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Limitation — Delay of 53 days in filing appeal — Delay attributed to resignation of both employee handling service tax matters and his successor — Delay condoned — Section 86 of the Finance Act, 1994.

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Facts:
The appellant pleaded that the delay of 53 days in filing the appeal was owing to the resignation tendered by the employees handling service tax matters. The delay on part of the appellant was neither willful nor on account of any negligence and was beyond the appellant’s control.

Held:
The Tribunal held that the reasons given for the delay in application for condonation were justifiable and were aptly supported by an affidavit by a senior functionary and hence the delay of 53 days was condoned.

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Implementation of enhanced regulatory framework on annual statutory filings.

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Companies that have not filed their statutory annual filings for both form 20B and 23AC/23ACA since 2006 i.e., 2006-2007, 2007-2008 and 2008- 2009 (i.e., have not done any of the six required filings) will not be allowed to file any other eform with the Ministry, unless and until all such pending documents are filed. The status of such companies would be changed to ‘Dormant’. Each such company having the status as ‘Dormant’ will have to file an application for normalising in e-form-61 and once e-form 61 is approved by respective Registrar of Company, The Company will be given a stipulated period of 21 days for filing all the due balance sheets and annual returns from the date of approval of form 61. If all the due documents are not filed within this period, the company’s status will again be reverted to ‘Dormant’ and will have to follow the process of filing form 61 once again.
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(2011) 22 STR 533 (Tri.-Chennai) Trichy Inst. of Management Studies (P) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Trichy.

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Commercial training or coaching services — Parallel colleges, liability — Levy in respect of training and coaching which forms essential part of course, leading to issue of degrees, etc., not justified — Section 65(27) of Finance Act, 1994.

Facts:
The assessee was conducting classes for students enrolled in distance education programme of Alagappa University. The appellant contended that the coaching classes being in the nature of parallel colleges should be exempted from the payment of service tax. Further, as per the MOU executed between the Alagappa University and the institution run by the appellant, the institution was recognised as a centre for enrolling candidates for distance education programmes. The case of Malapuram Distt. Parallel College Association v. Union of India, 2006 (2) STR 321 (Ker.) was cited in support.

Held:
Applying the ratio of the High Court judgment in case of Malapuram Distt. Parallel College Association v. Union of India, 2006 (2) STR 321 (Ker.), it was held that service tax was not to be levied in respect of training and coaching provided by the appellant. Although it formed an essential part of the course or curriculum of a university leading to issuance of certificate or diploma or degree to the students recognised by law, is not justified to be commercial coaching. The appeal was allowed accordingly.

(2011) 22 STR 539 (Tri.-Bang.) — Mphasis Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Bangalore.

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Digest of recent important foreign decisions on cross-border taxation

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Part II

In the first part of the Article published in November, 2011, we dealt with some of the recent important foreign decisions on cross-border taxation. The remaining decisions are covered in this part.

8. New Zealand — Supreme Court decision on tax avoidance
On 24 August 2011, in a significant unanimous decision by five judges, the Supreme Court in Penny and Hooper v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue, SC 62/2010 (2011) NZSC 95 held that the transfer of the taxpayers’ medical practices to companies owned by family trusts was lawful, being a business structure choice that the taxpayers were entitled to make. There was nothing artificial or unusual for companies under the taxpayers’ control to pay salaries to the taxpayers. However, fixing the salaries at an artificially low level to avoid paying tax at the highest personal tax rate did constitute tax avoidance. The commencement of paying lower salaries coincided with the increase in the top personal income tax rate to 39%, while the corporate rate was 30%. In addition, the taxpayers maintained control of all of the companies’ income and were able to, and did, transfer funds from the companies for their own, and their families’ use.
The Court acknowledged that there circumstances where the setting of a salary at a low level may be justified, e.g., where a company has a commercial need to retain funds for capital expenditure, or where a company faces, or is about to experience, financial difficulties. In these situations, tax avoidance does not arise when low salaries are paid. However, where the setting of the annual salary is influenced in more than an incidental way by the impact of taxation, the whole arrangement is considered to be tax avoidance. In this case, the tax advantage was at least one of the principal purposes and effects of the taxpayers’ arrangements, rendering them void u/s. BG 1 of the Income-tax Act, 2007.

The Court stated the basic principle as follows:

— “. . . . the policy underlying the general antiavoidance provision is to negate any structuring of a taxpayer’s affairs whether or not done as a matter of ‘ordinary business or family dealings’ . . . unless any tax advantage is just an incidental feature. That must include using a company structure to fix the taxpayer’s salary in an artificial manner”; and
— “Parliament must have contemplated and been content that people may structure their transactions for commercial reasons or for family reasons in which any tax advantage is merely incidental, but that they will not be permitted to do so when tax avoidance is more than a merely incidental purpose or effect of the steps they have taken.”
The Supreme Court decision followed Peate v. Commissioner of Taxation of Commonwealth of Australia, (1962-1964) 111 CLR 443, affirmed (1967) 1 AC 308 (PC), where a doctor similarly used a company, which paid him a low salary, to avoid taxation that would have been paid if the doctor had derived the income himself and then applied it for the benefit of his family. The doctor nevertheless retained control of all of the income.

On a separate matter, the Court also criticised the practice (which was evident in this case) of expert witnesses going beyond their role as authorities in their field of expertise and expressing their views on legal issues in the case at hand. The Court considered the practice undesirable and a wasteful duplication of time and effort, and rather pointedly directed that the practice stop and, if it did not, lower courts should require amended briefs to be filed.

There is now a call from tax practitioners seeking Inland Revenue certainty about what constitutes artificially low salaries. It is difficult to see Inland Revenue drawing a definitive line given that there are circumstances where, on a case-by-case basis, low salaries can be justified, as noted by the Supreme Court. Reference :

 TNS:2010-06-07:NZ-1; ITS:NZ; ITA:NZ; IGTT:NZ.

9. Estonia — Application of CFC and GAAR — Substance over Form Principle — Supreme Court rules Re attribution of foreign company’s profits to Estonian company
On 26 September 2011, the Supreme Court of Estonia gave its decision in the case of Technomar v. Tax Authorities, (Case No. 3-3-1-42-11) where it, among other issues, decided for the first time on the attribution of a foreign company’s income to an Estonian company.

(a) Facts

The Estonian resident individual held shares in a taxpayer, Estonian resident company, Technomar. A Manx company (Ltd.) and a US company (L.L.C.) derived their income from (i) purchasing goods from third parties and selling them for a higher price to Technomar, or from (ii) purchasing goods from Technomar and selling them for a higher price to third parties. Both of these companies were incorporated and controlled by the above-mentioned individual shareholder of Technomar.
L.L.C. transferred EEK 118 million from its Estonian bank account to its Austrian account.
The tax authorities considered that Technomar used Ltd. and L.L.C. as conduit companies to evade taxes. Therefore, the tax authorities applied the look-through approach and concluded that all the transactions, profits and assets of Ltd. and L.L.C. were Technomar’s and, correspondingly, all transfers from the bank account of L.L.C. must be treated as made directly by Technomar.
Further, as, due to the bank secrecy rules, the tax authorities did not manage to receive information from the Austrian authorities on the L.L.C.’s bank account in Austria, the EEK 118 million transferred by L.L.C. to Austria was treated as undocumented expense of Technomar. As a result, the tax authorities assessed Technomar in respect of these transfers.
Technomar appealed against the assessment to the administrative Court, which upheld the tax authorities’ position. Subsequently, the Court of appeal also decided in favour of the tax authorities. Technomar appealed to the Supreme Court.

(b) Legal background

U/s.22 of the Income-tax Law (ITL), resident individuals are taxable on the income of a controlled company established in a low-tax territory, whether or not such company has distributed any profits. As retained earnings of resident companies are tax exempt, the ITL does not contain such a provision for companies.
Section 84 of the Law on Taxation sets out the general anti-avoidance rule which provides that where, from the content of a transaction it is evident that such a transaction is performed for the purposes of tax evasion, the conditions corresponding to the actual economic substance shall apply for tax purposes (substance-over-form principle).

(c) Issue

The issue before the Court was, in essence, whether or not the transactions and bank transfers of Ltd. and L.L.C. could be attributed to the Estonian company under the general anti-avoidance rule, and whether bank transfers to accounts, of which the tax authorities have no means to receive information about, can be qualified as taxable hidden profit distributions under the ITL.

(d)    Decision

The Court agreed with the tax authorities that the substance-over-form principle allows the authorities to attribute the income of a foreign company to an Estonian company if the circumstances of the transactions demonstrate that the transactions of the foreign company have not been directly concluded for the interests of the individual who manages and controls the company, but to conceal the transactions related to the economic activities of the Estonian company.

Technomar’s argument that Ltd. and L.L.C. were separate legal persons with separate tax liabilities and, therefore, the tax authorities should have, instead of applying the general substance-over-form principle, applied specific provisions such as section 22 ITL or section 50(4) ITL (transfer pricing), was not upheld. The Court stated that in order to apply the latter provisions, the companies should have been engaged in independent economic activities. In the case at hand, the Court agreed with the tax authorities that Ltd. and L.L.C. did not engage in such activities and the transactions concluded by them were fictitious.

Also, the Court did not recognise the position of Technomar that transfers of funds from one account of the company to its other account, whether Estonian or foreign, cannot be considered as a non-business expense. The Court held that in certain circumstances it is allowed to tax as a non-business expense payments from one account of the company to another or withdrawals of cash. The pre-condition for the non-taxation of retained corporate profits is the use of these profits in business. However, such use must be proven. Any transfer or cash payment which makes it impossible to exercise control over the use of funds must be taxed as a non-business expense. If the movement of attributed funds on the bank accounts is not reflected in the company’s books and the tax authorities have no means to receive information on the use of funds on some accounts, then the transfer to such account constitutes a payment for which there is no source document certifying the transaction. In this regard, there is no difference in which country the bank account is situated or for which reason the tax authorities are not able to obtain information about the account.

The Court upheld the position of the tax authorities and the lower Courts, and dismissed the appeal of Technomar.

Reference: CTA:EE:10.

10.    Brazil — CFC — Superior Court of Justice rules on impossibility of setting off tax losses of foreign-controlled and affiliated companies against taxable profit in Brazil

The Superior Court of Justice (Superior Tribunal de Justiça — STJ) in the session held on 27 September 2011, within the case records of Special Appeal n. 1161003 filed by Marcopolo S/A against the Federal Treasury, ruled on the question of the impossibility of offsetting tax losses of foreign-controlled and affiliated companies against taxable profits of the parent company in Brazil.

(a)    Background

Law 9,249/1995 determines that profits accrued by foreign-controlled and affiliated companies of Brazilian companies are taxable in Brazil. When imposing this obligation, Law 9,249/1995 expressly provides that potential tax losses resulting from activities carried out by these foreign entities could not be offset against the taxable profits of the parent company in Brazil.

Subsequently, Provisional Measure 2,158/2001 (PM 2,158) anticipated the timing for recognition and taxation of foreign profits earned by foreign-controlled or affiliated companies to the end of the same calendar year in which they are accrued in the balance sheet of the foreign companies, regardless of their actual distribution to the Brazilian parent company.

PM 2,158 was silent vis-à-vis the impossibility of offsetting tax losses incurred by foreign-controlled and affiliated companies against the taxable profits of the parent company in Brazil. Therefore, Marcopolo S/A has argued that PM 2,158 has actually revoked the prohibition set forth by Law 9,249/1995 and, from that moment on, the offsetting would be allowed.

(b)    Decision

The Justices of the Superior Court of Justice, in a unanimous decision, ruled that tax losses of foreign-controlled and affiliated companies cannot be offset against the taxable profits of their parent company in Brazil. This reasoning was based on the argument that this would provide a double advantage to the Brazilian company, given that these tax losses could be used to offset the profits to be generated by the same foreign-controlled and affiliated companies in the following tax years.

Furthermore, the Justices understood that PM 2,158 has not revoked the prohibition set forth by Law 9,249/1995 in that regard and, therefore, the provisions brought by the latter are still applicable.

It is expected that Marcopolo S/A would file an appeal against this decision before the Brazilian Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal — STF).

Reference: CTS:BR:1.5.1., 6.1.1.; CTA:BR:1.8.1., 7.2.2.

11.    Netherlands; European Union; France; Ger-many; Portugal — Thin capitalisation rules Netherlands Supreme Court — AG opines on application of thin capitalisation provision under tax treaties with France, Germany and Portugal

On 9 September 2011, Advocate-General (AG) Wattel delivered his opinion in case No. 10/05268 on the application of the Dutch thin capitalisation rules under the France-Netherlands tax treaty on income and capital of 16 March 1973 as amended, the Germany-Netherlands tax treaty on income and capital of 16 June 1959 as amended and the Netherlands-Portugal tax treaty on income and capital of 20 September 1999 (‘the treaties’).

(a)    Facts:

The taxpayer is a company resident in the Netherlands, which in 2004 was owned for 95% by a French company. In 2004, The taxpayer had debts to companies, established in France, Germany and Portugal, belonging to the same group as the taxpayer. The taxpayer deducted the negative balance of the group interest. The tax inspector rejected the deduction based on the Dutch thin capitalisation provision of Article 10d of the Corporate Income Tax Act (CIT).

(b)    Issues and opinion:
The issues before the Supreme Court are as follows:

Issue (1)

The AG considered that the thin capitalisation provision is compatible with EU law with reference to the decision of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) of 25 February 2010 in the case C-337/08, X-holding, in which it was held that the Netherlands rules disallowing cross-border group taxation are compatible with freedom of establishment and a decision of the Supreme Court of 24 June 2011, nr. 09/05115, in which it was decided that the loss relief restriction applicable to holding companies is not incompatible with EU freedom of establishment (see TNS:2011-06-27:NL-3). In addition, the AG considered that EU law does not oblige to allow a cross-border consolidation and also not to separate from a package deal group regime, parts which in domestic situations result only from the full consolidation.

Issue (2)

The AG refers to the decision of the ECJ of 21 July 2011 in the Case C-397/09, Scheuten Solar Technology. The AG observed that the aim of the Directive is not a broadening of the tax base of the related company paying the interest, but the prevention of legal double taxation at the level of the receiving company. Therefore, the AG takes the view that the thin capitalisation provision is compatible with Article 1 of the Interest and Royalty Directive.

Issue (3)

The AG rejected the appeal based on Article 25(5) (non-discrimination) under the treaty with France because the taxpayer is not treated differently from another company which is not part of a group and is not comparable with a group company. In addition, the AG held that the non-discrimination provision does not oblige to allow a cross-border fiscal unity.

Furthermore, the AG rejected the appeal based on Article 6 of the treaty with Germany and Article 9 of the treaty with France, because the application of a thin capitalisation provision is not incompatible with those arm’s-length provisions. Based on the wording ‘may’, the AG opined that those provisions do not preclude the application of thin capitalisation provisions without the possibility of proof to the contrary.

In addition, the AG pointed out that these treaty provisions textually do not concern capital structures or the determination of the tax base, but transactions.

The AG did not take the 1992 Commentary to the OECD Model Convention into account, because the tax treaties with France and Germany were signed before, but noted that the 1992 Commentary supports the view of the taxpayer.

In addition, the AG referred to the group test, included in the thin capitalisation provision. Under this test, companies may opt that the excessive debt is determined by multiplying the difference between the average annual debts and the average annual equity using a multiplier based on the commercial debt/equity ratio of the group. The AG held that this option may be regarded as a possibility of proof to the contrary.

The AG accepted the taxpayer’s appeal based on Artilce 9 of the treaty with Portugal and Article X of the protocol to that treaty and held that this arm’s-length provision obliges the treaty states to allow the taxpayer with the possibility of providing proof to the contrary.

Consequently, the AG opined to overturn the decision of the Lower Court Haarlem and held that the case should be referred to another Court for further fact finding.

Reference:  tnS:2010-11-19:nl-2;  tnS:2011-06-27:nl-3;
CtS:nl:7.3.; Cta:nl:10.3.; hold:nl; tt:Fr-nl:02:enG:1973:tt;
tt:de-nl:02:enG:1959:tt;  tt:nl-Pt:02:enG:1999:tt;
tt:e2:82:enG:2003:tt; eCJd:C-337/08; eCJd:C-397/09.

Acknowledgment/Source:
We have compiled the above summary of decisions from the Tax News Service of IBFD for the period September to October, 2011.

Section 148 — Reassessment proceedings — Assessee’s appeal allowed by the CIT(A) on merits — In the appellate proceedings whether the assessee can challenge the validity of the reassessment proceedings — Held, Yes.

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Dy. CIT v. Duratex Export
ITAT ‘D’ Bench, Mumbai
Before Pramod Kumar (AM) and Asha Vijayaraghavan (JM)
ITA Nos. 3088 & 3089/Mum./2010 (C.O. Nos. 19 & 20/Mum./2011) A.Ys.: 2001-02 & 2002-03 Decided on: 15-6-2011 Counsel for revenue/assessee: R. K. Gupta/ K. Shivaram

Section 148 — Reassessment proceedings — Assessee’s appeal allowed by the CIT(A) on merits — In the appellate proceedings whether the assessee can challenge the validity of the reassessment proceedings — Held, Yes.


Facts:

The assessee firm was engaged in the business of manufacturing and trading in fabrics. Pursuant to the scrutiny assessment proceedings, the assessment for the A.Y. 2001-02 was finalised on 19-12-2003. In its return the assessee had claimed deduction u/s.80HHC amounting to Rs.3.18 crores which was computed after considering the sum of Rs.24.03 lac received on account of sale of DEPB licence. The assessment for A.Y. 2002-03 was made u/s.143(1). By the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 2005, the receipt on account of the sale of DEPB licence was excluded from the definition of the term ‘total turnover’. The amendment made was retrospective from April 1, 1998. In view thereof, the AO reopened the assessment u/s.147 and issued the notice dated 28-3-2008 u/s.148. The assessee challenged validity of the action of the AO.

On appeal, the CIT(A) treated the grievance against reopening of assessment as not pressed but gave relief to the assess on merits in respect of additions made on account of the sale of DEPB licence by following the Special Bench decision of the Mumbai Tribunal in the case of Topman Exports [318 ITR (AT) 87]. Before the Tribunal, the Revenue relied on the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Kalpataru Colours & Chemicals (328 ITR 451) whereunder the Special Bench decision of the Mumbai Tribunal in the case of Topman Exports was reversed. As regards the validity of reopening of assessment, it was contended that since the assessee did not object to reopening of assessment before the CIT(A), it was not open to do so now.

Held:

According to the Tribunal, the mere fact that the assessee was not allowed to, or did not, press the grievance against the reopening of assessment before the CIT(A), particularly in a situation in which the resultant addition on merits could not have been sustained because of binding judicial precedent then holding at the relevant point of time, the assessee cannot be deprived of his rights to adjudicate the reopening of assessment at a later stage. Accordingly, it proceeded to decide the validity of the reassessment proceedings. Relying on the Mumbai Tribunal decision in the case of Dharmik Exim Pvt. Ltd. v. ACIT, (ITA No. 232/ Mum./2009), the Tribunal observed that it was a settled legal position that when the assessment is reopened beyond four years from the end of the relevant previous year and unless it cannot be established that the assessee had failed to disclose all the material facts necessary for the purpose of assessment, such reassessment proceedings cannot be upheld under the law. In the case of the assessee, the assessment for the A.Y. 2001-02 was made u/s.143(3) on 19-12-2003 while the notice u/s.148 was issued after 4 years on 28-3-2008. Therefore, the Tribunal upheld the grievance raised by the assessee in its cross-objection and allowed the same.

According to it, the fact that the assessment for A.Y. 2002-03 was framed u/s.143(1) would not have any impact on the validity of reassessment proceedings. As per the decision of the Mumbai Tribunal in the case of Pirojsha Godrej Foundation v. ADIT, [133 TTJ (Mumbai) 194] where it was held that irrespective of whether the assessment was finalised u/s.143(1) or section 143(3), the requirements of section 147 have to be fulfilled, the Tribunal allowed the cross-objection of the assessee challenging the reassessment proceedings and the appeals filed by the Revenue was dismissed as infructuous.

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Section 271B r.w.s 44AB — Penalty for failure to get accounts audited — Assessee following project completion method of accounting — Whether advances received from the customers could be considered as part of turnover — Held, No.

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Siroya Developers v. DCIT
ITAT ‘I’ Bench, Mumbai
Before S. V. Mehrotra (AM) and Asha Vijayaraghavan (JM)
ITA No. 600/Mum./2010
A.Y.: 2005-06. Decided on: 12-1-2011 Counsels for assessee/revenue: B. V. Jhaveri/ S. K. Singh

Section 271B r.w.s 44AB — Penalty for failure to get accounts audited — Assessee following project completion method of accounting — Whether advances received from the customers could be considered as part of turnover — Held, No.


Facts:

The assessee, a property developer, was following project completion method. During the year the opening work in progress was Rs.4.35 crore and the closing work in progress was Rs.10.07 crore. Besides the assessee had also received advances against sale of flats of Rs.4.03 crore. According to the AO, the assessee was required to obtain and file report u/s.44AB by 31-10-2005. For failure to do so, he levied a penalty u/s.271B. On appeal the CIT(A) confirmed the AO’s order.

Held:

According to the Tribunal, when the assessee was following the project completion method of accounting, the advances received against booking of flats cannot be treated as sale proceeds or a turnover or as part of gross receipt because the same was not received by the assessee unconditionally. For the purpose it relied on views expressed by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India and on the Pune Tribunal decision in the case of ACIT v. B. K. Jhala & Associates, (69 ITD 141). Accordingly, the penalty levied was deleted and the appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

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Section 14A — Rule 8D can be invoked only after AO records his satisfaction on how the assessee’s calculation is incorrect. Onus is on the AO to show that expenditure has been incurred for earning taxfree income. Disallowance u/s.14A cannot be made on the basis of presumptions.

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DCIT v. Jindal Photo Limited ITAT ‘D’ Bench, Delhi
Before G. E. Veerabhadrappa (VP) and A. D. Jain (JM)
ITA Nos. 814/Del./2011
A.Y.: 2008-09. Decided on: 23-9-2011 Counsel for revenue/assessee: R. S. Negi/ Rupesh Saini

Section 14A — Rule 8D can be invoked only after AO records his satisfaction on how the assessee’s calculation is incorrect. Onus is on the AO to show that expenditure has been incurred for earning tax-free income. Disallowance u/s.14A cannot be made on the basis of presumptions.


Facts:

The AO disallowed a sum of Rs.31.01,542 u/s.14A of the Act by invoking Rule 8D. However, he did not record satisfaction as to how the assessee’s calculation was not correct. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A). The CIT(A) upheld the applicability of Rule 8D but he reduced the amount of disallowance to Rs.19,43,022 by reducing the amount of disallowance on account of interest but as regards disallowance of administrative expenses he upheld the action of the AO. He also upheld the applicability of Rule 8D. Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal and the assessee filed cross-objections.

Held:

The Tribunal noted that the assessee has suo motu made a disallowance u/s.14A. The Tribunal also noted that the AO has invoked Rule 8D without recording satisfaction as to how the assessee’s calculation is incorrect. Upon considering the ratio of various decisions of the Tribunal and the decision of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of CIT v. Hero Cycles, (323 ITR 518), the Tribunal held that for invoking Rule 8D the AO must record satisfaction as to how the claim of the assessee is incorrect. If that is not done, provisions of Rule 8D cannot be invoked. An ad hoc disallowance cannot be made under Rule 8D. The onus is on the AO to establish that expenditure has been incurred for earning exempt income. Disallowance u/s.14A cannot be made on the basis of presumption that the assessee must have incurred expenditure to earn tax-free income.

Since the AO had not recorded satisfaction regarding the assessee’s calculation being incorrect and since such satisfaction is a pre-requisite for invoking Rule 8D, the CIT(A) erred in partially approving the action of the AO. The Tribunal dismissed this ground of the appeal filed by the Department. Cases referred:

1. CIT v. Hero Cycles, (323 ITR 518) (P&H)

2. ACIT v. Eicher Ltd., (101 TTJ 369) (Del.)

3. Maruti Udyog v. DCIT, (92 ITD 119) (Del.)

4. Wimco Seedlings Ltd. v. DCIT, (107 ITD 267) (Del.) (TM)

5. Punjab National Bank v. DCIT, (103 TTJ 908) (Del.)

6. Vidyut Investment Ltd. (10 SOT 284) (Del.) 7. D. J. Mehta v. ITO, (290 ITR 238) (Mum.) (AT)

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Capital gains v. Business Income: Section 28(va) of Income-tax Act, 1961: A.Y. 2006- 07: Consideration received on transfer of rights of trade mark, brands and copy rights: Business given up distinct from business continued: Consideration not arising out of business: Not business income, but is longterm capital gain.

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[CIT v. Mediworld Publications Pvt. Ltd., 337 ITR 178 (Del.), 244 CTR 387 (Del.)]

The assessee was engaged in the business of healthcare, print media and electronic media communications. The assessee entered into a specified assets transfer agreement with one CMP for sale of all its rights, title and interest in specified assets of its healthcare journals and communications business. In consideration of the transfer the assessee had received Rs.3.80 crores. In the return of income the receipt was shown as the long-term capital gain. The Assessing Officer taxed it as business income u/s.28(va) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal accepted the assessee’s claim that it is long-term capital gain.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under: “

(i) By the agreement, the assessee had transferred the rights of trade marks, brands, copyrights, etc., in the journals and publications. The clinical trials business which the assessee continued to carry on was distinct and separate from the business of healthcare journals and communications. As far as the healthcare journals and communication business is concerned, it had been given up in entirety in favour of the transferee.

(ii) Thus section 28(va) was not applicable to any sum received on account of transfer of right to carry on any business which was chargeable under the head ‘Capital gains’. In the specified asset transfer agreement, ‘business’ was to mean the business of publishing, distributing and selling the periodicals and products as carried on by the seller (assessee).

(iii) There was a transfer of exclusive assets and on the transfer it was the transferee which had become the sole and undisputed owner of these assets which were the business assets of the assessee.

(iv) We find no merit in this appeal and dismiss the same.”

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Business expenditure: Interest on borrowed capital: Section 36(1)(iii) of Income-tax Act, 1961: Assessee invested borrowed funds in the shares of subsidiary company to have control over that company: Interest on borrowed funds allowable as deduction u/s.36(1)(iii).

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[CIT v. Phil Corporation Ltd., 244 CTR 226 (Bom.)]

The assessee had invested the borrowed funds in the shares of the subsidiary company. The assessee’s claim for deduction of interest u/s.36(1)(iii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was rejected by the Assessing Officer. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under: “

(i) The Tribunal found that the assessee had invested the amount in question in subsidiary company for the acquisition of its shares i.e., to have a control over majority shares but not to earn dividend or interest. Before the Tribunal, it was not disputed that such an investment is an integral part of the business.

(ii) We find that the reasoning of the Tribunal that the overdraft was not operated only for investing in shares of subsidiary company to have control over that company and, therefore, the element of interest paid on the overdraft was not susceptible of bifurcation and, therefore, the respondent no. 1 is entitled to the deduction u/s.36(1)(iii) of the Income-tax Act is correct and deserves to be accepted.

(iii) In the result we hold that Tribunal was right
in deleting the addition.”

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Business expenditure: Deduction u/s.35AB of Income-tax Act, 1961: A.Ys. 1993-94 to 1995-96: Agreement for supply of technical knowhow: Assessee obliged to pay income-tax under the agreement: Assessee entitled to deduction of income tax paid u/s.35AB.

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[Tata Yodogawa v. CIT, 243 CTR 263 (Jharkhand)]

The assessee entered into a collaboration agreement with ESW for acquiring know-how for use in the business. Under the agreement, the assessee was required to pay a fixed sum and also the tax payable on such sum. Jharkhand High Court considered the following question of law: “Whether deduction u/s.35AB was permissible only in respect of the remittances made by the assessee to ESW or it was permissible in respect of the income-tax paid by the assessee on the said remittances in terms of the collaboration agreement? To be more specific the question is whether the phrase ‘lump sum consideration’ used in section 35AB(1) would include the taxes paid by the assessee under the agreement for acquisition of know-how?” The High Court held as under:

“(i) Deduction u/s.35AB is permissible in respect of any lump sum consideration for acquiring any know-how for use for the purpose of assessee’s business. The word ‘consideration’ include the entire obligation of the assessee, without which the assessee would not be able to acquire the know-how.

(ii) On the facts of the case the obligation of the assessee under the agreement with ESW extended not merely to remitting the amount of two million DM to ESW, but also extended to payment of taxes which would include the income-tax as well as the R&D cess. It seems quite obvious that if the assessee had not paid the tax or the R&D cess, and had merely made payment of two million DM to ESW, the latter would not be obliged to part with the knowhow in view of the terms of the collaboration agreement. Therefore, payment of these taxes are as integral a part of the ‘consideration’ as the payment of two million DM.

(iii) There is no logical reason for not treating the income-tax paid by the assessee in terms of the collaboration agreement as part of the ‘consideration’ for acquisition of the knowhow. The word ‘lump sum’ as used before the word ‘consideration’ in section 35AB only excludes periodical or turnover based payments like royalty, etc., and any one-time payment for the know-how would fall within the expression ‘lump sum’ if it is fixed and specified in the agreement, although it may be payable in installments.”

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Appellate Tribunal: Power to examine validity of search: Sections 132(1), 253(1)(b) and 254(1) of Income-tax Act, 1961: B. P. 1985-86 to 5-12-1995: The Tribunal has power to examine the validity of the search in an appeal against the assessment order passed pursuant to search.

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[C. Ramaiah Reddy v. ACIT, 244 CTR 126 (Kar.)]

On the scope of the power of the Appellate Tribunal to examine the validity of search u/s.132 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the Karnataka High Court held as under:

“(i) A search u/s.132 as contemplated by Chapter XIV-B has to be a valid search. An illegal search is no search and in such a case Chapter XIV-B would have no application.

(ii) If the conditions for the exercise of power are not satisfied, the proceeding is liable to be quashed and consequently the block assessment cannot be sustained. Thus, when the assessee challenges the order of assessment and contends that the search is illegal and void, the said question goes to the root of the matter. If the said search and seizure results in determination of liability and levy of tax, then the assessee can be said to be an aggrieved person. Though he cannot prefer an appeal against the authorisation of search and seizure, once such unauthorised or illegal search and seizure culminates in an assessment order, he gets a right to challenge the assessment on several grounds including the validity of authorisation and initiation of search and seizure.

(iii) If he has not challenged the validity of initiation of the proceedings by way of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, he would not lose his right to challenge the same in the appeal. Specific words used in clause (b) of s.s (1) of section 253 i.e., “an order passed by the AO under clause (c) of section 158BC in respect of search initiated u/s.132” tend to show that this appeal provision specifically applies to an assessment order consequent to search initiated u/s.132. Thus, the subjectmatter of the appeal under the provision is not only the assessment order made by the AO, but also ‘a search initiated’ u/s.132.

(iv) Therefore, if the assessee contends that the search initiated u/s.132 is not in accordance with law, the said contention has to be considered and adjudicated upon by the Tribunal in the appeal filed by the assessee against the assessment order. It is obligatory on the part of the Tribunal first to go into the jurisdictional aspect and satisfy itself that the search was valid and legal. It is only then it can go into the correctness of the order of block assessment.

(v) Therefore, in the absence of a specific provision under the Act for appeal against illegal search, the Tribunal is not estopped from going into such question in the appeal filed against the assessment order.”

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Reassessment: Sections 143(3), 147 and 148 of Income-tax Act, 1961: A.Y. 1999-00: Assessment u/s.143(3): Subsequent reopening of assessment (beyond 4 years): The recorded reasons must indicate as to how there was a failure on the part of the assessee to disclose the facts fully and truly: Lapse on the part of the AO cannot be a ground for reopening when the primary facts are disclosed.

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[M/s. Atma Ram Properties Pvt. Ltd. v. DCIT (Del.), ITA No. 87 of 2010 dated 11-11-2011]

For the A.Y. 1999-00, the case was taken up for scrutiny and the assessment was completed u/s.143(3) of the Act. Subsequently, (beyond the period of 4 years) the assessment was reopened and an addition of Rs.79,23,834 was made u/s.2(22)(e) of the Act, in the reassessment. The reopening and the addition were confirmed by the Tribunal.

On appeal by the assessee, the following question was framed : “Whether the Assessing Officer was justified and correct in law in initiating the reassessment proceedings for reasons recorded in Annexure A2?” The Delhi High Court answered the question in favour of the assessee and held as under: “

(i) In the regular assessment the Assessing Officer had inquired into the details of the advances received, but did not make any addition u/s.2(22)(e). If the Assessing Officer fails to apply legal provisions, no fault can be attributed to the assessee. The assessee is merely required to make a full and true disclosure of material facts, but is not required to disclose, state or explain the law.

(ii) A lapse or error on the part of the Assessing Officer cannot be regarded as a failure on the part of the assessee to make a full and true disclosure of material facts.

(iii) Though the recorded reasons state that the assessee had failed to fully and truly disclose the facts, they do not indicate why and how there was this failure. Mere repetition or quoting the language of the proviso is not sufficient. The basis of the averment should either be stated or be apparent from the record.

(iv) Explanation (1) to section 147 which states that mere production of books is not sufficient does not apply to a case where the Assessing Officer failed to apply the law to admitted facts on record.

(v) The allegation that the assessee did not disclose the true and correct nature of the payment received from the sister concerns, nor disclosed the extent of holding of the sister concern so as to enable the Assessing officer to apply his mind regarding section 2(22)(e) is not acceptable. The assessee had filed statement of accounts of each creditor and indicated them to be sister concerns. The primary facts were furnished. The law does not impose any further obligation of disclosure on the assessee.

(vi) Appeal is accordingly allowed and the reassessment proceedings are set aside.”

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(2011) 23 STR 345 (Kar.) — Commissioner of Central Excise, Mangalore v. Dee Pee En Corporation.

