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Service Tax on Builders.

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Part B : INDIRECT TAXES


SERVICE TAX UPDATE

42 Service Tax on Builders.

 

Circular No. 108/02/2009-ST, dated 29-1-2009 :

A developer/builder/promoter selling a dwelling unit in a
residential complex at any stage of construction or even prior to that and
providing services in connection with construction of residential complex till
the execution of sale deed would be in the nature of ‘self-service’ and
consequently would not attract service tax. All pending cases to be disposed of
accordingly with the exception for decision by the Advance Ruling Authority in a
specific case.

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Manner of utilisation of the information collated by the Department from AIR — Instruction No. 1/ 2009, dated 12-2-2009.

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Part A : DIRECT TAXES


41 Manner of utilisation of the information
collated by the Department from AIR — Instruction No. 1/ 2009, dated 12-2-2009.

Brief summary of instructions for utilisation of AIR
information for financial year 2007-08 (assessment year 2008-09) and subsequent
years :

Sr. No.
 
Category
Method of selection

Remarks
1. AIR
Transactions
with PAN where
returns are filed

(i) Running of CASS by the respective RCCs

(ii) Depending upon feedback on scrutiny assessment in a case for a
particular assessment year, the AOs may resort to proceedings u/s.148 for
earlier assessment years


Action as prescribed
2. AIR
Transaction with PAN where there is no information of return filed
(i)
CIT(CO) to generate list of non-filers
(ii) Jurisdictional Assessing Officers to issue query letters to all
non-Government non-filers
(a)
If the letter is returned unserved, Assessing Officers to refer the cases to
CIT(CIB)
(b) If return has been filed before the date of issue of letter, then deal
as at SI. No. 1
(c) If return is filed after issue of letter/notice, compulsory scrutiny by
the Assessing Officer having jurisdiction. (for details refer to para 3)
(d) If return is not filed or there is no response to the served query
letter, notice to be issued u/s. 142(1)/148 and the case to be assessed
u/s.143(3)/144/147.
3 AIR
Transactions without PAN

Designated Assessing Officers to issue query letters in non-Government cases
(a)
If return has been filed before the issue of letter, then refer to
jurisdictional Assessing Officer for action as at Sl. no. 1
(b) If return is filed after the issue of letter, the case shall be taken up
for compulsory scrutiny by the designated or the jurisdictional Assessing
Officer as the case may be.
(c) If there is no response to the served query letter, notice to be issued
u/s.142(1)/148 and the case to be assessed u/s.144/147/143(3) as per due
process of law.
(d) If the letter is returned unserved, designated Assessing Officer to
refer the case to CIT(CIB)
(e) The designated Assessing Officer shall intimate PAN to CIT(CIB) on the
basis of replies received.

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Wealth Tax (Second Amendment) Rules, 2009 — Notification No. 16/2009, dated 13-2-2009.

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Part A : DIRECT TAXES


40 Wealth Tax (Second Amendment) Rules, 2009
— Notification No. 16/2009, dated 13-2-2009.

Rule 3A of the Wealth Tax Rules has been amended. This rule
decides the jurisdiction of valuation officers, which is based on the asset
value declared by the assessee in the wealth tax return. There are three levels
of Valuation Officers as prescribed in the aforementioned Rule. The new
jurisdiction based on the valuation is as under :

Prescribed value
of the asset either declared in the return of net wealth or not declared,
but believed by the AO to be of such value
Jurisdictional
Valuation officer

If the asset value exceeds Rs.300 lakhs

District Valuation officer

If the asset value exceeds Rs.40 lakhs, but not exceed Rs.300 lakhs

Valuation officer

If the asset value does not exceed Rs.40 lakhs

Assistant Valuation officer

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Wealth Tax (First Amendment) Rules, 2009 — Notification No. 15/2009/F.No.149/144/2008-TPL, dated 30-1-2009.

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Part A : DIRECT TAXES


39 Wealth Tax (First Amendment) Rules, 2009
— Notification No. 15/2009/F.No.149/144/2008-TPL, dated 30-1-2009.

The CBDT has substituted Rule 8C of the Wealth Tax Rules,
1957 which prescribe the scale of fees to be charged by a valuer for valuation
of any asset for wealth tax purposes with effect from 1st April 2009. The
changes are summarised in the table below :

Pre-amended version

On the first Rs.50,000 of the
asset as valued
2 % of the value
On the next
Rs.1 lakh of the asset as valued
3 % of the
value
On the balance
of the asset as valued
c % of the
value
On the first Rs.5,00,000 of
the asset as valued
2 % of the value
On the next
Rs.10 lakhs of the asset as valued
2 % of the
value
On the next
Rs.40 lakhs of the asset as valued
2 % of the
value
On the balance
of the asset as valued
2 % of the
value

Further when two or more assets of an assessee are to be
valued by the valuer, then they would constitute single asset for calculating
the aforementioned fees. The minimum fees prescribed are Rs.500.

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A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 6, dated August 3, 2009 — Memorandum of Instructions governing money-changing activities

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Spotlight – Part C

Part C : RBI/FEMA


Given below are the highlights of RBI Circulars.

  1. A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 6, dated August 3, 2009 —
    Memorandum of Instructions governing money-changing activities

Presently, Authorised Dealers/FFMC are required to obtain
certain documents, including a conduct certificate from the local police
authorities, while conducting the due diligence of their agents/franchisees.
However, they have been experiencing difficulties in obtaining conduct
certificate from local police authorities in respect of agents/franchisees,
which are incorporated entities.

This Circular has done away with the requirement of
obtaining conduct certificate from local police authorities in respect of
agents/franchisees, which are incorporated entities. Henceforth, Authorised
Dealers/FFMC have been permitted to accept certified copy of the Memorandum
and Articles of Association and Certificate of Incorporation in lieu of
conduct certificate from the local police authorities, in respect of
agents/franchisees, which are incorporated entities.

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S. 145 — In terms of MOU the assessee liable to refund of earnest money received with interest on cancellation of MOU — During previous year assessee cancels MOU and refunds amounts received under MOU with interest — Whether interest paid for period of ea

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Part B — Unreported Decisions

(Full texts of the following Tribunal decisions are available
at the Society’s office on written request. For members desiring that the
Society mails a copy to them, Rs.30 per decision will be charged for
photocopying and postage.)







22 Urban Improvement Co. (P) Ltd. v.


Income-tax Officer, Ward 18(2)

ITAT ‘D’ Bench, Delhi

Before C. L. Sethi (JM) and K. D. Ranjan (AM)

ITA No. 3246/D/2006

A.Y. : 2003-04. Decided on : 5-9-2008

Counsel for assessee/revenue : Rano Jain/

Nikhil Choudhary

S. 145 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — In terms of MOU the
assessee was liable to refund of the earnest money received by it along with
interest, on cancellation of the MOU in the events mentioned in the MOU — During
the previous year the assessee cancelled the MOU and refunded the amounts
received under MOU along with interest — Whether interest paid for the period
covering earlier years could be disallowed on the ground that it was prior
period expense — Held, No.

 

Per C. L. Sethi :

Facts :

The assessee-company is engaged in the business of developing
land. It debited to its profit & loss account a sum of Rs.15,66,172 towards
interest on earnest money. On 13th June 1997, the assessee had entered into a
memorandum of understanding (‘MOU’) with certain educational societies for
construction of school buildings and had accepted certain amounts as earnest
monies. The MOU provided that in the event that the permission for construction
from the concerned authority was not received, the assessee shall refund the
entire amount with interest. During the previous year relevant to the assessment
year under consideration, the Board of Directors of the assessee company passed
a resolution to refund the said earnest money together with interest. Since the
amount of interest paid pertained to the period from the date of receipt of the
amounts of earnest deposit, the Assessing Officer disallowed the sum of
Rs.15,66,172 as prior period expenses. The AO justified his action by making a
reference to the Madras High Court decision in the case of K. Sankaranarayana
Iyer & Sons. On an appeal, the CIT(A) upheld the action of the AO. The CIT(A)
observed that merely by passing a resolution by the Board of Directors of the
company, the assessee cannot create a liability in the year under consideration
when it was maintaining the books of account on mercantile system. Aggrieved by
the order of the CIT(A), the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

 

Held :

The Tribunal held that the liability to pay interest had
accrued in the year under consideration when the resolution was passed and not
prior to that. The liability under consideration was a contractual liability and
was crystallised and ascertained only when the decision to refund the earnest
money along with interest was taken. Accordingly, the Tribunal set aside the
order of the authorities below and held that the assessee’s claim of deduction
of interest amounting to Rs.15,66,172 had actually accrued or crystallised or
ascertained in the present year under consideration and was therefore allowable
as a deduction.

 

Case referred to :


K. Sankaranarayana Iyer & Sons v. CIT, 110 ITR 571
(Mad.).

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Whether assessee who participated in block assessment is precluded from taking objection that notice u/s.143(2) was not served or not served in time in view of provisions of S. 292BB w.e.f. 1-4-2008 and if so, since when he can be precluded — Held, S. 292

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New Page 1

Part B — Unreported Decisions

(Full texts of the following Tribunal decisions are available
at the Society’s office on written request. For members desiring that the
Society mails a copy to them, Rs.30 per decision will be charged for
photocopying and postage.)

23 Kuber Tobacco Products Pvt. Ltd.
v. DCIT


ITAT Delhi Bench ‘Special’

Before Vimal Gandhi (President),

I. P. Bansal (JM) and Deepak R. Shah (AM)

IT(SS) A No. 261/Del./2001

A.Y. : 1-4-1988 to 25-1-1999. Decided on : 14-1-2009

Counsel for assessee/revenue : Raj Kumar Gupta, Saurav
Rahatgi/Durga Charan Dash

S. 143(2) read with S. 292 BB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 —
Whether the assessee who has participated in the block assessment proceedings is
precluded from taking any objection that notice u/s.143(2) was not served upon
him or was not served upon him in time in view of the provisions of S. 292BB
inserted by the Finance Act, 2008 w.e.f. 1-4-2008 and if so, since when he can
be said to be so precluded — Held that S. 292BB is applicable to the A.Y.
2008-09 and subsequent assessment years.

Per I. P. Bansal :

Facts :

The issue before the Bench was regarding the validity of the
assessment made u/s.158BC in the absence of issuance of a notice u/s.143(2) of
the Act.

According to the Revenue in view of insertion of S. 292BB,
which is inserted by the Finance Act, 2008 w.e.f. 1st April, 2008, the assessee
cannot take the plea that assessment should be held invalid merely for the
reason that no notice u/s.143(2) was issued. Further, relying on the Madras High
Court decision in the case of Areva T & D India Ltd., it was contended that the
non-issuance/service of notice cannot render the assessment/re-assessment
invalid, but at best it can be a case of irregularity which can be removed. It
was also submitted that presumption against retrospective construction has no
application to enactment, which affects only the procedure, and the practice of
the Courts as held by the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Man Bahadur Singh.

 

Held :


The Tribunal referred to two of the Supreme Court decisions
viz., the case of H. V. Thakur and the case of Maharaj Chintamani Saran
Nath Shahdeo to examine the present issue. According to it,

‘First and foremost rule of
construction of interpretation is that in the absence of anything in the
enactment to show that it is to have retrospective operation, the said enactment
cannot be construed to have retrospective operation and when amendment relates
to a procedural provision resulting into creating a new disability or obligation
and which imposes new duty in respect of transactions already completed, then,
the said procedural provision also cannot be applied retrospectively. Similar is
the position where a statute which not only changes the procedure, but also
creates new rights and liabilities which shall be construed to be prospective in
operation, unless otherwise provided either expressly or by necessary
implication.”


 

Applying the above principle, it noted that S. 292BB has been
made effective by the Legislature from 1st April 2008 and there is nothing in
the enactment to show that S. 292BB has retrospective operation. If it is so,
according to Rule of Interpretation described above, S. 292BB cannot be
construed retrospectively. Further, it noted that if the principles laid down by
the Supreme Court in the above two cases were applied, it would mean that every
litigant has a vested right in substantive law, but no litigant has such right
in procedural law. It further added that though the provisions in question
related to procedural law, since the said procedural statute created a new
disability or obligation, and imposed new duties in respect of transactions
already accomplished, the statute cannot be construed to have retrospective
effect. Therefore, it was held that S. 292BB cannot be construed to have
retrospective operation and it has to be applied prospectively.

 

Cases referred to :



1. H. V. Thakur v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1994 SC
2623

2. Maharaj Chintamani Saran Nath Shahdeo v. State of
Bihar,
AIR 1999 SC 3609

3. Areva T & D India Ltd. v. ACIT, 294 ITR 233
(Mad.)

 


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Project completion method of accounting — AO cannot adopt two methods of accounting in one project to determine income of assessee — In case of an assessee following project completion method, profit arising on sale of TDR, which was received as considera

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(Full texts of the
following Tribunal decisions are available at the Society’s office on written
request. For members desiring that the Society mails a copy to them, Rs.30 per
decision will be charged for photocopying and postage.)





  1. ITO v. Chembur Trading Corporation




ITAT ‘C’ Bench, Mumbai

Before Sunil Kumar Yadav (JM) and

D. Karunakara Rao (AM)

ITA No. 2593/Mum./2006

A.Y. : 2000-01. Decided on : 21-1-2009

Counsel for revenue/assessee : Yeshwant U. Chavan/J. P.
Bairagra

Per Sunil Kumar Yadav :

Facts :

The assessee was in the business of construction of
buildings and was regularly following project completion method which method
was accepted by the Revenue. The assessee started project of construction of a
building known as ‘Kailash Towers’ (KT) on a plot of land at Anik Village,
Chembur of which the assessee was the owner. Till 31-3-1994, the assessee
received Rs.32,31,159 as advances for sale of flats in KT. The assessee had
incurred expenditure of Rs.87,35,285 (which included cost of land and also
cost of work done on this project).

While the project was on, the entire plot of land
admeasuring 44544.25 sq.mts. was required by the Government of Maharashtra for
construction of Eastern Express Freeway and also for construction of tenements
for rehabilitation of slum dwellers. An agreement was executed between the
assessee, the Slum Rehabilitation Authority (SRA) and the Government of
Maharashtra through PWD which agreement detailed modalities as to how the land
was to be acquired and in what manner TDR was to be granted to the assessee.
The agreement was a composite agreement for construction of Eastern Express
Freeway to be carried out by the Government of Maharashtra after acquiring
land from the assessee and also for rehabilitation of the slum dwellers living
in 7500 hutments on the freeway land required for the purpose of Eastern
Express Freeway. 1474 tenements and 92 shops were to be constructed by the
assessee. The assessee was entitled to receive land TDR for handing over land
to the Government and Construction TDR for constructing tenements and shops on
land belonging to it. The grant of TDR was to be in phases. The assessee was
not entitled to any monetary consideration.

During the previous year relevant to the assessment year
under consideration the assessee sold certain TDR and the sale consideration
was reflected on the liability side of the balance sheet. Sale consideration
of TDR was regarded by the assessee as a receipt of the project to be taxed in
the year of completion of the project.

The AO dissected the entire project into two schemes (1)
Transfer of land for construction of Eastern Express Freeway by the Government
of Maharashtra and the Road TDR granted to the assessee in lieu thereof; (2)
Transfer of land and construction of tenements and shops by the assessee
itself and the grant of TDR in lieu thereof. The AO, accordingly, applied
different methods of accounting to both the projects. In respect of road TDR
he taxed the assessee yearwise in the year in which TDR was sold and in
respect of the project for transfer of land and construction of tenements and
shops he accepted project completion method. In A.Y. 2000-01 the AO made an
addition of Rs.1,88,86,810.

The CIT(A) held that Road TDR was directly related to the
said project and sale proceeds against this TDR were to be recognised as a
revenue receipt in the year in which the project was completed.

Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal noted that the agreement was a composite
agreement for handing over land for Expressway and also for construction of
tenements and shops by the assessee on land belonging to it. The Tribunal also
noted that the entire land was acquired in phases and also consideration in
the form of TDR was received in phases. Consideration was received in kind.
The funds received on sale of TDR were utilised for construction of tenements
and shops. The Tribunal held that it was clearly one project and not two
projects as they have been treated by the AO. The Tribunal held that the AO
cannot adopt two methods of accounting in one project to determine the income
of the assessee. It observed that in case of construction activity there are
two recognised methods of accounting viz. (1) Project Completion Method
and (2) Percentage Completion Method. The Tribunal stated that the assessee
has a right or a privilege to adopt any one of the methods of accounting for
determining its profit. In the present case, the assessee had been following
the project completion method to determine the profits of a project for last
so many years, but, during the year under consideration the AO had dissected
the project in two segments and for one segment he applied project completion
method and for the remaining segment, he determined the profit on sale of TDR.
The method of accounting adopted by the AO was held to be neither prevalent
nor recognised by the ICAI or under any law. The Tribunal held that the
assessee had rightly computed its profit on the basis of the project
completion method. Accordingly, it upheld the order of CIT(A) and dismissed
the appeal filed by the Revenue.

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S. 145 — Accounting Standard 7 issued by ICAI — In case of an assessee following mercantile system and ‘percentage completion method’ deduction is allowable of ‘foreseeable losses’ on incomplete projects in respect of which a major part of work was not co

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(Full texts of the
following Tribunal decisions are available at the Society’s office on written
request. For members desiring that the Society mails a copy to them, Rs.30 per
decision will be charged for photocopying and postage.)





  1. Jacobs Engineering India Pvt. Ltd. v. ACIT




ITAT ‘J’ Bench, Mumbai

Before N. V. Vasudevan (JM) and

Mehar Singh (AM)

ITA No. 335/Mum./2007 & 336/Mum./2007

A.Ys. : 2002-03 & 2003-04. Decided on : 26-5-2009

Counsel for assessee/revenue : Sunil Lala & Aliasger
Rampurwala/Ajay

Per Mehar Singh :

Facts :

The assessee was engaged in the business of executing works
contracts and was following the mercantile system of accounting and the
‘percentage completion method’. During the previous year relevant to the A.Y.
2002-03 the assessee had debited to P & L and had claimed a deduction of
Rs.18,73,568 being provision for future losses. The AO while assessing the
total income of the assessee held that this sum did not represent actual loss;
under mercantile system of accounting it is only an existing liability which
is deductible and not a liability which will come into existence upon
occurrence of certain events; the decision of the Apex Court in Tuticorin
Alkali Chemical & Fertilisers Ltd. does not contemplate deduction of such an
amount. He, accordingly, disallowed Rs.18,73,568 claimed by the assessee as
provision for foreseeable losses.

The CIT(A) observed that since the work completed during
the year under consideration was not a major part of the contract such a
provision was not allowable as according to him it cannot be established that
such a loss had been fully anticipated. He held that since several parameters
were accounted for only on estimate it was not plausible to anticipate the
result. The CIT(A) confirmed the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the
Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal considered Para 13.1 of Accounting Standard 7
(AS-7) which mandates that a foreseeable loss on the entire contract should be
provided for in the financial statements, irrespective of the amount of work
done and the method of accounting followed. The argument on behalf of the
Revenue that AS-7 has not been notified by the Central Government as an
accounting standard for the purposes of S. 145(2) did not find favour with the
Tribunal. The Tribunal held that in principle, anticipated losses on
incomplete projects are allowable as deduction subject to their being
calculated as per AS-7. However, for the purposes of calculation and
quantification of the said loss in terms of AS-7 it restored the matter to the
file of the AO.

Cases referred :



(1) Tuticorin Alakali Chemcial & Fertilisers Ltd. v.
CIT,
(227 ITR 172) (SC)

(2) ITA No. 9701/Bom./1991, dated 10-8-2001

(3) DCIT v. OTIS Elevator Co. India Ltd., (284 ITR
173) (AT) (Mum.)

(4) Aarts Module v. ITO, (ITA No. 9302/Bom./1992)

(5) Mkb (Asia) (P) Ltd. v. CIT, (294 ITR 655) (Gau.)

(6) Metal Box Co. of India Ltd. v. Their Workmen,
(73 ITR 53) (SC)

(7) Gopal Purohit v. DCIT, (20 DTR 99)

(8) CIT v. India Discount Co. Ltd., (75 ITR 191)
(SC)

(9) Kedarnath Jute Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. CIT, (82 ITR
363) (SC)

(10) Sinclair Murray And Co. P Ltd. v. CIT, (97
ITR 615) (SC)

(11) Mazagoan Dock Ltd. v. JCIT, (2009) (29 SOT
356) (Mum.)

(12) Arawali Construction Co. Pvt. Ltd. (124 Taxman 146)
(Raj.)

(13) CIT v. Elecon Engineering Co. Ltd., (1987)
(SC)

(14) Amway India Enterprises v. DCIT, (2008) (111
ITD 112) (Del.) (SB)

(15) Vithal Health Care Pvt. Ltd. v. ITO, (ITA No.
1754/M/04) (AY 01-02)

(16) CIT v. Shirke Construction Equipments Ltd.,
(246 ITR 429) (Bom.)

(17) M/s. Cambay Electric Supply & Industrial Co. Ltd.
v. CIT,
(113 ITR 84) (SC)


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S. 37(1) — Treatment of deferred revenue expenditure — Expenditure on brand promotion and brand building classified in the books of account as deferred revenue expenditure — Allowable as revenue expenditure.

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(Full texts of the
following Tribunal decisions are available at the Society’s office on written
request. For members desiring that the Society mails a copy to them, Rs.30 per
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  1. ACIT v. Raj Oil Mills Ltd.




ITAT ‘A’ Bench, Mumbai

Before D. Manmohan (VP) and

Rajendra Singh (AM)

ITA No. 5781/M/2007

A.Y. : 2003-04. Decided on : 27-5-2009

Counsel for revenue/assessee : Sanjay Agarwal/ Sanjay R.
Parikh

Per Rajendra Singh :

Facts :

The assessee was engaged in the business of manufacturing
and trading of edible and hair oils, cosmetics and hygiene products. For the
relevant year the assessee had incurred total expenditure of Rs.1.53 crore on
brand promotion and brand building. Out of the same, a sum of Rs.33.15 lacs
had been debited to the profit and loss account and the balance amount of
Rs.1.20 crore had been treated as deferred revenue expenditure in the books of
account. In the return of income the assessee had claimed the entire amount of
Rs.1.53 crore as revenue expenditure. According to the AO the accounting
treatment given by the assessee clearly showed that the assessee was to derive
benefits from the said expenditure for a number of years. He therefore
disallowed the amount of Rs.1.20 crore shown by the assessee as a deferred
expenditure and added to the total income. On appeal, the CIT(A) allowed the
appeal of the assessee.

Held :

The Tribunal noted that the Assessing Officer had
disallowed the claim mainly on the basis of the accounting treatment given by
the assessee in the books of accounts. According to it, the advertisement
expenditure was basically incurred for promoting the sale of the products.
While incurring such expenses the assessee may derive some enduring benefits
but as held by the Supreme Court in Empire Jute Co.’s case, test of enduring
benefit was not conclusive in understanding the true nature of expenditure. A
particular expenditure can be considered as capital expenditure only if there
was some advantage in the capital field i.e., when the assessee had
acquired any new assets or any new source of income. In case the expenditure
had been incurred only for conducting the business more efficiently and more
profitably, there being no advantage in the capital field, such expenses had
to be treated as revenue expenditure as held by the Supreme Court in the above
case. In the case of the assessee, by incurring expenditure on advertisement,
it had not acquired any new asset or any new source of income. The expenditure
had been incurred only for better profitability by promoting the sales. Such
expenditure, according to the Tribunal had to be treated as revenue
expenditure, irrespective of the accounting treatment given in the books as
the accounting treatment is not conclusive in understanding the true nature of
expenditure.

Case referred to :

Empire Jute Company (124 ITR 1) (SC).



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S. 145A — Valuation of inventory — Assessee following exclusive method of accounting for modvat valued its inventory excluding modvat credit — AO valued closing stock inclusive of modvat credit, but refused to similarly value opening stock — AO not justif

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(Full texts of the
following Tribunal decisions are available at the Society’s office on written
request. For members desiring that the Society mails a copy to them, Rs.30 per
decision will be charged for photocopying and postage.)




  1. ACIT v. Tokyo Plast International Ltd.




ITAT ‘A’ Bench, Mumbai

Before J. Sudhakar Reddy (AM) and

P. Madhavi Devi (JM)

ITA No. 3290/Mum./2007

A.Y. : 2003-2004. Decided on : 26-5-2009

Counsel for revenue/assessee : S. K. Pahwa/

Ishwer Rathi

Per P. Madhavi Devi :

Facts :

The assessee was following exclusive method of accounting
for modvat i.e., it did not include un-utilised modvat in the value of
the closing stock. According to the AO, the assessee had not valued the
closing stock as per the S. 145A insofar as the duties relatable to the stock
were not included in the value of the closing stock. He therefore made an
addition of Rs.5.10 lacs to the value of the closing stock and also to the
total income of the assessee. The assessee’s contention to give similar
treatment in the value of the opening stock was rejected by the AO. On appeal,
the CIT(A) agreed with the assessee and allowed the appeal.

Held :

The Tribunal relying on the decisions of the Delhi High
Court in the case of Mahavir Aluminium Ltd. and of the Bombay High Court in
the case of CIT v. Mahalaxmi Glass, upheld the order of the CIT(A) and
dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue.

Case referred to :



1. Mahavir Aluminium Ltd. in 297 ITR 77 (Del.)




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S. 220(2) — Liability to pay interest by assessee — AO not justified in charging interest for the intervening period when the CIT(A) allowed the appeal in favour of the assessee to the period when the Tribunal allowed the appeal in favour of the revenue

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following Tribunal decisions are available at the Society’s office on written
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  1. ACIT v. The Southern Paradise and Stud
    Developers Pvt. Ltd.




ITAT E-1 Bench, Mumbai

Before A. L. Gehlot (AM) and

P. Madhavi Devi (JM)

ITA Nos. 2135 and 2136/Mum./2008

A.Ys. 1995-96 and 1996-97. Decided on : 27-5-2009

Counsel for revenue/assessee : Ajay/Arvind Dalal

Per P. Madhavi Devi :

Facts :

According to the Revenue the CIT(A) had erred in deleting
the interest charged u/s.220(2) for the intervening period when the CIT(A)
allowed the appeal in favour of the assessee to the period when the Tribunal
allowed the appeal in favour of the Revenue. It relied on the decisions of the
Madras High Court in the case of Super Spinning Mills Ltd. and of the
Karnataka High Court in the case of Vikrant Tyres Ltd. and the Board Circular.

Held :

The Tribunal agreed with the assessee that the issue was
covered by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Vikrant Tyres Ltd.
The provisions of S. 220 only revives the old demand notice which had never
been satisfied by the assessee and which notice got quashed during some stage
of the appellate proceedings. In the case of the assessee, no such demand was
pending. Accordingly, the appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed.

Cases referred to :



(1) Vikrant Tyres Ltd., 247 ITR 821 (SC);

(2) Super Spinning Mills Ltd. v. CIT, 244 ITR 814
(Mad.);

(3) Vikrant Tyres Ltd., 202 ITR 456 (Kar.);

(4) Board Circular No. 334, dated 3-1-1982.



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Generalia Specialibus non derogant

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The ‘WORD’

Legal disputes generally become entrenched in cases of clash
of provisions in different statutes, or in the same statute when all such
provisions have application to the issues involved. In such situation the
controversy created is resolved by application of the legal maxim ‘generalia
specialibus non derogant’
which means that general things do not derogate
from special things. Conversely, special things derogate from general things. In
law it means that where there are more than one dispensations, the special
dispensation overrules the general one and it is the special one that has
application in resolving the issue.

2. The principle helps in resolving the conflict arising
between two different Acts. In a recent landmark decision relating to the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 where there were conflicting provisions
in the A & C Act and in the Limitation Act, 1963 as to the bar of limitation for
commencement of proceedings in a Court, the Supreme Court in Consolidated
Engineering Enterprises v. The Principal Secretary (Irrigation Department) &
Ors.,
(2008) INSC 574 held the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to be
a special law, consolidating and amending the law relating to arbitration and
matters connected therewith overriding the provisions of the Limitation Act. The
A&C Act does not prescribe the period of limitation for starting various
proceedings under the Act, except where it intends to prescribe a period
different from what is prescribed in the Limitation Act. There is no express
provision excluding the application of the provisions of the Limitation Act to
proceedings under the A&C Act. On the other hand, S. 43 makes the provisions of
the Limitation Act applicable to proceedings under the A&C Act, except in
certain specified areas and insofar as they are not inconsistent with the
provisions of the A&C Act. When the question arose as to whether the Limitation
Act will apply to proceedings in arbitration which are proceedings before a
Tribunal, an argument was advanced that the Limitation Act has application to
proceedings in Courts only and, therefore, will have no application to
proceedings in arbitration. However, considering the provisions of S. 43 of the
A&C Act, Ss.(1) of which specifically extended application of the Limitation Act
to arbitration as it applies to proceedings in Court, it was held by the Supreme
Court, having regard to the legislative intent and the principle of generalia
specialibus non derogant,
that the Limitation Act will apply with its
extended scope in relation to arbitration proceedings and will have application
to such proceedings whether before the Tribunal or the Courts.

3. The determination as to which of the various statutes is a
special Act is based on the relative evaluation of the two Acts in the context
of the subject-matter in dispute. In relation to the same Act i.e., the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, when there was a clash between the
provisions of the A&C Act and the Electricity Act, the Supreme Court in
Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Essar Power Ltd.,
(2008) 4 SCC 755, where
the issue was whether the provisions of dispute resolution between the licensees
and generating companies contained in the Electricity Act, 2003 will prevail
over the provision of the A&C Act dealing with appointment of arbitrators,
applied the very same principle of generalia specialibus non derogant and
held that the provisions in the Electricity Act are special and hence will
override the general provisions of the A&C Act, 1996.

4. The maxim applies when there are overlapping provisions in
the same statute not consistent with each other. Issues have arisen in the
interpretation of S. 37 vis-à-vis the provisions of S. 30 to S. 36 of the
Income-tax Act. All these provisions govern admissibility of business expenses.
Whereas S. 37(1) is a general provision laying down the broad yardsticks
applicable to admissibility of expenses, S. 30 to S. 36 are special provisions
providing for the admissibility of specified expenses subject to conditions and
limitations prescribed therein. The issue arose as to whether total amount of
bonus paid to employees governed by the Payment of Bonus Act in excess of the
monetary limit prescribed therein can be allowed deduction in computation of
business income. The argument was that to the extent of amount payable under
that Act, the same should be allowed under the proviso to S. 36(1)(ii) and the
excess amount under the general provision of S. 37(1) being the expenditure laid
out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business. The view was
taken that there being a specific provision for such bonus contained in proviso
to S. 36(1) (ii), the general provisions of S. 37(1) had no application and,
therefore, the CBDT vide Circular No. 414, dated 14-3-1985 clarified that the
allowance for bonus to employees governed by the Payment of Bonus Act has to be
restricted to the amount payable under that Act. This view was upheld by the
Bombay High Court in Sabodhchandra Popatlal v. CIT, (1953) 24 ITR 566 and
Madras High Court in N. M. Rayaloo Iyer and Sons v. CIT, 26 ITR 265. The
proviso having been deleted, the overlapping now stands removed.

5. A similar situation arose in relation to the allowability
of expenses on the maintenance of any residential accommodation in the nature of
a guest-house. Whereas S. 30 allows deduction in respect of rent, rates, taxes,
repairs and insurance for premises used for the purposes of business, Ss.(4) of
S. 37 (now stands deleted )denied such guesthouse maintenance expenses. Treating
Section 30 as the special provision not to be overridden by the general
provision of S. 37, the Bombay High Court in CIT v. Chase Bright Steel Ltd.,
177 ITR 124 and in Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd., 189 ITR 660 held
these guesthouse expenses allowable u/s.30 regardless of the provision contained
in S. 37(4). The Supreme Court in Britannia Industries Ltd. v. CIT, 278
ITR 546, however, agreed with the contention of the Revenue that ‘premises used
for purpose of business’ is a broad expression, whereas guesthouse in S. 37(4)
refers to a special category within that broad expression. By the specific
provision in Ss.(4) of S. 37, guesthouse is to be treated differently from the
general category of premises and S. 37(4) brings out clear and unambiguous
intention of the Legislature to make such expenses disallowable.

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Fractionem Diei

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The ‘Word’


When it comes to determine the applicability of any provision
of law with reference to an event occurring on a day, the maxim ‘Fractionem
Diei non recipit lex’
applies according to which the law does not recognise
and take notice of fraction of a day except in cases of necessity and for the
purpose of justice. [Clarke v. Bradlaugh, (1881) 8 QBD 63].

2. When, therefore, a thing is to be done on a certain day,
all the day is allowed to do that thing i.e. from the commencement to the
end of the day. For instance, an Act of Parliament becomes law as soon as the
day on which it is passed commences, unless the commencement be expressly
postponed [Tomlinson v. Bulock, (1879) 4 QBD 230]. Under Indian law also
a central enactment comes into force on the date it receives Presidential
assent. Section 5 of General Clauses Act 1897 provides that any Central Act, not
expressed to come into operation on any particular date, shall come into
operation on the date it receives assent of the President.

3. Every minor comes of age on the beginning of the
anniversary after the years prescribed for majority. S. 3 of the Indian Majority
Act 1872, lays down that every person domiciled in India shall attain the age of
majority on his completing the age of eighteen years and not before. It is
clarified that in computing the age of any person, the day on which he was born
is to be included as a whole day and he shall be deemed to have attained
majority at the beginning of the eighteenth anniversary of that day. His
minority ceases on the day preceding the eighteenth anniversary of his birthday
and he may act as of full age from the first moment of his anniversary date. The
principle applies equally in determining attainment of the age of 65 years
anytime during the previous year for availing income tax benefits of higher
exemption limit prescribed for senior citizens under the Finance Acts.

