is that it would repeal the nearly 50-year old Maharashtra
Ownership Flats (Regulation of the Promotion of Construction, Sale,
Management and Transfer) Act, 1963 (MOFA).
The Preamble
states that the MOFA did not have an effective implementing arm as the
flat purchasers could only approach the Consumer Forums or Civil Courts.
It further provides that the Bill has been drafted to ensure full
disclosure by promoters, to ensure compliance of agreed terms and
conditions and to usher in transparency and discipline in the
transaction of flats and to put a check on abuses and malpractices.
Let
us examine this important piece of Legislation which is expected to
soon become the Law and also compare it with the existing provisions of
MOFA which it seeks to repeal, to understand whether the MHRD is vintage
wine packaged in a flashy new bottle or something more?
Non-applicability
The
MHRD does not apply to MHADA. Further, the Maharashtra Apartment
Ownership Act, 1970 is not repealed. Thus, condominium structures would
yet continue to be governed by the earlier law.
Housing Regulatory Authority and Appellate Tribunal
The
Bill proposes to introduce a radical change in the real estate
industry. For the first time, a Housing Regulatory Authority (HRA) would
be constituted to regulate, control and promote planned and healthy
development and construction, sale, transfer and management of
properties. Thus, just as the capital markets have a regulator in the
form of SEBI, the banking industry has RBI, the real estate sector would
also have an authority. It would be an autonomous body in the form of a
body corporate consisting of a Chairperson and Two or more Members.
The
Authority would have powers to ensure compliance of the obligations
cast upon builders under the Act, to make inquiries into compliance of
its Orders, etc. It has powers of a Civil Court and hence, it is a
quasi-judicial authority.
An additional feature is the
establishment of the Housing Appellate Tribunal, which would hear all
appeals against the Orders of the Authority. The Tribunal shall be a
three member bench to be headed by a sitting or retired judge of a High
Court. Thus, the Tribunal has been constituted on the lines of tribunals
under other Corporate Laws, such as the Securities Appellate Tribunal.
Both
these features are on the lines of the Central Act which would
constitute a Real Estate Regulatory Authority and a Real Estate
Appellate Tribunal.
One only hopes that the addition of two new authorities does not lead to more delays and latches in serving justice.
Promoter’s Obligations
The
obligations cast on a “promoter” of a project, i.e., the builder, are a
combination of those under MOFA in a new avatar and some additional
ones. A promoter has been defined to cover any person, firm, LLP, AOP or
any other body which constructs a block or a building of flats. In the
event that the builder and the person selling the flats are different,
then both of them are promoters. The decision of the Bombay High Court
in the case of Ramniklal Kotak v. Varsha Builders AIR 1992 Bom 62 is
relevant on this issue. A mere contractor of the builder would not come
within the definition of the term.
The definition of “flat” is
also relevant and it is defined as a separate and self-contained
premises which may be used for residence, office, show-room, shop,
godown, etc., and includes an apartment. The definition of the term flat
is similar to the one u/s. 2 of MOFA except that it does not include
the words “and includes a garage”. This is a fallout of the celebrated
decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Nahalchand Laloochand P Ltd
v Panchali Co-op. Hsg. Society (2010) 9 SCC 536 which held that the
promoter has no right to sell open or stilt parking spaces. A terrace
has been held not to be a flat. The premises contemplated by the term
“flat” refers to a structure which can be used for any of the purposes
specified in the definition, for example, residence, office, show room,
etc. – Association of Commerce House v Vishandas, 1981 Bom CR 716.
Let us Look at some Key Obligations of Promoter:
(a)
Registration of a Project – This is a new requirement cast on the
developer, which was not found under MOFA. Every developer must apply
for registration of his project with the HRA and for displaying it on
the HRA’s website. The HRA must register such project within a period of
seven days from application. Registration is required even for ongoing
projects where the Occupation Certificate has not been received. If a
Court declares that the title of the promoter to the land is invalid,
then the HRA can cancel the registration of the project which is built
on such land. If registration is cancelled, then the promoter is
prohibited from selling the flats constructed in such project.
Registration is not required in the following cases:
(i) When the land area to be developed does not exceed 250 sq. mtrs.
(ii) When the total number of flats to be developed is less than five.
(iii) When the promoter has received the OC before the provision came into force.
(iv)
Where the project is one of a renovation, repairs, reconstruction or
redevelopment project not involving a fresh allotment or marketing of
flats.
Once the project is registered, the promoter can upload
details on the HRA’s website. The features relating to a central
registry and a website are similar to the RERA. The monetary penalty for
not registering a project is Rs. 1,000 per day of default. In addition,
a promoter cannot issue any advertisement for a project or receive any
advance payment for the same, unless it is displayed on the HRA’s
website.
(b) Disclosures by the promoter – The promoter must
make full and true disclosure of several documents and information in
respect of the project, e.g., details of the entity developing the
project, consultants used, phase-wise time schedule for completion, type
of materials used, fixtures and fittings bifurcated between branded and
unbranded, possession date, nature of organisation to which conveyance
would be made, etc. One such requirement is obtaining a title
certificate to the land which should be certified by an advocate with a
minimum three years’ standing. While disclosures are a good move, it
must be ensured that it does not lead to undue red tape.
(c)
Agreement for Sale – Similar to the current provisions of section 4 of
MOFA, the promoter must execute an Agreement for Sale in the prescribed
form before accepting any advance payment/ deposit exceeding 20% of the
sale price. Once a promoter has executed an Agreement to Sell, he would
not mortgage or create any charge on the plot, building or apartment
without the previous consent of the allottee.
The Bombay High
Court’s decision u/s. 4 of MOFA in the case of Ramniklal Kotak v. Varsha
Builders, AIR 1992 Bom 62 is relevant in this respect :
“To prevent bogus sales being effected by a Promoter and to put a check to malpractices indulged in by the Promoters in regard to sales and transfer of flats, the Legislature has provided that the Promoter shall :
(i) not accept any sum or money as advance payment or deposit more than 20% of the sale price;
(ii) enter into a written agreement with each individual flat owner.”
The Bombay High Court in Association of Commerce House Block Owners v. Vishnidas Samaldas (1981) 83 Bom. L.R. 339 held that the provisions of section 4 are mandatory and not directory in nature. The ratio of the above-mentioned decisions would apply even under the provisions of the Bill.
The Agreement must also be registered. However, even if it is unregistered, the same would be admissible as evidence in a suit for specific performance or as evidence of part performance of a contract. A similar section is present under MOFA and was inserted to overrule the Bombay High Court’s decision in the case of Association of Commerce House Block Owners v. Vishnidas Samaldas that non-registered agreements are wholly invalid and void ab initio and create no rights between the parties.
(d) Responsibilities – If any flat buyer suffers a loss due to any false statement, then the promoter must compensate him. If the buyer withdraws, then he would be refunded the sum invested along with interest @ 15% p.a. Under MOFA, this is refundable with interest @ 9% p.a.
The promoter would have to take various specified safety measures for the builder. He is not allowed to give possession of the flats till the OC or Completion Certificate has been obtained. Interestingly, a majority of the builders in Mumbai do not obtain a Building Completion Certificate.
The promoter needs to adhere to the plans and project specifications which have been approved and which have been disclosed to the prospective flat allottees. Further, if any defect is brought to the promoter’s notice within three years from possession, then he is required to rectify the same wherever possible or offer such compensation to the flat allottees as the HRA may decide.
(e) Carpet Area Selling – The MOFA was specifically amended in 2008 to provide that one of the responsibilities of the promoter is to sell flats on the basis of the carpet area only. He could, however, separately charge for the common areas in proportion to the carpet area. The Statement of Objects and Reasons introducing this Amendment mentioned that flat purchasers are not understanding the difference between carpet, built-up, super built-up area and hence, the promoters must sell flats on carpet area alone.
While the Bill requires a promoter to disclose the carpet area and the Agreement for Sale should mention the extent of the carpet area, the amendment made in 2008 is nowhere to be found. The Agreement is required to mention the total price of the flat, but there is no reference in this clause to the carpet area pricing. MOFA also provided that the definition of carpet area for carpet area pricing included the balcony area of the flat. The Bill now defines carpet area for all purposes under the Bill to mean the net usable floor area within a flat or building in accordance with the Development Control Regulations.
Powers of Promoters
Section 12A of MOFA provides that the promoter cannot, without just and sufficient cause, cut off, with-hold, curtail or reduce essential supply or services enjoyed by a flat purchaser. Any person who contravenes the provision of this section shall on conviction be liable to imprisonment for a term of up to three months and/or fine. These include, water, electricity, lights in passages / stair-cases, lifts, conservancy or sanitary services, etc.
The Bill contains similar provisions with some differences. The responsibility of the promoter to provide these services has been made subject to the service provider providing the same. If the service provider does not provide the services, the promoter would not be responsible. This is a welcome change. However, an interesting addition has also been made.
If the flat purchaser fails to pay the maintenance charges to the promoter for a period of more than three months, then the promoter is entitled to, after giving a seven day notice period, cut-off or withhold such essential supply or service. The provision for three months imprisonment which currently exists in MOFA has also been laid to rest.
Accounts and Audit
One interesting and welcome new facet is the compulsory maintenance of building-wise separate bank accounts. The promoter must maintain a separate bank account of the sums taken by him as advance /deposit/towards the share capital for the formation of a cooperative society or a company/towards the outgoings/taxes. He must hold these sums for the purposes for which they were given and disburse them for those purposes.
A promoter who has registered under the Act must maintain accounts for various specific heads. The promoter must also get such accounts audited by a Chartered Accountant. The HRA can direct the promoter to produce all such books of account or other documents relating to a project or flat in case of a complaint against the promoter.
PART A : DECISIONS OF THE COURTS
A very interesting and unusual matter came before the High Court of Delhi. The same is summarised as under:
- “The petitioner challenged the order dated 16th January, 2009 of the Central Information Commission (CIC) imposing penalty u/s.20 of the Right to Information Act, 2005 on the petitioner of Rs. 12,500 deductible in two instalments of Rs.6,250 each from the salary of the petitioner, starting from 3rd March 2009. The petition came up before the Court first on 2nd March, 2009, but no stay was granted. The petitioner on 14th December, 2009 informed that the penalty amount had been paid to the CIC and further submitted that the fault leading to the imposition of penalty was not in his functioning as the Public Information Officer (PIO) of the DDA, but of Shri S. C. Gupta, the then Dy. Director (Housing) of the DDA. It may be noticed that the CIC has vide the impugned order, while levying penalty of Rs.12,500 on the petitioner, levied penalty of Rs.12,500 on the said S. C. Gupta also, deductible from his salary. On the said contention of the petitioner, the said Shri S. C. Gupta was impleaded as respondent No. 4 to the petition and in fact he alone has been served with the notice of petition.”
- “It is the case of the petitioner that he, as PIO of DDA had acted with promptitude and has on the very next day of receiving the RTI application, sought information from the respondent No. 4 and the delay in providing information was of the respondent No. 4. It is further the case of petitioner that in pursuance to the directions of the First Appellate Authority to provide further information also, the delay in providing the same was of the said Shri S. C. Gupta.”
- The CIC however has in the order dated 16th January, 2009 impugned in this petition held that it had in the earlier order dated 26th September, 2008 (which is not before the Court) held that it is the not the delay in response for which the petitioner had been held liable, but the petitioner had failed to provide the information sought and had simply forwarded a report to the information seeker without caring to examine whether the report even addressed the information sought. It was thus held that the petitioner had abdicated his responsibility as PIO. It was further held that the petitioner as the PIO of the DDA was responsible for providing the information and what was being passed on. The said conduct of the petitioner was held to be amounting to deemed refusal of information.
The Court stated:
- “It is not in dispute that the petitioner was the designated PIO u/s.5 of the Act of the DDA. U/s.5(3) of the Act it was for the petitioner to deal with the request and render reasonable assistance to the information seeker. The PIO u/s.5(4) is authorised to seek the assistance of any other officer as may be considered necessary for the purpose of providing information and section 5(5) mandates such officers to render all assistance to the PIO. Section 5(5) also deems such officers from whom information is sought, as the PIO for the purpose of any contravention of the provisions of the Act.”
- “The contention of the petitioner appears to be that he as PIO was merely required to forward the application for information to the officer concerned and/or in possession of the said information and upon receipt of such information from the concerned officer furnish the same to the information seeker. He would thus contend that as long as he as PIO has acted with promptitude and forwarded the application to the officer in possession of the information and furnished the same to the information seeker immediately on receipt of such information, he cannot be faulted with and liability for penalty if any has to be of such other officer from whom he had sought the information and cannot be his.” “The argument aforesaid reduces the office of the PIO to that of a Post Office, to receive the RTI query, forward the same to the other officers in the department/administrative unit in possession of the information, and upon receipt thereof furnish the same to the information seeker. It has to be thus seen from a perusal of the Act, whether the Act envisages the role of a PIO to be that of a mere Post Office.”
- The Court then provided definition of ‘dealt with’. In Karen Lambert v. London Borough of Southwark, (2003) EWHC 2121 (Admin) it was held to include everything right from receipt of the application till the issue of decision thereon. U/s. 6(1) and 7(1) of the RTI Act, it is the PIO to whom the application is submitted and it is he who is responsible for ensuring that the information as sought is provided to the applicant within the statutory requirements of the Act. Section 5(4) is simply to strengthen the authority of the PIO within the department; if the PIO finds a default by those from whom he has sought information, the PIO is expected to recommend a remedial action to be taken. The RTI Act makes the PIO the pivot for enforcing the implementation of the Act.
The Court further noted
- “This Court in Mujibur Rehman v. Central Information Commission held that information seekers are to be furnished what they ask for and are not to be driven away through filibustering tactics and it is to ensure a culture of information disclosure that penalty provisions have been provided in the RTI Act. The Act has conferred the duty to ensure compliance on the PIO. He cannot escape his obligations and duties by stating that persons appointed under him had failed to collect documents and information; that the Act as framed casts obligation upon the PIO to ensure that the provisions of the Act are fully complied. Even otherwise, the settled position in law is that an officer entrusted with the duty is not to act mechanically. The Supreme Court as far back as 1995 in Secretary, Haila Kandi Bar Association v. State of Assam, [1995 supp. (3) SCC 736] reminded the high-ranking officers generally, not to mechanically forward the information collected through subordinates. The RTI Act has placed confidence in the objectivity of a person appointed as the PIO and when the PIO mechanically forwards the report of his subordinates, he betrays a casual approach shaking the confidence placed in him and duties the probative values of his position and the report.”
- Two writ petitions were heard together, since common arguments were canvassed and common questions are involved, they were disposed of by this judgment.
- The petitioner functions as service provider to the Government of Maharashtra. It provides the facility of Smart Card-based Registration Certificate. It is stated that considering the need for computerisation, the Government switched over to the latest technology in its various departments. In the transport sector, the Government aimed at modernising the Regional Transport Offices which was aimed at streamlining the entire process undertaken at these offices and obviously to make functions of these Regional Transport Offices efficient, prompt and easy. In this backdrop, the Central Government took a policy decision to introduce ‘Smart Card’ with micro processor chip and it was decided to permit the use of Smart Cards for issuing registration certificates in electronic form. It is stated that this micro processor chip-based Smart Card obviously has various advantages over the regular paper-based registration books. A reference is made to the Central Government’s guidelines issued on 17-10-2001. The implementation of this policy required amendments to the Motor Vehicles Act and Rules and therefore, the amendments were made on 31-5-2002 and Rule 2(s) was added to define the term ‘Smart Card’. It is stated that the registration certificate is now issued to the motor vehicle owners in the form of Smart Cards and thereafter, several provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act have been referred to. It was submitted that the Government of Maharashtra floated a PAN India tender for appointing a service provider to comply with requirement of issuance of ‘Smart Cards’. The petitioner participated in the tender process and was declared successful. A contract dated 30-11-2002 came to be executed. It is stated it is not an ordinary contract, but it is an outcome of exhaustive statutory project. The project which the petitioner is implementing must be seen in the backdrop of the policy decision of the Government to provide a more standardised and tamper-proof registration of the vehicles. The policy of the Government is to adopt a technology which will prevent tampering of registration books by the anti-social elements. It is stated that this contract is confidential in nature. The project has been undertaken by the petitioner, but attempts are made to exploit the petitioner for personal gains by various unscrupulous elements. The RTI Act, according to the petitioner, does not give an absolute right to a person to obtain any informa-tion and it is therefore, contended that Shri Sanjay Bhole, the respondent No. 4’s attempt to obtain the information must be seen in this light.
- SCIC in its order had directed the Transport Commission to furnish the information requested for. The same is challenged in this writ petition. While the Court agreed that clause (a) of section 8(1) is in no way applicable. However, as to clause (d), order notes:
- “Clause (d) provides that the information can be disclosed if the competent authority is satisfied that larger public interest warrants such disclosure. Therefore, that clause as admitted by (Advocate of the appellant) Mr. Manohar is not absolute. It does not say that information including commercial confidence, trade secrets or intel-lectual property, the disclosure of which, would harm the competitive position of a third party; cannot be demanded or if demanded, cannot be disclosed even if larger public interest warrants the same. The State Information Commissioner has held that the disclosure of both agreements would not result in disclosure of trade secret or intellectual property. His conclusion is that the tenders were for an important work which affects large number of vehicle owners and drivers of vehicles. The agreements have to be entered into for providing a service in the form of making of Smart Cards for registration of motor vehicles and driving licences at enhanced fees. Further, the conclusion is that the disclosure of information would enable public scrutiny of the process and contracts and therefore, it is desirable in larger public interest that the information is provided.”
Final Order
“In the light of this conclusion, both writ petitions fail. Rule is discharged, but without any order as to costs. At this stage, it is prayed that the ad interim orders passed by this Court be continued so as to enable the petitioners to challenge this judgment in higher court. This request is opposed by the respondent No. 4. In such circumstances, the request made to continue the ad interim orders is rejected and particularly, when the information as directed to be given under the impugned orders is as early as on 23-3-2011.”
[Writ petitions No. 2912 & 3137 of 2011, Shonkh Technology Ltd. & United Telecom Ltd. v. Shri Sanjay Bhole & State IC, Joint Transport Commissioner & PIO decided on 1-7-2011: (‘Information Decisions’ 2012 (1) ID 268) Bombay High Court]
Leases
A lease is one of the
oldest modes of enjoying immovable property. When one speaks about
leases, one often comes across terms, such as tenancy, licence, etc.
Some of these are synonyms while some have different meaning. Although
leases have been around since numerous years, there is yet a fair deal
of confusion surrounding them. Let us try and clear some of the myths
about leases.