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Quantum of penalty — Whether penalty could be levied at the rate of Rs.100 per day on failure to pay duty by the assessee for period prior to 10-9-2004.

Facts:
The issue for consideration was whether the appellant could levy penalty at the rate of Rs.100 per day on failure to pay duty by the assessee for the period prior to 10-9-2004 or not. According to the assessee, the provisions of section 76 to levy penalty at the rate of Rs.100 per day came only from 10-9-2004 and thus it could not be levied retrospectively. The Department relying on the judgment in the case of ETA Engineering Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Chennai 2004 (174) ELT 19 (Tri.- LB) contended that even for the period prior to 10-9-2004, the Tribunal had confirmed the order of levying penalty at the rate of Rs.100 per day.

Held:
The Tribunal observed that the judgment of ETA Engineering Ltd. was not applicable to this case as it did not consider effective date of the amended provision. It was held that penalty at the rate of Rs.100 per day was leviable for the period 10-9-2004 onwards and not prior to the said date.

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The Second Freedom Struggle – Our Unfinished Agenda

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Mahatma Gandhi gave us freedom from the Britishers. Yet, we still have to be free from hunger, poverty, and above all, from corruption. We, the older generation, who witnessed to our freedom struggle were losing heart. We remembered with nostalgia and a deep sense of sadness those days when the whole country was united and fighting against the foreign rule. The air resounded with the slogans of ‘Quit India’ and ‘Do or Die’. I personally recollected having helped in making badges and posters at home. We believed that all is lost and the torch lit by Gandhiji and our other leaders is extinguished. There is no more light. Only darkness.

But things are not so bad. There is a silver lining to the dark clouds. Anna Hazare and his team have rekindled the flame. From what we believed were smoldering ashes, he has relit a flame and brought back hope.

In August, we saw history in the making. Anna Hazare demonstrated to us and the world, what can be achieved by satyagraha and non-violence and how the common people can make the Government wake up from its slumber, sit up and listen to the message that people are not prepared to tolerate corruption.

The fight today is against corruption. We have to get rid of this cancer which is eating away the very vitals of our social fabric, that is based on Dharma and sapping at the very roots of our real freedom.

The present generation is dimly aware of the great movement which brought us freedom. I am reminded of an incident narrated in the book ‘Exodus’. The Jews were fighting the Britishers to get their homeland. One aged freedom fighter, a grandfather was dying of bullet injuries, suffered while breaking out from the prison where he was held pending his execution. His young grandson, who had helped him in the escape, tells him “Grandfather, it is good to die for one’s country”. The grandfather replies, “Son, it is good to have a country to die for !” People today are not aware what it means to be citizens of a free country. The sacrifices of freedom fighters and lakhs of our people during the freedom struggle have been forgotten.

There are three great things about the entire movement by Anna Hazare, which have gladdened my heart. First is the spontaneous response of lakh’s of people to the cause. Such a response was beyond the wildest imagination of anyone. Second is the amalgam of people which responded. They were from every strata of society. Many of them were young and most of them were the common man. It was indeed a movement of masses and the younger generation. The third is that the entire movement was peaceful and without any violence, incidents of looting, stone throwing or burning of vehicle. There was nothing like ‘The Jasmine Revolution’ of Middle East. This has restored my faith in our people and the principles laid down by Mahatma Gandhi.

But the battle has just begun. We have to see that the torch lit by Anna remains burning. There is a saying in Gujarati, that “Gujaratis are courageous only in the beginning”. That applies to the rest of the country also. We have to disprove this and wash this black stain from our forehead. Of course Mahatma Gandhi proved this for us.

I came across this very apt shloka from Niti Shatakam of Bhartruhari.

“Base men do not undertake any work apprehending obstacles. Mediocres make a start, but cease working when they encounter hindrances. The men of excellence, however, after commencing a job do not give up despite recurrence of impediments.”

We all have to take part in this movement against corruption. We have to finish it before it finishes us. We can no longer be passive observers. We must support and participate in the anti-corruption movement in every possible way. Of course we must resolve not to be part of corruption. We must not indulge in ‘convenient corruption’ — corruption to get what we want through offering bribes. We must also resist coercive corruption and refuse demands for bribes.

I would end with my Namaskaar to Anna and his team, for starting the struggle, and leading from the front, and also to millions who gave tremendous sacrifices in our freedom struggle. Let us assure Anna that we all are with him in this struggle to eradicate this cancer called corruption. Let us then rise united for this cause, and see that the torch of real freedom remains ever burning.

I conclude by quoting the national poet and freedom fighter Zaverchand Meghani:

“We do not know what perils lie ahead of us on the path. We only know that the call has come from Mother India.”
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Demed Dividend — Loans or Advances to Related Concerns

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Issue for consideration

Dividend is an income under the Income-tax Act, 1961. The term ‘dividend’ is inclusively defined in section 2(22), vide five clauses, (a) to (e). These clauses primarily provide for treatment of certain distribution or payments, by the company, as dividend to the extent of the accumulated profits of the company. Clause (e) provides for payment of certain loans and advances by a company to a certain category of shareholders or for the benefit of this category of shareholders, or to any concern in which such shareholder is a member or a partner and in which he has a substantial interest (popularly referred to as ‘deemed dividend’). This clause reads as under:

“(e) any payment by a company, not being a company in which the public are substantially interested, of any sum (whether as representing a part of the assets of the company or otherwise) made after the 31st day of May 1987, by way of advance or loan to a shareholder, being a person who is the beneficial owner of shares (not being shares entitled to a fixed rate of dividend whether with or without a right to participate in profits) holding not less than 10% of the voting power, or to any concern in which such shareholder is a member or a partner and in which he has a substantial interest (hereafter in this clause referred to as the said concern) or any payment by any such company on behalf, or for the individual benefit, of any such shareholder, to the extent to which the company in either case possesses accumulated profits;”

These loans or advances to the specified shareholders or for the benefit of such shareholders or to the concerns in which such shareholders are substantially interested, are therefore taxable as dividend. Such dividend is not subject to the dividend distribution tax u/s.115-O, and is therefore a taxable income, not exempt u/s.10(34) of the Act.

In cases of payments of loans and advances to the specified concerns, the following questions have arisen before the courts in the recent past, in interpretation of this provision, namely, (a) whether the dividend under this clause is taxable in the hands of a shareholder or in the hands of the concern receiving the loan; (b) should the person being taxed be the registered as well as the beneficial shareholder; and (c) whether in cases of the fiduciary holding, the recipient can be taxed even where he is not the registered owner of the shares by presuming the recipient concern to be the shareholder. While the Bombay High Court had approved the decision of the Special Bench of the Tribunal that the dividend be taxed in the hands of the shareholder, only and not in the hands of the concern and further that the shareholder has to be both a registered shareholder as well as the beneficial shareholder, recently the Delhi High Court in a dissenting decision has taken a different view of the matter, holding that such dividend is taxable in the hands of the concern receiving the loan or advance where the firm is a beneficial shareholder, not following its own decision in an earlier case.

Universal Medicare’s case The issue came up before the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT v. Universal Medicare Private Limited, 324 ITR 263.

In this case, an amount of Rs.32 lakhs was transferred from the bank account of one company to the bank account of the assessee-company. One of the directors held over 10% of the equity capital of the company, which transferred the funds and also held over 20% of the equity capital of the assessee-company. This transfer was part of a misappropriation by a senior employee, who had opened bank accounts and carried out certain transactions to defalcate funds.

The assessee claimed that the amount was neither an advance nor a loan to the assessee, but represented misappropriation of funds by the senior employee. Alternatively, it was forcefully contended that, even assuming that this was an amount advanced to the assessee, for the purposes of taxation, the deemed dividend would be taxable in the hands of the shareholder and not in the hands of the assessee to whom the payment was advanced. The Assessing Officer concluded that the section 2(22)(e) provided for taxation in the hands of the recipient company and that they were attracted the moment a loan or advance was made and that subsequent defalcation of funds was immaterial. Noting that all the requirements of section 2(22)(e) were fulfilled, the Assessing officer concluded that the loan was to be treated as deemed dividend in the hands of the recipient company and not in the hands of the shareholder director.

The Commissioner (Appeals) affirmed the order of the Assessing officer. The Tribunal reversed the findings of the Commissioner (Appeals) on the reasoning that the amount was taxable in the hands of the shareholder director and not in the hands of the assessee-company and also on the fact that the amount was part of a fraud committed, and that the transaction was not reflected in its books of accounts of the company.

The Bombay High Court analysed the provisions of section 2(22)(e), and observed that the clause was not artistically worded. It noted that Parliament had expanded the ambit of the expression ‘dividend’ by providing an inclusive definition. It noted that the payment by a company had to be by way of an advance or loan. On facts, it noted that the Tribunal had found that no loan or advance was granted to the assessee-company, since the amount in question had actually been defalcated and was not reflected in the books of account of the assessee-company. According to the Bombay High Court, this was a pure finding of fact which did not give rise to any substantial question of law.

The Bombay High Court, on law, concurred with the construction placed on the provisions of section 2(22)(e) by the Tribunal. It held that all payments by way of dividend had to be taxed in the hands of the recipient of the dividend, namely, the shareholder; that the effect of section 2(22) was to provide an inclusive definition of the expression ‘dividend’ and clause (e) expanded the nature of payments which could be classified as dividend; that looking at the different types of payments covered by this clause, the effect of clause (e) was to broaden the ambit of the expression ‘dividend’ by taxing the shareholder where certain payments were made by way of a loan or advance or payments on behalf of or for the individual benefit of such a shareholder and that the definition did not alter the legal position that dividend had to be taxed in the hands of the shareholder and consequently, even assuming that the payment was dividend, the payment was taxable not in the hands of the assessee-company, but in the hands of the shareholder.

National Travel Services’ case

The issue again recently came up before the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT v. National Travel Services, (ITA Nos. 223, 219, 1204 & 309 of 2010) dated 11th July 2011 (available on www.itatonline. org).

In this case, the assessee was a partnership firm, having three partners. It had taken a loan of Rs.28.52 crore from a company, in which the assessee had invested in equity shares constituting 48.18% of the capital of the company. However, the shares were acquired in the names of two of the partners of the assessee.

Before the Delhi High Court, the assessee highlighted that the issue as to whether the person to whom the payment was made should not only be a reg-istered shareholder but a beneficial shareholder as well was concluded by the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT v. Ankitech Pvt. Ltd., (ITA No. 462 of 2009) and other cases, decided on 11th May 2011 (43-A BCAJ 327, June 2011 — full text available on www.itatonline.org), where the Court had held that the loan or advance could be taxed only in the hands of the shareholder, and not in the hands of the company receiving the loan or advance and had observed therein that the expression ‘shareholder, being a person who is the beneficial owner of shares’ referred to in section 2(22)(e) meant that the shareholder should be both a registered shareholder and a beneficial shareholder.

In addition, it was argued that for the purposes of income-tax, a partnership firm is different from its partners. A reference was made to various provisions of the Companies Act [including section 187(c) and section 153 read with section 147], and to SEBI guidelines on joint shareholding in respect of partnership firm, in support of the proposition that the partnership firm in its own right could be the shareholder as distinguished from the partners themselves. Reliance was placed by the assessee on the decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of CIT v. Raj Kumar Singh and Co., 295 ITR 9, where the Court had held that the conditions stipulated in section 2(22)(e) were not satisfied where the assessee firm was not the shareholder of a company which gave the loan, but partners of the firm were its shareholders.

On behalf of the Department, it was argued that on first principles, under the Indian Partnership Act, a partnership firm was not a separate entity but was synonymous with the partners. It was argued that when shares were acquired by a partnership firm, for want of its own separate legal entity, the shares had to be bought in the names of partners, and in no case, shares could be held in the name of the partnership firm however, for all intended purposes, it was the partnership firm, which was the shareholder in such a case.

The Delhi High Court agreed that the person to whom the loan or advance was made should be a shareholder as well as beneficial owner and proceeded further to examine the question whether the assessee firm could be treated as a shareholder having purchased shares through its partners in the company, or whether the shareholder necessarily had to be a registered shareholder and hence the shares should have been registered in the name of the firm, itself. The Delhi High Court observed that if the assessee’s contention was accepted, a partnership firm could never come within the mischief of section 2(22)(e), because the shares would be necessarily purchased by the firm in the names of its partners since it did not have any separate entity of its own and the firm therefore could never be a registered shareholder.

According to the Delhi High Court, by requiring a firm to be a registered shareholder, the very purpose of enactment of this provision would be defeated, and this would lead to absurd results. The Delhi High Court observed that though a deeming provision had to be strictly construed, it had also to be taken to its logical conclusion by making the law workable and to meet that in case of the purchase of shares by the firm in the name of its partners, it was the firm which was to be treated as shareholder for the purposes of section 2(22)(e).

The Delhi High Court therefore concluded that a partnership firm was to be treated as the shareholder even if the shares were held in the names of its partners, and it was not necessary that the partnership firm had to be the registered shareholder. The loan received was held to be taxable as deemed dividends in the hands of the partnership firm.

Observations

The ratio of the decision in National Travel Services’ case where applied to the issues discussed here is that a person for being taxed has to be a registered and the beneficial shareholder so however in cases of the fiduciary ownership the beneficial owner can be presumed to be the registered owner even where he may not be the one. Such an assumption, found to be permissible in law by the Court, however makes no departure from the understanding held so far that the dividend under clause (e) can never be taxed in the hands of a specified concern where the concern is not holding any shares, beneficially or otherwise, in the capital of the company which makes the payment of the loan or advances. In cases where the payment is sought to be taxed on the basis of the common shareholder, the tax if any shall continue to levied in the hands of the shareholder only and not in the hands of the recipient concern. The ratio of the Court’s own decision in the case of Ankitech Pvt. Ltd. remains uncontroverted to that extent.

The Rajasthan High Court in the case of CIT v. Hotel Hilltop, 313 ITR 116 (Raj.), held that in the case of a payment of an advance by a company to a partnership firm, where a shareholder of the said company holding 10% or more of the shares of the company and who also had substantial interest in the said partnership firm, the amount of payment could not be taxed as a deemed dividend in the hands of the firm, but would be taxed in the hands of the individual, on whose behalf or for whose individual benefit, being such shareholder and partner, the amount was paid by the company to the partnership firm.

The Special Bench of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, in the case of ACIT v. Bhaumik Colour Pvt. Ltd., 313 ITR (AT) 146 (Mum., SB), has held that if a person is a beneficial shareholder but not a registered shareholder, or if a person is a registered shareholder but not the beneficial shareholder, then the provisions of section 2(22)(e) will not apply and in that view of the matter dividend u/s.2(22)(e) cannot be taxed in the hands of a concern where a certain shareholder is a partner with a substantial interest.

The decision of the Delhi High Court in National Travel Services’ case seems to be primarily applicable to cases of partnership firms owning shares in companies which shares are held in the names of their partners. As noted the decision does not seek to alter the understanding in respect of the loan or advances received by the firm where the firm does not hold any shares directly or indirectly through partners of the company in which case, it is only the shareholder who would be taxable i.e., a person who is the owner of the shares of the company and is also the partner of the firm and is otherwise the registered and the beneficial owner of the shares.

While the Delhi High Court has carved out an exception in the cases of partnership firms that own the shares of the company and such firms on account of the fact that partnership firms cannot hold the shares in their own names are holding the shares in the names of the partners. In doing so, the Delhi High Court has taken a view different from that of the Allahabad High Court and the Court in doing so has also not followed the ratio of the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Raj Kumar Singh and Co.’s case (supra).

The concept that the reference to the term ‘shareholder’ means registered shareholder has been laid down by the Supreme Court as far back as in the cases of CIT v. C. P. Sarathy Mudaliar, 83 ITR 170 and Rameshwarmal Sanwarmal v. CIT, 122 ITR 1, which was in the context of an HUF as the shareholder of a company. In fact, even earlier a similar view was taken by the Supreme Court in the case of Howrah Trading Co. Ltd. v. CIT, 36 ITR 215, in the context of taxation of dividends in the hands of a shareholder who had not lodged his shares for transfer, though he had acquired a beneficial interest in the shares. These decisions were rendered in the context of the law as it stood prior to the amendment by the Finance Act, 1987 made effective from 1st April 1988.

The provisions of section 2(22)(e) were amended with effect from 1st April, 1988, by the Finance Act, 1987. Prior to the amendment, only a loan or advance to a shareholder, being a person who had a substantial interest in a company, or any payment by any such company on behalf, or for the individual benefit, of any such shareholder, was taxable as dividend. The amendment introduced the requirement of the shareholder being a beneficial owner of shares holding not less than 10% of the voting power, as well as extended the definition to concerns in which such shareholder was a member or partner, in which he has a substantial interest. This amendment also inserted the definition of ‘concern’ in explanation 3(a), to mean an HUF, or a firm, or an association of persons or a body of individuals or a company.

Does the insertion of this requirement of beneficial ownership of shares mean that the concept of registered shareholder is no longer relevant and therefore once a person is found to be a beneficial owner the dividend will be taxable in his hands, irrespective of the fact that he is not a registered shareholder? The Special Bench of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, in the case of ACIT v. Bhaumik Colour Pvt. Ltd., 313 ITR (AT) 146 (Mum., SB), has held that it is a principle of interpretation of statutes that once certain words in an act have received a judicial construction in one of the superior courts, and the Legislature has repeated them in a subsequent statute, the legislature must be taken to have used them according to the meaning which a Court of competent jurisdiction has given them. The Tribunal therefore held that the expression ‘being a person who is the beneficial owner of shares’ only qualifies the word ‘shareholder’ and does not in any way alter the position that the shareholder has to be a registered shareholder, nor substitute the requirement to a requirement of merely holding a beneficial interest in the shares without being a registered holder of shares. The Tribunal therefore held that if a person is a beneficial shareholder, but not a registered shareholder, or if a person is a registered shareholder, but not the beneficial shareholder, then the provisions of section 2(22)(e) will not apply.

The issue therefore is whether a partnership firm can be regarded as a shareholder in a company where the shares are held by the partners of the partnership firm for and on behalf of the firm. Similar can be the case where the shares are held by the karta of an HUF for and on behalf of the HUF and the trustee of a Trust for and on behalf of the Trust. Whether the shares are assets of the partnership firm or the individual assets of the partners would normally be determined based on how the firm and the partners have treated the assets — for instance, disclosure of the shares as assets of the partnership firm or the partners in their respective accounts, disclosure of the dividends as income of the partnership firm or the partners in their respective accounts, etc. While there may not be any dispute about the beneficial ownership of the firm over the shares, it is not possible to hold the firm as the legal owner in view of the corporate laws prohibiting the holding of shares in the names of the firm and in that view of the matter it is not possible to hold the firm as a registered shareholder and if that be so the dividend cannot be taxed in the hands of the firm and also not in the hands of the partners where the beneficial ownership is not with them.

The fact that a firm is specifically listed among the entities that are regarded as ‘concern’ indicates that the intention is also to rope in loans or advances to partnership firms, and to achieve that the payments to such concerns has to be taxed but will be taxed in the hands of such person who owns shares with certain percentage of voting rights and is also the partner holding a substantial interest in the firm. Dividend cannot be taxed in the hands of the firm in cases where the firm is not the owner of the shares as even the Delhi High Court does not suggest so. Where the firm is the owner of the shares it may not be taxable in its hands in view of the decisions referred to above. The ratio of the Delhi High Court decision therefore, if at all, applies only to a limited situation of a partnership firm, where the partnership firm treats the shares as its own assets, but the shares are held in the names of partners on behalf of the partnership firm.

Since the entire purpose is to tax dividends, and dividends can arise only to the shareholder, the better view of the matter is that it is only the shareholder who can be taxed, even if the advance is to a concern in which he is substantially interested, since the shareholder is deriving an indirect advantage or benefit through such concern.

Deductibility of Discount on Employee Stock Options – An analysis, Part1

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Introduction

It is an accepted fact that employees if recognised will reciprocate in a thousand ways. By acknowledging employee efforts, organisations can increase employee satisfaction, morale and self-esteem leading to increased business and income. Employee Stock Option Plan [commonly known as ESOP(s)] is a fallout of this thought.

Sustained competitiveness by any company hinges upon the quality of its human resources. This in turn has much to do with employee loyalty and commitment. A widely acknowledged method of giving the right incentive signals and rewarding loyalty is through an ESOP.

ESOP is a share-based payment to an employee in lieu of remuneration for his services. The philosophy behind ESOP is to imbibe a ‘sense of belongingness’ to the company. It is to enable them to participate in the organisation’s growth and prosperity. This is achieved by inviting them to be part owners of the company.

ESOP has evolved as a very potent tool to employee compensation. Variants to ESOP have also evolved. ESOP guidelines issued by the Central Government of India (reported in 251 ITR [st] 230) has enlisted various kinds of ESOP(s) – Employee Stock Option Plan, Employee Stock Ownership Plan, Employee Stock Purchase Plan, Stock Appreciation rights etc.

In an ESOP scheme, the company issues shares to its employees at a price lesser than its prevailing market value. To achieve this, a plan is put in place. The plan is approved and adopted by the company. Regulatory approvals, if required, are obtained. The plan generally provides for a compensation committee for evaluating performance of employees and recommending the allotment of options. These options entitle employees to become shareholders of the company. The difference between the price at which the company could have issued the shares in the “open market” and the reduced price is the benefit to the employees. The employee is compensated by the concession.

In other words, the company/ employer forgoes it ability, of getting higher money for the shares. The discussion in the ensuing paragraphs is whether such amount forgone or ‘loss’ suffered can be claimed as a deduction from an Income-tax standpoint.

This write-up is classified into the following segments:

A. Accounting Principles
B. Claim of ESOP under General Tax Principles
C. Claim of ESOP under specific provisions of Income-tax Act, 1961(the Act)
D. Some judicial pronouncements

PART A – Accounting Principles
Accounting/ regulatory aspects of ESOP(s) in India

When a company receives a sum which is lesser than the fair value of the share, it suffers a ‘loss’. This loss needs to be accounted for. A determination of the ‘nature of loss’ is important to enable the addressal of many issues. Whether this loss is compensation, and hence is to be accounted for in the profit and loss account? Or is it a premium on shares forgone and hence is a balance sheet item? Does it partake the character of benefit, hence a perquisite and thereby salary? Or is it in the nature of enabling employees to become shareholders of the company and hence a transaction inextricably linked to the share capital? Is the ‘discount’ a form of compensation? Or is the sufferance an abatement of the ability to get full value of shares? These are some questions associated with an ESOP.

A reference to the accounting principles or guidelines statutorily prescribed could help in ascertaining the nature of loss. Securities and Exchange Board of India (“SEBI”) and Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (“ICAI”), two of the premier regulatory and statutory bodies have issued guidelines in this matter.

ICAI has issued a Guidance Note on “Accounting for Employee Share-based payments”. The Guidance Note specifies the treatment of discount on issue of ESOP (hereinafter referred as ‘ESOP discount’).

A. Guidance Notes issued by ICAI

ICAI is empowered to issue Guidance Notes. These are designed to provide guidance to its members on matters arising in the course of their professional work. Guidance notes resolve issues which may pose difficulty or are debatable. The Guidance Notes are recommendatory in nature. Any deviation from such guidance mandates an appropriate disclosure in the financial statements or reports.

Financial statements form the substratum for income-tax laws. These Financial statements of corporates have to be mandatorily prepared in accordance with accounting system/ standards prescribed by the ICAI. Thus the role of ICAI assumes significance. The courts have also recognised the importance of ICAI prescriptions in various cases.

The Gauhati High court in the case of MKB Asia (P) Limited v CIT (2008) 167 Taxman 256 (Gau) held that the income-tax authority has no option/ jurisdiction to meddle in the matter either by directing the assessee to maintain its accounts in a particular manner or adopt different method where the accounting system is approved by the ICAI.

The Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of CIT v State Bank of Indore (2005) 196 CTR 153 (MP) held –

“it involves the manner and methodology of accountancy in claiming deduction. In cases of like nature, their Lordships of Supreme Court have always taken the help of methods adopted/ prescribed/recognised by the Indian Institute of Chartered Accountants as in the opinion of their Lordships, they are the best guide. In one of the cases CCE v. Dai Ichi Karkaria Ltd. (1999) 7 SCC 448, their Lordships while supporting their conclusion while examining the case of Central Excise, made following observations in para 26:

“Para 26-The view we take about the cost of the raw material is borne out by the guidance note of the Indian Institute of Chartered Accountants and there can be no doubt that this Institute is an authoritative body in the matter of laying down accountancy standards.”
(Emphasis supplied)

The Supreme Court in the case of British Paints India Ltd. (1991) 188 ITR 44 (SC) relied on the guidance note issued by ICAI while adjudging a matter on stock valuation. Other instances are available of courts relying on guidance note. For example, guidance note on section 44AB has been relied on in understanding the total turnover of an agent (Kachha Arhatiya).

The Hyderabad Tribunal (Special Bench) in the case of DCIT v Nagarjuna Investment Trust Ltd (1998) 65 ITD 17 (Hyd) SB relied on the Accounting standard (IAS 17) and the guidance note issued by the ICAI while upholding the accounting methodology of lease equalisation.

As mentioned earlier, ICAI issued Guidance note on Accounting for Employee Share-based Payments (“ESOP Guidance note”). In the ESOP Guidance note, the discount on issue of shares is described as “Employee Compensation expense”. As the name suggests, this is viewed as ‘employee remuneration’ to be expensed in the Profit and loss account of the relevant year. It concurs with SEBI on the aspect of charge of such discounts against the profits. The Guidance Note acknowledges and thus approves the loss to be an item on revenue account.

The aforesaid accounting recommendations are guided by the principles of “Conservatism”, “Prudence” and “Matching Concept”. Conservatism and Prudence are concepts for recognising expenses and liabilities at the earliest point of time even if there is uncertainty about the outcome; and to recognise revenues and assets only when they are assured of being received. The concept of Prudence is now statutorily recognised by an explicit mention in Accounting Standard 1 issued u/s. 145 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (“the Act”). ‘Matching principle’ signifies that in measuring the income for a period, revenue is to be adjusted against expenses incurred for producing that revenue.

Income referable to employee efforts gets captured in the ordinary course of accounting applying the principles of revenue recognition (Accounting Standard 9) . It is essential that the associated expenditure is also booked. ESOP discount is an associated cost. Non-recognition of ESOP discount in the Profit and Loss Account could inflate the reported profits for the year. The accounts would then not be reflective of a true and fair position of the performance of an entity. From an accounting standpoint therefore, ESOP discount needs to be charged against the business income. It is an item on revenue account.

Some of the relevant portion of the Guidance note is highlighted below –

    Preface

“Employee share-based payments generally involve grant of shares or stock options to the employees at a concessional price or a future cash payment based on the increase in the price of the shares from a specified level….The basic objective of such payments

is to compensate employees for their services and/ or to provide an incentive to the employees for remaining in the employment of the enterprise and for improving their performance…”

    Recognition (para 10)

“An enterprise should recognise as an expense (except where service received qualifies to be included as a part of the cost of an asset) the services received in an equity-settled employee share-based payment plan when it receives the services, with a corresponding credit to an appropriate equity account, say, ‘Stock Options Outstanding Account.”

   Measurement (para 15)

“Typically, shares (under ESPPs) or stock options (under ESOPs) are granted to employees as part of their remuneration package, in addition to a cash salary and other employment benefits… Furthermore, shares or stock options are sometimes granted as part of a bonus arrangement, rather than as a part of basic pay, eg, as an incentive to the employees to remain in the employment of the enterprise or to reward them for their efforts in improving the performance of the enterprise…”

B. SEBI guidelines

SEBI is a regulatory body established to protect the interests of investors in securities, regulate the securities market and for matters connected therewith. Newer types of financial instruments are emerging. Financial intermediaries have emerged performing a slew of complex functions. The implications of dealing/ investing in securities are continuously evolving, giving rise to a multitude of tax consequences. There is therefore an imperative need for such governing bodies to be involved in the matters of tax also. The increased interplay of SEBI and Income-tax Act is evidenced by SEBI provisions being incorporated in the Act. For instance the erstwhile proviso to section 17(2)(iii) [which was one of the sections on ESOP taxation] read –

“Provided that nothing in this sub-clause shall apply to the value of any benefit provided by a company free of cost or at a concessional rate to its employees by way of allotment of shares, debentures or warrants directly or indirectly under any Employees Stock Option Plan or Scheme of the company offered to such employees in accordance with the guidelines issued in this behalf by the Central Government”.

The Central Government issued the guidelines referred to in the proviso above by Notification No. 323/2001 dated October 11, 2001, effective from April 1, 2000. The Guidelines enumerate various aspects that ought to be included in any Employees Stock Option Plan or Scheme. The guidelines, inter alia, provided that the plan or scheme shall be as per the SEBI Guidelines.

SEBI has also evidenced interest in ESOP taxation (although indirectly), by prescribing accounting guidelines. These guidelines require ESOP discount to be charged off to the profit and loss account over the period of vesting. Such prescriptions are bound to impact “total income” for tax purposes.

The SEBI guidelines prescribe not merely the accounting policies but also the precise accounting entries to be passed over the life of ESOP. As per the SEBI guidelines, discount associated with grant of stock options can be worked out by various methods. SEBI has prescribed its own method of calculation of the discount. It mandates deferring and spreading this discount over the vesting period. The aliquot share of discount required to be spread over is recognised as expenditure in the profit and loss account.

C. OECD recommendations

Organisation for Economic Co -operation and Development (“OECD”) is set up to promote policies that will improve the economic and social well-being of people around the globe. OECD provides a forum in which governments can work together to share experiences and seek solutions to their common problems. This organisation has framed its model tax convention and commentaries. The commentary is modified from time to time and is considered by tax authorities across the globe. From an income-tax standpoint, they are relevant in interpreting and applying the provisions of bilateral tax conventions between countries.

Though India is not a member of the OECD, the model conventions and commentaries on OECD have been used as guidance in interpretation of the statute. The OECD Model Convention and commentary thereto though primarily meant for use by the OECD countries is often referred to and applied in interpreting Agreements of non-OECD countries also.

The Calcutta Income Tax Tribunal, in the case of Graphite India Ltd v DCIT (2003) 86 ITD 384 (Cal) acknowledged the importance and relevance of views of OECD. It observed as follows:

“In our considered view, the views expressed by these bodies, which have made immense contribution towards development of standardisation of tax treaties between various counties, constitute contemporanea expositio inasmuch as the meanings indicated by various expressions in tax treaties can be inferred as the meanings normally understood in, to use the words employed by Lord Radcliffe, international tax language developed by bodies like OECD and UN.”

In connection with ESOP also, the OECD convention and commentaries have made various observations. Some of the relevant portions are as follows:

–    Commentary to Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital (2010) has housed the ESOP income under Article 15 (Taxation of Income from Employment). It states that ESOP is a reward for the employment services. It reads as follows:

“While the Article applies to the employment benefit derived from a stock option granted to an employee regardless of when that benefit is taxed, there is a need to distinguish that employment benefit from the capital gain that may be derived from the alienation of shares acquired upon exercise of the option.”

–    ESOP impact on transfer pricing (page 7 & 8): “b) Equity ownership vs. Remuneration

The analysis in this study starts with the premise that the granting of stock options is an element of remuneration just like performance-related bonuses or benefits in kind, even when stock options are issued by an entity that is distinct from the employer. In fact in many MNE groups the shares subscribed to or purchased by employees under stock option plans are sold as soon as authorised by the plan and applicable regulations, i.e. employees do not seek to exercise their prerogative as shareholders, apart from benefiting from an increase in value between the strike price paid and the value of the share at the date the option is exercised. Moreover, a stock option is a financial instrument which is valuable and which can be exercised in order to realise such value. Although, upon exercise, the holders of such options may acquire and decide to retain a share in the capital of an enterprise, this investment decision made by each employee is a distinct step from that of the remuneration, one that is occurring at a different point in time and that is of no relevance to the transfer pricing issue under consideration…..”
(Emphasis supplied)

Thus, there are various accounting and statutory bodies governing the accounting and preparation of financial statements in India. Compliance with such prescribed norms is mandatory. The judicial precedents also have repeatedly respected such guidelines. This being the prevailing position, the tax treatment of ESOP discount should be in compliance with guidelines prescribed by ICAI and SEBI, as also OECD.

International practice

The international practices in relation to treatment of discount on ESOP to employees are on similar lines.

Statement of Financial Accounting Standards

Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) is a designated organisation whose primary purpose is to develop generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) within the United States. These principles are recognised as authoritative by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. Statement of Financial Accounting Standards is a formal document issued by the FASB, which details accounting standards and guidance on selected accounting policies set out by the FASB. All reporting companies listed on American stock exchanges have to adhere to these standards. Accounting Standard No. 123 details share based payments to employees. Some relevant portions from the same are as below:

Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 123 (revised 2004)

Para 1 – This Statement requires that the cost resulting from all share-based payment transactions be recognised in the financial statements. This Statement establishes fair value as the measurement objective in accounting for share-based payment arrangements and requires all entities to apply a fair-value-based measurement method in accounting for share-based payment transactions with employees except for equity instruments held by employee share ownership plans. However, this Statement provides certain exceptions to that measurement method if it is not possible to reasonably estimate the fair value of an award at the grant date. A nonpublic entity also may choose to measure its liabilities under share- based payment arrangements at intrinsic value. This Statement also establishes fair value as the measurement objective for transactions in which an entity acquires goods or services from nonemployees in share-based payment transactions. This Statement uses the terms compensation and payment in their broadest sense to refer to the consideration paid for goods or services, regardless of whether the supplier is an employee.

Para 9 – Accounting for Share-Based Payment Transactions with Employees

The objective of accounting for transactions under share-based payment arrangements with employees is to recognise in the financial statements the employee services received in exchange for equity instruments issued or liabilities incurred and the related cost to the entity as those services are consumed.

(Emphasis supplied)

International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS)

The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) is an independent, privately funded accounting standard-setter based in London, England. IFRS is a set of accounting standards developed by the IASB. IFRS 2 deals with the share based payment to employees.