4. Certain provisions prescribe qualifying period for
attaining certain legal status or for eligibility to commence certain
proceedings. Such period is to be reckoned from the day of certain event upto
the day of some other event. In such a case, while the whole day of both the
events is to be recognised as per the maxim, the issue remains whether both the
days are to be reckoned in working out the prescribed period or only one of them
and if so, which of the two days. The issue in the context of S. 6 of the
Income-tax Act prescribing residence of 182 days or more in India for acquiring
the status of ‘resident’, was examined by the A.A.R. in P. No. 7 of 1995, in
re
(1997) 223 ITR 462 (AAR). It was held that in determining the period of
182 days, even a part of the day will be construed as full day so that both the
days i.e. the date of arrival in as well as the date of departure from
India is to be reckoned The principle should equally apply in reckoning the time
period prescribed under various articles of Double Tax Avoidance Agreements such
as article relating to service PE, independent personal services, dependent
personal services and others.

5. The import of the words ‘from’ and ‘to’ in any legislation
for computing the period prescribed under the statute is laid down in S. 9 of
the General Clauses Act 1897 as under :

(1) In any Central Act or Regulation made after
commencement of this Act, it shall be sufficient, for the purpose of excluding
the first in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word
‘from’ and, for the purpose of including the last in a series of days or any
other period of time, to use the word ‘to’.

6. The principle contained in the above provision of General
Clauses Act governs a large number of charging provisions under the income tax
law in India. With the requirement of recognising part of a day as the whole
day, these provisions require exclusion of the day from which the period begins
and inclusion of the day when the period ends. S.217, for instance, requires
charging of interest at 15% per annum from 1st day of April next following the
financial year in which the advance tax was payable upto the date of regular
assessment. The period for charge of interest should exclude 1st day of April
but include the date of regular assessment. Similarly the amount specified in
the notice of demand u/s. 156 needs to be paid within 30 days of the service of
notice of demand, which means exclusion of the day of service in computing the
period of 30 days.

7. Interest provisions under the Income-tax Act, however, are
worded in a manner so as to exclude the operation of the general provision
contained in the General Clauses Act or make them inconsequential. S. 220, S.
234A, S. 234B and S. 244 relating to charge of interest on taxes due and on
refunds specify the interest period as month or part of month comprised in the
period commencing from a specified date. These specified days are not the days
of event but the days following the day on which some event took place or
following the end of the month suggesting inclusion of the first day in the
period to be computed for charge of interest. S. 220 for instance prescribes
liability to pay simple interest for the period comprised in the period
commencing from the day immediately following the expiry of 30 days of the
service of notice. Further, with the treatment of part of a month as full month
and rate of interest expressed ‘per month’, the actual number of days have lost
significance.

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Exceptio Probat Regulam

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The ‘ WORD’

The maxim describes the role of an exception in inferring,
establishing, confirming and explaining the general rule to which the exception
relates. Understood in its ordinary and literal sense, it means that presence of
an exception establishes that a general rule exists. Derived from medieval Latin
legal principle Exceptio probat regulam in casibus non exceptis,
it indicates existence of a rule having application in cases other than those
stated in the exception.

2. Fowler in ‘Modern English Usages’ explains the principle
with the help of example of an order giving “special leave for men to be out of
barracks tonight till 11 p.m.” Application of the maxim will interpret grant of
special leave as implying a general rule requiring men to be in earlier.
Similarly, a sign that says “parking prohibited on Sundays” (the exception)
proves that parking is allowed on other six days of the week (the rule). The
phrase is also invoked to claim the existence of a rule that usually applies,
when a case to which it does not apply is specially mentioned.

3. The above is, however, a view of the rule somewhat loosely
worded and works differently in different contexts. At times the word ‘prove’
actually means ‘test’. An unusual case in that sense is used to test whether or
not a rule is valid. If the rule stands up to the unusual case, then that
reinforces its truth, if not, then the rule is disproved. In such a case the
main rule and the exception supplement each other in which one gives meaning to
other.

4. Exceptions in law are generally by way of a negative
provision, specific exclusion, proviso or explanation. In tax laws while the
general rule is stated by way of the main provision, exclusions are provided for
by proviso to the general rule. A proper understanding of the law therefore,
requires reading the general rule and the proviso together. The proviso in tax
laws apart from proving the existence of the general rule, confirming,
explaining or harmonising the provision, gets its scope and meaning from the
general rule of which it is an exception.

5. Explaining the purpose of a proviso in a taxing statute,
the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income-Tax vs. Indo-Mercantile Bank Ltd.
[1959] 36 ITR 1, observed, “The proper function of a proviso is that it
qualifies the generality of the main enactment by providing an exception and
taking out, as it were, from the main enactment, a portion which, but for the
proviso, would fall within the main enactment. Ordinarily, it is foreign to the
proper function of a proviso to read it as providing something by way of an
addendum or dealing with a subject which is foreign to the main enactment.” In
this case whereas the main provision contained in Section 24(1) of the
Income-tax Act, 1922 provided for set-off of loss under one head against profit
under another, the proviso which restricted such set-off was attempted to be
used to prevent set off within the same business head arising from two different
businesses. The Court refused to accept the argument observing that a proviso
must be considered with relation to the principal matter to which it stands as a
proviso. Since the proviso in dispute has no positive words which would support
an interpretation in favour of the disintegration of the head ‘business’, it
cannot stop set-off within the same head of income.

6. To put if differently, in taxing statutes an exception
contained in a proviso takes its scope and meaning from the main provision.
Being a carved out exception, in no circumstance can it be construed in such a
manner as to obliterate and swallow up the main provision to which it is a
proviso. In Commissioner of Income-Tax vs. Ajax Products Ltd., (55 ITR
741 SC) Section10(2)(vii) of the I.T. Act, 1922 [Section 41(2) of I.T. Act,
1961] came for consideration in reference to insertion of words “whether during
the continuance of the business or after cessation thereof” in the proviso by
Act 67 of 1949. Arguments were advanced for the Revenue that insertion of these
words takes away the essential condition in the main provision that the asset
should have been used for business conducted during the previous year. Rejecting
the argument and reiterating their observations in Indo- Mercantile Bank case (supra)
about the scope of the proviso, the Court held that as a result of the amended
proviso, surplus arising from machinery sold or discarded or demolished or
destroyed can be taxed even when such events take place after cessation of
business, but only if the machinery was used in the business carried on for any
part during that financial year, as the amended provision has to be considered
with relation to the principal matter to which it stands as a proviso. Unless
the language is so clear that a proviso may be construed as a substantive
clause, it cannot do violence to the main provision.

7. Harmonious construction of the provision and the exception
contained in proviso thereto require consideration of the two as a whole so as
not to set at naught the real object of the main enactment or put in danger the
legitimacy of the rule in its globality. Deciding about retrospective or
prospective application of the proviso to Section 43B inserted by the Finance
Act, 1987 making exception to the general rule contained in Section 43B in
respect of payments of tax, duty, cess or fees, if payment of such liability is
made on or before the due date of furnishing of return, the Orissa High Court in
Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Pyarilal Kasam Manji and Co. 198 ITR 110
went into the intention of the Legislature, the objects and reasons of the main
provision, the mischief sought to be remedied and came to the conclusion that
the proviso, although stated to be applicable w.e.f. 1.4.1988, is to
cover cases from April 1, 1984.

8. In CIT vs. Hico Products Pvt. Ltd. (No.2) Bom, 201
ITR 575 the issue was whether proviso to Section 40A (5)(a) carves out a
different category of director-employees so as to free them from separate
ceilings of allowability of expenditure on payment of salary as laid down in
sub-clause (i) of clause (a) and on provision of perquisite as laid down in
sub-clause (ii) or subjects them, like any other employee, to such separate
ceilings subject to overall ceiling of Rs.72,000. Applying the characteristics
of a proviso as laid down by the Courts, the Bombay High Court held that the
proviso carves out a separate category of employee-directors and, unlike other
employees, subjects them to uniform ceiling of Rs.72,000.

9. What applies to provisos equally applies to specific
provisions laying down exceptions to the general rule. Reference may be made to
the provisions of Section 37(1) containing the general rule of allowability of
business expenditure laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the
purposes of the business or profession. Exceptions to the general proposition
are contained in Sections 40 and 40A. It will be too simplistic to hold that what is not excepted is allowable under the general rule as the allowability of unexcepted is still to be judged by the touchstone of the broad basis in Section 37(1). The same applies to exceptions contained in explanations. Section 37(1) itself has an explanation carving out exception to the general rule in respect of expenditure incurred by an assessee for any purpose which is an offence or which is prohibited by law.

10. To sum up ‘exceptio probat regular’ is a rule of commonsense in which exceptions prove existence of a general rule and the two make a cohesive whole wherein each derives its scope and meaning from the other. The two cannot be read independently unless there are clear words indicating the exception as laying down a substantive provision.

Impotentia excusat legam

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The

Law does not compel one to do that which one cannot
possibly perform
. Where the law creates a duty or charge and circumstances
make it impossible to be performed for no fault of his, the law will, in
general, excuse him. The principle is expressed in the Latin maxim
‘impotentia excusat legam’
literally meaning ‘law excuses impossibility’.
The maxim is referred to in English judgments as ‘lex non cogit ad
impossibilia’
and is akin to Roman maxim ‘nemo tenetur ad impossibilia’.

2. As per Broom’s Legal Maxims “Where the law creates a duty
or charge, and the party is disabled to perform it, without any default in him,
and has no remedy over there, the law will in general excuse him, and though
impossibility of performance is in general no excuse for not performing an
obligation which a party has expressly undertaken by contract, yet when the
obligation is one implied by law, impossibility of performance is a good
excuse”.

3. Broom distinguishes obligation undertaken by the party
under a contract and one which is cast on him or implied by law. While the
former is not excused unless so provided expressly, the latter i.e.,
obligation implied by law stands excused by a supervening or other impossibility
beyond the control of the person obliged. The application of maxim in legally
implied obligation is illustrated by the case in which consignees of cargo are
prevented from unloading a ship promptly by reason of a dock strike. In the
absence of an express agreement to unload in a specified time, there was implied
obligation to unload within a reasonable time and the performance having become
impossible, the maxim ‘lex non cogit ad impossibilia, execuses it.

4. In Industrial Finance Corporation of India v. Spinning
and Weaving Mills,
(2002) INSC 201, the Supreme Court was seized with the
question as to whether the guarantors of loan advanced by the plaintiff to the
respondent were discharged from their obligation on nationalisation of the
respondent’s undertaking and consequent vesting of its properties, which were
given as security, with the Government. Reliance was placed from the side of
guarantors on the provision of S. 141 of the contract Act under which a surety
is entitled to the benefit of every security which the creditor has against the
principal debtor and, if the creditor loses or without the consent of the surety
parts with the security, the surety is discharged to the extent of the value of
the security. The plea of ‘impotentia excusat legam’ from the side of the
plaintiff was sought to be countered on behalf of the sureties and it was argued
that loss of securities by the creditor will cover both voluntary and
involuntary act or acts of the creditor which will discharge the sureties from
their obligation to the extent of their value. After extensive discussion, the
Supreme Court held recourse to the principle of impossibility as misplaced and
held that despite vesting of properly in the government consequent to
nationalisation the contract of guarantee being an independent contract
unaffected by nationalisation and consequences thereof has, in all fairness, to
be honoured to fulfil the contractual obligation.

5. Even though the application of doctrine of impossibility
was considered not relevant, the IFCI decision (supra) makes in-depth
discussion of the doctrine. Even in matters of contractual obligation
distinction is to be drawn between cases where the event which causes the
impossibility was or might have been anticipated when the promisor, by an
absolute contract bound himself or where the impossibility arises from the act
or default of the promisor and cases where it cannot reasonably be supposed
to have been in the contemplation of the contracting parties when the contract
was made. In the latter case the principle of impossibility will apply.
It
is for this reason that an act of God, in some cases, excuses the breach of
contract. It is not, however, uncommon in large contracts to incorporate a
force majeure
clause providing for circumstances in which the performance
will be excused.

6. In Appeal No. 95/2007 decided on 17-3-2007 in the matter
of M/s. CSL Securities (P) Ltd v. Securities and Exchange Board of India,
the Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT) relied on the doctrine of impossibility
as explained in the case of IFCI (supra) and held that if on
corporatisation, the erstwhile proprietor shareholder could not continue to be a
whole-time director for the required period of three years under Para 4 of
Schedule III of SEBI (Stock Brokers and Sub-brokers) Rules 1992, the company
will not be liable to pay the fees for the period for which the founder
shareholder has already been paid.

7. There are situations of impossibility sometimes in legal
provisions also. The maxim of ‘impotentia excusat lagam’ requires
application of legal provision keeping in view the impossibility of
implementation so as not to insist on application of that part of the provision
which is not capable of application. In Standard Chartered Bank v. the
Directorate of Enforcement,
(2005) 4 SCC 50, the applicability of the
provision prescribing punishment of imprisonment and fine for an offence came to
be considered in the context of offence by corporations which, being juristic
persons, are incapable of being imprisoned. While both the majority as well as
minority judgments relied on the maxim ‘Lex non cogit ad impossibilia,
they differed on whether the entire provision is to be ignored or the same is to
be modified so as to remove the impossibility. Delivering the minority judgment
Srikrishna, J observed that the application of the maxim could persuade the
Court to ignore the language of the statutory provision in the case of juristic
person, there being no warrant for dissecting of the Section and treating only
one part as capable of implementation when the mandate of the Section is to
impose the whole of the prescribed punishment. K.J. Balkrishnan J, on the other
hand, delivering the majority decision, quoted from Bennions Statutory
Interpretation and observed that if an enactment requires what is legally
impossible, it will be presumed that Parliament intended it to be modified so as
to remove the impossibility element.

8. The principle also known as doctrine of frustration
finds
expression in the Contract Act. As per Lord Radcliffe, “Frustration
occurs whenever the law recognises that without default of either party a
contractual obligation has become incapable of being performed, because the
circumstances in which performance is called for would render it a thing
radically different from that which was undertaken by the contract” (Davis
Contractors v. Fareham UDC,
1956AC696) S. 56 of the Contract Act provides
that an agreement to do an act impossible in itself is void.
It further provides that a contract to do an act which, after the contract is made, becomes impossible or, by reason of some event which the promisor could not prevent, unlawful, becomes void when the act becomes impossible or unlawful. Impossibility renders the act unlawful and therefore unenforceable.

Ignorantia Juris

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The ‘WORD’

The ‘WORD’

N. C. Jain
Advocate

Ignorantia Juris

‘Ignorantia Juris’
is generally a defence against the violation of law which the courts are quite
circumspect in accepting in view of the legal maxim ‘ignorantia juris non
excusat’
or ‘ignorantia legis neminem excusat’ meaning that
ignorance of law does not excuse
. The principle holds that a person who is
unaware of a law may not escape liability for violating that law merely because
he or she was unaware of it.

2. The rationale behind the doctrine is that if ignorance of
law is taken as an excuse, it would be conveniently used by any person charged
with criminal offence or subjected to civil lawsuit without any conceivable
basis to decide on such ignorance. The law, therefore, imputes such knowledge to
all within the jurisdiction, no matter how transiently.

3. The maxim is juxtaposed to ignorance of facts relevant to
the charge of violation of law or commission of offence which is contained in
the maxim ‘ignorantia facit excusat’. While the ignorance of facts
excuses, ignorance of law does not.
If the heir pleads ignorance of the
death of his ancestors, he is ignorant of fact but ignorance of rights vested in
him on the death of ancestor is ignorance of law which does not generally afford
an excuse.

4. In order, however, for the maxim to apply it is necessary
that the law in question is properly published and distributed. In Harla v.
State of Rajasthan,
1951 AIR 467 where Jaipur Opium Act 1923 was passed by
Council of Ministers but not promulgated or published in gazette, the Supreme
Court observed that natural justice requires that before a law can become
operative, it must be promulgated or published. It must be broadcast in some
recognisable way so that all men may know what it is, or at very least, there
must be some special rule or regulation or customary channel by or through which
such knowledge can be acquired with the exercise of due and reasonable
diligence. In the absence of any special law, or custom, it would be against the
principle of natural justice to permit the subjects of a state to be punished or
penalised by laws of which they had no knowledge and of which they could not,
even with the exercise of reasonable diligence have acquired any knowledge. The
court referred to the decision in Johnson v. Sargent, ILR 1944 Karachi
107 where such a publication or publicity was held to be necessary particularly
in regard to orders of empowered authorities as compared to Acts of British
Parliament which are publicly enacted. The debates in the case of Parliamentary
legislation are open to the public and the Acts are passed by accredited
representatives of the people who in theory can be trusted to see that the
constituents know what has been done. They also receive wide publicity in papers
and now, on wireless.

5. The maxim based on presumed knowledge of law, however,
stands considerably diluted with heavily increasing corpus of national
legislation which works more in favour of lawyers rather than citizens for whom
it is enacted. Taking a practical view, the Courts in genuine cases of ignorance
take account of total facts and circumstances including the object of
legislation, nature of default, its impact and its social cost. In cases
involving penal action, particularly in fiscal matters, where the determinative
issue is existence of reasonable cause or deliberate, contumacious conduct on
the part of the defaulter, ignorance of law is taken as a material factor. The
decision of the Supreme Court in Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. State of Orissa,
(1972) 83 ITR 26 (SC) and similar other decisions could be taken as suggestive
of ignorance of law being taken as relevant to establish absence of guilty
intention when it lays down two basic requirements for imposition of penalty,
viz.
deliberate defiance of law and conscious disregard of obligation. Both
these mental states presuppose knowledge of law and obligations flowing
therefrom.

6. The Courts in taking such liberal view have even gone to
the extent of excusing defaults arising out of wrong legal advice given by
eligible legal consultants. In Shyam Gopal Charitable Trust v. DIT
(Exemption),
290 ITR 99, 105, Delhi High Court, while deciding appeal
against order of imposition of penalty u/s.272A(2)(e), recalled the observations
of the Kerala High Court in State of Kerala v. Krishna Kurup Madhava Kurup,
AIR 1971 Ker 211, which was approved and extracted by the Supreme Court in
Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. [1979] 118 ITR 507.

"I am of the view that legal advice given by the members of
the legal profession may sometimes be wrong even as pronouncement on questions
of law by Courts are sometimes wrong. An amount of latitude is expected in such
cases for, to err is human and laymen, as litigants are, may legitimately lean
on expert counsel in legal as in other departments, without probing the
professional competence of the advice".

The Court, however, made it clear that it cannot be taken as
laying down a general proposition that in all cases where the failure is
attributed to legal advice, it should be taken as constituting sufficient cause.

7. Such dilution in the application of ‘ignorantia juris
non excusat’
even though justified on grounds of modern day multiplicity and
complexity of litigation coupled with standard of education, is to be
resorted to with utmost caution and subjected to the satisfaction that such a
plea is without any taint of malafide or element of recklessness, gross
negligence or a mere ruse.
Willful or deliberate default or disregard of
obligation should not be camouflaged as bonafide mistake caused by ignorance of
law. In V. G. Paneerdas & Co. P. Ltd. v. CWT, 284 ITR 444, the Madras
High Court while commenting on the plea of ignorance of the provisions of
Finance Act 1983 bringing closely held companies into the ambit of wealth tax
observed "Going beyond the well known principles that the ignorance of law is no
excuse, it has to be pointed out that the assessee could not point out any
material fact showing that it was prevented from getting to know the relevant
provisions of the Finance Act 1983." In the facts of the case, the court held
that the provision was well published and a much discussed affair, it is clear
and unambiguous and the assessee was assisted in tax matt

Quo warranto

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The Word

1. A Latin expression for ‘by what warrant ?’ is a legal
process demanding to know by what right a person exercises the controversial
authority. As one of the prerogative writs, the process is a constitutional
remedy which can be availed against a person not qualified to hold a public
office or post. The petition filed against a person alleged to have usurped any
franchise or liberty or office of public nature enables enquiry into the
legality of the claim which a person asserts to an office or franchise and to
oust him from such position if he is found to be a usurper. As observed by the
Supreme Court in the University of Mysore v. C. D. Govinda Rao and Another,
AIR 1965 SC 491, “the procedure of quo warranto confers
jurisdiction and authority on the judiciary to control executive action in the
matter of making appointments to public offices against the relevant statutory
provision; it also protects a citizen from being deprived of public office to
which he may have a right. It would be seen that if these proceedings are
adopted subject to conditions recognized in that behalf, they tend to protect
the public from usurpers of public offices; in some cases, persons not entitled
to public office may be allowed to occupy them and to continue to hold them as a
result of the connivance of the executive or with its active help, and in such
cases, if the jurisdiction of the Courts to issue writs of quo warranto
is properly invoked, the usurper can be ousted and the person entitled to the
post allowed to occupy it”.


2. Halsbury in Law of England, 3rd Vol. II (P.145) puts it as
under :

“The writ of quo warranto is a common law process of
great antiquity a writ of right for the king against one who claimed or
usurped any office, franchise or liberty. An information in the nature of
quo warranto
is obviously its modern form.”


Post the aforesaid observations, informations in quo
warranto
were abolished by Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous
provisions) Act, 1938 giving power to grant an injunction to restrain the
executive of power in an office to which a man is not entitled. The injunction
took place with all the old substantive rules, though the cumbersome and
reconciled procedure of the old writ had been given up.

3. The writ of quo warranto is a discretionary remedy
which the Court may grant or refuse. For a citizen to claim such remedy, he has
to satisfy the Court that (a) the office is of public and of a substantial
nature, (b) it is created by statute or by the constitution itself, and (c) The
respondent has asserted his claim to the office.

4. The remedy of quo warranto is a limited remedy. The
jurisdiction of the High Court to issue such writ can only be used when the
appointment is in clear violation of statutory provisions and rules. Where the
order of appointment is within law, but mala fides of the appointing
authority is alleged, the High Court of Delhi in P. L. Lakhanpal v. Ajit Nath
Ray,
AIR 1975 Delhi 66 held that even though it is indisputable that mala
fide
action is no action in the eye of law, the motives of the appointing
authority in making the appointment of a particular person are irrelevant in
considering issue of writ of quo warranto. The Court in R. K. Jain v.
Union of India,
(1993) 4 SCC 119, held that the evaluation of comparative
merits of the candidates would not be gone into such litigation. In B.
Srinivasa Ready v. Karnataka Urban Water Supply and Drainage Board Employees
Association
(2006), coming out of SLP (C) No. 9393/ 2006, the question to be
decided was whether an order appointing a person ‘until further orders’ can be
challenged in a writ. It was argued that a writ of quo warranto would not
lie against order ‘Until further orders’, as it is not a regular appointment.
Moreover it ensures that appointment continues without limit. Holding that a
writ will not lie, the Court in the facts of the case observed that “When the
statute does not lay down the method of appointment or terms of appointment, the
appointing authority who has power to appoint has absolute discretion in the
matter and it cannot be said that discretion to appoint does not include power
to appoint on contract basis”.

5. The existence of the legal right of the petitioner which
is alleged to have been violated, is the foundation for invoking the
jurisdiction of the High Court in matters of writs. This orthodox rule regarding
the locus standi to reach the Court has gradually undergone a change and
the constitutional Courts have been adopting a liberal approach in dealing with
the cases or dislodging the claim of a litigant merely on hyper technical
grounds. This rule is particularly relaxed in quo warranto matters. The
Supreme Court in Ghulam Qadir v. Special Tribunal & Others, (2002) I SCC
33, observed that there is no dispute regarding the legal proposition that
rights under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can be enforced only by an
aggrieved person except in the case where the writ prayed is for habeas
corpus
or ‘quo warranto’.

6. Courts have, however, been taking the view that the writ
of quo warranto should be refused where it is an outcome of malice or ill
will. The Supreme Court in Dr. B. Singh v. Union of India and others,
(2004) 3 SCC 363, held that only a person who comes to the Court with bona
fides
and public interest can have locus. Coming down heavily on busybodies,
meddlesome interlopers, wayfarers or officious interveners having absolutely no
public interest except for personal gains or private profit either of themselves
or as a proxy for others or for any other extraneous motivation or for glare of
publicity, it was held that apart from credentials of the applicant and prima
facie
correctness and definiteness, the information should show gravity and
seriousness involved.

7. Other grounds on which a writ can be refused are when it
is vexatious or would be futile, or when an alternative remedy will be equally
efficacious or where there is mere irregularity in the election of the office.
Refusal can also arise in cases of laches or where there has been prior
acquiescence of the applicant in respect of the act complained of.

Mandamus

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The Word

Literally meaning ‘command’ or ‘order’ in Latin, the term ‘mandamus
has come to be used in law for a judicial remedy in the form of an order from a
superior court to a court, tribunal, authority, board, corporation or any other
individual or body charged with the performance of a public duty, to discharge
that duty. Mandamus compels them to do acts which they are obliged under
law to do or refrain from doing, which they are not authorised to do in
discharge of public duty or statutory duty. The remedy is in the form of a
prerogative writ under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution of India.


2. While there are judicial remedies by way of appeals,
certiorari
and others to remedy the wrong done, the order of mandamus
is an effective remedy against injustice caused by non-performance of duty
affecting legal rights vested in the person aggrieved by such non-performance of
the public duty. It lies in cases where there is a specific right, but no
specific legal remedy for enforcing that right and also in cases where, even
though there is an alternative remedy, the mode of redress is less convenient,
beneficial and effective or where there is a total absence of jurisdiction. When
a petition for issue of writ of mandamus was filed seeking directions to
the State to refund money illegally collected as tax, the same was held not
maintainable, because a claim for such refund could always be made in a suit
against the authority which had illegally collected the money as tax. Further,
it was held that in the absence of statutory provision whereby the tax realised
had to be refunded when the appellate authority set aside the assessments, no
duty was cast on the State to refund the amount it had realised which was
subsequently found by the appellate authority to be not in accordance with law.
The question whether the State was bound u/s.72 of the Contract Act to return
the amount on the ground that it was paid under mistake was a matter to be
decided in a regular suit and not in proceedings under Article 226 [Sugan Mal
v. State of M.P.,
56 ITR 84 (SC)]. In another case where mandamus was
sought for stopping the recovery proceedings by the TRO for alleged
irregularities, the Supreme Court observed that the existence of an alternative
remedy is not generally a bar to the issuance of a writ or order in the nature
of prohibition. But, in order to substantiate a right to obtain a writ, an
applicant has to demonstrate total absence of jurisdiction to proceed on the
part of the officer or authority complained against. It is not enough if a wrong
Section or provision of law is cited in a notice or order if the power to
proceed is actually there under other provision [Isha Beevi v. TRO, 101
ITR 449 (SC)].

3. Mandamus does not lie to enforce a private right,
neither to enforce a duty of purely ministerial nature which the officer is
bound to perform under orders of competent authority, nor in matters where duty
is discretionary, not imperative. Mandamus was sought against the CBDT
claiming refund of taxes paid for years in respect of which no appeals were
preferred and assessments were allowed to become final. The claim was made on
the basis of the decision in appeal relating to an earlier year, received after
those assessments became final which revealed that no tax was payable in those
years. Rejecting the writ, the Supreme Court held that it is doubtful that the
Central Board can exercise any judicial power and direct refund. Nor is there a
statutory duty cast on it to consider applications for refund, and so a writ of
mandamus would not issue from the court. [Raja Jagdambika Pratap
Narain Singh v. CBDT,
100 ITR 698 (SC)].

4. A public duty enforceable through mandamus must
also be an absolute duty i.e., one which is mandatory and not
discretionary. Where a bottling company’s application for grant of licence was
rejected by the Commissioner and in a writ filed against the Commissioner, the
High Court not only quashed the order but also directed the Commissioner to
grant the licence, the Supreme Court disapproved mandamus on the ground
that in order to compel the Commissioner, by an order of mandamus, to
grant the licence, it must be shown that under the Act and the Rules framed
thereunder there was a legal duty imposed on the Commissioner to issue a licence
without the prior approval of the State Government. In this case the
Commissioner was under no legal duty to grant the licence till he received the
prior approval of the State Government. [Chingleput Bottles v. Majestic
Bottling Co.,
(1984) INSC 60].

5. Distinction has to be drawn between public duties
enforceable by mandamus and duties arising merely from contract.
‘Contractual duties’ are enforceable as matters of private law by the ordinary
contractual remedies such as damages, injunction, specifics performance and
declaration. Such duties are not enforceable by mandamus which is
confined to public duties and is generally not granted if other remedies are
adequate.

6. While mandamus applies to public duties only, it is
not necessary that the person or the authority on which the statutory duty is
imposed, need be a public official or an official body. A mandamus may
issue, for instance, to official of a society to compel him to carry out the
terms of the statute under or by which the society is constituted or governed
and also to companies and corporations to carry out duties placed on them by the
statutes authorizing their undertakings. A mandamus would also lie
against a company constituted by a statute for the purpose of fulfilling public
responsibilities. A writ would lie even against a private individual. The words
‘any person or authority’ used in Article 226 are not to be confined only to
statutory authorities and instrumentalities of the State. They may cover any
other person or body performing public duty. The form of the body concerned is
not very much relevant. What is relevant is the nature of the duty imposed on
the body [Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti
Mahotsav Smarak Trust v. V. R. Rudani,
1989 AIR (SC) 1669].

7. The remedy is prerogative. Apart from existence of
alternative remedy, the Court may decline to interfere where circumstances so
warrant, including the delay in making claims. In Jagdambika Pratap Narain’s
case (supra) the Supreme Court upheld the order of the High Court,
observing that Article 226 of the Constitution is not a blanket power regardless
of temporal and discretionary restraint. If a party is inexplicably insouciant
and unduly belated due to laches, the Court may ordinarily deny redress.

8. Mandamus may take the form of ‘Alternative
mandamus’ when issued upon the first application for relief, commanding the defendant either to perform the act or to appear before the Court to show cause for not performing it. It may be ‘Pre-emptory’ when it is an absolute and unqualified command to do the act in question and is issued when one defaults on, or fails to show sufficient cause in answer to ‘alternative mandamus’.  It is Continuing  mandamus when issued in general public interest commanding performance for an unstipulated period of time for preventing miscarriage of justice. Such an order has relevance where a mere issue of mandamus would be futile against a public agency guilty of continuing inertia and thus continuing mandamus may be issued [Vineet Narain v. UOI, 1998 AIR (SC) 889].

9. Mandamus is a relatively inexpensive and expeditious remedy. In an era where extensive powers are vested in the executive and their inaction in discharge of duties or action which is malafide, beyond jurisdiction or influenced by extraneous considerations might play havoc with the life and liberties of individuals and orderly running of societies mandamus works as the most effective instrument to ensure order and justice. No wonder, the trend of judicial pronouncements is towards a liberal approach with the object of extending its scope and taking a broader view of its coverage. As observed by the Supreme Court in Rudani’s case (supra) “the judicial control over the fast expanding maze of bodies affecting the rights of the people should not be put into watertight compartments. It should remain flexible to meet the requirements of variable. circumstances. Mandamus is a very wide remedy, which must be easily available to reach injustice wherever it is found. Technicalities should not come in the way of granting that relief under Article 226”.

Non Sequitur

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The ‘WORD’

Non Sequitur
is latin for ‘it does not follow’. It is used in speech and reasoning to
describe a statement in which premise and conclusions are totally unrelated but
are used as if they are. In other words, where a conclusion, even if correct, is
sought to be derived from the premise from which such conclusion does not
follow, it is said to be non-sequitur.


2. The expression is often used in legal decisions to
discard, declare irrelevant or unrelated an argument used to establish a
particular fact or a legal position. The fact that a statement or conclusion of
facts or law is non-sequitur does not necessarily imply that the same is
incorrect. What it implies is that the same does not logically follow from the
premise from which it is arrived at. In other words the premise and the
conclusions are unrelated having no cause and effect relationship.

3. A legal decision is a combined effect of finding of
relevant facts — direct and inferential — and application of appropriate legal
principles to the problems disclosed by those facts. Finding of a particular
factual situation from a bundle of facts, not all leading to the same legal
situation, is one area where the conclusion can be termed non-sequitur
i.e.,
not arising from the facts presented. In Alembic Chemical Works Co.
Ltd., v. CIT Gujarat,
1989 AIR 1913, where the issue was whether payment to
a Japanese company for supply of requisite technical know-how was revenue
expenditure being laid out for existing business or capital expenditure on a new
business, the High Court on reading of various clauses of the agreement
concluded that initiation and exploitation of the new process as per the
know-how brought in their wake a new venture requiring an altogether new plant
and, accordingly, held it capital expenditure. In appeal the Supreme Court
basing their decision on terms of the same agreement held the conclusion drawn
by the High Court as non-sequitur.

4. Doctrine of ‘Precedent’ makes the decisions of higher
judicial authorities binding on all lower judicial bodies operating within the
jurisdiction. Doctrine of ‘stare decisis requires Courts to stand by
their earlier decisions, unless a review becomes necessary for reasons of
compelling contemporary social conditions or when additional reasons exist
pointing to a wrong precedent having been created. Legal decisions favouring the
stand of the concerned parties are, therefore, cited to support the views
advocated by them. But, as held by the Supreme Court in State of Orissa v.
Mohd Illiyas,
(2006) ISCC 275, reliance on such decisions without going into
the factual background of the cases before it, is clearly impermissible. A
decision is a precedent on its own facts. It is an authority for what it
actually decides and no more. Their Lordships quoted with approval the
observations of Earl of Halsbury L. C in Leathem (1901) AC 495 (HL) to the
effect that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts of
the case in which such expressions are found. When arguments are based on the
earlier legal decisions of the same or higher judicial authority without due
consideration of the factual background in which those decision were made, the
resulting decision becomes non-sequitur as the conclusion therein does
not follow the cited cases. In Wajid Ali Abid Ali v. CIT Lucknow, 1987
AIR 2074 where the Court was to give meaning to the word ‘cease’ in the context
of a partner ceasing to be a partner and large number of cases were cited, the
Court for the above-stated reason did not consider it necessary to be bogged by
these decisions, holding “These (cases) though throwing light, however, are
non-sequitur
for the issue before us”.