Meaning
Section 105 of the Transfer
of Property Act, 1882 (‘the Act’) has defined the term ‘lease’ in
relation to an immovable property to mean:
(a) a transfer of a
right to enjoy such property — the person transferring the property is
called a lessor and the transferee is known as a lessee;
(b) made for a certain time. Expressly or impliedly or made in perpetuity;
(c)
in consideration of a price paid or promised or of money/share in
crops/service or any other thing of value to be rendered periodically or
on specified occasions to the transferor by the transferee who accepts
such terms. The price paid is known as premium and the money, share,
service or other thing to be rendered periodically or occasionally is
known as rent. The premium is also known as pagadi or salami.
As
opposed to a conveyance in which there is an absolute transfer of
ownership of immovable property, in the case of a lease there is only a
limited transfer of a right to enjoy the immovable property.
Once
the lessor grants a lease, he is left with two rights — right to
receive rent and a reversionary right. A reversionary right is the right
of the lessor to receive back the property once the tenure of the lease
expires. The lessor can transfer the reversionary rights. In an
interesting decision, the Supreme Court in the case of R. Kempraj v.
Barton Son & Co., (1969) 2 SCC 594 has held that even in the case of
a perpetual lease, the lessor has a reversionary right.
The
Supreme Court in A. R. Krishnamurthy, 176 ITR 417 (SC) has held that a
lease of land is a transfer of interest in the land and creates a right
in rem and there is a transfer of title in favour of the lessee though
the lessor has right of reversion after the period of the lease
terminates. The grant of a lease is a transfer of an asset. The Supreme
Court in the case of B. Arvind Kumar v. GOI, (2007) 5 SCC 745 has laid
down the essential elements of a lease of immovable property:
(a) There should be a transfer of a right to enjoy an immovable property;
(b) Such transfer may be for a certain term or in perpetuity;
(c) The transfer should be in consideration of a premium or rent; and
(d)
The transfer should be a bilateral transaction, the transferee
accepting the terms of transfer. A lease agreement is like any other
agreement and can be oral also.
However, this would be subject to the provisions of section 107 of the Act explained later.
Tenure of lease
Unless
the lease provides otherwise a lease of immovable property, for any
purpose other than agricultural or manufacturing, shall be deemed to be a
lease from month to month, which is terminable on the part of either
the lessor or the lessee, by 15 days’ notice expiring within the end of a
month of the tenancy. Some leases contain a clause for renewal of the
lease on the same terms and conditions as the current lease except with
an increase in the rent. It should be noted that the renewal of a lease
is not automatic and it must be expressly so stated in the lease deed.
In
India, a perpetual lease is also valid — R. Kempraj v. Barton Son &
Co., (1969) 2 SCC 594. Whether a lease is a lease in perpetuity or a
monthto- month lease has been the subject-matter of great debate and is
relevant from a stamp duty perspective also (as explained below). Where
the lease deed does not specify any duration, but permits the lessee to
hold the land forever, subject to the right of the lessor to resume the
land by giving one month’s notice, there is no grant in perpetuity — B.
Arvind Kumar v. GOI, (2007) 5 SCC 745. Hence, it is important that the
lease deed clearly specifies the lease period.
Making of a lease
U/s.107
of the Act, a lease of a period for more than one year or a lease from
year to year must be made only by way of a registered instrument. Any
other lease can be made by way of a registered instrument or by an oral
instrument accompanied by delivery of possession. In cases where a
registered instrument is executed, both the lessor and the lessee must
execute the same.
Thus, section 107 makes it mandatory for any
lease of more than one year to be in the form of a written, registered
instrument. A corollary of a registered instrument is stamping. Failure
to create a lease of more than one year by way of a registered
instrument makes the lease deed inoperative and the Courts are disabled
from using the instrument as evidence — Anthony v. KC Ittoop & Sons,
(2000) 6 SCC 394/Bajaj Auto v. Behari Lal Kohli, (1989) (4 SCC
39/Shantabai v. State of Bombay, AIR 1958 SC 532. However, the Supreme
Court also laid down an important principle in the case of Anthony v. KC
Ittoop & Sons, (2000) 6 SCC 394 in the context of leases made by
non-registered instruments:
“. . . . . . What is mentioned in
the three paragraphs of the first part of section 107 of the TP Act are
only the different modes of how leases are created. The first paragraph
has been extracted above and it deals with the mode of creating the
particular kinds of leases mentioned therein. The third paragraph can be
read along with the above as it contains a condition to be complied
with if the parties choose to create a lease as per a registered
instrument mentioned therein. All other leases, if created, necessarily
fall within the ambit of the second paragraph. . . . . . . . . . . . .
Since
the lease could not fall within the first paragraph of section 107, it
could not have been for a period exceeding one year. The further
presumption is that the lease would fall within the ambit of residuary
second paragraph of section 107 of the TP Act. . . . . . .
Non-registration of the document had caused only two consequences. One
is that no lease exceeding one year was created. Second is that the
instrument became useless so far as creation of the lease is concerned.
Nonetheless the presumption that a lease not exceeding one year stood
created by conduct of parties remains un-rebutted. . . . . .”
Thus, even in cases where leases of more than one year are not registered, a lease of one year is created.
Stamp Duty
Article 36 of Schedule I to the Bombay Stamp Act provides for the stamp duty on a lease deed, sub-lease deed.
The
rate of duty is as shown in Table 1: Hence, whether or not a lease is a
perpetual lease becomes very important from a stamp duty perspective.
In the case of perpetual leases, the duty incidence would be at 4.5% of
the market value of the property based on the Stamp Duty Ready Reckoner.
Even a monthly tenancy would be treated as a perpetual lease
because no definite period is specified. In that case, stamp duty as on a
perpetual lease would be applicable — Collector of Stamps v. Laxmibai
Saheb, AIR 1948 Bom. 336; Santosh Pundalik Madankar v. Ramdas, 1985 Mah.
LJ 973.
If no definite term for lease is fixed and it is terminable by notice, it is a perpetual lease. Though a tenancy may be described as a monthly tenancy within the purview of the Transfer of Property Act, it does not follow that the document evidences a lease for any definite period for the purposes of stamp duty — Hidayat Mohindin v. Karamullah, AIR 1961 AP 1. Similar views have also been taken in the cases of Skinner v. Arunachalam, AIR 1939 Mad. (FB) 356, Mangal Puri v. Baldeo Puri, AIR 1938 All. 304.
Lease v. Licence
A leave and licence of an immovable property is different from a lease as a lease creates an interest in the property which the licence does not since it is only a personal non-transferable right. However, in many cases, a question may arise as to whether a transaction is one of a leave and licence or one of lease. This issue has witnessed a plethora of cases and controversies as the distinction between the two is very fine. Over a period of time the Supreme Court and various High Courts have laid down several tests for distinguishing a licence from a lease, but none of them are conclusive. Some of the important judgments on this issue are Qudrat Ullah v. Municipal Board, (1974) 1 SCC 202, Konchadda Ramamurthy v. Gopinath, (1968) 2 SCR 559, Associated Hotels of India Ltd. v. R.N. Kapoor, (1960) 1 SCR 368, Dunlop Rubber Co., AIR 1968 SC 175, Behari Lal v. Chotte, AIR 1963 All. 911, Mohan Sons & Co., 78 Bom. LR 195; Delta International v. Shyam Sunder Ganeriwalla, (1999) 4 SCC 545; ICICI, (1999) 5 SCC 708 (SC). A few tests laid down by these and several other cases are the intention of the parties, their conduct and circumstances surrounding the agreements, substance of the transaction, exclusive possession in case of a lease, creation of interest in the property in case of a lease, etc. Thus, this is an issue on which there is a lot of confusion and arbitariness and there is no litmus test to differentiate one from the other. It may also be noted that there is a thin distinction between lease and leave and licence, which has led to the wide-scale misconception among many people that a leave and licence can only be for 11 months. A lease which is of more than one year is to be compulsorily registered u/s.17(1)(d) of the Registration Act, 1908 and section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. In the event that a licence was held to be a lease, people started making licences of 11 months so that registration would not be compulsory. This led to a general impression that leave and licence agreements can only be for a term of 11 months. In a leave and licence agreement, normally, there is no right given to the licencee to assign his or her rights, whereas in a lease agreement, the licencee subject to the approval of the licensor can assign and or transfer his or her rights.
Lease v. Tenancy
The terms lease and tenancy are synonyms and are often interchangeably used. However, quite often, it is believed that the two terms are different. In fact, even the Bombay Stamp Act, 1958, till some years ago (incorrectly) believed the two to be different and provided two separate Articles under Schedule I — one for transfer of tenancy and one for transfer of a lease. The definition of a lease u/s.105 of the Act would encompass a tenancy also. Generally, tenancy refers to a duration of a month-to-month lease while a lease refers to a longer duration. However, this is only a commercial distinction and has no legal basis.
The Bombay Stamp Act has now removed the distinction between a tenancy and a lease. The stamp duty in the case of a transfer of tenancy and transfer of a lease is now the same, i.e., the same as rate specified for a conveyance under Article 25 ~ 3, 4 or 5% depending upon the location of the immovable property. The duty is leviable on the fair market value of the property as computed under the Stamp Duty Ready Reckoner.
Transfer of reversionary rights
If the landlord/lessor transfers the reversionary rights to the tenant/lessee who has taken the property on lease, then the lessee becomes the full owner of the property. The stamp duty on a transfer of a lease is the same rate as on a conveyance on the fair market value of the property computed as per the Stamp Duty Ready Reckoner. However, in case of a transfer of reversionary rights of a property by the lessor to the lessee, there is a concessional basis of valuation of the property. The value is computed at 112 times the monthly lease rent paid by the tenant and not as per the Ready Reckoner. Thus, the duty in an urban area would be @ 5% of 112 times the monthly rent of the property. This benefit is available only if the tenant is able to prove that he has been in occupation of the property for at least five years. Further, this benefit is not available in case of properties taken on leave and licence.
Doctrine of merger
When a lessee of a property acquires the reversionary rights from the lessor, the Doctrine of Merger applies and the lesser estate (the lease) merges into the larger estate (reversionary rights) — Dr. D. A. Irani, 234 ITR 850 (Bom.). The Court held that once a lessee purchases the leased property from the lessor, the lease is extinguished as the same person cannot be both the landlord and tenant at the same time. There is a drowning or sinking of the inferior right into the superior right. This principle is also recognised under the Transfer of Property Act which specifically provides for the determination of the lease in case the interests of the lessor and the lessee vest in the same person at the same time. In such a case, the period of holding of the asset would be counted from the date on which the reversionary rights were acquired. The fact that the assessee was a lessee earlier for several years would be of no consequence in determining whether or not the gain was a short-term capital gain.
Transfer of lease and section 50C
Decisions of the Income-tax Tribunal have held that a transfer of a tenancy does not attract the provisions of section 50C of the Income-tax Act — Kishori Sharad Gaitonde, AIT 2010 200 ITAT (Mum.); Atul G. Puranik, 132 ITD 499 (Mum.); Munsons Textiles, ITA No. 6320/M/2010; Tejinder Singh (2012) 19 taxmann.
com 4 (Kol.).
Auditor’s duty
The Auditor should enquire of the auditee whether it has complied with the aforesaid provisions in respect of any lease agreements executed into by it. In case the Auditor comes across a lease transaction which does not comply with any provisions of the above Acts, then he will have to consider whether appropriate disclosures should be made in the Notes to Accounts or whether the non-compliance is so material so as to warrant a qualification in his report. He may insist upon a legal opinion to support any claim which the auditee is making. He can caution the auditee of likely unpleasant consequences which might arise. It needs to be repeated and noted that an audit is basically under the relevant law applicable to an entity and an auditor is not an expert on all laws relevant to business operations of an entity. All that is required of him is exercise of ‘due care’ and ‘diligence’.
Is It Fair to Prohibit the Law Students from Pursuing any Other Studies?
“6. Prohibition to register for two regular courses of study.
No student shall be allowed to simultaneously register for a law degree program with any other graduation or post graduation or certificate course run by the same or any other University or an Institute for academic or professional learning excepting in the integrated degree program of the same institution. Provided that any short period part time certificate course on language, computer science or computer application of an Institute or any course run by a Centre for Distance Learning of a University however, shall be excepted.”
As per the above clause, a Law student cannot pursue any other academic/professional course. Many students of C.A./C.W.A/C.S. course intending to pursue Law course simultaneously as an additional or necessary supplementary qualification are adversely affected by the above rule.
It is submitted that the said restriction is harsh/ unreasonable and unfair for the following reasons.
i) There is already a restriction on pursuing more than one University course. Thus, effectively the above restriction remains applicable only to the courses of the Institutes.
ii) The expression “Institute” is not defined in the Rules.
Thus, the prohibition is a sweeping one. Some Institutes are statutory. Some are either run or recognised by the various administrative Ministries of Central/State Governments. Some others are purely private. The examples, other than of ICAI/ICWA/ICSI, are of Insurance Institute of India and Indian Institute of Bankers. These Institutes are running the academic courses which are mostly pursued by insurance and bank employees.
iii) The above restriction appears to be proceeding on the premises that Law course is pursued only for the practice in Law. The fact is that the same is pursued by majority as an additional or necessary supplementary qualification.
iv) A student of three years Law course can be in the full time employment, but cannot pursue other courses as above.
v) Even if a person is qualified for practice in more than one discipline, he/she can practice only in one discipline. It is therefore unreasonable to put restriction at the qualifying stage.
vi) In the case of any course, after completing the tuition period, one may be required to only appear for exams for completing the course for a long period. It is not clarified during what period a Law student can be said to be pursuing other courses.
vii) While a University student, whether for graduate or post graduate studies in other branches can simultaneously pursue a non-University course, a student of Law course, which is essentially a University course, cannot do so.
viii) There is an uncertainty about completing any particular course. By curtailing the options, the career prospects of a student gets adversely affected.
The inbuilt exemption to distant learning courses is quite logical. But it is applicable only to a University. It is a different thing that it may come into the clutches of a University’s own rules. However, if the said that exemption to distant learning education is extended to the Institutes also, the situation can be substantially salvaged. The issue is highlighted for the attention of various Institutes, academicians and prominent professionals for their consideration and pursuing it further, if and as may be deemed appropriate.
At the most, if at all the prohibition is to be applied, it should be restricted to the five year course and not for the three year course of LLB. Further, depriving the law students from acquiring indepth knowledge of accountancy, costing, corporate laws etc. would eventually be to their own detriment. In the present day world, multi-disciplinary knowledge is not only desirable, but essential. …………..
Transfer – Property of Minor – Disposal of immovable property by natural guardian – Limitation 3 years from time minor attains Majority: Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 – Section 8(3):
Nandu & Anr Suit No. 158 of 2012, Bombay High Court, dated 2nd
August 2012 AIR 2012 (NOC) 361 (Bom.) (High Court)
The
Plaintiffs are mother and three children. They have entered into an
agreement for sale with Defendant No.1 on 3rd December 1988. On the date
of the execution of the agreement Plaintiff Nos. 3 and 4 were minors.
Their mother Plaintiff No.1 signed the agreement on behalf of herself
and her minor children. Plaintiff No.2 has signed for herself. The
consideration under the agreement was Rs.2.5 lakhs. Rs.1 lakh has been
admittedly paid. The sale was to be completed within one month from the
date the title was clear by the permission of the competent authority
and the permission of the Court was obtained for sale of the minors’
share. An Irrevocable General Power of Attorney was also executed
similarly by the Plaintiffs along with the agreement for sale. The
Plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2 have also executed a declaration and indemnity on
6th December 1989, showing the possession of the property was handed
over to Defendant No.1. It is the Plaintiffs’ case that thereafter only
in the year 2007 the Defendants sent to the Plaintiffs a draft Deed of
Conveyance and draft Irrevocable General Power of Attorney to be
executed along with a declaration cum indemnity bond.
It is the
case of the Plaintiffs that the consideration under the document is not
paid. It is the case of the Defendants that it is. The consideration is
receipted in the Deed of Conveyance itself. The Defendants have shown
the amount debited to their bank account. The Defendants have, however,
not shown that the amounts are credited to the bank account of the
Plaintiffs.
However, the document remained to be registered. The
Defendant No.1 has sought to register a conveyance in February 2007
under a Deed of Confirmation executed by him as a Constituted Attorney
of the Plaintiffs under the Irrevocable General Power of Attorney
executed by the plaintiffs in 1989.
The Court observed that
there are no disputes shown between the mother and the children. The
minors who attained majority alleged that the transaction was against
their interest and was not for legal necessity and could not have been
entered into by their mother.
It may be mentioned that u/s. 8(3)
of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act 1956, the disposal of an
immovable property by a natural guardian is voidable at the instance of a
minor. It is for the minor to avoid the contract. The contract can be
avoided within the prescribed period of Limitation. Article 60 of
Schedule I to the Limitation Act 1963 provides the period of 3 years
from the time the minor attains majority to set aside a transfer made on
his behalf by his guardian.
Defendant Nos. 3 & 4 attained
majority in 1994 and 1996. They could have voided the contract in 1997
and 1999 respectively. They failed to do so. They must be taken to have
acquiesced in the transfer. In fact in 2008, the minor Plaintiff No.4
affirmed the transaction. Though the most determinative aspect is the
payment and the receipt of consideration and though the payment is
sought to be shown, the receipt has not been shown by any
contemporaneous evidence of the banking transaction, the fact that the
tenants have been attorned and Defendant No.1 has been collecting rents
show knowledge on the part of the Plaintiff that the Defendant No.1 had
become the owner. That aspect was accepted. Plaintiff No.4 confirmed the
transaction on attaining the majority. Plaintiff No.2 never sought to
avoid the transaction entered into by her guardian. It is only because
the conveyance was not registered in 1993 itself, that the Plaintiffs
sought to claim rights upon the registration made years thereafter, when
the construction on the suit land became rife. In that case, it is
observed that the Plaintiffs who are minors would not have been bound by
the agreement entered into, they being minors, if they have not chosen
to standby it. It is open to them either to standby it or renounce it.
It is observed in that case, that it was reasonable to assume that the
minors therein were aware of their rights upon the facts of that case.
They did not deny the agreement. They continued to enjoy the properties.
They went on alienating items of those properties. They were taken to
have ratified the agreement entered into by their guardian, as they
elected to stand by that agreement. In this case, the benefit that they
would have obtained is only the consideration, but the circumstantial
evidence about the allowance to receive rents by the purchaser in the
agreement for sale shows that they stood by the agreement for sale even
after Plaintiff Nos. 3 & 4 attained majority. Plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2
in any event stood by the said agreement at all times by attorning
tenancies. The Plaintiffs are not entitled to any relief of injunctions.