IFRS 2 on Share-based payment

“Para 1 – The objective of this IFRS is to specify the financial reporting by an entity when it undertakes a share-based payment transaction. In particular, it requires an entity to reflect in its profit or loss and financial position the effects of share-based payment transactions, including expenses associated with transactions in which share options are granted to employees.

Para 12 – Typically, shares, share options or other equity instruments are granted to employees as part of their remuneration package, in addition to a cash salary and other employment benefits. Usually, it is not possible to measure directly the services received for particular components of the employee’s remuneration package. It might also not be possible to measure the fair value of the total remuneration package independently, without measuring directly the fair value of the equity instruments granted. Furthermore, shares or share options are sometimes granted as part of a bonus arrangement, rather than as a part of basic remuneration, eg as an incentive to the employees to remain in the entity’s employ or to reward them for their efforts in improving the entity’s performance. By granting shares or share options, in addition to other remuneration, the entity is paying additional remuneration to obtain additional benefits. Estimating the fair value of those additional benefits is likely to be difficult. Because of the difficulty of measuring directly the fair value of the services received, the entity shall measure the fair value of the employee services received by reference to the fair value of the equity instruments granted.”

(Emphasis supplied)

The above extracts demonstrate the consensus that ESOP discount is a charge against profits and hence a Profit and Loss Account item. This ensures true and correct disclosure of the financial performance of the Company.

Based on the aforesaid discussion, one could discern that from an accounting perspective ESOP is a revenue item. This is the understanding of the accounting and regulatory bodies in India. The same view is shared by some of the international bodies/ practices as well.


PART B – Claim of ESOP discount under general tax principles

Income-tax relies on the general commercial and accounting principles in determining the taxable income. As a general principle, any expenditure incurred for the purposes of business is a ‘deductible expenditure’ for income-tax purposes.

Reliance of Income-tax laws on general/ commercial principles

“Tax accounting” is not essentially different from commercial accounting. Tax accounting recognises and accepts accounting which is consistent and statute compliant. Profit as per such commercial accounting is the base from which the taxable income is determined.

Tax laws may incorporate specific rules and departures from commercial accounting in determining the taxable income. To the extent, there are no specific departures, commercial accounting norms would prevail for tax purposes also. The earliest acknowledgement by the Courts of the relevance of appropriate accounting practices (while explaining the concept of accrual) can be found in the decision of the Privy Council in the decision CIT v Ahmedabad New Cotton Mills Co. Ltd (1930) 4 ITC 245 (PC). The Apex Court has thereafter upheld the significance of accounting practices on various occasions. Some of such judicial precedents and the relevant observations therein are as follows:

   P.M. Mohammed Meerakhan v CIT (1969) 73 ITR 735 (SC) –

“In the case of a trading adventure the profits have to be calculated and adjusted in the light of the provisions of the Income-tax Act permitting allowances prescribed thereby. For that purpose it was the duty of the Income-tax Officer to find out that profit the business has made according to the true accountancy practices.”

   Challapalli Sugars Limited v CIT (1975) 98 ITR 167 (SC) –

“As the expression “actual cost” has not been defined, it should, in our opinion, be construed in the sense which no commercial man would misunderstand. For this purpose it would be necessary to ascertain the connotation of the above expression in accordance with the normal rules of accountancy prevailing in commerce and industry.”

   CIT v U.P. State Industrial Development Corporation (1997) 225 ITR 703 (SC) –

“for the purposes of ascertaining profits and gains, the ordinary principles of commercial accounting should be applied so long as they do not conflict with any express provision of the relevant statute”.

   Badridas Daga v CIT (1958) 34 ITR 10 (SC) –

“Profits and gains which are liable to be taxed under section 10(1) of the 1922 Act are what are understood to be such according to ordinary commercial principles”

    Other judgments {Kedarnath Jute Mfg. Co. Ltd. v CIT (1971) 82 ITR 363 (SC)/ Madeva Upendra Sinai v Union of India (1975) 98 ITR 209 (SC)} –

“The assessable profits of a business must be real profits and they have to be ascertained on ordinary principles of trading and commercial accounting. Where the assessee is under a liability or is bound to make a certain payment from the gross profits, the profits and gains can only be the net amount after the said liability or amount is deducted from the gross profits or receipts”

The Act requires business income computation to be based on accounting practices and principles. Section 145 of the Act mandates business income for income-tax purposes to be computed under the ‘ordinary principles of commercial accounting’ regularly employed. The Gujarat High Court in the case of CIT v Advance Construction Co P Limited (2005) 275 ITR 30 (Guj) held –

“Section 145 is couched in mandatory terms and the department is bound to accept the assessee’s choice of method regularly employed, except for the situation wherein the Assessing officer is permitted to intervene in case it is found that the income, profits and gains cannot be arrived at by the method employed by the assessee. The position is further well settled that the regular method adopted by an assessee cannot be rejected merely because it gives benefit to an assessee in certain years.”

Subsection 2 to section 145 empowers Central Government to notify accounting standards to be followed by an assessee. Central Government has till date notified two accounting standards. Accounting Standard I (relating to disclosure of accounting policies) requires accounting policies to be adopted so as to represent true and fair view of the state of affairs of the business. The concepts of “prudence” and “conservatism” have been injected into the income-tax laws through this standard. The standard defines ‘Prudence’ to be provision made for all known liabilities and losses, even though the amount cannot be determined with certainty and represents only a best estimate in the light of available information.

The considerations of prudence and conservatism have been adopted and accepted for tax purposes in several judicial precedents of late. Tax laws have also veered towards the adoption of the concept of matching principles in determining the quantum of income to be offered to tax. The case of Madras Industrial Investment Corporation v CIT (1997) 225 ITR 802 (SC) acknowledges the concept of matching expenses and revenues. The matching principle is applied by matching expenditure against specific revenues – ‘as having been used in generating those specific revenues’ or by matching expenses against the revenues ‘of a given period in general on the basis that the expenditure pertains to that period’. The former is termed as “matching principle on revenue basis” and the latter is termed as “matching principle on time basis”. The concept of ‘matching principle’ was again dealt with in detail by the Supreme court in the case of J K Industries Ltd v UOI (2008) 297 ITR 176 (SC).

As mentioned earlier, ESOP discount is an employee welfare measure. The income referable to the employee effort is recognised in the Profit and loss account. Matching principles would warrant the corresponding expenditure and/ or loss to be accounted in the Profit and loss account. Such discount when recognised in the Profit and loss account would also uphold the principle of prudence and conservatism.

Placing reliance on the commercial principles has been one of the elements of statutory interpretation. Interpretation postulates the search for the true meaning of the words used in the statute. It is presumed that a statute will be interpreted so as to be internally consistent. In other words, a section/ provision of the statute shall not be divorced from the rest of the Act. Similarly, a statute shall not be interpreted so as to be inconsistent with other contemporaneous statutes. Where there is an inconsistency, the judiciary will attempt to provide a harmonious interpretation.

A statute is an edict of legislature. The Government enacts laws to regulate economic, social behaviors and conduct. A series of legislation may be passed for this purpose. These laws have specific objectives. Their interplay helps in determining the larger purpose. When such is the interdependence, the tax laws must operate in tandem with other prevailing statutes. Income-tax law has to be interpreted taking cognizance of other statutes.

Aid from other statutes in interpreting Income-tax law

Income-tax Act is an integrated code. The interpretation of a taxing statute has to be on the basis of the language employed in the Act unless the words/ phrases are ambiguous or gives scope for more than one interpretation. The Act being
a    forward-looking statute does not operate in isolation.

With the modernisation and evolution of business, there could be occasions where one may have to refer other statutes to better understand certain terms or arrangements. This is done when the terms in the statute are technical in nature or dealing with a specialised matter. In such cases, the interpretation of income -tax law cannot be limited to the words in the Act itself. The Kerala High Court in the case of Moolamattom Electricity Board Employees’ Co-Operative Bank Ltd In re (1999) 238 ITR 630 (Ker) held –

“Resort to a different provision of another Act may also be permissible in the absence of a definition or where the term is technical in nature.”

There could also be situations where certain provisions in the Act lean or depend upon other laws in a particular matter/ context. In such cases, the provisions of such other laws will have to be considered. The Apex court in the case of CIT v Bagyalakshmi & Co (1965) 55 ITR 660 (SC) held –

“The income-tax law gives the Income-tax Officer a power to assess the income of a person in the manner provided by the Act. Except where there is a specific provision of the Income-tax Act which derogates from any other statutory law or personal law, the provision will have to be considered in the light of the relevant branches of law.”

ESOP discount involves forgoing of share premium receivable by the company. In the absence of any specific provision in the Act dealing with such discount, one may have to dwell into the commercial understanding of such discount. In doing so, one may take guidance (even if not strict compliance) from other statutes and regulatory guidelines prescribed in this regard.

In ACIT, Delhi v Om Oils And Oil Seeds Exchange Ltd (1985) 152 ITR 552 (Delhi) the High Court acknowledged the treatment of share premium by placing reliance on the Companies Act, 1956 (“Companies Act”)

“Such a payment and the right can properly be regarded as a capital asset and the money paid as on capital account. This is more so in view of the provisions of s. 78 of the Companies Act, 1956. The effect of s. 78 of the said Act is to create a new class of capital of a company which is not share capital but not distribution of the share premium as dividend is not permitted and it is taken out of the category of the divisible profit.”

The court relied on the principles in the Companies Act to conclude that share premium is a capital receipt.

One may therefore look at the guidance note issued by ICAI and SEBI regulations for treatment of ESOP expenses as well along with the treatment under the OECD convention.

In summary, Income-tax relies on the general commercial and accounting principles in determining the taxable income. This principle has got a statutory mandate through section 145 of the Act. Further, one may refer other statutes for appropriate interpretation of the Income-tax statute. Accordingly, the guidelines prescribed by the regulatory bodies such as the SEBI, ICAI, OECD need to be reckoned in computing the taxable income.

Bagyalakshmi & Co (1965) 55 ITR 660 (SC) held –

“The income-tax law gives the Income-tax Officer a power to assess the income of a person in the manner provided by the Act. Except where there is a specific provision of the Income-tax Act which derogates from any other statutory law or personal law, the provision will have to be considered in the light of the relevant branches of law.”

ESOP discount involves forgoing of share premium receivable by the company. In the absence of any specific provision in the Act dealing with such discount, one may have to dwell into the commercial understanding of such discount. In doing so, one may take guidance (even if not strict compliance) from other statutes and regulatory guidelines prescribed in this regard.

In ACIT, Delhi v Om Oils And Oil Seeds Exchange Ltd (1985) 152 ITR 552 (Delhi) the High Court acknowledged the treatment of share premium by placing reliance on the Companies Act, 1956 (“Companies Act”)

“Such a payment and the right can properly be regarded as a capital asset and the money paid as on capital account. This is more so in view of the provisions of s. 78 of the Companies Act, 1956. The effect of s. 78 of the said Act is to create a new class of capital of a company which is not share capital but not distribution of the share premium as dividend is not permitted and it is taken out of the category of the divisible profit.”

The court relied on the principles in the Companies Act to conclude that share premium is a capital receipt.

One may therefore look at the guidance note issued by ICAI and SEBI regulations for treatment of ESOP expenses as well along with the treatment under the OECD convention.

In summary, Income-tax relies on the general commercial and accounting principles in determining the taxable income. This principle has got a statutory mandate through section 145 of the Act. Further, one may refer other statutes for appropriate interpretation of the Income-tax statute. Accordingly, the guidelines prescribed by the regulatory bodies such as the SEBI, ICAI, OECD need to be reckoned in computing the taxable income.

PART C(1) – Claim of ESOP expense under specific provisions of the Act

Income-tax is a charge on income. The term ‘Income’ is defined in section 2(24) of the Act. The definition is an inclusive one and enlists various items which are to be regarded as income under the Act. Section 4 is the charging provision under the Act. The charge is defined vis-à-vis a person who is the recipient of income. The charge is in respect of the total income of a person for any year.

The scope of income chargeable to tax in India is dealt in section 5 of the Act. The income that is referred to in section 5 as chargeable to tax would have to be classified into 5 heads, by virtue of section 14. For each head of income, the law provides for a separate charging section and computation mechanism. Though section 5 is an omnibus charging section; for being taxed, the income would also have to satisfy, the separate charging and computation mechanism under the respective heads.

In the present case, the claim of ESOP expense is under the head “Income from profits and gains of business or profession” (“business income”). Section 28 outlines the charge in relation to such income. As per section 29, the income referred to in section 28 would be computed in accordance with the provisions contained in sections 30 to 43D.

As regards claim of deductions in business income, Lord Parker in the case of Usher’s Witshire Brewery Limited v Bruce 6 TC 399, 429 (HL) said –

“Where a deduction is proper and necessary to be made in order to ascertain the balance of profits and gains it ought to be allowed… provided there is no prohibition against such an allowance.”

Income connotes a monetary return ‘coming in’ from definite sources. It is a resultant figure derived after considering the receipts and payments made there for. Not every receipt of business is income. A receipt could be capital or a revenue receipt. The Privy Council in the case of CIT v Shaw Wallace and Co 6 ITC 178 (PC) laid out tests to find out whether a particular receipt is ‘income’. According to that test, income connotes a periodical monetary return coming in with some sort of regularity or expected regularity from definite sources. The source is not necessarily one which is expected to be continuously productive, but it must be one whose object is the production of a definite return excluding anything in the nature of a mere windfall. ‘Capital receipts’ are not to be brought into account in computing profits under business head, apart from express statutory provisions like section 28(ii) and section 41. Section 28 envisages revenue profits which arises or accrues in the course of business.

Similarly, a disbursement is not allowable if it is of a capital nature. Capital items can be deducted from receipts only when the statute expressly provides so. Generally, the criteria which are invoked in distinguishing capital receipts and revenue receipts will also serve to distinguish between capital and revenue disbursements. This view was expressed by the learned authors Kanga and Palkiwala and was upheld by the High Court in the case of Dalmia Dadri Cement Ltd v CIT (1969) 74 ITR 484 (P&H).

Accordingly, there is no single yardstick to determine whether an item (income or deductions therefrom) would be capital or revenue. There is no explicit statement or provision in the Act in this regard. This would be a fact specific exercise. What is generally an established fact is that disbursement of capital nature is not allowed/ deductible unless specifically provided for in the Act.

PART C(2) – Whether ESOP discount is capital in nature (not allowable)?

Claim of ESOP discount as a deduction is to be examined under the head “Profits and gains of business or profession”. This head of income is housed in sections 28 to 44DB. Under section 28(i) the profits and gains of any business or profession carried on by the assessee at any time during the previous year is chargeable to tax. As per section 29, the income referred to in section 28 should be computed in accordance with the provisions contained in sections 30 to 43D. Sections 30 to 36 confer specific deductions. Section 37 deals with expenditure which is general in nature and not covered within sections 30 to 36. The remaining sections enlist various categories of non-deductible expenditure (not relevant for the present discussion).

Sections 30 to 36 dealing with specific deductions do not deal with ESOP discount. The allowability of ESOP discount would have to be examined under section 37 – the residuary section. To examine eligibility of ESOP discount u/s. 37, the character of discount needs to be examined. If the discount is regarded as capital in nature, section 37 would prohibit its deduction. It is expenditure on revenue account that qualifies for deduction. From an accounting perspective ESOP discount is a revenue item (as discussed earlier). From an income-tax view point, whether such discount is capital or revenue in nature is the issue for consideration?

In the absence of an express definition of capital or revenue expenditure in the Act, one may have to rely on the various judicial precedents on this matter; the rationale adopted and the interpretation adjudged therein.

In the treatise ‘The Law and Practice of Income Tax’ by Kanga and Palkiwala, (9th edition – page 225) the learned authors observe –

“The problem of discriminating between capital receipts and income receipts, and between capital disbursements and income disbursements, has very frequently engaged the attention of the courts. In general, the distinction is well recognised and easily applied, but from time to time cases arise where the item lies on the border line and the task of assigning it to income or capital becomes much of refinement. As the Act does not define income except by way of adding artificial categories, it is to be decided cases that one must go in search of light.”

(Emphasis supplied)

In the context of ESOP discount, one notices two contradictory judgments – in the case of S.S.I. Limited v DCIT (2004) 85 TTJ 1049 (Chennai) and Ranbaxy Laboratories Limited (2009) 124 TTJ 771 (Del). The Chennai Tribunal held ESOP discount to be a revenue and allowable/ deductible business expenditure. The Delhi Tribunal however gave a contrary judgment. The Delhi Tribunal placed it reliance on the decision of the House of Lords in the case of Lowry v Consolidated African Selection Trust Ltd (1940) 8 ITR 88 (Supp) [This is discussed in detail later in the write-up].

Before application of tests whether ESOP discount is a revenue (and therefore deductible) expenditure, one needs to enlist the arguments put forth in some of the decisions which held that ESOP discount is NOT an allowable expenditure (largely for the reason that it is a capital expenditure).

  –  ESOP discount are incurred in relation to issue of shares to employees. They are not relatable to profits and gains arising or accruing from a business/ trade. The Apex Court decision in the case of Punjab State Industrial Dev Corporation Ltd (1997) 225 ITR 792 (SC) and Brooke Bond India Ltd (1997) 225 ITR 798 (SC) have held that expenditure resulting in ‘increase in capital’ is not an allowable deduction even if such expenditure may incidentally help in business of the company.

–    ESOP discount does not diminish trading/ business receipts of the issuing company. The company does not suffer any pecuniary detriment. To claim a charge against income, it should inflict a detriment to the financial position. ESOP is a voluntary scheme launched by the employers to issue shares to employees. The intention is to only give a ‘stake’ to the employees in the organisation.

–    This discount is not incurred towards satisfaction of any trade liability as the employees have not given up anything to procure such ESOP.

–    Share premiums obtained on issue of shares are items of capital receipt. When such premium is forgone, it cannot be claimed as an ‘expenditure wholly and exclusively laid out or expended for the purposes of the trade’.

Each of these points has been addressed in the following paragraphs and specifically in Part D (Judicial pronouncements).

PART C(3) – Deductibility of ESOP
discount under section 37

As discussed earlier, sections 30 to 36 enumerate specific deductions. The remaining deductions/ expenditure fall to be governed under the residuary section 37. Section 37 permits deduction of an “expenditure” (not being personal or capital in nature), which is wholly and exclusively incurred for the purpose of business of the assessee. ESOP discount is not specifically covered under sections 30 to 36. The allowability of such discount is therefore to be considered under section 37 of the Act.

Section 37, to the extent material reads as follows-“37( 1) – Any expenditure (not being expenditure of the nature described in sections 30 to 36 and not being in the nature of capital expenditure or personal expenses of the assessee), laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purposes of the business or profession shall be allowed in computing the income chargeable under the head “Profits and gains of business or profession”……”

In order to be eligible for a deduction under section 37, the following conditions should be cumulatively satisfied:

(i)    The impugned payment must constitute an expenditure;
(ii)    The expenditure must not be governed by the provisions of sections 30 to 36;
(iii)    The expenditure must not be personal in nature;
(iv)    The expenditure must have been laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purposes of the business of the assessee; and
(v)    The expenditure must not be capital in nature.
Each of the above is examined in seriatim except point (ii) which is satisfied (as mentioned before).

Condition 1 – Payment must constitute expenditure

Claim of ESOP discount as “expenditure”

The existence of an “expenditure” is the sine qua non for attracting section 37. The phraseology “expenditure……laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of such business, profession or vocation” in section 10(2)(xv) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, is identical to the phraseology used in section 37 of the Act.

The term “expenditure” is not defined in the Act. In the absence of a definition, one may rely on the commercial understanding of the term; the definition in other enactments and deduce a meaning suitable to the context. Section 2(h) of the Expenditure Act, 1957 defines expenditure as follows:

“Expenditure: Any sum of money or money’s worth spent or disbursed or for the spending or disbursing of which a liability has been incurred by an assessee. The term includes any amount which, under the provision of the Expenditure Act is required to be included in the taxable expenditure.”

In the landmark decision of the Supreme Court in Indian Molasses Company (P) Ltd. v. CIT (1959) 37 ITR 66, the term “expenditure” was defined in the following manner:

“`Expenditure’ is equal to `expense’ and `expense’ is money laid out by calculation and intention though in many uses of the word this element may not be present, as when we speak of a joke at another’s expense. But the idea of `spending’ in the sense of `paying out or away’ money is the primary meaning and it is with that meaning that we are concerned. Expenditure’ is thus what is `paid out or away’ and is something which is gone irretrievably.”
(Emphasis supplied)

The expression ‘lay out’ is defined in the Oxford Dictionary as ‘to spend, expend money’. The use of these words ‘laid out’ before ‘expenditure’ emphasise the irretrievable character of the expenditure.

In common usage, expenditure would mean outflow of money in satisfaction of a liability. This liability may be imposed or voluntarily agreed upon. A mere liability to satisfy an obligation is not “expenditure”. When such obligation is met by delivery of property or by settlement of accounts, there is expenditure.

However, ‘Expenditure’ may not always involve actual parting with money or property; actual disbursement of legal currency. For instance, if there are cross-claims, each constitutes an admitted liability qua the other party. When one of them pays to the other the difference between the two counter liabilities, the payer in effect pays the value of his/ her liability against payment due to him from the other party. In making payment of that difference, the payer in fact lays out expenditure equal to the liability due by him.

Satisfaction of cross-claims to a transaction involves both retention/ payment of money. The amount which is debited/ adjusted in the account settlement would constitute expenditure. This principle was upheld by the Apex court in the case of CIT v Nainital Bank Ltd. (1966) 62 ITR 638 (SC). It is a ‘net off’ of receivables against payables. This ‘netting off’ effectively discharges the entire payables.

Stock options are issued to employees at discount. This discount represents the difference between the market value of the shares and the strike price on exercise of options. The company forbears from receiving the full value on its shares. The primary meaning of expenditure no doubt involves monies going away irretrievably. In its indirect connotation it would also include amount forgone. Forbearance of profit could also thus be covered within the gamut of section 37.

Claim of expense under section 37 as “amount forgone”

The question whether expenditure can be said to be incurred when an assessee ‘forgoes profit’ out of commercial considerations must be determined upon facts of the case. Amount forgone represents an act of relinquishment. It is a relinquishment of commercial or pecuniary prospect. If the relinquishment is for the purposes of business it would fall to be considered under section 37.

In the case of Usher’s Wiltshire Brewery Ltd. v Bruce (1914) 84 L. J. KB 417; (1915) AC 433 a brewery company acquired freehold or leasehold interest in several premises in the ordinary course of its trade and let them to publicans who were tied to purchase their beer from the company. In consideration, the company charged the publicans a rent less than the full value of the licensed premises. The House of Lords held that the company was entitled to deduct the difference between the actual rent which it received from its tied tenants and the bonafide annual value as money wholly and exclusively laid out or expended for the purposes of trade. Lord Loreburn said –

“on ordinary principles of commercial trading, such loss arising from letting tied houses at reduced rents is obviously a sound commercial outlay”

The above was upheld by Supreme Court in the case of CIT v S.C. Kothari (1971) 82 ITR 794. The Apex court in the case of CIT v Chandulal Keshavlal & Co (1960) 38 ITR 601 held that amount forgone for the purpose of business is an allowable expenditure. Section 10(2) (xv) of the 1922 Act required that the expenses must be laid out for the purpose of business of the assessee, and further that they should not be in the nature of capital expenditure. In Chandulal Keshavlal’s case, the managing agent’s commission was agreed at ` 309,114. However, at the oral request of the board of directors of the managed company the managing agent agreed to accept a sum of `100,000 only as its commission. The question before the Supreme Court was whether the commission amount forgone constituted expenditure for the managing agents. The Supreme Court held:

(i)    that in cases such as this case, in order to justify deduction the sum must be given up for reasons of commercial expediency: it might not be voluntary, but so long as it was incurred for the assessee’s benefit the deduction was allowable;

(ii)    that as the Appellate Tribunal had found that the amount was expended for reasons of commercial expediency, and was not given as a bounty but to strengthen the managed company so that if the financial position of the managed company became strong the assessee would benefit thereby, the Appellate Tribunal rightly came to the conclusion that it was a deductible expense under section 10(2)(xv).   

Based on the aforesaid, one could claim the ESOP discount u/s. 37 as allowable. Such discount –

–    Is an amount forgone for the purposes of employee welfare

–    Is not a bounty/ gratuitous expense, but paid in lieu of employee service

–    Is aimed at retaining and encouraging the employees thereby benefitting the business of the Company

Claim of expense under section 37 as “losses”

As stated earlier, section 37 presupposes expenditure. Per contra, expenditure does not always mean that an amount should have gone out from one’s pocket. It could include a ‘loss’. A loss may be allowed as expenditure under section 37.

The Supreme Court in the case of CIT v Woodward Governor India (P) Ltd. and Honda Siel Power Products Ltd. (2009) 312 ITR 254 (SC) held that, loss arising on account of fluctuation in the rate of exchange in respect of loans taken for revenue purposes was allowable as deduction u/s. 37 of the Act.

In the case of M.P. Financial Corporation v CIT (1987) 165 ITR 765 (MP) the Madhya Pradesh High Court held that the expression “expenditure” as used in Section 37 may, in the circumstances of a particular case, cover an amount which is a “loss” even though the amount has not gone out from the pocket of the assessee.

Thus, ESOP discount satisfies the first condition irrespective of whether it is characterised as ‘expenditure’, ‘amount forgone’ or ‘loss’. Non-capital expenditure incurred for the purposes of business should be covered under the omnibus residuary section

37.    Even otherwise, the same would be allowable under section 28. The deduction is founded on ordinary commercial principles of computing profits.

Condition 2 – Expenditure should not be personal in nature

A company is an artificial juridical person. It is a distinct assessable entity under the Act. A company being an artificial juridical person cannot have personal expenses. The ‘personal’ facet is associated with human beings. It is concerned with human body or physical being.

The Supreme Court in State of Madras v. G.J Coelho (1964) 53 ITR 186 (SC) held that personal expenses would include expenses on the person of the assessee or to satisfy his personal needs such as clothes, food, etc. Needs such as clothes, food are associated with human beings and not with any artificial juridical person. The Gujarat High court in the case of Sayaji Iron & Engineering Company v. CIT (2002) 253 ITR 749 held that a company cannot have any personal expenditure. Accordingly, ESOP discount cannot be disallowed branding it to be personal expenditure.

Condition 3 – Expenditure to be laid out wholly and exclusively for business

This is one of the most important and debated conditions of section 37. To qualify as a deduction u/s. 37:

–    The expense must be wholly and exclusively incurred; and

–    Such incurrence must be for the purposes of business.

Meaning of ‘wholly and exclusively’

The words “wholly and exclusively for the purposes of the business” have not been defined in the Act. Judicial precedents have explained the meaning of this phrase. “The adverb ‘wholly’ in the phrase ‘laid out or expended. . . for business’ refers to the quantum of expenditure. The adverb ‘exclusively’ has reference to the object or motive of the act behind the expenditure. Unless such motive is solely for promoting the business, the expenditure will not qualify for deduction” – C.J. Patel & Co. v. CIT (1986) 158 ITR 486 (Guj). ESOP discount concerns wholly and exclusively with employee welfare measures.

Meaning of ‘For the purposes of business’

The expression ‘for the purpose of business’ in section 37(1) of the Act (corresponding to section 10(2)(xv) of the 1922 Act) is wider in scope than the expression ‘for the purpose of earning profits’. The Apex court in the case of CIT v. Malayalam Plantations Ltd (1964) 53 ITR 140 (SC) elucidating the concept “for the purpose of business” held –

“Its range is wide; it may take in not only the day-to-day running of a business but also the relationship of its administration and modernisation of its machinery, it may include measures for the preservation of the business and for the protection of its assets and property from expropriation or coercive process; it may also comprehend payment of statutory dues and taxes imposed as a pre-condition to commence or for carrying on of a business; it may comprehend many other acts incidental to the carrying on of a business.”
(Emphasis supplied)

This decision of the Apex court upheld the wide scope of the phrase ‘for the purposes of business’. It covers within its ambit all expenditure which enables a person to carry on and maintain the business, including any incidental or ancillary activities thereto. The range of this phrase is broad to encompass not only routine business expenses but also incidental expenses.

The wide scope of this phrase can also be appreciated by contrasting with the language used in section 57 of the Act. Section 57 of the Act enlists deduction allowable under the head “Income from other sources”. Similar to section 37, clause (iii) of section 57 is a residuary deduction available in case of “Other sources” income. However, there is a difference in the language – section 57 requires expenditure to be incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of making or earning such income.

In the treatise ‘The Law and Practice of Income Tax’ by Kanga and Palkiwala, (9th edition – page 1211) the learned authors observe –

“There is a marked difference between the language of section 37(1) and section 57(iii), both of which are residuary provisions under the respective heads; whereas this section [section 57(iii)] allows expenditure ‘laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purposes of making or earning such income’, the allowance under section 37 is in wider terms – ‘laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purposes of business or profession’.

“For the purposes of business” alludes to business expediency. ‘Business expediency’ is a broad term. The best person to judge the business expediency is the businessman himself. Courts have consistently held that the necessity or otherwise of the commercial expediency is to be decided from the point of view of the businessman and not by the subjective standard of reasonableness of the revenue. The absence of business connection should not mar the application of the test of business expediency.

The Apex court in the case of S.A. Builders Limited v CIT (2007) 288 ITR 1 (SC) explaining the meaning and scope of the phrase “commercial expediency”, held –

“The expression “commercial expediency” is an expression of wide import and includes such expenditure as a prudent businessman incurs for the purpose of business. The expenditure may not have been incurred under any legal obligation, but yet it is allowable as business expenditure if it was incurred on grounds of commercial expediency.”

The test of the “need for expenditure” is alien to section 37. Any expenditure made on ground of commercial expediency is to be allowed even though there is no legal necessity or even if it is not for direct or immediate benefit of trade. A sum of money voluntarily expended indirectly to facilitate business is entitled to be allowed as expenditure on grounds of commercial expediency.

The following are some of the observations from judicial precedents which further explain “Commercial expediency”:

In the case of Atherton v British Insulated & Helsby Cables Limited 10 TC 155, 191 (HL), the court held –

“A sum of money expended, not necessarily and with a view to a direct and immediate benefit to the trade, but voluntarily and on the grounds of commercial expediency and in order indirectly to facilitate the carrying on of the business, may yet be expended wholly and exclusively for the purposes of trade.”

The Supreme Court in the case of CIT v Panipat Woollen & General Mills Co. Ltd. [1976] 103 ITR 66 (SC) observed –

“The test of commercial expediency cannot be reduced in the shape of a ritualistic formula, nor can it be put in a water-tight compartment so as to be confined in a strait-jacket. The test merely means that the Court will place itself in the position of a businessman and find out whether the expenses incurred could be said to have been laid out for the purpose of the business or the transaction was merely a subterfuge for the purpose of sharing or dividing the profits ascertained in a particular manner. It seems that in the ultimate analysis the matter would depend on the intention of the parties as spelt out from the terms of the agreement or the surrounding circumstances, the nature or character of the trade or venture, the purpose for which the expenses are incurred and the object which is sought to be achieved for incurring those expenses”
(Emphasis supplied)

Loss due to ESOP discount is necessitated by business expediency. The business expediency is the compensation and recognition to its employees. Over the years the concept of master-servant relationship is fading. Sharing of wealth of an employer with his employee is the order of the day. Stock option is one such mode of employee participation deserving fiscal encouragement. The Directive Principles of State Policy, enshrined in the Indian Constitution, lays down that “the State shall take steps by suitable legislation or in any other way, to secure the participation of workers in the management of undertakings, establishment or other organisations engaged in any industry” (Article 43A).

ESOP is an employee retention and recognition strategy. It enables the company to beat the pace of attrition. There is a direct nexus between incurrence of this expenditure and the business of the Company. The expenditure so incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business and necessitated by commercial expediency, would satisfy the aforesaid condition.

Condition 4 – The expenditure must not be a capital expenditure

The demarcation between revenue and capital is not a straight jacket exercise. One may have to get into the facts of each case for such determination.

In Assam Bengal Cement Co. Ltd. v CIT (1955) 27 ITR 34, the Supreme Court held that due to diversity in the nature of business, a particular test cannot determine the nature of expenditure. The Supreme Court held that it is the object of expenditure which determines its nature. As per the Supreme Court “The aim and object of the expenditure would determine the character of the expenditure whether it is a capital expenditure or revenue expenditure. The source or the manner of the payment would then be of no consequence.”
(Emphasis supplied)

The nature of expenditure must be determined from the point of view of the payer. The Madras High Court in CIT v Ashok Leyland Ltd (1969) 72 ITR 137, 143 (affirmed by Supreme Court in (1972) 86 ITR 549) pointed out that the generally accepted distinction between ‘capital expenditure’ and ‘revenue expenditure’ is susceptible to modification under peculiar circumstances of a case. The relevant observations are as follows:

“A clear-cut dichotomy cannot be laid down in the absence of a statutory definition of “capital and revenue expenditure”. Invariably it has to be considered from the point of view of the payer. In the ultimate analysis, the conclusion of the admissibility of an allowance claimed is one of law, if not a mixed question of law and fact. The word “capital” connotes permanency and capital expenditure is, therefore, closely akin to the concept of securing something tangible or intangible property, corporeal or incorporeal rights, so that they could be of a lasting or enduring benefit to the enterprise in issue. Revenue expenditure, on the other hand, is operational in its perspective and solely intended for the furtherance of the enterprise. This distinction, though candid and well accepted, yet is susceptible to modification under peculiar and distinct circumstances”.

(Emphasis supplied)

The nature of business and expenditure are decisive factors in determining the answer to the controversy. Temptation to use decided cases must be avoided in answering the question whether a particular expenditure constitutes capital or revenue expenditure. The Supreme Court in Abdul Kayoom (KTMKM) v CIT (1962) 44 ITR 689 (SC) held –

“Each case depends on its own facts, and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough, because even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect. In deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cordozo) by matching the colour of one case against the colour of another. To decide, therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, its broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive. What is decisive is the nature of the business, the nature of the expenditure, the nature of the right acquired, and their relation inter se, and this is the only key to resolve the issue in the light of the general principles, which are followed in such cases.”