5. In Azadi Bachao Andolan v. UOI reported in 263 ITR
706 where the Supreme Court was to adjudicate on the legality of the Circular
No. 789, dated 13-4-2000 making certificate of residence issued by Mauritius
Authorities as sufficient proof of residence and beneficial ownership, the
argument about the inconsistency of the impugned Circular with the provisions of
the Act, was found to be total non-sequitur for the simple reason that
the impugned Circular No. 789 was a Circular within the meaning of S. 90 and,
therefore, should have legal consequences contemplated by Ss.(2) of S. 90 and
not any other provision of the Act. In other words, the Circular, it was held,
shall prevail even if inconsistent with the provisions of Income-tax Act 1961,
insofar as the parties covered by the provisions of DTAC are concerned, as the
convention overrides the provisions of the Act. The consistency of what is
contained in the Circular, therefore, needs to follow the provisions of S. 90
which alone prevails.

6. Many a time, an order is supported by several reasons out
of which some may be found to be of no relevance to the determination of issue
involved. Mention of such reasons is held non-sequitur even if the
conclusions are upheld in appeal. In State of Maharashtra v. Chandrabhan
Tale,
1983 AIR 803, the Supreme Court was to decide on the legality of the
second proviso to Rule 151(1)(ii)(b) of the Bombay Civil Service Rules 1959
which provided for award of subsistence allowance at rupees one per month to a
government servant who is convicted and sentenced to imprisonment and whose
appeal against the conviction is pending. Concurring with his fellow Judge who
held that rule as illegal, inter alia, for reason of ludicrously low
amount of subsistence allowance, Chinnappa Reddy, J considered the observations
about the nature of public employment opportunity made by the fellow judge as
non-sequitur
and held that “Though the view that public employment
opportunily is national wealth in which all citizens are equally entitled to
share and that no class of people can monopolise public employment in the guise
of efficiency or other ground, is correct, it is non-sequitur“.

He did not favour the right to equal opportunity to public
employment to be treated as a new form of private property and saw no reason to
introduce a new concept of property so as to bring in its wake the vestiges of
the doctrine of leissez faire and create, in the name of efficiency, a
new oligarchy.

S. 149(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Whether the time limit provided u/s.149(3) applies to the asses-see who has voluntarily filed the return of his principal non-resident, and in whose case no order u/s.163 has been passed treating him as the agent of

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New Page 28 2009 TIOL 168 ITAT Mum. (SB)


J. M. Baxi & Co., as agents of Chartering
Singapore Pte Ltd. v. DDIT
ITA No. 2965/M/2006 to ITA No. 2968/M/2006
A.Ys. : 1998-99 to 2002-2003. Dated : 5-3-2009

S. 149(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 —
Whether the time limit provided u/s.149(3) applies to the asses-see who has
voluntarily filed the return of his principal non-resident, and in whose case
no order u/s.163 has been passed treating him as the agent of the non-resident
— Held, No.

Facts :

M/s. J. M. Baxi & Co. (‘the assessee’) filed
returns for A.Ys. 1998-99 to 2002-03 as agent of non-resident Singapore
company, M/s. Thaoresen Chartering Singapore Pte Ltd. (TCSPL). In the returns
filed the assessee and its principal claimed that under Article 8 of Double
Tax Avoidance Treaty, the freight collected in India on account of various
vessels owned/ chartered by TCSPL was taxable at a lower rate. The returns
filed were accepted u/s.143(1) of the Act. Subsequently, the AO issued notices
u/s.148 dated 6-1-2005 to the assessee as agent of non-resident.

Since the notices issued u/s.148 in the first
three assessment years i.e., 1998-99, 1999-2000 and 20002001 were
issued after the expiry of period of two years from the end of the relevant
assessment year the same were claimed to be out of time u/s.149(3) on the
ground that the assessee was an agent of a non-resident. On the other hand,
the Revenue contended that the provisions of S. 149(3) do not apply to a
person who is ‘agent’ under general law and that since the assessee has never
been ‘treated as an agent’ u/s.163, the notices issued are not barred by the
limitation prescribed u/s.149(3).

Since the Regular Bench found conflict of
decisions between various authorities, the matter was referred to the Special
Bench.

Held :

S. 160 to S. 166 are machinery and enabling
provisions and give the Department the option to either assess the
non-resident or his agent. A non-resident or his agent cannot claim that he be
assessed under a particular clause of S. 163 and not u/s.160(1)(i) read with
S. 161.

Under provisions of S. 160 to S. 166, there are
agents of two types : (1) agents who admit their liability as agents of
non-resident. Such liability may be expressly admitted or it may be implied
from their act and conduct. Having accepted themselves to be ‘agent’ of the
non-resident, the question of giving opportunity of being heard to such agents
or passing order, treating them as agent of non-resident, would not arise. (2)
There can be agents u/s.160(1)(i) or u/s.163(1), who deny their liability to
be agents of the non-resident assessee. Because of their stand, it becomes
necessary for the AO to allow them an opportunity of being heard and then
adjudicate the matter relating to their liability to be agent in terms of S.
163(2). When an order u/s.163(2) is passed holding such persons to be agent of
the non-resident, such person falls in the category of persons who are treated
as agents u/s.163. Whether a particular person would fall under first category
or second category, would depend upon facts and circumstances of the case.

S. 149(3) applies only in a case where a person
is ‘treated as an agent’ of a non-resident u/s.163 i.e., persons
disputing their liability as agent. It does not apply to persons who have
voluntarily treated themselves as agent of the non-resident.

The SB upon going through the various clauses of
the agreement entered into by the assessee with its principal and upon
consideration of other facts viz. that the assessee had not disputed
its liability to be assessed as an agent of the non-resident; it had signed
income-tax returns and had filed them as agent for and on behalf of the
non-resident, several documents were furnished with the income-tax authorities
including an undertaking that taxes due from the non-resident would be paid by
the asses-see, came to a conclusion that the assessee had treated himself as
the ‘agent’ and that it was not necessary for the authorities in this case to
provide any opportunity of being heard to the assessee as regards its
liability to be treated as an agent under the Act, nor was there any necessity
to pass any order in terms of S. 163(2). The time limit prescribed in S.
149(3) was held to be not applicable. The question referred to the SB was
answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.


S. 115JB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Whether while computing book profits u/s.115JB of the Act, provision for diminution in value of investments can be added back by invoking clause (c) of Explanation below S. 115JB on the ground that it is not an ascer

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New Page 27 2009 TIOL 131 ITAT Bang.


Rajmahal Trade & Investment Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT
ITA No. 68/Bang./2008
A.Y. : 2003-2004. Dated : 8-8-2008

S. 115JB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 —
Whether while computing book profits u/s.115JB of the Act, provision for
diminution in value of investments can be added back by invoking clause (c)
of Explanation below S. 115JB on the ground that it is not an ascertained
liability — Held, No.

Facts :

For the A.Y. 2003-04, the profit & loss account
prepared by the assessee had adjustments in two parts, namely, adjustments
above the line and adjustments below the line. Profit of Rs.1,47,15,215 was
shown as net profit ‘above the line’. The following two adjustments were
made below the line :

Provision for diminution in value of investments Rs. 32,66,947

Provision for taxes Rs. 10,00,000

After the above two adjustments, the profit
transferred to balance sheet was shown at Rs.1,04,42,268. The assessee while
computing book profit added back the provision for taxes and computed the
book profit to be Rs.1,14,42,268.

While assessing the income of the assessee u/s.
143(3) of the Act, the AO while computing the book profits u/s.115JB held
that provision for diminution in the value of investments was not an
ascertained liability and therefore he invoked clause (c) of Explanation
below the Section and added this sum of Rs.32,66,947 to the profit as per
profit & loss account.

On an appeal by the assessee, the CIT(A) held
that in view of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Apollo Tyres
the AO had no power to re-compute the book profit if the profits of the
assessee have been ascertained in accordance with Part II and Part III of
Schedule VI of the Companies Act, 1956. He agreed with the assessee’s
contention that the provision for diminution in the value of investments did
not represent any unascertained liability and, therefore, cannot be added
back under Explanation

(c) below S. 115JB. He, however, held that the
shares were held as investments and not as stock-in-trade and, therefore,
held that the AO was right in adding back the provision to the book profit.
Accordingly, he confirmed the assessment order on this point.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to
the Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal held that in view of the
observations of the Apex Court in the case of Apollo Tyres Ltd. it is not in
order for the AO or the CIT(A) to rescrutinise the assessee’s accounts to
find out whether the provision has been made for diminution in respect of
shares held as stock-in-trade or as investments. Part III of Schedule VI to
the Companies Act only requires a provision to be created for diminution in
the value of assets and no distinction has been made between an asset which
is held as stock-in-trade and assets which are held as investments by the
assessee. In rescrtuinising the accounts of the assessee and questioning
their correctness the CIT(A) has overlooked the observations of the SC in
the case of Apollo Tyres.

Parts II and III of Schedule VI to the
Companies Act do not recognise any distinction between above the line
adjustments and below the line adjustments. Therefore, the assessee itself
has not recognised any such distinction.


The contentions of the assessee were accepted
and the Tribunal directed the AO to reduce the book profit by Rs.32,66,947
being the provision for diminution in the value of investments.

Section 80IB(10) — Assessment Year 2003-04 — Whether in a case where a project comprising residential housing units and also commercial establishments has been approved by a local authority as a ‘housing project’, deduction under S.80IB(10), as applicable

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New Page 2

  1. 2009-TIOL-218-ITAT-PUNE-SB

Brahma Associates vs. JCIT

A.Y. : 2003-2004. Date of Order : 6.4.2009

 

Section 80IB(10) — Assessment Year 2003-04 — Whether in a
case where a project comprising residential housing units and also commercial
establishments has been approved by a local authority as a ‘housing project’,
deduction under S.80IB(10), as applicable prior to 1.4.2005, is admissible qua
the profits of the entire project i.e., including the profits on sale of
commercial units — Held : Yes.

Whether in a case where such a project is approved by the
local authority as a ‘residential-cum-commercial project’, deduction
u/s.80IB(10), as applicable prior to 1.4.2005, is admissible —Held : Yes, if
the commercial establishments are up to 10% of the built-up area. Whether in a
case where in such a project the area of commercial establishments is more
than 10% of the built-up area, but the profits of residential units can be
ascertained separately and also the size of the plot after excluding the area
utilised for construction of commercial establishment exceeds one acre and all
other conditions are satisfied by considering construction of residential
units as a separate project on a stand-alone basis, deduction u/s. 80IB(10),
as applicable prior to 1.4.2005, is admissible in respect of profits of
residential units — Held : Yes.

Facts :


The assessee was an AOP who constructed a project in Pune,
which project was started on 14th August, 2000 and was completed on 3rd Oct.,
2005. The total area of the plot was 34,209.79 sq. mts. The built-up area of
the residential units was 24,583.31 sq. mts, whereas built-up area of
commercial premises was 7,128.87 mts. The percentage of commercial area to the
total area was 20.83%. The Pune Municipal Corporation had approved the project
as a ‘New/Residential + Commercial’.

The assessee, at the assessment stage, claimed deduction
u/s.80IB(10) in respect of profits attributable to the residential units or
dwelling unit segment of the overall project. The Assessing Officer (AO)
rejected the claim of the assessee on the ground that prior to A.Y. 2005-06 a
project qualified for deduction u/s.80IB(10) only if it was a purely
residential project and did not involve construction of commercial areas at
all. He also noted that the commercial areas constructed in the project of the
assessee were far in excess of the limits prescribed in DC Regulations for
convenience shopping and also the commercial units constructed violated the
norms prescribed in DC Regulations as regards size and the purpose for which
the same could be used.

The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) upheld the order
of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the
Tribunal. The Division Bench noted that there were divergent views in various
decisions of the Division Benches and therefore, a Larger Bench was
constituted to consider the following questions :

1 Whether deduction u/s. 80IB(10), as applicable prior to
1st April, 2005, is admissible in case of ‘housing project’ comprising
residential housing units and commercial establishments ?

2 In case questions no.1 is answered in the affirmative,
whether considering the facts and circumstances of a particular case, a
propor-tionate deduction should be allowed ?

3 In case the answers to questions no. 1 and 2 are in
affirmative, whether the limit prescribed by clause (d) of S. 80IB(10)
should operate ?


Held :

The Special Bench held the amendment to S.80IB(10)
w.e.f.
1.4.2005 laying down the limit up to which a housing project can
have commercial areas to be prospective and not retrospective. It observed
that the 2005 amendment placed a restriction on commercial user and also shows
that commercial user was permissible even prior to that.

The Bench noted that this Section is aimed at promoting
construction of housing projects so as to address the problem of shortage of
dwelling units and it cannot be said that the object is to encourage house
building activity per se, irrespective of whether these are dwelling or
commercial units.

The Special Bench held that for a period prior to 1.4.2005,

(a) A project involving construction of commercial areas
along with dwelling units would qualify for deduction u/s. 80IB(10) if such
a project was approved by local authority as a ‘housing project’. Such an
approval by the local authority will be conclusive and no further inquiry
needs to be made on the extent of commercial use in such a project. Profits
of such a project, subject to satisfaction of other conditions specified in
S.80IB(10), will qualify for deduction u/s.80IB(10). The entire profits of
the project and not only profits attributable to dwelling units will qualify
for deduction u/s.80IB(10).

(b) Given that under the DC Rules (of Pune) there cannot
be a pure residential project and it is incumbent on the developer to
reserve a part of the plot for shopping, commercial use of area must be
regarded as an integral part of housing project and consequently in case a
project involved construction of dwelling units and commercial areas and the
project was approved by a local authority as ‘residential-cum-commercial
project’, such a project will qualify for deduction u/s.80IB(10) if the
commercial areas are up to 10% of the built-up area. Once such a project is
regarded as housing project qualifying for deduction u/s.80IB(10), subject
to satisfaction of other conditions stated in S.80IB(10), entire profits of
the project will be eligible for deduction and not only the profits
attributable to construction of residential dwelling units.

Section 10B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Formula under S. 10B(4) — Whether any expenses on freight, telecommunication charges or insurance attributable to the delivery of articles or things or computer software outside India or any expenses incurred in f

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New Page 2

  1. 2009-TIOL-187-ITAT-MAD-SB

ITO vs. Sak Soft Ltd.

A.Ys. : 2002-2003 and 2003-04.

Date of Order : 6.3.2009

Section 10B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Formula under S.
10B(4) — Whether any expenses on freight, telecommunication charges or
insurance attributable to the delivery of articles or things or computer
software outside India or any expenses incurred in foreign exchange in
providing technical services outside India, which are required to be excluded
from export turnover as defined in Explanation 2(iii) below S. 10B, ought also
to be excluded from the figure of total turnover while applying the formula
prescribed by Ss (4) of S. 10B. — Held : Yes.

 

Facts :

The assessee was a company engaged in export of computer
software. In the return of income filed by the assessee it claimed an
exemption of Rs.3,07,77,341 u/s. 10B of the Act. While computing the amount of
deduction u/s. 10B of the Act the assessee had taken export turnover at
Rs.8,33,64,528 and total turnover at Rs.9,26,23,216. In the course of
assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer (AO) noticed that assessee had
incurred the following expenses in foreign currency.


Employer’s NIC contribution Rs.2,19,672


Salary at London office Rs.20,92,763


Lodging expenses at London Rs.6,263


Travelling expenditure Rs.5,62,896


Professional charges at London office Rs.25,462


Total Rs.29,07,056


The AO held that in terms of clause (iii) of Explanation 2
below S.10B the above expenditure was to be deducted from export turnover. He,
accordingly, reduced the sum of Rs 29,07,056 from export turnover of
Rs.8,33,64,528. The AO thereafter worked the deduction u/s.10B in accordance
with the formula prescribed by S.10B(4). He, however, did not reduce this sum
of Rs.29,07,056 from total turnover in the denominator.


The assessee’s contention was that there should be parity
between the figures of export turnover and total turnover, and the figure of
Rs.29,07,056 should be excluded from both the export turnover and the total
turnover, which are the numerator and denominator, respectively, in the
formula.


The question before the Special Bench (SB) was whether AO
should have taken the total turnover in the formula to be Rs.8,97,16,160
(Rs.9,26,23,216 minus expenditure of Rs.29,07,056).

Held :



(a) As held by the SC in the case of LMW, there has to be
an element of turnover in the receipt if it has to be included in the total
turnover. That element is missing in the case of freight, telecom charges or
insurance attributable to the delivery of the goods outside India and
expenses incurred in foreign exchange in connection with providing of
technical services outside India. These receipts can only be received by the
assessee as reimbursement of such expenses incurred by him. Mere
reimbursement of expenses cannot have an element of turnover. It is in
recognition of this position that in the definition of ‘export turnover’ in
S. 10B the aforesaid two items have been directed to be excluded.


(b) The definition of export turnover contemplates that
the amount received by the assessee in convertible foreign exchange should
represent ‘consideration’ in respect of the export. This can only refer to
the price of the computer software exported out of India. Any reimbursement
of the two items of expenses mentioned in the definition can under no
circumstances be considered to represent ‘consideration’ for the export of
the computer software or articles or things. Thus, there is evidence
inherent in the definition of ‘export turnover’ itself that it should
represent ‘consideration’ for export of the articles or things or computer
software. It follows that the expression ‘total turnover’ which is not
defined in S.10B should also be interpreted in the same manner. Thus, the
two items of expenses referred to in the definition of ‘export turnover’
cannot form part of the total turnover since the receipts by way of recovery
of such expenses cannot be said to represent consideration for the goods
exported.


(c) Ss 10A, 10B, 80HHC, 80HHE and 80HHF provide for
relief from export profits and in that sense they are of the same genre. It
cannot be disputed that the object of these Sections is to promote exports.
If some of the Sections such as S.80HHE and S.80HHF provide for a formula
for calculating the deduction which is identical with the formula prescribed
by S. 10B, it follows that it would be incongruous to interpret Section 10B
in a manner different from these two Sections merely because there is no
definition of ‘total turnover’ in that Section.


(d) Statutorily parity is maintained between export
turnover and total turnover in S.80HHE and S.80HHF. We do not see why such
parity cannot be maintained between export turnover and total turnover in
S.10B just because ‘total turnover’ has not been defined in that Section.


(e) In clause (iii) of Explanation 2 to S. 10B, the
freight, telecom charges and insurance attributable to the delivery of the
goods outside India and expenses incurred in foreign exchange in providing
technical services outside India have been excluded from export turnover.
Therefore, the same have to be excluded also from the total turnover though
that expression has not been defined in the Section.


(f) While explaining the rationale for introduction of
the definition of ‘total turnover’ with retrospective effect in S.80HHC, the
CBDT has in circular no. 621, dated 19.12.1991 by implication at least,
taken the view that parity should be maintained between both the
expressions.


The appeals filed by the Department were dismissed.


Section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 —Concealment penalty — Whether in a case where an assessee in penalty proceedings successfully explains his position and is not trapped within the parameters of clause (c) of S. 271(1)(c) along with the Explan

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  1. 2009-TIOL-193-ITAT-MUM

ACIT vs. VIP Industries Ltd.

A.Y. : 2000-2001. Date of Order : 20.3.2009

Section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 —Concealment
penalty — Whether in a case where an assessee in penalty proceedings
successfully explains his position and is not trapped within the parameters of
clause (c) of S. 271(1)(c) along with the Explanations deeming the concealment
of income, penalty cannot be imposed — Held : Yes. Whether ratio decidendi of
the judgment of Apex Court in Dharmendra Textiles Processors and Ors. is
confined to treating willful concealment as not vital for imposing penalty
u/s. 271(1)(c) and not that in all cases where addition is confirmed, the
penalty shall mechanically follow — Held : Yes.

 

Facts :

The assessee claimed deduction u/s. 35 for scientific
research expenditure @ 100% inter alia towards cost of motor car
purchased during the year. The tax audit report filed by the assessee
categorically mentioned that deduction was claimed on Research & Development
Expenditure including deprecia-tion. The Assessing Officer (AO) added back
this amount and allowed depreciation @ 20% by treating it as car used for
ordinary business purpose not connected with the scientific research and
development activity. This addition was confirmed by the Tribunal.

The AO levied penalty u/s. 271(1)(c).

The CIT(A) allowed the appeal of the assessee and deleted
the penalty levied by the AO.

In an appeal by the Revenue to the Tribunal heavy reliance
was placed on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Dharmendra
Textiles Processors and Ors. (306 ITR 277).

Held :

The Tribunal after considering the decision of the Apex
Court in Dharmendra Textiles Processors held that :

(a) the mere fact that addition is confirmed cannot
per se
lead to the confirmation of penalty because quantum and penalty
proceedings are independent of each other;

(b) Explanation 1 to S. 271(1)(c) is attracted when
either of the following three ingredients is satisfied viz. :

(i) the assessee fails to offer an explanation; or

(ii) he offers an explanation which is found by the
authorities to be false; or

(iii) the person offers an explanation which he is not
able to substantiate and fails to prove that such explanation is bona
fide
and that all the facts relating to the same have been disclosed
by him.

(c) the judgment of the Supreme Court in Dharmendra
Textiles Processors which holds that penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) is a civil
liability and that ‘willful concealment’ and ‘mens rea’ are not
essential ingredients for imposing penalty cannot be read to mean that in
all cases where addition is confirmed, penalty shall automatically follow.
In order to attract S. 271(1)(c), there must be concealment — the fact that
the same is willful or unintentional is irrelevant;

(d) where an assessee genuinely claims a deduction after
disclosing necessary facts, there is no ‘concealment’ even if the claim is
rejected. If penalty is imposed under such circumstances also there will
remain no course open to an assessee to raise disputed claims and such
proposition is beyond recognised canons of law.

The Tribunal upon examining the facts found that the
assessee had bona fide made a claim for deduction u/s. 35 in respect of
cost of car purchased for the purpose of R & D activity by disclosing all the
necessary particulars in the audit report. The Tribunal found this to be a
case of genuine difference of opinion between the assessee and the AO. The
Tribunal held that the assessee had not concealed its income and also none of
the ingredients necessary to be satisfied for invoking Explanation 1 was
satisfied. The Tribunal confirmed the action of CIT(A) and dismissed the
appeal of the Revenue.


Once an assessee is maintaining its accounts as per the mercantile system, any liability which has accrued in a year, though to be discharged at a future date, would be a proper deduction while working out the profits and gains of business.

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  1. [2008] 304 ITR (AT) 130 (Pune)

Thermax Babcock & Wilcox Ltd. vs. Addl. CIT

A.Y. : 1997-98 Dated : 02.03.2007

Once an assessee is maintaining its accounts as per the
mercantile system, any liability which has accrued in a year, though to be
discharged at a future date, would be a proper deduction while working out the
profits and gains of business.


There exists a stipulation in the contract agreements
entered into by the assessee with its customers for manufacture of boilers
that liquidated damages would be paid by either party for causing delay in
executing or erecting or commissioning the work. For the relevant A.Y., the
assessee made a provision of Rs.40,73,360 for liquidated damages. The
Assessing Officer held it to be a contingent liability and hence not
allowable. The disallowance was also upheld by the CIT(A).


On Second Appeal, the ITAT held that :


1. The condition for payment of liquidated damages for
delay in work is inbuilt in the contract agreement itself. Therefore, there
exists an undertaking given by the parties to execute the work within
specified time, and if any delay is caused in completing the work within the
specified time, the defaulter has agreed to pay damages on account thereof.
This undertaking is not found to be conditional.

2. This certain act or event of not completing the work
within the stipulated time has imported a definite and absolute liability on
the assessee and merely because of the fact that liability would be
discharged at a future date and there is a difficulty in estimating the
correct amount thereof would not convert this definite and absolute
liability into conditional one.

3. There could be a dispute only with regard to the exact
quantification thereof, but that by itself would not convert the definite
liability into a contingent one. Where no dispute has been raised as to the
assessee’s liability to pay liquidated damages for delay in executing the
contract work, the provision for liability may be claimed in the year to
which the transaction relates, provided it can be fairly ascertained or
estimated on agreed and admitted terms of the contract.

4. From the Notification No. S.O. 69(E), dt. 25th Jan.,
1996, issued by the CBDT under S.145(2), it is clear that the Department has
itself accepted the principle that a provision should be made for all known
liabilities and losses even though the amount cannot be determined with
certainty and represents only a best estimate in the light of available
information.


Based on the above observations, the ITAT remanded the
matter back to the Assessing Officer to ascertain and determine the accrued
liability pertaining to the relevant A.Y. in light of the terms and condition
of the agreement and accordingly allow the deduction.


Cases relied upon :





1. Calcutta Co. Ltd. vs. CIT, (1959) 37 ITR 1 (SC)


2. Metal Box Company of India Ltd. vs. Their Workmen,
(1969) 73 ITR 53 (SC)


3. Bharat Earth Movers vs. CIT, (2000) 245 ITR 428
(SC).



Whether Assessing Officer can make a reference to DVO u/s. 142A where he is of the opinion that the figure of investment in property is overstated; Held : No.

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  1. [2008] 304 ITR (AT) 354 (Jodhpur)

Saraswati Devi Gehlot (SMT) vs. ITO

A.Y. : 2002-03 Dated : 31.08.2007

Whether Assessing Officer can make a reference to DVO u/s.
142A where he is of the opinion that the figure of investment in property is
overstated; Held : No.

 

The assessee has shown an investment in shops at Rs.
26,45,100 and the Assessing Officer made reference to the DVO as in his
opinion this figure should be less. Hence, the Assessing Officer made a
reference to the DVO. The valuation given by the DVO Rs.23,33,177 was adopted
as cost of construction by the Assessing Officer, which resulted into a short
term capital gain of Rs. 2,50,823 against loss of Rs. 61,100 declared by the
assessee. This addition was also upheld by the CIT(A).

The Tribunal observed that :

1. Basis of cost of construction of shops shown by the
assessee has not been disputed by the Assessing Officer and no adverse
comment has been made by him in this regard. Thus, the cost of acquisition
declared by the assessee does not warrant any interference.

2. Reference to DVO u/s. 142A can be made for the purpose
of Sec. 69, 69A or 69B. All these Sections refer to a situation where either
the assessee is found to be owner of some valuables not recorded in the
books or the value recorded by him is less than the investment made by him.
However, in the present case, the Assessing Officer was of the view that the
value recorded by the assessee is more than the investment made by him.
Reference to DVO u/s. 142A is not permissible in such situation.

3. Further, reference as contemplated under S.55A is for
ascertaining the fair market value of a capital asset and not for
determining the cost of acquisition or construction.

Thus, the ITAT was of the view that reference to DVO is
void ab initio and the report supplied by the DVO is of no consequence.

Case Referred to :



· Smt. Amiya Bala Paul vs. CIT, (2003) 182 CTR
(SC) 489; (2003) 262 ITR 407 (SC) and also Circular No. 5 of 2005, dt. 15th
July, 2005.



Payments made by assessee, a co-operative society running sugar mills, to Zone Samitis formed by the cane growers, for spending the same on harvesting, cutting and transporting sugarcane to assessee’s factories on behalf of cane growers, which were debite

[2008] 304 ITR (AT) 1 (Ahmedabad)

    Kamrej Vibhag Sahakari Khand Udyog Mandli Ltd. vs. ITO

    and

    Sayan Vibhag Sahakari Khand Udyog

    Mandli Ltd. vs. ITO

    A.Ys. : 2003-04 & 2004-05 Dated : 30.05.2008

    Payments made by assessee, a co-operative society running sugar mills, to Zone Samitis formed by the cane growers, for spending the same on harvesting, cutting and transporting sugarcane to assessee’s factories on behalf of cane growers, which were debited to cane growers’ advance account and ultimately adjusted against the cost of cane — Whether provisions of Section 194C applicable ? Held : No.

    The assessee is a co-operative society running sugar mills. Farmers, who are members of the assessee society, form committees every season known as Zone Samitis for the purpose of undertaking the collective work of harvesting, cutting and transportation of sugarcane to the factory sites. The assessee made advance payments at a fixed rate to the Samitis for spending the same on harvesting, cutting and transporting sugarcane to its factories which was the liability of the cane growers. The Assessing Officer held that the assessee was liable to deduct tax at source u/s. 194C from these payments and accordingly he raised demands u/s. 201 against the assessee with interest. These orders were also upheld by the CIT(A).

    On second appeal to the ITAT, the Tribunal observed that there were conflicting judgments in case of Shree Chalthan Vibhag Khand Udyog Sahakari Mandli Ltd. vs. ITO, 104 TTJ 654 (AHD) and Shree Mahuva Pradesh Sahakari Khand Udyog Mandli Ltd. Because of these two orders, the President constituted a Special Bench to decide the controversy.

    The Special Bench held as follows :

    1. Section 194C applies when payments are made for carrying out any work including supply of labour for carrying out any such work in pursuance of a contract between the contractor and the persons stated therein. By sub-Section (1) of S.194C a liability to deduct tax at source is cast upon the person responsible for paying any such sum. Here, the responsibility of paying the sum for harvesting, cutting and transporting is of the cane growers. This is clearly established by the fact that the payments, though made in instalments, were debited to the individual accounts of the cane growers, maintained by the assessee and adjusted ultimately against the cost of the cane.

    2. The payments are, no doubt, made to the labour hired for this purpose but these payments were made by the Samiti or by the assessee as alleged by the Revenue, not on its own account; they were for and on behalf of the cane growers.

    3. The assessee was required to pay the fixed price and make the payment to the cane growers for the cost of the cane; The payments, though in instalments, were debited to the cane growers’ advance account and adjusted ultimately as cost of the cane.

    4. The assessee had given and Samitis have taken the amount from the assessee for and on behalf of the cane growers and on their behalf; Samitis have also paid that amount to the labourers on account of the cane growers.

    5. Surplus and deficit is ultimately adjusted in the cane growers’ account through the Samitis who have paid and received that amount from the assessee-company.

    Thus assessee is not liable to deduct tax at source under S.194C from these payments.

    Cases Relied upon :

    · Associated Cement Company Ltd. vs. CIT, (1993) 201 ITR 435 (SC)

    · BDA Ltd. vs. ITO, (2006) 281 ITR 99 (Bom)

    · Balsara Home Products Ltd. vs. ITO, (2005) 94 TTJ (Ahd) 970

    · Birla Cement Works vs. CBDT, (2001) 248 ITR 216 (SC)

    · CIT vs. Dabur India Ltd., (2006) 283 ITR 197 (Del)

Whether fee received from clients in advance by advocate following a cash method is income of the year in which it is received, Held : No. Whether a mistake in one assessment year should be carried over to the assessment proceedings of the next assessment

14. [2008] 304 ITR (AT) 295 (Delhi)

    K. K. Khullar vs. Dy. CIT

    A.Y. : 2002-03 Dated : 18.01.2008

    Whether fee received from clients in advance by advocate following a cash method is income of the year in which it is received, Held : No. Whether a mistake in one assessment year should be carried over to the assessment proceedings of the next assessment year, Held : No i.e., it is not compulsory for the A.O. to carry forward the interpretations and findings of the earlier orders without application of mind.

    The assessee, an Advocate, recovered fees from his clients in advance. The proportionate fees relating to the work performed and the balance of fees is shown as advance received from clients. The Assessing Officer made an addition of the advance fees to the income of the year in which it was received in view of Section 145 of Income-tax Act, 1961, stating that there are only two methods of accounting viz., Cash and Accrual. As per cash system of accounting, the amount of fess received should be liable to tax in the year of receipt itself. Also the CIT(A) was of the opinion that since the assessee was a professional, the method of accounting followed should be in consortium with other professionals i.e., cash basis.

    On further appeal to the Tribunal, it was held as follows :

    1. Income only to the extent of the amount pertaining to services rendered vested in the assessee. The rest of the amount was taken as liability to be vested in subsequent years as and when the services were rendered.

    2. The excess amount would have to be returned in case the service was not performed in subsequent years and therefore, in respect of such amount, no debt came into existence in favour of the assessee.

    3. The levy of Income-tax is a levy on income. The Act takes into account two points of time at which the liability to tax is attracted, namely, the accrual of income and its receipt. However the substance of the matter is ‘Income’.

    4. The findings of the CIT(A) that the assessee was following a hybrid system of accounting on the ground that the whole of the amount received from clients as retainer fees was not declared as income in the year of receipt of the amount was not correct.

    5. A wrong decision rendered by the Assessing Officer in one year or in number of years would not bind the Assessing Officer in the assessment of a subsequent year as there could not be any estoppel against law. The principle of res judicata does not apply to Income-tax proceeding as each assessment year is a separate unit.

    On the above reasoning, the ITAT deleted the addition made by the Assessing Officer.

    Cases Relied upon :

    1. CIT vs. M/s. Shoorji Vallabhdas & Co., [1962] 46 ITR 144(SC)

    2. Radhasoami Satsang vs. CIT, [1992] 193 ITR 321 (SC).

Section 271(1)(c) — When Assessing Officer recalculates total income in accordance with law and such total income is different from that calculated by the assessee, there is no concealment of particulars of income or furnishing of inaccurate particulars o

   (2009) 28 SOT 470 (Mum.)

    Mimosa Investment Co. (P.) Ltd. vs. ITO

    A.Y. : 2004-05. Dated 15.01.2009

    Section 271(1)(c) — When Assessing Officer recalculates total income in accordance with law and such total income is different from that calculated by the assessee, there is no concealment of particulars of income or furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income or deemed concealment in accordance with Explanation 1 to Section 271(1).

    
    For the relevant assessment year, the Assessing Officer made some addition on a pro rata basis in terms of Section 14A. Thereafter, the Assessing Officer levied penalty u/s.271(1)(c) on ground that the assessee had not furnished full particulars for purpose of computation of its income. The CIT(A) confirmed the penalty by observing that the assessee had concealed its income and had furnished inaccurate particulars of its income.