Succession Certificate – Nominee – Widow – Right after Remarriage: Indian Succession Act, 1925 – Section 372
The appellant disclosed that the dispute between the parties were already settled in another succession case filed by the appellant (Rashmi Bharti). It was further claimed that she being legally married wife of Late Sanjeev Kumar, she had got statutory right to inherit in toto the estate of Sanjeev Kumar to the exclusion of all other relatives of Late Sanjeev Kumar. Besides this, the appellant further asserted that after the death of her husband Late Sanjeev Kumar, the Respondent No. 1 had also obtained Rs. 50,000/- from the account of Late Sanjeev Kumar lying in Punjab National Bank. The appellant herself had accepted that subsequent to death of her husband Late Sanjeev Kumar, she had married one Arun Sao. It was submitted that the applicant/ respondent No. 1 was only nominated by her Late husband to get the amount from the insurance company, whereas, the appellant as Class I heir was entitled to get the entire amount of the insurance policy. He submits that law in respect of nominee has already been settled by the Apex Court in a case reported in AIR 1984 SC 346 (Smt. Sarbati Devi and another v. Smt. Usha Devi).
The Court observed that it is not in dispute that only being nominee in the policy taken by the deceased Sanjeev Kumar, the respondent no. 1 was not entitled to claim succession certificate in his favour in respect of insurance policy of deceased Sanjeev Kumar. Only on the basis of being nominee he was not entitled to claim. The issue regarding the right of a nominee is no longer res integra. It has already been settled in Sarbati Devi Case (Supra). In the present case, it is not in dispute that the appellant after the death of her husband had remarried, and as such, she had forfeited her right to claim any interest in the property of her deceased husband. Remarriage of a widow stands legalised by reason of the incorporation of the Act of 1956 but on her remarriage, she forfeits the right to obtain any benefit from her deceased husband’s estate and Section 2 of the Act of 1856 is very specific that the estate in that event would pass on to the next heir of her deceased husband as if she were dead.
In view of the aforesaid, the court held that the appellant herself had initially filed succession case vide Succession Case No. 123 of 2004, and thereafter, she agreed to withdraw the said case after accepting certain amount. This fact regarding compromise in between the parties was admitted by the appellant in her written statement filed before the court below. Once after compromise she had withdrawn the succession case, at subsequent stage, the appellant shall not be entitled to claim any succession right in the property of her husband (deceased), that too, after being remarried.
The district Judge rightly allowed the issuance of succession certificate in favour of Respondent No. 1 (brother of deceased)
Stamp Duty – Surrender of tenancy by earlier tenant – Creation of new tenancy on next day – Premises in question more than 60 years old – Entitled to discount of 70% – Bombay Stamp Act, 1958 (Art. 36)
The premises in question were earlier occupied by one Sadashiv Sheshappa Amin, who was a tenant and had filed R.A. Declaratory Suit. On 11th December, 2009, he surrendered the tenancy rights. On 12th December, 2009, the landlords Mrs. Urmila L. Pittie and Mr. Arvind L. Pittie inducted the Petitioners as tenants in respect of the premises.
The stamp duty of Rs. 100/- was affixed to the Tenancy Agreement and an Application for adjudication was made. Thereupon, the Collector of Stamps, Mumbai issued a demand notice, demanding a stamp duty of Rs.1,35,130/- alongwith penalty of Rs. 8,108/- by claiming that the Instrument was chargeable with stamp duty for lease under Article 36 of the Schedule to the Bombay Stamp Act, 1958. The Petitioners contended that Article 5 (g-d) was applicable and hence, according to the Petitioners, a stamp duty of Rs. 50,000/- only was payable.
Consequently, the Collector directed payment of sum of Rs.1,12,575/- as deficit stamp duty with penalty of Rs. 4505 after giving a discount of 50% only as building was very old.
The Petitioners case was that since earlier tenant had surrendered the tenancy and since immediately on the next date a new tenancy was created, the transaction was in fact covered by Article 5 (g-d) since it was the transaction of transfer of tenancy. He, therefore, submitted that Article 36 had no application to the facts of this case.
The Hon’ble Court observed that if the Petitioners, Landlords and the earlier Tenant who had surrendered tenancy had entered into one composite instrument whereby the tenancy had been transferred in favour of the Petitioners, then certainly the instrument would be one covered by the Article 5(g-d). However, in this case, such a composite tripartite agreement has not been executed.
Agreement of surrendering the tenancy and the agreement of creation of tenancy are two different and distinct documents arising out of the two different and distinct transactions. It is, therefore, not possible to accept the submission of the Petitioner that a composite transaction of transfer of tenancy had taken place.
On the second contention of the Petitioners about the discount on old buildings, the court observed that the Agreement of Tenancy specifically mentions that the building in which the premises in question are situated was 250 years old. The relevant extract of the Ready Reckoner also provides for different rates of depreciation for old buildings and provides that if the building was more than 60 years old only 30% of the market value is charged, meaning thereby that 70% discount over the market value for new property has to be given. Thus, the second contention of the Petitioner to get a discount of 70% was upheld.
Right of inheritance – In absence of ‘Son or Daughter’ of wife from her husband, property would devolve upon brother of her husband being heir of her husband – Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – Section 5(1)(a)(e).
The plaintiff – Reetu brought a suit for declaration of title and to declare the sale deed executed by Hira Kunwar in favour of defendant – Rengtu Chandra and Ramlal Sonar as void and if it is found that plaintiff is not in possession of the suit land, the possession of the suit land be given back to the plaintiff, alleging that the owner of the suit property was late Matharu. After his death, the suit land came into possession of his widow Budhwara. Late Matharu was issueless. Plaintiff, being real brother of late Matharu, inherited the suit property but respondent No. 1 – Hira Kunwar, who is daughter of Budhwara from her previous husband, got her name mutated in the revenue records behind his back. The trial Court, after recording evidence, decreed the plaintiff’s suit for declaration of title, finding inter alia, that after the death of Matharu, suit property was inherited by the appellant and that the respondent No. 1 – Hira Kunwar had no right or title over the suit land and had also no right to alienate the property.
The Hon’ble Court observed that the words “sons and daughters and the husband” appeared in Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 15 of the Act, 1956 only mean “sons and daughters and the husband of the deceased and not of anybody else”. The use of the words ‘of the deceased’ following ‘son or daughter’ in Clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 15 and absence of the same in sub-section (1) make no difference. Therefore, where on death her daughter from previous husband would not be entitled to inherit said property within meaning of section 15(1)(e) of Act and in absence of son or daughter of deceased wife from her husband, property would devolve upon brother of the deceased husband, being an heir of the husband.
Company – Dishonour of Cheque – Offence by company – Directors/Other Officer of Company cannot be prosecuted alone – Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 Sections. 138 and 141:
The common proposition of law that emerged for consideration was, whether an authorised signatory of a company would be liable for prosecution u/s. on 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 without the company being arraigned as an accused. There was difference of opinion between the two learned Judges in the interpretation of sections 138 and 141 of the Act and, therefore, the matter was placed before the larger bench.
The Appellant, Anita Hada, an authorised signatory of International Travels Limited, issued a cheque dated 17th January, 2011 for a sum of Rs.5,10,000/- in favour of the Respondent, namely, M/s. Godfather Travels & Tours Private Limited, which was dishonoured, as a consequence of which, the said Respondent initiated criminal action by filing a complaint before the concerned Judicial Magistrate u/s. 138 of the Act. In the complaint petition, the Company was not arrayed as an accused. However, the Magistrate took cognisance of the offence against the accused Appellant.
The Hon’ble Court observed that Section 141 of the Act is concerned with the offences by the company. It makes the other persons vicariously liable for commission of an offence on the part of the company. The vicarious liability gets attracted when the condition precedent u/s. 141 of the Act stands satisfied. The Court also held that the power of punishment is vested in the legislature and that is absolute in section 141 which clearly speaks of commission of offence by the company. The liability created is penal and thus warrants strict construction. It cannot therefore be said that the expression “as well as” in section 141 brings in the company as well as the Director and/or other officers who are responsible for the acts of the company within its tentacles and, therefore, a prosecution against the Directors or other officers is tenable, even if the company is not arraigned as an accused. The words “as well as” have to be understood in the context. Applying the doctrine of strict construction, it is clear that commission of offence by the company is an express condition precedent to attract the vicarious liability of others. Thus, it is absolutely clear that when the company can be prosecuted, then only the persons mentioned in the other categories could be vicariously liable for the offence, subject to the averments in the petition and proof thereof. It necessarily follows that for maintaining the prosecution u/s. 141 of the Act, arraigning of a company as an accused is imperative. Only then, the other categories of offenders can be brought in the dragnet on the touchstone of vicarious liability as the same has been stipulated in the provision itself. Accordingly, the proceedings initiated under Section 138 of the Act are quashed.
(2011) 24 STR 723 (Tri.-Del.) — Moon Network Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Kanpur.
Facts:
The appellant was a multi-system cable operator providing cable services. An order for payment of service tax was issued to the appellant since the figures seized from their records and the figures submitted by them did not reconcile. However, the appellant contended that service tax was computed on receipts basis for the period when services were taxable viz. 9-7-2004 till 31-7-2005. The appellant, further contended that their services did not fall under the category of broadcasting service, and hence it was not liable for service tax for the impugned period. The Department alleged that according to Prasar Bharti Law, cable operators providing transmission service provided broadcasting service.
Held:
The impugned service provided by the appellant fell under the taxable category of ‘Broadcasting Service’ after withdrawal of Notification No. 8/2001-ST and service tax was leviable for the period 9-7-2004 to 31-7-2005. Direction issued to adjudicating authority to re-compute the liability accordingly. No mala fide intention of the appellant, hence penalty was waived. Only penalty for delay in payment of service tax to be imposed.
(2011) 24 STR 721 (Tri.-Mumbai.) — Commissioner of Central Excise, Kolhapur v. Helios Food Additives Pvt. Ltd.
Facts:
The assessee along with manufacture of the food products in the district of Ratnagiri was also engaged in providing taxable services of renting of immovable property in Mumbai. The service tax on the same was not paid. The show-cause notice demanding service tax of Rs.2,62,032 and interest and penalties thereon was issued to the assessee by the Assistant Commissioner at Ratnagiri. The assessee’s Mumbai office had separate registration with the service tax authorities much prior to the issuance of the show-cause notice. Hence, taking into account the judgment in the case of C.C.E., C. & S.T., BBSR-II v. Ores India (P) Ltd., (2008) 12 STR 513 (Tri.), they contended that the proceedings initiated by the Assistant Commissioner at Ratnagiri are unsustainable.
Held:
It was held that the order confirming the demand of service tax and interest and penalty, etc. could not be sustained in law as held by the lower Appellate Authority as the adjudication authority at Ratnagiri had no jurisdiction over the Mumbai office of the Noticee.
On facts, buy-back of shares by an Indian Company treated as distribution of dividend.
article 13(4) of india-Mauritius DTAA,
Section 46A, 115-O, 245R(2) of income-tax Act
Dated: 22-3-2012
Justice P. K. Balasubramanyan (Chairman)
V. K. Shridhar (Member)
Present for the appellant: Ravi Sharma, Advocate
Present for the Department: G. C. Srivastava, Advocate
The applicant is a public limited company incorporated in India (ICO). The major shareholders of ICO are three foreign companies incorporated in US (US Co), Mauritius (Mau Co) and Singapore (Sing Co).
- AAR noted that: (a) Mau Co was held by a USbased parent company; (b) Mau Co had acquired shares of ICO during the years 2001 to 2005; (c) ICO declared dividends to its shareholders till 2003 (i.e., till the year of introduction of DDT) and had thereafter accumulated reserves despite consistent profits; (d) ICO had offered to buyback its shares twice (in 2008 and 2010) but, only Mau Co agreed to transfer its shares under the buy-back offer to ICO.
- Before AAR, the Tax Department contended that the transaction was colourable and designed to avoid tax in India by non-declaration of dividend and acceptance of buy-back offer only by Mau Co was on account of capital gains exemption available to Mau Co.
- ICO claimed that buy-back was genuine and taking advantage of exemption provision of the Act or treaty was not tax avoidance.
- AAR rejected ICO’s contentions and held that the scheme of buy-back was a colourable device to avoid tax in order to take benefit under India- Mauritius DTAA. It supported its conclusion based on the finding that:
- There was no proper explanation on the part of ICO as to why dividends were not declared subsequent to year 2003 while it regularly distributed dividends before introduction of DDT.
- The offer of buy-back was accepted only by Mau Co which enjoyed treaty exemption while the other two shareholders did not enjoy such protection. AAR also held that:
- Though an identical issue was pending adjudication before the Tax Authority, the present application was maintainable since it related to a different transaction.
- The fact that Mau Co is owned by US Company would not ipso facto label the transaction to be prima facie designed for avoidance of tax.
Vodafone – Wrong Number
On a more serious note, the Supreme Court, while delivering the judgment, carried out a broad review of precedents – it considered the principle laid down in Westminster’s case, visited the ghosts of Ramsay and spirit of McDowell, discussed the decision in Dawson and took in to account the freedom given to Mauritius companies by the decision in Azadi Bachao. To put it in a nutshell, it ultimately held that if the transaction is genuine and for business purposes then sale of shares by a non-resident in a foreign company having downstream subsidiaries, which in turn hold shares in an Indian company that has business in India, does not result in capital gain which can be considered to have accrued or deemed to have accrued in India.
Interestingly, while deciding the above issue, the Court developed a possibly new concept of ‘puppet subsidiary’. The Court held that “where the subsidiary’s executive directors’ competences are transferred to other persons/bodies or where the subsidiary’s executive directors’ decision making has become fully subordinate to the Holding Company with the consequence that the subsidiary’s executive directors are no more than puppets then the turning point in respect of the subsidiary’s place of residence comes about.”
While this concept of ‘puppet subsidiary’ certainly needs further consideration, it would be interesting to see how the assessing officers react. Many of us may recall that for several years after the decision in McDowell nearly every assessment order while making addition drew support from the decision and held that the assessee had resorted to a ‘colourable device’ or subterfuge or that the transaction was ‘sham’. One wonders whether after the decision in Vodafone, assessing officers will start viewing every subsidiary as a puppet of its holding company.
The majority judgement delivered by the honourable Chief Justice Kapadia did not decide the issue whether a non-resident having no tax presence in India is required to deduct tax at source u/s 195.
Over the next few months tax professionals will be busy analysing the Vodafone decision, digesting what is meant by ‘look at’ test, doctrine of ‘look through’, doctrine of ‘economic substance’, ‘dissecting approach’, ‘investment to participate’ and ‘purposive interpretation’ approach.
The reaction of the Government has been understandably muted. May be it is considering whether to play the oft-used trump card – ‘amend the law’. Or maybe politicians are far too busy with the election campaigns in Uttar Pradesh, Punjab, Uttarakhand, Goa and Manipur, whose proceedings have been, arguably, at least as interesting as the Vodafone judgement.
While many states are going to polls, so are various cities and towns in Maharashtra. Elections to the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (MCGM) will be held on 16th February 2012. MCGM is the richest municipal Corporation in the country with a budget of possibly more than that of a small state. The corporators that we elect have great influence in governance of this city which has many problems – bad roads, pollution of every kind, corruption – the list is long. We deserve better governance. Just as it is our right to expect good governance from the corporators, it is also our duty to cast vote in the forthcoming elections. So do cast your vote.
This issue has interesting articles and features dealing with the current issues – reference to OECD Commentary for interpretation, XBRL, accounting of foreign currency fluctuations and SEBI’s action against professionals.
We take this opportunity to congratulate the doyen of our profession Mr. Y. H. Malegam on his being conferred Padma Shri.
Royalty income receipts under different agreements are different sources of income, taxpayer can take benefit of lower tax rate by comparing the rate of tax under Income-tax Act and the DTAA separately for each agreement.
ITA No. 759/Bang./2011
Section 115a(1)(b) of income-tax act,
article 12 of india-US DTAA
A.Y.: 2007-08. Dated: 13-4-2012
Present for the appellant:
Padam Chand Khincha
Present for the respondent: Etwa Munda
Royalty income receipts under different agreements are different sources of income, taxpayer can take benefit of lower tax rate by comparing the rate of tax under income-tax act and the DTAA separately for each agreement.
- Taxpayer, a Company incorporated in the USA (FCO), received royalty income in respect of the following agreements:
- Royalty income in respect of IBM software ‘remarketer agreement’ entered into between FCO and IBM India Pvt. Ltd. (ICO) before 1 June 2005.
- Royalty income in respect of ‘Marketing Royalty Agreement’ between FCO and ICO dated 1 June 2005.
- Receipts from sale of software to third parties in India pursuant to agreements entered into on or after 1 June 2005.
2. FCO computed tax @15% under the DTAA as against 20% u/s.115A of the Income-tax Act for income from software ‘remarketer agreement’ entered into prior to 1 June 2005, on the basis that the beneficial rate of tax under DTAA was available. As against that for the other two agreements, tax was sought to be paid u/s.115A @10% (plus surcharge).
ITAT Ruling:
ITAT accepted FCO’s contentions and held:
- Depending on the nature of receipt i.e., royalty or FTS, and the date of the agreement i.e., before 1 June 2005 or after 1 June 2005, a foreign company has to compute the tax separately under each sub-clause of section 115A(1)(b) of the Incometax Act. Further, each sub-clause is mutually exclusive and independent of each other.
- Royalty income in respect of agreement entered into before 1 June 2005 was from one ‘source’ and royalty income in respect of agreement entered into on or after 1 June 2005 was from a different ‘source’.
- The contracts or agreements being the source of income have been entered into on different dates and the statute recognises such time differentiation and provides separate tax rates for each such stream.
- Reliance placed on SC ruling in the case of Vegetable Products Ltd.3 to support that where a provision in the taxing statute is capable of two reasonable interpretations, the view favourable to the taxpayer is to be preferred.
- FCO was correct in computing the tax at a beneficial rate in accordance with section 90(2) of the Income-tax Act wherein the expression ‘to the extent’ reinforces the principle that the provisions of Income-tax Act or the DTAA whichever is beneficial is applicable to the taxpayer.
Does God Reside in the Self or in the Temple?
Being born and brought up in a family in which worship of God is a daily routine, there cannot be any doubt in my mind about God or His presence, nor had I any occasion to test my faith about His presence in the temple.
Once an enlightened priest explained that the purpose of a temple is to provide a serene atmosphere to the tired soul such that it experiences peace, getting rid of negative emotions in the process. All great masters agree on one thing and that is ‘God is One and Indivisible’ which entity is nothing but perpetual universal energy. Modern science accepts that in the ultimate analysis, the foundation of the Universe and its multifarious manifestation is nothing but primordial energy which, being omnipresent, omniscient and omnipotent, can assume any shape or form at will, temple idol not excluded. So when an idol is consecrated in the Sanctum Sanctorum, the universal energy gets worshipped and when thousands of people direct their thought and attention towards that idol, it gets infused and enlivened. And consequently, we generally experience the divine spark of energy in the serene atmosphere of temples.
Well, this is one of the arguments in favour of idol worship and I am, of course, aware that there are other view points as well.