The aim and object of the expenditure is thus the decisive factor for determining whether a particular expenditure constitutes revenue or capital expenditure. This is ascertained by examining all aspects and surrounding circumstances. The nature of the business has to be seen. The issue must be viewed from the point of a practical and prudent businessman.

One has to determine ‘why’ the expenditure has been incurred by a businessman and not ‘how’ the expenditure has been funded by him. As observed by Supreme Court in Assam Bengal Cement Co. Ltd. case (supra), the source and manner of the payment is inconsequential for determining the nature of a particular expenditure. It is the aim and object of the expenditure that would determine its character. The Madras High Court in India Manufactures (P) Ltd v. CIT (1985) 155 ITR 770 held that for determining the nature of a particular expenditure, the manner of payment is not relevant. The Calcutta High Court in Parshva Properties Ltd v CIT (1976) 104 ITR 631 held

“…in order to determine whether the expenditure was deductible or not, it is necessary to find out in what capacity the expenditure was incurred.”

If the examination is limited to “how” the funds have been secured, the answer (to all share capital issue expenses) would be the same. It is the aspect of “why” that would help in appreciating the underlying difference in the motive, object and aim of the expenditure. The question “why” may involve determination whether the funds are for:

–   future expansion of the business;
–    the prolongation of life of an existing business;

–    forming a conceivable nucleus for posterior profit earning;

–    conduct of the business;

–    avoiding inroads and incursions into its concrete presence;

–    commercial expediency;

–    profit earning enhancement.

All of the above do not have the same purpose. The involvement and intensity with the business or its existence may not be uniform. The degree of association with the business or its conduct may vary. Some have their objective of profit earning or enhancement. Others concern the substratum of business. It would be unwise to characterise expenses associated with all the above as same. If the characterisation is not uniform, the associated expenditure is not to be branded in the same light. The attendant circumstances would have to be examined. These circumstances influence the characterisation of the associated payments.

The expenditure under discussion [viz., ESOP discount] would be allowed as business deduction only if the aim and object of the expenditure falls in the revenue field. As discussed repeatedly, the test of determining a disbursement to be ‘revenue’ in nature is fact specific. Characterisation of amounts as ‘income’ or ‘capital’ is determined as a matter of commercial substance, and not by subtleties of drafting, or by unduly literal or technical interpretations. The Apex Court in the case of Dalmia Jain and Co. Ltd. v CIT (1971) 81 ITR 754 (SC) while holding that expenditure incurred for maintenance of business is revenue in nature, observed – “The principle which has to be deduced from decided cases is that, where the expenditure laid out for the acquisition or improvement of a fixed capital asset is attributable to capital, it is a capital expenditure, but if it is incurred to protect the trade or business of the assessee then it is a revenue expenditure. In deciding whether a particular expenditure is capital or revenue in nature, what the courts have to see is whether the expenditure in question was incurred to create any new asset or was incurred for maintaining the business of the company. If it is the former it is capital expenditure, if it is the latter, it is revenue expenditure.”

As a general principle, an amount spent by an assessee for labour/ employee welfare would be deductible as revenue expenditure. Even if such expense results in an asset to the employees or third party – it is ‘revenue’ as far as it does not result in creation of capital asset for employer. Employee emoluments are revenue in nature. The Calcutta High Court in the case of CIT v Machinery Manufacturing Corporation Ltd (1992) 198 ITR 559 (Cal) held –

“In our view, the question is now well settled. If the employer pays any amount to the employee which is by way of an incentive, in that event such amount shall be treated as additional emoluments and such payment is inextricably connected with the business and necessarily for commercial expediency. It cannot be said that the claim which has been made is de hors the business of the assessee. As will appear from the narration of facts, it was found that it was the payment made by the assessee for better performance and, accordingly, it must be held that such payment was for commercial expediency and incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business.”

The following points support the proposition that ESOP discount is an employee welfare measure and is bonafide revenue expenditure:

1.    Support in the Income-tax statute

ESOP benefit is taxable in the hands of the employees as ‘perquisites’ under section 17(2) of the Act. There is no dispute that salary is bona fide revenue expenditure eligible for deduction. Salary and its components would remain on revenue account whether it is paid in cash or in kind.

ESOP is remuneration in kind. It is a perquisite. It is a benefit or amenity. It is consideration for employment. The concept of ESOP evolves/ springs out from the employer-employee relationship.

Consideration for employment in the form of amenity, benefit was the subject matter of levy of fringe benefit tax. The circular of CBDT explaining and clarifying various aspects of ESOP is relevant in the context of the issue under consideration.

    Fringe Benefit Tax Circulars

The Central Board of Direct Taxes released a circular No 9/2007 dated September 20, 2007 containing frequently asked questions on ESOP. A number of issues had been raised by trade and industry at different fora after the presentation of the Finance Bill, 2007, after its enactment and also after the notification of Rule 40C.

In answer to question no. 9, the Board observed “Therefore, an employer does not have an option to tax the benefit arising on account of shares allotted or transferred under ESOPs as perquisite which otherwise is to be taxed as fringe benefit.”

FBT is a charge on expenditure. The circular acknowledges the fact that ESOP is a salary expense from the employer/ payer’s perspective. Once the payment is established as a salary, its deductibility should be unquestioned. ESOP discount is an allowable expenditure – being perquisite paid by the employer.

The FBT regime was amended to make the ESOP benefit, as susceptible to a levy of FBT. FBT by definition was a ‘consideration for employment’ in certain specified forms. ESOP discount thus constituted ‘employment related expenditure’ by the Act itself.

Section 115W(1)(b) provided for a levy of FBT on the value of concession in the context of travel. A ‘concession’ was thus conceptually encompassed within FBT since 2006. Finance Act 2008 extended the regime to cover “ESOP concession”.

As discussed earlier, section 37 is not limited to actual expenditure but also covers amount forgone. ESOP being a concession given to the employees, the same is squarely covered within the ambit of section 37.

Initially ESOP benefit was held to be outside the ambit of FBT due to the absence of computation mechanism. The law was amended and ESOP was subjected to FBT. The essence of ESOP continuing to remain a benefit or amenity to an employee and constituting a consideration for employment was confirmed.

Various questions and answer thereto in the Board circular have upheld the concept of determining nature of expenditure based on the proximate purpose. If the same yardstick is used in the case of ESOP discount, the proximate purpose is salary disbursement, incidentally resulting in increased share capital. ESOP discount thus remains revenue in nature.

    Tax withholding on salary payments under section 192

Section 192 in the Act imposes a responsibility on the employer to withhold taxes on salary payments. Salary includes perquisites. Perquisites would include benefit granted to an employee as ESOP(s). Section 192(1) of the Act reads –

“Any person responsible for paying any income chargeable under the head “Salaries” shall, at the time of payment, deduct income tax on the amount payable at the average rate of income-tax computed on the basis of the rates in force for the financial year in which the payment is made, on the estimated income of the assessee under this head for that financial year.”
(Emphasis supplied)

On a perusal of the above definition it is apparent that accrual of income and the act of payment must co-exist for the purposes of withholding tax under this provision. In the case of CIT v Tej Quebecor Printing Limited (2006) 281 ITR 170 (Del), it was held that if the salary due to the employee is not paid, there is no obligation to deduct tax at source. Conversely, if section 192 is applicable, then the law presumes a payment to have been made to an employee. Section 192 requires deduction of tax at the time of payment.

The Board issues a circular each year outlining the obligations of an employer relating to the deduction u/s. 192. Circular No. 8/2010, dated 13-12-2010 outlines such obligations for the financial year 2010-11.

Paragraph 5 of the circular mandates an employer to consider the “ESOP benefit” to an employee as a part of perquisite. Once it is a part of perquisites, it forms part of salary on which the liability to deduct tax at source fastens. The allotment of shares triggering the perquisite would constitute the act as well as the fact of payment. The circular reinforces the conclusion that ESOP benefit constitutes salary to an employee. Being a part of the salary, it should be regarded as revenue in nature and allowable as a deduction much like other perquisites.

2.    Nexus between benefit and expenditure

Under general principles, allowability of a deduction is not dependent upon character of income in the hands of the payee. In other words, the fact that a certain payment constitutes an income or capital in the hands of the recipient is not material in determining whether the payment is a revenue or capital disbursement qua the payer.

Macnaghten J said in Racecourse Betting Control Board v Wild 22 TC 182 “The payment may be a revenue payment from the point of view of the payer and a capital payment from the point of view of the receiver, and vice-versa.”

The Calcutta High Court in the case of Anglo-Persian Oil Co. (India), Ltd. v CIT (1933) 1 ITR 129 (Cal) held -“The principle that capital receipt spells capital expenditure or vice versa is simple but it is not necessarily sound. Whether a sum is received on capital or revenue account depends or may depend upon the character of the business of the recipient. Whether a payment is or is not in the nature of capital expenditure depends or may depend upon the character of the business of the payer and upon other factors related thereto.”

Income is taxable unless and otherwise exempt under the Act. However, expenditure operates on the principles of commercial expediency – it is allowable unless specifically prohibited by the Act. Based on commercial principles, ESOP discount should be an allowable expenditure in the hands of employer/ company. The fact that it does not get taxed or is taxed at a later point of time or is taxed under a different head in the hands of the employee would not be relevant.

The function of the ESOP discount forming part of employee’s income (and suffering tax accordingly) would thus support and sustain a claim for the same being reckoned as a revenue deduction in the hands of the employer. This principle has been supported by the courts on various occasions. Some of them are as below:

The Calcutta High court in the case of CIT v Britannia Industries Co Ltd (1982) 135 ITR 35 (Cal) held –

“We are fully in agreement with the view of the Tribunal that there cannot be any two different standards for assessment in respect of the employee and the employer. It is also equitable that what the payer gives is what the receiver receives.”

In the case of Weight v Salmon (1935) 19 Tax Case 174; 153 L.T.55, E.Lord Atkin said –

“..it would be a startling inconsistency to say that the director was to be taxed because he was receiving by way of remuneration money’s worth at the expense of the company, and yet that the company which was incurring the expense for purposes of its trade to remunerate the directors was not entitled to deduct that expense in ascertaining the balance of its profits and gains..”

3.    The ‘Act of giving’ and ‘act of receiving’ are two separate events

Issue of shares under ESOP scheme involves two actions. One is the giving of benefit to the employee (in the form of discount on share premium) and the other is receipt of premium by the employer/ company. They are distinct and separate from each other. The discount emerging out of the transaction is revenue in nature. It is different from the ‘premium receipt activity’ which is a capital item. Although they are inter-linked, they are two independent transactions. The act of giving a benefit would precede the act of receipt of premium. One cannot receive premium unless, the benefit is parted with. The sequence of occurrence of these two events is thus critical.

The purpose of ESOP discount has proximity to giving of benefit and not receipt of premium. Such discount emerges out of the act of giving benefit. The mere fact that subsequent receipt of premium is ‘capital’ in nature, should not militate the revenue character of the ESOP discount.

4.    There is no creation of capital asset

The expenditure is to be attributed to capital if it be made ‘with a view’ to bringing an asset or advantage, although it is not necessary that it should always result in an asset or advantage. Lord Viscount LC, in the course of the case [10 TC 155 (1926) AC 205] said –

“When an expenditure is made, not only for once and for all, but with a view to bringing into existence an asset or an advantage for the enduring benefit of a trade, there is very good reason (in the absence of special circumstances leading to an opposite conclusion) for treating such an expenditure as properly attributable not to revenue but to capital.”

The test of enduring benefit or advantage cannot be reduced to a straight jacket formula. There may be cases where expenditure, even if incurred for obtaining an advantage of enduring benefit, may, nonetheless, be on revenue account. The test of enduring benefit may break down. Every advantage of enduring nature does not render the expenditure to be capital in character. It is only where the advantage is in the capital field that the expenditure would be disallowed for income-tax purposes. If the expenditure is incurred only to facilitate and promote business, then it would necessarily have to be considered revenue in nature and allowed as a deduction.

ESOP is a share-based payment of employee remuneration. Issue of ESOP(s) creates an ‘asset’ for the employees (in form of share investment in the Company). From a Company’s standpoint, such issue of ESOP results in emergence of a liability. It is an acknowledgment by the Company of an increase in the amount due to the shareholders. There is no capital asset created out of this transaction.

5.    ESOP – a consideration for employment services

An offer made to employee under ESOP is a mode of employee remuneration. This offer has direct nexus with the employment of a person with the organisation. Evidences of linkage with employee can be evidenced through terms of the ESOP agreement. Some of the typical clauses/ conditions are:

Eligibility criterion – wherein the person eligible for an ESOP would be employee of a particular class, or could be employee serving a certain span of time in the organisation; or could be employee who meets certain thresholds/ targets etc.

Vesting Schedule – The vesting of stock options is generally spread over a number of years of service. There could be different vesting schedule depending on the caliber and hierarchy of the employees in the organisation ladder, as also the philosophy adopted by the employee.

Transfer Restrictions or Lock in – Transfer of vested stock options are generally restricted and subject to particular occasions. The employees are not allowed to transfer options freely to others.

Termination/ Exit Clause – This clause generally provides the lapse of options on termination of employment.

The various conditions in the ESOP agreement provide the employment nexus to such stock options. The stock options are generally in appreciation of their past performances and an incentive to stay with the organisation on its growth path. They represent payment for services of the employees. These are payments/ losses borne by the employer. The discounts are offered in the course of employment. They are a form of salary payments for the services rendered. Accordingly, they are business expenditure allowable under the Act.

6.    Documentation

Documentation of any transaction is critical. Documents serve as the proof to decipher the intent of any transaction. These documents need to be interpreted based on the intention of the parties contained therein. The Apex Court in the case of Ishikawajma-Harima Heavy Industries Ltd v Director of Income-tax (2007) 288 ITR 408 (SC) commented on interpretation of documents. It held:

“In construing a contract, the terms and conditions thereof are to be read as a whole. A contract must be construed keeping in view the intention of the parties. No doubt, the applicability of the tax laws would depend upon the nature of the contract, but the same should not be construed keeping in view the taxing provisions.”

Commercial expediency and business intentions can be better understood when supported with appropriate and adequate documentation. A company is mandatorily required to maintain various documents.

An ESOP scheme also entails a huge amount of documentation. Most of these are available in the public domain. Commencing from the preliminary intent of the Board resolution, to issue of employee share certificate – there are various documents that are exchanged/ maintained.

The significance of documentation has been upheld by the Apex court in the case of CIT v Motors & General Stores (1967) 66 ITR 692 (SC) which quoted another landmark decision in the case of Lord Russell of Killowen in Inland Revenue Commissioners v Duke of Westminster. It held –

“It is therefore obvious that it is not open to the income-tax authorities to deduce the nature of the document from the purported intention by going behind the documents or to consider the substance of the matter or to accept it in part and reject it in part or to re-write the document merely to suit the purpose of revenue.”

The Kerala High Court in the case of CIT v. M. Sreedharan (1991) 190 ITR 604 (Ker) held –

“Ground realities cannot be ignored. Existence of contemporaneous evidence and agreements should also be considered and interpreted having regard to the factual matrices.”

Documentation helps in determining tax incidence. They act as an evidence of the fact. Indian courts have repeatedly upheld the role of an agreement in the interpretation of the legal rights and obligations. A document has to be read as a whole. Neither the nomenclature of the documents nor any particular activity undertaken by the parties to the contract alone would be decisive.

It is an established principle of law that commercial documents must be construed in commercial parlance. These are business agreements and must be read as business men would read them. This principle was upheld by W T Suren & Co. v CIT (1971) 80 ITR 602 (Bom). In all taxation matters, emphasis must be placed on the business aspect of a transaction rather than the purely legal and technical aspect. This principle has been upheld in various judicial precedents; few of which are as follows:

–    CIT v Kolhia (1949) 17 ITR 545 (Bom)
–    Suren v CIT (1971) 80 ITR 602 (Bom)
–    Nilkantha v CIT (1951) 20 ITR 8 (Pat)

The following documents would assist in determining the nature of ESOP transaction:

    Director’s report

The intentions of the company are disclosed through the director report. Through their report, the directors spell out the impact on the revenue on account of ESOP. The reason to accommodate the loss is accounted to the shareholders. They are an intrinsic evidence to show that the shares were allotted by way of remuneration to compensate the services rendered in promoting, forming or running the company.

    ESOP agreement

This is an agreement between the company/ employer and the employee detailing the objectives, terms and conditions of the ESOP issue. This agreement details the aspects of scheme eligibility, terms, time-frames, rights and duties of each of the parties etc. This serves as a primary document of the ESOP transaction.

It is the drafting of this agreement and the nomenclature employed herein that has been the subject of a severe scrutiny of the Revenue authorities. ESOP is essentially an employee remuneration contract (in addition to the employee contract). However, as per the Revenue’s interpretation, the emergence of shares is to be superimposed on the employee remuneration element, coloring and converting the entire transaction as a “share issue” transaction.

The mere fact that the agreement intends to make the employees the stakeholders does not dilute or dilate the character of the transaction. The intent is to remunerate. It is recognition tool. The transaction is not to be re-written to say that it is a “share issue” transaction. By describing the allotment of ESOP as “towards giving equity stake”, the motive for conferring the benefit cannot be confounded.

It is a trite saying that remuneration need not generally be effected by systematic and recurring monetary payments. There could also be compensation in kind. ESOP is a typical example of a payment in kind.

7.    Utilisation of expenditure is important – not the source

A reason why ESOP discount is not regarded as revenue is possibly the attribute of ‘resultant permanency’. Share capital and the company’s existence are inseparable. Shares survive as long as the company exists. Possibly therefore, expenditure referable to increase in share capital is regarded as ‘capital in nature’.

The question is – whether the aspect of life of share capital is determinative? Or is it the purpose of utilisation that is decisive? Share capital may be utilised for creating a profit making apparatus. It may, on the other hands be utilised for a profit making activity. In the latter utilisation, the capital is churned over. It keeps changing form. In the former, the form remains largely unimpaired – save the depletion in value due to lapse of time or usage. This distinction should govern characterisation for tax purposes also.

It is not that every expenditure involving/ pertaining to the subject of share capital that is to be pigeonholed as not allowable as a deduction under section 37. The Supreme Court in its decision in CIT v General Insurance Corporation (2006) 286 ITR 232 held that expenses by way of stamp duty and registration fee for issue of bonus shares are revenue in nature. The Supreme Court held that the allotment of bonus shares did not result in the acquisition of any benefit or advantage of an enduring nature. In this decision, the Supreme Court no doubt approved the principle in the cases Brooke Bond India Limited v CIT (supra) and Punjab Industrial Development Corporation Ltd v. CIT (supra). However, it recognised that every expenditure connected with share capital is not necessarily capital in nature.

The Supreme Court in General Insurance Corporation’s case approved the decision of Bombay High Court in Bombay Burmah Trading Corpn Ltd v CIT (1984) 145 ITR 793. In the said decision, the Bombay High Court held it is not essential or mandatory that an expenditure incurred in connection with the raising of additional capital requires disallowance. The Bombay High Court in Shri Ram Mills Ltd v. CIT 195 ITR 295 interpreting its decision in Bombay Burmah Trading Corporation’s case made the following observation:

“In the case of Bombay Burmah Trading Corpn Ltd. v. CIT [1984] 145 ITR 793, this Court held that it was not that every expenditure incurred in connection with the raising of additional capital that required disallowance. Expenditure such as legal expenses, printing expenses, which a trader is expected, to incur in the course of its capacity as trader have to be allowed as revenue expenditure even though a part of them might relate to the raising of the additional capital”

It is to be noted that the Supreme Court in Brooke Bond India Limited v. CIT (supra) and Punjab Industrial Development Corporation Ltd v. CIT (supra) had affirmed the decision of Bombay High Court in Bombay Burmah Trading Corporation’s case.

The Jodhpur bench of Rajasthan High Court in CIT v. Secure Meters Ltd (2008) 321 ITR 611 held that expenses incurred in connection with issue of quasi equity viz., convertible debentures would constitute revenue expenditure. The Karnataka High Court recently in CIT v ITC Hotels Ltd. (2010) 190 Taxman 430 has held to the same effect.

The Andhra Pradesh High Court in Warner Hindustan Ltd v CIT (1988) 171 ITR 224 was called upon to adjudicate on two issues. The first issue was whether claim of the assessee-company that the legal and consultation fees in connection with the issue of bonus shares is an allowable business expenditure is correct or not? The second issue was whether the amount spent by the assessee-company by way of fees paid to Registrar of Companies for increasing its authorised capital was deductible as revenue expenditure? The High Court held that both would constitute revenue expenditure in the hands of the assessee-company. It is to be noted that the Supreme Court in Punjab Industrial Development Corporation Ltd v CIT (supra) disapproved the decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court only with regard to the second issue and not the first issue. In other words, the Supreme Court had not questioned the revenue character of legal and consultation fees paid in connection with issue of bonus shares.

Besides, one could look at various instances wherein the utilisation of expenditure is important – the form or source is irrelevant. Today’s fast track business world does not intend to issue shares only for increasing the capital base. The Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP) has released Discussion Papers on various aspects related to Foreign Direct Investment. In a series of these Discussion Papers, ‘Issue of shares for considerations other than cash’ has also been included. This discussion paper enlists some of the instances wherein shares are issued on non-cash considerations towards the following:

–    Trade Payables
–    Pre-operative expenses/ pre-incorporation expenses (including payment of rent)
–    Others

These transactions when viewed from the income-tax standpoint, leaves us with the question – whether these are allowable expenses, when discharged in the form of shares. Would it be possible to hold that payment of ‘rent’ is not an allowable expenditure as the same has been discharged through issue of shares? Rent is certainly allowable for tax purposes. So would be fee for technical services which is paid for in shares. The same analogy should be extended to ESOP discount. ESOP discount arising on discharge of salary liability should be allowable in the hands of the employer/ company.

In summary, ESOP discount satisfies all the conditions stipulated for claim of expense under section 37 based on the following counts:

–    ESOP discount is a forbearance of profit and hence would qualify as an ‘expenditure’;

–    Even if such discount does not qualify as ‘expenditure’, it may be allowed as ‘profit forgone’;

–    It is not a an expenditure of personal nature;

–    Being an employee remuneration, the expenditure is laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purposes of the business of the assessee – employee retention and recognition; and

–   The expenditure is not capital in nature.

(to be continued………)

What does ‘settlement’ mean?

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Recently one of the tax journals reported a judgment delivered by the Madras High Court in its writ jurisdiction on the powers of the Income Tax Settlement Commission.2 The honourable High Court in this judgment has held that the Settlement Commission does not have power to settle the case at the income higher than what is disclosed by the applicant in the settlement application, as the Law does not authorise the Commission to assess the applicant’s income. The High Court delivered this judgment following its similar decisions given in the cases of Ace Investments3 and Canara Jewellers.

The Court has reasoned that according to the provisions of the section 245C(1)5, the Settlement Commission can admit only such assessee’s settlement application who has made ‘full and true disclosure’ of its income before the Commission. The Court has held that making of ‘full and true disclosure’ is one of the pre-condition for valid application. Therefore, settling income higher than income disclosed by the applicant would amount to holding firstly, that the applicant’s income disclosure in the application was not ‘full and true’ and secondly, it would also amount to assessing the applicant’s income. The Court further held that the Commission should dismiss such application leaving the option to the applicant to work out the legal remedies when it becomes clear to the Commission that the disclosure of the applicant is not full and true. However, in any case, the Commission cannot proceed to assess the income of the applicant, as the Commission is not empowered to assess the income. Hence, the settlement order assessing the applicant’s income is without jurisdiction, bad in law and void ab initio.

In the backdrop of the above judgment, this article discusses some of the arguments on the powers of the Settlement Commission particularly as to whether the Commission has power to assess the applicant’s income. It also discusses the pre-condition of ‘full and true’ disclosure for the admission of the case before the Settlement Commission. It may be mentioned that the honourable Court did not have the occasion to consider and give its findings on many of the arguments advanced in this article, as the parties did not place the same before the Court.

Concept of ‘Settlement’ After this judgment, many have wondered and have raised a question as to if the Settlement Commission is not empowered to assess the income then what is the job of the Settlement Commission ? The obvious known answer to this question is that the job of the Settlement Commission is to ‘settle’ the income of the applicant. However, this answer leads to more fundamental questions as to what is the meaning of ‘settlement’ ? Does ‘settlement’ includes assessment ? Answer to these questions will vary; as the Act does not define the word ‘settlement’, nor does it provide clear answer to the second question. This article makes a humble attempt to answer these questions.

According to the Black’s Law Dictionary, ‘settlement’ means ‘an agreement ending a dispute or lawsuit’. However, it also may be worthwhile to discuss ‘settlement’ conceptually rather than discussing only its legal meaning. The concept of ‘settlement’ may be a better-appreciated form the familiar occurrence of ‘out of the court settlement’6. The parties resolve the dispute among them possibly with the spirit of ‘give and take’ in the ‘settlement out of the court’. From it, one may infer that; ‘settlement’ is a resolution of the dispute possibly in the spirit of compromise shown by both the sides.

The Settlement Scheme in the Income-tax Act envisages a settlement incorporating the elements of compromise, according to which an applicant pays tax on the income not disclosed before the Income-tax Department and the Department in return may have to forego levying penalty and initiating prosecution. Further, both the sides give up their right to further appeal on the issues decided against them by the Settlement Commission. It may be recalled that the Supreme Court in Brijlal’s7 case has equated the dispute resolution method adopted by the Commission with arbitration. The similarity with the arbitration is not only with the Settlement Commission’s method of the dispute resolution but due to the fact that there is finality in the decision of the Commission and also due to the fact that the applicant cannot withdraw after he submits himself to the Settlement Commission. There is no provision under which the Department also can withdraw from the proceedings before the Commission. Finality of the order and submission without the possibility of the withdrawal thereafter, are essential ingredients of the alternate dispute resolution methods.

In the case of B. N. Bhattachargee8, the Supreme Court has held that the Settlement Commission is a Tribunal. It is obvious that the function of the Tribunal is to adjudicate the dispute between two parties. Based on these positions it becomes clear that the work before the Commission is limited to the resolution of dispute between two sides by way of arbitration on the issues raised by the applicant in its application and the issues raised by the Commissioner in its report on the applicant’s application. This jurisdiction of the Settlement Commission is provided in the section 245D(4) which reads as follows:

‘the Settlement Commission may, in accordance with the provisions of this Act, pass such order as it thinks fit on the matters covered by the application and any other matter relating to the case not covered by the application, but referred to in the report of the Commissioner u/ss.(1) or u/ss.(3)’

‘Settlement’ includes limited power of assessment The Supreme Court has held that the Settlement Commission passes the ‘Order’, but does not ‘assess’ income and its ‘Order’ is not described either as original assessment or reassessment.9 However, The Supreme Court in Brijlal’s case10 has mentioned that ‘When Parliament uses the word “as if such aggregate would constitute total income”, it presupposes that under the special procedure the aggregation of the returned income plus income disclosed would result in computation of total income, which is the basis for levy of tax on the undisclosed income is nothing but ‘assessment’.’ These decisions may appear to be contradictory on the Commission’s power of assessing income, however it is not so.

It may be necessary to understand the term ‘assessment’ for appreciating the above judgments. The Supreme Court has explained this term in the judgment delivered by the three-Member Bench in the case of S. Sanakappa11 as under:

‘. . . . the word ‘assessment’ is used in the IT Act in a number of provisions in a comprehensive sense and includes all proceedings, starting with the filing of the return or issue of notice and ending with determination of the tax payable by the assessee. Though in some sections, the word ‘assessment’ is used only with reference to computation of income, in other sections it has more comprehensive meaning mentioned by us above.’

The Act has entrusted the work of assessing income to the Assessing Officer by providing procedural machinery provisions and providing enabling powers such as carrying out enquiries and verifications. On the contrary, the Law has not empowered the officers of the Commission to carry out verifications to arrive at settled income although the Settlement Commission enjoys all the powers of the Income-tax Authority u/s.245F(1). Further, time provided to the Commission for settling the case is not the same as provided for completing the assessment. Therefore, the Act does not envisage the Commission the work of the assessing applicant’s income in the same way as the Law has entrusted it to the Assessing Officer in view of its limited jurisdiction, lesser time available, and in absence of the powers of carrying out enquiries and verification to the Officers of the Commission. Therefore the term of ‘assessment’ cannot have a comprehensive meaning as mentioned in the above judgment of the Supreme Court with respect to the work done by the Commission. This aspect is clarified by the Supreme Court in the case of Brijlal12 by holding that, ‘It contemplates assessment by settlement and not by way of regular assessment or reassessment u/s.143(1) or u/s.143(3) or u/s.144 of the Act.’

However, the Commission is required to settle the issues before it in a fair manner taking assistance of the Officers of the Commission when necessary and by taking independent view of the issues which are required to be settled. The Commission in this process may determine income, which would amount to assessment as held by the Supreme Court. Therefore, the Commission does have power to assess the applicant’s income, although limited to the issues before it.

This conclusion is also supported by the provisions of the section 245D(6). It provides that ‘Every order passed u/ss.(4) shall provide for the terms of settlement including any demand by way of tax, penalty or interest, the manner in which any sum due under the settlement shall be paid and all other matters to make the settlement effective…’ This provision does not make sense, if the Commission is not empowered to settle the case at the income higher than what is disclosed by it in the settlement application. The demand can only be raised if the Commission decides any issue against the applicant based on the records and evidence before it.

The Settlement Scheme is in favour of Revenue


The arbitration scheme of the Settlement Commission is different in certain aspects from the arbitration method provided in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Unlike the arbitration method provided in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, the Commission has powers to call and examine records of one of the parties before it — i.e., Income-tax Department, it also has suo motto power to have the issues investigated by the Commissioner, even when the Commissioner does not request for it. Moreover, it may be interesting to note that the Commission assumes all the powers of the Income-tax Authority after filing of the application before the Commission, but it does not assume the powers of the Court. Further, preconditions for the filing of application, such as requirement of disclosure of additional income not disclosed before the Assessing Officer and requirement of disclosure of the manner in which it was derived show that the scheme is designed in favour of the Revenue.

The legal provision that all the Members of the Commission are ex-Revenue Service senior officers and are not accounting professionals from outside the Department also support this proposition. Moreover, the Law does not create distinction among Members of the Commission, such as ‘Accountant Member’ and ‘Judicial Member’ as provided in the case of the Members of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. Therefore, considering powers of the Income-tax Authority given to the Commission, power to have investigation conducted, nature of pre-conditions for the valid application before the Commission and the composition of the Commission, it is clear that the Settlement Scheme is in favour of the Revenue. These aspects of the Settlement Scheme as against the provisions in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 otherwise do not make sense, but seem to have been provided with the object mentioned above.

Disclosure of ‘full and true’ income according to the applicant

In the case of the Ajmera Housing Corporation13, the Supreme Court has held that ‘full and true disclosure’ is one of the basic requirements for valid settlement application. The Supreme Court in this case has further held that unless the Commission records its satisfaction on this aspect, it will not have any jurisdiction to pass any order on the matters covered by the application. This judgment as understood by me, lays down the Law in the facts of the case, in which the applicant after disclosing Rs.1.94 crore before the Commission had revised its disclosure by filing revised application containing confidential annexure and related papers and offering additional income of Rs.11.41 crore. On these facts, the Supreme Court in para 36 of its order has held that the disclosure of the applicant could not be considered as ‘full and true’.14

It may be pointed out that the Act does not provide for fulfilment of this requirement at the satisfaction of the Settlement Commission. Therefore, in absence of the statutory requirement of ascertaining ‘full and true’ disclosure at the satisfaction of the Commission, fulfilment of this condition should be viewed from the applicant’s perspective. For example, applicant’s disclosure without including income on a legal issue may be ‘full and true’ according to the best of his knowledge and belief. However, merely because the Settlement Commission settling the case takes a view against the applicant on such an issue the applicant’s disclosure made in the application would not cease to be ‘full and true’. Therefore, the Supreme Court’s judgment in the case of Ajmera should be read as the Commission should record its satisfaction that the disclosure is ‘full and true’ to the best of knowledge and belief of the applicant at the stage of the admission of the application.

Moreover, the Law does not intend that the Commission arrive at satisfaction of ‘full and true’ disclosure at the stage of the admission of the case. Such a provision would not only make the entire process of the settlement redundant which is followed after the admission of the case, but also it is practically impossible to arrive at such a judgment without hearing both the sides at length and examining the records. It is settled that the Law does not require achieving the impossible.

The requirement of making ‘full and true disclosure’ is provided to ensure that the applicant honestly and with the bona fide intentions invokes the jurisdiction of the Settlement Commission without playing the game of hide and seek. It is held in many Court judgments that the facility of the Settlement Commission for resolution of disputes is not available to the dishonest assessees.

Revival of the abated proceedings

Presently, neither the section 245HA of the Income-tax Act, nor the Clause 280 of the proposed Direct Taxes Code (DTC) allow revival of the abated proceedings before the Assessing Officer when the Court annuls the settlement order passed u/s.245D(4) or holds the settlement order void. It may be mentioned that the Finance Act 2008 had inserted such a provision in the section 153A on the search assessment to provide revival of the assessment or reassessment proceedings in case of the annulment of assessment or reassessment. Therefore, it would not be surprising that the Government would introduce such an amendment in the near future on similar lines in the Chapter-XIX-A of the Income-tax Act on the Settlement Commission to prevent the assessees taking the advantage by getting declared the Settlement Order void on technical grounds. At the same time, such annulment also prevents the reassessment of income due to lapse of the time permitted by law. The Government may find it difficult to accept such a situation, in which the assessees would get away by paying lesser revenue than what was due from it.

To conclude, this author is of the view that the Settlement Commission is empowered to settle the case at the income above what is disclosed before the Commission as the concept of ‘full and true disclosure’ should be viewed from the applicant’s perspective.