    The Tribunal deleted the penalty. The Tribunal noted as under :

    1. There cannot be a straitjacket formula for detection of defaults of concealment or of furnishing inaccurate particulars of income. Concealment of particulars of income and furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income may at times overlap. It depends upon the facts of each case.

    2. On consideration of facts of the instant case it was not found that the assessee had concealed the particulars of his income or had furnished inaccurate particulars of such income. The assessee had furnished a note along with the return of income stating, “the interest expenditure was not considered as disallowed u/s.14A as the investments had not been made for the purpose of earning dividend income but for business consideration including capital appreciation. However, without prejudice to the above contentions, if any interest was to be considered as being in relation to dividends earned, the disallowance would amount to Rs.41.18 lacs as per the relevant annexure”, which was also enclosed by the assessee.

    3. Hence, the assessee had disclosed all the relevant material facts for the purpose of computation of total income. The assessee had also offered explanation in this regard, which was not found to be false by the Assessing Officer. The explanation of the assessee regarding claim of interest expenditure was bona fide. The assessee had substantiated his explanation.

    4. When the assessee had furnished all the material facts for the purpose of computation of total income, the Assessing Officer was duty-bound to calculate correct total income in accordance with law, which might have been different than the total income calculated by the assessee.

    5. Mere fact that the Assessing Officer while discharging his duty was recalculating the total income in accordance with law and such income was not the same as calculated by the assessee, it could not be held that the assessee had concealed particulars of his income or had furnished inaccurate particulars of such income or there was a deemed concealment in accordance with Explanation 1 to Section 271(1)(c).

    Therefore, penalty u/s.271(1) read with Explanation 1 could not be invoked. The penalty levied by the Assessing Officer was deleted.

Section 194D does not apply to each and every payment made by any person by way of commission or otherwise; it applies to remuneration or reward paid for soliciting or procuring insurance business.

       12. (2009) 28 SOT 453 (Mum.)

        General Insurance Corpn. of India vs. Asst. CIT (TDS)

        A.Ys. : 2004-05 to 2006-07. Dated 13.02.2009

        a. Section 194D does not apply to each and every payment made by any person by way of commission or otherwise; it applies to remuneration or reward paid for soliciting or procuring insurance business.

        b. Since commission paid by assessee to insurance companies was in nature of compensation towards cost of procurement incurred by insurance companies for originally accepting insurance business from agents, provisions of Section 194D would not be attracted.

        The assessee public sector undertaking, engaged in the business of re-insurance, accepted re-insurance contracts from other insurance companies and paid commission on the re-insurance premium earned without deducting tax at source on such commission. The Assessing Officer treated the assessee to be in default for non-deduction of tax u/s.194D. The CIT (A) upheld the order of the Assessing officer.

        The Tribunal held that Section 194D was not attracted on the facts of the instant case. The Tribunal noted as under :

        1. In terms of Section 194D, tax deduction is to be made from income which is in the nature of remuneration or reward (whether it is called commission or otherwise) for soliciting or procuring insurance business. Section 194D does not apply to each and every payment made by any person by way of commission or otherwise; it applies only to remuneration or reward paid for soliciting or procuring insurance business. The language of Section 194D makes it abundantly clear that if the commission or other payments are made by any assessee not by way of remuneration or reward for soliciting or procuring insurance business, then Section 194D would not apply.

        2. In the instant case, the insurance companies did not procure business for the assessee-company nor did the assessee-company pay any commission or other payment for soliciting the business from the insurance companies.

        3. Such commission was allowed by the assessee-company in order to compensate the insurance companies for the brokerage and other costs incurred in procuring the business by the ceding company. Considering the nature of the payment made by the assessee-company to the insurance companies by way of commission, it could be said that the same did not fall within the category of payments by way of remuneration or reward for soliciting or procuring insurance business from the insurance companies.

    2. As held in the case of Gujarat Gas Financial Services Ltd. vs. Asst.CIT (2008) 115 ITD 218 (Ahd.)(SB), deposits cannot be equated with loans or advances. The Special Bench had held that the two expressions ‘loans’ and ‘deposits’ are different and the distinction can be summed up by stating that in the case of loan, the needy person approaches the lender for obtaining the loan therefrom. The loan is clearly lent at the terms stated by the lender. In case of deposits, however, the depositor goes to the depositee for investing his money primarily with the intention of earning interest.

    3. Section 2(22)(e) enacts a deeming fiction whereby the scope and ambit of the word ‘dividend’ has been enlarged to bring within its sweep certain payments made by a company as per the situations enumerated in the said Section.

    4. Such a deeming fiction could not be given a wider meaning than what it purports to be. The provision would necessarily be accorded strict interpretation and the ambit of the fiction would not be pressed beyond its true limits.

    5. The requisite condition for invoking Section 2(22)(e) is that payment must be made by way of loan or advance. Since there is a clear distinction between inter-corporate deposits vis-à-vis loans / advances, the lower authorities were not right in treating the same as deemed dividend u/s.2(22)(e).

Section 2(22)(e) — Inter Corporate Deposits (ICDs) are different from loans or advances and would not come within purview of deemed dividend u/s.2(22)(e).

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  1. (2009) 28 SOT 383 (Mum.)

Bombay Oil Industries Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT

A.Y. : 2001-02. Dated 22.01.2009

Section 2(22)(e) — Inter Corporate Deposits (ICDs) are
different from loans or advances and would not come within purview of deemed
dividend u/s.2(22)(e).

 

During the relevant assessment year, the assessee-company
had taken unsecured loans from three companies by way of ICDs for the purpose
of its business. The Assessing Officer treated these amounts as deemed
dividend u/s.2(22)(e). The CIT(A) upheld the order of the Assessing Officer.

The Tribunal held that ICDs do not come within the purview
of Section 2(22)(e). The Tribunal noted as under :

1. The lower authorities had not controverted the claim
of the assessee that the amounts received from the three companies were
inter-corporate deposits. The Assessing Officer held it against the assessee
only on account that it had failed to explain that the investment was
neither loan nor advance.

2. As held in the case of Gujarat Gas Financial Services
Ltd. vs. Asst.CIT (2008) 115 ITD 218 (Ahd.)(SB), deposits cannot be
equated with loans or advances. The Special Bench had held that the two
expressions ‘loans’ and ‘deposits’ are different and the distinction can be
summed up by stating that in the case of loan, the needy person approaches
the lender for obtaining the loan therefrom. The loan is clearly lent at the
terms stated by the lender. In case of deposits, however, the depositor goes
to the depositee for investing his money primarily with the intention of
earning interest.

3. Section 2(22)(e) enacts a deeming fiction whereby the
scope and ambit of the word ‘dividend’ has been enlarged to bring within its
sweep certain payments made by a company as per the situations enumerated in
the said Section.

4. Such a deeming fiction could not be given a wider
meaning than what it purports to be. The provision would necessarily be
accorded strict interpretation and the ambit of the fiction would not be
pressed beyond its true limits.

5. The requisite condition for invoking Section 2(22)(e)
is that payment must be made by way of loan or advance. Since there is a
clear distinction between inter-corporate deposits vis-à-vis loans /
advances, the lower authorities were not right in treating the same as
deemed dividend u/s.2(22)(e).



Section 11 read with Section 12A — An Institution or Trust having mixed activities of charity as well as religion cannot be denied exemption u/s.11(1)(a).

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  1. (2009) 28 SOT 148 (Cochin)

Calicut Islamic Cultural Society vs. Asst. CIT

A.Y. : 2003-04. Dated 31.07.2008.

Section 11 read with Section 12A — An Institution or Trust
having mixed activities of charity as well as religion cannot be denied
exemption u/s.11(1)(a).

 

The assessee was an Islamic Society registered under the
Societies Registration Act, 1860 as a charitable society. Its claim for
exemption of income u/s.11 was not allowed by the Assessing Officer on the
ground that the activities of the assessee were partly religious and partly
charitable in nature and, thereby, they were not eligible for claiming
exemption of their income u/s.11(1)(a).

The CIT (A) confirmed the order of the Assessing Officer.

The Tribunal, relying on the decisions in the following
cases, held that the assessee was entitled to exemption u/s.11 :

a. Hiralal Bhagwati vs. CIT, (2000) 246 ITR 188 (Guj.)

b. CIT vs. Surat City Gymkhana, (2008) 170 Taxman
612 (SC)

The Tribunal noted as under :

1. The assessee was not constituted only for the benefit
of the backward community but for the benefit of the entire public.
Moreover, in the institutions run by the assessee, more particu-larly the
educational institutions, members of other communities were also admitted.
They were also giving support to the poor.

2. The entire controversy was thus revolving around the
interpretation of Section 11(1)(a). It was interpreted that as per the words
used in Section 11(1)(a), any institution or trust must perform either
wholly charitable or wholly religious activities.

3. The interpretation given by the Assessing Officer as
well as by the CIT(A) that the purpose should be wholly charitable or wholly
religious was only academic. When the Legislature has categorically defined
the purposes like religious and charitable and if the assessee is engaged as
per their objects in mixed activities, which are partly charitable and
partly religious, it cannot be said that Section 11(1)(a) does not
contemplate such a situation.

4. Once registration is granted to the assessee by the
CIT u/s.12A, the Assessing Officer cannot probe into the objects and the
purpose of the trust or institution — that is within the exclusive domain
and jurisdiction of the Commissioner. What the Assessing Officer can do at
the most is that he can investigate into the matter within the four corners
of Section 13. In the instant case, the Assessing Officer had gone ahead
with investigating and probing the basic objects of the trust by entering
into the shoes of the Commissioner and such exercise was not permissible.

In view of the above, the assessee was allowed the benefits
of Section 11.


S. 36(1)(vii) of the Income-tax Act — Since debts could not be recovered in spite of best efforts, whether assessee was entitled to deduction u/s.36(1)(vii) — Held, Yes.

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  1. [2009] 116 ITD 321 (Chennai)


Preeti Tex v. Income-tax Officer,

Ward-II(4), Coimbatore

A.Y. : 2003-04. Dated : 18-1-2008

S. 36(1)(vii) of the Income-tax Act — Since debts could not
be recovered in spite of best efforts, whether assessee was entitled to
deduction u/s.36(1)(vii) — Held, Yes.

The assessee-firm had entered into a Cost, Insurance and
Freight (CIF) agreement with a certain Bangladeshi party for selling its
goods. When the goods reached Custom station of Benapole inside Bangladesh,
said party failed to pay for goods after having acknowledged receipt of goods
at Custom station. Therefore, the assessee claimed value of goods from foreign
buyer. Despite making an honest attempt to recover the said amount, the
assessee could not recover the same and, therefore, had written-off said
amount as bad debts in its books of account during the year and claimed
deduction of same u/s.36(1)(vii). The Assessing Officer rejected its claim. On
appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) found that there was no evidence on the
part of the assessee to show as to what legal steps were taken by it against
the buyer or its bank to recover its money. He, therefore, rejected the
assessee’s claim.

On second appeal : the ITAT held that :

(1) Under a CIF contract, seller is required to insure
the goods; to deliver them to the shipping company; to arrange for
affreightment; and to send the bill of lading and insurance policy together
with invoice and a certificate of origin to a bank.

(2) The documents are usually delivered by the bank
against the payment of price or against the acceptance of the bill.

(3) The property in the goods passes on to the buyer on
the delivery of documents. In the instant case, it was not disputed that the
buyer had got the delivery of documents.

(4) In a CIF contract the buyer has got to accept the
documents and to pay the price, even if the goods are destroyed or lost. In
that case, he has the remedy against the insurer to recover the loss.

(5) The whole documents the assessee relied upon had
clearly proved the completed wholesome CIF contract and the assessee had
taken an honest decision as contemplated on the part of the duty of the
seller. The insurance was perfectly made. All requirements of CIF contract
were satisfied. Therefore, the assessee could not be faulted with
transaction. As per the C&F terms, the goods were sold and the fact that the
goods had reached the Custom station was not at all disputed.

(6) The fact that the goods were lost or destroyed in a
fire at the Custom port in Bangladesh was also not disputed. Under the above
circumstances, the amounts were due under two of the invoices for goods sold
on C&F terms and the goods were exported on C&F terms after fulfilling all
the conditions for entering into C&F contract, the goods were covered by
transit insurance arranged by the buyer.

Under the above facts and circumstances, in spite of honest
efforts made by the assessee, the debts could not be recovered and in view of
the honest decision of the assessee the book debts were written-off for the
previous year relevant to the assessment year under appeal. Therefore, the
claim of the assessee was to be allowed.

S. 80IA of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Whether S. 80-IA(2) gives an option to assessee to claim relief u/s.80-IA for any 10 consecutive assessment years out of 15 years beginning from year in which undertaking or enterprise develops or begins to operate an

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  1. [2009] 116 ITD 241 (Chennai)


Mohan Breweries & Distilleries Ltd. v. ACIT
(Chennai)

A.Y. : 2004-05. Dated : 31-10-2007

S. 80IA of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Whether S. 80-IA(2)
gives an option to assessee to claim relief u/s.80-IA for any 10 consecutive
assessment years out of 15 years beginning from year in which undertaking or
enterprise develops or begins to operate any infrastructure facility, etc.,
and it does not mandate that first year of 10 consecutive assessment years
should be always first year of set-up of enterprise — Held, Yes — Whether
provision of S. 80-IA(5), treating eligible undertaking as a separate sole
source of income, is applicable only when assessee chooses to claim deduction
u/s.80-IA and same cannot be applied to a year prior to the year in which
assessee opted to claim relief u/s.80-IA for first time — Held, Yes.

The assessee-company had started three power projects, two
in the previous year, relevant to the A.Y. 1996-97 and one in the previous
year, relevant to the assessment year 1999-2000. In respect of the profits of
these power units, the assessee claimed deduction u/s.80-IA for the first time
in the A.Y. 2004-05. The Assessing Officer held that while computing the gross
total income of the eligible units, the notional brought forward loss incurred
by those units in earlier years had to be taken into account first and after
that, if any remaining profit was available then the deduction u/s.80-IA had
to be given.

On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the order of
the Assessing Officer. On second appeal, the ITAT held that :

(1) S. 80-IA gives an option to the assessee to claim
relief under this section for any 10 consecutive assessment years out of 15
years beginning from the year in which the undertaking or enterprise
develops or begins to operate any infrastructure facility, etc.

(2) S. 80-IA(2) does not mandate that first year of 10
consecutive assessment years should be always the first year of set-up of
enterprise.

(3) The provision of S. 80-IA(5) is applicable only when
the assessee chooses to claim deduction u/s.80-IA and if it has not chosen
to claim the deduction u/s.80-IA, S. 80-IA(5) cannot be made applicable.

(4) In the instant case, there was a categorical finding
by the Assessing Officer and the Commissioner (Appeals) that the first year
claimed by the assessee was from the A.Y. 2004-05. Hence, the initial
assessment year could not be the year in which the undertaking commenced its
operations but it was the assessment year in which the assessee had chosen
to claim deduction u/s.80-IA. Therefore, there was no question of
setting-off notionally carried forward unabsorbed depreciation or loss of
earlier years against the profits of the units and the assessee was entitled
to claim deduction u/s.80-IA on the current assessment year’s profit.

Whether if application filed by assessee for additional time for removing the defect in the return u/s.139(9), is not disposed of or no action is taken and if Assessing Officer remains silent then time asked for by assessee would be treated as granted by

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  1. [2009] 116 ITD 207 (Cochin)


Indus Motor Co. Ltd. v. ACIT

A.Y. : 1998-99. Dated : 24-1-2007

Whether if application filed by assessee for additional
time for removing the defect in the return u/s.139(9), is not disposed of or
no action is taken and if Assessing Officer remains silent then time asked for
by assessee would be treated as granted by Assessing Officer — Held, Yes.

The assessee-company filed its return of loss on
30-11-1998, but it could not attach the statutory audit report with it.
Consequently, the Assessing Officer issued letter to the assessee asking it to
rectify said defect. On receipt of the letter, the assessee filed application
requesting for extension of time till 5-3-1999 for filing the audit report as
per the deficiency letter. However, there was no communication from the
Assessing Officer in response to the said application of the assessee.
Subsequently, the assessee filed another return of loss on 5-3-1999 revising
the loss. The Assessing Officer completed the assessment u/s.143(3) but the
said loss was refused to be carried forward and set-off in future on the
ground that the assessee had filed its revised return of loss after the due
date. On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the impugned order.

On second appeal, the ITAT held that :

1. As per the provisions of S. 80, if the return of
income is not filed as provided u/s.139(3) the loss determined shall not be
carried forward and allowed to be set-off under the relevant provisions.

2. S. 139(9) provides that if the return furnished by the
assessee is defective then the AO may intimate the defect to him and give
him an opportunity to rectify the defect within a period of 15 days or
within such further period on an application made by the assessee as the
Assessing Officer in his discretion may allow.

3. In the instant case, the assessee filed an application
requesting for further period to rectify the defect. It had requested the AO
for time up to 5-3-1999 to file the return. It was the duty of the AO to
dispose of the application filed by the assessee, either granting the
additional time or refusing the same. But the AO did not act on the said
application.

4. If the application filed by the assessee for
additional time is not disposed of or no action is taken and if the
Assessing Officer remains silent, then time asked for by the assessee would
be treated as granted by the Assessing Officer.

5. Another aspect to be considered was that if it was not
a valid return, then how the assessment was framed u/s.143(3). The returns
filed by assessee on 30-11-1998 as well as on 5-3-1999 were valid returns
and there was no bar to carry forward determined loss as per S. 80.

Whether as per S. 26, any income which is chargeable under head ‘Income from house property’ is to be assessed in hands of co-owners if their shares are ascertainable and such income cannot be taxed in hands of AOP — Held, Yes.

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  1. [2009] 116 ITD 155 (Bang.)


ACIT v. S. Prabhakar Kamath

A.Ys. : 1995-96 to 1998-99

Dated : 30-4-2007

Whether as per S. 26, any income which is chargeable under
head ‘Income from house property’ is to be assessed in hands of co-owners if
their shares are ascertainable and such income cannot be taxed in hands of AOP — Held,
Yes.

The assessees, four individuals, purchased a plot of land
and thereafter constructed a commercial complex thereon. Each co-owner had
equal undivided share in the entire property. A part of the said complex was
given on rent. The assessees filed their individual returns separately, in
status of co-owners and showed the rental income under the head ‘House
property’. The Assessing Officer issued a notice u/s.148 to the assessees
stating that there was an AOP in existence and income from the commercial
complex was chargeable to tax in the hands of the AOP. Accordingly, the rental
income had been taxed as business income in the hands of the AOP. On appeal,
the Commissioner (Appeals) held that since share of all members was equal,
rental income should be assessed in the individual hands of the co-owners as
per S. 26.

On Revenue’s appeal, the ITAT observed that :

(1) It was an admitted position that rental income from
the property had been assessed in the hands of the individual co-owners upto
the A.Y. 1994-95.

(2) When the revenue had taken a stand that rental income
upto the A.Y. 1994-95 was assessable in the hands of individual co-owners,
then it could not take a different stand for the subsequent years,
particularly in view of S. 26. As per S. 26, any income which is chargeable
under the head ‘Income from house property’ is to be assessed in the hands
of co-owners if their shares are ascertainable and such income cannot be
taxed in the hands of the AOP.

Hence, rental income in question chargeable under the head
‘Income from house property’ was to be taxed in the individual hands of the
co-owners.

S. 32 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Expression ‘any other business or commercial rights of similar nature’ appearing in clause (ii) of S. 32(1) would include such rights which can be used as a tool to carry on business — Assessee entitled to claim depreci

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  1. [2008] 116 ITD 348 (Mum.) (SMC)


Skyline Caterers (P.) Ltd. v. ITO

A.Y. : 2003-04. Dated : 28-12-2007

S. 32 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Expression ‘any other
business or commercial rights of similar nature’ appearing in clause (ii) of
S. 32(1) would include such rights which can be used as a tool to carry on
business — Assessee entitled to claim depreciation on amount paid for
acquisition of all rights under catering contract.

The assessee entered into an agreement with ‘R’ on
16-8-2000 for taking over the catering contract of ‘R’ with HLL against a
consideration of Rs.27 lakhs. Out of the said sum, the assessee paid a sum of
Rs.25 lakhs to ‘R’ as a consideration for acquiring all the rights under the
catering contract between ‘R’ and HLL and balance sum of Rs.2 lakhs was paid
to ‘R’ for not competing with the assessee. The assessee treated the said
amount of Rs.27 lakhs in its balance sheet as goodwill and claimed
depreciation thereon treating the same as commercial rights acquired by it.
The Assessing Officer held that depreciation is admissible only on know-how,
patents, copyrights, trade marks, etc. He further held that the expression
‘similar nature’ in S. 32(1)(ii) would not include goodwill. He, therefore,
disallowed the assessee’s claim for depreciation. On appeal, the Commissioner
(Appeal) upheld the action of the Assessing Officer.

On second appeal, the ITAT held that :

(1) The nomenclature given to the entries in the books of
account is not relevant for ascertaining the real nature of the transaction.
The nature of transaction should be ascertained on the basis of the
agreement between the parties. Therefore, merely because the assessee showed
the said payment on account of goodwill in the books of account, no adverse
inference could be drawn against the assessee.

(2) The payment of Rs.25 lakhs was specifically made for
acquiring all the rights under the catering contract between ‘R’ and HLL and
for acquiring articles and paraphernalia belonging to ‘R’, which were lying
in the canteen. Hence, it could not be said that the payment was either on
account of goodwill or on account of not to compete with the assessee.

(3) The specific intangible assets referred to in S.
32(1)(ii) are followed by the expression ‘any other business of commercial
rights of similar nature’. The specific words in the above section reveal
the similarity in the sense that all the intangible assets specified are
tools of the trade, which facilitate the assessee carrying on the business.
Therefore, the expression ‘any other business or commercial rights of
similar nature’ would include such rights which can be used as a tool to
carry on the business. Since catering business at HLL canteen could be
carried on only with the help of such rights under the contract, the
assessee would be entitled to depreciation.

S. 80-IB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Whether amendment by Finance Act, 2000 in provision of S. 80-IB(10) extending period for completion of eligible projects to 31-3-2003 was made with effect from 1-4-2001 apparently because as per pre-amended provision

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  1. [2008] 116 ITD 253 (Delhi)


Dy. CIT v.


Ansal Properties & Industries Ltd.

A.Y. : 2000-01. Dated : 15-2-2008

S. 80-IB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Whether amendment by
Finance Act, 2000 in provision of S. 80-IB(10) extending period for completion
of eligible projects to 31-3-2003 was made with effect from 1-4-2001
apparently because as per pre-amended provisions, such period was prescribed
up to 31-3-2001 and date of 1-4-2001 given as an effective date for said
amendment cannot be read in a manner to say that same was applicable only for
and from A.Y. 2001-02 — Held, Yes.

The assessee-company was engaged in the business of
development of mini-townships, construction of house property, villas,
commercial complexes, etc. For the A.Y. 2000-01, the assessee’s claim for
deduction u/s.80-IB(10) in respect of profits derived from a housing project,
was disallowed by the Assessing Officer on the ground that the assessee had
not produced the completion certificate in respect of the said project as
evidence of completion by 31-3-2003, as required by the Section. On appeal,
the Commissioner (Appeals), relying upon the Occupation certificate submitted
by the assessee as additional evidence, allowed the assessee’s claim for
deduction u/s.80-IB(10).

On 2nd appeal, the revenue raised a new plea that the date
of completion of project as earlier prescri-bed in S. 80-IB(10) as on
31-3-2001 was extended to 31-3-2003 by the Finance Act, 2000 only with effect
from 1-4-2001 and hence the benefit of extended date for completion of project
in order to make it eligible for deduction u/s.80-IB was not available to the
assessee for the assessment year 2000-01.

The ITAT observed that :

(1) As is clearly evident from the Explanatory note to
the Finance Bill, 2000, the purpose of amendments made by the Finance Act,
2000 in the provisions of S. 80-IB(10) was to extend the benefit available
under the said provisions even to the housing projects which would be
completed up to 31-3-2003 as against the period up to 31-3-2001 specified
earlier.

(2) The period of commencement of the said projects in
order to become eligible for benefits of S. 80-IB(10) was also
simultaneously specified as up to 31-3-2001 as against the period earlier
prescribed as on or after 1-10-1998, which clearly means that the intention
of the Legislature was to give the benefit of extended period of completion
to all the projects which had already commenced on or after 1-10-1998.

(3) The interpretation given by the Revenue may also lead
to absurd results in the cases of assessees following two different methods
of accounting to recognise the income derived from the projects eligible for
benefit u/s.80-IB. In a case where the assessee follows a project completion
method, he will be able to avail the benefit of S. 80-IB in respect of
entire profits of the projects completed after 31-3-2001 but before
31-3-2003, whereas the assessee following percentage completion method would
be able to avail the said benefits in respect of profits of the project
completed after 31-3-2001 but before 31-3-2003 only to the extent of profit
declared on percentage completion method in the A.Y. 2001-02 and subsequent
year and lose that benefit on the profits of the very same project declared
on percentage completion method in the A.Ys. 1999-2000 and 2000-01.

(4) It is a well-settled canon of construction that in
construing the provisions of beneficial Legislation, the Court should adopt
the construction, which advances, fulfils and furthers the object of the Act
rather than the one, which would defeat the same and render the benefit
illusory.

Based on the above observations, the ITAT held that the
amendment in the provision of S. 80-IB(10) extending period for completion of
eligible projects was made with effect from 1-4-2001 apparently because as per
pre-amended provision such period was prescribed up to 31-3-2001 and the date
of 1-4-2001 given as an effective date for the said amendment cannot be read
in a manner to say that the same was applicable only for and from A.Y. 2001-02
and the subsequent years. Therefore, the benefits of the amended provisions of
S. 80-IB(10) would be available in A.Y. 2000-01 even to the projects completed
within the extended period, i.e., 31-3-2003.

S. 292B r.w. S. 80, S. 139(1) and S. 139(3) — Assessee company having filed four returns in respect of its four units correctly disclosing all relevant information without causing any prejudice to Revenue, such mistake or defect stood removed by operation

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  1. (2009) 121 TTJ 289 (Mumbai) (TM)


Nicholas Applegate South East Asia Fund Ltd. v. Asst. DIT
(International Taxation)

ITA No. 3875 (Mum.) of 2005

A.Y. : 2001-02. Dated : 23-1-2009

S. 292B r.w. S. 80, S. 139(1) and S. 139(3) — Assessee
company having filed four returns in respect of its four units correctly
disclosing all relevant information without causing any prejudice to Revenue,
such mistake or defect stood removed by operation of S. 292B and consolidated
revised return filed by assessee will relate back to the date of filing of
original returns entitling the assessee to claim carry forward and set off of
loss as claimed in original returns and consolidated in revised returns.

The assessee is a company incorporated in Mauritius under
the Protected Cells Companies Act having four cells/sub-divisions in India.
For the relevant assessment year, it filed separate returns of income in
respect of each cell in India within the time limit prescribed u/s.139(1)
showing short term capital loss and exempt dividend income. Subsequently, the
assessee realised that a consolidated return for all the four divisions was
required to be filed and, accordingly, it filed a revised return incorporating
the incomes/losses of the four divisions. The Assessing Officer treated the
original four returns as invalid and treated the consolidated revised return
as the original return and, since the same was not filed within the time
prescribed u/s.139(1), disallowed the assessee’s claim for carry-forward of
short term capital loss. The CIT(A) allowed the loss to be carried forward.

Since there was a difference of opinion between Members of
the Tribunal, the matter was referred to the Third Member. The Third Member
also held in favour of the assessee. The Third Member relied on the decisions
in the following cases :

(a) Swaran Kanta v. CIT, (1989) 176 ITR 291 (P&H)

(b) CIT v. K. Saraswathi Ammal, (1984) 39 CTR
(Mad.) 35/(1984) 146 ITR 486 (Mad.)

(c) Shirish Madhukar Dalvi v. ACIT, (2006) 203 CTR
(Bom.) 621/(2006) 287 ITR 242 (Bom.)

The Third Member noted as under :

(1) As per Circular No. 179 dated 30th September 1975 of
CBDT, S. 292B has been made to provide against purely technical objections
without substance coming in the way of the validity of assessment
proceedings. It is clear from the language of S. 292B that its aim is to
prevent any return of income, assessment, notice or other proceedings being
treated as invalid merely by reason of any mistake, defect or omission in
such return of income, assessment, notice, other proceedings which are in
substance and effect in conformity with and according to the intent and
purpose of this Act. Substance over form theory is the underlying philosophy
of S. 292B. If in substance and in effect, the return, notice or assessment
is in conformity with or according to intent and purpose of the Act, the
mistake, defect or omission is to be ignored.

(2) If significance of words ‘substance’ and ‘effect’ is
kept in mind, there is no justification to take the four returns separately
and in not considering them together. All the four returns were filed at the
same time with the same Assessing Officer and signed by the same competent
and authorised person. When the total effect of all the four returns is
taken into account, it is clearly found that the assessee did disclose full
information of total loss in time as was needed by the Revenue to compute
assessee’s income/loss. The Revenue has not pointed out any information
needed but not given in the four returns submitted by the four cells.

(3) There was a mistake in filing four returns instead of
one consolidated return of total loss of the assessee company. However, that
mistake, otherwise rendering the returns invalid, is fully taken care of by
provisions of S. 292B.

(4) Four cells of the assessee, by filing four returns,
in which total loss claimed by the assessee was disclosed, did comply in
substance and in effect with the intent and purpose of the Act. It is
nobody’s case that any prejudice was caused to the Revenue because of the
above defect and mistake.

(5) In such a situation, it is not correct to hold that
returns filed earlier were invalid, ineffective and of no legal consequence.
The revised return would, in such circumstances, relate back to the date of
filing of original return. The said return has to be taken along and
considered with the original four returns which contained complete
information for making an assessment. The technical mistake in the four
returns stood removed on filing of the consolidated return. To ignore date
of four returns is to ignore provisions of S. 292B.

The assessee was, therefore, entitled to carry forward such
losses for setting off the same in the subsequent year in terms of the
provisions of S. 80.

Section 28(i) — Penalty paid on account of failure to maintain margin money and not recovered from client, was an allowable loss.

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  1. (2009) 27 SOT 469 (Mum.)

ITO vs. VRM Share Broking (P.) Ltd.

A.Y. : 2004-05. Dated 03.11.2008

1. Section 28(i) — Penalty paid on account of failure to
maintain margin money and not recovered from client, was an allowable loss.
2. Section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 —Penalty paid to SEBI for ‘excess
utilisation limits’ was an allowable business expense.

 

For the relevant assessment year, the Assessing Officer
disallowed the following amounts claimed by the assessee as expenses :

a. Amount not recovered from client on account of failure
to maintain margin money of 20% of the price of the securities proposed to
be purchased by the client.

b. Amount paid to the NSE for violation of the margins
imposed by SEBI on the share brokers.

Both the disallowances were deleted by the CIT(A).

The Tribunal, following the decision of the Bombay High
Court in the case of CIT vs. Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturing (Wvg.)
Co. Ltd. [1999] 237 ITR 23/102 Taxman 433, also held in favour of the
assessee. The Tribunal noted as under :

1. From the perusal of various Notifications issued by
SEBI, it was apparent that they were issued mainly in the context of risk
management rather than as penal provisions for punishing the defaulters or
deeming the transactions as illegal. In view of the same, it was held that
irrespective of whether the margin money was available or not, the loss
could not be held as illegal loss. The benefit of set-off of the same
against the income or allowing the same to be carried forward to the later
years cannot be denied to the assessee.

2. The amount paid was a penalty levied for violation of
the margins imposed by SEBI on the sharebrokers. From the Notification
issued by SEBI, it was found that such margins were imposed in order to
reduce the risk components and, therefore, those were basically risk
management oriented penalties, which were routine in nature. Having regard
to the purpose of the provisions of Section 37(1) which is aimed at
providing deterrence for infraction of laws of the country, the violation in
the instant case was not such that it would attract the provisions of
Section 37(1).



Debitum in Presenti

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The

Debitum in presenti’ refers to the debt which is a present obligation in contradistinction to the debt which may become an obligation in future on the happening of certain event. When a statute mentions ‘debt’ in any context or, where a debt is implied, it refers to ‘debitum in presenti’ i.e., a sum of money which is now payable or will become payable in the future by reason of a present obligation.

2 Existence of an obligation to pay is the essence of a debt. The same may be payable in present in which case it is ‘debitum in presenti, solvendum in presenti’ or payable on future when it is ‘debitum in presenti solvendum in futuro’. Irrespective of the time of payment, an obligation in order to become enforceable debt has to exist in presenti. The debt payable in present may be termed as ‘debt accruing or due’ and one payable in future as ‘debt owing’ but in both the cases they are debt represented by an existing obligation. The Supreme Court of California in People v. Arguello, (1969) 37 calif 524 observed “Standing alone , the word ‘debt’ is as applicable to a sum of money which has been promised at a future day as to a sum now due and payable. If we wish to distinguish between the two, we say of the former that it is a ‘debt owing’, and of the latter that it is a ‘debt due’. Where no obligation exists, it is only a contingent debt howsoever probable and howsoever soon it may become a debt.