But as I grew up and saw the gross abuse of temples by vested interests, my faith in God residing therein got eroded somewhat. Today, we are witness to all sorts of degrading activity in and around temples. For example, special or VIP Darshan for a certain class of people, modes of pooja linked to the amount of Dakshina, etc. etc. leading to the conclusion that temples have become money-spinning resorts, plain and simple.
If God does not reside in temple, where can I find Him? Here, I am reminded of the following poem by Gurudev Rabindranath Tagore:
Go not to the temple to put flowers
Go not to the temple to light
Go not to the temple to bow down
Go not to the temple to pray
Go not to the temple to ask
When I assimilated the pith of this poem I realised in that I don’t have to visit a temple at all to see God, as He is omnipresent, omniscient and omnipotent. At the same time, I have nothing against those who go to the temple.
Today, I do believe that regardless of the presence of God in the temple precincts, He resides in the core of my being. Faith moves. Faith nestles and blends/merges with the surging, bubbling, energy abounding the Universe, call it Nature, Truth, God or whatever you please.
So be it!
Contract for supply, installation and commissioning of equipment is a composite contract and cannot be segregated.
aar No. 977 of 2010
explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vi),
article 12(2) of india-Singapore DTaa
Dated: 7-5-2012
Justice P. K. Balasubramanyan (Chairman)
Present for the Applicant: Anita Sumant
Present for the Department: None
Contract for supply, installation and commissioning of equipment is a composite contract and cannot be segregated for tax purpose; Separate payment schedule agreed in the contract cannot alter tax treatment; Consideration for offshore supply of equipment is taxable in india.
A decision of a Larger Bench of Supreme Court (SC) is a stronger binding precedent.
- Taxpayer, a Bahrain Company (FCO), entered into contract with ONGC (ICO) for supply, installation and commissioning of 36 manometer gauges in India. Under the contract, FCO was responsible for offshore supply of gauges and their installation and commissioning at sites within India.
- FCO claimed that the contract was in the nature of an offshore supply contract and since title in the equipment passed to ICO outside India and also since payments were received outside India, the consideration for offshore supply was not taxable in India. Reliance was placed on SC rulings1 to contend that income derived from offshore supply of equipment was not taxable in India.
AAR rejected FCO’s contention and held that contract with ICO was a composite contract and entire consideration was chargeable to tax in India for the following reasons:
- A contract is to be read as a whole and cannot be segregated for tax purposes. In Ishikawajima’s case, SC adopted a dissecting approach by dissecting a composite contract into two parts and holding one part not taxable in India. The decision of SC in Ishikawajima needs to be reviewed in light of recent SC ruling in case of Vodafone International2, which has propagated that a transaction needs to be looked at as a whole. Further, the ruling in case of Vodafone was rendered by a larger Three-Member Bench and hence would have greater precedence as compared to the SC ruling in Ishikawajima’s case.
- The nomenclature of offshore contract was ‘services for supply, installation and commissioning of 36 manometer gauges’. Other documents such as ‘Invitation to tender’, ‘Scope of Work’, etc. executed by the parties, also support that the primary purpose of the contract was installation of gauges in order to enable ICO to carry on oil extraction in India. Thus, the contract was a composite contract for supply and erection of equipment in India.
- Hence, payment received for installation and commissioning of gauges is chargeable to tax in India and the same will be taxable u/s.44BB of the Income-tax Act as the services are rendered in connection with prospecting and extraction of oil by ICO.
USA — Disclosure of Foreign Accounts and Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program (OVDP)
this article, we have given brief information about the Offshore
Voluntary Disclosure Program (OVDP) reopened by the U.S. Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) and its relevance to the Non-resident Indians
(NRIs) and Persons of Indian Origin (PIOs) residing in the USA as well
as to the U.S. citizens residing in India. Since a large number of NRIs
and PIOs live in the USA, the information given in this article would be
relevant to many of them as well as to the tax practitioners in India
who are often consulted on the implications and desirability of
disclosure under OVDP.
Background
According to
the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (IRC) as amended, of
the USA, all U.S. residents, green-card holders and citizens must file
their tax returns in the U.S. on their global income and pay taxes on
that income in the U.S. The penalties for failure to pay tax on global
income in the U.S. can be quite severe. This includes penalty for
failure to file return of income in time, failure to pay the taxes by
the due dates and levy of interest for delay in payment of taxes.
In
order to ensure that all the U.S. taxpayers comply with the provisions
of the IRC, the followings additional reporting requirements for
offshore income have been prescribed:
Financial Accounts (FBAR) — Form TD F 90–22.1
(a) The U.S.
Congress passed the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) in 1970 as the first laws to
fight money laundering in the United States. The BSA requires businesses
to keep records and file reports that are determined to have a high
degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, and regulatory matters. The
documents filed by businesses under the BSA requirements are heavily
used by law enforcement agencies, both domestic and international to
identify, detect and deter money laundering whether it is in furtherance
of a criminal enterprise, terrorism, tax evasion or other unlawful
activity.
(b) Accordingly, U.S. residents or persons in and
doing business in the U.S. must file a report with the government if
they have a financial account in a foreign country with a value
exceeding INR614,567 at any time during the calendar year. Taxpayers
comply with this law by reporting the account on their income tax return
and by filing Form TD F 90–22.1, the Report of Foreign Banks and
Financial Accounts (FBAR). The FBAR must be received by the Department
of the Treasury on or before June 30th of the year immediately following
the calendar year being reported. The June 30th filing date may not be
extended. Willfully failing to file a FBAR can be subject to both
criminal sanctions (i.e., imprisonment) and civil penalties equivalent
to the greater of INR6,145,675 or 50% of the balance in an unreported
foreign account — for each year since 2004 for which an FBAR was not
filed.
B. Statement of Specified Foreign Financial Assets under the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) — Form 8938
(a)
The FATCA, enacted in 2010 as part of the Hiring Incentives to Restore
Employment (HIRE) Act, is an important development in U.S. efforts to
combat tax evasion by U.S. persons holding investments in offshore
accounts.
Under FATCA, certain U.S. taxpayers holding financial
assets outside the United States must report those assets to the IRS. In
addition, FATCA will require foreign financial institutions to report
directly to the IRS certain information about financial accounts held by
U.S. taxpayers, or by foreign entities in which U.S. taxpayers hold a
substantial ownership interest.
(b) Reporting by U.S. Taxpayers Holding Foreign Financial Assets
FATCA
requires certain U.S. taxpayers holding foreign financial assets with
an aggregate value exceeding INR3,072,837 to report certain information
about those assets on a new form (Form 8938 — Statement of Specified
Foreign Financial Assets) that must be attached to the taxpayer’s annual
tax return. Reporting applies for assets held in taxable years
beginning after March 18, 2010. For most taxpayers this will be the 2011
tax return they file during the 2012 tax filing season. Failure to
report foreign financial assets on Form 8938 will result in a penalty of
INR614,567 (and a penalty up to INR3,072,837 for continued failure
after IRS notification). Further, underpayments of tax attributable to
non-disclosed foreign financial assets will be subject to an additional
substantial understatement penalty of 40 percent.
(c) Reporting by Foreign Financial Institutions
FATCA
will also require foreign financial institutions (‘FFIs’) to report
directly to the IRS certain information about financial accounts held by
U.S. taxpayers, or by foreign entities in which U.S. taxpayers hold a
substantial ownership interest. To properly comply with these new
reporting requirements, an FFI will have to enter into a special
agreement with the IRS by June 30, 2013. Under this agreement a
‘participating’ FFI will be obligated to:
(i) undertake certain identification and due diligence procedures with respect to its accountholders;
(ii)
report annually to the IRS on its accountholders who are U.S. persons
or foreign entities with substantial U.S. ownership; and
(iii)
withhold and pay over to the IRS 30% of any payments of U.S. source
income, as well as gross proceeds from the sale of securities that
generate U.S. source income, made to
(a) non-participating FFIs,
(b) individual ac-countholders failing to provide sufficient information to determine whether or not they are a U.S. person, or
(c) foreign entity accountholders failing to provide sufficient information about the identity of its substantial U.S. owners.
(d)
Form 8938 is and will be a significant tool for the IRS to identify the
scope of international tax non-compliance of a given U.S. taxpayer. The
reason why Form 8938 is so useful for the IRS is that Form 8938 now
requires a taxpayer to disclose more information, which connects various
parts of a taxpayer’s international tax compliance including the
information that escaped disclosure on other forms earlier.
(e)
Form 8938, allows the IRS to effectively identify the overall scope of a
taxpayer’s noncompliance. Form 8938 may lay the foundation (and road
map) for an IRS investigation of whether the taxpayer has been in
compliance previously. For example, Question 3a of Form 8938 indirectly
asks a problematic question: it requires the taxpayer to tick the box
‘account opened during tax year’, if the account is opened during the
tax year.
(f) For older accounts, this is a dangerous question.
Answering that the account was not opened in the tax year, implicitly
(and affirmatively by omission) states that account was opened in a
prior year. As a result, prior years FBARs should have been filed. The
answer to question 3a could provide incriminating evidence to the IRS.
(g)
The IRS is tracking foreign accounts in all countries, but thanks to
recent indictments of account-holders in countries like Switzerland and
India (several HSBC India account-holders have been indicted), there
could be increased focus on these countries.
(h) For Basic
Questions and Answers on Form 8938, the interested reader can refer to
the IRS website link at www.irs.gov/businesses/
corporations/article/0,,id=255061,00.html.
Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program (OVDP)
For years, the IRS has been pursuing the disclosure of information regarding undeclared interests of U.S. taxpayers (or those who ought to be U.S. taxpayers) in foreign financial accounts. On January 9, 2012, the IRS announced yet another Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program (the 2012 OVDP) following the success of the 2009 Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program (the 2009 OVDP) and the 2011 Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Initiative (the 2011 OVDI), which were announced many years after the 2003 Offshore Voluntary Compliance Initiative (OVCI) and the 2003 Offshore Credit Card Program (OCCP).
The OVDP programs basically eliminate the risk of criminal prosecution for taxpayers that are accepted into the program, and provide for reduced civil penalties than would apply if the IRS were to discover the taxpayer’s non-compliance in this area. In part, the success of such initiatives often depends on the perception that strong government tax enforcement efforts will follow.
2012 OVDP — Salient features
(a) The IRS on 9th January, 2012 reopened the OVDP to help people hiding offshore accounts get current with their taxes.
(b) The program is similar to the 2011 OVDI program in many ways, but with a few key differences. Unlike 2011 OVDI, there is no set deadline for people to apply. However, the terms of the program could change at any time going forward. For example, the IRS may increase penalties in the program for all or some taxpayers or defined classes of taxpayers — or decide to end the program entirely at any point.
(c) The overall penalty structure for the 2012 OVDP is the same as was for 2011 OVDI, except for taxpayers in the highest penalty category. For the 2012 OVDP, the penalty framework requires individuals to pay a penalty of 27.5% of the highest aggregate balance in foreign bank accounts/entities or value of foreign assets during the eight full tax years prior to the disclosure. That is up from 25% in the 2011 OVDI. Some taxpayers will be eligible for 5 or 12.5% penalties; these remain the same in the 2012 OVDP as in 2011 OVDI. Smaller offshore accounts will face a 12.5% penalty. People whose offshore accounts or assets did not surpass $75,000 in any calendar year covered by the 2012 OVDP will qualify for this lower rate. As under the prior programs, taxpayers who feel that the penalty is disproportionate may opt instead to be examined.
(d) Participants must file all original and amended tax returns and include payment for back-taxes and interest for up to eight years as well as pay accuracy-related and/or delinquency penalties.
Who should take advantage of the OVDP?
Taxpayers who have undisclosed offshore accounts or assets are eligible to apply for the 2012 OVDP penalty regime.
Taxpayers who reported and paid tax on all their taxable income but did not file FBARs, should not participate in the 2012 OVDI but should merely file the delinquent FBARs with the Department of Treasury, Post Office Box 32621, Detroit, MI 48232-0621 and attach a statement explaining why the reports are filed late. Under the 2011 OVDI, the IRS agreed not to impose a penalty for the failure to file the delinquent FBARs if there were no underreported tax liabilities and taxpayers filed the FBARs by September 9, 2011 (FAQ 17). Presumably, the IRS will follow the same course under the 2012 OVDP since those with no underreported tax liabilities are not truly within the range of taxpayers the IRS is trying to identify.
However, those taxpayers who have failed to report their foreign income altogether, might consider taking the advantage of 2012 OVDP. The ability of a U.S. taxpayer to maintain an undisclosed, ‘secret’ foreign financial account is fast becoming impossible. Foreign account information is flowing into the IRS under tax treaties, through submissions by whistleblowers, from others who participated in the 2009 OVDP and the 2011 OVDP who have been required to identify their bankers and advisors.
It does not matter if the failure to report foreign income or tax evasion was unintentional. For many years the IRS has, as part of the tax return in Schedule B of the Form 1040 — U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, had asked for information on foreign bank accounts and hence a taxpayer is expected to be aware of this.
Additional information will become available as the FATCA and new mandatory IRS Form 8938 — Statement of Specified Foreign Financial Assets has become effective. Under such circumstances, the decision to apply for 2012 OVDP involves fair bit of risk management. Although the 2012 OVDP penalty regime may seem overly harsh for many, the decision to participate should include an economic analysis of the taxpayer’s projected future earnings that could be generated from the foreign funds. It is important to note that if a taxpayer is discovered before any voluntary disclosure submission, there could be harsh criminal (in addition to civil) penalties. The risks may outweigh the benefits.
For those taxpayers at substantial risk of being treated as willful non-filers by the IRS, the OVDP’s fixed civil penalties, generally, are substantially lower than the potential maximum willful penalties. Therefore, filing under the OVDP generally should be a good deal for such taxpayers.
For those few taxpayers, however, who have credible and strong reasonable cause arguments to avoid penalties completely, the fixed penalties of the OVDP program generally do not appear to be an attractive option.
For the vast majority of taxpayers who fall somewhere in between (i.e., clearly not a willful non-filer, but also no credible reasonable cause arguments), the decision becomes a difficult one of number-crunching and comparing all possible outcomes, followed by risk-tolerance and risk-aversion based choices from amongst those possible outcomes in deciding which course to follow. Anyone considering an OVDP submission must carefully examine all potential civil penalties and evaluate the risk of criminal prosecution.
Options available to taxpayers
Taxpayers who have not disclosed their foreign assets and wishing to come into compliance, have the following two options:
(a) a formal disclosure through the IRS’s standard voluntary disclosure program (a ‘noisy disclosure’) or
(b) simply trying to file prior year original or amended returns and hope they slip through the cracks and don’t get audited (a ‘silent disclosure’).
Taxpayers must be clearly aware that the IRS is getting more aggressive in auditing ‘silent disclosures’ of offshore accounts and, therefore, this option remains highly risky and is not advisable for most taxpayers. However, a silent disclosure could be a preferred option for some taxpayers, depending on their specific circumstances and that the IRS will never be able to succeed in forcing all taxpayers into a noisy disclosure, which is their stated goal. It is strongly advisable to consult one’s tax advisor for his specific situation. An individual’s situation maybe different from the facts of a generic article of this type and hence it’s better to look at getting the right advice.
Risks of non-reporting and IRS initiatives to seek Foreign Accounts Information
There are rumors regarding ongoing ‘John Doe’ summons (A John Doe summons is any summons where the name of the taxpayer under investigation is unknown and therefore not specifically identified) activity seeking to force foreign financial institutions to deliver account-holder information to the U.S. government as well as possible indictments of foreign financial institutions. Recently, several foreign institutions have advised their account-holders to consult U.S. tax advisers regarding the IRS voluntary disclosure program and their U.S. tax reporting relating to their foreign financial accounts. It is reasonable to assume that such institutions will take whatever action is necessary to avoid being indicted, beginning with the delivery of information regarding account-holders to the U.S. government.
It is likely that the U.S. will require foreign financial institutions doing business in the United States to disclose account-holders having relatively small accounts and earnings. There have been rumors of discussions regarding accounts having a high balance of the equivalent of $50,000 at any time between 2002 and 2010. U.S. persons having interests in foreign financial accounts should not find comfort in a belief that their foreign financial institution will somehow refrain from disclosing very small accounts in the current enforcement environment. Those who think too long may be sorely surprised at the high level of ultimate cooperation of their institution with the U.S. government.
The U.S. government is establishing special disclosure pacts with France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom. Under this approach, foreign banks would disclose data on U.S. account-holders to their own governments, which would then provide information to the IRS. The U.S. government is looking to expand these pacts to other countries as well.
It is important to keep in mind that the U.S. government has prosecuted taxpayers in many cases who did not report their foreign accounts and foreign income. The list of some of such cases is given below:
(a) U.S. v. Mauricio Cohen Assor (Florida, 2011) got 120 months jail time — his son was also convicted and received the same jail time.
(b) U.S. v. Diana Hojsak (San Francisco, CA, 2007) got 27 months jail time.
(c) U.S. v. Igor Olenicoff (Orange County, CA, 2007) got 2 years probation and 120 hours community service.
(d) U.S. v. Monty D. Hundley (New York, 2005) got 96 months jail time.
(e) U.S. v. Brett G. Tollman (New York, 2004) got 33 months jail time — his mother and other relatives were also convicted.
Conclusion
Taxpayers having undisclosed interests in foreign financial accounts must consult competent tax professionals before deciding to participate in the 2012 OVDI. Others may decide to risk detection by the IRS and the imposition of substantial penalties, including the civil fraud penalty, numerous foreign information return penalties, and the potential risk of criminal prosecution. If discovered before any voluntary disclosure submission, the results can be devastating. Waiting may not be a viable option.
In view of the above discussion, the NRIs, PIOs and green-card holders living in the USA would be well advised to plan investments in India in a manner that they are able to obtain full credit for Indian taxes paid/withheld at source against their U.S. Tax liability on such Indian income. Further, planning to have the tax-free/low-taxed income in India may not be very prudent in many cases, in view of tax liability of such income in the USA.
The purpose of this article is to bring awareness about the 2012 OVDP of U.S. IRS and the potential risks of non-reporting of foreign financial accounts. This article is based on the information given on U.S. IRS website and views, experiences of earlier OVDPs and articles of U.S. tax experts, available in public domain. The reader is advised to consult U.S. Tax Expert(s) before taking advantage of 2012 OVDP.
State Finance Bill, 2012 enacted.
The Government of Maharashtra has gazetted the Maharashtra Act No. VIII [Maharashtra Tax Laws (Levy, Amendment and Validation) Act, 2012] on 25th April, 2012 after receiving consent of the Governor.
TDS — Payment to Unregistered Contractor — Notification No. JC(HQ)1/VAT/2005/97, dated 4-4-2012.
Clarification reg. submission of annexures by dealers not required to file audit report in Form 704 — Trade Circular No. 7T, of 2012, dated 24-4-2012.
Carry forward of the refund up to Rs.1 lakh of FY 2011-12 — Trade Circular No. 6T of 2012, dated 21-4-2012.