It is besides the point that an enactment of the Law is a dynamic process. Once the Law is amended as discussed above, the arguments and discussion on the topics such as this become irrelevant.

1. The author is Commissioner of Income-tax. The
views expressed in the article are personal views of the author and not
necessarily of the Government of India.

2. G. Jayaraman v. Settlement Commission (Additional Bench) (2011) 196 TAXMANN 552 (Mad.).

3. Ace Investments v. Settlement Commission (2003) 264 ITR 571 (Mad.), (2004) 186 CTR (Mad.) 486.

4. Canara Jewellers v. Settlement Commission (2009) 315 ITR 328 (Mad.), (2009) 226 CTR (Mad.) 79.

5  Section 245C(1).

‘An
assessee may, at any stage of a case relating to him, make an application in
such form and in such manner as may be prescribed, and containing a full and
true disclosure of his income which has not been disclosed before the Assessing
Officer, the manner in which such income has been derived, the additional
amount of income-tax payable on such income and such other particulars as may
be prescribed, to the Settlement Commission to have the case settled and any
such application shall be disposed of in the manner hereinafter provided:

6. Section 89(1) of the Civil
Procedure Code deals with the ‘Settlement outside the Court’

7       Bij Lal v. CIT, (2010) 328
ITR 477 (SC) at p-506, (2010) 235 CTR (SC) 417

8       CIT v. B. N. Bhattacgagee,
(1979) 118 ITR 461 (SC) at p-480, (1979) 10 CTR (SC) 354

9       Para-12, CIT v. Hindustan
Bulk Carriers, (2003) 259 ITR 449 (SC) at p-463, (2003) 179 CTR (SC) 362

10      Para-11, Bij Lal v. CIT,
(2010) 328 ITR 477 (SC) at p-501, (2010) 235 CTR (SC) 417

11      Para-2, S. Sankappa v. ITO, (1968) 68 ITR 760
(SC)

12      See note 9
13      Ajmera Housing Corporation
v. CIT (2010) 326 ITR 642 (SC), 234 CTR (SC) 642

14      At p 659, see note 12

Tax Acounting Standards – Do we need them?

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The Central Goverenment has recently exposed drafts of two Tax Accounting Standards which it proposes to issue under the provisions of section 145(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. It may be recalled that soon after the introduction of the provision empowering the Central Government to issue accounting standards, two standards were issued, which were more or less inverbatim reproduction of the accounting standards issued by the Institute.

The Government believes that a tax payer can avoid payment of taxes by following a particular method of accounting and the standards issued by the Institute offer flexibility.

This belief of the Government is misplaced. The standards issued by the Institute alongwith Accounting Standards Interpretation have been adopted by the Government on the recommendations of the National Advisory Committee on Accounting Standards and issued them as standards applicable to Companies under section 211 of the Companies Act, 1956. These standards do not provide for alternatives except in few cases. These exceptions are also for valid reasons and do not lead to avoidance of payment of taxes. In some cases it may only result in timing difference. Has the Government carried out study of revenue leakage or postponement of revenue due to the so called flexibility in the accounting standards? It may be of interest if the Government can publish the figures of lost revenue.

The attitude of the Ministry of Finance of trying to collect the revenue at the earliest without having regard to the business reality needs a change. One has seen this attitude in collection of Service Tax as well. Service Tax for the last quarter of the financial year has to be paid even before the end of the fiscal year.

In July 2002, the Government, appointed a Committee for formation of accounting standards. This Committee categorically recommended that separate accounting should not be issued under the tax law and where there is leakage of revenue appropriate legislative amendments should be made. The Government did not accept the reccomendations.

CBDT therefore constituted a new Committee in December 2010. The report of this Committee has not been made public. Based on the recommendations of this Committee, the drafts of two Tax Accounting Standards have been issued. CBDt proposes to issue more standards in due cource.

It is now proposed that based on the Tax Accounting Standards the tax payer should prepare a reconciliation statement. The tax payer, on the face of it will, not be required to maintain two sets of books of account, one in accordance with the standards issued by the Institute (or Company Accounting Standards) and another set in accordance with the Tax Accounting Standards. However, the Government has conveniently ignored the fact that enormous effort will be required to prepare the proposed reconciliation statement.

Instead of harmonising the taxable income with the accounting income and making computation simple, the computation of taxable income from income in the financial books will become cumbersome, leading to unintended errors. This will not reduce litigation but only increase it.

The Tax Accounting Standards will open a backdoor way for advancing the year of taxability of a receipt and postponing allowability of expenditure without amending the Income Tax Act. It will not be surprising if through these standards attempt is made to change nature of a receipt from capital to revenue .

Kautilya has propounded the theory that the king should collect tax the way bee collects honey from the flower without causing any damage to it. Citizens are willing to pay their fair share of taxes provided the tax rates are reasonable, administration is fair and transparent, policies of the Government inspire confidence in the taxpayers and there is mutual trust. Tax Accounting Standards will only make payment of taxes, a burdensome exercise, even more burdensome without corresponding benefits.

levitra

Kabir and the art of giving

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Kabir is talked about a lot, admired a lot and even worshipped by many, but hardly followed. This is true of most of the great people. We end up becoming their admirers rather than followers. One of my senior colleagues in IAS used to tell me, that when people listen to talks of great achievers, most of them are ‘prabhavit’ (impressed), but rarely ‘parivartit’ (reformed). We go home and extol virtues of the great speaker, but most of the time fail to bring in our lives the changes suggested by that great person.

Even few couplets of Kabir are sufficient to change our lives provided we truly follow them.

Society is an amalgamation of people. If people are good, society will be good. All of us want others to be good, while for us we have different standards. And this is the reason for the pitiable state in which we find the society today.

One way to reverse this trend is to follow what Kabirji says —

And it is because of this lack of introspection and self-correction that we are still grappling with the same problems against which Kabirji fought centuries ago — Hindu-Muslim differences, casteism, religious fundamentalism, ritualism, etc. Today we are supposedly more ‘educated’ than what people were during Kabirji’s time. But these problems have taken a turn for the worse. When an illiterate like Kabir could raise his voice against all such evils and fight resolutely, then why we the so called educated cannot ? But how can we expect them to fight the woes of society when todays educated cannot even take care of their parents and when they fight bitterly with their siblings and stab their friends in the back.

Maybe it is because of our education system today. Earlier the two main purposes for which people sent their wards for education were ‘character-building and knowledge’. Now it just teaches a person to become a money making factory. Parents are heard telling their wards — quickly do a course so that you can start earning, or choose a course which will fetch crores of income. We are not bothered about gaining knowledge or becoming wise. One of the greatest educationist and visionary — Benjamin Franklin has said — “the greatest aim and purpose of all education is — service to society”.

Of what use is our education if we cannot put it to use to eradicate the social evils or fight against the injustice or illogical things happening in the society. If Kabirji could do, why can’t we ?

It is therefore heartening to see that BCAS is a place where the education that one had is being put to the service of society. In my numerous interactions with the members and on going through the Namaskar articles I have found that an earnest attempt is being made to do something about the various problems of the society. I have been particularly inspired by two of the senior members — Narayan Varma and Pradeep Shah and have been regularly working with them in my own small way. This article too is an outcome of that.

Coming back to Kabir, as I have mentioned earlier, we do not need to do too much research on all that he has said. Even if we can just understand and imbibe a few of his teachings from the ocean of wisdom that he gave, we can do wonders, both for ourselves as well as for the society.

As Namaskar very often champions the cause of ‘giving’, I would now quote some of Kabir’s sayings about ‘giving’ :

It is amazing to see how Kabir could pack so much wisdom in just one Doha ! It talks about contentment, compassion, seva and giving (even when there is barely enough). In his view, man should ask God to give him only as much as is required to fulfil his needs. Whereas we all continue to run after money and matter and realise very late in life that we failed to do all those things that make our life worth ‘living’.

Nature takes its own time and everything has its own pace. But today there is a mad rush for everything which leaves us all with lots of tensions, blood pressures and frustrations. We have to learn to do our jobs and detach ourselves from its results which would happen at their own pace. We have to be patient and not hanker after them.

What is the point of being a big person when you are of no use to anybody ? It is like being a date tree. It is tall but a passerby cannot get respite from the hot sun under its shade and its fruits are too high and cannot be eaten by people.

Trees do not eat their fruits; rivers do not drink their water. Saints live this life to do good to others.

Says Kabir that making gifts does not diminish one’s wealth just as taking a beakful of grains by a little bird does not diminish the grain heap or the river water does not diminish even though it is extensively usd by a large number of people.

Like when water starts increasing in the boat, we have to throw the excess water out of it, similarly when wealth starts increasing, we should start giving it away. Otherwise in both cases there is the danger of drowning.

I would like to conclude by repeating what I mentioned earlier. Kabir is not something that we should keep in the museum. We have to try to understand and imbibe his teachings in our lives. It will benefit us, our society, our country and even the entire world.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 55, dated 29- 4-2011 —Foreign Investments in India by SEBI-registered FIIs in other securities.

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Presently, FII can investment up to US $ 15 billion in corporate debt and an additional US $ 5 billion in bonds with a residual maturity of over five years, issued by Indian companies which are in the infrastructure sector, where ‘infrastructure’ is defined in terms of the extant guidelines on External Commercial Borrowings (ECB).

This Circular has increased the FII investment limit in listed non-convertible debentures/bonds, with a residual maturity of five years and above, and issued by Indian companies in the infrastructure sector, where ‘infrastructure’ is defined in terms of the extant ECB guidelines, by an additional limit of US $ 20 billion i.e., from the existing limit of US $ 5 billion to US $ 25 billion. As a result, the total limit available to FII for investment in listed non-convertible debentures/bonds would be US $ 40 billion with a sub-limit of US $ 25 billion for investment in listed non-convertible debentures/ bonds issued by corporates in the infrastructure sector. This investment by FII in listed non-convertible debentures/bonds would have a minimum lock-in period of three years. However, FIIs are allowed to trade amongst themselves during the lock-in period.

Further, it has also been decided to allow SEBI registered FII to invest in unlisted non-convertible debentures/bonds issued by corporates in the infrastructure sector, subject to the terms and conditions mentioned above.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 54, dated 29-4-2011 — Issue of Irrevocable Payment Commitment (IOCs) to Stock Exchanges on behalf of Mutual Funds (MFs) and Foreign Institutional Investors (FIIs).

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Presently, no fund-based/non-fund-based facilities are permitted to FII.

This Circular permits Custodian Banks, subject to RBI regulations and instructions on banks’ exposure to capital markets, to issue Irrevocable Payment Commitments (IPC) in favour of Stock Exchanges/ Clearing Corporations of Stock Exchanges on behalf of their FII clients for purchase of shares under the Portfolio Investment Scheme.

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PLEDGE OF SHARES — DIFFICULTIES UNDER THE TAKEOVER REGULATIONS

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Borrowing against security of equity shares particularly by Promoters of listed companies is common. Security of the Promoters’ shares is often also given even for the borrowings of the listed company. Security of equity shares for certain reasons is often found preferable even to more substantial assets like land, buildings, etc. Listing and dematerialisation of shares has to some extent made this even easier, particularly with certain special provisions in law relating to pledge, etc. of shares.

However, the Takeover Regulations, made with a different object in mind, created serious consequences in the process of creation of the pledge, its invocation and when the shares are retransferred if the loans are eventually repaid.

This problem arises if the holdings of the borrower/ lender at any stage increase by more than prescribed percentage. For example, if the lender enforces the security and acquires the shares that result in his holding crossing, say, 15%, he is required to make an open offer. If the borrower is required to reacquire the shares from the lender on repayment of the loan and if this triggers the requirements of the Takeover Regulations, then again, the issue of open offer arises. The Regulations further contain restrictions on transfer of the shares till the open offer is complete and this delays the re-transfer of shares. It may be recollected that the open offer requirements would mean that a further 20% of the shares are to be acquired from the public. Even the very act of pledge of shares, if it involves transfer of shares in the name of the lender, may create similar complications, except where it is covered by a specific exception.

Earlier, in case of paper shares, it was not uncommon for the lender to get the shares transferred in its name to get total control over the shares. In other cases, blank transfer documents were lodged. However, in case of such blank transfers, the limited validity of the transfer documents created a problem. The system of dematerialisa-tion, however, resolved this problem to a substantial extent. As will be explained later, the security of the shares is recorded by the depository itself in a legally recognised manner and for practically an unlimited period of time.

A recent decision of the Securities Appellate Tribunal (‘SAT’) dealt in fair detail with the implications of the Takeover Regulations to a case where shares were retransferred to the pledger after the loan was repaid. This is in the case of Liquid Holdings Private Limited v. SEBI, (Appeal No. 83 of 2010, dated 11th March 2011).

The facts of that case are fairly simple (and simplified further here to bring focus on a few essential issues). Promoters of a listed company gave security to a lender against a loan given by the lender to a listed group company (‘the Company’). The security was given in the manner specified under the Depositories Act whereby the pledge against the shares is recorded in the demat account containing such shares.

The Company defaulted in repayment of the loan. The lender enforced the pledge and got the shares transferred to its name. However, after some time, the loan was fully repaid and the shares were reacquired from the lender. Because of such acquisition, however, the holding of the Promoters increased by such a percentage that would require the making of an open offer. The question was whether such an open offer was warranted when the Promoters merely re-acquired the shares.

The Takeover Regulations require an open offer to be made when shares are acquired whereby certain specified limits are crossed. This may be when the shareholding crosses 15% or when it crosses so-called creeping acquisition limits, etc. There are more situations when the open offer requirements are attracted. However, there is a special feature of these provisions. And that is that there is no netting off of purchase and sales. This can be explained as follows.

Say, a person holds 14% and acquires another 4% shares in a listed company. He is required to make an open offer. Now, let us say he sells 5% shares whereby his holding reduces to 13% but again buys 5% whereby he is back at 18%. Still, he is required to make an open offer when he crosses the milestone of 15% again. This point though a fundamental feature of the Regulations right from their formulation in 1997, is often forgotten or otherwise not appreciated.

So, this provision hits a borrower who is required for some reason to give up his shares because of his default. When he is able to raise the finance and he re-acquires the shares, he has to make an open offer. This is despite the fact that the control over the Company would not have changed at all.

It is worth emphasising that the ‘creeping acquisition limits’ of 5% would sound very low in context of a re-acquisition of shares from a lender after a default.

The expensive consequences of open offer hardly need emphasis. The acquirer is required to acquire another 20% shares from the public.

Interestingly, the banks and financial institutions are given exemption from the open offer requirements if they acquire shares, as pledgees. However, strangely, there is no reverse exemption if the shares are reacquired if the default is cured and even if the reacquisition is from the banks/financial institutions. Further, the exemption is given only to banks/financial institutions and not to other parties who may be lenders.

Normally, a pledge does not amount to transfer of shares even under the mechanism provided under the depositories regulations. It is a mere recording of a charge that disables the pledger from selling the shares, but does not make the pledgee the acquirer or owner of the shares. It is only if the pledge is exercised and the shares transferred in its name that the pledgee lender can be said to have acquired the shares. Though not stated in express terms, the intention seems to be that this acquisition by banks/financial institutions of shares on account of exercise of pledge is exempted from open offer requirements.

The provisions of Regulation 58 of the SEBI Depositories Regulations lay down the procedure for recording of the pledge in respect of the shares being held in the name of the pledger. The said Regulation also facilitates easy invocation of the pledge in accordance with the pledge document whereby the shares would be transferred from such account to the pledgee.

In the present case, the lender had invoked the pledge and transferred the shares in its name. Later on, the borrower could arrange for the funds and thus the shares were re-acquired by the Promoters. However, in this process, the open offer requirements were triggered since they acquired in excess of what is permitted without requiring an open offer.

Since the acquisition was made without making an open offer, SEBI levied a penalty on the acquirers. On appeal, SAT confirmed the penalty and did not agree to the argument of the Promoters on the facts that the re-acquisition of shares after invocation of the pledge did not trigger the open offer requirement. Thus, it confirmed that the acquirers had indeed violated the Takeover Regulations and the penalty levied was justified in law.

The following are some extracts of the decision that are relevant.

The Promoters argued that “the object of transferring the shares in the names of the banks was only to provide a certain comfort level to them so that they feel confident that they would be able to recover the amount without going back to the pledgers if and when a default in payment occurs.”. Thus, there was no real transfer or re-transfer. The SAT, however, did not accept this argument and held as follows.

First, they explained the nature of the pledge as under the new scheme of depositories as follows:

“The pledges were created and recorded in the records of the depository and the pledgors and the pledgees were informed of the entry of creation of the pledges through their participants. As long as the shares remained under pledge, the pledgors (the appellants) were their beneficial owners and the only effect of the pledge was that the shares under pledge could not be transferred any further or dealt with in the market without the concurrence of the pledgees i.e., the banks. The pledge by itself did not bring about any change in the beneficial ownership of the shares pledged and there was no question of the provisions of the takeover code being attracted.”

Then it explained what happened when the pledge was invoked. Thereby they also explained why the lenders were not required to make an open offer.

“It was somewhere in the year 2004 that default was committed in the repayment of the loans as a result whereof the banks invoked the pledges and got the shares transferred from the demat accounts of the appellants (pledgers) to their own demat accounts. On such invocation, the depository cancelled the entry of pledge in its records and registered the banks as beneficial owners of the shares in its records and made the necessary amendments therein. The depository then immediately informed the participants of the pledgers and the pledgees of the change and the participants also recorded the necessary changes in their records. Upon the banks being recorded as beneficial owners of the shares in the records of the depository, they became members of the target company and they acquired not only the shares but also the voting rights attached thereto. But for the exemption granted to them under Regulation 3(1)(f)(iv) of the takeover code, they would have been required to comply with the provisions of Regulation 11(1) by making a public announcement to acquire further shares of the target company as envisaged therein.”

And the third and final stage of the chain of events took place when the borrower settled the loan and the shares got retransferred to the Promoters. The consequences of this were explained as follows:

“The shares acquired by the banks ceased to be the security for the loans as the banks had become the beneficial owners thereof. In December 2007, Morpen paid the entire loan amounts to the banks and settled the loan accounts. It was then that the banks issued a ‘no dues certificate’ to Morepen, the principal borrower and simultaneously executed DIS requiring their participants to debit their accounts and transfer the shares in the names of the appellants. Accordingly, the shares got transferred from the demat accounts of the banks to the demat accounts of the appellants in the records of the depository. On this transfer being made by the banks, the appellants acquired the shares and became their beneficial owners as their names were entered in the records of the depository.”

Hence, since the shares were actually re-acquired, the requirements of disclosure as well as open offer were attracted. The SAT observed as follows:

“Admittedly, the shares which the appellants acquired in December 2007 were in excess of the threshold limit(s) prescribed by Regulation 11(1) of the takeover code and, therefore, the said regulation got triggered. The appellants were required to come out with a public announcement to acquire further shares of the target company as envisaged in this Regulation. This was not done. Not only this, the appellants having acquired the shares from the banks were also required to make the necessary disclosures in terms of Regulation 7 of the take-over code to the target company and the stock exchanges where the shares were listed. This, too, was not done. We are, therefore, satisfied that the provisions of Regulations 7 and 11(1) stood violated and the adjudicating officer was right in recording a finding to this effect.”

The final argument of the appellants that the legal effect of the transaction was that there was no real transfer of shares to the lender was also rejected. It was held that the title did transfer to the lender on the shares and there was a retransfer too.

Thus, SAT upheld the penalty for not making the open offer.

To conclude, to a fair extent, clarity has been obtained on the implications of the Takeover Regulations when shares are transferred on invocation of pledge and shares are retransferred on satisfaction of the default. At the time of invocation of pledge, if the pledgee is a bank/financial institution, the transfer would not attract the open offer requirements of the Regulations. Further, where shares are retransferred, the retransfer would attract the open offer requirements.

A possible way out of this is to apply to the Take-over Panel for exemption for such re-acquisition. However, it would be up to the discretion of the Panel whether or not to recommend such exemption and of SEBI to finally grant it.

However, the decision obviously does not cover many other situations of pledge and their consequences. Pledge of shares that are not dematerialised may remain an issue, though the above decision should apply if the shares are transferred in the name of the lender. The exemption on transfer on invocation of pledge is not available if the lender is not a bank/financial institution. The general unfairness of the consequences of such reacquisition is apparent and it is clear that the law needs a change to provide for exemption with clear conditions to avoid misuse.

PART D: RTI & SUCCESS STORIES

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Mr. Rohit Mehta
I am very grateful to the BCAS RTI Clinic for providing me the correct advice as regards the manner in which the RTI application/appeal is to be filed. Based on the advice provided I had filed the requisite applications/ appeals with the relevant authorities.

I am a co-owner of a building of which the ground floor was let out to tenants. The said tenants had carried out unauthorised and illegal construction without our permission. Various complaints were filed with the concerned authorities but there was no response. As suggested by one of my colleagues I visited the RTI Clinic operated by your esteemed society at New Marine Lines. I discussed the problem with Mr. A. K. Asher who advised me to file applications under the RTI Act with the various BMC Wards, the manner in which I should go and collect general information in respect of rules and regulations pertaining to construction of loft/mezzanine floor, etc. He also advised me that under the RTI Act it is possible for a citizen to make inspection of files and demand copies of inspection reports. Accordingly I applied for copies of inspection reports and other documents.

Being aggrieved by the incomplete and evasive replies given by the PIOs, first appeals were filed after due consultation. I was directed to take up the matter with the Building & Factory Departments, ‘D’ Ward office. Finally the Assistant Engineer (B & F) ‘D’ ward directed the tenant to restore the unauthorised work i.e., convert the mezzanine floor to loft within seven days from the date of the said letter. Further, a showcause notice u/s. 351 of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act has been issued to the tenant as to why the unauthorised work should not be pulled down.

I would like to sincerely thank BCAS-RTI Clinic and Mr. A. K. Asher for providing me all the assistance and support in relation to the above matter.

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PART B:

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  •    RTI
    Logo

The Central Government has designed RTI Logo and has released it on DoPT web and other sites.

  •  CBI is exempted from RTI

An unfortunate news came in the second week of June that the Central Government has notified u/s.24 read with the Second Schedule that the RTI Act shall not apply to Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). S/s. (2) of section 24 permits the Central Government to amend the Second Schedule and it is now amended to include CBI. The Notification is reproduced hereunder:

It is learnt that the Madras High Court has issued notice to the Government of India on exempting CBI. Many in the country are of the opinion that CBI cannot be classified as it does not deal either with ‘intelligence’ or ‘security’ issues, the only two conditions that can make a government department exempt under RTI.
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Development Agrement

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Introduction A popular mode of developing property, especially in Mumbai, is by way of an Agreement granting Development Rights, popularly known as ‘Development Agreement’ or a ‘DA’. Instead of the land-owner executing a conveyance in favour of the builder, he enters into a DA with a developer. Thus, the landowner remains the owner of the land but he gives permission to the developer to enter upon the land and develop it. Since this is a very important way of doing business in the real estate sector, we must familiarise ourselves with this instrument.

Meaning
In the case of a DA, the owner of the land grants development rights to a builder/developer. The roles and responsibilities of the developer include the following:

(a) To obtain the necessary permissions and to be responsible for the concept, design and planning of the project.

(b) To appoint architects, engineers, various contractors and other professional personnel required for the project, and be responsible for the control, management and co-ordination of the project.

(c) To construct the building(s), infrastructure and facilities as per the sanctioned plans.

(d) To market and sell the flats/offices.

(e) To form a society/association of flat purchasers.

(f) Generally to be responsible for the construction management, contract management, material management and overall management and supervision of the project.

Along with a DA, the owner also executes a Power of Attorney in favour of the developer to enable him to carry out the above acts.

Consideration
The consideration of a DA may involve the following:

(a) Lump sum

In consideration for the above rights, the owner is given a lump sum consideration.

(b) Area sharing

In some cases, the owner decides to split the constructed area with the builder, instead of getting the monetary consideration. For example, a DA may provide that the owner would get 49% of the flats, free of cost, as a consideration for granting the DA and the builder would be entitled to the balance 51% of the flats. The builder may also agree to market the flats of the land-owner since the land-owner may not have the necessary infrastructure and expertise for the same. The entire revenue from the sale of the owner’s flats would belong to him.

(c) Revenue sharing For various reasons, the land-owner and the developer may agree that the consideration for grant of the development rights would not be a fixed sum of money. The consideration payable by the developer to the land-owner for the development rights may consist of two components as follows:

(i) certain minimum amount, plus

(ii) a percentage(s) of the revenue received from the development and sale of the property.

Thus, in this arrangement the land-owner takes on a major risk of the property not being sold or being delayed, but also has the potential of maximising his income. For instance, there may be a revenue sharing arrangement of 40: 60 between the owner and the developer. Hence, for every Rupee realised from the sale or lease of the flats/offices, the owner would earn 40% of the same.

(d) Profit sharing arrangement In several cases, the owner and the builder enter into a profit sharing arrangement, which is quite similar to that under a partnership. An issue in such a case would be, whether the arrangement is one of a Development Rights Agreement or is a partnership? The income-tax and stamp duty consequences on the owner and the developer would vary depending upon the nature of the arrangement. In this arrangement the land-owner takes on the maximum risk coupled with the potential of the maximum returns.

However, it must be noted that a mere profit sharing arrangement does not make it a partnership. Section 6 of the Indian Partnership Act is relevant for this purpose. It provides that the sharing of profits or of gross returns arising from property by persons holding a joint or common interest in the property does not by itself make such persons partners. In the case of Vijaya Traders, 218 ITR 83 (Mad.), a partnership was entered into between two persons, wherein one partner S contributed land, while the other was solely responsible for construction and finance. S was immune to all losses and was given a guaranteed return as her share of profits. The other partner who was the managing partner was to bear all losses. The Court held that the relationship was similar to the Explanation 1 to section 6 of the Partnership Act and there were good reasons to think that the property assigned to the firm were accepted on the terms of the guaranteed return out of the profits of the firm and she was immune to all losses. The relationship between them was close to that of lessee and lessor and almost constituted a relationship of licensee and licensor and was not a valid partnership.

At the same time, though mere sharing of profit does not automatically make it a partnership, profit sharing is an essential ingredient of partnership. In addition to profit sharing, mutual agency is also a key condition of a partnership. Each partner is an agent of the firm and of the other partners. The business must be carried on by all or any partner on behalf of all. What would constitute a mutual agency is a question of fact. The Supreme Court decisions in the cases of K. D. Kamath & Co., 82 ITR 680 (SC) and M. P. Davis, 35 ITR 803 (SC) are relevant in this respect.

The Bombay High Court in the case of Sanjay Kanubhai Patel, 2004 (6) Bom C.R. 94 had an occasion to directly deal with the issue of whether a DA which provided for profit sharing was a partnership? The Court after reviewing the Development Rights Agreement, held that it is settled law that in order to constitute a valid partnership, three ingredients are essential. There must be a valid agreement between the parties, it must be to share profits of the business and the business must be carried on by all or any of them acting for all. The third ingredient relates to the existence of mutual agency between the concerned parties inter se. The Court held that merely because an agreement provided for profit sharing, it would not constitute a partnership in the absence of mutual agency.

Transfer of Property Act Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act provides that where a person contracts to transfer for consideration any immovable property by writing and the transferee has, in part performance of the same contract, taken possession of the property or a part thereof, and he is willing to perform his part of the obligations under the contract, then even though a formal transfer has not yet been executed, it would be treated as a part performance of the contract and the transferor cannot claim any right in respect of the property. However, rights endowed by the contract can be enforced by the transferor. A DA is an example of a contract of part performance.

It is important to note that after the amendment by the Registration and Other Related Laws (Amendment) Act, 2001, any contract for part performance shall not be effective unless it is registered with the Sub-Registrar of Assurances. Earlier, section 53A provided that such contracts did not have to be registered.

Section 53A is a shield and not a sword and can be used only to defend the transferee’s possession — Bishwabani P. Ltd. v. Santosh Datta, (1980) 1 SCC 185. Further, it is important that the transferee (the developer in case of a DA) is willing to perform his part of the contract. If he fails to do so, then he cannot claim recourse u/s.53A — J. Wadhwa v. Chakraborty, (1989) 1 SCC 76.

Stamp duty on a DA 


Very few States expressly provide for a levy of stamp duty on a development agreement. Maharashtra, Gujarat and Karnataka are a few instances of such States. Under the Bombay Stamp Act, 1958, any agreement under which a promoter, developer, etc., is given authority for constructing or developing a property or selling/transferring (in any manner whatsoever) any immovable property is exigible to stamp duty. The Stamp Acts of most States do not contain an express provision for levying stamp duty on a DA. They are generally stamped as agreements not otherwise provided for, e.g., Rs.100.

Till a few years back, such agreements in Maharashtra attracted duty under the provisions of Article 5(g-a) of Schedule-I @ 1% of the market value of the property. However, now the ad valorem rate of duty has been increased to rates applicable to a conveyance, e.g., 5% in Mumbai. Thus, as far as stamp duty is concerned now a DA is at par with a conveyance. The market value of the immovable property should be found out from the Stamp Duty Ready Reckoner.

When a power of attorney is given to a promoter or a developer for constructing or developing a property or selling/transferring (in any manner what-soever) any immovable property, it is chargeable with duty. If stamp duty has already been paid under Article 48(g) dealing with a power of attorney in respect of the same property, then stamp duty on a Development Agreement would only be Rs.100. Article 48 levies duty on different types of powers of attorney. A power of attorney, if authorising the holder to sell an immovable property or if given to a promoter/developer for constructing/developing or selling/transferring immovable property, attracts duty as on a conveyance on the fair market value of the property. Till a few years ago, this also attracted duty @ 1%. However, if duty is paid under Article 5(g-a) on the Development Agreement, then duty under Article 48 shall only be Rs.100.

Owner’s Taxation

The consideration received by the land owner would normally be taxable as capital gains in his hands. A variety of High Court and Tribunal decisions have dealt with this issue. The most prominent decision in this respect is the Bombay High Court’s decision in the case of Chaturbhuj Dwarkadas Kapadia, 260 ITR 491 (Bom.) — which has laid down the conditions necessary to attract section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act and hence, be treated as a transfer for the owner: (1) there should be a contract for consideration; (2) it should be in writing; (3) it should be signed by the transferor; (4) it should pertain to immovable property; (5) the transferee should have taken possession of the property, and (6) the transferee should be ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. It further held that if under the Development Agreement a limited power of attorney is intended to be given to the developer and even if the actual power of attorney is not given, then the date of such Development Agreement would be relevant to decide the date of transfer u/s.2(47)(v) read with section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. For this purpose, the date of the actual possession or the date on which substantial payments are made would not be relevant.

Other important decisions in this respect, include, Avtar Singh, 270 ITR 92 (MP); Zuari Estate Develop-ment & Investment Co. P. Ltd., 271 ITR 269 (Bom.) Asian Distributors Ltd., 119 Taxmann 171 (Mum.); ICI India Ltd., 80 ITD 58 (Cal.); Tej Pratap Singh, 127 ITD 303 (Delhi).

In view of the above decisions, it is very important to draft the DA very carefully and to properly structure the transaction regarding granting of licence, power of attorney and the possession of the property. In this connection, it may be noted that the Supreme Court in the case of Vimal Lalchand Mutha, 248 ITR 6 (SC) has held that interpretation of an agreement involves a question of law.

In Meera Somasekaran, (2010) 4 ITR (Trib) 271 (Chennai) and Arif Akhatar Hussain v. ITO, (ITAT- Mumbai) ITA No. 541/Mum./2010,
it was held that section 50C would even apply to a development agreement. Thus, if the land is held as a capital asset by the owner, then section 50C would apply. It was held that the transfer of development rights amounts to a transfer of land or building and therefore section 50C is applicable, since u/s.2(47)(v) the giving of possession in part performance of a contract as per section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act is deemed to be a ‘transfer’. The fact that the assessee’s name stands in the property records is immaterial. Once the land-owner received the sale consideration and parted with possession of the property under the DA, section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act was attracted and hence, it was a transfer under the Income-tax Act.

One of the ancillary issues which arises is that whether Transferrable Development Rights (TDRs) arising by virtue of the Development Control Regulations for Greater Mumbai, 1991 or on account of society redevelopment is liable to tax? A spate of judgments, such as Jethalal D. Mehta v. DCIT, 2 SOT 422 (Mum.), have held that since TDRs qualifying for equivalent Floor Space Index (FSI) have no cost of acquisition and so sale thereof does not give rise to taxable capital gains. Other relevant decisions in this respect include, Maheshwar Prakash 2 CHS Ltd., 24 SOT 366 (Mum.), New Shailaja CHS Limited, (ITA No. 512/Mum./2007) (Mum.), Om Shanti Co-op. Hsg. Soc. Ltd., [ITA No. 2550/Mum./2008] (Mum.), Lotia Court Co-op. Hsg. Soc. Ltd., [ITA No. 5096/ Mum./2008] (Mum).

Auditor’s duty

The Auditor should enquire of the auditee, in case the auditee is dealing in property which is under a DA, whether the covenants of the DA, etc. have been duly complied. In case of any doubts, he may ask for a legal opinion. This is all the more relevant in case the client is a real estate developer. Non-compliance with this could have serious repercussions for the developer.

By broadening his peripheral knowledge, the Auditor can make intelligent enquiries and thereby add value to his services. He can caution the auditee of likely unpleasant consequences which might arise. It needs to be repeated and noted that the audit is basically under the relevant law applicable to an entity and an Auditor is not an expert on all laws relevant to business operations of an entity. All that is required of him is exercise of ‘due care’.

Transfer of title occurs only with execution and registration of document — Possession in part — Performance of contract does not confer any title to buyer — Transfer of Property Act, 1882, section 53A, 55.

Transfer of title occurs only with execution and registration of document — Possession in part — Performance of contract does not confer any title to buyer — Transfer of Property Act, 1882, section 53A, 55.