3 The significance of ‘debitum in presenti’ may be understood with reference to certain decided cases where the decision depended on existence of debt. The material point of consideration in a such cases was whether an obligation is created or is yet to be created. In Shanti Prasad Jain v. The Director of Enforcement, 1962 AIR 1764 (SC), the appellant had a claim against a foreign company, in settlement of which the company deposited certain amount in the appellant’s account with a foreign bank in India on the condition that the amount can be withdrawn only for the purpose of purchase of machinery from the foreign company after obtaining import licence from the Government. In a dispute arising under FERA, the appellant was charged u/s.4(1) of the Act for giving loan to a non-resident bank in violation of the FERA regulations. The Supreme Court held that there was no present debt owing to the appellant, as the right of the appellant to the amount in deposit in the bank was to arise only on happening of contingency such as grant of import licence. The Court quoted with approval the observations of Lord Lindley in Webb v. Stanton, (1883) QBD 518,




where the point for decision was whether an amount payable by a trustee to the beneficiary in futuro could be attached by a judgment creditor as a debt ‘owing or accruing’. Answering in negative, the Court observed, “I should say, apart from any authority, that a debt legal or equitable can be attached whether it be a debt owing or accruing; but it must be debt, and a debt is a sum of money which is now payable or, will become payable in the future by reason of a present obligation, debitum in presenti, solvendum in futuro”. It was held that money which may or may not become payable from a trustee to his cestui que trust are not debts.


4 A similar issue arose in Raymond Synthetics Ltd. & Ors. v. UOI & Ors., 1992 AIR 847(SC), where the company issued shares and was required to make allotment within 10 weeks of the closure and refund the excess share application money within 8 days of the company becoming liable to repay. Allotment was made before the expiry of permitted period of 10 weeks and the issue arose whether interest is payable from the expiry of 10 weeks or from the date of allotment. The Court considered the issue together with the provisions of S. 73(1A) of the Companies Act, whereunder in the event of permission not being granted by the Stock Exchange before the expiry of ten weeks from the closure, the allotment is to become void and held that a debt remains contingent till the permission is received or the period of ten weeks is over. In the facts of the case it was held that the debt became due on expiry of 10 weeks.

5.    The issue generally arises in matters of income taxation where there is change of ownership of business or managing agency rights in the middle of the accounting period. In E. D. Sassoon & Co. Ltd. v. the CIT, (1954 AIR 470) where the managing agency was transferred by the appellant before the completion of the definite period of one year service which was a condition precedent to their being entitled to receive the remuneration or commission.

The question arose as to whether the appellant was chargeable to tax in respect of the commission for the broken period up to which they rendered services. It was held that no debt payable by the companies was created in favour of transferor. No remuneration or commission could, therefore, be said to have accrued to them at the date of transfer. Even though they rendered services as managing agents for the broken period, their contribution or parenthood cannot be said to have brought into existence a debt or a right to receive the payment or in other words I debitum in presenti solvendum in futuro’.

6.    Similar issue was decided in Cottons Agents Ltd. Bombay v. CIT Bombay, 1960 AIR 1279 (SC), where answering the question as to whether any income accrued to the transferor from transfer of managing agency agreement before the end of the financial year, the Court observed, “On our view of the managing agency agreement, the commission of the managing agents became due at the end of financial year and that is when it accrued; and there were neither any debt created nor any right to receive payment when each transaction of sale took place.”

7.    An interesting  question  came for decision  in J. Jermons v. Aliammal & Ors., (1999) INSC 275. The tenant in that case was served with a prohibitory order restraining payment of debt due from him to the defaulter viz. the landlord. The tenant in compliances to the notice stopped payment of rent after the receipt of notice. Thereafter, on receipt of notice u/s.226(3), he made payment to the TRO. The landlord sued him for eviction on ground of default in payment of rent to him. Accepting the argument that the rent which became due after the receipt of notice was not a debt covered by the notice, the Court held that the word ‘debt’ in the said prohibitory order is used in the sense that it is ‘debitum in presenti’ or ‘debitum in presenti, solvendum in futuro’. In that sense, rent that would become due and payable in future is in the nature of contingent debt and was not covered by the notice which was good only for rent that had become due up to the date of notice.

8.    The relevance of ‘debitum in presenti’ was elaborately discussed and applied in Kesoram Industries and Cotton Mills Ltd. v. CWT, (1966) 59 ITR 767 (SC). In this case the dividend proposed to be distributed was shown in P & L A/c. but declared at the general meeting held after the close of the year. The question arose as to whether the amount set apart as dividend was a debt owed by the company on the valuation date. It was held that nothing had happened as on the valuation date beyond a mere recommendation of the directors as to the amount that might be distributed as dividend, there was no debt owed by the company on that date. A further question arose as to whether the provision made for taxes in respect of the year was a debt. Even though the judgment was divided, both majority as well as minority decision examined the issue of creation of ‘debitum in presenti’. Whereas the majority decision held that it was a present liability of ascertained amount and, therefore a debt, the minority view was that the liability to pay tax arises only on the 151 day of April of the assessment year and hence was not a debt on the valuation date.

9.    In tax matters ‘debitum in presenti’ is the basis for determining accrual of income and expenditure under mercantile system. The material point is I whether any debt became due to or from the assessee. As held by the Supreme Court in Morvi Industries Ltd. v. CIT, 82 ITR 835 (SC), income accrues when if becomes due. The postponement of the date of payment does not affect accrual of income. The fact that the amount of income is not subsequently received would also not detract from or efface the accrual of the income.

S. 158BC and S. 158BD — Search warrant having been issued in the name of assessee’s husband, proceedings u/s.158BC cannot be initiated against the assessee

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  1. (2009) 120 TTJ 320 (Mum.)


Smt. Nasreen Yusuf Dhanani v.
ACIT

IT(SS)A No. 203 (Mum.) of 2002

Block Period : 1-4-1986 to 18-12-1996

Dated : 5-10-2007

 

The Assessing Officer passed the block assessment order in
the assessee’s case making huge additions of unclosed income. The assessee’s
plea that since there was no search warrant in the name of the assessee, the
Assessing Officer should drop the block assessment proceedings initiated in
her name was not considered.


The Tribunal, relying on the decisions in the following
cases, held in favour of the assessee :


(a) Jt. CIT v. Latika V. Waman, (2005) 1 SOT 535
(Mum.)

(b) Dhiraj Suri v. Addl. CIT, (2006) 99 TTJ 525
(Del.)/(2006) 98 ITD 187 (Del.)

The Tribunal noted as under :

(1) Chapter XIV-B is a special procedure for making
assessment of search cases. These provisions of block assessment come into
picture only as a result of search action carried out u/s.132. On reading
the provisions of S. 132(1), it is clear that the section is person-specific
and not premises-specific as argued by the Departmental Representative. The
primary target for conducting a search action is the person who is in
possession of any unclosed income and the search party can enter and search
any building, place, vessel, vehicle or aircraft where the undisclosed
assets or incriminating documents are likely to be found in relation to such
person.

(2) It is an undisputed fact that there is no search
warrant issued in the name of the assessee. In respect of the Panchnama
issued in respect of the bank lockers, it is seen that the Panchnama is in
the names of husband and the assessee for the simple reason that the bank
lockers were in joint names of husband and wife, the name of husband being
first in all the lockers.

(3) As per S. 158BB(1) r.w. S. 132(1), the position is
clear that in order to assess undisclosed income of any person in accordance
with Chapter XIV-B, a search is a prerequisite for the initiation of block
assessment proceedings. Since there is no search warrant issued in the name
of the assessee, the block assessment proceedings u/s. 158BC cannot be
sustained.

(4) If in the course of search of husband, any material
incriminating his wife had been found then the proper course for the
Assessing Officer would have been to issue a notice u/s.158BD. When specific
procedures are prescribed for persons who are searched and for persons in
respect of whom incriminating material is found, the AO cannot bypass the
prescribed procedures and issue notice u/s.158BC on a person who was not
subjected to search.


(5) In the case of the assessee, it was intimated to the
Assessing Officer (AO) vide letter dated 15th December 1997 that there is no
search warrant in her name and, hence, the block assessment pro-ceedings
initiated u/s.158BC need to be drop-ped and, even then, the AO has proceeded
to make assessment u/s.158BC. The entire proceedings undertaken by the AO were
bad in law and hence, the assessment is quashed.



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S. 40 (a)(i), read with S. 195, of the Income-tax Act, 1961 – In view of Board’s Circular No. 786, dated 7-2-2000, no income had accrued or arisen in India either u/s.5(2) or u/s.9 in respect of selling commission, brokerage and other related charges paid

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  1. [2009] 116 ITD 328 (Gauhati)


Jt. CIT v. George Williamson (Assam) Ltd.

A.Y. : 1995-96. Dated : 31-8-2007

S. 40 (a)(i), read with S. 195, of the Income-tax Act, 1961
– In view of Board’s Circular No. 786, dated 7-2-2000, no income had accrued
or arisen in India either u/s.5(2) or u/s.9 in respect of selling commission,
brokerage and other related charges paid to non-resident agents in respect of
sale of tea outside India and, therefore, no tax was deductible u/s.195.
Hence, disallowance made by Assessing Officer was liable to be deleted.

During the relevant assessment year, the Assessing Officer
disallowed the expenditure on selling commission, brokerage and other expenses
in relation to overseas sales paid to non-residents without tax deduction
u/s.195. On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) deleted the additions so made.

On revenue’s appeal : the ITAT held that :

1) S. 195 casts an obligation on an assessee to deduct
tax from the payments made to non-residents which are chargeable to tax
under the Act.

2) In Circular No. 786, dated 7-2-2000, the Board has
explained the applicability of S. 195, read with S. 40(a)(i), in relation to
commission paid to foreign agents. As per the said Circular, in respect of
commission and brokerage paid to foreign agents on export sales, no income had
accrued or arisen in India either u/s.5(2) or u/s.9 and no tax was, therefore,
deductible u/s.195. Consequently, expenditure on commission and related
charges payable to non-resident agents could not be disallowed u/s.40(a)(i) on
the ground that tax had not been deducted.

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Additional procedural conditions prescribed for scientific research association and universities, etc. carrying out such activities : Income-tax (Second Amendment) Rules, 2009, dated 5-12-2009.

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Part A : DIRECT TAXES




27 Additional procedural conditions
prescribed for scientific research association and universities, etc. carrying
out such activities : Income-tax (Second Amendment) Rules, 2009, dated
5-12-2009.

The CBDT has prescribed certain information to be furnished
the Commissioner/Director of Income-tax, by the due date of filing the return of
income for these organisations. This information pertaining to the year gone by
includes :



  • Detailed note on activities undertaken;


  • summary of research articles published in national or international journals


  • any patent or other similar rights


  •  programme of research projects to be undertaken during the forthcoming year
    and the financial allocation thereof.



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Conditions prescribed to eligibility of the prepaid electronic meal card for FBT purposes u/s.115WB(2)(b)(iii) of the Act : Income-tax (First Amendment) Rules, 2009, dated 5-1-2009.

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Part A : DIRECT TAXES


26 Conditions prescribed to eligibility of
the prepaid electronic meal card for FBT purposes u/s.115WB(2)(b)(iii) of the
Act : Income-tax (First Amendment) Rules, 2009, dated 5-1-2009.

FBT provisions were amended to exclude the prepaid electronic
meal cards from the ambit of the head of entertainment and hospitality on which
FBT is levied. Rule 40E has been introduced, which prescribes certain conditions
as stipulated for eligibility for the electronic meal cards for exclusion
purposes.

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Amendment in Service Tax Return ST-3 to capture details of Service Tax Return Preparer. Notification No. 10/2009 — Service Tax, dated 17-3-2009

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11 Amendment in Service Tax Return ST-3 to capture
details of Service Tax Return Preparer. Notification No. 10/2009 — Service
Tax, dated 17-3-2009 :


ST-3 form has been amended by this Notification by adding entries for
Identification No. and name of Service Tax Return Preparer.

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Exemption on services provided in relation to the authorised operations in a Special Economic Zone, and received by a developer or units of a Special Economic Zone, whether or not the said taxable services are provided inside the Special Economic Zone

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10 Exemption on services provided in relation to the
authorised operations in a Special Economic Zone, and received by a
developer or units of a Special Economic Zone, whether or not the said
taxable services are provided inside the Special Economic Zone

Notification No. 09/2009-Service Tax, dated 3-3-2009 :

By this Notification the taxable services specified in
clause (105) of S. 65 of the Finance Act, 1994 which are provided in
relation to the authorised operations in a Special Economic Zone, and
received by a developer or units of a Special Economic Zone, whether or not
the said taxable services are provided inside the Special Economic Zone, are
exempt from the whole of the Service Tax leviable thereon u/s.66 of the said
Finance Act, subject to conditions specified in this Notification.

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Reduction in Service Tax rate to 10% plus education cess. Notification No. 08/2009-Service Tax, dated 24-2-2009

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9 Reduction in Service Tax rate to 10% plus education
cess. Notification No. 08/2009-Service Tax, dated 24-2-2009 :

Service Tax rate has been reduced from 12% to 10%

w.e.f. 24-2-2009, so that the effective rate will be
10.3%. There is no change in works contract composition rate.

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Export of Services Rules, 2005 applicable when benefits accrue outside India Circular No. 111/2009, dated 24-2-2009

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8 Export of Services Rules, 2005 applicable when
benefits accrue outside India Circular No. 111/2009, dated 24-2-2009 :


In terms of Rule 3(2)(a) of the Export of Services Rules
2005, a taxable service shall be treated as export of service if “such
service is provided from India and used outside India
”. By this
Circular, it has been clarified that export of service may take place even
when all the relevant activities take place in India so long as the benefits
of these services accrue outside India.

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Reference from Commissioner, Nashik, seeking clarification in respect of levy of Service Tax on repair/renovation/widening of roads. Circular No. 110/2009, dated 23-2-2009

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7 Reference from Commissioner, Nashik, seeking
clarification in respect of levy of Service Tax on
repair/renovation/widening of roads. Circular No. 110/2009, dated 23-2-2009
:

It has been clarified that management, maintenance or
repair of roads are in the nature of taxable services and attracting Service
Tax u/s.65(105) (zzg) of the Finance Act, 1994. In this Circular, activities
called as ‘construction of road’ and ‘maintenance or repair of roads’ have
been categorised as follows :

(A) Maintenance or repair activities :

I. Resurfacing

II. Renovation

III. Strengthening

IV. Relaying
 
V. Filling of potholes

(B) Construction activities :

I. Laying of a new road

II. Widening of narrow road to broader road (such as
conversion of a two-lane road to a four-lane road)

III. Changing road surface (gravelled road to metalled
road/metalled road to black-topped/ black-topped to concrete, etc.)

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Filing of claim for refund of Service Tax paid under Notification No. 41/2007-ST, dated 6-10-2007. Circular No. 112/2009, dated 12-3-2009 :

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6 Filing of claim for refund of Service Tax paid under
Notification No. 41/2007-ST, dated 6-10-2007. Circular No. 112/2009, dated
12-3-2009 :


In this Circular procedural clarifications have been
given in relation to claiming refund of Service Tax paid under Notification
No. 41/2007-ST, dated 6-102007. which provides exemption by way of refund on
account of specified taxable services used for export of goods.
Clarification under this Circular are in addition to Circulars issued
earlier No. 101/4/ 2008-ST, dated 12-5-2008 and No. 106/9/2008-ST, dated
11-12-2008.

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Service Tax on movie theatres.

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5 Service Tax on movie theatres.

Circular No. 109/2009, dated 23-2-2009 :

It has been clarified that screening of a movie is
not a taxable service except where the distributor leases out the
theatre and the theatre owner get a fixed rent. In such case, the
service provided by the theatre owner would be categorised as ‘Renting
of immovable property for furtherance of business or commerce’ and the
theatre owner would be liable to pay tax on the rent received from the
distributor. All pending cases to be disposed of accordingly.

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S. 115JA(3), CBDT Circular No. 763, dated 18-2-1998 — Credit for MAT can be carried forward for a total of six years and not ‘five assessment years’ mentioned in sub-para 2 of para 45.4 of CBDT Circular No.763 — Statutory provisions prevail over a Circula

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  1. 2009 TIOL 404 ITAT (Mad.)


ITO v.
Data Software Research Company (International) Pvt. Ltd.

ITA No. 1602/Mds./2008

A.Y. : 2003-2004. Dated : 16-4-2009

 

Facts :

While assessing the total income of the assessee, a private
limited company, u/s.143(3) the AO had allowed credit for Rs.14,69,706 being
MAT paid in A.Y. 1997-98. Subsequently, the AO issued notice proposing to
withdraw MAT credit of Rs.14,69,706 by passing an order u/s.154. In response
to the show-cause notice the assessee contended that u/s.115JAA(3) MAT credit
can be set off for a period of 5 years immediately succeeding the assessment
year in which the credit became available. The AO did not accept this
contention and passed an order u/s.154 of the Act withdrawing tax credit of
A.Y. 1997-98 on the ground that u/s.115JAA the tax credit of A.Y. 1997-98 was
available for set-off only up to A.Y. 2002-03 and after that it cannot be set
off.


The CIT(A) allowed the assessee’s appeal.


Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal held that there is no ambiguity in the
language of S. 115JAA(3). The carry forward is available for a total of six
(1+5) years. The Tribunal observed that the confusion has arisen because of
the language used in CBDT Circular No. 763, dated 18-2-1998. The Tribunal held
that the period of ‘five assessment years’ mentioned in sub-paragraph (2) of
paragraph 45.3 of the said Circular contradicts what is stated in Ss.(3) of S.
115JAA. The Tribunal stated that it is trite law that statutory provisions
prevail over a Circular in case of a contradiction between the two. The
Tribunal stated that this position has been reiterated by the Apex Court in
CCE v. Ratan Melting & Wire Industries Ltd.,
220 CTR 98 (SC). The Tribunal
upheld the order of the CIT(A) and dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue.


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S. 2(42A), S. 48, S. 49(1)(e), Explanation III to S. 48 — Where assessee transferred the shares held by it to its 100% subsidiary which shares were retransferred by the subsidiary to the assessee and thereafter were sold by the assessee, the assessee was

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  1. 2009 TIOL 383 ITAT (Mum.)


ACIT v.
Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd.

ITA No. 2672/Mum./2006

A.Y. : 2000-01. Dated : 2-2-2009

 

Facts :

The assessee company had purchased 2,06,000 equity shares
of M/s. Trumac Engineering Company Ltd. on 7-11-1994. In the financial year
1995-96, the entire lot of 2,06,000 shares were transferred by the assessee to
its 100% wholly-owned subsidiary, M/s. Hamko Financial Services Ltd., (‘the
subsidiary’). In the financial year 1998-99, the subsidiary transferred back
the said shares to the assessee. During the financial year 1999-2000, the
assessee sold 1,56,000 shares out of the said 2,06,000 shares for a
consideration of Rs.70,20,000. The assessee in its return of income for A.Y.
2000-01 claimed loss on sale of these shares at Rs.14,55,72,296 by adopting
the indexation from 1994-95 i.e., the initial date of acquisition by
the assessee. The AO while passing order u/s.143(3) r.w.s. 147 of the Act held
that the assessee was entitled to indexation from the date the shares were
retransferred by the subsidiary to the assessee i.e., financial year
1998-99. Accordingly, the AO computed the indexed cost of acquisition of
shares sold by the assessee to be Rs.11,25,96,594 as against Rs.15,25,92,296
computed by the assessee.


The CIT(A) relying on the decision of the Mumbai Bench of
the Tribunal in the case of DCIT v. Meera Khera in ITA No. 5258/M/1998
of A.Y. 1995-96 and the decision of the Chandigarh Bench of the Tribunal in
the case of Mrs. Pushpa Sofat v. ITO, 81 ITD 1 (Chd.) upheld the
contention of the assessee.


Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal after referring to S. 48, S. 49(1)(e),
Explanation to S. 2(42A) and second proviso to S. 48 held that on a conjoint
reading of these provisions it is evident that in calculating long-term
capital gain on sale of shares of Trumac Engineering Company Ltd., the indexed
cost has to be calculated with reference to the cost, holding period and
indexation factor of the first owner i.e., from 1994-95. It held that
the cost has to be indexed from the date the shares were originally acquired
by the assessee company. It stated that the transfer from the assessee to its
subsidiary and retransfer from the said company has got to be ignored, as
provided in the above provisions of the Act. The Tribunal held that there was
no mistake in the capital gain disclosed by the assessee. Accordingly, it held
that the AO was not justified in denying the benefit of indexation from the
initial date of acquisition. It, accordingly, dismissed the appeal of the
Revenue.


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S. 139A, S. 272B — Penalty u/s.272B cannot be levied on the deductor for not quoting PAN of deductee in the quarterly statements filed in Form No. 26Q.

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  1. 2009 TIOL 370 ITAT (Bang.)


D. V. Steel Corporation v.
ITO (TDS)

ITA No. 907/Bang/2008

A.Y. : 2007-08. Date of Order : 27-2-2009

 

Facts :

The assessee firm filed quarterly statement in Form No. 26Q
for the 4th quarter of financial year 2006-07 without quoting therein PAN of
the deductees. The Assessing Officer was of the view that not quoting PAN of
deductees was contrary to the provisions of S. 139A(5B) of the Act. The AO
issued notice to the assessee asking it to show cause why penalty u/s.272B(1)
should not be levied for not quoting the PAN of the deductees in the
statement. The assessee submitted non-availability of the same to be the
reason for non-furnishing of PAN in the quarterly statement. The AO did not
find this to be a reasonable cause. He levied a penalty of Rs.10,000.


The CIT(A) confirmed the action of the AO.


Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal
where it was contended that not quoting the PAN was for a reasonable cause
since the asses-see was being asked to do something which was im-possible; it
had no statutory right or power to compel the deductee to furnish the PAN; not
quoting PAN was for no fault on the part of the assessee.

Held :

The Tribunal noted that there is no mechanism at the end of
the assessee to compel the deductee to give its PAN. The Tribunal was of the
view that the facts of the present case are identical to those before the
Ahmedabad Bench of Tribunal in the case of Financial Co-operative Bank Ltd.
where it has been held that since the rules and the provisions of the Act did
not cast an obligation on the manager of a bank to ensure that Form No. 60
filed by the customer was duly filled in, the failure to comply with the
provisions of S. 139A was on the part of the customer of the bank and not on
the part of the bank. The Tribunal following the reasoning of the said
decision of the Ahmedabad Bench directed the AO to delete the penalty.


          The
appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

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S. 201(1A) — When no tax is payable by payee, no interest can be charged from payer

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47
(2008) 304 ITR (AT) 338 (Jodhpur)

ITO v. Emrald Construction Co. P. Ltd.

ITA No. 357 and 370/Jdpr./2002

A.Y. : 1996-97. Dated : 31-8-2007

S. 201(1A) — In case no tax is payable by the payee, no
interest u/s.201(1A) can be charged from the payer.

 

The assessee-company had made payment to three companies in
the nature of interest and contractor’s payment, but without TDS on the same.
The Assessing Officer levied interest u/s.201(1A) till the date of assessment
order. Before the CIT(A), the assessee contested that no tax was payable qua
contract or interest payments (incomes) or qua any other incomes of the
recipients, so the question of loss to the Revenue does not arise. Hence, no
interest was leviable u/s.201(1A). The CIT(A) upheld the levy of interest, but
restricted it till the date of assessment order of the recipients. On cross
appeals by the assessee and the Revenue, the ITAT held that

1. The interest to be charged u/s.201(1A) is not a penalty,
but a compensation of revenue loss for the delay in the payments of tax. The
rigours of S. 201 are flexible and not rigid as would not admit any sort of
explanation with regard to non-deduction at source.

2. The charging of interest u/s.201(1A) is definitely
mandatory, but this ‘mandatory’ nature has to take colour from the main charge
of the deduction of tax at source u/s.201. So to say, when the ‘tax’ which was
to be deducted u/s.201 was not payable at all, it would be unjust to conclude
that, in all eventualities, come what may, interest u/s.201(1A) is to be
charged from the deductor.

3. It is certain that the interest is chargeable from the
date on which the tax is due for deduction. The starting point has been
envisaged in the Act but not the end point. The ‘benchmark’ of the end point
is to be decided after taking into consideration various factors. The question
of charging interest up to framing of assessment orders in the hands of the
recipients would not arise, because ‘no tax dues’ are found against them and
as such there was no loss of revenue. Interest cannot be charged for the sake
of charging of interest only, it has to be charged in accordance with a
provision.

4. The interest is chargeable on the amount of tax to be
deducted. In case the chargeable tax at source increases or decreases, the
interest amount varies accordingly. But, in a case where the tax was not
payable at all, then in that case no interest can be charged. The word
‘compensatory’ clearly suggests this conclusion.

 


Cases relied upon :



(i) Vikrant Tyres Ltd. v. ITO, (1993) 202 ITR 454
(Kar.)

(ii) CIT v. Rishikesh Apartments Co-operative Housing
Society Ltd.,
(2002) 253 ITR 310 (Guj.)

(iii) Bennet Coleman & Co. Ltd. v. Mrs. V. P. Damle,
(1986) 157 ITR 812 (Bom.)

(iv) Karimtharuvi Tea Estate Ltd. v. State of Kerala, (1966) 60 ITR
262 (SC)

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S. 115JA — AO has no power to scrutinise accounts except as per Explanation — No addition can be made due to reduction in value of inventory and obsolescence loss.

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46 (2008) 304 ITR (AT) 123 (Ahmedabad)

Deepak Nitrate v. Dy. CIT

ITA No. 1646 and 1748/Ahd./2004

A.Y. : 1998-99. Dated : 9-4-2007

S. 115JA — Assessing officer has no power to scrutinise the
accounts except as provided in Explanation to S. 115JA and hence no addition can
be made by him on account of reduction in value of inventory and obsolescence
loss for computation of book profit in terms of S. 115JA of the Act.

 

According to the Assessing Officer the two amounts viz.
(i) provision made for obsolescence loss, and (ii) reduction due to change in
method of inventory valuation should be added back in computation of the book
profits as per S. 115JA. He therefore added the said amounts to the income of
the assessee invoking the provisions of S. 154. The CIT(A) upheld the addition
no. (i) and deleted the addition no. (ii).

 

On cross appeals by the assessee and Revenue, the Tribunal
observed as under :

(1) Diminution in value of asset is not a provision for any
liability and consequently it would not be a case of reserve.

(2) As per the relevant provisions of the Companies Act, an
amount set apart to become a provision has to be either (i) provision for
depreciation, renewals, or diminution in value of asset, or (ii) provision for
any known liability of which the amount cannot be determined with substantial
accuracy. However, the Income-tax Act has included only one part of this
definition for increasing the net profit to determine the book profits and
that is provision for meeting liability other than ascertained liability.
Hence provision for diminution in the value of asset cannot be added back
u/s.115JA.

(3) The change in method of valuation of inventory was
adopted by the assessee being more scientific and was consistently followed.
Even otherwise, it would be a diminution in value of inventories and since
these items had not been found to be wrong by any authorities under the
Companies Act, the Assessing Officer did not have the jurisdiction under the
provisions of the Act to add back such items for calculating book profits.

 


Case relied upon :



(i) Apollo Tyres Ltd. v. CIT, (2002) 255 ITR 273
(SC)



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I. By holding shares, assessee entitled to exercise rights of owner of flat — Whether entitled to depreciation — Held, Yes. II. Forfeiture of application money on non-payment of call money on issue of debentures —Held, Capital receipt

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45 (2008) 304 ITR (AT) 167 (Mumbai)

Deepak Fertilizers and Petrochemicals Corporation Ltd.
v.
DCIT

A.Ys. : 1997-98 to 2001-2002. Dated : 21-9-2007



I. By virtue of holding the shares, assessee entitled
to exercise the rights of owner in respect of a flat — Whether entitled to
depreciation on flats — Held, Yes.



S. 32 — The assessee purchased the shares of YIL on the
basis of which it got an exclusive right to use and occupy certain flats and
claimed depreciation on the same which was disallowed by the Assessing
Officer, but the same was allowed by the CIT(A) relying on the provisions of
S. 2(47)(vi), S. 27(iii), S. 269UA(d)(ii) and also relevant Supreme Court
judgments.

 

The Tribunal observed as under :

1. The articles of association of a company engaged in
the business of real estate may provide that a shareholder of particular
shares would be entitled to exercise the rights of owner in respect of
properties owned by the company. Such mode of transfer is duly recognised by
the Legislature in provisions of S. 2(47)(vi), S. 27(iii), and S.
269UA(d)(ii)


2. The meaning of the term ‘owner’ for the purpose of S.
32 although not defined in the Income-tax Act, a reference to Supreme
Court’s decision in various cases can be construed so as to include a person
who can exercise the rights of the owner not on behalf of the owner but in
his own right. The term ‘owned’ as occurring in S. 32(1) should be assigned
a wider meaning. The provisions of this Section are for the benefit of the
assessee and the intention of the Legislature should be interpreted
accordingly.


 


The Tribunal accordingly allowed the assessee’s claim :

 

Cases relied upon :



(a) CIT v. Podar Cement P. Ltd., (1997) 226 ITR
625 (SC)

(b) Mysore Minerals Ltd. v. CIT, (1999) 239 ITR
775 (SC)

(c) R. B. Jodha Mal Kuthiala (1971) 82 ITR 570 (SC)

 

II. Forfeiture of application money on non-payment of
call money on issue of debentures —Held, Capital receipt.

The assessee issued partly convertible debentures and
received application money. On non-payment of call money, certain amount was
forfeited by the assessee. The assessee claimed it to be capital receipt not
liable to tax, which was rejected by the Assessing Officer. The CIT(A) deleted
the addition made by the Assessing Officer.

 

On Revenue’s appeal, the ITAT held that :

1. The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of T. V.
Sundaram Iyengar & Sons Ltd., 222 ITR 344 relied upon by the assessee, is
not relevant because the amount received is not a trading receipt of the
assessee.

2. Since the amount received was in respect of debentures
issued, it is a capital receipt not chargeable to rax.

 


Cases relied upon :



(1) CIT v. Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd., (2003) 261
ITR 501 (Bom.)

(2) Prism Cement v. Joint CIT, (2006) 285 ITR (AT)
43 (Mumbai)

 




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Set-up date of business is question of fact and depends upon circumstances involved.

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44 302 ITR (AT) 1 Pune


Styler India Pvt. Ltd. v. JCIT 2008

SS ITA 1961 S. 28, S. 37

A.Y. : 1998-99. Dated : 8-4-2008

When business can be said to be set up is a question of fact
and would depend upon the circumstances involved in a particular case.

The assessee-company was set up as a 100% sub-sidiary of S of
Austria with the aim to make available technical expertise to the Indian
industry in three main areas — technical design and con-sultancy services,
systems supplier with respect to vehicle components and parts, sourcing of
vehicle components and parts from India for the global market.

 

The assessee filed a return for the A.Y. 1998-99 showing a
receipt of Rs.3,91,780 as interest on fixed deposit with the banks and claiming
expenses of Rs.49,27,336 as administrative and selling expenses as against the
receipt. The Assessing Officer was of the opinion that expenses of Rs.17,92,600
were capital in nature and that exhibition and launch expenses of Rs.15,65,239
should be disallowed as preliminary expenses.

 

The assessee explained that repairs, improvement and
innovation expenses were incurred for carrying on the business which was done by
obtaining long lease and in regards to exhibition and launch expense of
Rs.15,65,239, these were incurred after the company was formed on September 15,
1997.

 

For substantiating its claim, the assessee stated that it had
attended an exhibition in January 1998 at Expo ’98 at Delhi and it had taken a
stall and participated in the exhibition to promote the business interest of the
company and to increase its visibility in the eyes of Indian automotive
industry. The Assessing Officer held that interest income was liable to be
assessed under the head ‘Other Sources’ and expenses claimed amounting to
Rs.49,27,336 were not admissible and were to be disallowed.

 

The Commissioner (Appeals) held that there was no sufficient
proof to hold that the business had commenced, that all expenses were incurred
by the assessee before setting up of the business and
were not permissible. He upheld assessment of interest income under the head
‘Other Sources’ and did not allow any expenses against the above receipt.

 

On appeal to the Appellate Tribunal :

 

Held :



1. That there were details of various activities handled by
the Managing Director during his stay in India and the corporate offices he
visited to carry on discussion with different persons. Even the names of the
persons he met were given. The assessee had also furnished the detailed
qualification of the general manager, marketing, who had met various
prospective clients and given a summary of various activities carried on by
the employee. The assessee had placed on record correspondence exchanged with
various manufacturers of automobiles.

2. The expenditure clearly showed that the assessee had a
building on which rent of Rs.3,10,400 was incurred. It further carried on an
advertisement related to the business it had set up and other miscellaneous
expenses connected with the consultative services the assessee intended to
provide.

3. The assessee participated and took a stall in ‘Auto
Fair’ held in Delhi with the objective of advancing the assessee’s business of
consultancy. The assessee had a place of business; it had qualified people who
could give advice on automobile industry. There was material to show that the
assessee contacted various clients who entered into agreement with the
assessee in the subsequent years and paid fees for consultation to the
assessee.

4. Merely because actual receipts were not shown, it could
not be said that the assessee did not set up its business. When the assessee
was ready to offer advice on matters and problems indicated in the
correspondence with the clients, it was im-material that no fees for the
consultancy were received in the year under consideration. The assessee had an
office from which advice could be given in the automobile industry. All the
correspondence was addressed to a particular address in Pune. The assessee had
machinery to render advice in the technical field. On the above facts, it
could not be held that the assessee did not set up business in the relevant
period.

 


Cases referred to :



(i) CIT v. Sarabhai Management Corporation Ltd.,
(1991) 192 ITR 151 (SC) (para 84)

(ii) Neil Automation Technology Ltd. v. Deputy CIT,
(2002) 120 Taxman 205 (Mum.) (Tribunal) (paras 4,18, 31, 57, 59, 62)

(iii) Western India Vegetable Products Ltd. v. CIT,
(1954) 26 ITR 151 (Bom.) (paras 4, 10, 13, 17, 29, 35, 52, 59, 60, 61, 75, 77,
81, 85, 92) and many more.

 


S. 10B, as amended w.e.f. 1-4-2001 — Deduction to be computed w.r.t. profits of EOU unit after reducing losses of non-EOU units — Held, No

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43 2009 TIOL 53 ITAT Bang.