Clarification reg. taxability of market fees collected by APMCs — Circular No. 157/08/2012- ST, dated 27-4-2012.
APMCs provide basic facilities in the market area out of the ‘market fee’ collected by them mainly to facilitate farmers, purchasers and others and a host of services to the licensees in relation to procurement of agricultural produce, which are ‘inputs’ as per section 65(19) of the Act; therefore, services provided by the APMCs are classifiable under ‘Business Auxiliary services’ and hence, benefit of exemption under Notification No. 14/2004-ST is available. However, any other service provided by the APMCs for a separate charge (other than ‘market fee’) either to the licensees or to the farmers or to any other person, e.g., renting of shops in the market area, etc. would be liable to tax under the respective taxable heads.
Sale price — Turnover of sales — Separate charges for amenity facilities and supply of food or liquor — Served in hotel and restaurants — Entire amount forms part of sales price and turnover of sales — Separation of sale price between cost and amenity charges immaterial — Section 2(xxvii) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963.
Sale price — Turnover of sales — Separate charges for amenity facilities and supply of food or liquor — Served in hotel and restaurants — Entire amount forms part of sales price and turnover of sales — Separation of sale price between cost and amenity charges immaterial — Section 2(xxvii) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963.
Held:
The question to be considered is whether the amenities separately charged without any facility or service provided is to be excluded from turnover. The dealer has no case that separate tariff is provided in hotel — one for those who do not want to avail of special amenities and the other for those who want to avail so. On the other hand, what is shown is sale price bifurcated between cost and amenities and the dealer is claiming exclusion of amenity charges from turnover for the purpose of levy of sales tax.
Exemptions — Classification of goods — Sale of pan masala in single pouch having two parts — One containing tobacco and other containing pan masala — Sold under brand name ‘Double Maza’ — Is a single commodity — Exempt as pan masala containing tobacco, Entry 82 of Schedule I, West Bengal Sales Tax Act, 1985.
Exemptions — Classification of goods — Sale of pan masala in single pouch having two parts — One containing tobacco and other containing pan masala — Sold under brand name ‘Double Maza’ — Is a single commodity — Exempt as pan masala containing tobacco, Entry 82 of Schedule I, West Bengal Sales Tax Act, 1985.
The dealer sold an item under the brand name Double Maza in a single pouch having two parts — one containing tobacco and the other, ‘Pan Masala’ without containing tobacco. The dealer claimed exemption form payment of tax on sale of the above item considering it as a ‘Pan Masala’ containing tobacco, although sold in a separate part, without mixing with each other, but packed in single pouch, duly covered by entry 82 of Schedule I of The West Bengal Sales Tax Act, 1985. The assessing authority held it taxable under Schedule IV not treating it as ‘Pan Masala’ containing tobacco, being poured in a single pouch making two parts separately, but customer has no option to buy it separately and therefore the item was considered as taxable. The dealer filed writ petition before the Calcutta High Court against the decision of the West Bengal Taxation Tribunal.
Held:
The disputed item manufactured by the dealer containing two separate folders, one for ‘Pan Masala’ and the other for tobacco, but not offered to sale separately, is really a ‘Pan Masala’ containing tobacco classified in Chapter 24 under the tariff heading 2404.49 of First Schedule of Excise Tariff, although the same is presented as unassembled or disassembled article which has the essential character of the complete or finished article. The High Court accordingly held it as covered by Entry 82 of First Schedule of the West Bengal Sales Tax Act, 1944 as such exempt from payment of tax and set aside the orders passed by the Taxation Tribunal and assessing authorities.
Authorised service station — Authorisation has to be given by the manufacturer of vehicles only, not by any manufacturer and the services have to be provided only in relation to vehicles manufactured by that manufacturer — If respondent provided services to vehicle manufactured by other manufacturer for which he is not authorised to provide services, they cannot be held authorised service station vis-àvis such manufacturer of vehicle and services provided in respect of those vehicles.
Authorised service station — Authorisation has to be given by the manufacturer of vehicles only, not by any manufacturer and the services have to be provided only in relation to vehicles manufactured by that manufacturer — If respondent provided services to vehicle manufactured by other manufacturer for which he is not authorised to provide services, they cannot be held authorised service station vis-à-vis such manufacturer of vehicle and services provided in respect of those vehicles.
The respondents were authorised dealers for vehicles manufactured by General Motors and were covered by the category of authorised service station and they were also registered with the Service Tax Department under the category of Business Auxiliary Services. During the period October 2006 — December 2007, they also undertook servicing of vehicles manufactured by other manufacturers. The Department was of the view that they were liable to pay service tax in respect of such servicing of vehicles i.e., other than General Motors.
Held:
The definition of ‘authorised service station’ includes centre or station authorised by any motor vehicle manufacturer, to carry out any service in respect of vehicles manufactured by such manufacturer i.e., the authorisation has to be given by the manufacturer of vehicles. It was held that authorised service station was required to be authorised for providing services to the vehicles of such manufacturer and not by any manufacturer. Hence the Department’s contention that the service station may be authorised by any manufacturer and services provided by them in respect of vehicles manufactured by other manufacturers for which it was not authorised are to be held taxable, was not accepted.
Business expenditure: TDS: Disallowance: Non-resident: Sections 9 and 40(a)(i): A.Y. 2007-08: Income deemed to accrue or arise in India: Business connection not established: Mere entry in books of account of Indian payer does not mean that non-resident received payment in India: No income accrued in India: Tax need not be deducted at source: Expenditure not disallowable.
The assessee-company was engaged in the business of development and export of software. In the A.Y. 2007-08, the assessee paid commission to its parent company in the U.K. on the sales and amounts realised on export contracts procured by it for the assessee and the same was claimed as deduction. The Assessing Officer held that the U.K. company had a business connection in India and that commission income had accrued and arisen in India when credit entries were made in the books of the assessee in favour of the U.K. company and the income towards commission was received in India. He held that the assessee was liable to deduct tax at source and as there was failure to do so, disallowed the expenditure u/s.40(a)(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Commissioner (A) held that the ‘business connection’ was not established and allowed the assessee’s claim. The Tribunal upheld the decision of the Commissioner (A).
On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:
“(i) The Assessing Officer did not elaborate or had not discussed on what basis he had come to the conclusion that ‘business connection’ as envisaged u/s.9(1)(i) existed. The assessee had submitted that the U.K. company was a non-resident company and did not have any permanent establishment in India. The U.K. company was not rendering any service or performing any activity in India itself. These facts were not and could not be disputed.
(ii) The stand of the Revenue was contrary to the two Circulars issued by the CBDT in which it was clearly held that when a non-resident agent operates outside the country, no part of his income arises in India, and since payment was remitted directly abroad, merely because an entry in the books of account was made, it did not mean that the non-resident had received any payment in India.
(iii) The Assessing Officer did not make out a case of business connection as stipulated in section 9(1)(i) of the Act. He had not made any foundation or basis for holding that there was business connection and, therefore, section 9(1)(i) of the Act was applicable.
(iv) The Appellate Authorities, on the basis of material on record, had rightly held that ‘business connection’ was not established.”
Interest on refund: Section 244A of Incometax Act, 1961: A.Y. 2002-03: Interest u/s.244A is to be calculated from the date of payment of tax till the date of refund and not from the 1st of April of the assessment year or from date of regular assessment.
For the A.Y. 2002-03, the Assessing Officer granted interest u/s.244A of the Act from the date of regular assessment. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal held that interest should be calculated from the date on which the self-assessment tax was paid by the assessee.
On appeal by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:
“Where the assessee is entitled to refund of self-assessment tax, interest u/s.244A is to be calculated from the date of payment of tax till the date of refund and not from the 1st of April of the assessment year or from the date of regular assessment.”
Business expenditure: Capital or revenue: A.Y. 2003-04: Assessee tenant in premises contributed to reconstruction cost of premises with understanding that it will continue as tenant at the same rent: Expenditure is revenue expenditure.
The assessee was a tenant of 5000 sq.ft. in a building which was declared as unsafe. The assessee contributed Rs.1.5 crore for reconstruction of the building with the understanding that it will continue as a tenant at Rs.11,300 per month. In the A.Y. 2003-04, the assessee claimed the deduction of the said expenditure of Rs.1.5 crore. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim holding that it is capital expenditure. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.
On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:
“(i) The assessee had not incurred any expenditure of capital nature. The expenditure did not result in the acquisition of a capital asset by the assessee. The assessee continued as before to be a tenant in respect of the premises.
(ii) By contributing an amount of Rs.1.5 crore towards the construction or, as the case may be, renovation of the existing structure, the assessee obtained a commercial advantage of securing tenancy of an equivalent area of premises at the same rent as before. Since there was no acquisition of a capital asset and the occupation of the assessee continued in the character of a tenancy, the expenditure could not be regarded as being of a capital nature.
(iii) The cost of repair/reconstruction of the tenanted premises was of a revenue nature and was allowable as and by way of deduction.”
Export profit: Deduction u/s.10BA of Incometax Act, 1961: A.Y. 2005-06: DEPB is a profit derived from export business for the purpose of deduction u/s.10BA.
The Tribunal held that DEPB is a profit derived from export business for the purposes of deduction u/s.10BA of the Income-tax Act, 1961. In appeal by the Revenue, the following question was raised:
“Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal erred in law in holding DEPB as a profit derived from export business for the purpose of deduction u/s.10BA ignoring the ratio of decision in the case of Liberty India v. CIT, (2009) 225 CTR (SC) 233; (2009) 28 DTR (SC) 73; (2009) 317 ITR 218 (SC) having binding force on facts and circumstances of the case?”
The Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:
“The Counsel for the Revenue fairly states that though the question has been raised by relying upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Liberty India v. CIT, the said decision has no relevance to the facts of the present case. In this view of the matter, the question raised by the Revenue cannot be entertained.”
Appellate Tribunal: Adjournment: Section 255, Rule 32 of Income-tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963: Where a case is adjourned by Tribunal by giving a last opportunity to counsel for assessee, same can be adjourned again on the next date, if sufficient or reasonable cause exists on that day.
The assessee’s appeal before the Tribunal was fixed for hearing on 11-1-2010 and at the request of the counsel for the assessee, hearing of the case was adjourned to 9-2-2010 giving him a last opportunity. However, the counsel for the assessee moved an application before the Tribunal for adjournment of the case in advance on 8-2-2010 on the ground that he was going to Mumbai for some urgent work. On 9-2-2010 the Tribunal rejected the application for adjournment. It further heard the counsel for the Revenue ex parte and allowed the appeal of the Revenue. On appeal to High Court, the assessee contended, inter alia, that
(i) from the order of the Tribunal it was clear that adjournment application was rejected only on the ground that a last opportunity was granted to counsel for the assessee to argue the appeal, and
(ii) even if a last opportunity was granted on last date, it did not mean that on sufficient ground the case could not be adjourned again. The Rajasthan High Court allowed the assessee’s appeal and held as under: “(i) From the proceedings of the Tribunal dated 11-1-2010, it is clear that last opportunity was given and the case was adjourned for 9-2- 2010. Application for adjournment was filed on 8-2-2010, which was put up for consideration before the Tribunal on 9-2-2010. From the application, it appears that counsel for the assessee had to go to Mumbai due to some urgent work. No one was present on behalf of the assessee. The Tribunal, in absence of counsel for the assessee, rejected the adjournment application. (ii) Ordinarily it is not incumbent on the part of the Tribunal to adjourn the case again when a last opportunity had already been granted to the counsel for the assessee. However, there may be number of circumstances where adjournment becomes necessary in the interest of justice. If counsel for the assessee had to go for some urgent work to Mumbai and an application for adjournment was moved in advance, then in the interest of justice a short adjournment should have been granted. If number of opportunities had already been afforded to the counsel for the assessee, then adjournment could have been granted on payment of cost.
(iii) The Tribunal has not assigned any reason as to whether reason mentioned in the application for adjournment constituted sufficient cause for adjournment or not. Even if a last opportunity is granted and case is fixed for hearing and sufficient cause is shown on the date fixed for hearing, then the case can be adjourned and it should be adjourned in the interest of justice. In these circumstances, the Tribunal committed an illegality in rejecting the application for adjournment and in deciding the appeal ex parte.
(iv) Therefore, the ex parte order passed by the Tribunal deserved to be set aside. The case was to be remitted back to the Tribunal for decision afresh on merits.”
Appeal to High Court: Power and scope: Section 260A: Jurisdiction to reassess: Question can be raised for the first time before the High Court.
The assessee had not raised the issue as regards the jurisdiction to reassess before the Assessing Officer, Commissioner (A) or the Tribunal. For the first time the assessee raised the issue before the High Court in appeal u/s.260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
The Calcutta High Court admitted the question and held as under:
“A pure question of law which goes to the very root of the jurisdiction and further initiation of the proceedings can be raised at any stage, even at the stage of appeal to the Supreme Court.”
Deemed income: Remission or cessation of trading liability: Section 41(1) of Incometax Act, 1961: A.Y. 1995-96: Explanation 1 to section 41(1) is prospective and not retrospective: Applies w.e.f. A.Y. 1997-98: Not applicable to A.Y. 1995-96: For A.Y. 1995-96 mere writing back of amounts in relation to unclaimed salaries, wages and bonus and unclaimed suppliers’ and customers’ balances could not amount to cessation of liability: Amounts (uncashed cheques, dividend paid to shareholders, provision<
In the A.Y. 1995-96, the assessee had written back certain amount representing (a) unclaimed salaries, wages and bonus; (b) credit balances unclaimed by the suppliers; (c) credit balances unclaimed by the customers; (d) uncashed cheques; (e) excess dividend; and (f) excess provision made for doubtful debts in its books of account. The Assessing Officer added these amounts as deemed income relying on the provisions of section 41(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal deleted the additions.
On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the deletion and held as under:
“(i) Salaries, wages and bonus
The contention of the assessee was that there was no cessation or remission of the liability and, therefore, by merely writing back the credit balances in the books of account, which is an unilateral action of the assessee, the liability cannot be said to have ceased.
The concerned assessment year was 1995-96. Explanation 1 to section 41(1) was added by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1996 with effect from 1-4-1997. The Explanation provides that the unilateral act of the assessee by way of writing off such liability in its accounts would be considered as remission or cessation of the liability. In Circular No. 762, dated 18-2-1998, which is reported in (1998) 230 ITR (St.) 12, the CBDT has explained the reason behind insertion of the above Explanation. In paragraph 28.3 of the Circular it has further been stated that the amendment will take effect from 1-4-1997 and will, accordingly, apply in relation to A.Y. 1997-98 and subsequent years. The Explanation, therefore, does not have any retrospective effect. It does not, therefore, apply to the A.Y. 1995-96. For this reason, the mere writing back of the loan in relation to unclaimed salaries, wages and bonus cannot amount to cessation of the liability.
(ii) Suppliers’ credit balances and customers’ credit balances
So far as the suppliers’ credit balances and the customers’ credit balances are concerned, the same reasoning is applicable for the year under consideration. Accordingly, those two additions made by the Assessing Officer are also not in accordance with law.
(iii) Uncashed cheques
In the case of the uncashed cheques, the finding of the Tribunal is that there was no claim for deduction in any of the earlier years and, therefore, the amount cannot be added u/s.41(1). It is not in dispute, as it cannot be, that the amount of uncashed cheques was not allowed as deduction in any of the earlier assessment years. As per the assessee this represents the cheques received and remaining on hand on the last day of the accounting period. The Tribunal has accepted this stand. The Assessing Officer and the Commissioner (Appeals) have not stated why the stand of the assessee was not acceptable. The Revenue has also not stated and averred that in the assessment order now passed, this aspect was not considered and examined. In these circumstances, section 41(1) can hardly have any application. Accordingly, the decision of the Tribunal deleting the addition is to be upheld.
(iv) Excess dividend
Dividend paid by a company to its shareholders is not an allowable deduction under the Income-tax Act as it represents an appropriation of the profits after they have been earned. If the dividend is not allowable as a deduction, the excess written back cannot also be assessed as income u/s.41(1).
(v) Excess provision for doubtful debts
The finding of the Commissioner (Appeals) is that the provision was never allowed as a deduction in the earlier years. Since the finding that the provision was not allowed in the earlier year as a deduction is not under challenge, the amount cannot be added u/s.41(1) when it is written back in the accounts. The decision of the Tribunal is to be upheld.”
Business expenditure — Banks — The provisions of clause (viia) of section 36(1) relating to the deduction on account of the provision for bad and doubtful debt(s) are distinct and independent of the provisions of section 36(1) (vii) relating to allowance of the bad debts — The scheduled commercial banks would continue to get the full benefit of the writeoff of the irrecoverable debt(s) u/s.36(1)(vii) in addition to the benefit of deduction for the provision made for bad and doubtful debt(s) u/s<
The
assessee, a scheduled bank, filed its return of income for the A.Y.
2002-03 on October 24, 2002, declaring total income of Rs.61,15,610. The
return was processed u/s.143(1), and eligible refund was issued in
favour of the assessee. However, the Assessing Officer issued notice
u/s.143(2) to the assessee, after which the assessment was completed.
Inter alia, the Assessing Officer, while dealing, u/s.143(3), with the
claim of the assessee for bad debts of Rs.12,65,95,770, noticed that the
argument put forward on behalf of the assessee, that the deduction
allowable u/s.36(1) (vii) is independent of deduction u/s.36(1)(viia),
could not be accepted. Consequently, he observed that the assessee
having a provision of Rs.15,01,29,990 for bad and doubtful debts
u/s.36(1)(viia), could not claim the amount of Rs.12,65,95,770 as
deduction on account of bad debts because the bad debts did not exceed
the credit balance in the provision for bad and doubtful debts account
and also the requirements of clause (v) of s.s (2) of section 36 were
not satisfied. Therefore, the assessee’s claim for deduction of bad
debts written off from the account books was disallowed. This amount was
added back to the taxable income of the assessee, for which a demand
notice and challan was accordingly issued. This order of the Assessing
Officer dated January 24, 2005, was challenged in appeal by the assessee
on various grounds.
The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals)
vide his order dated April 7, 2006, partly allowed the appeal,
particularly in relation to the claim of the appellantbank for bad
debts. Relying upon the judgment of a Division Bench of the Kerala High
Court in the case of South Indian Bank Ltd. v. CIT, (2003) 262 ITR 579
(Ker.), the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) held that the claim of
the appellant was fully supported by the said decision and since the
entire bad debts written off by the bank u/s.36(1)(vii) were pertaining
to urban branches only and not to the provision made for rural brances
u/s.36(1)(viia), it was entitled to the deduction of the full claimed
amount of Rs.12,65,95,770. Consequently, he directed deletion of the
said amount.