Limitation — Setting aside ex parte order — CPC 0.9 R.13

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[K. Surekha Reddy v. Chandraiah, AIR 2011 (NOC) 192 AP] The appellant filed application to set aside the ex parte decree pleading that she was not even served with summons in the suit. The respondent, on the other hand, pleaded that not only summons were served upon the appellant, but also an advocate was engaged by her. The Trial Court dismissed the application on two grounds, viz., (a) that no application was filed for condonation of delay, and (b) that the record discloses that the appellant engaged an advocate in the suit, and thereafter remained ex parte.

The Court observed that so far as the first ground is concerned, though the limitation for filing an application under Order IX Rule 13 C.P.C., is 30 days, from the date on which the ex parte decree was passed, a different approach becomes necessary, in case the defendant, who suffered the ex parte decree did not have any knowledge of the ex parte decree. In this regard, a distinction needs to be maintained between the defendant who entered appearance in the suit, but was set ex parte, before the ex parte decree came to be passed, on the one hand; and the one, who was not served with the summons at all, and accordingly was not aware of the ex parte decree.

In the first category of cases, the limitation for filing application starts from the date of ex parte decree. The reason is that, once the defendant is served with summons, or has entered appearance, he is supposed to be in the knowledge of the development, that takes place in the suit.

In the second category of cases, the Court cannot impute knowledge to him, as regards any step, including the passing of ex parte decree. If it is established that a defendant was not served with summons at all, before the ex parte decree was passed, the limitation starts from the date of knowledge of the ex parte decree, and not from the date of the decree. In the instant case, if the appellant proves that she was not served with summons at all, the date of order becomes irrelevant.

As regards the second ground, it needs to be seen that the Trial Court proceeded on the assumption that the appellant was served with summons and engaged an advocate also. When a specific plea was raised by the appellant herein, that she was neither served with notice, nor did she engage an advocate at all, the Trial Court was under obligation to verify the record, and come to a definite conclusion.

If vakalat is filed, the Court does not even have to verify whether summons were served, or not. It proceeded on the assumption that the appellant had engaged an advocate.

Nowadays, it is not uncommon that plaintiffs, who are smart enough, resort to arrange for filing vakalats on behalf of the defendants also, with the object of misleading the Court, and obtain an ex parte decree. The Trial Court can verify the record and arrive at proper conclusions. Hence, the plea is allowed, and the order is set aside. The matter is remanded to the Trial Court for fresh consideration and disposal.

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Gift by Muslim — Unregistered gift deed cannot be recognised — Section 123 of Transfer of Property Act.

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[Mayana Saheb Khan v. Mayana Gulab Jan & Ors., AIR 2011 (NOC) 97 AP] The 1st respondent is the wife of late Raheem Khan. Raheem Khan died on 24-6-1997 leaving behind him certain items of movable and immovable properties. The appellant, one of the son filed a suit in the Court against the respondents (being wife, sisters and other sons) for partition and separate possession of the assets left by late Raheem Khan. He claimed his share in those properties in the capacity of sharer of the properties of the deceased. The respondent (wife of deceased) however pleaded that her husband had gifted items 1 and 2 of the suit schedule in her favour and as such, they are not available for partition. The trial Court dismissed the suit. The appellant’s appeal was also dismissed.

In the second appeal the Court observed that the only question for consideration in this case was as to whether a gift said to have been made by a Muslim, which in turn was evidenced through a written document, could be recognised in law, unless the document is registered.

The Court further observed that neither the relationship was disputed, nor the fact that the deceased left behind him, the suit schedule items, was denied. The only dispute was about items 1 and 2 of the suit schedule, in respect of which the 1st respondent claimed gift in her favour. She did not plead ignorance about the document, nor did she plead loss of the same. Therefore, the case of the 1st respondent was to stand or fall, on the proof or otherwise of the gift.

The first respondent did not file the gift khararu-nama. The record discloses that an effort was in fact made by the 1st respondent to make the said document as a part of the record, but when the Court raised an objection as to the stamp duty, the document remained inadmissible, and no efforts were made by the first respondent to rectify the same. Even if it was assumed that the document was part of the record and the deficiency as to stamp duty was rectified, it was still inadmissible. The reason is that it was not registered.

It is a settled principle of law that it is the prerogative of a Muslim, to effect gift of immovable properties without even executing a written document, much less registering the same. Oral gift in respect of such persons is permissible. Where however, the gift is said to have been made through a written document, it is required to conform with section 123 of the Act. It was held that a document which evidences a gift, though made by a Muslim, cannot be acted upon, unless it accords with section 123 of the Act. In the instant case, the document was admittedly unregistered and as such, the gift pleaded by the 1st respondent could not have been accepted at all. The Trial Court and the lower Appellate Court committed serious error of law in recognising the gift pleaded by the 1st respondent.

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Contempt of Court — Malicious imputation against Judicial Officer — Apology not accepted — Contempt of Court Act, section 6.

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[High Court on its own motion v. Dnyandev Tulshiram Jadhav and State of Maharashtra, 2011 Vol 113(2) Bom. L.R. 1145]

In this case there was unfounded malicious attack on the character of a Judicial Officer, by a party who had been directed to pay maintenance allowance to the wife and minor child. The contemner and other co-accused were acquitted by the Judicial Magistrate, Shri U. T. Pol, in the matter of offence punishable u/s. 498-A of the Indian Penal Code. A Criminal Misc. Application was filed by the wife of the contemner, which was decided on 23rd April, 2007 by the same Magistrate wherein the present contemner was directed to pay costs of the said litigation. The contemner wrote an open letter dated 5th August, 2009 to the Chief Justice of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay and a copy thereof was sent to the President of India for taking action against the Judicial Officer. The imputations cast against the Judicial Officer by the contemner were per se malicious and scandalous.

In the contempt proceeding the contemner had given unconditional apology by way of filing reply affidavit. The Court observed that in view of per se mala fide attitude spelt out from the conduct of the contemner, inasmuch as he wrote the offending letter making wild, malicious and reckless allegations against the Judicial Officer, the apology was not acceptable.

It was a deliberate act on the part of the contemner to scandalise the Judicial Officer and to bring Courts or Judicial system into contempt, disrepute, disrespect and to lower its authority and offend its dignity. In other words, the conduct of the contemner is far more than causing the defamation simplicitor or aspersions against a particular judge. It was a fit case for inflicting appropriate punishment upon the contemner.

The Court relied on the Apex Court decision in the case of M. R. Parashar v. Dr. Farooq Abdullah, AIR 1984 SC 615 wherein it was observed that the Judges cannot defend themselves. They need due protection of law from unfounded attacks on their character. Law of Contempt is one of such laws.

The court pointed out that judiciary has no forum from which it could defend itself. The Legislature can act in defence of itself from the floor of the House. It enjoys privileges which are beyond the reach of law. The executive is all powerful and has ample resources and media at its command to explain its actions and, if need be, to counter-attack. Those, who attack the judiciary must remember that they are attacking an institution which is indispensable for the survival of the rule of law but which has no means of defending itself.

The sword of justice is in the hands of Goodess of Justice, not in the hands of mortal Judges. Therefore, Judges must receive the due protection of law from unfounded attacks on their character.

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Compensation — For violation of human rights during the search and seizure operation conducted by Income-tax Department.

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[Bihar Human Rights Commission (www.itatonline .com)] The applicant Rajendra Singh has approached the Commission complaining of violation of his human rights in course of the search and seizure operations conducted by officials of the Income-tax Department in his residential premises from 8-9-2010 to 10-9-2010. The grievance of the applicant is that he belongs to the minority Sikh community. He is earning his livelihood by doing timber business in the name and style of M/s. Bhargo Saw Mill at Mithapur in the town of Patna. On 8-9-2010 the authorities of the Income-tax Department came to his house and closed the main gate which is the only point of ingress and egress. They took the mobile phones of the applicant and others and did not allow them to contact any person outside during the course of the raid. They did not allow them to cook the food. They misbehaved and abused members of the family including the female inmates. They smoked with impunity; they also threw cigarette butts and empty packets of cigarettes on the images of Sikh Gurus and the Golden Temple, which hurt their religious feelings. They did not even allow them to go to the toilet. The applicant sent for his lawyer and he was made to leave the place. They also in the course of the raid held out threats of punitive action.

Notice was issued to the Chief Commissioner of Income-tax, Bihar who referred it to the Director General of Income-tax (Inv.) as the search and seizure operations were conducted by the Investigation Wing of the Department.

The Commission observed that it was the admitted position that the search and seizure operations commenced at 9.30 a.m. on 8-9-2010 and concluded at 9.20 p.m. on 10-9-2010. The grievance of the applicant was that he was continuously interrogated during this period for more than 30 hours. The operations having admittedly commenced at 9.30 a.m. on 8-9-2010 it was clear that question was being asked at about 10 p.m. on 9-9-2010.

The fact that question no. 15 was asked at about 10 p.m. or question no. 31 was asked at 3.30 a.m. on 10-9-2010 cannot be the basis to conclude that the interrogation took place for a few hours. The statement u/s. 132 of the Income-tax Act was the result of sustained interrogation which in the instant case apparently commenced from the morning of 9-9-2010. And even if anyone were to visualise the sequence of events liberally in favour of the Income-tax Department, there was no basis for taking the view that the interrogation/recording of statement was with breaks/intervals.

The Commission was of the view that the members of the raiding party may take their own time to conclude the search and seizure operations but such operations must be carried out keeping in view the basic human rights of the individual. They have no right to cause physical and mental torture to him. If the officer-in-charge of the interrogation/recording of statements wanted to continue with the process he should have stopped the same at the proper time and resumed it next morning. But continuing the process without any break or interval at odd hours up to 3.30 a.m., forcing the applicant and/ or his family members to remain awake when it was time to sleep was a torturous act which cannot be countenanced in a civilised society. It was violative of their rights relating to dignity of the individual and therefore violative of human rights. Even diehard criminal offenders have certain human rights which cannot be taken away. The applicant’s position was not worse than that.

In the opinion of the Commission, the Income-tax Department should ensure that the search and seizure operations at large in future are carried out without violating one’s basic human rights.

The Commission was prima facie satisfied that there had been violation of the applicant’s human rights by the concerned officials of the Incometax Department while continuing the search and seizure operations for which he was entitled to be monetarily compensated.

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Filing of Balance Sheet and Profit and Loss Account in XBRL mode.

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The Ministry of Corporate Affairs has issued General Circular No. 43/2011 on 7th July 2011 pertaining to the filing of Balance Sheet and Profit and Loss Account in XBRL mode, wherein it is clarified that the same will be applicable for financial statements closing on or after 31-3-2011. Further the Statutory Auditor needs to certify that the financial statements have been prepared in XBRL mode for filing on MCA-21 portal.

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E-filing of income-tax return in respect of companies under liquidation.

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The Ministry of Corporate Affairs vide general Circular dated 6th July 2011 has issued guidelines to the Official Liquidators for E-filing of Income-tax return in respect of companies under liquidation.

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Payment of MCA fees by NEFT mode.

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The Ministry has introduced payment of MCA fees via NEFT mode, in addition to already existing payment methods of credit card, Internet banking and physical challan to eliminate inconveniences caused due to payment processing delays.

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Digitally signed certificates to be issued by the ROC.

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As a step towards the ‘Green Initiative’ and with a view to reduce the time gap, 13 type of certificates and standard letters will be issued issued electronically under the digital signature of the Registrar of Companies as per the Circular No. 39/2011, dated 21-6-2011. These certificates pertain to the forms for creation, modification and satisfaction of charges, incorporation certificate and certificates pursuant to change of name, objects clause, etc.

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List of defaulting companies, directors and professionals.

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The MCA vide Circular dated 20-6-2011 has issued a clarification to Circular No. 33/2011, dated 1-6-2011 with regard to compliance of provisions under the Companies Act, 1956. The Ministry has clarified that the Circular shall be applicable to those defaulting companies and Directors which have not filed the Balance Sheet and Annual Return for any of the financial years 2006-07, 2007-08, 2008-09 and 2009- 10 with the ROC as required u/s. 220 and/or u/s. 159 of the Act, 1956 and the Circular would be effective from 3rd July onwards.

The defaulters list, has been updated and has been posted on the MCA21 site.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 2, dated 15- 7-2011 — Regularisation of Liaison/Branch Offices of foreign entities established during the pre-FEMA period.

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Presently, prior approval of RBI is required for establishing a Liaison Office (LO)/Branch Office (BO) in India by a person resident outside India.

This Circular advices persons resident outside India who have established LO/BO in India and have not obtained permission from RBI to do so within a period of 90 days from the date of issue of this Circular for regularisation of establishment of such offices in India, in terms of the extant FEMA provisions.

Similarly, foreign entities who may have established LO or BO with the permission from the Government of India must also approach RBI along with a copy of the said approval for allotment of a Unique Identification Number (UIN).

These applications/requests must be submitted to the Chief General Manager-in-Charge, Reserve Bank of India, Foreign Exchange Department, Foreign Investment Division, Central Office, Fort, Mumbai-400001 in form FNC and should be routed through the bank where the account of such LO/ BO is maintained.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 1, dated 4-7- 2011 — Redemption of Foreign Currency Convertible Bonds (FCCBs).

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This Circular permits Indian companies to refinance their outstanding FCCB under the Automatic Route up to US $ 500 million with immediate effect, subject to compliance with the following:

(i) Fresh ECB/FCCB must be raised with the stipulated average maturity period and applicable all-in-cost being as per the extant ECB guidelines.

(ii) Amount of fresh ECB/FCCB must not exceed the outstanding redemption value at maturity of the outstanding FCCB.

(iii) Fresh ECB/FCCB must not be raised six months before the maturity date of the outstanding FCCB.

(iv) Purpose of ECB/FCCB must be clearly mentioned as ‘Redemption of outstanding FCCBs’ in Form 83 at the time of obtaining Loan Registration Number from the Reserve Bank.

(v) Designated bank is required to monitor the end use of funds.

(vi) Must comply with all other requirements of ECB policy under the Automatic Route, such as eligible borrower, recognised lender, enduse, prepayment, refinancing of existing ECB and reporting arrangements.

ECB/FCCB beyond US $ 500 million for the purpose of redemption of the existing FCCB will be considered under the approval route. ECB/FCCB availed of for the purpose of refinancing the existing outstanding FCCB will be reckoned as part of the limit of US $ 500 million available under the Automatic Route as per the extant norms.

Restructuring of FCCB involving change in the existing conversion price is not permissible. Proposals for restructuring of FCCB not involving change in conversion price will be considered under the Approval Route depending on the merits of the proposal.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 75, dated 30- 6-2011 — Buyback/Prepayment of Foreign Currency Convertible Bonds (FCCBs).

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Presently, buyback/prepayment of FCCB requires prior approval of RBI.

This Circular has:

1. Extended the date for completion of buyback/ prepayment to 31st March, 2012.

2. Liberalised the procedure for buyback/prepayment of FCCB as under:

A. Automatic Route

Indian companies can prematurely buyback FCCB, subject to compliance with the following:

(i) Buyback value of the FCCB must be at a minimum discount of 8% on book value.

(ii) Funds used for the buyback must be out of existing foreign currency funds held either in India (including funds held in the EEFC account) or abroad and/or out of fresh ECB raised in conformity with the current ECB norms.

(iii) Where fresh ECB is raised, it must co-terminus with the outstanding maturity of the original FCCB. If it is raised for less than three years the all-in-cost ceiling should not exceed 6 months Libor plus 200 bps as applicable to short-term borrowings. If it is raised for more than three years, the all-in-cost for the relevant maturity of the ECB will apply. 

B. Approval Route

Indian companies can buyback FCCB up to redemption value of US $ 100 million out of their internal accruals, subject to compliance with the following:

(i) Minimum discount of 10% of book value for redemption value up to US $ 50 million.

(ii) Minimum discount of 15% of book value for the redemption value over US $ 50 million and up to US $ 75 million.

(iii) Minimum discount of 20% of book value for the redemption value of over US $ 75 million and up to US $ 100 million.

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(2011) 22 STR 656 (Tri.-Ahmd.) Fascel Ltd. v. Commissioner of S.T.

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Penalty — Actual amount not declared in ST-3 Return and intention to evade tax alleged — Tax demand with interest confirmed — Duty liability worked by appellants and no investigation by Revenue except issuance of SCN based on P/L account — Penalties set aside — Section 80 considered.

Facts:
The appellants engaged in providing telephone services were issued a show-cause notice (SCN) demanding service tax on noticing that the appellants had paid the service tax on lower amount than the income shown in the profit and loss account (P/L account). The appellants pleaded that the SCN was issued without any investigation/ verification and merely on the basis of the P/L account. Relying on the decision in the case of Martin & Harris Laboratories Ltd. v. CCE, Gurgaon 2005 (185) ELT 421 (Tri.-Delhi) and a host of other decisions, it was submitted that the Annual Report and P/L account were public documents and therefore on the ground of limitation, the whole demand was liable to be set aside. Moreover, the very fact that there was excess payment in one year and short payment in another year showed that there was no suppression, mis-declaration/fraud, etc. to invoke the extended time, whereas the Revenue contended that in view of the fact that ST-3 return did not reflect the correct position, suppression/ mis-declaration was rightly invoked.

Held:
The Tribunal observed that the appellants had reasonable cause for the alleged wrongful payment of service tax and hence it was held that the case was fit for invoking section 80 of the Finance Act, 1994 and the penalties were set aside.

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(2011) 22 STR 650 (Tri.-Bang.) — Vikas Coaching Centre v. Commissioner of Custom, Central Excise & S.T., Guntur.

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Valuation — Commercial training or coaching services — Whether hostel and mess charges includible while calculating the liability of service tax on their services.

Facts:
The appellants provided the service of ‘Commercial training or coaching’. In addition to the said taxable service, they also provided optional hostel and mess facility. The students opting for the hostel and mess facility were charged separately for the same. The appellants relied on the decision of the Tribunal in the case of Aditya College of Competitive Exams v. CCE, Visakhapatnam 2009 (16) STR 154 (Tri.-Bang.). According to the Revenue, hostel and mess charges were includible in the value of taxable service.

Held:
It was held that for calculating liability of service tax for providing commercial training or coaching service, the hostel and mess charges were not includible.

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2011 (22) STR 638 (Tri.-Chennai) — Commr. of Service Tax, Chennai v. State Bank of India.

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Whether provisions relating to suppression of facts invokable — Jurisdictional officer not intimated by concerned branch of SBI about providing both taxable and exempted service — No declaration made in ST-3 returns — Provisions of Rule restricting utilisation of credit clear — Tax evasion detected on audit — Longer period of limitation invokable.

Facts:
A branch of the State Bank provided both taxable and exempted service. During February 2005 the respondents utilised CENVAT credit exceeding the admissible limit of 20% amount as provided in the then Rule 6(3) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004. The Department alleged that the said branch of SBI did not disclose to the Department that they provided exempted output service also and that they have taken service tax in excess of the admissible 20% amount. The said evasion came to light when the accounts of SBI were audited by the Departmental audit officers. As per the Revenue, this was a clear contravention of service tax law on part of the respondents with an intention to evade payment of service tax. Moreover, the longer period of limitation was rightly invoked. Citing the case of Pushpam Pharmaceuticals Co. v. Collector of Central Excise, Bombay, 1995 (78) ELT 401 (SC), it was inter alia contended that there was no intention to evade service tax and that the head office of the respondents had issued a circular asking the branches to utilise CENVAT credit keeping in view the admissible 20% amount. However, copy of such circular was not produced.

Held:
The Tribunal observed that several ingredients required for the purpose of invoking longer period of limitation u/s. 73 of the Finance Act, 1994 were available in the case such as misstatement, suppression as well as contravention of provision with intent to evade payment of tax. Accordingly, it was held that the period of limitation was invokable in this case. The appeal was remanded to the lower Appellate Authority as regards the merit of the case.

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(2011) 22 STR 625 (Tri.-Chennai) — Parmeshwari Textiles v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Tiruchirapalli.

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Refund of service tax paid on technical testing and analysis service availed by exporter — Exemption under Notification No. 41/2007-ST by way of refund denied stating that service provider’s invoices not specific to export goods — Policy of Govt. not to burden exports with domestic taxes — Impugned order set aside.

Facts:

The appellant was denied refund by the lower appellate authority in respect of service tax paid for technical testing and analysis service on the ground that the appellant had not fulfilled the conditions specified in Notification No. 41/2007-ST, dated 6-10-2007 and that the service provider’s invoices were not specific to the export goods. The appellant contended that the order of the lower Appellate Authority denying the refund was not justified and was given without taking in consideration the facts.

Held:
The Tribunal observed that it is the policy of the Government to encourage exports and not to burden the export consignments with domestic taxes like the service tax which is paid in relation to the input service. The order passed by the original authority allowing the refund of input service tax in respect of the export goods was upheld by the Tribunal.

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PAN mandatory for allotment of DIN and existing DIN holders to furnish their PAN.

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The Ministry of Corporate Affairs vide its general Circular No. 11/2011 dated 7th April 2011 has made the PAN mandatory for issue of Director Identification Numbers and also directed that all DIN holders who have not furnished their PAN at the time of obtaining DIN should furnish their PAN by filing DIN 4 e-form by 31st May 2011.

For complete text of the Notification visit: http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/Circular_11-2011 _7apr2011.pdf

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(2011) 23 STR 369 (Tri.-Bang.) — Ceolric Services v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Bangalore.

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Non-consideration of revised return filed belatedly — Return revised after lapse of 11 months — Rule 7C states revised return cannot be ignored just because it is filed after period provided in Rule 7B.

Facts:
Service tax was demanded and penalty was levied. The applicant had filed a return under Rule 7 of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 and subsequently revised it. The lower authority had not taken into consideration the revised return as it was filed after a lapse of 11 months and as per the rules, the revised return was to be filed within 60 days.

Held:
It was held that revised return cannot be ignored simply on the ground that the same was filed after the period provided under Rule 7B by virtue of section 7C of the Service Tax Rules 1994. The appeal was allowed by way of remand.

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(2011) 23 STR 367 (Tri.-Ahmd.) — Nemlaxmi Books (India) P. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Surat.

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Refund of Cenvat credit accumulated on export of goods — More than one refund claim filed for same quarter — Violation of condition No. 2A of appendix of Notification No. 5/2006-C.E. (N.T.) and not sustainable — Rejection of refund upheld.

Facts:
The appellants were exporting stationary items, namely, notebooks and exercise books which were exempted from duty. The appellants were availing Cenvat credit on the duty paid on inputs and accordingly filed among other applications, an application on quarterly basis for refund of the accumulated credit on account of export for an amount of Rs.69,024 for the quarter January 2007 to March 2007. The Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the order of the lower original authority and inter alia held that the second application filed by the appellants seeking refund of Rs. 69,504 was hit by condition 2(a) of Notification No. 5/2006-C.E. (N.T.) which allows for refund of Cenvat credit only in cases where claims for such refund are submitted not more than once for any quarter in a calendar year. The appellants contended that the Commissioner (Appeals) travelled beyond the scope of show-cause notice as the original authority had not rejected the refund claim on the ground of two applications being submitted for one simple quarter under the condition of 2A.

Held:
The Tribunal concurred with the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) and held that the plea for admissibility of refund was too feeble and devoid of any merits.

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Section 40(a)(ia) — If tax has been deducted at source and paid to the Government, then no disallowance u/s.40(a)(ia) can be made on the ground that the deduction was at a wrong rate or under an incorrect section.

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DCIT v. S. K. Tekriwal
ITAT ‘B’ Bench, Kolkata
Before Mahavir Singh (JM) and
C. D. Rao (AM)
ITA Nos. 1135/Kol./2010
A.Y.: 2007-08. Decided on: 21-10-2011
Counsel for revenue/assessee: Niraj Kumar/Sanjay Bajoria
       

Section 40(a)(ia) — If tax has been deducted at source and paid to the Government, then no disallowance u/s.40(a)(ia) can be made on the ground that the deduction was at a wrong rate or under an incorrect section.


Facts:

The assessee was engaged in the business of construction of bridges, roads, dams and canals and heavy earth-moving activities in contract with government and semi-government bodies such as BRO, PWD, NTPC, etc. The assessee filed return of income showing total income at Rs.45,49,360. In the course of assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer (AO) noted that the assessee had debited Rs.3,37,37,464 in the P & L Account under the head ‘machine hire charges’ and on this tax was deducted at source @ 1%. The AO held that these payments attracted TDS u/s.194I @ 10%. He rejected the submissions of the assessee that the payments were made to sub-contractors for completion of specific work and therefore, tax was deducted @ 1% u/s.194C(2) of the Act and also that the payments were not made for hiring of machines, but the same were wrongly grouped under the head ‘Machine hire charges’. He made a proportionate disallowance u/s.40(a)(ia) of the Act with respect to machinery hire charges. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who examined the agreements entered into by the assessee and found that the quantity of work was fixed and the rate was fixed with reference to the quantity of work. He found merit in the argument that hire charges depend on the time period for which the machines are used. But in the present case, time consumed by the subcontractors or the period for which machines were used was not at all a factor in deciding the payments to be made to sub-contractors. It was only on the basis of quantity of work that the payments were made. He held that the payments were covered by S. 194C(2) and therefore provisions of S. 40(a)(ia) are not attracted. He deleted the addition made by the AO. Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal to the ITAT.

Held:

The Tribunal after examining the provisions of S. 40(a)(ia) observed that in the present case tax has been deducted at source, although u/s.194C(2) of the Act, it is not a case of non-deduction of tax or no deduction of tax as is the import of the section. It observed that even if it is considered that the sum under consideration falls u/s.194I, it may be considered that tax has been deducted at lower rate and it cannot be considered to be a case of non-deduction or no deduction. It noted that the C Bench of Mumbai ITAT in the case of Chandabhoy & Jassobhoy (ITA No. 20/Mum./2010, order dated 8-7-2011) the Tribunal was dealing with a case where the assessee deducted tax u/s.192 of the Act, whereas the Revenue contended that the tax should have been deducted u/s.194J of the Act, the Tribunal in that case held that the provisions of S. 40(a)(ia) of the Act can be invoked only in the event of nondeduction of tax but not for lesser deduction of tax. S. 40(a)(ia) has two limbs, one is where inter alia the assessee has to deduct tax and the second where after deducting tax, inter alia, the assessee has to pay the same into Government account. There is nothing in the said section to treat, inter alia, the assessee as a defaulter where there is a shortfall in deduction. S. 40(a)(ia) refers only to the duty to deduct tax and pay to Government account. If there is any shortfall due to any difference of opinion as to the taxability of any item or the nature of payments falling under various TDS provisions, the assessee can be declared to be an assessee in default u/s.201 of the Act and no disallowance can be made by invoking the provisions of S. 40(a)(ia) of the Act.

The Tribunal confirmed the order of the CIT(A) allowing the claim of the assessee. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue.

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Section 41(1) — Remission or Cessation of Trading Liability — On settlement of dispute the cost of machinery had reduced by two crore — Depreciation allowed in earlier years on two crore cannot be taxed u/s.41(1) or 41(2).

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130 ITD 46 (Hyd.) Binjrajka Steel Tubes Ltd. v. ACIT A.Y.: 2005-06. Dated: 30-9-2010

Section 41(1) — Remission or Cessation of Trading Liability — On settlement of dispute the cost of machinery had reduced by two crore — Depreciation allowed in earlier years on two crore cannot be taxed u/s.41(1) or 41(2).


Facts:

The assessee company was carrying on the business of manufacturing of steel tubes. In its assessment, the Assessing Officer observed that as per disclosure in the Notes of Accounts, the auditors had stated that by virtue of settlement of dispute with Tata SSL Ltd., the cost of machinery was reduced by Rs.2crore and the excess depreciation that was claimed on these Rs.2 crore in the earlier years had been adjusted in current year’s depreciation.

The Assessing Officer issued a show-cause notice demanding an explanation as to why the depreciation allowed in the earlier years should not be added back u/s.41(1).

 In response to the above notice the assessee furnished an explanation stating that section 41(1) was applicable in respect of trading liabilities. Not satisfied with assessee’s reply, the Assessing Officer treated Rs.2 crore as income u/s.41(1).

On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) confirmed the decision of the Assessing Officer. On second appeal, the Tribunal held as follows.

Held:

 It is clear from the reading of section 41(1) that where any allowance or deduction has been made in the assessment year in respect of loss, expenditure or trading liability incurred and subsequently the assessee, during any previous year, has obtained/ recovered such loss, expenditure or trading liability by way of remission or cessation thereof, the amount obtained by him, shall be deemed to be the income of that previous year. However the purpose of having section 41(2) in addition to section 41(1) implies that depreciation is neither loss nor expenditure nor a trading liability as referred to in section 41(1). It is only remission of liability incurred on capital goods. Hence the benefit of depreciation obtained by the assessee cannot be termed as an allowance or expenditure claimed by him and therefore will not be taxed u/s.41(1). The alternate contention of Revenue was that amount in question could be brought to tax u/s.41(2) and the same was also not upheld. (However the depreciation claimed by the assessee on Rs.2 crore was taxed u/s.28(iv) as value of benefit arising from business.)

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Section 154, read with section 68 — Rectification of mistakes and unsatisfactory explanation given by the assessee about the nature and source of income.

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129 ITD 469 (Mum.) DCIT v. Waman Hari Pethe Sons A.Y.: 2005-06. Dated: 25-3-2010

Section 154, read with section 68 — Rectification of mistakes and unsatisfactory explanation given by the assessee about the nature and source of income.


Facts:

The assessment of the assessee was completed u/s.143(3). Subsequently, the Assessing Officer initiated proceedings u/s.154 in respect of gold deposits received from customers. The Assessing Officer was of the view that the assessee had failed to establish the identity of customers who had given gold deposits. The Assessing Officer rejected the objection of the assessee and enhanced the assessment by making the addition u/s.68.

Held:

It was held that the power of the Assessing Officer is limited to rectify the mistakes that are apparent on the face of the record. The Assessing Officer does not have the power to go into the debatable issues and determine taxability. According to section 68, where any sum is found credited in the books of an assessee and the assessee offers no explanation about the nature and source of the same or the explanation offered by him is not satisfactory in the opinion of the Assessing Officer, the sum so credited may be charged to income-tax as the income of the assessee of that previous year. On the other hand, section 154 deals with rectification of mistakes apparent from record. In the course of rectification proceedings u/s.154, the Assessing Officer cannot go into debatable issues to determine taxability of unexplained cash credits.

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Section 10(23C) read with section 12A — Rejection of an application u/s.10(23C)(vi) cannot be a reason to cancel registration u/s.12A.

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129 ITD 299/ (All.) Sunbeam English School Society v. CIT A.Y.: N/A. Dated: 6-10-2010

Section 10(23C) read with section 12A — Rejection of an application u/s.10(23C)(vi) cannot be a reason to cancel registration u/s.12A.


Facts:

The assessee-society was duly registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. It was granted registration u/s.12A. Subsequently, the assessee applied for exemption u/s.10(23C) to the CCIT. However, the CCIT rejected application since he was of the view that certain payments made by the assessee to one ‘R’ were bogus. Relying on the said order, the Commissioner cancelled the assessee’s registration u/s.12A, holding that the activities of the society had ceased to remain charitable in nature as defined u/s.2(15).

Held:

The CBDT in its Circular No. 11 of 2008, dated 12-12- 2008 has clarified that an entity with a charitable object is eligible for exemption from tax u/s.11 or alternatively u/s.10(23C) which clearly shows that both the proceedings are independent of each other. Therefore the rejection of application for grant of the exemption u/s.10(23C)(vi) cannot be the basis for cancelling the registration u/s.12A.

The Commissioner while granting the registration u/s.12A is only required to see as to whether objects are charitable and the activities are genuine and are carried out in accordance with the objects of the trust or institution. As regards exemption u/s.11, the Assessing Officer is required to verify the records as to whether the assessee has fulfilled the conditions and the income derived is utilised for charitable purpose. The Assessing Officer had done this and granted exemption in all the assessment years. In the instant case, the Commissioner mainly relied on the order of the CCIT, wherein it had been observed that the payments made to ‘R’ for construction purpose were bogus and not for charitable purpose. On the contrary, the contention of the assessee was that ‘R’ was filing returns of income regularly and the payments were made to him for constructing a building through cheques on the basis of bills submitted by him. Even TDS had been made u/s.194C. The said contention has not been rebutted.

Further, it was not the case of the Commissioner that the building constructed was not used for the objects of the trust. Furthermore, there was no change in the objects of the trust. Hence, the only reason for cancellation of registration u/s.12A was rejection of application u/s.10(23C)(vi). As already mentioned, this cannot be the ground for cancellation of registration u/s.12A.

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Section 80-IB(10) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Once flats were sold separately and two flat owners themselves combined separate flats whereby the total area exceeded 1,500 sq.ft., deduction u/s.80-IB(10) cannot be denied to the assessee-developer on this ground.

(2011) 141 TTJ 1 (Chennai) (TM) Sanghvi & Doshi Enterprise v. ITO A.Ys.: 2005-06 & 2006-07. Dated: 17-6-2011

Section 80-IB(10) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Once flats were sold separately and two flat owners themselves combined separate flats whereby the total area exceeded 1,500 sq.ft., deduction u/s.80-IB(10) cannot be denied to the assessee-developer on this ground.

For the relevant assessment years, the Assessing Officer noticed that in the project developed by the assessee-developer the deduction u/s.80-IB(10) could not be allowed because, in some cases, two flats were combined to make a single dwelling unit with a single entrance and, hence, the built-up area of the combined flats worked out to be more than 1,500 sq.ft. The CIT(A) confirmed the disallowance.

Since there was a difference of opinion between the Members, the matter was referred to the Third Member u/s.255(4). The Third Member allowed the deduction u/s.80-IB(10). The Third Member noted as under:

(1)    The assessee has placed on record the confirmation given by the purchasers of the flats stating that they had combined the two flats after taking possession for their own convenience.

(2)    Once the flats are sold separately under two separate agreements, the builder has no control unless the joining of the flats entails structural changes. Nothing is brought on record to evidence such structural changes.