DCIT v. M/s Medreich Ltd.

ITA No. 632/Bang./2008

A.Y. : 2004-2005. Dated : 21-11-2008

Whether in view of the provisions of S. 10B, as amended
w.e.f. 1-4-2001, the deduction u/s.10B is to be computed with reference to
profits of EOU unit after reducing the losses of non-EOU units — Held, No.

 

Facts :

The assessee company, a 100% EOU, was engaged in the business
of manufacture of pharmaceutical products. The assessee company claimed
exemption u/s.10B of the Act in respect of export profits in the EOU Unit and
also the domestic profits thereon. The assessee had not claimed set-off of
business losses incurred in other units but carried them forward. The AO while
assessing the total income first set off the loss of non-EOU unit against the
entire profit of the EOU unit (domestic as well as export) and then allowed
deduction u/s.10B on the residue. As a result, the carried forward benefit
claimed by the assessee was not allowed. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an
appeal to the CIT(A) who allowed the claim of the assessee by relying on the
decision of the Bangalore Tribunal in the case of M/s. Webspectrum Software Pvt.
Ltd. in which the Tribunal held that the deduction u/s.10A is to be allowed
without setting off brought forward and current year loss of non-10A unit.
Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.


 

Held :

The Tribunal did not find any infirmity in the order of the
CIT(A). It dismissed the appeal of the Revenue.


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S. 10A — Assessee owned two STP units — Whether deduction to be computed w.r.t. profits of one unit without setting off loss of other unit — Held, Yes. Whether deduction to be allowed w.r.t. profits and gains derived — Held, Yes. Whether order of CIT u/s.

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42 2009 TIOL 41 ITAT Bang.


Tata Consultancy Service Ltd. v. ACIT

ITA No. 590/Bang./2008

A.Y. : 2003-2004. Dated : 14-11-2008

S. 10A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — A.Y. 2003-04 — Assessee
owned two STP units — During the assessment year STP Unit 1 earned profit and
STP Unit 2 suffered loss — Assessee computed deduction u/s.10A in respect of STP
Unit 1 with reference to its profits and without setting off the loss suffered
by STP Unit 2 — AO accepted the manner of computation adopted by the assessee —
CIT invoked S. 263 and directed AO to compute deduction u/s.10A in respect of
Unit 1 on the profits of Unit 1 after setting off loss of Unit 2 — Whether
deduction u/s.10A is to be computed with reference to profits of an undertaking
without setting off loss incurred by another eligible undertaking — Held, Yes.
Whether deduction u/s.10A is to be allowed with reference to profits and gains
derived by an undertaking — Held, Yes. Whether order of CIT u/s.263 needs to be
set aside — Held, Yes.

Facts :

The assessee company owned two STP units for export of
software. During the A.Y. 2003-04, STP Unit 1 earned profit, whereas STP Unit 2
suffered a loss. The assessee in its return of income claimed deduction u/s.10A
of the Act in respect of Unit 1. This deduction was computed with reference to
profits of Unit 1 without setting off the loss of STP Unit 2. No deduction
u/s.10A was claimed in respect of STP Unit 2.

 

The Assessing Officer (AO) while assessing the total income
of the assessee, accepted the manner of computation of deduction u/s.10A.

 

The CIT was of the opinion that deduction allowed u/s.10A in
respect of STP Unit 1 without setting off the loss of STP Unit 2 against income
of STP Unit 1 was not in accordance with law and that the order is prejudicial
to the interest of the Revenue. He accordingly directed the AO to modify the
order and allow deduction u/s.10A after setting off the loss from STP Unit 2
against the profit of STP Unit 1.

 

Aggrieved with the order of CIT u/s.263, the assessee
preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

 

Held :

The Tribunal after considering various judicial precedents
and also the provisions of S. 10A(1), 10A(4), notes on clauses while introducing
amendment to S. 10A(4) by Finance Bill, 2001 held as under :

(1) In S. 10A(1), the word ‘an’ has been used before the
undertaking. Deduction is to be allowed on such profit and gains as are
derived from the undertaking. Hence, to apply the provisions of S. 10A, one
has to consider the profit and gains as derived by an undertaking. It does not
refer to profits and gains as are derived by the assessee. The assessee may be
having more than one undertaking.

(2) Deduction u/s.10A is to be computed on the basis of
profits and gains derived by an undertaking. In the instant case, STP Unit 2
was having a loss and therefore, its loss cannot be set off while ascertaining
the deduction u/s.10A for STP Unit 1.

(3) When the AO has taken one of the possible views, then
the order of the AO cannot be termed as erroneous and the CIT was having no
power to cancel that order u/s.263 of the Act.

 


The Tribunal cancelled the order passed by the CIT u/s.263 of
the Act. The assessee’s appeal was allowed.

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S. 143(2), S. 158BC, S. 292BB — For period prior to 1-4-2008 where notice not issued, whether block assessment order without jurisdiction — Held, Yes. Whether S. 292BB applicable to A.Y. 2008-09 and subsequent years — Held, Yes

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41 2009 TIOL 38 ITAT Del. SB

Kuber Tobacco Products (P) Ltd. v. DCIT

IT(SS)A No. 261/Del./2001

A.Ys. : 1-4-1988 to 25-1-1999. Dated : 14-1-2009

Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 143(2), S. 158BC, S. 292BB — For a
period prior to 1-4-2008 where a notice u/s.143(2) of the Act is not issued, the
block assessment proceedings and consequential block assessment order can be
said to be without jurisdiction — Held, Yes. Whether S. 292BB is applicable to
A.Y. 2008-09 and subsequent years — Held, Yes.

 

Facts :

Search action u/s.132 of the Act was carried out in
the case of the assessee on 21-1-1999. The assessment order dated 29-1-2001
passed u/s.158BC of the Act was silent on the issue of notice u/s.143(2).
Neither before the Assessing Officer, nor before the CIT(A) did the assessee
contend that the assessment framed without issuance of notice u/s.143(2) was
invalid. The assessee in an additional ground before the Tribunal contended that
in the absence of issuance of mandatory legal notice u/s.143(2) of the Act the
block assessment proceedings and consequential block assessment order be held to
be without jurisdiction.

 

The Revenue raised a plea that in view of insertion of S.
292BB which is inserted by Finance Act, 2008 w.e.f. 1-4-2008, the assessee
cannot take the plea that assessment should be held invalid merely for the
reason that no notice u/s.143(2) was issued and the assessee is barred from
taking this plea.

 

In these circumstances, the question referred to the Special
Bench was whether the assessee who has participated in block assessment
proceedings is precluded from taking any objection that notice u/s.143(2) was
not served upon him or was not served upon him in time, in view of the
provisions of S. 292BB inserted by the Finance Act, 2008 w.e.f. 1-4-2008 and if
so, since when he can be said to be so precluded.


 

Held :

The Special Bench of the Tribunal held as follows :

(1) The scope of S. 292BB is that where any assessee has
appeared in any proceedings or has co-operated in any inquiry relating to
assessment or reassessment, then the consequences ensued will be that it will
be deemed that any notice under any provisions of the Act, which is required
to be served on an assessee has been duly served on him and it will further be
deemed to be served in time and in accordance with the provisions of the Act.
The assessee is debarred from taking the defence or raise any objection in any
proceedings or inquiry that the notice was :


(a) Not served upon him;


(b) Not served upon him in time; and


(c) Served upon him in any improper manner.

 


(2) The assessee has a right of being served with the
notice in case proceedings are taken against him and in case of invalid notice
the whole proceedings taken pursuant to that notice would be void ab initio
(subject to provisions of S. 292B) and will have no legal consequences. To
overcome some of the situations, S. 292BB has been brought on the statute as
explained in the Memorandum explaining the provisions as well as notes on
clauses.


(3) Applicability of S. 292BB is not strictly restricted to
issue of notice u/s.143(2), but it is in respect of other notices relating to
any provisions of the Act, which include notice to initiate re-assessment
proceedings and other proceedings also.


(4) Where the statute u/s.292BB deems service of notice, it
will always include issue of notice as service cannot be effected without
issuance thereof.


(5) Where procedural statute creates a new disability or
obligation and imposes new duties in respect of transactions already
accomplished, then the statute cannot be construed to have retrospective
effect. S. 292BB cannot be construed to have retrospective operation and it
has to be applied prospectively.


(6) S. 292BB is applicable to A.Y. 2008-09 and subsequent
years. The assessee is precluded from taking such objection for and from A.Y.
2008-09. Prior to 1-4-2008 i.e., up to 31-3-2008, as per S. 292BB, the
assessee is not precluded from taking any objection regarding invalidity of
assessment/reassessment on the ground of improper/invalid issuance/service of
a notice.



 



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Whether while computing book profit u/s. 115JB, lower of unabsorbed loss or depreciation as per profit and loss account of amalgamated company can be set off against profits of amalgamating company — Held, Yes.

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40 2009 TIOL 26 ITAT Bang.


VST Tillers & Tractors Ltd.
v. CIT

ITA No. 588/Bang./2008

A.Y. : 2003-2004. Dated : 21-11-2008

S. 115JB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — A.Y. 2003-04 — Whether
while computing book profit u/s. 115JB of the Act lower of unabsorbed loss or
depreciation as per profit and loss account of the amalgamated company can be
set off against profits of an amalgamating company — Held, Yes.

 

Facts :

During the year ended 31-3-2003, V.S.T. Precision Components
Ltd. (‘VPCL’), a company which was subsidiary of the assessee company was
amalgamated with the assessee company. The amalgamation, approved by the
Karnataka High Court by its order dated 18th July 2003, was to be effective from
1-4-2002. The terms of amalgamation, as mentioned in paragraph 11 of the order
of the Court, inter alia stated that accumulated loss and depreciation of
VPCL shall be deemed to be the loss and depreciation of the assessee company as
provided u/s.72 of the Act.

 

The assessee returned an income of Rs. Nil after setting off
business loss and unabsorbed depreciation of VPCL. The assessee computed book
profit u/s.115JB by reducing from profit as per its profit & loss account the
brought forward loss as per profit & loss account of VPCL.

 

The book profit computed by the assessee was accepted by the
AO in the assessment u/s.143(3).

 

Subsequently, the CIT was of the opinion that since the
unabsorbed loss was not as per the books of account of the assessee company but
of VPCL, the same cannot be permitted to be reduced from the book profit for
purposes of S. 115JB. He, accordingly, directed the AO to modify the assessment
order by re-computing the tax liability u/s.115JB.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

 

Held :

The Tribunal noted that the effective date of amalgamation
was 1-4-2002. The Tribunal held that in view of the statutory provisions of S.
72A(1) and also the order of the High Court sanctioning the scheme, the
unabsorbed business loss and also unabsorbed depreciation of VPCL were deemed to
be loss and depreciation of the assessee company. U/s.115JB(2) lower of
unabsorbed loss or unabsorbed depreciation is to be set off against the book
profit. Since the unabsorbed loss of VPCL was lower than unabsorbed
depreciation, the assessee had rightly set off the unabsorbed loss against book
profit. The Tribunal held that the CIT was not correct in directing the AO to
compute book profit without setting off the unabsorbed loss of VPCL. The
Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT passed u/s.263 of the Act.

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Whether grant of excessive credit of TDS amounts to escapement of income — Held, No. Whether it can be construed as grant of excessive relief under sub-clause (iii) of Explanation 2(e) to S. 147 — Held, No

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39 2009 TIOL 01 ITAT Hyd.

GMR Projects Pvt. Ltd. v. ACIT

ITA No. 1014/Hyd./2007

A.Y. : 2000-2001. Dated : 26-9-2008

S. 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — A.Y. 2000-01 — Whether
grant of excessive credit of TDS amounts to escapement of income — Held, No.
Whether grant of excessive credit of TDS can be construed as grant of excessive
relief under sub-clause (iii) of clause (c) of Explanation 2 to S. 147 of the
Act — Held, No.

 

Facts :

For A.Y. 2000-01 the assessee company filed its return of
income declaring total income of Rs.11,20,190. During the year under
consideration the assessee had in its profit & loss account admitted receipts of
Rs.3,33,87,112, but had claimed credit for TDS, amounting to Rs.56,30,970, in
respect of entire gross receipts of Rs.25,70,53,996. The Assessing Officer
completed the assessment u/s.143(3) of the Act assessing the total income to be
the same as returned income and granted credit of TDS amounting to Rs.56,27,970.


 


Subsequently, the AO initiated reassessment proceedings since
he was of the view that as per provisions of S. 199 of the Act credit should be
restricted to the extent of income admitted during the year. In the order passed
u/s.143(3) r.w. S. 147 of the Act, the AO restricted credit of TDS to
Rs.7,34,516.


 


In an appeal to the CIT(A) the assessee challenged the
reopening of assessment on the ground that grant of excessive credit of TDS
cannot be construed as escapement of income. The CIT(A) upheld the reopening and
held that grant of excess credit of TDS is a case of income being subjected to
excessive relief.


 



Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal,
wherein it challenged the reopening of the assessment
.

 

Held :

The Tribunal noted that the words ‘income’ and ‘tax’ have
different connotations and are separately defined in the Act. The tax on income
is on the basis of charge prescribed in Chapter II of the Act. It further
observed that what needs to be assessed under the Act is the income earned by
the assessee. Chapter XIV of the Act prescribes the procedure for assessment.
Once the income is earned, returned and assessed, the collection and recovery of
tax start simultaneously at each stage as prescribed in Chapter XVII of the Act.
The Tribunal observed that as per the scheme of the Act, each stage is a
distinct stage, and each stage culminates into the next. In the present case,
the Tribunal noted that it was dealing with assessment stage.

 

The Tribunal observed that S. 147 is contained in Chapter XIV
of the Act and deals with income which has escaped assessment. It stated that
when one says that income has escaped assessment, it only means that such income
has escaped the tax net though it was taxable. According to the Tribunal,
granting of excess credit cannot be equated with income escaping assessment. By
granting excess credit everything revolves around correct collection and
recovery of tax. Nowhere income is in picture and if income is not in picture,
where is the question of its escapement ? The Tribunal held that the AO assumed
the jurisdiction wrongly when no income had escaped assessment.

 

As regards the provision of clause (c)(iii) of Explanation 2
to S. 147 of the Act, the Tribunal noted that the issue is squarely covered in
favour of the assessee by the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of
Bombay Gas Co. Ltd.

 

The Tribunal quashed the order of reassessment.


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(a) Ss.(2) and (3) of S. 14A are procedural in nature and, hence, retrospective. (b) All direct and indirect expenses are disallowable u/s.14A, which have relation with income not chargeable to tax. (c) S. 14A applicable to dividend earned by assessee

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38 (2008) 26 SOT 603 (Mum.) (SB)

ITO v. Daga Capital Management (P.) Ltd.

ITA Nos. 8057 (Mum.) of 2003 and 183, 1372 and 2048 (Mum.)
of 2005

A.Ys. : 2001-02 and 2002-03. Dated : 20-10-2008

S. 14A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 :



(a) Expenses falling under any head or Section which
are otherwise deductible as business expenditure or under other respective
heads, would call for disallowance to the extent to which those expenses
have been incurred in relation to income exempt from tax.


(b) Ss.(2) and (3) of S. 14A are procedural in nature
and, hence, retrospective.


(c) For purpose of S. 14A what is relevant is to work
out expenditure in relation to exempt income and not to examine whether
expenditure incurred by assessee has resulted into exempt income or taxable
income.


(d) All direct and indirect expenses are disallowable
u/s.14A, which have any relation with income not chargeable to tax under the
Act.


(e) S. 14A would be applicable where shares are held
as stock-in-trade.


(f) Provisions of S. 14A would be applicable with
respect to dividend income earned by assessee engaged in business of dealing
in shares and securities on shares held as stock-in-trade when earning of
such dividend income was incidental to trading in shares.


 


The assessee-company was engaged in the business of dealing
in shares. For the relevant assessment year, the assessee had exempt dividend
income and, therefore, the Assessing Officer disallowed certain expenses in
terms of S. 14A. The CIT(A) upheld the disallowance.

 

The Special Bench also held in favour of the Revenue on all
the matters. The Special Bench observed as under :


1. S. 14A has an overriding effect over all other
Sections allowing deductions :

(a) The residence of this Section in the first
sub-chapter, viz., ‘Heads of income’, clearly demonstrates that it
has been made applicable to all the heads of income. If the intention of the
Legislature had been to restrict its application to the expenditure under
heads other than ‘business income’, then it would have been placed under the
relevant sub-chapter instead of the first sub-chapter, which, in turn,
refers to all the heads of income. Therefore, the expenses deductible under
the head ‘Business income’ are not immune from S. 14A.

(b) S. 14A is a special provision which deals with
disallowances of expenditure incurred by the assessee in relation to income
which does not form part of the total income under the Act. The expenses
falling under any head or Section which are otherwise deductible as business
expenditure or under other respective heads, would call for disallowance, in
view of the specific provision of S. 14A, to the extent to which those have
been incurred in relation to the income exempt from tax.

 

2. Ss.(2) and (3) of S. 14A are retrospective :

(a) In case of substantive provisions, the general rule
is that a provision is normally prospective in nature, unless it is given
retrospective operation expressly or can be so inferred by necessary
implication.

(b) However, in respect of
clarificatory/explanatory/procedural provisions, the date of insertion loses
its significance.

(c) S. 14A was inserted with a view to clarify the
intention of making disallowance in respect of ‘expenditure incurred by the
assessee in relation to income which does not form part of the total income
under this Act’. This Section declared the intention of the Act ‘since
inception’.

(d) When Ss.(1) itself is clarificatory and then
resultantly retrospective, it is beyond comprehension as to how Ss.(2) and
(3), providing the mechanism to do what is provided for in Ss.(1), can be
construed as substantive and, hence, prospective.

(e) A proviso has also been inserted in S. 14A for
reducing its rigor, which stipulates that no reassessment u/s.147 or
rectification u/s.154 shall be carried out by the Assessing Officer so as to
give effect to the newly inserted provision. That has been done so as not to
disturb the proceedings which have already attained finality in the period
prior to this insertion. However, assessments which are pending at any
stage, either before the Assessing Officer or the CIT(A) or the Tribunal or
the Higher Courts, would be governed by the mandate of that Section as it is
retroactive. From the above discussion, it is clear that Ss.(2) and (3) are
procedural in nature and, hence, retrospective.

 

3. Expenditure in relation to exempt income :

(a) The language of Ss.(1) of S. 14A clearly provides
that no deduction shall be allowed ‘in respect of expenditure incurred by
the assessee in relation to income which does not form part of the tot

(a) S. 48 — Option to avail benefit of indexation or not is with assessee. (b) S. 70 — Capital gain computed with indexation can be set off against capital gain computed without indexation.

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37 (2008) 26 SOT 380 (Mum.)

Mohanlal N. Shah HUF v. ACIT

ITA No. 789 (Mum.) of 2004

A.Y. : 2002-03. Dated : 24-9-2008



(a) S. 48 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Option to avail
or not to avail benefit of indexation is with the assessee.


(b) S. 70 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Capital loss
computed with indexation can be set off against capital gain computed without
indexation.




During the relevant assessment year, the assessee had sold
shares and units of mutual funds. In respect of shares sold, the assessee did
not claim benefit of indexation, but in respect of units sold of one mutual fund
the assessee opted for indexation. The resultant loss from the units was set off
against the gain from shares.

The Assessing Officer held that though the benefit of
indexation is a privilege allowed to the assessee as S. 48, the same could not
be availed of on a pick-and-choose basis; and that the option to offer capital
gain at the rate of 20% with indexation and at the rate of 10% without
indexation lies with the assessee as S. 112, but before that S. 70 comes into
appraisal and for setting off of any income under the same head it is but
natural that capital gain is to be calculated on the same footing. Therefore, he
disallowed the method adopted by the assessee. The CIT(A) also held against the
assessee.

The Tribunal, following the decision in the case of
Devinder Prakash Kalra v. ACIT,
(2006) 151 Taxman 17 (Delhi), held in favour
of the assessee. The Tribunal noted as under :

(1) The computation of income from capital gains is
governed by S. 48. A plain reading of the said provision reveals that a
capital gain from each asset which is transferred has to be computed.
Indexation is allowable while computing the ‘capital gain’ from the transfer
of each long-term capital asset.


(2) As provided in S. 48, option is with the assessee to or
not to avail of benefit of indexation for computation of capital gains on
transfer of each of long-term capital assets.


(3) It is only after computing the capital gains as per S.
48, can it be aggregated by setting off the loss u/s.70 and it is then that
the rate of tax as provided u/s.112 is to be applied.


(4) The Delhi Bench of the Tribunal in the case of
Devinder Prakash Kalra v. ACIT,
(2006) 151 Taxman 17 (Mag.), has held that
S. 112 is not only a beneficial provision, but is also mandatory provision and
if several transactions have taken place by way of sale of shares, the
assessee can avail of the benefit of indexation in a few transactions and
avail of 10% tax rate in the remaining transactions.



 


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S. 145A — If a change per se is forced upon assessee in valuation of closing stock, corresponding adjustment in opening stock to be carried out for consistency

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36 (2008) 26 SOT 141 (Mum.)

Dy. CIT v. Beck India Ltd.

ITA Nos. 383 and 483 (Mum.) of 2005

A.Y. : 2001-02. Dated : 11-9-2008

S. 145A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — If on account of
application of S. 145A, a change per se is forced upon assessee in valuation of
its closing stock, a corresponding adjustment in opening stock has to be carried
out for consistency.

 

For the relevant assessment year, the Assessing Officer held
that the assessee was bound to follow the decision of the High Court in
Melmould Corpn. v. CIT,
(1993) 202 ITR 789/71 Taxman 47 (Bom.) and that if a
change in method of accounting results in change in value of closing stock, no
corresponding adjustment would be required in opening stock, since such a change
would have the effect of disturbing the accounts leading to a chain reaction,
and, therefore, he added back MODVAT credit balance to closing stock of the
assessee. The CIT(A) directed the Assessing Officer to make corresponding
adjustments in the opening stock.

 

The Tribunal, relying on the decision in the case of CIT
v. Mahavir Aluminium Ltd.,
(2008) 297 ITR 77/ 168 Taxman 27 (Delhi), upheld
the CIT(A)’s order. The Tribunal noted as under :

1. S. 145A mentions ‘inventory’ and limiting it only to
‘closing inventory’, disregarding the opening inventory, would be not in
accordance with the plain meaning of the term ‘inventory’ used in the Section.
Inventory will necessarily include within its fold both opening as well as
closing.

2. In Melmould Corpn.’s case (supra), the assessee
had made a change in the method of valuation, which was not thrust upon the
assessee, but voluntarily selected by it. Such a change suo motu done
would definitely be different from one, which is statutory inflicted, where an
assessee per se is forced to make an adjustment to value of its
inventory.

3. However, when on account of application of S. 145A a
change per se is forced upon the assessee in the valuation of its
closing stock, a corresponding adjustment in opening stock has to be carried
out for consistency.

 


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S. 2(22)(e) — Amount given by company to director to purchase business premises, returned since deal could not materialise — Could not be treated as deemed dividend.

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35 (2008) 26 SOT 95 (Delhi)

Sunil Sethi v. Dy. CIT

ITA No. 2131 (Delhi) of 2007

A.Y. : 2004-05. Dated : 12-9-2008

S. 2(22)(e) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — When amount was
given by company to its director for business purposes of company i.e., to
purchase business premises, and said amount was returned since the deal could
not materialise, such amount could not be treated as deemed dividend.

 

During the relevant year, the assessee, who was a director in
a company and was holding 50% of the share capital of the Company, had received
Rs.30 lacs from the Company by way of an imprest to enable him to make the
payment for a proposed office complex and as the deal could not materialise, the
same was returned to the company. The Assessing Officer and the CIT(A) held such
amount as deemed dividend.

 

The Tribunal, following the decision in the case of Dy.
CIT v. Lakra Bros.,
(2007) 162 Taxman 170 (Chd.)(Mag.), held that provisions
of S. 2(22)(e) were not applicable in the assessee’s case. The Tribunal noted as
under :

1. A sum of Rs.30 lacs was given to him for the purpose of
making advance with respect to certain land dealings which were proposed to be
entered into by the company through the assessee. The assessee was a director
in the company and could lawfully execute certain agreements on behalf of the
company. Such payment was made in pursuance of a resolution passed by the
company.


2. It was not the case of the Revenue that such resolution
did not happen or it was an afterthought story. No material had been brought
on record to suggest that what was explained by the assessee was incorrect.
The sum had been treated as deemed dividend simply for the reason that it was
given to the assessee.


3. The transaction was in the ordinary course of the
business of the company, and there was no intention on the part of the company
to give a loan or advance to the assessee for his individual benefit.


4. It had been demonstrated that in the bank account of the
assessee, in which the said amount of Rs.30 lacs was credited, was always
having balance of more than Rs.30 lacs. So even for a short period the
assessee had not derived any benefit or it could not be said that the said
amount was given to the assessee by the company for his individual benefit.
The amount was lying in the bank account of the assessee, which was not
utilised at all for any purpose.


5. The amount was paid for a very short period for a
specific purpose and there was documentary evidence on record to substantiate
the explanation of the assessee that the amount was given for the business
purposes of the company.


 


Thus, the said amount could not be treated as deemed dividend
in the hands of the assessee.

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S. 254(1) — Oral pronouncement during hearing not order; Tribunal has power to refix cases to prevent miscarriage of justice — Only condition is aggrieved party must get opportunity of hearing.

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34 (2008) 119 TTJ 501 (Mumbai)


Mafatlal Securities Ltd. v. Jt. CIT

ITA No. 1127 (Mum.) of 2001

A.Y. : 1996-97. Dated : 10-8-2007

S. 254(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Oral pronouncement
during the course of hearing is not an order at all; even otherwise, Tribunal
has inherent power to refix the cases to prevent miscarriage of justice or to
grant substantial justice, and the only condition which is required to be
satisfied is that the aggrieved party must be given an opportunity of hearing.

 

In the course of original hearing, the learned counsel for
the assessee stated that the facts of this case were identical to the facts of
another case decided by this Tribunal, wherein the Tribunal had decided in
favour of the assessee. Hence, the case was heard mainly as a covered case and
the result was pronounced during the course of the hearing itself.

 

Thereafter, during the course of further study of the files,
the Bench thought that certain observations in the decisions in two cases of
Mumbai Benches were relevant. Hence, the case was released for fresh hearing as
a part heard case so as to confront these two decisions to the assessee. The
learned counsel took a preliminary objection that the Tribunal had pronounced
the order, hence, if any decision was taken contrary to the decision pronounced,
it would amount to review of order and which was beyond its powers. The learned
Departmental Representative supported the approach of the Tribunal where an
adequate opportunity of hearing was given to the assessee before taking any
other view in the matter.

 

The Tribunal, relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in
the case of ITAT v. V. K. Agarwal, (1998) 150 CTR 513 (SC)/(1998) 101
Taxman 382 (SC), held that unless the order of the Bench was signed by all the
members of the Bench and was dated, it was not an order of the Tribunal. The
Tribunal noted as under :

1. Legally speaking, oral pronouncement during the course
of hearing is not an order at all. It is only an intimation of likely result
or prima facie conclusion expressed on the basis of the contentions
made by the parties. It is only a procedural aspect and it does not create any
statutory embargo or limitation.

2. No party can proceed further unless it receives an order
in writing and in the case of orders passed by the Tribunal, the limitation
also starts from the date when the order is served. Hence, oral pronouncement
does not give any inherent right or create any limitation with regard to
statutory rights of the parties to the disputes.

3. Even an entry to this effect, in the order sheet signed
by the Members of the Bench would not constitute an order within the meaning
of r. 34 of the ITAT Rules.

4. Even if it is presumed that oral pronouncement during
the course of hearing is an order, then the Tribunal being a Court of plenary
jurisdiction is well within its powers within the meaning of S. 254(1) to
refix it for clarifications before passing an order in writing. The Tribunal
has inherent power to refix the cases in such type of situations to prevent
miscarriage of justice or to grant substantial justice. The only condition
which is required to be satisfied is that the aggrieved party must be given an
opportunity of hearing which has been done in this case.

5. Similarly, the Tribunal before passing a written order
can refix the case suo motu for clarifications so as to appraise the
issue afresh in the light of other facts or material. There is nothing wrong
in it because principles of natural justice are equally applicable to judicial
authorities as these are applicable to the parties to the disputes.

6. Though the Tribunal is not akin to a Court but the
functions discharged by it are similar to a Court, hence, in addition to its
expressed statutory powers, it has got inherent power to pass such orders as
may be necessary for the ends of justice.

 


The following cases were also relied on by the Tribunal :

1. Oriental Building & Furnishing Co. v. CIT, (1952)
21 ITR 105 (Punj.)

2. Singar Singh & Sons v. CIT, (1965) 58 ITR 626
(All.)

3. CIT v. Dr. T. K. Jairaj, (2002) 172 CTR (Ker.)
584; (2002) 256 ITR 252 (Ker.)

4. Khushalchand B. Daga v. T. K. Surendran, ITO
(1972) 85 ITR 48 (Bom.)

 



Note : Similar decision was taken by the Pune Tribunal in
the case of CIT v. Jinendra Smelting & Rolling Mills, Misc. Application
No. 65/Pn/2007 in ITA No. 539 (Pn) 2006 reported in 119 TTJ 519.

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S. 254(1) — If decision not relied upon by parties at hearing and Bench desires to apply ratio of such decision, natural justice demands that Bench should confront parties with decision and should give opportunity to make submissions w.r.t. such decisio

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33 (2008) 119 TTJ 433 (Jab.) (TM)

Vindhya Telelink Ltd. v. Jt. CIT

ITA No. 295 (Jab.) of 2000 and

C.O. No. 19 (Jab.) of 2002

A.Ys. : 1997-98 and 1998-99. Dated : 22-8-2008

S. 254(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — If any decision is
not relied upon by the parties at the time of hearing and the Bench desires to
apply the ratio of such decision, natural justice demands that the Bench should
confront the parties with such decision and should give an opportunity to them
so that they can make their submissions with reference to such decision.

 


For the relevant assessment years, the Assessing Officer
disallowed 50% of the expenditure claimed by the assessee assuming that
expenditure towards foreign travel was attributable to the wife of the managing
director, who accompanied him during such visits. The CIT(A) allowed the relief
following the decision of the Kerala High Court in the case of Appollo Tyres
Ltd. [CIT v. Appollo Tyres Ltd., (1998) 149 CTR 538 (Ker.)/(1999) 237 ITR
706 (Ker.)]. The learned AM upheld the order of the CIT(A) following the same
decision of the Kerala High Court. However, the learned JM reversed the order of
the CIT(A) following various other decisions. It was contended by the assessee’s
learned counsel before the TM that the learned JM has referred to such decisions
which were not relied upon or argued on behalf of the Department.

 


The Third Member noted as under :

1. If any decision is not relied upon by the parties at the
time of hearing and the Bench desires to apply the ratio of such decision,
natural justice demands that the Bench should confront the parties with such
decision and should give an opportunity to them so that they can make their
submissions with reference to such decision. Admittedly, in this case this has
not been done by the Bench.


2. Therefore, since the decisions were not referred to by
any of the parties at the time of hearing, the learned JM was not justified in
relying upon the same while deciding the issue under consideration.

 


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Clarification regarding approvals of 100% EOUs for the purpose of deduction u/ s.10B of the Act — Instruction No. 2/2009, dated 9-3-2009 (reproduced).

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4 Clarification regarding approvals of 100% EOUs for
the purpose of deduction u/ s.10B of the Act — Instruction No. 2/2009, dated
9-3-2009 (reproduced).

S. 10B of the Income-tax Act provides for exemption of
income in case of hundred percent export-oriented undertakings subject to
prescribed conditions. Explanation 2(iv) below to the said Section defines a
‘hundred percent export-oriented undertaking’ as an undertaking so approved
by the Board appointed in this behalf by the Central Government u/s.14 of
the Industries Development and Regulation Act, 1951. Subsequent to the
delegation of this power by the Ministry of Commerce and Industries to the
Development Commissioners, such approvals to 100% EOU’s are now being
granted by the Development Commissioners, which are later ratified by the
Board of Approvals.

The matter regarding validity of approvals given by
Development Commissioners has been examined in the Board. It has been
decided that an approval granted by the Development Commissioner in the case
of an export-oriented unit set up in an Export Processing Zone will be
considered valid, once such approval is ratified by the Board of Approval
for EOU scheme.

F.No.178/19/2008-ITA-1

(Padam Singh)

Under Secretary (ITA-I)

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S. 48 capital gains — Tax on capital gains would arise in respect of only those capital assets in acquisition of which an element of cost is actually present or is capable of being reckoned — Since rulers of yester years did not acquire their kingdoms by

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  1. (2009) 118 ITD 190 (Mum.)

HUF of H.H. late Sir J. M. Scindia v. ACIT

A.Y. : 1997-98. Dated : 22-8-2007

 

The assessee HUF was issued a notice requiring to show
cause as to why for the purpose of computation of capital gains, value for the
purpose of wealth tax was taken as the value of the plot of land, instead of
the value determined by the Government- approved valuer.

The Scindia Family had acquired the land on the occasion of
marriage of one of the forefathers of J. M. Scindia to one ‘Chimanibai’,
daughter of the then ruler of Deccan, i.e., the Peshwa. The said
property was given to Chimanibai as ‘choli bangdi’ according to the
custom prevailing in those days amongst the royal families.

It was further submitted that neither of the then rulers,
the Peshwas, nor the Scindias incurred any cost for acquiring this property.
In view of this, it was evident that the said plot did not have any cost of
acquisition and therefore it fell outside the purview of capital gains. The
claim of the assessee was rejected by the AO who computed the capital gains
taking Rs.1,50,404 as the cost of acquisition of the land. It was also
contended that the said land was recorded in the old Revenue records as ‘Inam’
land.