Being aggrieved from the order of the Commissioner
of Income-tax (Appeals), the Revenue as well as the assessee filed
appeal before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin. Vide its order
dated April 16, 2007, while relying upon the judgment of the
jurisdictional High Court in the case of South Indian Bank Ltd. (supra),
the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal dismissed the appeal of the Revenue
on this issue and also granted certain other benefits to the assessee in
relation to other items.
However, the Department of Income-tax,
being dissatisfied with the order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal
in the A.Y. 2002-03, filed an appeal before the High Court u/s.260A of
the Act.
The Division Bench of the High Court of Kerala at
Ernakulam hearing the batch of appeals against the order of the Income
Tax Appellate Tribunal expressed the view that the judgment of that
Court in the case of South Indian Bank (supra) was not a correct
exposition of law. While dissenting therefrom, the Bench directed the
matter to be placed before a Full Bench of the High Court.
Vide
its judgment dated December 16, 2009, the Full Bench not only answered
the question of law but even decided the case on the merits. While
setting aside the view taken by the Division Bench in South Indian Bank
(supra) and also the concurrent view taken by the Commissioner of
Income-tax (Appeals) and the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, the Full
Bench of the High Court held as under (page 181 of 326 ITR):
“What
is clear from the above is that provision for bad and doubtful debts
normally is not an allowable deduction and what is allowable under the
main clause is bad debt actually written off. However, so far as banks
to which clause (viia) applies are concerned, they are entitled to claim
deduction of provision u/ss.(viia), but at the same time when bad debts
written off is also claimed deduction under clause (vii), the same will
be allowed as a deduction only to the extent it is in excess of the
provision created and allowed as a deduction under clause (viia). It is
worthwhile to note that deduction u/s.36(1)(vii) is subject to s.s (2)
of section 36 which in clause (v) specifically states that any bad debt
written off should be claimed as a deduction only after debiting it to
the provision created for bad and doubtful debts. What is clear from the
above provisions is that though the respondent-banks are entitled to
claim deduction of provision for bad and doubtful debts in terms of
clause (viia), such banks are entitled to deduction of bad debt actually
written off only to the extent it is in excess of the provision created
and allowed as deduction under clause (viia). Further, in order to
qualify for deduction of bad debt written off the requirement of section
36(2)(v) is that such amount should be debited to the provision created
under clause (viia) of section 36(1). Therefore, we are of the view
that the distinction drawn by the Division Bench in the South Indian
Bank’s case between the bad debts written off in respect of advances
made by rural branches and bad debts pertaining to advances made by
other branches does not exist and is not visualised under the proviso to
section 36(1)(vii). We, therefore, hold that the said decision of this
Court does not lay down the correct interpretation of the provisions of
the Act. Admittedly, all the respondent-assessees have claimed and have
been allowed deduction of provision in terms of clause (viia) of the
Act. Therefore, when they claim deduction of bad debt written off in the
previous year by virtue of the proviso to section 36(1)(vii), they are
entitled to claim deduction of such bad debt only to the extent it
exceeds the provision created and allowed as deduction under clause
(viia) of the Act.
In the normal course we should answer the
question referred to us by the Division Bench and send back the appeals
to the Division Bench to decide the appeals consistent with the Full
Bench Decision. However, since this is the only issue that arises in the
appeals, we feel it would be only an empty formality to send back the
matter to the Division Bench for disposal of appeals consistent with our
judgment. In order to avoid unnecessary posting of appeals before the
Division Bench, we allow the appeals by setting aside the orders of the
Tribunal and by restoring the assessments confirmed in first appeals.”
Dissatisfied
from the judgment of the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court, the
assessee filed the appeals before the Supreme Court purely on question
of law.
The Supreme Court held that the income of an assessee
carrying on a business or profession has to be assessed in accordance
with the scheme contained in Part D of Chapter IV dealing with heads of
income. Section 28 of the Act deals with the chargeability of income to
tax under the head ‘Profits and gains of business or profession’. All
‘other deductions’ available to an assessee under this head of income
are dealt with u/s.36 of the Act which opens with the words ‘the
deduction provided for in the following clauses shall be allowed in
respect of matters dealt with therein, in computing the income referred
to in section 28’. In other words, for the purposes of computing the
income chargeable to tax, beside specific deductions, ‘other deductions’
postulated in different clauses of section 36 are to be allowed by the
Assessing Officer, in accordance with law.
The provision of section 36(1)(vii) would come into play in the grant of deductions, subject to the limitation contained in section 36(2) of the Act. Any bad debt or part thereof, which is written off as irrecoverable in the accounts of the assessee for the previous year is the deduction which the assessee would be entitled to get, provided he satisfies the requirements of section 36(2) of the Act. Allowing of deduction of bad debts is controlled by the provisions of section 36(2). The argument advanced on behalf of the Revenue is that it would amount to allowing a double deduction if the provisions of section 36(1)(vii) and 36(1)(viia) are permitted to operate independently. There is no doubt that a statute is normally not construed to provide for a double benefit unless it is specifically so stipulated or is clear from the scheme of the Act. As far as the question of double benefit is concerned, the Legislature in its wisdom introduced section 36(2)(v) by the Finance Act, 1985, with effect from April 1, 1985. Section 36(2)(v) concerns itself as a check for claim of any double deduction and has to be read in conjunction with section 36(1)(viia) of the Act. It requires the assessee to debit the amount of such debt or part thereof in the previous year to the provision made for that purpose.
The Supreme Court, referring to the Circular Nos. 258, dated 14-6-1979, 421, dated 12-6-1988, 464, dated 18-7-1986 and the objects and reasons for the Finance Act, 1986, held that clear legislative intent of the relevant provisions and unambiguous language of the Circulars with reference to the amendments to section 36 of the Act demonstrate that the deduction on account of provision for bad and doubtful debts u/s.36(1)(viia) is distinct and independent of the provisions of section 36(1)(vii) relating to allowance of the bad debts. The legislative intent was to encourage rural advances and the making of provisions for bad debts in relation to such rural branches. Another material aspect of the functioning of such banks is that their rural branches were practically treated as a distinct business, though ultimately these advances would form part of the books of accounts of the principal or head office branch. According to the Supreme Court the Circulars in question show a trend of encouraging rural business and for providing greater deductions. The purpose of granting such deductions would stand frustrated if these deductions are implicitly neutralised against other independent deductions specifically provided under the provisions of the Act.
The Supreme Court further held that the language of section 36(1)(vii) of the Act is unambiguous and does not admit of two interpretations. It applies to all banks, commercial or rural, scheduled or unscheduled. It gives a benefit to the assessee to claim a deduction on any bad debt or part thereof, which is written off as irrecoverable in the amounts of the assessee for the previous year. This benefit is subject only to section 36(2) of the Act. It is obligatory upon the assessee to prove to the Assessing Officer that the case satisfies the ingredients of section 36(1)(vii) on the one hand and that it satisfies the requirements stated in section 36(2) of the Act on the other. The proviso to section 36(1)(vii) does not, in absolute terms, control the application of this provision as it comes into operation only when the case of the assessee is one which falls squarely u/s.36(1)(viia) of the Act. The Supreme Court noticed that the Explanation to section 36(1)(vii), introduced by the Finance Act, 2001, had to be examined in conjunction with the principal section. The Explanation specifically excluded any provision for bad and doubtful debts made in the account of the assessee from the ambit and scope of ‘any bad debt, or part thereof, written off as irrecoverable in the accounts of the assessee’. Thus, the concept of making a provision for bad and doubtful debts would fall outside the scope of section 36(1)(vii) simpliciter. The proviso, would have to be read with the provisions of section 36(1)(viia) of the Act. Once the bad debt is actually written off as irrecoverable and the requirements of section 36(2) satisfied, then, it would not be permissible to deny such deduction on the apprehension of double deduction under the provisions of section 36(1)(viia) and the proviso to section 36(1)(vii). According to the Supreme Court this did not appear to be the intention of the framers of law. The scheduled and non-scheduled commercial banks would continue to get the full benefit of write-off of the irrecoverable debts u/s.36(1)(vii) in addition to the benefit of deduction of bad and doubtful debts u/s.36(1)(viia). Mere provision for bad and doubtful debts may not be allowable, but in the case of a rural advance, the same, in terms of section 36(1)(viia)(a), may be allowable without insisting on an actual write-off.
The Supreme Court observed that as per the proviso to clause (vii), the deduction on account of the actual write-off of bad debts would be limited to the excess of the amount written off over the amount of the provision which had already been allowed under clause (viia). According to the Supreme Court the proviso by and large protects the interests of the Revenue. In case of rural advances which are covered by clause (viia), there would be no double deduction. The proviso, in its terms, limits its application to the case of a bank to which clause (viia)applies. Indisputably, clause (viia)(a) applies only to rural advances.
The Supreme Court further observed that as far as foreign banks are concerned, u/s.36(1)(viia)(b) and as far as public finance institutions or State financial corporations or State industrial investment corporations are concerned, u/s.36(1)(viia)(c), they do not have rural branches. The Supreme Court therefore inferred that the proviso is self-indicative that its application is to bad debts arising out of rural advances.
In a concurring judgment, the Chief Justice held that u/s.36(1)(vii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the taxpayer carrying on business is entitled to a deduction, in the computation of taxable profits, of the amount of any debt which is established to have become a bad debt during the previous year, subject to certain conditions. However, a mere provision for bad and doubtful debt(s) is not allowed as a deduction in the computation of taxable profits. In order to promote rural banking and in order to assist the scheduled commercial banks in making adequate provisions from their current profits to provide for risks in relation to their rural advances, the Finance Act inserted clause (viia) in relation to their rural advances, the Finance Act inserted clause (viia) in s.s (1) of section 36 to provide for a deduction, in the computation of taxable profits of all scheduled commercial banks, in respect of provisions made by them for bad and doubtful debt(s) relating to advances made by their rural branches. The deduction is limited to a specified percentage of the aggregate average advances made by the rural branches computed in the manner prescribed by the Income-tax Rules, 1962. Thus, the provisions of clause (viia) of section 36(1) relating to the deduction on account of the provision for bad and doubtful debt(s) is distinct and independent of the provisions of section 36(1)(vii) relating to allowance of the bad debts. In other wards, the scheduled commercial banks would continue to get the full benefit of the write-off of the irrecoverable debt(s) u/s.36(1)(vii) in addition to the benefit of deduction for the provision made for bad and doubtful debt(s) u/s.36(1)(viia). A reading of the Circulars issued by Central Board of Direct Taxes indicates that normally a deduction for bad debt(s) can be allowed only if the debt is written off in the books as bad debt(s). No deduction is allowable in respect of a mere provision for bad and doubtful debt(s). But in the case of rural advances, a deduction would be allowed even in respect of a mere provision without insisting on an actual write-off. However, this may result in double allowance in the sense that in respect of the same rural advance the bank may get allowance on the basis of clause (viia) and also on the basis of accrual write-off under clause (vii). This situation is taken care of by the proviso to clause (vii) which limits the allowance on the basis of the actual write-off to the excess, if any, of the write-off over the amount standing to the credit of the account created under clause (viia).
Note: The Court incidentally considered whether, when findings recorded in the other assessment year are accepted by the Revenue, it should be permitted to question the correctness of the same in the subsequent years. The relevant portion of the judgment is extracted below:
The applicant has contended that as the similar claims had been decided in favour of the banks for the A.Ys. 1991-92 to 1993-94 by the Special Bench of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, which had not been challenged by the Department, as such, the issue had attained finality and could not be disturbed in the subsequent years.
The above contention of the appellant-banks does not impress us at all. Merely because the orders of the Special Bench of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal were not assailed in appeal by the Department itself, this would not take away the right of the Revenue to question the correctness of the orders of assessment, particularly when a question of law is involved. There is no doubt that the earlier orders of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) had merged into the judgment of the Special Bench of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and attained finality for that relevant year. Equally, it is true that though the Full Bench judgment of that very Court in the case of South Indian Bank (supra), it did not notice any of the contentions before and principles stated by the Special Bench of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal in its impugned judgment. As already noticed, the questions raised in the present appeal go to the very root of the matter and are questions of law in relation to interpretation of sections 36(1)(vii) and 36(1)(viia) read with section 36(2) of the Act. Thus, without any hesitation, we reject the contention of the appellant-banks that the findings recorded in the earlier A.Ys. 1991-92 to 1993-94 would be binding on the Department for subsequent years as well.
Capital or revenue expenditure: Section 37 of Income-tax Act, 1961: A.Y. 1998-99: Airport authority: Expenditure towards removal of encroachments in and around technical area of airport for safety and security: Is revenue expenditure.
The assessee is the Airport Authority managing the airports in India. The assessee incurred expenditure towards removal of encroachments in and around technical area of the airport for safety and security. The assessee’s claim for deduction of the expenditure was disallowed by the Assessing Officer and the disallowance was confirmed by the Tribunal.
On appeal by the assessee, the Delhi High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:
“The land belonged to the assessee. In the scheme formulated by the Government for removal of encroachers and their rehabilitation amount was not for acquisition of new assets. The payment was made to facilitate its smooth functioning of the business in a profitable manner and, therefore, such an expenditure was revenue in nature.”
Deduction u/s.80IB Manufacture: Production of perfumed hair oil by using coconut oil and mineral oil is manufacture: Assessee entitled to deduction u/s.80IB.
On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:
“(i) The finding of fact recorded by the ITAT is that the production of the perfumed hair oil as per the requirement of Hindustan Lever Ltd. constituted manufacture of a product distinct from the inputs used and on the said manufactured product the Central Excise Duty has been paid. The Apex Court in the case of CCE v. Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd., reported in (2006) 12 SCC 453 has held that addition of perfume to coconut oil to produce perfumed oil constitutes a manufacturing process.
(ii) Moreover, in the present case it is not in dispute that the deduction u/s.80IB of the Act has been allowed to the assessee in the first year of manufacture and that order has attained finality.
(iii) In these circumstances, the decision of the ITAT in holding that the assessee is engaged in manufacturing activity and hence entitled to avail deduction u/s.80IB cannot be faulted.”
Capital gain: Computation: Section 2(42A) and section 48 Indexed cost: A.Y. 2001-02: Acquisition of capital asset by gift, will, etc.: Indexed cost to be determined w.r.t. the holding of the asset by the previous owner.
On appeal by the assessee, the Delhi High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal, followed the judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT v. Manjula J. Shah, 16 Taxman.com 42 (Bom.) and held as under:
“(i) The Department’s contention that in a case where section 49 applies the holding of the predecessor has to be accounted for the purpose of computing the cost of acquisition, cost of improvement and indexed cost of improvement but not for the indexed cost of acquisition will result in absurdities. It leads to a disconnect and contradiction between ‘indexed cost of acquisition’ and ‘indexed cost of improvement’.
(ii) This cannot be the intention behind the enactment of section 49 and Explanation to section 48. There is no reason why the Legislature would want to deny or deprive an assessee the benefit of the previous holding for computing ‘indexed cost of acquisition’ while allowing the said benefit for computing ‘indexed cost of improvement’.
(iii) The benefit of indexed cost of inflation is given to ensure that the taxpayer pays capital gains tax on the ‘real’ or actual ‘gain’ and not on the increase in the capital value of the property due to inflation.
(iv) The expression ‘held by the assessee’ used in Explanation (iii) to section 48 has to be understood in the context and harmoniously with other sections and as the cost of acquisition stipulated in section 49 means the cost for which the previous owner had acquired the property, the term ‘held by the assessee’ should be interpreted to include the period during which the property was held by the previous owner.”
Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement — While India is not a party to the Vienna Convention, it contains many principles of customary international law, and the principle of interpretation of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, provides a broad guide-line as to what could be an appropriate manner of interpreting a treaty in Indian context also.
In deciding the matter, the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement with Germany and the Vienna Connection and it made certain observations with respect to the same.
The Supreme Court noted the relevant portions of Article 26 of the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement with Germany, which reads as follows:
“1. The competent authorities of the Contracting States shall exchange such information as is necessary for carrying out the provisions of this Agreement. Any information received by a Contracting State shall be treated as secret in the same manner as information obtained under the domestic laws of that State and shall be disclosed only to persons or authorities (including courts and administrative bodies) involved in the assessment or collection of, the enforcement or prosecution in respect of or the determination of appeals in relation to, the taxes covered by this Agreement. Such persons or authorities shall use the information only for such purposes. They may disclose the information in public court proceedings or in judicial decisions.
2. In no case shall the provisions of paragraph 1 be construed so as to impose on Contracting State the obligation:
(a) to carry out administrative measures at variance with the laws and administrative practice of that or of the other Contracting State;
(b) to supply information which is not obtainable under the laws or in the normal course of the administration of that or of the other Contracting State;
(c) to supply information which would disclose any trade, business, industrial, commercial or professional secret or trade process or information, the disclosure of which would be contrary to public policy (order public).”
The Supreme Court observed that the above clause in the relevant agreement with Germany would indicate that there is no absolute bar or secrecy. Instead the agreement specifically provides that the information may be disclosed in public court proceedings which the instant proceedings are. The proceedings before it, relate both to the issue of tax collection with respect to unaccounted monies deposited into foreign bank accounts, as well as with issues relating to the manner in which such monies were generated, which may include activities that are criminal in nature also. Comity of nations cannot be predicated upon clauses of secrecy that could hinder constitutional proceedings such as these, or criminal proceedings.
The Supreme Court noted that the claim of the Union of India is that the phrase ‘public court proceedings’, in the last sentence in Article 26(1) of the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement only relates to proceedings relating to tax matters. The Union of India claims that such an understanding comports with how it is understood internationally. In this regard, the Union of India cited a few treatises. According to the Supreme Court, however, the Union of India did not provide any evidence that Germany specifically requested it to not reveal the details with respect to accounts in the Liechtenstein even in the context of proceedings before it.
The Supreme Court held that in Article 31, ‘General Rule of Interpretation’, of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, 1969, provides that a “treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.” While India is not a party to the Vienna Convention, it contains many principles of customary international law, and the principle of interpretation of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, provides a broad guideline as to what could be an appropriate manner of interpreting a treaty in Indian context also.
The Supreme Court said that in Union of India v. Azadi Bachao Andolan, (2003) 263 ITR 706; (2004) 10 SCC 1, it approvingly had noted Frank Bennion’s observations that a treaty is really an indirect enactment instead of a substantive legislation, and that drafting of treaties is notoriously sloppy, whereby inconveniences obtain. In this regard this Court further noted that the dictum of Lord Widgery C.J. that the words “are to be given their general meaning, general to lawyer and layman alike . . . . The meaning of the diplomat rather than the lawyer.” The broad principle of interpretation, with respect to treaties, and the provisions therein, would be that the ordinary meanings of words be given effect to, unless the context requires or otherwise. However, the fact that such treaties are drafted by diplomats, and not lawyers, leading to sloppiness in drafting also implies that care has to be taken to not render any word, phrase, or sentence redundant, especially where rendering of such word, phrase or sentence redundant would lead to a manifestly absurd situation, particularly from a constitutional perspective. The Government cannot bind India in a manner that derogates from constitutional provisions, values and imperatives.