(3)    Therefore, it is quite clear that the two flat owners have themselves combined the flats whereby the area has exceeded 1,500 sq.ft. The project as a whole and the assessee cannot be faulted for the same.

(4)    Moreover, clauses (e) and (f) of section 80-IB (10) are effective from 1st April, 2010 and they are not retrospective in operation. Therefore, they do not apply to the present case which pertains to the years prior to 1st April, 2010.

(a) Section 40(b) r.w.s 36(1)(iii) and 14A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — The section for allowing deduction of interest is section 36(1)(iii) and, therefore, payment of interest to partners is also an expenditure only and same is also hit by provisions of section 14A if it is found that the same has been incurred for earning exempt income. (b) Section 28(v) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Proviso to section 28(v) comes into play only if there is some disallowance in hands of firm under clause (b)<

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(2011) 47 SOT 121 (And) Shankar Chemical Works v. Dy. CIT A.Y. : 2004-05. Dated : 9-6-2011

(a)    Section 40(b) r.w.s 36(1)(iii) and 14A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — The section for allowing deduction of interest is section 36(1)(iii) and, therefore, payment of interest to partners is also an expenditure only and same is also hit by provisions of section 14A if it is found that the same has been incurred for earning exempt income.

(b)    Section 28(v) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Proviso to section 28(v) comes into play only if there is some disallowance in hands of firm under clause (b) of section 40 and it is not applicable in case of disallowance made u/s.14A.

For the relevant assessment year, the Assessing Officer observed that the firm had made investment in mutual funds, shares, etc. out of capital of the partners. The Assessing Officer disallowed u/s.14A some amount of interest paid to partners on the ground that the capital was employed for the purpose of investment in mutual funds, shares, etc. and not for the business of the assessee-firm for which the partnership deed was formed. The CIT(A) upheld the disallowance of interest u/s.14A.

Before the Tribunal the assessee, inter alia, contended as under:

(a) Section 14A talks of disallowing expenditure incurred by the assessee in relation to exempt income and interest paid to partners is not an expenditure at all and it is a special deduction allowed to the firm u/s.40 (b).

(b) If at all any disallowance had to be made in the hands of the firm, direction should be given that, to that extent, interest income should not be taxed in the hands of concerned partners in terms of provisions of section 28(v). The Tribunal held in favour of the Revenue.

The Tribunal noted as under:

(1) Section 40(b) is a section that only restricts the amount of interest payable to partners — the section which allows the deduction of interest is section 36(1)(iii).

(2) The payment of interest to partners is also expenditure only and, therefore, the same is also hit by the provisions of section 14A, if it is found that the same has been incurred for earning exempt income.

(3) From the proviso to section 28(v), it is seen that if there is any disallowance of interest in the hands of the firm due to clause (b) of section 40, income in the hands of the partner has to be adjusted to the extent of the amount not so allowed to be deducted in the hands of the firm. Hence, the operation of the proviso to section 28(v) will come into play only if there is some disallowance in the hands of the firm under clause (b) of section 40.

(4) In the instant case, the disallowance is u/s.14A and not u/s.40(b) and, therefore, the proviso to section 28(v) is not applicable and the partner of the firm did not deserve any relief on this account.

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Section 48 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Benefit of indexation is available in respect of preference shares.Section 48 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Benefit of indexation is available in respect of preference shares.

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(2011) 47 SOT 62 (Mum) G. D. Metsteel (P.) Ltd. v. ACIT A.Y. : 2005-06. Dated : 8-4-2011

Section 48 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Benefit of indexation is available in respect of preference shares.

For the relevant assessment year, the Assessing Officer declined to grant indexation benefit in terms of second proviso to section 48, to the assessee on the ground that since prices of preference shares do not fluctuate, and these shares cannot be treated at par with equity shares, indexation benefits cannot be granted in respect of the same. The CIT(A) confirmed the action of the Assessing Officer. The Tribunal allowed the benefit of indexation to the assessee.

The Tribunal noted as under:

(1) The only exception to the second proviso to section 48 is that it shall not apply to the long-term capital gain arising from the transfer of a long-term capital asset being bond or debenture other than capital indexed bonds issued by the Government.

(2) Once shares are specifically covered by indexation of cost, and unless there is a specific exclusion clause for ‘preference shares’, it cannot be open to the Assessing Officer to decline indexation benefits to preference shares.

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Sections 143(3), 144, — Non-refundable amounts received for services to be provided in future cannot be taxed as income in the year of receipt. Such amounts received cannot be regarded as debt due till such time as services are provided.

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(2011) TIOL 706 ITAT-Del. BTA Cellcom Limited v. ITO A.Y.: 2002-03. Dated: 30-6-2011

Sections 143(3), 144, — Non-refundable amounts received for services to be provided in future cannot be taxed as income in the year of receipt. Such amounts received cannot be regarded as debt due till such time as services are provided.


Facts:

The assessee was engaged in the business of providing cellular mobile telecommunication services. It had received advances from customers against prepaid calling services, sim processing fees and recharge fees. The amounts received as advances were reflected in the balance sheet under the head Current Liabilities. Since these amounts were not refundable to the customers, the AO taxed them as income. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO. Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal. Held: The Tribunal noted that the Delhi High Court has in the case of CIT v. Dinesh Kumar Goel come to a conclusion that the fees paid by the students, at the time of admission, for the entire course was only a deposit or advance. It held that it could not be said that this fee had become due at the time of deposit. It also noted that the ITAT has in the case of ACIT v. Mahindra Holidays & Resorts India Ltd. come to a conclusion that two conditions are necessary to say that income has accrued or earned by the assessee viz.

(i) it is necessary that the assessee must have contributed to its accruing or arising by rendering services or otherwise and

(ii) a debt must have come into existence and the assessee must have acquired a right to receive the payment. In that case, according to the ITAT, a debt was created in favour of the assessee immediately on execution of the agreement for becoming the member of resort under the policy, but the assessee had not fully contributed to its accruing by rendering services. Having noted the ratio of these two decisions, the Tribunal held that if the services are to be rendered for a future period, then the amount received by an assessee cannot be said as debt due. It held that the right to enforce the debt is subject to ifs and buts. It is not crystallised.

The Tribunal also noted that the AO was disturbing the accounting policy consistently followed by the assessee. Disturbing the accounting policy would disturb the accounts of all other years. It also noted that the amount has ultimately been offered for tax at the time of rendering of the services by the assessee. The Tribunal held that the Revenue should not have disturbed the method of accountancy adopted by the assessee in one assessment year when it is accepted in the earlier assessment year and also in the subsequent assessment years. The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

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Students’ Annual Meet

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The Students’ forum of the BCAS has been actively working towards pursuing the vision of providing students a platform conducive for growth and pursuit of knowledge. A step in that direction has been the organising of the fourth students’ annual meet, henceforth to be called as the Jal Dastur Students’ Annual Day. The event was a mix of learning, guidance, inspiration, healthy competition, fun and loads of prizes to be won. The workshop enjoyed the enrolment of over 200 students with active participation in all the contests organised. The meet was organised on Saturday, 6th August 2011 at Directiplex, Andheri 3.00 p.m. Like the first students’ annual meet, this year too we invited Padma Shri CA T. N. Manoharan, a very dear friend of the Society. Mr. Manoharan addressed the students on the topic ‘Design to Win’. The key-note was a blend of theory and case studies in real life. Mr. Manoharan shared with the students his experiences in personal and professional life which in his opinion has played an instrumental role in his successes. Mr. Manoharan chose to draw inferences from his tryst with Satyam Computer Services revival wherein qualities like persistence, discipline, hard work, empathy, positive attitude, in-depth understanding of the ground realities and most importantly the will to succeed were amongst the fundamental reasons for the turnaround of the failed organisation. Mr. Manoharan was successful in striking a cord with the students and driving home the point that challenges may vary but the approach to tackle them can be standardised. With the right approach Mr. Manoharan emphasised, success can be delayed but not denied. The audience redeemed their faith in the learned speaker’s address by giving a worthy applause filled with gratitude and appreciation. The Forum expresses its sincere appreciation to Padma Shri T. N. Manoharan to have spared his valuable time for the common interest of the students’ fraternity. Elocution competition: BCAS had organised an Elocution competition for CA students under the auspices of Smt. Chandanben Maganlal Bhatt Elocution Fund. The competition enjoyed the participation of 33 students conducted at the Conference room of BCAS, Mumbai on Saturday 28th May 2011.

All the participants were given three minutes each to present their views on respective topics. Participants were judged by three very dear friends of the BCA Society; Sonalee Godbole, Mihir Sheth and Nitin Shingala. Each participant competed for 100 marks broken up into the undermentioned criteria: Personal Appearance, Speech Opening, Eye Contact, Voice Modulation, Gestures, Contents, Speech Conclusion, Time Management & Overall Impact. Finally the judges unanimously shortlisted eight participants to compete for the coveted Elocution Prize trophies.

All the finalists competed fiercely in front of a large audience to make a lasting impression on our judges for the finals; Aspi Doctor, Joe Rodrigues and Shyam Lata. The audience was treated to some of the finest speeches encompassing information, humor, satire, thought provocation, inspiration, vision and last but not the least, lots of passion. But like all competitions, only some win while some lose.

This competition was no different, five participants perished and the top three winners emerged to claim the gleaming crystal trophies.

The winners
The winners of the elocution competition were as follows:

Quiz Contest
‘Quiz 20-Twenty’ the quiz contest is organised by BCAS only for CA students. The quiz was designed to test the participants’ knowledge about current affairs and general knowledge; it also had a dash of academics to rake up that grey matter. All in all, infotainment formed the core of this event.

It was an inter-firm competition with all the firms invited to send their best teams to fight for the coveted prizes. The participants in the quiz contest had to appear for a standard set of questions. They were screened on the basis of the marks they scored in this questionnaire. The top scorers were short-listed but announced only on the day of the final quiz on 6th August 2011. The eliminations of the quiz took place along with elocution competition at the conference room of the BCAS Office, Churchgate, Mumbai on Saturday, 28th May 2011. Total number of students participating in the eliminations was over 60 students.

The shortlisted teams to compete in the final round of the quiz were as follows:

The competition had its share of ups and down. All the teams gambled for their fortunes, some got rewarded while some paid dearly. The audiences were treated with a mix of knowledge, fun and most importantly, healthy competition. The winners of the quiz contest were as follows:

The winner of this year’s rotating firm trophy is M/s. B. K. Oza & Associates. Awakening the writer within The writing competition was initiated last year and now this year onwards it is named in the memory of Jal Dastur. The competitive strives to harness talent in literary skills. The initiative also enjoyed the strong backing of the BCAS Foundation. Write-ups not exceeding 1000 words were invited from all the participants and the responsibility of assessment was entrusted to the Society’s very dear friends K. C. Narang, Pradip Kapasi, Gautam Nayak and Pradeep Shah. All the judges need no introduction and anybody regularly following the BCA Journal, must be aware of the immense contribution done by these learned people to the journal over a long period of time.

The winners of the article writing contest were as follows:

The task of the judges was more demanding in this case unlike other competitions because unlike other cases this competition performance cannot be taken of face value. A lot of reading between the lines is necessary by the contestants who don the cap of an evaluator of such contest. But our judges did not let us down and gave us our three winners for this year, the ones who toiled and gave their 100% to the competition, and hence rightly deserved to win. The winner of this year is yet to join a chartered accountant firm for articleship, hence this year the rotating trophy for the firm has not been presented. The evening ended with a show of appreciation for all the persons responsible for organising this wonderful evening full of guidance, entertainment and fun. The students were treated with a sumptuous meal after a hard day’s work with renewed promises to organise and participate in many such programmes to follow in future.

Acknowledgements

 We would like to express our sincere gratitude to all the undermentioned persons without whose support this event would not have scaled the heights it did.

  • Padma Shri T. N. Manoharan
  •  Shri Sohrab E. Dastur
  • Shri Mukesh Bhatt
  •  Shri Mahendra Turakhia
  •  BCAS Foundation
  •  All the Judges for the various Competitions
  •  Mr. Ashish Fafadia
  •  The Admin Team at Directi Iplex
  •  President & Vice-President, BCAS
  •  Office Bearers of the Bombay Chartered Accountants’ Society
  •  Core Group Members of BCAS.
  •  The Admin Team at B

(2011) 23 STR 346 (Tri.-Del.) — State Bank of Indore v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Indore.

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Banking and other financial services — Exemption under Notification No. 29/2004-ST for tax on interest in relation to overdraft, cash credit, bill discounting or exchange — Allegation that condition of interest being separately shown in invoice not fulfilled.

Facts:
The appeal was filed the Bank challenging the adjudication order levying service tax and cess. The appellant had followed all RBI guidelines and the debit slips in all transactions clearly disclosed interest and other receipts. The Department contended that the conditions of Notification No. 29/2004-ST exempting interests on overdraft facility, cash credit facility or discounting of bills, bills of exchange or cheques in relation to banking services were not fulfilled as the interest amount was not shown separately in any invoice, a bill or a challan issued for the purpose.

Held:
Strict interpretation was unwarranted if it is established that the claimant squarely falls within the exemption zone. However, it was necessary to satisfy the authority through evidence. Accordingly, the appeal was disposed of with a direction to the appellant to adduce evidence as required by the Notification.

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Twenty years after liberalisation, the list of India’s economic problems is fairly long

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The 20th anniversary of India’s economic liberalisation was celebrated in remarkably studied silence. The odd newspaper article apart, there was no official hubris over the epochal changes undertaken in 1991 by a clutch of reformers, many of whom occupy key positions in the current government. A report by C. Rangarajan, the Prime Minister’s Economic Adviser, throws some light on this extraordinary display of reticence. The message from the former central banker who, alongside Manmohan Singh, untied many of the knots that led to the balance of payments crisis in July 1991: it’s not business as usual in India in July 2011. Graft has paralysed the government and the economy is hurting. Prime Minister Singh cannot ignore this cautionary advice from a fellow reformer and a friend.

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Over 31% SC, HC Judges’ posts vacant

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More than 31% of posts of Judges in various High Courts and the Supreme Court are lying vacant, Law Minister Salman Khurshid said in the Lok Sabha. Of the 895 sanctioned posts of Judges in the Apex Court and 21 High Courts of the country, 284 were vacant as on 1st August, 2011, Khurshid said. The largest number of vacancies is in Allahabad High Court where 98 of 160 posts — more than 61% — have not been filled. Himachal Pradesh High Court is the only one which has no vacancies. The Sikkim High Court is functioning with just one Judge against its sanctioned strength of three.

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Is it time to invoke Cicero?

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“The budget should be balanced, the treasury should be refilled, public debt should be reduced, the arrogance of officialdom should be tempered and controlled, assistance to foreign lands should be curtailed lest Rome become bankrupt. . . . .,” Marcus Cicero, 55 BC. Down the ages, Cicero’s words have fallen on deaf years of sovereigns. Athens is bankrupt.

Washington, the modern-day Rome, is on the brink of bankruptcy. Stocks are falling, leading currencies are losing their worth, and investors across markets are cutting their positions before August 2 when the world will come to know whether the US can borrow more. If it can’t, a default stares in the face of the largest economy that suddenly looks like a ponzi scheme — something dollar-sceptics have been predicting for a decade. But since a lot is at stake the big hope is that US lawmakers will somehow find a away to avert a default by the US.

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(2011) 23 STR 310 (Tri.-Del.) — Prakash Industries Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Raipur.

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Adjudication — Adjournment of hearing to be at insistence of parties — Not for difficulty faced by authority or circumstances beyond its control — Limit of three adjournments has to be understood from facts of case — Fourth adjournment may be granted if circumstances demand and no choice left — Section 33A(2) of Central Excise Act, 1944 (the Act).

Adjudication — Denial of request of cross-examination of persons whose statements were relied in SCN — Denial on ground that the case was based on documentary evidence and not on statements of persons.

Held:
Adjudicating authority pre-judged the issue and acted with pre-conceived mind — Natural justice principles to be followed by quasi-judicial authorities depending on facts/circumstances of case.

Appeal — Right to appeal not taken away and cannot be denied on ground of delay.

Facts:
An SCN was issued to the appellants demanding duty on unaccounted produces pursuant to the search and seizure. Notices were also sent to transporters. The Commissioner addressed a letter dated 26th September, 2008 to one of the appellants whereby the appellants’ request for cross-examination of witnesses was rejected and final date of hearing was intimated to the appellants.

The two issues requiring consideration are relating to misconstruction of provisions of law comprised u/s.33-A of the Act and the arbitrary rejection of the request for cross-examination of the persons whose statements were recorded and relied upon documents for conclusion in the matter.

The appellants contended that the Commissioner misconstrued the provisions contained in section 33-A of the Act which provided for granting of adjournment of hearing to a party for not more than three times as this was only an outer limit for number of days for hearing and thereby pleaded denial of natural justice. Referring to the Supreme Court decision in the case of State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Shivananda Pathak & Ors., (1998) 5 SCC 513 it was contended that the letter dated 26th September, 2008 clearly disclosed that the Commissioner had pre-judged the issue and had a biased approach in relation to the right of the appellants to cross-examine the persons whose statements were recorded and to be relied upon for the findings. This amounted to violation of principle of natural justice. According to the Revenue, the allegation of the appellants of biased attitude was devoid of substance. Such allegations cannot be made at a later stage after the final order was delivered. The appellants were uncooperative from the commencement of the proceedings. Further, relying on the decision in the case of Debu Shah v. Collector of Customs, 1990 (48) ELT 302, inter alia it was contended that in quasi-judicial proceedings authorities were not bound by strict rules of evidence and procedure and further contended that the information received from various sources could be relied upon without making it available to the parties.

Held:
The Tribunal observed that the fourth adjournment could be granted u/s.33A of the Act on the basis of valid and justifiable reasons. The decision of the Commissioner to decide about the claim of the appellants for cross-examination of the witnesses was premature on account of the fact that there was no defence placed on record for the appellants. Following the decision in the aforementioned Shivananda Pathak’s case, it was observed that the rejection of the request for cross-examination on part of the Commissioner clearly disclosed legal bias. Also, the rules of natural justice are applicable to quasi-judicial authorities depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case as observed in the case of A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, AIR 1970 Supreme Court 150. The appellants were well within their rights to challenge the appeal as the appellants had the right to challenge the interlocutory order either immediately after the passing of order or to challenge the same along with the final order. Setting aside the impugned order, the appellants were permitted to file detailed reply to the SCN on or before 20th October, 2009 and the Commissioner was directed to dispose of the matter, in any case before 31st March, 2010. The appellants would not be entitled to seek adjournment more than three times in the matter. The matter was remanded with the consent of both the parties before the Commissioner at Indore to avoid further complications in the matter.

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Gold is at an all-time high, but not for any rational reason

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What do you say to an asset that has few commercial or practical uses, earns no rents, produces nothing, employs nobody and yields no dividends — but manages to rise nearly 40% in one year? On top of that, this asset has been on a tear away run, its longest surge in the last 31 years, and shows no signs of slowing down. At around INRNaN per ounce, gold is on a roll, though many savvy investors will be stumped if you asked them to explain exactly why. Some might say, after scratching their heads, that gold is a defensive position — the thing to hold when everything around you is turning into dust. Thus, the trendy explanation of gold’s meteoric rise is that it’s a mirror image of what’s happening in developed markets — as the European and US economy looks increasingly shaky, money is fleeing conventional assets and turning, literally, into gold. Which investor, even a sophisticated one, would bet on European currencies now?

Who’d stick their necks out on bonds issued by treasuries that increasingly look like they might go under? When sovereign status begins to sound hollow, people head for the yellow stuff. But why do people buy gold and not tin? Well, some folk are diversifying into silver, palladium and platinum, all of which have become dearer. But why is gold the benchmark of value across cultures and centuries? The Egyptians buried their pharaohs with it, the conquistadors went mad looking for El Dorado in the Amazon forests and Indians have always squirrelled the stuff away in lockers and the bowels of temples. Ultimately, the answer to why we value gold might not lie in rationality, but in its exact opposite: faith. Gold has value simply because so many people collectively share the belief that it does. Without that belief, gold would be about as valuable as, say, tin.

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(2011) 23 STR 299 (Tri.-Del.) — Sahni Video Movies v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Chandigarh-II.

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Video tape production services — Exemption to individual professional videographer — Benefit of exemption denied in first appeal as not claimed earlier — Appeal allowed.

Facts:
The appellants being an ‘Individual professional videographer’ was denied exemption of service tax as exemption was not claimed earlier. The Department argued that the appellant being an individual videographer operating from his home was not liable to pay any service tax. Notification No. 7/2001-ST, dated 9-7-2001 stated that service tax on taxable service provided to a client by an individual professional videographer in relation to video tape production was exempt.

Held:
Though the benefit of the Notification was claimed in the first appeal, the authority had rejected the claim on the ground that it was not claimed earlier. However, the Tribunal stated that exemption could be claimed at any stage if it was available to the litigants, and thus the exemption was allowed to the appellant.

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EAC Opinion Capitalisation of Interst during pre-operative period in cable and telecommunication industry

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Facts

(i) A closely held company is engaged in the business of providing cable TV (both analog and digital services) and broadband Internet service in the State of Orissa and its neighbouring states. The company plans to expand its operations to different States of India in near future. The company, therefore, is entering into new locations and is also expanding in its locations, and for this, it is incurring borrowing costs.

(ii) The company, as per its business plan, mixed the funding requirement of both equity and debt to meet the capital expenditure including the preoperational expenses at new locations and expansion and upgradation in its existing locations. The nature of activity is such that the same materials are used both for capital expenditure and the repair and maintenance activities. It is also difficult to bifurcate the loan and equity amount that is spent to purchase fixed assets for different locations. The total assets requirement for all locations is pulled and then loan is arranged for the entire lot. The company has stated that it is difficult to identify direct relationship between the loan and the capital item purchased.

(iii) On these facts, the company has sought the opinion of the Expert Advisory Committee (EAC) of ICAI that considering the nature of the business and assets of the company, whether

(a) the company ought to capitalise borrowing cost for the period, when commercial operation is not feasible for certain period initially, and

(b) charging off fully the interest to the profit and loss account will not be proper in view of applicability of AS-16. Opinion The committee observed that the ‘qualifying asset(s)’ in the company’s case is not clear hence the committee is laying down the broad principles to be kept in mind while capitalising the borrowing costs.

 (a) Broadly stated, such borrowing costs can be classified into two categories, viz.;

(i) those borrowing costs that are directly attributable to construction/creation of an asset and

(ii) those borrowing costs that are not directly attributable to such constructions/creation.

(b) According to paragraph 6 of AS-16, the borrowing costs that are not directly attributable to construction/creation of an asset (e.g., borrowing costs related to repair charges of an already existing centre or for expenses relating to deployment of manpower) should be expensed in the period in which these are incurred.

(c) The assets which are ready for use when acquired, cannot be considered as ‘qualifying asset’ within the meaning of AS-16, although there may be some time lag between their acquisition and actual use.

(d) The company should evaluate what constitutes a substantial period of time (according to AS-16, ordinarily a period of twelve months is considered as substantial period of time, unless a shorter or longer period can be justified on the basis of facts and circumstances of the case) considering the peculiarities of the facts and circumstances of the case, such as nature of the asset being constructed. In this regard, time which is taken by an asset, technologically and commercially to get ready for its intended use or sale should be considered. When a facility is technologically and commercially ready for distribution to the end customers, the subsequent activities do not add value to the asset and therefore, the borrowing costs incurred thereafter should not be capitalised.

(e) In case the interest incurred is not directly attributable to constructions/creation of an asset, it should be fully expensed in the period in which it is incurred. However. If the interest incurred is directly attributable to construction/creation of a qualifying asset as per the provisions of AS-16, charging it off to the profit and loss account will not be proper in view of AS-16.

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PART B: THE RTI ACT, 2005

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12-10-2011 was the RTI Foundation Day.

RTI instrument completed six years of its glorious use to make India’s democracy participative and meaningful, in exposing many scams and for the first time in the history of our nation, put some of the MPs, MLAs, Ministers (including CM) and business magnets in jail.

BCAS foundation, PCGT and IMC held a function on 12-10-2011. The keynote address was delivered there by Justice (Retd.) Shri C. S. Dharmadhikari. We also brought out two-page supplement in MID DAY on 12-10-2011, the same is available to glance at in BCAS & PCGT Library.

This was followed by 6th Annual Convention 2011 on 14th & 15th October at Vigyan Bhavan, New Delhi.

I was invited by the Central Information Commission who organises this convention each year and I attended it.

Delegates from Maharashtra along with two Maharashtra Information Commissioners and a Central Information Commissioner here under at the 6th Annual Convention held a New Delhi.

Four speeches were delivered at the Inaugural session:

Welcome speech by Shri Satyananda Mishra, Chief CIC

Prime minister’s Inaugural Address

Address by Shri V. Narayanasamy, Hon’ble Minister of State (PMO & Personnel, Public Grievances & Pensions)

Vote of Thanks by Shri M. L. Sharma, CIC. There were 4 technical sessions as under:

Group I : Transparency and accountability: with special reference to Public-Private Partnership Projects

Group II : RTI Act: potential and efficacy in curbing corruption and grievance redressal

Group III : RTI Act, exemption provisions and Second Schedule

Group IV : Experiences and Prospects of Information Commissions

Finally, presentations were made by chair persons and panelists of each of 4 groups, mostly through power-point presentations.

The Convention concluded with valedictory address by Shri Nitish Kumar, Chief Minister of Bihar.

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(2011) 23 STR 295 (Tri.-Delhi) — Norasia Containers Lines v. Commissioner of Central Excise, New Delhi.

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Special Economic Zones (SEZ) — Exemption —Containers provided to units in SEZ — Exemption denied as containers partly used inside and partly outside SEZ — Containers used by units for bringing inputs and carrying finished goods out of SEZ — Impugned service of supply of containers, exempt.

Facts:
The appellants were engaged in providing containers to various units in SEZ. Service tax was demanded on the ground that containers have been used partly in and partly outside SEZ. According to the appellants, in terms of the SEZ Act, 005 and the Rules thereunder, payment of service tax was exempted if taxable services were provided to a unit in the SEZ and the appellants had exactly done that irrespective of the fact that the container had carried cargo out of the SEZ territory, exemption could not be denied to them. ST Notification No. 4/2004 which limits the exemption to service consumed within the SEZ uses the expression ‘for consumption of services’ within such SEZ, but at the same time, also uses the expression ‘taxable services provided to a unit of the SEZ.’

Held:
Section 26 of the SEZ Act and Rule 31 of the SEZ Rules, 2006 make it clear that there was no restriction regarding the consumption of the services and the exemption was extended to the services rendered to a unit in the SEZ for the purpose of authorised operation i.e., for bringing inputs for manufacture and carrying finished goods out of SEZ for export purpose, in the SEZ. Thus, the impugned services relating to supply of containers in SEZ units were exempted from service tax.

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Celebrations on 63rd Foundation Day of ICAI

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ICAI celebrated its 63rd Foundation Day on 1st July, 2011. The celebrations were held at New Delhi and at all Regional Councils and Branch Offices all over the country. Report about these celebrations at New Delhi has been published at pages 216-225 of C.A. Journal for August, 2011. Respected Shri Rameshwar Thakur, our Former President and at present Governor of Madhya Pradesh was the Chief Guest at the function at New Delhi. In his speech on this occasion he observed that “Chartered Accountants play an essential role in society, providing reliable and transparent information about public and private bodies. They are the Trustees of Society, at large, and have to shoulder onerous responsibility of protecting and preserving the Trust. They not only have to be adept at work, but also have to adopt with changing environment”.
He advised the members that “As the profession grows, rules and regulations alone would not safeguard the conduct of members. They are more meant to convey what is permissible and what would be frowned upon. Being a Chartered Accountant myself having been in active practice for few decades, I would like to advice every member to uphold the dignity of the profession to conduct them honestly, without fear or favour in carrying out their professional duties. Accounting profession has a long and distinguished history of guarding the integrity of financial statements. As a statutory body, the Institute owes the responsibility to evolve accounting and financial frame-work that facilitates economic growth with certain sense of discipline and stability. I would like to emphasise that our profession owes a moral responsibility to society to sustain the highest degree of professionalism and excellence.”
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Part A: ORDER of the Supreme Court

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Education:
Section 8(1)(e) of the RTI Act: The Supreme Court has delivered a detailed judgment running into 23 printed pages. It is a landmark decision. Aditya Bandopadhyay had appeared for the Secondary School Examination, 2008 conducted by the Central Board of Secondary Education (for short ‘CBSE’ or the ‘Appellant’). When he got the mark-sheet he was disappointed with his marks. He thought that he had done well in the examination but his answer-books were not properly evaluated and that improper evaluation had resulted in low marks. Therefore, he made an application for inspection and re-evaluation of his answer-books. CBSE rejected the said request by letter dated 12-7-2011, holding that it was exempt u/s.8(1)(e) of the RTI Act since CBSE shared fiduciary relationship with its evaluators and maintains confidentiality of both manner and method of evaluation and further the Examination By-laws of the Board provided that no candidate shall claim or is entitled to re-evaluation of his answer-book(s) or disclosure or inspection of answer-book(s) or other documents and further that the larger public interest does not warrant the disclosure of such information sought.

The appellant filed a writ petition before the Calcutta High Court. A Division Bench of the High Court heard and disposed of the said writ petition along with the connected writ petitions (relied by West Bengal Board of Secondary Education and others) by a common judgment dated 5-2-2009. The High Court held that the evaluated answerbooks of an examinee writing a public examination conducted by statutory bodies like CBSE or any University or Board of Secondary Education, being a ‘document, manuscript record, and opinion’ fell within the definition of ‘information’ as defined in section 2(f) of the RTI Act. It held that the provisions of the RTI Act should be interpreted in a manner which would lead towards dissemination of information rather than withholding the same; and in view of the right to information, the examining bodies were bound to provide inspection of evaluated answer books of the examinees.

Consequently, it directed CBSE to grant inspection of the answer books to the examinees who sought information. The High Court however rejected the prayer made by the examinees for re-evaluation of the answer-books, as that was not a relief that was available under RTI Act. The RTI Act only provided a right to access information, but not for any consequential reliefs.

On the above decision, CBSE came to the Supreme Court contending that they were holding the ‘information’ (in this case, the evaluated answer-books) in a fiduciary relationship and therefore exempted u/s.8(1)(e) of the RTI Act.

Decision:
Every examinee has the right to access his evaluated answer-books, by either inspecting them or taking certified copies thereof, unless the evaluated answer-books are found to be exempted u/s.8(1)(e) of the RTI Act.

Section 22 of RTI Act provides that the provisions of the said Act will have effect, notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force. Therefore the provisions of the RTI Act will prevail over the provisions of bye-laws/rules of the examining bodies in regard to examinations. As a result, unless the examining body is able to demonstrate that the answer-books fall under the exempted category of information described in clause (e) of section 8(1) of the RTI Act, the examining body will be bound to provide access to an examinee to inspect and take copies of his evaluated answer-books, even if such inspection or taking copies is barred under the rule/bye-laws of the examining body governing the examinations.

The SC then extensively discussed what is the meaning of ‘fiduciary relationship’ as in section 8(1)(e), dictionary meaning and as stated in number of Indian and US Court’s decisions and concluded: “We, therefore, hold that an examining body does not hold the evaluated answer-books in a fiduciary relationship. Not being information available to an examining body in its fiduciary relationship, the exemption u/s.8(1)(e) is not available to the examining bodies with reference to evaluated answer-books. As no other exemption u/s.8 is available in respect of evaluated answer books, the examining bodies will have to permit inspection sought by the examinees.”

The SC then also extensively and beautifully analysed the provisions of the RTI Act and its real purport, scope and meaning and concluded: “In view of the foregoing, the order of the High Court directing the examining bodies to permit examinees to have inspection of their answer-books is affirmed, subject to the clarification regarding the scope of the RTI Act and the safeguards and conditions subject to which ‘information’ should be furnished. The appeals are disposed of accordingly.

[The above decision was delivered on 9-8-2011: Central Board of Secondary Education and Anr. v. Aditya Bandopadhyay and Ors. It is reported in number of law magazines/journals, etc. including at 2011(8) SCALE 645]

[As it is one of the finest decisions to read and understand the real scope of the RTI Act, photo copy of the full decision will be made available both at BCAS and PCGT]

[This decision is followed by another very interesting, decision in the case of Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. Shaunak H. Satya & Ors. delivered on 2-9-2011 by the same two judges. It will be reported next month.]

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Suggested methodology for obtaining audit evidence while reporting default of Directors u/s. 274(1)(g) available online.

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The MCA has enabled the viewing of companies in which a person is/was a director by using the DIN or details such as full name of the Director (as given in DIN), father’s last name and date of birth. The list shows the default, if any, of the companies in filing the Annual return and Balance Sheet which is one of the requirements u/s. 274(1)(g). The facility is available after logging in on the MCA portal using your user name and password under the head ‘Services’ — in the ‘Companies in which a person is/was a director’.

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Section 45 — Gain arising on sale of shares, acquired under an ESOP Scheme whereby right was conferred on the assessee, but the purchase price of shares was to be paid at the time of sale of shares or their redemption, after a period of 3 years from the date of grant of right under ESOP Scheme is chargeable as long-term capital gain.

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(2011) TIOL 664 ITAT-Del. 11 Abhiram Seth v. JCIT A.Y.: 2004-05. Dated: 30-9-2011

Section
45 — Gain arising on sale of shares, acquired under an ESOP Scheme
whereby right was conferred on the assessee, but the purchase price of
shares was to be paid at the time of sale of shares or their redemption,
after a period of 3 years from the date of grant of right under ESOP
Scheme is chargeable as long-term capital gain.