On appeal, the CIT(A) did not accept the assessee’s
contention and confirmed the action of the AO. On appeal before the Tribunal,
it was held :

(1) The CIT(A) has recorded the fact that the land was
received in gift by the forebears and inherited by their progeny and its
cost was nil. In support of this proposition, the assessee produced old
Revenue records obtained from Government Archives, which showed that the
said plot of land was recorded as ‘Inam’ land. The extracts furnished stated
that ‘Inam’ documents in respect of the said land were not available, and
the assessee’s stand was rejected by the CIT(A) on that count alone.
Further, in absence of any evidence to show that the land was purchased by
paying cash, the assessee’s contention which was based on factual and
historical background was to be accepted.

(2) It is also settled principle that in order to make
this transaction liable for capital gains tax, it is for the Revenue to show
that the assessee had incurred a cost in acquiring the said plot of land.

(3) As per the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court
in the case of CIT v. H.H. Maharaja Sahib Shri Lokendra Singhji,
(1986) 162 ITR 93, it was clearly held that the liability to pay tax on
capital gains would arise only in case of those capital assets in the
acquisition of which an element of cost is actually present or is capable of
being reckoned and not in case of those assets where the element of cost is
altogether inconceivable.

In the light of the above discussion, the ITAT held that
the capital gain on the transfer of said land was not exigible to tax.


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The Income-tax (Fifth Amendment) Rules, 2009 — Notification No. 24/2009, dated 12-3-2009.

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3 The Income-tax (Fifth Amendment) Rules, 2009 —
Notification No. 24/2009, dated 12-3-2009.


Rule 67 regulates the manner of investment of Recognised
Provident Funds. This rule has been amended and now these funds can invest
up to 55% in Government securities and units of mutual funds which invest in
Government securities, 40% in prescribed debt securities and time deposit
receipts, 5% in money market instruments and 15% in derivatives of companies
available on BSE/NSE and equity-linked schemes of regulated mutual funds.
There are certain restrictions and conditions prescribed for each individual
limit aforementioned.

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Insertion of Rules 37BA and 37I — Income-tax (Sixth Amendment) Rules, 2009, — Notification No. 28/2009, dated 16-3-2009.

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2 Insertion of Rules 37BA and 37I — Income-tax (Sixth
Amendment) Rules, 2009, — Notification No. 28/2009, dated 16-3-2009.

Rule 37BA has been inserted wherein the CBDT has
clarified certain issues relating to credit available u/s.199 of the Act on
TDS and TCS. Important clarifications issued are as under :

  • Credit shall be available based on the information
    provided by the tax deductor to the tax authorities in the E-TDS returns
    filed by them.

     

    • Credit
      shall be available to persons other than the deductee in case :


       


      • clubbing provisions are attracted, or

         


      • income is taxed in the hands of beneficiaries of a trust or an AOP,

         


      • partner of a firm or karta of an HUF,

         

      • cases of joint ownership when the income is
        clubbed with
        the other person’s income, and the deductee provides details of name,
        address and PAN of such other person to the deductor by way of a
        declaration. In such cases the deductor needs to issue the certificate
        in the name of the other person mentioned in the declaration.

  •  Credit for TDS would be given in the year in which the
    income is assessable to tax. In case the taxability of the income is
    deferred, then the credit for tax would be allowed over the said period of
    years in proportion to the income charged for each year.


Rule 37I has also been inserted with similar provisions
relating to tax collection at source.

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CBDT has started issuing Annual Tax Statement to assessees

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1 CBDT has started issuing Annual Tax Statement to
assessees

The CBDT has started issuing Annual Tax Statement to
assessees, a consolidated statement in Form 26AS which gives details for a
particular tax year of details of tax deducted by the employer/others and
the taxes by way of advance tax/self-assessment tax during the said tax
year. The intention is verification of these details by the taxpayer for
getting suitable tax credit. The Department would rely on this while
processing the returns of assessees. In case there is some discrepancy
noticed by the tax payer, they should contact the tax deductor/relevant bank
to sort the same. Also the Tax Department should be intimated about the
errors.

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Block assessment : If in course of search of husband, any material incriminating his wife (assessee) had been found, proper course for AO was to issue notice u/s.158BD — he could not bypass prescribed procedure and issue notice u/s.158BC on assessee who w

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  1. (2009) 118 ITD 133 (Mum.)


Smt. Nasreen Yusuf Dhanani v.
ACIT

A.Y. : 1-4-1986 to 18-12-1996.

Dated : 5-10-2007

 

Search and seizure action u/s.132 was conducted at
residential premises where the assessee was staying with her husband — Search
warrant was issued in the name of the assessee’s husband — consequent to
search action, notice u/s.158BC was issued to the assessee, in response to
which she filed her return of income for block period declaring ‘nil’
undisclosed income — subsequently intimated to the AO that since warrant of
authorisation u/s.132 was not issued and served in her name, special procedure
for assessment of search cases was not applicable to her case — AO without
dealing with the objection, made huge additions of undisclosed income — The
CIT(A) upheld the block assessment.

On appeal before the Tribunal, it was held :

(1) That a reading of S. 132 makes it clear that the
Section is person-specific and not premise-specific as argued by the
Revenue. The primary target for the search action is the person in
possession of any undisclosed income. Thus, the arguments of the Revenue
that the premises where the search action was carried out belonged to the
assessee, and therefore, the block assessment u/s.158BC was validly passed
did not hold good.

(2) Another argument of the Revenue was that in the
course of search action, evidence was found showing undisclosed income in
the name of the assessee and thus, provisions of S. 158BC could be invoked.
In this case, it is provision of S. 158BD which is to be applied in a case
where there is no search warrant and evidence is found showing undisclosed
income in the course of search conducted in respect of any other person. The
proper course of action would therefore be to issue a notice u/s.158BD.

(3) In view of the above factual and legal position, the
entire proceedings undertaken by the AO were bad in law, and hence the
assessment was to be quashed.


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“Recommendation of getting accounts audited u/s.142(2A) should come from AO only — can not be substituted by another officer’s opinion.”

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  1. (2009) 118 ITD 99 (Mum.)


Rajendra C. Singh v.
JCIT

A.Y. : 1-4-1987 to 15-11-1997

Dated : 27-9-2007

 

A search was conducted at the assessee’s premises and after
completion thereof, the AO issued notice u/s.158BC to the assessee. In
response thereto, the assessee filed block return offering undisclosed income.
In the meanwhile, the Assistant Director, in the appraisal report recommended
an audit u/s. 142(2A). The AO requested the Commissioner to approve the said
proposal.

Accordingly, by a letter dated 5-5-1999, the assessee was
directed to get the accounts audited within 60 days from the receipt of the
letter. Before expiry of such period, the assessee applied for extension of
period of audit by two months, which was also granted. On 26-8-1999, the
assessee asked for a further extension of two months which was also granted on
the same date.

During the assessment proceedings, the AO was of the view
that in normal circumstances, the block assessment should have been completed
by 30-11-1999, however, considering the Explanation to S. 158BE, the period
got extended up to 31-5-2000 and hence he passed an assessment order on
31-5-2000.

On appeal before the CIT(A), the assessee argued that
assessment order was barred by time and also contended that the AO had passed
the order only on the basis of the appraisal report of the Assistant Director
and that he had not applied his mind to the proceedings carried out before him
as contemplated in S. 142(2A). It was further submitted that the AO had not
passed an order directing the audit, but merely had endorsed the
recommendation of the Assistant Director, who was not competent authority to
direct the audit.

The CIT(A) rejected the assessee’s claims and upheld the
order of the AO. On appeal before the Tribunal it was held :

(1) Reading of S. 142(2A) makes it clear that the
recommendation should come from the AO. The AO has to form an opinion having
regard to the nature and complexity of the accounts and also keeping in mind
the interests of the Revenue, that a special audit is required. If he forms
such an opinion, he has to seek prior approval of the Chief Commissioner or
the Commissioner to get the accounts audited.

(2) In the instant case, the initiation was done by the
Assistant Director and the AO had only requested the Commissioner to accept
the proposal of the Assistant Director.

(3) Therefore, in the above-mentioned case, since
recourse to S. 142(2A) was not valid, the finding of the Commissioner
(Appeals) that the assessment order was passed within time, is devoid of
merit. The order should have been passed by the AO on or before 30-11-1999,
as he himself had held that in the normal circumstances that was the last
date of passing the order. Therefore, the order of the AO was beyond time
contemplated u/s.158BE and accordingly, the appeal of the assessee was
allowed.



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S. 147 — Differences in account balances of various creditors added to the income of the assessee in re-assessment — Since neither the reassessment order nor the order of CIT(A) gave details of nature of differences in accounts, amount could not be ‘any o

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  1. (2009) 118 ITD 70 (Delhi)


Nuware India Ltd.
v.
DCIT

A.Y. : 1994-95. Dated : 31-1-2008

 

Facts :

The AO had found differences in the account balances of
various creditors on comparison of accounts of the assessee and concerned
creditors. Differences were found in the accounts of 20 parties totalling to
Rs.4,20,949. As these differences were not reconciled, the same was added to
assessee’s income. The Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the addition. On appeal
before the Tribunal, it was held :

(1) That neither the assessment order, nor the order of
the CIT(A) gave details of the nature of differences in the accounts, so to
say, whether the credit balances were more or less or both in the books of
the assessee when compared with the confirmed accounts received from the
parties.

(2) If it is the case of the AO that these liabilities
ceased to exist, it was for him to prove so by bringing the case within the
four corners of the provisions contained in S. 41(1). Reference was made to
the SC decision in the case of CIT v. Suguali Sugar Works (P) Ltd. in
which it was held that the entries made in the accounts of the debtor,
unilaterally writing off the debt, without any action on the part of the
creditor will not enable the debtor to say that the liability had come to an
end. Therefore, it was held that the amounts written off by the debtor would
not constitute income u/s.41(1).

(3) Thus, as the details of the differences were not
given, as also, it is not shown as to how the sum total of these differences
would be income of the assessee, the impugned amount cannot be said to be
income, and the CIT(A) has erred in upholding the additions.



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Amendments to Export of Service Rules, 2005 —Notification No. 25/2009-ST, dated 19-8-2009.

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Part B : Indirect Taxes

Updates in VAT and Service Tax :

Service Tax UPDATE

Notifications

  1. Amendments to Export of Service Rules, 2005 —Notification
    No. 25/2009-ST, dated 19-8-2009.

Definition of ‘India’ in Explanation to Rule 3 has been
amended to include the installations, structures and vessels in the
continental shelf of India and the exclusive economic zone of India.

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Exemption to management, maintenance or repair of roads services w.r.t. sub-clause (zzg) of clause (105) of S. 65 — Notification No. 24/2009 — Service Tax, dated 27-7-2009.

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Part B : Indirect Taxes

 Updates in VAT and Service Tax :

Service Tax UPDATE

Notifications

  1. Exemption to management, maintenance or repair of roads
    services w.r.t. sub-clause (zzg) of clause (105) of S. 65 — Notification No.
    24/2009 — Service Tax, dated 27-7-2009.

Services in relation to management, maintenance or repairs
of roads have been exempted from Service Tax.

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Income-tax Act, 1961 — Section 139A(5B) and S. 272B — Whether Press Release dated September 25, 2007 and February 12, 2008 issued by CBDT brings down the rigours of S. 139A(5B) —Held : Yes. Whether penalty u/s. 272B cannot be levied in a case where an ass

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  1. 2009-TIOL-257-ITAT-Bang

Hewlett-Packard Globalsoft Pvt. Ltd. vs. DCIT.

A.Y. : 2008-2009. Date of Order : 25.3.2009

Income-tax Act, 1961 — Section 139A(5B) and S. 272B —
Whether Press Release dated September 25, 2007 and February 12, 2008 issued by
CBDT brings down the rigours of S. 139A(5B) —Held : Yes. Whether penalty u/s.
272B cannot be levied in a case where an assessee has submitted Permanent
Account Number of such number of deductees as satisfies the threshold limit
mentioned in the Press Release issued by CBDT —Held : Yes.

 

Facts :

The Assessing Officer (AO) found that the assessee had
filed its quarterly statement in Form No. 24Q for the 3rd quarter of financial
year 2007-08 wherein it had not furnished Permanent Account Number (PAN) of
2154 deductees out of the total of 29,733 deductees. He also found that
details furnished for 38 deductees were not in accordance with the provisions
of S. 139A(5B) of the Act. In response to the show-cause notice issued by the
AO the assessee submitted that the number of deductees whose PAN had been
furnished by the assessee exceeded the threshold limit of 90% stated in the
press release issued by the CBDT and therefore penalty u/s. 272B is not
leviable. However, the AO was of the view that the compliance to the extent of
threshold limit stated in press release issued by the CBDT is only for filing
quarterly TDS statements and that such compliance does not debar an AO from
initiating penal action. He, accordingly, levied penalty u/s. 272B. The CIT(A)
confirmed the action of the AO. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to
the Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal upon going through the Press Release dated
September 25, 2007 and also subsequent Press Release dated February 12, 2008,
held that it is evident from paras 2 and 3 of the Press Release that the CBDT
has prescribed a threshold limit for compliance i.e., to provide
information of PAN data by virtue of S. 139A(5B)(iv) of the Act. It held that
the sole intention of the Press Release is to bring down the rigour of the
provision of S. 139A(5B) and 272B keeping in view the laborious and cumbersome
task of compliance.

Since the assessee had furnished PAN data to the extent of
93% of the total deductees there was compliance in furnishing PAN data in
accordance with the threshold limit of 90% prescribed in press release by the
CBDT, the penal provisions were held to be not attracted. Accordingly, the
Tribunal deleted the penalty levied u/s. 272B of the Act.


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Income-tax Act, 1961 — Section 271(1)(c) — Concealment penalty — Impact of the decision of the Apex Court in Dharmendra Textile Processors on the scheme of S. 271(1)(c) — Whether even a civil liability for penalty can be invoked only when the conditions f

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  1. 2009-TIOL-278-ITAT-Pune

Kanbay Software India Pvt. Ltd. vs. DCIT

A.Y. : 2002-2003. Date of Order : 28.4.2009

Income-tax Act, 1961 — Section 271(1)(c) — Concealment
penalty — Impact of the decision of the Apex Court in Dharmendra Textile
Processors on the scheme of S. 271(1)(c) — Whether even a civil liability for
penalty can be invoked only when the conditions for imposition of penalty
under Section are satisfied — Held : Yes. Whether once the mandate of S.
271(1)(c), read with Explanations thereto are satisfied, there is no further
onus on the AO to establish mens rea —Held : Yes. Whether ratio decidendi of
the judgment of Apex Court in Dharmendra Textile Processors and Ors. is
confined to treating the willful concealment as not vital for imposing penalty
u/s. 271(1)(c) and not that in all cases where addition is confirmed, the
penalty shall mechanically follow — Held, Yes.

 

Facts :

The assessee company was engaged in the business of
development and export of computer software. The assessee had two units
eligible for deduction u/s. 10A. For assessment year 2002-03, in the first
unit the assessee had made profits, while in the second unit, the assessee
incurred losses. The assessee filed a revised return of income for AY 2002-03,
wherein it claimed carry forward of loss and unabsorbed depreciation of second
unit and claimed a deduction u/s. 10A on the profits of first unit without
setting off loss and depreciation of the second unit. Appropriate disclosure
was made in the return of income. The Assessing Officer (AO) rejected this
claim and the assessee accepted the decision of the AO. The AO initiated
proceedings for furnishing inaccurate particulars of income and levied penalty
u/s. 271(1)(c) which action of the AO was confirmed by CIT(A). Aggrieved,
assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal deleted the penalty and held as under :

(a) On first principles, penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) is not
simply a consequence of an addition being made to the income of the
assessee. Unless it is established that there is concealment of income or
furnishing of inaccurate particulars or it is established that on the facts
of the case, concealment of income can be deemed in accordance with the
provisions of law, the penalty provisions cannot be invoked at all,
irrespective of whether penalty is a civil liability or a criminal
liability.

(b) The judgment of the Supreme Court (SC) in UOI vs.
Dharmendra Textile Processors
(306 ITR 277) has to be understood in the
correct perspective. Penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) has been held to be a ‘civil
liability’ in contradistinction to prosecution u/s. 276C. It is wrong to
infer that because the liability is a ‘civil liability’ it ceases to be
penal in character. There is no contradistinction in a liability being a
civil liability and the same liability being a penal liability as well,
though a civil liability cannot certainly be a criminal liability as well.

(c) The only impact of a liability being a civil
liability is that mens rea or the intentions of the assessee need not
be proved. Unless contravention of law takes place and unless the conditions
for imposition of penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) are satisfied, even a civil
liability cannot be invoked. The action which triggers the civil liability
is the lapse on the part of the assessee.

(d) An addition made during the course of assessment
proceedings, by itself, cannot be enough to initiate, leave aside conclude,
penalty proceedings u/s. 271(1)(c).

(e) The proposition that mens rea need not be
proved before penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) can be imposed was not laid down by SC
in Dharmendra Textile for the first time. Even in the case of K. P.
Madhusudan (251 ITR 99), a three-judge Bench of SC had so held.

(f) Dharmendra Textiles is not an authority for the
proposition that penalty is an automatic consequence of an addition being
made to the income of the taxpayer for the reason that whether it is a civil
liability or a criminal liability, penalty can only come into play when
conditions are satisfied. All that Explanation 1 to S. 271(1)(c) is to shift
the onus of proof from AO to the assessee; instead of AO being under an
obligation to establish the mala fides of the assessee, the onus is
now on the assessee to establish his innocence and righteous conduct.

(g) The observations in Dharmendra Textile to the effect
that penalty is to provide a remedy for loss of Revenue cannot be construed
to mean that penalty can be imposed as an automatic consequence for addition
to returned income, given the scheme of S. 271(1)(c).

(h) An assessee’s statutory obligation u/s. 139(1) is to
give correct and complete information with the return of income. If this is
complied with, then there is no contravention which can attract even a civil
liability. The fact that additions and disallowances are made by the AO does
not mean that there is a breach of the obligation. The proposition that just
because penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) is a civil liability, it must mean that
penalty can automatically be levied on the basis of any addition to income
is not correct.

Section 143 — Notice under Section 143(2) is required to be served on assessee within 12 months from end of month in which return of income has been filed and mere issuance of notice within a period of 12 months is not sufficient —The onus to prove servic

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[2009] 116 ITD 123 (Del.)

BHPE Kinhill Joint Venture


vs. Additional DIT (Delhi).

A.Y. : 2000-01 Dtd. : December 14, 2007

Section 143 — Notice under Section 143(2) is required to be
served on assessee within 12 months from end of month in which return of
income has been filed and mere issuance of notice within a period of 12 months
is not sufficient —The onus to prove service of notice on assessee within
statutory period is upon Assessing Officer.

 


The assessee filed return of income on 22-10-2001. The
Assessing Officer issued notice by way of foreign air registered letter on
31-10-2002. The assessee contended that since the notice under Section 143(2),
dated 31-10-2002 had not been received by it by 31-10-2002, the assessment
proceedings were not valid in law. The Commissioner (Appeals) relying on the
decision of the Apex Court in Prima Realty vs. Union of India [1997]
223 ITR 655, held that the Post Office had acted as an agent of the assessee
and, therefore, the date of service under the provisions of Section 143(2)
would be treated as 31-10-2002, which was within time.

On second appeal by the assessee, the ITAT held that :

1) The onus to prove the service of notice on the
assessee within the statutory period is upon the Assessing Officer and not
upon the assessee.

2) In the instant case, the notice was only issued by the
Assessing Officer on 31-10-2002, but neither the same had been received back
by the Assessing Officer nor the Department was able to prove the service of
notice upon the assessee on 31-10-2002. Therefore, the notice under Section
143(2) was not proved to have been served upon the assessee on or before
31-10-2002 by the Department.

3) In the case of Prima Realty vs. Union of India
[supra] the Apex Court was dealing with the payment made by cheque.
The ratio of that case is that whether the addressee has shown his desire
either expressly or impliedly to send a cheque by post, the property in the
cheque passes to him as soon as it is posted. Therefore, the Post Office
acts as an agent of the person to whom the cheque is sent and so the facts
of that case are clearly distinguishable with the facts of the case of the
assessee.

4) In case the Revenue has failed to establish the
service of the notice upon the assessee under Section 143(2) within the
statutory period of limitation provided under the proviso to Section 143(2)
then the assessment proceedings completed by the Assessing Officer in
violation of statutory provision of Section 143(2) are liable to be
cancelled/quashed.

In support of his contention, the assessee has relied upon
the decision of the ITAT Delhi Bench ‘C’ in the case of Whirlpool India
Holdings Ltd. vs. Dy. DIT
rendered in I.T. Appeal No. 330 (Delhi) of 2004
for the assessment year 2000-01, which has also considered the decision of the
Apex Court in the case of Prima Realty (supra). The Tribunal has also
placed reliance on the decision of jurisdictional High Court of Delhi in the
case of CIT vs. Lunar Diamonds Ltd. [2006] 281 ITR 1 (Delhi), wherein
Their Lordships have also discussed the decision of Apex Court delivered in
the case of Prima Realty (supra).

Cases relied upon :



1. Whirlpool India Holdings Ltd. vs. Dy. DIT [IT
Appeal No. 330/Delhi of 2004]

2. Raj Kumar Chawla vs. ITO [2005] 94 ITD 1
(Delhi) (SB).



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Income-tax Act, 1961 — Section 6(1)(c) and Explanation to S. 6(1) — In the case of an assessee who is sent on deputation by his Indian employer to a company outside India and his salary is borne and paid by the foreign company, can it be said that the ass

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  1. 2009-TIOL-261-ITAT-Mad.

DCIT vs. Ashok Kumar

A.Y. : 2004-2005. Date of Order : 6.3.2009

Income-tax Act, 1961 — Section 6(1)(c) and Explanation to
S. 6(1) — In the case of an assessee who is sent on deputation by his Indian
employer to a company outside India and his salary is borne and paid by the
foreign company, can it be said that the assessee has left India for the
purpose of employment and therefore his case is covered by clause (a) of
Explanation to S. 6(1) — Held : Yes.

 

Facts :

The assessee was an employee of ONGC. During the previous
year relevant to assessment year 2004-05, he was seconded to ONGC Nile Ganga
BV, a Dutch company. During the year under consideration his stay in India was
for 98 days. The AO held that in view of S. 6(1)(c) of the Act the assessee
became resident and accordingly he charged to tax salary received by the
assessee from ONGC Nile Ganga in Sudan. The AO held that the assessee did not
leave India for employment outside India but was sent for work of ONGC out of
India and, therefore, his income was chargeable to tax.

The CIT(A) held the assessee to be a non-resident and
directed the AO to exclude salary received by the assessee from ONGC Nile
Ganga by treating the assessee as a non-resident.

The Revenue filed an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal noted that during the period when the assessee
was deputed to ONGC Nile Ganga no salary was paid by ONGC. It held that since
ONGC Nile Ganga B.V. is a foreign company, a separate entity, the assessee can
be said to have left India but joined employment in a foreign country and,
therefore, the condition for treating him as resident would be for 180 days (sic
182 days) as against 60 days provided in the Explanation. Accordingly, it
held that the assessee was a non-resident and therefore, income received by
him from ONGC Nile Ganga in Sudan would not be taxable. It noted that this
view was also supported by the decision of AAR in the case of British Gas
India P. Ltd. (285 ITR 218). The Tribunal dismissed the appeal of the Revenue.


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Income-tax Act, 1961 — Sections 40(a)(i) and S. 195 — Whether provisions of S. 195 apply only to income chargeable to tax in India — Held : Yes. Whether in a case where amount paid to non-resident is not chargeable to tax in India and therefore provisions

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  1. 2009-TIOL-241-ITAT-Mad.

DCIT vs. Venkat Shoes Pvt. Ltd.

A.Y. : 2004-2005. Date of Order : 6.3.2009

Income-tax Act, 1961 — Sections 40(a)(i) and S. 195 —
Whether provisions of S. 195 apply only to income chargeable to tax in India —
Held : Yes. Whether in a case where amount paid to non-resident is not
chargeable to tax in India and therefore provisions of Chapter XVII-B are not
applicable, can such an amount be disallowed u/s. 40(a)(i) — Held : No.

 

Facts :

The assessee paid a sum of Rs.23,57,715 as commission to a
non-resident. The commission was paid for services rendered by the agent
outside India. The assessee did not deduct tax at source on the ground that
the services have been rendered outside India. The AO held that in view of the
ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Transmission
Corporation of India the assessee ought to have deducted tax at source. The AO
disallowed this sum u/s. 40(a)(i) since according to the him tax was
deductible on this sum and the assessee had failed in its duty of deducting
tax as per S. 195.

The CIT(A) held that (a) the commission paid by the
assessee was not chargeable to tax in India as per Ss. 4 and 5 of the Act; (b)
the case of the assessee was supported by CBDT Circular No. 786, dated
7.2.2000. Accordingly, he held that the provisions of S. 195 and S. 40(a)(i)
were not applicable. He also accepted the assessee’s contention that the Apex
Court decision in the case of Transmission Corporation of AP Ltd. and Another
mandated deduction of tax at source only when the same is chargeable to tax in
India. Accordingly, he allowed the assessee’s appeal.

Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal noted that as the non-resident rendered
services outside India, the amount under consideration could not be said to
have been deemed to accrue or arise in India and also the payment was remitted
abroad and therefore the amount was not exigible to tax in India. The Tribunal
held that since the payment was not chargeable to tax in India, the provisions
of S. 195(2) are not applicable.

The Tribunal also found the case of the assessee to be
fully meeting the criteria laid down by the CBDT in its Circular No. 786,
dated 7th February, 2000 and Circular No. 23, dated 23rd July, 1969 according
to which, no tax is deductible u/s. 195. The Tribunal noted that in view of
the decision of the Apex Court in Azadi Bachao Andolan the circulars of CBDT
are binding on the Revenue authorities.

The Tribunal held that it cannot be said that the decision
of the Apex Court in Transmission Corporation mandates deduction of tax at
source, if non-resident renders service outside India which is not chargeable
to tax. The Hon’ble Court’s exposition in that case was on the premise that at
least some part of the receipt may be chargeable to tax. The Apex Court has
clearly upheld that the obligation of the assessee to deduct tax at source is
limited to the appropriate portion of income chargeable under the Act. So when
there is no income chargeable to tax, the question of deduction at source does
not arise.


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Service Tax not applicable on commission paid to Managing Director/Director : Circular No. 115/08/2009-ST, dated 31-7-2009.

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Part B : Indirect Taxes

 Updates in VAT and Service Tax :

Service Tax UPDATE

Circulars

  1. Service Tax not applicable on commission paid to Managing
    Director/Director : Circular No. 115/08/2009-ST, dated 31-7-2009.

It is clarified that remunerations paid to Managing
Director/Directors of companies, whether whole-time or independent, when being
compensated for their performance as Managing Director/Directors would not be
liable to Service Tax.

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Instruction No. 1829, dated 21st September 1989 laying down guidelines for determining taxability of non-residents from execution of power projects on a turnkey basis stand withdrawn — Instruction No. 5, dated 20-7-2009 (reproduced).

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79. 


Instruction No. 1829, dated 21st September 1989 laying down guidelines for
determining taxability of non-residents from execution of power projects on a
turnkey basis stand withdrawn — Instruction No. 5, dated 20-7-2009 (reproduced).


Instruction No 1829, dated 21-9-1989 (hereinafter called ‘the instruction’)
issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes deals with the taxability of income
arising to non-residents from the execution of power projects on turnkey basis
involving activities to be carried out in India as well as outside India. The
Instruction analyses a hypothetical situation and taxability thereof. The
Instruction lays down the basis of taxation with regard to the four activities
listed therein. With regard to the activity relating to profits from sale of
equipments and materials on FOB basis, delivered at port outside India, where
the payments are also made outside India, it instructs that on the given facts
no part of the income will be deemed to accrue or arise in India.


2. This Instruction was issued in 1989 with regard to execution of power
projects on turnkey basis with certain specified features. Further, the
Instruction quite clearly covers a specific situation in which there is actually
a consortium of foreign companies.


3. In practice, however, the assessees rely on the Instruction for not only the
power projects but other projects as well. Further, a single project is split
into various components like offshore supply of equipments/services, onshore
supply equipments and onshore services. Sometimes, the contract is split even
when only one contractor/supplier bid for the project. In such cases the
contract is split into various components to be executed by the bidder and its
associate concerns. Thus consortium of foreign companies is not in existence,
but is created to take advantage of the Instruction. This is not the same case
as ‘consortium of foreign companies’ envisaged in the Instruction.


4. It is also noticed that most of the profit is loaded in the offshore supply
and the payments for the Indian portion of the contracts barely meet the
expenses resulting into either losses in India or very low profit. The Assessing
Officer’s attempt to apportion profit correctly into various components of the
overall project on the basis of functions, risks and assets is often resisted by
the assessee taking recourse to the Instruction. Further, even if it is proved
that a part of the operations relating to supplies have taken place in India or
the permanent establishment of the assessee had a role in offshore supply, the
profit from offshore supply is claimed to be exempt under the Instruction.


5. Thus the Instruction which was originally intended for only a particular type
of turnkey power project, for a given situation, is being relied upon by
assessees in all cases, in all situations, to align their business operation in
a manner to avoid payment of taxes in India, This was never the purpose of
issuance of this Instruction. Accordingly, the Central Board of Direct Taxes
hereby withdraws the Instruction No. 1829, dated 21-9-1989 with immediate
effect.


6. It is clarified that the withdrawal of Instruction will not in any way
prejudice the plea of the Income-tax Department, in any appeal, reference or
petition, that the Instruction No. 1829 does not apply to a particular case on
the given facts even though it was in force at the time of making the
assessment.


7. This may be brought to the knowledge of all officers within your region.

 

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S. 2(22)(e) — Whether deemed dividend can be assessed in hands of person other than a shareholder of lender — Held, No — Whether words ‘such shareholder’ in S. 2(22)(e) refer to shareholder who is both registered and also beneficial — Held, Yes.

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32 2008 TIOL 641 ITAT Mum-SB


ACIT v. Bhaumik Colour Pvt. Ltd.

ITA No. 5030/Mum./2004

A.Y. : 1997-98. Dated : 19-11-2008

S. 2(22)(e) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Assessee received
interest-bearing loan of Rs.9 lakhs from Umesh Pencils Pvt. Ltd. (UPPL) —
Narmadaben Nandlal Trust (NMT), a shareholder holding 20% shares in assessee
company held 10% shares in UPPL — Trustees of NMT were the registered
shareholders in both the companies, but the beneficiaries of NMT were different
from the trustees – Assessing Officer taxed the amount of loan received by
assessee as deemed dividend u/s.2(22)(e) — Whether deemed dividend can be
assessed in the hands of a person other than a shareholder of the lender — Held,
No — Whether the words ‘such shareholder’ in S. 2(22)(e) of the Act refer to a
shareholder who is both the registered shareholder and also the beneficial
shareholder — Held, Yes.

 

Facts :

Bhaumik Colour Pvt. Ltd. (BCPL), the assessee, was a company
engaged in the business of manufacture of pencil-paints. The assessee took an
interest-bearing loan of Rs.9 lakhs from UPPL. The AO found that though the
assessee was not a shareholder of UPPL, both the companies had one common
shareholder i.e., NNT. The said trust was holding 20% shares in
assessee-company i.e., holding substantial interest and 10% shares in
UPPL. The shares were held by the trust in the name of three trustees for and on
behalf of the trust and the beneficiaries of the trust were five in number and
none of the trustees was the beneficiary of the trust. The AO was of the view
that this transaction was covered by the second limb of provisions of S.
2(22)(e) of the Act. The AO taxed the sum of Rs.9 lakhs in the hands of the
assessee. The CIT(A) deleted the addition made by the AO for the reason that NNT
was not beneficial shareholder of shares in BCPL or UPPL and therefore the
second limb of the provisions of S. 2(22)(e) could not be applied vis-à-vis
the assessee. Aggrieved by the order of the CIT(A), the Revenue preferred an
appeal to the Tribunal. The Division Bench noted that there was a direct
conflict between the decisions in Nikko Technologies (I) Pvt. Ltd. and Seamist
Properties (P) Ltd., and was, therefore, of the opinion that the matter should
be heard by a Special Bench on the following questions :

(a) Whether deemed dividend u/s.2(22)(e) of the Act, can be
assessed in the hands of a person other than a shareholder of the lendor ?

(b) Whether the words ‘such shareholder’ occurring in S.
2(22)(e) refer to a shareholder who is both the ‘registered’ shareholder and
also the ‘beneficial’ shareholder ?

The Special Bench held as under :

(1) The provisions of S. 2(22)(e) of the Act, and the
provisions of S. 2(6A)(e) of the Income-tax Act, 1922 were considered. The
Bench analysed the amendments made in S. 2(22)(e) from time to time and
observed that under the 1922 Act, two categories of payment were considered as
dividend viz. (a) any payment by way of advances or loan to a
shareholder was considered as dividend paid to the shareholder, or (b) any
payment by any such company on behalf of or for the individual benefit of a
shareholder was considered as dividend. In the 1961 Act, the very same two
categories of payment were considered as dividend but an additional condition
that payment should be to a shareholder being a person who is the beneficial
owner of shares and who has a substantial interest in the company viz.,
share-holding which carries not less than twenty percent of the voting power,
was introduced.

(2) The Apex Court has in the case of C. P. Sarathy
Mudaliar (83 ITR 170), while dealing with provisions of S. 2(6A)(e),
(synonymous to the provisions of S. 2(22)(e) of the 1961 Act,) held that when
the Act speaks of shareholder, it refers to the registered shareholder. This
decision was followed by the Apex Court in Rameshwarlal Sanwarmal (122 ITR 1).
It is clear from these pronouncements that to attract the first limb of S.
2(22)(e), the payment must be to a person who is a registered holder of
shares.