The last sentence of the Article 26(1) of the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement with Germany, “They may disclose this information in public court proceedings or in judicial decisions,” is revelatory in this regard. It stands out as an additional aspect or provision, and an exception, to the proceeding portion of the said Article. It is located after the specification that information shared between the Contracting Parties may be revealed only to “persons or authorities (including courts and administrative bodies) involved in the assessment or collection of, the enforcement or prosecution in respect of, or the determination of appeals in relation to taxes covered by this Agreement.” Consequently, it has to be understood that the phrase ‘public court proceedings’ specified in the last sentence in Article 26(1) of the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement with Germany refers to court proceedings other than those in connection with tax assessment, enforcement, prosecution, etc., with respect to tax matters. If it were otherwise, as argued by the Union of India, then there would have been no need to have that last sentence in Article 26(1) of the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement at all. The last sentence would become redundant if the interpretation pressed by the Union of India is accepted. Thus, notwithstanding the alleged convention of interpreting the last sentence only as referring to proceedings in tax matters, the rubric of common law jurisprudence, and fealty to its principles, leads us inexorably to the conclusion that the language in this specific treaty, and under these circumstances cannot be interpreted in the manner sought by the Union of India.
The Supreme Court while agreeing that the language could have been tighter, and may be deemed to be sloppy, to use Frank Bennion’s characterisation, negotiation of such treaties are conducted and secured at very high levels of Government, with awareness of general principles of interpretation used in various jurisdictions. It is fairly well known, at least in common law jurisdictions, that legal instruments and statutes are interpreted in a manner whereby redundancy of expressions and phrases is sought to be avoided.
The Supreme Court inter alia constituted Special Investigation Team to take over the matter of investigation of the individuals whose names had been disclosed by Germany as having accounts in Liechtenstein; and expeditiously conduct the same.
Public Search of Trademarks database can be done through MCA21 portal.
Companies Bill, 2011 and corrigenda can be accessed on MCA website.
Clarifications for Video Conferencing at General Body Meetings and E-voting.
In case of e-voting at General Body Meetings, now, any agency can provide the electronic platform for e-voting after obtaining a certificate from Standardisation Testing and Quality Certification (STQC) Directorate, Department of Information Technology, Ministry of Communication and IT, Government of India, New Delhi. Full Circular can be accessed on http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/General_Circular_ No_72_2011.pdf
Amendments to the Companies Accounting Standards Rules 2006.
Vide another Notification dated the same day, the Ministry has clarified that the same would be applicable for accounting periods commencing on or after 7th December 2006 and ending on or before 31st March 2020.
A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 67, dated 13-1- 2012 — Foreign investment in Single Brand Retail Trading — Amendment to the Foreign Investment (FDI) Scheme. Press Note No. 1 (2012 Series), dated 10-1-2012.
The said paragraph 6.2.16.4 of ‘Circular 2 of 2011 — Consolidated FDI Policy’ has been replaced as under:
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Tenancy rights — Property in possession of tenant — SARFAESI Act has overriding effect over local Rent Control Act.
The petition had been filed by the petitioner Vikas Book Ltd. against the respondent No.1 Bank of Baroda and respondent No. 2 Shri Umraomal Chordia, seeking issuance of order or direction against the respondent No. 1 Bank to the effect that the Bank may proceed under the said Act without disturbing the tenancy rights of the petitioner and that the petitioner should not be evicted from the property in question without following the due process of law. It has been averred inter alia in the petition that the petitioner was in occupation as tenant of the residential premises by virtue of the rent note dated 10-5- 2006 executed by the landlord i.e., respondent No. 2 in favour of the petitioner. According to the petitioner, on 7-2-2011, the offices of the respondent No. 1 along with some police personnel came to the said premises and asked the petitioner to vacate the premises.
It has been contended by the respondent Bank that the property in question was mortgaged by the respondent No. 2 towards the security for the repayment of loan advanced to the borrower Vipul Gems along with other properties. Since the said Vipul Gems did not pay the dues of the bank, action was initiated against borrower/ mortgagor u/s.13(4) of the said Act. It has also been contended in the said reply that the petition was filed by the petitioner in collusion with the respondent No. 2 so as to create obstructions in the way of the respondent Bank from taking possession of the disputed property and to frustrate the dues of the bank. The Court held that if the lease was created in contravention of section 65A of the Transfer of Property Act, by the mortgagor in favour of the lessee, neither the mortgagor, nor the lessee can claim any protection to defeat the right of the mortgagee.
The Court observed that in the instant case, there is nothing on record to suggest that the respondent Bank had the knowledge about any tenancy rights created in favour of the petitioners in respect of the mortgaged property in question, while granting credit facilities to the borrower Vipul Gems P. Ltd. The third party interest created before or after the mortgage in question could not frustrate the provisions of the said Act having effect of overriding the other laws for the time being in force.
The Court observed that the petitions had been filed as a collusive and manoeuvred exercise between the petitioners and the respondent No. 2 Umraomal, so as to create the inroads and obstructions in the way of the respondent Bank to take the actual possession of the disputed premises, consequent upon the measures taken by the respondent Bank u/s.13(4) of the said Act. The petitions having been filed by the petitioners as proxy and frivolous litigation at the instance of the respondent mortgagors, the Court held that SARFAESI Act has overriding effect over local Rent Control Act, accordingly the petition of the tenant was dismissed.
Nath Holding & Investment Pvt. Ltd. v. DCIT ITAT ‘B’ Bench, Mumbai Before D. Manmohan (VP) and Pramod Kumar (AM) ITA No. 5328/Mum./2006 A.Y.: 1996-97. Decided on: 25-10-2011 Counsel for assessee/revenue: N. R. Agarwal/P. K. B. Menon
Facts:
The impugned penalty was levied in respect of disallowance of loss in share trading business. The loss was disallowed on the ground of discrepancy in the distinctive number of shares purchased and sold and which could not be explained at the relevant point of time. It was only for the lack of explanation for discrepancy that quantum addition was finally confirmed.
Before the Tribunal the assessee furnished reconciliation in order to explain the discrepancy and it also filed an affidavit setting out the reasons as to why the same could not be explained earlier.
Held:
According to the Tribunal, once the assessee had given a reasonable explanation which was not found to be false, imposition of penalty in respect of the same cannot be justified. Further, it observed that the mere fact that the assessee could not explain its claim in the quantum proceedings and in the absence of any independent finding in the penalty order to the effect that claim for loss made by the assessee was bogus or false, it held that the penalty cannot be imposed.
Refund through ECS — Trade Circular No. 11T of 2012, dated 17-7-2012.
Administrative relief in respect of importexport licences covered in Schedule Entry C-39 — Trade Circular No. 10T of 2012, dated 2-7-2012.
Amendments to the Schedule entries — Trade Circular No. 9T of 2012, dated 30-6- 2012
Changes in the various Schedule entries under the Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act, 2002 are briefly explained in this Circular.
OffShore Transfer of Shares Between Two NRs Resulting in Change in Control OF Indian Company — Withholding Tax Obligation and Other Implications
1.2.1 Under the Mauritius Tax Treaty, one major advantage is with regard to non-taxability of capital gain arising on alienation of shares of the Indian companies. Under the Mauritius Tax Treaty, the right to tax such a gain is only with Mauritius (with some exception with which we are not concerned in this writeup) and as such, the same cannot be taxed in India. For this purpose, Mauritian Company is required to establish that it is tax resident of Mauritius and which can generally be established by producing Tax Residency Certificate (TRC) issued by the Tax Department of Mauritius. Such TRC issued by the Mauritius tax officer is generally regarded as sufficient evidence for that purpose by virtue of the CBDT Circular No. 789, dated 13-4-2000. This legal position is also confirmed by the judgment of the Apex Court in Azadi Bachao Andolan (263 ITR 507). There is a historical background to this position, with which also we are not concerned in this write-up.
1.3 For the purpose of withholding tax from the taxable income received by a Non-Resident (NR), section 195(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (the Act) provides that any person responsible for paying (Payer) to NR (Payee) any sum chargeable under the Act is liable to deduct tax (TDS) as provided therein. There are some exceptions to this, with which we are not concerned in this write-up. Effectively, under these provisions, the Payer is liable to deduct tax at source (TAS) in such cases and pay the amount so deducted to the Government. Procedural provisions are also made for compliance of these provisions and consequences are also provided for default in compliance of these provisions, with which also we are, effectively, not concerned in this write-up.
1.4 Multinational Groups (MNG) generally operate through various companies in different jurisdictions where such operating companies are directly or indirectly controlled through downstream subsidiaries set up by the main holding company of the MNG. Such holding and subsidiary structures are common in commercial world for various business needs. One of the objectives of putting-up overseas holding and downstream subsidiary structure for FDI is also to provide for easy exit at a later stage when it is decided to withdraw from a business carried on in India through Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) created in India. At the time of exit, in such cases, generally shares of overseas company are transferred to the buyer who, in the process, acquires control and management of Indian SPV. Such overseas transaction, many times, takes place between two NR entities.
1.5 In case of a transaction of the nature referred to in 1.4 above, of late, the Revenue Department has taken a stand that on account of transfer of shares of such overseas holding company, there is indirect transfer of underlying assets of the Indian company as the control and management of the Indian company gets indirectly transferred in such cases. Therefore, the capital gain arising in such offshore transaction between two NRs is liable to tax in India by virtue of provisions of section 9(1)(i) which, inter alia, provides that all income accruing or arising, whether directly or indirectly through the transfer of capital asset situate in India shall be deemed to accrue or arise in India. According to the Revenue, indirect transfer of capital asset situated in India is covered within the scope of this provision.
1.5.1 In view of the above stand of the Revenue, further stand is taken by the Revenue that the Payer NR entity is also required to deduct TAS u/s.195(1) while making payment to the transferor of the share, which is also another NR entity. If such obligation of TDS is not discharged, then the Payer is regarded as ‘assessee in default’ u/s.201 and he would be liable to pay the amount of such tax with interest and will also be subject to other consequences such as penalty, etc. The Payer could also be considered as representative assessee of the Payee u/s.163.
1.6 The issues referred to in paras 1.5 and 1.5.1 are under debate currently in many cases and different views were being taken. The issue became more vital in view of the judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of Vodafone International Holdings B. V. (VIH) reported in 329 ITR Page 126.
1.6.1 Recently, the issues referred to in para 1.6 above, came up for consideration before the Apex Court in the case of VIH and this hotly debated issue got finally decided. Relevant principles of law have been decided/re-iterated in this case and therefore, the judgment becomes more relevant.
1.7 Now, since the Revenue has filed a review petition before the Apex Court for recalling the judgment in Vodafone‘s case, it would also be useful to consider the judgment of the High Court in little greater detail. Various contentions were raised by both the parties before the High Court, as well as Supreme Court. Both the judgments are very long. For the sake of brevity and space constraints, only some of the main contentions are referred to in this write-up. For the same reasons, even the facts of the case are very broadly given in brief. For the sake of convenience, the percentages of shareholding referred to herein at different places are rounded off.
Vodafone International Holdings B.V. v. UOI — 329 ITR 126 (Bom.)
Facts in brief
2.1 In 1992, Hutchison group of Hong Kong (HK) acquired interest in Mobile Telecommunication Industry in India, through a joint venture Company in India (JV Co.), Hutchison Makes Telecom Ltd., [subsequently renamed Hutchison Essar Ltd. (HEL)] through its overseas group of companies. In 1998, CGP Investment Holdings Ltd., (CGP) was incorporated in Cayman Islands (CI) of which the sole shareholder was Hutchison Telecommunication Ltd., HK (HTL). The CGP had set up two Wholly-Owned Subsidiaries (WOS) in Mauritius viz. Array Holdings Ltd. (Array) and Hutchison Telecommunication Services India Holdings Ltd., (HTI-MS).
Array, through its various downstream subsidiaries in Mauritius held 42% shareholdings interest in HEL. Further, 10% shareholding interest in HEL was held by CGP through certain overseas JV companies. HTL-MS had set up WOS in India, namely, 3 Global Services Pvt. Ltd. (3GSPL). The shareholding of HTL in CGP got transferred to another group com-pany [HTI (BVI Holding Ltd.) HTIHL (BVI)], a company incorporated in British Virgin Island (BVI). The HTIHL (BVI) was indirectly WOS of Hutchi-son Telecommunication International Ltd. (HTIL), a company incorporated in CI. HTIL was listed on stock exchange of New York and Hong Kong. As part of group restructuring and consolidation, the structure was further evolved with certain arrangements/ agreements and finally in 2006, the Hutchison group held 52% shareholding in HEL through structural arrangement of holding and subsidiary companies and it had also options to acquire through 3GSPL, a further 15% shareholding interest in HEL from certain Indian companies, subject to relaxation of FDI norms as the Essar group, JV partner, was already hold-ing 22% shareholding through Mauritius companies. Effectively, CGP through its downstream overseas subsidiaries held 42.43% (42%) interest in HEL and it had indirect interest of 9.62% (10%) in the equity of HEL through its pro rata shareholding (indirect) in some Indian companies which had direct/indirect equity interest in HEL. These Indian companies [viz., Telecom Investment India Pvt. Ltd. (TII) and Omega Telecom Holding P. Ltd. (Omega)] belong to (with majority shareholding) its Indian Partners (viz. Mr. Asim Ghosh, Mr. & Mrs. Analgit Singh and IDFC). The structure created was very complex and various commercial arrangements were made between group companies and others for that purpose. The detailed chart of the structure is appearing in the judgment of the High Court at pages 134/135.
2.2 Vodafone International Holdings B. V., Netherlands (VIH) is a company controlled by Vodafone group, UK (Vodafone) . The said VIH acquired the entire shareholding of CGP from HTIHL (BVI) vide transaction dated 11 -2-2007, as a result of which the Vodafone group indirectly acquired the interest of Hutchison group in HEL which that group held through structural arrangement of holding and subsidiary companies (referred to in para 2.1) either through Mauritius-based companies having Tax Residency Certificates (TRCs), or through other entities in which the interest of Hutchison group was held by Mauritius companies. On these facts, the Revenue took a stand that it was a case of acquisition of 67% controlling interest in HEL by VIH from HTIL and since HEL is a company resident in India, such controlling interest is an asset situated in India. Therefore, the capital gain arising from this transaction is taxable in India on the basis that though CGP is not a tax resident in India, it indirectly also holds underlying Indian assets of HEL. The transaction results into indirect transfer of capital assets situated in India. As such, VIH was also under obligation to deduct TAS u/s. 195 from the payment made for acquiring 67% interest of Hutchison group. This was disputed by VIH saying that it agreed to acquire share of CGP and as a consequence, it has direct/indirect control of 52% shareholding of HEL with call options to further acquire 15% shareholding.
2.3 Prior to the above arrangement of transfer of direct and indirect interest of Hutchison group to Vodafone group, certain events took place such as: in December 2006, HTIL had issued a statement stating that is has been approached by various potential-interested parties regarding possible sale of its equity interest in HEL; in December 2006, Vodafone group had made non-binding offer to HTIL for its direct and indirect shareholding in HEL; in February 2007, the offer was revised with binding offer on behalf of VIH for ‘HTIL’s shareholdings in HEL together with inter-related company loans; in February 2007, Bharti Infotel Pvt. Ltd. had also given a letter stating it has no objection to the proposed transaction (as Vodafone had some shareholding in the said company). Ultimately, final binding offer was made by Vodafone group on February 10, 2007 of US $ 11.076 billion.
2.3.1 On 11th February, 2007, Share Purchase Agreement (SPA) was entered into with HTIL [and not with HIHL (BVI) which was holding share of CGP] under which HTIL agreed to procure and transfer to VIH the entire issued share capital of CGP by HTIHL (BVI), free from all encumbrances together with all rights attaching or accruing, and together with as-signment of its loan interests. This was followed by announcement of Vodafone group on February 12, 2007 stating that it had agreed to acquire a controlling interest in HEL via its subsidiary VIH. On February 28, 2007 Vodafone group, on behalf of VIH, addressed a letter to Essar group for purchase of Essar’s entire shareholding in HEL under ‘Tag along rights’ of Essar group under its joint venture with Hutchison group in HEL and so on.
2.3.2 On 28th February, 2007, VIH filed an application with the Foreign Investment Promotion Board (FIPB) of the Union Ministry of Finance in which, effectively, it was requested to take note and grant approval under Press Note 1 to the indirect acquisition of 51.96% stake in HEL through an overseas acquisition of the entire shareholding of CGP from HTIHL (BVI). HTIL in its filing before US SEC had, inter alia, stated that a combined holding of the HTIL group was 61.88%, which is sought to be transferred. Therefore, on a query being raised by FIPB in regard to the difference in percentage of shareholding mentioned in the application and in the filing with US SEC, it was clarified that the variation is because of the difference in the US GAAP and Indian GAAP declarations that the com-bined holding for US GAAP purpose was 61.88% and for the Indian GAAP purpose it is 51.96% and the Indian GAAP number reflects accurately a true equity ownership and control position. Based on this clarification, FIPB granted a requisite approval. On 15th March, 2007, a settlement was also arrived at between HTIL and set of companies belonging to the Essar group on certain payments on the basis of which the Essar group indicated its support to the proposed transaction between Hutchison group and Vodafone group. For the purposes of running the business of JV with Essar Group, a term sheet agreement between VIH and Essar Group of companies was entered into for regulating various affairs of the HEL and the relationship of shareholders of the HEL. In this term sheet, it was, inter alia, stated that VIH had agreed to acquire the entire indirect shareholding of HTIL in HEL, including all rights, contractual or otherwise, to acquire directly or indirectly shares in HEL owned by others, which shares shall, for the purposes of the term sheet, be considered to be part of holding acquired by VIH.
2.3.3 In respect of the above transac-tion, a show- cause notice u/s.163 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (the Act) was issued by the Revenue to HEL in August 2007 asking it to explain why it should not be treated as a representative assessee of VIH. A notice was issued u/s.201(1) and 201(1A) of the Act to VIH in September 2007 asking it to show cause as to why it should not be treated as an ‘assessee in default’ for failure to withhold tax. This action of the Revenue was challenged by VIH before the Bombay High Court in a writ petition in which the jurisdiction of the Revenue over the petitioner for issuing such a notice was challenged. The petition was dismissed by the Bombay High Court (311 ITR 46) declining to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 in a challenge to the show-cause notice. Against this, a Special Leave Petition (SLP) was filed by the petitioner before the Supreme Court which was also dismissed with a direction to Revenue to determine the jurisdictional challenge raised by the petitioner and the right of the petitioner to challenge the decision of the Revenue (if, determined against the petitioner) on this issue was reserved keeping all the questions of law open (179 Taxman 129).