Facts:

The assessee was an employee of M/s. Pepsico India Holdings (P) Ltd. (PIHL). Consequent to employment with PIHL, the assessee was granted valuable rights in shares of Pepsico Inc. The rights were conferred on various dates from 27-7-1995 to 27-1-2000. The assessee sold these shares on 25-2- 2004 i.e., A.Y. 2004-05. Consequent to sales, the assessee claimed the gains as long-term capital gains as the assessee held the rights for more than 3 years. The assessee also claimed deduction u/s. 54F. In reassessment proceedings the AO held that since the shares were actually held by a trustee i.e., Barry Group at USA and the assessee received the differential amount between gross sale consideration and cost price, the AO taxed the gain as short-term capital gain and consequently he denied deduction claimed u/s.54F. According to the AO, the earlier right of allotment does not constitute purchase of shares. Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who upheld the order passed by the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal, where the following facts relating to the ESOP scheme were pointed out. The shares were offered to the employee at prices which were commensurate with US market. Upon the employee accepting the offer an agreement was signed for eligible shares and he became the owner. Distinctive shares were not issued by Pepsico Inc in the name of the employee, but the shares in the form of stock were held by an appointed trustee who held the shares on behalf of the employee and the employer. Shares were encashable within a period of ten years after a lapse of initial period of 3 years from the date of acceptance of the ESOP offer. The employee was to pay consideration for shares at the time of sale /redemption. The ESOP agreement provided for transferability in case of death, etc. from the employee to his legal heirs. It also provided that after option became exercisable, the Trustees at their sole discretion and without the assessee’s consent could sell such an option and pay the difference between the option price and the prevalent fair market value of the shares by giving written notice called as the ‘Buy-out notice’. Payments of such buy-out amounts pursuant to this provision was to be effected by Pepsico and could be paid in cash, in shares of capital stock or partly in cash and partly in capital stock, as the trust deemed advisable.

Held:

A perusal of the clauses of the allotment clearly reveal that the particular number of shares were allotted to the assessee in different years at different prices; only distinctive numbers were not allotted. The apparent benefit to the assessee out of the ESOP scheme was that it had not to pay the purchase price immediately at the time of allotment, but the same was to be deducted at the time of sale or redemption of shares. Since there was an apparent fixed consideration of ESOP shares, the right to allotment of particular quantity of shares accrued to the assessee at the relevant time. The benefit of deferment of purchase price cannot lead to an inference that no right accrued to the assessee. The sale of such valuable rights after three years is liable to be taxed as ‘long-term capital gains’ and not as ‘short-term capital gains’. The CIT(A) has not considered that the acquisition of valuable rights in a property amounts to a capital asset. In the case under consideration, there was a fixed price of allotment of right to fixed quantity of shares and the indistinctive shares were held by a trust on behalf of the assessee. Non-allotment of distinctive number of shares by trust cannot be detrimental to the proposition that the assessee’s valuable right of claiming shares was held in trust and stood sold by Pepsico. Therefore, there was a definite, valuable and transferable right which can be termed as capital asset. The claim of taxability of gains as ‘long-term capital gains’ is justified.

 The Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by the assessee.

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Waiver of approval of Central Government for payment of remuneration to professional managerial person by companies having no profits or inadequate profits.

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The Ministry vide Notification dated 14th July 2011 made amendments to Schedule XIII part II section II pertaining to remuneration payable by companies having no profits or inadequate profits. Conditions to be fulfilled for waiver of approval of the Central Govt. for managerial personnel of subsidiary companies have also been listed.

Approval is now waived if managerial personnel do not have any interest in the capital of the company or its holding company, directly or indirectly or through other statutory structures or related to the directors or promoters of the company or its holding company at any time during the period of two years prior to the date of appointment and have a graduate-level qualification with expertise in the field of their profession.

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Vide Notification dated 3rd June 2011, the MCA has issued the Companies (Cost Accounting Records) Rules, 2011. They will apply to every company which is engaged in the production, processing, manufacturing, or mining activities and wherein,

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? the aggregate value of net worth as on the last date of the immediately preceding financial year exceeds five crore rupees;

? or wherein the aggregate value of the turnover made by the company from sale or supply of all products or activities during the immediately preceding financial year exceeds twenty crore rupees;

? or wherein the company’s equity or debt securities are listed or are in the process of listing on any stock exchange, whether in India or outside India. Cost records need to be maintained for all units and branches thereof in respect of each of its financial year commencing on or after the 1st April, 2011.

For further information:

http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/notification/pdf/ Common_Record_Rules_03jun11.pdf

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Vide Circular No. 37/2011, dated 7th June, 2011, the Ministry has mandated the following companies to financial statements in XBRL form only from the year 2010-11

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(1) All listed companies of India and their Indian subsidiaries

(2) All companies having a paid up capital of Rs. 5 cores and above

(3) All companies having a turnover of Rs.100 crores and above. Further all the above companies as above whose balance sheets are adopted at AGM’s held before 30-9-2011 are permitted to file up to 30-9-2011 without additional filing fees but those that hold the meeting in September 2011, will file within 30 days from date of adoption in the AGM.

For further information:

http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/Circular_37-2011 _07jun2011.pdf

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In order to give an opportunity for fast track exit to a defunct company i.e., for getting its name struck off from the Register of Companies, the MCA has decided to modify the existing route through e-form 61 and has prescribed the guidelines for ‘Fast-Track Exit mode’ for such defunct companies, vide General Circular No. 36/2011, dated 7th June 2011. The Guidelines will be implemented with effect from 3 July 2011.

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For further information:

http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/Circular_36-2011 _07jun2011.pdf

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Vide Circular No. 35/2011, dated 6th June 2011, the MCA has issued clarification to the General Circulars No. 27/2011 and 28/2011, dated 20-5-2011, with regard to participation by shareholders or Directors in meetings held under the Companies Act, 1956, through electronic mode. In respect of shareholders’ meetings to be held during financial year 2011-12, video conferencing facility for shareholders is optional. Thereafter, it is mandatory for all listed companies.

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http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/Circular_35-2011 _06jun2011.pdf

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Vide General Circular No. 33/2011, dated 1st June 2011, the Ministry has notified various forms that would be accepted by the ROC of defaulting companies — that is companies which have not filed their annual forms but are filing only event based forms

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For further information:
http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/Circular_33-2011 _01jun2011.pdf

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Vide Circular No. 32/2011, dated 31st May 2011, the Ministry has decided that w.e.f. 12th June 2011 all DIN-1 and DIN-4 applications will be signed by practising Chartered Accountants, Company Secretaries or Cost Accountants, who will verify the particulars given in the applications. To avoid duplicate DINs all existing DIN holders require to submit their PAN details by filing DIN-4 e-form by 30th September, failing which their DIN will be disabled and be liable for heavy penalty.

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For further information:
http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/Circular_32-2011 _31may2011.pdf

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Vide Ciruclar No. 32/2011, dated 31st May 2011, the Ministry has issued clarifications u/s. 616 (C) the Companies Act, 1956 pertaining to depreciation for the purpose of declaration of dividend u/s. 205 in case of Companies engaged in the generation or supply of electricity

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For further information:

http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/Circular_32-2011 _31may2011.pdf

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Vide Circular No. 30A/2011, dated 26th May 2011, the MCA has clarified that Limited Liability Partnership (LLP)’s of Chartered Accountants will not be treated as body corporate for the limited purpose of section 226(3) of the Companies Act.

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For further information: http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/Circular_30A- 2011_26may2011.pdf

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 70, dated 9-6-2011 — Remittance of assets by foreign nationals — Opening of NRO Accounts.

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Presently, foreign nationals employed in India are eligible to maintain resident accounts with banks in India. On their leaving the country they are required to close their resident accounts with banks in India and transfer the balances to their accounts abroad.

This Circular permits these foreign nationals, subject to certain terms and conditions, to redesignate their resident accounts with banks in India as NRO account on leaving the country. Only bona fide dues of the account holder, when he/ she was resident in India, can be deposited in the NRO account. Debits to the account should only be for the purpose of repatriation of funds to the overseas account of the account holder under the US $ 1 million per financial year scheme and after payment of appropriate taxes.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 69, dated 27-5-2011 — Overseas Direct Investment — Liberalisation/Rationalisation.

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This Circular has liberalised/rationalised the regulations relating to Overseas Direct Investment as under:

(1) Performance Guarantees issued by the Indian Party:

Presently, ‘financial commitment’ of the Indian Party includes contribution to the capital of the overseas Joint Venture (JV)/Wholly-Owned Subsidiary (WOS), loan granted to the JV/WOS and 100% of guarantees issued to or on behalf of the JV/WOS.

This Circular provides that only 50% of the amount of performance guarantee will be reckoned for the purpose of computing financial commitment to its JV/WOS overseas, within the 400% of the net worth of the Indian Party as on the date of the last audited balance sheet. Further, the time specified for the completion of the contract may be considered as the validity period of the related performance guarantee.

In cases where invocation of the performance guarantee breaches the ceiling for the financial exposure of 400% of the net worth of the Indian Party, the Indian Party will have to obtain prior approval of RBI before remitting funds from India, on account of such invocation.

(2) Restructuring of the balance sheet of the overseas entity involving write-off of capital and receivables:

Presently, there is no provision for restructuring of the balance sheet of the overseas JV/WOS not involving winding up of the entity or divestment of the stake by the Indian Party.

This Circular provides that Indian promoters who have set up WOS abroad or have at least 51% stake in an overseas JV, can write off capital (equity/preference shares) or other receivables, such as, loans, royalty, technical know-how fees and management fees in respect of the JV/WOS, even while such JV/WOS continue to function as under:

(i) Listed Indian companies are permitted to write off capital and other receivables up to 25% of the equity investment in the JV/WOS under the Automatic Route; and

(ii) Unlisted companies are permitted to write off capital and other receivables up to 25% of the equity investment in the JV/WOS under the Approval Route.

The write-off/restructuring have to be reported to the Reserve Bank through the designated AD bank within 30 days of write-off/restructuring. The Indian Party must submit the following documents along with the applications for write-off/restructuring to the bank under the automatic as well as the approval routes:

(a) A certified copy of the balance sheet showing the loss in the overseas WOS/JV set up by the Indian Party; and

(b) Projections for the next five years indicating benefit accruing to the Indian company consequent to such write off/restructuring.

(3) Disinvestment by the Indian Parties of their stake in an overseas JV/WOS involving write-off:

Presently, all disinvestments involving ‘write-off’, i.e., where the amount repatriated on disinvestment is less than the amount of original investment, need prior approval of RBI. However, in the following cases disinvestment is permitted under the automatic route, subject to the following conditions:

(i) In cases where the JV/WOS is listed in the overseas stock exchange;

(ii) In cases where the Indian promoter company is listed on a stock exchange in India and has a net worth of not less than Rs.100 crore; and

(iii) Where the Indian promoter company is an unlisted company and the investment in the overseas venture does not exceed US $ 10 million.

This Circular: (i) Has expanded the list of corporates eligible for disinvestment under the automatic route. As a result, listed Indian promoter companies with net worth of less than Rs.100 crore and investment in an overseas JV/WOS not exceeding US $ 10 million, can now go for disinvestment under the automatic route. They are however, required to report the disinvestment to RBI through their designated bank within 30 days from the date of disinvestment.

(ii) Clarifies that disinvestment, in case of eligible corporates, under the automatic route will also include cases where the amount repatriated after disinvestment is less than the original amount invested.

(4) Issue of guarantee by an Indian Party to step down subsidiary of JV/WOS under general permission:

Presently, Indian Parties are permitted to issue corporate guarantees only on behalf of their first level step-down operating JV/WOS set up by their JV/WOS operating as a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) under the automatic route, subject to the condition that the financial commitment of the Indian Party is within the extant limit for overseas direct investment.

This Circular provides that:

(i) Indian Party may extend corporate guarantee on behalf of the first generation step-down operating company under the automatic route, within the prevailing limit for overseas direct investment, irrespective of whether the direct subsidiary is an operating company or an SPV.

(ii) Indian Party may issue corporate guarantee on behalf of second generation or subsequent level step-down operating subsidiaries under the approval route, provided the Indian Party directly or indirectly holds 51% or more stake in the overseas subsidiary for which such guarantee is intended to be issued.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 68, dated 20-5-2011 — Hedging IPO flows by Foreign Institutional Investors (FIIs) under the ASBA mechanism.

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Presently, FIIs are allowed to hedge currency risk on the market value of their entire investment in equity and/or debt in India as on a particular date using forward foreign exchange contracts with rupee as one of the currencies and foreign currency — INR options.

This Circular permits FII to, in addition to the above, hedge risk related to transient capital flows in respect of their applications to Initial Public Offers (IPO) under the Application Supported by Blocked Amount (ASBA) mechanism, subject to the following:

(i) FII can undertake foreign currency — rupee swaps only for hedging the flows relating to the IPO under the ASBA mechanism.

(ii) Amount of the swap should not exceed the amount proposed to be invested in the IPO.

(iii) Tenor of the swap should not exceed 30 days.

(iv) Contracts, once cancelled, cannot be rebooked. (v) No rollovers will be permitted under this scheme.

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Set-off of long-term capital loss against short-term capital gains u/s.50 — U/s.74(1)(b) the assessee is entitled to the claim of set-off of long-term capital loss against the income arising from the sale of office premises, the gain of which is short-term due to the deeming provision, but the asset is longterm.

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(2011) 62 DTR (Mum.) (Trib.) 196 Komac Investments & Finance (P) Ltd. v. ITO A.Y.: 2005-06. Dated: 27-4-2011

Set-off of long-term capital loss against short-term capital gains u/s.50 — U/s.74(1)(b) the assessee is entitled to the claim of set-off of long-term capital loss against the income arising from the sale of office premises, the gain of which is short-term due to the deeming provision, but the asset is long-term.


Facts:

The assessee-company is engaged in the business of investment, finance and brokerage. The assessee had derived income from capital gain on account of sale of office premises owned by it on which depreciation was claimed. The assessee had set off the capital gain of the year with the brought forward capital loss of the earlier year.

The AO disallowed such set-off on the ground that in view of section 50(2), the income received or accruing as a result of such transfer shall be deemed to be capital gains arising from the transfer of shortterm capital asset. The CIT(A) also upheld the action of AO stating that in view of section 50 r.w.s 2(42A) which defines the term ‘short-term capital assets’ meaning an asset held by assessee for not more than 36 months preceding the date of its transfer, contention that the said assets were held for more than 36 months has become inconsequential as deeming provisions of section 50 would treat such asset as short-term assets and resultant gains as short-term gains.

Held:

The fiction created u/s.50 is confined to the computation of capital gains only and cannot be extended beyond that. It cannot be said that section 50 converts a long-term capital asset into a shortterm capital asset. Therefore, the brought forward long-term capital C. N. Vaze, Shailesh Kamdar, Jagdish T. Punjabi, Bhadresh Doshi Chartered Accountants Tribunal news loss can be set off against the capital gain on account of transfer of the depreciable asset which has been held by the assessee for more than 36 months, thereby making the asset a long-term capital asset. The gain of the asset is short term due to the deeming provision, but the asset is a longterm asset. The decision of CIT v. Ace Builders (P) Ltd., 281 ITR 210 (Bom.) was relied upon.

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Reassessment: Sections 147 and 148 of Income-tax Act, 1961: A.Y. 2003-04: Notice u/s.148 based on report from Director of Income-tax that credit entry in accounts of assessee was an accommodation entry: AO not examining evidence: Notice not valid.

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[Signature Hotels P. Ltd. v. ITO, 338 ITR 51 (Del.)]

For the A.Y. 2003-04, the return of income of the assessee company was accepted u/s.143(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and was not selected for scrutiny. Subsequently, the Assessing Officer issued notice u/s.148 which was objected by the assessee. The Assessing Officer rejected the objections. The assessee company filed writ petition and challenged the notice and the order on objections. The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

“(i) Section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, is wide but not plenary. The Assessing Officer must have ‘reason to believe’ that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. This is mandatory and the ‘reason to believe’ are required to be recorded in writing by the Assessing Officer.

(ii) A notice u/s.148 can be quashed if the ‘belief’ is not bona fide, or one based on vague, irrelevant and non-specific information. The basis of the belief should be discernible from the material on record, which was available with the Assessing Officer, when he recorded the reasons. There should be a link between the reasons and the evidence/material available with the Assessing Officer.

(iii) The reassessment proceedings were initiated on the basis of information received from the Director of Income-tax (Investigation) that the petitioner had introduced money amounting to Rs.5 lakhs during F.Y. 2002-03 as stated in the annexure. According to the information, the amount received from a company, S, was nothing but an accommodation entry and the assessee was the beneficiary. The reasons did not satisfy the requirements of section 147 of the Act. There was no reference to any document or statement, except the annexure. The annexure could not be regarded as a material or evidence that prima facie showed or established nexus or link which disclosed escapement of income. The annexure was not a pointer and did not indicate escapement of income.

(iv) Further, the Assessing Officer did not apply his own mind to the information and examine the basis and material of the information. There was no dispute that the company, S, had a paid up capital of Rs.90 lakhs and was incorporated on January 4, 1989, and was also allotted a permanent account number in September 2001. Thus, it could not be held to be a fictitious person. The reassessment proceedings were not valid and were liable to the quashed.”

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Reassessment: Sections 147 and 148 of Income-tax Act, 1961: A.Y. 1997-98: Notice u/s.148 issued without recording in the reasons that there was failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts: Notice not valid.

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[Titanor Components v. ACIT, 243 CTR 520 (Bom.)]

For the A.Y. 1997-98, the assessment was completed u/s.143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on 29-12-1999. Thereafter, on 18-3-2004 (beyond the period of 4 years), the Assessing Officer issued notice u/s.148 for reopening the assessment.

The assessee challenged the notice by filing a writ petition. The Bombay High Court allowed the petition and held as under: “

(i) Having regard to the purpose of section 147, the power conferred by section 147 does not provide a fresh opportunity to the Assessing Officer to correct an incorrect assessment made earlier unless the mistake in the assessment so made is the result of the failure of the assessee to fully and truly disclose all material facts, it is not open for the Assessing Officer to reopen the assessment on the ground that there is a mistake in assessment.

(ii) Moreover, it is necessary for the Assessing Officer to first observe whether there is a failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for assessment and having observed that there is such a failure to proceed u/s.147. It must follow that where the Assessing Officer does not record such a failure he would not be entitled to proceed u/s.147.

(iii) The Assessing Officer has not recorded the failure on the part of the petitioner to fully and truly to disclose all material facts necessary for the A.Y. 1997-98. What is recorded is that the petitioner has wrongly claimed certain deductions which he was not entitled to. There is a well-known difference between a wrong claim made by an assessee after disclosing all the true and material facts and a wrong claim made by the assessee by withholding the material facts. It is only in the latter case that the Assessing Officer would be entitled to proceed u/s.147.

(iv) In the circumstances, the impugned notice is not sustainable and is liable to be quashed and set aside.”

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Deemed dividend: Section 2(22)(e) of Incometax Act, 1961: A.Ys. 1992-93 and 1993-94: Advance on salary received by managing director: Not assessable as deemed dividend.

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[Shyama Charan Gupta v. CIT, 337 ITR 511 (All.)]

The assessee, the managing director of a company, received advances of salary and commission on profits. The Assessing Officer treated them as deemed dividend u/s.2(22)(e) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal held that the assessee was not entitled to claim receipt of advance against commission and directed the Assessing Officer to redetermine the deemed dividend in the hands of the assessee after adjusting the salary.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Allahabad High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under: “We do not find any error in the findings recorded by the Tribunal that the advance towards salary, which was due to the assessee and was credited to his account every month could not be treated as deemed dividend, but the advance of commission on profits over and above that amount drawn during the course of the years before the profits were determined and accrued to him would be treated as deemed dividend subject to tax. The amount was not treated as a separate addition in the hands of the assessee.”

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Deduction u/s.80-IB of Income-tax Act, 1961: A.Y. 2005-06: Assembling of different parts of windmill: Amounts to ‘manufacture’ as well as ‘production’: Assessee entitled to deduction u/s.80-IB.

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[CIT v. Chiranjjeevi Wind Energy Ltd., 243 CTR 195 (Mad.)]

The assessee was engaged in procuring different parts and assembling wind mills. For the A.Y. 2005- 06, the Assessing Officer disallowed the assessee’s claim for deduction u/s.80-IB holding that the activity of assembling the parts of the wind mill does not amount to ‘manufacture’ or ‘production’ of any article or thing. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Madras High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under: “

(i) The different parts procured by the assessee by themselves cannot be treated as a windmill. Those different parts bear distinctive names and when assembled together, it gets transformed into an ultimate product which is commercially known as ‘windmill’.

(ii) There can, therefore, be no difficulty in holding that such an activity carried on by the assessee would amount to ‘manufacture’ as well as ‘production’ of a thing or article as set out u/s.80-IB(2)(iii). (iii) In such circumstances, the conclusion of the Tribunal in accepting the plea of the assessee cannot be found fault with.”

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E-filing of statutory Forms with ROC.

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The Ministry of Corporate Affairs has issued the following filing schedule to avoid the rush and system congestion in MCA 21 due to heavy filing in last 10 days of the months of October and November 2011. It is requested that filing of balance sheet and annual return may preferably be done in the following order:

During this period, ROC facilitation centres/help desks would give priority in e filing/answering queries of companies falling under the above alphabetical order.
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Filing of certain forms by Directors of defaulting Companies for Defaulting Companies/Dormant Companies/Active Companies.

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The Ministry had issued General Circular No. 33/2011, dated 1-6-2011 wherein it was informed that in order to ensure corporate governance and proper compliances of provisions of the Companies Act, 1956, no request, whether oral or in writing or through e-forms, for recording any event-based information/changes shall be accepted by the Registrar of Companies from such defaulting companies, unless they file their updated Balance Sheet and Profit & Loss Accounts and Annual Return with the Registrar of Companies.

However, in the interest of stakeholders, certain event-based information/changes were being accepted by the Registrar from such defaulting companies. Now, on the requests received from various quarters of the corporates & professionals, certain forms will be accepted by the Registrar as per the General Circular No. 63/2011, dated 6th September 2011 for:

(a) Filing by Directors of defaulting Companies in respect of such companies.

(b) Filing by Directors of defaulting Companies in respect of Companies having the status of Dormant Companies.

(c) Filing by Directors of defaulting Companies in respect of Companies having the status as active in progress companies.

This Circular shall be effective from 18th Sept., 2011.

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Practical Issues — Transfer Pricing Documentation and Certification

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Lecture Meetings

Practical Issues — Transfer Pricing Documentation and Certification

This lecture meeting was addressed by Rakesh Alshi, Chartered Accountant on 11th October 2011 at Walchand Hirachand Hall, IMC. The speaker gave an energetic presentation on the practical aspects of transfer pricing documentation in detail with many pertinent and relevant examples and answered many questions from the audience. The meeting received very enthusiastic response and was very well attended.

L to R: Rakesh Alshi, Speaker, Chetan Shah, Pradip Thanawala, President and Surin Kapadia

Other programmes

Workshop on Filing of Service Tax Returns

Half day workshop on ‘Filing of Service tax Returns’ was held on Friday, 7th October, 2011 at the Society’s premises and was attended by approx. 100 participants. The programme schedule included presentation and replies to the queries by the service tax officials viz. Sushil Solanki, Commissioner of Service Tax-I, Mumbai, Rishi Goel,


L to R: Sushil Solanki, Speaker, Suhas Paranjpe, Govind Goyal, Pradip Thanawala, President, and Rishi Goyal

Joint Commissioner of Service Tax and V. V. Brahmashatriya, Superintendent of Service Tax and also by the speakers of the evening Puloma Dalal and Sunil Gabhawalla, both Chartered Accountants.

Integrated Security Management — Practice Approach

On Saturday, 8th October 2011, the ‘Gulmohar’ conference room of BCAS was the venue for a unique event organised by the Information Technology & 4i Committee. An introductory workshop on ‘Integrated Security Management’ was conducted for the BCAS members by ‘Secure Matrix’ — an organisation specialising in the subject. The compact group of participants got an insight into the exciting and challenging world of ‘Information Security’ under the able guidance of Saurabh Dani and Dr. Harrold D’Costa, well known experts in this area.

Mr. Dani explained the importance of Information as an asset to the organisation and the need to secure the same. He explained the various vulnerabilities that exist in a computerised environment and thus the risks that an organisation is exposed to and how these vulnerabilities can be addressed by doing a vulnerability assessment. According to Mr. Dani, generally, IT vulnerabilities arose mainly from application software (85%), Operating Systems (8%) and Devices (7%).


L to R: Ameet Patel, Nikunj Shah, Pradip Thanawala, President and Saurabh Dani,
Speaker

Dr. D’Costa briefly highlighted various types of cyber crimes, modern trends in cybercrimes and also some of the relevant provisions of the amended IT Act along with various practical case studies. He also shared with the audience a few tips for detecting forged emails. The importance of cyber data and identities was highlighted by him by referring to the cyber will of late Steve Jobs of Apple Computers.

The workshop was indeed an enriching experience for all the participants.

Public Meeting to celebrate 6th Anniversary of The RTI Act

BCAS Foundation joined Public Concern for Governance Trust (PCGT) and Indian Merchants’ Chamber’s Anti-Corruption Cell (IMC) to celebrate 6th Anniversary of the Right to Information Act, 2005 (RTI) on 12th October 2011 at Walchand Hirachand Hall, IMC.


L to R: Justice C.S. Dharmadhikari, Speaker, Narayan Varma, Julio Rebeiro, Speaker, Pradip Thanawala, President and Dara Gandhi, Speaker

Justice C. S. Dharmadhikari (retd.) delivered the keynote address and explained how Gandhiji’s objective was Freedom and not just Independence and this Freedom can be achieved only by increasing accountability and transparency through tools such as RTI.

Julio Rebeiro, Chairman — PCGT and Anti- Corruption Cell of IMC, Narayan Varma, Trustee — BCAS Foundation and PCGT, and Dara Gandhi, Trustee — PCGT, also addressed the audience and stressed on need to further strengthen RTI law and implementation. Students of Government Law College performed a street play highlighting how RTI can help in curbing menace of corruption in day to day life.

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Applicability of Revised Schedule VI for Companies having IPO/FPO.

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The Ministry of Corporate Affairs vide Circular has clarified that the Notification No. S.O. 447(E), dated 28-2-2011 pertaining to the Revised Schedule VI, will apply to accounts for the year ending on 31st March 2012. The Ministry has now clarified that the Financial Statements made for the limited purpose of IPO/FPO during financial year 2011-12 may be made in the revised Schedule VI to avoid administrative difficulties and unrealistic comparison.
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Online incorporation of companies within 24 hours will not be implemented.

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The Ministry of Corporate Affairs by General
Circular No. 61/2011, dated 5-9-2011, after re-examination of Circular
No. 49/2011 for incorporation of a company, has decided, that since
currently companies are being incorporated within 24-48 hours, online
approval of incorporation forms i.e., STP mode of approval of e-forms 1,
18 and 32 on the basis of certification and declarations given by the
practising professional will not be implemented as yet.
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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 20, dated 16-9-2011 — Meeting of medical expenses of NRIs close relatives by Resident Individuals.

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Presently, a resident can make payment in rupees for meeting expenses on account of boarding, lodging and services related thereto or travel to and from and within India of a person resident outside India who is on a visit to India.

This Circular has expanded the meaning of ‘services related thereto’ as stated in Regulation 2(i) of Notification No. FEMA 16/2000-RB, dated May 3, 2000 by including medical expenses therein. As a result, a resident individual can now pay for the medical expenses incurred in India by his NRI close relative (relative as defined in section 6 of the Companies Act, 1956).

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 19, dated 16-9-2011 — Repayment of loans of nonresident close relatives by residents.

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Presently, a close relative, resident in India, can repay the housing loan availed by his Non-Resident Indian (NRI) relative.

This Circular permits a resident close relative (relative as defined in section 6 of the Companies Act, 1956), of the NRI to repay the loan availed by the NRI by crediting the borrower’s (NRI) loan account through the bank account of such relative.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 18, dated 16-9-2011 — Loans in Rupees by resident individuals to NRI close relatives.

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This Circular permits a resident individual to give an interest-free loan with a minimum maturity period of one year under the Liberalised Remittance Scheme (LRS) to Non-Resident Indian (NRI)/Person of Indian Origin (PIO) close relative (means relative as defined in section 6 of the Companies Act, 1956) by way of crossed cheque/electronic transfer. The loan is subject to the following conditions:

(1) The loan amount must be within the overall limit under the LRS of US $ 200,000 per financial year. The lender has to ensure that the amount of loan is within the LRS limit.

(2) The loan can be utilised for meeting the borrower’s personal requirements or for his own business purposes in India.

(3) The loan must not be utilised, either singly or in association with other person(s), for any of the activities in which investment by persons resident outside India is prohibited, namely:

(a) The business of chit fund, or

(b) Nidhi Company, or

(c) Agricultural or plantation activities or in real estate business, or construction of farm houses, or

(d) Trading in Transferable Development Rights (TDRs).

Explanation: For the purpose of item (c) above, real estate business shall not include development of townships, construction of residential/commercial premises, roads or bridges.

(4) The loan amount must be credited to the NRO account of the NRI/PIO.

(5) The loan amount must not be remitted outside India.

(6) Repayment of the loan must be made by way of inward remittances through normal banking channels or by debit to the Non-resident Ordinary (NRO)/Non-resident External (NRE)/ Foreign Currency Non-resident (FCNR) account of the borrower or out of the sale proceeds of the shares or securities or immovable property against which such loan was granted.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 17, dated 16-9-2011 — Gift in Rupees by Resident Individuals to NRI close relatives.

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This Circular permits a resident individual to make a rupee gift to a NRI/PIO who is a close relative of the resident individual (close relative as defined in section 6 of the Companies Act, 1956) by way of crossed cheque/electronic transfer. The amount should be credited to the Non-Resident (Ordinary) Rupee Account (NRO) account of the NRI/PIO.

The gift amount must be within the overall limit  of US $ 200,000 per financial year as permitted under the Liberalised Remittance Scheme (LRS) for a resident individual. The resident donor will have to ensure that the gift amount being remitted is under the LRS and all the remittances under the LRS during the financial year including the gift amount have not exceeded the limit prescribed under the LRS.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 16, dated 15-9- 2011 — Credit of sale proceeds of Foreign Direct Investments in India to NRE/FCNR (B) accounts — Clarification.

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Presently, in terms of Schedule 3, 4 and 5 of the FEMA Notification No. 20/2000-RB, dated May 3, 2000, sale proceeds of Foreign Investments in India are eligible for credit to NRE/FCNR(B) accounts, where the purchase consideration was paid by the Non-resident Indians/Persons of Indian Origin out of inward remittance or funds held in their NRE/FCNR(B) accounts and subject to applicable taxes, if any.

This Circular has extended the said facility of credit of sale proceeds of Foreign Investments in India to NRE/FCNR(B) accounts, where the purchase consideration was paid by the Non-resident Indians/ Persons of Indian Origin out of inward remittance or funds held in their NRE/FCNR(B) accounts and subject to applicable taxes, if any, to NRI/PIO under Regulation 11 of the said Notification.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 15, dated 15-9-2011 — Exchange Earners Foreign Currency (EEFC) Account and Resident Foreign Currency (RFC) account — Joint holder — Liberalisation.

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This Circular permits resident in India to include their non-resident close relative(s) (relatives as defined in section 6 of the Companies Act, 1956) as joint holder(s) in their EEFC/RFC bank accounts on ‘former or survivor’ basis. However, such nonresident Indian close relatives are not permitted to operate the said bank accounts during the life-time of the resident account holder.
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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 14, dated 15-9-2011 — Foreign Investments in India — Transfer of security by way of gift — Liberalisation.

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Presently, a person resident in India can transfer, by way of gift, to a person resident outside India any security including shares/convertible debentures up to the value of US $ 25,000 during a calendar year after obtaining prior approval of RBI.

This Circular has increased the said limit from US $ 25,000 to US $ 50,000. As a result, a person resident in India can now transfer, by way of gift, to a person resident outside India any security including shares/convertible debentures up to the value of US $ 50,000 per financial year after obtaining prior approval of RBI.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 67, dated 20-5-2011 — Forward cover for Foreign Institutional Investors — Rebooking of cancelled contracts.

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Presently, Foreign Institutional Investors (FII) are permitted to cancel and rebook up to 2% of the market value of the portfolio as at the beginning of the financial year.

This Circular has increased this limit from 2% to 10% with immediate effect. As a result, FII can now cancel and rebook up to 10% of the market value of the portfolio as at the beginning of the financial year.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 60, dated 16-5-2011 — Comprehensive Guidelines on Over-the-Counter (OTC) Foreign Exchange Derivatives and Hedging of Commodity Price and Freight Risks.

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This Circular has changed the eligibility criteria for users of Over-the-Counter (OTC) cost reduction structures and option strategies.

Presently, listed companies or unlisted companies with a minimum net worth of Rs.100 crore, subject to certain conditions, are eligible to use OTC structures/strategies.

As per the new criteria, listed companies and their subsidiaries/JV/associates having common treasury and consolidated balance sheet or unlisted companies with a minimum net worth of Rs.200 crore, subject to certain conditions, are eligible to use OTC structures/strategies.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 58, dated 2-5-2011 — Opening of Escrow Accounts for FDI transactions.

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Presently, banks can open Escrow account and Special account on behalf of non-resident corporates only for acquisition/transfer of shares/convertible debentures of an Indian company through open offers/delisting/exit offers, subject to compliance with the relevant SEBI [Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers (SAST)] Regulations, 1997 and other applicable SEBI regulations.

This Circular permits, banks to open and maintain, without prior approval of the Reserve Bank, non-interest bearing Escrow accounts in Indian Rupees in India on behalf of residents and/or non-residents, towards payment of share purchase consideration and/or provide Escrow facilities for keeping securities to facilitate FDI transactions. Similarly, permission has been granted to SEBI authorised Depository Participants, to open and maintain, without prior approval of the Reserve Bank, Escrow accounts for securities.

These facilities will be applicable for both issue of fresh shares to the non- residents as well as transfer of shares from/to the non-residents and is subject to the terms and conditions given in the Annex to this Circular.

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