(3) The word ‘shareholder’ is followed by the words ‘being
a person who is the beneficial owner of shares’. These provisions do not
substitute the aforesaid requirement to a requirement of merely holding a
beneficial interest in the shares without being a registered holder of shares.
Thus the expression ‘shareholder being a person who is the beneficial owner of
shares’ referred first time in S. 2(22)(e) means both a registered shareholder
and beneficial shareholder. If a person is a registered shareholder but not
the beneficial shareholder or vice versa, then the provisions of S.
2(22)(e) will not apply.

(4) There are divergent views on this issue of the person
in whose hands dividend is to be taxed viz. the ‘concern’ or the
‘shareholder’. The Rajasthan High Court in the case of Hotel Hilltop (217 CTR
527), held that the liability of tax, as deemed dividend, could be attracted
in the hands of the ‘shareholder’ and not the ‘concern’.

(5) The provisions of S. 2(22)(e) do not spell out as to
whether the income has to be taxed in the hands of the shareholder or the
concern. Since the provisions are ambiguous, the intention behind enacting the
provisions of S. 2(22)(e) should be examined. The intention of the Legislature
is to tax dividend only in the hands of the shareholder and not in the hands
of the concern.

(6) The decision of the Apex Court in the case of Kantilal
Manilal (41 ITR 275), explained the basic characteristic of dividend.
Provisions of S. 206 of the Companies Act prohibits payment of dividend to
persons other than shareholders and in the case of Nalin Beharilal (74 ITR
849), the Apex Court considered what can come within the artificial definition
of dividend u/s.2(22).

Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 32(1)(ii) — Depreciation on Intangible Assets — Payment for Non-compete fees — Whether by payment of non-compete fees the assessee can be said to have acquired a commercial or business right similar to the intangible assets enume

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6 ITO v. Medicorp Technologies India Ltd.

ITAT ‘A’ Bench, Chennai

Before H. S. Sidhu (JM) and Ahmad Fareed (AM) ITA No. 2328/Mds./2007

A.Y. : 2002-03. Decided on : 16-1-2009
Counsel for revenue/assessee : Shahji P. Jacob/ K. Ravi

Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 32(1)(ii) — Depreciation on Intangible Assets — Payment for Non-compete fees — Whether by payment of non-compete fees the assessee can be said to have acquired a commercial or business right similar to the intangible assets enumerated in S. 32(1)(ii)of the Act — Held, Yes. Whether claim of depreciation is admissible on non-compete fees paid by the assessee — Held, Yes.

Facts :

The assessee-company was in the business of manufacture and distribution of bulk drugs and intermediaries, and exporting these products to the USA, Canada, Europe and Australia. Another company, Medispan Limited (MS) was engaged in the business of development and production of medical and pharmaceutical formulations and had been exporting it to various South American, African and South-East Asian countries. The assessee with an intention to expand its market reach to South American and African countries, for its own products as well as for other formulations, drugs and medicines, entered into an agreement dated 12-7-2000, whereby MS agreed to transfer the business and activities of its export division to assessee for a consideration of Rs.5.33 crores. Clause III of the agreement inter alia provided for break-up of various components of the consideration of Rs.5.33 crores. It was provided that the consideration of Rs.5.33 crores comprises Rs.2 crores towards compensation for MS accepting noncompete obligation in respect of export of bulk drugs, pharmaceutical products and formulations. In the computation of total income filed along with the return of income, the assessee had claimed the payment of Rs.2 crores towards non-compete obligation as revenue expenditure. The AO rejected the claim. The assessee made an alternative claim before the AO that depreciation be allowed u/s.32(1) of the Act on the non-compete fee. The AO rejected this claim also. The CIT(A) held that depreciation on this sum of Rs.2 crores be granted u/s.32(1) of the Act. Aggrieved the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal considered the legislative history and scope of the provisions dealing with the benefit of ‘depreciation’ under the Act. It noted that the scope of S. 32(1) was widened by the Finance Act, 1999 by allowing depreciation in respect of ‘intangible assets’ w.e.f. 1-4-1999. This has been achieved by introducing clause (ii) in S. 32(1) of the Act. Prior to this, depreciation was allowable only in respect of ‘tangible assets’ viz. buildings, machinery, plant or furniture. It stated that the words ‘being intangible assets’ appear in clause (ii) by way of a nomenclature, to contradistinguish the items appearing in clause (ii) from those appearing in clause (i). It noted that the provisions of S. 32(1)(ii) w.e.f. 1-4-1999 not only extended the benefit of S. 32 to the ‘intangible assets’ but also gave therein an ‘inclusive’ definition of the ‘intangible assets’, for this purpose. It stated that one can say that clause (ii) contains an ‘inclusive’ definition of ‘intangible assets’, for the purpose of S. 32.

The Tribunal found that it was an admitted fact that the payment of Rs.2 crores was made by the asses-see-company to ward off competition in the export business which was acquired by it from MS. Therefore, it concluded that what was acquired by the assessee by paying this amount of Rs.2 crores was a business/commercial right. It observed that it is clear from the language of clause (ii) of S. 32(1) that each of the terms, know-how, patents, copyright, trade mark, licences, or franchises represents a ‘business or a commercial right’. It then proceeded to examine the ‘nature’ of these business/commercial rights and compared their ‘nature’ with the ‘nature’ of the impugned business/commercial right which was acquired by the assessee and concluded that in the case of copyright, trade mark, licence, and franchises also the owners have exclusive business/ commercial rights, and if there is a breach they can sue. It held that similar was the nature of the impugned right acquired by the assessee. It further stated that if the business/commercial right of a patent, copyright, trademark, licence and franchise fulfils the conditions of being intangible asset, then surely the impugned business/commercial right acquired by the assessee also fulfils that condition by way of a logical corollary. The decision of Madras Tribunal in the case of A. B. Mauria India Pvt. Ltd. was held to be not applicable in the facts of the present case. The Tribunal held that the payment of Rs.2 crores made by the assessee under agreement dated 12-7-2000 to ward off competition was a business/commercial right which was similar in nature to copyright, trade mark, licence and franchises and therefore qualified for depreciation u/s.32(1)(ii) of the Act. The Tribunal observed that the decision of ITAT, Chennai, in the case of A. B. Mauria India Pvt. Ltd., on which reliance was placed on behalf of the Revenue, does not support the case of the Department on the facts of the case in the present appeal.

Case referred to :

1. A. B. Mauria India Pvt. Ltd. (ITA No. 1293/ Mds./2006, dated 23-11-2007)

 

S. 133A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Whether an addition can be sustained merely on the basis of statement made at the time of Survey — Held, No.

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5 Dy. CIT v. Premsons

ITAT ‘B’ Bench, Mumbai
Before R. S. Syal (AM) and Asha Vijayaraghavan (JM) ITA No. 4698/Mum./2006

A.Y. : 2003-04. Decided on : 15-1-2009 Counsel for revenue/assessee : Pitambar Das/ Reepal Tralshawala

S. 133A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Whether an addition can be sustained merely on the basis of statement made at the time of Survey — Held, No.

Per R. S. Syal :

Facts :

A survey action u/s.133A of the Act was conducted on the office premises of the assessee along with its two sister concerns on 15-1-2003. During the course of survey, physical stock in the case of the assessee was found to be excessive by Rs.21,14,146. Statement of Mr. Bharat Gala, partner of the assessee firm, was recorded. The assessee admitted to surrender a sum of Rs.50 lakhs as additional income over and above the income recorded in the books of accounts with the following bifurcation :

Towards excess stock Rs.21 lakhs

Towards any other discrepancy Rs.29 lakhs

After the close of survey but before the close of the year the assessee retracted from the surrender made during survey, vide its letter dated 24-3-2003. The assessee mentioned in its letter that the surrender was obtained forcefully by the survey team.

The assessee filed its return of income declaring total income of Rs.25,20,483 which included the surrender of Rs.21.14 lakhs towards difference in closing stock. The remaining portion of Rs.28.85 lakhs agreed by the assessee at the time of survey was not offered for taxation.

While assessing the total income of the assessee, the AO held that retraction was an after thought and further since the assessee had not maintained quantitative stock register, it was not possible to check the sales and purchases of different items dealt in by it. He also held that accounting of sales was such that it was open to manipulation. He, therefore, made an addition of Rs.28.85 lakhs.

The CIT(A) held that the books of accounts ought not to have been rejected and also the addition of Rs.28.85 lakhs was deleted by him. Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal on these two grounds.

Held :

As regards rejection of the books of accounts by the AO, the Tribunal held that the books of accounts can be said to be properly maintained when correct income can be deduced therefrom. It is not only the arithmetical inaccuracy in the books of accounts which would call for the resorting to the provisions of S. 145(3). Since during the course of survey physical stock was found to be excessive as compared to the books of accounts, the Tribunal held that the books of accounts were rightly rejected by the AO.

As regards the addition of Rs.28.85 lakhs, the Tribunal noted that the real question before it was whether addition can be sustained simply on the basis of statement recorded at the time of survey. The Tribunal noted that the Kerala High Court has in the case of Paul Mathew & Sons held that addition cannot be sustained simply on the basis of statement recorded at the time of survey. The Madras High Court has in the case of S. Khader Khan Son, held that S. 133A does not empower any Income-tax authority to examine any person on oath and hence such a statement has no evidentiary value. The Tribunal also observed that the Circular dated 10-3-2003 issued by the CBDT which makes it clear that no attempt should be made to obtain undue confession from the assessee during search or survey proceedings is indicative of the fact that the Department is also not oblivious of the practice by which the Revenue Authorities obtain undue confession from the assessee during search or survey. The Tribunal held that in view of the verdict of the two High Courts and the position reaffirmed by the CBDT through its Circular, it is abundantly clear that no addition can be made or sustained simply on the basis of statement recorded at the time of survey/search. It further held that in order to make an addition on the basis of surrender during search or survey, it is sine qua non that there should be some other material to correlate the undisclosed income with such statement. The Tribunal noted that the surrender to the extent of Rs.28.85 lakhs was specifically ‘towards other discrepancy’. The assessment order had no mention of any such discrepancy found as a result of survey throwing light on undisclosed income. There was nothing on record which could correlate such income offered by the assessee during the course of survey with any other discrepancy. The Tribunal was of the view that there is no basis for sustaining the addition in question.

Cases referred to :

  •     Paul Mathew & Sons v. CIT, (2003) 263 ITR 101 (Ker.)
  •     CIT v. S. Khader Khan Son, (2008) 300 ITR 157 (Mad.)

S. 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Penalty for concealment — Claim made under bona fide belief rejected and penalty imposed — Whether penalty can be levied — Held, No.

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4 Kisanlal Sarda v. ACIT

ITAT Pune Bench ‘A’ Pune
Before Pramod Kumar (AM) and Mukul Shrawat (JM) ITA No. 241/PN/2006


A.Y. : 1994-95. Decided on : 29-8-2008 Counsel for assessee/revenue : B. V. Jhaveri/
S. Bains

S. 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Penalty for concealment — Claim made under bona fide belief rejected and penalty imposed — Whether penalty can be levied — Held, No.

Per Mukul Shrawat :

Facts :

The case before the Tribunal was about a penalty being levied on account of the claim of inadmissible higher rate of depreciation. The facts of the case were, the assessee in the earlier two years had claimed depreciation @ 40% in respect of two vehicles which were given on hire and the same was allowed. The assessee’s claim for the same in the year under appeal was negatived by the AO on the ground that during the year, the main activity of the assessee was not that of running the vehicles on hire, hence he was entitled to depreciation @ 25% only. On appeal the CIT(A) confirmed the AO’s order. For claiming depreciation at the higher rate, the AO levied penalty of Rs.4.68 lacs, which was confirmed by the CIT(A).

Before the Tribunal the Revenue relied on the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Ramesh Chandra & Co. and contended that once the addition was accepted by not filing appeal against the same, the assessee has no right to challenge the levy of penalty.

Held :

The Tribunal noted that the claim by the assessee of depreciation at the higher rate was based on the advice given by his chartered accountant. Secondly, it was not the case of the Revenue that there was a deliberate attempt to conceal the vital facts of the case pertaining to the claim of depreciation, and all the necessary information on the basis of which the correct claim of depreciation had to be allowed was on record and furnished by the assessee. Accordingly, relying on the ratio in the decisions listed at S. Nos. 2 to 6 below, it held in favour of the assessee. Further, it also referred to the recent Supreme Court decision in the case of Dilip N. Shroff, where in the context of the penalty u/s.271(1)(c), the Court had observed that the AO was required to arrive at a finding that the explanation offered by the assessee was false. Based on the same, the Tribunal reversed the orders of the authorities below and allowed the appeal.

Cases referred to :

  •     Dilip N. Shroff 291 ITR 519 (SC)
  •     Orion Travels Pvt. Ltd. v. ACIT, 87 TTJ 246 (Mum.)
  •     Kalyani Enterprises v. ACIT, 86 TTJ 767 (Mad.)
  •     ITO v. Tolaram Phusanan, 88 TTJ 1040
  •     Udan Research & Flying Institute Pvt. Ltd. v. JCIT, (2007) 17 SOT 494 (Mum.)
  •     ACIT v. Malhotra Mukesh Satpal, (2008) 113 TTJ 401 (Pune)

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Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 50C — Whether provisions of S. 50C are applicable only in respect of computation of income under the head ‘Income from Capital Gains’ and that the said Section cannot be invoked where the income is assessed as business income und

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3 Inderlok Hotels Pvt. Ltd. v. ITO, Circle 5(2)(1)
ITAT ‘I’ Bench, Mumbai
Before A. L. Gehlot (AM) and R. S. Padvekar (JM)
ITA No. 4376/Mum./2008

A.Y. : 2005-06. Decided on : 5-2-2009 Counsel for assessee/revenue : A. H. Dalal / S. K. Singh

Income-tax Act, 1961 — S. 50C — Whether provisions of S. 50C are applicable only in respect of computation of income under the head ‘Income from Capital Gains’ and that the said Section cannot be invoked where the income is assessed as business income under the head ‘profits and gains of business or profession’ — Held, Yes.

Per R. S. Padvekar : Facts :

The assessee had constructed a building on land held by it as stock-in-trade. During the previous year relevant to the assessment year under consideration two flats in the building constructed by the asses-see were sold for a consideration of Rs.60 lakhs and Rs.40 lakhs, respectively. The Stamp Authorities had for the purposes of levy of stamp duty valued the flats at Rs.78,41,500 and Rs.72,81,456, respectively. The assessee accepted the valuation done by the Stamp Authorities. The assessee declared profit @ 8% of the sale price. The profit declared by the assessee was offered for taxation under the head ‘Income from Business’. The AO assessed profit arising on sale of these two flats under the head ‘Income from Business’, but made an addition of Rs.51,22,956. This amount represented the difference between valuation adopted for the purpose of the stamp duty and actual sale consideration shown by the assessee. The CIT(A) confirmed the action of the AO. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held :

The Tribunal noted S. 50C deals with transfer of a ‘capital asset’ being land or building or both and it provides for replacing the value adopted or assessed for the purpose of stamp duty more particularly u/s.48 of the Act in place of value or sale consideration shown by the assessee if it is lower than the value adopted or assessed for the purpose of levy of stamp duty. It observed that the expression ‘capital asset’ has specific relevance with S. 45 which provides for taxing gain on transfer of ‘capital asset’ as capital gain. The Tribunal upon consideration of the language of the provisions of S. 50C of the Act and also the intention of insertion of the provisions of S. 50C as mentioned in the Explanatory Circular No. 8, dated 27-8-2002 issued by the CBDT, held that there should not be any cloud of doubt that S. 50C has application only to the extent of determining sale consideration for computation of capital gain and it cannot be applied for determining the income under other heads.

 

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S. 80IB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Whether income from DEPB and drawback eligible for deduction — Held, Yes.

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2 ACIT v. Podar Associates
ITAT ‘B’ Bench, Jaipur
Before I. C. Sudhir (JM) and B. P. Jain (AM) ITA No. 579/JP/2008

A.Y. : 2003-04. Decided on : 13-8-2008 Counsel for revenue/assessee : Jai Singh/ Mahendra Gargieya

S. 80IB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Whether income from DEPB and drawback eligible for deduction — Held, Yes.

Per B. P. Jain :

Facts :

One of the issues before the Tribunal was about the allowability of deduction u/s.80IB with respect to income earned by way of DEPB and drawback. The CIT(A) had held in favour of the assessee.

Held :

The Tribunal agreed with the assessee that the income from DEPB and drawback went to reduce the cost of purchase and therefore, income to that extent was derived from the eligible undertaking. According to it, a similar view was expressed by the Gujarat High Court in the case of India Gelatine and Chemical Ltd. where the Court had also distinguished the decision in the case of Cambay Electric Supply Co. Ltd.. Further, it also referred to the provisions of S. 28(iiid), whereunder such receipt is treated as business profit. Accordingly, relying on the decisions of the Jaipur Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Vijay Industries and in the case of Garment Craft India Ltd. and also on the Delhi High Court decision in the case of Eltek SGS Pvt. Ltd., it upheld the order of the CIT(A).

Cases referred to :

  1. CIT v. India Gelatine and Chemical Ltd., 275 ITR 284 (Guj.);


  2. Vijay Industries (ITA No. 247/JP/05 dated 29-6-2007);


  3. Garment Craft India Ltd. (ITA No. 105/JP/06 dated 28-9-2007);


  4. CIT v. Eltek SGS Pvt. Ltd., 300 ITR 06 (Del.);


  5. Cambay Electric Supply Co. Ltd., 113 ITR 84 (SC)

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Rule 8D read with S. 14A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Expenditure disallowable with reference to exempt income — Disallowed expenditure is the subject matter of appeal before the Tribunal — Whether Revenue justified in its contention to apply the ratio o

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1 ACIT v. Indexport Ltd.
ITAT ‘D’ Bench, Mumbai
Before Sushma Chowla (JM) and Abraham P. George (AM) ITA Nos. 1941 and 2200/Mum./2004

A.Y. : 2000-01. Decided on : 29-1-2009 Counsel for revenue/assessee : Sanjay Agarwal/ Nishant Thakkar

Rule 8D read with S. 14A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 — Expenditure disallowable with reference to exempt income — Disallowed expenditure is the subject matter of appeal before the Tribunal — Whether Revenue justified in its contention to apply the ratio of the Special Bench decision rendered in the matter — Held, Yes but the disallowance cannot exceed the amount originally disallowed by the AO.

Per Sushma Chowla :

Facts :

One of the issues before the Tribunal was regarding the disallowance of expenditure u/s.14A. The AO had disallowed the aggregate sum of Rs.15.2 lacs consisting of interest of Rs.8.46 lacs and other expenses of Rs.6.74 lacs under the said provisions of S. 14A. The interest amount was computed by applying the ratio of investment attributable to tax-free income earned by the assessee to total investments, including the current assets, to the sum of interest paid by the assessee. The other expenses were estimated at 10% of the total of other expenses incurred by the assessee. On appeal, the CIT(A) gave partial relief by restricting the disallowance of other expenses at 5% of the total of such expense. Being aggrieved with the order of the CIT(A) qua the other expenses, the assessee as well as the Revenue, both appealed before the Tribunal.

Before the Tribunal, the Revenue challenged the order of the CIT(A) in giving partial relief to the assessee and also sought to apply the ratio of the decision of the Special Bench in the case of Daga Capital Management Pvt. Ltd. in support of its contention for the enhanced sum of disallowance.

Held :

The Tribunal noted that the Special Bench in the case of Daga Capital Management Pvt. Ltd. has held that the provisions of Rule 8D are explanatory in nature and are applicable to all the pending cases. Therefore, even though the Tribunals in the case of the assessee in respect of the earlier years had fully allowed the expenses incurred, including the interest paid, following the Special Bench decision, it remitted back the matter to the AO with a direction to recalculate the disallowance. However, the order passed was with a condition that the amount of disallowance should not exceed the amount originally disallowed by the AO.

Case referred to :

ITO v. Daga Capital Management Pvt. Ltd., 26 SOT 603 (Mum.) (SB)

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Payments made for charter hire charges to a non resident shipping company for transporting merchandise from one foreign port to another foreign port is not royalty chargeable to tax in term of provision of S. 9 of the Act.

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  1. M/s. ACIT v. Kin Ship Services India (P) Ltd.



(Cochin) (31 SOT 375)

S. 9, S. 40(a)(i), S. 195, Income-tax Act

A.Y. : 2004-05. Dated : 26-3-2009

Issue :

Payments made for charter hire charges to a non resident
shipping company for transporting merchandise from one foreign port to another
foreign port is not royalty chargeable to tax in term of provision of S. 9 of
the Act.

Facts :

The assessee is engaged in shipping and other related
activities such as stevedoring, clearing and forwarding. During A.Y. 2004-05,
the assessee made certain payments to non resident companies for charter hire
charges.

The Assessing Officer (AO) held that payments made by the
assessee on account of charter hire charges were in the nature royalties and
therefore such payments were taxable in the hands of recipients in term of S.
9(1)(vi) of the Act. The AO disallowed the payment by invoking provisions of
S. 40(a)(i) of the Act by alleging that the assessee failed to deduct tax at
source.

The assessee contended that the payments made for charter
ship hire is not in the nature of royalty. It was claimed that the assessee
had not acquired any right on the foreign ships nor had it acquired any
property in the ship by chartering it. The ships were hired following
international chartering protocol for transporting merchandise from foreign
port to another foreign port and hence the payments cannot be held to be in
the nature of royalty.

The CIT(A) accepted the contentions of the assessee by
relying on the ruling in the case of Ind Telesoft (P) Ltd. (267 ITR 725) (AAR
New Delhi).

Held :

The ITAT held :

(a) The payments made by the assessee company were in the
nature of payments for chartering ships on hire for doing the business
outside India. The payments did not satisfy the test laid down in S. 9 of
the Income-tax Act, 1961.

(b) To constitute royalty, payments have to be for use of
specified assets. The tribunal concluded that the ship hire charges did not
satisfy this test by observing :

‘Royalty means consideration for the transfer of all or
any rights in respect of a patent, invention, model design, secret formula
or processes or trade mark or similar property. A plain reading makes it
clear that the charter ship hire payments made by the assessee do not fall
under the above category. The royalty also means consideration for imparting
of any information concerning the working of, or the use of, a patent,
invention, model design, secret formula or process or trade mark or similar
property. The payments made by the assessee do not have nay of these
characteristics.’

(c) The liability to deduct tax at source u/s.195 is cast
on the assessee only when the payment is made to a non-resident which is
chargeable under the provisions of the Income-tax Act. In the present case
since payments made by the assessee do not fall u/s.9 and the payments do
not take the character of any sum chargeable to tax under this Act,
provisions of S. 195 are not applicable.

(d) When S. 195 does not apply, there cannot be a
violation of that section and consequently question of disallowance
u/s.40(a)(i) does not arise.

 

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German company is not liable to pay tax in respect of its supervision activity in India which is expected to last for about 2 months.

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  1. Pintsch Bamag

(AAR) (2009 TIOL 23 ARA IT)

AAR No. 790 of 2008

Dated : 11-9-2009

Issues :

German company is not liable to pay tax in respect of its
supervision activity in India which is expected to last for about 2 months.

Independent sub-contractor’s time is not to be added for
determining threshold for construction of PE.

Article 5, 12, India-Germany Treaty; S. 9(1)(vii),
Income-tax Act.

Facts :

The applicant, a German company, was awarded a contract by
Tuticorin Port Trust (TPT) on 28th November, 2006 through the process of
international bidding.

The scope of work for the contract was ‘work design,
fabrication supply, transportation, delivery, installation and maintenance of
mild steel, navigational channel and fairway buoys, mooring gear and solar
operated navigational lighting equipments’ in relation to Sethu Samudram Ship
Channel Project being executed by TPT in Tamil Nadu.

The applicant sub-contracted certain part of work to
independent third parties in India. Though the agreements with the
sub-contractors were entered into in 2006, formal permission for
sub-contracting was obtained from the TPT in June, 2009.

The following work was to be undertaken by the applicant :

(i) Study of the technical requirements in relation to
the execution of the Contract.

(ii) Designing of Fairway Buoys, Mooring Gears and Solar
Operated Navigational Equipments.

(iii) Supply of critical components to sub-contractors,
if required.

(iv) Supervision of installation of equipments and other
items mentioned in the Main Contract, as and when the installation is
carried out by the sub-contractor.

The scope of work mentioned in point (ii) and (iii) above
was to be executed by the applicant’s office in Germany.

(v) The work at point (iv) was to be carried out in India
and for this purpose two engineers were to be deputed to India. The work was
expected to last for not more than 2 months.

Before the AAR, the applicant contended that as per clause
(i) of Article 5.2 of the India Germany DTAA, it is not expected to have
Permanent Establishment in India and in absence thereof, no part of income is
liable to tax in India. In this regard the applicant placed reliance on the
decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in CIT v. Vishakapatnam Port
Trust,
(144 ITR 146).

The revenue contended that the sub-contractor is
undertaking various activities which constitute the core of the contract work
entrusted to the applicant. All the activities undertaken by the
sub-contractor are on behalf of the applicant and in connection with the
execution of the contract between the applicant and TPT. As a result, length
of construction of PE needs to be reckoned having regard to time spent by the
sub contractor. Alternatively, place of manufacture of the sub-contractor
constitutes permanent establishment of the applicant itself. Still
alternatively, the revenue contended that length of construction PE needs to
be reckoned.

The revenue authorities also contended that the services
rendered for designing are taxable as fees for technical services under
Article 12.4 of the Indo German DTAA.1

Held :

AAR held :

  • The work/project of the
    applicant are in the nature of construction project. As a consequence,
    article 5.2 gets attracted and therefore duration test of six months
    necessarily applied to determine whether the applicant has taxable presence.

  • AAR referred to and relied on
    earlier ruling in the case of Cal Dive Marine Construction (Mauritius) Ltd.
    315 ITR 334 to conclude that once construction PE clause is attracted,
    minimum period test has to be necessarily applied. The fact that the
    applicant may have a project office or a workshop for the purpose of
    carrying out contract work does not bring the establishment of the applicant
    within the other clauses of Article 5(2) to the exclusion of requirement of
    minimum duration test of construction PE. In case of construction PE, a
    specific provision dealing with construction or assembly project, prevails
    over the other general clauses of Article 5(2). An office or workshop,
    established as a part of or incidental to the execution of a construction or
    assembly project does not alter the minimum period test contemplated by
    construction PE.

  • The fact that sub-contractor
    is only a nominee carrying out the work which otherwise would have been
    performed by the applicant does not transform the workshop of the
    sub-contractor into the PE of the applicant. The sub-contractor cannot be
    treated as a dependent agent of the applicant. Article 5 of the treaty
    regards a place to be a PE only if the applicant carries on business through
    such place. The concept of PE conveys the idea that the enterprise has
    visible presence in the other country. The presence can be either in the
    form of applicant’s own PE or the presence of dependent agent. The
    independent contractor does not satisfy any of these tests.

  • The revenue’s reliance on OECD
    commentary which indicates that the time taken by a sub-contractor needs to
    be added for reckoning threshold of PE of general contractor is limited in
    its application to a situation where the building site is set up by the main
    contractor and the services of the sub-contractor are deployed in aiding the
    execution of such building project with conjoint effort of contractor and
    sub-contractor. In case of the applicant, the sub-contractor carries out
    fabrication and assembly at a place away from the installation site by
    independently running such facility and does not get covered by this
    contingency.

  • The aspect of comprehensive
    responsibility being that of the contractor as also the furnishing of
    performance guarantee by applicant does not alter the legal position above.

S. 142(2A) and S. 142(2C). The amendment to S. 142(2C) by insertion of the words ‘suo moto or’ w.e.f. 1-4-2008 is prospective and prior to this date AO could not grant extension of time except on an application by the assessee.

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  1. Bishan Saroop Ram Kishan Agro Pvt. Ltd. v. DCIT

ITAT ‘A’ Bench, New Delhi

Before K. G. Bhansal (AM) and

George Mathan (JM)

ITA Nos. 3413, 3415, 3416, 3459, 3068 and

3670/Del./2008

A.Ys. : 1999-2000 to 2005-06. Decided on : 18-9-2009

Counsel for assessee/revenue : Rano Jain &

V. Mohan/Pratima Kaushik

S. 142(2A) and S. 142(2C). The amendment to S. 142(2C) by insertion of the words ‘suo moto or’ w.e.f. 1-4-2008 is prospective and prior to this date AO could not grant extension of time except on an application by the assessee.

Per Bench :

Facts :

On 7-10-2004 there was a search action on the assessee. The last panchnama was drawn on 6-12-2004. As per provisions of S. 153B(i), the assessment u/s.153A could be completed upto 31-12-2006. On 12-12-2006, the AO passed an order directing the assessee to get his accounts audited u/s.142(2A) and the time given for filing audit report was 90 days. Thus, due date for furnishing audit report u/s. 142(2A) was 12-3-2007.

Due to alleged non co-operation by the assessee, the AO, at the request of the auditor, vide order dated 7-3-2007 extended time from 12-3-2007 to 20-4-2007. Subsequently, two more extensions, of one month each, were granted vide orders dated 17-4-2007 and 17-5-2007. The audit report was finally submitted on 4-6-2007 and the assessment order was passed on 3-8-2007.

The assessment order passed u/s.153A was challenged on the ground that it was barred by limitation. It was contended that since special audit had been ordered on 12-12-2006 and was to be completed on 12-3-2007 and as per the provisions as they stood at the relevant point of time the AO did not have the power to suo moto extend the time limit for completion of special audit u/s.142(2A). Extension granted by the AO at the request of the auditor resulted into a suo moto extension being granted by the AO. Consequently, as per provisions of S. 153B(1) the time limit for completion of assessment expired on 11-5-2007. Since assessment order was passed on 3-8-2007 it was barred by limitation.

On an appeal to the Tribunal,

Held :

The provisions of S. 142(2A) do not provide for any time limit for completion of the special audit. However, S. 142(2C) specifies that the AO can, at his discretion, give any time limit subject to a maximum of 180 days from the date on which the direction u/s.142(2A) is received by the assessee. The provisions of S. (2A), S. (2B), S. (2C) and S. (2D) of S. 142 are to be read together as a complete code. It cannot be held that the provisions of S. 142(2A) have a stand alone position and are unfettered by S. 142(2C).

The Tribunal noticed that the assessee had not made an application for extension of time. The extension of time granted by the AO, at the request of the auditor, was held to be suo moto action of the AO. The Tribunal on perusal of the memorandum explaining the provisions of the Finance Bill, 2008 as also Circular No. 1 dated 27-3-2008 explaining the amendment to the proviso to S. 142(2C) held that the power to suo moto extend the time limit for completion of audit u/s.142(2A) was available to the AO w.e.f. 1-4-2008 and before such date, the extension could have been made only at the request of the assessee. The extensions granted by the AO were held to be without jurisdiction and accordingly such extensions could not extend the limitation. The exclusion as provided in Explanation (ii) to S. 153B was read to be 90 days being a period between 12-12-2006 to 12-3-2007.

The Tribunal upheld the claim of the assessee that the assessment was barred by limitation.

 

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S. 234C — Interest u/s.234C is not payable if, on the date of payment of advance tax it is not known whether the demerger scheme will be sanctioned or not and from which date it would be sanctioned.

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  1. Ultratech Cement Ltd. v. Dy. CIT



ITAT ‘E’ Bench, Mumbai

Before R. K. Gupta (JM) and

D. Karunakara Rao (AM)

ITA No. 7646 & 7647/Mum./2007

A.Y. : 2004-05. Decided on : 20-8-2009

Counsel for assessee/revenue : Arvind Sonde &

Sampat Kabra/K. K. Das

S. 234C — Interest u/s.234C is not payable if, on the date
of payment of advance tax it is not known whether the demerger scheme will be
sanctioned or not and from which date it would be sanctioned.

Per R. K. Gupta :

Facts :

The assessee, pursuant to a demerger scheme, acquired
cement business of L & T Limited from 1-4-2003. The scheme of demerger was
sanctioned by the Bombay High Court on 22-4-2004 effective from 1-4-2003 as a
result of which the income for the period from 1-4-2003 to 31-3-2004 became
taxable in the hands of the assessee. The assessee had not paid advance tax in
respect of this income. Consequently, the Assessing Officer charged interest
of Rs.44,94,392 u/s.234C.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A)
where it contended that interest is not payable since on the due dates for
payment of advance tax there was no liability to pay tax. It was further
submitted that if the liability to pay advance tax arises on account of
subsequent event, i.e. demerger sanctioned after the end of the
previous year then in such an event it cannot be said that the assessee was
liable to pay advance tax on due dates specified in S. 210. The CIT(A)
dismissed the ground by observing that the assessee was liable for payment of
advance tax u/s.208 with all consequences of law to pay interest u/s.234B and
u/s.234C. He held that since there was a shortfall in payment of installments
of advance tax, liability of interest u/s.234C is automatically attracted.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal
where it was also contended on behalf of the assessee that it was impossible
to pay advance tax as it was not aware whether the demerger scheme would be
sanctioned and if yes, from which date.

Held :

The Tribunal observed that the liability to pay advance tax
in respect of cement business had arisen consequent to the sanction of the
demerger scheme by the Bombay High Court on 22-4-2004 i.e. after the
due dates of payments of advance tax. The Tribunal noted that the tax
liability arising after the date of sanction of the demerger scheme has been
paid by the assessee while filing its return of income along with interest
u/s.234A & B. It held that payment of advance tax in respect of cement
division was an impossible situation. The Mumbai Bench of the Tribunal in the
case of Reliance Energy Ltd. in ITA No. 218/Mum./05 (order dated 24-1-2008)
has after considering several decisions of the Tribunal and discussing the
doctrine of impossibility held that an assessee cannot be forced to do an
impossible task.