2.3.4 Subsequent to the above events, another show-cause notice u/s.201 was issued by the Revenue in October 2009 on the basis of which, after considering the assessee’s reply, the order was passed u/s.201 upholding jurisdiction of the Revenue on 31st May, 2010. On the same date, a show-cause notice was also issued u/s.163 to VIH as to why it should not be treated as an agent/representative assessee of HTIL. These were challenged by the assessee before the Bombay High Court by a writ petition.
Basic contentions from both the sides
2.4 Before the High Court, on behalf of the petitioner, it was pointed out that the CGP through its downstream subsidiaries, directly or indirectly controlled equity interest in HEL. The transfer of share of CGP has resulted in the petitioner acquiring control over the CGP and its downstream subsidiaries including ultimately HEL and its downstream operating companies. On the passing of downstream companies, commercial arrangements common to such transaction were put in place. The transaction represents a transfer of a capital asset (i.e., share of CGP) situated outside India and hence, any gain arising on such transfer is not taxable in India. Accordingly, there was no obligation on the part of the petitioner to deduct tax u/s.195. It was also pointed out that if the shares held by the Mauritian companies were sold in India, the capital gain, if any arising on such transaction would not be taxable in India in view of the Mauritius Tax Treaty. Section 195 is inapplicable to foreign entity which has no presence in India, not even a branch office, as such entity cannot be subjected to obligation to deduct tax in respect of offshore transaction. It is the recipient who is the potential assessee as he has received the sum chargeable, if any. This by itself, does not create nexus with the Payer who has neither taxable income nor any presence in India. In support of this stand, various submissions were made.
2.5 On behalf of the Revenue, primarily it was pointed out that SPA and other documents establish that the subject-matter of the transaction between HTIL and VIH was a transfer of 67% interest (direct as well as indirect) in HEL. The CGP share is only one of the means to achieve this object. The transaction constitutes a transfer of composite rights of HTIL in HEL as result of the divestment of HTIL’s rights which paved way for VIH to step in the shoes of HTIL. The transaction in question has a sufficient territorial nexus to India and is chargeable to tax under the Act. This is evident from various arrangements made to give an effect to the understanding between the parties including the fact that SPA was entered in to with HTIL and not HTIHL (BVI). The consideration paid was a package for composite rights and not for a mere transfer of a CGP share. It was also pointed out that there is a distinction between proceedings for deduction of tax and regular assessment proceedings. The jurisdiction issue should be legitimately confined to obligation of VIH u/s.195 to withhold tax. Nonetheless, the Revenue made various submissions before the Court with regard to chargeability to tax arising out of the transaction.
2.5.1 The view of the Revenue that the real nature of transaction is with regard to transfer of 67% interest of HTIL in HEL to VIH and not only transfer of one CGP share was based on the premise that on interpretation of SPA and other agreements/documents, it is clear that the form of the transaction is reflected therein. Several valuable rights which are property rights and capital assets of HTIL stand relinquished in favour of VIH under these agreements. These rights are property and constitute capital assets which are situated in India. But for these agreements, the HTIL would not have been able to effectively transfer to VIH, its controlling inter-est in JV Co., HEL, to the extent of 67%. The HTIL’s interest in HEL arose by way of indirect equity shareholding upon agreements; finance agreements, shareholdings agreements, call options agreements, etc. aggregate of which confers a controlling interest of 67% in HEL. All these varied interests did not emerge only from one share of CGP and could not have been conveyed by the transfer of only one equity share of CGP. The parties themselves have treated the transaction as acquisition of one share of CGP, as well as other assets in the form of various rights, and entitlements, which are situated in India.
Settled principles acknowledged
2.6 For the purpose of considering the submissions made by both the parties and the principles on which they have relied, the Court referred to various judicial precedents and the principles emerging therefrom and acknowledged various settled principles in that regard such as: in interpretation of fiscal legislation, the Court is guided by the language and the words used; a legal relationship which arises out of the business transaction cannot be ignored in search of substance over form or in pursuit of the underlying economic interest; the tax planning is legitimate so long as the assessee does not resort to colourable device or a sham transaction with a view to evade taxes; incorporated corporation has a distinct juristic personality and its business is not the business of its shareholders; during the subsistence of corporation, its shareholders have no interest in its assets; a share represents an interest of a shareholder which is made up of various rights; shares, and rights which emanate from them, flow together and cannot be dissected; a controlling interest is an incident of the ownership of the shares in a company and the same is not an identifiable or distinct capital asset independent of the holding of shares; control and management is one facet of the holding of shares; the jurisdiction of a State to tax NRs is based on the existence of nexus connecting the person sought to be taxed with the State which seeks to tax; in certain instances, a need for apportioning income arises where the source rule applies and the income can be taxed in more than one jurisdiction, etc.
2.6.1 Evaluating the contentions of the petitioner with regard to obligation to withhold tax, the Court dealt with the provisions of section 195(1) as well as the relevant precedents and then, the Court formulated the principles governing the interpretation of section 195 which, inter alia, include the position that the Parliament has not restricted the obligations to deduct TAS on a resident and the Court will not imply a restriction not imposed by the legislation.
Analyses of facts and tax implications
2.7 The Court, then, proceeded to analyse the fact of the case on hand to determine the issues raised on the basis of settled principles referred to hereinbefore. For this purpose, the Court noted that essentially the case of VIH is that the transaction was only in respect of the purchase of one share of CGP and that being a capital asset situated outside India, no taxable income arises in India. On the other hand, the case of the Revenue is that the subject-matter of the transaction on a true construction of SPA and other transaction documents is a composite transaction involving transfer of various rights in HEL by HTIL to VIH, which resulted into deemed accrual of Income for HTIL from a source of income in India or through transfer of capital assets situated in India.
2.7.1 To decide the issue, the Court first considered as to how both the parties have construed the transaction. The Court noted that it is revealed from both the interim and final reports of HTIL that the transaction represented discontinuation of its operations in India upon which, it had generated a profit of HK $ 70,502 million. From the proceeds of the transaction, the HTIL also declared special dividend to its shareholders. Accordingly, from HTIL’s perspective, it had carried on in India Mobile Telecommunications Operations, which were to be discontinued as a result of the transaction.
On the other hand, VIH also perceived the transaction as acquisition of 67% interest in Indian JV Co., for an agreed consideration. This is evident from various announcements made by VIH, as well as the arrangements entered into between the parties. The equity value of HTIHL (BVI)’s 100% stake in CGP was computed on the basis of the enterprise value of HEL at US $ 18,250 million and by computing 67% of equity value on that basis. The entire value that was ascribed to its stake in CGP was computed only on the basis of enterprise value of HEL.
The Court then noted that it is in the above background, various documents should be considered and analysed and the effect thereof should be determined.
2.7.2 After considering various clauses of the SPA and the relationship of shareholders of the Company, the Court observed as under (Page 207):
“The diverse clauses of the SPA are indicative of the fact that parties were conscious of the composite nature of the transaction and created reciprocal rights and obligations that included, but were not confined to the transfer of the CGP share. The commercial understating of the parties was that the transaction related to the transfer of a controlling interest in HEL from HTIL to VIH BV. The transfer of control was not relatable merely to the transfer of the CGP share.
Inextricably woven with the transfer of control were other rights and entitlements which HTIL and/or its subsidiaries had assumed in pursuance of contractual arrangements with its Indian partners and the benefit of which would now stand transferred to VIH BV. By and as a result of the SPA, HTIL was relinquishing its interest in the telecommunications business in India and VIH BV was acquiring the interest which was held earlier by HTIL.”
2.7.3 The Court also further noted various other agreements/arrangements made between the parties such as: the term sheet agreement with Essar group to regulate the affairs of HEL and relationship of the shareholders of both the groups, put option agreement with Essar group of companies, a tax deed of covenant for indemnifying various companies in respect of taxation and transfer pricing liabilities, the brand licence agreement, the loan assignment agreements, the arrangement with the existing Indian partners of HTIL (viz. Asim Ghosh, Analjeet Singh and IDFC), etc.
2.7.4 The Court then observed that the facts which have been disclosed before the Court support the contention of the Revenue that the transaction between HTIL and VIH took into consideration various rights, interests and entitlements which, inter alia, include: direct and indirect interest of 52% equity shares of HEL; indirect interest of 15% in HEL through call options held by Indian partners of Hutchison group; right to carry on business through telecom license in India; non-compete in India; management rights of HEL under SPAs; right to use Hutchison brand for a specified period, etc. (the complete details of rights, etc. are appearing on pages 211/212 of the judgment).
2.7.5 The Court then also referred to the FIPB process in the transaction, wherein various queries were raised and clarifications were given by VIH. Referring to one of the clarifications of VIH dated 19th March, 2007, the Court noted that VIH had stated that it had agreed to acquire from HTIL for US $ 11.08 billion interest in HEL, which included 52% equity shareholding (direct/indirect). This price included a control premium, use and rights to use the Hutch brand in India, a non-compete agreement, loan obligations and entitlement to acquire further 15% indirect interest in HEL, subject to the FDI rules, etc. These elements together equated to about 67% of the equity capital.
2.7.6 The above facts clearly establish that it will be simplistic to assume that the entire transaction between HTIL and VIH was only related to transfer of one share of CGP. The commercial and business understanding between the parties postulated what was being transferred was controlling interest in HEL from HTIL to VIH. In its due diligence report, Earnst & Young have also stated that the target structure now also includes CGP which was originally not within the target group. The due diligence report emphasises that the object and intent of the parties was to achieve the transfer of control over HEL and transfer of solitary share of CGP was put in place at the behest of HTIL, subsequently as a mode of effectuating the goal.
2.7.7 The Court further observed that the true nature of the transaction as it emerges from the transactional documents is that the transfer of solitary share of CGP reflected only a part of the arrangement put into place by the parties in achieving to object of transferring control of HEL to VIH. T h e Court, then, held as under (pages 213/214):
“The price paid by VIH BV to HTIL of US $ 11.01 billion factored in, as part of the consideration, diverse rights and entitlements that were being transferred to VIH BV. Many of these entitlements were not relatable to the transfer of the CGP share. Indeed, if the transfer of the solitary share of CGP could have effectuated the purpose it was not necessary for the parties to enter into a complex structure of business documentation. The transactional documents are not merely incidental or consequential to the transfer of the CGP share, but recognised independently the rights and entitlements of HTIL in relation to the Indian business which were being transferred to VIH BV.”
2.7.8 According to the Court, intrinsic to the transaction was a transfer of other rights and entitlements. These rights and entitlements constitute in themselves capital assets within the meaning of section 2(14) of the Act.
2.7.9 After concluding that the transaction should be dissected in to various rights and entitlements for which the consideration is paid, the Court, dealing with the issue of apportionment of consideration to such rights and entitlements to determine the taxability thereof, further held as under (page 215):
“The manner in which the consideration should be apportioned is not something which can be determined at this stage. Apportionment lies within the jurisdiction of the Assessing Officer during the course of the assessment proceedings. Undoubtedly, it would be for the Assessing Officer to apportion the income which has resulted to HTIL between that which has accrued or arisen or what is deemed to have accrued or arisen as a result of a nexus within the Indian taxing jurisdiction and that which lies outside. Such an enquiry would lie outside the realm of the present proceedings ……..”
2.8 The Court then considered the issue with regard to jurisdiction of the Revenue to initiate pro-ceedings u/s.195 in the case of VIH. In this context, after referring to the provisions of section 195(1) and the relevant judicial precedents, the Court concluded as under (page 221):
“Chargeability and enforceability are distinct legal conceptions. A mere difficulty in compliance or in enforcement is not a ground to avoid observance. In the present case, the transaction in question has significant nexus with India. The essence of the transaction was a change in the controlling interest in HEL which constituted a source of income in India. The transaction between the parties covered within its sweep, diverse rights and entitlements. The petitioner by the diverse agreements that it entered into has nexus with India jurisdiction. In these circumstances, the proceedings which have been initiated by the income-tax authorities cannot be held to lack jurisdiction.”
2.8.1 The Court finally stated that the issue of juris-diction has been correctly decided by the Revenue for the reasons already noted above and the VIH was under an obligation to deduct TAS while making payment to HTIL.
2.8.2 This judgment of the High Court is now reversed by the Apex Court (of course, subject to outcome of the review petition filed by the Revenue) which we will consider in the next part of this write-up.
(To be continued)
(2011) 24 STR 719 (Tri.-Del.) — BSNL v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Chandigarh.
Facts:
The appellant is a public sector unit which adjusted the excess payment of service tax against the tax liability of a subsequent period. The appellant held a view that this adjustment was allowable as per the provisions of Rule 6 of the Service Tax Rules, 1994. As per the said Rule 6, excess payment of service tax can be adjusted against future liability on a pro-rata basis, but only under specific conditions mentioned therein.
Held:
Though the appellant’s plea for adjustment was held invalid, it was found that subsequently the Service Tax Rules were amended. As per the amended rules the appellant could adjust his excess payment.
However, the amended rules were not in force during the material time and therefore did not apply to the case at hand. But considering the spirit of the amended rules and the fact that the appellant was a public sector unit, a lenient view was taken and the adjustment was allowed fully.
(2011) 24 STR 717 (Tri.-Del.) — Commissioner of Central Excise, Allahabad v. A.P.S.M. Study Centre.
Facts:
The assessee provided commercial training and coaching services. The appeal was filed in relation to the fees received by the respondent during April, May and June, 2003 for the period after 1-7-2003, when the service was brought under the tax net. Show-cause notice was issued to the respondent on 20-7-2006 for the period April-September 2003. The Revenue claimed that the assessee suppressed facts since they had not disclosed the amount of consideration received prior to 1-7-2003 and also not filed ST-3 return for the relevant period.
Held:
It was held that the longer period could not be invoked on the grounds that an audit was conducted in 2004 and also, there was extensive communication with the Department, but a show-cause notice was issued only on 20-7-2006. Hence the demand was barred by limitation and the Revenue’s appeal was rejected.
(2011) 24 STR 705 (Tri.-Del.) Commissioner of Central Excise, Ludhiana v. Municipal Council.
Facts:
The appellant received a sum of Rs.4,26,000 for letting out of land and open ground for the period 12-2-2003 to March, 2005 and receipt of Rs.6,000 each for the financial years 2005-06 and 2006-07 and Rs.93,000 for the financial year 2007-08 upon which no service tax was paid.
Held:
However, since the notice issued failed to bring out the nature of the receipt and the nature of functions performed over rented immovable property, the show-cause notice was rendered unjustified and hence, the stay application and the appeal were dismissed.
(2011) 24 STR 702 (Tri.-Chennai) — K. K. Academy Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Service Tax, Chennai.
Facts:
The appellants hold franchisee for ‘Abacus’ training which is an ancient Chinese tool to solve arithmetical calculations with speed and accuracy without calculator. They are engaged in imparting such training to students as well as teachers who could be either employed by them or had an option for self-employment after such training and to train students at various centres run by themselves. They also receive amounts towards granting franchise for imparting training through Abacus. For all the three revenues, service tax was demanded.
The appellant contended that the training imparted to the students could not be taxed under the category ‘Commercial Training or Coaching Services’ for it was recreational in nature as held by the Bangalore Bench in Fast Arithmetic v. Asst. Comm. of Central Excise & ST, (2010) 17 STR 158. Also, no service tax was payable for training which is recreational in nature vide Notifications Nos. 9/2003 and 24/2004. Similarly, the above Notifications also exempted such vocational training provided to teachers.
Held:
In terms of the Notifications and case cited above the demand with respect to training given to students and teachers was set aside along with the penalty.
On the other hand the amount received towards franchisee services was held liable to service tax. The appellant did not dispute this and had paid service tax on the franchise fee received. The penalty stood reduced only to the extent of delayed payment towards franchise fee and the cost was waived.
(2011) 24 STR 662 (Tri.-Bang.) — Sri Bhagavathy Traders v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Cochin.
Facts:
The appellant, a ‘Clearing and Forwarding Agent’, during the period 2003-04 to 2005-06 did not charge service tax on the reimbursable receipts, such as transportation charges, loading and unloading charges, rent, salary to staff, electricity, courier charges, stationery charges, etc. According to the adjudicating authority, such charges were liable for service tax and were includible in the gross amount of value of service. The appellant submitted a series of Tribunal decisions wherein it was held that the gross value for the discharge of service tax liability would not include reimbursement charges. The Revenue relied upon a contrary decision in the case of M/s. Naresh Kumar & Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Service Tax, Kolkata, (2008) 11 STR 578 (Tri.).
Held:
It was previously held in various cases that service tax is restricted to amounts received by the assessee for carrying C&F only and other charges such as loading, unloading should be excluded. Similarly, it was also proposed that transportation expense collected by such an agent was not liable to tax along with the actual expenses such as labour, freight, telephone, electricity reimbursed by the principal. However, in the case referred by the Revenue (cited above), it was concluded that those expenses which are indispensable and inevitable for providing such services and which would essentially make value addition to the services be liable to service tax. Since there were two different stands taken by the Co-ordinate Benches, it was decided to refer the matter to the Larger Bench.
Ghanshyam Mudgal v. ITO ITAT ‘A’ Bench, Jaipur Before R. K. Gupta (JM) and N. L. Kalra (AM) ITA No. 896/JP/2010 A.Y.: 2007-08. Decided on: 9-9-2011 Counsel for assessee/revenue: Mahendra Gargieya/D. K. Meena
Section 2(1A) — Agricultural income — Compensation received on account of demolition of borewell and godown on agricultural land — Held that the amount received is agricultural income.
Facts:
During the year under appeal, the assessee’s land was acquired by the government agency under the Land Acquisition Act. Amongst other amounts, he received a sum of Rs.4.64 lakh with reference to the land acquired. As per the provisions of section 23(1A) of the Land Acquisition Act, the said amount was calculated @ 12% p.a. on market value of the land acquired for the period commencing on from the date notified for acquisition of land to the date of taking its possession. In addition, the assessee had also received Rs.8.54 lakh as compensation on account of demolition of borewell and godown used by him in his agricultural activities. According to the assessee, the sum of Rs.4.64 lakh received was part of the land compensation though it was computed on the basis of the period between the date of notification to the date of possession. As regards the sum of Rs.8.54 lakh received, it was contended that the same should be treated as receipt on account of transfer of agricultural land, income wherefrom is exempt from tax. However, the AO treated the sum of Rs.4.64 lakh as interest income. As regards the sum of Rs.8.54 lakh received, the AO assessed it as capital gains and after indexation the gain was determined at Rs.2.86 lakh. On appeal the CIT(A) agreed with the AO and upheld his order.
As regards the sum of Rs.8.54 lakh received, the Tribunal observed that borewell is a form of irrigation and related to agricultural income. Hence, the compensation received on borewell is to be considered as compensation for agricultural land. Similarly, it was held that the compensation received against godown which was used for storage of agricultural produce, would also be considered as compensation for agricultural land.